Title: Griswold v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
NORMAN EDWARD GRISWOLD 
                                           OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 951794 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                           JUNE 7, 1996 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This is an appeal of a conviction for operating a vehicle 
under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), as a second conviction 
within 5 to 10 years of a first DUI conviction.  The primary 
issue involves the introduction into evidence of two prior DUI 
convictions in which the defendant was unrepresented by counsel. 
 
In June 1983, Norman Edward Griswold was convicted of a DUI 
offense and sentenced to 30 days in jail, the entirety of the 
sentence being suspended.  Griswold was again convicted of a DUI 
offense in January 1985.  Because his 1985 DUI conviction was 
within 5 years of his first DUI conviction, Griswold was required 
to serve 48 hours of the 180-day jail sentence imposed for the 
1985 conviction.  Code § 18.2-270. 
 
In August 1992, Griswold was indicted for the present DUI 
offense.  His trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond 
was in two phases as provided in Code § 46.2-943.  In the first 
phase, the jury found Griswold guilty of DUI, "as charged."
1  In 
the second phase, after considering Griswold's traffic record, 
                     
     
1The indictment upon which Griswold was tried charged him 
with DUI after "having been previously convicted of a like 
offense on June 15, 1983." 
 
 
 
 
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the jury imposed the maximum sentence of 12 months in jail and a 
$2,500 fine, upon which the trial court entered judgment.  Code 
§ 18.2-270. 
 
In both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, 
Griswold objected to the admission into evidence of his prior DUI 
convictions.  Griswold contended that he had not been represented 
by counsel in the two prior DUI proceedings and that he had not 
waived his right to counsel.  And Griswold concluded that because 
these convictions either resulted in his imprisonment or an  
impermissible threat to his liberty, both were violations of his 
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. 
 
Although concluding that the 1983 conviction was uncounseled 
and, thus, inadmissable during the guilt phase, the trial court 
agreed with the Commonwealth that Griswold was represented by 
counsel in the 1985 proceeding and admitted evidence of that 
conviction in both stages of his trial.  Following the jury's 
verdict of guilty, the trial court also admitted evidence of 
Griswold's uncounseled 1983 conviction during the sentencing 
phase since it was a part of Griswold's traffic record.  Code 
§ 46.2-943. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals en banc concluded that 
Griswold was not represented by counsel in the 1985 proceeding, 
but held that both the 1985 and 1983 convictions were properly 
admitted into evidence.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial 
court was affirmed.  Griswold v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 22, 
 
 
 
 
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461 S.E.2d 411 (1995).  We awarded Griswold an appeal. 
 
An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction resulting in a jail or 
prison sentence is a violation of a defendant's rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972);  
Nichols v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1927 
(1994); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).  We 
conclude that the record establishes that Griswold was 
unrepresented in both the 1983 and 1985 proceedings. 
 
Consequently, and contrary to the ruling of the Court of 
Appeals, we hold that the 1985 conviction is constitutionally 
infirm because of the two days in which Griswold was actually 
imprisoned.  Therefore, this conviction cannot be used either to 
support guilt or to enhance punishment for a subsequent criminal 
violation.  See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 
(1967)(uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used to support 
guilt or enhance punishment in subsequent criminal trial).  
Further, to convict a defendant of a second DUI offense within 5 
to 10 years of a prior DUI conviction, "the prior offense must be 
charged and proven."  Calfee v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 253, 255, 
208 S.E.2d 740, 741 (1974) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 
Va. 403, 409, 413, 4 S.E.2d 762, 764, 766 (1939)).  Accordingly, 
we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
that it could convict Griswold of a second DUI offense within 5 
 
 
 
 
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to 10 years of a first DUI conviction.
2  We will remand the case 
to the Court of Appeals with instructions directing that court to 
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. 
 
We will address the use of the two prior DUI convictions in 
the sentencing hearing as a part of Griswold's "record of prior 
convictions of traffic offenses," Code § 46.2-943, since the 
issue will probably arise if Griswold is convicted in a new 
trial.  Consistent with our ruling that the 1985 conviction was 
unconstitutional and cannot be used either to establish guilt or 
enhance punishment for the subsequent DUI conviction, we reject 
the Commonwealth's contention that it could be considered as a 
part of Griswold's record of prior convictions of traffic 
offenses. 
 
     
2The Commonwealth claims that even if the 1985 conviction 
was inadmissible to establish Griswold's first DUI conviction, 
the 1983 conviction was admissible for that purpose.  However, 
after the trial court had ruled that Griswold was unrepresented 
in the 1983 proceedings, the Commonwealth struck its reference to 
the 1983 conviction from the indictment as one of the prior DUI 
convictions.  Thus, the 1983 conviction was neither charged in 
the indictment nor proven in the guilt phase of the case.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the 1983 conviction cannot be used 
to establish the necessary prior DUI conviction.  Calfee, 215 Va. 
at 255, 208 S.E.2d at 741. 
 
 
 
 
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Regarding the 1983 conviction, Griswold argues that his 30-
day suspended sentence suffers from the same constitutional 
infirmity as his two-day jail sentence because "[w]hen someone 
receives a sentence, whether it is suspended or immediately 
served, his liberty is severely curtailed" in violation of the 
principles articulated in Scott.  According to Griswold, 
suspended sentences are "imposed" jail or prison sentences within 
the Scott rationale.  We do not agree. 
 
Neither party cites, and we are unable to find, any case in 
which the United States Supreme Court has decided this issue.  
However, in Nichols, the Supreme Court decided that an 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction resulting only in a fine could 
be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent conviction.  
There, we think the Supreme Court made it plain, if it had not 
done so already, that there is no constitutional right to counsel 
in a misdemeanor case unless the conviction results in an "actual 
imprisonment."  Nichols, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1925-26 
(citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 373, and Argersinger, supra). 
 
And many federal courts that have considered the issue of an 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction with a suspended sentence have 
not invalidated the misdemeanor conviction itself.  See United 
States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20, 21-22 (9th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Sultani, 704 F.2d 132, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1976); Cottle v. 
 
 
 
 
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Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973); United States v. Nash, 703 F. Supp. 
507, 510 (W.D.La.), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 
Since Griswold was never actually imprisoned as a result of 
his 1983 conviction, that conviction was not constitutionally 
invalid.  Hence, we conclude that if he is convicted in a new 
trial, the 1983 conviction may be considered as a part of 
Griswold's traffic record in the sentencing hearing. 
 
In summary, we will reverse Griswold's conviction and 
sentence and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with 
directions to remand the case to the trial court for a new trial 
in conformity with the views expressed herein. 
 
Reversed and remanded.