Title: Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12926 
 
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & another1  vs.  CHIEF 
JUSTICE OF THE TRIAL COURT & others2 (No. 2). 
 
 
April 28, 2020. 
 
 
Committee for Public Counsel Services.  Chief Justice of the 
Trial Court.  Commissioner of Correction.  District 
Attorney.  Sheriff.  Parole.  Pretrial Detention.  Supreme 
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, 
Parole. 
 
 
 
The petitioners seek reconsideration or modification of our 
decision in this case, which was issued on April 3, 2020.  
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court, 484 Mass. 431 (2020).  Specifically, they ask us to 
reconsider our determination that neither our inherent judicial 
authority nor our superintendence authority permits a judge to 
stay a final sentence that is being served, absent a pending 
appeal or a motion for a new trial, without violating the 
separation of powers under art. 30 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See id. at 436.  The petitioners also 
assert violations of this court's order with respect to 
reporting requirements of information to be sent to the special 
master, and, in addition, ask this court to expand the reporting 
requirements so as to provide the petitioners with information 
                     
 
1 Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
2 Department of Correction; parole board; Attorney General; 
district attorneys for the Berkshire, Bristol, Cape and Islands, 
eastern, Hampden, middle, Norfolk, northern, northwestern, 
Plymouth, and Suffolk districts; and fourteen sheriffs' 
departments. 
2 
 
 
that might be used to pursue other legal pathways by which the 
population of those held in custody serving sentences might be 
reduced. 
 
 
We affirm our prior decision as to the extent of our 
constitutional authority to stay final sentences absent an 
ongoing challenge to the underlying conviction or a violation of 
constitutional rights.  Notwithstanding the petitioners' 
assertion that our previous "misapprehension" of our authority 
was as a result of the speed with which the decision was issued 
after oral argument, the jurisprudence on this point is well-
established.  We do, however, conclude that some of the 
requested relief as to additional reporting requirements should 
be allowed, and, accordingly, issue a revised Appendix B, 
attached hereto. 
 
 
As we stated in our decision, the executive branch has the 
authority, inter alia, to commute sentences, issue furloughs, 
and allow early parole.  We urge the executive branch to 
contemplate how it best might exercise those constitutional 
powers to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the Commonwealth's 
prison system. 
 
 
Background.  In our prior decision, we recognized that the 
unprecedented and urgent conditions created by the global COVID-
19 pandemic necessitated judicial action to reduce the 
population of those held in custody.  Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., 484 Mass. at 445.  Accordingly, we determined that the 
advent of the pandemic amounted to a changed condition as a 
matter of law, so that any individual who was being held 
pretrial could seek reconsideration of the bail decision which 
resulted in the pretrial detention.  Id. at 435.  For 
individuals not charged with specified offenses as enumerated in 
Appendix A, set forth in that decision, see id. at 454, we 
created a strong but rebuttable presumption of release, id. 
at 447 ("These categories of pretrial detainees shall be ordered 
released on personal recognizance unless the Commonwealth 
establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that release 
would result in an unreasonable danger to the community or that 
the individual presents a very high risk of flight"). 
 
 
At the same time, we determined that "[o]ur broad power of 
superintendence over the courts does not grant us the authority 
to authorize courts to revise or revoke defendants' custodial 
sentences, to stay the execution of sentence, or to order their 
temporary release unless a defendant (1) has moved under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 29, [as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016),] within 
3 
 
 
sixty days after imposition of sentence or the issuance of a 
decision on all pending appeals, to revise or revoke his or her 
sentence, (2) has appealed the conviction or sentence and the 
appeal remains pending, or (3) has moved for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30[, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)]."  
Id. at 450. 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Stays or suspensions of sentences.  As the 
petitioners point out, the bulk of our reasoning in the slip 
opinion focused on their argument seeking a suspension of the 
sixty-day time period in Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, within which a 
judge may revise or revoke a sentence.  See Committee for Pub. 
Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 450.  Having determined that the 
sixty-day time period exists to protect the separation of 
powers, we concluded that it was beyond our superintendence 
authority to eliminate the requirement of a time limit.  Id.  
Moreover, as we noted, the conditions for which a revision may 
be sought must be something that existed at the time of 
conviction.3 
 
 
The petitioners now ask for release, or stay, under our 
inherent authority to stay sentences.  We conclude that the 
global stays of sentences that the petitioners request also 
would co-opt executive functions in ways that are not permitted 
by art. 30. 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 72 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 520 (2000), we said 
that "a judge has the inherent power to stay sentences for 
'exceptional reasons permitted by law.'"  We later explained the 
exceptional reasons more precisely in that case by answering the 
reported question, "In exceptional circumstances, a judge of the 
Superior Court does have the authority to allow a defendant's 
motion to stay the execution of his sentence, then being served, 
pending disposition of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial . . . ."  Charles, supra at 79.  "In the context of a 
pending appeal, the practice of granting a stay of execution of 
sentence 'is grounded in rudimentary notions of justice' because 
a 'conviction may be reversible, but the time spent in prison is 
                     
 
3 In response to an issue raised by the Chief Justices of 
the Trial Court, we clarify that the tolling provision of this 
court's Order Regarding Court Operations under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, 
dated April 1, 2020; our updated order, dated April 27, 2020; 
and any similar orders subsequently issued, apply to motions 
filed under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29. 
4 
 
 
not.'"4  Id. at 77, quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. 
Ct. 501, 512-513 (1979).  See Charles, supra at 78 (elaborating 
on key fact that defendant's "motion for a new trial has 
presented an issue that 'offers some reasonable possibility of a 
successful decision" [quotation omitted]). 
 
 
Other than in circumstances where the validity of the 
underlying conviction is being questioned, however, the 
petitioners have not put forth anything to indicate that this 
court has inherent authority to stay, across the board, all 
sentences that are being executed for certain groups of 
incarcerated individuals, or to create a presumption of stay for 
those individuals.  For even in the broadest formulation of our 
inherent power, any stay, even those granted in exceptional 
circumstances, must be "permitted by law."  See Charles, 466 
Mass. at 72; art. 30 ("the judicial [department] shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of 
them"). 
 
 
The power to stay sentences in the absence of a challenge 
to the underlying conviction after the time period of Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 29 has expired lies in the executive branch.  "In 
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, [175 Mass. 37, 39 (1899)], the court 
said that [Commonwealth v. Hayes, 170 Mass. 16 (1897)] implies 
that, under the statute," the power of the court after all 
appeals have been decided "to vacate the order staying the 
sentence, and to order the sentence executed, does not extend so 
far as to permit a further stay of the sentence on independent 
grounds not affecting the legality or propriety of the 
conviction."  McLaughlin, 431 Mass. at 517.  "That is a strong 
indication that trial judges lack authority to stay execution of 
sentence on independent grounds not affecting the legality or 
propriety of the conviction" (quotation omitted).  Id., and 
cases cited.  We follow this strong indication here.  See 
Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 601–602 (1940), and cases 
                     
 
4 We recognize the petitioners' assertion that an untimely 
death is even less reversible than time spent in prison.  As the 
petitioners note, a claim of substantial and unmitigated risk of 
harm or death is the gravamen of another emergency petition now 
pending before this court, seeking class certification and a 
preliminary injunction on the ground of violations of the 
provision against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See Foster vs. 
Commissioner of Correction, No. SJC-12935.  That claim is the 
proper vehicle by which to seek injunctive relief. 
5 
 
 
cited; Jamnback v. Aamunkoitto Temperance Soc'y, Inc., 273 Mass. 
45, 50 (1930).5 
 
 
The petitioners contend that this court should consider the 
pending claims for declarative relief in another case, Foster 
vs. Commissioner of Correction, No. SJC-12935, as a challenge to 
all of the underlying convictions of all individuals serving 
sentences, so as to satisfy the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. 
P 29.  This contention is unavailing.  First, there is no 
challenge in that case to the underlying convictions of any 
individual; rather, the complaint seeks declaratory relief.  
Granting a stay without such a challenge essentially amounts to 
granting a furlough, which lies within the purview of the 
executive branch.  Thus, if a judge were to suspend execution of 
a sentence that is being served, without any pending motion 
challenging the conviction or the validity of the sentence when 
it was imposed, there could be a significant issue with art. 30 
and the separation of powers.  Moreover, the parties, and the 
incarcerated individuals represented by the plaintiffs in the 
two cases, are not the same.  In any event, we decline the 
petitioners' urging that we order trial judges to suspend 
sentences for large groups of inmates, or to act on a 
presumption that sentences should be suspended. 
 
                     
 
5 Specifically with respect to Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, in 
addition to the sixty-day filing limitation, a judge must 
consider a motion to revise or revoke a sentence within a 
reasonable time after the motion is filed.  See Commonwealth. v. 
DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 150-151 & n.7 (2003).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Barclay, 424 Mass. 377, 380–381 (1997) (six-year 
delay between defendant's sentencing and consideration of motion 
to revise or revoke was unreasonable); Commonwealth v. Layne, 
386 Mass. 291, 295–296 (1982) (stressing that '[w]ith the 
passage of time from the date of sentencing, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for a trial judge to make the 
determination called for by the rule without improperly 
considering postsentencing events"); K.B. Smith, Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 2028 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 2003).  But 
see Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 421 Mass. 472, 473 n.2 (1995) 
("Rule 29 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, . . . requires that a motion to revise or revoke must 
be filed within sixty days of the imposition of a sentence.  
However, under this rule, once the motion is filed, a judge may 
act on it at any time.  See Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 29(a)"). 
6 
 
 
 
2.  Motions for funds.  The petitioners assert that motions 
for funds for social workers and others who are needed to 
establish medical parole eligibility or to put in place release 
plans for paroled individuals are not being heard, or are being 
denied, and that hearings are not taking place in a timely 
manner.  Due to the extraordinary nature of this pandemic, we 
exercise our superintendence authority to require the trial 
court departments to develop procedures to enable counsel to 
seek expedited approval of such funds for those who are being 
held pretrial, those who are civilly committed for substance 
abuse treatment, and those who are serving a committed sentence. 
 
 
3.  Medical records.  The petitioners assert that numerous 
incarcerated individuals continue to experience difficulties in 
obtaining copies of their medical records from the institutions 
in which they are being held.  According to the petitioners, 
"some [institutions] are even requiring attorneys to mail 
medical releases to clients."  At the same time, other 
institutions have been permitting attorneys to request medical 
records and medical releases by electronic mail.  All 
correctional facilities shall accept requests by electronic 
mail, and shall make copies of medical records immediately 
available to the incarcerated person upon request, or to the 
individual's attorney upon request accompanied by signed 
permission by the incarcerated person.  Because attorneys may 
not visit incarcerated individuals at this time, the 
institutions shall obtain the necessary permissions for medical 
releases directly from the individuals; such permissions shall 
be sought expeditiously upon request by the attorney. 
 
 
4.  Reporting requirements.  In our decision in this case, 
we agreed that the potential spread of COVID-19 through jails 
and prisons in the Commonwealth created a situation that is 
"urgent and unprecedented, and that a reduction in the number of 
people who are held in custody is necessary."  See Committee for 
Pub. Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 445.  To facilitate this 
reduction, the petitioners request additional information from 
the respondents in order effectively to exercise legal channels 
by which inmates may pursue release.  For example, they seek the 
identity of those who are serving sentences in houses of 
correction who have not reached their parole eligibility dates, 
but who are eligible for early consideration pursuant to 120 
Code Mass. Regs. § 200.10 (2017).  We agree that it is important 
that the petitioners are able to explore every extant legal 
mechanism by which to reduce the population of incarcerated 
individuals.  Accordingly, the reporting requirements in 
Appendix B, as set forth in our decision, see Committee for Pub. 
7 
 
 
Counsel Servs., supra at 456, shall be amended to enable counsel 
more readily to identify those individuals.  See infra. 
 
 
Similarly, with respect to individuals who are incarcerated 
pending a final probation violation hearing or on a technical 
parole violation, the reporting requirements set forth in 
Appendix B also shall be amended.  See infra. 
 
The petitioners also assert delays and a lack of compliance 
with the reporting requirements we previously ordered.  To the 
extent that they have information about particular instances of 
such noncompliance, as we stated in our decision, the proper 
channel by which to address such issues is to bring these 
concerns to the special master, who may be able to investigate 
and facilitate a resolution. 
 
 
5.  Timeliness of hearings on Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 motions.  
The petitioners assert that responses to emergency motions for 
resentencing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 have been delayed, and, 
once responses are received, hearings on the motions also have 
been delayed.  We emphasize that responses should be filed 
promptly and that hearings should be held expeditiously 
thereafter, in conformance with the guidelines promulgated by 
the trial court departments.  As stated, see note 3, supra, 
these motions are subject to the tolling provisions of this 
court's orders regarding court operations under the exigent 
circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Benjamin H. Keehn, Rebecca Kiley, 
& David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, Laura K. McCready, 
Kristin M. Mulvey, Chauncey B. Wood, & Victoria Kelleher for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
David C. Kravitz, Deputy State Solicitor, for the Attorney 
General. 
 
Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Chief Justice of the Trial Court. 
 
Charles W. Anderson, Jr., for Department of Correction. 
 
Shara Benedetti for parole board. 
 
Rachael Rollins, District Attorney, & Cailin M. Campbell, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Suffolk district. 
8 
 
 
 
Thomas M. Quinn, III, District Attorney, Jonathan Blodgett, 
District Attorney, Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, Joseph 
D. Early, District Attorney, Michael W. Morrissey, District 
Attorney, & Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, for the district 
attorney for the Bristol district & others. 
 
Dan V. Bair, II, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
& Robert Harnais for fourteen sheriffs' departments. 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Appendix B (AMENDED). 
 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
1.  In order to effectuate the purposes of this decision 
and the underlying public health goals, while the COVID-19 state 
of emergency remains in effect, the court asks the Department of 
Correction (DOC) and each sheriff to provide daily reports to 
the special master, the probation service, the district 
attorneys, and Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS), 
identifying: 
 
 
a.  The over-all inmate population; 
 
 
b.  The number of COVID-19 tests and number of positive 
results for all inmates, correction officers, or other staff 
members, including contactors, by facility; and 
 
 
c.  The number of inmates who have been released pursuant 
to the procedures or guidance set forth in this decision. 
 
 
2.  In addition to the above, the sheriffs also shall 
provide the special master, the probation service, the district 
attorneys, and CPCS daily census reports containing the names of 
pretrial detainees, the docket numbers in the cases for which 
they are being held, and the offenses with which they have been 
charged. 
 
 
3.  The probation department shall provide daily reports to 
the special master, the district attorneys, CPCS, and each 
sheriff containing the identity and relevant docket numbers for 
any individual awaiting a preliminary hearing or a final 
revocation hearing for an alleged violation of probation. 
 
 
4.  The parole board shall provide weekly reports to the 
special master, the district attorneys, CPCS, the sheriffs, and 
the DOC, containing the identities of: 
 
 
a.  Incarcerated individuals serving a sentence in a house 
of correction who have not yet reached their initial parole 
eligibility date, but who are eligible to submit a petition to 
the parole board for early consideration pursuant to 120 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 200.10(3) (2017); 
 
 
b.  All incarcerated individuals who have received a 
positive vote for parole but who have not yet been released; 
 
10 
 
 
 
c.  All incarcerated individuals who have received a 
positive vote for parole but for whom release is contingent upon 
completing a particular program or spending time in a lower 
security facility, who with counsel could seek reconsideration 
of the parole contingency under 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 304.03 
(2017); 
 
 
d.  All incarcerated individuals whose parole was revoked 
and who are serving time for a technical violation of parole. 
 
 
e.  Any individuals who previously have submitted a 
petition for medical parole, regardless of the outcome of that 
petition, and who remain incarcerated.