Title: WORCHESTER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WORCHESTER v. STATE2001 WY 8230 P.3d 47Case Number: 00-31Decided: 08/31/2001

 

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

JEFF 
WORCESTER,

Petitioner,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Respondent.

 

 

 

Representing 
Petitioner:

            
Michael N. Deegan, Gillette, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Respondent:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Devon O'Connell Coleman, Adjunct Faculty Director of 
the Prosecution Assistance Program; Mackenzie Hunt, Student Director; and Joseph 
J. Simola, Student Intern

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Jeff Worcester 
filed a petition for writ of review based on four alleged errors committed by 
the justice of the peace court and affirmed by the district court.  We granted his petition, and, upon 
review, we find no basis for reversal.  

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES 

 

[¶3]      Mr. Worcester 
presents these issues for our review:

 

            
Issue #1:  Whether or not petitioner's 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law was violated, and thus plain 
error committed, when the court permitted evidence utilized by the expert 
witness to go into the jury room and be considered by the jury when the same was 
not admitted into evidence as an exhibit.

 

            
Issue #2:  Whether or not the court, as part of its 
sentence rendered, exceeded it[s] authority when it ordered petitioner to pay an 
amount in restitution that was well in excess of the civil jurisdiction of the 
court.

 

            
Issue #3:  Whether or not petitioner's 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law was violated, and thus plain 
error committed, when the court failed to give an expert witness instruction to 
the jury so as to enable [it] to properly understand that while [it] might 
consider an expert's opinion [it was] not bound to accept 
it.

 

            
Issue #4:  Whether or not the statute under which 
the petitioner was convicted (W.S. Sec. 41-13-204, 1977 Repub. Ed. as amended) 
is void for vagueness in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due 
process of law.

 

The 
State of Wyoming rephrases the issues as:

 

            
I.  Did the justice of the peace court commit plain error when 
it permitted models of jet skis, which had not been admitted into evidence, to 
be taken to the jury room?

 

            
II.  Did the justice of the peace court exceed its jurisdiction 
in ordering petitioner to pay restitution in the amount of 
$16,213.04?

 

            
III.  Did the justice of the peace court commit plain error 
when it did not give the jury an instruction on expert 
witnesses?

 

            
IV.  Where petitioner did not raise the issue of 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-13-204 in the trial court, may he 
raise the issue on appeal?  If so, 
is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-13-204 void for vagueness?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On September 5, 
1998, Mr. Worcester and Michael Babich were operating personal watercrafts on 
Keyhole Reservoir in Crook County.  
They were anticipating the arrival of a large motorboat which created 
particularly high wakes sufficient for recreational jumping.  Mr. Worcester and Mr. Babich aligned 
themselves side by side in an attempt to cross the wakes at a ninety-degree 
angle.  Mr. Babich proceeded into 
the wake, and Mr. Worcester followed.  
Once Mr. Babich went over the first wake, Mr. Worcester could no longer 
see him but anticipated that he would clear both wakes.  After jumping one wake, Mr. Babich came 
to a halt when he ran out of fuel, and he proceeded to look for his wife while 
standing on his personal watercraft.  Once Mr. Worcester went over the 
crest, he saw Mr. Babich.  
Thereafter, Mr. Worcester collided with Mr. Babich's personal watercraft 
after Mr. Babich was fortunately able to dive into the water.  Even so, Mr. Babich suffered severe 
injury to his legs as the result of the collision.  Mr. Worcester was charged by citation 
with reckless operation of a watercraft in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-13-204 (LexisNexis 2001).1  

 

[¶5]      Mr. Worcester was 
arraigned in the justice of the peace court and entered a plea of not 
guilty.  On February 17, 1999, a 
jury convicted him.  Thereafter, he 
filed a pro se notice of appeal in the district court from the justice of the 
peace court's judgment.  Mr. 
Worcester was ordered to pay a fine of $200, $20 in court costs, a $50 victim's 
compensation surcharge, and $573.36 for the cost of prosecution.  The justice of the peace court ordered 
incarceration for a period of ninety days but suspended the sentence and placed 
Mr. Worcester on six months' unsupervised probation with specific terms and 
conditions.  In addition, Mr. 
Worcester was assessed seventy percent of the total restitution which equaled 
$16,312.04.  On May 13, 1999, Mr. 
Worcester filed a second notice of appeal in the district court regarding the 
justice of the peace court's sentence and order for probation.  He filed a motion for a new trial and a 
notice of amendment to the motion for a new trial which the justice of the peace 
court denied.  On June 14, 1999, Mr. 
Worcester filed a notice of appeal in the district court from the justice of the 
peace court's order denying his motion for a new trial.  On January 10, 2000, the district court 
affirmed the justice of the peace court's sentence, order of probation, and 
order denying Mr. Worcester's motion for a new trial.2  Mr. Worcester filed a petition for writ 
of review with this court, seeking review on four specific findings.  We granted his 
petition.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Demonstrative Models

 

[¶6]      During trial, the 
witnesses used two small personal watercraft models for demonstrative purposes 
in front of the jury.  These models 
were neither offered nor received into evidence as exhibits in the case.  However, during the jury's deliberation, 
the justice of the peace court permitted the models to be taken into the jury 
room.  Mr. Worcester claims the 
justice of the peace court committed error by permitting the models to go to the 
jury room during deliberations when they were not admitted into evidence as an 
exhibit.  No objection was lodged at 
trial against the submission of the models to the jury; therefore, the plain 
error analysis applies.

 

[¶7]      "A failure to 
object constitutes a waiver of whatever error occurred, unless the error rises 
to the level of plain error."  
Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1163-64  (Wyo. 1981).  The plain error doctrine is applied 
cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances.  Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 
1007 (Wyo. 1974).  A three-part test 
has been established to determine whether plain error exists.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 
566 (Wyo. 2000).  First, the record 
must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error.  Id.  Second, the party claiming the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Id.  Finally, that party must prove a 
substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially 
prejudiced.  Id.  Mr. Worcester claims all three 
requirements are met in this case; however, we disagree.  We hold the final requirement has not 
been satisfied since the error did not result in material 
prejudice.

 

[¶8]      The first 
requirement is easily satisfied as the alleged error is sufficiently clear in 
the record.  Mr. Worcester next 
claims his right to due process of law was denied and the submission of the 
nonadmitted demonstrative models to the jury for deliberations was a violation 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
He relies upon Hays, 522 P.2d 1004, wherein this court considered 
the propriety of submitting nonadmitted evidence to the jury during 
deliberations without objection.  In 
Hays, the trial court provided the jury with an instruction containing 
the criminal information in the case with a detailed statement of "the essential 
facts and acts" upon which the crime was charged.  522 P.2d  at 1006.  Upon reversal of the case, we 
stated:

 

Viewed 
factually, this resulted in the submission to the jury of a written evidentiary 
statement inadmissible in evidence by any standard in the guise of an 
instruction with probable reliance thereon by the jury in its 
deliberations.  The submission 
to the jury of papers or exhibits not received in evidence is prejudicial 
error.  

 

522 P.2d  
at 1008 (emphasis added).  This is 
the law in Wyoming which we herein reaffirm recognizing it still provides the 
most appropriate bright-line rule.  
However, the submission of demonstrative models which have not been 
admitted into evidence presents a factual situation not previously considered by 
this court.

 

[¶9]      Demonstrative 
evidence has been defined as "[p]hysical evidence that one can see and inspect 
(such as a model or photograph) and that, while of probative value and usu[ally] 
offered to clarify testimony, does not play a direct part in the incident in 
question."  Black's Law Dictionary 
577 (7th ed. 1999).  In 
addition:

 

[J]ust 
as the testimony of the witness is not sent to the jury room, so illustrative 
objects should be left behind when the jury retires to deliberate.  This practice will reduce the likelihood 
that jurors will use the object as a source of original inference.  Moreover, it will eliminate any 
incentive for counsel to use illustrative objects solely as a method of 
smuggling argument into the jury room.

 

22 
Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 5174 at 137 (1978).  

 

[¶10]   It is uniformly viewed as improper 
to send into the jury room items not admitted into evidence.  2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 
§ 217 (5th ed. 1999).  
Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Company, 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 
1985), addressed the use of jury charts and other visual aids that have not been 
admitted into evidence but summarize or organize testimony or documents which 
have already been properly admitted.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such aids are not evidence 
and, absent the consent of the parties, they should not be sent to the jury 
room.  753 F.2d  at 431; see 
also GNB Battery Technologies, Inc. v. Exide Corporation, 876 F. Supp. 582, 604 (D. Del. 1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 605 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  United States v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991),3 addressed the very same type of 
evidence as that in Pierce and held the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
had long held such evidence should only be used as testimonial aid and should 
not be admitted into evidence or otherwise used by the jury during the 
deliberative process.  Moreover, in 
Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1965), a transcript of testimony 
given to a federal grand jury which had not been admitted into evidence at the 
defendant's trial was sent to the jury room.  The court held the highly prejudicial 
and inadmissible evidence contained in the transcript deprived the defendant of 
a fair trial and "[t]he delivery to the jury for [its] consideration of an 
exhibit not received in evidence constitutes error."  351 F.2d  at 115.  The holding in Hays, 522 P.2d 1004, and the persuasive authorities cited in this discussion convince 
this court that Mr. Worcester has demonstrated that a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated.

 

[¶11]   Mr. Worcester's final burden is to 
prove he has been denied a substantial right and, as a result, he has been 
materially prejudiced.  He relies 
upon Hays in which the court found plain error based on material 
prejudice to the defendant.  522 P.2d  at 1008.  However, the 
nonadmitted evidentiary statement submitted to the jury in Hays concerned 
unusually prejudicial information that directly contradicted the defendant's 
sole defense.4  Id.  The evidentiary statement read by the 
trial judge attacked the defendant's credibility while bolstering the victim's 
credibility, therefore resulting in material prejudice.  Id.  The plain error rule must be applied to 
each case on its own particular facts.  
Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 552 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶12]   While we recognize the use of the 
demonstrative models under the circumstances of the instant case was error, we 
can discern no indication that the jury used or could have used the models for 
any improper or prejudicial purpose.  
A lack of prejudice is indicated by the fact that both the prosecution 
and the defense utilized the models.  
Likewise, the defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine John 
Davis, the Moorcroft game warden, and his demonstrative use of the models.  As the state points out, the jury could 
recreate the accident by using any devices available to it in the deliberation 
room; e.g., paper, pens, or even the jurors' own hands.  These models were not physically altered 
to depict the resultant damage, but rather they were merely generic models.  Upon review, neither this court nor Mr. 
Worcester can be sure of what use, if any, the jury made of the models.  Without a more specific indication of 
prejudice, Mr. Worcester's generalized allegation of prejudice is not sufficient 
to require reversal.  Scheikofsky 
v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wyo. 1981).  We cannot discern a reasonable 
possibility that, in the absence of the models being sent into the jury room, 
the verdict may have been more favorable to Mr. Worcester.  Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 395 
(Wyo. 1979).  Mr. Worcester has 
failed to establish prejudice from this error; therefore, we conclude it is 
harmless. 

  

B.        
Restitution in Excess of the Civil Jurisdiction of the 
Court

 

[¶13]   Mr. Worcester's second contention 
is that the justice of the peace court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction 
in a criminal matter when it ordered an amount in restitution in excess of its 
civil jurisdiction.  This issue 
concerns a matter of statutory interpretation.  This court interprets statutes by giving 
effect to the legislature's intent.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. 
Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶20, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶20 (Wyo. 2001).  We begin by making an inquiry relating 
to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  
Id.  We give effect to 
every word, clause, and sentence and construe together all components of a 
statute in pari materia.  
Id.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
LePage v. State, Department of Health, 2001 WY 26, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001).  We review 
questions of law de novo without affording deference to the district court's 
decision.  Amoco 
Production Company v. EM Nominee Partnership Company, 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶14]   The criminal jurisdiction of 
justice of the peace courts is set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-116 
(LexisNexis 2001) which provides:

 

Justice 
of the peace courts have jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to 
misdemeanors for which the punishment prescribed by law does not exceed 
imprisonment for more than six (6) months and a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00).  
Jurisdiction shall also include those criminal cases in which the 
defendant is placed on probation for a period exceeding the maximum six (6) 
months imprisonment sentence under W.S. 31-5-233(d) [§ 
31-5-233(e)].

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2001) outlines the court's ability to order 
restitution and provides in pertinent part:  "In addition to any other punishment 
prescribed by law the court shall, upon conviction for any misdemeanor or 
felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to each victim as determined under 
W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-4-106(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2001) establishes the civil 
jurisdictional limits for justices of the peace as:  "Of all civil actions where the amount 
in controversy, exclusive of costs, does not exceed three thousand dollars 
($3,000.00)."

 

[¶15]   The court ordered restitution in 
the total amount of $16,312.04.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) defines restitution as 
"full or partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2001) defines victim as "a person who has suffered pecuniary damage 
as a result of a defendant's criminal activities."  Mr. Worcester relies upon Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001) which defines pecuniary damage as "all 
damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the same facts or event, including damages for wrongful 
death."  He asserts this statutory 
provision in conjunction with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) (LEXIS 1999) (amended 2000) prohibits 
the justice of the peace court from ordering restitution in excess of $3,000the 
civil action jurisdictional limit for justice of the peace courts.  Section 7-9-103(b) stated: "To satisfy 
the order, the clerk, upon request of the victim or the district attorney, may 
issue execution against the defendant for any assets including wages subject to 
attachment in the same manner as in a civil action."  Mr. Worcester contends the words "civil 
action" are critical to resolving this issue.  However, the statutory language does not 
state "in a civil action in the same court as the conviction occurred."  This court has no power to add to, or to 
substitute, words in a statute.  
Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1991).  That authority is vested in the 
legislature, and we will not encroach upon its proper authority.  Id.  We do not read these statutes to require 
the justice of the peace court to limit restitution to 
$3,000.

  

[¶16]   Furthermore, Mr. Worcester's 
argument ignores the difference between the statutes establishing the 
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts and the statutes granting 
authority to such courts to award restitution.  The authority to require restitution in 
criminal cases is delineated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-106 (LexisNexis 2001) and 
is not constrained by the civil jurisdictional limits of § 7-9-102.  Mr. Worcester argues the legislature 
intended that disputes involving large sums of money should be heard and 
determined in the district court.  
However, there is no indication the legislature intended to limit a 
victim's restitution or a court's authority to award such restitution in 
criminal cases subject to its jurisdiction based upon the civil jurisdictional 
limits of the court in which the conviction occurred.  Under Mr. Worcester's theory, justice of 
the peace courts would have to determine whether the restitution in a criminal 
case could potentially exceed the court's civil jurisdictional limits before 
hearing a case.  If a case could 
potentially yield a restitution amount in excess of the justice of the peace 
court's jurisdiction, Mr. Worcester's argument would require the district court 
to hear the misdemeanor case.  We do 
not believe this was the legislature's intent.

 

[¶17]   Section 5-4-116 limits the justice 
of the peace court's jurisdiction to all criminal cases "for which the 
punishment prescribed by law does not exceed imprisonment for 
more than six (6) months and a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00)."  (Emphasis added).  Mr. Worcester equates the term 
restitution with punishment, therefore implying the court's jurisdiction is 
limited to cases where restitution would not exceed more than $750.  However, the statute specifically 
identifies punishment as imprisonment, fines, and probation.  We find no authority for equating 
allowed restitution with the punishment levels within the justice of the peace 
court's jurisdiction.  In Keller 
v. State, 723 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Wyo. 1986), we held defendants should be 
informed of the possibility that restitution may be required under W.R.Cr.P 
15(c) as part of the "penalty" of a crime to which they may plead guilty.  However, in that case, we were concerned 
that proper notice be given to a defendant of the impact of a guilty plea before 
a plea is accepted.  We were not 
concerned with determining the extent of the criminal jurisdiction of justice of 
the peace courts intended by the legislature.  Based upon legislative intent and 
statutory construction, we conclude the justice of the peace court did not 
exceed its jurisdiction when it ordered $16,312.04 in 
restitution.

  

C.        
Expert Witness Jury Instruction

 

[¶18]   Next, Mr. Worcester claims he was 
denied his right to due process of law when the court failed to give an expert 
witness instruction to the jury.  
Officer Davis testified and attempted to reconstruct what he believed 
occurred in the personal watercraft collision.  The doctrine of plain error applies 
because Mr. Worcester never requested an expert witness instruction, nor was an 
objection lodged.

 

[¶19]   The record is sufficiently clear to 
identify Mr. Worcester's alleged erroran expert witness instruction was not 
provided to the jury.  Next, he 
argues an expert witness instruction is required by law.  A qualified expert witness may testify 
about scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge if such testimony will 
help the jury understand the case.  
W.R.E. 702.  Clearly, Officer 
Davis testified as an expert witness.  
The pertinent issue is whether the justice of the peace court erred by 
not providing the jury with an expert witness instruction.

 

[¶20]   W.R.Cr.P. 30 entitled "Instructions 
to jury; objections" states in pertinent part:

 

(a)  At 
the close of the evidence or at such earlier time before or during the trial as 
the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court 
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. . . . No party may 
assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that 
party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection.

 

We have 
stated:

 

It is 
generally considered that it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury on 
the essential law of the case and of such matters of law without which the 
defendant will not receive a fair trial, or without which a jury of laymen would 
be apt to go wrong. . . .

                        

. . . 
While it is generally considered that a request for instruction should be made 
and an exception to a refusal taken, in order for a defendant to avail himself 
of the error in the Supreme Court, this is not the universal rule, and there are 
exceptions to it, especially where the matter is fundamental and goes to the 
gist of the case.

 

Gardner 
v. State, 27 
Wyo. 316, 196 P. 750, 754 (1921).  
In Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Wyo. 1975), we 
recognized it is preferable to offer an expert witness jury instruction.  However, we do not believe the lack of 
such an instruction in this case prevented Mr. Worcester from receiving a fair 
trial or caused the jury to misunderstand the law.  Here, the justice of the peace court did 
provide a minimally sufficient instruction in the form of a preliminary 
instruction which outlined the duties of the court and the jury.  See Runnion, 531 P.2d  at 
1310.

 

[¶21]   Mr. Worcester asserts he was 
prejudiced by Officer Davis' testimony in which he stated that Mr. Worcester hit 
Mr. Babich head on.  This testimony 
directly disputed Mr. Worcester's and Mr. Babich's testimony that their personal 
watercrafts collided at a ninety-degree angle.  Mr. Worcester maintains this testimony 
was extremely damaging because it contradicted his assertion that his view of 
Mr. Babich was obstructed due to the crest of the wake, an assertion that would 
have been implausible if he had been proceeding in a head-on direction.  Mr. Worcester contends an expert witness 
instruction would have instructed the jury that it was free to disregard the 
expert's opinion if it found it to be unreasonable.  However, the justice of the peace 
court's instructions to the jury did include an instruction that it was to be 
the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility, including factors to be considered 
in determining credibility.  The 
jury was instructed to assess the credibility of each witness and to give his or 
her testimony the consideration it merited, and this logically included the 
option of disregarding Officer Davis' testimony if it was found to be 
unreasonable.  It is the jury's duty 
to resolve conflicting testimony and decide the weight to be given to the expert 
testimony.  Runnion, 531 P.2d  
at 1309.  "A jury has considerable 
latitude in its acceptance or rejection of expert testimony."  Id.  We conclude the instructions to the jury 
prevented any potential prejudice, and therefore we find no error.  

 

D.        
Constitutionality of § 41-13-204

 

[¶22]   Finally, Mr. Worcester attacks the 
constitutionality of § 41-13-204 as being void for vagueness.  Issues of constitutionality are 
questions of law and are reviewed de novo.  
V-1 Oil Company v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

It is 
our well-established rule that every law is presumed constitutional, and all 
doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.  [An appellant] has the burden of 
demonstrating that [a] statute is unconstitutionally vague.  A statute is unconstitutionally vague if 
people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application.  A vague 
statute violates due process because it fails to give fair notice that the 
conduct is forbidden and creates the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. In determining whether a statute provides sufficient notice, we 
look to the statutory language and previous court decisions which have limited 
or applied the statute.  

 

Smith v. 
State, 964 P.2d 421, 422-23 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted).

 

[¶23]   Mr. Worcester bases his 
unconstitutionally vague argument on a comparison of § 41-13-204the 
reckless-operation-of-a-watercraft statute under which he was convictedand its 
companion statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-13-203 (LexisNexis 2001)5 which addresses the careless 
operation of a watercraft.  
Specifically, Mr. Worcester argues § 41-13-204 in conjunction with  § 41-13-203 fails to give a person of 
ordinary sensibility fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden 
because both statutes seem to proscribe the same behavior.  Hobbs v. State, 757 P.2d 1008, 
1011 (Wyo. 1988).

 

[¶24]   We agree with the state that the 
standard relied upon by Mr. Worcester and articulated in State v. 
Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 968 (Wyo. 1963), is applicable to whether a statute 
is internally vague as opposed to a comparison of two different statutes.  The state points to Nowack v. 
State, 774 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1989), for the proper analysis.  In Nowack, the defendant was 
charged with both driving under the influencea misdemeanorand aggravated 
assault and batterya felony, both charges arising from the same vehicular 
accident.  774 P.2d  at 562.  The defendant claimed the state should 
have charged him with the statute which exclusively and specifically covered his 
conductthe misdemeanor.  Id. 
 This court replied quoting from 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979) (citation omitted):

 

"The 
provisions in issue here, however, unambiguously specify the activity proscribed 
and the penalties available upon conviction.  That this particular conduct may violate 
both Titles does not detract from the notice afforded by each.  Although the statutes create uncertainty 
as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, 
they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various 
alternative punishments."

 

774 P.2d  
at 563.

 

[¶25]   Under both statutes at issue in 
this case, Mr. Worcester was unambiguously provided notice of what the state 
commands or forbids and the penalties that may be imposed.  The difference between § 41-13-204 and § 
41-13-203 is the language "endanger" versus "indifferent."  Each statute can be read with its plain 
meaning so that a person of common intelligence would be able to understand the 
conduct each statute prescribes.  
Endanger is defined as "to bring into danger or peril."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
381 (10th ed. 1999).  In contrast, 
indifferent is defined as "marked by impartiality . . . does not 
matter one way or the other [or] marked by a lack of interest, enthusiasm, or 
concern for something."  Id. 
at 592.  Whether one acts 
indifferently or endangers another or another's property, the conduct is covered 
by a specific statute.  The statutes 
provide fair notice and clearly define the punishment and the conduct 
prohibited.

 

[¶26]   Furthermore, unlike Nowack, 
the punishments for violating the statutes at issue in this case are the same.6  As described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-13-216(a) (LexisNexis 2001), a conviction under each statute is a misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine of not more than $750, imprisonment for not more than six 
months, or both, and the person may be refused the privilege of operating any 
watercraft on any of the waterways of this state for not more than two 
years.  "So long as overlapping 
criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment 
authorized, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are 
satisfied.'"  Nowack, 774 P.2d  at 562 (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123).  Therefore, Mr. Worcester failed to prove 
§ 41-13-204 is unconstitutionally vague.

 

[¶27]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Section 
41-13-204 provides:

 

Any person who shall operate any 
watercraft in such a manner as to endanger the life or limb, or damage the 
property of, another person, shall be guilty of the crime of reckless 
operation.

 

  2The justice of 
the peace court's order was affirmed in all respects except the district court 
vacated imposition of the crime victim's compensation 
surcharge.

 

  3In 
Pierce, GNB Battery Technologies, Inc., and Wood, the 
courts found no plain error in refusing to admit the exhibits at 
issue.

 

  4Mr. Hays was 
convicted of rape, aggravated assault, and assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon.  Hays, 522 P.2d  at 
1005.  The evidentiary statement 
related specific events of threats, the use of deadly weapons, and forcible 
rape.  522 P.2d  at 1006.  This was in direct contradiction to Mr. 
Hays' sole defense theory at trial which was consent.  522 P.2d  at 
1008.

 

  5Section 
41-13-203 provides:

 

Any person who operates any watercraft 
in a careless or heedless manner so as to be indifferent to the person or 
property of another person, or at a rate of speed greater than will permit him 
in the exercise of reasonable care to bring the watercraft to a stop within the 
assured clear distance ahead, is guilty of the crime of careless 
operation.

6However, we do recognize the Uniform 
Bail and Forfeiture Schedules differentiates between the two statutes.  Specifically, a defendant is required to 
post a bond of $110 for a misdemeanor offense under § 41-13-203. W.R.Cr.P. 3.1, 
Appendix I.  In contrast, a 
misdemeanor under § 41-13-204 is not a bondable offense.  Id.  The distinction in the bond schedule 
reflects the difference in the severity of the two 
crimes.