Title: Commonwealth v. Gibson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13150 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARC GIBSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2021. – January 19, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, & 
Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Evidence, Photograph.  Consent.  Jury and Jurors.  
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 18, 2018. 
 
The cases were tried before Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Debra Kornbluh for the defendant. 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Marc Gibson, of 
two counts of rape and one count of photographing an 
unsuspecting nude person.  The defendant appeals from his 
convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to 
2 
 
support the convictions and that the trial judge impermissibly 
coerced a juror requesting to be dismissed into reaching a 
unanimous verdict.  We affirm. 
 
Facts.  Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts.  
See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  
A.M.,1 the victim, traveled to Boston for a business trip.  Upon 
arrival, she and her coworkers checked into a hotel.  After 
attending a business meeting with her coworkers that evening, 
A.M. went to the hotel restaurant and ordered soup and a 
cocktail.  She ate alone but was later joined by some coworkers, 
including the defendant -- with whom A.M. had worked briefly 
once before -- and had a second drink.  The group then went to 
another bar in the hotel, where A.M. ordered a third drink. 
 
After smoking a cigarette with the group, A.M. began to 
feel dizzy and as if she were going to vomit.  She told her 
coworkers that she was going to her room, and the defendant 
offered to help her.  A.M. and the defendant took an elevator up 
to A.M.'s room, and A.M. vomited in the bathroom while the 
defendant held her hair and rubbed her back.  A.M. then changed 
and lay in bed.  The defendant left A.M.'s room to use the 
bathroom in his own room.  He returned soon after using one of 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
3 
 
A.M.'s room keys, which he had picked up before leaving her 
room. 
During this time, the defendant had been sending text 
messages to another coworker about A.M.'s condition.  In doing 
so, he lied about his whereabouts.  He sent a text message to 
the coworker stating that A.M. was "puking again" and did not 
want the defendant "to go," but at that time the defendant 
actually was in his own hotel room rather than with A.M.  The 
coworker asked for A.M.'s room number to check on her.  The 
defendant told him and let the coworker into A.M.'s room.  The 
coworker found A.M. sleeping in bed, and he tried waking her up 
by snapping his fingers in front of her face.  He asked if she 
were all right, and she opened her eyes and responded 
affirmatively.  The coworker and the defendant then left the 
room together to smoke a cigarette. 
When the coworker and the defendant parted ways, the 
defendant still had A.M.'s room key.  He returned to A.M.'s 
room.  A.M. woke up and saw the defendant standing at the foot of 
the bed.  The defendant pulled A.M.'s blanket off her and got on 
top of her.  He put his fingers and his penis into her vagina.  
A.M. testified that she did not want the defendant to put his 
fingers into her vagina, that she did not consent to his doing 
so, and that his doing so made her scared. 
4 
 
At one point, A.M. tried to move away by turning over and 
moving her legs.  The defendant stopped for a few seconds, then 
tried again to put his fingers inside her vagina.  He also 
repositioned A.M.  She was unable to "do anything physically" 
when the defendant put his penis into her vagina because he was 
on top of her at that time and considerably bigger and heavier 
than she was.  A.M. did not tell the defendant to stop because 
she felt weak, incoherent, and dizzy, and hardly knew what was 
going on.  The defendant continued trying to have sex with A.M. 
even after losing his erection.  The defendant's continued 
intercourse physically "hurt" A.M. "really bad." 
During this incident, the defendant took sixteen explicit 
photographs of A.M.  A.M. testified that she did not know about 
or consent to the photographs being taken.  Some photographs 
depict A.M. with her eyes closed and face turned away from the 
camera.  None of the photographs shows A.M.'s hands or body 
engaged with the defendant. 
A.M. went to a hospital and agreed to an examination by a 
sexual assault nurse examiner.  A toxicology report estimated 
that A.M.'s blood alcohol concentration at midnight, around the 
time of the alleged rape, was between .08 and .20 percent.  An 
expert testified that individuals with blood alcohol 
concentrations in this range may experience a negative impact on 
5 
 
memory and decision-making, as well as a negative impact on the 
ability to move their bodies. 
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of penile 
and digital rape under G. L. c. 265, § 22, and photographing an 
unsuspecting nude or partially nude person under G. L. c. 272, 
§ 105.2  The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion. 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support 
his convictions of rape and photographing an unsuspecting nude 
person.  Based on these arguments, the defendant moved 
unsuccessfully for a required finding of not guilty at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the evidence.  
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  We affirm the denial of a motion 
for a required finding of not guilty if the Commonwealth's 
evidence, "together with reasonable inferences therefrom, when 
viewed in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth," is 
sufficient to persuade a rational jury of the defendant's guilt 
 
2 He was sentenced to from two to three years in State 
prison for each rape charge to be served concurrently, and one 
additional year in a house of correction for the nude 
photographs charge. 
6 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 
255, 259 (2019).  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677. 
 
b.  Rape.  To prove the defendant guilty of rape, the 
Commonwealth had to show that the defendant compelled the victim 
to submit to sexual intercourse by force or threat of force and 
against the victim's will.  G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b).  
Commonwealth v. Sherman, 481 Mass. 464, 471 (2019).  The 
defendant argues that the Commonwealth provided insufficient 
evidence of force.  We disagree. 
Force can be actual physical force, nonphysical 
constructive force, or threat of force.  Sherman, 481 Mass. at 
471, citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 727 (2001).  
In situations where a victim lacks the capacity to consent, the 
Commonwealth "has no obligation to prove the use of force by the 
defendant beyond what is required for the act of penetration."  
Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 583, 594 (2008).  Rather, in 
addition to the act of penetration, the Commonwealth must prove 
that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the 
victim lacked the capacity to consent.  Id.  The Commonwealth 
argued at trial that the defendant used actual and constructive 
force and that the victim was unable to consent. 
The jury could have found that the defendant used actual 
force when he entered A.M.'s room, uninvited, while she was 
asleep by using her room key that he had taken without 
7 
 
permission, pulled the blanket off of her, removed her clothes 
without her consent, lay on top of her such that she could not 
resist, repositioned her body to penetrate her, continued trying 
to penetrate her after she moved away, and caused her pain by 
trying to have sex with her after he lost his erection.  See 
Commonwealth v. Oquendo, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 191-193 (2013) 
(sufficient actual force where defendant entered bathroom while 
victim was weak from vomiting, pulled down her pants, and turned 
her onto her back to continue rape). 
The jury also could have found that the defendant used 
sufficient force simply by penetrating A.M. with his fingers and 
penis because A.M. lacked the capacity to consent due to 
intoxication.3  See Blache, 450 Mass. at 594.  At the time of the 
sexual intercourse, A.M. had a blood alcohol concentration 
between .08 and .20 percent.4  After consuming three alcoholic 
 
3 The defendant points to evidence suggesting that A.M. did 
not lack the capacity to consent due to intoxication.  However, 
we "do not weigh supporting evidence against conflicting 
evidence when considering whether the jury could have found each 
element of the crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 
Mass. 255, 260 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 
291, 312 (2014). 
 
4 For context, it is a crime to operate a motor vehicle with 
a blood alcohol concentration at or above .08 percent.  G. L. 
c. 90, § 24.  The Commonwealth's expert explained at trial that 
"[b]lood alcohol concentration is an expression of the amount of 
alcohol present in someone's blood.  It's typically in the units 
of gram-percent, which means the amount by weight in grams of 
how much alcohol is in a deciliter or a hundred milliliters of 
blood.  It's typically just described as . . . a percent." 
8 
 
drinks, A.M. returned to her hotel room to vomit, which she did 
before the defendant reentered her room and had sexual 
intercourse with her.  She remembered only bits and pieces of 
her sexual encounter with the defendant because, at the time, 
she felt incoherent and hardly knew what was going on.  See 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 439 Mass. 482, 490-491 (2003) (sufficient 
evidence to warrant instruction on incapacitation where victim 
"felt 'drugged' and unable to act" during sexual assaults).  The 
photographs taken by the defendant, many of which show A.M. with 
her eyes closed, reasonably could lead the jury to conclude, 
when considered along with the rest of the evidence, that A.M. 
was unconscious during parts of the sexual encounter.  See 
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 456 Mass. 135, 139 (2010) (sufficient 
evidence of incapacitation where victim faded in and out of 
consciousness during rape). 
In addition, the jury could have found that the defendant 
knew or reasonably should have known that A.M. could not 
consent.  The defendant helped A.M. to her room as she was very 
intoxicated, watched her vomit, sent text messages to A.M.'s 
coworker about A.M.'s level of intoxication and illness while 
lying about his whereabouts at the time, checked on her with a 
coworker, returned to the room alone and gained entrance using 
her key that he had retained without her permission, and 
ultimately photographed her while she appeared unconscious. 
9 
 
For all these reasons, there was sufficient evidence that 
the defendant used force against A.M.5 
c.  Nude photographs.  The defendant also argues that the 
Commonwealth provided insufficient evidence to prove that he 
photographed an unsuspecting nude person in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 105 (b).  We conclude otherwise. 
For a conviction pursuant to G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), first 
par., the Commonwealth must prove that 
"(1) the defendant willfully photographed, videotaped, or 
electronically surveilled; (2) the subject was another 
person who was nude or partially nude; (3) the defendant 
did so with the intent to secretly conduct or hide his 
photographing activity; (4) the defendant conducted such 
activity when the other person was in a place and 
circumstance where the person would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in not being 'so photographed'; and 
(5) the defendant did so without the other person's 
knowledge or consent" (footnote omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 467 Mass. 371, 375–376 (2014). 
 
 
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that the defendant photographed A.M. 
without her knowledge or consent.  However, A.M. testified that 
she did not know about or consent to the photographs, and that 
she had never seen the photographs until trial.  "This testimony 
alone was sufficient, under the Latimore standard, to prove that 
the defendant acted without the victim's knowledge or consent."  
 
5 The Commonwealth's proof did not deteriorate after the 
close of its case.  See Copeland, 481 Mass. at 260, citing 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010). 
10 
 
Commonwealth v. Castro, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 506 (2021).  
Furthermore, the photographs themselves show A.M. with her eyes 
closed and not engaging with the defendant; the jury thus could 
reasonably conclude that A.M. did not know about or consent to 
the photographs being taken. 
2.  Juror note.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
impermissibly coerced a juror requesting to be dismissed into 
reaching a unanimous verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 
Mass. 245, 251 (2001) ("The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury").  There was no error. 
a.  Background.  At the end of the second day of jury 
deliberations, the judge remarked to the jurors that they looked 
tired.  After observing that they had been "hard at work," the 
judge said that he expected the jury to reach a verdict the next 
day.  He explained that, if they did not, the jury would not be 
able to resume deliberations the day after, a Friday, because 
the judge would be out of town.  Thus, the judge said, they 
could resume deliberations only the following Monday. 
The next morning, before the resumption of deliberations, 
juror no. 9 sent a note to the judge stating, "I would like to 
be excused from the trial.  I feel I will be forced to make a 
decision I do not believe."  The judge notified both parties and 
11 
 
proposed bringing the juror into the court room and explaining 
to her that she could not be excused, while also telling her 
that nobody was "asking her to make a decision she [could not] 
agree with," she needed to "continue to participate in jury 
deliberations with an open mind," and she had to "continue to 
respectfully consider the views of the other jurors and also to 
continue to respectfully share her own views with other jurors."  
Neither counsel objected to the judge's plan.  With counsel 
present, the judge had the following exchange with the juror: 
The judge:  "Thank you for your note.  I understand a 
little bit of how you're feeling.  Sometimes I decide cases 
without a jury and I fully appreciate how hard it is to be 
a juror in a case like this when you've been spending a 
good amount of time on very serious matters, trying to 
reach a verdict.  I can't excuse you from [the] jury." 
 
The juror:  "Okay." 
 
The judge:  "Let me tell you a few more things.  First of 
all, nobody is asking you to make a decision that you 
cannot agree with in good conscience.  You should 
[indiscernible].  On the other hand, you need to continue 
to participate in jury deliberations with an open mind.  
Continue to, as you have been, respectfully consider the 
views of the other jurors and also continue respectfully to 
make sure the other jurors understand your views.  All 
right.  You can do this; we know you can do this." 
 
The juror:  "I do feel very intimidated." 
 
The judge:  "Well, I don't want to know anything about the 
discussions." 
 
The juror:  "Okay." 
 
The judge:  "I know discussions can get heated but it's not 
personal.  You all are working together as citizens to try 
12 
 
to resolve this and we very much appreciate your service 
and work." 
 
The juror:  "I take it very seriously, I know that." 
 
The judge:  "I know you do.  I know you do.  So, I'm sorry 
that you need to keep doing something that is very -- very 
hard." 
 
The juror:  "[U]ncomfortable, very uncomfortable." 
 
The judge:  "But I cannot excuse you, all right?" 
 
The juror:  "Okay." 
 
The judge then brought in the full jury and asked whether 
anything had happened in deliberations in violation of his 
instructions.  No juror raised any concerns, nor did counsel 
object to the judge's colloquy with juror no. 9.  The judge then 
asked the jurors to continue their "respectful and collaborative 
work to reach a verdict in this case."  The jury resumed 
deliberations and around one hour later came back with a 
unanimous verdict against the defendant on all three counts. 
 
b.  Analysis.  "The discharge of a deliberating juror is a 
sensitive undertaking and is fraught with potential for error.  
It is to be done only in special circumstances, and with special 
precautions."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 486 Mass. 646, 651 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485, 489 
(2019).  "A juror properly may be discharged only for reasons 
personal to that juror, having nothing whatever to do with the 
issues of the case or with the juror's relationship with his or 
13 
 
her fellow jurors" (alterations and quotation omitted).  
Williams, supra, quoting Tiscione, supra.  "To determine whether 
good cause exists for dismissal, a judge must hold a hearing 
with the juror in question" (quotation omitted).  Williams, 
supra, quoting Tiscione, supra at 490. 
 
Here, the judge properly met with juror no. 9 and declined 
to dismiss her after discerning that her issue pertained to the 
deliberations.  See Williams, 486 Mass. at 654.  He also 
properly interrupted the juror during the colloquy when she 
started to reveal her relationship with other jurors.  See id. 
at 656 ("the moment a juror suggests that there may be a 
disagreement among the jurors, the judge must interrupt the 
juror and firmly reiterate that the juror must not reveal any 
information regarding deliberations").  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 862 (2021) (judge's colloquy with 
individual juror was impermissibly coercive where judge knew 
juror's position).  Indeed, the judge's colloquy with the 
individual juror and his instructions to the jury emphasized the 
jury's core responsibility to be fair and impartial while 
avoiding statements that could be deemed coercive.  The judge 
told juror no. 9 to deliberate with an open mind yet not make a 
14 
 
decision with which she disagreed, and he told the jury to 
deliberate respectfully and collaboratively.6 
The judge's instruction the previous day, in which he told 
the full jury he expected them to have a decision by the next 
day, did not make his later colloquy with juror no. 9 rise to 
the level of coercion.  Although the judge would have done 
better not to make explicit his expectation, that comment 
appears to have been made to inform the jury about the upcoming 
schedule, not to coerce them into making a decision.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Firmin, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 65-66 (2016) 
(judge improperly told jury "that the case would have to be 
retried if they could not reach a verdict and the court was 
booked until May, that the jurors should do 'whatever voting or 
whatever they need to do' if they saw a 'ground swell of 
support' in either direction, and that the court would take the 
verdict if it was reached within the approximate twenty minutes 
before the lunch break" [alteration omitted]). 
The defendant argues that the jury quickly returning a 
unanimous verdict after juror no. 9's individual colloquy is 
 
6 There was no error in the judge's decision not to give a 
Tuey-Rodriquez charge to the jury.  See Ray v. Commonwealth, 463 
Mass. 1, 6 (2012) ("nothing in our cases renders the provision 
of the Tuey-Rodriquez charge mandatory, even on request of the 
parties").  See also Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 
101-102 (1973) (Appendix A); Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-
3 (1851). 
15 
 
evidence that juror no. 9 felt coerced.  However, the hour-long 
delay shows that juror no. 9 did not concede immediately to the 
opposing side, and that substantive deliberations continued.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 Mass. 722, 729-730, 737 (2009) 
(unanimous verdict around seventy-five minutes after individual 
colloquy with problem juror, and thirty minutes after judge told 
full jury that unanimous verdict was necessary, did not indicate 
need for mistrial).  Moreover, because we do not know for 
certain the position of the juror before she returned to 
deliberations or how many other jurors shared her position, we 
simply cannot say whether she conceded to the other side or more 
forcefully made her point after the colloquy and convinced 
others. 
 
In sum, there was no error in the judge's handling of juror 
no. 9's note. 
 
Conclusion.  Because the defendant's arguments are without 
merit, the judgments are affirmed. 
So ordered.