Title: PLETCHER v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

PLETCHER v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY2003 OK 11784 P.3d 725Case Number: 99291Decided: 12/23/2003Modified: 02/05/2004THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEBRA JEAN PLETCHER, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ¶0 Plaintiff refused to take a chemical test after being arrested for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance, and as a result the Department of Public Safety revoked her driver's license. The arrest occurred in the parking lot of the Dillards Group Building in Norman, Oklahoma. The district court, Honorable William C. Hetherington, Jr., applied the test set out in Justus v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Public Safety, CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. E. Joe Lankford, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee. Kevin L. McClure, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant. BOUDREAU, Justice: ¶1 The issue is whether the parking lot of the Dillards Group Building in Norman, Oklahoma, is a public parking lot for purposes of Oklahoma's implied consent statute, ¶2 The material facts in this case are not disputed. At around 2:53 a.m. on February 8, 2003, a Norman police officer on routine patrol noticed a car with its engine running and lights on, parked in the parking lot of the Dillards Group Building. Upon investigation he found plaintiff sitting in her car and arrested her for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance. Pursuant to Oklahoma's implied consent statute, he asked her to take a chemical test. She refused. As a result, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked her driver's license. She appealed to the district court. The district court applied the test set out in Justus v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Public Safety, ¶3 Appeals from implied consent revocation orders are heard de novo in the district court, both on the law and on the facts. In re Braddy, ¶4 The implied consent statute provides in pertinent part: "[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes or other public place within this state shall be deemed to have given to consent to a test or tests of such person's blood or breath, for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration[.]" ¶5 Under these statutes, if the parking lot of the Dillards Group Building in Norman, Oklahoma is a public parking lot, plaintiff impliedly consented to taking a chemical test and her refusal to take the test supports DPS' revocation of her driver's license. On the other hand, if the parking lot is not a public parking lot, the implied consent statute is not applicable and her refusal to take a chemical test does not support DPS' revocation of her driver's license. ¶6 We recently addressed this exact issue in the context of an apartment complex parking lot in Justus v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Public Safety, ¶7 The statutory definition of public parking lot is plain and unambiguous. The first part of the definition means any parking lot which is adjacent to a right-of-way dedicated to public use and to which the public has a reasonable expectation of access. ¶8 In this case it is undisputed that the Dillards Group Building parking lot is adjacent to a right-of-way dedicated to public use and that the public has a reasonable expectation of access to it. Accordingly, we hold that the Dillards Group Building parking lot in Norman, Oklahoma, is a public parking lot for purposes of Oklahoma's implied consent statute. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the district court judgment, and remand with instructions to affirm the order of the Department of Public Safety. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. All Justices Concur. FOOTNOTES 1This is but a short excerpt of § 753, but it is the only language of § 753 that is material to the narrow issue in this case. 2The definition of public parking lot is found in Chapter 1 of Title 47. Chapter 1 contains definitions that expressly apply to Title 47. See 47 O.S. 2001, § 1-101. 3In Justus we observed: The parking lot has three entrances. All three have signs reading, in pertinent part: "Private Property, Tenants and Invited Guests Only!" Two of the entrances have gates that are locked after 10:00 p.m. The third entrance is the main entrance and has no gate, but opens directly into the main office where the business of the apartment complex is transacted. Justus, 2002 OK 46, ¶1, 61 P.3d at 889.