Title: State v. Miles

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

233 Kan. 286 (1983)
662 P.2d 1227
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
WILEY JAMES MILES, Appellant.
No. 54,487

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 29, 1983.
Gordon R. Olson, of Olson & Smith, of Sabetha, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
William C. O'Keefe, county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LOCKETT, J.:
This is an appeal from the District Court of Nemaha County, Kansas where the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana (K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 65-4127b[a] [3]) and possession of heroin (K.S.A. 65-4127a). The defendant was originally sentenced to not less than 10 nor more than 30 years; the sentence was later modified to not less than 5 nor more than 20 years. Defendant has appealed.
The facts are as follows: In the early morning hours of October 24, 1981, Officer Kirwin pulled behind the defendant's car on Highway 75. After observing the defendant's car cross the center line twice, Officer Kirwin turned on his lights and stopped the defendant's car. The defendant was the only occupant of the car. When Officer Kirwin approached the car he noticed the smell of marijuana. Asking the defendant to exit the vehicle, the officer shined his light in the ashtray and saw what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette butt. Officer Kirwin asked the defendant if he could look into the car; receiving permission, he seized the marijuana butt and warned the defendant of his Miranda rights. When asked to identify the item, the defendant stated that it was a marijuana cigarette butt. Defendant then reached into his shirt pocket and pulled out another cigarette which he identified as a marijuana cigarette. Officer Kirwin then asked if there were additional marijuana cigarettes in the car. Defendant replied "No" and then gave the officer permission to search the car. Officer Kirwin found an additional marijuana cigarette butt and a blue shaving kit on the floor of the car. Defendant stated that the kit was his. Officer Kirwin took the kit back to his car and had the defendant open the kit. Officer Kirwin found a plastic bag of marijuana seeds and individually wrapped aluminum foil *288 packets. The officer opened one of the packets and saw a brown powder which he suspected to be heroin.
Terry L. Koch, a chemist for the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, examined the evidence. At the trial he identified one of the cigarettes as containing marijuana and testified that heroin was contained in the foil packets. From his conviction defendant appeals.
Defendant raises fourteen issues in his appeal. It would not be productive in this opinion to set out each of the numerous issues raised and discuss them individually. It is sufficient to relate each point has been individually considered, and no error of substance has been found. Two issues numbered ten and fourteen by the appellant are of such import they merit discussion.
K.S.A. 22-3215 is the defendant's statutory right to suppress a confession or admission given by the defendant on the grounds that a statement is not admissible as evidence. It provides:
The motion to suppress a confession or admission under K.S.A. 22-3215 is available only to the defendant.
A second method of determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession or admission is the Jackson v. Denno hearing. The Jackson v. Denno hearing can be requested by (1) the defendant, (2) the State, or (3) the court on its own motion prior to or during a trial. A motion to suppress (K.S.A. 22-3215) or a Jackson v. Denno hearing raises the same issue, therefore there is no requirement that the court conduct both a hearing on the *289 motion to suppress (K.S.A. 22-3215) and a Jackson v. Denno hearing on the same facts.
June 22, 1964, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964), 1 A.L.R.3d 1205. The facts were summarized as follows:
Justice White, writing for a splintered majority, stated:
All federal courts and the courts of the fifty states of the United States determined Jackson v. Denno required a hearing on the voluntariness of a confession prior to its admission into evidence. Failure to conduct the Jackson v. Denno-type hearing required (1) a new trial, or (2) a remand of the case back to the trial court for a post-trial hearing to determine if the confession was voluntary or involuntary; if involuntary the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
*291 In State v. Milow, 199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967), following the rationale of Jackson v. Denno, this court stated:
Milow was followed in Baker v. State, 204 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d 212 (1970). The Court of Appeals of Kansas in State v. Shuckahosee, *294 2 Kan. App.2d 717, 587 P.2d 923 (1978), restated the understood requirements of Jackson v. Denno.
June 23, 1977, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). John Sykes was tried for third-degree murder in a Florida court. During the trial an oral statement previously made by Sykes to police officers, admitting that he had shot the deceased from the front porch of his trailer home, was admitted into evidence through the testimony of two officers who had heard it. At no time during the trial were any of Sykes' statements challenged by his counsel on the ground that Sykes had not understood the Miranda warnings given to him by the police, nor did the trial judge on his own motion question their admissibility or hold a Jackson v. Denno hearing on that issue. The issue was not raised on appeal. Respondent subsequently filed in the trial court a motion to vacate his conviction, and filed petitions for habeas corpus in the state appellate courts, apparently for the first time challenging the voluntariness of his statements. Failing in the Florida court, Sykes initiated an action in the United States District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting the inadmissibility of his statements by reason of his lack of understanding of the Miranda warnings. That court ruled that Jackson v. Denno (1964), required a hearing in a state criminal trial prior to the admissions of an inculpatory out-of-court statement, and Sykes had not lost his right to assert such a claim by failing to object at trial or on direct appeal. The State of Florida appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the United States District Court requiring a hearing on the issue of voluntariness despite the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure "contemporaneous objection" rule which barred a subsequent review of objections or claims not raised before the time of the original trial.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding:
A defendant is entitled to a hearing out of the presence of the jury for the purpose of determining the issue of voluntariness. This determination should be made without regard to the truth or falsity of the confession. Under the Kansas law there are two methods for determining the voluntariness of a confession: (1) K.S.A. 22-3215, motion to suppress confession or admission, or (2) a Jackson v. Denno-type hearing. Either method of testing the voluntariness of a confession is sufficient. A defendant is entitled to have his confession tested by one or the other but not both. When a confession is challenged, then the prosecution has the burden of proving the confession is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. It is incumbent upon the defendant to request a hearing to test the voluntariness of a confession.
A defendant during a trial has the right to object to the introduction of any confession or admission on the issue of voluntariness. If there has been a prior determination under K.S.A. 22-3215 or a Jackson v. Denno-type hearing on the same facts and issues and the confession or admission has been determined voluntary, there is no requirement that the hearing be repeated. Where there has been no hearing prior to trial on the voluntariness of a confession then the court, outside the presence of the jury at the time of trial, determines if the confession or admission is voluntary.
Kansas has a "contemporaneous objection" rule similar to Florida. K.S.A. 22-3417 provides:
One attempting to exclude evidence, whether by objection or *296 motion, has a duty to indicate the specific grounds so as to alert the court as to the question raised. Absent some objection or motion by the defendant to the admission of his confession or admission, the United States Constitution does not require a hearing on the voluntariness to be held prior to its admission into evidence.
We therefore conclude that Kansas procedure does, consistent with the United States Constitution, require that appellant's confession be challenged prior to or during the trial or not at all. The appellant's failure to request a hearing or timely object to the admission of his confession waives his right to raise that issue for the first time on appeal unless the opportunity to object did not exist. We, therefore, depart from our prior requirement, distinguish State v. Milow, 199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967), and overrule State v. Shuckahosee, 2 Kan. App.2d 717, 587 P.2d 923 (1978), and the cases that follow its holding.
Defendant finally contends that to enhance the penalty, as provided in K.S.A. 65-4127a, any prior violation must be a violation contained within the Kansas version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
Count 1 of the complaint filed by the State stated the charge:
The complaint filed against the defendant advised of the specific offense with which he was charged (illegal possession or control of heroin), the seriousness thereof (a felony), and the penalty (Class B felony), because of the defendant's prior conviction for sale of heroin. Defendant's prior conviction for sale of heroin in October, 1972, occurred in the State of Iowa.
Defendant reasons that his conviction for possession of heroin under the Kansas Uniform Controlled Substances Act is not a second or subsequent offense since the Iowa conviction was not a violation of the Kansas Act. Defendant claimed only a prior conviction of the present Kansas Act can be used to enhance *297 the sentence set forth in K.S.A. 65-4127a for the present conviction.
The primary purpose of a uniform state law is to provide, as far as possible, uniform laws on the subject involved that would be common to all the states adopting the uniform law. Uniform laws are intended to secure not only identity of statute, but also uniformity of decision.
Kansas adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act July 1, 1972, replacing the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which had been enacted in 1957. The purpose of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 U.L.A. 197 (1979), is to regulate drug traffic. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws explained:
*298 Our legislature, recognizing the increasing drug problem that has been and is affecting our society, included a method of increasing the penalty for habitual violators of the Kansas Uniform Controlled Substances Act. K.S.A. 65-4127a provides:
The propriety of inflicting severer punishment on second or subsequent offenders has been long recognized in this state. The offenders are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies increased penalties when they are convicted. The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized the validity of a habitual criminal act, State v. Collins, 215 Kan. 789, 528 P.2d 1221 (1974); that such an act does not violate due process or equal protection, State v. Sully, 219 Kan. 222, 547 P.2d 344 (1976); and is constitutional, State v. Levier, 226 Kan. 461, 601 P.2d 1116 (1979). Prior convictions can be limited to those which were committed in the sentencing state or may include prior convictions of other jurisdictions. The applicability of convictions obtained in other jurisdictions for enhancement purposes may be made conditional, requiring that the previous offense be of the same class, a felony or misdemeanor.
Our legislature intended that prior drug convictions within this state and drug convictions of other jurisdictions may be used to increase an offender's punishment for sentencing purposes under K.S.A. 65-4127a if, (1) the prior conviction was for an offense of the character specified in the Kansas Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and (2) the prior conviction was of the same class, a felony. A prior conviction for a misdemeanor theft would not be of the same character (a drug offense) or class (a felony), and therefore could not be used to enhance the penalty for a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
The defendant's prior conviction, for sale of heroin in Iowa, was a violation of the same character under our law and the penalty, a felony, was of the same class. The State's use of the *299 prior Iowa conviction to enhance the sentence for the Kansas violation was proper.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.