Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JONATHAN D HICKMAN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 20, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122548 
JONATHAN D. HICKMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
In this case, we must determine when the right to 
counsel attaches to corporeal identifications. 
We adopt 
the analysis of Moore v Illinois, 434 US 220; 98 S Ct 458; 
54 L Ed 2d 424 (1977), and hold that the right to counsel 
attaches only to corporeal identifications conducted at or 
after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings. 
To the extent that People v Anderson, 389 
Mich 
155; 
205 
NW2d 
461 
(1973), 
goes 
beyond 
the 
constitutional text and extends the right to counsel to a 
time 
before 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversarial 
criminal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
proceedings, it is overruled. 
The Court of Appeals 
decision is affirmed. 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm 
during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, 
MCL 750.227b(1); conspiracy, MCL 750.157a; and armed 
robbery, MCL 750.529, for robbing the complainant of $26 
and two two-way radios. 
The complainant testified that 
two men approached him from behind and robbed him. 
He 
testified that one of the men, later identified as 
defendant, pointed a gun at his face while the other person 
took the radios and money. The complainant then called the 
police and gave a description of the two men, as well as a 
description of the gun. 
An officer soon saw a man fitting the description of 
the man with the gun. 
The man, later identified as 
defendant, was caught after a foot chase. 
During the 
chase, the police saw defendant throw something and they 
later 
recovered 
a 
chrome 
handgun 
that 
matched 
the 
complainant’s description of the gun. 
Defendant was 
carrying one of the two-way radios. 
Approximately ten minutes later, an officer took the 
complainant to a police car in which defendant was being 
held. 
The officer asked the complainant if the person 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
sitting in the police car was involved in the robbery. The 
complainant immediately responded that defendant was the 
man who had the gun. 
Defendant’s 
motion 
to 
suppress 
an 
on-the-scene 
identification by the victim on the ground that defendant 
was not represented by counsel at the time of the 
identification was denied, and defendant was convicted. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction.1  The 
Court held that the prompt on-the-scene identification did 
not offend the requirements set forth in Anderson and 
rejected defendant=s due process claim, holding that the 
identification was not unduly suggestive. 
Defendant appealed, and this Court granted leave, 
limited to the issue “whether counsel is required before an 
on-the-scene identification can be admitted at trial.” 468 
Mich 944 (2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo questions of law relevant 
to a motion to suppress. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 
496; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). The inquiry here involves issues 
of constitutional law, which are also reviewed de novo. 
People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued September 17,
2002 (Docket No. 232041). 
3  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. BACKGROUND: PEOPLE V ANDERSON 
In Anderson, the right to counsel was extended to all 
pretrial 
corporeal 
identifications, 
including 
those 
occurring before the initiation of adversarial proceedings. 
This extension of United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 
1926; 
18 
L 
Ed 
2d 
1149 
(1967), 
to 
all 
pretrial 
identification 
procedures 
was 
based 
on 
“psychological 
principles,” 389 Mich 172-180, and “social science,” 389 
Mich 182.   
Notably absent was any grounding in our federal 
constitution or state constitution. 
In People v Jackson, 
391 Mich 323, 338; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), this Court 
acknowledged 
that 
the 
Anderson 
rules 
were 
not 
constitutionally mandated: 
The . . . Anderson rules . . . represent the
conclusion of this Court, independent of any 
Federal constitutional mandate, that, both before
and after commencement of the judicial phase of a
prosecution, 
a 
suspect 
is 
entitled 
to 
be 
represented 
by 
counsel 
at 
a 
corporeal
identification . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
The Jackson Court affirmed the Anderson rules, however, as 
an exercise of the Court’s “constitutional power to 
establish 
rules 
of 
evidence 
applicable 
to 
judicial 
proceedings in Michigan courts and to preserve best 
evidence eyewitness testimony from unnecessary alteration 
4  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
by unfair identification procedures . . . .” 
Id. at 338­
339. Finally, in People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 9 n 8; 551 
NW2d 355 (1996), this Court noted in obiter dictum that the 
right to counsel under Const 1963, art 1, § 20 “attaches 
only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial 
proceedings by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.” 
 
Thus, the Anderson rules lack a foundation in any 
constitutional 
provision, 
whether 
state 
or 
federal. 
Instead, the rules reflect the policy preferences of the 
Anderson Court. 
Similarly, the Jackson Court’s attempt to 
rationalize the promulgation of the rules as an exercise of 
the Court’s authority to promulgate rules of evidence is 
unpersuasive. 
The Anderson rules encompassed more than 
purely evidentiary matters,2 and the rationale underlying 
them has since been disapproved in Moore. 
B. MOORE V ILLINOIS
 
In Moore, the United States Supreme Court adopted the 
plurality opinion in Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682; 92 S Ct 
1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972), holding: 
2See McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 29; 597 NW2d 148
(1999), which disapproved of previous blanket statements of
authority over all matters relating to the admission of
evidence. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
[T]he right to counsel announced in Wade[
supra] and Gilbert  [v California, 388 US 263; 87
S Ct 1951; 18 L Ed 2d 1178 (1967),] attaches only
to corporeal identifications conducted “at or 
after 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversary 
judicial
criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal 
charge, 
preliminary 
hearing, 
indictment,
information, or arraignment” . . . because the
initiation 
of 
such 
proceedings 
“marks 
the 
commencement of the criminal prosecutions to 
which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment[3] are applicable.” 
[Moore, supra at 
226-227 (citations omitted).] 
The Court further noted that identifications conducted 
before the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings could still be challenged: 
In such cases, however, due process protects
the accused against the introduction of evidence
of, 
or 
tainted 
by, 
unreliable 
pretrial
identifications obtained through unnecessarily 
suggestive procedures. 
[Id. at 227 (emphasis
added; citations omitted).] 
3 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, 
which 
district 
shall 
have 
been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defense. [Emphasis added.] 
6  
 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is now beyond question that, for federal 
Sixth Amendment purposes, the right to counsel attaches 
only at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial 
proceedings. 
This conclusion is also consistent with our state 
constitutional provision, Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which 
provides: 
In every criminal prosecution, the accused
shall have the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury, which may consist of less
than 12 jurors in prosecutions for misdemeanors
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1
year; to be informed of the nature of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him or her; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his or her favor; to
have the assistance of counsel for his or her 
defense; to have an appeal as a matter of right,
except as provided by law an appeal by an accused
who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by
leave of the court; and as provided by law, when
the 
trial 
court 
so 
orders, 
to 
have 
such 
reasonable assistance as may be necessary to 
perfect and prosecute an appeal. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
As Judge YOUNG noted in his opinion in People v Winters, 225 
Mich App 718, 723; 571 NW2d 764 (1997), neither the 
Anderson decision nor the Jackson decision was based on our 
state constitutional provision; therefore, those cases 
cannot be read as expanding art 1, § 20 protections beyond 
those provided by the Sixth Amendment. Further, this Court 
has already noted in Cheatham, albeit in obiter dictum, 
7  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
that a defendant’s right to counsel under art 1, § 20 
attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial 
judicial proceedings. 
This Court also held in People v 
Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 119-120; 587 NW2d 1 (1998), 
quoting People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 318; 521 NW2d 797 
(1994): 
[T]here exists no structural differences 
with regard to the right to assistance of counsel
between 
federal 
and 
Michigan 
provisions.
Moreover, no peculiar state or local interests
exist in Michigan to warrant a different level of
protection with regard to the right to counsel in
the instant case. Both the federal and the state 
provisions originated from the same concerns and
to protect the same rights. 
Because the Moore analysis is consistent with both US 
Const, Am VI and Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which expressly 
apply only to criminal prosecutions, we adopt that analysis 
and hold that the right to counsel attaches only to 
corporeal 
identifications 
conducted 
at 
or 
after 
the 
initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings.4 
Further, we agree with Judge YOUNG’s observation in 
Winters that the Anderson decision generated considerable 
4 Because the instant case involves a corporeal
identification 
conducted 
prior 
to 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversarial judicial proceedings, we do not, contrary to 
the dissent’s contention, address whether a defendant has a
right to an attorney after the initiation of adversarial 
judicial proceedings during a photographic showup. Post at 
2. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
confusion regarding its proper application. 
First, the 
Court in People v Marks, 155 Mich App 203, 209-210; 399 
NW2d 469 (1986), noted that although Anderson appeared to 
be a Sixth Amendment case, it was really divorced from any 
constitutional considerations. 
Nevertheless, the Marks 
Court 
observed 
that 
the 
issue 
of 
on-the-scene 
identification is still often raised in the context of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
The Winters Court also lamented the lack of any 
simple, practical standard regarding on-the-scene corporeal 
identifications. 
In People v Dixon, 85 Mich App 271, 280­
281; 271 NW2d 196 (1978), the Court held that if the police 
have “more than a mere suspicion” that the suspect is 
wanted for the crime, there can be no on-the-scene 
corporeal identification; rather, the suspect must be taken 
to the police station and participate in a lineup with 
counsel present. 
In People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 36; 
328 NW2d 5 (1982), however, the Court found the Dixon rule 
too difficult5 and, instead, held that police may conduct 
on-the-scene identifications without counsel unless the 
police have “very strong evidence” that the person stopped 
5 It must be noted that the Turner Court did retain the 
Dixon standard where the police have already validly 
arrested the suspect for an unrelated offense. 
Turner, 
supra at 37. 
9  
 
 
 
       
                                                 
is the perpetrator. 
“Very strong evidence” was defined as 
“where the suspect has himself decreased any exculpatory 
motive, i.e., where he has confessed or presented the 
police with either highly distinctive evidence of the crime 
or a highly distinctive personal appearance.” 
Id. at 36­
37. 
As the Winters Court noted, the Turner “strong 
evidence” rule is hardly more workable than Dixon’s “more 
than a mere suspicion” rule. 
Rather than perpetuate the 
confusion in this area, we take this opportunity to adopt 
the Moore analysis and clarify that the right to counsel 
attaches only to corporeal identifications conducted at or 
after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings. This eliminates any unwarranted confusion and 
allows the focus to be on whether the identification 
procedure used violates due process.6 
6Although we recognize the importance of stare decisis,
it 
is 
appropriate 
to 
overrule 
Anderson 
because, 
as 
explained above, it is clearly inconsistent with Const
1963, art 1, § 20. 
Further, there are no relevant 
“reliance” 
interests 
involved 
and 
overruling 
Anderson 
would, therefore, not produce any “practical real-world
dislocations.” 
See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 465­
466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). 
Contrary to the dissent’s
suggestion, this Court has never held that a “special
justification” must be established before this Court will
depart from precedent. 
Post at 9. 
Finally, as explained
above, the courts have had considerable difficulty in 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
IV. APPLICATION 
The on-the-scene identification in this case was made 
before the initiation of any adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings; thus, counsel was not required.  Therefore, 
this Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Anderson rule, extending the right to counsel to 
all pretrial identifications, is without constitutional 
basis. 
Consistently 
with 
both 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, we adopt the 
straightforward analysis of Moore v Illinois and hold that 
the 
right 
to 
counsel 
attaches 
only 
to 
corporeal 
identifications conducted at or after the initiation of 
adversarial judicial criminal proceedings. 
The Court of 
Appeals decision is affirmed. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
applying 
Anderson, 
and 
the 
resulting 
confusion 
and 
instability also demonstrate the need to overrule Anderson. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122548 
JONATHAN D. HICKMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
To the casual reader, the rationale for today's 
majority decision may be elusive. 
After all, as the 
majority correctly notes, the case deals with law that has 
been relatively well-settled for close to thirty years: 
a 
potential 
criminal 
defendant 
does 
not 
have 
a 
Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during identifications that 
occur 
before 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversarial 
judicial 
proceedings, such as a formal charge or preliminary 
hearing. Moore v Illinois, 434 US 220, 226-227; 98 S Ct 
458; 54 L Ed 2d 424 (1977); People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 
338; 217 NW2d 22 (1974); see also People Cheatham, 453 Mich 
1, 9 n 8; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), citing People v Wright, 441 
Mich 140, 173; 490 NW2d 351 (1992) (Riley, J., dissenting); 
 
 
 
                                                 
Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 430; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 
410 (1986). 
Nor has this Court held that the protective rules 
enumerated by People v Anderson1 and its progeny apply to 
on-the-scene identification procedures and require counsel 
during those procedures. People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 
186 n 23; 205 NW2d 461 (1973). 
In fact, the opposite is 
true. Id. 
Yet the majority undertakes today ostensibly to 
resolve these issues. 
Its purpose is to take away the 
potential defendant's entitlement to counsel during all 
preindictment2 proceedings by overruling Anderson and its 
progeny. 
Hereafter, a defendant, in custody but not yet 
indicted, will no longer have the practical ability to 
challenge 
photographic 
or 
corporeal 
identification 
procedures. 
The police will be able to conduct such 
procedures without allowing a defendant's attorney to be 
present. Moreover, even after the initiation of adversarial 
judicial procedures, a criminal defendant will no longer 
have the right to counsel during a photographic showup. 
1389 Mich 155, 186 n 23; 205 NW2d 461 (1973). 
2For ease of explanation, I use the term "preindictment
identifications" to refer to identifications that occur 
before the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. 
2  
 
 
 
Because I do not see any good reason to depart from 
longstanding precedent, I must respectfully dissent. 
The majority is not correct in its assertion that, 
under Anderson, "the right to counsel was extended to all 
pretrial 
corporeal 
identifications, 
including 
those 
occurring 
before 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversarial 
proceedings." Ante at 4. Anderson, which itself dealt with 
the right to counsel for pretrial custodial photographic 
showup procedures, set forth "justified" exceptions, albeit 
arguably in dicta, for the absence of counsel at eyewitness 
identification procedures. 
Notably included as exceptions 
were 
emergency 
situations 
requiring 
immediate 
identification 
and 
"prompt, 
'on-the-scene' 
corporeal 
identifications within minutes of the crime . . . ." 
Id., 
at 
187 
n 
23 
(citations 
omitted). 
We 
have 
since 
specifically affirmed the Anderson exception for prompt on­
the-scene identifications. 
City of Troy v Ohlinger, 438 
Mich 477, 487; 475 NW2d 54 (1991). 
The majority could reaffirm the Anderson exception for 
prompt on-the-scene identifications, or perhaps enlarge the 
explanation 
of 
the 
exception 
to 
provide 
a 
workable 
framework for the lower courts. 
Instead, it unnecessarily 
chooses to remove the Anderson protections from all 
preindictment identification procedures. 
It is an ill­
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
conceived 
decision 
that 
ignores 
principles 
of 
stare 
decisis. 
It also fails to consider the adverse effect on 
defendants' 
rights 
to 
be 
assured 
that 
pretrial 
identifications 
are 
not 
obtained 
through 
mistake 
or 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures. 
In deciding to remove the Anderson protections for all 
preindictment identifications, the majority chooses to 
decide 
an 
issue 
already 
decided. 
It 
sweeps 
aside 
longstanding 
precedent, 
asserting 
that 
the 
Anderson 
protections reflect the policy preferences of the Anderson 
Court and that the Jackson Court failed to justify the 
Anderson Court's ruling.3
 Apparently the majority's own 
"policy preferences" outweigh those of the members of the 
Anderson Court and the Jackson Court, as well as other 
members of this Court. Unlike the majority, I believe 
3The majority relies on McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich
15, 29; 597 NW2d 148 (1999), for the proposition that this
Court "disapproved of previous blanket statements of 
authority over all matters relating to the admission of
evidence." 
I did not then, nor do I now, agree with the
majority opinion in McDougall. 
But it is my understanding
that McDougall was not a broad disapproval of blanket
statements regarding the admission of evidence. Rather, it
was a disapproval of a specific rule of evidence. Even the
McDougall majority acknowledged that the line between 
substantive law and practice and procedure must be drawn
case by case. 
McDougall, supra at 36. 
The McDougall
decision concerned the interaction of statutes and this 
Court's constitutional rule-making authority over "practice
and procedure." 
Because there is no statute at issue in 
this case, McDougall is not applicable. 
4  
 
 
Anderson was decided with due deference to the practical 
problems 
of 
ensuring 
accurate 
identifications. 
I 
am 
concerned 
that 
the 
majority’s 
policy 
decision 
gives 
insufficient thought to the underlying rationale for our 
long-existing decision to grant counsel to defendants where 
practicable. 
Anderson discussed at length the scope of the problem 
of 
misidentifications, 
particularly 
in 
the 
use 
of 
photographic identification procedures. Anderson, supra at 
182-187, 192-220 Appendix A. These concerns have certainly 
not diminished with time. 
See, e.g., Utah v Ramirez, 817 
P2d 774, 779-780 (Utah, 1991); Rutledge, They all look 
alike: 
The inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications, 28 
Am J Crim L 207, 209-210 (2001); Brigham, Disputed 
eyewitness identification evidence: 
important legal and 
scientific issues, 36 Ct Rev 12, 12-13 (1999).  Wise, A 
survey of judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness 
testimony, 40 Ct Rev 6, 6-8 (2003); Risinger, Three card 
monte, Monty Hall, modus operandi and "offender profiling": 
Some lessons of modern cognitive science for the law of 
evidence, 24 Cardozo L Rev 193, 194 (2002). The latter law 
review article noted that the past century has seen the 
accumulation of literally thousands of studies on the 
weakness of eyewitness testimony. Id. 
5  
 
 
 
Defendant points out in his appellate brief that in 
1996, after DNA identification techniques became more 
common, the United States Justice Department conducted a 
study of exonerated defendants and prepared a research 
report. 
Connors, Convicted by juries, exonerated by 
science: 
Case studies in the use of DNA evidence to 
establish innocence after trial (1996). The study was 
commissioned by the National Institute of Justice. 
It 
reviewed twenty-eight cases where the defendants had been 
exonerated 
through 
the 
use 
of 
DNA 
identification 
techniques. 
Among the conclusions reached was that, in the 
majority of cases, "eyewitness testimony was the most 
compelling evidence. 
Clearly, however, those eyewitness 
identifications were wrong." Id. at 24. 
Notably, one of 
the significant factors of misidentification listed in the 
Justice Department report involves an issue directly raised 
in the instant case and the majority's decision to overrule 
Anderson: the potential susceptibility of eyewitnesses to 
suggestions 
from 
the 
police, 
whether 
intentional 
or 
unintentional. Id. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
One of the major underpinnings of the Anderson 
decision, and the later affirmation in Jackson,4 was the 
recognition 
of 
difficulties 
with 
obtaining 
reliable 
identification 
evidence. 
Courts 
and 
scholars 
have 
recognized the continued validity of these concerns. 
Nonetheless, 
this 
Court 
refuses 
to 
recognize 
that 
Anderson's rules were, in fact, grounded on more than a 
transient notion of what the Sixth Amendment requires. 
The majority does so with barely a nod to the 
principle of stare decisis. As my frequent colleague in the 
dissent so well articulated recently, "[t]he doctrine of 
stare decisis is more than a fad and decades of precedent 
cannot be readily discounted as the majority suggests." 
Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 699; 677 NW2d 843 
(2004) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). "The application of 
stare decisis is generally the preferred course because it 
promotes 
the 
evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process." People v 
Petit, 466 Mich 624, 633; 648 NW2d 193 (2002) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
4Jackson, supra at 338-339. 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
Even if this Court has found that an error occurred, 
before it "'overrules a decision deliberately made, it 
should be convinced not merely that the case was wrongly 
decided, but also that less injury will result from 
overruling than from following it.'" Id. at 634, quoting 
McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 
(1904). I take as my guide the following from the recent 
United Supreme Court opinion in Dickerson v United States, 
530 US 428, 443-444; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000), 
discussing the requirement of Miranda5 warnings during 
interrogations: 
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's 
reasoning 
and 
its 
resulting 
rule, 
were 
we 
addressing the issue in the first instance, the
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against
overruling it now. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 100
S. Ct. 1682 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring in
judgment) ("The meaning of Miranda has become 
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices
have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at
this late date"). While "'stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command,'" State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199, 118 S. Ct. 275 
(1997) (quoting Payne v Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)),
particularly 
when 
we 
are 
interpreting 
the 
Constitution, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
235, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997),
"even 
in 
constitutional 
cases, 
the 
doctrine 
carries such persuasive force that we have always 
5Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966). 
8  
 
 
 
 
required 
a 
departure 
from 
precedent 
to 
be 
supported 
by 
some 
'special 
justification.'"
United States v. International Business Machines 
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 116 S. Ct. 1793, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 124 (1996) (quoting Payne, supra, at 842
(SOUTER, J., concurring) (in turn quoting Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164
104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984))). 
We do not think there is such justification
for 
overruling 
Miranda. 
Miranda 
has 
become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our 
national culture. See Mitchell v. United States,
526 U.S. 314, 331-332, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424, 119 S.
Ct. 1307 (1999) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (stating
that the fact that a rule has found "'wide 
acceptance in the legal culture'" is "adequate
reason not to overrule" it). While we have 
overruled our precedents when subsequent cases
have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings,
see, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989), we do not believe that this has happened
to the 
Miranda decision. If anything, our 
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while
reaffirming 
the 
decision's 
core 
ruling 
that 
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence
in the prosecution's case in chief. 
In the instant case, the injury done by unnecessarily 
overruling Anderson is grave. 
Conversely, the continued 
use of its precedent would harm no one but those who fail 
in their duty to ensure that identifications are made under 
circumstances that render them reliable. 
The use of 
counsel during preindictment procedures has become part of 
the accepted practice in Michigan courts. 
I see nothing 
9  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
even approaching a "special justification" to depart from 
precedent here.6 
The majority incorrectly asserts that defendant's due 
process protections will be sufficient to protect the 
accused 
against 
the 
introduction 
of 
unreliable 
identification evidence. Ante at 6. 
Such an assertion 
ignores 
the 
reality 
of 
numerous 
preindictment 
identification procedures and this Court's attempt to 
ensure that these procedures lead to reliable information. 
The 
fact 
that 
the 
majority 
has 
seen 
fit 
to 
unnecessarily overturn Anderson creates a Catch-22 for 
defendants 
during 
other 
preindictment 
identification 
procedures. 
Until 
today, 
a 
defendant 
who 
was 
not 
"formally" charged but in custody was entitled to an 
attorney during any identification procedure. 
Now, the 
only required persons in the room will be the investigating 
6The majority states that this Court has never held
that a "special justification" must be established before
it will depart from precedent. Ante at 10, n 7. 
I 
disagree. 
See Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354,
365; 
550 
NW2d 
215 
(1996) 
(absent 
the 
rarest 
of 
circumstances, 
this 
Court 
should 
remain 
faithful 
to 
established precedent). It certainly could be said that the
current majority does not share my view and that of Brown. 
See Delaney, Stare decisis v The "New Majority": The 
Michigan Supreme Court's practice of overruling precedent,
1998-2002, 66 Alb L Rev 871, 903-904 (2003). But I persist
in clinging to this archaic notion despite the urging of my
colleagues. 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
officer and the witness. 
Where the defendant is presented 
to 
a 
potential 
witness 
during 
an 
on-the-scene 
identification, the defendant himself is present to observe 
the actions and words of the officer. 
Arguably, a 
defendant who has been subjected to an unnecessarily 
suggestive on-the-scene identification procedure has the 
opportunity to present a coherent rationale for his 
arguments. 
In contrast, a defendant who seeks to challenge a 
corporeal identification procedure will be effectively 
unable to do so. 
He must stand before the one-way glass 
and 
trust 
the 
competence 
and 
conscience 
of 
the 
investigating officer. I doubt that J.R.R. Tolkien's image 
of Wormtongue whispering quietly into the ear of Theoden, 
King of Rohan7 will be one that is frequently repeated in 
practice. 
However, even an inadvertent suggestion will be 
imperceptible to a defendant who remains precluded from 
witnessing it.8
 The majority is essentially creating a 
black box into which the defendant will not be allowed to 
7See J.R.R. Tolkien. The Lord of the Rings (New York:
Ballantine Books 1954-1974). 
8See United States v Wade, 388 US 218, 228-230; 87 S Ct
1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967) (recognizing that the 
"vagaries" of eyewitness testimony during a corporeal
lineup can be effectively challenged only if there is
adequate observation of the process of identification). 
11  
 
 
 
 
peer. It then requires him to refute the premise that what 
occurred inside did not violate his right to due process. 
Nothing 
in 
the 
majority's 
opinion 
provides 
for 
substitute 
protections 
to 
guard 
against 
overzealous 
individual officers or the failure of an officer to avoid 
or correct potentially suggestive procedures in these 
cases. 
As one author has aptly noted, the fact that 
identification evidence is unique in character should 
instead warrant the imposition of greater protections, 
rather than less: 
In most situations the state simply collects
preexisting 
evidence 
about 
a 
crime; 
through
pretrial identifications the state creates a 
piece of evidence that would not otherwise exist.
The 
creation 
of 
evidence, 
rather 
than 
its 
collection, should impose a special obligation on
the state to behave correctly, because the 
creation 
of 
evidence 
presents 
heightened
opportunity for wrongdoing and unfairness by the
state and to the detriment of the defendant. 
[Rosenberg, Rethinking the right to due process
in 
connection 
with 
pretrial 
identification 
procedures: 
An analysis and a proposal, 79 Ky L
J 259, 291-292 (1991). (emphasis omitted).] 
I disagree with the majority's decision to effectively 
remove any ability for a criminal defendant to raise a due 
process 
argument 
relating 
to 
these 
preindictment 
identification 
procedures. 
In 
so 
doing, 
I 
agree 
wholeheartedly with Justice Brennan's dissenting statement 
12  
 
 
 
 
in Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682, 699 n 8; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 
L Ed 2d 441 (1972): 
As the California Supreme Court pointed out,
with 
an 
eye 
toward 
the 
real 
world, 
"the 
establishment of the date of formal accusation as 
the time wherein the right to counsel at lineup
attaches could only lead to a situation wherein
substantially all lineups would be conducted 
prior to indictment or information." People v.
Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P. 2d 643, 650
(1969). 
Until today, Michigan has not known this to occur. 
However, I seriously doubt that it will long be the case 
after the majority's ruling. 
In addition, the majority claims that it is not 
deciding today whether a defendant retains the protection 
of counsel at custodial photographic showups, ante at 8 n 
5. 
However, it is clear from the thrust of the majority 
opinion that such protections have been removed. 
Anderson 
itself involved a photographic lineup where the defendant 
was in custody before the photographs were shown to the 
witness. 
Anderson, supra at 160. Because of the Court's 
distrust of photographic identification procedures, it 
established rules regarding their use, including the right 
to counsel when a suspect is in custody. See People v 
Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 298; 505 NW2d 528 (1993), citing 
Anderson, supra at 186-187. 
13  
 
 
 
                                                 
The United States Supreme Court stated in United 
States v Ash,9 that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
the right to counsel at photographic displays where 
witnesses attempt to identify a suspect. 
This is true, 
even when the suspect is in custody. 
Anderson, supra at 
186-187. However, as noted by the majority, ante at 4, 
Jackson took 
Ash into consideration and nevertheless 
affirmed the Anderson decision to extend the protections to 
suspects in Michigan. 
It did so using the power of the 
Court to exercise its authority to establish rules of 
evidence. Jackson, supra at 338. 
Today, the majority decides to overrule Anderson and 
repudiate the Jackson rationale. Ante at 5. Therefore, it 
has 
removed 
the 
protection 
of 
counsel 
at 
custodial 
photographic 
showups. 
I 
leave 
for 
another 
day 
an 
enumeration of the additional areas of law affected by the 
majority's sweeping language and abdication of judicial 
power. 
I realize that it might be difficult at times for the 
majority to keep track of the specific cases it is 
overruling. This is due in part to its propensity to reach 
for issues and decide them with a broad pen stroke. 
9413 US 300, 318; 93 S Ct 2568;37 L Ed 2d 619 (1973). 
14  
 
 
 
However, when one specifically mentions a case by name, it 
should be easy to remember that its holding must be 
analyzed before it is rejected. 
Finally, I disagree with the majority's disposition of 
the question whether the identification procedure used here 
violated defendant's right to due process irrespective of 
whether a Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed. 
Especially because defendant was sixteen at the time of his 
arrest, I find troubling the majority's abdication of the 
issue 
to 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
without 
any 
further 
explanation. 
In conclusion, I believe that the majority has reached 
out to take this case needlessly in order to address 
constitutional questions. I would further find that, 
whatever the scope of the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment or Michigan's Constitution, the decision to 
overrule Anderson is misguided. 
It has been made without 
due deference to the principles of stare decisis and 
without a comprehension of the practical realities of 
frequent eyewitness misidentifications. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
15