Title: Commonwealth v. Ferguson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 081645      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 4, 2009 
MICHAEL RAY FERGUSON, JR. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether statements made by 
Michael Ray Ferguson (“Ferguson”) during a custodial 
interrogation should have been suppressed because of police 
failure to honor his invocation of the right to counsel. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On July 27, 2005, Pittsylvania County Deputy Sheriff 
Kenneth Glass responded to a report of a residential burglary 
and received a description of a vehicle seen leaving the 
residence as a “black, small Talon Eagle with blue stripes on 
it.”  The description of this car was dispatched to the 
surrounding jurisdictions for a “be on the lookout.”  
Subsequently, an officer from the Altavista town police 
department in Campbell County stopped a vehicle meeting the 
description and driven by Ferguson.  Altavista officers 
notified Investigator Jerry A. Hagerman from Pittsylvania 
County and Chief Brian Marr from the Town of Hurt in 
Pittsylvania County that they had stopped Ferguson.  Both 
Hagerman and Marr soon arrived at the scene of the stop.  
After conferring with the other officers, Hagerman asked 
Ferguson to follow him to the Town of Hurt police station. 
 
Ferguson testified that at the station he was put in a 
conference room along with four police officers.  Ferguson was 
told that he was being questioned about a breaking and 
entering, and Hagerman asked for permission to search his car.  
Ferguson refused permission.  Hagerman turned on a tape 
recorder, told Ferguson again he was being questioned about a 
breaking and entering and asked Ferguson to repeat his answer 
to the search request, to which Ferguson responded, “Nah, I 
want a lawyer, you know what I’m saying?” 
After Ferguson requested a lawyer, Hagerman read Ferguson 
his Miranda rights and asked Ferguson if he understood his 
rights.  Ferguson said he did.  Then Hagerman asked if 
Ferguson wanted to speak about the offense, to which Ferguson 
replied, “Uh, My Moma [sic] said that if I get in any more 
trouble I need a lawyer.”  Hagerman immediately responded, 
“You don’t have to talk with me.  Let me talk to you now.”  
Then Hagerman told Ferguson that he had a “positive 
identification of your car as it was pulling out of that house 
yesterday,” and that he knew the amount of goods stolen.  
Specifically, Hagerman attempted to get Ferguson to talk to 
him by saying, “[i]f you want to go ahead and talk to me about 
this fine, if you don’t, you know you’re in trouble right now.  
 
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Uh, I’m not, I’m not playing with you.”  Hagerman continued 
asking Ferguson questions such as “[W]here was you at 
yesterday? . . . Who was with you yesterday? . . . What kind 
of work do you do?” and asked about Ferguson’s source of 
money. 
At 1:32 p.m., Hagerman stated “okay, I am going to let 
you sit here a for a few minutes.  The time is now 1:32 
[p.m.].  This concludes the interview.”  Then he turned off 
the recorder.  After the recorder was turned off, Ferguson 
testified that Hagerman said, “he would bring the wrath of 
Hell on [Ferguson].”  Marr confirmed that the threat was made 
and added that Hagerman said “if you ever come back to 
Pittsylvania County he would put him in jail.”  Hagerman 
instructed Marr to remain in the room with Ferguson while he 
went to obtain a search warrant for Ferguson’s car.  Marr 
stated that once Hagerman left the room, he and Ferguson were 
in the room “waiting on Investigator Hagerman to come back.” 
Marr knew Ferguson and Ferguson’s mother.  After sitting 
silently for “[a] couple minutes” Ferguson testified he said, 
“I don’t want to go to jail.”  Marr testified that they sat in 
the room in silence “for several minutes” and then Ferguson 
said, “I messed up”, or “this is messed up.” 
Once Ferguson and Marr started talking, Ferguson 
testified that Marr told him to “own up to what [he] did” and 
 
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to think of his daughter and that Marr “would try to help 
[him] as much as he could.”  Marr stated that he and Ferguson 
“just talked in general” about Ferguson’s family and needing a 
job and that Ferguson “needed to help his self [sic].”  Marr 
conceded that he was trying to get Ferguson to admit to the 
crime.  After Marr and Ferguson spoke, he read Ferguson his 
Miranda rights again and asked Ferguson if he would prefer 
speaking with him rather than with Detective Hagerman.  
Ferguson stated he preferred talking with Marr. 
At 2:00 p.m., the tape recorder was turned on again, and 
Ferguson gave consent for a search of the car.  After being 
read his Miranda rights again, Ferguson “waived” his rights 
and confessed to the crime of breaking and entering.  Ferguson 
signed an “Advice of Rights” form, which indicates his 
statement began at 2:04 p.m. and ended at 2:20 p.m.  Prior to 
the second recorded statement, Ferguson had not admitted to 
the crime. 
At trial, Ferguson moved to suppress all statements made 
after he said “I want a lawyer” as well as the resulting 
evidence, as violative of his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Based on its finding that Ferguson had “reinitiated 
the conversation,” the trial court denied the motion.  
Ferguson entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  Both a 
 
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panel of the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals sitting 
en banc reversed Ferguson’s conviction.  Ferguson v. 
Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 48, 69, 654 S.E.2d 328, 338 (2007) 
(panel); 52 Va. App. 324, 329-30, 348, 663 S.E.2d 505, 507-08, 
516 (2008) (en banc).  We awarded the Commonwealth an appeal. 
II.  Analysis 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth concedes that Ferguson 
properly asserted his right to counsel in a custodial 
interrogation setting.  The Commonwealth assigns error to the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals as follows: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Ferguson’s 
confession was not admissible. 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding the 
interrogation never ceased. 
 
3. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to find that 
Ferguson reinitiated the dialogue with police, that his 
subsequent waiver was knowing and voluntary, and that his 
confession [was] therefore admissible. 
 
 
As we noted in Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. ___, ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2009) (this day decided), “[t]he right to 
have counsel present during a custodial interrogation is an 
axiom of American law expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) and its progeny.”  In Miranda, the United States 
Supreme Court established that “[i]f the individual states that 
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an 
attorney is present.” 384 U.S. at 474.  The United States 
 
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Supreme Court has further held “that an accused, . . . having 
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (footnote omitted).  
Further,  
the prophylactic protections that the Miranda 
warnings provide to counteract the “inherently 
compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation 
and to “permit a full opportunity to exercise the 
privilege against self-incrimination,” 384 U.S. 
at 467, are implemented by the application of the 
Edwards corollary that if a suspect believes that 
he is not capable of undergoing such questioning 
without advice of counsel, then it is presumed 
that any subsequent waiver that has come at the 
authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own 
instigation, is itself the product of the 
“inherently compelling pressures” and not the 
purely voluntary choice of the suspect. 
 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988). 
Even without the concession of the Commonwealth, we have 
no difficulty holding that Ferguson clearly, unambiguously and 
unequivocally asserted his right to counsel during a custodial 
interrogation.  Part of the interrogation was tape-recorded. 
Having been placed in a conference room with four police 
officers, Ferguson was told that he was being questioned about 
a breaking and entering offense.  He immediately stated “Nah, 
 
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I want a lawyer, you know what I’m saying?” One cannot imagine 
a clearer invocation of the right to counsel.  But police did 
not honor this invocation.  Instead, Hagerman alternately 
threatened and attempted to cajole Ferguson into cooperation. 
After the invocation of the right to counsel, Hagerman 
continued to read Miranda rights from a form prompting 
Ferguson to say, “My Moma [sic] said that if I get in any more 
trouble I need a lawyer.”  Undeterred, Hagerman pressed on 
with the interrogation.  “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to 
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.”  Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).  
Hagerman’s statements and the totality of circumstances 
surrounding this interrogation were clearly “designed to 
elicit an incriminating response.”  
Hagerman told Ferguson about the evidence that he had 
including “positive identification of your car as it was 
pulling out of that house yesterday.”  Hagerman’s intent to 
cause Ferguson to change his mind about having a lawyer was 
clear from his own statements to Ferguson: 
 
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If you’re willing to talk.  If you want to go 
ahead and talk to me about this fine, if you 
don’t, you know you’re in trouble right now. Uh, 
I’m not, I’m not playing with you. . . . The 
only hope you’ve got right now is to come as 
clean as you can get. 
 
Hagerman continued questioning seeking to have Ferguson 
incriminate himself.  He asked “Where was you at yesterday” 
and “who was with you yesterday?”  Hagerman continued 
questioning by asking Ferguson about the source of his money. 
Hagerman turned off the tape recorder, but the threats and 
coercive techniques continued, all in blatant disregard of 
Ferguson’s invocation of his right to counsel.  According to 
Marr, after the tape recorder was turned off, Hagerman told 
Ferguson that “the wrath of Hell is going to come down on you” 
and “if you ever come back to Pittsylvania County he would put 
him in jail.” 
 
Hagerman stated to Ferguson, “I am going to let you sit 
here for a few minutes,” and directed Marr to stay in the 
conference room with Ferguson.  Hagerman left to seek the 
assistance of a Commonwealth’s Attorney in obtaining a search 
warrant for Ferguson’s vehicle.  Marr stated that he and 
Ferguson were “waiting on Investigator Hagerman to come back.” 
According to Marr, they sat in silence alone for “several 
minutes.”  According to Ferguson, they sat in silence for “[a] 
couple minutes.”  The silence was broken when the coercive 
 
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environment, the threats, the cajoling, the promises of 
assistance in return for cooperation, and the failure to honor 
Ferguson’s request for counsel had its intended effect.  
According to Ferguson, he broke the silence by saying “man I 
don’t want to go to jail.”  According to Marr, Ferguson said 
“this is messed up” or “I messed up.”  Whatever Ferguson said 
was immediately followed by Marr’s further conversation and 
questioning.  Marr read Miranda warnings to Ferguson again and 
thereafter obtained a confession. 
The Commonwealth contends that when Ferguson broke his 
silence in the very few minutes alone with Marr, he 
reinitiated communication with police under the rule in 
Edwards and consequently, further interrogation was 
permissible.  Whatever the significance of Ferguson’s comments 
that broke the silence, they were the product of the coercive 
interrogation and environment created by police.  Surely, 
police may not use the product of such techniques as proof of 
a voluntary reinitiation of communication and subsequent 
waiver of the right to counsel.  Even if Ferguson’s comments 
qualified as reinitiation of communication under Edwards, 
where reinterrogation follows, the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that 
subsequent events indicated a waiver of the 
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present 
during the interrogation . . . the question 
would be whether a valid waiver of the right to 
counsel and the right to silence had occurred, 
 
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that is, whether the purported waiver was 
knowing and intelligent and found to be so under 
the totality of the circumstances. 
 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-45 (1983) (emphasis 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Under the totality of 
the circumstances, we hold that this encounter was one 
continuous custodial interrogation conducted in such a manner 
as to deliberately disregard a clear, unambiguous and 
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel and coerce 
Ferguson to incriminate himself.  The person subject to 
interrogation does not have to repeat his invocation of the 
right to counsel – once is enough if it is clear, unambiguous 
and unequivocal as it is in this case. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Ferguson’s 
statements should have been suppressed because he clearly, 
unambiguously, and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
 
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