Title: State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 88 
Ohio St.3d 577, 2000-Ohio-431.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, OHIO 
CONFERENCE, ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of 
Emp. Serv. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577.] 
Mandamus action claiming Ohio Bureau of Employment Services failed to 
comply with its duties under various prevailing wage law provisions of 
R.C. Chapter 4115 — Denial of writ and attorney fees affirmed. 
(No. 99-1759 — Submitted March 8, 2000 — Decided May 31, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD07-895. 
 
In July 1997, appellants, National Electrical Contractors Association, Ohio 
Conference (“NECA”), its local chapters, and NECA member Royal Electric 
Construction Corporation (“Royal”), filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that appellee, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services 
(“OBES”), had failed to enforce provisions of R.C. Chapter 4115, which governs 
the prevailing wage to be paid on public works projects.  NECA is a trade 
association representing electrical contractors throughout Ohio for construction in 
both public and private works, and NECA members, including Royal, 
competitively bid on public projects in Ohio in compliance with applicable law, 
including R.C. Chapter 4115. 
 
In their complaint, appellants requested a writ of mandamus to compel 
OBES to (1) investigate and timely act upon all complaints and make 
determinations and collections of wages due for violations of the prevailing wage 
law, (2) make a finding whether each violation of the prevailing wage law was 
intentional, including each determination since the effective date of the statute, (3) 
 
 
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file with the Secretary of State a list containing the names of contractors who 
intentionally violated the law, and (4) collect the penalties provided for employees 
and the enforcement fund for each determination since the effective date of the 
statute.  Appellants further demanded a judgment declaring the rights of the parties 
and an award of attorney fees.  OBES moved to dismiss appellants’ complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
In October 1997, the court of appeals granted the motion and dismissed 
appellants’ complaint.  The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
appellants’ declaratory judgment claim and that appellants’ mandamus claim was 
barred by R.C. 4115.16, which provided an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law. 
 
On appeal, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings “that portion 
of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing appellants’ mandamus complaint as it 
relates to cases in which the OBES Administrator timely determines that an 
intentional violation of prevailing wage law has occurred but fails to impose and 
collect statutory penalty fees and include the violator’s name on the list filed with 
the Secretary of State.”  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 
Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 184-185, 699 N.E.2d 64, 68-69 (“NECA I”).  In 
the foregoing case, we held that R.C. 4115.16 does not provide an adequate legal 
remedy.  Id. at 184, 699 N.E.2d at 68.  We affirmed the remainder of the judgment 
of the court of appeals dismissing appellants’ claims.  Id.  Appellants did not move 
for reconsideration of our judgment. 
 
On remand, the parties stipulated that “[a]t no time since June 21, 1994 has 
the OBES’s Administrator (or her predecessor in interest the Ohio Director of 
Industrial Relations * * *), within sixty (60) days of the filing of a prevailing wage 
complaint, determined that an intentional violation of the prevailing wage law 
occurred.”  OBES also filed an answer in which it specifically claimed that under 
 
 
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our decision in NECA I, the remand was limited to those cases in which the OBES 
Administrator determined within the R.C. 4115.16(B) sixty-day period that an 
intentional violation of the prevailing wage law had occurred. 
 
In September 1999, the court of appeals denied the writ.  In dicta, the court 
of appeals opined that there might be additional cases in which R.C. 4115.16 
would not constitute an adequate remedy, i.e., those cases in which OBES timely 
finds a non-intentional violation but does not take any action to collect statutory 
penalties. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Luther L. Liggett, Jr. and Emmett M. Kelly, for 
appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Michael D. Allen, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the 
writ and attorney fees because (1) once OBES determines that a construction 
contractor violated Ohio’s prevailing wage law, mandamus is appropriate to 
compel the imposition and collection of statutory penalties, and (2) when OBES 
finds evidence that a construction contractor intentionally violated the prevailing 
wage law, mandamus lies to compel the issuance of a statement of intent and the 
submission of the names of these contractors to the Secretary of State.  In this 
regard, appellants claim that the scope of our remand was not limited to those cases 
in which the OBES Administrator determined within the R.C. 4115.16(B) sixty-
day period that an intentional violation of the prevailing wage law had occurred, 
but instead encompassed other cases, including those mentioned by the court of 
appeals in its dicta. 
 
 
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To the extent that appellants now assert claims that are beyond the limited 
scope of our NECA I remand, res judicata precludes our consideration of the 
merits of appellants’ claims.  See, e.g., Holzemer v. Urbanski (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 133, 712 N.E.2d 713, 716.  In other words, issues beyond the scope of a 
previous remand are beyond the scope of review following a return of the case 
from remand.  See State v. Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 679 N.E.2d 
276, 279.  Therefore, if appellants wanted to raise these claims or argue that our 
judgment in NECA I was partially erroneous, they should have moved for 
reconsideration of or appealed our judgment in NECA I.  By not doing so, they are 
now barred from raising issues beyond the scope of our remand in this appeal.  
Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d at 549, 679 N.E.2d at 279. 
 
Further, appellants’ citation of our discretionary, plenary authority to 
consider extraordinary writ cases as if they had been originally filed in this court 
does not alter our conclusion.  The court’s plenary authority generally refers to our 
ability to address the merits of a writ case without the necessity of a remand if the 
court of appeals erred in some regard.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 N.E.2d 940, 944; State ex rel. Cleveland 
Police Patrolmen’s Assn. v. Cleveland (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 310, 312, 703 N.E.2d 
796, 797.  We have not used our plenary authority to contravene legal doctrines 
like res judicata. 
 
Therefore, the sole claim that is properly before the court is appellants’ 
claim for a writ of mandamus in cases where the OBES timely determines that an 
intentional violation of prevailing wage law has occurred but fails to impose and 
collect statutory penalty fees and include the violator’s name on the list filed with 
the Secretary of State.  NECA I, 83 Ohio St.3d at 184-185, 699 N.E.2d at 68-69.  
As the court of appeals correctly held, the parties stipulated that this fact pattern 
 
 
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has not yet occurred, so appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus or an 
award of attorney fees. 
 
Based on the foregoing, because the only potential circumstances specified 
in our NECA I remand that would entitle appellants to extraordinary relief in 
mandamus have not occurred, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment.