Title: Industrial Siting Council of State of Wyo. v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Industrial Siting Council of State of Wyo. v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co.1983 WY 22660 P.2d 776Case Number: 5740Case Number: 5740Decided: 03/08/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
INDUSTRIAL SITING COUNCIL 
OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY AND WESTERN RAILROAD PROPERTIES, INC., APPELLEES 
(PETITIONERS). No. 5740

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Peter J. 
Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Walter Perry, III, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and 
John D. Erdmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., signed the briefs, and Erdmann appeared in 
oral argument for 
appellant.

Craig Newman and 
Morris R. Massey of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, and 
Christopher A. Mills, Chicago, Ill., an atty. in good standing, Bar of Ill., 
signed the brief and Mills appeared in oral argument for appellees.

Before ROONEY, 
C.J.,* RAPER, THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., and 
FORRISTER, District Judge.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellees-petitioners, 
Chicago and North Western Transportation Company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Western Railroad Properties, Inc. (hereinafter C & NW), filed an 
application for a certificate of insufficient jurisdiction with 
appellant-respondent, the Industrial Siting Council of the State of Wyoming 
(hereinafter ISC), to exempt C & NW's planned railroad construction project 
from the permit requirements of the Industrial Development Information and 
Siting Act, § 35-12-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1982. After a public 
hearing, the ISC denied C & NW's application and C & NW appealed to the 
district court. The district court reversed, holding that the Interstate 
Commerce Act, specifically 49 U.S.C. § 10901, pre-empted the jurisdiction of the 
ISC with regard to C & NW's planned railroad construction 
project.

[¶2.]     On appeal from the 
decision of the district court, the ISC raises the following issues: 

"I. DOES THE WYOMING INDUSTRIAL SITING 
ACT EMPOWER THE SITING COUNCIL TO REGULATE IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF CONCERN 
OF THE I.C.C. [Interstate Commerce Commission]?

"II. DOES THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE ACT, IN PARTICULAR 49 U.S.C. § 10901, PREEMPT THE INDUSTRIAL SITING 
ACT?

"III. DOES THE EXERCISE 
OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER MATTERS OF STATE OR LOCAL CONCERN BY THE SITING 
COUNCIL CONFLICT WITH THE ORDERS OF THE I.C.C.?"

In addition, we 
must address the question of whether or not the district court had jurisdiction 
to entertain the appeal.

[¶3.]     We find that the 
district court had jurisdiction and we affirm the holding of the district 
court.

FACTS

[¶4.]     Pursuant to § 3(a) 
through (f) of the Industrial Development Information and Siting Rules and 
Regulations (1981), C & NW filed an application for a certificate of 
insufficient jurisdiction with the ISC for its planned construction and 
operation of a railroad line to transport low-sulfur coal from the eastern 
Powder River Basin to a connecting point with the Union Pacific railroad line at 
Joyce, Nebraska. The estimated cost of the Wyoming construction is $112,804,874, in 
mid-1981 dollars. The plan includes:

(1) The construction of a 
wye at Shawnee Junction, near Orin Junction, to connect the C & NW and 
Burlington Northern railroad line running north to the PowderRiver Basin with C & NW's present 
east-west line;

(2) The reconstruction of 
C & NW's east-west line which parallels U.S. Highway 20 from Shawnee 
Junction east to Crandall, near Van Tassell;

(3) The construction of a 
new connector line from Crandall south in Wyoming crossing into Nebraska east of Torrington 
and then to Joyce, 
Nebraska; and

(4) The construction of a 
microwave communication system and support facilities for the 
project.

[¶5.]     In 1976 the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (hereinafter I.C.C.) issued a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity to Burlington Northern, Inc. and C & NW 
authorizing the construction of the joint line between Shawnee Junction and the 
Powder River Basin coal fields. In connection with its issuance of a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity, the I.C.C. caused an environmental impact 
statement to be prepared. As a result of the statement, the I.C.C. imposed 
mitigating conditions on the issuance of the certificate. See Burlington 
Northern, Inc. and Chicago and North Western Transportation Company - 
Construction and Operation - Between Gillette and Douglas, in Campbell and 
Converse Counties, Wyoming, 348 I.C.C. 388 (1976). The construction of the wye 
at Shawnee Junction would complete the construction authorized by the I.C.C. in 
1976.

[¶6.]     In 1978 C & NW 
filed an application with the Federal Railroad Administration to finance its 
interest in the joint line and to upgrade 519 miles of its existing line east 
from Shawnee Junction.1 This proposal did not satisfy the 
Federal Railroad Administration and C & NW was requested to explore 
alternatives. C & NW's planned railroad line construction project resulted. 
In connection with C & NW's application for financial assistance from the 
Federal Railroad Administration, another environmental impact statement covering 
the planned railroad line construction was prepared. Chicago and North Western 
Transportation Company Construction and Operation of a Line of Railroad in 
Niobrara and Goshen Counties, Wyoming and in Sioux and Scotts Bluff Counties, 
Nebraska, 363 I.C.C. 906 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 685 F.2d 624 (1982). 

[¶7.]     Over a period of time, 
C & NW filed a complex series of applications with the I.C.C. concerning the 
joint line authorized in 1976, the construction of the connector line, and the 
transactions necessary to obtain financing for the project. The environmental 
impact statement prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration covering the 
planned railroad line construction was used by the I.C.C. in considering C & 
NW's applications. The I.C.C. approved, with conditions, the joint line 
agreement between C & NW and Burlington Northern, Inc. and approved the 
construction of the connector line subject to certain mitigating measures 
covering the construction of both the connector line and C & NW's existing 
line between Shawnee Junction and Crandall, which measures resulted from 
consideration of the environmental impact statement. Chicago and North Western 
Transportation Company Construction and Operation, supra.

[¶8.]     The ISC recognizes that 
the I.C.C. has authorized the construction of the planned project but contends 
that it is not precluded from imposing additional requirements on C & NW's 
planned construction. C & NW contends that the ISC authority with regard to 
the planned construction has been pre-empted by the Interstate Commerce Act 
and/or the I.C.C. approval of the planned construction project. However, 
preliminary to reaching these contentions, we must determine whether the 
district court had jurisdiction to entertain C & NW's appeal from the denial 
of the certificate of insufficient jurisdiction by the 
ISC.

JURISDICTION

"* * * The first and 
fundamental question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question 
cannot be waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever 
it is raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own motion. 
[Citation.]" Gardner v. Walker, Wyo., 373 P.2d 598, 599 
(1962).

And see Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake 
DeSmet, Wyo., 623 P.2d 764, 767 (1981); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Hallmark Insurance Company, Wyo., 561 P.2d 706, 708-709 
(1977).

[¶9.]     Because of the separate 
procedure established by the ISC to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction 
over a given construction project, we must determine whether or not there is 
statutory authority to review the ISC decision and, if there is statutory 
authority, whether or not the ISC decision is ripe for judicial 
review.

[¶10.]  By rule the ISC has created a procedure 
apart from the permit process by which its jurisdiction over the construction of 
an industrial facility2 may be challenged. Under it, the 
ISC jurisdiction may be challenged by filing an application for a certificate of 
insufficient jurisdiction pursuant to § 3(a), Ch. 1 of the Industrial 
Development Information and Siting Rules and Regulations (1981).3 Rather than contest the ISC 
jurisdiction during the permit process established by the Industrial Development 
Information and Siting Act, supra, C & NW availed itself of this separate 
procedure in addition to filing an application for a permit, and it appealed the 
ISC denial of its application for a certificate of insufficient jurisdiction to 
the district court.

[¶11.]  The right to judicial review of an 
administrative decision is entirely statutory. Said another way, judicial review 
is not available unless made so by statute. Where judicial review is available, 
the legislature must clearly express its intent in order to preclude judicial 
review. United States Steel Corporation 
v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 
Wyo., 575 P.2d 749, 750 (1978).

[¶12.]  The Industrial Development Information 
and Siting Act, supra, provides for the review of the ISC final decision on a 
permit application and of a decision issued after a hearing on an application 
for a permit, but is silent concerning the review of a decision on an 
application for a certificate of insufficient jurisdiction. Section 35-12-115, 
W.S. 1977. Therefore, the only other statute possibly providing for judicial 
review of such decision is § 9-4-114(a), W.S. 1977,4 which provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency 
action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an 
agency, is entitled to judicial review in 
the district court * * *." (Emphasis added.)

And see Rule 
12.01, W.R.A.P.

[¶13.]  This appeal is not from an agency 
decision rendered in a contested case, nor is it from the application of an 
agency rule. Therefore, in order to be appealable, pursuant to § 9-4-114(a), 
supra, it must come within the "other agency action or inaction" language of 
that section and Rule 12.01, W.R.A.P. See: Diefenderfer v. Budd, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1355 (1977); and Thornley v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, Motor Vehicle Division, Wyo., 478 P.2d 600 (1971). It does. The ISC by 
rule separated the jurisdictional question from the permit process and rendered 
a decision denying C & NW's application for a certificate of insufficient 
jurisdiction. C & NW was aggrieved or adversely affected by that decision 
and was entitled to judicial review in the district court.

[¶14.]  The ISC would have us hold otherwise, 
arguing that the pre-emption question raised by C & NW before the ISC and on 
appeal to the district court is not ripe for judicial review until the separate 
ISC permit process is complete and the ISC permit is issued with conditions. The 
ripeness doctrine is a category of justiciability "developed to identify 
appropriate occasions for judicial action." 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3529, p. 146 (1975). The basic 
rationale of the ripeness requirement, like that of the justiciability 
requirement,

"* * * is to prevent the 
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves 
in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the 
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been 
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 
The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the 
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration." Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 
(1967).

[¶15.]  In Brimmer v. Thompson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574, 
578 (1974), we set out the necessary elements of a justiciable controversy, 
quoting at length from Sorenson v. City 
of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 496 P.2d 512, 517 (1972), as 
follows:

"`* * * First, a 
justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as 
distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy 
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as 
distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a 
controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect 
of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other 
legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities be of such great 
and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and 
not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a 
thorough research and analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking 
these elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly before the 
courts for solution.' (Emphasis supplied.)"

[¶16.]  In this case the ISC has established a 
separate procedure which may be utilized to challenge its jurisdiction over a 
given construction project. This procedure was followed to its completion and 
resulted in a formal order denying C & NW's application for a certificate of 
insufficient jurisdiction. No further administrative action is contemplated on 
the decision. It is final. The decision of the ISC requires C & NW to 
complete the permit process and pay the costs associated with the permit 
process. See §§ 35-12-108(b) and 35-12-110(a), W.S. 1977. Failure to do so will 
in all likelihood result in the imposition of severe civil penalties. See: § 
35-12-119, W.S. 1977.

[¶17.]  Both parties have an existing and genuine 
interest in the controversy. C & NW seeks to avoid the permit process of the 
Industrial Development Information and Siting Act; the ISC seeks to impose the 
permit process on C & NW. Our decision will operate to terminate the 
controversy and will determine the rights and legal relationships between the 
parties vis-a-vis the necessity of C & NW obtaining a permit prior to 
construction. Finally, these proceedings are genuinely adversary. The issues are 
fit for judicial resolution and there is no reason for us to withhold our 
consideration.

PRE-EMPTION

[¶18.]  The ISC contends on appeal that the 
district court erred in finding that it is pre-empted from acting with regard to 
C & NW's planned railroad construction project by § 10901, 49 U.S.C. of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. The ISC argues that its authority to consider and 
mitigate environmental, social, and economic impacts of the construction project 
does not conflict with the I.C.C.'s authority over interstate railroad 
construction projects and that Congress has not directly or indirectly occupied 
the field. C & NW contends that there is an actual conflict between the 
Interstate Commerce Act and the Industrial Development Information and Siting 
Act and that Congress has evidenced its intent to occupy the field of interstate 
railroad construction.

[¶19.]  At the outset it is appropriate to note 
what this case does not involve. It does not involve a challenge of state 
legislation based on the dormant power given Congress by the Commerce Clause, 
Art. I, § 8, United States Constitution, where Congress has not acted. See: Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945) and the cases discussed therein. 
Rather, Congress has acted and we must determine the interrelationship between 
state and federal power because of that action.

[¶20.]  When Congress exercises its power under 
the Commerce Clause, supra, a state's power to legislate in the same area may be 
limited by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI, 
which provides in pertinent part:

"This Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding."

The United 
States Supreme Court recently set out the standard to be used in determining 
whether or not a state law has been pre-empted by a federal statute or 
regulation in Chicago & North Western 
Transportation Company v. Kalo Brick & Tile Company, 450 U.S. 311, 101 S. Ct. 1124, 1130, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1981). 

"Pre-emption of state law 
by federal statute or regulation is not favored `in the absence of persuasive 
reasons - either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no 
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. 
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1963). See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 96 S. Ct. 933, 936, 47 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1976). The underlying rationale of the 
pre-emption doctrine, as stated more than a century and a half ago, is that the 
Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that `interfere with, or are contrary 
to, the laws of Congress. . . .' Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). The doctrine does not and 
could not in our federal system withdraw from the States either the `power to 
regulate where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern' a 
federal law, San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243, 79 S. Ct. 773, 778, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 
(1959), or the authority to legislate when Congress could have regulated `a 
distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation . 
. . but did not,' Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68, n. 22, 61 S. Ct. 399, 405, n. 22, 85 L. Ed. 581 
(1941). But when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its constitutional 
powers, then a court must find local law pre-empted by federal regulation 
whenever the `challenged state statute "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649, 
91 S. Ct. 1704, 1711, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1971), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67-68, 61 
S.Ct., at 404. Making this determination `is essentially a two-step process of 
first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the 
constitutional question whether they are in conflict.' Perez v. Campbell, supra, at 644, 91 
S.Ct., at 1708. And in deciding whether any conflict is present, a court's 
concern is necessarily with `the nature of the activities which the States have 
sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted.' San Diego Building Trades Council v. 
Garmon, supra, at 243, 79 S.Ct., at 778."

[¶21.]  Pursuant to the power granted it by the 
Commerce Clause, supra, Congress has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
covering interstate common carriers, including railroads. Interstate Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.5 It has been the source of numerous 
pre-emption questions over the years. More often than not, state attempts to 
impose obligations on interstate common carriers have been invalidated as 
"plainly inconsistent with the plenary authority of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission or with congressional policy as reflected in the [Interstate 
Commerce] Act." Chicago & North 
Western Transportation Company, supra, 101 S. Ct.  at 1130. As stated in Chicago & North Western Transportation 
Company, supra, 101 S.Ct. at 1131:

"* * * The common 
rationale of these cases [invalidating state imposed obligations on interstate 
commerce] is easily stated: `[T]here can be no divided authority over interstate 
commerce, and . . . the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and 
exclusive.' Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. 
Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408, 45 S. Ct. 243, 245, 69 L. Ed. 683 (1925). 
Consequently, state efforts to regulate commerce must fall when they conflict 
with or interfere with federal authority over the same 
activity."

[¶22.]  Congress has granted the I.C.C. broad 
power to regulate interstate railroad construction, acquisition and operation of 
an extended or additional railroad line. Section 10901 of 49 U.S.C. provides in 
pertinent part: 

"(a) A rail carrier 
providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title [49 U.S.C. § 10501 et 
seq.] may -

"(1) construct an 
extension to any of its railroad lines;

"(2) construct an 
additional railroad line;

"(3) acquire or operate 
an extended or additional railroad line; or

"(4) provide 
transportation over, or by means of, an extended or additional railroad 
line;

"only if the 
Commission finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity 
require or will be enhanced by the construction or acquisition (or both) and 
operation of the railroad line.

* * * * * 
*

"(c)(1) If the Commission 
-

"(A) finds public 
convenience and necessity, it may -

"(i) approve the 
application as filed; or

"(ii) approve the 
application with modifications and require compliance with conditions the 
Commission finds necessary in the public interest; or

"(B) fails to find public 
convenience and necessity, it may deny the application.

"(2) On approval, the 
Commission shall issue to the rail carrier a certificate describing the 
construction or acquisition (or both) and operation approved by the 
Commission."6

[¶23.]  In Transit Commission v. United States, 289 U.S. 121, 53 S. Ct. 536, 77 L. Ed. 1075 (1933), the United States Supreme Court 
discussed the authority of a state to regulate the terms of an agreement between 
two railroads to jointly use railroad facilities. In finding that state 
regulation of the terms of the agreement covering an "extended or additional 
railroad" line was pre-empted by the Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Transportation Act of 1920, from which 49 U.S.C. § 10901, supra, 
fn. 5, comes, was intended to cure the detrimental effects of multiple 
regulation on interstate railroad transportation and the public interest. The 
Supreme Court held that federal regulation must be

"* * * construed to make 
federal authority effective to the full extent that it has been exerted and with 
a view of eliminating the evils that Congress intended to abate. [Citations.]" 
Transit Commission, supra, 289 U.S.  at 128, 53 S. Ct.  at 
538.

See: Chicago & North Western Transportation 
Company, supra, 101 S. Ct.  at 1131; Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company v. 
Jackson & Eastern Railway Company, 271 U.S. 244, 46 S. Ct. 535, 70 L. Ed. 928 (1926); and Board of Administration 
v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 138 Kan. 720, 27 P.2d 550 (1933). The power 
of the I.C.C. over railroad extensions is plenary. Transit Commission, supra, 53 S. Ct.  at 538. The same conclusion has been reached with regard to the I.C.C.'s 
authority to regulate the abandonment of railroad lines.7 It is exclusive. Chicago & North Western Transportation 
Company, supra, 101 S. Ct.  at 1132; and Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 
46 S. Ct. 452, 455, 70 L. Ed. 878 (1926).

[¶24.]  Thus, the I.C.C.'s authority to regulate 
the construction, extension and operation of interstate railroad lines is 
exclusive.

[¶25.]  The Industrial Development Information 
and Siting Act, supra, confers on the ISC the authority to regulate the 
construction of facilities8 through a permit process. A permit 
must be obtained prior to beginning construction, § 35-12-106, W.S. 1977, or the 
person may be subject to substantial civil penalties, § 35-12-119, W.S. 1977. By 
virtue of a 1981 amendment to § 35-12-121(e), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, the 
exemption for railroad construction was removed, thereby subjecting C & NW's 
planned railroad line construction to the permit requirements of the Industrial 
Development Information and Siting Act, supra. See: Ch. 127, § 1, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1981.

[¶26.]  The ISC is empowered to grant the permit 
for construction of a facility, grant the permit with conditions to mitigate the 
adverse effects of the construction or deny the permit by § 35-12-114, W.S. 
1977, which provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Within sixty (60) 
days of completion of hearing the council shall make complete findings, issue an 
opinion and render a decision upon the record, either granting or denying the 
application as filed, or granting it upon such terms, conditions or 
modifications of the construction, operation or maintenance of the facility as 
the council may deem appropriate. The council shall grant a permit either as 
proposed or as modified by the council if it finds and 
determines:

"(i) The nature of the 
probable environmental impact is acceptable, including a specification of the 
predictable adverse effect on the normal environment, public health and safety, 
aesthetics, scenic, historic and recreational value, forest and parks, air 
quality, water supply and quality, fish, wildlife and agricultural 
resources;

"(ii) That by the design 
and location of the facility, any adverse environmental impact is reduced to the 
extent deemed acceptable considering:

"(A) The state of 
available technology;

"(B) The nature and 
economics of the various alternatives;

"(C) Preservation of 
historic sites, forest and parks, fish and wildlife, air quality, water supply 
and quality, agriculture resources and land areas possessing sensitive 
ecological conditions; and

"(D) Other pertinent 
considerations.

"(iii) That the facility 
is compatible with the public health and safety;

"(iv) That the facility 
is compatible with the state, intrastate regional, county and local land use 
plans, if any, and with existing and projected nearby land 
utilization;

"(v) That the facility is 
designed in compliance with applicable state and local laws and regulations 
issued thereunder, except that the council may refuse to apply any local law or 
regulation if it finds that, as applied to the proposed facility, such law or 
regulation is unreasonably restrictive in view of the existing technology, or of 
factors of cost or economics;

"(vi) That the department 
of environmental quality has determined that the proposed facility or cumulative 
effects intensified by the facility will not violate state and federally 
established standards and implementation plans. The judgments of the department 
are conclusive on all questions related to the satisfaction of state and federal 
standards;

"(vii) That the facility 
represents an acceptable impact upon the environmental, social and economic well 
being of the municipality and people in the area where the facility is proposed 
to be located, considering the factors enumerated in W.S. 35-502.81(a)(xii) [§ 
35-12-108(a)(xii)].

"(b) No permit shall be 
granted if:

"(i) The estimated 
emissions or discharges of the proposed facility will exceed state or federal 
standards, either individually or because of the cumulative effect with other 
sources;

"(ii) The location of the 
facility conflicts with or violates state, intrastate regional, county and local 
land use plans;

"(iii) The cumulative 
effect of the facility on the environmental, social and economic conditions in 
the area in conjunction with other facilities will substantially impair the 
health, safety and welfare of people even though paragraph (i) of this 
subsection is not applicable. 

"(c) If the council 
determines that the location of all or part of the proposed facility should be 
modified, it may condition its permit upon such modification, provided that the 
local governments, and persons residing therein, affected by the modification, 
have been given reasonable notice of the modification."

This pervasive 
regulatory scheme was enacted to protect Wyoming's environment and the social 
and economic fabric of the communities affected by industrial development.9 It gives the ISC the power to 
control or prohibit the construction of facilities, such as C & NW's planned 
railroad line construction project.

[¶27.]  The ISC stresses the emphasis of the 
Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, supra, on the mitigation of 
social and economic impacts of a planned construction project, rather than on 
the power of the ISC to deny a construction permit. The ISC apparently concedes 
that it cannot block C & NW's planned railroad line construction project 
which has been authorized by the I.C.C. See Burlington Northern, Inc. and 
Chicago and North Western Transportation Company - Construction and Operation, 
supra, 348 I.C.C. 388; and Chicago and North Western Transportation Company - 
Construction and Operation, supra, 363 I.C.C. 906. However, it argues that it 
may impose conditions, in addition to the conditions already imposed by the 
I.C.C., on the construction project.

[¶28.]  We cannot agree. As noted above, Congress 
has granted the I.C.C. pervasive authority over the construction, extension and 
operation of interstate railroad lines. Environmental impact statements are 
mandated in connection therewith10 and were accomplished in this 
instance. The Industrial Development Information and Sitting Act purports to 
give the ISC authority to grant or deny permits for the construction of 
interstate railroads. This imposition of additional obligations by the 
Industrial Development Information and Siting Act cannot stand. To hold 
otherwise would reimpose the burden of multiple regulation which Congress 
intended to abolish. Transit Commission, supra. Regulation of the construction, 
extension and operation of interstate railroad lines by the Industrial 
Development Information and Siting Act, supra, is pre-empted by the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10901, supra, under the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, Art. VI.

[¶29.]  The ISC has placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the factors it must consider in passing on an application for a 
construction permit, § 35-12-111, W.S. 1977, as contrasted to the factors 
considered by the I.C.C. in granting a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, supra, fn. 10, in 
an attempt to circumscribe an area within which it has power to regulate C & 
NW's planned railroad line construction project. However, nothing was left to 
the states. Therefore, we need not address the issues raised by the ISC 
concerning the extent of federal pre-emption. Federal pre-emption in the domain 
of interstate railroad line construction is complete.

[¶30.]  The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 C & NW has withdrawn 
its application for financial assistance.

2 For the definition of 
"facility" as the term is used in the Industrial Development Information and 
Siting Act, supra, see § 35-12-102(a)(iii), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1982.

3 Section 3(a), Ch. 1, of 
the Industrial Development Information and Siting Rules and Regulations (1981) 
provides:

"a. Any person who 
intends to construct any industrial facility may submit to the Office an 
application for a certificate of insufficient jurisdiction which shall state 
that the proposed facility intended to be constructed does not qualify as an 
industrial facility under the Act, and that the Council lacks sufficient 
jurisdiction to require that an application for a permit to construct be 
submitted."

4 The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act was moved from Title 9 to Title 16, effective 
January 1, 1983. Ch. 62, S.L. 
of Wyoming 
1982. In this opinion, we will refer to the provisions of the Act as they 
appeared in Title 9.

5 The Interstate Commerce 
Act was codified in 1978 as Subtitle IV of Title 49. Pub.Law 95-473, 92 Stat. 
1337 et seq. (1978). The provisions governing railroads with which we are 
concerned in this case were added to the Interstate Commerce Act by the 
Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 477. See: Chicago & North Western Transportation 
Company, supra, 101 S. Ct.  at 1131.

6 Prior to the 1978 
codification, § 10901, 49 U.S.C. was contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1(18). Cases prior 
to 1978 refer to § 1(18). The codification did not change the provisions of § 
1(18) concerning construction.

7 Both railroad line 
construction or extension and railroad line abandonments were covered under 49 
U.S.C. § 1(18) prior to the 1978 codification. Abandonments are now covered by 
49 U.S.C. § 10903 through 10906.

8 See fn. 2, 
supra.

9 For a general discussion 
of Wyoming's 
industrial siting legislation see Van Baalen, "Industrial Siting Legislation: 
The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act - Advance or 
Retreat?" 11 Land & Water L.Rev. 27 (1976).

10 Preparation of 
environmental impact statements are mandated by the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.