Title: Anthony Robinson v. Alabama Central Credit Union

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/23/2007 - Robinson v. Alabama Central Credit Union
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051327
____________________
Anthony Robinson
v.
Alabama Central Credit Union
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-05-1738)
STUART, Justice.
Anthony Robinson appeals the summary judgment entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of his former employer,
Alabama 
Central 
Credit 
Union 
("ACCU"), 
on 
his 
age-
discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Alabama Age
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2
Discrimination and Employment Act, § 25-1-20 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975 ("the AADEA").  We affirm.
I.
On February 15, 2000, Robinson was hired by ACCU for the
position of "Vice President for Marketing and Business
Development."  Robinson was interviewed and selected for the
position by Ron Haas, president and chief executive officer of
ACCU; Haas would also serve as Robinson's direct supervisor
during Robinson's tenure with the company.  At the time of his
hiring, Robinson was 48 years old.
Robinson's performance evaluations for the years he was
employed by ACCU were generally satisfactory; however, they
did note that there was room for improvement in some areas.
Nevertheless, Robinson received merit pay raises and bonuses
during this time. 
In early 2004, ACCU hired an outside consultant, Glen
Blickenstaff of Human Strategies, Inc., to advise management
on issues related to employee development, performance
management, and strategic planning.  Blickenstaff worked with
the ACCU senior management team, which included Robinson, to
develop a comprehensive business plan and to improve the
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3
business's efficiency.  This process ultimately resulted in
Haas's decision, made sometime in the late summer of 2004, to
restructure the senior management team.  First, the position
of vice president of operations was eliminated; in its place
two regional vice-president positions were created.  Joe
Kiser, the then senior vice president, was also promoted to
the newly created position of executive vice president and
chief operating officer.
In approximately late September 2004, after consultation
with Kiser and Blickenstaff, Haas decided to terminate
Robinson's employment and to eliminate the position of
marketing vice president on the senior management team.  On
October 4, 2004, Haas met with Robinson and terminated
Robinson's employment with ACCU.  Robinson was 52 years old at
the time.  On October 18, 2004, ACCU announced that Jennifer
Denholm, who was 25 years old at the time, had been promoted
to the newly created position of "Marketing and Business
Development Coordinator."
On March 25, 2005, Robinson sued ACCU in the Jefferson
Circuit Court alleging that the termination of his employment
was an unlawful act of age discrimination prohibited by the
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4
AADEA.  ACCU filed an answer denying the substance of
Robinson's claim and, on March 2, 2006, moved for a summary
judgment.  Robinson responded and, on March 27, 2006, the
trial court granted ACCU's motion and entered a judgment in
its favor.  Robinson moved the trial court to alter, amend, or
vacate its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.;
however, the trial court denied that motion.  Robinson
appealed.
II.
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).
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5
Additionally, we note that this Court has not yet
considered the burden of proof applicable to an AADEA claim.
However, federal courts considering the issue have noted that
the purpose and prohibitions of the AADEA are similar to those
of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and concluded that ADEA principles
should therefore govern in AADEA cases as well.  See, e.g.,
Bonham v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321
(M.D. Ala. 2001); see also § 25-1-29, Ala. Code 1975
(expressly adopting as part of the AADEA the remedies,
defenses, and statutes of limitations applicable to the ADEA).
Accordingly, the federal courts have applied to AADEA claims
the same evidentiary framework applied to federal age-
discrimination claims.  We agree that this framework, which
was articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), is the proper means by which to review an AADEA claim.
The evidentiary framework was summarized as follows in Dooley
v. AutoNation USA Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1278 (N.D. Ala.
2002):
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"'First, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving 
by 
the 
preponderance 
of 
the
evidence 
a 
prima 
facie 
case 
of
discrimination.  Second, if the plaintiff
succeeds in proving the prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant "to
a r t i c u l a t e  
s o m e  
l e g i t i m a t e ,
nondiscriminatory 
reason 
for 
the 
employee's
rejection."  Third, should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then
have 
an 
opportunity 
to 
prove 
by 
a
preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.'
"Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089
(citations omitted).  At all times, plaintiff bears
the burden of persuasion on the ultimate question of
whether the defendant acted with an unlawful motive.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511,
113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).  If the
plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether each of the defendant employer's articulated
reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's
claim.  See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997)."
Thus, in reviewing the summary judgment in favor of ACCU, we
must determine whether Robinson established a prima facie case
of age discrimination and, if so, whether ACCU articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Robinson
and, if so, whether Robinson then presented substantial
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
1051327
7
whether ACCU's proffered reason for his discharge  is
pretextual.
III.
ACCU, in its motion for a summary judgment, argued both
that Robinson failed to establish a prima facie case and that,
even if he did establish a prima facie case, he failed to
establish that ACCU's stated reason for his discharge was
pretextual.  In granting the motion, the trial court based its
decision on the second argument, stating:
"Assuming [Robinson's] evidence is sufficient to
create an issue of material fact that precludes
summary judgment as to [Robinson's] prima facie
case, [ACCU] nevertheless articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons to justify [Robinson's]
termination, which [were] not related to age and
which [were] not rebutted by substantial evidence by
[Robinson]."
We agree.  Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Robinson 
did 
establish 
a 
prima 
facie 
case 
of 
age
discrimination, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
because ACCU has articulated a legitimate reason for
Robinson's discharge, which he has failed to prove was
pretextual.
ACCU has stated its reason for terminating Robinson's
employment as follows:
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8
"[Robinson's employment] was terminated as part
of a restructuring in the Fall of 2003.  After
carefully 
analyzing 
[Robinson's] 
position, 
the
functions [Robinson] was performing and how he was
performing those functions, Ron Haas determined that
it would be beneficial to the Credit Union to
outsource many of [Robinson's] primary functions and
have a lower-grade marketing person to merely
coordinate and assist the outside agency to perform
those 
functions. 
 
[Robinson's] 
position 
was
eliminated and to date, has not been re-instated."
Robinson does not dispute that, if true, this would qualify as
a 
legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory 
reason. 
 
The 
burden,
therefore, shifted to him to produce evidence indicating that
ACCU's stated reason for discharging him is pretextual.
Robinson first argues that over time ACCU has changed the
reason it has given for terminating his employment and that
its doing so accordingly presents a genuine issue of material
fact as to the truthfulness of that reason.  This Court has
previously held that a judgment as a matter of law is
inappropriate when evidence exists indicating that an employer
has given contradictory reasons for an employee's discharge.
See, e.g., Flint Construction Co. v. Hall, 904 So. 2d 236, 252
(Ala. 2004), a retaliatory-discharge case in which this Court
held that "a [judgment as a matter of law] is not appropriate
where, as here, the employer subsequently contradicts the
1051327
9
reason it initially gave for the discharge, thereby at least
implicitly disavowing it or by such action acknowledging its
pretextual status."  In his brief to this Court, Robinson
states this argument as follows:
"To establish pretext, the Court need look no
farther than the inconsistent and contradictory
reasons given for [Robinson's] termination.  Since
[Robinson's] termination, defendant has offered a
variety of different reasons:
"(1) October 5, 2004 –– Denying that Robinson 'had
done anything to cause [his] termination ... and
that this wasn't about Tony.  Simply the credit
union is going in a new direction.'
"(2) October 27, 2005 –– '[Robinson] was terminated
as part of a restructuring in the Fall of 2003.' 
"(3) December 21, 2005 –– 'The primary reason was
cost; and then of course we had some performance
issues as well.' 
"(4) March 2, 2006 –– 'Ron Haas was displeased with
Robinson's lack of initiative and the extensive and
expens[ive] use of outside vendors.'
"Based on these direct quotations alone, [ACCU]
cannot decide whether it fired [Robinson] because of
restructuring, 
performance 
problems, 
or 
some
combination of both.  Because [ACCU] cannot itself
provide a consistent explanation for its actions,
whatever reason it currently gives is unworthy of
credence and thus substantial evidence of pretext."
(Citations to record omitted.)
1051327
10
We cannot agree that these reasons are "inconsistent and
contradictory."  To the contrary, the evidence cited by
Robinson appears to be entirely consistent with ACCU's stated
reason for terminating Robinson's employment –– that, after
reviewing his job duties and performance, it was decided "that
it would be beneficial to the Credit Union to outsource many
of [Robinson's] primary functions and have a lower-grade
marketing person to merely coordinate and assist the outside
agency to perform those functions."  
It is instructive to compare the facts in this case with
those in Flint.  In Flint, the employee was initially told
that his employment was being terminated because of a lack of
available work.  However, the employer subsequently admitted
that there was, in fact, no such lack of work and stated that
its real reason for discharging the employee was that he had
too many absences and was gambling in casinos when he was
supposed to be working or undergoing medical treatment.
Accordingly, this Court concluded that the employer was not
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the employer
itself had acknowledged the pretextual status of the initial
reason given for the employee's discharge.  However, ACCU,
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11
unlike the employer in Flint, has never disavowed a reason it
has given for terminating Robinson's employment.  ACCU has
consistently maintained that the decision to terminate
Robinson's employment was a business decision made as part of
a restructuring process.  That Robinson's performance was
considered in the context of making that decision in no way
indicates that that reason is anything other than legitimate.
Robinson is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Robinson next argues that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to the truthfulness of the reason given by
ACCU for the termination of his employment because, he claims,
the facts in the record do not support that reason.  Robinson
notes that ACCU has claimed it eliminated his position so that
it could outsource more of its marketing work; however, he
notes, ACCU has simultaneously claimed that management was
displeased with him for that very reason –– because he
outsourced too much of the marketing work.  Thus, he
concludes, that reason must be pretextual.
Again, we cannot agree with Robinson's conclusion that
this evidence is inconsistent.  As Haas testified in his
deposition, "[Robinson] was outsourcing everything.  So after
1051327
Robinson and ACCU dispute whether, in fact, Jennifer
1
Denholm replaced Robinson after his employment was terminated;
however, it is undisputed that she was paid less than half of
Robinson's $65,000 salary.
12
we looked at it; we said, well, look, you know, we'd be better
off [if his employment was terminated].  Everything's already
outsourced."  Or, as ACCU stated the issue in its brief:
"[T]he efficiencies and cost-savings which ACCU anticipated
when it created the VP position and hired Robinson were not
being realized."  Thus, the fact that Robinson was criticized
for doing too much outsourcing does not cast aspersions on the
legitimacy of ACCU's decision to terminate his employment and
to do more outsourcing.  It appears that ACCU simply decided
that it did not need to pay a vice president to coordinate
outsourcing when a lower-grade employee could do the same.1
Robinson also argues that there is no credible evidence
indicating that his performance was in any way deficient,
stating:  "The only evidence that [ACCU] has produced
concerning Robinson's poor performance is Haas's testimony,
which is contradicted by Haas's own evaluation of Robinson's
performance."  See Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d
1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he lack of complaints or
disciplinary reports in an employee's personnel file may
1051327
13
support a finding of pretext ....").  However, the record does
not support Robinson's argument.  Although it is true that
Robinson's evaluations were generally laudatory and that he
received merit-based bonuses and pay increases, those same
evaluations provide some support for the criticism voiced by
Haas after Robinson's employment was terminated.  For example,
his February 14, 2003, performance evaluation included the
following critiques:
"I encourage you to be more timely meeting with
branches and lenders on all promotions."
"Tony does a great job carrying through on projects
assigned to him.  But, you need to reach another
level."
"Tony must seek out new responsibilities and take on
more risk and challenges that lie outside your
responsibility."
"You should not be afraid of applying more creative
solutions to marketing programs.  As explained, one
major goal of the credit union upon your employment
was to reduce outside resources ....  The credit
union incurred considerable expense in the purchase
[of] special computer equipment to meet your needs.
This equipment must be better utilized."
"Tony should take a stronger leadership role in
management team situations."
"Tony's presentations have always been good.  But
often, I need to encourage you to do more."
1051327
14
Robinson's April 1, 2004, performance evaluation likewise
contained the following statements:
"Tony does a satisfactory job but at times he has a
tendency to assume all details will be handled
without his follow up.  Tony can be counted on to
get most tasks done, but not necessarily to go the
EXTRA MILE and push beyond the limits of your
instruction."  
(Capitalization in original.)
"Tony has other interests beyond ACCU.  These
interests 
can 
be 
mutually 
beneficial 
to 
our
organization if they are communicated and planned
well in advance.  This has created difficulty in the
past and must be addressed early this year to avoid
a breakdown in communication."
"[Initiative] continues to be Tony's weak area.  He
does a great job in following through with assigned
or specific tasks.  The credit union must tap his
ability 
to 
perform 
employee 
and 
director
development.  Tony must achieve a higher level.  It
is 
essential 
for 
Tony 
to 
step 
forward 
and
demonstrate much more initiative in assisting in
employee training and business development."
These statements not only refute Robinson's claim that there
was no evidence outside Haas's deposition testimony indicating
that his performance was deficient, but also buttress the
reason given by ACCU for terminating his employment.  As early
as February 14, 2003, Robinson was told that one of the
reasons he was hired was to reduce the credit union's
dependence on outside contractors.  Yet the evidence indicates
1051327
15
that ACCU's expenses for outside contractors in fact increased
during Robinson's tenure as vice president for marketing.
Robinson has not presented substantial evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether ACCU's proffered
reason for his discharge is pretextual; therefore, the summary
judgment entered in favor of ACCU was appropriate.
IV.
ACCU moved for a summary judgment on Robinson's AADEA
claim, arguing both that Robinson failed to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination and that he failed to rebut
ACCU's proffered legitimate reason for his discharge.  We need
not consider whether Robinson established a prima facie case,
however, because he has not put forth substantial evidence
that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that
ACCU's stated reason for terminating his employment was
pretextual.  Accordingly, ACCU was entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law, and the summary judgment was proper.
AFFIRMED.
 
See, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur in the result.
1051327
16
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I question whether the varying explanations given by ACCU
for terminating Robinson's employment do not create a genuine
issue of fact as to whether any one of those explanations is
pretextual.  I concur in the result, however, because Robinson
has failed to present substantial evidence that he was
replaced in his position by Jennifer Denholm, as opposed to
his position being eliminated, with Denholm and others
dividing 
the 
responsibilities 
previously 
assigned 
to
Robinson's position.
Lyons, J., concurs.