Title: PATRICK FEENEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PATRICK FEENEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 67208 P.3d 50Case Number: No. S-08-0087Decided: 05/21/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
PATRICK 
FEENEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dion 
J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      After 
conditionally pleading guilty to a controlled substance offense, Patrick Feeney 
(the appellant) challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence discovered during a search of the vehicle he was driving.  He maintains that he was detained in 
violation of his constitutional rights.  Concluding the highway patrol trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the appellant after the original 
purpose of the traffic stop had ended, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
The 
sole issue presented for our review is whether the appellant's right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution was violated so as to require suppression of evidence and 
dismissal of charges.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      On March 20, 
2007, at approximately 11:45 a.m., Trooper Jeremy Beck of the Wyoming Highway 
Patrol noticed a vehicle travelling eastbound on Interstate 80.  The trooper locked his radar onto the 
vehicle and confirmed that the vehicle was travelling 80 miles per hour in a 75 
mile per hour zone.  The trooper 
pulled the vehicle over at approximately mile marker 354, a few miles outside of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  The appellant 
rolled down his window as the trooper approached his vehicle and the trooper 
immediately smelled the overwhelming scent of dryer sheets.  The trooper also noticed that the only 
luggage in the vehicle was a backpack in the back seat.  The trooper told the appellant he had 
pulled him over for speeding and the appellant provided the trooper his 
Massachusetts driver's license and the rental agreement for the 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶4]      
The 
appellant then accompanied the trooper back to the trooper's vehicle where the 
appellant sat in the front passenger seat.  
The trooper informed the appellant that he was going to write him a 
warning for speeding and began to review the rental agreement.  While reviewing the agreement, the 
trooper asked the appellant where he was travelling.  The appellant stated he was going home 
to Massachusetts from Oakland, California, where he had been visiting 
friends.  The rental agreement, 
however, required the appellant to return the vehicle in California.  Despite the discrepancy between 
appellant's statement concerning his travel plans (returning home to 
Massachusetts) and the terms of the rental agreement (return the vehicle to 
California), the trooper issued a warning ticket and told the appellant he was 
free to go.

 
 

[¶5]      
As 
the appellant returned to his vehicle the trooper reinitiated contact as the 
appellant was getting in the driver's side door.  The trooper asked the appellant if he 
would be willing to answer a few more questions about the rental agreement 
before he left.  In response, the 
appellant stated that he was in a hurry and asked why the trooper wanted to ask 
more questions.  The trooper 
explained to the appellant his concern that the rental agreement showed that the 
appellant was to return the vehicle to Oakland, California, and the appellant 
had told the trooper that he was taking the vehicle to Massachusetts.  The appellant responded that he had 
called the rental company and changed the destination to Massachusetts.  Upon the trooper's request, the 
appellant told the trooper he could call the rental company to verify the change 
in the final destination.  The 
trooper called the rental company and asked about the change; however, the 
company had no record of any change in the agreement.  When the trooper asked if there was any 
way the destination could have been changed and not entered into the computer 
system, the rental company representative stated that any change is updated 
immediately throughout all of the rental company's computers.  The trooper concluded his phone call to 
the rental company and told the appellant that they had no record of any changes 
to the rental agreement.  The 
appellant responded, "that's weird because I did call."  The trooper then asked the appellant if 
he was initially planning to bring the vehicle back to California when he first 
rented the vehicle and the appellant responded "no."

 
 

[¶6]      
After 
this conversation concerning the rental agreement, the trooper asked the 
appellant if there were any illegal drugs in the vehicle.  The appellant responded that there were 
not.  The trooper then asked if the 
appellant would consent to a search of the vehicle.  The appellant refused.  The trooper then told the appellant that 
he was going to detain him until a K-9 unit arrived to perform a "free-air" 
sniff around the vehicle.  The K-9 
unit arrived a short time later and alerted in the vicinity of the back door and 
trunk of the appellant's vehicle.  
The trooper searched the vehicle and found a duffle bag containing 
airtight packages of what was ultimately confirmed to be 
marijuana.

 
 

[¶7]      
On 
March 21, 2007, the appellant was charged with one count of possession of 
marijuana with the intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
On May 25, 2007, the appellant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that 
the search of his vehicle and seizure of the marijuana was in violation of his 
constitutional rights under both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions and 
thus the marijuana evidence should not be admissible.  A hearing on the appellant's motion was 
held on August 8, 2007, and the district court entered an Order Denying Motion 
to Suppress on August 24, 2007.

 
 

[¶8]      
The 
parties filed a Plea Agreement for Recommended Disposition wherein the appellant 
entered a guilty plea to the charged crime and reserved his right to appeal the 
district court's ruling.  As part of 
the plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss the felony possession charge and 
to recommend a sentence of three to five years incarceration, with the sentence 
to be suspended in lieu of four years of supervised probation.  The appellant was sentenced as described 
above and then timely filed a notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]                              
When 
reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court does not 
disturb findings on factual issues made by the district court unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1124 
(Wyo. 1997) (citing Bravo v. State, 897 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Wyo. 1995)). 
 At the suppression hearing, the 
district court has the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight to be given the evidence and to make the necessary inferences, 
deductions and conclusions; therefore, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination. Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1124 (citing Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 1994)).  On those issues where 
the district court has not made specific findings of fact, this Court will 
uphold the general ruling of the court below if supported by any reasonable view 
of the evidence.  Neilson v. 
State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 
(Wyo. 1979).  The issue of law, 
whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of 
constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999). 
 A district court judgment may be 
affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record.  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000); 
see also Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1286 n.7 (Wyo. 
1982); Jones v. State, 
602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 

State 
v. Williams, 
2004 WY 53, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 85, 88 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶10]   The appellant concedes that the 
traffic stop was justified and that the trooper's initial questioning inside the 
patrol car was proper and did not exceed the scope of the stop.  However, the appellant claims that he 
did not consent to further questioning after he exited the trooper's vehicle and 
that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to further detain him once 
the appellant received his warning ticket.  
Because we conclude that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to justify 
expanding the scope of the questioning and to further detain the appellant, we 
will confine our analysis to that dispositive question.

 
 
Independent 
State Constitutional Analysis

 
 

[¶11]   The 
appellant raises his claim under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1 § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  We have said that when a litigant 
endeavors to interpret the Wyoming Constitution independent of the Federal 
Constitution, the litigant "must provide a precise, 
analytically sound approach when advancing" such a claim.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Dworkin v. L.F.P., 
Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992)).  
Six factors must be analyzed when a separate state constitutional claim 
has been raised:  1) the textual 
language; 2) the differences in the text; 3) constitutional history; 4) 
preexisting state law; 5) structural differences; and 6) matters of particular 
state or local concern.  Saldana 
v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 
621-24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant's attempt to present 
an independent state constitutional claim falls short.  Although he mentions the above-cited 
factors, he fails to analyze any of them, or even generally describe how Article 
1 § 4 might provide him greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.  We will therefore confine our analysis 
to the Fourth Amendment.  

 
 

Fourth 
Amendment

 
 

[¶13]   The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

 
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.

 
 
U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. We recognize three tiers of interaction between police and 
citizens for Fourth Amendment purposes: 

 
 
The 
least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter. 
 Custer [v. State, 2006 WY 72], ¶ 13, 
135 P.3d [620], 624-25 [(Wyo. 2006)]. A consensual encounter is not a seizure 
and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.  The second tier is the investigatory or 
Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An 
investigatory detention is a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  However, because of its limited nature, a 
law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence of specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" in order to 
justify the detention.  Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1994). 
 The most intrusive encounter 
between police and a citizen is an arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a 
crime.'"  Id. at 625, 135 P.3d 620 quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
219-20.

 
 

Flood 
v. State, 
2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007).  A traffic stop is more analogous to an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest; therefore the reasonableness of 
such a stop is analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Terry v. Ohio:  1) whether the initial stop was 
justified; and 2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance." Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 705 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994)).  

 
 
During 
a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request a driver's 
license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and 
issue a citation. Campbell [v. State, 2004 WY 106], ¶ 12, 
97 P.3d [781,] 785 [(Wyo. 2004)]; Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706 (citing 
Burgos-Seberos v. State, 
969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998); United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 
1997)). Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way without 
further delay once the officer determines the driver has a valid driver's 
license and is entitled to operate the vehicle.  Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706; see also 
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997); Barch [v. State, 2004 WY 79], ¶ 9, 
92 P.3d [828,] 832 [(Wyo. 2004)].  In the absence of consent, an officer may 
expand the investigative detention beyond the purpose of the initial stop only 
if there exists an "objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion' that 
criminal activity has occurred or is occurring." Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706 (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 
2001)). The existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances. 
Damato, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d  at 
707.  The "whole picture" must be 
considered, "[c]ommon sense and ordinary human experience are to be employed, 
and deference is to be accorded a law enforcement officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."  Id. (citing Wood, 106 F.3d at 
946).

 
 

Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 14, 172 P.3d 725, 729 (Wyo. 2007).  Finally,

 
 
The 
Supreme Court has instructed that we not examine each factor adding up to 
reasonable suspicion individually, but that we evaluate how convincingly they 
fit together into a cohesive, convincing picture of illegal conduct.  In [United States v.] Arvizu, [534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002)], the Court rejected what is called a 
"divide-and-conquer analysis," noting that reasonable suspicion may exist even 
if "each observation" is "susceptible to an innocent explanation."  Arvizu, 534 U.S.  at 274, 122 S. Ct. 744.

 
 

Id. 
at 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 16, 172 P.3d  at 730 (quoting United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 
787 (10th Cir. 2007)). 

 
 

[¶14]   In this case, the district court's 
order denying the motion to suppress listed the factors it found provided the 
trooper reasonable suspicion to further detain the 
appellant:

 
 
Here, 
it appears there were numerous factors present that led Trooper Beck to conclude 
that he had reasonable suspicion that some illicit activity was occurring.  These factors include: 1) the 
overwhelming smell of dryer sheets emanating from the Defendant's car with no 
dryer sheets or laundry in sight; 2) there was only one small bag visible in the 
back seat; 3) the Defendant exhibited extreme nervousness and this nervousness 
did not subside even after the Defendant was informed he would only be receiving 
a warning; 4) the Defendant's travel plans were inconsistent with the rental 
agreement; and, 5) upon being questioned about his travel plans, the Defendant 
initially claimed he had called [the rental company] to inform them of his 
intention to return the car in Massachusetts but then stated he never had any 
intention to return the car in California.

 
 

[¶15]   The 
appellant does not dispute the district court's factual findings surrounding the 
above factors, rather he contends that these facts were insufficient to provide 
the trooper with reasonable suspicion to justify further detention and 
questioning.  We disagree.  When we view facts surrounding the 
traffic stop and the factors considered by the district court in context of the 
totality of the circumstances, we must affirm the district court's conclusion 
that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.

 
 

[¶16]   We 
begin with the scent of dryer sheets.  
"Fourth Amendment precedent is clear that the scent of a potential 
masking agent is one factor which may be considered in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis."  Flood, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 24, 169 P.3d  at 
546 (citing United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) (odor of detergent supported reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity)); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(odor of patchouli oil supported reasonable suspicion of drug offense where 
officer testified the oil was often used to cover the scent of marijuana).  This Court has found that the strong 
odor of dryer sheets, especially in the case of rental cars, which typically do 
not need strong air fresheners, is a factor that may be properly considered in a 
determination of reasonable suspicion.  Garvin, 2007 WY 190, ¶¶ 15-17, 172 P.3d  
at 729-30.

 
 

[¶17]   Here, 
the trooper testified that the overwhelming smell of dryer sheets  which was 
immediately apparent when the appellant rolled down the window  was unusual 
because based on his training and experience having pulled over "lots and lots" 
of rental vehicles, such vehicles typically have a "clean car" or "new car" 
scent.  The trooper also testified 
that, based on his training and experience, dryer sheets are used to mask the 
odor of a controlled substance.  Also, the trooper did not see any dryer 
sheets or laundry in the vehicle that would explain the strong odor.  We find that the district court properly 
considered this factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis.  

 
 

[¶18]   The next factor the district court 
considered was the appellant's extreme and continuing nervousness. 
"[G]eneric 
nervousness is of little significance in establishing reasonable suspicion 
because the average citizen is usually nervous when stopped by law enforcement 
for a routine traffic violation.'"  
Flood, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 27, 169 P.3d  at 546 (citing Barch v. State, 
2004 WY 79, ¶ 11, 92 P.3d 828, 833 (Wyo. 2004)).  "It is 
generally accepted that nervousness upon the initial confrontation is normal and 
the telling information is whether the citizen calmed after the initial few 
minutes of the encounter.  Extreme 
and continued nervousness, however, "is entitled to somewhat more 
weight."'"  Damato, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 21, 64 P.3d  at 708 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 
271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)). 

 
 
[¶19]   The trooper testified that during 
the short conversation that took place at the driver's side window of the 
appellant's vehicle, the appellant was acting very nervous.  He appeared to be trying to avoid 
conversing with the trooper by looking straight forward and to the floorboard 
and the appellant's hands were shaking so badly that he had to put them down on 
his pant leg to control the shaking.  
The trooper testified that, based on his experience, most individuals 
make eye contact with him and their attention is focused on him during a traffic 
stop, as most individuals want to know the reason for the stop, what they did 
wrong, and whether the trooper is going to give them a ticket.  The trooper also testified that he found 
it unusual that the appellant's nervousness continued even after the trooper 
informed him that he was only going to write him a warning for speeding.  The trooper 
testified:

 
 
Just 
off my training experience, when I speak with people, you can kind of get a 
judge of if  how they are reacting to you as in nervous behavior.  A lot [of] times when you stop people 
and you stop them for speeding or for lane use, that type of thing, the biggest 
factor for them is whether or not they are getting a ticket or a warning.  A lot of times they are very nervous 
up-front because they are thinking they are going to have to pay a fine.  And as a traffic stop goes on, their 
nervous behavior usually subdues down quite a bit.

 
 
The 
trooper also noted the appellant's continued nervous behavior while the trooper 
reviewed the rental agreement.  The 
trooper testified that in his experience most motorists will engage him in 
conversation as he looks over a rental agreement, asking him what he is looking 
for or offering to help the trooper by providing additional information.  Finally, even after the trooper told the 
appellant he was only issuing him a warning and that he was free to go, the 
trooper described the appellant's continued 
nervousness:

 
 
Q.   What was his demeanor like when he 
was leaving your car?

A.   Hurriedly, as if he was wanting to 
get away from me, he's done.  He was 
still nervous.  The nervousness had 
never subdued.  In fact, as he 
exited the patrol car and went back to his vehicle, it was more at a fast walk 
as he was trying to get away from the patrol car.

 
 
We 
find that it was proper for the district court to consider the appellant's 
continuing nervousness as a factor in the reasonable suspicion 
determination.

 
 

[¶20]   Finally, we turn to the 
inconsistencies in appellant's statements regarding his travel plans.  We have recognized that unusual or 
inconsistent travel plans are a proper consideration in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis.  Flood, 2007 WY 167, ¶¶ 30, 33, 169 P.3d 
at 547-48; see also United States v. 
Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946-47 (10th Cir. 1997) ("unusual travel plans may 
provide an indicia of reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 
1431 (10th Cir. 1997) ("contradictory or implausible travel plans can contribute 
to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity").

 
 

[¶21]   During 
their initial conversation, the appellant told the trooper that he was returning 
home to Massachusetts from California where he had been visiting friends.  The trooper became suspicious of this 
statement after seeing that the terms of the rental agreement required the 
appellant to return the vehicle to California.  Further, the trooper testified that he 
was concerned that although the rental agreement required the vehicle to be 
returned to the same location where it was rented, the appellant's statements 
indicated that it was actually one-way rental.  The trooper testified that in his 
experience, one-way rental vehicles are often used to transport illegal 
drugs.

 
 
A.  Like I was saying, a lot of vehicles 
that are being used to transport illegal drugs are rental vehicles.  And there are several different reasons 
why they use rental vehicles.

            
Rental vehicles are used for not having liability if the vehicle gets 
seized because it goes back to the rental company.  They are not losing their vehicle.  If they rent a vehicle, they don't have 
to worry about it being their own vehicle.  
They can take that vehicle, take it to another area in the United States, 
drop that vehicle off, and get on a plane to fly back and can erase their hands 
from it to be done and over with.

            
Q.  So are you indicating 
that it's just the fact that it's a rental vehicle, or is it  would it be 
suspicious if it's a one-way rental vehicle?

            
A.  One-way rental 
vehicle.  

 
 
Finally, 
although the appellant represented to the trooper that he had called the rental 
company to resolve the discrepancies in the rental agreement, when the trooper 
contacted the rental company, they had no record of any contact by the 
appellant.  We find that the 
district court properly considered this factor in its reasonable suspicion 
analysis.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶22]   The 
behaviors and observations discussed above, when considered in isolation, could 
be interpreted as innocent.  Our 
task, however, is to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether these facts, when considered together, justify a reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity.  Looking at the 
whole picture, we affirm the district court's determination inasmuch as the 
overwhelming smell of dryer sheets, the appellant's extreme and continuing 
nervousness, and the appellant's behaviors related to the irregularities in his 
travel plans provided the trooper with reasonable suspicion to detain the 
appellant until the K-9 unit arrived.

 
 

[¶23]   Affirmed.