Title: JEFFREY D. HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEFFREY D. HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 150Case Number: No. S-09-0185Decided: 11/22/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

JEFFREY 
D. HOLLOWAY,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT,* and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Jeffrey D. Holloway, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of second 
degree sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced to three to eight years in 
prison.  He seeks reversal of that 
conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.  We will affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Holloway raises 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Was 
Mr. Holloway denied due process of law by the prosecutor's misconduct in 
pursuing a charge she knew was not supported by any 
evidence?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On December 3, 
2008, the victim, a fourteen-year-old girl, reported to police that she had been 
involved in a sexual relationship with Holloway, aged twenty-six years, in 
October 2008.  Among other things, 
the victim reported going to Holloway's house on the morning of October 24 after 
getting off the school bus and having sex with him.  The victim also reported having sex with 
Holloway "6-7 times" during the two-week period preceding October 24.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State 
ultimately charged Holloway with three counts of second degree sexual abuse of a 
minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009), with each count 
pertaining to an act of sexual intercourse occurring on October 22, 23, and 24, 
respectively.  After a preliminary 
hearing, the case was bound over to district court and proceeded to trial on 
July 8, 2009.  

 
 
[¶5]      Following jury 
selection and before opening statements, and in the course of a hearing on a 
series of motions, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the district court judge 
discussed the prosecutor's concern that the victim's testimony might not support 
Count III, which related to the alleged incident of sexual intercourse on 
October 24.  The prosecutor thought 
she had filed a motion to dismiss that charge, but her file review showed she 
had not.  Ultimately, the prosecutor 
decided not to dismiss the charge until she had an opportunity to evaluate the 
victim's testimony regarding the events of October 24.1  Defense counsel objected to continuing 
with Count III, but the district court determined its only option under the 
circumstances was to wait and see what testimony came out at trial.  

 
 
[¶6]      When the victim 
testified at trial, she specifically recalled engaging in sexual intercourse 
with Holloway on October 23.  
However, she was unable to remember whether she had sex with him on 
October 24, nor could she recall if sexual intercourse occurred on October 
22.   Based on the victim's 
lack of memory about October 22 and 24, the prosecutor elected to dismiss Counts 
I and III, and that decision was relayed to the jury by the district court 
before the second day of trial.  The 
case was eventually submitted to the jury on the sole remaining count (Count 
II), and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  The district court sentenced Holloway to 
serve three to eight years in prison.  
This appeal followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Holloway insists 
that reversible error occurred when the prosecutor pursued the October 24 
criminal charge, a charge he claims the prosecutor clearly knew was not 
supported by any evidence.  He 
contends that the prosecutor's actions violated several rules of professional 
conduct and resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial.  The State counters that the prosecutor 
had a reasonable belief that some incriminating evidence existed to support the 
charge  the victim's initial statements to police  and, therefore, did not 
violate her ethical duties by pursuing it.

 
 
[¶8]      In addressing a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our focus is on the prejudicial effect of the 
misconduct.  In Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 21, 141 P.3d 690, 
697 (Wyo. 2006), abrogated on other 
grounds by Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, 193 P.3d 266 (Wyo. 2008), we 
described our standard of review as follows:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the entire record must be 
considered.  Whether such misconduct 
is reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, 
or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, our primary 
focus is whether an accused's case has been so seriously prejudiced by the error 
that a fair trial has been denied.  
Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005); Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 
(Wyo. 2004).  This involves a 
determination as to whether, "based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Lopez, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d  at 
157.  [The appellant] bears the 
burden of establishing prejudicial error.  
Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d  at 
554.

 
 
[¶9]      Applying these 
legal principles, we cannot conclude that reversible error occurred in this 
instance.  First, we are not 
persuaded under the facts of this case that the prosecutor violated her ethical 
responsibilities by prosecuting the October 24 charge.  More importantly, we are not convinced 
from our review of the entire record that the prosecutor's pursuit of that 
charge, even if deemed improper, resulted in substantial prejudice amounting to 
the denial of a fair trial.

 

[¶10]   As previously noted, the prosecutor 
dismissed the October 24 charge, and the jury was told of its dismissal before 
the second day of trial.  After 
that, there was only minimal reference to the victim's initial report of sexual 
contact on that date; the alleged sexual activity was not emphasized, nor was it 
used as substantive evidence of Holloway's guilt.  Most importantly, the evidence of 
Holloway's guilt on Count II was quite strong.  The victim testified in detail to having 
sex with Holloway on October 23.  
She recounted going to Holloway's house after getting off the school bus 
that morning, lying with him in his bed, and engaging in foreplay and eventually 
sexual intercourse.  The victim 
never wavered that the sexual encounter occurred on that day because she 
specifically remembered missing the entire day of school.   Other evidence presented at trial 
substantially corroborated the victim's testimony.  For example, the school records revealed 
the victim missed the entire day of school on October 23.  Considering the strength of the evidence 
in conjunction with what transpired at trial, we do not believe the inclusion of 
the October 24 charge had a deleterious effect on the jury's verdict.  We therefore cannot conclude a 
reasonable possibility exists that the exclusion of that charge would have led 
to a more favorable verdict.  
Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The essence of the prosecutor's concern was the victim's statement to her 
that no sexual encounter occurred on October 24, which was the underlying basis 
for her initial decision to dismiss that charge.  That statement contradicted what the 
victim had originally reported to law enforcement.  The prosecutor concluded in light of the 
victim's earlier statements to law enforcement that she might have simply 
misunderstood what the victim had told her.