Title: Krow v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Krow v. State1992 WY 138840 P.2d 261Case Number: 92-99Decided: 10/26/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Richard 
Dean KROW, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 Richard 
Dean Krow, pro 
se.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Richard Krow appeals 
from a district court order which denied his motion to correct an allegedly 
illegal sentence.

 [¶2.]     We 
affirm.

ISSUES

 [¶3.]     The issues on appeal 
are:

1. 
Whether appellant was denied due process of law by the district court's failure 
to hold a preliminary hearing to determine if probable cause existed that he had 
violated a term of his probation.

2. 
Whether the district court's order which revoked appellant's probation and 
reimposed his original sentence of two to five years confinement was supported 
by sufficient evidence.

3. 
Whether appellant was denied his constitutional right against double jeopardy 
when the district court reimposed his original sentence after such sentence had 
been reduced to time served and five years probation.

4. 
Whether appellant was denied his constitutional right against double jeopardy 
when the district court failed to grant full credit for time spent in 
S.T.O.P.

FACTS

 [¶4.]     On June 9, 1989, 
appellant pleaded guilty to one count of taking indecent liberties with a minor 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (1986). He was sentenced on October 27, 
1989, to serve not less than two nor more than five years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

 [¶5.]     On November 21, 1989, 
appellant filed a motion to have his sentence reduced. The district court 
granted this motion at a hearing which was held on October 26, 1990. At the 
hearing, the district court informed appellant that his original sentence of two 
to five years confinement would be suspended and that he would be placed on 
probation for five years. Appellant was also advised that he would receive 
credit for time served against his term of probation and that he would be 
required to serve the first year of probation in the Surveillance and Treatment 
of Offender Program (S.T.O.P.).

 [¶6.]     On August 26, 1991, 
appellant filed a second motion to have his sentence reduced. Appellant asserted 
that he would be rehired by Union Pacific Railroad if he could obtain an early 
release from S.T.O.P. On September 10, 1991, before any action was taken on 
appellant's motion, the district attorney filed an affidavit and request for a 
hearing to show cause why appellant's probation should not be revoked. The 
district attorney stated in his affidavit that appellant had violated a 
probation condition by attempting to contact, in April, May and July of 1991, 
the victim of his offense. The district attorney's affidavit was supported by an 
affidavit from the victim.

 [¶7.]     A hearing was scheduled 
for and held on September 20, 1991. The district attorney presented testimonial 
evidence from appellant's probation officer and from the victim regarding the 
alleged probation violations. Appellant, who was represented by counsel, 
testified on his own behalf to explain that his run-ins with the victim were 
mere "coincidences" which did not constitute "contact." Appellant also had his 
social worker testify concerning the progress he had made in therapy. Following 
the hearing, the district court revoked appellant's probation and reimposed his 
original sentence. The district court gave appellant credit for time previously 
served in confinement and for 120 days in S.T.O.P.

 [¶8.]     On April 14, 1992, 
appellant filed a motion to correct the sentence imposed by the district court 
following the probation revocation hearing. In this motion, appellant raised the 
due process, sufficiency of the evidence, and double jeopardy issues which are 
presently before this court. The district court denied appellant's motion by 
order dated April 17, 1992. Appellant appeals that order.

DISCUSSION

 [¶9.]     Appellant's first 
contention is that he was denied the process of law due by the district court's 
failure to hold a preliminary, probable cause hearing before it held the final 
revocation hearing. Our discussion of this argument need only be brief as we 
have "walked this way before." Murphy v. State, 592 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Wyo. 
1979).

 [¶10.]  In Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 
(Wyo. 1978), we addressed whether Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) required state courts to hold a preliminary and a final probation 
revocation hearing. We held that a probationer's due process rights are 
adequately protected where a district court, as in this case, settles not only 
the initial probable cause question but also determines the fate of the 
probationer in a single revocation hearing held in compliance with Wyo.R.Crim.P. 
33(f).1 Knobel, 576 P.2d at 942-43; accord 
Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979).

 [¶11.]  While the process due a probationer does 
not necessarily include both a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, it 
does include the right to reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. See, e.g., Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981). In this case, 
appellant was notified of the probation violations alleged against him. In 
response to this notice, his attorney prepared for the hearing by obtaining a 
court order requiring the Department of Probation and Parole to release relevant 
information and by having appellant's social worker subpoenaed to testify. A 
hearing was then held at which a neutral decisionmaker presided. At this 
hearing, appellant confronted the witnesses against him through 
cross-examination conducted by his attorney. He also presented evidence and 
argument on his own behalf. We hold that appellant's probation revocation 
hearing was held in compliance with Wyo.R.Crim.P. 33(f) and that he was afforded 
due process of law. 

 [¶12.]  Appellant's second contention is that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's order which 
revoked his probation and reimposed his original sentence. Specifically, 
appellant contends that there was not "a shred of evidence" that he had 
"contact" with the victim in violation of his probation agreement. He argues 
that his run-ins with the victim were "coincidental" and that they did not 
constitute "contact" as he neither spoke to nor touched the victim. We 
disagree.

 [¶13.]  The duties of a district court in a 
probation revocation hearing are to determine: (1) whether there are verified 
facts which establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a condition of 
probation has been violated; and, if so, (2) whether probation should be revoked 
in light of the proven violation. Swackhammer, 808 P.2d  at 224; Mason, 631 P.2d  
at 1055. Upon review, all that is necessary to uphold a district court's 
decision to revoke probation is evidence that it made a conscientious judgment, 
after hearing the facts, that a condition of probation had been violated. E.g., 
Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359 (Wyo. 1992).

 [¶14.]  A special condition of appellant's 
probation was that he "have no contact with the victim * * * under any 
circumstances, at any time." At the hearing, the victim testified that appellant 
had stopped and "stared" at her while she was at Lion's Park with some friends 
in April of 1991; that he had "followed" her and a friend around Frontier Mall 
in May of 1991, causing them to hide in the restroom of a department store; and 
that he had "stared" at her while she was pushing carts from the Buttrey's 
parking lot to the store in July of 1991. Appellant's probation officer 
confirmed the victim's testimony, in part, by testifying that appellant had 
disclosed during a S.T.O.P. group therapy session that he had "followed" the 
victim at the Frontier Mall.

 [¶15.]  While appellant explained his encounters 
with the victim as mere coincidences (he was at Lion's Park to "sit in the sun," 
at the Frontier Mall to "buy his mother a card," and at Buttrey's to "buy a 
light bulb"), evidence was also presented which would support a finding that the 
encounters were the result of appellant's strong sexual attraction to the 
victim. Accordingly, we hold that the record reflects that the district court 
made a conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that appellant had not 
only violated a term of his probation, but also that probation should be revoked 
to give the victim "peace of mind."

 [¶16.]  Appellant's third contention is that the 
district court violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy by 
reimposing his original sentence of two to five years confinement after revoking 
his probation. Specifically, appellant points to the order reducing sentence 
which was filed on November 16, 1990. This order purports to "reduce" 
appellant's original sentence "to time served and five years probation." 
Appellant argues that, since his original sentence was "reduced" and not 
"suspended," the district court effectively sentenced him twice for the same 
crime. We disagree.

 [¶17.]  The record reflects that the district 
court held a hearing on October 26, 1990, concerning appellant's first motion to 
reduce sentence. At the hearing, the district court granted appellant's motion 
and stated:

     Your sentence that was 
entered November 8, 1989, will be modified as follows:

     First, the basic term 
of two to five years will remain, but that term - the additional term of two 
years will be suspended because of the fact - in view of the fact that you have 
served time as to that two-year sentence.

     You will be placed on 
a period of probation for a period of five years, with credit given for all your 
time served to date.

 [¶18.]  As is clear from the foregoing, the 
district court suspended appellant's original sentence and placed him on five 
years probation. Appellant's attorney was instructed to prepare an order 
reflecting this modification of sentence. The order reducing sentence which was 
prepared, however, did not accurately reflect the sentence modification. Rather 
than provide that appellant's sentence had been suspended and that he had been 
placed on five years probation, it provided that his sentence had been reduced 
to time served and that he had been placed on five years 
probation.

 [¶19.]  This court has previously held that the 
judgment and sentence pronounced orally in open court governs a subsequent, 
inconsistent written judgment and sentence. Lane v. State, 663 P.2d 175, 176 
(Wyo. 1983); Fullmer v. Meacham, 387 P.2d 1007, 
1009 (Wyo. 
1964). We believe that this rule should also apply in the context of sentence 
modification. Consequently, we hold that the district court did not violate 
appellant's constitutional right against double jeopardy by reimposing his suspended sentence following revocation 
of probation. Additionally, we direct the district court to enter an order nunc 
pro tunc to cause the record to accurately reflect the sentence modification 
made orally by the court on October 26, 1990. See Lane, 663 P.2d  at 176; 
Meacham, 387 P.2d  at 1009; Wyo. R.Crim.P. 37.

 [¶20.]  Appellant's final contention is that, 
because the district court failed to give him full credit for time spent in 
S.T.O.P., he is being punished twice for the same crime in violation of the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. This argument must fail in 
light of Kupec, wherein we recently held that a district court need not give a 
probationer credit for time served in S.T.O.P. upon revocation of probation. 
Kupec, 835 P.2d  at 362. That the district court gave appellant partial credit 
for time in S.T.O.P. is attributable to judicial grace, not constitutional 
mandate. We hold accordingly.

DISPOSITION

 [¶21.]  The order of the district court which 
denied appellant's motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence is affirmed, 
and the district court is directed to enter an order nunc pro tunc to correct 
the order of November 16, 1990, which purported to reduce appellant's sentence 
to time served and five years probation.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Wyo.R.Crim.P. 33(f), 
effective until March 24, 1992, provided:

Revocation of probation. - The court 
shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant shall 
be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The 
defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing.

The procedures 
governing probation revocation are now outlined in substantially greater detail 
by Wyo.R.Crim.P. 39.