Title: Linardon v. Gomes

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-13349 
 
KELECHI LINARDON  vs.  JOHNNY GOMES & another.1 
 
 
January 19, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
The petitioner, Kelechi Linardon, appeals from a judgment 
of a single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
As best we can discern from the limited record before us, 
Linardon filed an application for a criminal complaint in the 
Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department, 
claiming that the respondents stole her car.  She then filed a 
motion for a change of venue.  A clerk-magistrate denied the 
motion, but, according to Linardon, he did so after initially 
recusing himself from the matter due to a conflict of interest.2  
Linardon appealed from the denial of the motion, and that appeal 
was entered in the Appeals Court on April 19, 2022.  On June 24, 
2022, after the court had issued a notice preceding dismissal, 
Linardon filed two motions:  a motion to "compel the lower court 
to send the case file . . . to the Appeals Court," and a motion 
for the Appeals Court to transfer the appeal to a single justice 
of this court.  A single justice in the Appeals Court denied 
both motions, essentially on the basis that the court lacked 
 
 
1 Terry Mercury. 
 
 
2 Notwithstanding Linardon's claims regarding the clerk-
magistrate, the record before us is devoid of any information 
regarding the purported recusal -- e.g., any record that the 
clerk-magistrate did recuse himself -- other than Linardon's own 
statements on that point. 
2 
 
jurisdiction over the matter.3 
 
 
Shortly thereafter, on July 11, 2022, Linardon filed her 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court.  In the 
petition, Linardon asked the court to review the clerk-
magistrate's denial of the motion for a change of venue.  She 
argued that the clerk-magistrate "violated the laws," and 
although the basis for this argument is not entirely clear, it 
appears to stem from Linardon's claims regarding the clerk-
magistrate's recusing himself from the case but then 
nevertheless ruling on the change of venue motion.  The single 
justice denied both the petition and Linardon's subsequent 
motion for clarification.4 
 
 
In her appeal to this court, Linardon raises two issues:  
(1) that, as to the underlying merits of the petition, the 
clerk-magistrate improperly ruled on the change of venue motion 
after having recused himself from the matter; and (2) that the 
single justice erred in denying the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition 
on the basis that the petition did not present an extraordinary 
circumstance warranting review.5  Linardon's argument regarding 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, however is, essentially, an argument on the 
underlying merits.  That is, Linardon argues that her case 
presents an extraordinary circumstance because it involves her 
application for a criminal complaint against two individuals 
whom she accuses of stealing her car. 
 
 
 
3 In denying the motion to transfer, the judge noted that 
whether this court has jurisdiction pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is a matter best left to a single justice of this court to 
decide. 
 
 
4 The single justice denied Linardon's petition on August 
26, 2022, and the motion for clarification on October 3, 2022.  
Linardon filed a notice of appeal from the single justice's 
judgment on November 8, 2022, and the appeal was entered in this 
court on November 9, 2022.  In April 2023, this court issued a 
notice preceding dismissal.  Linardon then asked for and 
received an extension of time to file her brief, which she then 
filed on August 25, 2023. 
 
 
5 Although Linardon styles her pleading in this court as an 
application for further appellate review pursuant to Mass. 
R. A. P. 27.1, that rule does not apply here, where she is 
appealing from a judgment of the single justice on a petition 
filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
3 
 
 
In a case such as this, where "the single justice exercises 
discretion not to reach the merits of a petition, the appeal to 
the full court 'is strictly limited to a review of that ruling,' 
Commonwealth v. Samuels, 456 Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010), and 
the full court asks only whether the single justice abused his 
or her discretion in making that decision."  Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 484 Mass. 1047, 1049 (2020).  This is not the first 
time that Linardon has sought relief in this court, and she thus 
should be well aware of the requirements and parameters of G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  See Linardon v. WoodSpring Suites Boston MA 
Saugus, LLC, 490 Mass. 1006 (2022); Linardon v. Secretary of 
Hous. & Economic Dev., 490 Mass. 1005 (2022); Linardon v. Boston 
Hous. Auth., 487 Mass. 1006 (2021); Linardon v. United States 
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 485 Mass. 1005 (2020).  Linardon, 
however, nowhere addresses the issue of adequate alternative 
remedy, e.g., why the denial of the change of venue motion could 
not be raised at the conclusion of the trial court proceedings 
rather than at the interlocutory stage at which Linardon has 
raised them. 
 
 
Moreover, in seeking relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, it was 
Linardon's burden "to create a record -- not merely to allege 
but to demonstrate, i.e., to provide copies of the lower court 
docket entries and any relevant pleadings, motions, orders, 
recordings, transcripts, or other parts of the lower court 
record necessary to substantiate [her] allegations -- showing 
both a substantial claim of violation of a substantive right and 
that the violation could not have been remedied in the normal 
course of a trial and appeal or by other available means."  
Linardon v. Boston Hous. Auth., 487 Mass. at 1007, quoting Gorod 
v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied sub nom. Davis 
v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  She has not done that 
here, where, for example, although she claims that the clerk-
magistrate recused himself, there is nothing in the record, such 
as a docket entry or ruling, that reflects this. 
 
 
The single justice was well within her authority in 
declining to employ this court's extraordinary power of general 
superintendence in the circumstances and on the record 
presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Kelechi Linardon, pro se.