Title: Unnamed Person No. 2 v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 30 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding Commenced 
by Affidavit Dated July 25, 2001: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person No.1,  
 
Petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person No.2,  
 
Petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person No.3,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable Sarah B. 
O'Brien, presiding,  
 
Respondents, 
The Capital Times Company, Ron McCrea, City 
Editor of the Capital Times, Journal Sentinel, 
Inc. and Mark Maley, State News Editor for the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,  
 
Intervenors. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 18, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O'Brien   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner, Unnamed Person No. 1, there were briefs 
by Franklyn M. Gimbel and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Franklyn M. Gimbel. 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioner, Unnamed Person No. 2, there were briefs 
by Stephen L. Morgan, Suzanne Lee, and Murphy & Desmond, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Stephen L. Morgan. 
 
For the petitioner, Unnamed Person No. 3, there were briefs 
by Lisa C. Goldman, Robert F. Nagel, and Law Offices of Robert 
Nagel, Madison, and oral argument by Lisa C. Goldman. 
 
For the respondent, State of Wisconsin, the cause was 
argued by Alan Lee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent, Honorable Sarah B. O'Brien, there was a 
brief by Nancy E. Wheeler and Knuteson, Powers & Wheeler, S.C., 
Racine, and Robert E. Hankel and Robert E. Hankel, S.C., Racine, 
and oral argument by Robert E. Hankel. 
 
For the intervenors there were briefs by Robert J. Dreps, 
Katherine Stadler, and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, and 
oral argument by Katherine Stadler. 
 
 
2003 WI 30 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
(L.C. No. 01-JD-6 ) 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding 
Commenced by Affidavit Dated July 25,  
2001: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person  
No.1,  
 
          Petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person  
No.2,  
 
          Petitioner,  
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Unnamed Person  
No.3,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable  
Sarah B. O'Brien, presiding,  
 
          Respondents, 
 
The Capital Times Company,  Ron McCrea,  
City Editor of the Capital Times, Journal  
Sentinel, Inc. and Mark Maley, State News  
Editor for the Milwaukee Journal  
Sentinel,  
 
          Intervenors. 
   
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
2
CERTIFICATION of questions of law from the Court of 
Appeals.  Certified questions answered.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review certified questions relating 
to three petitions for supervisory writ filed in connection with 
a John Doe proceeding pending before the Honorable Sarah B. 
O'Brien, a Dane County Circuit Court judge.  See In the Matter 
of a John Doe Proceeding Commenced by Affidavit dated July 25, 
2001; Nos. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W, Certification Mem. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 5, 2002).  Three witnesses summoned to 
testify in the secret John Doe proceeding filed separate 
petitions for supervisory writ in the court of appeals, each 
challenging certain actions of the John Doe judge and asking the 
court of appeals to exercise its supervisory authority with 
respect to those actions.  The court of appeals sealed the 
records, then certified these matters to this court because of 
concerns as to whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to 
issue a supervisory writ to a judge presiding over a John Doe 
proceeding.  The court of appeals also asked for clarification 
in regard to the scope of secrecy of an appellate record in such 
a proceeding.  We accepted certification and granted a motion 
filed by the Journal Sentinel, Inc. and The Capital Times Co. 
(Newspapers) to intervene with respect to the issue of the scope 
of secrecy of an appellate record in a John Doe proceeding.  
¶2 
We now conclude that the court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ to a John Doe judge.  
We conclude further that a John Doe judge has the authority to 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
3
disqualify counsel for a witness in a John Doe proceeding but 
must ensure that there is a record of that decision for review.  
Finally, we hold that when documents are submitted under seal in 
connection with a petition for supervisory writ that stems from 
a secret John Doe proceeding, the court of appeals must conduct 
an in camera review of those documents prior to issuing an order 
that continues the sealing of such documents, applying the 
criteria set forth herein.  
¶3 
The 
underlying 
John 
Doe 
proceeding 
involves 
an 
investigation by Dane County District Attorney Brian Blanchard 
into 
possible 
illegal 
campaign 
activity 
by 
the 
partisan 
legislative caucuses of the Wisconsin Senate and Wisconsin 
Assembly, as well as various state employees and legislators.1  
The underlying investigation is subject to a secrecy order 
entered by the John Doe judge on July 27, 2001, as amended by 
order dated August 17, 2001 and order dated March 6, 2003.   
¶4 
The petitioners are three separate individuals who 
were 
subpoenaed 
to 
testify 
in 
the 
underlying 
John 
Doe 
proceeding. After these writs were filed in the court of 
appeals, the court of appeals sua sponte ordered all the files 
in these three matters sealed.  As a result of this action, the 
Newspapers filed a motion to intervene, which, as noted, this 
court granted when it accepted certification by order dated July 
29, 2002. 
                                                 
1 Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann has 
served as the special prosecutor handling the investigation 
relating to the Senate Democratic Caucus. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
4
¶5 
By virtue of the secret nature of the underlying John 
Doe proceedings, the record before this court is somewhat 
sparse.  Indeed, because these are writ proceedings commenced in 
the court of appeals, we do not have access to the record of the 
underlying John Doe proceeding.  The facts presented to this 
court regarding each of the three petitions are as follows: 
UNNAMED PERSON NO. 1 
¶6 
Unnamed Person No. 1 is represented by the law firm of 
Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown.  In the course of the John Doe 
proceeding, the district attorney filed a motion to disqualify 
counsel for Unnamed Person No. 1.  As grounds, the district 
attorney alleged that different lawyers at this firm had 
represented other witnesses subpoenaed to testify in the John 
Doe proceeding.  The lawyers could not obtain the usual waivers 
and consents from their clients because the secrecy order 
precluded disclosing the names of their clients. 
¶7 
Based on information presented by the Dane County 
District Attorney, the John Doe judge issued a non-final order 
disqualifying Unnamed Person No. 1's counsel based on the 
alleged conflict of interest which was deemed not subject to 
waiver due to the secrecy order.  Unnamed Person No. 1 filed a 
petition for supervisory writ2 asking the court of appeals to 
issue a writ precluding the John Doe judge from disqualifying 
                                                 
2 Initially, Unnamed Person No. 1 filed a motion for leave 
to appeal a non-final order, which the State moved to dismiss.  
The court of appeals eventually granted this petitioner's motion 
to construe the motion as a petition for supervisory writ.  
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
5
his or her counsel.  As part of this petition, Unnamed Person 
No. 1 challenged the authority of the John Doe judge to 
disqualify counsel in this manner.   
¶8 
Subsequently, the State moved to dismiss as moot the 
writ filed by Unnamed Person No. 1, indicating that it has "no 
current intention" of subpoenaing Unnamed Person No. 1.  The 
petitioner responded that the matter is not moot because the 
State has not withdrawn its objection to his or her counsel and 
has "left open the door" to subpoenaing him or her in the 
future.   
¶9 
On May 30, 2002, before the court of appeals acted on 
the motion to dismiss, the John Doe judge issued an order 
vacating her earlier order disqualifying Unnamed Person No. 1's 
counsel.3  Notwithstanding this order, Unnamed Person No. 1 
maintains that the matter is not moot, emphasizing that the 
question of a John Doe judge's authority to disqualify counsel 
should be resolved.  The matter was certified to this court with 
the motion to dismiss still pending before the court of appeals. 
UNNAMED PERSON NO. 2 
¶10 The procedural background relevant to Unnamed Person 
No. 2 is similar to that of Unnamed Person No. 1.  The district 
attorney filed a motion to disqualify counsel for Unnamed Person 
No. 2, who is represented by the law firm of Murphy & Desmond.  
Again, the disqualification motion was based on an alleged 
                                                 
3 On May 31, 2002, the State moved to supplement the record 
with this order.  We hereby grant that motion. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
6
conflict of interest involving the firm's representation of 
multiple witnesses in the John Doe proceeding. 
¶11 As with Unnamed Person No. 1, the John Doe judge 
issued an order disqualifying counsel based on information 
presented by the Dane County District Attorney.  Unnamed Person 
No. 2 contends that the information was disclosed to the judge 
in a private session that excluded both the petitioner and the 
petitioner's counsel.  Accordingly, Unnamed Person No. 2 filed a 
petition for supervisory writ4 asking the court of appeals to 
issue a writ precluding the John Doe judge from disqualifying 
his or her counsel.  
¶12 On May 2, 2002, the State moved to dismiss Unnamed 
Person No. 2's writ as moot, indicating that it has "no current 
intention" of subpoenaing this petitioner.  On May 30, 2002, the 
John Doe judge issued an order vacating the order disqualifying 
counsel.5  Unnamed Person No. 2 did not oppose the motion to 
dismiss but the matter was certified to this court before the 
court of appeals ruled on the motion.  Accordingly, the State's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
Unnamed 
Person 
No. 
2's 
petition 
for 
supervisory writ is still pending. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Petitioner No. 2 filed a dual motion for leave to appeal a 
non-final order as well as a petition for supervisory writ.  
Petitioner No. 2 later amended the filing to clarify that a 
petition for supervisory writ was sought. 
5 The State also filed a motion to supplement the record 
with this order.  We hereby grant the motion. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
7
UNNAMED PERSON NO. 3 
¶13 Unnamed Person No. 3 filed a petition for supervisory 
writ alleging different facts.  Unnamed Person No. 3, a former 
employee of the Assembly Democratic Caucus, was subpoenaed to 
testify in connection with the underlying John Doe proceeding.  
Unnamed Person No. 3 appeared at the John Doe proceeding on 
March 13, 2002 and exercised his or her Fifth Amendment rights 
with respect to several questions.  The day before he or she was 
ordered to appear again, on March 25, 2002, Unnamed Person No. 3 
filed a petition for supervisory writ, a motion seeking relief 
from the subpoena, and a stay of the entire John Doe proceeding. 
The request for a stay was denied.  Subsequently, Unnamed Person 
No. 3 was granted immunity in open court, testified and was 
released from the subpoena. 
¶14 Unnamed Person No. 3's petition for a writ involved 
the claim that Dane County District Attorney Brian Blanchard had 
an impermissible conflict of interest, such that he should not 
have remained involved in the John Doe investigation generally, 
or in this petitioner's subpoena or questioning, specifically.  
Unnamed Person No. 3 claims further that the John Doe judge 
misused her discretion by failing to exclude District Attorney 
Blanchard because of this alleged conflict.  This petitioner 
asserts that the entire John Doe proceeding should be halted on 
the grounds that it is impermissibly tainted by District 
Attorney Blanchard's involvement. 
¶15 As evidence of the alleged conflict of interest, 
Unnamed Person No. 3 references a press release District 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
8
Attorney Blanchard issued on June 7, 2001 in which District 
Attorney Blanchard disclosed that he had received certain 
limited assistance from an individual at the Senate Democratic 
Caucus early in his own campaign.  In that press release, he 
stated that "[t]o avoid the appearance of a conflict of 
interest, today I am naming Milwaukee County District Attorney 
E. Michael McCann as special prosecutor to handle investigation 
of, and any prosecution decisions relating to," the Senate 
Democratic Caucus.  
¶16 The court of appeals denied Unnamed Person No. 3's 
motion to stay the entire John Doe proceeding.  Unnamed Person 
No. 3 later renewed that motion and the court of appeals again 
denied it.6  The court also directed the parties to brief the 
jurisdictional issue we will address herein.7   
¶17 While Unnamed Person No. 3's petition was pending 
before this court, the John Doe judge, on September 6, 2002, 
granted 
District 
Attorney 
Blanchard's 
request 
for 
an 
investigation into his alleged conflict of interest.  A hearing, 
which was open to the public, was conducted on September 17, 
2002, one day before the oral argument in this case.  On 
September 18, 2002, a few hours after the oral argument in this 
matter concluded, the John Doe judge issued an order finding 
                                                 
6 Unnamed Person No. 3 renewed this motion at oral argument.  
We deny the motion to stay the entire John Doe proceeding. 
 
7 The court also asked Unnamed Person No. 1 to brief the 
question of jurisdiction. 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
9
that there was no impermissible conflict of interest involving 
District Attorney Blanchard. 
¶18 The first question we consider is whether the three 
respective petitions for supervisory writ are moot.  It is well 
settled that a case is moot when a determination is sought on a 
matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical legal 
effect upon an existing controversy.  Stahovic v. Rajchel, 122 
Wis. 2d 370, 374, 363 N.W.2d 243 (1984).   
¶19 At first blush, it appears these matters may well be 
moot.  The bases for the requests for supervisory writ from 
Unnamed Persons No. 1 and No. 2 stem from the John Doe judge's 
orders disqualifying their counsel.  Each of these orders was 
subsequently vacated.  The basis for Unnamed Person No. 3's 
request for a supervisory writ stems from his or her allegations 
regarding District Attorney Blanchard, which have now been 
addressed in the John Doe proceeding.  Moreover, Unnamed Person 
No. 3 has been released from his or her subpoena.  However, even 
if an issue is moot, this court may address the issue if: (1) 
the issue is of great public importance; (2) the situation 
occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; (3) the issue is likely to arise again and 
a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; or (4) the 
issue will likely be repeated, but evades appellate review 
because the appellate review process cannot be completed or even 
undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties.  
State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶5, 245 Wis. 2d 
607, 629 N.W.2d 686. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
10
¶20 Regardless of whether these matters are moot, we 
conclude that they present issues that are likely to be repeated 
but may evade review.  We believe that the issues are of great 
public importance, and that a definitive decision from this 
court would alleviate uncertainty and provide guidance to the 
lower courts.  Accordingly, we will address the certified 
question whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
a supervisory writ to a judge presiding over a John Doe 
proceeding.8  We will also consider whether a John Doe judge has 
the authority to disqualify counsel for a witness in a John Doe 
proceeding.  Finally, we will address the scope of secrecy of an 
appellate record in a petition stemming from a secret John Doe 
proceeding. 
¶21 The question whether the court of appeals has the 
authority to issue a supervisory writ over the actions of a 
judge in a John Doe proceeding arises because of the unusual 
nature of John Doe proceedings.  The John Doe proceeding is an 
institution sanctioned by long usage and general recognition in 
                                                 
8 In certifying this question, the court of appeals candidly 
acknowledges that it has been inconsistent in its treatment of 
this issue in unpublished orders.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
L'Minggio v. Circuit Court, No. 99-2689-W (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
1999) (concluding court of appeals has no jurisdiction); State 
ex rel. Pierce v. Circuit Court, No. 98-3029-W (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 22, 1999) (no jurisdiction); State ex rel. Lee v. Circuit 
Court, No. 01-2440-W (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2001) (not 
addressing jurisdiction); State ex rel. Mentek v. Circuit Court, 
No. 01-2434-W (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2001) (not addressing 
jurisdiction). 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
11
this state.  State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 814 n.2, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978).9   
                                                 
9 The history of John Doe proceedings in this state, which 
date back to at least 1889, and the development of the John Doe 
statute are explained in State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 
266 N.W.2d 597 (1978). 
The "John Doe" statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (1999-2000), 
provides: 
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall 
examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her and may, and at the request of 
the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and by whom committed. The extent to which 
the judge may proceed in the examination is within the 
judge's discretion. The examination may be adjourned 
and may be secret. Any witness examined under this 
section may have counsel present at the examination 
but the counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or 
her client, cross-examine other witnesses or argue 
before the judge. If it appears probable from the 
testimony given that a crime has been committed and 
who committed it, the complaint may be reduced to 
writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a 
warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused. 
Subject to s. 971.23, if the proceeding is secret, the 
record of the proceeding and the testimony taken shall 
not be open to inspection by anyone except the 
district attorney unless it is used by the prosecution 
at the preliminary hearing or the trial of the accused 
and then only to the extent that it is so used. A 
court, on the motion of a district attorney, may 
compel a person to testify or produce evidence under 
s. 972.08 (1). The person is immune from prosecution 
as 
provided 
in 
s. 
972.08 
(1), 
subject 
to 
the 
restrictions under s. 972.085. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
12
 
¶22  A John Doe proceeding is intended as an independent, 
investigatory tool used to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and if so, by whom.  State ex rel. Reimann v. Cir. 
Ct., 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997) (citations 
omitted).  It is "designed to protect innocent citizens from 
frivolous and groundless prosecutions."  Id.    
¶23 Typically, when a circuit court judge renders a 
decision in a court of record, that decision may be appealed 
directly 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03.   By contrast, a John Doe proceeding is 
commenced by a judge, who acts as the tribunal.  See State v. 
Noble, 2002 WI 64, 253 Wis. 2d 206, 646 N.W.2d 38.  Therefore, 
an order issued by a judge in a John Doe proceeding is not a 
judgment or order of a circuit court.  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 
814 n.2; see also Wis. Stat. § 967.02(6) (defining "judge") and 
§ 967.02(7) (defining "court").  Thus, it is well settled that a 
John Doe judge's actions are not directly appealable to the 
court of appeals because an order issued by a John Doe judge is 
not an order of a "circuit court" or a "court of record."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 808.01 (defining "[a]ppeal"); Wis. Stat. § 808.03 
("[a]ppeals to the court of appeals"); see also State ex rel. 
Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963).    
¶24 With that background, we consider the nature and scope 
of the court of appeals' jurisdiction to evaluate whether the 
court of appeals has jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ 
over the actions of a John Doe judge.   
 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
13
¶25 The nature and scope of the court of appeals' 
appellate, supervisory, and original jurisdiction are set forth 
in the constitution and the statutes.  Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article VII, Section 5(3) provides: 
 
The 
appeals 
court 
shall 
have 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction in the district, including jurisdiction 
to 
review 
administrative 
proceedings, 
as 
the 
legislature may provide by law, but shall have no 
original jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ. 
The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid 
of 
its 
jurisdiction 
and 
shall 
have 
supervisory 
authority over all actions and proceedings in the 
courts in the district. 
 
Id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 752.01;10 Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 
428, 284 N.W. 42 (1939).   
¶26 To resolve the question whether the court of appeals 
has jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ to a judge 
presiding over a John Doe proceeding, we must interpret Article 
VII, Section 5(3), as well as related statutory provisions. 
¶27 This court interprets provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution de novo.  Polk County v. State Pub. Defender, 188 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.01 provides: 
  
(1) The court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by law. 
(2) The court of appeals has original jurisdiction 
only to issue prerogative writs. 
(3) The court of appeals may issue all writs necessary 
in aid of its jurisdiction. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
14
Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994).  In interpreting a 
constitutional provision, the court turns to three sources in 
determining the provision's meaning:  the plain meaning of the 
words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the 
practices in existence at the time of the writing of the 
constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision 
by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed 
following adoption.  Id. at 674; State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 
123-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). 
¶28 The interpretation of a statute and its application to 
a set of facts are also questions of law that we review de novo.  
Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 364-65, 597 
N.W.2d 687 (1999); Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, 
¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  If the language of a 
statutory provision is unambiguous, and clearly sets forth the 
legislative intent, we do not look beyond the language itself 
and simply apply the statutory provision to the case at hand.  
Landis, 2001 WI 86, ¶14.  If, however, the language of a statute 
is ambiguous, we must look beyond its language and examine such 
things as its scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
purpose, to determine the intent of the legislature.  UFE, Inc. 
v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Landis, 2001 WI 
86, ¶15.  A statute is ambiguous if reasonable minds could 
differ as to its meaning.  UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 283.   
¶29 Article VII, Section 5(3) might be read narrowly and 
taken 
to 
mean 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
lacks 
supervisory 
jurisdiction because the actions of a John Doe judge are not 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
15
actions of a "court."  That is how the State and the dissent 
would have us construe it.  It might also be taken to reflect a 
broad grant of authority to the court of appeals, which includes 
the authority to issue a supervisory writ over the actions of a 
John Doe judge.  That is how the petitioners and the John Doe 
judge would have us construe it.  Both constructions are 
reasonable and we conclude that Article VII, Section 5(3) is 
ambiguous with respect to whether it grants the court of appeals 
jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ over a John Doe 
proceeding.  Therefore, we turn to extrinsic factors, including 
the history of the constitutional enactment and contemporaneous 
statutory enactments, to evaluate the relevant constitutional 
provision. 
¶30 The history of Article VII, Section 5(3) supports a 
construction that would imbue the court of appeals with 
jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ to a judge presiding 
over a John Doe proceeding.  Our analysis is inextricably 
intertwined with the reorganization of the Wisconsin court 
system, enacted in 1977, which created the court of appeals.  
Prior to the court reform, Wisconsin's court system was 
comprised of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, circuit courts, county 
courts and municipal courts.  See 4 Jay E. Grenig & Nathan 
Fishbach, Wisconsin Practice, Civil Procedure Forms, §§ 1.6-1.11 
(1999).  Before the creation of the court of appeals, actions of 
a John Doe judge were subject to review by writ proceedings 
initiated in a circuit court, pursuant to the authority vested 
in the circuit court by the Wisconsin Constitution.  Wis. Const. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
16
art. VII, § 8 (1975);11 see also State ex rel. Niedziejko v. 
Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 126 N.W.2d 96 (1964); State ex rel. 
Kowaleski v. Dist. Ct., 254 Wis. 363, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949).   
¶31 There was apparently no dispute that a circuit court's 
appellate authority over "inferior county courts" and other 
"tribunals" included John Doe proceedings, because a John Doe 
judge is a judicial tribunal.  See State v. Noble, 2001 WI App 
145, ¶22, 246 Wis. 2d 533, 629 N.W.2d 317; State ex rel. Freemon 
v. Cannon, 40 Wis. 2d 489, 493, 162 N.W.2d 32 (1968). 
¶32 Effective 
in 1978, 
Wisconsin's court 
system was 
completely overhauled.  County courts were abolished and merged 
into circuit courts; county court jurisdiction and judges were 
transferred to circuit courts.  See William A. Bablitch, Court 
Reform of 1977: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Ten Years Later,  72 
Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1988);12 4 Jay E. Grenig & Nathan Fishbach, 
                                                 
11 In 1975 the Wisconsin Constitution provided in relevant 
part:  
The 
circuit 
courts 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within 
this state, not excepted in this constitution, and not 
hereafter 
prohibited 
by 
law; 
and 
appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control over the same. They shall 
also have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and 
all other writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and give them a general 
control over inferior courts and jurisdictions. 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 
12 The process of amending the Wisconsin Constitution to 
achieve court reorganization was detailed by Justice Bablitch: 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
17
Wisconsin Practice at § 1.9.  The four districts of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals were created and were specifically 
granted the authority set forth in Wisconsin Constitution 
Article VII, Section 5(3) (1977) codified at sections 752.01 and 
752.02, Wis. Stats. (1977). 
¶33 Consistent with this reorganization, the Wisconsin 
Constitution was amended to delete the reference to circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
The reorganization of the judiciary could not be 
accomplished 
without 
amending 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
This 
required 
that 
the 
proposed 
amendments 
be 
agreed 
to 
by 
each 
house 
of 
the 
legislature in two consecutive sessions.  Following 
such agreement, the proposed amendments were then 
submitted to the vote of the people. 
 . . . . 
In April 1977, the proposed amendments were submitted 
to the people for ratification.  The amendments were 
overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 455,350 to 
229,316.  All that remained to be done was the 
enabling legislation (footnotes omitted). 
 
It is clear that the Wisconsin Legislature, which agreed to the 
language of the amendments, was directly involved in the process 
that resulted in these constitutional enactments.  It also 
enacted the enabling legislation. 
 
The 
Legislative 
Council 
created 
a 
special 
committee on court reorganization to draft enabling 
legislation for the creation of a court of appeals.  
Chaired by Senator James Flynn of West Allis, the 
special committee drafted and introduced Senate Bill 
525 which was enacted by the legislature in a special 
session in November of 1977 as ch. 187, Laws of 1977, 
and subsequently incorporated into Wisconsin Statutes 
as ch. 752. 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
18
courts having appellate jurisdiction of "all inferior courts and 
tribunals."13  
¶34 Pursuant to the constitutional enactment, most of the 
appellate function previously exercised by circuit courts was 
assigned to the newly created court of appeals.  It is unclear 
whether 
the 
reorganization 
was 
intended 
to 
transfer 
the 
authority to review John Doe proceedings to the court of 
appeals, because the constitutional enactment failed to include 
the word "tribunal" in the constitutional grant of jurisdiction 
to the court of appeals.  The legislative history provides no 
evidence that the constitutional enactment was intended to 
deviate from the long-standing practice of permitting review of 
the decisions of a John Doe tribunal.  See Dan Fernbach, Working 
Document # 2: Jurisdiction of the Intermediate Court of Appeals 
(Wisconsin Legislative Counsel Reports; Special Committee on 
Court Reorganization) (May 16, 1977); Robert J. Martineau & 
Richard R. Malmgren, Wisconsin Appellate Practice, § 2901 (1978) 
("The Court of Appeals can exercise control over any action or 
proceeding in any court or before any administrative agency or 
public official or body to protect the legal rights of the 
petitioner.").  Indeed, traditionally, we have assumed that 
                                                 
13 With respect to circuit court jurisdiction, the Wisconsin 
Constitution now provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise 
provided 
by 
law, 
the 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state 
and 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
circuit 
as 
the 
legislature may prescribe by law.  The circuit court may issue 
all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."  Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 8 (1977) (emphasis added). 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
19
there must be some mechanism for review of the actions of a John 
Doe judge.  See, e.g., Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 828 ("We 
believe that witnesses and persons accused can be protected by 
appellate court review of John Doe proceedings and of the court 
orders 
which 
are 
an 
outgrowth 
of 
those 
proceedings."); 
Niedziejko, 22 Wis. 2d at 401 (if the facts show the judge has 
extended the proceeding in duration or scope beyond the 
reasonable intendment of the statute or has otherwise improperly 
conducted the proceedings, he or she can be restrained by writ 
of prohibition for abuse of discretion); 51 Op. Att'y Gen. 87 
(Sept. 1, 1987) ("The acts of the judge in conducting the John 
Doe are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and subject to a 
writ of prohibition.").  Had the legislature intended to curtail 
an individual's right to seek review of an order issued in a 
John Doe proceeding, it could have expressly said so.  The 
question, then, is which court appropriately reviews the actions 
of a judge in a John Doe proceeding.  To resolve this question, 
it is appropriate to consider the context in which the 
constitutional enactment creating the court of appeals arose. 
¶35 As noted previously, the legislature was extensively 
involved in the creation of the court of appeals, including the 
scope of its jurisdiction.  In April 1977, the voters of 
Wisconsin endorsed by over a two-thirds margin the establishment 
of a court of appeals and in that referendum, authorized the 
legislature to decide the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, 
as well as the number of judges, the districts in which the 
judges would be elected, and the districts for venue purposes.  
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
20
See In Re Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 82 Wis. 2d 369, 263 
N.W.2d 149 (1978).  The legislature was directed to have the 
court of appeals operational by August 1, 1978.  Id. 
¶36 To achieve that directive, the Legislative Council 
appointed a special committee on court reorganization.  Id.  
This committee was directed to prepare the legislation setting 
up the court of appeals.  The legislature considered the 
proposals of the special committee at a special session in 
November 1977, and Chapter 187 of the Laws of 1977 was enacted 
establishing the court of appeals.  Id. at 370.   
¶37 In light of the legislature's involvement with the 
court reform approved in 1977 and effective in 1978, we also 
consider contemporaneous statutory enactments, which clarify the 
grant of jurisdiction made to the court of appeals by Article 
VII, Section 5(3) of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 808.03(2) was enacted by the legislature in 1977, the 
same year as the constitutional amendment, and provides an 
instructive analogy.  It sets forth the procedure for seeking 
discretionary appellate review of nonfinal orders in the court 
of appeals.14  This section gives the court of appeals 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
808.03(2) 
is 
entitled 
"Appeals 
By 
Permission" and provides that: 
A judgment or order not appealable as a matter of right 
under sub. (1) may be appealed to the court of appeals in advance 
of a final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or 
clarify further proceedings in the litigation; 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
21
jurisdiction to take up a matter if doing so will, in its 
exercise of discretion, clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation.  The legislative council's comments indicate this 
provision was intended to supply standards for determining when 
the court of appeals should grant permission for review of an 
intermediate judgment or a non-final order.  While this 
provision obviously deals with a different aspect of the court 
of 
appeals' 
jurisdiction 
than 
is 
before 
us 
today, 
it 
demonstrates that certain statutes may shed light on the scope 
of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the court of 
appeals.  It also shows that the legislature wanted to be sure 
that the court of appeals had clear authority to clarify issues 
when necessary for the administration of justice. 
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1), which was adopted 
effective July l, 1978 to coincide with the beginning of the 
court of appeals, supports our conclusion that the court of 
appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether to exercise its 
supervisory jurisdiction over a John Doe judge.   It provides:  
 
A person may request the court to exercise 
its supervisory jurisdiction or its original 
jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ 
over a court and the presiding judge, or 
other person or body, by filing a petition 
and supporting memorandum. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable 
injury; or 
(c) 
Clarify 
an 
issue 
of 
general 
importance 
in 
the 
administration of justice. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
22
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1) (emphasis added).  The State 
correctly asserts that "[t]he statute, of course, cannot expand 
the court of appeals' jurisdiction beyond that which Article 
VII, Section 5(3) provides."  State's Br. at 8.  However, this 
provision was enacted contemporaneous with the reorganization of 
the court system and we are of the opinion it reflects the court 
of appeals' broad authority to issue a supervisory writ over an 
"other 
person 
or 
body" 
over 
which 
it 
has 
supervisory 
jurisdiction, including a John Doe judge.  Cf. Reise v. Morlen, 
2002 WI App 83, 251 Wis. 2d 472, 642 N.W.2d 568 ("the reference 
to 'court' or 'other person or body' in Rule 809.51(1) includes 
a Register in Probate"); State ex rel. S.M.O. v. Resheske, 110 
Wis. 2d 447, 329 N.W.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1982) (court has 
supervisory authority over the clerk of the circuit court). 
¶39 Our decision in State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 625-26, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997), 
is consistent with the conclusion we reach today.  In Reimann, 
this court touched, albeit peripherally, on the question of the 
court of appeals' jurisdiction to issue writs over John Doe 
proceedings.  Reimann had filed a petition in circuit court 
seeking a John Doe proceeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.26 
(1995-96), but the petition was denied without a hearing.  
Reimann petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 (1995-96).  The court of 
appeals granted the writ and ordered the John Doe judge to 
examine Reimann and his witnesses.  Id. at 612-13.  This court 
accepted the petition for review on the issue of whether Wis. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
23
Stat. 
§ 968.26 
(1995-96) 
requires 
a 
judge 
to 
examine 
a 
complainant under oath.  Ultimately, this court modified the 
writ, but implicitly approved the use of a supervisory writ 
issued by the court of appeals under § 809.51 (1995-96) in its 
review of the actions of a John Doe judge.   
¶40 We recognize the court of appeals' concern, as 
expressed in its certification memorandum: 
If the statement in Reimann accurately reflects the 
Supreme Court's view that [the court of appeals] has 
supervisory 
jurisdiction 
to 
review 
John 
Doe 
proceedings, we would be left with the incongruity 
that we could review rulings by a John Doe judge by 
writ but could not review final determinations in John 
Doe proceedings by appeal. Such a construction would 
also appear to give different meanings to the term 
"court" as used in Wis. Stat. §§ 808.03 and 752.02.   
Certification Mem. at 5-6.   
¶41 It is true that a John Doe judge's decisions made in 
the context of a John Doe proceeding are not subject to direct 
appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03, because the decisions of 
a John Doe proceeding are not the decisions of a "circuit court" 
or a "court of record."  However, we have concluded that such 
actions are subject to review pursuant to a petition for 
supervisory writ.  With respect to the court of appeals' concern 
that the final determination in a John Doe proceeding is not 
subject to direct appeal, we note that all that can issue from a 
John Doe proceeding is a complaint.  The validity of such a 
complaint will be scrutinized in the circuit court.  For 
example, probable cause to bind over for arraignment and trial 
may be tested in a preliminary examination in the circuit court.  
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
24
See State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 165-66, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  
In this sense, then, the final determination of a John Doe 
proceeding is subject to review.   
¶42 State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Board, 133 Wis. 2d 87, 
394 N.W.2d 732 (1986), does not require a contrary result, even 
though the dissent maintains that it does.  In Swan, the 
Elections Board, relying on Wis. Stat. § 8.30(4), refused to 
certify Monroe Swan as a candidate entitled to have his name 
placed on a ballot for state senator in a 1984 primary election, 
because Swan had two federal felony convictions.  Swan commenced 
an original action in the court of appeals, seeking a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Elections Board to place his name on the 
ballot. The court of appeals declared Wis. Stat. § 8.30(4) 
unconstitutional and granted the writ.  On the filing of a 
petition for review, this court raised, sua sponte, the issue 
whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction of such an 
original action raising questions publici juris.  We ultimately 
vacated the court of appeals' decision, concluding that the 
court of appeals was not empowered to issue a prerogative writ 
in that case, on the grounds that it had no original 
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ, and there was no 
basis for the court of appeals to exercise supervisory or 
appellate powers over the Elections Board.   
¶43 We view Swan as a procedurally unusual and highly 
fact-specific case.  In her dissent from that decision, now 
Chief Justice Abrahamson predicted this decision would "spawn 
numerous cases exploring the boundaries of the court of appeals' 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
25
'supervisory jurisdiction,' a concept less easily defined and 
more open textured than 'appellate jurisdiction.'"  Id. at 106 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  As the matters presently before 
the court attest, this prediction has come to pass. 
¶44 However, 
we 
are 
of 
the 
opinion 
that 
Swan 
is 
procedurally 
distinguishable. 
 
First, 
it 
involved 
an 
administrative agency.  The dissent calls this a "distinction 
without a difference" but we disagree.  In Swan, when the writ 
petition was filed in the court of appeals, it was clear that 
the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
Elections Board with a right of appeal from a final judgment of 
the circuit court to the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat.  
§§ 227.16(1)(a) and 227.21. Consequently, the Swan court's 
holding was based in part on the fact that it perceived no 
"jurisdictional 
underpinning" 
for 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
authority to issue the writ.  By contrast, here we have 
concluded that the constitutional drafters involved, as well as 
the Wisconsin Legislature, intended to give the court of appeals 
supervisory jurisdiction over the actions of a judge in a John 
Doe proceeding, so there is a jurisdictional basis for the court 
of appeals to issue the supervisory writ.   
¶45 Swan is further distinguishable in that it is not a 
"John Doe" case.  The unusual nature of John Doe proceedings is 
such that the proceedings are not readily amenable to comparison 
with different proceedings.  It is highly unlikely that the Swan 
court, despite its somewhat expansive discussion on the scope of 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
26
the court of appeals' jurisdiction, even considered John Doe 
proceedings when ruling on that case.   
¶46 In addition, the Swan decision relied heavily on the 
reasoning of State ex rel. Gilboy v. Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, 119 Wis. 2d 27, 349 N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1984), which we 
later overruled in State ex rel. James L.J. v. Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, 200 Wis. 2d 496, 546 N.W.2d 460 (1996).  In the 
State ex rel. James L.J. case, we held that the court of appeals 
did have jurisdiction to hear a petition for a supervisory writ 
relating to a ruling made by a chief judge on a substitution 
request, even though a judge, rather than a court, made the 
ruling.  Id.   
¶47 We further note that Swan relied on the theory that 
questions publici juris must be brought to the supreme court, 
Swan, 133 Wis. 2d at 93, because the court of appeals is 
"charged primarily with error correcting in the individual 
case."  Id. at 94.   
¶48 On balance, we conclude that Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article VII, Section 5(3), read together with the language in 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) and in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(1) 
including "other person or body," is sufficiently broad in scope 
to 
permit 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
to 
exercise 
supervisory 
jurisdiction over the actions of a judge presiding over a John 
Doe proceeding.  Interpreting the constitution to allow for the 
court of appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the actions of a 
John Doe judge represents sound practice and is in keeping with 
the court of appeals' traditional role as an error-correcting 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
27
court.  See State ex rel. James L.J. v. Cir. Ct. for Walworth 
County, 200 Wis. 2d 496, 546 N.W.2d 460 (1996).   
¶49 We emphasize, however, that writs stemming from John 
Doe proceedings should not become a vehicle for delaying a John 
Doe proceeding.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.51(2), the 
court of appeals enjoys the discretion to deny a petition for 
supervisory writ ex parte, when warranted. 
¶50 We now turn to certain procedural questions raised by 
these petitions.  The first is whether a John Doe judge has the 
authority to disqualify counsel in a John Doe proceeding, as 
occurred in the matters of Unnamed Persons No. 1 and No. 2.  
Resolution of this issue has significant implications for the 
rights of witnesses in a John Doe proceeding. 
¶51 In John 
Doe proceedings 
conducted 
in 
Wisconsin, 
witnesses and persons under investigation have substantial 
rights and due process 
protections. 
 
State 
v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 165, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  One of those rights is 
to have counsel present during questioning.  The John Doe 
statute does provide that "counsel shall not be allowed to 
examine his or her client, cross-examine other witnesses or 
argue before the judge."  Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  We construe this 
limitation to apply to counsel, such that counsel is not 
entitled to advocate on his or her client's behalf as typically 
occurs in the context of a circuit court proceeding.  While the 
John Doe judge may impose limits on counsel's right of advocacy, 
this provision should not be interpreted to preclude the John 
Doe judge from entertaining argument when necessary to ensure 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
28
procedural fairness.  This is consistent with the practice of 
many John Doe tribunals.  See, e.g., Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 
818-19 (noting that judge permitted argument); Noble, 253 
Wis. 2d at 215. 
¶52 This conclusion is consistent with the broad powers 
granted the John Doe judge. 
It is well settled that a John Doe 
judge has broad discretion to determine the nature and extent of 
John Doe proceedings.  Niedziejko, 22 Wis. 2d 392.  The judge 
also has final responsibility for the proper conduct of John Doe 
proceedings.  State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 284, 252 
N.W.2d 671 (1977) (stating that it is the John Doe judge's 
obligation "to ensure that the considerable powers at his or her 
disposal are at all times exercised with due regard for the 
rights of witnesses, the public, and those whose activities may 
be subject to investigation"). 
¶53 To that end, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 grants the John Doe 
judge 
the 
extraordinary 
authority 
to 
convene 
John 
Doe 
proceedings, to order the proceedings secret, and to issue a 
complaint or complaints as a result of the John Doe proceeding.  
See Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d 605.  
¶54 A John Doe judge is also entitled to exercise the 
authority inherent in his or her judicial office.  See In re 
Wis. Family Counseling Serv. v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670, 675-76, 
291 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1980).  As such, a John Doe judge has 
authority to issue subpoenas, examine witnesses, adjourn the 
proceedings, take possession of subpoenaed records, adjudicate 
probable cause, and issue and seal warrants.  See, e.g., State 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
29
v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 735-36, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996) 
(holding John Doe judge has authority to seal search warrant 
despite lack of express statutory authority); State v. Kielisch, 
123 Wis. 2d 125, 131, 365 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1985).15     
¶55 We have presumed that the grant of jurisdiction to 
John Doe judges "includes those powers necessary to fulfill the 
jurisdictional mandate."  See Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 736.  It 
is the John Doe judge's responsibility to ensure procedural 
fairness, and matters such as attorney conflicts of interest may 
indeed interfere with procedural fairness, particularly in a 
matter where a conflict may not be subject to waiver because of 
a secrecy order.  The commentary to SCR 20:1.7, regarding 
attorney conflicts of interest, is cited by the dissent to 
support the assertion that a John Doe judge lacks the authority 
to disqualify counsel.  However, the same commentary observes 
that opposing counsel may raise the question of a conflict 
"[w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the 
fair or efficient administration of justice . . . ."  Comment to 
SCR 20:1.7 (2002).  Accordingly, we conclude that a John Doe 
judge must have the authority to disqualify counsel, and may 
                                                 
15 A John Doe judge does not, however, enjoy the statutory 
powers of a court.  See State ex rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 
Wis. 2d 529, 536, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963).  In the examples cited 
by the dissent involving contempt proceedings, immunity grants, 
and the like, a "court" must decide the motions.  The relevant 
statutes governing immunity and contempt explicitly provide that 
those particular decisions must be made by a "court."  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 972.08 (indicating person may be compelled to 
testify "by order of the court"); Wis. Stat. § 785.05 (referring 
to contempt "of court").  
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
30
permit argument by counsel when necessary to ensure procedural 
fairness.  State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 805, 823, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978) (citing State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 
284, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977)).  See also State v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 165, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  Denying a John Doe 
judge the ability to disqualify counsel would seriously reduce 
the ability of the John Doe judge to carry out his or her 
responsibilities with respect to the proper conduct of John Doe 
proceedings.   
 
¶56 Were we required, however, to review the John Doe 
judge's exercise of discretion in these matters, we would be 
greatly hampered by the absence of any record for our review.  
In the briefs filed in this court, the John Doe judge explained 
at length her reasons for disqualifying counsel for Unnamed 
Persons No. 1 and No. 2.  But, the fact remains that there are 
simply no findings, conclusions or reasons on the record, other 
than the briefs, for this court to review to determine whether 
the judge did, in fact, properly exercise her discretion here.   
¶57 We, therefore, remind John Doe judges to be mindful 
that, when rendering judicial decisions in the context of a John 
Doe proceeding, they must create a record for possible review.  
See SCR 72.01(26) (governing retention of the record created in 
a John Doe proceeding).  We appreciate that the John Doe judge 
could conclude that the terms of the secrecy order may preclude 
a disclosure of the factual basis for the disqualification 
orders to the petitioners and their counsel.  However, our 
system of justice demands that there be some basis set forth to 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
31
facilitate review.  If necessary to preserve the integrity of a 
secret John Doe proceeding, the details concerning the grant or 
denial of such a motion need not be recited in open court.  
State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee County, 
65 Wis. 2d 66, 72, 221 N.W.2d 894 (1974); State ex rel. Jackson 
v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 536, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963).  The 
facts comprising the basis for the disqualification order may be 
sealed and, in the event of further review, submitted directly 
to the reviewing court for in camera review.  Such a procedure 
protects the integrity of the underlying John Doe proceeding, 
and also protects the excluded parties from arbitrary or 
capricious decisions.  
¶58 It so happens that the John Doe judge vacated the 
disqualification orders that were the subject of the petitions 
filed in the court of appeals.  Therefore, we need not consider 
whether the judge erroneously exercised her discretion in 
disqualifying counsel for Unnamed Persons No. 1 and No. 2 in 
these matters.16 
                                                 
16 These proceedings also raise a question about the 
authority of a John Doe judge to issue orders regarding an issue 
while a writ proceeding involving the same issue is pending in 
an appellate court.  As a general rule, in the context of a 
direct appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03, service of a 
notice of appeal strips the circuit court of all jurisdiction 
regarding the case, except where there is a specific grant of 
authority permitting the trial court to act.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.075; In re Marriage of Hengel v. Hengel, 120 Wis. 2d 522, 
355 N.W.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding since no specific 
exception was applicable, trial court judge had no power to act 
on attorneys fees after notice of appeal was filed).  See also 
Seyfert v. Seyfert, 201 Wis. 223, 226, 229 N.W. 636 (1930) 
(recognizing the general rule). 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
32
¶59 Finally, we address whether the court of appeals may, 
sua sponte, seal the appellate record in an action involving a 
petition for supervisory writ stemming from a secret John Doe 
proceeding.  It is clear that a John Doe judge has authority to 
designate a John Doe proceeding as secret and to issue 
appropriate orders to that effect.  The John Doe statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26, provides in relevant part: "[T]he record of the 
proceeding and the testimony taken shall not be open to 
inspection by anyone except the district attorney unless it is 
used by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing or the trial 
of the accused and then only to the extent that it is so used." 
¶60 Indeed, we have recognized that it is sometimes 
desirable for John Doe proceedings to be carried out in secrecy.  
See, e.g., Newspapers, 65 Wis. 2d at 72; see also Jackson, 18 
Wis. 2d 529 (upholding secrecy orders against constitutional 
challenge).  There are a number of reasons why secrecy may be 
vital to the very effectiveness of a John Doe proceeding.  These 
include:  
(1) keeping knowledge from an unarrested defendant 
which could encourage escape;  
(2) preventing the defendant from collecting perjured 
testimony for the trial;  
(3) preventing 
those 
interested 
in 
thwarting 
the 
inquiry from tampering with prosecutive testimony or 
secreting evidence;  
(4) rendering 
witnesses 
more 
free 
in 
their 
disclosures; and  
(5) preventing testimony which may be mistaken or 
untrue or irrelevant from becoming public.  
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
33
State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 736, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996) 
(citing State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 279, 252 N.W.2d 671 
(1977)). 
¶61 The precise scope of a permissible secrecy order will, 
of course, vary from proceeding to proceeding.  However, as we 
observed in O'Connor, "[s]ecrecy of John Doe proceedings and the 
records thereof is not maintained for its own sake." Id. at 283.  
The policy underlying secrecy is directed to promoting the 
effectiveness of the investigation. Id. at 286.  Therefore, any 
secrecy order "should be drawn as narrowly as is reasonably 
commensurate with its purposes."  Id. An allegation that a 
secrecy order issued in a John Doe proceeding exceeds the scope 
of the statutory authority provided in Wis. Stat. § 968.26 is 
subject to review.  See, e.g., Jackson, 18 Wis. 2d 529. 
¶62 Typically, a permissible secrecy order issued in a 
John 
Doe 
proceeding 
may 
properly 
encompass 
information 
concerning questions asked, answers given, transcripts of the 
proceedings, exhibits produced during the proceedings, or "other 
matters observed or heard in the secret session at a John Doe 
Proceeding."  See O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d at 279; Jackson, 18 
Wis. 2d at 545-47; see also State ex rel. Kowaleski, 254 Wis. at 
370-71 (holding that a John Doe secrecy order exists, in part, 
to protect the witnesses). 
¶63 As such, a document that is not used as an actual 
exhibit or entered into the record, but is used to question a 
witness, may be included within the scope of the secrecy order 
as a "matter observed or heard."  Similarly, if a witness 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
34
noticed that the prosecutor had documents in his or her 
possession, but those documents were not used to question the 
witness, the witness would still be precluded from telling 
anyone that he or she had observed that the prosecutor had those 
records because those documents would constitute a "matter 
observed."17 
¶64 Although several of the parties intimated that the 
secrecy order in the underlying John Doe proceeding was 
overbroad in its application, the question formally presented 
for our review is whether the court of appeals has authority to 
seal the record when a petition for supervisory writ is filed 
that derives from a secret John Doe proceeding.  Wisconsin 
statutes and case law do not specifically address this issue.   
¶65 The Newspapers contend that the court of appeals had 
no authority to seal the record in these cases without making 
appropriate public findings.  They emphasize that all records 
                                                 
17 A John Doe secrecy order would not, however, prohibit a 
witness from disclosing what he or she knows about an incident 
or the subject of the inquiry.  Similarly, there appears to be 
no compelling reason for the names of persons subpoenaed as 
witnesses but who do not appear or testify to be regarded as 
secret, although neither the John Doe judge nor the prosecutor 
must provide any list of persons subpoenaed, whether they 
testify or not because release of that information could prove 
inimical to the John Doe proceeding.  See In re Wisconsin Family 
Counseling Servs. v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670, 673, 291 N.W.2d 631 
(Ct. App. 1980) ("the public's right to know has never been 
interpreted to provide such unlimited access to public records 
that the state is unable to effectively prosecute and punish 
criminals and protect society from criminal ravaging").   
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
35
and proceedings are presumed public, and assert that they may be 
closed only when the court determines, after hearing and the 
making of explicit findings, that overwhelming public values 
connected with the administration of justice will be subverted 
by making them public.   
¶66 We agree that the public records law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35, is applicable to this issue and we reaffirm the general 
presumption that all public records shall be open to the public.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39.  This presumption reflects the basic 
principle that the people must be informed about the workings of 
their government, and that openness in government is essential 
to maintain the strength of our democratic society.  Id.  We 
have recognized, however, that the policy toward openness, 
although strong, is not absolute.  Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. 
Ass'n v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 227 Wis. 2d 779, 787, 596 N.W.2d 403 
(1999).  A balance must be struck between the public's right to 
be informed about the workings of its government and the 
legitimate need to maintain the secrecy of certain John Doe 
proceedings.   
¶67 To that end, the public records law provides that a 
requester has a right to inspect any record "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by law."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1).  The John 
Doe statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.26, which authorizes secrecy in 
John Doe proceedings, is a clear statement of legislative policy 
and constitutes a specific exception to the public records law.  
It is critical that when a John Doe judge issues a secrecy order 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.26, the judge must be assured that 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
36
secrecy will be preserved when and if the matter reaches an 
appellate court.  Seeking review in the court of appeals must 
not become a vehicle to undermine the secrecy or integrity of a 
John Doe proceeding. 
¶68 Therefore, on review of a petition for a writ stemming 
from a secret John Doe proceeding, the court of appeals may seal 
parts of a record in order to comply with existing secrecy 
orders issued by the John Doe judge.  As noted above, a 
permissible secrecy order may properly encompass information 
concerning questions asked, answers given, transcripts of the 
proceedings, exhibits produced during the proceedings, or "other 
matters observed or heard in the secret session at a John Doe 
Proceeding."  See O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d at 279. Therefore, this 
information may be sealed by the appellate court.  Indeed, 
failure to protect this information on review would compromise 
John Doe investigations and encourage frivolous requests for 
review by disgruntled individuals seeking to expose the details 
of the underlying proceeding.   
¶69 Here, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
faced 
a 
difficult 
predicament.  It was presented with three separate petitions for 
supervisory writ deriving from a secret John Doe proceeding 
about which it knew very little, save that there was a secrecy 
order that was to be strictly observed.  The record of the 
entire underlying John Doe proceeding was not available to the 
court of appeals, nor, indeed, was it available to this court, 
to evaluate whether particular documents needed to be sealed to 
protect the integrity of the underlying John Doe proceeding.   
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
37
¶70 In an effort to avoid such dilemmas in the future, we 
outline the following procedure to guide counsel and the courts 
when a petition for supervisory writ that derives from a secret 
John Doe proceeding is filed in the court of appeals.  
¶71 The party seeking review of a John Doe judge's 
decision shall file the petition for supervisory writ in the 
court of appeals, together with a motion seeking leave to file 
under seal any portions of the petition or record that fall 
within the scope of an existing secrecy order, but which the 
petitioner deems necessary to prosecute his or her petition.  
The State may respond to that motion.  The court of appeals can 
then entertain the motion, and conduct an in camera review of 
the documents proposed to be filed under seal.  If the documents 
appear to fall legitimately within the scope of a permissible 
secrecy order, the court may grant the motion and the documents 
will be filed under seal.18   
¶72 Here, the John Doe judge has advised the court that 
the following documents, which are already part of the appellate 
record, must remain sealed because each is subject to the 
                                                 
18 In certain cases, such as the petitions filed by Unnamed 
Persons No. 1 and No. 2 relating to the John Doe judge's order 
disqualifying counsel, the petitioner may not have been granted 
access to the record of the proceedings he or she seeks to 
challenge because of a secrecy order.  In such cases, the 
petitioner shall so advise the court and the court of appeals 
may issue an order directing the clerk of the circuit court to 
transmit the relevant documents to the court of appeals, under 
seal, so that the court of appeals can conduct an in camera 
review of the record relating to the John Doe judge's decision. 
 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
38
secrecy order issued in the underlying John Doe proceeding.  
Those documents are: 
1.  Transcript of John Doe proceeding included in 
Unnamed Person No. 1's Appendix filed in the Court of 
Appeals on December 3, 2001. 
2.  John Doe orders dated July 27, 2001 and August 17, 
2001, included in Unnamed Person No. 1's Appendix 
filed in the Court of Appeals on December 3, 2001, and 
as Exhibit 10 to Unnamed Person No. 3's Memorandum in 
Support 
of 
Petition 
for 
Supervisory 
Writ 
dated 
March 25, 2002. 
3.  John Doe order dated November 21, 2002 included in 
Unnamed Person No. 1's Appendix filed in the Court of 
Appeals on December 3, 2001. 
4.  John Doe order dated January 30, 2002 included as 
Exhibit 1 to Unnamed Person No. 2's Petition for Leave 
to Appeal Non-Final Order, or in the alternative, for 
review by Supervisory Writ, dated February 13, 2002. 
5.  Affidavit describing examination which occurred 
during the John Doe proceeding included as Exhibit 4 
to Unnamed Person No. 3's Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Supervisory Writ dated March 25, 2002. 
6.  John 
Doe 
Subpoena 
for 
Unnamed 
Person 
No. 3 
included as Exhibit 5 to Unnamed Person No. 3's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Supervisory Writ 
dated March 25, 2002. 
7.  John Doe motion dated April 30, 2002 and John Doe 
order dated April 30, 2002 attached to the State's 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Supervisory Writ on 
Ground of Mootness dated May 2, 2002 in Case No. 01-
3220-W (Unnamed Person No. 1). 
8.  John Doe motion dated April 30, 2002 and John Doe 
order dated April 30, 2002 attached to the State's 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Supervisory Writ on 
Ground of Mootness dated May 2, 2002 in Case No. 02-
0446-W (Unnamed Person No. 2). 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
39
9.  John Doe order dated May 30, 2002 attached to the 
State's Motion to Supplement the Record dated May 31, 
2002, in Case No. 01-3220-W (Unnamed Person No. 1). 
10.  John Doe order dated May 30, 2002 attached to the 
State's Motion to Supplement the Record dated May 31, 
2002 in Case No. 02-0446-W (Unnamed Person No. 2). 
Br. of Resp't, the Honorable Sarah B. O'Brien, at 7-8. 
¶73 Because these matters are moot, we decline to remand 
them to the court of appeals.  To the extent any party wishes to 
pursue a request to open the appellate record in these matters, 
they are directed to file a motion in the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals shall then conduct an in camera review of the 
appellate records in each of these three matters to determine 
whether any of the documents that comprise the appellate record 
should be unsealed.  To the extent any of the documents fall 
within the scope of a permissible secrecy order, they shall 
remain sealed.  The court of appeals shall issue an order to 
that effect, summarizing the reasons any documents must remain 
under seal.  
¶74 We do not reach the merits of the petitions filed by 
Unnamed Persons No. 1 and No. 2 because the John Doe judge 
vacated the disqualification orders that were the subject of the 
petitions filed in the court of appeals.  We also decline to 
reach the merits of the petition filed by Unnamed Person No. 3, 
regarding 
the 
alleged 
impermissible 
conflict 
of 
interest 
involving District Attorney Blanchard.  We need not resolve the 
question whether the petitioner had standing to file this 
petition in light of the fact that he or she had been discharged 
from the subpoena prior to filing this petition for supervisory 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
40
writ.  We also need not resolve whether this issue presented a 
justiciable controversy at the time it was filed.  Whatever the 
procedural posture at the time this petition was filed, by the 
time of the oral argument in this matter, the John Doe judge had 
initiated an investigation and conducted a public hearing 
regarding the very issue presented in Unnamed Person No. 3's 
petition.  Questions regarding the order subsequently issued by 
the John Doe judge on September 18, 2002, after oral argument 
before this court would be left to the court of appeals to 
address, 
if 
it 
is 
asked 
to 
exercise 
its 
supervisory 
jurisdiction.19   
¶75 In summary, we conclude that the court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ to a John Doe judge.  
We conclude further that a John Doe judge has the authority to 
disqualify counsel for a witness in a John Doe proceeding, but a 
record for review must be created.  Finally, we hold that when 
documents are submitted under seal in connection with a petition 
for supervisory writ that stems from a secret John Doe 
proceeding, the court of appeals shall conduct an in camera 
review of those documents to ascertain whether they are 
encompassed by a permissible secrecy order.  This in camera 
                                                 
19 Unnamed Person No. 3 has also filed a motion to amend the 
caption and a motion to compel the production of transcripts.  
Each of these motions is denied. 
No. 01-3220-W, 02-0446-W, 02-0831-W 
 
 
 
41
review must occur prior to the issuance of an order that 
continues the sealing of such documents.  
By the Court.—Questions answered. 
No.  01-3220.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion.  I 
write separately to point out that the majority opinion again 
takes a significant step towards overruling Swan.20  Rather than 
leaving Swan to be overturned in small measures by dubious 
judicial distinctions, I would embrace the inevitable now by 
expressly overruling Swan and adopting my dissent in Swan as the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
constitutional 
provision 
granting 
jurisdiction to the court of appeals.21   
 
 
 
                                                 
20  State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Board, 133 Wis. 2d 87, 
394 N.W.2d 732 (1986).  
 
21  Id. at 97 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶77 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  The Wisconsin 
Constitution confers two types of jurisdiction on the court of 
appeals: appellate, such as the legislature may provide by law; 
and supervisory, over actions and proceedings in the lower 
courts.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 5(3).  The constitution 
specifically prohibits the court of appeals from exercising any 
original jurisdiction, except by prerogative writ, and further 
provides that the court may issue writs that are "necessary in 
aid of its jurisdiction." Id.  This court has definitively 
declared this to mean that original writ proceedings in the 
court of appeals are limited to those that have an appellate or 
supervisory jurisdictional basis.  State ex rel. Swan v. 
Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 95-96, 394 N.W.2d 732 (1986); 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 5(3). 
¶78  This matter——an original writ proceeding in the court 
of appeals seeking review of certain actions of a John Doe 
judge, not a court——does not fall within the court of appeals' 
appellate or supervisory jurisdiction under the constitution.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals cannot entertain it as it is 
currently procedurally postured. 
¶79  Although an original writ petition of this type may 
not be initiated in the court of appeals, it may be brought in 
the circuit court, because the circuit court has plenary 
original jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal under 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
2 
 
the constitution, including original writ jurisdiction.22  Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 8; see also Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 
445-46, 284 N.W. 42 (1939).  If the matter is publici juris, 
this court may elect to take original jurisdiction if asked to 
do so.  Id. at 445-46. 
¶80  Finally, although a court has the authority to enter 
an order disqualifying counsel in an appropriate case, a John 
Doe judge does not.  While a John Doe judge must be a judge of a 
court of record, a John Doe investigation is not a court 
proceeding and a John Doe judge is not authorized to exercise 
all the powers of a court.  State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 
822-24, 828-29, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978); see also State ex rel. 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 
66, 72-73, 221 Wis. 2d 894 (1974); Wis. Stat. §§ 968.26, 
967.02(6).  The John Doe judge presides as a neutral judicial 
officer 
over 
an 
investigative——not 
adversarial——proceeding.  
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822-23.  The John Doe judge's 
adjudicative role is limited to determining probable cause.  Id. 
¶81  To the extent that circumstances arising in the John 
Doe investigation 
require 
the adjudication 
of 
adversarial 
motions or orders affecting the substantial rights of targets or 
witnesses——compulsion orders, contempt, privilege claims, and 
immunity grants——the John Doe statute contemplates, and caselaw 
has consistently required, that the John Doe judge convene and 
                                                 
22 Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides 
that 
"the 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state 
and 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
circuit 
as 
the 
legislature may prescribe by law.  The circuit court may issue 
all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."  
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
3 
 
act as a court.  Id. at 828-31; see also State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 
2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977); Newspapers, 65 Wis. 2d at 72-73; 
State ex rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.2d 939 
(1963); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to B.M. v. State, 113 
Wis. 2d 183, 335 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1983).  This sets up 
conventional and fully constitutional appellate or supervisory 
review in the court of appeals. 
¶82  The jurisdictional regime established by the majority 
opinion is contrary to both our constitution and our caselaw.  
The majority's conclusion regarding the authority of a John Doe 
judge to disqualify counsel conflicts with caselaw that has 
required these sorts of adversarial matters, when they arise in 
the context of a John Doe, to be heard and decided by the judge 
acting as a court rather than a John Doe tribunal.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
¶83  On the matter of the court of appeals' jurisdiction, 
the Wisconsin constitution provides: 
The appeals court shall have such appellate 
jurisdiction in the district, including jurisdiction 
to 
review 
administrative 
proceedings, 
as 
the 
legislature may provide by law, but shall have no 
original jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ.  
The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid 
of 
its 
jurisdiction 
and 
shall 
have 
supervisory 
authority over all actions and proceedings in the 
courts of the district. 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
VII, 
§ 
5(3)(emphasis 
added). 
This 
constitutional provision plainly contains both a jurisdictional 
grant and certain jurisdictional restrictions and exclusions.  
The court of appeals has general appellate jurisdiction as the 
legislature may provide.  The court of appeals also has general 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
4 
 
supervisory jurisdiction, "over all actions and proceedings in 
the courts."  Id.  Thus, the scope of the court of appeals' 
appellate jurisdiction depends upon the language of legislative 
enactments.  The scope of the court of appeals' supervisory 
jurisdiction 
is 
constitutionally 
limited 
to 
actions 
and 
proceedings in courts. 
¶84  Original jurisdiction in the court of appeals is 
strictly limited by the constitution: the court of appeals 
"shall have no original jurisdiction other than by prerogative 
writ."  Id.  The constitution authorizes the court of appeals to 
issue 
"all 
writs"——this 
language 
clearly 
includes 
the 
prerogative writs mentioned in the sentence immediately prior——
if "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."  Id.  Read as a 
whole, 
then, 
the 
jurisdiction 
clause 
prohibits 
original 
jurisdiction in the court of appeals, with the limited exception 
of prerogative writ original jurisdiction; but prerogative writ 
original jurisdiction, while available, is limited to that which 
is necessary in aid of the court of appeals' appellate and 
supervisory jurisdiction.  If there is no basis for the exercise 
of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction, the court of 
appeals cannot entertain an original prerogative writ action.23 
¶85  This was the holding in Swan, over 15 years ago, when 
this court was asked to determine the scope of the court of 
appeals' jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 5(3).  There 
the question was the court of appeals' jurisdiction to issue a 
                                                 
23  Black's Law Dictionary lists certiorari, habeas corpus, 
mandamus, and prohibition as examples of prerogative writs.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary at 1602-03 (7th ed. 1999).  
  
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
5 
 
writ of mandamus to an administrative agency, specifically, the 
Elections Board, in an election matter that was alleged to be 
publici juris. 
¶86  The legislature, pursuant to the constitutional 
directive in Article VII, Section 5(3), has defined the scope of 
the court of appeals' appellate jurisdiction as encompassing 
review "by appeal or writ of error . . . of a judgment or order 
of a circuit court."  Wis. Stat. § 808.01(1)(emphasis added).  
Therefore, direct appellate jurisdiction in the court of appeals 
is statutorily limited to review of judgments or orders of 
circuit courts.  The court of appeals' supervisory jurisdiction 
is constitutionally limited to "actions and proceedings in 
courts."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 5(3).  Accordingly, because an 
administrative agency is neither a "circuit court" for purposes 
of the court of appeals' appellate jurisdiction nor a "court" 
for purposes of its supervisory jurisdiction, this court in Swan 
was called upon to decide the scope of the court of appeals' 
original prerogative writ jurisdiction. 
¶87  Tracing the relevant constitutional language, and 
consulting a treatise on Wisconsin appellate practice by the 
drafters of the 1977 court reorganization amendments,24 the Swan 
court ultimately concluded as follows: 
The foregoing considerations persuade us that the 
court of appeals is a court of limited, rather than 
general, writ jurisdiction.  The references in the 
constitution to appellate and supervisory jurisdiction 
limit and define the power of the court of appeals to 
issue 
prerogative 
writs. 
 
The 
issuance 
of 
a 
                                                 
24 See Robert J. Martineau & Richard R. Malmgren, Wisconsin 
Appellate Practice (1978).  
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
6 
 
prerogative writ by the court of appeals is an 
exercise of original jurisdiction.  However, it is not 
an exercise of jurisdiction independent of the court's 
appellate and supervisory powers.  The court of 
appeals has power to decide questions publici juris 
which are brought to it by appeal or which it 
considers under its supervisory jurisdiction.  It does 
not have the power to issue a prerogative writ based 
solely on the importance of the question presented 
without any other jurisdictional underpinning. 
. . . . 
It should be remembered that a writ brought in any 
appellate 
court 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
exercising 
superintending or supervisory powers is an original 
action, i.e., a new action designed to affect or 
control the litigants or the court in respect to a 
matter then at issue or subject to the action of a 
lower court. . . .  
We conclude that the court of appeals does not 
have jurisdiction to entertain an original action 
unrelated to its supervisory or appellate authority 
over the circuit court.  Original jurisdiction in the 
sense intended by the petition of Monroe Swan for the 
determination ab initio of a matter publici juris 
under the constitution lies only in the circuit court 
or in this court. 
Swan, 133 Wis. 2d at 95-97. 
¶88  Swan is dispositive of the jurisdictional question now 
before this court.  Swan held that Article VII, Section 5(3) 
precludes the court of appeals from entertaining original writ 
petitions absent an appropriate basis for the exercise of the 
court's appellate or supervisory jurisdiction. 
¶89  The majority attempts to distinguish Swan by saying 
that it involved an administrative agency, not the action of a 
John Doe judge.  Majority op., ¶¶42-43.  This is a distinction 
without a difference.  As discussed above, the appellate 
jurisdiction of the court of appeals is statutorily limited to 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
7 
 
judgments and orders of circuit courts; the court's supervisory 
jurisdiction 
is 
constitutionally 
limited 
to 
actions 
or 
proceedings in courts.  An administrative agency is obviously 
not a court.  Similarly, a John Doe judge, while a judge of a 
court of record, does not act as a court, as the majority must, 
and does, concede.25  Majority op., ¶23.   
¶90  This court has repeatedly distinguished between a John 
Doe judge and a court.  "A John Doe judge is not the equivalent 
of a court, and a John Doe proceeding is not a proceeding in a 
court of record."  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 828.  "[A] John Doe 
judge does not have the statutory powers of a court."  State v. 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 738, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996)(emphasis 
in original); see also Newspapers, 65 Wis. 2d at 71; Jackson, 18 
Wis. 2d at 534-35.  The court of appeals has echoed this 
distinction.  State v. Schober, 167 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 481 N.W.2d 
689 (Ct. App. 1992)("the John Doe tribunal is not acting as a 
'court,' but as a 'judge'  . . . [and] [t]here is an express 
distinction between a judge and a court"); Gavcus v. Maroney, 
127 Wis. 2d 69, 70-71, 377 N.W.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1985)("[A]n 
order issued by a judge in a [John Doe] proceeding [is] not an 
order made by a court."). 
                                                 
25 The John Doe statute provides that "[i]f a person 
complains to a judge that he or she has reason to believe that a 
crime has been committed within his or her jurisdiction, the 
judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her. . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (emphasis 
added).  The criminal code contains separate and distinct 
definitions of "judge" and "court."  See Wis. Stat. § 967.02(6) 
and (7)(in Chapters 967-79, "judge" means a "judge of a court of 
record" and "court" means a "circuit court"); see also State v. 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 829 n.15, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978). 
  
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
8 
 
¶91  I will admit that this distinction between a John Doe 
judge and a court is somewhat abstract.  But it is based on 
valid concerns about the procedural differences between John Doe 
investigations and court proceedings.  See ¶¶101-107, infra.  In 
any event, it is a distinction that has been consistently 
maintained in the caselaw.  Unless the majority is willing to 
overrule this unbroken line of authority, it cannot interpret 
Article VII, Section 5(3) as vesting the court of appeals with 
original supervisory prerogative writ jurisdiction over the 
actions of John Doe judges, because the constitution explicitly 
limits the court of appeals' supervisory jurisdiction to 
"actions and proceedings in courts."  Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 5(3). 
¶92  The majority attempts to get around this inescapable 
reality by interpreting Article VII, Section 5(3) "together with 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2), and in Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.51(1)," which provides that "[a] person may request 
the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction or its 
original jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ over a court 
and the presiding judge, or other person or body."  Majority 
op., 
¶48; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.51(1). 
 
The 
majority 
acknowledges the basic principle that a statute cannot expand 
jurisdiction beyond 
that 
which the 
constitution 
provides, 
majority op., ¶38, but then proceeds to interpret the statute as 
doing precisely that.  Majority op., ¶48 ("[W]e conclude that 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, Section 5(3), read together 
with the language in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2), and in Wis. Stat. § 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
9 
 
809.51(1) including 'other person or body' is sufficiently broad 
in scope to permit the court of appeals to exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction over the actions of a judge presiding over a John 
Doe proceeding."). 
¶93  This approach to constitutional analysis was rejected 
by no less an authority than Chief Justice John Marshall, for a 
unanimous United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Although the case is obviously most 
revered for its forceful articulation of the judicial review 
power, 
the 
underlying 
question 
that 
precipitated 
that 
declaration 
of 
principle 
was 
jurisdictional: 
whether 
the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 could confer upon the Supreme Court a form 
of 
jurisdiction 
not 
included 
in 
the 
constitutional 
jurisdictional grant.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173-74.  The Supreme 
Court, of course, said no.  Id. at 180. 
¶94 I am not suggesting that Wis. Stat. § 809.51 is 
unconstitutional, only that it cannot be read to expand the 
court of appeals' jurisdiction beyond that which is contained in 
the constitutional grant.  And that is what the majority has 
done. 
¶95 The majority claims that its conclusion is consistent 
with State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 
Wis. 2d 605, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997), in which this court affirmed 
a writ of mandamus granted by the court of appeals stemming from 
a John Doe judge's denial of a John Doe petition without a 
hearing.  Reimann, however, did not address the issue of the 
court of appeals' supervisory writ jurisdiction under the 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
10 
 
constitution, but merely assumed without further discussion that 
Wis. Stat. § 809.51 writ procedures were applicable.  Reimann, 
214 Wis. 2d at 625-26. 
¶96 The majority asserts that the history of Article VII, 
Section 5(3), and particularly the 1977 reorganization of the 
Wisconsin court system, "supports a construction that would 
imbue the court of appeals with jurisdiction to issue a 
supervisory writ to a judge presiding over 
a 
John Doe 
proceeding."  Majority op., ¶30.  The majority notes that prior 
to court reorganization, Article VII, § 8, vested the circuit 
courts with appellate jurisdiction over "all inferior courts and 
tribunals," which included John Doe judges.  Majority op., ¶30, 
n.11.  Court reorganization altered the language of Article VII, 
§ 8 somewhat, deleting the reference to "inferior courts and 
tribunals" but retaining for the circuit courts "such appellate 
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may prescribe by 
law."  Majority op., ¶33, n.13. 
¶97 Based on this history, the majority concludes that 
"[p]ursuant to the constitutional enactment, most of the 
appellate function previously exercised by the circuit courts 
was assigned to the newly created court of appeals."  Majority 
op., ¶34.  The majority does not identify which "constitutional 
enactment"——Article VII, § 5(3), Article VII, § 8, or some other 
provision——accomplished this purported "reassignment" of the 
circuit court's "appellate function."  The majority cites no 
authority for this sweeping conclusion; the text of Article VII, 
§§ 5(3) and 8 certainly do not support it.      
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
11 
 
¶98  The majority has also concluded that a John Doe judge 
"must have the authority to disqualify counsel, and may permit 
argument 
by 
counsel 
when 
necessary 
to 
ensure 
procedural 
fairness."  Majority op., ¶55.  These conclusions cannot be 
squared with long-standing caselaw; the latter rewrites the John 
Doe statute. 
¶99 Adversarial motions which adjudicate the substantial 
rights of persons called before John Doe investigations——e.g., 
motions to compel, contempt motions, assertions of privilege and 
immunity grants——are heard and decided by the John Doe judge 
sitting as a court.  See  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 828-30 
(compulsion/contempt); 
Doe, 
78 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
164 
(same); 
Newspapers, 65 Wis. 2d at 72-73 (grant of immunity upon 
determination of self-incrimination privilege); Jackson, 18 Wis. 
2d at 535-37 (same); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 113 Wis. 2d at 
185 
(motion 
to 
quash 
on 
assertion 
of 
self-incrimination 
privilege). 
¶100  This court has held that while the John Doe statute 
"grants the John Doe judge power to issue subpoenas [] it does 
not 
specifically 
authorize 
the 
John 
Doe 
judge 
to 
force 
compliance 
with 
the 
subpoena 
or 
punish 
non-compliance."  
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 829 n.17.  Such adversarial, 
adjudicative matters are outside the investigative scope of a 
John Doe, and, when they arise, are heard by the judge sitting 
as a court.  This is because a John Doe judge's authority is 
limited by the purposes of the proceeding: a John Doe proceeding 
is investigative, not adversarial, and the John Doe judge's only 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
12 
 
adjudicative function is to determine probable cause.  Id. at 
821-22. 
¶101  This court's most comprehensive statement of the role 
and authority of a John Doe judge is the following, from 
Washington: 
The [John Doe] statute confers upon the John Doe judge 
the power to determine the extent of the examination, 
as well as the power to determine whether the 
examination 
will 
be 
secret. 
 
The 
John 
Doe 
investigation is essentially limited to the subject 
matter of the complaint upon which the John Doe is 
commenced.  The John Doe judge has no authority to 
ferret out crime wherever he or she thinks it might 
exist. 
. . . . 
 
By invoking the formal John Doe investigative 
proceeding, law enforcement officers are able to 
obtain the benefit of powers not otherwise available 
to them, i.e., the power to subpoena witnesses, to 
take testimony under oath, and to compel the testimony 
of a reluctant witness.  Although the judge's subpoena 
power is important to the prosecution and the judge 
has broad discretion in conducting the investigation, 
we reject [the defendant's] characterization of the 
judge as inevitably the 'chief investigator' or as an 
arm or tool of the prosecutor's office.  We do not 
view the judge as orchestrating the investigation.  
The John Doe judge is a judicial officer who serves an 
essentially judicial function.  The judge considers 
the testimony presented.  It is the responsibility of 
the John Doe judge to utilize his or her training in 
constitutional and criminal law and in courtroom 
procedure 
in 
determining 
the 
need 
to 
subpoena 
witnesses requested by the district attorney, in 
presiding at the examination of witnesses, and in 
determining probable cause.  It is the judge's 
responsibility to ensure procedural fairness.  State 
v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 284, 252 N.W.2d 671 
(1977). 
 
The John Doe judge should act with a view toward 
issuing a complaint or determining that no crime has 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
13 
 
occurred.  To the extent that the judge exceeds this 
limitation, there is an abuse of discretion.  State ex 
rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 545, 118 
N.W.2d 939 (1963). 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822-24 (footnotes omitted).  This 
articulation of the John Doe judge's role allowed the court in 
Washington to sustain the John Doe statute against a claim that 
it violated separation of powers by merging judicial and 
executive authority.  Id. at 825-26. 
 
¶102  The John Doe statute permits witnesses to have 
counsel present during the examination but provides that 
"counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or her client, 
cross-examine other witnesses or argue before the judge."  Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26 (emphasis added).  While this language relegates 
the attorney to a largely consultative rather than adversarial 
role (important, nonetheless, given the stakes), it also 
indicates a limitation on the scope and purpose of the John Doe 
and the authority of the John Doe judge. 
¶103  Because an attorney may be present but may not 
examine witnesses or argue before the judge, the statute 
obviously does not contemplate that the John Doe judge, as a 
John Doe judge, would adjudicate motions affecting the rights of 
targets or witnesses, as this would necessarily require at least 
some semblance of adversarial process, such as the opportunity 
for counsel to be heard, which the statute otherwise prohibits.26  
                                                 
26 The John Doe judge here may have permitted argument by 
counsel for Unnamed Persons No. 1 and No. 2, even though the 
John Doe statute precludes it, because the briefs refer to 
counsel 
as 
having 
requested 
further 
information 
and 
an 
opportunity to seek conflict waivers.  We have no record by 
which to confirm this, however, because of the John Doe secrecy 
order. 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
14 
 
A prosecutor's motion to disqualify counsel would qualify as an 
adversarial adjudicative matter, unless we are willing to say 
that a judge can legitimately disqualify an attorney based upon 
argument from a prosecutor alone.27 
¶104 Thus the John Doe statute itself, and the cases cited 
above, require the John Doe judge to convene and act as a court 
in order to adjudicate an adversarial matter such as a motion to 
disqualify counsel during a John Doe investigation. This 
conclusion provides basic procedural fairness (the opportunity 
to be heard before important rights are adjudicated), and also 
creates a record for review, which is completely lacking here. 
¶105 The 
majority 
notes 
that 
any 
review 
of 
the 
disqualification orders, had they not been withdrawn, "would be 
greatly hampered by the absence of any record for our review."  
Majority op., ¶56.  This eloquently understates the problem.  
Review is not merely "greatly hampered" without a record; it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
27 The commentary to SCR 20:1.7 regarding attorney conflicts 
of interest carries this caution regarding a conflict charged by 
an opposing party in a motion to disqualify counsel:  
 
Resolving questions of conflict of interest is 
primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking 
the representation.  In litigation, a court may raise 
the question when there is reason to infer that the 
lawyer has neglected the responsibility.  In a 
criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally 
required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants.  
Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in 
question the fair or efficient administration of 
justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the 
question.  Such an objection should be viewed with 
caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique 
of harassment. 
  
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
15 
 
impossible.  We have no idea why the John Doe judge disqualified 
the attorneys in this matter, other than a generic claim of 
conflict of interest stemming from previous representation of 
other witnesses.  Here, the "no record" problem is theoretical 
only, because of the apparent mootness brought about by the John 
Doe judge's withdrawal of the orders in question; in another 
case, the problem will be real. 
¶106  The majority gets around the caselaw and the 
statutory language by simply rewriting the statute: "counsel 
shall not be allowed to argue before the judge" now reads 
"counsel may argue before the judge."  However, argument of 
counsel, while now permitted under the majority's rewrite of the 
statute, may not be terribly meaningful.  While the majority 
"remind[s] John Doe judges to be mindful that, when rendering 
judicial decisions in the context of a John Doe proceeding, they 
must create a record for possible review," the majority also 
"appreciate[s] that the John Doe judge could conclude that the 
terms of the secrecy order may preclude a disclosure of the 
factual basis for the disqualification orders to the petitioners 
and their counsel."  Majority op., ¶57.  If counsel is not told 
why the prosecutor and judge want him disqualified, how can he 
possibly "argue before the judge" on the matter, and how can he 
formulate and prosecute a credible supervisory writ action in 
the court of appeals? 
¶107  It is interesting to note that during the same week 
that we heard oral argument in this matter, the John Doe judge 
took evidence and heard argument on the issue of whether the 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
16 
 
John Doe prosecutor ought to be disqualified on conflict of 
interest grounds.  She did so not as a judge presiding over a 
John Doe tribunal, but as a circuit court in open session.  She 
then issued an 11-page written decision captioned "State of 
Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Dane County, Branch 16," bearing the 
signature line "Circuit Court, Branch 16," finding no conflict 
of interest. The decision states that this procedure was 
followed "because the law is not settled in Wisconsin whether a 
John Doe judge has the power to make orders regarding a conflict 
of interest of attorneys appearing in the John Doe."  Decision 
and Order, Dane County Circuit Court Case No. 01JD6, dated 
September 18, 2002.  In any event, there is a court record and a 
court order. 
¶108  Thus, when a John Doe judge adjudicates these sorts 
of motions as a court rather than a John Doe tribunal, then 
direct appellate or supervisory review in the court of appeals 
is available because the proceeding produces an order from a 
court, not a John Doe judge.  This brings me full circle, back 
to the threshold jurisdictional question. 
¶109  The constitution and the caselaw are clear that a 
John Doe judge's order may be reviewed by an original writ 
proceeding in the circuit court (which in turn is reviewable in 
the court of appeals), or by an original action in this court if 
the matter is publici juris and the court chooses to hear it, 
but not by the court of appeals in an original supervisory writ 
action.  Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 3, 8; Swan, 133 Wis. 2d at 95-
97; Heil, 230 Wis. at 445-46.  A motion to disqualify counsel in 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
17 
 
a John Doe investigation, just like a contempt motion, a motion 
to compel, or a claim of privilege and grant of immunity, must 
be heard by the judge sitting as a court rather than a John Doe 
tribunal.  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 829 n.17; Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 
at 164; Newspapers, 65 Wis. 2d at 72-73; Jackson, 18 Wis. 2d at 
535-37; In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 113 Wis. 2d at 185.  An 
order emanating from such a hearing may be reviewed by the court 
of appeals pursuant to its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction 
under Article VII, Section 5(3) of the constitution. 
¶110  The majority opinion rewrites Article VII, Section 
5(3) of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as the John Doe 
statute; refuses to follow plainly applicable precedents; and 
expands the authority of a John Doe judge beyond that which 
either the statute or the caselaw allow.  I cannot join this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  01-3220.dss 
 
1