Title: WALTERS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WALTERS v. STATE2004 WY 3787 P.3d 793Case Number: 03-1Decided: 04/08/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

BRANDON 
RAY WALTERS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Will Bierman, Deputy Public 
Defender

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
After 
the district court determined that his constitutional right to a speedy trial 
had not been violated, Appellant Brandon Ray Walters entered a conditional 
guilty plea to third degree sexual assault.  He has appealed his conviction and 
sentence contending that his constitutional right to speedy trial was 
violated.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Walters 
presents the following issue for our review:

 

Whether 
the district court improperly denied Appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of 
speedy trial, when a two-hundred thirty-five (235) day delay occurred between 
Appellant's waiver of preliminary hearing and Appellant's 
arraignment?

 

The 
State rephrases the issue as:

 

Did 
the district court properly conclude that Appellant was not denied his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the delay between his waiver of a 
preliminary hearing and his arraignment?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
On 
April 16, 2001, Walters was charged with third degree sexual assault, and his 
initial appearance was set for May 24, 2001. Walters retained counsel who 
entered an appearance, moved to continue Walters' initial appearance, and waived 
Walters' right to a speedy preliminary hearing on May 18, 2001.  The initial appearance was rescheduled 
for June 14, the same day Walters waived his right to a preliminary hearing. On 
September 7, the Information was filed in the district court, and the State 
moved for setting of arraignment.  
Walters had not been jailed and was released on his own 
recognizance.  

 

[¶5]           
On 
October 8, 2001, Walters moved to disqualify the district judge.  The case was assigned to a circuit court 
judge, and arraignment was set for December 12.  Walters objected to a circuit court 
judge assignment and filed a motion to dismiss for deprivation of right to a 
speedy trial.  On December 14, 2001, 
the case was reassigned to another district court judge who set the arraignment 
and motion hearing for February 5, 2002.  

 

[¶6]           
At 
that hearing, Walters entered a not guilty plea, but defense counsel objected to 
a trial date of March 11, 2002, because counsel had a scheduled vacation at that 
time.  The trial was set for May 7, 
2002.  The motion to dismiss was 
heard, and Walters asserted that the ten-month delay from arrest was prejudicial 
because the deputy sheriff in charge of the investigation and who had obtained 
Walter's confession during a taped interview had died on July 28, 2001.  The deputy's death prevented inquiry 
concerning Walters' allegations that the deputy had not advised Walters of his 
rights and had allowed the interview tape to be damaged.  Additionally, three witnesses who had 
been present in the house when the alleged sexual assault occurred had since 
moved, and Walters lacked the funds to find them and return them for trial.  

 

[¶7]           
The 
district court determined that discovery could resolve issues relating to the 
deputy's interview and handling of the tape.  The district court also found that 
Walters had not attempted to interview the witnesses before they moved, had not 
attempted to locate them since and could request fees from the public defender's 
office for assistance.  For these 
reasons and because incarceration was not a concern, the district court ruled 
that any delay attributable to the State was not prejudicial to Walters.  The court's order denying the motion to 
dismiss issued on February 11, 2002. 

 

[¶8]           
On 
March 28, 2002, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw.  At the hearing on April 22, 2002, 
Walters did not appear, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.  The hearing was continued to the next 
day, and a public defender was appointed.  
On May 22, 2002, the State moved to revoke Walters' release on bond 
because of allegations that he was involved in another sexual assault.  His recognizance bond was revoked, and 
trial was set for August 20, 2002.  
Later, that same date was set for a change of plea and sentencing 
hearing.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶9]           
Walters 
does not claim any violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).1  He does claim that his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay that occurred prior to 
arraignment.  W.R.Cr.P. 48 governs 
the time period between arraignment and trial; however, delays between the time 
of charge and the time of trial are subject to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Warner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 67, ¶9, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001); Doggett 
v. United States, 
505 U.S. 647, 651, 655-56, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690, 2692-93, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 
(1992); Jennings 
v. State, 
4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 2000).  This 
Court examines de novo the constitutional question of whether a defendant has 
been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  We review the district court's factual 
findings for clear error.

 

[¶10]      The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial.  In deciding 
whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, courts must balance 1) the 
length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion 
of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.  Warner, 
¶10, 
Campbell v. State, 
999 P.2d 649, 655 (Wyo. 2000); Barker 
v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 530, 533, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  None of these factors alone is 
sufficient to establish a speedy trial violation, "[r]ather they are related 
factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be 
relevant."  Barker, 
407 U.S.  at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.  
"The determinative dynamic in our inquiry is whether the delay in 
bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it 
substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair trial."  Warner, 
¶10, 
Wehr v. State, 
841 P.2d 104, 112 (Wyo. 1992).  When 
a speedy trial violation is found to have occurred, the charges must be 
dismissed.  Warner, 
¶10; 
Barker, 
407 U.S.  at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.

 

 

Length 
of Delay

 

[¶11]      Between 
June 14, 2001, when Walters waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and 
February 5, 2002, when he was arraigned, 235 days had elapsed.  This time period is not presumptively 
prejudicial or significantly long and would not be found to violate his 
constitutional rights absent a showing of prejudice.  Taylor 
v. State, 
2001 WY 13, ¶6, 17 P.3d 715, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001) (holding 236 days is not 
presumptively prejudicial); Osborne 
v. State, 
806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1991) (holding 244 days is not presumptively 
prejudicial, but requiring further analysis).

 

 

Reasons 
for Delay

 

[¶12]      Walters 
asserts there was an 83-day delay from June 14, 2001, when Walters orally waived 
his preliminary hearing, and September 7, 2001, the date the State requested a 
setting for arraignment, and this delay may have been in part due to his request 
for a change of judges, but the State had no reason for its failure to timely 
request an arraignment setting.  The 
record shows that almost half of the delay was caused by Walters' 
dissatisfaction with the assignment of judges and the resulting docketing 
issues.  See 
McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Wyo. 1997).

 

 

Assertion 
of Right

 

[¶13]      Between 
Walters' waiver of preliminary hearing on June 14, 2001, and his motion to 
dismiss filed on December 7, 2001, a delay of 177 days occurred.  The State contends that Walters' 
assertion of his right was another delaying tactic and deserves little weight in 
evaluating his speedy trial claim.  
However, we agree with the district court's finding that the delays in 
this case were the fault of the State, the court and the defendant, the State's 
delays should not be allowed to happen, and this factor should be balanced with 
the other factors.

 

 

Prejudice

 

[¶14]      The 
delays attributable to the State were no more than 120 days, a time period that 
does not deprive a defendant of a speedy trial unless prejudice is 
demonstrated.  Taylor, 
¶6.  For that time period, we do not 
consider whether pretrial anxiety prejudiced the defendant and do not consider 
that factor here.  See 
McDaniels, 945 P.2d  at 1189.  Walters was not 
incarcerated and did not show that his defense was impaired because he failed to 
prove that three witnesses were actually unavailable and the deputy's actions 
could not be established through discovery.  Walters' constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was not violated.  
See 
Warner, 
¶17; Campbell, 
999 P.2d  at 
656.   

 

[¶15]      Affirmed.

    
FOOTNOTES

 

1Rule 48(b) states:  

 

(b) 
Speedy trial.--

            
(1) It is the responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to 
insure that the defendant is timely tried.

            
(2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 180 days following 
arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.