Title: State v. Brunet

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Brunet (2000-121); 174 Vt. 135; 806 A.2d 1007

[Filed 10-May-2002]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Jul-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-121


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Kevin J. Brunet	                                 June Term, 2001 


James R. Crucitti, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       AMESTOY, C.J.   The question presented is whether collateral estoppel
  bars a criminal  prosecution based on factual allegations decided adversely
  to the State in an earlier probation  revocation proceeding. We hold that
  it does not.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

       The material facts are undisputed.  In November 1998, defendant was
  convicted of  misdemeanor domestic assault, and sentenced to three to six
  months. The sentence was suspended,  and defendant was placed on probation
  with the standard conditions of probation, as well as several  special
  conditions, including requirements that he not contact the victim of the
  assault, and that he  abide by any pending relief from abuse order.  

       On January 5, 1999, defendant was charged with a violation of
  probation and two new   offenses, second degree aggravated domestic assault
  and violation of an abuse-prevention order,  all 

 

  arising out of a single incident.  Following a bail review hearing on
  January 12, the court ordered  that defendant be held without bail on the
  pending violation of probation.  On January 26, the court  held a probation
  violation hearing.  The State alleged that defendant had violated the
  conditions that  he not engage in "threatening, violent, or assaultive
  behavior," not have any contact with the victim,   and abide by any pending
  relief from abuse order.  In support of the allegations,  the State called
  two  witnesses.  Bret Ward, a bartender/bouncer at Alley Cats, a Burlington
  bar, testified about an  incident that had occurred during the late evening
  of December 23 or early morning of the 24th.   He  recalled observing the
  victim and another woman approach the bar, and moments later saw defendant 
  strike the victim several times and kick her.  Defendant's probation
  officer testified that defendant  had called her on December 28 to report
  that the victim had "attacked" him.

       Defendant called two witnesses.   His current girlfriend testified
  that on the night in question,  she and her two young children and
  defendant had parked across the street from Alley Cats to visit a  friend
  of defendant who lived above the bar.  She recalled that as defendant
  approached the bar, the  victim came up behind him, pulled on his jacket,
  spun him around, blocked his path, and struck him  several times. 
  Defendant, in response, picked her up and put her on the ground in order to
  subdue  her.  Defendant also testified, essentially corroborating his
  girlfriend's account of the incident.  He  did not believe that Ward, the
  bartender, could have observed the altercation.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued findings from the
  bench.  The court found  that defendant's meeting with the victim was
  accidental, that the victim initiated the altercation, and  that defendant
  put her on the ground solely to subdue her.  The court thus found that the
  physical  contact between defendant and the victim "was the result of the
  Defendant trying to either protect  himself or to extricate himself from
  the situation."  Accordingly, the court ruled that there was no  probation
  violation.

 

  Defendant later moved to dismiss the criminal charges on several grounds,
  including   collateral estoppel.  The trial court denied the motion in a
  written decision, concluding that the State  had not had a "full and fair
  opportunity to litigate the issues" in the revocation proceeding, and 
  therefore was not collaterally estopped from proceeding with the criminal
  prosecution.  The matter  proceeded to trial, which resulted in a hung
  jury.  At the retrial, the State called nine witnesses,  including Ward
  (the bartender who had testified in the revocation proceeding), an
  acquaintance of  defendant who stated that defendant was looking for the
  victim as he approached the bar on the  evening in question, the
  investigating officers who described the victim's condition after the 
  incident, and the victim herself, who testified that defendant struck her
  without provocation, threw  her down - breaking a chair in the process -
  and hit her with a piece of the broken chair.   As in the  earlier
  revocation proceeding, defendant called his girlfriend, and testified on
  his own behalf.  The  jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of
  felony domestic assault, and defendant was  subsequently sentenced to two
  to five years.  

       On appeal, defendant renews his claim that collateral estoppel barred
  the criminal  prosecution for domestic assault because of the adverse
  finding against the State in the earlier  probation revocation proceeding.  
  Although we have not heretofore addressed this precise issue,  our 
  analysis is necessarily informed by several well-settled principles and
  precedents.  The doctrine of  collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
  will bar the relitigation of an earlier decided issue where:

    (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in
    privity  with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was
    resolved by a final  judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the
    same as the one raised in  the later action; (4) there was a full
    and fair opportunity to litigate the  issue in the earlier action;
    and (5) applying preclusion in the later  action is fair.

  Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265, 583 A.2d 583, 587
  (1990); see also State v.  Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 127-28, 702 A.2d 105, 110-11
  (1997) (applying Trepanier elements in criminal 

 

  case); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268, 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992)
  (considering whether "cross-over" estoppel, i.e., principle that issue
  decided in civil case is determinative in later criminal case,  bars DUI
  prosecution following judgment for defendant in civil suspension
  proceeding).        

       The trial court here found, and the State implicitly concedes, that
  the first two Trepanier  elements were satisfied.  The parties were
  identical - both the revocation proceeding and the criminal  prosecution
  were brought by the State of Vermont against defendant - and there was a
  final  judgment on the merits in the revocation proceeding.  We may assume,
  as well, that the factual  finding that defendant had not engaged in
  "assaultive" behavior and that any physical contact with  the victim was
  purely inadvertent and defensive would - if conclusive - preclude the
  charge of  domestic assault predicated on the same facts.  See Lucido v.
  Superior Court,