Title: BROWN v STAUFFER CHEMICAL CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12928 I N T H E SUPREM6 C O U R T OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 T E R R Y D . BROWN, p l a i n t i f f and Appellant, STAUFFER CHEMICAL GO. , .. . , A Corporation, and LeRoy Mehring, an Individual, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l District, Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : McKittrick and Duffy, Great F a l l s , Montana Joseph Duffy and L e s l i e Waite, 111, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Robert H. Prigge argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: June 17, 1975 -- Decided : >j{J: 3 I ' \Q)il I Filed : M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a summary judgment i n favor of defendant Stauffer Chemical Co., and an appeal from a damage award of $1.00 i n favor of p l a i n t i f f Terry D. Brown and against defendant LeRoy Mehring. The complaint alleges t h a t Brown was an employee of Stauffer and t h a t Mehring was a supervisory employee of Stauffer. That Brown was hired on o r about December 4, 1972, and worked u n t i l December 23, 1972, a t an hourly r a t e of pay a t ~ t a u f f e r ' s plant near Silver Bow, Montana. A t the time Brown was employed, he was eighteen years of age. There was no written contract. Brown alleges t h a t while he was working f o r Stauffer, h i s I I supervisor Mehring engaged i n a constant course of action of harassment.:' Asked what t h i s consisted o f , Brown s a i d i n answer t o interrogatories: "INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Set f o r t h a l l the f a c t s , actions and circumstances alleged by you i n Paragraph 6 of Count 1 I of your Complaint of an alleged constant course of action of harassment' by the Defendant Mehring. "ANSFJER: The time was 7:45 p.m. when I was i n the o f f i c e a t the h i l l . I was talking on the phone when LeRoy came i n t o t h e office. The f i r s t thing he did 1 was say, ~ e t ' s go sweetheart'. Well, I t o l d him m y name wasn't sweetheart! He said, 'O.K., Sweetheart. I And t h a t ' s when I called him a scab. Right away he said 'DO you want t o go home, boy?' I d i d n ' t say any- thing, I j u s t hung up the phone and he s t a r t e d g e t t i n g on m y back some more. He said I was f i r e d and I said, 'What f o r , c a l l i n g you a scab?' H e said, 'yeah!' I went out of the o f f i c e i n t o the lunchroom t o get m y s t u f f together when LeRoy came i n again. H e s t a r t e d t e l l i n g m e t o get out of there. He said, 'I t o l d you you a r e fired. 1 And he kept t e l l i n g m e t o get out. I t o l d him t o 'get off m y back' and t h a t I ' d go when I got m y coat and bucket. IIe kept t e l l i n g m e t o get out so I got m y s t u f f together and l e f t . Mehring continually c a l l e d I m e sweetheart' a s well a s obscene names and-gave m e p a t s on the r e a r a t d i f f e r e n t times." (Emphasis supplied) The same alleged f a c t s a r e asserted by Brown a s t o h i s allegation of " w i l l f u l and malicious assault and i n j u r i e s and humiliation. 11 11 Brown a s s e r t s t h a t he was covered by, protected by1' and had t h e benefits of an agreement between Stauffer and Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2 e f f e c t i v e June 28, 1972. Brown admits t h a t he was covered by a l l of the provisions of t h a t agreement, including t h e following: "INTERROGATORY NO. 13: In t h e event t h a t you claim any r i g h t s under said agreement between Stauffer Chemical Company and Butte Teamsters Union, Local No. 2, does Section 7.5 reading a s follows: "'7.5 A n employee s h a l l be on probation u n t i l he has worked up t o t h i r t y (30) calendar days following t h e date of h i s employment unless the probationary period i s extended by mutual agreement. I f t h e employee i s retained a f t e r h i s probationary period, h i s name s h a l l be added t o the s e n i o r i t y l i s t a s of the date of h i s l a s t employment. The company may, i n i t s sole dis- cretion, termmate t h e employment o i an employee on probation.' I I apply t o your period of employment by Stauffer Chemical Company? "ANSWER: I had not worked 30 calendar days p r i o r t o m y dismissal." (Emphasis supplied.) I t The above c o n s t i t u t e s a l l of the evidence on wrongful discharge. I I It i s c l e a r from Brown's own admission t h a t he had not worked t h i r t y calendar days and was s t i l l on probation. He has completely admitted t h a t during those t h i r t y calendar days: 11 The Company may, i n i t s sole discretion, terminate the employment of an employee on probation. 11 The t r i a l court had ample and s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o grant a motion f o r summary judgment f o r Stauffer a s a matter of law. In Count I1 of the complaint p l a i n t i f f alleges general damages of $1,000 against Stauffer and punitive damages of $50,000 f o r alleged a c t s constituting w i l l f u l and malicious a s s a u l t and humiliation. In l i g h t of section 92-204.1, R.C.M. 1947, and McGrew v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 141 Mont. 324, 377 P.2d 350, ~ r o w n ' s s o l e remedy against h i s employer Stauffer f o r a s s a u l t , i f any, was a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The t r i a l court was completely j u s t i f i e d i n granting summary judgment f o r Stauffer when the answers t o defendant's interrogatories were f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t there was no genuine issue of material f a c t a s t o ~ t a u f f e r ' s l i a b i l i t y toward Brown f o r wrongful discharge o r a s s a u l t and battery. As t o the issue of damages of $1.00 only a s against Mehring, the e n t i r e basis f o r the claimed damages a r e the same a s previously quoted from t h e answer t o Interrogatory No. 6. 1 I Put simply t h a t basis is---Mering called m e sweetheart" a s well a s obscene names and gave m e pats on the r e a r a t d i f f e r e n t times. These a r e a l l t h e f a c t s of the so-called a s s a u l t and battery. Obviously the mere words a r e not an a s s a u l t ; and 11 c e r t a i n l y i n a plant working environment a pat on the rear" i s hardly actionable a s s a u l t and battery. The e n t i r e exchange i s insignificant and Montana's 1947 Revised Codes, section 49-125, s t a t e s h he law disregards t r i f l e s " . Even assuming t h a t a battery occurred, the award of nominal damages i s a l l t h a t i s required. The t r i a l court was j u s t i f i e d i n i t s r u l i n g t h a t the record disclosed no genuine issue of material f a c t on punitive damages. The material f a c t s were contained i n the complaint and answers t o interrogatories. There simply was not j u s t i c i a b l e issue a s t o defendant Stauffer and summary judgment was correct. Nominal damages of $1.00 a s against defendant Mehring a r e a l s o j u s t i f i e d on t h i s record, and t h i s Court does not wish t o indulge i n an extended discussion of law on such a t r i f l i n g matter. The judgment i s affirmed. W e Concur: . . i ( * ? 1 I f , . , I . 7 ' s +* e:J:d,.: " d W*" 5 - f . - -b---r,bd-,Lm--Lr.-h-------------'z-%a Chief J u s t i c e