Title: Schreibvogel v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RANDALL D. SCHREIBVOGEL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 15Case Number: S-11-0172Decided: 02/07/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
RANDALL 
D. SCHREIBVOGEL,Petitioner,v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Respondent.
 
Original 
Proceeding
Petition 
for Writ of Review
District 
Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, 
Judge
 
Representing 
Petitioner:
W. 
Keith Goody, Cougar, Washington.
 
Representing 
Respondent:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; Meri V. Geringer, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Geringer.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; 
KITE C.J., files 
a concurring opinion.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      We granted the 
appellant’s Petition for Writ of Review in which we were asked to review the 
district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s Verified Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief.  We agree 
with the district court that the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel is barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2011).  Therefore, the district 
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition.  Having no better jurisdiction than did 
the district court, we likewise dismiss the petition before this Court.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Where an 
appellant has raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his 
direct appeal, and that claim has been decided against him on the merits, may he 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, based upon different 
allegations, in a petition for post-conviction 
relief?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The appellant was 
convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of 
robbery.  Our opinion affirming 
those convictions upon direct appeal is found at Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, 228 P.3d 874 (Wyo. 2010).  In that 
proceeding, the appellant alleged, inter 
alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
inadmissible evidence, and for failing adequately to cross-examine the victim in 
regard to the defense of consent.  
Id. at ¶¶ 47-49, at 
889-90.  The appellant did not 
prevail on either allegation.  Id. at ¶¶ 48, 50, at 
889-90.
 
[¶4]      Just less than a 
year after losing his appeal, the appellant filed in the district court a 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  In his petition, the appellant alleged 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising in the direct appeal 
two additional allegations of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness: (1) failure to 
pursue as a defense the synergistic effect of the victim’s simultaneous use of 
the prescription drug Paxil and alcohol; and (2) failure to investigate and 
pursue expert medical testimony as to the cause of an injury to the victim’s 
face.  In addition, the appellant 
also alleged that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to seek an evidentiary hearing under W.R.A.P. 
21.
 
[¶5]      The State 
responded to the petition by filing a Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief.  The State 
cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii) for the proposition that the 
appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally 
barred because it had been determined on the merits in the direct appeal.  The district court heard the motion to 
dismiss and subsequently issued a lengthy decision letter and order dismissing 
the petition.  The district court’s 
conclusion was as follows:
 
            
The State’s Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED.  Mr. Schreibvogel’s post-conviction claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred by Wyoming 
Statute § 7-14-103(a)(iii) because he raised a claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in his direct appeal, which was decided on the merits.  Additionally, Mr. Schreibvogel’s claim 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is barred by Wyoming Statute § 
7-14-101(b) because it is not a claim of error arising in the proceedings that 
resulted in his conviction.
 
[¶6]      The appellant’s 
response to dismissal of his petition was to file in this Court a Petition for 
Writ of Review.  We granted that 
petition, the matter was briefed, and oral argument has been heard, bringing the 
case to its present posture.
 
RELEVANT 
STATUTES
 
[¶7]      Post-conviction 
relief is a statutory remedy, with the following statutory provisions at issue 
in the instant proceedings:
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b) (LexisNexis 2011) provides in relevant part as 
follows:
 
            
(b)  Any person serving a 
felony sentence in a state penal institution who asserts that in the proceedings 
which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, 
may institute proceedings under this act. . . 
.
 
In 
turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103 provides in relevant part as 
follows:
 
            
(a)    A claim under 
this act is procedurally barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the 
claim if the claim:
 
(i)      Could have been 
raised but was not raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding which resulted 
in the petitioner’s conviction;
 
(ii)     Was not raised in the 
original or an amendment to the original petition under this act; 
or
 
(iii)    Was decided on its merits or 
on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which has become 
final.
 
(b)    Notwithstanding paragraph 
(a)(i) of this section, a court may hear a petition 
if:
 
. 
. . .
 
(ii)     The court makes a 
finding that the petitioner was denied constitutionally effective assistance of 
counsel on his direct appeal.  This 
finding may be reviewed by the supreme court together with any further action of 
the district court taken on the petition.
 
. 
. . .
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]      Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a), the question of whether a court may hear a petition 
for post-conviction relief is a question of jurisdiction.  The question of jurisdiction is a 
question of law that we review de 
novo.  Jones v. State, 2011 WY 114, ¶ 7, 
256 P.3d 527, 531 (Wyo. 2011).  In 
the instant case, the district court treated the State’s motion to dismiss as 
being similar to a motion under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which also presents a question 
of law.  See Kennedy v. State, 443 P.2d 138, 139 
(Wyo. 1968) (per curiam affirmance of 
dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief for failure to state a cause of 
action).  A petition for 
post-conviction relief is, however, different from a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss because the contents of the petition need not be considered as 
true.  Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 1049, 1059 (Wyo. 2005); State ex 
rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, 696 P.2d 54, 61-62 (Wyo. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 
106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1985).
 
[¶9]      It may be helpful 
if we restate the question before us in a different form: As applied in the 
context of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, does the word 
“claim” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a) mean the broader concept of the 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, or does it mean the 
narrower concept of each separate factual assertion of alleged 
ineffectiveness?  As stated in this 
form, the question is a question of statutory construction, which also is a 
question of law that we review de 
novo.  Roden v. State, 2007 WY 200, ¶ 5, 173 P.3d 369, 371 (Wyo. 2007).
 
            
The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain, if 
possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used.  We begin with an inquiry into the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature, according 
to the manner in which those words are arranged.  If the legislative pronouncements are 
written in unambiguous terms, then we are bound by those words.  Moreover, we construe the statute as a 
whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.
 
Demeulenaere 
v. State, 
995 P.2d 132, 134 (Wyo. 2000) (internal citations omitted).  If we determine that a statute is 
unambiguous, we do not further apply rules of construction, and we do not extend 
statutes to matters that do not fall within its express provisions.  State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Hanover Compression, LP, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 
2008).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]   This discussion must take place in 
the context of our post-conviction relief jurisprudence, in which we have been 
steadfast in holding that post-conviction relief is a strictly confined 
statutory remedy.  See, e.g.,  Rathbun v. State, 2011 WY 116, ¶ 13, 257 P.3d 29, 34 (Wyo. 2011) (both the statute and the doctrine of res judicata forbid raising matters in 
post-conviction relief that were, or could have been, raised on appeal); Harlow, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d  at 
1057 (“only substantial violations of constitutional rights amounting to a 
miscarriage of justice will warrant relief”); Taylor v. State, 2003 WY 97, ¶¶ 8-9, 74 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2003) (policy favoring finality in criminal proceedings 
forbids use of post-conviction relief as a substitute for direct appeal); Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, ¶¶ 9-26, 51 P.3d 851, 853-58 (Wyo. 2002) (statute reflects policy favoring finality, statute 
has a res judicata effect, and 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction outside the statute would violate 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198, 199-200 
(Wyo. 1989) (statute has res judicata 
effect); Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597, 599 (Wyo. 1989) (matters raised on appeal are procedurally barred, and 
matters not raised that could have been raised, are procedurally waived under 
post-conviction relief statute); Whitney 
v. State, 745 P.2d 902, 903 (Wyo. 1987) (statute applies only to proceedings 
which resulted in conviction, so does not apply to sentencing);  Diefenderfer v. State, 745 P.2d 556, 557 
(Wyo. 1987) (courts have no jurisdiction under the statute unless the petitioner 
is in the penitentiary);  Hoggatt v. State, 606 P.2d 718, 722 
(Wyo. 1980) (relief under the statute requires “extraordinary circumstances 
which strongly suggest a miscarriage of justice”); Johnson v. State, 592 P.2d 285, 286 
(Wyo. 1979) (post-conviction relief limited to grounds authorized by the 
statute, and not granted except in “extraordinary circumstances where there is a 
likelihood that without it the defendant would not have been found guilty and 
the probability of the miscarriage of
justice 
is strong.”); Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo. 1979) (petitioner has burden of showing denial of 
constitutional safeguards—the absence of fundamental fairness).1
 
[¶11]   It is noteworthy that the 
post-conviction relief statutes speak in terms of a petitioner’s “claim.”  We have previously defined that term, as 
compared to the term “issue,” as follows:
 
A 
“claim” is “[t]he aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right 
enforceable by a court[.]”  Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed. 
2009).  An “issue,” on the other 
hand, is “[a] point in dispute between two or more parties . . . [that] may take 
the form of a separate and discrete question of law or fact, or a combination of 
both.”  Id. at 
907.
 
Rathbun, 
2011 WY 116, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d  at 33.2  In the instant case, the “claim” that is 
barred by the statute and by the doctrine of res judicata is the claim of a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.  That is the right that is enforceable by 
the court.  The issues are the 
various factual allegations of ineffectiveness that make up the claim.  Because the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was raised in the direct appeal, and was decided against 
the appellant, he is barred by the provisions of  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii) from 
raising that claim again in a post-conviction relief 
petition.
 
[¶12]   The foregoing conclusion might end 
this discussion, but an additional aspectof the matter requires 
comment.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(b)(ii) provides that, notwithstanding the procedural bar contained in 
subsection (a)(i) of the same section, a court may hear a post-conviction relief 
petition if it first “makes a finding that the petitioner was denied 
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal.”  We have said that “'claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are statutorily recognized as the 
'portal’ through which otherwise waived claims of trial-level error may be 
reached.’”  Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Harlow, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d at 
1056)).
 
            
In order to prevent petitioners from circumventing the “waiver” rule 
altogether by claiming ineffective assistance of their appellate counsel, this 
Court has adopted a strict test for reviewing that claim.  Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257,1266-67 (Wyo. 1988).  The 
issue of whether a counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient should 
be analyzed in much the same way that this Court has analyzed the concept of 
plain error.
 
In 
submitting a claim of deficient representation by appellate counsel, the 
petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding must demonstrate to the district 
court, by reference to the record of the original trial without resort to 
speculation or equivocal inference, what occurred at that trial.  The particular facts upon which the 
claim of inadequate representation by appellate counsel rests must be 
presented.  The petitioner then must 
identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law which those facts demonstrate was 
transgressed in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.  Furthermore, the petitioner must show 
the adverse effect upon a substantial right in order to complete a claim that 
the performance of appellate counsel was constitutionally deficient because of a 
failure to raise the issue on appeal.  
The adverse effect upon a substantial right in the context of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel is shown by demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.
 
Smizer 
v. State, 
835 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1992) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).
 
[¶13]   This brings us full circle to the 
question of first impression now before this Court:  Where the appellant has raised the claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal, may he raise 
the claim again, on different factual grounds, in a petition for post-conviction 
relief by arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising those 
different factual grounds?  We 
answer the question in the negative, for several reasons.  First, we agree with the rationale of Peoples v. United States, 403 F.3d 844, 
847-48 (7th Cir. 2005):
 
            
Peoples presented ineffective-assistance arguments in his two prior 
appeals.  That ground was resolved 
adversely to him on the merits, twice.  
Although Peoples now wants to present new instances of supposed 
shortcomings, ineffective assistance of counsel is a single ground for relief no 
matter how many failings the lawyer may have displayed.  Counsel’s work must be assessed as a 
whole; it is the overall deficient performance, rather than a specific failing, 
that constitutes the ground of relief.
 
In 
short, as discussed above, see supra 
¶ 5, the “claim” is ineffective assistance of counsel, and that claim has 
been determined on the merits.
 
[¶14]   Relying upon the “law of the case” 
doctrine, rather than res judicata, 
the court in Peoples also declared as 
follows, with which declaration we also agree and which we find applicable to 
the doctrine of res 
judicata:
 
The 
twin goals of this doctrine are to ensure that the parties marshal all of their 
facts and arguments so that a dispute may be resolved in one pass, and to 
conserve judicial resources.  
Treating new arguments as grounds for a second decision would contradict 
both rationales and in practical effect abandon the 
doctrine.
 
Peoples, 
403 F.3d  at 846-47.3  Exactly the same can be said about both 
the statutory bar and the doctrine of res 
judicata.  Allowing the 
appellant to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
post-conviction relief petition, after that claim has been determined against 
him on the merits in his appeal, would negate both the narrow intent of the 
statute we have previously recognized and the goal of finality inherent in the 
statute and in res judicata.  We do not find the statute ambiguous; 
its intent is to limit a criminal defendant to “one bite at the apple” when 
presenting claims on appeal.
 
[¶15]   It is also clear from the 
unambiguous wording of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b) that the jurisdictional 
exception for instances where a court has found ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel applies only to the single subsection mentioned therein.  That is, it applies only where the court 
has found appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise a claim in the 
direct appeal, resulting in that claim being barred from consideration in 
post-conviction relief by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i).  The jurisdictional exception found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b) does not apply so as to allow a petitioner to 
supplement, in post-conviction relief proceedings, a claim that was denied on 
the merits in the direct appeal.  If 
that had been the legislature’s intent, the “notwithstanding” found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b) would not be limited to subsection (a)(i), but would 
also include subsection (a)(iii).
 
[¶16]   The appellant relies upon United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239 
(10th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should be raised in a post-conviction relief petition rather than in a 
direct appeal.  The problem with 
that reliance is that Galloway is 
based upon federal law, where the equivalent of a W.R.A.P. 21 remand hearing 
takes place during the post-conviction relief process, rather than during the 
direct appeal.  Galloway, 56 F.3d 1240 n.1.  Therefore, in the federal system, the 
evidentiary development of a claim does not take place during the direct appeal, 
as is the case in Wyoming.4  The Galloway rationale has  been rejected, at least in part, in two 
states because of the availability of an evidentiary hearing such as Wyoming’s 
W.R.A.P. 21 hearing before the post-conviction process.  See Rice v. State, 154 P.3d 537 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2007), and Berget v. State, 
907 P.2d 1078 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).  
Beyond that, our statute clearly prohibits the consideration under a 
post-conviction relief petition of claims raised in the direct appeal, so even 
if an evidentiary hearing were available at this point, the claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel would be barred by statute.  “It is not for this Court to extend the 
availability of post-conviction relief beyond its statutory limits . . . .”  Harlow, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d  at 
1057 n.4.
 
[¶17]   Finally, we will note that, while 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b)(ii) is the basis for our conclusion in other cases 
that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may provide a 
“portal” through which otherwise waived claims of trial error may be raised, no 
“stand-alone” claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel has thereby 
been created.  Id., 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d  at 
1057.  Post-conviction relief is 
limited to errors occurring during the “proceedings which resulted in” 
conviction.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-101(b).  Therefore, as 
correctly determined by the district court, the appellant’s
independent 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to request an 
evidentiary hearing, not being authorized by statute, is not cognizable in these 
proceedings.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   Where a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel has been raised and decided against the appellant in his 
direct appeal, he may not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
based upon different allegations, in a petition for post-conviction relief 
because the claim is procedurally barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(a)(iii).  A stand-alone 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not cognizable under the 
post-conviction relief statutes because post-conviction relief is limited to the 
alleged denial of constitutional rights during the proceedings which resulted in 
conviction.  The jurisdictional 
exception for the consideration of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b)(ii) is limited to situations where a 
claim “[c]ould have been raised but was not raised” in the direct appeal, as 
addressed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(a)(i).
 
[¶19]   The petition for post-conviction 
relief is dismissed.
 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice, 
concurring.
 
[¶20]  I write separately because, while I 
agree that Mr. Schreibvogel is not entitled to the relief he seeks, I disagree 
with the majority’s conclusion that the district court and this Court lack 
subject matter jurisdiction to decide his post-conviction claim.  I disagree with the majority’s 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101, et seq. because it precludes 
consideration of an issue involving a constitutional right that was not raised 
and could not have been raised in a direct appeal and has not been decided in 
any previous proceeding.  
Were 
I writing the majority opinion, I would hold that Mr. Schreibvogel’s assertion 
that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
appellate counsel falls within the scope of § 7-14-101(b) and is not barred 
under § 7-14-103 and I would address the merits of the 
claim.
 
[¶21]  In relevant part, § 7-14-101(b) 
provides:
 
            
Any person serving a felony sentence in a state penal institution who 
asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a 
substantial denial of his rights under the constitution of the United States or 
of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute proceedings under this 
act.
 
Mr. 
Schreibvogel is a person serving a felony sentence in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings resulting in his conviction 
there was a substantial denial of his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.  He is, therefore, 
entitled to institute proceedings under § 7-14-101 unless his claim is barred 
under § 7-14-103(a).  That section 
provides in pertinent part as follows:
 
(a)  
 A claim under this act is procedurally 
barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim if the 
claim:
(i)  Could have been raised but was not 
raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding which resulted in the petitioner’s 
conviction;
. 
. .
or
(iii) 
Was decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding 
which has become final.
 
Mr. 
Schreibvogel’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of appellate 
counsel could not have been raised in his direct appeal from the proceeding 
resulting in his conviction.  It 
follows that the claim also has not been decided in any previous proceeding 
which has become final.  Under the 
clear language of the statute, Mr. Schreibvogel’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel is not barred and the district court had 
jurisdiction to decide the claim.  

 
[¶22]  In concluding otherwise, the majority 
opinion interprets the statutory language to mean that because Mr. Schreibvogel 
claimed in his direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective and we held 
otherwise, he is forever barred from challenging the effectiveness of his 
appellate counsel—a claim that was not, and could not, have been raised on 
direct appeal; a claim, therefore, that has never been decided.  This 
interpretation leaves Mr. Schreibvogel with no relief for his claim that his 
Sixth Amendment right to effective appellate counsel was violated.  I do not believe this result is what the 
legislature intended.  It is also 
contrary to this Court’s prior statements.
 
[¶23]  In Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1263 
(Wyo. 1988), this Court held that post-conviction review was required of a 
petitioner’s claim that appellate counsel ineffectively failed to present claims 
in his direct appeal concerning the improper admission of evidence and the 
violation of his right not to be compelled to give evidence against 
himself.  The Court did not address 
the question of whether post-conviction relief is available when a petitioner 
asserts that appellate counsel presented a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel on direct appeal but did so ineffectively.  However, the Court made it clear that a 
“claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not an issue which can 
be foreclosed as a matter of waiver . . . under Wyoming law because it is not an 
issue that could have been raised in the initial appeal.”  Id.  Thus, this Court has recognized, as the 
legislature did in enacting § 
7-14-103, 
that claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriate 
matters for consideration in post-conviction proceedings because they cannot be 
raised on direct appeal.  They 
necessarily arise only after appeal.  

 
[¶24]  Despite this reality, the majority 
carves out a narrow exception to the non-waiver rule.  The majority holds that a 
post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is waived 
if a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was made on direct 
appeal.  The majority reasons that 
creating this exception is appropriate because the issue of trial counsel’s 
effectiveness has already been decided on direct appeal and post-conviction 
relief is not available to obtain review of issues previously raised or 
decided.  The most obvious problem 
with this reasoning is that the issue of appellate counsel’s effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness has not been previously raised or decided.  The other problem, in my view, is that 
it denies post-conviction relief to a narrow category of petitioners, those who 
raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, who claim to 
have received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel while it allows others 
with the same claim, those who did not raise ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on direct appeal, to obtain review.  Yet, in both instances post-conviction 
relief is sought for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; in both 
instances the issue of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness was not raised in the 
direct appeal; and in both instances the issue of appellate counsel’s 
ineffectiveness has not been decided on its merits in any previous 
proceeding.  In both instances, I 
would hold that post-conviction review is required.                 

 
[¶25]   In the present case, I would also 
hold that Mr. Schreibvogel has failed to demonstrate that he was denied 
effective assistance of appellate counsel.  
In reaching that result, I would apply the following principles from Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 
1266-67:
 
In 
submitting a claim of deficient representation by appellate counsel, the 
petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding must demonstrate . . ., by 
reference to the record of the original trial without resort to speculation or 
equivocal inference, what occurred at that trial.  The particular facts upon which the 
claim of inadequate representation by appellate counsel rests must be 
presented.  The petitioner then must 
identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law which those facts demonstrate was 
transgressed in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.  Furthermore, the petitioner must show 
the adverse effect upon a substantial right in order to complete a claim that 
the performance of appellate counsel was constitutionally deficient because of a 
failure to raise the issue on appeal.  
[citations omitted]  The 
adverse effect upon a substantial right in the context of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel is shown by demonstrating a “ * * * reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”  Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S.  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.   
* * * The reasonable probability must be one that demonstrates a more 
favorable result to the appellant if the omitted issue had been pursued.      

 
[¶26]  Ordinarily, the determination as to 
whether the petitioner has made the required showing is to be made in the 
district court in which the post-conviction proceeding was filed.  Here, however, as was also the case in 
Cutbirth, id. at 1264, the district court did not 
hold a hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Under these circumstances, I would do 
what was done in Cutbirth, id., and 
turn to the record of the original trial in order to weigh the question of 
deficient performance and prejudice. 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Schreibvogel alleges that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective in his direct appeal in not raising trial 
counsel’s failure to pursue the effect of the victim’s use of Paxil and alcohol 
or expert testimony as to the cause of an injury to the victim’s face.  He also alleges appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to seek a remand hearing under W.R.A.P. 21.  From the record of the original trial, I 
would conclude not only that appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient 
but that there was no prejudice to Mr. Schreibvogel.  Testimony was presented at trial about 
the victim’s use of Paxil and alcohol and the fact that consuming alcohol while 
taking Paxil is not recommended.  It 
was undisputed that the victim was taking Paxil and consumed alcohol on the 
night in question.  At least one 
witness testified and the hospital notes reflected that the victim was 
intoxicated.  Testimony was also 
presented that the victim fell outside her shop and injured her face.  Additionally, testimony was presented 
that the victim was in and out of consciousness during the assault.  
 
[¶28]  From this evidence, trial counsel argued 
to the jury that the victim consumed alcohol to the point of being intoxicated 
while she was taking Paxil and, if she was drugged, that was the cause.  Trial counsel also argued that the 
evidence showed she fell outside her shop causing the injury to her face.  Given the trial record, I would conclude 
appellate counsel made no professional error as Mr. Schreibvogel asserts and a 
reasonable probability does not exist that the result would have been different 
had appellate counsel raised the issues Mr. Schreibvogel asserts should have 
been raised.  
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1In 
a couple of instances, we have allowed an appellant’s constitutional right to 
appeal to “trump” the limitations of the post-conviction relief statutes.  In Hauck v. State, 2007 WY 113, ¶ 10, 162 P.2d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2007), we concluded that Hauck’s petition for 
post-conviction relief should not be dismissed due to his failure to file a 
timely appeal because the district court had denied Hauck his right to appeal by 
failing to advise him of that right.  
In Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, 
¶ 26, 115 P.3d 1110, 1120 (Wyo. 2005), we concluded that Keats did not have an 
opportunity to raise on appeal the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel because the same law office represented him at trial and on 
appeal.
 
2Consistent 
with our use of the doctrine of res 
judicata in discussing the post-conviction relief statutes is the fact that 
res judicata is “claim preclusion,” 
while collateral estoppel is “issue preclusion.”  Erwin v. State, Dep’t of Family 
Services, 2010 WY 117, ¶ 10, 237 P.3d 409, 412-13 (Wyo. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1785, 179 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2011); Wilson v. Lucerne 
Canal & Power Co., 2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 22-23, 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 
2007).
3“Under 
the law of the case doctrine, a court’s decision on an issue of law at one stage 
of a proceeding is binding in successive stages of the litigation.”  Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 56, 248 P.3d 1120, 1134 (Wyo. 2011).  

4Though 
not relied upon by the petitioner, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 
123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003), should also be mentioned.  In Massaro, a unanimous Supreme Court held 
that the procedural default rule—claims not raised on direct appeal may not be 
raised on collateral review—is not promoted by requiring ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims to be brought on direct appeal, because the evidentiary 
hearing takes place during collateral review.  Massaro, 538 U.S.  at 504, 123 S. Ct.  at 
1693-94.  Like Gallloway, Massaro does not control our decision in 
the instant case because it is based on federal procedures that differ from 
ours.