Title: Mark Henry, Warden, Etc. v. Runner O. Santana

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1027 
____________ 
 
MARK HENRY, WARDEN, etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
RUNNER O. SANTANA,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 28, 2011] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Santana v. Henry, 12 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Third District Court of Appeal in Pope v. State, 898 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
The issue presented is whether a court may sua sponte dismiss a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, in which a prisoner is seeking immediate release, based 
upon the petitioner’s failure to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies.  As 
further explained below, we hold that such a petition may not be dismissed on such 
 
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grounds where the issue of the petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies has not been raised by the parties. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 24, 2008, Santana, an inmate, filed a pro se petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in the circuit court in Jackson County, alleging that he was entitled 
to immediate release.  He filed the petition against Mark Henry, warden of the 
facility in Jackson County where he was housed.  Santana’s claim concerned the 
sentences that were imposed on October 4, 2007, following his violation of 
probation (VOP).  The relevant facts are set forth in the district court opinion 
below: 
 
Runner O. Santana appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus alleging “that he is entitled to immediate release 
when properly credited with time served” and requesting “issuance of 
an Order com[m]anding the Florida Department of Corrections . . . to 
immediately release” him.  Without prior notice to the parties or input 
from them, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition.  It 
reasoned, in part, that Mr. Santana failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies, although the Department of Corrections (DOC) never raised 
this below. . . . 
 
The petition below alleges that, after his probation (in three 
separate cases) was revoked, Mr. Santana was sentenced anew on 
October 4, 2007, receiving three concurrent prison sentences.  In case 
No. 95-CF-4926, the petition alleges, he was sentenced to six years in 
prison with credit for 2,023 days, to be followed by two years' 
probation; in case No. 96-CF-9601 to 60.75 months with credit for 
831 days; and in case No. 96-CF-10668 to six years with credit for 
1682 days.  In addition, against each sentence, the petition alleges, he 
was awarded “credit for time served at the State Hospital,” and a 
separate credit for 142 days for time spent in jail before the revocation 
hearing. . . . 
 
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Attached to the petition are the sentencing documents, as well 
as a transcript of the sentencing hearing.  
 
Santana v. Henry, 12 So. 3d 843, 844-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 
 
The district court framed the issue before it narrowly, as follows: 
 
At issue is whether the habeas court properly dismissed the 
petition on its own motion without hearing from the authorities 
alleged to hold the petitioner unlawfully.  We are not concerned here 
with mere conditions of confinement, or gain-time calculations not 
affecting DOC's current right to hold the petitioner, or anything less 
than a state prisoner's alleged right to immediate release from custody. 
 
Id. at 845-46 (citations omitted).  The district court then addressed the traditional 
role of the writ of habeas corpus versus the role of the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and held that the trial court erred in dismissing Santana’s 
habeas petition on the basis of a technicality not raised by the parties—i.e., 
Santana’s failure to allege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies: 
 
In any event, we hold the trial court erred by dismissing Mr. 
Santana's petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a 
technicality—an assumed pleading defect—that was not raised by the 
parties.  It is not clear DOC would have defended in this fashion, left 
to its own devices.  “A trial judge may not sua sponte dismiss an 
action based on affirmative defenses not raised by proper pleadings.”  
Liton Lighting v. Platinum Television Group, Inc., 2 So. 3d 366, 367 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 
 
 
Santana, 12 So. 3d at 847-48 (citations omitted).  The district court ruled as 
follows: 
Mindful that the “writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument 
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state 
action,”  Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969), we reverse 
 
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and remand with directions that the trial court issue an order to show 
cause to the Department of Corrections before proceeding further. 
 
Santana, 12 So. 3d at 844-45 (citations omitted).  The district court certified 
conflict with Pope v. State, 898 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).1  DOC sought 
review in this Court, which was granted. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The writ of habeas corpus, or the Great Writ, is a high prerogative writ and, 
when properly issued, supersedes all other writs.  State ex rel. Perky v. Browne, 
142 So. 247, 248 (Fla. 1932).  The writ, which literally means “that you have the 
                                          
 
 
1.  In Pope v. State, 898 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), the Third District 
Court of Appeal held as follows: 
 
Anthony Evans Pope appeals the denial of his Emergency 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum.  The petition 
alleges that the appellant is being illegally detained by the Department 
of Corrections beyond his maximum release date. 
 
When Appellant filed his petition with the trial court, he failed 
to allege, or prove, that he had exhausted any of the administrative 
procedures available to him prior to filing the petition.  The 
prerequisite to the issuance of an extraordinary writ is exhaustion of 
all administrative remedies.  The trial court, without addressing the 
merits, summarily and correctly denied the appellant's petition, 
without prejudice, finding the petition facially insufficient for failing 
to allege the appellant had exhausted all of the administrative 
remedies. 
 
. . . . 
 
Based on the above, we affirm the trial court's decision, without 
prejudice to Pope's right to file a new petition, upon the exhaustion of 
all administrative remedies available to him. 
Id. at 253-54 (citation omitted). 
 
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body,” is a writ of inquiry and has traditionally been used to compel the custodian 
of the prisoner to bring the body of the prisoner into court so that the legality of the 
detention might be tested.  This Court in State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 152 So. 
207 (Fla. 1933), addressed the deep roots of the writ in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence: 
 
The great writ, known commonly by the name of “habeas 
corpus,” was a high prerogative writ known to the common law, the 
object of which was the liberation of those who were imprisoned 
without sufficient cause.  See Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 193, 7 
L. Ed. 650. 
 
It is a writ of inquiry upon matters of which the state itself is 
concerned in aid of right and liberty.  State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel, 
105 La. 741, text 747, 30 So. 122, 54 L. R. A. 927; Ex parte 
Coupland, 26 Tex. 386. 
 
The name of the writ is “habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et 
recipiendum.”  It is not an action or suit, but is a summary remedy 
open to the person detained.  It is civil rather than criminal in nature 
and is a legal and not equitable remedy.  See Ex parte Watkins, supra; 
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 75, 2 L. Ed. 554. 
 
. . . [W]hile the writ had been in use in England from remote 
antiquity, it was often assailed by kings who sought tyrannical power 
and the benefits of the writ were in a great degree eluded by time-
serving judges who assumed a discretionary power in awarding or 
refusing it and were disposed to support royal and ministerial 
usurpations.  Owing to such abuses, the writ became powerless to 
release persons imprisoned without any cause assigned.  In the fight 
by the people against the abuses of the writ, petitions of rights were 
submitted to the king, and during the reign of Charles I, A. D. 1641, 
provisions were enacted intended to make the writ effectual.  These 
activities were, however, in vain.  At last, in 1679, the Statute 31 
Chas. II, chap. 2, was enacted.  That act is known as the [H]abeas 
[C]orpus [A]ct.  That act has been substantially incorporated into the 
jurisprudence of every state in the Union and the right to it secured by 
their Constitutions.  The Constitution of the United States provides 
 
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that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
except in certain circumstances.  Article 1, § 9, par. 2, U. S. Const. 
 
. . . . 
 
The great writ of habeas corpus is the one mentioned in Magna 
Charta in the year 1215; the writ which alone was the subject of the 
acts of 16 Chas. I and 31 Chas. II.  It was the writ referred to in the 
Declaration of Independence and secured to the people of this country 
by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitutions of the 
different states.  
 
Fabisinski, 152 So. at 209-10.2  This Court subsequently in Allison v. Baker, 11 
So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1943), reiterated the basic purpose of the writ: 
 
The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ of ancient 
origin designed to obtain immediate relief from unlawful 
imprisonment without sufficient legal reasons.  Essentially, it is a writ 
of inquiry and is issued to test the reasons or grounds of restraint and 
detention.  The writ is venerated by all free and liberty loving people 
and recognized as a fundamental guaranty and protection of their right 
of liberty. 
  
Id. at 579.3 
                                          
 
 
2.  See also Jamason v. State, 447 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) 
(“The great writ has its origins in antiquity and its parameters have been shaped by 
suffering and deprivation.  It is more than a privilege with which free men are 
endowed by constitutional mandate; it is a writ of ancient right.”), approved, 455 
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1984). 
 
3.  See also Crane v. Hayes, 253 So. 2d 435, 439 (Fla. 1971) (“As a general 
rule, a habeas corpus proceeding is an independent action, legal and civil in nature, 
designed to secure prompt determination as to the legality of restraint in some 
form.); Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1954) (“The purpose of a habeas 
corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner’s present 
detention.”); Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1944) (“The general 
rule is that the object of the writ of habeas corpus is not to determine whether a 
person has committed a crime, or the justice or injustice of his detention on the 
 
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Given the basic purpose and fundamental importance of the writ, this Court 
has long recognized the necessity of informality and tolerance with regard to the 
pleading requirements for the writ: 
 
The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right. It is sometimes 
issued upon very informal application.  Ex parte Pells, 28 Fla. 67, 9 
So. 833.  Neither the right to the writ nor the right to be discharged 
from custody in a proper case is made to depend upon meticulous 
observance of the rules of pleading.  The purpose of bringing the 
petitioner before the court is to inquire into the legality of his 
detention, and if during the proceedings it appears formally or 
informally to the court's satisfaction that the person is unlawfully 
deprived of his liberty and is illegally detained in custody against his 
will he will be discharged. 
 
Ex parte Amos, 112 So. 289, 291-92 (Fla. 1927).  This Court has emphasized this 
need for informality repeatedly: 
[H]istorically, habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is as old as 
the common law itself and is an integral part of our own democratic 
process.  The procedure for the granting of this particular writ is not to 
be circumscribed by hard and fast rules or technicalities which often 
accompany our consideration of other processes.  If it appears to a 
court of competent jurisdiction that a man is being illegally restrained 
of his liberty, it is the responsibility of the court to brush aside formal 
technicalities and issue such appropriate orders as will do justice.  In 
habeas corpus the niceties of the procedure are not anywhere near as 
important as the determination of the ultimate question as to the 
legality of the restraint. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
merits, but to determine whether he is legally imprisoned or restrained of his 
liberty.”). 
 
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Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. 1956).  This Court has gone so far as 
to rule that “[n]o formal application for habeas corpus is required.”  Martin v. 
State, 166 So. 467, 467 (Fla. 1936). 
The gravamen of the issue before the Court is whether the writ of habeas 
corpus should be encumbered by a pleading requirement regarding the exhaustion 
of administrative remedies in those cases where an inmate is seeking immediate 
release.  DOC contends that unless the inmate first exhausts administrative 
remedies, he or she will be unable to file an informed petition because the petition 
will be based on mere speculation concerning the inmate’s term of imprisonment 
and release date.  DOC also contends that if the inmate fails to exhaust 
administrative remedies, the courts too will be operating in the dark in the same 
respect.  DOC contends that the district court’s ruling below will encourage 
inmates to file free habeas petitions instead of utilizing the Department’s internal 
grievance procedure.  In brief, it appears that DOC, for its own purposes, would 
prefer to respond to such inmate inquiries via its own internal grievance procedure 
rather than respond to orders to show cause issued by the courts.  In light of the 
above authorities, however, it appears that DOC’s proposed pleading requirement 
is antithetical to the basic purpose and fundamental importance of the writ. 
 
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In the decision under review, the district court addressed at length the 
traditional role of the writ of habeas corpus in relation to the doctrine of exhaustion 
of remedies: 
 
“The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ of ancient 
origin designed to obtain immediate relief from unlawful 
imprisonment without sufficient legal reasons.  Essentially, it is a writ 
of inquiry and is issued to test the reasons or grounds of restraint and 
detention.  The writ is venerated by all free and liberty loving people 
and recognized as a fundamental guaranty and protection of their right 
of liberty.”  Allison v. Baker, 11 So. 2d 578, 579 (1943).  “The great 
writ has its origins in antiquity and its parameters have been shaped 
by suffering and deprivation.  It is more than a privilege with which 
free men are endowed by constitutional mandate; it is a writ of ancient 
right.”  Jamason v. State, 447 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).  
“[H]istorically, habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is as old as 
the common law itself and is an integral part of our own democratic 
process.”  Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla.1956). 
 
By comparison, judicial abstention in favor of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is a relatively recent invention.  The doctrine 
of exhaustion of remedies counsels against judicial intervention in the 
decision-making function of the executive branch in certain 
circumstances.  Whether to require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is a question of judicial “policy rather than power.”  Gulf 
Pines Mem’l Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Mem’l Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695, 
699 (Fla. 1978).  See also  State, Dep't of Revenue v. Brock, 576 So. 
2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“[T]he doctrine requiring the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional.  The 
exhaustion requirement is a court-created prudential doctrine; it is a 
matter of policy, not of power.” (citations omitted)). 
 
Notions of administrative autonomy have been thought to 
require that agencies be given the opportunity to discover and correct 
their own errors, even after a case has reached the courts for judicial 
review of agency action.  In some contexts, judicial restraint may be 
necessary “to support the integrity of the administrative process and to 
allow the executive branch to carry out its responsibilities as a co-
equal branch of government.”  [Key Haven Associated Enters., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153,  
 
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157 (Fla. 1982)].  When an agency has discretion to exercise, it should 
of course be allowed to make discretionary decisions.  If a party 
succeeds in vindicating its rights in the administrative process, thus 
obviating the need for judicial intervention, judicial resources are 
conserved; and immediate judicial access can weaken the 
effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its 
procedures.   
 
But the rationales for requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies diminish and disappear where an executive branch agency 
has little or no discretion to exercise and little or no expertise to bring 
to bear.  The Department of Corrections does have discretion in 
deciding, for example, the conditions of confinement, and does have 
its own procedures on this subject deserving of judicial deference.  On 
the other hand, the DOC has no discretion about which prisoners to 
release upon expiration of their sentences.  Sentencing is a power, 
obligation, and prerogative of the courts, not the DOC.   
 
. . . . 
. . . While the general rule is that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is an affirmative defense, see Sylvia H. Walbolt, Matthew J. 
Conigliaro & J. Andrew Meyer, Florida Civil Practice Before Trial, § 
25.34 at 25-30 (7th ed. 2004) (“Affirmative defenses to extraordinary 
writs include impossibility or lack of power to perform, laches, 
unclean hands, absence of parties whose substantial rights would be 
affected, illegality of purpose, detriment to the public interest, 
mootness, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  See 
FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 20.38 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th 
ed.2003)”), moreover, in the prisoner habeas context, it has been held 
that certain petitions must allege exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in order to be facially sufficient.  But none of the cases to 
which our attention has been drawn has laid down such a pleading 
requirement for petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging 
entitlement to immediate release.  The petitioners in [the other cases] 
sought relief from conditions of confinement or restoration of 
forfeited gain time, not immediate release from the DOC's custody. 
 
Santana, 12 So. 3d at 846-47 (citations omitted). 
 
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The district court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Santana’s 
habeas petition based on a technicality not raised by the parties, and the court then 
noted the following: 
 
The general rule that pleadings ought not be dismissed on 
grounds no party urges has special force when the pleading is a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  “The scope and flexibility of the 
writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its ability 
to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always 
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers.  
The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the 
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice 
within its reach are surfaced and corrected.”  Harris v. Nelson, 394 
U.S. 286, 291 (1969).  When a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
alleging that the petitioner is entitled to immediate release sets out 
plausible reasons and a specific factual basis in some detail, the 
custodian should be required to respond to the petition. 
 
Santana, 12 So. 3d at 848 (citations omitted). 
 
The district court added as a postscript the following passage explaining its 
ruling further: 
 
If in this case the petition had not been summarily denied and 
the trial court had instead ordered the DOC to show cause why Mr. 
Santana's petition should not be granted, the DOC might have resisted 
by moving to dismiss on exhaustion of administrative remedies 
grounds or for failure to allege exhaustion but it might also have 
decided that the petition was meritorious and released the petitioner.  
“The procedure for the granting of this particular writ [i.e., habeas 
corpus] is not to be circumscribed by hard and fast rules or 
technicalities which often accompany our consideration of other 
processes.  If it appears to a court of competent jurisdiction that a man 
is being illegally restrained of his liberty, it is the responsibility of the 
court to brush aside formal technicalities and issue such appropriate 
orders as will do justice.  In habeas corpus the niceties of the 
procedure are not anywhere near as important as the determination of 
 
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the ultimate question as to the legality of the restraint.”  Anglin, 88 
So. 2d at 919-20. 
 
Santana, 12 So. 2d at 848 (brackets in original). 
 
In light of the constitutional and statutory authorities and precedent from this 
Court noted above, we conclude that the district court below ruled correctly, and 
we hold that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which a prisoner is seeking 
immediate release, may not be dismissed based upon the petitioner’s failure to 
allege exhaustion of administrative remedies where such failure has not been raised 
by the parties.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, we approve the First District Court of Appeal’s decision 
below and disapprove the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Pope v. 
State, 898 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), to the extent it is inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
 
It is so ordered.   
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-3852 
 
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(Jackson County) 
 
Jennifer Alani Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Beverly 
Bartlett Brewster and Carolyn J. Mosely, Assistant General Counsels, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Henry G. Gyden of Swope, Rodante, P.A., Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent