Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael J. Backes

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 59 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2002AP3238-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael J. Backes, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Michael J. Backes,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BACKES 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
December 14, 2004   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins the concurrence. 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., 
join the concurrence.   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent there were briefs by Michael J. Backes, 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the complainant there was a brief by Gregg Herman, 
Matthew J. Price, and Loeb & Herman, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
2005 WI 59 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2002AP3238-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael J. Backes, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael J. Backes,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
May 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.     
 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Michael Backes seeks review of 
a report and recommendation filed by Referee Joan Kessler on or 
about October 2, 2003.1   
                                                 
1 Attorney Backes' notice of appeal was untimely.  The 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) moved to dismiss the entire 
appeal.  This court acknowledged that the appeal was untimely 
but directed the parties to file briefs in the matter pursuant 
to SCR 22.17(2), which provides that "[i]f no appeal is filed 
timely . . . [t]he court, on its own motion, may order the 
parties to file briefs in the matter." 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
2 
 
 
¶2 
Attorney Backes attended law school following a career 
in real estate.  He was admitted to practice in Wisconsin in 
1986.  He has no prior disciplinary history. 
 
¶3 
On December 5, 2002, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Backes, alleging some 
15 disciplinary violations stemming from five separate client 
matters. 
 
¶4 
Attorney Backes filed a timely answer and the parties 
stipulated to two exhibits, which were admitted at the hearing 
before the referee, conducted on July 8 and 9, 2003.  The first 
exhibit was entitled "Binding Stipulation as to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law."  This constituted a "no contest plea" 
to the factual allegations and four violations charged in 
connection with one of the client matters which is referred to 
herein as "J.J."  The parties also stipulated to a document 
entitled "Facts Admitted by Respondent . . ." that summarized 
the other facts admitted by Attorney Backes in connection with 
the other allegations made against him.  The matter proceeded to 
a hearing before the referee. 
 
¶5 
Ultimately, the referee concluded that Attorney Backes 
had committed misconduct in connection with nine2 of the 15 
counts with which he was originally charged.  He was cleared of 
six counts alleged in connection with two client matters.  The 
referee recommended a public reprimand and restitution in the 
                                                 
2 These nine violations include the four counts to which 
Attorney Backes stipulated. 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
3 
 
form of fee refunds to two clients.  The referee recommended 
further that Attorney Backes pay the costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding.   
 
¶6 
Attorney Backes contends that a public reprimand is 
excessive discipline in view of the facts of this matter.  He 
suggests that the recommended discipline was derived from 
considering all the charges against him and is no longer 
appropriate considering that the referee cleared him of the 
allegations made in connection with two client matters.  Indeed, 
he points out that he was cleared of one of the most serious 
allegations, an alleged violation of SCR 20:8.4, which involves 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation.  He suggests further that the referee erred 
with respect to certain factual findings made in two client 
matters.  He asserts that a private reprimand is sufficient 
discipline for his misconduct.   
 
¶7 
For clarity, the allegations against Attorney Backes 
will be discussed in connection with the client matters to which 
they relate. 
MATTER OF J.J. 
 
¶8 
Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation entered by 
the parties, Attorney Backes conceded he committed misconduct in 
this matter.  As background, in 1994, the client, J.J., was 
convicted of one count of attempted first-degree murder and four 
counts of sexual assault.  His conviction was affirmed on 
appeal.   
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
4 
 
 
¶9 
In March 1998, J.J. contacted Attorney Backes about 
possible postconviction representation.  He suggested he might 
be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
Attorney Backes sent J.J. two letters, explaining first that he 
charged a flat fee, and later stating that fee would be $2500.  
On April 16, 1998, J.J. mailed Attorney Backes a check for 
$2500. There was no formal written fee agreement.  
 
¶10 Attorney Backes visited J.J. in prison on June 26, 
1998.  At that meeting he stated that he would file a 
postconviction motion on J.J.'s behalf within 60 days of the 
meeting.   
 
¶11 Despite several letters from Attorney Backes promising 
to take action in the near future, no pleading was ever filed on 
J.J.'s behalf.  J.J. made several attempts to ascertain the 
status of the matter, including three attempts to terminate 
representation and obtain a refund of the retainer.   
 
¶12 In May 2002, during the course of the ensuing 
grievance investigation, Attorney Backes did refund the full 
$2500 retainer to J.J. 
 
¶13 The OLR alleged and Attorney Backes conceded that 
(1) by failing to file a postconviction motion or to conclude 
his review of J.J.'s file for more than 2½ years, Attorney 
Backes failed to act with reasonable diligence in representing 
J.J. in violation of SCR 20:1.33; (2) by failing to respond to 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
5 
 
J.J.'s correspondence, Attorney Backes failed to keep J.J. 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of 
SCR 20:1.4(a)4; (3) by failing to respond to J.J.'s specific 
inquiries about various postconviction relief issues, Attorney 
Backes failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit J.J. to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation in violation of SCR 20:1.4(b)5; and (4) by 
failing until May 2002, to refund the $2500 fee that J.J. had 
paid, 
Attorney 
Backes 
failed, 
upon 
termination 
of 
representation, to refund an advance payment of fees that had 
not been earned in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).6 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides:  "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information." 
5 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides:  "(b) A lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
6 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:  
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
6 
 
MATTER OF D.M. 
 
¶14 Counts V through VIII of the complaint involved 
allegations of misconduct with respect to the matter of D.M.  
The referee concluded that Attorney Backes did not commit 
misconduct in his handling of the D.M. matter, and the OLR did 
not appeal that conclusion.  Therefore, these facts and 
conclusions are not in dispute, but are discussed herein for 
reference because Attorney Backes contends this matter was 
wrongly considered by the referee in her decision to recommend a 
public reprimand.   
 
¶15 D.M. was convicted of one count of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child in 1993.  His motion for plea 
withdrawal was denied and the matter affirmed on appeal.   
 
¶16 In May 1996, D.M. met with Thomas Russell, another 
lawyer at Backes' law firm, to discuss filing a possible 
postconviction motion.  D.M. signed a fee agreement with this 
attorney.   
 
¶17 A short time later, D.M. met with Attorney Backes and 
executed a new written fee agreement, for "post judgment 
matters" in which he agreed that the initial retainer would be 
$2500.  The agreement provided:  "This fee is a minimum and non 
refundable fee and is to be paid as follows: $1500.00 Down, Bal. 
45 Days."  The agreement goes on to discuss the possibility of a 
higher fee "if an appeal is required."  D.M. paid Attorney 
Russell $1500 when he signed the fee agreement.   
 
¶18 D.M. then "effectively disappeared." From May 1996 to 
May 1997, he neither initiated contact with Attorney Backes nor 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
7 
 
responded to Attorney Backes' attempts to contact him.  In 
September 1997, D.M. "reappeared" and requested legal action 
from Attorney Backes on a matter apparently unrelated to the 
earlier fee agreement. 
 
¶19 On September 18, 1997, Attorney Russell provided 
Attorney Backes with a written analysis of D.M.'s case, 
concluding that there was no good-faith basis upon which a 
postconviction motion could be filed.  At this point, the $1000 
balance on the fee agreement was still due and owing. 
 
¶20 In October 1997, Attorney Backes wrote to D.M. and 
asked for the additional $1000 to proceed with the case.  The 
complaint indicates that "[t]hereafter, for over a year [D.M.] 
was unable to obtain $1,000.00 to pay [Attorney Backes]."  In 
December 1998, D.M. gave Attorney Backes $1000 to proceed. 
 
¶21 In a letter dated January 18, 1999, after some 
additional review of the file, Attorney Backes informed D.M. 
that there were no grounds upon which to proceed with a 
postconviction motion.  Correspondence between the two ensued.  
It appears that D.M. was unwilling to accept Attorney Backes' 
conclusion, and repeatedly insisted some motion be filed.  
Attorney Backes declined to file a motion and declined to refund 
the $1000 payment, asserting that this fee was earned. 
 
¶22 On March 21, 2002, four months after D.M. filed a 
grievance against him, Attorney Backes refunded D.M. $1000.  
 
¶23 The 
OLR 
complaint 
alleged 
that Attorney Backes' 
conduct with respect to the D.M. matter violated SCR 20:1.3 
(reasonable diligence), SCR 20:1.4(b) (failure to adequately 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
8 
 
explain matter), SCR 20:1.16(d) (failure to refund unearned 
payment), and the most serious charge levied against Attorney 
Backes, 
SCR 
20:8.4(c)(conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation).   
 
¶24 The referee, however, concluded that Attorney Backes 
did not commit misconduct with respect to his handling of the 
D.M. matter, noting that a fixed fee agreement is not a per se 
violation of rules of professional conduct, so long as the fee 
is reasonable in relation to the work performed.  The referee 
observed that there was no evidence that the fee here was 
unreasonable.  The referee noted further that there was no 
indication that D.M. objected to the delay or to the fee "until 
after he was told that . . . nothing could be done to reopen the 
case."   
MATTER OF C.D. 
 
¶25 The referee also exonerated Attorney Backes from the 
OLR's charges against him in respect to the matter of C.D.  The 
OLR does not appeal that conclusion.  Therefore, again these 
findings and conclusions are not in dispute and are only 
summarized here for purposes of evaluating whether they were 
improperly considered in recommending discipline. 
 
¶26 In November 1998, C.S. retained Attorney Backes to 
pursue a sentence modification motion for her fiancé, C.D., who 
had been incarcerated since 1991 following his conviction for 
armed robbery and threats to injure.  C.S. paid Attorney Backes 
$1250 and agreed to pay him another $1250 within 30 days.  There 
was no written fee agreement.  C.S. duly paid the remaining 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
9 
 
$1250 on December 31, 1998.  The premise of the requested motion 
was that C.D.'s parents were ailing and needed C.D. to care for 
them.  
 
¶27 On February 24, 1999, Attorney Backes wrote to C.D. 
advising him that he had spoken to the parents and had questions 
about whether the requested motion was appropriate.  On March 9, 
1999, Attorney Backes contacted C.D. to state that C.D.'s 
parents had informed him that they were not in ill health, and 
did not need C.D. to come home to care for them.  He advised 
C.D. that there was thus no basis for filing a motion for 
sentence modification.  
 
¶28 Over the following months, a series of correspondence 
ensued between C.D. and Attorney Backes, with C.D. demanding 
Attorney Backes either file a motion or refund $2000 of his fee, 
and Attorney Backes explaining he had earned his fee.  
 
¶29 In October 1999, C.D. wrote to Attorney Backes, asking 
him to pursue whether a potential witness was available and 
stating that he had been assaulted by another inmate.  Attorney 
Backes 
did 
contact 
C.D.'s 
former 
attorney 
regarding 
the 
potential witness, and on December 20, 1999, forwarded C.D. a 
letter from that attorney stating that the witness was not 
available.  On January 5, 2000, C.D. was attacked by another 
inmate and seriously injured.  In June 2000, another attorney 
represented C.D. in a sentence modification motion.  The motion 
was denied. 
 
¶30 The referee concluded that Attorney Backes had not 
committed misconduct with respect to his handling of the C.D. 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
10 
 
matter, noting that there was no evidence that a flat fee was 
unreasonable. 
 
¶31 Attorney Backes agrees with this conclusion, but 
emphasizes that the injury C.D. sustained in the altercation 
with another inmate did not establish a basis for a sentence 
modification.  We acknowledge the point, but conclude that the 
referee included these facts to establish the chronology; it was 
not the basis for the referee's decision, nor does it appear to 
have affected the referee's recommendation with respect to 
discipline. 
MATTER OF D.L.S. 
 
¶32 The referee concluded that Attorney Backes committed 
misconduct in his handling of the matter of D.L.S.  Attorney 
Backes challenges the referee's factual findings on several 
points. 
 
¶33 On January 28, 2000, D.L.S. retained Attorney Backes 
to defend her son, M.L., against a charge of repeated acts of 
sexual assault against a child.  D.L.S. signed a fee agreement 
in which she agreed to pay a flat, nonrefundable fee of $2500 to 
resolve the case short of trial. 
 
¶34 On January 31, 2000, Attorney Backes met with M.L. in 
jail.  M.L. requested that Attorney Backes file an immediate 
motion to reduce his bail.  D.L.S. also asked Attorney Backes to 
file a motion to reduce her son's bail, explaining this was a 
high priority.   
 
¶35 On February 25, 2000, Attorney Backes had not filed 
the requested motion, and D.L.S. discharged Attorney Backes, 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
11 
 
requesting an itemization and return of any unearned fees.  On 
February 28, 2000, D.L.S. retained another attorney who promptly 
entered an appearance and moved for bail modification on March 
7, 2000.  The motion was granted the same day.  M.L. was 
released on cash bond a few days later.   
 
¶36 D.L.S. made two subsequent requests for a refund of 
unearned fees on March 29 and May 3, 2000.  Although Attorney 
Backes admitted he had worked only five to seven hours on the 
matter, he did not send D.L.S. a refund until March 21, 2002, 
more than two years after he was discharged.  The refund was in 
the amount of $1500, leaving a balance of $500 in dispute. 
 
¶37 The parties disputed the reason Attorney Backes did 
not promptly file a motion for bail modification.  The referee 
made findings that Attorney Backes testified that he delayed 
bringing the motion because he thought the motion would require 
the support of the district attorney and he was trying to obtain 
that support, and because it was his understanding that his 
clients could raise no more than $5000 for bail.   
¶38 On appeal, Attorney Backes challenges these findings.  
The record does reflect statements indicating that he thought 
the clients could only produce $2500 for bail.  Bail was 
ultimately reduced to $5000, indicating it was reasonable for 
him to be concerned about the client's inability to raise more 
than $2500.  Indeed, Attorney Backes implies that it would have 
been futile to bring a motion.  He adds that he, in fact, had 
established the court date for the bail hearing although he 
concedes that he had not yet prepared a written bail motion.   
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
12 
 
 
¶39 Attorney 
Backes 
also 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
conclusion that he did not adequately communicate his strategic 
reasoning to the clients.  He points to testimony elicited on 
cross-examination 
at 
the 
hearing 
in 
which 
the 
clients 
acknowledge that Attorney Backes did have discussions with them 
about various aspects of the case.   
 
¶40 While 
there 
is 
record 
evidence 
of 
some 
misunderstanding as to the amount of money the client had 
available for bail, the record supports the referee's conclusion 
that the clients did not understand Attorney Backes’ strategic 
decisions, nor did they believe that Attorney Backes had the 
matter in hand.  M.L. wrote Attorney Backes several letters and 
D.L.S. telephoned Attorney Backes several times in an effort to 
obtain information about the status of the bail hearing, without 
receiving a response from Attorney Backes.  Although Attorney 
Backes may indeed have intended to raise the question of bail at 
a scheduled pretrial hearing, he never formally filed a motion 
for bail modification.  And, it is undisputed that it took more 
than two years for Attorney Backes to refund even a portion of 
the retainer, despite his admission that he spent no more than 
five to seven hours on the client's file. 
 
¶41 We are persuaded that the referee's conclusions that 
Attorney Backes failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in violation of SCR 20:1.3, and failed to timely 
refund an advance payment that had not been earned in violation 
of SCR 20:1.16(d) are supported by the record and are not 
clearly erroneous.  We agree further with the referee's 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
13 
 
recommendation that Attorney Backes be required to refund D.L.S. 
the balance of the fee retainer in this matter. 
MATTER OF C.B. 
 
¶42 The referee concluded that Attorney Backes committed 
misconduct in his handling of the C.B. matter.  Attorney Backes 
challenges the referee's factual findings on several points. 
 
¶43 C.B. 
was 
convicted 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, while armed, in 1993.  In November 1999, C.B.'s mother 
and aunt retained Attorney Backes to file a motion for 
postconviction relief on behalf of C.B.   
 
¶44 On C.B.'s behalf, a fee agreement was signed by his 
mother in which a nonrefundable fee of $2500 was to be paid.  
C.B.'s aunt paid $1500 on November 18th, and the remaining $1000 
was paid 30 days later.  The women understood that they were 
paying to bring the motion to court.  They testified that they 
would never have paid $2500 for an attorney to simply review 
C.B.'s case.  Attorney Backes spoke with C.B. on January 17, 
2000.  On January 27, 2000, C.B. wrote to Attorney Backes with 
various suggestions and questions.  Attorney Backes never 
responded to this letter and refused to accept C.B.'s telephone 
calls from prison.  He also failed to return telephone calls 
from C.B.'s family members, and was repeatedly unavailable to 
meet with them, even when they went to his office seeking 
information about the status of C.B.'s case.   
 
¶45 C.B. wrote to Attorney Backes again on April 20, 2000.  
Attorney Backes responded in writing on April 25, 2000, advising 
him that he had "reviewed the materials we have been sent and 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
14 
 
the input you have provided and have scheduled this matter for 
further review to determine what cause of action may have merit 
and how to bring it forward."  The letter concluded:  "I would 
certainly acknowledge that more time has passed on this than I 
would have liked, and we will proceed to re-review this matter 
and get back to you before too long."   
 
¶46 On April 29, 2000, C.B.'s aunt wrote to Attorney 
Backes, stating she had reviewed his letter to C.B. and she was 
terminating Attorney Backes' representation.  She requested a 
refund of the retainer and return of C.B.'s transcripts.  
Initially, Attorney Backes refused to refund any portion of the 
retainer, asserting that he had completed extensive document 
review in the matter.  On March 21, 2002, Attorney Backes did 
refund the clients $2250 of the retainer, leaving a balance of 
$250 in dispute. 
 
¶47 The OLR alleged and the referee concluded that by 
(1) not completing a review of C.B.'s case between November 19, 
1999 and April 29, 2000, Attorney Backes failed to act with 
reasonable diligence in his representation of C.B. in violation 
of SCR 20:1.3; (2) failing to respond to C.B.'s letter and the 
telephone calls from C.B. and his family members, Attorney 
Backes failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the 
status of 
a 
matter in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20.1.4(a); and 
(3) failing to return $2250 to C.B. until March 2002, Attorney 
Backes failed to timely return fees that had not been earned in 
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).  The referee recommended that 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
15 
 
Attorney Backes be required to refund the client the remainder 
of the retainer fee. 
 
¶48 Attorney Backes challenges the referee's findings and 
conclusions of law regarding this matter.  The referee stated 
that she found the witnesses in this matter "substantially 
believable."  Attorney Backes vigorously disputes this finding, 
asserting that their testimony was "clearly exaggerated" and 
suggesting that the testimony of C.B.'s mother was "driven by 
her son's relentless prodding to obtain a refund of the entire 
legal fee after an excessive amount of work was completed, for 
purposes of retaining another attorney and getting another 'kick 
at the can.'"  Attorney Backes concedes that he should have 
accepted the calls from C.B., but explains that his failure to 
do so was due to the mistaken belief that the telephone calls 
were collect calls.   
 
¶49 He maintains he did work on the matter and cites as 
evidence the fact that C.B.'s mother "peeked" into his office in 
one of her attempts to contact him and saw for herself the 
transcripts stacked next to his desk.  He adds that he testified 
that he performed work on the matter.  Attorney Backes asserts 
that the referee's finding that "it does not appear that any 
significant work was done to review [C.B.'s] undoubtedly thick 
file" is in error.  
 
¶50 We disagree.  Attorney Backes was unable to produce 
documentation reflecting substantial work on the C.B. matter.  
He could only document having researched and copied two 
appellate decisions, and had no notes or other documentation to 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
16 
 
support his claim that he had reviewed voluminous transcripts.  
The 
referee 
was 
entitled 
to 
disbelieve 
Attorney 
Backes' 
assertions to the contrary.  Similarly, there is no reason to 
disregard the referee's credibility determinations with respect 
to the witnesses in this matter.  We recognize that Attorney 
Backes maintains that he earned the fee and returned it only to 
appease the OLR, however, absent documentary evidence of work 
performed on these files, we will not deem the referee's 
findings clearly erroneous.  
 
¶51 Indeed, having reviewed the record in this matter we 
adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
commend the referee for her detailed report and recommendation 
and careful citations to the record evidence.  The few arguable 
discrepancies identified by Attorney Backes do not alter the 
conclusions we reach in this matter. 
 
¶52 Turning to the question of the appropriate discipline, 
Attorney Backes points to statements by the OLR indicating it 
considered the alleged misconduct committed in the C.D. matter 
to be the most serious charge levied against Attorney Backes, as 
well as to statements indicating that it was the combination of 
incidents 
of 
alleged 
misconduct 
that 
warranted 
a 
public 
reprimand.  Attorney Backes was, of course, absolved of the 
allegations of misconduct in the C.D. matter, and also in the 
D.M. matter. 
 
¶53 In 
considering 
the 
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
professional misconduct, we consider a variety of factors, 
including the seriousness, nature and extent of the misconduct; 
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
17 
 
the level of discipline needed to protect the public, the courts 
and the legal system from repetition of the lawyer's misconduct; 
the need to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the 
misconduct; 
and 
the 
need 
to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
committing 
similar 
misconduct. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 876, 498 N.W.2d 
380 (1993).  
 
¶54 We 
consider 
Attorney 
Backes' 
lack 
of 
previous 
discipline and the fact that he was cleared of several charges.  
We recognize his extensive cooperation with the OLR and his 
acknowledgement that he committed certain errors, and that a 
"lesson has been learned."  We are mindful that he did return 
fees to clients. 
 
¶55 However, we share the OLR's concern about "the 
distressing patterns of behavior . . . carried out against some 
of the most vulnerable and undereducated clients."  Attorney 
Backes' repeated incidents of failure to proceed with reasonable 
diligence, failure to keep clients informed of the progress of 
their cases, and failure to return unearned fees owed to clients 
does 
constitute 
a 
pattern 
of 
conduct 
that 
warrants 
the 
imposition of public discipline.  
¶56 Therefore, we adopt the report and recommendation.  We 
order Attorney Backes to pay restitution in the form of a $250 
fee refund to C.B., and a $500 fee refund to D.L.S., reflecting 
the unreimbursed portion of the $2000 fee retainer.  In 
addition, we order Attorney Backes to pay the costs of the 
disciplinary proceeding.   
No.  2002AP3238-D   
 
18 
 
 
¶57 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney Michael J. Backes is 
publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct. 
 
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Michael J. Backes 
make restitution in the amount of $250 to C.B., and $500 to 
D.L.S. 
¶59 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Michael J. Backes pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Attorney Michael J. Backes to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court. 
 
 
No.  2002AP3238-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
My 
concurrence in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 
2005 WI 37, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 376, provides context 
and perspective regarding costs in disciplinary proceedings and 
also stands as a concurrence in the present case.  See also In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 367 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶61 Keith Sellen, Director of the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, has filed an administrative rules petition proposing 
certain 
changes 
to 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
relating 
to 
assessment of costs.  The court will hear the petition in the 
fall of this year.  See Rules Petition 05-01, In the Matter of 
the Petition for Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 22.0001(3) 
Relating to Cost Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System 
(Jan. 18, 2005).   
¶62 Until the court decides the petition, I would continue 
the court's practice of generally assessing full costs. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2002AP3238-D.awb 
 
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¶64 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I have not yet 
written in what has become a continuing discussion on the issue 
of imposition of costs in disciplinary cases.  Much has been 
written and the topic has consumed, in my opinion, an undue 
amount of this court's time and resources.7  A petition has been 
filed for the court to consider new guidelines and standards in 
the imposition of such costs.8  Let us hear the petition, make 
changes to our current procedures as we deem necessary, and get 
on with the business of this court. 
¶65 Both my life experience and my experience on this 
court impel me to the conclusion that we need uniform procedures 
and they need to be uniformly applied.  Each case has its unique 
facts which result in differing levels of discipline.  But no 
matter what the circumstances involved, the procedures should be 
the same. 
¶66 The 
procedures 
and 
standards must 
apply equally 
regardless if the respondent is with a large firm or small firm, 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., OLR v. Trewin, 2004 WI 116, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 
684 N.W.2d 121; OLR v. Polich, 2005 WI 36, ____ Wis. 2d ____, 
694 N.W.2d 367; OLR v. Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ____ Wis. 2d ____, 
694 N.W.2d 376. 
8 Petition Number 05-01, In the Matter of the Petition For 
Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 22.001(3) Relating to Cost 
Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System, filed by Keith 
Sellen, Director, Office of Lawyer Regulation.  The petition 
requests that the court amend SCR 22.001(3) to define "costs" in 
the Lawyer Regulation System to include "the compensation and 
necessary expenses of referees [and] litigation expenses other 
than counsel fees of the office of lawyer regulation . . . ."  
As a result, counsel fees would not be assessed against the 
respondent in a disciplinary case, but would be absorbed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation's operating expenses, paid for by 
all of the members of the Bar. 
No.  2002AP3238-D.awb 
 
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specialized practice or general practice, urban or rural.   I 
believe it to be laudatory that the dissent envisions new 
approaches and considers better ways of doing things.  However, 
to apply a new standard in this case, which has not been applied 
in others, only because some justices have a new idea for a 
temporary standard, promotes instability and lack of uniformity 
in our procedures.  It is also unfair to others who have not had 
the benefit of catching the attention and imagination that 
prompts this new stopgap approach. 
¶67 Notably, this new approach will likely be more costly, 
which may exacerbate rather than minimize the concern regarding 
high costs advanced by the dissent.  It will require a 
determination by a fact finder as to what is "substantially 
related." 
 
Although 
the 
dissent 
suggests 
that 
such 
a 
determination is "simple," I do not think so.  
¶68 It may not be so simple to parse what part of trial 
preparation is attributed to which count.  Likewise, in my 
experience, it may not be able to easily determine what fraction 
of the hearing before the referee or the oral argument in this 
court is as a result of what count.  Are we to add the total 
minutes or hours of the proceeding, and then analyze the 
questions and answers to determine how each is to be allocated? 
¶69 After we have a hearing on the newly filed petition 
and consider the positions advanced by those who appear, the 
court may well embrace the position set forth by the dissent.  
Or, it may consider an alternative.  But whatever we do, we must 
No.  2002AP3238-D.awb 
 
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be 
consistent 
in 
the 
application 
of 
our 
standards 
and 
procedures.  
¶70 Let's have the hearing on the filed petition, decide 
it, and turn our attention to the many other pressing issues 
before this court. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, JUSTICE JON P. WILCOX, and JUSTICE N. PATRICK 
CROOKS, join this concurrence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶72 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). I join the per curiam's decision and order 
as to the discipline imposed in this action.  I write separately 
because I disagree with the court that full costs should be 
imposed in this case.  Because Attorney Backes was absolved of 
any allegations of misconduct in both the C.D. and D.M. matters, 
I would not assess any costs for the counts associated with 
those complaints. 
¶73 On December 5, 2002, Attorney Backes was charged with 
15 disciplinary violations stemming from five separate client 
matters.  Ultimately, the referee concluded that Attorney Backes 
had committed misconduct in connection with nine of the 15 
counts concerning three separate client matters.  We accept the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 
to the disciplinary proceedings.9  Those findings include a 
determination that Attorney Backes did not commit misconduct 
with respect to his handling of the D.M. matter contained in 
counts five through eight of the complaint,10 and that he did not 
commit misconduct with respect to his handling of the C.D. 
matter contained in counts 11 and 12 of the complaint.11   
¶74 Given our determination, we must now determine the 
appropriate discipline for the professional misconduct found.  
As the per curiam opinion indicates, we consider a variety of 
factors, including the seriousness, nature, and extent of the 
                                                 
9 Per curiam op., ¶51.   
 
10 Per curiam op., ¶24. 
 
11 Per curiam op., ¶30. 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
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misconduct; the level of discipline needed to protect the 
public, the courts, and the legal system from repetition of the 
lawyer's misconduct; the need to impress upon the attorney the 
seriousness of the misconduct; and the need to deter other 
attorneys from committing similar misconduct.  Per curiam op., 
¶53.  See also Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 
Wis. 2d 844, 876, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  In considering these 
factors, 
the 
critical 
term 
used 
in 
the 
evaluation 
is 
"misconduct."  Where no misconduct occurs, by definition nothing 
serious has happened.  Where no misconduct occurs, the public, 
courts, and legal system are not in need of protection from its 
repetition.  Where no misconduct occurs, there is no need to 
impress upon the attorney the seriousness of a nonexistent 
violation.  Where no misconduct occurs, the need to deter other 
attorneys is absent.   
¶75 We have determined that Attorney Backes has committed 
nine counts of misconduct against three different clients.  Of 
course, he should be held responsible for the costs of the 
proceeding with respect to these counts, as well as the 
restitution ordered by the court.  Per curiam op., ¶56.  He did 
not commit any misconduct with respect to C.D. and D.M., 
however.   
¶76 For the reasons stated in my concurring in part, 
dissenting in part opinion in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶¶39-40, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 
367, I would adopt a "substantially related" approach to 
ordering 
costs 
in 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulations 
("OLR") 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
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proceedings.  In other words, where evidence is introduced that 
relates to multiple violations, I would assess costs associated 
with the prosecution of both the successful and the related 
unsuccessful counts.  See United States v. Pieper, 854 F.2d 
1020, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1988).  Costs should not be assessed 
against an attorney in unrelated, unsuccessful counts where no 
misconduct has been found concerning a particular client.  Such 
an assessment simply does not support the purposes underlying 
the factors we consider in determining the appropriate level of 
discipline where misconduct has occurred, but in unrelated 
matters.   
¶77 I recognize that the "substantially related" approach 
that I would apply in this matter may not be a long-term 
solution as to how costs should be awarded in attorney-
discipline cases.  Supreme Court Rule 22.24 (1) establishes that 
this court has discretion to apportion costs in OLR proceedings.  
Until we establish standards, guidelines, and procedures for how 
to exercise our discretion, I propose the "substantially 
related" approach as a temporary measure so that we do not 
abdicate our responsibility to exercise our discretion in cases 
like this where discretion is warranted.12  Accordingly, I would 
                                                 
12 We agree with the concurrence that one way to handle the 
lack of standards for assessing costs is by rule petitions.  
Bradley, J., concurrence, ¶¶64, 70.  Nevertheless, Supreme Court 
Rule 22.24 (1) unequivocally vests this court with discretion to 
apportion costs in OLR proceedings.  "The fact that we have not 
established standards, guidelines, and procedures for when we 
exercise that discretion does not abdicate our responsibility to 
do so in cases like this where discretion is warranted."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶43, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 694 N.W.2d 367 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
4 
 
follow the rationale set forth in Pieper until we devise our own 
procedures. 
¶78 Applying the "substantially related" test is simple in 
this case.  I conclude that imposing costs on Attorney Backes 
regarding the allegations of misconduct with respect to handling 
C.D.'s and D.M.'s matters is not warranted.  Attorney Backes was 
acquitted of all allegations of misconduct regarding these 
clients, and there is no basis upon which to conclude that these 
allegations were in any way, much less substantially, related to 
the misconduct that was established.   
¶79 In 
view 
of 
his 
lack 
of 
prior 
discipline, 
his 
"extensive cooperation with the OLR," his acknowledgement that 
he committed certain errors, and the fact that he returned fees 
to clients,13 imposing full costs on Attorney Backes is not 
justified.  The factors we are to consider when imposing 
discipline simply do not warrant that result.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The key word is "discretion."  As this court reaffirmed 
just last term in State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶3, 270 Wis. 2d 
535, 678 N.W.2d 197, discretion is not synonymous with decision-
making.  The exercise of discretion "'contemplates a process of 
reasoning.'"  Id. (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 
280-81, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)). 
13 Per curiam op., ¶54. 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
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¶80 I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of 
the per curiam opinion that assesses full costs against the 
respondent.  I concur with the remainder of the decision. 
¶81   I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this opinion. 
          
 
No.  2002AP3238-D.lbb 
 
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