Title: State v. Forichette

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

156 N.W.2d 93 (1968) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John William FORICHETTE, aka John Edward Forichette, Appellant. No. 40035. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 5, 1968. Rehearing Denied February 28, 1968. *95 Lynn S. Castner and James S. Bullock, Minneapolis, Joseph Perry, St. Paul, for appellant. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Henry *96 W. McCarr, David Weinberg, Asst. Co. Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent. SHERAN, Justice. Appeal from a district court judgment of conviction for the crime of perjury. The principal issue raised by the appeal is whether one charged with the crime of perjury in this state can be found guilty where the false testimony was given in proceedings which were initiated because of a regulation which could have been successfully attacked directly as an encroachment upon personal liberties protected by the Federal and State Constitutions. In addition we have for consideration the question of whether defendant was denied a fair trial because: (a) Reports made by the state's key witnesses to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to matters covered by their direct testimony were not made available to defendant for purposes of cross-examination. (b) The trial court failed to instruct the jury as requested by defendant on matters deemed relevant to the alleged falsity of the testimony in question. (c) The cross-examination of one of the state's witnesses was limited. (d) The attorney for the state in final argument read a statement from an unidentified newspaper or magazine. The Civil Service Commission of the city of Minneapolis, authorized by the charter of that city (c. 19, § 7) to adopt rules respecting persons eligible for employment by the city of Minneapolis, promulgated Civil Service Commission Rules 4.06(j) and 12.02(q) now under attack. Rule 4.06(j) provides: Rule 12.02(q) provides: "The following shall be sufficient cause for removal: On July 9, 1964, proceedings were instituted to effect the discharge of John William Forichette, employed by the city of Minneapolis as an engineering aide from June 1, 1960, to July 8, 1964, upon the ground that he had, in violation of the regulations quoted, fraudulently obtained employment with the city by intentionally and falsely stating in applications for examination dated March 14, 1960, December 11, 1961, and June 8, 1962, that he was not a member of any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government *97 in the United States. Defendant denied under oath the testimony of the witnesses produced in support of the charges that during the period in question Mr. Forichette was a dues-paying member of the North Side Club of the Communist Party and that he served as treasurer. On May 4, 1965, the Hennepin County grand jury indicted defendant on the basis of this testimony for the crime of perjury in violation of Minn.St. 609.48, subd. 1(1), which provides: On June 18, 1965, defendant was found guilty of the crime charged by verdict of the jury to which the case was submitted. Defendant was sentenced on July 21, 1965, for a term of 2 years with execution stayed upon condition that he serve the first 6 months in the Minneapolis Workhouse. This appeal from the judgment of conviction was promptly taken. 1. Defendant argues that the conviction cannot stand because Rules 4.06(j) and 12.02(q) are constitutionally forbidden bills of attainder; are so vague as to deny defendant his right of due process of law guaranteed under U.S.Const. Amends. V and XIV and Minn.Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 7; are infringements upon the freedoms of speech, press, and association guaranteed by U.S.Const. Amends. I and XIV and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 3; and are in conflict with Minneapolis City Charter, c. 19, § 13, which forbids questions in any examination of persons seeking civil service employment by the city of Minneapolis which "relate to the political or religious convictions or affiliations of the applicant." If we were dealing here with a direct attack upon Rules 4.06(j) and 12.02(q), (as in a declaratory judgment proceeding, for example), it is possible that these rules would be held inconsistent with the quoted provision of c. 19, § 13, of the Minneapolis charter and violative of constitutional guarantees as interpreted in such decisions of the United States Supreme Court as United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508; Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 389, 88 S. Ct. 184, 19 L. Ed. 2d 228; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S. Ct. 275, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285; Smith v. People of State of California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252; and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796. Cf. American Communications Assn. CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925. But, under the laws of Minnesota, it is no defense to a charge of perjury before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person that the law giving rise to the proceedings in which the false testimony was given could have been successfully attacked upon the grounds of invalidity. In State v. Mandehr, 168 Minn. 139, 209 N.W. 750, the defendants, convicted of the crime of perjury argued that an essential element of the offense was lacking because the false testimony was given during the prosecution of the defendants for a violation of an ordinance of the city of St. Paul prohibiting a person in an intoxicated condition from driving a motor vehicle, which ordinance under state laws then in force was invalid as an intrusion upon an area of regulation preempted by state legislation. Counsel for defendants contended that since the ordinance *98 upon which the prosecution was based was invalid, the false testimony was not criminal because perjury cannot be committed in the trial of a person charged with a violation of an invalid ordinance. In affirming the conviction, we said (168 Minn. 145, 209 N.W. 752): The Federal rule appears to be in accord. See, United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 71 S. Ct. 595, 95 L. Ed. 747; United States v. Remington (2 Cir.) 208 F.2d 567; United States v. Parker (7 Cir.) 244 F.2d 943; United States v. Ponti (E.D.Pa.) 257 F. Supp. 925; Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S. Ct. 1840, 16 L. Ed. 2d 973. Since defendant undertook to respond to questions addressed to him in quasi-judicial proceedings which the Civil Service Commission was empowered to conduct, the false testimony which the jury found defendant gave cannot be excused now upon the ground that if properly advised he would not have answered these questions in the first place. Defendant is not being punished because of his membership in the North Side Club of the Communist Party. The offense with which he was charged and of which he has been found guilty is that, sworn to tell the truth in proceedings within Civil Service Commission jurisdiction, he made statements which the jury has found to have been knowingly false. We are not aware of any legal doctrine which suggests that a person may justify perjury as a necessary means for the advancement of personal liberty. 2. Although no effective motion for a new trial was made, we will consider defendant's claim of prejudicial rulings at trial, there being constitutional grounds for the assertions of error. (a) The key witnesses for the prosecution gave testimony from which the jury could have found that defendant was a dues-paying member and officer of the North Side Club, the denial of which by defendant in the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission constituted the perjury for which he was indicted and convicted in the district court. These witnesses testified that they made regular reports of their activities in the North Side Club to the F.B.I. and turned over to it receipts for dues paid by them. Some of these receipts were received in evidence against defendant in this trial. Defendant served a subpoena upon the F.B.I. to produce all written reports made by these witnesses and all memoranda made by them, together with all records of sums paid to them by the Bureau. A special agent of the F.B.I. appeared in response to the subpoena and, acting upon advice of the United States District Attorney, claimed privilege with respect to these reports and records, refusing to answer all questions put to him other than his name and whether he was acquainted with the state's witnesses. Defendant then moved to strike the testimony of the witnesses who had made the reports upon the ground that the failure to produce them resulted in an unconstitutional curtailment of his right to cross-examine. The motion was denied. Subsequent to the trial of this case, our decisions in State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490, certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 817, 87 S. Ct. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 56, and State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815, were filed. The operative effect of these decisions may include the present case because the judgment herein had not become final by expiration of the time for appeal. It is clear that if the reports demanded were in the possession of the *99 prosecuting authorities for the state or of police officers employed by the state or its governmental subdivisions, production of the reports would have been imperative as written statements made by a witness and signed or otherwise approved and adopted by him. It is clear, too, that if this were a prosecution for perjury in the Federal courts and the testimony of these witnesses were tendered in support of a claimed violation of a Federal criminal law, the reports to the F.B.I. would be producible under the rule of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103. There are two state cases which have dealt with this problem. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219, it was held error for the trial court to have refused to issue a subpoena in an effort to secure reports in the hands of the F.B.I. made by witnesses in state criminal proceedings. The case is not strictly in point because here a subpoena was issued. But this language of that court makes distinction upon this ground of doubtful validity (417 Pa. 332, 208 A.2d 225): On the other hand, in People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001, the refusal of a state trial court to strike the testimony of witnesses who had given statements to the F.B.I. which were not produced upon demand by the defendant was held not to be error. The difficulty in the present case comes from the fact that the agent of the F.B.I. who refused to produce the demanded reports and records did so because of restraints imposed by Federal law forbidding disclosure of national security files without approval of the Attorney General. In an effort to meet the impasse thus created, the court inquired as to whether defendant would join in a request by the United States District Attorney to stay the proceedings "so that he may get in touch with the Attorney General for the purpose of granting permission to divulge the records that are subpoenaed." The attorney for the defendant declined to do so. Nevertheless, the court, concerned about the problem with which he was confronted, made this statement: Although the record indicates that one of the attorneys for the defense requested a "few minutes recess to discuss this," there was no joinder by the attorneys for defendant in a request that the proceedings be stayed for 48 hours to permit reference of the problem to the Attorney General of the United States in an attempt to secure permission for release of the subpoenaed information. The problem posed is a troublesome one. We agree with the trial court that, generally at least, an employee of the Federal government subpoenaed to testify in a state court should not be punished for contempt if his refusal to testify is based upon binding orders of officers of the Federal government for which he is acting. But this does not answer the question of whether the testimony of the witnesses presented by the state should have been stricken from the record with instructions to the jury to disregard it. In some cases, even this procedure would be unsatisfactory for the obvious reason that testimony once heard cannot be fully erased by judicial admonition. The dangers to be anticipated would suggest the desirability of pretrial arrangements by the attorneys for the state and for the defendant on the one hand, and Federal authorities on the other, for the release of reports and statements of the kind here involved for presentation to the state court for examination upon demand of the attorney for the defendant made at the close of direct examination of the witness called by the state to prove its case. As to the matter before us, we have concluded, with some misgivings, that prejudicial error has not been made to appear because defendant, given the opportunity to secure the desired statements by consenting to a 48-hour stay of the proceedings, failed to do so. There is nothing in the record to indicate that this stay would have caused irreparable harm to the case of defendant and, although no assurance was given that the requested statements and records would be produced if the stay was granted by consent of the parties, we do not feel that this conviction should be reversed when the possibilities of securing the requested materials were not fully exhausted by defendant. (b) Defendant contends that the following requested instructions should have been given: In Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 248, 82 S. Ct. 302, 311, 7 L. Ed. 2d 256, 267, the United States Supreme Court refers to the following criteria as being usable in determining whether or not a person is a member of the Communist Party: We do not believe that the variance between the instructions given and the instructions requested would warrant a new trial under the circumstances of this case. In the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission defendant was asked whether he was a dues-paying member or officer of the North Side Club of the Communist Party. He denied it. There was ample testimony to support the proposition that this testimony was false. Defendant was not questioned as to whether he advocated or supported the overthrow of the existing form of government by force and violence, and the question of whether he committed perjury in this respect was not in the case. The charge of perjury did not involve a denial by defendant that he read Communist Party literature, so there was no need to give the requested instruction No. 13. The failure to give requested instruction No. 14 was not error in light of the court's instruction to the effect that the state was obligated to show that false answers, if any, given by defendant in the hearing before the Civil Service Commission were given "knowingly and willingly." The criteria of membership set out in Killian v. United States, supra, were not fully incorporated in the charge, but the essential tests in so far as applicable to the facts of this case were included in the charge as given. (c) Defendant argues that his cross-examination of a witness called by the state was unduly restricted. We have examined the cross-examination as it appears reported in the transcript covering approximately *102 40 pages and we are satisfied that defendant's attorney was not unduly restricted by any rulings of the trial court with respect to the scope of his inquiry. (d) During the course of his final argument, the attorney for the state, apparently anticipating that two of the state's witnesses would be attacked as incredible informers, said: There was no adequate reason for this reference to out-of-court assertions by an unidentified Congressman at an unspecified occasion, presumably reported in an unnamed journal. However, no exception was made at the conclusion of the argument and there was no request that the trial court instruct the jury to disregard it. The course defendant's attorney chose instead was to characterize the witnesses as paid informers and liken them to "a man named Judas" who "threw the money back" and "hung himself." The result was abandonment of the right to complain in this court about the anticipatory argument made by the state. Among the exhibits produced in evidence were receipts for dues, which receipts were claimed by a state's witness to have been received from Mr. Forichette. The matter of whether Mr. Forichette actually wrote these receipts became relevant on the issue of whether his Civil Service Commission testimony that he was never a treasurer of the North Side Club of the Communist Party was or was not false. In corroboration *103 of the witness, the state produced a handwriting expert who testified that from comparison of the receipts with certain proved samples of defendant's handwriting he was of the opinion that the receipts were written by defendant. One of these samples was state's exhibit O, an arrest record of the Duluth, Minnesota, police department containing a quantity of handwriting by defendant. Early in the trial, out of hearing of the jury, the state's attorney explained that this exhibit was a document on which the state's expert witness had relied in making the comparisons described. Before state's exhibit O was offered in evidence, this statement was made by the prosecuting attorney: In spite of this offer made at an early stage of the trial, the attorney for defendant preferred not to make the stipulation suggested, and the state proceeded to call as a witness one Robert Olbin of the Duluth Police Department who identified state's exhibit O as containing handwriting of defendant. The exhibit was offered in evidence. The trial court in his instructions to the jury in an attempt to avoid the prejudicial effect of the testimony adduced in support of the foundation for receipt of state's tendered exhibit O, said: So far as possible, the trial court deleted such portions of state's exhibit O as were not relevant to the purpose for which it was offered. Defendant, in contending that prejudicial error resulted with respect to state's exhibit O, cites State v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 114 N.W.2d 267; State v. Elli, 267 Minn. 185, 125 N.W.2d 738; and State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 84 N.W.2d 616. These cases clearly support the proposition that attempts to inject prejudicial matter such as conviction of a prior criminal offense will justify and sometimes require the directing of a new trial. The rule relied upon does not apply here where defendant was forewarned that an arrest record would be offered in evidence as a sample of his handwriting needed to lay the foundation for expert testimony as to the authorship of writings appearing on critical exhibits allegedly written by defendant; where the record indicates that this particular sample of handwriting was essential to the foundation for the expert's opinion; where the state was willing to withdraw *104 the exhibit if defendant stipulated that the handwriting appearing on it was his so as to permit the expert to use the knowledge secured in examining it as a basis for making a comparison of the handwriting attributed to defendant on the questioned documents; and where after all efforts to eliminate the prejudicial impact of the exhibit were exhausted, it was received but the jury was warned by clear and unequivocal instructions of its limited purpose. We have also considered the cumulative effect of the alleged errors, notwithstanding our opinion that considered separately no one of them would justify the granting of a new trial. In doing so, we have reviewed the evidence as a whole and the general conduct of the trial. We do not believe that the interests of justice dictate a new trial in this case. Affirmed.