Title: Newell v. SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel:03/17/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151078
____________________
Robert O. Newell
v.
SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC, and 
Richard T. Johnson III
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-15-902787)
BOLIN, Justice.
Robert O. Newell appeals from an order of the Mobile
Circuit Court granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by
1151078
SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC, and Richard T. Johnson III
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "SCI").
Facts and Procedural History
Newell's wife Lisa passed away at their home on November
17, 2013.  Newell telephoned E-911, and an ambulance and the
sheriff's department soon arrived.  According to Newell, he
requested that Lisa's body be transported to Mobile Memorial
Gardens Funeral Home.  However, unbeknownst to Newell, Lisa's
body was transported to Radney Funeral Home.1  
The following day Newell, accompanied by his sister, two
daughters, and a son-in-law, went to Mobile Memorial Gardens
Funeral Home to make the final arrangements for Lisa. Newell
testified that he asked his family to accompany him because he
was distraught over Lisa's death.  When Newell and the others
arrived at Mobile Memorial Gardens Funeral Home they met with
Richard T. Johnson III, an employee of Mobile Memorial
Gardens.  Johnson informed Newell at that time that Lisa's
body had been transported to Radney Funeral Home instead of
1It appears that SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC, is an
Alabama corporation that owns or is otherwise affiliated with
the Dignity Memorial network of funeral homes, of which Mobile
Memorial Gardens Funeral Home and Radney Funeral Home are a
part.   
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Mobile Memorial Gardens Funeral Home.  According to Newell,
Johnson informed him that Lisa's body had been transported to
Radney instead of Mobile Memorial Gardens because Radney was
now a part of the Dignity Memorial Company and because Mobile
Memorial Gardens did not have a crematory service.  Newell
stated that he was upset when he learned that Lisa's body had
been transported to Radney Funeral Home instead of Mobile
Memorial Gardens Funeral Home.
Newell informed Johnson during the meeting that he wanted
Lisa's remains cremated and that he wanted to conclude the
process as soon as possible.  Johnson responded that they
could return Lisa's ashes to Newell within 5 to 10 days.
According to Newell, Johnson then began asking him a series of
questions from a "checklist" that Newell said he found "very
insensitive," including  whether he wanted to pay to have
Lisa's eyes and mouth sewn shut during the cremation process.
Newell elected not to have Lisa's body embalmed because
Johnson had represented that Lisa's ashes would be returned to
him in 5 to 10 days.  After Newell answered the questions, he
executed a contract providing for the disposition of Lisa's
remains by cremation.  
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The contract contained immediately above the signature
lines a section entitled "NOTICES TO PURCHASER/CO-PURCHASER." 
Within that section appeared the following:
"SEE PART THREE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT
ARE PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.  DO NOT SIGN THIS
AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU READ IT OR IF IT CONTAINS ANY
BLANK SPACES. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF AN EXACT
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT.
"BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU ARE AGREEING
THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST THE SELLER SHALL
BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP
YOUR RIGHT TO A COURT OR JURY TRIAL AS WELL AS YOUR 
RIGHT OF APPEAL."
(Capitalization in original.) The contract contains in part
three a section entitled "TERMS AND CONDITIONS."  This section
contains the arbitration provision, which provides:
"ARBITRATION: YOU AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY
HAVE RELATING TO THE TRANSACTION CONTEMPLATED BY
THIS AGREEMENT (INCLUDING ANY CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY
REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS ARBITRATION
CLAUSE) SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND FINALLY RESOLVED
BY MANDATORY AND BINDING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH 
THE 
APPLICABLE 
RULES 
OF 
THE 
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ('AAA'); PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
THAT THE FOREGOING REFERENCE TO THE AAA RULES SHALL
NOT BE DEEMED TO REQUIRE ANY FILING WITH THAT
ORGANIZATION, NOR ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THAT
ORGANIZATION.  THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE SELECTED BY
MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.  IF THE PARTIES
FAIL TO OR ARE UNABLE TO AGREE ON THE SELECTION OF
AN APPROPRIATE ARBITRATOR, THE AAA SHALL SELECT THE
ARBITRATOR PURSUANT TO ITS RULES AND PROCEDURES UPON
THE APPLICATION OF ONE OR BOTH PARTIES. THIS
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY CLAIM OR
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DISPUTE BETWEEN OR AMONG THE SELLER, YOU AS THE
PURCHASER, ANY PERSON WHO CLAIMS TO BE A THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY OF THE SELLER'S
EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS, ANY OF THE SELLER'S PARENT,
SUBSIDIARY, OR AFFILIATE CORPORATIONS, EXCEPT AS MAY
BE REQUIRED BY LAW, NEITHER PARTY NOR AN ARBITRATOR
MAY DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE, CONTENT, OR RESULTS OF
ANY ARBITRATION HEREUNDER WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN
CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES."
(Capitalization in 
original.) 
The 
contract 
also 
requested that
Newell provide his Social Security number directly below the
signature line; however, Newell wrote "refused" on the line
provided for the Social Security number.
Newell states that after Lisa's memorial service on
November 21, 2013, SCI did not return any of his telephone
calls or e-mails inquiring as to the status of Lisa's remains. 
Newell eventually went to Radney Funeral Home on December 4,
2013, to obtain an answer regarding the status of Lisa's
remains.  Newell learned at that time that Lisa had not yet
been cremated because the funeral home had not yet received
the death certificate from a physician.  Newell stated that at
that time he was so upset over the lack of communication and
the knowledge of the status of Lisa's remains that he
requested that his sister re-identify Lisa's remains.  Newell
alleged that he was  emotionally distraught over the potential
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1151078
state of Lisa's remains because, based on Johnson's
representation that she would be cremated within 5 to 10 days,
he had elected not to embalm her.  Lisa's ashes were
ultimately returned to Newell on December 6, 2013. 
On 
November 
17, 
2015, 
Newell 
sued 
SCI 
alleging
negligence, wantonness, the tort of outrage, and fraud. On
March 8, 2016, SCI moved the trial court to compel
arbitration.  On May 12, 2016, Newell filed a response in
opposition to the motion to compel arbitration or, in the
alternative, seeking discovery relating to arbitration,
arguing that the arbitration provision was unconscionable. 
Specifically, Newell argued that the terms of the arbitration
provision were grossly favorable to SCI, that SCI had
overwhelming bargaining power over a grieving husband,  and
that the arbitration provision violated public policy.  On May
31, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting SCI's
motion to compel arbitration.  Newell appeals.
Standard of Review
This Court's standard of review of a ruling on a motion
to compel arbitration is well settled:
"'This Court reviews de novo the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration. Parkway Dodge, Inc. v.
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Yarbrough, 779 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 2000). A motion to
compel arbitration is analogous to a motion for a
summary judgment. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739
So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999). The party seeking to
compel arbitration has the burden of proving the
existence of a contract calling for arbitration and
proving that the contract evidences a transaction
affecting interstate commerce. Id. "[A]fter a motion
to compel arbitration has been made and supported,
the burden is on the non-movant to present evidence
that the supposed arbitration agreement is not valid
or does not apply to the dispute in question." Jim
Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260,
1265 n. 1 (Ala. 1995) (opinion on application for
rehearing).'"
Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d
277, 280 (Ala. 2000)).  
Discussion
Newell argues that the arbitration provision in part
three of the contract is unconscionable, and therefore void,
because, he says, the terms of the provision are grossly
favorable to SCI.   "Unconscionability is an affirmative
defense, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409, 415
(Ala. 1999), and the party asserting the defense bears the
burden of proof. Ex parte Napier, 723 So. 2d 49, 52–53 (Ala.
1998)." Fleetwood Enters., 784 So. 2d at 281. In order to meet
that burden, the party seeking to invalidate an arbitration
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1151078
provision on the basis of unconscionability must establish
both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Alabama v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1087 (Ala.
2005). As this Court explained in Rigas:
"Substantive unconscionability
"'"relates to the substantive contract
terms themselves and whether those terms
are unreasonably favorable to the more
powerful party, such as terms that impair
the integrity of the bargaining process or
otherwise 
contravene 
the 
public 
interest 
or
public policy; terms (usually 
of an
adhesion 
or 
boilerplate 
nature) 
that
attempt to alter in an impermissible manner
fundamental 
duties 
otherwise 
imposed 
by 
the
law, fine-print terms or provisions that
seek to negate the reasonable expectations
of the nondrafting party, or unreasonably
and unexpectedly harsh terms having to do
with price or other central aspects of the
transaction."'
"Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731 (Ala. 2002)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex parte Foster, 758 So.
2d 516, 520 n. 4 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn 8
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 18:10 (4th
ed. 1998)). See also Leeman v. Cook's Pest Control,
Inc., 902 So. 2d 641 (Ala. 2004).
"Procedural unconscionability, on the other
hand, 'deals with "procedural deficiencies in the
contract formation process, such as deception or a
refusal to bargain over contract terms, today often
analyzed in terms of whether the imposed-upon party
had meaningful choice about whether and how to enter
into the transaction."' Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 731
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(quoting Foster, 758 So. 2d at 520 n. 4, quoting in
turn 8 Williston on Contracts § 18:10)."
923 So. 2d at 1086–87. 
Relying upon Anderson v. Ashby, 873 So. 2d 168 (Ala.
2003), Newell initially argues that the arbitration provision
was substantively unconscionable.
I.
Newell first contends that the breadth of the arbitration
provision 
meets 
the 
standard 
for 
substantive
unconscionability, because, 
he 
says, 
it 
reaches 
every 
possible
action the party opposing arbitration may have against the
party seeking to compel arbitration and protects every
individual against whom a claim could be brought.  The
arbitration provision in Anderson provided:
"'Borrower(s) 
and 
Lender 
agree 
that, 
except
as otherwise set forth in this provision,
all claims, disputes, or controversies of
every kind and nature between Borrower(s)
and Lender shall be resolved by arbitration
including (i) those based on contract, tort
or statute, (ii) those arising out of or
relating 
to 
the 
transaction(s) evidenced 
by
this 
agreement, 
the 
disclosures 
relating 
to
this agreement, the Federal Disclosure
Statement, any insurance certificates or
policies, any documents executed at or
about the same time this agreement was
executed or (iii) those arising out of,
[or] relating to any other prior, proposed
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or actual loan or extension of credit (and
the relationships which result from these
transactions 
or 
any 
other 
previous
transactions 
between 
Borrower(s) 
and
Lender). Borrower(s) and Lender further
agree that all issues and disputes as to
the arbitrability of claims must also be
resolved by the arbitrator.
"'BORROWER(S) AND LENDER UNDERSTAND
THAT EACH HAS THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE SUCH
DISPUTES THROUGH A COURT, AND BORROWER(S)
AND LENDER VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE
ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL OR
JUDGE TRIAL OF SUCH DISPUTES.
"'....
"'BORROWER(S) AND LENDER AGREE THAT
THE ARBITRATOR MAY AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ONLY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A COURT OF
COMPETENT JURISDICTION COULD AWARD SUCH
DAMAGES. HOWEVER, IN NO EVENT SHALL AN
AWARD OF DAMAGES EXCEED FIVE (5) TIMES THE
ECONOMIC LOSS SUFFERED BY THE PARTY.
BORROWER(S) AND LENDER FURTHER AGREE THAT
THE ARBITRATOR SHALL NOT CONDUCT ANY
CLASS-WIDE 
PROCEEDINGS 
AND 
WILL 
BE
RESTRICTED TO RESOLVING THE INDIVIDUAL
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
"'Borrower(s) and Lender agree that,
notwithstanding 
the 
foregoing, 
Lender
retains the right to use judicial or
self-help remedies (i) to repossess or
foreclose on collateral or to enforce the
security 
interests 
relating 
to 
this
transaction, and (ii) to pursue collection
actions against the Borrower(s) where the
amount of the debt is $10,000 or less. The
exercise of this right by Lender to pursue
judicial or self-help remedies shall not
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constitute a waiver of Lender's right to
compel the arbitration of any claim or
dispute 
subject 
to 
this 
arbitration
clause--including 
the 
filing 
of 
a
counterclaim by Borrower(s) in a lawsuit
filed by Lender.'"
873 So. 2d at 170.  This Court found the arbitration provision
in Anderson unconscionable, on the basis that it contained a
number of terms grossly favorable to the defendant and
indicative of unconscionability, including: 
"1) the breadth of the arbitration agreement, which
extends to every cause of action that might
conceivably arise in favor of the Ashbys and that
applies to every individual or entity against whom
the Ashbys might bring a claim; (2) the provision
purporting to invest the arbitrator with the
threshold issue of arbitrability; (3) the provision
reserving to American General Finance the right to
a trial by jury while mandating that the Ashbys
arbitrate any and every claim that might arise; and
(4) the provision limiting the Ashbys' right of
recovery for all species of damages to no more than
five times the economic loss while preserving
American General Finance's right to seek full
redress for its claims."
Anderson, 873 So. 2d 176-77.
Focusing on the provision in "Notices to Purchaser/Co-
Purchaser" that states "BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU ARE
AGREEING THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST THE SELLER SHALL
BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION," Newell argues that, like the
arbitration provision in Anderson, this provision is overly
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broad because it contemplates that every conceivable claim he
might possibly have against SCI must be submitted to
arbitration.  This argument is not well taken.  
The provision relied upon by Newell to form the basis of
his argument is not the actual arbitration provision.  Rather,
the provision is contained in the "Notices to Purchaser/Co-
Purchaser" section and informs the signatory that the 
contract
contains an arbitration provision.  Further, the "Notices to
Purchaser/Co-Purchaser" 
section 
expressly 
informs 
the
signatory that the terms and conditions of the contract are
found in part three of the contract.  Part three of the
contract contains the arbitration provision, which expressly
limits it scope to "any claim ... relating to the transaction
contemplated by this agreement."  Because the arbitration
provision in this case expressly limited its scope to claims
relating only to transactions contemplated by the contract of
which it was a part and did not extend to every conceivable
claim that may have arisen in favor of Newell against SCI, it
is 
distinguishable from 
the 
arbitration 
provision in 
Anderson. 
Accordingly, because the scope of the arbitration provision is
expressly limited to only those claims "relating to the
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transaction contemplated by this agreement," we cannot say
that it is so overly broad so as to be unconscionable.
II. 
Newell, again relying upon Anderson, next argues that the
arbitration provision, which vests the arbitrator with the
jurisdiction to determine questions of arbitrability, is
grossly favorable to SCI and therefore unconscionable.  The
arbitration provision in Anderson provided that "all issues
and disputes as to the arbitrability of claims must also be
resolved by the arbitrator."  873 So. 2d at 170.  The
arbitration provision presently before this Court provides
that "any claim or controversy regarding the 
interpretation of
this arbitration clause ... shall be submitted to and finally
resolved by mandatory and binding arbitration."  
This Court has upheld arbitration provisions that give
the arbitrator the authority to determine arbitrability:  
"When deciding the threshold issue whether the
court or the arbitrator decides a challenge to the
enforcement of an arbitration clause entered into by
the parties, the court first must satisfy itself
that the terms of the arbitration clause are broad
enough to permit the arbitrator to decide issues of
arbitrability. However, a determination that, by the
terms of the arbitration clause, the arbitrator is
to decide issues of arbitrability does not end the
inquiry. Where the attack is addressed to the
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arbitration clause itself, as opposed to the
contract as a whole, the court, and not the
arbitrator, resolves the issue. But, when the
challenge goes to the whole contract, a contract
that happens to contain an arbitration clause, the
issue of enforceability of the contract, including
the arbitration clause, is for the arbitrator to
decide."
Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Alabama v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409,
413 (Ala. 1999).  See also Regions Bank v. Neighbors, 168 So.
3d 1 (Ala. 2014); Anderton v. Practice-Monroeville, P.C.,  164
So. 3d 1094 (Ala. 2014); and CitiFinancial Corp. v. Peoples,
973 So. 2d 332, 340 (Ala. 2007).        
   As discussed above, this Court found unconscionable in
Anderson a provision reserving to the arbitrator the authority
to determine the threshold issue of arbitrability when
considered in conjunction with several other terms in the
contract that were grossly favorable to the defendant.  Those
other grossly favorable terms are not present in this case. 
Initially, we determined above that the arbitration provision
was not overly broad so as to include every conceivable claim
that could arise between Newell and SCI because the
arbitration provision in part three is expressly limited to
the transaction contemplated by the contract.  Second, the
arbitration provision in this case contains no terms limiting
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Newell's right to the recovery of damages.  Accordingly, the
terms  found in the arbitration provision in this case, in
addition to that reserving to the arbitrator the authority to
determine any issues of arbitrability, are not so grossly
favorable to SCI as to render the arbitration provision
unconscionable.
III.
Continuing to rely upon Anderson, Newell next argues that
a defendant's specific reservation of the right to avail
itself of the courts while forcing a plaintiff to arbitrate
every conceivable claim is grossly favorable to the defendant
and therefore unconscionable.  We find Anderson to be easily
distinguishable from the present case.  In Anderson, the
defendant expressly reserved in the arbitration provision the
"right to  use judicial or self-help remedies (i) to repossess
or foreclose on collateral or to enforce the security
interests relating to this transaction, and (ii) to pursue
collection actions against the Borrower(s) where the 
amount of
the debt is $10,000 or less," 873 So. 2d at 170, while
requiring the plaintiffs to arbitrate any and every claim that
might arise between the parties. 
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We initially note that there is no express reservation by
SCI in the arbitration provision here  of the right to avail
itself of the courts, while relegating Newell to arbitration. 
Although the contract does allow SCI to refer the agreement to
an attorney for collections, there is no express reservation
of that right in the arbitration provision.  In addition to
expressly reserving the right to pursue collections, the
arbitration provision in Anderson expressly reserved to the
defendant the right to avail itself of the courts in order to
pursue foreclosure or repossession of collateral. That factor
is not present in this case. Also, as discussed above, the
arbitration provision here requires Newell to arbitrate only
the claims relating to the transaction contemplated by the
agreement between the parties, whereas the arbitration
provision in Anderson expressly reserved for the 
defendant the
right to avail itself of the courts in order to pursue the
collateral and to allow for collections, while requiring the
plaintiff to arbitrate any and every conceivable claim between
the parties.  Finally, the limitation of the plaintiff’s right
of recovery contained in the arbitration provision in 
Anderson
is not present in this case.  Accordingly, the contract term
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allowing SCI to refer the agreement to an attorney for
collections is not so grossly favorable to SCI as to render
the arbitration provision unconscionable.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Newell has
failed to establish that the arbitration provision in this
case was substantively unconscionable. Rigas, supra.
IV. 
Newell next argues that the arbitration provision was
also "procedurally" unconscionable because, he says, SCI had
overwhelming bargaining power over him in that he was
distraught and grieving when he executed the contract
containing the arbitration provision.  As set out earlier in
the quotation from Rigas, procedural unconscionability deals
with the procedural deficiencies in the contract-formation
process, "'"such as deception or a refusal to bargain over
contract terms, today often analyzed in terms of whether the
imposed-upon party had a meaningful choice about whether and
how to enter into the transaction."'"  Leeman v. Cook’s Pest
Control, Inc., 902 So. 2d 641, 645 (Ala. 2004)(quoting Ex
parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731 (Ala. 2002), quoting in
turn Ex parte Foster, 785 So. 2d 516, 520 n.4 (Ala. 1999)). 
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Newell does  not claim that SCI deceived him or coerced him
into entering into the contract containing the arbitration
provision.  Rather, Newell claims that, when a contract
involves funeral matters, time is of the essence with respect
to making final arrangements and it is not practical to
require a grieving family member to "shop around" for a
funeral home that does not require the execution of an
arbitration agreement.  Newell states that he had originally
selected Mobile Memorial Gardens Funeral Home as the funeral
home he wanted to use and that when he arrived there to make
the final arrangements he was notified that Lisa’s remains had
been taken to Radney Funeral Home without his knowledge.  He
claims that to require him at that point in time to make an
additional choice regarding funeral homes in the state of mind
he was in would have required him to expend considerable
effort and resources.  Newell contends that 
those considerable
efforts and resources should be viewed in the context of a
family making final arrangements for a loved one and that,
when viewed in that light, SCI held overwhelming bargaining
power over him.
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"'Although a party would not have to spend a considerable
amount of time and effort to find alternatives, Alabama
Courts, nevertheless, do require that a party "shop around" in
order to show that there was no meaningful alternative.'" 
Leeman, 902 So. 2d at 647 (quoting Pitchford v. AmSouth Bank,
285 F. Supp. 2d  1286, 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2003)). Although the
sensitive nature of the circumstances in this case are not
lost upon this Court, we cannot say that those circumstances
would have required Newell to expend considerable effort and
resources in seeking an alternate funeral home as he claims.
Nothing in the record indicates that either Newell or one of
the other family members accompanying him to make the final
arrangements was unable to at least make a telephone call to
one of the number of funeral homes in the Mobile area to
inquire about funeral services.  Newell’s assertions that he
did not consider alternatives and that he was in no position
to negotiate because of his emotional state must be viewed in
light of his express refusal to provide his Social Security
number and his negotiation of the services he desired for his
wife, including the choice of cremation and the insistence
that the cremation process be concluded as soon as possible. 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Newell has failed to
establish that the circumstances under which he entered into
the contract containing the arbitration provision were
procedurally unconscionable.  Rigas, supra.
V. 
Newell last argues that the arbitration provision in part
three of the contract violates public policy.   "'The [Federal
Arbitration Act] preempts contrary state law (specifically,
contrary law based on Ala. Code 1975, § 8–1–41(3), and public
policy) 
and 
renders 
enforceable 
a 
written 
predispute
arbitration agreement but only if that agreement appears in a
contract evidencing a transaction that "involves" interstate
commerce.'"  Tefco Fin. Co. v. Green, 793 So. 2d 755, 758
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight,
736 So. 2d 582, 585–86 (Ala. 1999)).  This Court has
consistently enforced arbitration agreements where  the
following elements are established: (1) "'the existence of a
contract calling for arbitration'" and (2) "'that contract
evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce.'"
Kenworth of Mobile, Inc. v Dolphin Line, Inc., 988 So. 2d 534,
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539-39 (Ala. 2008)(quoting Fleetwood Enters., 784 So. 2d at
280).
In this case, we have before us a contract that includes
an arbitration provision that we have upheld as being valid in
the face of challenges based on unconscionability. Newell has
made no argument that the contract is not one evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce. Again, although we
realize the sensitive nature of the circumstances surrounding
the underlying transaction in this case, we cannot say that
the 
arbitration provision in this case violates public policy.
Conclusion
Based on the forgoing, we conclude that Newell has failed
to establish that the arbitration provision contained in the
contract he executed with SCI for funeral services was
unconscionable 
or 
that 
it 
violated 
public 
policy. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order compelling
arbitration of the dispute.
AFFIRMED.
Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
21