Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3075.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3075 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. MCCAFFERTY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3075.] 
Judges—Misconduct—Felony convictions—Lying to FBI agents—Conduct 
prejudicial to administration of justice—Conduct adversely reflecting on 
fitness to practice law—Violation of rules of Code of Judicial Conduct, 
including those prohibiting noncompliance with law and abuse of prestige 
of office—Indefinite suspension imposed, without credit for time served 
under interim felony suspension, to begin when term of federal supervised 
release is completed. 
(No. 2013-0939—Submitted August 21, 2013—Decided July 17, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2012-056. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Bridget Marie McCafferty of Westlake, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0055367, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1991.  Prior to this, McCafferty had no disciplinary history. 
{¶ 2} McCafferty served as a judge on the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas from January 11, 1999, until September 15, 2010, when she was 
arrested.  In February 2011, McCafferty was indicted by a federal grand jury on 
multiple counts of making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001.  In August of that year, a jury found McCafferty 
guilty on all counts. 
{¶ 3} On September 14, 2011, we imposed an interim suspension on 
McCafferty’s license to practice law based on her conviction.  In re McCafferty, 
129 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2011-Ohio-4605, 953 N.E.2d 334.  On August 6, 2012, the 
Ohio State Bar Association, relator, filed a complaint with the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline against McCafferty, requesting that 
McCafferty be disciplined. 
{¶ 4} On January 23, 2013, a three-member panel of the board held a 
hearing.  The parties stipulated that McCafferty’s convictions constituted certain 
rule violations.  In accordance with this stipulation, the panel found that 
McCafferty’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R.  8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or 
trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law).  The panel further found that McCafferty 
violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 (a judge shall comply with the law), 1.2 (a judge shall 
act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, 
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and impartiality of the judiciary), 1.3 (a judge shall not abuse the prestige of 
judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or 
others), and 2.4(B) (a judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or 
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or 
judgment).  The panel recommended that McCafferty be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law with no credit for time served under the 2011 interim 
felony suspension. 
{¶ 5} On June 6, 2013, the board adopted the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation of the panel and recommended that 
McCafferty be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio with no 
credit for time served, with costs taxed to McCafferty. 
{¶ 6} We adopt the board’s findings of fact, misconduct, and 
recommended sanction.  We find that an indefinite suspension from the practice 
of law with no credit for time served during the felony suspension is the 
appropriate sanction in this case. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 7} In the summer of 2007, the FBI formally opened an investigation 
based on allegations of widespread corruption among public officials and public 
employees in and around Cuyahoga County.  The primary focus of the 
investigation was on Cuyahoga County Commissioner James Dimora and 
Cuyahoga County Auditor Frank Russo. The FBI intercepted some 44,000 
telephone conversations between various public officials and private citizens in 
furtherance of the investigation. These calls included conversations between 
McCafferty, Frank Russo, and others in which she revealed that she had used or 
intended to use her influence in cases in her courtroom to advance the interests of 
Russo and Dimora and to get more favorable settlement terms for local 
businessman Steve Pumper.  This misuse of her judicial position was not charged 
in the criminal complaint and is not part of the instant case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 8} On September 23, 2008, FBI Agents Oliver and Curtis pulled into 
McCafferty’s driveway unannounced as she was taking her garbage cans to her 
garage.  They asked if they could talk to her about the Cuyahoga County 
corruption investigation.  McCafferty agreed and invited them inside to sit at her 
kitchen table. 
{¶ 9} The agents asked McCafferty numerous questions about Dimora, 
Russo, and Pumper.  McCafferty denied that Dimora had ever attempted to 
influence or intervene in any cases before her court.  She also denied that Dimora 
had any involvement in any cases before her court. When questioned about Russo, 
McCafferty told the federal agents that she had never spoken to Russo about any 
of her cases.  And when asked about Steve Pumper, McCafferty denied ever 
attempting to sway settlement negotiations for Pumper.  And she denied ever 
telling Pumper that she had tried to settle his case for less money. 
{¶ 10} The agents stopped the interview and told McCafferty that they 
knew she was being dishonest.  They warned her that lying to federal agents was a 
federal crime.  They even told her about the wiretapped conversations and 
offered, multiple times, to play the tapes for her.  McCafferty repeatedly refused 
to listen to the recordings. 
{¶ 11} McCafferty was indicted, tried, and convicted on ten counts of 
violating 18 U.S.C. 1001, making false statements to federal law enforcement.  In 
sentencing McCafferty, the trial court merged the counts, reducing the number to 
four.  The court applied an upward variance from a standard sentence due to the 
fact that McCafferty was a sitting judge at the time she committed her crimes.  
McCafferty received the maximum sentence of 14 months in prison, with three 
years of supervised release.  She was also ordered to serve 150 hours of 
community service and pay a fine of $400. 
{¶ 12} On September 13, 2011, McCafferty reported to Federal Prison 
Camp Alderson in West Virginia.  She completed her prison term with good-time 
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credit, and on September 17, 2012, she began serving three years of probation in 
accordance with her sentence.  She has completed her community-service 
requirement and paid her fine and has no requirements left on her probation other 
than filing a monthly report with her probation officer.  Barring a parole violation, 
McCafferty will complete her term of supervised release on September 17, 2015. 
{¶ 13} The day after her incarceration, we imposed the interim felony 
suspension, and 11 months later, the complaint now before us was filed.  A panel 
of the board held a hearing in January 2013. The parties stipulated to the 
following: (1) Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(B), McCafferty’s federal conviction 
of four counts of providing false statements “constitute[s] conclusive evidence 
that she engaged in the charged acts and conduct,” (2) McCafferty’s actions 
constitute a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b), (c), (d), and (h), and (3) 
McCafferty’s actions constitute a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.2. 
{¶ 14} McCafferty disputed that her conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 and 
2.4.  Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 provides, “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial 
office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or 
allow others to do so.”  Jud.Cond.R. 2.4(B) and (C) provide, “A judge shall not 
permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to 
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment,” and a judge “shall not convey 
or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a 
position to influence the judge.”  The board, however, found that McCafferty had 
violated these rules.  The board concluded that McCafferty’s false statements to 
the FBI about Russo’s and Dimora’s attempts to influence her judicial conduct 
were attempts to make herself appear less susceptible to such influence than she 
actually was and that through those false statements, she abused the prestige of 
her office to advance her personal interest and the interests of Russo and Dimora.  
We agree. Thus, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding McCafferty’s misconduct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Sanction 
{¶ 15} When determining the appropriate sanction to impose on 
McCafferty for her violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, we consider the duties violated, respondent’s 
mental state, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, 
and applicable precedent.  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 
2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 45; Disciplinary Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 29, 2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 513, ¶ 11; Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 
89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000).  McCafferty has not offered 
evidence of any medical disability or chemical dependency that contributed to her 
ethical violations.  Thus, we presume that she was healthy and unhindered at the 
time.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 
N.E.2d 324, at ¶ 84, citing  Disciplinary Counsel v. Sargent, 118 Ohio St.3d 322, 
2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 31. 
{¶ 16} This court has stated that judges are held to the highest possible 
standard of ethical conduct. Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 
23, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958); Hoskins at ¶ 42.  Canon 1 of the Ohio Code of Judicial 
Conduct states that a judge “shall uphold and promote the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.”  As the board correctly observed, a judge’s violation 
of these duties can undermine public confidence in the judiciary, particularly 
when the violation constitutes a felony,  Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 
Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998) (“When a judge’s felonious conduct 
brings disrepute to the judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed”).  By 
her own admission, McCafferty violated duties imposed upon her by the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The most basic of those 
duties is to adhere to the law at all times without fail.  McCafferty thus had the 
duty to be truthful with the FBI without regard to the outcome for herself, Russo, 
January Term, 2014 
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Dimora, or others.  Her failure to cooperate with the FBI resulted in prolonging a 
federal investigation, and McCafferty’s conviction undermined public confidence 
in the judiciary. 
{¶ 17} In aggravation, the parties have stipulated and the board has found 
that McCafferty’s conviction arose from conduct that involved dishonesty. BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1).  We agree.  We further observe that McCafferty’s insistence 
that she subjectively believed that she was telling the truth to the FBI agents, 
despite the fact that there are recordings of telephone calls demonstrating that she 
was not telling the truth, is an aggravating factor in this case.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(g). 
{¶ 18} In mitigation, the board found the following factors: McCafferty 
had no prior disciplinary record, she displayed a cooperative attitude during the 
disciplinary proceedings, she submitted many letters attesting to her good 
character and reputation, she had a record of extensive community service, and 
she had suffered prior penalties for this misconduct, such as the loss of her 
judgeship, incarceration, a fine, court-ordered community service, and supervised 
release.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), (e), and (f).  We agree.  We further 
observe that McCafferty has made a timely good-faith effort to rectify the 
consequences of her misconduct.  Examples of this include McCafferty’s prompt 
completion of the 150 hours of community service imposed as a result of her 
conviction, prompt payment of her monetary penalty, and her efforts in tutoring 
women in prison to help them to obtain a GED.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c). 
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 19} The relator has maintained that permanent disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction, and the case law supporting disbarment is clear. McCafferty 
has requested a fixed suspension of 24 months.  The board has recommended an 
indefinite suspension with no credit for the time served under the interim felony 
suspension imposed in September 2011. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 20} This court affirms its position that “ ‘judges are held to higher 
standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not 
invested with the public trust.’ ”  O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 
814 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and 
Ethics 2 (3d Ed.2000).  The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect 
the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and to bolster 
public confidence in the institution.  Id. at ¶ 33, citing Kloepfer v. Comm. on 
Judicial Performance, 49 Cal.3d 826, 864-865, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239 
(1989). 
{¶ 21} We recognize the board’s observation, at relator’s urging, that this 
court has found disbarment to be an appropriate sanction for a judge who has been 
convicted of a felony.  Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (judge 
disbarred after federal conviction for distributing cocaine); Disciplinary Counsel 
v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209 (judge 
disbarred after being convicted of multiple federal offenses for burning down his 
house to defraud an insurance company).  And this court has disbarred judges for 
dishonest conduct that has not resulted in a felony conviction.  Hoskins, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 N.E.2d 324 (judge disbarred for multiple 
violations involving serious deceit and misrepresentation). 
{¶ 22} We also recognize that this court has not always permanently 
disbarred a judge for dishonest conduct.  Evans, 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 733 N.E.2d 
609 (six-month stayed suspension for judge who, as judicial candidate, used 
township property and the labor of inmates and welfare recipients that he did not 
pay for or disclose).  Even when the misconduct results in a felony conviction, 
disbarment is not inevitable.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Crane, 56 Ohio St.3d 38, 
564 N.E.2d 96 (1990) (indefinite suspension with no credit for time served for 
judge convicted of federal tax evasion and filing a false return).  And this court 
has said, “ ‘[P]roof of a criminal conviction is generally not conclusive of the 
January Term, 2014 
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issue of moral turpitude, which required consideration of all the circumstances 
surrounding the illegal conduct.’ ” McAuliffe at ¶ 24, quoting Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Burkhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 188, 191, 661 N.E.2d 1062 (1996). 
{¶ 23} We agree with the board that the circumstances in this case can be 
distinguished from Gallagher, McAuliffe, and Hoskins, in which judges were 
permanently disbarred.  In those cases, the judges had engaged in criminal 
conduct over a period of time, from a few days to months, and the misconduct 
was preplanned. 
{¶ 24} Certainly McCafferty’s conduct warrants a severe sanction. She 
was convicted on multiple counts of lying to FBI agents about conversations with 
people who were the subject of a county-wide corruption investigation.  In 
addition, McCafferty was deceptive about the nature of those conversations, most 
particularly that those conversations included matters that had been before her in 
court. Notwithstanding, the conduct that led to the criminal convictions and rule 
violations occurred during a single impromptu conversation with FBI agents, 
rather than as a pattern of premeditated criminal conduct.  Thus, we agree with the 
board that imposition of the system’s most severe sanction is not warranted in this 
case. 
{¶ 25} But we also do not believe that the appropriate sanction is a fixed-
term suspension.  Despite McCafferty’s cooperative attitude during the 
disciplinary proceedings, we are troubled by the contradiction between 
McCafferty’s assertion that she accepts full responsibility for her actions and her 
statement that she believed that she had answered the agents’ questions as 
truthfully as she could.  She clings to this claim, despite its utter implausibility in 
the face of the recorded conversations.  Thus, we determine that an indefinite 
suspension without credit for time served is the appropriate sanction for her 
misconduct. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, Bridget Marie McCafferty is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio with no credit for any period of earlier 
suspension. Her interim felony suspension continues until she completes all terms 
of her federal supervised release and has been discharged by the federal district 
court, and this indefinite suspension will begin at that time.  Costs are taxed to 
McCafferty. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 27} I do not see how the majority can square a sanction of a mere 
indefinite suspension with its statements that “[t]his court has stated that judges 
are held to the highest possible standard of ethical conduct,” majority opinion at 
¶ 16, citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151 N.E.2d 
17 (1958), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-
3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 42, and that “ ‘ “judges are held to higher standards of 
integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the 
public trust,” ’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 20, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 814 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting 
Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics 2 (3d Ed.2000). 
{¶ 28} I disagree that Bridget McCafferty’s case should be distinguished 
from other cases in which a judge has been disbarred.  She has been convicted of 
a felony, as were the judges in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mosely, 69 Ohio St.3d 
401, 632 N.E.2d 1287 (1994); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 
51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998); Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 
315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 29} We are to consider all the circumstances surrounding her conduct 
in determining what sanction should be imposed for these disciplinary violations.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B); Hoskins at ¶ 79.  McCafferty was convicted on 
multiple counts of lying to FBI agents about conversations with people who were 
the subject of a county-wide corruption investigation.  Those conversations, 
which the FBI intercepted, revealed that she had used or intended to use her 
influence in cases in her courtroom to advance the interests of Frank Russo, 
Jimmy Dimora, and a local businessman.  This misconduct strikes at the very 
heart of the judiciary. 
{¶ 30} And it is not conduct that we can ignore, as the majority opinion 
attempts to do.  The majority focuses solely on McCafferty’s conversation with 
FBI agents and paints her conduct as a one-time, brief lapse in judgment.  This 
narrow characterization is simply untrue; McCafferty’s misconduct was more 
prolonged and more egregious than the majority admits.  Months before she ever 
spoke to the FBI, McCafferty was swaying judicial outcomes for political 
associates and giving special consideration to high-ranking politicians.  There can 
be no dispute that this conduct occurred.  McCafferty’s criminal indictment 
outlined her involvement with Dimora and Russo, and she stipulated, at her 
disciplinary hearing, to engaging in the conduct described in the indictment.  Even 
without this clear stipulation, her convictions alone would still establish an 
irrebuttable presumption that this particular misconduct occurred.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(5)(B).  We must therefore presume that she grossly abused her judicial position 
for political favor. 
{¶ 31} There can also be no dispute that this misconduct is part of the case 
before us.  The disciplinary complaint specifically charged McCafferty with 
violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 (“A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial 
office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or 
allow others to do so”) and Jud.Cond.R. 2.4 (“A judge shall not permit family, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the 
judge’s judicial conduct or judgment”).  Both of these rule violations relate to her 
abuse of office and her involvement with Russo and Dimora.  It therefore makes 
no sense for the majority to claim that McCafferty’s misuse of her position is “not 
a part of the instant case.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 7.  If it formed the basis for her 
rule violations—violations which the majority upholds—then it is clearly part of 
this case and we must consider it in imposing our sanction. 
{¶ 32} We have stated that “[w]hen a judge’s felonious conduct brings 
disrepute to the judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed,” and the 
judge deserves “the full measure of our disciplinary authority.”  Gallagher, 82 
Ohio St.3d at 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078.  If the primary purposes of judicial discipline 
are to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and 
to bolster public confidence in the institution, then nothing short of disbarment 
should be imposed in this case. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Douglas N. Godshall, Eugene P. Whetzel, and Joseph S. Kodish, for 
relator. 
 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Kimberly 
Vanover Riley, for respondent. 
_________________________