Title: Martinez v. General Metalcraft, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LUIS MARTINEZ, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 514, 2006      
 
Claimant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Kent County 
 
 
§ 
GENERAL METALCRAFT, INC., 
§ 
C. A. No. 06A-01-003  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Employer Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  January 24, 2007 
 
 
Decided:     February 21, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of February 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Luis Martinez (“Martinez”), the claimant-below appellant, appeals from 
a decision of the Superior Court affirming the Industrial Accident Board’s (“IAB”) 
denial of his petition for additional disfigurement compensation.  Martinez 
contends that (i) the IAB erred in its application of 19 Del. C. § 2326 by awarding 
only ten weeks of disfigurement benefits; and (ii) the IAB erred by failing to 
sufficiently particularize its findings under Colonial Chevrolet v. Conway.1  We 
conclude that the IAB’s decision is supported by the record, is free from legal 
                                                 
1 1980 Del. Super. LEXIS 145 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 1980). 
 
2
error, and the Superior Court properly upheld the IAB’s decision, and, therefore, 
affirm. 
 
2. 
The material facts are not in dispute.  Martinez worked for General 
Metalcraft, Inc. (“Metalcraft”) as a welder and developed varicose veins in his left 
leg as a result of his employment.  Metalcraft agreed to compensate Martinez for 
his condition, and paid him total disability compensation from March 25, 1997 to 
May 15, 1997.  Martinez was also compensated for a ten percent permanent 
impairment of his left leg as a result of the varicose veins.  Although Martinez 
underwent surgery in March 2000, the varicose veins later reappeared.   
 
3. 
The IAB held a hearing to determine the disfigurement to Martinez’s 
left leg.  At the hearing, Martinez showed the IAB his disfigurement and submitted 
photographs of his condition into evidence.  As Martinez’s counsel represented, the 
photographs showed that: 
[t]he varicose veins on [Martinez’s] left leg equal approximately 
twenty-seven inches in length; they are located on the inside of his left 
thigh, in front of the knee, and around the ankle; there are dark, coin-
shaped spots on Mr. Martinez’s knee, ankle and thigh; the varicose 
veins are popped out and look like vitamin capsules.2  
 
 
4. 
Martinez testified that the varicose veins embarrassed him.  The IAB 
accepted his testimony and found that “Martinez’s disfigurements are visible and 
                                                 
2 Martinez v. General Metalcraft, Inc., 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 376, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 22, 
2006). 
 
 
3
offensive when normally clothed.”3  The Board also determined that Martinez’s 
disfigurements were noticeable, although less noticeable than if he had scars on his 
hands or face.  Applying 19 Del. C. § 2326(f)4 and assessing the factors delineated 
in Conway,5 the IAB awarded Martinez ten weeks of compensation for the 
disfigurement of his left leg.   
 
5. 
The Superior Court affirmed the IAB’s decision.  On this further 
appeal, Martinez presents two issues:  (i) did the IAB err in its application of 19 
Del. C. § 2326(f) by awarding only ten weeks of disfigurement benefits, and (ii) 
did the IAB err by failing to particularize its finding under Conway?  We address 
those issues.   
6. 
On appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, the reviewing 
court must determine whether the agency ruling is supported by substantial 
evidence and is free from legal error.6  Substantial evidence means such relevant 
                                                 
3 Martinez v. Steel Works/General Metal, IAB Hearing No. 1102826 (Dec. 29, 2005), at *3. 
 
4 19 Del. C. § 2326(f) provides, in relevant part: “[t]he Board shall award proper and equitable 
compensation for serious and permanent disfigurement to any part of the human body up to 150 
weeks, provided that such disfigurement is visible and offensive when the body is clothed 
normally. . . .”  19 Del. C. § 2326(f) (2005). 
 
5 1980 Del. Super. LEXIS 145 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 1980). 
 
6 State Dep’t of Lab. v. Med. Placement Serv., Inc., 457 A.2d 382, 383 (Del. 1982). 
 
 
4
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.7  
It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence.8  The 
appellate inquiry, however, is limited.9  Weighing the evidence and determining 
questions of credibility that are implicit in factual findings are functions reserved 
exclusively for the IAB.10  The appellate court’s review of questions of law is de 
novo.11  
 
7. 
Martinez first contends that the IAB failed to award him proper and 
equitable disfigurement benefits under 19 Del. C. § 2326(f).  That statute 
relevantly provides that “the Board shall award proper and equitable compensation 
for serious and permanent disfigurement to any part of the human body up to 150 
weeks, provided that such disfigurement is visible and offensive when the body is 
clothed normally . . . .”12  Colonial Chevrolet v. Conway13 holds that when 
deciding what amount of compensation to award in disfigurement cases the IAB 
                                                 
7Downes v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 144, at *1 (Del. Mar. 30, 1993).  See Breeding v. 
Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Del. 1998), Std. Distrib. v. Hall, 897 A.2d 155, 
157-58 (Del. 2006), and Wenke v. GAICO, 2006 Del. LEXIS 265, at *6-8 (Del. May 23, 2006). 
 
8 Downes v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 144, at *1 (Del. Mar. 30, 1993). 
 
9 Id.  
 
10 Id.  
 
11 Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 533 (Del. 2000). 
 
12 19 Del. C. § 2326(f) (2005). 
 
13 1980 Del. Super. LEXIS 145 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 1980). 
 
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must specify the following factors to determine the number of weeks of 
compensation to award:  “1) the size, shape and particular location of 
disfigurement; 2) the social and psychological impact resulting from the 
disfigurement; 3) the comparative severity of the disfigurement; and 4) any other 
matters relevant to the Board’s determination on the amount of the award.”14  This 
Court has adopted the Conway formulation as an “accurate and appropriate 
interpretation of the statutory mandate.”15 
8. 
Martinez argues that an award of ten weeks compensation was paltry, 
was “out of proportion to the serious and severity of [his] permanent 
disfigurement,” and was “not the product of an exercise of judgment directed by 
conscience and reason.”  Martinez cites three cases as supporting his argument.  
The first, Bagley v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,16 was decided before Conway.  In Bagley, 
there was no testimony regarding the employee’s disfigurement, the only evidence 
on the issue being photographs showing a scar.17  After examining the 
photographs, the Court held that the IAB had not set forth its reasons for arriving at 
its award and that the award fell significantly short of proper and equitable 
                                                 
14 Id. at *3-4.  
 
15 Murtha v. Cont’l Opticians, Inc., 1998 Del. LEXIS 24, at *3 (Del. Jan. 16, 1998).  
 
16 369 A.2d 1081 (Del. 1977). 
 
17 Id. at 1083. 
 
6
compensation.18  Therefore, this Court set aside an award of 15 weeks 
compensation for disfigurement of a leg.19   
9. 
Bagley is distinguishable, because here the IAB reviewed the extensive 
evidence and considered the Conway factors, and its decision is supported by 
substantial evidence.  After viewing Martinez’s disfigurement in person, hearing 
Martinez describe his disfigurement condition, and reviewing photographs 
showing the disfigurement,20 the IAB accepted Martinez’s counsel’s description of 
the disfigurement and addressed the Conway factors thusly: 
The Board finds that the varicose veins on [Martinez’s] left leg 
are noticeable.  The varicose veins are located on the inside of the left 
thigh, in front of the knee, and around the ankle.  There are also dark, 
coin-shaped spots on [Martinez’s] left knee, ankle and thigh.  The 
varicose veins are popped out from the skin and look like vitamin 
capsules. 
 
The Board accepts [Martinez’s] testimony that the varicose 
veins embarrass him.  Located on the leg, the disfigurements are 
                                                 
18 Id.  
 
19 Id.  
 
20 The IAB also found that:  “[Martinez] displayed the varicose veins on his leg for the Board.   
The varicose veins are located on the inside of the left thigh, in front of the knee, and around the 
ankle.  There are dark, coin-shaped spots on [Martinez’s] knee, ankle and thigh.  The varicose 
veins are popped out from the skin and look like vitamin capsules.  Prior to the hearing, 
[Martinez] measured all of the varicose veins and they totaled twenty-seven inches.  There are 
also discolorations on the right leg and varicose veins on the right calf, for which [Martinez] is 
not seeking compensation and [Metalcraft] has not accepted compensability for [Martinez’s] 
right leg.  [Martinez] believes that people notice the varicose veins and they are embarrassing to 
him.”  Martinez v. Steel Works/General Metal, IAB Hearing No. 1102826 (Dec. 29, 2005), at *2.  
 
 
7
noticeable, although less noticeable than scars would be on the face or 
hands.21   
 
10. Based on these factual findings, the IAB concluded that:  “[c]onsidering 
all the factors delineated in Conway, [Martinez] is awarded ten weeks of 
compensation for the disfigurement to his left leg.”22  Nothing in Bagley compels a 
conclusion that the award of ten weeks’ compensation in this case was 
“significantly short of proper and equitable compensation under the Statute,”23 as 
was the case in Bagley. 
11. Martinez also relies on Taylor v. Hatzel & Buehler,24 although he 
concedes there are “differences between the facts in Taylor and in the instant 
case.”  In Taylor, the employee was awarded 85 weeks of disfigurement benefits 
for severe electrical burns to both of his hands.25  Here in contrast, Martinez “only 
suffered compensable disfigurement on one leg.”26  As the Superior Court 
observed, “if Mr. Martinez’s injuries were on his face or hands, they would have 
                                                 
21 Id., at *3. 
 
22 Id.  
 
23 Bagley v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 369 A.2d 1081, 1082 (Del. 1977). 
 
24 258 A.2d 905 (Del. 1969). 
 
25 Id. 
 
26 Martinez v. General Metalcraft, Inc., 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 376, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 22,  
2006). 
 
8
been more noticeable, and presumably [he] would have received a larger award.”27  
Taylor is distinguishable.  Moreover, Martinez failed to demonstrate how or why 
the IAB abused its discretion under Taylor.28 
12. Finally, Martinez points to Lanham v. Garrison Lake Golf Course,29  
which is also distinguishable.  There, the IAB awarded ten weeks of disfigurement 
benefits to a claimant who had a scar one and one-half inches across, and one inch 
high, on his forehead.30  Martinez argues that the IAB erred in awarding him a 
“mere ten weeks of compensation,” because (in contrast to Lanham) “he has many 
scars covering his left leg which are highly offensive.”  But Lanham involved a 
forehead scar, which was more visible, noticeable and offensive than the leg scars 
Martinez sustained.  In summary, Martinez has failed to show that the IAB erred in 
its application of 19 Del. C. § 2326. 
 
13. Martinez next contends that the IAB failed to particularize its findings 
as to the Conway factors, and that therefore, the IAB’s decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence.  We disagree.  The IAB is “required to explicitly state the 
                                                 
27 Id.  
 
28 Martinez is therefore deemed to have abandoned the argument in his brief.  Stevens v. State, 
1996 Del. LEXIS 68, at *5 (Del. Jan. 24, 1996). 
 
29 IAB Hearing No. 1240658 (Mar. 2, 2005). 
 
30 Id.  
 
9
facts upon which its decisions are based.”31  “Despite the subjective nature of the 
board’s decision in a disfigurement case, it is nonetheless required to particularize 
its findings of fact so that the court can conduct its appellate review.”32   
Nonetheless, in cases where the “employee [is] the only witness before the [IAB] 
and there [are] no disputes of fact,”33 a “somewhat less particularized findings may 
be acceptable to an appellate court.”34   
 
14. Here, the IAB made efforts to identify the factors it considered in 
determining Martinez’s disfigurement compensation, specifically Section 2326(f) 
and under Conway.  The IAB made findings of fact relating to these factors, all of 
which are supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Regarding “the size, 
shape and particular location of disfigurement,”35 the IAB found that the varicose 
veins on Martinez’s left leg were noticeable, and that varicose veins were located 
on the inside of the left thigh, in front of the knee and around the ankle.36  The IAB 
                                                 
31 Pollard v. Placers, Inc., 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 371, at *12 (Del. Super. May 20, 1996); See 
Branch v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 372, at *9 (Del. Super. May 20, 
1996); Bordley v. Mid-Del Employment, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 90 at *6, (Del. Super. Feb. 13 
1995). 
 
32 Pollard v. Placers, Inc., 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 371, at *13-14 (Del. Super. May 20, 1996). 
 
33 Id. at *15.   
 
34 Id.  
 
35 Conway, supra note 13, at 4. 
 
36 Martinez v. Steel Works/General Metal, IAB Hearing No. 1102826 (Dec. 29, 2005), at *3. 
 
10
also noted the dark, coin-shaped spots on Martinez’s left knee, ankle and thigh.37  
The IAB further found that the varicose veins protruded from the skin and looked 
like vitamin capsules.38  The IAB adequately addressed the first Conway factor.      
 
15. Regarding the second factor, “the social and psychological impact 
resulting from the disfigurement,”39 the IAB accepted Martinez’s testimony that 
the varicose veins embarrass him,40 and found that the varicose veins were 
noticeable, although less noticeable than they would be if located on his face or 
hands.41  Therefore, the IAB took into account the social and psychological impact 
of the disfigurement suffered by Martinez.    
 
16. The third Conway factor concerns the comparative severity of the 
disfigurement.42  Having reviewed the record, we find the IAB compared the 
disfigurement on Martinez’s left leg (which was compensable) to the disfigurement 
                                                 
37 Id. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Conway, supra note 13, at 4. 
 
40 Id.  
 
41 Id.  
 
42 Id. 
 
 
11
on his right leg (which was not).43  The IAB further noted the discolorations on 
Martinez’s right leg and the varicose veins on his right calf.44   
 
17. Because this case involved no disputes of fact and Martinez was the 
only witness, the IAB was given latitude to make somewhat less particularized 
findings than would otherwise be required.  After carefully considering the 
evidence of record, including Martinez’s brief testimony, the photographs 
depicting Martinez’s disfigurement and the IAB’s recollection of Martinez’s 
varicose veins, we conclude that the IAB made particularized findings sufficient to 
enable this Court to review the IAB’s disfigurement compensation decision.  
Because substantial evidence supports that decision, this claim is without merit as 
well. 
                                                 
43 The transcript containing the relevant dialogue between counsel and the IAB’s hearing officer 
reads as follows: 
 
[Martinez’s counsel]: Would you [Martinez] please step forward and show the 
Board your leg. 
[Metalcraft’s counsel]: Members of the Board my only request is that you see 
both legs so you can compare one to the other.  Only the left leg is compensable. 
[IAB member]: Okay.  Would you [Martinez] show us you’re [sic] other leg as 
well?  Alright and where exactly is the surgery site.     
 
Martinez v. Steel Works/General Metal, IAB Hearing No. 1102826 (Dec. 29, 2005), at *2. 
 
44 Id.  
 
12
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice