Title: Board of Sup. of Prince William County v. Omni Hom

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
 
v.    Record No. 960508 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                      January 10, 1997 
OMNI HOMES, INC. 
 
OMNI HOMES, INC. 
 
v.    Record No. 960471 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF   
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
 
Richard B. Potter, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider a property owner's claim that 
government action constituted an uncompensated taking of 
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.   
 
In 1986, Omni Homes, Inc. (Omni) executed a contract to 
purchase a 72.68-acre parcel of unimproved land located in 
Prince William County and, in 1989, bought the parcel for 
$436,091.  The property was zoned R-10, urban residential 
development, and Omni proposed to develop the land as Doves 
Landing subdivision with 106 residential lots.  The property 
was located adjacent to an undeveloped 188-acre parcel owned by 
 Doves Landing Associates (DLA).  DLA planned to develop its 
property as Doves Overlook subdivision with approximately 405 
residential lots. 
 
Development of Doves Landing as a subdivision required 
securing certain road and utility access.  The property was 
 
 
 
 
2 
three miles from public water and sewer access, and the only 
access to a public road was over a gravel road called Doves 
Lane.  To obtain adequate access to the public road, Omni could 
purchase additional easements along Doves Lane from adjoining 
property owners and upgrade the road, or it could design a new 
road through Doves Overlook.  Similarly, Omni could secure 
access to the needed utilities by paying the full three-mile 
extension costs or could agree to share the cost of the utility 
extension with DLA, the owner of Doves Overlook.  Omni decided 
to base its R-10 development plan on providing road, sewer, and 
water access through and in conjunction with Doves Overlook and 
its owner. 
 
DLA and Omni had an informal understanding that if Doves 
Overlook was developed as an R-10 subdivision, DLA would permit 
Omni to "piggyback" on its plans so that the road access and 
public sewer and water could run through Doves Overlook and 
into Doves Landing.  Omni and DLA also "agreed to agree later" 
that they would enter into a cost-sharing agreement in which 
Omni would pay its pro rata share of the road and utility 
extension cost on a per lot basis.  However, there was no 
written agreement between Omni and DLA to this effect, and Omni 
did not have any easements or other property interests in Doves 
Overlook that would permit it to construct the infrastructure 
through Doves Overlook. 
 
DLA submitted its preliminary subdivision plan for Doves 
 
 
 
 
3 
Overlook in October 1987.  In the opinion of the County, the 
plan proposed a public facility which was inconsistent with the 
County's Comprehensive Plan, and necessitated a review under 
Code § 15.1-456.  The County's position led to a series of 
appeals, culminating in a determination by the Circuit Court of 
Prince William County that such review was not necessary.  This 
Court refused the County's petition for appeal on January 9, 
1990.  Doves Overlook's preliminary plan was approved on 
February 7, 1990. 
 
 Meanwhile, in January 1988, Omni submitted its 
preliminary subdivision plan for Doves Landing to the County 
for approval.  On January 12, 1988, the County told Omni that 
its plan did not meet minimum requirements because it did not 
show access to a public road through Doves Overlook.  The 
County also informed Omni of the litigation involving DLA's 
subdivision plan for Doves Overlook.  Omni proceeded with its 
plans, completing its contract to purchase the Doves Landing 
parcel in January 1989, and re-filing its subdivision plan in 
April 1989.  The County returned the plan in May, suggesting 
that it was premature until the appeals surrounding DLA's 
subdivision plan for Doves Overlook were resolved.  Omni sued 
the County to force it to process Omni's plan.  That litigation 
was settled by an agreement that the County would process the 
plan, but no approval would be given until the conclusion of 
the litigation between DLA and the County. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
The County informed Omni in June 1990, that the Doves 
Landing preliminary plan could not be presented to the planning 
commission until access to the public road was secured by an 
approved, bonded road through Doves Overlook.  The Doves 
Overlook plan did not show such a road.  Omni acknowledged the 
requirement and the County agreed to hold the plan open. 
 
 In November 1990, the County adopted regulations required 
for implementation of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act.  
Code §§ 10.1-2100 through -2116.  These regulations affected 
Doves Overlook, and DLA sued the County for inverse 
condemnation.  That litigation was settled by a consent decree 
entered on October 6, 1993, in which the County paid DLA $3.7 
million for Doves Overlook under a three-year lease/purchase 
agreement.  
 
On April 4, 1994, Omni filed the instant litigation 
alleging that the County's various actions amounted to a taking 
of Omni's property without compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Fifth 
Amendment), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Art. I, § 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia (Art. I, § 11).  Following an ore 
tenus hearing, the trial court determined that the purchase of 
Doves Overlook by the County qualified as regulatory action and 
constituted a compensable taking or damaging of Omni's property 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Art. I, § 11.  The 
trial court entered an order requiring the County to pay Omni 
 
 
 
 
5 
                                                
$850,000.  The trial court denied Omni's request for attorneys' 
fees and dismissed Omni's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 
ripeness grounds.  The County and Omni filed separate appeals 
challenging a number of the trial court's rulings.  We awarded 
both appeals and combined them for argument and disposition 
here.  
 
Omni argues, and the trial court held, that the property 
interest in issue was Omni's right "to use its property, and to 
do so at a density permitted under the R-10 zone."
1  The trial 
court determined that, at the time the County purchased Doves 
Overlook, development of Doves Landing by using Doves Overlook 
for road, water, and sewer access was the only remaining 
economically viable use of Omni's land.  Consequently, the 
County's purchase of Doves Overlook, according to the trial 
court, caused Omni to lose all economically viable uses of its 
property.  Thus, the trial court held that the County's action 
was an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
and Art. I, § 11. 
 
The trial court also held that, even if the County's 
action did not preclude all economically viable uses, an 
 
 
1The parties disagree over the property right at issue in 
this case.  The County asserts that the interest affected by 
its purchase of Doves Overlook was Omni's ability or right to 
develop its property with and through Doves Overlook.  
Resolution of these conflicting views is unnecessary in light 
of our disposition of the case.  For purposes of this opinion, 
we utilize the trial court's description of the right at issue. 
 
 
 
 
6 
uncompensated taking occurred under both the federal and state 
constitutions.  The trial court found that the economic impact 
of the County's actions on Doves Landing went beyond mere 
diminution of the value of the land and that Omni's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations were frustrated by the County's 
action.  Finally, the trial court held that Omni suffered 
damage, as that term is used in Art. I, § 11, because the right 
to develop Doves Landing as an R-10 subdivision was a right 
appurtenant to the land, and the County's purchase of Doves 
Overlook directly and specially decreased the value of Omni's 
property. 
 
Principles of appellate review require that the judgment 
of the trial court be upheld unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Carter v. Carter, 223 Va. 505, 
508-09, 291 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1982).  However, we are not bound 
by the trial court's view of the law.  See City of Richmond v. 
Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 163-64, 355 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1985).  In 
this case, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
relevant legal standards used to determine whether property has 
been taken under the federal and state constitutions.  Applying 
these standards, we conclude that the facts do not support a 
finding of a compensable taking or damage under either the 
federal or state constitutions and, accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the trial court.  We first review 
Omni's Fifth Amendment claim. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking 
private property for public use without just compensation.  
Until 1992, the United States Supreme Court had enunciated 
various criteria to be applied by the courts in considering 
whether a compensable taking had occurred.  These criteria did 
not provide a bright line test but required courts to engage in 
a case-by-case, ad hoc analysis.  Florida Rock Industries, Inc. 
v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 898 (1995).  A compensable 
taking occurred if government regulation went "too far," 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), based 
on consideration of:  (1) the character of the government's 
action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant; and (3) the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.  Penn 
Cen. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 
In 1992, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), 
explained that this "case-specific inquiry" is not necessary 
when the government physically takes possession of property or 
 regulatory action deprives property of "all economically 
beneficial or productive use."   Id. at 1015.  Such 
governmental action goes "too far" and constitutes a 
categorical taking for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 
 
 
 
 
8 
1015, 1019. 
 
The Court in Lucas also set out a new test for determining 
whether a take is compensable, even in categorical takings:  if 
the "owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests 
were not part of his title to begin with," the owner is not 
entitled to compensation.  Id. at 1027.  Stated another way, 
the limitation imposed by the government which constitutes the 
taking "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions 
that background principles of the State's law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership."  Id. at 1029.  The 
regulation must "do no more than duplicate the result that 
could have been achieved in the courts - by adjacent landowners 
. . . under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the 
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that 
affect the public generally, or otherwise."  Id.   
 
The facts in Lucas involved a categorical taking and thus 
did not require further discussion of whether regulatory action 
which results in less than a per se or categorical taking can 
be a compensable taking.  Nothing in Lucas, however, indicated 
an intent to limit compensable takings under the Fifth 
Amendment to such instances.  Courts considering the issue 
since Lucas have continued to resolve Fifth Amendment claims 
involving less than a categorical taking of property by 
utilizing the traditional three-part test.  See e.g., Concrete 
Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers 
 
 
 
 
9 
Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 643-47 
(1993); Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality 
Cable Corp., 65 F.3d 1113, 1123 (4th Cir. 1995); Creppel v. 
United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 
A. 
 
In this case, the trial court first determined that the 
action of the County in purchasing Doves Overlook was a 
categorical taking as described in Lucas because it resulted in 
denying Omni all economic use of its property.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court limited its 
consideration of the property's uses to those uses considered 
economically viable by Omni.  Acknowledging that the property 
could be developed without using Doves Overlook either at the 
R-10 density, if Omni paid the full cost of the off-site roads 
and utility access, or at a lesser density, the trial court 
nevertheless concluded that neither of these plans was 
"economically feasible for Omni," because "by the time the 
County purchased Doves Overlook Omni had expended thousands of 
dollars to engineer, plan and develop the property, as well as 
attorney fees in litigation."  
 
 The constitutional inquiry, however, is not whether the 
remaining uses are economically feasible to the owner.  The 
loss of the ability to develop or use the land as originally 
 
 
 
 
10 
intended is not a categorical taking if another economic use 
for the land is available, even if the value of the use is less 
than the value attached to the owner's desired use.  Andrus v. 
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-67 (1979); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 
U.S. 590, 593-94 (1962).  Thus, action which limits the ability 
to develop or use land as originally intended or in a manner 
producing the largest return on investment does not qualify as 
a categorical taking if another economic use for the land is 
available.  The proper inquiry is whether the action complained 
of stripped the land of all economic uses.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1015; Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 
1172 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991). 
 
When the proper standard for determining whether there was 
a categorical taking of property under the Fifth Amendment is 
applied, it is evident that no such taking occurred in this 
case.  The property was originally purchased for $436,000, or 
approximately $6,000 per acre.  The value of the land after the 
County's purchase of Doves Overlook, according to the appraisal 
relied on by the trial court, was $4,200 to $5,000 an acre, 
based on comparable sales of lots consisting of approximately 
ten acres each.  There was no evidence of a lack of market for 
such lots.  The trial court itself recognized that the property 
could be developed in this manner.  Therefore, the County's 
purchase of Doves Overlook did not deprive Doves Landing of all 
economic or beneficial use and did not constitute a categorical 
 
 
 
 
11 
taking of Omni's property.  
 
B. 
 
Similarly, the trial court erred in its alternate holding 
that a Fifth Amendment violation occurred even if the County's 
action did not eliminate all economic use of the property.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the trial court considered the 
criteria traditionally applied prior to Lucas - character of 
the government's action, economic impact of the action, and 
frustration of investment-backed expectations.   
 
We begin with the trial court's analysis of the 
investment-backed expectations frustrated by the County's 
action.  While this criterion embraces a number of factors, a 
primary purpose is to ensure that owners seeking compensation 
for an alleged taking "bought their property in reliance on a  
state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory 
regime."  Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1177; see also Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1009-10 (1984); Connolly v. Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986); Robert M. 
Washburn, "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations" as a 
Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 Wash. U.J. Urb. & 
Contemp. L. 63, 76 (1996). 
 
The trial court described Omni's investment-backed 
expectation as purchasing Doves Landing with the expectation 
that it could be developed at an R-10 density.  This 
expectation was not speculative, the trial court concluded, 
 
 
 
 
12 
because Omni's feasibility studies showed such development was 
possible, the zoning was in place, plans had been submitted, 
"DLA had established its legal rights and thereby Omni's legal 
right to proceed with the plan," and DLA's preliminary plan had 
been approved.  Thus, the trial court concluded, "Omni clearly 
had abundant reason to believe that its investment-backed 
expectations were reasonable and accurate and to expect the 
County to approve the plans for Doves Landing."  
 
What the trial court failed to consider in its description 
of Omni's expectations was that the "state of affairs" relative 
to R-10 development of Doves Landing at all times included the 
requirement of adequate road and utility access.  Omni was 
always aware of this requirement.  Securing this access was not 
an expectation under the "state of affairs" but a risk which 
Omni was aware of and accepted when it purchased Doves 
Landing.
2  Omni's hope or optimism that it could secure the 
required access cannot transform a risk of development into an 
investment-backed expectation supported by the "state of 
[regulatory] affairs" at the time of purchase.  One who buys 
with knowledge of a restraint must assume the risk of economic 
loss.  Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1177; Creppel, 41 F.3d at 632.  
                                                 
     
2Testimony at trial indicated the price paid for Doves 
Landing was low for R-10 land, reflecting the need "to do 
things" including acquiring the access rights. 
 
 
 
 
13 
"A party may not undertake a calculated business risk and then 
seek reimbursement from the Government when the party's gamble 
does not result in its favor."  Atlas Enters. Ltd. Partnership 
v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 704, 708 (1995). 
 
Omni's gamble here went beyond merely securing road and 
utility access.  Omni's proposed development depended on such 
access coming through Doves Overlook.  There was no assurance 
that such access would be available.  Omni's ownership of Doves 
Landing did not carry with it any right or assurance that Omni 
could utilize access through Doves Overlook.  There were no 
easements or contracts giving Omni road or utility access 
through or with Doves Overlook.  At best, Omni and DLA had an 
"agreement to agree" at some future time regarding the access 
issues.  There is no evidence in the record that any of the 
money Omni invested in Doves Landing was spent to secure the 
needed access.  Had DLA sold Doves Overlook to a party other 
than the County, Omni would be in the same position in which it 
finds itself now:  having an R-10 development plan and hoping 
to secure the required road and utility access through and 
together with Doves Overlook.
3  Omni was always dependant on 
                                                 
     
3Reasonable investment-backed expectations are also 
subject to the government's power to reasonably regulate for 
the public interest.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023; Pace Resources, 
Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir.), 
 
 
 
 
14 
                                                                                                                                                        
the willingness of the owner of Doves Overlook to accommodate 
its development plan. 
 
The trial court erred to the extent that it considered 
Omni's ability to achieve the required access through Doves 
Overlook as a reasonable investment-backed expectation.  The 
trial court further erred in omitting consideration of the risk 
of securing road and utility access when analyzing Omni's 
investment-backed expectation in R-10 development of the 
property.  Taking these matters into consideration, we conclude 
that the "state of affairs" upon which Omni relied when it 
purchased Doves Landing included the risk of not securing 
adequate road and utility access.  The County's purchase of 
Doves Overlook did not impose this risk, did not change the 
requirements for R-10 development, and did not interfere with 
or frustrate any enforceable arrangement or right Omni had 
 
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987). 
 In the absence of a vested interest, Omni was not entitled to 
rely on continued R-10 zoning of its own property or Doves 
Overlook.  Snow v. Amherst County, 248 Va. 404, 408, 448 S.E.2d 
606, 608-09 (1994); Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 
244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978).  Regulatory action required by the 
Chesapeake Bay Act affected the Doves Overlook property and 
ultimately resulted in the change of ownership from DLA to the 
County. 
 
 
 
 
15 
regarding road or utility access.  Therefore, Omni's 
investment-backed expectation in R-10 development does not 
support a claim for a compensable taking of property under the 
Fifth Amendment.   
 
The access requirement for R-10 development is also 
relevant to consideration of the economic impact of the 
County's action.  This criterion is measured by the difference 
between the fair market value of land before and after the 
alleged take.  Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1563.  The trial court 
characterized the economic impact of the County's purchase as a 
significant diminution of the property's value.  Although the 
trial court reached this conclusion by considering the change 
in the property's fair market value, its finding was based on a 
pre-purchase value which assumed the existence of access rights 
through Doves Overlook.   
 
The appraisal report relied on by the trial court placed 
the pre-purchase value of Doves Landing at $1.2 million 
"assuming the functional unity" of Doves Overlook and Doves 
Landing.  The "functional unity," or access through Doves 
Overlook, was always a contingency, not a right attached to 
Doves Landing or a right which could be enforced by Omni.  To 
base a property value on a factor which is required to develop 
the property, but which never existed in fact or in law, 
distorts the fair market value analysis in this case.  
 
The economic impact of the County's action must be 
 
 
 
 
16 
measured without regard to the illusory "functional unity" 
between the two parcels.  The value of the property absent 
"functional unity" prior to the County's purchase of Doves 
Overlook was set at $436,000, the 1989 purchase price, and at 
$450,000, based on an April 11, 1989 assessment, which was 
reaffirmed on March 6, 1991.  The fair market value immediately 
following the County's purchase without the "functional unity" 
was $350,000.  The economic impact, therefore, was at most a 
decrease of $100,000 in value, or somewhat less than one-third 
of the fair market value of the property prior to the County's 
purchase of Doves Overlook. 
 
No single criterion or combination of criteria is 
dispositive in a Fifth Amendment taking analysis.  See Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1071; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714-16 (1987). 
 Here, we conclude that the trial court erred in its 
identification of relevant investment-backed expectations and 
in the factors it considered in determining the economic impact 
of the County's purchase of Doves Overlook on Doves Landing.  
When viewed properly, we find that Omni's expectation of using 
Doves Overlook to develop Doves Landing did not qualify as an 
investment-backed expectation, as that term is used in an 
analysis under the Fifth Amendment, and that the economic 
impact of the County's action was not one of significant 
diminution in value.  In this case, based on the conclusions we 
have reached on two criteria, we believe it unnecessary to 
 
 
 
 
17 
consider the third criterion, the character of the County's 
action, because regardless of the legality or merit of the 
County's action, Omni did not establish a regulatory taking of 
Omni's property under the Fifth Amendment.
4
 
ARTICLE I, § 11 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 
 
Article I, § 11 prohibits the government from taking or 
damaging private property for public uses without just 
compensation.  Code § 15.1-276 defines the constitutional term 
"public uses" to embrace "all uses which are necessary for 
public purposes."  Property is considered taken for 
constitutional purposes if the government's action deprives the 
property of all economic use.  City of Virginia Beach v. 
                                                 
     
4Omni claimed a total loss of the economic use of its 
property or alternatively a constitutionally significant 
economic loss of its total property.  Thus, we do not address 
whether the total loss of "one of the sticks" in the bundle of 
property rights qualifies as a compensable taking under the 
Fifth Amendment.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.  Compare 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987) and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); 
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 
(Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 898 
(1995); and Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
 
 
 
 
18 
Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n No. 1, 239 Va. 412, 416-17, 389 S.E.2d 
312, 314 (1990). 
 
As we have previously discussed, the purchase of Doves 
Overlook by the County did not eliminate all economic uses of 
Doves Landing.  Therefore, the County's action did not 
constitute a taking of Omni's property under Art. I, § 11.  Id.
 
Property is damaged for Virginia constitutional purposes 
when an appurtenant right connected with the property is 
directly and specially affected by a public use and that use 
inflicts a direct and special injury on the property which 
diminishes its value.  City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40, 
49, 157 S.E. 769, 772 (1931).  Virginia law holds partial 
diminution in the value of property compensable only if it 
results from dislocation of a specific right contained in the 
property owner's bundle of property rights.  Lambert v. City of 
Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 268, 61 S.E. 776, 778-79 (1908). 
 
Omni argues, and the trial court held, that the right to 
develop one's property is an "appurtenant right connected to 
the property" and that such right was directly and specially 
affected by the County's actions resulting in the loss of the 
"only viable economic use of the property."  However, Omni has 
not lost the right to develop its property.  The R-10 density 
classification has not been altered.  Omni seeks to transform a 
risk attached to the development of its land at R-10 density 
into a right to do so.  As discussed above, Omni had not 
 
 
 
 
19 
acquired the rights necessary to realize its preferred method 
of development either as a matter of contract or easement.  
There was no right appurtenant to Doves Landing which would 
allow Omni to develop it with and through Doves Overlook.  The 
action of the County in purchasing Doves Overlook could not 
damage a non-existent right.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
County's purchase of Doves Overlook did not damage Omni's 
property within the contemplation of Art. I, § 11.  
 
For these reasons we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter judgment in favor of the County in Record 
No. 960508.
5  In light of this holding, we will dismiss Omni's 
separate appeal, Record No. 960471, challenging the trial 
court's disposition of its claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
for attorneys' fees because it is moot.  
 
Record No. 960508 - Reversed and final judgment.
               Record No. 960471 - Dismissed.
                                                 
     
5Our disposition of the case makes consideration of the 
County's assignments of error regarding whether the County's 
purchase qualified as regulatory action and Omni's retention of 
the fee interest in Doves Landing unnecessary.