Title: Green v. Kaesler-Allen Lumber Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

197 Kan. 788 (1966)
420 P.2d 1019
LUCILLIE M. GREEN, Appellant,
v.
KAESLER-ALLEN LUMBER COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 44,592

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 10, 1966.
Gerald L. Michaud, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Russell Cranmer, Orval L. Fisher, M. William Syrios and Kenneth L. Ingham, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
H.E. Jones, of Wichita, argued the cause, and A.W. Hershberger, Richard Jones, Wm. P. Thompson, Jerome E. Jones, Robert J. Roth, William R. Smith and Robert J. O'Connor, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
*789 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered summarily on the trial court's own motion during a pretrial conference.
The plaintiff filed her petition which, omitting formal parts, stated:
The answer consisted of a general denial and the further allegation that if plaintiff suffered injuries they were the direct result of her own negligent acts.
At the pretrial conference the trial court considered the statement of plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff's discovery deposition and various photographs of the scene of the accident which were offered by both parties. It then concluded:
The plaintiff has appealed.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment at the pretrial conference without the filing of a motion for summary judgment and without previous notice.
The appellant calls our attention to K.S.A. 60-256 which provides for summary judgments on motion by a party filed at least ten days before the time fixed for hearing. It must be conceded that neither the summary judgment statute nor any other procedural statute gives the trial court specific authority to enter a summary judgment on its own motion. The authority is derived from the inherent power of the trial court to summarily dispose of litigation *790 when there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact and giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence the judgment must be for one of the parties as a matter of law. It may be said that before a court may enter a judgment summarily the same conditions must exist as would justify a summary judgment on motion of a party.
Summary disposition of an action may logically follow a pretrial conference when proper pretrial procedures disclose the lack of a disputed issue of material fact and the facts so established indicate an unequivocal right to a judgment in favor of a party.
The Kansas summary judgment and pretrial statutes were taken from the federal rules. The federal courts, in applying the rules, have clearly established that where no disputed fact survives a pretrial conference judgment may be summarily issued.
In Lynch v. Call, 261 F.2d 130, 132, it is stated:
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in summarily granting judgment for defendant at the pretrial conference because there was substantial competent evidence to be submitted to the jury on genuine issues of disputed fact.
We are forced to agree with appellant's contention.
This court has now laid down a definite yardstick for the granting of such judgments. Generally it must appear conclusively that there remains no genuine issue as to a material fact and that one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A mere surmise or belief on the party of the trial court, no matter how reasonably entertained, that a party cannot prevail upon a trial will not justify a summary judgment where there remains a dispute as to a material fact which is not clearly shown to be sham, frivolous or so unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to try it. A party against whom a summary judgment is being considered must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts under consideration. (Herl v. State Bank of Parsons, 195 Kan. 35, 403 P.2d 110; Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P.2d 964; Board of Satanta v. Grant County Planning Board, 195 Kan. *791 640, 408 P.2d 655; City of Ulysses v. Neidert, 196 Kan. 169, 409 P.2d 800; Timmermeyer v. Brack, 196 Kan. 481, 412 P.2d 984; Secrist v. Turley, 196 Kan. 572, 412 P.2d 976.)
We find in the record a genuine issue of a material fact and a serious dispute thereon.
It would serve no useful purpose to review all of the proceedings which consist largely of a colloquy between the trial court and counsel. It will suffice to state that plaintiff's deposition was considered in which she stated that she parked on the south side of the Kaesler-Allen Lumber Company, entered the south door, bought a gallon of paint and started to step out. She further testified:
"A. That's the board I started to step across.
"Q. You say it was raised up?
"A. It was raised up.
The appellee offered one photograph which showed the floor inside the building next to the door to be quite smooth. The following conversation then took place:
"MR. MICHAUD: Yes.
"MR. JONES: She denies any extraneous material.
*792 It would appear that the trial court discarded the testimony of appellant as disclosed by her deposition and accepted instead appellee's photograph in regard to the condition of the threshold. It can hardly be disputed that there was a serious conflict between the testimony of the appellant and what appeared in the photograph as presented by the appellee. However, photographs should not be accepted as absolute and positive evidence in a negligence case without an opportunity for the opposing party to inquire as to whether they represent with fair accuracy the place of the happening and the physical condition surrounding it at the time of the injury. Generally, before a photograph may be considered as evidence, it must be shown by extrinsic evidence to be a substantially true representation of the place or instrument causing the injury. (32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 715.)
Neither should the trial court, on considering a summary judgment, accept as positive and absolute that which an attorney says he can prove by witnesses, especially where the statement is in conflict with the opposing party's testimony.
Pretrial procedure is not to determine controverted issues of fact. Although at a pretrial conference an attorney owes a duty to the court and opposing counsel to make a full and fair disclosure as to what the specific issues at the trial will be, the trial court should not attempt to determine a disputed question of fact by pressing counsel for evidentiary statements.
What has been said renders unnecessary an extension of this opinion by a discussion of other issues such as an alleged narrow, insufficient and sloping step. The rules announced apply to all disputed issues of fact which exist at the pretrial stage of the proceeding.
The judgment is reversed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.