Title: DAVIDSON LAND COMPANY, LLC v. SUEELLEN L. DAVIDSON, CHARLES NOLLER DAVIDSON, and DEBORAH J. DAVIDSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVIDSON LAND COMPANY, LLC v. SUEELLEN L. DAVIDSON, CHARLES NOLLER DAVIDSON, and DEBORAH J. DAVIDSON2011 WY 29Case Number: No. S-10-0060Decided: 02/18/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
DAVIDSON 
LAND COMPANY, LLC,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.SUELLEN L. 
DAVIDSON, CHARLES NOLLER DAVIDSON,

 and DEBORAH J. DAVIDSON,Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C.M. 
Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees Suellen L. Davidson and Charles Noller 
Davidson:

Alexander 
K. Davison of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Deborah J. Davidson:

Greg 
Weisz and Megan Overmann Goetz of Pence & MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ. 

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

                            

[¶1]      Two brothers, 
Daniel Davidson and Chester Davidson, agreed to partition their ranch in 1982.1  In recognition of a railroad right of 
way that traversed the ranch, they provided in their agreement that if the right 
of way were ever abandoned, they would execute any necessary documents to vest 
the other with full title in the right of way over his respective portion of 
ranch.  Later, Daniel purchased a 
quitclaim deed to the right of way from the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(UPRR), and his successors refuse to execute documents to fully vest Chester's 
successors with title to the right of way over Chester's portion of the 
ranch.  

  

[¶2]      The district 
court granted summary judgment and quieted title in property covered by the 
railroad right of way to Daniel's successors on the basis of the quitclaim 
deed.  Chester's successors claim 
the district court incorrectly interpreted the terms of the parties' 
agreement.  We conclude, as a matter 
of law, the district court's interpretation of the agreement was incorrect.  The unambiguous contractual language 
requires Daniel's successors to convey whatever interest they received from UPRR 
in the right of way over Chester's land to his successors.  

 
 
[¶3]      We reverse and 
remand.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      Chester's 
successors state the issues on appeal as follows:

 
 
ISSUE 
I:         
Whether the District Court misconstrued the parties' contractual 
intent.

 
 
ISSUE 
II:        
Whether the doctrine of Estoppel by Deed precludes appellees' claim of 
ownership by their after-acquired title.

 
 
ISSUE 
III:       
Whether title to real property can be quieted in a grantee, sua sponte, based only on a quitclaim 
deed, without evidence that the grantor owned a fee interest to convey.  

            

            
Daniel's 
successors phrase the issue differently:

 
 
Che[ster] 
and Dan[iel] Davidson owned a ranch with a railroad-owned right-of-way through 
it.  By agreement, they divided the 
ranch in 1982, exchanging warranty deeds.  
Each would receive the right-of-way through his property if it was ever 
abandoned.  In 1996 Dan[iel] bought 
the entire right-of-way from UPRR.  
Are Dan[iel]'s successors now required to transfer any of the 
right-of-way to Appellant under the terms of the agreement or warranty 
deed?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      Daniel and 
Chester Davidson, together with their wives, owned a 160 acre ranch, containing 
nine separate parcels, near Saratoga, in Carbon County, Wyoming.  A railroad traversed the ranch from the 
northwest to the southeast.  Around 
1979, the tracks, bridges and abutments were removed by UPRR.     

 
 
[¶6]      In 1982, the two 
Davidson couples entered into an agreement to partition the ranch  by cross-conveying the parcels, with 
Chester and his wife Norma receiving parcels one through five and Daniel and his 
wife Earlene receiving parcels six through nine (1982 Agreement).  The railroad had been located on parcels 
three and four on Chester's land and parcels seven and eight on Daniel's 
land.  Title to the lands affected 
by the railroad in parcels three and four is at issue here.  

 
 
[¶7]      Paragraph 6 of 
the 1982 Agreement addressed the interests the respective Davidsons owned in the 
railroad right of way, as follows:

 
 
Parcels 
3 and 4 contain a railroad right-of-way containing 2.78 acres, more or 
less.  The parties agree that the 
land within said right-of-way is the property of Chester C. Davidson and Norma 
Davidson and that if the right-of-way is ever abandoned, Daniel Davidson and 
Earlene Davidson agree to execute such instruments of conveyance as may be 
required to vest said land in Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson.  Parcels 7 and 8 likewise contain a 
railroad right-of-way which the parties agree is the property of Daniel Davidson 
and Earlene Davidson and Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson agree to execute 
such instruments of conveyance as may be required to vest said land in Daniel 
Davidson and Earlene Davidson if the right-of-way is ever abandoned.  

 
 
[¶8]      At the same time 
they entered into the 1982 Agreement, the parties executed reciprocal warranty 
deeds conveying the properties in accordance with the agreement.  There is no showing in the record that 
the land subject to the right of way was excluded from the property description 
contained in each deed.  The 
property descriptions were followed by the language:

 
 
SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to all easements, reservations, restrictions and rights-of-way of 
record in the office of the County Clerk and Ex-Officio Register of Deeds for 
Carbon County, Wyoming. 

 
 
Daniel 
subsequently conveyed his interest to Earlene as part of their estate plan.  

[¶9]      Twelve years 
after the ranch was partitioned, Daniel met with a UPRR representative 
concerning the right of way.  He 
stated that the representative wanted to sell the right of way to "interested 
persons," but would not divide the right of way into two parts to accommodate 
Daniel's and Chester's partition of the property.  In 1996, after Daniel paid $6,900, UPRR 
executed a quitclaim deed to the entire right of way across parcels three, four, 
seven and eight to Daniel's wife, Earlene.  
Daniel averred that he purchased the right of way "with the thought that 
[Chester] would purchase his share of it," but Chester never paid for his 
portion.    

 
 
[¶10]   Over the years, the properties were 
passed down to family members.  In 
August 2009, Chester's successors filed a complaint against Daniel's successors 
seeking specific performance of the 1982 Agreement.  Chester's successors also requested a 
declaration that they owned the land formerly subject to the railroad right of 
way in parcels three and four.  
Daniel's successors generally denied the allegations and counterclaimed 
to have title to the right of way land quieted in them on the basis of the 
quitclaim deed they received from UPRR.2   

 
 
[¶11]   Both sides moved for summary 
judgment on Chester's successors' claims.  
After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Daniel's successors and quieted title to the property in them.  Chester's successors appealed.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   Summary judgments are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We 
review a summary judgment de novo, 
using the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. 
"We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record." Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. No. 6, 
2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, 637-38 (Wyo. 2002), 
quoting Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991).  See also, Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital West Nat'l 
Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 5, 231 P.3d 869,870-71 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
[¶13]   In cases involving questions of 
contract interpretation, we apply the following standard of 
review:

 
 
            
The initial question of whether the contract is capable of being 
understood in only one way is a question of law for the court. If the court 
determines that the contract is capable of being understood in only one way, 
then the language used in the contract expresses and controls the intent of the 
parties. In such case, the next question, what is that understanding or meaning, 
is also a question of law. When we review the district court's summary judgment 
decisions that a contract is capable of being understood in only one way and 
what that understanding is, we accord no deference to those decisions. 

 
 

M 
& M Auto Outlet v. Hill Inv. Corp., 2010 
WY 56, ¶ 12, 230 P.3d 1099, 1104 
(Wyo. 2010), quoting Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996) 
(internal citations omitted).

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   This case requires interpretation 
of the 1982 Agreement, the corresponding warranty deeds and the UPRR quitclaim 
deed.  Each of these documents is a 
contract and must be interpreted using our standard contract interpretation 
principles.  Ecosystem Res., 
L.C., v. Broadbent Land & Res., L.L.C., 2007 WY 87, 
¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d 685, 688 (Wyo. 
2007);  R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
In 
considering the meaning of a contract, we focus on the parties' 
intent. If possible, we determine their intent from the language used in the 
agreement. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we limit our inquiry to 
the four corners of the document, giving the words contained therein their 
ordinary meaning. The parties are free to incorporate within their agreement 
whatever lawful terms they desire, and we are not at liberty, under the guise of 
judicial construction, to rewrite the agreement. It is only when a contract is 
ambiguous that we construe the document by resorting to rules of construction. A 
contract is ambiguous if indefiniteness of expression or double meaning obscures 
the parties' intent.

 
 

Christensen 
v. Christensen, 
2008 WY 10, ¶ 13, 176 P.3d 626, 629 (Wyo. 2008), 
citing Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 18, 123 P.3d 579, 587 (Wyo. 2005).  See also, M & M, ¶ 15, 230 P.3d  at 1105.   While we do not consider parol 
evidence when interpreting unambiguous contracts, it is well settled that even 
if a contract is unambiguous we can examine evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding its execution to determine the parties' intent.  "Relevant considerations may include the 
relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the 
parties' purpose in making the contract."  
Ecosystem, ¶ 10, 158 P.3d  at 
688.  In addition, documents 
executed as part of the same transaction should be considered together and 
consistently.  See, e.g., Houghton v. Thompson, 57 Wyo. 196, 206, 
115 P.2d 654, 657 (Wyo. 1941); 
11 Williston on Contracts § 30:26 (2010), stating "in the absence of anything to 
indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the 
same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same 
transaction will be considered and construed together as one contract or 
instrument . . . ."  (footnotes omitted).      

 
 
[¶15]   For convenience, we will restate 
the relevant provisions of the documents at issue.  The 1982 Agreement 
stated:

 
 
Parcels 
3 and 4 contain a railroad right-of-way containing 2.78 acres, more or 
less.  The parties agree that the 
land within said right-of-way is the property of Chester C. Davidson and Norma 
Davidson and that if the right-of-way is ever abandoned, Daniel Davidson and 
Earlene Davidson agree to execute such instruments of conveyance as may be 
required to vest said land in Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson.  Parcels 7 and 8 likewise contain a 
railroad right-of-way which the parties agree is the property of Daniel Davidson 
and Earlene Davidson and Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson agree to execute 
such instruments of conveyance as may be required to vest said land in Daniel 
Davidson and Earlene Davidson if the right-of-way is ever abandoned.  

  

[¶16]   In the warranty deed executed at 
the same time as the 1982 Agreement, Daniel and his wife conveyed all of their 
interest in parcels one through five to Chester and his wife subject "to all 
easements, reservations, restrictions and rights-of-way of record."   Chester and his wife executed a 
reciprocal warranty deed to Daniel and his wife, conveying all of their interest 
in parcels six through nine.  In the 
quitclaim deed executed in 1996, UPRR conveyed all of its right, title and 
interest in the right of way property, described by metes and bounds, to 
Daniel's wife, Earlene.  UPRR did 
not warrant it owned anything, but it did reserve the mineral rights.       

 
 
[¶17]   The district court interpreted the 
documents as follows:

 
 
            
The Court finds that the language of the 1982 Agreement is clear and 
unambiguous.  Likewise, the Court 
finds that the 1982 Warranty Deeds . . . and the 1996 Quitclaim Deed are clear 
and unambiguous.  Therefore, the 
Court will secure the parties' intent from the four corners of these 
documents.

             
Plaintiff [Chester's successors] initially contends that the first clause 
of the pertinent provision from the 1982 Agreement establishes its ownership 
over the right-of-way ("the land within said right-of-way is the property of 
Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson").  
The parties to the 1982 Agreement did not hold ownership of the 
right-of-way, as the contract clearly spells out in the preceding sentence 
("Parcels 3 and 4 contain a railroad right-of-way containing 2.78 acres, more or 
less.").  UPRR held ownership over 
the right-of-way.  The parties 
simply did not own the right-of-way at the time they entered into the 1982 
Agreement.  Chester and Daniel 
Davidson's ownership interests in the 160 acres of land did not include the 
UPRR's right-of-way.  Further, the 
parties have presented no evidence nor contended that the UPRR did not own the 
right-of-way in 1982.  Indeed, each 
party agrees that the UPRR conveyed its interest in the entire right-of-way to 
Earlene Davidson by execution of the 1996 Quitclaim Deed.  Consequently, the Court finds that the 
1982 Agreement is clear and does not attempt to transfer ownership of the 
right-of-way.  The land within the 
right-of-way is owned by the respective party, just as the 1982 Agreement 
states.   However, the 
right-of-way was owned by the UPRR at the time of the 1982 Agreement and the 
agreement does not operate to vest title and ownership of the right-of-way 
crossing Parcels 3-4 in Plaintiff.  
  

 
 
[¶18]   The district court's ruling states 
that the parties did not own any interest in the railroad right of way and did 
not "attempt to transfer ownership of the right-of-way," but then states that 
"[t]he land within the right-of-way is owned by the respective party, just as 
the 1982 Agreement states."  Because 
the district court quieted title to the right of way property in Daniel's 
successors on the basis of the quitclaim deed from UPRR to their predecessor, 
the district court apparently presumed UPRR, rather than the Davidsons, owned 
the fee interest in the right of way.  

 
 
[¶19]   The only evidence in the record on 
appeal about the source of UPRR's interest is the following statement from 
Daniel's affidavit:  

 
 
            
2.         
My parents acquired the Davidson Ranch in 1928.  It was at or after this time that the 
Valley bought the existent railroad out of bankruptcy and gave the railroad to 
the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR).  
The UPRR acquired the about one-half (1/2) mile of track on the 
right-of-way that cuts across the Davidson Ranch.

 
 
Daniel's 
statement does not explain what the "Valley" was or describe the nature of 
UPRR's right of way interest.  As 
such, the record does not contain any direct evidence concerning the source or 
scope of UPRR's interest.5 

 
 
[¶20]   It is axomatic that a grantor can 
convey no greater rights in property than he owns.  See, e.g., Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 41, 112 P.2d 570, 573 (Wyo. 1941) (grantee takes no better right than grantor); Casper Nat'l Bank v. Swanson, 42 Wyo. 
113, 126, 291 P. 812, 816 (Wyo. 
1930) (same). A quitclaim deed conveys only "the then 
existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor in the premises therein 
described[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-2-105 (LexisNexis 2009).  Opposing 
parties in a quiet title action have the responsibility to prove the origin of 
their claimed interest in the property, although the extent to which they must 
trace the chain of title depends on the circumstances of the case.  See, e.g., York v. James, 62 Wyo. 184, 199, 165 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo. 1946) (holding that, because the parties claimed from a 
common grantor, they were not obligated to show title beyond their common 
grantor).  Thus, without evidence of 
what interest the railroad owned, the district court could not quiet the fee 
title to the right of way in Daniel's successors simply on the basis of the 
quitclaim deed from UPRR to their predecessor.   

 
 
[¶21]   Although there is insufficient 
evidence in the record to determine the nature of the railroad's interest, we 
are able to resolve the issue regarding the meaning of the 1982 Agreement and 
corresponding warranty deeds.  We 
conclude the 1982 Agreement unambiguously reflects an intention to cross convey 
all of the interest the Davidsons owned in the land within the right of way to 
the brother who received the adjacent property, as part of the partition and 
cross conveyance of the entire ranch.  
This intent is reflected in the clear statement, "[t]he parties agree 
that the land within said right-of-way [in parcels three and four] is the 
property of Chester C. Davidson and Norma Davidson" and the property in the 
right way in parcels seven and eight belonged to Daniel and Earlene.  The 
plain meaning of the 1982 Agreement was that Chester and his wife acquired all 
of the interest the Davidsons owned in the lands within the right of way in 
parcels three and four. 

 
 
[¶22]   The district court concluded that 
because the warranty in the deed was "subject . . . to all easements, 
reservations, restrictions and rights-of-way of record in the office of the County 
Clerk and Ex-Officio Register of Deeds for Carbon County, Wyoming," it did not 
convey the parties' interest in the railroad right-of-way. The court ruled 
"[t]his language unambiguously omitted the UPRR right of way from the transfer 
of ownership between the brothers."  
 

 
 
[¶23]   We do not agree that the warranty 
language in the deeds meant that the lands covered by the right of way were not 
included in the cross conveyances.  
Any deed, whether warranty or quitclaim, passes the grantor's interest in 
the real property described therein to the grantee.  See, e.g., Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1998) (deed 
passed only the 90 acres described therein even though both grantor and grantee 
believed it conveyed 180 acres, requiring the grantee to later bring an adverse 
possession action to acquire the additional 90 acres).  See also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2-102 
and 103 (LexisNexis 2009) (form and effect of warranty deed conveys property 
described therein); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2-104 and 105 (form and effect of 
quitclaim deed conveys interest grantor owns in property described 
therein).  There is nothing in the 
record or the parties' arguments indicating that property covered by the 
railroad right of way was not included in the legal descriptions of the 
properties conveyed in the warranty deeds.  

 
 
[¶24]   Section 34-2-103 governs warranty 
deeds and states:

 
 
            
Every deed in substance 
in the above form [§ 34-2-102], when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed 
and held a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, with 
covenants on the part of the grantor, (a) that at the time of the making and 
delivery of such deed he was 
lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises 
therein described, and had good right and power to convey the same; (b) that the 
same were then free from all incumbrances; and (c) that he warrants to the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns, the quiet and peaceful possession of such 
premises, and will defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully 
claim the same. And such covenants shall be obligatory upon the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives, as fully, and with like effect as if written 
at length in such deed.

 
 
[¶25]   Consistent with § 34-2-103, the 
deed language stating that it was "subject . . .  to all easements, reservations, 
restrictions and rights-of-way of 
record" is standard language indicating that the warranty in the deed is limited 
and does not cover lands affected by recorded encumbrances.  Without that language, the grantor would 
be warranting that the property was free from encumbrances which were already 
shown on the record.   The 
exception to the warranty does not mean the fee title to the land covered by the right 
of way and included in the legal description was somehow reserved or excepted 
from the reciprocal conveyances between Chester and Daniel.  The "subject to" language simply put the 
grantee on notice that the warranty was limited by any recorded 
encumbrances.  We also note that 
there is nothing in the record indicating the railroad right of way was of 
record in the county clerk's office to bring it within the "subject to" 
provision.   

 
 
[¶26]   Furthermore, if the provision is 
interpreted as removing the property covered by the right of way from the 
conveyance altogether, it is inconsistent with the 1982 Agreement and renders 
paragraph 6 of that agreement essentially meaningless.  Our rules of contract interpretation 
require us to interpret all documents executed as part of a single transaction 
together and consistently with one another.  See, 
e.g., Houghton, 57 Wyo. at 206, 115 P.2d  at 
657; 11 Williston on Contracts § 30:26 (2010). 

 
 
[¶27]   The warranty deeds are consistent 
with the 1982 Agreement and reflect Daniel's and Chester's intent to convey all 
of the interest they owned in the land within the right of way to the brother 
who acquired the adjacent property in the partition of the ranch, i.e., land 
within the right of way in parcels three and four to Chester and land within the 
right of way in parcels seven and eight to Daniel.  In sum, we conclude that the clear 
language of the 1982 Agreement and warranty deeds resulted in Chester owning all 
of the interest the Davidsons had in the land within the right of way in parcels 
three and four.   

 
 
[¶28]   The question then becomeshow does 
the 1982 Agreement relate to Daniel's subsequent acquisition of UPRR's 
interest?  Under the terms of the 
1982 Agreement, Daniel and Chester indicated their belief that UPRR had some 
kind of a right of way over their property and anticipated the right of way may 
be "abandoned" in the future.  In 
that event, they agreed they would "execute such instruments of conveyance as 
may be required to vest said land" in the respective party.    

 
 
[¶29]   The plain meaning of the term 
"abandon" as used in the context of the 1982 Agreement means "to give up with 
the intent of never again asserting or claiming an interest in (a right or 
property)" or "to renounce one's 
obligations and rights."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2 
(2002).  The right of way was 
physically abandoned when the tracks were removed in 1979; nevertheless, Daniel 
and Chester obviously believed in 1982 that further action may be needed to 
extinguish whatever interest UPRR owned and remove the encumbrance from their 
respective properties.  
Consequently, they imposed upon one another the obligation to execute any 
necessary documents to accomplish the full vesting of title when the railroad 
renounced its interest in the right of way.  

 
 
[¶30]   Daniel recognized his obligation 
under the agreement in his summary judgment affidavit.  He stated that, when he was negotiating 
with UPRR, "the railroad would not agree to divide" the right of way between 
Chester and him, but would "only agree to sell the right-of-way on our two 
properties as a whole, i.e., to one purchaser."  Daniel averred that he "purchased the 
right of way for [$6,900] with the thought that [Chester] would purchase his 
share of it" and, even after Earlene received the quitclaim deed from UPRR, the 
parties continued to use the property "as it had always been."    

 
 
[¶31]   The quitclaim deed evinced UPRR's 
unequivocal intent to abandon its interest, i.e, never again assert or claim an 
interest in the property and to renounce whatever rights it had in the right of 
way.6 After Daniel acquired 
whatever interest UPRR owned in the right of way in parcels seven and eight, he 
held title to both the dominant and servient estates, resulting in termination 
of the dominant estate. 

 
 

When 
one party acquires a fee title to both the servient and dominant estates, the 
easement merges into the interest of the servient estate and terminates. Thus, any time the party who owns an 
easement right acquires legal ownership of a servient tenement, the easement 
associated with that parcel is extinguished. Such unity of possession destroys all 
existing easements, because a person 
cannot have an easement on land that he or she owns.  

 
 
25 
Am.Jur.2d Easements § 100 (2010) (footnotes omitted).  Once the right of way was extinguished 
on Daniel's land, the purposes of paragraph 6 had been accomplished for his 
successors.  

 
 
[¶32]   Because UPRR did not convey to both 
Chester and Daniel, the quitclaim deed did not result in a merger of the 
dominant and servient estates on Chester's property.  Applying the clear language of paragraph 
6, the railroad abandoned its right of way by executing the quitclaim deed and 
Daniel was, therefore, obligated to "execute such instruments of conveyance as 
may be required to vest said land [in parcels three and four]" in Chester.7  

 
 
[¶33]   Chester's successors argue that the 
doctrine of estoppel by deed8 governs this issue.  We do not believe estoppel by deed 
applies in this case because Daniel and Chester specifically recognized the need 
for future conveyances in their agreement.   Specific performance, as requested 
by Chester's successors in the complaint and summary judgment motion, is the 
proper legal theory and remedy to be applied here.  

 
 

Specific 
performance is an equitable 
remedy which compels the performance of a contract on the precise terms agreed 
upon or such a substantial performance as will do justice between the parties 
under the circumstances. It is a means of compelling a contracting party to do 
precisely what he should have done without being coerced by a court. 81 C.J.S. 
Specific Performance § 2, 701; 71 Am.Jur.2d 10, 
Specific Performance, § 1; Restatement of the 
Law, Contracts § 358, Comment a, § 359(2), § 360(b), § 
326(c).

 
 

Ekberg 
v. Sharp, 2003 
WY 123, ¶ 22, 76 P.3d 1250, 1257 
(Wyo. 2003), quoting Williams v. Collins 
Communications, Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 892-93 (Wyo. 
1986). 

 
 
[¶34]   Because Daniel's and Chester's 
clear intent was that the property within the right of way would belong to the 
party owning the adjacent property, they agreed to execute the appropriate 
documents to implement that intent in the future.  While the district court's ruling that 
the 1982 Agreement did not "attempt to transfer ownership of the right of way" 
is accurate with regard to UPRR's interest in the right of way in 1982, the 
ultimate decision that Daniel owned the land within the right of way across 
Chester's land ignores the rest of the agreement which transferred any interest 
owned by Daniel in the land within the right of way in parcels three and four to 
Chester in 1982 and provided for execution of the necessary documents to vest 
title in the respective brother in the event of an abandonment.  The district court's ruling disregarded 
an important rule of contract interpretation which requires that courts consider the contract as a whole and give effect to each provision, if possible.  Hall v. Perry, 2009 WY 83, ¶ 13, 211 P.3d 489, 494 
(Wyo. 2009).  Under the plain terms 
of the 1982 Agreement, Daniel's successors are, therefore, obligated to 
specifically perform that obligation and transfer the interest they acquired 
from UPRR in parcels three and four to Chester's successors.  

 
 
[¶35]   Our ruling with regard to specific 
performance adequately answers the question as to which party in this case has 
better title to the property at issue.  
However, to the extent the parties decide that a quiet title order is 
necessary, we note that, because UPRR quitclaimed whatever interest it had in 
the right of way to Daniel and Daniel's successors are required under the 1982 
Agreement to convey the same to Chester's successors, Chester's successors would 
be entitled to an order quieting title in parcels three and four in their favor 
because, as between the parties before the court, they have the better 
interest.  See, e.g., Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 52, 226 P.3d 889, 912 
(Wyo. 2010).  

 
 

[¶36] 
While we have ruled that, on the record before us, Daniel's 
successors are obligated to specifically perform their contractual obligation, 
we note that Daniel's successors have pleaded additional affirmative defenses, 
including a statute of limitations defense.   On remand, the district court may 
conduct additional proceedings to resolve whether any outstanding affirmative 
defenses prevent enforcement of the 1982 Agreement and any other issues not 
addressed in this opinion.  

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶37]   The district court erred as a 
matter of law when it quieted title to the land within the right of way in 
parcels three and four to Daniel's successors.  Daniel and Chester Davidsons' clear 
intent in the 1982 Agreement and warranty deeds was to convey all the interest 
they had in the land within the railroad right of way to the party who received 
the adjacent property and to execute the appropriate documents in the future 
when and if the right of way was abandoned to fully vest title in the adjoining 
property owner.  For purposes of the 
1982 Agreement, UPRR abandoned its right of way when it executed the quitclaim 
deed.  On the record before us, 
Chester's successors are, therefore, entitled to specific performance of the 
agreement, and Daniel's successors are obligated to convey whatever interest 
they received from UPRR in parcels three and four to Chester's successors.   

 
 
[¶38]   Reversed and remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The parties in this case are successors in interest to Daniel and his 
wife Earlene and Chester and his wife Norma.  At the time of this proceeding, 
Chester's interest was owned by Appellant Davidson Land Company, LLC, and 
Daniel's interest was owned by Appellees Suellen, Charles and Deborah 
Davidson.  For the sake of clarity, 
we will refer to the parties as "Daniel's successors" and "Chester's 
successors."  

 
 

2In the district court, Suellen and Charles Davidson appeared together, 
while Deborah Davidson was separately represented.  Although there were minor differences in 
their positions, they are not relevant here.  Suellen and Charles filed a brief on 
appeal, but Deborah did not.  

 
 

3At oral argument on September 22, 2010, vague reference was made to a 
federal court proceeding involving these parties and the railroad.  On January 5, 2011, Daniel's successors 
filed a "Notice of Submittal of Additional Authority," which included a copy of 
a summary judgment order from the federal district court.  Chester's successors had apparently 
brought an action against UPRR and Daniel's successor's seeking a declaration 
that UPRR had abandoned the railroad prior to 1996.  The federal district court entered 
judgment in favor of UPRR and Daniel's successors, ruling Chester's successor's 
action was barred by res judicata.  
The federal court action has no bearing on our 
decision.

      

4The 
term "right of way" commonly refers to a servitude or easement type interest 
rather than a fee interest.  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
1956 (2002); Jackson Hole Mountain Resort 
Corp. v. Alpenhof Lodge Assocs., 2005 WY 46, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 555, 559 (Wyo. 2005) 
(stating  "[a]n owner of land who 
grants a right of way over it conveys nothing but the right of passage and 
reserves all incidents of ownership not granted . . . ."  (citations omitted)).  Cases from other jurisdictions reveal 
that railroad rights of way may be held in various estates.  See, e.g., Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of 
Lands, 233 P.3d 721, 728-29 (Idaho 2010); Zobrist v. Culp, 570 P.2d 147, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1977).  The actual deed language 
creating the right of way is generally determinative.  City Motel, Inc. v. State of Nevada, ex rel. 
State Dep't of Highways, 336 P.2d 375, 377 (Nev. 1959). 

 
 

5On January 5, 2011, nearly three and one half months after oral argument, 
Daniel's successors filed their notice of additional authority which included a 
copy of a September 30, 2010, decision letter issued by the district court, 
denying Chester's successor's motion for relief from judgment under W.R.C.P. 
60(b).  Part of the basis for the 
motion was apparently the discovery of the original deed to UPRR's predecessor, 
which had apparently been recorded in 1916.  The district court ruled that the deed 
confirmed UPRR owned a fee interest in the right of way property.  Neither the district court's Rule 60(b) 
ruling nor the deed affect our task  interpretation of the 1982 Agreement or, 
in any way, undermine our decision herein.  

 
 

6As noted above, the record does not contain evidence concerning title to 
the right of way. The parties have presumed the owner was UPRR and for purposes 
of this litigation that appears to be a logical presumption.  If other entities have any claim to the 
right, those interests would not be affected by this decision. 

 
 

7The issue of whether Chester's successors should be required to reimburse 
Daniel's successors for the consideration Daniel paid to UPRR for Chester's 
portion of the right of way apparently was not raised in the district court and 
will not be considered by this Court.  
We note some potential theories may exist for such reimbursement, 
including: enforcement of an express agreement between Chester and Daniel 
regarding payment of consideration; equitable reformation of the 1982 Agreement 
to provide for equal payment of the costs of removing adverse interests, see, e.g., Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. State, ex 
rel., Wyoming Attorney General, 2009 WY 143, ¶ 32, 221 P.3d 306, 316 (Wyo. 2009); Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002); 
contribution of co-tenants to the expenses of jointly owned property, including 
the necessary expenses of purchasing adverse interests, see, e.g., Andersen v. Griffeth, 71 Wyo. 136, 
145-46, 254 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 
(Wyo. 1953).  

 
 

8Estoppel 
by deed precludes a party and those in privity with him from 
denying the truth of his deed by asserting as 
against the other party thereto any right or title in derogation of the 
deed.  The principle also 
encompasses the general rule that "one who acquires a title or estate which he 
has previously conveyed is estopped to assert his after-acquired title as 
against the grantee or his successors."  
Kennedy Oil v. Lance Oil 
& Gas Co., 2006 WY 9, ¶ 
28, 126 P.3d 875, 883-84 (Wyo. 
2006), quoting 3 American Law of Property, §§ 15.18, 15.19 (A. James Casner, 
ed., 1952).  See also, Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434 
(1899).