Title: State Road Commission v. Silliman

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

448 P.2d 347 (1968) 22 Utah 2d 33 STATE of Utah, By and Through its ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kenneth N. SILLIMAN, Executor of the Estate of B.J. Silliman, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent. No. 11301. Supreme Court of Utah. December 4, 1968. *348 Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Tom G. Platis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant. Boyd Bunnell, Price, for respondent. ELLETT, Justice: This is an appeal by the State of Utah from a jury verdict awarding damages to the landowner in a condemnation proceeding. The only issue tried was the value of the land taken and the severance damages, if any, to the remaining land by reason of the taking. Section 78-34-10, U.C.A. 1953, sets out the manner of arriving at just compensation to be paid to the landowner when his land is taken for a public purpose. That section so far as material reads: The State assigns a number of errors, including the denial by the trial court of a motion to strike the testimony of expert witnesses for the landowner and of its motion for a new trial. The qualification of an expert witness is to be determined by the trial judge, and if he determines that a witness by reason of training and experience can assist the jury by giving an opinion on a matter properly before the court, we on appeal should not hold that testimony should be stricken unless such palpable ignorance of the subject matter is manifested by the witness as to indicate an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in allowing the witness to express an opinion in the first place or in refusing to grant a motion to strike after it is given. While we cannot say that the trial judge was compelled to strike the testimony of the three witnesses for the landowner, we certainly can appreciate the qualms which *349 counsel for the State must have had at the time he made the motion. All three witnesses testified that severance damages were exactly $12,487.50. One witness did not have a clear understanding of what was meant by the term "fair market value." (It should be noted, however, that counsel never asked the trial judge to explain the term to the witness.) Another witness thought the total value of the land before the taking was $50,000, yet he testified that the severance damages plus the value of the land actually taken amounted to over $65,000. The third witness thought there was some advantage to the remaining land by reason of the construction of the freeway, but he did not know how much advantage there was, and so he never deducted anything from the severance damages which he believed were occasioned by the construction of the freeway. Since no error is assigned as to the instructions given, we must assume that the court properly instructed the jury as to the law of the case, but let us look at the verdict and the evidence upon which it was based to see if the verdict can be allowed to stand. There were five witnesses who testified as to value, and the substance of their testimony is set out below: In this case, as in most others involving the taking of land, the claim is made that the best land is that which is taken. Here the land remaining was fit only for grazing. Counsel for the landowner summed it up in his address to the jury in the following words: Let us investigate the verdict. The State took 212.15 acres of land outright for the freeway, and took an easement of 7.1 acres for drainage purposes which all parties concede to be a taking for all practical purposes. That would be 219.25 acres taken for which the jury allowed $6,296.50. That figures to be less than $29 per acre for the land actually taken. For the remaining 390.21 acres of grazing land not taken, the jury awarded severance damages in the amount of $15,023.50, or more than $38 per acre. The trial judge realized that the amount of severance damages awarded exceeded the highest figure of any witness, so he reduced the figure to $12,487.50, the amount testified to by all three witnesses for the landowner. Even after this reduction the severance damages to the grazing land not taken amounted to $32 per acre, which is three dollars per acre more than the jury had fixed as the value of the better land taken. This court in the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 123 (1947), said at pages 436 and 437 of the Utah Reports, 184 P.2d at page 126: The instant case is a good illustration of the principle that the verdict cannot stand when it clearly shows that it was given either under the influence of passion and prejudice or under a lack of understanding of the law as it applies to severance damages. The trial court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The verdict of the jury is set aside, and the case is remanded for new trial. No costs are awarded. CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER, TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.