Title: Fonville v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE G. FONVILLE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 2, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1409005465 
§  and 1203007725 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 17, 2015 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 13, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 13th day of October 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In September 2014, the defendant-appellant, Andre Fonville, 
was arrested on multiple drug-related charges.  As a result of these charges, 
Fonville also was charged with violating the terms of his probation in Cr. ID 
1203007725.  On December 16, 2014, Fonville pled guilty to one count each 
of Possession of Heroin in a Tier 5 Quantity and Drug Dealing in a Tier 2 
Quantity.  He also admitted that he was a habitual offender and that he had 
violated his probation.  The Superior Court immediately sentenced Fonville 
2 
 
as a habitual offender to a total period, including the VOP, of thirty-two 
years and six months at Level V incarceration, with credit for 100 days 
previously served, to be suspended after serving five years in prison for one 
year at Level IV Crest followed eighteen months at Level III Crest 
Aftercare.  This is Fonville’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Fonville’s counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and 
careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
By letter, counsel informed Fonville of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
gave him a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief and 
appendix.  Fonville also was informed of his right to supplement counsel’s 
presentation.  Fonville has raised several issues for inclusion in the Rule 
26(c) brief.   
 
(3) 
In response to his counsel’s motion to withdraw, Fonville 
enumerates six issues for the Court’s consideration.  First, he contends that 
the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to provide him with a 
copy of the Medical Examiner’s drug testing report.  Second, he contends 
that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant.  In a third, related 
argument, he asserts that the search warrant was executed at night but was 
not a nighttime search warrant.  Fourth, Fonville argues that the evidence 
3 
 
was insufficient to establish the possession charge.  Fifth, he contends that 
the Superior Court erred in failing to sanction the State for committing a 
discovery violation.  And, sixth, Fonville contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
 
(4) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  a) the Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the 
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) 
the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine 
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues 
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1    
 
(5) 
With the exception of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, which we decline to consider for the first time in this direct appeal,2 
the disposition of Fonville’s remaining claims hinges on the Court’s 
determination of whether Fonville entered his guilty plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.3  It is well-settled that a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to challenge any errors 
                                                 
1 Penson v Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 Sahin v. State, 7 A.3d 450, 451 (Del. 2010) (claims of ineffective assistance generally 
are not considered for the first time on direct appeal). 
3 Lewis v. State, 2010 WL 2163910, at *1 (Del. May 11, 2010). 
4 
 
occurring before the entry of the plea, “even those of constitutional 
dimensions.”4 
 
(6) 
In this case, Fonville does not raise any argument challenging 
the validity of his plea.  Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that 
Fonville knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty with a full 
understanding of the rights he was waiving.  The judge engaged in a 
colloquy with Fonville in open court.  Fonville informed the judge that he 
understood the charges against him and that he was pleading guilty because 
he was, in fact, guilty.  Fonville stated that he had reviewed the guilty plea 
agreement and that he understood its meaning.  Fonville also told the judge 
that no one was forcing him to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with his 
counsel’s representation.  The Superior Court accepted Fonville’s plea and 
sentenced him in accordance with his plea agreement. 
 
(7) 
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that Fonville’s 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waived his right to challenge 
the search warrant or the search, to challenge any alleged discovery issues or 
violations, or to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.5  We have 
reviewed the record carefully and conclude that Fonville’s appeal is wholly 
                                                 
4 Wilson v. State, 2010 WL 572114, at *2 (Del. Feb. 18, 2010) (quoting Smith v. State, 
2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004)). 
5 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202 (Del. 2015) (holding that the defendant’s valid 
guilty plea waived any right to challenge the strength of the State’s evidence, including 
the chain of custody of the drug evidence). 
5 
 
without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We also are 
satisfied that Fonville’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine 
the record and has properly determined that Fonville could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice