Title: Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc.1999 WY 127987 P.2d 681Case Number: 98-362Decided: 09/20/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GARY 
A. BOONE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

FRONTIER REFINING, INC., 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge

Bruce S. Asay of 
Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing appellant. 

Gary R. Scott of 
Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Gary 
Boone filed several claims against Appellee Frontier Refining, Inc., contesting 
its termination of his employment. He appeals from the summary judgments which 
were granted in favor of Frontier Refining.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Boone presents 
several issues for our consideration on appeal:

ISSUE I: Were 
oral representations made to the Appellant at the time of his hiring, as well as 
other memoranda provided to the Appellant, sufficient to alter the presumption 
of at-will status?

ISSUE II: Did 
the District Court err in granting [s]ummary judgment on the issues of implied 
contract/promissory estoppel?

ISSUE III: Did 
the District Court err in granting summary judgment as to the Appellant's Duty 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claim?

ISSUE IV: Did 
the District Court err in granting summary judgment as to the Appellant's claim 
of Retaliatory Discharge?

ISSUE V: Did the 
District Court improperly ignore the Doctrine of Law of the 
Case?

FACTS

[¶4]      In November 1991, 
Frontier Refining offered Boone a job as a senior project engineer in its 
Cheyenne refinery. Boone accepted the offer, resigned from his position with 
another company, and moved his family from Texas to Cheyenne. During Boone's 
tenure at the refinery, Frontier Refining assigned him to a team which was 
working on a special project.

[¶5]      In June 1992, 
Boone observed a condition at the refinery which he considered to be unsafe. He 
reported the condition to the refinery operations person. Very shortly 
thereafter, an explosion and a fire occurred in the refinery. Several Reiman 
Construction Company employees were working in the area of the explosion. Some 
of those employees were injured by the explosion and the 
fire.

[¶6]      The Reiman 
Construction employees and/or their families commenced legal actions against 
Frontier Refining. Frontier Refining's managers conducted an investigation of 
the explosion. They spoke with Boone, and he told them about his observation and 
the report he had made of the unsafe condition. Boone claimed that, after he 
spoke with the managers about the explosion, they began to treat him 
differently. The Reiman Construction employees and/or their families eventually 
settled their disputes with Frontier Refining.

[¶7]      Frontier Refining 
conducted an appraisal of Boone's work performance on two occasions while he was 
employed by the company. Both performance appraisals indicated that Boone's work 
was less than satisfactory. Frontier Refining terminated Boone's employment on 
August 20, 1993, citing poor work performance as the basis for the 
discharge.

[¶8]      Boone filed a 
complaint against Frontier Refining on August 18, 1997, articulating claims for 
retaliatory discharge and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Frontier Refining filed a motion for a summary judgment, and the 
district court held a hearing on the motion. The district court subsequently 
granted a summary judgment in favor of Frontier Refining on Boone's claims and 
permitted Boone to amend his complaint.

[¶9]      Boone filed an 
amended complaint, alleging that Frontier Refining had breached the terms of an 
implied employment contract created by its employment manual. Frontier Refining 
filed a motion seeking a summary judgment on that claim. The district court held 
a hearing and initially denied Frontier Refining's motion, stating that the 
evidence suggested the parties may have entered into an oral contract for 
continued employment. Frontier Refining filed a motion for reconsideration, 
maintaining that it did not address the possibility that an oral contract 
existed because the only claim set out in Boone's amended complaint was that an 
implied contract arose from the employment manual. The district court 
reconsidered Frontier Refining's motion and granted it a summary judgment on 
Boone's employment manual claim. The district court again allowed Boone to amend 
his complaint.

[¶10]   Boone filed an additional amended 
complaint on July 31, 1998, alleging breach of an implied contract and 
promissory estoppel. Frontier Refining filed another motion for a summary 
judgment, and the district court granted that motion. Boone appealed to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of 
Review

[¶11]   Our standard for reviewing summary 
judgments is well known. A summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue 
exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to be awarded a 
judgment as a matter of law. Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Wyo. 1998); 
Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo. 1998); see also 
W.R.C.P. 52(c). The Wyoming Supreme Court evaluates the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as the 
district court employed and used. Covington, 952 P.2d  at 1106. We examine the 
record in the light most favorable to the party who opposed the motion for a 
summary judgment, and we give that party the benefit of all the favorable 
inferences that may be fairly drawn from the record. Id; Marchant, 967 P.2d  at 
554. We do not accord deference to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law. Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 897 (Wyo. 
1997).

B. Nature of 
Employment Relationship

[¶12]   Boone asserts that the district 
court erred when it determined that he was an at-will employee and granted the 
summary judgments in favor of Frontier Refining on his employment contract 
claims. He argues that Frontier Refining made oral representations to him which 
changed his employment status from at-will to continued. Boone also maintains 
that an implied contract for continued employment arose by virtue of statements 
made in Frontier Refining's performance appraisal forms and its employment 
manual. Frontier Refining contends that the district court's decisions on 
Boone's employment contract claims were correct. We agree with Frontier 
Refining.

[¶13]   In Wyoming, employment 
relationships are presumed to be at-will. Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry v. Unicover Corporation, 878 P.2d 510, 
512 (Wyo. 1994). In an at-will employment relationship, either the employer or 
the employee may terminate the relationship at any time, for any reason or for 
no reason at all. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 
(Wyo. 1994). The at-will presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the 
parties entered into an express or implied agreement which prohibited the 
employer from discharging the employee without just cause. Brodie v. General 
Chemical Corporation, 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997); Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1249. 
Express contracts and implied contracts for continued employment are equally 
enforceable. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 217. An express contract for continued 
employment exists when the terms of the agreement are declared by the parties in 
writing or verbally. 868 P.2d  at 216. An implied contract for continued 
employment is created by "a mutual agreement and intent to promise which is 
found in the acts or conduct of the party sought to be bound." Id. Employment 
contracts which are set out in employee handbooks or policies are implied 
contracts. 868 P.2d  at 217.

[¶14]   We consider first Boone's claim 
that Frontier Refining made statements during his job interview which created an 
oral contract for continued employment. Boone testified at his deposition that 
Frontier Refining told him that he would possibly be chosen for a management or 
supervisory position within a short period of time after he began his employment 
with the company. Frontier Refining also apparently stated that Boone would 
receive regular performance appraisals and pay raises. Boone admitted, however, 
that he and Frontier Refining did not discuss why or under what circumstances 
his employment could be terminated.

[¶15]   The statements made by Frontier 
Refining during Boone's interview did not create a contract for continued 
employment. Its statement that Boone would possibly be chosen for a management 
position within a short period of time after his employment commenced did not 
rise to the level of being a promise, and it certainly did not create a contract 
for continued employment. Likewise, Frontier Refining's statement that Boone 
would receive regular performance appraisals and pay raises did not constitute a 
promise of job security. See Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 276 
(Wyo. 1997).

[¶16]   Boone also claims that he and 
Frontier Refining had an understanding that he would be employed as long as he 
accomplished the work that was expected of him. As evidence of this 
understanding, he points to Frontier Refining's statement that he would possibly 
be chosen for a management position. In Wilder, a discharged employee stated 
that his employer had made an explicit oral promise that he would be employed 
for as long as he accomplished the work that was required of him. 868 P.2d  at 
218. We ruled that, under the facts presented there, a disputed issue of 
material fact existed as to whether or not the parties had entered into an oral 
contract for continued employment. 868 P.2d  at 218-19.

[¶17]   There is an important distinction 
between the facts of Wilder and the facts of this case. Unlike the employer in 
Wilder, Frontier Refining did not promise Boone that he would be employed as 
long as he did his job. In fact, Boone admitted that there was no discussion 
during his job interview about the circumstances under which his employment 
could be terminated. Boone simply assumed that he had job security. Boone's 
subjective belief that he could not be discharged unless just cause existed was 
insufficient to create a contract for continued employment. See Allen v. Safeway 
Stores Incorporated, 699 P.2d 277, 282 (Wyo. 1985). The district court correctly 
determined that the parties did not enter into an oral contract for continued 
employment.

[¶18]   We turn now to the statements in 
the performance appraisal form. Frontier Refining's performance appraisal form 
stated:

The purpose of 
performance feedback and appraisal at Frontier . . . is to improve each 
employee's productivity and long-range value to the Company. Performance 
appraisal consists of a formal evaluation of current performance and a plan for 
future improvement. It is Company policy that a performance appraisal will be 
conducted at least once a year for each employee. A supervisor or employee may 
request that the period be shorter in order to document improvement. This form 
is to be filled out by the direct supervisor of the employee. It is generally 
recommended that the supervisor obtain feedback from the employee and any other 
sources prior to completing this form.

[¶19]   In certain instances, statements 
made in the context of a performance appraisal can give rise to an implied 
contract for continued employment. See Davis, 934 P.2d 1246; Lincoln v. 
Wackenhut Corporation, 867 P.2d 701 (Wyo. 1994). A contract for continued 
employment is not formed, however, if the statements do not manifest an intent 
on the employer's part to create an employment relationship in which the 
employee may be discharged only for cause. Terry, 947 P.2d  at 
275-76.

[¶20]   Frontier Refining's performance 
appraisal form did not address termination in any manner. It simply indicated 
that Frontier Refining intended to use the performance appraisal process as a 
tool to enhance its employees' job performances. Better job performance 
increases an employee's value to his employer regardless of whether the 
employment relationship is at-will or continued. The performance appraisal form 
did not manifest an intent by Frontier Refining to include job security as a 
part of its employment relationship with its employees. 

[¶21]   Boone also contends that Frontier 
Refining's employment manual created an implied contract for continued 
employment. The employment manual included procedures for disciplining and 
discharging employees. Boone claims that Frontier Refining breached the implied 
employment contract by failing to follow the discharge procedures outlined in 
the employment manual.

[¶22]   The facts of the case at bar are 
somewhat different from those in our typical employment handbook cases. Boone 
admitted that Frontier Refining did not give him the employment manual and that 
he did not read it. He stated that he had seen the manual but that he could not 
remember when or under what circumstances he saw it. Tommy Woznick, a Frontier 
Refining manager, averred that the manual was distributed only to members of 
management and some supervisory employees and that Boone was not a manager or a 
supervisor at Frontier Refining. The district court determined that, because the 
employment manual was not widely distributed, it did not apply to Boone's 
employment and did not create an implied contract for continued 
employment.

[¶23]   Boone directs us to the case of 
Bear v. Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1998), in 
support of his claim that the employment manual gave rise to an implied contract 
for continued employment even though it was not distributed to most of Frontier 
Refining's employees. In Bear, a majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded 
that a disclaimer in Volunteers of America's employment manual prevented the 
implication of a contract for continued employment even though Bear claimed that 
she did not receive the disclaimer with the rest of her handbook. 964 P.2d  at 
1251-52. The Bear Court relied on a New Jersey Supreme Court case entitled 
Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corporation, 643 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1994), in reaching its 
decision. 964 P.2d  at 1251. In Nicosia, the court held that the relationship 
between the employer and the employee was governed by the entire employment 
handbook even though the employee may have received only a portion of the 
handbook. 643 A.2d  at 557-58. The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the 
employer had widely distributed the entire handbook among its employees. 643 A.2d  at 557-59. By contrast, the uncontradicted evidence in this case 
established that Frontier Refining did not routinely distribute the employment 
manual to its nonsupervisory employees. Accordingly, the Bear case is not 
applicable to this case.

[¶24]   Other jurisdictions have considered 
the issue of what effect an employment handbook, which was not generally 
distributed to employees, has on the employment relationship. See, e.g., Carbone 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 528 A.2d 1137, 1142-43 (Conn. 1987); Cederstrand 
v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 117 N.W.2d 213, 220-22 (Minn. 1962). The courts in 
Carbone and Cederstrand applied a contract formation analysis to determine 
whether the parties intended to enter into a contract. Id. The Wyoming Supreme 
Court recently utilized a similar analysis in Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 946 (Wyo. 1999), to determine whether a handbook disclaimer was effective. 
We conclude that such an analysis is the appropriate method for determining the 
issue presented here.

[¶25]   The basic elements of a contract 
are offer, acceptance, and consideration. Bouwens, 974 P.2d 946; Miller v. 
Miller, 664 P.2d 39, 40 (Wyo. 1983). Our concern in this case is with the 
question of whether Frontier Refining's employment manual constituted an offer. 
An offer is "`a manifestation of assent to enter into a bargain.'" Bouwens, 974 P.2d  at 946 (quoting 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.3., at 
163 (1990)). This Court looks at the external or objective manifestations of the 
parties' intentions as revealed by their actions. Id. We determine whether a 
reasonable man in the position of the offeree would have believed that the other 
party intended to make an offer. See id.

[¶26]   Frontier Refining's employment 
manual was not generally available to its work force. Only managers and some 
supervisors were given manuals. Boone was not given a manual, did not read the 
manual, and consequently could not have relied on its terms. A reasonable person 
in Boone's position would not have considered the undistributed employment 
manual to be an offer. The district court correctly concluded that the 
employment manual did not alter Boone's status as an at-will employee. The 
district court's decisions granting summary judgments in favor of Frontier 
Refining on Boone's employment contract claims were 
proper.

C. Retaliatory 
Discharge

[¶27]   Boone maintains that the district 
court erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of Frontier Refining on his 
claim that he was discharged in retaliation for reporting the unsafe condition 
to Frontier Refining. Frontier Refining argues that the district court's 
decision was correct. We agree with Frontier Refining.

[¶28]   The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a 
tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge in Griess v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989). A claim for 
retaliatory discharge arises when a person is discharged from his employment in 
violation of public policy. Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Incorporated, 891 P.2d 80, 81 (Wyo. 1995). A plaintiff must satisfy two requirements in order to 
establish a retaliatory discharge claim: (1) The discharge violated a well 
established public policy; and (2) there is no other remedy available to protect 
the interests of the discharged employee or society. Hermreck v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997); Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal 
Savings and Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶29]   We would normally begin our 
analysis of a retaliatory discharge claim by determining whether the discharge 
violated public policy. This Court identifies public policy, and consequently 
conduct which violates public policy, by looking to "`well-established 
legislative, judicial, or administrative mandate.'" Dynan, 792 P.2d  at 640 
(quoting Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D.R.I. 
1988)). It is not, however, necessary for us to determine whether discharging an 
employee for reporting an unsafe condition to his employer violates public 
policy because Boone failed to establish that Frontier Refining actually 
discharged him for reporting the unsafe condition.

[¶30]   In Cardwell v. American Linen 
Supply, 843 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Wyo. 1992), we discussed the relative burdens of 
the parties in a retaliatory discharge action. Although that case addressed a 
discharge allegedly resulting from the employee's filing of a request for 
worker's compensation benefits, some of the general principles announced in the 
decision are applicable to all retaliatory discharge cases. One of those 
principles is that an employee must show that his employer actually had a 
retaliatory motive for discharging him. See 843 P.2d  at 599. In Cardwell, the 
employee was required to show that she was discharged because she requested 
worker's compensation benefits. Id. Similarly, under this principle, Boone was 
obligated to establish that Frontier Refining discharged him because he reported 
the unsafe condition.

[¶31]   A prima facie case of retaliatory 
discharge may be shown by circumstantial evidence because an employer is not 
likely to admit that it had an improper motive for discharging the employee. 843 P.2d  at 600. In making that showing, "`[p]roximity in time between the claim and 
the firing is a typical beginning-point, coupled with evidence of satisfactory 
work performance and supervisory evaluations.'" Id. (quoting 2A Arthur Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 68.36 (1987)).

[¶32]   Boone reported the condition just 
prior to the explosion and fire that occurred in June 1992, and the managers 
questioned him a short time later. He was not fired until August 20, 1993. 
Accordingly, there was no proximity in time between Boone's report and his 
discharge. Furthermore, Frontier Refining stated that it discharged Boone 
because of his poor work performance. The summary judgment evidence included two 
performance appraisals which revealed that Boone's work performance was less 
than satisfactory. Boone alleges that he performed his job duties adequately and 
that Frontier Refining created the performance appraisals as a subterfuge to 
cover up its true motive for firing him. Boone did not, however, present 
evidence to prove his theory. He failed to establish that Frontier Refining 
discharged him in retaliation for reporting the unsafe condition, and the 
district court correctly granted a summary judgment in favor of Frontier 
Refining on his retaliatory discharge claim.

D. Promissory 
Estoppel

[¶33]   Boone contends that the district 
court erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of Frontier Refining on his 
claim for promissory estoppel. We agree with Frontier Refining's argument that 
Boone did not establish the requisite elements of a promissory estoppel claim. 
We discussed the elements of promissory estoppel in Terry, 947 P.2d at 276-77: 
"Promissory estoppel claims must show a clear and definite agreement, proof that 
the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on 
the agreement, and that the equities support enforcement of the 
agreement."

[¶34]   Boone asserts that the parties had 
a clear and definite agreement that he could be discharged only if just cause 
existed. He states that the representations made during his interview, in the 
performance appraisal form, and in the employment manual prove that Frontier 
Refining promised him job security. We have already ruled that the oral 
representations and the written materials were insufficient to create a contract 
for continued employment. They are also insufficient to demonstrate a clear and 
definite agreement. See Terry, 947 P.2d  at 276-77. Frontier Refining was 
entitled to a summary judgment on Boone's promissory estoppel 
claim.

E. Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

[¶35]   Boone contends that the district 
court erred by granting Frontier Refining a summary judgment on his tort claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Frontier 
Refining maintains that the district court's decision was correct, and we 
agree.

[¶36]   All employment contracts contain an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 220. In 
order to maintain a tort claim for breach of the implied covenant, the employee 
must show that he had a special relationship of trust and reliance with his 
employer. 868 P.2d  at 221.

[¶37]   We recently reviewed Wyoming case 
law discussing the special relationship requirement:

In Wilder, we 
held that mere longevity of service does not suffice to create the special 
relationship leading to the tort remedy. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221-22. Garcia v. 
UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996), added another factor 
to the concept of the special relationship. There we ruled that usually such a 
special relationship can be found only in a "long term employment relationship 
coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the 
employees. . . ." [920 P.2d] at 646. More recently, we said in Loghry[] that the 
trust and reliance necessary to give rise to the existence of such a tort claim 
may be found by "the existence of separate consideration, common law, statutory 
rights, or rights accruing with longevity of service." Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 
712.

VanLente v. 
University of Wyoming Research Corporation, 975 P.2d 594, 598 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶38]   Boone claims that Frontier 
Refining's employment policies guaranteeing its employees the right to be 
discharged only if just cause existed created the requisite special 
relationship. Earlier in this opinion, we concluded that neither Frontier 
Refining's employment manual nor its performance appraisal form created an 
implied contract for continued employment. Boone was an at-will employee. The 
mere existence of an employment relationship does not give rise to the special 
relationship that is necessary to establish the tort claim. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
221. Consequently, Boone failed to establish a special relationship to support 
his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
the district court properly granted a summary judgment in favor of Frontier 
Refining on that issue. 

F. Law of the 
Case

[¶39]   Boone asserts that the district 
court should have dismissed Frontier Refining's third summary judgment motion 
under the law-of-the-case doctrine. He claims that the issue presented in 
Frontier Refining's third motion for a summary judgment - whether Frontier 
Refining's representations to Boone gave rise to a contract for continued 
employment - was decided in favor of Boone in the earlier summary judgment 
rulings. Boone argues that the district court should not have revisited the 
issue.

[¶40]   In its initial ruling on Frontier 
Refining's second summary judgment motion, the district court stated that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not the parties had 
entered into an oral contract for continued employment. The parties did not, 
however, fully address that issue during the proceedings related to Frontier 
Refining's second motion for a summary judgment. The issue was fully developed 
during the proceedings associated with the third summary 
judgment.

[¶41]   District courts have discretion in 
determining whether to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine. Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo. 1998). Under the facts of this case, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it revisited the issue after the parties had 
fully briefed it.

[¶42]   Affirmed.