Title: Wis. Justice Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2003 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., a Wisconsin 
nonstock corporation, Jacqueline E. Boynton, 
Jerome F. Buting, Craig R. Johnson and Fred A. 
Risser, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann S. Jacobs, 
in her official capacity as Chair of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Douglas La 
Follette, in his official capacity as Secretary 
of State of Wisconsin, and Josh Kaul, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General of 
Wisconsin, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 16, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Frank D. Remington   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined, and in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined with 
respect to ¶¶58-59 and 61-65. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed 
a concurring opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., 
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
KAROFSKY, J., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined 
with respect to ¶¶93-122. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion in which DALLET, J., joined with respect to ¶¶137-150. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Jody J. Schmelzer and Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorneys 
general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney 
general. There was an oral argument by Hannah S. Jurss, 
assistant attorney general.  
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Dennis M. Grzezinski and the Law Office of Dennis M. Grzezinski, 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Dennis M. Grzezinski.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mike Wittenwyler, 
Kendall W. Harrizon, Maxted M. Lenz, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., 
Madison, for Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, L.L.C., Mothers Against 
Drunk 
Driving, 
Wisconsin 
Victim/Witness 
Professionals 
Association, Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association, Milwaukee 
Police Association, Wisconsin Professional Police Association, 
Bolton Refuge House, Inc., Golden House, Inc., Unidos Against 
Domestic Violence, New Day Advocacy Center, and Eau Claire Area 
Hmong Mutual Assistance Association, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and 
WMC Litigation Center, Madison, for Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Katie R. York, 
appellate division director, with whom on the brief was Kelli S. 
Thompson, state public defender, for the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Christine Donahoe, Mel 
Barnes, Elizabeth M. Pierson, Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M. 
Poland, Pahoua Thao, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, for 
the ACLU of Wisconsin and Law Forward, Inc.  
 
 
 
3 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Erika Jacobs Petty, 
Rachel E. Sattler, and Lotus Legal Clinic, Brookfield, for Lotus 
Legal Clinic.  
 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 38 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP2003 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV3485) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., a Wisconsin 
nonstock corporation, Jacqueline E. Boynton, 
Jerome F. Buting, Craig R. Johnson and Fred A. 
Risser, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann S. Jacobs, 
in her official capacity as Chair of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Douglas La 
Follette, in his official capacity as Secretary 
of State of Wisconsin, and Josh Kaul, in his  
official capacity as Attorney General of 
Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined, and in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined with 
respect to ¶¶58-59 and 61-65. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed 
a concurring opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., 
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
KAROFSKY, J., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined 
with respect to ¶¶93-122. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion in which DALLET, J., joined with respect to ¶¶137-150. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
1 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Frank D. Remington, Judge.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   When the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted in 1848, it included a process enabling amendments——
an act the people of Wisconsin have seen fit to do almost 150 
times.  A proposed amendment must be approved by a majority of 
both houses of the legislature in two successive legislative 
sessions.  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  Once it passes that test, 
the proposed amendment is submitted to the people.  Id.  If a 
majority vote yes, it becomes part of our constitution.  Id.  A 
victim's rights amendment termed "Marsy's Law" by its sponsors 
(a term we also use in this opinion) was ratified by the people 
in April of 2020.  In this case, Wisconsin Justice Initiative, 
Inc. and several citizens (collectively "WJI") argue that 
Marsy's Law was adopted in violation of the process spelled out 
in the constitution.   
¶2 
When considering claims grounded in the Wisconsin 
Constitution, our obligation is to faithfully interpret and 
apply its original meaning.  The relevant constitutional text 
governing the claims here is found in Article XII, Section 1.  
It provides that the legislature has a duty "to submit such 
proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner 
and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe."  Wis. 
Const. art. XII, § 1.  And, "if more than one amendment be 
submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the 
people may vote for or against such amendments separately."  Id.   
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
2 
 
¶3 
The legislature has prescribed further guidelines via 
statute 
regarding 
the 
form 
of 
the 
ballot 
for 
proposed 
constitutional amendments.  Notably, Wis. Stat. § 5.64(2)(am) 
(2021-22)1 requires ballot questions to contain a "concise 
statement of each question."  However, WJI has not raised a 
challenge based upon this or any other statute.  Therefore, this 
case 
concerns 
only 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution which, by their plain terms, give broad discretion 
to the legislature to prescribe the manner of submission to the 
people.   
¶4 
To that end, WJI argues that the ballot question for 
Marsy's Law submitted to Wisconsin voters ran afoul of Article 
XII, Section 1.  WJI asserts the ballot question fails to 
contain "every essential" of the proposed amendment, and that it 
misled voters in several respects by neglecting the amendment's 
impact on the rights of criminal defendants.   WJI pulls this 
supposed "every essential" requirement from language, although 
not the holdings, in two of our prior cases.  See State ex rel. 
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. 803 (1925); State ex 
rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953).  
However, not a single constitutional amendment in Wisconsin 
history has ever undergone judicial review using this ostensible 
test.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Examining the original meaning of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, we discern no such requirement, and therefore we 
decline the invitation to fashion a new, exacting constitutional 
standard.  The constitution itself requires only that the 
legislature "submit" the proposed amendment to the people.  See 
Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  In 1953, we did strike down a 
proposed amendment in Thomson——the only time we have done so on 
this basis in Wisconsin history——when we concluded the question 
submitted 
to 
the 
people 
described 
the 
amendment 
in 
a 
fundamentally counterfactual way.  264 Wis. at 660.  The 
proposed amendment was therefore not, in any meaningful way, 
"submitted" to the people.  Id.  However, the extreme situation 
in Thomson is not present here.  While WJI takes issue with the 
wording, completeness, and implications of the ballot question, 
we conclude the question was not fundamentally counterfactual 
such that voters were not afforded the opportunity to approve 
the actual amendment. 
¶6 
Additionally, in view of what WJI contends were 
modifications to the rights of criminal defendants and victims, 
it argues Marsy's Law should have been submitted to voters as 
multiple amendments, rather than as a single amendment.  We have 
summarized our interpretation of this portion of Article XII, 
Section 1 as follows:  
It is within the discretion of the legislature to 
submit several distinct propositions as one amendment 
if they relate to the same subject matter and are 
designed to accomplish one general purpose.  The 
general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from 
the text of the amendment itself and from the 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
4 
 
historical context in which the amendment was adopted.  
And all of the propositions must tend to effect or 
carry out that purpose.   
McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶50, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 
N.W.2d 855 (cleaned up).  Applying this test, we conclude all of 
the provisions of Marsy's Law relate to expanding and defining 
victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this general 
purpose. 
¶7 
We therefore hold that WJI's challenges to Marsy's Law 
fail.  The ballot question was not submitted to the people in 
violation of the process outlined in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Therefore, absent challenge on other grounds, the amendment has 
been validly ratified and is part of the Wisconsin Constitution.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶8 
In successive legislative sessions, both houses of the 
legislature adopted a proposal to amend Article I, Section 9m of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  See 2017 Enrolled Joint Resolution 
13; 2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3.  The proposed amendment 
renumbered the existing Article 1 Section 9m to Section 9m(2) 
(intro.) 
and 
modified 
it 
as 
follows, 
with 
underlines 
representing 
additions 
to 
and 
strikethroughs 
representing 
deletion of the then-existing text: 
[Article I] Section 9m (2) (intro.)  This state shall 
treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, 
dignity and respect for their privacy.  This state 
shall ensure that crime victims have all of the 
following privileges and protections as provided by 
law:  In order to preserve and protect victims' rights 
to justice and due process throughout the criminal and 
juvenile justice process, victims shall be entitled to 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
5 
 
all of the following rights, which shall vest at the 
time of victimization and be protected by law in a 
manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded 
to the accused: 
(a) To be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, 
sensitivity, and fairness. 
(b) To privacy. 
(c) To proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 
(d) To timely disposition of the case; the opportunity 
to attend court, free from unreasonable delay. 
(e) Upon request, to attend all proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; involving the case. 
(f) 
To 
reasonable 
protection 
from 
the 
accused 
throughout the criminal and juvenile justice process;. 
(g) 
Upon 
request, 
to 
reasonable 
and 
timely 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to. 
(h) Upon request, to confer with the prosecution; the 
opportunity to make a statement to the court at 
disposition; attorney for the government. 
(i) Upon request, to be heard in any proceeding during 
which a right of the victim is implicated, including 
release, 
plea, 
sentencing, 
disposition, 
parole, 
revocation, expungement, or pardon. 
(j) To have information pertaining to the economic, 
physical, and psychological effect upon the victim of 
the 
offense 
submitted 
to 
the 
authority 
with 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
case 
and 
to 
have 
that 
information considered by that authority. 
(k) Upon request, to timely notice of any release or 
escape of the accused or death of the accused if the 
accused is in custody or on supervision at the time of 
death. 
(L) To refuse an interview, deposition, or other 
discovery request made by the accused or any person 
acting on behalf of the accused. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
6 
 
(m) To full restitution; from any person who has been 
ordered to pay restitution to the victim and to be 
provided with assistance collecting restitution. 
(n) To compensation; and as provided by law. 
(o) Upon request, to reasonable and timely information 
about the status of the investigation and the outcome 
of the case and the release of the accused. 
(p) To timely notice about all rights under this 
section 
and 
all 
other 
rights, 
privileges, 
or 
protections of the victim provided by law, including 
how such rights, privileges, or protections are 
enforced. 
(3) Except as provided under sub. (2) (n), all 
provisions of this section are self-executing.  The 
legislature 
shall 
provide 
may 
prescribe 
further 
remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in 
this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to 
this section, shall limit any right of the accused 
which may be provided by law. and further procedures 
for compliance with and enforcement of this section. 
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3, § 1.   
¶9 
The 
proposed 
amendment 
also 
created 
four 
new 
subsections: 
[Article I] Section 9m (1)(a) In this section, 
notwithstanding any statutory right, privilege, or 
protection, "victim" means any of the following: 
1. A person against whom an act is committed that 
would constitute a crime if committed by a competent 
adult. 
2. If the person under subd. 1. is deceased or is 
physically or emotionally unable to exercise his or 
her rights under this section, the person's spouse, 
parent or legal guardian, sibling, child, person who 
resided with the deceased at the time of death, or 
other lawful representative. 
3. If the person under subd. 1. is a minor, the 
person's parent, legal guardian or custodian, or other 
lawful representative. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
7 
 
4. If the person under subd. 1. is adjudicated 
incompetent, the person's legal guardian or other 
lawful representative. 
(b) "Victim" does not include the accused or a person 
who the court finds would not act in the best 
interests of a victim who is deceased, incompetent, a 
minor, or physically or emotionally unable to exercise 
his or her rights under this section. 
 . . .  
[Article I] Section 9m (4)(a) In addition to any other 
available enforcement of rights or remedy for a 
violation 
of 
this 
section 
or 
of 
other 
rights, 
privileges, or protections provided by law, the 
victim, 
the 
victim's 
attorney 
or 
other 
lawful 
representative, or the attorney for the government 
upon request of the victim may assert and seek in any 
circuit court or before any other authority of 
competent jurisdiction, enforcement of the rights in 
this section and any other right, privilege, or 
protection afforded to the victim by law.  The court 
or other authority with jurisdiction over the case 
shall act promptly on such a request and afford a 
remedy for the violation of any right of the victim.  
The court or other authority with jurisdiction over 
the case shall clearly state on the record the reasons 
for any decision regarding the disposition of a 
victim's right and shall provide those reasons to the 
victim or the victim's attorney or other lawful 
representative. 
(b) Victims may obtain review of all adverse decisions 
concerning their rights as victims by courts or other 
authorities with jurisdiction under par. (a) by filing 
petitions for supervisory writ in the court of appeals 
and supreme court. 
 . . .  
[Article I] Section 9m (5) This section does not 
create any cause of action for damages against the 
state; any political subdivision of the state; any 
officer, employee, or agent of the state or a 
political subdivision of the state acting in his or 
her official capacity; or any officer, employee, or 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
8 
 
agent of the courts acting in his or her official 
capacity. 
 . . .  
[Article I] Section 9m (6) This section is not 
intended and may not be interpreted to supersede a 
defendant's federal constitutional rights or to afford 
party status in a proceeding to any victim. 
Id., §§ 2-5. 
¶10 The 
legislature 
directed 
that 
this 
amendment, 
informally known as "Marsy's Law," be submitted for ratification 
at the April 7, 2020 election.  The legislature determined that 
the ballot question should state as follows: 
Question 1:  "Additional rights of crime victims.  
Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution, 
which gives certain rights to crime victims, be 
amended to give crime victims additional rights, to 
require that the rights of crime victims be protected 
with equal force to the protections afforded the 
accused 
while 
leaving 
the 
federal 
constitutional 
rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime 
victims to enforce their rights in court?" 
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3. 
¶11 Several months before the April election, WJI brought 
suit against the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging 
the ballot question failed to satisfy the requirements of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.2  WJI sought declarations that the ballot 
question violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution on various grounds, and requested both a permanent 
injunction and a temporary injunction preventing submission of 
                                                 
2 WJI also sued Dean Knudson, Douglas LaFollette, and Josh 
Kaul in their official capacities as Chair of the WEC, Secretary 
of State, and Attorney General, respectively.  We refer to all 
the defendants collectively as WEC. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
9 
 
the question to voters while the litigation was pending.  The 
circuit court denied WJI's motion for a temporary injunction, 
and Wisconsinites ratified the amendment at the April 7, 2020 
election by a vote of 1,107,067 to 371,013.  Several months 
later, the circuit court granted declaratory judgment in favor 
of WJI, concluding the ballot question failed to meet all the 
requirements with respect to content and form.  The circuit 
court, on its own motion, stayed judgment pending appeal.  WEC 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court, which we accepted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 The Wisconsin Constitution provides two mechanisms by 
which 
the 
people 
may 
change 
their 
founding 
charter:  
constitutional convention3 and constitutional amendment.  This 
case concerns only the amendment process, which is spelled out 
in Article XII, Section 1: 
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may 
be proposed in either house of the legislature, and if 
the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the 
members elected to each of the two houses, such 
proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on 
their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, 
and referred to the legislature to be chosen at the 
next general election, and shall be published for 
three months previous to the time of holding such 
election; and if, in the legislature so next chosen, 
such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed 
to by a majority of all the members elected to each 
house, then it shall be the duty of the legislature to 
                                                 
3 Wis. Const. art. XII, § 2. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
10 
 
submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the 
people in such manner and at such time as the 
legislature shall prescribe; and if the people shall 
approve and ratify such amendment or amendments by a 
majority 
of 
the 
electors 
voting 
thereon, 
such 
amendment or amendments shall become part of the 
constitution; 
provided, 
that 
if 
more 
than 
one 
amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in 
such manner that the people may vote for or against 
such amendments separately. 
This section was adopted as part of our original constitution in 
1848 and has never been amended.  Compare Wis. Const. art. XII, 
§ 1 (1848) with Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1 (2021); Ray A. Brown, 
The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), 1952 Wis. L. 
Rev. 23, 60.   
¶13 WJI argues the ballot question for Marsy's Law 
violated two separate clauses of Article XII, Section 1.  First, 
it contends the proposed amendment was not, in effect, submitted 
"to the people in such manner and at such time as the 
legislature shall prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  WJI 
maintains that this provision requires a ballot question on a 
proposed 
amendment 
to 
disclose 
"every 
essential" 
of 
the 
amendment and not be misleading.  Separately, WJI asserts that 
Marsy's Law constituted "more than one amendment" and therefore 
voters should have been given the opportunity to "vote for or 
against such amendments separately."  Id. 
¶14 Analyzing these questions requires us to interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and determine if the amendment was 
ratified in conformance with the constitutional procedures——
questions of law we determine independently.  Serv. Emps. Int'l 
Union, Loca1 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
11 
 
N.W.2d 35; McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶12.  We begin by reviewing 
our approach to constitutional interpretation.   
A.  Constitutional Interpretation 
¶15 The Wisconsin Constitution begins, "We, the people of 
Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to 
secure its blessings, form a more perfect government, insure 
domestic tranquility and promote the general welfare, do 
establish this constitution."  Wis. Const. pmbl.  This reflects 
the foundational assumption of our system of government:  all 
authority resides with the people, and it is the people alone 
who have the authority to establish the terms and methods by 
which they will be governed.  The constitution is that 
foundational charter in which the people determine their 
fundamental law, and by which they consent to be governed.  See 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (government derives its "just powers 
from the consent of the governed").   
¶16 This contrasts with the constitutional system of the 
British from whom we declared independence.  While our friends 
in Great Britain speak of being governed by a "constitution," it 
is not a written constitution.  Nikolas Bowie, Why the 
Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 1400 
(2019).  Rather, for them, it is a set of civic values and norms 
accepted by the people through the years.  Id.  But that is not 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
12 
 
how we do it here.  Our constitutions——state and federal——are 
written documents.  They are law and should be read as such.4   
¶17 This 
foundational 
point 
means 
our 
authority 
to 
interpret the constitution when deciding cases is not without 
limits. 
 
The 
constitution 
establishes 
the 
entities 
and 
institutions that the people have determined will order their 
lives.  Each of our three branches of government——legislative, 
executive, and judicial——is created by the constitution and 
subject to it.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31; League of Women Voters 
of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 
N.W.2d 209.  The constitution tells the judiciary, no less than 
any other branch, what we can do, what we must do, and what we 
cannot do.  See generally Wis. Const. art. VII (providing 
powers, obligations, and prohibitions of various kinds on the 
judiciary).  We must be faithful to the charge we have been 
given by the people, exercising only the authority entrusted to 
us.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶31-33; see also The Federalist No. 
78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (calling judges 
the "faithful guardians of the Constitution"). 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring the 
federal Constitution "the supreme Law of the Land"); The 
Attainment 
of 
Statehood 
883 
(Milo 
M. 
Quaife, 
ed. 
1928) 
(detailing that the president of the state constitutional 
convention adjourned the convention in 1848 by remarking, "[t]he 
result of our labors, if approved, becomes henceforth the 
supreme law of our adopted land, and whether well or ill done it 
stands forth as the record of our united opinions upon the form 
of government best suited to the condition of our people"); 
Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 97 
Marq. L. Rev. 93, 93 (2013) (stating the "Wisconsin Constitution 
is the state's fundamental law").   
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
13 
 
¶18 The main power we have been given in the constitution 
is the judicial power, which by necessity means the power to 
interpret the law in appropriate cases.  See Gabler v. Crime 
Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶37, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384.  One of our most famous early cases, Attorney 
General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, presented a significant 
challenge to this court at a time when many questioned our  
authority to issue orders in a disputed gubernatorial contest.  
4 Wis. 567 [*567] (1855).  Chief Justice Whiton explained that 
the legal rights at issue were "fixed by the constitution, and 
the court, if it has jurisdiction of this proceeding, is the 
mere instrument provided by the constitution to ascertain and 
enforce their rights as fixed by that instrument."  Id. at 672-
73 [*659].  Although the case centered on who the lawful 
occupant of the governor's office was, the court's role was "the 
same as in all controversies between party and party; not to 
create rights, but to ascertain and enforce them."  Id. at 673 
[*659].  Thus, we have understood from early on that our role is 
not to use the constitution to create new rights and protections 
that are not there, but to ascertain and enforce the rights and 
protections that are already there, fixed by the people in the 
text of the constitution.  See Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 
512, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987) ("Courts would be ill-advised to 
rewrite history and plain, clear constitutional language to 
create some new rights contrary to history.").  Where our 
constitution needs updating, the people may do so through 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
14 
 
constitutional amendment or constitutional convention; that 
authority has not been given to us.  See Wis. Const. art. XII.   
¶19 This should not be surprising because that is exactly 
how we have described our duty when interpreting other sources 
of law.  When it comes to statutory interpretation, we 
understand that it is "a solemn obligation of the judiciary to 
faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, 
and to do so requires a determination of statutory meaning."  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  This is why the focus in 
statutory interpretation is on the language of the statutory 
text, read reasonably, along with relevant statutory context and 
structure.  Id., ¶44-46.  The whole goal "of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  Id., ¶44.     
¶20 Our obligation to be true to the law the people have 
enacted 
requires 
the 
same 
kind 
of 
consideration 
of 
constitutional meaning as we give to statutory meaning.  The 
awesome responsibility entrusted to us by the people calls us to 
have the humility and fortitude to say what the law is, not what 
we may wish it to be.  We do not "update" statutes to fit with 
the times.  We do not rewrite statutes to account for changing 
moral norms.  We do not modify statutes so they better accord 
with our sense of justice or good public policy.  We do not 
ignore or fail to interpret statutes to mean what they say when 
critics are loud.  We have repeatedly said it is not our job to 
judge the wisdom of the laws we interpret; rather, it is our job 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
15 
 
to interpret the law as we find it.  See, e.g., Town of Wilson 
v. City of Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶45, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938 
N.W.2d 493 ("The Town's argument that a petitioner should be 
required to use one method of calculation over another is a 
policy argument and has no support in the statutory language."); 
Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶40, 382 
Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 ("[A] court cannot issue a declaration 
regarding the wisdom of a legislative determination."); Columbus 
Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶34, 267 
Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633 ("[W]e must apply the statute as 
written, not interpret it as we think it should have been 
written."); Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶57, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("It is not our role to determine 
the wisdom or rationale underpinning a particular legislative 
pronouncement."); Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 
415, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) ("We are not concerned with the 
wisdom of what the legislature has done."). 
¶21 Just as the purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statutory text means, the purpose of 
constitutional 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine 
what 
the 
constitutional text meant when it was written, commonly called 
the original public meaning or original understanding.  Although 
constitutional language is at times written with less precision, 
that fact does not fundamentally change the nature of our 
charge.  We must similarly focus on the constitutional text, 
reading it reasonably, in context, and with a view of the 
provision's place within the constitutional structure.  Vos, 393 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶28.  Other sources such as the debates and 
practices at the time of adoption, along with early legislative 
enactments, may prove helpful aids to interpretation.  State v. 
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶22, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847.  
Just as we leave policy choices to the legislature in statutory 
interpretation, we must leave policy choices to the people in 
constitutional interpretation.  See Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28 
("The text of the constitution reflects the policy choices of 
the 
people, 
and 
therefore 
constitutional 
interpretation 
similarly 
focuses 
primarily 
on 
the 
language 
of 
the 
constitution."); Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 576 
N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("It is for the legislature to make policy 
choices, ours to judge them based not on our preference but on 
legal principles and constitutional authority.").     
¶22 Although we have not been entirely consistent in its 
application, we have consistently described our task as one 
focused on the meaning of the text.5  For many years, we have 
commonly 
recited 
that 
when 
interpreting 
a 
constitutional 
provision, we look to "the plain meaning of the words in the 
                                                 
5 This 
is 
also 
true 
across 
the 
country. 
 
"[T]he 
supermajority of state supreme courts have expressly identified 
originalism as the primary canon of state constitutional 
interpretation."  Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism:  The 
Primary Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 Geo. J. 
L. & Pub. Pol'y 341, 344 (2017); see, e.g., Elliott v. State, 
824 S.E.2d 265, 268-269 (Ga. 2019); People v. Tanner, 853 
N.W.2d 653, 667 (Mich. 2014); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 
89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I. 2014); League of Educ. Voters v. State, 
295 P.3d 743, 749 (Wash. 2013) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Rose, 
81 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. 2013); State v. Hernandez, 268 P.3d 822, 
¶8 (Utah 2011). 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
17 
 
context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in 
existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and 
the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature 
as manifested in the first law passed following adoption."6  
Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  
Notably, all of these are directed at the original meaning of 
the constitution.   
¶23 This court has doubled down on this approach in recent 
years.7  In State v. Roberson, for example, we overruled our 
                                                 
6 We have——without controversy——embraced this formulation of 
how we do constitutional interpretation for decades, just as 
Kalal has taken root as the proper approach to statutory 
interpretation.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; Daniel R. 
Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 
970 
(2017) 
(explaining 
"Kalal 
transformed 
statutory 
interpretation in Wisconsin" by advancing "a uniform method" for 
Wisconsin courts to use when interpreting statutes).  As a 
result, the Wisconsin court system has a growing culture where 
the meaning of the text reigns supreme.  And for that, we should 
be grateful.   
Justice Dallet's concurrence, on the other hand, suggests 
we should depart from a methodology focused on the meaning of 
the text we are interpreting in favor of a more eclectic and 
"pluralistic" approach.  Justice Dallet concurrence, ¶94.  The 
concurrence's open pining for the freedom to go beyond the 
meaning of constitutional language must be and is rejected.      
7 Justice Dallet's concurrence tries to marshal cases 
challenging this.  Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶97.  It points 
to Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, ¶33, 403 Wis. 2d 424, 977 
N.W.2d 390.  But the constitutional analysis cited was joined by 
only three justices and is not an opinion of the court.  Justice 
Dallet's concurrence also cites State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765; State v. Christen, 2021 WI 39, 
396 Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746; and Miller v. Carroll, 2020 
WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542.  But those cases involved 
applying United States Supreme Court precedent on the Second 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
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prior decision in State v. Dubose,8 which had adopted new 
requirements 
for 
the 
admissibility 
of 
out-of-court 
identification evidence under the Wisconsin Constitution.  State 
v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶3, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.  
We did so, however, not based on the policies reflected in this 
decision, but based on our assessment of the "original meaning 
of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Id., ¶44.  We recognized that 
while state constitutions may provide further protection to 
citizens than the federal Constitution, "the question for a 
state court is whether its state constitution actually affords 
greater protection."  Id., ¶56.  Critically, we held, "A state 
court does not have the power to write into its state 
constitution additional protection that is not supported by its 
text or historical meaning."  Id.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Amendment and Due Process Clauses of the federal Constitution.  
The only other example it offers is State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 
285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, a single decision from 18 years 
ago 
that 
remains 
controversial 
for 
its 
departure 
from 
traditional judicial reasoning and constitutional analysis.  See 
State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶38, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 
N.W.2d 847 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) ("Because 
the Knapp court's interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution lacks any mooring in text or history, 
this 
court 
should 
restore 
the 
original 
meaning 
of 
this 
constitutional provision."); Judge Diane S. Sykes, Reflections 
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Hallows Lecture (March 7, 2006), 
in Marquette Lawyer, Summer/Fall 2006, at 60 ("The court's 
decision [in Knapp] rests not on the language or history of the 
state constitution's self-incrimination clause but on the 
court's own policy judgment flowing from an expansive view of 
the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule."). 
8 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 
N.W.2d 582, overruled by State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
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¶24 In Halverson, a criminal defendant asked us to 
conclude under the Wisconsin Constitution that an incarcerated 
individual is "in custody" for purposes of requiring Miranda 
warnings, despite rejection of that principle under the federal 
Constitution.  395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶¶2-4.  We unanimously rebuffed 
that argument in part because the defendant provided no argument 
rooted in the text or history of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Id., ¶¶26-28.  We did not view the request as a wide-ranging 
invitation 
to 
make 
new 
judicial 
policy 
on 
custodial 
interrogations.  Rather, we emphasized that "any argument based 
on the Wisconsin Constitution must actually be grounded in the 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Id., ¶24 
¶25 Likewise, in State ex rel. Kaul v. Prehn, the State 
asked us to hold that the Governor should have similar removal 
powers as the President does under the federal Constitution.  
2022 WI 50, ¶2, 402 Wis. 2d 539, 976 N.W.2d 821.  We rejected 
the State's overreliance on federal law because the federal 
cases lent "only limited support to structure, meaning, and 
original understanding of the Wisconsin Governor's removal 
power."  Id., ¶43.  We emphasized that "we focus on the language 
of the adopted text" when interpreting the constitution, and 
said it was the State's obligation to present historical 
research and evidence of the Wisconsin Constitution's "original 
meaning."  Id., ¶¶12, 44.  We went on to consult and discuss the 
original understanding of the appointment powers of the Governor 
by reference to the historical record, including records of the 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
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constitutional convention and early legislative enactments.  
Id., ¶¶48-51.  
¶26 In Johnson v. WEC, we examined the requirements under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
as 
it 
related 
to 
redrawing 
legislative maps.  2021 WI 87, ¶2, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469.  In doing so, we reviewed the text and history in 
search of the "original meaning" of the relevant constitutional 
provisions.  Id., ¶¶28, 33, 58.  We rejected, for example, the 
notion that the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes judicial 
consideration of partisanship because "[n]othing supports the 
notion that Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was originally understood" this way.  Id., ¶58.   
¶27 When 
considering 
our 
role 
in 
constitutional 
interpretation, Justice Smith said it well in 1855.  It is worth 
quoting at length: 
Let us then look to that constitution, adopted by the 
people of Wisconsin, and endeavor to ascertain its 
true intent and meaning, the distribution of the 
powers of government which it has in fact made, and 
the agencies which it has provided, whereby those 
powers are to be executed.  And here, let it be 
remarked, that our conclusions must be guided and 
determined . . . by 
the 
plain, 
simple, 
but 
authoritative and mandatory provisions of our own 
constitution.  We made it ourselves.  We are bound to 
abide by it, until altered, amended or annulled, and 
we must construe it, and support it, not according to 
the 
vague, 
conjectural 
hypothesis 
of 
volunteer 
expounders, resident in other states, having no care 
or interest in the government, and having no knowledge 
of the constitution of our state, but according to its 
plain letter and meaning, as the oath-bond of our 
safety——as the palladium of our rights and liberties——
as the vital principle of our social and political 
organism. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
21 
 
Bashford, 4 Wis. at 785 [*757-58] (Smith, J.). 
¶28 In 
short, 
our 
solemn 
duty 
in 
constitutional 
interpretation 
is 
to 
faithfully 
discern 
and 
apply 
the 
constitution as it is written.9  What the constitution says, it 
says.  What it does not say, it does not say.  Through careful, 
humble, and courageous fidelity to the constitution, we allow 
the people to govern themselves, we support and uphold the 
constitutional 
rights 
and 
protections 
the 
people 
have 
established, and we ensure that the government the people have 
authorized remains in their hands.   
B.  Submitted to the People 
¶29 We turn then to the first constitutional challenge WJI 
poses:  Was the proposed amendment submitted to the people in 
compliance with Article XII, Section 1?  Before addressing WJI's 
several arguments concerning this clause, we begin with the 
original meaning of Article XII, Section 1. 
                                                 
9 Justice 
Dallet's 
concurrence 
attempts 
to 
critique 
originalism by raising some of the challenges that come with 
understanding legal texts.  Reading the concurrence's near-
hopeless description of the interpretive task, one wonders why 
we bother with a written constitution at all.  None of the 
issues she identifies are unique to constitutional language, 
however.  The same problems inhere in the interpretation of 
statutes and other legal texts.  Laws written by people, 
sometimes hundreds of years ago, can be difficult to interpret 
and apply.  But this fact does not change the nature of our 
duty.  Thus, the concurrence's broadside against originalism 
"isn't an attack against originalism so much as it is an attack 
on written law."  Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 
113 (2019). 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
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1.  The Original Meaning of Article XII, Section 1 & Ekern 
¶30 Our constitutional analysis begins with the text.  As 
relevant to this dispute, following initial adoption in the 
legislature and other procedural requirements, the constitution 
requires "the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or 
amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the 
legislature shall prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  This 
language commands only two things:  First, the amendment must be 
"submitted" to the people; and second, it must be done in the 
manner and at the time prescribed by the legislature.  Id.  The 
legislature has enacted Wis. Stat. § 5.64(2),10 which spells out 
various instructions for submission such as giving a "concise 
statement of each question."  However, WJI does not develop any 
separate arguments under this statute.  Therefore, we do not 
address the statute further and focus our attention solely on 
the requirements in the constitution itself.  See Vos, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶24 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.64(2)(am) states: 
There shall be a separate ballot when any proposed 
constitutional amendment or any other measure or 
question is submitted to a vote of the people, except 
as authorized in s. 5.655.  The ballot shall give a 
concise statement of each question in accordance with 
the act or resolution directing submission in the same 
form 
as 
prescribed 
by 
the 
commission 
under 
s. 
7.08(1)(a).  The question may not be worded in such a 
manner as to require a negative vote to approve a 
proposition or an affirmative vote to disapprove a 
proposition.  Unless otherwise expressly provided, 
this ballot form shall be used at all elections when 
questions are submitted to a vote of the people. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
23 
 
develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to 
make their case."). 
¶31 On its face, the constitutional requirement that an 
amendment be "submitted" to the people does not contain any 
explicit 
obligations 
regarding 
form 
or 
substance. 
 
The 
legislature is granted substantial discretion and freedom in how 
amendments can be submitted to the people.  The text simply 
requires that the people must have the opportunity to ratify or 
reject a proposed amendment.   
¶32 Moving 
to 
other 
evidence 
of 
the 
original 
understanding, we are unaware of any ratification debates or 
other 
contemporaneous 
evidence 
from 
the 
constitutional 
convention that bear on the meaning of this provision.  But 
early legislative actions pursuant to this provision confirm our 
reading of the text of Article XII, Section 1.  We look to these 
early 
legislative 
actions 
not 
to 
conclusively 
settle 
constitutional meaning, but because they can reveal how a 
constitutional provision was understood at the time of adoption.  
See, e.g., Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶67.  In other words, early 
legislatures attempting to amend the constitution are likely to 
have 
acted 
consistent 
with 
their 
understanding 
of 
its 
requirements, and therefore proceed consistent with the original 
public meaning of Article XII, Section 1.   
¶33 In the early years after our constitution was adopted, 
ballot questions were uniformly submitted as simple up or down 
votes.  In 1854, the legislature submitted three separate 
amendments to the voters concerning:  (1) 2-year terms for 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
24 
 
assemblymen, (2) 4-year terms for senators, and (3) biennial 
legislative sessions.  §§ 1-3, ch. 89, Laws of 1854.  The 
electors were given three ballots:   
 "'For amendment to section four' or 'against 
amendment to section four'"; 
 "'for amendment to section five' or 'against 
amendment to section five'"; and 
 "'for amendment to section eleven' or 'against 
amendment to section eleven.'" 
§ 4, ch. 89, Laws of 1854.  This process confirms that the 
constitutional command to submit the amendment to the people for 
ratification was understood not to demand any particular 
substantive content.  It simply required that voters be afforded 
a clear opportunity to ratify a proposed amendment.   
¶34 The pattern continued.  In 1862, the legislature 
submitted to voters an amendment to increase the governor's pay 
to $2,500 per year.  § 1, ch. 202, Laws of 1862.  There again, 
the question on the ballot was simply "for the amendment to the 
constitution" or "against the amendment to the constitution."  
§ 2, ch. 202, Laws of 1862.  In 1867, the people were asked to 
amend the constitution to increase legislative pay to $350 per 
year.  Ch. 25, Laws of 1867.  The question on the ballot once 
again was "for amendment to the constitution" and "for amendment 
to the constitution, no."  § 2, ch. 25, Laws of 1867.  And in 
1869, the legislature submitted two amendments to the people to 
increase the salary of the governor to $5,000 per year and the 
lieutenant governor to $1,000 per year.  Ch. 186, Laws of 1869.  
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
25 
 
The legislature submitted both amendments in the same ballot 
question:  "for amendments to the constitution" and "for 
amendments to the constitution, no."  § 2, ch. 186, Laws of 
1869.   
¶35 Thus, no ballot question in the first 22 years after 
the 
constitution 
was 
adopted 
contained 
any 
substantive 
description of the amendment at all.  So far as we can tell, no 
one questioned the validity of this process.  If in fact the 
constitution requires the content of a proposed amendment to be 
included in the ballot question, the inescapable conclusion is 
that every one of these amendments was submitted to the people 
in an unconstitutional manner——with no one batting an eye.  That 
is highly unlikely.  The overwhelming, indeed, uniform teaching 
of the text and history surrounding Article XII, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution is that an amendment only needs to be 
submitted to the people for ratification.  It need not——as a 
constitutional prerequisite——contain any kind of description of 
the amendment's substance.11 
¶36 This leads to two questions.  First, where does the 
proposed "every essential" test come from, then?  And second, 
are there circumstances under which a proposed amendment can be 
                                                 
11 Justice Dallet's concurrence critiques our interpretive 
principles because, she argues, originalism is "almost always 
fruitless."  Justice Dallet concurrence, ¶108.  But this case 
stands in direct conflict with those assertions.  The original 
meaning in this case is apparent, with text and history all 
pointing in the same direction.  While some cases may involve 
harder questions, here, as is often the case, a careful analysis 
yields a relatively clear answer.   
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
26 
 
deemed not "submitted" to the people under Article XII, Section 
1?  To provide the necessary context for these questions, we 
continue with a brief survey of the historical practice, 
legislative changes, and cases that led to the arguments before 
us today.   
¶37 Starting in 1870, the legislature changed its practice 
and began adding a general subject area to the ballot question, 
although still without explaining any of the content of the 
proposed amendment.  Criminal defendants at that time had to be 
presented to or indicted by a grand jury (absent a few 
exceptions) before answering a criminal offense.  Wis. Const. 
art. 1, § 8 (1848).  In 1870, the legislature asked voters to 
amend the constitution and remove the grand jury requirement.  
Ch. 118, Laws of 1870.  Voters in favor of the amendment were 
asked to cast a ballot "against the grand jury system" while 
those who opposed the proposed amendment voted "for the grand 
jury system."  § 2, ch. 118, Laws of 1870.  In 1871, voters were 
asked to add Sections 31 (prohibiting special legislation and 
private laws) and 32 (authorizing general laws on subject areas 
prohibited under section 31) to Article IV.  Ch. 122, Laws of 
1871.  Those in favor of the amendment were asked to vote 
"against special legislation" and those opposed to the amendment 
cast a ballot "for special legislation."  § 2, ch. 122, Laws of 
1871.  Along these lines, in 1872, the ballot question asked the 
people to vote "for amending the constitution increasing the 
number of justices of the supreme court" or "against amending 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
27 
 
the constitution increasing the number of justices of the 
supreme court."  § 2, ch. 111, Laws of 1872. 
¶38 1874 saw a longer, more substantive question submitted 
to the people, immediately followed by a return to ballot 
questions without subject matter.  The ballot language in 1874 
was "for amending the constitution limiting bonded indebtedness 
by counties, towns, cities and villages, to five per cent" and 
"against 
amending 
the 
constitution 
limiting 
the 
bonded 
indebtedness by counties, towns, cities and villages to five per 
cent."  § 2, ch. 37, Laws of 1874.  Following this, however, the 
legislature again began asking simple yes or no questions.  In 
1877 the voters were asked to increase the composition of the 
supreme court again (the earlier proposal failed).  Ch. 48, Laws 
of 1877.  The ballot question presented this time was, "for 
amendment to the constitution" or "for amendment to the 
constitution, no."  § 2, ch. 48, Laws of 1877.  Also that year, 
the legislature asked the people to amend the provision 
regarding claims against the state.  Ch. 158, Laws of 1877.  The 
ballot question simply asked:  "for the amendment" and "against 
the amendment."  § 2, ch. 158, Laws of 1877.  Other proposed 
amendments proceeded similarly.12   
                                                 
12 All ballot questions from 1881 until 1897 simply served 
to identify the section (or sections) amended.  See § 2, ch. 
262, Laws of 1881 (amending Article IV, Sections 4, 5, 11, and 
21); § 2, ch. 273, Laws of 1882 (amending Article III, Section 
1); § 2, ch. 290, Laws of 1882 (amending Article VI, Section 4; 
Article VII, Section 12; and Article XIII, Section 1); § 2, ch. 
362, Laws of 1891 (amending Article IV, Section 31); § 2, ch. 
69, Laws of 1897 (amending Article VII, Section 7).  Or they 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
28 
 
¶39 Then, just before the turn of the century, the 
legislature adopted a statute that required "a concise statement 
of the nature" of a proposed amendment.  Wis. Stat. ch. 5, § 39 
(1898).  This mandate was moved in 1907 to the predecessor of 
what later became today's Wis. Stat. § 5.64.  § 2, ch. 583, Laws 
of 1907 (creating § 38(7)).13  And in 1908, ballot questions 
began 
to 
include 
substantive 
descriptions 
of 
proposed 
amendments.  That year, four amendments were submitted to the 
people.  Voters were asked to vote yes or no to the following 
questions: 
 "For the amendment providing state aid in the 
construction or improvement of public highways."  
§ 2, ch. 238, Laws of 1907. 
 "For 
the 
amendments 
authorizing 
a 
graduated 
income tax."  § 2, ch. 661, Laws of 1907. 
 "For the amendment extending from three to six 
days the time allowed the governor in which to 
approve bills."  Id. 
 "For the amendment providing that after December 
1st, 1912, electors shall be citizens of the 
United States."  Id.  
And so the trend continued moving forward.  
¶40 The 
first 
case 
to 
address 
the 
manner 
of 
the 
legislature's submission to the people occurred in 1925.  The 
question before this court in Ekern was whether the legislature 
                                                                                                                                                             
asked if the voter was for or against an amendment.  See § 2, 
ch. 22, Laws of 1889 (amending Article VII, Section 4). 
13 See § 25, ch. 383, Laws of 1915 (renumbering § 38 to Wis. 
Stat. § 6.23); § 1, ch. 666, Laws of 1965 (renumbering Wis. 
Stat. § 6.23 to Wis. Stat. § 5.64). 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
29 
 
complied with the constitution when it delegated the drafting of 
a ballot question to the secretary of state.  187 Wis. at 196-
200.  We held that this was permissible.  Id. at 205.  The 
constitution 
requires 
that 
the 
legislature 
determine 
the 
"manner" of submission to the people, and we concluded this 
language was broad enough to encompass directing the secretary 
of state to determine the content of the ballot question.  Id.  
Although extraneous to the issue in the case, the court engaged 
in an extended digression regarding the content and design of 
ballot questions.  Id. at 200-02.  Because this language is the 
genesis for the proposed "every essential" test we are asked to 
breathe life into in this case, we quote the discussion at 
length and in context: 
A constitutional amendment being designed to affect 
the fundamental law, the highest degree of care and 
foresight 
which 
the 
legislature 
is 
capable 
of 
exercising, in order that the proposed amendment may 
not fall by the wayside and thus result in thwarting 
the will of the people, should be exercised as an act 
of wisdom, and therefore, under the law as it now 
exists, it would appear to be highly desirable that 
the form of the question which should be submitted 
should be prescribed and set forth in the act 
directing its submission.  Every legislature has among 
its members lawyers who have obtained distinction in 
their profession and who have made a special study of 
constitutional law, and ever since the adoption of the 
constitution 
it 
has 
been 
the 
practice 
of 
the 
legislature to appoint such members on the judiciary 
committees 
of 
the 
two 
houses. 
 
The 
knowledge, 
experience, and prudence of such members of the 
judiciary committee, when supplemented by the aid and 
advice of the legal department of the state, are 
liable to result in the production of a better form of 
submission than if the whole responsibility is rested 
upon an administrative officer, with the aid of the 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
30 
 
attorney general alone.  But the question raised in 
the instant case is not one which involves the best 
method, the greatest wisdom, or the most comprehensive 
foresight, but whether the general statutes above 
referred 
to 
were 
adequate 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
constitutional provisions; and this depends entirely 
upon the construction to be placed upon the provision 
of the fundamental law above quoted on the subject of 
amendments.  Had the framers of the constitution 
intended that the legislature should prescribe the 
form, it might easily have done so by using a few 
additional words, or it might have so worded the 
provision that the idea of form would have been 
necessarily included by implication.  This, however, 
was not the case, and it is highly probable that the 
framers had in mind the vital distinction existing 
between matters of substance and matters of mere form.  
Had the legislature in the instant case prescribed the 
form of submission in a manner which would have failed 
to present the real question, or had they by error or 
mistake presented an entirely different question, no 
claim could be made that the proposed amendment would 
have been validly enacted.  In other words, even if 
the form is prescribed by the legislature it must 
reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have 
reference to every essential of the amendment.  This 
demonstrates quite clearly the fact that the form of 
submission is after all a mere form, and that the 
principal and essential criterion consists in the 
submission of a question or a form which has for its 
object and purpose an intelligent and comprehensive 
submission to the people, so that the latter may be 
fully informed on the subject upon which they are 
required to exercise a franchise. 
Id. (emphasis added).     
¶41 Reviewing 
this 
discussion, 
the 
"every 
essential" 
language does not read as a separate test.  Rather, it comes as 
an explanatory statement (phrased as "[i]n other words") for the 
comment that the real question, not an entirely different 
question, must be submitted to the people.  Therefore, an effort 
to infuse constitutional significance into this language is not 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
31 
 
an accurate reading of Ekern on its own terms.  The relevant 
discussion in Ekern simply does not set forth a substantive, 
explainable "every essential" test at all.  And why would it?  
The content of the ballot question was not challenged and was 
not at issue.  There was no need to create, much less apply, a 
new substantive constitutional test.  
¶42 Therefore, we do not understand Ekern as adopting or 
creating a new, undefined, and strict constitutional test for 
detail 
and 
accuracy 
in 
constitutional 
amendment 
ballot 
questions.  Rather, Ekern's discussion is best read as affirming 
the unremarkable proposition that the real question of the 
amendment must be submitted to the people.  This is consistent 
with the constitutional requirement that a proposed amendment 
must be "submitted" in order to be validly ratified.  Where a 
question is not the real question at all, such a proposal cannot 
be said to be submitted to the people.      
¶43 This reading of Ekern animated our decision years 
later in Thomson, 264 Wis. at 659–60.  Thomson concerned 
proposed 
amendments 
related 
to 
legislative 
apportionment.  
Id. at 650-51.  The amendments were challenged on the grounds 
that they should have been submitted as separate amendments——an 
issue we return to later——and that the ballot question was 
contrary to the amendment itself.  Id. at 655, 657.   
¶44 The ballot question in Thomson stated that, if 
approved, "the legislature shall apportion senate districts 
along" 
certain 
municipal 
lines——using 
mandatory 
language.  
Id. at 660.  The problem, we explained, is "the actual 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
32 
 
amendment . . . has no such mandate at all and under it the 
legislature is uncontrolled except that the territory inclosed 
shall be 'contiguous' and 'convenient.'"  Id.  The question 
given to the voters was the opposite of what the amendment 
actually provided.  We concluded the question was misinformation 
and not "in accord with the fact."  Id.  We cited Ekern and 
concluded that the "question as actually submitted did not 
present the real question but by error or mistake presented an 
entirely different one."  Id.  Accordingly, there was "no valid 
submission to or ratification by the people."  Id.  To this day, 
Thomson remains the only case in state history where a 
constitutional amendment was deemed invalid because it was not 
"submitted" to the people.   
¶45 A final case we must address involved the court of 
appeals' efforts to understand these two prior cases, and what 
sort of requirement an "every essential" test is.  The issue in 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee was the validity of a municipal ballot question——not a 
constitutional amendment.  2011 WI App 45, ¶1, 332 Wis. 2d 459, 
798 N.W.2d 287.  One argument raised was whether municipal 
ballot questions under Wis. Stat. § 9.20(6) were subject to the 
"'every essential' element" test.  Id., ¶¶10, 12.  The court of 
appeals answered in the negative.  Id., ¶13.  It began by 
discussing Ekern, and concluded that in context it was not clear 
an every essential standard was even being proposed at all, an 
observation we agree with.  Id., ¶22.  It then read our decision 
in Thomson as adopting the "every essential" language into the 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
33 
 
statutory requirement of a "concise statement"——an issue not 
before us here.14  Id., ¶23.  But, the court noted, Thomson never 
had to apply the "every essential" language in its reasoning 
because of its conclusion the ballot statement was inaccurate.  
Id.  The court of appeals went on to address the municipal 
ballot issue, ultimately concluding the inclusion of "every 
essential" of a proposal was not incorporated into municipal 
ballot questions under the relevant statute.  Id., ¶30. 
2.  Takeaways 
¶46 So what principles of law can we derive from this 
discussion?   
¶47 First, Article XII, Section 1 does not require any 
substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question 
submitted to the people.  No explanation or summary is 
constitutionally commanded.   
¶48 Second, the constitution requires that the amendment 
be "submitted" to the people for ratification.  We held in 
Thomson, borrowing language from Ekern, that an amendment has 
not been "submitted" to the people when the ballot question 
fails to present the real question or is contrary to the 
amendment itself.  Thomson, 264 Wis. 2d at 660.  In other words, 
voters have not been given the opportunity to vote for or 
                                                 
14 We observe that our decision in State ex rel. Thomson v. 
Zimmerman never clarified or discussed the legal foundation for 
an "every essential" analysis.  264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 
(1953).  Therefore, we question whether Thomson held anything 
regarding the statutory "concise statement" requirement. 
No. 
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34 
 
against a proposal when the ballot question is fundamentally 
counterfactual.  When a ballot question is factually inaccurate 
in a fundamental way, it cannot be said that the amendment was 
actually submitted to the people for ratification.  But given 
the unique facts of Thomson and the broad authority given to the 
legislature in the constitution, this requirement is narrow and 
will be triggered only in rare circumstances.   
¶49 Third, this court has never, in a single case, 
developed or applied an "every essential" test for review of 
proposed constitutional amendments.  Nowhere in our two cases 
that use this language have we established, defined, or utilized 
such a test.   
¶50 And finally, because it is our solemn obligation to 
follow the original meaning of the constitution, we will not 
design, invent, or breathe life into the so-called "every 
essential" test without a constitutional command to do so.   
¶51 Insofar as the content of a proposed ballot question 
is concerned, the relevant constitutional question is whether 
the proposed amendment was, at a basic level, submitted to the 
people for ratification.  A ballot question could violate this 
constitutional requirement only in the rare circumstance that 
the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters 
were not asked to approve the actual amendment.  These 
principles in hand, we examine WJI's argument that the ballot 
question at issue here failed to satisfy this constitutional 
requirement. 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
35 
 
3.  Applied Here 
¶52 Once again, the ballot question submitted to voters 
for Marsy's Law stated: 
Additional rights of crime victims.  Shall section 9m 
of article I of the constitution, which gives certain 
rights to crime victims, be amended to give crime 
victims additional rights, to require that the rights 
of crime victims be protected with equal force to the 
protections afforded the accused while leaving the 
federal constitutional rights of the accused intact, 
and to allow crime victims to enforce their rights in 
court? 
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3.  WJI raises several objections 
to this question.   
¶53 First, WJI argues that the ballot question fails 
because it does not mention the new section creating a 
constitutional definition of a "victim."  In an amendment of 
this length and complexity, the legislature had to make choices 
of what to include and how to phrase it.  We must give 
significant deference to the legislature in making these choices 
because the constitution affords the legislature substantial 
discretion in submitting an amendment to the people.  While the 
legislature could have decided that more be said, WJI's legal 
argument 
depends 
on 
its 
erroneous 
contention 
that 
the 
constitution demands a more exacting review of the legislature's 
choices.  It does not.  A constitutional definition of "victim" 
fits comfortably within the statement that crime victims are 
given certain or additional rights, as the ballot question 
states.  Nothing here is fundamentally counterfactual such that 
voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.   
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
36 
 
¶54 Second, WJI contends the ballot question failed to 
correctly capture how the rights of the accused would change.  
It offers several arguments in this regard.  WJI asserts the 
ballot question is misleading because it requires "that the 
rights of crime victims will be protected with equal force to 
the protections afforded the accused," while the text of the 
amendment says victim rights will "be protected by law in a 
manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the 
accused."  2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3 (emphasis added); 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2) (emphasis added).  While the parties 
debate the import of this wording choice, we again emphasize the 
deference owed to the legislature in explaining the proposal to 
the people.  Minor deficiencies in a summary (and all summaries 
will, by necessity, be incomplete) do not give rise to the kind 
of bait-and-switch we struck down in Thomson.  This does not 
rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question 
such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.     
¶55 WJI additionally suggests the ballot question is 
misleading because the amendment reduces the rights of the 
accused.  Prior to Marsy's Law, Article I, Section 9m stated, 
"Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to 
this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be 
provided by law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m (2017).  Marsy's Law 
struck this sentence and added:  "This section is not intended 
and may not be interpreted to supersede a defendant's federal 
constitutional rights or to afford party status in a proceeding 
to any victim."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(6); 2019 Enrolled 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
37 
 
Joint Resolution 3, §§ 1, 5.  WJI says the ballot question was 
misleading because this change in its view could reduce the 
rights of the accused in some situations, yet voters were told 
"the federal constitutional rights of the accused" would be left 
intact.  We once again return to the relevant question:  the 
issue is not whether the amendment was explained, but whether it 
was "submitted" to the people.  Nothing in the constitution 
requires that all components be presented in the ballot 
question.  The constitution leaves the level of detail required 
to the legislature, which may impose more or less requirements 
on itself.  The failure to raise an issue in a summary or 
describe it with precision does not amount to the kind of 
wholesale inaccuracy of Thomson or suggest the amendment was not 
submitted to the people.  This as well does not rise to the 
level of a fundamentally counterfactual question such that 
voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.     
¶56 Finally, WJI contends the ballot question is infirm 
for failing to inform the people that victims can now obtain 
review of adverse decisions by filing a supervisory writ in this 
court or the court of appeals.  See Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9m(4)(b); 2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3, § 3.  We leave the 
substantive impact of this change for another day.  But WJI's 
argument again depends on the constitution requiring a level of 
completeness in a proposed question that simply isn't there.  
The right to file a supervisory writ is certainly encompassed by 
the ballot question's statement that crime victims will be given 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
38 
 
certain rights.  Nothing about its absence renders the ballot 
question even arguably inaccurate.   
¶57 For these reasons, the challenges to the form of the 
ballot question presented to the people of Wisconsin do not 
succeed.  The question approved by voters was not fundamentally 
counterfactual in any way.  The proposed amendment was submitted 
to the people for ratification, and as far as the challenge 
before us today is concerned, that is all the constitution 
requires.   
C.  Multiple Amendments 
¶58 Finally, WJI argues that the amendment should have 
been submitted as multiple amendments, rather than one.  The 
relevant constitutional text governing this claim is also found 
in Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  It 
states, "if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be 
submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against 
such amendments separately."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1. 
¶59 The text, plainly read, creates a straightforward 
requirement:  multiple amendments must be submitted separately.  
The question then becomes, what constitutes more than one 
amendment? 
¶60 Unlike the other claims in this case, this issue is 
one the court has addressed on several occasions.  Our first 
consideration of the multiple amendments question in Article 
XII, Section 1 occurred in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54 
Wis. 318, 335, 11 N.W. 785 (1882).  There, we carefully 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
39 
 
considered the text and relevant history to determine the 
original understanding of this provision.15  Id. at 335-38. 
¶61 Focusing on the language, we explained that there 
could be only two constructions of this sentence.  Id. at 335.  
"First, it may be construed . . . that every proposition in the 
shape of an amendment to the constitution, which standing alone 
changes or abolishes any of its present provisions, or adds any 
new provision thereto, shall be so drawn that it can be 
submitted separately, and must be so submitted."  Id.  Such a 
reading did not make sense, however.  Id.  It would "be so 
narrow as to render it practically impossible to amend the 
constitution."  Id.  
¶62 Instead, we adopted the second construction, and 
concluded that the relevant language must mean that only 
"amendments which have different objects and purposes in view" 
must be submitted separately.  Id. at 336.  We explained, "In 
order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions 
submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at 
least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or 
connected with each other."  Id.  The court then confirmed this 
reading by considering the process utilized in the adoption of 
earlier amendments.  Id. at 337-38.  It concluded that its 
                                                 
15 The court in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme did not use the 
terminology of originalism to explain its analysis, but that is 
what it did.  54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785 (1882).  The court began 
with the text, and then proceeded to consider the history to 
determine how the language was understood when drafted.  Id. at 
335-38.     
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
40 
 
reading of the text was the understanding of nearly everyone 
when earlier amendments were submitted to the people, without 
objection.  Id. at 338.   
¶63 We 
therefore 
held 
that 
the 
multiple 
amendment 
requirement "must be construed to mean amendments which have 
different objects and purposes in view."  Id. at 336.  And in 
"order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions 
submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at 
least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or 
connected with each other."  Id.  Our test has remained 
substantially the same since.  See, e.g., Thomson, 264 Wis. at 
656 (concluding "that a separate submission was required of the 
amendment" because it failed to satisfy Hudd's test). 
¶64 Our most recent formulation of the test was in 
McConkey, a case challenging the adoption of Article XIII, 
Section 13, governing marriage.  326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶1.  There, we 
articulated the test as follows: 
It is within the discretion of the legislature to 
submit several distinct propositions as one amendment 
if they relate to the same subject matter and are 
designed to accomplish one general purpose.  The 
general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from 
the text of the amendment itself and from the 
historical context in which the amendment was adopted.  
And all of the propositions must tend to effect or 
carry out that purpose. 
Id., ¶50 (cleaned up).  Applying this test, we concluded a 
single amendment was appropriate because "the general purpose of 
the marriage amendment is to preserve the legal status of 
marriage in Wisconsin as between one man and one woman.  Both 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
41 
 
propositions in the marriage amendment relate to and are 
connected with this purpose."  Id., ¶56. 
¶65 The parties do not dispute that this is the governing 
test.  And we see no reason to question the textual and 
historical analysis done by Hudd and its progeny.  Employing 
this test, we have no difficulty concluding Marsy's Law did not 
violate the constitutional prohibition on submitting multiple 
amendments as one.  The amendment broadly protects and expands 
crime victims' rights.  This is plain from the text and history 
of its adoption.  In so doing, it amends only Section 9m of 
Article I.  Even if WJI is correct that it will impact those 
accused of crimes as well (an issue we need not decide), all of 
the changes relate to the same, general purpose of expanding and 
protecting the rights of crime victims.  All of the propositions 
are aimed at this goal, and tend to effect or carry this out.  
We hold that WJI's challenge to Marsy's Law on the ground that 
it was required to be submitted as separate constitutional 
amendments fails.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 Through the Wisconsin Constitution, the people of 
Wisconsin 
have 
given 
the 
legislature 
broad 
authority 
to 
determine 
how 
proposed 
constitutional 
amendments 
may 
be 
submitted to the people for ratification.  WJI argues that the 
ballot question for Marsy's Law was constitutionally deficient 
under Article XII, Section 1 on multiple grounds.  We disagree.  
We conclude that the ballot question was not fundamentally 
No. 
2020AP2003   
 
42 
 
counterfactual 
such 
that 
voters 
were 
not 
afforded 
the 
opportunity to approve the actual amendment.  Rather, Marsy's 
Law was validly submitted to and ratified by the people of 
Wisconsin, as the constitution requires.  WJI further argues 
Marsy's Law should have been split into more than one amendment, 
each receiving a separate vote.  However, the constitution did 
not require that here.  We conclude the amendment had the single 
general purpose of expanding and protecting victims' rights, and 
all provisions of the proposed amendment furthered this purpose.  
For these reasons, WJI's constitutional challenges to the 
ratification of Marsy's Law do not succeed, and we reverse the 
circuit court's judgment to the contrary. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is reversed. 
 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶67 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   
If the judicial power extended to every question under 
the [C]onstitution it would involve almost every 
subject 
proper 
for 
legislative 
discussion 
and 
decision . . . .  The division of power . . . could 
exist no longer, and the other departments would be 
swallowed up by the judiciary. 
John Marshall, Speech (Mar. 7, 1800), reprinted in 4 The Papers 
of John Marshall 82, 95 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984). 
 
¶68 Not every constitutional question falls under the 
authority of the judiciary to answer:  "Sometimes, . . . 'the 
law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining 
[a] claim of unlawfulness——because the question is entrusted to 
one of the political branches or involves no judicially 
enforceable rights.'"  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 
87, ¶40, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (quoting Rucho v. 
Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019)) 
(ellipsis and modification in the original).  "The judiciary 
should not be drawn into deciding issues that are essentially 
political in nature, exclusively committed by the constitution 
to another branch of government and not susceptible to judicial 
management or resolution."  Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶192, 
236 
Wis. 2d 588, 
614 
N.W.2d 388 
(Sykes, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting). 
 
¶69 I join the majority opinion and write separately to 
explain why the "every essential" test is incompatible with the 
political question doctrine.  As the majority holds, whether a 
ballot question states "every essential" of a proposed amendment 
is non-cognizable.  Nevertheless, three justices cast themselves 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
2 
 
as legal writing professors with the power to grade the 
legislature's work.  Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet, joined by 
Justice Jill J. Karofsky, writes in concurrence to give the 
legislature's work a passing grade, while Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley, in dissent, gives the legislature an F.  This court 
lacks the authority these justices would usurp from the 
legislature.  Cf. Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶45 ("Nothing in the 
Wisconsin Constitution authorizes this court to recast itself as 
a redistricting commission[.]").   
 
¶70 The "every essential" test is incompatible with the 
political question doctrine for at least two reasons.  First, 
Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution assigns the 
legislature, not the judiciary, the power to determine the 
manner by which a proposed amendment is submitted to the people.  
See id. ¶51 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
It states, in relevant part: 
[I]t shall be the duty of the legislature to submit 
such proposed amendment . . . to the people in such 
manner and at such time as the legislature shall 
prescribe; . . . provided, 
that 
if 
more 
than 
one 
amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in 
such manner that the people may vote for or against 
such amendments separately.[1]   
Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  Self-evidently, while this provision 
requires the legislature to submit a proposed amendment to the 
people, it also gives the legislature, not the judiciary, the 
                                                 
1 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
posted 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Historical Society's website places a period before "provided" 
and capitalizes the P.  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 1 (1848), 
https://content.wisconsinhistory.org/digital/collection/tp/id/71
791. 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
3 
 
power to determine how that submission occurs.  The constitution 
imposes 
only 
one 
textually-expressed 
limitation 
on 
the 
legislature's power to determine the manner of submission:  "if 
more than one amendment be submitted," the people must be able 
to vote on each separately.  Id.  The judiciary does not have 
the authority to compel the legislature to exercise its power 
over the manner of submission in a particular way.  As explained 
more thoroughly below, this court possesses the power to 
determine whether a proposed amendment was even submitted to the 
people, but such a claim is distinguishable from a complaint 
about an unartful manner of submission.   
 
¶71 This case accordingly presents a separation of powers 
issue.  As one amicus curiae explains, "[i]f affirmed, the 
circuit court's decision could force the [l]egislature to use 
new language that no longer expresses the [l]egislature's 
desired meaning. . . .  [T]he [l]egislature presumptively chose 
those words for a reason[.]"  Challenges to the manner of 
submission are therefore "beyond the purview of judicial review" 
because they present purely political questions.   
 
¶72 The desire of Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Dallet, and 
Karofsky to entertain these political questions would likely 
spawn "defensive" ballot question drafting.  Cf. Brief for the 
Wisconsin Legislature as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 
(No. 2019AP1376-OA), 2020 WL 811784 *1 ("Governors of this 
[s]tate have regularly misused their claimed veto power to 
rewrite appropriation laws, striking out sentence fragments to 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
4 
 
create new provisions that the [l]egislature did not enact.  To 
combat this gubernatorial lawmaking, the [l]egislature drafts 
legislation defensively, removing descriptive language that the 
[g]overnor could turn into operative text, revising language 
that would contribute to the clarity of law, changing every 'may 
not' to 'cannot,' and so on.").  The legislature could, for 
example, quote the proposed amendment verbatim on the ballot, 
perhaps 
satisfying 
the 
values-based 
concerns 
of 
the 
aforementioned justices.  The Wisconsin Constitution, however, 
does not impose such a cumbersome requirement. 
 
¶73 Second, 
the 
"every 
essential" 
test 
is 
not 
a 
"manageable standard[]" by which the judiciary could objectively 
evaluate 
the 
manner 
of 
submission. 
 
See 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶39.  The judicial power vested in this court by 
Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, like the 
judicial power vested in the United States Supreme Court, "is 
the power to act in the manner traditional for English and 
American courts.  One of the most obvious limitations imposed by 
that requirement is that judicial action must be governed by 
standard, by rule."  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 
(2004) 
(plurality). 
 
These 
standards 
and 
rules 
must 
be 
"'principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions' 
found in the . . . law[]."  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).  Otherwise, "intervening courts——even 
when proceeding with best intentions——would risk assuming 
political, not legal, responsibility[.]"  Id. 2498–99 (quoting 
Vieth, 
541 
U.S. at 
307 
(Kennedy, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
the 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
5 
 
judgment)).  Whether a particular characteristic of a proposed 
amendment is "essential" sounds a lot like the "I know it when I 
see it" test.  See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  The judiciary, however, must make 
decisions based on reason, not instinct. 
¶74 The lack of manageability can be gleaned by comparing 
and contrasting Justice Dallet's concurrence to the dissent.  
Justice Dallet states: 
I 
conclude 
that 
a 
ballot 
description, 
if 
the 
legislature chooses to provide one, must accurately 
summarize 
the 
significant 
changes 
the 
proposed 
amendment would make to the [Wisconsin] Constitution. 
. . . . 
In this case, the legislature's summary was sufficient 
and . . . [the proposed amendment] was thus validly 
submitted to the people.  Although . . . [the proposed 
amendment's challengers] point[] to some of the 
amendment's 
particulars 
that 
weren't 
described 
specifically in the ballot language, . . . a summary 
always leaves some details out.  The legislature's 
description 
of . . . [the 
proposed 
amendment] 
is 
accurate, and the expanded definition of "victim," and 
arguable changes to the state constitutional rights of 
the accused and this court's jurisdiction weren't so 
significant that they needed to be described on the 
ballot. 
Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶¶133, 135.  At no point does 
Justice Dallet explain why an "expanded definition of 'victim'" 
is not "so significant."  She also does not explain why 
"arguable changes to the state constitutional rights of the 
accused and this court's jurisdiction" are not "so significant."  
Her analysis is conclusory, and a reasonable person could 
certainly consider such changes to be significant.     
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
6 
 
 
¶75 Recognizing the inherent vagueness of the "every 
essential" test, Justice Dallet "acknowledge[s] . . . that this 
rule doesn't always provide clear answers."  Id., ¶134.  In 
actuality, the "every essential" test is incapable of providing 
any answers whatsoever.  The test is based purely on subjective 
perception, not objective rule.  As Justice Dallet reasons, 
"[b]ecause a summary . . . will always be incomplete and isn't 
meant to take the place of the text of a proposed amendment, 
judgment will always be required.  But that is okay.  We trust 
judges to make judgment calls all the time[.]"  Id.  Her view 
invites judicial overreach because it is based on the rule of 
judges rather than the rule of law.   
¶76 Embracing a standardless test would empower a single 
circuit court judge in a single county to toss the results of a 
statewide 
election 
based 
on 
little 
more 
than 
subjective 
predilections.  This court would become the final arbiter of 
every proposed constitutional amendment, without any express 
grant 
of 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
second 
guess 
the 
legislature's work.  As the majority notes, only once in 
Wisconsin's 175-year history has this court declared a proposed 
amendment was not ratified based on a challenge to the wording 
of a ballot question——despite the Wisconsin Constitution having 
been amended nearly 150 times.  Majority op., ¶¶1, 5 (citing 
State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 
(1953)). 
 
¶77 Justice Dallet is also wrong to suggest her approach 
is "the only way to preserve both the legislature's authority to 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
7 
 
specify the manner in which amendments are to be submitted to 
the people and the right of the people to decide whether to 
change 
the 
[Wisconsin] 
Constitution." 
 
Justice 
Dallet's 
Concurrence, ¶134.  Several steps must be followed before a 
proposed amendment even becomes a ballot question, and the 
people maintain control over the process at every step.  Article 
XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution specifies the 
amendment procedure.  As relevant to this case, "a majority of 
the members elected to each of the two houses [of the 
legislature]" must vote in favor of a proposed amendment.  Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
XII, 
§ 1. 
 
Thereafter, 
"such 
proposed 
amendment . . . shall be entered on their journals, with the 
yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature to 
be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published 
for three months previous to the time of holding such 
election[.]"  Id.  In the next legislative session, which occurs 
after a legislative election, "a majority of all members elected 
to each house" must vote in favor of the proposed amendment.  
Id.  The legislature then has a "duty" to "submit" the proposed 
amendment to the people, although the legislature has the power 
to "prescribe" the "manner" and "time" of submission.  Id.  If a 
majority of people who vote on whether to adopt the proposed 
amendment approve its adoption, the amendment is ratified.  Id.  
An early treatise on the Wisconsin Constitution explains this 
"gauntlet" decreases the chance "that a very unwise measure" 
could succeed.  
See A.O. Wright, 
An Exposition of the 
Constitution of the State of Wisconsin 153 (Revised & Improved 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
8 
 
ed. 1897).  "Ample opportunity is . . . given for discussion[.]"  
Id.  The people, without judicial intervention, can "preserve" 
their popular sovereignty. 
 
¶78 Similar to Justice Dallet, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
never defines an "essential," instead concluding "[b]y any 
definition of the word" the ballot question in this case was 
legally inadequate.  Dissent, ¶185.  The definition, however, 
matters a great deal, largely because the difficulty in defining 
the word demonstrates that judges should not be defining it in 
the first place.   
 
¶79 Illustrating the problem, the dissent declares, "I do 
not argue . . . that all components of an amendment [need] be 
presented in a ballot question.  Our precedent establishes, and 
I would maintain, only that 'every essential' is required."  
Id., ¶187.  Nothing in this judicially conceived test tells us 
how to distinguish between a mere "component" of a proposed 
amendment 
and 
an 
"essential." 
 
Nor 
does 
the 
dissent.  
Regardless, as the majority opinion explains, "our precedent" 
requires no such thing.  In its certification of this appeal, 
the court of appeals noted, "there is little case law examining 
the 'every essential' test . . . and, in fact, no case law 
applying this test to a given ballot question."  Wis. Just. 
Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2020AP2003, 
unpublished certification, at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2021).  
The majority explains the suspect origins of the "every 
essential" test in a nuanced, scholarly manner; in contrast, the 
dissent simply takes one sentence from a century-old case out of 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
9 
 
context and runs with it.  "[I]t is tempting for a creative 
court to reach a decision by extorting from precedents something 
which they do not contain.  Once embarked on this path, it is 
too easy for the court to extend [its] precedents, which were 
themselves the extensions of others, till, by this accommodating 
principle, a whole system of law is built up without the 
authority or interference of the [people]."  Bartlett, 393 
Wis. 2d 172, 
¶202 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting) 
(modifications in the original) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
¶80  Unlike the "every essential" test, the counterfactual 
test this court adopts is consistent with the text of Article 
XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and is justiciable.  
While the legislature has the power to decide the manner by 
which a proposed amendment is submitted to the people, the 
legislature 
has 
the 
"duty . . . to 
submit 
such 
proposed 
amendment[.]"  See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  That duty is not 
fulfilled when the ballot question misidentifies the proposed 
amendment with counterfactual information.  A challenge alleging 
the presence of counterfactual information takes issue not with 
the "manner" of submission but with whether submission even 
occurred.  See id.  Applying the counterfactual test therefore 
does not usurp the legislature's authority but rather ensures 
the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional duty. 
 
¶81 The reasoning underlying Justice Dallet's defense of 
the "every essential" test is difficult to discern and seemingly 
contradictory.  For example, she states:  "whether an amendment 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
10 
 
was submitted to the people always requires courts to analyze 
whether the manner the legislature prescribed for submission 
satisfied that constitutional requirement."  Justice Dallet's 
Concurrence, ¶134 n.9.  Justice Dallet seems to concede she is 
in fact proposing judicial review of the manner of submission.  
She fails to appreciate the fundamental distinction between what 
the legislature submitted to the people and how the legislature 
made a submission.  In conflating the two, Justice Dallet shows 
little 
respect 
for 
the 
constitutional 
prerogatives 
of 
a 
coordinate branch. 
 
¶82 The counterfactual test is straightforward and capable 
of judicial review:  Did the ballot question contain clearly 
false information?  Whether a statement is true or false is 
simply a factual determination, and while factual determinations 
are not always easy, they do not turn on personal beliefs.  A 
factual determination is difficult only to the extent that 
evidence is lacking or conflicting.  In contrast, the "every 
essential" test is largely indeterminate, even if the evidence 
is clear, precisely because it requires a judge to form a 
political opinion. 
 
¶83 Justice Dallet responds that "the majority's approach 
also 
requires 
judgment 
to 
determine 
what 
questions 
are 
'fundamentally counterfactual.'"  Id., ¶134 (quoting majority 
op., ¶51).  She continues, "[a]s the use of the word 
'fundamentally' implies, superficially counterfactual ballot 
questions would pass the majority's test.  But the majority 
offers no principled way of distinguishing between superficially 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
11 
 
counterfactual 
and 
'fundamentally' 
counterfactual 
ballot 
questions."  Id.   
 
¶84 As a preliminary matter, Justice Dallet misunderstands 
the 
word 
"fundamentally." 
 
The 
word 
merely 
signals 
a 
presumption:  if a judge is unsure whether information in a 
ballot question is counterfactual, the judge should assume it is 
not. 
 
This 
presumption 
respects 
the 
power 
the 
people 
constitutionally conferred on the legislature and minimizes 
indeterminacy.  As well as Justice Dallet's argument can be 
understood, she seems to suggest that because the counterfactual 
test has, as most legal tests do, a degree of indeterminacy when 
the facts are unclear, any objection to the "every essential" 
test grounded in that test's indeterminacy is equally applicable 
to the counterfactual test.  Not so.   
 
¶85 Justice Dallet commits the "fallacy of the beard."  In 
the classic book Straight and Crooked Thinking, the author 
explained: 
[W]e may deny the reality of difference because there 
is continuous variation between the different things.  
A very old example illustrates this error.  One may 
throw doubt on the reality of a beard by a process 
beginning by asking whether a man with one hair on his 
chin has a beard.  The answer is clearly "No."  Then 
one may ask whether with two hairs on his chin a man 
has a beard.  Again the answer must be "No."  So again 
with "three," "four," etc.  At no point can our 
opponent say "Yes," for if he has answered "No" for, 
let us say, twenty-nine hairs and "Yes" for thirty, it 
is easy to pour scorn on the suggestion that the 
difference between twenty-nine and thirty hairs is the 
difference between not having and having a beard.  Yet 
by this process of adding one hair at a time, we can 
reach a number of hairs which would undoubtedly make 
up a beard.  The trouble lies in the fact that the 
difference between a beard and no beard is like the 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
12 
 
difference between white and gray in the fact that one 
can pass by continuous steps from one to the other. 
In this argument, the fact of continuous variation has 
been used to undermine the reality of the difference.  
Because there is no sharp dividing line, it has been 
suggested that there is no difference.  This is 
clearly a piece of crooked argument[.] 
Robert H. Thouless, Straight and Crooked Thinking 169–70 (2d 
prtg. 1932).  Justice Dallet suggests that determining whether a 
test is objective is itself a subjective determination and 
therefore cannot be done properly.  Obviously, subjectivity and 
objectivity exist on a spectrum, just like the colors white and 
grey.  Just as a reasonable person can look at a color and 
determine whether it is white or grey, a reasonable person can 
look at a legal test and determine whether it is subjective or 
objective.  No one can seriously question the objectivity of the 
counterfactual test, even if it may be difficult to apply in 
some cases (although not in this one), or the subjectivity of 
the "every essential" test.  The former is indeterminate only to 
the extent a factual determination is impossible, but the latter 
is indeterminate even when the facts are undisputed.  Notably, 
Justice Dallet never argues the "every essential" test will 
constrain judges acting in good faith to the same extent as the 
counterfactual test. 
 
¶86 Justice 
Dallet 
mischaracterizes 
my 
view 
of 
the 
counterfactual 
test 
as 
"somehow 
free 
from 
subjectivity."  
Justice Dallet's Concurrence, ¶134 n.10.  Justice Dallet 
struggles to understand that the attributes of perfectly 
subjective and perfectly objective are opposite ends of a 
continuum.  A test can be deemed subjective or objective without 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
13 
 
being perfectly so.  The counterfactual test is not perfectly 
objective, nor is recognizing that a man has a beard. 
¶87 Unlike the "every essential" test endorsed by three 
justices, the counterfactual test safeguards democracy by 
preserving the prerogatives of the people's representatives in 
the legislature to decide political questions.  Three justices 
would 
instead 
supplant 
the 
legislature's 
constitutionally 
assigned role, arrogate the power to set aside the not-
particularly-close results of a lawfully-conducted election, and 
embrace a judicially invented test never before applied in the 
history of Wisconsin.  None of these justices defines with any 
particularity the test they propose to determine whether such an 
undemocratic remedy is warranted, much less identify the source 
of their authority to impose it.  Without elaboration on the 
"every essential" test, judges are licensed to inject their 
political will into the analysis, potentially substituting their 
will for the will of the people. 
¶88 Ironically, 
these 
justices 
suggest 
that 
if 
the 
judiciary is denied the power to discard election results at 
will, democracy will suffer.  Their concerns arise from both a 
misunderstanding of the constitutional purpose of a ballot 
question and a distrust of voters.  For example, the dissent 
complains, "[t]hose voters who do not research a proposed 
amendment beforehand will see the ballot question and only the 
ballot question prior to casting their votes."  Dissent, ¶189.  
The constitutional purpose of a ballot question, however, is not 
to educate voters.  As indicated by the historical analysis 
No.  2020AP2003.rgb 
 
14 
 
discussed in the majority opinion, a ballot question merely 
identifies the particular proposed amendment the voters will 
decide to ratify——or not.  Second, as the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission 
explains, 
"[v]oters 
are 
expected 
to 
review . . . election notices and apprise themselves of public 
debate, and educate themselves on the substance and implications 
of a proposed amendment."  (Citation omitted.)  By analogy, a 
ballot for President of the United States does not describe the 
candidates or their platforms.  Voters are trusted to inform 
themselves. 
¶89 Alexis 
de 
Tocqueville 
observed, 
"[s]carcely 
any 
political question arises in the United States which is not 
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."  1 Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 357 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., 1863).  If true, government by the people 
would be replaced with judicial supremacy.  Because this court 
rightly refuses to entertain political questions in this case, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this concurrence. 
 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶91 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that Marsy's Law was validly adopted because the 
amendment complied with Article XII, Section 1's requirements 
that proposed constitutional amendments be "submit[ted] to the 
people" and not contain "more than one amendment."1  See Wis. 
Const. art. XII, § 1.  Evaluating whether Marsy's Law was 
submitted to the people requires us to balance two competing 
interests reflected in Article XII, Section 1:  (1) the 
legislature's authority to specify the time and manner in which 
amendments are to be submitted, and (2) the people's right to 
evaluate and vote on proposed constitutional amendments.  Doing 
so leads to the conclusion that Marsy's Law was submitted to the 
people because the summary of the amendment that appeared on the 
ballot 
accurately 
summarized 
the 
significant 
changes 
the 
amendment would make to the constitution.   
¶92 The 
majority 
uses 
a 
similar 
interest-balancing 
approach, but arrives at a rule that is too narrow.  And it does 
so only after a ten page digression extolling the virtues of 
originalism, which it then tacitly abandons as futile.  Because 
I reject both originalism and the majority's narrow conception 
of what it means for a proposed amendment to be submitted to the 
people, I respectfully concur.   
                                                 
1 Because I agree with the majority that WJI's second claim 
should be rejected based on our longstanding precedent about 
multiple amendments, I join ¶¶58-59 and 61-65 of the majority 
opinion.   
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
2 
 
I 
 
¶93 The majority begins by reviewing what it claims to be 
"our approach to constitutional interpretation," an approach it 
says seeks "to determine what the constitutional text meant when 
it was written, commonly called the original public meaning or 
original understanding."  See majority op., ¶¶14, 21.  According 
to the majority, we have "commonly recited" and "consistently 
described" this as our approach over "many years."   See id., 
¶22.  Thus, according to the majority, our singular approach to 
constitutional interpretation is originalism and we must follow 
it, no matter where it leads.  See id. ¶¶21-28 (collecting 
cases).   
¶94 I disagree with these conclusions for three reasons.  
First, the majority's claim that originalism is somehow our 
settled approach to constitutional interpretation is incorrect.  
In fact, many of our recent cases use a more inclusive approach 
to constitutional interpretation that considers more than merely 
text and history.  Second, the majority's two defenses of 
originalism——(1) that originalism is simply how we interpret any 
written law, and (2) that originalism constrains judges to their 
proper role by providing a basis for decisions different than a 
judge's personal views——are both unconvincing.  In my view, a 
more pluralistic method is needed to interpret faithfully the 
Wisconsin Constitution (or the United States Constitution for 
that matter).  Under such an approach text and history of course 
matter, but so do precedent, context, historical practice and 
tradition.  And third, an earlier court's choice of an 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
3 
 
interpretive methodology like originalism does not bind later 
courts to use that same methodology.   
A 
 
¶95 Before addressing the majority's unconvincing defenses 
of originalism and my competing view of how to interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution, it's useful first to lay out what the 
majority means by "originalism," why it is wrong to claim that 
originalism 
is 
our 
consistent 
approach 
to 
constitutional 
interpretation, and its arguments for why originalism is 
required.    
 
¶96 There 
are 
a 
number 
of 
different 
variations 
on 
originalism, 
but 
all 
spring 
from 
"the 
following 
three 
propositions: (1) the meaning of the constitutional text is 
fixed at the time of ratification; (2) judges should give that 
meaning a primary role in constitutional interpretation; and (3) 
pragmatic modern concerns and consequences are not allowed to 
trump discoverable original meaning."  See Eric J. Segall, 
Originalism As Faith 8 (2018).  The majority agrees with each of 
these propositions.  It says that "our solemn duty in 
constitutional interpretation is to faithfully discern and apply 
the constitution as it is written."  See majority op., ¶28.  To 
do that, the majority explains we must identify the "original 
public meaning or original understanding" of the constitutional 
provision we are interpreting, and apply that original public 
meaning no matter the consequences.  See id., ¶21.  In this 
respect, the majority agrees with most contemporary academic and 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
4 
 
judicial originalists who, in a break from their predecessors,2 
also focus on identifying and applying the original public 
meaning.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856 (1989).  And although the 
majority acknowledges that we have not always done so, it argues 
that our cases have "consistently described our task as one 
focused on the meaning of the text," and have recently "doubled 
down on" an approach focused on the original public meaning.  
See majority op., ¶¶22-23.   
 
¶97 This claim, however, is incorrect.  In fact, in a 
number of recent cases the court has taken a more pluralistic 
approach to constitutional interpretation that takes into 
account more than just text and history.  See Becker v. Dane 
County, 2022 WI 63, ¶33, 403 Wis. 2d 424, 977 N.W.2d 390 (lead 
op.) (rejecting plaintiffs' invitation to revisit our case law 
regarding the separation of powers to fit better with their 
account of the original public meaning); State v. Roundtree, 
2021 WI 1, ¶¶20-52, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (analyzing 
the text and history of the Second Amendment along with 
precedent and empirical evidence about the risks underlying the 
prohibition on felons possessing firearms); Miller v. Carroll, 
                                                 
2 Earlier originalists tended to focus on the intent of the 
framers.  See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1971).  But this 
approach was abandoned in the face of "serious problems" 
identifying whose views counted, and how to discern intent when 
the framers' views differed.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse Than 
Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalism 17 (2022) (noting, 
for 
example, 
James 
Madison's 
and 
Alexander 
Hamilton's 
disagreements about the authority of Congress and the executive 
branch).   
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
5 
 
2020 WI 56, ¶¶21-35, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (applying 
United States Supreme Court precedent to conclude that a judge's 
acceptance of a Facebook friend request created a "serious risk 
of actual bias" that violated a litigant's Due Process rights); 
State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶60-63, 75-83, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899 (refusing to interpret Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in lockstep with the Fifth Amendment 
based on the need to deter intentional Miranda3 violations).  And 
these decisions and others like them were criticized by some 
justices as non-originalist, or at least not sufficiently 
originalist.  See, e.g., Becker, 403 Wis. 2d 424, ¶76 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (contending that the original 
public meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution contradicted the 
lead opinion and the concurrence's interpretation); Roundtree, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, at ¶67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that "the majority contravenes the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment"); State v. Christen, 2021 WI 
39, 
¶65, 
396 
Wis. 2d 705, 
958 
N.W.2d 746 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring) 
(criticizing 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
as 
"insufficiently rooted in the original public meaning of the 
Second Amendment"); State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶45, 395 
Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (arguing 
that Knapp is "non-textual" and "ahistorical"); Miller, 392 
Wis. 2d 49, ¶104 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision 
continues the march away from the original public meaning of our 
Constitution."). 
 
Thus, 
the 
majority 
cannot 
claim 
that 
                                                 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
6 
 
originalism is somehow our consensus approach to constitutional 
interpretation.     
 
¶98 Setting 
aside 
its 
claim 
that 
originalist 
interpretation is our dominant approach, the majority offers a 
simple account for why we should embrace its particular brand of 
originalism.  The argument goes like this:  We have only the 
judicial power, "the power to interpret the law in appropriate 
cases."  See majority op., ¶18.  And that power is limited to 
applying the law as it exists, not as we might want it to be.  
See id.  Since the Wisconsin Constitution is written law, it 
should be interpreted in the same way as other written law, "as 
we find it."  Id., ¶20.  The way you do that is by trying to 
ascertain the constitution's meaning from the text, reading it 
reasonably, in context, in the way in which it would have been 
understood by people when it was written.  Id., ¶21.  That is 
what we have done in the past, see id., ¶¶22-26, and that is 
what we should continue to do in order to ensure that we "leave 
policy choices to the people."  Id., ¶21.    
 
¶99 In sum, the majority's defense of originalism rests on 
two related arguments.  First, originalism is simply what we do 
whenever we read any text; we look at the words, figure out what 
they meant to people at the time they were written, and apply 
that meaning.  And second, originalism helps separate judicial 
decisions from the policy views of individual judges and keeps 
the authority to change the constitution where it belongs, with 
the people acting through their elected representatives.   
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
7 
 
B 
 
¶100 Both of the majority's arguments for originalism are 
unconvincing.  Its argument that originalism flows directly from 
the fact that our constitutions are written is circular and thus 
doesn't support its conclusion.  And the argument about 
constraining judges fails because originalism does not, and 
cannot, accomplish that goal.   
1 
 
¶101 "Our constitutions——state and federal——are written 
documents," and according to the majority they "should be read 
as such."  Majority op., ¶16.  In the majority's view, that 
means we must "ascertain and enforce the rights and protections 
that are already there, fixed by the people in the text of the 
constitution."  Id. ¶18.  In short, the Wisconsin Constitution 
was written down, and because it was written down, we have to 
look for its original public meaning because that's just what it 
means to interpret written law.  See id.   
 
¶102 Although this argument is somewhat common4 it suffers 
from a fatal flaw:  it assumes its own conclusion.  It simply 
defines 
"interpretation" 
as 
"synonymous 
with 
originalist 
interpretation" and then uses that definition as evidence that 
only originalist interpretation is permissible.  Andrew B. Coan, 
                                                 
4 Indeed, many scholars have asserted that "'our commitment 
to a written constitution' entails not only judicial review but 
also an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation."  
Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (2010) (quoting 
source). 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
8 
 
The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 
158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1030 (2010); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Worse Than Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of 
Originalism 26 (2022) ("[A]rguments from definition aren't 
arguments at all; they do not defend their conclusion but assume 
it.").  The normative question of how we should interpret the 
constitution thus remains unanswered.   
 
¶103 The majority's only response is to complain that "one 
wonders why we bother with a written constitution at all."  See 
majority op., ¶28 n.9.  But there are all kinds of reasons why——
and none of them require us to be originalists.  "For example, 
one might be committed to a written constitution as a focal 
point for legal coordination in the manner of the rules of the 
road; as a flexible framework for common law elaboration; as a 
locus of normative discourse in a flourishing constitutional 
culture; or as one of many legitimate ingredients in a 
pluralistic practice of constitutional adjudication."  Coan, 
supra at 1047.  Each of these approaches honors and gives effect 
to constitutional text.  And the fact is, neither the United 
States nor the Wisconsin constitutions tell us which one we 
should choose.  See Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That 
Interpretation Just Is, 30 Const. Commentary 193, 211-12 (2015).  
(explaining that the Constitution does not "set out the rules 
for its own interpretation.").   
¶104 In making that choice, it's important to remember that 
"[t]he meaning of the Constitution must be made rather than 
found, not in the grand (and preposterous) sense that it is 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
9 
 
entirely up for grabs, but in the more mundane sense that it 
must be settled by an account of interpretation that it does not 
itself contain."  Id. at 212.  In other words, the majority's 
simplistic 
description 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation 
as 
"faithfully discern[ing] and apply[ing] the constitution as it 
is written" is worthless.  See majority op., ¶28.  Sure, 
sometimes our constitution uses very clear language.  It doesn't 
take anything beyond the constitution's words to know, for 
example, that someone licensed to practice law in Wisconsin for 
only four years can't serve as a member of this court.  See Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 24 (requiring a license to practice law in 
Wisconsin for "5 years immediately prior to election or 
appointment").  But you don't need originalism to reach that 
conclusion, just the text.   
¶105 Most of our constitution, by contrast, was written 
broadly, 
and 
for 
good 
reasons. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution——now the sixth oldest in the nation, see Jack Stark 
& Steve Miller, The Wisconsin State Constitution 11 (2d ed. 
2019)——came about only after a prior, more specific proposed 
constitution was rejected by the people, largely because it 
tried to settle too many then-contemporary policy disputes.  See 
Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin and the Shaping of American Law 46 
(2017).  No doubt part of the reason our constitution has 
endured so long is because its breadth gave the people of our 
state the room needed to adapt to new problems.  See Ray A. 
Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), 1952 
Wis. L. Rev. 23, 63 ("[T]he wisdom, conscious or unconscious, of 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
10 
 
the founders by concentrating on fundamental outlines and 
refraining in the main from details, provided the state with a 
constitution, which . . . has permitted the government to grow 
and adapt itself to new conditions and new concepts.").     
¶106 The breadth and adaptability of our constitution is 
evident in its many clauses declaring broad principles in 
general terms.  The Wisconsin Constitution contains, for 
example, a guarantee of "a certain remedy in the law for all 
injuries, or wrongs," a prohibition against "control of, or 
interference 
with, 
the 
rights 
of 
conscience," 
and 
a 
pronouncement that "[t]he blessings of a free government can 
only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, 
temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles."  See Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 18, 22.  
And our framers recognized that by writing these provisions 
broadly it would be up to future judges and interpreters to 
decide what they mean.  As the state constitutional convention's 
president put it, the framers of our constitution sought to 
declare "those great principles which characterize the age in 
which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven, will——
nay, must——guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and secure 
the permanent welfare of our beloved country."  The Attainment 
of Statehood 883 (Milo M. Quaife, ed. 1928).  They weren't 
trying to write specific rules settling difficult questions for 
all time.  Instead, they were——like the framers of the United 
States Constitution——trying to "provide a political platform 
wide enough to allow for considerable latitude within which 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
11 
 
future generations could make their own decisions."  See Joseph 
J. Ellis, The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American 
Revolution, 1783-1789, at 219 (2015); see also Jack Balkin, 
Living Originalism 27 (2011) ("[C]onstitutional framers and 
ratifiers very often use open-ended language that deliberately 
delegates questions of application to future interpreters.").  
Simply observing, as the majority does, that the constitution 
was written down does not demonstrate that originalism is the 
best way to make those decisions.   
2 
 
¶107 The majority's second defense of originalism——that it 
constrains judges to their proper role by focusing them on the 
text and history of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provide a 
basis for judicial decisions that differ from an individual 
judge's personal views——also falls flat.   
 
¶108 The central problem with this argument is that the 
search for original meaning is almost always fruitless.  "The 
reality is that for most provisions, this single understanding 
[of the original public meaning] did not exist."  
See 
Chemerinsky, supra at 56.  And this is just as true of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
as 
it 
is 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, if not more so.  To begin with, there are far 
fewer sources to draw on in trying to determine what the 
Wisconsin Constitution meant to the people who drafted and 
adopted it.  There are only a handful of volumes collecting 
sources regarding the 1846 and 1847-48 conventions and the 
ratification debates.  See The Movement for Statehood, 1845-1846 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
12 
 
(Milo M. Quaife ed. 1918); The Convention of 1846 (Milo M. 
Quaife, ed. 1919); The Struggle Over Ratification, 1846-1847 
(Milo M. Quaife, ed. 1920); Attainment, supra.  And there are a 
couple of law review articles from the 1940s and 1950s as well, 
but they review basically the same materials contained in the 
print volumes.  See Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution (Part I), 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 648; Brown, The Making 
of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), supra.       
¶109 What even these limited sources reveal is not one 
single, universally accepted original public meaning of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Instead, they demonstrate that the 
questions 
that 
consumed 
the 
drafters 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution——whether the document would retain the failed 1846 
constitution's 
provisions 
prohibiting 
banking, 
guaranteeing 
property rights to married women, and creating an elected 
judiciary, for example——tell us nothing about how to resolve 
contemporary cases.  See Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution (Part II), supra at 26; see also generally The 
Attainment of Statehood, supra.  They also show that, when it 
came to the document's more open-ended provisions, the drafters 
left little evidence of what they thought these clauses meant.  
See Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part I), 
supra at 689 (noting that although some provisions of the 1846 
constitution's bill of rights were "greatly altered before final 
adoption, there was general agreement as to the provisions which 
it should contain"); Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution (Part II), supra at 57 ("The committee in charge 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
13 
 
of" Article I, the Declaration of Rights, "adopted this article 
[from the 1846 constitution] without material changes, and so 
generally accepted were they, that no debate arose on" them).  
The same is true of many of the constitution's more specific 
provisions like the one about how to amend the constitution at 
issue in this case, Article XII, Section 1.  As the majority 
acknowledges, there is no evidence from the constitutional 
convention or ratification debates that sheds any light on its 
meaning.  See majority op., ¶32.    
 
¶110 The majority suggests that when these sources are 
unclear or silent, early legislative actions can identify the 
original public meaning of uncertain constitutional provisions.  
See id.  But that too is inadequate.  First, any effort to 
identify what early legislative enactments mean about the 
constitution requires sifting through voluminous materials that 
often conflict with one another.  Compare Julian Davis Mortenson 
& Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. 
Rev. 
277, 
332-66 
(2021) 
(reviewing 
evidence 
from 
early 
congresses demonstrating that "[t]he nondelegation doctrine 
simply was not an accepted feature of the constitutional fabric 
at the time of ratification"), with Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation 
at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) (arguing that 
"[a]lthough the history is messy," it supports a version of the 
nondelegation doctrine).  Conflicting history means that early 
legislative enactments are of little use in identifying what the 
constitution means.  Worse yet, rather than acknowledge these 
conflicts, courts often cherry-pick historical examples to 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
14 
 
support their preordained conclusions instead, a practice 
rightly derided as "law office history."  See Chemerinsky, supra 
at 66; see also, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 
S. Ct. 2228, 2324 (2022) (Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., 
dissenting) (noting that "early law in fact does provide some 
support for abortion rights" and that the majority's citation to 
laws adopted after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified was 
"convenient . . . , but it is window dressing").  Second, 
relying on early legislative inaction as evidence of the 
constitution's 
original 
public 
meaning 
is 
particularly 
problematic.  There are all kinds of reasons why an early 
legislature 
might 
not 
have 
acted 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
is 
nevertheless 
constitutionally 
permissible 
for 
a 
later 
legislature.  See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke 
L.J. 1407, 1427-29 (2017) (identifying some of these reasons 
including 
new 
factual 
and 
legal 
developments); 
see 
also 
Chemerinsky, supra at 66 ("The absence of a specific practice at 
a specific time does not mean that those then in power thought 
the 
practice 
was 
unconstitutional."). 
 
Finally, 
early 
legislative enactments are "at best weak evidence of original 
meaning."  Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. 
L. Rev. 327, 398 (2002).  Although early legislative enactments 
might reflect what legislators thought the constitution meant, 
their interpretations might not have been widely held.  See id.  
Moreover, legislators are not "disinterested observers;" they 
are capable of misinterpreting the constitution or ignoring its 
meaning entirely when it is politically expedient.  See id.; 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
15 
 
Chemerinsky, supra at 65 (explaining that it is "possible that 
the Framers wrote the [relevant constitutional provision] in an 
effort to outlaw the practice, but faced with the political 
realities of governing they saw no alternative but to engage in 
the 
forbidden 
behavior."). 
 
Thus, 
their 
actions 
cannot 
meaningfully inform our interpretation of what the constitution 
means.     
 
¶111 In addition to the problems with identifying original 
public meaning, "[o]ne of the largest difficulties in applying 
originalism is choosing the level of abstraction at which the 
original understanding is stated."  Chemerinsky, supra at 67.  
This issue is illustrated by the majority's discussion of early 
historical practices regarding constitutional amendments.  As 
the 
majority 
explains, 
early 
legislatures 
submitted 
constitutional amendments to the people as simple yes-or-no 
questions, for the amendment or against the amendment.  See 
majority op., ¶33-34.  Accordingly, the language that appeared 
on the ballot regarding those early amendments didn't describe 
the substance or intended effect of the proposed amendments at 
all.  See id. ¶35.  The legislature moved away from that 
practice in fits and starts beginning in the 1870s, however, 
directing that somewhat more descriptive language appear on the 
ballot during that period.  See id. ¶¶37-38.  And that practice 
eventually solidified into a statute requiring that a "concise 
statement of the nature" of the proposed amendment appear on the 
ballot.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 5, § 39 (1898); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.64 (2021-22).   
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
16 
 
 
¶112 From this history, the majority derives the principle 
that "an amendment only needs to be submitted to the people for 
ratification," no description required.  See majority op., ¶35.  
Fair enough, but at this level of abstraction the majority's 
purported original public meaning tells us nothing.  What about 
when the legislature does describe an amendment's substance on 
the ballot?  Can the legislature then offer an incomplete 
description?  An inaccurate one?  If the purported original 
public meaning of Article XII, Section 1 doesn't answer those 
questions for the majority then something else has to.   
 
¶113 Whatever that something is, it's not originalism.  
That is because, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, what 
originalism requires judges to identify——a single, objective 
original public meaning——is something we cannot know.  And even 
if we do somehow identify one original public meaning, like the 
majority's abstract insight about Article XII, Section 1, it 
tells us nothing about how to resolve real cases.  Without the 
objective answers it promises, originalism is no constraint on 
judges at all.  Constitutional interpretation is never as simple 
as just "apply[ing] the constitution as it is written."  See 
majority op., ¶28.  That is because the constitution forces us 
to choose between competing interests all the time, and value-
neutral judging is therefore impossible.  Take, for example, 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated."  What is 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
17 
 
reasonable when it comes to drone surveillance or searching cell 
phones isn't dictated by any original understanding.  There 
could never be an "original understanding" on these topics 
because they were unimaginable at the time our constitution was 
written. 
 
Moreover, 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
search 
is 
"unreasonable" always requires a value judgment, balancing the 
interests of the government against an invasion of privacy.  So 
too in deciding what it means for a constitutional amendment to 
be "submit[ted] to the people."  See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.   
 
¶114 Finally, even if the original public meaning of many 
provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution were discoverable, 
applying it would lead to intolerable results.  As one scholar 
said, "[t]he only kind of originalism that is reasonably 
determinate leads to conclusions that practically no one 
accepts."   David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2012).  For example, Article I, Section 9 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[e]very person is 
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being 
obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws."   There is no 
escaping that, as the use of male pronouns demonstrates, the 
original public meaning of this provision and many others in our 
original constitution didn't include women.  The delegates to 
the constitutional convention were all men, and as mentioned 
previously, part of the reason the proposed 1846 constitution 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
18 
 
was rejected was because it guaranteed a modicum of autonomy to 
women 
through 
its 
provisions 
about 
married 
women 
owning 
property.  See Ranney, supra at 46-47.  Yet we would never say 
today that, because the original public meaning of this 
provision didn't include women, women are therefore not entitled 
to a "remedy in the laws."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  And that's 
not the only example.  Take Article I, Section 18's guarantee of 
"[t]he right of every person to worship Almighty God according 
to the dictates of conscience."  At the 1847-48 convention, a 
motion to strike the words "Almighty God" on the grounds that 
the people had the right to worship whomever or whatever they 
wanted was defeated as "too radical a doctrine for our God-
fearing forefathers."  See Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution (Part II), supra at 57.  Although this supports the 
conclusion that the original public meaning of Article I, 
Section 18's guarantee of religious liberty was inapplicable to 
those who didn't share our founders' belief in "Almighty God," 
even those who claim to be originalists would not reach such a 
repellent conclusion today.    
3 
 
¶115 In summary, the majority's arguments fail to defend 
originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation.  
Originalism 
isn't 
required 
merely 
because 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution was written down.  Rather, there are many plausible 
ways of interpreting the constitution that are both non-
originalist and true to the text.  See Coan, supra at 1047.    
And originalism doesn't constrain judges by providing objective 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
19 
 
answers to difficult constitutional questions.  See Chemerinsky, 
supra at 166 ("Originalism fails on its own terms to provide a 
constraint on judging.  It is only a fig leaf allowing a justice 
to pretend to adhere to a neutral method.")  After all, the 
search for an original public meaning is usually impossible, and 
even when it's not, leads to useless insights, abhorrent 
results, or both.   
¶116 Many of originalism's most vocal proponents suggest 
that rejecting it means embracing the rule of "philosopher-king 
judges [who] swoop down from their marble palace to ordain 
answers rather than allow the people and their representatives 
to discuss, debate, and resolve them."  Neil Gorsuch, A 
Republic, If You Can Keep It 113 (2020).  The majority takes a 
similar tack, accusing me of "open[ly] pining for the freedom to 
go beyond the meaning of constitutional language."  See majority 
op., ¶22 n.6.  But this criticism misses the point.  The 
"constitutional language" alone doesn't resolve difficult cases.  
Constitutional 
adjudication 
is 
and 
always 
has 
been 
more 
complicated than that.  And for that reason, no theory——
originalism or any other——can provide determinate answers to 
difficult constitutional questions.  
 
¶117 If that is true, then how should we go about 
interpreting our constitutions?  In my view, we should use the 
same kind of pluralistic approach I have identified previously.  
See State v. Hoyle, 2023 WI 24, ¶109, 406 Wis. 2d 373, 987 
N.W.2d 732 (Dallet, J., dissenting).  We should analyze the 
United States or Wisconsin constitutions' text and history 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
20 
 
carefully, but we should also be guided by precedent, context, 
historical practice and tradition, and the need to balance "'the 
majority's values against the values that should be protected 
from society's majorities.'"  Id. (quoting Chemerinsky, supra at 
207).    
C 
 
¶118 In closing I note that even if the majority were 
correct 
that 
originalism 
is 
our 
consensus 
approach 
to 
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, that approach would 
nevertheless not be binding in future cases.  See majority op., 
¶¶22-26.  That is because reliance on a particular method of 
interpretation in one case doesn't bind future courts to use 
that same method in all future cases.   
 
¶119 We have never said that our methodological choices 
bind us in future cases even though we have occasionally assumed 
so in other contexts.  For example, State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 and subsequent cases applying it appear to assume 
that its statutory-interpretation framework is binding.  See 
Abbe 
Gluck, 
The 
States 
As 
Laboratories 
of 
Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Textualism, 
119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1800-03 (2010) (noting that "most of [our] 
court's disputes" about Kalal "are about how [its] framework 
should be applied, not whether it controls.").  But there are 
good reasons to doubt that assumption.  After all, the United 
States Supreme Court doesn't treat prior methodological choices 
as binding in either statutory or constitutional cases.  Id. at 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
21 
 
1823 ("The U.S. Supreme Court does not apply methodological 
stare decisis . . . in the context of articulating binding 
statutory interpretation frameworks."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1013 (2009) 
("Although methodological disputes grow heated in some cases, it 
is striking that in the domain of constitutional adjudication, 
the justices have seldom exhibited much interest in attempting 
to bind either themselves or each other, in advance, to the kind 
of general interpretative approaches that academic theorists 
champion.").   
¶120 There are several likely reasons the Court does not do 
so.  For one thing, abstract, general methodologies like 
originalism (or Kalal, for that matter) are an awkward fit with 
stare decisis, which aims to treat like cases alike.  See Chad 
M. 
Oldfather, 
Methodological 
Pluralism 
and 
Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 42-44 (2014).  If the 
choice of originalism in one constitutional case is treated as 
binding that means all constitutional cases must be decided 
using originalist methods.  But this one-size-fits-all thinking 
would 
upend 
existing 
precedent 
because 
"[a]ny 
form 
of 
originalist analysis with bite . . . would generate unpalatable 
results when viewed from a contemporary perspective."  Id. at 
45.  For example, Brown v. Board of Education,5 same sex 
                                                 
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
22 
 
marriage, virtually all rights of women6 and racial minorities, 
and any number of other fundamental rights are difficult, if not 
impossible, to justify on originalist grounds.  See Chemerinsky, 
supra at 92-114.  Because "the Court would be unlikely to find 
all 
substantive 
conclusions 
generated 
by 
a 
particular 
methodology palatable," avoiding those results would mean having 
to abandon the supposedly settled choice of methodology or 
twisting that method so much that it no longer really applied at 
all.  See Oldfather, supra at 45-46.  Safer then not to adopt 
any binding methodology, except perhaps in determining the 
application of an already settled constitutional interpretation.7  
See id. at 39-42 (explaining that stare decisis can play a role 
when it comes to "decision rules," that is, rules that help 
implement an existing interpretation of the Constitution like 
                                                 
6 Indeed, just last year, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that "history and tradition" led to the "clear 
answer . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the 
right to an abortion."  Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248.  But as in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the history 
on which the majority relied is contested.  See Dobbs, 142 S. 
Ct. at 2324 (Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) 
("[E]mbarrassingly for the majority . . . early law in fact does 
provide some support for abortion rights."); see also Heller, 
554 U.S. at 595 (arguing that the text and history of the Second 
Amendment supported a constitutional right to possess a gun for 
self-defense in the home); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(contending that text and history supported the opposite 
result).   
7 For example, the United States Supreme Court's decision 
last year in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) explained that "text and history" are the 
test for whether firearm regulations are permitted by the Second 
Amendment.  Id. at 2127.  But in doing so, the Court never said 
that "text and history" should be the sole test for interpreting 
every provision of the United States Constitution. 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
23 
 
the tiered-scrutiny framework for claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause).   
¶121 For another thing, reasonable judges disagree about 
the best way to interpret the constitution.  If everyone agreed 
about the appropriate method for interpreting the constitution, 
or if there were a clear best method, there would be no need to 
treat methodologies like originalism as binding in future cases—
—consensus would already accomplish that goal.  But even self-
professed originalists disagree about how to do originalism, to 
say nothing of those who believe non-originalist methods are 
best.  See Segall, supra at 123 (explaining that Justice 
Scalia's 
and 
Justice 
Thomas's 
"ideologies 
have 
nuanced 
differences such as their use of precedent, tradition, and what 
evidence counts toward original meaning.").  In the face of such 
disagreements, labeling a particular method of constitutional 
interpretation as binding precedent cannot force consensus.   
¶122 Indeed, disagreement about the proper method of 
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution is almost as old as this 
court.  In Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 
(1911), two members of the court wrote at length to express 
their 
divergent 
views 
about 
the 
appropriate 
methods 
of 
constitutional interpretation.  Chief Justice Winslow, writing 
for the majority, favored the view that "the changed social, 
economic, 
and 
governmental 
conditions 
and 
ideals 
of 
the 
time . . . must also logically . . . become influential factors 
in 
the 
settlement 
of 
problems 
of 
construction 
and 
interpretation." 
 
Id. 
at 
349-50. 
 
But 
Justice 
Marshall 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
24 
 
disagreed, 
asserting 
that 
"[i]f 
the 
constitution 
is 
to 
efficiently endure, the idea that it is capable of being re-
squared, from time to time, to fit new legislative or judicial 
notions of necessities in præsenti . . . must be combated 
whenever and wherever advanced."  Id. at 375 (Marshall, J., 
concurring).  And that disagreement continues to this day.  
Compare 
Hoyle, 
406 
Wis. 2d 373, 
¶¶83-89 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring), with id., ¶¶106-09 (Dallet, J., dissenting).  We 
should not pretend that these disagreements are settled merely 
because four members of the court have, in a few cases, applied 
a particular method of constitutional interpretation.  Such 
decisions do not conclusively bind this court to originalism any 
more than Chief Justice Winslow's opinion more than a century 
ago compels us to reject it.   
 
II 
 
¶123 Turning now to the specific issue in this case, 
Wisconsin Justice Initiative (WJI) argues that the way in which 
Marsy's Law was submitted for ratification violated two aspects 
of Article XII, Section 1, which governs the process by which 
the 
legislature 
may 
propose 
amendments 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  First, WJI asserts that the language that 
appeared on the ballot describing the proposed amendment was 
incomplete, inaccurate, or perhaps misleading, and thus the 
amendment wasn't truly "submit[ted] . . . to the people" for 
ratification.  See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  And second, 
because Marsy's Law affects the rights of crime victims and the 
accused in different ways, WJI concludes that it is "more than 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
25 
 
one amendment," and thus should've been submitted to the people 
separately.  See id.   
 
¶124 I agree with the majority's analysis of why, based on 
our longstanding precedent about multiple amendments, WJI's 
second claim should be rejected.  I therefore join ¶¶58-59 and 
61-65 of the majority opinion.  I disagree, however, with the 
majority's explanation of why, despite the issues WJI identifies 
with the language that appeared on the ballot, Marsy's Law was 
nonetheless "submit[ted] to the people" as required by Article 
XII, Section 1.   
 
A 
¶125 Amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution 
may be 
proposed by the legislature through the process set forth in 
Article XII, Section 1.  It provides that if a proposed 
amendment is approved by a majority vote of two consecutive 
legislatures, "entered on [the legislature's] journals, with the 
yeas and nays taken thereon," and published for three months 
prior to the next general election, "it shall be the duty of the 
legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to 
the people in such manner and at such time as the legislature 
shall prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  "[I]f more than 
one amendment [is] submitted" to the people for ratification, 
each amendment "shall be submitted in such manner that the 
people may vote for or against such amendments separately."  Id.  
If a majority of voters approve of the amendment, it becomes 
part of the constitution.  See id.   
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
26 
 
 
¶126 The constitution doesn't explain what it means for a 
proposed amendment to be "submit[ted] . . . to the people."  Id.  
All it says is that the amendment must be submitted "in such 
manner and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe."  
Id.   
 
¶127 As discussed previously, for much of the state's early 
history, 
the 
legislature 
submitted 
proposed 
constitutional 
amendments to the people through simple yes-or-no questions, for 
the amendment or against the amendment.  See majority op., ¶¶33-
34.  Accordingly, the language that appeared on the ballot 
regarding those early amendments didn't describe the substance 
or intended effect of the proposed amendments at all.  See id., 
¶35. 
 
But 
over 
time 
the 
legislature 
moved 
toward 
the 
contemporary practice of providing a short description of 
proposed constitutional amendments on the ballot.  See id., 
¶¶37-38.   
 
¶128 That move raised a potential problem.  Could the 
legislature direct that the ballot describe a proposed amendment 
in a way that was fundamentally incomplete, inaccurate, or 
deceptive?  Was such an amendment still "submit[ted] . . . to 
the people?"  See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  In State ex rel. 
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 200-02, 204 N.W. 803 (1925), 
this court said no.  We explained that if the legislature 
"prescribed the form of submission in a manner which would have 
failed to present the real question, or had they by error or 
mistake presented an entirely different question, no claim could 
be made that the proposed amendment would have been validly 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
27 
 
enacted."  Id. at 201.  That makes sense.  If the legislature 
misleads the people, intentionally or not, about what a proposed 
constitutional amendment would do, then the question was never 
truly submitted to them at all.   
 
¶129 Ekern didn't stop there though.  In the next sentence, 
it said "[i]n other words, even if the form is prescribed by the 
legislature it must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly 
comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment."  
Id.  WJI seizes on this sentence, arguing that the language the 
legislature directed appear on the April 2020 general election 
ballot regarding Marsy's Law fell short of that mark.  The 
ballot read:  
Question 1: "Additional rights of crime victims.  
Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution, 
which gives certain rights to crime victims, be 
amended to give crime victims additional rights, to 
require that the rights of crime victims be protected 
with equal force to the protections afforded the 
accused 
while 
leaving 
the 
federal 
constitutional 
rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime 
victims to enforce their rights in court?" 
2019 Enrolled Joint Res. 3.  According to WJI, this language 
doesn't describe "every essential" of Marsy's Law because it 
fails to mention that Marsy's Law expanded the definition of 
"victim," altered the state constitutional rights of the 
accused, and changed our court's jurisdiction.8  
 
¶130 The majority disagrees with WJI's view that Ekern 
imposed a constitutional requirement that ballot language 
contain "every essential" of a proposed amendment.  See majority 
                                                 
8 I accept, for purposes of this opinion only, WJI's 
characterizations of the substantive effects of Marsy's Law.    
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
28 
 
op., 
¶49. 
 
According 
to 
the 
majority, 
"the 
relevant 
constitutional question is whether the proposed amendment was, 
at a basic level, submitted to the people for ratification."  
Id., ¶51.  And the majority concludes that the only way in which 
an amendment could flunk that test is "in the rare circumstance 
that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that 
voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment."  Id.    
Because the ballot language about Marsy's Law does not fit 
within that narrow category, the majority concludes that the 
amendment was validly adopted.     
 
¶131 Before getting to why I think the majority's proposed 
rule is too narrow, it's important to note one thing.  Despite 
the 
majority's 
purported 
allegiance 
to 
originalism, 
this 
analysis is anything but originalist.  The text of Article XII, 
Section 1 doesn't tell us what it means for an amendment to be 
"submit[ted] to the people."  Indeed, it's plausible to read the 
text as allowing the legislature to do whatever it wants when it 
comes to describing constitutional amendments on the ballot.  
And 
knowing 
that 
early 
legislatures 
used 
to 
provide 
no 
descriptions on the ballot at all doesn't help us answer whether 
an 
amendment 
submitted 
with 
a 
misleading 
or 
incomplete 
description is submitted to the people either.   
¶132 Accordingly, to answer that question, the majority 
engages in precisely the kind of interest balancing that I 
argued 
earlier 
is 
a 
necessary 
part 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation.  See supra Part I.B.2.  Here, the relevant 
interests are the legislature's authority, explicit in the 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
29 
 
constitution, to specify the time and manner in which amendments 
are to be submitted, and the people's right——also reflected in 
the constitution——fairly to evaluate and vote on a proposed 
constitutional amendment.  And we know that no matter what the 
majority says, it has to be balancing these interests.  That is 
because the text could plausibly mean that the legislature has 
carte blanche when it comes to prescribing how constitutional 
amendments are submitted to the people and all the history tells 
us is that the legislature doesn't have to describe the contents 
of proposed amendments at all.  So without saying so, the 
majority tries to strike an appropriate balance between these 
interests that preserves both the legislature's discretion and 
the people's right to decide whether to amend the constitution.   
 
¶133 The problem is that the new rule the majority derives 
from Ekern and our other cases regarding the submission-to-the-
people requirement is still too narrow.  Although the majority 
is certainly correct that a "fundamentally counterfactual" 
ballot question doesn't comply with the constitution, that's not 
the only way to violate the requirement that an amendment be 
submitted to the people.  See majority op., ¶51.  An amendment 
that is described in a way that is so incomplete as to be 
misleading is also not submitted to the people.  For example, if 
the legislature had described Marsy's Law on the ballot as 
merely "an amendment to expand the definition of 'victim' 
contained in Article I, § 9m of the Constitution," that 
description 
wouldn't 
violate 
the 
majority's 
rule. 
 
This 
statement is accurate, it's not fundamentally counterfactual.  
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
30 
 
But the description would also be misleading because Marsy's Law 
made many more significant changes to Article I, Section 9m.  
And if the people voted to adopt the amendment in reliance on 
such a description, it can't be said that all of those more 
significant 
changes 
were 
submitted 
to 
the 
people 
for 
ratification.  This, I think, is what Ekern was referring to 
when it said the ballot must describe "every essential" of the 
proposed amendment.  See Ekern, 187 Wis. at 201.  Thus, I 
conclude that a ballot description, if the legislature chooses 
to provide one, must accurately summarize the significant 
changes the proposed amendment would make to the Constitution.   
 
¶134 I acknowledge, of course, that this rule doesn't 
always provide clear answers.  Because a summary that appears on 
the ballot will always be incomplete and isn't meant to take the 
place of the text of a proposed amendment, judgment will always 
be required.  But that is okay.  We trust judges to make 
judgment calls all the time, and doing so in this context is the 
only way to preserve both the legislature's authority to specify 
the manner in which amendments are to be submitted to the people 
and the right of the people to decide whether to change the 
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
31 
 
constitution.9  Indeed, the majority's approach also requires 
judgment 
to 
determine 
what 
questions 
are 
"fundamentally 
counterfactual."  See majority op., ¶51 (emphasis added).  As 
the use of the word "fundamentally" implies, superficially 
counterfactual ballot questions would pass the majority's test.  
But the majority offers no principled way of distinguishing 
between 
superficially 
counterfactual 
and 
"fundamentally" 
counterfactual ballot questions.10     
 
¶135 In this case, the legislature's summary was sufficient 
and Marsy's Law was thus validly submitted to the people.  
Although WJI points to some of the amendment's particulars that 
weren't described specifically in the ballot language, as I said 
before, a summary always leaves some details out.  The 
                                                 
9 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence accuses me of 
committing a logical fallacy while making one of her own.  See 
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence, ¶85.  According to 
her concurrence, the majority's approach is consistent with the 
constitution because it identifies whether an amendment was 
"submitted to the people," while mine is impermissible because 
it focuses on "the manner of submission."  See id. ¶¶69-70.  But 
this is a straw man.  Both the majority and I are answering the 
same question: whether Marsy's Law was "submitted to the 
people."  We just disagree on the meaning of that constitutional 
requirement.  Article XII, Section 1 says that "it shall be the 
duty of the legislature to submit . . . proposed . . . 
amendments to the people in such manner . . . as the legislature 
may prescribe."  As this language makes clear, the manner of 
submission 
and 
the 
submission 
itself 
are 
inextricably 
intertwined.  Thus, deciding whether an amendment was submitted 
to the people always requires courts to analyze whether the 
manner the legislature prescribed for submission satisfied that 
constitutional requirement.   
10 For 
this 
reason, 
Justice 
Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley's 
concurrence 
is 
wrong 
to 
suggest 
that 
the 
"fundamentally 
counterfactual" test is somehow free from subjectivity.  See 
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶82-84.     
No.  2020AP2003.rfd 
 
32 
 
legislature's description of Marsy's Law is accurate, and the 
expanded definition of "victim," and arguable changes to the 
state constitutional rights of the accused and this court's 
jurisdiction weren't so significant that they needed to be 
described on the ballot.  In short, the legislature gave voters 
the gist of Marsy's Law, and in an accurate way, and that is all 
that is required.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
¶136 I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY 
joins this concurrence, and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this 
concurrence with respect to ¶¶93-122.   
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
1 
 
¶137 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  A central feature 
of the American legal system is the idea that matters once 
decided should generally remain that way.  The default norm is 
that when an appellate court takes up and decides an issue, its 
legal determination remains the rule for that court and 
authoritatively binds lower courts facing the same question.  We 
call this "precedent," and it is a practice that goes back 
centuries.  
¶138 But by necessity, judicial opinions touch on matters 
beyond the issues in a case.  They might describe a prior 
opinion or legal doctrine tangential to an issue, but not 
necessary for resolution of the case.  The law calls this 
"dicta."  This word comes from the Latin, obiter dictum, which 
means "something said in passing."1  So while the reason or 
rationale for a decision (in Latin, ratio decidendi2) constitutes 
precedent, the other things said by a court do not.  This is 
true even when the court comments on the law.   
¶139 In recent years, however, some discussion in Wisconsin 
has minimized dicta and maximized the effect of the words in 
judicial opinions.  This is problematic for many reasons.  I 
write separately to bring clarity to what this court has and has 
not said about dicta, and to issue a clarion call to re-embrace 
                                                 
1 Obiter Dictum, Black's Law Dictionary 569 (11th ed. 2019).  
Dicta is the plural of dictum.  Dictum, Black's Law Dictionary 
569 (11th ed. 2019). 
2 Ratio Decidendi, Black's Law Dictionary 1514 (11th ed. 
2019). 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
2 
 
dicta's 
crucial 
role 
in 
understanding 
our 
case-deciding, 
precedent-setting function.    
¶140 Both we and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely 
carry out our case-deciding work through written judicial 
opinions.  We distribute these opinions to the parties, make 
them available to the public, and print them in reporters that 
stretch back to before Wisconsin's statehood.  While the 
Wisconsin Reports are filled with sound writing and compelling 
legal analysis (and, to be sure, some of the other variety), 
lawyers and lower courts need to know what from these opinions 
constitutes a rule of decision governing the next case.  Is 
every jot and tittle, stray statement, or tangential footnote 
binding legal precedent that must be followed faithfully?   
¶141 The 
answer 
to 
this 
question 
almost 
always 
and 
everywhere is no.  While debate continues over where to draw the 
line in principle and from case to case, the general rule 
remains that the holding of a case——that is, the legal rationale 
underlying and necessary to a decision——constitutes precedent.  
Other discussion, including discussion of legal matters, is non-
binding dicta.3   
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 
U.S. 425, 431 (2001); M. Elaine Buccieri, et al., 21 C.J.S. 
Courts, § 223 ("Dictum is a statement on a matter that is not 
necessarily involved in the case and is not binding as 
authority."); Ryan S. Killian, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013 
Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2013); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes 
Holding and Why It Matters, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 219, 223 (2010); 
David Coale & Wendy Couture, Loud Rules, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 715, 
725 (2007); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1997, 2000 (1994).  
Chief Justice Marshall explained the distinction this way: 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
3 
 
¶142 From our earliest days, this court acknowledged and 
understood the important distinction between the holding of a 
case and the non-binding dicta contained within it.  See, e.g., 
Stucke v. Milwaukee & Mississippi R.R. Co., 9 Wis. 202, 211 
(1859) (explaining a doctrine "rests in mere obiter dicta, 
without a direct authority in its favor").  We have repeated the 
unremarkable rule that when we deliberately take up and decide 
an issue central to the disposition of a case, it is considered 
precedential.  See State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶19 n.21, 261 
Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381; State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 
392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981).  But where our opinions addressed 
tangential matters not central to the question presented, we 
labeled such statements dictum and recognized that "[t]his court 
is not bound by its own dicta."  Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984); see also 
State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996); 
State ex rel. Ekern v. Dammann, 215 Wis. 394, 403, 254 N.W. 759 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general 
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in 
connection with the case in which those expressions 
are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a 
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for 
decision.  The reason of this maxim is obvious.  The 
question actually before the Court is investigated 
with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other 
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are 
considered in their relation to the case decided, but 
their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom 
completely investigated. 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821). 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
4 
 
(1934).4  Put simply, not every statement in our opinion pages, 
no matter how peripheral to the issues in the case, constitutes 
a precedential opinion of the court. 
¶143 This practice took a confusing turn in 2010, however.  
In Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co., we addressed whether the court of 
appeals may decline to follow a statement in a majority opinion 
of this court on the grounds that it is dictum.  2010 WI 35, 
¶¶50-58, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682.  The answer, somewhat 
surprisingly, was no.  Id., ¶58.  This new approach directly 
contradicted prior statements of this court.  In State v. Koput, 
for example, we stated it was perfectly appropriate "for the 
court of appeals or a circuit court to evaluate statements in 
our opinions on the basis of whether they constitute dictum."  
142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).  The court of 
appeals was wrong to think "it was required to give equal weight 
to every statement in our opinions."  Id.  Nevertheless, in 
Zarder we concluded that because the court of appeals could not 
overrule itself (citing Cook v. Cook5), "the court of appeals may 
not dismiss a statement from an opinion by this court by 
concluding that it is dictum."  324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶58.   
                                                 
4 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged this as well.  Cole v. 
Young, 817 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Wisconsin follows the 
common law rule that dicta——statements of law going beyond the 
particular 
facts 
of 
the 
case——do 
not 
constitute 
binding 
precedent.").  
5 In Cook v. Cook, we declared that the court of appeals 
could not "overrule, modify or withdraw language from its prior 
published decisions" even if it believed the prior decision "is 
erroneous."  208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
5 
 
¶144 This portion of Zarder deserves reexamination.  Its 
reasoning was questionable, its foundation was weak, and its 
consequences have undermined a proper conception of the judicial 
role.  Just because we stated in Cook that the court of appeals 
cannot overrule itself does not mean it cannot disregard 
statements that were never binding in the first place.  Indeed, 
the traditional rule is that only the rationale for a decision 
has precedential effect.  See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821); Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 386-87; 
Lakeshore Com. Fin. Corp. v. Drobac, 107 Wis. 2d 445, 457-58, 
319 N.W.2d 839 (1982).  Simply because the rule of decision in a 
case cannot be ignored does not transform non-binding dictum 
into binding precedent.  Logically, Zarder's conclusion does not 
follow.   
¶145 Furthermore, the Zarder rule itself distorts the law.  
Let me give an example.  When I joined the court of appeals, one 
of the very first questions that came across my desk was a 
motion for leave to appeal.  Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) spells 
out three statutory criteria for permissive appeals:  "(a) 
Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify 
further 
proceedings 
in 
the 
litigation; 
(b) 
Protect 
the 
petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or (c) 
Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of 
justice."  But form orders from the court of appeals also cited 
State v. Webb, 160 Wis. 2d 622, 632, 467 N.W.2d 108 (1991) and 
stated, "Additionally, before leave to appeal will be granted, 
the petitioner must show a substantial likelihood of success on 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
6 
 
the merits of the appeal."  While the likelihood of success 
would likely be relevant, I thought it odd that an additional 
requirement not listed in the statutes was added to the draft 
order.  So I searched for the answer. 
¶146 In a discussion tangential to the issue in Webb, this 
court identified the three statutory criteria governing the 
consideration of a motion for leave to appeal, and then said, 
"The defendant must also show a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits."  160 Wis. 2d at 632.  In support of this 
statement, the Webb court cited Wisconsin's Appellate Practice 
and Procedure treatise.  Id.  That treatise does not list 
"substantial likelihood of success" as a separate factor, but 
notes that it is implicit in the enumerated criterion and is 
likely to influence a decision by the court of appeals to take a 
case.  See David L. Walther, Patricia L. Grove, & Michael S. 
Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin, § 9.2 
at 9–2 (1990).  Therefore, even though the statute does not 
establish likelihood of success as a separate factor, the court 
of appeals felt bound by Webb's offhand remark.  It is 
disturbing that a single inartfully-phrased sentence on a 
peripheral legal matter can have that much impact.  Zarder 
effectively transformed a stray comment in a supreme court 
opinion into a de facto statutory amendment——at least insofar as 
the court of appeals was concerned. 
¶147 Moreover, Zarder has led some in the legal community, 
and even on this court, to suggest we no longer recognize a role 
for dicta in our opinions.  Every description or discussion, in 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
7 
 
this view, constitutes a precedential holding of this court.  To 
be sure, Zarder never says this.  In fact, Zarder recognizes and 
describes two divergent definitions of dicta in our cases.  See 
324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶52 n.19.6  These two lines of cases discuss how 
to define dicta, not whether our opinions contain dicta.  Id.  
As far as I am aware, this court has never held——in what would 
be 
a 
dramatic 
departure 
from 
basic 
norms 
of 
American 
jurisprudence——that the bench and bar must respect every word or 
discussion in our opinions as precedent.  
¶148 Yet 
for 
whatever 
reason, 
Zarder 
seems 
to 
have 
distorted how we think about our judicial work-product as well.  
Perhaps the feeling that everything we do and say must be 
followed is partially to blame for the increasing length of our 
opinions.  Perhaps it contributes to the seeming itch to address 
legal matters in our decisions beyond those necessary to resolve 
a case.  Increasingly, we also find ourselves carefully parsing 
which parts of opinions we "withdraw language" from and which we 
do not——a practice that does not appear common around the 
country or at the United States Supreme Court.  Furthermore, we 
have ceased calling language in our own opinions dicta.  Indeed, 
since Zarder, I cannot find any time we explicitly concluded 
that a portion of our own opinions was nonbinding dicta.  Once 
again, Zarder on its own terms doesn't demand this, nor does it 
                                                 
6 Zarder explains that our cases reflect two definitions of 
dicta and those cases debate what, beyond the holding, has 
binding effect on future courts.  See Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co., 
2010 WI 35, ¶52 n.19, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682.  I do not 
attempt here to choose sides, but rather, to restart this 
debate. 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
8 
 
call into question the existence of dicta as a general matter.  
But its directional influence casts a long shadow.      
¶149 This departure from judicial norms may also reflect an 
over-inflated sense of our own importance and role in the 
constitutional order.  The judicial role is, at root, a case-
deciding function.  See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 
2020 WI 67, ¶31, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  And cases are 
brought by parties whose legal rights and obligations must be 
determined.  Id.  Treating the legal rationale for a decision as 
precedential helps ensure consistency in the application of the 
law to other parties with similar issues, and gives due respect 
to the learned members of the judiciary who have come before.  
But treating as precedential legal discussions or comments not 
central to deciding a case flips this on its head, and 
reimagines our opinions as akin to legislation.  In effect, it 
gives this court power to do far more than decide cases, and 
therefore, makes us likely to transgress our own guardrails——
both constitutional and prudential.      
¶150 Our opinions are not statutes, they interpret them.  
Our opinions are not the constitution, they interpret it.  Our 
opinions are explanations of how and why we decided a case a 
particular way.  They are meant to resolve the issue before us 
and, in so doing, set forth a legal standard that will be 
applied in other cases.  But we don't know what we don't know.  
We make mistakes and misdescribe things and use imprecise 
language.  Perhaps a little judicial modesty is in order.  Stray 
statements or tangential discussions in opinions should not bind 
No.  2020AP2003.bh 
 
9 
 
future courts or demand a stare decisis analysis.  Recognizing 
dicta serves as a check on the current court, and keeps us in 
our proper case-deciding constitutional lane.  We should embrace 
it.  We should employ it.  And neither we nor lower courts 
should feel compelled to bow before every prior pen-stroke in 
our opinions.   
¶151 So why raise this now?  Because these concepts would 
be beneficial in cases like this.  Here, the parties ask us to 
breathe life into Ekern's statement that "even if the form is 
prescribed by the legislature it must reasonably, intelligently, 
and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the 
amendment."  State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 
201, 204 N.W. 803 (1925).  But this statement in Ekern was not 
necessary to the issue decided in that case, which was whether 
the content of a ballot question may be delegated to the 
secretary of state.  Id. at 196-200.  In other words, this is 
classic dicta.  Unfortunately, the parties argued the case as if 
we are obligated to do something with this language.  But we are 
not.  The premise is incorrect.  The tangential discussion in 
Ekern may have persuasive value, but it did not create a 
judicial test we are bound to apply forevermore.  We should call 
it dicta and call it a day, leaving us to focus on the 
requirements found in Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  That approach is appropriate here, and will be 
useful and appropriate in cases moving forward.    
¶152 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this concurrence with respect to ¶¶137-150. 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
1 
 
¶153 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Ballot question 
challenges have been few and far between in the history of our 
state.  Such a challenge reached this court in State ex rel. 
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. 803 (1925).  There, 
the court established a test for our review of a ballot question 
challenge:  "it must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly 
comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment."  
Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
¶154 Yet rather than respecting the precedent of a nearly 
century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course 
not requested by either party.  Instead of applying the test 
established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never 
before stated, much less applied.   
¶155 Specifically, the majority sets forth that "[a] ballot 
question could violate [the] constitutional requirement only in 
the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally 
counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the 
actual amendment."  Majority op., ¶51.  In addition to being 
created by the majority from whole cloth, this new test is 
unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test 
from Ekern.  
¶156 The majority arrives at its newly discovered test by 
tossing precedent to the wind and engaging in an unconvincing 
search for the "original meaning" of the state constitution's 
command that the legislature "submit" a proposed amendment to 
the people.  As Justice Dallet's concurrence aptly explains, the 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
2 
 
endeavor of divining the "original meaning" of a constitutional 
provision is largely a futile endeavor.1   
¶157 But even setting this aside, the majority's analysis 
rests on an infirm foundation.  It erroneously dismisses the 
Ekern test, and instead creates and applies a newly-minted test, 
resulting in an overly permissive approach that risks giving the 
legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions.   
¶158 I would follow our precedent set forth in Ekern.  
Applying the Ekern framework, I determine instead that the 
ballot question here failed to convey "every essential" of the 
amendment as is required.  From the ballot question only, voters 
would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the 
rights of criminal defendants in addition to bolstering the 
rights of crime victims.  In my view, the diminution of a 
defendant's rights previously protected by law, constitutes an 
"essential" element of the amendment.  Because the ballot 
question failed to accurately represent an essential element of 
the law to the voters who approved it, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶159 At the April 7, 2020 election, voters were presented 
with a yes or no vote on an amendment to Article I, § 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.2  This section of the constitution 
addresses the rights of victims of crime, and the amendment 
sought to expand the rights to which crime victims are entitled. 
                                                 
1 I join part I of Justice Dallet's concurrence. 
2 As the majority observes, this amendment is informally 
known as "Marsy's Law."  Majority op., ¶10. 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
3 
 
¶160 When the amendment was presented to voters, the ballot 
question gave no hint that a defendant's rights were being 
diminished.  It stated:   
Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution, 
which gives certain rights to crime victims, be 
amended to give crime victims additional rights, to 
require that the rights of crime victims be protected 
with equal force to the protections afforded the 
accused 
while 
leaving 
the 
federal 
constitutional 
rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime 
victims to enforce their rights in court?  
Majority op., ¶10.    
¶161 The Wisconsin Justice Initiative (WJI) brought this 
suit, asserting that the ballot question failed to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in the state constitution for distilling 
a constitutional amendment down to a ballot question that is 
then presented to the voters.  Id., ¶11.  At the outset, it 
should be emphasized that the substance of the amendment is not 
at issue, except to the extent that the court must determine 
whether the ballot question accurately represented the substance 
of the law to the voters who approved it.   
¶162 In the course of tackling the question that now comes 
before us, the circuit court found several shortcomings with the 
above language.  Among the shortcomings, it determined that "the 
single question presented to the voters was insufficient because 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
4 
 
it did not reference the effect on the existing constitutional 
rights of the accused."3   
¶163 The circuit court stayed its ruling pending appeal, 
and the court of appeals certified WEC's appeal to this court.  
Now, the majority reverses the circuit court. 
¶164 Purportedly 
grounding 
its 
determination 
in 
the 
constitution's "original meaning," the majority turns its back 
on Ekern, seeing only a requirement that the legislature 
"submit" the proposed amendment to the people.  Majority op., 
¶5.  Applying such an understanding, the majority concludes that 
"the question was not fundamentally counterfactual such that 
voters were not afforded the opportunity to approve the actual 
amendment" and was thus permissible.  Id.  The upshot is that 
"absent challenge on other grounds, the amendment has been 
validly ratified and is part of the Wisconsin Constitution."  
Id., ¶7. 
                                                 
3 The 
circuit 
court 
additionally 
determined 
that 
the 
question "did not accurately correspond to the language in the 
proposed amendments regarding the standard 'no less vigorous'" 
and that the amendment required two ballot questions rather than 
a single question "because the portion of the amendments that 
affected the rights of the accused did not sufficiently relate 
to the principal purpose behind the changes being driven by 
Marsy's Law to create rights for crime victims." 
Because I determine the ballot question to fail the "every 
essential" test, I need not address these additional bases for 
the circuit court's decision. 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
5 
 
II 
¶165 I begin by setting forth the guiding principles in 
reviewing a ballot question.  Subsequently, I address the 
majority's errors. 
¶166 It is true that the legislature has a fair amount of 
discretion in constructing a ballot question.  McConkey v. Van 
Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶40, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.  Indeed, 
this court has stated that the amount of discretion granted to 
the legislature is "considerable."  Id.   
¶167 According to the state constitution, "it shall be the 
duty of the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or 
amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the 
legislature shall prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.  
"Article XII, sec. 1 expressly delegates to the legislature the 
authority 
to 
determine 
the 
method 
for 
placing 
proposed 
constitutional amendments before the people."  Milwaukee All. 
Against Racist and Political Repression v. Elections Bd., 106 
Wis. 2d 593, 603, 317 N.W.2d 420 (1982).  "The inquiry is 
'whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted 
reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority 
and discretion.'"  McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶40 (quoting 
Milwaukee All., 106 Wis. 2d at 604).  
¶168  The legislature's discretion is broad, but it is not 
unlimited.  In accordance with the constitution ("in such manner 
and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe"), statutory 
constraints on the legislature's authority indicate that the 
ballot question "shall include a complete statement of the 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
6 
 
referendum question upon which the voters shall be requested to 
vote."  Wis. Stat. § 13.175.4  Wisconsin Stat. § 5.64(2)(am) 
provides further guidance on what must be included in a ballot 
question, requiring a "concise statement" and setting forth 
additional requirements:   
There shall be a separate ballot when any proposed 
constitutional amendment or any other measure or 
question is submitted to a vote of the people, except 
as authorized in s. 5.655.  The ballot shall give a 
concise statement of each question in accordance with 
the act or resolution directing submission in the same 
form 
as 
prescribed 
by 
the 
commission 
under 
s. 
7.08(1)(a).  The question may not be worded in such a 
manner as to require a negative vote to approve a 
proposition or an affirmative vote to disapprove a 
proposition.  Unless otherwise expressly provided, 
this ballot form shall be used at all elections when 
questions are submitted to a vote of the people. 
Wis. Stat. § 5.64(2)(am). 
¶169 As stated, this court has also previously set forth a 
test for reviewing a ballot question challenge, providing that a 
ballot question violates the constitution when it "fail[s] to 
present the real question" or "present[s] an entirely different 
question."  Ekern, 187 Wis. at 201.  "In other words, even if 
the form is prescribed by the Legislature, it must reasonably, 
intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every 
essential of the amendment."  Id. (emphasis added). 
                                                 
4 As the majority correctly observes, no argument was raised 
here regarding the legislature's compliance with its statutory 
obligations.  See majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
7 
 
III 
A 
¶170 The root of the majority's error lies in its hasty 
dismissal of the Ekern test. 
¶171 This court in Ekern set forth what the parties refer 
to as the "every essential" test.  It requires that a ballot 
question "must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or 
have reference to every essential of the amendment."  Ekern, 187 
Wis. at 201.  As the court of appeals observes in its 
certification in the present case, this court has not expanded 
on what it really means for a ballot question to include "every 
essential" and this case presents an opportunity for the court 
to explain and apply this court's statement in Ekern.  See Wis. 
Just. Initiative v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2020AP2003, 
unpublished certification, at 3 (Dec. 21, 2021). 
¶172 But instead of taking that opportunity, the majority 
simply dispenses with Ekern.  In the majority's view, the "every 
essential" test is no test at all, but is instead just an 
"explanatory 
statement."5 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶41. 
 
Such 
a 
                                                 
5 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence goes a step further, 
asserting that the "every essential" test is mere dicta.  Such 
an 
approach 
runs 
counter 
to 
the 
thrust 
of 
our 
recent 
jurisprudence.  See Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 64, 
¶139 n.8, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) (explaining that "[o]ur court does not 
recognize the concept of dicta").    
This approach to dicta has been recognized to be simple and 
clear.  It does not require the reader to dissect an opinion to 
determine, under whatever definition of dicta is embraced, what 
is and is not "necessary" or "germane" to the holding.  See 
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶147.   
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
8 
 
characterization would be news to the court in State ex rel. 
Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 659, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953), 
who noted (although did not decide) a controversy over whether a 
ballot question "fairly comprised every essential of the 
amendment."  And it most certainly is news to the parties here, 
who both argued their positions in terms of the "every 
essential" framework Ekern set forth. 
¶173 By dismissing the "every essential" test of Ekern, the 
majority is able to avoid an exacting stare decisis analysis in 
order to determine if it should be overruled.  See Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  Instead of analyzing whether a 
"special justification," see Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 
2, ¶¶67-68, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37, is present that 
would compel Ekern to be overruled, the majority relies on the 
convenient 
and 
outcome-determinative 
hypothesis 
that 
the 
relevant language is not actually the "test" the parties think 
it is.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Such 
an 
approach 
also 
fosters 
consistency 
and 
predictability.  "As the distinction between holding and dicta 
becomes increasingly vague, past precedents can be increasingly 
manipulated . . . [by] 
offer[ing] 
some 
facially 
plausible 
argument for disregarding a statement in a prior case."  Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 
953, 1024 (2005).  Therefore, "loose and unpredictable standards 
for determining whether a statement is dicta can undermine stare 
decisis and the principles of judicial restraint."  Est. of 
Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶83, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 
N.W.2d 481 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
9 
 
¶174 Of note is that no party here asked us to overrule 
Ekern.6  See St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶37, 398 
Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635 (observing that "no party asked us to 
overrule either" of two cases and declining to "overrule or 
revisit either case on our own initiative").  Indeed, WEC argued 
within the confines of Ekern that the ballot question at issue 
provided "every essential" of the amendment.  We have thus been 
provided no special justification for overruling Ekern.  As 
such, I would maintain the Ekern test.  Doing so not only 
respects the precedent established by the courts who came before 
us, but in this case furthers the aims of democratic governance.  
Making sure that a ballot question includes "every essential" of 
an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can "vote 
intelligently."  Ekern, 187 Wis. at 204.  This is critical to 
maintaining a democracy.   
¶175 The result of the majority's error is an overly 
permissive approach that risks giving the legislature carte 
blanche in crafting ballot questions.  The potential for a 
ballot question to mislead the public leads me to believe that a 
more exacting standard is necessary.  Ekern's "every essential" 
test provides more of a safeguard, enhancing the sacred right to 
vote, than does the majority's proffered new test.   
¶176 When a ballot question fails to accurately describe 
"every essential" of a corresponding constitutional amendment, 
the people have not spoken on the true question.  Rather than 
                                                 
6 WEC confirmed at oral argument that it was not asking for 
this court to overturn "any of its prior decisions." 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
10 
 
heralding that "the people have spoken" through their votes, 
instead the people are misled and democracy is undermined.  
Accordingly, I would maintain a test that provides more of a 
safeguard against such an outcome.  The established Ekern test 
fits the bill. 
B 
¶177 Applying the Ekern test to the ballot question at 
issue here, I determine that the ballot question fails to inform 
voters of "every essential" of the amendment. 
¶178 It is true that our previous cases offer precious 
little guidance in what it means to inform voters of "every 
essential."  Indeed, challenges to ballot questions are rare in 
our jurisprudence, and when they are challenged the attack is 
often leveled on other grounds.  See, e.g., McConkey, 326 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶4 (addressing a challenge under the "separate 
amendment rule"). 
¶179 As observed above, both parties here framed their 
arguments in terms of the Ekern test, and their arguments 
provide us with some guideposts as to the contours of the 
inquiry.  WEC proposes the following understanding:  "this Court 
should hold that the 'every essential' standard requires that 
the Legislature 'fairly express' the 'clear and essential 
purpose' of the proposed amendment in the ballot question."  For 
support, WEC points us to Minnesota law applying a similar 
standard.  See Breza v. Kiffmeyer, 723 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 
2006). 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
11 
 
¶180 In contrast, WJI cites language in Ekern itself as 
providing the operative standard:  "It is clear and unambiguous, 
so as to enable voters to vote intelligently."  Ekern, 187 Wis. 
at 204.  "[T]he principal and essential criterion consists in a 
submission of a question or a form which has for its object and 
purpose an intelligent and comprehensive submission to the 
people, so that the latter may be fully informed on the subject 
upon which they are required to exercise a franchise."  Id. at 
201-02; Thomson, 264 Wis. at 659. 
¶181 Under either formulation, the ballot question here 
fails.  I begin my analysis with the essential fact, recognized 
by the circuit court, that the victim's rights amendment does 
more than just increase the rights of crime victims.  The 
majority fails to acknowledge this.  Instead, it opines:  "all 
of the provisions of Marsy's Law relate to expanding and 
defining victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this 
general purpose."  Majority op., ¶6.  
¶182 Several provisions of the amendment do, in fact, 
decrease the rights afforded to criminal defendants.  For 
example, the amendment limits the rights of criminal defendants 
in the following ways: 
 Where the previous version of § 9m stated that 
"[n]othing in this section, or in any statute enacted 
pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the 
accused which may be provided by law," the new version 
protects only the federal constitutional rights of the 
defendant, 
not 
the 
broader 
protection 
of 
"any 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
12 
 
right . . . provided by law."  The change  allows for 
a limitation of the defendant's rights that are 
provided by statute, or by the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which may afford greater protections than its federal 
counterpart.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 
 The 
amendment 
adversely 
impacts 
the 
defendant's 
ability to obtain discovery, giving victims the 
constitutional 
right 
"[t]o 
refuse 
an 
interview, 
deposition, or other discovery request made by the 
accused or any person acting on behalf of the 
accused."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(L). 
 The circuit court's ability to sequester a victim 
witness where "sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant" has been removed. 
¶183 The new language that allows a victim to essentially 
refuse interviews and discovery requests would certainly seem to 
have a detrimental effect on the rights of the accused.  
Similarly, the previous constitutional language allowed a 
circuit court to sequester a victim from the courtroom to 
preserve the fair trial right of the defendant.  This right is 
now gone.   
¶184 Shouldn't the voters be informed that a constitutional 
amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants before 
voting on it?  In light of these provisions, it is apparent that 
the amendment serves dual "purposes," both expanding the rights 
of victims and diminishing those of the accused. 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
13 
 
¶185 By any definition of the word, such a change is an 
"essential" aspect of an amendment.  Accordingly, a voter would 
need to be informed of the change before voting "intelligently."  
Its lack of inclusion has the significant potential to mislead 
voters as to the consequences of their votes. 
¶186 The majority tersely disposes of this argument within 
the span of a single paragraph.  See majority op., ¶55.  It does 
so with a one-two punch, first setting up a false dichotomy 
followed closely by a strawman.  To explain, the majority 
directs the reader not to the question of "whether the amendment 
was explained, but whether it was 'submitted' to the people."  
Id.  Yet according to the majority, if an amendment is not 
properly explained (i.e., it is "fundamentally counterfactual"), 
that does not constitute "submission."  In other words, an 
examination of the "explanation" offered is not irrelevant to 
the "submission" question, but is instead part and parcel of 
such a determination. 
¶187 Next, the majority advances that "[n]othing in the 
constitution requires that all components be presented in the 
ballot question."  Id.  This is a strawman.  I do not argue, and 
I do not understand any of the parties to be arguing, that all 
components of an amendment be presented in a ballot question.  
Our precedent establishes, and I maintain, that only "every 
essential" is required.     
¶188 When an amendment to the state constitution is placed 
before the voters for an up or down vote, it is imperative that 
the voters know what they are voting on.  It can be a difficult 
No.  2020AP2003.awb 
 
14 
 
exercise to distill a complex and multifaceted constitutional 
amendment down to a simple description that will fit on the 
ballot, yet still informs voters of the true nature of the 
question. 
¶189 Nevertheless, the ballot question is the only text 
that all voters are guaranteed to see.  See Craig M. Burnett & 
Vladimir Kogan, When Does Ballot Language Influence Voter 
Choices?  Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 32 Pol. Commc'n 
109, 112 (2015).  Those voters who do not research a proposed 
amendment beforehand will see the ballot question, and only the 
ballot question, prior to casting their vote.  This gives the 
framing provided by the ballot question considerable power in 
shaping how voters think about and understand the question 
presented. 
¶190 That ballot question language possesses this power to 
frame the issue in turn dictates that the language provide an 
accurate picture of the measure that is placed before the 
voters.  To this end, we should maintain the vitality of 
judicial review in the ballot question context, rather than 
essentially surrendering our responsibility for judicial review 
to the legislature.  Democracy works best when voters are fully 
informed.  The majority opinion takes a step backward in this 
endeavor.   
¶191 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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