Title: Idaho v. Campbell

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47037 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
  
v. 
  
CARLI JOANN CAMPBELL, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, December 2020 Term 
 
Opinion filed: February 10, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Lansing L. Haynes, Senior District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Eric Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. 
Ben McGreevy argued. 
 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.  Justin  
Porter argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice 
 
This case asks us to determine whether the district court properly instructed the jury on 
the elements of accessory to a felony. The State charged Carli Campbell as an accessory to a 
felony under Idaho Code section 18-205(1) for withholding or concealing information from 
police officers about an aggravated battery and burglary that occurred in her home on December 
24, 2017. After the evidentiary phase of the trial was completed, Campbell requested that the 
district court instruct the jury that the State was required to prove that the alleged assailant, 
Michael Cross, committed the aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
State opposed this request and the district court agreed, concluding that while the State was 
required to prove Campbell had knowledge of the conduct that constituted an aggravated battery 
or a burglary, it was not was required to prove Cross committed the aggravated battery or 
burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Campbell 
guilty. Campbell now appeals her conviction to this Court. We affirm. 
 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Daniel Renaud and Carli Campbell have known each other for about fifteen years. 
Sometime after Campbell’s husband was incarcerated, their relationship had become romantic.1 
On December 23, 2017, Campbell and her female friend met Renaud at a bowling alley around 
10:00 p.m. About an hour later, Renaud, Campbell, and her friend took an Uber back to 
Campbell’s house, near Hayden, Idaho. Renaud left his vehicle at the bowling alley because he 
had been drinking. Once back at Campbell’s house, the three of them played cards and drank 
alcohol. Later, after Campbell and Renaud had engaged in sexual intercourse in her bedroom, 
Campbell became angry when she saw Renaud cuddling on the couch with her friend. Renaud 
suggested that he, Campbell, and her friend engage in a “threesome.” Campbell was incensed 
and demanded that Renaud leave. He refused, claiming he was too drunk, it was 2:30 a.m., and 
his vehicle was parked at the bowling alley. Campbell went outside with her phone for about five 
minutes, and then returned and told Renaud that he would get his “ass kicked” if he did not 
leave. Campbell told him, “If I was [sic] you, I would leave.” Renaud said he would be staying, 
and then closed his eyes and fell asleep on the couch.  
Shortly thereafter, Renaud opened his eyes and saw Matthew Cross coming through the 
front door and rushing at him. He recognized Cross because Renaud had met him on two prior 
occasions. He testified that Cross pointed at Renaud and then “bull rushed” him. Cross punched 
and kicked Renaud, until he became unconscious.  
Campbell called 911 and requested an ambulance. She told the operator, “there was like a 
dispute over a girl and someone got punched.” Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy Brock 
responded to a report of an unconscious male at Campbell’s house around 3:13 a.m. on 
December 24, 2017. When Deputy Brock arrived, Campbell met him and directed him to the 
kitchen, where he observed a male, later identified as Renaud, propped up by Campbell’s friend. 
Renaud was lethargic, mumbling, his eyes were rolling around, and he had blood on his face. 
Deputy Brock attempted to question Renaud but Renaud was largely incoherent.  
Campbell told Deputy Brock that an unknown individual entered her home without 
permission, beat Renaud until he was unconscious, and then left. She stated that she had not seen 
anything or anybody because she was in another room sleeping when it happened. Later, Deputy 
                                                 
1 Carli Campbell is married to Cody Campbell, who was incarcerated at the Kootenai County Jail during the time 
relevant to this case. 
 
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Brock overheard Campbell tell medical personnel that Renaud had been kicked and punched. 
Because Campbell had told Deputy Brock that she did not see anything, Deputy Brock 
questioned her again. Campbell then told Deputy Brock, “I didn’t see what happened. I just 
know that I saw the kick.” Campbell also told another officer she saw “a person” but she could 
not describe their race or gender. Yet, a short time later, Campbell told a different officer that 
“he” had walked in and punched and kicked Renaud and then walked out—specifically using 
male pronouns in her statement. Officers expressed skepticism about Campbell’s story and 
concern over her apparent indifference to the crime, explaining that she would be charged if they 
found out she was lying, Yet, Campbell continuously denied any knowledge of the incident, 
insisting that an unknown person randomly came into her house and knocked out Renaud, even 
though she initially told the 911 operator that “there was like a dispute over a girl.” 
Upon regaining full consciousness at the hospital, Renaud identified Cross as his attacker 
to police officers. Doctors determined that Renaud had a broken jaw and a fractured sinus that 
required surgery. Afterwards, doctors wired his jaw shut for five weeks. Renaud’s recovery was 
difficult – he lost twenty pounds because he could not eat solid food, he endured serious pain, he 
could not work, and he could barely communicate. The metal plates used to hold his jaw in place 
became infected, so Renaud had to undergo a second surgery to remove and replace those. The 
shape of Renaud’s jaw has been permanently altered as a result of the incident.  
Deputy Brock and other deputies were unsuccessful in their attempts to arrest Cross until 
about two weeks after the incident. Deputy Brock confiscated two cell phones from Cross. Law 
enforcement then obtained search warrants for Cross’ two cell phones and Campbell’s cell phone 
and extracted data from all three cell phones. Detective Kelso also obtained a search warrant for 
records from Cross’ cell phone provider. Data from these records showed when the phone had 
been used and which cell phone towers it was near during use, thereby giving a rough physical 
location of where the caller was when the calls were placed and the text messages sent. Detective 
Kelso examined the content of text messages between Cross and Campbell from the days 
surrounding the incident and opined that they were also engaged in a sexual relationship.  
On the night of the incident, the cell phone records showed that Campbell called Cross at 
2:39 a.m. and the call lasted two minutes and forty seconds, and then Cross called Campbell 
back at 2:42 a.m. and that call lasted fifteen seconds. At 2:55 a.m. Cross texted Campbell, “Its 
[sic] ok carli i [sic] know im [sic] not worth it. Wish you the best.” Campbell responded at 3:01 
 
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a.m., “Actually was looking forward to you fucking him up. You are a great man wish I could 
have seen that.” Cross replied at 3:01 a.m., “Lmfao I bet,” “Cop callin [sic] for sure,” and “Not 
setting me up.” At 3:03 a.m. Campbell sent Cross a text, “He was so scared,” and she sent 
another one at 3:04 a.m., “I am like upset that he’s gonna [sic] keep his teeth.”  
Detective Uhrig analyzed the cell phone provider records to generate a map that showed 
what cell phone tower Cross’ phone was operating near at the time of the incident. At 11:37 
p.m., Cross’ phone was operating in a sector on the north side of Coeur d’Alene. At 2:38 a.m. 
and between 2:55 a.m. and 3:06 a.m. the phone was operating in a sector on the north side of 
Hayden, near Campbell’s house.  
An analysis of Campbell’s cell phone also revealed she conducted several internet 
searches immediately following the incident, including such topics as: (1) “can cops subpoena 
text messages”; (2) “How Can I Protect My Cell Phone Data Records From Law Enforcement 
Subpoenas[]”; (3) “Court Rules Police Don’t Need A Warrant To Get Your Cellphone Records”; 
(4) “can cops read text messages”; (5) “How do you read deleted text messages”; and (6) “how 
long does it take cops to get phone records.”  
The State charged Campbell with accessory to a felony under Idaho Code section 18-
205(1). The superseding indictment alleged:  
That the defendant, Carli Joann Campbell, on or about the 24th day of December, 
2017, in Kootenai County, Idaho, having knowledge that a felony had been 
committed, to wit; aggravated battery and/or burglary, did willfully withhold or 
conceal it from a peace officer or officers, all of which is contrary to the form, 
force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the 
peace and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho.  
The case proceeded to trial and the State presented evidence and testimony consistent with the 
aforementioned facts. Campbell did not testify in her defense or present any evidence.  
 
During the jury instruction conference, following the close of evidence, Campbell 
objected to the district’s court’s refusal to give her proposed jury instructions. Campbell’s 
proposed instructions required the jury to find that the State proved Cross committed an 
aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, her proposed instructions 
read:  
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the state 
must prove each of the following elements of Aggravated Battery as related to 
Matthew Cross:  
1. On or about December 24, 2017 
 
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2. in the state of Idaho  
3. Matthew Cross committed a battery upon Daniel Renaud, 
4. by wearing shoes and kicking Daniel Renaud, and  
5. when doing so Matthew Cross caused great bodily harm, permanent 
disability or permanent disfigurement and/or used a deadly weapon or 
instrument 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.  
. . . .  
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the state 
must prove each of the following elements of Burglary as related to Matthew 
Cross: 
1. On or about December 24, 2017 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. Matthew Cross entered a house located at [] North Maple in Hayden 
and  
4. at the time entry was made, Matthew Cross had the specific intent to 
commit Aggravated Battery. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.  
(Emphasis added). 
Campbell supported her proposed instructions by arguing, “in this particular case, since it 
is an element of the offense that [Campbell] had knowledge that a felony occurred, that the State 
is indeed required to prove that the offense occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.” Campbell 
further asserted, “Because if this was an issue where it only amounted to a level of a 
misdemeanor battery, then my client wouldn’t have withheld or concealed information or 
knowledge regarding a felony, which this is specific to a felony offense.”  
 
The district court rejected Campbell’s proposed instructions and reasoned:  
the State must prove that the defendant in this case had knowledge of conduct that 
can be constituted [sic] aggravated battery or burglary, but not that she had 
knowledge that those crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that 
those crimes have such evidence that they amount to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard.  
Instead of imposing a burden on the State to prove Cross committed a collateral crime, the 
district court required the jury to find an aggravated battery and/or burglary had been committed 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court gave the following elements instruction: 
 
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the State 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about December 24, 2017 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Carli Joann Campbell while  
4. having knowledge that an Aggravated Battery and/or Burglary had 
been committed 
5. did willfully withhold or conceal knowledge of such Aggravated 
Battery and/or Burglary from a peace office or officers.  
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.  
 (Emphasis added). The district court also defined the elements of Aggravated Battery and 
Burglary for the jury, using standard Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI) 511, 1203, 1207. 
The jury found Campbell guilty of accessory to a felony. The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of five years, with zero years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. Following a 
successful Rider, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Campbell on supervised 
probation for two years. Campbell timely filed a notice of appeal.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“ ‘Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the 
applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.’ ” State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 P.3d 853, 864 (2011) (quoting State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 
657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). This Court looks to jury instructions as a whole, rather than 
individually, to determine whether they adequately present the issues and state the applicable 
law. Id. at 588, 261 P.3d at 865; State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012). 
“ ‘An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole 
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.’ ” State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 43, 394 P.3d 79, 86 (2017) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996)). If there is an omission 
of an essential element in a jury instruction this Court employs the harmless error test. State v. 
Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 180, 191 P.3d 1098, 1100 (2008).  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The district court properly instructed the jury on the charge of accessory to a 
felony.  
Campbell contends the district court erred when it refused to give her proposed jury 
instruction, which required the jury to find the State proved Cross committed an aggravated 
 
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battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. She essentially asserts that the jury had to find the 
principal, Cross, guilty of a felony before she could be found guilty as an accessory. Campbell 
argues that due process requires each and every element of a crime to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right 
to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that due 
process, ‘no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction 
except upon sufficient proof – defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of 
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.’ 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at 432 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 
(1979)).  
First, we begin our analysis with Idaho Code section 18-205(1), which pertains to 
accessories to a felony crime. Statutory interpretation is intended to ascertain and “ ‘give effect 
to legislative intent.’ ” Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 
(2009) (quoting State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009)). This Court begins 
with the statute’s literal words, “which are the best guide in determining legislative intent.” Id. 
Idaho Code section 18-205(1) provides:  
 
All persons are accessories who, having knowledge that a felony has been 
 
committed: 
(1) Willfully withhold or conceal it from a peace officer, judge, 
magistrate, grand jury or trial jury 
(Emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute does not support Campbell’s position. The 
plain words require that the person charged have knowledge that a felony has been committed. 
The reasonable interpretation of section 18-205(1) is that it places the burden on the State to 
prove that the accessory possessed the required mental state—knowledge of the felony—and it 
requires commission of a felony.  
 
No Idaho appellate court has ever held that conviction of a principal of the crime, prior to 
or during the trial of the accessory, is a prerequisite to an accessory conviction. However, while 
considering whether accessory after the fact is a lesser included offense of aiding and abetting, 
this Court noted the essential statutory elements of accessory of a felony as:  
[T]he accessory after the fact statute requires that (1) the actor hav[e] knowledge 
that a felony has been committed; then, (2) with that knowledge . . . willfully 
withhold or conceal that knowledge from law enforcement. . . . 
 
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Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 418, 431 P.3d 242, 253 (2018) (internal quotations omitted).  
In State v. Hauser, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence for a conviction as an accessory to a felony. See State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 
150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App. 2006). The defendant conceded that the State presented sufficient 
evidence to prove the underlying offense – so that issue was never considered by the court. Id. at 
607, 150 P.3d at 300. Instead, the defendant focused her appeal on the requirement that the State 
must prove she had actual knowledge that a felony had been committed. Id. Regarding that 
argument, the court held, “the knowledge requirement of I.C. § 18-205, in the context of 
subsection (1) of that statute, is met if the person charged as an accessory had such information 
as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a felony had been committed.” Id. The court 
in State v. Teasley also reached a similar result. See Teasley, 138 Idaho 113, 58 P.3d 97 (Ct. App. 
2002). We find Hauser’s holding regarding the knowledge element persuasive and we adopt it 
here.  
Campbell cites a handful of federal cases to support her position that the district court 
should have given a separate instruction that required the jury to find the State had proved Cross 
committed burglary or aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Innie, 
7 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. De La Rosa, 171 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1, 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Lepanto, 
817 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cruz-Santiago, 330 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 
(D. P.R. 2004). However, these cases do not support Campbell’s argument that the district court 
needed to instruct the jury on the elements of burglary and aggravated battery, as it related to 
Cross.  
Cruz-Santiago may be the closest case on point. There, the defendant was charged and 
convicted of accessory after the fact by providing assistance to a fugitive charged with 
conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Cruz-Santiago, 330 F. 
Supp. 2d at 27. On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her 
conviction for accessory after the fact. Id. The court brushed aside the government’s argument 
that focused on the defendant’s mere knowledge that the offense had been committed. Id. at 27-
28. The court noted that “ ‘commission of the underlying offense is a prerequisite for conviction 
as an accessory after the fact.’ ” Id. at 28 (quoting Innie, 7 F.3d at 850). The court reiterated the 
three elements the government must prove to establish an accessory after-the-fact conviction “ 
 
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‘(1) the commission of an underlying offense against the United States; (2) the defendant’s 
knowledge of that offense; and (3) assistance by the defendant in order to prevent the 
apprehension, trial, or punishment of the offender.’ ” Id. (quoting De La Rosa, 171 F.3d at 221). 
The court found that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find the first element - that 
there was a commission of an underlying offense against the United States. Id. The court 
importantly stated:  
While it is true that ‘[c]onviction of the principal is not a necessary condition 
precedent to the conviction of an accessory after the fact’ U.S. v. Walker, 415 
F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1969), the Court cannot sustain a conviction without any 
evidence that Diaz-Rivera voluntarily conspired to possess with the intent to 
distribute heroine [sic], cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana as stated in his 
indictment. For example, a review of the record indicates that there was no 
circumstantial or direct evidence presented at trial to determine whether Diaz-
Rivera acted alone or whether he had entered into a voluntary agreement with 
one or more individuals which ultimately is the essence of a conspiracy.  
Id. Similarly, in Rivera-Figueroa, the court noted in a footnote that, “[t]he accessory-after-the-
fact offense does have some elements in common with the principal crime insofar as it requires 
proof of the substantive offense by someone . . . .” 149 F.3d at 6 n.5 (emphasis added). It did not 
discuss the issue further.   
  
 
  These authorities cited by Campbell actually support the district court’s jury 
instructions, as given. There must be evidence of the underlying felony and its commission “by 
someone,” in order to sustain an accessory conviction. Id. (emphasis added). This can be done by 
“circumstantial or direct evidence presented at trial” demonstrating the principal’s culpability. 
Cruz-Santiago, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Here, that standard was met because the district court 
required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell had knowledge that someone 
committed an aggravated battery or burglary. Therefore, to find that Campbell was an accessory, 
it was not necessary for the jury to make a specific finding that Cross was the principal. 
Similarly, the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, which this Court generally presumes to 
be correct, only require a felony to have been committed, not a conviction of the actual principal 
who committed the felony. Mann, 162 Idaho at 43; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 
P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010). ICJI 310 suggests the following instruction:   
A person who knows a felony was committed, and willfully conceals it from a 
[peace officer] [judge] [magistrate] [grand jury] [petit jury] [or] [harbors and 
protects the person charged with or convicted thereof,] is guilty of an accessory.  
 
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ICJI 310. Cross’ identity as the principal was not a prerequisite to Campbell’s conviction as an 
accessory. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give Campbell’s proposed 
instructions, which would have required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, “as related 
to Matthew Cross,” that he committed the battery.  
 
The district court’s instructions, although formatted differently than ICJI 310, were 
appropriate because: (1) they were consistent with the plain language of the statute, (2) they 
reflected persuasive authorities that require proof the underlying crime was committed “by 
someone” rather than conviction of the principal, and (3) the instructions mirrored the relevant 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions. The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of 
accessory to a felony, as follows:  
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Accessory to a Felony, the State 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about December 24, 2017 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Carli Joann Campbell while  
4. having knowledge that an Aggravated Battery and/or Burglary had 
been committed 
5. did willfully withhold or conceal knowledge of such Aggravated 
Battery and/or Burglary from a peace office or officers.  
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.  
(Emphasis added). Campbell ignores the language at the bottom of the district court’s 
instructions that requires the jury to find each element – including the fact that an Aggravated 
Battery or a Burglary had been committed – beyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction clearly 
requires the jury to find commission of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, 
this instruction required the State to prove all the necessary elements.  
Furthermore, the district court followed the ICJI definitions of Aggravated Battery and 
Burglary in instructing the jury, which define those terms as follows:  
In order for a person to be guilty of Aggravated Battery, the State must prove each 
of the following: 
1. On or about a time  
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. a person committed a battery upon another, 
4. when doing so said person caused great bodily harm 
. . . .  
 
A “battery” is committed when a person: 
 
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(1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of 
another; or 
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person 
against the will of the other; or  
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual 
. . . . 
In order for a person to be guilty of Burglary, the State must prove each of 
the following: 
1. On or about a time 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. a person entered a home, and  
4. at the time entry was made said person had the specific intent to 
commit a felony.  
See ICJI 511, 1203, 1207. Therefore, the jury was informed of the required elements of 
aggravated battery and burglary, and it was instructed as an element to accessory that one of 
those crimes had to have been committed beyond a reasonable doubt.  
When read as a whole, the jury instructions correctly stated the law. State v. Medina, 165 
Idaho 501, 507, 447 P.3d 949 955 (2019). While we acknowledge that it might be ideal to either 
try both the principal and the accessory together, or first obtain a conviction of the principal 
before proceeding to trial with the accessory, it is not required. There is simply no requirement 
that the State must prove the identity of the principal, or establish their guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury instruction given to the jury by the district court 
properly reflected the law. 
B. Due to the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence of guilt, the alleged errors 
in the jury instructions were harmless. 
Even if we were to find that the district court’s jury instructions were somehow erroneous 
for leaving out a required element, we must still determine whether the totality of the record 
would render such error harmless. “In instances where erroneous jury instructions were provided 
at trial, an appellate court must first determine whether an improper jury instruction affected the 
entire deliberative process.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2008). If the 
improper jury instruction was so fundamentally flawed that it affected the entire deliberative 
process, then reversal is required. Id. However, in cases   
where the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such as where the jury 
instructions improperly omitted one element of a charged offense, the appellate 
court may apply the harmless error test, and where the evidence supporting a 
finding on the omitted element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no 
 
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rational jury could have found that the state failed to prove that element, the 
constitutional violation may be deemed harmless. 
Id. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the record in this case presents a compelling 
basis for finding that Campbell knew, yet concealed her knowledge, that a felony had been 
committed. 
 
First, although Campbell contends that she contested the evidence presented by the State 
on both the aggravated battery and burglary charges at trial, she called no witnesses, presented 
no evidence, and only claims that she contested the evidence through her closing argument. We 
reject this argument because it is a fundamental principle that the closing arguments of counsel 
are not evidence, as the jury in this case was specifically instructed. See ICJI 202. While 
Campbell pleaded not guilty, thereby requiring the State to present sufficient evidence to prove 
its case beyond a reasonable doubt, she made no attempt to rebut any of the State’s evidence with 
evidence of her own. Therefore, the evidence of guilt in the record before us is almost entirely 
uncontroverted. 
Second, turning to the weight of the evidence presented by the State in this case, it was so 
overwhelming that no rational jury could have found that the State had failed to meet its burden 
on every element. Narrowing the scope of our analysis to just the underlying acts by Campbell 
sufficient to prove the charge of accessory to an aggravated battery, the evidence was conclusive. 
In sum, the State presented substantial and competent evidence that on December 24, 2017, in 
the state of Idaho, Campbell had knowledge that a battery had been committed upon Renaud and 
the battery had caused Renaud great bodily harm, and Campbell willfully withheld and 
concealed knowledge of the crime from law enforcement every time she was questioned. See I.C. 
§ 18-205(1).  
For example, the State presented substantial and competent evidence for a rational jury to 
have found that Campbell had knowledge of the circumstances related to the aggravated battery 
committed against Renaud. The evidence, again wholly unrebutted at trial, showed that 
Campbell told Renaud he would get his “ass kicked” if he did not leave. Later, Renaud awoke to 
see Cross enter through the front door, point at him, and then “bull rush” him. Campbell, despite 
initially denying any knowledge of the incident, later reported to law enforcement that Renaud 
was punched and kicked by an unknown random stranger. Renaud  identified Cross as his 
assailant to law enforcement at the hospital. The crime was an aggravated battery—a felony—
because Cross caused great bodily harm in commission of the battery, to wit: Cross broke 
 
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Renaud’s jaw and fractured his sinus; Renaud underwent two surgeries to fix his jaw, which 
included doctors installing metal plates; during recovery from surgery, Renaud lost weight, 
suffered great pain, and he could not work; he could barely communicate; and Renaud’s jaw 
shape has been permanently altered.  
Additionally, the State presented persuasive evidence that not only showed that Campbell 
had knowledge of the aggravated battery, but it also demonstrated she may have facilitated the 
attack. At the very least, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that she concealed and 
withheld the full extent of her knowledge about the crime from police officers. For example, the 
jury heard evidence that Campbell became angry after Renaud cuddled up to her female friend 
and suggested a “threesome.” Campbell then demanded that Renaud leave but he refused. Cell 
phone records confirm she then made at least two phone calls to Cross. The evidence suggested 
that Campbell was not only in a sexual relationship with Renaud at the time, but she had been 
similarly involved with Cross. After the calls with Cross, she warned Renaud that he would get 
his “ass kicked” if he did not leave. Shortly thereafter, Cross appeared at Campbell’s house and 
battered Renaud until he was unconscious. When police arrived, Campbell’s story constantly 
changing. For instance, she initially told Deputy Brock she had not seen what happened or who 
did it. Yet, Campbell told medical personnel that Renaud had been punched and kicked. 
Campbell later told Deputy Brock that she saw “a person” kick Renaud. Later on, Campbell told 
a different officer, while describing the incident, that “he” punched and “he” kicked Renaud. 
When directly confronted, Campbell continuously denied any knowledge of what happened, 
apparently forgetting that she had earlier reported to the 911 operator that there was a motive for 
the crime: “there was like a dispute over a girl and someone got punched.” 
 
After the incident, telecommunication records confirmed that Campbell and Cross 
exchanged multiple text messages, including one in which Campbell texted Cross: “Actually was 
looking forward to you fucking him up. You are a great man wish I could have seen that.” 
(Emphasis added). Cross replied, “Lmfao I bet.” Campbell also said, “He was so scared” and “I 
am like upset that he’s gonna [sic] keep his teeth.” The analysis of Cross’ cell phone records 
showed that before the incident, Cross’ phone was operating on the north side of Coeur d’Alene. 
However, around the time of the battery, Cross’ phone was operating in a sector on the north side 
of Hayden, near the incident. Between the time of the incident and the time police seized 
Campbell’s phone pursuant to a warrant, records show that Campbell made many internet 
 
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searches relating to whether police can subpoena text messages, and how to delete text messages. 
Most importantly, Campbell’s text messages to Cross, recorded jail phone calls with Cross and 
her husband, and post-incident internet searches all show that she knew the aggravated battery 
occurred and was actively attempting to conceal the full extent of her knowledge from law 
enforcement.  
 
In sum, this Court concludes that the district court properly rejected Campbell’s proposed 
jury instructions and correctly instructed the jury as required by Idaho Code section 18-205(1) 
and applicable precedent. Even if the district court somehow erred in its jury instruction, there 
was overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial to satisfy each and every element of the 
crime, thus satisfying the standard for harmless error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the conviction and judgment of the district 
court.  
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BURDICK, BRODY and STEGNER CONCUR.