Title: State v. Waddell

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 418A98
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
FLOYD CURTIS WADDELL
On appeal of right to review a substantial
constitutional question pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) and
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, 130 N.C. App. 488, 504 S.E.2d 84
(1998), finding no error in judgments entered by Everett, J., on
25 August 1995 in Superior Court, Wayne County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 11 May 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Anita LeVeaux-
Quigless, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Mark D.
Montgomery, Assistant Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
LAKE, Justice.
On 6 February 1995, defendant was indicted for two
counts of first-degree statutory sex offense, three counts of
taking indecent liberties with a minor, three counts of lewd and
lascivious acts, and two counts of felony child abuse.  The cases
were joined for trial and came to trial before a jury at the 21
August 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Wayne County. 
The jury found defendant not guilty of one count of first-degree
sex offense and convicted him of all other offenses enumerated
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above.  Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
first-degree sex offense, three consecutive ten-year terms for
taking indecent liberties with a minor and committing a lewd and
lascivious act, and two consecutive ten-year terms for felony
child abuse.  From these judgments and convictions, defendant
gave timely notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals, with one
judge dissenting, affirmed the trial court.  Defendant appealed
to this Court based on the dissent below and the assertion that
another issue determined by the Court of Appeals raised a
substantial constitutional question.
The State’s evidence tended to show that subsequent to
defendant’s divorce from Connie Waddell, she was awarded custody
of their son, with defendant accorded supervised visitation one
day a weekend from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m., commencing in March 1993. 
On 27 August 1994, visitation was increased to supervised
visitation one day a weekend from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
Apparently, defendant did not understand that his visitation was
to be supervised by the child’s paternal grandmother, and the
majority of defendant’s visitation with his son was unsupervised.
According to Ms. Waddell, the child developed
behavioral problems after beginning extended visitation with his
father, including bed-wetting, masturbation and aggressive
behavior when he became angry, such as hitting and name-calling. 
Ms. Waddell related that she had not seen the child masturbate
previous to his visitation with his father and that the child
told her “his daddy done [like] that.”
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After a 4 September 1994 visit with defendant, Ms.
Waddell stated the child, then six years old, “started touching
his privates, masturbating and saying my daddy, my daddy, my
daddy,” and that “his daddy let him touch his privates.”  After
visitation on 10 September 1994, the child told Ms. Waddell he
and his father had washed the car together in the nude and that
“his father had him to masturbate him and he [the child] saw it
shoot off.”  Thereafter, Ms. Waddell notified Kim Sekulich of the
Johnston County Department of Social Services (DSS), who told Ms.
Waddell to take the child to Wake Medical Center, where he
received a physical exam and met with a psychiatrist.
On 15 September 1994, the child was interviewed by
Sekulich at his school.  According to Sekulich, the child told
her about washing the car in the nude with his father, described
seeing his father masturbate and said his father “shot it off in
the air.”  The child used the word “peanut” to describe his
genitalia and reported he and his father touched each other’s
peanuts.  Sekulich subsequently filed a petition alleging
defendant’s abuse and neglect of the child.  Defendant was
thereafter interviewed and arrested by police on 23 September
1994.
On 4 August 1995 and 17 August 1995, the State gave
notice to defendant and the trial court that if the child victim
was deemed unavailable, the statements and testimony of Ms.
Lauren Rockwell-Flick, a licensed psychological associate at Wake
Medical Center; Dr. Elizabeth Witman, who performed a physical
examination of the child; Ms. Sekulich; Detective Mike Smith; and
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the child’s mother would be introduced at trial.  As expected,
the child was found incompetent to testify at trial, and the
aforementioned individuals testified regarding statements made to
them by the child.
At trial, the State presented Rockwell-Flick as an
expert in the field of child sexual abuse.  She testified, inter
alia, that she interviewed the child on 21 September 1994, using
anatomically correct dolls.  The child again described washing
his father’s automobile while wearing no clothes, identified his
genitals as a “peanut,” described seeing his father masturbate to
the point of ejaculation, and said his father had touched the
child’s genitals.  When asked by Rockwell-Flick to demonstrate
what his father did, the child said, “he takes his pants off
. . . and his shirt,” and then the child “took the peanut off the
adult male doll and put it in the mouth of the boy doll.”  When
Rockwell-Flick asked, “does his peanut touch your mouth?” the
child responded affirmatively.  Rockwell-Flick inquired whether
his father had ever done anything to the child’s rectal area, and
the child took both the boy and adult dolls and began touching
the adult doll’s penis to the rectum of the boy doll.  During a
second interview by Rockwell-Flick, on 27 September 1994, the
child repeated demonstrations of oral and anal sex with the adult
male and the boy anatomical dolls and indicated the child’s penis
had been in his father’s mouth.  Both interviews between
Rockwell-Flick and the child were videotaped.  However, only the
tape from the 21 September 1994 interview was admitted into
evidence, over defendant’s objection, and shown to the jury.
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On appeal, defendant first argues the trial court erred
by overruling defendant’s objection to the admission of the
hearsay testimony of witness Rockwell-Flick, which the Court of
Appeals held was admissible under the firmly rooted hearsay
exception of “Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment,” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (1999).  After a
thorough review of the record, we find that, contrary to
defendant’s contentions, defendant did not object to the
admission of Rockwell-Flick’s testimony at trial as required to
preserve the question for appellate review.  N.C. R. App. P.
10(b).  At an early stage in Rockwell-Flick’s testimony,
defendant did object to testimony regarding the child’s responses
to questions about the body parts of the anatomically correct
male dolls.  Defendant also objected to the State’s instruction
to Rockwell-Flick to explain how she had conducted the interview
with the child.  However, after these preliminary objections,
Rockwell-Flick entered into extended testimony, running over
fourteen pages of the transcript, which was a continuous detailed
narrative, without question from the State and without objection
from defendant.  It was after this testimony that defendant
objected to the jury’s being shown the video of Rockwell-Flick’s
interview of the child.  In response to that objection, the trial
court pointed out that defendant had not objected to testimony
which had already been given regarding the content of the
interview between Rockwell-Flick and the child.  Defendant
acknowledged through counsel that there had not been an
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objection, and defendant then specifically stated he thought
Rockwell-Flick could testify as to her examination of the child.
Based on the above, defendant clearly not only did not
object to the Rockwell-Flick testimony, but also did not think
the testimony was objectionable at the time.  Although defendant
did object to the presentation of the videotape, Rockwell-Flick
had already given detailed testimony regarding the content of the
video before the objection was made.  Notwithstanding defendant’s
lack of objection, and thus failure to preserve this issue for
appellate review, we will review the Sixth Amendment
confrontation question addressed by the opinion of the Court of
Appeals for plain error.
This Court has recently examined the admissibility of
testimony from the very same witness, Rockwell-Flick, under very
similar circumstances in State v. Hinnant, ___ N.C. ___, 523
S.E.2d 663 (2000).  In Hinnant, this Court held that hearsay
evidence is admissible under Rule 803(4) only when two inquires
are satisfied.  Id. at ___, 523 S.E.2d at 670.  “First, the trial
court must determine that the declarant intended to make the
statements at issue in order to obtain medical diagnosis or
treatment. . . .  Second, the trial court must determine that the
declarant’s statements were reasonably pertinent to medical
diagnosis or treatment.”  Id. at ___, 523 S.E.2d at 670-71.  In
Hinnant, the child victim was interviewed by Rockwell-Flick two
weeks after the initial medical examination, in a “child-
friendly” room, in a nonmedical environment, and with a series of
leading questions, whereby Rockwell-Flick systematically pointed
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to the anatomically correct dolls and asked whether anyone had
performed various acts with the child.  The record did not
disclose that Rockwell-Flick or anyone else explained to the
child the medical purpose of the interview or the importance of
truthful answers.  This Court concluded that there was no
evidence the child had a treatment motive when speaking to
Rockwell-Flick and that the record did not disclose that
Rockwell-Flick or anyone else explained to the child the medical
purpose of the interview or the importance of truthful answers. 
Id. at ___, 523 S.E.2d at 671.  Based on this lack of evidence,
this Court held the two-prong test required for the admissibility
of hearsay evidence under Rule 803(4) had not been satisfied, and
the Rockwell-Flick testimony was therefore not admissible under
that rule.  Id.
The circumstances surrounding the interview of the
child victim in the case sub judice are essentially identical to
those in Hinnant.  The interview took place after the initial
medical examination, in a “child-friendly” room, in a nonmedical
environment, and with a series of leading questions.  The record
also lacks any evidence that there was a medical treatment
motivation on the part of the child declarant or that Rockwell-
Flick or anyone else explained to the child the medical purpose
of the interview or the importance of truthful answers. 
Therefore, for the reasons stated in Hinnant, we conclude the
Court of Appeals erred in determining that Rockwell-Flick’s
testimony was properly admitted under Rule 803(4).
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In Hinnant, this Court also noted that Rockwell-Flick’s
testimony might have been admissible under the residual
exceptions to the hearsay rule provided there was proper notice,
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial court. 
Id.; see also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 803(24), 804(b)(5) (1999). 
In reviewing the record in the instant case, we note several
references made by the State to the residual hearsay exceptions. 
In fact, the State pointed out to the trial court that the State
recognized it had the burden to file notice of its intention to
use residual hearsay and had ensured that timely notice was
filed.  However, the record also shows the State vacillated
between relying on the residual and the medical exceptions to
hearsay, and at a pivotal point during in limine discussions
regarding the admissibility of Rockwell-Flick’s testimony, the
State determined its position in tender of this evidence in
stating, “[T]he testimony of [Rockwell-Flick] comes in under the
medical diagnosis.”  This statement, along with the fact that the
trial court then did not make any findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting admissibility as residual hearsay,
also precludes a finding of admissibility under the residual
exception to hearsay.  See State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 515,
374 S.E.2d 249, 254-55 (1988), cert. denied,  490 U.S. 1101, 104
L. Ed. 2d 1009 (1989).
Notwithstanding the erroneous admission of the
Rockwell-Flick testimony in the case sub judice, as in Hinnant,
we note that an erroneous admission of hearsay “‘is not always so
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prejudicial as to require a new trial.’”  Hinnant, ___ N.C. at
___, 523 S.E.2d at 672 (quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457,
470, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986)).  In reviewing the prejudicial
impact of Rockwell-Flick’s testimony in the present case, because
defendant not only did not object to the admission of the
testimony at trial, but also stated he thought the testimony as
to the examination of the child was admissible, the issue is
reviewed for “plain error.”  See State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573,
589, 509 S.E.2d 752, 762 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145
L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999); State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 477, 509
S.E.2d 428, 439 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d
802 (1999).  Before an error by the trial court amounts to “plain
error,” we must be convinced that absent the error the jury
probably would have reached a different verdict.  See State v.
Keel, 337 N.C. 469, 485, 447 S.E.2d 748, 757 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1198, 131 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1995).  Therefore, the
test for “plain error” places a much heavier burden upon the
defendant than that imposed upon those defendants who have
preserved their rights on appeal by timely objection.  Id.
To determine whether the jury probably would have
reached a different verdict had Rockwell-Flick’s testimony not
been considered, we review the other evidence before the jury. 
The record shows Ms. Waddell testified without objection that her
son told her he washed the car naked with defendant and that
defendant masturbated in front of the child to the point of
ejaculation.  On cross-examination, the mother also stated her
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son said defendant had the child put his mouth on defendant’s
“peanut.”
Counsel stipulated Dr. Witman as an expert in the field
of pediatrics and child sex abuse.  She testified, without
objection, that she conducted a physical examination of the child
on or about 21 September 1994 and that in her opinion the child
“probably had been sexually abused.”
Ms. Sekulich testified, without objection, that the
child told her defendant masturbated in front of him and “shot it
off”; that defendant had touched the child’s peanut; that the
child touched defendant’s peanut; and that defendant made a
voluntary statement at the juvenile hearing that he had been on
the couch watching TV, had fallen asleep, and had awakened to
find the child’s mouth on his “stuff.”
Detective Smith testified that defendant voluntarily
came to the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, was given his Miranda
rights and made an oral statement.  Defendant’s statement was
reduced to writing; was reviewed sentence by sentence, word by
word with defendant; and was signed by defendant.  The trial
court found the statement was freely, voluntarily and
understandingly made after defendant was adequately advised of
his constitutional rights, and the statement was read into
evidence for the jury’s consideration.  In the statement,
defendant admits to sexually molesting his son since 1992; to
taking problems that he had with his ex-wife out on his son; to
masturbating in front of his son; to having his son put lotion on
defendant’s penis and masturbate him; and that on two separate
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occasions, once while washing the car and once while in the
bathroom together, the child had taken his father’s penis in his
hand and put it in the child’s mouth.  Defendant admitted in his
statement that he knew the things he was doing to his son were
wrong and that he was in need of help.
Detective Smith also testified at trial, without
objection, that he had presented the child victim with
anatomically correct dolls and asked if the child would like to
name the dolls.  The child named the boy doll after himself and
the adult male doll “Daddy.”  Detective Smith asked the child
what he did when he and his daddy were alone, and the child said
that he would have to take the dolls’ clothes off first to show
him.  The child removed the dolls’ clothes and demonstrated the
child doll putting his mouth on the adult doll’s penis.  He also
demonstrated the adult doll putting his penis on the child doll’s
buttocks.  The child told the detective he had put his mouth on
his daddy’s peanut, that he put lotion on his daddy’s peanut and
that his daddy put lotion on the child’s peanut.  The child also
related that “after putting lotion on his daddy’s peanut, stuff
came out of the peanut into the air.”
At trial, defendant testified on direct examination
that he had his son put lotion on his penis and that his son had
put defendant’s penis in his mouth once when they were washing
the car and once when defendant fell asleep watching TV.  When
asked about the automobile washing incident, defendant responded
that he was wearing swim trunks and that his son ran up to him,
grabbed defendant’s penis and put it in his mouth.  When asked
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about the incident on the couch, defendant stated he had fallen
asleep on the couch and awoke to find his penis in the child’s
mouth.  Defendant also testified on cross-examination that the
child put his mouth on defendant’s penis once while in
defendant’s bathroom.  Defendant testified that he did not know
why the child had done this and that the child had done it for
only a few seconds before defendant told him to stop.
At trial, defendant also acknowledged three prior
convictions for indecent exposure and one conviction for felony
child abuse arising from the death of defendant’s child from a
previous marriage.  On direct examination, defendant initially
stated the child died from a head injury received in a car
accident which occurred two weeks prior to the child’s death.  On
cross-examination, defendant clarified that the child died from a
head fracture that medical reports indicated happened on the day
of the child’s death.
The aforementioned testimony from Ms. Waddell, Dr.
Witman, Ms. Sekulich, Detective Smith and the defendant himself
has not been challenged on appeal to this Court.  Therefore,
applying the “plain error” standard and considering the abundance
of evidence properly presented at trial, particularly defendant’s
own extensive and detailed admissions, we cannot conclude that
because of the trial court’s error in admitting Rockwell-Flick’s
testimony the scales were tilted to the extent that a different
result was reached by the jury than would have been reached
otherwise.  To the contrary, we conclude a different result
probably would not have been reached by the jury without the
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Rockwell-Flick testimony.  We therefore hold that the erroneous
admission of the Rockwell-Flick testimony did not constitute
plain error, and defendant is not entitled to a new trial as a
result of that error.
Defendant next assigns error to the Court of Appeals’
holding that the trial court did not err when it denied
defendant’s request to instruct the jury that the child had been
found incompetent to testify.  The parties do not dispute the
fact that the child was incompetent to testify at trial and was
therefore “unavailable.”  He suffered from a speech impediment
and learning disabilities, became distracted and confused during
questioning and did not understand the need to tell the truth at
trial.
The sequence of events which led to defendant’s request
for jury instruction began when the State called the child to
testify before the jury.  The State opened the examination by
asking the child whether he understood the need to tell the
truth.  Although the child became confused several times during
questioning, initially it appeared as though the child could
sufficiently express himself and that he understood the need to
tell the truth, as required by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601. 
Defendant then requested a voir dire of the witness, and the
trial court sent the jury out while the child was still on the
stand.  During continuing questioning, the child was repeatedly
asked if he would promise to tell the truth in court, to which
the child began to consistently reply, “No.”  When the trial
court asked, “Don’t you know it is good to tell the truth?” the
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child responded, “No.”  The trial court eventually concluded the
child was unable to “express to the Court his understanding of
what it is to tell the truth and what it is to tell a lie,” and
the child was brought down from the witness stand and removed
from the courtroom.  Before the jury was brought back into the
courtroom, the trial court denied defendant’s request for
instruction to the jury explaining why the child was no longer on
the stand. 
Defendant asserts that the boy’s words were put before
the jury in the hearsay testimony of Rockwell-Flick and other
witnesses, and because the jury was never instructed the child
was incompetent to testify, the jury was necessarily led to
believe his words were worthy of belief.  Precedent has
established, however, that “the Confrontation Clause does not
erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of
a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time
of trial.”  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 825, 111 L. Ed. 2d
638, 658 (1990).  In the case sub judice, the admissibility of
the child’s prior statements to police, doctors and his mother is
determined by their own indicia of reliability.  The reliability
requirement can be met in either of two ways:  “where the hearsay
statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or
where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.’”  Id. at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653 (quoting
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608 (1980)). 
“[T]he relevant circumstances [in determining trustworthiness]
include only those that surround the making of the statement
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. . . .”  Id. at 819, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 655 (emphasis added).  The
determination of whether the child victim is competent to
testify, which is determined at the time of trial, is a separate
analysis from the determination of whether hearsay statements
meet the required standard of reliability or trustworthiness as
judged at the time the statement was made.  Therefore, we reject
defendant’s intimation that the trial court’s finding that the
child was incompetent as a witness renders the child’s out-of-
court statements unreliable.  See State v. Rogers, 109 N.C. App.
491, 498, 428 S.E.2d 220, cert. denied, 334 N.C. 625, 435 S.E.2d
348 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1008, 128 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1994).
Additionally, the presiding judge is given large
discretionary power as to the conduct of a trial.  State v.
Young, 312 N.C. 669, 678, 325 S.E.2d 181, 187 (1985); State v.
Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 23, 224 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1976).  Generally,
in the absence of controlling statutory provisions or established
rules, all matters relating to the orderly conduct of the trial
or which involve the proper administration of justice in the
court, are within the trial court’s discretion and are reviewed
only for abuse of that discretion.  Young, 312 N.C. at 678, 325
S.E.2d at 187.
In determining whether defendant could possibly have
been prejudiced by this ruling of the trial court, we find it
relevant and determinative that the credibility of the child’s
version of events does not appear to have been in question.  The
child’s version is, for the most part, consistent with
defendant’s own testimony.  The primary variance between
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defendant’s own admissions and the accusations against him was
how the child’s mouth came to be on his father’s penis and the
extent of any rectal contact which occurred.  Assuming arguendo
the jury unanimously believed defendant’s contention that there
was no inappropriate rectal contact, there was abundant evidence
of fellatio through defendant’s own admissions to support his
conviction of one count of first-degree sex offense.  Based on
the lack of conflicting testimony before the jury, we are
unpersuaded by defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the
lack of instruction regarding the child’s competency to testify
at trial.  Therefore, based on the discretionary nature of the
trial court’s ruling and the lack of possible prejudice resulting
from that ruling, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion or
resulting error.
In summary, based on our holding in Hinnant, we hold
the Rockwell-Flick testimony was inadmissible under the medical
exception to hearsay.  However, based on “plain error” analysis
of that issue, we conclude defendant received a fair trial, free
from prejudicial error, and we therefore modify and affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Justice FREEMAN did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.