Title: Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie, 84 Ohio St.3d 437, 1999-Ohio-
362.] 
 
 
 
 
CUYAHOGA SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, APPELLANT, v. GUTHRIE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency v. Guthrie (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 
437.] 
Parent and child — Paternity — Civil procedure — Relief from judgment or order 
— For purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(2), results of a paternity test, not obtained 
and thus not provided until after an adjudication of the existence of a 
parent-and-child relationship, are not “newly discovered evidence.” 
For purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(2), results of a paternity test, not obtained and thus 
not provided until after an adjudication of the existence of a parent-and-
child relationship, are not “newly discovered evidence.” 
(No. 97-2398 — Submitted October 13, 1998 — Decided February 17, 1999.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72216. 
 
On February 19, 1990, Phyllis Taylor gave birth to a son, Jason.  On June 1, 
1994, appellant, Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA” or “agency”), 
conducted an administrative hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of 
a parent-and-child relationship between appellee, Denver R. Guthrie, the alleged 
father, and Jason.  Appellee did not appear at the hearing, and the request for an 
administrative determination of parentage was denied.  In dismissing the matter, 
the hearing officer stated that “Denver Guthrie, having been advised of his rights 
under Ohio law, does not acknowledge that he is the natural father of the child, 
Jason Taylor, and does not agree to be bound by the results of genetic testing.” 
 
On June 21, 1994, CSEA commenced a paternity action in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.  In the complaint, CSEA 
alleged that appellee was the father of Jason.  CSEA requested that the court order 
 
 
2
appellee to pay expenses associated with the birth of Jason, to reimburse the 
agency for public assistance provided for the child, and to pay child support. 
 
A copy of the complaint was sent by certified mail to appellee.  It was 
returned unclaimed and then sent by regular mail.  Appellee did not answer the 
complaint, and he did not appear at a scheduled pretrial hearing.  The case was 
scheduled for trial before a referee (now magistrate).  Appellee was sent a notice 
stating that the trial would begin on February 17, 1995. 
 
The trial was held as scheduled.  Appellee did not appear, and the 
magistrate, relying on Phyllis Taylor’s testimony, determined that appellee was 
Jason’s father.  The magistrate also recommended that appellee pay $40 per week 
plus a two-percent fee as interim child support, that the payments were to 
commence on February 24, 1995 or when appellee secures employment, 
whichever occurs first, and that the case should be continued for disposition. 
 
On March 23, 1995, the juvenile court approved and adopted the 
magistrate’s findings and recommendations.  Thereafter, in a letter dated 
September 27, 1995, CSEA informed appellee that he owed $960 in unpaid 
support, that the arrearage would be referred to the IRS for collection, and that it 
may also be reported to the credit bureau.  Appellee was also informed that he had 
a right to challenge the arrearage by contacting the agency no later than November 
30, 1995. 
 
In a handwritten letter dated November 15, 1995, appellee asked CSEA to 
delay a scheduled hearing until an attorney was appointed for him.  The hearing 
was continued and ultimately rescheduled for May 17, 1996.  Phyllis Taylor was 
notified of the May 17 hearing, but she did not appear.  At the hearing, appellee 
again requested that counsel be appointed for him, and he also asked that genetic 
testing be performed to determine parentage. 
 
 
3
 
The magistrate granted appellee’s request for testing and ordered that the 
tests be conducted pursuant to R.C. 3111.09(A).  Appellee submitted a sample for 
testing.  Phyllis and Jason both submitted samples on December 9, 1996. 
 
The report provided by the laboratory listed the probability of appellee 
being Jason’s father as zero percent, thereby conclusively excluding appellee’s as 
the biological father of Jason.  On February 5, 1997, the juvenile court, in 
accordance with R.C. 3111.09(D), found that appellee was not Jason’s father.  The 
court entered judgment in favor of appellee and ordered that the earlier February 
17, 1995 findings and recommendations of the magistrate (and, in effect, the court 
order of March 23, 1995) “be vacated and set aside.” 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.  The court of appeals held that “the trial court’s order 
vacating the prior paternity determination was authorized under Civ.R. 60(B)(4), 
which provides that a party may be relieved from judgment when ‘it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.’  In this case, 
paternity testing conclusively determined that [appellee] was not the father of 
Jason Taylor.  Equity supports the trial judge’s decision to relieve him of the duty 
[to] pay child support.”  Thereafter, the court, finding its judgment to be in conflict 
with the judgment of the First Appellate District in Gosink v. Hamm (1996), 111 
Ohio App.3d 495, 676 N.E.2d 604, entered an order certifying a conflict, and we 
determined that a conflict existed.  80 Ohio St.3d 1479, 687 N.E.2d 474. 
__________________ 
 
William Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Lynne A. Yohe, 
Timothy G. Spackman and Michael J. Corrigan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 
for appellant. 
 
 
4
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David J. 
Kelley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The question certified to us by the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals is, “When a motion for relief from a judgment of paternity is based on the 
results of genetic testing, can such motion be brought under Civ.R. 60(B)(4), 
which provides for relief when the continued application of the judgment would 
be inequitable or must the motion be reviewed under Civ.R. 60(B)(2), which 
provides for relief based upon newly discovered evidence?”  The court of appeals 
concluded that the February 5, 1997 entry of the juvenile court, vacating the initial 
determination of parentage and interim order of support, was authorized under 
Civ.R. 60(B)(4).  CSEA contends that the court of appeals erred in this regard and 
that relief from a prior determination of parentage premised upon later genetic 
testing can be authorized pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(2), but not (B)(4). 
 
We disagree both with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals 
regarding the application of Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and with CSEA’s position that the 
applicable provision is Civ.R. 60(B)(2).  In fact, upon further reflection, and 
notwithstanding the question certified for our review, we find that neither Civ.R. 
60(B)(2) nor (4) controls the outcome of this particular case.  To find that the 
juvenile court had the authority to vacate the prior determination of paternity 
under either (B)(2) or (4), given the circumstances of this case, would clearly be 
contrary to law. 
 
Civ.R. 60(B) provides: 
 
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the 
 
 
5
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.  The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year 
after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.  A motion under 
this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. 
 
“The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In order to prevail on a motion brought pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), the 
moving party must demonstrate that “(1) the party has a meritorious defense or 
claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of 
the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made 
within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) 
or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered 
or taken.”  GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio 
St.2d 146, 1 O.O.3d 86, 351 N.E.2d 113, paragraph two of the syllabus. We have 
considered these standards in the context of a challenge to a prior finding of 
paternity and order of child support.  See Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
172, 637 N.E.2d 914. 
 
 
6
 
In Strack, approximately nine years after a divorce decree addressing 
paternity and child support, David A. Strack filed a motion for a human leukocyte 
antigen (“HLA”) test to determine whether he was the father of the child in 
question.  Prior blood-grouping tests had indicated that Strack could not be 
excluded as the father.  However, the results of the later available HLA tests 
conclusively excluded Strack as the biological father.  Strack then filed a Civ.R. 
60(B) motion, challenging the divorce decree as it pertained to paternity and child 
support.  The trial court overruled the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
On appeal to this court, Strack argued that he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 
60(B)(4) and (5).  We disagreed and held: 
 
“Appellant asserts that his claim falls under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5), and not 
the more specific provision that deals with newly discovered evidence.  We 
disagree.  The basis of Strack’s motion is test results that were not available at the 
time of the divorce decree.  The results are evidence; they are newly discovered.  
A straightforward and logical reading of Civ.R. 60(B)(2) dictates that it applies. 
 
“Civ.R. 60(B)(5) applies only when a more specific provision does not 
apply.  Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66, 5 OBR 120, 
122, 448 N.E.2d 1365, 1367.  Here, Civ.R. 60(B)(2) specifically addresses newly 
discovered evidence; thus, there is no reason to invoke the less specific catchall 
provision, Civ.R. 60(B)(5).  The claim under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) fails for similar 
reasons.  We hold, therefore, that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) is the provision of the rule that 
applies to Strack’s claim. 
 
“The third prong of the Civ.R. 60(B) test is that the motion must be made 
within a reasonable time, and where the grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) 
or (3), not more than one year after judgment.  See GTE, supra.  Strack filed his 
Civ.R. 60(B) motion in 1987, approximately nine years after the judgment of 
 
 
7
divorce and five years after the results of genetic testing became admissible in this 
state.  R.C. 3111.09 and 3111.10.  This filing delay falls far outside the one-year 
time limitation imposed by Civ.R. 60(B)(2).  The fact that Strack filed his motion 
shortly after he received the results of the genetic testing is not legally relevant.  
The time limits of Civ.R. 60(B) refer to the judgment from which relief is sought, 
not to the time of discovery of the new evidence.  Strack bears some responsibility 
to assert timely his new evidence.  The law cannot assume lack of knowledge of 
the admissibility of HLA test results.  We decline the invitation to alter the clear 
meaning of Civ.R. 60(B). 
 
“Even if we were to apply Civ.R. 60(B) loosely and allow extra time not 
provided for by the rule, we would have to look to the time when the evidence 
became admissible to determine paternity, in this case 1982.  Because Strack 
asserts that he has contested paternity of the minor child from before the time of 
the divorce decree, we may impute to him the knowledge of the newly developed 
technology to support his claim.  For these reasons, we concur with the trial 
court’s determination that Strack did not file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in a timely 
manner.”  (Emphasis added.)  Strack, 70 Ohio St.3d at 174-175, 637 N.E.2d at 
916. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we recognized the competing principles of 
finality and perfection, and stated: 
 
“We are not unaware that our decision in effect declares as static a state of 
facts that reliable scientific evidence contradicts.  Nonetheless, there are 
compelling reasons that support such a decision.  A claim under Civ.R. 60(B) 
requires the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles of finality 
and perfection.  In Knapp v. Knapp (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 144-145, 24 OBR 
362, 364, 493 N.E.2d 1353, 1356, this court declared, ‘[f]inality requires that there 
 
 
8
be some end to every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public 
confidence in the system’s ability to resolve disputes.  Perfection requires that 
every case be litigated until a perfect result is achieved.  For obvious reasons, 
courts have typically placed finality above perfection in the hierarchy of values.’  
Finality is particularly compelling in a case involving determinations of parentage, 
visitation and support of a minor child.”  Strack, 70 Ohio St.3d at 175, 637 N.E.2d 
at 916. 
 
CSEA contends that Strack is dispositive of the question before us.  CSEA 
asserts that testing results submitted after an initial finding of paternity are by 
necessity “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(2).  
Therefore, according to CSEA, because appellee requested genetic testing more 
than one year after the initial determination of paternity, the request was not made 
in a timely manner. 
 
However, we believe that CSEA misreads Strack and our findings in that 
case with respect to the applicability of Civ.R. 60(B)(2).  The situation in Strack is 
clearly distinguishable and can, in fact, be reconciled with the fact pattern now 
before us.  In Strack we did not state nor did we intend to establish an absolute 
rule that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) was to have universal application in every situation 
where later tests are submitted to challenge a previous determination of paternity.  
Indeed, to apply Strack in such a literal manner would leave little room for a court 
to consider all the interests involved in these types of cases, including the welfare 
of the minor child, and to balance all of the equities.  To be sure, an application of 
Strack, as suggested by CSEA, to the situation here would be clearly 
inappropriate. 
 
In Strack, we found that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) was the operable provision, since 
the basis of Strack’s 60(B) motion was the result of genetic testing whose 
 
 
9
technology was not available at the time of the initial determination of paternity.  
Thus, the later HLA test results obviously fell under (B)(2), newly discovered 
evidence.  In contrast, appellee herein had genetic testing available to him at the 
time of the initial finding of parentage.  In fact, such testing was available at the 
time of the administrative hearing before the CSEA.  In this regard, we agree with 
the court of appeals that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) is not applicable here because “the 
technology for paternity testing was in existence at the time of the initial paternity 
determination.  Consequently, it does not meet the definition of newly discovered 
evidence because it could have been discovered by due diligence in time to move 
for a new trial.” 
 
Moreover, a noteworthy distinction in Strack also exists in that Strack, in 
his case, actually filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion.  Here, appellee did not file a Civ.R. 
60(B) motion in the juvenile court.  Thus, the court did not make a Civ.R. 60(B) 
ruling.  Further, the juvenile court, in its March 23, 1995 order, approved and 
adopted 
the 
recommendation 
of 
the 
magistrate, 
which 
included 
the 
recommendation that the matter should be continued for further disposition.  
Appellee was then advised by CSEA that he could contest the support arrearage.  
He thereafter appeared at a scheduled hearing and requested genetic testing, and 
his request was not challenged by CSEA. 
 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we reject CSEA’s assertion that Civ.R. 
60(B)(2) is applicable in this case.  We hold that for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(2), 
results of a paternity test, not obtained and thus not provided until after an 
adjudication of the existence of a parent-and-child relationship, are not “newly 
discovered evidence.” 
 
Furthermore, while we agree with the court of appeals’ reasoning that 
Civ.R. 60(B)(2) does not control the outcome of this particular case, we are, 
 
 
10
however, also not persuaded by the court’s conclusion that the juvenile court’s 
February 5, 1997 final ruling was authorized under Civ.R. 60(B)(4).  In Knapp, 24 
Ohio St.3d 141, 24 OBR 362, 493 N.E.2d 1353, paragraph one of the syllabus, we 
held that “[t]he ‘ * * * it is no longer equitable * * * ’ clause of Civ.R. 60(B)(4) 
was designed to provide relief to those who have been prospectively subjected to 
circumstances which they had no opportunity to foresee or control.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In other words, Civ.R. 60(B)(4) was not meant to offer a party a means to 
negate a prior finding that the party could have reasonably prevented. 
 
In the case at bar, appellee did not appear at the February 17, 1995 trial, and 
he was found to be Jason’s father.  The record reflects that he was aware of 
parentage proceedings against him and that he was also aware that genetic testing 
could have been performed.  Appellee, however, chose to ignore these initial 
proceedings.  In doing so, he made a voluntary, deliberate choice not to seek 
genetic testing until after a finding of parentage and until after he was notified of a 
support arrearage.  Clearly, Civ.R. 60(B)(4) was not intended to provide a party 
relief in such an instance.  See Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d at 145-146, 24 OBR at 365, 
493 N.E.2d at 1357 (Otherwise, “litigants, armed with the knowledge that Civ.R. 
60[B][4] would relieve them of the consequences of their voluntary, deliberate 
choices, would be encouraged to litigate carelessly.  Judgment winners would be 
unable to rely on their victories.  Those financially able to do so could crush their 
less affluent adversaries under a pile of Civ.R. 60[B][4] motions.  All this would 
be a subversion of judicial economy and an opening of the proverbial floodgates, 
causing Ohio’s courts to drown in a sea of duplicative, never-ending litigation.”).  
Therefore, we find that Civ.R. 60(B)(4) is not applicable here. 
 
Having concluded that neither Civ.R. 60(B)(2) nor (4) is applicable under 
the circumstances of this case, the question then becomes what authority, if any, 
 
 
11
did the juvenile court have in vacating the prior determination of parentage and in 
ordering interim child support.  We believe that the juvenile court had the 
authority to vacate the initial finding of paternity under R.C. 3111.16.  See, 
generally, Singer v. Dickinson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 408, 588 N.E.2d 806. 
 
Specifically, R.C. 3111.16 provides: 
 
“The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment or 
order issued under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code to provide for 
future education and support and a judgment or order issued with respect to 
matters listed in divisions (C) and (D) of section 3111.13 and division (B) of 
section 3111.15 of the Revised Code, except that a court entering a judgment or 
order for the payment of a lump sum or the purchase of an annuity under division 
(D) of section 3111.13 of the Revised Code may specify that the judgment or order 
may not be modified or revoked.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 3111.16, a juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over 
all judgments or orders issued in accordance with R.C. 3111.01 to 3111.19, which 
includes judgments or orders that concern the duty of support or involve the 
welfare of a minor child.  See Dickinson, 63 Ohio St.3d at 413-411, 588 N.E.2d at 
811 (“A child affected by such an order is considered a ward of the court, which 
may always reconsider and modify its rulings when changed circumstances require 
it during the child’s minority.”).  Here, the juvenile court exercised its continuing 
jurisdiction upon a finding that there was a zero percent chance that appellee was 
Jason’s biological father.  In vacating the initial finding of parentage, the court 
was obviously aware of and considered all interests involved, including the best 
interests of the minor child.  In this regard, we are not prepared to say that the 
court erred in vacating the prior finding of paternity.  We believe that, given the 
 
 
12
circumstances here, the subsequent finding of nonpaternity constituted a change in 
circumstances that warranted relief from the initial finding of parentage. 
 
However, in vacating the initial determination of parentage, the juvenile 
court further held, and the court of appeals agreed, that appellee was not 
responsible for any support payments.  We agree that the situation here warrants 
prospective relief of support payments.  On the other hand, we do not believe that 
appellee should be permitted to avoid any arrearage that presently exists as a result 
of his own inexcusable conduct.  Appellee voluntarily and deliberately disregarded 
initial parentage proceedings, thereby causing a delay of the finding of 
nonpaternity.  Thus, we affirm, though for different reasons, the judgment of the 
court of appeals to the extent that it determined that the juvenile court had the 
authority to vacate the initial determination of parentage.  We disagree, however, 
with the findings of the juvenile court and court of appeals that appellee is not 
responsible for any support payments. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and 
reverse it in part and remand the cause to the juvenile court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion.  On remand, the juvenile court should assess to 
appellee any arrearage that the court deems proper and that has accumulated up 
until the court’s February 5, 1997 final entry. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
 and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
 
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COOK, J., dissenting.  I must respectfully dissent on two points.  First, 
though I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Guthrie may not use Civ.R. 
60(B)(2) to vacate his paternity judgment, I interpret the rule differently.  Second, 
I differ with the court’s conclusion that R.C. 3111.16 authorizes the relief the 
court grants. 
I 
 
I cannot join the syllabus of the majority as I think its interpretation of 
Civ.R. 60(B)(2) eliminates certain putative fathers who could qualify for relief. 
 
The reasoning of the opinion is that because courts have accepted genetic 
testing evidence in paternity actions for years, such evidence cannot now, under 
any circumstance, constitute newly discovered evidence.  But, just because the 
technology is not “newly discovered” does not mean that a particular putative 
father may not show evidence of circumstances that objectively impeded his 
ability to secure accurate, timely test results.  The term “newly discovered” in the 
rule refers, of course, to discovery by the movant. 
 
In this case, it is undisputed that Guthrie, but for his own neglect, could 
have presented the genetic test results in a timely manner. 
II 
 
Having properly denied Guthrie Civ.R. 60(B) relief, the majority concludes 
that he can nonetheless resort to R.C. 3111.16 to vacate the judgment.  Neither the 
parties nor the lower courts cited R.C. 3111.16 as a source of relief here. 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that this statute provides continuing 
jurisdiction to vacate paternity judgments.  I believe this conclusion is wrong. 
 
R.C. 3111.16 provides, in relevant part: “The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment or order issued under sections 3111.01 
to 3111.19 of the Revised Code to provide for future education and support and a 
 
 
14
judgment or order issued with respect to matters listed in divisions (C) and (D) of 
section 3111.13 and division (B) of section 3111.15 of the Revised Code.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3111.13(C) and (D) deal with aspects of support, custody, 
and visitation.  R.C. 3111.15(B) provides support payment options. 
 
Thus, R.C. 3111.16 allows courts that order support, custody, or visitation 
as part of a paternity determination, continuing jurisdiction to modify those 
aspects of the order.  It does not provide the court with continuing jurisdiction to 
vacate the paternity judgment itself.  An adjudicated father who seeks to vacate 
such a judgment can do so only by complying with the standards and time limits 
set forth in Civ.R. 60(B) and GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. 
(1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 1 O.O.3d 86, 351 N.E.2d 113. 
 
Moreover, an adjudicated father may not use tardy evidence of non-
paternity as a factor justifying modification of support under R.C. 3111.16.  Such 
evidence is of no moment once there is a valid and final judgment of paternity; an 
adjudicated father’s legal duty of support continues throughout the child’s 
minority.  Singer v. Dickinson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 408, 414, 588 N.E.2d 806, 
811. 
 
The majority here cites Singer, supra, as support for its conclusion that final 
judgments establishing paternity can be challenged later under R.C. 3111.16.  
Singer does not support this position.  In that case, we concluded that, based on 
the plain language of R.C. 3111.13(C) and 3111.16, a court retains jurisdiction 
over an order allocating a dependency exemption in a paternity action (an aspect 
of support), not over the judgment of paternity itself.  Singer, 63 Ohio St.3d at 
413, 588 N.E.2d at 810.  The language quoted by the majority as support for its 
position must be put in context to be properly understood.  “It has long been 
recognized in Ohio that a court retains continuing jurisdiction over its orders 
 
 
15
concerning the custody, care, and support of children  * * *.   * * *  A child 
affected by such an order is considered a ward of the court, which may always 
reconsider and modify its rulings when changed circumstances require it during 
the child’s minority.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 413-414, 588 N.E.2d at 810-811. 
 
Though the practical result in this and similar cases seems harsh, this court 
has previously elevated finality over perfection in paternity actions.  In Strack v. 
Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 637 N.E.2d 914, we affirmed the denial of 
Strack’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion due to his failure to present genetic evidence within 
the time allowed by the rule.  We upheld the judgment of paternity despite the fact 
that the genetic evidence proved conclusively that Strack was not the father.  We 
recognized that our decision “declare[d] as static a state of facts that reliable 
scientific evidence contradict[ed].”  Id. at 175, 637 N.E.2d at 916.  We justified 
our conclusion by saying, “ ‘Finality requires that there be some end to every 
lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public confidence in the system’s 
ability to resolve disputes.  Perfection requires that every case be litigated until a 
perfect result is achieved.  For obvious reasons, courts have typically placed 
finality above perfection in the hierarchy of values.’ ”  Id. at 175, 637 N.E.2d at 
916, quoting Knapp v. Knapp (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 144-145, 24 OBR 362, 
364, 493 N.E.2d 1353, 1356.  We further emphasized that “[f]inality is 
particularly compelling in a case involving determinations of parentage.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
And in Gilbraith v. Hixson (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 127, 512 N.E.2d 956, this 
court analyzed the application of res judicata to paternity judgments.  In that case, 
we found that no provision of R.C. Chapter 3111, expressly or by implication, 
excluded the application of the doctrine from parentage actions, and that the same 
public policy supporting its application generally, applied just as forcefully in such 
 
 
16
cases.  Id. at 130, 131, 512 N.E.2d at 960, 961.  We held, “the policy of this state 
requires, in sum, that the parent-child relationship be shielded from the unsettling 
effects of further judicial inquiry, and that relitigation of parentage be barred, as a 
general rule, in any subsequent actions, including those initiated under R.C. 
Chapter 3111.”  Id. 
 
This majority decision contradicts Strack, Gilbraith, and the important 
principles of finality guarded by Civ.R. 60(B) and GTE Automatic.  It is cold 
comfort that the misconstruction is done in the interest of achieving a “more just” 
result in this particular case.