Title: Gaines v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE DISSENTING OPINION 
Filed 2/25/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MILTON HOWARD GAINES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S215990 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B244961 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE  
) 
INSURANCE COMPANY et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC361768 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Plaintiff‘s lawsuit was dismissed for failure to comply with Code of Civil 
Procedure1 section 583.310, which requires that an action ―be brought to trial 
within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.‖  The issue 
here is whether the statute was tolled by an order entered pursuant to the parties‘ 
agreement.  The order struck the trial date and ―stayed‖ the proceedings while the 
parties engaged in mediation and completed all outstanding discovery. 
In computing the five-year time frame, the court must exclude any period 
when the ―[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.‖  (§ 583.340, 
subd. (b), hereafter section 583.340(b).)  The court must also exclude any time 
when it was ―impossible, impracticable, or futile‖ to bring the case to trial.  
(§ 583.340, subd. (c), hereafter section 583.340(c).)  The trial court held that 
                                              
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure.  
2 
 
neither of those tolling provisions saved this case from dismissal.  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the dismissal as to all but one defendant.  We affirm the Court of 
Appeal‘s judgment.  As explained in greater detail below, the statutory framework 
and our own case law recognize that a stay can be either partial or complete.  A 
complete stay will operate to automatically toll the five-year period.  A partial stay 
will not do so unless it results in a circumstance of impossibility, impracticability, 
or futility.  We conclude that the court‘s order did not effect a complete stay of the 
prosecution of the action.  Nor did the order create a circumstance of 
impracticability because plaintiff agreed to it, remained in control of the 
circumstances, and made meaningful progress towards resolving the case during 
the stay period.  Accordingly, the period of the ―mediation stay‖ did not toll the 
five-year period. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Fannie Marie Gaines and her husband, Milton, owned a home in Los 
Angeles with an appraised value of $1.25 million.  They held over $500,000 in 
equity in the property.  A $554,000 loan with Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
(Countrywide) was secured by a first deed of trust.  The Gaineses fell behind in 
their mortgage payments, received two notices of default from Countrywide, and 
failed in their attempts to refinance.  Facing foreclosure, they agreed to sell the 
property to Tornberg, Johnson, and Ray Management (Tornberg) with an option to 
lease the property and repurchase it.  Tornberg obtained loans that were secured by 
the property and subsequently transferred to various entities.  The complaint here 
alleges that Tornberg and others involved in the transaction deceived the couple 
into selling their home under threat of foreclosure. 
Milton died before the suit was filed.  Mrs. Gaines filed a complaint on 
November 13, 2006, alleging negligence, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and failure to follow home equity sales contract requirements contained in 
3 
 
the Civil Code.  She sought rescission and cancellation of the deed transferring 
ownership of the property.   
Once begun, the suit followed an involved procedural journey.  Amended 
complaints and answers were filed and defendants substituted.  In November 2009 
Mrs. Gaines died and her son, Milton Howard Gaines, was substituted as 
successor in interest.2  An extended dispute subsequently arose concerning 
whether one of the defendants, Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Aurora) held legal 
title to the property.  Aurora originally admitted holding title, but subsequently 
urged that Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman), by then in bankruptcy, was 
the actual owner.  Much delay resulted from disputes over that question and 
plaintiff‘s ultimate motion for relief from Lehman‘s bankruptcy stay.  We need not 
delve into those complexities to resolve the question before us. 
On May 19, 2012, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (Fidelity) 
moved to dismiss for failure to bring the action to trial within the five-year time 
frame required by section 583.310.  When the motion was filed, the case had been 
pending for approximately five and a half years.  A trial date was scheduled for 
August 6, 2012.  At no time did Gaines move to advance the trial date.           
In opposition to the motion, Gaines claimed the five-year period had been 
tolled several times.  In computing the period of pendency, the trial court excluded 
two months for the delay resulting from Mrs. Gaines‘s death, and 125 days during 
which plaintiff sought relief from Lehman‘s bankruptcy stay.  Those rulings are 
not disputed here.  However, the court did not exclude the time during which the 
court had vacated the trial date and ordered a 120-day stay of proceedings to 
                                              
2  
For clarity and ease of reading, we simply refer to plaintiff as Gaines 
throughout the opinion except as it becomes necessary to distinguish between 
Fannie Marie and her son, Milton. 
4 
 
permit the parties to engage in mediation.  It concluded that, because this 
mediation period did not support tolling, the scheduled trial date exceed the five-
year limitation by 82 days.  The case was ultimately dismissed in its entirety on 
August 24, 2012. 
The facts relevant to the question before us are undisputed.  In April 2008 
Gaines applied for an order to vacate a September 2008 trial date, which was 
scheduled to occur less than two years into the pendency of the litigation.  The 
application stated that all parties had agreed to vacate the trial date, to stay the 
action for 120 days, and to participate in mediation.  The parties agreed that 
responses to pending discovery requests would not be stayed.  Consistent with this 
agreement, the trial court‘s April 3, 2008 order:  (1) ―struck‖ the current trial date 
of September 22, 2008; (2) ―stayed [the case] for a period of 120 days except that 
[the] parties are to respond to all previously served and outstanding written 
discovery;‖ (3) set a post-mediation and trial-setting conference on July 16, 2008; 
and (4) directed ―all parties . . . to participate in good faith in a mediation of all 
claims in this case within the next 90 days.‖  The ensuing mediation conducted on 
May 30, 2008, was not successful except that Gaines moved to dismiss one 
defendant on June 9, 2008, in exchange for the reconveyance of its $150,000 
interest in the property.   
At a November 6, 2008, status conference, the mediation stay was lifted 
and an August 29, 2009, trial date was set.  The original stay was ordered to last 
120 days, but was actually lifted after 217 days.  The longer period was 
occasioned, in part, by judicial reassignments.  We analyze the legal question here 
in terms of the 217-day period between granting and lifting the mediation stay. 
The trial court concluded that section 583.340(b) did not apply to this 
period because there was not a complete stay of the prosecution as required under 
that exception.  It further concluded that the mediation stay did not create a 
5 
 
circumstance of impossibility, impracticability, or futility under section 
583.340(c).  The stay was requested by plaintiff and was not a circumstance 
beyond plaintiff‘s control.  It was to last only 120 days and did not affect 
previously served and outstanding written discovery.  Further, plaintiff did not 
demonstrate diligence during the period in question.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‘s dismissal as to all defendants 
but Lehman.3  We uphold the Court of Appeal.     
II.  DISCUSSION 
An action must be brought to trial within five years after it is commenced.  
(§ 583.310.)  If this deadline is not met, the action ―shall be dismissed by the court 
on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties . . . .‖ 
(§ 583.360, subd. (a).)  ―The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not 
subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.‖  
(§ 583.360, subd. (b).)  The question before us is whether the trial court‘s order 
vacating the trial date and granting the mediation stay fell within one of the 
statutorily recognized exceptions to the five-year period.  In construing these 
provisions, ―the policy favoring the right of parties to make stipulations in their 
own interests and the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the 
merits are generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for 
failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action . . . .‖  
(§ 583.130.) 
The statutes governing dismissal for delay in prosecution were revised in 
1984.  (Stats. 1984, ch. 1705, § 5, pp. 6176-6180.)  The legislative history makes 
clear that the revision was prepared by the California Law Revision Commission.  
                                              
3  
Its ruling as to Lehman is not before us.       
6 
 
The Legislature and commission intended largely to codify, not supplant, the 
quasi-common law developments in this area that had evolved over the preceding 
decades.  (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1366 (1983-1984 
Reg. Sess.) as amended July 3, 1984, p. 3 [― ‗The major purpose of the bill is to 
clarify ambiguities in the law, to bring the statutes into conformity with case law 
interpreting them, and to reconcile discrepancies in statutes and cases‘ ‖]; Revised 
Recommendation Relating to Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution (June 1983) 17 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) p. 916 [―The statutes should accurately state 
the law.  The proposed law codifies the significant case law rules governing 
dismissal for lack of prosecution . . . .‖].)  Accordingly, in addition to the statutory 
language, a substantial body of case law guides our analysis.         
A.  Submission of the Action to Mediation (§ 1775.7) 
We begin with section 1775.7, which expressly addresses the effect of 
mediation on the running of the five-year period.  That section provides that 
submission of an action to mediation under the title‘s provisions shall not toll the 
running of section 583.310‘s five-year period except when the action is or remains 
submitted to mediation more than four years and six months after the action is 
filed.  (§ 1775.7, subds. (a), (b).)  Although neither party cited the mediation 
statutes in the courts below, we have discretion to consider whether these statutes 
affect this dismissal, which is a question of law raised by the parties and pertinent 
to a proper disposition of the case.  (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 
1001-1002, overruled on another ground in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1172, 1201; People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 195.) 
Section 1775.7 is part of a statutory scheme implementing the civil action 
mediation program.  (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 
536, 540 (Jeld-Wen).)  Its provisions apply to cases with an amount in controversy 
not exceeding $50,000 (§ 1775.5), and to all cases, regardless of potential liability, 
7 
 
when all parties file a written stipulation to mediate (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 
3.890 & 3.891(a)(2); Jeld-Wen, at p. 541).  The parties did so here.   
Section 1775.7 provides for automatic tolling when mediation is conducted 
late in the pendency period.  (Cf. Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 434 (Howard) [discussing parallel provisions of § 1141.17 
governing court-ordered arbitration].)  ―[T]he five-year statute will only stop 
running for [mediations] beginning or continuing into the last six months of the 
five-year period, and then only from the four-year six-month date after filing the 
action until the date a trial de novo is requested.‖  (Howard, at p. 434.)  This 
mediation, which occurred in the second year of litigation, does not qualify for 
tolling under section 1775.7.  Gaines does not contend otherwise. 
B.  Time During Which Prosecution or Trial of the Action was Stayed or 
Enjoined (§ 583.340(b)) 
The order in this case did not simply direct the parties to mediate.  It also 
struck the scheduled trial date of September 22, 2008 and ―stayed [the case] for a 
period of 120 days except that [the] parties are to respond to all previously served 
and outstanding written discovery‖ and ―are directed to participate in good faith in 
a mediation of all claims in this case within the next 90 days.‖  Gaines argues 
these conditions triggered the exception codified in section 583.340(b) that 
requires the court to exclude the time during which ―[p]rosecution or trial of the 
action was stayed or enjoined.‖   
Applying our holding in Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 717, 725 (Bruns), the trial court and Court of Appeal concluded that this 
stay did not qualify for tolling under section 583.340(b) because it was not a 
complete stay of all the proceedings in the action.  We asked the parties for 
supplemental briefing on whether the order striking the existing trial date 
8 
 
constituted a stay of the ―trial of the action‖ under that section.  (Ibid.)  We 
conclude that neither condition was satisfied here. 
1.  Stay of the Trial 
To decide whether section 583.340(b) applies, we must distinguish between 
a stay of the trial and a continuance.  Under section 583.340(b), a stay of the trial 
halts the running of the five-year period.  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 725.)  By 
contrast, a continuance generally does not.  We have long observed that 
―[s]tipulations [by the parties] that merely extend the time for trial within the five-
year period, absent a showing that the parties intended otherwise, will not extend 
the five-year period.‖  (J. C. Penney Co. v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 666, 
669 (J. C. Penney); accord, Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 
333, 337-338 (Miller & Lux); Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1269, fn. 3.)   
The label the trial court uses is not dispositive of the inquiry.  (Holland v. 
Dave Altman’s R. V. Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 (Holland).)  What 
matters is whether the order is functionally in the nature of a stay, which 
implicates the legislative purposes behind tolling the five-year period, or whether 
it is functionally in the nature of a continuance, which does not.  Accordingly, we 
do not read too much into the trial court‘s declaration that the trial date is being 
―struck,‖ as opposed to ―continued‖ or ―stayed.‖  We review the question de novo 
because it does not hinge on the resolution of factual questions concerning 
credibility of extrinsic evidence.  (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 
Cal.2d 861, 865 (Parsons).)       
The long-standing judicial understanding of the term stay in the context of 
the five-year statute is that it refers to those postponements that freeze a 
proceeding for an indefinite period, until the occurrence of an event that is usually 
extrinsic to the litigation and beyond the plaintiff‘s control.  Holland, supra, 222 
9 
 
Cal.App.3d 477, provides an example.  There, the plaintiff appealed the trial 
court‘s order quashing service on one of the defendants.  (Id. at p. 479.)  The 
plaintiff filed an ― ‗Ex Parte Motion for Continuance of Defendant‘s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Trial Date, Mandatory Settlement Conference, and Demand 
for Designation of Expert Witnesses.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 481.)  The trial court ordered 
that ― ‗the trial date set for March 17, 1987 . . . be continued until the pending 
appeal has been decided.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The minute order reflected that the trial date 
was vacated and the case was ― ‗off calendar‘ ‖  ― ‗pending ruling on appeal.‘ ‖  
(Ibid.)  A subsequent minute order additionally stated:  ― ‗Mandatory settlement 
conference and trial to be reset in Department NWA after ruling of appellate 
court.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 482.)  The appeal was ultimately resolved against the plaintiff 
over a year later, on March 29, 1988.  (Id. at p. 480.)   
The appellate court concluded that, notwithstanding the use of the term 
― ‗continue,‘ ‖ the order amounted to a stay of the trial under section 583.340(b).  
(Holland, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 482.)  The court reasoned that ―it is plain 
. . .  the court did not intend to postpone trial to any known date.  Instead, it put the 
trial over indefinitely, until the happening of a designated event:  determination of 
the . . . appeal.  The legal effect of this order was to stay, rather than to continue 
the trial.‖  (Ibid; accord, Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist. (1993) 15 
Cal.App.4th 1762, 1773-1774 [stay pending appeal of order disqualifying 
plaintiff‘s counsel in related action]; Rosenthal v. Wilner (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 
1327, 1331, 1333-1334 [appellate court‘s order directing trial court to stay all 
proceedings pending resolution of related appeal that would affect issues such as 
proximate cause and damages tolled the proceedings under § 583.340(b)]; Hughes 
v. Portsmouth Square, Inc. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 170, 173 [under former § 583, 
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy qualifies for tolling because it operates as a 
stay on the commencement or continuation of any action against the bankrupt 
10 
 
party]; cf. Spanair S.A. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 348, 
358-359 [removal of case to federal court suspended trial court‘s jurisdiction]; 
Bergin v. Portman (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 23, 25-26 [appeal of motion for 
summary judgment suspended trial court‘s jurisdiction].) 
By contrast, stipulated continuances that are not tied to any matter outside 
the parties‘ control more logically fall under section 583.330.  That section 
provides that the parties may extend the five-year period during which an action 
must be brought to trial by written stipulation or oral agreement made in open 
court.  (§ 583.330, subds. (a), (b).)  The reason for the requirement was given as 
follows:  ―The provision [of former section 583] that a written stipulation be 
entered into was intended to preclude all disputes, with their attendant charges and 
countercharges of overreaching and unethical conduct, by a requirement that clear 
and uncontrovertible evidence be presented to the court that the statutory time was 
deliberately intended to be extended by both parties.‖  (Miller & Lux, supra, 192 
Cal. at p. 340 [discussing former § 583]; accord, Taylor v. Shultz (1978) 78 
Cal.App.3d 192, 196.)  There was no written stipulation or oral agreement here.   
We conclude that this order striking the trial date at the parties‘ request 
should be construed as a continuance of the trial of the action rather than a stay.  
The trial was not continued indefinitely.  Instead, the date was struck pending two 
defined contingencies:  a definite 90-day period for mediation to occur and a 120-
day stay of the proceedings.  Neither of the contingencies was extrinsic to the 
litigation.  Both were agreed to by the parties and totally within their control.  
Neither necessitated a stay of the trial, which was over five months distant.  
Plaintiff represented that ―good cause exist[ed] for granting the parties‘ request for 
a continuance of the current trial date‖ because newly named defendant, Aurora, 
had not formally appeared or conducted discovery, and defendant Countrywide 
anticipated filing a motion for summary judgment.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
11 
 
3.1332(c) [grounds for continuance of trial].)  Although the order did not set a new 
trial date, it identified a date certain to resume proceedings by calendaring a July 
16, 2008 trial-setting conference.  This stipulated trial postponement, agreed to by 
the parties and not occasioned by an extrinsic proceeding, court order, or law 
barring action, does not qualify for automatic tolling. 
2.  Stay of the Prosecution of the Action 
In Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th 717, we addressed the meaning of a stay of the 
prosecution of the action under section 583.340(b).  There the plaintiff sought to 
exclude time during which stays of discovery and other specific proceedings were 
in effect.  (Bruns, at p. 721.)  We held that ―the prosecution of an action is stayed 
under subdivision (b) only when the stay encompasses all proceedings in the 
action.‖  (Id. at p. 722, first italics added.)  We reasoned:  ―subdivision (b) 
contemplates a bright-line, nondiscretionary rule that excludes from the time in 
which a plaintiff must bring a case to trial only that time during which all the 
proceedings in an action are stayed.‖  (Id. at p. 726, italics added.)  Such complete 
stays ― ‗stop the prosecution of the action altogether‘ ‖ (id. at p. 730, quoting 
Black‘s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1267, col. 1), making it impossible to bring 
the action to trial (Bruns, at p. 726).  The circumstances of a partial stay can vary, 
however, and might not have such an effect.  (Ibid.)  In the latter circumstance, the 
court must look to the ― ‗impossible, impracticable, or futile‘ ‖ standard of section 
583.340(c) to assess the effect of a partial stay of the proceedings.  (Bruns, at pp. 
726, 730.) 
This order provided that the ―case is stayed for a period of 120 days.‖  
Nonetheless, it contemplated that the case would move forward during the relevant 
period in two respects:  The parties were ordered to respond to previously served 
and outstanding discovery and to participate in mediation in an effort to settle the 
lawsuit.  The trial court found this stay was only a partial one that did not qualify 
12 
 
for automatic tolling under section 583.340(b).  We review the question de novo 
because it does not hinge on the resolution of factual questions concerning 
credibility of extrinsic evidence.  (Parsons, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 865.)  As with 
the stay of trial exception discussed above, the label used in the trial court‘s order 
is not dispositive.  (Holland, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.)   
 ―The term ‗prosecution‘ is sufficiently comprehensive to include every 
step in an action from its commencement to its final determination.‖  (Ray Wong v. 
Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926) 199 Cal. 15, 18 (Ray Wong).)  Discovery constitutes 
a step in the prosecution of the action.  (Melancon v. Superior Court (1954) 42 
Cal.2d 698, 707 [depositions].)  Because the order required the parties to comply 
with previously served and outstanding written discovery, it did not ― ‗stop the 
prosecution of the action altogether.‘ ‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 730.)  
Gaines counters that the provision allowing for ongoing discovery was ―merely 
precautionary‖ and that ―there was no evidence presented that any discovery 
responses were ever served during the period of the stay.‖  This argument misses 
the mark.  As the Court of Appeal observed, ―[w]hether any party actually served 
discovery responses during the 2008 stay does not recharacterize the trial court 
order, which allowed for some discovery to take place during the stay.‖ 
  We further conclude that submission of this action to mediation pursuant 
to the parties‘ filed stipulation constituted a ―step in [the] action‖ (Ray Wong, 
supra, 199 Cal. at p. 18), within the meaning of section 583.340(b) and Bruns.  
Mediation is ―a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate 
communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement.‖  (§ 1775.1, subd. (a); accord, Evid. Code, § 1115, subd. 
(a).)  It does not abate the civil suit; it is a means by which the parties may reach a 
settlement of the suit.  (Jeld-Wen, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 540.)  These 
parties sought a court order directing them to mediate pursuant to their written 
13 
 
stipulation, thus incorporating the procedure and rules that govern mediation into 
the prosecution of the case.  (§ 1775 et seq.; see discussion, ante, at pp. 6-7.)4   
Cases hold that a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of contractual 
arbitration tolls the five-year period under section 583.340(b).  (Brock v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1801 (Brock); see Marcus v. 
Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 204, 212-213 (Marcus); see generally 
§§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)5  Marcus characterized a stay pending contractual arbitration 
as a stay ― ‗as to all issues, as to all causes of action, and as to all parties, until 
arbitration is concluded . . . .‘ ‖  (Marcus, at p. 209, quoting Cook v. Superior 
Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 880, 885.)  Bruns cited Marcus as an example of a 
complete stay of proceedings.  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 729.)  As Bruns 
explained, the Legislature enacted subdivision (b) with contractual arbitration in 
mind.  (Bruns, at p. 729.)  The Law Revision Commission‘s comment to section 
583.340(b) states that ―[s]ubdivision (b) codifies existing case law,‖ citing 
Marcus, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 204.  (17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at 
p. 935.)6   
                                              
4  
We have no occasion to consider how the parties‘ participation in informal 
settlement discussions might affect a stay of proceedings (see dis. opn. of Kruger, 
J., post, at pp. 9-10), and we offer no opinion on that question. 
5  
Contractual arbitration is to be distinguished from judicial arbitration, 
which we discuss separately at page 7, ante, and pages 14-15, post.  (See Nanfito 
v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 315, 318-319; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 
(5th ed. 2008) Proceedings Without Trial, § 580, pp. 1101-1102.) 
6  
As the Court of Appeal observed in Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners 
Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 469 (Sierra Nevada):  
―Section 583.340 was added to the code in 1984 without change as proposed  by 
the California Law Revision Commission.  (See 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 
(1984) pp. 905, 935.)  For that reason the report of the commission is entitled to 
substantial weight in construing the statute, particularly since the Law Revision 
Commission‘s comment which accompanied the proposed statute through the 
legislative process is brief.‖ 
14 
 
Those cases are distinguishable.  Contractual arbitration and mediation are 
different.  Contractual arbitration is a remedy distinct from an action at law.  Its 
assertion constitutes a plea in abatement to the civil suit.  (Brock, supra, 10 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1793, 1795-1796.)  A party seeking to enforce contractual 
arbitration is statutorily entitled to a stay of pending legal actions.  (§ 1281.4.)  
―Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, 
the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining 
merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration‖ to determine, 
upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits 
requires dismissal of the legal action.  (Brock, at p. 1796.)  This is so, in part, 
because the whole point of contractual arbitration is to obviate the need for an 
action at law.  The court in Brock found the distinction between an action at law 
and a contractual arbitration proceeding critical in deciding that a stay pending 
contractual arbitration tolled the five-year period under section 583.340(b).  
(Brock, at pp. 1792-1793, 1796.)  
By contrast, mediation is not an event outside the lawsuit; it is one means 
by which a settlement of the lawsuit may be reached.  (§ 1775.1, subd. (a); Evid. 
Code, § 1115; Jeld-Wen, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 540.)  It does not effectively 
abate the litigation ― ‗as to all issues, as to all causes of action, and as to all 
parties.‘ ‖  (Marcus, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 209.)  Section 1775.7 lends further 
support.  That section provides that submitting an action to mediation shall not 
suspend the five-year statute (id., subd. (a)), unless the action ―is or remains 
submitted to mediation . . . more than four years and six months after the plaintiff 
has filed the action . . . .‖ (id., subd. (b)).  The period involved here did not fall 
within section 1775.7‘s timeline.  In Howard, supra, 10 Cal.4th 424, we held that 
the parallel statute governing judicial arbitration (§ 1141.17) ―restricts the amount 
of time that can be tolled automatically as the result of submitting an action to 
15 
 
arbitration,‖ thus effectively preempting automatic tolling under section 583.310 
for arbitration conducted in the first four and a half years of the litigation.  
(Howard, at p. 434.)  The provisions of section 1775.7 demonstrate the 
Legislature‘s intent to treat mediation as part of the prosecution of the action. 
The dissent challenges this conclusion by citing general case law and 
statutory language that describes mediation as an ― ‗alternative‘ ‖ to trial or 
litigation.  (Dis. opn. by Kruger, J., post, at p. 9.)  But these descriptions provide 
little assistance in determining whether submitting an action to mediation should 
be considered a step in the prosecution of the action under section 583.340(b).  
Many pretrial proceedings may terminate the action short of trial:  Discovery 
between the parties may result in a settlement, and a demurrer or summary 
judgment motion may lead to a dismissal.  But that result does not change the fact 
that these are all ―step[s] in [the] action.‖  (Ray Wong, supra, 199 Cal. at p. 18.)  
Indeed, section 583.130 sets forth a ―policy favoring trial or other disposition of 
an action on the merits.‖  (Italics added.)  Mediation resulting in a voluntary 
settlement of the lawsuit by the parties can be one such disposition.                        
By its terms, the April 3, 2008 order was not a complete stay ― ‗used to stop 
the prosecution of the action altogether.‘ ‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 730.)  It 
directed that some discovery continue, and that the parties participate in 
mediation.  Section 583.340(b) is therefore inapplicable.  (Bruns, at p. 730.) 
Our construction of section 583.340(b) should encourage, rather than deter, 
agreements to partial stays and to continuances of the trial within the five-year 
period as the parties deem necessary.  (See § 583.130.)  Plaintiffs who desire 
tolling for the relevant period can achieve it by obtaining defendants‘ written 
stipulation or express oral agreement in court.  (§ 583.330.)  Conversely, 
defendants will have the predictability of knowing that, absent such agreement, a 
16 
 
stipulated continuance of the trial date or a partial stay of the proceedings will not 
later be construed to automatically toll the statute.   
3.  Estoppel 
Gaines argues that defendants, having agreed to the 120-day partial stay, 
are estopped from claiming that the five-year statute was not tolled for that period.  
(See § 583.140.)  The argument fails.   
Equitable estoppel requires that:  (1) the party to be estopped was aware of 
the operative facts and either intended that its act or omission be acted upon, or 
acted in such a way that the party asserting estoppel rightfully believed it was 
intended; and (2) the party asserting estoppel was unaware of the facts and relied 
on the other party‘s conduct to its detriment.  (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 994.)  The party asserting estoppel has the burden to 
establish these elements.  (Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44, 53; 
Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1221.)     
Substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s rejection of Gaines‘s estoppel 
argument.  (Jordan v. Superstar Sandcars (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423 
(Jordan); International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 
Cal.App.4th 345, 354; In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, 850.)  
The parties‘ communications regarding the stay explicitly set forth their 
expectations.  Nowhere did those communications reflect an understanding that 
the five-year statute would be tolled.   
A letter drafted by Aurora and signed by Gaines‘s counsel memorialized 
the agreement between them.  The letter stated the parties‘ agreement that Aurora 
would not be required to enter an appearance or answer the fourth amended 
complaint for 120 days and that Gaines would not file a request for default 
judgment during that period.  The letter also set forth several agreements designed 
―to preserve the status quo as between themselves concerning the $865,000 Loan 
17 
 
and the Longwood Property,‖ specifically:  ―(3) Aurora Loan agrees to take no 
further steps during the Stay to foreclose the $865,000 Loan against the Longwood 
Property; (4) Aurora Loan agrees to toll as of February 26, 2008 the ‗running‘ of 
the three month period provided for in Civil Code section 2924[, subdivision] 
(a)(2); (5) Aurora Loan agrees not to post or record or publish a notice of sale as 
provided for by Civil Code sections 2924[, subdivisions] (a)(3) and [(f)] during the 
Stay; (6) Aurora Loan and Gaines shall execute a stipulation to toll the recordation 
of a Notice of Trustee‘s Sale during the Stay, which stipulation may be filed with 
the Los Angeles Superior Court for entry by the court . . . .‖  Although the letter 
specifically mentioned the tolling effect of these latter agreements, nowhere does 
it mention tolling of the five-year period for trial. 
A letter from Gaines‘s counsel to the remaining defendants set forth terms 
consistent with those ultimately adopted in the order.  Specifically, it referred to 
staying the litigation ―except for the matters set forth below,‖ which included that 
the parties were to respond to all previously served and outstanding written 
discovery and participate in a global mediation of all claims.  Again, there was no 
reference to tolling the five-year dismissal statute.   
Finally, Gaines‘s application in support of the order represented that the 
parties mutually agreed to the 120-day stay as a means to defer certain filing 
deadlines under the ―Fast Track‖ system,7 which limits the parties‘ ability to 
stipulate to continuances.  (Gov. Code, §§ 68607, subd. (g), 68616.)  The 
application represented that Aurora ―wants to explore fully the possibilities for 
resolving this case before formally making an appearance and incurring attorneys‘ 
fees and costs in defending itself; but the Fast Tract [sic] Rules require an 
                                              
7  
Officially titled the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act.  (Gov. Code, § 68600 
et seq.) 
18 
 
appearance and as such an order striking the current trial date and staying this 
action for 120 days is needed to accomplish these goals.‖  It further stated that 
―Countrywide is willing to participate in this mediation only if it does not 
prejudice its rights to prosecute a summary judgment . . . motion if the mediation 
is not successful and as such there is a need to strike the current trial date and to 
stay this litigation for a period of time.‖  Citing California Rules of Court, rule 
3.1332(c), Gaines represented that these circumstances amounted to good cause, 
and that ―[b]ecause of the Court‘s Fast Track Rules[,] the striking of the current 
trial date and entry of an order staying this action for a period of time is necessary 
for the accomplishing of these ends.‖  Again nothing in the application suggests 
that the parties intended the stay would extend the five-year period under section 
583.310.  (Compare Knight v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 
923, 926-927, 930-933 [without language regarding five-year period, stipulations 
to continuances did not estop defendant from seeking dismissal for delay] with 
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1921) 185 Cal. 405, 408-411 [parties 
expressly stipulated that an agreed-upon continuance of one year would not count 
against the five-year period].)   
Gaines relies on Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 
and Woley v. Turkus (1958) 51 Cal.2d 402, but those cases are distinguishable.  In 
Tresway, the plaintiff served a summons on the defendant within three years of 
filing the complaint.  The defendant requested an extension of time beyond the 
three-year period to answer.  Rather than answer, the defendant moved to quash 
service of summons and to dismiss for nontimely service under former section 
581a.  (Tresway, at p. 434.)  Tresway held the defendant was estopped from 
invoking the dismissal statute because its request for an extension had ―effectively 
prevented plaintiff from discovering the defect in service until after the statutory 
period had run.‖  (Id. at p. 433; see id. at pp. 441-442.)  In Woley, the plaintiff, in 
19 
 
the fifth year of litigation, filed a motion to advance the case for trial, citing 
former section 583.  (Woley, at p. 404.)  The defendant requested a continuance 
and the parties entered a stipulation to continue the plaintiff‘s motion for summary 
judgment and the trial ― ‗beyond [the] five year period . . . .‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 405.)  The 
defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the action based on the plaintiff‘s failure 
to bring the case to trial within five years.  The court found the defendant‘s 
continuance request, which expressly acknowledged the five-year deadline, 
estopped it from subsequently seeking dismissal for failure to prosecute.  (Id. at 
pp. 407-409.)  Here, by contrast, the stay in question ended well before the five-
year period expired.  Nor was there a mention of that period in either the parties‘ 
correspondence or the prepared order.  No basis for estoppel appears on this 
record.             
C.  Impossibility, Impracticability, or Futility 
A circumstance that does not qualify for automatic tolling under section 
583.340(b) may nonetheless be excludable from the five-year period if the 
circumstance makes it ―impossible, impracticable, or futile‖ to bring the action to 
trial.  (§ 583.340(c); accord, Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 726.)  Gaines invokes 
this provision.  In deciding whether these exceptions are met, the court must 
consider ― ‗all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and 
conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves.  [Citations.]  
The critical factor in applying these exceptions to a given factual situation is 
whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her 
case.‘ ‖  (Bruns, at p. 730, quoting Moran v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 229, 
238.)     
―The question of impossibility, impracticability, or futility is best resolved 
by the trial court, which ‗is in the most advantageous position to evaluate these 
diverse factual matters in the first instance.‘  [Citation.]  The plaintiff bears the 
20 
 
burden of proving that the circumstances warrant application of the . . . exception.  
[Citation.]  . . .   The trial court has discretion to determine whether that exception 
applies, and its decision will be upheld unless the plaintiff has proved that the trial 
court abused its discretion.  [Citations.]‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731.)  
Under that standard, ―[t]he trial court‘s findings of fact are reviewed for 
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its 
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.‖  
(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns. omitted.)8 
The statute refers to excluding ―the time during which . . . [b]ringing the 
action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.‖  
(§ 583.340(c).)  The Law Revision Commission comment to section 583.340 
states:  ―Under Section 583.340 the time within which an action must be brought 
to trial is tolled for the period of the excuse, regardless whether a reasonable time 
remained at the end of the period of the excuse to bring the action to trial.  This 
overrules cases such as State of California v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 643 
 . . . (1979), and Brown v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 197 . . . (1976).‖  (17 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 936.)  Thus, a condition of 
impossibility, impracticability, or futility need not take the plaintiff beyond the 
five-year deadline to be excluded; it will be excluded even if the plaintiff has a 
                                              
8  
Gaines argues that the abuse of discretion standard is too amorphous to 
allow for meaningful appellate review.  The standard, however, has long been 
applied in this context.  (Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co. (1919) 181 Cal. 472; 
Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 590-591 & fn. 9; Sanchez v. City of 
Los Angeles, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271; Hughes v. Kimble (1992) 5 
Cal.App.4th 59, 71; cf. Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 555 
[trial court is in the best position to evaluate impracticability in the first instance].)  
We recently affirmed its application in Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 731.  
Gaines provides no persuasive justification to revisit this settled rule. 
21 
 
reasonable time remaining after the period to bring the case to trial.  (Sierra 
Nevada, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 471.)  
But what is meant by establishing a condition of impossibility, 
impracticability, or futility in the first instance?  The question depends on both the 
timing and nature of the interference.  It is well established that ― ‗ ―[e]very period 
of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the 
case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.‖ [Citation.]‘ ‖  
(Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731, quoting Sierra Nevada, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 472.)  ― ‗Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of 
proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the 
normal time of waiting for a place on the court‘s calendar are not within the 
contemplation of these exceptions.‘ ‖  (Bruns, at p. 731, quoting Baccus v. 
Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532; see Bruns, at p. 732; accord, 
Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 540, 548; J. C. Penney, 
supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 670.)  This rule reflects the Legislature‘s understanding that 
a reasonably diligent plaintiff should be able to bring the case to trial within the 
relatively lengthy period of five years notwithstanding such ordinary delays.  (See 
§ 583.130 [―a plaintiff shall proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution 
of an action‖].)  To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to litigate piecemeal 
every period, no matter how short, in which it was literally impracticable to try the 
case, thus rendering the statute ―utterly indeterminate, subjective, and 
unadministerable.‖  (Sierra Nevada, at p. 472.) 
Here, for example, when the 120-day stay was entered on April 3, 2008, the 
scheduled trial date was five months out, beyond the period of the stay.  Aurora, a 
recently added defendant, had not made an appearance, answered the amended 
complaint, or conducted discovery, and Countrywide anticipated filing a motion 
for summary judgment.  It would thus be illusory to ask if it was impracticable for 
22 
 
Gaines to try the case during the period of the stay because the posture of the case 
would not have allowed for such a result.  Rather, in these types of circumstances, 
courts have focused on the extent to which the conditions interfered with the 
plaintiff‘s ability to ―mov[e] the case to trial‖ during the relevant period.  (De 
Santiago v. D & G Plumbing, Inc.  (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 365, 371; accord, 
Tamburina v. Combined Ins. Co. of America (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 323, 335 
(Tamburina).)  
Additionally, when the delay involves the time necessary for the parties to 
conduct ordinary incidents of proceedings leading up to the trial, the interference 
must deprive the plaintiff of a ― ‗substantial portion‘ of the five-year period for 
prosecuting the lawsuit‖ in order to qualify as a circumstance of impracticability.  
(Tamburina, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 335, quoting Sierra Nevada, supra, 217 
Cal.App.3d at p. 473; see Tamburina, at pp. 333-334.)  This is because ordinary 
delays, even ones beyond the plaintiff‘s control, are already accounted for in the 
five-year period.  In Tamburina, for example, the parties‘ stipulations established 
that the plaintiff‘s counsel suffered an unusually lengthy illness which deprived 
Tamburina of a substantial portion of the five-year period (424 days) to prepare 
for trial.  (Tamburina, at pp. 335-336; but see Sierra Nevada, at p. 472 [generally, 
counsel‘s routine illness is treated in the same manner as the usual and ordinary 
proceedings attendant to moving the case to trial].)  Here, the delay was 
occasioned by the parties‘ agreement to participate in mediation; the need for 
Aurora to make an appearance and to conduct discovery; and the need for Aurora 
and Countrywide to file certain defensive pleadings.  These are ordinary steps in 
the prosecution of the action.  It was therefore necessary for Gaines to demonstrate 
that the delay had a significant enough impact on the litigation to elevate it from 
an ordinary circumstance to a circumstance of impracticability.  This 
23 
 
determination requires a fact-specific inquiry in light of all of the circumstances in 
the case.  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731.)   
On this record, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the 
time attributable to the partial stay did not qualify for tolling under section 
583.340(c).  The parties participated in mediation during that time, which was a 
meaningful attempt to move the litigation forward to resolution.  Shortly after the 
mediation and during the stay period, Gaines reached a settlement with United 
Mortgage Company and filed a request to dismiss that defendant.  Other named 
defendants were relieved of certain filing deadlines, but not for an inordinately 
long period.  And nothing prevented Gaines from conducting her own trial 
preparation during this time.  Indeed, Gaines announced ready for trial against all 
named defendants in August 2009, three years into the litigation.  Nothing about 
these circumstances elevated an ordinary delay agreed to by the parties into an 
extraordinary one.  
Additionally, case law both predating and postdating the 1984 statutory 
revision has long held that ―[f]or the tolling provision of section 583.340(c) to 
apply, there must be ‗a period of impossibility, impracticability or futility, over 
which plaintiff had no control,‘ ‖ because the statute is designed to prevent 
avoidable delay.  (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1273, quoting New West Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1990) 
223 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1155; accord, Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731; Christin v. 
Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 526, 532; Tamburina, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 328.)  The Law Revision Commission affirmed this understanding in its 
comment to section 583.340:  ―Subdivision (c) codifies the case law ‗impossible, 
impractical, or futile‘ standard.  The provisions of subdivision (c) must be 
interpreted liberally, consistent with the policy favoring trial on the merits.  See 
Section 583.130 (policy statement).  Contrast Section 583.240 and Comment 
24 
 
thereto (strict construction of excuse for failure to serve within prescribed time).  
This difference in treatment recognizes that bringing an action to trial, unlike 
service, may be impossible, impracticable, or futile due to factors not reasonably 
within the control of the plaintiff.‖  (17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at 
p. 936, italics added.)  Our colleagues in dissent challenge this reading of the 
statute  (dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at pp. 12-14), but long-standing case law, 
including our recent pronouncement in Bruns, confirms it.  (Bruns, at p. 731.)  
Indeed, as the commission‘s comment demonstrates, our dissenting colleagues‘ 
emphasis on the policy in favor of trial on the merits in construing the provisions 
of this chapter (dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at pp. 5, 8, 15; § 583.130), derives 
from the very same premise.    
The trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the circumstances 
of the partial stay were not beyond Gaines‘s control.  Gaines voluntarily agreed to 
mediation upon the belief that it would ―possib[ly] . . . resolv[e] all of th[e] case or 
at least major portions of it[,] . . . thereby simplifying and shortening the trial of 
any unresolved issues.‖  Gaines also agreed to the partial stay with full 
understanding that it would relieve defendants of certain filing deadlines during 
the specified period.  Gaines represented to the court that the partial stay would 
benefit all parties by saving attorneys‘ fees and costs during the mediation period.   
Even after the order was entered, Gaines largely retained control over the 
proceedings.  The purpose of mediation is to resolve disputes ―in a fair, timely, 
appropriate, and cost-effective manner‖ without derailing the litigation.  (§ 1775, 
subd. (a).)  Parties participate voluntarily and may withdraw at any time.  (Jeld-
Wen, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 541; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.853(2).)  ―Even 
after a case has been ordered to mediation, the mediator must inform the parties 
that participation in mediation is completely voluntary, refrain from coercing a 
party to continue its participation in the mediation and respect the right of each 
25 
 
party to decide the extent of its participation or withdraw from the mediation.  
(Rule 3.853 . . . .)  In fact, unless the parties have agreed to a binding award, any 
party who voluntarily enters mediation may revoke its consent and withdraw from 
the dispute resolution process.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 467.7, subd. (a); 
Kirschenman v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 832, 835 . . . .)‖  (Jeld-
Wen, at p. 541.)  Upon the filing of a statement of nonagreement by the mediator, 
Gaines was entitled to request that the original trial date be reinstated, or that she 
receive priority for a new trial date.  (§ 1775.9, subd. (b).)  There is no reason to 
believe that the stay, entered at the parties‘ request, could not have been similarly 
vacated at their request.  Indeed, the court order facilitated plaintiff‘s return to 
court by designating a trial-setting conference on July 16, 2008, during the period 
of the stay and two months before the originally scheduled trial date.   
Gaines further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
exclude the 97 days between the date the partial stay was supposed to expire and 
the date it was actually lifted, during which time there was a series of judicial 
assignments.  Assuming, without deciding, that the stay did not terminate 
automatically, we reject plaintiff‘s argument with one minor exception.  
By its own terms, the partial stay was to last 120 days (i.e., from April 3, 
2008 to August 1, 2008).  At the trial-setting conference on July 16, 2008, the 
parties appeared before Judge Kalin, sitting temporarily for Judge Lee, who was 
out of the country.  Judge Kalin indicated that the case would be reassigned.  On 
September 4, 2008 the case was reassigned to Judge Barbara Meyers, but she was 
peremptorily challenged on September 12, 2008.  (§ 170.6.)  On October 2, 2008, 
the case was reassigned to Judge Rex Heeseman, and a status conference was set 
for November 6, 2008.  On November 6, 2008, Judge Heeseman lifted the stay.  
We have held that delay attributable to trial court reassignment following a 
party‘s exercise of a section 170.6 peremptory challenge should be excluded.  
26 
 
(Hartman v. Santamarina (1982) 30 Cal.3d 762, 768.)  Here that delay amounted 
to 20 days (from September 12, 2008 to October 2, 2008).  That period, standing 
alone, does not overcome plaintiff‘s 82-day deficit. 
As for the remaining period, the trial court was within its discretion to 
conclude that Gaines failed to proceed diligently.  ―A plaintiff has an obligation to 
monitor the case in the trial court, to keep track of relevant dates, and to determine 
whether any filing, scheduling, or calendaring errors have occurred.‖  (Jordan, 
supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.)  After mediation concluded, it was Gaines‘s 
duty to seek an order from the trial court lifting the stay, if necessary, and 
rescheduling the trial date.  (Cf. Howard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 434.)  There is no 
evidence that Gaines attempted to do either during the 97-day period in question.  
Although there were a series of judicial reassignments, Gaines appeared before 
Judge Kalin, sitting temporarily for Judge Lee, on July 16, 2008.  There is no 
reason apparent from the record why Judge Kalin could not have handled these 
requests. 
In short, the trial court was within its discretion to find that the conduct of 
mediation and partial stay of proceedings were not so exceptional, extenuated, or 
beyond Gaines‘s control as to qualify as a circumstance of impossibility, 
impracticability, or futility under section 583.340(c).  Accordingly, the case was 
properly dismissed under the mandatory provisions of section 583.360. 
While this conclusion brings an end to plaintiff‘s suit, that is what the five-
year statute is designed to do.  The five-year rule is mandatory and dismissal for 
noncompliance is required.  (§ 583.360, subd. (b).)  The dissent protests that 
today‘s result ―reward[s] plaintiff for working cooperatively with an opposing 
party by depriving her of her day in court.‖  (Dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 1.)  
While attempts to work cooperatively are to be lauded, they do not absolve 
litigants from the obligation to prosecute claims within the statutory guidelines.  
27 
 
Established case law advised Gaines to seek an express stipulation from the parties 
that the agreed-upon postponements would extend the five-year period.  (J. C. 
Penney, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 669.)  Gaines did not do so.  Our holding affords 
due deference to the trial court‘s unique ability to determine, based on all of the 
facts before it, that Gaines did not demonstrate a circumstance of impossibility, 
impracticability, or futility arising from this period.  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 731.)   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
 
 
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the five-year limit for bringing an 
action to trial is tolled during periods when ―[p]rosecution or trial of the action 
was stayed or enjoined‖ or ―[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was 
impossible, impracticable, or futile.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340, subds. (b), (c) 
(hereafter section 583.340(b) and section 583.340(c)); see id., § 583.310.)  
Plaintiff in this case agreed with one of the defendants to seek a stay of the trial 
court proceedings in order to permit the defendant to retain counsel and prepare 
and file its responsive pleading, as well as to permit the parties to attempt to settle 
their dispute out of court.  The trial court gave its approval, striking an existing 
trial date and ordering that the action be stayed for a period of 120 days.  The court 
today concludes that the 120-day period during which the action was stayed 
qualifies neither as a period when ―[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed‖ 
(§ 583.340(b)) nor as a period when ―[b]ringing the action to trial‖ was 
―impracticable‖ (§ 583.340(c)).  The result is to reward plaintiff for working 
cooperatively with an opposing party by depriving her of her day in court.  
Because that result cannot be squared with either the text of section 583.340 or the 
statutory policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
2 
 
I. 
The facts relevant to the question before us are, as the majority says (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 4), not in dispute.  The history of the stay at issue in this case, 
however, warrants some elaboration. 
In November 2006, plaintiff Fannie Marie Gaines filed a complaint against 
defendants A.J. Roof, Josh Tornberg, and several others, including Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide) and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
(Fidelity).  The complaint alleged that she and her husband had been deceived into 
selling their home to Tornberg under threat of foreclosure.  The complaint sought 
rescission and cancellation of the deed transferring ownership of the property.  
Due to various complications, however, the parties were unable to clearly identify 
the entity that held the title to the property pursuant to a loan taken out by 
Tornberg.  After an extended dispute on this subject, Gaines determined that the 
holder of the title was Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Aurora).  In January 2008, she 
amended her complaint to name Aurora as a defendant. 
In March 2008, with its responsive pleading already overdue, Aurora 
entered into a written agreement with Gaines to stay the case.  The agreement, 
dated March 20, 2008, recited that Aurora ―needs additional time to retain 
California counsel to represent its interests in this action and to prepare and file its 
responsive pleading,‖ and that ―Gaines and Aurora Loan enter into this letter 
agreement to preserve the status quo . . . and to afford them time to explore 
resolution of this case . . . .‖  The parties agreed, among other things, ―that 
(1) Aurora Loan shall not be required to enter an appearance, and/or answer . . . 
for 120 days from the date of this letter (‗Stay‘); (2) Gaines shall not file a request 
for default judgment . . . during the Stay; (3) Aurora Loan agrees to take no further 
steps during the Stay to foreclose the $865,000 Loan . . . ; (7) Gaines‘ counsel will 
take the necessary steps to petition the Los Angeles Superior Court and request 
 
3 
 
that the Court formally approve the Stay; and (8) . . . Gaines‘ counsel agrees to 
coordinate with all party defendants an in person, non-binding mediation to occur 
before expiration of the Stay to confidentially discuss if a global resolution can be 
reached between all parties . . . .‖ 
In a letter dated March 31, 2008, all parties confirmed their agreement that 
―1.  The Court strike the current September 22, 2008 Trial Date, set this case for a 
Trial Setting Conference on or after July 16, 2008 and enter its order that, except 
for the matters set forth below, all other litigation efforts in this case be stayed 
until on or after the future Trial Setting Conference; [¶] 2.  All previously served 
and outstanding written discovery shall be responded to by the party obligated to 
respond in the near future and each serving party‘s 45 day period to move to 
compel further responses to that discovery shall commence on the date of the 
future Trial Setting Conference; [¶] 3.  No other discovery shall be commenced 
until after the future Trial Setting Conference; [¶] 4.  Gaines agrees that the Court 
can enter an order striking the following portions of the Fourth Amended 
Complaint . . . and [¶] 5.  All parties participate in a global mediation of all claims 
in this action in the near future.‖  The letter gave notice to the parties that Gaines 
would seek an ex parte order ―staying until July 16, 2008 all activity in this case 
[except] as outlined above.‖ 
On April 3, 2008, Gaines filed an ―Ex Parte Application for Order (a) 
Striking Existing Trial, Final Status Conference and Post Mediation Conference 
Dates, (b) Staying Case for 120 Days, (c) Setting a Future Trial Setting 
Conference Date and (d) Directing All Parties to Participate in Good Faith in a 
Mediation of All Claims Within the Next 90 Days.‖  The motion asked for an 
order ―(a) striking the current Trial Date . . . (b) staying this action for 120 days, 
except for responding to previously served and outstanding written discovery, (c) 
 
4 
 
setting a Trial Setting Conference date on or after July 16, 2008, and (d) directing 
all parties . . . to participate in good faith in a mediation of all claims . . . .‖ 
The motion stated that ―Aurora Loan wants to explore settlement prior to 
making an appearance . . . [and] an order striking the current trial date and staying 
this action for 120 days is needed to accomplish these goals . . . .‖  The 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the request for a stay adds 
that ―Defendant Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (‗Countrywide‘) is willing to 
participate in this mediation only if it does not prejudice its rights to prosecute a 
summary judgment . . . and as such there is a need to strike the current trial date 
and to stay this litigation for a period of time.‖   
On that same day, April 3, 2008, the superior court issued the following 
order:  ―(A) The current Trial Date of September 22, 2008, the current Final Status 
Conference Date of September 12, 2008, and the current Post Mediation 
Conference Date of August 19, 2008 and Discovery Cut-Off Date are struck; [¶] 
(B) This case is stayed for a period of 120 days except that parties are to respond 
to all previously served and outstanding written discovery; [¶] (C) This case is set 
for a Post Mediation and Trial Setting Conference on July 16, 2008, at 8:30 a.m. in 
Department 33; and [¶] (D) All parties are directed to participate in good faith in a 
mediation of all claims in this case within the next 90 days.‖ 
Although the 120 days expired on August 1, 2008, various judicial 
reassignments meant that the stay was not formally lifted until November 6, 2008, 
when the trial court scheduled the case for a trial setting conference.  In May 2012, 
defendant Fidelity moved to dismiss for failure to bring the action to trial within 
the five-year time frame required by section 583.310.  If the 120-day period is 
excluded from the calculation of time, then defendant‘s motion to dismiss fails; if 
not, then not. 
 
5 
 
II. 
In Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340, the Legislature instructed that, 
in computing ―the time within which an action must be brought,‖ courts must 
exclude certain periods of time, including ―the time during which‖ ―[p]rosecution 
or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined‖ (§ 583.340(b)) and during which 
―[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, 
or futile‖ (§ 583.340(c)).  ―[T]he evident purpose‖ of this provision is, as one court 
has observed, ―to exclude from the mandatory dismissal provision time periods 
during which the case could not be brought to trial.  The absence of trial court 
jurisdiction to try it . . . is one reason; a court order barring the trial (by a stay or 
injunction) is another.‖  (Holland v. Dave Altman’s R.V. Center (1990) 222 
Cal.App.3d 477, 482 (Holland).)  In construing this provision, the Legislature has 
instructed that we are generally to prefer ―the policy favoring trial or other 
disposition of an action on the merits‖ over ―the policy that requires dismissal for 
failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action.‖  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 583.130 (section 583.130).) 
The threshold question in this case is whether all or part of the period 
following the trial court‘s order entering the stay should be excluded from the 
five-year time frame as a period during which ―[p]rosecution or trial of the action 
was stayed or enjoined.‖  (§ 583.340(b).)  Giving this language its ―usual and 
ordinary meaning,‖ as we generally must do (Committee of Seven Thousand v. 
Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501), I would think that the answer to that 
question is yes:  The period during which the trial court stayed the action counts as 
a period during which the prosecution (if not also the trial) of the action was 
stayed. 
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority begins not with the plain 
language of the statute, but with our decision in Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, 
 
6 
 
Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717 (Bruns).  Bruns concerned ―whether a stay of the 
‗prosecution‘ of the action under section 583.340(b) includes a stay of specific 
proceedings, such as a stay of discovery, while other aspects of the action may go 
forward.‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 721–722.)  Bruns answered that 
question in the negative, concluding — reasonably enough — that a stay of 
discovery or other ―specific proceedings‖ is not the same thing as a stay of the 
prosecution or trial ―of the action.‖  (§ 583.340(b), italics added; see Bruns, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at pp. 726–727.)  Bruns went on to state, however, that although the 
plain language of section 583.340(b) might be read more broadly, its relationship 
to its neighboring provision, subdivision (c), calls for reading section 583.340(b) 
more restrictively, to apply ―only when a stay encompasses all proceedings in the 
action.‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 723.)  Bruns explained that subdivision (b) 
―contemplates a bright-line, nondiscretionary rule that excludes from the time in 
which a plaintiff must bring a case to trial only that time during which all the 
proceedings in an action are stayed.‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 726, italics 
added.)  ―Subdivision (c),‖ on the other hand, ―gives the trial court discretion to 
exclude additional periods, including periods when partial stays were in place, 
when the court concludes that bringing the action to trial was ‗impossible, 
impracticable, or futile.‘  Obviously, if a complete stay is in effect, bringing the 
action to trial is impossible.  It makes sense for the Legislature to state a bright-
line rule in this situation.  The effect of a partial stay, however, can vary from stay 
to stay and from case to case.  A partial stay might, or might not, make it 
‗impossible, impracticable, or futile‘ to bring the action to trial.‖  (Ibid.) 
As the court read the statute in Bruns, then, a ―partial‖ stay that does not 
halt ―all the proceedings in an action‖ will toll the five-year clock only if it is the 
sort of stay that — like a ―complete‖ stay — makes it ―impossible, impracticable, 
 
7 
 
or futile‖ to bring the action to trial under section 583.340(c).  The question thus 
becomes whether the stay at issue here was that sort of stay. 
The stay at issue was not simply a stay of discovery or other ―specific 
proceedings,‖ as in Bruns.  It was just about the opposite:  The trial court‘s order 
struck a scheduled trial date and put a temporary halt to all judicial proceedings 
with respect to all parties, with the minor exception of the exchange of responses 
to previously served and outstanding written discovery.  (The record does not 
reveal whether any outstanding discovery responses were in fact exchanged.)  
Labels, of course, cannot be dispositive.  But given the comprehensive scope of 
the order, it is not surprising that the trial court referred to ―the case‖ — not 
merely certain ―proceedings‖ — as having been stayed.  As Justice Rubin wrote in 
his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal, if this was a ―partial‖ stay under 
Bruns, ―it was barely so.‖ 
Were we writing on a blank slate, I would consider that 120-day stay to be 
a stay of the prosecution of the action that is excluded from the computation of the 
period for trial under section 583.340(b).  But even if a stay is not a ―stay‖ under 
section 583.340(b) if it allows the court proceedings to continue in any respect, no 
matter how trivial, the time for bringing the case to trial should still have been 
tolled because it was impracticable to bring the action to trial during this period 
under section 583.340(c).  A stay of proceedings that is very nearly ―complete,‖ 
accompanied by the striking of a scheduled trial date, is precisely the kind of stay 
that one would expect to toll the five-year clock under section 583.340(c) as 
interpreted in Bruns.  The single respect in which the court proceedings were not 
halted — the failure to vacate existing deadlines for exchanging outstanding 
discovery responses — did not bring the parties meaningfully closer to bringing 
the case to trial.  The stay at issue in this case operated, in all relevant respects, 
precisely in the same manner as a ―complete‖ stay subject to automatic tolling, and 
 
8 
 
the time period should have been excluded from the five-year computation for 
precisely the same reason:  It is not ―practicable‖ for a plaintiff to bring a case to 
trial during a period when the trial court has ordered otherwise.  (See Holland, 
supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 484.) 
If there were any doubt on the subject, it ought to be dispelled by the rule of 
construction prescribed in section 583.130.  That provision tells us that, although it 
is a ―policy of the state that a plaintiff shall proceed with reasonable diligence in 
the prosecution of an action . . . the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an 
action on the merits [is] generally to be preferred over the policy that requires 
dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an 
action in construing the provisions of this chapter.‖  (Ibid.) 
In Bruns, we explained that our restrictive interpretation of the term ―stay‖ 
in section 583.340(b) is consistent with this policy favoring trial because, even if 
the bright-line exclusion of subdivision (b) is unavailable, a plaintiff may always 
turn to ―the more flexible subdivision (c) of the provision, which permits trial on 
the merits when appropriate in situations not governed by subdivision (b).‖  
(Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 729.)  If Bruns is to be taken at its word, then a stay 
that just misses the mark under subdivision (b) ought to pass with flying colors 
under subdivision (c).  The alternative — to give a restrictive reading to both 
prongs of the computation statute — would hardly comport with either the 
Legislature‘s apparent intent in enacting the exclusion for stay periods in section 
583.340(b) or its instruction to err on the side of interpreting the statute to allow a 
plaintiff her day in court. 
III. 
The majority gives three reasons in support of its conclusion that the stay 
period at issue in this case properly counted against plaintiff‘s five-year time limit.  
First, the majority emphasizes that the stay order contemplated that the parties 
 
9 
 
would use the 120-day period to, among other things, attempt to resolve their 
dispute out of court, and, toward that end, directed them to mediate in good faith.  
Mediation, the court reasons, represents the continued prosecution of the action 
because ―it is a means by which the parties may reach a settlement of the suit.‖  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  The majority thus cites the mediation both as a reason 
that the stay was ―partial,‖ rather than ―complete,‖ and a reason that the stay order 
did not render it ―impracticable‖ to bring the case to trial during the relevant time 
period.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–13, 22.)   
In my view, this argument rests on a flawed premise.  Mediation is indeed a 
means by which parties might settle a lawsuit, as are more informal settlement 
discussions.  But while mediation, like other settlement discussions, may obviate 
the need for continued pursuit of litigation, it is not part of the litigation itself.  
Mediation is, rather, ― ‗an alternative to litigation . . . [that] provides a simple, 
quick, and economical means of resolving disputes.‘ ‖  (Simmons v. Ghaderi 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 578, italics added; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1775, subd. 
(d) [describing mediation as an ―alternative[] to trial‖]; Cassel v. Superior Court 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 132–133 [noting that mediation can resolve ―disputes by 
means short of litigation‖ and describing mediation as an ―alternative means of 
resolution‖].)1  The majority‘s contrary notion seems particularly out of place in 
                                              
1 
Section 1775.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on which the majority 
relies, provides no indication of any legislative ―intent to treat mediation as part of 
the prosecution of the action.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  It instead reflects a 
recognition that, in the absence of a court-ordered stay, mediation has no 
necessary impact on the continued prosecution of the action and thus ordinarily 
does not warrant tolling, except insofar as the mediation remains pending after 
four years and six months.  This statute has no particular bearing on the question 
here, which concerns whether it was ―practicable‖ for plaintiff to bring the case to 
trial during the period when the case had been stayed by the trial court. 
 
10 
 
the context of interpreting a statute governing the time to bring ―[a]n action . . . to 
trial.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310, italics added.)  Given the Legislature‘s 
overarching concern with the exercise of ―reasonable diligence in the prosecution 
of an action‖ — to the end of bringing the action to ―trial or other disposition . . . 
on the merits‖ (id., § 583.130) — there is little reason to suppose that, by using the 
phrase ―[p]rosecution . . . of the action‖ (§ 583.340(b)), the Legislature meant to 
refer to steps taken to avoid bringing the action to trial or otherwise resolving the 
action on the merits through the judicial process. 
In any event, if the prospect that the parties would use the stay period to 
attempt to settle their differences out of court sufficed to disqualify the stay under 
section 583.340, then it is hard to imagine what kind of court-ordered stay would 
qualify for tolling under the statute.  The logical consequence of this view would 
be that even a stay order that halted court proceedings in every conceivable respect 
would not stop the five-year clock if it permitted the parties to discuss settlement 
out of court.  I am not aware of any court that has ever not permitted parties to 
attempt to settle, nor am I aware of any stay order that has been interpreted to have 
such an effect.  It is unlikely that this is what the Legislature intended when it 
drafted section 583.340. 
Perhaps by its italicized reference to the court order ―directing [the parties] 
to mediate‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12), the majority means to suggest that there is 
something special about the court‘s order to ―participate in good faith in a 
mediation of all claims‖ that specially disqualifies the stay under section 583.340.  
If so, it is not clear what, precisely, that something might be.  The majority asserts 
that by its order, the court ―incorporat[ed] the procedure and rules that govern 
mediation into the prosecution of the case.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  How this 
 
11 
 
might have occurred, the majority does not explain.2   Orders to participate in 
mediation or other settlement negotiations in good faith are common.  Such orders 
are not generally thought to transform such settlement discussions into a kind of 
adjunct judicial forum, with the mediator acting as a kind of deputized bench 
officer.  Even when backed by a court‘s order to participate in good faith, 
mediation remains an alternative to litigating the action to an ultimate conclusion 
on the merits.  It is not part of the litigation itself. 
Second, the majority reasons that the stay ―did not qualify for tolling under 
section 583.340(c)‖ because, while the stay was in effect, ―nothing prevented 
Gaines from conducting her own trial preparation during this time.‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 23.)  By this reasoning, the majority would all but read section 
583.340(b) out of the statute.  Under any stay order — even a ―complete‖ stay 
order within the meaning of Bruns — the parties are always free to conduct their 
own trial preparation.  True, depending on the circumstances that gave rise to the 
stay, trial preparation may seem, as a practical matter, inefficient or premature.  
But the possibility that the parties to a stayed action might make profitable use of 
                                              
2 
The sole explanation the majority provides is a parenthetical citation of the 
statutory rules governing cases submitted to mediation under the civil action 
mediation program created by Code of Civil Procedure section 1775 et seq.  
Defendants themselves, however, appear to have conceded these provisions ―are 
not directly applicable to this case‖ because the case was not submitted to 
mediation pursuant to the civil action mediation program.  It is, moreover, unclear 
whether section 1775 et seq. could have any application to private mediation, as 
this mediation appears to have been.  (See Castillo v. DHL Express (USA) (2015) 
243 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1197 [interpreting section 1775 et seq. to apply ―only to 
court-annexed mediation programs‖ and not private mediation].)  No party has 
asked us to resolve that question in this case. 
 
In any event, even if Code of Civil Procedure section 1775 et seq. did 
apply, nothing in the statutory scheme purports to ―incorporate[e] the procedure 
and rules that govern mediation into the prosecution of the case.‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 13.) 
 
12 
 
the stay period does not render it any less a ―stay,‖ nor does it make it any more 
―practicable‖ to bring the case to trial while the stay remains in effect.  To hold 
otherwise gives insufficient weight to the Legislature‘s determination that a court-
ordered stay of the prosecution or trial of the action constitutes a circumstance of 
impracticability that warrants tolling the five-year clock. 
Finally, the majority asserts that ― ‗[f]or the tolling provision of section 
583.340(c) to apply, there must be a ―period of impossibility, impracticability or 
futility, over which plaintiff had no control . . . .‖ ‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  
The majority concludes ―that the circumstances of the partial stay were not beyond 
Gaines‘s control‖ because Gaines voluntarily agreed both to mediation and to the 
stay, and could have sought to have the stay vacated before it expired.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 24.) 
In my view, this reasoning, too, is fundamentally flawed.  Begin with the 
text:  The words ―over which plaintiff had no control‖ do not appear anywhere in 
section 583.340 — although similar language does appear in the parallel provision 
governing the calculation of the three-year period during which service must be 
made.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.240 (section 583.240) [―In computing the time 
within which service must be made pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded 
the time during which . . . :   [¶] . . . [¶] (d) Service, for any other reason, was 
impossible impracticable, or futile due to causes beyond the plaintiff’s control.‖  
(Italics added.)].)  As a general rule, when a legislature ― ‗includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, 
it is generally presumed that [it] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.‘ ‖  (Russello v. United States (1983) 464 U.S. 16, 23; see 
also, e.g., People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242 [―When the Legislature  
 
13 
 
uses materially different language in statutory provisions addressing the same 
subject or related subjects, the normal inference is that the Legislature intended a 
difference in meaning.‖].)  Applying that rule in Bruns, we refused to ―engraft 
onto subdivision (b) an exception that the Legislature explicitly included in section 
583.240 but did not include in section 583.340(b).‖  (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 727.)  The same result ought to obtain here. 
The difference in the wording of the two provisions reflects a basic 
difference in their functions.  The primary purpose of the dismissal statutes is to 
ensure that plaintiffs prosecute their cases with ―reasonable diligence.‖  
(§ 583.130.)  From that standpoint, there are significant differences between the 
timing of service and the timing of bringing a case to trial.  As the Law Review 
Commission comment to section 583.240 observes, that provision is designed to 
advance ―one aspect of the policy announced in Section 583.130 — plaintiff must 
exercise diligence — and recognizes that service, unlike bringing to trial, is 
ordinarily within the control of the plaintiff.‖  (Revised Recommendation Relating 
to Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution (June 1983) 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 
(1984) p. 933.)  In other words, because the timing of service generally lies in the 
plaintiff‘s sole discretion, a plaintiff who effects service beyond the prescribed 
time limits does not act diligently unless the delay results from some circumstance 
beyond his or her control. 
But the timing of trial, unlike the timing of service, does not rest in the 
plaintiff‘s sole discretion, and therefore may be affected by ―factors not 
reasonably‖ within the plaintiff‘s sole control.  (Ibid., italics added.)  As the 
Legislature itself recognized, once the wheels of judicial process have been set in 
motion, bringing the case to trial requires ―all parties [to] cooperate.‖  (§ 583.130.)  
Here, a primary reason for the stay was to permit Aurora, which had just been 
added as a defendant, to retain California counsel and prepare and file its 
 
14 
 
responsive pleading, as well as to accommodate Aurora‘s desire to explore 
settlement before making an appearance.  And the parties did not simply agree 
among themselves to delay the continuation of court proceedings; they sought and 
received the trial court‘s approval.  Once the court entered the stay order, the order 
had the same force and effect as any other stay order, including one entered over a 
party‘s objection. 
It is certainly true that the decision to agree to her opposing party‘s request 
was not beyond Gaines‘s control in any absolute sense; she could have refused.  
(Of course, had she done so, there is no guarantee her objection would have 
carried the day; the trial court might well have granted the stay regardless.)  But 
the decision to accommodate an opposing party does not reflect a lack of 
reasonable diligence.  It reflects a willingness to cooperate.  To fault Gaines for 
agreeing to seek the stay — or for failing to seek to lift the stay before its 
expiration — simply creates unfortunate incentives for the conduct of pretrial 
litigation, without meaningfully advancing the policies underlying the dismissal 
statute.   
IV. 
The majority points out that the parties could have extended the five-year 
time limit by means of a written stipulation or an oral agreement in open court.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 583.330; maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  That is true, and parties 
who find themselves in a similar position in the future would be well advised to 
avail themselves of this option.  It is, however, cold comfort to Gaines — who, 
before the court‘s opinion today, would have had no reason to believe that any 
stipulated extension would be necessary.  Section 583.330 permits the parties to 
extend the five-year period without the consent or participation of the trial court.  
But section 583.340 commands courts to exclude periods during which the 
―[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed‖ or during which ―[b]ringing the 
 
15 
 
action to trial‖ was otherwise ―impracticable.‖  Under a straightforward reading of 
the statute, the 120-day-long stay in this case ought to qualify as such a period. 
The ―tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340 must be 
liberally construed consistent with the policy favoring trial on the merits.‖  
(Dowling v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685, 693.)  The 
majority opinion fails to do so.  It instead reaches the textually implausible 
conclusion that a trial court order that strikes the trial date and stays the case does 
not toll the five-year period under section 583.340, thereby ensuring that no court 
will decide the merits of plaintiff‘s claim.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 222 Cal.App.4th 25 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No.S215990 
Date Filed: February 25, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Rolf M. Treu 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt, W. Keith Wyatt and Antonio K. Kizzie for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Fidelity National Law Group, Kevin R. Broersma and Jordan Trachtenberg for Defendants and 
Respondents Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Bobbie Jo Rybicki. 
 
Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Garcia Legal, Steven Ray Garcia and Alexander Levy for Defendants and 
Respondents Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and Aurora Loan Services, LLC. 
 
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents Joshua Tornberg, Craig Johnson, Ray Management Group, 
Inc., and A.J. Roop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
W. Keith Wyatt 
Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt 
444 South Flower Street, Suite 1800 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 489-0028 
 
Antonio K. Kizzie 
Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt 
444 South Flower Street, Suite 1800 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 489-0028 
 
Kevin R. Broersma 
Fidelity National Law Group 
915 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2100 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 438-7207 
 
Steven Ray Garcia 
Garcia Legal 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, 8th Floor 
Pasadena, CA  91101 
(626) 577-7500