Title: Benge v. Jones

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
 
 
) 
ESTATE OF RUSSELL E. JONES,  
)  No. 257, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JOHN H. BENGE, JR.,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware 
 
 
Respondent Below- 
 
)  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  RW No. 113625 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MYRON C. JONES, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner Below-  
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 12, 2000 
Decided:  February 2, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 2nd day of February, 2001, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
John H. Benge appeals the Court of Chancery’s entry of two default 
judgments against him in his capacity as the appointed executor of the Estate of 
Russell Jones.  Those orders resulted in judgments against him in an amount of 
$15,500 representing the sum he paid himself as an executor’s commission and for 
$497 representing additional sums improperly paid from the Estate plus costs and 
attorney’s fees of $2,625 with interest.  Benge argues that the Court of Chancery 
abused its discretion when it entered the default judgments against him in the 
 
 
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absence of any actions warning him of potential sanctions or judicial orders 
requiring responses on his part.  In addition, Benge argues that the Court of 
Chancery had no inherent power to assess attorney’s fees in the absence of a 
statutory or contractual basis for an award of fees as costs. 
2. 
Russell Jones died testate on December 30, 1996.  The Will named 
Benge executor of the estate.  The Will named Myron Jones the sole beneficiary of 
Russell Jones’ estate.  The estate consisted of a house valued at $150,000, a bank 
account of approximately $4,000, a life insurance policy of approximately $23,000 
and miscellaneous items valued at $9,000.  Russell Jones had minimal debt. 
 
3. 
The house was sold on March 28, 1998.  From that time until 
approximately March 15, 2000, the facts show that Benge failed to respond to 
Jones’ lawyer’s requests to distribute the proceeds from the sales, yet he did pay 
himself $15,500 from the estate account for his fees as an executor. 
 
4. 
On October 22, 1999, Appellee Jones filed a petition in the Court of 
Chancery for presentation on a regular Friday morning hearing on petitions. 
 
5. 
The petition alleged that the estate had been liquidated as of May 28, 
1998, seventeen months before Jones filed his petition and as of the date of filing, 
no distributions had been made to the sole beneficiary. 
 
6. 
Jones’ petition sought orders revoking Benge’s letters testamentary, 
removing Benge as executor, appointing himself as successor administrator and for 
 
 
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delivery of all assets to Jones’ counsel.  The Court of Chancery considered the 
petition on November 5, 1999.  Despite notice, Benge did not appear. 
 
7. 
A Vice Chancellor granted the requested order on November 5, 1999 
and the Court provided a copy to Benge.  Benge did not respond. 
 
8. 
On November 19, 1999, with notice to Benge, Jones filed a petition to 
enforce the November 5, 1999 Order and requested the issuance of a Rule to Show 
Cause why Benge should not be held in contempt for refusing to comply with the 
Court’s Order of November 5, 1999.  The Court scheduled a hearing for December 
17, 1999. 
 
9. 
Benge delivered the estate file to Jones’ counsel on December 16, 
1999, one day before the hearing on the Rule. 
 
10. 
At the December 17, 1999 hearing, Jones’ counsel withdrew the 
request for a contempt order but renewed his objection to the executor’s 
commission and requested an award of attorney’s fees.  Jones requested that the 
Court schedule an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the executor’s fees.  
Benge appeared at this hearing and represented to the Court that he would be filing 
an application for a commission which would substantiate the basis for his earlier 
payment to himself.  The Court granted an award of attorney’s fees subject to the 
filing of an affidavit in support. 
 
 
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11. 
On February 15, 2000, Jones alleged in a filing with the Court that:  
(a)  Benge had told Jones’ counsel that he would pay attorney’s fees and provide 
time records supporting his executor’s commission (in hope of avoiding the need 
for an evidentiary hearing); and, (b) that on December 23, 1999 Jones’ counsel 
wrote to Benge requesting the attorney’s fees and time records and that Benge had 
not replied.  Benge did not respond to the February 15, 2000 filing.   
 
12. 
The Vice Chancellor held an office conference on the February 15, 
2000 petition on March 15, 2000.  Both Benge and Jones’ counsel attended.  At 
that conference, the Vice Chancellor entered an Order awarding attorney’s fees 
incurred in connection with the petitions of October 22, 1999 and February 15, 
2000 and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for May 4, 2000 on issues involving 
executor’s commissions and improper payments of sums from the estate.  At the 
conference, Benge told the Vice Chancellor that he would file an application for 
his commission by March 23, 2000.   
 
13.  On March 17, 2000, Jones’ counsel wrote Benge reminding him of his 
representation to the Court that he would file a factually supported application for a 
commission by March 23, 2000, that Jones would seek discovery after receiving 
the application and that no hearing would be viable without Benge’s application in 
hand and responses to discovery available before a hearing date.  Jones’ counsel 
further made it clear to Benge that if Benge did not comply, that Jones intended to 
 
 
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seek an order denying Benge any commission.  Benge neither replied to the letter 
nor filed a timely application. 
14. 
Because Benge filed no application, Jones’ counsel complained to the 
Court, by letter of March 27, 2000, that neither appropriate discovery could be 
filed nor adequate preparation be made for a hearing.  Jones requested the entry of 
a default judgment against Benge for $15,500 which represented the executor’s 
commission which he had paid himself from the estate account.  Jones further 
indicated that he would present evidence of the uncontested fact that Benge had 
paid himself $15,500 in commission if required at the May 4 evidentiary hearing. 
 
15. 
On March 28, 2000, the Court of Chancery entered a default judgment 
against Benge for $15,500, five days after the date by which Benge stated he 
would file an application for a commission.   
 
16. 
On April 14, 2000, Jones’ counsel wrote Benge and then on May 1, 
2000, the Court, in an attempt to avoid any further hearing.  Benge did not respond. 
 
17. 
On the May 4, 2000 hearing date, Benge did appear and admitted that 
he had not communicated with Jones’ counsel, had produced no time records in 
support of his $15,500 commission and did not object to the default judgment.  He 
did not object to the entry of an additional award of attorney’s fees for the 
February 15, 2000 petition.  On May 4, 2000, the Court of Chancery awarded 
attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,625.  
 
 
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18. 
A trial court may enter the remedy of a default judgment within its 
sound discretion.  We review the issue for abuse of discretion. 
 
19. 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it enters default 
judgments on a record which reflects an exercise of judgment directed by 
conscience and reason. 
 
20. 
Benge’s actions, outlined in detail above, caused delay in the 
distribution of the proceeds of the estate to Jones, the sole beneficiary, the loss of 
earnings on the proceeds and resulted in attorney’s fees and costs that could have 
been avoided.  He paid himself a commission of $15,500 on an estate with a gross 
value of $185,000 and, despite an opportunity to do so, never justified the 
commission by documented evidence of time spent on the estate’s behalf. 
 
21. 
Benge’s failure to communicate with other counsel and to follow his 
own representations to the Court inexplicably cost Jones and the Court time and 
expense. 
 
22. 
We conclude that the Vice Chancellor conscientiously and reasonably 
exercised his discretion in granting default judgments for both the executor’s 
commission paid and for other improper payments. 
 
23. 
Further, the Vice Chancellor appropriately exercised his discretion to 
award attorney’s fees and costs here, where the record shows that Benge’s actions 
unjustifiably caused attorney’s fees to be incurred by Jones.  The fees were 
 
 
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necessarily but totally unjustifiably incurred in order to force Benge to exercise his 
fiduciary duty as an executor in good faith. 
 
24. 
Benge’s argument that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion by 
entering default judgments where there had been no judicial action ordering 
discovery or pretrial procedure is without merit.  The Court of Chancery 
appropriately found that Benge had engaged in a two-year process of delay, failed 
to follow up on his own representations to the Court and ignored requests from 
Jones’ attorney for information regarding the estate.   
 
NOW, THERFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery in all respects be AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Myron T. Steele_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice