Title: In the Matter of the Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). POLLOCK, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal concerns the standards for terminating the parental rights of a biological parent in an adoption proceeding. In this case, G.P.B., Jr. ( G.P.B.) seeks to adopt his two stepsons, A.M., age nine, and R.M., age eleven, and to terminate the parental rights of the boys' biological father, M.M., who opposes the adoption. M.M. and A.B. were married in 1981 and it soon became apparent that M.M. was an alcoholic. M.M. attended meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous at A.B.'s insistence and after his condition stabilized, they decided to have a child. R.M. was born on November 20, 1987, but M.M. had begun to drink heavily during A.B.'s pregnancy and except for a one-year period when he abstained from alcohol after seeking counseling, M.M. was not involved in caring for either child, the second of whom was born in 1989. M.M. and A.B. separated in the spring of 1990 and M.M. subsequently was diagnosed with bipolar disorder aggravated by alcohol and antihistamine abuse. He was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital and was hospitalized several times between 1990 and 1993. During the beginning of this period, however, M.M. provided for his sons financially and visited the boys weekly in a supervised setting. After M.M. appeared at A.B.'s home on Thanksgiving of 1991 and announced that he was Jesus Christ and that his place was with her, A.B. terminated the visitation and M.M. has neither seen nor spoken with his sons since that time. Under the terms of the settlement made by M.M. and A.B. when the judgment of divorce was entered in February 1992, A.B. was given sole custody of the children. M.M. surrendered all visitation rights, but agreed to pay $800 per month in child support. Between 1992 and 1996, M.M. received $810 per month in Social Security disability benefits and limited his support payments to $186, but he since has paid his support arrears. M.M. maintained that A.B. orally agreed to supervised visitation and he made several unsuccessful motions for visitation between 1992 and 1996. A.B. asserted M.M. was unstable and M.M. failed to provide his medical records or any proof that his condition had improved. A.B. rebuffed M.M.'s efforts to communicate with his children during this period. Since 1993, M.M. has been a recovering alcoholic. His condition has stabilized and he receives regular treatment. He remarried and is the primary caretaker of the two children from his second marriage. He also cares for his four stepchildren. At the time of the trial in this matter, M.M. was a full-time college student. A.B. remarried also, in 1994, after dating G.P.B. since 1991. G.P.B. functions as the boys' father and the boys consider him their father. They want to use his last name as theirs. G.P.B. wants to adopt his stepsons and as part of the adoption proceedings seeks to terminate M.M.'s parental rights. M.M. objects to the adoption and to the termination of his parental rights. He seeks only supervised visitation with his sons, not custody of them. At the trial of this matter, G.P.B. offered an expert witness who testified that in his opinion adoption was in the boys' best interests. M.M. offered an expert who reached the opposite conclusion. The Family Part granted the adoption and terminated M.M.'s parental rights. The court found that the evidence met the standards of N.J.S.A. 9:3 46 (a), and found specifically that the boys had not perceived M.M. as their father for more than six months. M.M. appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed the judgment of adoption. The court acknowledged that the boys had no relationship with M.M., but stated that the Family Part should have considered whether continuing M.M.'s parental rights would result in imminent danger of serious harm to the children. The Appellate Division found no such danger. The Supreme Court granted G.P.B.'s petition for certification. HELD: Following the 1998 amendment to N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 (a), a court deciding the contested adoption of a child who has lived with one biological parent should use the best interests of the child standard and determine whether the biological parent objecting to the adoption has affirmatively taken on the duties of a parent as described in the statute. 1. Before authorizing the adoption of a child, a court must terminate the parental rights of the biological parent, a procedure that implicates fundamental liberty interests protected under the United States Constitution. In recent years, however, there has been increasing concern for the best interests of children whose parents have forsaken their parental responsibilities. A child's right to a permanent home has gained increasing prominence. The New Jersey Legislature has responded to those concerns. ( pp. 6-9 ) 2. The Legislature amended the statute governing termination of parental rights in 1994 and 1998; each amendment has emphasized more strongly the needs of the child. The 1994 amendment declared that a parent's care and support of a child should include three functions: maintenance of the parental relationship such that the child perceives that person as the child's parent; communication between parent and child; and financial support for the child. The failure to perform at least two of those functions likely would be required before parental rights were terminated. The focus has been on an actual relationship between parent and child. In this case, M.M. has no relationship with his sons, in part because of A.B.'s actions. ( pp.10-14 ) 3. The 1998 amendment to the statute stresses the importance of the affirmative assumption of parental duties. It mandates granting the adoption if the court finds the existence of the prescribed conditions rather than prohibiting the adoption absent the existence of those conditions. In a case such as this, the proceedings turn initially on the best interest of the child. The court should consider whether the objecting parent has affirmatively assumed the statutorily specified duties of a parent and may consider other factors bearing on the best interest of the child, but should not undertake a comparative analysis of the birth parent with the adoptive parent. ( pp.14-22 ) 4. The focus of the Appellate Division on whether continuation of M.M.'s parental relationship would place his sons in imminent danger of serious harm was misplaced. Instead, on remand to the Family Part for reconsideration under the statute as amended in 1998, the court should decide whether over the course of his sons' lives, M.M. has affirmatively assumed the specified duties of a parent. ( pp.22-23 ) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Family Part. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurring, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins, stresses that, using the analytical structure of the statute, the court must make the qualitative determination of whether the physical or mental health of the children has been and will continue to be jeopardized by their relationship with their father. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY G.P.B., JR. Argued November 9, 1998 -- Decided August 3, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 311 N.J. Super. 38(1998). Richard A. Russell argued the cause for appellant, G.P.B., Jr. David A. Stefankiewicz argued the cause for respondent, M.M. The opinion of the Court was delivered by POLLOCK, J. This appeal concerns the standards for terminating the parental rights of a biological parent in an adoption proceeding. In this appeal, the stepfather of two minor children seeks to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and to adopt the children. The Family Part terminated the biological father's parental rights and approved the adoption. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the biological father did not pose an imminent danger to the children. 311 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 1998). We granted the stepfather's petition for certification. 156 N.J. 405 (1998). During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature amended the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-46, to emphasize that the dominant consideration was the best interest of children rather than the rights of their biological parents. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the Family Part for reconsideration under the amended statute. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY G.P.B., JR. O'HERN, J., concurring. Termination of parental rights presents the legal system with an almost insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, we emphasize the inviolability of the family unit, noting that "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' * * * 'basic civil rights of man,' * * * and '[r]ights far more precious * * * than property rights' * * *." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972) (citations omitted). The interests of parents in this relationship have thus been deemed fundamental and are constitutionally protected. On the other hand, it has been recognized "that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 119 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 33 (1972)). N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 elaborates on the best interests standard by cataloguing the circumstances in which the Legislature has determined that a child's health and welfare will be seriously impaired by continuing an existing parental relationship. The judicial inquiry should focus on the conduct specified by the Legislature as evidence of the type of harm that children should be spared. For example, a father who never sees his child or never makes efforts to be a part of a child's life sufficient to cause the child to view the person as a parent, causes harm to the child. Children have a profound interest in permanency and knowing who their parents are. The problem is compounded here because the adopting party is a step-parent who has bonded with the two children. See In re Guardianship of J.C. and J.M.C., 129 N.J. 1, 25-26 (1992) (requiring remand to determine whether children had bonded with their foster parents and if so whether breaking such bonds would cause the children serious psychological or emotional harm. ). Under N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a, in order to determine best interests, the court considers whether the parent has fulfilled financial obligations toward the child, whether the parent has demonstrated continued interest in the child, whether the parent has made a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and whether the parent has a place of importance in the child's life. The statute then sets forth time periods in a child's life when the standards must be met, such as, for example, within the crucial first months of a child's life. Under N.J.S.A. 9:3 46a(1) and (2), an adoption may be entered over the objection of a parent if the court finds that during the relevant time periods, either the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or the parent is unable to do so. The regular and expected parental functions of care and support include the maintenance of a relationship with the child such that the child perceives the person as his parent . . . communicating with the child . . . unless prevented from so doing, and providing financial support . . . unless prevented from doing so. N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a(2)(a), (b) and (c). The elements of these composite tests are intended to indicate whether a parent has failed and thereby harmed a child and whether that harm is likely to continue if the relationship is not ended. N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 comports with the Court's reasoning in In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396 (1988), also a contested adoption case. Although [t]he statutory descriptions [in Title 30 guardianship actions and Title 9 adoption actions] of the conditions required to terminate parental rights differ; their interpretation in case law . . . tends to equate them. 109 N.J. at 444. Our former Chief Justice Wilentz explained: Although the question of best interests of the child is dispositive of the custody issue in a dispute between natural parents, it does not govern the question of termination. It has long been decided that the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent's rights. . . . It must be noted, despite some language to the contrary, that the interests of the child are not the only interests involved when termination issues are raised. The parent's rights, both constitutional and statutory, have their own independent vitality. [Baby M., supra, 109 N.J. at 44 (citations omitted).] On remand, the Family Part must make the qualitative determination, using the analytical framework of the statute, of whether the physical or mental health of the children has been and will continue to be jeopardized by their relationship with their father. Parham, supra, 442 U.S. at 603, 94 S. Ct. at 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 119. Justice Stein joins this opinion. NO. A-7 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY G.P.B., JR. DECIDED In a contest between a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L. 1977, c. 367 (C.9:3-45) objecting to the adoption and the prospective adoptive parent, the standard shall be the best interest of the child. The best interest of a child requires that a parent affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. In determining whether a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent, the court shall consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations for the birth and care of the child, demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the child's life. A judgment of adoption shall be entered over an objection of a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L. 1977, c. 367 (C. 9:3-45) communicated to the court by personal appearance or by letter if the court finds, during the six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption or within 120 days after the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, in the case of a child placed for adoption as a newborn infant: (1) that the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or (2) that the parent is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child and that the parent's inability to perform those functions is unlikely to change in the immediate future.