Title: Cleveland v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6318.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6318 
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6318.] 
R.C. 9.68 is a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does 
not unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home-rule authority. 
(No. 2009-2280 — Submitted October 12, 2010 — Decided December 29, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 92663,  
185 Ohio App.3d 59, 2009-Ohio-5968. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 9.68 is a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does 
not unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home rule authority. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether R.C. 9.68, a statute enacted 
by the General Assembly in 2006 that provides that only federal or state 
regulations can limit an Ohioan’s individual right to bear arms, is a general law.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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We hold that R.C. 9.68 is a general law that displaces municipal firearm 
ordinances and does not unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home rule 
authority. 
I.  Procedural History 
{¶ 2} In 2006, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.68 as a component 
of Sub.H.B. No. 347, effective March 14, 2007, recognizing that the right to keep 
and bear arms is a “fundamental individual right” that is “constitutionally 
protected in every part of Ohio,” but that there was a “need to provide uniform 
laws throughout the state” regulating ownership and possession of firearms.  R.C. 
9.68(A), 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8138, 8139. 
{¶ 3} Before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.68, the city of 
Cleveland, plaintiff-appellee, enacted several ordinances regulating firearms, 
including Cleveland Codified Ordinance 627.08 (possession of firearms by 
minors), 627.09 (possessing deadly weapons on private property), 627.10 
(possessing certain weapons at or about public places), 627A.02 (access to 
firearms, prohibiting children access to firearms), 628.03 (unlawful conduct, 
prohibiting possession and sale of assault weapons), and 674.05 (registration of 
handguns). 
{¶ 4} In March 2007, the city filed a complaint against the state of Ohio, 
defendant-appellant, seeking a declaration that R.C. 9.68 (1) is an unconstitutional 
infringement of Cleveland’s home rule powers under Section 3, Article XVIII of 
the Ohio Constitution, (2) is an abuse of legislative power, and (3) violates the 
single-subject provision of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  
The trial court denied the city’s motion for summary judgment and granted the 
state’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial court concluded that based on 
this court’s holding in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, R.C. 9.68 is constitutional and does 
not violate the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution.  The trial court 
January Term, 2010 
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further held that R.C. 9.68 is a “general law that is part of a comprehensive 
statewide legislative enactment,” that Sub.H.B. No. 347 did not violate the single 
subject rule, and that the General Assembly did not abuse its legislative power in 
enacting the law. 
{¶ 5} The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of 
the trial court and remanded the cause for entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the city.  In so ruling, the court of appeals held that R.C. 9.68 is not a general law, 
that it unconstitutionally limits municipalities’ home rule powers, and that it 
violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution.  We accepted 
the state’s discretionary appeal.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
II. Law and Analysis 
{¶ 6} We begin by recognizing the fundamental principle that a court 
must “presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.” Arnold v. 
Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, citing Univ. Hts. v. 
O'Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 22 O.O.3d 372, 429 N.E.2d 148, and 
Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 405 N.E.2d 
1047.  Therefore, we begin by presuming that R.C. 9.68 is constitutional, and so it 
“will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 39.  See also State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 7} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, commonly 
known as the Home Rule Amendment, gives municipalities the “authority to 
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in 
conflict with general laws.”  Today we must determine whether R.C. 9.68 is a 
general law. 
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{¶ 8} We first turn to the words of the statute in question.  R.C. 9.68 
provides:  
{¶ 9} “(A) The individual right to keep and bear arms, being a 
fundamental individual right that predates the United States Constitution and Ohio 
Constitution, and being a constitutionally protected right in every part of Ohio, the 
general assembly finds the need to provide uniform laws throughout the state 
regulating the ownership, possession, purchase, other acquisition, transport, 
storage, carrying, sale, or other transfer of firearms, their components, and their 
ammunition.  Except as specifically provided by the United States Constitution, 
Ohio Constitution, state law, or federal law, a person, without further license, 
permission, restriction, delay, or process, may own, possess, purchase, sell, 
transfer, transport, store, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its components, 
and its ammunition.” 
{¶ 10} Traditionally, we have used a three-part test to evaluate conflicts 
under the Home Rule Amendment.  “A state statute takes precedence over a local 
ordinance when (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of 
local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in 
conflict with the statute.”  Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-
270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 11} The first and third parts of the analysis are not involved in this 
case.  The city acknowledges that its firearm ordinances are an exercise of 
municipal police power.  Further, the city does not argue that its local firearm 
ordinances do not conflict with R.C. 9.68.  Thus, our focus is on the second part 
of the home rule analysis, which involves determination of whether R.C. 9.68 is a 
general law. 
A. Is R.C. 9.68 a General Law for Purposes of 
Home Rule Analysis? 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 12} “A general law has been described as one which promotes 
statewide uniformity.”  Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. 
Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 602 N.E.2d 1147.  “Once a matter has 
become of such general interest that it is necessary to make it subject to statewide 
control as to require uniform statewide regulation, the municipality can no longer 
legislate in the field so as to conflict with the state.”  State ex rel. McElroy v. 
Akron (1962), 173 Ohio St. 189, 194, 19 O.O.2d 3, 181 N.E.2d 26. 
{¶ 13} In Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 
N.E.2d 963, this court held that to constitute a general law for purposes of home-
rule analysis, a statute must “(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive 
legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate 
uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a 
municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary or similar regulations, and (4) 
prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”  Canton at syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Applying the Canton test, the court of appeals concluded that R.C. 
9.68 is not a general law, because it failed the first, third, and fourth prongs of the 
Canton test.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
1.  Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment 
{¶ 15} Under the first prong of the Canton test, we must examine whether 
R.C. 9.68 is part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment.  The 
court of appeals held that Sub.H.B. No. 347 pertains to a matter of statewide 
concern but that it is not comprehensive, because it leaves a “great deal of firearm 
activity unregulated.”  Cleveland v. State, 185 Ohio App.3d 59, 2009-Ohio-5968, 
923 N.E.2d 183, ¶ 19.  Specifically, the court held that Sub.H.B. No. 347 did not 
address discharge of firearms, possession and sale of assault weapons, carrying 
firearms in public places, possession and use of firearms by minors, registration of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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handguns, registration and licensing of firearm dealers, licensing of firearm 
owners, and background checks for firearm purchasers.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 16} In Clyde, this court held that “[t]he General Assembly reiterated 
the need for uniformity in R.C. 9.68(A), which represents an attempt by that body 
to nullify all municipal laws impeding uniform application of the state statute.”  
Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, at ¶ 40.  In addition 
to pointing to the words of the statute, we concluded that “[t]he General Assembly 
could not have been more direct in expressing its intent for statewide 
comprehensive handgun-possession laws.”  Id. at ¶ 41.  Thus, this court held that 
R.C. 2923.126, “which regulates handgun possession as part of the licensing 
procedure,” was a statewide comprehensive legislative enactment.  Id. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, today we reaffirm what we held in Clyde—that R.C. 
9.68 is part of a comprehensive statewide legislative enactment—and we hold that 
the court of appeals erred in analyzing R.C. 9.68 in a vacuum.  There are a host of 
state and federal laws regulating firearms.  For example, statutes prohibit 
possession of firearms in specific places.  See, e.g., R.C. 1547.69 (vessels), 
2921.36 (detention and mental health facilities), 2923.121 (liquor establishments), 
2923.122 (school zones), and 2923.123 (courthouses).  Other statutes preclude 
discharge of firearms in certain locations.  See, e.g., R.C. 1541.19 (state parks), 
2909.08 (airports), 2923.16 (motor vehicles), 2923.161 (habitation structures), 
and 2923.162 (cemeteries, schoolhouses, churches, dwellings, charitable 
institutions, and public roads). 
{¶ 18} In addition, there are statutes that prohibit certain persons from 
possessing firearms.  See, e.g., R.C. 2923.13 (felons and incompetents), 2923.15 
(persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol), and 2923.211 (minors).  
Further, state law bans the acquisition and possession of certain firearms, such as 
automatic firearms, sawed off firearms, zip guns, and semiautomatic weapons.  
R.C. 2923.11(E) and (K) and R.C. 2923.17.  Other statutes preclude the reckless 
January Term, 2010 
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transfer of a firearm to a person with a disability, R.C. 2923.20, preclude the 
defacement of identification marks on firearms, R.C. 2923.201, authorize 
interstate firearm transactions, R.C. 2923.22, and specify that locking devices be 
offered with all firearm sales, R.C. 2923.25. 
{¶ 19} Other state statutes establish a framework of laws regarding 
carrying concealed handguns.  See, e.g., R.C. 2923.125 (licensing procedures) and 
2923.126 (establishes a list of places where carrying concealed handguns is 
prohibited and where it is permitted).  Still other statutes enhance criminal 
sentences when a defendant commits certain offenses with a firearm.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 2941.141 (one-year prison term for general firearm specification), 2941.144 
(six-year prison term for possessing an automatic firearm or a firearm with a 
muffler), 2941.145 (three-year prison term for displaying or brandishing a 
firearm), 2941.146 (five-year prison term for discharging a firearm from a motor 
vehicle), and 2941.1412 (seven-year prison term for discharging a firearm at 
police officers or at corrections officers). 
{¶ 20} Finally, our state firearm laws also integrate federal firearm laws.  
See, e.g., R.C. 2923.22(C).  Federal laws impose mandatory background checks 
for firearm purchasers and prohibit persons with certain disabilities (such as prior 
felony convictions, mental defects, or illegal alien status) from possessing 
firearms.  Section 922(g),(s), and (t), Title 18, U.S.Code.  Federal laws also 
require firearm dealers to meet specific qualifications and obtain a license and 
they criminalize the transport and sale of firearms by unlicensed persons.  
Sections 922(a) and 923, Title 18, U.S.Code.  In addition, federal law requires 
that the sale of two or more firearms be reported to the attorney general and state 
law enforcement, Section 923(g)(3)(A), Title 18, U.S.Code, and requires that 
records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of 
firearms be maintained.  Section 923(g)(1), Title 18, U.S.Code. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 21} A comprehensive enactment need not regulate every aspect of 
disputed conduct, nor must it regulate that conduct in a particularly invasive 
fashion.  See Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-
92, 880 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 20 (“There is no requirement that a statute must be devoid 
of exceptions to remain statewide and comprehensive in effect”).  “ 
‘[C]omprehensive’ does not mean ‘perfect.’ ”  Dayton v. State (2d Dist.), 157 
Ohio App.3d 736, 2004-Ohio-3141, 813 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 89.  Nor does 
“comprehensive” mean “exhaustive.”  And the fact that regulations of firearms 
appear in various code chapters does not nullify the fact that they are all part of a 
comprehensive enactment concerning firearms.  This court, in Am. Fin. Servs. 
Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, held 
that the General Assembly had enacted  comprehensive consumer mortgage 
lending regulations even though the applicable provisions–R.C. 1.63 and 1349.25 
through 1349.37–were codified in two different chapters.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 22} Again, we hold that the court of appeals erred in considering R.C. 
9.68 in isolation.  In Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold 
(1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 442 N.E.2d 1278, when considering whether a statute 
prohibiting regulation of properly licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities by a 
political subdivision was a valid general law, we held that “[t]he section of law 
questioned * * * should not be read and interpreted in isolation from the other 
sections [of the Revised Code Chapter] dealing with the state’s control of the 
disposal of hazardous wastes.  All such sections read in pari materia do not 
merely prohibit subdivisions of the state from regulation of these facilities.  
Conversely, the statutory scheme contained in this chapter is a comprehensive one 
enacted to insure that such facilities are designed, sited, and operated in the 
manner which best serves the statewide public interest.”  Id. at 48. 
{¶ 23} “Considered in isolation, * * * a provision may fail to qualify as a 
general law because it prohibits a municipality from exercising a local police 
January Term, 2010 
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power while not providing for uniform statewide regulation of the same subject 
matter.”  N. Olmsted, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 245, 602 N.E.2d 1147.  Rather than 
considering R.C. 9.68 in pari materia with other statutes regulating firearms, the 
court of appeals considered the provision in isolation, leading to the erroneous 
conclusion that the statute is not part of a statewide comprehensive legislative 
enactment regulating firearms. 
{¶ 24} We note that when we determined in Clyde that R.C. 9.68 is part of 
a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, we took into account that 
the General Assembly had “express[ed] its intent for statewide comprehensive 
handgun possession laws.”  Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 
N.E.2d 967, ¶ 41.  The General Assembly indicated that its intent in enacting R.C. 
9.68 was “to provide uniform laws throughout the state” for firearm ownership 
and possession.  R.C. 9.68(A).  Moreover, statements made on the floor of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate reflect the General Assembly’s belief 
that the legislation would bring uniformity to the state, superseding the existing 
patchwork of local firearm ordinances, which varied from one jurisdiction to the 
next.  See statements of Representative Jim Aslanides, House Session, Mar. 8, 
2006, 126th General Assembly and Senator Jim Jordan, Senate Session, Nov. 29, 
2006, 126th General Assembly. 
{¶ 25} We reaffirm the holding that R.C. 9.68 is part of a statewide 
comprehensive legislative enactment. 
2.  Uniform Operation Throughout the State 
{¶ 26} As noted by the court of appeals, it is undisputed that R.C. 9.68 
meets the second prong of the Canton test.  The statute applies to all parts of the 
state and operates uniformly. 
3.  Establishes Police Regulations Rather Than Granting or  
Limiting Municipal Legislative Power 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 27} Under the third prong of the Canton test, a general law must set 
forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations rather than simply granting or limiting 
municipal legislative power.  The court of appeals held that R.C. 9.68 attempts to 
curtail the city’s home rule police powers without enacting legislation to remedy 
the purported ill of a confusing patchwork of municipal regulations involving 
firearms.  The appellate court once again found that R.C. 9.68 has many gaps, and 
to support that holding, it relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422, 859 N.E.2d 514, 
wherein she stated: “In comparison to other states, Ohio has barely touched upon 
the subject of firearm possession, use, transfer, and ownership.”  Id. at ¶ 53. 
{¶ 28} However, the fact that some states have more regulations than 
Ohio does not warrant a conclusion that Ohio’s statutory scheme for regulating 
firearms is not comprehensive, nor does it mean that R.C. 9.68 does not set forth a 
police regulation.  We conclude that R.C. 9.68 establishes police regulations 
rather than limiting municipal legislative power. 
4.  Prescribes a Rule of Conduct Upon Citizens Generally 
{¶ 29} The court of appeals held that R.C. 9.68 does not prescribe a rule 
of conduct upon citizens generally but instead limits lawmaking by municipal 
legislative bodies.  However, we note again that the court of appeals erred in 
considering R.C. 9.68 in isolation rather than as part of Ohio’s comprehensive 
collection of firearm laws.  In Am. Fin. Servs. and Mendenhall,  this court looked 
to other statutes regulating the same subject to determine whether the particular 
statute in question prescribed a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.  See Am. 
Fin., 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 36, and 
Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 27.  
Thus, when we consider the entire legislative scheme, as we must, we conclude 
that when interpreted as part of a whole, R.C. 9.68 applies to all citizens 
generally. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
B.  Separation of Powers Analysis 
{¶ 30} In addition to regulating possession and ownership of firearms, 
R.C. 9.68 also provides:  “In addition to any other relief provided, the court shall 
award costs and reasonable attorney fees to any person, group, or entity that 
prevails in a challenge to an ordinance, rule, or regulation as being in conflict with 
this section.”   R.C. 9.68(B). 
{¶ 31} The court of appeals held that the General Assembly’s decision to 
include a provision that awards attorney fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs in 
R.C. 9.68 invades the province of the judiciary.  The court held that the provision 
unconstitutionally “usurp[ed] judicial discretion in the award of attorney’s fees 
and costs,” and “invite[d] unwarranted litigation and attempt[ed] to coerce 
municipalities into repealing or refusing to enforce longstanding local firearm 
regulations.”  Cleveland v. State, 185 Ohio App.3d 59, 2009-Ohio-5968, 923 
N.E.2d 183, ¶ 33 and 34.  Again, we disagree. 
{¶ 32} The General Assembly has enacted many statutes that provide for 
the award of attorney fees and costs to parties who prevail in certain types of 
cases, as a means to deter certain conduct.  See, e.g., R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) (public 
records request);  13010.06(D) (unconscionable consumer leases); 1345.75(A) 
(nonconforming motor vehicle law, i.e., “Lemon Law”); 2151.23(G) (child 
support contempt proceedings);  2743.48(F)(2) (wrongful imprisonment); and 
3105.18(G) (spousal support contempt proceedings), to name a few.  In addition, 
the General Assembly has enacted statutes, such as R.C. 1345.09, which is part of 
the Consumer Sales Practices Act, that authorize treble damages awards against 
defendants for certain statutory violations. 
{¶ 33} Moreover, in Sorin v. Warrensville Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 177, 75 O.O.2d 224, 347 N.E.2d 527, this court considered 
whether a statute authorizing a court to grant “the relief prayed for in the petition 
as may be proper in accordance with the evidence” impliedly permitted the trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, to permit the recovery of attorney 
fees in situations where the public policy of the state would otherwise be 
subverted.  This court held that  it did not: “The General Assembly has expressly 
provided for the recovery of attorney fees, as part of the costs of litigation, with 
respect to certain statutory actions. See, e. g., R.C. 163.21, 309.13, 733.61, 
1313.51, 5519.02. See, also, Billington v. Cotner (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 17, 305 
N.E.2d 805; State, ex rel. White, v. Cleveland (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 37, 295 
N.E.2d 665; Shuey v. Preston [(1961), 172 Ohio St. 413, 177 N.E.2d 789].  In 
light of the expressed precedent in this state, State, ex rel. Michaels v. Morse [165 
Ohio St. 599, 60 O.O. 531, 138 N.E.2d 660], we defer to the General Assembly 
on the matter of statutory authorization of recovery of attorney fees as part of the 
costs of litigation.”  Id. at 180. 
{¶ 34} Thus, the General Assembly is clearly within its legislative 
authority to authorize the award of attorney fees and costs in R.C. 9.68(B).  
Therefore, R.C. 9.68’s authorization for awards of attorney fees and costs does 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 35} R.C. 9.68 addresses the General Assembly’s concern that absent a 
uniform law throughout the state, law abiding gun owners would face a confusing 
patchwork of licensing requirements, possession restrictions, and criminal 
penalties as they travel from one jurisdiction to another.  We hold that R.C. 9.68  
is a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does not 
unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home rule authority.  Moreover, we hold 
that the authorization for awards of attorney fees and costs in R.C. 9.68 does not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals for it to 
address the city’s assignment of error that Sub.H.B. No. 347 violates the one 
subject rule, an issue which the court of appeals previously held to be moot. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP. JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} The Home Rule Amendment, Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio 
Constitution, states: "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of 
local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 
police, sanitary, and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 
laws." 
{¶ 37} In Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-
Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 31, the court stated: "A statement by the General 
Assembly of its intent to preempt a field of legislation is a statement of legislative 
intent * * * but does not trump the constitutional authority of municipalities to 
enact legislation pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment * * *."  From this, I 
conclude that the General Assembly is incapable of casting a preemption blanket 
over an entire field. 
{¶ 38} The key issue when analyzing whether a local ordinance is a 
proper subject of home rule is whether the ordinance conflicts with general laws.  
Id.  In Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 169, 60 O.O.2d 117, 285 
N.E.2d 714, we stated that "in order for * * * a conflict to arise, the state statute 
must positively permit what the ordinance prohibits, or vice versa, regardless of 
the extent of state regulation concerning the same object."  We have also stated 
that "[n]o real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be 
right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa."  Struthers v. Sokol 
(1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 N.E. 519.  When applying legal tests, such as 
the test set forth in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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N.E.2d 963, ¶ 9, it is possible to overlook the common-sense principles that 
undergird the test.  It is not enough to determine that R.C. 9.68 is a general law or 
that R.C. 9.68 is extensive, the Cleveland ordinances must be shown to conflict 
with the statute.  In this case, I conclude that the Cleveland ordinances do not 
conflict with R.C. 9.68, because they does not permit something that the statute 
forbids or vice versa.  Sokol at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 39} Paragraph three of the syllabus in Sokol is even more specific, it 
states: "A police ordinance is not in conflict with a general law upon the same 
subject merely because certain specific acts are declared unlawful by the 
ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the general law * * *."  I believe that 
R.C. 9.68 infringes upon municipalities' constitutional home-rule rights by 
preventing them from tailoring ordinances concerning the regulation of guns to 
local conditions.  I dissent. 
 
BROWN, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, and Gary S. Singletary, 
Assistant Law Director, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant. 
McNamee & McNamee, P.L.L., Cynthia P. McNamee, and Michael P. 
McNamee, urging affirmance for amicus curiae city of Englewood. 
Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P., William F. Abrams, Karen Lu, and 
Christopher Chang; and David Cannon, urging affirmance for amici curiae Legal 
Community Against Violence, Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, Brady 
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, States United to 
Prevent Gun Violence, Violence Policy Center, Ohio State University Youth 
Violence Prevention Advisory Board, National Council of Jewish Women 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
Cleveland Section, Ohio State Public Affairs of the National Council of Jewish 
Women, Toledo Area Ministries, Toledo Police Patrolman’s Association, city of 
Akron, city of Cincinnati, city of Columbus, city of East Cleveland, city of Parma, 
city of Shaker Heights, and village of New Albany. 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. 
Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
Lydy & Moan, Ltd., Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. 
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, L.L.P., and James B. Vogts; and 
Lawrence G. Keane, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Shooting Sports 
Foundation, Inc. 
______________________