Title: SSC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Company, LLC v. Bolding

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/22/2013 
Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l 
r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e 
r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of Decisions, 
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 
((334) 229¬
0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any 
t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s 
may 
be 
made b e f o r e 
t h e o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1120122 
SSC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Company, 
LLC 
v. 
Linda Bolding, as attorney i n 
f a c t and 
next f r i e n d of Norton 
Means 
Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t Court 
(CV-12-900311) 
STUART, J u s t i c e . 
SSC Montgomery Cedar C r e s t O p e r a t i n g Company, LLC 
("SSC 
Montgomery"), a p p e a l s t h e 
judgment o f 
t h e 
Montgomery 
C i r c u i t 
C o u r t d e n y i n g i t s 
motion t o 
compel a r b i t r a t i o n o f 
t h e m e d i c a l -
1120122 
m a l p r a c t i c e 
c l a i m a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t i t by 
L i n d a B o l d i n g , 
as 
a t t o r n e y i n f a c t and n e x t f r i e n d of her f a t h e r , N o r t o n Means. 
We 
a f f i r m . 
I . 
On 
J a n u a r y 
8, 
2012, 
Means 
was 
h o s p i t a l i z e d 
a f t e r 
e x p e r i e n c i n g 
s t r o k e 
and/or 
h e a r t - a t t a c k 
symptoms. 
On 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
J a n u a r y 
25, 
2012, 
he 
was 
a d m i t t e d 
t o 
Cedar 
C r e s t , a nursing-home f a c i l i t y o p e r a t e d by SSC Montgomery, t o 
r e c e i v e 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
and 
n u r s i n g 
s e r v i c e s 
w h i l e 
he 
r e c o v e r e d . 
A t the time Means was 
a d m i t t e d t o Cedar C r e s t , he 
was 
accompanied 
by 
h i s 
d a u g h t e r , 
M i c h e l l e 
P l e a s a n t , 
who 
c o m p l e t e d the n e c e s s a r y paperwork on h i s b e h a l f . 
Among the 
paperwork c o m p l e t e d and 
s i g n e d by 
P l e a s a n t 
was 
a 
d i s p u t e -
r e s o l u t i o n agreement ("the DRA") 
p r o v i d i n g t h a t the 
" p a r t i e s " 
w a i v e d t h e i r 
r i g h t t o a judge or j u r y t r i a l 
i n the e v e n t a 
d i s p u t e a r o s e between them and i n s t e a d a g r e e d t o r e s o l v e 
any 
such d i s p u t e by way of a d i s p u t e - r e s o l u t i o n 
program c o n s i s t i n g 
of m e d i a t i o n and b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n . 
The DRA 
f u r t h e r d e f i n e d 
the term " p a r t i e s " as i n c l u d i n g : 
"(a) [ T ] h e r e s i d e n t , any and a l l f a m i l y members 
who 
would have the r i g h t t o b r i n g a c l a i m i n s t a t e 
c o u r t on b e h a l f of the 
r e s i d e n t or the 
r e s i d e n t ' s 
e s t a t e , a l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , i n c l u d i n g a power of 
2 
1120122 
a t t o r n e y f o r h e a l t h c a r e and/or f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s 
or 
a 
c o u r t 
a p p o i n t e d 
g u a r d i a n , 
or 
any 
o t h e r 
p e r s o n 
whose c l a i m i s d e r i v e d t h r o u g h or on b e h a l f of the 
r e s i d e n t , 
i n c l u d i n g , 
i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e 
a l r e a d y 
l i s t e d 
i n 
t h i s 
d e f i n i t i o n , 
any 
p a r e n t , 
spouse, 
c h i l d , 
e x e c u t o r , 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r , h e i r 
or s u r v i v o r 
e n t i t l e d t o b r i n g a w r o n g f u l 
d e a t h 
c l a i m , 
and 
the 
f a c i l i t y , 
[ r e l a t e d c o r p o r a t e e n t i t i e s , 
and 
of t h e i r employees or a g e n t s ] . " 
(b) 
any 
P l e a s a n t s i g n e d her name on the 
f i n a l page of the DRA 
on 
a 
l i n e i n d i c a t e d f o r the " S i g n a t u r e of L e g a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e or 
F a m i l y Member" and under the f o l l o w i n g 
p a r a g r a p h : 
" I f r e s i d e n t i s adjudged incompetent, 
complete t h i s 
s e c t i o n : 
" I am the spouse, r e s p o n s i b l e p a r t y , l e g a l 
g u a r d i a n 
or 
power 
of 
a t t o r n e y 
of 
the 
r e s i d e n t and have the a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n the 
agreement on h i s / h e r b e h a l f . 
In s i g n i n g 
t h i s Agreement, the L e g a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e or 
F a m i l y Member b i n d s b o t h the R e s i d e n t 
and 
themselves 
i n d i v i d u a l l y . " 
On March 2, 2012, Means was h o s p i t a l i z e d a g a i n . 
On March 
6, 2012, 
a n o t h e r of h i s d a u g h t e r s , 
L i n d a B o l d i n g , whom Means 
had p r e v i o u s l y g r a n t e d a d u r a b l e power of a t t o r n e y , sued 
SSC 
Montgomery, a l l e g i n g t h a t Cedar C r e s t s t a f f had n e g l i g e n t l y 
c a r e d 
f o r 
Means, 
c a u s i n g 
him 
t o 
s u f f e r 
d e h y d r a t i o n , 
malnourishment, and an u n t r e a t e d i n f e c t i o n t h a t combined t o 
3 
1120122 
r e s u l t i n h i s h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n on March 2.
1 
On A p r i l 5, 2012, 
SSC 
Montgomery 
f i l e d 
b o t h 
i t s answer 
d e n y i n g B o l d i n g ' s 
a l l e g a t i o n s and a motion t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o the 
terms of the DRA. 
B o l d i n g s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d 
a r e s p o n s e , 
a r g u i n g t h a t i t 
would be improper t o e n f o r c e the DRA 
because, 
she argued, P l e a s a n t had no l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o a c t on Means's 
b e h a l f a t the time P l e a s a n t e x e c u t e d the DRA. 
F o l l o w i n g a 
September 12, 2012, h e a r i n g , the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r 
d e n y i n g SSC Montgomery's motion t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
On 
October 2, 2012, SSC Montgomery 
f i l e d i t s t i m e l y n o t i c e o f 
a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t . 
I I . 
Our s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w o f a r u l i n g d e n y i n g a motion t o 
compel a r b i t r a t i o n i s w e l l 
s e t t l e d : 
" ' T h i s C o u r t r e v i e w s de novo the d e n i a l of a 
m o t i o n t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
Parkway Dodge, I n c .  
v. Yarbrough, 779 So. 2d 1205 
( A l a . 2000) 
. A motion 
t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n i s analogous t o a m o t i o n f o r 
a summary judgment. 
TranSouth F i n . Corp. v. 
B e l l , 
^ B o l d i n g ' s c o m p l a i n t a l s o named as d e f e n d a n t s f o u r o t h e r 
c o r p o r a t e e n t i t i e s she a l l e g e d were r e l a t e d t o SSC Montgomery, 
as 
w e l l 
as 
two 
Cedar 
C r e s t 
employees. 
However, 
t h o s e 
c o r p o r a t e e n t i t i e s were l a t e r d i s m i s s e d by agreement of the 
p a r t i e s , and the two Cedar C r e s t employees d i d not j o i n i n the 
motion t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
t h a t 
i s the s u b j e c t o f 
t h i s 
a p p e a l ; t h e r e f o r e , 
i n t h i s 
o p i n i o n , 
we 
r e f e r 
t o o n l y 
SSC 
Montgomery. 
4 
1120122 
739 
So. 
2d 
1110, 
1114 
( A l a . 1999). 
The 
p a r t y 
s e e k i n g 
t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
p r o v i n g 
the 
e x i s t e n c e 
of 
a 
c o n t r a c t 
c a l l i n g 
f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n and p r o v i n g t h a t the c o n t r a c t e v i d e n c e s 
a t r a n s a c t i o n a f f e c t i n g 
i n t e r s t a t e 
commerce. 
I d . 
" [ A ] f t e r 
a motion t o compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
has 
been 
made and s u p p o r t e d , the burden i s on the non-movant 
t o p r e s e n t 
e v i d e n c e t h a t the supposed 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement i s not 
v a l i d 
or does not 
a p p l y 
t o 
the 
d i s p u t e i n q u e s t i o n . " 
Jim Burke A u t o m o t i v e , I n c . v. 
B e a v e r s , 
674 
So. 
2d 
1260, 
1265 
n. 
1 
( A l a . 
1995) 
( o p i n i o n on a p p l i c a t i o n 
f o r r e h e a r i n g ) . ' " 
E l i z a b e t h Homes, L.L.C. v. G a n t t , 882 
So. 
2d 313, 
315 
( A l a . 
2003) 
( q u o t i n g F l e e t w o o d E n t e r s . , 
I n c . v. Bruno, 784 
So. 
2d 
277, 
280 
( A l a . 
2 0 0 0 ) ) . 
I I I . 
There 
i s 
no 
d i s p u t e 
t h a t 
a 
c o n t r a c t 
c a l l i n g 
f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n — 
the DRA 
— 
e x i s t s 
i n t h i s case and 
t h a t 
t h a t 
c o n t r a c t 
e v i d e n c e s 
a 
t r a n s a c t i o n 
a f f e c t i n g 
i n t e r s t a t e 
commerce. 
The 
i s s u e here i s whether the DRA 
a p p l i e s t o 
the 
c l a i m s b r o u g h t by B o l d i n g on b e h a l f of Means, n e i t h e r of whom 
s i g n e d 
the 
DRA. 
The 
g e n e r a l 
r u l e 
i n Alabama 
i s t h a t 
"a 
n o n s i g n a t o r y 
t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement cannot be f o r c e d t o 
a r b i t r a t e her c l a i m s . " 
Cook's P e s t C o n t r o l , I n c . v. 
B o y k i n , 
807 
So. 
2d 
524, 
526 
( A l a . 
2 0 0 1 ) ) . 
However, 
t h e r e 
are 
e x c e p t i o n s 
t o t h i s r u l e , 
see g e n e r a l l y MTA, 
I n c . v. 
M e r r i l l  
Lynch, P i e r c e , Fenner & Smith, I n c . , [Ms. 1111167, December 7, 
5 
1120122 
2012] 
So. 3d 
, 
( A l a . 2012), and t h i s C o u r t has 
c r e a t e d a d i s t i n c t body o f c a s e l a w c o n s i d e r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y 
the i s s u e how and when a r b i t r a t i o n agreements e x e c u t e d by 
t h e 
owners and o p e r a t o r s o f n u r s i n g homes and t h e i r 
r e s i d e n t s 
and/or 
t h e i r 
r e s i d e n t s ' 
f a m i l y members s h o u l d be e n f o r c e d . 
See Owens v. Coosa V a l l e y H e a l t h Care, I n c . , 
890 So. 2d 983 
( A l a . 2004); B r i a r c l i f f N u r s i n g Home, I n c . 
v. T u r c o t t e , 894 
So. 2d 661 ( A l a . 2004); N o l a n d H e a l t h S e r v s . v. W r i g h t , 971 
So. 2d 681 ( A l a . 2007); Carraway v. B e v e r l y E n t e r s . Alabama,  
I n c . , 978 So. 2d 27 ( A l a . 2007); and Tennessee H e a l t h Mgmt.,  
I n c . v. Johnson, 49 So. 3d 175 ( A l a . 2010) . The U n i t e d S t a t e s 
C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r 
t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t r e c e n t l y r e v i e w e d 
t h i s 
c a s e l a w i n E n t r e k i n v. I n t e r n a l M e d i c i n e A s s o c s . o f  
Dothan, 
P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th C i r . 2012), and 
c o n c l u d e d , c o r r e c t l y , t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e t o 
be e x t r a c t e d from 
t h e s e cases i s t h a t an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement t h a t b i n d s t h e 
nursing-home 
r e s i d e n t 
a l s o 
b i n d s 
t h e 
r e s i d e n t ' s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
Thus, i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e whether 
B o l d i n g 
i s bound by t h e 
DRA, we must d e t e r m i n e whether Means was bound 
by t h e DRA. 
F o r t h e r e a s o n s t h a t f o l l o w , we c o n c l u d e he was 
not. 
6 
1120122 
The o n l y e v i d e n c e b e f o r e the C o u r t i n t h i s case i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t Means was m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t when he was a d m i t t e d t o 
Cedar C r e s t and the DRA was e x e c u t e d ; i n d e e d , SSC Montgomery 
does not even argue 
t h a t he was 
competent 
a t any 
r e l e v a n t 
t i m e . 
The 
e v i d e n c e o f Means's 
incompetency 
i n c l u d e s 
an 
a f f i d a v i t 
s u b m i t t e d by 
B o l d i n g 
i n which 
she 
s t a t e s : 
"On 
J a n u a r y 25, 
2012, 
my 
f a t h e r was 
m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t 
and 
p h y s i c a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d . 
My f a t h e r d i d not have the mental 
c a p a c i t y t o g i v e h i s consent t o an a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement a t 
t h a t t i m e . "
2 Moreover, P l e a s a n t s i g n e d the DRA, p r o v i d e d her 
by SSC Montgomery, u n d e r n e a t h a p a r a g r a p h t h a t 
i n s t r u c t e d : 
" I f r e s i d e n t i s adjudged i n c o m p e t e n t , complete t h i s 
s e c t i o n . " 
C h i l d r e n and the m e n t a l l y incompetent have 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
been 
t r e a t e d 
d i f f e r e n t l y 
under 
the law t h a n the s t a n d a r d 
competent 
a d u l t . 
See, e.g., Ex p a r t e E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 
678 ( A l a . 
2011) 
(Main, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ("The s t a t e n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n j e c t s 
i t s e l f 
i n t o the a f f a i r s of c h i l d r e n and the m e n t a l l y 
2 C i t i n g Queen v. B e l c h e r , 888 So. 2d 472, 477-78 ( A l a . 
2003), SSC Montgomery argues t h a t the s t a t e m e n t s i n B o l d i n g ' s 
a f f i d a v i t r e g a r d i n g Means's competency cannot be c o n s i d e r e d ; 
however, SSC Montgomery d i d not o b j e c t t o t h a t a f f i d a v i t or 
move t o s t r i k e i t , even though i t f i l e d a r e p l y t o the 
f i l i n g 
t o 
w h i c h 
the 
a f f i d a v i t 
was 
a t t a c h e d 
as 
an 
e x h i b i t . 
C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the a f f i d a v i t i s t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r . 
Ex p a r t e  
S e c r e t a r y of V e t e r a n s A f f a i r s , 92 So. 3d 771, 777 ( A l a . 
2012) . 
7 
1120122 
i n c o m p e t e n t when t h e y a r e i n 
need o f p r o t e c t i o n because 
t h e i r 
d e v e l o p m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e s and t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e s t r a i n t s 
r e n d e r them more v u l n e r a b l e than competent 
a d u l t s . " ) . 
And, 
w h i l e we have h e l d t h a t competent 
r e s i d e n t s o f n u r s i n g homes 
may be bound by a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreements 
e x e c u t e d by 
t h e i r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , see, 
e.g., Carraway, 978 So. 2d a t 30-31, and 
Johnson, 
49 So. 3d a t 176, our cases 
a l s o 
i n d i c a t e 
t h a t 
i n c o m p e t e n t 
r e s i d e n t s a r e n o t so bound. 
I n N o l a n 
H e a l t h 
 
S e r v i c e s , we c o n s i d e r e d whether t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f Dorothy 
W i l l i s ' s 
e s t a t e was bound t o a r b i t r a t e 
p e r s o n a l - i n j u r y and 
w r o n g f u l - d e a t h c l a i m s stemming from Dorothy's t r e a t m e n t a t a 
n u r s i n g 
home p u r s u a n t t o an 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n i n a 
c o n t r a c t e x e c u t e d by Dorothy's d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w , V i c k y 
W i l l i s , 
when Dorothy was a d m i t t e d t o t h e n u r s i n g home. 
971 So. 2d a t 
683. 
A p l u r a l i t y o f t h e C o u r t a g r e e d w i t h t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
f i n d i n g 
t h a t Dorothy was i n c o m p e t e n t when t h e c o n t r a c t was 
s i g n e d and t h a t V i c k y ' s s i g n a t u r e as t h e " r e s p o n s i b l e 
p a r t y " 
or n e x t 
f r i e n d on t h a t 
c o n t r a c t "was 
i n e f f e c t i v e t o b i n d 
Dorothy o r 
h e r p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e agreement." 
971 
So. 2d a t 686. In s u p p o r t o f t h a t c o n c l u s i o n , t h e p l u r a l i t y 
o p i n i o n quoted Page v. L o u i s v i l l e & N a s h v i l l e R.R., 129 A l a . 
8 
1120122 
232, 238, 29 So. 676, 678 (1901), f o r 
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
"one who p u r p o r t s t o a c t 
m e r e l y as a 'next f r i e n d ' o f a 'non 
compos m e n t i s ' 
i s ' w h o l l y 
w i t h o u t 
a u t h o r i t y t o make any 
c o n t r a c t t h a t would b i n d h e r o r h e r e s t a t e . ' " 
N o l a n d H e a l t h  
S e r v s . , 971 So. 2d a t 
686. 
Of 
c o u r s e , 
N o l a n d 
H e a l t h 
S e r v i c e s 
was a 
p l u r a l i t y 
o p i n i o n , and i t s p r e c e d e n t i a l v a l u e i s a c c o r d i n g l y 
l i m i t e d .
3 
 
Ex p a r t e Achenbach, 783 So. 2d 4, 7 ( A l a . 2000). 
However, 
t h i s C o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y 
r e c o g n i z e d t h e p r i n c i p l e f o r w h i c h 
N o l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s i s 
now c i t e d i n Johnson. 
I n Johnson, 
Tennessee H e a l t h Management ("THM") a p p e a l e d t h e 
d e n i a l o f 
i t s 
motion t o e n f o r c e 
an a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement 
a g a i n s t 
C a r o l 
Rousseau Johnson, who was p r o s e c u t i n g 
p e r s o n a l - i n j u r y and 
w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s 
c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t THM i n h e r c a p a c i t y as t h e 
p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f 
t h e 
e s t a t e o f D o l o r e s Rousseau, who 
a l l e g e d l y was i n j u r e d 
w h i l e a r e s i d e n t o f a n u r s i n g home 
o p e r a t e d by THM. 49 So. 3d a t 176. When D o l o r e s was a d m i t t e d 
t o t h a t n u r s i n g home, h e r 
d a u g h t e r B a r b a r a Rousseau had s i g n e d 
3The U n i t e d 
S t a t e s 
C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e E l e v e n t h 
C i r c u i t 
c o n c l u d e d 
i n E n t r e k i n t h a t p a r t o f t h e h o l d i n g i n 
N o l a n d 
H e a l t h 
S e r v i c e s was 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
B r i a r c l i f f , 
Carraway, and Johnson. 
689 F. 3d a t 1255-60. 
However, i t i s 
u n n e c e s s a r y f o r us t o c o n s i d e r t h a t and o t h e r a s p e c t s o f 
t h e 
N o l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s h o l d i n g i n t h i s 
case. 
9 
1120122 
an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement w i t h THM, 
but " [ t ] h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t D o l o r e s 
... was m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t when she 
was a d m i t t e d 
49 So. 3d a t 176-77. 
C i t i n g N o l a n d H e a l t h 
S e r v i c e s , C a r o l s u b s e q u e n t l y argued t o t h i s C o u r t t h a t D o l o r e s 
was not bound by the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement because she had 
not 
s i g n e d 
i t . 
49 
So. 
3d 
a t 
180. 
T h i s 
C o u r t 
r e j e c t e d 
her 
argument, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g N o l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s as f o l l o w s : 
" C a r o l r e l i e s upon N o l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s , I n c . 
v.  
W r i g h t , 971 
So. 
2d 
681 
( A l a . 2007). 
In Noland, a 
p l u r a l i t y 
of 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
h e l d 
t h a t 
a 
d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w ' s 
s i g n a t u r e as the r e s p o n s i b l e p a r t y 
on 
a 
nursing-home 
a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement 
was 
i n e f f e c t i v e 
t o b i n d the r e s i d e n t t o the agreement. 
N o l a n d i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h i s case, however, 
because 
the 
nursing-home 
r e s i d e n t 
i n N o l a n d 
was 
m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t and c o u l d not a u t h o r i z e anyone 
t o a c t on her b e h a l f and because the 
d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w 
d i d 
not 
s i g n any document i n the 
c a p a c i t y of 
her 
m o t h e r - i n - l a w ' s l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . " 
Johnson, 49 So. 
3d a t 180-81. 
We 
t h e r e a f t e r h e l d t h a t 
the 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement e x e c u t e d by B a r b a r a d i d b i n d D o l o r e s 
and 
was t h e r e f o r e e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t C a r o l , thus r e c o g n i z i n g the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a r b i t r a t i o n agreements s i g n e d on b e h a l f of 
nursing-home r e s i d e n t s who are i n c o m p e t e n t and those s i g n e d on 
b e h a l f of nursing-home r e s i d e n t s who are competent. 
49 So. 
3d 
a t 
181. 
10 
1120122 
SSC Montgomery 
argues 
t h a t N o l a n d 
H e a l t h 
S e r v i c e s i s 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e inasmuch as V i c k y 
W i l l i s d i d not s i g n t h e 
c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n i n g t h e a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n i n 
N o l a n d H e a l t h  
S e r v i c e s 
as 
Dorothy's 
l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
w h i l e , 
SSC 
Montgomery a s s e r t s , P l e a s a n t d i d s i g n t h e DRA as Means's l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
We d i s a g r e e , however, w i t h SSC Montgomery's 
a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t 
P l e a s a n t 
s i g n e d 
t h e DRA 
as Means's 
l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
The s i g n a t u r e b l o c k on t h e DRA i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
P l e a s a n t 
s i g n e d t h e DRA as " L e g a l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
or 
F a m i l y 
Member." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, a l t h o u g h t h e p a r a g r a p h 
above t h e s i g n a t u r e 
l i n e 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s i g n e r o f t h e 
document i s a s s e r t i n g t h a t he or she has "the a u t h o r i t y t o 
s i g n 
t h e agreement on 
[the r e s i d e n t ' s ] 
b e h a l f , " 
m e r e l y 
c l a i m i n g t o have l e g a l a u t h o r i t y on someone e l s e ' s b e h a l f or 
c l a i m i n g t o be someone e l s e ' s l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e does not 
make i t 
so. 
I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t P l e a s a n t has never h e l d a 
power o f a t t o r n e y 
f o r Means, 
and she 
a l s o 
s t a t e d 
i n an 
a f f i d a v i t s u b m i t t e d t o t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t t h a t she was g r a n t e d 
"no l e g a l a u t h o r i t y by him or anyone e l s e t o e n t e r 
i n t o t h e 
[DRA] on h i s b e h a l f . " 
11 
1120122 
SSC 
Montgomery 
argues 
i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e 
t h a t t h e 
d o c t r i n e o f a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s b i n d Means, 
and by e x t e n s i o n B o l d i n g , t o 
t h e 
DRA. I n Carraway, we a p p l i e d 
the 
d o c t r i n e o f a p p a r e n t 
a u t h o r i t y t o h o l d 
t h a t 
S h i r l e y 
Carraway, a nursing-home r e s i d e n t , was bound by an a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement s i g n e d by h e r b r o t h e r R i c h a r d Carraway: 
" J u s t as R i c h a r d 
s i g n e d 
a l l t h e o t h e r 
documents 
r e l a t i n g t o S h i r l e y ' s a d m i s s i o n 
i n t o t h e n u r s i n g 
home 
on 
S h i r l e y ' s 
b e h a l f , 
R i c h a r d 
s i g n e d 
t h e 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement on S h i r l e y ' s b e h a l f 
e x p r e s s l y 
as 
an 
' a u t h o r i z e d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . ' 
A p p a r e n t 
a u t h o r i t y ' i s i m p l i e d where t h e p r i n c i p a l p a s s i v e l y 
p e r m i t s t h e agent t o appear t o a t h i r d p e r s o n t o 
have 
t h e 
a u t h o r i t y 
t o a c t on 
[her] b e h a l f . ' 
T r e a d w e l l F o r d , I n c . v. C o u r t e s y Auto B r o k e r s , 
I n c . , 
426 So. 2d 859, 861 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1983). 
' I t 
i s 
not e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e r i g h t o f c o n t r o l be e x e r c i s e d 
so 
l o n g 
as t h a t 
r i g h t 
a c t u a l l y 
e x i s t s . ' 
Wood 
C h e v r o l e t Co. v. Bank o f t h e S o u t h e a s t , 352 So. 2d 
1350, 
1352 ( A l a . 
1977) . 
There i s no 
e v i d e n c e 
i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t 
S h i r l e y had any 
o b j e c t i o n 
t o 
R i c h a r d ' s 
a c t i n g on h e r b e h a l f i n a d m i t t i n g S h i r l e y 
t o t h e n u r s i n g home. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e e v i d e n c e 
s u g g e s t s 
t h a t 
S h i r l e y approved o f h e r 
b r o t h e r ' s 
a c t i n g on h e r b e h a l f . 
A few weeks i n t o S h i r l e y ' s 
r e s i d e n c y a t t h e n u r s i n g home, she e x e c u t e d a power 
of a t t o r n e y , g i v i n g R i c h a r d f u r t h e r a u t h o r i t y t o a c t 
1 -p 
II 
on her 
b e h a l f . " 
978 So. 2d a t 30-31. 
We l i k e w i s e a p p l i e d t h e d o c t r i n e o f 
a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y i n 
Johnson, s t a t i n g t h a t D o l o r e s " p a s s i v e l y 
p e r m i t t e d B a r b a r a t o appear t o THM t o have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o 
a c t on h e r b e h a l f , 
and B a r b a r a ' s 
a p p a r e n t 
a u t h o r i t y 
i s , 
12 
1120122 
t h e r e f o r e , 
i m p l i e d . " 
49 So. 3d a t 180. 
However, i n b o t h 
Carraway and Johnson t h e nursing-home r e s i d e n t was competent 
and 
e f f e c t i v e l y a c q u i e s c e d t o and/or r a t i f i e d t h e d e c i s i o n s 
made by 
t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
t h u s making t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e a p p a r e n t - a u t h o r i t y 
d o c t r i n e 
a p p r o p r i a t e .
4 
In c o n t r a s t , t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e i n 
t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s case 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t Means i s 
i n c o m p e t e n t and thus u n a b l e t o 
empower 
an agent, whether p a s s i v e l y o r t h r o u g h a f f i r m a t i v e a c t s . See 
Johnson, 49 So. 3d a t 180-81 ("[T]he nursing-home r e s i d e n t i n 
N o l a n d was m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t and c o u l d n o t a u t h o r i z e anyone 
t o a c t 
on h e r b e h a l f 
" ) . Thus, a t b e s t P l e a s a n t may have 
p u r p o r t e d t o be Means's l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , b u t t h a t i s 
an 
i n s u f f i c i e n t 
b a s i s 
upon 
w h i c h t o a p p l y 
t h e d o c t r i n e o f 
a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y . 
N o r t h i n g t o n v. D a i r y l a n d I n s . Co., 445 
So. 2d 283, 286 ( A l a . 1984) ( " [ I ] n o r d e r f o r a p r i n c i p a l t o 
be 
h e l d 
l i a b l e 
under t h e d o c t r i n e o f a p p a r e n t 
a u t h o r i t y and 
e s t o p p e l , t h e p r i n c i p a l must have engaged i n some conduct 
4There i s some i n d i c a t i o n i n Carraway t h a t 
S h i r l e y may 
have been i n c o m p e t e n t a t t h e time she was a d m i t t e d t o t h e 
n u r s i n g home, a l t h o u g h R i c h a r d ' s argument was p r e m i s e d on 
t h e 
c l a i m t h a t she was i n f a c t competent. 
978 So. 2d a t 29-30. 
R e g a r d l e s s , 
i t i s u n d i s p u t e d 
t h a t 
she a p p a r e n t l y 
became 
competent a t some p o i n t because she e x e c u t e d a power o f 
a t t o r n e y i n f a v o r o f R i c h a r d a f t e r h e r a d m i t t a n c e . 
13 
1120122 
w h i c h 
l e d 
a 
t h i r d 
p a r t y 
t o 
b e l i e v e 
t h a t 
the 
agent 
had 
a u t h o r i t y t o a c t f o r the p r i n c i p a l . " (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . 
See 
a l s o Gray v. G r e a t American Reserve I n s . Co., 
495 So. 2d 
602, 
607 
( A l a . 
1986) 
( n o t i n g 
t h a t 
one 
cannot 
" b l i n d l y 
t r u s t " 
a n o t h e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g the e x t e n t of h i s or her agent 
power), and 
C i t y S t o r e s Co. 
v. W i l l i a m s , 287 A l a . 385, 
391, 
252 So. 2d 45, 51 (1971) ("The 
burden of p r o v i n g agency r e s t s 
upon the p a r t y a s s e r t i n g 
i t . " ) . 
In c o n c l u s i o n , we h o l d t h a t Means was 
not bound by 
the 
DRA 
e x e c u t e d by P l e a s a n t ; t h e r e f o r e , B o l d i n g was 
not bound. 
However, we 
emphasize t h a t 
t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n 
i s not 
r e a c h e d 
because Means d i d not p e r s o n a l l y e x e c u t e the DRA. 
R a t h e r , i t 
i s because a l l 
the e v i d e n c e i n the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t Means 
i s 
i n c o m p e t e n t . 
Thus, w h i l e 
B o l d i n g , 
as 
the 
h o l d e r 
of 
a 
d u r a b l e power of a t t o r n e y g r a n t e d by Means, may have been a b l e 
t o b i n d him t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement, P l e a s a n t , as m e r e l y 
a f a m i l y member or n e x t f r i e n d , c o u l d not. 
IV. 
B o l d i n g sued SSC Montgomery as Means's a t t o r n e y i n 
f a c t 
and n e x t f r i e n d , a l l e g i n g m e d i c a l m a l p r a c t i c e i n the c a r e 
he 
r e c e i v e d 
a t Cedar C r e s t . 
SSC 
Montgomery moved t o 
compel 
a r b i t r a t i o n i n the case p u r s u a n t t o an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement 
14 
1120122 
P l e a s a n t 
s i g n e d when Means was 
a d m i t t e d 
t o Cedar 
C r e s t ; 
however, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h a t m o t i o n . We hereby 
a f f i r m 
the 
judgment o f t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t , 
h o l d i n g 
t h a t 
P l e a s a n t ' s 
s i g n a t u r e on t h e a r b i t r a t i o n agreement was i n e f f e c t i v e t o b i n d 
Means, and by e x t e n s i o n 
h i s l e g a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
B o l d i n g , 
because t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s he was m e n t a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t a t 
the time P l e a s a n t e x e c u t e d t h e agreement. 
AFFIRMED. 
Moore, C.J., and P a r k e r and Wise, J J . , c o n c u r . 
Murdock, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t . 
15