Title: Laumann v. Dept. of Public Safety

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Laumann v. Dept. of Public Safety (2003-105); 177 Vt. 52; 857 A.2d 3

2004 VT 60

[Filed 25-Jun-2004]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
       

                                 2004 VT 60

                                No. 2003-105

  Kenneth Laumann	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Commissioner of Department 
                                                 of Labor and Industry
  	
  Department of Public Safety	                 March Term, 2004

  Robert Wheeler

          v.

  Ethan Allen, Inc.

  R. Tasha Wallis, Commissioner

  Thomas A. Zonay of Ford & Zonay, P.C., Woodstock, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Laumann.

  Bernard D. Lambek, Robert Halpert and Patricia K. Turley of Zalinger
    Cameron & Lambek, P.C., Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant Wheeler.

  Keith J. Kasper of McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C.,
    Burlington, for  Defendant-Appellee Department of Public Safety.

  William J. Blake and Wesley M. Lawrence, Law Clerk, of Kiel Ellis & Boxer,
    Springfield, for Defendant-Appellee Ethan Allen, Inc.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.  Appellants Kenneth Laumann and Robert Wheeler
  (Claimants) appeal a decision of the Commissioner of the Department of
  Labor and Industry (Department) granting summary judgment in favor of
  Claimants' employers, Vermont Department of Public Safety and Ethan Allen. 
  Claimants contend that the Commissioner violated statutory requirements of
  the Workers' Compensation Act when she ruled that the date claimants
  returned to work was the operative date from which to calculate cost of
  living increases for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits.  Because
  the Commissioner's interpretation is consistent with the plain language of
  the relevant statutes and regulations, we affirm.

       ¶  2.  The facts of this case are not in dispute.  Kenneth Laumann
  injured his back while working as a Vermont State Trooper.  He reported for
  duty the following day and thus lost no time from work as a result of his
  injury.  He reached medical end result after more than three and a half
  years from the date of the incident. (FN1)  Laumann still suffered a
  permanent impairment, however, and was therefore entitled to PPD benefits. 
  Upon reaching medical end result, Laumann and the Vermont Department of
  Public Safety entered into an agreement awarding him PPD benefits for a
  period of 52.25 weeks based on a 9.5% impairment rating.
    
       ¶  3.  Robert Wheeler injured his hand operating a wood chipper while
  working for Ethan Allen.  Eight months passed before Wheeler was able to
  return to work.  He reached medical end result for his injury about a year
  and two months after the date of the accident, but still suffered a
  permanent impairment.  At that point, he entered into an agreement with
  Ethan Allen awarding him PPD benefits for a period of 52.65 weeks based on
  a 13% impairment rating.  
   
       ¶  4.  In these two agreements, the date Claimants returned to work
  was used as the operative date for calculating cost of living increases for
  PPD benefits.  Under this so-called "old methodology," once a claimant
  reaches medical end result and receives an impairment rating, PPD benefits
  are determined by taking two-thirds of the claimant's average weekly wage
  at the time of the injury, then making weekly payments until the total
  number of weeks are satisfied.  If those payments extend beyond July 1, an
  annual cost of living adjustment was made.

       ¶  5.  After the parties signed the agreement, but before Claimants
  were paid, the Department developed a new way to calculate annual cost of
  living increases for PPD benefits.  Under this "new methodology," once a
  claimant reaches medical end result and receives an impairment rating, the
  compensation rate for PPD benefits is determined after adding annual
  adjustments to the average weekly wage from the date of injury to the date
  of medical end result.  The change in methodology would have had the
  greatest impact on Laumann because, with three and a half years between the
  date of injury and medical end result, he would have received $5000.00 more
  in PPD benefits.  The impact would have been far less on Wheeler because
  only a year and two months passed between the date of injury and medical
  end result.  

       ¶  6.  Citing the change to the "new methodology," the Department
  declined to approve the parties' PPD benefit agreements because they
  employed the "old methodology."  The employers then sought a hearing before
  the Department and requested consolidation of their cases. (FN2)  On
  January 5, 2003, the Commissioner issued a decision granting the employers'
  summary judgment motion.  The Commissioner based her ruling on the fact
  that the "old methodology" represented the most consistent reading of the
  statutory language and applicable regulations.  Claimants appealed.         
   
       ¶  7.  This Court's review is limited to questions of law that the
  Commissioner has certified, see 21 V.S.A. § 672, and is tempered by the
  considerable deference we must accord her ruling.  "The Commissioner's
  decision is presumed valid, to be overturned only if there is a clear
  showing to the contrary."  Wood v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, 169 Vt. 419,
  422,