Title: ALBERT WOOSTER V. CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, and DARLENE JOHANSON,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALBERT WOOSTER V. CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,  and DARLENE JOHANSON, 2005 WY 47109 P.3d 893Case Number: 04-146Decided: 04/14/2005
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 

 
 
 
 
ALBERTWOOSTER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 

CARBON 
COUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 1, a 
local government entity; and

DARLENE 
JOHANSON, individually,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Robert W. Horn of Robert W. Horn, P.C., Jackson Hole, Wyoming; and 
Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee  Carbon  CountySchool District No. 1:

 
 
            
Catherine MacPherson of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; BURKE, Justice, filed a dissenting 
opinion, with which KITE, Justice, joined.

 
 

 

 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court granted summary judgment to the appellee in this negligence action because 
the appellant's notice of governmental claim did not meet constitutional and 
statutory requirements.  We agree 
and dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issues in this appeal may be stated as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
Does the district court have subject matter jurisdiction in a Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act case where the claim does not meet the requirements of 
Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution?1

 
 
            
2.         
Can a defective notice of claim presented within the two-year period of 
limitation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-39-113(a) (LexisNexis 2003) be cured by 
presentment of a non-defective notice of claim after that period has passed?2

 
 

            
3.         
Is the holding of Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 863, 866 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II) that governmental claims, when presented, 
must meet the requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution, to be 
applied prospectively only?

 
 

 
 

[¶3]      Our standard of 
review of summary judgments is well known and will not be repeated here.  See Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 
WY 33, ¶¶ 8-10, 20 P.3d 521, 525-26 (Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu I).

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      The material 
facts are undisputed.  On September 
18, 2001, the appellant was driving a tractor-trailer that collided with a 
school bus driven by the appellee's employee.  On July 16, 2002, the appellant 
presented to the appellee a notice of claim alleging injuries and damage 
resulting from the collision.  The 
notice of claim was signed only by the appellant's counsel.  On November 4, 2002, the appellant filed 
a complaint in district court alleging, inter alia, presentment of the 
notice of claim.

 
 
[¶5]      On March 25, 
2004, this Court issued its decision in Beaulieu II.3  On the following day, the appellee filed 
a motion for summary judgment alleging that the appellant had not signed his 
notice of claim and it was not signed under penalty of perjury.  The appellant responded on March 31, 
2004, by presenting to the appellee an amended notice of claim, duly signed by 
the appellant and certified under penalty of perjury.  Clearly, the amended notice of claim was 
presented more than two years after the date of the 
collision.

 
 

[¶6]      Further detailed 
analysis of this case is unnecessary.  
The ruling of the district court is correct.  The law is as follows:  (1) when presented to the governmental 
entity, a notice of claim must be signed by the claimant and certified under 
penalty of perjury, as required by the Wyoming Constitution; (2) such 
presentment, and the allegation thereof, is a condition precedent to suit and 
is, therefore, jurisdictional; (3) the limitation period of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(a) is not a mere procedural statute of limitations, but is a 
jurisdictional non-claim statute, meaning that a defective notice of claim 
cannot be cured via the relation-back doctrine by presentment of a non-defective 
notice of claim after the period has passed; (4) the holding in Beaulieu 
II that a notice of claim must meet the requirements of Article 16, § 7 of 
the Wyoming Constitution is not applied prospectively only, because such has 
always been the law, as was stated in Beaulieu I, three years earlier.4  See Bell v. Schell, 2004 
WY 153, ¶¶ 10-11, 16-36, 101 P.3d 465, 468, 469-76 (Wyo. 2004); 
Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004); 
Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶¶ 6-15, 86 P.3d at 866-69; and 
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 12-18, 20 P.3d  at 526-27.

 
 

[¶7]      As to the third 
issue, that being prospective application of the ruling that governmental claims 
must meet the signature and certification requirements of the state 
constitution, we will add the following.  
Long ago, this Court declared that district courts do not have 
jurisdiction over governmental claims that were not presented to the 
governmental entity as required by Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  Price v. State 
Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 396, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (1946); 
Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 422-25, 19 P.2d 951, 954-55 (1933).  In Beaulieu I, we held that, 
inasmuch as a notice of claim that did not meet the constitutional signature and 
certification requirements was not a valid claim, the period of limitation found 
in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act did not begin to run upon presentment of 
such deficient claim.  In reaching 
that conclusion, we commented upon the "jurisdictional impact of establishing 
for purposes of pleading the date of the claim and its appropriate certification 
. . .."  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 
33, ¶ 18, 20 P.3d  at 527.  The very clear holding of Beaulieu 
I was this:

 
 
The 
requirement is clear that an itemized statement in writing is to be filed, which 
is certified under penalty of perjury.  
Such a statement must be signed by the claimant or the charge of perjury 
could not lie.  In addition, it is 
to be filed with the officer or officers charged with the duty to audit the 
claim.

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
15, 20 P.3d  at 527.

 
 

[¶8]      This Court has 
always required that governmental claims comply with Article 16, § 7 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  Earlier cases 
primarily dealt with the issue of presentment of a claim to the governmental 
entity.  Wyoming State Highway 
Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1345-46 (Wyo. 1978); Awe 
v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 100 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on 
other grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 1991); 
Price, 167 P.2d  at 312; 
Utah Const. Co., 19 P.2d  at 954-55.  Beaulieu I established that 
governmental claims must comply not just with the presentment requirement of the 
constitution, but also with its signature and certification requirements.  The only change in Beaulieu II 
was the recognition that, if these requirements were jurisdictional, they 
could not be waived as had erroneously been held in Martinez v. City of 
Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo. 1990), overruled by Beaulieu II, 
2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863.

 
 

[¶9]      The collision 
that occasioned this lawsuit occurred approximately six months after the 
publication of Beaulieu I, which opinion clearly stated that governmental 
claims must be signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury.  The appellant's notice of claim was 
presented to the appellee nearly ten months latersixteen months after the 
publication of Beaulieu I.  
Thus, the later publication of Beaulieu II did not establish a 
new principle of law that was relevant to this determinative issue, making 
prospective application inappropriate.5  See Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 177 ( Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶10]   In response to the dissent's earnest plea for 
equity in the form of prospective application of Beaulieu II, we feel 
compelled to review to some extent Wyoming's governmental claims jurisprudence, 
with our focus on subject matter jurisdiction.  We begin with Houtz v. Board of Com'rs of Uinta County, 
11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840, 842 (1902), where we noted that the constitutional 
and statutory requirements that governmental claims be verified "has for its 
object a showing of good faith and honesty in the presentation of the bill . . 
.."  While deciding the case on 
other grounds, we noted that the notice of claim at issue was neither certified 
nor presented properly.  Id. at 844.  Perhaps presaging Beaulieu I, we found that a notice of 
claim that was not "presented in form" likely was not intended to be an attempt 
to comply with the claim statute.  
Houtz, 70 P.  at 844.  
Significantly, we did not distinguish between the constitution's 
verification and presentment requirements in discussing whether the questioned 
instrument was a governmental claim.

 
 
[¶11]   In Utah Const. Co., 19 P.2d  at 955 
(quoting Gates v. State, 128 N.Y. 221, 228, 28 N.E. 373 (1891)), we made 
clear that, because the State cannot be sued except as it has, itself, allowed, 
compliance with the constitution and the statutes implementing the 
constitution's mandates is "a question of jurisdiction [and] could be raised at 
any time, and could not be waived . . ..'"  
Thus, "[t]he objection that the plaintiff has failed to perform a 
condition that would have given him a right to sue raises a question of 
jurisdiction."  Id.  Furthermore, while the specific issue 
before the court was the failure to present a governmental claim, rather than to 
verify it, this Court held that implementing statutes "cannot be given a meaning 
that would permit an evasion of the mandatory constitutional provision[.]"  Id. at 953.  Carried into the present controversy, 
that means that the courts cannot interpret governmental claims statutes to 
allow less than the constitution requires; courts cannot give themselves 
jurisdiction over claims that are not signed or certified to under penalty of 
perjury.

 
 
[¶12]   In Price, 167 P.2d  at 312, we sustained the 
dismissal with prejudice of an amended petition because the governmental claim 
had never been presented to the state auditor.  We did not use the phrase "subject 
matter jurisdiction," but we described compliance with constitution and statute 
as "a condition to the right to sue[.]"  
Id.  
The same result was obtained in Awe, 534 P.2d  at 99.  Although Awe once again involved the failure to 
present a claim to the state auditor, we went beyond presentment and noted that 
"no sworn or certified claim of any sort" was presented.  Id. at 98.  We repeatedly stated the need for "a 
formal claim, in proper form," "[a] formal claim fitting the requirements of 
Art. XVI, § 7, of the Wyoming Constitution . . .."  Awe, 534 P.2d  at 99-100.  Describing this requirement as a 
"condition precedent" to the filing of an action, we affirmed judgment in favor 
of the State.  Id. at 99, 102.  To the plaintiffs' allegation that they 
were misled by the State's assertion that it would not raise immunity, we 
responded:

 
 
We 
are not here, however, deciding questions of sovereign immunity, except 
peripherally.  We are discussing and 
deciding questions of serious and important prerequisite jurisdictional 
procedures, without which we might as well abandon all rules of orderly conduct 
of lawsuits, disregard the mandates of the legislature and place everything upon 
an equitable basis of what we, as judges, might think the arrangement from day 
to day ought to be.  Plaintiffs' 
claim of estoppel is without merit; we cannot set up a government or court of 
men and not of law.

 
 

Id. 
at 105.  The point is that there is 
not a hint in any of these cases that compliance with all of the requirements of 
Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 is not jurisdictional.

 
 
[¶13]   In Napolitano, 578 P.2d  at 1345-49, we 
reiterated the "condition precedent" principles of Utah Const. Co., Price, and Awe, and applied those principles to an 
inverse condemnation claim.  Five 
years later, in Board of Trustees of 
University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 415 (Wyo. 1983), we added 
emphasis to our recognition that compliance with claim-presentment requirements 
is jurisdictional by dismissing an appeal on our own motion for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Three months 
later, we did the same in Dee v. Laramie 
County, 666 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo. 1983).  In Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. 
No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo. 1991), we agreed with the district 
court's dismissal for the same reason.

 
 
[¶14]   Ten years after Bell and Dee were published, and two years after Dye, this Court took an even stronger 
stance.  In Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993), we held that, to gain the jurisdiction of the 
district court in a governmental claims case, the complaint must allege not only 
presentment of the claim, but timely 
presentment under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-113(a).  Of particular 
relevance, given the dissenting opinion in the present case, is the fact that 
this Court applied this requirement to Mr. Amrein, rather than applying it 
prospectively only, and did so even though the matter had been raised by this 
Court, and not the parties.  The 
point of Amrein is that plaintiffs 
must meet and allege compliance with governmental claims procedures with 
specificity.

 
 
[¶15]   Amrein was followed in 1996 by two cases, Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 325-26 
(Wyo. 1996), and Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1996), where district courts were found to lack subject 
matter jurisdiction due to claim presentment deficiencies.  Both cases applied Amrein's "with specificity" rule.  Similarly, in Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1116-17 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814 (1998), we held that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, being in 
derogation of the common law, had to be strictly construed, and required claim 
presentment compliance.  Later, Allen, Amrein, and Bell were again followed in Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 561 (Wyo. 
2000).  And in Campbell County School Dist. v. Catchpole, 
6 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Wyo. 2000), we reaffirmed the jurisdictional nature of 
the condition precedent of a timely presentment of a notice of claim to the 
state auditor.

 
 
[¶16]   As mentioned above, the focus of these cases was upon the 
presentment or filing requirement of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, and similar requirements found in governmental claims 
statutes.  The 
signature and certification requirements of the same constitutional provision 
were not directly addressed, no doubt because the failure before the Court was 
the failure to present or file any notice of claim.  That focus began to change, however, with the 
publication of Beaulieu I in 2001.6  Beaulieu I must be 
read carefully to understand what it does, and what it does not say.  Its specific holding 
has already been quoted above; that is, to be valid, a governmental claim must 
be signed by the claimant and certified to under penalty of perjury.  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d  
at 527.  
Furthermore, "establishing for purposes of pleading the date of the claim 
and its appropriate certification" has "jurisdictional 
impact."  
Id. at ¶ 18, 20 P.3d  at 
527 (emphasis added).  
That is what Beaulieu I says.  It does not say that the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements may be waived.  Rather, Beaulieu I says that 
waiver, as recognized in Martinez, is not before the 
court, because signature and certification deficiencies were raised below.  Beaulieu I is not an 
endorsement of Martinez.

 
 
[¶17]   The line of cases just described led up to Beaulieu II.  Beaulieu II is 
the case characterized by the dissent as a "bombshell."  In truth, Beaulieu II is 
entirely consistent with the jurisprudence reviewed above, from Houtz in 1902, 
through Beaulieu 
I, 99 years 
later.  There 
is, however, one case "out of whack" with all the others.  That case is 
Martinez.  In 1990, this Court 
declared that the constitutional signature and certification requirements were 
non-jurisdictional and could be waived.  Martinez, 791 P.2d  at 
958.  There is 
nothing in the precedent of this Court to explain this aberrant decision.  Perhaps, as we noted 
in Beaulieu II, 
2004 WY 31, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d  
at 868, the decision is aberrant because the Martinez holding relied upon In re Bear River Irr. Dist., 51 
Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937), a case 
that had nothing whatever to do with governmental claims or Article 16, § 7 of 
the Wyoming Constitution.  Yet it is the existence of Martinez that fuels the 
dissent in the present case.

 
 
[¶18]   The dissent contends that the erroneous holding of Martinez should be applied 
to the instant case to save the appellant's invalid claim, because Martinez was not overruled 
until Beaulieu II 
in 2004.  We 
decline to do so, for three reasons.  First, as recited above, the appellant's 
notice of claim was presented to the appellee sixteen months after the publication of Beaulieu I, where we clearly announced that, to be 
valid, governmental claims had to be signed by the claimant and certified to 
under the penalty of perjury.  There is no reason not to expect the appellant 
to have complied with the law.  Equity simply does not demand that this Court 
step in to prevent the natural consequences of the appellant's own 
dereliction.  In 
particular, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant was actually misled 
by the fact that Martinez existed.

 
 
[¶19]   The second reason that we decline to validate the 
appellant's invalid claim via Martinez is that, even if the appellant had 
been aware of Martinez, which has not been shown, 
Martinez 
did not tell the appellant not to sign and certify his claim.  Rather, Martinez merely held that such 
could be waived if not raised in the district court.  Inasmuch as these 
requirements were raised in the district 
court, waiver is not even available to the appellant.

 
 
[¶20]   Third, we decline to apply our holding herein prospectively 
only because, with the exception of Martinez, we have for decades considered compliance with 
Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution and its implementing statutes to be 
jurisdictional, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.  Even more 
importantly, subject matter jurisdiction can be neither created nor destroyed by 
judicial fiat.  
21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 12, 18, 56, 64 (1990 & 2004 Cum. 
Supp.).  What 
that means is that the erroneous holding of Martinez does not allow the 
district courts to acquire jurisdiction that they do not have.  Id. at § 90.7  Martinez did not create 
jurisdiction where none existed.  Pickle v. Board of CountyCom'rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 264 
(Wyo. 1988), is not a holding to the 
contrary.  Pickle simply says 
that "the district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims filed 
under the [Wyoming Governmental Claims Act]."  Id.  We already know that 
from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-117(a) (LexisNexis 2003).8  What we also already 
know is that a claim that does not meet the constitutional signature and 
certification requirements is not a valid claim under the act.  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d  
at 527; see also 
Bell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 10-11, 101 P.3d  at 468; Yoak, 
2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d  
at 874; and Beaulieu 
II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d  
at 866.

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, if we are to concern ourselves with stare decisis, as we 
should, then we should refuse to deviate again from the law, as we did in 
Martinez.  Martinez, not Beaulieu II, was the 
bombshell.  
Never before, or since, have we said that a governmental claim need not 
be in compliance with the constitution.9  We must be 
especially careful that the siren song of equity does not cause us to abandon 
the law in jurisdictional matters.  Subject matter jurisdiction is determined in 
constitutional conventions and in legislative halls, not in courtrooms.

 
 

 
 

[¶22]   The appellant did not present to the 
appellee, during the mandatory two-year period of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a), 
a notice of claim signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury, as required 
by Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution.  The appellant's belated effort to cure that 
deficiency was ineffective because his cause of action ceased to exist when the 
statutory period expired.  The presentment of a valid claim being 
jurisdictional, the district court was correct in determining that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the appellant's claim.  Because this Court 
can have no better jurisdiction than did the district court, we dismiss this 
appeal.  Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 
2004); Platte Development Co. v. State, 
Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1998); Sheridan Retirement Partners v. 
City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Wyo. 1997).

  
            
BURKE, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶23]   In Beaulieu II, this 
Court held that failure to comply with the constitutional certification and 
execution requirements of Article 16, §7 of the Wyoming Constitution 
deprived the 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction.  The majority rejects Mr. Wooster's contention 
that the holding in Beaulieu II should be applied prospectively only.  Because I am 
convinced that the subject matter classification set forth in Beaulieu II should 
not be applied retrospectively, I respectfully dissent.

 
 
[¶24]   This Court has on several occasions 
considered whether a change in law should operate retrospectively or 
prospectively.  
In Nehring v. 
Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 80 
(Wyo. 1978), this Court 
declared Wyoming's guest statute 
unconstitutional and limited its holding to prospective application.

 
 
Further, cognizant that the determination is ours to make, 
we conclude that in consideration of all the factors and any prior reliances 
involved, our holding should be applied prospectively only, i. e., to this 
action and all causes of action accruing after 30 days following the date of 
this decision. (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶25]   We determined in Ostwald v. State, 538 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 1975), that a prior decision of 
the Court declaring a criminal statute unconstitutional should be applied 
prospectively only.

 
 

Linkletter v. Walker, 1965, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, (footnote 10 omitted) brought to a 
climax and explained the entire field of retroactivity, bringing into focus the 
actuality and practicality of prospective rather than retroactive application, 
of court decisions declaring a fundamental phase of the criminal law 
unconstitutional, in any sphere.  It laid to rest as out of tune with the times 
the concept of Norton 
v. Shelby County, supra.  It settled most matters of controversy and 
concluded that, with respect to reaching a determination of whether a decision 
should be retrospective or prospective: there is no distinction drawn between 
civil and criminal litigation; a ruling may be prospective only and it may apply 
to the invalidity of statutes (footnote 11 omitted) as well as to the effect of 
a decision overturning long-established common law rules; the constitution 
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect and the federal Constitution 
has no voice upon the subject; and, the accepted rule today is that in 
appropriate cases in the interests of justice, a court may make its decision 
prospective. 

 
 

Id. at 1302-1303.

 
 
[¶26]   In Oroz v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wyo. 1978), this Court prospectively 
applied its holding abolishing governmental immunity.

 
 
The final question herein is the application of this 
decision.  The 
court is fully cognizant that a long reliance has been placed upon the rule of 
immunity and that it will raise certain problems which must be considered and 
proper arrangements made.  Based upon these considerations, the doctrine 
of governmental immunity as it is applied to counties and all other similar 
governmental subdivisions is abolished as to any and all claims arising on and 
after July 1, 1979. 

  

[¶27]   In McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983), this Court recognized a 
cause of action against liquor vendors in favor of persons injured by an 
intoxicated driver. Two years later, in Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 552 
(Wyo. 1985), we held that such cause 
of action is limited to prospective application.  In reaching its determination the Court 
noted:

 
 
It has been repeatedly stated that where a decision might 
produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, it is 
appropriate to avoid such hardship or injustice by providing for prospective 
operation only.

 
 
[¶28]   In Hanesworth v. Johnke, 
783 P.2d 173, 177 
(Wyo. 1989)(emphasis in original), we adopted a three 
part test for determination of prospective application.     

 
 

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish 
a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the 
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in 
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will 
further or retard its operation."  Linkletter v. Walker, [381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965)].  Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by 
retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce 
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis 
in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of 
nonretroactivity."  
Cipriano v. 
City of Houma, [395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1969)].  

 
 
We must apply these standards in order to determine if the 
"subject matter jurisdiction" holding of Beaulieu II, should be applied prospectively only.  

 
 
[¶29]   Initially, we must determine "if the new 
rule explicitly overruled a past precedent of this court."  Id. at 177 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 325, 107 S. Ct. 708, 714, 93 L.Ed 2d 649 (1987)).  According to the majority, ". . . the holding 
in Beaulieu II 
that a notice of claim must meet the requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the 
Wyoming Constitution is not applied prospectively only, because such has always 
been the law, as was stated in Beaulieu I, three years earlier."  I disagree.  

 
 
[¶30]   I do not take issue with the concept 
that this Court has previously required compliance with the constitutional 
requirements of Article 16, § 7.  I also concede that Beaulieu I 
reaffirmed the compliance requirement.  My point of departure relates to the elevation 
of non-compliance with the execution and certification requirements of Article 
16, §7 to the level of a subject matter jurisdiction defect.  

 
 
[¶31]   Prior to Beaulieu II, an 
execution defect that violated Article 16, § 7 was treated by this Court as 
"nothing more than a defect or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional."  Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 
(Wyo. 1990).  In Martinez, we rejected 
appellant's contention that a plaintiff's failure to certify a claim pursuant to 
Article 16, § 7 deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.  

 
 
In the last issue asserted in its appeal, the State contends 
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed because Fleetwood 
failed to comply with Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  This constitutional provision requires, inter alia, that any 
claim against the State be "certified to under penalty of perjury." Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  Specifically, the 
State asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Martinez, acting on behalf of Fleetwood, failed 
to make the certification under penalty of perjury when they first presented 
their claim and that, since proper filing of a claim is a condition precedent to 
suit, their claim cannot be brought because it was not properly filed.  Wyoming State Highway 
Department v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342 (1978); Awe 
v. University of 
Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (1975); Utah Construction 
Company v. State Highway Commission, 45 
Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933).

                        
This particular contention by the State is raised for the first time in 
this appeal.  
The point was never argued to the district court.  The State agrees 
that this is true, but it contends that an omission of the correct certification 
results in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised 
at any time in the proceeding.  We do not agree with this contention.  The failure to 
verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect or 
an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.  In re Bear River Irrigation District, 51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937).  The effect of that 
decision is that this alleged defect is not jurisdictional and, for that reason, 
the defense cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Id. at 958.

 
 
[¶32]   In Beaulieu I, we 
reiterated the distinction, from a subject matter jurisdiction perspective, 
between the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, §7 and 
"filing" or "presentment" requirements.

 
 
While the court has ruled that the execution requirements of 
art. 16, § 7 can be waived by failing to assert the issue in the trial court, it 
has not held that the requirement of filing or presenting the claim is subject 
to waiver.  
Instead, we have treated the allegation of the filing of a claim as 
jurisdictional.   

 
 

Beaulieu I, ¶14.  In Beaulieu II, this Court elevated compliance with the 
signature and certification requirements of Article 16, §7 to subject matter 
jurisdiction status.  
In doing so, it specifically overruled Martinez.

 
 
We have, in fact, previously stated [in Martinez] that the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements, unlike the statutory filing 
requirements, are not jurisdictional:

 
 
. . .

 
 
We now believe that Martinez was wrongly decided and that 
it must be overruled. 

 
 

Beaulieu II, ¶13.

 
 
[¶33]   The new subject matter jurisdiction 
status established in Beaulieu II is significant.  The lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is a fundamental defect which cannot be cured by waiver, 
consent of the parties or the passage of time.  Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 496 
(Wyo. 1998).  Subject matter 
jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings by a party or by 
the court.  Brunsvold v. State, 
864 P.2d 34, 36 
(Wyo. 1993).  A court that does 
not have subject matter jurisdiction ". . . lacks any authority to proceed and 
any decision, judgment or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and 
of no effect for any purpose.  Routh v. State Ex rel. Workers' Comp. Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1114 
(Wyo. 1998).10

 
 
[¶34]   In summary, prior to Beaulieu II, 
signature and certification defects in the claim could be waived if not 
raised in a timely manner by the governmental entity.  After Beaulieu II, such 
defect could not be waived.  Beaulieu II explicitly overruled clear past precedent of 
this Court.  It 
established a new principle of law.  

 
 
[¶35]   In order to satisfy the second prong of the Hanesworth test, we 
must determine if the purpose of the new rule would be satisfied by retroactive 
application.  
This second prong analysis is inextricably intertwined with the 
"hardship" and "injustice" criteria set forth in the third part of the Hanesworth 
test.  In Hanesworth, we 
treated the issue as follows:

 
 
The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy 
the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. and 
established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).  While that purpose may be furthered by 
retroactive application of the Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. decision, 
we conclude that the benefit of avoiding hardships created by retroactivity is 
an ample basis for nonretroactive application.  

 
 

Hanesworth, 783 P.2d  at 177.

 
 
[¶36]   The stated purpose of requiring 
certification and execution compliance is taxpayer protection.  Beaulieu II, 
¶13.  In 
governmental claim cases which come before this Court, the governmental entity 
has had the opportunity to contest the validity of the claim and assert all 
defenses which it might have to the claim.  Taxpayers are protected.  Even if it is 
assumed that the new subject matter jurisdiction classification created in Beaulieu II 
increases taxpayer protection, this Court should properly recognize, as it 
did in Hanesworth, ". . . that the benefit of avoiding 
hardships created by retroactivity is an ample basis for non-retroactive 
application."  
Hanesworth, 783 P.2d  at 177.

 
 
[¶37]   The third prong of the Hanesworth test 
requires an examination of the hardship or injustice generated by retroactive 
application.  
Id.  The hardship and 
injustice to claimants by retroactive application is dramatically illustrated by 
the facts of this case.

 
 
[¶38]   Mr. Wooster was allegedly injured in a 
motor vehicle collision caused by the negligence of appellee's employee.  On November 4, 2002, 
Mr. Wooster filed his complaint.  The answer was filed November 21, 2002.  Appellee's answer 
failed to set forth any allegation that Mr. Wooster had failed to comply with 
the governmental claims act or Article 16, §7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
The case proceeded toward trial for the next year and a half.  Trial was scheduled 
to commence May 10, 2004.

 
 
[¶39]   On March 25, 2004, this Court dropped 
the Beaulieu II 
bombshell.  The 
next day, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment asserting, for the 
first time, a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to meet 
the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, §7.  Mr. Wooster 
immediately filed an amended claim in a futile effort to comply with Article 16, 
§7.  The amended 
claim was filed too late to meet the time requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§1-39-114.11  The district court, noting that it had "some 
sympathy for the position Wooster finds himself in," 
granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶40]   At the time appellee filed its answer, 
Martinez set forth the applicable 
law.  Pursuant 
to Martinez, certification and 
execution defects in a claim could be waived.  Appellee failed to challenge Mr. Wooster's 
compliance with the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, §7 
until six weeks prior to trial and only after the time had expired for Mr. 
Wooster to correct errors in his claim.  The majority, by failing to provide for 
prospective application of Beaulieu II, delivers a catastrophic blow to Mr. Wooster 
and a corresponding windfall to appellee.  The result causes a "hardship" and "injustice" 
to Mr. Wooster and others similarly situated which satisfies the third prong of 
the Hanesworth 
test.

 
 
[¶41]   The majority's justification for its 
decision is also troubling in a broader and more fundamental context. The 
majority refuses to limit Beaulieu II to prospective application because "such has 
always been the law."  
This assertion is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the 
doctrine of stare 
decisis.  

 
 
[¶42]   The doctrine of stare decisis 
embodies a concept that serves as "the basis of Anglo-American common law."  Bornes ex. rel Gannon 
v.Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶24, 70 P.3d 262, ¶24 (Wyo. 
2003).  We have 
emphasized the importance of the doctrine.  Stare decisis is:

 
 
 . . . the means by which we ensure that the law 
will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and 
intelligible fashion.  
That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are 
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby 
contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in 
appearance and in fact.

 
 

Id., ¶25.  We have observed: 

 
 
. . . stare decisis "furthers the  "evenhanded, predictable, 
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process." ' "

 
 

Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991)).

 
 
[¶43]   We have also recognized that stare decisis is not 
a law, but a policy and that we should depart from precedent when necessary "to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice"  Id.  However, such 
departure from prior precedent "should occur slowly, deliberately after much 
experience, and if possible so as not to affect vested rights."  Id. at 272.

 
 
[¶44]   In Martinez, this Court held that 
failure to comply with the execution and certification requirements of Article 
16, §7 is not a subject matter jurisdiction defect.  In Beaulieu II, decided 
14 years later, we declared that lack of compliance with the execution and 
certification requirements is a subject matter jurisdiction defect.  This holding of Beaulieu II is a 
departure from prior precedent.  It did not occur "slowly, deliberately after 
much experience."  
It significantly affected Mr. Wooster and others similarly situated.

 
 
[¶45]   Our past precedent also includes that 
body of case law epitomized by Hanesworth which allows prospective application of new 
rules of law in appropriate cases.  Proper application of the Hanesworth 
principles nurtures stare decisis because it allows development in the 
common law as occurred in Beaulieu II without negatively impacting those affected 
by Martinez.

 
 
[¶46]   The common thread running through our 
decisions involving issues of prospective application is evaluation of the 
potential inequities resulting from retroactive application of the new rule of 
law.12  Summary judgment undoubtedly resulted in 
hardship and injustice to Mr. Wooster.  He was deprived of the opportunity to have his 
claim determined on the merits by the unfortunate timing of the Beaulieu II 
decision. Retrospective application will cause similar problems for other 
claimants in Mr. Wooster's position.  Such harsh results can, and should, be avoided 
by limiting Beaulieu 
II to prospective application.

 
 
[¶47]   Prospective application will not 
prejudice any governmental entity which, pursuant to the Martinez requirements, timely 
raised the issue of claimant's failure to comply with Article 16, §7.  If a governmental 
entity has timely asserted lack of compliance, the governmental entity should 
prevail if plaintiff's claim fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 16, 
§7.13  If the governmental entity has failed to 
timely raise the compliance issue, the claim will be determined on the 
merits.  A 
determination on the merits will provide protection to the taxpayers of this 
state by insuring that the claim is valid. 

 

[¶48]   Two other issues deserve comment.  The majority notes 
that Mr. Wooster's claim was presented to appellee 16 months after publication 
of Beaulieu I.  It is difficult 
to understand the relevancy of that factor in determining whether Beaulieu II should 
be limited to prospective application.  As previously indicated, Beaulieu I did not 
hold that a certification defect was jurisdictional.  More significantly, 
such reasoning ignores the reality that retroactive application of Beaulieu II will 
also negatively impact claims which predate Beaulieu I.  At least three such 
cases are pending before the Court.

 
 
[¶49]   The majority also relies upon the fact 
that appellee eventually raised the issue of compliance at the district court 
level to support its holding.  Merely raising the defense is not 
sufficient.  The 
defense must be asserted in a timely fashion.  Prejudice to the opposing party is a factor 
that must be weighed in determining whether the defense was timely.  "The controlling 
consideration is whether the adverse party is prejudiced by the moving party's 
delay in raising the defense."  Pickel at 264.  Reversal of summary judgment would allow the 
district court to determine if appellee's late assertion of the defense unduly 
prejudiced Mr. Wooster.

 
 
[¶50]   In conclusion, this Court in Beaulieu II created 
a new rule of law by overruling Martinez and elevating compliance with the certification 
and execution requirements of Article 16, §7 to subject matter jurisdiction 
status.  
Retroactive application of Beaulieu II is devastating to Mr. Wooster and similarly 
situated claimants.  
We have consistently rejected retroactive application of a new rule of 
law where such application will produce substantial inequitable results.  This is such a 
case.  The 
concurring opinion in Giles v. State, 96 P.3d 1027, 1046 
(Wyo.2004) states:  
"[T]he doctrine of stare decisis demands respect. But the underlying 
principle of our system of justice is justice."  If Beaulieu II is limited to prospective application we 
maintain consistency with the doctrine of stare decisis and eliminate any injustice caused by 
overruling Martinez.

 
 
[¶51]   The decision of the district court 
should be reversed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1

No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon 
appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, 
claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political 
subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement 
in writing, certified under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer 
or officers whose duty it may be to audit the same.

 
 

Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.

 

  
2"No action shall be brought under this act 
against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is based is 
presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission . . .."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(a).

 

  
3

Beaulieu I made it clear that governmental claims must meet the 
requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, including the requirement that such 
claims must be signed and certified under penalty of perjury.  . . .  Furthermore, Beaulieu I made it just as clear that the claim "must be 
signed by the claimant or 
the charge of perjury could not lie."

 
 

Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d at 866 (quoting Beaulieu I, 
2001 WY 33, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d 
at 527) (emphasis in original).

 

  
4It is important not to confuse the act of compliance with the 
constitution's signature and certification requirements with the act of alleging such compliance in a 
complaint.  Beaulieu I reiterated that the former has always been 
the law.  Beaulieu II applied the latter prospectively.  In the instant case, 
the deficiency is the failure in compliance, not just in allegation.

 

  
5The erroneous holding of Martinez that the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements were non-jurisdictional and could, 
therefore, be waived if not raised in the district court, is of no assistance to 
the appellant in the present case, where the issue was raised in the district court.

 

  
6We will later discuss Martinez, a 1990 
case.

 

  
7Here, we are concerned with erroneous decisions 
on questions of law.  
By way of example, a Wyoming state district 
court cannot acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case simply 
by declaring that it has such jurisdiction.  On the other hand, where the question is one 
of fact, the court may have jurisdiction over the general class of cases, but 
not over the particular case before it.  The district courts have jurisdiction over the 
general class of cases brought as governmental claims under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, but they do not have jurisdiction over cases where the 
claim does not meet constitutional or statutory requirements.  Otherwise, the 
district court could adjudicate cases in which the State has not consented to be 
sued.

 

  
8"Original and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim under 
this act shall be in the district courts of Wyoming."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-117(a).

 

  
9In Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming Highway Dept., 582 P.2d 583, 586-87 
(Wyo. 1978), we allowed substantial 
compliance with, rather than strict adherence to, statutory claim presentation 
procedures.  In 
the minds of the three concurring justices, equitable considerations prevailed 
where a claim was presented, but to the wrong authority.  In dissent, however, 
the two remaining justices opined that lowering the standard for claim filing to 
substantial compliance did, in effect, judicially deprive the legislature of its 
right to determine how and when the State could be sued, and violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers.  Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., 
dissented, with which Raper, J., joined).

 

10I do not concede that execution and certification compliance 
with Article 16, §7 implicates subject matter jurisdiction.  We have previously 
held that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims filed 
under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.  Pickle v. Board of CountyCom'rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 264 
(Wyo. 1989).  Because this case 
can be determined on the narrower issue of prospective application, such a 
discussion is not necessary at this time.  However, the majority's declaration that "such 
has always been the law" raises concerns.  If Beaulieu II is not limited to prospective application 
and, if all actions of any court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction 
are "utterly void and of no effect for any purpose," are all governmental claim 
cases, including Martinez, now open to jurisdictional challenge for lack 
of compliance with Article 16, §7?   

 
 
 
 

11If Mr. Wooster's failure to comply with Article 16, §7 had 
been raised in the original answer, Mr. Wooster would have had several months to 
file an amended claim before his claim would have been time barred.

 
 

12Appellee relies upon GID v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1996), in support of its 
position that Beaulieu II should be applied retrospectively.  Such reliance is 
misplaced.  In 
GID, this Court 
reasserted its position that the appropriateness of prospective application ". . 
. depends on whether a substantial injustice would otherwise occur." Id. at 949 (quoting Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295, 1298 
(Wyo. 1993) (Cardine,J.,specially 
concurring)). The Court in GID rejected prospective application because GID ". . . 
failed to explain to our satisfaction how a substantial injustice would befall 
it when it had notice that its supplemental right might be subject to 
abandonment for at least a year after our Hofeldt decision and yet, it took no preventive measures 
to ensure the safety of its water right."

 
 

13See e.g. York v. Ide, 2004 WY 
32, 86 P.3d 872 (Wyo. 2004) 
and Bell v. Schell, 
2004 WY 53, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo. 
2004).  Both 
cases were decided by this Court after Beaulieu II.  In neither case was the Court required to 
address the issue of prospective application.  Had the Court been required to address the 
issue it would not have resulted in a different outcome.  In both cases, the 
governmental entity timely raised lack of compliance with Article 16, §7 in 
their responsive pleading.  The governmental entity would have prevailed 
because of plaintiffs' noncompliance regardless of whether the law of Martinez or Beaulieu II was 
applied.  In Beaulieu I lack of 
compliance with the execution and certification requirement of Article 16, §7 
was raised by Beaulieu.  Upon remand, the governmental entity timely 
raised lack of compliance with Article 16, §7 regarding the second claim filed 
by Beaulieu.  The result in Beaulieu II would 
have been the same for Beaulieu even if the execution and certification defect 
was not determined to be of subject matter jurisdiction magnitude.