Title: Jameson v. Jameson

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

387 So. 2d 351 (1980)
Martha J. JAMESON and George Ronald Jameson, Appellants,
v.
Edward Lee JAMESON, II, Appellee.
No. 56793.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 17, 1980.
Peter S. Schwedock of Pelzner, Schwedock & Finkelstein, Miami, for appellants.
Ray Strauss of Berkell & Strauss, North Miami Beach, for appellee.
OVERTON, Justice.
This case is before us on direct appeal from a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, reported at 369 So. 2d 436 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), which held that the Florida Constitution requires the spouse of a homestead owner to join in an interspousal conveyance of the homestead to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. In its opinion, the district court directly construed article X, section 4(c), of the Florida Constitution, to require spouse joinder and declared section 689.11(1), Florida Statutes, unconstitutional to the extent it would allow interspousal conveyance of the homestead without joinder. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), and reverse.
We hold that article X, section 4(c), does not require joinder in an interspousal conveyance of solely owned homestead property to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, and find that section 689.11(1) is consistent with the constitutional provision as we construe it.
The relevant facts reflect that in 1974 Louis Jameson conveyed homestead property owned in his sole name to his wife, Martha Jameson, and himself as tenants by the entirety. Martha Jameson, the appellant, did not join in the conveyance. After Louis Jameson's death, his son, Edward, the appellee, filed a declaratory action seeking to have the conveyance declared null and void on grounds that there is a constitutional requirement of joinder in such a conveyance by the spouse. The circuit court agreed with this contention and entered a summary judgment voiding the deed. The district court affirmed and held that article X, section 4(c), "clearly requires joinder of the wife where there is an attempt to alienate homestead property." 369 So. 2d  at 437. Referring to the facts in the instant case, the district court stated:
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court determined such a holding was required by the "implied rationale" of our opinion in Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976).
The predecessor language to the present article X, section 4(c), was contained in the 1885 amendment to the constitution of the State of Florida in sections 1 and 4 of article X, which read as follows:
These constitutional provisions were so construed as to prohibit the instant conveyance. Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917); see Crosby and Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U.Fla.L.Rev. 12, 64-67 (1949). Article X was changed in the constitutional revision of 1968, and section 4(c) was amended to read as follows:
In 1972, this section was again amended, although the applicable sentence to the issue before us for decision remains the same as it was in the 1968 revision. The present section 4(c), as amended in 1972, reads as follows:
The critical language is the emphasized sentence, which we have not expressly construed in any prior case. The issue is whether this provision allows a husband who is the sole owner of the homestead to convey that homestead property to his wife and himself as a tenancy by the entireties without joinder by the wife as a grantor in the conveyance.
In its July 20, 1968, analysis of the instant provision, the Legislative Reference Bureau wrote that under the revision "the right of a married owner to directly transfer by deed the title of the homestead to himself and his spouse as an estate by the entirety would be given constitutional status." *353 Similarly, two articles have expressed the view that the new provision no longer requires spousal joinder as a grantor in interspousal transfers of solely owned homestead property. One author has stated:
Note, Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow: Alienation of Homestead under the 1968 Constitution, 24 U.Fla.L.Rev. 701, 705-07 (1972).
In the Star Project Commentary submitted to the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission, the portion pertaining to section 4(c) of article X states in part as follows:
Background Papers of 1978 Constitution Revision Commission, Record Group 5, Series 263, Box 3, Florida State Archives. See Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U.Fla.L.Rev. 227, 265-69 (1978).
*354 The appellee in the instant case contends that joinder is required by the wife both to alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale, or gift, and to transfer the property from sole title in the husband to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. The district court of appeal agreed with this contention and interpreted the phrase "joined by the spouse" as applying to both the first and second clauses of the subject constitutional provision. We disagree. In our opinion the provision is more logically and reasonably interpreted if the joinder requirement is applied only to the alienation clause. In our view, a requirement of spousal joinder when that spouse is the grantee was not intended by the constitutional drafters, and is neither rational nor necessary to protect the homestead heirs.
The district court of appeal decision relies upon our decision in Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976). In that case the present constitutional provision was considered only inferentially because (1) the subject property was at the time of the conveyance owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties and (2) the conveyance was made at a time when the 1885 constitutional provision was applicable. We held that the 1885 constitutional provision did not apply to an estate by the entireties occupied as a home of the parties, citing Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950). In so doing, we stated:
335 So. 2d  at 812. Much reliance was placed by the district court on this portion of our opinion, particularly the sentence stating that the same requirements are in our present constitutional provision. To eliminate any mistaken impression concerning our intent, we explain that this paragraph concluded there was no change between the 1885 constitutional provision and the 1972 constitutional provision concerning the disposal of property which is held as a tenancy by the entirety. By our Williams decision we did not intend to adopt a rationale which would require joinder by the spouse where there is interspousal alienation of solely owned homestead property by conveyance to the spouses as a tenancy by the entirety.
Our construction and interpretation of the constitutional provision is in complete harmony with section 689.11, Florida Statutes. The legislature in its interpretation of the constitutional provision obviously believed that joinder is not constitutionally required in circumstances such as those in the instant case. Our conclusion is also in accordance with the authors of Our Legal Chameleon (1972) and the Star Project Report to the Constitution Revision Commission.
The decision of the district court of appeal is reversed and remanded with directions that the trial court vacate summary judgment and enter a judgment in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.