Title: Woodworth v. Gaddis

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 138 
Docket: 
Was-11-604 
On Briefs: 
October 10, 2012 
Decided: 
December 18, 2012 
 
 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
JO A. WOODWORTH 
 
v. 
 
PAUL GADDIS et al. 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Jo A. Woodworth appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Machias, Cuddy, J.) awarding her $67,180 in damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. 
§ 7552 (2011) based on a timber harvest trespass.  Woodworth argues that the 
court erred in its damages award and in declining to grant her motion to add a party 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 21.  Because we conclude that the court erred by not 
doubling Woodworth’s damages as required by 14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(A), we 
modify the damages award and, as modified, affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  “The trial record, reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, 
supports the following facts.”  Van Dam v. Spickler, 2009 ME 36, ¶ 2, 968 A.2d 
1040.  Woodworth owns real property in Steuben, separated from David 
 
2 
Robertson’s property by a parcel owned by a third party.1  In 2008, Robertson 
contracted with David Crane and Crane’s Contract Cutting, Inc. to harvest timber 
on his property.  Crane’s Contract Cutting in turn contracted with Paul Gaddis, a 
licensed forester, to identify Robertson’s property lines.  On November 15, 2008, 
Gaddis employed a series of substandard procedures in identifying the boundaries 
of the Robertson property, and mistakenly marked a portion of Woodworth’s land 
as part of the Robertson property.2  On November 22, Gaddis and Crane partially 
walked the property, and Gaddis identified what he had marked as the northern 
boundary of the Robertson property.  Relying on Gaddis’s markings of the 
property boundaries, Crane’s Contract Cutting then proceeded to remove trees 
from 17.9 acres of Woodworth’s property. 
[¶3]  In May 2009, Woodworth filed a complaint against Gaddis and 
Robertson, asserting common law trespass, damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552, 
and negligence.  In October 2009, the court (Romei, J.) granted Woodworth’s 
M.R. Civ. P. 21 motion to add Crane as a necessary party.  In March 2011, 
                                         
1  Although Robertson passed away after the court entered judgment, we continue to refer to the parcel 
as his for the sake of clarity. 
 
2  According to Maine Forest Ranger Courtney Hammond, Gaddis (1) failed to properly identify the 
Robertson property line; (2) used the wrong starting point in marking the property, leading to inaccurate 
markings; (3) relied on tax maps to establish boundary lines, as opposed to a deed description; (4) used a 
compass without also employing a Global Positioning System (GPS) device; (5) paced the property lines 
as opposed to using a more precise form of measurement; and (6) relied on conversations with two local 
people to confirm property boundaries without determining whether those individuals had any basis for 
their opinions as to the boundaries.  Gaddis himself admitted that his conduct in marking the Robertson 
boundary was the “biggest honest mistake” that he had ever made. 
 
3 
Woodworth filed a motion to substitute Crane’s Contract Cutting for Crane, which 
the court granted on April 6, 2011.  On October 18, 2011, more than two years 
after filing the complaint and less than one month before trial, Woodworth filed a 
M.R. Civ. P. 21 motion to once again add Crane as a party.  The court denied as 
“not timely” Woodworth’s motion to add Crane. 
[¶4]  During the trial, Woodworth called Maine Forest Ranger Courtney 
Hammond to testify, who estimated that the mill-delivered value of the timber cut 
from Woodworth’s property was approximately $44,000.  Forest Ranger 
Hammond testified that restoring the property would cost $23,180, based on 
per-acre restoration estimates by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) prepared in 2008 or 2009.  Woodworth also called witness David 
Garcelon, a conservationist for NRCS, who provided higher per-acre restoration 
estimates based on 2011 NRCS figures.3  
[¶5]  In a written judgment, the court (Cuddy, J.) concluded that Gaddis, 
Crane’s Contract Cutting, and Robertson each violated 14 M.R.S. § 7552.4  The 
court made factual findings crediting Forest Ranger Hammond’s testimony that the 
                                         
3  Trial evidence included a letter from Garcelon to Woodworth, in which Garcelon estimated that the 
restoration cost, based on NRCS rates, was $360 per acre for “Tree/Shrub Site Preparation,” and an 
additional $1805 per acre for “Tree/Shrub Establishment.”  The letter indicated that NRCS may fund up 
to 90% of the restoration costs for qualifying landowners.  
 
4  The court also found all three defendants liable on the other common law counts.  We need not 
address these counts because no party contests them. 
 
4 
value of the trees cut from Woodworth’s property was $44,000, and the cost to 
restore the property was $23,180.  The court concluded that Woodworth’s actual 
damages pursuant to section 7552(3) totaled $67,180, which represented the 
combined market value of the wood cut and the cost of regeneration.  
[¶6]  The court considered whether to apply section 7552(4), which permits 
double damages for negligent conduct, and treble damages for intentional or 
knowing conduct.  The court concluded that all three defendants were negligent, 
but that none of the defendants acted intentionally or knowingly.  Gaddis was 
negligent for failing to exercise proper care in identifying the boundaries of the 
Robertson property.  Crane’s Contract Cutting was negligent for relying on 
Gaddis’s work.  Robertson, who failed to appear at trial, was negligent for having 
engaged Crane’s Contract Cutting.  However, the court declined to double 
Woodworth’s damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(A) because it determined 
that the maximum damages award authorized by statute was the greater of the 
actual damages pursuant to section 7552(3), or $250.  Accordingly, the court 
awarded Woodworth $67,180, plus interest and costs, for which the defendants 
were jointly and severally liable.   
 
5 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶7]  On appeal, Woodworth argues that the court erred (A) in its damages 
award, and (B) in declining to grant her motion to add Crane as a party.  We begin 
by addressing the calculation of damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552. 
A. 
Damages Pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552 
[¶8]  Title 14 M.R.S. § 7552,5 “replaces the common law with respect to 
damage to trees from a trespass.”  Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 7, 905 A.2d 
                                         
5  In relevant part, 14 M.R.S. § 7552 (2011) provides: 
 
2.  Prohibitions.  Without permission of the owner a person may not: 
 
A.  Cut down, destroy, damage or carry away any forest product, ornamental or 
fruit tree, agricultural product, stones, gravel, ore, goods or property of any kind 
from land not that person’s own; or 
 
. . . .  
  
3.  Measure of damages.  This subsection governs the measurement of damages 
resulting from a violation of subsection 2. 
 
A.  When agricultural or forest products have been destroyed or carried away, the 
owner may recover as damages either the value of the lost products themselves or 
the diminution in value of the real estate as a whole resulting from the violation, 
whichever is greater. 
 
B.  For lost trees, the owner may claim in lieu of market value the forfeiture 
amounts determined in Title 17, section 2510, subsections 2 and 3.  In addition, 
the owner’s damages may include the costs for regeneration of the stand in 
accordance with Title 12, section 8869.  The court may reduce the damages 
awarded for good cause shown when the cutting of trees was done negligently or 
without fault. 
 
. . . . 
 
4.  Damages recoverable.  Damages are recoverable as follows. 
  
 
6 
290 (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, if a party violates the listed “[p]rohibitions” 
set forth in section 7552(2), the statute provides for a three-step process to 
calculate damages.  See 14 M.R.S. § 7552(2)-(5).  First, subsection (3) identifies 
the “[m]easure of damages” for violations of subsection (2), listing several 
alternate measures of actual damages, including regeneration damages.  Id. 
§ 7552(3).  Second, subsection (4) provides the “[d]amages recoverable,” which 
the court calculates by doubling or trebling a party’s subsection (3) actual damages 
depending on the trespasser’s degree of fault.  Id. § 7552(4).  Third, subsections (4) 
and (5) provide for certain costs and fees in addition to other damages obtained as 
a result of the trespass.  Id. § 7552(4)(C), (5).  Woodworth contends that the court 
erred first in its calculation of actual damages by not awarding her additional 
regeneration damages pursuant to section 7552(3), and second in not doubling or 
trebling her actual damages pursuant to section 7552(4).   
1. 
Regeneration Damages Pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552(3)(B) 
[¶9]  We will disturb a damages award only “when there is no competent 
evidence in the record to support the award.”  Estate of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 
                                                                                                                                   
A.  A person who negligently or without fault violates subsection 2 is liable to 
the owner for 2 times the owner’s damages as measured under subsection 3 or 
$250, whichever is greater. 
 
B.  A person who intentionally or knowingly violates subsection 2 is liable to the 
owner for 3 times the owner’s damages as measured under subsection 3 or $500, 
whichever is greater.  
 
7 
24, ¶ 43, 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks omitted).  Section 7552(3) permits the 
injured party to “recover as [actual] damages either the value of the lost products 
themselves or the diminution in value of the real estate as a whole resulting from 
the violation, whichever is greater.”  14 M.R.S. § 7552(3)(A).  Additionally, the 
actual “damages may include the costs for regeneration of the stand [of lost trees] 
in accordance with Title 12, section 8869.”  Id. § 7552(3)(B).  The court concluded 
that Woodworth’s actual damages totaled $67,180, based on its factual findings 
crediting Forest Ranger Hammond’s testimony that the value of the trees cut was 
$44,000 and that the regeneration cost was $23,180.  Woodworth does not take 
issue with the tree value calculation, but contends that the court erred in failing to 
rely on the higher regeneration estimate provided by Garcelon.  
[¶10]  The court did not err in its determination of the regeneration cost 
because Forest Ranger Hammond’s testimony provided competent evidence for the 
court’s regeneration cost calculation.  See Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 43, 16 A.3d 137.  
Where Woodworth presented two witnesses to testify as to the cost of regeneration, 
and those witnesses provided the court with different regeneration cost estimates, 
the court was permitted to credit the testimony of one witness over the other.  
See Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, ¶ 16, 917 A.2d 123 (“a 
fact-finder . . . is responsible for weighing the evidence to decide between the 
competing versions of the truth.” (quotation marks omitted)).  Furthermore, the 
 
8 
court was not bound to adopt the most recent of the two cost estimates simply 
because it was more recent. 
2. 
Double and Treble Damages Pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552(4) 
[¶11]  Having determined that the court did not err in its calculation of 
Woodworth’s actual damages, we next turn to Woodworth’s argument that the 
court should have doubled or trebled her actual damages pursuant to section 
7552(4).  At the second step of the damages analysis pursuant to section 7552, an 
injured party is entitled to double damages if the trespasser acted negligently or 
without fault, or treble damages if the trespasser acted intentionally or knowingly. 
14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(A), (B). 
[¶12]  We begin with Woodworth’s contention that the defendants acted 
intentionally or knowingly, entitling her to treble damages.  We review the 
intentional or knowing nature of tree cutting pursuant to section 7552 for clear 
error.  See Dupuis v. Soucy, 2011 ME 2, ¶ 21, 11 A.3d 318.  Factual findings are 
not clearly erroneous “if supported by competent evidence.”  Weinstein v. 
Hurlbert, 2012 ME 84, ¶ 9, 45 A.3d 743.  Because Woodworth had the burden of 
proof at trial to show the intentional or knowing nature of the trespass, she will 
only prevail on appeal if she demonstrates that the evidence compelled such a 
finding.  See Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79. 
 
9 
[¶13]  Treble damages for intentional or knowing conduct are available 
pursuant to section 7552(4)(B) where the perpetrator is “subjectively aware that his 
conduct was contrary to [the landowner’s] rights in the property, or that [the 
trespasser’s] conduct displayed more than an utter and complete indifference to 
and disregard for [the landowner’s] rights.”  Dupuis, 2011 ME 2, ¶ 22, 11 A.3d 
318.  In the present case, there was competent evidence to support the court’s 
conclusion that Gaddis and Crane’s Contract Cutting acted negligently.  Moreover, 
the evidence did not compel the court to find that the defendants acted knowingly 
or intentionally.6  Accordingly, the court did not err in declining to award treble 
damages to Woodworth.  See Handrahan, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79; Dupuis, 
2011 ME 2, ¶ 21, 11 A.3d 318. 
[¶14]  Although we conclude that Woodworth is not entitled to treble 
damages, we must still consider her contention that double damages were 
mandatory pursuant to section 7552(4)(A), given the court’s finding that the 
defendants acted negligently in violating section 7552(2).  We review de novo the 
proper interpretation of section 7552(4)(A).  See Goodrich v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. 
Sys., 2012 ME 95, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 212.   
                                         
6  Woodworth does not contest the court’s finding that Robertson acted negligently as opposed to 
intentionally or knowingly, therefore waiving any argument in this respect.  See Laqualia v. Laqualia, 
2011 ME 114, ¶ 34, 30 A.3d 838 (arguments not developed in the appellate brief are waived). 
 
10 
[¶15]  Where a person acts negligently or without fault in cutting trees in 
violation of section 7552(2), that person “is liable to the owner for 2 times the 
owner’s damages as measured under subsection 3 [the actual damages provision] 
or $250, whichever is greater.”  14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(A).  Here, the court 
interpreted the double damages provision as limiting the total award of damages to 
the greater of the actual damages pursuant to subsection 3, or $250, and declined to 
double Woodworth’s actual damages for this reason.   
[¶16]  Contrary to the court’s interpretation, upon a finding of negligence, 
section 7552(4)(A) requires a court to award the greater of either twice the actual 
damages pursuant to section 7552(3), or $250.  See Mehlhorn, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 8 
& n.3, 905 A.2d 290 (noting that a damages award of $250 pursuant to section 
7552(4)(A) implies that the section 7552(3) actual damages award “even when 
doubled, [is] less than $250”); see also Dupuis, 2011 ME 2, ¶¶ 13, 26, 11 A.3d 318 
(upholding a damages award of $12,900 pursuant to 7552(4)(B) based on $4300 
actual damages multiplied by three for intentional or knowing conduct, where the 
relevant language of subsections (4)(A) and (4)(B) is identical).  Moreover, we 
have previously defined the language “is liable” in section 7552(4) to make 
damages mandatory as opposed to discretionary.  See Currier v. Huron, 2008 ME 
19, ¶ 15 & n.4, 940 A.2d 1085.  Accordingly, upon finding that the defendants 
acted negligently in violating section 7552(2), the court erred by failing to double 
 
11 
Woodworth’s actual damages as mandated by section 7552(4)(A).  See id.; 
Mehlhorn, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 8 & n.3, 905 A.2d 290. 
B. 
Denial of the Motion to Add a Party 
[¶17]  Woodworth also contends that the court erred in declining to grant her 
M.R. Civ. P. 21 motion to add Crane as a party.  The court’s order denying the 
motion indicated that the motion was “not timely.”  We will uphold a trial court’s 
decision not to add a party “unless the moving party clearly demonstrates a 
manifest abuse of discretion and the necessity to grant the motion to prevent 
injustice.”  Cnty. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Green Mountain Agency, Inc., 2000 ME 
161, ¶ 56, 758 A.2d 59 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶18]  The court’s denial of Woodworth’s motion to add Crane for a second 
time was not a manifest abuse of discretion, and Crane’s addition was not 
necessary to prevent injustice.  Woodworth’s original complaint of May 2009 did 
not include Crane, and the court granted Woodworth’s first motion to add Crane as 
a necessary party in October 2009.  Nearly two years after filing the complaint, 
Woodworth filed a motion to substitute Crane’s Contract Cutting for Crane, which 
the court granted on April 6, 2011.  Six months later, and less than one month 
before trial, Woodworth again filed a motion to add Crane as a party.   
[¶19]  The substantial delay between the filing of the complaint and the 
second motion to add Crane as a party was a factor supporting the denial of the 
 
12 
motion.  See id. ¶ 58 (noting that a court would be within the bounds of its 
discretion to deny a motion to add a party based on delay and expense alone 
because the motion came almost a year and a half after the case began); Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Bert Cote’s L/A Auto Sales, Inc., 1998 ME 53, ¶¶ 16-18, 707 A.2d 
1311 (finding that although the passage of time alone is not sufficient grounds for 
denying a motion to add a party, denial was within the bounds of the court’s 
discretion when the delay prejudiced the proposed defendant by depriving it of 
necessary time to prepare a defense).  Additionally, if Crane were reintroduced as a 
party less than one month before trial, it could have resulted in additional expense, 
prejudice to Crane in having to prepare a defense after having been dismissed from 
the case, and further postponement of the trial.  Accordingly, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Woodworth’s motion to add Crane for a second 
time.7  See Cnty. Forest Prods., 2000 ME 161, ¶ 56, 758 A.2d 59. 
 
The entry is:   
Judgment modified to double the court’s award of 
damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(A). 
Judgment affirmed in all other respects. 
 
 
                                         
7  The only authority Woodworth cites in support of her argument for adding Crane as a party, 
Advanced Construction Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, 901 A.2d 189, is distinguishable.  Although Pilecki 
involved the liability of a corporation and the corporation’s sole shareholder, it is of no help to 
Woodworth because the shareholder in Pilecki was a party to the action and the corporation was liable by 
agreement, whereas Crane ceased to be a party after Woodworth chose to dismiss him and he has not 
consented to assuming liability attributed to Crane’s Contract Cutting.  See id. ¶¶ 3, 8 & n.3, 9. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Toff Toffolon, Esq., Machias, and Jo Woodworth, pro se, for appellant Jo 
Woodworth 
 
Ronald A. Mosley, Jr., Esq., Machias, for appellee Paul Gaddis 
 
Christopher J. Whalley, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellee Crane’s Contract 
Cutting, Inc. 
 
 
 
Machias District Court docket number RE-2009-32 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY