Title: Commonwealth v. Pridgett

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12574 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAURICE R. PRIDGETT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 8, 2018. - February 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Receiving Stolen Goods.  Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor 
vehicle.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  Probable 
Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 9, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
S. Kaplanes, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
William M. Driscoll for the defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Maurice R. Pridgett, was arrested 
2 
 
 
while sitting alone in the passenger seat of a motor vehicle 
that had been reported stolen.  He was charged with receiving a 
stolen motor vehicle, subsequent offense, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 28 (a), and receiving stolen property over $250, in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60, in connection with items found 
in the motor vehicle.  He filed a motion to suppress his 
postarrest statements, contending that the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest. 
 
A judge in the Boston Municipal Court Department allowed 
the defendant's motion following an evidentiary hearing, and the 
Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal.  The Appeals Court 
affirmed in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its 
rule 1:28.  Commonwealth v. Pridgett, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1105 
(2018).  We granted the Commonwealth's application for further 
appellate review, and we conclude, as did the Appeals Court, 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause 
that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen, a requisite 
element of the crime of receiving a stolen motor vehicle.  G. L. 
c. 266, § 28 (a).1  We therefore affirm the order of the motion 
                     
1 General Laws c. 266, § 28 (a), states in pertinent part:  
"Whoever . . . receives, possesses, . . . or obtains control of 
a motor vehicle . . . , knowing . . . the same to have been 
stolen, . . . shall be punished . . . ." 
 
3 
 
 
judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress.2 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are derived from the 
testimony of the police officer who made the observations of the 
defendant prior to his arrest; the testimony of the officer, who 
was the sole witness at the suppression hearing, was fully 
credited by the motion judge. 
While working undercover, the officer observed the 
defendant, who was leaning on a motor vehicle, talking on a 
cellular telephone (cell phone) and looking around.  Upon 
investigating the vehicle's license plate, the officer learned 
that the vehicle had been reported stolen.  The officer further 
observed the defendant open the vehicle's front passenger's side 
door to toss something into the vehicle.  The defendant then 
shut the door and resumed leaning on the vehicle.  After a 
period of time, the officer observed the defendant open the 
front passenger's side door and sit in the front passenger's 
seat.  At that point the officer radioed to uniformed police 
                     
 
2 The motion judge allowed the motion because he found that 
"the officers seized and arrested the [d]efendant prior to [one 
officer's] administration of the Miranda rights."  We have never 
held that Miranda warnings must be administered prior to the 
seizure or arrest of a suspect.  However, we may affirm the 
allowance of the motion on any lawful ground provided in the 
record.  See Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 
(1997) ("An appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on 
grounds different from those relied on by the motion judge if 
the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by 
the record and the findings"). 
4 
 
 
officers, directing them to "move in."  The uniformed officers 
removed the defendant from the vehicle and handcuffed him. 
After he was read Miranda warnings, the defendant made 
incriminating statements including that he knew the motor 
vehicle was stolen, and that items recovered from the motor 
vehicle during an inventory search3 may have been stolen.  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress his postarrest statements 
on the basis that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest 
him.  The motion was allowed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear 
error and "make an independent determination of the correctness 
of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205 
(2011).  Probable cause to arrest exists when, "at the moment of 
arrest, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the 
police are enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that 
the individual arrested has committed or was committing an 
offense."  Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321 (1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980).  Here, at the moment of the 
defendant's arrest, police must have had probable cause to 
believe that (1) the motor vehicle was stolen, (2) the defendant 
                     
3 Officers recovered a cell phone and a computer "tablet" 
device from the motor vehicle. 
5 
 
 
possessed the motor vehicle, and (3) the defendant knew or had 
reason to know the vehicle was stolen.  G. L. c. 268, § 28 (a).  
See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 750 (2015). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that there was sufficient 
evidence prior to the defendant's arrest that provided the 
police with a reasonable belief that all three elements of the 
crime were satisfied.4  For his part, the defendant concedes that 
the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle was 
stolen, but he disputes that police had probable cause to 
believe that he was in possession of the vehicle or that he knew 
it was stolen.  We conclude that, at the time of the arrest, 
                     
 
4 The Commonwealth argues for the first time that the 
defendant was not under arrest at the time he was handcuffed, 
and therefore all that was required was reasonable suspicion to 
stop the defendant.  Because this argument was not raised at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, it is waived on appeal.  
Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 781-782 (2004).  We note, 
however, that whether the seizure of a defendant constitutes an 
investigatory stop or an arrest depends on the existence of one 
or more factors. 
 
For example, the handcuffing of a suspect may not transform 
a seizure into an arrest where there is a possibility of flight 
or suspicion of a violent crime, or if the safety of the 
officers is at risk.  See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 
617, 627 (2008) (handcuffing defendant and placing him in police 
car did not constitute arrest "because of the violent nature of 
the reported crimes, [defendant's] attempt to flee, and the 
possible danger to the safety of the officers as well as the 
potential occupants of the house"); Commonwealth v. Williams, 
422 Mass. 111, 118-119 (1996) (seizure of defendant did not 
constitute arrest because defendant "posed a substantial flight 
risk" and "a significant safety risk" to officers and public).  
Here, there were no factors present that would suggest that the 
seizure was not an arrest. 
6 
 
 
although the officer had probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was in possession of a stolen vehicle, the 
observations he made did not rise to the level of probable cause 
to believe that the defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen. 
 
a.  Possession.  Where there is evidence that an individual 
exercised "dominion and control" over a motor vehicle, probable 
cause exists to believe that that individual possessed the 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Darnell D., 445 Mass. 670, 672-673 
(2005).  See also Commonwealth v. Paniaqua, 413 Mass. 796, 801 
(1992), citing Commonwealth v. Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 409 
(1989) ("possession is the intentional exercise of control over 
an item").  Dominion and control may be shown by circumstantial 
evidence.  Ramos, 470 Mass. at 750. 
 
Here, the defendant argues that evidence of his presence in 
the vicinity of the stolen vehicle and sitting in the 
passenger's seat is not enough to warrant a reasonable belief 
that he possessed the vehicle.  We agree that mere presence in 
the passenger's seat of a motor vehicle would not be sufficient 
to indicate possession.  See Darnell D., 445 Mass. at 673, 
citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 
(2003).  However, the defendant's presence near the vehicle was 
not the only observation that the officer made.  The officer 
also observed the defendant leaning on the vehicle, opening and 
closing the vehicle's door, tossing something inside the 
7 
 
 
vehicle, and sitting in the vehicle's passenger's seat.  
Importantly, no one else was in the vicinity of the vehicle 
while the officer made these observations of the defendant. 
These actions suggested that, for all intents and purposes, 
the defendant had exclusive access to the inside of the vehicle, 
utilized that access, and had at least some degree of control 
over the vehicle.  Taken together, the officer's observations 
were sufficient to establish probable cause to reasonably 
believe the defendant had dominion and control over the vehicle, 
that is, that he possessed it.5 
 
b.  Knowledge.  To arrest the defendant for receiving a 
stolen motor vehicle, the police also needed probable cause to 
believe the defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 393 Mass. 132, 137-139 (1984) 
(possession of stolen vehicle alone is not sufficient to 
establish that defendant had knowledge that vehicle was stolen). 
                     
5 The defense points to observations that the officer did 
not make of the defendant, including operation of the vehicle, 
sitting in the driver's seat, or attempting to conceal the fact 
that the automobile was stolen.  See Commonwealth v. Namey, 67 
Mass. App. Ct. 94, 100 (2006); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 50 Mass. 
App. Ct. 565, 569-570 (2000).  Although such observations would 
have added to the probable cause calculus, they are not 
necessary to determine that the defendant exercised dominion and 
control over the vehicle.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1986 
Volkswagen GTI Auto., 417 Mass. 369, 371, 375 (1994) (defendant 
exercised dominion and control over vehicle that was regularly 
parked where defendant resided and had stereo system that 
defendant altered for his benefit). 
8 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that circumstantial evidence and 
"reasonable inferences" established the defendant's knowledge 
that the vehicle was stolen.  See id. at 136 ("A person's 
knowledge . . . is a matter of fact . . . which may not be 
susceptible of proof by direct evidence").  We are not 
convinced. 
 
The Commonwealth notes that when one is in possession of 
recently stolen property, knowledge of its status as stolen may 
be inferred.  See Commonwealth v. Burns, 388 Mass. 178, 183 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 600-
602 (1988).  Here, however, there was no evidence presented at 
the hearing that the officer knew when the vehicle had been 
stolen. 
 
The Commonwealth acknowledges that the record does not 
reflect the timing of the theft, but nevertheless urges us to 
conclude that the officer could have inferred that the vehicle 
was recently stolen based on the fact that the original license 
plates were still attached.  The Commonwealth reasons that this 
inference is permissible because a thief presumably would want 
to hide the vehicle's stolen status as soon as possible, and 
thus the lawful owner's license plates would likely be removed 
or replaced soon after the theft.  However, the Commonwealth 
provides no case law -- and we can find none -- that supports 
this proposition.  Further, there was no testimony at the 
9 
 
 
hearing that even hinted at such a correlation.  The 
Commonwealth points to no other evidence that the officer had 
probable cause to believe that the suspect knew that the motor 
vehicle had been stolen. 
 
Although the police did not have sufficient evidence to 
support probable cause as to the knowledge element of receiving 
stolen property, the circumstances did provide a basis for 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being 
committed.  However, reasonable suspicion justifies only a 
Terry-type investigative stop, not an arrest.  See Commonwealth 
v. Willis, 415 Mass. 814, 817 (1993) (reasonable suspicion 
exists where there are "specific articulable facts . . . that 
the defendant had committed or was committing a crime"); 
Commonwealth v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984).  Given the 
information that the motor vehicle was stolen, the officers 
could have performed an investigative stop.  They could have 
asked the defendant for the vehicle registration and inquired 
about his relationship to the vehicle and his knowledge of its 
ownership.  If, after such inquiry, the police still had 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle was stolen, they 
could have seized and impounded the vehicle without a warrant.  
See Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 172-176 (1982).  And, 
if the information the defendant provided in response to their 
questioning indicated his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, 
10 
 
 
they might then have had probable cause to arrest him.  On the 
record before us, however, the arrest was premature. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because there was no probable cause to 
believe that the defendant knew that the motor vehicle was 
stolen, the defendant's arrest was unlawful and his postarrest 
statements were properly suppressed as the fruit of that 
unlawful arrest.  The motion to suppress was properly allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.