Title: Turnage v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAQUITA TURNAGE, 
 
 
Defendant Below-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below-Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 356, 2015 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1307002341 
§   
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  August 26, 2015  
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  November 4, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and SEITZ, Justices. 
  
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of November 2015, upon consideration of the appellant‘s 
opening brief, the appellee‘s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jaquita Turnage, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court‘s denial of her first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Turnage‘s opening brief that 
her appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.  
(2) 
On January 7, 2014, Turnage pled guilty to Drug Dealing and the 
State dismissed seven other charges.  Turnage was sentenced to fifteen years of 
2 
 
Level V incarceration, suspended after two years of Level V Key, followed by 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Turnage did not file a direct appeal. 
(3) 
On May 28, 2015, Turnage filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Rule 61.  Turnage claimed that she was entitled to postconviction relief due 
to problems at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (―OCME‖).  Primarily, 
she argued that her guilty plea was involuntary under Brady v. United States1 
because, although she admitted her guilt, she did not have knowledge of the 
evidence-handling problems at the OCME when she chose to do so.  On June 9, 
2015, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Turnage‘s motion as procedurally 
barred under Rule 61(i)(1).  This appeal followed.      
(4) 
We review the Superior Court‘s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.2  The procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.3  Under 
Rule 61(i)(1), Turnage‘s motion for postconviction relief was time-barred because 
it was filed more than a year after Turnage‘s conviction became final and Turnage 
did not plead a claim that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction or a claim that 
satisfied the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).4  Turnage‘s 
                                                 
1 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
2 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Cr. R. 61(i)(1) (effective June 14, 2014) (providing that Rule 61(i)(1) does not apply 
to claims that court lacked jurisdiction or claims that satisfy pleading requirements of Rule 
61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii)).   
3 
 
conviction became final in February 2014, but she did not file the motion for 
postconviction relief until May 2015. 
(5) 
As she did below, Turnage argues that the version of Rule 61 in effect 
before June 4, 2014 should apply to her motion because the June 4, 2014 
amendments to Rule 61 contain unconstitutional restrictions on her right of access 
to the courts, violate due process, and are impermissibly retroactive.  These claims 
are without merit.   
(6) 
First, Turnage‘s argument that the amended Rule 61 denies her due 
process of law and meaningful access to the courts is without merit.   The United 
States Supreme Court has held that ―[s]tates have no obligation to provide 
[postconviction] relief.‖5  Thus, Turnage is arguing about the extent to which the 
State has afforded a right to postconviction relief that it does not have to afford at 
all.  Therefore, the amended Rule 61 provides more due process and access to the 
courts than is constitutionally required.  Moreover, the amended form of Rule 61 
still provides a broad right to file a first petition within ―one year after the 
judgment or conviction is final,‖6 and even allows successive petitions in the 
compelling circumstance when a person ―pleads with particularity that new 
evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent‖ 
                                                 
5 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third 
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 89 (2009) (―States are under no obligation to provide 
mechanisms for postconviction relief . . . .‖). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
4 
 
or ―that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review . . . , applies to the movant‘s case.‖7  Turnage is not deprived of meaningful 
access to the courts just because she cannot collaterally attack a beneficial guilty 
plea more than a year after her conviction became final. 
(7) 
Second, Turnage‘s related argument that the amended Rule 61 is 
operating retroactively as to postconviction motions filed before June 4, 2014 is 
factually erroneous.  Turnage did not have a right to pursue any postconviction 
claim indefinitely.  She was on notice as of June 4, 2014—over seven months 
before Rule 61‘s one-year period expired—that Rule 61 had been amended.  But, 
she waited until May 28, 2015 to file her Rule 61 petition.8 
(8) 
Turnage claims that even if the June 4, 2014 amendments to Rule 61 
are constitutional her motion should not be time-barred because it is subject to 
equitable tolling because facts regarding the OCME investigation were still being 
disclosed.  This Court, however, has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling is 
inapplicable to a motion for postconviction relief.9   
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 
8 We take judicial notice that the revelations of problems at the OCME became public a week 
after Turnage pled guilty and that the Public Defender began filing Rule 61 applications as a 
result of those problems at the end of April 2014.  Turnage did not file for postconviction relief 
under Rule 61 until May 28, 2015, well after both the amendment to Rule 61 and the 
demonstrated ability of her lawyers to file Rule 61 applications based on the events at the 
OCME. 
9 Chapman v. State, 2007 WL 1933229, at *2 (Del. July 3, 2007) (―Superior Court Criminal Rule 
45(b)(2) expressly provides that the Superior Court ‗may not extend the time for taking any 
action‘ under Rule 61(i)(1).‖). 
5 
 
(9) 
Turnage also makes a confusing argument that the State is judicially 
estopped from arguing that her guilty plea cannot be vacated.  Turnage did not 
raise her judicial estoppel argument in the Superior Court and we will not consider 
it for the first time on appeal.10   
(10) Even if Turnage‘s claims were not procedurally barred, her claim 
under Brady v. United States has no merit.  We previously rejected a Brady claim 
like Turnage‘s in Aricidiacono v. State.11  Turnage has pled no facts suggesting 
that her guilty plea was involuntary or that she was otherwise unjustly convicted.  
In 2014, she admitted to the crimes of which she was convicted, and she received 
far less harsh a sentence than she could have received after a trial.  Under our 
precedent in Ira Brown v. State,12 Anzara Brown v. State,13 and Aricidiacono,14 
therefore, her claim is without substantive merit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State‘s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
10 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
11 __ A.3d __, 2015 WL 5933984, at *2–4 (Del. Oct. 12, 2015). 
12 108 A.3d 1201, 1205–06 (Del. 2015). 
13 117 A.3d 568, 581 (Del. 2015). 
14 __ A.3d at __, 2015 WL 5933984, at *3–4.