Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DAVE M. MONCAVAGE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 97, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. 09-05-0993, 09-05-0994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0905019689 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 29, 2010 
Decided:  October 19, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 19th day of October, 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In this appeal, David Moncavage argues that the prosecutor 
mischaracterized his earlier, unrelated assault conviction and improperly explained 
the facts surrounding that conviction in the sentencing record in this case.  He also 
contends that his sentencing judge relied on impermissible factors and had a closed 
mind while considering and imposing his sentence.  Because we find the 
prosecutorial misconduct claim unpersuasive, the sentence appropriate, and no 
evidence of a closed mind, we AFFIRM. 
2 
 
(2) 
On May 22, 2009, Corporal Troy Pezzuto arrested motorcyclist David 
Moncavage.  After Pezzuto saw Moncavage execute a “wheelie,” change lanes 
without signaling, and remove his hands from the handlebars of his motorcycle on 
State Route 1, Pezzuto attempted to pull Moncavage over.  Moncavage, in an 
attempt to evade Pezzuto, sped through a crowded Wawa parking lot, crashed his 
motorcycle, and tried, but failed, to remount his motorcycle and flee.  The State 
charged Moncavage with (1) resisting arrest, (2) failing to stop at the command of 
a police officer, (3) reckless driving, (4) criminal mischief under $1000.00, (5) 
failing to maintain his hands on the grips of his motorcycle, (6) inattentive driving, 
(7) keeping his signal flashing improperly, and (8) failing to have possession of his 
insurance card.  As part of a plea arrangement, on November 9, 2009, Moncavage 
waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to failing to stop at the command 
of a police officer and no contest to resisting arrest with force.  The judge ordered a 
pre-sentence report.  On January 8, 2010, after a hearing, the judge sentenced 
Moncavage to a total of four years in prison, suspended immediately for 60 days 
Level IV probation to be served at the Violation of Probation Center and followed 
by one year of probation. 
(3) 
With respect to his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Moncavage 
argues that the prosecutor committed reversible error by mischaracterizing one of 
his earlier convictions from 2004 as second degree assault when in fact it was for 
3 
 
third degree assault.  He also argues that the prosecutor misstated the 
circumstances surrounding the 2004 convictions.  Moncavage did not object to the 
prosecutor’s remarks at the hearing, so we review for plain error.1  As a first step in 
plain error review, we examine the record de novo.2  If we determine prosecutorial 
misconduct did not occur, our analysis ends.3  Here, there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct and therefore no plain error. 
(4) 
The prosecutor misspoke and described Moncavage’s earlier 
conviction as second degree assault when it was actually third degree assault.4  
Moncavage’s defense attorney quickly corrected this mistake for the judge, 
however.5  Also, the judge had independent access to the pre-sentence report as 
well as the criminal docket, which clearly identifies Moncavage’s earlier 
conviction as third degree assault.6  While the prosecutor erred, he did not commit 
misconduct.  He simply misspoke, an error corrected immediately by both the 
record and opposing counsel. 
                                          
 
1 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006). 
2 Id. at 150. 
3 Id. at 150. 
4 Appendix to Op. Br. at A-18; Appendix to Ans. Br. at B-7. 
5 Appendix to Op. Br. at A-21. 
6 Appendix to Ans. Br. at B-7. 
4 
 
(5) 
Also, the prosecutor’s characterization of the circumstances 
surrounding Moncavage’s 2004 convictions was consistent with the record before 
the judge.  Specifically, Moncavage labels as unsupported hyperbole the 
prosecutor’s statement to the judge that Moncavage’s 2004 convictions resulted 
from an incident in which he “got into a prolonged physical fight with a Delaware 
State trooper where he attempted to remove the officer’s firearm.”7  However, the 
police report from the incident that gave rise to the 2004 convictions clearly 
establishes this fact.8  Since the prosecutor accurately portrayed the circumstances 
underlying Moncavage’s 2004 convictions—information the judge has discretion 
to consider for purposes of sentencing9—this description did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
(6) 
With respect to his claim of judicial error, Moncavage argues that the 
judge relied on impermissible factors and had a closed mind in his consideration 
and imposition of a sentence.  Specifically, Moncavage argues that the judge 
should 
not 
have 
relied 
upon 
the 
prosecutor’s 
allegedly 
improper 
                                          
 
7 Op. Br. at 5. 
8 Appendix to Ans. Br. at B-14 (“During one point, the defendant repeatedly grabbed at the 
officer in an attempt to gain control of him and force him onto the ground.  While [Officer] 
Trestka attempted to restrain [Moncavage] from behind, [Moncavage] reached back with his 
right hand and grabbed the grip of Trestka’s holstered weapon.”). 
 
9 See Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
5 
 
mischaracterization of the facts and circumstances surrounding his earlier 
convictions from 2004.10  He also argues that the judge improperly failed to 
articulate aggravating factors at the sentencing hearing to justify sentencing him 
more harshly than recommended by the sentencing guidelines.11  We review a 
sentence determination on appeal only to determine whether it is within the 
applicable statutory limits and whether it is based upon factual predicates which 
are false or impermissible, or which lack minimal reliability, judicial 
vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.12  A judge sentences with a closed mind 
when he bases the sentence on a preconceived bias without consideration of the 
nature of the offense or the character of the defendant.13 
(7) 
Because the prosecutor presented a proper characterization of the facts 
and circumstances underlying Moncavage’s 2004 convictions to the judge, the 
prosecutor’s proffered facts and circumstances were not impermissible factors for 
the judge to consider at sentencing.  In addition, there is no evidence that the judge 
had a closed mind.  In fact, before determining Moncavage’s sentence in this case, 
                                          
 
10 Op. Br. at 8–9. 
11 Op. Br. at 9. 
12 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
13 Id. 
6 
 
the judge listened to his attorney’s pleas for lenience and Moncavage’s own 
expression of sorrow and regret.14 
(8) 
Finally, the sentence is appropriate and the judge did not need to 
articulate aggravating factors verbally at the sentencing hearing.  Moncavage 
admits that aggravating factors must be set forth “with particularity . . . using the 
forms provided by the [Sentencing Accountability] Commission.”15  Here, 
according to Commission rules, the judge listed two aggravating factors in the 
sentencing order.  Specifically, he found both lack of amenability and undue 
depreciation of offense to be aggravating factors,16 and he adjusted the 
Commission’s presumptive sentence accordingly.  Moncavage does not dispute the 
aggravating factors, nor does he argue that the sentence improperly exceeded the 
Sentencing Accountability Commission’s guidelines, but rather he simply argues 
that the judge articulated the aggravating factors improperly by only writing them 
in the sentencing report without verbally communicating them when delivering the 
sentence from the bench.  This argument is unpersuasive, since the judge did all he 
was required to do by listing them on the proper forms.  Also, the sentence—four 
years in prison, suspended immediately for 60 days Level IV probation to be 
                                          
 
14 Appendix to Op. Br. at A11–A18. 
15 Op. Br. at 9–10. 
16 Exhib. A to Op. Br. at 7. 
7 
 
served at the Violation of Probation Center, and followed by one year of 
probation—was within the statutory range for each of the charges.17  Therefore, the 
sentence was within prescribed statutory limits and there is no evidence the judge 
sentenced Moncavage on the basis of impermissible factors or with a closed mind. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
17 11 Del. C. §§ 1257(a), 4205(b)(7); 21 Del. C. § 4103(b).