Title: STATE v CAMPBELL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 79-04 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . ARTHUR ELDON CAMPBELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial ~istrict, Honorable B. W . Thomas, Judge presiding. In and for the County of Hill Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ronald Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana Submitted: April 14, 1980 Decided: 4UG 5- 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n by f i l i n g an informa- t i o n charging a p p e l l a n t Arthur Campbell with one count of d r i v i n g under t h e influence of alcohol, s i x t h offense, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while adjudged an habitual offender. The information was f i l e d i n t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l District Court, H i l l County, t h e Honorable B. W. Thomas presiding. Approximately two months a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n i t i a l charges a g a i n s t Campbell, t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o f i l e an amended information adding a t h i r d count t o t h e charges. The added count charged Campbell with negligent homicide. Campbell entered pleas of n o t g u i l t y t o a l l t h r e e counts charged i n t h e amended information. H e a l s o f i l e d a motion t o suppress testimony regarding c e r t a i n i d e n t i f i c a - t i o n testimony and t h e r e s u l t s of a blood t e s t . Subsequent t o a hearing on t h e motion t o suppress, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ruled t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n evidence was admissible b u t t h a t t h e blood test r e s u l t s should n o t be admitted. The S t a t e moved t o reopen t h e suppression hearing f o r t h e presen- t a t i o n of f u r t h e r evidence. The District Court granted t h e motion and conducted another hearing i n t o t h e matter of t h e admission of a blood t e s t . After t h e hearing, the c o u r t entered a supplemental order denying Campbell's motion t o suppress t h e blood test r e s u l t s . P r i o r t o t r i a l on t h e charges, Campbell moved t o sever Count I1 of the information r e l a t i n g t o the habitual t r a f f i c offender charge. The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e motion. Campbell came t o t r i a l on t h e charges i n t h e amended information on May 1 4 , 1979. The jury found him g u i l t y of a l l charges. Campbell moved f o r a new t r i a l o r a judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t . The motions were denied, and t h i s appeal followed. Appellant Campbell began the day of June 6, 1978, by drinking a beer. A f t e r drinking somewhere between t e n and twelve beers, Campbell and h i s two companions, Vincent and Manuel Moreno, borrowed a Plymouth automobile t o d r i v e t o Fresno Reservoir t o go swimming. Gus Keller observed t h e Plymouth heading west from Havre on Highway 2 toward Fresno. Keller was a l s o headed w e s t on Highway 2. The Plymouth passed h i s truck. Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e Plymouth "tapped" h i s truck t w i c e a s it passed. Keller a l s o observed a highway p a t r o l c a r approach- i n g from t h e w e s t with i t s l i g h t s f l a s h i n g . Seconds later, Keller saw what appeared t o be a puff of d u s t along t h e road ahead. The highway p a t r o l c a r Keller observed i n t h e d i s t a n c e was being driven by Patrolman Gordon Hage. Patrolman Hage was proceeding e a s t on Highway 2 t o t h e scene of an a c c i - dent. H e w a s d r i v i n g approximately 90 m i l e s per hour with h i s l i g h t s f l a s h i n g and s i r e n on. The puff of d u s t Keller saw was caused by t h e c o l l i s i o n of t h e Plymouth t h a t Campbell was d r i v i n g and Hage's p a t r o l c a r . The c o l l i s i o n occurred i n t h e patrolman's l a n e near t h e edge of t h e highway. The Plymouth had turned a c r o s s t h e highway i n f r o n t of t h e oncoming p a t r o l car. Patrolman Hage applied h i s brakes and veered t o t h e r i g h t b u t w a s unable t o avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n . There w a s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e Plymouth attempted t o s t o p h i s v e h i c l e before t h e c o l l i s i o n . There w e r e no witnesses t o t h e c o l l i s i o n o t h e r than t h e occupants of t h e vehicles. None of them remember t h e c o l l i - s i o n i t s e l f . Witnesses who a r r i v e d on t h e scene s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n found Officer Hage s t i l l i n s i d e h i s vehicle. They helped him from t h e c a r j u s t a s it b u r s t i n t o flames. inc cent and Manuel Moreno w e r e discovered l y i n g on t h e ground some d i s t a n c e from t h e Plymouth. Campbell was discovered i n t h e f r o n t seat of t h e v e h i c l e with h i s r i g h t f o o t wedged under t h e c a r ' s brake pedal and h i s body angled s o t h a t h i s head was r e s t i n g on t h e s e a t near t h e passenger door. A l l t h e p a r t i e s involved i n t h e a c c i d e n t were severely i n j u r e d . They w e r e taken immediately t o t h e h o s p i t a l i n Havre and t r e a t e d f o r i n j u r i e s . An attempt w a s made t o question Campbell while he w a s being t r e a t e d . Patrolman S e y f e r t of t h e Highway P a t r o l attempted t o t a l k with Campbell b u t w a s t o l d by a nurse t h a t it would be b e s t i f he d i d n o t do so. Patrolman Walston and Deputy S h e r i f f Glover d i d t a l k t o Campbell. They w e r e unable t o g e t any coherent answers from him. Campbell d i d respond t o some questions about t h e l o c a t i o n of h i s pain and once spelled h i s name i n t h e ab- sence of t h e o f f i c e r s . Generally, however, Campbell showed confusion and incoherence. A f ter t h e s e attempts t o question Campbell, Patrolman S e y f e r t requested t h a t blood samples be taken from t h e occu- pants of t h e Plymouth. A blood sample w a s subsequently taken from Campbell. The ~ i s t r i c t Court found t h a t Campbell was n o t placed under a r r e s t p r i o r t o t h e taking of t h e blood sample, t h a t he w a s n o t advised of t h e purpose f o r t h e taking of t h e blood sample, and t h a t he d i d n o t consent t o t h e taking of t h e sample. Campbell and Manuel Moreno u l t i m a t e l y recovered from t h e i r i n j u r i e s . Patrolman Hage remains paralyzed a s a r e s u l t of i n j u r i e s he s u f f e r e d i n t h e accident. inc cent Moreno d i d not recover from the i n j u r i e s he suffered. H e died J u l y 1 4 , 1978. A t t r i a l t h e S t a t e introduced t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood alcohol test administered t o Campbell s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e accident. The test showed Campbell's blood alcohol content was - 2 0 percent. The S t a t e a l s o introduced evidence tending t o show Campbell w a s driving the Plymouth when the accident occurred. Patrolman Harold Wood w a s c a l l e d a s an expert witness. Patrolman Wood t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s examination of t h e evidence a t t h e accident scene l e d him t o conclude t h a t Campbell had been driving when t h e Plymouth c o l l i d e d with t h e p a t r o l c a r . Sandy Bryant, a r e s p i r a t o r y therapy techni- c i a n who t r e a t e d Campbell during h i s recovery from i n j u r i e s suffered i n the accident, t e s t i f i e d about a conversation she overheard between Campbell and Manuel Moreno. M s . Bryant s t a t e d Moreno asked Campbell, "Why d i d you do that?" t o which Campbell r e p l i e d , "You t o l d m e t o see i f I c o u l d n ' t h i t him." M s . Bryant s a i d t h e conversation took place about a week a f t e r t h e accident and t h a t she thought the men w e r e t a l k i n g about t h e accident. Campbell introduced evidence a t t r i a l indicating t h a t he w a s not driving when t h e cars collided. D r . Mark Jacobson, a p h y s i c i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e accident l e d him t o believe t h e d r i v e r of the Plymouth would have been thrown from t h e c a r on impact. This testimony implied Campbell w a s not driving s i n c e he was n o t thrown from the c a r . Further, Manuel Moreno and Campbell both t e s t i f i e d t h a t Vincent Moreno was driving a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident. However, i n a statement made s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e accident and before Vincent Moreno died, Manuel Moreno s a i d Campbell had been driving when t h e accident occurred. Campbell r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e s on appeal: 1. id t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n admitting t h e r e s u l t s of Campbell's blood t e s t taken s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t i n t o evidence? 2. id t h e D i s t r i c t Court have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e charge of d r i v i n g while under t h e influence of alcohol? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n r e f u s i n g t o sever Count I1 of t h e amended information from t h e o t h e r two counts? 4. Is t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t supported by s u f f i c i e n t evidence? The f i r s t i s s u e Campbell r a i s e s p r e s e n t s t h r e e ques- t i o n s f o r consideration. The f i r s t question presented i s whether Campbell was unconscious o r otherwise i n a condition rendering him incapable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e taking of t h e blood sample. This question a r i s e s because Campbell was n o t placed under a r r e s t before t h e taking of t h e blood t e s t . A n a r r e s t i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e taking of a blood sample i f a defendant i s conscious and capable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e t e s t . S t a t e v. Mangels (1975), 166 Mont. 190, 193, 531 P.2d 1313. Since Campbell was n o t a r r e s t e d , t h e test r e s u l t s would be inadmissible here i f Campbell was conscious and capable of refusing consent. The S t a t e does n o t contend t h a t Campbell was unconscious when t h e blood test was administered. The question, there- f o r e , i s whether Campbell was i n a condition rendering him incapable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e taking of t h e sample. The standard f o r determining whether a p a r t y i s i n a condi- t i o n rendering t h e p a r t y incapable of r e f u s i n g consent i s set o u t i n Mangels where w e s a i d , ". . . w e only r e q u i r e t h a t t h e incapacity be determined on t h e b a s i s of t h e b e s t evidence which i s reasonably a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r . . ." 166 Mont. a t 194, 531 P.2d a t 1315. Applying t h a t standard i n Mangels, we found t h a t a highway patrolman improperly determined t h a t Mangels was incapable of r e f u s i n g consent t o t h e t e s t where Mangels appeared confused, was s u f f e r i n g from abrasions a f t e r an accident, and where t h e patrolman d i d n o t t a l k t o Mangels a t any t i m e before t h e taking of t h e blood sample. 166 Mont. a t 192, 194, 531 P.2d a t 1313, 1314. The D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s case applied t h e Mangels t e s t and determined t h a t t h e b e s t evidence reasonably a v a i l - a b l e t o the o f f i c e r s here indicated Campbell was i n a condi- t i o n rendering him incapable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o a blood test. The following evidence was introduced a t t h e suppression hearing t o support t h i s determination by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Patrolman S e y f e r t t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he a r r i v e d on t h e a c c i d e n t scene he found Campbell lying on t h e f r o n t s e a t of t h e Plymouth. S e y f e r t s t a t e d Campbell's f a c e was covered with blood and t h a t Campbell was moaning and groaning. S e y f e r t s a i d Campbell d i d n o t respond t o t h e questions he asked him. Patrolman S e y f e r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t when he attempted t o question Campbell a t t h e h o s p i t a l a s h o r t time a f t e r t h e accident, a nurse t o l d him t h a t it was b e s t n o t t o t r y t o s e e Campbell. Patrolman Walston s t a t e d t h a t he attempted t o question Campbell o u t s i d e t h e X-ray room a t t h e h o s p i t a l s h o r t l y before t h e taking of t h e blood sample. Walston t e s t i f i e d t h a t he asked Campbell h i s name and s e v e r a l o t h e r questions b u t g o t no meaningful response. He s a i d t h a t a t one p o i n t Campbell d i d answer a question a s t o h i s name b u t gave another name. Patrolman Walston s a i d Campbell mainly swore and asked f o r "Dot" during t h e t i m e he attempted t o ques- t i o n him. Deputy S h e r i f f Glover asked Campbell questions f o r about f i v e minutes a f t e r Campbell had been taken t o t h e h o s p i t a l . Glover s t a t e d t h a t he g o t only one coherent answer from Campbell during t h e questioning. Glover s a i d Campbell gave him a name i n response t o a question about h i s name. However, t h e name Campbell gave was n o t h i s own. This evidence i n d i c a t e s the D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n determining Campbell was incapable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e blood test under t h e Mangels standard. I n Mangels t h e o f f i c e r s only had evidence of confusion on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant, minor i n j u r i e s , and d i d n o t attempt t o ques- t i o n t h e defendant. Here, t h e o f f i c e r s observed t h a t Campbell was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d and i n g r e a t pain, w e r e advised by a nurse t h a t it would be b e t t e r n o t t o t r y t o t a l k t o him, and could n o t g e t him t o respond coherently t o questions when they d i d t a l k with him. Given t h i s evidence a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r s , it appears they properly d e t e r - mined t h a t Campbell was i n a condition rendering him incap- a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o a blood test. The second question presented by t h i s i s s u e i s whether Montana's implied consent s t a t u t e only allows t h e taking of a blood sample from an i n d i v i d u a l a f t e r a v a l i d a r r e s t even i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s unconscious o r otherwise incapable of r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e test. Mangels a l s o spoke t o t h i s question. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e implied consent s t a t u t e , w e s p e c i f i c a l l y held t h a t a n a r r e s t was n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e taking of a sample i f t h e p a r t y t e s t e d was unconscious o r incapable of consenting t o the test. 166 Mont. a t 193, 531 P.2d a t 1314. Thus, i f Mangels i s given e f f e c t here, t h e r u l e set o u t i n t h a t case disposes of t h i s question. Campbell argues t h a t Mangels should be overruled i n s o f a r a s it holds an a r r e s t i s n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o administering a blood test when a p a r t y i s unconscious o r incapable of consenting t o t h e test. Campbell contends t h i s a s p e c t of Mangels should be overturned because of t h e p l a i n language of the implied consent s t a t u t e and the i n t e n t of the l e g i s - l a t u r e i n enacting t h e s t a t u t e a s evidenced by t h e t i t l e of t h e o r i g i n a l a c t . These a r e the same arguments o r i g i n a l l y made i n Mangels. See 166 Mont. a t 193, 531 P.2d a t 1314. The arguments d i d n o t persuade us then and are no more persuasive now. It i s apparent from a reading of t h e implied consent s t a t u t e t h a t an a r r e s t i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o administering a blood alcohol test t o a p a r t y who i s uncon- scious o r otherwise incapable of consenting t o the t e s t . We, therefore, r e j e c t Campbell's argument and a f f i r m the decision made i n Mangels. The t h i r d question presented by t h i s i s s u e i s whether t h e Fourth Amendment protection a g a i n s t unlawful searches p r o h i b i t s t h e taking of a blood test from an unconscious o r otherwise incapable person without an a r r e s t . W e previously addressed t h i s i s s u e i n S t a t e v. Deshner (1971), 158 Mont. 188, 489 P.2d 1290. I n Deshner p o l i c e had a blood sample taken from the defendant s h o r t l y a f t e r he w a s involved i n an automobile accident. The defendant was unconscious when t h e sample was taken. The p o l i c e d i d n o t arrest the defendant before requesting t h e blood sample. The defendant a s s e r t e d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood t e s t should n o t be admitted a t h i s t r i a l f o r manslaughter. He contended t h a t taking the blood sample without placing him under a r r e s t constituted an unconstitutional search. The Court found no m e r i t i n defendant's argument. 158 Mont, a t 192, 489 P. 2d at 1292. The Court stated the taking of the blood sample under these circumstances was constitutionally proper because the officer might reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency situation in which the evidence would be destroyed if time was taken to procure a warrant, and the procedures used in taking the blood were reasonable. 158 Mont. at 193, 489 P.2d at 1293. Campbell attacks the holding in Deshner by inference. He does so by citing cases from other jurisdictions which reach a result contra to the holding in Deshner. There is a split of authority on the question of whether an arrest is required before a blood sample can be taken from an uncon- scious person. Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 325, 84 (1976); 2 LaFave Search & Seizure S5.4 (b) at 342-344. However, a United States Supreme Court case decided since Deshner and at least one commentator's analysis indicate we should reject Campbell's argument to adopt the line of cases contra to Deshner. In Cupp v . Murphy (1973), 412 U . S . 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900, a defendant voluntarily went to a police station to discuss the strangulation death of his estranged wife with the authorities. The police noticed a dark spot on the defendant's finger while questioning him. The police asked the defendant if they could take a sample of scrapings from his fingernails. The defendant refused to consent to the scraping. Without consent, a warrant or an arrest, the police took the fingernail scraping samples. The samples revealed incriminating evidence which was introduced at the defendant's homicide trial. The Court held the search did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. A quote from Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion sum- marizes the holding of the Court: "The Court today permits a search f o r evidence without an a r r e s t b u t under circumstances where probable cause f o r an a r r e s t e x i s t e d , where t h e o f f i c e r s had reasonable cause t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e evidence was on t h e respondent's per- son, and where t h a t evidence was highly de- s t r u c t i b l e . . ." 4 1 2 U.S. a t 300, 93 S.Ct. a t 2006, 36 L.Ed.2d a t 908. I n discussing Cupp and t h e s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y on t h e i s s u e of whether an a r r e s t is an absolute p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e taking of a blood sample from an unconscious p a r t y i n a drunk d r i v i n g s i t u a t i o n , LaFave, supra, s t a t e s : ". . . Indeed, t h e case f o r permitting t h e taking of t h e blood sample upon probable cause t h a t t h e defendant i s i n t o x i c a t e d without f i r s t a r r e s t i n g him is, i f anything, s t r o n g e r than t h e case f o r t h e searches conducted i n Cupp and Franklin. I n t h e blood sample case, a s op- posed t o those cases, t h e r e i s no room whatso- ever f o r t h e argument t h a t t h e lack of a formal arrest may decrease somewhat t h e chances t h a t t h e evidence w i l l be destroyed, f o r t h e 'eva- nescent' c h a r a c t e r of t h e evidence i s i n h e r e n t i n its n a t u r e and does n o t depend upon any motive of t h e defendant t o d e s t r o y it. That is, t h e need f o r t h e blood sample arises o u t of t h e f a c t , a s s t a t e d i n Schrnerber v. Cali- f o r n i a , ' t h a t t h e percentage of alcohol i n t h e blood begins t o diminish s h o r t l y a f t e r drinking s t o p s , ' an emergency which i s i n no way a f f e c t e d by whether o r n o t t h e defendant has been for- mally a r r e s t e d . I t i s t h e height of formalism, t o say t h e l e a s t , t o suggest t h a t a warrantless search on probable cause i n order t o m e e t t h i s emergency i s reasonable only i f t h e p o l i c e f i r s t d e c l a r e t h e h o s p i t a l i z e d defendant under a r r e s t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , it 'would be r i d i c u l o u s t o r e q u i r e a p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o perform some formal r i t u a l of a r r e s t over t h e unconscious body of a c r i t i c a l l y i n j u r e d person who was a p a r t y t o a f a t a l automobile accident. ' The claim t h a t t h e contrary p o s i t i o n 'provides some measure of assurance t h a t probable cause i s based upon considerations independent of t h e blood-alcohol test r e s u l t s ' i s untenable, a s t h e need f o r a c o u r t t o determine t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d p r i o r t o t h e test i s p r e s e n t under e i t h e r r u l e . " 85.4 (b) a t 343-344. The above summary of Cupp and LaFave's comments on t h e question i n d i c a t e t h e r e i s no per se arrest requirement f o r a warrantless search. That a n a l y s i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with Deshner and t h e l i n e of a u t h o r i t y from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t hold an unconscious d r i v e r need n o t be a r r e s t e d before a blood sample can be taken. Cupp and LaFave's comments thus provide a s o l i d b a s i s f o r continuing t o adhere t o the Deshner holding. W e , therefore, r e j e c t Campbell's argument t h a t the l i n e of a u t h o r i t y contra t o Deshner should be adopted and reaffirm t h e Deshner decision. Having analyzed t h e t h r e e separate questions Campbell r a i s e s under the f i r s t i s s u e , it i s now necessary t o sum- marize the a n a l y s i s t o resolve the ultimate question of whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n admitting the r e s u l t s of t h e blood test i n t o evidence. I n i t i a l l y , the evidence shows t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly found t h a t Campbell w a s i n a condition t h a t rendered him incapable of refusing t o consent t o t h e taking of t h e blood sample when t h e sample was taken. This means the absolute a r r e s t requirement f o r conscious individuals who a r e capable of refusing consent established by s t a t u t e and explained i n Mangels does n o t come i n t o play. Thus, the blood test r e s u l t s a r e n o t automatically inadmis- s i b l e here because no a r r e s t occurred. Further, Campbell only repeats arguments we previously r e j e c t e d i n Mangels t o support h i s contention t h a t Montana's implied consent s t a t u t e requires an a r r e s t before a blood sample can be taken even i f an individual i s unconscious o r otherwise i n a condition rendering the p a r t y incapable of refusing t o consent t o the taking of the sample. The argu- ments w e r e not persuasive when presented i n Mangels and a r e no more so now. Therefore, w e reaffirm our decision t h a t Montana's implied consent s t a t u t e does n o t contain an abso- l u t e a r r e s t requirement before a blood sample can be taken from an unconscious o r otherwise incapable person and hold t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s here a r e admissible under ~ o n t a n a ' s implied consent s t a t u t e . ina ally, campbell's Fourth Amendment claim l a c k s merit. W e r e j e c t e d Campbell's argument i n Deshner. Cupp supports t h e decision. Thus, t h e blood test r e s u l t s are n o t inadmis- s i b l e on t h e b a s i s of Campbell's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argument. This summary shows none of t h e questions r a i s e d by Campbell c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i s f o r r e f u s i n g t o admit t h e re- s u l t s t o t h e blood test. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n admitting t h e r e s u l t s i n t o evidence. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by Campbell involves t h e D i s - t r i c t Court' s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e d r i v i n g while i n t o x i - cated charges brought a g a i n s t him. J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court over criminal matters depends on t h e maximum sentence t h a t can be imposed f o r committing t h e crime. When t h e maximum sentence i n c r e a s e s t o give t h e D i s t r i c t Court j u r i s d i c t i o n because of repeated offenses, proof of p r i o r offenses does n o t become an element t h a t must be proved a t t r i a l and can be proved a t any t i m e u n t i l sentencing. Therefore, f a i l u r e t o introduce evidence of p r i o r convic- t i o n s a t t r i a l does n o t deprive t h e D i s t r i c t Court of j u r i s - d i c t i o n . S t a t e v. Nelson (1978), - Mont. - , 583 P.2d 435, 437-438, 35 St.Rep. 1337, 1339-1341. Campbell contends here t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e D.W.I. charge brought a g a i n s t him because t h e S t a t e introduced no evidence a t t r i a l proving p r i o r D.W.I. convictions. This contention l a c k s m e r i t under Nelson and does n o t c o n s t i t u t e grounds t o dismiss t h e D.W.I. charge f i l e d a g a i n s t Campbell. The t h i r d i s s u e Campbell raises concerns t h e severance of Count I1 of t h e information f i l e d a g a i n s t him from Counts I and 111. Count I1 of t h e information charged Campbell with d r i v i n g while adjudged an h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c offender. Count I of t h e information i s t h e D . W . I . charge, and Count I11 i s t h e negligent homicide charge. Campbell contends Count I1 of t h e information should have been severed from t h e o t h e r counts based on s e c t i o n 46-11-404(4), MCA. That s e c t i o n reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " I f it appears t h a t a defendant o r t h e s t a t e i s prejudiced by a joinder of r e l a t e d prose- c u t i o n s . . . t h e c o u r t may order s e p a r a t e t r i a l s . . . o r provide any o t h e r r e l i e f a s j u s t i c e may require." Campbell a s s e r t s t h a t joining t h e h a b i t u a l offender charge with t h e o t h e r two charges here prejudiced h i s case and t h a t he should, t h e r e f o r e , have been granted severance under sec- t i o n 46-11-404 (.4), MCA. W e have s e t o u t t h r e e b a s i c kinds of prejudice t h a t may 0 - k % occur on t h e joinder of s i m i l a r offenses. S t a t e v. 4 A z b e ~ ~ (1976)l 170 Mont. 480, 489, 555 P.2d 509. The f i r s t kind of p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s when t h e jury considers a person facing m u l t i p l e charges t o be a bad man and tends t o accumulate evidence a g a i n s t him u n t i l it f i n d s him g u i l t y of something. The second type of prejudice manifests i t s e l f when proof of g u i l t on t h e f i r s t count i n an information i s used t o con- v i c t t h e defendant of a second count even though t h e proof would be inadmissible a t a separate t r i a l on t h e second count. The t h i r d kind of prejudice occurs when t h e defen- d a n t wishes t o t e s t i f y on h i s own behalf on one charge b u t oC/&fli-- n o t on another. O&esmI 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515. Determining whether t h e r e has been p r e j u d i c i a l joinder involves weighing t h e prejudice incurred by t h e defendant because of a j o i n t t r i a l a g a i n s t t h e j u d i c i a l economy re- s u l t i n g from a j o i n t t r i a l . This balancing process i s l e f t t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. Absent a show- i n g of abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t should n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . United S t a t e s v. Cuesta ( 5 t h C i r . 1979), 597 F.2d 903, 919. I n s t r i k i n g t h e balance between p r e j u d i c e t o a defen- d a n t and j u d i c i a l economy, considerations of j u d i c i a l economy e x e r t strong pressure i n favor of j o i n t t r i a l s . United S t a t e s v. Dohm ( 5 t h C i r . 1979), 597 F.2d 535, 540. The f a c t o r s t h a t provide t h e b a s i s f o r t h e p r e d i s p o s i t i o n f o r j o i n t t r i a l s include expedition of t h e administration of j u s t i c e , reduction i n t h e congestion of t r i a l dockets, conservation of j u d i c i a l t i m e , reduction of burden on c i t i - zens who serve on j u r i e s i n terms of t i m e and money s a c r i - f i c e d , and avoidance of t h e n e c e s s i t y of r e c a l l i n g witnesses who would otherwise have t o t e s t i f y only once. United S t a t e s v. Brady ( 9 t h C i r . 1978), 579 F.2d 1121, 1128, c e r t . denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41. Further, t h e burden of showing p r e j u d i c e rests on t h e 0 A v - defendant. Qskeyi, 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515. I n showing prejudice, it i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e defendant prove some prejudice o r t h a t a b e t t e r chance of a c q u i t t a l e x i s t s i f s e p a r a t e t r i a l s a r e held. Rather, t h e defendant must show t h e p r e j u d i c e was so g r e a t as t o prevent a f a i r t r i a l . Dohm, 597 F.2d a t 539; United S t a t e s v. Martinez (1st C i r . 1973), 479 F.2d 824, 828. Given t h i s high stan- dard of proof and t h e deference afforded t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment on balancing p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t j u d i c i a l economy, r e v e r s a l of a d e c i s i o n n o t t o sever crimi- n a l charges i s seldom granted. Brady, 579 F.2d a t 1127; United S t a t e s v. Barrett ( 7 t h C i r . 1974), 505 F.2d 1091, 1106, c e r t . denied, 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 4 4 L.Ed.2d Under t h i s standard of review, w e must now consider t h e od*.r2--- d i f f e r e n t kinds of p r e j u d i c e l i s t e d i n t o determine the merits of Campbell's severance claim. The first type of prejudice--prejudice resulting from the jury believing the defendant to be a bad man because of multiple charges--has o A seldom been found sufficient to warrant severance. Qsbwa, 170 Mont. at 489, 555 P.2d at 514-515. In fact, it has been specifically held that the prejudice incurred by a defendant from being held out to the jury as an "habitual offender" is not alone sufficient to entitle the defendant to separate trials. Pummill v . United States (8th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d 34, 36; see also Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure S222 We agree that the mere inclusion of an habitual offender count in an information is insufficient to automatically require severance of that charge from other charges. It would be contrary to the considerations of judicial economy set out above to require separate trials whenever one count of an information charges a party with being an habitual offender. That would be especially true in this case where all the charges stemmed from the same incident and the main fact in issue as to all the charges was whether or not Campbell was driving. To grant severance would require essentially the same evidence about the same occurrence to be introduced at two different trials. We, therefore, do not find the District Court abused its discretion in holding Campbell's motion for severance should not have been granted because the jury considered him a bad man. The second kind of prejudice from joinder is present when the jury uses proof of guilt on one count in an informa- tion to convict a defendant on another count in the informa- tion even though the proof would have been inadmissible at a separate trial on the second count. No prejudice of this nature w i l l be found when t h e evidence presented a t a j o i n t t r i a l i s simple and d i s t i n c t . Commonwealth v. Peterson (1973), 453 Pa. 187, 307 A.2d W , 271; D r e w v. United sw S t a t e s (D.C. C i r . 1964), 331 F.2d 85, 91. This r u l e i s based on t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t when t h e charges a r e few and t h e evidence straightforward, t h e r e i s no reason t o assume t h e jury w a s confused and could n o t keep t h e r e l e v a n t evidence separate. United S t a t e s v. Jamar ( 4 t h C i r . 1977), 561 F.2d 1103, 1107-1108; Peterson, 307 A.2d a t 271, c i t i n g United S t a t e s v. Lotsch (2nd C i r . 1939), 102 F.2d 35, 36, c e r t . denied, 307 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed. 1500. See a l s o United S t a t e s v. Luna (1st C i r . 1978), 585 F.2d 1, 5, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 160, 58 L.Ed.2d 157. Here t h e charges a r e few and t h e evidence s t r a i g h t - forward. Only t h r e e charges w e r e brought a g a i n s t Campbell a t t h e t r i a l . The main f a c t i n i s s u e concerning a l l t h r e e was whether Campbell was d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e t h e a c c i d e n t occurred. Proof t h a t Campbell w a s d r i v i n g w a s an element of a l l t h e crimes charged by t h e information. Thus, evidence p e r t a i n i n g t o t h a t f a c t would have been admitted even i f t h e t r i a l s on t h e d i f f e r e n t counts had been separated. The o t h e r evidence introduced a t t h e t r i a l , such a s proof of Campbell's blood alcohol content and t h e f a c t t h a t Campbell had been adjudged an h a b i t u a l offender a t t h e t i m e t h e accident occurred, w a s n e i t h e r voluminous nor complex. Under t h e s e f a c t s , w e cannot assume t h e jury was confused and d i d n o t consider only t h e r e l e v a n t evidence i n reaching a v e r d i c t on each count of t h e information. Therefore, w e f i n d any prejudice of t h i s nature i n s u f f i c i e n t t o hold t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Campbell's motion f o r severance. The t h i r d type of prejudice occurs when the defendant wants t o t e s t i f y on h i s own behalf on one charge b u t n o t on t h e o t h e r s . Campbell s t a t e d i n t h i s case t h a t he wanted t o t e s t i f y as t o t h e D.W.I. and negligent homicide charges, b u t n o t t h e h a b i t u a l offender charg . 0 Y u . h A s w e pointed o u t i n &WXYFTQ t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have only considered t h i s type of prejudice where t h e a l l e g e d offenses were t o t a l l y s e p a r a t e a s t o t i m e , place and evi- dence. 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515. It has a l s o been held t h a t a defendant cannot claim t h i s type of p r e j u d i c e when t h e s t a t e does n o t e x p l o i t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defendant t a k e s t h e stand by cross-examining t h e defendant as t o t h e charge about which t h e defendant d i d n o t want t o t e s t i f y . Bradley v. United S t a t e s (D.C. C i r . 1969), 433 F.2d 1113, 1123. Here Campbell f a i l s t o demonstrate prejudice under e i t h e r of these c r i t e r i a . The charges a l l stemmed from one i n c i d e n t t h a t occurred a t t h e same t i m e and place, and t h e evidence introduced t o prove a l l t h e charges was s i m i l a r . Further, Campbell d i d take t h e stand and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was n o t d r i v i n g t h e c a r when t h e a c c i d e n t occurred. The S t a t e on cross-examination l i m i t e d i t s questions mainly t o Campbell's a c t i v i t i e s on t h e day of t h e accident. The S t a t e d i d n o t question Campbell about h i s h a b i t u a l offender s t a t u s . Under t h e s e circumstances, w e do n o t f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Campbell's motion f o r severance based on t h i s type of prejudice. Under t h e above a n a l y s i s , Campbell d i d n o t demonstrate any of the kinds of prejudice necessary t o r e q u i r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o order separate t r i a l s on t h e charges contained i n t h e information. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o g r a n t Campbell's motion t o sever. The f i n a l i s s u e Campbell r a i s e s concerns t h e s u f f i - ciency of t h e evidence t o support t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . I t i s t h e duty of t h e jury t o hear the evidence and t o decide i f t h e evidence presented i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support a conviction on t h e charges brought a g a i n s t a defendant. This Court w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e decision of t h e jury a s t o t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence i f t h e record contains s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e decision. Deshner, 158 Mont. a t 191, 489 P.2d a t 1290. H e r e t h e main e v i d e n t i a r y question was whether Campbell was d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t occurred. The evidence on t h i s question introduced a t t r i a l was c o n f l i c t i n g . Campbell introduced t h e following evidence t o support h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t he w a s n o t d r i v i n g when t h e accident occurred: (1) H i s testimony t h a t he w a s n o t driving; (2) Manuel Moreno's testimony a t t r i a l t h a t Vincent Moreno w a s d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t occurred; (3) t h e e x p e r t testimony of p h y s i c i s t D r . Mark Jacobson t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r would have been thrown from t h e c a r coupled with t h e evidence t h a t Campbell remained i n t h e c a r on impact; and ( 4 ) testimony t o r e f u t e t h e theory advanced by Patrolman Wood tending t o show Campbell w a s d r i v i n g when t h e accident occurred. The S t a t e presented t h e following evidence t o t h e jury t o show Campbell was d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t happened: (1) A statement by Manuel Moreno a f t e r t h e accident b u t before Vincent Moreno died t h a t Campbell was d r i v i n g when t h e accident occurred; ( 2 ) t h e e x p e r t testimony of Highway Patrolman Harold Wood t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r would have remained i n the c a r on impact, coupled with t h e testimony t h a t Campbell was found i n t h e c a r af t e r t h e accident; (3) testimony t o r e f u t e t h e theory advanced by D r . Jacobson tending to show Campbell was not driving when the accident occurred; (4) testimony by Sandra Bryant concerning the accident during which Moreno asked Campbell, "Why did you do that?" to which Campbell replied, "You told me to see if I couldn't hit him." Presented with the conflicting evidence, the jury concluded Campbell was driving when the accident occurred. While evidence to prove the contrary conclusion is present in the record, the evidence introduced by the State is substantial and does support the conclusion that Campbell was driving when the accident occurred. Therefore, we will not disturb the jury's verdict. Affirmed. * We concur: Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, concurring specially: I concur in the result foregoing. I want to point out that any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his blood if arrested by a peace officer for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 61-8-402(1), MCA. A person who is unconscious or who is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, is deemed not to have withdrawn his consent. Section 61-8-402(2), MCA. Campbell's implied consent to the blood test is not considered withdrawn here because Campbell fits within the narrow exceptions set forth in Mangels, supra, that an arrest is not necessary where a person qualifies as an unconscious or incapable person under section 61-8-402(2), MCA. I want my position regarding the second issue, the District Court's jurisdiction of the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol, to be clear. In section 61-8-401, MCA, it is provided that driving under the influence is unlawful and punishable as provided in section 61-8-714(1), MCA. Section 61-8-714(1), MCA provides that a first conviction of driving while intoxicated shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500. On a second conviction, the driver is punished by a fine of not less than $300 or more than $500 to which may be added in the discretion of the court imprisonment for 30 days. On a third or subsequent conviction, the driver is punished by imprisonment of not less than 30 days or more than 1 year, to which may be added in the court's discretion, a fine of not less than $500 or more than $1,000. The difference in the penalties for the successive con- victions becomes important when one considers whether the jurisdiction of the District Court or the justice court applies. Under section 3-5-302(1), MCA, the District Court is given original jurisdiction in all felony criminal cases and "all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for." The justice court, on the other hand, is given criminal jurisdiction of all misdemeanors punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both. Section 3-10-303 (1) , MCA. From the statutes, therefore, District Courts have no jurisdiction of a misdemeanor involving a first conviction or a second conviction of driving while intoxicated. On the other hand, the District Court would have exclusive criminal jurisdiction of driving while intoxicated charges involving 3 or more convictions. Since Campbell was charged with a sixth offense of driving while intoxicated, the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction of this count. Justice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later.