Title: State v. Walter F. Hill

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued April 27, 1998 -- Decided July 22, 1998 PER CURIAM Walter Hill shot Asbury Park police officer Sean Ryan in the chest. A bullet-resistant vest saved Ryan's life. Hill was tried and convicted of attempted murder. In addition to a twenty-year prison sentence (with a ten-year parole disqualifier), Hill was directed to pay Asbury Park $3,195 in restitution for the benefits paid to Officer Ryan as a result of the injuries he sustained. The benefits covered Ryan's medical bills and his loss of pay while on disability. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed Hill's conviction but determined that Asbury Park was not a "victim" entitled to restitution under the relevant statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3e). The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: The statute governing restitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3e) does not prohibit restitution to third parties who reimbursed a crime victim for losses suffered as a result of criminal conduct. 1. The State argued that Asbury Park was a "victim" within the meaning of the restitution statute because it incurred a pecuniary loss as a result of Walter Hill's attempt to murder Officer Ryan. Under the State's reading of the statute, indirect or secondary victims who incur losses as a result of a crime committed against the direct victim are entitled to restitution. (pp. 3-5) 2. Hill contends that the clear language of the statute does not permit indirect victims to recover restitution. He relies on a 1993 Supreme Court case to support that position. The Court determined that the prior case does not control the within matter. (p. 6) 3. The state's past practices included restitution to indirect victims of crime. The Court concludes that those practices should not be viewed as having been affected by the amendment to the restitution statute in 1991, which defined "victim" for the first time. The Court sees no reason why all related aspects of the criminal act should not be disposed of in the criminal proceedings. If any problems persist in the administration of the restitution provisions, the Legislature can amend the statute to address them. (pp. 7-8) 4. Hill's claim that the city did not suffer a "loss" within the meaning of the statute was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Although the Court sees no reason generally why the fortuitous fact that an injured party was insured in some way should excuse a defendant from an obligation to pay restitution, it declines to address the issue. The question is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of the loss and to whom restitution should be made. In addition, the trial court is to make findings on Hill's ability to pay. (pp. 8-9) The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division to conduct further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER F. HILL, a/k/a WILLIAM DOUSE, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 27, 1998 -- Decided July 22, 1998 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Cecelia Urban, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). PER CURIAM The question in this appeal is whether N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3, permits restitution to third parties who have reimbursed a crime victim for losses suffered as a result of criminal conduct. Such third parties, who may be viewed as "indirect victims of crime," are usually collateral sources of funds covering the losses. Such collateral sources include insurance companies, government entities, employers, or health organizations that have provided reimbursement or assistance to crime victims. A victim would ordinarily be entitled to restitution for the injuries or losses sustained but for the reimbursement from the third party and the Code's preclusion against double recovery, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2f. The State argues that the additional phrase "or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed against that person" should be read to include as victims persons who suffer economic loss or injury as a result of the offense committed against another person. Under that interpretation, the City of Asbury Park is a victim because it incurred a pecuniary loss as a result of defendant's attempt to murder Officer Ryan. The State argues that the statutory definition is broad enough to go beyond direct or primary victims to include indirect or secondary victims who incur "loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed against" the direct victim. The third party stands in the place of the victim, whose loss or injury has been absorbed by, or transferred to, the third party. We are not so certain that a grammarian would read the phrase "as a result of a crime committed against that person" to provide a definition of victim only in the case of property losses. We believe that a fair reading of the sentence structure is that the phrase "that person" modifies the word "person," which appears earlier in the definition of "victim," whether that person suffers personal injury or loss of property. In either case, it is the crime against that person that triggers restitution under the Act.See footnote 1 The State relies on cases from other jurisdictions in support of its view. A similar factual and legal scenario was presented in People v. Cruz, 615 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1993). In that case the New York Court of Appeals upheld a restitution award to Nassau County for costs resulting from injuries caused by the defendant to a police officer. In the Cruz case, an off-duty detective was injured when he attempted to arrest the defendant for burglary. Id. at 1017. The Court found that the County's losses were not voluntarily incurred expenses of law enforcement, e.g., drug-buy money, but rather stemmed from a legal obligation "directly and causally related to the crime," the obligation to pay an injured employee sick leave. Ibid. The Court of Appeals therefore held that restitution was appropriate under these circumstances. Ibid. The State cites other courts that have determined that third parties, such as insurance companies, government agencies, and medical groups, are indirect or secondary victims who can recover restitution under their state statutes. See Roe v. State, 917 P.2d 959, 960 (Nev. 1996) (considering state agency victim under restitution statute if harm or loss suffered was unexpected and occurred without voluntary participation of agency suffering harm or loss, and money expended for direct victims); People v. McDaniel, 631 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), app. denied 667 N.E.2d 347 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that victim's medical insurer and employer were victims in their own right and could receive restitution for cost of medical care and sick leave); State v. Sanchez, 869 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that insurance company was secondary victim and could receive restitution for vehicles damaged or destroyed by "joyriding" juveniles). Almost invariably, however, such results are driven by the language of the act involved. For example, the New York law allows restitution to a "governmental agency that has . . . provided financial assistance or compensation to the victim." NY Penal Law 60.27 (McKinney 1997). Defendant thus focuses on the statutory language used in defining the term "victim" and the interpretation placed upon that language by the court. See State v. Gardiner, 898 P.2d 615, 623-27 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that Idaho statute did not contemplate restitution to victim's insurer). Defendant contends that the clear language of the New Jersey restitution statute does not permit indirect victims to recover, citing State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159 (1993). However, Newman does not control here. In Newman, this Court held that drug-buy monies expended by the prosecutor's office were not recoverable as restitution. The Court reasoned that the county was not a victim within the statutory definition or as that term had historically been understood. Id. at 176-77. The Court found the drug-buy situation was not "the typical case, in which the criminal act causes the victim's loss [since] the County expended funds to assist defendant in the commission of the offense." Id. at 177. No action by the City facilitated the commission of the offense in this case. Defendant attempted to murder a police officer, a municipal employee. The City sustained a loss because of the sick time and other expenses it was obligated to provide for the officer. The City did not suffer a loss of money expended in order to facilitate an offense or obtain evidence of a crime. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in this opinion. NO. A-133 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER F. HILL, a/k/a WILLIAM DOUSE, Defendant-Respondent DECIDED