Title: State v. Clevenger

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258, 2007-Ohio-4006.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CLEVENGER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258, 2007-Ohio-4006.] 
Criminal law — Sentencing — Authority of trial court to suspend court costs or 
waive payment of court costs — Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. 
(No. 2006-0324—Submitted February 13, 2007—Decided August 22, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County,  
No. 2004-T-0130, 2006-Ohio-128. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A trial court may not suspend court costs previously imposed on a criminal 
defendant absent statutory authority. 
2.  A trial court may waive the payment of court costs previously imposed on a 
criminal defendant only upon statutory authority and only if the defendant 
moves for waiver of costs at the time of sentencing. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether a trial court has the 
authority to suspend either imposition of or payment of court costs previously 
imposed on a criminal defendant.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that a trial 
court may not suspend court costs previously imposed absent statutory authority.  
We further hold that a trial court may waive the payment of court costs only upon 
statutory authority and only if the defendant moves for waiver of costs at the time 
of sentencing. 
Facts and Procedural History 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 2} In October 1999, Daniel Clevenger was convicted of and sentenced 
on a felony charge of breaking and entering.  As part of the sentence, the trial 
court ordered him to pay court costs.  At a July 2000 sentencing for a probation 
violation, the trial court once again ordered Clevenger to pay costs.  He did not 
appeal either order.  In 2004, Clevenger filed a motion to suspend payment of 
court costs and attached an affidavit attesting to his financial status.  He also 
submitted documentation that he was attempting to obtain Social Security benefits 
for a mental disability but that the outstanding court costs barred him from 
eligibility.  Based on these factors, the trial court issued a judgment entry 
suspending the costs.  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial 
court and held that the trial court could not suspend the costs imposed.  However, 
the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the trial court to suspend the 
payment of the costs.  The case is here upon our acceptance of the state’s 
discretionary appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶ 3} At issue in this appeal is whether a trial court has the authority to 
suspend either the imposition or the payment of court costs previously imposed on 
a criminal defendant.  R.C. 2947.23 requires the imposition of court costs as a part 
of a criminal sentence. 1  This court has held that R.C. 2947.23 requires a trial 
court to assess costs against all criminal defendants, and to do so even if the 
defendant is indigent.  State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 
N.E.2d 393, ¶ 8.  Therefore, a defendant’s financial status is irrelevant to the 
imposition of court costs.  The question is whether those costs, once properly 
imposed, may subsequently be suspended or waived so as to avoid payment. 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) states:  “In all criminal cases, including violations of ordinances, the judge 
or magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution and render a judgment against 
the defendant for such costs.” 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 4} The common pleas courts do not have inherent power to suspend 
the execution of a sentence unless authorized by statute.  State v. Smith (1989), 42 
Ohio St.3d 60, 537 N.E.2d 198, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Consequently, 
absent statutory authority, a trial court may not suspend the imposition of costs.  
Limited statutory authority exists for waiver of payment, as opposed to the 
suspension, of costs.  R.C. 2949.092 permits a trial court to waive the payment of 
costs imposed if the trial court finds the defendant to be indigent.2  White, 103 
Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 5} In State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 
N.E.2d 164, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that a motion by an 
indigent criminal defendant to waive payment of costs must be made at the time 
of sentencing.  The court stated:  “If the defendant makes such a motion, then the 
issue is preserved for appeal and will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  Otherwise, the issue is waived and costs are res judicata.”  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 6} In this case, the trial court’s order was erroneous under Smith 
because the trial court suspended that portion of Clevenger’s sentence imposing 
costs and lacked authority to do so.  The court of appeals properly reversed the 
trial court’s order in that regard, and we affirm that portion of the court of 
appeals’ judgment.  However, the court of appeals also ordered the trial court to 
waive the payment of the court costs, contrary to the holding in Threatt.  
Clevenger did not raise the issue of costs either at the initial sentencing hearing or 
                                                 
 
2.  R.C. 2949.092 states:  “If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense and the court 
specifically is required, pursuant to section 2743.70, 2949.091, or 2949.093 of the Revised Code 
or pursuant to any other section of the Revised Code to impose a specified sum of money as costs 
in the case in addition to any other costs that the court is required or permitted by law to impose in 
the case, the court shall not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that the 
section of the Revised Code specifically requires the court to impose unless the court determines 
that the offender is indigent and the court waives the payment of all court costs imposed upon the 
offender.” 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
at the subsequent hearing on the probation violation.  The costs assessed against 
him, therefore, are res judicata.  Id. at ¶ 23.  Accordingly, that portion of the court 
of appeals’ judgment is reversed. 
{¶ 7} Our decision today does not mean, however, that a criminal 
defendant is without recourse when his indigence prevents him from paying costs.  
Although R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) requires that the costs be imposed regardless of a 
defendant’s financial status, the statute also provides:  “At the time the judge or 
magistrate imposes sentence, the judge or magistrate shall notify the defendant of 
both of the following:  
{¶ 8} “(a) If the defendant fails to pay that judgment or fails to timely 
make payments towards that judgment under a payment schedule approved by the 
court, the court may order the defendant to perform community service in an 
amount of not more than forty hours per month until the judgment is paid or until 
the court is satisfied that the defendant is in compliance with the approved 
payment schedule. 
{¶ 9} “(b) If the court orders the defendant to perform the community 
service, the defendant will receive credit upon the judgment at the specified 
hourly credit rate per hour of community service performed, and each hour of 
community service performed will reduce the judgment by that amount.” 
{¶ 10} Thus, a trial court may properly order community service as a 
means of payment in accordance with R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) and (b).  Defendants 
who are not indigent at the time of sentencing, and therefore would have no 
reason to move for the waiver of payment then, have alternative means of 
satisfying the payment of court costs if they later become indigent.  This 
alternative is apparently applicable here.  The trial court, upon finding that 
Clevenger had failed to make payment of the costs imposed, could have 
considered ordering community service as an alternative to payment, and 
Clevenger is free to seek that option. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
Conclusion 
{¶ 11} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a trial court may not 
suspend court costs previously imposed absent statutory authority.  We further 
hold that a trial court may waive the payment of court costs only upon statutory 
authority and only if the defendant moves for waiver of costs at the time of 
sentencing.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part  
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, HILDEBRANDT, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR., J., of the First Appellate District, was assigned 
to sit for O’CONNOR, J. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos and Diane L. Barber, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co., L.P.A., and Michael A. Partlow, 
for appellee. 
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