Title: Dube v. Dube

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 15 
Docket: 
Yor-15-231 
Submitted  
    On Briefs: November 19, 2015 
Decided: 
January 19, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
KEVIN DUBE 
 
v. 
 
LISA DUBE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Kevin Dube appeals from a divorce judgment entered in the District 
Court (Biddeford, Janelle, J.).  He argues that the court abused its discretion in 
setting his rights of contact with the parties’ daughter by (1) depriving him of 
overnight visitation with his daughter, and (2) failing to set a specific contact 
schedule.  He also challenges the judgment as to the spousal and child support 
awards, arguing that the court erred in finding that Kevin earns $175,000 per 
year—a finding underpinning both awards.  For the following reasons, we 
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in setting Kevin’s rights of 
contact.  However, because we conclude that the court erred in its finding 
regarding Kevin’s income, we vacate the judgment as to the spousal and child 
support awards and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts, drawn from the record in this contested divorce 
matter, are undisputed.  Kevin and Lisa Dube were married on December 24, 2002, 
and have a fourteen-year-old daughter.1  Kevin is a merchant marine engineer who 
works the majority of the year on the Great Lakes.  Lisa is a homemaker who 
earned some income over the course of the marriage through self-employment. 
[¶3]  Kevin filed a complaint for divorce on March 25, 2014.  On 
February 10, 2015, a final divorce hearing was held in the District Court,2 and on 
March 13, 2015, the court entered a final divorce judgment granting Lisa and 
Kevin shared parental rights and responsibilities and stating, 
Kevin shall have the right to visit with and be visited by [their 
daughter] at all reasonable times when he is in Maine during time off 
from his work on the Great Lakes.  The parents shall confer to set up a 
workable schedule.  Lisa and Kevin should be flexible in scheduling 
parenting time and should consider the benefits to [their daughter] of 
frequent, meaningful and regular contact with each parent and the 
schedules of the child and each parent.  Both parents shall provide the 
other parent direct telephone access to [their daughter].  Phone calls 
made to [their daughter] shall be promptly returned.   
 
The court stated that it had “made certain findings regarding the parties’ incomes 
and Parental Support Obligation set forth in the Child Support Worksheet that are 
incorporated herein” and ordered that Kevin pay $325 per week in child support.  
                                         
1  Kevin also has one adult child from a previous relationship. 
2  The hearing was delayed in part to accommodate Kevin’s work schedule in the Midwest. 
 
3 
The worksheet lists Lisa’s gross income as $25,000 per year and Kevin’s as 
$175,000.  The court also ordered that Kevin pay general spousal support of 
$3,300 per month for six years, stating, 
The 
[c]ourt 
considered 
all 
of 
the 
factors 
listed 
in 
19-A M.R.S. § 951-A [2015] in arriving at this spousal support award.  
The [c]ourt finds that Kevin currently earns significantly more income 
than Lisa and that he has a much greater earning potential than Lisa.  
This spousal support award allows both parties to maintain a 
reasonable standard of living after the divorce.   
 
[¶4]  On March 23, 2015, Kevin filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a motion for findings of fact, 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a),3 concerning, in relevant part, his rights of contact 
with his daughter and the court’s finding regarding his income.4  After the court 
denied both motions without indicating its reasoning, Kevin timely appealed to us 
pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2015) and M.R. App. P. 2.    
                                         
3  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 52 was recently amended, see 2015 Me. Rules 15 (effective 
Sept. 1, 2015), but these amendments do not affect this appeal. 
4  Both parties note that the final judgment is captioned “Defendant’s Proposed Divorce Judgment.” 
However, the text of the judgment does not indicate that the court simply copied Lisa’s proposed 
judgment.  See Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 14, 832 A.2d 775 (“[A] trial court’s verbatim adoption of 
findings or orders proposed by one party in a case is disfavored . . . .”).   
 
4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Rights of Contact 
1.  
Overnight Visitation 
[¶5]  Kevin contends that the court erred by “depriving” him of overnight 
visitation with his daughter.  We review determinations of rights of contact for 
abuse of discretion.  Sullivan v. Doe, 2014 ME 109, ¶ 19, 100 A.3d 171.  
Generally, a trial court is “afforded broad discretion to determine the custodial 
arrangements for a minor child.”  Jackson v. MacLeod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 23, 
100 A.3d 484.  Because Kevin did not timely move for findings on the issue of 
rights of contact, 5 we assume that the District Court made all the findings 
necessary to support its judgment on that issue, if those findings are supported by 
the record.  See Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 5, 120 A.3d 106. 
[¶6]  A court’s discretion in determining rights of contact is constrained by 
the principle that “except when a court determines that the best interest of a child 
would not be served, it is the public policy of this State to assure minor children of 
                                         
5  Kevin’s Rule 52(a) motion for findings of fact was untimely as to the issue of his rights of contact 
with his daughter.  Kevin filed the motion ten days after the divorce judgment was docketed, but 
M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) establishes a seven-day deadline.  Kevin contends that his motion should be treated as 
a Rule 52(b) motion for additional findings of fact, with a fourteen-day deadline, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 
notwithstanding the motion’s caption.  However, we have established that a motion for findings of fact is 
governed by Rule 52(a) when the trial court “had not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 
issues that were the subject of the motion.”  Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 10, 120 A.3d 106 (emphasis 
added).  Because the court did not make any findings as to parent-child contact in the judgment, Kevin’s 
motion was governed by Rule 52(a) as to that issue, and was therefore untimely.   
 
5 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents.”  19-A M.R.S. § 1653(1)(C) 
(2015).  The District Court did not determine that frequent contact with Kevin 
would not be in his daughter’s best interest.  We therefore assume that the court 
made the necessary findings to support its judgment that Kevin and Lisa can work 
together to create a schedule assuring their daughter of frequent and continuing 
contact with Kevin.  
[¶7]  The record demonstrates that such cooperation is possible.  Lisa 
testified that she would like to keep Kevin involved in their daughter’s life, and 
that she has the ability to co-parent and communicate with Kevin.  Lisa proposed 
that Kevin would have the right to “visit with and be visited by” their daughter 
every other day when he is home in Maine, from noon until 8:00 p.m. on days 
when she is not in school, and from 3:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. on school days.  
Finally, Lisa testified that it was Kevin who did not keep to the contact schedule 
during the pendency of the divorce by missing scheduled visits with their daughter. 
[¶8]  Kevin’s contention that the court “deprived” him of overnight 
visitation is not accurate.  Despite evidence in the record that Lisa will not allow 
Kevin to visit overnight with their daughter, the court’s judgment does not itself 
purport to limit overnight visitation in any way.  If the parties are able, over time, 
to agree to expanded visits between Kevin and his daughter, the judgment will not 
prevent that.  
 
6 
2.  
Contact Schedule 
[¶9]  Kevin also argues that the court abused its discretion by denying his 
timely motion to alter or amend the judgment to include a specific contact schedule 
for the times when he is in Maine.  Essentially, Kevin’s argument is based on his 
contention that the lack of a specific contact schedule “will jeopardize any 
continuing relationship with [his daughter] and undoubtedly require further legal 
proceedings.”6  “We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion seeking 
clarification and amendment of a judgment for an abuse of discretion.”  
Theberge v. Theberge, 2010 ME 132, ¶ 21, 9 A.3d 809.  There is evidence in the 
record supporting the court’s finding that Lisa and Kevin can arrange a contact 
schedule ensuring frequent and continuing contact between Kevin and his 
daughter.  For these reasons, we affirm the judgment as it pertains to rights of 
contact.7  
                                         
6  Kevin’s Rule 59 motion was timely, see M.R. Civ. P. 59(b), but he has not preserved the argument 
that the court’s judgment is ambiguous or vague as to the rights of contact because he failed to raise that 
issue in his motion.  See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102 (“An 
issue raised for the first time on appeal is not properly preserved for appellate review.”). 
 
7  We note that if Lisa denies Kevin “frequent, meaningful and regular contact” with their daughter in 
violation of the judgment, Kevin can seek modification of the terms of rights of contact and remedial 
sanctions.  19-A M.R.S. § 1653(7) (2015); M.R. Civ. P. 66; see Hogan v. Veno, 2006 ME 132, ¶¶ 19-20, 
909 A.2d 638.  
 
7 
B.   
Spousal Support 
[¶10]  Kevin argues that the trial court’s findings are inadequate to sustain 
the amount of the spousal support award.  We review a decision regarding spousal 
support for abuse of discretion.  Jandreau v. LaChance, 2015 ME 66, ¶ 14, 
116 A.3d 1273.  The trial court “has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform 
the parties of the reason underlying [its] conclusions and to provide for effective 
appellate review.”  Brown v. Habrle, 2008 ME 17, ¶ 10, 940 A.2d 1091 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Because Kevin timely moved for findings of fact on his income,8 
which is a consideration underlying a court’s spousal support award, 
see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(B), (E), we cannot assume that the court’s findings 
were sufficient to support the judgment.  See Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 ME 67, 
¶ 27, 43 A.3d 965 (stating that when a motion for findings has been filed and 
denied, “the court’s decision must include sufficient findings to support its result or 
the order must be vacated”); Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me. 1992) 
                                         
8  We treat Kevin’s motion for findings of fact as a timely Rule 52(b) motion regarding the issue of his 
income because the court did make findings on that issue.  See Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 256 n.2 
(Me. 1984) (stating that we will regard a motion as though it were brought pursuant to the appropriate 
rule of civil procedure, regardless of its caption).   
 
Because Kevin did not raise the calculation of Lisa’s income as an issue in his Rule 59 motion, or 
move for findings on this issue in his Rule 52 motion, his argument that the trial court improperly 
calculated Lisa’s income in regards to the spousal and child support awards is not preserved, and there is 
no obvious error.  See Foster, 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102.  Kevin’s motion for findings of fact was 
also untimely as to Lisa’s alleged economic misconduct because the court did not make findings on that 
issue.  Nevertheless, the evidence on that issue could reasonably have led the court to conclude that Kevin 
and Lisa were equally to blame for their poor financial situation.   
 
 
8 
(“[W]here a party has moved for specific findings of fact the [court] is obliged to 
do more than recite the relevant criteria and state a conclusion.”).  
[¶11]  Kevin’s most recent child support affidavit and financial statement 
both listed his estimated income as $136,420 for 2015.  The court did not provide 
any explanation for its finding, contained in the child support worksheet, that 
Kevin’s gross income is $175,000, and it is not clear whether the court was 
imputing income to Kevin, despite his testimony that he is planning to no longer 
take additional “winter work,” or basing its finding on previous years in which 
Kevin had made more than $136,000.   
[¶12]  We have vacated and remanded a divorce judgment where the trial 
court relied on something other than a party’s most recent statement of income 
without providing its reasons for doing so, or otherwise arrived at an income figure 
without adequate explanation.  See Williams v. St. Pierre, 2006 ME 10, ¶¶ 9-10, 
889 A.2d 1011 (vacating and remanding the judgment because the “court may have 
had a reason for concluding that Williams’s earning capacity was higher than the 
earnings estimated by his most recent child support affidavit, but without explicit 
findings to justify the reliance on the older affidavit, our appellate analysis is 
hindered”); Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶¶ 22-23, 832 A.2d 775 (vacating and 
remanding the judgment because the “trial court did not state its reasoning for 
ignoring [the party’s] current income and relying on his income . . . from his 
 
9 
former employment”); Payne v. Payne, 2006 ME 73, ¶¶ 10-11, 899 A.2d 793 
(vacating and remanding the judgment where it was unclear whether an income 
finding was based on imputation of income by the court). 
[¶13]  The trial court, despite Kevin’s Rule 52 motion, did not make findings 
concerning Kevin’s income sufficient to inform the parties of the reasoning 
underlying its conclusion and to provide for effective appellate review.  It is 
possible that Kevin “currently earns significantly more income than Lisa” no 
matter how his income is computed, but we cannot speculate how a different 
calculation of Kevin’s gross income would inform the trial court’s spousal support 
award.  Because we conclude that the court’s finding regarding Kevin’s income, 
which the court implicitly relied upon in determining the spousal support award, is 
insufficient to support the judgment, we vacate the spousal support award and 
remand the matter for further proceedings regarding spousal support. 9  
C.   
Child Support  
[¶14]  Finally, Kevin contends that the child support award should be 
vacated and remanded because of the court’s unsupported finding regarding his 
income. We review an award of child support for abuse of discretion.  Young, 
                                         
9  Kevin also argues that the trial court erred in setting the duration of the spousal support award.  
Because we are vacating the spousal support award in its entirety, we do not address this aspect of the 
award.  However, we remind the trial court to consider the rebuttable presumption controlling the 
duration of spousal support awards, 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A)(1) (2015), on remand.    
 
10 
2015 ME 89, ¶ 7, 120 A.3d 106.  Because the court’s finding concerning Kevin’s 
income, which is cited in connection with the child support award, is insufficient to 
support the judgment for the reasons discussed above, we also vacate the child 
support award and remand the matter for further proceedings regarding child 
support.10  
The entry is: 
Judgment as to spousal and child support vacated.  
Judgment affirmed in all other respects.  Remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O’Brien 
Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant Kevin 
Dube 
 
Jeffrey P. Buhrman, Esq., South Portland, for appellant Lisa 
Dube 
 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2014-111 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
10  In her brief, Lisa asks us to require Kevin to pay her attorney fees because she contends that his 
appeal is frivolous.  Ordinarily, a request for sanctions of this kind must be made in a separately filed 
motion.  M.R. App. P. 13(f).  In addition, as we are vacating and remanding the judgment in part, it is 
clear that Kevin’s appeal does not meet the usual standard for sanctions—an “egregious case” of an 
obviously frivolous appeal taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, or with the purpose of 
causing delay.  See id.; Estate of Dineen, 2006 ME 108, ¶ 8, 904 A.2d 417.