Title: McCabe v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McCabe v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc1983 WY 123674 P.2d 699Case Number: 83-55Case Number: 83-55Decided: 12/02/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRED 
McCABE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
R.A. 
MANNING CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Teton County, W.J. Nicholas, J.

 
 
William L. 
Miller and Holly Brown of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant; oral argument by Miller.

 
 
Lawrence 
B. Hartnett of Hartnett & Moyer, Jackson, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This was an action to 
recover the balance due upon an oral contract for the construction of the 
Pioneer Press Building at Jackson, Wyoming. The jury returned its verdict in 
favor of plaintiff, appellee. Defendant, appellant, appeals from the judgment 
entered upon that verdict. 

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The issues for 
determination, as stated by appellant, are the following:

 
 
"1. The 
trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence the second page of the 
architect Hocker's notes of the November 26, 1980 meeting.

 
 
"2. The 
trial court erred in its comments regarding the testimony of Mr. 
Hocker.

 
 
"3. The 
trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross examine Bob Manning, 
Sr. regarding problems with the Black house."

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Pioneer Press is a 
commercial printing business owned by appellant and located in Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming. The business received a thirty-day notice to vacate its premises and 
thereafter moved into a building housing the Jackson Hole Guide, a newspaper 
also owned by appellant. There was not sufficient space for both businesses; and 
appellant contacted appellee about April 6 or 7, 1980, concerning the 
construction of a building to house the Pioneer Press printing business. At that 
time, appellant had neither plans nor specifications for construction of the 
proposed building. He employed an architect to assist him and discussed with 
appellee, in a preliminary way, the construction of either a metal or concrete 
block, single story, 50' by 100' commercial building without basement. Appellant 
and appellee agreed to proceed with construction of the proposed building, 
without plans or specifications, upon a cost-plus oral contract under which 
appellee would be paid his cost of construction plus 5% for overhead and 10% 
profit. There is no dispute that this is the oral agreement entered into between 
the parties.

 
 

[¶5.]     Construction was begun 
by appellee on May 23, 1980. By that time the architect had prepared a 
foundation plan with basement of sufficient strength and size to carry a second 
floor on the building if that were decided upon.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellee first gave an 
estimate of the cost of constructing a single story, 5,000 square foot concrete 
block building. Then, on June 29, 1980, he was asked to estimate the additional 
cost of adding a second floor to the building with six apartments, and he 
estimated that cost at $161,422.

 
 

[¶7.]     As construction 
progressed, appellant's architect prepared drawings and delivered them to 
appellee. On August 7, 1980, appellee was asked to give an estimate of the cost 
of construction of the total building, still without final drawings being 
completed. He then gave an estimate of $440, 037.71.

 
 

[¶8.]     Construction of the 
building proceeded and, on November 7, 1980, appellant requested that appellee 
prepare another estimate of the cost of completion advising that he wished the 
entire building, with the exception of the apartment to be occupied by 
appellant, to be completed by the last day of January, 
1981.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellee prepared the 
estimate pursuant to request, and the parties met on November 26, 1980. Present 
at the meeting were appellant, appellant's architect, and appellee. The parties 
discussed the progress being made, the proposed completion date, extra expense 
and cost resulting from changes as construction progressed, and the final cost 
of the project. Appellant asked appellee if he had arrived at a price for 
completion of the building. Appellee stated he had made an estimate for the cost 
of completion of $493,025.69. Appellant states that he asked for a "final" 
figure, and this is the figure given him by appellee. Appellee denies it was a 
"final" figure.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant wrote the figure, $493,025.69, 
on a piece of paper, pushed it across the table and asked appellee to sign it. 
Appellee signed the paper and gave it back to appellant. This document, 
designated Exhibit C, was offered and received into evidence. When received in 
evidence, the figure, $493,025.69, was written twice, and there appeared thereon 
the word "final." Appellee testified the word "final" was not on the paper when 
he signed it. Appellant testified it contained the word "final" and that because 
the figure, $493,025.69, was smudged, he had written it again on the piece of 
paper marked Exhibit C. 

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that the effect of 
signing the paper and the meeting of the parties on November 26, was to change 
the oral agreement of the parties from cost-plus to a firm or fixed-bid 
contract. Appellee contends that nothing was ever said about changing the 
agreement from cost-plus to a fixed price. He testified the change would have 
been impossible without stopping the job, getting all the bills together, 
determining what had been paid and what had not been paid, and getting fixed 
firm bids from each of the subcontractors still to perform work. That was not 
done, nor was it requested.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellee continued work on the building 
and continued submitting bills in cost-plus form as he had done before, with the 
bills submitted in December being paid in full. When he submitted his bills on 
January 5, he was told by the bookkeeper who made payments that she, at that 
time, was unable to pay more than the $493,025.69. On January 5, appellant was 
still in the town of Jackson and had told his architect that he did not want the 
job stopped. The architect knew that appellant was contending that the agreement 
had been changed to a fixed-price contract. He never informed appellee of this 
contention. The bookkeeper never advised appellee that he would be paid no more 
than $493,025.69, or that the agreement had been changed. Appellant never called 
appellee and advised him of this, although appellant was in Jackson through the 
7th of January before leaving on vacation for the Cayman 
Islands.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellee continued working on the job 
under the assumption that the agreement was as it had been initially. He 
completed the job as agreed at the end of January, 1981. Appellant returned from 
his vacation in March 1981 and thereafter, during April 1981, the parties met 
concerning the claimed balance due. Appellant, then for the first time, advised 
appellee that he would pay no more than the $493,025.69. Appellee became irate, 
left the meeting, and this lawsuit ensued.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant's architect testified that it 
was not unusual for a general contractor to submit estimates during construction 
with a cost-plus contract. The estimates permit the owner to know the 
approximate cost of the building as work is progressing and determine whether to 
continue, stop work, or make changes to stay within his plans and budget. The 
architect further testified that it would be unusual to change an agreement from 
cost-plus to a fixed bid, and that he knew of it happening only one other time 
in his experience. He said there were problems in deciding changes in the 
building as work progressed. Plans were drawn and materials and specifications 
determined during construction, the last set of drawings being given to appellee 
on November 10, 1980. The job was termed "fast-track construction" which means 
there was some urgency about getting started and getting the building completed. 
Appellant had lost his lease for Pioneer Press, had moved into cramped quarters, 
and it was desirable that the new building for the commercial printing business 
be completed as soon as possible. This kind of construction is more expensive 
than construction which can be bid after the completion of plans and 
specifications for the structure to be built.

 
 

[¶15.]  The Pioneer Press building, as finally 
completed, was an 11,000 square foot building with a full basement, a first 
floor occupied by the printing business, and a second floor containing six 
apartments.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant has no complaint concerning the 
quality of construction, timeliness of completion, or the performance of 
appellee. He simply contends that the oral cost-plus arrangement was, by 
agreement of the parties, changed to a "fixed price" agreement and he should pay 
no more than that agreed fixed price ($493,025.69). The jury found against 
appellant upon this contention, and he claims that this finding resulted from 
error in the trial as specified in the issues he presents in this 
appeal.

 
 
I

 
 
REFUSAL TO 
ADMIT ARCHITECT'S NOTES.

 
 

[¶17.]  Pretrial conference in this case was held 
June 8, 1982. Among other exhibits, appellant produced at the pretrial 
conference two pages of the architect's notes which were marked "Defendant's 
Exhibit B." These notes were prepared by the architect at or immediately after 
the meeting of the parties on November 26, 1980. The court's written Order After 
Pretrial Conference stated: "Defendant's [appellant's] exhibits b [and other 
exhibits] are all received into evidence without objection." This order was 
filed and served upon all counsel of record September 7, 
1982.

 
 

[¶18.]  At the trial, during the testimony of 
appellant's architect upon direct examination, the following occurred with 
respect to Exhibit B.

 
 
Appellant's 
counsel: "Now, Mr. Hocker, I will hand you Defendant's Exhibit B which has 
already been admitted into evidence * * *."

 
 

[¶19.]  Appellee's counsel then approached the 
bench and, out of the hearing of the jury, stated:

 
 
"My notes 
from the pretrial conference don't show Exhibit B as being admitted. He is 
laying a foundation. He just said to the jury they had already been admitted 
into evidence."

 
 
The court 
then stated,

 
 
"That's an 
error on my part * * *,"

 
 
The court 
further stated,

 
 
"The 
problem with this exhibit is this page [referring to page two of Exhibit B] was 
not made contemporaneously with the other; it contains all his impressions. 
These are not statements, just conclusions."

 
 

[¶20.]  Page two of Exhibit B contained the 
following statement:

 
 
"Bob will 
hold $493,025.69 figure. Initialed agreement."

 
 
Appellee's 
objection to the exhibit being received in evidence was that it contained the 
opinion and conclusion of the architect that the parties had entered into an 
agreement to complete the job for the amount stated. Appellant offered Exhibit 
B, both pages one and two, into evidence. Page one of Exhibit B (mostly factual 
and made at the time of the meeting) was received into evidence upon stipulation 
of the parties. Although the Order After Pretrial Conference stated that the 
second page of Exhibit B had been received into evidence without objection, the 
court modified the pretrial order and refused admission of the exhibit into 
evidence.

 
 

[¶21.]  Rule 16, W.R.C.P., governing pretrial 
conferences, states in pertinent part:

 
 
"The court 
shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference * * * and 
such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶22.]  Although the court should be cautious, 
even reluctant, to modify its pretrial orders during trial, yet when 
circumstances require modification to prevent manifest injustice, the court has 
not only the right but an obligation to relieve counsel of his pretrial 
stipulations. In deciding whether to modify its pretrial order, the same 
principles which govern the exercise of discretion in permitting amendments to 
pleadings apply. Thus, the trial court has a broad discretion in determining 
whether to modify or amend its pretrial order during trial, and the decision of 
the trial court in this regard will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. 62 Am.Jur.2d Pretrial Conference § 37.

 
 

[¶23.]  Amendment of the pretrial conference 
order was approved in Frontier Fibreglass Industries, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 
Wyo., 435 P.2d 456 (1967); and when, in Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1255 (1974), the trial court permitted a witness, not disclosed or listed 
in the pretrial conference order, to testify contrary to the order on pretrial 
conference, we held there was no abuse of discretion. We 
stated:

 
 
"* * * 
Courts should generally recognize the binding effect of all matters in the 
pretrial orders, but this does not mean that there should be a rigid or 
pointless adherence to them in a trial but rather that avoidance of possible 
hardship to parties and the accomplishment of substantial justice to the merits 
of claims should be among the factors which the trial court considers. * * *" 
518 P.2d  at 1260.

 
 

[¶24.]  In this case the court had made a mistake 
in its preparation of its Order After Pretrial Conference and had erroneously 
shown Exhibit B as being admitted into evidence. Appellee's counsel should have 
discovered the mistake, but did not. The court was of the opinion that the 
conclusory statement of appellant's architect contained in page two of Exhibit 
B, i.e., that the parties had entered into a new agreement to complete the 
building for a fixed sum of $493,025.69, was the very essence of the litigation. 
Whether the parties had entered into such new agreement was the only question 
submitted to the jury for its determination. It was of such significance that 
admission into evidence of the architect's opinion of the parties' state of mind 
might result in manifest injustice in the case. The court, therefore, modified 
its Order After Pretrial Conference, setting aside the parties' purported 
stipulation under which the exhibit had been shown as received into 
evidence.

 
 

[¶25.]  Whether the court should modify its 
pretrial conference order at trial, as was done here, relieving a party of his 
apparent stipulations, depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case. We have said the question is one addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. In this case a mistake had been made showing the exhibit admitted 
into evidence. That was not disputed. Under the circumstances, modification of 
the order was not an abuse of discretion.

 
 
ADMISSION 
AS A BUSINESS RECORD

 
 

[¶26.]  Appellant next contends that even if the 
court could properly have modified the Order After Pretrial Conference to 
relieve appellee of the provision admitting Exhibit B into evidence, the court 
should nevertheless have admitted page two of Exhibit B as a business record. 
Rule 803, W.R.E., provides that business records are admissible into evidence 
even though the declarant is available to testify.1 To be admissible, it is required by 
the rule, that

 
 
(a) it be 
the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
and

 
 
(b) that 
the source of information does not indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness.

 
 

[¶27.]  In this case appellant had asked for a 
meeting at which appellee was to submit his statement of cost of completion of 
the entire project. Appellant intended to change the agreement of the parties 
from a cost-plus contract to a fixed-price contract. The architect in 
appellant's employ was present. His conclusion, stated in Exhibit B, that the 
parties had made a new agreement must 
have been based upon his observation of the parties, their expressions and 
demeanor, and words spoken by them. The opinion that a new agreement had been 
made was crucial to appellant's case. The court might reasonably find that page 
two of Exhibit B lacked trustworthiness and should not be 
admitted.

 
 

[¶28.]  There is a second reason page two of 
Exhibit B might be rejected. Where the business record contains opinions, it is, for purposes of 
admissibility into evidence, subject to the limits imposed by Rules 701 and 702, 
W.R.E.2 

 
 

[¶29.]  Opinion evidence may be given by either a 
lay or expert witness. During much of the trial, appellant's architect testified 
as an expert in the area of his expertise.3 However, when he proposed to 
testify that, based upon his observation of the parties, their appearance, 
demeanor, statements and what transpired between them, in his opinion, the 
existing agreement had been abandoned and a new agreement entered into, he would 
not be testifying as an expert witness. He would then have been testifying as a 
lay person in an area involving matters of common knowledge and experience 
generally and ordinarily possessed in common by lay 
persons.

 
 

[¶30.]  Prior to adoption of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence, it was held error to admit opinion evidence upon an ultimate issue in 
the case. In Re Estate of Carey, Wyo., 504 P.2d 793 (1972). Such evidence was 
said to invade the province of the jury to decide that ultimate issue. The 
exclusionary rule, although of merit in some instances, was otherwise mostly 
confusing, disruptive, and an obstacle to presentation of testimony in a clear, 
understandable form. Rule 704, W.R.E.,4 now allows receipt of this kind of 
opinion evidence if reliable and helpful to the jury; and that question, 
initially, is for the trial court to decide.

 
 

[¶31.]  Thus, pursuant to Rule 701, W.R.E., the 
opinion of the architect, that the parties had entered into a new agreement, would be admissible if it 
was

 
 
"a. 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and

 
 
"b. 
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact 
in issue."

 
 

[¶32.]  It was the intent of the framers of the 
Rules of Evidence to considerably relax the prohibition against receipt of 
opinion testimony both by expert and lay witnesses. Generally, the rules should 
be liberally construed to allow the admission of such evidence. Yet, on 
occasion, we recognize that certain opinion evidence may not be helpful or may 
have a potential for such mischief that it ought to be rejected. Thus, it has 
been stated that:

 
 
"[i]t is a 
difficult question whether a witness should be permitted to give his opinion as 
to the unspoken knowledge, intent, understanding, or feelings of another person, 
or to the intended meaning of another in the words he speaks. * * 
*"

 
 
that 
the

 
 
"* * * 
helpfulness requirement calls for rejection of `assertions which amount to 
little more than choosing up sides,' * * *."

 
 
and 
finally that,

 
 
"[t]he 
price may be too high to pay, however, if the witness [testifies to] * * * a 
conclusory term highly damaging to a party and relating to a hotly contested 
issue * * *." 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 376 
(1979).

 
 

[¶33.]  The architect was in the employ of 
appellant. He helped in the preparation of his case. Surely he was on his side. 
Whether a new agreement had been made was a hotly contested issue. Whether his 
opinion was rationally based upon his perception is open to question. Regardless 
of this, the court felt, and we agree, that it would not have been helpful to a 
determination of the fact in issue.

 
 

[¶34.]  It was not a complicated matter. The 
testimony of the parties as to what transpired at their meeting, what was said, 
what occurred, was clear and understandable and more than sufficient for the 
jury to reach its determination.

 
 

[¶35.]  Had the architect been permitted to say 
"the parties made a new agreement," it would, in our judgment, have made little 
difference. The trial judge must have felt otherwise in excluding this opinion. 
Appellant does not raise sufficiency of evidence as an issue, nor does he 
contend the jury could not find as it did upon the evidence before them. He 
merely contends that the architect should have been allowed to give his opinion 
that a new agreement had been made 
between the parties either through the introduction of the second page of 
Exhibit B or through his testimony pursuant to the provisions of Rule 803(6), 
W.R.E.

 
 

[¶36.]  Although Rule 701 permits receipt of this 
kind of opinion evidence,

 
 
"* * * 
conditions set for receipt of testimony of this sort - that it be helpful to the 
trier of fact and rationally based on the perception of the witnesses - are 
themselves generally defined, with a certain looseness about them which calls 
for the exercise of discretion by the trial judge." (Footnote omitted.) 3 
Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 375 (1979).

 
 
Whether 
this type of evidence should be received in a particular case is a matter 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent abuse. We hold in this case that there was no abuse 
of discretion on the part of the court in refusing to receive this proposed 
opinion evidence and that prejudice did not result from its 
exclusion.

 
 
II

 
 
COURT'S 
COMMENTS REGARDING ARCHITECT.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellant contends that the trial court's 
comments, in the presence of the jury, demonstrated hostility toward his 
architect witness and conflicting instructions materially prejudiced his case. 
He further contends that the court was benevolent toward appellee and partial to 
his cause. We look to the record to determine whether the court made 
inappropriate comments or favored one party over the 
other.

 
 

[¶38.]  Before the trial began and out of the 
jury's presence, there was a hearing on motions in the court's chambers. In 
ruling on a motion in limine, the court declared its concern about conclusory 
testimony when the following occurred:

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: The thing that * * * concerns me * * * I did find, at [the 
architect's] deposition, he would tend to characterize what his impressions or 
understanding of what the parties said meant * * *.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: If he does that, I will admonish and if he persists, I will just put him 
in jail. I will expect that counsel will not allow him to do that because it's 
inappropriate. * * *

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: * * * I agree with the Court * * * [the architect] may at times make a 
statement like Mr. Manning was surprised or Fred McCabe was surprised, which 
technically, is a conclusion.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: I just simply want to inform the Court I have informed [the architect] 
about not doing that.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: [With respect to the architect] I don't know him at all and I can't even 
suggest -"

 
 

[¶39.]  The trial began. It was appellee's turn 
first. He called the plaintiff, Manning, as his first witness. During his direct 
examination, the following occurred:

 
 
"Q. [By 
plaintiff's attorney] Mr. Manning, is there a reason why an owner would choose a 
fixed-price contract over a cost-plus contract? * * *

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Objection. That calls for an opinion as to why an owner would do that, 
Your Honor. 

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Sustained.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. But he 
did say that it was okay?

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Objection. That is leading, Your Honor.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Sustained."

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. [By 
Mr. Hartnett]: Now, Mr. Manning -

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Let me go back and explain to the jury what happened there. The witness 
answered the question and then the counsel repeated the answer to the counsel's 
satisfaction * * * in effect, putting words in the witness' mouth * * *. The 
Court will always stop counsel from putting words into the witness' mouth. There 
is no reason for a lawyer having to repeat the answers that the witness already 
gave.

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: Thank you, Your Honor.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. Okay. 
Do you remember what was discussed at that meeting?

 
 
"A. * * * 
[W]e discussed the necessity of completing portions of the building for an 
open-house * * * we discussed whether or not the 12th of December was a feasible 
date * * *. It was decided that it was * * *.

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Your Honor, I am going to object to him testifying any further. He is 
stating a conclusion.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Sustained.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. [By 
plaintiff's attorney] Do you remember what else was said at that 
meeting?

 
 
"A. We had 
a discussion on the -

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Objection, again, Your Honor.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Sustained. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what I anticipated through 
this trial is beginning to happen here. * * * If a person testifies about a 
conversation * * *, the most useful information * * * will be to repeat the 
exact words that were said. * * * If the witness is not able to recall the exact 
words * * *, he is, in Court, permitted to give his recollection or the tenor of 
the conversation, but generally, in law, * * * that is not as reliable testimony 
as if he can remember the exact words. * * *"

 
 
"Q. Mr. 
Manning, where did that figure come from?

 
 
"A. That 
was an estimate on my part.

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Objection, Your Honor. That is a conclusion that that was an estimate. * 
* *

 
 
"THE 
COURT: The objection is well taken. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. I am 
going to ask you again what you did with that figure at the 
meeting?

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Your Honor, that's been asked and answered.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: It calls for a conclusion of the witness in all 
events."

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: All I wanted him to say is that I handed it to Mr. 
McCabe.

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Objection, Your Honor * * *

 
 
"THE 
COURT: [To Mr. Hartnett] That's very reprehensible. * * *"

 
 
Appellee 
next called a building contractor to testify in his case as an expert witness 
concerning the custom among contractors and architects on cost-plus jobs. The 
following occurred:

 
 
"THE 
COURT: * * * [T]his witnesses' [sic] opinion as to what might be a standard in 
the business simply is of no assistance to the trier of fact in this case * * 
*.

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: I hear you, Your Honor.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: If you persist in putting in matter which the Court has told you is 
irrelevant, then I will discipline you for that.

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: I understand that. * * * I don't want to incur the Court's wrath. * * 
*

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: I will object * * *.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Well, the Court would exclude those. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, * * * what's transpired here just in 
the last few minutes * * *, I have concluded that * * * the business of being a 
building contractor, * * * is not so benign, * * * so far away from the everyday 
knowledge of ordinary people * * * that it requires expert testimony to explain 
* * * what the case is about * * *."

 
 

[¶40.]  The witness was excused, the court not 
having allowed him to testify. We are unable to discern from the above a partial 
or benevolent attitude of the court toward appellee as is claimed by 
appellant.

 
 

[¶41.]  Next it was appellant's turn. He called 
the architect to testify and the following occurred:

 
 
"Q. Can 
you tell the jury to the best of your recollection what was 
said.

 
 
"A. There 
was a discussion of -

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: Objection, Your Honor. * * * [E]very time he starts to testify, he 
looks at his notes at that point. I don't know whether he is testifying to his 
recollection refreshed or whether he is reading the notes * * * I would object 
if he has to read the notes to the jury * * * after answering the question he 
recalls.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Well, then also, Mr. Miller, * * * I perceive hat [sic] were [sic] going 
to have the same or more serious problems that we undertook yesterday. So if you 
wish me to lecture the witness, I will do that. * * * [T]he form of the 
questions * * * is * * * such * * * as to permit him to volunteer every personal 
opinion he might have * * *.

 
 
"Q. Now, I 
would ask you to refer to your notes and do your notes reflect what that 
estimate was?

 
 
"A. Yes, 
they do.

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: Objection, Your Honor. * * * I anticipate that he is going to then ask 
him to read what the piece of paper says and I am going to object to this line 
of questioning . . . Could I take the witness on voir dire one more 
time?

 
 
"THE 
COURT: * * * [W]e get into a mechanical problem * * * of whether * * * we * * * 
have * * * the witness explore his own conscience as to whether he has testified 
to something he actually remembers now or whether * * * he has to go back 
through his notes * * *. [G]o ahead with your voir dire at this 
time.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Q. But in 
many cases, [to the architect], those notes reflect only your impressions of 
what was said at those meetings; is that not correct?

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"A. In 
some.

 
 
"MR. 
HARTNETT: * * * [T]he problem * * * is that I almost feel like I ought to look 
at every note before he goes ahead and testifies because it may be what his 
opinion or his impression was of what was said.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Your Honor, I am not sure where we were.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: You were talking about the end of the conversation; August 7, 1980 
meeting and he testified, inappropriately, I thought, that Mr. Manning gave an 
estimate * * *.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury * * * When [the architect] says Mr. 
Manning gave him an estimated price for the change, obviously Mr. Manning did 
not say that * * *. [The architect] concluded that that's what he did. * * * 
[H]e could be entirely wrong and * * * that answer does not help you to resolve 
the case. * * * [T]he Court needs to know what the facts are, not your 
opinion."

 
 

[¶42.]  The above is essentially what occurred 
before the jury during the trial that was claimed to have been 
prejudicial.

 
 

[¶43.]  The trial court acts as a referee of the 
contest between the parties. It should be fair and impartial as between the 
parties and their attorneys and allow them considerable freedom in the 
presentation of their respective cases in their own way. That is true even 
though the court may feel that counsel is proceeding on the wrong theory or not 
emphasizing his strongest points or that the court would try the case 
differently. The court should not, under our rules of practice, convey to the 
jury its own opinions of evidence or of the credibility of witnesses or the 
merits of the controversy. These matters specifically are for determination by 
the jury.

 
 

[¶44.]  Juries see the court as an impartial, 
unbiased presider at the trial to whom they look for guidance. Thus, it is 
said,

 
 
"In the 
eyes of the jury the trial judge is the epitome of justice and wisdom. His 
influence upon the jurors is immense. A trial judge is obligated to maintain 
strict impartiality as between the adverse parties to a lawsuit. Jurors are 
quick to detect and respond to his slightest inclination toward or against 
either side of a lawsuit; to condemn the side which he condemns and to approve 
the party litigant or the cause upon which he smiles. Wright v. Richmond, 21 Mo. 
App. 76. It is easy for a trial judge, unintentionally, to prejudice a jury for 
or against one party or another. He must be extremely cautious in his comments, 
considerate in his rulings, and thoughtful, patient and forbearing in his 
conduct. * * *" Harms v. Simkin, Mo. App., 322 S.W.2d 930, 938 (1959); see also, 
Ryan v. Ald, Inc., 146 Mont. 299, 406 P.2d 373 (1965).

 
 

[¶45.]  Some of the court's comments were 
directed to the attorneys in the case. Thus, appellee's counsel was admonished 
by the court to stop repeating the witness' answers and putting words in the 
witness' mouth. Admonishment of counsel is so delicate and can result in such 
harm in the jury's eyes that this counsel replied, "Thank you, Your Honor." 
Again, after objection was sustained, appellee's counsel volunteered before the 
jury what testimony he sought from the witness, and the court stated, "That's 
very reprehensible."

 
 

[¶46.]  When it came time for appellant's turn, 
after objection by appellee, the court advised appellant's counsel that his 
question created the same serious problems that had occurred earlier in the 
trial and that if he wished the court to do so, he would lecture the witness 
about them.

 
 

[¶47.]  Although we have said that the court must 
assiduously avoid any appearance of partiality, we recognize also that the court 
must be firm, maintain control of the proceeding and assure that what occurs is 
within the rules of law and procedure to the end that the jury receives and 
considers only lawful evidence conducive to its arriving at a just result. An 
attorney is an officer of the court and he should neither be complimented nor 
discredited before the jury; although where circumstances reasonably 
necessitate, it is within the province of the trial court to admonish or rebuke 
counsel. We recognize the problems which arise and must be dealt with in 
presiding at hotly contested trials. Maintaining a semblance of order in those 
trials is left largely to the trial court and is not a basis for reversal absent 
a clear showing of prejudice. It has been suggested by appellant that the court 
was partial, even benevolent, toward appellee. The record does not support that 
contention. We would find that this court showed no favoritism or partiality to 
either counsel, but treated everyone the same.

 
 

[¶48.]  With respect to the court's comments and 
statements to the jury concerning the testimony of witnesses, most of that 
related to the court's firm and repeated effort to avoid opinion and conclusory 
testimony by witnesses. In the not too distant past, this type of testimony was 
prohibited. Thus, in Nichols Applied Evidence, Contracts (1929), citing cases 
which predate the Rules of Evidence, it was stated:

 
 
"A 
question asked a witness as to whether a negotiation was ever concluded by an 
agreement was properly excluded as calling for a conclusion. Where a witness had 
narrated the facts and circumstances of the transaction as he understood them, a 
question calling for his conclusion as to whether or not the contract was 
entered into was properly excluded. * * *" (Footnotes omitted.) Nichols, supra, 
Contracts, p. 1249.

 
 

[¶49.]  The rules restricting admission of 
opinion testimony, although functional, were exceedingly cumbersome and 
difficult to apply. The remnants of those rules are with us yet to a greater or 
lesser extent; perhaps they always will be. The court in this case sustained 
numerous objections to what it considered conclusory, and therefore inadmissible 
opinion testimony. Appellant contends that the effect of these objections, the 
rulings by the court, and lectures to the jury was to destroy the credibility of 
his architect, place the witness in a bad light before the jury, and was 
therefore prejudicial to his case. Appellant further contends that all of the 
court's remarks indicated a hostility toward this witness. We think appellant is 
mistaken in this conclusion and that the jury would not gather from what 
occurred any hostility on the part of the court. First the court said he did not 
know the witness. His remarks were not directed at the witness but at his manner 
of testifying; and the court's position, with respect to opinion or conclusory 
testimony, was explained in detail for the jury.

 
 

[¶50.]  In Kendrick v. Healy, 27 Wyo. 123, 154, 
192 P. 601, 612 (1920), we said:

 
 
"* * * But 
in nothing that the court said was there an expression of opinion or comment 
upon the truthfulness or credibility of the witness, nor were the remarks, in 
our opinion, so severe as to require that they be held prejudicial. * * * [T]he 
language of the court * * * was intended only as a caution to pay attention to 
the questions and answer so as to be heard, and that the occasion was not one 
for levity. That the court may properly do, without reflecting upon the 
character or credibility of the witness, if warranted by what has occurred. It 
occasionally happens that some occurrence upon a trial will warrant and may 
require comment by the court upon the conduct of a witness by way of caution, 
admonition, or censure, and, when such comment is within due bounds, and 
appropriate to the character of the occurrence, it will not be subject to a 
valid exception. [Citations.]" See also Schaffner v. C.F. Massey Co., 270 Ill. 207, 110 N.E. 381 (1915).

 
 

[¶51.]  In this case the comments of the court 
were not directed at the witness but at the proposed testimony. They did not go 
to the truthfulness of that testimony, nor did they affect his 
credibility.

 
 

[¶52.]  Cases which have held judge's comments or 
involvement with the trial prejudicial are generally those in which the trial 
court interferred in the trial process by undertaking cross-examination of a 
witness in an effort to impeach or overcome other evidence detrimental to a 
party. There are also cases in which the court's characterization of a witness 
was extreme such as referring to him as an "unmitigated scoundrel" or comments 
that exceeded all that was reasonable. These cases are collected in 83 A.L.R.2d 
1135-1147. This case does not approach the severity of those cases or a 
magnitude of transgression as would generally be held to be materially 
prejudicial to a party or affect the outcome of a trial.

 
 
III

 
 
REFUSAL OF 
CROSS-EXAMINATION.

 
 

[¶53.]  During discovery, before trial, appellant 
had taken the deposition of appellee. He inquired whether appellee had any 
problem with construction of the "Black" house. Appellee testified there were no 
problems. Appellant subsequently learned that there had been difficulties during 
construction of this house. He contended that he should be allowed to impeach 
appellee with these facts and that such affected his 
credibility.

 
 

[¶54.]  A motion in limine, before trial, to 
prohibit this proposed evidence was granted, the court holding that such was 
irrelevant to the issues unless it appeared that the Black house was constructed 
under a cost-plus arrangement in circumstances similar to those in the instant 
case so as to show a pattern of conduct on the part of 
appellee.

 
 

[¶55.]  During trial, because of the order in 
limine, appellant advised the court that he wished to cross-examine appellee on 
the subject of the Black house. The court recessed the trial and retired to 
chambers to hear argument on appellant's request. Appellant was asked what 
questions he would propound and what he expected to prove, if permitted to 
inquire into this area. Appellant responded as follows: 

 
 
"MR. 
MILLER: Your Honor, the first question that I would ask is if there were any 
problems with the Black House. Under oath, in his deposition, Mr. Manning said 
that there were no problems with the Black House. I am informed and I have 
another witness, Mr. Stafford, that there were numerous problems. Mr. Stafford 
is a former employee of Mr. Manning and was also the employee of Mr. Black 
during the construction of the Black house. Mr. Stafford can testify from his 
own personal knowledge that at one time, Mr. Manning -

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * 
pulled all the workers off the job; and on another occasion plaintiff said to 
plaintiff's foreman that he would not have the men work a full eight hours if 
money were to be withheld plaintiff by Mr. Black, and it developed that Mr. 
Black did withhold money from the plaintiff. * * *"

 
 

[¶56.]  The court ruled that problems with the 
Black house were not relevant nor material to the issues before the court, that 
the matter was not within the subject matter of direct examination, and denied 
appellant's request to cross-examine appellee on this 
matter.

 
 

[¶57.]  The court's denial was, first, grounded 
upon the proposition that it was outside the scope of direct examination. Rule 
611(b), W.R.E.,5 provides that cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination. There was no 
testimony on direct examination concerning the construction of the Black house. 
It was not an issue in the case. Although the court could, in its discretion, 
have permitted the cross-examination under this rule, it was proper also in 
these circumstances, and not an abuse of discretion, to refuse to permit this 
cross-examination.

 
 

[¶58.]  The court also sustained an objection to 
this testimony upon the ground that it was irrelevant. Rules 401, 402, and 403, 
W.R.E.,6 deal with admissibility of relevant 
evidence. It has been suggested that

 
 
"The only 
arguments for excluding evidence of other incidents that retain their cogency 
today are those involving the practical problems of prejudice and confusing the 
jury. Under the scheme of relevance provided in Article IV of the Federal Rules 
[and W.R.E.], these arguments go to the discretion of the judge to exclude 
evidence under Rule 403 rather than to any rule of exclusion such as existed at 
common law. If the other incidents have `any tendency' to prove a consequential 
fact, they are relevant under Rule 401. The pre-existing rules of relevance 
dealing with such proof have been repealed by the adoption of Rule 402 * * *." 
(Footnotes omitted.) Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Evidence § 5170.

 
 

[¶59.]  We are not fully in accord with that 
view. When Rule 402, W.R.E., states specifically that, "Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible," that language has meaning and should be applied in 
a proper case. The Black house was a different type of building, being 
constructed under a different arrangement, perhaps with plans for its 
construction; the problems encountered (holding workers off the job, withholding 
money) were vastly different from those in this case. Therefore, we agree with 
the trial court that what occurred during the construction of the Black house, 
as related to the court by appellant's counsel, was not relevant to any issue in 
the instant case and was properly excluded.

 
 

[¶60.]  Finally, appellant contends that 
cross-examination of appellee concerning construction of the Black house should 
have been permitted for impeachment purposes and as affecting appellee's 
credibility. Appellee had not, on direct examination, testified concerning the 
construction of the Black house, and was not yet subject to impeachment on this 
subject. Thus, appellant's counsel advised the court that upon 
cross-examination,

 
 
"* * * 
[T]he first question that I would ask is if there were any problems with the 
Black House. * * *"

 
 

[¶61.]  If the question were permitted and 
appellee answered there were no problems with the construction of the Black 
house, appellant would then impeach him with his deposition and by calling other 
witnesses. If appellee responded on cross-examination that there had been 
problems in the construction of the Black house, appellant's position then would 
be that appellee was also the cause of the problems with the construction of the 
Pioneer Press building.

 
 

[¶62.]  Had the court permitted appellant to 
proceed as he requested, opening the subject of the Black house, then appellee 
should be granted the right to respond and offer proof of the entire history of 
construction of the Black house; he might show that the problems were to be 
expected, not unusual, or that there were no problems at all, and call numerous 
witnesses with respect to this area of dispute. There would be a trial within 
the trial.

 
 

[¶63.]  Rule 611(a), W.R.E., vests in the court a 
duty to exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence to avoid 
needless consumption of time. Rule 611(b) places a discretion in the court in 
allowing additional matters on cross-examination. Rule 403, W.R.E., supra fn. 6, 
permits the court to exclude even relevant evidence if its admission will result 
in undue delay, waste of time, be cumulative, cause confusion, mislead the jury, 
or present a danger of unfair prejudice. The rules vest in the court a large 
discretion which is necessary to an efficient and orderly trial process. The 
court in this case did not abuse its discretion in excluding this 
evidence.

 
 

[¶64.]  Affirmed.

 
 

1 Rule 
803(6), W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. 
- A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term `business' as used in 
this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, 
occupation, and calling for every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit."

 
 

2 Rule 701, 
W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"If the 
witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally 
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

 
 
Rule 702, 
W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise."

 
 

3 An expert 
witness is one having superior knowledge of a subject acquired by professional, 
scientific, or technical training or by practical experience, or who possesses 
peculiar knowledge respecting the matter involved that is not ordinarily 
possessed by lay persons.

 
 

4 Rule 704, 
W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"Testimony 
in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."

 
 

5 Rule 
611(b), W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"(b) Scope of cross-examination. - 
Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct 
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, 
in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on 
direct examination."

 
 

6 Rule 401, 
W.R.E., provides:

 
 
"`Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence."

 
 
Rule 402, 
W.R.E.:

 
 
"All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by 
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible."

 
 
Rule 403, 
W.R.E.:

 
 
"Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."