Title: State v. Hamilton

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

236 N.W.2d 325 (1975) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Dennis HAMILTON, Appellant. No. 57263. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 17, 1975. Rehearing Denied January 14, 1976. *326 Gary B. Garrison, Des Moines, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas Mann, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray A. Fenton, County Atty., and Francis X. Sarcone, Asst. County Atty., for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Defendant appeals from judgment on jury verdict finding him guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Section 204.401(1), The Code 1973). We affirm. September 6, 1973, a United States Customs agent, using a dog trained to detect narcotics in mail shipments at Kennedy International Airport, New York, seized a package addressed to Mike Hamton, 3308 Crescent Drive, Des Moines, Iowa. The parcel was found to contain a quantity of hashish. After being resealed it was forwarded to Des Moines where a postal inspector and three policemen placed same in the hands of a regular mail carrier for delivery. At the 3308 Crescent Drive residence, defendant Michael Hamilton answered the door. The mailman called his attention to the fact the name on the package was "Hamton", but defendant answered, "This is mine". He also, by signature, acknowledged receipt thereof. The carrier testified that after defendant closed the door he said, "Whoopee, the stuff is here". A short time later peace officers entered the above designated premises with a previously obtained warrant authorizing them to there search for "hashish, a Schedule I controlled substance, and any and all controlled substances as defined in [Chapter] 204 of the 1973 Code of Iowa". Four or five people were in the house, including defendant. After being informed the officers had a warrant to search for controlled substances, defendant surrendered the aforesaid parcel, claiming it had been mistakenly delivered to him. A federal narcotics agent testified, however, "Mr. Hamilton said he got a package in the mail and he thought it was sent by Mark Rynearson". Defendant was thereupon arrested and a prompt search of the premises followed. A number of letters addressed to defendant were immediately found in a bedroom dresser drawer. Four of them were seized and all but one bore *327 the return name and address "M. Rynearson, XXX-XX-XXXX, B Company, 2d 13th Infantry, APO New York, N.Y. 09028". Numerous other items, including marijuana seeds, hashish pipes, hypodermic needles, a set of scales and other paraphernalia were also seized. After defendant had been charged by information, he pled not guilty and, before trial, unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidential use of the aforesaid letters. They were later admitted over these defense objections: (1) "fruits of a wrongful search in that said search, while ostensibly pursuant to a search warrant, [was] in fact an inexcusable incursion and extension of said warrant" and (2) "hearsay as to the defendant". In support of a reversal it is now contended trial court reversibly erred in overruling these objections. I. Conceding there was probable cause to search for the package of hashish, defendant first argues the warrant was overbroad in additionally authorizing a search for "any and all controlled substances" in that such constituted an impermissible "general warrant". Resolution of this issue requires us to determine whether (1) there was probable cause to search for "any and all controlled substances" and (2) such substances are described with sufficient particularity. These questions will be entertained in the order presented. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038-2039, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), the court said: Mindful thereof we look to decisions from other jurisdictions in order to ascertain whether authorization to search for "any and all controlled substances" made the instant warrant, to such extent, a proscribed "general warrant". As might be expected, various courts have taken divergent positions on this subject. We are satisfied, however, People v. McGill, 528 P.2d 386 (Colo.1974) expresses the more rational, therefore preferable attitude. The affidavit in that case alleged an officer had personally seen marijuana plants growing in defendant's window. The warrant issued pursuant to this observation directed the police to search for "growing cannabis plants, commonly known as marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs, implements and paraphernalia involved in drug use". The attendant search produced numerous caches of marijuana, amphetamines and related equipment. The court thus framed one of the issues: "Whether facts set forth in the affidavit established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant to search the defendants' apartments for evidence apart from the marijuana plant". (Emphasis supplied). Id. 528 P.2d at 388. Trial court suppressed all evidence other than the plants. In reversing, the Colorado Supreme Court said at 389: Even more on point is this statement in Weber v. Superior Court for County of Santa Clara, 30 Cal. App. 3d 810, 814, 106 Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (1973): See also People v. Hester, 22 Ill.App.3d 118, 319 N.E.2d 301, 302 (1974); People v. Singer, 44 A.D.2d 730, 354 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (1974); People v. Mangialino, 75 Misc.2d 698, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327, 336 (1973); State v. Eismann, Or.App., 533 P.2d 1379, 1381-1382 (1975); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a; Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(b); § 751.3(9), The Code 1973. We now conclude there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant authorizing a search for "any and all controlled substances" despite the fact affiant's personal knowledge may have been limited to contents of the package containing hashish. This holding is accorded additional support in State v. Oliveri, 261 Iowa 1140, 1147, 156 N.W.2d 688, 692 (1968), where this court said: See also State v. Hall, 259 Iowa 147, 156, 143 N.W.2d 318 (1966). II. The next related inquiry goes to validity of the warrant because it failed to describe "other controlled substances" with particularity. Reduced to bare essentials we are called upon to determine whether the phrase "any and all other controlled substances" was so broad and vague it necessarily clothed the warrant-executing officers with interdicted discretion regarding items to be seized. The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently dealt with this problem. In State v. Quintana, 87 N.M. 414, 534 P.2d 1126 (1975), the warrant authorizing a search of certain premises directed the officers to look for "any and all controlled substances which may be kept there contrary to law". In upholding the adequacy of this specification the court said, 534 P.2d at 1129-1130: See also People v. Leahy, 173 Colo. 339, 484 P.2d 778, 781 (1970); State v. Olson, 15 Or.App. 393, 515 P.2d 1342 (1973); 68 Am. Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, §§ 81-82; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 81c. *329 Under existing circumstances the instant search warrant was not subject to attack on the ground of generality or overbreadth. Consequently, it was not a proscribed "general warrant". III. We come now to the controverted admission in evidence of the four letters found in a bedroom dresser drawer. This case presents a classic example of a "mere evidence" seizure, countenanced by the United States Supreme Court in Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). In that regard the test to be applied, 387 U.S. at 307, 87 S. Ct. at 1650, is thus stated: It is also appropriate to here note the standard which has been generally applied since repudiation by Hayden of the "mere evidence" rule. Bell v. State, 482 P.2d 854, 860 (Alaska 1972), quoted with approval in Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759, 767-768 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972) and Chambers v. State, 508 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), says: Factually similar to the case at bar is People v. Sloss, 34 Cal. App. 3d 74, 83, 109 Cal. Rptr. 583, 588 (1973), and the court there observed: See also Taylor v. State of Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119, 1121 (8th Cir. 1972); State v. Carter, 161 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Iowa 1968); State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 781, 785-786, 150 N.W.2d 284 (1967), quoted approvingly in State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa *330 1974); Commonwealth v. Fields, Mass.App., 319 N.E.2d 461, 463-464 (1974). As demonstrated, infra, we are satisfied there was a manifest nexus between the letters and the criminal activity in which defendant was engaged. No error attended seizure of the subject letters. IV. Next entertained is the "hearsay" objection voiced by defendant regarding evidential use of said letters. The State maintains they were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Iowa 1970) recognized, as such an exception, a declaration "against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the uttering party at time the statement was made". (Emphasis supplied). But we are now asked to extend that holding by adding thereto another exception element, i. e., statements against the penal interest of a declarant. On this subject State v. Everett, 214 N.W.2d 214, 217-218 (Iowa 1974) is first noted. See also People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826-829, 257 N.E.2d 16, 17-19 (1970); State v. Gardner, 13 Wash. App. 194, 534 P.2d 140, 141 (1975); 5 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1476-1477, at 281-290 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick on Evidence, § 278 at 673-675 (2d ed. 1972); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 219a, n. 30.5, at 608. In any event, application of the "penal interest" factor would here be of doubtful worth because of prosecutorial failure to show testimonial unavailability of declarant Rynearson. See Rules 804(a)(4), (5) and (b)(4), Fed.R. Evidence, and Advisory Committee's Note. See also People v. Brown, supra. But see People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845-846, 389 P.2d 377, 381-382 (1964). On the other hand, it is to us apparent the letters were admissible in evidence as nonhearsay admissions by defendant through adoption of, or acquiescence in, the declarant's statements. See Rules 801(a)(1), (b) and (d)(2)(B), Fed.R. Evidence, and Advisory Committee's Note. This does not mean we now overrule or dilute State v. Menke, 227 N.W.2d 184, 187-188 (Iowa 1975) and State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 925-927 (Iowa 1972), in which this court repudiated the "tacit admission" rule. Rather, as demonstrated infra, the aforesaid "adoption/acquiescence" and "tacit admission" precepts are distinguishable. Like an oral accusatory statement in the presence of a person, mere possession of incriminating letters received from another party will not in itself create an admission by adoption or acquiescence. See A. B. Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120, 128, 48 S. Ct. 57, 57-58, 72 L. Ed. 194 (1927). In fact, admission by adoption or acquiescence can only be established, where justified, by the totality of circumstances viewed in terms of probable human behavior. See H. v. H., 59 N.J.Super. 227, 157 A.2d 721, 725 (1959). See also 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 637 at 690; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 297b at 763. *331 At this point it will be recalled defendant, when arrested, possessed a controlled substance recently forwarded to him by "M. Rynearson, XXX-XX-XXXX, B Company, 2d 13th Infantry, APO New York, N.Y. 09028". Significantly, save and except Exhibit 8, infra, each questioned letter was found in an envelope bearing the name Rynearson with the same return address above set forth. All of the letters must, of necessity, be set forth at length. A. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 8: "Mike, B. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 9: "Mike, C. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 10: "Mike, D. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 11: "Mike, *333 "I sure wish you could make it over here, you'd really enjoy yourself. I know you would. There are so many things I've seen on my time that I couldn't start to explain, you'd have to see these things yourself to really know. It is to us evident these communications clearly manifested (1) a continuing course of correspondence between defendant and Rynearson; (2) the carrying out of an illegal transaction or venture by these two parties over an appreciable period of time; (3) an absence of any disclaimer by defendant; and (4) a familiarity which invited freedom of correspondence and open discussion. See McCormick on Evidence, § 270 at 654 (2d ed. 1972). Moreover, defendant's acceptance of the hashish sent to him by Rynearson provided other proof that the contents of said letters were sanctioned and acted upon by defendant. See Commonwealth v. Fusci, supra. Viewed in the context of probable behavior, defendant's possession of the above quoted letters, coupled with at least an inferential active participation by defendant in Rynearson's criminous proposals, sufficed to create an adoptive or acquiescent admission by defendant of the declarant's statements. Thus the instant situation transcends the aforesaid "tacit admission" concept and its inherent element of passivity. Finally brought into play is our rule to the effect "there is no reversible error if trial court's ruling which admitted the evidence in controversy may be sustained on any ground". State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1975). Stated otherwise, evidential use of the letters is upheld on the basis of the admission concept, supra, not as a hearsay exception. By the same token, applicability of the "penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule, as urged by the State, is neither reached nor resolved. V. In summary we now hold (1) the warrant authorizing a search for "hashish * * * and any and all controlled substances * * * " was not an impermissible general warrant; (2) a sufficient nexus existed between the letters and criminal activity for which the warrant issued to justify seizure thereof; and (3) they were admissible in evidence under the admission by adoption or acquiescence concept. The errors here asserted by defendant, upon which he seeks a reversal, are without merit. Affirmed.