Title: Ex parte Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Ann B. Garnett v. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 01/30/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070663
____________________
Ex parte Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Ann B. Garnett
v.
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-06-3877)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens")
petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit
1070663
Citizens is the successor entity to both the Florida
1
Windstorm Underwriting Association, which was "a non-profit
residual insurer, created by the Florida Legislature, to
provide insurance for wind damage to property owners who were
unable to obtain it otherwise,"  Zimmerman v. State, Office of
Ins. Regulation, 944 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006), and the Florida Residential Property Casualty Joint
Underwriting 
Association, 
which 
was 
established 
to 
address 
the
lack of available homeowner's property and casualty insurance
in the private-insurance market after Hurricane Andrew in
1992.  Symposium, Responsibility for the Restoration of the
Hurricane Insurance Industry: Business Proposal or State
Solution?, 31 Nova L. Rev. 527, 530-31 (2007).  
2
Court to vacate its order denying Citizens' motion to dismiss
an action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction and to
enter an order granting the motion to dismiss.  We grant the
petition.  
Ann B. Garnett, a resident of Huntsville, owned a two-
story beach home located in Navarre Beach, Florida.  The home
was insured against wind damage by Citizens, which is "a
[Florida] government entity that is an integral part of the
state, and that is not a private insurance company."  Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 627.351(6)(a)1 (2008).  The Florida legislature
established Citizens, a nonprofit corporation, "to provide
affordable property insurance to applicants who are in good
faith entitled to procure insurance through the voluntary
market but are unable to do so."   Id.  Citizens issues
1
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"Citizens' rates are required by law to be higher
than the rates of private insurers.  As a result,
Citizens has a rate structure that is not meant to
compete with the private market.  In fact, it is
'[d]esigned to offer insurance only where the
private market will not provide coverage' making it
the 'provider of last resort.'"
    
31 Nova L. Rev. at 531 (quoting Kevin M. McCarty et al., Task
Force 
on 
Long-term 
Solutions 
for 
Florida's 
Hurricane 
Insurance
Market 40 n.8 (2006)(footnotes omitted)).
3
insurance only on property located in Florida and only through
insurance agents licensed in Florida.  
In the aftermath of a series of hurricanes that struck
Florida in 2004, Citizens entered into agreements with
numerous independent claims adjusters to evaluate wind-damage
claims by Citizens' insureds.  One such adjuster was Allied
American Adjusting Company, LLC ("Allied), an Alabama limited
liability company.  Citizens' contract with Allied was entered
into in Florida.
In September 2004, Garnett's beach home was destroyed by
Hurricane Ivan.  Thereafter, she filed a claim on her Citizens
policy.  Allied was the claim adjuster for Garnett's claim.
Allied hired Joseph Morris, a resident of Mobile, as the
"primary adjuster" to assist with Garnett's claim.  Also,
Allied retained Engineering Fire Investigations ("EFI"), a
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The gravamen of Garnett's action against Citizens is
2
Citizens' decision not to pay for hurricane damage to
Garnett's residence in Florida.  The complaint does not allege
misrepresentation or suppression in relation to Garnett's
purchase of her insurance policy from Citizens.  Instead, the
allegations of misrepresentation and suppression in the
complaint concern 
only facts "related 
to 
the investigation 
and
adjustment of Ms. Garnett's claim," i.e., "that no evidence
existed of wind damage to the home" and that storm surge was
the cause of Garnett's loss.  The complaint contains no
allegation of reliance by Garnett on such representations.
The pendency of the present case indicates that Garnett did
not rely on any such representations and related denial of
4
Tennessee corporation that specializes in environmental
investigations, to assist with the investigation of Garnett's
claim.  
In May 2005, after Allied completed its review of
Garnett's claim, Citizens denied the claim on the grounds that
the damage to Garnett's beach home allegedly was caused by
storm surge from Hurricane Ivan, not by wind.  
In January 2006, Garnett sued Citizens, Allied, and EFI
in the Madison Circuit Court; she subsequently amended her
complaint to add Morris as a defendant.  Garnett's complaint,
as amended, contains claims of breach of contract, bad faith,
"[u]nfair claim settlement practices," see Florida Stat. Ann.
§ 
626.9541(1)(i) 
(2008), 
negligence, 
wantonness,
misrepresentation, 
suppression,  
and 
civil 
conspiracy,
2
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coverage.  See generally Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. State, 901
So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2004); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537
(1977) ("The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation can
recover against its maker for pecuniary loss resulting from it
if, but only if, ... he relies on the misrepresentation in
acting or refraining from action ....").  Thus, such
misrepresentations, 
even 
if 
made 
by 
Citizens 
in 
correspondence
received by Garnett in Alabama, provide no basis for specific-
contacts personal jurisdiction over Citizens in Alabama as
argued by Chief Justice Cobb in her dissent.  
Although Citizens enjoys limited immunity under Florida
3
law, the parties have not discussed the extent to which that
immunity might be pertinent to some of Garnett's claims.  See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.351(6)(r) (2008).  See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
5
specifically a conspiracy to conduct a biased investigation
that would lead to the denial of Garnett's insurance claim.3
 
Citizens filed a motion to dismiss Garnett's action on
the grounds that the Madison Circuit Court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Citizens and on grounds of forum non
conveniens.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-430 ("[T]he courts of
this state shall apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
determining whether to accept or decline to take jurisdiction
of an action based upon such claim originating outside this
state[.]").  In May 2006, the Madison Circuit Court conducted
a hearing on Citizens' motion.  In November 2006, the Madison
Circuit Court entered an order, sua sponte, transferring on
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6
forum non conveniens grounds the action to the Mobile Circuit
Court.  
In February 2007, the Mobile Circuit Court conducted a
hearing on Citizens' motion to dismiss, after which it ordered
limited discovery concerning Citizens' insureds who reside in
Alabama.  In part, the results of the ordered discovery
reflect that Citizens has approximately 1.3 million active
insurance policies and that, of the insurance policies
Citizens issued between 2002 and 2007 (either as an original
policy or as a renewal policy), 2,363 contain an Alabama
mailing address for notices and correspondence.   
According to an affidavit from Ray Walton, director of
claims for Citizens, Garnett initially obtained her policy
through a Florida insurance broker located in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.  Citizens mailed the notices for Garnett's policy to
the address Garnett provided on her application for insurance,
i.e., her Alabama address.  We also note that Walton averred
that Citizens maintains no place of business or office in
Alabama, it does not conduct business in Alabama, it has no
property in Alabama, it has no telephone listing in Alabama,
1070663
Citizens also filed a motion with the trial court
4
requesting that it stay further proceedings, including further
discovery, pending this Court's decision on Citizens' petition
for writ of mandamus.  The trial court denied the motion.
Citizens then filed a motion with this Court requesting that
we order the trial court to stay further proceedings pending
our decision on Citizens' petition.  We granted the motion.
7
it has no employees or authorized agents in Alabama, and it
has derived no income from business conducted in Alabama.  
On January 4, 2008, the Mobile Circuit Court entered an
order denying Citizens' motion to dismiss.  On January 24,
2008, Garnett, Allied, EFI, and Morris filed a joint motion to
dismiss, with prejudice, Garnett's claims against them; the
trial court entered an order dismissing the claims.  Thus,
Citizens is the only remaining defendant in Garnett's action.
Citizens petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its January 4,
2008, order and to enter an order of dismissal of Garnett's
claims against it on the grounds of lack of personal
jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.   Because we conclude
4
that Citizens' petition is due to be granted on the ground
that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Citizens, we pretermit any discussion of the issue whether
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The trial court made no findings of fact based on oral
5
testimony that might implicate the ore tenus rule.
8
Citizens' motion to dismiss should have been granted on the
ground of forum non conveniens.  
It is well settled that
"[m]andamus is 
a 
drastic 
and 
extraordinary 
writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."  
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).  A
petition for a writ of mandamus can be used to challenge the
denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala.
2001).  
The issue of personal jurisdiction "'stands or falls on
the unique facts of [each] case.'"  Ex parte I.M.C., Inc., 485
So. 2d 724, 725 (Ala. 1986) (quoting and adopting the trial
court's order).  "An appellate court considers de novo a trial
court's judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction."  Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726,
729 (Ala. 2002).   "In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R.
5
1070663
9
Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction,
a court must consider as true the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint not controverted by the defendant's
affidavits ...."  Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d at 798.  If,
however, 
"the defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal jurisdiction,
'the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the
jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by
affidavits or other competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations in the
complaint.'"  
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004) (quoting  Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal
Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)).
Where, as here, a case involves service of process on a
foreign defendant pursuant to Alabama's long-arm rule,
"[a]n appropriate basis exists for service of
process outside of this state ... when the person or
entity has such contacts with this state that the
prosecution of the action against the person or
entity in this state is not inconsistent with the
constitution of this state or the Constitution of
the United States ...."
Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  This Court has stated that  Rule
4.2 "extends the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to
the limit of due process under the United States and Alabama
1070663
10
Constitutions."  Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc.,
957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006).  
As to the "limits of due process" under the United States
Constitution, 
in 
International 
Shoe 
Co. 
v. 
State 
of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court stated: 
"[I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he [must] have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'"  
326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)); see also Sudduth v. Howard 646 So. 2d 664, 667 (Ala.
1994).  The Supreme Court continued in International Shoe:
"Whether due process is satisfied must depend ...
upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.  That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
"But to the extent that a corporation exercises
the privilege of conducting activities within a
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the
laws of that state.  The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
1070663
11
hardly be said to be undue."
326 U.S. at 319-20 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Personal jurisdiction can rest either on the theory of
specific jurisdiction, when "a State exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or
related to the defendant's contacts with the forum,"
Helicopteros Nacionalas de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.8 (1984), or on the theory of general jurisdiction,
"when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to
the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, [but]
... there are sufficient [continuous and systematic] contacts
between the State and the foreign corporation."  Id. at 414-
16; see also Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., supra.  This
Court has stated, however, that regardless of whether the
issue 
of 
jurisdiction 
is 
considered 
under 
specific-
jurisdiction analysis or under general-jurisdiction analysis,
"[t]he critical question with regard to the nonresident
defendant's contacts [with the forum state] is whether the
contacts are such that the nonresident defendant '"should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court"' in the forum
state."  Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 730 (quoting Burger King Corp.
1070663
12
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985), quoting in turn
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295
(1980)(emphasis added)).  As the Supreme Court has explained,
it is only "[w]hen a corporation 'purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. [235]  at 253 [(1958)],
[that] it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there."
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
"This 
purposeful-availment 
requirement 
assures 
that 
a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction as a result of
'"the unilateral activity of another person or a third
person."'" Elliot, 830 So. 2d at 731 (quoting Burger King, 471
U.S. at 475, quoting in turn Helicopteros Nacionalas de
Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 417).
Based on the materials submitted to the trial court
concerning Citizens' contacts with Alabama, we conclude that
its contacts are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements
for personal jurisdiction described above.  As already noted,
Citizens is a nonprofit "[Florida] government entity that is
an integral part of th[at] State."  Further, it insures only
property located in Florida, and it does so only because it
1070663
If, after procuring a policy from Citizens, an Alabama
6
resident were to move to Oregon, and the insurer acquiesced in
the insured's request to begin forwarding notices to the
insured's new address in Oregon, could we say that the insurer
was doing business in Oregon so as to reasonably be expected
to be haled into court in that state?  To avoid being haled
into court in another state, should a Florida insurance
company in the sole business of selling casualty insurance on
Florida 
real 
property 
through 
Florida-based 
agents 
be 
required
to 
insist that 
prospective 
policyholders 
go 
through the 
motion
of renting a post-office box somewhere in the state of Florida
for the purpose of receiving notices from that company?  We
suggest that the answer to both queries is "No."  
13
has been mandated to do so by the Florida legislature.  It
issues insurance policies only through Florida-licensed
insurance brokers; the policy at issue was issued through a
Florida insurance broker located in Fort Lauderdale.  There is
no evidence indicating that Citizens advertises in Alabama or
that it otherwise solicits business in Alabama.  Insofar as
its policyholders are concerned, the most that can be said of
Citizens, based on the record before us, is that it uses the
United States mail to forward notices from its Florida office
to addresses in Alabama designated by a fraction of a percent
of those policyholders.  Even this act is performed only as a
result of the unilateral designation 
by 
those 
policyholders of
such 
an 
address, 
typically 
because 
the 
policyholder 
has 
chosen
to maintain a principal residence in Alabama.   See Hanson,
6
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In support of her argument that Alabama courts have
7
personal jurisdiction over Citizens, Garnett relies, in part,
on McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957).  McGee was decided in 1957, before the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Worldwide Volkswagen.  Moreover,
it is distinguishable.  In McGee, a Texas-based insurance
company chose to insure the life of an individual residing in
the forum state in which the underlying judgment was obtained,
namely California.  In contrast, the object of the insurance
in the present case was real property located, not in Alabama
14
357 U.S. at 253 ("The unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy
the requirement of contact with the forum State.  The
application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature
of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." (emphasis added)); see also 16 Lee R. Russ & Thomas
F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 228:22 (3d ed. 2000)("[T]he
court must consider whether the insurer's contacts with a
state were the result of a deliberate and purposeful act on
the part of the insurer, or whether the contacts were
compelled by the unilateral actions of the insured, or were
created by circumstances over which the insurer had no
control.").   Also, Citizens' contract with Allied was entered
7
1070663
-- the forum state where the plaintiff seeks to obtain a
judgment -- but in the state of Florida.
15
into in Florida and concerned the performance of services in
Florida; the only connection with Alabama in that regard is
that Allied is an Alabama limited liability company.  In
addition, Citizens' actions toward Garnett in response to
Allied's 
coverage 
recommendation 
were 
based 
on 
an
investigation and decision-making process that apparently
occurred in Florida.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Garnett
has established that Citizens purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting business activities within the
State of  Alabama such that Citizens "reasonably should
anticipate being haled into court" in this State.  We hold
that Citizens did not subject itself to the personal
jurisdiction of Alabama courts in the present case, and its
petition is due to be granted.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, J., dissent.
1070663
16
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I concur with Justice Lyons's assessment that, because of
Citizens' 
general contacts with 
this 
State, 
personal
jurisdiction does exist under a general-contacts analysis.
I write to add that personal jurisdiction would also
exist 
under 
a specific-contacts analysis. 
 That 
is, regardless
of whether it had sufficient general contacts with the State
to be subject to personal jurisdiction, Citizens' specific
contacts with Garnett are sufficient to give rise to personal
jurisdiction over Garnett's action.  
At the time it entered into an insurance contract with
Garnett, Citizens knew that it was undertaking a duty not only
to pay money upon the occurrence of certain contingencies
related to Garnett's Florida real property, but also to act in
good faith and to deal fairly with Garnett.  Citizens also
knew, at the time it entered into the contract, that the
violation of this duty of good faith and fair dealing, and any
related tortious conduct, would give rise to damages in tort
personal to Garnett, who was an Alabama resident.  See Chavers
v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981). 
1070663
I express no opinion as to whether the evidence supports
8
Garnett's bad-faith, fraud, and suppression claims, or as to
whether the fraud and suppression claims as currently stated
are sufficient under Rule 9(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  I disagree
with the reasoning underlying the majority's statement that
"[t]he pendency of the present case indicates that Garnett did
not rely on any [allegedly fraudulent] representations and
related denial of coverage." ___ So. 2d at ___ n.2.  The
filing of a fraud action does not negate the possibility that
17
In fact, Garnett asserts tort claims in this case seeking
damages not for damage to the insured property in Florida, but
for 
personal 
harm 
arising 
from 
alleged 
bad-faith
investigation 
of 
her 
claim 
and 
denial 
of 
coverage,
misrepresentation, suppression, and conspiracy on the part of
Citizens.
In particular, the record reflects that the letter from
Citizens denying coverage, which is alleged to have been sent
in bad faith and to have contained misrepresentations or to
have been a vehicle for fraud and suppression, was sent to the
insured, Garnett, in Alabama.  Thus, the parties' evidentiary
submissions establish that the allegations of bad faith,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and suppression arise from
Citizens' 
own 
deliberate 
and 
purposeful 
dealings 
and
communications with Garnett in Alabama--not from 
any
unilateral act on Garnett's part.   In addition, Garnett
8
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reliance existed before the discovery of the alleged fraud.
Furthermore, given the current stage of the litigation and the
fact that the parties did not present evidence to this Court
on the issue of reliance, I believe it is premature to opine
on whether Garnett relied on any of Citizens' allegedly
fraudulent representations.
The record indicates that Garnett's insurance contract
9
with Citizens was renewed on several occasions before
Hurricane Ivan damaged Garnett's home, but Citizens did not
present sufficient evidence from which to determine whether
Florida is the locus of the renewal contracts.  See
Consolidated Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Landers, 285 Ala. 677,
235 So. 2d 818 (1970) (recognizing that a renewal provision in
an insurance policy constituted a continuing offer to insure
18
alleges that Citizens conspired through communications with
its Alabama-based adjuster to conduct a flawed investigation
of Garnett's claim that would result in the denial of
coverage.
This is not a case where, as the majority hypothesizes in
footnote 6 of its opinion, an insured has procured a contract
in one state and then unilaterally moves its primary residence
to another.  In fact, this case is not even akin to a
products-liability case in which a person purchases a
defective product in one state and then unilaterally moves the
product to the state of the purchaser's residence.  The
alleged tortious conduct here occurred not when the insurance
contract at issue was created (perhaps in Florida),  but when
9
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and that payment of the renewal premium in advance constituted
acceptance of that offer and created a binding contract of
insurance).  Even if I were to assume that the locus of the
insurance contract at issue is Florida, that assumption would
not change my analysis as to whether personal jurisdiction
exists, because Citizens reasonably ought to have anticipated
that tortious activity related to the 
investigation 
and denial
of the claim would cause injury to Garnett in Alabama.
19
the insurer investigated and then denied the insured's claim.
At that time, the insurer reasonably ought to have anticipated
that the direct consequences of its actions would have been
felt by the insured in Alabama.  See Duke v. Young 496 So. 2d
37, 39 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a person subjects himself to
personal jurisdiction in a particular state if he reasonably
ought to anticipate that someone residing in that state would
be the recipient of the direct consequences of his actions).
The majority also poses the following hypothetical in
footnote 6: "To avoid being haled into court in another state,
should a Florida insurance company in the sole business of
selling casualty insurance on Florida real property through
Florida-based agents be required to insist that prospective
policyholders go through the motion of renting a post-office
box somewhere in the state of Florida for the purpose of
receiving notices from that company?"  I agree that the answer
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20
to that question is "no."  Several simple solutions, however,
exist for the insurance company in such a situation.  For
example, if the insurer truly is not doing insurance business
outside the state of Florida so that it would be subject to
the insurance regulations of other states, I see no reason why
the insurer would not be able to insist upon a Florida venue
provision in the insurance contract. Further, Citizens is a
creature of Florida statutory law.  Assuming Citizens is not
subjecting itself to regulation in other states by the extent
of its insurance business there, I see no reason why the
Florida legislature could not have provided that, as a
condition of obtaining insurance from Citizens, each insured
must agree to pursue any legal action against Citizens in
Florida.
In conclusion, "[t]he fundamental question is, did the
defendant act in such a manner that he reasonably ought to
anticipate the direct consequences of his actions to be felt
by another person residing in another state?"  Duke v. Young
496 So. 2d at 39.  Assuming the uncontradicted allegations in
the complaint to be true and considering the evidentiary
submissions of the parties as they pertain to allegations that
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21
are in dispute, see Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama,
Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 349-50 (Ala. 2008), I believe that, in
this case, the answer to that question would have to be "yes"
-- even if one looks solely at the specific contacts between
Citizens and Garnett that give rise to this action.
Therefore, I believe that personal jurisdiction exists, even
under a specific-contacts analysis.
I respectfully dissent.
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22
LYONS, Justice (dissenting).
The effect of the use of the mail on an insurer's doing
business is explained in 1 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla,
Couch on Insurance § 3:13 (3d ed. 1995):
"The traditional concept seems to be that a
foreign 
insurer's 
mere 
mailing 
of 
insurance
applications and policies to residents of a state is
not a sufficient basis of that state assuming
jurisdiction over the insurer.  Under this view the
effecting of an isolated contract of insurance
through the use of the mails, or the mailing of a
policy from one state to the insured in another
state does not amount to doing business in the
latter state, and the same is true with regard to
policies of renewal. Likewise, the issuance of a
policy by a foreign insurance company to a resident
of a state and the collection of premiums thereon by
mail does not constitute 'doing business' in the
state."
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) 
Over 2,300 of the insurance policies Citizens issued
(either as original policies or as renewal policies) between
2002 and 2007 contain an Alabama mailing address for notices
and correspondence.  Garnett received premium and policy-
renewal notices from Citizens at her Alabama address.
Citizens could have simply declined to issue policies to an
applicant who could not furnish a Florida mailing address but
who, instead, requested that Citizens use an address in an
1070663
23
adjoining state for transacting business.  Under these facts,
where we do not deal with an isolated contract but one among
many such contracts issued to policyholders in an adjoining
state, I do not consider subjecting Citizens to the
jurisdiction of an Alabama court to be offensive to notions of
justice and fair play.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.