Title: MORRIS v FRANK TRANSPORTATION CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14727 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 CLYDE MORRIS, PHYLLIS MORRIS, and DALE MORRIS, Plaintiffs and Respondents, FRANK TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and FJILLIAM FRANK, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: June 1,1979 Decided: OCT 2 5 7979 Filed: m W . : - '77". . .- Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the ~hirteenth Judicial District, the Honorable Robert H. Wilson presiding, denying defendants' motion to set aside default and granting plaintiffs' motion for entry of judg- ment by default. Plaintiffs-respondents filed their complaint in this matter on January 16, 1979, seeking to recover wages and expenses for driving trips made on behalf of Frank Trans- portation Company, appellant herein. The complaint was personally served by a Yellowstone County deputy sheriff on appellant William Frank on January 18, 1979. The complaint demanded an amount certain. Appellants failed to answer and default was entered on February 8, 1979. Thereafter, on February 13, 1979, appellants entered an appearance by a motion to dismiss. The next day respondents filed a motion to enter judgment by default. This motion was noticed for hearing on February 23, 1979. A hearing was conducted at that time and appellant William Frank appeared and testi- fied. During this hearing the District Court consolidated appellants' motion to dismiss with appellants' motion to set aside default for excusable neglect. There was no objection to this consolidation. In an effort to show excusable neglect, William Frank testified that he had been ill and had left it up to other people to run his business and to take care of the lawsuit. He further testified that he was in his office one day, found the complaint, and immediately took it to his attor- neys. He also admitted that he was personally served with a copy of the complaint. A t t h e end of t h e hearing t h e c o u r t took t h e matter under advisement and on February 27, 1979, e n t e r e d an o r d e r denying t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t and o r d e r i n g t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o e n t e r judgment by d e f a u l t be granted. On February 28, 1979, judgment by d e f a u l t w a s e n t e r e d by o r d e r of t h e c o u r t . Notice of e n t r y of judgment was mailed t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s on February 28, 1979, and Frank Transportation Company and W i l l i a m Frank now appeal. The i s s u e f a c i n g t h i s Court on appeal i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e motion t o set a s i d e d e f a u l t and i n e n t e r i n g judgment by d e f a u l t . W i l l i a m Frank a l l e g e s t h a t because he w a s ill and under a d o c t o r ' s c a r e , he l e f t h i s business i n t h e c a r e of o t h e r s r e s u l t i n g i n h i s n e g l e c t of t h i s l a w s u i t . This he contends was "excusable neglect." W e do n o t agree. Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., states t h a t a c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y from a f i n a l judgment upon a f i n d i n g of " (1) mistake, inadvertence, s u r p r i s e , o r excusable neglect." Appellants c i t e a number of c a s e s f o r t h e proposi- t i o n t h a t Rule 60(b) i s t o be l i b e r a l l y construed: C l u t e v. Concrete (1978), Mont. , 587 P.2d 392, 35 St.Rep. 1775; Big Spring v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet, etc. (1978) Mont. , 573 P.2d 655, 35 St.Rep. 34; Davis v. Hubbard (1947), 120 Mont. 45, 179 P.2d 533. While w e do n o t d i s a g r e e with t h e r u l e s i n t h e s e cases, s u f f i c e it t o say t h a t they a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t case. Appellants here have simply n o t shown excusable n e g l e c t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. There i s nothing i n t h e record t o i n d i c a t e t h a t William Frank had s p e c i f i c a l l y requested t h a t someone else t a k e t h e complaint t o h i s a t t o r - neys, as i n Davis v. Hubbard, supra, nor t h a t he was h o s p i t a l i z e d o r t o o s i c k t o do it himself. F u r t h e r , t h e r e was nothing t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he was n o t properly served with t h e complaint a s i n C l u t e v. Concrete, supra, nor t h a t he d i d n o t have n o t i c e of hearings a s i n Blackfeet T r i b e , supra. A f a i l u r e to appear due t o f o r g e t f u l n e s s and t h e p r e s s of o t h e r , more important business i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h excusable n e g l e c t . Dudley v. S t i l e s (1963), 142 Mont. 566, 386 P.2d 342, 343. Even t h e most l i b e r a l approach t o t h i s problem cannot save a p p e l l a n t s ' case. " . . . A l i b e r a l c o u r t cannot f i n d excusable n e g l e c t where a defen- d a n t h a s w i l l i n g l y slumbered on h i s r i g h t s and ignored t h e j u d i c i a l machinery e s t a b l i s h e d by law." Dudley v. S t i l e s , supra, 386 P.2d a t 343. "A motion t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment i s addressed t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s Court w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e e x c e p t upon a show- i n g of manifest abuse." Purington v. Sound West (1977), Mont. , 566 P.2d 795, 797, 34 St.Rep. 579. W e f i n d no such abuse here. W e concur: 7Ad4 $?$kw@ Chief J u s t i c e ustices I