Title: BRIAN HATFIELD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

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RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2013-SC-000442-MR
BRIAN HATFIELD APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ROBERT COSTANZO, JUDGE
NO. 10-CR-00285

(COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE,
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING

In the early morning hours of January 15, 2008, Appellant, Brian

Hatfield, and

 

confederates went to Bill Taylor's house in order to obtain
money to purchase drugs. One of Appellant's co-conspirators, Candy Maiden,
claimed that Taylor was her “sugar daddy.” Another co-conspirator, Deborah
Partin, had also befriended the 91-year-old Taylor and believed that she could
get some money from him. Partin cut Taylor's phone lines prior to their arrival
so that Taylor would not call the police.

While at the Taylor residence, Appellant kicked Taylor and hit him in the
head with a blunt force object until he stopped moving. Appellant and the
others fled the scene in a truck driven by Jeramiah Evans. It is unclear exactly

how much cash they stole from Taylor.
‘Sometime after the assault, Taylor revived and ran outside and attracted
the attention of his neighbors. They testified that he had multiple abrasions
and a deep wound in the back of his skull. He was bleeding severely and,
according to his neighbors, made statements implicating Maiden and Partin.
‘Todd Daugherty was a first responder who arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter. Daugherty asked Taylor who had committed the crime. Taylor
provided two names: Candy Maiden and Deborah Partin. Taylor was rushed to
the University of Tennessee Medical Center in Knoxville, where he died as a
result of his wounds.

Appellant, Maiden, Partin, and Evans were indicted for murder and
complicity to commit murder. Evans pled guilty and testified against
Appellant. A Bell Circuit Court jury tried and convicted Appellant, Maiden, and
Partin of complicity to murder. Each was sentenced to 20 years’ incarceration.
‘Appellant appeals his judgment and sentence as a matter of right pursuant to §
110(2}(b) of the Kentucky Constitution. Several issues are raised and
addressed as follows.

‘The Right of Confrontation

Appellant argues that out-of-court statements introduced at trial to
incriminate him were improperly admitted and violated his right to confront
witnesses. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987);
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009); and Commonwealth v.
‘Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696 (Ky. 2009).
Appellant specifically argues that his right of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment as articulated in Crawford and Bruton/ Richardson was
violated when the trial court allowed into evidence seven out-of-court
statements alleged to have been made by his co-defendants, Debbie Partin and
Candy Maiden.

Appellant was indicted for murder or complicity to commit murder, along

 

with Debbie Partin, Candy Maiden, and Jeremiah Evans. Hatfield, Partin, and
Maiden were tried jointly. Evans had made a plea agreement and testified at
the trial for the Commonwealth. Appellant chose to testify and was thus
subject to cross-examination. Partin and Maiden chose not to testify and so
the out-of-court statements attributed to them by other witnesses could not be
challenged by cross-examination. Appellant complains that seven out-of-court,
statements, three attributed to Partin and four allegedly made by Maiden, were
used against him at trial. As noted below, Appellant objected to only one of the
seven statements,

1, Detective Lawson testified that Debbie Partin told him that on the
evening of the murder, Appellant and several others took her to the victim's
home where she got $100. Appellant and the others then picked her up and
bought drugs, which they used together. Appellant objected to the admission
of this statement due to his inability to cross-examine Debbie Partin but the
trial court admitted it.

2, Francis Partin testified that shortly after the crime, Debbie Partin told

her that she had cut the victim’s telephone cord so that he could not call the

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police for help. Francis Partin also testified that Debbie Partin denied that she
put the gash in the victim's head, but that “they hit him,” and he fell into a
curio cabinet.

3. Co-defendant Evans testified that co-defendant Debbie Partin asked
him to take “them” to the victim’s house on the night of the murder and that
Hatfield, Debbie Partin, and Maiden went to the victim’s home to borrow some
money.

4, Co-defendant Evans also testified that after he picked them up at the
victim's house with the money, Maiden or one of her confederates said, “We'll
have to go to Tennessee to get drugs.”

5, Tara Hatfield testified that a month after the murder Maiden told her
that “they” got high and “they” . .. she wanted to go get some money from her
sugar daddy, the victim, so “they” could get higher and that “they” went to the
victim’s house and when “they” got there she got the money,

6. Scott Mason testified that shortly after the crime he saw Maiden, that
Maiden was intoxicated and admitted to him that “they” committed the crime
and that she got a pocket full of money.

7. Shanna Mason Daniels testified that several weeks after the crime she
heard Maiden talk about her role in the victim’s murder. Daniels testified that,
Maiden said that the victim was not supposed to have gotten hurt. Maiden told
Daniels that the victim was fighting with “them.” Daniels testified that Maiden

admitted that she took $2000 from the victim's house.
Each of the out-of-court statements would have been admissible under

 

KRE 801A(b)(1) (statements of a party) to prove the guilt of the individual who
uttered it. But they also clearly implicate Appellant, either by a direct reference

to his name or by the use of a plural pronoun that plainly refers collectively to

 

the group of defendants on trial. Consequently, his inability to confront the
declarants implicates his Sixth Amendment right.

‘As previously noted, Appellant's arguments are premised upon Crawford
v. Washington, Bruton v. United States, and Richardson v. Marsh. Crawford
holds that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against
him is violated when an out-of-court “testimonial” hearsay statement of a
declarant who is unavailable for cross-examination is introduced into evidence.
Bruton holds that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation when he is incriminated by the admission into evidence of a non-
testifying co-defendant’ out-of-court statement. Richardson holds that a
Bruton violation of the Sixth Amendment can be prevented by redacting the
non-testifying co-defendant’s out-of-court statement to eliminate any reference
to the defendant's existence and by giving a proper limiting instruction.

As explained in Stone, 291 S.W.3d at 699-700, Crawford and its progeny
address the use of “testimonial” out-of-court statements of an absent declarant
to directly incriminate the defendant in a criminal trial. Crawford did not
involve the joint trial of multiple defendants and the declarant was not on trial
with the defendant. The Bruton/Richardson line of cases focus more

specifically on the situation before us in this case: a joint trial of two or more

5s
defendants, where the out-of-court statements of one defendant (the declarant),
who chooses not to testify, is presented at trial to incriminate the declarant,
but has also the collateral effect of incriminating another defendant in the joint
trial. Crawford's analysis of the Confrontation Clause does not displace and
supersede the Bruton/ Richardson analysis; it complements it.

Beyond the acknowledgment that formal statements to police
investigators are “testimonial,” Crawford and subsequent cases leave the
‘meaning of the term vague and elusive. Recognizing the Sixth Amendment's
focus upon the right to confront “witnesses,” Crawford accepts the definition of
“witnesses” as “those who bear testimony,” testimony typically being a “solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.” 541 U.S. at 51. Debbie Partin and Maiden may have uttered th

 

out-
of-court statements in a less than “solemn” manner, but when repeated by
solemnly sworn witnesses at trial to prove the guilt of the accused, the
statements become “testimonial” in every relevant aspect.

In any event, the use of Debbie Partin’s statements as testimony makes
her as much of a witness against Maiden and Appellant as if she had taken the
stand, except that they could not confront her with cross-examination.
Moreover, as noted above, all of the statements fall under a Bruton/ Richardson
‘analysis regardless of their “testimonial” character, or lack thereof.

‘The application of those analyses indicates that the out-of-court
statements at issue were inadmissible against Appellant. However, we also

conclude that, to the extent Appellant properly preserved the error for appellate

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review, the statements were harmless under the constitutional error standard
cited in Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 595 (Ky. 2010). To the
extent that Appellant failed to preserve the errors with an adequate objection or
request for a limiting instruction, we conclude that in context with all the
evidence the statements failed to generate the kind of prejudice necessary to
establish palpable error under RCr 10.26. See also, MoCleery v.
Commonwealth, 410 8.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. 2013).

Appellant did not request the limiting instruction that was available to
him, He suggests on appeal that doing so would have been a useless gesture.
Nevertheless, KRE 105(a) provides that the failure to make the request waives
his appeal of the issue, except under the palpable error rule, RCr 10.26. We
find no basis for finding palpable error here.

Mistrial

‘Appellant further argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
for a mistrial after the prosecutor briefly mentioned in its opening statement
that Evans, a witness for the Commonwealth, “has, in fact, pled guilty to being
4 part of the actions that night.” Appellant and his co-defendants moved for a
mistrial at the end of the Commonwealth's opening statement.

When determining whether there was manifest necessity to declare a
mistrial, we must consider whether the statements made by the prosecutor
constitute information coming to the attention of the jury which is prejudicial
toa fair trial. Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. 1997) (citations

omitted). It is also critical to note that “a finding of manifest necessity is a

7
matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Scott,
12 8.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2000).

In addition to the prosecutor's comment during opening statement, she
also asked Evans during direct examination whether Evans was a felon. He
replied that he was. Defense counsel cross-examined Evans concerning his
guilty plea, read part of the plea agreement to the jury, and later introduced
the guilty plea documents as defense exhibits. Appellant argues that this line
of questioning and evidence was only necessary because of the
Commonwealth's erroneous assertion during its opening statement that Evans
had pled guilty concerning his role in this case.

“Ithas long been the rule in this Commonwealth that itis improper to
show that a co-indictee has already been convicted under the
indictment.” Parido v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Ky. 1977) (citing
Martin v. Commonwealth, 477 8.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1972)). However, we have
refined this rule to bar only the “[blatant | use [of] the conviction [of a co-
indictee] as substantive evidence of guilt of the indictee now on triall.|" Tipton
v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1982). We fail to see the blatant
intent behind the prosecutor's statement here. Moreover, the contested
statement was introduced during the Commonwealth's opening statement, not
as substantive evidence, “It is well-settled that opening and closing arguments
are not evidence and prosecutors are given considerable leeway during both.”
Mayse v. Commonwealth, 422 S,W.3d 223, 227 (Ky. 2013), as modified on

denial of rehearing (March 20, 2014) (citations omitted). Prior felony evidence

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is also expressly permitted under KRE 609 that may be employed tactically by
prosecutors when examining witnesses. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's mistrial motion.

Jury Issues
Postponed Jurors

‘The Circuit and District Court venire panels were exhausted and
additional jurors were needed. The Court then had the clerk to pull the names
of those jurors who had been postponed or excused and not required to report
to serve on this case. These postponed jurors were to serve from March to
September of 2013, which was the time period during which the trial occurred
‘The clerk recalled these jurors by telephone.

‘Appellant contends that these jurors at issue here “were effectively
excused from jury service for this case” and were no longer a part of the
“randomized jury list” nor properly summonsed as required under KRS
298.060.

‘That statute states:

[w}hen there is an unanticipated shortage of available jurors
obtained from a randomized jury list, the Chief Circuit Judge
may cause to be summonsed a sufficient number of jurors
selected sequentially from the randomized jury list beginning
with the first name following the last name previously selected.
‘The persons so chosen shall be summonsed as provided in this,
section, but need not be given the notice provided in subsection
(3) of this section.
‘Subsection (3) requires that “[tJhe service of summons shalll be made by the

court utilizing first class mail, for] personally by the sheriff.”

°
This statute

 

{tended for when the jury pool is exhausted and new
jurors are needed to supplement the panel. The postponed jurors were not
new. They were initially chosen from a randomized jury selection list and
initially summonsed pursuant to KRS 29A.060(3). As we stated in Smith v.
Commonwealth, *{t}he practice of permitting jurors who appeared for service
fone term to volunteer in a later term to serve out the remainder of their trial
days does not amount to reversible error.” 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Ky. 1987).
‘There is no error here.

Appellant also argues that the trial court violated KRS 29A.070(7) by

 

denying him access to the back of the postponed jurors’ qualification forms so
that defense counsel could ascertain the reason for each juror’s postponement,
‘The court denied this request. In Smith, we determined that “defendant or his
counsel's access to these forms is not unlimited because the statute vests
jurisdiction in the trial judge to refuse access to the forms under certain
circumstances.” Id. at 443. Like our decision in Orovimenez v.
Commonwealth, it is clear that any discrepancy that occurred here “did not

constitute a substantial deviation from the proper method and does not require

reversal and re-trial simply for the sake of enforcing strict compliance with our

 

rules.” 412 8.W.3d 174, 178 (Ky. 2013).
‘Tainted Jury

Appellant also argues that the entire group of postponed jurors was
tainted and that he was entitled to a mistrial. This issue was properly

preserved. One of the postponed jurors was Larry Partin, the spouse of Francis

 

10
Partin, a witness for the Commonwealth. Mr. Partin was excused and did not,
sit on Appellant's jury.

‘Thereafter, several postponed jurors indicated that they heard Mr. Partin
talking about the case where they were gathered. The trial court individually
questioned each postponed juror about what they heard. Seven out of the
‘seventeen jurors indicated that they had not heard anything. The remaining
ten stated that they heard Larry Partin say that he knew the victim and the
defendant because he lived in the community where the crimes occurred. Out
of these ten individuals, several indicated that they heard that an older man

had been murdered, Others stated that they heard speculation that

 

was
the “Taylor case.” None of the allegedly tainted jurors stated that Mr. Partin
indicated that he thought the defendants were guilty.

Appellant takes specific issue with four potential jurors. Juror 759
heard that the victim's head had been bashed in with a crowbar. Juror 389
also said that Mr. Partin stated that the victim's brain was beaten in with a
crowbar and that his daughter was friends with “these people” and lived across
the street. These two jurors were dismissed.

According to Appellant, “the defense specifically challenged Jurors 483
and 675 for cause as they were the only two postponed jurors in the pool and
they were tainted.” Appellant also takes specific issue with Juror 220. We will
address these three jurors in a subsequent section of this opinion.

However, Appellant’s general claim that the entire group of postponed

jurors was tainted must fail. As previously stated, Appellant has only taken

ist
specific issue with five jurors, two of whom were dismissed by the court.
Moreover, the trial court admonished the remaining postponed jurors not to
consider anything they may have heard concerning the case. It is well-settled
that “[a] jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and
the admonition thus cures any error.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.34
430, 441 (Ky. 2003). The court also asked if any of the jurors could not put
aside facts, speculation, rumors, and any other topics that were discussed in
the jury room. None of the jurors raised their hands. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
Juror Selection

{As previously noted, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not
excusing potential Jurors 220, 483, and 675 for cause. Prior to jury selection,
defense counsel indicated on her strike sheet that she would have used a
peremptory strike to strike other jurors who eventually sat on the jury. Thus,

ue, Sluss v. Commonwealth, 450 8.W.3d

 

Appellant properly preserved thi
279, 284-85 (Ky. 2014). We review the trial court's decision whether to strike
jurors for cause under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 282,

Appellant takes issue with the fact that the Commonwealth's Attorney
represented Juror 483 in a divorce proceeding 26 years before the trial in this
case, When questioned whether this would impact the juror’s service and
decision, the juror indicated that it would not matter. Juror 483 also indicated
she was in the jury room with Mr. Partin when he commented on the case.

Although she stated that she heard what the case was about, she also said that

12
no one told her any details. Unlike Jurors 759 and 389, who provided details
about the case and were excused, Juror 483 indicated that she heard only a
general statement about the case. Based on these facts, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss Juror 483 for cause.

Appellant also argues that Juror 220 should have been excused for
cause because he indicated that he wanted to hear from the defendant in a
death penalty case. When the court clarified that this was not a death penalty
case, the juror said “I've got no problem with it.” There also appears to have
been an issue with the juror’s ability to hear what was being discussed,

However, he w

 

.ppropriately provided with headphones. Appellant's counsel
‘argues that Juror 220 stated that he heard people talking about the case.
‘When questioned by the court, however, the juror indicated that he was talking
about a different case. Juror 675 was also questioned about what he heard
from Mr. Partin in the jury room. The juror indicated that he heard nothing
about the case, Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to dismiss Jurors 220 and 675 for cause.
Witness Issues

During the Commonwealth's direct examination of its witness, Shanna
Daniels, the prosecutor asked if she was a convicted felon and if the prosecutor
recently filed a motion to revoke her probation. Appellant's counsel objected,
stating that the prosecutor was impermissibly questioning the witness about
the details of prior crimes thereby bolstering the witness. Appellant's objection

was subsequently overruled.

13
Prior felony evidence is expressly permitted under KRE 609. That rule
provides that “[tJhe identity of the crime upon which conviction was based may
not be disclosed upon cross-examination .. .." KRE 609(a) (emphasis added).
‘This witness was not the defendant, nor even a defense witness, She was a
prosecution witness. Even assuming that the Commonwealth's questioning

concerning the witness’

 

pending probation revocation implicated the details of
the felony for which she had been convicted, this testimony was elicited from
the Commonwealth’s own witness, and on direct examination, not cross-
examination, See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 8.W.3d 635, 664 (Ky. 2003).

Appellant also takes additional issue with the Commonwealth's
statements in closing argument where the prosecutor remarked that another
witness, Tara Hatfield, was prosecuted by the Bell County Commonwealth
Attorney's office and denied parole after she gave her statement in the present
case. The prosecutor concluded: “so there were no deals for her.” The
prosecutor also asked several other witnesses, many of whom were witnesses
for the Commonwealth, if they had been convicted of a felony and if the Bell
County Commonwealth Attorney's office had prosecuted them. This type of
questioning is expressly permitted under KRE 609.

Jury Instructions

‘Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to

instruct the jury on reckless homicide, complicity to reckless homicide,

facilitation to murder, facilitation to first-degree manslaughter, facilitation to

 

second-degree manslaughter, and facilitation to reckless homici

14
‘There was no evidence in this case that required the court to instruct the
jury on the alternative offenses requested by Appellant. The Commonwealth
presented significant testimonial evidence in support of its case. For example,
the jury heard evidence that Appellant and his confederates went to the
victim's house in order to obtain money to purchase drugs, and that Appellant
beat the 91-year-old victim in the head with a pipe and/or the butt of a gun
until he stopped moving. Jeremiah Evans’ testimony was particularly
damaging. He testified in detail that Appellant confessed to beating the victim,
Bill Taylor. Other witnesses also testified that Appellant acknowledged beating
Taylor,

In contrast, Appellant denied all involvement in the murder and stated
that he had never been to Taylor's residence. If the jury believed his testimony,
then Appellant would have been acquitted. However, the evidence presented at
‘rial was not sufficient to warrant a facilitation instruction. See Perdue v.
Commonwealth, 916 8.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995) (‘Facilitation reflects the
‘mental state of one who is ‘wholly indifferent’ to the actual completion of the
crime.”) (iting KRS 506.080(1)). Furthermore, only intentional crimes can be
facilitated. A wanton or reckless crime cannot. Finnell v. Commonwealth, 295
S.W.3d 829, 833-34 (Ky, 2009). Finally, Appellant’s voluntary intoxication
argument does not warrant an instruction for reckless homicide, KRS

501.020(4)

1s
Impeachment
Appellant contends that the prosecutor improperly impeached witness
Jeff Stevens with irrelevant, prior bad acts. Stevens was called by Maiden to
impeach Evans’ testimony. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to

 

information concerning Stevens’ prior criminal record in order to
demonstrate that he had made threats, The prosecutor was trying to show
that because Stevens had made threats, he was not afraid of threats that he
received from Evans.

Maiden objected and a bench conference ensued. Much of that exchange

 

is unclear. Appellant subsequently joined Maiden’s motion. Without citation,
Appellant claims that *{t]he jury was told to disregard the prosecutor's
statement about [Stevens] conviction.” However, our review of the record fails
to indicate that an admonition was provided or requested. Although the
admissibility of the disputed evidence at issue here is highly questionable,
there was no reversible error.
Cumulative Error

Appellant claims that reversal is required because of cumulative error.

However, reversal on the basis of cumulative error is only appropriate “where

the individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the

 

prejudicial.” Brown, 313 8.W.3d at 631. Any errors that may have occurred

here were not substantial and do not require reversal.

16
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Bell
Circuit Court.
All sitting, Cunningham, Keller, VanMeter, Venters, and Wright, JJ.,

concur. Minton, C.J. and Hughes, J., concur in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer

Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

‘Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General

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