Title: Schwab v. Schwab

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1200 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Kathy Schwab, n/k/a Siech, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paul Schwab, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 660,946 N.W.2d 241 
PDC No:2020 WI App 40 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Dwyer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Carlton D. Stansbury, Colin A. Drayton, and Burbach & 
Stansbury S.C., Milwaukee. Oral argument was presented by 
Carlton D. Stansbury. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Andrew J. Laufers, Laura Stack, and Cordell Law, LLP. Edina, 
Minnesota and Milwaukee.  Oral argument was presented by Andrew 
J. Laufers.  
 
 
2021 WI 67 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1200 
(L.C. No. 
1991FA915107) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
 
 
Kathy Schwab, n/k/a Siech, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul Schwab, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Kathy Siech and Paul Schwab 
divorced in 1992.  As part of the divorce judgment, the circuit 
court incorporated their marital settlement agreement, in which 
Paul promised to pay Kathy half of his pension "when and if" 
that benefit first became available to him.  But when Paul first 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
2 
 
received his pension nearly 21 years later, he refused to pay 
Kathy her share.  Kathy sought to judicially enforce their 
agreement via a contempt order, to which Paul responded that her 
action was barred by a 20-year statute of repose, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 (2019–20).1  The circuit court disagreed and concluded 
that, under Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43, 347 Wis. 2d 238, 830 
N.W.2d 647, it had the authority to order Paul to comply with 
the settlement agreement.2  The court of appeals reversed that 
order, concluding that § 893.40 barred Kathy's action.3  We agree 
with the circuit court that Johnson v. Masters is instructive.  
Accordingly, § 893.40 does not bar Kathy's action because it was 
impossible for Paul to perform on his promise——and therefore for 
Kathy to enforce that promise——until after the statutory period 
of repose had run.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' 
decision and reinstate the circuit court's order. 
I 
¶2 
In February 1992, the circuit court granted Kathy and 
Paul, then both 39 years old, a divorce judgment.  The judgment 
incorporated Kathy and Paul's marital settlement agreement, 
which detailed how they would divide their marital property and 
stated 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
would 
retain 
"continuing 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Michael J. Dwyer of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
3 Schwab v. Schwab, 2020 WI App 40, 392 Wis. 2d 660, 946 
N.W.2d 241. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
3 
 
jurisdiction . . . to make orders enforcing" that division.  
Under one provision, Paul agreed to provide Kathy half his Air 
National Guard pension "when and if" it became available to him. 
¶3 
Paul's pension first became available to him in 
February 2013 when he turned 60 years old, roughly 21 years 
after the divorce judgment was entered.  Although he received 
regular pension disbursements, Paul never paid Kathy her share.  
In 2017, Kathy requested both her share of past payments and 
that Paul sign a military retired pay order per 10 U.S.C. § 1408 
so that her share of Paul's future disbursements would be sent 
directly to her.4  Paul refused to pay her or to sign the pay 
order. 
¶4 
Kathy then initiated contempt proceedings.  Paul 
argued that Kathy's contempt action was untimely under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40.  That provision, a statute of repose, bars any 
"action upon a judgment or decree of a court" brought more 
than "20 years after the judgment . . . is entered."  § 893.40.  
Paul reasoned that because the 1992 judgment was entered more 
than 20 years earlier, Kathy's contempt action was barred by 
§ 893.40. 
¶5 
The circuit court disagreed, concluding that under our 
decision in Johnson v. Masters, 347 Wis. 2d 238, it had the 
equitable authority to enforce a pension-division obligation 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1408, once served with a court 
order dividing a military pension, the secretary of the 
applicable armed-forces branch shall directly pay a former 
spouse his or her interest in the pension. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
4 
 
extending beyond 20 years, § 893.40 notwithstanding.  The 
circuit court ordered Paul to pay Kathy her share of pension 
payments and to sign the military retired pay order within 30 
days or it would find him in contempt of court.  It stayed 
enforcement of that order pending Paul's appeal. 
¶6 
The court of appeals reversed, determining that 
§ 893.40 barred Kathy's contempt action.  The court of appeals 
distinguished Johnson on factual grounds and dismissed the 
equitable-authority rationale on which the circuit court relied 
because that reasoning did not garner a majority.  We granted 
Kathy's petition for review. 
II 
¶7 
We review whether Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars the 
enforcement of a marital property division that was impossible 
until after the statutory period of repose had run.  Resolving 
this question requires us to interpret the language of both the 
statute and the parties' agreement, matters which we review de 
novo.  See Jones v. Est. of Jones, 2002 WI 61, ¶9, 253 
Wis. 2d 158, 646 N.W.2d 280. 
A 
¶8 
We 
resolved 
a 
similar 
question 
in 
Johnson 
v. 
Masters, 347 Wis. 2d 238.  There, we held that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 did not bar an action to enforce a divorce judgment's 
pension division brought more than 20 years after the judgment 
was entered, because it was impossible to comply with the 
judgment for the first nine years.  Johnson and Masters' divorce 
judgment, entered in 1989, required that Johnson be awarded half 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
5 
 
of Masters' pension and that a "QDRO [qualified domestic 
relations order] shall be submitted to secure these rights."  
Id., ¶7.  The parties could not immediately submit the required 
QDRO, however, because from the time of their divorce until the 
law was amended in 1998, Wisconsin law prohibited the assignment 
of state pension benefits via a QRDO.  Id., ¶6.  Upon learning 
in 2010 that Masters had retired a year earlier, Johnson filed a 
QDRO.  When Masters refused to sign the required authorization, 
Johnson filed a post-judgment motion requesting that Masters 
release his pension information.  Id., ¶9.  Masters argued that 
Johnson's motion, filed 21 years after entry of the divorce 
judgment, was untimely under § 893.40.  Id., ¶10.  The circuit 
court agreed.  Id., ¶11. 
¶9 
We reversed the circuit court's order, determining 
that § 893.40 did not bar Johnson's motion because then-existing 
law made it impossible for the parties to execute the required 
QDRO for the first nine years after the divorce judgment.  
Id., ¶¶19, 26.  Johnson turned on our duty to interpret statutes 
to avoid "unreasonable results" and to "constru[e] each in a 
manner that serves its purpose."  Id., ¶¶19-26 (citing State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45–46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 and State v. Szulczewski, 216 
Wis. 2d 495, 503, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998)).  Citing several prior 
decisions in which we rejected interpretations that would 
produce results contrary to both the statute's purpose and 
common sense, we concluded that it would be similarly illogical 
for § 893.40 to penalize Johnson for failing to do something not 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
6 
 
possible.  Id., ¶¶20-21; see also Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. 
Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶30-43, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (lead 
opinion) 
(rejecting 
a 
literal 
interpretation 
that 
both 
"produce[d] absurd results and defie[d] common sense").5  We 
further recognized that this court elsewhere accommodates 
ongoing 
obligations 
in 
family 
law 
judgments 
that 
extend 
beyond 20 years.  Johnson, 347 Wis. 2d 238, ¶¶22-24 (explaining 
that under SCR 72.01(11)-(14), records for family law matters 
must be retained for 30 years; and that Wis. Stat. § 767.01 
authorizes courts to do "all acts and things necessary and 
proper" in family law actions "to carry their orders and 
judgments into execution").  Therefore, we held that § 893.40 
did not bar Johnson's action because the 20-year clock for the 
statute of repose did not start running until 1998, when it 
first became possible to divide the pension according to the 
judgment.  Id., ¶26. 
¶10 Those same principles apply here.  At the time Kathy 
and Paul's divorce judgment was entered in 1992, Paul's pension 
benefits would not be available to him until he turned 60 years 
old in February 2013, 21 years later.  See 10 U.S.C. 
                                                 
5 As further support for the principle that we should avoid 
literal interpretations that lead to unreasonable results, 
Johnson also cited Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-64 (1989), Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. 
Co., 
490 
U.S. 504, 
527-30, 
(1989) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring), and Robbins v. Chronister, 402 F.3d 1047, 1050 
(10th Cir. 2005), the last of which collected other United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decisions 
applying 
the 
"absurdity 
exception."  Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43, ¶20 n.12, 347 
Wis. 2d 238, 830 N.W.2d 647. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
7 
 
§ 1331(a)(1) (1988) (requiring that a service member in Paul's 
situation be "at least 60 years of age" before becoming entitled 
to retired pay benefits).  Because the divorce judgment required 
Paul to divide his pension only "when and if" the pension became 
"available" to him, that division was impossible prior to 
February 2013.  The "when and if" condition also made it 
impossible for Kathy to judicially enforce the agreement during 
those first 21 years because that action would not be ripe until 
Paul's pension became available.  See Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 
Wis. 2d 422, 439, 
253 
N.W.2d 335 
(1977). 
 
It 
would 
be 
unreasonable to interpret § 893.40 as barring enforcement now of 
a marital property division that was impossible to enforce 
during the 20 years prior.6  See State v. Wachsmuth, 73 
Wis. 2d 318, 
326, 
243 
N.W.2d 410 
(1976) 
(avoiding 
an 
"unreasonable" interpretation that would require someone to do 
the "impossible"); Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 163, ¶16, 338 
Wis. 2d 190, 807 N.W.2d 687 (same). 
¶11 That result would also be unreasonable because it 
would render Paul's promised pension division illusory and deny 
                                                 
6 While Kathy sought to enforce the divorce judgment via a 
contempt action, she could have alternatively enforced the 
marital settlement agreement approved by and incorporated into 
that judgment via a breach of contract action.  See Miner v. 
Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 443-44, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960) (explaining 
that provisions in a marital settlement agreement approved by 
and incorporated, rather than "merged," into the divorce 
judgment and that are not modifiable by the court retain their 
contractual nature), abrogated on other grounds by Rohde-
Giovanni 
v. 
Baumgart, 
2004 
WI 27, 
269 
Wis. 2d 598, 
676 
N.W.2d 452; see also 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation 
§ 1010; 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 717. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
8 
 
Kathy the benefit she bargained for in the marital settlement 
agreement.  When Paul promised to pay Kathy half his pension, 
the earliest he could do so was one year after the statute of 
repose would have run.  See 10 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1) (1988).  
Under Paul's reading of § 893.40, then, he made no real promise 
to pay Kathy half his pension.  Rather, at Paul's sole "will and 
discretion," he could pay Kathy her share or not and be free of 
liability either way under the statute of repose.  See 
Runzheimer Int'l, Ltd. v. Friedlen, 2015 WI 45, ¶45, 362 
Wis. 2d 100, 862 N.W.2d 879 (quoted source omitted).  Such a 
"promise" is illusory. 
¶12 An illusory promise in a martial settlement agreement 
disturbs the balance of mutual obligations.  Paul's promise to 
pay Kathy half his pension's value "when" it became available to 
him was critical to the rest of their agreement.  See Washington 
v. Washington, 2000 WI 47, ¶30, 234 Wis. 2d 689, 611 N.W.2d 261 
(explaining that a pension is one of a marriage's "most 
significant assets").  Had Kathy known that Paul's "promise" was 
illusory and unenforceable, she likely would have negotiated for 
a different distribution of the other marital assets.  Thus, 
barring Kathy's enforcement action under the statute of repose 
would deny her the specific benefit for which she bargained.  
Paul, on the other hand, would keep the benefit of his bargain.  
See Johnson, 347 Wis. 2d 238, ¶¶24-25 (explaining that a former 
spouse "is in a poor position" to object to a property division 
to which that spouse agreed and "has obtained a benefit from 
it") (quoting Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 639-40, 178 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
9 
 
N.W.2d 35 (1970)).  Such an inequitable and unreasonable result 
runs contrary to our duty to give effect to the parties' express 
agreement that we presume was intended to be enforceable.  See 
Variance, Inc. v. Losinske, 71 Wis. 2d 31, 36–37, 237 N.W.2d 22 
(1976) (instructing courts to assume parties intend to enter 
enforceable 
agreements 
and 
construe 
them 
accordingly); 
Washington, 234 Wis. 2d 689, ¶17 (holding that divorce judgments 
be construed in the same way). 
¶13 Our conclusion also comports with the purpose of 
§ 893.40.  The purpose of a statute of repose is to provide 
defendants 
relief, 
or 
"repose," 
from 
the 
uncertainty 
of 
potential 
liability 
arising 
from 
some 
long-ago 
act 
by 
extinguishing all causes of action once the statutory period has 
lapsed.  See Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Schs., 2005 WI 99, ¶62, 
283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794.  At its core, a statute of repose 
seeks to ameliorate the possibility that parties and courts will 
be stuck "litigating claims in which the truth may be obfuscated 
by death or disappearance of key witnesses, loss of evidence, 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
10 
 
and faded memories."7  Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶27, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. 
¶14 None of those concerns exists here.  No uncertainty 
hangs over Paul.  He voluntarily promised to pay Kathy "when and 
if" his pension became available to him.  Although that event 
was not possible until 21 years later, once it occurred, his 
liability to Kathy was certain.  As for stale evidence concerns, 
a divorce judgment incorporating a settlement agreement uniquely 
obviates those concerns as the only evidence necessary to 
litigate that liability is the agreement itself.  And the 
circuit court is required to retain such agreements for at 
least "30 years after entry of judgment of divorce."  See 
SCR 72.01(11).  Therefore, barring Kathy's enforcement action 
under § 893.40 would not advance the statute's purpose. 
B 
¶15 Finally, we are unpersuaded by Paul's argument that, 
because Kathy submitted no military retired pay order to divide 
Paul's pension, she slept on her rights and the statue of repose 
bars her enforcement action.  To begin with, the existence of 
                                                 
7 A statute of repose is unlike a statute of limitations in 
that a statute of limitations generally starts with an event 
uncertain, such as the occurrence or discovery of an injury, 
while a statute of repose sets an absolute outside date 
triggered by an event certain, such as the filing of a judgment.  
See Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶28, 245 
Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  In that respect, a statute of 
limitation encourages plaintiffs not to sleep on their rights 
once they accrue; a statute of repose, on the other hand, is 
indifferent to the particular plaintiff's timeliness in bringing 
the action.  See Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, ¶16, 390 
Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
11 
 
other non-judicial remedies provides no insight into how we 
should interpret a statute concerned with judicial actions.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 addresses only an "action upon a 
judgment . . . of a court," a judicial remedy; it mentions 
nothing about the availability of administrative or self-help 
remedies.  Moreover, nowhere does Kathy and Paul's agreement 
require either party to submit a military retired pay order, a 
notable 
contrast 
with 
the 
agreement 
in 
Johnson. 
 
Cf. 
Johnson, 347 Wis. 2d 238, ¶7 (noting that the divorce agreement 
expressly 
required 
that 
a 
QDRO 
"be 
submitted 
to 
secure 
[Johnson's] rights" in Masters' pension).  To the extent Paul 
desired 
that 
administrative 
convenience, 
he 
was 
equally 
responsible for filing the pay order, especially considering 
that he had better access to the relevant information regarding 
his service.  Regardless, the agreement reserved for Paul the 
flexibility to fulfill his obligation in other ways, including 
by simply writing Kathy a check after he received each 
disbursement.8  Thus, whether the parties submitted a military 
retired pay order is irrelevant to interpreting a statute of 
repose or applying it to their agreement. 
III 
¶16 Barring Kathy's enforcement action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 would produce an unreasonable result that would not 
                                                 
8 Indeed, because the agreement is silent as to submitting a 
military retired pay order, Kathy may have been unable to compel 
Paul to sign or authorize such an order even within 20 years 
after the judgment was entered. 
No. 
2019AP1200 
 
12 
 
advance the statute's purpose.  Accordingly, following our 
interpretation of § 893.40 in Johnson v. Masters, we conclude 
that § 893.40 poses no bar to Kathy's action.9  Therefore, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
circuit court's order enforcing Paul's obligation to divide his 
pension. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
                                                 
9 Because we decide this case under Johnson, we do not reach 
Kathy's argument that under Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, 
¶47, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832, the judiciary's inherent 
contempt power is unaffected by statutes of repose.  See Md. 
Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 
786 N.W.2d 15. 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
1 
 
¶17 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Today, the majority sheds its judicial robes and takes its seat 
in the legislature.  When we interpret the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40, it is clear that Kathy Schwab's contempt 
action is barred.  Instead of following the plain language of 
the statute, the majority calls into question every statute of 
repose by placing its policy choices above the plain text of the 
statute.  However, our role in the judiciary is to interpret the 
law, not create it.  Because I would not engage in judicial 
activism or legislate from the bench as the majority does in 
this case, I respectfully dissent.  
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶18 On February 25, 1992, Kathy and Paul Schwab entered 
into a Marital Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") as part of 
their divorce proceedings.  That Agreement is the focus of this 
case.  The Agreement awarded Kathy "50% of the current pretax 
value of [Paul's] Air National Guard pension, [then] non-vested 
when and if it is available to [Paul]."  The Agreement also 
awarded Paul "his non vested pension from Air National Guard 
subject to an order to pay one-half the present non vested value 
to [Kathy] when and if it is available to [Paul]."   
¶19 To ensure Kathy and Paul fulfilled the terms of the 
Agreement, the Agreement stated that "[e]ach party recognizes 
that the terms of this [Agreement] will require each to 
cooperate in signing further documents to make the terms a 
reality and each party agrees to cooperate in signing such 
documents."  Consequently, both Kathy and Paul were aware that 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
2 
 
they may have to sign further documents to effectuate their 
rights under the Agreement.   
¶20 After a total of 35 years in the Air National Guard, 
Paul retired from service in November 2008.  Paul applied for 
his Air National Guard pension in February 2013 when he was 60 
years old——the earliest he was able to receive his pension.  See 
10 U.S.C. § 12731.  Neither Kathy nor Paul took steps to secure 
Kathy's allocation of Paul's pension.  Paul never paid Kathy any 
portion of his pension.   
¶21 In November 2017, Kathy filed an affidavit to show 
cause for contempt for Paul's failure to pay her half of his Air 
National Guard pension.  The circuit court issued an order to 
show cause in December 2017.  Paul moved to dismiss the order to 
show cause for contempt.   
¶22 After an evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court 
ordered that Paul must sign an order to divide his pension, but 
did not find him in contempt.  Rather, the court stated that it 
would find him in contempt if he refused to sign the order 
dividing the pension within 30 days of the court's order.   
¶23 Paul appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
holding "that [Kathy's] contempt motion is barred by the twenty-
year time constraint set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.40."  Schwab 
v. Schwab, 2020 WI App 40, ¶23, 392 Wis. 2d 660, 946 N.W.2d 241.  
Kathy petitioned this court for review, which we granted.   
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶24 Unlike the majority, I begin with the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 to determine whether it bars Kathy's 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
3 
 
contempt action.  Next, I analyze Johnson v. Masters, 2013 
WI 43, 347 Wis. 2d 238, 830 N.W.2d 647, explaining that it is 
inapplicable to Kathy's case.  Finally, I address the majority's 
evisceration of statutes of repose and our precedent.  
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 Bars Kathy's Contempt Action. 
¶25 Kathy's contempt action is barred by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 because the legislature has made no exception to the 
time bar in the statute that applies to Kathy's contempt action.  
To understand the application of § 893.40, we must interpret the 
plain language of the statute.  "[W]e have repeatedly held that 
statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted 
source omitted). 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 provides that "action upon a 
judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the 
United States shall be commenced within 20 years after the 
judgment or decree is entered or be barred."  The nature of the 
time constraints set forth in § 893.40 render it a statute of 
repose, in that it "limits the time period within which an 
action may be brought based on the date of an act or omission."  
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶29, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 
N.W.2d 832.   
¶27 "Statutes 
of 
limitation 
and 
statutes 
of 
repose 
represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the 
courthouse doors close for particular litigants."  Aicher ex 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
4 
 
rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶27, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  Whereas "[a] statute of limitations 
usually establishes the time frame within which a claim must be 
initiated after a cause of action actually accrues," a statute 
of repose "limits the time period within which an action may be 
brought based on the date of the act or omission."  Id., ¶26.  
"Statutes of repose thus bear no relation to the accrual of a 
cause of action and can toll before an injury is discovered or 
even before an injury has occurred."  Id.   
¶28 Statutes 
of 
repose 
inherently 
create 
unfair 
situations.  As we have previously explained, "[c]ourts may 
shudder at the unfairness visited by statutes of repose."  Id., 
¶45.  However, despite the unfairness created, "statutes of 
repose inherently are policy considerations better left to the 
legislative branch of government."  Id., ¶54.  Thus, when the 
legislature expressly chooses not to recognize a claim after a 
certain period, "[w]e cannot preserve a right to obtain justice" 
because "none in fact exists."  Id.  "Were we to extend a right 
to 
remedy 
outside 
the 
limits 
[the 
legislature 
set], 
we 
effectively would eviscerate the ability of the legislature to 
enact any statute of repose."  Id.   
¶29 To alleviate the unfairness that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
creates, the legislature has enacted two exceptions to the 
statute of repose.  See § 893.40.  The first exception is for 
deficiency judgments in mortgage foreclosures, set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 846.04(2) and (3).  See § 893.40.  The second exception 
is for actions relating to child or family support, set forth in 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.415.1  See id.  Given that the legislature has 
enacted these two exceptions to the statute, we cannot now 
create new exceptions to § 893.40.  See State v. Delaney, 
2003 WI 9, ¶22, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 ("Under the well-
established canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
expression of one thing excludes another), where the legislature 
specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a statute, we 
conclude, based on that rule, that the legislature intended to 
exclude any other exception.").   
¶30 Applying this understanding of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 to 
this case, it is clear that Kathy's contempt action is barred.  
In this case, the act that triggered the statute of repose was 
the entry of the judgment.  Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶29.  
Thus, when the circuit court entered the judgment of divorce on 
March 17, 1992, the 20-year time clock began to run.  Kathy did 
not file her contempt action by March 17, 2012.  Rather, she 
filed her contempt action in November 2017.  Moreover, Kathy's 
action is neither an action on a deficiency judgment in a 
                                                 
1 The legislature added the second exception——for actions 
relating to child or family support——in response to our decision 
in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 
N.W.2d 832.  See 2003 Wis. Act 287.  In Hamilton, we 
specifically held that "Wis. Stat. § 893.40 governs the time 
within which a party may bring an independent action to collect 
child support arrearages that have amassed after July 1, 1980."  
Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶50.  The legislature clearly 
abrogated this holding when it enacted 2003 Wis. Act 287, which 
created a specific exception to section 893.40 for actions 
relating to child or family support.  Accordingly, our precedent 
reflects our deference to the legislature in making decisions 
regarding both when a statute of repose applies and specific 
exceptions to a statute of repose.   
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
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mortgage foreclosure nor an action relating to child or family 
support; it is for contempt for failing to comply with a 
property 
division 
in 
a 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement.  
Consequently, Kathy's action is barred under the plain language 
of the statute and no exception applies. 
B.  Johnson v. Masters Does Not Demand a Different Result. 
¶31 To avoid the plain language of the statute, the 
majority relies upon Johnson v. Masters, 347 Wis. 2d 238, to 
conclude that it would be unreasonable to apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 to bar Kathy's contempt action.  Majority op., ¶10.  
However, this misinterprets our holding in Johnson.  When 
properly interpreted, Johnson does not prevent applying § 893.40 
in this case.   
¶32 In Johnson, we addressed a unique factual scenario 
when the petitioner was legally incapable of filing a qualified 
domestic relations order (QDRO).  In that case, the Marital 
Settlement Agreement between Johnson and Masters provided that 
"[t]he Petitioner shall be awarded [half] of the value of the 
Respondent's Wisconsin Retirement System benefits accrued from 
the date of marriage thr[ough] the date of divorce.  A QDRO 
shall be submitted to secure these rights."  Johnson, 347 
Wis. 2d 238, ¶7.  At the time of the divorce in 1989, Johnson 
was unable to file a QDRO under state law.  Id., ¶6.  This 
changed in 1999 when the legislature adopted 1997 Wis. Act 125, 
which permitted the Wisconsin Retirement System to accept QDROs 
related to certain divorces, including Johnson and Masters' 
divorce.  Id.  More than 20 years after the divorce judgment, 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
7 
 
Johnson filed an action upon the judgment, requesting an order 
to require Masters to release his pension information.  Id., 
¶10.  The circuit court applied Wis. Stat. § 893.40 and barred 
Johnson's action, which was eventually appealed to this court.   
¶33 In our review, we stated that "the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40 in certain circumstances may produce results that 
'def[y] both common sense and the fundamental purpose' of the 
statute."  Id., ¶21.  "The judgment here has the flaw, as to the 
pension award provision, that under the statute then in effect 
the pension was not assignable."  Id.  The "dispositive fact" in 
that case was "that the statute operated to prohibit pension 
interests from being assigned at the time the judgment was 
entered."  Id., ¶22 (emphasis added).  Thus, because the law 
prohibited the assignment, application of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
would be unreasonable.   
¶34 The 
present 
divorce 
between 
Kathy 
and 
Paul 
is 
remarkably different from the divorce in Johnson because, at the 
time of the divorce, the law permitted an assignment of Paul's 
Air National Guard pension to Kathy, and Kathy could secure her 
rights in his pension.   
¶35 Paul's Air National Guard pension is governed by 
federal law.  To divide a military retiree's retired pay, a 
military retired order must be sought pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408.2  Specifically, to secure an interest in the military 
retired pay, a copy of the final divorce decree must be served 
                                                 
2 This statute was enacted in 1982, and was in effect when 
Paul and Kathy entered the Agreement in 1992.  Pub. L. 97-252, 
Title X, § 1002(a).   
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
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on the appropriate agent for the Secretary of Defense concerned 
with court orders.  10 U.S.C. § 1408(b)(1)(A).  That court order 
can also be served prior to the retirement of the servicemember.  
See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B).  When a servicemember is not 
receiving payments on the effective service date of the court 
order, the Secretary of Defense makes payments not later than 90 
days after the date on which the servicemember first becomes 
entitled to receive retired pay.  10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1).   
¶36 Accordingly, federal law permitted Paul to assign 
Kathy her interest in his Air National Guard pension, and Kathy 
could have secured that assignment.  During the 20 years 
following their divorce, Kathy could have sought a military pay 
order pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1408, and served a copy of her 
divorce decree on the appropriate agent of the Secretary of 
Defense.  If Paul refused to sign the military pay order, Kathy 
then could have filed a contempt motion pursuant to the 
provision of the Agreement that provides that "each party agrees 
to cooperate in signing such documents."  After receiving the 
military pay order, Kathy would have received the portion of 
Paul's Air National Guard pension that she was given as part of 
the Agreement.   
¶37 Because Kathy did not face a legal barrier to the 
assignment of her interest, Johnson is inapplicable to Kathy.  
Moreover, the law specifically included a system by which she 
could secure her rights in Paul's pension.  Rather than follow 
that system, Kathy delayed and fell afoul of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40.  Consequently, Kathy's contempt action is now barred, 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
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and neither Johnson nor the statutory exceptions can save her 
claim.   
 
C.  The Majority Reinvents Statutes of Repose to  
Satisfy Its Preferred Policy Outcomes. 
¶38 Rather than follow this straightforward analysis, the 
majority "eviscerate[s] the ability of the legislature to enact 
any statute of repose."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶54.  The 
majority never once grapples with the language of the statute.  
Instead, the majority resorts to the general purposes of 
statutes of repose to determine that the text of the statute 
could not possibly mean what it says.  See majority op., 
¶¶13-14.  But the majority's reliance on purpose cannot 
contravene the plain text of the statute.  See Hamilton, 261 
Wis. 2d 458, ¶45 (noting that the court's holding ran "counter 
to the desire previously expressed by the legislature and 
courts" but still concluding that the statute of repose 
applied).   
¶39 Because the majority's logic lacks any sort of 
limiting principle, all statutes of repose must fall because 
statutes of repose may often cause a result that the majority 
deems "unreasonable."  For example, under a different statute of 
repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.35, a plaintiff is barred from bringing 
a claim for replevin after six years from when the conversion 
occurs, even if the plaintiff learned of the conversion ten 
years later.  See, e.g., Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, 390 
Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566.  Applying the majority's conclusion, 
it is clearly unreasonable for a plaintiff who never learns of 
the conversion during the statute of repose period to bring a 
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
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replevin action.  Consequently, the majority would purport to 
hold, the statute of repose cannot apply to such a plaintiff.  
However, this is exactly what happens in statute of repose cases 
"[b]ecause, by their nature, statutes of repose can sometimes 
arbitrarily extinguish a prospective plaintiff's cause of 
action," even before the plaintiff learns of the claim.  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶32.  
¶40 As we cut away the flowery language and demystify the 
majority's argument, the truth reveals itself:  the majority 
simply disagrees with the policy decision of the legislature.3  
Such a power grab runs afoul of our role as judges to declare 
the law, not create it.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Our precedent is clear:  "statutes of 
repose inherently are policy considerations better left to the 
legislative branch of government."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶54.  
                                                 
3 To be sure, I recognize that the policy underlying 
application of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 to certain family court 
matters may require attention from the legislature, as I did in 
Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43, ¶¶39-40, 347 Wis. 2d 238, 830 
N.W.2d 647 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  However, it is not our 
role to make such policy decisions——that is left to the 
legislature.   
No.  2019AP1200.akz 
 
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Accordingly, we must respect the choice the legislature made 
when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 893.40 and bar Kathy's action.4 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 The majority sheds its judicial robes and takes its 
seat in the legislature.  When we interpret the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.40, it is clear that Kathy Schwab's contempt 
action is barred.  Instead of following the plain language of 
the statute, the majority calls into question every statute of 
repose, placing its policy choices above the plain text of the 
statute.  However, our role in the judiciary is to interpret the 
law, not create it.  I would not engage in judicial activism or 
legislating from the bench as the majority does in this case. 
¶42 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶43 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and BRIAN HAGEDORN join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
4 The majority also creates whole-cloth a new argument that 
neither party raised:  that Paul's promise of his pension was 
illusory.  Despite the majority's smoke and mirrors, Paul's 
promise was not illusory.  The majority asserts that it was at 
Paul's "will and discretion" whether he would pay Kathy, but 
this is simply untrue.  Majority op., ¶11.  Pursuant to the 
Agreement, Paul was obligated to pay Kathy, and Kathy could 
secure her rights to receive payment by filing a military pay 
order pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1408.  Accordingly, the Agreement 
was not subject to Paul's "will and discretion."  Rather, it was 
subject to Kathy exercising her rights, which she failed to do. 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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¶44 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Chief Justice Annette Ziegler's dissent in full.  I write 
separately 
because 
the 
majority 
does 
not 
appreciate 
the 
distinction between a contract and a court judgment.  At the 
time Paul Schwab reneged on his agreement to pay half of his 
pension to Kathy Siech, her action to enforce the divorce 
judgment was time-barred, but a contract claim was not.  The law 
would have afforded Siech the fair and equitable result the 
majority gives her, had she brought a viable claim.  Because she 
failed to do so, the majority crafts what it considers to be a 
"reasonable" result but not one based in the law.1   
                                                 
1 The majority repeatedly suggests the court bears some 
obligation to disregard the statute of repose whenever it leads 
to "unreasonable" results.  If courts ignored the law every time 
they deem a result unreasonable, the rule of law would be 
supplanted by the rule of judges.  In support of this 
disturbingly subjective standard, the majority invokes the 
absurdity doctrine.  The majority abuses the canon.  The 
absurdity doctrine applies only to textual errors that may be 
fixed "by changing or supplying a particular word or phrase 
whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or 
ministerial error."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 238 (2012); see State ex 
rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 224 Wis. 398, 402, 
272 N.W. 457 (1937) (stating that the absurdity canon does 
"not . . . justify a court in amending the statute or giving it 
a meaning to which its language is not susceptible merely to 
avoid what the court believes are inequitable or unwise 
results").  Just because a court dislikes the outcome does not 
mean it is absurd.  Mellen Lumber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of 
Wisconsin, 154 Wis. 114, 119, 142 N.W. 187 (1913) ("The statute 
in question may be inequitable, but this does not make it 
absurd.").  As Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent explains, 
statutes of repose often extinguish claims before they even 
accrue, which may be considered unfair but it certainly isn't 
"absurd."  Nor does Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43, 347 
Wis. 2d 238, 830 N.W.2d 647, support setting aside the statute 
of repose, as Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent makes clear.  
Regardless, 
Johnson 
was 
wrongly 
decided 
and 
should 
be 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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¶45 A Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) is a contract 
under the law, as explained in my dissent in Pulkilla v. 
Pulkilla, 2020 WI 34, 391 Wis. 2d 107, 941 N.W.2d 239.  Because 
Schwab's and Siech's MSA is a contract, the statute of 
limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.43——applicable to "actions on 
contract"——would have applied to Siech's breach of contract 
claim (if she had brought one) for Schwab's failure to pay her 
50 percent of his military pension as he agreed in the MSA.  
Instead of asserting a breach of contract claim in the circuit 
court, Siech brought a contempt motion based upon the divorce 
judgment.  Accordingly, this court's review is limited to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40——Wisconsin's statute of repose for an action on 
judgment or decree.  Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent correctly 
concludes that Siech failed to commence her action within 20 
years after the circuit court entered the divorce judgment; 
hence, Siech is statutorily barred from pursuing her claim. 
¶46 In my dissent in Pulkilla, I exhaustively analyzed 
long-standing precedent establishing the contractual nature of 
an MSA and it is not necessary to repeat that analysis in this 
opinion.  In sum, "MSAs have been treated as contracts by this 
court for at least 83 years."  Pulkilla, 391 Wis. 2d 107, ¶48 
                                                                                                                                                             
overturned.  In that case, the court justified its decision to 
disregard the statute of repose because "the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40 in certain circumstances may produce results that 
'def[y] both common sense and the fundamental purpose' of the 
statute."  Johnson, 347 Wis. 2d 238, ¶21.  The court was wrong 
on both counts.  The legislature has the prerogative to enact a 
statute that may produce outcomes which defy "common sense" so 
long as the statute comports with the constitution.  And courts 
have no authority to disregard the plain text of a statute in 
order to achieve what the court may divine to be its "purpose." 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Since at least 1935, 
this court has referred to a "marriage settlement" as a 
"marriage settlement contract," In re Will of Koeffler, 218 Wis. 
560, 564-65, 260 N.W. 638 (1935) (emphasis added), and has 
consistently applied principles of contract law to MSAs.  
Pulkilla, 391 Wis. 2d 107, ¶¶48-49 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (collecting over 35 cases from this court and the 
court 
of 
appeals). 
 
Academic 
literature 
and 
dictionary 
definitions of marital settlement agreements support this 
court's history of interpreting MSAs as contracts.  Id., ¶¶50-51 
(collecting sources); see Lauren M. Ilvento, The Application of 
Kenney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. to Modification of 
Child Custody Proceedings, 83-May Fla B.J. 41, 43 (2009) ("In 
the context of family law, marital settlement agreements and 
mediated agreements are contracts and are to be interpreted 
pursuant to the provisions of contract law.") (emphasis added); 
Martial Settlement Agreement, Black's Law Dictionary 604, 1158 
(11th ed. 2019) ("A contractual agreement that sets out 
divorcing 
spouses' 
rights 
and 
responsibilities 
regarding 
property, alimony, custody, visitation, and child support.") 
(emphasis added).  
¶47 MSAs are bargained-for agreements between two parties, 
and courts must uphold them, absent any violations of public 
policy.  Pulkilla, 391 Wis. 2d 107, ¶52 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting); see Topolski v. Topolski, 2011 WI 59, ¶7, 335 
Wis. 2d 327, 802 N.W.2d 482 (interpreting an MSA to "plac[e] the 
husband and wife in the same position" but for the occurrence of 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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an event and "giv[ing] both the husband and wife exactly what 
they bargained for in the Martial Settlement Agreement").  
Incorporating an MSA into a divorce judgment does not change the 
former's status as a contract.  Pulkilla, 391 Wis. 2d 107, ¶53 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Like all other 
contracts, we interpret MSAs according to their "plain language" 
and "consistent with what a reasonable person would understand 
the words to mean under the circumstances."   Marx v. Morris, 
2019 WI 34, ¶63, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 925 N.W.2d 112 (quoted source 
omitted).  "Where the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, we construe the contract according to its literal 
terms."  Gorton v. Hostak, Henzel & Bichler, S.C., 217 
Wis. 2d 493, 506, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998) (citation omitted). 
¶48 These principles apply to the MSA Schwab and Siech 
negotiated and signed in 1992.  The MSA states that "[Siech] 
shall receive 50% of the current pre-tax value of [Schwab's] Air 
National Guard pension, presently non-vested when and if it is 
available to [Schwab]."  The MSA further provides that both 
parties agreed the pension provision was a "full, fair, and 
final division of their marital property."  The parties also 
agreed that the MSA's provisions "shall be the terms and 
conditions of relief in this action."  The circuit court 
approved the MSA and incorporated its provisions into the 
divorce judgment.  As pertinent to this dispute, the circuit 
court stated in the divorce judgment that "[t]he parties have 
entered into a written agreement concerning the division of 
their marital property . . . .  Their agreement is reasonable 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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under the facts as the court has determined those facts, and 
shall be included and incorporated in the conclusions of law and 
judgment in this action." 
¶49 In November 2008, Schwab retired from the Air National 
Guard.  He started receiving his military pension in February 
2013.  Despite Schwab's pension having vested, he never paid 
Siech 50 percent of its value as the MSA required.  In 2017, 
Siech brought a contempt motion against Schwab, contending that 
he intentionally failed to comply with the circuit court's 1992 
divorce judgment.  Siech did not bring a breach of contract 
claim.  In resolving Siech's contempt motion, the circuit court 
concluded that Siech could recover her 50 percent share of the 
military pension as the parties agreed in the MSA incorporated 
into the divorce judgment.  According to the circuit court, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40 did not bar Siech's action.  A statute of repose, 
§ 893.40 states that "an action upon a judgment or decree of a 
court . . . shall be commenced within 20 years after the 
judgment or decree is entered or be barred."  Schwab appealed 
the circuit court's decision to the court of appeals, which 
reversed the circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals 
held that Siech's claim was time-barred under the statute of 
repose because 20 years had passed before Siech brought her 
contempt motion to enforce the divorce judgment. 
¶50 As 
Chief 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
dissent 
correctly 
concludes, Wis. Stat. § 893.40 indeed bars Siech's action.  The 
circuit court issued the divorce judgment in 1992, and Siech did 
not bring a contempt motion until 2017——more than 20 years after 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
6 
 
the judgment was entered.  Even though Schwab's military pension 
did not vest until 2013, § 893.40 nonetheless bars Siech's claim 
because a statute of repose begins to run regardless of when a 
claim accrues or is discovered and it cuts off any claim once 
the period of repose lapses.  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, 
¶29, 
261 
Wis. 2d 458, 
661 
N.W.2d 832 
("A 
statute 
of 
repose . . . limits the time period within which an action may 
be brought based on the date of an act or omission.  A statute 
of repose does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action.  
In fact, it may cut off litigation before a cause of action 
arises."). 
¶51 While the statute of repose extinguished Siech's 
action on the divorce judgment, she could have timely brought a 
breach of contract claim based on the MSA.  As explained in my 
dissent in Pulkilla, MSAs are stand-alone contracts, regardless 
of whether they are incorporated into a divorce judgment.  
Pulkilla, 391 Wis. 2d 107, ¶53 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  A breach of contract claim for Schwab's failure to 
pay 50 percent of his military pension to Siech——as the parties 
agreed under the MSA——would have been subject to the statute of 
limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.43 and not the statute of repose 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  Under § 893.43, "an action upon any 
contract obligation, or liability, express or implied, including 
an action to recover fees for professional services, except 
those mentioned in s. 893.40, shall be commenced within 6 years 
after the cause of action accrues or be barred."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
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¶52 Unlike the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.40, 
the statute of limitation time period in Wis. Stat. § 893.43 
begins to run when the claim accrues.  See Hamilton, 261 
Wis. 2d 458, ¶29 ("A statute of limitations usually establishes 
the time frame within which a claim must be initiated after a 
cause of action actually accrues."); Yocherer v. Farmers, 2002 
WI 41, ¶10, 252 Wis. 2d 114, 643 N.W.2d 457 ("The parties do not 
dispute that the applicable statute of limitations is Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.43," which provides parties 6 years to commence an action 
after "a cause of action accrues.").  It is undisputed that 
Schwab's military benefits vested in 2013 and Siech's claim 
accrued upon Schwab's failure to pay her that year; accordingly, 
Siech had until 2019 to bring a breach of contract claim against 
Schwab for violating the MSA, at which time the statute of 
limitations 
would 
have 
expired. 
 
The 
existence 
of 
this 
alternative avenue by which Siech could have compelled Schwab to 
comply with their agreement belies the majority's assertion that 
it was "impossible" for Siech to enforce the MSA. 
¶53 The majority seems to think the statute of repose 
applies to a breach of contract claim, declaring that "it was 
impossible for Paul to perform on his promise——and therefore for 
Kathy to enforce that promise——until after the statutory period 
of repose had run."  Majority op., ¶1.  Of course, the statute 
of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applies only to actions on 
judgments, not breach of contract claims.  Although Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.43 references § 893.40 with respect to other types of 
claims, the statute of repose would not have applied to Siech's 
No.  2019AP1200.rgb 
 
8 
 
breach of contract claim (had she brought one).  Because the MSA 
is a stand-alone contract, independent of the divorce judgment, 
an action for its breach would not be subject to the 20-year 
statute of repose applicable to an action to enforce the divorce 
judgment.  It was, therefore, quite possible for Siech to 
enforce Schwab's promise——if she had brought a claim that was 
not time-barred. 
¶54 Siech never brought a breach of contract claim, and 
relied solely on a contempt action to enforce the divorce 
judgment in order to compel Schwab to fulfill his pension 
payment obligations to her under the MSA.  We cannot convert her 
contempt action into one for breach of contract and must apply 
the law to the action she actually filed.  See, e.g., Wolnak v. 
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgeons of Cent. Wisconsin, S.C., 
2005 WI App 217, ¶¶46-52, 287 Wis. 2d 560, 706 N.W.2d 667 
(denying relief under a breach of contract claim the plaintiff 
failed to plead).  As Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent explains 
more fully, the action Siech chose to bring is barred by the 
statute of repose.  Avoiding a result it deems "inequitable and 
unreasonable," the majority designs an outcome that may comport 
with its conceptions of fairness but it does not comport with 
the law.  I dissent. 
 
 
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