Title: Francis v. Pountney

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Francis v. Pountney1999 WY 12972 P.2d 143Case Number: 98-76Decided: 02/04/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
William E. FRANCIS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

John A. POUNTNEY, Sr., 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Niobrara County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

 

Eric M. Alden, 
Wheatland, Wyoming, Representing the Appellant.

Julie Nye 
Tiedeken, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing the 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant William 
Francis appeals from the judgment which was entered on his negligence claim 
against Appellee John Pountney, Sr. and from the order denying his motion for a 
new trial.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Francis presents 
the following issues for our review:

1. Was the 
verdict on comparative negligence contrary to the great weight of the evidence 
and was it error to instruct on comparative negligence?

2. Was the 
verdict on damages contrary to the Defendant's admissions and the weight of the 
evidence?

3. Was it error 
for the Court to instruct on allocation of damages between the accident trauma 
and a pre-existing condition and to refuse to instruct on the burden of proof 
for establishing that allocation?

FACTS

[¶4]      This case 
involves an automobile accident which occurred on July 28, 1996. Pountney, who 
was accompanied by his wife and children, was driving a van south on U.S. 
Highway 85 between Lusk and Torrington. He and his wife saw two vehicles parked 
on the side of the road. Concerned that someone in the two vehicles might need 
assistance, Pountney turned around, drove back to the two cars, and stopped in 
front of them. The Pountneys soon determined that their assistance was not 
necessary and decided to resume their trip southward. Francis, who was traveling 
north in his pickup, came upon the scene at that moment. Pountney attempted to 
make a U-turn directly in front of Francis, and their vehicles 
collided.

[¶5]      Francis filed a 
complaint against Pountney, claiming that Pountney's negligence caused the 
accident. He asserted that he suffered injuries to his neck and his right knee 
as a result of the collision. Pountney answered, maintaining that Francis was 
comparatively negligent. The case was tried to a jury in January 1998. The jury 
found that Francis and Pountney were each fifty percent at fault for the 
accident. The jury also determined that Francis had not sustained damages. The 
trial court entered a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict, and Francis 
filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied Francis' motion, and 
Francis perfected his appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Comparative 
Negligence

[¶6]      Francis asserts 
that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that 
he was comparatively negligent. Pountney argues that the jury's verdict that 
Francis was fifty percent at fault in the accident was supported by sufficient 
evidence. We agree with Pountney.

[¶7]      In determining 
this issue, we apply our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support a jury's conclusions.

On review, this 
court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true. We 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party that conflicts with the evidence of the successful party, and we afford to 
the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it.

Kadrmas v. 
Valley West Homeowner's Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) (citation 
omitted). See also Cundy Asphalt Paving Construction, Inc. v. Angelo Materials 
Company, 915 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Wyo. 1996). The elements of a negligence claim 
are: (1) a duty; (2) a violation of that duty; (3) which violation is a 
proximate cause of; (4) injury to the claimant. John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 
954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998). Francis maintains that there was not sufficient 
evidence to establish the violation-of-duty and proximate-cause elements of 
Pountney's comparative negligence claim against him.

[¶8]      The trial court 
instructed the jury that "[a] driver has a duty to keep a proper lookout for 
others using the highway." The trial judge also told the jury that a driver must 
have his vehicle under reasonable control "by observing other use of the highway 
and being able to guide and direct his vehicle, to fix its speed and bring it to 
a stop in a reasonable distance. Failure to have such control is evidence of 
negligence."

[¶9]      The trial 
evidence, when considered in favor of Pountney, supports the jury's 
determination that Francis was fifty percent at fault in the accident. Robert 
Hill was an eyewitness to the accident and testified at the trial. Like Francis, 
Hill was traveling northbound on U.S. Highway 85 on the day of the accident. 
Hill testified that, as he neared the place where the vehicles were stopped on 
the side of the road, Francis passed him. Just when Francis moved back into the 
northbound lane of traffic after passing Hill, Pountney started to make his 
U-turn, and the parties collided. The accident occurred at the crest of a long 
hill, and the highway was marked with a double yellow line which prohibited 
passing. Francis acknowledged that the double yellow line continued down the 
hill for "a ways." The jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony 
that Francis passed Hill in a no-passing zone and that his action constituted 
evidence of negligence.

[¶10]   The jury also could have determined 
that Francis' speed was a factor in the accident. The posted speed limit was 
sixty-five miles per hour. Hill testified that he was driving between fifty and 
fifty-five miles per hour. He estimated that Francis was traveling sixty to 
sixty-five miles per hour when he passed him. Francis acknowledged that he had 
been driving sixty-five miles per hour prior to the accident, and he conceded 
that he slowed down only slightly when he noticed the vehicles parked by the 
side of the road. The highway patrolman who investigated the accident testified 
that Francis would have had a much better chance of avoiding the accident if he 
had slowed down significantly. Hill, who was traveling slower, did successfully 
avoid the accident. The jury could have determined from this evidence that 
Francis failed to keep his vehicle under control when he did not further reduce 
his speed as he approached the three vehicles.

[¶11]   In accordance with the trial 
court's instructions, Francis' failure to keep his vehicle under control was 
evidence of negligence. The jury also could have reasonably concluded that 
Francis' negligence, which included passing in a no-passing zone and failing to 
significantly reduce his speed, was a proximate cause of the accident. The 
verdict allocating fifty percent of the fault to Francis was, therefore, 
supported by sufficient evidence.

[¶12]   Francis claims that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury on comparative negligence because no evidence was 
presented at the trial to establish that he was negligent. Because we have 
determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury's determination that 
Francis was at fault in the accident, there was, obviously, evidence to support 
a jury instruction on that issue. See Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wyo. 1994). The trial court did not err by giving the 
comparative fault instruction.

B. 
Damages

[¶13]   The jury determined that Francis 
had not suffered damages as a result of the accident. Francis claims that the 
jury's zero-damages verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. As with 
the previous issue, we apply our well established standard for weighing the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Juries generally have great discretion in 
determining the amount of damages to be awarded. John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d  
at 1358; see also Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 
1278 (Wyo. 1985). We are reluctant to interfere with a jury's verdict on damages 
"unless the award, by its excessiveness or inadequacy, denotes passion, 
prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis." John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d  at 
1358. See also Union Pacific Railroad Company, 702 P.2d  at 
1278.

[¶14]   Francis claimed that his right knee 
and his neck were injured in the accident. The parties presented evidence to 
establish the extent to which Francis' knee and neck problems were a product of 
the accident and the extent to which they were a result of medical conditions 
that he suffered from prior to the accident.

[¶15]   Francis had undergone three 
surgical procedures on his right knee prior to the accident. The surgeries did 
not, however, completely resolve Francis' knee problems. The medical testimony 
confirmed that Francis had arthritis in his knee. His arthritic condition was 
progressive and would have grown worse regardless of whether or not he injured 
his knee in the accident.

[¶16]   Pountney presented evidence showing 
that Francis had been diagnosed with arthritis in his neck as early as 1987. 
Francis maintained that the arthritis in his neck did not cause him pain prior 
to the accident but that, after the accident, he suffered from pain and loss of 
range of motion in his neck. The medical testimony indicated, however, that a 
person with an arthritic condition like Francis' condition might experience 
symptoms which were similar to those symptoms that Francis complained about even 
without enduring a trauma to the neck. The jury could have reasonably concluded 
from this evidence that Francis' knee and neck symptoms were not a result of the 
accident and that he had not, therefore, suffered damages.

[¶17]   The parties also presented 
conflicting evidence at the trial as to the extent to which Francis' injuries 
affected his normal activities. Francis owned a ranch and a dirt moving 
business. He introduced evidence at the trial to show that, after the accident, 
he was not able to perform many of the ranching and construction activities he 
had engaged in prior to the accident. In contrast, Pountney offered testimony 
indicating that Francis continued to partake in those activities. This evidence 
suggested that Francis might not have been injured in the 
accident.

[¶18]   The evidence, when viewed in favor 
of Pountney, was sufficient to support the jury's determination that Francis had 
not suffered damages as a result of the accident. The verdict was not the result 
of passion, prejudice, bias, or other improper considerations, and we, 
therefore, refuse to interfere with it.

[¶19]   During her closing argument, 
Pountney's attorney made three statements in which she indicated she thought 
that Francis had some pain after his accident but that his injuries were less 
extensive than he claimed. Francis maintains that these statements were 
admissions that he sustained injuries in the accident. He argues, therefore, 
that Pountney should be bound by his attorney's admissions and that the 
statements were strong evidence that the zero-damages verdict was 
erroneous.

[¶20]   A judicial admission is an express 
waiver made in court by a party or his attorney conceding the truth of an 
alleged fact. Kohne v. Yost, 250 Mont. 109, 818 P.2d 360, 362 (1991). Under the 
right circumstances, an admission made by an attorney can be binding upon his 
client and constitute the basis for a verdict. Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 292 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Larson v. A.T.S.I, 859 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo.Ct.App. 
1993); see also World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1237 (Wyo. 1993). 
Such an admission can be made in closing argument. Childs, 563 F. Supp.  at 292; 
World Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d  at 1237; Kohne, 818 P.2d  at 
362.

[¶21]   In order to be considered an 
admission, the attorney's statement must be unequivocal. Childs, 563 F. Supp.  at 
292; Baxter v. Gannaway, 113 N.M. 45, 822 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Ct.App.), cert. 
denied, 113 N.M. 16, 820 P.2d 1330 (1991). An admission is a declaration 
relating to factual matters; a statement of personal opinion is not an 
admission. Baxter, 822 P.2d  at 1133; Larson, 859 P.2d  at 276. In determining 
whether a statement made by counsel is an admission, we must consider the 
circumstances of the case and the context of the statements. Baxter, 822 P.2d  at 
1133; Kohne, 818 P.2d  at 362. If ambiguity or doubt exists as to whether or not 
the attorney's statement was an admission, we presume that the attorney did not 
intend to make a judicial admission during his argument. Baxter, 822 P.2d  at 
1133.

[¶22]   With these principles in mind, we 
conclude that the statements made by Pountney's attorney during her closing 
argument were not judicial admissions. The attorney was obviously expressing her 
personal opinion because she qualified each of her statements with the words "I 
think." Furthermore, when we consider the attorney's statements in the context 
of her entire closing argument and the circumstances of the case, it is clear 
that Pountney did not concede that Francis had suffered damages as a result of 
the accident. The statements made by Pountney's counsel do not undermine our 
confidence in the jury's determination.

[¶23]   Finally, Francis contends that the 
trial court erred by instructing the jury on allocating the damages between the 
accident trauma and Francis' preexisting condition and by refusing to instruct 
the jury on the burden of proof for establishing the allocation. The jury 
determined that Francis had not suffered damages as a result of the accident, 
and we have concluded that sufficient evidence supported that determination. 
Accordingly, the basis for allocating Francis' damages between the accident 
trauma and his preexisting condition is irrelevant. See Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 555-57, 558 (Wyo. 1998). We do not, therefore, need to address this 
issue.

[¶24]   Affirmed.