Title: Com. v. Carter

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

318 Pa. Superior Ct. 252 (1983) 464 A.2d 1327 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William CARTER, Jr., Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted April 28, 1983. Filed August 19, 1983. *254 Abraham A. Hobson, III, Norristown, for appellant. Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from the denial of appellant's, William Carter's, Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) Petition (19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq.) by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. We affirm. By Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated September 12, 1977, the Superior Court's per curiam affirmance of the lower court's dismissal of appellant's 1975 PCHA petition without a hearing was reversed. The record was remanded to the lower court to determine, after an evidentiary hearing, the truthfulness of appellant's allegation that his guilty pleas were illegally induced. Before examining what transpired at the PCHA hearing, it is necessary, in order to place this case in perspective, to set forth the allegations of the appellant as they appear in his 1975 pro se PCHA petition. In that portion of the PCHA petition which requests "the facts in support of the alleged error(s) upon which th[e] petition is based . . ." is typed the following: In a document attached to the PCHA petition, captioned "Memorandum of Law," appellant repeated his allegation that, "The plea of guilty arose out of a THREAT, made by the Prosecutor, who said "That if I didn't plead guilty that additional charges would be placed on me . . . . [']" In response, the Commonwealth filed an "Answer to Post Conviction Hearing Act Petition," wherein it set forth, inter alia, that: (Emphasis in original) With the preceding as a backdrop, we can now examine what occurred at the December 9, 1977 PCHA hearing, which was restricted to the resolution of appellant's claim that he was "threatened" by the attorney for the Commonwealth that if he did not plead guilty "additional criminal charges [would be filed] against [him.]" (RR. 5) The first witness to take the stand was the appellant, who recounted how, on the day set for his trial for the July 31, 1974 robbery of a fast-food convenience ("Wawa") store, he and his defense attorney (Mr. Narducci) had been discussing whether to accept a plea bargain offered by the assistant district attorney (Mr. Furber). Appellant recalled, in response to his own counsel's (Mr. Hobson's) inquiry as to what additional charges were threatened, that: On cross-examination, appellant was asked a series of questions regarding the April 29, 1975 guilty plea colloquy conducted before Judge Honeyman. He recalled that at that time he indicated no one threatened or forced him to enter his plea and he understood the nature of the agreement. He also admitted that during the plea bargain discussion the prosecutor talked to him and Mr. Narducci. His recollection was that after telling the prosecutor that the offer of "five to ten years was too much," (RR. 12), according to the appellant the prosecutor "later stated that he would try to get [appellant] back on the reconsideration of three to eight years, try to get [appellant] three to eight years." Id. Appellant indicated this conversation occurred before the entry of the guilty plea at defense counsel's table. However, when counsel for the Commonwealth asked appellant why he did not object to the prosecutor's recommendation at the plea to the accused receiving a sentence of five to ten years and the non-pros of the two simple assaults, the following exchange ensued: *259 It is to be noted that not until after the jury had been empanelled and an opening statement made by the prosecutor was there a motion to sequester the witnesses, which was granted upon request of the prosecution. Thereafter, the trial court was informed that the appellant agreed to plead guilty to the offenses charged. At this point in the discussion it is relevant to recite what was stated by defense counsel at the guilty plea hearing. It is reproduced in the PCHA court's Opinion to this Court and the content thereof is not contested by appellant's appellate counsel. To-wit: The next witness to testify was Mr. Furber, who, "[a]s best [as he] c[ould] recollect," indicated that, as was customary between the defense attorney and the assistant district attorney, conversation was had with appellant's counsel as to what, if anything, the Commonwealth might recommend as a sentence. The conversations between counsel "probably extended from the suppression hearing into the next day," when the prosecutor opened to the jury. (RR. 23) Since the prosecutor was preparing to try the appellant for robbery, criminal trespass, receiving stolen property, violation of the uniform firearms act, simple assault and conspiracy, (RR. 19), he initially offered to "recommend to the court, seven and a half to fifteen years," (RR. 21), if appellant elected to plead. This was not acceptable. During the course of these discussions, Mr. Furber recalled indicating to Mr. Narducci that there was an investigation that was still in progress concerning the robbery in Ambler, and that the investigation "indicated that [appellant] was involved." (RR. 25) This information, as far as Mr. Furber was concerned, "certainly . . . was taken into consideration" in negotiating the ultimate plea bargain. Id. After the initial offer by the prosecution was refused by appellant, Mr. Furber "moved off of [his] original thoughts of seven and a half to fifteen years, and made a recommendation or evidenced to Mr. Narducci that it possibly would be appropriate to recommend to the court five to ten years, but no less than that." (RR. 23) This offer was "conveyed" to appellant, who, again, would not accept it. Thereafter, Mr. Furber opened to the jury. When Mr. Furber was asked if any "assurances" were given to the appellant to the effect that no charges would *261 be filed against him in conjunction with the Ambler robbery, the following appears of record: On cross-examination, Mr. Furber disputed appellant's counsel's characterization that he "indicated to Mr. Carter that if [appellant] did not plead guilty that charges would be brought against him for the [Ambler] sportman's store job[.]" (RR. 29) Rather, Mr. Furber, sometime prior to his opening statement to the jury, had a three-way conversation with the appellant and his counsel in which he stated, "Rocco Wack, the detective from Ambler[,] . . . indicated to [him] that if, in fact, Mr. Carter admitted his guilt in the Wawa robbery, that at that particular time the investigation concerning the Ambler robbery would, in essence, be complete.. . . [T]he Ambler police department was not interested in pursuing charges against Mr. Carter." (RR. 30-31) In other words, Detective Wack "said he would not press the charges against Mr. Carter." (RR. 32) The reason the channels of communication were kept open prior to, as well as including, the trial phase, according to Mr. Furber, "was to continue whatever negotiations we had on-going." (RR. 34) To a point, Mr. Narducci, the last witness to appear, reaffirmed Mr. Furber's version of what transpired. For example, Mr. Narducci agreed that the first offer of seven and a-half to fourteen years was unacceptable. Also, that the two had discussed the matter "for some time in an attempt to work out a plea disposition[.]" (RR. 38) However, Mr. Narducci's accounting of how the two struck an agreement at five to ten is not as clear. According to Mr. Narducci, the assistant district attorney, appellant and he did not act in concert at all times. As he states it, he "was kind of shuttling back and forth between Mr. Furber and Mr. Carter." (RR. 40) After the five to ten figure had been agreed upon, Mr. Narducci then went back and told the appellant, "we have a new wrinkle in this matter." Id. Narducci went on to testify that some of the discussion "took place collectively" among all three, "rather than being directed to any individual specifically." (RR. 42) When questioned on cross, Narducci also stated that Mr. Furber never mentioned anything about a sentence of three to eight years. (RR. 44) Shortly thereafter, the hearing came to an end and counsel for both sides presented closing arguments to the PCHA court. The PCHA court, after finding as a fact that the assistant district attorney neither "threatened" appellant in any fashion nor "promised" him anything if he pleaded guilty, concluded as a matter of law that the pleas of guilty were not "illegally induced by either the [Assistant] District Attorney, defense counsel or the court, with respect to any representations concerning any other criminal proceedings or with respect to any promises or representations outside *264 of the explicit terms of the plea agreement pursuant to which the pleas of guilty were entered." (PCHA court's Opinion at 3) This appeal followed. Presently, appellant seeks to withdraw his plea after the imposition of sentence. The standard for granting withdrawal at this stage of the proceedings is that of "manifest injustice." Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 301 A.2d 592 (1973). "Manifest injustice" occurs where the accused makes an involuntary plea. Id. Upon a finding that a plea was involuntary, the court should permit withdrawal in order to correct a "manifest injustice." The defendant is so entitled, it would appear, as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Ammon, 275 Pa.Super. 324, 418 A.2d 744 (1980). However, the determination of the existence of "manifest injustice" is in the first instance for the trial court, which initially accepted the plea. Commonwealth v. Starr, supra; Pa.R.Crim.P. 320. Also, it needs to be remembered that the burden is on appellant to prove that his plea was not voluntary. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 273 Pa.Super. 488, 417 A.2d 753 (1979). Consistent therewith, albeit "[a] guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void[,]" Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962), appellant has not met this burden. Historically, the vital role plea bargaining plays in this Commonwealth has not gone unrecognized. This Court has remarked: Commonwealth v. Schmoyer, 280 Pa.Super. 406, 413-14, 421 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1980). With these considerations in mind, we find additional guidance as to the manner in which we should rule from the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject of plea negotiations in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978), reh. denied, 435 U.S. 918, 98 S. Ct. 1477, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978). In Bordenkircher, Paul Hayes was indicted by a county grand jury in Kentucky for uttering a forged instrument. After arraignment, Hayes, his counsel and the Commonwealth's attorney met to discuss a possible plea agreement. The prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if Hayes would plead guilty. He also said that if Hayes did not plead guilty he would seek a grand jury indictment under Kentucky's recidivist statute, which *266 would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his prior felony convictions. Hayes decided not to plead guilty, and the prosecutor did secure the indictment he had promised. A jury found Hayes guilty of the uttering charge and, in an independent proceeding, also found him to be a recidivist. As called for by Kentucky law, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes' constitutional objections to the enhanced sentence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Court's judgment, on the ground that the prosecutor's conduct during the bargaining negotiations had violated the principles of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), which protected defendants from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion. Hayes was ordered discharged. The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that the prosecutor was acting "vindictively" and in violation of due process of law because his charging decision was influenced by what he hoped to gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations. In the course of making its ruling, the high Court made statements relevant to the case at bar: Id. 434 U.S. at 363-364, 98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 610-611. Instantly, it cannot be gainsaid that the appellant had at all times, with the knowledge and advice of his attorney, the option freely to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. In fact, appellant's guilty plea counsel memorialized the offer from the prosecution, in regard to Detective Wack agreeing not to pursue the investigation as to the Ambler robbery as the quid pro quo for appellant's willingness to plead guilty, by having it placed on the record for transcription. Thus, we have no evidence of surreptitious activity characteristic of subtle "threats or promises" kept from the purview of the guilty plea court. Quite the contrary, everything was out in the open and, as can be gleaned from the testimony *268 reproduced supra at the PCHA hearing, truly epitomizes the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining. As stated by appellant's guilty plea counsel at the PCHA hearing, he, in acting in the best interest of his client, advised appellant to accept the plea bargain. We cannot find fault with this counseling, given the particular circumstances presented to this Court. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Stated otherwise, we find that there are sufficient facts within the record for this Court to determine that the alternative of pleading guilty was one for which there was a reasonable basis. Cf. Commonwealth v. Marsh, 460 Pa. 253, 333 A.2d 181 (1975). Moreover, in accordance with the finding of the PCHA court, we hold that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly presented the appellant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he might be subject to prosecution, did not constitute "unlawful inducement" nor will it be equated with "manifest injustice" warranting the withdrawal of the guilty pleas. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra; Commonwealth v. Starr, supra. Order affirmed.