Title: State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LEE v. KARNES, SHERIFF. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718.] 
Criminal law — License to carry concealed handgun — Mandamus to compel 
issuance — Temporary emergency license — R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1) — 
Evidence of imminent danger—Applicant’s sworn statement of reasonable 
cause to fear criminal attack sufficient without statement of factual basis. 
(No. 2004-0602 — Submitted September 14, 2004 — Decided November 17, 
2004.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} On January 7, 2004, the General Assembly enacted a concealed-
handguns law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 12 (“H.B. 12”), which “authorize[s] county 
sheriffs to issue licenses to carry concealed handguns to certain persons.”  Title of 
H.B. 12.  Governor Bob Taft approved the act on January 8, and the act became 
effective on April 8.  Id. at L-61. 
{¶ 2} On April 8, 2004, relator, Josephine Lee, appeared at the office of 
respondent, Franklin County Sheriff Jim Karnes, with her applications and 
supporting materials for a temporary emergency license to carry a concealed 
handgun (“TEL”) and a concealed-handgun license (“CHL”).  According to 
Emmett L. Wheeler, who processes applications to carry concealed handguns for 
the sheriff’s office, he informed Lee that she could submit either application, or 
both, with the required fees for processing.  Wheeler advised Lee that in his 
opinion, she would not have to submit the TEL application because the CHL 
application would be processed and received by her at the same time.  After she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
consulted with another person who had accompanied her to the sheriff’s office, 
Lee elected to submit only her TEL application. 
{¶ 3} Lee then submitted her completed TEL application form, sworn 
affidavits pursuant to R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(a) and (b), and a temporary 
emergency license fee pursuant to R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(c).  Lee also was 
prepared to submit a specimen of her fingerprints to the sheriff in accordance with 
R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(d). 
{¶ 4} In one of Lee’s affidavits submitted with her TEL application, she 
swore that “she has reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack upon herself or a 
member of h[e]r family, such as would justify a prudent person in going armed.” 
{¶ 5} The sheriff’s office did not obtain fingerprints from Lee and did 
not conduct either a criminal-records check or an incompetency-records check on 
her.  In addition, the sheriff’s office never reviewed Lee’s TEL application 
materials to determine whether the criteria in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (j) 
applied to Lee. 
{¶ 6} Instead, by letter dated April 8, 2004, which was handed to Lee on 
April 9,  Sheriff Karnes notified Lee that her TEL application had been denied 
because she failed to submit sufficient evidence of imminent danger as required 
by R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(a).  In the letter, Sheriff Karnes informed Lee of the 
denial of her application, the claimed defect in her affidavit, and the availability 
of appeal to challenge the denial: 
{¶ 7} “Your application for a temporary emergency permit * * * is 
denied since your application fails to provide sufficient facts leading to a 
reasonable conclusion.  Merely reciting the statutory language, without any facts 
to support your conclusory allegations, is not a sufficient basis for me to issue a 
temporary emergency permit. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 8} “You have the right to provide me with an additional affidavit 
containing sufficient facts to support your application or you can appeal my 
decision, per section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 9} On April 9, 2004, instead of attempting to appeal the sheriff’s 
denial of her TEL application, Lee filed this action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel Sheriff Karnes to accept and process her CHL and TEL applications.  
After Sheriff Karnes answered Lee’s complaint, we granted an alternative writ, 
and the parties filed evidence and briefs.  State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 1481, 2004-Ohio-3069, 810 N.E.2d 965. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before us for a consideration of the merits. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 11} Lee requests a writ of mandamus to compel Sheriff Karnes to 
accept and process her CHL and TEL applications.  In order to be entitled to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus, Lee must establish a clear legal right 
to the acceptance and processing of her applications, a corresponding clear legal 
duty on the part of Sheriff Karnes to accept and process them, and the lack of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Savage v. Caltrider, 
100 Ohio St.3d 363, 2003-Ohio-6806, 800 N.E.2d 358, ¶ 8.  With this standard of 
proof providing our analytical framework, we now consider Lee’s claims. 
CHL Application 
{¶ 12} Under H.B. 12, a person can apply for a CHL by submitting a 
completed application form, a nonrefundable license fee, certain supporting 
documents, and a set of fingerprints to the sheriff of the applicant’s county of 
residence or to the sheriff of any county adjacent to the applicant’s county of 
residence.  R.C. 2923.125(B). 
{¶ 13} Upon receipt of these materials, the sheriff must conduct a 
criminal-records check and an incompetency-records check.  R.C. 2923.125(C).  
Within 45 days after receipt of the application and pertinent materials, the sheriff 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
must generally issue a four-year CHL if the criteria specified in R.C. 
2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (l) apply.  If the sheriff denies the CHL application because 
the applicant does not satisfy the criteria in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (l), the 
applicant may appeal the sheriff’s denial under R.C. 119.12.  R.C. 
2923.125(D)(2)(b).  If the sheriff denies the CHL application as a result of a 
criminal-records check, the applicant may contest the result using a challenge and 
review procedure.  R.C. 2923.125(D)(2)(b) and 2923.127. 
{¶ 14} Lee is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Sheriff Karnes 
to accept and process her CHL application.  The sheriff’s duties under H.B. 12 
arise only after the applicant submits a completed application form and supporting 
materials to the sheriff’s office.  R.C. 2923.125.  Sheriff Karnes introduced 
evidence that Lee never submitted her CHL application to his office for 
processing and that if she had done so, his office would have accepted it for 
processing.  Although Lee introduced contrary evidence, the sheriff’s evidence 
prevents her from establishing a clear legal right to the acceptance and processing 
of her CHL application or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the 
sheriff to do so.  See State ex rel. Preschool Development, Ltd. v. Springboro, 99 
Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-3999, 792 N.E.2d 721, ¶ 12 (relator in mandamus 
action “has the burden of proving * * * entitlement to the writ”); State ex rel. 
Woodmen Acc. Co. v. Conn (1927), 116 Ohio St. 127, 132, 156 N.E. 114 (“In the 
light of the conflicting testimony offered [in a mandamus action filed in the 
supreme court], we feel that the relators have not established a clear right to the 
relief prayed for”). 
{¶ 15} Therefore, because Lee failed to establish any of the requirements 
for extraordinary relief in mandamus, we deny the writ of mandamus to compel 
Sheriff Karnes to accept and process her CHL application. 
TEL Application 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶ 16} H.B. 12 further provides that a person can apply for a TEL to carry 
a concealed handgun by submitting to the sheriff of the applicant’s county of 
residence (1) evidence of imminent danger to the person or a member of the 
person’s family, (2) a sworn affidavit that attests to some of the criteria set forth 
in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1),1 (3) a temporary emergency license fee, and (4) a set of 
fingerprints taken by the sheriff’s office.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(a) to (d). 
{¶ 17} Upon receipt of the foregoing documentation, the sheriff must 
immediately conduct a criminal-records check and an incompetency-records 
check and, after receiving these results, must determine whether the criteria of 
R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (j) apply to the TEL applicant.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2).  
The sheriff must either grant the 90-day TEL or deny it.  The applicant may 
appeal the denial of the application.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2). 
{¶ 18} Sheriff Karnes determined that he need not process Lee’s TEL 
application because he found that she did not present sufficient “[e]vidence of 
imminent danger to the person or a member of the person’s family.”  R.C. 
2923.1213(B)(1)(a).  R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1) defines this evidence as either a 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(1)(b) requires that this affidavit contain “all of the information required to 
be on the license and attesting that the person is at least twenty-one years of age; is not a fugitive 
from justice; is not under indictment for or otherwise charged with an offense identified in 
division (D)(1)(d) of section 2923.125 of the Revised Code; has not been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to an offense, and has not been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act, 
identified in division (D)(1)(e) of that section; within three years of the date of the submission, has 
not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense, and has not been adjudicated a delinquent 
child for committing an act, identified in division (D)(1)(f) of that section; within five years of the 
date of the submission, has not been convicted of, pleaded guilty, or adjudicated a delinquent child 
for committing two or more violations identified in division (D)(1)(g) of that section; within ten 
years of the date of the submission, has not been convicted of, pleaded guilty, or adjudicated a 
delinquent child for committing a violation identified in division (D)(1)(h) of that section; has not 
been adjudicated as a mental defective, has not been committed to any mental institution, is not 
under adjudication of mental incompetence, has not been found by a court to be a mentally ill 
person subject to hospitalization by court order, and is not an involuntary patient other than one 
who is a patient only for purposes of observation, as described in division (D)(1)(i) of that section; 
and is not currently subject to a civil protection order, a temporary protection order, or a protection 
order issued by a court of another state, as described in division (D)(1)(j) of that section.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
sworn statement by the applicant or a written document prepared by a 
governmental entity or public official: 
{¶ 19} “(1) ‘Evidence of imminent danger’ means any of the following: 
{¶ 20} “(a) A statement sworn by the person seeking to carry a concealed 
handgun that is made under threat of perjury and that states that the person has 
reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack upon the person or a member of the 
person’s family, such as would justify a prudent person in going armed; 
{¶ 21} “(b) A written document prepared by a governmental entity or 
public official describing the facts that give the person seeking to carry a 
concealed handgun reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack upon the person or 
a member of the person’s family, such as would justify a prudent person in going 
armed.  Written documents of this nature include, but are not limited to, any 
temporary protection order, civil protection order, protection order issued by 
another state, or other court order, any court report, and any report filed with or 
made by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} Lee chose to submit evidence in accordance with the first 
alternative — a sworn statement made under threat of perjury — as evidence of 
imminent danger supporting her TEL application.  R.C. 2923.125(A)(1)(a).  
Sheriff Karnes concluded that her statement was insufficient because she did not 
include specific facts supporting her statement that she had “reasonable cause to 
fear a criminal attack upon herself or a member of h[e]r family, such as would 
justify a prudent person in going armed.” 
{¶ 23} Resolution of Lee’s challenge to the sheriff’s conclusion requires 
our interpretation of R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1)(a).  The court’s paramount concern in 
construing a statute is legislative intent.  State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. 
Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  In discerning 
this intent, we read words and phrases in context according to the rules of 
grammar and common usage.  R.C. 1.42; Bosher v. Euclid Income Tax Bd. of 
January Term, 2004 
7 
Review, 99 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-3886, 792 N.E.2d 181.  If the statute is 
unambiguous, we must apply it as written.  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 
2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1)(a) requires only an applicant’s sworn 
statement made under threat of perjury that “the person has reasonable cause to 
fear a criminal attack upon the person or a member of the person’s family, such as 
would justify a prudent person in going armed.”  It does not require underlying 
facts to support the sworn statement. 
{¶ 25} Adopting the sheriff’s construction of the R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1)(a) 
statutory requirement would substitute “describing the facts that give the person” 
for “states that the person has” before “reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack 
upon the person or a member of the person’s family, such as would justify a 
prudent person in going armed.”  This additional language would make the R.C. 
2923.1213(A)(1)(a) definition of “[e]vidence of imminent danger” read, “A 
statement sworn by the person seeking to carry a concealed handgun that is made 
under threat of perjury describing the facts that give the person reasonable cause 
to fear a criminal attack upon the person or a member of the person’s family, such 
as would justify a prudent person in going armed.”  We cannot, however, add this 
language to the statute.  See State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 
N.E.2d 540 (“In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words”). 
{¶ 26} Had the General Assembly intended the factual requirement 
espoused by the sheriff, it would have included it in R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1)(a).  In 
fact, the General Assembly did just that in the alternate method for TEL 
applicants to establish evidence of imminent danger.  R.C. 2923.1213(a)(1)(b) 
(“A written document prepared by a governmental entity or public official 
describing the facts that give the person seeking to carry a concealed handgun 
reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack upon the person or a member of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
person’s family, such as would justify a prudent person in going armed.”  
[Emphasis added.]). 
{¶ 27} “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to 
‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says there.’ ”  BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States (2004), 541 U.S. 
176, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 1593, 158 L.Ed.2d 338, quoting Connecticut Natl. Bank v. 
Germain (1992), 503 U.S. 249, 253-254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391.  
Because the General Assembly did not include a requirement of descriptive facts 
to support a TEL applicant’s sworn statement providing evidence of imminent 
danger in R.C. 2923.1213(A)(1)(a), we will not infer one. 
{¶ 28} Consequently, Sheriff Karnes erred in rejecting Lee’s TEL 
application and failing to process it further.  Lee presented sufficient evidence of 
imminent danger. 
{¶ 29} Under these circumstances, the sheriff had a duty to conduct the 
criminal-records and incompetency-records checks and, upon receipt of those 
results, to review the information and determine whether the criteria of R.C. 
2923.125(D)(1)(a) to (j) apply to Lee.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2). 
{¶ 30} Nevertheless, Lee had an adequate remedy by appeal from Sheriff 
Karnes’s decision denying her TEL application.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2) specifies 
that a TEL applicant may appeal the denial of a TEL: 
{¶ 31} “If the sheriff denies the issuance of a temporary emergency 
license to the person, the sheriff shall specify the grounds for the denial in a 
written notice to the person.  The person may appeal the denial, or challenge 
criminal records check results that were the basis of the denial if applicable, in the 
same manners specified in division (D)(2) of section 2923.125 and in section 
2923.127 of the Revised Code, regarding the denial of an application for a 
license to carry a concealed handgun under that section.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2004 
9 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2923.125(D)(2)(b) provides that an applicant who has been 
denied a CHL can appeal the denial under R.C. 119.12: 
{¶ 33} “If a sheriff denies an application under this section because the 
applicant does not satisfy the criteria described in division (D)(1) of this section, 
the sheriff shall specify the grounds for the denial in a written notice to the 
applicant.  The applicant may appeal the denial pursuant to section 119.12 of the 
Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} Lee contends that this appeal is not available to her because of the 
first sentence of R.C. 2923.125(D)(2)(b), which limits the appeal of the denial of 
CHL applications to those denials based on the applicants’ failure to satisfy the 
criteria described in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1). 
{¶ 35} Lee misreads R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2).  The right of TEL applicants 
who have been denied licenses to appeal is not restricted to a sheriff’s finding 
concerning R.C. 2923.125(D)(1) criteria.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2) specifies that 
TEL applicants who have been denied licenses may appeal the denial in “the same 
manners specified in” R.C. 2923.125(D)(2).  Construing this language according 
to the rules of grammar and common usage as required by R.C. 1.42, “manner” 
means “mode or method in which something is done.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 1376.  Therefore, the reference in R.C. 
2923.1213(B)(2) to 2923.125(D)(2) is only to the procedural mode or method in 
which an appeal is effectuated, i.e., pursuant to R.C. 119.12, and not to the 
substantive types of denials that may be appealed. 
{¶ 36} In fact, unlike a denial of a CHL under the first sentence in R.C. 
2923.125(D)(2)(b), the denial of a TEL application by a sheriff is not restricted to 
the applicant’s satisfaction of criteria described in R.C. 2923.125(D)(1).  Cf. R.C. 
2923.1213(B)(2) (“If the sheriff denies the issuance of a temporary emergency 
license to the person, the sheriff shall specify the grounds for the denial in a 
written notice to the person”) with R.C. 2923.125(D)(2)(b) (“If the sheriff denies 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
an application under this section because the applicant does not satisfy the 
criteria described in division (D)(1) of this section, the sheriff shall specify the 
grounds for the denial in a written notice to the applicant”).  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 37} Adopting Lee’s construction of the first sentence of the second 
paragraph of R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2) would add to that provision the language in 
the first sentence of R.C. 2923.125(D)(2)(b).  Lee’s argument results “ ‘not [in] a 
construction of [the] statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so 
that what was omitted * * * may be included within its scope.’ ”  Lamie v. United 
States Trustee (2004), 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 1032, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024, 
quoting Iselin v. United States (1926), 270 U.S. 245, 251, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed 
566. 
{¶ 38} Therefore, although Sheriff Karnes erred in denying Lee’s TEL 
application for lack of sufficient evidence of imminent danger, Lee is not entitled 
to the requested writ of mandamus, because she had an adequate remedy by 
appealing the sheriff’s denial.  R.C. 2923.1213(B)(2) and 119.12. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} Based on the foregoing, Lee has not established her entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus regarding either her concealed-
handgun license or temporary emergency license applications.  Accordingly, we 
deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
Firestone & Brehm, Ltd., L. Kenneth Hanson III and Joanna R. Davis, for 
relator. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick A. Soulas 
Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.