Title: Crawford v. Amadio

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Crawford v. Amadio1997 WY 30932 P.2d 1288Case Number: 95-233, 95-234, 96-18Decided: 02/27/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

KIMBERLY CRAWFORD

Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.

TRACY LYNN AMADIO

Appellee(Defendant)

 

TRACY LYNN AMADIO

Appellant(Defendant)

v.

KIMBERLY CRAWFORD

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County

The 
Honorable J. Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

Steven R. Helling, 
Casper

Representing Appellant:

Rex O. Arney and James W. 
Owens, Jr., of Murane & Bostwick, Casper

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ.

* Chief 
Justice at the time of oral argument.

 

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1]      The parties in 
these consolidated cases ask us to resolve the question of how costs should be 
awarded after an offer of judgment (settlement) is made and rejected by a 
plaintiff who then is not successful in achieving a more favorable recovery. 
Kimberly Crawford (Crawford) brought her action against Tracy Lynn Amadio 
(Amadio) to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Amadio 
made an offer of judgment to Crawford, which Crawford declined, and the jury 
verdict in favor of Crawford was not more favorable than the amount offered by 
Amadio. When costs were determined, the trial court ruled Crawford should 
recover for her costs prior to the offer of judgment, and Amadio should recover 
costs after the offer of judgment. We have consolidated yet another case, 
involving the same parties, in which the issue is the proper amount of statutory 
interest that should have been awarded to Crawford. Both parties have appealed 
from the Order and Judgment for Payment of Costs entered in the trial court. 
Crawford also appealed the award of statutory interest, contending she should 
have been awarded interest from the time a tender of payment was made to her and 
the money was deposited with the clerk of court until the money was disbursed to 
her. The trial court terminated the statutory interest as of the date of the 
tender of payment after which the money was deposited with the clerk of court. 
We hold that the trial court correctly determined the issues relating to costs, 
and the Order and Judgment for Payment of Costs is affirmed. In addition, we 
affirm the manner in which the trial court determined the statutory interest 
payable to Crawford in the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Release of 
Funds.

 

[¶2]      Crawford's Brief 
of Appellant, in Case No. 95-233, states these issues:

 

1. Following an offer of judgment, and a jury verdict 
which is not more favorable than the offer, what costs are properly awarded to 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant?

2. Did the Trial Court improperly award certain costs 
to the Defendant in this case, and deny certain costs to the 
Plaintiff?

3. Did the Trial Court improperly enter an order 
staying proceedings to enforce the underlying Judgment on Jury Verdict, in light 
of the fact that no one appealed said Judgment?

 

[¶3]      Amadio presents a 
different statement of the issues in her Brief of 
Appellee:

 

1. If a defendant makes an offer of judgment and the 
subsequent jury verdict is less than the amount stated in the defendant's offer 
of judgment, what costs may be properly awarded to the plaintiff and the 
defendant?

2. Did the trial court err in entering an order that 
prevented the plaintiff from enforcing and executing on the Judgment on Jury 
Verdict?

3. Is the appellee entitled to recover her costs and 
attorney's fees expended in defending this appeal?

            

[¶4]      In Case No. 
95-234, Amadio presents this statement of issues in her Brief of 
Appellant:

 

1.      
If a defendant makes an offer of 
judgment and the subsequent jury verdict is less than the amount stated in the 
defendant's offer of judgment, is the plaintiff the "prevailing party" for 
purposes of awarding costs?

 

2. When a defendant has made an offer of judgment and 
the subsequent jury verdict is less than the amount stated in defendant's offer 
of judgment, what costs may properly be awarded to the 
defendant?

 

[¶5]      In the Brief of 
Appellee in this case, Crawford states a single issue:

Following an offer of judgment, and a jury verdict 
which is not more favorable than the offer, what costs are properly awarded to 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant?

 

[¶6]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed by Crawford in the consolidated case, No. 96-18, she states the 
issue as:

 

Was it error for the Trial Court to deny interest on 
the judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff (Appellant herein), in this 
case, following what the Trial Court found was a tender of 
payment?

More specifically, did the Trial Court commit 
reversible error when it found a letter from the Appellee's counsel, dated July 
18, 1995, constituted a tender of payment?

 

[¶7]      In her Brief of 
Appellee, filed in this case, Amadio states the issues in this 
way:

 

1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
July 18, 1995 letter from the appellee's counsel to the appellant's counsel 
constituted a tender of the funds due and owing to the appellant by the appellee 
pursuant to the judgments entered by the trial court, thus causing statutory 
interest to cease to accrue on the funds from the date of the 
tender?

 

2. Is the appellee entitled to recover her costs and 
attorney's fees expended in defending this appeal?

 

[¶8]      On February 27, 
1992, Amadio collided with a vehicle that was stopped behind Crawford at a 
traffic light. The collision between Amadio's vehicle and the second vehicle 
forced that vehicle into the back of Crawford's car. Crawford suffered both 
physical injuries and property damage, and on March 24, 1994, she filed an 
action to recover damages.

 

[¶9]      The trial was set 
for May 22, 1995. On May 2, 1995, Amadio served an offer to allow judgment to be 
taken against her for $30,000, together with costs incurred prior to that date. 
The offer of judgment stated that it was made "for the purposes specified in 
Rule 68," but that it was not to be construed as admitting liability or damages. 
Crawford declined the offer of judgment for $30,000, and the trial was held on 
May 22, 1995, as scheduled. The jury, in a verdict returned May 25, 1995, found 
Amadio to be 100% at fault, and awarded Crawford damages in the amount of 
$25,000. The Judgment on Jury Verdict, awarding Crawford $25,000 plus her 
recoverable costs, was filed on June 7, 1995.

 

[¶10]   Following the directives of UNIFORM 
RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 501,1 Crawford filed a certificate of her 
costs in the amount of $4,027.59. Amadio objected to Crawford's certificate of 
costs, contending that Crawford was not the prevailing party. Amadio relied upon 
Stamp v. Hagerman, 181 Mich. App. 
332, 448 N.W.2d 849, 851 (1989). In Stamp, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
addressed the question of awarding costs to a plaintiff as a prevailing party 
when the "adjusted verdict" was less than the "average offer" to stipulate to a 
judgment. The court said:

 

[A] party should not be deemed the prevailing party 
for purposes of taxing costs unless the party improves his or her position by 
the litigation. * * * [W]e agree that a showing of improved position is a 
minimal standard for taxing costs. To hold otherwise would encourage unnecessary 
litigation.

 

Stamp, 
448 N.W.2d  at 851. Amadio filed her own petition for costs on June 27, 1995, 
setting forth a total of $3,963.45. Crawford objected to Amadio's petition for 
costs, and on July 12, 1995, the trial court filed its decision letter on the 
matter. That letter stated:

 

The above matter having come before the Court upon 
motions for costs filed by both parties. I find that Plaintiff should be 
entitled to recover costs up to the date of the offer of judgment, and Defendant 
should recover costs after that date.

 

The trial court applied WYO. 
R. CIV. P. 682 in concluding that Crawford was 
entitled to recover costs. The court then awarded to Crawford total costs in the 
amount of $2,124.61 accrued before the offer of judgment, and $2,838.45 in costs 
to Amadio, incurred after the offer of judgment, by applying the UNIFORM RULES 
FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 501. This left a net of $713.84 to 
be remitted to Amadio from Crawford. The Order and Judgment for Payment of Costs 
was entered July 14, 1995, setting out the amounts of costs awarded to each 
party and the net payment of $713.84 Crawford was to remit to 
Amadio.

 

[¶11]   On July 18, 1995, Amadio's counsel 
sent a letter outlining the total amount owed to Crawford based upon the jury's 
verdict and the court's calculations of each party's costs. The pertinent 
portions of the letter state:

 

I 
have calculated the amount owing as of tomorrow [July 19] on the following 
basis: interest on the $25,000 judgment from June 7 [date judgment was filed] 
through July 14 = $253.42 (37 days x $6.849315) and on $24,286.16 ($25,000 - 
$713.84) from July 15 through July 19 = $33.27 (5 days x 
$6.653724).

 

Based upon the foregoing, State Farm's payment to you 
and your client would be in the amount of $24,286.16, plus $253.42, plus $33.27 
for a total of $24,572.85.

 

It was appropriate for 
counsel to calculate 10% interest on the full $25,000 until costs were 
determined and ordered to be paid by the court.3 At the time costs were established 
on July 14, it was then appropriate to subtract those from the $25,000 judgment 
and continue to calculate the 10% interest from July 15 until a tender of 
payment was made.

 

[¶12]   On July 25, 1995, the $24,572.85 
was deposited with the clerk of the district court, and on the same date, 
Amadio's counsel notified the district judge of that deposit and how it was 
calculated. Enclosed with the July 25 letter was Amadio's proposed order for the 
judge to sign requesting that Crawford be prevented from collecting the 
$24,572.85 pending the appeals by both parties on the issues relating to the 
costs.

 

[¶13]   On August 10, 1995, the trial court 
granted Amadio's Motion for Stay to prevent enforcement of or execution on the 
judgment by Crawford. The court ordered that Crawford would collect 10% interest 
on the $25,000 award from the date of entry of the judgment, and Amadio would 
receive 10% interest on the $713.84 from the date of the order for payment of 
costs. The order granting the stay further stated that Amadio must remit the 
$25,000 judgment with interest, but Amadio could deduct the costs plus interest 
Crawford was ordered to pay Amadio from the total 
remitted.

 

[¶14]   Crawford appealed the trial court's 
Order and Judgment for Payment of Costs, and she also appealed the Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Relief from Enforcement of Judgment and for Stay 
of Proceeding to Enforce Judgment. Amadio, by a cross-appeal, appealed the Order 
and Judgment for Payment of Costs to this court. After that, Crawford filed a 
Motion for Release of Funds in the trial court, and Amadio filed her response, 
followed by a reply from Crawford. The trial court judge subsequently entered an 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Release of Funds, which directed the district 
court clerk to release to Crawford the sum of $24,572.85, in complete 
satisfaction of her judgment and costs with interest. Crawford then appealed the 
award of interest the court set in the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Release 
of Funds. Any issue as to whether the court's temporary stay preventing 
execution on Crawford's judgment was erroneous has become moot because of the 
trial court's order for release of the funds to Crawford.

 

[¶15]   The version of WYO. R. CIV. P. 68 
in effect on May 2, 1995 required that the offer of settlement be made more than 
thirty days before the date of trial. Amadio's offer of judgment was made only 
twenty days before the trial, which would cause that offer to be untimely under 
the new rule, even though it was timely under the old version of the rule. 
Neither party has objected in this case to untimeliness of the offer at the 
trial court level, nor here, and we hold that it is the law of this case that 
the timeliness of the offer of judgment made by Amadio is governed by the 
previous version of WYO. R. CIV. P. 68. See Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 
1985); Matter of Mora's Estate, 611 P.2d 842 (Wyo. 1980); DeWitty v. 
Decker, 383 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1963).

 

[¶16]   The recovery of costs of litigation 
by the prevailing party from the unsuccessful party is articulated both in 
statute and in rules of procedure. The statute provides:

 

Costs shall be allowed to the plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor in an action for 
the recovery of money only or for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, unless otherwise provided by 
law.

 

WYO. STAT. § 1-14-124 (1988) 
(emphasis added). In our rules of procedure, WYO. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (Supp. 1995) 
speaks to the award of costs generally:

 

(d) Costs; 
attorney's fees.

(1) Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees. Except when 
express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs 
other than attorney's fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs[.]

 

Detail with respect to the 
identification of costs to be allowed the prevailing party is articulated in 
UNIFORM RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS 501. The final procedural proposition with 
respect to costs is found in WYO. R. CIV. P. 68.

 

[¶17]   When Amadio objected to Crawford's 
certificate of costs in accordance with UNIFORM RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS 
501(a)(2) and filed her own petition for costs, Amadio was asserting that 
Crawford was not the prevailing party under WYO. R. CIV. P. 54(d), and in any 
event, Crawford could only recover costs prior to the offer of judgment. Amadio 
contended she was entitled to costs following the offer of judgment. We hold 
that our statute and rule are distinguishable from the Michigan court rules that 
were applied in Stamp. Crawford was the "prevailing party" since the verdict of 
the jury was completely in her favor. The verdict awarded Crawford $25,000 in 
damages and assessed Amadio's fault at 100%. Under both WYO. STAT. § 1-14-124 
and WYO. R. CIV. P. 54, Crawford is the "prevailing party" and the "plaintiff" 
with a judgment in her favor, which means her costs are to be allowed "unless 
otherwise provided by law" or an "express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute or in these rules" or "the court otherwise 
directs."

 

[¶18]   We conclude that an express 
provision as otherwise provided by law is found in WYO. R. CIV. P. 68. It 
applies to offers of judgment, and is a limitation on the award of all costs to 
a prevailing party. Even if we found that Crawford were not the "prevailing 
party" as Amadio suggested in her brief, Crawford is nonetheless the "offeree" 
who was tendered an offer of judgment under WYO. R. CIV. P. 68. That rule, 
applied by its plain language to Crawford, requires that Crawford pay costs 
incurred after the making of the offer since the offer was $5,000 more than the 
jury verdict. The trial court did "otherwise direct" and correctly divided the 
award of costs between Amadio and Crawford.

 

[¶19]   Crawford objects to the award of 
specific costs to Amadio as violative of UNIFORM RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS 501. 
Objection is particularly made to a fee for a doctor of $900, which the court 
previously had reduced from $2,025. Crawford contends that this fee should have 
been $750, and Amadio should not be entitled to recover costs for expedited 
reporting fees rather than for the ordinary reporting fees required under the 
rules. Crawford states, however, "[i]t is impossible to now specify, based upon 
the information in the record, what the Appellee's [Amadio's] recoverable costs 
should have been, if properly determined * * *." Crawford's point is sound that 
the record before us makes it impossible to determine what Amadio's actual costs 
after May 2, 1995 should have been. That leads to the conclusion that there was 
an appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial court pursuant to the 
language of UNIFORM RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS 501(a)(4) (emphasis 
added):

 

These rules do not preclude the award of other costs 
not enumerated herein if otherwise allowable under law; nor do they require the 
award of costs as they may be denied altogether if the court, through the exercise of its discretion, so 
determines.

 

All of Crawford's costs were 
allowed up until the date of Amadio's offer, and all were rejected after that 
date. The court did not pick and choose which costs were appropriate, but it did 
adhere to the language of WYO. R. CIV. P. 68 after determining appropriate costs 
under UNIFORM RULES FOR DISTRICT COURTS 501. Except for the diminution of 
$1,125, a doctors charge for review of records and deposition fees, Amadio was 
allowed costs after May 2, 1995. We are unable to discern from this record that 
the district court abused its discretion in its allowance and allocation of the 
costs of the parties.

 

[¶20]   We turn then to the question of 
interest on the judgment. In accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a), statutory 
interest in this case began to accrue on June 7, 1995, the day the jury's award 
of damages was filed with the court. See Gose v. Hess, 822 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 1991); 
see also, Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 527 (Wyo. 1995). In addition, this 
court has stated that WYO. R. CIV. P. 67 "does not require the payment of a 
judgment amount to be made and accepted by the prevailing party to toll the 
accrual of statutory interest." Parker, 889 P.2d  at 528. As we stated in 
Parker at 527 (emphasis 
added):

 

The purpose of W.R.C.P. 67 is to relieve the 
depositor of the responsibility for the funds and, in some circumstances, to stop the 
accrual of interest by authorizing a payment into the court. 12 Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2991 at 
50-51 (1973).

 

[¶21]   In this situation, Amadio tendered 
an offer of payment to Crawford of $24,572.85 on July 18, which was calculated 
to the penny based upon the jury's award and the court's Order and Judgment for 
Payment of Costs. Amadio in good faith deposited the full amount with the clerk 
during pendency of appeal to this court. The district court held a hearing on 
November 30, 1995; found the July 18, 1995 letter constituted a tender of all 
funds due and owing to Crawford; and authorized release of the $24,572.85 to 
Crawford in "satisfaction of all judgments that have been rendered by the 
District Court in this action."

 

[¶22]   Amadio's tender was "an 
unconditional offer to perform coupled with the ability to carry out the offer 
and the production of the subject matter of the tender." Parker, 889 P.2d  at 527; Black's Law 
Dictionary 1467 (6th ed. 1990). After a hearing, the district court released the 
$24,572.85 to Crawford on December 8, 1995, approximately 143 days after the 
July 18 tender of payment. Amadio should not be assessed an additional $1,044.63 
for those days when the court's disbursement to Crawford was the same amount 
Amadio had offered to pay from the beginning. This is one of those circumstances 
in which Amadio's tender of payment was appropriate "to stop the accrual of 
interest by authorizing a payment into the court." Parker, 889 P.2d  at 
527.

 

[¶23]   We hold that the district court 
correctly followed and applied statutory law and procedural rules. Specifically, 
the court correctly applied WYO. R. CIV. P. 68, resulting in a net payment of 
$713.84 in costs from Crawford to Amadio. We affirm the Order and Judgment for 
Payment of Costs. We also affirm the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Release of 
Funds.

 

Footnotes
 

1 Rule 501 of the Uniform Rules for 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming provides in pertinent 
part:

Rule 501. Taxation of 
costs

(a) Civil 
cases.

(1) Filing of Certificate of Costs. - 
Within 20 days after entry of the final judgment allowing costs to the 
prevailing party, a certificate of costs shall be filed and copy served upon 
opposing counsel. The certificate shall be itemized. For witness fees, the 
certificate shall contain:

(A) The name of the 
witness;

(B) place of residence, or the place 
where subpoenaed, or the place to which the witness voluntarily traveled without 
a subpoena to attend;

(C) The number of full days or half days 
the witness actually testified in court;

(D) The number of days or half days the 
witness traveled to and from the place of trial;

(E) The exact number of miles 
traveled;

(F) The manner of travel, air, railroad, 
bus or private vehicle; and,

(G) If common carrier transportation is 
used, the price of an economy fare.

(2) Objections to Certificate of Costs. 
- If no objections are served within 10 days after service of the certificate of 
costs, the costs shall be taxed as set forth in the certificate of costs. If 
objections are filed, the court shall consider the objections and tax costs. A 
hearing may be provided at the discretion of the 
court.

(3) Allowable 
Costs.

(A) Filing 
fees, jury demand fees and fees for services of process. (W.S. 18-3-608 sets 
forth sheriff fees.)

(B) Witness 
fees.

(i) Witness fees are allowed at the rate 
of $30.00 per day and $15.00 per half day necessarily spent traveling to and 
from the proceeding and in attendance at the proceeding. Mileage is allowed at 
the rate of $.23 per mile, not to exceed the costs of common carrier 
transportation rates.

(ii) Expert witness fees shall be 
allowed at the rate of $25.00 per day or such other amount as the court may 
allow according to the circumstances of the case. If the amount allowed 
constitutes a higher hourly rate than $25.00 per day, this higher amount is 
allowable only for the time that the expert witness actually testified. Time 
charged in preparation for providing testimony and/or standing by awaiting the 
call to give testimony is not allowable as costs, except at the rate of $25.00 
per day.

(C) Reporter 
fees. The $45.00 fee is a taxable cost. Transcripts of proceedings, such as 
motion hearings, pretrial conferences, etc., prepared at the request of a party 
in anticipation of trial are not taxable as costs unless such matters become 
part of the record on appeal.

(D) Costs of 
depositions.

(i) Costs of depositions are taxable if 
reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. A deposition is 
deemed reasonably necessary if:

I. Read to the jury as provided in Rule 
32(a)(3), W.R.C.P.;

II. Used at trial for impeachment 
concerning a material line of testimony (impeachment on a collateral issue does 
not fall within the scope of this rule);

III. Necessarily, and not merely 
conveniently, used to refresh the recollection of a witness while on the stand; 
or,

IV. Was taken at the request of a 
nonprevailing party. The foregoing are meant to provide guidelines, and are not 
exhaustive. The use of depositions for trial preparation alone does not justify 
the imposition of costs.

(ii) Reporters fees for depositions. 
Actual, ordinary reporting fees will be allowed. Extra costs for expediting 
transcripts or daily copy costs will not be allowed, except as authorized by an 
order entered prior to the date such costs are to be incurred. Reporters' 
travel, per diem expenses and appearance fees will not be taxed as 
costs.

(iii) Fees and expenses of counsel. Fees 
and expenses of counsel for traveling to and attending depositions are not 
taxable as costs.

(E) Copies of 
papers. Duplicating costs necessarily incurred for documents admitted into 
evidence shall be allowed. Duplication costs for documents for counsel's own use 
are not allowable.

(F) Exhibits 
received in evidence. The expense of preparing exhibits received in evidence, 
including 8x11 photographs (but not enlargements), videotapes, models, and other 
demonstrative evidence are allowable as taxable costs at the discretion of the 
court.

(4) Other Costs Not Enumerated. - These 
rules do not preclude the award of other costs not enumerated herein if 
otherwise allowable under law; nor do they require the award of costs as they 
may be denied altogether if the court, through the exercise of its discretion, 
so determines. Moreover, to the extent that W.S. 1-14-125 limits costs, that 
statute is controlling. However, costs associated with the offer of judgment 
rule, i.e. Rule 68, W.R.C.P., must be awarded.

(5) Apportionment. - All costs may be 
apportioned among some or all of the non-prevailing parties as the court may 
determine.

 

2 Prior to April 11, 1995, WYO. R. CIV. 
P. 68 read:

At any time more than 10 days before the 
trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party 
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or 
to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days 
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the 
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance 
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the court shall enter 
judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof 
is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment 
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the 
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. As used 
herein, costs does not include attorney's fees. The fact that an offer is made 
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one 
party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the 
amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further 
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which 
shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within 
a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to 
determine the amount or extent of liability.

An amendment to 
WYO. R. CIV. P. 68 became effective April 11, 1995, and the amended rule 
reads:

At any time more than 60 days after 
service of the complaint and more than 30 days before the trial begins, any 
party may serve upon the adverse party an offer, denominated as an offer under 
this rule, to settle a claim for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the 
service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is 
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together 
with proof of service thereof and thereupon the court shall enter judgment. An 
offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not 
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally 
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer the offeree must 
pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. As used herein, "costs" 
does not include attorney's fees. The fact that an offer is made but not 
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party 
to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount 
or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the 
party adjudged liable may make an offer of settlement under this rule, which 
shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within 
a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to 
determine the amount or extent of liability.

 

3 The statutory language authorizing 
interest is Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102 (Supp. 1995), and the section applicable to 
this case reads:

(a) Except as provided in subsections 
(b) and (c) of this section, all decrees and judgments for the payment of money 
shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the date of rendition 
until paid.