Title: Whitney Bank v. Jerry O. Lorant and JOL, LLC (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-12-1120). Affirmed. No Opinion.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:02/07/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
_________________________
1121220
_________________________
Whitney Bank
v.
Jerry O. Lorant and JOL, LLC
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-12-1120)
SHAW, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.  
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
1121220
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Under Florida law, the judgment
domesticated here was final, and the "'validity and effect of
a foreign judgment ... are to be determined by the law of the
state in which [the judgment] was rendered.'" Teng v. Diplomat
Nat'l Bank, 431 So. 2d 1202, 1203 (Ala. 1983)(quoting Morse v.
Morse, 394 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1981)). 
Rather than applying Florida law, the trial court used an
Alabama procedural rule, namely, Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
to determine that the Florida judgment was a nonfinal
judgment.  Although § 6-9-232, Ala. Code 1975, a portion of
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the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, provides
that a foreign judgment domesticated in Alabama "is subject to
the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening,
vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court of this
state," the fact remains that a circuit court of this state is
The trial court's order vacating the domesticated
1
judgment stated: "Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that a final judgment adjudicate all the
claims, rights and liabilities of all the parties. It further
provides that judgment against less than all parties be
rendered 'only upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.' The Florida judgment submitted for domestication
provides no such satisfaction of that requirement and
therefore is not final under Alabama law." 
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bound by its constitutional obligation to afford full faith
and credit to the valid judgments of sister states. 
This Court has explained:
"The Constitution of the United States, Article
IV, Section 1, requires that 'full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of every other
state.' A judgment, therefore, entered by the court
of another state having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and persons is entitled to full faith
and credit in Alabama courts. [Citations omitted.]" 
Greene v. Connelly, 628 So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 1993), abrogated
on other grounds by Ex parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C.,
883 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2003). "[T]he duty to afford full faith
and credit to judicial proceedings of our sister states ... is
one 
consisting 
of 
both 
constitutional 
and 
statutory
dimensions." Package Exp. Ctr., Inc. v. Maund, 957 So. 2d
1137, 1140 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)(citing U.S. Const., art. IV,
§ 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738).  Moreover, "[i]f a judgment of a
2
However, although this issue is not implicated here, a
2
statute of a sister state that is clearly against public
policy in Alabama will not be recognized here. See Pacific
Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California,
306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)("[T]he very nature of the federal
union of states, to which are reserved some attributes of
sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit
clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a
subject 
matter 
concerning 
which 
it 
is 
competent 
to
legislate."); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala.
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sister state is properly authenticated and filed with the
circuit court, ... a presumption arises that the court
rendering that judgment had jurisdiction to do so." Greene,
628 So. 2d at 351 (citing Teng, 431 So. 2d at 1203).
Accordingly, "the party challenging the judgment has the
burden of asserting lack of jurisdiction and producing
evidence to overcome the presumption." Id. The burden, then,
was on Jerry O. Lorant and JOL, LLC, to show that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction, but their argument that the
judgment was nonfinal because it did not dispose of all
parties contradicts Florida law regarding the finality of
judgments.
In Florida, a judgment is final when an order, judgment,
or decree "constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the
cause, and nothing further remains to be done by the court to
effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties
directly affected." S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d
97, 99 (Fla. 1974). "That termination occurs when the trial
court loses jurisdiction over the cause upon the expiration of
554, 557, 155 So. 74, 76 (1934)("[I]t is not always
obligatory, either on the ground of comity or duty, that one
state give effect to the judgment of another, when to do so
would result in having its own law overridden."). 
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the time limits set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.530(b)." Joannou v. Corsini, 543 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989). Florida law regarding final judgments is
distinguishable from federal and Alabama law regarding final
judgments. Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., deals with a judgment
involving multiple claims:
"(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving
Multiple Parties. When an action presents more than
one claim for relief –- whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim –- or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the
court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties'
rights and liabilities." 
Alabama has adopted a similar provision in Rule 54(b), Ala. R.
Civ. P. According to this rule, a judgment that does not
determine all claims presented in an action is not final. 
Florida has not adopted such a rule. Hotel Roosevelt Co.
v. City of Jacksonville, 192 So. 2d 334, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966)("[T]he Supreme Court of Florida ... has not yet
seen fit to also adopt a counterpart to Rule 54(b), Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing with judgments upon multiple
claims."); Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P. (providing that
"partial final judgments are reviewable either on appeal from
the partial final judgment or on appeal from the final
judgment in the entire case"); Jenson v. Whetstine, 985 So. 2d
1218, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)("[A] partial judgment is
appealable as a final order under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.110(k) when the judgment resolves a distinct and
severable cause of action, i.e., the remaining claims do not
arise from a set of common facts or a single transaction.").
Therefore, when a Florida court deals with multiple claims,
the test for the finality of a judgment is whether the
judgment "marks the end of the judicial labor in the case, and
nothing further remains to be done by the court to fully
effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties
directly affected." Hotel Roosevelt, 192 So. 2d at 338. For
example, the court in Hotel Roosevelt held that an order
dismissing the third-party complaint filed by the City of
Jacksonville was a final judgment and thus appealable, even
though the underlying case remained pending in the circuit
court. Id. Likewise, in 1977, the Florida Supreme Court
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considered whether a trial court's order was final and thus
appealable when issues between other parties still 
remained 
in
the underlying case. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla.
1977). The court determined that when the rights of the
parties directly affected have been fully determined in the
judgment, the judgment is final. Id. 
Absent an "express direction for the entry of judgment"
and the "express determination" by the trial court, pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., that "there is no just reason
for delay," Alabama does not recognize a judgment as final
when other claims remain pending. In Florida, however, as long
as a judgment has determined the rights of the directly
affected parties, the judgment is considered final. 
Lorant and JOL complain that Whitney Bank's evidence
regarding the finality of the Florida judgment was submitted
for the first time on appeal or in the Rule 59(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate; in light of
Florida law, however, the only evidence a trial court needs to
determine that the Florida judgment was final is the triple-
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certified copy of the Florida judgment that Whitney Bank filed
in the Jefferson Circuit Court. 
"If the judgment of a sister state is properly
authenticated and produced at trial, as in the case
at bar, it must be presumed that the court rendering
the judgment had jurisdiction to do so. The burden
is upon the party challenging the judgment to assert
lack of jurisdiction and to produce evidence to
overcome the presumption."
 
Teng, 431 So. 2d at 1203; see Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v.
Howell, 456 So. 2d 58, 59 (Ala. 1984)("[T]he properly
authenticated judgment of the [sister state's] court, that
court having jurisdiction, is conclusive ...."); see also
Stallworth v. Stallworth, 272 Ala. 449, 454, 131 So. 2d 867,
871 (1961)("Since the decree of the [sister state's] court
appears on its face to be a valid and binding decree ..., then
full faith and credit must be given to the decree of the
[sister state]."). Here, Lorant and JOL failed to carry their
burden and to overcome the presumption in favor of the Florida
judgment because they relied on the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, which have no legal effect on the finality of the
Florida judgment. Cf. Canon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. National
Voting Rights Museum & Inst., Inc., 57 So. 3d 766, 769 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2010)("[I]t is readily apparent that the Alabama
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court's views concerning the efficacy of service of process in
the underlying action under Alabama law are immaterial to
whether full faith and credit should be extended to the
judgment of the [sister state's] court."). Whitney Bank was
not required to show that the Florida judgment disposed of all
other parties and claims to demonstrate that the judgment was
final, and Whitney Bank did not bear the burden of instructing
the trial court to apply Florida law to determine the validity
of the Florida judgment. 
"[W]here the facts before the trial court are essentially
undisputed and the controversy involves questions of law for
the court to consider, the court's judgment carries no
presumption of correctness." Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Skelton, 
675
So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996). "An appellate court may affirm
the judgment of the trial court when the trial court has
reached the right result for the wrong reason. ... However,
this rule should not apply where the 'wrong reason' prevented
a party from properly presenting his case or prejudiced his
rights." Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979
So. 2d 784, 796 (Ala. 2007). This Court "'can affirm a
judgment if we disagree with the reasoning of the trial court
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in entering the judgment, as long as the judgment itself is
proper.'" Verchot v. General Motors Corp., 812 So. 2d 296, 305
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Hammonds, 551 So. 2d 333, 337 (Ala. 1989)). Here, the trial
court's vacation of the domesticated Florida judgment was not
proper and is not due to be affirmed. Had the trial court
recognized its constitutional and statutory duty to afford
full faith and credit to the Florida judgment, it would have
discovered 
that 
the 
Florida 
judgment 
was 
final,
notwithstanding the arguments made to the trial court by the
parties. Evidence that the Florida judgment did not dispose of
all the defendants was simply immaterial to the determination
whether the judgment was final under Florida law. Therefore,
Whitney Bank timely presented the trial court with evidence
indicating that the Florida judgment was final. 
In light of the foregoing, I would reverse the order
vacating the Florida judgment and remand this case for the
trial court to reevaluate the finality of the Florida judgment
according to Florida law in accordance with the doctrine of
full faith and credit.
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