Title: JASON WAYNE CRAIG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JASON WAYNE CRAIG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 122163 P.3d 828Case Number: No. 06-30Decided: 08/02/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JASON 
WAYNE CRAIG,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty 
Director, Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, and Edward K. Britzius, Student 
Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.   Argument by Mr. 
Britzius.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jason Craig pled 
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of battery1 against a household member.  The district court sentenced Craig to 30 
to 36 months imprisonment based on a finding that this was Craig's third 
domestic violence conviction.  On 
appeal, Craig challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the legality 
of the district court's sentencing decision.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Craig raises the 
following issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether Appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury 
when the district court made the factual determination that Appellant's two 
previous convictions were assaults on household members.

 
 
II.         
Whether Appellant entered a knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 15, 
2005, Craig struck his wife multiple times in the face.  Craig then grabbed a broom and proceeded 
to hit her with the handle until she fell to the floor, at which time he then 
kicked her several times.  During 
the attack, Mrs. Craig suffered a cut lip and bruising to her face, left leg, 
and left hand.  Mrs. Craig reported 
to the police officers responding to the scene that the physical abuse had been 
ongoing for some time and provided details of an assault that had occurred 
approximately two weeks earlier, during which Craig had struck her on the head 
with a wooden mallet. 

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Craig with two counts of battery against a household member in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007), both felonies.2  The charging documents alleged that 
Craig had two prior battery convictions involving a household member within the 
previous ten years.  The parties 
ultimately reached a plea agreement, wherein Craig agreed to plead guilty to 
Count II in exchange for the State's dismissal of Count I.3  The plea agreement set a three-year cap 
on sentencing in the event the offense was found to be Craig's third domestic 
violence conviction within ten years, and reserved to Craig the right to 
challenge the nature of the prior offenses and the applicability of the felony 
enhancement at sentencing.  

 
 
[¶5]      At the change of 
plea hearing, as an initial matter, Craig disputed whether the two prior 
convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the felony sentence 
enhancement provision of § 6-2-501(f)(ii).  
The district court determined that both convictions could be used as a 
basis for enhancement so long as the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
they were committed against a member of Craig's household.  The parties agreed that the issue should 
be resolved by the district court at the sentencing 
hearing

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court then addressed Craig personally and advised him of his rights under 
W.R.Cr.P. 11, including the right to a jury trial on the charged offenses, and 
the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty.  Craig stated that he understood the 
court's advisement.  Craig then pled 
guilty to Count II, admitting to battering his wife.  The district court found that the plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily entered with full awareness of the potential 
consequences.  

 
 
[¶7]      At the sentencing 
hearing, the district court heard evidence that Craig's prior battery 
convictions involved a household member.  
The district court concluded sufficient evidence existed that this was 
Craig's third conviction of assault and battery against a household member and 
sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Voluntariness 
of guilty plea

 
 
[¶8]      We first address 
Craig's challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea.  Claims regarding the voluntariness of a 
guilty plea are reviewed de 
novo.  Maes v. State, 2005 WY 70, ¶ 9, 114 P.3d 708, 710 (Wyo. 2005); Van Haele v. 
State, 2004 WY 59, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2004).  We examine the procedure utilized to 
accept a guilty plea as a whole to determine if the trial court "sufficiently 
described the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed 
the defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the 
rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea."  Id.  These procedural requirements are 
intended to assure that the defendant is not misled into an unintentional waiver 
of substantial rights.  Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 9, 33 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 2001); McCarty v. 
State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994).  A guilty plea will stand where the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant made a voluntary 
and intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of action 
available to him and understood the consequences of his plea.  Maes, ¶ 9, 114 P.3d  at 
710.

 
 
[¶9]      Craig contends he 
was never accurately advised of the nature of his plea.  Specifically, Craig contends he was 
never adequately advised of the minimum and maximum penalties for his crime and, 
as a consequence, did not know whether he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor 
or felony.  The charging 
Information, however, was quite clear.  
Craig pled guilty to Count II, which was felony battery against a 
household member.  At the change of 
plea hearing, the district court ensured Craig's understanding of the charge 
against him:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Have you reviewed the 
Information that's been filed in this matter?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, Your Honor, I 
have.

 
 
                        
*  *  *  
*

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
Now, this Information contains originally two counts.  And the proposal is a potential guilty 
plea to Count Two, which is a charge of assault and battery on an alleged 
household member.  Do you understand 
that?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir, I do.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And this is alleged to have 
occurred in February 15th of this year in 
NatronaCounty. 

 
 
[¶10]   The unusual aspect of this case, 
and seemingly what Craig is objecting to on appeal, is that a process was 
adopted whereby the State would present evidence at the sentencing hearing 
establishing that this was Craig's third battery conviction against a household 
member.  In the event the State was 
unable to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the felony 
charge would be reduced to a misdemeanor.  
Craig's objection is not well-taken, however, since he knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed to this process:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  . . . The State is reserving 
the right to argue that you had been previously convicted at least twice of 
assault and battery on household members.  
If they are able to prove that, that would make this a felony with a 
potential penalty of a five-year prison sentence.

            
Do you understand that?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir, I do.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And do you understand that 
they reserve the right to argue these facts at sentencing?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir, I do.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And I have ruled they may 
present evidence on that.  If they 
cannot present evidence on that, if they cannot bear their burden of 
establishing those facts, then this would be a 
misdemeanor.

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir, I do understand 
that.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And that, again, is the 
agreement of all parties; is that correct?

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, sir.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir.  

 
 
[¶11]   Later in the hearing, the district 
court again addressed the potential consequences of Craig's guilty plea, to 
Craig's satisfaction:

 
 
[CRAIG]:  . . . I am kind of a little at a loss of 
what is actually going on at the moment.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Well, let me see if I can explain it, 
and [Defense Counsel] can clarify it or you can confer with him if you need 
to.  

            
The parties have agreed, and my understanding is with your consent, that 
you'll be pleading guilty this morning.

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Correct.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  There will be a sentencing 
hearing at a later date, in approximately 45 to 60 days.  It will be a more lengthy hearing than 
we normally have in these matters.  
And at that hearing, the State will present evidence that you have been 
previously convicted of assault [sic] on a household member, as that term is 
defined in Wyoming Statutes.

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Okay.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  [Defense Counsel] has the 
right, on your behalf, to dispute that and to present any contrary evidence if 
you wish to do that.

            
At the conclusion of that hearing, I will decide whether the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that those earlier convictions involved a 
household member.  If I find that 
they have proven that, then this would be treated as a felony; and you'll be 
sentenced accordingly, with the agreed-upon 

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Okay.  I understand, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You would receive not more 
than three years.  If I find that 
they have not met that burden, then you'll be sentenced as a 
misdemeanor.

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Okay, Your Honor.  I understand that.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Have I correctly set forth 
the plea agreement?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir, Your 
Honor.

 
 
*  *  
*  *

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Do you wish to go forward 
under those conditions?

 
 
[CRAIG]:  Yes, sir. 

 
 
[¶12]   From the above colloquy, we cannot 
agree with Craig's contention that his guilty plea was not knowing and 
voluntary.  The charge against him 
was clear.  The district court 
explained to Craig several times the ramifications should he enter a guilty 
plea.  Each time, Craig acknowledged 
his understanding of what the district court was telling him.  We find Craig intelligently, knowingly 
and voluntarily pled guilty with full awareness of the possible 
consequences.

 
 

Sentencing 
procedure

 
 
[¶13]   On appeal, Craig objects to the 
sentencing procedure because he believes it violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial under Apprendi v. 
New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) (any fact that enhances a sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum, except the fact of a prior conviction, must be decided by a 
jury).  Even should these 
circumstances fall within tenets of Apprendi, the right to a jury trial, as 
critical and fundamental as it is, can be waived.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2541, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004); Van 
Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 236 (Wyo. 1994).

 
 
[¶14]   We find that Craig knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury determination of the facts underlying 
his prior assault and battery convictions.  
During the change of plea hearing, Craig was expressly informed of his 
right to a jury trial.  Early in the 
change of plea proceeding, the district court recommended that Craig persist in 
his plea of not guilty and take the case to trial.  Craig, through counsel, declined.  Later, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11, the 
district court properly advised Craig of his right to a jury trial.  

  

[¶15]   Most pointedly, as noted in the 
above colloquy, the district court plainly advised Craig that, at sentencing, it 
would be receiving evidence and making the ultimate determination as to whether 
his prior convictions were against household members.  Craig indicated his understanding and 
agreement to this process.   
Reading the change of plea hearing transcript as a whole, we find Craig 
was given multiple opportunities to exercise his right to a jury trial.  In the end, Craig affirmatively agreed 
to bypass the jury and let the judge be the fact-finder.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   We find no ambiguity with the 
charge to which Craig pled guilty.  
The district court very thoroughly explained Craig's rights and the 
process ultimately followed in determining his guilt and sentence.  Craig expressly agreed to the process 
employed, after affirmatively acknowledging his understanding of the same.  Craig's guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary and the sentencing procedure was conducted in accordance with the 
parties' agreement.  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The court 
documents, the district court, and the parties consistently refer to the charge 
generically as "assault and battery." 

 
 

2§ 6-2-501 
provides in relevant part:

 
 
(b) A person 
is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or 
angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another.

 
 
                                    
*  *  *  
*

 
 
(d)  Except as provided by subsection (f) of 
this section, battery is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00), or both. . . .

 
 
                                    
*  *  *  
*

 
 
(f)  A household member as defined by W.S. 
35-21-102 who commits a second or subsequent battery against any other household 
member shall be punished as follows:

(i)  A person convicted upon a plea of guilty 
or no contest or found guilty of a second offense under this subsection against 
any other household member, after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or 
no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 
6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or any 
other state, tribe or territory against any other household member within the 
previous five (5) years is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both. . . .

(ii)  A person convicted upon a plea of guilty 
or no contest or found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially 
similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against any other 
household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 
 

3Count I was 
based on the incident that took place in early February, while Count II involved 
the incident which occurred on February 15, 
2005.