Title: State v. Weideman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 2002-Ohio-1484.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WEIDEMAN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Weideman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501.] 
Criminal law — Where law enforcement officer, acting outside statutory 
territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense 
committed and observed outside officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the 
motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth 
Amendment — Officer’s statutory violation does not require suppression 
of all evidence flowing from the stop. 
(Nos.  00-1869 and 00-2126 — Submitted October 31, 2001 — Decided April 3, 
2002.) 
CERTIFIED by and APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 98-
P-0109. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Where a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial 
jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and 
observed outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by 
the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.  
Therefore, the officer’s statutory violation does not require suppression of 
all evidence flowing from the stop. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  The state of Ohio appeals the judgment of the Portage 
County Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to suppress following her conviction for driving while under the influence 
of alcohol. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
On May 24, 1998, Ravenna Police Officer David S. Rarrick was working 
the midnight shift.  Officer Rarrick left the Ravenna city limits to check on a 
fellow Ravenna police officer, who had failed to radio his status to the dispatcher.  
After confirming that the officer was in no distress, Officer Rarrick drove back 
toward Ravenna. 
 
While stopped at an intersection approximately half a mile outside 
Ravenna, Officer Rarrick observed a car coming toward him, traveling “well left 
of center.”  As he observed the car, it went off the right side of the road twice and 
again traveled left of center. 
 
Officer Rarrick stopped the vehicle and radioed the police dispatcher to 
request that the Ohio State Highway Patrol or the sheriff’s office be sent to the 
scene because he was making a traffic stop outside his jurisdiction.  As Officer 
Rarrick approached the car, driven by defendant Pamela Weideman, he smelled a 
strong odor of alcohol and observed that her eyes were bloodshot.  Officer Rarrick 
performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test and noticed that Weideman’s eyes 
could not smoothly follow a moving object.  Based on these indicators, Officer 
Rarrick had Weideman step out of the car to perform a finger-to-nose sobriety test 
to ensure that he had enough reason to detain Weideman until the state police 
arrived.  Officer Rarrick then informed Weideman that she was being detained 
until the state police arrived, and retained possession of her car keys, driver’s 
license, vehicle registration, and insurance card.  He did not arrest Weideman. 
 
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes after Officer Rarrick stopped 
Weideman, Sergeant Dunbar of the Ohio State Highway Patrol arrived.  After 
speaking to Officer Rarrick, Sergeant Dunbar  conducted his own series of field 
sobriety tests.  Sergeant Dunbar concluded that Weideman was under the 
influence of alcohol and placed her under arrest. 
 
Weideman was transported to the Ravenna Highway Patrol Post, where 
she submitted to a breath-alcohol test, which registered 0.239 grams of alcohol 
January Term, 2002 
3 
per two hundred ten liters of breath.  As a result, Weideman was cited for driving 
under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and driving with 
a prohibited breath-alcohol content in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3). 
 
Weideman filed a motion to suppress in which she argued that Officer 
Rarrick had “no lawful cause” to stop and detain her, and that there was no 
probable cause to arrest her without a warrant.  The trial court overruled 
Weideman’s motion to suppress because, in the words of the trial court, Officer 
Rarrick had the “right to be in the area of the stop” and “noticed what could be 
perceived as a hazard.” 
 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court 
erred when it overruled defendant’s motion to suppress, because “the observed 
traffic offense and the stop and detention occurred outside of Officer Rarrick’s 
territorial jurisdiction.”  R.C. 2935.03(A)(1) governs a police officer’s jurisdiction 
to arrest and states: 
 
“A sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, municipal police 
officer, township constable, police officer of a township or joint township police 
district * * * shall arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, a person 
found violating, within the limits of the political subdivision * * * in which the 
peace officer is appointed, employed, or elected, a law of this state, an ordinance 
of a municipal corporation, or a resolution of a township.” 
 
The court of appeals reasoned that the extraterritorial stop in this case was 
unlawful and thus per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The court of appeals certified a conflict pursuant to S.Ct. Prac.R. IV, 
finding that its judgment conflicted with those of the Ninth District in State v. 
Filler (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 731, 667 N.E.2d 54; the Sixth District in State v. 
Tennison (Apr. 14, 1989), Wood App. No. WD-88-41, unreported, 1989 WL 
35534; the Fourth District in State v. Brown (Apr. 16, 1999), Pickaway App. No. 
98CA27, unreported, 1999 WL 259649; and the Second District in State v. 
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Hammons (Aug. 28, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16931, unreported, 1998 WL 
543363. 
 
The case is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists (case No. 00-1869) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case 
No. 00-2126). 
 
The question certified by the court of appeals is “[w]hether a stop and 
detention of a motorist by a police officer, who is beyond his or her jurisdictional 
limits, for an offense observed and committed outside the officer’s jurisdiction 
automatically constitutes a per se unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, thereby triggering the mandatory application of the exclusionary 
rule to suppress all evidence flowing from the stop.”  (Emphasis sic.)  We apply 
previous decisions of this court and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
We find no precedent in the decisions of this court for the holding of the 
court of appeals.  Rather, this court has consistently considered the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether a violation of a statutory standard is 
unreasonable per se thus requiring suppression of evidence. 
 
In Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235, 18 O.O.3d 
435, 437, 416 N.E.2d 598, 600, we stated, “The exclusionary rule has been 
applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only,” and continued, 
“It is clear * * * that the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to 
evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not 
violative of constitutional rights.” 
 
The issue in Hollen was similar to that in the case sub judice.  A police 
officer violated state law by making an extraterritorial warrantless arrest.  A 
significant difference between the two cases is that in Hollen the police officer 
made the extraterritorial arrest “based on probable cause that a crime was 
committed within the officer’s jurisdiction, and * * * the officer was in hot pursuit 
of the misdemeanant.”  Id. at syllabus.  (R.C. 2935.03 had not yet been amended 
January Term, 2002 
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to authorize extraterritorial arrests after hot pursuit.)  Here the probable cause for 
the detention of the defendant was created outside the detaining officer’s 
jurisdiction.  There was no hot pursuit. 
 
In Hollen, we applied well-settled law, citing State v. Myers (1971), 26 
Ohio St.2d 190, 196, 55 O.O.2d 447, 450, 271 N.E.2d 245, 249 (exclusionary rule 
would not be applied to statutory violations falling short of constitutional 
violations, unless legislation required suppression); see, also, Hilliard v. Elfrink 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 155, 672 N.E.2d 166; State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36, 
697 N.E.2d 620, syllabus (“Absent a violation of a constitutional right, the 
violation of a statute does not invoke the exclusionary rule”).  We are not 
persuaded that we should change the standard used to decide whether a statutory 
violation rises to the level of a constitutional violation. 
 
A balancing analysis has been used by this court in similar cases where 
there was a violation of state statute.  In Hollen, the court considered the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether the police officer had sufficient 
probable cause to make the stop.  It was clear that the police officer in Hollen had 
probable cause to stop and arrest the driver after witnessing the driver’s erratic 
driving.  Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d at 235, 18 O.O.3d at 437, 416 N.E.2d at 600.  The 
opinion continues, “[W]e find no Fourth Amendment violation, given the 
probable cause to make the seizure.”  Id.  See, also, State v. Downs (1977), 51 
Ohio St.2d 47, 63-65, 5 O.O.3d 30, 39-40, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1150-1151 (sheriff’s 
violation of Crim.R. 41, in not returning a search warrant to the judge, did not rise 
to the level of a constitutional violation); State v. Davis (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 51, 
56, 10 O.O.3d 87, 89-90, 381 N.E.2d 641, 645 (taking of a minor’s fingerprints in 
violation of R.C. 2151.313 does not require the exclusion of fingerprint evidence); 
State v. Geraldo (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 126-129, 22 O.O.3d 366, 370-372, 
429 N.E.2d 141, 146-148 (violation of R.C. 4931.28, prohibiting telephone 
wiretapping, does not require suppression of evidence); State v. Griffith (1996), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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74 Ohio St.3d 554, 660 N.E.2d 710 (police violation of defendant’s right to 
counsel under R.C. 2935.20 does not require suppression of evidence of breath-
alcohol content); State v. Droste, Ohio St.3d at 39-40, 697 N.E.2d at 623 (state 
liquor control officers’ violation of R.C. 5502.61, by making a stop outside their 
authority, does not trigger exclusionary rule, because defendant’s constitutional 
rights were not violated). 
 
In all of these cases a law enforcement officer violated a statute.  But in 
each, the violation of a statute did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  
However, the court has used the same basic analysis in at least one other case to 
determine that the state statutory violation did rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation.  In State v. Jones (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 432, 727 N.E.2d 886, 888, 
police officers arrested a person for jaywalking and thereby violated R.C. 
2935.26(A), which prohibits arrests for minor misdemeanors.  The court applied a 
balancing test and stated that “the government’s interests in making a full 
custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense, absent any R.C. 2935.26 
exceptions, are minimal and are outweighed by the serious intrusion upon a 
person’s liberty and privacy that, necessarily, arises out of an arrest.”  Id. at 440, 
727 N.E.2d at 894-895.  Under this rationale, we concluded that a full custodial 
arrest for a minor offense was an unreasonable seizure and therefore a 
constitutional violation.  The Jones case demonstrates that although we have not 
adopted a per se rule, the violation of a state statute may rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. 
 
In Jones, we applied the two-prong test adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court for determining whether a governmental action violates the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  88 Ohio St.3d at 437, 727 
N.E.2d at 892, citing Wyoming v. Houghton (1999), 526 U.S. 295, 299, 119 S.Ct. 
1297, 1300, 143 L.Ed.2d 408, 414. The first prong is to determine whether the 
action was regarded as an unlawful seizure when the Fourth Amendment was 
January Term, 2002 
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adopted.  We restated the second prong as follows:  “If, however, at the time of 
the Fourth Amendment’s ratification there was no clear practice either allowing or 
forbidding the type of governmental action at issue, then its reasonableness is 
judged by weighing the competing interests involved.”  Id. 
 
The governmental action in the case sub judice is a stop and detention.  
Under the first prong of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test we must 
attempt to discern whether, at common law in 1791, police officers, who were 
outside their statutory jurisdiction, were permitted to stop and detain drivers of 
vehicles.  We know of no such case at common law, and thus conclude that there 
was no clear practice either allowing or forbidding the government action of 
stopping such a vehicle.  Therefore, because this situation was not contemplated 
at common law, we move to the second prong of the reasonableness test. 
 
The second prong balances the interests of the government in making the 
stop and the rights of the affected driver.  The government’s interest in promoting 
public safety by stopping and detaining persons driving erratically outweighs the 
momentary restriction of the driver’s freedom. 
 
The trial court and the court of appeals concluded that Officer Rarrick had 
probable cause to stop Weideman.  The trial court did not err when it concluded 
that defendant’s manner of operating her motor vehicle gave Officer Rarrick 
sufficient probable cause to make the stop.  After the stop, the strong smell of 
alcohol, Weideman’s bloodshot eyes, and the results of the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test all amounted to probable cause for Officer Rarrick to detain 
Weideman until Sergeant Dunbar arrived at the scene. 
 
The state’s interest in protecting the public from a person who drives an 
automobile in a manner that endangers other drivers outweighs Weideman’s right 
to drive unhindered.  These two factors demonstrate that Officer Rarrick’s 
violation of R.C. 2935.03 does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  
As Officer Rarrick’s detention of defendant under the circumstances presented 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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here did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the trial court was not required to 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and detention.  Where a law 
enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction, 
stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the 
officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable 
per se under the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, the officer’s statutory violation 
does not require suppression of all evidence flowing from the stop.  Accordingly, 
the trial court did not err when it overruled Weideman’s motion to suppress.  The 
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the trial court’s judgment is 
reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment only.  The majority correctly 
concludes that a law enforcement officer’s violation of R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), in 
and of itself, is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  And as the majority 
acknowledges, Officer Rarrick had probable cause to stop Pamela Weideman for 
drunk driving.  We need not go any further to determine that the traffic stop 
passed constitutional muster.  A traffic stop is generally reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment where the police have probable cause to believe that the 
detainee has committed a traffic violation.  Whren v. United States (1996), 517 
U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95; Dayton v. Erickson 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091, syllabus.  Thus, the majority’s Fourth 
Amendment balancing analysis is largely, if not entirely, superfluous.  See Whren, 
517 U.S. at 817, 116 S.Ct. at 1776, 135 L.Ed.2d at 100 (subject to “rare 
January Term, 2002 
9 
exceptions,” the result of Fourth Amendment balancing “is not in doubt where the 
search or seizure is based upon probable cause”). 
 
Even if the majority’s Fourth Amendment balancing analysis were 
necessary, I would decline to join the opinion because of its apparent reliance on 
this court’s holding in State v. Jones (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 432, 727 N.E.2d 
886, 888.  Although some of the legal principles relied upon in Jones may retain 
some vitality, the ratio decidendi of the case—that a full custodial arrest for a 
minor misdemeanor violates the Fourth Amendment—is no longer a correct 
statement of law in light of recent United States Supreme Court precedent.  See 
Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001), 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549.  
With these observations, I concur in the judgment. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  Ravenna Police Officer David S. Rarrick did a 
good thing on May 24, 1998.  By stopping Pamela Weideman’s vehicle and 
taking her keys, Officer Rarrick may have saved lives. In this case, it was the 
most he could do.  And that should have been enough. 
 
Officer Rarrick did good police work, but good police work does not 
always have to lead to a conviction.  The fact that Officer Rarrick’s stop of 
Weideman was unlawful is enough to show that it was unreasonable.  Because of 
R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), Officer Rarrick had no authority to stop and detain 
Weideman.  Certainly, being stopped and detained by a governmental agent who 
has no authority to do so violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Victor  V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. 
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Antonios C. Scavdis, for appellee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and David M. Gormley, State 
Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
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