Title: Stockett v. Exxon Corporation

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

312 So. 2d 709 (1975) Robert N. STOCKETT et ux. v. EXXON CORPORATION. No. 48056. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 19, 1975. Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Richard L. Forman, Roger C. Landrum, Jackson, for appellants. *710 Heidelberg, Woodliff & Franks, Otis Johnson, Jr., Jackson, for appellee. Before GILLESPIE, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ. ROBERTSON, Justice. Exxon Corporation, successor to Humble Oil and Refining Company, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, against Robert N. Stockett and wife, Caroline Price Stockett, to recover $17,550, the total of rents paid under the terms of a lease to Humble entered into on June 27, 1968, together with interest at the legal rate from and after October 21, 1971. After all the evidence was in, the court granted a peremptory instruction to the plaintiff for the recovery of $17,550, but denied the recovery of any interest. Defendants have appealed. They contend: Plaintiff has cross-appealed. All errors assigned can be summed up in this one: Humble (Exxon's predecessor) wanted to acquire a service station site, about an acre, on the south side of the proposed Pearl-Pascagoula connection or interchange with Interstate 55. After extended negotiations, on November 8, 1966, an option for lease was given by the Stocketts to Humble. These were a few of the difficulties encountered: 1. The State of Mississippi claimed these lands and brought suit against the Stocketts to quiet title. The title question was finally resolved in the Stocketts' favor. See State v. Stockett, 249 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971). 2. Platted but unopened streets extended into these swamp and overflow lands. 3. The survey crews at times had to use boats to go on this land to attempt to survey it. 4. As new facts were developed, it was necessary for the City of Jackson to change the location and the description of the right-of-way to be acquired. With a commendable singleness of purpose, Humble and the Stocketts attempted to meet these difficulties head-on with other written instruments. The first amendment to the option for lease was executed on February 13, 1967; the second amendment on March 23, 1967; the third amendment on September 1, 1967; and the fourth amendment on June 6, 1968. The third amendment, among other things, contained this paragraph: The fourth amendment, among other things, provided: On June 27, 1968, a lease was entered into which contained this clause, specially typed into a printed form lease: Paragraph 20 was personally initialed in ink by all parties. On November 18, 1968, the Stocketts petitioned the City of Jackson for rights of access to their property. Their petition contained this paragraph: On July 3, 1969, the City of Jackson entered an order denying access to the Pearl-Pascagoula connection with I-55. On August 2, 1971, the City of Jackson refused to grant Humble a building permit on the land described in the lease of June 27, 1968. On September 21, 1971, Humble wrote the Stocketts canceling the lease under the provisions of paragraph 5 of the third amendment to land purchase option. On July 10, 1972, the long and extended negotiations with the City of Jackson came to an end, and the Stocketts on that day executed a warranty deed to the City of Jackson conveying 29 1/2 acres (including the Humble service station site) to the City of Jackson for $300,000 cash. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in construing and interpreting all of these instruments together as constituting the contract between the parties. They contend that the third amendment to the land purchase option should be isolated and separated from all of the other instruments *712 and construed by itself and, if so construed, the third amendment was without consideration because admittedly the $10 cash consideration recited therein was not paid. This argument is without any merit. It is perfectly obvious to us, as it was to the trial judge, that it takes all of these instruments to make the mosaic of this most complicated matter. All are inextricably woven into the warp and woof of the cloth. It is impossible to remove a part without destroying the whole. From Section 228(2), Restatement (Second) of Contracts, (Tent. Draft, 1973), we get this rule in aid of interpretation: The mutual advantages to Humble and the Stocketts are apparent if there could have been a successful culmination of all of these extended negotiations. Humble would have gotten a long-term lease of a valuable service station site, and the Stocketts would have been paid a handsome monthly rental for the term of the lease by Exxon, the largest corporation in the world. The trial court was correct in peremptorily instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff. The judgment is affirmed on direct appeal. In its cross-appeal, Exxon contends that the trial court erred in not allowing legal interest from October 21, 1971, to August 8, 1973. Cross-appellant is correct in its contention. The obligations of Exxon and the Stocketts were clearly matters of contract and not matters of forfeiture as interpreted by the trial judge. Mississippi has long held that the prevailing party in a breach of contract suit is entitled to have added legal interest on the sum recovered computed from the date of the breach of the contract to the date of the decree. Rubel v. Rubel, 221 Miss. 848, 75 So. 2d 59 (1945). The undisputed testimony was that 6% interest per annum from October 21, 1971, to August 8, 1973, amounted to $1,893.69. We reverse and render on cross-appeal. Exxon is entitled to judgment in the total sum of $19,443.69 ($17,550 principal plus $1,893.69 interest). Of course, this judgment for $19,443.69 bears interest at the legal rate from August 8, 1973, to the date of payment. Affirmed on direct appeal and reversed and rendered on cross-appeal. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.