Title: Karen Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School District

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP967-AC 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Karen Schill, Traci Pronga, Kimberly Martin, 
Robert Dresser and Mark Larson, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Rapids School District and Robert 
Crist, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Don Bubolz, 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles A. Pollex   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Jina L. 
Jonen and the Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison, 
and oral argument by Jina L. Jonen. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there were briefs by Robert 
W. Burns, Geoffrey A. Lacy, and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Green 
Bay, and oral argument by Robert W. Burns. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. Langley, city 
attorney 
and 
Melanie 
R. 
Swank, 
assistant 
city 
attorney, 
Milwaukee; and Michael P. May, city attorney and Roger A. Allen, 
assistant city attorney, Madison, on behalf of the Office of the 
Milwaukee City Attorney and the Office of the Madison City 
Attorney. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Patrick C. Henneger, and Centofanti Phillips, S.C., Mequon, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce F. Ehlke and 
Ehlke, Gartzke, Bero-Lehmann & Lounsbury, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of AFSCME District Council 40. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tamara B. Packard, 
Lester A. Pines, and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, Madison, on 
behalf of Madison Teachers, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert J. Dreps and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, and Jennifer L. Peterson and 
Journal Communications, Inc., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Council, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters Association, the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, 
the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Journal Broadcast Group, Inc., 
and the Associated Press. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jennifer Sloan Lattis, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general, on behalf of the Department of 
Justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 86
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP967-AC  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV304) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Karen Schill, Traci Pronga, Kimberly Martin, 
Robert Dresser and Mark Larson, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Rapids School District and Robert 
Crist, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Don Bubolz, 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Wood County, 
Charles A. Pollex, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   If Wisconsin were not 
known as the Dairy State it could be known, and rightfully so, 
as the Sunshine State.  All branches of Wisconsin government 
have, over many years, kept a strong commitment to transparent 
government. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Open 
records 
and 
open 
meetings 
laws, 
that 
is, 
"Sunshine Laws," "are first and foremost a powerful tool for 
everyday people to keep track of what their government is up 
to. . . . The right of the people to monitor the people's 
business is one of the core principles of democracy."1 
¶3 
The 
legislature 
states 
the 
importance 
of 
open 
government and open records this way:  "[I]t is . . . the public 
policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the 
greatest 
possible 
information 
regarding 
the 
affairs 
of 
government and the official acts" of government officers and 
employees.2           
¶4 
The court is asked in the instant case to apply the 
Public Records Law to e-mails, a technology not contemplated 
when the legislature enacted the Public Records Law. 
¶5 
When the Public Records Law was enacted, government 
employees no doubt wrote occasional personal notes in the 
workplace but mailed them, threw them away, or took them home.  
Now, these same kinds of personal communications are more likely 
to be created and saved on government-maintained computer 
networks.  As a part of normal workplace operation, many 
government offices, like many private employers, have chosen to 
                                                 
1 Editorial,  Shine Light on Public Records, Wis. State J., 
Mar. 14, 2010, at B1.  The week of March 14, 2010, was "Sunshine 
Week."  See http://www.sunshineweek.org/About.aspx (last visited 
July 9, 2010). 
2 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (2007-08). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
3 
 
allow their employees to send and receive occasional personal 
messages on the employer's e-mail system.   
¶6 
There are good reasons why employers allow this 
practice.  E-mail can enhance a worker's productivity.  It is 
often the fastest and least disruptive way to do a brief 
personal communication during the work day, and employees who 
are forbidden or discouraged from occasional personal use of e-
mail may simply need to take more time out of the day to 
accomplish the same tasks by other means.  Reasonable government 
workplace policies in line with private sector practice help 
government attract and retain skilled employees.  
¶7 
In the present case, the court is asked to decide 
whether the contents of government employees' personal e-mails 
(that is, e-mails not related to government business) should be 
released to the public in keeping with the purpose and policy of 
the Sunshine Laws that the public be fully informed about the 
affairs of government and the official acts of government 
officers and employees.  
¶8 
Several other states have already addressed this 
issue.  Each has concluded that the contents of government 
employees' personal e-mails are not information about the 
affairs of government and are therefore not open to the public 
under their respective open records acts.  We know of no state 
that has reached the conclusion that the contents of such 
personal e-mails should be released to members of the public.   
¶9 
For the reasons set forth, we too now conclude that 
while government business is to be kept open, the contents of 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
4 
 
employees' personal e-mails are not a part of government 
business.  Personal e-mails are therefore not always records 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) simply because they 
are sent and received on government e-mail and computer systems. 
* * * * 
¶10 This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court 
for Wood County, Charles A. Pollex, Judge, on certification from 
the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007-08).3  
The circuit court ordered the Wisconsin Rapids School District 
to release to the record requester all e-mails of Karen Schill, 
Traci Pronga, Kimberly Martin, Robert Dresser, and Mark Larson 
(the Teachers), who are employed as teachers by the School 
District.4   
¶11 The Teachers sent and received e-mails for personal 
use as well as professional use, using the school district e-
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version, unless otherwise indicated.  
4 Chief Justice Abrahamson's lead opinion is joined by 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks and Justice David T. Prosser.  Justice 
Bradley and Justice Gableman conclude that the contents of e-
mails that are at issue here are records as defined by the 
statute.  Justice Bradley concludes, as does the lead opinion, 
that once the custodian determines that the contents of certain 
e-mails are purely personal and evince no violation of law or 
policy, the custodian does not undertake a balancing of each 
request.  The lead opinion, Justice Bradley, and Justice 
Gableman all conclude that the custodian should not release the 
contents of e-mails that are purely personal and evince no 
violation of law or policy.  Thus five justices conclude that a 
custodian should not release the contents of e-mails that are 
purely personal and evince no violation of law or policy. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
5 
 
mail accounts and District-owned computers during the time 
period specified by the requester.  
¶12 The School District's written Internet Use Policy and 
Guidelines permit employees to use their district e-mail 
accounts for occasional personal use limited to times that do 
not interfere with the user's job responsibilities.  Users of 
the School District's network and e-mail accounts are advised 
that "[a]ll district assigned e-mail accounts are owned by the 
district and, therefore, are not private"; that the School 
District "has an obligation to monitor network activity to 
maintain the integrity of the [network] and ensure adherence to 
district policies"; and that "the Network manager will not 
routinely inspect the contents of e-mail sent by district 
employees."  The Internet Use Policy and the Guidelines say 
nothing about access to the e-mails under the Public Records 
Law.  
¶13 No allegation of improper use is at issue here.  The 
School District and the Teachers agree that the Teachers did not 
violate the School District's written Internet Use Policy or 
Guidelines and that the content of the e-mails at issue is of a 
purely personal nature, with no connection to a government 
function.    
¶14 This case does not involve the right of the government 
employer to monitor, review, or have access to the personal e-
mails of public employees using the government e-mail system.  
¶15 Rather, this case involves the right of a third party, 
a record requester, to review under the Public Records Law the 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
6 
 
personal e-mails of public sector employees who use government 
e-mail accounts and computers.5  The status of these personal e-
mails of public sector employees as records is a question of 
first impression in Wisconsin. 
¶16 More specifically, this case poses the question of 
whether the contents of the Teachers' personal e-mails are 
records available to a requester under the Public Records Law, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39, where the e-mails are sent or received 
on government e-mail accounts and created or maintained on 
government-owned computers pursuant to the employer's permission 
for occasional personal use, and the content has no connection 
to a government function.  We use the phrase "no connection to a 
government function" (and sometimes the phrase "work-related") 
as a short-hand for the phrases in Wis. Stat. § 19.31, "the 
affairs of government," "the official acts of officers and 
employees," and "the conduct of governmental business," which 
underlie the purpose for giving public access to documents.  We 
need not, and do not, describe the contours of "connection to a 
government function" in this case because the parties agree that 
the contents of the e-mails at issue have no such connection.    
                                                 
5 For purposes of this opinion, we refer to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-.39 as the "Public Records Law," although it is 
sometimes referred to as the "Open Records Law."  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 16.61-.62, 
addressing, inter alia, retention and 
preservation of documents, and also sometimes referred to as the 
"Public Records Law," is not involved in the instant case.  The 
questions of whether a record or document must be retained and 
whether it is subject to release present different issues than 
presented in an open record request.  See State ex rel. Gehl v. 
Connors, 2007 WI App 238, ¶13, 306 Wis. 2d 247, 742 N.W.2d 530.  
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
7 
 
¶17 This case has been presented raising only the question 
of whether the contents of public employees' personal e-mail 
communications created or stored on a government-owned system 
are "records" under the Wisconsin Public Records Law.  The facts 
are not in dispute in this case.  Numerous briefs filed in the 
instant case acknowledge explicitly or implicitly that the only 
e-mails at issue are those whose contents relate exclusively to 
personal matters.  The release of e-mails whose contents relate 
to government business is not at issue in the instant case. 
¶18 No one has asked the circuit court or this court to 
examine the contents of the e-mails in camera to determine 
whether the contents are personal or relate to government 
business or are a mixture of the two.  Don Bubolz, the person 
who made the record request and is named as an intervenor in 
this proceeding, filed a response in the circuit court and a 
brief in the court of appeals, both of which this court has 
considered.  Mr. Bubolz wants the contents of all of the 
Teachers' e-mails to be declared records under the Law, 
regardless of whether the contents are personal or relate to 
government business.6 
¶19 The interpretation and application of the Public 
Records Law is a question of law that this court determines 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, the dissent distorts the issue presented by 
the parties and addressed by the court.  The issue is not, as 
the dissent would portray it, a dispute about whether the 
contents of the teachers' e-mails are truly personal or are 
actually related to government business.   
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
8 
 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from the analyses of these courts.7      
¶20 If the contents of the Teachers' personal e-mails are 
records under the Public Records Law, then the court must 
undertake a balancing test to decide whether the statutory 
presumption favoring disclosure of public records is outweighed 
by any other public interest.8 
¶21 In keeping with the court's past interpretations of 
the Public Records Law, we explore various avenues to interpret 
the word "record" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), including 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2); the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31, the legislature's explicit statement of its intent, the 
statutory purpose and policy, and the construction of the Public 
Records Law; the statutory history and case law interpretations 
of 
prior 
versions 
of 
the 
statute; 
the 
executive 
branch 
interpretations of the definition of "records" (especially the 
opinions of the attorney general); the legislative failure to 
amend § 19.32(2);  other states' interpretations of their open 
                                                 
7 Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶21, 284 
Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551. 
8 Where documents are public records not subject to a 
statutory or common-law exception to disclosure requirements, 
"the balancing test must be applied in every case in order to 
determine whether a particular record should be released."  
Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996) (quoting Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan 
Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 781, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996)).  The 
balancing test inquires "whether permitting inspection would 
result in harm to the public interest which outweighs the 
legislative policy recognizing the public interest in allowing 
inspection."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 183-84. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
9 
 
records laws; and the consequences for custodians of records of 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) to exclude the content of the 
Teachers' personal e-mails.   
¶22 All these avenues of interpretation lead to one 
conclusion:  In determining whether a document is a record under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), the focus is on the content of the 
document.  To be a record under § 19.32(2), the content of the 
document must have a connection to a government function.  
¶23 In the instant case, the contents of the Teachers' 
personal e-mails have no connection to a government function and 
therefore are not records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). The 
contents of personal e-mails could, however, be records under 
the Public Records Law under certain circumstances.  For 
example, if the e-mails were used as evidence in a disciplinary 
investigation or to investigate the misuse of government 
resources, the personal e-mails would be records under the Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  A connection would then exist between the 
contents of the e-mails and a government function, namely the 
investigations.9   
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dt., 2007 WI 53, 300 
Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240 (a discipline case).  Zellner does 
not apply in the instant case.  There are no allegations of 
misconduct and no disciplinary proceeding occurred. 
The public has an interest in monitoring how the resources 
it finances are used by government employees and in reviewing 
the conduct of disciplinary investigations.  In several cases 
materials constituted records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) when 
such materials were implicated in investigations into alleged 
misconduct. See, e.g., Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811; Armada Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 
183 Wis. 2d 463, 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994).   
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
10 
 
¶24 The contents of the personal e-mails that the Teachers 
created and maintained on government-owned computers pursuant to 
the government employer's permission for occasional personal use 
of the government e-mail account and computer are not "records" 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  The personal contents of these e-
mails are not subject to release to a record requester merely 
because 
they 
are 
sent 
or 
received 
using 
the 
government 
employers' e-mail systems and then stored and maintained on 
those systems.  Because we conclude that the contents of the 
Teachers' personal e-mails are not "records" under the Public 
Records Law, we need not reach the question of balancing the 
public interest favoring disclosure with any other public 
interest. 
¶25 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court to 
enjoin the School District from releasing the contents of the 
Teachers' personal e-mails. 
I 
¶26 The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Don Bubolz, 
the records requester, filed a request with the School District 
pursuant to the Public Records Law.10  He requested e-mails for 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.35 
authorizes 
such 
requests:  
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right 
to inspect any record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  The statute 
also provides that: "any requester has a right to inspect a 
record and to make or receive a copy of a record which appears 
in written form," Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(b), and that "no 
request . . . may be refused because the person making the 
request is unwilling to be identified or to state the purpose of 
the request.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(i). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
11 
 
the period from March 1, 2007 through April 13, 2007 "from the 
computers [the Teachers] use during their school work day."   
¶27 The School District notified the Teachers that it 
intended to release all of their e-mails to the requester, 
regardless of content.11   
¶28 The Teachers did not object to the release of their 
work-related e-mails, that is, e-mails with a connection to 
school district affairs or their official actions as public 
employees.  The Teachers acknowledge that the public interest in 
monitoring appropriate use of e-mail and computer systems and 
compliance with policies limiting personal e-mail use could be 
satisfied by release of statistical information, including the 
number of e-mails (personal and business) and the time and dates 
of the personal e-mails over the specified period, or by 
redacting all personal content and releasing only the time and 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the instant case, the requester described his request in 
a number of ways:  He had a right to see the personal e-mails 
because the taxpayers paid for the equipment; the Teachers' e-
mails were official acts because they were sent on taxpayer time 
using taxpayer equipment; he needed to see the personal content 
of the e-mails to determine whether the Teachers violated the 
School District policy regarding use of the computer; and he 
needed to determine whether the Teachers used the e-mails to 
discuss elections of school board candidates.  None of the e-
mails at issue here relate to school board candidates.  The 
Teachers have not objected to the release of any e-mails 
relating to school business.  
At the circuit court, the requester stated that he was on a 
"fishing mission" to see how often the Teachers were using the 
school e-mails for personal use. 
11 The issue of whether the notice was required under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356 is not before the court. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
12 
 
date at which e-mails were sent.  The Teachers claim that 
although a record requester may have a legitimate public 
interest in knowing whether a public employee is violating 
School District policies or misusing public resources on 
taxpayer-paid work time, the Teachers' volume of e-mail use 
could easily be disclosed without disclosing the contents of the 
personal e-mails.   
¶29 The Teachers commenced this action in the circuit 
court to enjoin the School District from releasing the contents 
of their personal e-mails, that is, e-mails that contain only 
personal information, whose contents have no connection to a 
governmental function.  These personal e-mails include such 
messages as an e-mail from a teacher to her spouse about child 
care responsibilities and an e-mail from a friend to a teacher 
regarding social plans.  The Teachers assert that an intrusion 
on their privacy should not occur simply by virtue of a computer 
system's ability to store information.      
¶30 It is uncontested that the Teachers' personal e-mails 
at issue were not prepared for work-related purposes.  It is 
also uncontested that the contents of the e-mails at issue do 
not relate to the school district or government affairs or any 
official actions of the Teachers or other public officers or 
employees or the conduct of governmental business.  Neither the 
Teachers nor the School District relied on the e-mails to make 
school district or government-related decisions.   
¶31 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
Teachers' 
personal e-mails were records under the statute.  It then 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
13 
 
applied the balancing test and concluded that the personal e-
mails should be disclosed.      
¶32 The circuit court ordered that sensitive information, 
including pupil records, medical information, social security 
numbers, bank account information, home addresses, and telephone 
numbers be redacted upon disclosure.  Redaction of this 
information is not at issue here.  
¶33 The Teachers appealed.  The court of appeals certified 
the case to this court. 
¶34 In September 2009, after the Teachers and the School 
District finished their briefing, a number of non-party briefs 
were filed.  Several media entities——the Wisconsin Freedom of 
Information Council, the Wisconsin Broadcasters Association, the 
Wisconsin Newspaper Association, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
Journal Broadcast Group, Inc., and the Associated Press——joined 
in filing one brief.  The Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
Madison Teachers, Inc., AFSCME District Council 40, the Offices 
of the Milwaukee and Madison City Attorneys, and the Wisconsin 
Counties Association each filed a non-party brief.   
¶35 The briefs of the Media Entities and the Department of 
Justice challenged for the first time the circuit court's 
competence to hear the Teachers' action.  They interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356 as limiting judicial review of the disclosure of 
records under the Public Records Law.  Neither the Teachers nor 
the School District, nor any other entity, had argued the issue 
of the Teachers' right to judicial review.  The other nonparty 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
14 
 
briefs argue that the personal e-mails in the instant case are 
not records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).   
¶36 At this court's request, the Teachers and the School 
District filed supplemental briefs addressing these late-rising 
issues, namely (1) whether the Teachers have standing to pursue 
the claims they raised in circuit court; (2) whether the circuit 
court had subject matter jurisdiction and was competent to 
proceed with those claims; and (3) whether this court has 
subject matter jurisdiction and is competent to proceed with a 
review of those claims.  Both the Teachers and the School 
District urge the court to decide the substantive legal issue 
posed in the instant case, namely whether the personal e-mails 
of the Teachers are "records" within the Public Records Law.     
II 
¶37 As an initial matter, we determine the issues of 
standing and competence.  
¶38 Whether a party has standing is a question of law that 
this court determines independent of the circuit court or court 
of appeals but benefitting from their analyses.12  Wisconsin 
courts evaluate standing as a matter of judicial policy rather 
than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.13  Courts construe 
standing broadly in favor of those seeking access.14  A person 
                                                 
12 State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶23, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 
749 N.W.2d 611. 
13 Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 
65, ¶38 n.7, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866.  
14 Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶24 (citing Bence v. City of 
Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 478, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982)).  
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
15 
 
has standing to seek judicial review when that person has a 
personal stake in the outcome and is directly affected by the 
issues in controversy.15    
¶39 The Teachers have a personal stake in the outcome in 
the present case and are directly affected by a determination of 
whether their personal e-mails are records under the Public 
Records Law.  In Zellner v. Cedarburg School District, 2007 WI 
53, ¶¶2, 3, 21, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240, the court held 
that a teacher had standing to argue that certain materials are 
not "records" under the Public Records Law.  We determined in 
Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶21, that the teacher "will be 
impacted personally by this court's holding in regard to the 
requested release, and his interests were adversely affected by 
the circuit court decision [to release the record]."  The same 
is true here.  We therefore conclude that the Teachers have 
standing. 
¶40 With regard to the competence of the circuit court, 
the Department of Justice and the Media Entities argue that 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1) the circuit court was not competent 
                                                 
15 Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶24; Bence v. City of 
Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 478, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
16 
 
to rule on the Teachers' claims.16  The crux of their argument is 
that Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1) limits the classes of litigants who 
are entitled to judicial review.  The statute provides that 
except as provided in § 19.356 or by other statute, an authority 
is not required to give notice to a record subject (here the 
Teachers) of its intent to provide access to the requested 
record except in three limited circumstances, and that except as 
provided, "no person is entitled to judicial review of the 
decision of an authority to provide a requester with access to a 
record" (emphasis added).  The three limited exceptions to the 
notice requirement set forth in § 19.356 are confined to (1) 
disciplinary or investigation records; (2) records obtained by a 
subpoena or search warrant; and (3) records prepared by a 
private sector employer relating to its employee.17 
                                                 
16 In 
Wisconsin, 
a 
circuit 
court's 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction is conferred by the state constitution.  There is 
no 
question 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction in the present case.  The circuit court's ability 
to exercise that subject matter jurisdiction, that is, the 
circuit court's competency to proceed to judgment, may be 
affected by the failure to comply with statutory requirements.  
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶2, 8, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  
17 The School District argues that it had the right to 
release the records without giving the Teachers prior notice but 
also had discretion to provide notice to the Teachers of its 
intent to release the records.  
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
17 
 
¶41 Section 19.356(1) and (2) provide as follows:  
Wis. Stat. § 19.356 Notice to record subject; right of 
action.  (1) Except as authorized in this section or 
as otherwise provided by statute, no authority is 
required to notify a record subject prior to providing 
to 
a 
requester 
access 
to 
a 
record 
containing 
information pertaining to that record subject, and no 
person is entitled to judicial review of the decision 
of an authority to provide a requester with access to 
a record. 
(2)(a)  Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c) and as 
otherwise authorized or required by statute, if an 
authority decides under s.19.35 to permit access to a 
record specified in this paragraph, the authority 
shall, before permitting access and within 3 days 
after making the decision to permit access, serve 
written notice of that decision on any record subject 
to whom the record pertains, either by certified mail 
or by personally serving the notice on the record 
subject.  The notice shall briefly describe the 
requested record and include a description of the 
rights of the record subject under subs. (3) and (4).  
The paragraph applies only to the following records: 
1. A record containing information relating to an 
employee that is created or kept by the authority and 
that is the result of an investigation into a 
disciplinary matter involving the employee or possible 
employment-related violation by the employee of a 
statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or policy of the 
employee's employer.  
2. A record obtained by an authority through a 
subpoena or search warrant. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The District also contends that the statute stating that an 
individual is "entitled" to judicial review only when a request 
for records is made that fits within the statute's three 
circumstances does not preclude that person's ability to seek 
judicial review under other circumstances.  The School District 
asserts that this approach harmonizes Wis. Stat. § 19.356 and 
this court's reasoning in Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 
549 N.W.2d 699 (1996). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
18 
 
3. A record prepared by an employer other than an 
authority, 
if 
that 
record 
contains 
information 
relating to an employee of that employer, unless the 
employee authorizes the authority to provide access to 
that information (emphasis added). 
¶42 The legislature apparently adopted Wis. Stat. § 19.356 
in 2003 to narrow and codify the notice and judicial review 
rights set forth in Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 
N.W.2d 699 (1996).18      
                                                 
18 In Woznicki, the court held that "an individual whose 
privacy 
or 
reputational 
interests 
are 
implicated 
by 
the . . . potential release of his or her records has a right to 
have the circuit court review the . . . decision to release the 
records . . . ."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 193. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356 resulted from the study of the 
Special Committee on Review of the Open Records Law.  See 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Report to the Legislature, March 
25, 
2003, 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/prior/files/rl2
003_01.pdf (last visited July 9, 2010).  
The Joint Legislative Council Prefatory Note to 2003 Wis. 
Act 47 states the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 19.356 as follows: 
This bill partially codifies Woznicki and Milwaukee 
Teachers'.  In general, the bill applies the rights 
afforded by Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers' only to a 
defined 
set 
of 
records 
pertaining 
to 
employees 
residing in Wisconsin.  As an overall construct, 
records relating to employees under the bill can be 
placed in the following 3 categories: 
1. Employee-related records that may be released under 
the general balancing test without providing a right 
of notice or judicial review to the employee record 
subject. 
2. Employee-related records that may be released under 
the balancing test only after a notice of impending 
release and the right of judicial review have been 
provided to the employee record subject. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
19 
 
¶43 The 
Teachers 
argue 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
competent to proceed in the instant case because the Teachers 
come within one of the three circumstances set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356, providing for notice by the employer and 
judicial review.  The Teachers argue that upon receiving notice 
from the School District that their personal e-mails were being 
released, they reasonably assumed that the e-mails were part of 
a disciplinary inquiry into whether the Teachers had violated 
the School District's e-mail policy.19  
¶44 The Teachers and the School District want this court 
to decide the substantive issue about the personal e-mails.  The 
substantive issue is important to record custodians, record 
subjects, and record requesters alike.20  Personal e-mail 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. Employee-related records that are absolutely closed 
to public access under the open records law. 
19 The Teachers assert in the alternative that the circuit 
court was competent to adjudicate the Teachers' claims pursuant 
to a writ of mandamus under Wis. Stat. § 783.01; the Teachers 
had requested a writ of mandamus ordering that the personal e-
mails are not records subject to release.  We do not address 
whether the writ was an available alternative here. 
20 The School District's brief argued that "this is a matter 
of 
importance 
about 
which 
[records] 
custodians 
require 
guidance."  The School District also recognized that the 
certification to this court by the court of appeals identified 
the need to create a "workable set of guidelines for records 
custodians to apply," and argued that precluding judicial review 
in this case would place the district in an untenable position 
of either denying access and thus forcing the requester to seek 
a writ of mandamus to compel release, or simply releasing the e-
mails and waiting for the Teachers to file suit after an 
intrusion on its employees' privacy interests had already 
occurred. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
20 
 
communications of government employees are frequent occurrences, 
and every day in Wisconsin numerous custodians of records 
receive, analyze, and must respond to requests to inspect 
material, including e-mails.     
¶45 Until the nonparty briefs were filed in this court, no 
party or nonparty had contested the competence of the circuit 
court to provide judicial review.  Because the issue of the 
circuit court's competence was never raised in the circuit 
court, we treat the issue as having been forfeited.21  To allow 
amici to raise this issue at this late date, contrary to the 
wishes of the parties, would be contrary to the principles of 
fairness and the policies of judicial administration that the 
forfeiture rule protects.  Consequently, we do not address the 
                                                 
21 Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right.  Although cases sometimes use the words "forfeiture" and 
"waiver" interchangeably, the two words embody very different 
legal concepts. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29-
30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  The present case raises 
the question of forfeiture, not waiver.  
Forfeiture is a rule of judicial administration.  It is a 
fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must be 
preserved at the circuit court to be raised on appeal as a 
matter of right.  If the issue is not preserved, an appellate 
court may consider the issue forfeited.   The forfeiture rule 
gives the parties and the circuit court notice of the issue and 
a fair opportunity to address it; encourages attorneys to 
diligently 
prepare 
for 
and 
conduct 
trials; 
and 
prevents 
attorneys from "sandbagging" opposing counsel by failing to 
object to an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that 
the error is grounds for reversal.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶15 
(citing State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
21 
 
issue of the competence of the circuit court to provide judicial 
review in the present case.       
¶46 With regard to the competence of this court and the 
court of appeals, the circuit court's order to release the 
personal e-mails is a final and binding order for purposes of 
appeal.  When this court grants review on certification it 
acquires jurisdiction of the entire case.  No one asserts a 
failure to comply with any statutory procedure to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court of appeals or this court.  We 
therefore proceed to answer the important substantive question 
presented in this case. 
III 
¶47 Whether the Teachers' personal e-mail communications 
on government computers are records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
for purposes of the Public Records Law is a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  The question posed is whether the statutory 
definition of "record" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) includes the 
Teachers' personal e-mails.   
¶48 The statutory definition does not refer explicitly to 
e-mails.  The definition of "record" at issue was adopted 
effective January 1, 1983,22 long before e-mail and mass storage 
of electronic data were ubiquitous within and outside of 
government.  Therefore we must interpret and apply a statutory 
text to a factual situation not explicitly encompassed in the 
                                                 
22 See 1981 Act 335 (published May 6, 1982; eff. Jan. 1, 
1983). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
22 
 
statute and apparently not contemplated by the legislature, a 
relatively common occurrence in the judicial interpretation of 
statutes.    
¶49 In keeping with the court's past interpretations of 
the Public Records Law and with the provisions of the Public 
Records Law, we approach the statutory interpretation of the 
word "record" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) as follows:  
A. 
We examine first the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
defining "record" for purposes of the Public Records 
Law.  The text is not definitively determinative of 
the question posed. 
B. 
For guidance in interpreting the meaning of the word 
"record," 
we 
turn 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.31, 
the 
legislature's explicit statement of its intent, the 
statutory 
purpose and policy, and its direction 
regarding the construction of the Public Records Law.  
The legislature's statement supports the requirement 
that to be a "record," the content of a document must 
have a connection to a government function, that is, 
the 
content 
must 
relate 
to 
"the 
affairs 
of 
government," "the official acts" of officers and  
employees, or "the conduct of governmental business."     
C. 
Statutory language is interpreted in relation to the 
language of closely related statutes.  The lesson 
learned from examining the prior public records 
statutes and case law is that documents with no 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
23 
 
connection to government functions are not "records" 
within the Public Records Law.  
D. 
Statutory interpretation may be informed by executive 
branch interpretations of a statute.  The opinions of 
the Wisconsin Attorney General are especially helpful 
in deciphering the definition of "record" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  The Public Records Law has long 
been interpreted and administered to exclude from the 
meaning of "record" documents of purely personal 
content, sometimes referred to as "fugitive papers." 
E. 
Statutory 
interpretation may be informed by the 
legislative history of the definition of "record" in 
Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  The legislative history 
supports 
interpreting 
"record" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) as requiring the content of a document to 
have a connection to a government function. 
F. 
Statutory 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Public 
Records Law may be informed by the interpretations of 
other states of their open records laws.  No states 
have been cited as including the contents of purely 
personal e-mails in their open records laws. 
G. 
The legislature would not have intended a court's 
interpretation of the word "record" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) 
to 
impose 
an 
unreasonable 
burden 
on 
custodians of records.  Interpreting the definition of 
record in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) to exclude e-mails of 
purely 
personal 
content 
does 
not 
impose 
an 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
24 
 
unreasonable administrative burden on custodians of 
records.    
A 
¶50 We examine first the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
defining "record" for purposes of the Public Records Law, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 19.33 to 19.39.   
¶51 To determine whether particular materials are or are 
not records, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) provides guidance by defining 
"record" in three parts: (1) by stating a general description of 
a record; (2) by providing a non-exhaustive list illustrating 
specific types of records; and (3) by providing a description 
and non-exhaustive list of items that are excluded from the 
definition and therefore are not records.  
¶52 The first part of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) states that 
"'Record' means any material on which written, drawn, printed, 
spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or 
preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which 
has been created or is being kept by an authority" (emphasis 
added).  
¶53 The 
second 
part 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) 
more 
specifically enumerates several types of materials included as 
records.  E-mails are not listed.   
¶54 The third part of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) describes 
materials that are excluded from the definition of a "record."  
As relevant here, "'Record' does not include drafts, notes, 
preliminary computations and like materials prepared for the 
originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
25 
 
name of a person for whom the originator is working"  (emphasis 
added). 
¶55 The complete text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) (formatted 
for clarity) is as follows: 
[1]"Record" means any material on which written, 
drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic 
information is recorded or preserved, regardless of 
physical form or characteristics, which has been 
created or is being kept by an authority.  
[2]"Record" 
includes, 
but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, 
tapes 
(including 
computer tapes), computer printouts and optical disks.  
[3]"Record" 
does 
not 
include 
drafts, 
notes, 
preliminary computations and like materials prepared 
for the originator's personal use or prepared by the 
originator in the name of a person for whom the 
originator is working; materials which are purely the 
personal property of the custodian and have no 
relation to his or her office; materials to which 
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and 
published materials in the possession of an authority 
other than a public library which are available for 
sale, or which are available for inspection at a 
public library. 
¶56 The Teachers and the School District agree, as do we, 
that e-mails can fall within the first part of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2)'s description of materials that may be "records."  
The personal e-mails at issue were created by the Teachers.  The 
School District, not the Teachers, is an "authority" within the 
meaning of the statute and the e-mails are stored on computers 
owned by the School District.23       
                                                 
23 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1) 
for 
the 
definition 
of 
"authority." 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
26 
 
¶57 The second part of the definition of "record" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of 10 
illustrations of items that are included within the word 
"record." 
 
"'Record' 
includes, 
but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, charts, photographs, 
films, recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), computer 
printouts and optical disks."  This more specific enumeration 
does relatively little to illuminate our inquiry into whether 
the Teachers' personal e-mails are records.  
¶58 The third part of the definition of "record" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) excludes from the definition of records both 
(1) "materials which are purely the personal property of the 
custodian and have no relation to his or her office," and (2) 
"drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like materials 
prepared for the originator's personal use." 
¶59 As a preliminary matter, it is clear that some 
materials that fall within the broad description of records in 
the first or second parts of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) may be 
specifically excluded by the third part of § 19.32(2).  If a 
document falls within an exception, it is not a "record."  
Exceptions are to be narrowly construed.24 
¶60 There is a question whether the Teachers' personal e-
mails fall within the exception of materials that are "purely 
the personal property of the custodian and have no relation to 
his or her office."  The School District's record custodian is 
                                                 
24 Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 411, 438 N.W.2d 589 (1989). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
27 
 
Dr. Robert Crist, the Superintendent of Schools; the Teachers 
are not the custodians of the e-mails.      
¶61 The legislative intent may have been to exclude from 
the word "record" personal property of any government employee 
(rather than merely the personal property of the custodian) that 
has no relation to his or her employment.  One commentator 
observed that this language relating to the personal property of 
the custodian was added in 1983 "as a refinement of earlier case 
law which recognized some materials to be 'fugitive papers' and 
indicated that if such items had no relation to the function of 
the office, there was no requirement that they be kept as a 
public record."25  We discuss the "fugitive papers" exception to 
records later in our analysis.  See infra ¶¶97-99, 101-102, 104.    
¶62 We turn to whether the Teachers' personal e-mails fall 
within the exception for "notes," "drafts," or "like materials 
prepared for the originator's personal use."  The words "notes," 
"drafts," and "like materials" should each be given distinct 
meanings, to avoid redundancy or "surplusage."26 
                                                 
25 Linda de la Mora, The Wisconsin Public Records Law, 67 
Marq. L. Rev. 65, 90 (1983).   
The Teachers reason that just as an authority cannot 
circumvent the Public Records Law by putting public records in 
the possession of a private entity, see WIREdata Inc. v. Village 
of Sussex, 2008 WI 69, ¶82, 310 Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736, 
private transmissions do not become records under the Public 
Records Law by virtue of their storage on government e-mail 
systems.  
26 Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 
n.14, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67 (citing Donaldson v. State, 
93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980)). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
28 
 
¶63 We agree with the School District that the Teachers' 
personal e-mails do not fit easily into the statutory exclusion 
for "drafts."  The Teachers' personal e-mails are final work 
products. 
¶64 The word "notes" is susceptible of more than one 
meaning.  The word ordinarily refers to a brief, informal 
document.  An e-mail may well fit within this meaning.  
¶65 The 
School District, however, urges a different 
meaning of "notes," arguing that this exclusion from the 
definition of "record" should be limited to materials that are 
in preliminary draft form and that the Teachers' e-mails are 
documents in "final form."   
¶66 The meaning of "like materials" is hardly self-
explanatory.  When two or more words or phrases are listed 
together, the general terms (in the instant case, "like 
materials") may be defined by the other words and understood in 
the same general sense.  This canon of construction is known in 
Latin as noscitur a sociis, "it is known from its associates," 
and its variation ejusdem generis.27  These canons, like all 
canons of statutory construction, are instructive "only if the 
result is consistent with the legislative intent."28  Thus, 
"[t]hat a word may be known by the company it keeps is . . . not 
                                                 
27 See Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 601, ¶46 & n.25; 2A Norman J. 
Singer 
& 
J.D. 
Shambie 
Singer, 
Statutes 
and 
Statutory 
Construction § 47:16, 347-54 (2007). 
28 2A Singer & Singer, supra note 27, § 47:16, 354. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
29 
 
an invariable rule, for the word may have a character of its own 
not to be submerged by its association."29 
¶67 The words "like materials" plainly describe materials 
that are "like" notes and drafts but are not, by themselves, 
either of those things.  The phrase therefore describes some 
broader set of materials that is "prepared for the originator's 
personal use."  
¶68 We 
turn 
then 
to 
the 
phrase 
"prepared 
for 
the 
originator's personal use."  The School District suggests that 
"personal" refers to the intended use of the material, not the 
content of the material.  The School District contends that when 
the e-mail is sent, regardless of content, the communication is 
no longer "prepared for the originator's personal use" but is 
also intended for and prepared for the use of others, namely the 
recipient(s) of the e-mail.  In contrast, the Teachers argue 
that a more logical reading of the words "for the personal use 
of the originator" is to distinguish between materials with 
work-related content and those with personal content. 
¶69 For support of its interpretation of "prepared for the 
originator's personal use," the School District looks to State 
v. Panknin, 217 Wis. 2d 200, 212-13, 579 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 
1998), in which the court of appeals held that personal notes of 
a circuit court judge, even when "work related," were not 
records under the Public Records Law, but were instead a 
                                                 
29 Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 
(1923). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
30 
 
"voluntary piece of work completed by the trial court for its 
own convenience and to facilitate the performance of its 
duties."30  The Panknin court held that such notes did not have 
to be disclosed under the public records law "because disclosure 
would impede the work habits of the trial court."31 
¶70 The School District urges that the Teachers' personal 
e-mails are not analogous to a judge's notes in Panknin, because 
the e-mails are not private working documents created for the 
Teachers' own convenience.  An e-mail that is sent to another 
person, according to the School District, is not prepared for 
the originator's personal deliberation, and therefore falls 
outside the meaning of "prepared for the originator's personal 
use." 
¶71 The School District also relies on Fox v. Bock, 149 
Wis. 2d 403, 
408, 
417, 
438 
N.W.2d 589 
(1989), 
for 
the 
proposition that once a draft or preliminary computation is 
circulated or used by others, it becomes a record under the 
Public Records Law.  The Fox court held that regardless of 
whether the document was labeled a draft, once a government 
entity had begun taking official actions based on the document's 
suggestions, the document became a record.  The Fox court 
refused to allow the label of "draft" to exclude the document 
from the Public Records Law.  That the report "aroused official 
                                                 
30 State v. Panknin  217 Wis. 2d 200, 212, 579 N.W.2d 52, 58 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
31 Id. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
31 
 
action" indicated that the "draft" was for government, not 
personal, use, declared the Fox court, 149 Wis. 2d at 417.     
¶72 The Teachers read Fox to indicate that the focus of 
"personal use" in determining whether a document is a record 
under the third part of the definition of "record" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) is on whether the content of the document has been 
connected to an official function.  They argue that materials 
become records when they serve a governmental purpose rather 
than a solely personal purpose of the originator. 
¶73 The Teachers argue that Fox means that documents used 
for a government purpose are records, but that merely using the 
government 
e-mail 
system 
does 
not 
transform 
private 
communications into "records" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  "It 
is the nature of the documents and not their location that 
determines their status under [the Public Records Law].  To 
conclude otherwise would elevate form over substance."  Nichols 
v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 274-75, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996).  
¶74 Although both offer insights, neither Panknin nor Fox 
is determinative of whether the Teachers' personal e-mails fall 
within the statutory phrase "for the personal use of the 
originator." 
¶75 Both the School District and the Teachers make 
persuasive arguments about the correct interpretation of the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  To properly interpret the word 
"record" in § 19.32(2) we therefore look further to other 
sources we have traditionally used to interpret the public 
records law.  First we look to Wis. Stat. § 19.31, which 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
32 
 
encompasses the legislative statement of intent, purpose, 
policy, and direction regarding the construction of the statute 
as aids in interpreting the definition of "record" in the Public 
Records Law.   
B 
¶76 In enacting the Public Records Law, the Legislature 
provided an explicit statement of its intent and the policies 
and purposes underlying the Public Records Law, as well as 
directions 
regarding 
a 
presumption 
to 
be 
used 
in 
the 
interpretation of the Law.  In Wis. Stat. § 19.31, the 
Declaration of Policy, the legislature has declared that "all 
persons are entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding the affairs of government" and that the Public Records 
Law "shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of 
complete access, consistent with the conduct of government 
business."  The text of § 19.31 is an important aid in 
interpreting the meaning of "record" in § 19.32(2). 
¶77 The full legislative directive in Wis. Stat. § 19.31 
is as follows: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
33 
 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied. 
¶78 Statutory 
interpretation 
strives 
to 
give 
"full, 
proper, and intended effect" to the law we are interpreting.32  
The Teachers argue, and we agree, that publicly disclosing the 
contents of their personal e-mails is neither a proper nor an 
intended effect of the Public Records Law, as articulated by the 
Legislature's explicit statement of legislative intent, policy, 
purpose, and rule of construction. 
¶79 The 
clear 
and explicit statement of legislative 
intent, policy, and purpose in the Public Records Law supports 
the Teachers' argument that the content of a document must have 
a connection to a government function to constitute a record 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). 
¶80 The legislature has stated that the Public Records Law 
serves "an informed electorate" and that "all persons are 
entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts of those officers 
and employees who represent them."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  This 
explicit 
statement 
of 
legislative 
policy 
supports 
making 
available those documents whose contents are related to the 
affairs of government, to the official acts of officers and 
employees, and to "the conduct of governmental business," rather 
                                                 
32 Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶10, 315 
Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
34 
 
than those related solely to the private affairs of officers and 
employees.  
¶81 Affairs of government and official acts include the 
public's ability to evaluate the use of public resources.  But 
there is a distinction between allowing public oversight of 
employees' use of public resources and invoking the Public 
Records Law to invade the private affairs of public employees by 
categorically revealing the contents of employees' personal e-
mails.  Disclosure of the contents of the Teachers' personal e-
mails does not keep the electorate informed about the government 
and sheds no light on "official acts" or "the affairs of 
government." 
¶82 Furthermore, the legislature's rule of construction of 
the Public Records Law, a presumption of complete access, 
supports the Teachers' position.  According to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31, "in every instance" the law is to be construed "with a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with the 
conduct of governmental business."  The presumption of complete 
public access is thus not absolute.  The presumption of complete 
public access is limited to access "consistent with the conduct 
of governmental business."  Disclosure of the contents of the 
Teachers' personal e-mails is not "consistent with the conduct 
of governmental business."   
¶83 Rather, disclosure of the contents of the Teachers' 
personal e-mails is antithetical to the conduct of governmental 
business.  It is consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business to allow public employees occasional personal use of 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
35 
 
government computers and e-mail accounts consistent with their 
work duties.  Flexible, common-sense workplace policies that 
allow occasional personal use of e-mail are in line with the 
mainstream of professional practice.  In this case, the School 
District's Internet Use Policy and Guidelines required that 
"[a]ccess to e-mail on [the network] will be through the 
district provided account only.  Other commercial e-mail 
services will not be allowed."  
¶84 Occasional personal use of District e-mail accounts 
thus enables public employees to take care of family and 
personal necessities in the office, without requiring greater 
interruption to the workday.  E-mail often provides the quickest 
and simplest way to facilitate brief communications and enables 
employees to be more productive. 
¶85 Forbidding employees from using work e-mail accounts 
for any personal communications, or making such communications 
automatically subject to public review, would create a perverse 
incentive for employees to use more time-consuming means of 
personal communication during the workday.  Stripping a public 
employee of his or her privacy in the contents of personal e-
mails simply because he or she works for the government might 
hamper productivity, negatively impact employee morale, and 
undermine recruiting and retention of government employees.   
¶86 Given such considerations, the School District has 
made the very reasonable decision to allow occasional personal 
use of e-mail.  Excluding the content of personal e-mails from 
the definition of "record" under the Public Record Law comports 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
36 
 
with the "presumption of complete public access, consistent with 
the conduct of governmental business."  Excluding the content of 
the Teachers personal e-mails from "records" is the kind of 
common-sense, functional limit on "complete public access" 
expressly endorsed by the legislative statement of policy in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
C 
¶87 In addition to the legislative statement of intent and 
policy and directive as to construction of the Law, our 
interpretation of the definition of "record" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) is informed by the prior statutes and the case law.  
The statutory history and the case law are especially important 
in interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39 inasmuch as our court 
has long relied on case law interpreting prior statutory 
language in interpreting the Public Records Law, and Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1) 
provides 
that 
"[s]ubstantive 
common 
law 
principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive 
copies of records shall remain in effect."33  The common law is 
therefore important in interpreting the word "record."34   
                                                 
33 See also Wis. Stat. § 19.356(6), stating:  "The court 
shall apply substantive common law principles construing the 
right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of records in making 
its decision."  This statute was cited in Local 289 v. Rock 
County, 2004 WI App 210, ¶3, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644. 
34 In State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 434 
n.5, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991), the court explained the importance 
of case law in interpreting the Public Records Law as follows:  
Prior to the enactment of the first general public 
records legislation by ch. 178, Laws of 1917, the 
public's right of access to government records was 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
37 
 
¶88 Public access to government records is of long 
standing in Wisconsin.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized 
the right of public access to government records before any 
statutory enactment.  Provisions relating to the public's right 
to review government records are found in Wis. Stat. § 18.01 
(1917), which was enacted to unify a number of specific 
provisions relating to public officers.35  Because the statute 
was brief, case law served as the primary body of law in 
determining access to government materials.  Although the 1983 
version of the Public Records Law revised and renumbered the 
prior statute, courts continue to look to the earlier public 
records cases for guidance.36  
                                                                                                                                                             
governed mainly by the common law.  These general 
principles remain unchanged.  Section 19.35(1)(a), 
Stats. 
states 
that 
"[s]ubstantive 
common 
law 
principles construing the right to inspect, copy or 
receive copies of records shall remain in effect." 
35 For discussions of the history of the Public Records Law 
in Wisconsin, see International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 
366-67, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 
Wis. 2d 672, 677-679, 137 N.W.2d 470, (1965); Sverre David 
Roang, Comment, Toward a More Open and Accountable Government: A 
Call for Optimal Disclosure Under the Wisconsin Open Records 
Law, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 719, 721-722, 733-35; de la Mora, supra 
note 25, at 73-83.  
36 See, e.g., Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Baldarotta, 
162 Wis. 2d 142, 158-159, 469 N.W.2d 638 (1991) (applying State 
ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 
(1965)); State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 434-
436, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991) (analyzing and relying on numerous 
pre-1983 cases); State ex rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ., 209 
Wis. 2d 377, 385-387, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying  
Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 518, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967)). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
38 
 
¶89 The lesson learned from examining the prior statute 
and the case law is that documents with no connection to 
government functions are not records within the Public Records 
Law.    
¶90 Before the adoption of the present Public Records Law 
effective January 1, 1983, the public's right to review 
government records was governed by Wis. Stat. §§ 19.21-19.25 
(1979-80), which was substantially similar to the 1917 statute 
codified at §§ 18.01(1)-(2) (1917-18).   
¶91 Section 19.21(2) (1979-80) provided in relevant part 
that "any person may . . . examine . . . any of the property or 
things mentioned in sub. (1)."  Subsection (1) of § 19.21 
provided in relevant part that each public officer "is the legal 
custodian of and shall keep and preserve all property and 
things . . . required by law to be filed, deposited, or kept in 
his office, or which are in the lawful possession or control of 
himself or his deputies . . . " (emphasis added).  
¶92 The 
phrase 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.21(1) 
(1979-80) 
highlighted above is the predecessor language to the current 
definition of records made available to public inspection in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  This definition in § 19.21(1) had been 
the subject of extensive discussion over the years among the 
attorney general, various public officials, and this court. 
¶93 Prior to the adoption of the present law in 1983, the 
law was clear that papers having no relation to the function of 
a government office, including personal correspondence, were not 
open to public inspection. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
39 
 
¶94 The case law developed as follows:  In 1922, the 
attorney general interpreted the highlighted language of Wis. 
Stat. § 18.01(1) (1921) as referring to only those documents an 
officer was under a legal obligation to preserve and "does not 
embrace every document or memorandum that may be found in a 
public office at any time."37  A similar interpretation of the 
statutory language was adopted in State ex rel. Spencer v. 
Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 223 N.W. 861 (1929). 
¶95 This 1929 Freedy interpretation was reconsidered in 
International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 369, 29 N.W.2d 730 
(1947).38  In International Union, the court stated that the 
statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 18.01(2) (1945) encompassed 
three categories of documents: (1) documents required by law to 
be filed, deposited, or kept in his office; (2) documents "in 
his possession as such officer"; and (3) documents "to the 
possession of which he is entitled as such officer." 
¶96 In 
other 
words, 
the 
International 
Union 
court 
concluded that the "possession" language in Wis. Stat. § 18.01 
(1945) encompassed more than simply what was legally required to 
be kept in an office, thus rejecting the earlier interpretation 
                                                 
37 11 Wis. Op. Att'y. Gen. 7 (1922). 
38 International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 369, 29 
N.W.2d 730 (1947), "overruled sub silentio the dictum appearing 
in the final paragraph of the opinion in State ex rel. Spencer 
v. Freedy [198 Wis. 388, 233 N.W. 861 (1929)] in which the 
conclusion was expressed that sec. 18.01, Stats., only allowed 
inspection of 'anything required by law to be filed, deposited, 
or kept in a public office.'"  Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 679. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
40 
 
that possession referred only to those documents which a 
government entity was under a legal obligation to maintain.  The 
International Union court, 251 Wis. at 371, stated: "It is rule 
independently of statute that public records include not only 
papers specifically required to be kept by a public officer but 
all written memorials made by a public officer within his 
authority 
where 
such 
writings 
constitute 
a 
convenient, 
appropriate, or customary method of discharging the duties of 
the office." 
¶97 The 
International 
Union 
court 
further 
declared, 
however, that the "possession" language of the statute was 
limited to those items possessed in an official capacity:  "It 
is also clear that the words of limitation give some power to 
officers to dispose of what this court has called purely 
fugitive papers having no relation to the function of the 
office."39  
¶98 The 
court 
affirmed 
the 
International 
Union 
interpretation of "records" in State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 
                                                 
39 Int'l Union, 251 Wis. at 370-71.  See also State ex rel. 
Dinneen v. Larson, 231 Wis. 207, 214, 284 N.W. 21 (1939) 
(contrasting "mere fugitive papers, which were not required to 
be filed or kept, but were subject to disposition at the 
pleasure of the secretary" with those with "relevancy . . . to 
matters which may legitimately concern the [authority] in its 
official activities"). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
41 
 
28 Wis. 2d 672, 677-80, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965), modified on 
denial of reh'g, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 139 N.W.2d 324 (1966).40   
¶99 The attorney general also interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.21(1)-(2) 
(1973) 
in 
1974, 
regarding 
the 
types 
of 
correspondence in the governor's office that were open to the 
public.  The attorney general advised the governor that the 
governor's official correspondence was subject to open record 
review "with the exception of truly personal correspondence or 
truly fugitive papers having no relation to the function of your 
office."41 
                                                 
40 "[P]ublic records include not only papers specifically 
required to be kept by a public officer but all written 
memorials made by a public officer within his authority where 
such writings constitute a convenient, appropriate or customary 
method of discharging the duties of the office."  State ex rel. 
Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 679, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965) 
(quoting Int'l Union, 251 Wis. at 371). 
41 63 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 400 (1974).  This opinion was 
issued in response to an inquiry regarding a citizen request to 
examine correspondence addressed to the governor concerning a 
bill recently enacted by the legislature.  The attorney general 
was interpreting the definition of "record" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.21(2) (1973) along with the definition of "public record" 
in § 16.80(2)(a) applicable, inter alia, to records retention.  
Wis. Stat. § 16.80(2) (1973) provided as follows: 
(a)'Public records' means all books, papers, maps, 
photographs, films, recordings, or other documentary 
materials or any copy thereof, regardless of physical 
form or characteristics, made, or received by any 
agency of the state or its officers or employes [sic] 
in connection with the transaction of public business 
and retained by that agency or its successor as 
evidence of its activities or functions because of the 
information contained therein; except the records and 
correspondence of any member of the state legislature  
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
42 
 
¶100 The court again affirmed the International Union 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.21(1) in Hathaway v. Joint 
School District No. 1, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 342 N.W.2d 682 
(1984).  The court reiterated that public records included "not 
only those documents specifically required to be filed by the 
custodian of records, but all written papers made by an officer 
within his authority."  Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 393.  Public 
records 
include 
those 
"made 
by 
an 
officer 
within 
his 
authority."42 
¶101 The statutory history, the case law and the attorney 
general opinions demonstrate that whether a document is a public 
record depends on the nature and purpose of the document's 
contents and that the existence of a document within a public 
office does not in and of itself make that document a public 
record.  As the court recognized in Panknin, not everything a 
government official or employee creates is a public record.43 
¶102 In sum, the statutory history evidences that for most 
of a century Wisconsin's public records law has recognized that 
                                                 
42 The Hathaway case addressed a request for lists of 
student names and addresses.  It was never contested that these 
were 
prepared 
for 
official 
school 
purposes, 
and 
it 
was 
"conceded . . . that the list of names and addresses of parents 
of children in the Green Bay School District constitutes a 
public record" and was therefore subject to inspection at face 
value.  Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 
392, 342 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1984).  The question addressed was 
whether another statutory provision, Wis. Stat. § 118.125, 
governing "Pupil Records," made the list confidential as an 
express exception to the Open Records Law. 
43 State v. Panknin, 217 Wis. 2d 200, 209-10, 579 N.W.2d 52 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
43 
 
"fugitive papers" and personal communications with no connection 
to government functions are not records under the law.  The case 
law has also emphasized that the statute, although slightly 
differently over the decades, has continued to recognize and 
incorporate the existing common-law limitations on access to 
public records. 
¶103 The legislature is presumed to be aware of existing 
laws44 and the courts' interpretations of those laws45 when it 
enacts a statute.  The 1983 statute defining "record" uses  
language similar to that used in the predecessor statute and 
does not topple the long-established exclusion of purely 
personal (that is "fugitive") documents from the meaning of the 
word "record."  Indeed, the 1983 statute explicitly preserves 
substantive common-law principles construing the right to 
inspect, copy, or receive copies of records.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a). 
¶104 The lesson learned from examining the prior statutes 
and the case law is that documents with purely personal content 
and with no connection to a government function are not records 
within the Public Records Law.  This definition of "records" 
comports with the interpretations and applications of the Public 
                                                 
44 Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins., 2009 WI 27, ¶40, 316 
Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652. 
45 State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 198, 560 N.W.2d 266 
(1997); DOR v. Johnson Welding & Mfg. Co., Inc., 2000 WI App 
179, ¶16, 238 Wis. 2d 243, 617 N.W.2d 193. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
44 
 
Records Law by the executive branch and the explicit legislative 
purposes of the Public Records Law, which we now discuss. 
D 
¶105 Statutory interpretation may also be informed by the  
interpretations and applications of a statute by the executive 
arms of government.  The Public Records Law has long been 
administered to exclude from the meaning of "record" those 
documents with purely personal content, sometimes referred to as 
fugitive papers.  To be a record, according to the frequently 
applied administrative interpretation of the Public Records Law, 
the content of the document must have a connection to a 
government function.  
¶106 One important interpretation of the word "record" in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) comes from the Office of the Attorney 
General.  Although we are not bound by an attorney general's 
opinion, a well-reasoned opinion is of persuasive value when a 
court later addresses the meaning of the same statute.46  The 
opinions and writings of the attorney general have special 
significance in interpreting the Public Records Law inasmuch as 
the legislature has specifically authorized the attorney general 
                                                 
46 State v. Ludwig, 31 Wis. 2d 690, 698, 143 N.W.2d 548 
(1966); Town of Vernon v. Waukesha County, 102 Wis. 2d 686, 692, 
307 N.W.2d 227 (1981); Village of DeForest v. Dane County, 211 
Wis. 2d 804, 812, 565 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Norton 
v. Town of Sevastopol, 108 Wis. 2d 595, 599, 323 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
45 
 
to advise "any person" as to the applicability of the Law.  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.39.47   
¶107 In 
1983, 
shortly 
after 
the 
present 
statutory 
definition of "record" became effective, the attorney general 
advised the Department of Health and Human Services about 
releasing copies of documents received from other agencies 
purely for informational purposes and concerning matters not 
affecting the Department's functions.  The attorney general 
advised the Department that documents whose content did not 
demonstrate "sufficient connection with the function of" the 
office did not qualify as public records and "therefore, would 
not have to be preserved or disclosed."  72 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
99 (1983).     
¶108 In issuing this opinion, the attorney general examined 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) in connection with two statutes:  Wis. 
Stat. § 16.61 and § 19.21.  Wisconsin Stat. § 16.61 governs, 
                                                 
47 See State v. Beaver Dam Area Dev. Corp., 2008 WI 90, ¶37, 
312 Wis. 2d 84, 752 N.W.2d 295 ("the interpretation advanced by 
the attorney general is of particular importance" because "the 
legislature has expressly charged the state attorney general 
with 
interpreting 
the 
open 
meetings 
and 
public 
record 
statutes"); see also State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 
Wis. 2d 429, 437, 477 N.W.2d 608, 611 (1991) (relying on the 
attorney general's opinion for "additional common law support"). 
Earlier drafts of the law contained provisions for an 
adjudicative body, the Open Records Board, which would review 
denials of requests for access to records.  The provision for 
the attorney general to give advisory opinions replaced this 
provision for an independent adjudicatory body.  See de la Mora, 
supra note 25, at 83-84; compare 1979 S.B. 482 with Senate 
Substitute Amendment 1 to 1981 S.B. 250 and 1981 Wis. Act 335. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
46 
 
inter alia, record retention practices.  Section 16.61(b) 
defines "public records" as "all books, papers . . . made, or 
received by any state agency or its officers or employees in 
connection with the transaction of public business . . . ." 
(emphasis added).  Wisconsin Stats. § 19.21 requires each and 
every officer of state and local government, including the 
school district, to keep and preserve property.   
¶109 The attorney general opined that these three statutes, 
read together, demonstrate that a legal custodian has a duty 
under the Public Records Law to preserve those records "that 
have some relation to the function of his or her office."  
Accordingly, the attorney general concluded that a custodian 
would not have to preserve or disclose copies of documents 
received from other agencies purely for information purposes 
because they "[do] not have a sufficient connection with the 
function of the office to qualify as public records . . . ."  72 
Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 99 (1983). 
¶110 The attorney general has continued to adhere to this  
interpretation, 
recognizing that "not everything a public 
official or employee creates is a public record,"48 and that 
records are those documents "created or kept in connection with 
                                                 
48 Wis. Dep't of Justice, Wis. Pub. Records Law:  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-19.39, Compliance Outline (Aug. 2009) (hereinafter DOJ 
Compliance Outline) (quoting In re John Doe Proceeding, 2004 WI 
65, 
¶45, 
272 
Wis. 2d 208, 
680 
N.W.2d 792), 
available 
at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dls/OMPR/2009OMCG-
PRO/2009_Pub_Rec_Outline.pdf (last visited July 9, 2010). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
47 
 
official purpose or function of the agency."49  The attorney 
general consistently advises that "content, not medium or 
format, determines whether a document is a 'record' or not."50   
¶111 In less formal writings, such as a 2001 correspondence 
with a journalist from the Wisconsin State Journal, the attorney 
general advised that "records of a purely personal nature are 
exempt for the definition of 'record' in Section 19.32(2)," and 
that "personal documents are not covered by the public records 
law."51 
¶112 In 
a 
2005 
correspondence, 
the 
attorney 
general 
informed the president of the Waukesha Taxpayers League that "if 
the emails were about some matter that was purely personal, the 
emails would not be a public record."52   
¶113 In a 2006 correspondence with the legal counsel for 
the State Elections Board, the attorney general's office advised 
that 
"[t]he 
fact 
that . . . electronic 
communications 
are 
transmitted and stored on private email accounts . . . is 
immaterial, because Wisconsin law has long recognized that the 
substance of the record, not its physical location or custody, 
determines whether the document is subject to the public records 
statute."53 
                                                 
49 Id.; State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 679, 
137 N.W.2d 470, 473 (1965). 
50 DOJ Compliance Outline at 3. 
51 See Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief and Appendix, A-Ap. 172. 
52 See id., A-Ap. 173. 
53 See id. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
48 
 
¶114 In a 2007 internal memorandum, the attorney general 
specifically applied this rationale to the issue of employees' 
personal e-mails, as presented in this case.  The memorandum 
concluded that "purely personal emails of public employees are 
not public records," again emphasizing that "content, not medium 
or format, determines whether a document is a 'record or not.'"54   
¶115 The 
attorney 
general's 
office 
is 
not 
the 
only 
executive entity advising that the contents of personal e-mails 
are not records under the Public Records Law.  The offices of 
the city attorneys of Milwaukee and Madison have also advised 
agencies within their respective cities on matters relating to 
compliance with the Public Records Law and offer formal and 
informal opinions interpreting the Public Records Law.    
¶116 These city attorneys have consistently advised that 
personal communications are not records under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2), and filed a nonparty brief in this case, advising 
this court that affirmance of the order of the circuit court 
might apply "to all recordable communications made on government 
equipment or resources, including all pieces of paper, instant 
messaging, text messaging, and VOIP (voice over internet 
protocol) used incidentally by employees to communicate on 
personal matters."  They urge us to clarify the law by ruling 
that the contents of e-mails including only personal messages 
are not records subject to disclosure as records under the 
Public Records Law. 
                                                 
54 See id. at A-Ap. 172 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
49 
 
¶117 The Milwaukee and Madison city attorneys also alert 
the court that federal and state courts have indicated there may 
be privacy concerns relating to disclosure of employees' 
personal e-mail55 and that disclosure of some personal messages 
under 
some 
circumstances 
may 
violate 
the 
federal 
Stored 
Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).  They urge this court 
not to place records custodians in what they consider an 
impossible position where, if the contents of personal e-mails 
are defined as records, custodians would risk on the one hand 
violation of the Public Records Law (for failure to disclose) or 
on the other hand violation of privacy rights or the federal 
                                                 
55 Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 121 P.3d 190 
(Colo. 2005) (acknowledging that a constitutional right to 
privacy may bar access to public records otherwise accessible 
under the public records law).  Compare Muick v. Glenayre 
Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (employees of private 
employer 
have 
no 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
information stored on employer laptops because of employer's 
announced policy that it could inspect the laptops it furnished 
for employee use).  
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
50 
 
Stored Communication Act (for disclosing protected personal 
information).56  
¶118 Applying these administrative interpretations to the 
instant case, we would conclude that the Teachers' personal e-
mails are neither for the informational purposes of the School 
District, nor are they communications between one official 
agency and another.  They have even less connection to any 
government function than the informational materials received 
from other government agencies that the attorney general advises 
                                                 
56 Similarly, the Wisconsin Department of Administration 
(DOA) 
has 
produced 
"E-mail 
Records 
Management 
Training" 
materials relating to records retention.  The DOA affirms that 
"e-mail messages about state business are public records." 
(emphasis added).  "[I]t is not sufficient to treat e-mail with 
a broad brush. . . . The medium is irrelevant.  E-mail messages 
should be evaluated for content and function to determine 
whether the message is a record or a non-record . . . ." See 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief and Appendix at A-Ap. 177.  In its 
training materials for public records e-mail management, the 
Department 
of 
Administration 
identifies 
"Personal 
e-
mail . . . such as 'let's do lunch' or 'can I catch a ride home' 
or family e-mail communications" as a specific example of "Non-
Record E-mail."  See Amy K. Moran & Nancy Kunde, Public Records 
in 
E-mail 
and 
Winning 
Strategies 
for 
Managing 
Them:  
Presentation to Wis. Ass'n of Academic Librarians, Apr. 23, 
2009, 
available 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=7617&locid=0 
(last 
visited July 9, 2010). 
The School District agrees that it was not required to 
retain the Teachers' personal e-mails at issue under Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.61. 
We do not interpret Wis. Stat. § 16.61 or rely on it.  It 
is interesting to note that arguably the only reason the record 
requester might have access to the Teachers' personal e-mails in 
the present case is that the School District did not destroy the 
e-mails. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
51 
 
are not public records.  Rather, these are personal messages 
between employees and their friends and families.   
¶119 The content of the Teachers' e-mails at issue has no 
connection to a government function, and executive branch 
interpretations of the Public Records Law would characterize the 
contents of the Teachers' personal e-mails as not records under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). 
E 
¶120 Insight into the meaning of the word "record" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) may also be provided by the legislative history 
of § 19.32(2). 
¶121 The definition of "record" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
has not been amended since the legislature adopted it in 1983.  
As noted, that same year, the attorney general interpreted 
"record" in § 19.32(2) to exclude documents whose content did 
not demonstrate "sufficient connection with the function of" the 
government office.  72 Wis. Op. Att'y. Gen. 99 (1983).  
¶122 Although Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) has not been amended, 
the legislature has amended various provisions in the Public 
Records Law multiple times since its original enactment.  The 
legislature has thus passed up several opportunities to change 
the 
definition 
of 
"record" 
after 
the 
attorney 
general's 
opinions. 
¶123 In 2002, the Joint Legislative Council established a 
Special Committee on Review of the Open Records Law, which was 
specifically directed to "recommend changes in the law to 
accommodate electronic communications . . . ."  The Committee 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
52 
 
issued a report to the legislature on March 25, 2003, without 
recommending any change to the definition of record or any 
change to accommodate electronic communications.57  
¶124 Legislative failure to act is ordinarily weak evidence 
of legislative intention to acquiesce in or countenance a 
judicial 
or 
executive 
branch 
interpretation.58 
 
Several 
alternative reasons may explain the inaction.  Under proper 
circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be 
evidence of legislative intent.59  In the instant case, the 
legislature's inaction appears probative of legislative intent 
to accede to the attorney general's interpretation of the word 
"record." 
¶125 This 
legislative inaction coupled with rules of 
statutory interpretation shows that the legislature has both 
contemplated the specific problem at hand and enacted numerous 
                                                 
57 See Wisconsin Legislative Council, Special Committee on 
Review of the Open Records Law: Report to the Legislature 5 
(Mar. 25, 2003). 
58 See Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 
36, 
240 
N.W.2d 422, 
428 
(1976) 
("[L]egislative 
inaction . . . has been called 'a week [sic] reed upon which to 
lean' and a 'poor beacon' to follow in construing a statute" 
(quoted source omitted).). 
59 See Mallo v. DOR, 2002 WI 70, ¶31 253 Wis. 2d 391, 645 
N.W.2d 853, 866 (under proper circumstances, inaction by the 
legislature may be evidence of legislative intent) (citing 
Estate of Cameron, 249 Wis. 531, 542, 25 N.W.2d 504 (1946)). 
For a discussion of reliance on legislative inaction to 
assist in statutory interpretation, see Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 
WI 103, ¶¶32-37, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
53 
 
other 
amendments 
to 
the 
public 
record 
law. 
 
In 
these 
circumstances, legislative inaction points to acquiescence in 
the attorney general's long-standing opinion that the meaning of 
"record" 
in 
§ 19.32(2) 
excludes 
documents 
whose 
content 
demonstrates no connection with a government function.   
¶126 A 
well-reasoned 
attorney 
general's 
opinion 
interpreting a statute is, according to the court's rules of 
statutory interpretation, of persuasive value.60  Furthermore, a 
statutory interpretation by the attorney general "is accorded 
even greater weight, and is regarded as presumptively correct, 
when the legislature later amends the statute but makes no 
changes in response to the attorney general's opinion."61      
¶127 In sum, the legislative history supports interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) to require that the content of a document 
have a connection to a government function in order to 
constitute a "record" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). 
                                                 
60 State v. Ludwig, 31 Wis. 2d 690, 698, 143 N.W.2d 548 
(1966); Town of Vernon v. Waukesha County, 102 Wis. 2d 686, 692, 
307 N.W.2d 227 (1981); Village of DeForest v. Dane County, 211 
Wis. 2d 804, 812, 565 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Norton 
v. Town of Sevastopol, 108 Wis. 2d 595, 599, 323 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
61 Staples for Staples v. Glienke, 142 Wis. 2d 19, 28, 416 
N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Village of DeForest v. 
County of Dane, 211 Wis. 2d 804, 812-813, 565 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
54 
 
F 
¶128 This court has looked to other states for their 
interpretations of their open records laws to assist in the 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Public Records Law.62 
¶129 The 
School 
District 
cites 
no 
cases 
from 
any 
jurisdiction taking the position that the contents of government 
employees' personal e-mails should be disclosed as public 
records.   
¶130 In contrast, several state courts have concluded that 
the contents of government employees' personal e-mails under 
their respective open records acts are not public records.  In 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., State v. Beaver Dam Area Dev. Corp., 2008 WI 
90, ¶¶45 & n.10, 50 & n.12, 312 Wis. 2d 84, 102, 104, 752 
N.W.2d 295 ("although the determination . . . depends on the 
respective statutory language [of open meetings and public 
records laws] of each state, the interpretations rendered by 
courts in other jurisdictions are instructive" in construction 
and application of public records law); State v. Panknin, 217 
Wis. 2d 200, 210-213, 579 N.W.2d 52 (1998) (citing Ohio law). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
55 
 
these states, a connection to government business is needed to 
classify the document as a public record.63   
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Griffis v. Pinal County, 156 P.3d 418, 421 
(Ariz. 2007) ("the nature and purpose of the document determine 
its status;" e-mails "relate[d] solely to personal matters" lack 
"the requisite substantial nexus with government activities"); 
Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 718, 
725 (Ark. 2007) (case-by-case examination of e-mails required 
"to discern whether [e-mails] relate solely to personal matters 
or whether they reflect a substantial nexus with [government] 
activities"); Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 121 
P.3d 190, 195 (Colo. 2005) (statute defines records to include 
only records that address the performance of public functions or 
the receipt or expenditure of public funds); State v. City of 
Clearwater, 863 So. 2d 149, 155 (Fla. 2003) (personal e-mails of 
government employees are not public records under statute or 
subject to inspection under state constitution because they lack 
a "connection with the transaction of official business"); 
Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd., 159 P.3d 896, 901 
(Idaho 2007) ("it is not simply the fact that the emails were 
sent and received while the employees were at work . . . that 
makes them a public record.  Rather, it is their relation to 
legitimate public interest that makes them a public record"); 
Howell Education Ass'n v. Howell Bd of Educ., ___ N.W.2d ___, 
2010 WL 290515 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (individual 
teacher's personal e-mails are not "rendered public records 
solely because they were captured in the email system's digital 
memory"); State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's 
Dep't, 693 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1998) (only e-mails that "serve 
to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, operations, or other activities" of the government 
office are public records); Brennan v. Giles County Bd. of Ed., 
No. M2004-00998-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1996625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
(digital records, including e-mails, held to fall outside 
statutory 
definition 
of 
public 
records 
unless 
"made 
or 
received . . . in connection with the transaction of official 
business"); Tiberino v. Spokane County, 13 P.3d 1104, 1108 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (personal e-mails were "public records" 
subject to disclosure where excessive personal e-mails were a 
reason for discharge and office printed and compiled e-mails in 
preparation for related litigation; however e-mails were exempt 
from disclosure because while the fact of excessive use is of 
legitimate public concern, the actual content of personal e-
mails is not); Associated Press v. Canterbury, 688 S.E.2d 317 
(W. Va. 2009) (interpreting West Virginia Freedom of Information 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
56 
 
¶131 We agree with the School District that the open record 
statutes differ from state to state and that the definition of 
"record" in other state statutes is not similar to the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  Nevertheless, it is of persuasive 
value that a substantial number of states have found that 
personal e-mails of public employees should not be treated as 
available public records.  Although the underlying laws vary 
somewhat, the strong consensus is that personal e-mails do not 
become public records merely because they were sent during a 
public employee's workday or using government computers and e-
mail accounts. 
G 
¶132 Finally, we examine the consequences for the custodian 
of records of interpreting the definition of "record" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) to exclude the content of personal e-mails.  
Statutes are to be interpreted reasonably.  The legislature 
would not have intended the interpretation of the word "record" 
in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) to impose an unreasonable burden on 
custodians of records.  Interpreting "record" to exclude the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Act, in line with "the majority position" of other states, 
holding that "personal e-mail communication by a public official 
or public employee, which does not relate to the conduct of the 
public's business" does not constitute public records and 
concluding that the contents of e-mails between Justice Maynard 
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and Donald 
Blankenship of Massey Energy Company did not render them public 
records, in spite of "great public interest in the relationship 
between Justice Maynard and Mr. Blankenship" as well as 
"enormous statewide and national public interest in our judicial 
recusal procedures"). 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
57 
 
content of personal e-mails does not impose an unreasonable 
administrative burden on custodians of records.  
¶133 No matter how the court rules in the present case, the 
custodian must examine and evaluate all e-mails before release 
to determine whether the content of the e-mail falls within an 
exception articulated in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(am)1.-3., a common-
law exception to records disclosure, or another statutory 
protection.  The custodian may need to redact protected or 
personal information within a document otherwise subject to 
release, and in any event must evaluate the content of the e-
mails to perform the balancing test, even if the e-mails were 
characterized as records under § 19.32(2).  
¶134 The School District acknowledges that even if the 
Teachers' personal e-mails at issue were records available to a 
records requester, the School District (and potentially courts, 
on judicial review) must examine the contents of the e-mails to 
determine whether to release them.  Here, the School District 
has already acknowledged, and the circuit court order has 
required, that confidential information including pupil records, 
banking 
and 
medical 
information, 
and 
other 
personally 
identifiable information must be redacted from any released e-
mails.  Under the present statutes, the custodian must examine 
the contents of each e-mail to decide what material is publicly 
accessible while withholding protected or exempt information.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6). 
¶135 It is thus no more laborious a task for the record 
custodian to sort the contents of e-mails into personal and 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
58 
 
governmental than is already required to protect sensitive and 
exempted information and to perform the required balancing test.   
¶136 As a result of today's decision, in addition to the 
other decisions the record custodian makes, he or she will have 
to determine whether the content of an e-mail is solely personal 
or has a connection to a governmental function.  We recognize 
that it may not always be easy for the record custodian to 
separate the content of personal e-mails from the content of e-
mails relating to school business.    
¶137 If the content of the e-mail is solely personal, it is 
not a record under the Public Records Law and the e-mail cannot 
be released.  If the content of the e-mail is personal in part 
and has a connection with the government function in part, then 
the custodian may need to redact the personal content and 
release the portion connected to the government function.  The 
record custodian's inquiry focuses on the content of the e-mail 
and asks whether that content is connected to a government 
function.  This is more of a pragmatic inquiry than an elaborate 
legal analysis.  The e-mails at issue in this case are conceded 
to be entirely personal, with no connection to a governmental 
function. 
¶138 Our decision today appears to add little to the 
administrative demands already created by Public Records Law.  
Indeed, in many cases it may be simpler for a record custodian 
to exclude wholly the content of personal e-mails, rather than 
to classify them as "records" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) and 
then need to further evaluate the contents of each to determine 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
59 
 
whether portions are protected from release.  These practical 
considerations therefore do not persuade us to deviate from the 
conclusion that the determination of whether the Teachers' 
personal e-mails are records is based on whether their content 
has a connection to a government function.  
* * * * 
¶139 In keeping with the court's past interpretations of 
the Public Records Law, we have explored various avenues to 
interpret the word "record" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), 
including the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2); the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31, the legislature's explicit statement of its 
intent, the statutory purpose and policy, and the construction 
of the Public Records Law; the statutory history and case law 
interpretations of prior versions of the statute; the executive 
branch 
interpretations 
of 
the 
definition 
of 
"records" 
(especially 
the 
opinions 
of 
the 
attorney 
general); 
the 
legislative 
failure 
to 
amend 
§ 19.32(2); 
other 
states' 
interpretations of their open records laws; and the consequences 
for custodians of record of interpreting Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
to exclude the content of the Teachers' personal e-mails.   
¶140 All these avenues of interpretation lead to one 
conclusion:  In determining whether a document is a record under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), the focus is on the content of the 
document.  To be a record under § 19.32(2), the content of the 
document must have a connection to a government function.  
¶141 In the instant case, the contents of the Teachers' 
personal e-mails have no connection to a government function and 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
60 
 
therefore are not records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  The 
contents of personal e-mails could, however, be records under 
the Public Records Law under certain circumstances.  For 
example, if the e-mails were used as evidence in a disciplinary 
investigation or to investigate the misuse of government 
resources, the personal e-mails would be records under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  A connection would exist between the contents 
of 
the 
e-mails 
and 
a 
government 
function, 
namely 
the 
investigations.   
¶142 The contents of the personal e-mails that the Teachers 
created and maintained on government-owned computers pursuant to 
the government employer's permission for occasional personal use 
of the government e-mail account and computer are not "records" 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  The personal contents of these e-
mails are not subject to release to a record requester merely 
because 
they 
are 
sent 
or 
received 
using 
the 
government 
employers' e-mail systems and then stored and maintained on 
those systems.  Because we conclude that the contents of the 
Teachers' personal e-mails are not "records" under the Public 
Records Law, we need not reach the question of balancing the 
public interest favoring disclosure with any other public 
interest. 
¶143 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court to 
enjoin the School District from releasing the contents of the 
Teachers personal e-mails. 
No. 
2008AP967-AC   
 
61 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause remanded. 
 
 
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
1 
 
¶144 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  During the last 
several decades, technological advancements have revolutionized 
document storage and electronic communication.  Prior to these 
advancements, an employee's personal communications, whether by 
note, letter, or telephone call, would not have been kept by an 
authority 
and 
therefore 
would 
not 
have 
been 
subject 
to 
disclosure under the public records law.    
¶145 As a result of changing technology, however, many 
personal communications that are unrelated to the affairs of 
government and the official acts of officers and employees may 
now be "kept by an authority" because they are stored on a 
government server.  This fact presents new challenges to record 
custodians who are required to determine whether particular 
documents are records subject to disclosure.1    
¶146 This case presents an important issue that has far- 
reaching effects.  It involves what I call a "bread and butter" 
issue of Wisconsin law.  Record custodians around the state in 
public entities large and small are called upon day in and day 
out to respond to public records requests. 
¶147 Although the various briefs submitted in this case 
take different positions as to the analysis and the answer, 
                                                 
1 The public records law was recently amended by 2003 
Wisconsin Act 47.  The prefatory note to the bill explains that 
the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee on Review of 
the Open Records Law was directed to "recommend changes in the 
open records law to accommodate electronic communications[.]"  
Nevertheless, the 2003 amendments did not address technological 
advancements in document storage and electronic communication.     
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
2 
 
there emerges a unified theme——what is needed is clear direction 
to record custodians for this important everyday task.     
¶148 Much like the various briefs submitted, the opinions 
authored in this case also offer different approaches.  Lest 
there be any doubt, however, a clear rule has emerged: a 
custodian should not release the content of an email that is 
purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy.2  
I 
¶149 At issue in this case is the content of emails that 
the School District and the Teachers agree is personal and 
evinces no violation of law or policy.  I begin by determining 
whether the content of such an email is a record under the 
public records law.   
¶150 Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) defines "record" as follows: 
"Record" means any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information 
is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics, which has been created or is being 
kept by an authority.  "Record" includes, but is not 
limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, 
tapes 
(including computer tapes), computer printouts and 
optical disks.  "Record" does not include drafts, 
notes, preliminary computations and like materials 
prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared 
by the originator in the name of a person for whom the 
originator is working; materials which are purely the 
personal property of the custodian and have no 
relation to his or her office; materials to which 
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and 
published materials in the possession of an authority 
other than a public library which are available for 
                                                 
2 Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Crooks, Justice Prosser, 
Justice Gableman, and I all reach this result.   
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
3 
 
sale, or which are available for inspection at a 
public library. 
¶151 The Teachers' emails are materials, kept by an 
authority, on which written or electromagnetic information is 
recorded and preserved.  The emails are not "drafts, notes, 
preliminary computations" or "like materials prepared for the 
originator's personal use."  Further, they are not "materials 
which are purely the personal property of the custodian."     
¶152 I do not consider the declaration of policy found in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31 when evaluating the definition of record in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32.  Nothing in the definition distinguishes 
between content that is personal and content that is work-
related when that content is prepared by an originator (here, 
the Teachers) and in the possession of the custodian (here, the 
School District).  Given this definition and unlike the lead 
opinion, I conclude that the Teachers' personal emails are 
records.  
II  
¶153 Although I agree with the dissent and with Justice 
Gableman's concurrence that the Teachers' personal emails are 
records, I do not join them.  I determine that the dissent fails 
to 
acknowledge 
the 
important 
policy 
reasons 
supporting 
nondisclosure of the content of personal emails.  I do not join 
Justice 
Gableman's 
concurrence 
because 
it 
embarks 
upon 
addressing a statute that is not implicated in this case.  
Further, in the wake of the discussion, it leaves confusion 
rather than clarity in the law because it misconstrues the lead 
opinion.   
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
4 
 
¶154 The dissent concludes that there is a strong public 
interest in disclosure of the content of all of the Teachers' 
emails, even those that are personal and evince no violation of 
law or policy.  Dissent, ¶224.  "Given the significant role that 
teachers play in our society," the dissent explains, "the public 
has a very strong interest in all of their activities in the 
workplace."  Dissent, ¶209.     
¶155 The trouble with this analysis, as I see it, is that 
the public interest in monitoring the content of the Teachers' 
personal emails cannot be as absolute as the dissent contends.  
The dissent acknowledges that disclosure would not extend to 
personal email accounts, such as email services offered by gmail 
or Yahoo, which may have been accessed by the teachers on their 
work computers during the school day.  Dissent, ¶188 n.1.  Under 
the dissent's interpretation of the public records law, it is 
the accident of the emails' location on the District's server——
rather than anything intrinsic about the content of these 
emails——that would make them subject to release.   
¶156 If the dissent is right, then a government employee 
could subvert the purpose of the public records law in seconds 
and with several strokes on a keyboard simply by logging onto a 
free personal email account.  I conclude that the policy 
underlying the public records law is not so ephemeral and its 
mandates are not so easily circumvented. 
¶157 Likewise, I am concerned that Justice Gableman's 
concurrence adds confusion rather than clarity to the law.  This 
case was initiated by record subjects——not record requestors.  
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1), created by 2003 Wis. Act 47, provides 
record subjects with limited rights of judicial review that 
differ from the rights of judicial review that apply when a 
requestor brings an action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37.   
¶158 Five teachers of the Wisconsin Rapids School District 
who were the subjects of a records request commenced this 
action.  The records requestor, Don Bubolz, did not initiate 
this or any other action.  Nevertheless, the concurrence reaches 
out and addresses the statute governing actions by record 
requestors, Wis. Stat. § 19.37, a statute not before the court.  
It discusses cases decided under that statute and offers advice 
to Bubolz on how to proceed as a requestor of public records 
under that statute.  Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶¶184-186. 
¶159 I 
am 
hesitant 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
concurrence's 
discussion of Wis. Stat. § 19.37 because, as explained above, it 
is extraneous to this case.  Nevertheless, I do so briefly 
because I fear that in misconstruing the lead opinion, the 
concurrence's discussion may leave confusion in the law.   
¶160 The 
concurrence 
incorrectly 
concludes 
that 
the 
approach of the lead opinion would give record custodians under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37 the final say on whether withheld documents 
should be released.  In essence it warns that record requestors 
would simply be out of luck and could not challenge the 
withholding of documents under the lead opinion's approach 
because 
they 
would 
not 
be 
records. 
 
Justice 
Gableman's 
concurrence, ¶186 n.12.   
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
6 
 
¶161 Regardless of whether the approach of the lead opinion 
is taken (the content of a purely personal email is not a 
record) or the approach of the concurrences is taken (the 
content of a purely personal email is a record), it is really 
the same question and yields the same result.  The custodian 
must either "fill the request" or notify the requestor of the 
denial and "the reasons therefor."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).   
¶162 Further, under either approach, if the decision of the 
custodian is to withhold requested documents, that decision can 
be challenged under Wis. Stat. § 19.37 and is subject to review 
by the circuit court.  If the custodian determines that the 
requested document is not a "record," that determination is 
subject to judicial review.  See Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Sch. 
Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 450 n.3, 521 
N.W.2d 165 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994) 
(reviewing 
the 
custodian's 
determination that a "Memorandum of Understanding" was a "draft" 
and therefore not a "record"); Stone v. Bd. of Regents, 2007 WI 
App 223, 305 Wis. 2d 679, 741 N.W.2d 774 (reviewing whether a 
copy of a record is a "record").  Likewise, if the custodian 
determines that the requested document is a record but its 
purely personal content will not be released under the balancing 
test, that determination is also subject to review.  In either 
event, the record custodian does not have the final say. 
III 
¶163 Before releasing a record, the record custodian must 
apply a balancing test, which weighs the public interest in 
disclosure against the public interest in nondisclosure.  This 
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
7 
 
case requires the court to provide direction to custodians on 
how to apply the balancing test to the content of an email that 
is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy. 
¶164 The Teachers have stated that they have no objection 
to the disclosure of statistical information about their email 
use or to the disclosure of their personal emails with the 
content fully redacted.  See lead op., ¶28.  This information 
would allow the requestor to determine how often the Teachers 
sent and received personal emails from their work accounts.  It 
is the disclosure of the content of personal emails that is the 
basis of the Teachers' objection.      
¶165 The public policy underlying the public records law is 
set forth in the statute and informs the application of the 
balancing test.  "[I]t is declared to be the public policy of 
the state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and the official 
acts of those officers and employees who represent them."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31.  "To that end," the statute provides that the 
public records law "shall be construed in every instance with a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with the 
conduct of governmental business.  The denial of public access 
generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied."  Id. 
¶166 When a record provides "information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts of [] officers and 
employees," including information that would permit the public 
to evaluate the use or misuse of public resources, access to 
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
8 
 
that record is presumed.  Denial of public access to such 
records is "generally contrary to the public interest."     
¶167 Disclosure 
of 
the 
contents 
of 
personal 
emails, 
however, does not keep the electorate informed about "official 
acts" and "the affairs of government" when the contents of the 
emails evince no violation of law or policy.  Disclosure of the 
contents of such emails would not further the public policy 
declaration found in Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶168 I agree with Justice Gableman that there is little 
public interest in disclosure of the content of emails when that 
content is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or 
policy.  See Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶182.  I also agree 
with Justice Gableman that there is a public interest served by 
nondisclosure.  Unlike Justice Gableman, however, I conclude 
that the balance always weighs in favor of nondisclosure. 
¶169 The public has an interest in hiring and retaining 
skilled employees.  As the lead opinion explains, "[s]tripping a 
public employee of his or her privacy in the contents of 
personal emails simply because he or she works for the 
government might . . . negatively impact employee morale, and 
undermine recruiting and retention of government employees."  
Lead op., ¶85.   
¶170 The public also has an interest in government employee 
productivity.  Like private employees, public employees often 
have to address personal or family issues that arise while they 
are at work, and email is an effective means by which employees 
can quickly address these issues.  See lead op., ¶¶84-85.  If 
No.  2008AP967-AC.awb 
 
9 
 
public 
employees 
believe 
that 
their 
personal 
email 
communications will be subject to disclosure upon a records 
request, public employees will likely use other less efficient 
means of communication, reducing their productivity.  
¶171 In the years since the advent of email and the 
resulting 
changes 
in 
the 
way 
that 
we 
communicate, 
many 
jurisdictions have been asked to address whether personal emails 
should be disclosed in response to a records request.  Every 
single one of the jurisdictions has concluded that the policies 
underlying public records laws do not support the disclosure of 
purely personal emails that evince no violation of law or 
policy.  See lead op., ¶130 n.63 (collecting cases). 
¶172 For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that 
whenever the content of an email is purely personal and evinces 
no 
violation 
of law or policy, the public interest in 
nondisclosure will always outweigh the public interest in 
disclosure.  Therefore, once the custodian determines that 
certain emails are purely personal and evince no violation of 
law or policy, the custodian does not undertake a balancing of 
each request.  Like the lead opinion and Justice Gableman's 
concurrence, I determine that the content of such emails should 
not be released.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶173 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I concur in 
the result reached by the lead opinion, but I cannot agree with 
its reasoning.  The lead opinion concludes that the content of 
the 
teachers' 
personal 
e-mails 
have 
no 
connection 
to 
a 
government function and therefore are not "records" under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) (2007-08).1  Lead op., ¶142.  The dissent 
concludes that the e-mails at issue here are records, that the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in 
nondisclosure, and therefore, that the e-mails should be 
released.  See dissent, ¶230.  I write separately because I 
agree with the dissent that an e-mail sent by a government 
employee from a government computer using a government e-mail 
account and stored on a government server is a "record" as 
defined in § 19.32(2).2  However, when a record is of a purely 
personal nature and does not evince a violation of any law or 
employer policy, I conclude that the public interest in 
nondisclosure 
always 
outweighs 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
disclosure.3  Thus, I conclude that the teachers' personal e-
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 A majority of this court (composed of Justice Bradley, 
Justice Roggensack, Justice Ziegler, and me) agrees that an e-
mail sent by a government employee from a government computer 
using a government e-mail account and stored on a government 
server is a "record" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). 
3 Justice Bradley adopts my analysis and likewise concludes 
that the public interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure when the content of an e-mail is purely 
personal and evinces no violation of law or policy.  Justice 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶172. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
2 
 
mails not reflecting a violation of law or policy should not be 
released.4  I write further to clarify the procedure that governs 
review of these kinds of record requests under our existing case 
law. 
I 
¶174 Requesters seeking documents under Wisconsin's open 
records law5 are entitled only to materials that meet the 
statutory definition of a "record" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).6  
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Bradley also concludes that, "once the custodian 
determines that certain e[-]mails are purely personal and evince 
no violation of law or policy, the custodian does not undertake 
a balancing of each request."  Id.  It is not clear what this 
statement 
means.  
Under both her and my approach, the 
custodian's determination that an e-mail is purely personal and 
evinces no violation of law or policy is the product of a 
balancing of each e-mail.  To then conclude that no balancing is 
required does not make sense. 
4 A majority of this court (composed of the Chief Justice, 
Justice Bradley, Justice Crooks, Justice Prosser, and me) also 
agrees that insofar as the teachers' e-mails are purely personal 
in nature and do not evince a violation of law or policy, they 
should not be released by the district. 
5 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) provides as follows: 
"Record" means any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information 
is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics, which has been created or is being 
kept by an authority.  "Record" includes, but is not 
limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, 
tapes 
(including computer tapes), computer printouts and 
optical disks.  "Record" does not include drafts, 
notes, preliminary computations and like materials 
prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared 
by the originator in the name of a person for whom the 
originator is working; materials which are purely the 
personal property of the custodian and have no 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
3 
 
See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) ("Except as otherwise provided by 
law, any requester has a right to inspect any record.") 
(emphasis added).  Thus, when faced with an open records 
request, the first step is to determine which requested items 
are records.  See Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, 
¶¶23-31, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240.  Just because an item 
is a record, however, does not automatically guarantee release.  
A record need not be disclosed if it falls under one of the 
statutory or common law exceptions to disclosure.  Linzmeyer v. 
Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶11, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.  A 
record may also be withheld from the record requester if the 
public interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public interest 
in disclosure; this is known as the balancing test.  See id., 
¶¶42-43. 
¶175 I agree with the dissent and Justice Bradley that the 
e-mails at issue in this case are "records" as defined by Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  An e-mail (specifically, the physical hard 
drive containing the e-mail's digital data) is unarguably 
"material on which . . . electromagnetic information is recorded 
or preserved . . . , which has been created or is being kept by 
an authority."  § 19.32(2).7  E-mails also do not fall under any 
                                                                                                                                                             
relation to his or her office; materials to which 
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and 
published materials in the possession of an authority 
other than a public library which are available for 
sale, or which are available for inspection at a 
public library. 
7 The lead opinion concedes this as well.  See lead op., 
¶56. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
4 
 
of the statutory exclusions specified in § 19.32(2).  See 
dissent, ¶206; Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶151. 
¶176 No party alleges that a statutory or common law 
exception to release of the records applies.  I therefore move 
to the balancing test.  Under the balancing test, we weigh the 
public interest in disclosure against the public interest in 
nondisclosure.  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, 
¶55, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.  The balancing test must 
be applied to each individual record.  Id., ¶56.  Applying this 
test, the dissent concludes that there is "no public interest" 
in nondisclosure and a "strong public interest" in disclosure of 
these e-mails.  Dissent, ¶¶228-29.  I conclude otherwise. 
¶177 It is important to remember the purpose and public 
policy underlying the open records law.  The legislature does 
not leave us in the dark on this front.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.31 
declares:  
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information. To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
5 
 
¶178 This statute tells us that the open records law seeks 
to make widely available the records relating to "the affairs of 
government and the official acts of those officers and employees 
who 
represent 
them." 
 
While 
the 
legislature 
mandates 
a 
presumption of complete public access, the presumption is 
confined by the addendum, "consistent with the conduct of 
governmental business."  Thus, the open records law declares 
that the public's interest inheres in government business, 
affairs, and official acts. 
¶179 The lead opinion uses this public policy directive as 
grounds to create a new exclusion to the definition of a 
"record" wholly divorced from the text of § 19.32(2).  See lead 
op., ¶¶76-86.  I take this clear policy pronouncement as an 
expression of the reach of the public interest when applying the 
balancing test——weighing the public interest in disclosure 
against the public interest in nondisclosure.8 
¶180 As I see it, the legislature has made clear that the 
public has no interest in the disclosure of records that are not 
reasonably related to the conduct of government affairs.  Or put 
positively, the public interest extends only to records that 
reasonably bear upon public affairs.  Accordingly, the public 
would normally have no interest in records relating to purely 
personal matters.  This is not to say the public never has an 
interest in records relating only to personal matters.  Such 
records are relevant to the conduct of government affairs when 
                                                 
8 Justice Bradley adopts this approach as well.  Justice 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶165-67. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
6 
 
personal conduct violates state or federal law, for example, or 
when the records evince a violation of the public employer's 
internal policy.  This accords with the purpose of sunshine laws 
such as the open records law——to ensure that government is 
behaving itself and spending our tax dollars legally and wisely. 
¶181 On the other side, the public does have at least some 
interest in the nondisclosure of purely personal records.  The 
public has an interest in providing some measure of privacy to 
public employees who make reasonable and lawful personal use of 
government resources.  It is in the public's interest that 
public employees be permitted to efficiently and privately 
conduct limited personal business at work, just as many private 
sector employees routinely do.  The public also has an interest 
in 
the 
government's 
ability 
to 
hire 
and 
retain 
skilled 
employees.  Some measure of privacy in conducting personal 
matters contributes at least in a small way to employee 
productivity and contentment.  Some might be dissuaded from 
public service if they believed a private e-mail to their 
spouse——perfectly lawful and not in contravention of any 
employer policy——could be posted for all the world to see.9 
¶182 The purpose of the open records law is to open a 
window into the affairs of government, not to open a window into 
the private lives of government employees.  Therefore, where e-
                                                 
9 The lead opinion's analysis explains many of these 
interests as well.  See lead op., ¶¶83-85.   
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
7 
 
mails, either individually or cumulatively,10 are of a purely 
personal nature and reflect no violation of law or policy, the 
public has no interest in such e-mails, and the public interest 
in nondisclosure will always outweigh the public interest in 
disclosure.  Thus, the public has no interest in such things as 
a teacher's e-mail reflecting after-work plans, setting up a 
doctor's appointment, or securing baby-sitting for her children.  
If the e-mails reflected such activities as a teacher's romantic 
involvement with a student, campaigning for a politician using 
government resources, or abuse of the e-mail system in violation 
of the district policy, the public interest would undoubtedly be 
strong.  Such a determination can only be made by reviewing each 
e-mail. 
¶183 Accordingly, I agree with the lead opinion and Justice 
Bradley that "a custodian should not release the contents of e-
mails that are purely personal and evince no violation of law or 
policy."  Lead op., ¶10 n.4. 
II 
¶184 This case is the first time this court has addressed 
the applicability of the open records law to personal e-mails.  
As such, I wish to further clarify the procedure that governs 
review of these kinds of record requests as established by our 
existing case law. 
                                                 
10 For example, while a singular e-mail itself might not 
violate any employer policy, it may be that a grouping of e-
mails does constitute a violation (e.g., abuse of the e-mail 
system).  At that point, the public interest in such e-mails 
becomes strong. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
8 
 
¶185 Our case law is clear that if the content of the 
records is unknown, and the record requester challenges the 
custodian's withholding of records, the circuit court conducts 
an in camera review.  In State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 
Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965), this court explained as 
follows: 
The duty of first determining that the harmful effect 
upon the public interest of permitting inspection 
outweighs the benefit to be gained by granting 
inspection 
rests upon the public officer having 
custody of the record or document sought to be 
inspected. 
 
If 
he 
determines 
that 
permitting 
inspection would result in harm to the public interest 
which outweighs any benefit that would result from 
granting inspection, it is incumbent upon him to 
refuse 
the 
demand 
for 
inspection 
and 
state 
specifically the reasons for this refusal.  If the 
person seeking inspection thereafter institutes court 
action to compel inspection and the officer depends 
upon the grounds stated in his refusal, the proper 
procedure is for the trial judge to examine in camera 
the record or document sought to be inspected.  Upon 
making such in camera examination, the trial judge 
should then make his determination of whether or not 
the harm likely to result to the public interest by 
permitting the inspection outweighs the benefit to be 
gained by granting inspection.  
Id. at 682 (footnote omitted).  We affirmed this procedure in 
State ex rel. Morke v. Donnelly, 155 Wis. 2d 521, 455 N.W.2d 893 
(1990).  We explained: 
Youmans shows that the in camera inspection assists 
the court in determining whether the harm to the 
public interest by allowing inspection outweighs the 
public interest in inspection.  After reviewing the 
records in camera, the court may decide that only 
certain records or portions of a particular record 
should be released. 
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
9 
 
¶186 In this case, we similarly do not know the content of 
any of the e-mails.  Under our cases and under § 19.37(1),11 
Bubolz can challenge the district's determination that the e-
mails were personal, or that they evinced no violation of law or 
policy.  If Bubolz chooses this route, the court must determine 
via in camera inspection whether the e-mails are personal in 
nature and, individually and cumulatively, whether they contain 
evidence of any violation of law or policy.  If they are 
personal and do not contain evidence of any violation of law or 
policy, 
the 
balancing 
test 
always 
weighs 
in 
favor 
of 
nondisclosure.  But this review process is important; without 
                                                 
11 I am, of course, aware that this case was initiated by 
record subjects under § 19.356(1), and not record requesters 
under § 19.37.  Justice Bradley accuses me of adding "confusion 
rather than clarity" by clarifying the rights of record 
requestors under this opinion and § 19.37.  Justice Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶¶153, 157. 
But the complicated nature of this case (represented by 
four different writings and no majority opinion) means that 
clarity in the actual operation of the principles we announce is 
critical.  My efforts here are aimed at making sure the public 
knows that under our holding, it still can seek judicial review 
of withheld e-mails that the custodian determines are purely 
personal. 
Though accusing me of "misconstruing" the lead opinion, and 
leaving "confusion" in my critique of the lead opinion's 
approach (see infra note 12), Justice Bradley appears to agree 
with my analysis regarding whether the e-mails here are records, 
the application of the balancing test, and the rights of record 
requesters under § 19.37.  Her staunch defense of an opinion she 
does not join is all the more perplexing. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
10 
 
it, the people will be deprived of the transparency the 
legislature mandated in the public records law.12 
                                                 
12 The lead opinion's approach, had it been adopted by a 
majority of my colleagues, would have dramatically reduced the 
transparency of government and would sanction the withholding of 
government records in ways that are contrary to the purposes of 
the statute. 
The lead opinion concludes that where the content of e-
mails is purely personal and does not evince a violation of law 
or policy, such e-mails are not records under § 19.32(2).  Lead 
op., ¶23.  In addition to being unfaithful to the text of 
§ 19.32(2), this approach would lead to results that should not 
go unnoticed.  The lead opinion's approach would, as a practical 
matter, give record custodians the final say on whether withheld 
e-mails are records, including the determination of whether such 
documents violate any law or employer policy, and whether they 
are even personal e-mails at all. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(4)(a) requires the custodian to 
"notify the requester" of a "determination to deny [a] request" 
"upon request for any record."  (Emphasis added.)  The duty to 
notify a record requester of a withheld record is clear.  See, 
e.g., Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 
N.W.2d 179 (1979) ("If the custodian gives no reasons or gives 
insufficient reasons for withholding a public record, a writ of 
mandamus compelling the production of the records must issue.").  
However, I can find no case suggesting a custodian must disclose 
the existence and nature of non-records.  Under the current 
state of the law, it appears that a record custodian need only 
notify the record requester when it withholds a record, not when 
it withholds non-records. 
Unless the custodian voluntarily chose to provide notice of 
non-records he or she did not release, the record requester 
would have no knowledge anything was withheld.  Thus, the lead 
opinion's approach would, as a practical matter, make the 
withholding of purely personal e-mails effectively unreviewable. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.mjg 
 
11 
 
¶187 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, 
under 
the 
public 
records 
statute, 
elected 
officials are the legal custodians of their own records and the 
records of their office.  Wis. Stat. § 19.33(1).  This means 
that under the lead opinion's approach, if a citizen sought e-
mail records from, for example, the Governor or his office, the 
Governor could simply determine that certain e-mails are not 
records, and then not disclose the existence of those e-mails to 
the record requester.  Such an outcome would constitute an 
unacceptable shutter over the window of transparency mandated by 
the legislature. 
Thankfully, four members of this court conclude that such 
e-mails are public records.  As such, the lead opinion's 
approach is not the law. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶188 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   The lead 
opinion 
prevents 
the 
public 
from 
viewing 
the 
workplace 
activities of Wisconsin Rapids School District (School District) 
employees (here, teachers) by creating an exception to the 
definition of "record" in the Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2).  This exception, when combined with the concurring 
opinions, grants government employees (here, teachers) a broad, 
blanket exception for emails that the teachers create in School 
District 
email 
accounts, 
on 
School 
District 
computers, 
maintained by School District servers, when the teachers 
characterize their emails as "personal."1  This broad exception 
prevents the public from discovering what public employees are 
doing during the workday, in the workplace, using equipment 
purchased with public funds.  In so doing, the court contravenes 
Wisconsin's long history of transparency in and public access to 
actions of government employees.  It is contrary to the letter 
and the spirit of the Public Records Law and is a disservice to 
the public's interest in government oversight.  Because I 
conclude that these emails are records2 and that the teachers 
have not met their burden to show that the public's interest in 
                                                 
1 This appeal does not involve personal email accounts that 
may have been accessed from government computers, but which 
accounts are not maintained on government servers.  No one has 
raised this issue, so I do not address it. 
2 Both Justice Bradley's concurrence and Justice Gableman's 
concurrence conclude, as I do, that these emails fall within the 
Public Records Law's definition of "record."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2).  Accordingly, a majority of the court holds that 
emails created in government email accounts, on government 
computers, 
maintained by government servers are "records" 
subject to the Public Records Law. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
2 
 
nondisclosure outweighs the public's interest in disclosure of 
these emails, I respectfully dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶189 Don Bubolz (Bubolz), a citizen of the state of 
Wisconsin, sent the School District a public records request3 for 
the emails of five named teachers in the School District.  
Bubolz requested the "e-mails from March 1, 2007 through 
April 13, 2007 in their entirety . . . from the computers [the 
teachers used] during their school work day."4   
¶190 The School District notified the teachers that it 
intended to comply with Bubolz's request.  The teachers then 
commenced this action in circuit court, seeking to enjoin the 
release of emails within government email accounts that they 
characterized as "personal."5   
¶191 The circuit court ordered the release of all of the 
requested emails, including those emails that the teachers 
characterized as "personal."  The circuit court concluded that 
all of the emails were "records" within the definition of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) of the Public Records Law.  The circuit court 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 19.31 through 19.37 contain provisions 
of the Public Records Law.  A request under the Public Records 
Law is often termed an "open records request."   
4 Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief, 
Exhibit A. 
5 The Teachers' Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive 
Relief requested the circuit court enter "[a]n order enjoining 
the [School District] and their agents and employees from 
releasing the personal emails."  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
3 
 
also applied the requisite Public Records Law balancing test6 and 
concluded that the public interest in preventing the disclosure 
of the teachers' emails from government email accounts did not 
outweigh the strong public interest favoring disclosure.  The 
circuit court ordered the School District, prior to release, to 
redact from the emails any home addresses, telephone numbers, 
home 
email 
addresses, 
social 
security 
numbers, 
medical 
information, bank account numbers and pupil record information.   
¶192 The teachers appealed. 
¶193 In his appellate brief, Bubolz, appearing pro se as 
the Intervenor-Respondent, explained that he requested the 
records because he wished to determine the extent and the 
quality of use of government computers and government email 
services by the teachers during the workday.7  He explained that 
the School District has a "number of policies" with which he 
wanted to assess the teachers' compliance.8  As an example, 
Bubolz pointed to "the policy regarding teacher involvement in 
political campaigns."9  He explained that he "believes if the 
teachers' emails, sent or received, discussed school board 
members, school board proceedings, school board candidates or 
                                                 
6 See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 
2009 WI 79, ¶¶54–55, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (explaining 
that, in the absence of a statutory or common law exception, the 
presumption favoring release may be overcome only when, in 
performing the balancing test, the public interest in non-
disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure). 
7 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
4 
 
organizations supporting or opposing school board members or 
candidates," such emails would bear on that policy.10  He asserts 
that without the ability to view the content of the teachers' 
emails, "the public [could not] bring [concerns] to the 
attention of an administration."11  
¶194 The School District has a written policy, "365.1 
Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy," for use of its 
email accounts.  That policy states in relevant part: 
Users 
of 
the 
WRDN[, Wisconsin 
Rapids 
District 
Network,] should not assume that information stored 
and/or transmitted is confidential or secure. 
. . .  
All district assigned e-mail accounts are owned 
by the district and, therefore, are not private.  
Messages received by the e-mail system are retained on 
the system until deleted by the recipient. . . . 
Occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted, 
but limited to times which do not interfere with the 
user's responsibilities.12 
To use the School District's internet system, School District 
employees must sign a form "acknowledg[ing] that e-mail messages 
and Internet usage are not private and recogniz[ing] that all 
employee's activities on the WRDN may be monitored."13  Part of 
that acknowledgement provides: 
                                                 
10 Id. at 3.  
11 Id. at 2.  
12 365.1 Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy, 300-
104, 300-111. 
13 WRDN Employee Acknowledgement and Waiver, 300-114.  
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
5 
 
[A]ccess to the WRDN and the Internet has been 
developed 
to 
support 
the 
district's 
educational 
responsibilities and mission. . . .  
By signing below I acknowledge that e-mail 
messages and Internet usage are not private and 
recognize that all employee's activities on the WRDN 
may be monitored.14 
¶195 The lead opinion asserts that "[n]o allegation of 
improper use is at issue here."15  The lead opinion further 
asserts:  "The School District and the Teachers agree that the 
Teachers did not violate the School District's written Internet 
Use Policy or Guidelines and that the content of the e-mails at 
issue is of a purely personal nature, with no connection to a 
government function."16  Similarly, Justice Bradley's concurring 
opinion asserts that the parties concede that the emails at 
issue in this case are purely "personal and evinces no violation 
of law or policy."17  However, neither Bubolz, the Intervenor-
Respondent who requested these records, nor the School District 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Lead op., ¶13. 
16 Id. 
17 Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶148. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
6 
 
agrees with the lead opinion's and Justice Bradley's concurring 
opinion's characterization.18 
¶196 First, Bubolz asserts that "this entire case is an 
attempt by the [Wisconsin Education] Association [Council and 
counsel for the teachers,] to narrowly define Wisconsin's 
[Public] Records Law to allow public employees on their taxpayer 
paid work time to conduct personal business without any 
monitoring or accountability to the public or taxpayers."19  
Bubolz also states:  "To try to distinguish some duties as 
personal and not official would relegate [teachers] to a 'punch 
clock' status and make accountability in schools impossible 
because anytime they would do something inappropriate, they 
would simply state they were acting on personal time and outside 
the realm of their official duties."20  Finally, Bubolz contends 
that "whenever the teacher is on taxpayer paid time during their 
paid workday, they are performing official duties."21   
                                                 
18 The assertion made by the lead opinion and Justice 
Bradley's concurring opinion that it is undisputed that the 
emails at issue are purely personal impacts their opinions in 
different ways.  The lead opinion creates an exception to Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2)'s definition of "record" for purely personal 
emails.  Lead op., ¶23.  Conversely, Justice Bradley concludes, 
as I do, that the emails fall within the statutory definition of 
records.  Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶151.  However, in 
conducting the balancing test, Justice Bradley asserts that the 
public interest in nondisclosure will always outweigh the public 
interest in disclosure of purely personal emails that evince no 
violation of law or policy.  Id., ¶167.  I disagree. 
19 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 3. 
20 Id. at 4.   
21 Id. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶197 Turning to the School District's position, in its 
answer to the teachers' amended complaint, the School District 
denied that it notified the teachers that it would release 
"personal emails," and instead asserted that it notified the 
teachers that it "would release records responsive to the 
request."  Moreover, in its brief to this court, the School 
District asserted:  "The materials at issue pertain to the 
business of the public entity."22  It explained:  "It is [] not 
apparent from current Wisconsin law that emails sent by public 
employees on public resources during public time are not of 
public interest."23  These statements contradict the lead 
opinion's repeated assertion that "[i]t is [] uncontested that 
the contents of the e-mails at issue do not relate to the school 
district or government affairs or any official actions of the 
Teachers or other public officers or employees or the conduct of 
governmental business."24 
¶198 We may accept parties' stipulated facts.  See Richards 
v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶4, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581.  However, as we just explained, the parties in this 
case have not stipulated, nor do they agree, to the fact that 
the emails do not relate to governmental affairs. 
                                                 
22 Defendant-Respondent's Brief, 8. 
23 Id. at 10. 
24 Lead op., ¶30 (emphasis added); see also id., ¶23 ("In 
the instant case, the contents of the Teachers' personal e-mails 
have no connection to a government function . . . ."). 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶199 As stated, the lead opinion and Justice Bradley's 
concurring opinion repeatedly assert that there is nothing in 
these 
emails 
that 
relates in any way to the teachers' 
employment.25  This assertion is made in the absence of an 
agreement by all the parties and based on a record that does not 
contain the emails at issue.  Accordingly, there is nothing in 
the record that would allow any member of this court to base a 
decision on the content, number or length of the emails, or the 
time of day when the emails were created, all of which are 
necessary to determine whether the emails relate to the 
teachers' employment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶200 This 
case 
presents 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation and application.  We interpret and apply statutes 
independently of the previous court decision, but benefitting by 
its analysis.  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of 
Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶14, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (citing 
Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 
N.W.2d 396).  Applying the balancing test prior to the 
disclosure of public records is also a question of law for our 
independent review; however, we benefit from the circuit court's 
discussion of the balance it conducted.  Id. (citing Wis. 
Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 
768, 784, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996)).   
                                                 
25 Id., ¶30, passim; Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶148, 
passim. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
9 
 
B.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
¶201 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
and 
apply 
Wisconsin's 
Public 
Records 
Law 
statutes. 
 
"Statutory 
interpretation begins 'with the language of the statute.'"  
Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶21, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  
Statutory language "is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  If a statute's meaning 
is plain, "then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is 
applied according" to its terms.  Id., ¶46 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted).  However, if a statute "is capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or 
more senses," the statute is ambiguous, and we may consult 
extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to discern the 
meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶¶47-48. 
¶202 Statutes are not interpreted in a vacuum.  Rather, we 
interpret them in the context in which the legislature placed 
them.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶17, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 
717 N.W.2d 641.  Furthermore, when the legislature has set out 
the purpose of a statute, we interpret the statute so as to 
fulfill its stated purpose.  Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶34 
(citing Johnson v. Wis. Lumber & Supply Co., 203 Wis. 304, 310, 
234 N.W. 506 (1931)). 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) 
¶203 The lead opinion turns on its creation of an exception 
to the Public Records Law's definition of "record."  "Record" is 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  Section 19.32(2) provides: 
"Record" means any material on which written, 
drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic 
information is recorded or preserved, regardless of 
physical form or characteristics, which has been 
created or is being kept by an authority.  "Record" 
includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or 
printed 
pages, 
maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), computer 
printouts and optical disks.  "Record" does not 
include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and 
like materials prepared for the originator's personal 
use or prepared by the originator in the name of a 
person for whom the originator is working; materials 
which 
are 
purely 
the 
personal 
property 
of 
the 
custodian and have no relation to his or her office; 
materials to which access is limited by copyright, 
patent or bequest; and published materials in the 
possession of an authority other than a public library 
which are available for sale, or which are available 
for inspection at a public library.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶204 The lead opinion seems to agree that emails are 
"records" within the definition of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).26  
However, it then narrowly construes "record" to create an 
exception for emails that it characterizes as "personal."27  That 
construction is incorrect as a matter of law for at least three 
                                                 
26 Lead op., ¶56, passim ("The Teachers and the School 
District agree, as do we, that e-mails can fall within the first 
part of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2)'s description of materials that 
may be 'records.'"). 
27 Id., ¶136, passim ("If the content of the e-mail is 
solely personal, it is not a record under the Public Records Law 
and the e-mail cannot be released."). 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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reasons:  (1) it contravenes the plain meaning of the statute; 
(2) it impairs Wisconsin's long history of open and accountable 
government; and (3) it creates a content-based exception from 
the Public Records Law for emails that are not in the record 
and, therefore, no member of this court has seen their content.  
Neither Bubolz, the public records requester, nor the School 
District agree the emails have no connection to the teachers' 
employment. 
1.  Plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) 
¶205 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) defines "record" in broadly 
stated terms.  It unambiguously defines "record" as "any 
material . . . regardless of physical form or characteristics."  
The statute also explains that the types of records that are 
listed are merely examples, not limitations on the broad 
definition the legislature chose.  The statute does so by 
stating that "[r]ecord includes, but is not limited to" the list 
of examples that follows the introductory phrase.   
¶206 Subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. § 19.32 also contains a 
discrete 
list 
of 
exceptions 
to 
the 
preceding 
statutory 
definition of "record."  I agree with the lead opinion's 
discussion of why emails are not included within any of the 
exceptions listed in § 19.32(2).28  However, subsec. (2)'s 
discrete list of exceptions from the definition of "record" 
strengthens 
the 
unambiguous 
breadth 
of 
the 
legislative 
definition of record.  Stated otherwise, if the legislature had 
intended to exclude "personal" emails, it would have included 
                                                 
28 E.g., id., ¶¶62-68. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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that exception in subsec. (2)'s discrete list of exceptions.  It 
did not do so.  
¶207 Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context in 
which the legislature has placed them.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 
541, ¶20.  Placed in context, the definition of "record" set out 
in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) must be compared with subsec. (2)'s 
discrete list of exceptions from the term "record."  Subsection 
(2) establishes a broad reach in defining "record" under the 
Public Records Law by explicitly providing that the list in 
subsec. (2) of what constitutes a record is "not limited to" the 
examples listed.  Accordingly, the list in subsec. (2) is by way 
of example only and not by way of limitation.  However, the 
exceptions to that broad definition, also contained in subsec. 
(2), have no introductory phrase that suggests that the 
exceptions include, but are not limited to, those exceptions 
enumerated.  The absence of such an introductory phrase suggests 
that the exceptions chosen by the legislature are a discrete 
list not to be expanded.   
¶208 In addition, when the legislature states the purpose 
that it expects legislation to accomplish, we interpret the 
affected statutes to "best promote [that] statutory purpose[]."  
Cnty. 
of 
Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶34.  In establishing 
Wisconsin's Public Records Law, the legislature unambiguously 
stated its purpose.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  It did so by 
establishing that construction of the Public Records Law must be 
undertaken "in every instance with a presumption of complete 
public access."  § 19.31 (emphasis added).  
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¶209 As we have explained, the "statement of public policy 
in § 19.31 is one of the strongest declarations of policy to be 
found in the Wisconsin statutes."  Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. 
Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶49, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240.  Given 
the significant role that teachers play in our society, the 
public has a very strong interest in all of their activities in 
the workplace.  See id., ¶53 ("Public school teachers . . . are 
in 
a 
significant 
position 
of 
responsibility 
and 
visibility. . . .  They are entrusted with the responsibility of 
teaching children, and the public has an interest in knowing 
about such allegations of teacher misconduct and how they are 
handled."); Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶28, 254 Wis. 2d 
306, 646 N.W.2d 811. 
¶210 In Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 438 N.W.2d 589 
(1989), we examined a claimed exception from record disclosure.  
We addressed a claim that a report of a study prepared by a 
third party was not a "record" within the meaning of the Public 
Records Law.  Id. at 405.  In concluding that the report was a 
record, we reasoned that the "term 'record' is broadly defined 
in sec. 19.32(2)."  Id. at 410.  We also explained that "[a]ny 
exceptions to the general rule of disclosure must be narrowly 
construed."  Id. at 411 (citing Hathaway v. Green Bay Sch. 
Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984)). 
¶211 I conclude that the lead opinion's creation of a broad 
exception to the Public Records Law——the exclusion of emails 
that 
government 
employees 
characterize 
as 
"personal"29——
                                                 
29 Lead op., ¶141. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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contravenes the plain meaning of "record" as defined by the 
legislature.  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  The lead opinion changes 
the word "personal" into the word "private" in contravention of 
Wisconsin's long history of open and accessible oversight of 
government employees' actions.   
2.  Open and accountable government 
¶212 Wisconsin has a long history of holding public 
employees accountable through providing complete public access 
to records that will assist in the public's review.  Zellner, 
300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶49.  As stated, the legislative purpose of the 
Public Records Law is set out in Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Because of 
the strong legislative commitment to open and transparent 
government embodied in Wisconsin's Public Records Law, it is 
appropriate to fully set out and discuss the legislature's 
policy objective.  Section 19.31 provides: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business. The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied.   
¶213 The legislature's statement that Wis. Stat. "ss. 19.32 
to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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of complete public access," was not followed in the lead 
opinion.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  The lead opinion accords no 
presumption of access to the requested emails.   
¶214 There 
is 
nothing 
ambiguous 
in 
the 
legislative 
directive of "complete public access."  All emails in the School 
District's email account should be released, unless there is an 
exception in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  § 19.31; Fox, 149 Wis. 2d 
at 410-11.   
¶215 Any exception to the general presumption of complete 
disclosure must be narrowly construed.  Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 
290, ¶31 ("[S]tatutory exceptions 'should be recognized for what 
they are, instances in derogation of the general legislative 
intent, and should, therefore, be narrowly construed.'" (quoting 
Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at 411)); Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397.  It is 
"contrary to general well established principles of freedom-of-
information statutes to hold that, by implication only, any type 
of record can be held from public inspection."  Hathaway, 116 
Wis. 2d at 397 (emphasis added).   
¶216 Here, there is no statutory language excepting any 
type of email from disclosure.  Despite this, the lead opinion 
creates a broad, blanket exception for all emails in the School 
District's 
email 
account, 
based 
solely 
on 
the 
teachers' 
allegation that the emails are "personal."  The lead opinion has 
crafted its exception "by implication only," id., when it 
concludes that for an email to be a "record" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2), it must involve the carrying on of governmental 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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business.30  There is nothing in Wis. Stat. ch. 19 that supports 
this interpretation.  Indeed, claims have been filed against 
government employees based on the allegation that government 
computers were being used for purposes other than government 
business.31   
¶217 And finally, why does the Public Records Law state 
that there is a presumption of complete public access?  It does 
so to enable the public to see for itself what is going on in 
government work places.  The lead opinion shuts down this public 
access whenever public employees characterize their emails as 
"personal."  It is not possible to accord public oversight of 
government employees' activities when those same government 
employees decide what the public is permitted to see.  
3.  Content-based exception 
¶218 Throughout the lead opinion, it repeats that whether 
an email is a record within the meaning of the Public Records 
Law depends on the content of the email.32  This is a curious 
position for justices that have never read any of the emails.  
As stated, the emails are not in the record, so there is no 
means by which any justice could know the content of the emails.   
¶219 Some courts in other jurisdictions have applied a 
content-based 
analysis 
to 
freedom-of-information 
types 
of 
                                                 
30 Lead op., ¶22, passim. 
31 See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, ¶93, 272 
Wis. 2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 230, subsequent appeal at State v. 
Jensen, 2009 WI App 26, 316 Wis. 2d 377, 762 N.W.2d 833, rev'd 
State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 782 N.W.2d 415. 
32 See lead op., passim. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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requests, but they have made a decision about whether the 
material should be released only after an in camera review of 
the emails under consideration.  See, e.g., Associated Press v. 
Canterbury, 688 S.E.2d 317, 322–23 (W. Va. 2009) (concluding 
that the trial court properly ordered the emails at issue 
produced for an in camera review of their content). 
¶220 The lead opinion also supports its content-based 
exception by stating that those "personal e-mails include such 
messages as an e-mail from a teacher to her spouse about child 
care responsibilities and an e-mail from a friend to a teacher 
regarding social plans."33  The lead opinion errs.  No justice 
has seen any of the emails at issue; they are not in the record.  
Therefore, there is no way any member of this court can provide 
examples of what the emails say.  Notwithstanding this lack of 
knowledge, a majority of this court relates what the emails say. 
¶221 Here, Bubolz, the records requestor and a party to 
this action,34 alleges that the teachers are attempting to 
preclude him from reviewing the extent and quality of use of 
School 
District 
computers 
and 
email 
services 
during 
the 
workday.35  He explains that he "believes if the teachers' 
emails, sent or received, discussed school board members, school 
board proceedings, school board candidates or organizations 
                                                 
33 Lead op., ¶29. 
34 The three justices who participate in the lead opinion 
and Justice Bradley in her concurring opinion rely on an 
asserted knowledge of the emails' content. 
35 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 2. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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supporting or opposing school board members or candidates," he 
should be able to learn of it.36  The School District agrees that 
if the emails demonstrate "excessive personal usage" of District 
email accounts during the workday "the public's interest may 
then be implicated."37  I, too, agree with Bubholz.   
¶222 While one could assert that those types of emails are 
personal in nature38 because the teachers are doing things 
outside of their jobs duties, one could also assert that it is 
not proper for teachers to be campaigning for school board 
candidates or members using School District email accounts and 
computers during the workday.39  However, there is no way of 
knowing what is going on here because the lead opinion prevents 
the public from learning the content of the teachers' emails and 
                                                 
36 Id. at 3.  The lead opinion misstates its knowledge of 
the content of the emails when it says, "None of the e-mails at 
issue here relate to school board candidates."  Lead op., ¶26 
n.10.  Neither Chief Justice Abrahamson, who authored the lead 
opinion, nor any other justice has seen the teachers' emails.  
Therefore, there is no basis on which to make such a statement.  
It is unfair to the public to make statements of material fact 
about which the court has no knowledge.   
37 Defendant-Respondent's Brief, 12. 
38 As I have already noted, a "personal" email is not 
necessarily a "private" email.  The School District's policy on 
email usage gives notice that the email accounts are not private 
and may be monitored. 
39 As I related above, Bubolz's appellate brief, raises this 
concern.  Query, what is to prevent a government employee who is 
campaigning 
through 
the 
use 
of 
governmental 
emails 
from 
characterizing those emails as "personal," thereby excluding 
them from disclosure when a public records request is made for 
emails. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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how often they are using School District email accounts and 
computers for non-job related tasks. 
D.  Balance 
¶223 Since I have concluded that emails created in School 
District email accounts on School District computers during the 
workday do not fall within an exception to the statutory 
definition of "record" contained in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), but 
rather that they are records covered by the Public Records Law, 
I must determine whether the circuit court properly applied the 
balancing of interests test.  See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶54–55.   
¶224 This balancing involves weighing "the public interest 
in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosure."  
Id., ¶55.  In balancing these interests, there generally are no 
"'blanket 
exceptions 
from 
release.'" 
 
Id., 
¶56 
(quoting 
Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶10).  Furthermore, there is a 
strong 
legislatively 
established 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
disclosure.  Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶63, 284 
Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551.  Only in an "exceptional case" will 
nondisclosure be appropriate.  Id.  This presumption of 
disclosure is one of the strongest in the Wisconsin statutes.  
Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶49.  To overcome this presumption, 
the person opposing disclosure has the burden to show a 
compelling public interest in nondisclosure.  Local 2489, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210, ¶27, 277 Wis. 2d 
208, 689 N.W.2d 644.   
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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¶225 Here, the teachers assert they have a personal privacy 
interest in preventing disclosure that rises to the level of a 
public interest.  The teachers cite two cases protecting the 
privacy of phone conversations and personal letters delivered to 
the school as supportive of their interests here.  Fischer v. 
Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 
2002); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 
1983).  They assert that "[i]f a teacher makes a personal phone 
call at lunch time on the school phone, she does not waive all 
expectation of privacy in her phone conversation[,] . . . [and] 
[i]f a teacher receives a personal letter in his school mailbox, 
he does not waive all expectation of privacy in his [] mail."40 
¶226 I am not persuaded.  First, the teachers have been 
informed by the School District's policy 365.1 on network and 
internet usage that they "should not assume that information 
stored and/or transmitted is confidential or secure."41  Second, 
each teacher was required to sign the following acknowledgement:  
"By signing below I acknowledge that e-mail messages and 
Internet usage are not private and recognize that all employee's 
activities on the WRDN may be monitored."  Therefore, there can 
be no expectation of privacy in these emails.  Neither of the 
cases cited by the teachers involved a similar policy and 
acknowledgement. 
                                                 
40 Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, 18. 
41 365.1 Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy, 300-
104. 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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¶227 Furthermore, even though individual privacy concerns 
may rise to the level of a public interest, the teachers have 
made no such showing here.  As the court of appeals has 
explained, "[w]hen individuals become public employees, they 
necessarily give up certain privacy rights and are subject to a 
degree of public scrutiny."  Local 2489, 277 Wis. 2d 208, ¶26 
(citing Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 786-87). 
¶228 Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
teachers 
have 
identified no public interest that will be served by the blanket 
exception from the Public Records Law they assert herein, given 
that the circuit court ordered the School District, prior to 
release, to redact from the emails any home addresses, telephone 
numbers, home email addresses, social security numbers, medical 
information, bank account numbers and pupil record information.  
¶229 Furthermore, the teachers' privacy concern, if it were 
to rise to the level of a public interest, is balanced against 
the strong public interest in disclosure of the activities of 
public employees in the workplace.  See Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 
290, ¶49.  It is also considered with regard to our recent 
affirmation that the Public Records Law is generally not 
amenable to blanket exceptions, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 319 
Wis. 2d 439, ¶56, such as the lead opinion has attempted to 
create here for all emails it labels "personal."  Therefore, 
even if I were to presume that the content of the emails do not 
involve work-related matters, I agree with the circuit court 
that the teachers have not overcome the statutory presumption of 
full disclosure and complete public access and, therefore, the 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
22 
 
emails should be provided pursuant to Bubolz's request.42  
Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court order releasing 
the emails. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶230 The lead opinion prevents the public from viewing the 
workplace activities of School District teachers by creating an 
exception to the definition of "record" in the Public Records 
Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  This exception, when combined with 
the concurring opinions, grants government employees, here, 
teachers, a broad, blanket exception for emails that the 
teachers create in School District email accounts, on School 
District computers, maintained by School District servers, when 
the teachers characterize their emails as "personal."  This 
broad exception prevents the public from discovering what public 
employees are doing during the workday, in the workplace, using 
equipment purchased with public funds.  In so doing, the court 
contravenes Wisconsin's long history of transparency in and 
public access to actions of government employees.  The lead 
opinion is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Public 
Records Law and is a disservice to the public's interest in 
government oversight.  Because I conclude that these emails are 
records and that the teachers have not met their burden to show 
                                                 
42 I, like every other justice, have not seen the emails.  
However, the presumption in favor of complete public access must 
be overcome by a compelling public interest in nondisclosure.  
Local 2489, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210, ¶26, 
277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644 (citing Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. 
Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 786-87, 546 
N.W.2d 143 (1996)).  The teachers have identified no compelling 
public interest.  
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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that the public's interest in nondisclosure outweighs the 
public's interest in disclosure of these emails, I respectfully 
dissent.   
¶231 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins in this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP967-AC.pdr 
 
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