Title: Betty M. Bradley and the State of Alabama ex rel. Betty M.Bradley v. Town of Argo et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/27/2008 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070258
_________________________
Betty M. Bradley and State of Alabama ex rel. Betty M.
Bradley
v.
Town of Argo et al.
Appeal from St. Clair Circuit Court
(CV-07-107)
LYONS, Justice.
Betty M. Bradley and the State of Alabama on the relation
of Bradley ("Bradley") appeal from an order of the St. Clair
Circuit Court vacating its August 15, 2007, order, which was
favorable to her.  In its August 15, 2007, order the circuit
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2
court (1) had declared that the prerequisites of § 11-42-
100.1, Ala. Code 1975, for a special election in the Town of
Argo on the question of the annexation of the Town of Argo
into the City of Springville had been satisfied and (2) had
ordered the Town of Argo to hold such a special election.  We
affirm the circuit court's vacatur of the August 15, 2007,
order. 
I. Facts and Procedural History
Betty M. Bradley, a resident of the Town of Argo, wants
the Town of Argo to be annexed by the City of Springville.
The Town of Argo is a municipal corporation whose territory is
located in St. Clair County and Jefferson County.  The Town of
Argo is contiguous to the City of Springville.  
Section 11-42-100.1, entitled "Mode of consolidation -–
When municipality to annex city or town," provides that
contiguous municipalities may consolidate and operate as one
municipality.  Section 11-42-100.1(b) provides that if the
governing bodies of contiguous municipalities each adopt,
pass, and publish an ordinance expressing a willingness to
consolidate ("a willingness ordinance"), "the governing body
of the municipality to be annexed shall, by resolution submit
1070258
3
the question of annexation at a special election."  If "a
majority of the voters cast votes in favor of the annexation,
and the number so voting in favor of the annexation equals or
is greater than one-half of the number of voters who voted in
the last general municipal election held in such city or town"
then the contiguous municipalities will be consolidated.  §
11-42-100.1(d).
Absent a willingness ordinance by the municipality to be
annexed, § 11-42-100.1(c) provides that citizens of that
municipality may petition the probate court of the county or
counties in which the municipality is located to require an
election on the question of annexation.  Such a petition must
be "signed by 10 percent or more of the number of qualified
voters who voted in the last general municipal election held
in such municipality immediately preceding the presentation of
said petition ...."  § 11-42-100.1(c).  Section 11-42-100.1(c)
provides that upon receipt of the petition the probate court
shall
"examine said petition to determine the genuineness
of the signatures thereon, the correctness and
adequacy of the information given by each person
signing the petition and the qualification of
electors signing such petition.  If the probate
judge determines that the petition meets statutory
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4
requirements, he shall certify such fact to the
chief executive officer of the municipality for
which such election is so petitioned ....  The
certificate of the judge of probate as to the
sufficiency of said petition shall be final." 
After the probate judge certifies that the petition meets the
statutory requirements and the annexing municipality passes a
willingness ordinance, "the governing body of the municipality
to be annexed shall by resolution submit the question of
annexation at a special election to be held at a time
specified in such proclamation ...."  § 11-42-100.1(c).  The
election must be held "not less than 40 days nor more than 90
days after passage of the willingness ordinance by the
annexing city, or after receipt of the petition certification,
whichever event occurs last, or at a time otherwise specified
by law."  § 11-42-100.1(c).
On February 23, 2007, Bradley petitioned the St. Clair
Probate Court for a special election in the Town of Argo on
the question of annexation into the City of Springville.  The
petition contained the signatures of nearly 350 residents of
the Town of Argo, which was more than 10 percent of the
approximately 800 residents of the Town of Argo who voted in
the immediately preceding general municipal election.  On
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5
March 20, 2007, the probate court certified that Bradley's
petition met the requirements of § 11-42-100.1.  On April 2,
2007, the City of Springville adopted ordinance no. 2007-02,
which stated that the City of Springville "is willing to annex
the Town of Argo, Alabama, if the voters of the Town of Argo,
Alabama, vote in favor of the said annexation as provided in
[§ 11-42-100.1, Ala. Code 1975]."
On May 15, 2007, the Town of Argo appealed to this Court
the adequacy of the St. Clair Probate Court's certification of
Bradley's petition.  On June 21, 2007, this Court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that it was from an unappealable
certification.  Town of Argo v. Shrader (No. 1061185).  On May
15, 2007, the Town of Argo also sued Bradley in the St. Clair
Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring that Bradley had
not met the requirements of § 11-42-100.1 for a special
election on the question of annexation and that the Town of
Argo could not lawfully hold an election until the statutory
requirements have been met. 
On July 11, 2007, Bradley answered the Town of Argo's
declaratory-judgment complaint, and she filed a counterclaim,
in essence, petitioning for a writ of mandamus.  Bradley
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6
petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Town of Argo
to conduct a special election to submit to the voters the
question of the annexation of the Town of Argo by the City of
Springville.  In the petition Bradley asserted that in
addition to seeking relief individually, she also sought
relief on the relation of the State of Alabama because, she
said, the public has an interest in the Town of Argo's
complying with the law and performing its official duties.
See Homan v. State of Alabama ex rel. Smith, 265 Ala. 17, 19,
89 So. 2d 184, 186 (1956).  That same day Bradley moved for a
preliminary injunction to require that the Town of Argo take
the actions necessary to hold a special election on the issue
of annexation.  Also on July 11, 2007, Bradley moved to
consolidate the instant action with City of Springville v.
Town of Argo (case no. CV-07-138), an action pending in the
St. Clair Circuit Court in which the City of Springville
sought to prevent the Town of Argo from incurring new and
substantial indebtedness pending the results of the special
election.
On July 25, 2007, Paul Jennings and Gordon Massey, Jr.,
residents of the Town of Argo, moved to intervene in the this
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7
action for the purpose of aligning themselves with the Town of
Argo.  The circuit court granted the motion and allowed
Jennings and Massey to intervene.  On July 26, 2007, Bradley
amended 
her 
motion 
for 
a 
preliminary 
injunction 
and
counterclaim petition for a writ of mandamus.  The amended
motion 
for 
a 
preliminary 
injunction 
and 
the 
amended
counterclaim each requested that the circuit court enjoin the
Town of Argo from incurring debt for construction of a
municipal building pending the special election on the issue
of annexation.
On August 8, 2007, the circuit court conducted a trial in
which no live testimony was presented, but the parties
presented arguments and documentary evidence as to whether the
statutory requirements for a special election had been
satisfied.  On August 15, 2007, the circuit court found that
Bradley had met the requirements of § 11-42-100.1, and it
ordered the Town of Argo to hold a special election on the
question of annexation.  The circuit court denied any other
relief sought by the parties.  
On September 5, 2007, the Town of Argo moved for a new
trial or, in the alternative, to amend or vacate the circuit
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8
court's August 15, 2007, order pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R.
Civ. P.  In its motion, the Town of Argo asserted that
subsequent to the circuit court's August 15, 2007, order the
City of Springville announced that it planned to reconsider
its willingness ordinance.  The circuit court stayed its
August 15, 2007, order pending its disposition on the Town of
Argo's motion and set the matter for a hearing on October 4,
2007.  
On September 13, 2007, the City of Springville adopted
ordinance no. 2007-09, rescinding its willingness ordinance.
Ordinance no. 2007-09 stated:
"[B]ecause the City [of Springville] would be
required to assume and pay all debts and liabilities
of Argo in the event at a special election the
citizens of Argo were to vote at a special election
in 
favor 
of 
annexation 
into 
the 
City 
[of
Springville], the City [of Springville] filed a
lawsuit seeking an order to prevent Argo from
incurring new and substantial indebtedness pending
the results of the said special election; and
"WHEREAS, the City [of Springville] was unable
to obtain an order to prevent Argo from incurring
new and substantial indebtedness pending a vote of
the citizen's of Argo on whether to annex Argo into
the City [of Springville]; and
"WHEREAS, Argo has incurred new and substantial
indebtedness since the City [of Springville] adopted
the Willingness Ordinance; and
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9
"WHEREAS, the City 
[of 
Springville] 
has 
concerns
that Argo will continue to incur indebtedness
despite the fact the Circuit Court of St. Clair
County has ordered that the special election be
held; and
"WHEREAS, the City Council is of the opinion
that, in light of Argo's new and additional debt, it
is 
in 
the 
best 
interests 
of 
the 
City 
[of
Springville] and its citizens that the City [of
Springville] not annex Argo and that the Willingness
Ordinance should be rescinded, revoked and repealed.
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the Mayor and
City Council of the City of Springville, Alabama,
that Ordinance No. 2007-02, also referred to as the
Willingness Ordinance, is hereby repealed, revoked
and rescinded."
On September 20, 2007, the Town of Argo amended its
motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend or
vacate the order.  To this motion the Town of Argo attached a
copy of ordinance no. 2007-09.  Bradley opposed the Town of
Argo's motion, arguing that the City of Springville's
rescission of the willingness ordinance was immaterial to the
Town of Argo's obligation to conduct the special election
pursuant to § 11-42-100.1 and the circuit court's August 15,
2007, order.  Bradley argued that § 11-42-100.1 does not allow
the proposed change or vacation of the August 15, 2007, order
and that Bradley's right to a special annexation election in
the Town Argo had vested. 
1070258
10
The circuit court held a hearing on the Town of Argo's
motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend or
vacate the August 15, 2007, order, and on October 9, 2007, the
circuit court vacated its August 15, 2007, order.  The circuit
court held that because the City of Springville had rescinded
its willingness ordinance, the requirements of § 11-42-100.1
had not been satisfied and that the Town of Argo was not
required to hold an election on the question of annexation.
Bradley, as an individual, and the State, on the relation of
Bradley, appealed the circuit court's vacation of its August
15, 2007, order.
II. Standard of Review
Whether to grant relief under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ.
P., is within the trial court's discretion.  See Moore v.
Glover, 501 So. 2d 1187, 1191 (Ala. 1986) (Torbert, C.J.,
concurring specially) ("During the 30-day period after the
entry of judgment, the trial court has great judicial
discretion that it may exercise over its final judgment.  The
trial judge should be able to consider any evidence in
deciding whether to vacate the entry of summary judgment.  Any
reasonable explanation of the party's failure to offer
1070258
11
evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment will
suffice, but this does not mean that under the guise of a Rule
59(e) motion a party can belatedly submit available evidence
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.").  In In re
Brickell, 142 Fed. Appx. 385, 391 (11th Cir. 2005) (not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
comparable Federal Rule 59(e), stating:
"We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to
alter or amend judgment for abuse of discretion.
Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 'The only grounds for
granting [a Rule 59(e)] motion are newly-discovered
[previously unavailable] evidence or manifest errors
of law or fact.' Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re
Kellogg), 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999).
Rule 59(e) may not be used to relitigate a claim or
to present arguments or evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment.  Mincey
v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 n. 69 (11th Cir.
2000)."
(Emphasis added.) 
Ordinance no. 2007-09, the newly discovered evidence
offered here as the basis for relief under Rule 59(e), was
"previously unavailable" because it did not exist when the
circuit court issued its August 15, 2007, order.  Under the
circumstances here presented the circuit court did not exceed
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12
its discretion in vacating the August 15, 2007, order to allow
the court to consider the "previously unavailable" evidence.
However, the circuit court's application of law to the
undisputed fact of the City of Springville's adoption of
ordinance no. 2007-09 is subject to de novo review.  See
Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. v. Paper, Allied Indus., Chem.
& Energy Workers Int'l Union Local 4-487, 328 F.3d 818, 820
(5th Cir. 2003) (applying the analogous Federal Rule 59(e))
("We generally review a decision on a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion.  See
Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2000); Midland
West Corp. v. FDIC, 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1990).  To
the extent that a ruling was a reconsideration of a question
of law, however, the standard of review is de novo. Tyler v.
Union Oil Co., 304 F.3d 379, 405 (5th Cir. 2002); Fletcher,
210 F.3d at 512.").  
III. Analysis
Bradley contends that the circuit court improperly
vacated its August 15, 2007, order because, she says, the
language of § 11-42-100.1 imposes a mandatory duty upon the
municipality to be annexed to conduct an election once the
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13
probate court certifies the petition and the annexing city has
adopted a willingness ordinance.  Bradley contends that § 11-
42-100.1 does not allow the annexing city to rescind its
willingness ordinance before the special election.  Bradley
recognizes that § 11-42-100.1 does not explicitly address the
situation here--when the annexing city rescinds a willingness
ordinance before the special election--but she argues that
"several facts and features" of the statute strongly imply
that the City of Springville's rescission of its willingness
ordinance is immaterial to the Town of Argo's duty to conduct
a special election on the question of annexation.  Bradley's
brief at 20.
First, Bradley notes that § 11-42-100.1(c) provides that
the purpose of the filing of the petition with the probate
court is to "mandatorily require an election to be held as
herein provided ...."  (Emphasis added.)  Second, Bradley
asserts that nothing in § 11-42-100.1 or its structure implies
that the mandatory character of the election disappears after
the the probate court has certified the petition and the
annexing city has passed a willingness ordinance.  Bradley
notes that § 11-42-100.1(c) provides that after those two
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14
prerequisites are met "the governing body of the municipality
to be annexed shall by resolution submit the question of
annexation at a special election ...."  (Emphasis added.)
Third, Bradley contends that the municipality to be annexed
has a mandatory duty to hold the special election once the
requirements of § 11-42-100.1(c) have been met because the
statute specifies a definite time within which to hold the
special election  ("not less than 40 days nor more than 90
days after passage of the willingness ordinance, or after
receipt of the petition certification, whichever event occurs
last ....").
Bradley further contends that § 11-42-100.1 implies that
the adoption of a willingness ordinance is not subject to
revocation after there has been final certification of the
petition by the probate judge.  She notes that § 11-42-
100.1(c) provides that the "certificate of the judge of
probate as to the sufficiency of said petition shall be
final." (Emphasis added.)  Bradley argues that the term
"final" implies that the probate court's certification takes
the process beyond the point where the initiators can change
1070258
The eight instances of the Town of Argo's allegedly
1
wrongful conduct are: 1) insisting that the certification of
the Probate Court of Jefferson County was also necessary; 2)
its earlier appeal from the probate court's certification; 3)
obtaining a stay of the certification while its earlier appeal
15
course and serves to prevent the withdrawal of a willingness
ordinance.
Bradley argues that the right to vote is contractual in
nature and that, therefore, the circuit court's vacation of
its August 15, 2007, order allows the Town of Argo, by
attempting to block the special election, to cause a violation
of § 95 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.  Section 95
provides: 
"There can be no law of this state impairing the
obligation of contracts by destroying or impairing
the 
remedy 
for 
their 
enforcement; 
and 
the
legislature shall have no power to revive any right
or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of
time, or by any statute of this state. After suit
has been commenced on any cause of action, the
legislature shall have no power to take away such
cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to
such suit."
Lastly, Bradley asserts that the Town of Argo's efforts
to block the referendum by a pattern of alleged wrongful
conduct makes relief important to the rule of law.  Bradley
then asserts eight instances of the Town of Argo's allegedly
wrongful conduct.   Bradley asserts that this Court's
1
1070258
was  pending; 4) incurring additional debt for a new municipal
building; 5) the litigation by the City of Springville to
block the borrowing; 6) requesting and obtaining a stay of the
August 15, 2007, order; 7) arguing that the City of
Springville's ordinance rescinding its willingness ordinance
excused the Town of Argo from holding the annexation election;
and 8) seeking to block inclusion in the record on appeal of
the transcript of the July 26, 2007, hearing in which the
circuit court dismissed the City of Springville's action, case
no. CV-07-138. 
16
assistance is needed in this matter in light of the Town of
Argo's past conduct because, she says, a citizen of the Town
of Argo could never achieve compliance with § 11-42-100.1 and
a referendum could never be held in a timely fashion. 
The Town of Argo contends that the circuit court properly
vacated its August 15, 2007, order because, it says, the City
of Springville had the authority to rescind its willingness
ordinance before the special election.  The Town of Argo
contends that the plain language of § 11-42-100.1 does not
provide or imply that the annexing city lacks the right to
rescind an earlier adopted willingness ordinance.  The Town of
Argo further asserts that to construe § 11-42-100.1 as
implying that the City of Springville lacks such a right would
limit a municipality's authority to act in its best interest.
The Town of Argo then argues that the circuit court
properly vacated its order requiring the Town of Argo to hold
1070258
17
a special election, because, it says, the Town of Argo cannot
proceed with a special election without a willingness
ordinance from the City of Springville.  The Town of Argo
further asserts that an election held pursuant to § 11-42-
100.1 when all the requirements of the statute have not been
met would be void or voidable.  See Boulding v. City of
Homewood, 277 Ala. 665, 174 So. 2d 306 (1965).  Lastly, the
Town of Argo contends that Bradley's contention that the
circuit court's determination that the Town of Argo was not
required to conduct a special annexation election violates
Art. IV, § 95, Alabama Constitution 1901, is misplaced
because, it says, the language of § 95 applies to the
legislature's power to determine the period within which an
action may be brought and protects against the revival of an
action once it is time-barred.
This Court has not previously considered whether a
municipality may rescind a willingness ordinance before the
election on the question of annexation is held pursuant to §
11-42-100.1, and "[t]here is very little authority which
discusses whether an annexation or detachment ordinance or
resolution may be repealed."  2 Eugene McQuillin, Law of
Municipal Corporations § 7:39.38 at 843 (3d ed. rev. 2006).
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18
McQuillin goes on to state, however, that "[o]f the few cases
that do decide the issue, most hold that the ordinance or
resolution may be repealed ...."  See Vesenmeir v. City of
Aurora, 232 Ind. 628, 115 N.E.2d 734 (1953); Allen Parish
Water Dist. No. 1 v. City of Oakdale, 540 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct.
App. 1989); Mitrus v. Nichols, 171 Misc. 869, 13 N.Y.S.2d 990
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939); and State ex rel. Maxson v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Franklin County, 167 Ohio St. 458, 149
N.E.2d 918 (1958).  
We recognize the general rule that the power of the
municipality to enact an ordinance implies the power to
rescind an ordinance, but that the rescission of an ordinance
is ineffective as to rights that were acquired under the
ordinance and that have vested prior to its rescission.  See
56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 370 (2000).  In
Vesenmeir, 232 Ind. at 632, 115 N.E.2d at 737, the Supreme
Court of Indiana held:
"As a general rule a municipality which has been
given the power to enact ordinances has, as a
necessary incident thereto and without any express
authorization in the statute, the power to modify or
repeal such ordinances unless the power so to do is
restricted in the law conferring it. The power is
subject to the limitation that the repeal or change
cannot be made so as to affect any vested rights
1070258
19
lawfully acquired under the ordinance sought to be
modified or repealed." 
Because a municipality has the right to rescind an ordinance
and § 11-42-100.1 does not explicitly restrict the annexing
municipality from rescinding the willingness ordinance before
the special election on the question of annexation, the
circuit court properly recognized the City of Springville's
rescission of its willingness ordinance and vacated its August
15, 2007, order.  We limit our holding that a willingness
ordinance may be rescinded before the special election on the
question of annexation to the extent that such rescission does
not disturb any vested rights.  Here, there is no evidence
indicating that the Town of Argo had set a date for the
special election or that it had disbursed any funds in
anticipation of such an election.  It is not necessary to
decide in this case whether such evidence would have been
sufficient to establish a vested right.
Moreover, § 11-42-100.1 is dependent on the existence of
a desire to consolidate on the part of at least one of the
contiguous municipalities.  Based on the circumstances here
presented, we also need not decide whether the continued
existence of a willingness ordinance at all stages is a
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20
jurisdictional issue.  In view of the rescission of the
willingness ordinance by the City of Springville at this early
stage of the process provided for by § 11-42-100.1, the
circuit court correctly concluded that the prerequisites of §
11-42-100.1 for a special election in the Town of Argo on the
question of annexation have not been satisfied.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
judgment vacating its August 15, 2007, order.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.