Title: ED McARTOR v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ED McARTOR v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 61699 P.2d 288Case Number: 84-22Decided: 05/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ED McARTOR, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Richard G. 
Miller and David B. Park, Casper, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen and Allen C. 
Johnson, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
a conviction, after a trial to the court, of taking indecent liberties with a 
minor in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977. Appellant was originally charged 
with several counts of indecent liberties, based on more recent alleged acts, 
but all charges except one were either dismissed, or appellant was found not 
guilty at trial. That count, upon which appellant was found guilty and sentenced 
to not less than one nor more than two years, concerned an act with a 
sixteen-year-old girl, in June of 1977; she testified that she and appellant 
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises two 
issues on appeal. First, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence 
to support a finding that the incident occurred in NatronaCounty. Second, appellant contends that 
the trial court erred in determining that the appellant could be charged and 
convicted under § 14-3-105 because: (a) "child" as used in § 14-3-105 is a 
person under the age of sixteen; (b) criminal statutes should be strictly 
construed and any ambiguity resolved in favor of the appellant; (c) § 14-3-105 
has been impliedly repealed by § 6-2-304, W.S. 1977; and (d) § 6-2-304 is the 
more specific statute of the two, and a general statute must give way to a more 
specific statute on the same subject.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

STATUTORY 
BACKGROUND

[¶4.]     A review of the 
background of the two statutes is in order inasmuch as the issues involve 
alleged statutory inconsistencies; inasmuch as the pertinent law is that which 
was in effect at the time of the incident which occurred several years ago, in 
June of 1977; and inasmuch as legislative history is often determinative of 
legislative intent. State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543 (1982); Padilla v. State, 
Wyo., 601 P.2d 189 (1979); Town of Clearmont v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 357 P.2d 470 
(1960).

[¶5.]     Section 14-3-105, W.S. 
1977, now in effect and in effect since January 1, 1979, 
reads:

"Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten 
(10) years, or both."

It was enacted 
as part of Chapter 25, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1978. The same enactment recited 
that:

"Upon becoming nineteen 
(19) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority * * *." Section 
14-1-101, W.S. 1977.

[¶6.]     The indecent liberties 
statute in effect when the incident occurred for which appellant was convicted, 
in June of 1977, read:

"It shall be unlawful for 
any person, including but not limited to parent, guardian or custodian knowingly 
to take immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any such child or knowingly 
to cause or encourage any such child to cause or encourage another child to 
commit with him or her any immoral or indecent act.

"Any person who shall 
violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony and 
upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned 
in the penitentiary not to exceed ten (10) years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment."

It was codified 
as § 14-28, W.S. 1957, and enacted by § 8, Ch. 220, Session Laws of Wyoming, 
1957 (Child Protection Act). The present statute omits specific reference to 
parents, guardians or custodians and it omits the word "such" modifying child. 
Section 7, the immediately preceding section of the Child Protection Act, made 
it a crime to solicit, procure or otherwise knowingly encourage "any female 
under the age of eighteen years to engage in illicit sexual intercourse."1 Accordingly, the words "any such 
child" in § 8 describe a "female under the age of eighteen years." The accepted 
rule of construction is that "such" refers to the character of that which 
immediately precedes it unless a contrary legislative intent is evidenced. Elementary School Districts 2, 3, and 10 of 
Campbell County v. District Boundary Board of Campbell County, Wyo., 454 P.2d 237 (1969); In re Tidball, 40 F.2d 560 (D.C. Wyo. 1930). Inasmuch as the last antecedent to "such" child in § 
8 of the Act is a "female under the age of eighteen years" in § 7 thereof, the 
legislative intent was obviously to have § 8 pertain to an age under eighteen 
years. Chapter 70, § 2, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1977, amended § 7 to make one 
guilty of a felony who solicits for, procures for, or knowingly encourages 
anyone "under the age of sixteen years to engage in illicit sexual penetration 
or sexual intrusion." Section 8 was not then amended or included in Chapter 70 
and, thus, remained as enacted in 1957 with "any such child" referring to a 
"female under the age of eighteen years."

[¶7.]     The sexual assault 
statute in effect at the time of this incident was enacted in 1977 as part of 
Chapter 70 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1977, with an effective date of May 
27, 1977 - the month previous to that in which this incident occurred. It was 
originally codified as § 6-63.5 in W.S. 1957, and it read:

"An actor who is at least 
four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual penetration or 
sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years is guilty of 
sexual assault in the fourth degree."

The penalty was 
fixed at imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or, if 
previously convicted of a similar crime, at not less than one (1) nor more than 
five (5) years. Sexual intrusion and sexual penetration were defined to include 
that which was testified to by the victim in this case.

[¶8.]     This section was 
slightly modified in 1982 and was numbered as § 6-2-304, W.S. 1977. It was again 
amended in 1984 to read:

"(a) Except under circumstances constituting a 
violation of W.S. 14-3-105, an actor commits sexual assault in the third 
degree if:

"(i) The actor is at 
least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual intrusion on 
a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; or

"(ii) The actor is an 
adult and subjects a victim under the age of twelve (12) years to sexual contact 
without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim." (Emphasis added.) Session Laws of Wyoming, 1984, Ch. 44, § 2.

[¶9.]     Although not presented 
as an issue in this case, the fact that the statute cited in the information was 
not a statute in existence at the time of the incident is not reversible error 
in this instance inasmuch as the indecent liberties statute cited (§ 14-3-105, 
W.S. 1977) is very similar to the indecent liberties statute in effect at the 
time of the incident (§ 14-28, W.S. 1957); inasmuch as the offense was otherwise 
sufficiently described to identify the statute alleged to have been violated; 
and inasmuch as appellant was not misled to his prejudice.

"* * * The indictment or 
information shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the 
statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is 
alleged therein to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission or any 
other defect or imperfection which does not tend to prejudice any substantial 
right of the defendant upon the merits or to mislead the defendant to his 
prejudice shall not be grounds for dismissal of the indictment or information or 
for a reversal of a conviction. * * *" Rule 9(a), 
W.R.Cr.P.

See 
United 
States v. 
Wagstaff, 572 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1978), and Sonnier v. United 
States, 314 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 
1963).

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶10.]  The victim twice testified that she was 
in NatronaCounty when the incident 
occurred. On cross-examination, her credibility was brought into question by her 
uncertainty as to the exact location of the county line. But the trier of fact 
gauged her credibility and made a determination that the incident occurred in 
NatronaCounty. This finding of 
venue was made on sufficient evidence. Brown v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 189 
(1978). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. McCormick v. Sewell, Wyo., 372 P.2d 481 (1962); Stock v. Roebling, Wyo., 
459 P.2d 780 (1969). On appeal, we do not evaluate the evidence but only 
ascertain whether or not there was substantial evidence upon which the trier of 
fact made a finding. Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 
(1959). As often said, we accept as true the evidence of the successful party, 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in 
conflict therewith, and give the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. Farella v. Rumney, Wyo., 649 P.2d 185 (1982); Foster Lumber Company, Inc. 
v. Hume, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1176 (1982); Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 
(1981). We will not disturb the finding of the trial court that venue was in 
NatronaCounty.

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 
14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (SECTION 14-28, W.S. 1957)

[¶11.]  As noted supra, appellant contends that 
he was improperly charged and convicted under § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977, for any one 
of four reasons:

[¶12.]  (a) Appellant contends that the victim was 
over the age of sixteen and thus was not a "child" as the term was used in § 
14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (§ 14-28, W.S. 1957).

[¶13.]  The prime objective in construing a 
statute is ascertainment of legislative intent. Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61 (1981); State ex rel. R.R. Crow 
& Company v. Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184 P.2d 594 (1947). Words of a 
statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning; and, if there is no 
ambiguity in the expression of intent, we cannot look for or impose a different 
meaning. Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 (1979); Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo., 598 P.2d 432 (1979); Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 567 P.2d 270 (1977).

[¶14.]  As noted supra, the words "such child" in 
§ 14-28, W.S. 1957, referred to the immediately preceding characterization of a 
child, to-wit, one "under the age of eighteen years." The victim in this case 
was under eighteen years of age and the statute cannot be said to be 
inapplicable on the basis that she did not qualify under the age 
requirement.

[¶15.]  (b) Appellant contends that the use of 
the word "such" in § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (§ 14-28, W.S. 1957) resulted in an 
ambiguity, and that the ambiguity should be resolved in his favor inasmuch as 
the statute is a criminal one.

[¶16.]  An ambiguous statute is one which is 
uncertain and susceptible to more than one meaning. Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 (1984); DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); Natrona County v. Casper Air 
Service, Wyo., 536 P.2d 142 (1975). Ambiguity exists 
when a word or a group of words in a statute is susceptible to more than one 
meaning. Matter of Reed's Estate, 
Wyo., 672 P.2d 829 (1983); State ex 
rel. Albany County Weed and Pest District v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Albany County, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979).

[¶17.]  When the accepted rule of construction 
relative to the word "such" having reference to the last antecedent to that 
which "such" modifies is applied, there is no ambiguity in this statute. It can 
be understood in only one way; it is definite in expression; it has but a single 
meaning, and that meaning is not uncertain. The legislative intent is plain. The 
pertinent age was set at under eighteen years.

[¶18.]  (c) Appellant contends that § 14-3-105, 
W.S. 1977 (§ 14-28, W.S. 1957), has been impliedly repealed by § 6-2-304, W.S. 
1977 (§ 6-63.5, W.S. 1957).

[¶19.]  We said in Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 73 
(1978):

"Repeals by implication 
are not favored, [citations] and while such implicit repeals have at times been 
found, [citations] the party so asserting bears `the burden of demonstrating 
beyond question that the legislative body by its later action evinced an 
unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal.' [Citation.] What must be shown is that the latter 
statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot stand together, 
or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the latter one 
having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable 
to the subject." (Emphasis added.)

[¶20.]  Not only was such an intent not clearly intended, but the contrary 
intent was clearly evidenced in more than one way. After enactment of § 6-63.5, 
W.S. 1957 (§ 6-2-304, W.S. 1977), the wording in § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (§ 14-28, 
W.S. 1957) was amended. Such would not happen if it had been impliedly repealed 
at an earlier time. Additionally, when § 6-63.5 (§ 6-2-304) was enacted, a 
specific repealer section was included in the act. It did not repeal § 14-3-105 
(§ 14-28). Not only did it not repeal such section, but it made specific 
reference to the continued existence of § 14-28 in setting forth the procedure 
to be followed after a defendant is convicted or pleads guilty to a sexual 
offense. Chapter 70, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1977, in addition to enacting that 
originally codified as § 6-63.5, W.S. 1957, enacted that which was codified as § 
7-348(a), W.S. 1957, to read:

"The court shall proceed 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section whenever any person is convicted 
of or pleads guilty to sexual assault, W.S. 6-63.2 through 6-63.5, attempted 
sexual assault, W.S. 6-64, incest, W.S. 6-85, taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with any child under eighteen (18) years of age, or knowingly 
committing any immoral, indecent, or obscene act in the presence of any child 
under eighteen (18) years of age and causing or encouraging any child under 
eighteen (18) years of age to cause or encourage any other child to commit or 
attempt to commit with the person convicted, any immoral or indecent act, W.S. 
14-7 and 14-28, and accosting, annoying or molesting any child under the age of 
eighteen (18) years, with intent to commit any unlawful act, W.S. 
14-25."

Both the statute 
under which appellant was convicted (§ 14-28) and the one (§ 6-63.5) which 
appellant contends impliedly repealed the one under which he was convicted are 
contained in this section. This would not be if the intention of the legislature 
was to impliedly repeal § 14-28.

[¶21.]  The legislative intent to maintain the 
existence of the indecent liberties statute, § 14-3-105, in spite of the 
enactment of § 6-2-304, was manifested and specifically stated when § 6-2-304 
was amended in 1984 to begin: "Except under circumstances constituting a 
violation of W.S. 14-3-105 * * *." The legislature never intended to repeal, by 
implication or otherwise, § 14-3-105 (§ 14-28).

[¶22.]  (d) Appellant contends that the provisions 
of § 6-2-304, W.S. 1977 (§ 6-63.5, W.S. 1957) should control over § 14-3-105, 
W.S. 1977 (§ 14-28, W.S. 1957) because it is the more specific of the two and 
they both cover the same subject.

[¶23.]  We have often stated that a special 
statute will govern where a general statute is inconsistent with a special 
statute pertaining to the same subject matter. City of Rock 
Springs v. Police Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979); Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 
(1977). However, appellant has not furnished us with any authority reflecting 
support for application of such rule to this instance. And it must be remembered 
that such is a rule of construction to which resort is had, as with all other 
rules of construction, only for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent. 
Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); Houghton Brothers v. Yocum, 40 
Wyo. 57, 274 P. 10 (1929). In this instance, the legislative intent to continue the operative 
functions of § 14-3-105 (§ 14-28) was manifested as noted supra. The propriety 
of applying any rule of construction to further ascertain legislative intent 
would seem to be futile.

[¶24.]  Beyond that, it is not immediately 
discernible as to which of the two statutes is the more specific. Sexual 
intrusion or penetration is an element of § 6-2-304 (§ 6-63.5) but is not a 
necessary element of § 14-3-105 (§ 14-28). Although the latter statute (at the 
time of the incident) is not limited to parents, guardians and custodians, the 
fact that they are specifically mentioned would indicate an intention to place a 
special onus on those with supervisory authority over minors - as appellant had 
over the victim in this case.2 Both statutes involve sexual 
activity, but they are not mutually exclusive. It is not uncommon for two valid 
statutes to prohibit the same type of conduct, or for the prosecutor to decide 
under which statute to charge a defendant. Jerskey v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 173 (1976); State v. Grider, 74 Wyo. 88, 288 P.2d 766 
(1955); see Rules 11 and 12, W.R.Cr.P.

[¶25.]  This is not an issue of double jeopardy. 
Appellant was not charged with violation of both statutes. He has not been given 
multiple sentences for the same act. Loddy v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 194 
(1972). See Marshall v. State, Wyo., 646 P.2d 795 
(1982).

[¶26.]  With reference to the discussion in the 
dissenting opinion concerning age differential, § 6-2-304 (§ 6-63.5) is 
seriously flawed. Whether denominated rape or sexual assault, the crime 
established by the act of which the statute is a part is premised on infliction 
of sexual activity on a victim through use of force or by virtue of a substitute 
for force. Wilson v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1246 (1982); Tryon v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 290 (1977); Gonzales v. State, Wyo., 516 P.2d 592 
(1973). Historically, the several jurisdictions have fixed an age by statute 
below which a victim could not give an informed consent, which fact would be one 
of the substitutes for force. In other words, the age under which one could not 
give valid consent to sexual activity is a substitute for force. Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299, reh. 
denied 94 P. 217 (1907).

[¶27.]  Section 6-2-304 (§ 6-63.5) sets this age 
at under sixteen. However, it also provides that the victim has the ability to 
give a consent which will be valid if the actor is no more than four years older 
than the victim. This is an inconsistency and is not rational. If one is too 
young to give a valid consent to sexual activity with a person five years older 
than she, how can she not be too young to do so when the sexual activity is by a 
person three years older than she? In other words, if the ability to give a 
valid consent is lacking because of the age of the victim, the ability is 
lacking regardless of the age of the actor, or regardless of any other exterior 
factor. The inability to give consent is a substitute for force in the elements 
of the crime. Simply because the actor is of a designated age, or has blue eyes, 
or has any other characteristic does not change the mental ability of the victim 
to be informed as to the full import of her consent if age makes the inability 
to consent a substitute for force. It does so regardless of the age or other 
characteristic of the actor. In this respect the statute is internally 
inconsistent and irrational. It cannot be said to set forth a usable criminal 
violation more specific than does the indecent liberties 
statute.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.

1 Preceding sections of 
the Act prohibited other actions jeopardizing the morals, health or welfare of 
children under the age of eighteen in one section and under the age of nineteen 
in three sections. The Act did not designate a child by any other 
age.

2 Appellant was a law 
enforcement officer in charge of the Sheriff's Office Cadet Program; the victim 
was a cadet in this program. The incident for which appellant was convicted 
occurred while the appellant and victim were on patrol.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶29.]  I adhere to my position developed in Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356, 
1362 et seq. (1980) (Rose, J., dissenting, with whom McClintock, J., joins), 
that Wyoming law does not prohibit the sort of consensual sexual activity 
involved in this appeal. Accordingly, I join in the dissent of Justice Cardine 
to the extent that it supports the conclusion that our sexual-assault statutes, 
and not our indecent-liberties statute, define the criminality of sexual 
activity between persons over 15 years old or less than four years apart in 
age.

[¶30.]  The conflict between the two statutory 
schemes is inescapable. The sexual-assault statutes1 define consensual sexual 
penetration as a crime only if the child is under 16 and the defendant is at 
least four years older than the child. The indecent-liberties statute,2 on the other hand, provides for up 
to ten years' imprisonment for any person who so much as consensually touches 
the clothed breast of a girl under 19. Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 
(1979). Specifically, the indecent-liberties statute criminalizes the conduct 
involved in this appeal - consensual sexual intercourse between persons over 15 
years of age - while the sexual-assault statutes decriminalize that same 
conduct. We are not free to ignore this contradiction, and, therefore, must 
resort to rules of statutory construction to harmonize these enactments dealing 
with the same subject matter. Capwell v. 
State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 
(1984).

[¶31.]  I agree with Justice Cardine that the 
specific sexual-assault statutes control over the more general 
indecent-liberties provisions. I also join in his position that doubts as to the 
construction of penal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Horn v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925, 927 
(1972). Application of these rules leads me to conclude that the sexual-assault 
statutes govern the criminality of consensual sexual conduct - including but not 
limited to sexual penetration - between persons over 15 or less than four years 
apart in age. Therefore, I would hold that the consensual sexual intercourse 
involved in this appeal does not constitute a crime under Wyoming 
law.

1 The statutes in effect 
at the time of the incident involved in this appeal 
provided:

"Sexual assault in the fourth degree. - 
An actor who is at least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts 
sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) 
years is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree." Section 6-63.5, W.S. 
1957, 1977 Interim Supp.

"Penalties for sexual assault. - * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) For sexual assault 
in the fourth degree, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) 
year." Section 6-63.6(a)(iv), W.S. 1957, 1977 Interim 
Supp.

The current 
sexual-assault statutes define the offense as a felony:

"(a) Except under 
circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105, an actor commits sexual 
assault in the third degree if:

"(i) The actor is at 
least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual intrusion on 
a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; or

"(ii) The actor is an 
adult and subjects a victim under the age of twelve (12) years to sexual contact 
without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim." Section 6-2-304, W.S. 1977, 1984 
Cum.Supp.

"(iii) Sexual assault in 
the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five 
(5) years; * * *" Section 6-2-306(a)(iii), W.S. 1977.

2 Section 14-3-105, W.S. 
1977, is substantially similar to the indecent-liberties statute in effect at 
the time of the incident and provides:

"Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten 
(10) years, or both."

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, partially 
joins.

[¶32.]  During June 1977, appellant and a girl, 
within five months of being seventeen years of age, engaged in consensual sexual 
intercourse. On December 21, 1982, five and one-half years later as a result of 
an investigation into the activities of others, this incident was reported by 
the girl to the sheriff's office. In an information filed February 2, 1983, 
appellant was charged with taking "immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with 
a child" in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977,1 hereafter called the indecent 
liberties statute. He was convicted and sentenced to one to two years in 
prison.

[¶33.]  Two questions addressed in this dissent 
make it clear that appellant was incorrectly charged under the indecent 
liberties statute. They are: 

(1) Is a "child" a person 
under the age of 16 years or one under the age of 18 years as the majority 
opinion concludes?

(2) Does the indecent 
liberties statute apply to sex crimes involving sexual intrusion or penetration 
in any event?

AGE OF A 
CHILD

[¶34.]  The indecent liberties statute does not 
tell us who is a child. If a child is one under the age of sixteen years, 
appellant could not have been charged with violation of the indecent liberties 
statute because the girl here was over the age of sixteen. This court in the 
majority opinion, by referring to what it claims to be the statute immediately 
preceding, construes the words "any such child" found in the indecent liberties 
statute to mean a female under the age of 
eighteen years. The court is mistaken in the statute it refers to, for the 
statute which preceded the indecent liberties statute and which was in effect on 
the date this incident occurred was § 14-2-111, W.S. 1977, which 
provided:

"Anyone who solicits for, 
procures for, or knowingly encourages anyone under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage 
in illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion as defined in W.S. 6-63.1 [§ 
6-4-301] is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed five (5) years." (Emphasis 
added.)

It is true that 
prior to the revision of the preceding statute by enactment of § 14-2-111, W.S. 
1977, supra, the age specified was eighteen years. I would conclude that it was 
the intent of the legislature to reduce the age specified to sixteen years. That 
result would be in accord with

"* * * a general rule, in 
the construction of compilations, revisions, or codes, that when a provision is 
plain and unambiguous the court cannot refer to the original statute for the 
purpose of ascertaining its meaning." 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 
325.

The majority 
opinion is incorrect on two counts. First, the statute defines "any such child" 
as a person under the age of sixteen years, not eighteen years of age as stated 
by the majority. Second, the statute does not restrict itself to females but 
pertains to anyone under the age of 
sixteen years. Applying the statute in effect at the time of this incident, § 
14-2-111, supra, to the determination of who is a child under the indecent 
liberties statute, it is apparent that a child is one under the age of sixteen 
years. That being so, appellant should not have been charged with violation of 
the indecent liberties statute as it existed at the time of this incident since 
the girl involved was over the age of sixteen years.

SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE 
APPLIES

[¶35.]  The majority opinion insists, 
nevertheless, that the indecent liberties statute pertains to sexual intercourse 
involving females under the age of eighteen years. To so construe the statute 
means that consensual sexual intercourse between a boy eighteen years of age and 
a girl one day shy of being eighteen years of age is immoral, immodest, and 
indecent and that the boy is guilty of a felony which may result in imprisonment 
for ten years.

[¶36.]  This construction of the indecent 
liberties statute is clearly contrary to what the legislature intended in 
adopting child abuse and sexual assault statutes. At the time the indecent 
liberties statute was reenacted in 1977, the legislature enacted a comprehensive 
sexual assault statute which set forth with specificity the instances in which 
sexual intercourse was to be a crime in the state of Wyoming. The sexual 
assault statutes provided in part as follows:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual 
assault in the first degree if:

"(i) The actor causes 
submission of the victim through * * * physical force or forcible confinement." 
Section 6-63.2, W.S. 1957.

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual 
assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituted sexual 
assault in the first degree:

* * * * * 
*

"(vi) The actor is in a 
position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to 
cause the victim to submit." Section 6-63.3, W.S. 1957.

"An actor who is at least 
four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual penetration or 
sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years is guilty of 
sexual assault in the fourth degree." Section 6-63.5, W.S. 
1957.

[¶37.]  The opinion of the majority states that 
the sexual assault statute, § 6-2-304, W.S. 1977 (§ 6-63.5), is not more 
specific than the indecent liberties statute because the victim under the sexual 
assault statute "has the ability to give a consent which will be valid if the 
actor is no more than four years older than the victim [but invalid if five 
years older]." The opinion goes on to state, "[t]his is an inconsistency and is 
not rational."

[¶38.]  The rationale behind consideration being 
given the age differential between the parties is best stated in the Model Penal 
Code, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955), at pages 253-254:

"The rationale of 
statutory rape is victimization of immaturity. It seems necessary, therefore, to 
recognize that immature males may themselves be victims of adolescence rather 
than engaged in exploitation of others' experience. * * * The most convenient 
way to give effect to the victimization rationale is to require a substantial 
age differential in favor of the male. * * *. Certainly, existing statutory 
provisions under which the rape label is applied to sexual experimentation by a 
girl just under and a boy just over 16 seem harsh and 
unreasonable."

The subject is a 
difficult one with which to deal. There is wide disagreement over what the age 
of consent ought to be. The difference in ages does and should make a 
difference, otherwise we would be sentencing to prison sixteen-year-old boys who 
are no more knowledgeable, mature or capable of wise judgment than a girl about 
the same age. The legislature has established sixteen years as the age of 
consent and the effect of age upon the criminality of the act. That is the 
function of the legislature, and this court must give effect to the statutes 
pertaining to sexual assault - which I see as clear and unambiguous 
pronouncements.

[¶39.]  The indecent liberties statute and the 
sexual assault statute both deal with sex crimes. It was contended that they 
were clearly in conflict, that one was specific and the other was general, and 
that the specific statute effected a repealer of the general statute. Justice 
Rose, in Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356, 1364 
(1980), analyzing this question in his dissenting opinion, 
stated:

"I feel that 
repeal-by-implication analysis is not an appropriate way to resolve the conflict 
between the fourth-degree-sexual-assault statute and the indecent-liberties 
statute."

The majority in 
this case holds that it was not the intent of the legislature that either 
statute work a repealer of the other. I am in full agreement with that holding 
and am convinced that the statutes do not conflict; they deal with different 
areas of the broad spectrum of sex crimes and can stand 
together.

[¶40.]  Sexual penetration is defined in § 
6-63.1, W.S. 1957, supra, as "sexual intercourse." The age of consent under § 
6-63.5, W.S. 1957, supra, is sixteen years of age.

[¶41.]  There can be no serious argument but that 
the sexual assault statute is a specific statute that deals with sexual 
penetration either as a result of force, consent, or involving a female under 
the age of twelve years or under the age of sixteen years. It deals specifically 
with what formerly was referred to as rape. In Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148, 1151 
(1984), we said:

"A statute making rape a 
crime was first adopted in Wyoming in 1899 * * * [and] remained in effect 
until 1977 when the legislature undertook a comprehensive revision of the 
statutes * * * [and] substituted the term `sexual assault' for the term `rape' * 
* *."

Rape seems 
specific. Sexual penetration to me seems specific. It is defined in § 6-63.1, 
W.S. 1957, supra, as sexual intercourse, and that seems specific. I would find 
that the sexual assault statute deals with a narrow area of sex crime, sexual 
penetration or intrusion, sexual intercourse, and that is specific as opposed to 
being general.

[¶42.]  Extended argument seems unnecessary to 
also hold that § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977, supra, making it unlawful to take 
"immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child," is a general statute 
rather than specific. Justice Rooney conceded as much when, in considering the 
constitutionality of this indecent liberties statute in Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 
1033 (1979), he quoted from Rose v. 
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S. Ct. 243, 244, 46 L. Ed. 2d 185 
(1975):

"`Even trained lawyers 
may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial 
opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or 
forbid.'"

Justice Rooney 
then proceeded to consult the dictionary to determine the meaning of "immoral, 
immodest, and indecent" liberties. He then, quoting from the opinions of other 
courts, stated: "`True, what shall be regarded as "immodest, immoral and 
indecent liberties" is not specified with particularity * * *.'" And he further 
quoted: "`The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of 
fairness.'"

[¶43.]  In construing statutes and determining 
the intent of the legislature with respect to each,

"[w]e presume that the 
legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with 
reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts. Such legislation 
should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony 
within the existing law. Civic Ass'n of 
Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 
Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941). Statutes should be construed in pari materia and if the special 
act is inconsistent with the general law, the provisions of the special act will 
control, Carpenter & Carpenter, Inc. 
v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463 (1941).

"`* * * "It is the 
general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the 
same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will 
be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed 
before or after such general enactment. Where the special statute is later, it 
will be regarded as an exception to or qualification of the prior general one; 
and where the general act is later the special statute will be considered as 
remaining an exception to its terms unless it is repealed in general words or by 
necessary implication."' 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1973), p. 
315." Capwell v. State, supra at 
1152.

Our sexual 
assault statutes, §§ 6-63.1 through 6-63.13, W.S. 1957, supra, deal specifically 
with the criminality or lack of criminality of sexual intercourse whether 
resulting from force or consensual. It is the specific statute, and it governs 
in this case. Section 14-3-105 was reenacted after the adoption of the sexual 
assault statute, and it evidenced a clear intent on the part of the legislature 
that this statute should govern the criminality of other sexual conduct not 
involving sexual penetration or sexual intercourse. As we stated in Capwell v. State, supra at 
1153:

"This construction gives 
effect to both statutes and a policy that ambiguity concerning the application 
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. * * 
*"

Applying the 
above principles to this case, we have a woman who was within five months of 
being seventeen years of age. She candidly admitted in her testimony that the 
sexual intercourse with appellant was consensual. A fair inference from her 
testimony and from the five-and-one-half-year delay in reporting the incident 
would indicate she had no wish to prosecute nor did she believe what occurred 
was a crime. In fact, under our sexual assault statute, § 6-63.5, W.S. 1957, 
supra, it is doubtful that there was a crime.

[¶44.]  I recognize that here appellant was a law 
enforcement officer and that there may be a natural bias on the part of society 
against one who is entrusted with enforcing our laws having sexual relations 
with a girl not quite seventeen, apparently while on duty. If this law 
enforcement officer used his position of authority to cause submission, that was 
the crime of second degree sexual assault under § 6-63.3, W.S. 1957, supra, and 
carries a penalty of one to twenty years in prison. Appellant was not charged 
with this crime; and the record would seem to indicate that the facts of the 
incident would not support that charge, but that may not be 
so.

[¶45.]  I would hold that where the incident 
charged involves sexual penetration or sexual intercourse as in this case, 
whether as a result of force or consent, the sexual assault statute is the 
statute under which the charge should be filed. I would, therefore, reverse and 
remand this case to the trial court.

1 Section 14-3-105, W.S. 
1977, was a reenactment of the statute in effect at the time of this incident; § 
14-2-112, W.S. 1977, then in effect, provided:

"(a) It shall be unlawful 
for any person, including but not limited to parent, guardian or custodian 
knowingly to take immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any such child or 
knowingly to cause or encourage any such child to cause or encourage another 
child to commit with him or her any immoral or indecent 
act.

"(b) Any person who shall 
violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony and 
upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned 
in the penitentiary not to exceed ten (10) years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment."

See majority 
opinion for a discussion that the charge was brought under a statute not then in 
effect but held not to be prejudicial to appellant.