Title: Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Puppolo, Executor v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC, and Dodig
(2010-230)
 
2011 VT 119
 
[Filed 07-Nov-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 119
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-230
 
MAY TERM, 2011 
 
Celeste Puppolo, Executor of the 
Estate of Eva C. Puppolo
}
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
Bennington Superior Court
    v.  
}
 
 
}
 
Donovan & O'Connor, LLC and 
Chris S. Dodig
}
}
DOCKET NO. 71-2-08
  Bncv
 
 
Trial Judge: David Suntag
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Plaintiff, Estate of Eva C. Puppolo, appeals a jury verdict in favor of
defendant in this legal malpractice action.  Plaintiff claims that the
trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was
denied a fair trial when the court allowed defendant's attorney to testify to
the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial
court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the
defendant's expert disclosure.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
On February 25, 2003, plaintiff's aunt Eva died from heart failure at
the age of eighty-three while a resident at the Crescent Manor Care
Center.  Plaintiff arrived minutes after her death, saw Fentanyl patches
on Eva, and concluded that her aunt died of an overdose of Fentanyl. 
According to Eva's primary care doctor, Fentanyl was prescribed to manage
increasing pain from a severe pressure ulcer on Eva's back.
¶ 3.            
Plaintiff reported the circumstances of her aunt's death to the
Bennington Police and requested that an autopsy be conducted.  The Chief
Medical Examiner of the State of Vermont conducted the autopsy and concluded
Eva had died of natural causes.  At his deposition, the medical examiner
stated, "Basically she died of complications from heart disease from hardening
of the arteries and high blood pressure."  After completing its
investigation, the police department closed the case.  
¶ 4.            
Plaintiff also filed a complaint related to her aunt's death with the
Department of Aging and Disabilities (DAD).  The DAD conducted an
unannounced investigation at Crescent Manor "to determine if the facility was
in violation of any [s]tate or [f]ederal regulations governing the operation of
nursing homes."  The investigator found no regulatory violations and
concluded that, despite the fact that the facility had used methods of
intervention to prevent "skin breakdown," Eva's overall medical condition made
the development of pressure ulcers "unavoidable."  
¶ 5.            
Plaintiff, unpersuaded by the results of these investigations, consulted
with defendant about bringing wrongful death and survivorship claims against
Crescent Manor and the attending physicians.  However, in light of the
autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police and DAD investigations,
defendant declined to take the case.  In so declining, defendant told
plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue
when she was appointed executor of the estate.  Defendant concedes that
this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun
to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. 
Defendant also concedes that he failed to specifically notify plaintiff of the
two year limitations period for the wrongful death action, which expired on
February 25, 2005.
¶ 6.            
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Crescent Manor and the physicians
through another attorney on February 6, 2006.  Both claims were dismissed
on summary judgment as time-barred.  On February 20, 2008, plaintiff
brought the present legal malpractice action against defendant, claiming that
her reliance on his legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue wrongful
death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death.  
¶ 7.            
Shortly before jury draw in the underlying action, on December 31, 2009,
plaintiff contacted her legal malpractice attorney by email and requested that
he withdraw his appearance.  Counsel filed his motion to withdraw on
January 4, 2010, one day before the scheduled jury draw.  The trial court
held the jury draw and reviewed the motion the next day, although plaintiff was
not in attendance.  The court declined to issue a decision on the motion,
however, noting that plaintiff was not present and had not received adequate
notice of a potential hearing.  The court then issued an entry order
scheduling a hearing on the matter for January 14, 2010, the first day of
trial, and mailed a copy of the order directly to plaintiff.  The order
read in pertinent part: "[T]he [c]ourt will set [p]laintiff's counsel's motion
to withdraw at the outset of the scheduled trial on January 14, 2010. 
Plaintiff and counsel should be prepared to proceed with the trial in the
likely event that the [c]ourt finds no good cause for either last-minute
substitution of counsel, or any associated request for a continuance."[1]
¶ 8.            
On January 12, 2010, two days before the hearing and trial, plaintiff
filed a pro se motion to recuse the trial judge.[2]  Her counsel had refused to seek
this disqualification. The following day, the chief administrative judge issued
an order to replace the trial judge "as a matter of judicial expediency but
without a determination that [p]laintiff ha[d] established grounds for
recusal."  The judge noted that because it was the "eve" of trial, there
was not sufficient time to consider the motion, and "to add further complexity,
the motion [wa]s purportedly based on an exhibit,' which the [court] ha[d] yet
to receive."  
¶ 9.            
Plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw was thus heard by the replacement
judge on the first morning of trial.  Plaintiff appeared and asserted
dissatisfaction with then counsel on several grounds.  She first
complained that there had been "some major tactical disagreements" regarding an
attempted mediation on November 16, 2009.  The trial court did not allow
plaintiff to elaborate on these "tactical disagreements," explaining that the
mediation proceedings were confidential.  She also complained of her
attorney's choice of expert witness.  While plaintiff conceded that both
her preferred expert and the expert her attorney eventually hired came to the
same conclusionthat her aunt had died of a Fentanyl overdoseshe felt her
expert was "more definitive," "not wimpy," and "very staunch in his
opinion."  Her attorney explained that he had made a "plurality of
attempts" to contact plaintiff's preferred expert, but having received no
response, retained another whom he considered "just as competent" and capable
of providing "everything" he needed for expert testimony.  Plaintiff took
further issue with her counsel's decision not to pursue a claim that certain of
her aunt's medical records had been falsified and with his failure to seek
disqualification of the trial judge.  Finally, plaintiff claimed that she
had come to question her attorney's competence because he allegedly forgot "a
very important detail" regarding the severity of her aunt's coronary artery
disease.
¶ 10.        
The trial court denied plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw,
explaining that "[a]fter a case is set for trial, leave to withdraw [under
V.R.C.P. 79.1(f)] will be granted only for good cause shown.' "  The
court noted that "[w]hether good cause' exists is determined on a case-by-case
basis under the particular circumstances of that case."  The court
reasoned that because the judge that plaintiff sought to recuse was no longer
sitting on the case, the point was moot and "d[id] not go to the issue of
[c]ounsel's ability to present the case."  The court observed that the
rest of plaintiff's arguments primarily concerned strategic disagreements, and
noted that trial strategy is traditionally within the attorney's
discretion.  The court concluded that in making these strategy decisions,
the attorney acted within his discretion.
¶ 11.        
The court was likewise unconvinced by plaintiff's allegation that her
attorney was incompetent and noted that the attorney "demonstrated a grasp of
the facts and an impressive ability to recall dates and details of the
case."  The court concluded that "[p]laintiff failed to demonstrate good
cause for allowing her attorney to withdraw at the start of a complex legal
malpractice trial," and that "[t]o grant this motion and allow [p]laintiff time
to obtain new counsel would unfairly burden and inconvenience [d]efendant, the
jurors and the [c]ourt."  After a trial, the jury found in favor of
defendant.  Plaintiff now appeals.
¶ 12.        
On appeal, plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in
denying the motion to withdraw counsel under Rule 79.1(f) because she did not
have appropriate notice of the January 14, 2010 hearing.  Plaintiff
concedes that she received the entry order from the January 5, 2010 hearing,
but complains that the entry order was "confusing" and that she did not
understand that a hearing would be held on January 14.  Rule 79.1(f)
provides that "[n]o motion to withdraw shall be considered by the court until
the party has been given notice of the motion and the date and time of hearing
thereon by the clerk."  The court's January 5 order read in pertinent
part: "the [c]ourt will set [p]laintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw at the
outset of the scheduled trial on January 14, 2010."  This order
unambiguously sets the date and time for the hearing on plaintiff's motion, and
plaintiff concedes she received the order.  Thus, the order complies with
the notice requirements of Rule 79.1(f).
¶ 13.        
Plaintiff also claims that the January 14, 2010 hearing on the motion to
withdraw failed to meet the promptness requirements implicit in Rule
79.1(f).  Rule 79.1 is silent on how soon a hearing must be provided, but
plaintiff argues that, because her right to have the counsel of her choice is
implicated, constitutional due process must be satisfied and a hearing on a
motion to withdraw must be held promptly and in a meaningful manner. 
Plaintiff failed to raise this issue below and in order "to properly preserve
an issue for appeal a party must present the issue with specificity and clarity
in a manner which gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on
it."  In re White, 172 Vt. 335, 343, 779, A.2d 1264, 1270 (2001)
(quotation omitted).  "We have repeatedly stressed that we will not
address arguments not properly preserved for appeal."  Id.; see,
e.g., Burton v. Jeremiah Beach Parker Restoration & Const. Mgmt. Corp.,
2010 VT 55, ¶¶ 5-6, 188 Vt. 583, 5 A.3d 38 (mem.) (declining to consider
validity of a statute awarding attorney's fees because issue not properly
raised below).  Plaintiff had an opportunity to raise the issue of
promptness at trial but failed to do so.  Therefore, we decline to address
this new argument on appeal.
¶ 14.        
Plaintiff likewise argues that the court erred when it did not allow her
to elaborate on events that took place during the mediation.  According to
plaintiff, she was deprived of the opportunity to explain that her attorney had
an "inability to retain key details" and an "unwillingness to call a compelling
expert witness" during the mediation.  If it was error to preclude
discussion about the substance of the mediation, any error was harmless. 
See V.R.C.P. 61 ("No error . . . or defect in any ruling . . . is ground
for . . . modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice.").  Despite the trial court's ruling to
the contrary on the motion to withdraw, plaintiff was in fact allowed to
explain that she questioned her attorney's competence because he forgot "a very
important detail" regarding her aunt's coronary artery disease.  She also
thoroughly discussed her concerns about her attorney's choice of expert
witness.  As discussed below, the trial court addressed each of her
concerns in its decision and found counsel's recall of numerous details to be
impressive and his choice of expert witness to be proper.  In light of the
fact that plaintiff expressed her concerns and the court plainly addressed
them, any error in the court's ruling was harmless and does not provide grounds
for reversal.  
¶ 15.        
Finally, plaintiff contends that the court erred in concluding that
there was not good cause supporting the motion request to withdraw.  In
doing so, she reiterates her concerns about her attorney's choice of expert
witness, his refusal to pursue a falsified records claim, his competency, and
his refusal to move to recuse the original trial judge.  We review the
trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion. 
See, e.g., Cameron v. Burke, 153 Vt. 565, 573, 572 A.2d 1361, 1366
(1990) (reviewing trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw under abuse of
discretion standard).  "We will not disturb a discretionary ruling unless
it is shown that such discretion was abused or entirely withheld, and the abuse
of discretion resulted in prejudice to [a party's] substantial rights."  Follo
v. Florindo, 2009 VT 11, ¶ 19, 185 Vt. 390, 970 A.2d 1230 (quotations
omitted).  Good cause must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  Cameron,
153 Vt. at 573, 572 A.2d  at 1366.  
¶ 16.        
Here, the trial court determined that plaintiff's attorney was capably
handling her case and that the actions complained of were strategic decisions,
emphasizing that trial attorneys are allowed a great deal of discretion in
trial strategy decisions.  The court noted that plaintiff's attorney "did
not ignore [p]laintiff's request to pursue the issue of falsified medical
records, but made a strategic decision that such potential embarrassment to the
doctors and nurses was not necessary to successfully present [p]laintiff's
case."  Nor, the court explained, did the attorney "ignore [p]laintiff's
request to retain a specific medical expert."  Rather, he attempted to
contact that expert, but did not receive a response.  He therefore
retained "another experienced expert whose opinion did not differ from that of
[p]laintiff's preferred expert."  The trial court also determined that her
attorney's refusal to file a motion to recuse the original trial judge did not
go to the issue of his ability to present the case.
¶ 17.        
We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.  As the trial court
correctly stated, "[t]he decision regarding which expert, or how many experts,
to retain is a classic strategy decision within the discretion of the
attorney."  See, e.g., In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 216, 647 A.2d 316, 322 (1994) (calling physician to testify as an expert witness is a
strategic decision left in the attorney's discretion).  Moreover, the
choices of which arguments to pursue and whether to file a motion to recuse a
judge are likewise strategy decisions generally left to the attorney's
discretion.  See In re E.T., 2008 VT 48, ¶ 11, 184 Vt. 273, 959 A.2d 544 (explaining that whether to pursue particular line of
cross-examination is "tactical decision within the professional discretion of
[the] attorney");  see also United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116,
130 (2d Cir. 2000) (characterizing counsel's choice not to move for recusal as
"strategic"); Lena v. Commonwealth, 340 N.E.2d 884, 887 (Mass. 1976)
(stating that filing a motion to recuse determined by attorney's "best view of
what the situation call[s] for").  A disagreement on strategy does not
rise to the level of "good cause" sufficient to support a motion to
withdraw.  See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (3d
Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court's denial of last-minute request to substitute
counsel where disagreement with counsel amounted to disagreement over
strategy).  The trial court thoroughly examined these strategy
disagreements, and its determination that counsel made reasonable decisions
within the purview of his professional discretion is firmly rooted in the
record.  The primary conflict was over the way in which the case would be
tried and plaintiff points to little more than her disagreement with these
decisions to support her motion.  Indeed, when plaintiff chose to be
represented by counsel, she also chose to abide by his professional judgment
regarding such decisions.  See In re E.T., 2008 VT 48, ¶ 11
(explaining that clients must abide by their lawyers' decisions regarding
cross-examination).  The choices at issue were well within the discretion
of plaintiff's counsel and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.
¶ 18.        
As to the issue of competency, the trial court determined that plaintiff's
attorney "demonstrated a grasp of the facts and an impressive ability to recall
dates and details of the case," and that there was no evidence that an impaired
"capacity to present the case" had prejudiced plaintiff.  At the hearing,
plaintiff conceded that her attorney "knew the law backwards and forwards" and
was a "wonderful attorney" who would be an "asset" to her case.  On these
record facts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on
this ground.  Denial of plaintiff's motion to withdraw was therefore
proper.
¶ 19.        
Turning to the evidentiary claims, plaintiff contends that it was plain
error for the trial court to allow the defendant attorney to testify to his
opinion of the merits of the underlying medical malpractice case and to discuss
the autopsy and DAD reports.  We do not review for plain error in the
present case because plaintiff raises no claim of deprivation of a fundamental
right and there is no liberty interest at stake.  See Follo, 2009
VT 11, ¶ 16 (explaining "limited circumstances" in which Court conducts
plain error review in civil cases).  Plaintiff's claims are unpreserved
because she elicited the testimony in question and did not move to have it
struck from the record.  Further, the two reports in question were
admitted into evidence without objection.  We therefore do not review them
on appeal.  See In re Estate of Peters, 171
Vt. 381, 390, 765 A.2d 468, 475-76 (emphasizing that failure to make a specific
objection to evidence at trial precludes consideration on appeal). 
Similarly, plaintiff's argument that the trial court should have bifurcated the
underlying medical malpractice issues from the legal malpractice claims at
trial is unpreserved and unreviewable because she did not raise the concern at
trial.  See In re Madore, 2003 VT 35, ¶ 9, 175 Vt. 510, 825 A.2d 12
(mem.) (declining to hear bifurcation request for the first time on appeal). 
¶ 20.        
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the trial court to allow a
defense expert witness to testify as to the use of Fentanyl in pressure ulcer
pain management and the likelihood that Fentanyl caused Eva's death because
this testimony exceeded defendant's expert disclosure statement.  The
trial court's discovery order read in pertinent part: "Defendant shall disclose
experts by July 31, 2009.  Plaintiff shall depose those experts by
September 30, 2009."  In response to the order, defendant disclosed to
plaintiff that its expert would testify "that the care and treatment of Eva Puppolo's
decubitus ulcer was reasonable and met the applicable standard of care." 
The expert was not deposed.
¶ 21.        
During trial, defendant's expert testified that the doctors and nurses
who had treated Eva's ulcer satisfied the standard of care.  When asked,
"whether pain management [is] part of the care and treatment of a pressure
ulcer," the expert responded, "emphatically yes."  He then offered the
opinion that, "entertaining a thought that this woman was poisoned by Fentanyl
is . . . ridiculous."  Plaintiff's counsel objected repeatedly to the
expert's testimony on the ground that pain management and cause of death were
outside the scope of defendant's expert disclosure.  Counsel raised the
issue again post judgment in the motion for a new trial claiming plaintiff was
subjected to "trial by ambush."  
¶ 22.        
The trial court denied the objections during the expert's testimony and
later denied the motion, explaining that "it is likely that the appropriate use
of Fentanyl would be a topic within the scope of the testimony on the standard
of care for a bed sorethe disclosed topic of [the expert's] testimony." 
It further concluded that "[p]laintiff could not claim unfair surprise" because
she "did not avail [herself] of discovery procedures . . . which
may have helped to determine the precise boundaries of this expert testimony
before trial."  
¶ 23.        
The trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Estate of George v. Vt. League of
Cities & Towns, 2010 VT 1, ¶ 14, 187 Vt. 229, 993 A.2d 367.  We
will not find an abuse of discretion unless the admission of the disputed
evidence was "either made for reasons clearly untenable or was unreasonable."
 See USGen New Eng., Inc. v. Town of Rockingham, 2004 VT 90, ¶ 24,
177 Vt. 193, 862 A.2d 269.  We see no abuse of discretion here.  The
trial court is in the best position to assess the correlation between the
evidence presented and the disclosure.  As the trial court indicated, the
use of Fentanyl for pain management squarely fits within the broad topic of
"care and treatment" of Eva's ulcer.  While the expert testimony relating
to the cause of death fits less clearly into the disclosure, the decision to
admit that testimony is also well within the discretion of the trial
court.  The expert's testimony did not stray so far beyond the scope of
the disclosure so as to make its admission an abuse of discretion. 
Neither rules nor the trial court's order required the disclosure to be more
specific, and plaintiff cites no authority for the contention that defendant's
disclosure was inadequate.  Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the
admission of this testimony. 
¶ 24.        
Likewise, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude that
plaintiff could not claim unfair surprise in her post-trial motions.
 Without passing judgment on whether the trial court would or should have
granted such a motion, "failure to request a continuance at the time of
surprise, except under extraordinary circumstances, serves as a waiver of the
party's rights."  Hartnett v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 146 Vt. 297,
301, 503 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1985) (quotation omitted).  Plaintiff has not
put forth any "extraordinary circumstances" warranting departure from the
general rule.  Plaintiff took no affirmative steps to alleviate the
alleged surprise when defendant elicited the expert's testimony and did not ask
the court for a continuance, recess, or adjournment in order to depose the
expert or otherwise prepare for the testimony.  The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in this determination.
           
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Robert R. Bent, Superior
  Judge, 
Specially Assigned
 
 
 

[1]  Plaintiff contends that the court
denied the motion on January 5, but the plain language of the entry order shows
the court made no dispositive decision on the motion; it merely set a date to
do so.
 
[2]  Plaintiff's counsel's motion to
withdraw was still pending at the time plaintiff filed the motion to recuse,
resulting in some confusion as to plaintiff's representation.  We note
that V.R.C.P. 79.1(f) provides that "[w]hen an attorney has entered an
appearance the attorney shall remain as counsel until the attorney has been
granted leave to withdraw by the court."  Because plaintiff's counsel's
motion to withdraw was pending, she remained represented by counsel and her pro
se motion to recuse was improper.