Title: Rawland v. Sheppard

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

232 N.W.2d 8 (1975) Frank S. RAWLAND, by Walter S. Johnson as Guardian Ad Litem, Respondent, v. C. G. SHEPPARD, M. D., Medical Director, Minnesota Security Hospital, St. Peter, Minnesota, Respondent, State of Minnesota, Appellant. No. 45300. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 18, 1975. *9 John E. MacGibbon, County Atty., Elk River, for appellant. C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Mark W. Peterson, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Rawland by Johnson. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., Michael R. Saeger, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Sheppard. Heard before OTIS, PETERSON, TODD, MacLAUGHLIN, and YETKA, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. OTIS, Justice. This is a proceeding brought by petitioner, Frank S. Rawland, under Minn.St. 631.19 to secure his parole from the Minnesota Security Hospital at St. Peter. The state appeals from an order of the District Court of Sherburne County denying its motion for dismissal and certifying as important and doubtful three questions pursuant to Rule 103.03(i), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. We affirm and remand to the district court for a decision on the merits. Petitioner was tried and convicted of murder in the third degree by the District Court of Sherburne County in the year 1969. On appeal to this court, we held that the evidence established as a matter of law that petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity. State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972). Accordingly, in September 1972, he was committed to the Minnesota Security Hospital as provided by Minn.St. 631.19. These proceedings were initiated by petitioner in December 1973 to secure his parole from the hospital. That part of § 631.19 which governs release procedures is as follows: Dr. C. G. Sheppard, medical director and head of the security hospital, was not able to certify to the court without qualification that in his opinion petitioner was improved sufficiently to be released and that no person *10 would be endangered by his discharge. He did, however, certify as follows: At the hearing in the district court petitioner waived his claim to an outright discharge and sought only a parole. At the conclusion of the hearing, the state moved the court to dismiss the petition. The court denied the motion and made the following finding: In denying the motion to dismiss the petition, the district court entered the following order and memorandum and certified the following questions for review by this court: For reasons hereinafter set forth, we decline to answer Question No. 1 and Question No. 2 but answer Question No. 3 in the affirmative. We do not pass on the question of whether the district court may grant petitioner an outright discharge since that matter is not before us. We do, however, hold that under the statute the court has the authority to grant petitioner a parole on the conditions set forth in the statute, for such time and upon such other and additional terms and conditions as the court may determine *12 and order, notwithstanding the failure of the medical director of the security hospital to certify without qualification that petitioner is not dangerous to the public. We confine our answer to the specific proceedings which we here review and do not thereby intend to construe the statute more broadly than the facts of the instant case require. From the inception of these proceedings it is clear that the lower court was disturbed by the fact that Dr. Sheppard had granted so-called "home visits" for periods up to 10 days without authority from the court. Upon petitioner's motion and over Dr. Sheppard's continuing objection, he was joined as a party respondent. In granting that motion, the court repeatedly stated that the issue in the case was whether Dr. Sheppard had discretion to grant the relief sought without any order of the court. It is clear from the court's preliminary discussion of the matter that he treated home visits as a type of parole which he seemed to feel could be authorized only by compliance with § 631.19, as evidenced by the following colloquy: The testimony at the hearing centered on whether, from a therapeutic point of view and for the protection of the public, the closer supervision of petitioner afforded by home visits was preferable to the less restrictive supervision inherent in granting a parole. The court deferred decision on the matter, however, and did not address itself to that issue except in an accompanying memorandum. It was apparently the court's judgment that if the medical director of the security hospital had authority to grant home visits without permission of the court, it might not be necessary to grant the petitioner the parole which he sought. Quite obviously, Question No. 1 and Question No. 2 were drafted with a view to resolving that issue before the court undertook to determine the matter of granting a parole, which was the relief sought by petitioner. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made this observation: *13 Although Dr. Sheppard has not sought review of the order joining him as a respondent, we note in passing that his objections were well taken. As his counsel stated to the court, this was not a petition for habeas corpus but one for parole in which Dr. Sheppard had no interest or standing after refusing to certify that petitioner could not be unconditionally released without endangering the public. His function in the release or parole process terminated at that point, and the responsibility thereafter was solely that of the courts. However, in refusing to dismiss Dr. Sheppard from the case at the conclusion of the testimony, the court reiterated that he was a "vital, essential, and necessary party to this proceeding." None of the parties has questioned Dr. Sheppard's authority to grant home visits. That issue was not litigated. The thrust of the argument made by counsel for the state was simply that home visits were preferable to parole under the statute. Indeed, counsel urged the court We therefore hold that the only issue before the lower court which was raised by the parties and on which the court had a responsibility to pass was whether, in the judgment of the court, petitioner had satisfied the statutory conditions making him eligible for parole, and, if so, what other terms and conditions were proper and necessary for the protection of the public and for the therapy and control of petitioner's mental illness.[1] Since Question No. 1 and Question No. 2 are not germane to that issue, we decline to respond to them. The order denying the state's motion for dismissal of the petition is accordingly affirmed, and the matter is remanded for a decision on the merits. [1] Of course there is nothing to prevent the district court from qualifying any parole he may grant with the five conditions of discharge proposed by Dr. Sheppard.