Title: State v. Walls

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WALLS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059.] 
Criminal law — Conviction for aggravated murder for an offense that occurred 
13 years prior to defendant’s indictment and while he was still a minor 
— Conviction affirmed, when — Application of juvenile statutes in place 
at the time the state commenced criminal proceedings against defendant 
did not impair defendant’s substantive rights within the meaning of Van 
Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. and its progeny — Ex Post Facto 
Clause or defendant’s due process rights not violated. 
(No. 2001-0099 — Submitted March 13, 2002 — Decided October 9, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA99-10-174. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
Defendant-appellant, Kevin Walls, appeals from his aggravated 
murder conviction for an offense that occurred 13 years prior to his indictment 
and while he was still a minor.  Focusing upon the time lapse between the 
indictment and the offense, Walls argues that his conviction is unconstitutional 
because of (1) a retroactive application of a law requiring that he be tried as an 
adult and (2) unreasonable preindictment delay.  Because we find no merit to 
either of his constitutional claims, we affirm his conviction. 
I 
{¶2} 
On March 8, 1985, Ann Zwiefelhoefer was found dead in her 
home, having bled to death from nine stab wounds.  When investigators arrived at 
the scene, they found her home ransacked in several areas and appearing as 
though it had been forcibly entered.  The Butler County Coroner examined the 
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victim’s body and stated that she likely died no earlier than approximately 4:00 
p.m. on the preceding day. 
{¶3} 
While at the scene, investigators retrieved a number of latent 
fingerprints and submitted them to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation for analysis.  Investigators compared these fingerprints with those of 
various suspects and other persons having business at the victim’s residence.  The 
comparisons revealed no matches and the fingerprints remained unidentified for 
13 years. 
{¶4} 
In the summer of 1998, some of the latent prints were entered into 
an on-line automated fingerprint identification system that had just become 
available.  This new system identified Walls’s fingerprints as a good match.  After 
a visual comparison and subsequent analysis by an FBI specialist in Washington, 
D.C., experts discovered that Walls’s fingerprints matched those on a coin jar 
found in the victim’s basement, on a fondue pot in the kitchen pantry, on the 
storm door, and on a cup and a dish lying on the floor. 
{¶5} 
Following this discovery, the investigators located Walls for 
questioning.  Walls, who was 15 years old at the time of the murder, stated that he 
had never been to the victim’s home or to any other home on that street.  
Investigators learned, however, that Walls had attended school only 436 yards 
from the victim’s home on the day of the murder. 
{¶6} 
The Butler County Grand Jury indicted Walls on November 13, 
1998, for aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B).  Even though Walls 
was a minor at the time of the alleged murder, the versions of R.C. 
2151.011(B)(6)(c) and 2151.23(I) then in effect allowed the state to try Walls as 
January Term, 2002 
3 
an adult.  See 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3421-34221; 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2054.2  
Walls moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the 1985 version of R.C. 
2151.011(B)(1) should control his disposition rather than the 1997 statutes.  
Under the 1985 law, Walls could not be tried as an adult until a juvenile court had 
first bound him over for trial to the general division of the court of common pleas.  
See former R.C. 2151.011(B)(1), 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 584.3  Walls also moved 
to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the delay between the offense 
charged and the indictment was so great that he was prejudiced by the 
disappearance of evidence implicating another person in the crime.  The trial court 
denied both motions and tried Walls as an adult.  Walls was ultimately convicted 
of aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
                                          
 
1. 
{¶a} 
The version of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6)(c) in effect in 1997 provided: 
 
{¶b} 
“Any person who, while under eighteen years of age, commits an act that would 
be a felony if committed by an adult and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act 
until the person attains twenty-one years of age is not a child in relation to that act.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
2. 
{¶a} 
R.C. 2151.23(I), as it existed in 1997, stated: 
 
{¶b} 
“If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that would be a 
felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act 
until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to 
hear or determine any portion of the case charging the person with committing that act.  In those 
circumstances * * *, the case charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal 
prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense as if the 
person had been eighteen years of age or older when the person committed the act, all proceedings 
pertaining to the act shall be within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and 
the court having jurisdiction of the offense has all the authority and duties in the case as it has in other 
criminal cases commenced in that court.”  (Emphasis added.) 
3. 
{¶a} 
In 1985, R.C. 2151.011(B)(1) provided: 
 
{¶b} 
“ ‘Child’ means a person who is under the age of eighteen years, except that any 
child who violates a federal or state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of 
age shall be deemed a ‘child’ irrespective of his age at the time the complaint is filed or hearing had 
on the complaint and except that a person whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant 
to [former R.C. 2151.26] and is subsequently convicted in that case shall after the transfer be deemed 
not to be a child in any case in which he is alleged to have committed an act that if committed by an 
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{¶7} 
Walls appealed his conviction, raising the issues of retroactive 
application of the law, preindictment delay, and prosecutorial misconduct.  The 
appellate court affirmed the conviction, and the cause is now before this court 
pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
II 
{¶8} 
Walls urges us to void the conviction against him, arguing that the 
court of common pleas, general division, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
his case.  At the center of this jurisdictional argument is his belief that application 
of the 1997 statutes, R.C. 2151.26 and 2151.011(B)(6), violated the Retroactivity 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  Though 29 years old at the time of indictment, 
Walls contends that he had a right to juvenile treatment under the law as it existed 
at the time of the offense in 1985.  He insists that the amended statutes are 
unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to his situation because, without benefit 
of those statutes, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to try him as an adult 
unless there had first been a bindover proceeding in the juvenile court.  See State 
v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
A 
{¶9} 
“Retroactive laws and retrospective application of laws have 
received the near universal distrust of civilizations.”  Van Fossen v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 104, 522 N.E.2d 489; see, also, Landgraf 
v. USI Film Products (1994), 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 
(noting that “the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our 
                                                                                                                   
adult would constitute the offense of murder or aggravated murder, or would constitute an aggravated 
felony of the first or second degree or a felony of the first or second degree.” 
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5 
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic”).  
In recognition of the “possibility of the unjustness of retroactive legislation,” Van 
Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 104, 522 N.E.2d 489, Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution provides that the General Assembly “shall have no power to pass 
retroactive laws.”  It is now settled in Ohio that a statute runs afoul of this 
provision if it “ ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, 
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in 
respect to transactions or considerations already past.’ ”  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio 
St.3d at 106, 522 N.E.2d 489, quoting Cincinnati v. Seasongood (1889), 46 Ohio 
St. 296, 303, 21 N.E. 630; accord Bielat v. Bielat (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 354, 
721 N.E.2d 28; State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 411, 700 N.E.2d 570. 
{¶10} This court has articulated a two-part framework, involving both 
statutory and constitutional analyses, for determining whether a statute is 
impermissibly retroactive under Section 28, Article II.  Because R.C. 1.48 
establishes a presumption that statutes operate prospectively only, “[t]he issue of 
whether a statute may constitutionally be applied retrospectively does not arise 
unless there has been a prior determination that the General Assembly specified 
that the statute so apply.”  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  If there is no “ ‘clear indication of retroactive 
application, then the statute may only apply to cases which arise subsequent to its 
enactment.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 106, 522 N.E.2d 489, quoting Kiser v. 
Coleman (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 28 OBR 337, 503 N.E.2d 753.  If we 
can find, however, a “clearly expressed legislative intent” that a statute apply 
retroactively, we proceed to the second step, which entails an analysis of whether 
the challenged statute is substantive or remedial.  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 410, 700 
N.E.2d 570; see, also, Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶11} In applying the analytic framework of Van Fossen and its progeny, 
the court of appeals found that the amended statutes did not apply retrospectively 
and therefore declined to undertake the second step of the Van Fossen analysis.  
The court reasoned: 
{¶12} “The current version of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6)(c) determines the 
present jurisdiction of the court of common pleas general division by looking to 
the charged individual’s age at the time of the complaint or indictment.  This 
section makes irrelevant any consideration of the accused’s age at the time he 
committed the crime.  Thus, by its very terms, the statute relies on no factor that 
would extend back in time before the date of its 1997 amendment.  We hold that 
the statute was intended to operate prospectively to confer jurisdiction on the 
general division of the court of common pleas regardless of whether the juvenile 
was under the age of eighteen at the time he or she committed the crime.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶13} From this analysis, it is evident that the court of appeals viewed the 
date on which criminal proceedings commenced against Walls as the relevant date 
of assessing whether the amended juvenile statutes operated prospectively or 
retrospectively.  And although the court of appeals cited none, there exists some 
authority that arguably supports this approach.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Plavcan v. 
School Emp. Retirement Sys. of Ohio (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 240, 243, 643 N.E.2d 
122 (“Statutes that reference past events to establish current status have been held 
not to be retroactive”); Cox v. Hart (1922), 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S.Ct. 154, 67 
L.Ed. 332 (“A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon 
antecedent facts for its operation”); see, also, French v. Dwiggins (1984), 9 Ohio 
St.3d 32, 39, 9 OBR 123, 458 N.E.2d 827 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If there is no 
specific expression by the General Assembly that the statute is to be retrospective 
in its application * * *, the statute will be applied to causes of action arising 
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7 
subsequent to the effective date of the legislation”).  But while the court of 
appeals’ approach may be adequate to resolve retroactivity challenges to many 
types of legislation, particularly laws pertaining to purely civil matters, it is not 
ideal when the application of a new statute penalizes criminal conduct that 
occurred prior to the statute’s effective date.  In this circumstance, the date of the 
offense is the governing date when assessing whether a given statute is retroactive.  
See Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 
(noting that a law is retrospective for purposes of ex post facto analysis if it 
“appl[ies] to events occurring before its enactment”).  Thus, in order to assess 
properly whether the amendments to R.C. Chapter 2151 are retrospective, we 
must determine whether the General Assembly intended them to apply to offenses 
occurring before the statutes became effective in 1997.  See In re Daniel H. 
(1996), 237 Conn. 364, 376, 678 A.2d 462 (identifying the date of the offense as 
the governing date in assessing whether a juvenile statute was impermissibly 
retroactive). 
{¶14} Focusing on the date of Walls’s offense, we conclude that the 
General Assembly intended that the 1997 amendments to R.C. Chapter 2151 
apply retrospectively.  The 1997 version of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6)(c) changed the 
definition of “child” to exclude “[a]ny person who, while under eighteen years of 
age, commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and who is 
not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after that person attains 
twenty-one years of age.”  Also effective in 1997, the General Assembly added 
R.C. 2151.23(I), which declared the juvenile court’s lack of jurisdiction over a 
person 21 years of age who is apprehended for an offense committed prior to the 
person’s 18th birthday.  146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2054.  These changes to the 
statutory scheme effectively removed anyone over 21 years of age from juvenile-
court jurisdiction, regardless of the date on which the person allegedly committed 
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the offense.  In other words, the statutory amendments made the age of the 
offender upon apprehension the touchstone of determining juvenile-court 
jurisdiction without regard to whether the alleged offense occurred prior to the 
amendments’ effective date.  From these circumstances, we find an express 
legislative intent that the juvenile statutes apply retroactively.  Cf. Cook, 83 Ohio 
St.3d at 410, 700 N.E.2d 570 (finding a “clearly expressed legislative intent” that 
sexual-predator statutes apply retrospectively because the statutes imposed 
requirements on offenders based on offenses committed before the statutes’ 
effective date). 
B 
{¶15} Having held that the juvenile statutes apply retroactively (i.e., to 
juvenile offenses committed prior to the statutes’ effective date), we next proceed 
to the constitutional prong of the Van Fossen analysis.  As we have previously 
noted, a statute is unconstitutionally retroactive under Section 28, Article II “if it 
impairs vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, or imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction.”  
Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d at 354, 721 N.E.2d 28; see, also, Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 
at 106-107, 522 N.E.2d 489.  On the other hand, a statute that is “ ‘purely 
remedial’ ” does not violate Section 28, Article II.  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 
107, 522 N.E.2d 489, quoting Rairden v. Holden (1864), 15 Ohio St. 207, 1864 
WL 26, paragraph two of the syllabus.  We have defined as “remedial” those laws 
affecting merely “ ‘the methods and procedure[s] by which rights are recognized, 
protected and enforced, not * * * the rights themselves.’  (Emphasis added.)”  
Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d at 354, 721 N.E.2d 28, quoting Weil v. Taxicabs of 
Cincinnati, Inc. (1942), 139 Ohio St. 198, 205, 22 O.O. 205, 39 N.E.2d 148. 
{¶16} Walls argues that the 1997 statutes were “substantive” within the 
meaning of our retroactivity cases because of the statutes’ profound effect on the 
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9 
jurisdiction of the juvenile and common pleas courts. Whereas the old statutes 
required a bindover proceeding in juvenile court as a prerequisite to criminal 
proceedings in the court of common pleas for persons situated similarly to Walls, 
the 1997 statutes divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction.  Thus, the 1997 
statutes subjected a person 21 years of age or older to criminal prosecution in the 
general division of the court of common pleas, regardless of the person’s age at 
the time of the alleged offense and without any necessity of a bindover proceeding 
in juvenile court.  Emphasizing the “extraordinary” difference between 
delinquency proceedings in juvenile court and criminal proceedings in common 
pleas court, Walls contends that the 1997 statutory changes were substantive 
because they deprived him of juvenile-court proceedings to which he had a vested 
right.  We disagree. 
{¶17} The 1997 changes to R.C. Chapter 2151 did not impair any of 
Walls’s vested rights within the meaning of our retroactivity jurisprudence.  
Although the 1997 amendments to the juvenile statutes allowed criminal 
prosecution without the bindover proceeding required under the 1985 law, we 
cannot characterize this change as anything other than remedial.  Even under the 
law in effect in 1985, Walls was subject to criminal prosecution in the general 
division of a court of common pleas if the juvenile court made certain 
determinations specified by statute.  See former R.C. 2151.26(A) and (E), 140 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 585-586.  Thus, under either the 1985 law or the 1997 law, 
Walls was on notice that the offense he allegedly committed could subject him to 
criminal prosecution as an adult in the general division of the court of common 
pleas.  The 1997 law merely removed the procedural prerequisite of a juvenile-
court proceeding.  Even though they may have an occasional substantive effect on 
past conduct, “it is generally true that laws that relate to procedures are ordinarily 
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remedial in nature.”  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570; see, also, In re 
Nevius (1963), 174 Ohio St. 560, 564, 23 O.O.2d 239, 191 N.E.2d 166. 
{¶18} Walls makes much of the fact that the new statutes effected 
substantial changes to the jurisdiction of the juvenile and common pleas courts.  
He maintains that the changes must be substantive within the meaning of our 
retroactivity cases because the amendments conferred jurisdiction where it was 
previously lacking.  See State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 
(noting that the juvenile court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the 
absence of a bindover procedure under former R.C. 2151.26).  But Walls offers no 
authority for the proposition that legislative changes in jurisdiction implicate 
substantive rights when applied to conduct occurring before the effective date of 
the amendments.  To the contrary, “[a]pplication of a new jurisdictional rule 
usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to 
hear the case.’ ”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229, 
quoting Hallowell v. Commons (1916), 239 U.S. 506, 508, 36 S.Ct. 202, 60 L.Ed. 
409; see, also, People v. Pena (2001), 321 Ill.App.3d 538, 542, 254 Ill.Dec. 608, 
747 N.E.2d 1020 (observing that a bindover proceeding is a procedural matter that 
“determin[es] the forum in which guilt or innocence will be adjudicated”), citing 
People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill.2d 289, 302, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366. 
{¶19} We therefore hold that application of the juvenile statutes in place 
at the time the state commenced criminal proceedings in this case did not impair 
Walls’s substantive rights within the meaning of Van Fossen and its progeny. 
III 
{¶20} Our conclusion that the amended statutes do not impair Walls’s 
substantive rights does not end our constitutional inquiry.  Walls also argues that 
the amendments to the juvenile statutes, when retroactively applied to him, are ex 
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11 
post facto laws prohibited by Section 10, Article I of the United States 
Constitution.4 
{¶21} “Although the Latin phrase ‘ex post facto’ literally encompasses 
any law passed ‘after the fact,’ it has long been recognized by [the United States 
Supreme Court] that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies 
only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them.”  Collins 
v. Youngblood (1990), 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30.  Not just 
any “disadvantage” to an offender, however, will run afoul of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  The clause implicates only certain types of legislative acts: 
{¶22} “ ‘1st.  Every law that makes an action done before the passing of 
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  
2d.  Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed.  3d.  Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th. Every law 
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, 
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 
convict the offender.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 
30, quoting Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (opinion of 
                                          
 
4. 
Walls limits his ex post facto argument here to the federal Constitution.  We note, 
however, that various courts of appeals have observed that the prohibition of “retroactive laws” in 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution includes a prohibition of ex post facto laws.  See 
State v. Gleason (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 240, 246, 673 N.E.2d 985; State v. Smith (1984), 16 
Ohio App.3d 114, 116, 16 OBR 121, 474 N.E.2d 685, fn. 4; State v. Ahedo (1984), 14 Ohio 
App.3d 254, 256, 14 OBR 283, 470 N.E.2d 904; State ex rel. Corrigan v. Barnes (1982), 3 Ohio 
App.3d 40, 3 OBR 43, 443 N.E.2d 1034.  This court has also implied as much.  See, e.g., Van 
Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489 (observing that Section 28, Article II was “a much 
stronger prohibition” on retroactive legislation than its precursor, which was limited to ex post 
facto laws and laws impairing contracts). 
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Chase, J.); see, also, Carmell v. Texas (2000), 529 U.S. 513, 521-522, 120 S.Ct. 
1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577. 
{¶23} Even though a law may not impair “vested rights” within the 
meaning of our retroactivity cases, the law may still run afoul of the ex post facto 
prohibition if it falls within one of the four Calder categories enumerated above.  
See Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, fn. 
13 (referring to a vested-rights analysis of retroactivity as “irrelevant” to an ex 
post facto inquiry); see, also, Collins, 497 U.S. at 46, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 
30 (“simply labeling a law ‘procedural’ * * * does not thereby immunize it from 
scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause”).  In this case, Walls argues that the 
amended juvenile statutes applied in his case implicate the first and third 
categories of ex post facto legislation.  He contends that by making criminal 
prosecution mandatory for a person over 21 years of age, regardless of the 
person’s age at the time of the offense, the legislature has impermissibly 
criminalized juvenile acts (implicating the first Calder factor) and enhanced the 
punishment meted out for their commission (implicating the third Calder factor).   
A 
{¶24} Walls invokes the first category of ex post facto laws by 
emphasizing his age at the time of the murder.  Because Walls was only 15 years 
old at the time of the offense, he maintains that his conduct was “a civil 
delinquency act and remained a civil delinquency act unless and until the Juvenile 
Division held a proper bind-over proceeding resulting in [Walls] being bound 
over to the adult justice system.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Walls therefore concludes that 
the amended statutes, as applied to him, impermissibly transformed a “civil 
delinquency act” into a criminal offense. 
{¶25} It is true that this court has characterized juvenile proceedings as 
civil rather than criminal.  See In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 748 
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13 
N.E.2d 67.  But the “civil” label traditionally attached to juvenile matters does not 
lead a fortiori to a conclusion that Walls’s act was not “criminal” at the time he 
committed it.  “[D]etermining the relevance of constitutional policies, like 
determining the applicability of constitutional rights, in juvenile proceedings, 
requires that courts eschew ‘the “civil” label-of-convenience which has been 
attached to juvenile proceedings,’  In re Gault [(1967), 387 U.S. 1, 50, 87 S.Ct. 
1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527], and that ‘the juvenile process * * * be candidly appraised.’ 
[Id. at 21, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527].”  Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 
529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346. 
{¶26} Whatever their label, juvenile delinquency laws feature inherently 
criminal aspects that we cannot ignore.  See Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 65-66, 
748 N.E.2d 67.  For this reason, numerous constitutional safeguards normally 
reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally applicable to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  Id. at 66, 748 N.E.2d 67, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57,  87 
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (holding that various Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
protections apply to juvenile proceedings), and In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 
358, 365-368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (holding that the state must prove 
juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt); see, also, Breed, 421 U.S. 519, 
95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (holding that a delinquency proceeding places a 
juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause); In re Melvin J. 
(2000), 81 Cal.App.4th 742, 759-760, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (relying on Gault, 
Winship, and Breed to hold that ex post facto principles apply to juvenile 
proceedings).  Just as we cannot ignore the criminal aspects inherent in juvenile 
proceedings for purposes of affording certain constitutional protections, we also 
cannot ignore the criminality inherent in juvenile conduct that violates criminal 
statutes.  See former R.C. 2151.02(A), now R.C. 2152.02(F)(1) (defining 
“delinquent child” as a child who commits an act that would be a crime if 
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committed by an adult).  Whether the state prosecutes a criminal action or a 
juvenile delinquency matter, its goal is the same: to vindicate a vital interest in the 
enforcement of criminal laws.  Breed, 421 U.S. at 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 
346. 
{¶27} In light of the criminal aspects inherent in Ohio’s juvenile law, we 
reject Walls’s contention that the amended statutes applied in his case had an 
impermissible ex post facto effect under the first Calder category.  The primary 
evil prohibited by this category is the legislature’s retroactive alteration of the 
definition of crimes.  See Collins, 497 U.S. at 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30.  
Walls cannot persuasively argue here that the legislature altered the definition of 
aggravated murder in a manner that has retroactively criminalized his conduct.  
R.C. 2903.01(B), the statute under which Walls was convicted, was the same in 
all material respects at the time of Walls’s offense in 1985 as it was during the 
criminal proceedings against him.  Compare 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 3, with 146 
Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10424-10425.  And under either the law effective at the time 
of the offense or the law effective at the time of the indictment, Walls was subject 
to criminal prosecution for his conduct.  Walls therefore cannot complain of a lack 
of fair warning that his conduct could be treated as a criminal offense.  See 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. at 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (noting that 
the Ex Post Facto Clause assures that “legislative Acts give fair warning of their 
effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed”).  
Inasmuch as Walls was already subject to criminal prosecution under the old law, 
we cannot say that the new statutes criminalized actions that were “innocent when 
done” within the meaning of Calder’s first category.  Cf. People v. Pena, 321 
Ill.App.3d at 543-544, 254 Ill.Dec. 608, 747 N.E.2d 1020 (retroactive application 
of new law providing for a juvenile’s “presumptive transfer” to adult court did not 
violate Ex Post Facto Clause). 
January Term, 2002 
15 
B 
{¶28} Walls also invokes the third Calder factor, which prohibits as ex 
post facto any law that inflicts a greater punishment for a crime than the law 
annexed to the crime at its commission.  As we have previously stated, the 
common pleas court could not have tried Walls as an adult under the 1985 law 
unless and until the juvenile court had first conducted a bindover proceeding 
under former R.C. 2151.26.  Only after a juvenile court had made the necessary 
determinations in former R.C. 2151.26(A) could it have transferred Walls to the 
court of common pleas for a criminal trial.  Thus, under the law in place in 1985, 
Walls was technically eligible to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court, leaving open the possibility that he could receive lesser “punishment” (i.e., 
the dispositional orders provided in former R.C. 2151.355 for children adjudicated 
delinquent) than the term of life imprisonment he received upon his conviction in 
criminal court.  By divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction in his case, Walls 
contends, the amended statutes necessarily “raised the specter of substantially 
increased criminal punishment” by removing any possibility of his case being 
treated as a juvenile delinquency matter. 
{¶29} Retroactive changes in the measure of punishment are 
impermissibly ex post facto if they subject a defendant to a more severe sentence 
than was available at the time of the offense.  See Lindsey v. Washington (1937), 
301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182.  In one sense, Walls’s 
punishment under the new statutes was not “more severe” than under the old; he 
could have received the same punishment under the 1985 law upon conviction for 
aggravated murder (albeit only after a bindover proceeding in juvenile court).  
Assessing whether a punishment is “more severe” under a later statute, however, 
involves more than simply comparing the range of punishments available under an 
old statute.  “[O]ne is not barred from challenging a change in the penal code on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
ex post facto grounds simply because the sentence he received under the new law 
was not more onerous than that which he might have received under the old.”  
Dobbert v. Florida (1977), 432 U.S. 282, 300, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344; 
see, also, Miller v. Florida (1987), 482 U.S. 423, 432, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 
351.  Rather, a defendant may establish an ex post facto violation by 
demonstrating that a penal statute increases the measure of punishment for crimes 
committed before its effective date.  California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales 
(1995), 514 U.S. 499, 505-506, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588; id. at 510, 115 
S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, fn. 6.5 
{¶30} In this case, the statutory amendments at issue arguably subjected 
Walls to a more severe range of punishment than he faced under the 1985 law.  
Because of the amendments to R.C. Chapter 2151, Walls stood no chance of 
remaining in the juvenile system and could no longer receive the lesser 
“punishment” available in juvenile dispositional orders.  But our analysis of the 
statutory changes does not stop there.  The types of legislative adjustments that are 
“ ‘of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition’ [of ex post 
facto laws] must be a matter of ‘degree.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Morales, 514 U.S. at 
509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, quoting Beazell v. Ohio (1925), 269 U.S. 
167, 171, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216.  Accordingly, to succeed on his ex post facto 
claim based on the third Calder factor, Walls must show that the amendments to 
the juvenile law applied in his case actually “produce[d] a sufficient risk of 
increasing the measure of punishment attached to” his crime.  Morales, 514 U.S. 
                                          
 
5. 
In Lindsey, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that a statute providing a 
mandatory sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied 
to an offender who committed his crime at a time when the penalty was only an indeterminate 
sentence of not more than 15 years.  Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182. 
January Term, 2002 
17 
at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588.  A “speculative and attenuated” 
possibility that the statutory change has increased the measure of punishment will 
not constitute an ex post facto violation.  Id.  In other words, Walls must 
demonstrate that he had more than a speculative chance under the old law of being 
tried in juvenile court and subjected only to juvenile delinquency dispositions. 
{¶31} Walls’s claim that the new statutes actually increased the measure 
of punishment for his conduct is speculative at best.  While Walls perhaps 
remained eligible for retention within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under a 
technical reading of the old statutes, the practical reality is that Walls had virtually 
no chance of being kept in the juvenile system.  In 1985, the criteria for deciding 
whether to transfer a child to common pleas court for trial as an adult were 
contained in former R.C. 2151.26(A): 
{¶32} “After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is delinquent 
by reason of having committed an act that would constitute a felony if committed 
by an adult, the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution to 
the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the following 
determinations: 
{¶33} “(1) The child was fifteen or more years of age at the time of the 
conduct charged; 
{¶34} “(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the 
act alleged; 
{¶35} “(3) After an investigation, including a mental and physical 
examination of the child made by a public or private agency, or a person qualified 
to make the examination, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
{¶36} “(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or 
rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision, or rehabilitation of 
delinquent children; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶37} “(b) The safety of the community may require that he be placed 
under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his 
majority.”  140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 585-586.  See, also, Juv.R. 30. 
{¶38} The purpose behind former R.C. 2151.26 was “the assessment of 
the probability of rehabilitating the child within the juvenile justice system.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State v. Douglas (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 20 OBR 282, 
485 N.E.2d 711.  Given this overriding statutory purpose, we find no basis to 
conclude that Walls had any realistic chance of remaining in the juvenile system 
under the 1985 law. 
{¶39} The first two factors of former R.C. 2151.26 are undoubtedly met 
in Walls’s case: Walls does not dispute that he was 15 years of age at the time of 
the alleged offense, and the grand jury indictment establishes that there was 
probable cause to believe that he had committed the act.  Whether Walls had any 
chance of remaining within juvenile-court jurisdiction under the 1985 law 
therefore depends on whether there was something more than a speculative 
possibility that a juvenile court could have found him amenable to juvenile 
treatment. 
{¶40} Even a cursory reading of former R.C. 2125.26(A)(3) reveals that 
the statute does not contemplate treatment of a 29-year-old adult within the 
juvenile justice system.  The statute contains not even one inquiry into whether a 
person beyond the age of majority should be protected as though still a minor.  
Indeed, the language in former R.C. 2125.26(A)(3)(a) and (b), with its emphasis 
on “care or rehabilitation” and reference to legal restraint “for the period 
extending beyond his majority,” contemplates the assessment of a person younger 
than 21 years of age.  Moreover, even if a juvenile court retained jurisdiction over 
a delinquency complaint against a person over 21 years of age, it would find its 
dispositional options profoundly limited.  For example, the law in place in 1985 
January Term, 2002 
19 
(and in 1997 for that matter) would have prevented a juvenile court from 
imposing any type of institutionalization or confinement on Walls.  See, e.g., State 
v. Iacona (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 90, 752 N.E.2d 937 (observing that former 
R.C. 2151.355[A][4] and [A][6] forbid the confinement of any person in the 
Department of Youth Services beyond the age of 21); In re J.B. (1995), 71 Ohio 
Misc.2d 63, 66, 654 N.E.2d 216 (recognizing that former R.C. 2151.355[A][11] 
prohibited a juvenile court from sentencing a person adjudicated delinquent to 
confinement in an adult correctional facility). 
{¶41} Notwithstanding the broad degree of discretion afforded to juvenile 
courts in bindover decisions, see State v. Watson (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95-96, 
547 N.E.2d 1181, the inherent limitations on the juvenile system under the law in 
place in 1985 convince us that the juvenile court would have had virtually no 
discretion to retain jurisdiction in Walls’s case because of his mature age.  The 
juvenile system in place in 1985 was not structured to retain a person well beyond 
the age of majority for an offense as serious as aggravated murder.  Any bindover 
hearing under the 1985 statute would have been simply a procedural step in the 
process of transferring Walls for prosecution as an adult.  Consequently, 
application of the amended statutes did not increase his available punishment in 
any manner other than a speculative and attenuated one.  Such a change in the 
measure of punishment is not enough to constitute an ex post facto violation. 
C 
{¶42} Our finding that Walls’s claim of increased punishment is only 
speculative distinguishes his case from Saucedo v. La Paz Cty. Superior Court 
(Ariz.App.1997), 190 Ariz. 226, 946 P.2d 908, and United States v. Juvenile Male 
(C.A.4, 1987), 819 F.2d 468, both of which found that a retroactive application of 
juvenile legislation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶43} At issue in Saucedo was an amendment to the Arizona Constitution 
providing that juveniles 15 years of age or older accused of certain serious 
offenses “ ‘shall be prosecuted as adults.’ ”  Id. at 227, 946 P.2d 908, fn. 1, 
quoting Section 22(1), Part 2, Article IV, Arizona Constitution.  Under the law 
prior to the amendment, Arizona, like Ohio, allowed prosecution of a juvenile in 
criminal court “[o]nly after a transfer decision by the juvenile court.”  Id. at 227, 
946 P.2d 908. 
{¶44} The Arizona Court of Appeals found that applying this provision to 
Saucedo for an offense committed prior to its effective date offended ex post facto 
principles.  “By depriving [Saucedo] of eligibility for prosecution as a juvenile, it 
would substantially alter his range of punishment, depriving him of eligibility for 
probation and raising his potential length of confinement from a maximum of two 
and one-half years in a juvenile setting to a minimum of thirteen years in a prison 
for adults.”  Id. at 229, 946 P.2d 908.  In contrast to Walls, however, Saucedo was 
only 15 years old at the time criminal proceedings commenced.  Id. at 227, 946 
P.2d 908.  Thus, under Arizona’s preamendment law, Saucedo had a realistic 
chance of remaining in the juvenile system.  But because Walls was 29 years old 
at the time criminal proceedings commenced in this case, he had no such chance 
under Ohio law.  Walls’s mature age therefore renders Saucedo’s reasoning 
inapplicable here. 
{¶45} The circumstances at issue in Juvenile Male are likewise 
distinguishable from the scenario in this case.  In Juvenile Male, the defendant 
was accused of committing multiple murders on federal property in 1981, when he 
was 15 years old.  At the time of the murders, federal law did not allow 
prosecution as an adult of any person who committed a crime at age 15; the 
government could prosecute the offender only as a juvenile, subjecting the 
offender to a maximum punishment of incarceration until the age of 21.  819 F.2d 
January Term, 2002 
21 
at 469, citing Sections 5032 and 5037, Title 18, U.S.Code (1982).  By the time the 
offender in Juvenile Male was apprehended in 1986, however, Congress had 
amended the relevant statutes to allow transfer of the defendant to a district court 
for trial as an adult for certain crimes committed by 15-year-old offenders.  Id., 
citing Section 5032, Title 18, U.S.Code (Supp. II 1984).  The government invoked 
the new statute and sought to prosecute the then-20-year-old defendant for trial as 
an adult. 
{¶46} The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
the application of the new statute to the defendant violated the ex post facto 
prohibition in Section 9, Article I of the United States Constitution.6  Applying the 
third Calder factor, the court held that the new statute plainly imposed a greater 
punishment than the law in effect in 1981 because it exposed the defendant to a 
much more severe sentence.  Id. at 470, citing Calder, Beazell, and Weaver, supra.  
The court rejected the characterization of the change as “procedural,” noting that 
“[o]nly by closing one’s eyes to the actual effect of the transfer can one label this 
radical increase in the applicable punishment a procedural change.”  Id. at 471.  
Despite the defendant’s mature age at the time of trial, the court found itself 
“bound by the result Congress dictated when it drafted the law in effect in 1981—
that fifteen-year-old offenders should be tried as juveniles, even if they are not 
charged until they reach the age of twenty.”  Id. at 472. 
{¶47} The result in Juvenile Male is of no help to Walls.  Under the 
federal law in place at the time of the Juvenile Male defendant’s offense, there 
was absolutely no possibility that he could be tried as an adult.  Thus, application 
                                          
 
6. 
Section 9, Article I of the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from passing ex 
post facto laws.  Section 10, Article I, which is at issue in this case, extends the identical 
prohibition to the states. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
of the intervening statute unquestionably subjected the defendant to a greater 
punishment that was not at all possible at the time of his offense.  Because the 
new federal statute allowed for a punishment that was previously unavailable as a 
matter of law, there was nothing speculative about the onerous effect of 
retroactively applying the amendment to that defendant’s case.  In contrast, the 
Ohio law in place at the time of Walls’s offense already contained a procedural 
mechanism for transfer to adult court, subjecting a 15-year-old (as Walls was at 
the time of the murder) to criminal prosecution and the full range of adult 
punishment.  And as we have previously explained, the new legislation’s removal 
of the bindover process—allowing for automatic jurisdiction in the common pleas 
court for trial as an adult—merely removed a procedural step that Walls had only 
a speculative and attenuated chance of successfully invoking.  Because a 29-year-
old had no realistic change of remaining within the juvenile system under the old 
law, the actual effect of the statutory changes applied to Walls was not nearly as 
dramatic as the amendments at issue in Juvenile Male.   
{¶48} We also reject Walls’s contention that Kent v. United States 
(1966), 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, mandates his receipt of a 
bindover hearing.  It is true that Kent identified the bindover procedure as a “ 
‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the 
juvenile.”  Id. at 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.  But the protections afforded 
by that procedure are important precisely because of the juvenile’s age at the time 
of the proceeding.  The offender in Kent was 16 years old; by contrast, Walls was 
29 years old at the time criminal proceedings commenced and well beyond an age 
at which there was a need for such protection.  Accordingly, our categorization of 
the bindover hearing as a procedural formality with respect to Walls in no way 
contravenes the Supreme Court’s decision in Kent. 
January Term, 2002 
23 
{¶49} We therefore hold that the application of the amended juvenile 
statutes to Walls did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Because we find no 
violation of either Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution or 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, we reject Walls’s first proposition 
of law. 
 IV 
{¶50} With his second proposition, Walls argues that the delay between 
the time of the offense and his indictment violated his due process rights.  
Specifically, Walls contends that he was harmed by the disappearance of evidence 
implicating another suspect in the crime. 
{¶51} To warrant dismissal on the basis of preindictment delay, a 
defendant must present evidence establishing substantial prejudice.  Once the 
defendant fulfills that burden, the state has the burden of producing evidence of a 
justifiable reason for the delay.  State v. Whiting (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217, 
702 N.E.2d 1199.  Thus, “the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for 
the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”  United States v. Lovasco 
(1977), 431 U.S. 783, 790,  97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752. 
{¶52} The determination of “actual prejudice” involves “a delicate 
judgment based on the circumstances of each case.” United States v. Marion 
(1971), 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.  In making this 
assessment, courts are to consider the evidence as it exists when the indictment is 
filed and the prejudice the defendant will suffer at trial due to the delay.  State v. 
Luck (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 150, 154, 15 OBR 296, 472 N.E.2d 1097, citing 
Marion, 404 U.S. at 326, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468. 
{¶53} Walls insists that the passage of time resulted in the loss of 
substantial exculpatory evidence.  He argues that the coroner’s investigator—if he 
had been alive to testify—could have placed the time of death during school hours 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
rather than at 4:00 p.m.  Walls also contends that missing school attendance 
records would have shown that he was in school on the afternoon of the murder.  
He further believes that unavailable witnesses could have supplied evidence 
implicating one Anthony Gray as the murderer.  In particular, he claims that an 
acquaintance of Gray’s, Dawn Smith, had heard Gray tell his cousin that he had 
killed a woman on the street where the murder took place.  Walls argues that he 
was prejudiced even further by the death of the lead investigator because only the 
investigator knew why Gray was considered a suspect.  Finally, Walls contends 
that he was prejudiced by the disappearance of specific items of evidence: (1) a 
tape made by a neighbor describing a person she saw entering the victim’s house, 
(2) a faucet handle from the victim’s home that had a blood stain on it, and (3) an 
anonymous letter that apparently discussed who committed the murder. 
{¶54} For its part, the state counters that the evidence of which Walls 
complains was either not missing, unhelpful to Walls, or duplicative.  First, 
although the coroner’s assistant is deceased and could not testify, the Butler 
County Coroner testified at length as to the time of death.  And despite the 
missing attendance reports from individual classes, the state produced a school 
record showing that Walls was in school on the day of the murder.  As to the 
evidence concerning the other suspect, police located Smith but considered her 
unreliable because she gave inconsistent statements.  Furthermore, scientific 
testing revealed that a bloodstain on a “missing” pillow taken from Gray’s home 
did not contain the victim’s DNA. 
{¶55} In addition to the state’s substantial arguments refuting Walls’s 
contentions, we must also consider the fingerprint evidence implicating Walls.  
Though Walls stated that he had never been to the victim’s home, his fingerprints 
were found in incriminating locations around the house, including on the storm 
door and on items scattered about the ransacked home.  Furthermore, the 
January Term, 2002 
25 
fingerprints found in the home did not match those of Gray, the individual who 
Walls claims actually committed the crime. 
{¶56} Although some prejudice may have occurred from evidence lost 
over the years, we conclude that Walls’s claims of prejudice are speculative at 
best.  Marion, 404 U.S. at 326, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.  Moreover, we are 
firmly convinced that the delay was justified.  As the United States Supreme 
Court explained, “[T]o prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does 
not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat 
prejudiced by the lapse of time.”  Lovasco, 431 U.S.  at 796, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 
L.Ed.2d 752.  Here, the indictment occurred only a couple of months after new 
computer technology made it possible to match the fingerprints at the murder 
scene to those of Walls.  Prior to the advent of that technology, the state had no 
means of obtaining a match for these prints.  Upon receiving the new fingerprint 
evidence, the state proceeded diligently to initiate proceedings against Walls.  
This situation is distinctly different from cases in which the state has compiled 
evidence but simply fails, or refuses, to take action for a substantial period.  See, 
e.g., Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150, 15 OBR 296, 472 N.E.2d 1097.  Because the delay 
here was justified, the 13-year hiatus between the offense and the indictment did 
not violate Walls’s due process rights. 
V 
{¶57} Having found no constitutional violations, we reject both of 
Walls’s propositions of law.  The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶58} The majority opinion well states the objectionable nature of 
retroactive legislation and accurately sets forth the test to determine whether 
legislation was designed to apply retroactively and whether it is constitutional.  
We diverge on our conclusions. 
{¶59} I dissent because former R.C. 2151.26 and 2151.011(B)(6) do not 
contain provisions allowing them to be applied retroactively to an offense that 
occurred prior to the enactment of the statutes. State ex rel. Wehrung v. 
Dinkelacker (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 310, 311, 750 N.E.2d 154 (Pfeifer, J., 
dissenting).  The retroactive application of R.C. 2151.26 and 2151.01(B)(6) fails 
on both statutory and constitutional grounds. 
{¶60} First, the General Assembly has not specified that the statutes at 
issue should be applied retrospectively.  The “ ‘clear indication of retroactive 
application’ ” required by Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 106, 522 N.E.2d 489, is lacking. Id. at 106, 522 N.E.2d 489, quoting 
Kiser v. Coleman (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 28 OBR 337, 503 N.E.2d 753. 
{¶61} Former R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) and 2151.23(I) were clearly designed 
to change the law that gave juvenile courts at least initial jurisdiction over persons 
apprehended after they turned 21 for crimes they committed before the age of 
eighteen.  R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) and 2151.23(I) achieved the sought-for change – 
but only for children who committed crimes during the life of those statutes.  The 
statutes do not reach back to acts that occurred before their effective dates. 
{¶62} The 1997 version of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6)(c) changed the definition 
of “child” to exclude “[a]ny person who, while under eighteen years of age, 
commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and who is not 
taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-
one years of age.” (Emphasis added.) 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3421-3422.  The 
January Term, 2002 
27 
General Assembly used the present tense “commits” in crafting the statute.  The 
use of the past tense, “committed,” would have evidenced a clear intent by the 
legislature to make the statute applicable to acts committed before the effective 
date of the statute.  The way the statute is written encompasses acts, not just 
apprehension, that occurred while the statute was in force, not before the statute 
was written. 
{¶63} Likewise, former R.C. 2151.23(I) stated: 
{¶64} “If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act 
that would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into 
custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years 
of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any 
portion of the case charging the person with committing that act.” (Emphasis 
added.), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2054. 
{¶65} Again, the use of the present tense indicates that the statute applies 
to acts that occur over the life of the statute.  The law tells persons under 18 years 
old that if they commit a felony but avoid apprehension until after age 21, they 
will face disposition of their case through the criminal court.  It alerts persons 
under eighteen years of age to the consequences of not facing responsibility for 
their actions in a timely manner.  The statute does not speak to persons over 21 
who have already committed a felony as a juvenile before the statute was enacted.  
Those persons would be unable to conform their behavior to the statute.  Under 
the majority’s construction, however, people over the age of 21 are simply 
informed that under this new statute they must now face new and different 
consequences for their previous acts.  That interpretation is untenable—the way 
the statute is written requires both the commission of the felonious act and the 
apprehension to occur as of the effective date.  The General Assembly could 
clearly have written the statute otherwise, but did not. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶66} Even if the statutes did feature clear evidence of intended 
retroactivity, such an application would be unconstitutional.  A statute is 
unconstitutionally retroactive pursuant to Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution “if it impairs vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, or 
imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past 
transaction.”  Bielat v. Bielat (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 354, 721 N.E.2d 28. 
{¶67} In finding that the statutes are remedial, rather than substantive, the 
majority ignores the important distinctions between juvenile and criminal courts.  
This court’s recognition in In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 748 N.E.2d 
67, syllabus, that a juvenile court proceeding is a civil action, not a criminal one, 
demonstrates that the differences are substantive.  The dichotomy between 
juvenile and criminal courts exists because we understand the important 
differences between children and adults, not just in their ultimate disposition once 
they are adjudged, but also in the motivations behind their behaviors. 
{¶68} Whenever the juvenile offender is ultimately apprehended, at the 
time of the crime or after he turns twenty-one, the fact remains that a child 
committed the offense.  Who of us is the same person we were as a teenager?  
Who of us is the person we aspired to be as a teenager?  Our juvenile laws and 
courts take into account that we are eminently changeable and reformable at that 
age.  The juvenile court structure recognizes our undeveloped judgment 
capabilities, our nonappreciation of the future, and the temporary and evolving 
nature of our influences.  The 1997 versions of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) and 
2151.23(I) keep a court from viewing Walls as he was when the crime was 
committed—as a child.  And that is substantive. 
{¶69} Ohio’s juvenile court system at the time Walls committed his 
crimes was not naïve as to serious juvenile offenders.  Pursuant to the version of 
R.C. 2151.26(A) in place at the time Walls committed his offenses, if the aims of 
January Term, 2002 
29 
the juvenile court system could not be met as to a specific child, or if the child 
provided an extraordinary threat to the community if released from custody too 
soon, then bindover to adult criminal court was appropriate. See 140 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 585-586.  Bindover may very well have been appropriate in the case of 
Walls.  But he at least deserved his threshold chance before the juvenile court.  
More important, there are others out there who probably deserve it more. 
__________________ 
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel G. 
Eichel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Law Offices of Scott J. Frederick, Scott J. Frederick and Kristen L. Sphar, 
for appellant. 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rebecca L. 
Collins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and T. Kenneth Lee, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender. 
__________________