Title: McIntosh v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,878 
 
CHARLES MCINTOSH, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
The purpose of our implied consent laws is to encourage a person arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol to submit to chemical testing to determine the 
person's blood or breath alcohol content. To further that coercive purpose, an arrested 
person should be given every reasonable opportunity to submit to testing, including the 
opportunity to rescind or change an initial test refusal where the rescission is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
 
2. 
 
Previously, this court held that for a subsequent consent to blood or breath alcohol 
testing to be effective as a rescission of a prior refusal, it must be made:  (1) within a very 
short and reasonable time after the prior first refusal; (2) when a test administered upon 
the subsequent consent would still be accurate; (3) when testing equipment is still readily 
available; (4) when honoring the request will result in no substantial inconvenience or 
expense to the police; and (5) when the individual requesting the test has been in the 
custody of the arresting officer and under observation for the whole time since arrest. 
2 
 
 
 
These rules are to be interpreted with a view to furthering the stated goal of providing an 
arrested person every reasonable opportunity to submit to testing. 
 
3. 
 
The requirement that a rescission of a previous refusal to consent to breath or 
blood alcohol testing under K.S.A. 8-1001 must be made within a very short and 
reasonable time after the test refusal is not subject to a bright line rule of a specific 
number of minutes. Rather, the focus should be on the particular circumstances of the 
case, including a look at what is transpiring during the period of delay. 
 
4. 
 
When an arrested person seeks to rescind a refusal to consent to blood or breath 
alcohol testing, the requirement that the arrestee has been in the custody of the arresting 
officer and under observation for the whole time since arrest can be satisfied where 
custody and observation has been temporarily transferred to another law enforcement 
officer or where the arrestee has been momentarily out of the arresting officer's physical 
presence under circumstances that will not compromise the integrity of the test results. 
 
Appeal from Barton District Court; RON SVATY, judge. Opinion filed August 20, 2010. Affirmed. 
 
John D. Shultz, of Kansas Department of Revenue, argued the cause, and James G. Keller, of 
Kansas Department of Revenue, was with him on the brief for appellant.  
 
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
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JOHNSON, J.:  The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) administratively 
suspended Charles McIntosh's driving privileges based upon a refusal to submit to a 
breath test following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI), see K.S.A. 2009 
Supp. 8-1002. McIntosh petitioned the district court to review the suspension, claiming 
that he had effectively rescinded his refusal and consented to take the breath test. The 
district court found that McIntosh had appropriately rescinded his test refusal; that he 
should have been permitted to take the breath test; and that the administrative driver's 
license suspension should be dismissed. KDR appealed the district court's decision, and 
the case was transferred to this court on its own motion. See K.S.A. 20-3018(c). We 
affirm the district court. 
  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Officer Rod Weber of the Great Bend Police Department arrested McIntosh for 
DUI and transported him to the law enforcement center. Upon arrival in the receiving 
room, the jail staff did a pat-down search of McIntosh for weapons or contraband, after 
which Officer Weber proceeded to give McIntosh the implied consent advisories. When 
asked if he would submit to a breath test, McIntosh said no. Jail staff then escorted 
McIntosh to the booking area for processing, while Officer Weber remained in the 
receiving area for approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete the Officer's Certification 
and Notice of Suspension, form DC-27, and to prepare citations. From his location in the 
receiving room, Officer Weber could not see McIntosh in the booking area of the jail.  
 
When the paperwork was completed, Officer Weber went into the booking area 
and personally served McIntosh with the DC-27 form and the citations. At that time, 
McIntosh advised Officer Weber that he wanted to take the breath test, but Officer Weber 
would not administer it because he believed that McIntosh had been given ample 
opportunity to take the test earlier. 
 
4 
 
 
 
In the DC-27 form, Officer Weber certified a test refusal and, after an 
administrative hearing, KDR issued an order suspending McIntosh's driving privileges. 
McIntosh petitioned the district court for review of the administrative order, alleging that 
the officer's certification of a test refusal was erroneous because McIntosh had timely 
rescinded the refusal and consented to the test. At the district court hearing, both parties 
argued that the factors governing a rescission of a test refusal set forth in Standish v. 
Department of Revenue, 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984), were controlling. The 
district court took the matter under advisement and directed the parties to submit 
memoranda. Ultimately, the district court issued a journal entry in which it found that 
"plaintiff appropriately 'rescinded' his refusal pursuant to Kansas law and that he should 
have been allowed to take the requested breath test."   
 
Did the district court err in determining that plaintiff effectively rescinded his refusal to 
submit to a breath alcohol test?  
 
Standard of Review 
 
"Following a trial de novo, this court reviews the trial court's license suspension to 
determine if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. [Citation omitted.]" Bruch 
v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 282 Kan. 764, 772, 148 P.3d 538 (2006). However, as KDR 
acknowledges, the parties in this case do not dispute the underlying facts. Rather, the 
question presented is the manner in which our prior opinion in Standish should be 
interpreted and applied to the undisputed facts. Accordingly, we are presented with a 
question of law, for which this court's review is unlimited. Cf. Bruch, 282 Kan. at 772 
(statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review). 
  
Analysis 
 
Given that KDR relies exclusively on Standish, we begin by reviewing that case. 
A law enforcement officer arrested Standish for DUI, advised him of his Miranda rights, 
5 
 
 
 
and then asked him to take a breathalyzer test. Standish responded that he wanted to talk 
with his attorney first. The officer took Standish to the police department, where he 
unsuccessfully attempted to call his attorney. When Standish continued to refuse to take 
the breath test until he had consulted his attorney, the officer took Standish to the county 
jail. The officer left the jail and returned to duty. Within 15 to 30 minutes, Standish asked 
a jailer whether he was going to take the test. Without consulting the arresting officer, the 
jailer responded that it was too late. The arresting officer testified that if Standish had 
changed his mind while still in the officer's custody, the officer would have administered 
the test.  
 
The administrative law judge found that Standish had refused to submit to a 
chemical breath test and suspended his driving privileges. Standish appealed to the 
district court, where, following an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Standish had 
rescinded his test refusal within a reasonable time and, therefore, the suspension order 
was reversed. The KDR appealed, raising "but one issue on appeal:  whether an initial 
refusal to submit to a lawfully requested chemical test of breath to determine the 
alcoholic content of the blood, K.S.A. 8-1001, may be 'rescinded' by subsequent 
consent." 235 Kan. at 900-01. 
 
The Standish opinion began by reciting that K.S.A. 8-1001 provides that all 
vehicle operators are deemed to have given their consent to submit to a chemical test of 
breath or blood to determine the alcoholic content in the operator's blood, and that a 
refusal to submit to such testing can result in the suspension of the operator's driver's 
license. The court then noted that "[t]here is nothing within the statute regarding the right 
of a person so arrested to change his mind and 'rescind' a refusal to take the test." 235 
Kan. at 902. However, after advising that it had carefully considered cases from other 
jurisdictions, which were chain cited without further discussion or analysis, the opinion 
declared: 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
"The chemical testing system provided under our implied consent law is 
important because it provides the best available and most reliable method of determining 
whether a driver is 'under the influence' of alcohol. It protects both the accused and the 
public. A refusal to submit to the test, on the other hand, invokes serious consequences 
for the person arrested. We believe that the administration of the test should be 
encouraged and the person arrested should be given every reasonable opportunity to 
submit to it. For this reason, we hold that an initial refusal may be changed or rescinded, 
and if rescinded in accordance with the following rules, cures the prior refusal. To be 
effective, the subsequent consent must be made: 
 
 
(1) within a very short and reasonable time after the prior first refusal; 
 
(2) when a test administered upon the subsequent consent would still be accurate; 
 
(3) when testing equipment is still readily available; 
 
(4) when honoring the request will result in no substantial inconvenience or 
expense to the police; and 
 
(5) when the individual requesting the test has been in the custody of the 
arresting officer and under observation for the whole time since arrest." 235 Kan. at 902-
03. 
 
 
After establishing the rules for curing an initial test refusal, the court briefly 
discussed how the rescission rules applied to Standish's scenario, albeit without referring 
to any individually enumerated rule. We take the liberty of quoting the analysis in its 
entirety: 
 
"For example, if Standish had refused at the scene and then changed his mind and 
requested the test a few minutes later when he arrived at the police station, the test should 
have been given. Here, however, Standish did not change his mind until the arresting 
officer had taken him from the scene to the police station and then to the jail, and until 
some time after the officer had left the jail and returned to his other duties. This, under 
the rules laid down above, was too late. The arresting officer need not sit and wait for the 
person to change his or her mind, and thus neglect other duties." 235 Kan. at 903. 
7 
 
 
 
 
In the interest of completeness, we note that the Supreme Court ultimately 
affirmed the district court's reversal of Standish's license suspension, notwithstanding the 
absence of a curative rescission. Standish found that the giving of the Miranda warnings 
immediately prior to requesting a breath alcohol test could have misled Standish into 
believing that he had the constitutional right to consult with an attorney before consenting 
to the test, even though no such right exists. Therefore, Standish held that the test refusal 
was reasonable under those unique circumstances, which circumstances are not present in 
the case before us. 235 Kan. at 905. Here, we are only considering the validity of the 
curative rescission. 
 
KDR relies exclusively on its interpretation of the Standish rules, specifically, the 
first and last enumerated rules. It does not challenge compliance with the middle three 
rules. When McIntosh asked to take the test:  the results would still have been accurate; 
the testing equipment was still readily available; and honoring the request would not have 
resulted in substantial inconvenience or expense to the police. Rather, KDR contends that 
the test request was not made within a very short and reasonable time after the initial 
refusal and that McIntosh was not in the custody of the arresting officer, Officer Weber, 
and under his observation for the whole time between arrest and the rescinded refusal/test 
request. 
 
KDR attempts to flesh out the Standish opinion to divine a specific and unique 
meaning in the language employed in the first and last rules. Although Lund v. Hjelle, 
224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974), was simply included in Standish's chain cite, without any 
discussion or analysis, KDR speculates that the Standish court lifted the Kansas rules for 
rescission from that North Dakota decision. Then, KDR argues that certain modifications 
to the Lund language manifest an intent by this court to make the rules more restrictive in 
this state.  
8 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, KDR points out that Lund said the postrefusal test request must be 
"made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal." 224 N.W.2d at 557.  In 
contrast, the Standish rule requires the subsequent consent to be "within a very short and 
reasonable time after the prior first refusal." (Emphasis added.) 235 Kan. at 903. 
Likewise, Lund required that the requesting individual "has been in police custody and 
under observation for the whole time since his arrest." 224 N.W.2d at 557. In contrast, 
Standish replaced "in police custody" with "in the custody of the arresting officer." 235 
Kan. at 903.  
 
The striking similarity between the language employed in Lund and that used in 
the Standish rules gives credence to KDR's theory that Lund was used as the examplar for 
our rules, notwithstanding the absence of any discussion of Lund. Likewise, the 
utilization of the modified language might be considered an obtuse signal that the Kansas 
court meant something different than the North Dakota court. Nevertheless, given that the 
Standish rescission rules were court-created to further the purposes of the implied consent 
law, it is only logical that the rules should be interpreted with a view to furthering their 
purposes. 
 
Timeliness  
 
KDR argues that the time elapse of approximately 30 minutes between McIntosh's 
test refusal and subsequent request to take the test was outside the "very short" time 
requirement in Standish's first rule. To support that contention, KDR recites the Standish 
analysis, quoted above, and singles out the sentence that reads:  "This, under the rules 
laid down above, was too late." 235 Kan. at 903. Then, the KDR asserts that the time 
period in Standish was from "fifteen to thirty minutes." 235 Kan. at 901. The apparent 
suggestion is that if 15 to 30 minutes was too late in Standish, then 30 minutes must be 
9 
 
 
 
untimely in this case. We note both factual and analytical problems with KDR's 
argument. 
 
In reciting the facts, the Standish opinion says that the arresting officer took 
Standish to the jail and then the officer "left the jail and returned to duty. Within fifteen 
to thirty minutes Standish talked to the jailer and asked him, 'Am I going to take this test 
or what?'" 235 Kan. at 901. It is not clear whether the 15 to 30 minutes refers to the time 
that elapsed after the officer left the jail and returned to duty or, as KDR apparently 
contends, refers to the time that elapsed between the test refusal and subsequent request. 
Furthermore, in our case, Officer Weber's actual testimony was that it took him roughly 
20 to 30 minutes to complete the paperwork after the refusal. 
 
More importantly, the Standish analysis does not clarify whether the subsequent 
request was too late under the first rule, either because the elapsed time between refusal 
and rescission was not a very short time or was not a reasonable time, or whether the 
request came too late under the fourth rule because honoring the request would have 
resulted in substantial inconvenience for the police. The analysis emphasizes that the 
officer had left the jail and returned to his other duties and declares that the "arresting 
officer need not sit and wait for the person to change his or her mind, and thus neglect 
other duties." 235 Kan. at 903.  Given that emphasis, we do not believe that Standish 
intended to create a bright-line rule that 30 minutes is not a very short time, i.e., a rule 
that a 30-minute old refusal cannot be cured. Rather, the focus should be on the particular 
circumstances of a case, including a look at what is transpiring during the period of delay. 
 
Here, unlike the officer in Standish, Officer Weber had not left the jail to return to 
his regular duties when McIntosh asked to take the test. In fact, Officer Weber was still 
performing or in the process of concluding his duties with respect to the DUI arrest. See 
K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1002(c) and (e) (officer shall personally serve notice of suspension 
10 
 
 
 
upon person still in custody when determination of test refusal is made; if person refuses 
test, officer shall take any license in person's possession and issue temporary license). 
Moreover, as McIntosh points out, he rescinded his test refusal at the first opportunity he 
had to convey his wishes to Officer Weber. The elapsed time between refusal and 
rescission in this instance was totally under the control of the officer, who could take 
whatever time he wanted to complete the notice of suspension and temporary license that 
had to be personally served on McIntosh. There is no indication that McIntosh was 
intentionally manipulating the right of rescission. 
 
The time frame here is more akin to the scenario in State v. Gray, 270 Kan. 793, 
797, 18 P.3d 962 (2001). In Gray, the arresting officer gave the implied consent advisory 
and asked Gray to take a breath test. Gray responded that he did not have his glasses with 
him, that he could not understand the form, and that he wanted to speak with an attorney. 
The officer advised Gray that he could not consult with an attorney, but reread a portion 
of the implied consent notice. Gray reiterated that he wanted to speak to an attorney and 
opined that because he could not read the form, he should not have to take the test. "All 
told, the meeting between [the officer] and Gray took about 35 minutes." 270 Kan. at 
795. The officer determined that Gray's actions constituted a test refusal and marked the 
DC-27 accordingly. When the form was served on Gray, he immediately said he would 
take the test, but the officer would not allow the test.  
 
On appeal, this court found the facts of that case clearly met each of the Standish 
elements. With respect to the timeliness rule, Gray stated that "[t]he subsequent consent 
was given within a minute or less of when the officer checked the 'refusal' box on the 
consent form." 270 Kan. at 797. Here, although we do not know exactly when Officer 
Weber may have checked the refusal box on the consent form, McIntosh's consent came 
immediately upon being served with that form, i.e., upon being notified that the refusal 
11 
 
 
 
box had been checked. Accordingly, we find that McIntosh's rescission was timely under 
the Standish standards. 
 
Custody and Observation 
 
The fifth Standish rule requires that the person requesting the test, i.e., rescinding 
a prior refusal, "has been in the custody of the arresting officer and under observation for 
the whole time since arrest." 235 Kan. at 903. KDR argued to the district court that this 
means that the person must be in the immediate presence of the arresting officer for the 
whole time from arrest until the rescission. The rationale proffered below was that an 
absence from the officer's presence could compromise the protocol for the test, because a 
defendant could claim that he or she "burped a little bit ago" or that he or she had put a 
hand in the mouth.  
 
McIntosh countered that the protocol for conducting a breath test only requires an 
observation period of 20 minutes immediately preceding the test. A test result is not 
invalidated if a person "burps" or places something in his or her mouth at some point 
following arrest, so long as the proscribed conduct does not occur during the requisite 20-
minute observation period. McIntosh suggests that the only conduct that would have 
invalidated the test results was a postarrest consumption of alcohol. That conduct was 
precluded in this case by the initial search of McIntosh for contraband and by McIntosh 
being in the custody of the jail personnel during the period he was not being personally 
observed by Officer Weber. 
 
As noted, Standish did not favor us with an explanation of why it chose the 
language employed in the fifth rule. For instance, we note that the prepositional phrase, 
"of the arresting officer," is applied to "custody," but not to "observation," which might 
suggest that someone other than the arresting officer could be performing the observation 
12 
 
 
 
requirement while the defendant is in the arresting officer's custody. Granted, the 
countering argument is that to be in the arresting officer's custody the defendant must be 
in the officer's physical presence and, thus, under the officer's observation. Of course, if 
that was the intent, one might ponder the necessity of including both a custody and an 
under-observation requirement. Nevertheless, we do not believe our decision should 
hinge on parsing the language used to create the court-made rule in Standish. Rather, we 
should be guided by the purpose behind the rule. 
 
 In developing the rescission rule, Standish opined "that the administration of the 
test should be encouraged and the person arrested should be given every reasonable 
opportunity to submit to it." 235 Kan. at 902. As McIntosh argues, under KDR's 
interpretation of the rule, some arrested persons will be precluded from changing their 
minds about taking the test, even if the consent immediately follows refusal, based upon 
what the officer may have done after the arrest. For instance, an arresting officer might 
leave the arrestee in the patrol car or in the custody of another officer while searching the 
arrestee's vehicle for open containers. The officer might use the restroom or permit the 
arrestee to do so. The officer might not be certified on the testing equipment, so that 
custody of the arrestee is delivered to a test-qualified officer. In such instances, the 
arrestee would not have been under observation by the arresting officer for the whole 
time following arrest. 
 
Such lapses in the arresting officer's custody and observation would not preclude 
the arrestee's opportunity to initially consent to a breath test. KDR argues that a consent 
which follows an initial test refusal is simply treated differently than an initial consent. It 
does not explain how that disparate treatment comports with the concept of providing 
arrestees with "every reasonable opportunity to submit to [blood alcohol testing]." 
Standish, 235 Kan. at 902. To the contrary, KDR would have us provide McIntosh with 
but one opportunity to submit to testing.  
13 
 
 
 
 
The better argument may be that the lapse of observation in this case occurred 
after the test refusal and that Officer Weber could not personally attest to McIntosh's 
abstinence from further alcohol consumption during that period. However, upon arrival at 
the jail, McIntosh was personally searched for contraband, which presumably would 
include any alcoholic beverages. Further, he was in the custody of jail personnel for the 
purpose of completing the booking process. It is not unreasonable to impute to the 
arresting officer the jailers' observational knowledge, i.e., that McIntosh was not drinking 
alcohol during the booking process. Cf. State v. Bieker, 35 Kan. App. 2d 427, 435, 132 
P.3d 478, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006) (an officer's reasonable suspicion to detain 
may be based upon the collective knowledge of all officers involved). Accordingly, we 
find that the circumstances in this case conformed to the custody and observation 
requirements for a valid rescission.  
 
In conclusion, we find that the district court did not err in finding that McIntosh's 
rescission of his refusal of a breath test met the Standish requirements; that McIntosh's 
subsequent consent to testing was valid; that the arresting officer should not have refused 
to allow the testing; and that KDR's suspension of McIntosh's driver's license was invalid 
and must be reversed. 
 
Affirmed.  
 
DAVIS, C.J., not participating. 
MICHAEL F. POWERS, District Judge, assigned.1  
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Powers was appointed to hear case No. 101,878 
vice Chief Justice Davis pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 
6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.