Title: Edwin L. Edwards, individually, and ELL 12, LLC, d/b/a Huntsville Kia v. Kia Motors of America, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 5/16/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061167
____________________
Edwin L. Edwards, individually, and ELL 12, LLC, d/b/a
Huntsville Kia
v.
Kia Motors of America, Inc.
Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
(No. 06-14306)
SEE, Justice.
This case is before us on a certified question from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
1061167
2
Edwin L. Edwards, individually, and ELL 12, LLC, d/b/a
Huntsville Kia (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Edwards"), sued Kia Motors of America, Inc. ("KMA"), in
federal court, alleging violations of the Alabama Motor
Vehicle Franchise Act, § 8-20-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
Franchise Act").  Pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R. App. P., the
federal court has certified the following question to this
Court:
"[W]hether the Franchise Act permits an automobile
dealer to bring a claim under the Act, despite the
fact that both parties already executed a mutual
release agreement in which the dealer relinquished
all existing legal claims against the manufacturer 
in
exchange for valid consideration."
We answer that question in the negative.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2002, Edwards purchased a struggling Kia dealership in
Huntsville, with the understanding that KMA would later award
Edwards a dealership franchise in Opelika and find a buyer for
the Huntsville dealership.  However, over the next two years,
contractual disputes developed between Edwards and KMA
regarding inventory shipments and payments for warranty
services and dealer incentives.  The Huntsville dealership
continued to lose money, and, with no indication that KMA
1061167
3
would award Edwards the Opelika dealership, Edwards sought a
buyer for the Huntsville dealership.  In 2004, Edwards, who
had suffered continued losses, found a potential buyer for the
Huntsville dealership.  Pursuant to the dealership agreement
between Edwards and KMA, Edwards was required to secure KMA's
approval before transferring the dealership to any buyer.
When Edwards asked for KMA's approval for the sale, KMA asked
Edwards to sign a "Mutual Release Agreement," which provided
that the parties agreed to
"release, acquit and forever discharge 
one another 
of
and from all claims which have arisen or may ever
arise, demands and causes of action arising from,
related to, or in any manner connected with the sale
and service of Kia Products, including, without
limitation, the Dealer Agreement, and from any and
all claims for damages, related to or in any manner
connected with the Dealer Agreement or the parties'
business relationship. ..."
Edwards states that, with the deadline for closing the sale of
the Huntsville dealership approaching, Edwards was afraid that
KMA would not approve the sale if Edwards refused to sign the
release.  In December 2004, Edwards signed the release and,
thereafter, completed the sale of the Huntsville dealership.
In July 2005, Edwards brought the underlying action in the
federal district court, alleging violations of the Franchise
1061167
The amici curiae brief filed by the Automobile Dealers
1
Association of Alabama, Inc., and the National Automobile
Dealers Association argues 
that 
the issue is, instead, whether
the Franchise Act "encompasses retrospective releases of
liability that were not the result of a good faith settlement
of a bona-fide legal dispute and were not supported by
adequate consideration." Amici brief at 2.  However, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not asked us to
determine whether the settlement was negotiated in good faith
and supported by adequate consideration, nor have the parties
made this argument in their briefs.
4
Act and asserting other common-law claims.  KMA moved for a
partial summary judgment on those claims KMA argued were
barred by the release.  The court entered a summary judgment
in favor of KMA on those claims, and Edwards appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and then
certified 
to 
this 
Court 
this 
question 
of 
statutory
interpretation of the Franchise Act.
Analysis
The sole issue before us is whether the language of § 8-
20-11, Ala. Code 1975, and the remedial purpose of the
Franchise Act permit automobile dealers to bring claims under
the Franchise Act against automobile manufacturers after they
have executed a mutual release of, among other claims, those
then existing claims.   Section 8-20-11 reads as follows:
1
1061167
The statute does not distinguish between the dealer and
2
the manufacturer in its definition of "[any] person." § 8-20-
5
"Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or
conditions of any dealer agreement or franchise or
the 
terms 
or 
provisions 
of 
any 
waiver, 
and
notwithstanding any other legal remedies available,
any person who is injured in his business or property
by a violation of this chapter by the commission of
any unfair and deceptive trade practices, or because
he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement
which, if consummated, would be in violation of this
chapter, may bring a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction in this state to enjoin
further violations, to recover the damages sustained
by him together with the costs of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee."
Edwards argues that § 8-20-11 is a remedial statute that
must be interpreted broadly and that the release agreement
Edwards and KMA signed thus falls within the statutory meaning
of "any waiver."  Edwards further argues that a broad
interpretation of the phrase "any waiver" creates an exception
for both prospective releases -- those dealing with issues
that have not arisen at the time the release is executed --
and retrospective releases -- those dealing with issues known
or accrued at the time the release is executed.  Therefore,
Edwards argues, it should be able to bring its claims
notwithstanding the mutual release agreement it entered into
with KMA.   
2
1061167
3(12), Ala. Code 1975.  Therefore, under Edwards's theory, the
manufacturer would likewise be free to sue the dealer,
notwithstanding that the dealer had undertaken substantial
obligations in settlement of a manufacturer's claim against
the dealer under the Franchise Act.
KMA bases its argument on the general law of Alabama on
3
§ 12-21-109, Ala. Code 1975: "All receipts, releases and
discharges in writing, whether of a debt of record, a contract
under seal or otherwise, and all judgments entered pursuant to
pro tanto settlements, must have effect according to their
terms and the intentions of the parties thereto."  KMA argues
that based on this statute, the release should be enforced
according to its terms.  However, we have held: "Pursuant to
the principle that statutes dealing with the same subject
should be read in pari materia, statutes should be construed
together so as to harmonize them as much as practical, and, in
the event of a conflict, a specific statute relating to a
specific subject will prevail over a general statute relating
to a broad subject." Peebles v. Mooresville Town Council, [Ms.
1060335, September 7, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ n.5 (Ala.
2007)(citing Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala
1991)).  To the extent that the Franchise Act and § 12-21-109,
Ala. Code 1975, might both apply to a release that, as in this
case, is a transaction between an automobile dealer and an
automobile manufacturer, the specific provisions of the
Franchise Act control over the general provisions of § 12-21-
109, Ala. Code 1975. 
6
KMA argues in response that retrospective releases are
favored under general Alabama law and under the Franchise Act
in particular.   KMA further asserts that § 8-20-11, Ala. Code
3
1975, does not encompass retrospective releases of existing
claims and alleges that a construction of the Franchise Act
that allows parties to bring an action under the Act despite
1061167
As 
the Eleventh Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals indicates 
in 
its
4
opinion affirming the partial summary judgment in part, the
few 
instances 
of 
caselaw 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
dealing 
with
this issue are inapposite because of specific provisions in
the statutes at issue in those cases that provide for the
recognition of retrospective releases.  Edwards v. Kia Motors
of America, Inc., 486 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Sportique Motors, Ltd. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d
390, 397-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)("Further, [the plaintiffs] were
businessmen, represented by counsel, advised of the need for
the Release well before the execution thereof, and had the
option to invoke [a section] of the Dealer Agreement and
except the warranty reimbursement claims from the Release."),
and Schmitt-Norton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 524 F. Supp.
1099, 1105 (D. Minn. 1981)("The state regulations adopted
7
having executed a mutual retrospective release would foster an
absurd result.
After a review of the question certified to us by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and an
examination of the arguments of the parties, it appears that
the dispositive issue is whether the legislature intended the
term "any waiver" in § 8-20-11, Ala. Code 1975, to apply to the
type of mutual release agreement at issue here, or, in other
words, whether the legislature intended § 8-20-11 to apply so
broadly as to preclude parties subject to the Franchise Act
from reaching any form of binding agreement by which then
existing, ripe claims could be mutually settled without resort
to a judicial determination of the claim.4
1061167
under the statute clearly allow good faith settlement of
disputes: 'Nothing herein shall be construed to limit or
prohibit good faith settlements of disputes when such
settlements 
are 
voluntarily 
entered 
into 
between 
the 
parties.'
Minn.Reg.S.Div. 1718 (1976).  Nothing in the provisions cited
by the plaintiffs prevents settlement for past causes of
action; the statute is aimed at prospective waivers of
rights.")).  
8
"This Court has held that the fundamental rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting
a statute. ...  If possible, a court should gather
the legislative intent from the language of the
statute itself. ...  The legislative intent may be
gleaned from the language used, the reason and
necessity for the act, and the purpose sought to be
obtained by its passage."
 
Norfolk S. Ry. v. Johnson, 740 So. 2d 392, 396 (Ala. 1999).  We
first look to the language of the statute.  Although the
Franchise Act, in § 8-20-3, Ala. Code 1975, defines 13 terms,
1061167
Although the Franchise Act does not define "waiver," it
5
is a well-settled principle of Alabama law that a "'[w]aiver
is generally defined as the intentional relinquishment of a
known right.' Bell v. Birmingham Broad. Co., 263 Ala. 355,
357, 82 So. 2d 345, 347 (1955)." Ernst & Young, LLP v. Tucker,
940 So. 2d 269, 288 (Ala. 2006) (See, J., concurring
specially).
This Court has stated that "[a] release is a contract and
6
must be supported by a lawful and valuable consideration; and,
if not supported by a lawful consideration, is nudum pactum.
Brown v. Lowndes County, 201 Ala. 437, 78 So. 815, 817."
Hamilton v. Edmundson, 235 Ala. 97, 101, 177 So. 743, 746
(1937).
9
neither "waiver"  nor "release"  appears in that definitional
5
6
section.  
In § 8-20-2, Ala. Code 1975, the legislature expressed its
intent in enacting the Franchise Act:
"The legislature finds and declares that the
distribution and sale of motor vehicles within this
state vitally affect the general economy of the state
and the public interest and the public welfare, and
that in order to promote the public interest and the
public welfare, and in the exercise of its police
power, it is necessary to regulate motor vehicle
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and their
representatives and to regulate the dealings between
manufacturers and distributors or wholesalers and
their dealers in order to prevent fraud and other
abuses upon the citizens of this state and to protect
and preserve the investments and properties of the
citizens of this state."
"The purpose of the [Franchise] Act is clear.  It is to protect
the state's citizens from abuses by motor vehicle manufacturers
1061167
10
and dealers, and, to that end, to regulate manufacturers and
dealers and the dealings between manufacturers and their
dealers."  Sutherlin Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA,
Inc., 549 So. 2d 460, 461 (1989).  We have stated that the
purpose of the Franchise Act is "to give balance to the
inequality of bargaining power between individual dealers and
their manufacturers."  Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC
Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883, 887 (1989).  The Franchise Act
proscribes certain practices, such as persuading dealers to
absolve the manufacturer from liability arising from the unfair
trade practices enumerated in the Franchise Act.  However,
there is no indication of a legislative intent to prohibit the
parties to an automobile-dealership franchise agreement from
reaching a good-faith settlement of existing claims after those
claims arise and entering into a binding settlement agreement.
Section 8-20-11, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes the dealer or
the manufacturer to bring a civil action notwithstanding the
terms of the dealership agreements, franchise agreements, or
waivers, and notwithstanding the availability of other legal
remedies.  However, there is no indication that § 8-20-11 does
or was intended to prohibit the settlement of known claims as
1061167
11
an alternative to taking them to trial and ultimately to
judgment.  If the legislature had wished to include the
settlement and release of known claims in the language of § 8-
20-11, Ala. Code 1975, it knew how to do so.  The legislature
lists prospective releases and waivers in describing specific
unfair trade practices under the Franchise Act:
"[T]he following acts or conduct shall constitute
unfair and deceptive trade practices:
"....
"(3) For any manufacturer, factory branch,
factory representative, distributor, or wholesaler,
distributor branch or distributor representative:
"....
"(m) To prospectively assent to a release,
assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel which
would relieve any person from any liability or
obligation under this chapter or to require any
controversy between a new motor vehicle dealer
and a manufacturer to be referred to any person
other than the duly constituted courts of this
state or the United States, if the referral would
be binding on the new motor vehicle dealer ...."
  
§ 8-20-4(3)(m), Ala. Code 1975.  The legislature did not
similarly include a retrospective release as an unfair trade
practice or include such a release in its list of ineffective
provisions in § 8-20-11.  Had the legislature meant to require
1061167
12
the litigation of every disagreement between a manufacturer and
a dealer, it could have said so.
We have read the disputed language of § 8-20-11 of the
Franchise Act in the context of the entire Act.  The dissent
takes issue with our decision to do so.  It criticizes this
Court for not looking at the language of the provision in
isolation, at what the dissent calls the "very plain language"
of the phrase "any waiver."  The dissent notes that the parties
have "'conceded that the terms "waiver" and "release" can be
synonymous.'" ___ So. 2d at ___ (quoting Edwards v. Kia Motors
of America, Inc., 486 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2007))
(emphasis added).  Apparently, because there exists a context
in which the two terms can be used synonymously, the dissent
would have this Court not inquire whether, in the context of
the Franchise Act, the legislature intended the terms to be
synonymous.  This, the dissent would have us believe, is what
is meant by "plain meaning."
This Court recently stated:
"Our inquiry is governed 
by 
settled principles of
statutory construction:
"'"The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that this Court is to
1061167
13
ascertain and effectuate the  legislative
intent as expressed in the statute. League
of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 290
So. 2d 167 (1974).  In this ascertainment,
we must look to the entire Act instead of
isolated phrases or clauses; Opinion of the
Justices, 264 Ala. 176, 85 So. 2d 391
(1956)."'"
Bright v. Calhoun, [Ms. 1061146, January 11, 2008] ___ So.  2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (quoting City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957
So. 2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala. 2006), quoting in turn Darks Dairy,
Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 367 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Ala.
1979)).  "Because the meaning of statutory language depends on
context, a statute is to be read as a whole."  Ex parte Jackson
614 So. 2d 405, 406 (Ala. 1993).  In determining legislative
intent our interpretation of the statutory language in § 8-20-
11, therefore, must be guided by the Franchise Act as a whole,
instead of simply accepting as exclusive and inevitable the
possible meaning of two isolated words outside this or any
other particular context.  "'"A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used."'" Parker v.
State, 648 So. 2d 653, 657 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Lowe
1061167
The implication in the dissent is that the Franchise Act
7
should be read to operate against the manufacturer and in
favor of the dealer and that it is the duty of this Court to
enforce such an application in favor of the one and against
the other class of parties.  It is instead the duty of this
Court to apply the law as it is written, regardless of the
identity of the parties, "dispassionately approach[ing] the
issues on their merits, as we are required by oath to do."
Kaylor v. State, 782 So. 2d 206, 211 (Ala. 2000).  The
language of § 8-20-11, Ala. Code 1975, that must guide us in
our decision applies, as we remark in note 2, to "any person
[whether manufacturer or dealer] who is injured in his
business or property by a violation of this chapter by the
commission of any unfair and deceptive trade practices ...."
(Emphasis added.)  The remedies provided by the Franchise Act
are thus available to the manufacturer for the dealer's unfair
or deceptive trade practices delineated in § 8-20-4(2) and to
the dealer for the manufacturer's unfair or deceptive trade
practices delineated in § 8-20-4(1).  If the one is bound, the
other is also; if the one is not bound, neither is the other.
14
v. State, 54 Ala. App. 280, 284-85, 307 So. 2d 86, 90 (1974)
(Cates, J., concurring specially), quoting in turn Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918)).  We decline to ignore the
legislative intent expressed in the Franchise Act as a whole in
favor of an isolated interpretation of the phrase "any waiver"
that is required to produce the result the dissent would have
us reach.  
7
Conclusion
The remedial purpose of the Franchise Act is to address
unfair trade practices between automobile manufacturers and
1061167
15
automobile dealers in the State of Alabama.  Section 8-20-11,
Ala. Code 1975, protects both parties by prohibiting either
from exempting its conduct from the requirements of the
Franchise Act.  It does not, however, render unenforceable the
settlement and release of existing claims.  We, therefore,
answer the federal court's question in the negative.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1061167
See also 
Keenan D. Kmiec, The 
Origin and Current Meanings
8
of "Judicial Activism," 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1441 (2004).
16
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.  The term "judicial activism" is susceptible to
many meanings; it has been referred to as a "notoriously
slippery term."  Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and
Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism? 73 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1401 (2002).   However, as this Court discusses the term in the
8
context of the review of substantive law or statutes, see,
e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Citizens of Alabama, 740 So. 2d 371
(Ala. 1999), it implies a willingness on the part of the Court
to invade, improperly, the province of the legislature by
refusing to apply the plain meaning of the statute before us in
favor of substituting language and meaning that are not
otherwise present.  Thus, the Court becomes a sort of
"superlegislature" that imposes its particular agenda on the
citizens of our State without the benefit of the usual
legislative process.  Certainly this is a bad thing.  Not only
does the Court disregard its obligations under the state and
federal constitutions, but it also demonstrates an abandonment
of principles that are absolutely critical to an effective
1061167
17
system of justice.  "Our system relies for its validity on the
confidence of society; without a belief by the people that the
system is just and impartial, the concept of the rule of law
cannot survive."  People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court of
Riverside County,  39 Cal. 3d 740, 746, 705 P. 2d 347, 351, 218
Cal. Rptr. 24, 28 (1985).  
When judicial activism is understood as the willingness of
this Court to improperly substitute itself for the legislature,
this case presents a picture of judicial activism that is worth
a thousand words.  Section 8-20-11, Ala. Code 1975, states:
"Notwithstanding 
the 
terms, 
provisions, 
or
conditions of any dealer agreement or franchise or
the 
terms 
or 
provisions 
of 
any 
waiver, 
and
notwithstanding any other legal remedies available,
any person who is injured in his business or property
by a violation of this chapter by the commission of
any unfair and deceptive trade practices, or because
he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement
which, if consummated, would be in violation of this
chapter, may bring a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction in this state to enjoin
further violations, to recover the damages sustained
by him together with the costs of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee."
(Emphasis added.)  In addition to this very plain language,
this Court has also discussed the legislature's purpose in
enacting the Franchise Act as "to give balance to the
1061167
18
inequality of bargaining power between individual dealers and
their manufacturers."  Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC
Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883, 887 (Ala. 1989)(emphasis added).
That is, automobile dealers in this State are to receive some
protection from the inequality of bargaining power that exists
in their transactions with automobile manufacturers by having
their claims of violations under the Franchise Act preserved
for judicial adjudication, regardless of contractual releases
or waivers the dealers may be compelled to sign in order to do
business. 
That purpose is directly applicable to this case, a
situation in which an automobile dealer has been pressured into
signing a release in order to effectively transact business
with a much more powerful automobile manufacturer.  Here, as a
result of the manufacturer's unfulfilled promises,  Edwards had
the choice of executing the release or suffering financial
ruin, essentially a choice "between a rock and a hard place."
In spite of the facts presented here, and in spite of the plain
language of § 8-20-11 and this Court's previous statements of
law concerning the legislature's intent as stated in § 8-20-2,
the majority opinion embarks on a semantic voyage to ascertain
1061167
19
the legislature's "intent" by attempting to parse a meaningful
distinction between concepts of "release" and "waiver," a
distinction the parties have conceded does not exist.  See
Edwards v. Kia Motors of America, Inc., 486 F.3d 1229, 1233
(11th. Cir. 2007) ("[D]uring oral argument, both parties
conceded that the terms 'waiver' and 'release' can be
synonymous.").  The result of the  majority's analysis is a
conclusion that the emphasized language quoted above from § 8-
20-11 does not mean what it says it means.  Because I cannot,
on any reasonable reading of the above statutory language --
particularly in light of the legislative purpose in enacting
the Franchise Act -- conclude that it means other than what it
says, I must conclude that the release agreement does not bar
Edwards's action.  In short, the majority opinion rewrites § 8-
20-11 to say that certain releases and waivers do in fact
operate to prevent a dealer from bringing a claim under the
Franchise Act in the courts of our State.  Not only does the
opinion "relegislate" § 8-20-11, but it also obviates the
legislature's intent as expressed in § 8-20-2 and Tittle,
supra, so as to remove the  protections in the Franchise Act
1061167
20
from the inequality in bargaining power that exists between
dealers and manufacturers.
In the past, this Court operated under a duty to adhere to
legal precedent without regard to the outcome of  the case, and
it consistently concluded that the plain language of a statute
required that this Court apply the language as stated.  The
rule has generally been stated as follows:
"'When [a] statutory pronouncement is clear and not
susceptible to a different interpretation, it is the
paramount judicial duty of a court to abide by that
clear pronouncement.'"  
Macon v. Huntsville Utils., 613 So. 2d 318, 320 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Parker v. Hilliard, 567 So. 2d 1243, 1346 (Ala.
1990)).  This rule has found application even in the recent
past.  See, e.g., Bright v. Calhoun, [Ms. 1061146, January 11,
2008] ___ So. 2d ___ , ___ (Ala. 2008) (quoting City of
Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala. 2006)
("'To discern legislative intent [for purposes of statutory
construction], the Court must first look to the language of the
statute. If, giving the statutory language its plain and
ordinary meaning, we conclude that the language is unambiguous,
there is no room for judicial construction.'")); Boutwell v.
1061167
21
State, [Ms. 1050299, September 21, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
(Ala. 2007) ("'[P]rinciples of statutory construction instruct
this Court to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean
exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction
only if the language in the statute is ambiguous.' Ex parte
Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ala. 2001)."); Cleburne County
Comm'n v. Norton, [Ms. 1060135, August 17, 2007] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2007)("'"'Words used in a statute must be given
their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the
language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room
for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of
the legislature must be given effect.'"'" (quoting Tolar
Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So. 2d 138, 149 (Ala.
2006), quoting in turn  Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen,
714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998), quoting in turn IMED Corp. v.
Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992))).
I believe that the majority opinion flies in the face of this
precedent and the many other cases that have espoused the
1061167
22
principle that this Court's paramount duty is to interpret the
plain  language of the law to mean what it says.
With respect to the contention that giving effect to the
plain language of § 8-20-11 means that no preexisting claim can
ever be settled, it is more accurate to say that giving effect
to the plain language of the statute means that a manufacturer
may not by weight of its greater bargaining position in
compelling a franchise agreement force a dealer to give up its
right to adjudicate its claims of violations of  the Franchise
Act.  Claims may still be settled by adjudication and
settlement, and claims may be forestalled by honest business
practices that do not give rise to violations of the Franchise
Act.  The statute says what it says.  Had the legislature
intended to except the release of known claims from the
operation of § 8-20-11, it could have done so.  The plain
language of the statute permits litigation alleging an unfair
trade practice notwithstanding prior agreements.  This language
may not be convenient for an entity that is stronger
economically and that seeks to force a weaker one into
compliance with its terms by allowing a release of known claims
in the context of contract negotiations, but I submit that
1061167
23
disregarding the language and intent of the Franchise Act is
the antithesis of the "strict construction" to which judicial
"conservatives"  give lip service."  Rather, rewriting § 8-20-
11 and discarding the intent of the legislature represents
judicial activism, which this Court should never endorse. 
Because I believe that a consistent application of this Court's
principles of statutory construction is a critical component of
American justice and of this Court's credibility as an agent of
that justice, I must dissent.