Title: Graham County v. Buhl

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

76 Ariz. 275 (1953) 263 P.2d 537 GRAHAM COUNTY v. BUHL. No. 5771. Supreme Court of Arizona. November 9, 1953. Ruskin Lines, County Atty., Safford, for appellant. Max T. Layton, Safford, for appellee. *276 UDALL, Justice. E.R. McBride, Sheriff of Graham County, on January 1, 1953 appointed his cousin, J.W. Buhl, a deputy-sheriff at a salary of $300 per month. The latter demanded his salary but the Board of Supervisors of Graham County, acting under the advice of their county attorney, refused to pay it on the ground the appointment was in violation of our nepotism law. Buhl, as plaintiff, then brought suit against Graham County to recover his salary. After trial, judgment for plaintiff was entered and defendant appeals. We shall hereafter refer to appellant as defendant and to appellee as plaintiff. Section 56-105, A.C.A. 1939 makes the employment of relatives within certain degrees unlawful. Insofar as applicable, this section reads as follows: A violation of this statute is made a misdemeanor. It is admitted that the sheriff and plaintiff are related by consanguinity and are first cousins, having common grandparents. Defendant's sole assignment of error is that the trial court used the wrong yard-stick in determining the degree of relationship. Its contention is that the common law or canon law, rather than the civil law method of computing degrees of consanguinity should be applied in interpreting Section 56-105, supra. An examination of our various statutes dealing with relationships will disclose that in some instances the legislature specifically designated the prohibited relationships, but in none of them has the legislature said which of the two rules is to be followed. See, Section 39-101 et seq., A.C.A. 1939, descent and distribution; Section 41-108 dealing with children as "descendants of every degree"; Section 38-401, Administrators order of preference; Sections 37-103 and 44-1313, disqualification of jurors "within the fourth degree"; Section 21-107, change of judge where he "is of kin or related to either party"; Section 63-107, persons who may intermarry; and Section 54-416(3), school trustees prohibited from employing relatives within the second degree. The whole basis of defendant's contention is that inasmuch as the legislature in adopting the anti-nepotism law, Section 56-105, supra, did not spell out the method to be followed in computing degrees of relationship, the common law governs. It relies upon Section 1-106, A.C.A. 1939, which provides: If the canon law method of computing degrees is followed, the trial court was in error, for the sheriff and his deputy would come within the second degree, as in applying this rule you begin with the common ancestor and reckon downwards, and in whatever degree the two persons, or the most remote of them, is distant from the common ancestor, that is the degree within which they are related to each other. Whereas, under the civil law rule as applied to the instant case, we begin with plaintiff and trace upwards to the common ancestor and then trace downwards to the sheriff. If this method of computation is the correct one, the parties are related within the fourth degree, hence the appointment would be valid and the judgment of the lower court correct. See 4 Kent's Comm. (star page) 412, Fourteenth Ed. page 473. For explanation and diagram of both rules, see Cooley's Blackstone, Book II, Chapter XIV, (star page) 200, or Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawles Third Revision, Consanguinity. Plaintiff primarily relies upon the case of Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 P. 471, Ann.Cas. 1917D, 729. In this opinion the Idaho court was among the first to up hold the constitutionality of an anti-nepotism Act enacted under the police power of the state for the purpose of improving the efficiency of public service and discouraging the practice of making appointments upon considerations other than the merit or ability of the appointees. See also Annotation 88 A.L.R. 1103. However, the validity of our Act is not questioned on this appeal, and the Barton case, supra, is of no help in determining whether to apply the civil or canonical rule, because the Idaho statute expressly provides degrees of kindred are to be computed according to the rules of the civil law. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Clayton v. Drake, 17 Ohio St. 367, 368, faced the problem of whether the canon law or the civil law method of computing degrees of consanguinity was to be followed, and said: Likewise, in McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa. 430, we find: The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Smallman v. Powell, 18 Or. 367, 23 P. 249, 250, found the canon law rule was adopted to fit the needs of a feudal society: For a more scholarly analysis of the historical causes which prompted the English courts to adopt the canonical computation of degrees of consanguinity to determine *279 heirship to realty, see Appeal of Campbell, 64 Conn. 277, 29 A. 494, 24 L.R.A. 667. In Bailey v. Turner, 108 Kan. 856, 197 P. 214, 215, the court dealt with a nepotism statute which provided, "* * * no reporter shall be related by blood to the presiding judge of the court wherein he is employed." Laws 1921, c. 171, § 1. In deciding where the line was to be drawn as to the prohibited degrees of relationship, the court adopted the common law rule for disqualification of jurors, and pointed out, From the cases cited it is apparent that the common law adopted the canon law rule for one purpose and the civil law rule for another. The one rule is no less a part of the common law than the other. Therefore, the real problem here presented is, which of the two common law rules applies? Certainly the social and political reasons which prompted feudal England to formulate the old canons of descent and adopt the canonical law rule to implement them, have never held sway in Arizona. The rule was tailored to the needs of a vanished society, one having many concepts foreign to ours. The reason for the rule has gone, and the rule has gone with it. The civil law method is easier to apply, less confusing, and may even be said to rest upon a sounder basis in logic. Moreover, the members of this court as presently constituted, having all served as judges of the superior court, take judicial notice of the fact that it has been the common practice of the bench and bar of this state to apply the civil law method rather than the archaic and cumbersome canonical rule in determining degrees of relationship, such as disqualification of jurors, etc. It appears from the decisions of the Attorney General that on May 4, 1934, when Mr. Justice LaPrade held that office the public officers of this state were advised to apply the civil rule in computing degrees of relationship in nepotism cases. We hold the civil rule is the one the legislature intended in enacting our antinepotism law. Judgment affirmed. STANFORD, C.J., and PHELPS, LA PRADE and WINDES, JJ., concur.