Title: Woodman v. Department Of Corrections (Opinion on Application - Remand to TC)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

WOODMAN v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
JOSEPH v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
 
Docket Nos. 163382 and 163383.  Argued on application for leave to appeal April 4, 2023.  
Decided July 26, 2023. 
 
 
Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, two freelance journalists, brought separate actions 
in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that 
the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq.  Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation 
that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot.  The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, asserting 
that the records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(c).  Plaintiffs, who were 
represented by both the American Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU) and Honigman LLP, 
separately filed actions in the Court of Claims, each requesting “a complete, unredacted copy of 
the Video and any accompanying audio recordings.”  The Court of Claims consolidated the cases.  
Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary disposition.  The Court of Claims ordered the 
MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera 
review.  The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the 
faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals.  However, the 
MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review.  The Court of Claims appointed a 
special master to review the videos for any security concerns, and the special master reported that 
there were no concerns except to the extent the videos made it possible to identify staff members 
and inmates.  The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to 
plaintiffs within seven days.  The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it need not 
disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should be allowed to redact the videos by blurring the 
faces of the individuals in the videos.  The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless 
permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view 
both the redacted and unredacted videos.  Plaintiffs then moved for attorney fees under 
MCL 15.240(6) and for punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).  The Court of Claims, CYNTHIA 
D. STEPHENS, J., determined that the MDOC was not a prevailing party and that plaintiffs had 
prevailed in full; therefore, the court held that plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
under MCL 15.240(6).  The court further held that the attorneys’ hourly rate and the number of 
hours billed on the cases were reasonable.  The court awarded the ACLU 100% of its requested 
attorney fees.  However, it awarded Honigman only 10% of its requested attorney fees because 
Honigman represented plaintiffs on a pro bono basis.  The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).  Plaintiffs and the MDOC appealed in the Court of 
Appeals, raising only the attorney-fee and punitive-damages issues.  Plaintiffs challenged the trial 
court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages.  The MDOC cross-
appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus 
were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA.  In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on 
June 24, 2021 (Docket Nos. 353164 and 353165), the Court of Appeals, GADOLA, P.J., and 
SAWYER and RIORDAN, JJ., affirmed the Court of Claims’ denial of punitive damages but 
concluded that plaintiffs had prevailed only in part and therefore remanded the cases to the Court 
of Claims for it to determine whether plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees.  Plaintiffs sought 
leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the 
application, directing the parties to address whether plaintiffs prevailed in full and were thus 
entitled to attorney fees, whether the Court of Claims abused its discretion when it reduced the 
attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs solely on the pro bono nature of Honigman’s representation, 
and whether the Court of Claims erred by denying plaintiffs punitive damages.  509 Mich 954 
(2022).  
 
 
In an opinion by Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CLEMENT and Justices 
BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, and WELCH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to 
compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially 
sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees.  Furthermore, pro 
bono representation is not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of 
attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee 
award to Honigman on the basis of Honigman’s pro bono representation of plaintiffs. 
 
 
1.  FOIA is a statute intended to provide members of the public access to public records 
unless a statutory exemption to disclosure under MCL 15.243 applies.  FOIA includes a fee-
shifting provision that awards attorney fees to requesting parties that “prevail” in actions seeking 
to compel disclosure under MCL 15.240(1)(b).  MCL 15.240(6) provides, in relevant part, that if 
a person asserting the right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of all or a portion of a public record 
prevails in an action commenced under MCL 15.240, the court shall award reasonable attorney 
fees, costs, and disbursements; MCL 15.240(6) further provides that if the person or public body 
prevails in part, the court may, in its discretion, award all or an appropriate portion of reasonable 
attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.  A court’s analysis of whether the plaintiff prevailed 
considers three fundamental questions: (1) Was the action reasonably necessary to compel the 
disclosure of the records?  (2) Did the action actually have the causative effect of delivering the 
information?  And (3) did the plaintiff obtain everything it initially sought?  In these cases, the 
action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records because it was undisputed 
that the records would not have been disclosed absent the litigation and that the litigation itself 
was the cause of the disclosure given that the MDOC admitted that it issued blanket denials for 
FOIA requests of video and audio recordings.  The significant question in these cases was whether 
plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought given that the Court of Claims permitted the 
MDOC to blur the faces of individuals in the videos.  Plaintiffs successfully received the records 
they originally sought in their FOIA requests as a result of this litigation.  The content of a 
complaint filed to compel disclosure of records in accordance with FOIA does not alter the 
information that plaintiffs initially sought in their FOIA requests, and here, plaintiffs requested 
video and audio recordings of an altercation; plaintiffs did not initially request unredacted videos.  
Not only were plaintiffs’ FOIA requests silent on redaction, blurring, and identity, but the litigation 
that ensued never expressly prevented plaintiffs from receiving an unredacted copy of the video 
footage.  Because plaintiffs received both video and audio recordings following litigation, they 
obtained everything they initially sought.  The trial court’s decision allowing the MDOC to 
“redact” the identities of individuals by blurring faces in the videos—after the court had already 
ordered the immediate disclosure of the records to plaintiffs and denied the MDOC’s motion for 
reconsideration—did not support the conclusion that plaintiffs prevailed only in part.  Accordingly, 
the portion of the Court of Appeals judgment that held to the contrary was reversed. 
 
 
2.  The touchstone in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to a prevailing 
party in a FOIA case is “reasonableness.”  Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519 (2008) (opinion by 
TAYLOR, C.J.), and Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269 (2016), provide the guiding 
principles lower courts should use in determining the reasonableness of attorney-fee awards.  
Under the Smith/Pirgu framework, the trial court is first required to determine the reasonable 
hourly or daily rate customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, using reliable 
surveys or other credible evidence.  Second, the court must multiply that rate by the reasonable 
number of hours expended in the case to arrive at a baseline figure.  Finally, the trial court must 
consider a nonexhaustive list of factors to determine whether an upward or downward adjustment 
is appropriate.  Those factors include the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the amount in 
question and the results obtained; the expenses incurred; the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; the time limitations imposed by the 
client or by the circumstances; and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  In these cases, the Court 
of Claims completed the first two steps in the Smith/Pirgu framework when it found that the 
attorneys’ hourly rate and number of hours expended in the cases were both reasonable.  However, 
the court did not consider the Smith/Pirgu factors on the record or explain that the 90% reduction 
of Honigman’s attorney fees was related to any Smith/Pirgu factor.  Accordingly, the Court of 
Claims abused its discretion by failing to address the Smith/Pirgu factors or otherwise justify such 
a reduction.  The Court of Appeals judgment was affirmed to the extent it vacated the Court of 
Claims’ attorney-fee award and remanded these cases to the Court of Claims to address the 
Smith/Pirgu factors and any additional factors the Court of Claims considers relevant.   
 
 
3.  Whether an otherwise reasonable fee award may be reduced because an attorney is 
representing a party on a pro bono basis was an issue of first impression in Michigan.  The purpose 
of the Smith/Pirgu factors is to aid courts in determining a reasonable amount of fees based on the 
specifics of the case.  Whether an attorney represents a client pro bono is not a valid consideration 
under the Smith/Pirgu framework because it is not relevant to the reasonableness of a fee.  When 
an attorney agrees to represent a client pro bono, the pro bono nature of the representation should 
not have any effect on the quality of representation provided or the time spent on the case.  
Moreover, pro bono fee awards, like all other fee awards, promote the purpose behind FOIA’s fee-
shifting provision.  The plain language of MCL 15.240(6) does not distinguish between an 
attorney-fee award for “pro bono” and “non-pro bono” attorneys.  Because FOIA’s fee-shifting 
provision is designed to protect plaintiffs who cannot afford the cost of litigation, that purpose is 
furthered when a plaintiff is represented pro bono.  Other jurisdictions have rejected the notion 
that pro bono representation bars reasonable attorney fees under fee-shifting provisions.  Outside 
of the FOIA context, federal courts have agreed that pro bono representation should not preclude 
the prevailing party from receiving its reasonable fees.  And other state courts have similarly 
rejected the argument that attorney fees should be denied when a prevailing party has pro bono 
representation.  Awarding reasonable attorney fees under fee-shifting provisions, regardless of the 
type of representation, encourages enforcement of FOIA, encourages pro bono representation in 
cases that lawyers might not otherwise accept, and furthers access to justice for indigent parties 
that are seeking enforcement of their rights.  Accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion 
by reducing Honigman’s otherwise reasonable attorney fees solely on the basis of Honigman’s pro 
bono representation.  The Court of Appeals judgment was vacated to the extent it directed the 
Court of Claims to address this issue on remand.   
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part, affirmed in part, and vacated in part, and cases 
remanded to the Court of Claims; leave to appeal denied in all other respects. 
 
 
Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice VIVIANO, dissenting in part, disagreed with the majority’s 
holdings that plaintiffs fully prevailed and that an attorney’s pro bono representation is not an 
appropriate consideration when determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees under 
FOIA; he did not disagree with the majority’s decision to deny leave to appeal on the issue of 
punitive damages.  Plaintiffs in this case explicitly requested the disclosure of unredacted footage 
in their complaints and sought complete, unredacted records throughout the entire FOIA process.  
Plaintiffs also contested the issue of redaction and did not concede the issue until after the trial 
court had already allowed redaction of the records.  Because plaintiffs initially sought unredacted 
records and ultimately were granted access only to redacted records, they did not obtain everything 
they initially sought and should not be entitled to mandatory attorney fees.  With regard to whether 
pro bono representation is an appropriate factor for determining the reasonableness of an attorney-
fee award, the Court of Appeals declined to address the issue, and therefore the trial court should 
address this issue in the first instance.  In responding to the majority, however, Justice ZAHRA 
would have concluded that the fact that a representation is pro bono was a legitimate consideration 
when deciding the reasonableness of attorney fees.  Under the Smith/Pirgu framework, the pro 
bono nature of a representation could be seen as part of the nature of the professional relationship 
with the client or potentially as an additional relevant factor.  Nothing in the Smith/Pirgu 
framework facially precluded its consideration.  In establishing a per se rule that courts cannot 
consider that a representation is pro bono when awarding reasonable attorney fees, the majority 
not only misread the law but distorted the meaning of pro bono representation.  Because attorneys 
and law firms should have no expectation of financial gain from pro bono work, courts should be 
able to consider that a representation is pro bono when deciding what attorney fees are reasonable. 
 
 
FILED  July 26, 2023 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
SPENCER WOODMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 163382 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
GEORGE JOSEPH, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 163383 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
BOLDEN, J.  
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement   
 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
 
 
2 
 
These cases concern the availability of attorney fees under Michigan’s Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq.  In particular, we must decide whether 
plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) and thus are entitled to attorney fees and costs.  
We must also decide whether a reasonable attorney fee under FOIA may be reduced when 
a party is represented by pro bono counsel.  We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment to 
the extent it held that plaintiffs only prevailed in part, and we hold that plaintiffs prevailed 
and are statutorily entitled to attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.240(6).  We further 
hold that the Court of Claims abused its discretion when it reduced the fee awarded to 
Honigman because Honigman represented plaintiffs pro bono.  We conclude that pro bono 
representation is not an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of 
attorney fees.  While we agree with the Court of Claims that plaintiffs were entitled to fees, 
we vacate the Court of Claims’ order and remand these cases to the Court of Claims to 
reassess the reasonableness of the attorney fees.  In all other respects, leave to appeal is 
denied because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by 
this Court. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Plaintiffs, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, two freelance journalists, 
submitted separate FOIA requests to defendant, the Michigan Department of Corrections 
(the MDOC), seeking video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in 
one inmate’s death.1  The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, asserting that the records 
 
1 Specifically, plaintiffs sought “a digital copy of video footage of the confrontation” and 
“footage from any and all available cameras that captured this incident as well as any 
available accompanying audio records.”  
 
3 
 
were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(c).2  Plaintiffs then separately filed 
lawsuits in the Court of Claims, arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests 
under FOIA.  In their complaints, plaintiffs both requested “a complete, unredacted copy 
of the Video and any accompanying audio recordings[.]”  Plaintiffs were represented by 
both the American Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU) and Honigman LLP (Honigman).  
The Court of Claims consolidated the cases.   
In the Court of Claims, plaintiffs argued that the MDOC wrongfully denied their 
requests.  Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law because the MDOC had violated FOIA by denying their requests for 
information.  The MDOC also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), 
arguing that the records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(a), (c), 
and (u).3   
 
2 MCL 15.243(1)(c) exempts from disclosure “[a] public record that if disclosed would 
prejudice a public body’s ability to maintain the physical security of custodial or penal 
institutions occupied by persons arrested or convicted of a crime . . . unless the public 
interest in disclosure under this act outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure.”  During 
discovery, it was revealed that the MDOC had a policy to issue blanket denials, apparently 
without exception, for FOIA requests of video and audio recordings.  We do not reach the 
punitive-damages issue raised by the parties, but we note that the blanket denial of FOIA 
requests is contrary to the purpose of FOIA.   
3 The relevant statutory provisions read: 
 
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record 
under this act any of the following: 
 
4 
 
The trial court ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and 
to produce the videos for an in camera review, holding in abeyance the parties’ motions 
pending the review.  The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format 
that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those 
individuals.  However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review.  
The trial court determined that the records did not reveal the placement of security cameras, 
but nonetheless, “in an abundance of caution,” the court appointed a special master to 
review the videos for “any security concerns, other than the identity of those persons who 
are seen on camera.”  The special master reported that the videos did not reveal any security 
concerns except to the extent the videos made it possible to identify staff members and 
inmates.  Accordingly, on April 22, 2019, the Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to 
immediately disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs within seven days.   
 
 
(a) Information of a personal nature if public disclosure of the 
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an 
individual’s privacy. 
*   *   * 
 
(c) A public record that if disclosed would prejudice a public body’s 
ability to maintain the physical security of custodial or penal institutions 
occupied by persons arrested or convicted of a crime or admitted because of 
a mental disability, unless the public interest in disclosure under this act 
outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure. 
*   *   * 
(u) Records of a public body’s security measures, including security 
plans, security codes and combinations, passwords, passes, keys, and 
security procedures, to the extent that the records relate to the ongoing 
security of the public body. 
 
5 
 
On April 29, 2019, the MDOC moved for reconsideration of the court’s order, 
arguing that it need not disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should be allowed to 
redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos.  The court denied 
the MDOC’s motion because it was “not convinced that an error of fact or law was made 
as to the Court’s conclusion that the videos should be released” and did “not believe that 
there is any law precluding the display of the faces of public employee correctional 
officers . . . .”  Nevertheless, it permitted the MDOC to blur the faces but also permitted 
plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos and “make further 
prayer for relief after the review.”   
Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.240(6) and 
for punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).  The MDOC opposed the motion, arguing 
first that because the court allowed the MDOC to redact the identities of the individuals in 
the videos, plaintiffs only prevailed in part under MCL 15.240(6) and the court should 
decline to award fees in its discretion.  The MDOC also argued that because Honigman 
represented plaintiffs pro bono, plaintiffs should not receive fees.  In the alternative, the 
MDOC argued that should the court award a fee, the court should reduce the fee because 
plaintiffs provided an unreasonable number of hours worked and an unreasonable hourly 
rate. 
The Court of Claims determined that the MDOC was not a prevailing party and that 
plaintiffs prevailed “in full”; therefore, the Court of Claims held that plaintiffs were entitled 
to reasonable attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.240(6).  The court further held that 
the attorneys’ hourly rate and the number of hours billed on the cases were reasonable.  The 
 
6 
 
court awarded the ACLU 100% of its requested attorney fees.  However, it awarded 
Honigman only 10% of its requested attorney fees, explaining as follows: 
The reason that the Court is awarding the fees is, in part, certainly it’s 
normal to compensate parties for dollars they’ve spent.  But in this case, 
dollars have not been necessarily spent except for those dollars that are 
attributable to counsel for the ACLU.  Instead[,] those were pro bono dollars 
[as to Honigman]. 
The Court of Claims also denied plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under MCL 
15.240(7).  
Plaintiffs and the MDOC appealed in the Court of Appeals, raising only the 
attorney-fee and punitive-damages issues.  Plaintiffs challenged both the trial court’s 
decision to reduce Honigman’s attorney-fee award and the denial of punitive damages.  
The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs 
prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees and costs under FOIA.4 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in 
part.  Woodman v Dep’t of Corrections, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, issued June 24, 2021 (Docket Nos. 353164 and 353165), p 1.  The panel reversed 
the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs prevailed, concluding that plaintiffs prevailed only 
in part.  Id. at 5.  The panel explained that plaintiffs’ complaints demanded the production 
of “ ‘a complete, unredacted copy of the Video . . . .’ ”  Id.  The panel opined that plaintiffs 
had only partially prevailed because the MDOC was permitted to redact certain information 
from the videos.  Id.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded the cases to the Court of 
 
4 The MDOC did not challenge the merits of plaintiffs’ FOIA claims or the Court of Claims 
order requiring the MDOC to disclose the records.  
 
7 
 
Claims to determine, within its discretion, whether plaintiffs should be awarded any, all, 
or a portion of reasonable attorney fees, costs, and disbursements under MCL 15.240(6).  
Id.  Because the panel vacated the attorney fees awarded, it did not address the Court of 
Claims’ decision to reduce Honigman’s fee by 90% on the basis of Honigman’s pro bono 
representation of plaintiffs.  The panel did, however, note that on remand the Court of 
Claims “should . . . determine whether the pro bono nature of the representation is a 
legitimate consideration in the determination of the reasonableness of the fees.”  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ request for 
punitive damages.  Id. at 8.  
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We ordered oral argument on the 
application and asked the parties to address whether “(1) [plaintiffs] prevailed in full, and 
are thus statutorily entitled to attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6); (2) the Court of Claims 
abused its discretion when it reduced by 90% the attorneys’ fees awarded to [plaintiffs] 
based solely on the pro bono nature of Honigman LLP’s representation, notwithstanding 
the Court of Claims’ factual findings that Honigman’s hourly rates and the number of hours 
worked were reasonable; and (3) the Court of Claims clearly erred in denying [plaintiffs] 
punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).”  Woodman v Dep’t of Corrections, 509 Mich 
954, 954 (2022).  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under FOIA, “legal determinations are reviewed under a de novo standard.”  Herald 
Co, Inc v Eastern Mich Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 471-472; 719 NW2d 19 (2006).  
A trial court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error.  See id.  An attorney-fee 
 
8 
 
award in a FOIA action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See Mich Tax Mgt Servs 
Co v Warren, 437 Mich 506, 507; 473 NW2d 263 (1991); Prins v Mich State Police, 299 
Mich App 634, 641; 831 NW2d 867 (2013).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 
court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.  See 
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).  A trial court 
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.  See Pirgu v United Servs 
Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016).  
Because determining the status of a prevailing party under FOIA is a legal 
determination, it is reviewed de novo.  See Outdoor Sys, Inc v Clawson, 273 Mich App 
204, 209; 729 NW2d 893 (2006) (recognizing that “determining prevailing-party status” 
for attorney fees in a 42 USC 1988 action “is a legal question subject to review de novo”).  
Similarly, statutory interpretation is also a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  See 
American Civil Liberties Union of Mich v Calhoun Co Sheriff’s Office, 509 Mich 1, 8; 983 
NW2d 300 (2022) (ACLU of Mich).  “The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory 
language.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
III.  PREVAILING PARTY UNDER MCL 15.240(6) 
To begin, we examine the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that plaintiffs prevailed 
only in part and thus that attorney fees were discretionary and not mandatory.  The panel 
reasoned that because plaintiffs’ complaints demanded the production of “ ‘a complete, 
unredacted copy of the Video’ ” and the MDOC was permitted to redact the faces of the 
individuals in the videos, plaintiffs prevailed only in part under MCL 15.240(6).  
 
9 
 
Woodman, unpub op at 5.  Therefore, the panel opined, the trial court had the discretion to 
award all or an appropriate portion of plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees, costs, and 
disbursements under MCL 15.240(6).  Id.  We disagree and hold that plaintiffs prevailed 
in full.  
A.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
1.  FOIA DISCLOSURE AND EXEMPTIONS 
FOIA is a statute intended to provide members of the public access to public records 
unless the Legislature enacted a statutory exemption to disclosure.  “FOIA is a 
manifestation of this state’s public policy favoring public access to government 
information, recognizing the need that citizens be informed as they participate in 
democratic governance, and the need that public officials be held accountable for the 
manner in which they perform their duties.”  Rataj v Romulus, 306 Mich App 735, 748; 
858 NW2d 116 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The Legislature codified 
the FOIA to facilitate disclosure to the public of public records held by public bodies.”  
Herald Co, Inc, 475 Mich at 472; see also ACLU of Mich, 509 Mich at 9-10.  “In construing 
the provisions of the act, we keep in mind that the FOIA is intended primarily as a 
prodisclosure statute and the exemptions to disclosure are to be narrowly construed.”  
Swickard v Wayne Co Med Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991).   
“Consistent with the legislatively stated public policy supporting the act, the 
Michigan FOIA requires disclosure of the ‘public record[s]’ of a ‘public body’ to persons 
who request to inspect, copy, or receive copies of those requested public records.”  Mich 
Federation of Teachers & Sch Related Personnel, AFT, AFL-CIO v Univ of Mich, 481 
Mich 657, 664-665; 753 NW2d 28 (2008) (Mich Federation), citing MCL 15.231(2), MCL 
 
10 
 
15.232(d) and (e), and MCL 15.233 (emphasis added).  Public bodies are required to 
disclose public records upon request unless those records are specifically exempt from 
disclosure under MCL 15.243.  See ACLU of Mich, 509 Mich at 10.  
When a public body denies a FOIA request and the requesting party seeks to compel 
disclosure of a public record in a circuit court action under MCL 15.240(1)(b), the public 
body bears the burden of proving that its decision to withhold the records was justified 
under FOIA.  MCL 15.240(4); see Mich Federation, 481 Mich at 665; Swickard, 438 Mich 
at 544.  “[A] court that determines a public record is not exempt from disclosure shall order 
the public body to cease withholding or to produce all or a portion of a public record 
wrongfully withheld . . . .”  MCL 15.240(4). 
2.  FOIA ATTORNEY FEES 
FOIA includes a fee-shifting provision that awards attorney fees to requesting 
parties that “prevail” in actions seeking to compel disclosure under MCL 15.240(1)(b).  
MCL 15.240(6) provides, in relevant part: 
 
If a person asserting the right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of all 
or a portion of a public record prevails in an action commenced under this 
section, the court shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and 
disbursements.  If the person or public body prevails in part, the court may, 
in its discretion, award all or an appropriate portion of reasonable attorneys’ 
fees, costs, and disbursements.  [Emphasis added.] 
Therefore, under MCL 15.240(6), when a party “prevails,” the court is required to award 
the party reasonable attorney fees.  See Fradco, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 495 Mich 104, 
114; 845 NW2d 81 (2014) (recognizing that “shall” denotes a mandatory directive).  On 
the other hand, when a party only “prevails in part,” then “the court may, in its discretion, 
award all or an appropriate portion” of a reasonable fee.  MCL 15.240(6) (emphasis added); 
 
11 
 
see In re Bail Bond Forfeiture, 496 Mich 320, 328; 852 NW2d 747 (2014) (stating that 
“may” is “permissive, not mandatory”).  
We have explained that to “prevail” under MCL 15.240(6), “a court must conclude 
that the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of public records, and 
that the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information to the 
plaintiff.”  Amberg v Dearborn, 497 Mich 28, 34; 859 NW2d 674 (2014) (quotation marks, 
citation, and brackets omitted).  Courts should also consider whether the party “obtained 
everything it initially sought.”  Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America v 
Dep’t of State Police, 422 Mich 432, 455; 373 NW2d 713 (1985) (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  
Thus, a court’s analysis of whether the plaintiff prevailed considers three fundamental 
questions: (1) Was the action reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records?  
(2) Did the action actually have the causative effect of delivering the information?  And 
(3) did the plaintiff obtain everything it initially sought?  
B.  ANALYSIS 
There is no dispute that the records at issue here—eight videos—were public 
records.  It is also undisputed that the records would not have been disclosed absent the 
litigation and that the litigation itself was the cause of the disclosure because the MDOC 
admitted that it issued blanket denials for the FOIA requests in the instant cases.  Therefore, 
“the action was reasonably necessary to compel . . . disclosure” of the public records 
sought.  Amberg, 497 Mich at 34 (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
The significant question at issue here is whether plaintiffs obtained everything they 
initially sought.  Plaintiffs’ FOIA requests to the MDOC sought video footage of the 
 
12 
 
incident from all available cameras and accompanying audio records.  Neither plaintiff 
asked that the footage be “unredacted” in their initial FOIA requests.  Nor did plaintiffs 
request the identities of the individuals in the videos.  However, as noted by the MDOC, in 
their complaints filed to compel disclosure of the records in the Court of Claims, plaintiffs 
did request “a complete, unredacted copy” of the relevant video footage.  
Notably, a FOIA request “need not specifically describe the records containing the 
sought information; rather, a request for information contained in the records will suffice.”  
Detroit Free Press, Inc v Southfield, 269 Mich App 275, 281; 713 NW2d 28 (2005).  When 
submitting a FOIA request to a public body, the requester is necessarily at an informational 
disadvantage.  Requiring a requesting party to describe individual records with specificity 
and precision before they have access to the records would make little sense.5  Therefore, 
FOIA, an inherently prodisclosure statute, permits requesters to ask broadly and receive 
records in return unless the records are expressly exempt.   
The content of a complaint filed to compel disclosure of records in accordance with 
FOIA does not alter the information that plaintiffs initially sought in their FOIA requests.  
Here, plaintiffs successfully received the records they originally sought in their FOIA 
requests as a result of this litigation.  Plaintiffs requested video and audio recordings of an 
altercation.  Plaintiffs did not initially request unredacted videos.  Not only were plaintiffs’ 
FOIA requests silent on redaction, blurring, and identity, but the litigation that ensued 
 
5 In essence, the dissent expects a person submitting a FOIA request to request the public 
records they would like to obtain and outline any redactions that person would accept 
before the person has ever obtained the sought-after record.  This is an unreasonable burden 
on citizens (who are often lay people not schooled in the finer points of FOIA law) seeking 
to obtain public records. 
 
13 
 
never expressly prevented plaintiffs from receiving an unredacted copy of the video 
footage.  The trial court permitted the MDOC to redact the videos only after the court had 
already ordered the MDOC to disclose the records.  Plaintiffs simply chose not to contest 
the blurring of faces.  As plaintiffs received both video and audio recordings following 
litigation, they “obtained everything [they] initially sought.”  Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 
(opinion by LEVIN, J.).   
Our decision in Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.), is instructive, 
providing support for our conclusion that plaintiffs prevailed in this action and are entitled 
to attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6) despite the eventual permitted redactions to the 
disclosed videos.  The plaintiff in Int’l Union sought reports “containing the names and 
addresses of guards employed by certain security guard agencies . . . .”  Id. at 438.  After 
the defendant refused to disclose the records because of privacy concerns, MCL 
15.243(1)(a), the trial court granted the plaintiff’s request and ordered disclosure of the 
records in full.  Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America v Dep’t of State 
Police, 118 Mich App 292, 294; 324 NW2d 611 (1982), aff’d 422 Mich 432 (1985).  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the disclosure of the records to the plaintiff, but it modified the 
trial court’s order, “forbid[ding] further disclosure” of the records.  Id. at 297-298.   
On appeal, we affirmed the lower courts’ decision to order disclosure of the records 
to the plaintiff.  Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 438 (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  We also concluded 
that the plaintiff was “entitled to recover reasonable, actual attorney fees” under the 
 
14 
 
statutory language.6  Id. at 454.  However, we noted that the plaintiff “[a]rguably” did not 
prevail completely because “its use of the disclosed information [had] been restricted.”  Id. 
at 455.7  Nevertheless, we concluded that the plaintiff “may recover reasonable attorney 
fees, costs, and disbursements that have been incurred or will be incurred on remand” 
because the victory was “still a very substantial one, and [the plaintiff] has obtained 
everything it initially sought.”  Id.  In other words, we recognized that even in the event 
that a court restricts a party’s use of disclosed public records, the party is entitled to 
reasonable fees and other expenses under MCL 15.240(6) when the party substantially 
prevails and “obtain[s] everything it initially sought.”  Id.  
While Int’l Union is distinguishable from the instant cases because the restriction at 
issue in Int’l Union was a use restriction, not a redaction, it is still instructive regarding 
restrictions that a court imposes on disclosure after a FOIA request is made and that the 
parties do not challenge.  In Int’l Union, the plaintiff requested a record and received it.  
The initial request did not mention whether the plaintiff planned to share the record with 
other entities following disclosure; the issue of further disclosure was simply not contested.  
Therefore, the fact that the Court of Appeals imposed a use restriction did not alter the 
 
6 When Int’l Union was decided, the relevant language was located in Subsection (4) of the 
statute rather than Subsection (6).  See Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 & n 45 (opinion by 
LEVIN, J.). 
7 We note that the Int’l Union use restriction was not grounded in FOIA and that the 
plaintiff in Int’l Union did not challenge the use restriction imposed by the Court of 
Appeals.  Moreover, this Court did not opine on whether the use restriction imposed by the 
Court of Appeals was valid.  Intl’ Union, 422 Mich at 454 n 43 (opinion by LEVIN, J.) 
(“Because the privacy interest invaded is minimal, regardless of whether use is restricted, 
and because [the plaintiff] has not objected to the use restrictions added by the Court of 
Appeals, we need not decide whether use restrictions are valid.”). 
 
15 
 
plaintiff’s substantial victory in the action or their ability to recover fees as the prevailing 
party.  Similarly to the public records at issue in the instant cases, the public records in Int’l 
Union were ordered to be disclosed to the plaintiff after the defendant failed to establish 
that an exemption to disclosure applied.   
In the instant cases, the MDOC denied plaintiffs’ FOIA requests on the basis that 
the records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(c), the “penal security 
exemption.”  In the Court of Claims, the MDOC argued for the first time that the records 
were exempt under MCL 15.243(1)(a) and (u).8  Ultimately, the trial court concluded that 
the MDOC failed to meet its burden of proving that the records or portions of the records 
were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243.9  Therefore, the MDOC failed to carry 
 
8 Before conducting an in camera review of the records, the trial court found that the 
MDOC “ha[d] not presented an argument regarding why the mere identities of the 
individuals [depicted in the videos were] of a personal nature” as required under MCL 
15.243(1)(a).  Additionally, the court stated that “it [was] not apparent that the safety 
concerns associated with these individuals were present at the time [the MDOC] denied the 
request.”  Nonetheless, the court stated that it would consider the exemptions asserted by 
the MDOC, among others not raised by the MDOC, during its in camera review.   
9 The dissent asserts that plaintiffs’ opposition to the MDOC’s motion for summary 
disposition—in which the MDOC argued that several exemptions to disclosure applied—
provides proof that the redaction was a contested issue in litigation.  Notably, all the 
exemptions raised by the MDOC were rejected by the Court of Claims.  Moreover, on 
appeal, the MDOC did not challenge the Court of Claims’ decision regarding those 
exemptions.  Nonetheless, “[t]he denial of a FOIA request occurs at a definite point in 
time,” and a public body’s decision to deny a request must be evaluated in light of the 
information available to it at the time it denied the request.  State News v Mich State Univ, 
481 Mich 692, 703-704; 753 NW2d 20 (2008).  “Subsequent developments are irrelevant 
to that FOIA inquiry.”  Id. at 704.  The MDOC had the burden of justifying its blanket 
denial of plaintiffs’ FOIA requests during the proceedings, and the trial court concluded 
that the MDOC failed to do so.   
 
16 
 
its burden of proof that any exemption to disclosure applied, and the trial court ordered 
disclosure of the records.   
The MDOC did not provide plaintiffs any records—redacted or unredacted—until 
the court ordered it to do so.10  The trial court’s decision allowing the MDOC to “redact” 
the identities of individuals by blurring faces in the videos—after the court had already 
ordered the immediate disclosure of the records to plaintiffs and denied the MDOC’s 
motion for reconsideration—does not support the conclusion that plaintiffs prevailed only 
in part.  Like the plaintiff in Int’l Union, the plaintiffs here had a substantial victory in the 
action.   
The MDOC argues that because the trial court permitted it to “redact” the records, 
it was permitted to protect one of its security concerns and thus it prevailed in part.  We 
disagree.  The record clearly establishes that the trial court gave plaintiffs an opportunity 
to review the redacted and unredacted versions of the videos and “make further prayer for 
relief after the review.”  Plaintiffs never challenged the permitted redactions; blurring the 
 
10 Even if the MDOC had met its burden of proving than an exemption applied to a portion 
of the records under FOIA, the presence of exempt information in a public record does not 
eliminate a public body’s responsibility to disclose the nonexempt information.  See 
MCL 15.244.  Again, public bodies are required to disclose public records upon request 
unless those records or portions of the records are specifically exempt from disclosure 
under MCL 15.243.  See ACLU of Mich, 509 Mich at 10.  The trial court concluded that 
the MDOC failed to prove that any exemption to disclosure applied and, thus, ordered 
disclosure of the records.  The MDOC has not challenged that order on appeal.  Rather, the 
only order challenged by either party on appeal is the trial court’s order granting in part 
and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages.   
 
17 
 
faces or obscuring the identities of individuals in the videos was never a contested issue.11  
While plaintiffs chose not to make a further prayer for relief, that does not change the fact 
that plaintiffs, in fact, did prevail in obtaining the requested videos.   
We conclude that plaintiffs’ action was “reasonably necessary to compel the 
disclosure” of the videos because the MDOC issued a blanket denial of the FOIA requests.  
Amberg, 497 Mich at 34 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  And, as already explained, 
that action “had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information” to 
plaintiffs.  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Finally, like the plaintiff in Int’l 
Union, plaintiffs “obtained everything [they] initially sought.”  Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 
455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  Therefore, plaintiffs prevailed, as contemplated by MCL 
15.240(6), and we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion that held to the 
contrary.  
IV.  PRO BONO REPRESENTATION AND REDUCED ATTORNEY-FEE AWARD 
Next, we turn to the Court of Claims’ decision to reduce Honigman’s fee by 90% 
because Honigman represented plaintiffs pro bono.  The court had determined that the 
attorney fees were reasonable based on the hours and hourly rates provided by plaintiffs in 
support of their motion for fees but decided to reduce Honigman’s fee by 90% solely on 
the basis of Honigman’s pro bono representation.  We must decide whether pro bono 
representation can be the sole basis for reducing an otherwise reasonable attorney fee.  We 
 
11 Whether a party can prevail in a FOIA action when contesting the scope of redactions is 
an issue we need not decide today.  Plaintiffs never challenged the redactions permitted by 
the trial court.   
 
18 
 
also take this opportunity to address, more broadly, whether pro bono representation is ever 
an appropriate factor for courts to consider when calculating reasonable attorney fees.   
We hold that the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing Honigman’s fees 
based on pro bono representation of plaintiffs because pro bono representation is never an 
appropriate factor for a court to consider in determining the reasonableness of an attorney 
fee.  
A.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Fee-shifting provisions in general are an aberration from the “American Rule,” 
which dictates that each side pay for its own attorneys.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 
ed) (defining “American Rule” as “[t]he general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing 
one, must bear their own attorney’s fees”).  However, certain statutes change that dynamic 
to encourage parties to act as “private attorneys general” and vindicate the rights of the 
public created by the Legislature.  See, e.g., Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc, 390 
US 400, 401-402; 88 S Ct 964; 19 L Ed 2d 1263 (1968).  Michigan’s FOIA is such a statute. 
The touchstone in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to a 
prevailing party in a FOIA case is “reasonableness.”  See Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins 
Exch, 413 Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982) (“[T]he controlling criterion is that the 
attorney fees be ‘reasonable.’ ”).  This Court articulated the guiding principles lower courts 
should use in making this determination in Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 530; 751 NW2d 
472 (2008) (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.), and Smith was further refined by Pirgu, 499 Mich 
at 281-282.  This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in 
determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules.  
 
19 
 
See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply 
for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) 
(stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing 
reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee-
shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) (recognizing 
that the Smith factors apply in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA).  
First, the trial court is required to determine “the reasonable hourly or daily rate 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, using reliable surveys or other 
credible evidence.”  Smith, 481 Mich at 522 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.); see Pirgu, 499 
Mich at 281.  Second, the court must “multiply that rate by the reasonable number of hours 
expended in the case to arrive at a baseline figure.”  Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281.  Finally, after 
that baseline number is determined, “the trial court must consider” a nonexhaustive list of 
factors to “determine whether an up or down adjustment is appropriate.”  Pirgu, 499 Mich 
at 281, discussing Wood, 413 Mich 573, and MRPC 1.5(a).  These factors include:  
(1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services, 
(2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly, 
(3) the amount in question and the results obtained, 
(4) the expenses incurred, 
(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client, 
(6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, 
 
20 
 
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, 
and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  [Id. at 282.] 
This list is not exclusive, and “the trial court may consider any additional relevant factors.”  
Id.  Importantly, “[i]n order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court should briefly 
discuss its view of each of the factors above on the record and justify the relevance and use 
of any additional factors.”  Id.   
B.  ANALYSIS 
The parties dispute whether pro bono representation is a factor that a trial court may 
consider when determining the reasonableness of an attorney-fee award under the FOIA 
fee-shifting statute and whether it is permissible to reduce such an award on that basis.12   
In the instant cases, the Court of Claims completed the first two steps in the 
Smith/Pirgu framework when it found that the attorneys’ hourly rate and number of hours 
expended in the cases were both reasonable.  Then, it awarded Honigman only 10% of its 
requested attorney fees based on the fact that Honigman represented plaintiffs on a pro 
bono basis.   
The court did not consider the Smith/Pirgu factors on the record or explain that the 
90% reduction was related to any Smith/Pirgu factor.  Nor did the court explain why pro 
bono representation was a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of the attorney 
 
12 In its appellee brief in the Court of Appeals, the MDOC challenged the Court of Claims’ 
finding that the hourly billing rate and number of hours spent on the cases were reasonable.  
Because the Court of Appeals vacated the award, it expressed no opinion on this part of 
the fee award.  We did not ask the parties to brief this issue, and so we likewise do not 
address it.  On remand, the MDOC is free to raise this issue again, and the Court of Claims 
may reexamine its determinations as to the reasonableness of the rates and hours as part of 
the broader Smith/Pirgu analysis. 
 
21 
 
fees.  Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Claims abused its discretion by failing to 
address the Smith/Pirgu factors or otherwise justify such a reduction.  See Pirgu, 499 Mich 
at 282.   
The question remains whether pro bono representation is ever a factor a court may 
consider when applying the Smith/Pirgu factors.  While FOIA does not expressly prohibit 
an attorney from recovering fees because they represent a plaintiff pro bono, whether an 
otherwise reasonable fee award may be reduced because an attorney is representing a party 
on a pro bono basis is an issue of first impression in Michigan.  The purpose of the 
Smith/Pirgu factors is to aid courts in determining a reasonable amount of fees based on 
the specifics of the case.  For example, courts can consider the “difficulty of the case,” the 
“time limitations,” or “the experience” of the attorneys.  Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282.  These 
factors, along with the others outlined in Smith/Pirgu, correspond to specific aspects of 
litigation that would justify increasing or decreasing a calculated fee.   
We conclude that whether an attorney represents a client pro bono is not a valid 
consideration under the Smith/Pirgu framework because it is not relevant to the 
reasonableness of a fee.  When an attorney agrees to represent a client pro bono, the pro 
bono nature of the representation should not have any effect on the quality of representation 
provided or the time spent on the case.  There are no “pro bono dollars” when determining 
the reasonableness of an attorney fee because “[r]easonable fees are not equivalent to actual 
fees charged.”  Smith, 481 Mich at 528 n 12 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Thus, regardless of any actual fees charged, the amount of attorney 
fees awarded under MCL 15.240(6) must be reasonable, and the trial court’s determination 
must be made consistently with this Court’s binding precedent.  See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 
 
22 
 
281-282.  Therefore, we conclude that whether a client is represented pro bono is never a 
valid consideration when calculating a reasonable fee award.     
Moreover, pro bono fee awards, like all other fee awards, promote the purpose 
behind FOIA’s fee-shifting provision.  As already discussed, the FOIA fee-shifting 
provision provides for the award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements” 
to prevailing parties.  MCL 15.240(6).  The plain language does not distinguish between 
an attorney-fee award for “pro bono” and “non-pro bono” attorneys.  The fee-shifting 
provision under MCL 15.240 is designed to “encourage voluntary compliance” with 
disclosing public records under FOIA and “to encourage plaintiffs who are unable to afford 
the expense of litigation to nonetheless obtain judicial review of alleged wrongful denials 
of their requests.”  Walloon Lake Water Sys, Inc v Melrose Twp, 163 Mich App 726, 733; 
415 NW2d 292 (1987).  Because FOIA’s fee-shifting provision is designed to protect 
plaintiffs who cannot afford the cost of litigation, that purpose is clearly furthered when a 
plaintiff is represented pro bono. 
Across our legal system, pro bono representation has played a critical role in 
providing indigent parties access to the justice system.  See MRPC 6.1.13  The State Bar of 
Michigan (the State Bar) also encourages its members to support access to justice by 
 
13 MRPC 6.1 provides: 
A lawyer should render public interest legal service.  A lawyer may 
discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a 
reduced fee to persons of limited means, or to public service or charitable 
groups or organizations.  A lawyer may also discharge this responsibility by 
service in activities for improving the law, the legal system, or the legal 
profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal 
services to persons of limited means. 
 
23 
 
participating in pro bono services and representation through its Voluntary Pro Bono 
Standard.14  Notably, the Pro Bono Institute (the PBI), a nonprofit organization whose 
mission is to assist law firms in identifying pro bono opportunities, encourages firms to 
seek reasonable attorney-fee awards in pro bono matters when available.15  
Other jurisdictions have rejected the notion that pro bono representation bars 
reasonable attorney fees under fee-shifting provisions.  For example, in the federal FOIA 
context, federal courts agree that attorney-fee awards should not be denied because of pro 
 
14 See 
The 
State 
Bar, 
Pro 
Bono 
Manual 
 (accessed July 3, 
2023) [https://perma.cc/5FK7-EWBG] (recognizing the importance of “providing 
professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means”).  For example, 
“more than 40,000 pro bono service hours provided by more than 1,000 Michigan-licensed 
attorneys in the 2022 calendar year were submitted to the State Bar.”  The State Bar, 2023 
A Lawyer Helps Pro Bono Honor Roll  
(accessed July 3, 2023) [https://perma.cc/W66W-923Y].  The State Bar explains that under 
the “case assignment model” approach to pro bono service, volunteer attorneys “represent 
the assigned client through all phases of the matter until resolution of the case.”  The State Bar, 
Pro Bono Manual  
(accessed July 3, 2023) [https://perma.cc/5FK7-EWBG] (emphasis added). 
15 The PBI explains:  
In handling cases in the public interest, law firms are acting as “private 
attorneys general,” enforcing legal rights, promoting access to justice for 
those who would otherwise be unable to press their suits, and uncovering and 
deterring unlawful behavior.  Seeking attorneys’ fees, as well as damages or 
equitable relief, on behalf of pro bono clients increases the disincentives and 
deterrence benefits of these cases by making defendants who have acted 
unlawfully pay the full costs associated with their behavior.  Accordingly, 
firms are encouraged to seek attorneys’ fees and to request compensation 
at the usual and customary billing rates.  [The PBI, What Counts? A 
Compilation of Questions and Answers Interpreting the Law Firm Pro 
Bono Challenge Statement of Principles (May 2023), pp 13-14, available 
at  (accessed July 3, 2023) [https://perma.cc/WTX5-YBTA].] 
 
24 
 
bono representation.  See, e.g., Jarno v Dep’t of Homeland Security, 365 F Supp 2d 733, 
741 (ED Va, 2005) (awarding attorney fees to pro bono counsel in a federal FOIA lawsuit); 
Williams v Fed Bureau of Investigation, 17 F Supp 2d 6, 9 (DDC, 1997) (holding that the 
denial of pro bono counsel’s motion for attorney fees “would discourage other attorneys 
from making a similar commitment” and is “[in]consistent with the legislative history” of 
the federal FOIA’s attorney-fee provision); Mattachine Society of Washington, DC v US 
Dep’t of Justice, 406 F Supp 3d 64, 70 (DDC, 2019) (recognizing that pro bono 
representation “is not a bar to recovering attorneys’ fees” under the federal FOIA).  
Although the federal FOIA and Michigan’s FOIA are distinct statutes, the same policy and 
underlying purposes are present in both. 
Outside of the FOIA context, federal courts have agreed that pro bono representation 
should not preclude the prevailing party from receiving its reasonable fees.  See, e.g., 
Turner v Comm’r of Social Security, 680 F3d 721, 724 (CA 6, 2012) (“Indeed, it is ‘well-
settled’ that the existence of an unsatisfied contingency or pro bono representation 
agreement does not preclude a fee award, even where the statute limits fees to those 
‘incurred’ by the plaintiff in that action.”); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood 
Ass’n v Albany Co, 522 F3d 182, 184 n 2 (CA 2, 2008) (explaining that attorneys engaged 
in pro bono work are not “excluded from the usual approach to determining attorneys’ 
fees” and that “[t]he reasonableness of a fee award does not depend on whether the attorney 
works at a private law firm or a public interest organization”).   
Other state courts have similarly rejected the argument that attorney fees should be 
denied when a prevailing party has pro bono representation.  See, e.g., Kirk v Arnold, 2020 
IL App (1st) 190782, ¶ 24; 157 NE3d 1111 (2020) (reversing denial of fees based on pro 
 
25 
 
bono representation and recognizing that “the purpose of fee shifting is to provide those 
whose civil rights have been violated with access to attorneys whose services they might 
otherwise be unable to afford and to provide incentives for attorneys to undertake 
representation in socially beneficial cases where the potential monetary recoveries are 
minimal”); Ostermeier, 589 SW3d at 8-9 (recognizing that denying fees when a party is 
represented by legal aid or pro bono counsel “thwarts the remedial purposes of the . . . fees 
shifting provisions” and “could have a chilling effect on the willingness of lawyers and law 
firms to take on [pro bono] representation”). 
The purpose behind fee-shifting statutes like MCL 15.240(6) is “to secure 
enforcement of the underlying statute at issue and increase the costs to violators for greater 
deterrent effect.”  Ostermeier, 589 SW3d at 8.  These policy goals apply equally to pro 
bono and non-pro bono representation.16  For the same reasons that other jurisdictions have 
determined that denying fees on the basis of pro bono representation is inappropriate, we 
conclude that reducing fees based on pro bono representation is also inappropriate.17 
Awarding reasonable attorney fees under fee-shifting provisions, regardless of the type of 
 
16 The dissent argues that “[i]f a lawyer or firm will not take a ‘pro bono’ case unless there 
is an opportunity to make money at the end,” it might not be “truly pro bono[.]”  But 
speculating about why a particular attorney chooses to engage in pro bono work is not a 
relevant consideration before us today. 
17 The MDOC points out that the cases cited here hold that an attorney’s pro bono 
representation does not bar a fee award, not that pro bono status is not an appropriate factor 
that would justify a reduction in fees.  This is an accurate characterization.  That said, the 
MDOC has not provided this Court with a single case in which pro bono representation 
was held to be an appropriate reason to reduce an attorney-fee award.  This is not an area 
of law in which this Court should endeavor to be a trailblazer or an outlier, especially when 
a reduction in fees because of pro bono representation would undermine the fee-shifting 
purpose of FOIA and undermine access to justice. 
 
26 
 
representation, encourages enforcement of FOIA, encourages pro bono representation in 
cases that lawyers might not otherwise accept, and furthers access to justice for indigent 
parties that are seeking enforcement of their rights.  Indeed, without the work done by the 
ACLU and Honigman in this case, the impermissible blanket-denial policy of the MDOC 
might not have come to light.  This case is a prime illustration of the “private attorneys 
general” model working to vindicate the private rights of the litigants and the right of the 
public to access its government’s information.  As recognized by other jurisdictions, a 
contrary ruling could have a chilling effect on the willingness of private attorneys to 
represent indigent litigants.  See Ostermeier, 589 SW3d at 8-9; Kirk, 2020 IL App (1st) 
190782 at ¶ 24.   
On top of discouraging attorneys from engaging in necessary pro bono work—and, 
perhaps, more importantly—a contrary ruling could have the practical effect of openly 
encouraging public bodies not to comply with FOIA when the requester was represented—
wholly or in part—by a private firm because it could later petition to have those fees almost 
entirely wiped out.  But the purpose of FOIA is to “encourage voluntary compliance” with 
FOIA requests.  Walloon Lake, 163 Mich App at 733.  Allowing courts to reduce an 
otherwise reasonable attorney fee on the basis of pro bono representation would be contrary 
to the policy and purposes underlying FOIA.  We refuse to undermine the purpose of the 
law so blatantly.    
Because we conclude that the pro bono nature of representation is not a relevant 
factor for courts to consider when assessing the reasonableness of a fee award, the Court 
of Claims abused its discretion by reducing Honigman’s otherwise reasonable attorney fees 
solely on the basis of Honigman’s pro bono representation.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
 
27 
 
part of the Court of Appeals judgment that directed the Court of Claims to consider on 
remand whether the pro bono nature of the representation is a legitimate consideration in 
determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee, but we affirm the Court of Appeals 
judgment to the extent it vacated the Court of Claims’ attorney-fee award and remanded 
the cases to the Court of Claims to address the Smith/Pirgu factors and any additional 
factors it considers relevant.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that plaintiffs only prevailed in part.  
Rather, we conclude that plaintiffs prevailed and are therefore entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6).  A party “prevails” under FOIA when “the action was 
reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of public records . . . .”  Amberg, 497 Mich 
at 34 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).  Here, because plaintiffs received 
no records prior to litigation and “obtained everything [they] initially sought,” Int’l Union, 
422 Mich at 455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.), they prevailed.  The fact that the court permitted 
the MDOC to blur the faces in the disclosed videos does not change the fact that the 
litigation was necessary to provide plaintiffs the records they sought.  We reverse the Court 
of Appeals judgment to the extent it held differently. 
We also conclude that the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the 
attorney-fee award to Honigman based on Honigman’s pro bono representation of 
plaintiffs.  We hold that pro bono representation is not an appropriate factor to consider in 
determining the “reasonableness” of attorney fees.  We vacate the Court of Appeals 
judgment to the extent it directed the Court of Claims to address this issue on remand. 
 
28 
 
We affirm the Court of Appeals judgment to the extent it vacated the Court of 
Claims’ attorney-fee award and remanded the cases to the Court of Claims to address the 
Smith/Pirgu factors and any additional factors it considers relevant except that the analysis 
should not consider Honigman’s pro bono representation of plaintiffs.   
In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the 
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.  We do not retain jurisdiction.   
 
 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
SPENCER WOODMAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 163382 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
GEORGE JOSEPH, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 163383 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting in part). 
I disagree with the majority’s holding that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus are 
entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).1  I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that an attorney’s pro bono 
representation is not an appropriate consideration when determining the reasonableness of 
an award of statutory attorney fees under FOIA.  For these reasons, I dissent.2 
 
1 MCL 15.231 et seq.; MCL 15.240(6). 
2 I do not disagree with the Court’s decision to deny leave to appeal on the issue of punitive 
damages. 
 
 
2 
 
Plaintiffs, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, are journalists who made separate 
FOIA requests for video and audio footage of a fight between inmates at the Ionia Bellamy 
Creek Correctional Facility.  The altercation unfortunately led to the death of inmate Dustin 
Szot.  The Department of Corrections (the Department) denied plaintiffs’ requests, 
concluding that the records were exempt from FOIA disclosure.3  Represented by the 
American Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU) and on a pro bono basis by Honigman LLP, 
plaintiffs filed complaints in the Court of Claims,4 alleging violations of FOIA and 
requesting that the court order the disclosure of “a complete, unredacted copy of the Video 
and any accompanying audio recordings[.]”  The Court of Claims consolidated the cases 
and ultimately ordered the Department to provide the video and audio recordings to 
plaintiffs.  But the court allowed the videos to be redacted to conceal the identities of the 
corrections officers and unnamed prisoner shown in the video.  Despite this redaction, the 
Court of Claims found that plaintiffs had prevailed in full and thus were entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees and costs under FOIA.5  The court awarded the full amount of 
requested attorney fees to the ACLU but awarded Honigman only 10% of its requested 
attorney fees, reasoning that a reduction was appropriate because Honigman represented 
plaintiffs pro bono.  Plaintiffs appealed the reduction of the attorney-fee award, while the 
Department appealed plaintiffs’ status as fully prevailing parties. 
 
3 See MCL 15.243(1)(c). 
4 See MCL 15.240(1)(b). 
5 MCL 15.240(6). 
 
 
3 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the Court of Claims erred by ruling that plaintiffs 
had prevailed in full.6  Because plaintiffs requested unredacted recordings but received 
redacted videos, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had prevailed only in part.  Thus, 
plaintiffs could still receive an award of attorney fees, but any award would be in the trial 
court’s discretion and not a matter of statutory entitlement.  The Court of Appeals also 
concluded that the Court of Claims had not properly considered the factors for determining 
the reasonableness of attorney fees.7  The Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to the 
Court of Claims for consideration of those factors and any other relevant factors. 
This Court now reverses the Court of Appeals’ well-founded conclusion that 
plaintiffs prevailed only in part and establishes a per se rule that the pro bono nature of a 
representation is not relevant to the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees. 
I.  PLAINTIFFS PREVAILED ONLY IN PART 
Plaintiffs prevailed at least partly in their actions to obtain the prison video and 
audio recordings.  The question is whether they prevailed in full or only in part.  The extent 
to which plaintiffs prevailed matters because it affects their entitlement to attorney fees.  
The relevant provision, MCL 15.240(6), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If a person asserting the right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of all 
or a portion of a public record prevails in an action commenced under this 
section, the court shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and 
disbursements.  If the person or public body prevails in part, the court may, 
 
6 Woodman v Dep’t of Corrections, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, issued June 24, 2021 (Docket Nos. 353164 and 353165). 
7 Id. at 5-6, citing Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 281-282; 884 NW2d 
257 (2016). 
 
 
4 
 
in its discretion, award all or an appropriate portion of reasonable attorneys’ 
fees, costs, and disbursements. 
Thus, if plaintiffs prevailed “in part,” the trial court “may, in its discretion,” award 
reasonable attorney fees.  If plaintiffs prevailed in full,8 however, the trial court must award 
reasonable attorney fees.9  “To ‘prevail’ in a FOIA action within the meaning of MCL 
15.240(6), a court must conclude that the action was reasonably necessary to compel the 
disclosure of public records, and that the action had a substantial causative effect on the 
delivery of the information to the plaintiff.”10  Our caselaw also establishes that for a 
requester to prevail in full, it must “obtain[] everything it initially sought.”11 
A majority of this Court concludes that plaintiffs prevailed in full—and are therefore 
entitled to mandatory attorney fees—even though plaintiffs did not receive the unredacted 
 
8 Although the first sentence of MCL 15.240(6) does not include the words “in full” or 
“fully prevail,” that meaning is implied by the context of the second sentence’s contrasting 
explanation of attorney-fee awards when a requesting party prevails only “in part.”  See 
Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 177; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (“We interpret the words in 
the statute in light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the statute and read 
them harmoniously to give effect to the statute as a whole.”) (quotation marks, citation, 
and brackets omitted); In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 114; 754 
NW2d 259 (2008) (explaining that under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis “a word or phrase 
is given meaning by its context of setting”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
9 Fradco, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 495 Mich 104, 114; 845 NW2d 81 (2014) (stating that 
“shall” denotes a mandatory directive).  See Local Area Watch v Grand Rapids, 262 Mich 
App 136, 151; 683 NW2d 745 (2004) (“Applying the plain text of the second sentence of 
[MCL 15.240(6)], we conclude that whether to award plaintiff reasonable attorney fees, 
costs, and disbursements when a party only partially prevails under the FOIA is entrusted 
to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). 
10 Amberg v Dearborn, 497 Mich 28, 34; 859 NW2d 674 (2014) (quotation marks, citation, 
and brackets omitted). 
11 Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America v Dep’t of State Police, 422 Mich 
432, 455; 373 NW2d 713 (1985) (opinion by LEVIN, J.). 
 
 
5 
 
records that they sought.  This conclusion ignores the plain text of the statute, twists the 
contents of the record, and defies common sense. 
To begin, the majority asserts that plaintiffs received everything that they sought in 
their initial FOIA requests because they did not “initially request unredacted videos.”  From 
this, the majority argues that plaintiffs’ failure to obtain unredacted videos does not mean 
that plaintiffs prevailed only in part.  But that analysis does not withstand scrutiny.  Not 
only did plaintiffs explicitly request the disclosure of unredacted footage in their 
complaints, but they have sought complete, unredacted records throughout the entire FOIA 
process.   
Both plaintiffs’ initial FOIA requests sought “footage from any and all available 
cameras that captured” the incident leading to Szot’s death, as well as “any” audio 
recordings accompanying the footage.  True enough, these requests did not specify that 
plaintiffs were seeking “unredacted” records.  But that is not dispositive, as the provision 
of unredacted records is the default requirement under FOIA.  We have previously stated 
that “FOIA is a prodisclosure statute . . . .”12  MCL 15.233(1) broadly provides a requesting 
party “a right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of the requested public record of the public 
body.”  The only exceptions to that right are the exemptions from disclosure enumerated 
in MCL 15.243.13  These exemptions allow the denial of requests or the redaction of records 
for specific reasons identified by the public body subject to the FOIA request.  Therefore, 
 
12 Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 119; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).  See also Mager v 
Dep’t of State Police, 460 Mich 134, 143; 595 NW2d 142 (1999); Swickard v Wayne Co 
Med Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991). 
13 MCL 15.243(1). 
 
 
6 
 
unless an exemption applies, a public body may not make any redaction to the requested 
record.  Combining the broad language of plaintiffs’ requests—“footage from any and all 
available cameras” and “any” audio recordings14—with the default provision that a 
complete public record will be provided in response to a FOIA request unless an exemption 
in MCL 15.243 applies, it is clear that plaintiffs were seeking unredacted recordings in 
their initial requests.15   
Plaintiffs’ complaints in the Court of Claims bolster this conclusion.  There, rather 
than request video and audio recordings with guards’ and inmates’ identities redacted, 
plaintiffs each asked for “a complete, unredacted copy of the Video and any accompanying 
audio recordings[.]”16  This request, provided without explanation or qualification, 
suggests that plaintiffs were seeking “complete, unredacted” recordings all along.  Because 
plaintiffs initially sought unredacted records and ultimately were granted access only to 
redacted records, they did not obtain everything they initially sought.  Therefore, they 
should not be entitled to mandatory attorney fees.17 
 
14 Emphasis added. 
15 Of course, requesting parties could narrow their requests by expressly asking for 
something other than complete, unredacted records.  But plaintiffs did not do so here.  
Naturally, requesting parties can make broad requests under FOIA, and provided that 
exemptions do not apply, those parties should, in turn, receive broad disclosures.  
Nonetheless, when a party makes a broad request and receives something less than what 
was requested, that party has not “obtained everything it initially sought” and is not entitled 
to mandatory attorney fees.  See Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  See 
also MCL 15.240(6).  
16 Emphasis added. 
17 See Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  The majority is correct that 
Int’l Union is instructive in this case.  In Int’l Union, this Court held that the requesting 
 
 
 
7 
 
Even if plaintiffs did not seek complete, unredacted recordings in their initial FOIA 
requests, they undoubtedly sought such recordings when they sued in the Court of Claims.  
The majority stresses that plaintiffs did not “initially” request unredacted videos.  
Assuming that this is true, how would it be relevant when plaintiffs inarguably requested 
unredacted videos when they sued to vindicate their FOIA rights?  Can a plaintiff make a 
limited initial FOIA request, sue to compel a more expansive FOIA disclosure, and then—
when it comes time to seek attorney fees after receiving the limited disclosure—pretend 
that the limited disclosure was all that was requested?  Such manipulation of a party’s status 
as a prevailing party would easily lead to an abuse of the attorney-fee provision in FOIA.  
The Court also concludes that there was no real dispute that a redacted version of 
the recordings would fully satisfy plaintiffs’ demand.  According to the majority opinion, 
plaintiffs agreed to allow the Department to redact the recordings only after plaintiffs had 
already prevailed in full.  But the record evidence belies this claim.  Plaintiffs contested 
the redaction issue in the trial court and did not give up on the issue until after the trial 
court decided to allow the Department to redact the recordings.   
 
party had “obtained everything it initially sought” and was entitled to mandatory attorney 
fees.  Id. at 450-455.  But Int’l Union does not support the proposition that plaintiffs here 
have prevailed in full.  In Int’l Union, the requesting party received a full disclosure of the 
documents it requested.  Id.  Subsequently, the Court of Appeals imposed a restriction on 
the requesting party’s ability to disclose those documents after the receipt of the 
documents.  Id. at 454 n 43; Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America v Dep’t 
of State Police, 118 Mich App 292, 298; 324 NW2d 611 (1982), aff’d 422 Mich 432 (1985).  
Without ruling on the propriety of that use restriction, we held that the requesting party had 
prevailed in full because it received all the documents that it had requested and thus could 
receive mandatory attorney fees.  Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 454 n 43, 455 (opinion by 
LEVIN, J.).  Here, unlike in Int’l Union, plaintiffs have not received a full disclosure of the 
requested records.  This distinction is material and shows that Int’l Union does not support 
a conclusion that plaintiffs here prevailed in full. 
 
 
8 
 
In its motion for summary disposition, the Department argued that releasing the 
recordings would threaten the safety of the individuals shown in the video.  In their 
response to the Department’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs argued, first, that 
there was no reason to hide the identities of the corrections officers in the video: “Similar 
to police officers, corrections officers are not entitled to anonymity.  It is wholly 
speculative that prison security would be prejudiced by disclosing their identities.”18  But 
plaintiffs then suggested that “faces could be redacted if that were truly necessary to ensure 
prison security,” citing a public body’s duty under FOIA to separate exempt material from 
nonexempt material.  That is, plaintiffs posed two different arguments, first asserting that 
the videos posed no threat and should be released in their entirety without the blurring of 
identities, but then stating that faces could be redacted if the Department could show that 
it was necessary to ensure security.  In light of plaintiffs’ primary argument, which opposed 
redaction, their second argument cannot be considered a true concession but only an 
alternative argument.19   
 
18 Citing State News v Mich State Univ, 481 Mich 692, 703-704; 753 NW2d 20 (2008), the 
majority opinion suggests that plaintiffs’ response opposing redaction is irrelevant to this 
issue because the Department failed to justify its blanket denials of plaintiffs’ FOIA 
requests at the time of the denials.  But that is a separate issue entirely, and the parties have 
not raised on appeal the issues of whether the Department’s denial was proper or whether 
the trial court erred by allowing the Department to make the redactions.  Plaintiffs’ 
opposition to the redactions is highly relevant to the factual question of whether the 
redaction issue was disputed by the parties.  As discussed, plaintiffs disputed the redaction 
issue, and they lost. 
19 And, in fact, plaintiffs’ response that “faces could be redacted if that were truly necessary 
to ensure prison security” arguably suggests that the faces were exempt from disclosure, in 
which case there was merit to the Department’s claim that redaction was appropriate. 
 
 
9 
 
Moreover, in their motion for attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages, plaintiffs 
stated that “[i]n an effort to avoid further litigation, [p]laintiffs did not contest [the 
Department] blurring the identities . . . in the videos.”20  The necessary implication is that 
plaintiffs disagreed with the trial court’s decision to allow redaction of the videos but chose 
not to pursue that issue further.  Had plaintiffs initially agreed to the redaction, they would 
have had no reason to affirmatively choose not to contest the matter.  Nor would they have 
done so “to avoid further litigation.”  Similarly, after the trial court allowed the Department 
to redact the videos, it offered plaintiffs’ counsel an opportunity to review both the redacted 
and unredacted videos and “make further prayer for relief after the review.”  Plaintiffs’ 
counsel declined to do so.  This was not a concession that plaintiffs made after winning all 
relief they sought.  Rather, it was a decision not to keep contesting the redaction issue, 
which, at that point, the Department had won.  None of this squares with the majority’s 
conclusion that the redaction issue was uncontested and that plaintiffs willingly allowed 
the blurring of identities.  Perhaps redaction was not ultimately a major sticking point for 
plaintiffs, but it was an issue that they contested and lost. 
The record evidence does not support this Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs agreed 
to accept the redacted videos only after they had won access to the unredacted versions of 
the recordings.  In ruling on the parties’ motions for summary disposition, the trial court 
ordered the Department to produce the videos for in camera review within 10 days “with 
attempts made to redact, if possible, faces and identities of the individuals depicted 
therein.”  The Department submitted unredacted versions of the videos, stating that it could 
 
20 Emphasis added. 
 
 
10 
 
not make the redactions in such a short time frame but maintaining that it should be allowed 
to blur identities before disclosing the recordings to plaintiffs if the trial court ruled in 
plaintiffs’ favor.  The trial court did not find the unredacted videos to reveal the placement 
of cameras, but it appointed a special master to review the videos “as to whether there are 
any security concerns, other than the identity of those persons who are seen on camera.”21  
The special master’s review of the videos did “not reveal any security concerns except for 
the display of the staff members and inmates that were caught on camera during this 
incident.”22    
In contradiction to its initial finding and the special master’s report, however, the 
trial court then stated in its disclosure order that the special master had “concluded that 
there are no security concerns.”  In a motion for reconsideration, the Department reiterated 
its earlier position that it should be allowed to redact the identities.  The trial court agreed 
that the Department could redact the videos but that plaintiffs’ counsel could review both 
the redacted and unredacted videos and “make further prayer for relief after the review.”  
As explained earlier, plaintiffs then decided not to contest the matter further.  Accordingly, 
even if there were a brief window in which the trial court ordered disclosure of the 
unredacted recordings, the trial court quickly changed course and allowed redaction.  This 
occurred before plaintiffs abandoned their challenge to redaction.   
Indeed, at no point prior to obtaining the videos did plaintiffs expressly agree to 
allow the Department to redact the videos; it was only after the trial court ordered the 
 
21 Emphasis added. 
22 Emphasis added. 
 
 
11 
 
release of the redacted videos on reconsideration that plaintiffs decided not to continue the 
dispute.  If a party could concede to accept less than what it initially sought in order to 
obtain a full and complete victory, that again would open up the attorney-fee statute in 
FOIA for abuse.  That is why the inquiry into whether a party prevailed in full should be 
measured by what materials that party initially sought and what materials the court 
ultimately deemed that party was entitled to receive under FOIA23—not what the party 
might have conceded or eventually accepted after the court ordered disclosure. 
Ultimately, because plaintiffs lost on the redaction issue and received a more limited 
disclosure than they initially sought, I conclude that they prevailed only in part and are not 
entitled to mandatory attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6).  Therefore, I would affirm the 
Court of Appeals on this issue. 
II.  PRO BONO REPRESENTATION IS A PROPER CONSIDERATION FOR 
DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY-FEE AWARDS 
Because I conclude that plaintiffs prevailed only in part, I would remand these cases 
for the trial court to decide “in its discretion” whether to “award all or an appropriate 
portion of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements.”24  Moreover, even if the 
 
23 See Int’l Union, 422 Mich at 455 (opinion by LEVIN, J.).  The majority opinion suggests 
that it would be unreasonable to expect a requesting party to outline on the front end the 
redactions that it is willing to accept for that party to have prevailed in full when it 
ultimately receives redacted disclosures.  This argument misses the point.  The purpose of 
a FOIA request is to obtain disclosures of public records, not to collect attorney fees.  And 
the degree to which a requesting party prevails is relevant only to the matter of attorney 
fees.  See MCL 15.240(6).  Limiting mandatory attorney fees to cases in which a requesting 
party receives everything it requested on the front end is both reasonable and compelled by 
a plain reading of MCL 15.240(6). 
24 MCL 15.240(6). 
 
 
12 
 
majority is correct that plaintiffs prevailed in full, it is premature to decide whether pro 
bono representation is an appropriate factor for determining the reasonableness of an 
attorney-fee award.  The Court of Appeals declined to address this issue.  Instead, it 
directed the trial court to consider on remand “whether the pro bono nature of the 
representation is a legitimate consideration in the determination of the reasonableness of 
fees,” along with other factors relevant to that determination set forth in our caselaw.25  
Like the Court of Appeals, I would allow the trial court to address this issue in the first 
instance.26 
But because the majority has decided to rule on this issue and has concluded that 
pro bono representation is not an appropriate consideration in determining the 
reasonableness of an attorney-fee award, a response is necessary.  In my view, the fact that 
a representation is pro bono is a legitimate consideration when deciding the reasonableness 
of attorney fees.  In Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, we listed eight factors to assist trial 
courts’ determination of whether attorney-fee awards are reasonable: 
(1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services, 
(2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly, 
 
25 Woodman, unpub op at 5-6, citing Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282. 
26 Id.  See also Gottesman v Harper Woods, 508 Mich 942, 943 (2021) (noting that the 
Court of Appeals has discretion to remand issues that the trial court did not decide in the 
first instance).  Although the trial court reduced the award to Honigman because of the pro 
bono representation, it did not explain why this was a legitimate consideration in 
determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. 
 
 
13 
 
(3) the amount in question and the results obtained, 
(4) the expenses incurred, 
(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client, 
(6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, 
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, 
and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.[27] 
We also clarified that these factors are “not exclusive” and that trial courts “may 
consider any additional relevant factors.”28  At the outset, I note that the pro bono nature 
of a representation can be seen as part of the “nature . . . of the professional relationship 
with the client” or potentially as an “additional relevant factor[].”29  Thus, there is nothing 
in the Pirgu framework that facially precludes its consideration. 
As the majority observes, MCL 15.240(6) is a fee-shifting provision meant to 
further the purposes of FOIA—the disclosure of public records.  Fee shifting helps 
requesting parties retain counsel for FOIA disputes and encourages public bodies’ 
 
27 Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v Albany Co, 522 F3d 182, 
184 & n 2 (CA 2, 2008) (explaining why the pro bono nature of representation might affect 
“the nature of representation and type of work involved in a case” and is among the 
“relevant circumstances” to consider when determining what a reasonable client would 
expect to pay for the purpose of calculating an attorney-fee award under the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965).  
 
 
14 
 
compliance with FOIA requests.30  But in establishing a per se rule that courts cannot 
consider that a representation is pro bono when awarding reasonable attorney fees, the 
majority not only misreads the law but distorts the meaning of pro bono representation. 
Generally, working pro bono means providing a service in the public interest 
without compensation.31  The Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct strongly encourage 
attorneys to engage in pro bono work for no fee or a reduced fee.32  With this in mind, 
lawyers and law firms should have no expectation of pecuniary gain from pro bono work.  
That does not necessarily preclude attorneys from benefiting monetarily from pro bono 
work—such as by receiving attorney fees and costs under a fee-shifting provision.  But I 
see no reason why it cannot be a relevant consideration when a court is determining what 
attorney fees are reasonable.  Indeed, some firms indicate that the circumstances of a 
particular pro bono case might affect their decision whether to attempt to collect fees.33  If 
the circumstances of an individual pro bono case can have an effect on the firm’s decision 
whether to pursue fees, it is hard to see how those circumstances, including the pro bono 
nature of the representation, would not be a relevant factor for the court to consider. 
 
30 Walloon Lake Water Sys, Inc v Melrose Twp, 163 Mich App 726, 733; 415 NW2d 292 
(1987). 
31 See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “pro bono” as “[u]ncompensated, esp. 
regarding free legal services performed for the indigent or for a public cause”).   
32 MRPC 6.1 (stating under the title “Pro Bono Publico Service” that lawyers should 
“render public interest legal service” and “may discharge this responsibility by providing 
professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means, or to public 
service or charitable groups or organizations”). 
33 See Cummings & Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well By Doing Better, 78 Fordham 
L Rev 2357, 2389 (2010).  One example given by a firm of the circumstances that could 
affect the decision whether to pursue fees is whether the firm advanced litigation costs.  Id. 
 
 
15 
 
The Court’s holding today blurs the line between “pro bono” work and work 
performed for a contingency fee.  This also creates a strong, and seemingly perverse, 
incentive for lawyers and law firms to focus their pro bono activities in areas where they 
can expect to recover attorney fees rather than in the many diverse areas of the law where 
pro bono services are desperately needed.34  There is little downside for law firms and 
lawyers who limit their pro bono activities to areas of law where an award of attorney fees 
is permitted.  They can obtain compensation and enjoy the reputational and other benefits 
that come from performing “pro bono” work, all with no risk of a court reducing the fees 
they receive.35 
That is not to say that courts should categorically deny or reduce attorney-fee awards 
because a representation is pro bono.  It is simply to say that pro bono representation should 
be a relevant factor to consider when awarding such fees.  This is where the majority goes 
astray.  After citing a raft of cases for the proposition that courts should not deny awards 
of attorney fees because a representation is pro bono,36 the majority pivots to a conclusion 
 
34 See Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L Rev 1, 134 (2004) (“[R]estrictions 
on fee awards in the civil rights and environmental context, combined with the high 
incidence of settlements for which attorneys are not entitled to statutory fees, create 
incentives to screen out meritorious but low-value cases.”) (citations omitted). 
35 Honigman reports that it donates any fees it receives from performing pro bono work.  
This is an admirable practice and hopefully one that other law firms emulate.  Nonetheless, 
the receipt of fees for pro bono work provides a benefit to Honigman, allowing it to make 
donations without additional cost to the firm.  That is not a bad thing per se.  But it 
nonetheless remains reasonable to allow a court to consider, as one factor among many, 
whether the funds that would go toward an attorney-fee award ought to remain in the public 
fisc rather than be used to subsidize a private entity’s charitable endeavors. 
36 See Jarno v Dep’t of Homeland Security, 365 F Supp 2d 733, 741 (ED Va, 2005); 
Williams v Fed Bureau of Investigation, 17 F Supp 2d 6, 9 (DDC, 1997); Mattachine 
 
 
 
16 
 
that differs in both nature and scope: that a court may never consider pro bono 
representation as a relevant factor in determining whether it is reasonable to reduce the 
amount of attorney fees awarded.  None of the cited cases supports the per se rule that the 
majority lands on, and I have not found any other legal support for the conclusion that trial 
courts cannot consider the fact of pro bono representation when awarding reasonable 
attorney fees.  On the contrary, at least one federal circuit has expressly stated that the pro 
bono nature of representation is relevant to a court’s determination on the issue of 
reasonable attorney fees, albeit not in the context of a FOIA statute.37   
Perhaps it is true, as the majority fears, that lawyers will be less likely to take up 
certain case types on a pro bono basis if there is a chance that courts will reduce attorney 
fees because of the pro bono representation.  But let’s not be afraid to acknowledge the 
elephant in the room.  If a lawyer or firm will not take a “pro bono” case unless there is an 
opportunity to make money at the end, is it truly pro bono?  What’s more, the attorney-fee 
provisions remain in place regardless of whether an attorney or firm and their client label 
the representation “pro bono.”  If the potential to make money from an award of attorney 
fees—and not service for the public good—is the primary consideration for whether to 
enter a representation, nothing stops lawyers from taking cases involving fee-shifting 
 
Society of Washington, DC v US Dep’t of Justice, 406 F Supp 3d 64, 70 (DDC, 2019); 
Turner v Comm’r of Social Security, 680 F3d 721, 724 (CA 6, 2012); Kirk v Arnold, 2020 
IL App (1st) 190782, ¶ 24; 157 NE3d 1111 (2020); Ostermeier v Prime Props Investments 
Inc, 589 SW3d 1, 8-9 (Mo App, 2019).   
37 See Arbor Hill, 522 F3d at 184 & n 2. 
 
 
17 
 
provisions without using the “pro bono” label.38  Otherwise, lawyers should enter pro bono 
representation without the expectation of financial gain, even if reasonable attorney fees 
might ultimately be awarded. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I disagree with the majority’s holdings that plaintiffs prevailed on their claims in 
full and that a court cannot consider that a representation is pro bono when deciding what 
attorney fee is reasonable to award.  I therefore dissent. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
38 The majority opinion states that “speculating about why a particular attorney chooses to 
engage in pro bono work is not a relevant consideration before us today.”  But this assertion 
begs the question by assuming that the definition of “pro bono work” does not depend on 
why an attorney engages in a representation.