Title: The People v. Steward

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 108  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Owen Steward,
            Appellant.
Jalina J. Hudson, for appellant.
Timothy C. Stone, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
The issue before us in this appeal is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing a five-minute limitation
on counsel for the questioning of jurors during each round of
voir dire in this multiple felony case.  Based on the seriousness
and number of charges, the identity of the victim and certain
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No. 108
characteristics of prospective jurors that were revealed during
examination by the court, we conclude that the trial court erred
in adhering to the unusually short time restriction after defense
counsel objected.  Defendant is therefore entitled to a new
trial.
This prosecution arose from a robbery that allegedly
occurred outside a Manhattan nightclub in the early morning hours
of July 23, 2006.  The alleged victim of the crime was Raashaun
Casey, a prominent radio personality in New York City known as
"DJ Envy" who hosted a show on "Hot 97," a popular radio station. 
According to the witnesses presented by the People at trial,
defendant and an unidentified accomplice accosted Casey and his
friend Derrick Parris at gunpoint as the two men were leaving the
nightclub, demanding that Casey hand over his $25,000 gold and
diamond necklace.  
After obtaining the necklace, defendant and the
accomplice fled the scene in a vehicle driven by defendant. 
Casey and Parris followed them in Casey's car, resulting in a
high speed car chase through lower Manhattan.  The defendant's
vehicle crashed and the pursuit continued on foot, with the
victim and Parris ultimately apprehending and detaining defendant
but not the accomplice (whose identity remains unknown). 
Defendant offered proof suggesting that he had been beaten by
Casey and Parris before the police arrived, which resulted in his
hospitalization for several days after his arrest.  Defendant was
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No. 108
subsequently charged with multiple counts of first and second-
degree robbery as well as various weapon possession offenses.
Prior to the commencement of jury selection, the trial
judge informed the parties that the attorneys would be given only
five minutes to question each panel of prospective jurors.  The
judge began voir dire by instructing and examining the venire
members on a variety of topics and then permitted counsel to
question the panel.  At the conclusion of the first round of voir
dire, defense counsel objected to the time limit, contending that
five minutes was an insufficient period of time for counsel to
conduct an adequate inquiry of venire persons in light of the
complexity of the prosecution, which involved multiple class B
felony charges.  Defense counsel suggested that the trial judge's
usual five minute "rule" that she had employed in misdemeanor
cases -- where only six jurors were being selected and the
parties had only three peremptory challenges -- should not apply
in this instance where the charges against defendant were
serious, 12 jurors were being selected and the parties would be
exercising 15 peremptory challenges.  He also cited examples of
several topics that he hoped to discuss with the prospective
jurors but had not had time to address as he was able to speak to
only two of the 16 prospective jurors during the allotted time.  
Without addressing defendant's objection, the court continued to
enforce the time limit in the two subsequent rounds of voir dire. 
The impact of this decision was evident throughout the
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No. 108
remainder of voir dire, particularly in the third round.  In
response to questioning by the court, 12 prospective jurors
indicated that they, or people close to them, had been victims of
robbery or theft.  Several others stated that they had either
witnessed or been the victims of violent crimes.  Some of these
individuals told the judge that they did not "think" their past
experiences would affect their ability to deliberate in this case
while at least one indicated it might (the court did not follow-
up with this juror).  After this series of questions, the court
sua sponte excused a number of jurors but the record does not
indicate whether the individuals that had been crime victims were
discharged (defendant suggests that none were).  Given the
unusual role the victim allegedly played in facilitating
defendant's capture and arrest and the considerable number of
venire members that had been victims of crime, there were
undoubtedly topics that would have been appropriate for follow-up
questioning by counsel. 
During this same round, two prospective jurors
indicated that they had ties to law enforcement and several
others identified themselves as lawyers or law students.  Two
members of the panel stated they had previously served on a jury;
one had deliberated to verdict and the other case ended in a hung
jury.  In addition, three jurors responded that they were
familiar with "DJ Envy," with one acknowledging that he listened
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No. 108
to the victim's radio show.1  
Yet, as a result of the time restriction on questioning
by counsel, defense counsel had only five minutes to explore the
issues that had arisen during questioning by the court.  Defense
counsel used his time segment to ask follow-up questions of the
prospective juror that had previously sat on a deadlocked jury. 
He also inquired of the panel whether jurors would hold it
against his client if he did not give an opening statement and
whether they would draw a negative inference from his client's
decision not to testify on his own behalf.  At this point, the
court interrupted counsel to warn him that only one minute
remained for questioning.  Time expired before defense counsel
had an opportunity to examine any of the prospective jurors who
stated that they had heard of the victim or indicated that they
had been witnesses or victims of crime.  
After the jury was selected and sworn, the trial
proceeded and defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in
the first degree and one count of robbery in the second degree. 
1  This was a recurring theme during jury selection.  Before
prospective jurors were placed in panels, the trial court
generally asked the entire venire whether they had heard of or
knew the victim either by the name Raashaun Casey or "DJ Envy." 
Many individuals raised their hands.  The court then instructed
that anyone who thought his or her knowledge of the victim would
impede fair consideration of the evidence was free to leave.  An
unidentified number of individuals left -- but it appears that
many prospective jurors that were familiar with the victim
remained, including the three venire members questioned during
the third round.
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No. 108
On appeal, defendant contended that he should be granted a new
trial because counsel was not provided with an adequate
opportunity to examine prospective jurors during voir dire and
the defense was prejudiced as a result.  The Appellate Division
rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction (72 AD3d 524). 
A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal and we
now reverse. 
In criminal cases, jury selection is governed by CPL
270.15, which directs that prospective jurors will initially be
questioned by the trial court (CPL 270.15[b]).  The statute also
provides:
"The court shall permit both parties . . . to
examine the prospective jurors, individually
or collectively, regarding their
qualification to serve as jurors.  Each party
shall be afforded a fair opportunity to
question the prospective jurors as to any
unexplored matter affecting their
qualifications, but the court shall not
permit questioning that is repetitious or
irrelevant, or questions as to a juror's
knowledge of rules of law" (CPL 270.15[c]).
CPL 270.15 does not contain guidelines relating to the duration
of voir dire but states that the scope of counsel's examination
of prospective jurors "shall be within the discretion of the
court" (id.).  This Court has emphasized the broad discretion
afforded trial courts in this arena (see People v Jean, 75 NY2d
744 [1989]; People v Pepper, 59 NY2d 353 [1983]; People v
Boulware, 29 NY2d 135 [1971], cert denied 405 US 995 [1972]),
while cautioning that any restrictions imposed on voir dire "must
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nevertheless afford . . . counsel a fair opportunity to question
prospective jurors about relevant matters" (Jean, 75 NY2d at
745).  
As we have previously recognized, this area of law is
not amenable to "the formulation of precise standards or to the
fashioning of rigid guidelines" that can be applied across-the-
board in all cases (Boulware, 29 NY2d at 139).   Thus, the
Legislature has left to the trial court the supervision of the
process of counsel questioning during jury selection.  Should a
court choose at the outset to allocate a fixed period of time for
such questioning, the allotment should be appropriate to the
circumstances of the case.  
It would be impossible to compile an exhaustive list of
all the factors that might inform a trial court's determination
of this issue.  But, in most cases, relevant considerations would
include: the number of jurors and alternate jurors to be selected
and the number of peremptory challenges available to the parties;
the number, nature and seriousness of the pending charges; any
notoriety the case may have received in the media or local
community; special considerations arising from the legal issues
raised in the case, including anticipated defenses such as
justification or a plea of not responsible by reason of mental
disease or defect; any unique concerns emanating from the
identity or characteristics of the defendant, the victim, the
witnesses or counsel; and the extent to which the court will
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No. 108
examine prospective jurors on relevant topics.  Because voir dire
is a fluid process and it is not always possible to anticipate
the issues that may arise during examination of the venire, it is
also incumbent on counsel to advise the court if any temporal
limitation imposed relating to juror questioning is proving, in
practice, to be unduly restrictive and prejudicial.  
In this case, the trial judge was particularly
conscientious in her extensive examination of the venire and her
sua sponte discharge of prospective jurors who offered troubling
responses -- a commendable approach that is certainly to be
encouraged.  But the controversy centers around 
the court's imposition of a five minute restriction on counsel
questioning for each round of voir dire.  As defendant points
out, five minutes per round is significantly shorter than the
time restrictions that have previously been upheld in this Court
and the Appellate Divisions (see Jean, 75 NY2d 744 [trial court
did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel questioning to
15 minutes in first two rounds and 10 minutes in third round of
voir dire]; see e.g. People v Davis, 166 AD2d 453 [2d Dept], lv
denied 76 NY2d 985 [1990] [15 minute restriction in first round
followed by 10 minutes in second and third rounds not an abuse of
discretion]; People v Erickson, 156 AD2d 760 [3d Dept 1989], lv
denied 75 NY2d 966 [1990] [10 minute restriction in each round
was not an abuse of discretion]).  While we agree with the People
that this fact is not determinative because the propriety of a
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No. 108
limitation on counsel questioning must be assessed based on all
the circumstances presented in a particular case, the fact that
the time restriction appears to be substantially shorter than the
norm in this multiple felony prosecution is an important
consideration in our review of defendant's claim.
It is also significant that defendant was facing four
serious class B violent felony charges -- offenses punishable by
up to 25 years in prison -- as well as five other felony
offenses.  And jury selection was complicated by the fact that
the victim was a local radio celebrity.  During questioning of
the venire, it became apparent that the victim was known to many
prospective jurors, with one panel member cryptically indicating
that the radio station that carried his program had a
"reputation" in the community.  In addition, the facts were
somewhat unusual as the case involved allegations that the
victims of the crime had turned the tables on the assailants
after the robbery, pursuing them in a car chase and eventually
capturing defendant (allegedly through the application of
significant force).  The case therefore raised potentially
sensitive issues concerning the use of self-help by crime victims
-- a consideration that increased in significance once it became
apparent that many of the prospective jurors had themselves been
victims of crime.  
In light of these circumstances, it would not have been
surprising if the trial court had allotted a longer-than-average
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period of time for the attorneys to conduct their questioning. 
Instead, the attorneys were significantly limited in their
efforts to follow-up on provocative answers given by prospective
jurors in response to the court's inquiries.  Although defense
counsel specifically alerted the court during the first round of
voir dire that the time limit was unduly restrictive and that he
had been able to examine only two jurors during the allotted five
minutes, the judge neither revisited the issue nor explained why
she had concluded that five minutes was sufficient.2  
Defendant argues that the trial judge did not offer an
explanation because she applied a similar rule for jury selection
in all cases, regardless of the number of jurors being selected,
the number or seriousness of the charges or the complexity of the
issues.  Although such a "one size fits all" approach does not
seem to have been what the Legislature had in mind when it
granted trial courts broad discretion in CPL 270.15(c), the fact
that the trial court may or may not have imposed the same
limitation in other cases is not relevant to the resolution of
this appeal.  And, from a practical standpoint, some uniformity
in jury selection procedures involving comparable prosecutions is
2  While the trial court certainly had no obligation to
articulate the basis for her decision on the record, such an
explanation would have facilitated appellate review.  Without it,
we must search the record ourselves to discern whether there was
a sufficient basis for the court's conclusion that the time
restriction provided counsel the requisite "fair opportunity" to
examine prospective jurors. 
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No. 108
to be expected.  Judges may well begin voir dire with the
assumption that a time limitation that has proven appropriate in
other similar trials will be adequate again (although the court
should be willing to reconsider the propriety of that restriction
if a party raises a legitimate concern once jury selection is
underway).  
But, as noted above, this was hardly a typical case. 
And, after counsel brought the issue to the court's attention,
the difficulties posed by the time restriction became more
apparent when a significant number of venire members revealed
that they, or someone close to them, had been a crime victim and
several others indicated their familiarity with the victim. 
Considering the factors that we have discussed, we conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in continuing to enforce
the five-minute limitation on counsel questioning after counsel's
timely objection explaining why the time period was insufficient.
This error, standing alone, does not warrant reversal. 
A trial court's abuse of discretion in limiting the scope of
counsel questioning will not warrant reversal unless defendant
establishes that he suffered prejudice (see Jean, 75 NY2d at
745).  In this case, however, the prejudice inquiry is hampered
by the manner in which the jury selection process was transcribed
by the court stenographer.  The prospective jurors that answered
questions are not identified in the record by name, initials or
panel number.  Rather, all members of the venire are referred to
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No. 108
as "prospective juror" in the transcript making it difficult to
differentiate between them.  And there were occasions when groups
of prospective jurors were excused sua sponte by the court but
the record fails to identify which individuals were retained and
which were dismissed.  Through no fault of the court or defense
counsel, it is therefore difficult to definitively resolve
certain issues relevant to the prejudice inquiry.  
Defendant contends that he suffered prejudice because
critical issues were revealed during jury selection involving a
large number of prospective jurors and, as a result of the five-
minute time restriction, his attorney was unable to query the
various venire members that had responded to the court's
inquiries in a problematic or provocative manner.  And he
suggests that some of these individuals did, in fact, serve on
the jury that convicted him.  
Given the lack of clarity in the record concerning
whether certain prospective jurors were discharged or retained,
we cannot say that defendant's claim of prejudice is refuted by
the record.  This is not a case where defendant has done nothing
other than identify one or two venire persons who made
questionable remarks but were not examined by counsel due to a
time constraint.  In the third round of voir dire alone, more
than a dozen prospective jurors seem to have said something that
invited additional inquiry in connection with their knowledge of
the victim or status as a crime victim or witness -- topics
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No. 108
especially pertinent to this case.  While none of these jurors
made statements that, without further elaboration, would have
justified their dismissal for cause, the purpose of follow-up
questioning by the court or counsel is to explore hidden biases. 
During jury selection, attorneys pay close attention to juror
responses in order to identify who should be challenged "for
cause" and decide whether to exercise peremptory challenges. 
This process may be thwarted if an insufficient amount of time is
permitted for questioning.  And, here, due to peculiarities in
the record, it is impossible to contradict the contention that
the problematic prospective jurors that counsel was unable to
examine ultimately sat on the jury that convicted him of multiple
class B violent felonies.  
Although we conclude that reversal is warranted in this
case, we agree with the People that it is certainly possible that
the statements made by these venire members were not indicative
of any inappropriate bias (this, too, might have been established
had counsel been provided a greater opportunity to pursue follow-
up questioning).  And we also recognize that efficiency is an
important consideration and that judges are in the difficult
position of having to properly marshal limited court resources
while at the same time respecting the rights of jurors and
ensuring that the parties receive a fair trial.  Sometimes this
can be a difficult balance to strike.  But the fact remains that
trial judges are not always able to cover all avenues of
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questioning that interest the parties during voir dire -- that is
why the Legislature has directed that counsel must be provided a
"fair opportunity" to examine prospective jurors after the court
has concluded its questioning (see CPL 270.15[c]).  Since the
record here establishes that the unusually short time restriction
imposed by the court prevented counsel from having a sufficient
opportunity to examine the various prospective jurors whose
statements could reasonably be expected to elicit further
questioning, and defendant's claim of prejudice cannot be
discounted, we conclude that the conviction must be reversed and
the case remitted for a new trial.  
In light of our resolution of the voir dire issue, it
is unnecessary for us to consider defendant's other claims of
error.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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People v Owen Steward
No. 108
SMITH, J.(dissenting):
This case seems to me to raise a single issue: Is five
minutes of lawyer-conducted voir dire per side too little time,
as a matter of law, for the first round of jury selection in a
felony case?  I would answer that question no.  The majority does
not address it, but answers another question, one I do not think
is preserved in this record.  
After conducting her own voir dire of the first-round
panelists, the trial judge gave each counsel five minutes to
question them.  After they had done so, defense counsel asked "to
put on the record my objection to the time limit."  He made clear
that the objection was one he had made to the same judge before,
in other cases: "I tried cases before you in supreme court and
criminal court.  My objection isn't something new to you, but I
need to make it nevertheless."  Counsel then spoke about the
importance of peremptory challenges and the need for a "fair
opportunity to question jurors."  He said that he had found "no
case where only five minutes was allowed in the first round of
voir dire, particularly a Class B violent felony or any other
felony."  He relied on a mathematical calculation: "Sixteen
jurors in the box and five minutes to speak with them averages to
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less than 20 seconds per [prospective] juror."
Counsel made no criticism of the judge's voir dire, and
acknowledged it was "thorough," but stressed that his job as an
advocate was different from the judge's.  He summarized by
saying: "[M]y objection is that your time limit here in this case
violates the defendant's statutory right to exercise preliminary
challenges and violates his rights under the state and federal
constitution."  At the end of his argument, counsel briefly
mentioned the circumstances of the present case, saying that he
"used up four out of my five minutes" in questions of individual
jurors and was forced to omit some subjects he would have covered
with the group.
It is clear to me that counsel was making a generic
objection to the five minute time limit, though he illustrated
his argument by referring to the case at hand.  He was saying
that, at least in the first round of a felony case, where 12
jurors may be selected and that number of panelists or more -- 16
in this case -- are being interviewed, five minutes is just not
enough time for a lawyer to talk to them.  The argument is not an
unreasonable one, but I would reject the per se rule that
defendant asked for.
CPL 270.15 (c) says, in relevant part:
"The court shall permit both parties . . . to
examine the prospective jurors, individually
or collectively, regarding their
qualifications to serve as jurors.  Each
party shall be afforded a fair opportunity to
question the prospective jurors as to any
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No. 108
unexplored matter affecting their
qualifications, but the court shall not
permit questioning that is repetitious or
irrelevant, or questions as to a juror's
knowledge of rules of law."
The question here is whether, by limiting defendant to
five minutes in the first round, the trial court denied him "a
fair opportunity to question the prospective jurors as to any
unexplored matter affecting their qualifications."  What amounts
to "a fair opportunity" is to be decided by the trial court in
its discretion (People v Jean, 75 NY2d 744 [1989]).  In Jean, we
held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting
counsel to 15 minutes in each of the first two rounds, and 10
minutes in the third.
So long as the trial court allows some appreciable time
for lawyer questioning -- and five minutes is appreciably more
than zero -- I would not hold as a matter of law that any minimum
number of minutes is necessary.  A lawyer who thinks more time is
needed to "question the prospective jurors as to any unexplored
matter" should tell the court what the "unexplored matter" is; in
this case, defense counsel identified no subject not covered in
the trial court's own "thorough" questioning.  If he had done so,
the judge might well have given him more than five minutes.
In exercising its discretion to keep lawyers on a very
short leash during voir dire, the trial court implicitly
recognized two important facts of courtroom life: Time is
precious, and lawyers questioning prospective jurors waste a lot
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No. 108
of it.  Lawyer-conducted voir dire no doubt has its value, but it
is a very inefficient process, as lawyers understandably try to
get to know as well as they possibly can each human being who
might serve on the jury.  The Legislature's purpose in enacting
CPL 270.15 (c) was to avoid such waste of time by "instructing
the court to maintain tight control over voir dire questioning"
(Preiser, Practice Commentary to CPL 270.15, McKinney's 2002 Main
Volume at 276) -- a practice we had previously encouraged (People
v Boulware, 29 NY2d 135, 140 [1971]).   I believe we would best
serve the legislative goal by not requiring any arbitrary minimum
for lawyer-conducted voir dire.
Today's majority does not suggest that it disagrees. 
Indeed, it disapproves of rules "that can be applied across-the-
board in all cases" in this area (majority op at 7).  Yet it
reverses defendant's conviction on a ground that defendant never
presented to the trial court: that the special circumstances of
this case rendered the five minute limit too strict -- especially
in the third round of jury selection, where an unusual number of
people who had been, or whose relatives had been, crime victims
appeared as prospective jurors.
The majority may be right about this, but I do not see
why defendant should be excused from preserving the argument.  He
could have said to the trial judge, essentially, everything the
majority now says, but he said none of it.  He never suggested
that he needed more time in the third round to ask about the
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No. 108
crimes of which panelists or their family members had been
victims; indeed, he made no objection to the time limit during
the third round of jury selection.  He did not say, at any stage
of the voir dire, that the victim's modest fame, or any other
fact unique to this case, made lengthier questioning appropriate. 
If he had said that, perhaps the trial judge would have agreed
with him.  But he preserved only a generic objection to the time
limit.  Since I think that objection should fail, I would affirm. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and a new trial ordered.  Opinion by Judge
Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Pigott and
Jones concur.  Judge Smith dissents and votes to affirm in an
opinion in which Judge Read concurs.
Decided June 7, 2011
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