Title: Oliver v. Perry

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

304 So. 2d 583 (1974)
H. D. OLIVER
v.
Viola PERRY and Clifford Perry.
SC 517.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 5, 1974.
Rehearing Denied January 2, 1975.
Roscoe B. Hogan and John F. Kizer, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Rives, Peterson, Pettus, Conway & Burge and Edgar M. Elliott, Birmingham, for intervenor, Nationwide Ins. Co.
FAULKNER, Justice.
On January 25, 1970, Oliver suffered severe personal injuries resulting from a collision between the automobile in which he was riding as a passenger, driven by Wilfred Gunter, and an automobile driven by Clifford Perry. This automobile was owned by Viola Perry. The collision occurred at the intersection of New Finley Avenue and Fourth Place, West, Birmingham, Alabama.
At the time of the accident, Clifford Perry was operating an uninsured automobile, but Gunter and Oliver had uninsured motorist coverage. Oliver notified Nationwide, the insurer of Gunter, that he would look to it for the ultimate satisfaction of any judgment he might obtain against the Perrys. There was no dispute from Nationwide that Oliver was within the coverage provided by the policy issued to Gunter. Alleging an interest in the suit filed June 10, 1970, Nationwide filed a complaint of intervention on September 24, 1970. Nationwide, thereupon, joined the suit on the side of the defense, hoping to defeat the claim entirely, or at least mitigate damages. However, Nationwide also had interests adverse to defendants since it asked to be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff upon its payment of any judgment for damages. Nationwide then asked for judgment over and against the defendants to the extent of any amount it would be required to pay toward any judgment obtained by Oliver against defendants. The trial ended in a verdict for defendants and Oliver has taken this appeal on the principal ground that the trial court erred in permitting Nationwide to convey to the jury that Clifford Perry had no liability insurance at the time of the accident, and *584 that the defendant would be ultimately liable to Nationwide for any judgment against him.
Prior to the trial, the trial judge and attorneys for all parties met in chambers to arrive at some stipulation concerning the issue of insurance and how it would be handled at the trial. No agreement was reached. During the opening statement by counsel for Nationwide the following colloquy took place:
Oliver argues that it was error to allow counsel for Nationwide to convey to the jury that the defendant had no liability insurance at the time of the accident and would ultimately be liable to the intervenor for any judgment rendered against him. It is contended that these remarks were prejudicial to the plaintiff and enlarged the scope of the lawsuit. We have many decisions in this state that hold it is reversible error to permit attempts to apprise the jury of the fact that the defendant is insured and will not be personally responsible for any judgment against him. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956); Thorne v. Parrish, 265 Ala. 193, 90 So. 2d 781 (1956); Sars v. Nichols, 275 Ala. 17, 151 So. 2d 739 (1963).
Here, we have the other side of the coin. Professor McCormick finds that the majority of the jurisdictions in the country have tended to exclude such evidence.
We note that the plaintiff had the jury qualified as to State Farm Insurance Company, as well as Nationwide, even though State Farm had no place in the litigation whatsoever. It was the carrier of Oliver's own uninsured motorist coverage. In the excerpts above, counsel for Oliver stated that "we have got, also, another policy of insurance involved," when in fact no other insurance was involved. The appellant relies on the case of Mobile Cab and Baggage Co. v. Busby, 277 Ala. 292, 169 So. 2d 314 (1964), where the question at hand was quite similar to the one in this case. There, during a heated exchange with opposing counsel, the defendant's attorney stated "`there is absolutely no liability insurance on the part of the gentleman here. ... He is self-insured and he pays for it out of his pocket.'" There was no reversal because the remarks were found to be reply in kind to earlier statements made by the plaintiff's attorney. However, Chief Justice Livingston did note that:
It is difficult to see how the dollar value of the plaintiff's case was prejudiced by the statements since the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. It never got to the question of whether the plaintiff's damages were worth more or less, because it found the defendant not negligent. The trial judge instructed the jury that the sole question before them was that of Perry's negligence, and not who would pay the judgment, matters of subrogation, and the like. This should have curtailed much of the influence the presence of the insurer may have had on the jury.
The remark of Mr. Elliott, "but, we then take the assignment of that right, what we call subrogation, and ourselves pursue it against the uninsured motorist," is not argued by the appellant as being objectionable. Therefore, we pretermit the consideration of the propriety of that part of the statement of Mr. Elliott, as well as the validity of a subrogation clause pertaining to personal injury in an uninsured motorist insurance policy since that issue likewise was not argued before this court.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.