Title: State v. Shirley E.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 129 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2752 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Torrance P., Jr., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Shirley E., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 55 
Reported at: 290 Wis. 2d 193, 711 N.W.2d 690 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Rebecca A. Kiefer, assistant district 
attorney, with whom on the briefs was E. Michael McCann, 
district attorney. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Andrea Taylor Cornwall, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Shelia Hill-Roberts, 
Michael J. Vruno, Jr., and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
2006 WI 129
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2752  
(L.C. No. 
2004TP544) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Torrance P., Jr., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Shirley E., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals vacating an order of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Dennis R. Cimpl, Judge, 
and remanding the cause for further proceedings.1  The circuit 
                                                 
1 State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI App 55, 290 Wis. 2d 193, 711 
N.W.2d 690. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
2 
 
court's order terminated Shirley E.'s parental rights to her 
biological son, Torrance P., Jr.  
¶2 
This case presents the issue of whether a circuit 
court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights 
proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has 
appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a 
hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in 
default as a sanction for disobeying the court order. 
¶3 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
vacating the circuit court's order terminating Shirley E.'s 
parental rights and remanding the cause to the circuit court.  
We hold that the circuit court erred in finding Shirley E. in 
default before conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence that the grounds 
for termination existed.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred 
in dismissing Shirley E.'s counsel at the fact-finding phase.  
We further hold that Shirley E. had a statutory right to counsel 
at the dispositional phase of the termination of parental rights 
proceeding, even when the circuit court found her in default as 
a sanction for her failure to obey the court order to appear 
personally at the fact-finding phase.  The circuit court's error 
in denying Shirley E. the right to counsel in both the fact-
finding and dispositional phases of the termination of parental 
rights proceeding is prejudicial error.  
I 
¶4 
The record provides an account of the life of Torrance 
P., Jr., who was born on March 22, 1999 with cocaine in his 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
3 
 
system, to parents who, during his life, were frequently in 
trouble with the law and were incarcerated at various times.  
During the first five years of his life, Torrance P., Jr. was 
shuttled between relatives, neighbors, and foster care in at 
least three different states.  He witnessed his parents abuse 
each other verbally and physically.  
¶5 
This review does not require us to determine the 
merits of the circuit court's order terminating Shirley E.'s 
parental rights, and thus we will not recount the chronology of 
events upon which the petition for termination is based.  The 
brief facts we state, however, are enough to demonstrate what a 
sad story this case presents. 
¶6 
This opinion focuses on the procedural aspects of the 
circuit court's order terminating Shirley E.'s parental rights 
to Torrance P., Jr.  Had the circuit court followed the 
procedures set forth in the statutes and our case law and 
allowed Shirley E.'s counsel to participate in both phases of 
the termination of parental rights proceeding, this case, in all 
likelihood, would not be before us.  Because the circuit court 
erred, Torrance P., Jr.'s permanent placement has been delayed. 
¶7 
The procedural facts relevant to our review are not in 
dispute. 
¶8 
On April 15, 2004, a hearing was held before Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court Judge Carl Ashley to extend the Child in 
Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) order that had been 
entered against Shirley E. in 2002.  The order was reduced to 
writing and warned of the possibility of termination of parental 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
4 
 
rights.  The CHIPS order also contained conditions that Shirley 
E. had to fulfill in order to regain custody of Torrance P., Jr.  
She was to maintain a stable residence, have regular visits with 
and show interest in the child, stay in contact with her case 
manager, and complete "Alcohol or Other Drug Abuse" (AODA) 
programs.  The CHIPS order also required Torrance P., Jr. to 
remain in the custody of his foster home. 
¶9 
Although Shirley E. was incarcerated in Michigan at 
the time, she sent Torrance P., Jr. several letters and 
completed AODA treatment.  On September 9, 2004, Shirley E. was 
released from prison.  
¶10 On November 23, 2004, the State of Wisconsin filed a 
petition for termination of parental rights, claiming Shirley E. 
had failed to meet the conditions of return contained in the 
CHIPS order.  
¶11 An initial plea hearing on the termination of parental 
rights was held on December 13, 2004, before Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court Judge Joseph R. Wall.  Shirley E., who was in 
Michigan, did not appear.  The hearing was adjourned to February 
14, 2005, so the State could obtain service on Shirley E. and 
arrange counsel for her. 
¶12 On February 14, 2005, Shirley E.'s recently appointed 
counsel appeared in person, but Shirley E. did not.  Upon her 
counsel's request, the circuit court allowed Shirley E. to 
appear by telephone.  The State asked the circuit court to find 
Shirley E. in default.  The circuit court instead ordered 
Shirley E. to appear in person at the next hearing and warned 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
5 
 
her that if she did not appear personally, she would be found in 
default.2  The hearing was adjourned and rescheduled for March 8, 
2005, so counsel would have an opportunity to confer with 
Shirley E.  
¶13 On March 8, 2005, Shirley E.'s counsel appeared in 
person, but Shirley E. did not.  The State asked the circuit 
court to find Shirley E. in default.  The circuit court found 
Shirley E. in default; the finding was a sanction for the 
parent’s failure to obey the court order to appear in person.3  A 
                                                 
2 The circuit court admonished Shirley E., stating, "[A]nd, 
of course, we need to have you here, so we're going to get a new 
date in this case. . . . But remember, you must appear.  If you 
don't appear, you will be defaulted. And what that means is that 
your rights will be automatically terminated, okay?"  R.42:5.  
The circuit court later explained at the hearing on March 
8, 2005 that it warns parents harshly to ensure they understand 
the need to appear in person.  It stated that the warnings are 
"a little harsher than reality."  Shirley E. was not present at 
this hearing but her counsel was.  R.43:4.  
3 The circuit court did not order a default under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.02(5).  Shirley E. had "appeared" at the hearing by her 
attorney.  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
6 
 
circuit 
court 
has 
both 
inherent 
authority 
and 
statutory 
authority under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7), 804.12(2)(a), 805.03 
(2003-04)4 to sanction a party for failing to obey a court 
order.5   
                                                                                                                                                             
The circuit court found Shirley E. in default as a sanction 
for failing to comply with its order to attend a hearing in 
person.  Before a circuit court may enter a default on the 
ground that a party failed to comply with a court order, the 
party's conduct must be egregious or in bad faith.  Evelyn C.R., 
2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; Johnson v. 
Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 276, 470 N.W.2d 859, 878-
79 (1991).  The circuit court made no finding that Shirley E.'s 
conduct was egregious or in bad faith before finding her in 
default.  The circuit court ordered the sanction of default on 
March 8, 2005——the first time Shirley E. failed to appear in 
person after being ordered to do so on February 14, 2004.  
Shirley E. ultimately failed to attend personally three other 
hearings in a five month period; her attorney attended all of 
them.  The circuit court failed to consider Shirley E.'s 
attorney's explanations about why Shirley E. was not present in 
person, including difficulty of coming to Wisconsin from out of 
the state, her status as a parolee, and her lack of funds.  A 
circuit court has discretion in imposing a sanction for 
noncompliance with an order but must make the appropriate 
findings to support a sanction of default.   
The issue of the egregious nature of Shirley E.'s conduct 
has not been raised in this court, and we will not address it 
further. 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
5 The statutes provide in relevant part:  
Wis. Stat. § 802.10(7):  
Sanctions. Violations of a scheduling or pretrial 
order are subject to ss. 802.05, 804.12 and 805.03. 
Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a):  
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery . . . the court in which the action 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
7 
 
¶14 The circuit court stated that it would entertain a 
motion to vacate the default if Shirley E. personally appeared.  
The circuit court scheduled the hearings for the fact-finding 
and dispositional phases of the termination of parental rights 
procedure for April 1, 2005.  
¶15 At the April 1, 2005 proceeding Shirley E.'s counsel 
appeared in person, but Shirley E. did not.  Shirley E.'s 
                                                                                                                                                             
is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others the following: 
 1. An order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of the action 
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining 
the order;  
2. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or 
prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing 
designated matters in evidence;  
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
or staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party;  
4. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
physical, 
mental 
or 
vocational 
examination. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.03:  
For failure of any . . . party to comply with the 
statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to 
obey any order of court, the court in which the action 
is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, including but not limited to 
orders authorized under § 804.12(2)(a). 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
8 
 
counsel informed the circuit court that she had not spoken with 
Shirley E. because Shirley E. was without telephone service for 
several weeks.  Counsel explained that Shirley E. had mentioned 
that she had had trouble traveling in the past because of lack 
of funds.  The State remarked that Shirley E. had an outstanding 
warrant in Wisconsin for her arrest.  The circuit court 
announced that if Shirley E. appeared in person, it would 
entertain a motion to vacate the default; otherwise, the default 
would stand.  The matter was then adjourned until May 6, 2005.  
¶16 On May 6, 2005, Shirley E.'s counsel appeared in 
person, but Shirley E. did not. The circuit court ruled that 
Shirley E. remained in default.  The circuit court and Shirley 
E.'s counsel discussed counsel's role in the case, with counsel 
requesting a further role in the proceedings.6  At the end of the 
hearing, the circuit court informed Shirley E.'s counsel that 
counsel was "relieved of any further duties in this case."7  The 
circuit court stated that it would entertain a motion to vacate 
                                                 
6 The court: Ms. Smith, did you have any further role? 
Ms. Smith: I'd like to have a further role, yes.  
The court: Your client has been defaulted.  
Ms. Smith: I know she has.  But she's actually been in 
contact with me and I suspect that she may be sitting 
on the stand at some point trying to explain to the 
Court why she didn't make court appearances.  
The court: Okay.  Well, well, let's go on.  
R.45:13.  
7 R.45:31.  
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
9 
 
the default if Shirley E. communicated with her counsel.  The 
termination of parental rights proceeding was rescheduled for 
August 1, 2005.  
¶17 At the termination of parental rights proceeding on 
August 1, 2005, Shirley E.'s counsel appeared in person, but 
Shirley E. did not.  Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Dennis 
R. Cimpl presided at this hearing.  The circuit court explained 
that at the May 6, 2005 hearing Judge Wall had reaffirmed 
Shirley E.'s default status and relieved her counsel of any 
further duties.  Although Shirley E.'s counsel informed the 
circuit court during the August 1 hearing that she had since 
spoken with her client and wanted to remain to represent her 
client, the circuit court once again relieved counsel of her 
duties and dismissed her from the courtroom.8  
                                                 
8 The court: This matter is here on a petition for 
termination of parental rights. In reviewing the 
judgment role, it appears on May 6th Judge Wall 
reaffirmed mom was in default status and relieved Ms. 
Smith of any further duty.  
[The State]: That's correct, judge. 
Ms. Smith: And, Your Honor, my recollection——maybe 
this is not reflected on the docket——if I did not have 
any contact with [Shirley E.], that I would be 
relieved of my duties.  Given this is a termination of 
parental rights case, and I have an obligation to 
remain in contact with my client because of infective 
[sic] assistance of counsel, I have had contact with 
her and discussed with her the reasons she was unable 
to travel from Michigan to Wisconsin for the purposes 
of these proceedings.  
The court: But she's not here today. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
10 
 
¶18 The circuit court then conducted hearings on both 
phases of the termination of parental rights proceeding without 
Shirley E. or her counsel present.  The State presented only one 
witness, the most recent case manager assigned to Torrance P., 
Jr.  Based on the case manager's testimony and the petition, the 
circuit court found that Shirley E. had failed to assume 
                                                                                                                                                             
[The State]: Judge, she has not appeared in person on 
this case at all. 
The court: She's not here today. There is no motion to 
vacate the default.  I'll have to go with Judge Wall's 
ruling of May 6th in that, Ms. Smith, you're relieved 
of any further duty.  You can leave, Ms. Shelia [sic] 
Smith. 
Ms. Smith: Correct. Your Honor, again because I think 
I do have obligation to stay in contact with my 
client, which I have, she lives in state of Michigan, 
she was unemployed for a significant period of time, 
and because of poverty, she was not able to travel to 
Wisconsin. The State is incorrect in that Ms. [E.] did 
make an appearance by telephone in reference to this 
matter, and she has been in contact with me.  
[The State]: Judge—— 
The 
court: 
No, 
wait. 
Judge 
Wall's 
ruled. 
I've 
ruled. . . . We don't need any more argument. 
Ms. Smith: ——but I have to make a record. 
The court: I know you've got to make an argument, 
you've got to make a record. You did. Now, you can go.  
Ms. Smith: Great. 
The court: Great. 
(Whereupon, Ms. Smith exits the courtroom.) 
R.47:3. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
11 
 
parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (one of the 
grounds for termination of parental rights) and that Torrance 
P., Jr. was in continuing need of protection or services under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) (another ground for termination of 
parental rights).  The circuit court found Shirley E. "unfit" 
under § 48.424(4).  The circuit court then proceeded to the 
dispositional phase and ruled that it was in Torrance P., Jr.'s 
best interests that Shirley E.'s parental rights be terminated.9  
See § 48.426(3) and § 48.427.   
¶19 On August 26, 2005, Shirley E. appealed the circuit 
court's order.  She claimed she was deprived of the right to 
counsel and that there was insufficient evidence in the record 
to support the findings on the two statutory grounds for 
termination of parental rights.  
¶20 On February 14, 2006, the court of appeals vacated the 
circuit court's order terminating Shirley E.'s parental rights, 
concluding that Shirley E. was erroneously deprived of the right 
to counsel.  The court of appeals did not reach the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence.  Because we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals vacating the order of the circuit court, 
                                                 
9 These hearings also involved a separate petition to 
terminate the parental rights of the biological father.  Like 
Shirley E., he failed to appear at several hearings and a 
default was entered against him.  Although he successfully moved 
to vacate the default and was allowed to provide testimony 
through a deposition, the circuit court found him to be unfit 
and terminated his parental rights.  The termination of the 
father's parental rights is not before the court today and will 
not be addressed further. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
12 
 
this court need not address the sufficiency of the evidence 
issue either. 
II 
¶21 This case presents the issue of whether a circuit 
court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights 
proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has 
appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a 
hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in 
default as a sanction for disobeying the court order.  This 
issue raises a question of law which this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, but 
benefiting from their analyses.    
III 
¶22 Before examining the right to counsel in a termination 
of parental rights proceeding, we briefly discuss the nature of 
a termination of parental rights proceeding to place the 
statutory right to counsel in proper context. 
¶23 This court has stated numerous times that termination 
of parental rights proceedings "'wor[k] a unique kind of 
deprivation.' . . . [They] involve the awesome authority of the 
State 'to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the 
parental relationship.'"10  A termination of parental rights 
proceeding implicates a parent's most fundamental rights.11  At 
                                                 
10 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996) (quoted 
sources omitted). 
11 Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
13 
 
stake is a parent's "interest in the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her child.  This court has 
recognized that . . . the integrity of the family is subject to 
constitutional protection through the due process clause of the 
state and federal constitutions."12   
¶24 Termination of parental rights proceedings require 
heightened legal safeguards to prevent erroneous decisions.13  
This court has consistently recognized that "[a] parent's right 
to the custody and care of his or her children is an extremely 
important interest that demands protection and fairness."14   
¶25 The Wisconsin's Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48, 
sets forth a "panoply of substantial rights and procedures to 
assure 
that 
the 
parental 
rights 
will 
not 
be 
terminated 
precipitously, arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only after a 
deliberative, well considered, fact-finding process utilizing 
all the protections afforded by the statutes unless there is a 
specific, knowledgeable, and voluntary waiver."15   
                                                 
12 T.M.F. v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 
332 N.W.2d 293 (1983). 
13 Evelyn C.R., Wis. 2d 1, ¶21. 
"The profound consequences of termination have necessitated 
the development of detailed statutory requirements."  Sheboygan 
County HHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶23, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 
N.W.2d 402. 
14 A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1003, 485 N.W.2d 52 
(1992). 
15 M.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 
Wis. 2d 432, 437, 342 N.W.2d 410, 413-14 (1984) (modified in 
part on other grounds by Steven V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, 271 
Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856). 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
14 
 
¶26 When a parent, like Shirley E., contests a petition 
for termination of parental rights, the circuit court must 
engage in a two-step process to determine whether to terminate 
parental rights.16    
¶27 The first step, the fact-finding phase, consists of an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether adequate grounds exist 
for the termination of parental rights.17  There are eleven 
statutory grounds on which a petition for termination can be 
based.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  The petitioner must demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence the existence of the alleged 
grounds for termination.18  If the petitioner satisfactorily 
carries the burden of persuasion, the circuit court "shall find 
the parent unfit."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4).  During this phase, 
"the parent's rights are paramount."19   
¶28 The second step, the dispositional phase, consists of 
another 
evidentiary 
hearing 
in 
which 
the 
circuit 
court 
determines whether termination of parental rights is in the 
child's best interests.20  The child's interests are paramount at 
this stage of the proceeding, but the parent has a right to 
                                                 
16 Waukesha County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. C.E.W., 124 
Wis. 2d 47, 60, 368 N.W.2d 47 (1985). 
17 Wis. Stat. § 48.424; Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d at 60. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
15 
 
present evidence and be heard.21  If the circuit court finds 
during this dispositional phase that the evidence does not 
warrant the termination of parental rights, the circuit court 
need 
not 
terminate 
the 
parent's 
rights. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.424(4), 48.427(2).  
¶29 We turn next to the statutory right to counsel which 
Shirley E. claims she was denied. 
IV 
¶30 One of the procedural safeguards the legislature has 
afforded 
to 
parents 
in 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings is the right to counsel.  The legislature placed 
great emphasis on the necessity of counsel.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.23(2) provides that any parent who appears before the 
circuit court in an involuntary termination of parental rights 
proceeding shall be represented by counsel.  A parent aged 18 
years or older (and Shirley E. is over 18 years of age) can 
waive the assistance of counsel, but only if the circuit court 
finds that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.  Minor parents 
cannot waive the right to counsel. 
¶31 The right to counsel statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2), 
states in relevant part:  
If a proceeding involves a contested adoption or the 
involuntary termination of parental rights, any parent 
18 years old or older who appears before the court 
shall be represented by counsel; but the parent may 
                                                 
21 Wis. Stat. § 48.427(1)-(1m); Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶23.  
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
16 
 
waive counsel provided the court is satisfied such 
waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. 
¶32 Although not physically present, Shirley E. "appeared" 
in the proceeding by counsel.22  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2) 
comes into effect.  
¶33 "Counsel," as defined by Wis. Stat. § 48.23 (1g), 
"means an attorney acting as adversary counsel who shall advance 
and protect the legal rights of the party represented . . . ."  
The circuit court may appoint counsel for any party unless the 
party has or wishes to retain counsel of his or her own 
choosing.23 
¶34 Shirley E. claims that her statutory right to counsel 
was violated when the circuit court dismissed her counsel from 
the August 1, 2005 proceeding, preventing the attorney from 
representing the then-absent Shirley E. during both the fact-
finding and the dispositional phases of the termination of 
parental rights proceeding. 
 
¶35 This case is not the first time we have been asked to 
examine the statutory right to counsel under Wisconsin's 
Children's Code, chapter 48.  Because "[t]he statutory direction 
is unequivocal: A parent has the right to representation in 
court unless there is a waiver,"24 and because counsel plays a 
                                                 
22 Id., ¶17. 
23 Wis. Stat. § 48.23(4),(5). 
24 M.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 441 (the court has stated that the 
legislature, in enacting Chapter 48, "intended to be expansive 
in its according of legal rights to parents even as it was 
expansive in providing that children and their rights be fully 
protected."). 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
17 
 
significant role in protecting parents' interests and ensuring a 
fair process, we have enumerated several interrelated principles 
regarding the right to counsel in chapter 48 proceedings.  
¶36 One principle is that counsel must be present in court 
and available to participate.  Mere "engagement" of counsel, 
that is, the contract to represent, without counsel's attendance 
at the proceedings, does not fulfill the statutory requirement 
that a parent shall be represented by counsel.25   
¶37 A second principle is that counsel has a "duty to 
provide his client with zealous, competent and independent 
representation."26 
¶38 A third principle is that the statutory right to 
counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel:  
"It is axiomatic that the right to be represented by appointed 
counsel is worthless unless that right includes the right to 
effective counsel.  Representation by counsel means more than 
just having a warm body with 'J.D.' credentials sitting next to 
you during the proceedings."27 
                                                                                                                                                             
"The legislature placed great emphasis upon the necessity 
of counsel.  The legislative edict is that, in termination 
proceedings, 'any parent. . . shall be represented by counsel.'"  
Id. at 437. 
25 Id. at 438. 
 
26 E.H. v. Milwaukee County, 151 Wis. 2d 725, 737, 445 
N.W.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1989). 
27 A.S., 168 Wis. 2d at 1003. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
18 
 
¶39 A fourth principle is that the circuit court has a 
duty "to assure there was representation in court unless there 
was a knowledgeable and voluntary waiver."28 
¶40 The State, however, now wishes us to interpret the 
statutory right to counsel narrowly.  The State argues that the 
statutory right to counsel is conditional upon a party's 
appearing in person at the proceeding and that the right to 
counsel is forfeited once the circuit court finds the parent in 
default as a sanction for disobeying a court order to appear 
personally.   
¶41 We do not accept the State's position for three 
reasons.  First, Wis. Stat. § 48.23 does not provide a right to 
counsel only to parents who appear in person.  Second, case law 
clearly bars a circuit court from finding a parent in default 
before taking evidence on the ground alleged for the termination 
of parental rights.  Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding of 
default in the present case was erroneous, and the circuit court 
had no power to bar the parent or parent's counsel from 
participation at the fact-finding stage.  Third, in any event, 
the circuit court erred in barring counsel from the disposition 
phase.   
¶42 We will discuss each of these reasons in turn. 
¶43 First, Wis. Stat. § 48.23 does not provide a right to 
counsel only to parents who appear in person.  Contrary to the 
State's argument, nothing in § 48.23 provides that the right to 
                                                 
28 M.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 438. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
19 
 
counsel is conditional upon the parent's appearance in person at 
a termination of parental rights proceeding.  The legislature 
intended to be expansive in its according of legal rights to 
parents.29 
 
The 
absence 
of 
an 
explicit 
and 
unambiguous 
requirement in § 48.23 that a parent appear in person to 
maintain a right to counsel means that a parent's right to 
counsel is not contingent upon the parent's personal attendance 
at the proceeding.   
 
¶44 If the legislature wanted the right to counsel to be 
contingent upon a parent's appearance in person, it could have 
expressly stated so.  The legislature, in constructing chapter 
48, knew how to require personal attendance at a termination of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding. 
 
For 
example, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.41(2)(a) allows a parent to voluntarily consent to a 
petition to terminate parental rights, but only if "[t]he parent 
appears personally at the hearing and gives his or her consent 
to the termination of his or her parental rights" (emphasis 
added). 
¶45 Furthermore, the State's position contradicts the 
legislative direction that the Children's Code is to be 
liberally construed to effect its objectives.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(2).  An objective of judicial proceedings is that 
parties are assured fair hearings and that their legal rights 
are recognized and enforced.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a). 
                                                 
29 Id. at 441. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
20 
 
 
¶46 In sum, the statute directs the right to counsel, and 
no 
statutory 
provision 
deprives 
a 
parent's 
counsel 
from 
presenting evidence and arguing at a termination of parental 
rights proceeding when the parent has "appeared" but has not 
appeared in person.  
 
¶47 Second, dismissing Shirley E.'s counsel and refusing 
to allow counsel to participate on behalf of Shirley E. at the 
fact-finding stage of the termination of parental rights 
proceeding contravenes Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 
¶17, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  
¶48 In Evelyn C.R., counsel appeared for the mother at a 
termination of parental rights proceeding.  The circuit court 
nevertheless entered a default judgment against the mother when 
the mother failed to appear in person at the fact-finding phase 
after the circuit court had ordered her attendance.  The circuit 
court entered a default judgment without first taking evidence 
sufficient to support the alleged grounds for termination.   
¶49 This court in Evelyn C.R. recognized that Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.02(5), the default judgment statute, did not control, 
inasmuch as the mother had "appeared" by counsel.30  The court 
stated that a circuit court could, however, find a parent in 
default as a sanction for failing to obey a court order to 
appear.  The Evelyn C.R. court nevertheless concluded that the 
circuit court could not enter a default judgment without holding 
a fact-finding hearing and finding the alleged grounds for 
                                                 
30 Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
21 
 
termination by clear and convincing evidence.31  The legislative 
goal of securing a fair procedure is not served unless a parent 
is given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner.32  The circuit court has a duty and 
obligation 
to 
protect 
the 
parent's 
right 
to 
participate 
meaningfully in a termination of parental rights proceeding.33  
This court concluded that by entering a default judgment without 
first taking evidence to support the grounds for termination of 
parental rights, "the circuit court [in Evelyn C.R.] failed to 
comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for 
termination of parental rights."34     
¶50 In the present case, as in Evelyn C.R., the circuit 
court erroneously found the mother in default before taking any 
evidence on the grounds alleged for termination of her parental 
                                                 
31 Id., ¶25: 
 Where, as in the present case, the constitution and 
statutory code require a showing of proof before the 
circuit court can enter a particular judgment or 
order, the circuit court cannot enter the judgment or 
order without the appropriate showing.  To be sure, 
the circuit court may, as it did here, determine that 
a party's action or inaction provides adequate cause 
for sanctions against that party.  But such cause does 
not allow the court to dispense with any independent 
constitutional or statutory burden of proof that must 
be satisfied prior to entering a judgment or order. 
32 Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, ¶56, 286 
Wis. 2d 278, 706 N.W.2d 269. 
33 R.G. v. F.C., 152 Wis. 2d 159, 167, 448 N.W.2d 239 
(1989). 
34 Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
22 
 
rights.  Because the circuit court should not have found Shirley 
E. in default before hearing evidence in the fact-finding phase, 
Shirley 
E.'s 
attorney 
should 
not 
have 
been 
barred 
from 
participating.  Thus, the circuit court violated Shirley E.'s 
statutory right to counsel in the fact-finding phase. 
¶51 In the present case, in contrast to Evelyn C.R., the 
circuit court heard evidence in the fact-finding phase after it 
found the mother in default and dismissed the mother's counsel.  
But the circuit court heard only the State's evidence, having 
erroneously barred Shirley E. by her attorney from challenging 
the State's evidence and presenting her evidence at the fact-
finding phase.  As a result of the circuit court's ruling 
dismissing Shirley E.'s counsel, the circuit court precluded 
counsel from participating on Shirley E.'s behalf. 
¶52 The United States Supreme Court has commanded, "When 
the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must 
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."35  By 
depriving Shirley E. of her statutory right to be heard through 
her counsel in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, the 
circuit court in the present case deprived Shirley E. of fair 
procedures.  
 
¶53 Third, even if we were to view the circuit court's 
finding of Shirley E. in default as valid, Shirley E. could 
still appear at the disposition phase in person or by counsel.  
                                                 
35 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
23 
 
The circuit court thus erred in dismissing Shirley E.'s counsel 
from this hearing.   
 
¶54 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.427(1), 
which 
governs 
the 
dispositional 
phase 
of 
a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding, provides that in the dispositional phase, "[a]ny 
party may present evidence relevant to the issue of disposition, 
including 
expert 
testimony, 
and 
may 
make 
alternative 
dispositional recommendations to the court."  This language is 
not qualified and its directive is clear.  By statute, Shirley 
E. and her counsel had a right to participate at the 
dispositional phase.36 
 
¶55 In Evelyn C.R., the circuit court permitted the 
defaulted mother to present evidence during the dispositional 
phase of the termination of parental rights proceeding.  The 
circuit 
court 
took 
the 
mother's 
testimony 
by 
phone 
and 
considered it in rendering its disposition.  This court, in 
reviewing and affirming the circuit court's actions in Evelyn 
C.R., relied heavily on the defaulted mother's participation in 
this later dispositional hearing.  We held that the circuit 
court's error in finding her in default before conducting an 
evidentiary hearing was harmless error because the circuit court 
did hear the mother at the later dispositional phase and did 
reaffirm its finding on the ground for termination on the basis 
                                                 
36 The circuit court had the power to sanction Shirley E. 
for failing to obey its order to appear but the sanction imposed 
here was inappropriate. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
24 
 
of her testimony.37  Accordingly, allowing Shirley E. or Shirley 
E.'s counsel to participate in the dispositional phase even 
after a finding of default is consistent with this court's 
decision in Evelyn C.R. 
¶56 For these reasons, we hold that Shirley E. maintained 
her statutory right to counsel throughout this termination of 
parental rights proceeding, even after the circuit court found 
her in default for failing to obey the circuit court order to 
personally attend the hearing. 
 
¶57 The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 
18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not 
appearing personally.  We can quickly dismiss this argument.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver 
of counsel must be knowing and voluntary.  As we determined in 
M.W. v. Monroe County Department of Human Services, it is "the 
duty of the court to determine by careful questioning that the 
waiver of counsel[ ]. . . is knowledgeable and voluntary."38  The 
circuit court conducted no such inquiry here. 
¶58 We turn now to consider the impact of the circuit 
court's error. 
                                                 
37 At the dispositional phase in Evelyn C.R., the mother 
appeared and the circuit court permitted her to speak.  The 
circuit court considered her testimony and then restated its 
finding of unfitness and ruled on the disposition.  This court 
concluded 
that 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
taken 
and 
considered evidence sufficient to support its finding of 
abandonment, the circuit court's procedural error was harmless.  
Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.   
38 M.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 439. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
25 
 
V 
¶59 A termination of parental rights proceeding is, as we 
have stated previously, not the ordinary civil action.  At stake 
here are fundamental rights.  Termination proceedings deprive 
parents of a significant liberty interest in their children.39 
¶60 The statutory right to the assistance of counsel in a 
termination of parental rights proceeding is, according to the 
Wisconsin legislature, essential to a fair proceeding.   
¶61 In criminal cases, in which counsel is viewed as 
essential to fair proceedings, when a litigant has been totally 
deprived of the presence and assistance of an attorney during a 
critical stage in the proceeding, reversal is automatic.40  A 
harmless error analysis is not applied in a criminal case 
because counsel is critical to a fair trial and no one can 
reliably determine the level of prejudice arising from the 
denial of a right to counsel. 
¶62 Courts have long recognized that the total deprivation 
of counsel in criminal proceedings is a "structural error."41  A 
structural error is a defect that upsets the framework within 
which trial proceeds; it is not merely an error in the trial 
                                                 
39 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. 
40 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). 
41 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (internal 
citations omitted); State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189; State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶35, 
262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
26 
 
process.42 
 
Consequently, 
"[s]uch 
errors . . . 'necessarily 
render a trial fundamentally unfair.'"43  In other words, 
structural errors "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 
public 
reputation 
of 
judicial 
proceedings"44 
and 
are 
so 
fundamental that they are considered per se prejudicial.45 
¶63 Depriving a parent of the statutory right to counsel 
in a termination of parental rights proceeding deprives the 
parent of a basic protection without which, according to our 
legislature, a termination of a parental rights proceeding 
cannot reliably serve its function.  The fairness and integrity 
of the judicial proceeding that the legislature has established 
for termination proceedings has been placed in doubt when the 
statutory right to counsel is denied a parent.  Accordingly, the 
denial of the statutory right to counsel in the present case 
constitutes structural error.  
¶64 We thus hold that it was prejudicial error per se for 
the circuit court to dismiss Shirley E.'s attorney from the 
proceedings and to prevent counsel from participating in the 
termination of parental rights proceeding.  
¶65 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit 
court erred in finding Shirley E. in default before conducting 
                                                 
42 Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. 
43 Id. (quoted source omitted). 
44 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 
(1997)). 
45 Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. 
No. 
2005AP2752   
 
27 
 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was clear and 
convincing evidence that the grounds for termination existed.  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing Shirley E.'s 
counsel at the fact-finding stage.  We further hold that Shirley 
E. had a statutory right to counsel at the dispositional phase 
of the termination of parental rights proceeding, even when the 
circuit court found her in default as a sanction for her failure 
to obey the court order to appear personally at the fact-finding 
stage.  The circuit court’s error in denying Shirley E. the 
right to counsel in both the fact-finding and dispositional 
phases of the termination of parental rights proceeding is 
prejudicial error.  The cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
1 
 
¶66 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  There is no 
dispute about the importance of parental rights.  When the state 
or a private individual petitions to terminate a parent's 
interest in her child, the court must follow proper procedures 
so that the parent's rights are fully protected. 
¶67 At the same time, however, every case involving a 
proposed termination of parental rights affects the interests of 
at least one other person——the child.  A rational legal system 
must not become so fixated on a parent's procedural rights that 
it forgets that a child's life may be at stake.  In criminal 
law, we are familiar with Blackstone's maxim that "It is better 
that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer."  In 
termination cases, we should question whether it is better that 
ten innocent children suffer than that one irresponsible parent 
forfeit her procedural rights. 
¶68 I concede that Shirley E. was not accorded her full 
procedural rights.  Her attorney should have been permitted to 
participate in the disposition hearing because, under the 
statute, any party may present evidence relevant to the issue of 
disposition and make alternative dispositional recommendations 
to the court.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(1).  The court may receive 
testimony from diverse witnesses, and it should welcome input on 
the best interests of the child. 
¶69 However, 
requiring 
that 
Shirley 
E.'s 
attorney 
participate——fully——in a fact-finding hearing on grounds for 
unfitness presents a different question.  In this case, the 
circuit 
court 
was 
confronted 
with 
a 
mother's 
protracted 
indifference to the welfare of her child.  The record is devoid 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
2 
 
of evidence that the mother made any real effort to preserve the 
companionship, care, custody, or management of her child, and 
the most compelling proof of this is her consistent failure to 
show up for hearings.  In the absence of any sensible 
explanation or excuse for the mother's repeated non-appearance, 
the circuit court found default.  The court clearly indicated 
that it would entertain a motion to vacate the default if the 
mother appeared.  On these facts, the circuit court cannot be 
said to have unfairly disregarded the mother's interests. 
¶70 Hence, this court's decision to protect a parent who 
did not care enough to appear and defend herself, seriously 
undercuts the authority of circuit judges to enforce their 
orders.  In remanding the case for new hearings on both 
disposition and grounds, the court is emphasizing form over 
substance.  I write separately to record my dissatisfaction with 
the state of the law and with the result in this case. 
ANALYSIS 
¶71 In 2001 this court heard and decided Evelyn C.R. v. 
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  The case 
is cited as controlling authority in the majority opinion, and 
thus it invites reexamination. 
¶72 In Evelyn C.R., a paternal grandmother sought to 
terminate the biological mother's rights to her son.  The child 
had lived with the grandmother for virtually his entire life; 
the grandmother had been appointed as his guardian when the boy 
was five.  When the boy was seven, the grandmother filed a 
petition to terminate the mother's parental rights so that she 
could adopt the child.  Id., ¶¶4, 5. 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
3 
 
¶73 At the time of the petition, the mother (Tykila) had 
not been in contact with her son for five years.  The 
grandmother alleged that the mother had "abandoned" the child, 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)3. (1997-98).  The court ordered 
the parties to obtain counsel and scheduled a fact-finding 
hearing before a 12-person jury.  Id., ¶¶6, 7. 
¶74 The mother failed to appear at the hearing.  "The 
court did manage to reach Tykila by phone, but, in light of the 
fact that the jury would be required to determine whether Tykila 
had 
abandoned 
[the 
child], 
the 
court 
expressed 
great 
apprehension about holding the hearing without Tykila's physical 
presence."  Id., ¶8. 
¶75 The mother's attorney objected to going forward in the 
absence of the mother.  The court offered to hold a court trial 
rather than a jury trial, but "Tykila refused the court's offers 
and insisted that the hearing be held before a jury."  Id., ¶8.  
The grandmother then moved for a default judgment.  The court 
denied that motion and released the jury but issued a stern oral 
and written order that Tykila must appear in person at 9:00 a.m. 
on April 3, 2000, and at "all subsequent proceedings held in 
this case" or face a potential default judgment.  Id. 
¶76 On April 3 Tykila failed to appear as required by the 
order.  The grandmother moved for default judgment, the child's 
guardian ad litem voiced no objection, and Tykila's attorney 
stated: "I would object and waive argument."  Id., ¶9.  
Thereafter, the court granted the motion for default judgment 
and found, based on the allegations in the petition, that the 
mother had abandoned the child and was unfit.  Id. 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
4 
 
¶77 On appeal here, the issue presented was whether the 
circuit court erred in entering a default judgment on the issue 
of abandonment without first taking evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of abandonment by clear and convincing 
evidence.  This court concluded that the circuit court erred.  
The court stated: 
Tykila concedes that the circuit court had the 
authority to enter a default judgment against her as a 
sanction for failing to comply with the court order 
for personal appearance.  However, Tykila contends 
that this authority did not relieve the circuit court 
of its constitutional and statutory duty to find by 
clear and convincing evidence——prior to finding her to 
be an unfit parent——that she had abandoned [the 
child]. 
Id., ¶16. 
 
¶78 In adopting this analysis, our opinion embraced an 
obvious inconsistency.  On the one hand, the opinion trumpets a 
court's discretion to enter a default judgment as a sanction, 
stating:  
[A] circuit court has both inherent authority and 
statutory 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7), 
804.12(2)(a), and 805.03 to sanction parties for 
failing to obey court orders.  Pursuant to this 
authority, a circuit court may enter a default 
judgment against a party that fails to comply with a 
court order.   
Id., ¶17 (citation omitted).  See Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7), 
804.12(2)(a), 805.03. 
¶79 On the other hand, the opinion concludes that a court 
simply has no discretion to enter a default judgment on grounds 
to terminate parental rights "without first taking evidence 
sufficient to support such a finding."  Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶19. 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
5 
 
¶80 In short, this court made it clear that the circuit 
court could not enter a default judgment as a sanction without a 
fact-finding hearing as well as clear and convincing evidence to 
support its decision.  Id., ¶24.  The court said: 
[T]he circuit court may . . . determine that a party's 
action 
or 
inaction 
provides 
adequate 
cause 
for 
sanctions against that party.  But such cause does not 
allow the court to dispense with any independent 
constitutional or statutory burden of proof that must 
be satisfied prior to entering a judgment or order. 
Id., ¶25. 
¶81 In Evelyn C.R., the circuit court took testimony on 
the fitness of the parent at a later dispositional hearing and 
made 
findings 
at 
that 
hearing 
to 
support 
grounds 
for 
termination.  Thus, the circuit court corrected its alleged 
error, and this court upheld the termination of parental rights.  
Because we unanimously agreed to the termination, we failed to 
confront the inconsistency in an analysis that authorizes a 
court to enter a default judgment but only after it hears 
testimony and finds clear and convincing evidence to support the 
judgment.  The present case accentuates this inconsistency. 
¶82 The respondent here, Shirley E., never came to court.  
On November 23, 2004, the State filed a Petition for Termination 
of Parental Rights.  Shirley E. acknowledged receipt of a 
certified mailing conveying the petition and notice of hearing.  
A legal notice of hearing was also published in a Michigan 
newspaper on December 1, 2004.  Shirley E. did not appear at the 
December 13 hearing or at subsequent court hearings on February 
14, March 8, April 1, May 6, and August 1, 2005.  The court did 
reach Shirley E. by telephone on February 14 and strongly 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
6 
 
admonished her that "failure to personally appear at the next 
scheduled court date and all subsequent scheduled court dates 
WILL result in a default finding."  Thus, when Shirley E. failed 
to appear on March 8, she violated the appearance order.  The 
court sanctioned Shirley E. by finding her in default. 
¶83 The gist of the majority opinion is to reaffirm the 
decision in Evelyn C.R. that a circuit court has no inherent or 
statutory authority to enter a true default judgment as a 
sanction in a termination of parental rights case.  It must 
always take evidence to support the judgment and make findings 
on the requisite burden of proof.  But more important, the 
decision determines that the failure of a parent to appear in 
person may not be sanctioned to limit the role of the parent's 
attorney in the fact-finding proceedings.  The attorney may 
challenge the state's evidence by motion, objection, or cross-
examination, or present alternative evidence, and even demand a 
jury trial.1  A parent's defiance or indifference, as reflected 
in the parent's consistent non-appearance in court, does not 
work any forfeiture of the parent's rights. 
¶84 This regimen effectively denies the circuit court 
authority to sanction an uncooperative parent.  It may create an 
incentive in some cases for the parent not to appear.  In my 
view, this is not satisfactory for the child, the prospective 
adoptive parent or parents, the circuit court, the state, or the 
                                                 
1 It is curious that the court eviscerates default judgments 
against parents who do not comply with court orders to appear, 
but validates summary judgments against parents who do appear 
and request a jury trial.  See Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 
47, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
7 
 
taxpaying public.  For the sake of the affected children, we 
must do better. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2752.dtp 
1