Title: People v. Rinehart

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 8/22/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S222620 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C074662 
BRANDON LANCE RINEHART, 
) 
 
) 
Plumas County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. M1200659 
 
____________________________________) 
 
California was shaped by the search for gold.  In time, the state‘s other 
natural treasures—its waters and wildlife, its forests and coastlines—proved 
similar draws.  We consider here a conflict arising from the competing desires to 
exploit and to preserve these various resources.  The People assert the state may, 
in pursuit of protecting fish habitats and the quality of the state‘s waterways, 
temporarily ban a particular method of gold mining pending adoption of suitable 
regulations.  Defendant Brandon Lance Rinehart, convicted of engaging in the 
banned mining technique, asserts it is the only practicable method and federal law 
promoting mining on federal land preempts the state‘s contrary legislation.  The 
Court of Appeal concluded Rinehart potentially was correct and remanded for 
consideration of additional evidence and argument.  We granted the People‘s 
petition for review. 
We conclude the state‘s moratorium is not preempted.  The federal laws 
Rinehart relies upon reflect a congressional intent to afford prospectors secure 
2 
 
possession of, and in some instances title to, the places they mine.  But while 
Congress sought to protect miners‘ real property interests, it did not go further and 
guarantee to them a right to mine immunized from exercises of the states‘ police 
powers.  We reverse the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Suction dredging is a technique used by miners to remove matter from the 
bottom of waterways, extract minerals, and return the residue to the water.  A 
high-powered suction hose vacuums loose material from the bottom of a 
streambed.  Heavier matter, including gold, is separated at the surface by passage 
through a floating sluice box, and the excess water, sand, and gravel is discharged 
back into the waterway.  (See Fish & G. Code, § 5653, subd. (g); Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 14, § 228; People v. Osborn (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 764, 768; Karuk Tribe of 
California v. U. S. Forest Service (9th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3d 1006, 1012 (en banc).) 
California has regulated suction dredging for the last half-century.  As 
originally enacted, Fish and Game Code section 5653 authorized the Department 
of Fish and Game, now known as the Department of Fish and Wildlife 
(Department), to issue permits for suction dredging, so long as it determined the 
dredging would not harm fish.  Operation of a suction dredge without, or in 
violation of the terms of, a permit was a misdemeanor.  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1816, § 1, 
p. 3864.)  Later amendments gave the Department authority to designate particular 
waterways off-limits to suction dredging (Stats. 1975, ch. 785, § 1, p. 1807) and 
made possession of a suction dredge near such waters unlawful (Stats. 1986, ch. 
1368, § 23, pp. 4896–4897). 
Responding to concerns that suction dredging disturbed endangered coho 
salmon habitats and contributed to mercury contamination of both fish and 
humans, in 2009 the Legislature imposed a temporary moratorium on the issuance 
of dredging permits pending further environmental review by the Department.  
3 
 
(Stats. 2009, ch. 62, § 1, adding Fish & G. Code, former § 5653.1; see Sen. Com. 
on Water, Parks & Wildlife, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 670 (2009–2010 
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 26, 2009, pp. 3–5.)  The moratorium went into 
immediate effect based on legislative findings that ―suction or vacuum dredge 
mining results in various adverse environmental impacts to protected fish species, 
the water quality of this state, and the health of the people of this state.‖  (Stats. 
2009, ch. 62, § 2.)  Two years later, in 2011, the Legislature placed a June 30, 
2016, sunset on the moratorium in the event environmental review and new 
regulations were not complete by that date.  (Stats. 2011, ch. 133, § 6.)  The 
following year, the Department finished its environmental review but concluded it 
lacked regulatory authority to address fully the environmental impacts of suction 
dredging.  (See Stats. 2015, ch. 680, § 1, subd. (c).)  The Legislature removed the 
2016 sunset (Stats. 2012, ch. 39, § 7) and in 2015 enacted legislation clarifying the 
scope of the Department‘s and other state agencies‘ regulatory authority (Stats. 
2015, ch. 680, §§ 2, 4).  The moratorium on permits remains in place. 
In 2012, defendant Brandon Rinehart was charged by criminal complaint 
with both possession and unpermitted use of a suction dredge.  (Fish & G. Code, 
§ 5653, former subds. (a), (d), recodified as subds. (a), (e) by Stats. 2015, ch. 680, 
§ 2.)  He demurred to the complaint.  Rinehart sought judicial notice of documents 
showing, and the People eventually stipulated, that he was operating on a mining 
claim he held on federal land in the Plumas National Forest.  Federal law ―allow[s] 
United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to 
prospect for and develop certain minerals.  ‗Discovery‘ of a mineral deposit, 
followed by the minimal procedures required to formally ‗locate‘ the deposit, 
gives an individual the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining 
purposes,‖ i.e., a mining claim.  (United States v. Locke (1985) 471 U.S. 84, 86.)  
4 
 
Such a claim may apply to a lode or placer,1 and may be patented or unpatented.2  
Rinehart holds an unpatented placer claim. 
In his demurrer, Rinehart contended section 5653 and the related temporary 
moratorium statute, Fish and Game Code section 5653.1, effectively banned 
suction dredging in California, preventing Rinehart from using the only 
commercially practicable method of extracting gold from his mining claim.  
Because, according to Rinehart, Congress had granted prospectors the right to 
mine on federal land free from material interference (see 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 612(b)), 
these provisions should be preempted as an obstacle to Congress‘s purposes and 
objectives. 
After a hearing, the trial court overruled the demurrer.  Having rejected as a 
matter of law the preemption defense, the court also excluded testimony Rinehart 
would have presented in support of that defense.  Rinehart waived a jury.  After a 
bench trial on stipulated facts, the court convicted Rinehart on both counts and 
sentenced him to three years‘ probation. 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  The court agreed with Rinehart that federal 
mining law should be interpreted as preempting any state law that unduly hampers 
mining on federal land.  The court further concluded Rinehart had made a 
                                              
1  
A lode is a vein or body of minerals embedded in fixed rock.  A placer is an 
area where minerals are found at or near the surface in loose earth, sand, or gravel, 
often by a riverside or in a riverbed.  (See United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co. 
(1888) 128 U.S. 673, 679–680; Gregory v. Pershbaker (1887) 73 Cal. 109, 113–
115.)  The term lives on in names like Placer County and Placerville in the Gold 
Country of eastern California. 
2  
―An ‗unpatented‘ claim is a possessory interest in a particular area solely 
for the purpose of mining; it may be contested by the government or a private 
party.  By contrast, if a claim is patented, the claimant gets a fee simple interest 
from the United States and no contest can be brought against the claim.‖  (Clouser 
v. Espy (9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1522, 1525, fn. 2.) 
5 
 
colorable argument that (1) the state regulatory scheme amounted to a de facto ban 
on suction dredging and (2) this ban rendered mining on his claim ― ‗commercially 
impracticable.‘ ‖  (Quoting California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co. 
(1987) 480 U.S. 572, 587 (Granite Rock).)  Because the establishment of these 
points hinged on disputed factual issues and the trial court had refused to admit 
evidence pertaining to them, the court remanded for further proceedings. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Preemption of State Law on Federal Land 
The federal Constitution‘s property clause vests Congress with the power to 
―make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States.‖  (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.)  Unlike the 
commerce clause, the property clause has no prohibitive effect when dormant.  
Instead, to displace the application of state law on federal land, Congress must act 
affirmatively.  (Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) 426 U.S. 529, 543 [―Absent consent 
or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its 
territory. . . .‖]; Omaechevarria v. Idaho (1918) 246 U.S. 343, 346 [―The police 
power of the State extends over the federal public domain, at least when there is 
no legislation by Congress on the subject.‖]; see Granite Rock, supra, 480 U.S. at 
pp. 580–581; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker (1905) 196 U.S. 119, 125–128 
[rejecting the argument that the property clause by itself preempts states from 
regulating mining claims on federal land].)  A state ―is free to enforce its criminal 
and civil laws‖ on federal land, unless those laws conflict with federal legislation 
or regulation; in the event of a conflict, of course, ―state laws must recede.‖  
(Kleppe, at p. 543.)  In the absence of any such conflict, state and federal laws 
governing the same land routinely coexist.  (See, e.g., Granite Rock, at pp. 576–
577 [simultaneous state and federal mining permit requirements]; United States v. 
6 
 
Locke, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 89 [simultaneous state and federal mining claim filing 
requirements].)  Dual sovereignty is the rule, federal exclusivity the exception. 
Rinehart asserts two federal land statutes supply a defense to his criminal 
convictions.  He contends the laws under which he was convicted are preempted 
by the general mining act of May 10, 1872 (30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq.; popularly 
known as the Mining Law of 1872) and by title 30 United States Code section 612, 
enacted as part of the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955 (Pub.L. 
No. 84–167 (July 23, 1955) 69 Stat. 367).  These statutes contain no express 
preemption provision, do not occupy a relevant field that would foreclose state 
regulation, and do not impose obligations that would make it impossible to comply 
simultaneously with state and federal law.  Rinehart‘s preemption argument rests 
instead on obstacle preemption, the principle that a state may not adopt laws 
impairing ―the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.‖  (Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67; accord, Quesada v. 
Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 312.)  He bears the burden of 
demonstrating preemption.  (Quesada, at p. 308.) 
In ascertaining whether preemption applies, ―[c]ongressional intent is the 
touchstone.‖  (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 318; 
see Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565.)  Obstacle preemption can play an 
important role in preventing states from creating, inadvertently or otherwise, 
functional impediments that materially constrain legitimate federal objectives.  But 
it can also lead to the overzealous displacement of state law to a degree never 
contemplated by Congress.  Accordingly, the threshold for establishing obstacle 
preemption is demanding:  ―It requires proof Congress had particular purposes and 
objectives in mind, a demonstration that leaving state law in place would 
compromise those objectives, and reason to discount the possibility the Congress 
7 
 
that enacted the legislation was aware of the background tapestry of state law and 
content to let that law remain as it was.‖  (Quesada, at p. 312.) 
The State of California‘s role in protecting the waters and the fish and 
wildlife within its borders is long-standing, predating even the federal laws upon 
which Rinehart relies.  Under English common law, the sovereign held title to the 
navigable waters within a land‘s borders in trust for the benefit of the people.  
(National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 434.)  Under 
this public trust doctrine, California became trustee of the state‘s waters, with 
responsibility for their oversight, from the beginning of statehood.  (Ibid.)  So too 
regarding the fish in the state‘s streams and lakes:  ―The fish within our waters 
constitute the most important constituent of that species of property commonly 
designated as wild game, the general right and ownership of which is in the people 
of the state [citation], as in England it was in the king; and the right and power to 
protect and preserve such property for the common use and benefit is one of the 
recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law, and 
preserved and expressly provided for by the statutes of this and every other state of 
the Union.‖  (People v. Truckee Lumber Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 397, 399–400; see 
Stats. 1852, ch. 62, p. 135 [regulating to protect the state‘s salmon]; Geer v. 
Connecticut (1896) 161 U.S. 519, 528 [tracing the ancient roots of the recognized 
―right of the States to control and regulate the common property in game‖], 
overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) 441 U.S. 322, 3263; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 25.) 
                                              
3  
Hughes retracted Geer‘s 19th-century view that state regulation of fish and 
game was immune to commerce clause objections, but left otherwise undisturbed 
the several states‘ power ―to protect and conserve wild animal life within their 
borders.‖  (Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 338.) 
8 
 
Following the United States Supreme Court‘s lead, we traditionally have 
applied a strong presumption against preemption in areas where the state has a 
firmly established regulatory role.  (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 312–313; City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 618, 631.)  Rinehart contends no presumption should arise here because 
state law is being used to regulate conduct on federal land, where congressional 
power is plenary.  (See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.)  The People disagree, 
urging that because the challenged state laws involve subjects traditionally within 
the state‘s regulatory purview, preemption is disfavored even on federal land.  In 
the circumstances of this case, we need not resolve this dispute, because the 
conclusion we would reach with or without the presumption is unchanged:  
Rinehart has not carried his burden of establishing congressional purposes and 
objectives that require California‘s environmental regulations be displaced. 
II. 
Preemption Under the Mining Law of 1872 
Rinehart‘s principal argument is that the present moratorium on suction 
dredging stands as an obstacle to the purposes of Congress implicit in the Mining 
Law of 1872.  In Granite Rock, the leading decision on the mining law‘s 
preemptive effect, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the law 
categorically forecloses states from imposing permit requirements on federal land.  
(Granite Rock, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 582–584.)  But Granite Rock involved a 
facial challenge to the requirement that a company obtain California Coastal 
Commission permits before engaging in mining.  The Supreme Court‘s decision 
left open the possibility of future preemption challenges to specific permit 
requirements or, as here, refusals to issue a permit.  (Id. at p. 594.)  Rinehart 
presents such a challenge. 
In Granite Rock, the party asserting preemption ―concede[d] that the 
Mining Act of 1872, as originally passed, expressed no legislative intent on the as 
9 
 
yet rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation.‖  (Granite Rock, 
supra, 480 U.S. at p. 582.)  Rinehart makes no such concession, but we reach the 
same no preemption conclusion:  The purposes and objectives underlying the 1872 
law do not require displacement of the challenged state laws. 
 
A. 
Text 
We begin with the relevant federal statutes.  The Mining Law of 1872 
allows citizens to enter federal land freely and explore for valuable minerals.  (30 
U.S.C. § 22; Granite Rock, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 575; United States v. Locke, 
supra, 471 U.S. at p. 86.)  Locators of valuable minerals may obtain a right to 
possess and develop the area around their claim, with title remaining with the 
United States.  (30 U.S.C. §§ 26, 35; Granite Rock, at p. 575; Locke, at p. 86.)  
The law and its regulations spell out further steps a miner may take to acquire not 
only possession, but formal title—a patented claim.  (30 U.S.C. §§ 29, 37; 43 
C.F.R. § 3861.1 et seq. (2016); Granite Rock, at pp. 575–576; Locke, at p. 86.) 
While these provisions all generally involve mining, their focus is 
considerably more specific—the delineation of the real property interests of 
miners vis-à-vis each other and the federal government.  The provisions of the 
1872 law identify in detail the conditions for obtaining, and extent of, a right of 
occupancy (30 U.S.C. §§ 26–27), the conditions for obtaining complete title (id., 
§§ 29, 37), the size of claims (id., §§ 23, 35), the marking and recordation of 
claims (id., §§ 28, 34), how disputes between claimants are to be resolved (id., 
§ 30), and so on.  The discovery of a valuable claim is in every instance a 
condition for thereafter obtaining some possessory or fee simple interest in federal 
land (id., § 22; United States v. Coleman (1968) 390 U.S. 599, 600–603), but the 
act as a whole is devoted entirely to the allocation of real property interests among 
those who would exploit the mineral wealth of the nation‘s lands, not regulation of 
the process of exploitation—the mining—itself. 
10 
 
As discussed, the property clause alone does not foreclose states from 
exercising their ordinary police powers on federal land; Congress must act.  From 
time to time in the years prior to 1872, California had seen fit to regulate mining 
within its borders.  (See, e.g., Stats. 1860, ch. 212, pp. 175–176 [conveyance of 
mining claims]; Stats. 1863–1864, ch. 91, p. 91 [disputes over property within 
mining claims]; Stats. 1865–1866, ch. 600, pp. 828–830 [mining partnerships].)  
The 1872 law is explicit concerning the effect of such past and future laws:  it 
endorses their continuing vitality and prospectors‘ ongoing obligations to abide by 
them.  Claimants are granted a right of possession ―so long as they comply with 
the laws of the United States, and with State, territorial, and local regulations.‖  
(30 U.S.C. § 26.)  One exception applies; compliance with laws that are ―in 
conflict with the laws of the United States governing [claimants‘] possessory title‖ 
(ibid.) is not required.  This narrow exception further underscores the real property 
focus of the law:  the one area where the law does intend to displace state law is 
with respect to laws governing title.  In other areas, state and local law are granted 
free reign. 
More generally, the law endorses in the first instance local, rather than 
federal, control over the mining fields.  (See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22 [mineral exploration 
on federal land shall occur subject to ―the local customs or rules of miners in the 
several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with 
the laws of the United States‖], 28 [permitting miners to adopt local rules 
governing the possession of mining claims], 43 [approving state regulation of 
mining claim sales].)  These express acknowledgements of the application of state 
and local law to federal mining claims suggest an apparent willingness on the part 
of Congress to let federal and state regulation broadly coexist, especially insofar as 
those state laws relate to matters other than a miner‘s ―possessory title.‖  (Id., 
§ 26.) 
11 
 
The text and history of title 30 United States Code section 21a, enacted a 
century later and codified as a preface to the Mining Law of 1872, also convey 
that Congress did not, and does not, intend mining to be pursued at all costs.  The 
provision describes as the ―continuing policy of the Federal Government‖ the 
promotion of (1) a private, ―economically sound and stable domestic mining . . . 
industr[y], (2) the orderly and economic development of domestic mineral 
resources . . . to help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and environmental 
needs, (3) mining . . . research, including the use and recycling of scrap . . . , and 
(4) the study and development of methods . . . to lessen any adverse impact of 
mineral extraction and processing upon the physical environment that may result 
from mining or mineral activities.‖  (30 U.S.C. § 21a.)  These policies recognize 
the importance of stable, sustainable industrial-scale mining in order to avoid 
foreign dependence.  (H.R.Rep. No. 91–1442, 2d Sess., pp. 2-4 (1970), reprinted 
in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5792–5794.)  But they also 
acknowledge mining must be done in an ―orderly‖ fashion and account for 
―environmental needs‖ and ―any adverse impact‖ on ―the physical environment.‖  
(30 U.S.C. § 21a; see H.R.Rep. No. 91–1442, at p. 5795 [―The reclamation of 
mined land, the recycling of scrap and waste materials and the development of 
methods to lessen any adverse impact on the environment must all receive 
consideration.‖].)  Federal support for mining is not limitless. 
Rinehart, however, asserts the 1872 law reflects a more expansive 
congressional purpose, an affirmative intent to grant individuals a federal right to 
mine, and requires preemption of state laws whenever they unduly infringe that 
right.  He focuses on the opening passage of section 22, which provides:  ―Except 
as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the 
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration 
and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase 
12 
 
. . . .‖  (30 U.S.C. § 22.)  To better understand the purposes and objectives 
underlying this and other provisions in the 1872 law, we may consider as well the 
history preceding and context surrounding their adoption.  What the text implies, 
history confirms:  no general federal right to mine, superior to the exercise of state 
police powers, was intended. 
B. 
Legislative History 
Gold was discovered in California in 1848.  Across the West, other 
discoveries of valuable minerals followed soon after.  (U. S. v. Shumway (9th Cir. 
1999) 199 F.3d 1093, 1098.)  Congress debated how best to regulate mining of 
these resources but took no immediate action.  (See Remarks of Sen. Stewart, 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) p. 3226 [discussing earlier inaction]; 
Remarks of Rep. Ashley, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) p. 4053 
[same].)  For years, the prospectors who entered federal land to seek their fortunes 
operated without federal regulation (Shumway, at p. 1098; Woodruff v. North 
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. (C.C.D.Cal. 1884) 18 Fed. 753, 773), subject instead 
to state and territorial law and local custom (Sparrow v. Strong (1865) 70 U.S. 97, 
104). 
As the Civil War concluded, Congress returned attention to the mining of 
the West and the need for formal rules.  Competing proposals contemplated two 
very different regimes.  Led by Congressman George Julian of Indiana, eastern 
legislators pushed a measure that would have put mining land up for public 
auction, selling out from under miners the territory they had explored and 
developed.4  In response, Senator William Stewart of Nevada proposed a system 
                                              
4  
House of Representatives No. 322, 39th Congress, 1st Session, section 1, as 
introduced February 21, 1866; see Remarks of Representative Julian, 
Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 2d Session (1865) pages 684–687; Remarks 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
 
advocated by western legislators under which miners would be granted a right to 
occupy and, for a small fee, acquire title to the land they mined.5  The Stewart 
approach prevailed.  (See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.) 
The 1866 mining law provided a template for what followed.  Originally 
applicable only to lodes, the law‘s principles were extended to placer claims in 
1870.  (Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217; see Deffeback v. Hawke 
(1885) 115 U.S. 392, 401.)  Those principles, and much of the 1866 act‘s original 
language, were then incorporated into the Mining Law of 1872.  (Act of May 10, 
1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq.)6  The provision at 
the heart of Rinehart‘s preemption claim, title 30 United States Code section 22, 
was drawn with minor rewording from the 1866 act.  (Compare 30 U.S.C. § 22 
with Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251.) 
These laws undoubtedly had as their central mission the orderly 
development of the nation‘s valuable mineral resources.  (See United States v. 
Coleman, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 602.)  But the way in which Congress went about 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
of Representative Julian, Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session (1866) 
pages 4050–4051. 
5  
House of Representatives No. 365, 39th Congress, 1st Session, as amended 
in the Senate July 19, 1866; see Remarks of Representative Ashley, Congressional 
Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session (1866) page 4021; High Country Citizens 
Alliance v. Clarke (10th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 1177, 1183–1184. 
6  
See, e.g., Remarks of Representative Sargent, Congressional Globe, 42d 
Congress, 2d Session (1872) page 534 (the 1872 law involved no ―change in the 
slightest degree [of] the policy of the Government in the disposition of the mining 
lands‖); High Country Citizens Alliance v. Clarke, supra, 454 F.3d at page 1183 
(the 1872 law ―essentially served to combine and fine tune‖ the 1866 and 1870 
acts). 
14 
 
establishing incentives to invest time and capital in a potentially risky enterprise is 
instructive.  First, the main inducement offered was the preservation, and 
endorsement going forward, of an existing system for the allocation of real 
property rights.  The 1866 act was drafted as protection for miners against the 
threatened exercise by Congress of its latent property clause power to sell land.  
(See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. Stewart, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 
pp. 3225–3229; Remarks of Rep. Higby, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1866) p. 4054.)  The ―general purpose of the act . . . was to give the sanction of 
the government to possessory rights acquired under the local customs, laws, and 
decisions of the courts.‖  (Jennison v. Kirk (1879) 98 U.S. 453, 461.)  By 
legislating, Congress endorsed the status quo and ―prevent[ed] such rights from 
being lost on a sale of the lands.‖  (Id. at p. 457; see High Country Citizens 
Alliance v. Clarke, supra, 454 F.3d at p. 1184.)  The mining laws gave prospectors 
tools to secure their real property interests against federal action. 
Second, while occupation and development of one‘s claim might protect 
against a federal sale, it did not insulate against parochial regulation.  The 1866 
act, unlike Representative Julian‘s proposal, gave the force of law to local miner 
rules.  (Compare Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 251–252 with 
H.R. No. 322, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).)  It also authorized state and territorial 
legislatures to regulate land sales to miners.  (Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 5, 14 
Stat. 252.)  These features were carried forward to the Mining Law of 1872.  (Act 
of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1, 9, 17 Stat. 91, 94, codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 43.)  
Additionally, the Mining Law of 1872 conditioned miners‘ rights of possession on 
ongoing compliance with existing and future state regulations.  (Act of May 10, 
1872, ch. 152, § 3, 17 Stat. 91, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 26.) 
From this history, we may infer Congress was concerned principally with 
removing federal obstacles to mining, and specifically the threat of a property sale, 
15 
 
that might deter individual prospectors and mining concerns from investing effort 
in mineral development.  Granted a right to enter federal land, the opportunity to 
obtain a right of possession, and the opportunity to acquire ownership, miners 
could pursue mineral discovery and exploitation free from the specter of having 
the land they worked sold at auction.  In contrast, the purpose Rinehart attributes 
to these laws—an intent to confer a right to mine, immune in whole or in part from 
curtailment by regulation—is not apparent.  The mining laws were neither a 
guarantee that mining would prove feasible nor a grant of immunity against local 
regulation, but simply an assurance that the ultimate original landowner, the 
United States, would not interfere by asserting its own property rights. 
Rinehart correctly notes the 1872 law conferred on him and others specific 
property rights.  Rinehart has an interest in land, a real property right to possess 
the area of his claim for particular purposes.  (See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. 
Krushnic (1930) 280 U.S. 306, 316–317; Cole v. Ralph (1920) 252 U.S. 286, 295.)  
But the grant of a real property interest does not ordinarily carry with it immunity 
from regulation, a guarantee that the state police power will be inoperative simply 
because the source of the real property interest is federal.  Given this, if Congress 
intended to do more, we can reasonably infer it would have said so.  It did not; 
indeed, quite to the contrary, it specifically noted the continuing obligation of 
miners with possessory interests, such as Rinehart, to obey state law.  (See 30 
U.S.C. §§ 26, 35.)  Collectively, the text and legislative history reveal no intent to 
displace state law. 
C. 
Congressional Acquiescence in State Regulation of Mining 
Methods 
Our confidence in this reading of the 1872 law is enhanced by Congress‘s 
reaction to state law limitations on mining in the immediate wake of the law‘s 
passage.  When in 1884 the application of California law resulted in a de facto ban 
16 
 
on a major industrial mining method, Congress did not move to restore the 
affected mining companies‘ rights.  Instead, it expressly approved and helped 
enforce the ban, which stayed in place for nearly a decade. 
By the early 1850s, much of the low-hanging fruit, the densest deposits of 
loose gold flakes and nuggets, had been picked clean from the Sierra Nevada 
foothills.  Prospectors turned from panning and digging to other more efficient 
techniques.  (Kelley, Gold vs. Grain: The Hydraulic Mining Controversy in 
California‘s Sacramento Valley (1959) pp. 23–28 (Kelley, Gold vs. Grain); Leshy, 
The Mining Law (1987) p. 184.)  Chief among these, hydraulic mining involved 
blasting hillsides with large volumes of high-pressure water to liquefy the earth 
and cull from it gold.  (See Pub. Resources Code, § 3982; Woodruff v. North 
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., supra, 18 Fed. at p. 756; Kelley, at pp. 27–56 
[discussing the rise of industrial-scale hydraulic mining].)  While effective, this 
method also had substantial environmental impacts.  Its waste products—gravel, 
silt, and other earthen debris—washed downstream, filled up riverbeds, and 
triggered devastating floods in lowland farming communities.7  (Woodruff, at 
pp. 756–763, 766–768; Kelley, at pp. 56–67; Leshy, at pp. 184–185.)  To cope 
with this ― ‗moving avalanche‘ ‖ (Kelley, at p. 244), Central California towns and 
the state spent vast sums on dams and levees, with mixed success (id. at pp. 58, 
65, 119, 198; Woodruff, at pp. 763–767). 
                                              
7  
During the heyday of hydraulic mining, more than triple the volume of 
earth excavated in digging the Panama Canal was discharged into the Yuba River, 
just one of four affected waterways.  (Bezerra & West, Submerged in the Yuba 
River: The State Water Resources Control Board’s Prioritization of the 
Governor’s Commissions Proposals (2005) 36 McGeorge L.Rev. 331, 332.)  
During one typically overwhelming 1875 flood, the City of Marysville was turned 
into ―a vast dump for mining debris‖ after its levees broke.  (Kelley, Gold vs. 
Grain, supra, at pp. 66–67.) 
17 
 
In time, state officials and members of Central Valley communities sued 
hydraulic mining companies under state nuisance law and obtained permanent 
injunctions prohibiting the discharge of debris into various waterways (see, e.g., 
People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co. (1884) 66 Cal. 138, 152; Woodruff v. North 
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., supra, 18 Fed. at pp. 806–809), which had the 
practical effect of banning the mining practice.  Of note, the Woodruff court 
considered at length and rejected the mining industry‘s argument for preemption 
under the Mining Law of 1872.  The Woodruff defendants argued federal 
legislation ―recognize[ed] mining as a proper and lawful employment, and 
encourage[ed] this industry‖ with full knowledge of the environmental 
consequences it might impose, and thus they could not be enjoined.  (Woodruff, at 
p. 770.)  The court identified as the purpose of the mining laws the granting to 
miners of estates in land and the legalization of what had been trespasses (id. at 
pp. 773–774), and found no purpose to authorize mining notwithstanding any 
proscriptions in state law addressed to its collateral consequences. 
Though the injunctions effectively crippled a major industry (North 
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. U. S. (9th Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 664, 671; Kelley, 
Gold vs. Grain, supra, at pp. 243–270) and de facto forbade a predominant form of 
mining, even on federal land, Congress endorsed the state law ban.  In 1886, 
Congress appropriated money for improvement of the Sacramento and Feather 
Rivers, but conditioned its expenditure on the Secretary of War satisfying himself 
―that hydraulic mining hurtful to navigation has ceased on said rivers and their 
tributaries.‖  (Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929, 24 Stat. 310, 326 (1886).)  If the 
Secretary of War found hydraulic mining had not ceased, he was ―instructed to 
institute such legal proceedings as may be necessary‖ to end it.  (Ibid.) 
Seeking an accommodation between mining and farming interests, our 
Legislature warned Congress that ―the mining industry of our State is in imminent 
18 
 
danger of being entirely suppressed‖ and asked for action.  (Assem. J. Res. No. 10, 
Stat. 1887 (1887 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 10, p. 253.)  Senator Stewart, the author of 
the original 1866 mining act and the chair of the Committee on Mines and Mining, 
submitted a report to Congress advising that state law injunctions had ―practically 
stopped‖ hydraulic mining and ―rendered valueless‖ the affected miners‘ property 
(Sen.Rep. No. 1944, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1888)) and favoring inquiry into 
whether there was any way to resume hydraulic mining without further damaging 
California‘s rivers (id. at pp. 1, 4).  Acting on the committee‘s recommendation, 
Congress allocated money for an ―investigation of the mining debris question in 
the State of California,‖ directing a commission of engineers to determine whether 
―the present conflict between the mining and farming sections may be adjusted 
and the mining industry rehabilitated.‖  (Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1057, 25 Stat. 
498, 498 (1888).)  The commission‘s recommendations eventually led to the 1893 
reauthorization of hydraulic mining, albeit on terms replicating the restraints state 
law had placed on the mining companies‘ perceived right to mine.  (Act of Mar. 1, 
1893, ch. 183, 27 Stat. 507 (1893), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.)  
Hydraulic mining now required a permit from the newly formed California Debris 
Commission, a permit that could be obtained only upon assurances that mining 
would not harm the state‘s rivers and lowland communities.  (33 U.S.C. §§ 663, 
670–678; see North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. U. S., supra, 88 Fed. at p. 674 
[upholding the requirement].)  This conditional approval did not revive the 
practice; hydraulic mining under an obligation to impound one‘s own debris 
proved economically infeasible, and the industry never recovered.  (Kelley, Gold 
vs. Grain, supra, at pp. 291–292.) 
From this chapter in history, we may infer that Congress in the late 19th 
century, at a time not long removed from passage of the Mining Law of 1872 and 
related enactments, did not view these laws as conveying a federal right to mine 
19 
 
on federal land without regard to any environmental impacts a particular method 
might have and any interests a state might seek to protect.  Woodruff and related 
cases did not merely impose damages, reallocating the burden of the impacts of 
mining to those responsible, but issued injunctions.  For nearly a decade, hydraulic 
mining, a method of far greater economic significance than the suction dredging at 
issue here, stood in abeyance based solely on state laws giving priority to other 
concerns.  Congress, including even the author of the law first declaring federal 
land open to mining, was explicitly aware of this circumstance.  Yet it acquiesced 
in hydraulic mining‘s discontinuation, allocating money to prosecute miners (see 
Sen.Rep. No. 1944, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1888); Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 
929, 24 Stat. 310, 326 (1886)) instead of taking action to assert federal supremacy, 
protect any supposed federal right to mine, and ensure the continued availability of 
federal lands for hydraulic mining notwithstanding contrary state law.  It stands to 
reason that Congress did not deem the core purposes and objectives of the mining 
laws impaired by state regulation of mining methods and further, that states can 
place limits on effective but environmentally destructive mining methods without 
contravening the supremacy clause. 
Rinehart distinguishes the Woodruff injunction on the ground it involved 
impacts felt elsewhere than on federal land, but this is a distinction without a 
difference.8  The effect of the injunction was to prohibit a major, widespread 
mining technique everywhere, including on federal land.  To the extent the Mining 
Law of 1872 might have been construed as creating a federal right to mine on 
                                              
8  
Indeed, it is not even a distinction.  The impacts the Legislature perceived 
as warranting a temporary moratorium here—on fish, water quality, and the health 
of the state‘s inhabitants—are likewise experienced elsewhere than just the federal 
land on which Rinehart seeks to mine. 
20 
 
federal land, that right would have been equally burdened by a mining technique 
ban premised on impacts elsewhere as by one premised on impacts on federal land 
itself.  The argument that the suction dredging moratorium challenged here poses a 
greater or different obstacle to posited federal rights than the nine-year hydraulic 
mining ban does not withstand scrutiny. 
Rinehart also relies on title 30 United States Code section 51, which 
authorizes damages actions for harm arising from the digging of ditches or canals, 
as a way to differentiate the Woodruff injunction from the present moratorium.  
However, if the purposes and objectives of the mining laws were as Rinehart 
posits, state law authorizing an injunction would still have been preempted, 
notwithstanding section 51, with the only proper remedy lying in a federal action 
for damages.  In the eyes of the Woodruff court, however, and manifestly in the 
eyes of Congress at the time, such a state-law-based injunction did not contravene 
federal rights. 
In sum: Like the hydraulic mining industry, Rinehart argues he holds a 
superior federal right to mine that allows him to proceed, notwithstanding impacts 
on other interests.  Like the court in Woodruff and Congress thereafter, we 
conclude that is not so.  The federal statutory scheme does not prevent states from 
restricting the use of particular mining techniques based on their assessment of the 
collateral consequences for other resources.9 
                                              
9  
Rinehart takes issue with the Legislature‘s assessment of those collateral 
consequences, dismissing the impacts of suction dredging as minimal.  In this 
proceeding, we are without authority to countermand the Legislature‘s judgment.  
The only issue for us is whether federal law permits the Legislature to favor other 
interests it deems in need of protection at the expense of mining. 
21 
 
 
D. 
Case Law 
Against the lessons of text and history, Rinehart argues that we should 
follow a series of cases from other courts finding various state restrictions on 
mineral exploitation preempted on one basis or another.  (See South Dakota 
Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County (8th Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 1005, 1009–1011; 
Skaw v. U. S. (Fed. Cir. 1984) 740 F.2d 932, 940; Ventura County v. Gulf Oil 
Corp. (9th Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 1080, 1083; Brubaker v. Bd. of Cty. Com’rs, El 
Paso Cty. (Col. 1982) 652 P.2d 1050, 1059; Elliott v. Oregon Intern. Mining Co. 
(Or.Ct.App. 1982) 654 P.2d 663, 668; but see Bohmker v. Oregon (D.Or. Mar. 25, 
2016 No. 1:15-cv-01975-CL) ___ F.Supp.3d ___ [2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39163] 
[no preemption of state moratorium on motorized instream mining]; Beatty v. 
Washington Fish & Wildlife Com’n (Wn.Ct.App. 2014) 341 P.3d 291, 307–308 
[no preemption of state restrictions on suction dredging].)  We do not find these 
cases persuasive. 
First, all but one predates the United States Supreme Court‘s landmark 
1987 decision in Granite Rock, supra, 480 U.S. 572, which for the first time 
clearly established the states‘ authority to regulate on environmental grounds 
mining claims within their borders.  Second, two of the cases involve statutes 
other than the one at issue here.  Ventura County, an oil drilling case, found 
preemption based on a conflict with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.  (30 
U.S.C. §§ 181–263; see Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 601 F.2d at 
pp. 1083–1084.)  In Elliott, the challenged mining took place on land governed by 
the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 and subject to a patent that expressly 
reserved to the defendants ― ‗the right to prospect for, mine, and remove‘ ‖ 
minerals under the provisions of that act.  (Elliott v. Oregon Intern. Mining Co., 
supra, 654 P.2d at p. 665 quoting 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) repealed by Pub.L. No. 
94–579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (1976).)  Third, the remaining cases uniformly omit 
22 
 
any close examination of the text, legislative history, and historical context of the 
1872 law.  To the extent they rely on a cursory understanding of congressional 
purposes, they are not convincing. 
Rinehart relies most heavily on his only post-Granite Rock case, South 
Dakota Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, supra, 155 F.3d 1005, which the 
Court of Appeal concluded was ―nearly directly on point here.‖  Lawrence County 
considered an ordinance banning surface mining in an area overlapping a national 
forest.10  Lawrence County concluded the ban was inconsistent with the 1872 
law‘s purposes, which it held included ―the encouragement of exploration for and 
mining of valuable minerals located on federal lands, providing federal regulation 
of mining to protect the physical environment while allowing the efficient and 
economical extraction and use of minerals, and allowing state and local regulation 
of mining so long as such regulation is consistent with federal mining law.‖  
(Lawrence County, at p. 1010.) 
We do not disagree that Congress adopted a real property regime in the 
Mining Law of 1872 with the larger purpose in mind of encouraging ongoing 
mineral exploration across the West.  Where we part company is with the 
conclusion that such general, overarching goals would be frustrated by state and 
local determinations that the use of particular methods, in particular areas of the 
country, would disserve other compelling interests.  Congress could have made 
express that it viewed mining as the highest and best use of federal land wherever 
minerals were found, or could have delegated to federal agencies exclusive 
authority to issue permits and make accommodations between mining and other 
purposes.  It did neither, instead committing miners to continued compliance with 
                                              
10  
Surface mining involves stripping off the top of an area to reach minerals, 
in contrast to boring down through tunnels or shafts to extract them.  
23 
 
state and local laws (30 U.S.C. § 26) and endorsing limits on destructive mining 
techniques imposed under such laws (Act of Mar. 1, 1893, ch. 183, 27 Stat. 507 
(1893)).  These actions cannot be reconciled with the view that Congress intended 
preemption of such state and local determinations. 
III. 
Preemption Under Section 612 
Additionally, Rinehart urges the moratorium is preempted by title 30 
United States Code section 612(b).  We conclude no basis for preemption has been 
shown. 
Section 612 of title 30 United States Code was enacted in 1955 as part of a 
― ‗crack-down‘ upon unauthorized uses of unpatented mining claims.‖  
(Funderberg v. Udall (9th Cir. 1968) 396 F.2d 638, 639.)  Concerned that some 
mining claims were being staked out as a pretext to support activities wholly 
unrelated to mineral development, Congress prospectively prohibited the use of 
unpatented mining claims for anything not ―reasonably incident‖ to prospecting 
and mining.  (30 U.S.C. § 612(a); see U. S. v. Shumway, supra, 199 F.3d at 
p. 1101; Funderberg, at p. 639; H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), 
pp. 5–7, reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, pp. 2478–
2480.) 
Congress also focused on the need to better accommodate competing 
surface and subsurface uses of federal land.  (H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1955), pp. 3, 8, reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, 
pp. 2475, 2480.)11  Mining claimants had traditionally been granted exclusive use 
                                              
11  
Contrary to Rinehart‘s view that Congress has deemed mining the absolute 
highest and best use of mining land, the congressional committee considering 
amendments to federal law that led to enactment of section 612 (30 U.S.C.) noted 
the ―principal problem faced by the Congress‖ in the years since the 1872 law‘s 
adoption had been how to ―encourage mining activity‖ in a way ―compatible with 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
24 
 
of the land encompassed by their claims.  (30 U.S.C. § 26; H.R.Rep. No. 730, at 
pp. 2477–2478; U. S. v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1980) 611 F.2d 1277, 
1281.)  Congress withdrew that exclusivity in favor of a right retained by the 
federal government and its permittees and licensees to use, manage, and dispose of 
the surface resources of the claim.  (30 U.S.C. § 612(b);12 see H.R.Rep. No. 730, 
at pp. 2482–2483; Curtis-Nevada Mines, at pp. 1281–1283.)  In turn, this retained 
right was subject to the condition that the United States and other users not 
―endanger or materially interfere with‖ mining operations.  (30 U.S.C. § 612(b); 
see Curtis-Nevada Mines, at pp. 1283–1286.) 
Nothing in California‘s regulation of suction dredging implicates or 
interferes with any of the purposes and objectives underlying this congressional 
reallocation of rights.  Congress concerned itself with abuses of the existing claim 
system by miners and the need to accommodate competing demands on federal 
land, and sought to end sham claims and ensure to others enjoyment of federal 
lands to the extent compatible with mining.  Section 612 of title 30 United States 
Code regulates the respective property rights of miners with claims on federal 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
utilization, management, and conservation of surface resources such as water [and] 
fish.‖  (H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), p. 3, reprinted in 1955 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, p. 2475.) 
12  
That subdivision provides in relevant part:  ―Any such mining claim shall 
also be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of the United 
States, its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as may 
be necessary for such purposes [i.e., management etc. of surface resources] or for 
access to adjacent land: Provided, however, That any use of the surface of any 
such mining claim by the United States, its permittees or licensees, shall be such 
as not to endanger or materially interfere with prospecting, mining or processing 
operations or uses reasonably incident thereto . . . .‖  (30 U.S.C. § 612(b).) 
25 
 
land, on the one hand, and the United States and its permittees who may wish to 
use that same land for other purposes, on the other.  It does no more. 
Rinehart infers from the text of title 30 United States Code section 612(b) a 
general command that state regulation to protect environmental interests may not 
―materially interfere‖ with mining.  The text is not susceptible to such a reading.  
By its terms, the ―materially interfere‖ standard defines what the United States and 
its licensees and permittees may not do on the surface of mining claims, not what 
states in the exercise of their police powers may not do. 
Rinehart also contends that because the last portion of section 612(b) 
assures certain states their laws concerning water rights will not be affected, 
Congress by implication preempted state law in all other regards.  The final clause 
of section 612(b) states: ―Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter and 
sections 601 and 603 of this title shall be construed as affecting or intended to 
affect or in any way interfere with or modify the laws of the States which lie 
wholly or in part westward of the ninety-eighth meridian[13] relating to the 
ownership, control, appropriation, use, and distribution of ground or surface 
waters within any unpatented mining claim.‖  This language was added to ―make[] 
clear an intent to leave unaffected the operation of State water laws in the 
reclamation West governing the ownership, control, appropriation, use, and 
distribution of ground or surface waters.‖  (H.Conf. Rep. No. 1096 on H.R. 5891, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
p. 2497.)  That Congress wanted to reassure western states that existing critical 
arrangements concerning their respective water rights would not be disturbed does 
                                              
13  
The 98th meridian cuts through the Great Plains states, from North Dakota 
through Texas. 
26 
 
not thereby establish an intent, not otherwise evident from the text or legislative 
history, to alter or displace state law in other respects. 
Nor do the cases Rinehart relies on support preemption under section 
612(b).  U. S. v. Shumway, supra, 199 F.3d 1093, 1105–1108 addresses the 
interplay between the mining laws and the Act of Congress authorizing oversight 
of the national forests by the National Forest Service.  (See 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 
551.)  Shumway concludes, consistent with precedent, that the Forest Service‘s 
authority extends to regulating mining claims insofar as such ―regulations are 
‗reasonable‘ and do not impermissibly encroach on legitimate uses incident to 
mining and mill site claims.‖  (Shumway, at p. 1107; see U. S. v. Weiss (9th Cir. 
1981) 642 F.2d 296, 298–299 [concluding the forest service may impose 
reasonable environmental regulations on mining operations in national forests].)  
Shumway does not interpret section 612(b), or any other federal statute, as 
preempting state environmental regulations. 
U. S. v. Backlund (9th Cir. 2012) 689 F.3d 986 likewise does not interpret 
the objectives of section 612(b) in a way that would require preemption of state 
environmental regulation.  Rejecting a void for vagueness challenge to Forest 
Service limits on unpermitted permanent residences in national forests, the Ninth 
Circuit explains that the Forest Service‘s regulatory authority is limited by, inter 
alia, the requirement that regulations not ― ‗materially interfere‘ ‖ with mining.  
(Backlund, at p. 997, quoting 30 U.S.C. § 612(b).)  Backlund reads section 612 as 
we do, as striking an accommodation between federal solicitousness for mining on 
federal land and federal management of the surface of mining claims.  It does not 
impute to Congress any broader purpose that would support state law preemption. 
27 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rinehart 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 230 Cal.App.4th 419 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S222620 
Date Filed: August 22, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Plumas 
Judge: Ira R. Kaufman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Murphy & Buchal and James L. Buchal for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Damien M. Schiff, James S. Burling and Jonathan Wood for Pacific Legal Foundation, Western Mining 
Alliance and Siskiyou County as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Parsons Behle & Latimer, Brook B. Bond, L. Michael Bogert; Mountain States Legal Foundation, Steven J. 
Lechner and Jeffrey W. McCoy for American Exploration & Mining Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Mark J. Breckler, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Gavin G. McCabe, Michael M. Edson, Marc N. Melnick and J. Kyle Mast, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jonathan Evans; Saxton & Associates and Lynne R. Saxton for Karuk Tribe, Center for Biological 
Diversity, Friends of the River, Klamath Riverkeeper, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen‘s 
Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Environmental Law Foundation, California Sportfishing 
Protection Alliance, Foothill Angler‘s Coalition, North Fork American River Alliance, Upper American 
River Foundation and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Sean B. Hecht and Eric Biber for John D. Leshy and Alejandro E. Camacho as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Lane N. McFadden for The United States as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
James L. Buchal 
Murphy & Buchal 
3425 SE Yamhill Street, Suite 100 
Portland, OR  97214 
(503) 227-1011 
 
Marc N. Melnick 
Deputy Attorney General 
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94612-0550 
(510) 622-2133