Title: Gueke v. Board of County Com'rs for Teton County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gueke v. Board of County Com'rs for Teton County1986 WY 201728 P.2d 167Case Number: 86-115Decided: 11/13/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Wayne GUEKE & theWyoming Pyrotechnic Association, 
Petitioners,

v.

The BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERSFORTETONCOUNTY, 
Respondent.

Appeal from DistrictCourtofTetonCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Rodger McDaniel, 
Terry J. Harris and Julie Nye Tiedeken of Southeast Wyoming Law Offices, 
Cheyenne, for petitioners.

Paul O. Vaughn, 
DeputyCounty & Pros. Atty. of 
Teton County, Jackson, for 
respondent.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case involves an 
administrative appeal certified to us pursuant to Rule 12.09, Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Appellants Wayne Gueke and the Wyoming Pyrotechnic 
Association filed a petition to review a resolution adopted by appellee Board of 
County Commissioners for TetonCounty which banned the sale and use of 
fireworks in TetonCounty.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues:

"Was the appellee's 
September 17, 1985, ban on fireworks in TetonCounty unlawful in that such 
action:

"1. conflicts with state 
statute;

"2. exceeds appellee's 
authority; or,

"3. amounts to an 
unconstitutional violation of appellant's right to due 
process?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     On September 17, 1985, 
appellee Board of County Commissioners for TetonCounty 
adopted Article 78 of the Uniform Fire Code banning fireworks within TetonCounty. Article 78 provides that it is 
unlawful for any person to "* * * possess, store, to offer for sale, expose for 
sale, sell at retail or use or explode any fireworks * * *." UFC § 78.102(b). 
"Fireworks" are defined in the Uniform Fire Code as 

"* * * any combustible or 
explosive composition, or any substance or combination of substances, or device 
prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or an audible effect by 
combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation, and shall include blank 
cartridges, toy pistols, toy cannons, toy canes or toy guns in which explosives 
are used, firecrackers, torpedoes, sky-rockets, Roman candles, Daygo bombs, 
sparklers or other devices of like construction and any devices containing any 
explosive or flammable compound, or any tablet or other device containing any 
explosive substance, except that the term `fireworks' shall not include any auto 
flares, paper caps containing not in excess of an average of twenty-five 
hundreths of a grain of explosive content per cap and toy pistols, toy canes, 
toy guns or other devices for use of such caps, the sale and use of which shall 
be permitted at all times."

[¶5.]     It should be noted that 
the county's resolution is not a total prohibition on fireworks. Approximately 
97 percent of the land in TetonCounty is under federal ownership or 
control. This includes Grand Teton and YellowstoneNational Parks, national forest lands, as well as lands 
administered by the Department of Fish and Wildlife Service such as the Jackson 
Hole National Elk Refuge. All fireworks are banned in the national parks and on 
all forest service lands. 36 C.F.R. § 2.38(b); 36 C.F.R. § 261.52(f). 
Furthermore, all fireworks are banned in the National Elk Refuge. 50 C.F.R. § 
27.41.

[¶6.]     The only incorporated 
town or city within TetonCounty is the Town of Jackson. All fireworks, 
except caps and sparklers, are prohibited within the Town of Jackson pursuant to the 
provisions of Chapter 8.20 of the Municipal Code of 
Jackson.

[¶7.]     We will consider all of 
appellants' issues together. The sale and use of fireworks in Wyoming is covered by §§ 
35-10-201 through 35-10-207, W.S. 1977. The act expressly provides that 
municipalities are free to enact further restrictions upon the sale and use of 
fireworks within city limits:

"This act [§§ 35-10-201 
to 35-10-207] shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition by municipal 
ordinance of further regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and 
possession of fireworks within the corporate limits of any city or town, but no 
such city or town shall permit or authorize the sale, use, or possession of any 
fireworks in violation of this act." § 35-10-205, W.S. 
1977.

[¶8.]     In Haddenham v. 
City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551, 554 (1982), we recognized 
the authority of a municipality to enact stricter regulations upon the sale and 
use of fireworks within the corporate limits of a city as well as "within a 
given distance thereof." We stated:

"The City was authorized 
by § 35-10-205 to ordain a provision more restrictive than that provided by 
state law relative to the use, sale, etc., of fireworks. The `within the 
corporate limits' of the city limitation contained in such section was amended 
by § 15-1-103(a)(xxviii) to authorize application of the Ordinance to an area 
`within a given distance' of the City limits. Considering the statutes in pari 
materia the `given distance' intended by the legislature was that set forth in § 
15-3-202(b)(i), W.S. 1977, i.e., `five (5) miles * * * for the enforcement of 
health * * * ordinance and regulation thereof.'" Id., at 556.

[¶9.]     In the second Haddenham 
case, Haddenham v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Carbon, Wyo., 679 P.2d 429 (1984), (hereinafter Haddenham II), in a unanimous decision of this 
court, we held that a county had the authority to enact stricter regulations 
upon the sale of fireworks. Therein we quoted the district court's decision 
letter recognizing the general principle that a local governing entity may enact 
laws which contain more stringent provisions than a state statute governing the 
same topic if the area has not been preempted by state 
regulation.

"In his Decision Letter 
in this case, the district court judge (the Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum) 
properly stated the law on this issue as follows: 

"`* * * It is generally 
recognized that a local government may pass laws which go beyond a state statute 
governing the same subject as long as the local law is not in direct conflict 
with the statute and the legislature has not preempted the regulation of the 
field. The mere fact that the local law goes beyond the state statute, in 
requiring more than the statute, is permissible as long as the two can co-exist 
together and the local law does not contravene the intent and purpose of the 
statute.

* * * * * 
*

"`* * * [T]he general 
rule is that where a local law merely enlarges upon the provisions of a state 
statute by having stricter requirements than the statute, there is no conflict 
between the two where the legislature has not preempted regulation of the field. 
That is the case here. The Board of County Commissioners of CarbonCounty has passed a resolution banning the 
sale or possession of fireworks in the county. The resolution merely goes beyond 
the requirements of state law on the subject and there is clearly no state 
preemption in the field. Absent such a showing, the resolution must be allowed 
to stand.'" Haddenham II, supra, at 430.

One authority 
has summed up the issue thusly:

"* * * The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the 
provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no 
conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to 
its own prescription. Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are 
prohibitory, and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes 
further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition under the 
statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance 
what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly 
licensed, authorized, or required, there 
is nothing contradictory between the provision of the statute and the ordinance 
because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Unless legislative 
provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not 
deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail." (Emphasis 
added.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc. § 374 
(1971).

In the above 
context, "municipality" is used in a general sense and is also intended to 
include a county government: "In accordance with the board meaning of the word 
`municipal,' and term `municipal government' may properly be used in 
characterizing the government of a county." 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal 
Corporations, § 5.1

[¶10.]  In Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975), a city 
ordinance was challenged which prohibited certain uses of handguns and knives. 
The challenge was based in part on the ground that the state had preempted the 
field of weapons control through state regulatory statutes. The court found 
there was no state regulatory preemption since arms control is an area of 
cities' concern, and there is "* * * no impediment to the exercise of authority 
by a city through ordinance so long as there is no conflict in terms with state 
legislation and the state legislature has not preempted the field. * * *" 
Id., 532 P.2d  
at 1296. There was no expressed legislative intent to preempt regulation in 
weapons control, so the court found that the city had a valid interest in 
enacting further, more strict measures.

[¶11.]  Even though the ordinance enacted in the 
Junction 
City 
case was more strict in its regulation of weapons than the state statute, the 
court nevertheless upheld the local law as valid and stated the following 
principles:

"A test frequently used 
to determine whether conflict in terms exists is whether the ordinance permits 
or licenses that which the statute forbids or prohibits that which the statute 
authorizes; if so, there is no conflict, but where both an ordinance and the 
statute are prohibitory and the only difference is that the ordinance goes 
further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition in the statute, 
and the city does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance that which the 
legislature has forbidden, or forbid that which the legislature has expressly 
authorized, there is no conflict (see 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, 
Etc., § 374, p. 408-409). This court has applied the foregoing principles. In 
City of Beloit v. Lamborn, 182 Kan. 288, 321 P.2d 177 
[1958], it held the mere fact that an ordinance provides for greater 
restrictions does not necessarily make it inconsistent or in conflict with the 
statute. * * *" Id., at 1297-1298.

[¶12.]  In Junction City v. Lee, supra, the court 
referred to an earlier Kansas case, Leavenworth Club Owners Association v. 
Atchison, 208 Kan. 318, 492 P.2d 183, 51 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1971), where a city 
ordinance was upheld which required private clubs to close at 1:30 a.m. The 
applicable state law only required such clubs to close by 3:00 a.m. The Kansas 
Supreme Court there said:

"Where a municipal 
ordinance merely enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than 
is required by the statute, there is no conflict between the two unless the 
legislature has limited the requirements for all cases to its own prescription." 
Id., 492 P.2d  
at 184.

[¶13.]  In Wyoming the board of county commissioners for 
any county has only those powers prescribed by law or reasonably implied 
therefrom. Probasco v. Sikes, 77 Wyo. 108, 307 P.2d 817 (1957); and Hyde v. Board of Commissioners of ConverseCounty, 47 Wyo. 101, 31 P.2d 75 (1934). Sections 
18-2-101(a)(v) and 18-3-504(a)(viii), W.S. 1977, both provide that boards of 
county commissioners have the general power to perform duties prescribed by law. 
One of the duties of the commissioners prescribed by law is to provide fire 
protection for the county under § 18-3-509, W.S. 1977. There are further 
statutes covering fire protection for unincorporated cities and towns under §§ 
35-9-405 and 35-9-406, W.S. 1977, and protection of areas deemed in peril of 
extreme fire danger under §§ 35-9-301 through 35-9-304, W.S. 1977. Section 
18-2-101(a)(v), W.S. 1977, authorizes counties to "exercise other powers as 
provided by law."

[¶14.]  The power of a board of county 
commissioners to control fireworks is implied from the authorization in § 
35-10-203(a), W.S. 1977, which provides:

"Any governing body shall 
have the power to grant permits, within the area under its jurisdiction, for 
supervised public displays of fireworks by individuals, municipalities, 
amusement parks and other organizations and groups, and to adopt reasonable 
rules and regulations for the granting of such permits. * * 
*"

[¶15.]  In furtherance of such duties, the Board 
of County Commissioners for TetonCounty passed a resolution banning the 
sale and use of fireworks in TetonCounty recognizing the fire danger, among 
others, associated with the use of fireworks. Admittedly, the resolution goes 
beyond the requirements of the state law on the same subject, §§ 35-10-201 
through 35-10-207. As discussed above, the general principle of law is that 
where a local ordinance or resolution merely enlarges upon the provisions of a 
statute by requiring more than the statute, there is no conflict between the two 
unless the legislature has preempted regulation of the field. In the present 
case, it seems clear that the legislature has certainly not preempted regulation 
of fireworks since § 35-10-205 specifically authorizes a municipality to enact 
further regulations upon the sale, use and possession of fireworks. Therefore, 
it appears that the county resolution in question is a valid law restricting the 
sale and use of fireworks within TetonCounty even though it goes beyond the 
requirements of state law. It does not appear to be in conflict with state law, 
and there is no state preemption in the field of fireworks regulation as 
evidenced by § 35-10-205. The resolution should be allowed to 
stand.

[¶16.]  Appellants have asked that we overrule 
Haddenham II. We have received additional legislative history in this case, but 
no compelling reason has been shown why we should overrule Haddenham II at this 
time. There are occasions when departure from precedent is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. 
However, in the absence of such a showing, the doctrine of stare decisis 
constrains us to follow precedent and not disturb settled point. Cf., Adkins v. 
Sky Blue, Inc., Wyo., 701 P.2d 549 (1985); and 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 
(1983).

[¶17.]  Appellants claim that if the purpose of 
the board in banning fireworks was to eliminate brush fires, then the action was 
"overly broad and amounts to a violation of appellants' constitutional right to 
due process * * *." In support of such argument, appellants cite one case, 
Fincher v. Union, 186 S.C. 232, 196 S.E. 1 
(1938). That case found that it was unreasonable to require barbecue stands in 
residential areas to close during certain hours when "barbecue stands" included 
all lunch rooms, sandwich shops, or other eating houses, and "residential areas" 
included any place where two or more houses were located 
together.

[¶18.]  Suffice it to say, that is not the 
situation here. We have already stated that the board's actions were in 
furtherance of its statutory duty to provide fire protection. Furthermore, the 
legislature authorized the adoption of the Uniform Fire Code, § 35-9-106, W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp 1986). The purpose of the Uniform Fire Code is the prevention of 
fires. In furtherance of such, the board specifically adopted § 78 of the 
Uniform Fire Code. The board heard evidence from local fire departments and 
others regarding the need to reduce or eliminate the fire hazard attendant upon 
the use of fireworks.

[¶19.]  We find the resolution was a proper 
exercise of the board's authority.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We do not intend to 
imply that the legislative authority of a municipality and a board of county 
commissioners is identical.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶21.]  I join with two members of the court in 
affirming the decision on the explicit basis of stare decisis. In no way can the 
essential controversy and critical issue be differentiated from Haddenham II, 
Haddenham v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Carbon, Wyo., 679 P.2d 429 (1984), a case which is only two years old.

[¶22.]  A matter of intrinsic philosophy is 
raised in that as a jurist I have no reluctance to vote for rehearing when a 
case is initially before this court. Thereafter, when that issue is once 
decided, stability of the law and propriety of acceding to legislative lawmaking 
mandate reluctance for reversal of a prior case in which I did not serve to 
either dissent or approve the decision. SeeState v. 
Carter, Wyo., 
714 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Having said this, it 
should also be understood that the extension to counties of implied police 
powers is neither recognized nor to be justified from this 
concurrence.

[¶23.]  I do not agree with Haddenham II, and 
would have voted to the contrary if then on this court. However, the kind of 
imperative social problem or constitutional issue that should now justify 
reversal as to the particular issues involved, is not to be found in selling or 
not selling fireworks, which, after Haddenham II, I would now leave for the 
legislature to accept or change. In the hackneyed phraseology of numerous 
appellate discussions, "We do not now write with a clean slate." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Company, 285 U.S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443, 76 L. Ed. 815 
(1932); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 617, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). See, however, Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 P. 593, 605 (1898) ("after mature 
reflection and a profound sense of an imperative 
necessity").

[¶24.]  On the substantive issues, excluding a 
reversal of the prior case, I would concur in reasoning with the thoughtful, 
succinct and explicitly phrased dissent.

[¶25.]  I specially concur in affirming the 
decision of the trial court.

MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom CARDINE, Justice joins.

[¶26.]  I dissent. This is an occasion when 
departure from precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of 
law and remedy continued injustice. Haddenham II is clearly wrong, and the 
continued application of the law of that case has caused a continued injustice 
in this case in the interest of stare decisis.

[¶27.]  The county ordinance in this case, as 
well as the resolution in Haddenham II, contravenes not only the plain language 
of the state statutes pertaining to fireworks but also their intent and purpose. 
The statute permits the use of certain fireworks, and the county laws prohibit 
it. They cannot co-exist. This being the case, the county ordinance should be 
declared null and void.

[¶28.]  I also do not agree that the term 
"municipality" is intended to include a county government in the context of this 
case or any other case. County and city governments should not be compared any 
more than apples and oranges, as it is fruitless.