Title: SMYTH v. KAUFMAN, M.D.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SMYTH v. KAUFMAN, M.D.2003 WY 5267 P.3d 1161Case Number: 02-38Decided: 04/30/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

ELIZABETH 
C. SMYTH and

DONALD 
G. SMYTH,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

STEPHEN 
L. KAUFMAN, M.D. and

MICHAEL 
D. KELLAM, M.D.,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Philip 
A. Nicholas and Jason M. Tangeman of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, 
LLC, Laramie, Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellee Kaufman:

            
Jeffrey C. Brinkerhoff of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee Kellam:

Frank 
D. Neville and Jason A. Neville of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, 
Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

KITE, 
J., delivered 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
LEHMAN, J., joined

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Elizabeth Smyth 
and her husband, Donald, claimed medical malpractice arising out of an alleged 
misdiagnosis of the cause of compromised blood flow in Mrs. Smyth's left foot 
and leg.  As a result of the alleged 
misdiagnosis, Mrs. Smyth's left foot and leg were amputated in three successive 
medical procedures.  In their suit 
against the doctors involved, the Smyths alleged it was discovered after the 
amputations that the drug Cafergot caused the decreased blood flow in Mrs. 
Smyth's left leg and discontinuing the drug would have restored circulation and 
prevented the amputations.

 

[¶2]      After a lengthy 
trial, the jury returned a verdict with no finding on the question of whether 
Stephen Kaufman, M.D. and Michael Kellam, M.D. failed to meet the standard of 
care and answering "no" to the question of whether any such failure caused Mrs. 
Smyth's injury.  The Smyths appeal, 
claiming abuses of discretion by the trial court in rulings concerning (1) 
peremptory challenges, (2) admission and exclusion of evidence relating to their 
claims against a third doctor with whom they settled, and (3) their motion for a 
new trial based on juror confusion.  
We affirm.         

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The Smyths 
present the following issues:

 

            
1.  Whether it was an abuse of discretion to afford defendants 
a total of six peremptory challenges and limiting the plaintiffs to only four 
peremptory challenges?

 

            
2.  Whether it was an abuse of discretion to allow defendants 
to elicit evidence and argue to the jury that negligence of Dr. Reckling 
occurred based simply on the fact that he had been sued by plaintiffs; then, 
excluding relevant evidence to the contrary from the jury by permitting 
defendants to omit critical parts of the deposition of plaintiffs' expert that 
Dr. Reckling's care was acceptable?

 

            
3.  Whether it was error to deny plaintiffs' motion for new 
trial based on jurors' belief that their partial verdict would result in a hung 
jury that would entitle plaintiffs to a new trial?

 

Dr. 
Kaufman phrases the issues as follows:

 

            
A.  Whether the jury verdict may be attacked on the basis of 
allocation of peremptory challenges when [the plaintiffs] failed to make a 
record at the time of jury selection of which juror they opposed, passed the 
jury for cause, failed to challenge the juror in question for cause, and failed 
to use an available peremptory challenge against her and, in any event, whether 
the trial court properly allocated peremptory challenges in light of the 
circumstances and inherent antagonism between the 
defendants?

 

            
B.  Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence that 
plaintiffs originally blamed Dr. Reckling to allow defendants the opportunity to 
have all actors on the verdict form and avoid the misleading and prejudicial 
inference that the defendants and not the plaintiffs had blamed Dr. Reckling; 
whether the evidence of the lawsuit was, in any event, admissible for purposes 
of showing the bias of Dr. Reckling as a plaintiffs' witness at trial; and 
whether the trial court properly declined to allow plaintiffs to supplement 
sworn deposition testimony by reading to the jury a document that was hearsay 
and without foundation.

 

            
C.  Whether the trial court properly denied the motion for a 
new trial because the jury unanimously agreed that the defendants did not cause 
injuries, plaintiffs waived any irregularities in the verdict by not advising 
the court, the jurors individually affirmed their verdict when polled, and no 
improper influence or communication occurred during 
deliberations.

 

Dr. 
Kellam did not set out the issues in his brief.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On April 3, 1998, 
Mrs. Smyth, then fifty-one years old, went to the office of Carlton Reckling, 
M.D. for a follow-up examination after she had a knee replacement and rod 
surgery on her left leg.  She 
reported experiencing pain, coldness, and discoloration of her left foot.  Dr. Reckling noted in her chart that she 
was suffering from ischemic feet, or lack of blood flow in the feet.  He told her she should contact him if 
the condition worsened and he would arrange for her to have a vascular 
evaluation in the emergency room.  

 

[¶5]      The next day, 
April 4, 1998, the pain had worsened, and Mrs. Smyth went to the emergency 
room.  The emergency room physician 
ordered an ultrasound, which showed poor arterial flow in her left foot.  He contacted Dr. Reckling as well as Dr. 
Kellam, the on-call interventional radiology specialist.  Dr. Kellam ordered an angiogram, which 
showed a blockage and collateral vessels around the left knee and an absence of 
blood flow from the mid-calf into the foot, symptoms indicative of 
atherosclerosis and a blood clot.  
He administered Priscoline, a vasodilator, to open up the vessels, loosen 
the clot, or allow blood flow around the blockage.  Although Priscoline is a recognized 
treatment for vasospasms, Dr. Kellam did not see vasospasms on the angiogram 
and, therefore, did not administer Priscoline with vasospasms in mind.  In any event, the Priscoline had no 
effect.  Dr. Kellam reported his 
findings of atherosclerosis and a blockage, most likely a clot, to Dr. 
Reckling.  He ordered another 
medication to be administered through the night in an effort to break up the 
clot, performed a second angiogram which showed the treatment had no effect, 
reported those findings to Dr. Reckling, and had no further involvement with 
Mrs. Smyth. 

 

[¶6]      Mrs. Smyth 
remained in the hospital and, on April 6, 1998, at the request of Dr. Reckling, 
was seen by Dr. Kaufman, a vascular surgeon, for a vascular consult.  Dr. Kaufman examined Mrs. Smyth's foot, 
reviewed the angiograms, consulted with Dr. Kellam, and diagnosed Mrs. Smyth as 
having an ischemic limb related to atherosclerosis and secondary blood 
clot.  He concluded that surgery to 
bypass the blockage was not an option.  
He advised Dr. Reckling that administering additional medications might 
possibly restore blood flow but it was likely Mrs. Smyth would need an 
amputation.  Dr. Kaufman had no 
further involvement with Mrs. Smyth.

 

[¶7]      Mrs. Smyth 
remained in the hospital under the treatment of Dr. Reckling.  Her condition continued to deteriorate, 
and, on April 8, 1998, Dr. Reckling amputated her foot and ankle.  The amputation site failed to heal 
properly, and, on June 12, 1998, Dr. Reckling performed two more amputations, 
resulting in an above-knee amputation on her left leg.

 

[¶8]      Two weeks later, 
Mrs. Smyth began experiencing identical symptoms in her right foot.  Dr. Reckling again requested a vascular 
consult to address the problem.  Dr. 
Kaufman's partner, Richard Fermelia, M.D., was the on-call vascular surgeon this 
time.  Dr. Fermelia examined Mrs. 
Smyth and reviewed the April angiograms.  
He was unable to take a new angiogram because the radiology suite was not 
in operation and recommended that Mrs. Smyth be transferred to Denver, 
Colorado.

 

[¶9]      Mrs. Smyth 
arrived at the University of Colorado Medical Center on June 25, 1998, where she 
was seen by Thomas Whitehall, M.D.  
He ordered an angiogram and immediately concluded Mrs. Smyth was 
suffering from vasospasms.  After 
taking steps to return blood flow to her right leg, Dr. Whitehall questioned 
Mrs. Smyth about what drugs she was taking, specifically migraine headache 
medication.  Upon learning she was 
taking Cafergot, he concluded it was the cause of the vasospasms. 

 

[¶10]   Prior to Dr. Whitehall seeing Mrs. 
Smyth, none of the physicians attributed the loss of blood flow in Mrs. Smyth's 
left leg to the Cafergot she was taking.  
Although a list of her medications, including Cafergot, was provided to 
the hospital when she arrived, Drs. Kellam and Kaufman were not aware she was 
taking the medication.  On April 7 
and 8, 1998, Mrs. Smyth was administered Cafergot by hospital 
staff.

 

[¶11]   Prior to April of 1998, Mrs. Smyth 
had been taking Cafergot for migraine headaches for approximately twenty 
years.  A side effect of Cafergot is 
vasospasms, or spasming of the blood vessels, which restricts blood flow and can 
stop the flow of blood to the extremities.  
In severe cases of Cafergot toxicity, blood flow to the extremities can 
be restricted to such an extent that amputation of a limb becomes 
necessary.  Vasospasms appear in 
angiograms as long, smooth narrow blood vessels tapering off to nothing.  Neither Dr. Kellam nor Dr. Kaufman saw 
vasospasms on the angiograms taken of Mrs. Smyth's left leg in April of 
1998.  

 

[¶12]   On April 4, 2000, the Smyths 
brought a medical malpractice claim against Drs. Reckling, Kaufman, and Kellam; 
Stanley Hartman, M.D. (the emergency room physician); and the Board of Trustees 
of Memorial Hospital of Laramie County d/b/a United Medical Center (UMC) 
alleging negligence in failing to identify vasospasms on the initial angiogram, 
misdiagnosis of Mrs. Smyth's condition as atherosclerosis, failure to consider 
medicationsspecifically Cafergotas part of the differential diagnosis, and 
failure to discontinue Mrs. Smyth's use of Cafergot.   The Smyths voluntarily dismissed 
their claims against UMC and Dr. Hartman.  
Dr. Reckling settled with the Smyths and was dismissed from the case 
prior to trial.   The case 
proceeded to trial against Drs. Kaufman and Kellam on June 18, 2001, and a 
verdict was returned June 29, 2001.  
The verdict form reflected the jury reached no finding on whether Drs. 
Kaufman and Kellam failed to meet the standard of care but found any such 
failure was not the direct cause of injury to Mrs. Smyth.  The Smyths filed a motion for a new 
trial, which the court denied.  
Judgment on the verdict was entered, and the Smyths timely 
appealed.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]   We review the trial court's 
decisions concerning peremptory challenges, the admissibility of evidence, and 
whether to grant a new trial for abuse of discretion.  Sanders v. State, 7 P.3d 891, 893 
(Wyo. 2000) (admission of evidence); Cargill, Incorporated v. Mountain Cement 
Company, 891 P.2d 57, 65 (Wyo. 1995) (peremptory challenges); Brown v. 
State, 816 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1991) (motion for new trial).  The ultimate question in determining 
whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the trial court could 
have reasonably concluded as it did.  
Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶8, 54 P.3d 754, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Peremptory Challenges

 

[¶14]   The Smyths argue the trial court 
erred in giving Drs. Kaufman and Kellam three peremptory challenges each, for a 
combined total of six, when the Smyths received only four peremptory 
challenges.  Citing Cargill, 
they claim the trial court was required to make a determination that a good 
faith controversy existed between Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Kellam before allowing 
additional peremptory challenges to be exercised by them separately.  The Smyths claim no such controversy 
existed between the doctors who presented a united defense and, therefore, were 
not entitled to additional peremptory challenges.

 

[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-202 
(LexisNexis 2001) provides that, "[i]n the trial of civil cases in the district 
courts of this state, each side is allowed three (3) peremptory 
challenges."  W.R.C.P. 47(e) 
provides:

 

(e)  Peremptory 
challenges.  Each party shall be 
entitled to three peremptory challenges.  
Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single 
party for the making of challenges or the court may allow additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly.

  

[¶16]   Applying these provisions in 
Cargill, this court said:

 

Allocation 
of peremptory challenges, although resting within the sound discretion of the 
district court, still requires the district court to determine that a good faith 
controversy exists between multi-party litigants, be they plaintiffs or 
defendants, before peremptory challenges are awarded.  This rule is intended to prevent 
multi-party litigants, on the same side, from stockpiling peremptory challenges 
if their interests are not antagonistic. 

 

891 P.2d  at 65.  However, the Cargill 
court did not determine whether error occurred in the application of this 
rule because the appellant failed to indicate which jurors, if any, it would 
have opposed had the peremptory challenges been allocated differently and, 
therefore, failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  The court quoted the rule from 
Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1984), 
that a jury verdict will not be reversed due to improper allocation of 
peremptory challenges "unless the challenging party can point to some 
convincing indication in the record that if a further peremptory challenge had 
been allowed, [the party] meant to challenge one or more jurors.'"  Id.  We held that "a jury verdict cannot be 
attacked on the basis of improper allocation of peremptory challenges absent 
some indication, on the record, of which jurors the challenging party 
opposed."  
Id.

 

[¶17]   The Smyths argue that, if the trial 
court had allocated peremptory challenges differently, a particular juror who 
demonstrated bias would never have been called to sit on the jury.  The juror to whom the Smyths refer was 
Juror No. 162, the last juror called before the final jury was selected.  During questioning by Dr. Kellam's 
counsel, Juror No. 162 indicated she was biased against the Smyths' counsel 
because he repeated the same questions during his voir dire, causing her 
to lose patience with him.  After 
questions from the Smyths' counsel, she confirmed her impatience with counsel 
would not prevent her from objectively considering the facts and following the 
court's instructions. Despite the juror's expression of bias against him, the 
Smyths' counsel passed the jury for cause, made no objection to her being seated 
on the jury, did not exercise the Smyths' final peremptory challenge to exclude 
her, did not request an additional peremptory challenge so he could exclude her, 
and answered "yes" when asked whether he was "okay with the 14 [jurors] we've 
announced."

 

[¶18]   There is nothing in the record to 
show the Smyths were dissatisfied with Juror No. 162 or wished to select someone 
else.  While they now complain they 
were given insufficient peremptory challenges to allow them to excuse Juror No. 
162, they did not make this point at the time the jury was empaneled or take any 
action at all to put the trial court on notice of their dissatisfaction.  In the absence of an indication that the 
jury selected was unsatisfactory to the Smyths at the time it was chosen, we are 
unwilling to find error.   

 

B.        
Admissibility of Evidence of Claim Against Dr. 
Reckling

 

[¶19]   The Smyths claim the trial court 
erred in permitting Dr. Kaufman to present argument and evidence that Dr. 
Reckling was originally named as a defendant but was no longer a party to the 
lawsuit.  The Smyths also claim the 
trial court erred in allowing the defense to present portions of the deposition 
testimony of the expert witness they retained to testify against Dr. Reckling 
while not allowing them to read into the record the written expert designation 
upon which the expert relied for a portion of his testimony.  The effect of these combined errors, the 
Smyths contend, was to prevent a fair trial, to make it impossible for the jury 
to properly apply the Wyoming comparative fault statute, and to allow the very 
type of abuse W.R.E. 408 was designed to prevent.

 

[¶20]   The record discloses the following 
facts relevant to this issue.  The 
Smyths settled their claims against Dr. Reckling before trial.  At the final pretrial conference on June 
15, 2001, Dr. Kaufman's counsel indicated he intended to introduce evidence that 
the Smyths originally filed a claim against Dr. Reckling alleging he negligently 
treated Mrs. Smyth, Dr. Reckling was no longer a party to the lawsuit, the 
Smyths were now "flip-flopping" and pointing the finger at Drs. Kaufman and 
Kellam, and the Smyths' own expert witnessAnthony Alter, M.D.concluded Dr. 
Reckling breached the standard of care in treating Mrs. Smyth.1  In response to defense counsel's 
statement that he did not intend to offer evidence of the settlement but would 
offer evidence that Dr. Reckling had been but was no longer a defendant, the 
trial court stated that evidence of the settlement was "out of bounds."  The Smyths argued that, if the court 
intended to allow evidence that Dr. Reckling was sued, evidence of the 
settlement, but not the settlement amount, also ought to be allowed.  The court indicated that, in its view, 
evidence of the settlement was irrelevant.  
The trial court ruled the doctors would be allowed to show the Smyths had 
sued Dr. Reckling and he was no longer a party.  Crucial to the trial court's ruling was 
its concern that unfairness would result if it appeared to the jury that Drs. 
Kaufman and Kellam were "pointing the finger" at Dr. Reckling rather than that 
the Smyths had sued him for negligence.  

 

[¶21]   Despite the trial court's ruling 
and defense counsel's stated intent to tell the jury in opening statement that 
Dr. Reckling had been a defendant, the Smyths' counsel made no mention in his 
opening statement of the fact that Dr. Reckling, in addition to Drs. Kaufman and 
Kellam, was named as a defendant in the original complaint.  Dr. Kaufman's counsel, however, made the 
following comments during his opening statement:

 

            
Well, one of the things that plaintiffs' counsel have not yet told you is 
that over a year ago when they filed this lawsuit against Dr. Kellam and Dr. 
Kaufman they also filed a lawsuit against Dr. Reckling, the orthopedic surgeon; 
and they sued Dr. Reckling.  He was 
a defendant in this lawsuit until just recently.  They claimed they hired an expert by the 
name of Dr. Alter, plaintiffs did, an orthopedic surgeon from Beverly Hills, Los 
Angeles.

 

            
We went out to Beverly Hills and took his deposition.  He testified that Dr. Reckling was 
negligent for not referring the patient on Friday, the 3rd, and that 
he was negligent for not taking the patient off Cafergot, . . . to order a 
patient could be on Cafergot while in the hospital.

 

            
Ladies and gentlemen, those are the claims of the plaintiffs, not Dr. 
Kaufman and not Dr. Kellam.  Neither 
Dr. Kaufman nor Dr. Kellam assert that Dr. Reckling was negligent.  But now the plaintiffs assert only the 
negligence of Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Kellam.

 

The 
Smyths did not object at the time the comments were made but objected on the 
basis of relevancy out of the presence of the jury following opening 
statements.

 

[¶22]   On the third day of trial, the 
Smyths called Dr. Reckling to the witness stand.  During direct examination, they made no 
mention of the fact that Dr. Reckling had been a defendant, nor did they mention 
it at any time during the trial.  
During cross-examination of Dr. Reckling by Dr. Kaufman's counsel, 
however, the following exchange occurred:

 

Q.  But 
plaintiffs have not always been so willing to be supportive of your care in this 
case, have they?  In fact you were a 
defendant in this lawsuit once; is that correct?

 

A.  I 
was.

 

Q.  And 
in fact they alleged, through an expert witness, that you should not have had -- 
kept the patient on Cafergot, correct?  
That was one of their allegations?

 

A.  That 
is correct.

 

Q.  And 
they alleged that you should have made a referral to a vascular surgeon earlier 
than you did; is that correct?

 

A.  That allegation was made.

 

Q.  And they alleged that you should not have 
allowed the Cafergot to be in the orders in the hospital, they made that 
allegation?

 

A.  That is correct.

 

After Dr. Reckling's testimony, the trial court asked 
counsel to approach the bench and informed them the following question had been 
received from one of the jurors:  "Why is Dr. Reckling no longer a defendant in 
this case?"  The 
Smyths objected to the admission of evidence of their claims against Dr. 
Reckling.  The 
trial court overruled the objection, letting stand its prior ruling that Dr. 
Reckling's former status as a defendant was admissible.   

 

[¶23]   The next day, the trial court read the 
following instruction to the jury:

 

Wyoming law requires the jury to consider the conduct of 
those individuals, whether or not parties, who may have contributed to the 
damages sustained by plaintiff.  So you may be called upon to judge the conduct 
not only of Dr. Kaufman, Dr. Kellam, and Mrs. Smyth, but also Dr. Reckling and 
possibly others.  
How you do this will be explained at the close of the evidence by further 
instruction.

 

            
You have heard evidence that Dr. Reckling was, but no longer is, a 
defendant.  That 
evidence was admitted for a limited purpose -- to show that plaintiffs and not 
the defendant physicians, Drs. Kaufman and Kellam, were initially critical of 
Dr. Reckling's care.

 

            
Your task is difficult enough, and you must focus upon the conduct of 
those individuals who may have contributed to the Smyths' damages and not be 
concerned about why Dr. Reckling is no longer a party.  The reason that Dr. 
Reckling is no longer a defendant is not an issue for you to consider, and you 
should draw no inference from it concerning Dr. Reckling's medical care of Mrs. 
Smyth.

 

            
The fact that Dr. Reckling was joined as a defendant and now is no longer 
a party does not mean that his care was below acceptable standards.  That question must 
be resolved solely by reference to expert medical testimony which may be offered 
in the trial.

 

A copy of the instruction was provided to the jury at the 
close of the evidence as part of the jury instruction packet.  The Smyths objected 
to the instruction on the following basis:

 

[I]t directs the jury to make an inference.  And that is an 
inference that if we bring a party in, Your Honor, and settle them out for any 
purpose, whether it be $1, $100, or a million dollars, that they are now to 
infer from that they were critical and thereby make an assumption that he was 
negligent.

 

And under our pleading laws, our rule on pleadings, you're 
entitled to plead in the alternative.  You're entitled to bring parties in and 
dismiss them.  
In the absence of telling the jury that there was a settlement and why 
there was a settlement the jury should be not permitted to assume, to make 
inferences from the fact that parties were named and dismissed at any time.

 

The trial court overruled the objection and adhered to its 
earlier ruling.  
During closing argument, Dr. Kaufman's counsel reiterated his earlier 
statements concerning the Smyths' claims against Dr. Reckling.

 

[¶24]   With this factual background in mind, we 
turn to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing evidence that Dr. Reckling had been, but was no longer, a defendant in 
the Smyths' lawsuit.  
It is well established that evidence of settlement is not admissible to 
prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount.  W.R.E. 408; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 713 (Wyo. 
1993).  It is 
also well established, however, that, under Wyoming's comparative fault scheme, 
a jury is entitled to apportion the fault of all those whose acts proximately 
caused injury to the claimantparties and nonparties alike.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2001).   We must decide where on this continuum 
the admission of evidence of Dr. Reckling's former party status lies; that is, 
did it raise the inference of settlement such that it ought to have been 
excluded for the reasons underlying W.R.E. 408, or was it properly admissible 
under the comparative fault scheme as probative of any relevant fact such as 
bias or prejudice of a witness?

 

[¶25]   We consider first the applicability of 
W.R.E. 408 (emphasis added), which provides as follows:

 

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove 
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.  Evidence of conduct 
or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.  This rule does not 
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as 
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, 
or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

 

Thus, W.R.E. 408 prohibits evidence of the settlement of 
disputed claims for the purpose of proving liability.  

 

[¶26]   In Haderlie, 
this court addressed very nearly the same issue we are asked to decide in this 
case.  The 
plaintiff in that case originally named four defendants, two of whom settled 
prior to trial.  
866 P.2d  at 707.  The remaining defendants sought to introduce 
the pleadings and settlement agreements showing the plaintiff originally claimed 
others were negligent.  
With respect to the settlement agreements, this court quoted from 2 J. 
Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408[05] at 408 (1991):  "The almost 
unavoidable impact of the disclosure of such evidence is that the jury will 
consider the offer or agreement as evidence of a concession of liability.'"  866 P.2d  at 
713.  This court 
also said:  
"Because of the potential prejudice, when the issue is doubtful, the 
better practice is to exclude evidence of compromises or compromise 
offers.'"  Id. (quoting Bradbury v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 
1987)).  
Addressing the issue of the admissibility of the pleadings, this court 
quoted with approval Whatley v. Armstrong World 
Industries, Inc., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1988):  "[R]eliance on the 
pleadings was not proper because the pleadings provide little real evidence of 
the liability of the settling defendants, [and] they provide no evidence upon 
which a jury could determine the percentage or extent of liability.'"  Id. at 714.  Holding neither the settlement agreements nor 
the pleadings were admissible, we said:  "[T]he . . . attempts to 
introduce the pleadings into evidence were in reality an attempt to allude to 
the settlement agreements which were inadmissible.  The trial court 
properly refused admission of the settlement agreements and pleadings."  Id.  

 

[¶27]   To the extent Dr. Reckling's prior party 
status was introduced to prove his liability, the same result is mandated 
here.  Evidence 
that the Smyths initially claimed Dr. Reckling was negligent was not probative 
of his liability.  
It had no "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.  Like the pleadings in Haderlie, evidence that the Smyths initially brought a 
negligence claim against Dr. Reckling provided no real evidence of his liability 
and provided no evidence upon which a jury could determine the percentage or 
extent of his liability.  Haderlie, 866 P.2d  
at 714.  
Particularly in a medical malpractice case, where expert opinion 
testimony is required in order to prove the claim, Siebert v. Fowler, 637 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1981), the 
plaintiff's lay opinion that a doctor was negligent has no relevance.  We hold, therefore, 
that, to the extent the evidence was introduced to prove Dr. Reckling's 
liability, the trial court erred in admitting it.

 

[¶28]   While disallowing evidence of settlement 
to prove liability, W.R.E. 408 does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice.   Thus, evidence 
that Dr. Reckling had been but was no longer a defendant would have been 
admissible if offered to prove his testimony at trial was biased or 
prejudiced.2  However, from the testimony elicited from Dr. 
Reckling concerning the Smyths' claims against him, it does not appear the 
evidence was presented for that purpose.  Counsel limited his questions to the fact that 
Dr. Reckling had been a defendant and the Smyths claimed he should have 
discontinued the Cafergot and not allowed the drug to appear on the hospital 
orders.  These 
questions appear to address Dr. Reckling's liability, not bias or 
prejudice.  They 
were, therefore, improper, and the testimony they elicited was 
inadmissible.  
We hold, however, in light of the other evidence presented, the error in 
allowing the evidence was harmless.  W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.E. 103; W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 

[¶29]   Even when this court determines that the 
trial court erred in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we disregard 
errors which are harmless.  Rudy v. Bossard, 
997 P.2d 480, 483 (Wyo. 2000).  An error warrants reversal only when it is 
prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights.  Id.  For error to be regarded as harmful and 
reversible, there must be a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the 
error, the verdict might have been different.  TZ Land & Cattle 
Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1210 (Wyo. 1990).  Where the disputed 
evidence is a small part of the case, the trial is lengthy and complicated, and 
there is substantial evidence supporting the result, we are not inclined to find 
harmful error in the admission of evidence.  Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Wyo. 1984).  

 

[¶30]   The trial of this matter lasted ten 
days.  The jury 
heard the testimony of four lay witnesses, fourteen medical doctors, and two 
other expert witnesses.  From this testimony, there was substantial 
evidence from which the jury could conclude that neither Dr. Kaufman nor Dr. 
Kellam caused Mrs. Smyth's injuries. 

 

[¶31]   Dr. Kellam testified he was called in on 
Saturday, April 4, 1998, to perform an angiogram, assess the blood supply to 
Mrs. Smyth's leg, and report back to Dr. Reckling.   He testified 
he concluded from the angiogram that her symptoms were consistent with a blood 
clot or atherosclerosis and did not see anything suggesting vasospasms.  After reporting back 
to Dr. Reckling on Sunday, April 5, 1998, Dr. Kellam had no further involvement 
with Mrs. Smyth.  
Charles Seibert, M.D., the expert witness called on Dr. Kellam's behalf, 
testified he agreed with Dr. Kellam's diagnosis of atherosclerosis, did not see 
evidence of vasospasms on the angiogram, and believed Dr. Kellam met the 
standard of care for an interventional radiologist in his diagnosis and 
treatment of Mrs. Smyth.  

 

[¶32]   Dr. Kaufman testified he was called in 
by Dr. Reckling to see Mrs. Smyth on Monday, April 6, 1998, for the purpose of 
determining whether surgery could be done to restore circulation to her left 
leg.  After 
reviewing the angiograms, examining Mrs. Smyth, and consulting with Dr. Kellam, 
Dr. Kaufman concluded Mrs. Smyth was suffering from atherosclerosis and a blood 
clot.   He 
did not see vasospasms on the angiogram.  He further concluded that nothing could be 
done surgically to resolve Mrs. Smyth's problem and amputation might be 
necessary.  He 
discussed his findings with Dr. Reckling and had no further involvement with 
Mrs. Smyth.  The 
testimony from Dr. Kaufman and his expert was that, by the time he was 
consulted, it was too late to save Mrs. Smyth's leg.  The pathologist 
testified the pathology report confirmed the limb was dead on April 6, 
1998.  James 
Anderson, M.D., the expert witness called on Dr. Kaufman's behalf, testified 
that, in his opinion, Dr. Kaufman's treatment and diagnosis met the standard of 
care for vascular surgeons.

 

[¶33]   In addition to this testimony, there was 
evidence that Mrs. Smyth was in poor health, had a complex medical history, was 
taking numerous medications, had been taking Cafergot for approximately twenty 
years, had been a heavy smoker for many years, was inactive, and had undergone 
two recent left leg surgeries leaving her even more inactive.  There was testimony 
that, one week before the April 1998 hospital admission, Mrs. Smyth was taken to 
the emergency room because of hallucinations possibly associated with taking 
more Cafergot than the recommended dosage.  The medical records also reflect that, prior 
to her discharge on that occasion, her physician discontinued several of her 
medications, including Cafergot.  The medical records further reflect she did 
not have Cafergot again until it was administered to her in the hospital on 
April 7, 1998.  
A medical toxicologist testified the vasospactic effects of Cafergot 
typically begin to resolve in one to three days after the patient stops taking 
the drug, meaning blood flow to her left leg should have returned prior to the 
April admission if Cafergot was the cause.  Expert testimony indicated the leading cause 
of ischemic legs and limb loss is smoking.  There also was evidence that knee surgery can 
cause blood clots to form and block blood supply to the lower leg.  There also was 
properly admitted deposition testimony from Dr. Alter, as well as live testimony 
from other expert witnesses, that Dr. Reckling's treatment of Mrs. Smyth fell 
below the standard of care.  

 

[¶34]  A thorough review of the record leads to the 
conclusion that substantial evidence was presented from which the jury could 
reasonably conclude factors other than any acts or omissions of Drs. Kaufman or 
Kellam caused Mrs. Smyth's injuries.  We, therefore, are unable to conclude a 
reasonable probability existed that the verdict might have been different in the 
absence of evidence that Dr. Reckling was sued.  Given the substantial evidence of other likely 
causes, including properly admitted expert testimony that Dr. Reckling was 
negligent in his treatment of Mrs. Smyth, we simply see no connection between 
the erroneously admitted evidence and the jury's finding of no causation by Drs. 
Kaufman and Kellam.  
We conclude, therefore, that admission of the evidence was harmless.       

 

[¶35]   In reaching this conclusion, we also 
note the trial court's instruction to the jury adequately apprised the jurors of 
their responsibility under Wyoming law to consider the fault of all individuals 
whose conduct contributed to Mrs. Smyth's injuriesincluding Dr. Reckling, of 
the limited purpose for which the evidence that he had been but was no longer a 
defendant was admitted, and that they should not concern themselves with or draw 
any inferences from the fact that he was no longer a defendant.  The instruction also 
informed the jury that the fact that Dr. Reckling was a defendant did not mean 
his care was below acceptable standards.  We assume the jury followed the court's 
corrective instruction.  Hursh Agency, Inc. v. 
Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27, 36 (Wyo. 1983). 

 

[¶36]   The Smyths also claim the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Kaufman to present deposition testimony of 
Dr. Alter, the expert witness they retained to testify that Dr. Reckling 
breached the standard of care, while precluding them from reading into the 
record a portion of the expert designation upon which he relied for part of his 
testimony.  The 
expert designation stated in pertinent part as follows:

 

            
(3)  Dr. Reckling was reasonable in relying on the opinions of 
the interventional radiologist, Dr. Kellam and the physician called for a 
vascular consult, Dr. Kaufman, in evaluating the etiology of symptoms and 
designing a treatment plan for Ms. Smyth.  If there was doubt about the ability to 
diagnose the patient's source of symptoms from angiography, it was incumbent on 
Drs. Kellam and/or Dr. Kaufman to suggest referral to another facility for 
definitive diagnosis before irreversible amputation was performed.

 

During the deposition of Dr. Alter, a copy of the 
designation was marked for identification as an exhibit but was retained by the 
Smyths' counsel.  
It was not read into the record or made part of the deposition 
transcript.  Dr. 
Alter was questioned about the designation during the deposition as follows:

 

Q.  Your third opinion is about Dr. Reckling 
relying upon Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman, which seems fairly straightforward to 
me.

 

A.  You are referring to --

 

Q.  To No. 3.

 

A.  In?

 

Q.  In your designation.

 

A.  In comments or conclusions?

 

Q.  In your designations.

 

A.  I'm sorry.  Go ahead.

 

Q.  It refers to Dr. Reckling relying upon the 
opinions of Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman.  Is that opinion as straightforward as it 
appeared in the designation?

 

A.  May I read the designation?

 

Q.  Sure.

 

A.  That's correct.

 

[¶37]   Prior to trial, the Smyths moved to have 
the deposition of Dr. Alter excluded or, in the alternative, to allow only those 
portions read which were within their expert designation.  At the pretrial 
conference, the trial court ruled that Dr. Alter's deposition could be read by 
the defense.  
During trial, the Smyths filed a motion in part asking the trial court to 
allow the expert designation read and relied upon by Dr. Alter during his 
deposition to be read to the jury when the deposition was read.  The trial court 
ruled that they would not be allowed to "supplement sworn testimony [with] 
unsworn testimony."

 

[¶38]   With regard to exhibits used during the 
deposition of a witness, W.R.C.P. 30(f)(1) (emphasis added) provides in relevant 
part:

 

Documents and things produced for inspection during the 
examination of the witness shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for 
identification and annexed to the deposition . . . except that if the person 
producing the materials desires to retain them the 
person may:  
(A) offer copies to be marked for identification and annexed to the 
deposition and to serve thereafter as originals . . . ; or (B) offer the originals to be marked for identification, after giving to each 
party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the materials may then be used in the same 
manner as if annexed to the deposition.  

 

Pursuant to this rule, the fact that the exhibit was not 
attached to the deposition is not grounds for excluding it at trial.  Rather, the Smyths' 
counsel was entitled to retain the original expert designation after having it 
marked for identification and giving defense counsel an opportunity to inspect 
it.  It could 
then be used in the same manner as any other exhibit annexed to the 
deposition.  

 

[¶39]   Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 32(a), any part or 
all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the 
rules of evidence, may be used at trial in accordance 
with specified criteria.  The expert designation the Smyths sought to 
have read to the jury was prepared by their attorney, not by Dr. Alter.  It was a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  As such, it was 
inadmissible hearsay and was properly excluded.  W.R.E. 801(c).  Moreover, even assuming reading of the 
designation was improperly denied, there were other options available to the 
Smyths to supplement or refute Dr. Alter's deposition testimony of which they 
chose not to avail themselves.  Presumably, since Dr. Alter was their expert, 
they could have arranged for him to appear at the trial and had him read or 
testify to his designated opinions in person, including his opinion that Dr. 
Reckling was entitled to rely on the opinions of Drs. Kaufman and Kellam.  Under these 
circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the Smyths' 
request to read the designation into the record.  In reaching this result, we note also that 
there was testimony from expert witnesses other than Dr. Alter concerning Dr. 
Reckling's negligence.  
In light of this testimony and all the evidence presented, we are not 
convinced the trial court's ruling concerning the designation had any real 
effect on the outcome.        

 

C.        Motion for 
a New Trial

 

[¶40]   The events leading up to the Smyths' 
motion for a new trial began on the second day of jury deliberations when the 
jury foreman notified the bailiff that the jury was unable to come to a 
consensus on the standard of care issue.3   Upon learning 
the jury was deadlocked, the trial court directed the bailiff to contact trial 
counsel and ask them to be present in the courtroom at two o'clock that 
afternoon for a further instruction to the jury.  It appears from the record that the bailiff 
informed the jurors that the trial court would talk with them at two 
o'clock.  When 
counsel arrived just before two o'clock, the trial court advised them it had 
just received the following note written by the jury foreperson:

 

While we unanimously agree that the two defendants were not 
responsible for the direct cause of injury, we cannot come to a consensus on the 
standard of care issue (Question #1).  Repeatedly we come to a 10/4 vote.  I am at a point that 
I don't know what to do to further our deliberations in a constructive 
fashion.

 

The trial court discussed the note with trial counsel and 
then instructed the jury as follows:  "If the jury has reached a unanimous vote on 
Question No. 2, . . . then answer only that question, sign the 
verdict form, and report to the bailiff."  During the discussion and before instructing 
the jury, the trial court asked for input from the Smyths.  Although they 
indicated the jury's note was inconsistent, they also stated they had "no 
problem" with the trial court's proposed response and told the court to "just do 
it."  They made 
no objection, nor did they suggest some other response or that the proposed 
response was improper.4 Ten minutes later, the jury returned the 
following verdict:

 

Verdict

 

            
We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled cause, do 
find by a preponderance of the evidence as follows:

 

1.  Do you find that any of the physicians below 
failed to meet the standard of care?

 

Stephen Kaufman, M.D.       Yes                  
 No 
                 

Michael Kellam, M.D.           
Yes                  
 No 
                 

 

If you answer "No" for both Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Kellam, then 
sign the verdict and report to the bailiff.  If you answer "Yes" for either Dr. Kaufman or 
Dr. Kellam, then answer Question Number 2.

 

2.  Did such failure amount to a direct cause of 
injury to Elizabeth Smyth?

 

Stephen Kaufman, M.D.       Yes                No         X         

Michael Kellam, M.D.          
Yes                No          
X         

 

If you have answered "No" for both Dr. Kaufman and Dr. 
Kellam, then sign the verdict form and report to the bailiff.  If you answered 
"Yes" as to either Dr. Kaufman or Dr. Kellam, then proceed to Question Number 
3.

 

The jury foreperson left the remaining paragraphs blank and 
signed and dated the verdict form.      

 

[¶41]   Before reconvening the jury, the trial 
court reviewed the completed verdict form with counsel.  Upon reading the 
verdict, the Smyths' counsel's only comment was:  "Your Honor, that's a defense verdict."  The trial court then 
called the jury back into the courtroom and had the clerk of court read the 
verdict and poll the jury.  Prior to polling the jury, the trial court 
asked the jurors the following question:  "Do you understand that by answering the 
Question No. 2 as you did that you have ruled in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiff?"  The Smyths entered no objection to the 
question posed by the trial court.  As they were polled, each juror responded, 
"yes."  When the 
polling was complete, the trial court excused the jury and adjourned the 
proceedings.  At 
no time during the proceedings did the Smyths voice any objection to or seek 
clarification of the jury verdict.  

 

[¶42]   After the verdict, the Smyths filed a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 in which they asserted they were 
entitled to a new trial based upon irregularity in the proceedings which, they 
contended, led to juror confusion and denial of a fair trial.   With their 
motion, they filed the affidavits of four jurors and an e-mail message from the 
juror foreperson.  
Essentially, the Smyths claimed the verdict was not truly unanimous 
because four jurors compromised on the causation question believing the result 
would be a hung jury since they did not reach a verdict on the standard of care 
question.   
The Smyths contended that, by instructing the jury to answer only the 
causation question, the trial court improperly rewrote the verdict form, which 
as written required the jury to answer Question No. 1 on the standard of care 
before answering Question No. 2 on causation.  Despite the fact that the four jurors 
responded affirmatively to the trial court's question as to whether they 
understood they had found for the defendants by answering Question No. 2 "no," 
the Smyths asserted the jurors did not understand that to be the effect of their 
verdict.  After 
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial.

 

[¶43]   The Smyths basically present the same 
argument to this court as they presented below, to no avail.  This court has 
consistently imposed a duty upon counsel to object to any claimed inconsistency 
or mistake in the verdict before the jury is dismissed.  Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini, 838 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Wyo. 
1992).  Failure 
to object to any substantive defect in the verdict when it is returned to the 
trial court is a waiver of the right to do so.  Goggins v. Harwood, 
704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo. 1985).  In the present case, before a final verdict 
was entered, the Smyths' counsel recognized a problem with the jury's unanimous 
vote on causation and inability to reach agreement on the standard of care.  Yet they made no 
objection to the trial court's proposed instruction and offered no alternative 
suggestions for resolving the inconsistency.  Instead, counsel indicated they had no problem 
with the trial court's proposed instruction and urged the trial court to "just 
do it."  When 
the trial court "did it" and the jury returned its final verdict and was polled, 
counsel still entered no objection and made no effort at all to obtain 
clarification despite claiming, in the post trial motions, they observed one 
juror shaking his head and mouthing the word "no" at the same time he answered 
the trial court's question "yes."  Counsels' lack of assertion of any problem 
with the verdict before the jury was dismissed had the effect of closing the 
book.  If the 
Smyths' counsel believed the verdict was inconsistent, unclear, or in any way 
improper at the time it was rendered, they were charged with the duty of raising 
the issue at the trial level before the jury was discharged.  Big-O Tires, 838 P.2d  at 1175-76.  They did not do so 
then and cannot do so now.  Thunder Hawk By and 
Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
891 P.2d 773, 784 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶44]   We turn to the claim that juror 
confusion became apparent after the trial when the jurors communicated by e-mail 
with the Smyths' counsel and, for that reason, counsel were not in a position to 
object before the jury was dismissed.  Upon receiving the e-mails, the Smyths' 
counsel obtained affidavits from four of the jurors, which they attached to the 
motion for a new trial.  The relevant portion of each affidavit 
stated:

 

5.  Prior to the Judge meeting with us at 2:00 pm, 
the Jury still could not come to an agreement regarding the standard of care in 
question no. 1 of the verdict form.  I felt the jury was "hung" because the jury 
could not agree to question no. 1.

 

6.  The verdict form provided to us required that 
we answer question no. 1 before we could move on to question no. 2.

 

7.  Believing that it made no difference because 
the jury was deadlocked, and relying upon the form of the verdict, I compromised 
with other jurors and agreed to vote in favor of the defendants regarding 
causation in question no. 2 of the verdict.

 

8.  I would never have agreed to a compromise vote 
on question no. 2 if I had been informed by the Court that to do so would not 
result in a hung jury.

 

The affidavits go on to make various other assertions 
concerning the jurors' mental processes as the verdict was read and the jury was 
polled.

 

[¶45]   W.R.E. 606(b) provides as follows:

 

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict 
. . ., a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon 
his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning his mental processes 
in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be 
received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.

 

W.R.E. 606(b) could not be any clearer.  The only time a 
juror affidavit is appropriate is when extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to a juror's attention or outside influence was brought to 
bear upon a juror.  
There is no evidence here of either.  Instead, the affidavits contain averments 
concerning matters occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations, the 
effect of the trial court's instruction on the verdict, and the jurors' mental 
processes.  The 
affidavits were, therefore, improper.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶46]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling on peremptory challenges or denying the Smyths' motion for 
a new trial.  
The admission of evidence that Dr. Reckling had been but was no longer a 
party was improper; however, the record does not support a finding of a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the 
improper evidence not been admitted.
 

[¶47]   Affirmed.

 

  
            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting, with whom LEHMAN, Justice, joins.

 

[¶48]   I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's resolution of the second issue.  I would also dissent from the resolution of 
the third issue, had the appellants not waived that issue in the district 
court.1  I would reverse.

 

[¶49]   This case is a perfect example of our 
judicial system's stated reverence for, but frequent distrust of, 
decision-making by juries.  The second issue, in simple terms, is whether 
the district court abused its discretion in deciding how much of the truth to 
tell the jury about Dr. Reckling.  The scenario is not complicated.  The appellants sued 
three doctors, one of whom settled before trial.  If the jury were entitled to the whole truth, 
that would be it.  
However, because we want to encourage settlements, and because 
settlements may be irrelevant to liability, W.R.E. 408 forbids introduction of 
evidence of a settlement to prove the liability of the settling defendant.  Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 713 (Wyo. 
1993).  
If that is going to be the law, we should enforce it, rather than 
allowing one side to make contrary hints to the jury.  The appellee 
doctors' meager plea that "it ain't fair" should not have outweighed the 
law.

 

[¶50]   I would hold that it was not harmless 
error when the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Kaufman's 
counsel to state in opening that "when [the appellants] filed this lawsuit 
against Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman they also filed a lawsuit against Dr. 
Reckling, the orthopedic surgeon; and they sued Dr. Reckling."  This error was 
compounded when, in answering the jury's question, the district court instructed 
it, in part, as follows:  "You have heard evidence that Dr. Reckling 
was, but no longer is, a defendant.  That evidence was admitted for a limited 
purpose  to show that plaintiffs and not the defendant physicians, Drs. Kaufman 
and Kellam, were initially critical of Dr. Reckling's care."  I agree with the 
majority that this situation is sufficiently similar to that in Haderlie as to be indistinguishable for the purpose of 
applying the law.  
Under Haderlie, neither the settlement 
agreements nor the pleadings were admissible.  Id. at 714.  Neither are they 
here.  And, as 
in Haderlie, Dr. Kaufman's attorney's opening 
statement was nothing more than a poorly disguised attempt to tell the jury that 
the real culprit had settled out.  Id.

 

[¶51]   The question of who first pointed the 
finger of liability at Dr. Recklingthe appellants or the other appellee 
doctorswas simply not relevant to any issue of fact to be determined by the 
jury.  I might 
be able to agree with the majority that the error in allowing the appellee 
doctors to pursue this argument was harmless had it not led directly to 
admission of Dr. Alter's deposition testimony, the only purpose of which was to 
prove Dr. Reckling's liability.  The final effect of the erroneous ruling was 
to allow the jury to infer that Dr. Reckling had settled because he was 
liable.2  That is exactly the inference that we are 
trying to avoid by disallowing evidence of pleadings and settlements.

 

[¶52]   Cases like the present one should give 
us pause to reconsider what we do and do not tell juries.  We should recognize 
that jurors are not stupid, and when they are given only part of the truth, they 
are likely to ask questions.3  Not surprisingly, the jurors in the instant 
case wanted to know why Dr. Reckling was no longer a defendant.4  This problem could have been avoided had the 
judge given, at the outset of the trial, a pattern jury instruction along the 
lines of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), which defines 
"actor" to include anyone "whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause of 
the death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a party to the 
litigation[.]"  
Had such an instruction been given, and had the irrelevant evidence about 
the initial complaint not been admitted, any jury question about Dr. Reckling's 
status could have been answered with a simple "it does not matter so do not 
consider it."  
An alternative approach would be to advise the jury outright that Dr. 
Reckling had settled, but that a settlement may not be based on liability, and 
therefore may not be considered by the jury for any reason.  Without debating the 
relative merits of either approach, it does seem safe to say that either is 
preferable to what happened in the present case.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Defense counsel's statement 
that the Smyths "flip-flopped" is misleading.  In their original complaint, the Smyths 
alleged all three physiciansDrs. Kaufman, Kellam, and Recklingwere negligent, 
as they were entitled to do under our liberal pleading rules.  W.R.C.P. 8; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 714 (Wyo. 1993). 
The implication that they initially "pointed the finger at" Dr. Reckling and 
now, having settled with him, were blaming Drs. Kaufman and Kellam is not 
accurate.  
However, defense counsel chose his words more carefully in front of the 
jury, and, therefore, his comments to the trial court out of the jury's hearing 
are not grounds for reversal.   

  

2If the testimony was 
presented to prove bias or prejudice, the trial court properly should have 
allowed the Smyths to present evidence on redirect that Dr. Reckling had 
settled.  So 
long as the evidence is not offered to prove liability, a trial court's decision 
to allow evidence of settlement to prevent juror confusion is not an abuse of 
discretion.  Belton v. Fibreboard Corporation, 724 F.2d 500, 505 
(5th 
Cir. 1984). 

3The trial court received 
earlier communications from the jury as well.  The previous afternoon, not long after 
beginning deliberations, the jury sent out a note requesting a drug book.  The trial court, 
without consulting counsel, instructed the bailiff to inform the jury the 
evidence consisted of the testimony and the exhibits and it would not be allowed 
to consider anything not introduced as evidence.  A short time later, the jury requested Dr. 
Kaufman's and Dr. Kellam's depositions.  This time the trial court called counsel in 
and, after consulting with them, advised the jurors they must rely on their own 
recollections.  
Later that evening, the jurors advised the bailiff that they could not 
reach a unanimous decision and wanted to go home for the night and come back in 
the morning.  
The trial court allowed them to go home; they began deliberations again 
the next morning; and, at approximately 11:30 a.m., the foreperson informed the 
court they could not reach an agreement on the standard of care issue.  

4The Smyths argue error 
occurred when the trial court failed to communicate to counsel that the jury was 
deadlocked earlier that morning and instead told the bailiff to inform the 
jurors that the court would talk to them at two o'clock and to have counsel 
present in the courtroom at that time.  The Smyths claim that, if they had been 
informed of the morning deadlock, they would never have agreed to the trial 
court's proposed instruction.  The record demonstrates the Smyths' counsel 
were informed at two o'clock in the afternoon that the jury was deadlocked.  With that knowledge, 
they agreed to the proposed instruction.  We are unable to see how the time lapse caused 
counsel to respond differently than they would have had the court met with them 
and proposed the instruction two and a half hours earlier.    

 

Footnotes for the 
Dissent

 

1The jury could not agree to 
find any "failure," but then found "such failure" not to have caused injury to 
the appellants.  
That, of course, is a logical inconsistency, and it should have been more 
thoroughly explored before the jury was excused.  We ask precise questions on verdicts because 
precise answers are required.

2There is the additional 
inference, of course, that Drs. Kaufman and Kellam did not settle because they were not negligent.  If defendants are 
allowed to pursue such arguments, the inclination of plaintiffs to settle with 
fewer than all defendants will certainly be reduced, and the public policy 
favoring settlement of civil disputes will be violated.

3Or worse, they may fill in 
the blanks with their own suppositions.

4Needless to say, they would 
not have had to ask that question had they not been told that he had once been a 
defendant.