Title: Commonwealth v. Costa

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11828 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LOUIS R. COSTA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 5, 2015. - July 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment, 
Parole.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole.  Parole.  
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole, Capital 
case. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 28, 2014.  
 
 
The case reported by Hines, J.  
 
 
 
David J. Apfel (Katherine C. Sadeck with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr., & Charles Allan Hope, for James 
Costello, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
LENK, J.  In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 
(2012) (Miller), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
2 
 
imposition of mandatory life sentences without the possibility 
of parole on individuals who were under the age of eighteen at 
the time of their crimes (juvenile offenders) violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution's prohibition 
on "cruel and unusual punishments."  Approximately one year 
later, in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 
466 Mass. 655, 666 (2013) (Diatchenko), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 
(2015), this court held that Miller applies retroactively to 
cases on collateral appeal.  We also went beyond the Court's 
holding in Miller and determined that art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which prohibits "cruel or 
unusual punishments," bars even the discretionary imposition of 
a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on juvenile 
offenders.  Id. at 671. 
Prior to our decision in Diatchenko, juvenile offenders 
convicted of murder in the first degree in the Commonwealth 
received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole, like adult offenders convicted of the same offense.  Id. 
at 667.  Our decision in Diatchenko invalidated the sentences of 
all juvenile offenders sentenced under that sentencing scheme, 
to the extent to which those sentences rendered the offenders 
ineligible for parole.  Id.  In Diatchenko and Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013) (Brown), decided on the same day as 
Diatchenko, we determined that the proper remedy was to excise 
3 
 
from the sentencing statute, when applied to juvenile offenders, 
the provision regarding parole ineligibility.  Diatchenko, 466 
Mass. at 673.  Brown, 466 Mass. at 680-689.  As a result, a 
sentencing statute prescribing life without the possibility of 
parole in effect became a statute prescribing, for juvenile 
offenders, life with the possibility of parole after fifteen 
years.  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 673-674. 
This case calls upon us to determine the effect of 
Diatchenko and Brown on the sentences of juvenile offenders who, 
unlike the defendants in those cases, were sentenced to multiple 
consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole 
prior to those decisions.  The defendant was convicted of two 
counts of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced in 1994 
to two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole.  At the time of his sentencing, the distinction between 
consecutive and concurrent sentences had little practical 
impact.  Our decisions in Diatchenko and Brown changed that.  If 
the defendant's sentences are modified in light of Diatchenko 
and Brown but remain consecutive, he will be eligible for parole 
after thirty years (the aggregate of two minimum terms of life 
with eligibility for parole after fifteen years).  If his 
sentences are rendered concurrent, he will be eligible for 
parole after fifteen years; because he has already served 
approximately twenty-eight years, he would be eligible for 
4 
 
parole immediately.  We conclude that a trial court judge, in 
resentencing a juvenile offender originally sentenced to 
multiple consecutive terms of life without the possibility of 
parole, may conduct a sentencing hearing to consider 
resentencing the juvenile offender to concurrent terms.1   
1.  Background.  The defendant's two murder convictions 
stem from his role in the shooting deaths of two individuals in 
a public park on a February evening in Boston in 1986.  At the 
time, the defendant was sixteen years old.  He participated in 
the shooting with two other individuals, who were then adults.  
The defendant initially was charged as a juvenile.  The 
case was then transferred to the Superior Court.  The defendant 
was tried alongside an adult codefendant and convicted on both 
indictments.  This court, concluding that the defendant's right 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
confront a witness against him had been violated, vacated the 
convictions and remanded for a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 39 (1992).  The defendant's second 
trial occurred in 1994.  The defendant again was tried alongside 
an adult codefendant, and both were convicted of two counts of 
murder in the first degree.  The jury's verdict, however, 
                                                 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted on behalf of 
the defendant by the Committee for Public Counsel Services and 
the Child Advocate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and by 
James Costello. 
5 
 
distinguished between the defendant and his codefendant.  While 
the codefendant was found guilty of the murders based on both a 
premeditation theory and an extreme atrocity or cruelty theory, 
the defendant was convicted only as a joint venturer on the 
deliberate premeditation theory.  This court affirmed the 
convictions.  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 
416 (1998).   
Pursuant to the then-applicable sentencing statutes, the 
defendant was sentenced to two terms of life without the 
possibility of parole.  At the defendant's sentencing hearing, 
the Commonwealth urged, based on "the nature . . . of the crimes 
committed," that the defendant's sentences be imposed 
consecutively.  Defense counsel, citing the defendant's "youth 
at the time these offenses took place" and his capacity for 
rehabilitation, urged that the sentences be imposed 
concurrently.  The sentencing judge suggested that the 
difference between a consecutive and concurrent sentence was 
"somewhat symbolic," in light of the mandatory sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole.  Defense counsel countered 
that whether the sentences were imposed consecutively or 
concurrently could have an impact on the defendant's treatment 
while incarcerated.  Ultimately, the sentencing judge, noting 
that the evidence showed that "the actions here were tantamount 
to execution by firing squad," concluded that consecutive 
6 
 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole were 
appropriate.  
In the wake of this court's decisions in Diatchenko and 
Brown, the defendant moved for resentencing under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  A different 
judge of the Superior Court (the original sentencing judge 
having retired) concluded that, in light of those decisions, 
each of the defendant's original sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole should be converted into a sentence of 
life with parole eligibility after a minimum term of fifteen 
years.  The judge also determined that the original sentencing 
judge "likely would not have considered the impact of adolescent 
brain development in . . . determining whether to impose 
concurrent sentences or consecutive life sentences for the 
crimes [of] which the defendant was convicted," given the 
"emerging" character of the research.  The judge accordingly 
concluded that the defendant was entitled to a resentencing 
proceeding on the issue whether the sentences should be imposed 
consecutively or concurrently.   
The judge outlined several aspects of the evidentiary 
hearing that his decision contemplated.  He indicated that he 
did not see a need for general testimony regarding scientific 
research into adolescent cognition and brain development, noting 
that the basic insights derived from such research are already 
7 
 
well established in the case law.  Without circumscribing the 
admissible evidence he would consider, the judge indicated that 
it might be appropriate to consider specific testimony 
concerning the defendant's "level of cognition at the time of 
the commission of this crime," and suggested that the defendant 
might offer evidence regarding the psychological examinations 
conducted prior to the hearing regarding the defendant's 
transfer from the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court.   
The Commonwealth petitioned a single justice of the county 
court for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing that the 
judge's order "improperly intrudes upon the lawful sentences 
previously imposed upon th[e] defendant."  The single justice 
reserved and reported the case, observing that the case "raises 
the important and novel question, not specifically addressed in 
Diatchenko or Brown, whether:  (1) a trial court judge in 
imposing a sentence in accordance with and pursuant to 
Diatchenko and Brown, may amend that aspect of the original 
sentence that imposed consecutive life sentences to impose 
concurrent life sentences . . . and, (2) if so, what shall be 
the nature of the proceeding required to make that 
determination."2    
                                                 
 
2  The parties do not dispute that our "general 
superintendence" power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, allows us to 
review the judge's order granting the defendant's motion for a 
hearing.  Additionally, "[w]here . . . the single justice has, 
8 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Power to amend the original sentence 
under Mass R. Crim. P. 30 (a).  Rule 30 (a) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:  "Any person who is 
imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal 
conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion 
requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to correct 
the sentence then being served upon the ground that the 
confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts."  The defendant's original sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole is contrary both to the Eighth 
Amendment, as construed in Miller, and to art. 26, as construed 
in Diatchenko and Brown.  Because Miller has retroactive effect 
on cases on collateral appeal, the judge has the power under 
rule 30 (a) to correct the unconstitutional sentence originally 
imposed.  See Diatchenko, 466 Mass. 661-667. 
When an appellate court determines that one component of an 
integrated sentencing package is illegal, the court generally 
vacates the sentence in its entirety, while leaving the 
underlying convictions intact, and remands for resentencing.  
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014); 
                                                                                                                                                             
in [her] discretion, reserved and reported the case to the full 
court, we grant full appellate review of the issues reported."  
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. 399, 402 n.4 
(2015), quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 113, 117 
(2008).   
9 
 
Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013); Commonwealth 
v. Talbot, 444 Mass. 586, 597-598 (2005).  In Commonwealth v. 
Renderos, 440 Mass. 422, 423 (2003), for instance, the defendant 
was convicted of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a 
person who had attained fourteen years of age, and was sentenced 
to a suspended two-year sentence and to a lifetime term of 
community parole supervision.  We determined the lifetime 
community parole supervision portion of the sentence was 
contrary to law.  Id. at 434.  We then vacated the defendant's 
entire sentence and remanded for resentencing.  Id. at 435.  We 
explained that "[t]he judge's belief that lifetime community 
parole supervision could be imposed influenced his decision as 
to the appropriate punishment for the defendant's two 
convictions."  Id.  As a result, "[t]he sentences imposed 
constituted an integrated package, each piece dependent on the 
other, which cannot be separated."  Id.   
Here, similarly, based on the sentencing laws in place at 
the time the judge imposed the sentence, the judge believed that 
the practical consequences of the decision to impose consecutive 
rather than concurrent sentences would be limited to the 
defendant's treatment while incarcerated for life.  This court's 
decisions in Diatchenko and Brown transformed a choice that 
could be regarded as "somewhat symbolic" into one of some 
consequence, since a consecutive sentence doubles the amount of 
10 
 
time the defendant must serve before he becomes eligible for 
parole.  The judge, in imposing consecutive sentences, could not 
have known that his decision would have that effect.  He also 
could not have known of the reasoning underlying our decisions 
in Diatchenko and Brown.  Those decisions were based on "current 
scientific research on adolescent brain development" that led us 
to conclude that juvenile offenders are "constitutionally 
different from adults for sentencing purposes."  Diatchenko, 466 
Mass. at 669-670, quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.  We cannot 
know that the judge would have imposed consecutive sentences had 
he known about the effect that decision would ultimately have, 
or had he known about the constitutional differences that 
separate juvenile offenders from adults.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that resentencing is appropriate under these 
circumstances.  
Our decision is not contrary to Diatchenko.  There, we 
rejected the defendant's argument that he was "entitled to be 
resentenced," concluding that "he was not improperly sentenced 
in the first instance, but only was denied the chance to be 
considered for parole."  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 674.  The 
defendant in Diatchenko, however, had been convicted of a single 
count of murder in the first degree, which carried a statutorily 
mandated sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  
Id. at 656.  Because we remedied that unconstitutional 
11 
 
sentencing statute by excising the parole ineligibility 
provision, while leaving the rest of the statute to stand, 
moreover, our decision simply transformed one statutorily 
mandated sentence (life without the possibility of parole) into 
another statutorily mandated sentence (life with the possibility 
of parole after fifteen years).  In contrast to cases like 
Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. at 435, where the original 
sentencing judge exercised a degree of discretion in structuring 
an "appropriate punishment," therefore, in Diatchenko neither 
the old nor the new sentence left a sentencing judge any 
discretion.  As a result, a resentencing proceeding would serve 
no purpose.  See Diatchenko, supra.  Instead, the defendant, 
already having served thirty-one years, was "eligible to be 
considered for parole immediately" and could apply directly "to 
the Massachusetts parole board for a hearing that shall afford 
him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release."  Id.   
While this case involves the same mandatory sentencing 
scheme at issue in Diatchenko, the original sentencing judge did 
exercise discretion in deciding to impose consecutive rather 
concurrent sentences.  See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 
145 (1989).  That decision, moreover, determines whether the 
defendant is immediately eligible for parole or must wait an 
additional two years.  The circumstances that rendered a 
resentencing proceeding before a trial court judge unnecessary 
12 
 
in Diatchenko, therefore, do not exist here.  Hence, in 
accordance with our general approach where one aspect of an 
integrated sentence has been deemed illegal, resentencing is 
appropriate on both convictions.      
Our conclusion, resting as it does on our general approach 
to resentencing rather than on constitutional grounds, has no 
impact on the current sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders 
convicted of murder in the first degree.  Our decisions in 
Diatchenko and Brown resulted in a situation in which the 
sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders convicted of murder in 
the first degree was effectively identical to that for juvenile 
offenders convicted of murder in the second degree.  See Brown, 
466 Mass. at 689-691.  The Legislature responded to that 
situation by providing specific penalties for juvenile offenders 
convicted of murder in the first degree.  G. L. c. 279, § 24.  
The resulting legislation establishes that, "for murder in the 
first degree committed by a person on or after the person's 
fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, 
the court shall fix a minimum term" before the individual 
becomes eligible for parole "of not less than [twenty] years nor 
more than [thirty] years."  Id.  Where the conviction of murder 
in the first degree is based on extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
"the court shall fix a minimum term of [thirty] years."  Id.  
Finally, where the conviction of murder in the first degree for 
13 
 
a juvenile offender is based on "deliberately premeditated 
malice aforethought . . . , the court shall fix a minimum term 
of not less than [twenty-five] years nor more than [thirty] 
years."  Id.  
The new sentencing scheme, therefore, allows (and, in the 
case of convictions of murder in the first degree based on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, demands) the imposition on a 
juvenile offender convicted of murder in the first degree of a 
sentence of life with eligibility for parole after thirty years.  
The defendant, however, was not sentenced under the new 
sentencing statute.  Instead, he was sentenced under the old 
sentencing statute.  Because our decisions in Diatchenko and 
Brown struck the parole ineligibility provision from that 
statute when applied to juvenile offenders, the result was that 
the defendant was sentenced under a statute that required a 
sentence of life with parole eligibility after fifteen years.  
The thirty-year time frame until the defendant becomes eligible 
for parole results from the judge's discretionary decision to 
impose consecutive sentences.  The defendant, moreover, does not 
base his argument that resentencing is appropriate on the 
contention that a sentence of life with parole eligibility after 
thirty years is the "functional equivalent of a sentence of life 
14 
 
without parole."  Brown, 466 Mass. at 691 n.11.3  Instead, the 
defendant merely argues that, because his sentence of life with 
parole eligibility after thirty years derives from the judge's 
decision to impose consecutive sentences, and because the 
sentencing judge could not have understood that his decision 
would have that effect, resentencing is appropriate.  We agree 
with that reasoning.  Our conclusion that resentencing is proper 
in this case thus does not rest on a constitutional 
determination that a sentence of life with parole eligibility in 
thirty years is the functional equivalent of life without the 
possibility of parole.  Our decision has no impact on the 
current sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders convicted of 
murder in the first degree.  The constitutionality of that 
scheme is not before us.4  
                                                 
 
3 Cf. Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52 
(2015) (concluding that "the imposition of a fifty-year sentence 
without the possibility of parole is subject to the sentencing 
procedures set forth in Miller"); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 
71 (Iowa 2013) (determining 52.5-year sentence was "sufficient 
to trigger Miller-type protections"); Bear Cloud v. State, 334 
P.3d 132, 136, 142 (Wyo. 2014) (sentence of forty-five years 
until parole eligibility sufficient to constitute functional 
equivalent of life without possibility of parole); United States 
Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data Report, at 32 (Fiscal 
Year 2013) (equating sentence of 470 months [39.17 years] to 
life sentence).   
 
 
4 There is no merit to the Commonwealth's argument that 
resentencing is unnecessary because this court already reviewed 
"the whole case" on both "the law and the evidence" under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and affirmed the imposition of consecutive 
sentences.  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 416 
15 
 
b.  Nature of the proceeding.  Having determined that a 
trial court judge may hold a resentencing hearing in these 
circumstances, we now address the factors to be considered at 
such a hearing.  Generally, "in the exercise of her sentencing 
discretion, [a] judge may consider a variety of factors 
including the defendant's behavior, family life, employment 
history, and civic contributions, as well as societal goals of 
'punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and 
rehabilitation.'"  Commonwealth v. Donohue, 452 Mass. 256, 264 
(2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 414 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).  In resentencing a 
juvenile offender originally sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, a judge properly may consider these 
factors.  We identify three additional factors that a judge 
conducting such a resentencing should consider. 
First, in Miller, the United States Supreme Court 
identified a number of factors (Miller factors) that sentencing 
judges must consider in making the individualized determination 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1998).  This court also affirmed the mandatory imposition of a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, although 
that decision is plainly contrary to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 
(2012) (Miller), which we already determined to have retroactive 
effect.  "Miller broke new ground and did not merely apply an 
established constitutional standard to a novel set of facts."  
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655, 663 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  The decision, 
therefore, rendered invalid sentences previously affirmed by 
this court after review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
16 
 
whether a juvenile offender should receive a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole:  (1) the defendant's 
"chronological age and its hallmark features -- among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences"; (2) "the family and home environment that 
surrounds" the defendant; (3) "the circumstances of the homicide 
offense, including the extent of [the defendant's] participation 
in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him" or her; (4) whether the defendant "might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 
incompetencies associated with youth -- for example, [the 
defendant's] inability to deal with police officers or 
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the defendant's] 
incapacity to assist his [or her] own attorneys"; and (5) "the 
possibility of rehabilitation."  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.  
Because these factors relate to the societal goals of 
punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and 
rehabilitation, see Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. at 414, we 
believe that a judge should consider the Miller factors when 
conducting a resentencing hearing of a juvenile offender 
originally sentenced to multiple consecutive sentences of life 
without parole.   
Second, this court's decisions in Diatchenko and Brown, 
like the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller, were 
17 
 
based on "current scientific research on adolescent brain 
development."  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 669.  That research led 
us to conclude that, "because the brain of a juvenile is not 
fully developed, either structurally or functionally, by the age 
of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that a 
particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably 
depraved."  Id. at 670.  In conducting the resentencing hearing, 
then, the judge appropriately may consider evidence concerning 
the defendant's then-extant psychological characteristics in the 
process of assessing the Miller factors.   
Third, "in resentencing following the invalidation of a 
sentence (where the underlying conviction has not been vacated), 
the resentencing judge has authority to consider favorable 
information about [a] defendant's good conduct subsequent to his 
[or her] original sentencing," as well as "information presented 
by the Commonwealth concerning a defendant's unfavorable conduct 
occurring subsequent to his [or her] original sentencing 
hearing."  Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass. 340, 344-345 (2002).5  
                                                 
 
5 In this regard, a resentencing proceeding under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), differs from 
a revocation and revision proceeding under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, 
378 Mass. 899 (1979).  Rule 29 allows a trial judge, within a 
limited period of time after the imposition of a sentence, to 
"revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may 
not have been done."  Rule 29 applies to lawful sentences; its 
purpose is "to permit a judge to reconsider the sentence he [or 
she] has imposed and determine, in light of the facts as they 
existed at the time of sentencing, whether the sentence was 
18 
 
Here, the defendant wishes to offer at a resentencing hearing 
evidence that he has maintained a perfect disciplinary record 
since his sentencing in 1994, that he has earned a college 
degree while incarcerated, and that he has founded and led the 
Restorative Justice Program, which seeks to foster 
reconciliation between prisoners and their victims' families.  
The defendant contends that this record of accomplishment is all 
the more compelling given that, for most of the time he has been 
incarcerated, he had no hope of ever receiving parole.  We agree 
that information concerning the defendant's postsentencing 
conduct, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether offered 
by the defendant or by the Commonwealth, properly may be 
presented and considered at the resentencing hearing.6   
                                                                                                                                                             
just."  Commonwealth v. Layne, 386 Mass. 291, 295 (1982).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. 305, 314 (1977).  The rule 
contains strict time limits because "the passage of time from 
the date of sentencing" makes it "increasingly difficult for a 
trial judge to make the determination called for by the rule 
without improperly considering postsentencing events."  
Commonwealth v. Layne, supra at 295-296.  Rule 30, by contrast, 
permits a motion to be made "at any time," but requires that the 
person bringing the motion be restrained or confined unlawfully. 
 
6 Contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, consideration 
of postsentencing conduct does not violate the separation of 
powers by encroaching on the parole board's executive function. 
A judge may not allow a motion to alter a sentence in order to 
"nullify the discretionary actions of the parole board."  
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 117 (1993).  Here, 
however, the resentencing proceeding merely will determine how 
many years the defendant must serve before becoming eligible for 
parole.  The decision whether to grant parole would remain 
within the parole board's discretion.  
19 
 
3.  Conclusion.  A trial court judge, in resentencing a 
defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the time of his 
or her crime under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) and this court's 
decisions in Diatchenko and Brown, may amend that aspect of the 
original sentence that imposed consecutive life sentences to 
impose instead concurrent life sentences.  At the resentencing 
proceeding, in addition to the factors considered at any 
sentencing, the judge should consider:  (a) the Miller factors; 
(b) evidence regarding the defendant's psychological state at 
the time of the offense; and (c) evidence concerning the 
defendant's postsentencing conduct, whether favorable or 
unfavorable.   
The matter is remanded to the county court for entry of a 
judgment denying the Commonwealth's petition for relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.