Title: State v. Brian D. Seefeldt

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 47 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1969-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Brian D. Seefeldt,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 149 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 410, 647 N.W.2d 894 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 28, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 18, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven W. Weinke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 47 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1969-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 63) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian D. Seefeldt,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 28, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that reversed a judgment of conviction against Brian D. 
Seefeldt.1  The State contends that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding 
that 
Seefeldt's 
second 
trial 
violated 
his 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.  Because the 
State did not meet its burden of showing a manifest necessity 
                                                 
1 State v. Seefeldt, 2002 WI App 149, 256 Wis. 2d 410, 647 
N.W.2d 894 (reversing a judgment and order of the circuit court 
of Fond du Lac County, Steven W. Weinke, Judge).  The court of 
appeals 
also 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
postconviction relief. 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
2 
 
for the termination of the first trial, we determine that the 
circuit court erred in granting the State's motion for mistrial.  
Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that the second 
trial violated Seefeldt's protection against double jeopardy.2  
We therefore affirm. 
I 
¶2 
Seefeldt was a passenger in a car that was stopped by 
police officers.  His girlfriend, Michelle Bart, was the driver 
of the car.  A police officer testified that he stopped the 
vehicle and ordered Bart and Seefeldt to exit the vehicle.  When 
they did not exit, the officer reached into the car and 
attempted to remove the keys.  At that point, Bart put the car 
into gear and a high-speed chase ensued.  The chase ended when 
the car spun out of control and became stuck in a snow bank. 
¶3 
A search of the car and Seefeldt revealed a revolver, 
some ammunition, brass knuckles, marijuana, cocaine, and drug 
paraphernalia. 
 
Seefeldt 
was 
charged 
with 
one 
count 
of 
possession with intent to deliver marijuana, one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of possession of 
                                                 
2 Seefeldt also argues that his right to counsel of his 
choice 
was 
violated 
when 
the 
trial 
court 
granted 
the 
prosecutor's request to remove his retained counsel from the 
case, his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor 
elicited testimony disclosing that Seefeldt invoked his right to 
counsel, and his right to a fair trial was violated when the 
prosecutor made an improper comment during closing arguments.  
Because the double jeopardy issue is dispositive, we need not 
address these issues. 
 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
3 
 
cocaine with intent to deliver, and two counts of carrying a 
concealed weapon. 
¶4 
During opening statements in Seefeldt's first jury 
trial, the prosecutor notified the jurors that Bart would be 
providing testimony and described Bart as follows: 
She is a person who you will hear about and obviously 
recognize, in terms of her dress, had been held 
accountable for her actions.  She will tell you that 
she saw Mr. Seefeldt sell cocaine.  She will tell you 
that she saw Mr. Seefeldt bring five pounds of 
marijuana to this community.  
¶5 
Defense counsel also referenced Bart in his opening 
statement and made a comment regarding the existence of multiple 
warrants for Bart's arrest: 
Now, the evidence is also going to show that the 
second car was being driven by this Michelle, Brian's 
girlfriend.  Now, at that point . . . the officers 
exit the car.  Apparently they had their guns drawn on 
this vehicle.  Michelle Bart had, at that time, I 
believe, 15 warrants for her arrest that were out 
there from around the state of Wisconsin, mostly from 
writing bad checks in places. 
¶6 
The State objected to the statement regarding the 
15 warrants and moved for a mistrial, claiming that defense 
counsel 
had 
violated 
a 
pretrial 
order 
prohibiting 
the 
introduction of other acts evidence without first seeking a 
ruling on the admissibility of the evidence.  The pretrial order 
was not transcribed or otherwise memorialized in the record. 
¶7 
During a hearing to determine whether a mistrial 
should be ordered, the State noted that most of the warrants 
were for ordinance violations.  It contended that the defense 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
4 
 
counsel's statement improperly presented other acts evidence to 
the jury and was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.3 
¶8 
Defense counsel countered that the statement did not 
constitute 
impermissible 
other 
acts 
evidence 
because 
the 
warrants provided a motive for Bart's decision to flee.  
According to defense counsel, this information was necessary to 
bolster Seefeldt's defense theory that Bart was the party who 
made the decision to flee and not Seefeldt.  The existence of 
the warrants explained why Bart would engage in a high speed 
chase to avoid being arrested.  Counsel asserted that because 
the nature of the warrants could be explained by the prosecution 
during trial, the statement regarding the warrants was not 
prejudicial. 
¶9 
The court determined that defense counsel had violated 
the pretrial order and that a curative instruction could not 
remove the prejudicial impact of the statement.  As a result, it 
granted the State's motion for mistrial.  It also granted the 
State's motion to 
disqualify Seefeldt's retained counsel.  
Subsequently, replacement counsel was appointed and a new trial 
                                                 
 
3  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) provides: 
 
(2) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith.  This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered 
for 
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
5 
 
was commenced.  The jury in the second trial found Seefeldt 
guilty of the lesser offense of possession of marijuana and on 
each of the other four charges. 
¶10 At a postconviction hearing, Seefeldt's postconviction 
counsel argued that the mistrial order was too extreme a remedy.  
He also asserted that the record was ambiguous as to what the 
original defense counsel had been told prior to the commencement 
of trial regarding the use of other acts evidence.  The circuit 
court responded that it "may be ambiguous to you but it was not 
ambiguous to the Prosecutor, to the Court, and to [the original 
defense 
counsel]." 
 
Seefeldt's 
postconviction 
motion 
was 
summarily denied and he appealed. 
¶11 The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether 
the second trial violated Seefeldt's protection against double 
jeopardy.  Citing State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 184, 495 
N.W.2d 341 (1993), the court determined that it should give 
strict and searching scrutiny to the circuit court's mistrial 
order because the mistrial request was made by the prosecutor 
over the objection of the defense.  State v. Seefeldt, 2002 WI 
App 149, ¶15, 256 Wis. 2d 410, 647 N.W.2d 894.  Using this 
standard, it concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a 
manifest necessity to terminate the first trial.  Id. at ¶29.  
According to the court, there was no showing of a manifest 
necessity because evidence regarding the existence of the 
15 warrants ultimately would have been admissible during trial.  
Id. at ¶27.  Thus, the jury was not tainted and there was no 
manifest necessity to terminate the trial.  Id. 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 Accordingly, the court determined that Seefeldt's 
second trial violated his constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy.  Id. at 29.  It reversed the judgment of 
conviction, 
and 
because 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
issue 
was 
dispositive, it did not address the other issues raised by 
Seefeldt.  Id. at ¶28-29. 
II 
¶13 This case presents us with an opportunity to examine 
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as it 
applies to the commencement of a second trial after the circuit 
court 
terminates 
the 
first 
trial 
prior 
to 
judgment.  
Specifically, we must determine whether the circuit court erred 
when it determined that the State met its burden of showing the 
requisite manifest necessity to support the mistrial order that 
terminated Seefeldt's first trial.  A circuit court's exercise 
of discretion in ordering a mistrial is accorded a level of 
deference that varies depending on the particular facts of the 
case.  Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 184.  Regardless of the level of 
deference to be applied, an appellate court must, at a minimum, 
satisfy itself that the circuit court exercised sound discretion 
in ordering a mistrial.  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 
514 (1978). 
¶14 We 
describe 
first 
the 
constitutional 
protection 
against double jeopardy and the manifest necessity standard used 
to determine whether a mistrial should be ordered.  We then 
examine the level of deference that may be applied to a circuit 
court's mistrial order.  Finally, we conclude that, regardless 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
7 
 
of the level of deference to be applied in this case, the 
circuit court erred in terminating Seefeldt's first trial.  
Accordingly, the second trial violated his protection against 
double jeopardy. 
III 
¶15 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect a 
criminal defendant from being placed in jeopardy twice for the 
same offense.4  The underlying purpose for this protection 
against double jeopardy is to prevent the State from using its 
resources and power to make repeated attempts to convict a 
person for the same offense.  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 187-188 (1957); Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 181. 
¶16 "Jeopardy" means exposure to the risk of determination 
of guilt.  State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 937, 485 N.W.2d 
354 (1992).  It attaches in a jury trial when the selection of 
the jury has been completed and the jury is sworn.  Id.  
Accordingly, the protection against double jeopardy includes a 
defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:  
". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . ."  Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that ". . . no 
person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of 
punishment, . . . ."  In construing Wisconsin's protection 
against double jeopardy, we are guided by the rulings of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 181, 
495 N.W.2d 341 (1993). 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
8 
 
particular tribunal."  Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 503. 
¶17 The protection against double jeopardy limits the 
ability of the State to request that a trial be terminated and 
restarted. 
 
This 
protection 
is 
important 
because 
the 
unrestricted ability of the State to terminate and restart a 
trial increases the financial and emotional burden on the 
defendant, extends the period during which the defendant is 
stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing and may 
increase the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted.  
Washington, 434 U.S. at 829. 
¶18 However, the prohibition against retrial is not a 
mechanical rule to be applied to prevent any second trial after 
the first trial is terminated prior to judgment.  Illinois v. 
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973).  We have recognized that 
criminal trials can be complicated and lengthy.  Barthels, 174 
Wis. 2d at 173.  Numerous technical or otherwise unforeseen 
eventualities may arise that necessitate terminating a trial.  
Id.  Treating the prohibition against retrial as a mechanical 
rule that prevents a second trial in all circumstances would 
"'be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal 
security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a 
mechanical rule would provide.'"  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-480 (1971)). 
¶19 A defendant's right to have his or her trial concluded 
by a particular tribunal can be, under certain circumstances, 
subordinated to the public interest in affording the State one 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
9 
 
full and fair opportunity to present its evidence to an 
impartial jury.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 505.  Nevertheless, 
given the importance of the constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy, the State bears the burden of demonstrating a 
"manifest necessity" for any mistrial ordered over the objection 
of the defendant.  Id.  If a trial is terminated without 
manifest necessity and over the defendant's objection, the State 
is not permitted to commence a second trial against the 
defendant.  "Manifest necessity" means a "high degree" of 
necessity.  Id.; Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 183. 
IV 
¶20 In this case, the judge granted the State's motion for 
a mistrial after the jury had been sworn.  Seefeldt had objected 
to the State's motion.  Accordingly, the granting of the 
mistrial implicated the interests protected by the double 
jeopardy clause.  The State was thus required to demonstrate 
that there was a manifest necessity to terminate the first 
trial.  Before reviewing the record to analyze whether the State 
satisfied its burden, we first address the level of deference 
that attends a circuit court's mistrial order.  We ultimately 
conclude, however, that regardless of the level of deference to 
be applied in this case, the circuit court did not exercise 
sound discretion in ordering the mistrial. 
¶21 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that "strict and searching scrutiny" was warranted 
simply because the mistrial request was made by the prosecutor 
over the objection of defense counsel.  Seefeldt, on the other 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
10 
 
hand, cites the following language from Barthels to support his 
position that strict scrutiny should be applied any time a 
prosecutor requests a mistrial: 
 
If, however, the prosecutor requests the mistrial, or 
the judge determines that the defendant's request was 
occasioned by prosecutorial overreaching or laxness, 
then this court gives stricter and more searching 
scrutiny to the judge's decision to grant a mistrial. 
 
Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 173. 
¶22 The State acknowledges that this ambiguous language 
could be construed to require strict scrutiny in all cases where 
the prosecutor requests the mistrial.  It argues, however, that 
such a reading would be inconsistent with Washington.  According 
to the State, a trial court's order granting a mistrial on 
motion of the prosecutor should be afforded great deference 
unless the prosecutor's request is preceded by misconduct, 
recklessness or overreaching designed to gain a tactical 
advantage.  The State notes that Barthels correctly accorded 
strict scrutiny to the circuit court's exercise of discretion 
because the prosecutor had acted recklessly in proceeding to 
trial without securing critical evidence and the prosecutor's 
reckless conduct precipitated the motion for a mistrial. 
¶23 In Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court described the 
level of deference to be used by an appellate court in reviewing 
a mistrial order.  Similar to the case at bar, the trial judge 
in Washington granted a prosecutor's motion for a mistrial 
because defense counsel made improper remarks during his opening 
statement.  However, unlike the case at bar, there was no legal 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
11 
 
theory under which the remarks could be deemed relevant and 
admissible at trial.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 510-511. 
¶24 Following the opening statements in Washington, the 
prosecutor moved for a mistrial and a colloquy among the trial 
judge and the attorneys ensued.  The trial judge withheld ruling 
on the mistrial motion until the following day when he heard 
additional 
arguments. 
 
After 
giving 
the 
parties 
a 
full 
opportunity to explain their arguments, the trial judge ordered 
a mistrial.  Id. at 500-01. 
¶25 In discussing the appropriate level of deference to 
apply in reviewing the mistrial order, the Washington court 
noted that the question of whether a manifest necessity has been 
shown is answered more easily in some kinds of cases than in 
others.  Id. at 507.  It described two ends of the spectrum of 
deference.  At one end are those cases in which the basis for 
the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution 
evidence or there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is 
using the State's superior resources to harass the defendant or 
to achieve a tactical advantage.  In such cases, an appellate 
court applies the strictest scrutiny to a trial judge's mistrial 
order.  Id. at 508. 
¶26 At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which 
the basis for the mistrial is the trial judge's belief that the 
jury is unable to reach a verdict.  Often in such cases, the 
jury has been unable to reach a verdict after protracted and 
exhausting deliberations.  Great deference is accorded to a 
trial court's exercise of discretion because the trial judge is 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
12 
 
best able to assess the risk that a verdict may result from 
pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered 
judgment of all the jurors.  Id. at 509. 
¶27 Having described the ends of the spectrum, the 
Washington court then returned to the case before it in which 
the mistrial was ordered because defense counsel made improper 
comments during his opening statement.  It determined that the 
situation before the trial judge was similar to a deadlocked 
jury.  The court stated that it was "persuaded that, along the 
spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial and 
which vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny, the 
difficulty which led to the mistrial in this case also falls in 
an area where the trial judge's determination is entitled to 
special respect."  Id. at 510. 
¶28 However, 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
trial 
judge's 
decision was entitled to great deference did not end the 
inquiry.  Rather, because of the constitutional implications of 
double jeopardy, the Washington court recognized its obligation 
to satisfy itself that the trial judge exercised "sound 
discretion" in declaring a mistrial.  The court concluded that 
sound discretion was exercised.  Id. at 514.  The trial judge 
had not acted hastily in response to the prosecutor's request 
for a mistrial.  Rather, he gave both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor a full opportunity to explain their positions.  The 
court found that the trial judge "acted responsibly and 
deliberately, 
and 
accorded 
careful 
consideration 
to 
the 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
13 
 
[defendant's] interest in having the trial concluded in a single 
proceeding."  Id. at 515. 
¶29 In Barthels, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the 
principles of Washington regarding appellate review of a 
mistrial order.  The basis for the mistrial in Barthels was the 
prosecution's inability to produce a key medical witness.  In 
reviewing the mistrial order, the court recognized that a trial 
judge is in the best position to determine whether circumstances 
warrant the granting of a mistrial.  Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 
183.  However, it also recognized that the level of deference to 
be applied in reviewing this discretionary determination "varies 
according to the facts of the case."  Id. at 184. 
¶30 Citing Washington, the court noted that the most 
stringent scrutiny is used by an appellate court when a mistrial 
is ordered because of the unavailability of critical prosecution 
evidence. 
 
Id. 
(citing 
Washington, 
434 
U.S. 
at 
508).  
Accordingly, the court examined the circuit court's mistrial 
order with "marked strictness."  Id. at 185. 
¶31 The Barthels court determined that the prosecutor did 
not act reasonably or take reasonable precautions in assuring 
the presence of the witness.  Id. at 188-89.  It therefore 
concluded that the circuit court erred in declaring a mistrial 
merely upon being informed of the unexcused absence of a 
witness.  Id. at 189.  The court also concluded that the circuit 
court failed to exercise appropriate discretion because it did 
not consider other alternatives to a mistrial.  Id. 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
14 
 
¶32 In examining the mistrial order terminating Seefeldt's 
first trial, the court of appeals cited Barthels as support for 
its determination to give "strict and searching scrutiny" to the 
circuit court's decision to grant a mistrial.  Seefeldt,  256 
Wis. 2d 410, ¶15.  It stated that where "the prosecutor requests 
the mistrial, we give strict and searching scrutiny to the trial 
court's decision to grant a mistrial."  Id. 
¶33 To the extent Barthels can be read to require strict 
scrutiny in all cases in which the prosecutor requests a 
mistrial, such a rule is clearly overbroad and inconsistent with 
the approach set forth in Washington.  Indeed, the court in 
Washington accorded great deference to a mistrial order that 
resulted from a prosecution motion. 
¶34 We note that the difficulty that led to the mistrial 
in the case at bar was similar to the difficulty that led to the 
mistrial analyzed in Washington.  However, we need not discern 
where along the spectrum the exact level of deference lies in 
this case, because, regardless of the level of deference, we 
determine that the circuit court did not exercise sound 
discretion in ordering the mistrial. 
V 
¶35 As recognized in Washington, a determination that the 
trial judge's mistrial order is entitled to great deference does 
not end the inquiry.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 514.  More is 
needed. 
 
Considering 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
interests, 
the 
reviewing court must still satisfy itself that the trial judge 
exercised "sound discretion" in concluding that the State 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
15 
 
satisfied its burden of showing a "manifest necessity" for the 
mistrial. 
¶36 Sound discretion means acting in a rational and 
responsible 
manner. 
 
Sound 
discretion 
includes, 
without 
limitation, acting in a deliberate manner taking sufficient time 
in responding to a prosecutor's request for a mistrial.  It 
requires giving both parties a full opportunity to explain their 
positions and considering alternatives such as a curative 
instruction or sanctioning counsel.  Sound discretion is not 
exercised when the circuit court fails to consider the facts of 
record under the relevant law, bases its conclusion on an error 
of law or does not reason its way to a rational conclusion.  See 
State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, ¶28, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 
62. 
¶37 Sound discretion also requires that the trial judge 
ensure that the record reflects there is an adequate basis for a 
finding of manifest necessity.  As such, sound discretion is 
more than a review to ensure the absence of a mistake of law or 
fact.  Rather, a review for sound discretion encompasses an 
assurance that an adequate basis for the finding of manifest 
necessity is on the record. 
¶38 We conclude that the trial judge did not exercise 
sound discretion for two reasons.  First, the existence of 
Bart's 15 warrants would likely have been admissible during 
trial and the record does not reflect that the judge considered 
whether the evidence would ultimately be admissible.  Second, 
the trial judge did not provide sufficient opportunity for the 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
16 
 
parties to present, and for the judge to consider, arguments 
regarding whether a mistrial should be ordered and the possible 
alternatives to a mistrial.  As a result, the record does not 
contain an adequate basis for a finding of manifest necessity. 
¶39 The facts indicate that Seefeldt would have been able 
to present evidence of Bart's 15 warrants at trial.  While Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2) (1999-2000) prevents the admission of other 
acts evidence to prove a character trait in order to show that 
the person acted in conformity with the character trait, it does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such 
as motive.  Seefeldt asserts that the existence of the warrants 
explained why Bart would engage in a high speed chase to avoid 
being arrested.  Seefeldt also asserts that the warrants 
demonstrate her motive to shift blame and curry favor with the 
authorities by implicating Seefeldt.  The State concedes that 
the warrant evidence, in some form, would probably have been 
admissible to show Bart's potential motive and bias. 
¶40 We recognize that it appears that defense counsel 
violated a pretrial order when he made the statement regarding 
Bart's 15 warrants.  However, this is not a basis for a mistrial 
unless the violation creates that high degree of necessity 
required by the double jeopardy clause.  While the trial judge 
may have been understandably troubled by defense counsel's 
violation of the pretrial order, the judge proceeded to order a 
mistrial without accurately assessing the admissibility of the 
reference to the 15 warrants.  This assessment is critical in 
determining whether manifest necessity exists because, if the 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
17 
 
warrants were admissible, there is insufficient jury taint to 
create the requisite manifest necessity. 
¶41 Further, although the trial judge expressed his belief 
that no cautionary instruction could cure the improper comment, 
this belief seems to be unfounded because the evidence was 
likely admissible.  Other than the statement of this belief, the 
record 
does 
not 
reflect 
that 
the 
trial 
judge 
explored 
alternatives to granting a mistrial, such as imposing sanctions 
on defense counsel.  As we stated in Barthels, a judge "should 
consider alternatives to a mistrial before depriving the 
defendant of the right to have the original tribunal render a 
final verdict."  Barthels, at 185. 
¶42 We also note the short time frame between the making 
of the statement regarding the 15 warrants and the order of the 
mistrial.  After a brief hearing that took place immediately 
after the statement was made, the trial judge ordered the 
mistrial.  This approach was significantly different from that 
taken in Washington, in which the trial judge delayed his ruling 
until the next day when both parties were permitted a full 
opportunity to explain their position on the propriety of a 
mistrial.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 500-501, 515.  
¶43 In sum, we conclude that, because the State did not 
meet its burden of showing a manifest necessity for the 
termination of Seefeldt's first trial, the circuit court erred 
in granting the State's motion for mistrial.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that Seefeldt's second trial violated his 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
18 
 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.  Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
01-1969-CR   
 
 
 
1