Title: Ledbetter v. Howard

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

LEDBETTER v. HOWARD2012 OK 39Case Number: 105902Decided: 04/24/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

GUY T. LEDBETTER and MIDGE LEDBETTER, individually and as 
husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees,v.DEREK G. HOWARD, D.O., and 
RADIOLOGY SERVICES OF ARDMORE, INC., jointly and severally, 
Defendants/Appellants.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,DIVISION II
¶0 The plaintiffs/appellees, Guy T. Ledbetter (Ledbetter/patient) and Midge 
Ledbetter (wife, collectively Ledbetters), sued the defendant/appellant, Derek 
G. Howard, D.O. (Howard/doctor), and his employer, Radiology Services of 
Ardmore, Inc. (Radiology Services, collectively, defendants), for malpractice. 
Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray causing delayed treatment of 
his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled with the malpractice claim was the 
wife's plea for loss of consortium. The jury found in favor of Howard and 
Radiology Services. The Ledbetters moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment request. 
Nevertheless, based on evidence of juror misconduct during deliberations, the 
motion for new trial was sustained. Howard and Radiology Services appealed. The 
Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded ordering the trial court to enter 
judgment in favor of the defendants. The foreperson assured the trial court in 
voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to 
override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a 
personal level but went further by communicating her alleged professional 
knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway 
their votes in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. Therefore, we determine 
that: 1) the juror's affidavit is admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial 
information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B); and 2) the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct 
during deliberations. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' 
OPINION VACATED;TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Tom L. King, Richard M. Glasgow, Justin T. King, King Law Firm, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for plaintiffs/appellees,Hilton H. Walters, R.Gene Stanley, 
Rife & Walters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for defendants/appellants.
Allison A. Cave, Allison A. Cave, PLLC, Edmond, Oklahoma
WATT, J.:
¶1 We granted certiorari to address a single issue: whether the trial court 
erred in granting a motion for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct.1 Resolution of this issue 
requires us first to answer the question of whether the juror's affidavit was 
properly submitted as evidence in the hearing on the request for new trial. 
¶2 We hold that the juror's affidavit demonstrating the injection into the 
deliberative process of extraneous prejudicial information was admissible under 
the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B).2 Furthermore, counsel were 
entitled to rely on the foreperson's guarantee to the trial court that she would 
not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. 
Because there is evidence to the contrary, we hold that there was no abuse of 
discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 Ledbetter has a long history of diabetes which grew worse over time 
requiring increased medical intervention. In 1997 or 1998, he developed signs of 
peripheral neuropathy of the legs, a diabetic complication affecting the nerves 
and which can lead to serious leg and foot complications, including 
amputation.
¶4 On May 31, 2005, Ledbetter went to his primary care physician, Dr. Kevin 
Reed, complaining of swelling, redness, and discomfort in his left foot and leg. 
Dr. Reed diagnosed Ledbetter with cellulitus, an infection of the soft tissues, 
and began treating him with a broad-spectrum oral antibiotic.
¶5 On Dr. Reed's orders, Ledbetter returned for a followup appointment on 
June 7th. There being no apparent improvement in Ledbetter's leg, Dr. Reed 
admitted him to the hospital and began intravenous antibiotics. Two days later, 
Dr. Reed ordered x-rays of Ledbetter's left foot because of concerns related to 
a potential bone infection. Howard read the x-rays concluding that there were no 
dislocations or fractures and that the foot was radiographically normal.
¶6 Having improved, Ledbetter was discharged from the hospital on June 11th. 
Although the symptoms continued to abate during the three (3) weeks after 
discharge, Ledbetter continued to have swelling in his left ankle. Dr. Reed 
ordered a second x-ray on July 5th which showed a dramatic deterioration of the 
bones in Ledbetter's left foot. Dr. Reed referred Ledbetter to an orthopedic 
surgeon who sent Ledbetter to see Dr. Steven Lund, a podiatrist with experience 
treating Charcot Foot.3
¶7 Dr. Lund diagnosed Ledbetter with Charcot Foot. Because of the severity of 
the foot's deformity, Dr. Lund recommended reconstructive surgery to attach an 
external fixator to Ledbetter's foot. Ledbetter wore the fixator, which was 
adjusted daily, for approximately seven weeks. Thereafter, Ledbetter spent 
several weeks in a cast and then in a specially crafted boot for six to eight 
months. Finally, Ledbetter was fitted with a brace intended to be worn 
continually with a shoe. However, because the brace was uncomfortable, Ledbetter 
discontinued its use.
¶8 The Ledbetters sued Howard and Radiology Services for negligence. 
Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread the July 9th 
x-ray causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled 
with the malpractice claim was the wife's plea for loss of consortium. The 
action was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
The Ledbetters filed two motions: one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 
and one for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct during deliberations. The 
trial court refused to grant judgment to the Ledbetters but sustained their 
motion for new trial finding that "juror misconduct affected materially the 
substantial rights of the [Ledbetters]".4 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded 
ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Howard and Radiology 
Services. The cause was assigned for consideration to this chamber on December 
5, 2011. 
Standard of Review
¶9 It has long been recognized that the granting of a new trial is within the 
wide discretion of the trial court.5 We will not reverse an order granting a new trial 
unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure, simple, and unmixed 
question of law.6 The judge who presides at the trial: hears the 
testimony; observes the witnesses; and has full knowledge of the proceedings 
during the trial process. It is that adjudicator who is in the best position to 
know whether substantial justice has been done. Where such a judge sustains a 
motion for new trial, a clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of 
discretion must be made before this Court is justified in reversing the ruling. 
The threshold for upholding the grant of a new trial is much lower than where 
the motion is overruled.7 Furthermore, when, as here, the new trial is granted by 
the same judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of 
discretion is required for this Court to reverse than if a party appeals from a 
refusal to grant a new trial.8 
¶10 The Ledbetters allege they are entitled to a new trial based on juror 
misconduct.9 They insist that the jury foreperson, a licensed 
practical nurse who regularly assists with the care and treatment of diabetic 
patients, improperly injected extraneous prejudicial information into the 
deliberative process. Howard and Radiology Services contend that the juror's 
affidavit utilized to impeach the verdict is inadmissible pursuant to 
12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B).10 In the alternative, they argue that the foreperson's 
statement interjected no extraneous information improperly influencing any 
juror. We disagree with both of the defendants' arguments.
¶11 a) The juror's affidavit regarding the foreperson's 
statementsduring deliberations is admissible under the"extraneous 
prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B).
¶12 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if 
possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as 
expressed by the statutory language.11 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of 
its general purpose and objective12 considering relevant provisions together to give full 
force and effect to each.13 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its 
intent and that it intended what it expressed.14 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and 
end15 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying 
them.16 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained 
from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are 
rules of statutory construction employed.17 If the language is plain and clearly expresses the 
legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary.18
¶13 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§2606(B)19 provides in pertinent part:
A juror may20 testify on the question whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention . . . 
An affidavit . . . of any statement by the juror concerning a matter 
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be 
received . . . [Emphasis provided.]
The statute does not preclude the admission of all juror affidavits in 
queries involving juror misconduct. Instead, it blocks the offering of juror 
affidavits on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying. 
Jurors are specifically allowed under the statute to testify on the question 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention. Therefore, if the foreperson's statements constituted extraneous 
prejudicial information, admission of the juror-affidavit was not precluded.
¶14 During voir dire, the foreperson testified that she was a licensed 
practical nurse involved in home-health care and that she dealt daily with 
diabetics but never with anyone with Charcot foot. When the trial court asked 
whether she ever had a diabetic patient with complications she confirmed that 
she had. She also assured the Court that nothing about her experiences 
would cause her to be biased and that she would not substitute her 
experience for the testimony of the witnesses in the trial.21
¶15 In support of the new trial argument, the Ledbetters obtained a sworn 
affidavit from one of the foreperson's fellow jurors. It provides that: 1) the 
foreperson took charge of the deliberations "eagerly sharing her experiences 
and knowledge of the proper care and treatment of diabetic patients"; the 
foreperson and another juror stated that "they had been in similar situations as 
Dr. Howard" and that it was "common place" to note a patient's condition as 
being "normal" when it was not; the foreperson shared "her experience and 
knowledge of diabetes" stating that "all diabetics have podiatrists" then 
questioned why Ledbetter did not have a treating podiatrist; the foreperson 
expounded that she was "certain" Ledbetter had prior foot problems and 
was not following his doctor's instructions because, in her experience, "most 
diabetics do not follow doctor's instructions;" the foreperson 
hypothesized that Ledbetter wasn't following his doctor's instructions 
because he was taking four shots of insulin per day and that was "certainly 
a lot of insulin;" and, finally, the foreperson told jurors that because 
Ledbetter had Charcot foot, he would "likely have had the same problems and 
result" regardless of any delay in treatment caused by Howard's misreading 
of the original x-ray.22
¶16 These statements were clearly improper under 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B). They were: made as 
statements of fact by the foreperson; involved purportedly extraneous 
information arising solely from the foreperson's professional experience; and 
were intended to sway the jury toward a defendant's verdict. The juror's 
affidavit regarding these statements was admissible under the "extraneous 
prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B).23
¶17 b) Counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's 
guaranteeto the trial court that she would not allow her professional 
expertiseto override the testimony presented. Because there is 
admissibleevidence to the contrary, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretionin ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during 
deliberations.
¶18 This is not a case in which we need make any sweeping statement as to 
when or how a professional may utilize individual training or expertise in the 
deliberative process or even may be allowed to communicate the same to fellow 
fact finders.24 Neither does this cause stand for the proposition that 
a single false answer to a question on voir dire requires or supports the 
ordering of a new trial. Here, the simple fact is that during voir 
dire, the foreperson clearly stated that she would not substitute her 
experiences as a nurse to diabetic patients to over-ride witness 
testimony. The affidavit indicates she did exactly what she promised not 
to do once deliberations began and went even further by attempting to influence 
her fellow jurors based on her professional knowledge and experiences, all while 
acting in the leadership position of foreperson on the jury.25
¶19 We addressed the issue of a juror giving untruthful answers to a question 
during voir dire in Dominion Bank of Middle 
Tenn. v. Masterson, 1996 OK 99, 928 P.2d 291. There, the juror gave false information 
concerning his involvement in prior lawsuits. We stated:
We need not determine whether the juror was biased against [the defendant] 
nor whether he had some influence upon the other jurors. It is enough that [the 
defendant] was deprived of an opportunity to delve deeper into [the juror's] 
qualifications during voir dire and under Oklahoma case law is 
entitled to a new trial.
Unlike the juror in Dominion, the foreperson here gave sworn 
testimony that she would not allow her expertise and training to override the 
testimony presented. Thereafter, she accepted the leadership position as 
foreperson of the jury, and specifically informed the other jurors that 
because Ledbetter had Charcot foot, he would "likely have had the same 
problems and result" regardless of any delay in treatment caused by Howard's 
misreading of the original x-ray.26 She made these statements based solely on her 
experience and training in treating diabetics, not on the basis of 
the evidence presented.
¶20 Trial courts must scrupulously avoid allowing a jury to have access to 
matters not proper for consideration or to perform their functions 
irregularly.27 The trial court attempted to meet that duty during 
voir dire. Counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guaranty 
to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to 
override the testimony presented. There is admissible evidence to the 
contrary. The foreperson made improper statements, involving extraneous 
information, intending to sway the jury toward a defendant's verdict. Under 
these facts, we determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial. 

CONCLUSION
¶21 We express no opinion on the ability of the Ledbetters to prevail in a 
new trial. Furthermore, this decision should not be construed to stand for the 
proposition that a single untrue response to a question on voir dire will 
necessarily require a new trial. Here, however, we are presented with a false 
answer which led to a person clothed with the mantel of leadership attempting to 
persuade fellow jurors to reach a defendants' verdict on extraneous prejudicial 
information precluded by the legislative pronouncement in 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B).28
¶22 The trial judge: conducted the initial voir dire in which the 
foreperson assured him that she would not allow her professional background to 
be substituted for the evidence presented by the witnesses; was present during 
the trial; observed the witnesses; and heard their testimony. After considering 
the motion for new trial and the juror's affidavit, the response, and the 
argument of counsel for all parties, he determined that the statements of the 
foreperson, taking on the persona of an expert witness during jury 
deliberations, constituted conduct materially and adversely affecting the 
Ledbetters' right to a fair trial. On the record presented, there has been no 
clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of discretion. Howard and Radiology 
Services simply have not met the difficult standard which must be demonstrated 
to show that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. Therefore, the trial 
court's new trial order must be upheld. The order of the trial court is affirmed 
and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' 
OPINION VACATED;TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, REIF, COMBS, JJ. - CONCUR
GURICH, J. - CONCURS IN RESULT
WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ. - DISSENT
KAUGER, J. - NOT PARTICIPATING 
FOOTNOTES
1 In the petition in error, 
Howard and Radiology Services asserted that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant them a continuance to conduct discovery concerning the alleged juror 
misconduct. They did not pursue this argument on certiorari. Although 
Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, 867 P.2d 438 teaches that the prevailing party in the 
Court of Civil Appeals may obtain review of issues properly raised and briefed 
on appeal but not addressed by the appellate court without filing a petition for 
certiorari, we need not do so here. The trial court never ruled on the 
continuance request and the doctor and his employer waived any such argument by 
announcing their readiness to proceed at the May 7, 2008 new trial hearing. 
Transcript of Motions Hearing, May 7, 2008, providing in pertinent part at p. 
3:
"THE COURT . . . Are the Plaintiffs ready to proceed?
MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And the Defendant Howard?
MR. STANLEY: Yes, Your Honor. . . ."
Bentley v. Melton, 1957 OK 229, ¶3, 316 P.2d 591 [Party waives issue by failing to secure a 
ruling or by failing to reassert the same.]. 
2 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B), see note 10, infra. 

3 Charcot Foot is a disease of the nerves causing the 
deterioration of the bony structure of the foot, related to diabetes, which can 
lead to multiple fractures in the bony regions and which is generally a 
progressive condition developing over a period of time. Matter of 
Workers' Compensation of Pederson, 
939 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1997); Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. 
Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 126 
Pa.Comwlth. 188, 559 A.2d 84 (1989); Durphy v. Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan, 698 A.2d 459 (D.C.App. 1997). 
4 Transcript of Motions Hearing, May 7, 2008, p. 14. 
5 Sligar v. Bartlett, 1996 OK 144, ¶13, 916 P.2d 1383; Propst v. Alexander, 
1995 OK 57, ¶8, 898 P.2d 141; Austin v. Cockings, 
1994 OK 29, ¶¶9-10, 871 P. 2.d 33; 
Rein v. Patton, 1953 OK 117, ¶¶19-20, 257 P.2d 280; Harper v. Pratt, 
1943 OK 281, ¶3, 141 P.2d 562. 
6 Rein v. Patton, see note 5, supra; 
Reyes v. Goss, 1951 OK 215, ¶11, 235 P.2d 950. 
7 Rein v. Patton, see note 5, supra; 
Harper v. Pratt, see note 5, supra. 
8 Sligar v. Bartlett, see note 5, supra; 
Propst v. Alexander, see note 5, supra. 
9 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §651 providing in pertinent 
part:
"A new trial is a reexamination in the same court, of an issue of fact or law 
or both, after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee, or 
a decision by the court. The former verdict, report, or decision shall be 
vacated, and a new trial granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for 
any of the following causes, affecting materially the substantial rights of the 
party:
. . . 2. Misconduct of the jury or a prevailing party . . ." 
10 Title 12 O.S 2011 §2606(B) providing:
"Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall 
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or as to the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or 
another juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes during deliberations. A juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror. An affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror 
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying 
shall not be received for these purposes." [Emphasis provided.] 
11 White v. Lim, 2009 OK 79, ¶12, 224 P.3d 679; Head v. McCracken, 
2004 OK 84, ¶13, 102 P.3d 670; Balfour v. Nelson, 
1994 OK 149, ¶8, 890 P.2d 916, 39 A.L.R.5th 935. 
12 Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶8, 37 P.3d 882; McSorley v. Hertz 
Corp., 1994 OK 
120, ¶6, 885 P.2d 1343; Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
1992 OK 61, ¶8, 832 P.2d 834. 
13 Haney v. State, 1993 OK 41, ¶5, 850 P.2d 1087; Public Serv. Co. 
of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Corp. 
Comm'n, 1992 OK 
153, ¶8, 842 P.2d 750. 
14 Minie v. Hudson, 1997 OK 26, ¶7, 934 P.2d 1082; Fuller v. Odom, 
1987 OK 64, ¶4, 741 P.2d 449; Darnell v. Chrysler 
Corp., 1984 OK 
57, ¶5, 687 P.2d 132. 
15 Oklahoma Ass'n for 
Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma 
City, 1995 OK 
62, ¶5, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S. Ct. 674, 133 L. Ed. 2d 523 
(1995); Wilson v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1979 OK 62, ¶5, 594 P.2d 1210. 
16 Haggard v. Haggard, 1998 OK 124, ¶1, 975 P.2d 439; Price v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 1991 OK 50, ¶7, 812 P.2d 1355. 
17 State ex rel. Dept. of 
Human Serv. v. Colclazier, 1997 OK 134, ¶9, 950 P.2d 824; Matter of Estate 
of Flowers, 1993 OK 19, ¶11, 848 P.2d 1146. 
18 White v. Lim, see note 11, supra; 
Rout v. Crescent Public Works Auth., 
1994 OK 85, ¶10, 878 P.2d 1045. 
19 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B), see note 10, supra. 

20 The term "may" is ordinarily construed as permissive. 
See, MLC Mort. Corp. v. Sun America 
Mortgage Co., 2009 OK 37, fn. 17, 212 P.3d 1199; Osprey LLC v. 
Kelly-Moore Paint Co., Inc., 1999 OK 50, ¶14, 984 P.2d 194; Shea v. Shea, 
1975 OK 90, ¶10, 537 P.2d 417. 
21 Partial Transcript of Jury Trial, July 7-9, 2009, 
Volume I, providing in pertinent part at pp. 88-90:
". . . THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything about your training or experience 
that might impact on the way you'd look at this trial?
JUROR NORTON: No, except that I deal with - I do deal with diabetics daily. . 
. .
THE COURT: Have you ever dealt with someone with Charcot foot?
JUROR NORTON: No. . . . 
THE COURT: You've already said you've dealt with diabetics and, I assume, 
have diabetics on your patient roll. And I'm assuming that some of them have 
probably had complications arising from that diabetes.
JUROR NORTON: Yes.
THE COURT: Would that experience make it difficult for you to be impartial in 
this lawsuit?
JUROR NORTON: (Shook head from side to side.) 
. . . THE COURT: Do you feel confident that you will not be that ER nurse 
that I talked about earlier and substitute your experience for the testimony of 
the witnesses in this trial?
JUROR NORTON: Yes. . . ." 
22 Affidavit of Dayle Baker, Plaintiff's Exhibit D to 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for 
New Trial, filed March 24, 2008. 
23 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B), see note 10, supra. 
See also, the following cases in which evidence was admissible as "extraneous" 
under the statutory provision: Propst v. Alexander, see note 5, 
supra [In a negligence case, jurors considered workers' compensation after 
plaintiff's surgeon accidentally mentioned it in violation of motion in 
limine.]; Willoughby v. City of Oklahoma 
City, 1985 OK 
64, 706 P.2d 883 [Juror conducted independent investigation relating to cause of death.]; 
Negrate v. Gunter, 1955 OK 118, 285 P.2d 194 [Jurors viewed exhibits which had not been 
admitted into evidence.]; Peoples Finance & 
Thrift Co. v. Ferrier, 1942 OK 343, 129 P.2d 1015 [Jurors considered a memo used by counsel 
that was not admitted into evidence.]; Swift & Co. v. 
Kirkley, 1942 OK 
395, 131 P.2d 998 [Jurors viewed premises where accident could have happened without court 
permission]; Graybeal v. Martin Sand & 
Gravel, 2008 OK CIV APP 
28, 179 P.3d 1278 [Jurors' affidavits admissible where jury foreperson made statement of 
fact indicating that personal representative had received large insurance 
settlement.]; Thompson v. Krantz, 2006 OK CIV APP 60, 137 P.3d 693 [A juror in a medical malpractice case 
conducted an internet search and obtained evidence regarding medical procedures 
and the results of other, similar lawsuits.]; Crane v. Nuttle, 
2005 OK CIV APP 73, 121 P.3d 1124 [Three jurors viewed the accident scene to 
"see how the accident could have happened" without court permission.]; 
Bledsoe By & through Bledsoe v. 
Truster, 1992 OK CIV APP 
25, 839 P.2d 673 [Jury misconduct in speculating that excluded deposition contained 
material weighing on decision]. 
24 See, Marquez v. City of 
Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2011); Meyer v. 
State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2003); State v. Mann, 
39 P.3d 124 (N.M. 2002); People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569, 708 N.Y.S.2d 701, 729 N.E.2d 701 (2000); Brooks v. Zahn, 170 Ariz. 545, 826 P.2d 1171 (Ct.App. 1991); Baker v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.App. 1987). See also, M. Mushlin, "Bound and 
Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors," 25 Yale L. & Pol'y 
Rev. 239 (2007). 
25 See, Stevens v. State, 94 Okla.Crim. 16, 
232 P.2d 949 (1951) [Election 
foreperson reflects evidence of juror's qualities for leadership.]. 
26 See, ¶15 and accompanying footnotes, supra. 
27 Barnhart v. International 
Harvester Co., 1968 OK 49, ¶0, 441 P.2d 1000. 
28 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2606(B), see note 10, 
supra.

GURICH, J., specially concurring in result:
¶1 The trial judge, in this case, after hearing arguments from both parties, 
granted the plaintiffs' motion for new trial, finding juror misconduct during 
deliberations. Because the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the 
post-trial motions of the parties, I concur with the majority that the 
Defendants did not overcome the heavy burden of proving that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in granting a new trial. Taliaferro v. Shahsavari, 
2006 OK 96, ¶ 14-15, 
154 P.3d 1240, 1244-45. However, the 
majority does not address whether and to what extent jurors may rely upon 
professional or occupational expertise during deliberations and whether a 
juror's statements based on such expertise constitute extraneous prejudicial 
information. I write separately to comment on these issues. 
¶2 Over the past thirty years, occupational exemptions from jury service have 
been eliminated across the country.1 Oklahoma is no exception.2 The only professionals 
exempt from jury service in Oklahoma state courts are Justices of the Supreme 
Court, judges of the Court of Civil Appeals, judges of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, judges of the district courts, sheriffs, and "licensed attorneys 
engaged in the practice of law." 38 O.S. 2009 § 28. Jurors with professional 
or occupational expertise routinely sit on juries, and often, as in this case, 
they sit on cases involving an issue related to their area of expertise. 
¶3 Parties to the litigation are responsible for questioning prospective 
jurors during voir dire regarding any knowledge or expertise they may have in an 
area relevant to the litigation. Any concerns about a juror's ability to remain 
fair and impartial because of his or her expertise should be resolved before the 
jury is seated. See Rule 6, Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 
12 
O.S. Ch. 2, App. If a juror with expertise remains on the jury, the trial court, in 
addition to giving Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4,3 should consider giving 
the following instruction: 
Should you have professional or occupational expertise in an area that is 
relevant to this litigation, you may rely on that expertise and experience in 
informing your deliberations. You may share that expertise and experience with 
other members of the jury as it applies to the specific evidence introduced in 
this case. However, you may not consider extra facts or law, not introduced at 
trial, that are specific to parties or an issue in this case that may be based 
on your professional or occupational expertise.4 
¶4 No error is committed when jurors with professional or occupational 
expertise rely on their expertise to evaluate the evidence. But when a jury 
verdict is challenged on such grounds, the trial court should set aside the 
verdict only when it is clear a juror has introduced specific facts or legal 
content relevant to the case from outside the record.5
¶5 Generally, affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony of jurors may not 
be used to impeach a jury verdict. Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 
1989 OK 166, ¶ 25, 794 P.2d 742, 747. Section 2606(B) is an exception to 
this general rule. Id. It authorizes jurors to testify regarding 
allegations of misconduct:
A juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. An affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying shall not be received for these 
purposes. 12 O.S. 2001 § 
2606(B) (emphasis added).
¶6 To set aside a verdict for juror misconduct based on the introduction of 
extraneous prejudicial information to the jury, the trial court must find both 
that extraneous information was improperly before the jury and that the 
extraneous information prejudiced the verdict.6 See id. When 
determining whether a juror with expertise improperly introduced extraneous 
information to the jury, the trial court must first decide whether the 
"experience used by the juror in deliberations [was] part of the juror's 
background, gained before the juror was selected to participate in the case," or 
was the result of independent investigation into a matter relevant to the case. 
Id. 
¶7 If the trial court finds that extraneous information was introduced to the 
jury, it must also determine that the extraneous information prejudiced 
the jury's verdict. Because section 2606(B) prohibits a juror from testifying 
"to the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or another juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes during deliberations," the 
trial court's inquiry into the element of prejudice must be an objective one. 
The trial court must determine whether the average hypothetical juror would be 
influenced by the juror misconduct. Meyer, 80 P.3d  at 566. Affidavits or 
statements by jurors about the actual effect of the misconduct on the 
deliberations or their individual decisions are not admissible to 
determine the impact of the misconduct upon a verdict. Id. Rather, the 
trial court should consider, for example, how the material was introduced to the 
jury, the length of time it was discussed by the jury, the timing of its 
introduction, whether the information was ambiguous, vague, or specific in 
content, whether it was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial, whether 
it involved a material or collateral issue, or whether it involved inadmissible 
evidence. Id. 
¶8 Such an approach by trial courts protects the policy behind section 
2606(B):
[T]here are compelling interests for prohibiting testimony about what goes on 
in the jury room after a verdict has been rendered. The rule protects the 
finality of verdicts. It protects jurors from harassment by counsel seeking to 
nullify a verdict. It reduces the incentive for jury tampering. It promotes free 
and frank jury discussions that would be chilled if threatened by the prospect 
of later being called to the stand. Finally, it preserves the community's trust 
in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople [that] would all be 
undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny.
United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted).7 Additionally, this approach recognizes the traditional 
role of the jury. Jurors are expected to call on their personal experiences and 
common sense in reaching a verdict. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4 
provides: "You may make deductions and reach conclusions which reason and 
common sense lead you to draw from the facts which you find to have been 
established by the testimony and evidence in the case." Oklahoma Uniform Jury 
Instruction 1.4 (emphasis added). Instruction 1.8A also instructs the jury to 
make its decision based on "the reasoning" each juror has. Oklahoma Uniform Jury 
Instruction 1.8A. 
¶9 The line between a juror's application of his or her professional or 
occupational expertise to evidence in the record and a juror's introduction of 
legal content or specific factual information learned from outside the record is 
often a fine one. As such, the procedure set forth in section 2606(B) must be 
precisely followed, and a jury verdict set aside only when it is clear a juror 
with professional or occupational expertise has introduced specific facts or 
legal content relevant to the case from outside the record. Otherwise, all jury 
verdicts are subject to challenge. 
FOOTNOTES
1 For a discussion of 
occupational exemptions from jury service and the recent statutory reforms 
abolishing most occupational exemptions, see Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and 
Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 Yale L. & 
Pol'y Rev. 239 (2007); See also Jury Service Reform, 
American Tort Reform Association (2011), 
http://www.atra.org/issues/jury-service-reform. 
2 In 2004, the Legislature amended 38 O.S. § 28 to encourage jury service by business and 
other professionals by reducing the time commitment and allowing professionals 
flexibility in rescheduling to meet the needs of their offices. 
3 "Do not read newspaper reports or obtain information 
from the internet about this trial or the issues, parties or witnesses involved 
in this case, and do not watch or listen to television or radio reports about 
it. Do not attempt to visit the scene or investigate this case on your own." 
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4. 
4 See Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 
1063 (Colo. 2011). 
5 A majority of courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have 
held that jurors' intradeliberational statements, when based on personal 
knowledge and occupational or professional experience, do not constitute 
extraneous prejudicial information. This approach allows jurors with 
professional or occupational expertise to rely on that knowledge to inform their 
deliberations and to communicate their opinions to fellow jurors so long as they 
do not bring in legal content or specific factual information learned from 
outside the record. Under this approach, jurors with expertise can apply their 
expertise to evidence already introduced at trial. See e.g., 
Kendrick, 252 P.3d 1052; Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005); Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2003); State 
v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124 (N.M. 2002); Brooks v. Zahn, 826 P.2d 1171 
(Ariz. 1991); Baker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App. 
1987). 
6 This Court has applied the 
extraneous-prejudicial-information exception contained in § 2606(B) on two 
previous occasions. See Oxley, 1989 OK 166, 794 P.2d 742; Willoughby v. City of Okla. City, 
1985 OK 64, 706 P.2d 883. 
7 This Court has recognized that 12 O.S. 2001 § 2606(B) is "substantially 
similar to the federal rule"; therefore, Benally's discussion of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(B) is instructive. Willoughby, 
1985 OK 64, ¶ 12, 706 P.2d 883, 887.

WINCHESTER, J., with whom Edmondson, J., joins, dissenting:
¶1 I dissent to today's majority opinion because I do not believe that a 
juror's personal experiences constitute an external influence under the meaning 
of Section 2606(B). The majority affirms the granting of a new trial based 
solely on the affidavit of one of the jurors in the case alleging that the jury 
foreperson "shared her knowledge of the proper care and treatment of diabetic 
patients" in jury deliberations.1 I do not believe that the jury's free deliberation 
process should be tampered with on such thin grounds. Thus, I would sustain the 
jury verdict and find the proposed juror affidavit inadmissible. 
¶2 It is the court's duty to protect jury verdicts from unwarranted 
intrusions. Jurors may not testify to invalidate their own verdict unless 
extraneous prejudicial information is brought to their attention or an improper 
outside influence is brought to bear upon them. 12 O.S. 2001 § 2606(B). The rule that jurors 
may not impeach their verdict was designed to encourage free and frank 
discussion among jurors, promote verdict finality, protect jurors from 
harassment by losing parties, and preserve the viability of the jury system. 
U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008). The majority 
opinion threatens these goals.
¶3 Prior to trial, the parties and their counsel were well aware of the 
foreperson's work experience as a home health nurse who had dealt with diabetic 
patients on numerous occasions. In fact, the juror was questioned about her 
employment in-depth on voir dire. She freely disclosed that she was a 
licensed practical nurse and she also admitted that diabetics were common among 
her patients. Despite this knowledge, and the ability to dismiss the juror 
during voir dire, the parties and their counsel opted to retain her as a 
juror and thereby waived any objections to her qualifications. 
¶4 The majority claims that the foreperson's conduct improperly injected 
extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberation process. In support of 
this claim, the majority places heavy reliance on the fact that the foreperson 
stated she would not substitute her experiences for those of the testimony from 
the trial witnesses, going so far as to claim that the foreperson lied 
under oath during voir dire.2 Notably, there is not one shred of evidence that the 
foreperson, or any of the other jurors, did not base her decision on the 
evidence presented in the case. That she may have applied personal observations, 
obtained from her job as a home health nurse, to the facts of this case does not 
present the catastrophic prejudice the majority contends it does.
¶5 In Benally, the Tenth Circuit cautioned courts to be careful "not 
to confuse a juror who introduces outside evidence with a juror who brings his 
personal experiences to bear on the matter at hand." U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)(citing Marquez v. 
City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2005)("A juror's personal 
experience, however, does not constitute 'extraneous prejudicial 
information.'"). In Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216 (10th 
Cir.2005), a juror's experience training police dogs was specifically relevant 
to the case at issue and it was learned that the juror had, in fact, discussed 
that experience to help the jury determine the issue before it which was whether 
the use of a police dog constituted excessive force. The Tenth Circuit held that 
the juror's comments were not extraneous, prejudicial information. Marquez v. 
City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2005).3 
¶6 Attacking a jury verdict with juror comments made during deliberation 
impermissibly leads to public exposure of what was intended to be a private 
discussion, exactly what § 2606(B) was designed to avoid. Internal influences on 
a verdict during the jury's deliberative process do not constitute outside 
influences and evidence thereof is inadmissible to impeach a jury's verdict. 
Here, there is absolutely no evidence that the foreperson brought any extraneous 
facts specific to the litigants or the case into the jury room or that she 
conducted any independent fact-finding regarding the case. Rather, the 
statements attributed to her came from her own work experience dealing with 
diabetic patients. Diabetes is, unfortunately, a common ailment that many people 
have either dealt with personally or who have family members or friends that 
have it, as indicated by several of the jurors during voir dire.
¶7 The necessity of democracy requires juries to have great latitude during 
deliberation. All jurors enter the jury system with a variety of life 
experiences, including their work experience. It is difficult to fathom any jury 
arriving at a verdict in a case without some, if not all, of the members drawing 
on their own experiences and asserting their individual ideas and opinions on 
the matters submitted to them. A juror's personal experience, be it professional 
or otherwise, so long as not directly related to the facts and parties in the 
underlying litigation, does not constitute a prejudicial, external influence 
necessitating a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1 The jury verdict was 9-3 
in favor of the defendants. Juror Baker, the affiant, apparently was not unduly 
influenced by the foreperson as she did not join the verdict for Defendants. 
Regardless, Section 2606(B) prohibits a juror from testifying as to "the effect 
of anything upon the juror's mind or another juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes during deliberations." 12 O.S. 2001 § 2606(B). 
2 "[A]llowing juror testimony through the backdoor of a 
voir dire challenge risks swallowing the rule. A broad question during voir dire 
could then justify the admission of any number of jury statements that would now 
be re-characterized as challenges to voir dire rather than challenges to the 
verdict. Given the importance that Rule 606(b) places on protecting jury 
deliberations from judicial review, we cannot read it to justify as large a 
loophole as [the defendant] requests." United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir.2008).
3 Significantly, not one of the cases cited by the 
majority finds that the personal or professional experience of a juror is the 
type of extraneous influence allowed to be exposed by the affidavits of other 
jurors after trial. Rather, all of the cited cases deal with actual, concrete 
influences such as external exhibits, independent investigations or the 
injection of facts outside the record of the specific case. There were no such 
external influences brought to bear on the instant matter. Numerous other 
jurisdictions have held that a juror's statements made during deliberation, when 
based on personal knowledge that is gained through work or otherwise and not 
directly related to the litigation at issue, do not constitute prejudicial, 
extraneous information. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2nd Cir. 1970)("[T]he Court has never suggested 
that jurors, whose duty it is to consider and discuss the factual material 
properly before them, become 'unsworn witnesses' within the scope of the 
confrontation clause simply because they have considered any factual matters 
going beyond those of record. To resort to the metaphor that the moment a juror 
passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record evidence, he becomes 'an unsworn 
witness' is to ignore centuries of history and assume an answer rather than to 
provide the basis for one."); Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 
870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989)("It is expected that jurors will bring their 
life experiences to bear on the facts of a case); Bethea v. Springhill 
Memorial Hosp., 833 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2002)(jurors' discussion during 
deliberation of their personal knowledge of or experience with induced labor, 
which was at heart of dispute, held not extraneous, prejudicial information); 
Brooks v. Zahn, 826 P.2d 1171, 1177-1178, (Ariz. App.1991)( "We expect 
jurors to draw upon their common sense and experience and use their knowledge to 
assist in reaching a verdict. … [W]e [must] distinguish between a juror's 
knowledge, opinions, feelings or bias and 'the type of after-acquired 
information that potentially taints a jury verdict.' … [The juror's] statements 
are the product of her own experience and knowledge. We reject the invitation to 
categorize specialized knowledge possessed by a juror and discussed during 
deliberations as extrinsic or extraneous information. To do so would cause 
endless examination into jurors' comments during deliberations to determine 
whether a particular juror drew upon unusual or expert knowledge to reach a 
verdict."); Leavitt ex rel. Leavitt v. Magid, 598 N.W.2d 722 (Neb. 
1999)(legal knowledge of attorney-juror on issue of proximate cause, brought 
into jury deliberations, was not prejudicial, extraneous information); Baker 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.App. 1987)(in negligence 
action to recover damages for personal injuries, jurors could not testify as to 
medical information supplied by another juror who was a registered nurse since 
the source of the information was inside the jury, not outside); Caldararo v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 794 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.App. 1990)(foreman's claim during 
deliberations that because he was married to nurse he had specialized knowledge 
about diabetics was not extraneous information).