Title: Cody v. Atkins

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cody v. Atkins1983 WY 10658 P.2d 59Case Number: 5757Case Number: 5757Decided: 02/04/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOIS M. CODY, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

ALFRED ATKINS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Louis A. Mankus, 
Cheyenne, signed 
the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of 
appellant.

J. Kent Rutledge 
of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of appellee.

Before ROONEY*, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument. 

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal arose from 
a negligence action brought by Lois M. Cody (appellant) against Alfred Atkins 
(appellee) for injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile collision 
between her car and appellee's pickup. Appellant appeals from the judgment on a 
jury verdict entered by the district court in favor of appellee. The following 
three issues are raised on appeal by appellant:

"I. Whether the denial of 
a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence was error when there was no 
evidence of plaintiff's negligence and ample evidence of defendant's 
negligence.

"II. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying a judgement not withstanding the verdict when the jury 
verdict was clearly contrary to the evidence and the law.

"III. Whether it was 
error to deny plaintiff a new trial when the jury verdict was not consistent 
with the evidence presented at trial."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     At about 7:00 o'clock 
a.m. on the morning of November 13, 1980, appellant's car was struck from behind 
by a pickup driven by appellee. At the time of the accident appellant was 
stopped for a red light in the right-hand, west-bound lane of 16th Street at the 
intersection of 16th 
Street and Snyder Avenue in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The right front corner of appellee's 
vehicle struck the left rear corner of appellant's car. In the words of the 
police officer who investigated the accident, the lane of traffic in which the 
accident occurred was ice covered and "very slick." It was overcast and snowing 
lightly at the time the accident occurred but visibility was not impaired. 
Neither party complained of injuries when questioned by the investigating 
officer at the accident scene; however, later that day appellant complained of 
injuries and was taken to the emergency room at MemorialHospital where she was examined and 
released. Appellant was subsequently hospitalized and treated for numerous 
physical complaints that she alleged resulted from the 
accident.

[¶4.]     Appellant brought suit 
June 5, 1981, complaining that appellee's negligent operation of his vehicle had 
caused harm to her. On March 1, 1982, appellant filed an amended complaint 
against appellee. Appellee answered the complaints by admitting that his pickup 
collided with appellant's car but denying appellant's remaining allegations of 
negligence, etc.; there were no counterclaims made nor affirmative defenses 
asserted by appellee. The matter was tried before a six-person jury May 10 and 
11, 1982, in the district court in Cheyenne. At the close of appellee's case, 
appellant made a motion for directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50, W.R.C.P. The 
district court denied the motion. The jury then, after receiving its 
instructions and deliberating on the matter, returned a verdict in favor of 
appellee. Following the trial, appellant made timely motions for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59, W.R.C.P. and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
pursuant to Rule 50, W.R.C.P. The district court denied both motions; this 
appeal followed.

I

[¶5.]     The first issue 
appellant raises for our consideration is the propriety of the district court's 
denial of his motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50(a), 
W.R.C.P.1 We will briefly summarize the 
standard of review we employ when faced with a directed verdict 
question.

[¶6.]     In Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 
(1977), this court said:

"In reviewing the grant 
of a directed verdict by a trial court, consideration must be given to all 
evidence favorable to party against whom the motion is directed, as well as to 
all reasonable and legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. 
[Citations.] Whether or not the evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an 
issue for the jury is solely a question of law to be answered by the trial 
court. That court must determine whether or not the evidence is such that, 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise, considering the 
weight of the evidence, there is but one conclusion as to verdict which men of 
reason could reach. * * *" (Footnote omitted.) 569 P.2d  at 
1250.

This court, in 
Carey v. Jackson, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 868, 877 (1979), adopted the commentators' view 
that:

"`In determining whether 
a verdict should have been directed, the appellate court applies the same 
standard as does the trial court in passing on the motion originally. * * * 
Whether a verdict should be directed is a question of law and on those questions 
litigants are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special 
deference to the views of the trial court.' 9 Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2536, p. 595, and § 2524, pp. 
541-542."

We also have 
held that since a directed verdict deprives the parties of a determination of 
the facts by a jury, such motion should be cautiously and sparingly granted. 9 
Wright and Miller, supra § 2524, and see Carey v. Jackson, 
supra.

[¶7.]     In the majority of our 
decisions in which directed verdicts are at issue, we have dealt with directed 
verdicts sought by the defendant; here we are faced with the opposite situation 
of a plaintiff seeking a directed verdict. In general, the standard in directing 
a verdict for a plaintiff is similar to the standard used to direct one against 
him. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2535 
(discussing an identical Rule 50(a), F.R.C.P.). However, due to the different 
burdens of persuasion placed on plaintiffs and defendants, there are some 
differences. In Mihalchak v. American 
Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 901, 80 S. Ct. 209, 4 L. Ed. 2d 157, the court, faced with a plaintiff's motion for directed verdict, 
declared:

"The propriety of 
directing a verdict in appropriate situations in favor of the party imposed 
initially with the risk of nonproduction of evidence seems to be well settled. 
Yet though a motion for directed verdict in favor of the proponent of an issue 
is cast in the same form as when made by the defending party, it requires the 
judge to test the body of evidence not for its insufficiency to support a 
finding, but rather for its overwhelming effect. He must be able to say not only 
that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding, even though other 
evidence could support as well a contrary finding, but additionally that there 
is insufficient evidence for permitting any different finding. The ultimate 
conclusion that there is no genuine issue of fact depends not on a failure to 
prove at least enough so that the controverted fact can be inferred, but rather 
depends on making impossible any other equally strong inferences once the fact 
in issue is at least inferable." (Footnotes omitted.) 266 F.2d  at 
877.

It is proper to 
direct a verdict for the plaintiff in those rare cases where there are no 
genuine issues of fact to be submitted to a jury. Parker v. Pine, Mo. App., 617 S.W.2d 536 
(1981). In a negligence action a verdict may be directed for the plaintiff when 
there is no evidence that would justify a jury verdict for the defendant. Whitly v. Moore, 5 Ariz. App. 369, 427 P.2d 350 (1967). A directed verdict for the plaintiff is proper when there is no 
dispute as to a material fact, and when reasonable jurors cannot draw any other 
inferences from the facts than that propounded by the plaintiff. Brown v. Sievers, Wyo., 410 P.2d 574 
(1966). In a negligence action, then, we need only determine that there was 
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant acted 
without negligence to hold that appellant's motion was properly denied. We so 
hold.

[¶8.]     In this case appellee 
presented evidence that the roadway he was traveling on was slippery due to snow 
and ice; that he had been attempting to slow down and stop to avoid a collision 
for some 400 feet prior to impact; that he had slowed from 20 m.p.h. to 5 m.p.h. 
in the 400 feet prior to impact; that he had attempted to drive to the left and 
avoid the collision; that his ability to stop was further complicated because he 
was traveling downhill; and that he was in control of his vehicle at all times 
prior to the collision. Although we were unable to find where appellee had 
testified in so many words that he had not been negligent, the jury could have 
properly inferred as much from the evidence we have outlined. Although appellant 
contends otherwise, the concept of an automobile accident occurring without a 
finding of negligence is not novel in our jurisprudence. Friesen v. Schmelzel, 78 Wyo. 1, 318 P.2d 368 
(1957). The district court could not have, in the face of appellee's evidence 
showing an absence of negligence, directed a verdict for appellant. Therefore, 
we hold the district court properly denied appellant's motion for a directed 
verdict.

II

[¶9.]     Appellant next argues 
that the district court erred in denying her motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) made pursuant to Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P.2 Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P. requires as a 
prerequisite to seeking a J.N.O.V. that the moving party has previously sought 
and been denied a directed verdict. As previously noted, appellant had sought 
and been denied a directed verdict at the close of the evidence; therefore, we 
reach this issue. Before deciding the issue, however, we first set out the 
standard of review we shall employ.

[¶10.]  In Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., Wyo., 372 P.2d 170 (1962), this court held that a J.N.O.V. can only be granted where there 
is an absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict entered. That 
same view was expressed in Simpson v. 
Western National Bank of Casper, Wyo., 
497 P.2d 878 (1972). The test then for granting a J.N.O.V. is virtually the same 
as that employed in determining whether a motion for directed verdict should be 
granted or denied. In fact, it has been said in discussing a nearly identical 
Rule 50(b), F.R.C.P. that a J.N.O.V. can be granted only if the prerequisite 
motion for directed verdict should have been granted. 9 Wright & Miller, 
supra § 2537; Law v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 144 App.D.C. 115, 
444 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Neville 
Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied 400 U.S. 826, 91 S. Ct. 51, 27 L. Ed. 2d 55. 

[¶11.]  The logic behind similar standards of 
review is that it allows the district court another opportunity to determine the 
legal question of sufficiency of the evidence raised by the motion after the 
jury has reached a verdict. 9 Wright & Miller, supra. In close cases the 
J.N.O.V. procedure promotes judicial economy. When a J.N.O.V. is reversed, for 
example, an appellate court can remand for reinstatement of the original 
verdict, where a new trial is generally required when a directed verdict is 
reversed.3 See Carey v. Jackson, supra, and Law v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 
supra.

[¶12.]  In the case before us, we have, in ruling 
on the directed verdict question, already held that there was sufficient 
evidence presented to create a question of fact for the jury to determine on the 
issue of appellee's negligence. For those same reasons we must also hold that 
the district court correctly denied appellant's motion for a 
J.N.O.V.

III

[¶13.]  We next reach appellant's final argument 
that the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial made 
pursuant to Rule 59, W.R.C.P.4 Appellant's motion set forth the 
following grounds for obtaining a new trial:

"1. That the Verdict is 
not Sustained by sufficient Evidence and is Contrary to 
Law.

"2. That Errors of Law 
were Committed at the Trial."

Appellant then 
centers her argument around the first ground. The position appellant takes is 
that she was entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict was not 
consistent with the evidence. We disagree.

[¶14.]  Rule 59(a), W.R.C.P. allows courts, for 
the grounds enumerated, to set aside the effect of a jury verdict and grant a 
new trial when not satisfied with the jury verdict. A court's exercise of the 
power to grant a new trial is not a derogation of the right of a jury trial but 
is one of that right's historic safeguards. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941). The power to grant a new trial gives 
the trial court the power to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2803 (1973) (discussing similar 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.). Trial courts should grant new trials whenever, in their 
judgment, the jury's verdict fails to administer substantial justice to the 
parties. Brasel and Sims Construction Co. 
v. Neuman Transit Co., Wyo., 378 P.2d 501 
(1963), quoting from Kester v. 
Wagner, 22 Wyo. 512, 145 P. 748 (1915). In Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 
158 A.L.R. 224 (1943), this court said:

"The right of trial by 
jury includes the right to have the jury pass upon questions of fact by 
determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of conflicting evidence. 
[Citation.] The findings of fact, however, are subject to review by the trial 
judge who, like the jury, has had the benefit of observing the demeanor and 
deportment of the witnesses. If he concludes that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the verdict, he should grant a new trial * * *." 136 P.2d  at 
244.

[¶15.]  This court has acknowledged that when a 
court could have properly granted a J.N.O.V. for insufficient evidence, it was 
not error to grant a motion for a new trial. Davis v. Schiess, Wyo., 
417 P.2d 19 (1966). That does not mean, however, that the same standards apply 
for granting a new trial and a J.N.O.V.; the standard must be more lenient for 
exercising the power to grant new trials to preserve that power's historic role 
as a safety valve in our system of justice. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. 
Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962), the court said:

"When the evidence is 
wholly insufficient to support a verdict, it is the duty of the trial court to 
direct a verdict or enter a judgment n.o.v., and the court has no discretion in 
that respect. But, the granting of a new trial involves an element of discretion 
which goes further than the mere sufficiency of the evidence. It embraces all 
the reasons which inhere in the integrity of the jury system itself. 
[Citations.]" 302 F.2d  at 643.

[¶16.]  It is well settled in Wyoming that trial 
courts are vested with broad discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, 
and that on review we will not overturn the trial court's decision except for an 
abuse of that discretion. Murphy v. 
Stevens, Wyo., 645 P.2d 82 (1982); Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981). In Brasel and Sims 
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., supra, this court discussed the 
standard of review as follows:

"`Trial courts have 
always been clothed with a large discretion in the matter of granting a new 
trial, and their action will not be disturbed in the appellate court unless that 
court can clearly and conclusively say that there was an abuse of that 
discretion. It will take a stronger case to warrant a reversal where a new trial 
has been granted than where it is denied. * * *'" (Quoting from Elliott v. Sloan, 38 Wyo. 276, 266 P. 1059 (1928).)

[¶17.]  In this case, appellant argues there was 
not sufficient evidence before the jury to entitle them to find in favor of 
appellee. As we pointed out in our discussion of appellant's first issue, 
appellee presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to reach the issue of 
negligence. Also, as we said earlier, the mere fact that the collision occurred 
does not in itself indicate negligence. Therefore, after hearing the testimony 
of the witnesses and observing their demeanor, the district court exercised its 
discretion and denied appellant's motion for a new trial. The district court 
thereby indicated its belief that under the circumstances of the case no 
substantial injustice would occur in upholding the jury's verdict. Appellant has 
presented no convincing argument that would persuade us that the district court 
abused its discretion. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err 
when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 50(a), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"A party who moves for a 
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without 
any assent of the jury."

2 Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P. 
provides in pertinent part:

"(b) Whenever a motion 
for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the moving party may move not later than ten (10) 
days after the entry of judgment to have the verdict and any judgment entered 
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for 
a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten (10) 
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance 
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined 
with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative; and a 
motion to set aside or otherwise nullify a verdict or for a new trial shall be 
deemed to include a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as an 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand 
or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was 
returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed or may order a new trial. Motions for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict shall be determined within sixty (60) days after the entry of the 
judgment, and if not so determined shall be deemed denied, unless within such 
sixty (60) days the determination is continued by order of the court, but a 
continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date 
of entry of judgment."

3 Although the standards 
for granting or denying both a motion for directed verdict and a motion for a 
J.N.O.V. are virtually the same, we do not by our discussion imply that motions 
for a directed verdict in the proper case should not be granted when made. See 
Carey v. Jackson, supra, 603 P.2d  at 
877.

4 Rule 59, W.R.C.P. 
provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Grounds. - A new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues. * * * Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted for any of the following 
causes:

* * * * * 
*

"(6) That the verdict, 
report or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to 
law;

* * * * * 
*

"(8) Error of law 
occurring at the trial."