Title: MARTIN SLOBIN V HENRY FORD HEALTH CARE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2003  
WILLIAM SLOBIN, Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE 
OF MARTIN SLOBIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant,  
v 
No. 122063  
HENRY FORD HEALTH CARE,  
Defendant-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
A law firm representing plaintiff1 in a legal matter  
requested a copy of his medical records held by defendant.  
The company under contract with defendant to copy and send the  
records charged the law firm $44.26 for twenty-two pages.  
Plaintiff filed this action alleging that the charge was  
unduly high and in violation of several legal principles.  The  
1 Plaintiff Martin Slobin died on December 6, 2000, and 
William Slobin, personal representative of the decedent’s 
estate, was thereafter substituted as plaintiff.  In this  
opinion, “plaintiff” refers to Martin Slobin.  
Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff could pursue his  
case on the basis of two of these principles, one under the  
Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq.,  
the second by theory of civil conspiracy under the MCPA. We  
conclude that the law firm’s request for copies was not  
subject to the MCPA and reverse that portion of the Court of  
Appeals decision accordingly.  
I  
Plaintiff was injured in a slip-and-fall incident at a  
shopping center in 1996 and retained the law firm of Goren &  
Goren to represent him in connection with his injury.  The law  
firm requested plaintiff’s medical records from defendant’s  
Fairlane Clinic for use in the legal pursuit of the injury  
claim.  In response to the request for the medical records,  
the law firm received a twenty-two-page compilation and an  
itemized invoice for $44.26.  
The medical records were copied and sent to the law firm  
by Smart Corporation (Smart), which had entered into a  
contract with defendant to respond to patient and other entity  
requests for copies of medical records. Under the contract,  
defendant 
collected 
the requested records and provided them to  
Smart for copying and mailing to the requesting party.  All  
fees received in connection with the copying were retained by  
Smart, with the exception of a $7 retrieval fee to defendant.  
The invoice presented to Goren & Goren contained this $7  
2  
retrieval fee, as well as a flat $15 charge for the first five  
pages of copied records, an $0.85 fee for each additional  
page, a $5.30 fee for shipping and handling, and sales tax.2  
The law firm paid the invoice, but subsequently filed this  
action on behalf of plaintiff, claiming the charges submitted  
by Smart were unduly high and therefore in violation of the  
law.  
Plaintiff in his complaint alleged that defendant, by  
contracting with Smart, (1) violated its common-law duty to  
provide copies of medical records at a reasonable cost, (2)  
violated the MCPA by charging a consumer price grossly in  
excess of similar copying rates, (3) breached its fiduciary  
duty to plaintiff by permitting Smart to charge him more than  
the marginal costs of copying records, and (4) tortiously  
acted in concert with Smart to require patients to pay  
unreasonably high fees for copies of their medical records.  
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary disposition, adding the  
contention 
that 
defendant’s contract with Smart amounted to an  
illegal subsidy by allowing Smart to recoup losses it accrued  
by providing free copies to select requesting entities, such  
as other health-care providers and government agencies.  
2 
 The record indicates that the fee charged by Smart 
varied on the basis of who made the request.  For example, 
doctors and hospitals were not charged for copies of medical 
records requested for the purpose of continuing patient care. 
Individual patients ordering their own records were charged a 
discounted rate. Law firms and insurance companies ordering 
medical records were charged at the higher rate being 
challenged in this case.  
3  
Defendant filed its own motion for summary disposition,  
not only responding to plaintiff’s arguments, but also  
contending that the Public Health Code provided the exclusive  
remedy for challenging a hospital’s copying charges.  The  
circuit 
court 
denied 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
and 
granted  
defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).  
Plaintiff appealed by right to the Court of Appeals. In  
a split decision, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant  
of summary disposition for defendant in all but two respects.3  
A majority of the Court concluded that plaintiff could  
maintain his claim under the MCPA, because the request for  
copies was subject to the act and reasonable minds could  
differ on whether the charge for the copies of plaintiff’s  
medical records was grossly excessive.  The majority also held  
that 
plaintiff 
could 
maintain 
his 
concert-of-action, 
or 
civil­
conspiracy, claim, limited to the extent it rested on the  
alleged MCPA violation.  We limit our analysis to the issue  
whether the request for medical records in this case was  
subject to the MCPA.  
II  
The MCPA provides protection to Michigan’s consumers by  
prohibiting various methods, acts, and practices in trade or  
3 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 9, 2002 
(Docket No. 216196).  Each judge on the panel wrote a separate  
opinion.  
4  
commerce.  MCL 445.903(1) provides a lengthy list of “unfair,  
unconscionable, or deceptive” conduct for which remedies are  
available under the act.  The prohibited conduct claimed by  
plaintiff is the following:  
(z) Charging the consumer a price that is 
grossly in excess of the price at which similar 
property or services are sold.  
Such improper charging is only unlawful under the act,  
however, “in the conduct of trade or commerce” as defined in  
the act.  MCL 445.902(d) defines the term in relevant part as 
follows: 
“Trade or commerce” means the conduct of a 
business providing goods, property, or service 
primarily for personal, family, or household  
purposes . . . .  
Defendant argues that the law firm’s request for  
plaintiff’s medical records in this case did not satisfy the  
requirement of being primarily for “personal, family, or  
household purposes,” and that the MCPA was therefore not  
applicable to the copying charges at issue in this case.  The  
Court of Appeals lead opinion did not directly address this  
question.
 The dissenting judge focused on it, however,  
contending that plaintiff’s MCPA claim failed as a matter of  
law because obtaining medical records for the purpose of  
litigation does not satisfy the definition of “trade or  
commerce” found in the act.  We agree because obtaining  
medical records for the purpose of litigation is not primarily  
for personal, family, or household use.  
5  
  
This 
is 
consistent with several Court of Appeals opinions  
that held that the MPCA applies only to purchases by consumers  
and does not apply to purchases that are primarily for  
business purposes.  For example, in Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236  
Mich App 261, 600 NW2d 384 (1999), the plaintiff purchased a  
truck for use in his business and alleged that a booklet that  
defendant had placed in new cars was misleading.  The Court  
noted that, although plaintiff used the truck in part for  
personal needs, he had testified that eighty percent of the  
miles he put on the truck were attributable to business  
driving.
 The Court therefore concluded that summary  
disposition 
was 
appropriate 
on 
plaintiff’s 
MCPA 
claim, 
holding  
that “if an item is purchased primarily for business or  
commercial rather than personal purposes, the MCPA does not  
supply protection.” Id. at 273.  
Likewise, in Jackson Co Hog Producers v Consumers Power  
Co, 234 Mich App 72; 592 NW2d 112 (1999), the claim was lost  
hog production from alleged “stray voltage.” The Court held  
that “the definition of ‘trade or commerce’ renders the MCPA  
inapplicable to the transaction . . . where plaintiffs  
purchased 
electricity 
from 
defendant 
primarily 
for 
the 
purpose  
of operating their business rather than ‘primarily for  
personal, family, or household purposes.’” Id. at 84. These  
cases reflect a correct understanding of the scope and purpose  
of the MCPA.  
In this case, we have precisely the business or  
6  
commercial purpose that is outside the express contemplation  
of the MCPA.  The law firm here did not act as a mere conduit  
or intermediary, procuring the medical records in order to  
pass them along for plaintiff’s “personal, family or  
household”
 use. 
Rather, the medical records were sought  
principally so that the law firm itself could engage in its  
own business or commercial enterprise, namely, the evaluation  
and pursuit of legal avenues to procure financial rewards and  
other relief for its client.  While there will sometimes be a  
fine line between activities within the scope of the MCPA and  
those beyond its coverage, we believe that the activities in  
question here are too indirectly related to plaintiff’s  
“personal, family, or household” use to fall within the act.  
III  
We hold that a claim for damages based upon a law firm’s  
request for the medical records of a client it is representing  
in litigation cannot be sustained under the MCPA.  Such a  
claim fails as a matter of law because obtaining medical  
records for the purpose of litigation is not “primarily for  
personal, family, or household use,” as required by the act.  
Because plaintiff’s claim cannot be sustained under the MCPA  
as a matter of law, this Court need not address defendant’s  
remaining arguments on appeal.  
We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and reinstate the order of the circuit court.  The Court of  
Appeals erred, for the reasons stated above, in permitting  
7  
plaintiff to go forward with his MCPA and accompanying  
concert-of-action claims.  The decision of the Court of  
Appeals is otherwise affirmed.  Plaintiff’s application for  
leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied.4  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
4 
 The motion by the Auto Club Insurance Association to 
file a brief amicus curiae is granted.  
8  
 
   
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WILLIAM SLOBIN, personal
representative of the estate of
MARTIN SLOBIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122063 
HENRY FORD HEALTH CARE, 
Defendant-Appellant
Cross-Appellee. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
plaintiff's medical records were ordered for a nonpersonal  
purpose.  Though the records were acquired by plaintiff's  
attorneys, this alone should not preclude the application of  
the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et  
seq.  
The 
attorney-client 
relationship 
is 
generally 
governed 
by  
agency principles.  Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 75; 312  
NW2d 585 (1981) ("Attorneys are the agents who provide the  
necessary expertise for clients who wish to litigate their  
rightful claims.") (Opinion of Blair Moody, Jr., J.). Here,  
 
 
Goren & Goren, P.C., sought plaintiff's medical records while  
acting in its representative capacity and with plaintiff's  
consent.  Under agency theory, the request by the law firm to  
defendant is treated as having been made by plaintiff to  
defendant.1  
Plaintiff, through his attorney-agent, requested the  
medical records for an evaluation of his injuries in  
connection with a slip-and-fall lawsuit against a shopping  
center.  Through this lawsuit, plaintiff sought to restore  
himself to his preinjury status.  Plaintiff did not bring the  
lawsuit as part of a commercial dispute.  Rather he brought it  
to recover for injury to his person. I would hold that this  
request was personal in nature, falling within the purview of  
the MCPA.  
Accordingly, I agree with Judges White and Wilder of the  
Court of Appeals, and I would remand the case to the trial  
court for consideration of the alleged MCPA violation.  
Marilyn Kelly  
1  1 Restatement Agency 2d (1958), ch 6, § 147, p 361, 
states:  
§ 147 Inference That Principal Is a Party; 
Simple Contracts  
Unless otherwise agreed, a disclosed or  
partially disclosed principal is a party to a 
contract, if not negotiable or sealed, made by his 
agent within his authority.  
2  
 
 
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
WILLIAM SLOBIN, Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE 
OF MARTIN SLOBIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant,  
No. 122063  
HENRY FORD HEALTH CARE,  
Defendant-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I would grant leave to appeal and not decide this case  
without oral argument.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver