Title: State ex rel. Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199, 2004-Ohio-718.] 
 
 
THE  STATE EX REL. SANOR SAWMILL, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199, 
2004-Ohio-718.] 
Workers’ compensation — Alleged improper guarding of power ripsaw — 
Specific safety requirement — Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-08(D)(2), 
construed and applied — Industrial Commission’s order finding Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-08(D)(2) applicable an abuse of discretion — 
Commission ordered to vacate its order and issue an order denying an 
award for VSSR. 
(No. 2003-0960 – Submitted December 15, 2003 – Decided March 3, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-880, 2003-
Ohio-2413. 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant Sanor Sawmill’s milling process begins with the transfer 
of logs from a log deck to a log carriage.  A single log is positioned and secured 
to the carriage, and the entire carriage is driven past the saw by a cable.  The cable 
is attached at one end to the carriage and at the other end to a power-driven drum. 
{¶2} 
The saw blade is 60 inches in diameter with 33 inches exposed 
above the saw plate.  It spins at 500 rpm and is unguarded.  To keep the operator 
safely away from the blade, the saw is operated from a cab approximately 20 feet 
away.  From the cab, operators can stop and start the saw, operate the log turner, 
and control carriage speed and direction with hand controls and pedals.  There is 
also a pedal to activate a kicker plate that dislodges jammed wood chips.  At 
Sanor, the kick plate did not always work. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
Appellee-claimant Tony Prendergast was a saw operator at Sanor 
with a history of approaching the blade to perform various functions without 
shutting it off.  On August 4, 1998, he tried to loosen a small piece of wood that 
had gotten stuck and was drawn into the moving blade, injuring his hand, arm, 
and shoulder. 
{¶4} 
After his workers’ compensation claim was allowed, claimant 
alleged that Sanor had violated Ohio Adm.Code  4121:1-5-08(D)(2)(a): 
{¶5} 
“(2) Circular rip saw (power feed). 
{¶6} 
“(a) Guarding. 
{¶7} 
“A hood-type guard shall be provided but need not rest upon the 
table nor upon the material being cut, but shall extend to a line not more than 
three-eighths of an inch above the plane formed by the bottom of the top feed 
rolls.” 
{¶8} 
Before appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio, Sanor asserted 
that the specific safety requirement was inapplicable. This argument rested on  (1) 
the specific safety requirement’s reference to “table” and “feed rolls,” neither of 
which was used with this saw; (2) expert testimony that the safety cab — not 
hood-type guarding — was the industrial norm; and (3) evidence of the 
impracticality of a hood-type guard. 
{¶9} 
The commission rejected these arguments that the rule was 
inapplicable, writing: 
{¶10} “In that it has been found that the saw was a circular saw, being 
used for ripping, and was fed by powered apparatus (vs. manually) OAC 4121:1-
5-08(D)(2)(a) is held to be applicable.  Staff Hearing Officer notes that the 
employer vigorously argues that the mention of ‘table’ in delineating the level to 
which such hood needs [to] extend downward and the saw not being equipped 
with a table PER-SE [sic] creates such an ambiguity as to not place employer 
upon notice of the guarding requirement, thus rendering OAC 4121:1-5-
January Term, 2004 
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08(D)(2)(a) inapplicable.  Staff Hearing Officer is not persuaded by such 
argument, finding that the SSR [is] unequivocal in its requirement that a hood-
type guard shall be provided, and does not make the provision [of] such guard 
conditional upon any other element.” 
{¶11} The commission accordingly assessed an additional award for 
violation of a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”).  In seeking a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order, Sanor repeated its 
argument to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals was 
not persuaded and denied the  writ. 
{¶12} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶13} One issue is before us:  Does Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-
08(D)(2)(a) apply?  Upon review, we find that the commission’s limited analysis 
of the applicability issue constituted an abuse of discretion that warrants reversal 
of the court of appeals. 
{¶14} Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-08(D)(2)(a) governs “[c]ircular rip saws 
(power feed).”  The code does not define that term, leaving its interpretation to the 
commission.  State ex rel. Allied Wheel Products, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1956), 
166 Ohio St. 47, 1 O.O.2d 190, 139 N.E.2d 41.  Because an additional award for a 
VSSR is, however, a penalty, it requires strict construction of the safety 
requirement, and “all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety 
standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer.”  State ex 
rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216. 
{¶15} In finding the saw to be properly classified under “Circular rip 
saws (power feed),” the commission relied on three undisputed facts: (1) the blade 
was circular, (2) it cut wood along the grain (see State ex rel. McArthur Lumber & 
Post Co. v. Indus. Comm. [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 217, 218, 6 OBR 289, 452 N.E.2d 
1269), and (3) wood was fed to the saw by powered apparatus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶16} Sanor decries this analysis as too narrow, again citing the provision 
itself: 
{¶17} “A hood-type guard shall be provided but need not rest upon the 
table nor upon the material being cut, but shall extend to a line not more than 
three-eighths of an inch above the plane formed by the bottom of the top feed 
rolls.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶18} Sanor stresses that the saw apparatus in question has no “table” as 
contemplated by the provision — a fact seemingly acknowledged in the 
commission’s order but discarded as inconsequential.  There is also no evidence 
in the record of any feed rolls on this machine.  It was fed instead by a cable-
operated powered carriage. 
{¶19} Contrary to the commission’s analysis, the absence of a table and 
feed rolls is not immaterial.  The guard’s placement is determined directly by the 
feed rolls.  Without these rolls there is no point of reference or measurement for 
the guard.  Perhaps this explains the unrebutted statements of three sawmill-
industry experts that they had never seen a hood-type guard on this type of saw. 
{¶20} In McArthur Lumber & Post Co., we held that the commission 
abused its discretion in classifying a saw based solely on its blade rather than on 
the construction of the entire saw.  There, the commission was confronted with a 
predecessor code section dealing with manually fed circular saws.  The specific 
safety requirement mandated a guard with the exception that “this requirement 
shall not apply to circular cross-cut saws with stationary tables where the saw 
moves forward when cutting.” 
{¶21} The commission found that the saw was a ripsaw, rendering the 
exemption inapplicable.  It based its conclusion exclusively on the fact that the 
saw blade had the coarse teeth characteristic of ripsaws.  It made this finding 
despite unrebutted evidence that: (1) the saw was at the time of injury — and 
always had been — used as a crosscut saw and (2) the saw blade moved forward 
January Term, 2004 
5 
when cutting.  The court deemed the commission’s finding an abuse of discretion, 
writing: 
{¶22} “Although the commission stated that it based its decision on the 
construction of the saw, it is evident that the commission relied entirely on the 
claimant’s statement which was limited to a description of the saw blade.  The 
regulations involved contain no provisions concerning the blades of the saws they 
describe.  Accordingly, there is no basis for distinguishing between the types of 
saws from a description of the blade. 
{¶23} “The regulations do impose specific requirements governing the 
construction of the saws surrounding the blade, however, which differ for the 
types of saws involved.  For instance, IC-5-06.04(B)(1)(d) requires that a rip saw 
be equipped with a spreader while no similar device is required on a cross-cut 
saw.  Particularly relevant herein is the fact that the type of guard required on a 
cross-cut saw depends on the construction of the saw table and the mechanism 
governing the movement of the saw blade.  IC-5-06.04(D)(1)(b).  In view of the 
nature of these regulations, we find that any determination as to the type of saw 
involved must be based upon evidence evaluating the construction of the entire 
saw.” Id., 6 Ohio St.3d at 219, 6 OBR 289, 452 N.E.2d 1269. 
{¶24} The commission committed the same error here.  Its order did not 
discuss the absence of feed rolls and dismissed the absence of a table as 
irrelevant.  As in McArthur Lumber, the applicability of the requirement of a 
guard in the case before us depends upon the construction of the saw table and the 
mechanism governing the movement of the wood to the blade.  There is no 
evidence here of a table or feed rolls.  To the contrary, the unrebutted evidence of 
expert Casey Creamer was that one of the distinctive features of this type of saw 
is that wood was moved by carriage and not feed rolls. 
{¶25} A specific safety requirement must plainly apprise an employer of 
its legal obligation to its employees.  State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 
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32 Ohio St.2d 257, 61 O.O.2d 488, 291 N.E.2d 748.  Where the code does not 
define the relevant apparatus and the cited provision refers to equipment that is 
not part of the machine in question, it is an abuse of discretion to apply that 
requirement to the employer. 
{¶26} The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby reversed.  The 
commission is ordered to vacate its order and issue an order denying an award for 
VSSR. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would affirm the court of 
appeals. 
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Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld & Lodge and Christopher P. Lacich, for 
appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Podor & Associates and Thomas B. Pyle, for appellee Tony Prendergast. 
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