Title: Greene v. Philip Morris USA Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13330 
 
PATRICIA WALSH GREENE1 & another2  vs.  PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.  
& another.3 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 4, 2023. - May 9, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Tobacco.  Conspiracy.  Fraud.  Evidence, Conspiracy, Fraud.  
Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act, Sale of 
cigarettes, Damages.  Damages, Consumer protection case, 
Interest.  Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, Waiver, 
Consumer protection case, Damages, Interest.  Interest. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 25, 2015. 
 
The case was tried before Hélène Kazanjian, J., and motions 
for posttrial relief were heard by her. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
1 Individually and as personal representative of the estate 
of Frederick Douglas Greene, Jr. 
 
2 Thomas D. Walsh, Jr., personal representative of the 
estate of Frederick Douglas Greene, Jr. 
 
3 Star Markets Company, Inc. 
2 
 
Scott A. Chesin (Elliott M. Davis also present) for Philip 
Morris USA Inc. 
Michael B. Bogdanow (Andrew Rainer also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Jessica E. Garland, of California, Stuart T. Rossman, & 
Matthew W.H. Wessler for National Consumer Law Center. 
Jennifer A. Creedon, Lauren E. Mankowski, & Kyle Bjornlund 
for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. 
Jeffrey R. White, of the District of Columbia, Thomas R. 
Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, J. Michael Conley, & Leslie-Anne Taylor 
for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys & another. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  After smoking Marlboro brand cigarettes for 
decades, the plaintiff Patricia Walsh Greene developed lung 
cancer, forcing her to undergo a difficult course of treatment 
that included chemotherapy, radiation therapy, and multiple 
brain surgeries.  She subsequently brought suit against the 
cigarette manufacturer, Philip Morris USA Inc. (Philip Morris).  
After a lengthy trial, a Superior Court jury returned a verdict 
for Philip Morris on Greene's negligence and breach of warranty 
claims, but found for Greene on claims alleging two different 
types of civil conspiracy.4  Thereafter, the trial judge, who had 
reserved for herself Greene's claim under G. L. c. 93A, entered 
findings, rulings, and an order for judgment for Greene on that 
claim.  Posttrial, Philip Morris moved for judgment 
 
4 The jury also found for Greene's husband, Frederick 
Douglas Greene, Jr., on his loss of consortium claim; he passed 
away during the pendency of the suit.  Additionally, Philip 
Morris's codefendant, Star Markets Company, Inc., was found not 
liable. 
3 
 
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and also moved 
for modification of the judgments.  Those motions were denied, 
Philip Morris timely appealed, and we transferred the case sua 
sponte from the Appeals Court. 
 
In this appeal, Philip Morris argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the judgments against it, or in 
the alternative that it is entitled to a new trial because the 
jury's instructions on conspiracy included "substantial 
contributing factor" causation language -- erroneously, 
according to Philip Morris, in the wake of our decision in Doull 
v. Foster, 487 Mass. 1 (2021).  Finally, Philip Morris argues 
that the twelve percent pre- and postjudgment statutory interest 
rates are unconstitutional. 
 
We conclude that the jury verdict against Philip Morris for 
civil conspiracy and the trial judge's finding of liability 
under G. L. c. 93A were supported by the evidence.  We further 
conclude that Philip Morris's only objections to the 
"substantial contributing factor" language in the causation 
instructions were in the context of instructions on the breach 
of warranty claim; it failed to object during the discussion of 
the substantially distinct causation instructions regarding the 
conspiracy claims, and thus has waived that argument for the 
purposes of this appeal.  Finally, we conclude that the 
Legislature's pre- and postjudgment interest rates pass rational 
4 
 
basis review and, thus, are constitutional.  We therefore 
affirm.5 
 
1.  Background.  Because Philip Morris contends that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict on 
conspiracy, we summarize the trial evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs.  Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 
465 Mass. 411, 417 (2013). 
 
a.  Greene's smoking history.  Greene grew up surrounded by 
advertising and promotion for Marlboro cigarettes -- on 
television, in movies, on billboards, and in magazines.  Greene 
smoked her first Marlboro cigarette in 1971, at the age of 
thirteen, and soon became addicted.  As a teenager, she received 
many small packs of cigarettes as free samples, most of them 
Marlboro.  By the time she was in high school, she smoked a full 
pack of cigarettes a day. 
 
Before she was able to permanently quit smoking in 1995, 
she had tried to quit "all the time," employing strategies 
ranging from nicotine patches to hypnotism.  She was not 
successful, although she did manage to stop smoking for nine 
months, in 1979 and 1980. 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association; the National Consumer 
Law Center; and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and 
American Association for Justice. 
5 
 
 
After that nine-month pause, Greene elected to switch from 
smoking regular Marlboro Red cigarettes to Marlboro Lights.  
Greene saw advertisements for Marlboro Lights promising that 
they delivered less tar and less nicotine -- "less of the bad 
stuff," as she put it.  She made the switch because she wanted a 
healthier alternative to regular Marlboros.  Greene went on to 
smoke a pack a day of Marlboro Lights for well over a decade.  
In 1995, after a scare during a surgical procedure, Greene was 
able to stop smoking for good. 
 
In 2013, Greene was diagnosed with lung cancer.  She 
underwent a lobectomy and began chemotherapy, but was forced to 
discontinue it after it led to permanent kidney damage.  By 
2018, the cancer had spread to her brain, necessitating multiple 
surgeries and radiation; the continuing cancer recurrence also 
makes her ineligible for a kidney transplant. 
 
b.  The conspiracy among Philip Morris and other cigarette 
manufacturers.  One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, Dr. 
Kenneth Cummings, provided extensive testimony regarding the 
cigarette industry and the conduct of its members.  In December 
of 1953, the executives of the largest American tobacco 
companies, including Philip Morris, met in New York City to 
discuss a coordinated response to published studies 
substantiating a link between smoking and lung cancer.  Although 
they internally admitted "that their own advertising and 
6 
 
competitive practices have been a principal factor in creating a 
health problem,"6 they committed to a "united front against the 
claims that . . . cigarette smoking causes cancer."  To that 
end, they hired a public relations firm to undertake a "positive 
. . . entirely 'pro-cigarettes'" campaign, and established the 
Tobacco Industry Research Committee (later renamed the Council 
for Tobacco Research).7 
 
A primary strategy of the coordinated campaign was "to 
overwhelm" the voices of those who challenged cigarettes as 
unhealthy "with mass publication of opposed viewpoints."  Its 
first salvo was a full-page statement published in over 400 
newspapers in January of 1954, titled "A Frank Statement to 
Cigarette Smokers," and signed by fourteen cigarette and tobacco 
companies, including Philip Morris.  Contrary to the 
understanding reflected in the signatories' internal company 
documents, the statement told the public that "there is no proof 
that cigarette smoking" caused cancer, and that the cigarette 
 
6 The attendees were also well aware of the addictive nature 
of cigarettes.  One executive noted, "It's fortunate for us that 
cigarettes are a habit they can't break." 
 
7 They elected to act through an "informal committee" rather 
than establish a trade association because of antitrust 
concerns.  In a 1978 memorandum, this research committee would 
be referred to by an industry executive as a "front" and a 
"shield" for the industry. 
7 
 
companies "believe[d] the products [they] make are not injurious 
to health." 
For decades, the cigarette companies continued to publicly 
deny that smoking caused cancer or was addictive, even as their 
internal documents showed otherwise.  The record is rich with 
examples, with a representative sample here focusing on Philip 
Morris:  In 1955, Philip Morris's research head said on a news 
program that there was "[nothing in smoke] that give[s] us any 
cause for concern."  In response to a critical 1964 report by 
the Surgeon General, a Philip Morris director told CBS News that 
the industry denied that there were "any bad elements" in 
cigarette smoke.  In a 1976 interview, a Philip Morris executive 
denied that any research existed that could prove that its 
products caused cancer, implored viewers to "read both sides" of 
the issue, and promised that "if the company, as a whole, 
believed cigarettes were really harmful, we would not be in the 
business."  In 1994, Philip Morris's president testified before 
Congress that there was no proof that smoking was addictive or 
caused cancer. 
As Dr. Cummings summarized, Philip Morris and its fellow 
cigarette manufacturers spent billions of dollars to execute a 
pervasive and long-lasting public relations campaign "to hide 
the truth about what they knew about the dangers of their 
8 
 
cigarettes."  This campaign lasted through Greene's childhood 
and the entire period that she smoked. 
c.  Cigarette manufacturers and alternative product lines.  
Dr. Cummings also testified regarding the efforts of cigarette 
companies to design and market different cigarette product 
lines.  Philip Morris's head of sales determined in 1964 that, 
given the persistent health-based opposition to cigarette 
smoking, it would be advantageous for the industry to "give 
smokers a psychological crutch and a self-rationale to continue 
smoking." 
One form of "crutch" was alternative product lines, which 
included "filtered" or "light" cigarettes.  According to Dr. 
Cummings, cigarette manufacturers introduced these "as a way of 
reassuring smokers you could still do it and not suffer the same 
risks."8  Internal Philip Morris market research bore this out, 
showing that many consumers believed light cigarettes to be 
healthier than regular cigarettes.  This belief, however, was 
misplaced:  research by Philip Morris showed that smokers of 
light cigarettes would adjust their manner of smoking, resulting 
 
8 Additional testimony on this subject was provided by the 
plaintiffs' marketing expert, Dr. Marvin Goldberg, who opined 
that (1) Philip Morris principally targeted teenagers in its 
advertising and marketing, (2) Philip Morris's promotion 
conveyed that its Marlboro Light cigarettes were safer than 
regular cigarettes, and (3) Philip Morris's advertising and 
marketing successfully caused consumers to both start smoking 
and, once started, to continue smoking. 
9 
 
in equal or greater amounts of tar and nicotine consumption 
compared to smoking nonlight cigarettes.  Philip Morris never 
disclosed this to its consumers.9  Finally, Philip Morris never 
disclosed to its consumers that internal research it conducted 
in the late 1970s showed that the smoke of its filtered 
cigarette products, such as Marlboro Lights, was more mutagenic 
than the smoke from its regular cigarettes.  Mutagenicity refers 
to the ability of a substance to damage deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA); damaged DNA is the first step toward development of 
cancer. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Evidence of conspiracy.  Philip Morris 
argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support 
the jury's findings of liability on the claims alleging civil 
conspiracy.  Massachusetts law recognizes two distinct theories 
of liability under the umbrella term of "civil conspiracy":  
"concerted action" conspiracy, Gurney v. Tenney, 197 Mass. 457, 
466 (1908); and "true conspiracy" based on coconspirators 
exerting "some 'peculiar power of coercion,'" Fleming v. Dane, 
304 Mass. 46, 50 (1939), quoting DesLauries v. Shea, 300 Mass. 
 
9 Philip Morris marketing used tar and nicotine delivery 
measurements from a standardized Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
"smoking machine" test.  Philip Morris knew that such numbers 
were inaccurate in real-world smoking scenarios and that, even 
if the FTC test showed lower numbers for light as compared to 
regular cigarettes, smokers would not actually receive less tar 
and nicotine from light cigarettes. 
10 
 
30, 33 (1938).  See Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 188 
(1998).  The jury returned a verdict for Greene on both 
theories, including independent findings of causation, and thus 
we may uphold the jury's verdict if we find either theory 
supported by the evidence and otherwise free of error.  Evans, 
465 Mass. at 423 n.7 ("With separate findings of causation, a 
jury's award of compensatory damages may be affirmed on appeal 
on one theory of liability even where an appellate court finds 
instructional error or insufficiency of evidence as to another 
theory"). 
We first turn to the concerted action theory, which is 
"akin to a theory of common law joint liability in tort."  Aetna 
Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1564 (1st Cir. 
1994).  This theory "applies to a common plan to commit a 
tortious act where the participants know of the plan and its 
purpose and take affirmative steps to encourage the achievement 
of the result."  Kurker, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 189, quoting Stock 
v. Fife, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 75, 82 n.10 (1982).  See Gurney, 197 
Mass. at 466 ("if [defendants] acted jointly, each would be 
liable for any actionable representations made by the others by 
which the wrong was finally accomplished").  See also Kyte v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 408 Mass. 162, 167 (1990) (conspiracy claim 
must fail where "record shows that there was no common design or 
11 
 
concerted action between Philip Morris and [retail seller of 
cigarettes]"). 
 
Here, the underlying tort Greene alleged was fraudulent 
misrepresentation -- that Philip Morris and its coconspirators 
misrepresented the health consequences of cigarettes and their 
addictiveness.  See Masingill v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532, 540 
(2007), quoting Kilroy v. Barron, 326 Mass. 464, 465 (1950) ("To 
recover for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff 'must 
allege and prove that the defendant made a false representation 
of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity for the purpose 
of inducing the plaintiff to act thereon, and that the plaintiff 
relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to 
[her] damage'").  Apart from referring to an "alleged" 
conspiracy, Philip Morris does not on appeal dispute that the 
plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence of agreement between 
it and the other cigarette entities to deceive the public about 
the dangers of smoking, nor does it dispute the falsity of many 
of the coconspirators' statements in evidence.  Further, Philip 
Morris does not dispute the evidence of medical causation, i.e., 
that smoking causes the type of cancer from which Greene 
suffered. 
Instead, Philip Morris attacks the causal connection 
between the conspirators' acts and Greene's smoking, especially 
reliance.  It first asserts that the plaintiffs failed to show 
12 
 
that Greene actually relied upon any of the coconspirators' 
misrepresentations, citing to Greene's testimony that she 
started smoking because of Marlboro advertisements that said 
nothing at all about the risks of smoking, and her admission 
that she had not read (nor even heard of) various documents 
prepared by the conspirators, including those produced by the 
Tobacco Industry Research Committee. 
This view of the evidence is far too narrow.  In assessing 
sufficiency of the evidence "[w]e review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict, assessing whether 
anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any 
combination of circumstances could be found from which a 
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, 
LLC, 489 Mass. 514, 528 (2022).  Through that lens, the evidence 
showed that the conspiracy, of which Philip Morris was a 
significant part, undertook a unified, pervasive campaign to 
hide the true health risks of smoking from prospective and 
actual smokers, by overwhelming and drowning out the voices 
seeking to establish the dangers of smoking with mass 
publication of false and deceptive pseudoscientific statements 
regarding their safety.  The effect was to create a smoke screen 
of deception and disinformation concealing the true dangers of 
cigarette smoking, including the dangers of the "low tar and 
13 
 
nicotine" cigarettes being marketed to her as a safer 
alternative, despite the industry's knowledge of compensation 
and the mutagenic effects of smoking such cigarettes.  A 
reasonable jury could conclude that Greene was exposed to this 
smoke screen of misinformation, or at least its over-all 
effects, as well as the deceptive marketing campaign, 
particularly that directed at low tar and nicotine cigarettes, 
and that all of this fraud and deception helped to conceal the 
dangers of continuing to smoke from her.  See Sullivan v. Five 
Acres Realty Trust, 487 Mass. 64, 73-74 (2021), quoting Boston 
Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Brooks, 309 Mass. 52, 55 (1941) 
("Deception need not be direct to come within reach of the law.  
Declarations and conduct calculated to mislead and which in fact 
do mislead one who is acting reasonably are enough to constitute 
fraud"). 
Of course, plaintiffs seeking to prove reliance must do 
more than introduce evidence that falsehoods were in the air, 
however pervasively:  they must establish causation by proving 
that they themselves relied on those falsehoods.  "The element 
of reliance overlaps with (and may be considered a form of) the 
usual requirement in tort that a defendant's wrong be a factual 
or 'but for' cause of the harm that the plaintiff suffered."  
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Economic Harm § 11 
comment a (2020).  See Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
14 
 
338 So. 3d 831, 838-840 (Fla. 2022) (discussing reliance as 
applied to fraud claims against cigarette companies).  "Only 
recipients of the defendants' statements were capable of being 
deceived by those statements.  No statements, no deception, no 
causation."  Prentice, supra at 840. 
In the case at bar, we conclude that Greene has met this 
requirement by introducing evidence of her detrimental reliance 
on the conspiracy's misrepresentations regarding filtered 
cigarettes.  Philip Morris represented that such products, 
including Marlboro Lights, delivered lower tar and nicotine and 
were a healthier alternative to regular cigarettes.  Given 
Philip Morris's research regarding compensation and 
mutagenicity, the jury could find that these representations 
were knowingly false.  Greene testified that she received these 
false messages, that she believed them, and that she switched to 
Marlboro Lights because of this belief.  Particularly against 
the backdrop of her exposure to the conspiracy's broader 
disinformation campaign, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Greene was exposed to the fraud and deception in the particular 
marketing and messaging regarding filtered cigarettes and that 
she relied on it to justify her continuing to smoke Marlboro 
Lights.  Compare Philip Morris USA Inc. vs. Holliman, Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App., No. 3D19-1739 (Dec. 14, 2022) (finding sufficient 
evidence of reliance where testimony was that [1] coconspirators 
15 
 
made misrepresentations regarding health risks of smoking on 
television programs, [2] decedent watched those or similar 
programs, and [3] after watching them decedent expressed belief 
that smoking was not harmful and continued to smoke), with Brown 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 38 F.4th 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 
2022) (finding insufficient evidence of reliance where plaintiff 
only testified to "brief recollection of a Marlboro Man 
advertisement, but . . . could not explain what it was about the 
Marlboro Man advertisement that influenced her decision to 
smoke"). 
Philip Morris also argues that Greene could not rely on the 
conspirator's statements to her detriment because she testified 
that she was aware that smoking was dangerous, yet chose to 
smoke anyway.  Cf. Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 
399, 403 (2021) ("Philip Morris argued that [decedent] caused 
his own death because, despite being adequately informed of the 
health risks of smoking, [he] chose to smoke, and then chose not 
to quit smoking").  This argument again oversimplifies the 
evidence.  The conspirators expressly misrepresented to the 
public that they would not have been in the business of selling 
cigarettes if cigarettes were truly dangerous, and Greene 
explicitly bought into that false messaging.  Given the extent 
of the efforts of the coconspirators to deceive the public and 
conceal the health risks of smoking -- including its highly 
16 
 
addictive nature and the comparative dangers of filtered 
cigarettes, which were marketed as being lower in tar and 
nicotine and, thus, a safer alternative when the conspirators 
knew they were not due to compensation -- the jury could have 
found that Greene would have smoked less, or quit sooner, absent 
the conspiracy's campaign of fraud and deception.  See United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 475 
(D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1025 (2010) ("even 
though low tar smokers may have a greater desire to quit, the 
misperception of increased safety associated with low tar 
cigarettes persuades them to avoid quitting").  Indeed, Greene's 
decision to switch to Marlboro Lights shows that her perception 
of the health impact of smoking affected her smoking choices. 
In sum, the plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to 
support the verdict in their favor for civil conspiracy.10  The 
 
10 Because we find Greene's concerted action theory of civil 
conspiracy to be supported by the evidence, we need not evaluate 
the alternate theory found by the jury, that of true conspiracy.  
See Evans, 465 Mass. at 423 n.7.  To prevail on a true 
conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove that alleged 
conspirators agreed to accomplish an unlawful purpose or "a 
lawful purpose by unlawful means," Willett v. Herrick, 242 Mass. 
471, 479-480 (1922), and then caused harm to the plaintiff via 
"some 'peculiar power of coercion'" that they would not have 
had, had they been acting independently (citation omitted), 
DesLauries, 300 Mass. at 33.  We have noted, however, that 
"instances of conspiracy which is in itself an independent tort 
are rare and should be added to with caution."  Fleming, 304 
 
17 
 
trial judge did not err in denying Philip Morris's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. 
 
b.  Jury instructions, and objections.  The defendant, 
relying on our recent decision in Doull, 487 Mass. 1, contends 
that the judge erroneously instructed the jury on causation on 
all counts, including the conspiracy counts, by including 
language about substantial contributing factor rather than but-
for causation.  In Doull, supra at 19, we considered the 
argument of plaintiffs in a medical negligence case that they 
were entitled to a jury instruction on "substantial contributing 
factor" causation.  We ultimately concluded that "a but-for 
standard, rather than a substantial factor standard, is the 
appropriate standard for factual causation in negligence cases 
involving multiple alleged causes of the harm," when but-for 
causation can be established.  Id. at 16-17. 
 
In the case at bar, the judge used substantial factor 
terminology as part of the jury instructions on conspiracy.  On 
 
Mass. at 50.  In the instant case, the plaintiffs contend that 
the peculiar power of coercion derived from the cigarette 
companies' unified, pervasive campaign to hide the true health 
risks of smoking, which would not have been so powerful and 
effective had companies in the conspiracy broken ranks.  As 
there is, however, little guiding authority for the application 
of the true conspiracy theory in the context of cigarette 
litigation, see Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 199 So. 3d 
465, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), overruled in part by Odom 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So. 3d 268 (2018), we conclude 
it to be prudent not to address and resolve the issue 
unnecessarily. 
18 
 
the concerted action theory, however, the judge also further 
defined substantial contributing factor to mean that the 
plaintiff "reasonably relied on a false statement and that she 
was injured as a result."  The judge also instructed on the 
power of coercion theory, that the jury were to determine 
whether the "cancer resulted from the power exercised by" the 
conspirators.  As such, the inclusion of substantial 
contributing factor language did not invite the jury to skip the 
causation inquiry altogether.  See Doull, 487 Mass. at 15 
(including instruction on substantial contributing factor 
without but-for causation instruction in cases in which but-for 
causation can be established "invite[s] jurors to skip the 
factual causation inquiry altogether"). 
 
To pursue its argument on this issue on appeal, however, 
Philip Morris must show that it properly raised and argued it 
before the trial court.  "As provided by the Massachusetts Rules 
of Civil Procedure, '[n]o party may assign as error the giving 
or failure to give an instruction unless [the party] objects 
thereto before the jury retire[] to consider [their] verdict, 
stating distinctly the matter to which [the party] objects and 
the grounds of [the] objection.'"  Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 431 
Mass. 748, 750–751 (2000), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 51 (b), 365 
Mass. 816 (1974).  "The primary purpose of the rule is to put 
the judge on notice of the issue," and thus, "[a] party 
19 
 
objecting to the inclusion or exclusion of an instruction must 
. . . clearly bring the objection and the grounds for it to the 
attention of the judge."  Rotkiewicz, supra at 751. 
 
No such notice was given here on the conspiracy 
instructions.  The manner in which Philip Morris's trial counsel 
treated each claim during the charge conference provides an 
instructive contrast.  The parties began the charge conference 
by discussing the instructions for Greene's warranty claim.  
Philip Morris requested a more explicit "but-for" causation 
instruction, in substitution for, or in addition to, the judge's 
proposed instruction on "substantial contributing factor" 
causation.  The conference next turned to the plaintiffs' 
negligence claim.  Here, counsel for Philip Morris referenced 
his earlier "vociferous and long-winded" objection regarding the 
substantial contributing factor language.11 
 
The transcript of the discussion of the proposed 
instructions on conspiracy, however, tells a different story.  
There, counsel for Philip Morris made no substantive objection, 
or even reference to his prior objections to the substantial 
 
11 We disagree with Philip Morris that any further objection 
would have been futile.  Although the trial judge at times 
expressed some exasperation with Philip Morris's counsel during 
the charge conference, she also assured him multiple times that 
he had the right to lodge objections as he saw fit, and she made 
some changes in response to his requests, including in her 
instruction on foreseeability on the negligence count. 
20 
 
contributing factor language.12  Indeed, his only recommendation 
regarding causation instructions on the conspiracy was a 
grammatical correction.  In contrast to the warranty claim, 
where the objection was made, and the negligence claim, where 
the objection was at least briefly raised, there is no 
indication in the record that the judge was on notice of Philip 
Morris's objection to the causation instructions on the 
 
 
12 To be sure, "the requirements of [Mass. R. Civ. P. 
51 (b)] may be satisfied in a variety of ways."  Rotkiewicz, 431 
Mass. at 751.  But the cases where we have found them satisfied 
have consistently contained more evidence of the judge being on 
notice than we find in the case at bar.  In Tenczar v. Indian 
Pond Country Club, Inc., 491 Mass. 89, 98 (2022), failure to 
object to a final jury instruction was not waiver where the 
contested issue had been raised in "opening remarks, throughout 
trial, and in multiple motions," with the parties and the judge 
having had multiple opportunities to argue the issue. 
 
 
Similarly, in Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 751-752, 
notwithstanding that it would have been "better practice . . . 
for defense counsel to renew the objection, with specificity," 
we concluded that there was no waiver where the trial judge 
"acknowledge[d] his awareness of the issue, explicitly ruled on 
it, and expressed his intention not to instruct as requested."  
Nowhere in the case at bar, however, did the defendant object to 
the causation instructions as to the conspiracy causes of 
action, and nowhere did the trial judge acknowledge that she had 
considered the specific issue and noted Philip Morris's specific 
objection.  See Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 Mass. 62, 66 
(1993) ("Counsel proceeds at considerable peril in objecting to 
a jury charge simply by reference to discussions had, and 
rulings made, during a charge conference, in the absence of some 
acknowledgement by the judge that the procedure was sufficient 
to alert the judge to the grounds of the objection").  There 
were also, as emphasized supra, multiple aspects to the 
causation instruction on the conspiracy counts, and not just 
substantial contributing factor language, making the objection 
to substantial contributing factor language in the warranty and, 
arguably, negligence contexts even less meaningful. 
21 
 
conspiracy claims, including the substantial factor language.  
The judge's instructions on conspiracy also, as explained supra, 
included specific causation requirements making clear, on the 
concerted action theory, that "substantial contributing factor" 
meant that the plaintiff "reasonably relied on a false statement 
and that she was injured as a result," and on the power of 
coercion theory, that the jury were to determine whether the 
"cancer resulted from the power exercised by" the conspirators.13  
If these additional causation instructions and clarifications 
were not enough to satisfy Philip Morris, it needed to expressly 
say so.  Accordingly, the issue is waived. 
c.  Evidence of violation of G. L. c. 93A.  After the jury 
verdict, the trial judge considered Greene's G. L. c. 93A claim.  
Because this claim is limited to Philip Morris's conduct after 
G. L. c. 93A's amendment in 1979,14 to prevail, Greene was 
required to show a causal link after 1979 between Philip 
Morris's deception regarding Marlboro Lights -- the only 
 
13 We note that the judge was not simply copying from the 
model instructions on conspiracy.  Rather she added case-
specific causation language.  The conspiracy instructions' 
tailored nature should have been another indication to Philip 
Morris that it needed to lodge specific objections to the 
particular causation language proposed. 
 
14 "The relevant 1979 amendments thus clarified that the 
Legislature intended to permit recovery when an unfair or 
deceptive act caused a personal injury loss . . . even if the 
consumer lost no 'money' or 'property.'"  Hershenow v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 798 (2006). 
22 
 
cigarette Greene was smoking by that point -- and her cancer.  
As the trial judge explained, Greene was required to "establish 
that Philip Morris's deceptive statements caused her to continue 
to smoke."15  See Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 
Mass. 500, 503 (2011).  See also Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 
451 Mass. 623, 630 n.12 (2008). 
The trial judge found such deception and a causal link to 
Greene's continued smoking.  She found that Greene, a regular 
smoker since 1971, quit smoking Marlboro Reds sometime around 
1979-1980, and then relapsed and switched to smoking Marlboro 
Lights.  The judge further found that from 1979 until Greene 
stopped smoking in 1995, Philip Morris engaged in unfair and 
deceptive acts within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A.  More 
specifically, the judge found that Philip Morris marketed 
Marlboro Lights as a cigarette with lower tar and nicotine, even 
though 
"Philip Morris knew and failed to disclose that due to 
smoker compensation, Marlboro Lights did not deliver lower 
levels of tar and nicotine as compared to Marlboro Reds.  
Philip Morris also knew and failed to disclose that the 
smoke from Marlboro Lights was more mutagenic, and, 
therefore, more likely to cause genetic damage as compared 
to the smoke from Marlboro Reds.  Finally, Philip Morris 
knew that consumers believed that Marlboro Lights were 
healthier than Marlboro Reds.  Nevertheless, despite this 
knowledge, Philip Morris continued to market Marlboro 
Lights as a lower tar and nicotine cigarette until 2003, 
 
15 There is no dispute on appeal that there was sufficient 
evidence introduced at trial to prove that Greene's smoking 
caused her cancer. 
23 
 
with the intention of misleading consumers into believing 
that Marlboro Lights were a healthier alternative to 
Marlboro Reds." 
 
The judge also found that this deception caused Greene to 
switch to Marlboro Lights and continue to smoke: 
"[Greene] switched to Marlboro Lights because she believed 
that if she smoked them, as opposed to Marlboro Reds, she 
would have a reduced risk of health problems.  Her 
motivation to quit was diminished as long as she held this 
belief.  In light of Philip Morris's explicit efforts to 
convince consumers that Marlboro Lights were a healthier 
option, it was reasonable for [Greene] to hold this 
belief." 
 
The judge further found that "such deception played a material 
role in [Greene's] choice to smoke Marlboro Lights" and that, 
ultimately, her cancer was caused by her continuing to smoke 
Marlboro Lights. 
 
Philip Morris challenges only the trial judge's finding of 
causation, arguing that, where Greene was already addicted to 
cigarettes prior to 1979, any of its advertising messages after 
that point could not have influenced her smoking choices.  See 
DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 101 (1983).  We 
disagree.  As the trial judge found, Greene switched to Marlboro 
Lights after quitting for a period in 1979-1980.  During this 
time, and for years afterwards, Marlboro Lights were being 
promoted as a smoking option with lower tar and nicotine, and 
thus a healthier alternative to regular Marlboros.  Reducing her 
exposure to tar and nicotine was also Greene's motivation for 
24 
 
switching to Lights.  Further, there was evidence from internal 
Philip Morris documents and expert testimony that smokers 
regarded light cigarettes as an alternative to quitting.  This 
evidence as a whole supported the trial judge's determination 
that Philip Morris's deceptive acts caused Greene to switch to 
light cigarettes and continue smoking, rather than quit. 
 
Finally, the trial judge trebled the damages, concluding 
that "Philip Morris's conduct was indeed willful and knowing.  
Philip Morris engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to 
deceive consumers, including [Greene,] about the relative health 
risks of Marlboro Lights."  As there was ample evidence of a 
willful and knowing deception, we affirm the trial judge's G. L. 
c. 93A decision in full. 
d.  Statutory interest rate.  On the matter of interest 
imposed on awards of damages, two statutes are directly at issue 
here:  G. L. c. 231, § 6B (prejudgment interest); and G. L. 
c. 235, § 8 (postjudgment interest).  Section 6B provides the 
fixed rate imposed: 
"In any action in which a verdict is rendered or a finding 
made or an order for judgment made for pecuniary damages 
for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for consequential 
damages, or for damage to property, there shall be added by 
the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest 
thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the 
date of the commencement of the action even though such 
interest brings the amount of the verdict or finding beyond 
the maximum liability imposed by law" (emphasis added). 
 
Section 8 complements this provision, stating in relevant part: 
25 
 
"When judgment is rendered . . . upon the verdict of a jury 
or the finding of a justice, interest shall be computed 
upon the amount of the . . . verdict or finding from the 
time when made to the time the judgment is entered.  Every 
judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest from 
the day of its entry at the same rate per annum as provided 
for prejudgment interest . . . ." 
 
Philip Morris argues that the twelve percent pre- and 
postjudgment interest rates, under current market conditions, 
are excessive in violation of its due process rights under the 
Federal and State Constitutions and cannot survive rational 
basis judicial review.  Demonstrating a lack of rational basis 
is a high bar for Philip Morris to overcome.  Under this 
standard, the statute must only "bear a reasonable relation to a 
permissible legislative objective" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 707 (1982).  
Furthermore, "it is well settled that a statute is presumed to 
be constitutional and every rational presumption in favor of the 
statute's validity is made" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 152 (2011).  "The 
challenging party bears the burden of demonstrating beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there are no conceivable grounds [that] 
could support its validity" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Id. at 152-153. 
 
As we have explained, "[t]he purpose of prejudgment 
interest under G. L. c. 231, § 6B, is 'to compensate a damaged 
party for the loss of use or the unlawful detention of money'" 
26 
 
(citation omitted).  McEvoy Travel Bur., Inc. v. Norton Co., 408 
Mass. 704, 717 (1990).  The same is true for postjudgment 
interest.  Both are intended to make the injured party whole.  
See id.  The purpose of these statutes is "not to penalize the 
wrongdoer" or provide punitive damages.  See id. 
 
Despite drawing a clear distinction between compensatory 
and punitive damages, we have been somewhat less clear regarding 
awards with interest that result in overpayment to the damaged 
party.  Although "[t]he damaged party is entitled to a return on 
the money that the party would have had but for the other 
party's wrongdoing[, t]o give the damaged party more than that 
would go beyond the purpose of the statute."  Id. 
 
Counsel for Philip Morris essentially argues that "a 
significantly above-market interest rate, i.e., a flat twelve 
per cent rate," in today's much lower interest rate environment 
as compared to when the rate was set in 198216 provides "a 
windfall for plaintiffs, mak[ing] them 'more than whole,'" and 
thus "run[s] contrary to the policy underlying interest awards."  
See Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 434 
 
16 We have previously discussed and reviewed the limited 
legislative history of the fixed interest rate in G. L. c. 231, 
§ 6B:  "In 1974, the Legislature fixed interest at eight per 
cent per annum.  St. 1974, c. 224, § 1.  The rate was increased 
to ten per cent in 1980, St. 1980, c. 322, § 2, and the present 
twelve per cent . . . rate in 1982.  St. 1982, c. 183, § 2."  
Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 434 Mass. 
340, 347 n.10 (2001). 
27 
 
Mass. 340, 346-347 (2001) (Labor Relations Comm'n).  This rate, 
Philip Morris argues, provides "a strong incentive to settle 
cases or to not appeal cases that would otherwise not be settled 
and would otherwise be appealed," rendering it more punitive 
than compensatory. 
 
The plaintiffs disagree, explaining that, because the time 
periods during which interest accrues have highly variable 
market rates, the statutory rate avoids such fluctuations and 
promotes administrative ease in calculating the loss of use of 
money -- all of which, the plaintiffs claim, provide reasonable 
legislative purposes.  See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. 
McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 
(1983) ("Section 6B establishes a simple, mechanical rule").  
They further note that the twelve percent interest rate is not 
out of line when compared to the rate of return on the S&P 500 
stock market index. 
 
In response, Philip Morris references two statutes that set 
interest rates based on the "[w]eekly average one-year constant 
maturity Treasury yield," based on "the calendar week preceding 
the date of the judgment."  See G. L. c. 231, § 6I (judgments 
against Commonwealth);17 G. L. c. 231, § 60K (medical 
 
 
17 In Labor Relations Comm'n, we addressed the fixed twelve 
percent rate in G. L. c. 231, § 6B, as applied to remedial 
orders issued by the Labor Relations Commission after the 
 
28 
 
malpractice).  While § 6I caps the interest rate, as calculated 
by the aforementioned Treasury yield, at "ten percent per 
annum," § 60K applies an interest rate of the "Treasury yield 
plus [two] per cent," which is then capped at the interest rate 
set forth in § 6B -- i.e., twelve percent.18  Pegged to 
fluctuating securities, these statutes demonstrate, according to 
 
passage of G. L. c. 231, § 6I.  That case is distinguishable 
from the facts at hand because our decision there hinged on 
changes in the statutory scheme.  "Prior to 1993, judgments 
against the Commonwealth accrued prejudgment interest at the 
rate of twelve per cent per annum."  Labor Relations Comm'n, 434 
Mass. at 344.  That year, however, the Legislature moved away 
from the application of the twelve percent fixed interest rates 
when the Commonwealth pays the award of damages, and instead 
adopted an interest rate based on the "weekly average one-year 
constant maturity Treasury yield."  See id. at 344, 345-346 
(noting amendment of eminent domain statute in same manner).  We 
concluded that the express language of § 6I now controlled the 
Labor Relations Commission's remedial orders, not the more 
expansive statutory language in § 6B previously used, and so to 
apply § 6B after the passage of § 6I was an error of law.  Id. 
at 347.  We went on to note that "[t]he Legislature's decision 
to maintain the twelve per cent rate in certain contexts (e.g., 
tort judgments against private parties) despite fluctuating 
conditions [was] undoubtedly its prerogative" (emphasis added; 
footnote omitted).  Id. 
 
18 The Legislature enacted G. L. c. 231, § 60K, in 2004 and 
set the total interest rate at "the weekly average [one]-year 
constant maturity Treasury yield plus [four] per cent."  
St. 2004, c. 149, § 207.  The Legislature amended that rate in 
2012 to add only two, instead of four, percent to the Treasury 
yield.  St. 2012, c. 224, § 220.  Both the 2004 and 2012 
versions, the latter being current, capped the interest rate as 
that set forth in G. L. c. 231, § 6B, which has been steady at 
twelve percent since 1982, St. 1982, c. 183, § 2 (increasing 
rate in § 6B from ten to twelve percent), suggesting that the 
Legislature still found a rate of twelve percent acceptable in 
the medical malpractice context. 
29 
 
Philip Morris, the absence of any administrative difficulty in 
employing a floating rate.  Philip Morris further argues that 
the stock market involves risk to the investor, while the 
statutory interest rate does not, rendering the comparison 
inapt. 
 
Although we have found a floating rate of interest to be 
"tailored to [fulfill] the public policy goals underlying 
interest awards," Labor Relations Comm'n, 434 Mass. at 346, and 
the higher fixed interest rate at issue here appears to have a 
"baggier" fit, especially in a persistent low-interest economy, 
as explained supra, interest rate legislation need not be so 
tailored to survive rational basis review.  There is no 
contention that the challenged statute implicates fundamental 
rights or raises equal protection concerns, thus requiring 
strict scrutiny review.  "Under strict scrutiny review, a 
challenged statute may only survive when it is 'narrowly 
tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental 
interest'" (citation omitted).  Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 153.  
Other statutes, such as this one, however, need only be 
"reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid State 
interest."  Id.  "[T]he Legislature's decision to maintain the 
twelve per cent rate in certain contexts (e.g., tort judgments 
against private parties) despite fluctuating conditions" is 
30 
 
entitled to deference when it has any such rational basis.  
Labor Relations Comm'n, supra at 347. 
 
State and Federal courts have upheld similar interest rate 
provisions in other States.  In 2016, the Vermont Supreme Court 
considered nearly identical arguments as those raised by Philip 
Morris when reviewing its twelve percent prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest statutes.  See Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Gritman, 2016 VT 45 (Gritman).  Although the court agreed 
that the rate was "incongruous in the context of today's market 
conditions," it "conclude[d] that the [twelve percent] rate 
[was] reasonably related to the purpose of the statute" -- that 
is, to "encourage defendants to settle claims and make prompt 
payments after judgment, and ensure that a plaintiff is made 
whole."  Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.  Furthermore, "[t]he Legislature could 
reasonably conclude that a fixed rate of simple interest is a 
more efficient and predictable way to calculate prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest than a floating rate pegged to the 
national prime rate."  Id. at ¶ 34.19 
 
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded ten 
years ago, in a medical malpractice case, that a twelve percent 
prejudgment interest rate "rationally serves a legitimate 
 
19 The Vermont Supreme Court also suggested that adjusting 
the interest rates "in periods like the present when market 
interest rates are low" is a question "more appropriately 
presented to the Legislature."  Gritman, 2016 VT 45, ¶ 35. 
31 
 
government interest."  Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438, 457 (R.I. 
2013).20  The court reiterated the same rational purpose that our 
jurisprudence has recognized:  prejudgment interest 
"compensate[s] an injured plaintiff for delay in receiving 
compensation to which he or she may be entitled."  Id.  Again, 
contrary to Philip Morris's arguments that such rates have an 
improper chilling effect on litigation, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court noted that these statutes "encourage early settlement of 
claims" and that such settlement is "a legitimate [S]tate 
interest."  Id.  Moreover, the court concluded that a uniform 
rate "is both an expedient and efficient use of judicial 
resources."  Id. 
 
Also in 2013, in a breach of contract case, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
addressed a due process challenge to New York's statute setting 
prejudgment interest at nine percent.  Citibank, N.A. v. 
Barclays Bank, PLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 174, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).21  
Recognizing that the statute "rationally serves a legitimate 
government interest," the court noted the same rationale our 
case law provides:  compensation to make the prevailing party 
 
20 The Vermont Supreme Court cited to this decision in its 
reasoning.  Gritman, 2016 VT 45, ¶ 33. 
 
21 The Vermont Supreme Court also cited to this decision in 
its reasoning.  Gritman, 2016 VT 45, ¶ 34. 
32 
 
whole while "not [imposing] a penalty against [the] defendant" 
(citations omitted).  Id. at 184.  The court went on to address 
the discrepancy between market rates and the higher fixed 
statutory rate, explaining that "there is no constitutional 
mandate that the statutory interest rate follow market rates 
point for point.  The appropriate interest rate is not measured 
by particular fluctuations in categories of interest rates for 
public or private securities lending" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
We cannot conclude that the twelve percent interest rate is 
either irrational or punitive, as it ensures that plaintiffs who 
have won in the trial court are fully compensated for the loss 
of the time value of their money during often lengthy periods of 
appeal, while the fixed rate makes the final award of damages 
particularly easy to calculate.  Despite the arguable windfall 
this rate provides in a low-interest economy, the interest 
amount is comparable to stock market returns over the same 
period; the money at issue, whether in the hands of plaintiffs 
or defendants, may very well have been so invested, despite the 
risk.  Furthermore, that this high rate may encourage settlement 
does not violate a defendant's due process rights.  See, e.g., 
Citibank, N.A., 28 F. Supp. 3d at 184; Oden, 71 A.3d at 457; 
Gritman, 2016 VT 45, ¶ 33. 
33 
 
 
For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the twelve 
percent interest rate imposed by G. L. c. 231, § 6B, and G. L. 
c. 235, § 8, lacks a rational basis or constitutes punitive, 
rather than compensatory, damages.22 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the jury's verdict and the trial judge's G. L. c. 93A 
findings were supported by the evidence and that Philip Morris 
has waived its argument regarding the jury instructions on 
conspiracy.  We further conclude that the fixed prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest rates in G. L. c. 231, § 6B, and G. L. 
c. 235, § 8, are not excessive in violation of Philip Morris's 
due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions.  
We, therefore, affirm the judgments of the Superior Court and 
the orders denying Philip Morris's posttrial motions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
22 Prejudgment interest is calculated on the compensatory -- 
not the punitive multiple -- amount of an award of damages under 
G. L. c. 93A.  McEvoy Travel Bur., Inc., 408 Mass. at 716-717 
("The multiple damage provisions of [G. L.] c. 93A are designed 
to impose a penalty . . . .  To add prejudgment interest to 
these penal damages would compound the penalty and would violate 
the purpose of G. L. c. 231, § 6B" [citation omitted]). 
 
As for postjudgment interest, in a case such as this, 
"where the amount of actual damages to be multiplied due to a 
[willful] or knowing violation of G. L. c. 93A . . . is based on 
the amount of an underlying judgment," the judgment amount that 
is multiplied "does not include postjudgment interest."  
Anderson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 476 
Mass. 377, 378, 385-386 (2017).