Title: Smith v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jason SMITH v. STATE of Arkansas

96-1180                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 2, 1997


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court not required to give equal
     weight to statutory factors. -- In making its determination on a
     juvenile-transfer matter, the trial court is not required to
     give equal weight to each of the three statutory factors set
     forth at Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1995).

2.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- decision to try juvenile as adult must
     be supported by clear and convincing evidence. -- If the trial court
     decides to try a juvenile as an adult, its decision must be
     supported by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial
     court's decision will not be overturned unless it is clearly
     erroneous.

3.   Juveniles -- age can be critical factor in determining whether
     rehabilitative services are available. -- The age of the juvenile can
     be a critical factor in determining whether rehabilitative
     services are available at the juvenile level.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court not clearly erroneous in
     denying transfer to juvenile court. -- Where appellant was nineteen
     years old, and the juvenile services available to him were
     virtually nonexistent, and where the charging information,
     coupled with a detective's description of the crimes,
     confirmed that the crimes, although property crimes, were
     intrusive to the victims and serious, the supreme court
     concluded that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
     denying transfer to juvenile court.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Marion Humphrey, Judge;
affirmed.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by:  C. Renae Ford,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Gil Dudley, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Jason Carlyle Smith appeals the trial court's denial
of his motion to transfer multiple charges brought against him to
juvenile court.  We agree with the trial court's decision and
affirm.
     On March 6, 1996, the State charged Smith, Michael Anthony
McCurley, and Timothy Lee Holt with 45 counts that stemmed from a
rash of residential burglaries in Pulaski County.  The counts
against Smith included seventeen charges of residential burglary,
seventeen charges of theft for assorted values, and one charge of
criminal attempt to commit burglary.  A second information was
later filed to add one charge against Smith for theft by receiving.
     On May 7, 1996, a hearing on the motion to transfer the case
was held.  Detective Jim Potter of the Pulaski County Sheriff's
Department testified for the State.  He described a series of
residential burglaries in one particular area of the Pulaski County
where typically a door would be kicked in and pillowcases would be
used to carry items out of the residence.  Items stolen included
television sets, V.C.R.'s, jewelry, stereos, and weapons. 
Detective Potter told the trial court that the Sheriff's Department
was alerted and deputies were dispatched to an address where Smith
and McCurley were caught prior to entering a residence.  He further
testified that after Smith was read his Miranda rights, he was
cooperative.  Smith admitted to the officers that he had committed
twelve burglaries and admitted that the value of the property taken
was $46,603.  Detective Potter added that Smith was born on May 17,
1978, making him almost age 18 at the time of the hearing.  The
other two defendants were ages 20 and 24.  Only a small amount of
the property stolen had been recovered.
     The defense called two of Smith's aunts as witnesses.  Shirley
Dean Austin, Smith's great aunt, testified that Smith had been
working on his GED while in detention and was also attending Bible
Study.  She stated that Smith could live with her because they had
always gotten along and had never had problems.  She added that she
would give him transportation to work and that there was a school
nearby where he could continue his GED studies.  She further
announced that she could enforce any restrictions placed on him.
     Sharon Kaye Goodman, Smith's aunt, testified that she wanted
Smith to come live with her.  She also stated that she could
supervise him and that she had never had any problem in getting him
to follow her demands.  Ms. Goodman added that Smith's father
wanted nothing to do with him and that his mother lived in Odessa,
Texas and had sent him to Arkansas to live.
     Smith's counsel argued to the trial court that there was no
evidence of violence and no showing of a repetitive pattern of
adjudicated offenses which would lead to a conclusion that Smith
could not be rehabilitated.  She specifically pointed to Smith's
family support in Arkansas, despite the fact that his parents had
abandoned their responsibility.
     The trial court denied the transfer motion and, in doing so,
stated:
          All right.  The Court, more than anything else, is
     troubled by the number of burglaries and the amount -- --
     well, the value of the merchandise.  And I do recall our
     having a case fairly similar to this some time ago.  That
     individual was sent to juvenile court but, as I recall,
     there was a distinguishing point being that he had
     actually worked to help the officers retrieve most of the
     merchandise.  Now, in this case -- -- and I asked
     specifically that question about whether or not most of
     the merchandise was retrieved.  It does not appear that
     that is the case.
                              ....
          And that's one thing that concerns the Court,
     amongst other things.  I think that under nine twenty-
     seven three eighteen a person can look at the character
     traits and mental maturity as being somehow lacking here
     in a situation where so many burglaries are committed and
     so much is taken.  And I realize that there is some
     problems with perhaps his absence of parental guidance
     here.  But I'm going to deny the motion to transfer.
     Smith abstracts the trial court's ruling from the bench which
presents the court's reasons for denying the motion to transfer. 
He does not abstract two one-sentence orders denying two motions to
transfer.  The State does not raise a violation of Supreme Court
Rule 4-2.  Under these circumstances, we do not deem the abstract
to be flagrantly deficient.
     Smith first complains that the trial court erred in denying
his motion.  In making its decision, the trial court considered the
following statutory factors:
          (1)  The seriousness of the offense, and whether
     violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission
     of the offense;
          (2)  Whether the offense is part of a repetitive
     pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts;
          (3)  The prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318 (e) (Supp. 1995).  In making its
determination, the trial court is not required to give equal weight
to each of these factors.  Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337
(1996); Sebastian v. State, 318 Ark. 494,