Title: Conservation Commission of Norton v. Pesa

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13058 
 
CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NORTON  vs.  ROBERT PESA1 & another.2 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 9, 2021. - August 31, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Wetlands Protection Act.  Municipal Corporations, Conservation 
commission.  Repose, Statute of.  Practice, Civil, Claim 
barred by statute of repose. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 22, 2016. 
 
The case was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J., on 
motions for summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
A. Alexander Weisheit for the plaintiff. 
David S. Frankel, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the Commonwealth. 
Donald P. Nagle for the defendants. 
Donald D. Cooper, for Massachusetts Association of 
Conservation Commissions, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Individually and as trustee of the Pesa 2000 Realty Trust. 
 
2 Annabella Pesa, individually and as trustee of the Pesa 
2000 Realty Trust. 
2 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The Wetlands Protection Act, G. L. c. 131, 
§ 40 (act), generally prohibits removing, filling, dredging, or 
altering wetlands without an order of conditions from a local 
conservation commission or issuing authority.  The act also 
provides that "[a]ny person" who acquires property on which work 
has been done in violation of the act shall restore the property 
to its original or permitted condition; but the act limits the 
time period during which an enforcement action against "such 
person" may be brought.  See G. L. c. 131, § 40.  Specifically, 
the act provides that any action must be brought within three 
years of the recording of the deed (or date of death) by which 
"such person" acquires the property.  See id. 
In this case, the conservation commission of Norton 
(commission) issued an enforcement order to owners of property 
on which unauthorized fill had been placed by a prior owner, 
directing the current owners to remove the fill.  When the 
current owners neither challenged nor complied with the order, 
the commission brought an action against them in the Superior 
Court, seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties.  A 
Superior Court judge construed the act as creating a statute of 
repose that prevents a conservation commission from bringing an 
enforcement action more than three years following the first 
transfer of ownership in the property after the asserted 
3 
 
violation occurred.  Because the current owners acquired title 
after this period, the judge denied the commission's motion for 
summary judgment, and granted the owners' cross motion. 
We agree with the judge that the act creates a statute of 
repose.  The repose, however, does not run with the land; 
rather, the repose is personal.  It requires the commission to 
commence an enforcement action within three years of the 
recording of the deed (or date of death) pursuant to which the 
new owner acquires the property.  After that period, the 
commission may not commence an action against that owner for 
preexisting violations.  Once the property again changes hands, 
however, the act permits the commission to commence an action 
against the subsequent owner, so long as it does so within three 
years of the triggering event –- the recording of the deed or 
date of death by which title was acquired.  Accordingly, because 
the commission commenced this enforcement action against the 
current owners within three years of the recording of the deed 
by which they acquired title, the act does not bar the action.  
The order granting summary judgment for the owners therefore 
must be vacated and set aside, and the matter remanded to the 
4 
 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.3 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the material, 
undisputed facts from the record.  See Arias-Villano v. Chang & 
Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 626 (2019). 
John Teixeira purchased a 2.3-acre property in the town of 
Norton (town) in 1967.  In 1979, he filed a notice of intent 
with the commission, in which he proposed to construct a store, 
install a sanitation system, and place fill for a parking lot on 
the property.  The commission determined, after a public 
hearing, that a freshwater meadow adjacent to the proposed fill 
site was significant to the public's interest in flood control 
and storm damage prevention, but approved the project and issued 
an order of conditions, allowing the project with the specific 
plan that had been submitted. 
 
In 1984, the commission sent a letter to John Teixeira 
asserting that the fill limits delineated in the approved plan 
"appear[ed] to have been exceeded" and asking him to submit an 
updated "sketch" of the fill locations.4  In 1996, he deeded the 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Commonwealth and the Massachusetts Association of Conservation 
Commissions. 
 
4 There is no indication in the record whether John Teixeira 
responded to this letter.  The commission wrote to him again in 
1987, asking how much additional fill he intended to place on 
the property, and, in 1988, based on an apparent response by the 
5 
 
property to himself and his wife, Ann Teixeira, as tenants by 
the entirety; he died in 2006. 
In 2014, Ann Teixeira decided to sell the property to the 
defendants, Robert and Annabella Pesa.  An attorney working on 
the closing contacted the commission to request a "certificate 
of compliance," which the commission was required to grant if 
the completed work on the property complied with the order of 
conditions issued to John Teixeira in 1979.  See G. L. c. 131, 
§ 40.  In conjunction with that request, an "as-built plan" was 
submitted on behalf of Ann Teixeira, delineating the areas of 
the property that had been filled.  The plan indicated that fill 
had been placed to the south of the approved work limit set 
forth in the order of conditions; notations on the plan stated 
that it was not clear whether that area had contained wetlands.  
A commission conservation agent also conducted a site inspection 
and reviewed historical aerial photographs of the property.  The 
commission wrote to Ann Teixeira in October 2014, explaining 
that there were 11,000 square feet of excess, unauthorized fill 
on the property and that, between 1995 and 2004, 2005 and 2006, 
and 2006 and 2013, vegetation had been cleared beyond the 
 
Army Corps of Engineers to the commission, stating that the 
project was not in violation of Federal law, provided that he 
did not place additional fill. 
6 
 
approved work limit; the commission requested that the 
unauthorized fill be removed.5 
The defendants, then prospective buyers of the property, 
wrote to the commission in November 2014, stating, "As the 
buyers, it is in our best interest [to] be involved in any 
changes to the property, to ensure that our investment meets our 
needs."  They asked the commission to give them time to contact 
engineering firms to solicit bids "for the removal of material 
as identified in the [o]rder of [c]onditions" and to provide a 
solution "that best meets the regulations as set forth in the 
[act]."  In December 2014, the defendants, as trustees of the 
Pesa 2000 Realty Trust, purchased the property. 
Over the following months, the defendants and the 
commission engaged in discussions regarding the property and the 
order of conditions.  In June 2015, the defendants proposed to 
complete certain work enumerated in the 1979 order of conditions 
that was not yet completed, such as installing a perforated dry 
well and siltation control to comply with the commission's 
original request to Teixeira to provide a final stabilization 
plan.  The defendants did not suggest that they would undertake 
 
5 Alternatively, the commission advised that a new notice of 
intent could be filed, which would allow some of the excess fill 
to remain in place.  The commission noted that, should this 
option be pursued, at least 6,000 square feet of excess fill 
would have to be removed due to "storm water management 
requirements and the Rivers Act." 
7 
 
to remove any excess fill, which they asserted was not 
necessary.  At an August 2015 public meeting, defendant Robert 
Pesa again indicated that he did not intend to remove fill from 
the property.  The commission voted at the meeting to proceed 
with issuing an enforcement order.  The defendants responded by 
letter the following day, disputing "that there is any valid or 
beneficial reason to remove the 35-year-old fill and disrupt the 
surrounding wetlands, vegetation, and thriving businesses on the 
property." 
On August 25, 2015, an enforcement order issued stating 
that, in violation of the 1979 order of conditions, 
approximately 13,000 square feet of unauthorized fill had been 
placed on the property between 1980 and 1984, and vegetation had 
been cleared beyond the approved work limit between 1995 and 
2004.  The enforcement order directed the defendants to cease 
all activities in the affected areas and to restore the affected 
areas to their "original condition."  The defendants did not 
comply with the order and did not commence legal action to 
challenge it. 
b.  Superior Court proceedings.  In June 2016, the 
commission commenced an action in the Superior Court seeking 
injunctive relief and civil penalties, in the form of fines, as 
a result of the defendants' failure to comply with the 
enforcement order, in violation of G. L. c. 131, § 40.  In 
8 
 
December 2018, the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  In June 2020, a Superior Court judge granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the 
commission's. 
The commission's complaint included separate claims 
regarding the excess fill and the unauthorized clearing of 
vegetation.6  With respect to the latter, the judge determined 
that because the clearing was a single act and not a continuing 
violation, see Worcester v. Gencarelli, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 
908 (1993), and because the commission alleged that clearing had 
last been undertaken in 2004, the commission's enforcement order 
as to the clearing was barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations, see G. L. c. 131, § 91.  Before us, the commission 
does not challenge this determination. 
With respect to the unauthorized fill, the judge determined 
that because G. L. c. 131, § 40, contains a statute of repose, 
the commission's action was prohibited.  He viewed the provision 
as requiring the commission to bring an enforcement action 
within three years of the first transfer of ownership in the 
property occurring after the unauthorized filling originally 
took place.  Because the unauthorized filling occurred no later 
 
6 The defendants disputed that there was an underlying 
violation of the act.  The judge concluded that having failed to 
challenge the order in an action in the nature of certiorari, 
see G. L. c. 249, § 4, they had waived that argument. 
9 
 
than 1984, when John Teixeira owned the property, and because he 
transferred the property to himself and his wife in 1996,7 the 
judge determined that the statute of repose barred enforcement 
actions commencing after 1999, and thus denied the commission's 
motion for summary judgment.  The commission appealed from this 
portion of the decision, and we transferred the matter to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review a decision on a motion for 
summary judgment de novo.  See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 
556 (2020).  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  See id.; Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  Because the parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment, we view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered, see Miramar Park Ass'n, Inc. v. Dennis, 
480 Mass. 366, 377 (2018), here, the commission. 
a.  Preclusion from challenging enforcement order.  As a 
preliminary matter, the commission maintains that the judge 
erred in allowing the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
 
7 Given the result we reach, we need not address the 
commission's contention that the transfer from John Teixeira to 
himself and his wife, Ann Teixeira, as tenants by the entirety, 
was not the triggering first transfer of property, and that 
instead the first transfer was the sale to the defendants in 
2014. 
10 
 
because the defendants failed timely to seek review of the 
commission's enforcement order pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
and therefore were barred from challenging its validity.  See 
Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 791-
792 (2012) (review of conservation commission's enforcement 
order is "available only through an action in the nature of 
certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4").  We disagree. 
A statute of repose has the effect of "abolishing" a cause 
of action after a certain date.  See Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 
445 Mass. 353, 358 (2005); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702 
(1982).  Thus, the defendants' argument that the present action 
is barred by the statute of repose in essence states that the 
statute of repose has abolished the cause of action the 
commission purported to enforce, and that the enforcement order 
was issued outside the commission's authority.  Such a defense 
is not waived by the failure to seek review of an enforcement 
order; instead, it asserts a substantive right to be free from 
liability.  See Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 
349, 352 (2018).  Compare Director of the Div. of Water 
Pollution Control v. Uxbridge, 361 Mass. 589, 592-593 (1972) 
(judge may consider whether agency action is within its 
jurisdiction, even if aggrieved party has not sought review of 
agency decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A); Lippman v. 
Conservation Comm'n of Hopkinton, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5-6 
11 
 
(2011) (party contending commission's order is without effect is 
not seeking review of discretionary order by commission). 
b.  Subsequent owners' liability under the act.  General 
Laws c. 131, § 40, provides, 
"Any person who purchases, inherits or otherwise acquires 
real estate upon which work has been done in violation of 
the provisions of this section or in violation of any order 
issued under this section shall forthwith comply with any 
such order or restore such real estate to its condition 
prior to any such violation; provided, however, that no 
action, civil or criminal, shall be brought against such 
person unless such action is commenced within three years 
following the recording of the deed or the date of the 
death by which such real estate was acquired by such 
person." 
 
The commission argues that the judge erroneously interpreted 
G. L. c. 131, § 40, as establishing a statute of repose limiting 
the commission's enforcement authority to three years after the 
first transfer of property by an owner who placed unauthorized 
fill. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  
See Boss, 484 Mass. at 556.  "Our primary goal in interpreting a 
statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature . . . ."  
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018), quoting 
AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 477 Mass. 
296, 300 (2017).  "The general and familiar rule is that a 
statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
12 
 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Commissioner of Revenue v. Dupee, 423 Mass. 617, 
620 (1996), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975). 
"The language of the statute is the primary source of 
insight into" legislative intent (citation omitted).  Casseus, 
478 Mass. at 795. "Where the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent," and 
"courts enforce the statute according to its plain wording . . . 
so long as its application would not lead to an absurd result."  
Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013) 
(College Hill), quoting Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n v. 
Assessors of W. Tisbury, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27–28 (2004).  
"All the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and 
usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be construed with 
reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue 
emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably 
possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each 
other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to 
accomplish its manifest purpose."  College Hill, supra at 139, 
quoting Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 
309, 312–313 (1949).  "Ultimately, we must avoid any 
13 
 
construction of statutory language which leads to an absurd 
result, or that otherwise would frustrate the Legislature's 
intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  Bellalta v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019). 
i.  Statute of repose.  We agree with the judge that the 
act establishes a statute of repose.  "A statute of repose 
eliminates a cause of action at a specified time, regardless of 
whether an injury has occurred or a cause of action has accrued 
as of that date."  Bridgwood, 480 Mass. at 352.  A statute of 
repose is distinct from a statute of limitations, which 
"specifies the time limit for commencing an action after the 
cause of action has accrued."  Id. at 351.  While a statute of 
limitations provides a procedural defense to a legal claim, a 
statute of repose provides a substantive right to be free from 
liability.  See id. at 352. 
 
The act prohibits the commission from bringing a cause of 
action against a person who acquires property on which work has 
been done in violation of the act three years after either of 
two numerated events:  "the recording of the deed or the date of 
the death by which such real estate was acquired by such 
person."  G. L. c. 131, § 40.  Compare D'Allessandro v. Lennar 
Hingham Holdings, LLC, 486 Mass. 150, 154 (2020) (G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2B, which provides that in no event shall actions be commenced 
more than six years after earlier of two events, establishes 
14 
 
statute of repose).  The act does not specify a period of time 
within which an action must be commenced after a cause of action 
has accrued.  Compare Commonwealth v. John G. Grant & Sons Co., 
403 Mass. 151, 158-159 (1988) (G. L. c. 131, § 91, which 
provides that action must be commenced within two years after 
time when cause of action accrued or offense was committed, is 
statute of limitations).  Regardless of when a conservation 
commission discovers a preexisting violation (or when it 
reasonably could have discovered the violation), the act 
prohibits it from seeking to enforce an order to cure the 
violation against the owner at a time certain, three years after 
the recording of the deed (or the date of death) by which the 
owner acquired the property.  See McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 
Mass. 617, 622 (1992). 
 
ii.  Entitlement to repose.  The judge construed the act as 
proscribing actions against subsequent owners of property on 
which work has been done, in violation of the act, more than 
three years after the first subsequent owner had acquired the 
property following the initial violation.  He based this 
interpretation on his conclusion that the statute of repose 
applies to all those in privity with the first subsequent owner 
to acquire the property. 
By its plain language, see D'Allessandro, 486 Mass. at 154, 
however, the act permits a conservation commission to bring an 
15 
 
enforcement action against "any person" who acquires property on 
which work has been done in violation of the act, not just the 
first such person.  The act provides that no action shall be 
brought against "such person" unless the action is commenced 
within three years of "such person" having acquired the 
property.  The act, therefore, permits an action to be initiated 
against any subsequent owner, so long as that action is 
commenced within three years of that particular individual 
obtaining title to the property. 
This construction is bolstered by the legislative history 
of the act.  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 609 (2019) ("Although 
'legislative history is not ordinarily a proper source of 
construction,' we use it to augment our interpretation of the 
language of a statute" [citation omitted]).  General Laws 
c. 131, § 40, first enacted in 1967, see St. 1967, c. 802, § 1, 
"was created to protect wetlands from destructive intrusion" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Miramar Park Ass'n, Inc., 480 
Mass. at 368.8  While, initially, the act had authorized local 
conservation commissions only to "recommend" protective measures 
 
8 The Legislature previously had enacted protections for 
coastal wetlands in 1963, see St. 1963, c. 426; and for inland 
wetlands in 1965, see St. 1965, c. 220.  See generally Hamilton 
v. Conservation Comm'n of Orleans, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 364-
365 (1981). 
16 
 
concerning work on wetlands, see Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n 
of Orleans, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 354-365 (1981), by 1972, the 
act expanded the purview of local conservation commissions, 
vesting them with the statutory authority to issue orders of 
conditions to regulate work affecting wetlands, as well as to 
commence enforcement actions to cure violations of the act, see 
G. L. c. 131, § 40; St. 1972, c. 784, § 1.  At that time, the 
act also provided that any person who acquired property on which 
work had been done in violation of its provisions was required 
to restore the property to its original or permitted condition; 
the act contained no period of repose.  See St. 1972, c. 784, 
§ 1. 
 
In 1974, the Legislature rejected a proposal by the 
Massachusetts Conveyancers Association9 that would have limited 
liability for subsequent landowners to "three years following 
the commencement of the work alleged to be violation" of the 
act.  See 1974 House Doc. No. 689.  One year later, in 1975, the 
 
 
9 The Massachusetts Conveyancers Association, a group of 
approximately 3,000 real estate attorneys in Massachusetts, is 
now known as the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, 
Inc. (REBA).  See, e.g., Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. 
v. National Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 Mass. 512, 516, 518-
519 (2011).  REBA's mission statement notes, "For nearly 150 
years, REBA's shared legacy has been advancing the practice of 
real estate law while upholding and promoting fair dealing, 
professional networking and collegiality among members of the 
real estate bar."  The Real Estate Bar Association for 
Massachusetts, Our Mission, https://www.reba.net/about-us/our-
mission/ [https://perma.cc/49CM-WVD4]. 
17 
 
Massachusetts Conveyancers Association proposed another, related 
amendment, entitled, "An Act to regulate the enforcement of 
violations of the wetlands law against subsequent owners."  See 
1975 House Doc. No. 655.  The language of the proposed amendment 
stated that no action could be brought against any person who 
acquires property on which work had been done in violation of 
the act unless the action were commenced within "two years" 
after the date of acquisition "by the first such person to 
acquire it."  Id. 
The Legislature did not adopt the amendment as proposed, 
and instead adopted a modified version that replaced the two-
year period of repose with a three-year period and struck out 
the phrases "the first" and "to acquire it."  The amendment the 
Legislature ultimately enacted, entitled, "An Act relative to 
the enforcement of violations of the wetlands law against 
subsequent owners of certain real property," thus provided that 
no action shall be brought against any person who acquires 
property on which work has been done in violation of the act 
unless the action is commenced within "three years" following 
the date of acquisition "by such person."  St. 1975, c. 334.10 
 
10 A summary of the amendment in the package provided to the 
Governor stated that the amendment "[p]rovides [a three]-year 
statute of limitations on operation of [G. L. c. 131, § 40,] by 
which a person acquiring real estate by purchase or inheritance, 
on which work has been carried out in violation of the Wetlands 
18 
 
Thus, the Legislature was squarely presented with the 
suggestion to use language that would have barred all actions 
against subsequent owners for two years following the first 
transfer of a property; yet the Legislature chose not to do so.  
See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 195 (2019); Canton 
v. Commissioner of the Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 794 
(2010).  Because the Legislature rejected the proposed amendment 
and replaced it with broader language, it is evident that the 
Legislature did not intend the provision to bar all actions 
commenced three years after the first transfer of a property.  
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220 (1983) ("While we 
are correctly reluctant to draw inferences from the failure of 
Congress to act, it would, in this case, appear improper for us 
to give a reading to the Act that Congress considered and 
rejected").  See also City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 
481 Mass. 784, 791-792 (2019) (statute cannot be read to include 
rejected language); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 
Mass. 156, 164 (1998) (inappropriate for judge to reinsert 
rejected language). 
The defendants argue, as the judge reasoned, that 
interpreting the act to permit conservation commissions to bring 
 
Act, may be compelled to return the land to its condition prior 
to the violation." 
19 
 
enforcement orders within three years of each subsequent 
acquisition of property would defeat the general purpose of 
statutes of repose to provide finality.  We disagree.  The 
period of repose, set forth in plain language, provides finality 
for each subsequent owner.  The repose is personal.  Three years 
after each subsequent owner acquires title, any cause of action 
under the act against that owner, for preexisting violations on 
the property, is precluded.  See Rudenauer, 445 Mass. at 358; 
Klein, 386 Mass. at 702. 
Interpreting the act in this way also is consistent with 
the over-all statutory scheme.  See Oyster Creek Preservation, 
Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 862 
(2007) (G. L. c. 131, § 40, sets out "comprehensive scheme" to 
manage wetlands projects).  The act not only prohibits 
unauthorized filling of wetlands, but also provides that leaving 
unauthorized fill in place is a continuing violation.  See G. L. 
c. 131, § 40.  The statutory language specifies that "[e]ach 
day" a person "fails to remove unauthorized fill" constitutes a 
separate offense.  Id.  Thus, a property owner who leaves in 
place unauthorized fill on his or her property -- regardless of 
the origin of the fill -- is committing a distinct and separate 
violation of the act and may be required to cure that violation.  
See John G. Grant & Sons Co., 403 Mass. at 157 (presence of 
20 
 
unauthorized fill is continuing wrong warranting injunctive 
relief). 
An interpretation that enforcement is possible only with 
respect to the first subsequent owner would leave conservation 
commissions without a means to enforce certain continuing 
violations, contrary to the Legislature's apparent intent that 
wetlands be protected against ongoing violations.  Interpreting 
the act to permit enforcement actions against each subsequent 
owner thus is more consistent with the statutory scheme and the 
recognition that each subsequent owner may be committing 
independent, daily violations by leaving in place unauthorized 
fill. 
Interpreting the act to permit enforcement against each 
subsequent owner also is consistent with the act's recording 
scheme.  The act provides that orders of conditions authorizing 
work in protected resource areas must be recorded at the 
registry of deeds (or, if applicable, the Land Court) before 
work may begin.  See G. L. c. 131, § 40.  Once the work is 
complete, the property owner must seek a certificate of 
compliance, see 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(9)(a) (2014), at 
which point a commission conservation agent must inspect the 
property to determine whether the work was done in accordance 
with the order of conditions, see G. L. c. 131, § 40, and 310 
Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(9)(b).  Once a certificate of 
21 
 
compliance has been issued, that certificate also is recorded in 
the registry of deeds or in the Land Court.  See 310 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 10.05(9)(f). 
This recording scheme provides prospective purchasers of 
property with notice that an order of conditions exists and, if 
no certificate of completion has been recorded, the possibility 
that any work accomplished under that order may have been done 
in violation of the order.  Here, for example, as stated, during 
the process of the defendants' purchase of the property, an 
attorney working on the closing requested a certificate of 
compliance for the property.  When none was issued, the 
defendants contacted the commission concerning changes to the 
property that were required to be made.  While the defendants 
are correct that the purpose of statutes of repose is to prevent 
older claims from "surprising the parties" (citation omitted), 
Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 344, 351 (2005), here, the defendants 
could not have been surprised that the commission brought an 
enforcement action against them after their months-long 
interactions concerning the asserted violations and requested 
restoration of the property.  Interpreting the statute of repose 
to apply personally, and to permit enforcement against each 
subsequent owner, thus is consistent with the act's recording 
scheme.  Accordingly, G. L. c. 131, § 40, does not bar the 
instant action. 
22 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants is vacated and set aside.  The matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.