Title: State v. Bean

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

337 So. 2d 496 (1976) STATE of Louisiana v. Charles BEAN. No. 57718. Supreme Court of Louisiana. September 13, 1976. Adam G. Nunez, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., A. J. Fazzio, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. SANDERS, Chief Justice. Defendant was charged with the second degree murder of Nathaniel Cornely, Jr., a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1(1). After trial by jury, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant relies upon ten assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence. Finding merit in defendant's Assignment of Error No. 10, we find it unnecessary to discuss the remaining assignments of error. In Assignment of Error No. 10, defendant alleges that the court committed reversible error in permitting certain hearsay testimony into evidence, over defense objection, reciting that defendant had stabbed the victim. *497 The challenged testimony of State's witness, Howard James Leger, is as follows: Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered at the trial to prove the truth of the matter contained in the statement. State v. Gonzales, 258 La. 103, 245 So. 2d 372 (1971); State v. Thomas, 159 La. 1076, 106 So. 570 (1925); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 497, p. 555. The contested statement could have no other purpose than to prove that the defendant was in fact the assailant. Hence, it is hearsay. The State contends, however, that the statement is admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. Res gestae is a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The res gestae exception is statutorily defined as follows: The excited utterance exception is broadly applied in Louisiana and includes testimony of utterances before, during, and immediately after the crime. State v. Batiste, La., 318 So. 2d 27 (1975); State v. Mays, La., 315 So. 2d 766 (1975). The rationale of the exception is the special reliability of utterances made under the pressure and excitement of a crime or other extraordinary occurrence. Basic to the exception, therefore, is the requirement that the declarant must have personally observed the event about which he makes a factual utterance. Carney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968); Montesi v. State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967); Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law, p. 506 (1974); Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 La.L.Rev. 661, 673 (1969); 6 J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 1751, p. 155 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence, § 297 P. 705 (2d ed. 1972); Anno.-Declarations-Condition of Admissibility, 127 A.L.R. 1030 (1940). The fundamental principle is correctly stated in 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 724, p. 795, as follows: We have found no decision in Louisiana which has squarely applied the rule. Our examination of numerous decisions of this Court dealing with the res gestae exception discloses that invariably the declarant observed the incident to which his utterance pertained. The presence of the declarant was shown either by the statement, itself, or by the foundation laid for the introduction of the statement. In the present case, the record is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that the declarant actually witnessed the crime. Whether or not his identification of the assailant was based on personal observation is not disclosed in the context of the utterance or in the foundation for its admission. Hence, we hold that the utterance identifying the defendant as the assailant was inadmissible at the trial. The evidence against the defendant in this case was circumstantial. Undoubtedly, the hearsay statement naming the defendant as the assailant was quite damaging. Hence, in the light of the entire record, we conclude that it was reversible error. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 921. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed.