Title: Baldwin County v. Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 09/20/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
_________________________
1120599
_________________________
Baldwin County, by and through the Baldwin County Commission
v.
Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc.
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-2012-900869)
MAIN, Justice.
Baldwin County ("the County") appeals from a judgment on
the pleadings entered in favor of Baldwin County Cattle & Fair
Association, Inc. ("the Fair Association").  We reverse and
remand.
1120599
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History
On or about June 14, 2004, the Baldwin County Commission
passed 
a 
resolution 
recognizing 
the 
Fair 
Association's 
planned
construction of a multimillion dollar coliseum at the Fair
Association's new fairgrounds site in Baldwin County.  The
Fair Association is a nonprofit corporation that operates the
Baldwin County Fair. In the resolution, the Commission
resolved to provide long-term funding for the 
Fair Association
in the amount of $75,000 annually for a period of 10 years,
beginning in the County's 2005 fiscal year.
On October 18, 2005, the County and the Fair Association
entered into a memorandum of understanding, pursuant to which
the parties agreed that the Fair Association would construct
the new coliseum to standards suitable for the County to use
as a hurricane-evacuation shelter.  The parties 
further 
agreed
that, upon the completion of construction, the coliseum
property would be conveyed to the County, which would then
lease the property back to the Fair Association.  The
memorandum of understanding additionally provided that, once
the property was conveyed to the County, the County would be
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relieved from its commitment to make the annual $75,000
payment to the Fair Association.
On September 10, 2008, the County and the Fair
Association entered into a real-estate sale and purchase
agreement for the conveyance of the coliseum property to the
County.  The purchase agreement provided that the County would
be "released and relieved from paying [the Fair Association]
the Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), annual
payment...."  Following conveyance of the coliseum property,
on September 29, 2008, the parties entered into a lease
agreement for the property.  The lease was for a term of 75
years, and the agreement provided that the Fair Association
would pay annual rent to the County in the amount $15,000 plus
15 percent of the Fair Association's net revenues.
Despite the parties' agreement to discontinue the annual
$75,000 payment to the Fair Association, the County made two
additional payments–-one in 2009 and another in 2010.  Each
additional payment was presented to the County Commission as
part of the "County Commission Accounts Payable Payments" and
was approved by the Commission along with payments to other
vendors.  The County now asserts that the two $75,000 payments
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were made by mistake and were the result of failure of the
County's 
clerk/treasurer 
to 
discontinue 
the 
automatic
transfers and payments set up following adoption of the June
2004 resolution.  The County also contends that the Fair
Association owes it $32,762 in past-due rent and other
financial obligations under the lease agreement.
On July 3, 2012, the County, by and through the County
Commission, filed this lawsuit against the Fair Association 
in
the Baldwin Circuit Court.  The complaint alleged that the two
$75,000 payments to the Fair Association were made in error;
that the Fair Association knew or should have known that the
payments were in error; and that the Fair Association has
retained the funds rather than return the moneys to the
County.  Counts one, two, and three of the complaint assert
claims for money had and received, money paid by mistake, and
unjust enrichment, respectively.  Each count seeks damages in
the amount of $150,000.  Count four of the complaint asserts
a claim of breach of the lease agreement and alleges that the
Fair Association has failed to pay rents and other financial
obligations it incurred under the lease agreement.  The County
seeks damages in the amount of $32,762 as a result of the Fair
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Association's alleged breach and also demands rescission of
the lease agreement.
On August 20, 2012, the Fair Association filed a motion
for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala.
R. Civ. P.  The motion asserted two grounds.  First, the Fair
Association argued the County's claims for money had and
received, money paid by mistake, and unjust enrichment were
each barred by the separation-of-powers doctrine.  According
to the Fair Association, the judiciary may not interfere with
what the Fair Association contends was a valid appropriation
of funds by the County.  In support of its argument, the Fair
Association attached excerpts of published minutes of the two
County Commission meetings at which the Commission approved
the two additional $75,000 payments to the Fair Association as
part of an "Accounts Payable Payment."  Second, the Fair
Association argued that the circuit court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claim alleging breach of the
lease agreement.  The Fair Association contends that an action
seeking compensatory damages for breach of a lease or
rescission of a lease must be brought as an unlawful-detainer
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action originating in the Baldwin District Court.  The County
filed a brief in opposition to the motion.
A hearing on the motion was held on November 29, 2012. 
On January 11, 2013, the circuit court granted the Fair
Association's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.  The
County appealed.
II.  Standard of Review
The motion filed by the Fair Association and granted by
the circuit court was styled as a Rule 12(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.,
motion for a judgment on the pleadings.  Although the motion
may have been more appropriately styled as a Rule 12(b)(6),
Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss, the Fair Association
supported the motion with evidence outside the pleadings,
requiring the conversion of the motion to a motion for a
summary judgment.1
The record indicates that the Fair Association did not
1
file an answer before filing its motion, rendering a Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings premature.  See
Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562
(Ala. 2005)("'Motions brought under Rule 12(c) cannot 
be 
filed
until "[a]fter the pleadings are closed" (i.e., after filing
its answer).'")(quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net
Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). The
substance of a motion, however, and not what a party styles
it, determines the nature of the motion.  Lloyd Noland Found.,
Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So. 2d 784, 792 (Ala. 2007). 
For a discussion on the differences between a Rule 12(b)
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"When matters outside the pleadings are considered
on a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted into
a motion for summary judgment, Rule 12(b), Ala. R.
Civ. P.; this is the case regardless of what the
motion has been called or how it was treated by the
trial court, Papastefan v. B&L Constr. Co., 356 So.
2d 158 (Ala. 1978); Thorne v. Odom, 349 So. 2d 1126
(Ala. 1977).  'Once matters outside the pleadings
are considered, the requirements of Rule 56, Ala. R.
Civ. P., become operable and the "moving party's
burden changes and he is obliged to demonstrate that
there exists no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."  C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure, Civil, 1366 at 681 (1969).' 
Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So. 2d 1077, 1079 (Ala.
1986).  The effect of converting the defendants'
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
was to impose upon the defendants the burden of
meeting the two-part summary judgment standard, that
is, the burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the defendants are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56,
Ala. R. Civ. P."
Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So. 2d 932, 937-38 (Ala. 1997).  We
have recently described the standard of review applicable to
a summary judgment:
"'This Court's review of a summary
judgment is de novo.  Williams v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
motion to dismiss and a Rule 12(c) motion for a judgment on
the pleadings, see Pontius, 951 So. 2d at 561-62.  Regardless
of whether the motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or
Rule 12(c), when "matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated
as one for summary judgment ...."  Rules 12(b) and (c), Ala.
R. Civ. P. 
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1120599
(Ala. 2003).  We apply the same standard of
review 
as 
the 
trial 
court 
applied. 
Specifically we must determine whether the
movant has made a prima facie showing that
no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c),
Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
952-53 (Ala. 2004).  In making such a
determination, we must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d
756, 758 (Ala. 1986).  Once the movant
makes a prima facie showing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce "substantial evidence" as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin
County, 588 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989);
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.'"
Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 101 So. 3d 743, 746
(Ala. 2012)(quoting Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.
2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004)).
III.  Analysis
The Fair Association argues that application of the
separation-of-powers doctrine compels us to affirm the
judgment of the circuit court with respect to Count one (money
had and received), Count two (money paid by mistake), and
Count three (unjust enrichment) of the County's complaint. 
Each of those counts seeks recovery of the two $75,000
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payments made by the County to the Fair Association after the
execution of the purchase agreement.  According to the Fair
Association, each payment represents a valid legislative
appropriation that was duly approved by the 
County 
Commission. 
The County, on the other hand, which is suing by and through
the County Commission, asserts that the payments 
were approved
and paid by mistake, that it has a right to bring this action
in its name for the recovery of the funds, and that the
separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply.
The Constitution of Alabama expressly adopts the
separation-of-powers doctrine.  Birmingham-Jefferson Civic
Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 2005). 
Section 42, Ala. Const. 1901, divides the power of state
government into three distinct departments: the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial.  We have stated that "the
core judicial power is the power to declare finally the rights
of parties, in a particular case or controversy, based on the
law at the time the judgment becomes final."  Ex parte
Jenkins, 723 So. 2d 649, 656 (Ala. 1998).  Under § 43, Ala.
Const. 1901, however, the judicial branch "shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
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them."  We have interpreted Section 43 to mean that "this
Court will not decide 'political questions,' even if 
submitted
to it."  City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d at 214.  In
determining what constitutes a nonjusticiable political
question, this Court has adopted the formulation set forth by
the United State Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962): 
"'It 
is 
apparent 
that 
several
formulations which vary slightly according
to the settings in which the questions
arise may describe a political question,
although each has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function
of the separation of powers.  Prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found [1] a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of
deciding 
without 
an 
initial 
policy
determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial 
discretion; 
or 
[4] 
the
impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political
decision 
already 
made; 
or 
[6] 
the
potentiality 
of 
embarrassment 
from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.'"
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City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d at 214-15 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217).
Particular examples of our application of the separation-
of-powers doctrine include our holdings in City of 
Birmingham,
supra, in which we held that the question as to whether a
statute had passed the Alabama House of Representatives  with
a proper quorum was a nonjusticiable political question, and
Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002), in which we
concluded that any remedy that we could impose with regard to
the question of the constitutionality of the State's method
for funding the public-school system would necessarily usurp
the power of the legislature.  We have held that the
separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply to local
municipal governments.  State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181
Ala. 646, 658, 62 So. 31, 34 (1913).  Moreover, it should be
noted that we have long recognized the ability of a public
body to recover funds mistakenly or illegally paid out.  See,
e.g., City of Demopolis v. Marengo Cnty., 195 Ala. 214, 70 So.
275 (1915); Mobile Cnty. v. Williams, 180 Ala. 639, 61 So. 963
(1913); and Ledger Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 170 Ala. 437, 54 So.
52 (1910). 
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The present case does not present a political question
sufficient to invoke the separation-of-powers doctrine.  Here
the County, by and through the County Commission, asserts that
it mistakenly approved continued payments toward an old
funding obligation to the Fair Association.  The County, which
is permitted by the laws of Alabama to sue and be sued,
asserts various equitable claims seeking recovery of 
the 
money
it claims was mistakenly paid to the Fair Association. 
Deciding whether the County is entitled to recover under any
of its asserted theories will not risk improper judicial
intrusion into the province of a coordinate branch of
government.  Accordingly, judicial review of the County's
action is not barred by the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Next, we must determine whether the circuit court
properly entered a judgment in favor of the Fair Association
as to the County's claims of breach of the lease agreement and
rescission.  Citing Darby v. Schley, 8 So. 3d 1011 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008), the Fair Association argues that the County's
lease claims are in the nature of an unlawful-detainer action
and, therefore, that original jurisdiction for the County's
claims lies exclusively with the Baldwin District Court.  In
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contrast, the County argues that its breach-of-lease and
rescission claims do not seek possession of the premises and
therefore are not claims for unlawful detainer.  The County's
argument is well taken.
Count four of the County's complaint seeks monetary
damages from the Fair Association in the amount of alleged
unpaid rent and other financial obligations due under the
lease agreement.  Count four further demands rescission of the
lease agreement.  There appears to be no dispute that the Fair
Association remains in lawful possession of the leased
premises under the lease agreement.
The Fair Association principally relies on the Court of
Civil Appeals' statement in Darby v. Schley, 8 So. 3d 1011
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008):
"By statute, original jurisdiction over unlawful-
detainer actions lies in the district courts.  6-6-
330, Ala. Code 1975 ('The forcible entry upon and
detainer, or the unlawful detainer, of lands,
tenements and hereditaments is cognizable before the
district court of the county in which the offense is
committed.').  A circuit court may not exercise
jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer action until
the district court has adjudicated the unlawful-
detainer action and one of the parties has appealed
to the circuit court."
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8 So. 3d at 1013.  Section 6-6-310 of the Alabama Code defines
"unlawful detainer":
"UNLAWFUL DETAINER.  Where one who has lawfully
entered into possession of lands as tenant fails or
refuses, after the termination of the possessory
interest of the tenant, to deliver possession of the
premises to anyone lawfully entitled or his or her
agent or attorney."
§ 6-6-310, Ala. Code 1975.  See also Ex parte McKinney, 87 So.
3d 502, 507 n.6 (Ala. 2011) ("'Unlawful detainer is a penal
action, summary in character, specifically designed to oust a
hold-over tenant.'")(quoting Lane v. Henderson, 232 Ala. 122,
124, 167 So. 270, 271 (1936)).
  The County's action is not an action to oust the Fair
Association from possession of the leased premises, and the
Fair Association's possessory 
interest 
in the premises has not
been terminated.  Accordingly, the action cannot be
characterized as an unlawful-detainer action.  Rather, the
action seeks damages for the Fair Association's alleged
failure to make rental payments due under the lease agreement. 
The County also seeks rescission of the lease agreement.  The
County was not required to bring its breach-of-lease and
rescission claims in the district court.  Instead, these
claims fall within the circuit court's subject-matter
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jurisdiction.  See § 142, Ala. Const. 1901; Ex parte Dennis,
681 So. 2d 157, 160 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) ("'[T]here is a
presumption against divestiture of jurisdiction from a court
to a lower court.'")(quoting Thomas v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 368 So. 2d 254, 257 (Ala. 1979)).2
IV.  Conclusion
We reverse the circuit court's judgment entered in favor
of the Fair Association and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
We note that the Fair Association, for the first time on
2
appeal, makes several new arguments in favor of affirming the
judgment of the circuit court.  "'[T]his Court will affirm a
judgment for any reason supported by the record that satisfies
the requirements of due process, Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So.
2d 810, 814 (Ala. 2001), even where the ground upon which we
affirm was not argued before the trial court or this Court. 
Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 2000).'"
CitiFinancial Corp. v. Peoples, 973 So. 2d 332, 340 (Ala.
2007) (quoting Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 380
(Ala. 2006)).  
Several of the Fair Association's arguments challenge the 
validity of the purchase agreement, including the provision
relieving the County of the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair
Association.  For example, the Fair Association argues that
the merger clause contained in the subsequently signed lease
agreement invalidates the purchase agreement.  We have
reviewed these additional arguments and, in light of the
record before us, do not find that they form a basis for
affirming the judgment of the circuit court.
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