Title: Shooting Point LLC v. Wescoat

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico,* S.J. 
 
SHOOTING POINT, L.L.C., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 020801 
 
JOHN W. WESCOAT 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          February 28, 2003 
 
JOHN W. WESCOAT 
 
v.  Record No. 020803 
 
SHOOTING POINT, L.L.C., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we primarily consider whether the 
chancellor erred in determining the location of an easement and 
in ruling that the proposed use of the dominant estate as a 
residential subdivision would not overburden the servient 
estate. 
 
John W. Wescoat owns a tract of land in Northampton County 
(the Wescoat parcel) that is subject to a recorded easement in 
favor of a 176-acre tract owned by Shooting Point, L.L.C. (the 
Shooting Point parcel).  The easement, which is 15 feet wide and 
0.3 mile in length, is the only means of ingress and egress 
between the Shooting Point parcel and a nearby state highway.  
                     
 
* Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of 
In response to a plan by Shooting Point, L.L.C. (Shooting Point) 
to develop its parcel into a residential subdivision, Wescoat 
filed a bill of complaint alleging, among other things, that 
Shooting Point's proposed use of its parcel would "impose an 
additional and unreasonable burden on the easement" over 
Wescoat's land. 
 
After hearing the evidence ore tenus, the chancellor ruled 
that use of the Shooting Point parcel as a residential 
subdivision would not overburden the servient estate.  The 
chancellor also determined that the actual location of the 
easement was as shown on certain survey plats.  Both Wescoat and 
Shooting Point appeal. 
 
The evidence before the chancellor showed that the Shooting 
Point parcel is separated from State Highway Route 622 (Route 
622) by the Wescoat parcel.  The easement, which follows a dirt 
road over the Wescoat parcel, is located between a field on one 
side and woods on the other side.  The dirt roadway has three 
90-degree turns, including two turns that are "blind" where the 
wooded areas obscure approaching traffic. 
 
In 1974, Wescoat's predecessors in title executed and 
recorded a written grant of easement establishing the right-of-
way.  The grant described the location of the easement in the 
following terms: 
                                                                  
his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
 
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[S]aid right-of-way easement to follow the present 
road leading from Virginia State Highway Route 622 to 
lands . . . known as Shooting Point Farm, said present 
road running generally in a northerly direction from a 
point in a turn of said Virginia State Highway Route 
622 to a point at or near a corner of a certain woods, 
thence turning in a generally easterly direction and 
running along the northern edge of said woods to a 
point at or near the edge of said woods, thence 
turning in a generally northerly direction and 
following along the edge of said woods to a point at 
or near a corner of said woods, thence turning in a 
generally easterly direction and running along the 
edge of said woods until the boundary line separating 
Shooting Point Farm from the [Wescoat parcel] is 
reached, at which boundary line the said right-of-way 
easement terminates. 
 
The grant further described the right-of-way as "the only 
easement to provide a means of ingress and egress" from Route 
622 to the Shooting Point parcel.  The grant did not contain a 
clause limiting use of the easement. 
 
At the time the easement was established, both the servient 
estate and the dominant estate were used primarily for 
agricultural and recreational purposes.  In June 1979, Shooting 
Point's predecessors in title conveyed 13.2 acres at the 
southern border of the Shooting Point parcel to Richard E. 
Meekins, Sr.  The deed conveyed to Meekins the right to use the 
easement as shown on a plat prepared in May 1979 by Bonifant 
Land Surveys (the Bonifant plat). 
 
In December 1999, Shooting Point purchased the dominant 
estate and began planning the development of a residential 
subdivision.  The proposed subdivision has 18 residential lots, 
 
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each averaging over five acres, which border a 50-acre lot to be 
preserved as "open space." 
 
Shooting Point recorded a plat in the circuit court clerk's 
office, prepared by Baldwin & Gregg Surveyors (the Gregg plat), 
that showed the proposed subdivision and the 15-foot-wide 
easement connecting the Shooting Point parcel to Route 622.  The 
Gregg plat incorporated the Bonifant plat and, in depicting the 
easement, adopted the Bonifant plat's courses, distances, 
measuring points, and centerline. 
 
Shooting Point also recorded a declaration of protective 
covenants that incorporated the Gregg plat, and later used that 
plat to describe the easement in a deed of trust conveying a 
subdivision lot to a trustee.  Shooting Point conveyed certain 
other subdivision lots in five separate deeds, each conveying 
the right to use the easement and referencing the Gregg plat's 
depiction of the right-of-way. 
 
In January 2000, Wescoat sent a letter to some of the 
subdivision lot purchasers advising them that the easement was 
restricted to a width of 15 feet.  Wescoat further informed the 
purchasers that the right-of-way would be "clearly marked" to 
make them aware of the easement's width.  Wescoat's son placed 
two stakes 15 feet apart at the easement's entrance near Route 
622 that straddled the existing usage of the easement.  A large 
 
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sign was placed near the stakes that read, "Begin 15 Foot Right 
of Way." 
 
In February 2000, Wescoat filed a bill of complaint against 
Shooting Point alleging that Shooting Point's proposed use of 
its parcel as a residential subdivision was not reasonable and 
would create "an additional and unreasonable burden" on the 
easement.  Wescoat asked the chancellor, among other things, to 
enjoin Shooting Point from selling and conveying the remaining 
lots in the proposed subdivision. 
 
In January 2001, Wescoat employed George E. Walters, a 
certified land surveyor, to survey the easement and to place 
markers delineating its course.  After Walters situated the 
markers on the property, Wescoat's son placed wooden posts 
outside those markers along the roadway to designate the 
easement's course.  In general, the pathway created by the posts 
followed the line of the woods more closely than the existing 
roadway and resulted in "sharper" 90-degree turns. 
 
In February 2001, Wescoat filed a bill of complaint for 
declaratory judgment against Shooting Point, L.L.C., Shooting 
Point Property Owners Association, Inc. (collectively, Shooting 
Point), and others, seeking various rulings concerning Shooting 
Point's use of its property.  The chancellor consolidated 
Wescoat's two suits for trial. 
 
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Before trial, Shooting Point requested leave to file a 
cross-bill in Wescoat's declaratory judgment suit.  In its 
proposed cross-bill, Shooting Point sought a determination of 
the easement's location and removal of the posts that Wescoat's 
son had placed along the course of the easement.  The chancellor 
denied Shooting Point's motion. 
 
Shooting Point also filed a motion in limine to exclude 
from evidence Walters' testimony and the two revised plats he 
prepared depicting the easement (the Walters plats) on the 
ground that this evidence was not timely disclosed.  Shooting 
Point did not receive copies of Walters' revised plats until the 
day before trial. 
 
In response to the motion in limine, Wescoat noted that no 
order had been entered regulating discovery in the case, and 
that Shooting Point also was not timely in its disclosures, 
having designated an expert witness only the day before trial.  
The chancellor denied Shooting Point's motion in limine. 
 
On the first day of trial, Wescoat moved the chancellor to 
continue the case on the ground that the issue of the easement's 
location was not properly before the court.  Shooting Point 
opposed the motion, arguing that the issue was "directly" before 
the court.  The chancellor denied the continuance motion. 
 
At trial, the chancellor received evidence from expert 
witnesses indicating that the proposed residential subdivision 
 
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would generate daily about ten vehicle trips per lot.  Thus, the 
proposed subdivision would result in an additional 180 trips 
daily over the easement. 
 
Wescoat's son, John W. Wescoat, Jr., testified that 
vehicles traveling in opposite directions on the easement could 
not pass at the same location.  John stated that the worn 
roadway remained the same from 1977 to 1999, and that, after 
Shooting Point purchased its parcel, the traffic on the easement 
increased and the roadway became wider as motorists drove around 
"mudholes" in the easement and "cut" corners at the turns in the 
roadway. 
 
Curtis Jones, Jr., Wescoat's cousin, leased both the 
Wescoat and Shooting Point parcels for farming purposes.  Jones 
testified that he and his employees make heavy use of the 
easement when they plant, maintain, irrigate, and harvest the 
crops. 
 
Wescoat presented the testimony of Walters, who qualified 
as an expert witness on the subject of land surveying.  He 
testified that the easement was first surveyed in 1979 by P. 
Bonifant, and that Walters created his plats in an attempt to 
"resurvey" the easement shown on the Bonifant plat. 
 
Walters stated that he first chose a buried survey pin, or 
"rebar," that he discovered in the middle of the existing 
roadway near Route 622 to mark the centerline of the easement, 
 
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and that he originally used that centerline in his plat to 
delineate the easement's course.  However, after a consultation 
with Bonifant, Walters later concluded that a " 'bent rebar' 
marker," located approximately nine feet east of the other 
"rebar," was the marker indicating the correct location of the 
easement's centerline.  Walters testified that he revised his 
plats to reflect the "bent rebar" as the centerline of the 
easement, which resulted in a nine-foot eastward shift of the 
easement's entrance onto Route 622. 
 
Walters stated that the course designated on his revised 
plats reproduced the easement as shown on both the Gregg and the 
Bonifant plats.  Walters opined that the present usage of the 
easement had moved westward since the time of Bonifant's survey 
and explained that the paths of farm roads "tend to wander" as 
motorists drive vehicles around potholes and tree limbs that 
protrude into roadways. 
 
Shooting Point presented the expert testimony of James B. 
Latimer, II, a licensed land surveyor, who testified that the 
easement's centerline in the Bonifant plat "is closer to the 
east, closer to the woods than the physical road that's there."  
He also stated that the roadway has always been in its present 
location. 
 
Shooting Point also submitted expert testimony from 
Millison E. Duff, Jr., a licensed surveyor and president of 
 
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Baldwin & Gregg Surveyors.  Duff stated that the Gregg plat 
adopted the Bonifant plat's depiction of the easement because 
that depiction "appeared to follow generally along the road that 
we had evidence of being in existence at that time." 
 
Duff further testified that the "bent rebar" located about 
nine feet east of the center of the existing roadway was the 
survey pin that Bonifant used to mark the easement's centerline.  
Duff stated that if Bonifant's centerline were followed, the 
eastern border of the easement would "go right through an 18-
inch pine tree," and motorists traveling on the easement would 
"scrape" the right side of their vehicles against the tree.  
Duff said that he did not believe that anyone presently could 
determine the precise location of the roadway in 1974 "short of 
doing a soils analysis."  However, he concluded that the 
Bonifant plat was the "best evidence" available concerning the 
easement's location when the Gregg plat was prepared in 1999. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the chancellor held that 
the Bonifant plat, the Gregg plat, and the Walters plats were 
the "best evidence" of the easement's location, and that the 
easement's location was accurately depicted on those plats.  The 
chancellor stated that "[a]ny attempt to establish an alteration 
[of the designated easement] would simply amount to no more than 
guesswork or speculation on the part of the Court."  The 
chancellor also held that use of the Shooting Point parcel as a 
 
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residential subdivision would not overburden the servient 
estate. 
 
Shooting Point argues that the chancellor erred in denying 
its motion for leave to file a cross-bill and its motion in 
limine to exclude Walters' testimony and survey plats.  In 
support of these contentions, Shooting Point advances the same 
arguments it made before the chancellor.  We disagree with 
Shooting Point's arguments. 
 
The chancellor's rulings on both pretrial motions were 
proper exercises of his discretion.  First, Shooting Point did 
not need to file a cross-bill to raise the issue of the 
easement's location, which already was before the court as 
Shooting Point observed in its opposition to Wescoat's 
continuance motion.  Moreover, the location of the easement was 
the subject of extensive evidence presented by both parties 
during trial and is before us in this appeal.  Second, the 
chancellor's ruling denying the motion in limine is supported by 
the materiality of Walters' testimony and his plats to the 
issues being tried, and the absence of any order requiring 
earlier disclosure of discoverable information. 
 
Shooting Point next argues that the chancellor erred in 
concluding that the Bonifant plat, the Gregg plat, and the 
Walters plats accurately depict the easement's location.  
Shooting Point contends that the chancellor improperly ignored 
 
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evidence of existing usage and established a new easement 
location.  Shooting Point asserts that a literal application of 
the Bonifant and Walters plats results in an easement that is 
unreasonably close to the line of woods, includes a pine tree 
over 18 inches in diameter, and contains sharp turns that impede 
the passage of larger vehicles.  We disagree with Shooting 
Point's arguments. 
 
An established standard of review governs our consideration 
of both this issue and the issue of the burden placed on the 
servient estate.  The chancellor, as trier of fact, evaluated 
the witnesses' testimony and their credibility.  Tauber v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 520, 526, 562 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2002); 
Johnson v. Cauley, 262 Va. 40, 44, 546 S.E.2d 681, 684 (2001).  
Because he heard the evidence ore tenus, the chancellor's decree 
is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.  Chesterfield 
Meadows Shopping Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350, 355, 
568 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2002); Johnson, 262 Va. at 44, 546 S.E.2d 
at 684; Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill Two Assocs. P'ship, 259 
Va. 685, 696, 529 S.E.2d 318, 325 (2000).  Thus, on appeal, we 
will not set aside the chancellor's findings unless they are 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.  Tauber, 263 
Va. at 526, 562 S.E.2d at 120; Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 
302, 541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001). 
 
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Here, the chancellor received substantial evidence 
supporting his determination of the easement's location.  The 
Bonifant Plat, the first plat depicting the easement, was 
prepared only five years after the easement was established.  
The Gregg plat and the revised Walters plats placed the easement 
at the same location detailed in the Bonifant plat. 
 
The chancellor's determination also is supported by 
Shooting Point's own extensive use of the Bonifant plat's 
location of the easement.  Shooting Point implicitly agreed to 
the accuracy of this location by referring to the Gregg plat in 
five deeds conveying lots to subdivision purchasers, in one deed 
of trust, and in Shooting Point's declaration of protective 
covenants.  In addition, Shooting Point's expert, Duff, 
testified that the Bonifant plat was the "best evidence" 
available of the easement's location when the Gregg plat was 
prepared. 
 
We disagree with Shooting Point's assertion that a literal 
application of these plats incorrectly would place the easement 
too close to the woods.  Although Duff initially testified that 
the eastern border of the easement, as shown in the plats, would 
"go right through an 18-inch pine tree," he effectively modified 
this statement when he later testified that a vehicle traveling 
on the easement would merely "scrape" its side against the tree.    
Also, the chancellor received testimony indicating that the path 
 
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of the worn roadway had "migrated" away from the woods since the 
time of Bonifant's survey. 
We also find no merit in Shooting Point's contention that 
evidence of existing usage showed that Wescoat consented to a 
change in the easement's location.  We initially observe that, 
generally, when a fixed location of a granted easement is 
established, that location may be changed only with the express 
or implied consent of the persons interested.  Buxton v. Murch, 
249 Va. 502, 508, 457 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1995); Fairfax County Park 
Auth. v. Atkisson, 248 Va. 142, 148, 445 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1994); 
Wagoner v. Jack's Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 746, 101 S.E.2d 
627, 630 (1958).  Thus, in the present case, evidence of 
existing usage of the easement was competent evidence for the 
chancellor's consideration. 
Here, however, the evidence of usage did not establish 
consent by Wescoat to a new easement location.  Although Curtis 
Jones, Wescoat's cousin and tenant, sometimes drove his vehicles 
outside the defined course of the easement as a matter of 
convenience, his actions did not indicate that Wescoat consented 
to a different course of the roadway.  Similarly, Wescoat's 
consent cannot be inferred from evidence that after Shooting 
Point purchased its parcel, the worn pathways in the road 
widened as motorists drove their vehicles around mud holes and 
"cut" corners to ease the sharp turns along the roadway. 
 
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The placement of stakes at the easement entrance, and posts 
along the course of the easement, also did not establish 
Wescoat's consent to a different fixed location for the right-
of-way.  Although Wescoat's letter to the subdivision lot owners 
advised that the easement would be "clearly marked," only two 
stakes were placed at the easement's entrance near Route 622.  
The following month, Wescoat initiated the present suit against 
Shooting Point. 
While some posts later were placed along the course of the 
worn roadway, the evidence showed that the path marked by the 
posts generally followed the line of woods more closely than the 
existing roadway and resulted in "sharper" 90-degree turns.  In 
addition, both Shooting Point and Wescoat disputed that the 
pathway created by the posts was the true easement location.  At 
trial, Shooting Point asserted that the posts improperly 
restricted its use of the easement.  Wescoat argued that the 
revised Walters plats, which shifted the easement about nine 
feet to the east of the posts at the entrance onto Route 622, 
depicted the correct location of the right-of-way.  Thus, we 
conclude that the record did not establish an express or implied 
agreement by Wescoat to effect a change in location of the 
easement, and we hold that the chancellor did not err in his 
determination of the easement's location. 
 
14
 
Wescoat assigns error to the chancellor's ruling that 
Shooting Point's use of its parcel as a residential subdivision 
would not overburden the servient estate.  Wescoat argues that 
this use would create an additional burden on his property that 
would adversely impact his ability to use the easement.  He 
alternatively contends that even if Shooting Point's use would 
only result in an increase in degree of the existing burden, 
that increase would have the practical effect of imposing an 
additional burden on the servient estate.  We disagree with 
Wescoat's arguments. 
 
A party alleging that a particular use of an easement is 
unreasonably burdensome has the burden of proving his 
allegation.  Shenandoah Acres, Inc. v. D.M. Conner, Inc., 256 
Va. 337, 342, 505 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1998); Hayes v. Aquia Marina, 
Inc., 243 Va. 255, 259, 414 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1992).  Generally, 
when an easement is created by grant or reservation and the 
instrument creating the easement does not limit its use, the 
easement may be used for "any purpose to which the dominant 
estate may then, or in the future, reasonably be devoted."  Id. 
at 258, 414 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting Cushman Virginia Corp. v. 
Barnes, 204 Va. 245, 253, 129 S.E.2d 633, 639 (1963)); see also 
Collins v. Fuller, 251 Va. 70, 72, 466 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1996).  
However, this general rule is subject to the qualification that 
no use may be made of the easement, different from that 
 
15
established when the easement was created, which imposes an 
additional burden on the servient estate.  Id.; Hayes, 243 Va. 
at 258-59, 414 S.E.2d at 822; Cushman, 204 Va. at 253, 129 
S.E.2d at 639-40. 
 
In the present case, the 1974 grant did not restrict use of 
the easement.  Therefore, we consider whether the evidence 
supports a conclusion that Shooting Point's subdivision of the 
dominant estate is a reasonable use of the parcel that would not 
overburden the servient estate. 
 
Our decisions in Hayes and Cushman illustrate the nature of 
this inquiry.  In Hayes, an operator of a marina on the dominant 
estate, a 2.58-acre tract, proposed to expand its marina 
facility from 84 to 280 boat slips.  The easement providing 
access to the marina was a private roadway about 1,120 feet long 
and 15 feet wide along its entire course.  The agreement 
creating the easement did not restrict its use.  243 Va. at 256-
59, 414 S.E.2d at 820-22. 
 
We held that the record supported the chancellor's 
conclusion that the proposed expansion would not unreasonably 
burden the servient estate, although the "degree of burden" 
would be increased.  We assumed, without deciding, that an 
expanded use of a dominant estate could be of such degree as to 
create an additional burden on a servient estate, but concluded 
 
16
that the proposed marina expansion was not shown to create such 
an additional burden.  Id. at 260, 414 S.E.2d at 823. 
 
Similarly, in Cushman, the instrument creating the easement 
did not contain any language limiting the easement's use.  When 
the easement was established, the dominant estate, a 126.67-acre 
tract, had two dwelling houses and was used as a farm.  The 
owner of the dominant estate proposed to subdivide his land for 
a residential and commercial development that would include 34 
residential lots.  204 Va. at 252-53, 129 S.E.2d at 639-40. 
 
We reversed the chancellor's decree limiting the easement 
to its original uses, stating: 
The fact that the dominant estate is divided and a 
portion or portions conveyed away does not, in and of 
itself, mean that an additional burden is imposed upon 
the servient estate.  The result may be that the 
degree of burden is increased, but that is not 
sufficient to deny use of the right of way to an owner 
of a portion so conveyed. 
 
Id. at 253, 129 S.E.2d at 640.  Emphasis added. 
 
Applying these principles to the present case, we hold that 
the subdivision of the 176-acre Shooting Point parcel into 18 
residential lots is, in the language of Cushman, a purpose to 
which the dominant estate may be reasonably devoted.  See id., 
129 S.E.2d at 639.  Moreover, the record supports the 
chancellor's conclusion that Shooting Point's proposed use of 
the easement would not impose an unreasonable burden on the 
servient estate.  Although the number of vehicles using the 
 
17
easement would increase substantially as a result of the 
proposed use, this fact demonstrates only an increase in degree 
of burden, not an imposition of an additional burden, on the 
servient estate.  Like the facts underlying our decision in 
Hayes, the facts here do not support consideration of a further 
question whether an increased degree of burden could be so great 
as to impose an additional burden on the servient estate. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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