Title: Commonwealth v. Smith

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13254 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  HUBERT LEE SMITH, JR. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 4, 2022. – February 28, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Postconviction relief, 
District attorney.  Time.  Words, "Good cause," "Excusable 
neglect." 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court on 
February 17, 1978. 
 
Following review by this court, 384 Mass. 519 (1981), a 
motion for postconviction relief, filed on April 7, 2020, was 
heard by Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
A motion to dismiss a request for leave to appeal and a 
motion to accept the request for leave to appeal as timely filed 
were reported by Gaziano, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Michelle Menken for the defendant. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Stanley Donald, pro se. 
Robert F. Hennessy for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
2 
 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell for Families for Justice as 
Healing. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On July 6, 2022, the defendant was released on 
parole after having served forty-four years in prison for his 
conviction of murder in the first degree.  A Superior Court 
judge granted the defendant's motion for postconviction relief 
on the ground that the Commonwealth's 1978 package plea offer 
violated the defendant's rights to due process.  The judge then 
reduced the defendant's conviction from murder in the first 
degree to murder in the second degree.  Following issuance of 
the judge's order on August 4, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a 
notice of appeal, but it did not file the requisite gatekeeper 
petition under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, until five and one-half 
months later, substantially exceeding the thirty-day filing 
requirement set forth in Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 
n.10 (2000).  The single justice initially granted the 
Commonwealth's petition.  After the defendant sought 
reconsideration, supplemental briefing was filed, the single 
justice conducted a hearing, and he then allowed the 
Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition, contingent upon the full 
court's approval of the Commonwealth's motion for leave for late 
filing.  The single justice then reserved and reported the 
matter to this court. 
3 
 
 
To resolve the reported issues, we must decide whether the 
Commonwealth had good cause to file its gatekeeper petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, more than five months late.  
Because the petition was not filed within the applicable thirty-
day period, and because there was no showing of good cause to 
excuse the delay, see Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), as appearing in 481 
Mass. 1626 (2019), the Commonwealth's petition must be dismissed 
as untimely. 
 
In addition, we conclude that the thirty-day deadline for 
filing a gatekeeper petition set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 
n.10, does not allow adequate time in which to develop and file 
the substantive pleadings required for such a petition.  
Accordingly, for petitions under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, filed 
after the date of issuance of the rescript in this case, the 
filing period shall be extended to sixty days.1 
 
1.  Background.  On February 10, 1978, Max Fishman, who was 
making oil deliveries to customers in the aftermath of the so-
called "Great Blizzard of 1978," was shot and killed during a 
robbery committed by the defendant and a codefendant.2  The two 
were arrested, and on February 17, 1978, a grand jury returned 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Stanley 
Donald, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Families 
for Justice as Healing. 
 
 
2 At the time of the shooting, the defendant was twenty 
years old and his codefendant was fifteen years old. 
4 
 
indictments charging the defendant with murder in the first 
degree, armed assault with intent to rob, unlawfully carrying a 
firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery.3 
 
Before trial, the prosecutor offered the defendant a plea 
arrangement; the Commonwealth was willing to reduce the charges 
against him from murder in the first degree to murder in the 
second degree, if both the defendant and the codefendant agreed 
to plead guilty to the same charges.4  The defendant told police 
that he had used the gun involved in the shooting, and his 
counsel indicated to the prosecutor that his client was 
"anxious" to plead guilty to murder in the second degree.  The 
codefendant, however, declined the plea offer, and the case 
proceeded to a joint trial. 
 
During deliberations, the jury sent three questions to the 
judge that indicated that they were likely to find the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree and the codefendant guilty 
of murder in the second degree.  After further consultation with 
his counsel, the codefendant pleaded guilty to murder in the 
second degree.  Counsel for the defendant argued vigorously that 
his client should be offered the same plea agreement, but the 
 
3 The conspiracy charge was not pursued at the joint trial. 
 
 
4 This type of plea agreement also is referred to as a 
package, contingent, linked, or wired plea.  See United States 
v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 1175 and 543 U.S. 1176 (2005). 
5 
 
prosecutor declined to engage in further plea negotiations with 
the defendant; the prosecutor asserted that all plea 
negotiations had terminated when the jury began their 
deliberations.  After the judge rejected the defendant's 
attempted plea, the defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree and sentenced to the statutorily mandated sentence 
of life in prison without the possibility of parole.5 
 
In 1980, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in 
the county court; he argued that he was entitled to a new trial 
because he should have been permitted to plead guilty to murder 
in the second degree, as the prosecutor initially had offered, 
and as his codefendant later had done.  After the single justice 
remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary 
hearing, a Superior Court judge determined that there had been 
no outstanding plea offer when the case was given to the jury.  
The single justice then denied the defendant's motion, and the 
defendant appealed from the denial of the motion for a new 
trial; we consolidated that appeal with the defendant's direct 
appeal.  We accepted the motion judge's finding that the plea 
offer was no longer in effect once the jury received the case 
and affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for a 
 
5 The defendant also was convicted of assault with intent to 
rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18, and unlawfully carrying a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
6 
 
new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 523 
(1981). 
 
The defendant subsequently filed two additional motions for 
a new trial.  The second, filed in August of 1996, asserted that 
the prosecutor's exercise of certain peremptory challenges had 
been based on race and, thus, unconstitutional; that motion was 
denied without a hearing.  The third motion for a new trial, 
filed in September of 2007, argued that trial counsel had been 
ineffective, the trial judge's decision to preclude the 
defendant from cross-examining his codefendant was error, and 
the plea agreement that had been offered to the defendant should 
be enforced "in the interest of justice."  That motion also was 
denied. 
 
In April of 2020, more than a decade later, the defendant 
filed the instant motion to reduce the verdict from murder in 
the first degree to murder in the second degree.  This time, the 
defendant argued that the "locked plea" offered to him and his 
codefendant violated his rights to due process under the Federal 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Hearings on the defendant's motion were held in February and 
April of 2021.  On June 2, 2021, the motion judge issued a 
memorandum and order in which the judge concluded that "the 
locked plea offer was fundamentally unfair and in violation of 
substantive due process," and ordered a hearing on the issue of 
7 
 
remedy.  On June 9, 2021, the Commonwealth filed its first 
notice of appeal.  The hearing on the appropriate remedy was 
held on July 27, 2021.  Following the hearing, the parties 
jointly filed a memorandum in which they agreed that, in light 
of the judge's decision, the appropriate remedy would be to 
reduce the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree 
to murder in the second degree.  On August 4, 2021, the motion 
judge reduced the verdict from murder in the first degree to 
murder in the second degree, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995). 
 
The Commonwealth filed a second notice of appeal on 
August 13, 2021.  In an e-mail message to defense counsel on 
September 9, 2021, the appellate prosecutor indicated that she 
was going to pursue the appeal as soon as she received 
transcripts of the prior hearings, which had been handled by a 
different prosecutor.  On September 15, 2021, the defendant was 
resentenced, and he therefore became eligible for parole, as by 
that point he had been incarcerated for forty-three years.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 389 Mass. 464, 470 (1983) ("parole 
is . . . available to a person convicted of murder in the second 
degree who has served fifteen years in prison"); G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2; G. L. c. 127, § 133A.  The transcripts of the hearings were 
ordered on November 5, 2021, and the prosecutor received them on 
December 3, 2021.  Nothing further was filed until the 
8 
 
prosecutor filed the instant gatekeeper petition on January 21, 
2022. 
 
A hearing on the defendant's application for release on 
parole ultimately was scheduled for January 27, 2022.  In 
response to the Commonwealth's filing of its gatekeeper 
petition, on January 27, 2022, the defendant filed an emergency 
motion to dismiss the petition, citing its untimeliness.  On 
that same day, the Commonwealth filed a motion to accept its 
petition as timely filed due to delays in receiving the hearing 
transcripts necessary for drafting the petition, absences 
related to COVID-19 and vacation, and the unusually busy 
workload in the district attorney's office during the filing 
period.  Also on the same day, the single justice allowed the 
motion for late filing, while the defendant's parole hearing 
went forward as scheduled. 
 
Thereafter, the defendant sought reconsideration of the 
single justice's allowance of the Commonwealth's motion for 
leave for late filing of its gatekeeper petition.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 469 Mass. 134, 144-145 (2014).  The 
defendant argued that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate 
excusable neglect or good cause, as required by Mass. R. A. P. 
4 (c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019), or Mass. R. A. P. 
14 (b).  Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the 
gatekeeper petition was allowed, contingent upon the full 
9 
 
court's approval of the Commonwealth's motion for leave for late 
filing; the matter then was reserved and reported to the full 
court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In reserving and reporting the matter, the 
single justice posed two questions to the full court:  
(1) "whether the defendant's right to due process or to the 
protections against double jeopardy preclude reinstatement of a 
conviction of murder in the first degree after the time in which 
to file a gatekeeper petition challenging the reduction in the 
verdict has expired"; and (2) "whether the thirty-day deadline 
for filing set forth in [Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10,] allows 
adequate time in which to file a gatekeeper petition, or whether 
a different period of time is warranted." 
 
a.  Filing deadline for petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  The procedures set forth in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, govern 
petitions for leave to appeal from postconviction motions in 
capital cases, after this court has affirmed the defendant's 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 583 
(1992); Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 742 (1986).  
General Laws c. 278, § 33E, however, does not specify a time 
period in which such a petition must be filed.  Consequently, 
this court has determined that "a gatekeeper petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [must] be filed within thirty days of 
10 
 
the denial of a motion for new trial."  See Mains, 433 Mass. 
at 36 n.10. 
 
The Commonwealth suggests that this thirty-day period of 
time for filing a gatekeeper petition should be extended or, 
alternatively, that the court should recognize that the filing 
window may be enlarged, within the sound discretion of the 
single justice.  The defendant maintains that the deadline set 
forth in Mains is absolute. 
 
The thirty-day period set forth in Mains was adopted, in 
part, in reliance on the rules of appellate procedure and, in 
particular, Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as amended, 489 Mass. 1601 
(2022).  Rule 4 (b) governs the filing of appeals in criminal 
cases, and requires a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty 
days of the issuance of the challenged decision.  See 
Commonwealth v. White, 429 Mass. 258, 262 (1999) ("we have 
concluded that the time limitations of rule 4 [b] apply to 
circumstances other than those specified in that rule").  
Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), 
"(1) In a criminal case, unless otherwise provided by 
statute or court rule, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the lower court 
within [thirty] days after entry of the judgment, 
appealable order, or adjudication appealed from, or entry 
of a notice of appeal by the Commonwealth, or the 
imposition of sentence, whichever comes last. 
 
"(2) If a motion for a new trial is filed under 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 25 (b) (2) or 30 
within [thirty] days of the verdict, finding of guilt, 
11 
 
judgment, adjudication, or imposition of sentence, the 
period to appeal shall not terminate until [thirty] days 
from entry of the order disposing of the motion.  If a 
motion is filed for reconsideration within [thirty] days of 
entry of the order disposing of the motion, the period to 
appeal shall not terminate until [thirty] days from entry 
of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. 
 
"(3) If a motion is filed for reconsideration within 
[thirty] days of an appealable order, judgment, or 
adjudication, the period to appeal from the decision for 
which reconsideration was sought shall not terminate until 
[thirty] days from entry of the order disposing of the 
motion for reconsideration."6 
 
 
Like other procedural rules governing filing periods, rule 
4 permits an extension of time for filing.  Under rule 4 (c), 
"Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the lower court may 
extend the time for filing the notice of appeal or notice 
of cross appeal by any party for a period not to exceed 
[thirty] days from the expiration of the time otherwise 
prescribed by this rule.  Such an extension may be granted 
before or after the time otherwise prescribed by this rule 
has expired; but if a request for an extension is made 
after such time has expired, it shall be made by motion 
with service upon all other parties." 
 
Rule 14 (b) further provides for an enlargement of time, 
"The appellate court or a single justice of the appellate 
court in which the appeal will be, or is, docketed for good 
cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by 
these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may 
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time; 
but neither the appellate court nor a single justice may 
enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal beyond [one] 
year from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought 
to be reviewed, or, in a criminal case, from the date of 
the verdict or finding of guilt or the date of imposition 
of sentence, whichever date is later." 
 
6 In February 2022, after the Commonwealth filed its 
gatekeeper petition, Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b) was amended to replace 
rule 4 (b) (2) and to add rule 4 (b) (3).  These changes are not 
relevant to this case. 
12 
 
 
 
Thus, the approximately 140-day delay here was subject to 
rule 14 (b).  Contrary to the defendant's argument that, once 
filing was delayed thirty-one days past entry of the order 
reducing his degree of guilt, any challenge exceeded the period 
prescribed in Mains, and the single justice had no authority to 
extend that period, the Commonwealth could have sought leave for 
late filing of its gatekeeper petition at any point within the 
140-day period of delay. 
 
We note that the type of filing contemplated by rule 4 (b) 
when Mains was adopted was (and continues to be) a notice of 
appeal, which requires significantly less than what is necessary 
to write a gatekeeper petition.  Filing a notice of appeal 
merely requires a one-sentence document indicating the party's 
intent to appeal and the names of all parties.  See Mass. R. A. 
P. 3 (c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1603 (2019).  By contrast, 
the petition that must be filed pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
requires extensive legal research and writing; a petitioner must 
demonstrate that there is a "new and substantial" issue worthy 
of review by the full court.  "[W]here the Commonwealth rather 
than the defendant petitions the gatekeeper, 'the single 
justice's primary focus should be on the meritoriousness or 
"substantiality" of the Commonwealth's position on appeal and 
less on the newness of the underlying issue.'"  Commonwealth v. 
13 
 
Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 803 n.6 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 322 (2011). 
 
Moreover, a denial of a gatekeeper petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, may not be appealed.  If the single justice 
denies the petition, "that decision 'is final and 
unreviewable.'"  See Commonwealth v. Wampler, 488 Mass. 1003, 
1004 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 482 Mass. 1027, 
1027 (2019). 
 
Thus, following issuance of the rescript in this case, 
parties will have sixty days following the allowance or denial 
of a postconviction motion within which to file a gatekeeper 
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Mandeville v. 
Gaffney, 487 Mass. 308, 310 (2021) (Mains "thirty-day deadline 
was imposed prospectively").  The extension of the filing 
deadline will allow parties the time necessary to obtain 
transcripts, conduct research, and craft arguments.  The 
extension of the filing period will promote fairness and equity, 
will serve the defendant's and the Commonwealth's interests in 
an accurate verdict, and also will protect all parties' 
interests in the finality of judgments. 
 
We turn to consider whether, here, there was good cause for 
the delay in filing of the Commonwealth's petition. 
 
b.  Good cause.  As stated, because G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is 
silent concerning the procedural restraints on filing such 
14 
 
challenges, we analyze delays in filing gatekeeper petitions 
under the appellate standards of "excusable neglect" and "good 
cause."  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), 14 (b).  The rules of 
appellate procedure give "courts broad discretion and authority 
to permit a deserving party, on showing of 'excusable neglect' 
or 'good cause,' to prosecute an appeal notwithstanding [the] 
failure to comply with a procedural time limitation."  Giacobbe 
v. First Coolidge Corp., 367 Mass. 309, 315-316 (1975).  
Rule 4 (c) allows a motion judge to grant an extension of time 
of up to sixty days for filing a notice of appeal, upon a 
showing of excusable neglect.  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c).  
Excusable neglect, for purposes of late filing under rule 4 (c), 
applies to situations that are "unique or extraordinary" and not 
to any "garden-variety oversight."  Shaev v. Alvord, 66 Mass. 
App. Ct. 910, 911 (2006), citing Feltch v. General Rental Co., 
383 Mass. 603, 613-614 (1981).  At the same time, rule 14 (b) 
provides the single justice or an appellate court authority to 
enlarge the time in which to file a notice of appeal to up to 
one year, upon "good cause shown."  See Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b). 
 
Thus, for the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition to be 
timely filed, it would have had to have been filed by 
September 3, 2021, or thirty days after entry of the judge's 
decision and order on resentencing.  See Mandeville, 487 Mass. 
at 310; Mass. R. A. P. 14 (a).  Rule 4 (c) only permits an 
15 
 
extension of up to sixty days, which would have required the 
Commonwealth to have filed its petition by October 4, 2021, 
whereas the Commonwealth ultimately filed its petition on 
January 21, 2022.  Accordingly, we analyze the Commonwealth's 
delay under Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), which permits the enlargement 
of time in which to file a notice of appeal to up to one year, 
upon a showing of good cause. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that there were "unique and 
extraordinary circumstances that caused the delay" and which 
demonstrate the existence of good cause.  The appellate 
prosecutor assigned to the case details four reasons in support 
of her argument that there was good cause to excuse the 
Commonwealth's delay.  First, the prosecutor avers that she was 
"repeatedly misled" by other members of her office about 
transcripts of the hearings on the defendant's motion to reduce 
the verdict having been ordered; the prosecutor stated that 
without those transcripts, it would have been unethical for her 
to draft the gatekeeper petition, because she would not have 
known what the previously assigned prosecutor had argued at the 
hearings on the motion to reduce the verdict.  Second, at the 
time that the gatekeeper petition should have been drafted, the 
prosecutor's unit was missing five members, which led to an 
overwhelming workload and the inability to reassign drafting of 
the petition to anyone else in the unit.  Third, the prosecutor 
16 
 
asserts that she followed the well-established practice for 
filing a late-filed motion, based on advice from the county 
clerk's office.  Finally, the prosecutor describes three periods 
of time in which COVID-19-related absences required her to 
quarantine herself and care for her children, and also cites 
time she took off during her children's school vacations. 
 
Whether a party has established good cause to excuse a 
delay is a determination within the sound discretion of the 
reviewing court.  See Jordan, 469 Mass. at 144-145; Commonwealth 
v. Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183 (2007). 
 
"Excusable neglect, at least in theory, is something other 
than, 'Oops, I forgot.'  It is meant to apply to circumstances 
that are unique or extraordinary, not any 'garden-variety 
oversight.'"  (Footnote omitted.)  Tai v. Boston, 45 Mass. App. 
Ct. 220, 222 (1998), quoting Feltch, 383 Mass. at 613–614.  "It 
seems clear that relief will be granted only if the party 
seeking relief demonstrates that the mistake, misunderstanding, 
or neglect was excusable and was not due to his own 
carelessness. . . .  The party seeking the relief bears the 
burden of justifying failure to avoid the mistake or 
inadvertence."  Tai, supra at 223, quoting Reporter's Notes to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (1), Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, at 589 (1997).  See Scannell v. Ed. Ferreirinha & 
Irmao, Lda., 401 Mass. 155, 158 (1987); Pasquale v. Finch, 418 
17 
 
F.2d 627, 630 (1st Cir. 1969).  "Discretion is not granted to 
the judge to allow late filing of a notice of appeal simply 
because the matter is important to the parties, the issues to be 
raised in the appeal are debatable, or the consequences to the 
losing party are harsh.  Rather, such discretion must focus on 
the nature of the acts or failures to act that are offered up as 
excusable neglect."  (Footnote omitted.)  Shaev, 66 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 911–912. 
 
"'[G]ood cause' is a standard no less exacting than 
'excusable neglect.'"  Commonwealth v. Trussell, 68 Mass. App. 
Ct. 452, 454 (2007), quoting Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 183-
184.  "The . . . function of [rule 14 (b)] is to care for cases 
where for extraordinary reasons the party was unable to apply 
for a [rule 4 (c)] extension within the time allowed in that 
rule."  Trussell, supra at 454-455, quoting Bernard v. United 
Brands Co., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 418 n.8 (1989).  Therefore, 
"we would not expect [rule 14 (b)] to depart substantially from 
the rather exacting standard of [rule 4 (c)]" because "the time 
to apply under [rule 14 (b)] can run for as much as a year."  
Bernard, supra.  A lower threshold for good cause "would have 
the anomalous effect of making it more difficult to obtain an 
extension of thirty days than it would be to obtain an extension 
from thirty-one to 365 days."  Trussell, supra at 455. 
18 
 
 
"[G]arden-variety oversight" does not constitute excusable 
neglect and, therefore, does not establish good cause.  See 
Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614, quoting Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 
181, 186 (1980).  And, notably, the meaning of good cause does 
not "cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy."  
Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 184, quoting Feltch, supra. 
 
Of course, in criminal cases, "there are additional 
considerations that the appellate court or a single 
justice . . . properly [may] consider in determining [whether] 
'good cause'" exists.  Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 184, 
quoting White, 429 Mass. at 264.  Specifically, both the 
importance of the rights the defendant would lose and the 
interests in judicial economy in allowing an appeal to proceed 
are factors to be considered in the determination whether good 
cause existed for late filing in a criminal case.  See White, 
supra at 264-265. 
 
The defendant concedes that the ramifications of COVID-19 
exposure and illness justified a portion of the prosecutor's 
delay.  Nonetheless, only about twenty-two of the 140 days of 
delay were attributable to COVID-19.  The remaining 
approximately 118 days were due to miscommunications amongst 
assistant district attorneys about whether transcripts had been 
ordered, and the increased over-all workload in the office 
because it was operating with five fewer assistant district 
19 
 
attorneys than it would have had if the office had been at its 
full complement. 
 
We do not doubt that the workload at the time this case was 
assigned to this prosecutor was challenging.  Nonetheless, 
miscommunications concerning whether transcripts have been 
ordered, and an increased workload, do not constitute good cause 
justifying the period of delay here.  See Barboza, 68 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 184, quoting Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614 (justification for 
delay "is not meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is 
too busy, which can be used, perhaps truthfully, in almost every 
case. . . .  It is [meant] to take care of emergency situations 
only").  Furthermore, that the prosecutor relied on advice from 
a clerk in deciding when and what to file also does not 
constitute good cause justifying the delay here; it was the 
attorney's duty to file the motion in a timely manner.  See 
Brown v. Quinn, 406 Mass. 641, 645 (1990) ("The concept of 
excusable neglect does not embrace '[a] flat mistake of counsel 
about the meaning of a statute or rule" [citation omitted]). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the applicable filing 
deadline was confusing and that it was not clear whether the 
deadline set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10, was 
applicable to the allowance of postconviction relief.  More 
specifically, the Commonwealth argues, the language in Mains, 
supra, only addressed denials of motions for new trials, not 
20 
 
allowances of such motions, and therefore it was not clear 
whether Mains applied in the circumstances here.  The 
Commonwealth contends, therefore, that we should exercise our 
discretion to decide its petition on the merits, notwithstanding 
the lengthy delay in filing.  See Jordan, 469 Mass. at 145 
(deciding Commonwealth's untimely appeal despite lack of good 
cause for late filing because "there sometimes has been a lack 
of clarity" by single justices in application of procedural 
rules governing timeliness). 
 
The period within which to file a petition for 
extraordinary relief set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10, 
unquestionably applied to petitions arising from both the 
allowance and the denial of postconviction motions filed by 
either the Commonwealth or the defendant.  In Francis, 411 Mass. 
at 583, for instance, we concluded that G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
applies with equal force to the Commonwealth.  See Randolph v. 
Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 9 (2021) ("we have required both 
defendants and the Commonwealth to file gatekeeper petitions in 
order to appeal from decisions on a variety of motions").  Thus, 
the procedural requirements imposed on defendants in filing 
gatekeeper petitions also are applicable to the Commonwealth.  
The language of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, itself supports the 
proposition that, with respect to filing deadlines, the 
Commonwealth would be subject to the limitations established in 
21 
 
Mains.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E, provides that "no appeal 
shall lie" unless it is allowed by a single justice of this 
court; the statutory language does not state that only a 
particular type of appeal, or a specific category of petitioner, 
is subject to its requirements. 
 
Moreover, since our decision in Mains, the single justice 
has dismissed as untimely a number of gatekeeper petitions filed 
by the Commonwealth that sought to challenge a trial court 
judge's allowance of a defendant's motion for postconviction 
relief.  See, e.g., Commonwealth vs. Marrero, Supreme Judicial 
Ct., No. SJ-2017-0441 (Suffolk County Feb. 1, 2018) (dismissing 
Commonwealth's petition for leave to appeal from allowance of 
defendant's motion for scientific testing as untimely); 
Commonwealth vs. Lang, Supreme Judicial Ct., SJ-2016-0460 
(Suffolk County Sept. 12, 2017) (denying Commonwealth's petition 
for leave to appeal from trial court judge's allowance of 
defendant's postconviction motion to contact members of jury, 
because petition was untimely and did not otherwise raise 
meritorious issue). 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that even if there were no 
good cause for its delay, this case presents a meritorious issue 
that is worthy of appellate review and the court should exercise 
its discretion to hear the appeal despite its untimeliness.  
Because we address the constitutionality of package plea offers 
22 
 
in a paired case, Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 491 
Mass.     (2023), also released today, we see no need to excuse 
the Commonwealth's unreasonable delays in filing here. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper 
petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.