Title: Commonwealth v. Santana

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13146 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NICHOLAS SANTANA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 6, 2021. - February 25, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation, Waiver, 
Stipulation, Sentence, Appeal.  Notice, Timeliness.  
Waiver.  Due Process of Law, Probation revocation, Hearing. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 1, 2013. 
 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by Heidi 
E. Brieger, J., and a motion to revise and revoke the 
defendant's sentence was also heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Estera Halpern for the defendant. 
 
Howard P. Blatchford, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On September 11, 2014, the probationer, 
Nicholas Santana, entered pleas of guilty in the Superior Court 
in Middlesex County to an indictment charging him with carrying 
2 
 
a firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 
(a) (count 1), and to an indictment charging him with carrying a 
loaded firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) (count 
3).1  In June 2017, while the probationer was serving a suspended 
sentence, he stipulated to violations of the conditions of his 
probation, waived a probation violation hearing, and was 
resentenced with additional conditions of probation.  The 
probationer filed a motion to revise and revoke his sentence, 
which was denied.  The probationer appeals from the denial of 
his motion to revise and revoke his sentence of probation as 
well as from the sentence of probation itself. 
The probationer claims that the denial of his motion to 
revise and revoke his sentence was an abuse of discretion.  He 
argues that the motion judge failed to consider the effect of a 
"forthwith" sentence, see G. L. c. 279, § 27 (§ 27), imposed in 
a separate case, on his sentence of probation in this case.  For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm the order denying the 
probationer's motion. 
We also conclude that the probationer's appeal from his 
sentence of probation is not properly before us.  Nevertheless, 
because the arguments have been briefed fully and present issues 
 
1 The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi on an indictment 
charging the defendant with possession of ammunition without a 
firearm identification card, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 
(h). 
3 
 
of importance in the conduct of surrender hearings, we exercise 
our discretion to reach the issues raised.  In particular, we 
take this opportunity to adopt the analysis and conclusion of 
the Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
479, 480 (2014), and hold that a probationer's agreement to 
waive a probation violation hearing, including by stipulating to 
probation violations, must be knowing and voluntary and that the 
validity of such a waiver should be evaluated in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.  We conclude that the 
probationer's stipulation and waiver were knowing and voluntary, 
and we therefore affirm his sentence.2 
The probationer also challenges a specific condition of his 
probation as not being reasonably related to the goals of 
sentencing.  While this argument would be waived even if the 
appeal from the sentence properly were before us, we reach the 
issue because of its importance and because it presents the 
opportunity to clarify our case law in this area.  We conclude 
that the challenged condition was proper. 
 
Background.  Following the probationer's original pleas of 
guilty, the judge imposed a sentence on count 1 of two and one-
half years in a house of correction, with eighteen months to be 
 
2 We also reject the probationer's related argument that his 
sentence of probation must be vacated because no evidence of a 
violation was presented. See part 3, infra. 
4 
 
served and the balance (one year) suspended for a period of five 
years, during which time the probationer would serve probation.  
The judge also sentenced the probationer to five years of 
probation on count 3, to be served concurrently with the 
probation sentence imposed in count 1. 
 
Separately, on January 16, 2015, the probationer was 
sentenced in a case in the Superior Court in Worcester County 
(Worcester case) to a State prison term of from two and one-half 
years to two and one-half years and a day, to be served 
"forthwith and notwithstanding any sentence [that he is] now 
serving." 
In April 2017, the probationer was served with a notice of 
alleged probation violation alleging that he had (1) recklessly 
endangered a child, (2) committed assault and battery on a 
family member, (3) failed to report to the probation office for 
a visit, and (4) distributed a class B controlled substance.  
The notice listed the probationer's rights, including a right to 
cross-examine witnesses against him, a right to present 
evidence, and a right to a hearing. 
 
A surrender hearing was held on June 21, 2017.  At the 
start of the hearing, the probationer, through counsel, 
indicated that he would stipulate to the violations and the 
probation department's proposed resolution.  A probation officer 
then testified that two criminal complaints had entered in the 
5 
 
District Court against the probationer, one charging reckless 
endangerment of a child and domestic assault, and the other 
charging distribution of a class B substance.  The probation 
officer outlined the recommendation requiring the probationer to 
serve the one-year suspended portion of his sentence on count 1 
and that he be placed on probation for two years following the 
completion of that sentence.  Finally, the probation officer 
described the recommended conditions of probation, including the 
entry of an abuse prevention order as to the mother of the 
probationer's child and the requirement that the probationer 
participate in a ten-month batterer's intervention program after 
his release from incarceration. 
 
The judge then held the following colloquy with the 
probationer: 
The judge:  "Mr. Santana, your lawyer tells me that you 
want to stipulate to these violations.  Is that true?" 
 
The probationer:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "Do you know what that means?" 
 
The probationer:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "What does it mean?" 
 
The probationer:  "Waiving my rights." 
 
The judge:  "You're waiving your rights because you have a 
right to a hearing and [the probation officer] would have 
to prove that you actually violated your probation by 
distributing Class B and by domestic assault and reckless 
endangerment.  You're giving up that right to a hearing.  
Do you understand that?" 
6 
 
 
The probationer:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "Did you talk to [your attorney] about that 
decision?" 
 
The probationer:  "I did." 
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "Did she explain to you all the choices you 
have here?" 
 
The probationer:  "She did." 
 
The judge:  "Did you choose to waive your hearing?" 
 
The probationer:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "Nobody pressured you into it?" 
 
The probationer:  "No." 
 
During the colloquy, the probationer's attorney volunteered that 
she twice had visited him in jail to speak with him.  The judge 
made a finding on the record that the probationer had violated 
the terms of his probation.  She then imposed the remaining one-
year suspended portion of the original sentence on count 1 and 
imposed a two-year term of probation on count 3, with the 
recommended conditions, to run from and after the committed 
portion of the sentence. 
On July 6, 2017, the probationer filed a motion to revise 
and revoke his sentence.  His counsel submitted an affidavit in 
which she averred that, at the time of the surrender hearing, 
she had been unaware that the sentence in the Worcester case was 
7 
 
a forthwith sentence.  On September 22, 2017, at the hearing on 
the motion, counsel for the probationer argued that, under § 27, 
the forthwith sentence terminated both the committed and the 
probation portions of the sentence in this case.  The judge 
denied the motion.  On the following day, the probationer filed 
a notice of appeal from the denial of the motion to revise and 
revoke, purporting also to appeal from the "verdict" entered on 
June 21, 2017, after the surrender hearing.  We transferred the 
appeal to this court on our own motion. 
Discussion.  On appeal the probationer argues that (1) the 
judge abused her discretion by failing to weigh the impact of 
the forthwith sentence in the Worcester case on the 
probationer's probation sentence, (2) his waiver of his right to 
an evidentiary probation violation hearing was not knowing and 
voluntary, (3) his right to due process was violated when the 
judge revoked his probation without any evidence of the alleged 
violations, and (4) the condition that he attend a batterer's 
intervention program is not reasonably related to the goals of 
sentencing and probation as to the underlying firearms 
convictions.  The Commonwealth argues that § 27 does not apply 
to the probationer's sentence of probation and that the 
probationer's appeal from his sentence is not properly before 
us.  We consider these arguments in turn, beginning with the 
appeal from the denial of the probationer's motion to revise and 
8 
 
revoke his sentence, which undisputedly is timely and which, if 
successful, would render the appeal from his sentence moot. 
1.  G. L. c. 279, § 27, and the effect of the forthwith 
sentence.  The question whether a forthwith sentence under § 27 
terminates a preexisting sentence of probation is a question of 
first impression.3  We review matters of statutory interpretation 
de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 298 (2017), 
S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020).  While the probationer argued at the 
hearing on his motion to revise and revoke his sentence that 
§ 27, by its terms, meant that his probation sentence 
automatically was terminated by the forthwith sentence in the 
Worcester case, he argues on appeal only that the judge had the 
discretion to consider the impact of the Worcester sentence on 
his probation sentence and failed to do so. 
These arguments are interrelated, and the result depends on 
our interpretation of § 27, which states: 
 
3 Regarding the definition and effect of a forthwith 
sentence, we have stated that "the effect of such a sentence is 
that 'the sentence then being served in the jail or house of 
correction is terminated and the prisoner is discharged at the 
expiration of his [State prison] sentence'" (quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Lydon, 477 Mass. 1013, 1015 (2017), quoting Dale 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 247, 249 
(1983).  See Dale, supra at 248-249 ("A forthwith sentence may 
be defined as a sentence which is ordered by a judge to take 
effect immediately despite a previous sentence then being served 
by the prisoner").  See also 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 100 (2017) 
(parole board regulation's definition of "forthwith sentence" 
states, "Forthwith state prison sentences extinguish prior house 
of correction sentences"). 
9 
 
"If a convict serving a sentence of imprisonment in a jail 
or house of correction is convicted of a felony, the court 
may impose sentence of imprisonment in the state prison and 
order it to take effect forthwith, notwithstanding the 
former sentence.  The convict shall thereupon be removed to 
the reception center established under [G. L. c. 127, 
§ 20], and shall be discharged at the expiration of his 
sentence thereto." 
 
The statute does not refer to sentences of probation, and 
instead by its plain terms applies only to sentences of 
imprisonment.  Thus, § 27 does not apply to the probationer's 
sentence of probation.  See Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 
507, 512 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 
521 (2001) ("[A] statutory expression of one thing is an implied 
exclusion of other things omitted from the statute").  See also 
City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 789 
(2019) ("We do not read into the statute a provision which the 
Legislature did not see fit to put there" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 266 (2007) (declining 
to read into statute procedure not expressed by its terms).  
Therefore, the argument that the forthwith sentence terminated 
or otherwise had an impact on the probationer's sentence of 
probation is without support, and the motion judge did not abuse 
her discretion.  We thus affirm the denial of the probationer's 
motion to revise or revoke his sentence. 
 
2.  The probationer's waiver of his right to an evidentiary 
probation violation hearing.  a.  Propriety of appeal.  Before 
10 
 
we consider the merits of the probationer's challenges to his 
probation sentence, we first must determine whether the issues 
are properly before us.  The Commonwealth argues that they are 
not because the probationer never raised the issues in a motion 
for a new trial, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001), and thus does not appeal from any adverse 
final order with respect to the sentence.  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth argues that because the probationer did not file a 
notice of appeal from the sentence of probation within thirty 
days, see Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 
(2019), the appeal from the sentence is untimely.4 
 
"Under Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), the [probationer] must file a 
notice of appeal within thirty days of the . . . imposition of 
sentence."5  Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass. 119, 122 n.8 
(1989).  Thus, as it concerns the probationer's challenges to 
 
4 The probationer did not file a reply brief and did not 
address in his principal brief the timeliness of his appeal from 
the sentence. 
 
5 The probationer's notice of appeal states that it is filed 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001), which allows motions for postconviction relief to be 
filed at "at any time."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), (b).  
However, that rule pertains to motions filed in the trial court, 
not in the appellate courts.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (7) 
("All motions under subdivisions [a] and [b] of this rule may be 
heard by the trial judge wherever the judge is then sitting").  
As an appeal from a sentence, the probationer's case is subject 
instead to the thirty-day deadline imposed by Mass. R. A. P. 4 
(b) (1). 
11 
 
his sentence of probation, the notice of appeal was untimely, 
and the issues that the probationer raises are not properly 
before us.6 
 
Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to address the 
issues raised because the arguments have been briefed fully by 
the parties, they raise significant questions concerning the 
conduct of surrender hearings, and addressing them is in the 
public interest.  See Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 153 
(2012).  We apply the standard of review applicable to issues 
not properly preserved for appeal, determining whether an error 
occurred and, if so, whether it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 472 Mass. 
535, 548 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 
719 (1995). 
 
b.  Knowing and voluntary waiver.  The probationer argues 
that his waiver of his right to an evidentiary probation 
violation hearing was not knowing and voluntary.  While we never 
have addressed the question whether a stipulation to a violation 
 
6 Outside of the thirty-day deadline of Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b) 
(1), a probationer seeking to challenge the sentence imposed in 
consequence of an order revoking probation should file a motion 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) in the trial court.  Commonwealth 
v. Christian, 429 Mass. 1022, 1023 (1999).  On the other hand, a 
challenge to the procedural merits of the revocation itself 
should be brought by means of a motion for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  See Commonwealth v. Sayyid, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 479, 486 n.7 (2014), citing Christian, supra. 
12 
 
of probation and a waiver of the right to a hearing must be made 
knowingly and voluntarily in order to be valid, the Appeals 
Court did so several years ago in Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 
480.  In Sayyid, the Appeals Court adopted the approach of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and held 
that "a defendant's agreement to waive a [probation violation] 
hearing -- such as by stipulating to violations -- must be 
knowing and voluntary and that such waiver can be assessed under 
the totality of the circumstances."  Id. at 489.  See United 
States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2003).  Like 
the First Circuit, the Appeals Court also concluded that "no 
particular colloquy is constitutionally required at the time of 
the waiver."  Sayyid, supra at 480, 488-489, citing Correa-
Torres, supra at 23. 
 
We agree with the Appeals Court's reasoning in Sayyid and 
today adopt its analysis and conclusion in full.  To summarize, 
like most rights in our system of criminal justice, the right to 
a probation violation hearing may be waived.  See Sayyid, 86 
Mass. App. Ct. at 488, citing Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 22.  
Because this right and its waiver closely affect individual 
liberty, the waiver must be made knowingly and voluntarily in 
order to be effective.  See Sayyid, supra, citing Correa-Torres, 
supra.  Where a probationer later challenges the validity of 
such a waiver, a reviewing court should decide the question 
13 
 
based on the totality of the circumstances.  See Sayyid, supra 
at 489, citing Correa-Torres, supra at 23. 
Because revocation proceedings are less formal than 
criminal prosecutions, we do not prescribe any particular 
colloquy that the judge must undertake to determine whether the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary, and the absence of a colloquy 
is not fatal to determining that a waiver was valid.7  See 
Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 489, citing Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 
at 23.  We caution, however, that a thorough colloquy is the 
most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, 
and that such a colloquy followed by an express finding of 
voluntariness by the judge will be of great use to a reviewing 
court in assessing the validity of a waiver.  See Sayyid, supra, 
quoting Correa-Torres, supra ("While such an express finding is 
not ordinarily required in connection with a waiver of rights, 
it is infinitely more difficult to find a valid waiver based on 
a silent record").  In addition, we do not require that a 
stipulation to violations or a waiver of a hearing be in 
writing, but a judge is authorized to require it.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 24, 28 (2018) 
(applying Sayyid). 
 
7 As the Appeals Court noted, the Federal appellate courts 
uniformly have held that a colloquy is not absolutely required 
before a judge accepts a waiver.  See Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 492-493 (citing cases). 
14 
 
 
Turning to the case before us, we conclude based on the 
totality of the circumstances that the probationer's stipulation 
to violations and his waiver of his right to a probation 
violation hearing were knowing and voluntary.  While not 
required to do so, the judge held a colloquy in which the 
probationer acknowledged that he was stipulating to the 
violations and waiving his rights.  The judge informed the 
probationer that he had a right to a hearing at which the 
probation officer would be required to prove that the 
probationer actually violated his probation by committing the 
charged offenses and asked whether the probationer understood 
that he was waiving that right, and the probationer responded in 
the affirmative.  The judge also asked whether the probationer 
had consulted with counsel and whether counsel had explained the 
options available to him, and the probationer again responded in 
the affirmative.  In response to the judge's questions, the 
probationer indicated that he chose to waive his right to a 
hearing and that no one had pressured him to do so. 
In addition to the judge's direct colloquy with the 
probationer, the probationer's attorney stated that she had 
twice visited him in jail to speak with him.  Furthermore, the 
notice with which the probationer was served and which notified 
him of the alleged violations listed his rights, including the 
right to an evidentiary hearing. 
15 
 
On the other hand, the deficiencies that the probationer 
identifies are not insignificant.  The probation officer never 
recited the underlying facts of the alleged violations or the 
evidence in support of them.  Accordingly, the judge could not 
question the probationer as to his agreement with the factual 
basis for the alleged violations.  In addition, while the judge 
found that there was sufficient evidence of a violation, there 
was no express finding on the record that the probationer's 
waiver was knowing and voluntary.  Cf. Johnson, 94 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 30-31 (commending judge for having "followed the 
preferred practice of conducting a colloquy with the 
[probationer] in which she fairly and meticulously secured the 
[probationer]'s agreement to the factual basis for each of the 
alleged violations prior to accepting his admission and his 
waiver of the right to a hearing"). 
The record before us supports the conclusion that the 
probationer's stipulation and waiver were knowing and voluntary, 
and his challenge to his sentence on this basis thus fails.  
However, we note that, while not constitutionally mandatory, the 
best practice for a judge at a surrender hearing in which a 
probationer stipulates to a violation of probation or waives his 
right to a probation violation hearing is for the judge to (1) 
require the probation officer to state the nature of the alleged 
violations, recite the factual basis for them, and summarize 
16 
 
either orally or in writing the evidence that would be presented 
against the probationer at a probation violation hearing; (2) 
ask the probationer whether he agrees with the factual 
allegations stated; (3) inform the probationer of his rights to 
a hearing, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence; 
(4) question the probationer regarding his understanding of 
these rights, whether he has consulted with counsel regarding 
his decision to waive them, and whether he intends to stipulate 
to the alleged violation and to waive each right; and (5) make 
an explicit finding on the record that the probationer's 
stipulation and waiver are knowing and voluntary before finding 
sufficient evidence of a violation.8 
3.  Due process claim.  The probationer argues that the 
finding of a probation violation must be vacated because no 
evidence of a violation was presented.  The judge's finding was 
based on the probationer's stipulation and was proper because, 
as we have concluded, the stipulation was valid, as was the 
probationer's waiver of his right to have evidence presented.  
See part 2.b, supra.  The probationer's argument conflates the 
requirements of due process for a probation violation hearing, 
which include the presentation of evidence, with the 
 
8 For a summary of a probationer's rights in probation 
revocation proceedings, which this recommendation is meant to 
address, see Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 66 (2006). 
17 
 
requirements for finding that such a hearing is validly waived, 
as here.  See Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 487-489 (discussing 
due process requirements for probation violation hearing under 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 [1972], and Commonwealth v. 
Durling, 407 Mass. 108 [1990], as distinct from requirements for 
valid stipulation of violation and waiver of hearing adopted 
from Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18).  The probationer's challenge 
to his sentence of probation on this basis therefore fails as 
well. 
4.  Reasonableness of probation condition.  The probationer 
argues that the condition that he attend a ten-month batterer's 
intervention program is not reasonably related to the underlying 
firearms offenses to which he pleaded guilty.  In addition to 
the reasons already discussed, see part 2.a, supra, this 
argument is not preserved because the probationer made no 
objection to the proposed condition at the surrender hearing 
and, in fact, agreed to it, see Commonwealth v. Obi, 475 Mass. 
541, 549 (2016) (defendant waived argument about condition of 
probation because she "raised no such concerns before the trial 
court judge, and there is no information in the record that 
would allow us to evaluate her claims").  This argument 
therefore would be waived even if the probationer's appeal from 
his sentence properly were before us.  See id.  However, because 
the appropriateness of probation conditions is important to the 
18 
 
administration of justice and because this case presents an 
opportunity to elucidate our case law, we exercise our 
discretion to reach the issue. 
Just as a judge has discretion to set conditions of 
probation at the time of sentencing, see G. L. c. 276, § 87 
(judge may impose "such conditions as [the judge] deems 
proper"); see also Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 459 
(2001); Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 402 (1998), she 
also has the discretion to modify those conditions "as a proper 
regard for the welfare[] not only of the probationer but of the 
community[] may require" (citation omitted), Buckley v. Quincy 
Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 815, 818-819 (1985).  
In either circumstance, a condition of probation is enforceable 
so long as it is reasonably related to the goals of sentencing 
and probation.  See LaPointe, supra; Pike, supra; Commonwealth 
v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 414-415 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1042 (1996). 
We recognize that several statements in Commonwealth v. 
Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11 (2010) (Goodwin II),9 may have focused 
attention away from the general requirement that probation 
conditions always must be reasonably related to the goals of 
 
9 We adopt this label to clarify that our discussion in this 
does not pertain to our earlier, related decision in 
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 88 (1993), which is cited in 
many of the cases we discuss. 
19 
 
sentencing and probation.  In that case, we stated:  "Where a 
defendant has violated a condition of his probation, a judge's 
authority to modify or add conditions of probation is nearly 
unlimited should the judge decide not to imprison the defendant 
but to return him to probation."  Id. at 17.  We noted in a 
footnote that "[t]he only limitation is that, where a probation 
condition infringes on a defendant's constitutional rights, it 
must be 'reasonably related' to the goals of sentencing and 
probation."  Id. at 17 n.8.  Together these passages may have 
implied that, where a condition of probation does not infringe 
on a constitutional right, the "reasonably related" requirement 
does not apply.  However, our frequent statement that "[a] 
probation condition is enforceable, even if it infringes on a 
defendant's ability to exercise constitutionally protected 
rights, so long as the condition is 'reasonably related' to the 
goals of sentencing and probation," LaPointe, 435 Mass. at 459, 
quoting Pike, 428 Mass. at 403; see Power, 420 Mass. at 414 
(similar), has never meant that where such a right is not 
affected the condition need not be reasonably related to those 
goals.  Cases decided after Goodwin II perhaps have stated the 
point more clearly.  See Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 
96 (2018), quoting Obi, 475 Mass. at 547 ("[C]onditions are 
enforceable 'so long as the condition is "reasonably related" to 
the goals of sentencing and probation.'  Even where a condition 
20 
 
of probation affects a constitutional right, it is valid if it 
is 'reasonably related' to the goals of sentencing and probation 
. . ."). 
In addition, in Goodwin II, we stated that, where a 
probationer has violated a condition of his probation and the 
judge adds or modifies the conditions as a result, "the 
[probationer] is essentially being sentenced anew on his 
underlying conviction, and the judge may impose any conditions 
of probation that could have been imposed at his original 
sentencing."  Goodwin II, 458 Mass. at 17.  We now recognize 
this statement of the law as incomplete because it implies that, 
where a violation has occurred, the judge is limited to imposing 
conditions that could have been imposed at the original 
sentencing.10  As we went on to explain, even where the 
 
10 We note that the cases cited in Goodwin II, 458 Mass. at 
17, for this proposition addressed circumstances different from 
those presented in Goodwin II itself, which addressed a judge's 
alteration of the conditions of probation where the probationer 
had not committed a violation.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Cory, 
454 Mass. 559, 564 (2009) (in deciding whether G. L. c. 265, 
§ 47, requiring global positioning system monitoring, was 
impermissible ex post facto law, stating that "[p]enalties for 
violation of the terms of supervised release, including the 
penalty of additional supervised release, are attributed to the 
original conviction rather than to the violation"); Wilcox, 446 
Mass. at 65 (stating, in context of explaining why probation 
revocation proceedings are not treated as criminal trials, that 
"[t]he probation revocation proceeding is not a new criminal 
prosecution . . . .  The Commonwealth has already met its burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the person's guilt on the 
underlying crime"). 
21 
 
probationer has not violated the terms of his probation, "[a] 
judge may add or modify a probation condition that will increase 
the scope of the original probation conditions . . . where there 
has been a 'material change in the probationer's circumstances 
since the time that the terms of probation were initially 
imposed.'"  Id. at 18, quoting Buckley, 395 Mass. at 820.  We 
noted the additional limiting principle that such a modification 
may not be "so punitive as to significantly increase the 
severity of the original probation."  Goodwin II, supra, citing 
Buckley, supra at 818 n.5, 820.  Thus, if it were true that, 
where the probationer had violated the conditions of his 
probation, the judge could impose only those conditions that 
could have been imposed at the original sentencing, the bar for 
modifying probation conditions in cases of a violation would be 
higher than that in cases where no violation had occurred, 
because in the latter case additional conditions may be imposed 
upon a mere showing of changed circumstances.  See Goodwin II, 
supra. 
Thus, today we wish to restate two points.  First, in order 
to be enforceable, a condition of probation must be reasonably 
related to the goals of sentencing and probation, regardless of 
whether a constitutional right is affected.  Second, where a 
probationer who is serving a suspended sentence and a sentence 
of probation has violated a condition of his probation, a judge 
22 
 
considering the modification or addition of probation terms as 
an alternative to imprisonment may consider the conduct 
constituting the violation in modifying the conditions of 
probation or crafting new ones.11  Nevertheless, the modified or 
additional conditions may not be so punitive as to significantly 
increase the severity of the original probation. 
After considering the challenged condition according to 
these principles, we conclude that there was no error.  The 
judge had before her the probationer's prior convictions on 
firearms offenses and his stipulation, equivalent to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 
Mass. 61, 65 (2006) (probation violation must be proved by 
preponderance of evidence rather than proof beyond reasonable 
doubt), that he committed domestic assault and recklessly 
 
11 This principle is consistent with our approach to 
probation conditions generally.  For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 95-97 (2018), we held that, where the 
probationer had pleaded guilty to larceny and admitted that her 
addiction motivated her to commit the crime, it was appropriate 
for the judge to impose special conditions of probation 
requiring the probationer to remain drug free, to continue 
outpatient drug treatment, and to submit to random drug screens.  
We noted that the conditions were not a punishment for her drug 
use, but for the underlying crime of larceny.  Id. at 98.  
Nevertheless, the judge could consider the probationer's drug 
use in tailoring the conditions to the probationer's personal 
circumstances.  Id. at 97.  Upon the violation of a condition of 
probation, a probationer is not being separately punished for 
any uncharged conduct constituting the violation, but the 
conduct properly may be considered in the modification or 
addition of probation conditions as part of the task of 
tailoring the conditions to the probationer's circumstances. 
23 
 
endangered a child.  The judge reasonably could have concluded, 
based on these facts and on the generally acknowledged 
relationship between access to firearms and domestic violence,12 
that the probationer's participation in a batterer's 
intervention program was necessary to his rehabilitation and the 
protection of the public.  See Buckley, 395 Mass. at 817.  In 
addition, the new condition, to which the probationer at any 
rate agreed, is not so burdensome as to significantly increase 
the severity of the original probation.  The judge acted well 
within her broad discretion. 
Conclusion.  The probationer's appeal from his sentence of 
probation entered on June 21, 2017, is dismissed as untimely.  
The order denying the probationer's motion to revise and revoke 
his sentence, entered September 25, 2017, is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
 
12 See Everytown for Gun Safety, Guns and Violence Against 
Women:  America's Uniquely Lethal Intimate Partner Violence 
Problem, at 7, 10, 15 (Oct. 2019), https://everytownresearch.org 
/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/10/IPV-for-WEB-042921A-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HPJ-TGLW] (describing role that firearms play 
in power dynamic of abusive relationships, increased likelihood 
that abusive partners with access to firearms will kill female 
victims, and risk that children in abusive homes either will be 
injured or suffer long-term emotional and psychological trauma 
from witnessing death of parent).