Title: HANNIFIN v CAHILL-MOONEY CONSTR C

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A W . 1972 DANIEL P. HANNIFIN, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CAHILL-MOONEY CONSTRUCTION COI@AW, INC., a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Second J u d i c i a l District, Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: Far Appellant : Henningsen and Purcell, Butte, Montana. James E. Purcell argued, Butte, Montana. For Respondent : Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana. Kendrfck Smith argued, Butte, 14ontana. Submitted: June 13, 1972 Decided : JuN 3 0 1 r d F i l e d : 3 U W 3 0 1972 Xr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the granting of defendant's motion f o r summary judgment by the d i s t r i c t court of the second judi- c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Silver Bow, Hon. John B. McClernan, judge presiding. In August 1968, defendant Cahill-Mooney Construction Company, Inc. was given a contract by the Stauffer Chemical Company t o remove c e r t a i n equipment from a building a t i t s plant near Butte, Montana. Work on the contract commenced August 25, 1968 and terminated i n e a r l y December 1968. The work was done without plans or specifications. The equipment t o be removed was pointed out t o defendant by a representative of Stauffer, who remained on the job during the e n t i r e time it took t o remove the equipment. H e t o l d defendant when t o stop work on the project i n December, notifying defendant o r a l l y hat's a l l we want done." P l a i n t i f f , Daniel P. Hannifin, was an employee of Stauffer Chemical Company. H e had worked f o r the company over ten years and had worked several years i n the wash p l a n t , the building housing the equipment removed by defendant. Plain- t i f f ' s deposition indicates t h a t e a r l y i n 1969 he had been off work approximately a month due t o i l l n e s s and a death i n h i s family. O n February 20, 1969, three or four days a f t e r h i s return t o work, he f e l l through a hole i n the floor of the wash plant, f a l l i n g some twenty f e e t . H e was severely injured and as a r e s u l t was off work eleven months. The hole i n the floor was a r e s u l t of removal of the equipment heretofore described. P l a i n t i f f received medical and workman's compensation benefits. H e then brought t h i s action against defendant alleging negligence on the p a r t of defendant i n removing c e r t a i n barricades and r a i l i n g s and i n f a i l i n g t o warn plant employees. The record indicates t h a t defendant construction company l e f t the job about December 1, 1968, and had no control over the job s i t e f o r a period of some two months and twenty days preceding the accident. The d i s t r i c t court granted defendant summary judgment f o r two reasons, (1) there were no genuine issues of f a c t or law as t o the l i a b i l i t y of defendant, and (2) there appeared t o be no duty owed by defendant t o p l a i n t i f f a t the time of the accident on February 20, 1969. P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s two issue f o r review on appeal: 1. Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n granting summary judg- ment f o r defendant on the issue of l i a b i l i t y ? 2. Were there any genuine issues of material f a c t which should have been submitted t o the jury? Defendant, before t r i a l , r e l i e d on one case a s controlling, Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 14ont. 331, 354, 12 P.2d 856. In t h a t case p l a i n t i f f Ulmen drove an automobile i n t o an open excava- t i o n and against a concrete culvert which p l a i n t i f f supposed was a regularly established and used highway. H e was seriously injured. There were two defendants, a general contractor and a subcontractor f o r the concrete work. A t the time of the acci- dent the concrete work was complete but had not been accepted by the general contractor or the s t a t e highway commission. A judgment of $10,000 was entered against both defendants and they appealed. This Court affirmed a s t o the general contractor, but reversed a s t o the subcontractor Roscoe. The Court held: "1t i s a l s o unim~ortant that Roscoe's work had f not been ' a c c e ~ t e d . It was com~leted and he had withdrawn a l l r o n t r o l over i t , sb t h a t it was a t the time of the accident but an i n t e n r a l art of the unfinished highway, no part of wKich would be accepted u n t i l ~chwieger's [general contractor] e n t i r e contract had been f u l l y executed. "'The general r u l e i s well established t h a t an independent contractor i s not l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s t o t h i r d persons, occurring a f t e r the contractor has completed t h e work and turned it over t o the owner or employer and the same has been accepted by him ;'; ;'c A - the l a t t e r i s substituted a s the responsible party. The reason f o r the substitution of l i a b i l i t y i s found i n the general doctrine t h a t an action f o r negligence w i l l not l i e unless the defendant was under some duty t o the injured party a t the time and place where the injury occurred which he omitted t o perform.' (14 R.C.L. 107) The cases c i t e d i n support of the above t e x t a r e of t h a t c l a s s wherein an owner o r contractor employs an independent contractor t o work upon premises the possession o f , and control over, which is surrendered t o him, and consequently the independent contractor is not re- lieved of responsibility u n t i l h i s work has been accepted and the premises revert t o the control of the owner or o r i g i n a l contractor. Such i s not the case here; as shown above the o r i g i n a l contractor, ~chwieger, was a t a l l times i n control of the e n t i r e projected highway, the dangerous condition existing a t the culvert being but a part thereof. I f Either an independent contractor or a servant i s l i a b l e to a t h i r d person injured by reason of the negligent handling of property when he owes a duty t o such t h i r d person, but he owes a duty t o protect t h i r d persons only when he has such control over the property a s the master or contractee would otherwise have. (Hagerty v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 38 Mont. 69, 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 356, 98 Pac. 643.) It i s the owner, occupier o r person i n charge of premises who i s i n duty bound t o keep t h e premises i n a reasonably safe condition, so t h a t those whom he has invited t o enter upon them s h a l l noc be unreasonably exposed t o danger, and one charged with t h i s duty, who f a i l s t o prevent entry by means of proper barricades o r warning signs, impliedly i n v i t e s those who otherwise might lawfully e n t e r , t o come upon the dangerous premises. I f , through h i s negligence t o perform t h i s duty, persons enter and a r e injured, he, and not h i s servant or an independent contractor who owed no such duty t o the public, i s l i a b l e f o r damages suffered by reason of h i s negligence. (3 Shearman & Redfield on Law of Negligence, 6th ed., 699; 45 C . J . 823-826; Montague v. Hanson, 38 Mont. 376, 99 Pac, 1063. ) I "On the day of the accident, Roscoe was neither owner, occupier nor person i n chargef of any portion of the new grade, and a t no time had he been charged with the duty of maintaining a b a r r i e r a t the point where the detour marked the end of the constructed grade and opened highway. " (Emphasis supplied) P l a i n t i f f concedes the r u l e i n Ulmen i s good law but argues t h a t i t only applies where the p l a i n t i f f i s a member of the general public and does not apply where the p l a i n t i f f i s an employee. This Court's d e f i n i t i o n of an "independent contractor" i s well s t a t e d i n Grief v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Fund, 108 Mont. 519, 93 P.2d 961. Further, the depositions c l e a r l y show t h a t defendant was not a servant of Stauffer Chemical Company; ipso facto, defendant's servants could not be fellow servants of p l a i n t i f f f o r Stauffer had no control over the manner i n which defendant's employees did t h e i r work. Callan v. Hample, 73 Mont. 321, 236 P. 550. W e find no merit t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t issue. I n h i s second issue on appeal p l a i n t i f f r a i s e s the question of whether or not p l a i n t i f f i s protected by the Scaffold Act of Montana. Sections 69-1401 through 69-1405, R.C.M. 1947. P l a i n t i f f alleges t h a t section 69-1404 of t h a t a c t i s applicable t o h i s case. That section reads: "It s h a l l be the duty of a l l owners, contractors, builders, o r persons having the d i r e c t and immed- i a t e control o r supervision of any buildings i n the course of erection, which s h a l l be more than t h i r t y f e e t high, t o see t h a t a l l stairways, ele- vator openings, f l u e s , and a l l other openings i n the f l o o r s , s h a l l be covered or properly protected 7 k * + : . " W e find no application of t h i s section t o the s i t u a t i o n here. Section 69-1404 applies only t o " a l l owners, contractors, builders, or persons having the d i r e c t and immediate control or supervision of any buildings i n the course of erection1'. Here, it i s obvious t h a t defendant simply had no immediate control o r supervision. W e do not agree with p l a i n t i f f ' s reliance on a recent decision of t h i s Court, S t a t e ex r e l . Great Falls National Bank v. D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont. 336, 345, 463 P.2d 326, i n support of h i s position. There the d i s t r i c t court granted summary judg- ment i n a true scaffolding s i t u a t i o n , holding t h a t section 69-1401, R.C.M. 1947, imposed absolute l i a b i l i t y . O n appeal the issue before the Court was---- Is a landowner not i n d i r e c t supervision and control of the work l i a b l e i n damages f o r violation of the Scaffold Act by an employee of an independent contractor? The 'Court held he was not, saying: "J; ; ' c ; ' c it i s c l e a r t o us from the language of the Act construed i n the l i g h t of i t s purpose t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e intended only t o make the injured workman whole by granting him r e l i e f t o the extent of h i s i n j u r i e s and damages against the person, firm o r corporation having d i r e c t and immediate control of work involving the use of scaffolding, I I Here, the Scaffold Act has no application. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. i Associate J u s t i c e ~ s s o c i a f b Justices.