Title: STATE ON BEHALF OF WINDSCHITL v. Landkammer

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

217 N.W.2d 494 (1974) STATE of Minnesota, on Behalf of Lyle WINDSCHITL, Guardian Ad Litem of Marlys Theresa Windschitl, Respondent, v. Joel LANDKAMMER, Appellant. No. 44215. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 19, 1974. *495 Somsen, Dempsey & Schade and William M. Schade, New Ulm, for appellant. Raphael J. Miller, County Atty., Gaylord, for respondent. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and OTIS, SCOTT, and KNUTSON, JJ., and considered and decided by the court. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal in a paternity proceeding from an order denying defendant's alternative motion for an order vacating and setting aside the verdict, amending the findings, conclusions, and order for judgment, and granting judgment for defendant or for a new trial. We affirm the trial court. Following trial, the jury returned a general verdict on October 20, 1972, finding defendant to be the father of an illegitimate child. The action had been commenced for the reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement, including her suitable maintenance for the maximum of 8 weeks prior to and 8 weeks after delivery of the child, and further, for the education and necessary support of the illegitimate child born to Marlys T. Windschitl on July 14, 1972. Minn.St. 257.251. *496 Pursuant to the jury verdict, the judge ordered defendant to be questioned as to his financial ability to furnish support. He was subsequently ordered to pay the welfare board of Sibley County the amount of $668.20 in two installments; one half by December 1972, one half by February 1973. For the support of the child he was ordered to pay Marlys Windschitl the amount of $40 per month until the child reaches majority or is self-supporting, or until the order is amended by the court. The sole issue on appeal is whether defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because of the refusal of the county attorney to request immunity for defendant and his witnesses. The county attorney commenced this action under Minn.St. 257.254 in his official capacity at the request of the welfare department. As his first witness, the county attorney called defendant for cross-examination under the rules. After establishing that defendant did in fact know Marlys Windschitl and that he had seen her on occasions, he was asked whether or not, during the fall of 1971, he had sexual intercourse with Marlys Windschitl. The pertinent part of the testimony disclosed by the record is as follows: The next witness was Marlys Windschitl, who testified that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant on approximately 30 occasions during the period from September to December, 1971. She also testified that she gave birth to a male child on July 14, 1972, and that her last previous menstrual period ended on September 30, 1971. Further, she testified that she did not have sexual intercourse with any other person aside from defendant between August 1971 and December 1971. At that time she was 15 years of age. She told defendant in December that she thought she was pregnant, and he allegedly told her that "we will have to work it out." She further testified that defendant came to her home during the last of March, 1972, and in the presence of "[m]y aunt and uncle and my parents and myself * * * [h]e said he was the father of the child, that he did have intercourse with me. My father asked him if he knew of any other guys who did and he said no." She also testified that he said he would pay for it all. Mr. Lyle Windschitl, father of the complaining witness, confirmed this visit to his home in March, as well as other testimony his daughter had given. Dr. A. F. Duesterhoeft testified that he delivered a normal child conceived about the 8th, 9th, or 10th of October, 1971. The defendant then called Roger Hahn, who testified that he had been alone with Marlys Windschitl for approximately one-half hour in mid-September, 1971, and that she had removed part of her clothing. When asked by defendant's lawyer whether or not he had had sexual intercourse with Marlys Windschitl, he answered, "I refuse to answer on the grounds it might incriminate me." The following exchange then occurred: The next witness called by defendant was Thomas Peterson, who testified that he had also been alone with Marlys Windschitl *497 in an automobile after a dance at the Gibbon Ballroom on the evening of September 10, 1971. The next question led to another request for immunity: Defendant's next witness was Bradley Kizer. He testified that he had been at a party at the Windschitl farm in December of 1971, that Marlys Windschitl's parents were present, and that he had spent an hour and a half in a car with Marlys Windschitl. The same pattern was followed: Defendant then called his brother, Robert Landkammer, who stated that Marlys Windschitl had been at his house for several hours on October 15, 1971. The record reveals: The record discloses the following upon further questioning of this witness: Mr. Lyle Windschitl was recalled for rebuttal. He stated that he had been home at all times on the night that Bradley Kizer was at the party at his farm, and that Bradley had arrived and departed with his girlfriend, Vanna Messner and that defendant had been with his daughter that night and had left with her. This testimony was produced in open court before the jury. The constitutional attack upon these proceedings, based upon an alleged denial of due process and equal protection, appears a *498 bit nebulous. Minn.St. 609.09, subd. 1, with which we are concerned, reads as follows: A portion of the Advisory Committee's Comments to the Criminal Code reads as follows (40 M.S.A. p. 100): Although the statute differs somewhat from that originally recommended, having been amended since, the purpose, effect, and application of such a statute is discussed thoroughly by the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964) and in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 1609, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 695 (1964), which reads in pertinent part: It is clear from the above opinions that this statute compelling testimony is a "tool" designed to assist the prosecutor, and has been accepted as part of both Federal and state procedure as constitutionally sound. It is difficult to construe the statute to mean something other than that which effectuates the true purpose for which it was enacted. A reading of the statute will make it clear that immunity is granted by *499 the court, not the county attorney. It is inconceivable that immunity would be recommended by the prosecutor and granted by the court without a thorough investigation of the witness to determine the extent of his involvement. Otherwise, and particularly in a situation of surprise as presented here, no one is apprised of which particular crimes the witness is going to admit. To ask the court to forgive a witness of his crimes without knowing what crimes are to be forgiven is a very serious request. Such an application would lead to chaos in most cases because of the possible far-reaching effect of granting it.[1] If defense counsel did not know until trial that the witnesses would refuse to state whether they had had sexual intercourse with Marlys Windschitl unless they were granted immunity, this was knowledge he could have acquired by use of the discovery procedures of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It seems more likely that making requests for immunity when the witnesses refused to testify at trial was a trial tactic that failed. In any event, it is apparent that, whatever the defense was attempting to accomplish, the intended implication that Marlys may have had sexual intercourse with others than defendant was presented to the jury through each witness' claiming the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Even with this implication, the jury concluded that defendant was the father of this child. It is difficult to believe that defendant was in some way prejudiced by the actions of the county attorney. The more modern course for defense counsel would have been to apprise the county attorney or the court before trial of the information sought to be obtained through the requested grants of immunity in order to allow a determination of the authenticity of the information and to assure fairness to all concerned. In such matters, the usual procedure is that counsel avail themselves of all the rules of discovery. We suggest also that they should no longer deal at arm's length. We feel that the jury, in effect, had all the pertinent information available before it deliberated and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, and therefore affirm. Affirmed. [1] "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79, Note 18, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 1609, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 695 (1964).