Title: Gillespie v. Gillespie

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

74 Ariz. 1 (1952) 242 P.2d 837 GILLESPIE v. GILLESPIE. No. 5439. Supreme Court of Arizona. March 31, 1952. Rehearing Denied May 13, 1952. *2 Jennings, Strouss, Salmon & Trask; J.A. Riggins, Jr., and Charles L. Strouss, Jr., all of Phoenix, for appellant. Alice M. Birdsall, of Phoenix, for appellee. DE CONCINI, Justice. This is an appeal from an order granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's petition for modification of a divorce decree. Appellant husband, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, filed a complaint for divorce against defendant wife, appellee herein, on January 25, 1947. On February 27, 1947 the parties entered into an agreement settling their property rights and alimony to the wife, subject to the approval of the court. The important provisions of the agreement are as follows: On March 7, 1947 a hearing was had in the trial court. Both parties were represented by counsel but were not personally present. Plaintiff's evidence consisted of his deposition, one corroborating witness, and the settlement agreement above referred to. The trial judge ordered that a decree of divorce be granted to the plaintiff and further ordered as follows: On the same date the trial judge signed a divorce decree, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows: In March 1950 plaintiff petitioned the superior court to modify this monthly payment of two hundred dollars by reducing same. Defendant made a motion to dismiss the petition which was granted, and the court gave as its reason for not entertaining the motion the fact that the parties had entered into a contract for the above named amount and it was not within the province of the superior court to change that contract. Plaintiff's assignment of error raises but one question, to wit: Is the agreement in question, which was entered into by both parties and incorporated into the divorce decree, subject to modification? From 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 301, page 1157 et seq., we quote the following pertinent paragraphs: Quoting further from 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 301, supra, page 1159: Reading section 8 supra of the agreement together with the divorce decree supra it is clear that it was the intention of the parties that it should become a part of the decree, and that the court made it part of the decree by reference thereto. Therefore it is enforceable, not as an agreement, but as a decree of the court and subject to modification. In Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P.2d 15, the California Supreme Court quotes Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579, 154 A.L.R. 439, which we think significant to this case: Therefore any action taken must be based on the decree of the lower court and not based on the contract of the parties. We said in Long v. Stratton, 50 Ariz. 427, 72 P.2d 939, 942: The other question that this court must decide is a question of law, to wit: Is the agreement which the parties entered into, providing for two hundred dollars per month for support and maintenance of the wife, in the nature of a property settlement or in the nature of alimony? In order to give the lower court jurisdiction to modify the decree fixing a sum certain to be paid to the defendant as alimony, the alimony paid must not be a consideration for a property settlement since this would be the defendant's share in the property and not subject to modification by the lower court. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582, 109 A.L.R. 1061. It must, rather, be separate and distinct, that is, the alimony should be paid only for the wife's support and maintenance and no part of it should be considered as payment for her property rights. Joachim v. Joachim, 267 Ill. App. 237; 109 A.L.R. at page 1071. Also, Hough v. Hough supra. Defendant lays great stress on the fact that the court's minute entry did not use the word "alimony" as did the written decree and emphasizes that the word "alimony" was either "surreptitiously or inadvertently" inserted in the decree. Appellee also asserts that she was not adequately represented when the matter was presented to the lower court. There is no evidence in the record to support either of these charges except the bare assertions in defendant's brief. In McFadden v. McFadden, 22 Ariz. 246, 196 P. 452, 453, the court said: Futhermore the word "alimony" adds little to the decree because the words "support and maintenance of the wife" are used in the statute providing for modification of *6 divorce decrees. Section 27-811, A.C.A. 1939. Alimony and separate maintenance synonymous, 3 Words and Phrases, p. 130. An examination of the agreement and the decree leads us to but one conclusion and that is, the monthly payment of two hundred dollars was alimony and not in payment for any property rights. The agreement recognized and set aside to each of the parties his separate property. The one and only parcel of community property was set over to the plaintiff upon payment of five hundred dollars by him to the defendant. Thus it can be seen that the parties settled their property rights, and independently thereof they agreed that plaintiff pay $200 per month as alimony for defendant's support and maintenance. Section 27-811, A.C.A. 1939, provides in part as follows: In 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 238, p. 983, the following is said as to the court's power and right to modify an alimony decree: See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 132 Cal. App. 609, 23 P.2d 50. The case is reversed with instructions to the lower court to entertain plaintiff's petition to modify the decree as relates to the payment of money for support and maintenance of the defendant. Judgment reversed. UDALL, C.J., and STANFORD, PHELPS and LA PRADE, JJ., concur.