Title: Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: January 6, 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KEN HAMLIN,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
HAMPTON LUMBER MILLS, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
dba Willamina Lumber Company,
Respondent on Review.
(CC
040302235; CA A130213; SC S056700)
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 18, 2009.
Craig A. Crispin,
Crispin Employment Lawyers, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.
Brenda K. Baumgart,
Barran Liebman LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent of review.  With her on the brief was Edwin A. Harnden.
Phil Goldsmith,
Portland, filed the briefs for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
Before De Muniz, Chief
Justice, Durham, Balmer, Kistler, Walters, and Linder, Justices, and Gillette,
Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.  
Gillette, J. pro tempore,
filed a dissenting opinion in which Balmer, J., joined.
*Appeal from the Multnomah County
Circuit Court, Richard C. Baldwin, Judge. 222 Or App 230, 193 P3d 46 (2008), on
recons, 227 Or App 165, 205 P3d 70 (2009).  
**Landau, J., did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.
WALTERS, J.
In this case, plaintiff was injured
while working at defendant's mill.  When plaintiff was released to return to
work, defendant refused to reinstate him as required by ORS 659 A. 043, falsely
asserting that he was a "safety risk."  A jury awarded plaintiff lost
wages of $6,000 and punitive damages of $175,000.  On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the punitive damages award was "grossly excessive"
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and reduced the
award to a sum four times the amount of the compensatory damages.  Hamlin v.
Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 222 Or App 230, 238, 193 P3d 46 (2008), on
recons, 227 Or App 165, 205 P3d 70 (2009).  Having allowed plaintiff's
petition for review, we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the punitive damages award.
In accordance with the jury's
verdict, we state the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  See
Jensen v. Medley, 336 Or 222, 226, 82 P3d 149 (2003) ("We state the
facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, because [plaintiff] was the
prevailing party before the jury.").  Defendant operated a lumber mill and
employed approximately 380 employees.  Defendant employed plaintiff as a
temporary employee through Express Personnel Services (Express).  When
plaintiff came to work at defendant's mill, defendant did not instruct plaintiff
how to "lock out" its machinery to safely clear jams and avoid injury,
nor did it issue plaintiff the locks necessary to do so.  Instead, plaintiff was
instructed to watch the other employees and to do what they did.  On the night
that plaintiff was injured, defendant directed plaintiff to stand at a
specified location, which later was determined to be unsafe.  Plaintiff did as
instructed, and when a board became wedged between a conveyor belt and a bin, plaintiff
was unable to "lock out" the machinery and safely clear the jam.  One
of defendant's employees told plaintiff to grab the board, and when he attempted
to do so, the machinery caught his glove and mangled his thumb.
Plaintiff was hospitalized and unable
to work for four months.  During that time, defendant twice told plaintiff that
his job was secure.  Defendant did not suggest to plaintiff or anyone else that
plaintiff was a "safety risk" or that he had been at fault in causing
his injury.  Defendant prepared a written report describing the incident in
which plaintiff had been injured.  That report did not suggest that plaintiff
was responsible for his own injury or that he constituted a "safety risk." 

While he was unable to work, plaintiff
filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, which was granted, and a safety
complaint with Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
which was dismissed.  When plaintiff's physicians released him to resume work, plaintiff
contacted Express and sought reinstatement at defendant's mill.  
Express contacted the Oregon Bureau
of Labor and Industries (BOLI) to inquire whether a temporary employee in
plaintiff's position had reinstatement rights.  Express learned that defendant
generally was required to reinstate temporary employees, such as plaintiff,
under ORS 659 A. 043,(1)
and communicated that information to defendant.  Defendant deliberately decided
not to reinstate plaintiff and falsely asserted that he was a "safety
risk."
Plaintiff then filed this action
against defendant, asserting (among other claims)(2)
a claim for failure to reinstate under ORS 659 A. 043 and a claim for retaliation
for filing charges with OSHA under ORS 654.062(5).(3) 
Plaintiff sought $10,968 in economic damages, $100,000 in noneconomic damages,
and $969,000 in punitive damages.  A jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff on
his failure to reinstate claim and awarded him lost wages of $6,000.(4) 
The court rendered a verdict for plaintiff on his OSHA retaliation claim and
awarded him lost wages of $10,000.(5)
The court instructed the jury that,
to award punitive damages, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's
conduct amounted to "a particularly aggravated, deliberate disregard of
the rights of others."  The court permitted the jury to consider various
factors in determining the amount of punitive damages to award, including "the
sum of money that would be required to discourage the defendant and others from
engaging in such conduct in the future; and the income and assets of the
defendant."  The jury awarded punitive damages of $175,000.
Defendant filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, contending that the trial court
was required to reduce the punitive damages award to comport with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Specifically, defendant asserted that the punitive damages award in this case
failed to meet the constitutionality "guideposts" prescribed by the
United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996), and other cases.  Defendant
argued (among other things) that the ratio between the compensatory and
punitive damages was close to 30:1 and greatly in excess of the single-digit ratio
demanded by due process.  In opposing defendant's motion, plaintiff argued that
the Supreme Court expressly had declined to impose a strict ratio and that the
sum awarded by the jury was appropriate to meet the state's interest in
deterring and punishing illegal conduct.  The trial court agreed with
plaintiff, concluded that the punitive damages award "was not unconstitutionally
excessive," and entered judgment against defendant for the full amount of
damages awarded by the jury.(6)
Defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals, renewing its assertion that the punitive damages award in this case
was so "grossly excessive" that it violated due process.  The Court
of Appeals agreed.  It reasoned that, measured by the guideposts articulated in
Gore and other United States Supreme Court cases and reviewed and refined
by this court in Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 344 Or 232, 179 P3d 645
(2008), the punitive damages verdict was unconstitutionally large.  Hamlin,
222 Or App at 238.  The Court of Appeals decided that defendant's actions were
only moderately reprehensible and had produced only economic harm, id.
at 239-41, that the nearly 30:1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages
was well outside the asserted 4:1 limit for such cases, id. at 241-44, and
that the third guidepost, which examines comparable civil and criminal
sanctions, was unhelpful either way.  Id. at 246-47.  The court
therefore concluded that the constitutional limit on the punitive damages award
was four times the amount of the compensatory damages award (i.e., four
times $6,000 plus prejudgment interest).  Id. at 250. 
On review, plaintiff argues that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying the ratio guidepost too strictly.  Plaintiff
contends that when, as in this case, a compensatory damages award is small, a
punitive damages award that is more than a single-digit multiplier of the
compensatory damages award is constitutionally permissible.  Plaintiff also
asserts that, because defendant's conduct violated a statute, and particularly
a statute prohibiting discrimination against a worker, its conduct is more than
moderately reprehensible.
Before we consider the merits of plaintiff's arguments,
we first review the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that discuss the
limitations that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on
awards of punitive damages.  The Court has held that that clause prohibits "grossly
excessive" punitive damages awards.  State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 US 408, 416, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L Ed 2d 585 (2003); Gore,
517 US at 568.  "Grossly excessive" punitive damages awards are awards
that serve no legitimate state purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation
of property.  Campbell, 538 US at 417.
The Supreme Court has instructed
courts that, to arrive at a conclusion about whether a punitive damages award
is "grossly excessive," they are to consider three "guideposts."
 See Campbell, 538 US at 418 (summarizing guideposts); Gore,
517 US at 574-75 (noting guideposts).  The first guidepost is the degree to
which defendant's conduct is reprehensible.  Campbell, 538 US at 418; Gore,
517 US at 575.  The second guidepost examines the disparity between the
punitive and compensatory damages awards, usually in the form of a ratio.  See
Campbell, 538 US at 424-25; Gore, 517 US at 580 (both so
explaining).  The third guidepost compares the punitive damages award to
legislatively prescribed civil and criminal penalties for comparable misconduct. 
Campbell, 538 US at 428; Gore, 517 US at 583.
The second guidepost is the only quantitative
guidepost that the Supreme Court has announced.  The Court has suggested that, "in
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process[,]"
Campbell, 538 US at 425.  In this case, the Court of Appeals primarily relied
on the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in concluding that the
award of punitive damages was "grossly excessive."  Hamlin,
222 Or App at 241.  Because plaintiff challenges that analysis, we begin with
the second guidepost and its applicability in this case.
Key to understanding the second
guidepost is the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to set any "rigid benchmark"
beyond which a punitive damages award becomes unconstitutional.  See, e.g.,
Campbell, 538 US at 424-25; Gore, 517 US at 582 (both to that
effect).  The Court has explained that, "[i]n our federal system, States
necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive
damages that they will allow[,]" and that due process permits punitive
damages that are "reasonably necessary to vindicate the State's legitimate
interests in punishment and deterrence."  Gore, 517 US at 568.  Therefore,
the Court has concluded that "[o]nly when an award can fairly be
categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter
the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. 
The Supreme Court also has recognized
that a state may be unable to achieve its goals of deterrence and retribution
if awards of punitive damages must, in all instances, be closely proportional
to compensatory damages.  In one of the first
cases to discuss constitutional limits on punitive damages, the Court used a hypothetical
from a 1931 law review article to explain why significant punitive damages may
be appropriate in some cases: 
"'For instance, a man wildly fires a gun into a crowd.  By
sheer chance, no one is injured and the only damage is to a $10 pair of
glasses.  A jury reasonably could find only $10 in compensatory damages, but
thousands of dollars in punitive damages to teach a duty of care.  We would
allow a jury to impose substantial punitive damages in order to discourage
future bad acts.'  [Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W Va 656, 661,
413 SE2d 897, 902] (citing C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
Harv L Rev 1173, 1181 (1931)) [(hereinafter Morris)]."
TXO Production Corp v.
Alliance Resources Corp, 509 US 443,
460, 113 S Ct 2711, 125 L Ed 2d 366 (1993).  In the law review article that
the court cited, Professor Morris further described the admonitory function
that tort damages -- both compensatory and punitive -- serve:  
"When an act with a vicious tendency happens to result
in a small injury the 'compensatory' damages are necessarily small.  If it must
follow that the punitive damages must also be small, the total verdict might be
lenient where severity is desirable.  On the other hand, if the 'compensatory'
damages are large, the defendant is severely admonished without the addition of
any punitive damages; but in such a case the ratio test counsels large punitive
damages, and may result in over-severity entirely unnecessary for the proper
working of the admonitory function [of tort law]."
Morris, 44 Harv L Rev at 1182. 
To
address that concern, the Supreme Court has suggested that reviewing courts may
consider not only the compensatory damages awarded by the jury, but also the potential
harm that could have resulted from the defendant's acts.  Campbell,
538 US at 418; Gore, 517 US at 581-82; TXO, 509 US at 460-61.  The
Supreme Court also has stated that higher ratios than otherwise permitted may
be justified "'in cases in which the injury
is hard to detect' * * *, or when the value of injury and the corresponding
compensatory award are small[.]"  Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 US 471, 494, 128 S Ct 2605, 171 L Ed 2d 570 (2008) (emphasis added).(7)
In
this case, the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of the Court's
decision in Exxon and cited Gore, 517 US at 582, for the
proposition that, to come within the exceptions identified in that case, not
only must the compensatory damages be small, but a defendant's conduct also
must be "particularly egregious."  Hamlin, 222 Or App at
244-45.  Although Gore identified the circumstance in
which particularly egregious conduct results in small compensatory damages as
one in which higher ratios may be permitted, the court did so in the context of
listing examples of the kinds of cases in which flexibility in applying
ratios was necessary.  In Gore, the court stated: 
"Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may
properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for
example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages.  A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which
the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine.  It is appropriate, therefore, to reiterate
our rejection of a categorical approach." 
517 US at 582 (emphasis
added).  The Supreme Court's purpose was to caution against the
categorical use of ratios and not, in our view, to set forth an exclusive list
of exceptions to a ratio requirement.  See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.,
340 Or 35, 63, 127 P3d 1165 (2006), vac'd on other grounds, 549 US 346,
127 S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed 2d 940 (2007), on remand, 344 Or 45, 176 P3d
1255 (2008) (identifying an exception to the general rule of single-digit
ratios not listed in Gore for cases of "extraordinarily reprehensible"
behavior).(8)
Lower federal and state courts
have ruled accordingly.  For example, in Saunders
v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of VA,
526 F3d 142, 152-54 (4th Cir 2008), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a punitive
damages award of $80,000 when the compensatory award was $1,000.  The court explained
that other federal courts were in general agreement that, in that circumstance,
limiting punitive damages to a single-digit ratio would fail to serve the
purposes of punitive damages.  The court stated:  
"[W]hen a jury only awards nominal damages or a small
amount of compensatory damages, a punitive damages award may exceed the normal
single digit ratio because a smaller amount 'would utterly fail to serve the
traditional purposes underlying an award of punitive damages, which are to
punish and deter.'  Kemp v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F3d 1354,
1364-65 (11th Cir 2004) (allowing punitive damages award of $250,000
accompanying compensatory damages of $115.05); see also Abner v. Kan. City
S. R.R., 513 F3d 154, 165 (5th Cir 2008) (affirming punitive damages award
of $125,000 accompanying nominal damages of $1); Mathias v. Accor Econ.
Lodging, Inc., 347 F3d 672, 674-78 (7th Cir 2003) (affirming $186,000
punitive damages award accompanying compensatory damages of $5,000); Lee v.
Edwards, 101 F3d 805, 811 (2d Cir 1996) (rejecting ratio analysis because 'the
compensatory award here was nominal, [so] any appreciable exemplary
award would produce a ratio that would appear excessive by this measure')."
Id. at 154 (brackets and emphasis in original). 
Goff
v. Elmo Greer & Sons Const. Co., Inc., 297 SW3d 175 (Tenn
2009), cert den, ___ US ___, 130 S Ct 1910 (2010), is also illustrative. 
In that case, the defendant, a construction company working on a highway expansion
project, intentionally buried tires and other waste under several feet of
compacted rock on the plaintiff's property.  For that conduct, a jury awarded
the plaintiff $3,305 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages.(9) 
On review, the state supreme court first determined that defendant's conduct "d[id]
not constitute an environmental hazard or threaten the health or safety of any
individual" and that the defendant's actions did not reach the highest
levels of reprehensibility; consequently, the ratio of 302:1 was excessive.  Id.
at 195.  Nonetheless, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the federal
constitution requires the punitive and compensatory damages ratio be in single
digits, concluding that such a claim "reflects an overly restrictive view
that does not comport with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject."
 Id. at 194.  The court determined that a punitive damages award of
$500,000 (a ratio of 151:1) was adequate to send a "strong message."  Id.
at 196.  
We
agree that, when the compensatory damages award is small and does not already
serve an admonitory function, the second guidepost -- the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages -- is of limited assistance in determining whether the
amount of a jury's punitive damages award meets or exceeds state goals of
deterrence and retribution.  If we rely too heavily on the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages in those circumstances, we risk interfering with legitimate
state interests by striking down awards that are reasonably calculated to deter
and punish illegal conduct and that are, therefore, constitutionally permitted.
Before considering the degree to
which the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages is a reliable
indicator of unconstitutionality in this case, we must identify the damages
awarded and calculate the ratio between them.  We use the $175,000 punitive
damages award as the numerator and the compensatory damages award of $6,000,
plus prejudgment interest, as the denominator.  See Goddard, 344 Or
at 269-70 (prejudgment interest is considered as part of compensatory
damages).  For purposes of the ratio calculation in this opinion, we estimate
the amount of prejudgment interest to be approximately $2,000(10)
and calculate the ratio as approximately 22:1.  
In deciding whether the compensatory
damages award is small, we are mindful, just as the Supreme Court has been,
that the process of identifying due process limits demands flexibility and a
consideration of the facts and circumstances that each case presents.  Just as
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to draw a rigid dividing line between
constitutional and unconstitutional ratios, we are unwilling to draw a rigid
line between "small" and "substantial" compensatory damages
awards.    
We do note, however, that we have characterized
an award of compensatory damages of less than $25,000 as "relatively small"
and "low."  Williams, 340 Or at 60.  Furthermore, a compendium
of cases from other jurisdictions demonstrates that courts generally hold that,
in instances in which compensatory awards are $12,000 or less, awards in excess
of single-digit ratios are not "grossly excessive."  See Lauren
R. Goldman and Nicholai G. Levin, State Farm at Three:  Lower Courts'
Application of the Ratio Guidepost, 2 NYU J L & Bus 509, 514-15
(2005-06) (of 40 decisions in which the compensatory damages award was $25,000
or less, 24 upheld punitive damages awards with a double-digit or higher ratio,
and 23 of those 24 involved compensatory damages awards of $12,000 or less).   
In this case, $6,000 in lost wages is
a relatively small recovery that we would not expect to serve an admonitory, as
well as a compensatory, function.   Defendant does not argue, for example, that,
due to its size or financial circumstances, the compensatory damages award here
had a greater effect on it than we would anticipate that award having on a
typical employer.  Evidence in the record indicates that, in the year in which
it violated ORS 659 A. 043, defendant employed approximately 380 workers, that its
net worth was approximately $10 million, and that its gross profit was approximately
$2.8 million.  We conclude, therefore, that the fact that the ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages is greater than a single digit does not, in
itself, indicate that the punitive damages that the jury awarded were "grossly
excessive."(11)
We therefore turn to the other
guideposts that the Supreme Court has identified for assistance.  The first of
those -- the reprehensibility guidepost -- is "'[t]he most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award[.]'"  Campbell,
538 US at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 US at 575).  The Court has instructed that
we determine reprehensibility by considering whether   
"the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm
was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. *
* * The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff
may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of
all of them renders any award suspect.  It should be presumed a plaintiff has
been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages
should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid
compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of
further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence."
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
In this case, the Court of Appeals
concluded that two of the five reprehensibility subfactors identified in Campbell
and Gore were present:  "plaintiff was financially vulnerable,
and, to a degree, harm resulted from defendant's 'intentional malice, trickery,
or deceit.'"  Hamlin, 222 Or App at 240.  The parties do not disagree,
but plaintiff contends that this court should recognize an additional
reprehensibility subfactor -- defendant's violation of ORS 659 A. 043. 
In Gore and Campbell,
the Court instructed that we gauge the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award by considering whether it is grossly excessive in relation to
this state's interests.  Campbell, 538 US at 416-17; Gore, 517 US
at 568.  In listing the reprehensibility subfactors that it did, the
Court recognized that states, including this state, have a particular interest
in deterring and punishing conduct that causes its citizens physical harm,
evidences a disregard of their health or safety, or takes advantage of their
vulnerability.
By requiring employers to reinstate
injured workers, the Oregon legislature has protected similar societal
interests in workplace safety and the welfare of its citizens. By authorizing
an award of punitive damages against employers that breach their obligations under
ORS 659 A. 043, the Oregon legislature has indicated its intent to deter and
punish that conduct.  By authorizing an award of noneconomic damages against
employers that breach their obligations under ORS 659 A. 043,(12)
the Oregon legislature also has recognized that the harm that offending
employers inflict may be more than monetary and that a plaintiff who is not
reinstated and who is, therefore, unemployed, is in a more vulnerable position
than is a person who is employed when he or she suffers monetary loss.  A
person who suffers a loss of employment is without the present ability to earn
money to recover economic loss and to avoid further consequential loss. 
Although the Supreme Court did not
specifically identify the interests protected by ORS 659 A. 043 as
reprehensibility subfactors in Campbell and Gore, we think
that the Oregon legislature's affirmative action to protect qualitatively
similar state interests permits us to consider defendant's statutory violation
in our reprehensibility analysis.  When we also recognize, as did the jury and
the Court of Appeals, that defendant's conduct included
"intentional malice, trickery, or deceit," we conclude that
defendant's conduct was more than minimally reprehensible.  
In reaching that conclusion, we do
not mean to indicate that we consider defendant's conduct to approach that of
the defendant in Williams, 340 Or at 39-43.  In that case,
we considered the conduct of the defendant to be "extraordinarily reprehensible"
because the defendant had "engaged in a prolonged pattern of egregious and
deceitful conduct that pose[d] an extreme threat to the health and safety of a
significant segment of the population of the state[.]"  Goddard,
344 Or at 258, 258 n 3 (describing conduct of defendant in Williams).  In
this case, we conclude only that defendant's conduct was sufficiently
reprehensible that, in the circumstances presented -- where the compensatory
damages are low and the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages is
not a reliable indicator of the constitutionality of the punitive damages award
-- defendant's conduct may justify an award of punitive damages in excess of a
single-digit multiplier of the compensatory damages awarded.  
We next consider the third guidepost
that the Supreme Court has identified -- comparable civil or criminal
sanctions.  The parties do not challenge the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the only sanction that Oregon law provides for violation of ORS 659 A. 403
is a civil action against an offending employer and that, as a result, the
third guidepost neither militates against, nor supports, a punitive damages
award in excess of a single-digit multiplier of the compensatory damages award.
 See Hamlin, 222 Or App at 247 (stating conclusion).  In that
circumstance, the third guidepost does not play a significant role in our
analysis.  
Having decided that the punitive
damages award in this case may exceed a single-digit multiplier of the
compensatory damages award without violating due process, we still must decide
whether the amount of punitive damages actually awarded -- $175,000 -- is,
nevertheless, "grossly excessive."  In that regard, we note first that
the jury's award is different in order of magnitude from the multimillion dollar, three-digit multiplier,
punitive damages awards that the Supreme Court invalidated as "grossly
excessive" in Gore ($2 million punitive damages award in 500:1
ratio to compensatory damages) and Campbell ($145 million punitive
damages award in 145:1 ratio to compensatory damages).  The punitive damages
award in this case is less than $200,000 and is a low double-digit (22:1)
multiplier of the compensatory damages award.  
We
also note that the amount of the punitive damages award in this case is
not "grossly excessive" when measured by awards that legislatures and
courts have permitted in similar circumstances.  For
instance, Title VII prohibits certain acts of
discrimination in employment and authorizes the imposition of punitive damages
on a showing that the defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice"
with "malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights
of an aggrieved individual."  42 USC § 1981a(b)(1).  Title VII places
limits on the total amount of compensatory and punitive damages that may be
awarded, ranging from a limit of $50,000 for employers with fewer than 100
employees to a limit of $300,000 for employers with 500 or more employees.  42
USC § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D).  Title VII permits punitive damages up to
those statutory caps without regard to the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages.  For employers like defendant,
with more than 200, but less than 500 employees, the applicable limit is
$200,000.  42 USC § 1981a(b)(3)(C).  The award of punitive and compensatory
damages in this case is less than that sum. 
In
the following cases, appellate courts similarly have approved punitive damages
in amounts and in ratios greater than or similar to those present in this
case:  Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfg., 399 F3d 52, 56 (1st Cir 2005) (punitive damages
award of $199,999; compensatory damages $1, for 199,999:1 ratio in Title VII
discrimination claim); Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 428 F3d
629, 649 (6th Cir 2005), cert den, 549 US 946 (2006) (punitive damages
of $600,000; economic damages of $279.05, for 2,150:1 ratio, for false arrest
and confiscation of lunch voucher by casino security officer); Kemp v. American
Tel & Tel Co., 393 F3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir 2004) (punitive damages of
$250,000; compensatory damages of $115.05, for 2,173:1 ratio, for defrauding
customers); Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, 347 F3d 672, 674 (7th Cir
2003) (punitive damages of $186,000; compensatory damages of $5,000, 37:1
ratio, for bedbug-infested hotel room); Deters v. Equifax Credit Information
Services, 202 F3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir 2000) (punitive damages of $295,000;
compensatory damages of $5,000, for 59:1 ratio, for sexual harassment claim); Goff
v. Elmo Greer & Sons Const. Co., Inc., 297 SW3d 175, 196 (Tenn
2009), cert den, ___ US ___, 130 S Ct 1910 (2010) (punitive damages of 
$500,000; compensatory damages of $3,305, for 151:1 ratio, in common-law
nuisance action); State v. Carpenter, 171 P3d 41, 66 (Alaska 2007)
(punitive damages of $150,000; economic damages of $5,042, for 30:1 ratio, in
spoliation of evidence claim); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140
Idaho 495, 95 P3d 977, 982-83 (2004) (punitive damages of $300,000; compensatory
damages of $735, for 408:1 ratio, in breach of contract case); Craig v.
Holsey, 264 Ga App 344, 590 SE2d 742 (2003), cert den, 543 US 820
(2004) (punitive damages of $200,000; compensatory damages $8,801 for 22:1
ratio, for car accident caused by intoxicated driver).  See also Goldman
and Levin, 2 NYU J L & Bus at 550-55 (in
cases in which compensatory damages were less than $12,000, punitive damages in
double digit or greater ratio awarded and judicially affirmed in 68% of cases;
punitive damages greater than $175,000 awarded and judicially affirmed in 32%
of cases).  
In
this case, the compensatory damages are small and the ratio between the
punitive and compensatory damages -- 22:1 -- is in the low double digits.  That
ratio is higher than would be constitutionally permissible if the compensatory
damages were more substantial, but is not so high that it makes the award "grossly
excessive."  The amount of the punitive damages award -- $175,000 -- also
is not so high that we can say that it exceeds, rather than serves, this state's
interests in deterring and punishing the violation of ORS 659 A. 043.(13) 
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the jury's punitive
damages verdict, and we reinstate it.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
GILLETTE, J. pro tempore,
dissenting.
If the only issue in this case were
whether a punitive damages award of $175,000 is "grossly excessive,"
given defendant's conduct and the jury's $6,000 compensatory damages award, I
would have little trouble concluding that it is not.  However, the Supreme
Court has instructed us not only that punitive damages awards that are
"grossly excessive" are impermissible because they violate the Due
Process Clause, see State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
US 408, 416, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L Ed 2d 585 (2003), but it also has provided
"guideposts" that this court, and other lower courts, must use in
reviewing punitive damages awards for compliance with the Due Process Clause.  Id.
at 418.  My disagreement with the majority is based on its application of those
guideposts -- or, rather, its failure to apply one of those guideposts because
of what it views as an exception to the guidepost.
Before turning to the majority's
rationale for its conclusion that a 22:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court's caselaw, I pause
briefly to consider this court's obligation to follow the Court's guidance. 
When the Supreme Court decides a case, its decisions almost invariably contain
"explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to lawyers and
judges in future cases."  Carey v. Musladin, 549 US 70, 79, 127 S
Ct 649, 166 L Ed 2d 482 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Lower court judges may not "discount the importance of such guidance on the
ground that it may not have been strictly necessary as an explanation of the
Court's specific holding in the case."  Id.  Indeed, even when
applying its own precedents, the Court generally "adhere[s] not only to
the holdings of our prior cases, but also their explications of the governing
rules of law."  Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 US
573, 668, 109 S Ct 3086, 106 L Ed 2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  Thus, to my mind, when the Court
states that specific numerical ratios should be applied to determine whether a
punitive damages award exceeds constitutional limits, those statements are not
mere dicta, but rather constitute binding precedent that we are obliged
to follow.  Our federal system requires us to do what the Court says, not only
what the Court does.
To be sure, the majority does not
contend that we are free to ignore the Court's "ratio" guidepost. 
However, in relying on the "small" amount of compensatory damages
awarded in this case to justify departing from the numerical standards that the
Court has articulated, the majority, in my view, improperly "discount[s]
the importance of [the Court's] guidance." 
As to the substance of the majority's
conclusion, it appears to me that the majority's approach turns on two key
steps.  First, it asserts that the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to
the ratio guidepost for any "small" award of compensatory damages. 
Second, it concludes that any compensatory damages award less than
$12,000 - $25,000 is "small."
Both conclusions are problematic. 
The identified exception to the ratio guidepost is not for all
"small" damages awards, but only for those that also involve
particularly egregious misconduct -- which is not true in this case.  More
importantly, it is bad policy to allow punitive damages awards to be open-ended
below some arbitrary amount of compensatory damages deemed "small,"
because it means that many defendants who do more harm will be punished less.
I begin with the applicable law. 
Briefly, the Supreme Court has articulated three guideposts to be used to
determine whether a punitive damages award exceeds the limits of due process:  
"(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases."
Campbell, 538 US at 418; see BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 574-75, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809
(1996) (same).
My primary dispute with the majority
relates to the second of those guideposts:  the relationship between punitive
and compensatory damages.  The purpose of the ratio guidepost is to "ensure
that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the
amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered."  Campbell,
538 US at 426; see Gore, 517 US at 580 (noting that "[t]he
principle that exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to
compensatory damages has a long pedigree").  Although the United States
Supreme Court has declined to set any bright-line limits for those ratios, the
Court has expressly stated "that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process."  Campbell, 538 US at 425; see
id. ("[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process").  And, in an exhaustive discussion of Gore and Campbell,
this court concluded that punitive damage awards generally should be limited to
single-digit ratios -- and in cases of purely economic injury, to a 4:1 ratio. 
See Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 344 Or 232, 259-61, 179 P3d 645
(2008) (so explaining).
The Supreme Court has recognized
three exceptions to the ratio guidepost.  See Campbell, 538 US at
425 (listing exceptions); Gore, 517 US at 582 (same).  Gore
stated the only such exception relevant to this case as follows:  "[L]ow
awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high
compensatory awards if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted
in only a small amount of economic damages."  517 US at 582.  The Court
repeated that exception in Campbell, directly quoting the Gore
phrasing:  "[R]atios greater than those we have previously upheld may
comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages.'"  538 US at 425 (quoting Gore,
517 US at 582).
In this case, however, the majority
truncates that exception:  It drops the requirement of "particularly
egregious misconduct" and expands the exception to reach all
"small" compensatory damage awards.  The majority's support for that
proposition is a single case:  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 US 471,
128 S Ct 2605, 171 L Ed 2d 570 (2008).  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 9)
(so stating).  Exxon Shipping does not support that conclusion, however. 

Exxon Shipping's discussion of
the constitutional limits on punitive damages concerned a point of law that was
not at issue in the case.(1)
 And while the Court omitted to mention the "particularly egregious"
requirement in the text of the opinion, it specifically quoted the
"particularly egregious" requirement in a parenthetical.  554 US at
494.(2)
 Yet the majority necessarily concludes that the Court intended to abolish the
element.  To put it bluntly, the notion that the Supreme Court has abolished the
"particularly egregious" requirement is not a defensible reading of Exxon
Shipping.
I understand the majority's
motivation, however.  I believe that the majority is concerned about the
consequences of having the ratio guidepost apply to ordinary small awards --
and justifiably so.  No matter what the tort is, if a jury awards only $1 in
nominal compensatory damages, a single-digit ratio of punitive damages -- $9 --
is far too low.  In such cases, the award must be greater than the single-digit
ratio approved in Gore and Campbell.  We do need a solution to
that quandary.
The majority's solution is
effectively to presume that the Supreme Court did not mean what it said.  The
majority does not recognize, however, that doing so creates as many problems as
it solves.  It is not only bad law, it is bad policy.  Let me explain.  The
majority, having concluded that the ratio guidepost does not apply to any "small"
compensatory damages award, then suggests that the upper end of "small"
awards is in the $12,000 - $25,000 range.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14).  From
that idea, the majority leaps to the conclusion that $8,000 in compensatory
damages permits punitive damages of at least $175,000.
But consider what would happen if
this plaintiff had suffered $12,000 in damages, not just $8,000.  At that point
(or thereabouts), the ratio guidepost would kick in, and accordingly the
maximum ratio (subject to adjustment) generally would be 4:1.  See Goddard,
344 Or at 260 (for cases of purely economic injury).  Therefore, the maximum
constitutionally permissible punishment would be limited to only $48,000
(subject to some adjustment up or down).  Similarly, if this plaintiff had been
injured $25,000, he would have been entitled to punitive damages of only
$100,000.   
That point is worth emphasizing.  If
this defendant had done more than triple the amount of damages in this
case ($25,000), the maximum constitutionally permissible punitive damages award
would be reduced by over 40% from what the majority approves here.  If
this defendant had done quadruple the amount of damages ($32,000), the maximum
permissible punitive damages award still would be reduced by over 25% (to
$128,000).
How could an equitable rule require a
plaintiff who suffers more harm to receive less punitive
damages?  How could a fair rule permit a defendant who inflicts more harm to be
punished less?  The majority's rule will effectively reward defendants for
inflicting more harm on plaintiffs, while punishing those plaintiffs
unfortunate enough to have suffered extra harm.  However well intentioned, it
is a mistake for the majority to institutionalize that result.  "[T]he
penalty scheme [wrongdoers] face ought to threaten them with a fair probability
of suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage."  Exxon
Shipping, 554 US at 502.
The majority's approach creates
another problem.  In its effort to avoid punitive damages awards that are too
small, the majority instead allows punitive damages awards that are too
large.  There are plenty of small torts that deserve punitive damage
awards, but not $175,000 or more.  The defendant who publicly spits in a
plaintiff's face should be punished -- but $200,000 worth?  Yet the majority's deferential
analysis of small compensatory damage awards would impose no real restraint on such
an outcome.
For the lower half of damage awards,
then, the majority creates a topsy turvy world, in which the less harm you do,
the more you can be punished.  Measured by the actual damages that the
defendants cause, the least dangerous defendants can be punished with
constitutionally inappropriate punitive damages, while the more dangerous
defendants are protected by the ratio guidepost.(3)
I would propose a different
solution.  The key is to recognize that some punitive damages awards are small
enough that they do not implicate substantive due process concerns, even if the
misconduct essentially resulted in no harm to a party at all.  An entire genre
of court cases regularly involves financial penalties that are intended to
punish and deter misconduct.  Those financial penalties are familiar to all of
us:  They are civil penalties and criminal fines.  When those civil penalties
and criminal fines are in "ordinary" amounts, their constitutionality
is neither disputed nor disputable.  
So, too, then, with awards of
punitive damages.  Such awards, when comparable in amount to civil penalties or
criminal fines already prescribed by the legislature, do not raise any concerns
about being "grossly excessive," which is what the Gore
guideposts are intended to protect against.  See Campbell, 538 US at
416-17 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor." 
(Citations omitted.)); Gore, 517 US at 562 (to the same effect).
For that reason, it would be easy for
the courts to determine whether the award was, in effect, de minimis non
curat lex.(4) 
Awards below the de minimis amount would not be subject to the Gore
guideposts and would not require any sort of substantive Gore/Campbell
judicial review at all.  And, when the court identified an unconstitutional
punitive damages award, the appropriate remittitur would never drop below the de
minimis amount.(5)
It is worth pointing out, too, that,
under my analysis, the exception to the ratio requirement stated by the Supreme
Court -- "a particularly egregious act [that] has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages" -- remains important.  There will be cases in
which the de minimis award would fail to recognize adequately how
reprehensible the misconduct was and how near plaintiff came to suffering
extraordinary damages.  The example offered by the majority perfectly
illustrates how the exception applies:  A defendant who fires a gun wildly into
a crowd but only does $10 worth of damages to a pair of glasses should receive
a more severe punishment than the de minimis award.  ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 8).
Based on my review of existing
legislation, I would be inclined to conclude that the de minimis amount
should be $50,000.  That amount represents the maximum criminal fine that the
legislature permits to be imposed against a corporation for committing a
felony.  ORS 161.655(1)(a).  That choice represents a balance of factors.  On
the one hand, criminal fines may be imposed only after a trial with procedural
safeguards that are not available in civil actions; that fact would counsel for
a lower de minimis amount.  See Campbell, 538 US at 428 ("Great
care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal
penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a
criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards
of proof.").  On the other hand, corporations can only be fined -- they
face no risk of imprisonment -- and the fine for corporations is well below
that which may be imposed on individuals.  See ORS 161.625(1) (fines for
individuals can range from $125,000 for a Class C felony to $500,000 for murder
or aggravated murder).  Furthermore, in many cases corporations represent the
more dangerous civil defendants.  In this particular case, defendant is a
corporation.  The choice of $50,000 thus seems reasonable and appropriate.
In this case, the jury awarded
$175,000.  That is well above the de minimis amount, so we should apply
the Gore guideposts.  As applied to this case, I agree with the Court of
Appeals that defendant's misconduct was not particularly reprehensible.  See
Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 222 Or App 230, 239-41, 193 P3d 46
(2008), on recons, 227 Or App 165, 205 P3d 70 (2009) (explaining that
only two of the five reprehensibility subfactors exist here).(6) 
Because this case involved only economic harm ‑‑ it is not an
action for physical injury, but for unlawful refusal to reinstate the plaintiff
to his job -- I would conclude that the appropriate ratio for punitive damages
under Gore should be 3:1, or roughly $24,000.  See Goddard, 344
Or at 260 ("as a very general rule of thumb," punitive damages awards
for solely economic injury should not significantly exceed 4:1).  That amount,
however, is less than the de minimis amount of $50,000.  Accordingly, I
would hold that the punitive damages award should be subject to a remittitur of
punitive damages to $50,000.
I add one final note:  a plea to the
Supreme Court of the United States.  For years this court generally, and I
personally, have struggled to apply Gore and Campbell faithfully
to the cases before us.  This case represents but one of the many problems that
have cropped up in the seven years since the Court decided Campbell. 
The courts around are in need of -- indeed, I will assert that we deserve --
further guidance that only the Court can provide.  Whether the Court agrees
with my analysis, or the majority, or something in between, does not matter to
me.  But it would be a responsible act of comity for the Court to say something
clear to help in future cases.
I respectfully dissent.
Balmer, J., joins in this dissenting
opinion.
1. ORS
659A.043(1) provides:
"A worker who has sustained a compensable
injury shall be reinstated by the worker's employer to the worker's former
position of employment upon demand for such reinstatement, if the position
exists and is available and the worker is not disabled from performing the
duties of such position."
2. Plaintiff asserted a total of four claims for relief against
defendant:  failing to reinstate him (ORS 659A.043), retaliating against him
for making a safety complaint to Oregon OSHA (ORS 654.062(5)), retaliating
against him for filing a workers' compensation claim (ORS 659A.040), and
wrongful termination.  The jury decided against plaintiff on his claims for
workers' compensation retaliation and for wrongful discharge.  No issues
regarding the claims other than the failure to reinstate claim are presented on
review.
3. ORS
654.062(5) provides:
"It is an unlawful employment practice for
any person to bar or discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate
against any employee or prospective employee because the employee or
prospective employee has:
"(a) Opposed any practice forbidden by ORS
654.001 to 654.295, 654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780; 
"(b) Made any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to ORS 654.001 to
654.295, 654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding; or
"(c) Exercised on behalf of the employee,
prospective employee or others any right afforded by ORS 654.001 to 654.295,
654.412 to 654.423 and 654.750 to 654.780."
4. The
jury found that plaintiff's lost wages were $10,000, but that he had
unreasonably failed to mitigate $4,000 of those damages.  The jury declined to
award noneconomic damages.  
5. Unlike
the jury, the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had
unreasonably failed to mitigate his damages on the OSHA retaliation claim.  Violation
of ORS 654.062(5) does not permit an award of noneconomic or punitive damages. 
ORS 659A.885(3) (authorizing punitive damages for violations of listed
statutes, not including ORS 654.062(5)).  
6. The trial court entered two separate "general money
judgments" in this case, one on August 25, 2005, the other on October 20,
2005.  The judgments are essentially identical, save for the pre- and
post-judgment interest provisions.  Both judgments awarded plaintiff $185,000
-- compensatory damages of $10,000 (constituting both the $6,000 awarded by the
jury on the failure to reinstate claim and the $10,000 awarded by the trial
court on the OSHA retaliation claim) and punitive damages of $175,000. The
trial court later entered a supplemental judgment awarding plaintiff $72,506.90
in attorney fees, plus costs.  Defendant does not contest the computation of
those judgments in this court.
7. The
Court's holding in Exxon was based on federal maritime law, but the
Court discussed the constitutional limits on punitive damages in the course of
that opinion.
8. The dissent charges that we wrongly "truncate" the Gore exception by
dropping the requirement of "particularly egregious misconduct," ___Or
at ___ (Gillette, J., dissenting, at 4).  However, the dissent also eliminates
that requirement for punitive damages awards under $50,000, and, notably, thus
necessarily recognizes that the Gore exceptions are not an exclusive
list of the instances in which the multiplier of compensatory damages may
exceed a single-digit.  The difference between the dissent and the majority is
that the dissent would judicially cap punitive damages in small compensatory
damage cases at $50,000.   The dissent suggests a legislative "solution to
[the] quandary," ___Or at ___ (Gillette, J., dissenting, at 6, 8-10),
instead of confining its inquiry to the issue presented -- the constitutional
limits imposed by the Due Process Clause.  The dissent's proposal is not drawn
from Supreme Court precedent; instead it conflicts with the Supreme Court's
refusal to set "rigid benchmarks" beyond which a punitive damages
award becomes unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Campbell, 538 US at
424-25; Gore, 517 US at 582 (both to that effect).
9. The
jury initially had awarded $2 million in punitive damages, but the trial
court reduced the award to $1 million because that was what the plaintiff had
sought in the complaint.  Goff, 297 SW3d at 179. 
10. As the Court of Appeals noted, some doubt exists regarding the correct
amount of prejudgment interest.  See Hamlin, 222 Or App at 243 n 6 (so
indicating).
11. Because we reach that conclusion, the dissent understands us to be
drawing a numerical line between "small" and "substantial"
compensatory damages awards that compels two different applications of the
ratio guidepost and that, in its view, produces anomalous results.  For
instance, if we were to consider a compensatory damages award of $11,000 to be
"small," but a compensatory damages award of $12,000 to be
"substantial," it would be anomalous for the former award to justify
a punitive damages award of $175,000 (a 16:1 ratio), but the latter award to
justify a punitive damages award of only $48,000 (a 4:1 ratio).  We have three
responses.  
First, we do not intend to draw a
hard and fast numerical line between "small" and
"substantial" compensatory damage awards.  What is "small"
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the admonitory
effect of the compensatory damages. 
Second, we see the proportionality
aspect of the due process analysis as a continuum -- the lower the compensatory
damages, the higher the permitted ratio and, conversely, the higher the
compensatory damages, the lower the permitted ratio.  Thus, for example, if a
jury were to award compensatory damages of $100, a punitive damage award of 100
times that sum -- an award of $10,000 -- could be justified.  But if a jury
were to award compensatory damages of $10,000, a punitive damages award of 100
times that sum -- an award of $1 million -- could be "grossly
excessive."  Understood in that way, the difference between compensatory
damages of $11,000 and compensatory damages of $12,000 would not result in a
choice between a 16:1 or a 4:1 ratio.  If a defendant's conduct caused $11,000
in compensatory damages and justified a punitive damages award of $175,000,
neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that similar conduct that
resulted in compensatory damages of $12,000 could not justify a similar
punitive damages award. 
Third, when a defendant's conduct
causes substantial harm, the damages awarded generally will be different in
degree from those we consider "small."  In other words, if a
defendant inflicts more than minimal harm, it is likely that a plaintiff will
recover substantial compensatory damages and that a single-digit multiplier of
that award will produce punitive damages greater than or equal to those
produced by a higher multiplier of lower compensatory damages.  For example, if
a defendant were to cause harm that resulted in an award of $50,000 in
compensatory damages, an award of four times that sum would result in punitive
damages of $200,000.
12. ORS 659A.885(1) authorizes a court, in a civil action under ORS
659 A. 043, to
"order injunctive relief and any other equitable relief
that may be appropriate, including but not limited to reinstatement or the
hiring of employees with or without back pay."
A court is further authorized to award "compensatory
damages or $200, whichever is greater, and punitive damages[.]"  ORS
659A.883(3).  Compensatory damages include both economic and noneconomic
damages.  See Tadsen v. Praegitzer Industries, Inc., 324 Or 465, 928 P2d
980 (1996) (under earlier, but identical, version of ORS 659A.885(3),
plaintiff's compensatory award included both economic and noneconomic damages);
Griffin v. Tri-Met, 318 Or 500, 870 P2d 808 (1994) (same). 
13. The
dissent agrees that the compensatory damages in this case are small enough that
the otherwise permissible multiplier (the dissent assumes a permissible
multiplier of three) does not establish the maximum constitutionally
permissible punitive damages award.  In the dissent's view, however, the amount
of the punitive damages must be capped at $50,000.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
11).  The Due Process Clause does not impose such a cap.
1. See Exxon Shipping, 554 US at 501-02 ("Today's enquiry
differs from due process review because the case arises under federal maritime
jurisdiction, and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime
law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process * * *.").
2. The Court stated:
"Regardless of culpability, however,
heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable * * * when the
value of injury and the corresponding compensatory award are small (providing
low incentives to sue), see, e.g., [Gore, 517 US at 582] ('[L]ow
awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio * * * if,
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages') * * *."
554 US at 494 (second alteration and second ellipsis in
original; emphasis added).
3. The majority, disagreeing with my analysis, offers three responses. 
All of them miss the point.
The majority first asserts that there
is no "hard and fast numerical line" defining "small"
compensatory damages awards.  ___ Or at ___ n 11 (slip op at 15 n 11).  The
absence of a "hard and fast" rule does not affect the validity of my
contention.  If this jury had awarded this plaintiff more
compensatory damages -- which plaintiff asked the jury to do -- then this
compensatory damages award would not have been "small," and this punitive
damages award would have been unconstitutional.
Second, the majority (apparently
assuming for purposes of argument that $12,000 does mark the upper limit of
"small" compensatory damages awards) asserts that if an $11,000 award
would justify $175,000 in punitive damages, then a $12,000 award would justify
a comparable award.  ___ Or at ___ n 11 (slip op at 15 n 11).  The problem is
that the majority has just denied what its opinion holds.  If a $12,000
compensatory damages award is not "small," then the "small
compensatory damages" exception to the ratio guidepost does not apply,
by definition.  The majority thus cannot appeal to the "small
compensatory damages" exception to justify a punitive damages award of
$175,000 on compensatory damages of $12,000.  Such an award is sustainable, if
at all, only if some other exception applies.
Third, the majority seemingly asserts
that there is no problem because, when the compensatory damages are large
enough, even those punitive damages awards subject to the ratio guidepost will
exceed the award here.  "[I]f a defendant were to cause harm that resulted
in an award of $50,000 in compensatory damages, an award of four times that sum
would result in punitive damages of $200,000."  ___ Or at ___ n 11 (slip
op at 15 n 11).  That statement is true, but beside the point.  The majority's
exception for "small" compensatory damages awards (below $12,000)
necessarily means that a whole range of defendants who cause more than $12,000
harm will be punished less.  Indeed, at a 4:1 ratio for economic harm, a
defendant would have to inflict nearly $44,000 in damages to justify the same
$175,000 punitive damages award that the majority approves here for $8,000.
4. "The law does not notice or concern itself with trifling
matters."  Black's Law Dictionary 1826 (9th ed 2009).
5. The majority effectively asserts that I am also recognizing an
additional "exception" to the ratio guidepost.  ___ Or at ___ n 8
(slip op at 10-11 n 8).  That misunderstands the breadth of my argument.  If it
were an exception, it would apply only to the ratio guidepost, and so courts
still would have to address the other two Gore guideposts
(reprehensibility and comparable civil penalties).  As I just noted, however, I
would conclude that awards below the de minimis limit are not subject to
any substantive due process review at all.
The majority's suggestion that my
proposal would violate Supreme Court precedent by setting "rigid
benchmarks beyond which a punitive damages award becomes
unconstitutional," ___ Or at ___ n 8 (slip op at 10-11 n 8) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), also misreads my argument.  The de minimis
award amount is not a ceiling beyond which punitive damages may not go.  It is
a safe harbor against substantive due process challenges to any punitive
damages award up to $50,000.
6. I am not persuaded by the majority's assertion that the violation of the
statute at issue here represents an additional form of reprehensibility beyond
the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Gore and Campbell.  
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 17-18).