Title: State v. Edler

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2916-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Andrew M. Edler, 
          Defendant-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Terence T. Bourke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ZIEGLER, J., concurs and dissents. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.    
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Richard 
Hahn, 
Christopher 
M. 
Eippert, 
and 
Holden 
& 
Hahn, 
S.C., 
Sheboygan, and oral argument by Christopher M. Eippert. 
  
 
 
      2013 WI 73 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2916-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF205) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrew M. Edler, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, Terence T. Bourke, Judge.  Affirmed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of the 
circuit court's order granting Andrew M. Edler's motion to 
suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation.  
We affirm the order of the circuit court.  The statements Edler 
made after he invoked his right to counsel on April 20, 2011, 
must be suppressed.  We remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The court of appeals for District II certified the 
appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61,1 and we accepted 
the certification.2   
¶3 
To answer the certified questions, we must decide 
whether statements made by Edler on April 20 must be suppressed.  
This case requires an examination of two separate interactions 
between Edler and police, one involving Edler's unequivocal, 
unambiguous request for counsel while in custody on March 30, 
and the other involving Edler's arrest and statement, "Can my 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version.   
2 The certified questions are as follows: 
1. [W]hether Wisconsin should follow Shatzer or rely 
on the Wisconsin Constitution [art. I, § 8] as the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has done with Fifth Amendment 
issues on other occasions. 
2. When the defendant asked, in the squad car on the 
way to the second interrogation, "can my attorney be 
present for this?" did he unambiguously invoke his 
right to counsel? 
3. If the statement is declared to be ambiguous, then 
we ask that the supreme court resolve a third issue.  
Does it make a difference whether the ambiguous 
statement was made before Miranda warnings were given 
as opposed to afterwards? 
 
We answer the first two questions.  Because we hold 
that the statement by Edler was an unequivocal, unambiguous 
request for counsel, we need not and do not address whether 
the standard for a statement pre-Miranda is the same as 
that articulated in State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 252 Wis. 
2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142, and Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452 (1994), or whether the standard should differ when 
a defendant has not recently been told of his or her 
constitutional rights.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
3 
 
attorney be present for this," on April 20.  Accordingly, there 
are two potential bases for suppressing the April 20 statements.   
¶4 
We first examine Edler's March 30 invocation in light 
of the recent United States Supreme Court case Maryland v. 
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).  In Shatzer the United States 
Supreme Court examined the presumption in Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981), that after a suspect validly invokes the 
right to counsel, any subsequent waiver is invalid unless an 
attorney 
is 
present 
or 
the 
suspect 
"initiates 
further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."  
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.  The Court in Shatzer explained 
that the Edwards presumption ends when the suspect has been 
outside police custody for 14 days.  Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.  
Edler asks this court not to adopt Shatzer and instead interpret 
the Wisconsin Constitution to require a permanent bar on 
subsequent interrogation, or in the alternative, adopt a 
different test.  We see no need in this case to interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution to provide different protection than that 
provided by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the United States Constitution.  We therefore adopt the rule 
created in Shatzer and, because 19 days had passed between when 
Edler was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, 
hold that the March 30 invocation does not bar the interrogation 
on April 20.   
¶5 
A separate basis for suppressing the statements may 
exist even if the Edwards presumption no longer applied.  If 
Edler's statement in the police car on April 20 was an 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
4 
 
unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the 
Edwards presumption would begin again.  Given the circumstances 
surrounding the invocation and the understanding that statements 
beginning with the word "can" often constitute a request, we 
hold that Edler's statement, "can my attorney be present for 
this," was a valid invocation of the right to counsel.  The 
invocation re-starts the Edwards presumption, barring Edler's 
waiver of rights later that day because Edler was not provided 
with counsel and did not "initiate[] further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police."  After Edler's 
request for an attorney, police should have ceased questioning 
him.  Because they did not, Edler's statements made after that 
request must be suppressed.  His request was an unequivocal, 
unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Edler was a seventeen-year-old firefighter for the 
Waldo Fire Department.  He was able to respond to fires, but 
because he was on probationary status, he was limited to 
providing assistance such as moving hoses or other items for the 
firefighters.  He became a suspect in two arsons committed in a 
nearby town due to his unusually quick response to those fires. 
¶7 
 On March 30, 2011, Detective Gerald Urban met with 
Edler about an unrelated burglary.  In an interrogation room at 
the sheriff's department, Urban read Edler his Miranda3 rights, 
and Urban questioned Edler about the burglary.  After Edler made 
                                                 
3  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
5 
 
incriminating statements about the burglary, Urban left the 
room, returning about eight minutes later.  At that point, Urban 
began to ask Edler about the two arsons.  Edler then 
unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel, stating: "From 
this point on, I'd like a lawyer here."  Urban ceased 
questioning Edler.  After Urban spent about two minutes 
explaining that if Edler was responsible for the fires he should 
stop that behavior, Edler was taken to the jail to await 
charging on the burglary.   
¶8 
From jail the next day, Edler requested to speak with 
Urban.  Edler was transported from the jail to the sheriff's 
department, where an interview room had been set up.  Urban met 
with Edler in the interview room, and Edler asked him about when 
he would be having his initial appearance.  Urban asked Edler if 
he had anything to say about the arsons, to which Edler 
responded, "I honestly don't have anything to say about that."  
Urban did not ask any further questions about the arsons at that 
time.  
¶9 
Edler was charged with one count of burglary and one 
count of misdemeanor theft, made his initial appearance, and was 
released from custody on April 1, 2011.  Edler was appointed a 
public defender for the burglary case on April 4, 2011.   
¶10 On April 18, 2011, Urban talked with a friend of 
Edler.  Edler's friend agreed to wear a covert wire to talk to 
Edler about his involvement in the two arsons.  Edler made some 
damaging statements that were recorded on that day.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 On April 20, 2011, Urban arrested Edler at Edler's 
home for the arson fires.  Edler's father inquired about why 
Edler was being arrested, and Urban explained to Edler's father 
that he was being arrested for the fires.  Edler's father then 
told Edler to be honest and cooperate with the detectives.   
¶12 Edler was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of 
the detective's unmarked car.  Urban sat next to Edler in the 
back seat.  As they rode in the car, Urban encouraged Edler to 
follow his father's advice and cooperate with the investigation.  
About five minutes into the drive, Edler stated, "Can my 
attorney be present for this," to which Urban responded, "Yes, 
he can."  Edler did not make any incriminating statements during 
the ride.   
¶13 When they arrived at the station, Edler was brought 
into an interrogation room.4  Edler was having difficulty 
breathing and was crying when Urban entered the room.  Urban 
explained the evidence they had against him and that Edler 
needed to come clean.  Once again, he encouraged Edler to follow 
his father's advice.  Then Urban stated, "I've got to play by 
the rules."  He then gave Edler his Miranda warnings, and Edler 
waived those rights. Subsequently, Edler made incriminating 
statements to Urban.5   
                                                 
4 The interview was video-recorded.  
5 Toward the end of the interview, Edler appeared to have a 
panic attack and then vomited.  Urban did not question Edler 
after that occurred.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 Edler was charged on April 22, 2011, with two counts 
of arson in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.02(1)(a) and one count 
of possessing, manufacturing, or selling a Molotov cocktail in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.06(2), each as a party to the 
crime under Wis. Stat. § 939.05.   
¶15 Edler moved to suppress the statements he made after 
he waived his right to counsel on April 20 on the grounds that 
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated.6   
¶16 The Sheboygan County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Terence T. Bourke presiding, granted the motion to suppress on 
the 
grounds 
that 
when 
in 
custody 
on 
April 
20, 
Edler 
unequivocally, unambiguously invoked his right to counsel during 
the transportation to the sheriff's department, finding several 
facts:  in the car on the way to the station Edler asked if his 
attorney could be present; Edler had an attorney in his burglary 
case but did not have one in the arson matters; and Edler had 
talked to Urban three weeks earlier and, at that time, Edler 
requested an attorney while being questioned about the arsons.   
¶17 The circuit court held that Edler's Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel was violated when Urban interrogated Edler 
                                                 
6 Edler also moved to suppress the April 18, 2011, 
statements recorded on the covert wire on Sixth Amendment 
grounds.  The circuit court denied the motion to suppress the 
statements on April 18, dismissing the use of the Sixth 
Amendment in this case, stating that "Sixth Amendment rights do 
not attach until the State commences adversary proceedings," 
citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).  The circuit 
court explained why the exceptions to this rule were not 
satisfied here.  Edler did not appeal that order. 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
8 
 
after Edler's unequivocal, unambiguous assertion of the right to 
counsel on April 20.  The circuit court reasoned that under 
Miranda, after a request for counsel is made, it must be 
"scrupulously honored," and Edler's subsequent waiver of his 
Miranda rights at the station was therefore not valid.  The 
circuit court quoted the holding in Edwards:  
We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, 
having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates 
further 
communication, 
exchanges, 
or 
conversations with the police.  
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. 
¶18 The State appealed the order to suppress Edler's 
statements on the grounds that Edler's statement was a question 
about his rights and not itself an assertion of the rights.  The 
court of appeals certified the appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 Whether this court will apply the rule in Shatzer or 
adopt a different rule under the Wisconsin Constitution is a 
question of law which we decide independently.  Kenosha County 
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 
530, 716 N.W.2d 845.   
¶20 Whether a defendant effectively invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel is a question of constitutional fact 
decided by this court in a two-part test.  State v. Hambly, 2008 
WI 10, ¶16, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48.  First, this court 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
9 
 
upholds the circuit court's findings of facts unless clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  Second, this court independently applies 
constitutional principles to those facts, benefitting from the 
circuit court's interpretation.  Id.  The relevant facts are not 
in dispute; therefore, we must answer the question of whether 
the statements should be suppressed under either the United 
States or Wisconsin constitutions.  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 
¶20, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶21 We first decide whether this court will adopt the 14-
day break-in-custody rule of Shatzer.  If we adopt that rule and 
find that it was complied with here, then we must decide whether 
the statement by Edler in the back of the police car after he 
had been arrested was unequivocal or unambiguous.   
¶22 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  The 
Wisconsin Constitution contains a similar provision: "No person 
. . . may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself or herself."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1). 
¶23 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted and 
applied the Fifth Amendment protections as requiring a warning 
of certain constitutional rights when a defendant is subjected 
to custodial interrogation.  Miranda created a rule to prevent 
law enforcement officers from violating the Fifth Amendment.  
While 
the 
rule 
has 
been 
and 
is 
still 
often 
called 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
10 
 
"prophylactic,"7  the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist writing for the majority, confirmed that it is a 
"constitutional rule" in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 444 (2000).  The rule requires that a suspect be apprised 
of certain constitutional rights, including the right to 
counsel, before custodial interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).  If the suspect is not given these 
warnings and makes incriminating statements, those incriminating 
statements must be suppressed.  Id. at 444.  If the suspect 
chooses to invoke his or her right to counsel, that request must 
be "scrupulously honored," and "the interrogation must cease 
until an attorney is present."  Id. at 474, 479.   
¶24 The United States Supreme Court in Edwards further 
interpreted Miranda.  The relevant facts from Edwards are as 
follows: Edwards was arrested, was given Miranda warnings, and 
was cooperating with police.  451 U.S. at 478-79.  After some 
time passed, Edwards stated, "I want an attorney before making a 
deal."  Id. at 479.  The police did not question Edwards further 
on that day.  Id.  The next day, two different officers went to 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (a 
Sixth Amendment case describing prophylactic rules as "measures 
designed to ensure that constitutional rights are protected.")   
Recently the majority in Shatzer emphasized that Edwards 
and Miranda were judicially prescribed prophylactic rules and 
that the Court had an obligation to justify any expansion.  
Maryland 
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-05 (2010).  The 
concurrence by Justice Stevens made it clear that the Shatzer 
rule was based on the Fifth Amendment and argued that the 
majority "demeans Edwards as a 'second layer' of 'judicially 
prescribed prophylaxis.'"  Id. at 120 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
11 
 
see Edwards in jail.  Id.  Edwards attempted to decline to talk 
to them but was told by a guard "that 'he had' to talk."  Id.  
The guard brought Edwards to the officers, the officers then 
informed him of his Miranda rights, and he waived them.  Id.  
The Supreme Court held that "an accused, such as Edwards, having 
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless 
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, 
or conversations with the police."  Id. at 484-85.  Thus, 
Edwards created a presumption of involuntariness of a waiver of 
Miranda rights made after a valid invocation of the right to 
counsel unless an attorney is provided or the defendant 
initiates further communication with police.   
¶25 As we noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court 
recently interpreted the Edwards presumption in Shatzer and 
determined that the presumption of Edwards ends after a 14-day 
break in custody.  The Shatzer court examined whether a break in 
custody ended the Edwards presumption.  Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 
100.  Shatzer was incarcerated at a correctional facility 
serving a sentence on another offense.  Id. at 100-01.  A 
detective met with Shatzer at the institution, gave Shatzer his 
Miranda warnings, and Shatzer waived those rights.  Id. at 101.  
There was some confusion about what the detective was there for, 
but when Shatzer realized what the detective wanted to talk 
about, Shatzer declined to speak without an attorney, and 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
12 
 
Shatzer was released back into general population at the prison.8  
Id.  Two years and six months later, a different detective went 
to the correctional institution to which Shatzer had been 
transferred.  Id.  The detective gave Shatzer his Miranda 
warnings, and Shatzer provided a written waiver of those rights.  
Id. Shatzer subsequently made incriminating statements during 
the interview and also agreed to a polygraph examination.  Id. 
at 101-02.  Five days later, Shatzer again waived his Miranda 
rights, was given a polygraph examination which he failed, and 
made additional incriminating statements.  Id. at 102.  Shatzer 
then moved to suppress his statements as a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment on the grounds that Edwards barred the use of 
his statements because he had invoked his right to counsel two 
and a half years earlier.  Id.   
¶26 The Supreme Court disagreed with Shatzer and held that 
the Fifth Amendment was not violated.  The Court described the 
reasons behind Edwards as "conserving judicial resources," 
"preserv[ing] 
the 
integrity 
of 
an 
accused's 
choice 
to 
communicate with police only through counsel," and "preventing 
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously 
asserted Miranda rights."  Id. at 106 (citations omitted).  
Explaining 
the 
problems 
with 
a 
permanent 
bar 
to 
future 
                                                 
8 The United States Supreme Court in Shatzer held that being 
released back into general population constituted a break in 
Miranda 
custody, 
stating: 
"Without 
minimizing 
the 
harsh 
realities of incarceration, we think lawful imprisonment imposed 
upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive 
pressures identified in Miranda."  Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
13 
 
questioning and the establishment of prophylactic rules,9 the 
court decided that the Edwards presumption ends after there is a 
14-day break in custody.  Id. at 110.  It reasoned, "[t]hat 
provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to 
his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to 
shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody."  
Id.  The court recognized the clarity and certainty that result 
from Edwards and stated that "[c]onfessions obtained after a 2-
week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most 
unlikely to be compelled, and hence are unreasonably excluded."  
Id. at 111. 
A.  
¶27 The State argues that we should adopt the rule of 
Shatzer because it strikes a reasonable balance between the 
competing interests, preserving the protections of Edwards, and 
providing predictability for police officers.  Edler argues that 
Edwards would normally bar further interrogation of a defendant 
after he had invoked his right to counsel and that the 
subsequent interrogation of Edler was in violation of Edwards.  
                                                 
9 The Edwards majority does not describe the holding as 
creating a prophylactic rule.  It holds that a constitutional 
violation occurred, stating, "Because the use of [Edwards'] 
confession against him at his trial violated his rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. 
Arizona, we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court."  
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 (1981) (emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted).  The Edwards rule has been 
subsequently characterized as a prophylactic rule.  See Shatzer, 
559 U.S. at 105 (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787 
(2009); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 349 (1990); Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 644, n.4 (1984)). 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
14 
 
He further argues that the Shatzer rule constricts the rights of 
defendants who have invoked their right to counsel.  Edler urges 
this court to extend the protection provided in Wisconsin under 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution beyond that 
provided by the United States Supreme Court in Shatzer.  He 
suggests that subsequent custodial interrogation be permitted 
only if the suspect's attorney is present or if the suspect 
initiates further communication. In the alternative, he suggests 
a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a 
break in custody is sufficient.   
¶28 We adopt the 14-day rule of Shatzer.  The break in 
custody was more than 14 days, and therefore, we hold that 
interrogating Edler after a 19-day break in custody did not 
itself violate Edwards.  We agree with the court in Shatzer that 
predictability is important when creating prophylactic rules so 
police have clear guidance on what they can do and when.10  See 
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.  We also agree that setting the two-
week rule spares courts the inquiry of whether a suspect being 
asked to waive Miranda rights has ever asserted a Miranda right 
to counsel at an earlier date.  Id. at 111-12.   
                                                 
10 We recognize that the Shatzer majority calls the rule 
"prophylactic," implying that it is not mandated by the United 
States Constitution.  In this case, Edler argues that this court 
should interpret the Wisconsin Constitution to prevent this type 
of behavior by police.  Similarly, the court of appeals 
certified to us the question of whether to extend the Wisconsin 
Constitution to provide different protection than that in 
Shatzer.  For these reasons, we discuss the scope of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
15 
 
¶29 This holding is consistent with the fact that we often 
interpret both the United States and Wisconsin constitutions the 
same way.  See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 252 Wis. 2d 
228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  There are exceptions to this rule.  For 
example, 
in 
Knapp, 
this 
court 
looked 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution to provide protection beyond that described by the 
United States Supreme Court.  285 Wis. 2d 86.  In Knapp, a 
police officer testified that he had intentionally failed to 
provide Miranda warnings to a suspect so as to "keep the lines 
of communication open."  Id., ¶¶13-14.  The police officer 
acknowledged that he was aware that the suspect was attempting 
to contact counsel before the police brought the suspect in for 
custodial interrogation.  Id., ¶14.  Additionally, "the State 
ha[d] conceded that the physical evidence was seized as a direct 
result of an intentional Miranda violation."  Id., ¶20.  This 
court held that "the exclusionary rule bars physical fruits 
obtained from a deliberate Miranda violation under Article I, 
Section 8."  Id., ¶73 (footnote omitted).   
¶30 The case at hand does not present the same kind of 
constitutional issues as the intentional violation of Miranda in 
Knapp.  
We decline to extend the meaning of Wisconsin 
Constitution Article I, Section 8 in this situation so as to 
provide different protection than the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.   
 
¶31 Because we decline to provide different protection, we 
apply the 14-day break-in-custody rule of Shatzer.  The parties 
agree that Edler was outside of custody for 19 days.  Therefore, 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
16 
 
Shatzer was complied with here, and the statements cannot be 
suppressed on the grounds that Edler's March 30 invocation 
barred the interrogation on April 20. 
B.  
¶32 Even if under Shatzer enough time passed since Edler 
invoked his Miranda right to counsel such that his subsequent 
interrogation did not violate the Edwards presumption, we must 
determine whether Edler's statement in the police car was an 
unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel such 
that the subsequent waiver at the station was invalid under 
Edwards.11   
¶33 As noted above, Edwards creates a presumption that 
unless a 
suspect 
either "initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations," or is provided with an attorney, 
any waiver made after a valid invocation of the right to counsel 
is invalid.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.  "The legal 
sufficiency of a defendant's invocation of the right to counsel 
                                                 
11 Generally, a defendant must be subjected to custodial 
interrogation in order to get the protections of Miranda and 
Edwards.  See State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶41, 346 Wis. 2d 
523, 828 N.W.2d 552.  In State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶3, 307 
Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48, we held that a suspect who had been 
arrested and was not yet being interrogated could invoke his 
Miranda right to counsel.  In that case, this court split on the 
issue of whether interrogation must be "imminent or impending," 
with three justices deciding that it must be "imminent or 
impending" and three justices concluding that the question need 
not be answered.  Id., ¶33.  We need not answer that question 
here because the State conceded that Edler had a right to invoke 
his Miranda rights during the police transport when the 
attempted interrogation was forthcoming.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
17 
 
during 
a 
custodial 
interrogation 
is 
determined 
by 
the 
application of a constitutional standard to historical facts."  
Jennings, 
252 
Wis. 
2d 
228, 
¶25. 
 
This 
court 
measures 
independently 
"the 
historical 
facts 
against 
a 
uniform 
constitutional standard, benefiting from, but not deferring to, 
the circuit court's decision."  Id. (citations omitted).  
¶34 In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the 
United States Supreme Court established the test of whether a 
statement invoked the right to counsel as follows:  "[I]f a 
suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or 
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the 
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might 
be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require 
the cessation of questioning."  Id. at 459.  The test adopted 
was an objective one: "Although a suspect need not 'speak with 
the discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney."  Id. (internal 
citation omitted).  This court adopted the United States Supreme 
Court's test in Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶¶30, 36.  Under the 
objective test, we must examine the circumstances surrounding 
the request.12   
                                                 
12 We note that by using the objective test of Davis and 
Jennings to determine whether the statement was an unambiguous, 
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, we are not 
answering the third question certified by the court of appeals.  
Recall our earlier explanation: 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
18 
 
¶35 The relevant circumstances support the holding that 
Elder's statement was an unequivocal, unambiguous request for 
counsel.  Urban had interrogated Edler on March 30, at which 
time Edler had requested an attorney on the arsons, stating, 
"From this point on, I'd like a lawyer here," and the request 
had been complied with.  Urban had been present on March 31 and 
tried to ask Edler about the arsons, to which Edler responded, 
"I honestly don't have anything to say about that."  Urban had 
talked to Edler's father, and Edler's father had encouraged 
Edler to be honest with the detectives.  At the time Edler 
invoked his right to counsel he had been arrested, and no one 
disputes that the word "this" related to the forthcoming 
interrogation.  Urban knew Edler had been charged with burglary 
and had an attorney on that charge.  An officer in Urban's 
position would have known that Edler had on previous occasions 
requested counsel to deal with this matter, which would make the 
officer more likely to understand that Edler was asking for his 
attorney again.  In light of the circumstances, Edler's 
statement, 
"can 
my 
attorney 
be 
present 
for 
this," 
was 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because we hold that the statement by Edler was an 
unequivocal, unambiguous request for counsel, we need 
not and do not address whether the standard for a 
statement pre-Miranda is the same as that articulated 
in State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142 and Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 
(1994), or if the standard should differ when a 
defendant has not recently been told of his or her 
constitutional rights. 
Supra, ¶2 n.2.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
19 
 
sufficiently clear to a reasonable officer in Urban's position 
to understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.   
¶36 Regardless of the surrounding circumstances, including 
Edler's previous experience with Detective Urban, we are 
satisfied that Edler's statement, "can my attorney be present 
for this," constituted an unambiguous, unequivocal invocation.  
Our holding is consistent with the approaches of other courts 
that have looked at similar statements.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding "can I have 
a lawyer" was a valid invocation and that police should have 
ended the interrogation unless they clarified the suspect's 
statement); United States v. Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 
2012) (citing its decision in Lee and reiterating that the 
phrase "can I have a lawyer" is an unequivocal, unambiguous 
request for counsel); State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420 (R.I. 2000) 
(holding that the phrase "can I get a lawyer" amounted to a 
colloquial request); Taylor v. State, 553 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. 2001) 
(holding that the phrase "can I have a lawyer present when I do 
that," when made in response to the police's request that a 
suspect tell her side of the story, was an unequivocal, 
unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 
613 S.E.2d 579 (Va. 2005) (holding that "can I get a lawyer in 
here? . . . I already have a lawyer," in the circumstances, was 
an unequivocal, unambiguous request for an attorney).   
¶37 For the reasons stated above, we hold that Edler's 
statement was an unequivocal, unambiguous request for counsel.  
There 
is 
no 
indication 
that 
after 
Edler's 
unequivocal, 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
20 
 
unambiguous request that Edler initiated further communications 
with Urban to indicate a valid waiver under Edwards.  Therefore, 
any statements made by Edler after he requested his attorney in 
the car on the way to the sheriff's department must be 
suppressed.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶38 We first examine Edler's March 30 invocation in light 
of the recent United States Supreme Court case Shatzer.  In 
Shatzer the United States Supreme Court examined the presumption 
in Edwards, that after a suspect validly invokes the right to 
counsel, any subsequent waiver is invalid unless an attorney is 
present 
or 
the 
suspect 
"initiates 
further 
communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police."  Edwards, 451 U.S. 
at 484-85.  The Court in Shatzer explained that the Edwards 
presumption ends when the suspect has been outside police 
custody for 14 days.  Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.  Edler asks this 
court not to adopt Shatzer and instead interpret the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
to 
require 
a 
permanent 
bar 
on 
subsequent 
interrogation, or in the alternative, adopt a different test.  
We see no need in this case to interpret the Wisconsin 
Constitution to provide different protection than that provided 
by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
United States Constitution.  We therefore adopt the rule created 
in Shatzer and, because 19 days had passed between when Edler 
was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the 
March 30 invocation does not bar the interrogation on April 20.   
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
21 
 
¶39 A separate basis for suppressing the statements may 
exist even if the Edwards presumption no longer applied.  If 
Edler's statement in the police car on April 20 was an 
unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the 
Edwards presumption would begin again.  Given the circumstances 
surrounding the invocation and the understanding that statements 
beginning with the word "can" often constitute a request, we 
hold that Edler's statement, "can my attorney be present for 
this," was a valid invocation of the right to counsel.  The 
invocation re-starts the Edwards presumption, barring Edler's 
waiver of rights later that day because Edler was not provided 
with counsel and did not "initiate[] further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police."  After Edler's 
request for an attorney, police should have ceased questioning 
him.  Because they did not, Edler's statements made after that 
request must be suppressed.  His request was an unequivocal, 
unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.  
By the Court.— Affirmed and cause remanded. 
¶40 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I concur 
in the mandate.  The defendant's statement is to be suppressed.  
I join the part of the majority opinion concluding that Edler's 
statement in the police car was an unequivocal, unambiguous 
invocation of his right to counsel such that the subsequent 
waiver at the station was invalid under Edwards.1 
¶42 A person being interrogated in custody does not have 
to use the precise words "I want a lawyer" to invoke the right 
to counsel.  In discussing whether a defendant's statement about 
counsel is an unequivocal request for counsel, the Texas Supreme 
Court wisely observed: "While police often carry printed cards 
to ensure precise Miranda warnings, the public is not required 
to carry similar cards so they can give similarly precise 
responses."2  This court should follow this sage, practical 
advice.   
¶43 I write separately because I do not agree with the 
majority opinion that the court should fully adopt the 14-day 
rule of Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).   
¶44 There is no need in the present case for the court to 
decide whether to adopt the Shatzer rule.  The defendant's 
invocation of the right to counsel at the second interrogation 
decides the present case.  The statements made after invocation 
of the right to counsel must be suppressed.     
                                                 
1 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
2 In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tex. 1998) (footnote 
omitted). 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶45 If I were to reach the Shatzer issue, I would follow 
Shatzer to the extent of holding that law enforcement's 
subjecting a suspect——who has invoked his right to counsel and 
has been released from custody——to custodial interrogation 
within the Shatzer 14-day period violates Miranda3 and Edwards 
unless the suspect reinitiates the conversation or a lawyer is 
made available.   
¶46 Law enforcement obligations under state law for the 
first 14 days would thus be governed by and be in sync with the 
bright-line rule set under federal law.4  I would adopt this 14-
day prophylactic rule under the court's superintending and 
administrative authority, Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 3(1).5       
                                                 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 Nevertheless, I agree with Justice Thomas, who wrote in 
Shatzer that "an otherwise arbitrary rule is not justifiable 
merely because it gives clear instruction to law enforcement 
officers."  Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 119 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  
5 See, e.g., In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶¶40-41, 283 
Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (relying on Art. VII, § 3(1)).    
Citing numerous law review articles, Professor LaFave 
discusses the criticism of the United States Supreme Court's 
reliance on prophylactic rules rather than administratively 
based rules as follows:  
In general, commentators have criticized the Court's 
explanation of its utilization of prophylactic rules 
(often 
even 
though 
agreeing 
with 
the 
rules 
themselves).  
The commentators cite the Court's 
failure to fully explain its authority to prescribe 
such rules, the Court's failure to fully explain the 
difference 
(if 
any) 
between 
prophylactic 
and 
administratively based per se rules, the Court's 
failure to provide clear guidelines as to when the 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶47 I would not adopt Shatzer's prophylactic rule that 
after the 14-day period Edwards has no effect.6  Under Edwards, 
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel during custodial 
interrogation, a subsequent waiver of that right "cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of 
his rights."7 
¶48 The Shatzer decision and today's majority opinion are 
based entirely on an unsupported generalization about all 
suspects, 
namely 
that 
a 
14-day 
break 
in 
custody 
and 
interrogation will somehow overcome the concern of coercion and 
compulsion that is the basis for the Edwards line of cases.  The 
Shatzer Court speculated that "[i]t seems to us that" a period 
of "14 days . . . provides plenty of time for the suspect to get 
                                                                                                                                                             
imposition of a prophylactic rule is justified, the 
Court's inconsistency in its use of the "prophylactic" 
characterization in describing what appear to be 
functionally 
similar 
standards, 
and 
the 
Court's 
failure to establish any significant guidelines for 
determining when safeguards provided by legislation 
are sufficient to replace the prophylactic standards.  
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Crim. Proc. § 2.9(h) (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 
2012). 
6 The Shatzer court explained that after a 14-day break in 
custody, Edwards is no longer in effect but a defendant is "free 
to claim the prophylactic protection of Miranda——arguing that 
his waiver of Miranda rights was in fact involuntary under 
Johnson v. Zerbst."  Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110-11 n.7 (internal 
citations omitted). 
7 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.  This court has stated that such 
a waiver is presumed to be invalid.  State v. Harris, 199 
Wis. 2d 227, 251-52, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996). 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and 
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his 
prior custody."8 
¶49 I agree with Justice John Paul Stevens that this 
speculation "may well prove inaccurate in many circumstances."9  
Fourteen days is an arbitrary figure.10   
                                                 
8 Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110 (2010). 
9 Id. at 123-24 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
In Arizona v. Roberson, the United States Supreme Court 
explained as follows:  "[T]o a suspect who has indicated his 
inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation 
by requesting counsel, any further interrogation without counsel 
having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion 
to speak the suspect may be feeling."  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 
U.S. 675, 686 (1988). 
10 The Shatzer court admitted that "while it is certainly 
unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits 
governing police action, it is not unheard-of."  Shatzer, 559 
U.S. 98, 110 (2010).  Ironically, the only case the Shatzer 
court cites for its "unusual" decision to set forth a time limit 
held that police must bring forth a person arrested without a 
warrant to a magistrate judge within 48 hours to establish 
probable cause for continued detention.  Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 
110 (2010) (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 
44 (1991)).  The McLaughlin Court recognized a presumption that 
up to a 48-hour delay in holding the probable cause hearing 
after 
arrest 
was 
reasonable 
and 
hence 
constitutionally 
permissible.  
In McLaughlin, the Court required law enforcement to do 
something within a short specified period of time in order to 
protect the rights of the accused, while in Shatzer, the Court 
concluded that if law enforcement refrains from doing something 
for a sufficient period of time, the accused's rights have been 
sufficiently respected. 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
When police have not honored an earlier commitment to 
provide a detainee with a lawyer, the detainee likely 
will "understan[d] his (expressed) wishes to have been 
ignored" and "may well see future objection as futile 
and confession (true or not) as the only way to end 
his interrogation." . . . Simply giving a "fresh set 
of Miranda warnings" will not "'reassure' a suspect 
who has been denied the counsel he has clearly 
requested 
that 
his 
rights 
have 
remained 
untrammeled.'"11  
¶50 As Justice Stevens wrote, Edwards may require a longer 
period than 14 days, under the circumstances of a case, for a 
court to conclude that a sufficient break in custody occurred to 
dissipate 
the 
lingering 
coercive 
effects 
of 
the 
prior 
interrogation.12        
                                                                                                                                                             
Still, in McLaughlin, the Court held that even if law 
enforcement complied with the 48-hour mandate, the accused may 
still prove a Constitutional violation.  McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 
56-57 (1991).  
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701, 712 (2001) 
(citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-58) (noting that the 48-hour 
rule was based on the court of appeals' determination of the 
time required to complete a probable cause hearing).  In 
contrast, the 14-day period selected in Shatzer bears no 
relationship 
to 
the 
needs 
of 
law 
enforcement, 
the 
characteristics of the suspect, or the circumstances that occur 
during the 14 days. 
See also Jessica A. Davis, Casenote, Another Tweak to 
Miranda: The Supreme Court Significantly Limits the Edwards 
Presumption of Involuntariness in Custodial Interrogation, 36 S. 
Ill. U. L.J. 593, 608 (2012) ("According to the majority, 
fourteen days is sufficient for the coercive pressures to 
custodial interrogation to disappear because it says so."). 
11 Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 121-22 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. United States, 
512 
U.S. 
452, 
472-73 
(1994) 
(Souter, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
judgment); Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686). 
12 As Justice Stevens commented: 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶51 If 
a 
court 
is 
not 
willing 
to 
extend 
Edwards 
indefinitely and the court concludes that the coercive effects 
of the prior interrogation may dissipate with time, then the 
court should determine whether the coercive effects have 
dissipated in that particular case.  A court should take an 
                                                                                                                                                             
The most troubling aspect of the Court's time-based 
rule is that it disregards the compulsion caused by a 
second (or third, or fourth) interrogation of an 
indigent suspect who was told that if he requests a 
lawyer, one will be provided for him.  When police 
tell an indigent suspect that he has the right to an 
attorney, that he is not required to speak without an 
attorney present, and that an attorney will be 
provided to him at no cost before questioning, the 
police have made a significant promise.  If they cease 
questioning and then reinterrogate the suspect 14 days 
later without providing him with a lawyer, the suspect 
is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that 
he really does not have any right to a lawyer. 
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 121 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
See 
Kit 
Kinports, 
The 
Supreme 
Court's 
Love-Hate 
Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 375, 
386 (2011) ("[O]nce a suspect is released from custody, she is 
not entitled to state-provided counsel (assuming charges have 
not yet been filed).  For those unable to afford private 
lawyers, then, a fourteen-day break in custody does not provide 
a meaningful opportunity to obtain legal advice.") (footnote 
omitted). 
See also Illan M. Romano, Note & Comment, Is Miranda on the 
Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens Miranda's Grip in 
Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 Nova L. Rev. 525, 535 (2011) 
(presenting the following hypothetical application of Shatzer:  
"This holding expressly permits police to engage in a tactic 
where, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police 
simply release the suspect, wait fourteen days, and try again 
hoping this time the suspect is not intelligent enough to invoke 
his right to counsel, which may not have been provided to him 
the first time around."). 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
individualized approach to the dissipation of the coercive 
effects of the prior interrogation, not a generalized one.  
Under these circumstances, the court should hold that after the 
14-day period ends, the presumption established by Edwards 
continues and the State has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that time has dissipated the coercive 
effects of the prior interrogation in that case.     
¶52 In these situations, the court should consider the 
totality of circumstances including the age, education, and 
intelligence of the suspect; the physical, psychological and 
emotional condition of the suspect; and the suspect's prior 
experience with police to determine whether the coercive effects 
of the prior interrogation have dissipated.  The personal 
characteristics of the suspect must be viewed along with the 
police tactics used, such as the time between interrogations and 
length of the interrogations, the general conditions under which 
the statements were made, the physical and psychological 
pressures brought to bear on the suspect, the inducements and 
strategies used by law enforcement, the prior relationship 
between the interrogating officer and the suspect, and the 
circumstances ensuing in the period between the suspect's 
exercising the right to counsel and the re-interrogation.   
¶53 Examining whether the coercive effects of the prior 
interrogation have dissipated comports with the genuine concern 
for individual voluntariness required by Miranda and Edwards, 
rather than a blanket generalization about human reaction to 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
subsequent 
or 
repeated 
interrogations, 
and 
assists 
law 
enforcement officers in governing their conduct.13   
¶54 In the present case, after validly invoking his right 
to counsel with regard to the arson investigation, the 17-year-
old defendant was released from custody.  Then, 19 days later——
after law enforcement had covertly placed a wire on the 
defendant's young friend——the same detective whom the defendant 
had previously refused to talk to showed up at his home to 
arrest him again to discuss the same investigation.  As the 
defendant was led away to the squad car, his father told him to 
be honest and to cooperate with the detectives.   
¶55 We know that at no time was the defendant provided an 
attorney as he requested during the custodial interrogation.  
The State has not suggested that the defendant "initiate[d] 
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police."14   
¶56 Further inquiry is necessary about this particular 
defendant and the circumstances, beyond just saying that 14 days 
passed, before I can join an opinion concluding, as a matter of 
law, that the coercive effects of the prior interrogation had 
dissipated. 
¶57 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                 
13 See 
Hannah 
Misner, 
Comment, 
Maryland 
v. 
Shatzer:  
Stamping a Fourteen-Day Expiration Date on Miranda Rights, 88 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 289, 305 (2010). 
14 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶58 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I concur because I agree with the 
majority's adoption of Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).  
See majority op., ¶31.  I dissent and write separately to 
discuss 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
lack 
of 
regard 
for 
the 
fundamental question presented in this case: what is the legal 
standard to be applied when a suspect makes a statement about 
counsel post-custody, pre-Miranda warnings, pre-interrogation, 
and pre-waiver of Miranda rights.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966).  In my view, we accepted certification to answer 
this question.  Instead, the majority opinion merely restates 
the previously adopted Davis standard as if Edler's statement 
was 
made 
post-custody, 
post-Miranda 
warnings, 
during 
interrogation, and after waiver of Miranda rights.  Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  It was not.  We should 
answer the fundamental question presented and provide guidance 
for law enforcement, courts, and counsel, as this issue is 
likely to recur especially in light of Shatzer and its impact on 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  
¶59 Here, the issue presented is whether, under the 
circumstances, Edler's question "Can my attorney be present for 
this?" constitutes an invocation of the right to counsel.  In 
response to this question, Detective Urban responded "Yes he 
can."  About 20 minutes after making that statement, Edler was 
read his Miranda rights.  While his rights were being read, 
Edler interrupted Urban and stated "If the lawyer—if I request a 
lawyer, does that mean you still have to bring me into custody 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
and I have to go sit in the jail?"  Urban told Edler that he was 
already in custody and that Urban needed to read the full 
Miranda rights before they could talk further.  Urban read Edler 
his Miranda rights in their entirety.  Edler waived his right to 
counsel and made incriminating statements.   
¶60 Approximately three weeks earlier, Edler was arrested, 
read his Miranda rights, and unambiguously invoked his right to 
counsel by stating "From this point on, I'd like to have a 
lawyer here."  Urban scrupulously honored that request and 
ceased any questioning.  Thus, Edler knew how to unambiguously 
invoke his right to counsel and knew that questioning would 
cease if he so requested counsel.  Urban also knew that Edler 
was capable of invoking his right to counsel, and Urban 
demonstrated that he would scrupulously honor a request for 
counsel.     
¶61 Simply stated, my dissent distils into the following 
four points, which are interrelated: (1) the majority's analysis 
has not adhered to the proper de novo standard of review; (2) 
the majority muddies the waters with respect to existing 
precedent, the "reset" for interrogation permitted by Shatzer, 
and the impact of Shatzer on Edwards; (3) the majority does not 
provide sufficient analysis regarding how or whether law 
enforcement may clarify such pre-Miranda questions from a 
suspect; and (4) this issue is ripe for determination so that 
law enforcement, litigants, and courts will know how to evaluate 
such statements.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶62 The facts are undisputed.  On March 30, 2011, 
Detective Urban met with Edler to discuss a burglary.  Urban 
read Edler his Miranda rights and interrogated him, and Edler 
made incriminating statements about the burglary.  After a short 
break, Urban asked Edler about two arsons that were unrelated to 
the burglary.  At this point, Edler successfully invoked his 
right to counsel by stating "From this point on, I'd like a 
lawyer here."  Urban respected Edler's invocation and ceased the 
interrogation.  In fact, after Edler made this statement, he 
began to talk again and Urban told him "to be quiet" because he 
had asked for a lawyer.  In other words, in the first 
interrogation, Urban scrupulously honored Edler's invocation of 
counsel.   
¶63 Edler spent that night in jail and requested to meet 
with Urban the next day.  After a brief conversation about the 
burglary charge, Urban asked Edler if he had anything to say 
about the arsons.  Edler responded that "I honestly don't have 
anything to say about that."  Urban again scrupulously honored 
Edler's wish to remain silent.   
¶64 On April 1, 2011, Edler was charged with burglary, 
made his initial appearance with an attorney from the Public 
Defender's office, and was released from custody on a signature 
bond.  On April 4, 2011, Edler was appointed a public defender 
on the burglary charge.   
¶65 Almost three weeks later, on April 20, 2011, Edler was 
arrested for arson.  As Edler was being arrested, his father 
urged him to be honest and cooperate with the police.  Edler was 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
handcuffed, placed in the back of a squad car, and transported 
to the police station.  Edler was not read his Miranda rights at 
this point.  About five minutes into the 20 minute car ride to 
the station, Edler asked "Can my attorney be present for this?"  
Urban responded "Yes he can."  Edler did not ask any follow up 
questions or make further statements about an attorney during 
the remaining car ride, and Urban did not ask Edler any 
questions about the burglary or the arsons during the car ride.   
¶66 At the police station, Urban read Edler his Miranda 
rights.  As Edler was read the portion of his Miranda rights 
regarding his right to counsel, Edler interrupted Urban and 
asked "If the lawyer—if I request a lawyer, does that mean you 
still have to bring me into custody and I have to go sit in the 
jail?"  Urban responded that Edler was already in custody and 
that he would be willing to discuss the issue further after 
reading the rights.  Urban then reread the Miranda warnings in 
its entirety to Edler.  Edler waived his rights.  Urban asked 
Edler "realizing that you have these rights, are you now willing 
to answer questions?"  Edler replied "yeah."  Edler then made 
incriminating statements to Urban.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶67 I agree with the majority that the standard of review 
is two-fold.  We uphold the trial court's findings of fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous, 
and 
we 
apply 
the 
constitutional principles to those facts independently while 
benefiting from the trial court's interpretation.  State v. 
Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶16, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48.  I 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
disagree with the majority's application of this standard of 
review. 
¶68 The trial court did not engage in fact finding that 
required discretionary determinations regarding credibility, 
demeanor, or which version of the facts to accept.  We accept 
the facts as the trial court found them.  We then engage in a 
de novo review of the legal standard the trial court applied.  
Because this legal standard has never been determined, certainly 
no fault of the trial court, the trial court was without a 
specific legal standard to apply when it reached its legal 
conclusion.  If the trial court applied the correct legal 
analysis, we should adopt that standard.  If the trial court 
should have applied a different legal analysis, we should set 
forth that rule.  The majority does neither.     
¶69 While 
I 
do 
not 
quarrel 
with 
the 
majority's 
determination that a question such as "Can my lawyer be present 
for this?" could be an unambiguous request for counsel under 
certain circumstances, another court could come to the opposite 
conclusion just as easily in different circumstances.  Law 
enforcement, courts, and litigants expect our opinions to give 
them the necessary tools to do their jobs properly.  The 
majority opinion does not provide that guidance.  Because the 
mere mention of an attorney is not an invocation of counsel, it 
is important to clarify what about Edler's question meets a 
standard applicable to pre-Miranda invocations.  The majority 
specifically does not extend the Davis standard to this pre-
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
Miranda scenario,1 it does not clarify what legal standard should 
be applied, nor does it conclude that this statement is always 
an invocation of counsel.  See majority op., ¶35.  Hence, the 
applicable legal standard remains unanswered for statements 
regarding counsel when the suspect is in custody, has not been 
given the Miranda warnings, is not yet being interrogated, and 
has not waived his or her Miranda rights.2  See majority op., ¶¶2 
n.2, 34 n.12.  We can do better.   
III. PRECEDENT, SHATZER, AND OFFICER CONDUCT 
A. Precedent 
¶70 Precedent makes it less than clear that Edler's 
question "Can my attorney be present for this?" is sufficient to 
invoke his right to counsel.  "[I]f a suspect makes a reference 
to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a 
                                                 
1 Davis would be the rule to apply here when a suspect has 
been given Miranda rights, has waived them, and is being 
interrogated.  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Edler made no such 
statement regarding an attorney after he waived his Miranda 
rights.   
2 Though Wisconsin has not previously decided whether the 
Davis standard applies to statements made before Miranda 
warnings are given, other courts have faced this question.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.6, 1080 
(9th Cir. 2008) (listing 10 cases that have considered the 
standard applicable to pre-Miranda invocations and concluding 
that Davis did not supersede Ninth Circuit case law requiring 
clarification of ambiguous statements prior to obtaining a 
Miranda waiver); Harvey Gee, An Ambiguous Request for Counsel 
Before, and Not After a Miranda Waiver: United States v. 
Rodriguez, United States v. Fry and State v. Blackburn, 5 Crim. 
L. Brief 51 (2009) (discussing standards for pre-Miranda 
invocations).   
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of 
questioning."  Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.  The majority does not 
conclude that the question "Can my attorney be present for 
this?" is always an invocation of counsel.  See majority op., 
¶35.  In fact, courts often conclude that such a question 
regarding counsel is not an invocation, even if it is asked 
after the Miranda warnings were given.3   
¶71 For example, in State v. Ward, we concluded that where 
the defendant asked the police whether she should call an 
attorney, that question was equivocal and insufficient to invoke 
her right to counsel.  2009 WI 60, ¶43, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 
N.W.2d 236.  See also, Halbrook v. State, 31 S.W.3d 301, 302-04 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the question "Do I get an 
opportunity to have my attorney present?" was ambiguous under 
Davis); United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 
1999) (concluding that defendant's question "What time will I 
see a lawyer?" was ambiguous under Davis); United States v. 
                                                 
3 A question, such as "Can I get a lawyer?" may be 
sufficiently clear to invoke the right to counsel in the right 
circumstances.  The majority opinion should not be read to 
conclude that statements starting with "Can I" and including the 
word "lawyer" are all unambiguous and unequivocal requests for 
counsel.  See majority op., ¶36.  See also Marcy Strauss, 
Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1011, 
1037 (2007) ("The question, 'Can I get a lawyer?' has received a 
more checkered reception.  Many courts have found this type of 
question to be ambiguous, and a way of simply asking for 
clarification of one's rights."); Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure, 40 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 199-202 (2011).   
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
defendant did not sufficiently invoke his right to counsel when 
he asked "[b]ut, excuse me, if I am right, I can have a lawyer 
present through all this, right?") abrogated in part on other 
grounds, United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2010); Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695, 700 (Va. 2002) 
(holding that "Can I speak to my lawyer?  I can't even talk to 
[a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments or anything?" was 
ambiguous and equivocal, and therefore insufficient to invoke 
the defendant's right to counsel); Marcy Strauss, Understanding 
Davis v. United States, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1011, 1035-37 
(2007) (reporting that courts often conclude questions about a 
lawyer are ambiguous). 
¶72 Courts frequently conclude that even fairly pointed 
statements about obtaining a lawyer, as opposed to questions, 
are nevertheless ambiguous and equivocal.  For instance, the 
Court in Davis concluded that the statement "Maybe I should talk 
to a lawyer" was ambiguous and therefore did not constitute an 
invocation.  512 U.S. at 462.  Applying Davis, we held in State 
v. Jennings, that the statement "I think maybe I need to talk to 
a lawyer" was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.  2002 
WI 44, ¶36, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  As another 
example, in State v. Long, the court of appeals concluded that 
the defendant's statement "My attorney told me I shouldn't talk 
unless he is here" was an ambiguous and equivocal statement.  
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
190 Wis. 2d 386, 397, 526 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994).4  See also 
State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Mo. 1994) (concluding 
defendant's statement that he "ought to talk to an attorney" was 
not unambiguous invocation); Commonwealth v. Jones, 786 N.E.2d 
1197, 1206 (Mass. 2003) (concluding defendant's statement that 
he was "going to need a lawyer sometime" did not constitute an 
unambiguous request for an attorney); Baker v. State, 214 S.W.3d 
239, 243 (Ark. 2005) (concluding defendant's statements "I don't 
feel that I can talk to you without an attorney sitting right 
here to give——have them give me some legal advice" and "I think 
I'm going to need one.  I mean, it looks like that" were 
ambiguous).   
¶73 Significantly, the cases relied upon by the majority 
are clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances in 
the case at issue.  See majority op., ¶36.  The majority opinion 
relies upon Taylor and Lee to support its conclusion that "Can 
my attorney be present for this?" is an invocation of counsel.  
                                                 
4 Two recent court of appeals cases provide persuasive 
authority reaffirming Wisconsin's adherence to a strict standard 
that a suspect must meet to invoke his or her Miranda rights.  
In State v. Smith, the court of appeals held that the defendant 
did not invoke his right to remain silent where he stated "I 
don't want to talk about this," referring to a specific line of 
questioning, but where he also indicated a willingness to 
continue discussing other matters. Smith, No. 2012AP520-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶8-10 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2013).  In 
State v. Cummings, the court of appeals held that the defendant 
did not invoke his right to remain silent where he made the 
following statement during an interrogation: "Well, then, take 
me to my cell."  Cummings, No. 2011AP1653-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶8-9 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013).   
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
Taylor v. State, 553 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. 2001); United States v. 
Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005).  However, in both Taylor and 
Lee, unlike the case at hand, the statements were made post-
custody, 
post-Miranda 
warnings, 
and 
during 
interrogation.  
Taylor, 553 S.E.2d at 601-02; Lee, 413 F.3d at 624.  Further, in 
Taylor and Lee, unlike the case at issue, the court relied 
heavily on the fact that law enforcement actually discouraged 
the suspects from obtaining a lawyer.  Taylor, 553 S.E.2d at 
602; Lee, 413 F.3d at 627.  Law enforcement did not engage in 
any such conduct in the case at issue.   
¶74 Other cases relied upon by the majority are likewise 
distinguishable especially due to the fact that the suspects' 
questions were asked post-Miranda warnings.  In State v. Dumas, 
the court stated that the post-Miranda question "'Can I get a 
lawyer?' could be sufficiently clear in some circumstances to 
meet [the Davis] standard."  750 A.2d 420, 422, 425 (R.I. 2000) 
(emphasis added).  However, the Dumas court concluded that the 
defendant's question in and of itself did not amount to an 
invocation.  It remanded the matter for the trial court to 
consider the circumstances surrounding the defendant's question, 
including "the responses of the officers and any further 
utterances by defendant."  Id. at 425.  Here, the majority does 
not remand this case to the trial court to consider the 
officer's actions and further utterances by the defendant.  The 
majority also cites Wysinger as support for its position.  
United States v. Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784, 795 (7th Cir. 2012).  
While it is true that Wysinger cites Lee, a case wherein the 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
post-Miranda question "Can I have a lawyer?" was deemed to be an 
unequivocal request for counsel, the facts in Wysinger are 
distinguishable from the facts before this court.  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622, 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
In fact, in Wysinger, the court concluded that the suspect's 
pre-Miranda question "Do I need a lawyer before we start 
talking?" was insufficient to invoke his right to counsel.  683 
F.3d at 794-95.  See also Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 613 S.E.2d 
579 (Va. 2005) (holding that post-Miranda statement "Can I get a 
lawyer in here?" was sufficient to invoke the right to counsel).   
¶75 I dissent because the majority opinion could be viewed 
as implicitly overruling well-established case law and because 
the cases cited by the majority opinion are distinguishable.  If 
the majority intends to provide more protections to suspects by 
altering the standard to invoke the right to counsel or by 
tethering a subsequent interrogation to a previous arrest, the 
majority should make that clear.5  In any event, the majority 
                                                 
5 In some cases, the Wisconsin Constitution has been 
interpreted to provide greater protections than the United 
States Constitution.  For example, in United States v. Patane, 
542 U.S. 630 (2004), the Supreme Court concluded that "the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine does not extend to derivative 
evidence discovered as a result of a defendant's voluntary 
statements obtained without Miranda warnings."  State v. Knapp, 
2005 WI 127, ¶1, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.  The court in 
Knapp concluded that under the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
exclusionary rule barred physical fruits obtained from a 
deliberate Miranda violation.  Id., ¶2.  However, this court has 
previously determined that "[w]e cannot discover any meaningful 
difference 
between 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional 
protections against compulsory self-incrimination."  State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶42, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
should outline the standard to be used when evaluating these 
invocations, especially given Shatzer and the likelihood that 
this scenario will recur.  Unfortunately, the majority's 
decision is cabined to this one defendant's assertion, on this 
day, under these circumstances.  
B. Maryland v. Shatzer 
¶76 Moreover, the majority opinion adopts Shatzer but 
lacks a thorough discussion of Shatzer and its limitation of 
Edwards.6  See majority op., ¶31.  Specifically, under Shatzer, 
the rule of Edwards——that a defendant who has invoked the right 
to counsel is not subject to further interrogation——is not 
applicable if the defendant has been out of custody for 14 days.  
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 111-12 ("[W]hen it is determined that the 
defendant pleading Edwards has been out of custody for two weeks 
before the contested interrogation, the court is spared the 
fact-intensive inquiry into whether he ever, anywhere, asserted 
                                                 
6 Though the majority opinion describes the rule of Shatzer 
as a constitutional rule, the court in Shatzer states that "[w]e 
have frequently emphasized that the Edwards rule is not a 
constitutional mandate, but judicially prescribed prophylaxis."  
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 (2010); Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  Logically, any changes in the 
Edwards rule would similarly result in judicially-prescribed 
rules.  See also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 
(2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating that the majority 
opinion in Dickerson describes Miranda as a constitutional 
decision and as constitutionally based, but never says that 
violating Miranda violates the Constitution).  Clearly the 
language 
in 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution does not reference a 14-day break in custody.  
These rules are instead prophylactic protections pertaining to 
the Fifth Amendment.    
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
his Miranda right to counsel.").  Thus, Shatzer seemingly 
limited the Edwards prohibition on a subsequent interrogation.  
In my view, the majority opinion could be viewed as one which 
diminishes the holding in Shatzer because it relies so heavily 
on Edler's post-Miranda invocation of counsel three weeks prior 
and on the fact that the same officer was involved in both 
arrests.   
¶77 In this case, Edler had been out of custody for 19 
days when he was arrested on April 20, 2011, for arson.  Under 
the rule of Shatzer, the break in custody operated to reset the 
opportunity 
for 
law 
enforcement 
to 
interrogate 
Edler.  
Nonetheless, the majority focuses almost entirely on the 
previous invocation of counsel and the fact that the same 
officer was involved in both arrests.  Majority op., ¶35.  The 
analysis of whether Edler invoked his right to counsel by 
stating "Can my attorney be present for this?" should seemingly 
focus on the facts and circumstances surrounding Edler's 
statement as they existed on April 20, 2011, rather than a 
residual invocation from 21 days earlier.  In relying on the 
facts related to the previous interrogations and on Urban's 
knowledge of the previous interrogations, the majority opinion 
could be diminishing the clean break rule of Shatzer.  Instead, 
the majority opinion could be viewed as reviving the Edwards 
rule of continued invocation of counsel, despite the rule of 
Shatzer.  I would hope for more discussion regarding the legal 
implications of Shatzer and of a previous invocation of counsel. 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
¶78 Given the majority's analysis, what place does Shatzer 
hold in our jurisprudence?  Is the majority elevating the 
Edwards continued invocation rule over the Shatzer clean break 
rule?  Is Wisconsin adopting its own version of Shatzer/Edwards?  
Does the majority conclude the question "Can my attorney be 
present for this?" in and of itself, is an invocation of the 
right to counsel?  Does the majority limit its analysis to a 
situation where the same officer is involved in both arrests?  
C. Officer Conduct 
¶79 Similarly, the majority's analysis of how a reasonable 
officer would understand Edler's question turns on knowledge 
gained by Urban three weeks earlier, when Edler invoked his 
right to counsel.  See majority op., ¶35.  Because the majority 
makes much of the fact that Urban was involved in both 
interrogations, the majority opinion is further limited.  Id.  
Unfortunately, the majority does not clarify why it is so 
focused on Urban's knowledge from three weeks prior.   
¶80 Considering that the circumstances of the prior 
interrogation are seminal to the majority's analysis, it is 
curious that the majority attaches no weight to the fact that 
Urban scrupulously honored Edler's prior invocation.  Why does 
the majority assume that Urban has now failed to honor a request 
for counsel when he previously demonstrated that he would 
scrupulously honor such a request?  See People v. Gonzalez, 104 
P.3d 98, 107 (Cal. 2005) (stating that where interrogating 
officers knew the suspect had been read his Miranda rights on a 
prior occasion, "the police could reasonably have assumed that 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
defendant was capable of making an unequivocal request for 
counsel if he so desired").7  Under the majority's analysis, 
Urban's knowledge that Edler was capable of invoking his right 
to counsel and Urban's history of honoring an invocation of 
counsel deserve no consideration.   
¶81 In the earlier interrogation, Urban respected Edler's 
invocation by ceasing the interrogation, and when Edler made 
further statements, Urban acknowledged the invocation and told 
Edler "to be quiet" because he had invoked his right to counsel.  
In this subsequent arrest, about five minutes into the car ride, 
Edler asked "Can my attorney be present for this?"  Urban 
responded "Yes he can."  Compared to the earlier response, 
Urban's latter response suggests that he understood Edler to be 
asking a question about his rights rather than invoking his 
right to counsel.   
¶82 Unlike law enforcement in Taylor and Lee, Urban did 
not attempt to dissuade Edler from obtaining a lawyer.  Edler 
asked "Can my lawyer be present for this?" about five minutes 
                                                 
7 See also State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, ¶36, 306 
Wis. 2d 420, 
742 
N.W.2d 546 
(stating 
that 
the 
rules 
for 
invocation of the right to remain silent, which are derived from 
Davis, do not leave room for reasonable competing inferences: 
"[A]n assertion that permits reasonable competing inferences 
demonstrates that a suspect did not sufficiently invoke the 
right to remain silent").   
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
into the 20 minute car ride before any interrogation.8  Here, 
Urban could very well have understood Edler to be asking a 
question about his rights.  
¶83 Under Davis and Jennings, an officer is not required 
to stop an interrogation or to ask follow up questions about 
counsel if the suspect makes an ambiguous statement about an 
attorney, but this court has suggested that it is a good 
practice.  See Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶32.  Should we adopt 
a rule requiring law enforcement to clarify such pre-Miranda 
questions? 
 
Again, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
passes 
on 
this 
opportunity to provide such guidance to law enforcement.   
¶84 From Urban's perspective, the statement made by Edler 
at the police station, whether he would sit in jail if he 
requested a lawyer, likely clarifies that Edler did not invoke 
                                                 
8 The timing of Edler's question "Can my attorney be present 
for this?" could support that it was a clarification of his 
rights and not an invocation.  See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 
(stating that the Court is "unwilling to create a third layer of 
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might 
want a lawyer").  For example, in State v. Fischer, before the 
police read the defendant his Miranda rights and before 
interrogation began, the defendant stated that if the officers 
read him his rights, he would not answer questions and would 
request an attorney.  2003 WI App 5, ¶19, 259 Wis. 2d 799, 656 
N.W.2d 503.  The court held that a "conditional and futuristic 
request for counsel is a statement that a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances would have understood only that [the 
defendant] might be invoking the right to counsel."  Id.  Since 
Edler's statement was made 20 minutes prior to the start of 
interrogation, Edler's statement could be viewed as conditional 
and futuristic similar to the statement in Fischer.  See 
majority op., ¶32 n.11 (declining to clarify temporal standard 
that was left unsettled by State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, 307 
Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48).   
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
his right to counsel in the car.  The majority opinion lacks any 
analysis of Edler's question regarding counsel at the station, 
during the time when Urban was reading the Miranda warnings, or 
his waiver of his Miranda rights.  The majority does not 
consider how Urban made clear that he was not going to engage in 
discussion with Edler until he finished reading him his rights 
and Edler waived his rights.  The majority does not discuss how 
Edler, not Urban, reinitiated the conversation by asking Urban a 
question.  Urban was not interrogating Edler during the car ride 
or while he was reading the Miranda warnings.   
¶85 As Edler had an attorney on a pending burglary charge, 
his question "Can my attorney be present for this?" may have 
been clarifying whether that particular attorney could be 
present for the forthcoming interrogation, even though he did 
not yet have an attorney on the uncharged arson.  He also might 
have been asking whether he was entitled to have any attorney 
present during the interrogation.   
¶86 Given the totality of the circumstances, the majority 
is too quick to conclude that law enforcement would objectively 
know that the question "Can my lawyer be present for this?" was 
an unambiguous invocation of counsel and that law enforcement 
erred by giving Edler his Miranda rights and accepting Edler's 
waiver.  I do not conclude that a reasonable law enforcement 
officer, particularly one who is aware that Edler is capable of 
invoking his rights, would believe that the question "Can my 
attorney be present for this?" was an unambiguous request for 
counsel.  Our court should provide guidance to law enforcement 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
by illuminating the standard applicable to a statement made 
post-custody, pre-Miranda warnings, pre-interrogation, and pre-
waiver of Miranda rights.   
IV. CONCLUSION   
¶87 I readily concede that Edler's question might have 
been a poorly-worded request for an attorney.  Under the 
totality of the circumstances, however, it is just as likely 
that Edler's question was a clarification of his rights or 
something else.  Precedent does not require the cessation of 
interrogation when a reasonable law enforcement officer believes 
the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.  See Davis, 
512 U.S. at 459. 
¶88 I dissent because the majority opinion neither extends 
Davis to Edler's statement nor enunciates the standard to apply.  
Simply stated, the majority opinion leaves open questions that 
are likely to recur.  The majority opinion has not concluded 
that the "unambiguous and unequivocal" objective standard from 
Davis 
applies 
post-custody, 
pre-Miranda 
warnings, 
pre-
interrogation, and pre-waiver of Miranda rights.  The majority 
opinion does not determine whether interrogation must be 
impending for a suspect to invoke his right to counsel.  The 
majority opinion leaves open whether law enforcement must 
clarify a potential request for counsel under these pre-Miranda 
circumstances.  It remains unknown whether law enforcement 
should ever clarify a potential request by reading the suspect 
the Miranda warnings.  The law is now less clear regarding the 
implications of Shatzer on Edwards.  I write separately to 
No.  2011AP2916-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
highlight that our court should be analyzing these issues with 
regard to Edler's question, which was made post-custody, pre-
Miranda warnings, pre-interrogation, and pre-waiver of Miranda 
rights.  We should clarify the law.   
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part.   
 
 
 
No. 
2011AP2916-CR   
 
 
 
1