Title: Utilities v. WSSC

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

No. 101, September Term, 1998
Utilities, Inc. of Maryland v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
[Maryland Law Does Not Authorize A Declaratory Judgment Action, In Lieu Of A Condemnation Action
To Determine Issues Relating To Just Compensation]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 101
September Term, 1998
___________________________________________
UTILITIES, INC. OF MARYLAND
v.
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION
__________________________________________
        Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
        * Rodowsky
      ** Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
                                         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed: December 6, 2000
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this Court;
after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of
this opinion.
** Chasanow, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this Court but
did not participate in the decision and adoption of this opinio
Art. 29, § 3-107(a), states as follows:
1
“§ 3-107.  Same — Privately owned systems.
(a) Jury award in condemnation proceedings. — If a privately owned water or
sewerage system is the subject of a condemnation proceeding under Title 2 of this article,
a jury in the proceeding shall:
(1) Consider as a part of an award any payment, contribution, or tax paid by the
respective lot owners or purchasers toward the construction of the systems; and
(2) If the system has been built in connection with and for the purpose of developing
home sites, subdivisions, or villages by any person and the system has been offered as an
inducement for the purchase of lots or land to be served by the system, deduct from the
determined value of the plant or system a sum that the jury reasonably determines was
added to the purchase price of the land or lots for the purpose of constructing the system.”
Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 29, § 3-107(a), provides that, in a condemnation
action brought by the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (“the Commission”) against a privately
owned water or sewage system, the jury shall deduct from the compensation award any contribution that
lot owners or home buyers have made toward the construction of the private utility.  These contributions,
known as “contributions in aid of construction,” are a special kind of capital contributed by the developer
of a new residential subdivision and passed through to the home buyer.   
1
With condemnation of its Prince George’s County facility imminent, Utilities, Inc. of Maryland
(“Utilities”) brought an action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 3-
406 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, seeking a determination of the applicability of
§ 3-107(a) to the impending condemnation action, and, if applicable, a determination of the constitutionality
of § 3-107(a).  Utilities asserted that § 3-107(a) results in compensation that is less than fair market value
in violation of Article III, § 40, of the Maryland Constitution, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
-2-
Article III, §§ 40 and 40C of the Maryland Constitution provide as follows:
2
“Section 40.  Eminent domain.
“The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private
property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed
upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or
tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.”
* * *
“Section 40C. Same — Acquisition of property in Prince George’s
County by Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission.
“The General Assembly shall enact no law authorizing private property
to be taken for public use without just compensation, to be agreed upon
between the parties or awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to
the party entitled to such compensation, except that where such property,
located in Prince George’s County in this State, is in the judgment of the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission needed for water supply,
sewerage and drainage systems to be extended or constructed by the said
Commission, the General Assembly may provide that such property,
except any building or buildings may be taken immediately upon payment
therefor by the condemning authority to the owner or owners thereof or
into the Court to the use of the person or persons entitled thereto, such
amount as the condemning authority shall estimate to be the fair value of
said property, provided such legislation requires that the condemning
authority’s estimate be not less than the apprised value of the property
being taken as evaluated by at least one qualified appraiser, whose
qualifications have been accepted by a Court of Record of this State, and
also requires the payment of any further sum that may subsequently be
awarded by a jury, and provided such legislation limits the condemning
authority’s utilization of the acquisition procedures specified in this section
to occasions where it has acquired or is acquiring by purchase or other
procedures one-half or more of the several takings of land or interests in
land necessary for any given water supply, sewerage or drainage
extension or construction project.”
(continued...)
Rights, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution.   The Circuit Court issued
2
-3-
(...continued)
2
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states:
“Article 24.  Due process.
“That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner,
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part as follows:  “nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”
a declaratory judgment, determining that § 3-107(a) was applicable and was constitutional.  We shall
vacate that judgment on the ground that Maryland law does not authorize a declaratory judgment action
under the circumstances here.
I.
Utilities is the owner of a private facility providing water and sewage service to the Marlboro
Meadows Subdivision, an unincorporated community in Prince George’s County, Maryland.  The
Commission, an agency of the State, Katz v. Washington Sub. San. Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 509-512,
397 A.2d 1027, 1031-1032 (1979), created pursuant to Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.),  Art. 29, § 1-102
and § 1-201(a), is authorized to provide water and sewage service to most of Prince George’s County and
to Montgomery County, Maryland.  
This case has its genesis in the Commission’s public
meeting held on July 30, 1997, at which the Commission voted in favor of filing a petition for condemnation
of the Marlboro Meadows facility owned and operated by Utilities.  The decision was made after several
months of negotiations between the parties and their ultimate failure to reach an agreement on the fair
market value of the facility.  A major issue underlying the parties’ disagreement was, and still is, whether
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  The disputed contributions in aid of construction of the Utilities system total approximately $3.2
3
million.
  Utilities argued that, even if the statute is constitutional, it does not apply under the present
4
circumstances because the express language of § 3-107(a) limits its application to proceedings commenced
under Title 2 “quick take” powers, and not to Title 1 general condemnation, which is the type of proceeding
at issue here.
the contributions in aid of construction of the facility constitute property of Utilities for which it is entitled
to receive compensation in the condemnation proceeding.3
Anticipating the imminent condemnation action, Utilities, on August 29, 1997,  filed this declaratory
judgment action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, seeking a declaration that § 3-107(a) is
unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, because it requires the jury to consider contributions in
aid of construction in determining just compensation and directs jurors to completely deduct the value of
contributed property from the award, and, alternatively, that the statute by its own express terms is
inapplicable to Commission  condemnations which do not proceed under Title 2.   
4
On September 8, 1997, the Commission instituted formal condemnation proceedings of  the
Utilities system by filing a “Petition for Condemnation” in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
The record indicates that the trial in the condemnation proceeding, Case No. CAL97-17811, was
scheduled  to begin on January 24, 2000, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  We have not
been advised of any further proceedings in the condemnation case, and we presume that it is still pending
in the Circuit Court.
In the present declaratory judgment action, both sides filed motions for summary judgment.  After
a hearing, the Circuit Court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, denied Utilities’
motion for summary judgment, and issued a declaratory judgment that § 3-107(a) does, indeed, apply to
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the condemnation action against Utilities’ property  and that the statute violates neither the Maryland
Constitution nor the United States Constitution.  Utilities filed a motion for reconsideration which the Circuit
Court denied, and thereafter Utilities took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before the case was
heard by the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.  Utilities, Inc. of Maryland
v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 351 Md. 161, 717 A.2d 385 (1998).
II.
The issues raised by the parties to this appeal concern the interpretation of Art. 29, § 3-107(a),
and, if interpreted to be applicable to the Commission’s condemnation action, the constitutionality of § 3-
107(a).  Neither side has raised any question concerning the propriety of the declaratory judgment action.
Nevertheless, whether a case is or is not appropriate for a declaratory judgment is an issue which, on public
policy grounds, this Court will ordinarily address sua sponte.  See, e.g., Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md.
108, 113-117, 699 A.2d 426, 428-430 (1997); Harford Mutual v. Woodfin, 344 Md. 399, 414, 687
A.2d 652, 659 (1997); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 86-87, 660 A.2d 447, 455 (1995); Turnpike
Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 49, 557 A.2d 225, 226 (1989); Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products,
306 Md. 644, 649-654, 511 A.2d 40, 43-45 (1986).
As earlier indicated, we hold that Maryland law did not authorize the present declaratory judgment
action.  Instead, the statutory interpretation and constitutional issues, all relating to just compensation, must
be resolved in the pending condemnation case.
Section 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(b)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, states:
-6-
“(b) Special form of remedy provided by statute. — If a statute provides
a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be
followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”
It is well settled in Maryland that when there is a special statutory remedy for a specific type of case, and
that remedy is intended to be exclusive or primary, a party “may not circumvent those [special statutory]
proceedings by a declaratory judgment . . . action . . . .”  Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities,
360 Md. 438, 456-461, 758 A.2d 995, 1005-1008 (2000).  See, e.g., Josephson v. Annapolis, 353 Md.
667, 674-681, 728 A.2d 690, 693-696 (1998); Holiday v. Anne Arundel, 349 Md. 190, 201-203, 707
A.2d 829, 834-836 (1998); Zappone v. Liberty Life, 349 Md. 45, 60-64, 706 A.2d 1060, 1067-1069
(1998), and cases there cited.  Although most cases applying this principle have involved special statutory
remedies for specific types of cases which initially begin with adjudicatory administrative proceedings,
nevertheless, as shown by the broad language of § 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the principle
is equally applicable to special statutory remedies which begin with judicial proceedings.  See, e.g., Quinan
v. Schneider, 247 Md. 310, 231 A.2d 37 (1967); Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 577-578, 97
A.2d 449, 452-453 (1953).
When a governmental agency entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain decides to acquire
particular property in return for “just compensation,” a statutorily authorized condemnation action is “a
special form of remedy for a specific type of case.”  A judicial determination of “just compensation” should
be made in the condemnation proceeding.  Neither the governmental agency nor the property owner may
select particular issues relating to just compensation and have them resolved in declaratory judgment
actions.  Under circumstances such as existed in this case, we believe that the General Assembly intended
-7-
the condemnation proceeding to be the exclusive remedy. 
The right of a Maryland governmental entity to utilize the power of eminent domain is limited by
Article III, § 40, of the Maryland Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution which require that the taking of private property be for public use and that just
compensation be paid.  Green v. High Ridge, 346 Md. 65, 72, 695 A.2d 125, 128-129 (1997).  In
addition, many statutory provisions applicable to eminent domain provide that there be a “necessity” for
the taking.  Ibid.  The principal issues peculiar to a condemnation action are the government’s right to
condemn, public purpose, necessity, and the amount of compensation for the property owner.  See Bouton
v. Potomac Edison Co., 288 Md. 305, 418 A.2d 1168 (1980).
As pointed out by this Court many years ago, “[t]he mode and manner of the exercise of the power
of Eminent Domain is exclusively vested in the judgment and discretion of the Legislature . . . .”  Ridgely
v. Baltimore City, 119 Md. 567, 574, 87 A. 909, 912 (1913).  The only “mode and manner” provided
by the General Assembly for the Commission to exercise the power of eminent domain are the
condemnation proceedings authorized by Art. 29 of the Maryland Code.
Condemnation proceedings are peculiar civil actions and are often described as sui generis, i.e,
being the only one of its kind.  See 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 24.01(2), (3rd ed. 1982).  In
Maryland, condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of private property for public use, while regarded
as proceedings at law, are not ordinary suits at law.  They are “special proceedings, lacking the
characteristics of ordinary trials, brought pursuant to the power of eminent domain. . . .”  Bouton v.
Potomac Edison Co., supra, 288 Md. at 309, 418 A.2d at 1170.  See Bryan v. State Roads
Commission, 356 Md. 4, 10, 736 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1999).  The power of courts to try condemnation
-8-
proceedings is not part of the common law jurisdiction of the judiciary.  Rather, “[f]ew principles of law
are more firmly established than the rule in the field of eminent domain that the court exercises a special
statutory jurisdiction . . . .”  Southern Maryland Elec. Co-op. v. Albrittain, 256 Md. 39, 42, 259 A.2d
311, 313 (1969).  In fact, a condemnation proceeding may be the quintessential “special form of remedy
for a specific type of case” under the exclusion contained in § 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
An action for condemnation may be initiated only by those entities on whom the requisite authority
has been conferred by the General Assembly.  This Court stated in Kenly v. Washington County R. R.
Co., 129 Md. 1, 6, 98 A. 232, 234 (1916), that the condemnor “inaugurates the proceedings and it is the
actor throughout,” and that the “landowner is passive” until the condemning body takes action.  Thus, a
property owner cannot compel a condemnor to use the power of eminent domain to acquire private
property.  Condemnation, rather, is peculiarly a government prerogative.  The condemning authority retains
the right to abandon the proceedings up until the actual taking of the property or 120 days after the entry
of judgment, unless an appeal is taken.  See Code (1974, 1996 Repl. Vol.), § 12-109 of the Real Property
Article and Maryland Rule 12-211.  Allowing the property owner to maintain a declaratory judgment action
before any condemnation action is filed, and to obtain a judicial resolution of a critical issue in the
ascertainment of just compensation, cannot be reconciled with the proper role of the government and the
property owner with regard to the power of eminent domain.
There are other inherent inconsistencies between condemnation actions and declaratory judgment
actions which reinforce the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that a declaratory judgment action
could be substituted for a condemnation action.  Under Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, the jury in a normal action at law, including a declaratory judgment action, is a common law jury
-9-
with the attributes of a common law jury, except that it may be as small as six persons.  Under Art. III,
§ 40, of the Maryland Constitution, however, the jury in a condemnation action may, but need not, be a
common law jury.  The General Assembly could authorize, and at times in the past has authorized, a
sheriff’s jury to determine just compensation in a condemnation action.  For discussions of these
differences, see, e.g. Bryan v. State Roads Commission, supra, 356 Md. at 9-13, 736 A.2d at 1060-
1062; Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co, supra, 288 Md. at 309, 418 A.2d at 1170; Baltimore Belt
Railroad Co. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 106-108, 23 A. 74, 77 (1891).
Moreover, the role of the jury in a condemnation case is quite different from the role of a jury in
all other actions at law.  In normal actions at law, the jury ordinarily resolves factual disputes without regard
to which element of the cause of action or defense the facts relate.  In condemnation actions, however, the
jury resolves factual disputes relating only to just compensation and fixes the amount of compensation.
Issues relating to other possible elements, such as the right to condemn, public purpose, or necessity, are
exclusively for the judge.  Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., supra, 288 Md. at 309, 418 A.2d at 1170-
1171.
Furthermore, the judgment in “condemnations where private property is taken for public use, is not
a judgment in personam, but it is a judgment against the property sought to be condemned.  It is strictly
a judgment in rem.”  Ridgely v. Baltimore City, supra, 119 Md. at 577, 87 A. at 913.  When the General
Assembly in the Declaratory Judgment Act intended that an action under that Act could be brought in lieu
of an in rem action, it expressly so provided.  See Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 3-408.1 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article, expressly authorizing a declaratory judgment action in land patent cases.
The case at bar illustrates another problem if declaratory judgment actions by the property owner,
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in anticipation of a future condemnation action, are allowable.  The Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission has both regular condemnation authority and so-called “quick-take” condemnation authority
under Article III, § 40C, of the Maryland Constitution.  One of the contentions made by Utilities in this
declaratory judgment proceeding, which was filed before any condemnation suit, is that Art. 29, § 3-
107(a), applies only in a “quick take” condemnation action and not in a regular condemnation action.  Until
the condemning authority actually files the condemnation case, however, there is no way of definitely
knowing which type of condemnation proceeding will be instituted.  The court in the declaratory judgment
action may be rendering an advisory opinion on the statutory interpretation issue.
An important decision, relating to the issue of whether a condemnation action is the exclusive
remedy under circumstances such as exist in the present case, is Sollins v. Baltimore County, 253 Md.
407, 252 A.2d 819 (1969), where a landowner sought to enjoin a county from taking his land to widen
a public road.  Affirming the circuit court judgment for the defendant-condemnor, Chief Judge Hammond
for the Court stated that “it was established long ago that a court of equity will enjoin or interfere with a
condemnation only if the proceedings are void because the condemnor lacks constitutional or legal power
to condemn the property in question.”  Sollins, 253 Md. at 409-410, 252 A.2d 819, 820, citing
Baltimore & H. de G. Turnpike Co. v. Union R.R. Co., 35 Md. 224 (1872) and Webster v.
Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416, 423-425, 76 A. 254, [256-257] (1910).  Judge Hammond
continued (253 Md. at 410, 252 A.2d at ___, emphasis added):
“It is equally well established that where the condemnor has power to
condemn the land in question, equity will remit a litigant seeking its aid in
preventing or controlling the condemnation processes to the court of law
in which the condemnation case has been or will be filed.  The rationale
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In light of our holding that the declaratory judgment suit was barred by § 3-409(b) of the Courts and
5
Judicial Proceedings Article, we need not consider whether the suit was also precluded under the principle
that a declaratory judgment action ordinarily will not lie when there is another pending action involving the
parties and substantially the same issues.  See, e.g., Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md. 108, 699 A.2d 426
(1997); Turnpike Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 557 A.2d 225 (1989); Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg.
Products, 306 Md. 644, 511 A.2d 40 (1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 449 n. 1,
(continued...)
is that a special procedure and remedy exist in a court of law to effectuate
and supervise the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and it is the
court of law to which has been granted this special power and duty, that
can and should decide all questions that are raised concerning the
condemnation.”
Sollins v. Baltimore County underscores the principle that condemnation actions are exclusive
special statutory actions for the exercise of the eminent domain power, and that issues inherent to
condemnation cannot be taken out of a present or future condemnation case, in piecemeal fashion, and
litigated in separate judicial proceedings.  Although the general constitutional or statutory authority of a
government agency to condemn property may be challenged in an equitable proceeding, and thus
alternatively by a declaratory judgment action under § 3-409(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, the issues inherent to condemnation proceedings, such as those relating to just compensation, are
to be litigated in the condemnation case.  See Sollins v. Baltimore County, supra.  See also Potomac
Power Co. v. Birkett, 217 Md. 476, 143 A.2d 485 (1958); Perellis v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 190 Md. 86, 57 A.2d 341 (1948).
In sum, under circumstances such as those here, the condemnation action was the exclusive vehicle
for judicial resolution of the issues relating to just compensation.  The property owner’s declaratory
judgment suit was barred by § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.5
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(...continued)
5
463 A.2d 822, 824-825 n.1 (1983); Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 276 Md. 396,
406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY REVERSED, AND
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTION.  EACH PARTY TO PAY ITS
OWN COSTS.