Title: Johnnie Russ v. Elliott Russ

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2492 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Johnnie Russ, by her guardian Marion Schwartz, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Elliott Russ, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel A. Noonan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey R. 
Myer, Ann Laatsch, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Jeffrey R. Myer. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Barry 
Buckspan and Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C., Milwaukee 
and oral argument by Barry Buckspan. 
 
 
2007 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2492  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV2344) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Johnnie Russ, by her guardian Marion Schwartz, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Elliott Russ, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Daniel A. Noonan, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This appeal is before the 
court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2003-04)1.  Johnnie Russ (Johnnie) appeals 
from an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge 
Daniel A. Noonan presiding, dismissing Johnnie's complaint 
against her son, Elliott Russ (Elliott), with prejudice.  The 
complaint, which was filed on Johnnie's behalf by her guardian, 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
2 
 
Marion Schwartz (Schwartz), alleged that Elliott breached his 
fiduciary duty as Johnnie's agent under a power of attorney 
(POA), and that he engaged in conversion of funds from a joint 
checking account that he and Johnnie opened prior to the 
execution of the POA document. 
¶2 
Johnnie appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her 
complaint, and the court of appeals certified the following 
three issues to this court:  
(1) Whether the fiduciary duty of a POA agent, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 243.10, prevents the agent 
from using the principal's funds for the agent's 
personal use when such funds have been deposited into 
a joint checking account, inasmuch as joint account 
holders 
do 
not 
owe 
each 
other 
any 
duty 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 705.03, and whether a POA constitutes 
"clear and convincing evidence of a different intent" 
under § 705.03?   
(2) Whether a POA document may be reformed on grounds 
of mutual mistake, based on: (1) extrinsic evidence of 
the principal's intent; (2) the lack of an accounting 
requirement in the POA; or (3) the fact that the 
principal and agent lived in the same household in a 
familial relationship, to effectively overcome the 
fiduciary duty inherent in the POA? 
(3) Whether a POA principal may be equitably estopped 
from enforcing the agent's fiduciary duty not to self-
deal because the principal and agent lived in the same 
household in a familial relationship? 
¶3 
We hold that a joint checking account established 
under Wis. Stat. § 705.03 prior to the execution of a POA 
creates a presumption of donative intent, and that the transfer 
of funds from such joint account by an agent acting under a POA, 
but for the agent's own use, creates a presumption of fraud, 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
3 
 
unless the POA explicitly authorizes self-dealing.2  We further 
hold that when, as in the present case, these two conflicting 
and inconsistent presumptions coincide, the circuit court is 
free to make a determination based on the facts and the 
credibility of the witnesses, as the circuit court did here.  We 
are also satisfied that, while the circuit court here reformed 
the POA document on the basis of mutual mistake, and held that 
equitable estoppel barred Johnnie's claim, that such an approach 
should not be undertaken in future cases.  Rather, a circuit 
court should decide conflicts between Wis. Stat. § 705.03 and 
the 
fiduciary 
duties 
imposed 
by 
a 
POA 
executed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 243.10, in the manner discussed herein. 
I 
¶4 
Johnnie was born in 1926.  In 1985, she suffered a 
stroke and had health problems thereafter.3  In 1992, Johnnie 
moved in with her son, Elliott, and his wife, Doris Russ 
(Doris), where she remained for the next nine years.  That same 
year, Johnnie and Elliott opened a joint bank account into which 
                                                 
2 In this case, the POA did not explicitly authorize self-
dealing. 
3 We have been informed by her counsel, in a letter dated 
May 24, 2007, that Johnnie Russ died on May 5, 2007.  This case 
is not moot, however, because the issues are likely to arise 
again, 
and 
a 
decision 
from 
this 
court 
should 
alleviate 
uncertainty on such issues.  In re Commitment of Schulpius, 2006 
WI 1, ¶15,  287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495.  Johnnie's attorney 
also informed us that Johnnie's estate wishes to continue the 
claim against Elliott Russ.  
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
4 
 
they agreed to deposit all of Johnnie’s income,4 which consisted 
of monthly social security benefits, City of Milwaukee pension 
payments, and a small amount of oil royalties.   
¶5 
On February 26, 1999, without the assistance of an 
attorney, Johnnie executed a durable Wisconsin Basic Power of 
Attorney 
for 
Finances 
and 
Property,5 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 243.10 and 243.07, designating Elliott as her 
agent.  It is undisputed that the entire document was read aloud 
at the time of execution.  Johnnie granted Elliott all the 
powers on the first page of the form, authorizing him to, among 
other things, pay her bills and manage her bank accounts.  
However, she left the second page blank, choosing not to 
authorize Elliott to be compensated for his services or to have 
general authority, which would allow him to make gifts.  She 
also did not obligate Elliott to provide her with a periodic 
accounting. 
 ¶6 After executing the POA, the parties continued living 
together 
as 
they 
had 
before, 
maintaining 
their 
previous 
financial 
arrangement. 
 
In 
March 
of 
2001, 
due 
to 
her 
deteriorating health, Johnnie was admitted to a hospital, and 
later a nursing home.  On October 10, 2002, the circuit court 
                                                 
4 There is no evidence that Elliott or Doris deposited any 
of their income into the account. 
5 Johnnie used the “Wisconsin Basic Power of Attorney for 
Finances and Property” statutory form found in Wis. Stat. § 
243.10.  Johnnie also executed a Wisconsin Power of Attorney for 
Health Care, appointing Elliott as her agent. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
5 
 
declared Johnnie incompetent, appointed Schwartz as Johnnie’s 
guardian, and terminated the durable POA. 
¶7 
On March 10, 2003, Schwartz filed this suit on 
Johnnie’s behalf.  Johnnie sought recovery of funds that Elliott 
withdrew from the joint account between March 1999 and April 
2002, while he was her POA agent,6 for expenses related to 
himself, his business, and his wife.  Johnnie alleged that by 
using the joint account, which contained her funds, for his own 
expenses, Elliott breached his fiduciary duty as her POA agent.  
During the contested period, $45,172.44 of Johnnie’s funds were 
deposited into the joint account.  The parties stipulated that, 
between February 1999 and October 2002, the total amount of 
checks written from the joint account for the benefit of Elliott 
was $34,379.91. 
¶8 
In the circuit court, Johnnie argued that Elliott’s 
use of her funds from the joint account constituted self-
dealing.  She maintained that any authority to self-deal had to 
be written into the POA, and that because the POA did not 
authorize Elliott to make gifts or be compensated, it did not 
permit him to self-deal.  Elliott argued that because the funds 
in a joint account belong to all account holders under Wis. 
Stat. § 705.03, he was entitled to spend the money, regardless 
of his role as Johnnie’s POA agent.  He also argued that any 
                                                 
6 Johnnie does not seek recovery for any funds withdrawn 
from the joint account before Elliott became her POA agent. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
6 
 
money he used for his own benefit was offset by the value of the 
care he had provided Johnnie. 
¶9 
On August 2, 2004, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Judge Daniel A. Noonan presiding, granted Johnnie’s motion for 
summary judgment, and ordered a hearing on damages.  Judge 
Noonan concluded that Wis. Stat. § 705.03 did not alter 
Elliott’s fiduciary duty to Johnnie as her POA agent to put her 
interests above his own in matters related to the agency.  
Specifically, he ruled that Elliott had a fiduciary duty to 
prevent Johnnie’s funds from being deposited into a joint 
account to which another party had access. 
¶10 On April 26, 2006, at a hearing on damages, the 
circuit court altered the August 2nd decision by setting aside 
the summary judgment and dismissing Johnnie’s claim on the 
merits.  Based on additional evidence presented at this hearing, 
the court held that, as Johnnie’s POA agent, Elliott had assumed 
the fiduciary duty “to take care of” Johnnie, and that he had 
not breached this duty.  The circuit court entered written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The circuit court 
found 
that 
Johnnie 
had 
willingly 
agreed 
to 
her 
living 
arrangement, including Elliott’s use of the joint account.  
However, the court recognized that the parties failed to execute 
a POA document that accurately reflected their intentions.  
Therefore, the court applied the equitable doctrine of mutual 
mistake to reform the POA document to authorize Elliott to have 
free use of Johnnie’s money in the joint account.  Additionally, 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
7 
 
the circuit court concluded that equitable estoppel barred 
Johnnie’s claim. 
¶11 Johnnie moved for reconsideration, and the motion was 
denied.  She then appealed to the court of appeals, which 
certified the case to this court.  This court accepted 
certification. 
II 
¶12 This case requires this court to review the circuit 
court's order dismissing Johnnie's action with prejudice.  When 
reviewing a circuit court's order of dismissal, we are faced 
with a question of law, which we review de novo.  Ford v. 
Kenosha County, 160 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 466 N.W.2d 646 (1991).  
The circuit court's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  
Additionally, the application of a statute to undisputed facts 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. 
Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
¶13 Ordinarily, 
the 
admissibility 
of 
evidence 
is 
a 
discretionary decision for the circuit court, but in Praefke v. 
American Enterprise Life Insurance Company, 2002 WI App 235, ¶7, 
257 Wis. 2d 637, 655 N.W.2d 456, the court of appeals treated 
the question of whether extrinsic evidence is permissible for 
the interpretation of a POA document as a question of law, which 
this court reviews de novo.   
III 
¶14 Johnnie argues that the fiduciary relationship created 
by a POA under Wis. Stat. § 243.10 is, as a matter of law, 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
8 
 
"clear and convincing evidence of a different intent" from the 
joint account provisions of Wis. Stat. § 705.037.  Johnnie 
asserts that, immediately above Elliott's signature on the POA 
document, there is declaration in bold face, capital letters 
that states: "BY ACCEPTING OR ACTING UNDER THE APPOINTMENT, THE 
AGENT ASSUMES THE FIDUCIARY AND OTHER LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
LIABILITIES OF AN AGENT."  Johnnie argues that Elliott's 
signature on the POA document is clear and convincing evidence 
that he intended to accept the fiduciary duties of an agent. 
¶15 Johnnie further asserts that a POA agent may not 
engage in self-dealing unless the power to self-deal is written 
in the POA document.  She cites Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 
2d 32, 41, 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970), and Praefke, 257 Wis. 2d 637, 
¶¶14, 16, in support of her argument.  In Alexopoulos, 48 Wis. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 705.03 states in relevant part: 
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intent: 
(1) A joint account belongs, during the lifetime 
of all parties, to the parties without regard to the 
proportion of their respective contributions to the 
sums on deposit and without regard to the number of 
signatures required for payment.  The application of 
any sum withdrawn from a joint account by a party 
thereto shall not be subject to inquiry by any person, 
including 
any 
other 
party 
to 
the 
account 
and 
notwithstanding such other party's minority or other 
disability, except that the spouse of one of the 
parties may recover under s. 766.70.  No financial 
institution is liable to the spouse of a married 
person who is a party to a joint account for any sum 
withdrawn by any party to the account unless the 
financial institution violates a court order. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
9 
 
2d at 41, this court held that a POA created pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 243.10 creates an agency relationship that imposes 
a fiduciary duty on the attorney-in-fact, or POA agent.   
¶16 In Praefke, the petitioner, Heidi Praefke (Praefke), 
was the attorney-in-fact for an elderly friend, Betty Glasslein 
(Glasslein).  Praefke used the authority conveyed by the POA 
document to change the beneficiary designations on Glasslein's 
life insurance policies to herself and to make cash gifts to 
herself and others from Glasslein's checking account.  Id., ¶3.  
Praefke argued that she did not breach her fiduciary duty to 
Glasslein because the POA document gave her the authority to 
make gifts.  Id., ¶6.  Praefke further argued that, even if the 
POA document did not expressly state that she had the authority 
to make gifts, she could provide extrinsic evidence, in the form 
of an affidavit, that proved Glasslein had requested that 
Praefke make such gifts.  Id., ¶14.  The court of appeals in 
Praefke relied on Alexopoulos in stating that there is a 
"bright-line rule that an attorney-in-fact may not make a gift 
to himself or herself unless there is an explicit intent in 
writing from the principal allowing the gift."  Praefke, 257 
Wis. 2d 637, ¶16. 
¶17 Johnnie cites a third case, Losee v. Marine Bank, 2005 
WI App 184, 286 Wis. 2d 438, 703 N.W.2d 751, in support of her 
argument that Elliott is liable for self-dealing, because he 
used money from the joint account he held with Johnnie for the 
benefit of himself, his business, and his wife.  In Losee, a 
mother, Helen Losee (Helen), executed a POA document in 1994 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
10 
 
designating her son, John, as attorney-in-fact.  Id., ¶4.  In 
1997, Helen executed an assignment of rents and a mortgage 
against her condominium to secure a loan for John's business.  
Id., ¶17.  The terms of the mortgage provided for the securing 
of future advances up to $1,000,000.  Id., ¶4.  Future advances 
thereafter were made within the $1,000,000 limit.  Id., ¶5.  In 
2001, John invoked the authority conferred by the POA document 
to release the original mortgage on Helen's condominium so that 
it could be sold.  Id., ¶6.  The proceeds of the sale were 
placed in a certificate of deposit at Marine Bank.  John then 
executed an Assignment of Deposit Account, in which Helen was 
named as the grantor, John's business was named as the borrower, 
and Marine Bank was named as the lender with a security 
interest.  Id.  John defaulted, Marine Bank seized the security, 
and Helen sued Marine Bank alleging that John engaged in self-
dealing in continuing the pledge of her assets after her 
mortgaged condominium had been sold.  Id., ¶7.  The circuit 
court granted summary judgment to Marine Bank.  The court of 
appeals reversed and granted judgment in favor of Helen.  Id., 
¶10.  The court of appeals reasoned that, although the facts 
were different from those in Praefke because Helen executed the 
original mortgage without implicating the POA, and because there 
was no evidence that John acted out of greed, the principles of 
Praefke were nonetheless applicable.  Id., ¶¶15-16.  The court 
noted that, according to the holding in Praefke, an attorney-in-
fact has a fiduciary obligation to the principal, and cannot 
make gratuitous transfers of the principal's assets unless the 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
11 
 
POA expressly grants the authority to do so.  Id., ¶¶14, 16.  
The court of appeals concluded that John's interests, not 
Helen's, prompted his decisions, and that John engaged in self-
dealing.  Id., ¶¶20-21. 
¶18 Johnnie 
argues 
that, 
under 
the 
reasoning 
of 
Alexopoulos, Praefke, and Losee, Elliott should  be held liable 
for engaging in self-dealing in violation of his fiduciary duty 
to Johnnie.  Johnnie further argues that a conflict exists 
between Wis. Stat. § 705.03, under which Elliott owed no duty to 
Johnnie as a joint account holder, and Elliott's fiduciary duty 
as a POA agent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 243.10.  Johnnie asserts 
that there are three possible ways to resolve this conflict.  
First, she suggests that this court could adopt a bright-line 
rule, 
which would 
provide that the existence of a POA 
relationship is "clear and convincing evidence of a different 
intent" within the meaning of the introductory clause of 
§ 705.03.   
¶19 Second, Johnnie suggests that the court could adopt a 
rule stating that Wis. Stat. § 705.03 provides immunity, for 
breach of fiduciary duty as to funds taken from a joint account 
held in the names of both the POA principal and POA agent.  
Johnnie argues that the immunity approach would be too broad, 
and that such an approach would endanger the principal's funds, 
because any and all funds that enter the joint account could be 
plundered with impunity and no accountability. 
¶20 Finally, Johnnie states that the court could engage in 
a case by case inquiry of the intent of the parties as to the 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
12 
 
POA relationship with respect to the joint account.  She argues 
that this court should not adopt a case by case approach, 
because such an approach would lend itself to a great deal of 
litigation and appeals.   
¶21 Johnnie asserts that, out of the three suggested 
approaches, this court should adopt the bright-line rule that 
the existence of a POA relationship is "clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intent" within the meaning of the 
introductory clause of Wis. Stat. § 705.03.  Such a rule, she 
argues, would provide predictability and be easy to apply, while 
also allowing the principal the flexibility to authorize self-
dealing in the POA document, if he or she so desired. 
¶22 Elliott argues that the use of a preexisting joint 
account is not affected by the fiduciary duty established by a 
subsequently executed POA document, unless the POA document so 
provides, or there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intent outside of the POA document that would apply to 
the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 705.03.  Elliott asserts that the 
joint account held by himself and Johnnie was opened prior to 
the execution of the POA document.  He argues that there was no 
change in the use of the joint account before and after 
execution of the POA document. 
¶23 Elliott argues that, by completing the first page of 
the POA document and leaving the second page blank, Johnnie 
authorized Elliott to pay her bills, manage her accounts, and do 
banking on her behalf, but did not authorize him to be 
compensated for his services nor to make gifts.  Elliott further 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
13 
 
asserts that Johnnie chose not to initial line item number 14, 
which would have required Elliott to render an accounting.  
Elliott argues that the facts in this case do not amount to 
"clear and convincing evidence of a different intent" under 
Wis. Stat. § 705.03. 
¶24 Elliott 
further 
argues 
that 
this 
case 
is 
distinguishable from Alexopoulos, Praefke, and Losee.  Elliott 
asserts that none of those three cases involved a joint checking 
account.  In the present case, Elliott argues, he and Johnnie 
opened the joint checking account in 1992, more than six years 
before Johnnie designated Elliott as her POA agent.  He argues 
that Johnnie agreed to deposit all of her income, consisting of 
monthly social security benefits, City of Milwaukee pension 
payments, and oil royalties, into the joint account.  Elliott 
asserts that there is no evidence that Johnnie ever attempted or 
desired to change the flow of her income into the joint account 
after the execution of the POA document. 
¶25 Elliott cites Estates of Beisbier, 47 Wis. 2d 409, 
418, 177 N.W.2d 919 (1970) in support of his argument that a 
joint checking account is utilized as a "shared wallet," and 
that a primary consideration behind opening a joint account is 
to handle living expenses and transfer assets at death by way of 
survivorship.  Elliott argues that he did not engage in self-
dealing, and that the intent of both parties was that the income 
in the joint account should be shared for the use of the family 
living arrangement.  Elliott asserts that he and Johnnie had a 
shared understanding that Elliott could have unfettered use of 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
14 
 
the joint account.  He argues that the family combined and 
interchanged their incomes without a need for accounting, and 
that Johnnie received benefits from the living arrangement, 
including nursing care, a health care provider, medicine, room 
and board, clothing, and vacations.  Elliott also asserts that 
Johnnie stated that she wanted to be part of the Russ family, 
and that the Russes could spend the money she had on the family 
business.   
¶26 Elliott argues that this court should not adopt the 
bright-line rule suggested by Johnnie, because it is too 
restrictive.  He argues that such a rule would hold a POA agent 
liable for any money spent out of a joint account, in situations 
where the POA document is silent as to gifting or as to use of a 
preexisting joint account.  
¶27 He further argues that the POA document had no 
language requiring him to account for his withdrawals from the 
joint account, and that he should not be penalized for failing 
to do so.  Finally, Elliott asserts that a joint account opened 
before the execution of a POA document is different from a joint 
account opened afterward.  He argues that the joint account in 
this case was opened long before the existence of the POA, and 
that there is no evidence to suggest anything other than a 
donative intent.   
¶28 We agree with Johnnie that a POA agent has a fiduciary 
duty to the principal, and that the agent is usually prohibited 
from self-dealing unless the power to self-deal is written in 
the POA document.  Praefke, 257 Wis. 2d 637, ¶16; Alexopoulos, 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
15 
 
48 Wis. 2d at 41.  However, in this case, the prohibition 
against self-dealing is complicated by the fact that Elliott and 
Johnnie opened a joint checking account in 1992, shared the 
joint account for more than six years before they executed the 
POA document in 1999, and continued to use the joint account 
after the execution of the POA document.   
¶29 Under Wis. Stat. § 705.03, "unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intent," the parties to a 
joint account may withdraw and use the funds in the account 
without being required to account to any other party to the 
joint account.  In this case, the POA document itself is not 
clear as to the parties' intent. As the circuit court pointed 
out in its findings of fact, Johnnie did not check the box on 
the second page of the POA document that would have required 
Elliott to provide an accounting, nor did she write instructions 
for how the joint account should be handled. 
¶30 Although 
a 
POA 
document 
creates 
a 
fiduciary 
relationship, the document in this case is silent as to whether 
Johnnie intended to change the way income flowed into or out of 
the joint account after the execution of the POA document.  One 
way to avoid future uncertainty about the intentions of parties 
to a POA would be to have the principal write clearly his or her 
intentions into the POA document.  The Wisconsin Basic Power of 
Attorney for Finances and Property form has blank lines at the 
end of the form that could be used for such a purpose. 
¶31 We hold that, when a POA agent and a principal share a 
preexisting joint checking account, the execution of a POA 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
16 
 
document, in and of itself, is not "clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intent" under Wis. Stat. § 705.03.  We 
are satisfied that § 705.03, under which Elliott owed no duty to 
Johnnie as a joint account holder, appears to conflict with 
Elliott’s 
fiduciary 
duty 
as 
a 
POA 
agent 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 243.10. 
 
This 
case 
involves 
conflicting 
and 
inconsistent presumptions.8  When funds are deposited into a 
joint bank account, donative intent is presumed.  Derr v. Derr, 
2005 WI App 63, ¶36, 280 Wis. 2d 681, 696 N.W.2d 170.  The 
length of time that funds remain in a joint account, along with 
other evidence, is "'part of the inquiry into whether the 
presumption of donative intent is rebutted by other evidence.'" 
Id., ¶36 (citing Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 44, ¶38, 256 Wis. 
2d 508, 648 N.W.2d 536). 
¶32 On the other hand, a fiduciary, such as a POA agent, 
has an obligation not to engage in self-dealing.  In Zastrow v. 
Journal Communications, Inc., 2006 WI 72, 291 Wis. 2d 426, 718 
N.W.2d 51, we stated, "A consistent facet of a fiduciary duty is 
the constraint on the fiduciary's discretion to act in his own 
self-interest because by accepting the obligation of a fiduciary 
he consciously sets another's interests before his own."  Id., 
¶28 (citation omitted).  When a POA agent, for the agent's own 
                                                 
8 Under Wis. Stat. § 903.01, a presumption "imposes on the 
party relying on the presumption the burden of proving the basic 
facts, but once the basic facts are found to exist the 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the 
burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence." 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
17 
 
use, transfers funds deposited by the principal, without written 
authority in the POA document to do so, a presumption of fraud 
is created, regardless of whether the funds were deposited 
before or after the execution of the POA. 
¶33 Like the present case, Marine Bank v. Taz's Trucking 
Inc., 2005 WI 65, 281 Wis. 2d 275, 697 N.W.2d 90 involved 
conflicting and inconsistent presumptions.  In that case, the 
conflicting and inconsistent presumptions concerned consignor 
and consignee liability for freight charges.  This court quoted 
Professor Daniel D. Blinka in its analysis, stating, "'Should 
inconsistent presumptions be established in a case, the weight 
of 
the 
evidence 
establishing 
the 
facts 
upon 
which 
the 
presumption[s] are premised [the basic facts] is for the trier 
of fact. . . .'"  Id., ¶30 (quoting 7 Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice: Wisconsin Evidence, § 301.4 at 73 n.10 (2d ed. 
2001)(citations omitted)).   
¶34 In Estate of Rybolt, 631 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ill. App. 
1994), the Illinois court of appeals9 stated that "where such 
conflicting presumptions exist they cancel each other out, 
leaving the trial court free to make a determination based upon 
facts and credibility of the witnesses."  The court cited In re 
Estate of Harms, 603 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Ill. App. 1992), another 
Illinois court of appeals case, in which there were joint 
                                                 
9 The present case involves a matter of first impression for 
which no Wisconsin cases are directly on point.  Therefore, we 
may look to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority.  See 
State v. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26, ¶20 n.7, 289 Wis. 2d 222, 710 
N.W.2d 482. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
18 
 
accounts that existed prior to the fiduciary relationship 
created by a POA.  Income was deposited into the joint account 
while the fiduciary relationship existed.  The court held for 
the POA agent, reasoning that the deposits made to the accounts 
followed a procedure that was used prior to the existence of the 
fiduciary relationship.  Id. at 45. 
¶35 Then, in In re Estate of Teall, 768 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. 
App. 2002), the Illinois court of appeals limited the holding in 
Harms to apply only when a joint account was created before the 
fiduciary relationship began, and where deposits made during the 
fiduciary relationship followed a procedure that was established 
before that relationship.  The court stated, "'[W]here the 
attorney-in-fact actively uses his position to create the joint 
tenancies 
the 
presumptions 
do 
not 
cancel; 
instead, 
the 
controlling presumption is the presumption of fraud, which 
requires strong evidence to overcome.'"  Id. at 130 (citations 
omitted).  
¶36 We adopt the approach of the Illinois court of appeals 
in Estate of Rybolt, In re Estate of Harms, and In re Estate of 
Teall.  We hold that a joint checking account established under 
Wis. Stat. § 705.03 prior to the execution of a POA creates a 
presumption of donative intent.  We further hold that when an 
agent acting under a POA transfers funds deposited by the 
principal from such joint account, but for the agent's own use, 
a presumption of fraud is created.  When these two conflicting 
and inconsistent presumptions coexist, the circuit court is then 
free to make a determination based upon the facts and the 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
19 
 
credibility of the witnesses.  In re Estate of Harms, 603 N.E.2d 
at 44.  Under such circumstances, as well as in cases where a 
power of attorney agent actively uses his or her authority to 
create a joint account with the principal, thereby triggering a 
presumption of fraud, extrinsic evidence may be admissible to 
determine the intent of the parties.10  The prohibition against 
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
to allow the making of gifts, as set forth in Praefke, 257 Wis. 
2d 637, ¶20, would not apply in such cases.11   
¶37 In arriving at its conclusion that Elliott did not 
breach his fiduciary duty nor engage in conversion, the circuit 
court reformed the POA document on grounds of mutual mistake and 
applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar Johnnie's 
claim.  Although the circuit court applied the doctrines of 
                                                 
10 See Bronston v. C.I.R., 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 550 (1988)(U.S. 
Tax Court considered surrounding circumstances, in addition to 
the language of the POA document, in finding that the POA 
authorized gifts).  See also Estate of Gagliardi v. C.I.R., 89 
T.C. 1207 (1987)(U.S. Tax Court considered extrinsic evidence in 
determining that the POA was broad enough to authorize the 
making of gifts on behalf of the decedent). 
11 In Praefke v. American Enterprise Life Insurance Company, 
2002 WI App 235, ¶20, 257 Wis. 2d 637, 655 N.W.2d 456, the court 
of appeals stated: 
[W]e hold that an attorney-in-fact may not make 
gratuitous transfers of a principal's assets unless 
the power of attorney from which his or her authority 
is derived expressly and unambiguously grants the 
authority to do so. As a corollary to this bright-line 
rule, extrinsic evidence of the principal's intent to 
allow such gifts is not admissible. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
20 
 
reformation and equitable estoppel, we decline to take that 
approach here because such approach, if followed by other 
circuit courts, would likely be very time consuming.  Those 
doctrines are often difficult to apply, especially in cases such 
as the one presented here.  The equitable remedy of reformation 
requires a showing that the instrument fails to express the 
intent of the parties, either because of the mutual mistake of 
both parties, or because of the mistake of one party coupled 
with fraud or inequitable conduct of the other party.  Henning 
v. Ahern, 230 Wis. 2d 149, 174, 601 N.W.2d 14 (1999).  The 
elements for equitable estoppel include (1) an action or non-
action that induces (2) reliance by another, either in the form 
of action or non-action, (3) to his or her detriment.  Randy 
A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶26, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 
630.  We are satisfied that the conflicting presumptions 
approach taken by Illinois courts, and adopted here, will be 
more efficient and less time consuming than the multistep 
process of utilizing reformation and equitable estoppel.  We 
also decline to adopt a bright-line rule, as suggested by 
Johnnie.  We recognize that joint accounts are tools that can be 
useful for a POA agent and principal in carrying out the 
practical duties of daily life.  
¶38  In its findings of fact, the circuit court noted 
numerous facts that were essential to its dismissal of Johnnie's 
complaint.  We will not set aside a circuit court's findings of 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
See 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
21 
 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Some of the most significant findings 
of fact include the following:   
19. There is no dispute that the power of attorney 
contract is blank when it comes to the requirement to 
provide an accounting. 
. . . . 
22. 
Plaintiff, 
defendant, 
and 
Doris 
Russ 
lived 
together as three adults living a comfortable life.   
The arrangement was that everything defendant and 
Doris 
Russ 
had 
was 
plaintiff's 
and 
everything 
plaintiff had was defendant's and Doris Russ' as a 
family and commingled income and expenses. 
23. A paid caretaker was present almost daily for many 
years, at the direction of Doris Russ and defendant, 
in addition to the care given by Doris Russ, Leea 
Power, 
formerly 
a 
home 
health 
assistant, 
and 
defendant.  
. . . . 
28. 
The 
understanding 
and 
deal 
between 
the 
parties . . . that 
is 
consistent 
with 
everybody's  
testimony and the actions for many years both before 
and after the power of attorney was signed is that 
plaintiff 
and 
everyone 
concerned 
understood 
that 
defendant was taking care of plaintiff because she was 
his mother and defendant could do what he pleased with 
her money.   
29. The understanding between plaintiff, defendant and 
probably Doris Russ was that there was not to be a 
dispute, 
there 
was 
to 
be 
no 
litigation 
over 
expenditures of money and clearly an intent that such 
litigation should never happen. 
. . . . 
32. Plaintiff gave defendant broad discretion over the 
seven years prior to the signing of the power of 
attorney to use the joint account in any manner 
without objection and the parties intended that to 
continue after the signing of the power of attorney.   
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
22 
 
33. Plaintiff wilfully [sic] and voluntarily agreed to 
live with defendant and Doris Russ and plaintiff 
relied upon their willingness to take care of her, 
provide housing, food, clothing, vacations, health 
care 
and 
other 
personal 
needs 
and 
in 
exchange 
defendant and plaintiff created a joint account and 
there was freewheeling use of that account for many 
years.  After the signing of the power of attorney 
defendant chose willingly and voluntarily to continue 
this relationship the same as before.    
. . . . 
35. Plaintiff placed no restrictions upon the joint 
account and entitled defendant to use it freely and 
without restriction. 
36. 
The 
parties 
were 
not 
represented 
by 
any 
attorney(s) with regard to the drafting or signing of 
the power of attorney.     
¶39 These findings of fact are supported by the record and 
are not clearly erroneous.  The circuit court's findings provide 
a sufficient basis for its conclusion that Elliott did not 
breach his fiduciary duty.  Here we adopt and use the 
conflicting and inconsistent presumptions approach, rather than 
the doctrines of reformation and equitable estoppel, in reaching 
our holding that the decision of the circuit court should be 
affirmed.12 
IV 
¶40 We hold that a joint checking account established 
under Wis. Stat. § 705.03 prior to the execution of a POA 
creates a presumption of donative intent, and that the transfer 
of funds from such a joint account by an agent acting under a 
                                                 
12 Future problems can be avoided if parties include clear 
language of intent within the POA document. 
No. 
2005AP2492   
 
23 
 
POA, but for the agent's own use, creates a presumption of 
fraud, unless the POA explicitly authorizes self-dealing.  We 
further hold that when, as in the present case, these two 
conflicting and inconsistent presumptions coincide, the circuit 
court is free to make a determination based on the facts and the 
credibility of the witnesses, as the circuit court did here.  We 
are also satisfied that, while the circuit court here reformed 
the POA document on the basis of mutual mistake, and held that 
equitable estoppel barred Johnnie's claim, that such an approach 
should not be undertaken in future cases.  Rather, a circuit 
court should decide conflicts between Wis. Stat. § 705.03 and 
the 
fiduciary 
duties 
imposed 
by 
a 
POA 
executed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 243.10, in the manner discussed herein. 
By the Court.— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurrence).  I join 
the majority opinion but write to put this case in the larger 
societal and legal context of elder abuse generally and durable 
powers of attorney and joint accounts more specifically.1   
¶42 With 
the 
aging 
of 
our 
population 
has 
come 
an 
increasing interest in the legal problems of older Americans and 
an increasing awareness of the exploitation of the elderly.  The 
present case should raise concerns about the specter of 
financial exploitation.   
¶43 Traditionally 
the 
judicial 
system 
has 
provided 
protection for an incompetent and has reviewed the activities of 
a 
representative 
to 
ensure 
that 
the 
incompetent 
is 
not 
exploited.  An incompetent may have no one to protect him or her 
other than the courts.  Courts should be cognizant of this 
                                                 
1 I have consulted and relied on the following articles in 
writing this concurrence but, at points, have avoided citing one 
or more of these resources for some of the ideas set forth 
herein.  These scholarly commentaries have proven to be 
insightful and those interested in further discussion should 
turn to them.  See Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the 
Elderly: Is the Solution a Problem, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 267 
(2003) [hereinafter Dessin, Financial Abuse]; Nina A. Kohn, 
Elderly Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses 
of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (2006); Hans 
A. Lapping, License to Steal: Implied Gift-Giving Authority and 
Powers of Attorney, 4 Elder L. J. 143 (1996); Karen E. Boxx, The 
Durable Powers of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Carolyn L. Dessin, 
Acting as Agent under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An 
Unscripted Role, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 574 (1996) [hereinafter Dessin, 
Acting 
as 
Agent]; 
William 
M. 
McGovern, 
Jr., 
Trusts, 
Custodianships, and Durable Powers of Attorney, 27 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (1992-93). 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
2 
 
traditional function in resolving cases involving durable powers 
of attorney. 
¶44 The durable power of attorney is a statutory creature 
derived from the common law nondurable power of attorney.2  A 
durable power of attorney, unlike the common law power of 
attorney, survives the principal's disability or incapacity.  In 
fact, "[d]urable powers of attorney are intended to give 
competent individuals the ability to delegate to an agent broad 
powers to manage their affairs and assets in the event of 
incompetency."3  The durable power is a very useful tool for many 
persons and for many circumstances.  The durable power enhances 
the autonomy of the principal by enabling a principal to make 
decisions for himself or herself while competent that will 
continue to be effective if the principal becomes incompetent.4  
¶45 The durable power of attorney can improve the living 
conditions of the elderly and provide security for their future 
care.5  A durable power of attorney can help a competent 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 243.07-243.10.  See also Uniform Durable 
Power of Attorney Act, 8A U.L.A. 275 (2003). 
3 Knight v. Milwaukee County, 2002 WI 27, ¶27, 251 
Wis. 2d 10, 640 N.W.2d 773 (internal citations omitted) (also 
explaining that "the agent under a durable power of attorney has 
been characterized as the 'alter ego' of the principal"). 
4 The drafters of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act 
explained its purpose as "to assist persons interested in 
establishing non-court regimes for the management of their 
affairs in the event of later incompetence or disability."  See 
Knight, 251 Wis. 2d 10, ¶29. 
5 The durable power of attorney is not intended only for the 
benefit of the elderly.  It is a useful planning tool for 
persons of all ages; disability and incapacity unfortunately can 
happen to anyone at any age. 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
3 
 
principal to handle his or her financial and legal affairs and 
living arrangements and can then enable the attorney-in-fact, 
the agent, to handle the principal's finances and day-to-day 
quality of life without having to declare the principal 
incompetent and without having to seek court supervision.  These 
durable powers are drafted to enable the agent to handle a range 
of matters, including enabling the agent to do everything that 
the principal could individually do.   
¶46 As the population ages and as the value of these 
durable powers of attorney are becoming better known, lawyers 
and 
nonlawyers 
are 
drafting 
these 
durable 
powers 
more 
frequently.  A study by the AARP in 2000 found that 45% of 
Americans age 50 or older reported having executed a durable 
power of attorney, representing a large increase in the 
prevalence of durable powers from a decade earlier.6   
¶47 The durable power of attorney has been appropriately 
characterized as "a simple yet powerful tool."7    But it is at 
the same time a troublesome document, creating the potential for 
abuse.  By merely signing a durable power of attorney, a 
principal may give an agent tremendous power, including the 
power to sell the principal's home and any other assets, to make 
investments, 
to 
cancel 
insurance 
policies 
or 
name 
new 
beneficiaries, and even to empty the bank accounts.   
                                                 
6 Nina A. Kohn, Elderly Empowerment as a Strategy for 
Curbing the Hidden Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (2006) (citations omitted). 
7 Lapping, supra note 1, at 167. 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶48 A 1993 national survey of attorneys, social service 
providers, area aging administrators, district attorneys, and 
surrogate court judges conducted by the Government Law Center of 
Albany Law School found that 94% of those surveyed reported 
having personal knowledge of abuse of a power of attorney.  
Sixteen percent of those surveyed had encountered abuse 6 to 10 
times, and 22 percent had encountered such abuse 10 or more 
times.8  Most of the litigation involving durable powers of 
attorney seems to arise when an agent allegedly makes improper 
gifts or engages in more broadly-stated "self-dealing."9 
¶49 Yet the problems involving durable powers of attorney 
do not arise just from the acts of selfish and conniving agents.  
Commentators have also expressed concern about the difficulties 
created by the confusing nature of the fiduciary duty imposed by 
a durable power.  As one commentator aptly summarized, "[t]he 
most serious problem with durable powers is the uncertainty as 
to the agent's powers."10  Little guidance is given to agents in 
the statutes or case law, and few guidelines have been clearly 
                                                 
8 Id. at 167-68 (citation omitted).  Professor Boxx, 
however, states that abuse of the durable power document is 
rare.  Boxx, supra note 1, at 2 (citation omitted).  For 
discussions of the incidence of financial exploitation of the 
elderly, see, e.g., McGovern, supra note 1, at 13; Dessin, 
Acting as Agent, supra note 1, at 575-76, 584; Dessin, Financial 
Abuse, supra note 1, at 280-81.   
9 Dessin, Acting as Agent, supra note 1, at 612-14 (1996). 
10 McGovern, supra note 1, at 32.  See also Boxx, supra note 
1, at 42 (agent's predicament is to carry out "unscripted" 
duties in "confusing climate of amorphous fiduciary principles 
and the even less-defined role of an attorney-in-fact"). 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
5 
 
established as to the standard agents are to use in making 
decisions for the principal under the durable power and the 
extent of their duty to communicate with the principal.   
¶50 So how is a well-intentioned agent supposed to behave?  
Assumptions have been made that an agent under a durable power 
is governed by traditional agency rules, or by rules analogous 
to those governing guardians and trustees, or by general 
fiduciary principles.11  Merely to say that the principal is a 
fiduciary, however, is not sufficient.  Many different types of 
fiduciary relationships exist, and the obligations of the agent 
vary depending on the specific context of the fiduciary 
relationship.12 
¶51 Problems are also specifically posed by the "durable" 
nature of the durable power of attorney.  Perhaps when a 
principal is competent and is aware of the agent's actions one 
set of fiduciary duties comes into play under a durable power, 
but a different set of fiduciary duties may govern after the 
                                                 
11 Dessin, Acting as Agent, supra note 1, at 584-85.   
The Restatement (Third) of Agency explains that 
The relationship created by a durable power resembles 
agency because it is a mechanism to enable the legal 
consequences of one person's acts to be attributed to 
another person.  In other respects, the relationship 
at this point resembles a trust in which the power 
holder is similar to a trustee because the person 
acting is not under the control of the person for whom 
the actor's conduct has consequences and on whose 
behalf the actor has a duty to act. 
1 Restatement (Third) Agency, Introduction, at 10 (2006). 
12 Kohn, supra note 1, at 13 (citations omitted). 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
6 
 
principal becomes incompetent.  Having different standards, 
however, may prove not only difficult but may also be contrary 
to 
the 
goals 
of 
the 
durable 
power 
of 
attorney. 
 
The 
determination of incompetency is complicated and the durable 
power of attorney is designed to avoid a judicial declaration of 
incompetency.13  
¶52 State 
statutes 
on 
durable 
powers 
use 
multiple 
standards for the agent's decision-making, including fiduciary 
standards, due care, what the agent finds "desirable or 
necessary," 
what 
the 
agent 
finds 
"useful, 
necessary 
or . . . reasonable," or what the agent believes is "in the best 
interests of the principal."14  Wisconsin's statute plainly 
requires that the agent perform his or her duties "in accordance 
with the terms of the durable power of attorney executed by the 
principal."  Wis. Stat. § 243.07(6r)(a), (6r)(a)1.  
¶53 The majority opinion adopts the "intention of the 
principal" as the standard for testing the agent's decision-
making in the present case.  An agent is to act according to the 
principal's wishes.  Such a standard may be fine when the 
principal can supervise the agent.  This standard, however, may 
be subject to abuse when the principal can no longer supervise 
the agent and cannot testify because he or she is incompetent or 
deceased. 
                                                 
13 Boxx, supra note 1, at 42-43, 50-51; Dessin, Acting as 
Agent, supra note 1, at 607-08, 610. 
14 Kohn, supra note 1, at 13-15 (citations omitted); Boxx, 
supra note 1, at 47-48. 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
¶54 Moreover, this standard may become problematic when 
the principal's wishes are at odds with the principal's best 
interests.  The principal, for instance, may not want to move 
into an assisted living facility even though he or she can no 
longer live alone, or may not want to sell certain assets even 
though he or she is financially strapped.  What is the well-
intentioned agent to do, when what is clearly in the principal's 
best interests is against the principal's intentions?  
¶55 The lack of clarity of the agent's duties allows 
greater flexibility in an agent's decision-making process.  Yet 
the lack of clarity may also open the durable power to 
exploitation and may make it difficult for a court to remedy any 
misuse of the power, even though courts traditionally have 
protected the incompetent. 
¶56 Various proposals have been suggested that aim to help 
the principal maintain autonomy, to curb abuse of the durable 
power, and to retain the advantages of the document.  As the 
durable power of attorney is also used in other common law 
countries, this area of law may be one in which we can learn 
from the experiences of other countries, especially England, 
Australia, and New Zealand.15   
¶57 Among the proposals for reform of the durable power, 
one 
commentator 
suggests 
that 
the 
agent 
be 
required 
to 
communicate with the principal and provide advance notification 
of major transactions.16  Other suggested reforms include 
                                                 
15 Kohn, supra note 1, at 21-22 (citations omitted); 
McGovern, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
16 Kohn, supra note 1 (passim). 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
8 
 
requiring more robust practices in the execution of the durable 
power; focusing on an agent's limited ability to engage in 
certain suspect transactions like gift-giving and self-dealing; 
appointing a third party to monitor or otherwise increase the 
ability of third parties to police the durable power of attorney 
relationship; requiring the agent to register with the court 
system and provide periodic accountings to the court if and when 
the principal becomes incompetent; requiring the agent to be 
bonded; and clarifying the agent's role and reining in the 
agent's autonomy in order to create a system consistent with 
traditional agency principles.  Levy enhanced civil and criminal 
penalties on abusers of the durable power.17  
¶58 State legislatures have started paying attention to 
these and other concerns.  A study conducted by the American Bar 
Association's Commission on Law and Aging found that in the 
years 2000-2003, 28 states had engaged in legislative activity 
relating to durable power of attorney instruments.18 
¶59 This case illustrates the complexity of the problem 
and how simple reforms may not work.  In the instant case, the 
principal was an elderly woman who, without benefit of counsel,  
appointed her adult son as the agent under a standard durable 
power of attorney form and who later became incompetent.  In 
                                                 
17 Id. at 33-36 (citations omitted); Dessin, Financial 
Abuse, supra note 1, at 280-320 (discussing various statutory 
attempts to address, remedy and punish financial abuse of the 
elderly); Boxx, supra note 1, at 44-48, 55 (discussing statutory 
attempts to address the lack of supervision of agents and to 
define agents' duties). 
18 Kohn, supra note 1, at 33. 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
9 
 
completing the durable power form, the mother did not explicitly 
allow her son to make gifts or engage in self-dealing. 
Nevertheless, because of the circumstances and relationship, the 
circuit court (and this court) treat the power of attorney as if 
it had these provisions. 
¶60 Further complicating the agency relationship in the 
present case is that the mother and son had a joint account that 
predated the execution of the durable power. The joint account 
contained only the mother's funds but was used before the 
execution of the durable power for both the mother's and the 
son's personal needs.  The mother's funds continued to be put 
into the joint account after the durable power was executed and 
continued to be used for both the mother's and the son's 
personal needs.   
¶61 Joint accounts can serve many purposes and take 
several forms, although the title "joint account" is the same.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 705.01(4), 705.02(1).  Sometimes only one 
person knows of or uses the joint account; the account is 
actually a testamentary device.  With other joint accounts, both 
persons access the account for whatever purposes they wish.  
Still other joint accounts are accounts of convenience; the 
funds belong to the depositor of the funds and the other person 
accesses the account for the benefit of the owner of the funds, 
such as to pay the owner's bills.  
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶62 Cases have arisen concerning whether the incompetency 
of one of the joint tenants terminates the joint account.19  As 
the majority opinion makes clear, the present case concerns the 
intersection of the rules governing durable powers of attorney 
and the rules governing joint accounts.  This case illustrates 
that the durable power of attorney implicates other areas of the 
law, and any reform must be mindful of these other legal issues. 
¶63 The circuit court considered all the evidence and 
concluded that the son's use of the joint account was authorized 
by the mother despite the text of the durable power of attorney.  
This court reviewing the findings of the circuit court concludes 
that the son's use of the joint account comports with the 
mother's intention.  I join the majority opinion in the present 
case but conclude that a court must approach a case involving an 
incompetent with the "presumption" that a primary function of 
the court is to protect the incompetent. 
¶64 There are significant issues bubbling and brewing just 
below the surface of today's decision that need to be addressed.  
Courts have not had the opportunity to define the role of an 
agent under a durable power of attorney sufficiently because 
litigation is too infrequent and too fact-specific.  Legislative 
                                                 
19 For discussions of jointly held bank accounts, see Robert 
D. Williams, Note, When Is Separate Property, Which is Placed 
into a Jointly Held Bank Account, Transmuted?  The Approach 
Taken in Wisconsin: Lloyd v. Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1992), review denied, 494 N.W.2d 210 (Wis. 1992), 29 Idaho 
L. Rev. 1060 (1992-93) (relating to marital property); Bruno W. 
Tabis, Jr., Note, Illinois Conservator's Right to Invade Joint 
Savings Account, 48 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 230 (1971); William J. 
Rohrbach, Jr., Note, Contracts——Incompetency and the Joint and 
Survivorship Bank Account, 24  Baylor L. Rev. 397 (1972).    
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
11 
 
study of the use and abuse of durable powers of attorney may be 
called for.  See Wis. Stat. § 13.83(1) (Law Revision Committee).  
The legislature should consider formulating guideposts to govern 
the fiduciary responsibilities of an agent so that agents can 
operate efficiently on behalf of the principal under a durable 
power, while the principal is protected from abuse of the power 
and unnecessary court interventions and government intrusions 
are prevented.  Any reform of the durable power of attorney must 
preserve and foster the instrument's usefulness. 
¶65 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.    
 
 
No.  2005AP2492.ssa 
 
 
 
1