Title: Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc.1994 WY 129884 P.2d 979Case Number: 94-81Decided: 11/18/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Daniel T. 
DAVIS,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BIG HORN BASIN 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming Corporation; Sean McMahon; Lee Lockhart; and Michael 
Bloom,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Washakie County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Daniel T. Davis, Worland, 
pro se.

Representing 
Appellees:

Randy D. Kotel of Cook, 
Kotel & Fitch, Denver, CO.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Daniel 
Davis filed suit for libel against appellees, Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 
and various individuals. The district court granted appellees' motion for 
summary judgment and denied Davis' motion for summary judgment. Davis appeals 
this order. We affirm. Davis also appeals denial of his motions for sanctions, 
which portion we dismiss for violations of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

[¶2]      Appellant's 
presented issues are:

1. In this case, could a 
jury find that the defendant acted with malice.

2. Do the facts of this 
case as, presented in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, prove malice in 
the Defendant, Daily News, by clear and convincing 
evidence.

3. Is the Plaintiff 
entitled to Rule 11 sanctions where the Defendants stated in their Answer that 
Plaintiff's Complaint was frivolous and without merit and that all statements in 
the articles complained of were true or substantially true, knowing such 
statements to be false.

4. Is the Plaintiff 
entitled to a protective order under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
where, in a short deposition, Defendant's Attorney consulted three times with 
the deponent during the course of the deposition in a manner indicating that the 
subject of the deponent's testimony needed to be discussed; and he supplied the 
deponent answers at least 29 times during the deposition in his objections; and 
on two occasions he simply gave the answers to the deponent; and at least five 
times he directed the deponent not to answer questions with no proper basis; and 
finally he repeatedly made baseless objections to obstruct and to 
disrupt.

[¶3]      Appellees' 
presented issues are:

I. Were the articles 
printed in the North Wyoming Daily News on March 17, 18, and 19 true or 
substantially true and published without malice and thus a complete defense to 
any claim of libel.

1. Once the Appellees 
alleged that there was no issue of material fact, the burden is on the Appellant 
to show that there was sufficient evidence, utilizing the clear and convincing 
standard, to rebut the Appellees' evidence.

2. The Appellees have 
proved that the articles as written were either true, substantially true, or 
published without malice and hence there is no libel as to this public figure 
Appellant.

3. The Appellant has 
failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Appellees 
subjectively knew that the articles as published were false or published the 
articles with reckless disregard for the truth.

II. Were the subsequent 
articles published by the North Wyoming Daily News concerning the filing of the 
complaint and answer in the immediate matter (Count IV of Plaintiff's amended 
complaint) privileged under W.S. § 1-29-105, which operates as a complete 
defense to any claim of libel.

III. Was the Plaintiff a 
"Public Figure" for all counts of the amended complaint.

IV. Whether the court 
erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and for sanctions 
concerning appellees' attorney's behavior at a deposition.

V. Should the appellant's 
appeal be dismissed for failure to abide by the requirements of Rule 7.01 
W.R.A.P.

FACTS

[¶4]      Davis, a Worland 
attorney, organized the Wyoming Consumer Group and brought a petition with the 
Public Service Commission alleging that the gas utility, Wyoming Gas, was 
overpaying for its gas. In March of 1992, the Public Service Commission 
conducted hearings and found that Wyoming Gas was paying the fair market value. 
THE NORTH WYOMING DAILY NEWS reported the hearings in daily consecutive articles 
during the three days of hearings. Statements from these three articles were the 
basis for Davis' action in March of 1993 alleging three counts of libel. The 
newspaper then published an article reporting that Davis had filed the lawsuit, 
and Davis amended his complaint alleging a fourth count of libel had occurred in 
this last article.

[¶5]      In Count I, Davis 
charged that four parts of the March 18, 1992 article, "PSC gas rate hearing 
under way; no rebate forthcoming," were defamatory:

1. In that Petition, Dan 
Davis, attorney and founder of the Wyoming Consumer Group, asked the PSC to rule 
on a rebate of $9,304,400 from Wyoming Gas Company.

Nicholas asked the 
Commissioners to dismiss the second amended Petition with prejudice because the 
Petition was presented to (Wyoming Gas) only two weeks ago and because it 
covered issues already in (sic) been ruled on by the PSC.

PSC Chairman John Smyth, 
after conferring with the other Commissioners, ruled he would dismiss the 
Petition, but that he would not do so with prejudice.

According to Doug Moench, 
PSC attorney with the Consumer Representative Staff, although the decision 
prevents any kind of a rebate to come from the hearings, the Consumer Group can 
refile a petition at a later date if more evidence is found (emphasis 
added).

2. Smyth told Davis 
several times, as he was questioning witnesses, to ask some leading questions, 
so that they could get on with the hearings.

3. While Davis was 
questioning Phil Caines, a comptroller for Wyoming Gas, Smyth warned Davis that 
he had cut his (Caines) testimony off three different times, and that (Smyth) 
was not going to stand for it.

4. Tim Good, vice 
president and general manager of the Cody Gas Company was called by Davis as a 
witness, to testify what the Cody Gas Company paid per mcf (1000 cubic feet) of 
natural gas.

After 45 minutes of 
testimony regarding what the gas company paid, Smyth, with obvious exasperation, 
told Davis to go on to the next line of questioning.

[¶6]      Davis charged 
that the quotes were false and the meaning generated by the overall tone of the 
article had a defamatory meaning. In the second count, Davis charged three 
statements from the March 19, 1992 article, "PSC chairman nixes Davis' motion 
that he disqualify himself. Davis alleges gas hearing chairman is `mean,'" 
were defamatory:

1. When Ketchum was asked 
by Moench if his company could sell natural gas to Wyoming Gas Company, he 
replied that "No, I could not because all of InterEnergy's gas is under 
contract."

2. During Wednesday's 
testimony, Worland resident Harry Moberly, who was called as a witness by Davis, 
testified he had some knowledge of the gas business because he had been 
financially linked to six different gas wells.

Contrary to what Davis 
was trying to establish, Moberly testified that he would rather have a 20 year 
fixed rate contract than a 30 day spot rate contract.

3. Davis called NGP Vice 
President Janeen Capshaw as a witness to help establish the fair market price of 
natural gas.

Davis questioned Capshaw 
for more than 45 minutes, with Capshaw continually asking Davis to clarify what 
he meant by several questions. Capshaw, after the questions were repeated or 
reworded by either Davis or the PSC staff, testified that NGP sells the 
remaining 80 percent of NGP produced natural gas - the amount of gas not being 
sold to Wyoming Gas - for $2.11 an mcf (just for the gas), compared to the $2.08 
it sells the gas for to Wyoming Gas. She said that at that price, NGP is able to 
sell all of the natural gas the company can produce.

Davis contended 
that these quotes were false and it was false that he called Capshaw as a 
witness. He further charged that the entire article conveyed a false and 
defamatory meaning.

[¶7]      Davis' third 
count charged six statements from the March 20, 1992 article, "PSC hearings 
on gas prices convene, will reopen in Cheyenne. PSC chairman: `Most frustrating' 
experience," were defamatory:

1. After Davis' motion 
had been denied, Davis continued his examination of witnesses to try and prove 
that Wyoming Gas had not tried to find other, cheaper sources of natural gas to 
sell its customers.

Davis also called 
witnesses to the stand to support his belief that gas producers would rather 
sign a short term contract at generally lower spot prices than a 20-year 
contract at a fixed rate.

Testimony was also 
received from two contradictory Davis-called witnesses. One testified that 
InterEnergy, Inc. does not have any natural gas available to sell to Wyoming Gas 
Company, because all of InterEnergy's gas is under 
contract.

The other Davis called 
witness, Harry Moberly, said he would rather sign a 20 year contract at a fixed 
rate than a 30 day contract at a spot rate, because it would give him a 
guaranteed rate of return.

2. Because of the slow 
pace of the hearings and the plodding questioning by Davis, Smyth said the 
Worland hearing was the "most frustrating" experience he has ever had in his 15 
years on the PSC board.

3. Davis called Capshaw 
to the witness stand again and continued questioning her about the amount of 
natural gas that NGP has dedicated to Wyoming Gas.

After more that 30 
minutes of Davis questioning Capshaw about dedicated gas, Smyth stopped Davis 
and told him, "The question has been answered to the satisfaction of everyone, 
Mr. Davis, so please proceed to your next question."

4. During Wednesday and 
Thursday's cross examination of Chapshaw (sic) Davis was admonished by Smyth 
more than 12 times to stop referring to Mrs. (sic) Chapshaw (sic) as Mrs., but 
to call her Miss Capshaw and to stop using acronyms when referring to the 
different areas of natural gas purchasing. 

5. After two hours of 
testimony from Capshaw, Davis dismissed her as a witness, saying he wanted to 
call another witness who could testify that Chapshaw (sic) had lied while under 
oath.

Smyth stopped the 
proceedings and told Davis that Chapshaw (sic) should be allowed to finish her 
testimony before Davis called a witness to try and prove 
perjury.

6. At one point during 
the hearings, Smyth said, "We're in disarray again," and he granted a short 
recess so Davis could enter some of his paperwork as evidence with the Court 
Recorder.

Davis charged 
that the quotes and facts of the article were false and that the entire article 
conveyed several different false and defamatory meanings. He alleged the article 
falsely represented that Davis incompetently presented a frivolous case, held 
him up to contempt and ridicule, and injured his reputation as a lawyer. In the 
fourth count, Davis charged the March 10, 1993 article, "Allegations denied 
in Daily News defamation lawsuit," contained two false 
statements:

"[T]he complaint by 
plaintiff Dan Davis is `frivolous and totally without merit.' . . 
."

"`All statements and/or 
writings authored by these defendants were true or substantially true when 
made,' the response said."

Count five of 
Davis' complaint charged that the defendants had acted maliciously and with 
wanton disregard of the rights of Plaintiff.

[¶8]      Both parties 
filed motions for summary judgment. Although the appellate briefs state that the 
trial court heard argument on those motions and then entered an order on the 
motions, neither the transcript of that hearing nor the court's order are 
included in the record.

[¶9]      This court's 
resolution of appellant's numerous libel charges and his challenges of the trial 
court's decisions regarding his motions for sanctions are hampered by the 
seriously deficient briefing presented to this court. The record in this case is 
over one thousand pages, yet neither party provides references to the record in 
their statement of facts as required by WYO.R.APP.P. 7.01(e)(2). Appellant's 
argument cited neither pertinent authority nor made cogent argument. Appellant 
also incorporated by reference trial briefs contained in the record rather than 
the parts of the record relied on as directed by WYO.R.APP.P. 7.01(f). See 
Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979) (noting that this method 
does not comply with the rules), and appellant did not include any of the 
court's final orders in his brief as required by WYO.R.APP.P. 
7.01(j).

[¶10]   The record does not contain copies 
of the court's final order on the cross motions for summary judgment or 
transcripts of proceedings below. Although appellant does not provide the 
standard of review in his brief, our standard of reviewing a district court's 
denial of motions for WYO.R.CIV.P. 11 sanctions is whether the court abused its 
discretion. LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo. 1994); Wardell v. 
McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1067 (Wyo. 1992). Without the necessary record, it 
is impossible for this court to determine whether an abuse of discretion has 
occurred. Appellant's argument lists many facts without references to the 
record. He baldly states the conclusions of the district court are in error but 
provides no authority or argument. Appellant's appeal of the denial of sanctions 
is therefore dismissed and we address only the appeal of the summary judgment 
order.

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Appellant charges these articles 
are libelous because they ridiculed him and injured his reputation as an 
attorney. "A defamatory communication is one which tends to hold the plaintiff 
up to hatred, contempt, ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be shunned or 
avoided; one that tends to injure his reputation as to diminish the esteem, 
respect, goodwill or confidence in which he is held." Tschirgi v. Lander 
Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶12]   We begin examining this appeal by 
identifying the proper standard of review. Appellant's complaint states that he 
is a public figure. While a "private figure" who has been libeled may recover by 
proving the defendant was "negligent," a libeled public figure invokes the 
actual malice standard for liability. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 912 (Wyo. 1992). A public figure who has been libeled by the publication of 
a false statement of fact on a matter of public concern will not prevail in 
proving defamation under the actual malice standard unless he proves with 
convincing clarity that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not. Dworkin, 839 P.2d  at 912.

[¶13]   In applying the actual 
malice/convincing clarity standard in the summary judgment context, this court 
follows the same approach it uses in any other summary judgment setting: we have 
the same task as the trial court, we have the same material as that court, and 
we follow the same standards. Dworkin, 839 P.2d  at 914. We view the 
record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts. 
Tschirgi, 706 P.2d  at 1117. Proof that the statement is substantially 
true is all that is generally required to defend against a charge of defamation. 
Dworkin, 839 P.2d  at 917; Tschirgi, 706 P.2d  at 
1120.

[¶14]   Appellant contends that the 
reporter/author "listened to the truth, then twisted, falsified and omitted 
material facts in order to convey meanings which were incredibly damaging." 
Appellant asserts that his argument focuses solely upon malice to show that he 
provided the district court with clear, convincing evidence of malice precluding 
summary judgment. The sum total of appellant's evidence of malice is simply to 
state the offending statement and then supply the "conveyed" meaning derived 
from that statement. For example, appellant claims that the statement in the 
fourth paragraph of the first article, "The Consumer Group can refile a 
Petition at a later date if more evidence is found," falsely conveys the 
meaning that he was not prepared and therefore his reputation as a lawyer was 
injured. From the articles, appellant derives these other conveyed defamatory 
meanings: "key witness flops," "incompetent questioner," "he 
invents perjury," "he causes disarray."

[¶15]   This kind of argument is little 
more than appellant's subjective interpretation of the articles and not clear 
and convincing evidence of malice. Appellant does prove that the statement that 
he called Miss Capshaw as a witness was inaccurate; however, inaccuracy without 
malice is not actionable. Because appellant does not raise any genuine questions 
of material fact, the district court's order is affirmed.