Title: State v. Brookover

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

124 Ariz. 38 (1979) 601 P.2d 1322 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Paul BROOKOVER, Appellant. No. 4426. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 2, 1979. Rehearing Denied November 6, 1979. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Jessica L. Gifford, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Erlichman, Fagerberg & Margrave, P.A. by Joseph Erlichman, Kenneth E. Chase, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the defendant, Robert Paul Brookover, from a jury verdict and *39 judgment of guilt to the crime of murder in the first degree, A.R.S. § 13-454,[*] with a sentence thereon of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031. Although the defendant raises four questions on appeal, the thrust of defendant's brief is addressed solely to the question of the imposition of the death penalty. He asks that the death penalty be reduced by this court to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. Since we agree that the death penalty must be set aside, we need not consider other issues raised by the defendant and need answer only the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. Defendant and two others, Paul Zisser and Stanley Akers, Jr., were approached by Steven McCloud about the prospects of purchasing a large quantity of marijuana. Defendant agreed to purchase the marijuana and a meeting was arranged at which time the marijuana was sampled for quality. A third meeting was then scheduled to take place at defendant's home at which time the delivery of approximately 750 pounds of marijuana was to be made. Akers and McCloud went to meet the victim, Gregory Case, and returned to defendant's house where the marijuana was unloaded and weighed. As the weighing neared completion, Akers asked the defendant about the money and the defendant told Akers that it would be produced as soon as the weighing was completed. At that point defendant went in to the bedroom and pulled out a gun and told Akers there would be no money and that he was going to take the marijuana. The defendant then went into the living room and shot the victim once in the back. The victim fell to the floor moaning and asked the defendant what he had done. The defendant said "Don't worry * * * it will be over soon" and shot him once more in the back. After Zisser and Akers left, defendant and McCloud moved the victim's body into the victim's van, drove the van to the airport and abandoned it there. Based on evidence provided by Akers, Zisser and McCloud, the defendant was subsequently arrested and was convicted, on 5 June 1978, by a jury of first degree murder. After a presentence hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court issued its special verdict which read in part as follows: The Florida Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of "heinous," "atrocious," and "cruel," as applied to conduct which may be considered in applying the death penalty: In State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), where the victim was shot four times in the back during a burglary of a house and in which the victim had obtained a gun and was shooting at a codefendant, we stated: *41 In the instant case, the victim was shot twice in the back. While certainly cowardly, it was not done in a particularly cruel or depraved manner. This was not a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, supra; State v. Watson, supra. The actions of the defendant did not set his acts apart from the norm of first degree murder. We do not believe that the murder was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel and depraved manner." A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(6). The trial court found as a mitigating circumstance that defendant's "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution." A.R.S. § 13-454(F)(1). This finding in mitigation was supported by the evidence. Dr. Joseph Richard Melendez, a psychiatrist, testified as follows: And: The statute reads: The statute does not require that the number of aggravating circumstances be weighed against the number of mitigating circumstances. One mitigating circumstance, for example, may be "sufficiently substantial" to outweigh two aggravating circumstances. The converse is also true one aggravating circumstance could be so substantial that two or more mitigating circumstances would not be "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." A.R.S. § 13-454(D). Both the trial court and this court then must "weigh" the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances to determine if leniency is required: We believe that defendant's mental condition was not only a mitigating factor, but a major and contributing cause of his conduct which was "sufficiently substantial" to outweigh the aggravating factor of defendant's prior conviction. Under the circumstances, leniency is mandated. The imposition of the death penalty is set aside and the defendant's sentence is reduced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 calendar years from the date of sentencing herein. In all other respects, the verdict and judgment are affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concurring. [*] Title 13 citations in this opinion are to the Arizona Criminal Code as it existed prior to its extensive revision effective 1 October 1978.