Title: State v. Barker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Barker, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4130.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4130 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BARKER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Barker, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4130.] 
Criminal law — Crim.R. 11 — “Right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf” 
complies with constitutional and rule requirements — Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2010-1448 — Submitted June 7, 2011 — Decided August 24, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-09-1139,  
2010-Ohio-3067. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A trial court complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when its explanation of the 
constitutional right to compulsory process of witnesses is described to the 
defendant during the plea colloquy as the “right to call witnesses to speak 
on your behalf.” 
2. An alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified 
by reference to other portions of the record, including the written plea. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether a trial court complies with 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when its explanation of the constitutional right of 
compulsory process of witnesses is described to the defendant by the phrase “right 
to call witnesses to speak on your behalf.”  Further, we must decide whether an 
alleged ambiguity during an oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to 
other portions of the record, including the written plea.  Because we hold that the 
language employed by the trial court while addressing the defendant was a 
reasonable explanation of the defendant’s right to compulsory process and 
because we hold that other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving 
an alleged ambiguity during the oral colloquy, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
I. Facts 
{¶ 2} On January 7, 2009, Christopher Barker, defendant-appellee, was 
indicted on five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of 
R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(3), third-degree felonies. Barker initially entered a plea 
of not guilty, but he later withdrew that plea and entered a plea of no contest to 
the first three counts of the indictment. 
{¶ 3} At his plea hearing, Barker stated that he was 28 years old and 
could read, write, and understand English.  The court explained to Barker the 
level of felony to which he was pleading, the possible prison term and fine, and 
the Tier II sex-offender-registration and postrelease-control requirements and the 
consequences of their violation.  Moreover, the trial court inquired whether 
Barker was satisfied with his “attorney’s advice, counsel, and competence,” 
whether Barker was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or other substances that 
would make it difficult for him to understand what was going on, and whether any 
threats or promises had been made to influence Barker’s plea.  She also explained 
that the state was planning to dismiss counts four and five.  In addition, among 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
other things, the court explained that Barker would have had the right to testify, or 
not, at trial, the right to have the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the right to appeal. 
{¶ 4} Central to the analysis today, the court made the following 
statement: “I do have to ask you, do you understand when you’re entering a plea 
you’re giving up your right to a jury trial or bench trial, also giving up your right 
to call witnesses to speak on your behalf or question witnesses that are speaking 
against you.  Do you understand that?”  (Emphasis added.)  Barker replied, “Yes, 
Your Honor.” 
{¶ 5} Barker’s signed no-contest plea states:  “I understand by entering 
this plea I give up my right to a jury trial or court trial, where I could see and have 
my attorney question witnesses against me, and where I could use the power of 
the court to call witnesses to testify for me.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 6} After a review of the evidence, the court referenced Barker’s 
signed plea form and asked him whether he had had the opportunity to review it 
with his attorney, and he said he had.  The court asked him whether he had any 
questions, and he said he did not.  Consequently, the court found that the 
defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights and had an understanding 
of the nature of the charge, the effect of his plea, and the maximum penalty 
involved.  The court also found that Barker had made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his rights pursuant to Crim.Rule 11 (“Pleas, rights upon 
plea”).  The court accepted the plea and found him guilty of the three counts to 
which he had entered a plea. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was 
not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully 
comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C).  The court of appeals agreed, 
holding that the trial court’s admonition to Barker that by entering a plea he was 
giving up the “right to call witnesses to speak on [his] behalf” was insufficient to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process.  State v. Barker, Lucas 
App. No. L-09-1139, 2010-Ohio-3067, ¶ 11, 13.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 8} The case is now before this court upon our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  State v. Barker, 127 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2010-Ohio-5762, 937 
N.E.2d 1035. 
II. Analysis 
A. Sufficiency of phrase “right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf” 
{¶ 9} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must 
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Failure on any of those points 
renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States 
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.”  State v. Engle (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450.  Crim.R. 11 was adopted in 1973 to give detailed 
instructions to trial courts on the procedures to follow before accepting pleas of 
guilty or no contest.  State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 
N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 11(C) requires a trial judge to determine whether that 
criminal defendant is fully informed of his or her rights and understands the 
consequences of his or her guilty plea.  Of particular relevance to the case at bar is 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), which provides:  
{¶ 11} “In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 
plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first 
addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following: 
{¶ 12} “* * * 
{¶ 13} “Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to 
confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant 
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 14} This court has held that the preferred method of informing a 
criminal defendant of his or her constitutional rights during the plea colloquy is to 
use the language contained in Crim.R. 11(C).  Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18; State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 
479, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115.  However, a trial court’s failure to literally 
comply with Crim.R. 11(C) does not invalidate a plea agreement if the record 
demonstrates that the trial court explained the constitutional right “ ‘in a manner 
reasonably intelligible to that defendant.’ ”  (Emphasis added in Veney.)  Veney at 
¶ 27, quoting Ballard at 473. 
{¶ 15} In Veney, we reaffirmed that strict, or literal, compliance with 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required when advising the defendant of the  constitutional 
rights he is waiving by pleading guilty or no contest.  Id. at ¶ 18.  Included in the 
list of constitutional rights is “the right to compulsory process to obtain 
witnesses.”  Id. at ¶ 19, citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, and Ballard, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The right 
to compulsory process of witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  However, 
we reaffirmed that the “ ‘failure to [literally comply] will not necessarily 
invalidate a plea.  The underlying purpose, from the defendant’s perspective, of 
Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he can 
make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Ballard at 479-480.  This is because “a trial court can still convey the requisite 
information on constitutional rights to the defendant even when the court does not 
provide a word-for-word recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court 
actually explains the rights to the defendant.”  Veney at ¶ 27. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 16} In the case at bar, the trial court described Barker’s constitutional 
right to compulsory process as the “right to call witnesses to speak on your 
behalf.”  The court of appeals held that although a court does not necessarily have 
to employ the term “compulsory process” during the Crim.R. 11 oral colloquy, “it 
must use some equivalent term such as the defendant has the ‘power to force,’ 
‘subpoena,’ use the ‘power of the court to force,’ or ‘compel’ a witness to appear 
and testify on a defendant’s behalf.”  Barker, 2010-Ohio-3067, at ¶ 13.  The court 
held that the explanation that the defendant had the “ability ‘to call witnesses’ 
simply does not satisfy the constitutional mandate.”  Id.  We disagree. 
{¶ 17} A review of legal and standard dictionaries reveals that “to call” 
commonly means “to summon.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 232 
defines “call” as “[t]o summon.”  So does Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 318.  The Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed.1989) 786 defines 
“call” as to “summon with a shout, or by a call; hence to summon, cite; to 
command or request the attendance of.”  The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language (2d Ed.1987) 297 defines “call” as “to command or request to 
come; summon.” 
{¶ 18} Using “call” to mean “to compel someone’s appearance” is a 
commonly understood term in everyday parlance.  For example, citizens may be 
“called” for jury duty.  Members of the military reserves may be “called up” for 
active duty.  Professionals may be “on call” with respect to their jobs.  The word 
“call” in everyday usage clearly conveys the idea that one is required to appear or 
to perform. 
{¶ 19} The dissent in State v. Cummings, 107 Ohio St.3d 1206, 2005-
Ohio-6506, 839 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 14, highlighted this issue: “[T]o ‘call’ means to 
‘summon.’ Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 217.  * * * I believe 
that the trial court’s words conveyed an even clearer message than does a 
recitation of the right to ‘have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.’ 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).  The words ‘compulsory process,’ ‘subpoena,’ and ‘compel 
witnesses’ have legal significance and implications that a defendant may not 
know or understand.”  (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting from the decision to 
dismiss the case as having been improvidently accepted.) 
{¶ 20} The use of common, everyday words, including “call,” instead of a 
rote recitation of legal terminology, can assist the defendant in understanding the 
rights forfeited by entry of a plea.  Thus, we hold that the language employed by 
the trial court in informing the defendant that he had the “right to call witnesses to 
speak on [his] behalf” was a reasonably intelligible explanation to the defendant 
of his constitutional right to compulsory process and allowed the defendant to 
make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead no contest. 
B. Consequences of failure to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 
{¶ 21} Barker’s change-of-plea form states: “I understand by entering this 
plea I give up my right to a jury trial or court trial, where I could see and have my 
attorney question witnesses against me, and where I could use the power of the 
court to call witnesses to testify for me.”  During the plea colloquy, the trial court 
asked Barker whether he had reviewed the change-of-plea form with his attorney, 
and Barker stated that he had.  The court then asked: “Do you have any questions 
of the Court before I proceed?”  Barker stated that he did not have any questions. 
{¶ 22} In addition to invalidating Barker’s plea based on the alleged 
insufficiency of the language employed to describe the right to compulsory 
process, the court of appeals cited Veney, which states, “ ‘[T]he court cannot 
simply rely on other sources to convey these constitutional rights’ to the 
defendant.”  Barker, 2010-Ohio-3067, ¶ 15, quoting Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 29.  The court held that the plea agreement 
was another source and therefore could not be employed to satisfy the 
constitutional mandate in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).  We disagree. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 23} In Veney, this court held, “Although the trial court may vary 
slightly from the literal wording of the rule in the colloquy, the court cannot 
simply rely on other sources to convey those rights to the defendant.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  
However, Veney can be distinguished on its facts.  The court noted that in 
Veney’s case, “it [was] undisputed that the trial court plainly failed to orally 
inform Veney of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  Therefore, because the trial court had 
completely “failed to orally inform” the defendant of the right in question, under 
the facts of Veney, the court could not “simply rely on other sources to convey 
these constitutional rights.”  Id. at ¶ 30, 29. 
{¶ 24} In Ballard, as here, the trial court did not “simply” rely on the 
written plea.  Rather, the trial court engaged in a full plea colloquy with the 
defendant and addressed the right of compulsory process of witnesses.  Thus, 
when a trial court addresses all the constitutional rights in the oral colloquy, a 
reviewing court should be permitted to consider additional record evidence to 
reconcile any alleged ambiguity in it.  We further note that this interpretation 
comports with federal law, which does not require automatic vacation of a plea 
when a judge fails to inform a defendant of a Boykin right.  Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 
89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.  See United States v. Vonn (2002), 535 U.S. 55, 
59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90. 
{¶ 25} We hold that Veney did not reject the Ballard approach of 
considering the totality of the circumstances, but instead is limited to the situation 
where a trial court omits any discussion of a constitutional right in the oral 
colloquy.  Thus, we hold that an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea 
colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record, including 
the written plea, in determining whether the defendant was fully informed of the 
right in question. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 26} Following the totality-of-the-circumstances test of Ballard, we find 
it clear that Barker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
compulsory process, and his plea should not have been invalidated.  Barker was 
adequately informed of his right to compulsory process via the language 
employed.  In addition, Barker was represented by counsel, and he signed a 
written change-of-plea form stating that he understood that he was giving up the 
right to use the power of the court to call witnesses to testify for him. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 27} We hold that a trial court complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when 
its explanation of the constitutional right to compulsory process of witnesses is 
described to the defendant during the plea colloquy as the “right to call witnesses 
to speak on your behalf.”  We further hold that an alleged ambiguity during the 
plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record, 
including the written plea.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
 and trial court judgment reinstated. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Stephen D. Long, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Erick D. Gale and Michael J. Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
______________________