Title: Harvey v. Wight

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

68 Wn.2d 205 (1966) 412 P.2d 335 LARRY HARVEY, Respondent, v. BERT WIGHT et al., Appellants.[*] No. 38244. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. March 10, 1966. Guttormsen, Scholfield, Willits & Ager, for appellants. Joseph T. Pemberton, for respondent. HILL, J. This is another host-guest case. Six teenagers were riding in a car which, while traveling at high speed, failed to negotiate a curve and was wrecked. This is an action on behalf of one of the occupants, for personal injuries sustained by him, against the driver of the car and the parents of the driver of the car who were the owners of the car. A verdict of $25,000 was reduced by certain stipulated damages, which had already been paid, to $24,201.35, and a judgment entered in that amount. Aside from a claim that the damages were excessive and should be reduced, or a new trial granted, the only errors assigned are to instructions given or refused relating to gross negligence. The case was tried prior to our recent decisions in Nist, Dole, and Hansen,[1] which appear to give the answer to most of the questions raised by the defendants' assignments of error. [1] One claimed error relating to instructions remains for consideration. The phrasing of the last sentence in instruction No. 7, to which the defendants assigned error, is not to be commended, but when that instruction is read with the other instructions given, it seems to us that it could not possibly have been prejudicial. It reads as follows: In instruction No. 3 "gross negligence" was defined as the failure to exercise slight care. In instruction No. 5 the definition of the duty of a person driving an automobile upon the public highways of this state was given in the words of the statute.[3] In instruction No. 6, ordinary negligence was defined. In instruction No. 7, the jury was told that if there was a violation of that statute, it constituted negligence as a matter of law; that negligence does not render a person liable for damages unless such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury sustained. Then, as suggested in the Nist, Dole, and Hansen cases, it was explained that negligence had been defined in the preceding instruction (6) and in the first two paragraphs of instruction No. 7 to clarify *208 the distinction between "negligence" in its usual meaning and the "gross negligence" which a guest in a motor vehicle accident must establish to recover from his host; and then, in the final sentence, told the jury that they must determine whether a violation of the statute, which they had previously been told would be negligence, was also gross negligence. Instruction No. 8 again told the jury that there could be no recovery by a guest in an automobile unless there was gross negligence by the host, as previously defined. We will concede that the last sentence in instruction No. 7 might better have been phrased to say: that whether or not the conduct of the host-driver, which you may find constitutes a violation of the statute quoted to you in instruction No. 5, also constitutes gross negligence is for you to determine. However, there can be no question that the jury had to find gross negligence (which was properly defined) before they could bring in a verdict for the injured guest. The final assignment of error relates to the excessiveness of the $25,000 verdict. The doctor who performed the necessary surgery testified: The ophthalmologist, who first examined the plaintiff when he arrived at the hospital and later helped with the surgery and treated the plaintiff for his eye injury, testified: Fortunately, there were apparently no permanent disabilities and no loss of earning capacity. Total special damages were $798.65, which included all medical and hospital expenses. The accident was November 25, 1961, and the last medical treatment was April 12, 1962. The ophthalmologist testified that there was no residual injury, except *210 a very slight and hardly noticeable droop to the right eyelid. The plaintiff complained only of difficulty in sighting a rifle or in looking "at something real close," with sometimes a burning sensation in the scars on his forehead. [2, 3] The amount of more than $24,000, with such slight apparent residual damage, seems large. However, there is no claim or indication of passion and prejudice in connection with the verdict. The trial judge refused to grant a new trial or to reduce the verdict, and we do not feel that "we should presume to substitute our judgment for both his [the trial judge's] and the jury's unless this court's sense of justice is shocked by the amount of the award." Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 233, 248, 356 P.2d 316 (1960). The award does not shock[4] the court's sense of justice. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., OTT, HUNTER, and HALE, JJ., concur. May 31, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 412 P.2d 335. [1] Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322, 407 P.2d 798 (1965); Dole v. Goebel, 67 Wn.2d 337, 407 P.2d 807 (1965); Hansen v. Pauley, 67 Wn.2d 345, 407 P.2d 811 (1965). [2] The host-guest statute, RCW 46.08.080. [3] RCW 46.48.010. [4] It is only fair to note that it may "shake" some of us, but it does not "shock" us.