Title: State v. Deierling

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

406 N.W.2d 793 (1987) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Dean DEIERLING, Appellant. No. 86-1205. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 17, 1987. Rick L. Olson, Des Moines, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Ann E. Brenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., James A. Smith, Co. Atty., and Odell McGhee, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellee. Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and CARTER, JJ. LARSON, Justice. The defendant, Gary Dean Deierling, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, second offense. Iowa Code § 321.281 (1985). During the voir dire examination of the jury panel, Deierling challenged one of the prospective jurors for cause because she was employed by the Iowa State Legislative Services Bureau. See Iowa R.Crim.P. *794 17(5)(e). The court overruled the challenge. The challenged juror did not serve, but the defendant was required to exercise one of his strikes to remove her. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 17(9). The defendant was convicted, and on his appeal, we affirm. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(5)(e) provides, in part: (Emphasis added.) Deierling's argument is that the state of Iowa is the plaintiff, or the "person alleged to be injured by the offense charged," or "on whose complaint, or at whose instance, the prosecution was instituted." Id. We do not agree. This rule, like a statute, must be interpreted in a "sensible, workable, practical and logical" manner. See Emmetsburg Ready Mix Co. v. Norris, 362 N.W.2d 498, 499 (Iowa 1985). Under Deierling's theory, every state employee would be subject to challenge for cause in every criminal case, even when there is no reasonable likelihood of actual bias. We do not believe this was the intent of the rule. Statutes on challenges for cause, or rules like our rule of criminal procedure 17(5)(e), are said to create classes of imputed or implied bias or presumptions that certain classes of persons will be biased because of their particular circumstances in relation to the case. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 149-50, 57 S. Ct. 177, 187, 81 L. Ed. 78, 90 (1936); Tilford v. Page, 307 F. Supp. 781, 786-87 (D.C.Okla.1969); Henslee v. State, 251 Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352, 354 (1971); Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind.App.1985). We do not believe rule 17(5)(e) was intended to create such a broad presumption. The United States Supreme Court, in addressing a similar question as to whether employees of the federal government should be presumed to be biased, said this: Wood, 299 U.S. at 149, 57 S. Ct. at 186, 81 L. Ed. at 90; accord United States v. Chapman, 158 F.2d 417, 419 (10th Cir.1946). We believe the trial judge correctly overruled the challenge for cause. We therefore affirm. AFFIRMED.