Title: THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING V. THOMAS L. CROW and CAROL-ANN CROW, JAMES E. MOELLER and SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL INC., Trustees of the TLC/CGC Trust

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING V. THOMAS L. CROW and CAROL-ANN CROW, JAMES E. MOELLER and SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL INC., Trustees of the TLC/CGC Trust2007 WY 177170 P.3d 117Case Number: S-07-0031Decided: 11/05/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
THE BOARD OFCOUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF TETON 
COUNTY, WYOMING,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.THOMAS 
L. CROW and CAROL-ANN CROW, JAMES E. MOELLER and SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL 
INC., Trustees of the TLC/CGC 
Trust,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

James L. 
Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Bradford 
S. Mead and Katherine L. Mead, Jackson, 
Wyoming; and Tim Newcomb of Grant & 
Newcomb, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Board of 
County Commissioners of TetonCounty (TetonCounty) challenges an order of the 
district court that declined to order the abatement (removal) of excessive 
square footage added to a home built by Thomas and Carol-Ann Crow (Crows).  The maximum square footage allowed by 
the Teton County Land Development Regulations (LDRs) is 8,000 square feet of 
habitable space.  The home in 
question was originally designed as an 8,000 square foot home, but a contingency 
set of plans provided for renovation of that design so as to enlarge it to 
11,000 square feet, without changing the "footprint" of the home.  Immediately following the issuance of a 
certificate of occupancy for the 8,000 square foot home, the Crows enlarged the 
home to 11,000 square feet by converting porches to habitable space, and by 
flooring in rooms with cathedral ceilings so as to provide more habitable 
space.

 
 
[¶2]      In Board of County Commissioners v. Crow, 
2003 WY 40, 65 P.3d 720 (Wyo. 2003), we reversed an order of the district court 
that found the LDRs were unconstitutional as applied to the Crows.  Our conclusion was that the LDRs did not 
violate substantive due process either facially or as applied, and that 
TetonCounty had the statutory 
authority to enact the LDRs.  We 
remanded the matter back to the district court for reconsideration in light of 
that decision.

 
 
[¶3]      In Board of County Commissioners v. Crow, 
2006 WY 45, 131 P.3d 988 (Wyo. 2006), we reversed an order of the district court 
which imposed fines that appeared to be inconsistent with the penalty provisions 
of the statutes the Crows violated and which did not provide for abatement of 
the 3,000 square feet of habitable space that the Crows added to the house in 
violation of the LDRs, a penalty also contemplated by the governing statute, in 
addition to the fines.  We remanded 
the case to the district court to reconsider the fine imposed, as well as to 
more meaningfully address the issue of abatement, in light of the prevailing 
authority which we deemed pertinent to the answer to those 
questions.

 
 
[¶4]      On December 18, 
2006, the district court issued an order which we will set out in detail 
below.  TetonCounty appeals yet again, claiming that 
the district court erred in declining to order abatement of the offending 3,000 
square feet that has constituted a continuous violation of the LDRs since it was 
constructed.  We will affirm that 
order.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]      TetonCounty raises these 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Is the district court's "perception and finding" that 
confusion, disagreement and lack of clarity as to how to interpret and enforce 
Section 2450 "undoubtedly influenced by the Crow's decision to embark and 
continue on their ill advised course," clearly erroneous?

            
2.  Is the district court's "perception and finding" that the 
County's previous enforcement efforts "undoubtedly influenced the Crows' 
decision to embark and continue on their ill advised course," clearly 
erroneous?

            
3.  Did the district court abuse its limited discretion in 
denying the requested abatement, under the totality of the circumstances 
presented, thereby allowing the Crows to purchase a variance to which they are 
not otherwise legally or equitably entitled?

 
 
In 
response, the Crows query:

 
 
            
I.          
Should the County's appeal be dismissed as nothing more than a 
reiteration of its last appeal?

 
 
            
II.         
Were the district court's conclusions that abatement was not necessary in 
this case clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, or arbitrary and 
capricious?

 
 
Although 
it is not included in their statement of the issues, the Crows state that the 
court should find "that the County's appeal is frivolous and award Crows their 
costs on appeal.1"

 
 
[¶6]      In its reply 
brief, TetonCounty asks that we address 
these additional arguments:

 
 
1.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that there is a factual 
basis in the record for the district court's perception and finding that 
confusion, disagreement and lack of clarity as to how to interpret and enforce 
Section 2450 "undoubtedly influenced the Crows' decision to embark and continue 
on their ill-advised course," as urged by the Crows, the Crows' argument still 
fails because any confusion, disagreement or lack of clarity that the Crows or 
their architects may have had prior to trial was resolved (1) around the same 
time that the Crows began planning to intentionally violate Section 2450, and 
(2) long before the Crows began actual construction of the unpermitted additions 
to their home.

 
 
2.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that there is a factual 
basis in the record for the district court's perception and finding that the 
County's previous enforcement efforts "undoubtedly influenced the Crows' 
decision to embark and continue on their ill-advised course," as urged by the 
Crows, the Crows' argument still fails because the County's "previous 
enforcement efforts" (1) occurred after the Crows embarked on their ill-advised 
course; (2) concerned relatively minor violations of Section 2450; and (3) do 
not justify the Crows' intention[al] violation of Section 
2450.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶7]      In our most 
recent consideration of this case, we provided this general guidance to the 
district court in order to explain the purpose of the 
remand:

 
 
The 
district court reached these conclusions with respect to 
abatement:

 
 
105.  Abatement 
of the violation therefore requires serious consideration from the Court.  The conduct of the Crows and Overton was 
deliberate, premeditated, and egregious.  
However, the Court believes the interests of the citizens of TetonCounty are adequately addressed by the 
fines imposed herein.  

 
 
106.  The 
Court's leniency in this regard should not, however, be misconstrued.  The Court has the authority to order 
abatement as a remedy for violations of Teton County's LDR's and these parties 
and future litigants are on notice that the remedy of abatement is likely for 
future violations brought to this Court's attention.

 
 
The 
district court was correct insofar as it determined that it had the authority to 
order abatement.  However, based on 
the authority recited above, we agree that TetonCounty, the zoning and planning authority, 
need not make a showing of irreparable injury.  The violation of the LDR constitutes a 
basis for the imposition of an abatement order.  The district court is required to make 
specific findings balancing the equities.  
Only then may the district court ascertain if its equitable power to deny 
an injunction, or any other enforcement mechanism, is appropriate under the 
totality of the circumstances presented.

 
 
Fines

 
 
            
As noted above, the district court imposed a fine on Crow for 242 days in 
connection with Crow's violation of the habitable space regulation.  It is evident that Crow's violation of 
that regulation continued for a considerably longer time than 242 days, although 
we decline to make a precise calculation in that regard in disposing of this 
appeal.  It is also readily evident 
to this Court that Wyo. Stat.  Ann. 
§§ 18-5-204 and 18-5-206 make imposition of a fine mandatory for each day a 
violation continues.  See Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 42, 86 P.3d 270, 288 (Wyo.2004); also see 2 E.C. Yokley, supra, § 15-2 at 15-3; and Wright v. City of Guthrie, 150 Okla. 171, 1 P.2d 162, 163-64 (1931).  We agree 
with TetonCounty that the district court is required to impose a 
fine for each day Crow's habitable space violation continued, and that the 
record does not reflect a stipulation by TetonCounty that the fine should be imposed for 
a lesser period of time.

 
 

Crow, 
¶¶ 15-16, 131 P.3d  at 994.

 
 
[¶8]      The facts of this 
case are well summarized in our prior opinions and we will not iterate them 
here.  Each of the parties filed a 
brief after the second remand, and it is clear that the district court carefully 
considered those briefs, as well as the evidence developed at the May 3-5, 2004 
hearing held after our first remand.  
Based on those materials the district court issued the following 
order:

 
 
1.  The 
original and amended judgments entered in this matter on January 24, 2005 and 
February 22, 2005 detailed with particularity the Court's perception of the 
defendants' (Crows) conduct in this matter.

 
 
2.  Specifically, 
the Court found that the Crows' conduct in violating Sections 1320 and 2450 was 
deliberate, premeditated and egregious.

 
 
3.  The 
Court did not sufficiently detail the factors that it considered, in the 
exercise of its discretion, in declining to order abatement [demolition and 
removal and/or closing off some habitable areas that were added to the house by 
flooring in cathedral ceilings] as proposed by the County.  The Supreme Court was entirely correct 
to remand this matter with instructions to consider and address this 
deficiency.

 
 
4.  The 
factors considered by the Court in declining to order abatement fall into three 
general categories:  1) the size, 
character, and use of the house; 2) the conduct of the County officials and 
employees; and 3) the interest and benefit to the citizens of TetonCounty.

 
 
5.  With 
respect to the size, character, and use of the home, the Court considered that 
the "footprint" or the outside dimensions of the house did not materially change 
(with the exception of the two exterior porches) from the dimensions actually 
approved by the County.

 
 
6.  The 
Crows' home is not a 20 story edifice2 or a garish eyesore completely out 
of character with the community as a whole or the prevailing architecture.  No complaints were expressed by the 
Crows' neighbors.  The home 
otherwise complies with the restrictive covenants of the subdivision in which it 
is located and in the absence of the interior additions and alterations 
illegally added, would have complied with Teton County 
LDR's.

 
 
7.  The 
Court is of the opinion that the scheme of abatement proposed by the County is 
not likely to materially change or increase the use and occupancy of the 
residence by the Crows.  The Crows 
own the adjoining lot in the subdivision and could conceivably achieve the same 
result by building a second home or guest house.  The Court further notes that the 
provisions of Section 2450 do not even apply to habitable space below ground 
level and the testimony and evidence at trial indicated that the Crow residence 
contained substantial finished basement area that was not included in the 
calculations as habitable space [. . .] but could be utilized and /or converted 
to serve the same purposes as the offending portions of the Crow residence the 
County seeks to block off.

 
 
8.  With 
respect to the conduct of County officials and employees, the Court finds there 
was considerable confusion, disagreement, and lack of clarity as to how to 
interpret and enforce the Teton County Land Development Regulations, Section 
2450 in particular.  Those issues 
are detailed in the references to the trial transcript as set forth on page 2 of 
Defendant's Crow's Memorandum on the 
Issue of Abatement and Fines and Proposed Order Regarding the Same filed 
herein.

 
 
9.  The 
Court further finds that the previous enforcement efforts of the County have 
been characterized generally by some combination of the issuance of variances, 
and/or after the fact permits and modest fines.  Those previous enforcement actions and 
efforts are detailed in the references to the trial transcripts set forth on 
page 3 of Defendant's Crow's Memorandum 
on the Issue of Abatement and Fines and Proposed Order Regarding the Same. 

 
 
10.  The 
significance of the foregoing, in terms of balancing the equities is the Court's 
perception, and finding, that the County's prior conduct undoubtedly influenced 
the Crows' decision to embark and continue on their ill-advised course, and in 
the Court's opinion, under the facts of this case, degrade the County's 
expressed concern for the connection between the limitations imposed by Section 
2450 and the stated public objective.

 
 
11.  In 
terms of the interest TetonCounty has in enforcing the Land 
Development Regulations, the Court was originally and remains of the opinion 
that those interests are adequately served without requiring 
abatement.

 
 
12.  The 
Court notes that the Supreme Court in Crow I upheld and validated the 
constitutionality of the County's land development regulation scheme 
generally.  Section 2450 was 
specifically held to be valid and enforceable.

 
 
13.  Significantly, 
this Court held that the provisions of Sections 1350 and 2450 applied not only 
to the Crows but to their contractor (Overton) as well.  In addition, the Court levied a fine of 
$38,500.00 on the Crows' contractor.  
The fine has been paid and the contractor did not appeal.  This finding and judgment by the Court 
represents a strong precedent in any future enforcement action and while the 
Crows and others similarly situated might be blessed with significant financial 
resources, the Court believes the extension of liability to the actual builder 
and the fine assessed against the builder, will have a significant chilling 
effect on future violations and ultimately may represent the most important 
aspect of this litigation.3

 
 
14.  The 
total fine assessed against the Crows for their violation of Section 1350 and 
2450 was $363,000.  To the Court's 
knowledge, this fine far exceeds any previous fine levied in TetonCounty 
and as far as the Court was able to determine, it exceeds any fine previously 
levied in a residential setting on any individual in the State of Wyoming.4

 
 
15.  Based 
on the foregoing and in attempting to balance the equities of the parties and 
[to] serve the interests of the citizens of Teton County, the Court determined 
that a measured and escalated response in terms of the penalty assessed in this 
case was appropriate, together with a clear statement and warning that future 
violations of a similar nature would be met with an abatement 
order.

 
 
[¶9]      The remainder of 
the district court's order dealt with the matter of the fines to be imposed and 
when the time for ceasing the continued accumulation of fines would occur.  In a modification of the December 18, 
2006 Order, entered in the record on January 29, 2007, the district court 
clarified that the total fines to be paid by the Crows was $714,000.00.  Neither party appealed from that 
order.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Our discussion need be only very 
brief.  We agree with TetonCounty that Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the 
district court's order are unsound, and we do not rely on them in our decision 
to affirm the district court's ultimate conclusion.  There is no evidence in the record that 
the Crows were influenced to break the law because they saw others around them 
being allowed to do so.  However, 
even if that were the case, it would not constitute an "equity" to be balanced 
in their favor in circumstances such as this.  In an equitable weighing process, those 
factors could only be considered as further evidence of duplicity and 
dishonesty.  Similarly, even if the 
Crows detected "confusion" as to exactly how the LDRs should be interpreted, the 
actions they decided to undertake could not be justified.  Their "confusion," if there was any at 
all, was answered by the denial of their request for a variance, which they 
decided to flout rather than to clarify by further administrative means.  To suggest that that aspect of the 
processes at work here could excuse, or even explain in part, what the Crows did 
in this case is disingenuous.

 
 
[¶11]   The County asserts that the 
imposition of fines merely allows the Crows to buy a right to violate the law or 
to procure an "after the fact" variance.  
We cannot disagree that there is a significant measure of truth in that 
observation.

 
 

[¶12]   However, we have often recited the 
definition of judicial discretion as "a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously."  We 
must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it 
did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 
719 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶13]   We conclude that in its totality, 
the district court's balancing process resulted in a reasoned decision and was 
not an abuse of discretion.  The 
court properly considered the size, character, and use of the house and interest 
the County has in enforcement of its regulations.  Given the unique facts with which the 
district court was presented, the remedy chosen by the district court was not 
unreasonable and was supported by the record.

 
 
[¶14]   We will briefly mention that 
TetonCounty's appeal was clearly 
meritorious, and so no award of attorneys' fees or damages will be 
made.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   We affirm the district court's 
December 18, 2006 order denying abatement.  
The court's balancing of the equities was supported by the evidence and 
within the court's sound discretion.  
The accumulation of fines for the subject violations ceased as of the 
entry of the district court's clarifying order entered on January 29, 
2007.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although not 
specified in the brief, we assume that the Crows make reference to W.R.AP. 10.05 
which provides:

 
 
If the 
judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee shall recover 
the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed at the rate 
allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys' fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).

 
 

2This is a 
reference to a case cited in our remand wherein a builder was required to abate 
(tear down) a twenty-story apartment building because it was built in violation 
of land development regulations limiting structures to single family dwellings 
(no more than two per acre).  Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191 (Fla.App, 4 Dist. 2001).  
In a later finding, the district court may also be referring to this 
case, which was initiated by neighboring property owners who owned single family 
dwellings.

 
 
This 
quotation from the Pinecrest case is, 
perhaps, especially apropos in these sorts of 
circumstances:

 
 
            
The statute says that an affected or aggrieved party may bring an action 
to enjoin an inconsistent development allowed by the County under its 
Comprehensive Plan.  The statutory 
rule is that if you build it, and in court it later proves inconsistent, it will 
have to come down.  The court's 
injunction enforces the statutory scheme as written.  The County has been ordered to comply 
with its own Comprehensive Plan and restricted from allowing inconsistent 
development; and the developer has been found to have built an inconsistent land 
use and has been ordered to remove it.  
The rule of law has prevailed.

 
 
Pinecrest, 795 So. 2d  at 
209.

 
 

3This 
particular paragraph in the district court's balancing formula is not of 
particular significance in our analysis of this case, because it does not take 
into account that the fine may well have been paid (or in the future will be 
paid) by the homeowner on behalf of the contractor.  The real chilling effect might better 
lie in the loss of the privilege (license) to act as a contractor in TetonCounty, or some documentable proof that 
the burden of such a fine actually does fall on the shoulders of the 
contractor.

 
 

4This 
particular paragraph is not without some substance, but the much larger question 
and the much more onerous burden in most cases will be abatement, rather than 
mere fines (unless the fines exceed the value of the structure and the cost of 
its abatement combined).