Title: RALPH SISNEROS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RALPH SISNEROS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 139121 P.3d 790Case Number: Nos. 04-15, 04-237Decided: 10/25/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RALPH 
SISNEROS, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),         

 
 
  v.       

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,           

Appellee  (Plaintiff).  

 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Peter Free, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Free.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT , JJ., and WALDRIP, 
DJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ralph Sisneros 
appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court after he 
pled guilty to two counts of third degree sexual assault.  Mr. Sisneros reserved his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of his 
right to a speedy trial and the district court's ruling that the minor victim, 
KF, was competent to testify.  We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Sisneros 
states the following issues on appeal:

 
 
Was 
appellant denied his right to a speedy trial, and shou ld the charges against 
him have been dismissed with prejudice due to violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial?

 
 
II.          
Did the trial court err in finding the alleged victim, KF, competent to 
testify against appellant?

 
 
The State 
rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 
Was 
appellant denied his right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48 and the 
United 
States and Wyoming 
Constitutions?

 
 
II.          
Did the trial court err in finding the alleged victim, KF, competent to 
testify against appellant?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Sisneros 
lived with KF and her mother for a few months in 2002.  At that time, KF was six years old.  In October 2002, Mr. Sisneros' former 
girlfriend reported to the Cheyenne Police Department that Mr. Sisneros had told 
her he was molesting KF.  The police 
investigated the allegations against Mr. Sisneros and learned of several 
instances where Mr. Sisneros had touched KF inappropriately.  He also watched pornographic movies and 
masturbated in her presence.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Mr. Sisneros with three counts of third degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) and two counts of taking 
indecent liberties with a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  He was arraigned 
on April 28, 2003, and pled not guilty to all of the charges.  An attorney from the public defender's 
office was appointed to represent Mr. Sisneros and filed a written demand for a 
speedy trial.  The trial was 
originally scheduled to begin on July 15, 2003, in a stacked setting.  Because of its placement in the trial 
stack, Mr. Sisneros' trial was continued on three occasions until October 7, 
2003.  On October 1, 2003, the State 
filed a motion to continue the trial because its lead investigator would not be 
available to testify during the week of October 7, 2003.  The court held a hearing on the State's 
motion to continue, and Mr. Sisneros' attorney remarked that the defense also 
needed additional time to prepare.  
The district court treated the motion as a joint motion to continue and 
reset the trial to begin on October 21, 2003.  

 
 
[¶5]      On October 14, 
2003, Mr. Sisneros filed a motion to disqualify the entire Laramie County 
District Attorney's Office from prosecuting him.  He claimed the State had listed Jon 
Forwood, the Laramie County District Attorney, as a fact witness in the case, 
thereby creating a conflict of interest, which was imputed to the entire 
office.  Mr. Sisneros requested a 
special prosecutor be appointed in his case.  Later that day, the district court held 
a hearing on his motion to disqualify the district attorney's office from 
prosecuting him.  During that 
hearing, the parties discussed the fact that the 180 day speedy trial period 
would expire on October 25, 2003.  
Defense counsel stated Mr. Sisneros did not want to waive his right to a 
speedy trial, and she recognized, therefore, the court might be hesitant to 
continue the trial.  She 
acknowledged, however, the court could grant a continuance past the 180 day 
limit if the continuance was required in the due administration of justice.  The State represented it could find a 
special prosecutor to take the case.  
The district court did not rule upon the motion at that 
time.

 
 
[¶6]      Later that day 
the district court held another hearing with the parties.  During that hearing, which was conducted 
over the telephone and inadvertently was not reported, the parties discussed the 
options available to them regarding Mr. Sisneros' right to a speedy trial, 
including proceeding with the trial and prohibiting Mr. Forwood from testifying 
or dismissing the case without prejudice to allow a special prosecutor to be 
appointed.  Apparently, the State 
represented it preferred to dismiss the charges against Mr. Sisneros without 
prejudice, and defense counsel acknowledged the State had the right to do 
so.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court understood the parties had agreed to a dismissal 
without prejudice.  A deputy 
district attorney signed a motion to dismiss without prejudice on Friday, 
October 24, 2003.  The motion was 
not filed, however, until Monday, October 27, 2003, on which date the district 
court entered the order dismissing the case without prejudice.  Mr. Sisneros filed a notice of appeal of 
the dismissal without prejudice, and that case was assigned Wyoming Supreme 
Court Docket No. 04-15.  

 
 
[¶7]      A special 
prosecutor acting on behalf of the State filed an information against Mr. 
Sisneros on October 24, 2003.  The 
special prosecutor later amended the information to charge Mr. Sisneros with 
additional counts based upon the same course of conduct as the original 
information.  He was arraigned on 
those charges on December 1, 2003, and entered  "not guilty" pleas on all charges.  The trial was set for February 17, 
2004.  

 
 
[¶8]      On February 2, 
2004, the public defender who had been representing Mr. Sisneros filed a notice 
of change of defense counsel.  She 
indicated that the public defender's office had a conflict of interest and could 
not continue to represent Mr. Sisneros because he had filed a grievance against 
her with the Wyoming State Bar.  The 
public defender' s office then contracted with a private attorney to represent 
Mr. Sisneros, and he filed an entry of appearance on February 4, 2004.  Mr. Sisneros' new attorney filed a 
demand for a speedy trial and a motion for a continuance on the same day he 
filed his entry of appearance.  The 
trial was reset for March 16, 2004.  
Mr. Sisneros subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the charges with 
prejudice for lack of a speedy trial and a motion for a hearing to determine 
whether the victim, KF, was competent to testify.  The district court held a hearing on Mr. 
Sisneros' motion to dismiss and concluded he had not been denied his right to a 
speedy trial.  The district court 
also held a hearing to determine whether KF was competent to testify and 
concluded she was.  

 
 
[¶9]      In light of the 
district court's rulings, Mr. Sisneros and the State entered into a plea 
agreement in which he pled guilty to two counts of third degree sexual assault 
and the remainder of the charges were dismissed.  He, however, reserved his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy 
trial and its determination that the victim was competent to testify.  The district court sentenced Mr. 
Sisneros to serve 10 to 12 years of imprisonment on the first count and 18 to 20 
years on the second count.  The 
court ordered the sentences be served consecutively, but suspended the sentence 
on the second count and placed Mr. Sisneros on probation for a period of 20 
years.  He then filed a notice of 
appeal, which this Court docketed as Supreme Court Docket No. 04-237.  Docket Nos. 04-15 and 04-237 were, 
subsequently, consolidated for review by this Court.    

 
 
            
  

DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
            
A.        Speedy 
Trial

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Sisneros asserts his right to a 
speedy trial was violated.  He 
claims the State violated W.R.Cr.P. 48 when it did not either bring him to trial 
or dismiss the first case within 180 days after his initial arraignment.  He also claims he was denied a speedy 
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  

 
 
[¶11]   We consider first whether his right 
to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) was violated.  That rule provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(b) 
Speedy trial.

 
 
 * * *

 
 
  (2) A criminal charge shall be brought 
to trial within 180 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in 
this rule.

  (3) The following periods shall be 
excluded in computing the time for trial:

(A) All 
proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant;

(B) 
Proceedings on another charge;

(C) The 
time between the dismissal and the refiling of the same charge;  and

(D) Delay 
occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application 
therefor.

 
 
 * * *

 
 
  (5) Any criminal case not tried or 
continued as provided in this rule shall be dismissed 180 days after 
arraignment.

 
 
[¶12]   In the first case, Mr. Sisneros was 
arraigned on April 28, 2003.  On 
October 24, 2003, the prosecutor signed a motion to dismiss the charges against 
Mr. Sisneros.  The motion was not 
filed on that day, and the 180 day limit expired on October 25, 2003, which was 
a Saturday.  The State's motion to 
dismiss was filed on Monday, October 27, 2003, and the district court dismissed 
the charges without prejudice on that same day.  Mr. Sisneros argues his case was not 
dismissed until the 182nd day after he was 
arraigned and he was, therefore, entitled to a dismissal with prejudice in 
accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(5).  

 
 
[¶13]   In response, the State contends the 
case was dismissed within the speedy trial period because the 180 day period 
ended on a Saturday and W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) applies.  That rule provides in pertinent 
part:  

 
 
In 
computing any period of time, the day of the act or even t from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.  The last day of the period so computed 
shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . 
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of 
the aforementioned days.  

 
 
[¶14]   Although this Court has never 
directly addressed whether Rule 45 applies to the calculation of the speedy 
trial period, other jurisdictions have applied their rules, which are similar to 
Wyoming's, to 
extend their speedy trial deadlines.  
For example, federal courts have applied F.R.Cr.P. 45 to extend the 
deadline for filing indictments and bringing a case to trial under the federal 
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 through 3174.    See e.g., United States 
v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 348 (3rd Cir. 
1993); United States v. Wright, 990 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 
 953 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 
(9th Cir. 1992).  Similarly, Ohio courts have applied Ohio's Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a) to 
that state's speedy trial statutes, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2945.71.  See e.g., State v. Wilson, 1992 
Ohio App. LEXIS 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).   

 
 
[¶15]   In Wyoming, the argument for applying Rule 45 to 
the speedy trial deadline is even stronger because that deadline is included 
within our rules of criminal procedure, rather than a statute.  W.R.Cr.P. 45 expressly provides that it 
applies to any period of time and does not exclude the speedy trial 
provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 48 from its operation.  Applying Rule 45 to the facts of this 
case, it is clear the charges against Mr. Sisneros were dismissed before the 180 
day speedy trial period set out in Rule 48 expired.  Consequently, there was no violation of 
his right to a speedy trial under Rule 48.    

 
 
[¶16]   In the second part of Mr. Sisneros' 
speedy trial argument, he claims his constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated because nearly a year passed between the time of his original arrest 
and his conditional guilty plea.  
Every criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  Walters 
v.  State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
reviewing a district court's decision on whether a defendant's constitutional 
right has been violated, we apply the de novo standard of review.  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 17, 
93 P.3d 222, 227-28 (Wyo. 2004).  
The district court's findings of fact on the speedy trial issue are 
reviewed for clear error.  
Walters, ¶ 9.  

 
 
[¶17]   The test enunciated in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, (1972) applies to constitutional speedy trial claims.  Berry, ¶ 31.  "Under that test, we consider four 
factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred:  1) the length of the delay;  2) the reason for the delay;  3) the defendant's assertion of his 
right;  and 4) the prejudice to the 
defendant."  Id.   We consider the factors together and 
balance them in relation to all of the relevant circumstances of the delay in 
bringing a defendant to trial.  
Walters, ¶ 10;  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 
533.  The ultimate question is 
"whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, 
whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair 
trial."  Walters, ¶ 10 
quoting Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 
2001).  When a defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, the charges must be 
dismissed with prejudice.  
Walters, ¶ 10.  

 
 
[¶18]   Turning to the first factor of the 
Barker test  the length of the delay, we note that, for constitutional 
claims, "the speedy trial clock begins ticking upon arrest."  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 6, 
17 P.3d 715, 718 (Wyo. 2001).  There 
is no specific length of delay which automatically constitutes a violation of 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial.  We have, however, held that a delay of 
500 days was presumptively prejudicial, Berry, ¶ 32; while, delays of 
372, 355, and 319 days, respectively, warranted further analysis.  See, Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 
118, ¶ 40, 99 P.3d 457, 471 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
[¶19]   In this case, Mr. Sisneros was 
initially arrested on March 28, 2003, and entered his conditional guilty plea on 
March 11, 2004, resulting in a total delay in resolution of his case of 349 
days.  As we acknowledged in 
Berry, once a defendant's speedy 
trial right has attached, it continues until the case is finally resolved.  Berry, ¶ 32 (quoting LaFave, Israel, and King, 4 Criminal 
Procedure, § 18.1(c), pp. 670-71)).  
In cases, like this one, where the charges are dismissed and then 
refiled, the general rule is the "time between the  dismissal and recharging [is] not 
counted, provided of course that the defendant is not held in custody in the 
interim awaiting the new charge."  
Id.  In this case, the charges were 
refiled concurrently with the dismissal of the original charge.  Thus, there was no time when the charges 
were not pending.  See Caton v. 
State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1265 (Wyo. 1985).  Consistent with our prior cases, we 
conclude a delay of 349 days between Mr. Sisneros' arrest and the final 
resolution of his case warrants examination of the other 
factors.

 
 
[¶20]   We turn, therefore, to the reasons 
for the delay.  In conducting this 
analysis we determine which p arty was responsible for the delay.    

 
 
     "A deliberate attempt 
to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily 
against the government.  A more 
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less 
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility 
for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the 
defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 
justify appropriate delay."  

 
 

Wehr, 841 P.2d  
at 112-13 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)).  
Official bad faith in causing delay is weighed heavily against the 
government.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182. "Delays 
attributable to the defendant are deducted from the equation."  Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 
921 (Wyo. 2000).  "We weigh any 
delay properly attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the 
State.  We have frequently 
acknowledged a defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own 
dilatory practices."  Wehr, 
841 P.2d  at 113.

 
 

Whitney, 
¶ 42.  

 
 
[¶21]   Several of the early trial settings 
were continued, apparently because of the district court's crowded docket and 
its practice of stacking trial settings.  
Although Mr. Sisneros did not object and the reason is weighted less 
heavily, those delays still inure to the State.   The continuance of the trial from 
October 7, 2003, to October 21, 2003, was originally requested by the State 
because its investigator would not be available to testify during that 
week.  At the hearing on the motion, 
defense counsel remarked she was having the videotaped interview of the victim 
reviewed by an expert witness and, therefore, needed the extra time to 
sufficiently prepare for the trial.  
The district court, consequently, treated the motion as a joint motion 
for a continuance.  Finding no error 
in its analysis, we defer to the district court on that matter and conclude the 
two week delay is attributable to both parties.

 
 
[¶22]   The trial did not go forward on 
October 21, 2003.  On October 14, 
2003, the defense filed a motion to disqualify the entire Laramie County 
District Attorney's Office and requested appointment of a special prosecutor 
because it had recently learned Laramie County District Attorney Jon Forwood was 
listed as a witness for the State.  
The district court held a hearing on the defense motion on the same day 
it was filed.  In discussing this 
motion, defense counsel noted that while Mr. Sisneros did not want to waive his 
right to a speedy trial, a continuance could be granted as required in the due 
administration of justice.  
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii).  
There was no decision made about a trial setting at that hearing, but 
later in the day, the parties had an unreported telephone conference with the 
district judge.  In recalling that 
hearing, it was the district court's understanding that the parties agreed to 
the dismissal without prejudice in order to avoid a speedy trial violation under 
Rule 48.  Had that not been the 
district court's understanding, the trial would have gone forward, perhaps 
without Mr. Forwood's testimony or with a finding about whether there was a true 
conflict of interest within the district attorney's office, and/or with findings 
regarding the due administration of justice to allow an extension of the speedy 
trial deadline.  Consequently, the 
delay caused by the dismissal and refiling is attributable to both 
parties.

 
 
[¶23]   The case was then refiled and 
initially set for trial on February 17, 2004.  Thereafter, the defendant filed a 
grievance against his public defender, resulting in the appointment of a new 
attorney to represent him and a defense motion for a continuance of the February 
17th trial date, which was granted by the 
district court.  The case was 
finally resolved on March 11, 2004.  
Obviously the delay after February 17th 
was attributable to Mr. Sisneros.

 
 
[¶24]   In speaking to the motion to 
dismiss, the district court made the following comments which are relevant to 
our analysis of this issue:

 
 
. . . I'm 
certainly not suggesting that defense counsel at any time ever waived or 
attempted to waive Mr. Sisneros' right to a speedy trial.  I don't recall that happening.  But what the Court does recall is that 
there was a motion to disqualify the state that was filed by the defense in this 
case that led to the issue with regards to Mr. Forwood potentially being called 
as a witness.

  

The Court 
[had] taken that motion under advisement.  
There were suggestions as to a way to handle that:  Bring in new counsel, eliminate Mr. 
Forwood as a witness, order the state to somehow go to trial anyway, extend the 
time for trial, take a look at whether or not administration of justice could 
allow for the extension of that case for trial, examine any of the underlying 
factors with regards to whether or not what time should count, what time 
shouldn't count with regards to calculating 180 days.  

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
. . . [I]t 
doesn't seem to be appropriate for somebody to have a speedy trial right and 
somebody stay in jail for close to 180 days, have the case dismissed without 
prejudice and then refile. 

 
 
That seems 
like that can go on forever and then there would never be any violation of any 
speedy trial right if that is . . . allowable.  I don't know whether that is allowable 
or not, frankly. . . . 

 
 
I note that 
with regards to this file, in this case, that this motion to dismiss charges for 
prejudice for lack of speedy trial was not filed until March 9th of 2004.

 
 
            
The Court also notes that there's a court order in this case requiring 
that all motions be filed two weeks prior to the trial deadline.  This motion is untimely under that 
order.  And I guess the question is 
should the Court allow some sort of break for the failure to comply with that 
order.

 
 
            
The Court also notes in this file that there was a motion to continue 
that was filed in February.  Motion 
to continue February 4th that was filed by 
Mr. Sisneros.

 
 
            
There's nothing that is being brought to the attention of the Court today 
that could not have been brought to the Court's attention the day that the new 
information was filed and this new lawsuit commenced.  I don't know what any of that means 
legally to tell the truth. 

 
 
I'm going 
to deny this motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.  And I do so because it does feel to the 
Court like there's manipulation going on that is and I'm not saying any of it is 
intentional; I'm just saying that I know from my perspective as a judge this 
case either would have gone to trial absent that agreement from counsel on the 
date it was scheduled for trial [October 21, 2003] and what the Court perceived 
to be an agreement of counsel with regards to this dismissal without prejudice 
situation on the date that it was scheduled to go to trial in October before the 
180 days had run. 

 

The 
witnesses would have been allowed to be called to that trial, whether or not Mr. 
Forwood would have been allowed, or alternatively there may have been a 
continuance granted with regards to that if the Court found that in the 
administration of justice that would have been appropriate in that case.  I'm not sure how that all would have 
been resolved.

 
 
I do know 
that I was never given the opportunity to address that and would have addressed 
that if I did not have the understanding this dismissal without prejudice was 
agreed to.  And there has been no 
violation of any speedy trial with regards to this new case file that has been 
filed, also no demand has been made with regards to bringing this thing on 
early.

 
 

[¶25]   Some of the delays in the case were 
certainly attributable to the State, like the docketing problems.  Other delays were caused directly by Mr. 
Sisneros, such as the appointment of a new attorney to represent him in February 
of 2004.  With regard to the delay 
caused by the dismissal of the first case and the appointment of a special 
prosecutor to bring the second case, the district court's point is particularly 
well taken.  Although the district 
court expressed some concern about the potential for recurrent dismissals  to delay trials, it obviously believed, 
in this case, Mr. Sisneros agreed to have the case dismissed without prejudice 
so that a special prosecutor could be appointed.  While the State bears the responsibility 
for creating the need for the dismissal by listing Mr. Forwood as a witness so 
near to the trial date, with the predictable result of objections being raised 
to his testimony since his office represented the State, Mr. Sisneros' 
concurrence with the dismissal prevents the delay from being fully attributable 
to the State. 1 That 
procedural move, alone, accounts for several months in delay.  We conclude, therefore, on the whole, 
the reason for the 349 day delay is neutral, weighing evenly in favor of and 
against each party.

 
 
[¶26]   In discussing the third factor, 
whether the defendant affirmatively asserted his right to a speedy trial, we 
have stated:

 
 
it is not 
necessary for a defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial in order to 
identify a speedy trial violation.  
However, we can, and do, consider whether the right was asserted, and how 
vigorously, in determining the reasonableness of any delay.  The action or inaction of the defendant 
in this regard is a reflection of the actual amount of prejudice being 
experienced.  

 
 

Whitney, 
¶ 52 
(citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Sisneros did file a formal 
demand for a speedy trial in both actions, although his demand in the second 
case was not filed until several months after he had been charged.  The concerns expressed by the district 
court, which we quoted above, are relevant to a determination of the vigor with 
which Mr. Sisneros asserted his speedy trial right.  While he ostensibly continued to demand 
a speedy trial throughout the proceedings, he also engaged in procedural 
maneuvers which had the result of delaying the trial.  Most notable were the request for 
appointment of a special prosecutor and perceived agreement to the dismissal 
without prejudice in the first case and his grievance against his public 
defender which resulted in the appointment of a new defense attorney and another 
continuance of the trial in the second case.  Accordingly, we find that this factor is 
also neutral.

 
 
[¶28]   Finally, we consider the prejudice 
Mr. Sisneros suffered as a result of the delay in resolution of his case.  A demonstration of prejudice is not 
necessary to establishing a constitutional violation; however, in conducting a 
speedy trial analysis the prejudice suffered by the defendant should be 
considered.  Berry, ¶ 
46.  "Prejudice may consist of: 1) 
lengthy pretrial incarceration; 2) pretrial anxiety; and, 3) impairment of the 
defense.'" Id., quoting Harvey 
v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 96 (Wyo. 1989).  

 
 
Of these 
factors, the possibility that a defendant's defense will be impaired is the 
"most serious" factor "because the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."    Pretrial anxiety "is the 
least significant" factor and because a "certain amount of pretrial anxiety 
naturally exists," the appellant must demonstrate that he suffered 
"extraordinary or unusual" pretrial anxiety.  

 
 

Whitney, 
¶ 54 
(citations omitted).  Under the 
circumstance of this case, the length of the delay, alone, does not raise a 
presumption of prejudice.  Moreover, 
the fact that Mr. Sisneros' actions led to a significant amount of the delay 
weighs against a finding of presumed prejudice.  See, Whitney, ¶ 55.  Thus, the defendant has the burden of 
showing actual prejudice.  
Id. 

 
 
[¶29]   The only claim of actual prejudice 
Mr. Sisneros makes is the length of his pretrial incarceration.  It appears from the record he was 
incarcerated continually from the time of his arrest in March 2003 until the 
case was resolved in March 2004. There is no question, during this time, his 
liberty was severely restricted and his extended incarceration necessarily 
affected his "employment opportunities, financial resources and association" 
with family and friends.  Berry, 
¶  48.  Thus, without question, Mr. Sisneros 
suffered some prejudice as a result of the delay.  

 
 
[¶30]   Nevertheless, when we consider all 
of the factors together, we conclude the district court did not err by refusing 
to grant Mr. Sisneros' motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of a speedy 
trial.  Although a delay of nearly a 
year warrants careful analysis, the length of the delay was not so excessive 
that it resulted in a presumption of prejudice.  The critical aspect of this case is the 
parties' relative contributions to the delay.  As we noted above, Mr. Sisneros demanded 
and received a special prosecutor and new defense counsel.  Although Mr. Sisneros obviously suffered 
some prejudice as a result of the delay, his part in that delay weighs against 
finding he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  The district court correctly ruled Mr. 
Sisneros was not entitled to a dismissal of his case for violation of his 
constitutional rights. 

 
 
 
 
Competency 
of Victim to Testify

 
 
[¶31]   Mr. Sisneros filed a motion 
requesting a competency/taint hearing.  
At the hearing, he withdrew his claim of taint and the district court 
proceeded to determine whether KF was competent to testify.  Mr. Sisneros claims the district court 
erred by ruling KF was competent to testify at trial against him.  

 
 
[¶32]   Pursuant to W.R.E. 601, any person 
is competent to be a witness unless he is otherwise disqualified from 
testifying.  Our precedent discusses 
the specific requirements for competency: 

 
 
"A person 
is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and 
narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before 
testifying."  

 
 

Watters v. 
State, 2004 WY 
155, ¶ 14, 101 P.3d 908, 914 (Wyo. 2004) (some citations omitted).  The district court has broad discretion 
in determining whether a witness is competent to testify.  Id.   See also, Larsen v. State, 
686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984).    

 
 
[¶33]   With regard to children, 
"[i]ntelligence, not age, is the proper criteria" in determining the competency 
of a witness.  Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585.  The difficulty 
with cases involving the allegations of sexual improprieties with young children 
is evident.  As we stated in 
Larsen:

 
 
". . . On 
the one hand, in accepting the testimony of a child there is the danger that she 
may not be telling the truth, in which event an innocent man may be convicted of 
crime and suffer the consequences thereof.  
On the other, if the child's testimony is not accepted, a man guilty of 
crime, and possibly with the potential for more such, will go free.  In this connection, it must be borne in 
mind that when such an offense [assaulting and taking indecent liberties upon a 
child] is committed, it is done with the greatest possible stealth and secrecy, 
so that most often the testimony of the victim, coupled with the type of 
corroboration we have here, is the only evidence available upon which to 
determine guilt or innocence.  The 
fact that there are difficulties involved should not prevent the processes of 
justice from functioning."  

 
 

Larsen, 
686 P.2d  at 
585-86, quoting State v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 1965).  Recognizing these concerns, "once the 
child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of 
the court to make an independent examination of the child to determine 
competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be 
clearly erroneous."  Watters, 
¶ 14.  A five-part test is 
utilized to determine the competency of child witnesses:

 
 
"(1) an 
understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;  

 
 
(2) the 
mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, 
to receive an accurate impression of it;  

 
 
(3) a 
memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;  

 
 
(4) the 
capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence;  and 

 
 
(5) the 
capacity to understand simple questions about it."

 
 

Id., 
quoting 
Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585.

 
 
[¶34]   Mr. Sisneros' argument focuses on a 
few select statements made by the victim during the competency hearing which 
indicated a lack of understanding of the questions posed to her.  A representative sample of the 
statements relied upon by Mr. Sisneros follows:

 
 
Is it 
better to tell the truth or to say I don't remember?

 
 
Yes.

 
 
Is it 
better  I will ask you the question again.  Is it better to tell the truth when it 
is hard to tell the truth, or can you just say I don't remember instead of 
telling the truth?

 
 
A.        I don't 
remember.

 
 
We agree 
that, when some of KF's statements are taken in isolation, they are 
troubling.  Nevertheless, the 
district court was charged with determining whether or not KF was competent to 
testify based upon the entirety of her testimony.    

 
 
[¶35]   KF was eight years old at the time 
of the trial and six years old when the assaults took place.  At the competency hearing, in response 
to questions about her obligation to tell the truth while "in court," she 
indicated she understood that responsibility and repeated numerous times that 
lying was "bad."  She knew her age, 
birthday, school, grade level, and her teacher's name.  KF was able to recall the names and ages 
of friends who lived near her when the assaults took place and identified the 
different people and pets who lived with her at that location.  After KF faltered on a few questions, 
the State called a social worker who was employed by the Department of Family 
Services to testify at the competency hearing.  The social worker testified that KF has 
a language disability which affects "some aspects of communication."  Describing the effect of this condition 
upon KF's ability to testify, the social worker testified:

 
 
            
One aspect of the disability is her ability to translate what she's 
hearing and answering, so she needs time.  
You ask her a question, she needs time to process it because if you 
interrupt that train of thought with another question, she's lost that part of 
the question and moves on to the next one.  
So you need to [s]pace out your questions so she can have time to process 
it.

 
 
When 
questioned about the effect of her l anguage disability on her memory, the 
social worker testified:  "She has 
the memory.  She needs time to 
process the question so she can access the memory then say it."  

 
 
[¶36]   In rendering its ruling on KF's 
competency to testify, the district court recognized her testimony was not 
perfect.  The district judge 
explained, however, on the whole, he believed KF understood her obligation to 
tell the truth.  The court also 
concluded that, although she may not be a particularly effective witness because 
she occasionally did not follow the line of questioning, KF did have the mental 
capacity to receive an accurate impression of the charged events and a memory 
sufficient to retain an independent recollection of those events.  The district court judge also stated 
that, despite some difficulty expressing herself, KF had the capacity to 
describe her memory of the occurrences and to understand simple questions about 
them.  

 
 
[¶37]   Mr. Sisneros focuses on the fact 
that KF's testimony at the competency hearing about the charged events was not 
consistent with her previous statements.  
This argument does not speak so much to KF's competency, as to her 
credibility.  The weight to be 
accorded her testimony would have, of course, been left to the finder of fact if 
the case had gone to trial.  See 
Watters, ¶ 18 (discussing the distinction between competence and 
credibility).  By pleading guilty, 
Mr. Sisneros forewent his opportunity to argue the inconsistencies in her 
testimony to the finder of fact.

 
 
[¶38]   On this record, we must defer to 
the district court's finding that KF was competent to testify.  The district judge is in the best 
position to make that determination as he is the one 

 
 
"who sees 
the proposed witness, notices [the witness' ] manner, . . . apparent possession 
or lack of intelligence and may resort to any examination which will tend to 
disclose [the witness'] capacity and intelligence, as well as his [or her] 
understanding of the obligations of an oath.  As many of these matters cannot be 
photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be 
disturbed on review, unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was 
erroneous."  

 
 

Larsen, 
686 P.2d  at 
585 (citations omitted).  We agree 
with the district court's analysis and certainly cannot conclude its finding was 
clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶39]   Affirmed.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 
.We do consider the State's 
eleventh-hour declaration that it intended to call the district attorney to 
testify as a fact witness in this case to be highly unusual.  If the record did not so clearly 
indicate Mr. Sisneros consented to the dismissal without prejudice, we would be 
inclined to weigh this factor much more heavily against the 
State.