Title: State v. Connally

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  December 15, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
RICHARD MICHAEL CONNALLY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 000634971; CA A116517; SC S50999)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 9, 2004.
Jennelle Meeks Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her
on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Harry Auerbach, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Portland, filed
the brief for amicus curiae City of Portland.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Marshall Amiton, Judge. 189 Or App 551, 77 P3d 337 (2003).
KISTLER, J.
The issue in this criminal case is whether the Portland
City Code authorized police officers to inventory the contents of
a closed "fanny pack" that defendant left in an impounded car. 
We hold that that it did and accordingly affirm the Court of
Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment.
Portland Police Officer Larson was sitting in his car
outside Huskey's house.  Larson knew that Huskey had sold
methamphetamine and that there was an outstanding warrant for
Huskey's arrest.  Larson saw defendant and another person drive
up to Huskey's house, park, and go inside.  Later, defendant,
Huskey, and a third person came out of the house and got into the
car.  Defendant drove.  A short distance from the house, Larson
pulled up behind defendant's car and turned on his overhead
lights.  Defendant did not stop but instead drove back to
Huskey's house and parked in the driveway.
Larson approached the car and placed Huskey under
arrest.  At that point, defendant had stepped out of the car and
was standing beside it.  Larson mentioned to defendant that he
had failed to stop when Larson had turned on his overhead lights. 
Larson asked defendant for his driver license, and defendant told
him that his license had been suspended.  Larson confirmed
defendant's statement and, in doing so, learned that defendant
had an outstanding felony warrant.  At that point, he handcuffed
defendant and placed him under arrest.
Larson patted defendant down, found approximately
$1,200 in cash on him, and put him in the back of the patrol
car. (1)  Larson also impounded the car because defendant's
driver license had been suspended.  By that time, another officer
had arrived and Larson asked him to inventory the car's contents. 
That officer found eight bottles of pseudoephedrine in an open
paper bag, two cell phones, and a police scanner.  He then felt a
hard object inside a ski locker (a nylon bag for holding skis)
placed between the back seats.  Inside the ski locker, he found a
fanny pack.  He opened the fanny pack and discovered small
baggies of what appeared to be methamphetamine, other unused
baggies, syringes, and papers with defendant's name on them.
Based on the contents of the fanny pack, the state
charged defendant with possessing methamphetamine.  Before trial,
defendant filed a motion to suppress.  He did not challenge the
lawfulness of the stop, the arrest, the discovery of the
pseudoephedrine bottles, or the inventory search in general. 
Rather, defendant challenged only the search of the fanny pack.
At a pretrial hearing on defendant's motion, the state
argued that the officers properly opened the fanny pack either
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement or as
part of an authorized inventory.  The trial court ruled that the
automobile exception did not apply, apparently because the police
had impounded the car before opening the fanny pack.  The court
determined, however, that the officers properly opened the fanny
pack pursuant to the City of Portland's inventory policy.  That
policy, the court explained, authorizes the police to open closed
containers that are designed to hold valuables, and the fanny
pack fell into that category.  The court denied defendant's motion to suppress and, after a bench trial, convicted defendant
of possessing methamphetamine.
The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State
v. Connally, 189 Or App 551, 77 P3d 337 (2003).  Defendant
petitioned for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals had
issued conflicting opinions on this subject.  Defendant contended
that, in one case, the court had held that the City of Portland's
inventory policy permitted the officers to open a closed
container found in an impounded car but that, in another case,
the court had reached a different result under Washington
County's virtually identical inventory policy.  Compare State v.
Rutledge, 162 Or App 301, 986 P2d 99 (1999) (holding that
officers could open small leather container found next to
driver's seat), with State v. Ray, 179 Or App 397, 40 P3d 528
(2002) (holding that officer could not open gym bag found in
vehicle).  We allowed defendant's petition for review to resolve
that apparent conflict.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches. (2)  A warrantless search is
per se unreasonable unless it falls within "one of the few
specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement."  State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223, 94 P3d
872 (2004).  In this case, the officers did not have a warrant to
open the fanny pack.  However, the state argues on review, as it
did below, that the officers properly searched the fanny pack
either as part of an authorized inventory of the car's contents
or pursuant to the automobile exception.  Because we hold that
the City of Portland's inventory policy authorized the officers
to open the fanny pack, we need not decide whether the search
also came within the automobile exception.
State and local governments may authorize officers to
inventory the contents of an impounded car to protect the
owner's property, to reduce the likelihood of false claims
against the police, and to protect the safety of the officers. 
State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 7, 688 P2d 832 (1984).  The purpose
of the inventory is not to discover evidence of a crime. 
Rather, an inventory serves civil purposes and is one type of
administrative search.  Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 104,
743 P2d 692 (1987) (plurality opinion).  Officers may inventory
the contents of a vehicle consistently with Article I, section
9, if (1) they lawfully have impounded the vehicle and (2) they
conduct the inventory pursuant to a properly authorized
administrative program that limits their discretion.  State v.
Boone, 327 Or 307, 312-14, 959 P2d 76 (1998); Atkinson, 298 Or
at 8, 10.  The police may inventory the contents of containers
when doing so is necessary to serve the inventory's purposes. 
See Atkinson, 298 Or at 10 (stating proposition); cf. State v.
Keller, 265 Or 622, 629, 510 P2d 568 (1973) (opening closed
fishing tackle box as part of an inventory search was
unreasonable in violation of Article I, section 9).
In this case, defendant argues that the officers
opened the fanny pack in violation of the terms of the Portland
City Code (PCC).  Initially, he contends that the PCC does not
authorize officers to open any closed container that they find
in an impounded car.  Alternatively, he argues that, even if the
PCC authorizes officers to open some closed containers, it only
permits them to open closed containers in a suspect's
possession.  He contends that, because he did not possess the
fanny pack after the officers impounded the car and its
contents, the officers exceeded the scope of their authority
under the PCC. (3)
In determining what the PCC authorizes, we begin with
the text and context of that ordinance.  See Lincoln Loan Co. v.
City of Portland, 317 Or 192, 199, 855 P2d 151 (1993) (applying
statutory construction methodology to municipal ordinances). 
Chapter 14C.10 of the PCC (4) authorizes officers to inventory
both impounded vehicles and the personal property of persons
taken into police custody.  Section 14C.10.030 sets out the
policy for inventorying impounded vehicles.  With some
exceptions, it authorizes officers to inventory "the contents of
open containers" found throughout the vehicle.  PCC
14C.10.030(C).  It also provides that, "[u]nless otherwise
provided in this Chapter, closed containers located either
within the vehicle or any of the vehicle's compartments will not
be opened for inventory purposes."  PCC 14C.10.030(C)(3).
Chapter 14C.10 contains one other substantive section,
PCC 14C.10.040. (5)  That section provides, in part:
"A.  A police officer will inventory the personal
property in the possession of a person taken into
police custody and such inventory will be conducted
whenever:
"1.  Such person will be either placed in a
secure police holding room or transported in the
secure portion of a police vehicle;
"* * * * *
"C.  Inventories of the personal property in the
possession of such persons will be conducted according
to the following procedures:
"* * * * *
"2.  To complete the inventory of the personal
property in the possession of such person, the police
officer will remove all items of personal property
from the clothing worn by such person.  In addition,
the officer will also remove all items of personal
property from all open containers in the possession of
such person.
"3.  A closed container in the possession of such
person will have its contents inventoried only when:
"a.  The closed container is to be placed in the
immediate possession of such person at the time that
person is placed in the secure portion of a custodial
facility, police vehicle or secure police holding
room;
"b.  Such person requests that the closed
container be with them in the secure portion of a
police vehicle or a secure police holding room; or
"c.  The closed container is designed for
carrying money and/or small valuables on or about the
person including, but not limited to, closed purses,
closed coin purses, closed wallets and closed fanny
packs."
PCC 14C.10.040.
Defendant argues initially that section 14C.10.030
does not authorize officers to inventory the contents of any
closed container that they find in an impounded vehicle.  As
defendant notes, paragraph 14C.10.030(C)(3) of the PCC generally
prohibits officers from opening closed containers that they find
in impounded vehicles, but that paragraph also adds the
following qualification:  "[u]nless otherwise provided in this
Chapter."  Principles of statutory construction require that we
give the quoted phrase meaning, if possible, and we look to the
other sections in Chapter 14C.10 to determine the terms on which
officers may open closed containers left in impounded vehicles. 
See ORS 174.010 (court should attempt to give effect to all
provisions or particulars of statute when construing it); State
v. Snyder, 337 Or 410, 425, 97 P3d 1181 (2004) (same).
As noted, section 14C.10.040 is the only other
substantive section in Chapter 14C.10.  That section authorizes
officers to inventory "personal property in the possession of a
person taken into police custody," PCC 14C.10.040(A), and one
paragraph in that section authorizes officers to open closed
containers in certain circumstances, PCC 14C.10.040(C)(3).  We
conclude that the phrase "[u]nless otherwise provided in this
Chapter" in paragraph 14C.10.030(C)(3) refers to paragraph
14C.10.040(C)(3).  The Portland City Council adopted sections
14C.10.030 and 14C.10.040 at the same time, and any other
interpretation would render the phrase in paragraph
14C.10.030(C)(3), "unless otherwise provided in this Chapter,"
meaningless.  See, e.g., Snyder, 337 Or at 425 (directing courts
to avoid that result if possible).
Having concluded that paragraphs 14C.10.030(C)(3) and
14C.10.040(C)(3) authorize officers to open some closed
containers that they find while inventorying the contents of an
impounded vehicle, we turn to the second issue that defendant
raises -- whether subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(c) authorized
the officers to open the fanny pack that they found in this
case.  That subparagraph authorizes officers to inventory the
contents of a closed container "in the possession" of a person
taken into police custody when the container "is designed for
carrying money and/or small valuables on or about the person
including, but not limited to * * * closed fanny packs." 
Defendant does not dispute that the fanny pack was a container
"designed for carrying money and/or small valuables."  He
argues, however, that the fanny pack was not in his possession
when the officers inventoried its contents.
In arguing whether subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(c)
authorized the officers to open the fanny pack, the parties
spend much of their time debating the meaning of the word
"possession."  In our view, the meaning of that word is neither
difficult nor, as it turns out, dispositive.  "Possession"
ordinarily means "the act or condition of having in or taking
into one's control or holding at one's disposal."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 1770 (unabridged ed 2002).  That
definition is broad enough to include personal property within
the suspect's immediate reach as well as property under the
suspect's dominion and control, a conclusion that other parts of
the ordinance support.  Section 14C.10.040 refers both to
"possession" and "immediate possession."  See PCC 14C.10.040(C)
(possession); PCC 14C.10.040(C)(3)(a) (immediate possession). 
We understand the phrase "immediate possession" to refer to
personal property that is on the suspect's person or within his
or her immediate reach and the term "possession" to refer, in
addition, to personal property under the suspect's dominion and
control.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (use of different terms usually
connotes different meanings).  Put more succinctly, "possession"
includes both actual and constructive possession.
That definition does not resolve the parties' dispute,
however, as an examination of their arguments demonstrates. 
Defendant does not dispute that he possessed the fanny pack when
the officers placed him under arrest.  At that point, defendant
was standing next to the car, and the fanny pack was inside the
car under his dominion and control.  Rather, defendant argues
that he did not possess the fanny pack after the officers had
placed him in the back of the police car and had impounded his
car.  At that point, he argues, "[t]he car and its contents
[we]re in the physical possession and within the dominion or
control of the police bureau" -- an argument that has some
force.
It follows, we think, that the issue that divides the
parties is not the meaning of the term "possession" but the
temporal question of when, under the PCC, possession matters. 
Does the PCC authorize officers to inventory all the property
that was in a suspect's possession when they arrested him, or
does it authorize them to inventory only the property that
remains in the suspect's possession after they impound his or
her car?  In answering that question, we turn again to the text
and context of the PCC.
Subsection 14C.10.040(A)(1) directs the police to
"inventory the personal property in the possession of a person
taken into police custody * * * whenever * * * [s]uch person
will be either placed in a secure holding room or transported in
the secure portion of a police vehicle."  Temporally, the phrase
in the independent clause "property in the possession of a
person taken into police custody" refers to property that the
person possesses when the police take that person into custody. 
The dependent clause -- "whenever [s]uch person will be either
placed in a secure holding room or transported in the secure
portion of a police vehicle" -- reinforces that conclusion. 
(Emphasis added).  The use of the future tense makes clear that
paragraph 14C.10.040(A)(1) is directed at property that the
suspect possessed when the police took the person into custody
and before they put him or her into the secure portion of a
police vehicle.
Paragraph 14C.10.040(C)(3) -- the paragraph on which
defendant's argument turns -- refers to paragraph
14C.10.040(A)(1) and incorporates the same temporal
determination.  It provides that "[a] closed container in the
possession of such person [a person taken into police custody]
will have its contents inventoried only when" one of three
conditions occurs.  PCC 14C.10.040(C)(3).  Reading paragraph
14C.10.040(C)(3) and subsection 14C.10.040(A) together, we
conclude that the phrase "in the possession of such person" in
paragraph 14C.10.040(C)(3) refers to property that the suspect
possessed when the police took him or her into custody.  Not
only does that conclusion follow from the wording of paragraph
14C.10.040(C)(3), but any other conclusion would render
subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(b) internally inconsistent.  
That subparagraph states that a "closed container in
the possession of such person [a person taken into police
custody] will have its contents inventoried only when * * *
[s]uch person requests that the closed container be with them in
the secure portion of a police vehicle[.]"  At first blush, that
sentence appears internally inconsistent.  The independent
clause refers to a container in the suspect's possession.  The
dependent clause refers to the same container in the possession
of the police, which they may or may not return to the suspect.
However, as explained above, the independent clause in
subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(b) refers to containers that were
in the suspect's possession when the police took him or her into
custody and before they placed the suspect in the secure part of
a police vehicle.  The dependent clause in that subparagraph
refers to possession at a later period of time -- after the
police have taken the suspect into custody, removed the
suspect's personal property, see PCC 14C.10.040(B)(2) (so
authorizing), and placed him or her in the secure portion of a
police vehicle. (6)  Recognizing that temporal distinction
resolves the apparent contradiction between the independent and
dependent clauses and gives effect to both. (7)  See ORS
174.010 (directing courts to give effect to all provisions);
Snyder, 337 Or at 425 (same).
We hold that the PCC expressly authorizes officers to
inventory certain closed containers found in an impounded car if
the suspect possessed those containers when the police arrested
or took him or her into police custody.  See PCC
14C.10.020(D)(1) (defining "police custody" as, among other
things, "[t]he imposition of restraint as a result of an
'arrest'").  That interpretation gives effect to both the words
of the ordinance and the stated goal of avoiding spurious
claims.  See PCC 14C.10.040(B)(1) (identifying that goal as one
purpose of city's inventory policy).  It ensures that the police
can account for all the personal property that a suspect
possessed when the police took him or her into their custody.
The specific question in this case -- whether
defendant possessed the fanny pack when the police arrested him
-- presents a factual issue for the trier of fact.  See State v.
Oare, 249 Or 597, 599, 439 P2d 885 (1968) (recognizing that
question of constructive possession presents factual issue). 
Although the trial court did not address that issue explicitly,
we are bound by its implicit findings as long as there is
evidence in the record to support them.  See State v. Amaya, 336
Or 616, 628, 89 P3d 1163 (2004) (stating that proposition). 
Here, defendant drove the car and was standing next to it when
the officers took him into custody.  The trial court reasonably
could infer from that evidence that defendant exercised dominion
and control over the fanny pack (and thus possessed it) when
Larson placed him under arrest. (8)  We also note that
defendant does not dispute, at least on review, that a fanny
pack "is designed for carrying money and/or small valuables on
or about the person" and thus falls within the terms of
subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(c).  Because that subparagraph
explicitly authorized the officers to open defendant's fanny
pack in the course of the inventory, the trial court correctly
denied defendant's motion to suppress.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Larson noticed that defendant was sweating, unkempt,
talking fast, and acting aggressive.  Based on his experience,
Larson concluded that defendant probably was under the influence
of methamphetamine.
2. Article I, section 9, provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."
3. Defendant does not argue that, if the PCC authorized
the officers to inventory the contents of the fanny pack, the
scope of the inventory was unreasonable in violation of
Article I, section 9.  See State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d
827 (1984) (in noncriminal context, Article I, section 9,
prohibits opening closed suitcase to inventory its contents);
Keller, 265 Or at 629 (in criminal context, Article I,
section 9, prohibits opening closed tackle box to inventory its
contents).
4. At the time that police searched defendant's car,
Chapter 14C.10 of the PCC was numbered as Chapter 14.10. 
Because the chapter has not been changed substantially since the
search, we cite to the current version of the PCC.
5. Chapter 14C.10 contains four sections.  In addition to
the two sections discussed in the text, section 14C.10.010
states the purpose of the chapter, and section 14C.10.020
defines some of the terms used in the chapter.
6. Although the PCC contemplates that the police usually
will conduct the inventory before they place the suspect in a
secure holding room or police vehicle, it also recognizes that
the police may conduct the inventory after doing so.  PCC
14C.010.40(C)(1).
7.  Subparagraph 14C.10.040(C)(3)(a) presents the same
interpretative issue.  That subparagraph authorizes the police
to inventory the contents of a "closed container in the
possession of [a person taken into police custody]" when it "is
to be placed" in the suspect's possession after he or she is in
a secure area.  A container cannot simultaneously be both in the
suspect's possession and "to be placed" in his or her
possession.  The answer to that apparent contradiction is the
one noted above; the first use of the term "possession" refers
to possession when the police took the person into custody and
the second use of the term refers to possession after the
suspect has been placed in a secure area.
8. Defendant did not argue below and has not argued in
this court that the evidence was insufficient to permit the
court to find that he, as opposed to one of his passengers,
possessed the fanny pack.  Given defendant's apparent control
over the car and its contents, such an argument would be
difficult to mount.  Cf. Oare, 249 Or at 599-600 (evidence not
sufficient, under circumstances of that case, to establish that
visitor exercised constructive possession over contraband found
in home).