Title: In re Marriage of Mitchell

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

In re Marriage of Mitchell, No. 81791 (2/20/98) 
 
              Docket No. 81791--Agenda 20--March 1997. 
        In re MARRIAGE OF VICKY O. MITCHELL, Appellant, and 
                   STEPHEN G. MITCHELL, Appellee. 
                  Opinion filed February 20, 1998. 
 
          JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court: 
         Stephen G. Mitchell filed a petition for modification 
     of visitation rights with his children. Vicky O. Mitchell 
     then filed a petition for rule to show cause in the 
     circuit court of Lake County against Stephen, contending 
     that Stephen violated the child support provision of the 
     settlement agreement incorporated into an earlier 
     judgment dissolving their marriage. The circuit court 
     held that the percentage portion of the child support 
     provision was void and unenforceable under section 
     505(a)(5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of 
     Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(5) (West 1994)). On 
     appeal, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the 
     plain language of section 505(a)(5) requires that child 
     support orders state the amount of the child support in 
     a specific dollar amount. No. 2--95--1594 (unpublished 
     order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted leave to 
     appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment 
     of the appellate court and remand the cause to the trial 
     court. 
 
                          I. BACKGROUND 
          Vicky and Stephen were married in 1979. During their 
     marriage, the couple gave birth to two children. On 
     January 4, 1989, the trial court entered a judgment for 
     dissolution of marriage. The couple also entered into an 
     agreement specifying child support levels. This agreement 
     was incorporated into the divorce judgment. As part of 
     the agreement, Stephen agreed to pay $450 per month in 
     child support. This amount represented 25% of Stephen's 
     net income. The agreement stated that, after April 30, 
     1989, Stephen would pay Vicky a sum equal to 25% of his 
     net income. A redetermination of this amount would be 
     made each year on May 1. In no event would the child 
     support exceed $1,000 per month or be less than $450 per 
     month. 
          Stephen initiated this litigation by filing a 
     petition for modification of visitation rights on 
     December 16, 1994. On January 19, 1995, Vicky filed a 
     petition for rule to show cause, claiming that Stephen 
     had failed to comply with the 25% child support 
     provision. Vicky claimed that in calculating his net 
     income Stephen incorrectly included noncash losses of 
     depreciation and failed to include income from dividends, 
     interest, and stock and property sales. 
          Stephen filed a motion to strike Vicky's petition, 
     claiming that the petition lacked specificity as to the 
     exact arrearage due. The trial court granted Vicky leave 
     to file an amended petition. On March 2, 1995, Vicky 
     filed an amended petition specifying the exact arrearage 
     due. The case was set for trial. 
          During a pretrial conference on August 10, 1995, the 
     trial judge, sua sponte, determined that precedent from 
     the Appellate Court, Second District, rendered the 
     percentage provision in the agreement void and 
     unenforceable. On August 11, the trial judge allowed 
     brief argument concerning the validity of the percentage 
     provision. He then entered an order finding the child 
     support order void except for the minimum $450 provision 
     and dismissing Vicky's amended petition. Asserting that 
     neither party then resided in the Second District, Vicky 
     filed a motion to vacate the August 11 order due to 
     improper venue. On August 25, the trial judge found that 
     Vicky failed to raise venue in a timely fashion. 
          Vicky appealed the August 11 and August 25 decisions 
     of the trial judge. On appeal, Vicky asserted that the 
     trial judge erred in (1) denying her request for a change 
     of venue; and (2) finding the 25% provision of the 
     agreement void and unenforceable. 
          The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the 
     trial court.  No. 2--95--1594 (unpublished order under 
     Supreme Court Rule 23). In affirming, the appellate court 
     followed section 512(d) of the Act and found that venue 
     was waived because it was not initially contested in 
     Vicky's answer. 750 ILCS 5/512(d) (West 1994). That issue 
     has not been appealed to this court. Further, the 
     appellate court believed that the plain language of 
     section 505(a)(5) of the Act mandated that child support 
     provisions in final orders be stated in specific dollar 
     amounts. Section 505(a)(5) states that "[t]he final order 
     [for child support] in all cases shall state the support 
     level in dollar amounts." 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(5) (West 
     1994). Believing that entry of an order expressing child 
     support as a percentage of income was beyond the court's 
     authority, the appellate court found the percentage order 
     void and unenforceable and affirmed the trial court. 
 
                          II. ANALYSIS 
          In construing section 505(a)(5), we must ascertain 
     and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Varelis 
     v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,  167 Ill. 2d 449 , 454 
     (1995). Courts should first look to the language of the 
     statute to determine the intent of the drafters. Nottage 
     v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). When the statutory 
     language is clear, no resort is necessary to other aids 
     of construction. Henry v. St. John's Hospital,  138 Ill. 2d 533 , 541 (1990). We must first determine in this case 
     whether section 505(a)(5) of the Act mandates that child 
     support payments must be stated entirely as a specific 
     dollar amount or whether these payments may be expressed 
     partly as a percentage of net income, as was done in this 
     case 
          As we have noted, section 505(a)(5) provides that 
     "[t]he final order [for child support] in all cases shall 
     state the support level in dollar amounts." 750 ILCS 
     5/505(a)(5) (West 1994). We believe that the plain 
     language of the statute requires that the final order 
     state the support level solely in dollar amounts. The 
     legislature used the mandatory word "shall" to provide 
     that in "all cases" child support "shall" be stated in 
     dollar amounts and made no reference to the inclusion of 
     payments as a percentage. To allow settlement agreements 
     to be expressed in part as a percentage, as was done 
     here, would require us to read into the statute payment 
     options that the legislature did not include. 
          Although our decision is based on the plain language 
     of the statute, we note that our interpretation of the 
     provision is also consistent with its legislative 
     history. During debate on section 505(a)(5), which was 
     amended to its current form in 1985, Representative Olson 
     stated: "Final orders shall be in a dollar amount. This 
     [is] intended to help the clerk responsible for 
     collecting payments not to be dealing in percentages and 
     specific dollar amounts." 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House 
     Proceedings, May 20, 1985, at 35 (statements of 
     Representative Olson). We believe that the plain language 
     and the legislative history of the statute thus preclude 
     child support orders from expressing child support 
     payments as a percentage of net income. 
          Having determined that section 505(a)(5) does not 
     allow child support orders to express payments as a 
     percentage of income, we must next determine whether 
     judgments entered after the passage of section 505(a)(5) 
     containing such orders are void or voidable. The question 
     whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether 
     the court entering the challenged order possessed 
     jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. See 
     People v. Davis,  156 Ill. 2d 149 , 155 (1993). If 
     jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the 
     court is rendered void and may be attacked collaterally. 
     Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 155. "Judgments entered in a civil 
     proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only 
     where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court 
     which entered the judgment, either as to the subject 
     matter or as to the parties." Johnston v. City of 
     Bloomington,  77 Ill. 2d 108 , 112 (1979). A voidable 
     judgment, however, is one entered erroneously by a court 
     having jurisdiction and is not subject to collateral 
     attack. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 155-56. Once a court has 
     acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void 
     merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing 
     court's determination of the law. Vulcan Materials Co. v. 
     Bee Construction,  96 Ill. 2d 159 , 165 (1983); see 49 
     C.J.S. Judgments sec. 18(a) (1997). "Accordingly, a court 
     may not lose jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in 
     determining either the facts, the law or both." Davis, 
     156 Ill. 2d  at 156. 
          Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over the 
     parties and over the dissolution proceeding in general. 
     Further, the court had jurisdiction over the award of 
     child support. In exercising this jurisdiction, however, 
     the trial court judge entered a judgment that was 
     contrary to the statute. We find that the trial court's 
     original judgment of dissolution allowing child support 
     paid by Stephen to be expressed as a percentage of net 
     income with fixed dollar limitations was an erroneous 
     judgment. The error in the judgment, however, is not 
     enough to divest the court of jurisdiction to enter the 
     order. The judge had jurisdiction of the parties and the 
     subject matter, and, although the judgment was erroneous, 
     the judge had authority to enter the child support order. 
          We reverse the decision of the appellate court 
     finding the percentage portion of the child support order 
     void. The original dissolution judgment of the trial 
     court awarding child support to be paid as a percentage 
     of net income with fixed dollar limitations is voidable, 
     not void, and is not subject to collateral attack. Davis, 
     156 Ill. 2d  at 155-56. Thus, the trial court is therefore 
     directed to reinstate the original child support order. 
          We note that our result in this case is consistent 
     with the trend of modern authority on the closely related 
     question of defects in subject matter jurisdiction. The 
     contemporary view in that area, as exemplified by the 
     Restatement (Second) of Judgments, is to prefer finality 
     of an earlier judgment over alleged defects in its 
     validity. Restatement (Second) of Judgments sec. 12, 
     Reporter's Note, at 125 (1982); see also G. Hazard, 
     Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue 
     Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 
     586-91 (1981). Regarding the res judicata effect of a 
     judgment on an alleged defect in the subject matter 
     jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment, section 
     12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides: 
                    "When a court has rendered a judgment in 
                    a contested action, the judgment precludes the 
                    parties from litigating the question of the 
                    court's subject matter jurisdiction in 
                    subsequent litigation except if: 
                    (1) The subject matter of the action was 
                    so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction 
                    that its entertaining the action was manifest 
                    abuse of authority; or 
                    (2) Allowing the judgment to stand would 
                    substantially infringe the authority of 
                    another tribunal or agency of government; or 
                    (3) The judgment was rendered by a court 
                    lacking capability to make an adequately 
                    informed determination of a question 
                    concerning its own jurisdiction and as a 
                    matter of procedural fairness the party 
                    seeking to avoid the judgment should have 
                    opportunity belatedly to attack the court's 
                    subject matter jurisdiction." Restatement 
                    (Second) of Judgments sec. 12 (1982). 
          If these criteria were applied to the present case, 
     one would readily conclude that the order challenged here 
     is not subject to collateral attack, and hence is 
     voidable rather than void. First, the trial court had the 
     authority to enter an order for support; the court simply 
     erred in the manner in which the amount was to be 
     calculated, using a percentage of income rather than a 
     fixed dollar amount. Thus, the order entered by the court 
     does not appear to be a manifest abuse of its authority 
     or an indication that the court exceeded its inherent 
     authority. The trial court's earlier judgment does not 
     implicate the authority of another tribunal or government 
     agency, nor was it rendered by a court lacking the 
     capability to consider its own jurisdiction. Thus, even 
     if the defect in the present order could be characterized 
     as pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, the 
     Restatement would preclude collateral attack on the 
     order. 
          Adoption of the view expressed in the Restatement 
     would, of course, require us to reexamine the analysis 
     offered by cases such as In re Estate of Steinfeld,  158 Ill. 2d 1  (1994). Expressing the traditional view 
     regarding defects in jurisdiction, Steinfeld stated, "A 
     void order or judgment is one entered by a court without 
     jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, or by 
     a court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter 
     the order involved. [Citations.] A void order may be 
     attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time." 
     Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d  at 12. The parties do not ask us 
     to adopt the rule expressed in the Restatement, however, 
     and therefore we need not decide in this case whether to 
     take that step. It is enough to conclude here that the 
     present order was voidable and not void under either our 
     traditional mode of analysis or the view expressed in the 
     Restatement. In this case, the parties had the 
     opportunity to fully litigate this question when the 
     support order was entered, and they had as well the 
     opportunity to bargain for, and benefit from, the terms 
     of the settlement agreement. Moreover, numerous other 
     support orders could be subject to collateral attack if 
     the present decree were found void. These considerations, 
     as well as the others cited above, lead us to conclude 
     that the trial court's order is not subject to collateral 
     attack. 
          Stephen also raises here his claims that Vicky's 
     "Amended Petition For Rule To Show Cause" did not state 
     a cause of action and that Vicky is seeking an order from 
     the court that would improperly modify child support 
     retroactively. Vicky further argues that she is entitled 
     to arrears for insufficient payments by Stephen in the 
     past and that the child support payments can exceed the 
     $1,000 maximum provided for in the original child support 
     order. Because the trial court found the original child 
     support order void, the trial court did not address these 
     issues. We therefore remand this cause to the circuit 
     court for further proceedings consistent with this 
     opinion. 
 
                         III. CONCLUSION 
          For the foregoing reasons, we find that section 
     505(a)(5) of the Act mandates that child support payments 
     be expressed solely as a fixed dollar amount. Further, we 
     find that the portion of the trial court's judgment which 
     expressed child support payments as a percentage of 
     appellee's net income was erroneous but that it did not 
     affect the court's jurisdiction of the parties and the 
     subject matter. Thus, the judgment is voidable, but not 
     void, and is subject only to direct attack. We therefore 
     reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the 
     trial court and remand the cause to the trial court for 
     disposition of all remaining issues. 
 
     Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                               circuit court judgment reversed; 
                                                  cause remanded.