Title: V.C. v. M.J.B.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for the Court. The issue in these appeals involves the legal standard to be applied to a third party's claim to joint custody and visitation of her former domestic partner's biological children, with whom she lived in a familial setting and in respect of whom she claims to have functioned as a psychological parent. V.C. and M.J.B., who are lesbians, met in 1992 and began dating on July 4, 1993. On July 9, 1993, M.J.B. went to see a fertility specialist to begin artificial insemination procedures. According to M.J.B., she had made a decision to become pregnant independently and before beginning her relationship with V.C. Between November 1993 and February 1994, M.J.B. underwent several insemination procedures, at least two of which V.C. attended. On February 7, 1994, the doctor informed M.J.B. that she was pregnant. Eventually, she was informed that she was having twins. The children were born on September 29, 1994. V.C. was present in the delivery room at the birth of the children. Following the birth of the twins, M.J.B. and V.C. opened savings accounts for the children, naming V.C. as custodian for one account and M.J.B. as custodian for the other. Although they decided to have the children call M.J.B. mommy and V.C. Meema, M.J.B. referred to V.C. as a mother of the children. In addition, M.J.B. supported the notion, both publicly and privately, that during the months after the children were born, the parties and the children functioned as a family unit. Both M.J.B. and V.C. claimed that they made substantive decisions regarding the children's lives, such as those regarding the selection of a pediatrician and a day care center. In addition, V.C. maintained that she acted as a co-parent to the children and had equal parenting responsibility for them. Various witnesses testified as to the parental relationship between the children and V.C. and acknowledged that V.C. played an important role in the children's lives. In February 1995, M.J.B. and V.C. purchased a home together. Later that year, V.C. asked M.J.B. to marry her , and M.J.B. accepted. The two held a commitment ceremony in July 1995 in which they were married. At the ceremony, V.C., M.J.B., and the twins were blessed as a family. V.C. and M.J.B. joined the Lambda family organization, which is a social group in which children become aware of other families that also have gay and lesbian parents. V.C. and M.J.B., together with the children, attended at least ten Lambda family functions. In addition, as a group, V.C., M.J.B., and the twins attended family functions, holidays, and birthdays. During their relationship, the couple discussed both changing the twins' surname to a hyphenated form of the women's names and the possibility of V.C. adopting the children. Although the couple consulted an attorney on the subject of adoption, V.C. and M.J.B. never actually proceeded with it. In August 1996, M.J.B. ended the relationship. The parties then took turns living in the house with the children until November 1996. In December 1996, V.C. moved out. M.J.B. permitted her to visit with the children until May 1997. During that time, the children spent every other weekend with V.C. and V.C. contributed money toward the household expenses. In May 1997, M.J.B. stopped accepting V.C.'s money and refused to allow her to visit the children because she believed that V.C. was not properly caring for them and that the children were suffering distress from continued contact with V.C.. Both parties became involved with new partners after the relationship ended. Eventually, V.C. filed a complaint for joint legal custody of the children. At trial, expert witnesses appeared for both parties. Although they disagreed as to whether the children would suffer any long-term effects if their relationship with V.C. were severed, both agreed that the children enjoyed a bonded relationship with V.C. and that they would benefit from continued contact with her. The trial court denied V.C.'s applications for joint legal custody and visitation because it concluded that she failed to establish that the bonded relationship she enjoyed with the children had risen to the level of psychological parenthood. In reaching that decision, the trial court gave significant weight to the fact that M.J.B. had made an independent decision to have children. Finding that V.C. did not qualify as a psychological parent, and because she did not allege that M.J.B. was an unfit parent, the trial court determined that V.C. lacked standing to petition for joint legal custody. In addition, the trial court denied V.C.'s application for visitation, determining that visitation would not be in the best interests of the children because the M.J.B. and V.C. harbored animosity toward one another, which might be passed along to the children. V.C. appealed. The Appellate Division panel decided the case in three separate opinions. Judge Stern authored the majority opinion, which affirmed the denial of V.C.'s application for joint legal custody, concluding that it was not in the best interests of the children. However, the majority reversed the denial of her petition for visitation, concluding that V.C. had established a parent-like relationship with the children and that V.C.'s continued contact with them would be in their best interests. The majority remanded for proceedings to establish a visitation schedule. The two partial dissenters took opposite positions on the issues. Judge Braithwaite determined that V.C. did not qualify as a psychological parent and thus would have denied both joint custody and visitation. Judge Wecker concluded that V.C. qualified as a psychological parent and that the best interests standard necessarily applies to both visitation and custody. She would have granted visitation on the record before her and remanded for a best interests hearing on joint custody. An order for visitation was established on March 26, 1999. Both M.J.B. and V.C. appealed to the Supreme Court as of right based on the dissents. Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied M.J.B.'s motion for a stay and accelerated the appeals. HELD: Third parties who live in familial circumstances with a child and his or her legal parent may achieve, with the consent of the legal parent, a psychological parent status vis-a-vis a child, which may not unilaterally be terminated by the legal parent; the standard to be applied to custody and visitation issues between the legal parent and a psychological parent is the best interests of the child. 1. Although there are no statutes explicitly addressing whether a former unmarried domestic partner has standing to seek custody and visitation with her former partner's biological children, by the existing statutory scheme dealing with issues of custody and visitation, the Legislature has expressed its view that children generally should not be denied continuing contact with parents after the relationship between the parties ends. (p. 17) 2. Language in N.J.S.A. 9:2-13(f) defining the word parent evinces a legislative intent to leave open the possibility that individuals other than natural or adoptive parents may qualify as parents, depending on the circumstances. Thus, V.C. does not lack standing to apply for joint custody and visitation. (pp. 18-20) 3. The right of a legal parent to the care, custody and nurturance of his or her own child, while fundamental, is not absolute and may be infringed upon by the state if the parent is unfit or endangers the health or safety of the child. (pp. 20-22) 4. Even in the absence of a showing of unfitness of a parent, the existence of exceptional circumstances has been recognized as an alternative basis for a third party to seek custody and visitation of another person's child. (pp 22-23) 5. The exceptional circumstances category includes the psychological parent cases in which a third party has stepped in to assume the role of the legal parent who has been unable or unwilling to undertake the obligations of parenthood. (pp. 23-25) 6. Because V.C. invokes the exceptional circumstances doctrine based on her claim to be a psychological parent to the twins, she has standing to maintain her action separate and apart from the statute. (pp. 25-26) 7. To establish that one has become a psychological parent to the child of a fit and involved legal parent, the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and a parent-child bond must be forged. (pp. 26-29) 8. A psychological parent-child relationship that is voluntarily created by the legally recognized parent may not be unilaterally terminated after the relationship between the adults ends. (pp. 30-32) 10. Financial contribution may be considered but should not be given inordinate weight when determining whether a third party has assumed the obligations of parenthood. Rather the assumption of a parental role is determined by the nature, quality, and extent of the functions undertaken by the third party and the response of the child to that nurturance. (pp. 33 34) 11. The most important factor in considering whether a psychological parent-child relationship has been established is the existence of a parent-child bond. A determination regarding the actuality and strength of the parent-child bond generally will require expert testimony. (p. 34) 12. When a legal parent voluntarily has chosen to cede a measure of parental authority to a third party; to allow that party to function as a parent in the day-to-day life of the child; and to foster the forging of a parental bond between the third party and the child, the legal parent has created a family with the third party and the child, necessarily reducing the parent's expectation of privacy in her relationship with her child. Where such actions have altered the child's life by essentially giving the child another parent, the legal parent's options are constrained and it is the child's best interest that is preeminent. (pp. 35-36) 13. Once a third party has been determined to be a psychological parent to a child, he or she stands in parity with the legal parent, and custody and visitation issues are to be determined on a best interests standard giving weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. (p. 36) 14. Under ordinary circumstances, when the evidence concerning the child's best interests (as between a legal parent and psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to the legal parent. (p. 36-37) 15. Visitation will be the presumptive rule, subject to the considerations set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, as would be the case if two natural parents were in conflict. (pp. 37-38) 16. Because V.C. has not been involved in the decision-making for the twins for nearly four years, to interject her into the decisional realm at this point would be unnecessarily disruptive for all involved. Thus, joint legal custody is not ordered in this case. (p. 39) 17. Continued regular visitation between V.C. and the children is in the children's best interests because V.C. is their psychological parent. (p. 39) 18. Third parties who live in familial circumstances with a child and his or her legal parent may achieve, with the consent of the legal parent, a psychological parent status vis-a-vis a child, and the parent-child bond created cannot be unilaterally terminated by the legal parent. When there is conflict over custody and visitation between the legal parent and a psychological parent, the standard to be applied is the best interests of the child. (p. 40) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate opinion concurring in the opinion and judgment of the Court. While Justice O'Hern agrees that the degree of intrusion on parental autonomy is properly resolved in this case by the standard set forth in the Court's opinion, he adheres to the views expressed in his dissenting opinion in Watkins v. Nelson, ____ N.J. ____ (2000), also filed this date, that the determination of custody following the death of a custodial parent requires a different standard in order to protect a grieving child from being removed from her home before she is able to bear the twin losses of a parent and the familiar presence of those family members who had provided her nurture and love. JUSTICE LONG also filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Long added, however, that although the values attached to family life are properly attributed to the nuclear family model of husband, wife and children, those values can exist in other settings, including families created by unmarried persons regardless of their sexual orientation. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate concurring opinion, as did JUSTICE LONG. V.C., Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. M.J.B., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued October 25, 1999 -- Decided April 6, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 319 N.J. Super. 103 (1999). Alfred J. Luciani argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent. Robin T. Wernik argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Granata, Wernik & Zaccardi, attorneys). Leslie Cooper, a member of the New York bar, argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights and Lambda Families of New Jersey (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Ms. Leslie, David M. Wildstein, David R. Rocah and Lenora M. Lapidus, on the brief). Gregory J. Sullivan submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Concerned Women for America (Hartsough, Kenny & Chase, attorneys). The opinion of the court was delivered by LONG, J. In this case, we are called on to determine what legal standard applies to a third party's claim to joint custody and visitation of her former domestic partner's biological children, with whom she lived in a familial setting and in respect of whom she claims to have functioned as a psychological parent. Although the case arises in the context of a lesbian couple, the standard we enunciate is applicable to all persons who have willingly, and with the approval of the legal parent, undertaken the duties of a parent to a child not related by blood or adoption.See footnote 11 Further, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 provides, in part, that [t]he Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy. In any proceeding involving the custody of a minor child, the rights of both parents shall be equal . . . . By that scheme, the Legislature has expressed the view that children should not generally be denied continuing contact with parents after the relationship between the parties ends. N.J.S.A. 9:2-13(f) provides that [t]he word parent, when not otherwise described by the context, means a natural parent or parent by previous adoption. M.J.B. argues that because V.C. is not a natural or adoptive parent, we lack jurisdiction to consider her claims. That is an incomplete interpretation of the Act. Although the statutory definition of parent focuses on natural and adoptive parents, it also includes the phrase, when not otherwise described by the context. That language evinces a legislative intent to leave open the possibility that individuals other than natural or adoptive parents may qualify as parents, depending on the circumstances.See footnote 44 If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, the court must determine the intent of the Legislature from its plain meaning. Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999) (citing Board of Educ. v. Neptune Township Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.J. 16, 25 (1996) (quoting State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982))). Moreover, statutory language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. In re Sussex County Mun. Utils. Auth., 198 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting Hackensack Bd. of Educ. v. Hackensack, 63 N.J. Super. 560, 569 (App. Div. 1960)). By including the words when not otherwise described by the context in the statute, the Legislature obviously envisioned a case where the specific relationship between a child and a person not specifically denominated by the statute would qualify as parental under the scheme of Title 9. Although the Legislature may not have considered the precise case before us, it is hard to imagine what it could have had in mind in adding the context language other than a situation such as this, in which a person not related to a child by blood or adoption has stood in a parental role vis-a-vis the child. It is that contention by V.C. that brings this case before the court and affords us jurisdiction over V.C.'s complaint.See footnote 55 [Custody of H.S.H.-K., supra, 533 N.W.2d at 421 (footnote omitted).] Recapping, the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond must be forged. We are satisfied that that test provides a good framework for determining psychological parenthood in cases where the third party has lived for a substantial period with the legal parent and her child.See footnote 66 Prong one is critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with the child. Without such a requirement, a paid nanny or babysitter could theoretically qualify for parental status. To avoid that result, in order for a third party to be deemed a psychological parent, the legal parent must have fostered the formation of the parental relationship between the third party and the child. By fostered is meant that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant. Ordinarily, a relationship based on payment by the legal parent to the third party will not qualify. The requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it places control within his or her hands. That parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child. However, if she wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the child. Two further points concerning the consent requirement need to be clarified. First, a psychological parent-child relationship that is voluntarily created by the legally recognized parent may not be unilaterally terminated after the relationship between the adults ends. Although the intent of the legally recognized parent is critical to the psychological parent analysis, the focus is on that party's intent during the formation and pendency of the parent-child relationship. The reason is that the ending of the relationship between the legal parent and the third party does not end the bond that the legal parent fostered and that actually developed between the child and the psychological parent. Thus, the right of the legal parent [does] not extend to erasing a relationship between her partner and her child which she voluntarily created and actively fostered simply because after the party's separation she regretted having done so. [J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)(footnote omitted).] In practice, that may mean protecting those relationships despite the later, contrary wishes of the legal parent in order to advance the interests of the child. As long as the legal parent consents to the continuation of the relationship between another adult who is a psychological parent and the child after the termination of the adult parties' relationship, the courts need not be involved. Only when that consent is withdrawn are courts called on to protect the child's relationship with the psychological parent. V.C., Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. M.J.B., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. O'HERN, J., concurring. I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court. I agree that the degree of intrusion on parental autonomy is properly resolved here by the standard set forth in the Court's opinion. I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Watkins v. Nelson, ___ N.J. ___ (2000), that the determination of custody following the death of a custodial parent requires a different standard in order to protect a grieving child from being removed from her home before she may be able to bear the twin losses of a parent and the familiar presence of those family members who, until then, had provided her nurture and love. v. M.J.B., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent Long, J., concurring.See footnote 77 Sociologists who study the family have concluded that, like all social institutions, it has certain attributes or characteristics. Two of those are the stability of the parents' relationship and parental nurturing. Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, The Family: From Institution to Companionship, 651 (1953); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law 1 985 Wis. L. Rev. 1135, 1142-43 (1985). A third characteristic identified by scholars is the family's claim to autonomous privacy. Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay & Lesbian Family Values by a Simulacrum of Marriage , 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1699, 1717 (1998). That privacy association spawned the family's awareness of itself as a precious emotional unit demanding isolation from outside intrusion. Id. at 1718 (quoting Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family, 227 (1975)). It also resulted in a concept of domestic privacy with an objective meaning; the family not only experienced itself as private, but was recognized as such by society. Teitelbaum, supra, 1 985 Wisc. L. Rev. at 1144. The dominant model of the American family, both emotionally and legally, is the nuclear family -- a social institution with a sort of corporate identity: a collective of husband, wife, and children. Teitelbaum, supra, 1 985 Wisc. L. Rev. at 1138. Over time, because of the dominance of the nuclear family in our collective consciousness, the attributes of family life came to be associated with it to the exclusion of any other model: The stability of the companionate couple and the sustenance of parental nurturing were to become the quintessential American family values. As a necessary corollary, in aid and protection of the values, came recognition of the family as an autonomous bastion of privacy. Although the nuclear family was merely the perceived repository of these valued characteristics, eventually it came to be viewed by many as though it represented a value on its own right. [Christensen, supra, 66 Fordham L. Rev. at 1718.] NO. A-111/126 V.C., Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. M.J.B., Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED April 6 , 2000 Chief Justice Poritz The more expansive statutes allow third parties, without regard to blood relationship, to seek both custody and visitation. Examples include: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 46b-57, 59 (West 1999)(allowing custody or visitation to any interested third-party . . . upon such conditions and limitations as [the court] deems equitable ); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. 571-46(2), (7)(West 1999)(granting standing to third persons for custody when in the best interests of child and granting de facto parent prima facie award of custody; visitation standing granted to any person interested in the welfare of the child in court's discretion); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, 28 (West 1999) (granting standing to any third party to petition for custody if court deems such award expedient or in child's best interest); Or. Rev. Stat. 109.119(1)(granting standing to [a]ny person . . . who has established emotional ties for either custody or visitation); Va. Code Ann. 16.1-241(A)(Michie 1999)(granting standing to any party with a legitimate interest to petition for visitation or custody of child).