Title: State Ex Rel. Weiks v. Town of Tumwater

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

66 Wn.2d 33 (1965) 400 P.2d 789 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Roy R. Weiks et al., Respondents, v. THE TOWN OF TUMWATER, et al., Appellants.[*] No. 37612. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. April 8, 1965. Neil J. Lynch, for appellants. Brodie, Fristoe & Taylor, for respondents. MacIVER, J.[] The town of Tumwater appeals from a judgment of the trial court directing that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the town to issue the respondents a building permit and decreeing that ordinance No. 246 and ordinances No. 405 and No. 437 of the town, purporting to amend ordinance No. 246, are void. *34 The respondents and their predecessors occupied and operated the Chambers Packing Company in its present location for the past 70 years. This property was annexed to the town in 1950. The respondents' application for a permit to rebuild their plant so as to conform to the requirements of the State Department of Agriculture was denied by the town. June 1, 1948, the town enacted ordinance No. 246, a zoning ordinance. Section 1 provided: It was admitted that, at the time ordinance No. 246 was enacted, the map referred to in Section 1 was not in existence and the trial court so found: Not only did ordinance No. 246 fail to establish zone boundaries by map reference or by legal description, but, at the time of its enactment, there was no planning commission in existence (none was established until December 21, 1952). There was no comprehensive plan prepared by the commission and recommended to the council for adoption after a public hearing, as required by the Washington Zoning Act, RCW 35.63. On January 8, 1963, respondents requested a building permit. On January 22, 1963, ordinance No. 437 was enacted. *35 This ordinance purported to amend and clarify ordinance No. 246 and ordinance No. 405.[1] Ordinance No. 437 incorporated by reference a zoning map of the town and described by metes and bounds the area limits within the corporate limits. This ordinance and map were filed with the Thurston County Auditor February 18, 1963. March 19, 1963, the respondents' request for a building permit was denied. The trial court was of the opinion that the enactment of the Washington Zoning Act, RCW 35.63, took from municipalities their right to enact zoning ordinances in exercise of their police power under Const. art. 11, § 11, the constitutional grant being subject to "general laws," and that strict compliance with the act was mandatory. Since the city had failed to create a planning commission and adopt a comprehensive zoning plan upon the recommendation of that commission, as specified by the act, and since the ordinance did not establish zone boundaries, the trial court held that the ordinance was not enacted in strict compliance with the requirements of the act and was therefore void. [1] We do not reach the question of whether or not the town, in enacting ordinance No. 246, was bound by the provisions of RCW 35.63. The ordinance in failing, by map or otherwise, to establish zone boundaries is clearly a nullity and void. It is the general rule that: So also is the necessity for notice especially strong where the effect of the ordinance is to regulate the otherwise free use of property. In Moon v. Smith, 138 Fla. 410, 416, 189 So. 835, a zoning ordinance provided: Finding that the map referred to was not, in fact, attached to the ordinance, the Florida court held, p. 418: In Village of Williston Park v. Israel, 191 Misc. 6, 76 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608, it was held: [2] The defects in ordinance No. 246 were not remedied by the enactment of ordinance No. 437. Ordinance No. 437 did not purport to re-enact No. 246. The rule is: The fact that the ordinances of the town of Tumwater, including the ordinances here in question, had, prior to the commencement of the present action, been included in the codification of the ordinances of the town of Tumwater, as provided for by Laws of 1957, ch. 97, does not result in the re-enactment of the ordinances. Such a statute does not contemplate the re-enactment or the republication of the ordinances, but merely their compilation for convenient use and to simplify the method of their proof. Defects in the ordinances or in their enactment are not thereby cured. Barrett v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 190 Iowa 509, 175 N.W. 950. [3] We are committed to the rule that we will sustain the trial court's judgment upon any theory established by the pleading and supported by the proof. Lundberg v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 77, 346 P.2d 164; Guerin v. Thompson, 53 Wn.2d 515, 335 P.2d 36. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH, FINLEY, and WEAVER, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 400 P.2d 789. [] Judge MacIver is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] Ordinance No. 405 does not appear in the record. Ordinance No. 437 recites: "WHEREAS Ordinance No. 405, passed May 9, 1961, established zone boundaries as marked and designated on the following ordinances of the Town of Tumwater, but the true and correct legal descriptions of the zoning areas were not set forth; ...."