Title: Oedekoven v. Oedekoven

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Oedekoven v. Oedekoven1996 WY 92920 P.2d 649Case Number: 95-215Decided: 06/27/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Maxine OEDEKOVEN,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

John Gilbert OEDEKOVEN, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 

Charles Robert Oedekoven, 
Deceased, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price, II, J.

Tom C. Toner of 
Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellant.

James P. 
Schermetzler, Gillette, Philip White, Jr., Laramie, for 
appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Maxine Oedekoven 
appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of the personal 
representative of her ex-husband's estate. The district court held that alimony 
payments do not continue after the death of the payor spouse.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant Maxine 
Oedekoven (Maxine) presents the following issues for our review:

1.         When 
a divorce decree provides that a husband will pay the wife an annual payment as 
alimony "which will last for her life time," does the wife's right to alimony 
terminate on the husband's death?

2.         Is 
there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Charles Oedekoven 
established a trust for the benefit of Maxine Oedekoven which would terminate 
only on her death and under which she was to receive annual payments of $20,000 
during her life?

[¶4]      Appellee, the 
estate of Charles Oedekoven (estate or Charles), presents a single 
issue:

Is the Estate of Charles 
Oedekoven responsible for paying Plaintiff [Maxine] $20,000 per year in alimony 
(minus her Social Security benefits) for the rest of her life under terms of the 
divorce decree in this case?1

FACTS

[¶5]      Maxine and 
Charles Oedekoven were divorced on August 8, 1983. The terms of the divorce 
decree which are relevant to this case read:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
that the plaintiff [Charles] will pay the sum of $20,000.00 per year to the 
defendant [Maxine] as alimony which will last for her life time. Such payments 
shall be reduced as soon as the defendant starts to receive social security 
benefits by the amount of the social security benefits that she receives. 
Further, the alimony payments shall be secured by a pledge of assets and 
security agreement or such other security [de]vice including a trust as the 
parties may agree.

 

[¶6]      Charles died on 
July 28, 1994, and John Gilbert Oedekoven was appointed as the personal 
representative of the estate. Maxine filed the appropriate creditor's claim to 
maintain her alimony payments. On December 13, 1994, the estate rejected 
Maxine's claim. Maxine filed a complaint on December 29, 1994, asking the 
district court to determine that she was entitled to $20,000 in alimony each 
year until her death, and for other relief which is not relevant to this 
appeal.

[¶7]      Both parties 
filed motions for summary judgment, submitting briefs and supporting documents 
with their motions. After further briefing in response to the respective motions 
and a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the district court issued a 
decision letter on June 16, 1995. The decision letter stated, in pertinent 
part:

2. On the issue of the 
duration of the alimony, the court will find for the defendant [Charles] and 
against the plaintiff [Maxine]. On this issue, it appears that Wyoming follows 
the general rule of law that when alimony is granted as support and maintenance, 
it terminates upon the death of either party. Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 
527 (Wyo. 1961). In the Warren case, the spouse was awarded permanent alimony 
for as long as she should live or until she remarried, and the alimony was made 
a charge against the husband's estate. Based upon the evidence in that case, the 
court found that this was not alimony, but rather a "disposition of the property 
of the parties."

The $20,000.00 awarded by 
the judge in the Oedekoven divorce case was called alimony and appeared to be 
for support and maintenance, particularly since it was to be reduced upon 
receipt by the wife of social security payments. It is also evidence that it was 
only for support and maintenance because it was to terminate upon the death of 
the wife. What was left out of the decree, potentially, is whether this was 
binding on the husband's estate, should he die. The decree is silent in that 
area. In examining Wyoming law, Wyoming may be in the category that does not 
give the judge the power to order alimony to continue after death of the payor. 
In Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 594 (Wyo. 1989), the lower court awarded 
alimony of $600,000.00 payable at the rate of $5,000.00 per month, continuing as 
an obligation on the husband, his executor, trustee or successor after husband's 
death. The court also had ordered that this $600,000.00 was "as and for alimony, 
and not for property settlement". When the Supreme Court reviewed this action by 
the lower court it made this comment: "Upon remand, however, if the district 
court makes a similar award intending it to be alimony, the provision should be 
designed to terminate upon the death of either party in order to be effective as 
intended and to avoid further contest as to its operation. We also note, as 
another reason to avoid any ambiguity, that certain tax consequences flow from 
the construction of such provision by the Internal Revenue Service." Those tax 
consequences were taken into consideration by the parties in the Oedekovn [sic] 
case. Each had treated it as alimony for purposes of their individual income 
tax.

Even if Wyoming goes 
beyond the strict position not allowing alimony to continue after death, the 
court finds instructive the cases that require this to be done in clear and 
unmistakable language. Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wn. 180, 48 P.2d 247, 248 (1935), 
cited by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Warren v. Warren, Supra; Bird v. Henke, 65 Wn.2d 79, 395 P.2d 751 (1964). The specific and clear language binding upon the 
estate of the husband in this case is absent from the divorce 
decree.

On June 29, 
1995, the district court entered its order for summary judgment and this appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The precise issue 
in this case, whether alimony payments continue after the death of the payor 
spouse, is an issue of first impression for this Court. Although several of our 
cases have remarked that alimony terminates upon the death of either spouse, the 
question has not been directly at issue, nor has it been seriously analyzed in 
the context of this case. See Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 527-28 (Wyo. 1961) 
(Although award was labeled alimony in the decree, court intended it to be a 
distribution of property, not alimony. Division of property was not just and 
equitable if award was alimony and terminated upon remarriage of wife.); Sellers 
v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (Wyo. 1989) (Record did not support award of 
alimony. Alimony has some unique features which were not appropriate in this 
case.); Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 594 (Wyo. 1989) (District court 
improperly entered a default judgment, granting alimony and property 
distribution without an evidentiary hearing. Relies on Warren to hold that if 
award is intended to be alimony, it must be designed to terminate upon the death 
of either party to be effective as intended.)

[¶9]      At common law, 
the obligation to pay alimony was regarded as a personal one which terminated 
upon the death of either spouse. Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wn. 180, 48 P.2d 247, 
248 (1935). However, this rule has been modified by statute in many states so 
that now, where the statute allows the court to modify the alimony award, the 
court has the power to provide in its decree that alimony shall continue after 
the death of the obligor and be payable out of his estate. Id. "[I]f the court 
exercises such power, the provision for continuance of such payments after death 
must either be specifically stated in the decree, or else its language must be 
so clear and unmistakable as to indicate that the court intended that the decree 
should have that effect." Id. "There is some diversity of opinion in the cases 
as to the degree of certainty that must appear in the decree itself. . . ." 
Id.

[¶10]   WYO. STAT. § 20-2-116 (1994)2 gives the district court which 
issues the divorce decree continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree. In 
Swetich v. Smith, 802 P.2d 869, 870 (Wyo. 1990), we noted that Sellers and 
Warren indicated "alimony payments terminate on the death of either party or on 
the remarriage of the payee." However, we then determined that a payor is not 
allowed to stop making alimony payments upon remarriage of the payee unless the 
decree so provides.  Id. at 871. We 
based our decision on the court's ability to modify the decree.

In Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Wyo. 1978), we said "an award always remains 
open; and upon application, where conditions and circumstances have changed, the 
trial court can provide relief and modify the allowance." Necessarily, 
modification of the award for the payment of alimony is to be made by the 
district judge, not by a unilateral decision by the payor.

Swetich, 802 P.2d  at 870. "[T]he remedy available to the alimony obligor is reserved to a 
petition to modify the decree." Id. at 871. In other words, Swetich held that 
WYO. STAT. § 20-2-116, allowing the court to modify the decree, changed the 
common law rule concerning alimony payments after remarriage of the payee 
spouse.

[¶11]   Warren, Sellers, and Spitzer appear 
to have relied on the common law rule when they indicated that alimony 
terminates upon the death of either of the parties. However, we were able to 
resolve those cases without determining whether there may be circumstances in 
which the decree was intended to continue alimony payments after the death of 
the payor. In Warren and Spitzer, the issue presented to the court was whether 
an award was intended to be, and therefore should be designated as, alimony or a 
property distribution. Warren, 361 P.2d  at 527; Spitzer, 777 P.2d  at 594. 
Sellers merely determined that the evidence in the record did not support an 
alimony award. Sellers, 775 P.2d  at 1032-33. Therefore, we hold that WYO. STAT. 
§ 20-2-116 (1994) changed the common law rule concerning alimony payments after 
the death of the payor spouse. See Murphy, 48 P.2d  at 248.

[¶12]   Now we must determine whether the 
decree in this case was intended to require continued alimony payments to Maxine 
after Charles' death.

Although it has been held 
that the award of alimony should be made only during the joint lives of the 
parties, and that the court cannot without the consent or agreement of the 
parties provide for the continuance of alimony after the death of either party, 
statutes may provide for the continuance of alimony after the paying spouse's 
death, and the courts generally have the power, in many cases under statutes, so 
to provide. Where such power exists, alimony will continue after the death of 
the paying spouse where the decree expressly so provides, or it clearly appears 
that the court intended that the decree should have that effect, but in the 
absence of such express provision or clear intention the decree will not have 
such effect.

In order for a decree to 
expressly provide for maintenance subsequent to the obligor's death, it has been 
held that the decree must provide funding for such maintenance such as an 
insurance policy or a lien on property.

27B C.J.S. 
Divorce § 374 (1986).

[¶13]   The Oedekoven decree 
states:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
that the plaintiff [Charles] will pay the sum of $20,000.00 per year to the 
defendant [Maxine] as alimony which will last for her life time. Such payments 
shall be reduced as soon as the defendant starts to receive social security 
benefits by the amount of the social security benefits that she receives. 
Further, the alimony payments shall be secured by a pledge of assets and 
security agreement or such other security [de]vice including a trust as the 
parties may agree.

The decree 
clearly states that the alimony "will last for her [Maxine's] life time." It 
also provides funding for the alimony through a pledge of assets and security 
agreement or other security device. We hold that the trial court erred when it 
found that "specific and clear language binding upon the estate of the husband 
in this case is absent from the divorce decree."

[¶14]   Finally, the estate appears to 
argue that since Maxine cannot prove that a trust agreement between Maxine and 
Charles exists and Charles did not provide for any other security in accordance 
with the terms of the decree, the estate is excused from providing continued 
alimony payments. However, the decree required Charles to establish some 
security device to ensure continued payment. Charles' estate may not benefit 
from Charles' failure to follow the terms of the court ordered 
decree.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   According to the clearly expressed 
intent of the divorce decree, Maxine is entitled to continued alimony payments 
for her life time. The decision of the district court is reversed and remanded 
for action consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Charles argues that this 
Court should not consider Maxine's second issue concerning a trust agreement. 
Maxine presented some evidence that a trust was established; however, the trust 
presented into evidence was not signed by Charles. The district court did not 
address the trust issue in its decision letter or order. Fortunately, we are 
able to resolve this case without relying on the existence or non-existence of 
the alleged trust agreement.

2 The court had this power 
in 1983, the year the decree in this case was issued. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 
152 § 1.