Title: Tipperman V. Tsiatsos

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:   October 2, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MARK TIPPERMAN, dba McCoy
Meadows Ranch,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

WILLIAM TSIATSOS,

	Respondent on Review,

	and 

STATE OF OREGON, by the 
Department of Fish and Wildlife,

	Respondent.

(CC 93-12-35919; CA A86086; SC S43269)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted January 14, 1997; resubmitted July 27,
1998.

	Mark Tipperman, La Grande, argued the cause and filed the
briefs in propria persona for petitioner on review.

	Steven J. Joseph, La Grande, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**

	CARSON, C.J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
modified in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and modified in part, and the case is remanded to that
court for further proceedings.

    *Appeal from Union County Circuit Court,

	Ronald D. Schenck, Judge.

	140 Or App 282, 915 P2d 446 (1996).

   **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.

		CARSON, C.J.

		In this action for a declaratory judgment and an
injunction against defendant Tsiatsos (defendant),(1) plaintiff
asks this court to modify the trial court's judgment, which
construed a deed that reserved an easement favorably for
defendant.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment, with one minor modification.  Tipperman v. Tsiatsos,
140 Or App 282, 915 P2d 446 (1996).  The issues before us concern
the proper methodology for construing a deed that reserves an
easement and the application of that methodology to the deed at
issue in this case.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm in
part and modify in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.

		The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's
judgment de novo, pursuant to former ORS 19.125(3) (1995),
renumbered as ORS 19.415(3) (1997).  We accept the facts as found
by the Court of Appeals and limit our review to questions of law. 
ORS 19.415(4).  We take the following facts from the Court of
Appeals' decision and from other undisputed facts contained in
the record.

		In 1909, Jeff and Jennie Ayres, defendant's
predecessors in interest and the original grantors, conveyed land
located in Union County to The Grande Ronde Reservoir Company,
plaintiff's predecessor in interest.  The deed conveying the land
(the Ayres deed) contained the following reservation of an
easement:

"Reserving, however, out of the said last described
tract of land [175 acres], * * * the right to use the
waters of Meadow Creek flowing through the same, for
stock water for stock of the grantors and their assigns
pasturing on adjacent lands and the right of free
access for said stock to said waters over said lands."

There is no evidence in the record that demonstrates how the
burdened land was used at the time when the Ayres deed was
executed.  Nor is there any evidence that demonstrates how the
Ayreses used the easement after executing the deed.

		Defendant's family purchased the benefitted land in
1929, and defendant became the owner in the 1970s.  Defendant's
practice has been to feed his livestock hay on the benefitted
land in the winter months and to graze them on the benefitted
land during the five-month summer grazing season.  Defendant's
family had followed a similar practice since 1929.  Also, from
about 1929 to the late 1980s, livestock belonging to defendant or
defendant's family had unrestricted, year-round access to all
areas of Meadow Creek referred to in the reservation contained in
the Ayres deed, by crossing over the burdened land. 

		From 1986 to 1990, Earle and Dorothy Meisener owned the
burdened land now owned by plaintiff.  In 1987, they entered into
a lease with defendant State of Oregon that authorized the
erection of a riparian fence along both sides of Meadow Creek. 
Defendant was not a party to that lease agreement.

		In the spring of 1988, defendant met Earle Meisener
(Meisener) and Willie Noll, a representative of the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), on the Meiseners'
property at Meadow Creek to discuss construction of the riparian
fence.  Noll had staked out the fence, as well as a water gap in
the fence, to allow limited access to the creek.  Defendant
expressed concern about the width of the water gap, and Noll
agreed to widen it.  Defendant later contacted Noll and requested
additional changes to the gap.  Noll told defendant to work out
the dispute with Meisener, but defendant did not do so.  ODFW
completed construction of the riparian fence and water gap in the
fall of 1988.

		In 1990, plaintiff purchased the land burdened by the
easement from the Meiseners.  At that time, a fenced corridor ran
from defendant's land to the water gap in the riparian fence at
Meadow Creek, providing defendant's livestock with a single
access route over plaintiff's land to the creek.  

		In 1991, the original water gap was damaged by a flood.
Consequently, in 1992, ODFW modified the riparian fence and water
gap, resulting in a wider gap of about 50 feet.  About that same
time, defendant again complained to ODFW about the width of the
gap, asserting that it should be about 300 feet.  Also in 1992,
defendant complained for the first time to plaintiff about his
limited access to Meadow Creek.  Defendant never had complained
to Meisener about his limited access or the width of the water
gap.

		In the fall of 1992, ODFW closed off the water gap for
the winter months due to icing problems.  As a result,
defendant's livestock had no access to Meadow Creek over the
burdened land during that time.

		Defendant continued to complain about his limited
access to Meadow Creek and the width of the water gap.  The
parties were unable to work out a resolution, and this litigation
ensued.  After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered a
judgment that declared, among other things, that the easement at
issue "was reserved and exists for the benefit of a livestock
operation on the Benefitted Land."  The judgment further declared
that:  (1) with limited exceptions, defendant could water 163
head of livestock year-round at Meadow Creek, albeit not through
the fenced riparian area; (2) defendant, at his own expense,
could widen the existing water gap to 60 feet; (3) a second
corridor fence, running from defendant's land to Meadow Creek
over plaintiff's land, and a second water gap must be
constructed, to provide defendant's livestock with a second means
of access to Meadow Creek; (4) plaintiff and defendant State of
Oregon must share equally the cost of constructing the second
water gap; and (5) plaintiff alone must bear the cost of
constructing and maintaining the second corridor fence, as well
as the cost of maintaining the first corridor fence.

		Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.  Among
other things, he contended that the trial court erred in
construing the Ayres deed in favor of defendant, a successor of
the original grantors, rather than plaintiff, a successor of the
original grantee.  The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's
argument, effectively stating that the reservation contained in
the Ayres deed should be construed in favor of the owner of the
dominant estate, here, defendant.  Tipperman, 140 Or App at 290.

		After reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court had construed the deed correctly
and had not erred in ordering the construction of a second
corridor fence and water gap.  Id. at 289.  The Court of Appeals
further concluded, citing ORS 105.175,(2) that defendant, not
plaintiff, should bear the cost of maintaining -- but not
constructing -- the second corridor fence, as well as the first
corridor fence.  Id. at 290.  Accordingly, the court remanded the
case with instructions to amend the judgment so that defendant
would bear the sole responsibility of maintaining both corridor
fences, but otherwise affirmed.  Plaintiff petitioned for review
in this court, and we allowed review.  

		Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals erred when
it rejected his argument that the Ayres deed must be construed
narrowly against defendant, the grantors' successor in interest. 
In plaintiff's view, had the trial court and the Court of Appeals
applied his construction methodology, they would have been
compelled to conclude that the reference in the Ayres deed to
"stock * * * pasturing on adjacent lands" (emphasis added) means
that only livestock actually grazing on defendant's land could
use Meadow Creek for water and, consequently, that nongrazing
livestock otherwise being fed on defendant's land are not
included in the scope of the easement.  For the same reason,
plaintiff also contends that the Court of Appeals and the trial
court erred in requiring construction of a second corridor fence
and water gap.  Defendant does not challenge plaintiff's
contention that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous legal
standard when it construed the deed, but argues, nonetheless,
that we should affirm that court's construction.

		Several legal principles govern the proper construction
of an instrument creating an easement, whether by reservation or
express grant.  First, in such cases, "[i]t is the duty of the
court to declare the meaning of what is written in the
instrument."  Minto v. Salem Water Etc. Co., 120 Or 202, 210, 250
P 722 (1926).  Further, the court will look beyond the wording of
the instrument "only where there is an uncertainty or ambiguity." 
Fendall v. Miller, 99 Or 610, 619, 196 P 381 (1921).  If the
wording at issue is uncertain or ambiguous, then the court must
determine the intent of the original parties by examining the
relevant surrounding circumstances.  Doyle v. Gilbert, 255 Or
563, 566, 469 P2d 624 (1970); see also Fendall, 99 Or at 615
("The extent of an easement is to be determined by a true
construction of the grant or reservation by which it is created,
aided by any concomitant circumstances which have a legitimate
tendency to show the intention of the parties.").  Such
circumstances include the purpose and nature of the easement, the
circumstances existing at the time of the grant or reservation,
and the manner in which the easement was used by the original
parties.  Fendall, 99 Or at 616; see also Beck v. Lane County,
141 Or 580, 591-92, 18 P2d 594 (1933) (court looked to
circumstances surrounding creation of easement and actions of
original parties to determine scope of easement). 

		Finally, when an ambiguity exists in a deed that
reserves an easement, a supplemental rule of construction is that
the reservation "is to be construed most strongly against the
grantor [who reserves the easement] and in favor of the grantee." 
Oliver v. Johnson, 166 Or 475, 480, 113 P2d 430 (1941).  That
principle is consistent with the general rule that an ambiguity
in a deed must be construed against the grantor, because it is
the grantor who is deemed to have drafted the deed and who
unilaterally has conveyed the land to another party.  See Hurd v.
Byrnes, 264 Or 591, 598, 506 P2d 686 (1973) (stating rule).  The
rule is one of last resort, to be used when other tools for
construing a deed, such as an examination of the relevant
surrounding circumstances, have not resolved the ambiguities. 
See, e.g., id. at 597-99 (applying rule, when determining whether
grant at issue retained title or easement, only after concluding
that trial record contained insufficient evidence of original
parties' intent).

		The above-discussed rule of construction is well
settled in the law.  However, in rejecting plaintiff's contention
that the Ayres deed should be construed in his favor, the Court
of Appeals incorrectly stated and applied that rule, stating that
"[a] reservation [of an easement] is drafted by the grantee and
is construed in favor of the grantee."  Tipperman, 140 Or App at
290 (emphasis added).  As explained above, the correct statement
of the law is that a reservation of an easement is deemed to have
been drafted by the grantor of the land, and, consequently, any
ambiguity must be construed in favor of the grantee of the land. 
Here, plaintiff is the successor in interest of the grantee of
the land and is the servient owner.  Thus, any ambiguity in the
Ayres deed that remains after all other tools for resolving it
have failed should be resolved in favor of plaintiff, rather than
defendant.  The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.(3)

		Having explained our construction methodology, we turn
to the wording of the Ayres deed.  The first issue of
construction is the meaning of the clause "stock * * * pasturing
on adjacent lands."  (Emphasis added.)  Plaintiff contends that
the ordinary meaning of the word "pasturing" refers to grazing on
growing grass and, consequently, that only defendant's livestock
that actually are grazing on defendant's land, rather than those
being fed on the land by some method other than grazing, should
have access to Meadow Creek under the Ayres deed.  Plaintiff also
points to his own testimony in the record that there is only
enough grass grown on the benefitted land to nourish about 10
cows and 10 calves during the five-month summer grazing season. 
Consequently, in plaintiff's view, only that number of livestock
should be allowed access to Meadow Creek under the Ayres deed,
and then only during the grazing season.  Defendant responds that
the word "pasturing" is not limited to the act of grazing on
growing grass and that his livestock should have year-round
access to the creek.

		The Ayres deed itself does not define the word
"pasturing."  However, the dictionary is an available resource to
assist us in determining the meaning of that word.  At the time
when the Ayres deed was executed, the dictionary definition of
the verb "pasture" was consistent, for the most part, with
plaintiff's position here:

	"Pasture * * *, v.  [a.  OF. pasturer to feed
flocks * * *]

	" 1.  intr.  To feed, to eat (said of animals). 
* * *

	"b.  spec.  Of cattle, sheep, etc.: To graze.

	"* * * * *

	" 2.  trans.  To feed, supply with food. * * *

	"* * * * *

	"b.  spec.  To feed (cattle) by letting them graze
on a pasture; to lead or put to pasture.

	"* * * * *

	"3.  trans.  (Of sheep or cattle) To graze upon
(herbage, grass-land), to eat down; (of persons) to put
sheep or cattle on (grass-land, etc.) to graze."

VII A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 544 (1909)
(boldface and emphasis in original).  Although one of the above-quoted definitions refers to the act of "feed[ing]" or
"supply[ing]" with food, we note that, in relation to feeding
livestock, the dictionary repeatedly defines the verb "pasture"
synonymously with the word "graze."  Similarly, another
dictionary from about the same time period defined the verb
"pasture" as follows:"pasture * * *, v.; * * * I. trans.  To feed by
grazing; supply or afford pasture or nourishment to: 
as, the land will pasture fifty oxen; the cattle were
pastured on the hillside or in the meadow. 

"* * * * *

	"II.  intrans.  To graze; take food by eating
growing herbage from the ground."

IV The Century Dictionary, 4323 (1890) (boldface and emphasis in
original).

		Thus, at the time in question, the common meaning of
the verb "pasture," in relation to the act of "pasturing"
livestock, referred to the act of grazing on growing grass.  See
generally Fendall, 99 Or at 616-17 ("words used in the grant of
an easement should receive their plain[,] ordinary meaning,"
unless context otherwise requires or unless words carry technical
meaning).  That definition, in turn, supports the conclusion that
the easement reserved in the Ayres deed extends only to livestock
that are grazing on growing grass on the benefitted land. 
However, given the additional dictionary definitions, we are
hesitant to conclude that the dictionary clearly resolves the
ambiguity at issue here.

		Ordinarily, we next would examine the relevant
circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement, in order
to ascertain the intended meaning of the word "pasturing."  As
noted earlier, however, there is no evidence in the record
concerning those circumstances.  There also is no evidence that
demonstrates how the original grantors -- the Ayreses -- used the
easement after executing the deed, that is, whether their
livestock crossed the burdened land year-round to reach Meadow
Creek, or only during the summer grazing season.

		We note that the trial court found that the easement
here "was reserved and exists for the benefit of a livestock
operation on the Benefitted Land."(4)  Tipperman, 140 Or App at 285
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals agreed
and further concluded that "both the grantor and grantee would
have contemplated adjustments in the use of both the benefitted
and burdened estates to meet changing circumstances [in running a
livestock operation on the benefitted estate]," including
allowing defendant to water livestock at Meadow Creek that are
being wintered on the benefitted land.  Id. at 292.  In reaching
that conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited case law from this
court holding that, unless otherwise agreed, the use of an
easement is subject to change over time, so long as that use is
reasonable and not contrary to the intended scope of the
easement.  See Bernards et ux. v. Link and Haynes, 199 Or 579,
597, 248 P2d 341 (1952) ("it is settled that the grantee may
avail himself of modern improvements which will enable him to
enjoy more fully the rights which were granted").

		However, it is significant that neither the trial court
nor the Court of Appeals made any factual finding that indicated
whether the original grantors -- the Ayreses -- had grazed their
livestock on the benefitted land year-round or only during the
summer months, or whether their livestock had had year-round
access over the burdened land to Meadow Creek.  As noted, the
record contains no evidence in that regard.  Consequently, the
discussion by the lower courts concerning the changing nature of
the livestock operation on the benefitted land misses the mark,
because the nature of the operation might not have changed at
all.  That is to say, the Ayreses might have run their livestock
operation in the same manner as defendant, grazing livestock
during the summer months and feeding them during the winter
months.  It follows that they might have intended to reserve the
right to use Meadow Creek either only while they grazed their
livestock during the summer, as plaintiff contends, or also while
they otherwise fed their livestock in the winter, as defendant
contends.  There is no evidence, however, to indicate which is
the correct scenario.(5)

		In light of the lack of evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the creation and use of the easement by the original
grantors, it is appropriate to construe the reservation contained
in the Ayres deed against defendant, the grantors' successor in
interest.  Under that rule of construction, we conclude that the
word "pasturing" refers only to livestock grazing on the
benefitted land.  However, because there is no such limiting
wording in the deed, we cannot agree that the number of livestock
must be limited to 20 head, as plaintiff contends, or even 163
head, as the trial court ordered.  Rather, we hold that any
livestock actually grazing on defendant's land must have access
to Meadow Creek over the burdened land, as provided in the Ayres
deed.  The judgment of the trial court and the decision of the
Court of Appeals are modified accordingly.

		Plaintiff next contends that the Court of Appeals erred
when it affirmed the trial court's order to construct a second
corridor fence and water gap on the burdened land, thereby
allowing defendant's livestock a second means of access to Meadow
Creek.  In plaintiff's view, construction of a second corridor
fence and water gap unreasonably would burden his enjoyment of
his land, and, in any event, there is no evidence in the record
that a second corridor and water gap are necessary for the use
and enjoyment of defendant's easement.  Defendant responds that,
under the Ayres deed, he is entitled to unrestricted access to
all areas of Meadow Creek and, therefore, that the construction
of the second corridor fence and water gap reasonably adjusts the
easement to conform to the needs of both parties.

		Again, the starting point for resolving the parties'
dispute is the wording of the Ayres deed itself.  The deed
reserved the "right of free access" (emphasis added) for
livestock pasturing on the benefitted land "to said waters
[Meadow Creek] over said lands [plaintiff's burdened land, as
originally conveyed by the Ayreses]."  (Emphasis added.)  It is
apparent that, by using the unqualified words "free access," the
deed provided that livestock pasturing on the benefitted land
should have unrestricted access to Meadow Creek at any point on
the burdened land.  The wording "over said lands" in the deed
supports that reading, because it demonstrates that livestock
pasturing on the benefitted land can cross all the burdened land
to reach Meadow Creek.  In short, we agree with defendant that
the deed does not limit the means of access to the creek.

		Plaintiff urges us to adopt a narrower reading of the
words "free access," arguing that defendant's livestock must have
unobstructed access to Meadow Creek, but not unrestricted access
to the entire creek.  That construction, however, is not
supported by the wording of the Ayres deed.  As discussed above,
it is clear that, in broadly reserving the right to have "free
access * * * over said lands," (emphasis added), the deed
reserved unrestricted access over the burdened land, in order to
gain access to Meadow Creek.

		In light of the broad wording of the Ayres deed, we
agree with the lower courts that the construction of a second
corridor fence and water gap is reasonable in order to provide
defendant with a second means of access to Meadow Creek. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
entering that aspect of the judgment.(6)

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and modified in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and modified in part, and the case is remanded
to that court for further proceedings.

1. 	Defendant State of Oregon did not appear on appeal.

2. 	ORS 105.175 provides, in part:

	"(1) The holders of an interest in any easement
shall maintain the easement in repair.

	"* * * * *

	"(3) The cost of maintaining the easement in
repair in the absence of an agreement and in the
absence of maintenance provisions in a recorded
instrument creating the easement shall be shared by
each holder of an interest in the easement in
proportion to the use made of the easement by each
holder of an interest in the easement."

3. 	The Court of Appeals relied on another case, Verzeano 
v. Carpenter, 108 Or App 258, 815 P2d 1275 (1991), to support its
statement of the rule of construction.  Tipperman, 140 Or App at
290.  However, the court quoted Verzeano incompletely and,
consequently, applied it incorrectly.  Further, the Verzeano
decision itself inaccurately identified the owners of the
servient estate -- the grantees of the land -- as the "grantors,"
in the context of a reservation of an easement.  Verzeano, 108 Or
App at 263.  That is inconsistent with established case law that
refers to the seller who reserves an easement as the grantor and
to the buyer who buys the land burdened by the easement as the
grantee.  See Oliver, 160 Or at 480 (so labeling the parties). 
However, Verzeano did state, correctly, that any ambiguity in a
reservation must be construed in favor of "the grantee of the
land," that is, the owner of the servient estate.  Verzeano, 108
Or App at 263 (emphasis added).  That statement is consistent
with this court's decision in Oliver, discussed above.  

4. 	The trial court noted that, although livestock
belonging to the Ayreses probably had grazed on the benefitted
land at some point during the year, the nature of running a
livestock operation has changed over time and that, "when cattle
are on [the benefitted] property, it seems to me it's clear they
have a right to water out of [Meadow C]reek."  Tipperman, 140 Or
App at 291 n 9.  

5. 	Defendant emphasizes that, since 1929, he and his
family have used the easement year-round.  However, use of the
easement by defendant and his family, who were not original
parties to the Ayres deed, does not illuminate the intent of the
original parties who created the easement.

6. 	Neither party challenges the allocation of financial
responsibility for the construction of the second corridor fence
and water gap, and the maintenance of both corridor fences.

		For the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals'
decision, we reject plaintiff's additional contention that
defendant acquiesced in limiting his easement to the single
corridor fence and water gap in 1988 and thereafter.  See
Tipperman, 140 Or App at 287-88 (concluding that defendant did
not so acquiesce).