Title: Jason Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-0589 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Jason Meier, by his guardian, Barbara Meier,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., Nedzmi 
Semovski, and Shpend Jonuzi,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Mid-Century Insurance Company  
 
Defendant, 
Adam Augustine,  
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant.  
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-co-
appellant there were briefs (in the court of appeals) by Bruce D. 
Huibregtse, Barbara A. Neider, Laura Skilton Verhoff and Stafford 
Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Barbara A. Neider. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
(in the court of appeals) by Bruce M. Davey, Robert M. Whitney 
 
2 
and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce M. 
Davey. 
 
2001 WI 20 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 00-0589 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jason Meier, by his guardian, Barbara  
Meier,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., Nedzmi  
Semovski, and Shpend Jonuzi,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Mid-Century Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Adam Augustine,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Mark A. Frankel, Circuit Court Judge, and judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Dane County, David T. Flanagan, Circuit Court 
Judge. Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case comes before us on a 
petition to bypass the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.60 (1997-98).  The plaintiff, Jason Meier (Meier), 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
2 
by his guardian, his mother Barbara Meier, appeals an order of 
the circuit court for Dane County, Judge Mark A. Frankel 
presiding, granting summary judgment to the defendants, Champ's 
Sports 
Bar 
and 
Grill, 
Inc. 
(Champ's), 
Nedzmi 
Semovski 
(Semovski), and Shpend Jonuzi (Jonuzi).  He also appeals the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
granting 
Semovski's 
motion 
for 
an 
extension of time in which to file an answer and denying Meier's 
motion to strike Semovski's answer and motion for default 
judgment.1   
¶2 
On summary judgment, the circuit court determined that 
the defendants, vendors of alcohol, were entitled to immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) (1993-94).2  It further concluded 
that Meier was not entitled to an exception to that immunity 
because he was a provider of alcohol.  Meier, however, asserts 
that he is an injured third party and may proceed under an 
exception to the defendants' general immunity.  We conclude that 
an individual who provides alcohol to an underage person that is 
a substantial factor in causing an accident is not a third party 
under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) and therefore cannot take 
advantage of the exception to the immunity bestowed upon 
                     
1 Meier also appeals an amended final judgment entered in 
the Dane County Circuit Court, David T. Flanagan, Judge, 
dismissing the complaint upon Judge Frankel's grant of summary 
judgment.  Judge Flanagan assumed the case after Judge Frankel's 
resignation from the bench.  
2 All subsequent statutory references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1993-94 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
  
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
3 
providers of alcohol.  We also reject Meier's argument that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting 
defendant Semovski an extension of time to file his answer, and 
in denying Meier's motion to strike and motion for default 
judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the circuit 
court.3   
¶3 
The historical facts necessary to resolve the issues 
presented in this case are substantially undisputed.  On the 
evening of November 25, 1994, Meier, Bryan Johnson (Johnson), 
and Adam Augustine (Augustine) patronized Champ's, a Sun Prairie 
restaurant and bar, for the purpose of eating dinner.  Meier and 
Augustine were both 19 years old, and Johnson was 21 years of 
age.   
¶4 
Upon seating themselves in the bar area of Champ's, a 
server approached the young men to take their orders.  Johnson 
proceeded to order a beer, and the two 19-year-olds did the 
same.  The server brought the first of many pitchers of beer to 
be consumed that night.  No personnel at Champ's asked Meier, 
Johnson, or Augustine for identification to verify that they 
were of legal drinking age, and no member of the group 
represented that he was of legal drinking age.   
                     
3 Meier also seeks review of the circuit court's denial of 
his motion for summary judgment on his claim to pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Semovski and Jonuzi liable in lieu of 
Champ's.  Because we affirm the circuit court's order granting 
the respondents' motion for summary judgment, which dismissed 
all claims against Champ's, Semovski, and Jonuzi on the grounds 
that they are immune under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), we need not 
reach the piercing the corporate veil argument.   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
4 
¶5 
The young men spent the evening drinking and playing 
darts at Champ's.  While the deposed testimony of Johnson and 
Augustine differs to some degree, it is undisputed that the 
group drank at least five pitchers of beer.  The total number 
could have been as many as ten pitchers.  The bartender on duty 
that night testified that the group possibly consumed eight or 
nine pitchers of beer.  At some point after having lost all 
interest in eating dinner, the group switched from beer to mixed 
drinks, purchasing several rounds of Jack Daniel's and Coca-
Cola. 
¶6 
To obtain their drinks, the three alternated making 
trips to the bar to pick up new rounds.  To pay for their 
drinks, Meier 
and 
Augustine 
alternated 
purchasing rounds.  
Johnson testified that he did not have any money that night and 
that all the alcohol was purchased by Meier and Augustine.  
Augustine testified it was possible that Johnson purchased some 
alcohol.   
¶7 
There is no question that at the close of the evening, 
all three men were intoxicated.  In that intoxicated state, they 
left Champ's in order to obtain some food at a truck stop that 
they frequented.  It was agreed that Augustine, who described 
himself as "very drunk," would drive and the three entered his 
automobile.  Meier rode in the backseat as a passenger.  About 
halfway to the truck stop, the group called off their trip and 
decided to drive Meier home to his brother's house in Madison.   
¶8 
At about 1:05 a.m. on November 26, Augustine lost 
control of the vehicle and the car went careening into an 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
5 
embankment.  As a result of the collision, Meier was thrown from 
the vehicle. Augustine, who had to exit the vehicle through the 
sunroof, found Meier laying unconscious some twenty feet in 
front of the vehicle.  Meier suffered a skull fracture and a 
severe 
traumatic 
brain 
injury. 
 
The 
injuries 
left 
him 
permanently disabled.  Augustine testified that he attributes 
the cause of the accident to his intoxication, and the parties 
do not dispute that the accident was the result of Augustine's 
intoxication.   
¶9 
In 1995, Meier brought this action against Champ's, 
Semovski, Jonuzi, Augustine and their insurers.  Champ's is a 
closely held corporation, of which Semovski and Jonuzi are the 
sole shareholders.  Both Semovski and Jonuzi were also present 
at Champ's on the evening of November 25, 1994.  Meier alleged 
that Champ's, Semovski, and Jonuzi committed negligence in 
serving alcohol to Augustine and that the provision of alcohol 
was a substantial factor in causing Meier's injuries.4  
¶10 In beginning the action, Meier obtained substituted 
service of process on Semovski when he served the summons and 
complaint on Semovski's wife at home on April 27, 1995.  The 
registered agent for Champ's was served with an identical 
summons and complaint at the restaurant on April 30.  Semovski 
                     
4  Meier also alleged a cause of action against Augustine 
and his insurer for negligence in the operation of the motor 
vehicle.  This cause of action is not involved in this appeal.   
We note that Augustine is a party to this appeal as a co-
appellant and has joined in Meier's brief and reply brief.   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
6 
took only the latter summons and complaint served on Champ's to 
his attorney, and did not mention the other.  Semovski's 
attorney then referred Semovski to another law firm, where he 
forwarded the summons and complaint served on Champ's.  On 
Monday, May 22, Semovski and Champ's filed their joint answer.   
¶11 Because of the three-day difference between the dates 
of service, Semovski's answer had 
been due 
on May 17.  
Accordingly, Meier moved to strike the answer and moved for 
default judgment.  In response, Semovski moved to enlarge the 
time in which to file an answer or for relief from the effects 
of a late answer.  The circuit court concluded that there was 
excusable neglect and accepted Semovski's untimely answer after 
granting his motion for an extension of time and denying Meier's 
motion to strike and motion for default judgment.  
¶12 After 
several 
years 
of 
discovery 
and 
pretrial 
activity, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that 
they 
were 
entitled 
to 
immunity 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.035(2) because Meier was not an injured third party under 
the § 125.035(4)(b) exception to that immunity.5  Subsection 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035 states in pertinent part: 
125.035 Civil liability exemption: furnishing alcohol 
beverages. 
. . . . 
(2) A person is immune from civil liability 
arising out of the act of procuring alcohol beverages 
for or selling, dispensing or giving away alcohol 
beverages to another person. 
. . . .  
(4)(a) In this subsection, "provider" means a 
person, 
including 
a 
licensee 
or 
permittee, 
who 
procures alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
7 
(4)(b) excepts providers of alcohol from immunity where they 
provide alcohol to an underage person "if the provider knew or 
should have known that the underage person was under the legal 
drinking 
age 
and 
if 
the 
alcohol 
beverages . . . 
were 
a 
substantial factor in causing injury to a 3rd party."  The 
defendants argued that Meier was not a third party under this 
provision because he was a party to the sale and procurement of 
the alcohol that he claimed was a substantial factor in causing 
his injuries.   
¶13 In an extensive written decision the circuit court 
agreed that the defendants were entitled to immunity and granted 
the defendants summary judgment on all claims against them.  The 
court concluded that Meier did not qualify under a common and 
approved definition of the term "third party."6  The court 
explained: 
 
Because one who procures alcohol for an underage 
drinker is a party to the transaction that leads to 
the 
underage 
drinker's 
intoxication, 
they 
cannot 
qualify as a "third party" under this definition.  It 
is difficult to imagine a class of individuals that 
                                                                  
gives away alcohol beverages to an underage person in 
violation of s. 125.07(1)(a). 
(b) Subsection (2) does not apply if the provider 
knew or should have known that the underage person was 
under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol 
beverages provided to the underage person were a 
substantial 
factor 
in 
causing 
injury 
to 
a 
3rd 
party. . . .  
 
6 The circuit court consulted Black's Law Dictionary, which 
defined a third party as "one not a party to an agreement, a 
transaction, or an action but who may have rights therein."  
Deluxe Black's Law Dictionary 1479 (6th ed. 1990).   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
8 
the legislature would have more likely intended to 
exclude from qualifying as a "third party" than those 
persons involved in procuring alcohol for the underage 
drinker who ultimately injures another party. 
¶14 In 
response, 
Meier 
unsuccessfully 
sought 
reconsideration of the circuit court's order granting summary 
judgment.  He subsequently appealed.  The parties jointly 
requested to bypass the court of appeals.    
I 
¶15 We first address the circuit court order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  In reviewing a 
decision 
to 
grant 
summary 
judgment 
we 
employ 
the 
same 
methodology used by the circuit court.  Stelpflug v. Town of 
Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 275, 612 N.W.2d 700.  
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1999-2000).  The 
resolution of this case implicates the construction of Wis. 
Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) within this summary judgment context.  
Such a question of statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review independently of the determination of the circuit 
court.  Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶12, 
236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120.   
¶16 Our summary judgment determination essentially will 
depend on whether the defendants are entitled to the immunity 
bestowed upon providers of alcohol under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) 
or whether the § 125.035(4)(b) exception to that immunity 
applies.  Given the general rule of immunity under § 125.035(2) 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
9 
for providers of alcohol, Meier's claims against the defendants 
are 
predicated 
on 
the 
§ 125.035(4)(b) 
exception. 
 
The 
applicability of the exception to immunity hinges upon our 
construction of that provision, and in particular the term "3rd 
party" as juxtaposed against "provider."  In this case, we 
specifically must determine whether "3rd party" may be construed 
to include one who provides alcohol to an underage drinker that 
is a substantial factor in causing an accident.  If a provider 
of alcohol can also be a third party then Meier can take 
advantage of the exception to immunity provided by the statute 
in an action against a vendor of alcohol.   
¶17 While this is a question of first impression, in 
Miller v. Thomack, 210 Wis. 2d 650, 660 n.11, 563 N.W.2d 891 
(1997), we specifically acknowledged that this issue might arise 
under § 125.035(4)(b).  However, we declined to address the 
issue in that case.  Id.  In deciding the issue today, we 
conclude that an individual who provides alcohol to an underage 
person that is a substantial factor in causing an accident 
cannot be considered a third party under § 125.035(4)(b).  
¶18 We begin our analysis with the undisputed premise that 
Meier is a provider as the term is used in § 125.035(4)(b).  
While "3rd party" is not defined by the statute, "provider" is 
defined as one "who procures alcohol beverages for or sells, 
dispenses or gives away alcohol beverages to an underage person 
in violation of s. 125.07(1)(a)."  Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(a).  
In Miller 
v. 
Thomack, 
we 
concluded 
that 
a 
person 
"who 
contributes money with the intent of bringing about the purchase 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
10
of alcohol beverages for consumption by an underage person whom 
the person knows, or should know, is under the legal drinking 
age, procures alcohol beverages for the underage person within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(1)(a)1 and 125.035(4)."  210 
Wis. 2d at 656-57.  Because he contributed money for the 
purchase of alcohol, Meier procured alcohol under Miller and 
thus 
qualifies 
as 
a 
provider 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
§ 125.035(4)(a).7  
¶19 We also note that our analysis is premised on the fact 
that the alcohol provided by Meier was a substantial factor in 
causing the accident and his resulting injuries.  The issue as 
framed by the parties has been whether Meier's provider status 
barred him from being a third party under § 125.035(4)(b) 
without consideration of whether the alcohol he provided was a 
substantial factor in causing his injuries.8  However, given the 
degree of intoxication described in the summary judgment 
materials and the fact that Meier provided somewhere in the 
realm of one-third to one-half of the alcohol, we do not find 
                     
7 The summary judgment materials also suggest that Meier 
made actual physical trips to the bar to obtain rounds of 
alcohol.  By this act of procurement Meier is also a provider 
within the meaning of § 125.035(1)(a).   
8 In his brief, Meier stated without supporting argument 
that the circuit court erroneously assumed that Meier provided 
alcohol that was a substantial factor in causing the accident.  
However, Meier's position at oral argument was that the issue of 
whether the alcohol that Meier provided was a substantial factor 
is relevant only in considering whether Meier himself is immune. 
  
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
11
there to be a disputed issue of material fact as to whether 
Meier's provision of alcohol was a cause of the accident. 
¶20 While Meier acknowledges that he and the defendants 
are providers, he argues that his provider status is relevant 
only in determining whether he would be subject to liability 
vis-à-vis a third party and not in determining whether the 
exception to immunity applies in an action against another 
provider.  Meier argues that from the perspective of the 
provision of alcohol by the defendants to Augustine, the 
defendants are the first party, Augustine is the second party, 
and Meier is an injured third party.  He contends that this 
reading of the statute comports with the common understanding of 
"third party."   
¶21 In Miller we noted that "[t]he scope of the term third 
party is not apparent in the statute."  Id. at 660 n.11.  
Consistent with that statement, we conclude that as a result of 
the interplay of the terms "provider" and "3rd party" reasonable 
minds can differ as to the meaning of the statute.  To resolve 
the ambiguity we determine the legislative intent behind the 
statute through an inquiry into the ordinary usage of the 
language, legislative policy, and legislative history.   
¶22 Meier apparently understands the term "third party" to 
literally describe the numeric relationship among the actors 
described by the statute.  However, we do not believe that such 
an interpretation in this context is consistent with the common 
understanding of the term.  When construing a statute we must 
give effect to the ordinary and accepted meaning of language.  
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
12
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) (1999-2000); State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. 
Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 140, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  
¶23 "Third party" ordinarily describes one who is not a 
principal to a transaction.  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1865 (1992) ("One other than the principals 
involved in a transaction."); Black's Law Dictionary 1489 (7th 
ed. 1999) ("someone other than the principal parties").9  The 
term bears no relation to the actual number of individuals 
involved in a transaction.  There may be any number of 
principals to a transaction and any number of third parties.  
While the scope of the term "third party" is drawn into question 
in this statutory context, we are confident that term standing 
alone is intended by the legislature to have its ordinary 
meaning.  
¶24 Abiding by the common understanding of "third party" 
we next examine that term as it is used in the statute.  The 
transactional focus of § 125.035(4)(b) is the provision of 
alcohol to underage persons.10  The principal parties to such a 
transaction are: (1) providers and (2) underage drinkers.  When 
the transaction between these principals is a substantial factor 
                     
9  See also Wis. Stat. § 401.201(29) (1999-2000) ("'Party' 
as distinct from '3rd party', means a person who has engaged in 
a transaction or made an agreement within chs. 401 to 411.").   
10  At oral argument Meier suggested that it was possible 
that the transaction referenced by the term "third party" was 
the injury-causing accident.  We disagree.  The statute's focus 
is on the furnishing of alcohol beverages and not on the 
resulting accident or incident which may cause injury.   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
13
in causing harm to a third party the statutory immunity is 
lifted and a third party may proceed against a provider.  Thus, 
application of this common definition of third party to 
§ 125.035(4)(b) leads to the conclusion that a third party is 
someone other than the underage drinker or a provider who 
provides alcohol that is a substantial factor in causing the 
third party's injuries. 
¶25 Accordingly, because Meier provided alcohol that was a 
substantial factor in causing the accident and his injuries, he 
cannot be considered a third party under the statute.  An 
individual may not provide injury-causing alcohol and also claim 
to be a third party in order to take advantage of the exception 
to immunity in an action against another provider.  
¶26 We find further support for our conclusion that Meier 
is not a third party under § 125.035(4)(b) in the legislative 
policy underlying that provision.  In Doering v. WEA Insurance 
Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995), we explained that 
the legislative policy precludes injured underage drinkers from 
bringing a cause of action against the provider of alcohol.  We 
described how § 125.035(4)(b) protects underage persons by 
deterring those who would provide them with alcohol: 
 
The fact that sec. 125.035 does not allow underage 
drinkers who themselves are injured to bring a cause 
of action against the person who provided the alcohol 
beverages does not defeat the conjectured legislative 
purpose of protecting underage persons.  Facilitating 
compensation for injured underage drinkers is not the 
only means of attempting to protect people under the 
legal 
drinking 
age. 
 
The 
legislature 
may 
have 
determined that sheltering people under the legal 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
14
drinking age by deterring those who might otherwise 
furnish 
alcohol 
beverages 
to 
them, 
rather 
than 
compensating the injured underage person, would better 
serve the goal of protecting young people.   
Id. at 142-43 (footnote omitted).   
¶27 Under 
§ 125.035(4)(b), 
providers 
of 
alcohol 
are 
deterred from providing alcohol to minors by the liability that 
may arise when the provision of alcohol results in an injury to 
a third party.  Even though the underage drinker who causes 
injury to a third party may be among the group that the 
legislature seeks to protect, the exception to immunity applies 
only 
in 
an action brought 
by the 
injured 
third 
party.  
Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 157 Wis. 2d 768, 776, 461 
N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).  Under the statute, providers are 
the object of the statutory deterrence; they are the group whose 
conduct is sought to be prevented.  As the circuit court 
explained, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a class of individuals 
that the legislature would have more likely intended to exclude 
from qualifying as a 'third party' than those persons involved 
in procuring alcohol for the underage drinker who ultimately 
injures another party."   
¶28 To allow Meier to be both a provider and a third party 
would be to ignore that Meier, as a provider, is the object of 
the legislative goal of deterrence.  Meier emphasizes the 
wrongful and illegal nature of the defendants' conduct in 
selling alcohol to a minor in contravention of Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.07.  While there may be some moral distinction to be drawn 
between Meier's and the defendants' conduct, the controlling 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
15
statutes do not draw such a distinction.  Under § 125.035(4)(a), 
Meier's conduct in procuring alcohol for Augustine is the 
equivalent of the defendants' sale of alcohol to Augustine.  
Both have similarly committed a violation of § 125.07(1)(a) 
through their provision of alcohol to Augustine.11  Because the 
legislative goal of the statute is to deter the very conduct in 
which Meier engaged and that conduct was a substantial factor in 
bringing about his injuries, we conclude that he cannot take 
advantage of the exception to immunity in an action against 
another provider.   
¶29 Meier has also emphasized that he was an underage 
drinker who lacked the judgment of a 21-year-old and thus should 
                     
11  Section 125.035(4)(a) incorporates § 125.07(1)(a) into 
the definition of provider.  Section 125.07(1)(a) states: 
    (1) ALCOHOL BEVERAGES; RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO 
UNDERAGE PERSONS. (a) Restrictions. 1. No person may 
procure for, sell, dispense or give away any alcohol 
beverages to any underage person not accompanied by 
his or her parent, guardian or spouse who has attained 
the legal drinking age. 
 
    2. No licensee or permittee may sell, vend, deal 
or traffic in alcohol beverages to or with any 
underage person not accompanied by his or her parent, 
guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking 
age. 
 
    3. No adult may knowingly permit or fail to take 
action to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol 
beverages by an underage person on premises owned by 
the 
adult 
or 
under 
the 
adult's 
control. 
This 
subdivision does not apply to alcohol beverages used 
exclusively as part of a religious service. 
 
    4. 
No 
adult 
may 
intentionally 
encourage 
or 
contribute to a violation of sub. (4) (a) or (b). 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
16
be allowed to proceed against adult providers.  While we are 
sympathetic 
to 
Meier's 
situation, 
his 
argument 
seeks 
to 
interject 
an 
additional 
consideration 
of 
age 
into 
§ 125.035(4)(b).  Under § 125.035(4)(b), it is only Augustine's 
age that is relevant.  Augustine is the underage drinker to whom 
alcohol was provided by the defendants and Meier.  The statute 
draws no other distinction between minors and adults, whether 
providers or third parties.  To consider Meier's age in the 
statutory equation would require us to draw a line between a 
third party and a provider at the age of 21.  It is beyond our 
powers to draw such a line. 
¶30 Having concluded that the common meaning of the term  
"third party" as used in the statute and the legislative policy 
dictate that Meier is not a third party, we next examine the 
legislative history.  Meier urges us to employ the canon of 
construction that statutes in derogation of the common law must 
be strictly construed.12  Meier posits that at the time of 
§ 125.035's creation the common law provided no immunity to a 
party that provides intoxicants to an underage person, and that 
strict construction of the statute requires liability where 
immunity is not clearly and unambiguously established.  We 
conclude that this canon of strict construction is inapplicable 
                     
12  As a general matter, this canon of strict construction 
provides that where there exists a common law doctrine relevant 
to the issue presented and a statute would change the common 
law, the legislative intent to change the common law must be 
clearly expressed.  LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 129-
30, 330 N.W.2d 555 (1983).   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
17
to § 125.035(4)(b).  Meier's argument is based on an imprecise 
view of the pre-§ 125.035 rule of common law immunity.   
¶31 For 
decades 
Wisconsin 
common 
law 
recognized 
no 
liability on the part of sellers of alcohol for damages arising 
from the acts of an intoxicated person.  See, e.g., Farmer's 
Mut. Auto. Cas. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 
(1962); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 228 N.W. 774 (1939).  This 
common law immunity underwent a continuing series of salvos,13 
withstanding attack until this court's decision in Sorensen v. 
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).   
¶32 In Sorensen, the court was faced with the question of 
"whether a third party injured by an intoxicated minor has a 
common law negligence action against a retail seller for the 
negligent sale of an intoxicating beverage to a person the 
seller knew or should have known was a minor and whose 
consumption of the alcohol was a cause of the accident."  Id. at 
629.  The court concluded that in such a situation a third party 
does have a cause of action in negligence and abrogated the rule 
of common law immunity in the situation faced by the court.14  
                     
13  The rule of common law immunity withstood challenges in 
Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979); Garcia 
v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970); and Farmer's 
Mut. Auto. Cas. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 
(1962).   
14 In reaching this conclusion, the court incorporated the 
rationale of the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Hallows in 
Garcia 
v. 
Hargrove, 
46 
Wis. 2d 
at 
737 
(Hallows, 
C.J., 
dissenting), and Justice Day in Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d at 
494 (Day, J., dissenting).  See Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 
627, 646, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
18
Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 646.  The following term, Koback v. 
Crook extended the liability established in Sorensen to allow 
for a cause of action against social hosts who served alcohol to 
a minor where the minor's consumption of alcohol was a cause of 
injury to the third party.  123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 
(1985).  
¶33 It was against this backdrop that the legislature 
created Wis. Stat. § 125.035 in 1985.  The legislative history 
reveals that the statute was passed in direct response to the 
court's decisions in Sorensen and Koback.15  Although the 
specific holdings of those two cases only directly extended 
liability where alcohol was provided to a minor by a vendor or 
social host, the legislature solidified provider immunity as the 
general rule in Wisconsin with the creation of § 125.035(2).   
¶34 Through the § 125.035(4)(b) exception the legislature 
signaled its approval of the specific holdings of Sorensen and 
Koback.  Using the language of Sorensen and Koback, the 
legislature allowed for provider liability in substantially the 
same circumstances as provided by those cases. With the 
exception of the use of "provider" as the definitional framework 
of the statute, the legislature adopted the position of Sorensen 
                     
15 The Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau included 
as part of 1985 Wis. Act 47 made reference to "2 recent cases" 
of this court extending liability to vendors and social hosts 
who provide alcohol to underage persons.   
No. 
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19
and Koback in passing § 125.035(4)(b).16  Because the legislature 
drafted § 125.035 with Sorensen and Koback in mind and because 
the statute tracks the language of the case law, we conclude 
that the statute is not one in derogation of the common law, but 
indeed is one that attempted to codify the common law as it 
existed in 1985.  
¶35 Meier's argument in favor of strict construction also 
presumes that the defendants would not have been liable prior to 
the passage of § 125.035.  This presumes too much.  While 
Sorensen and Koback require injuries to a third party, no pre-
statutory immunity case law addresses the question posed here.17 
                     
16  We recognize that our rejection of the notion that 
§ 125.035(4)(b) is a statute in derogation of the common law 
runs contrary to the conflicting court of appeals discussions in 
Miller v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242, 263, 555 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. 
App. 1996), and Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 157 Wis. 2d 
768, 776-77, 461 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).  To the extent that 
the court of appeals discussions of this canon of strict 
construction in Miller and Kwiatkowski are inconsistent with 
this opinion, such discussions are no longer valid precedent.   
17 While we cannot place much reliance on the pre-statutory 
case law in defining the scope of "third party" in this context, 
we note that there is nothing in Sorensen or Koback to suggest 
that the injured third party was engaged in the procurement of 
alcohol.  
We also note that the parties engage in debate over the 
meaning of cases that arose during the fourteen months between 
the date of the Sorensen decision and the operative date of 
§ 125.035(2), including Dziewa v. Vossler, 149 Wis. 2d 74, 438 
N.W.2d 565 (1989). 
 Because 
we 
are 
concerned 
with the 
legislative intent behind § 125.035(2), we find that cases based 
upon pre-statutory law but decided after that statute was passed 
do not bear on the statute's interpretation and are of no 
assistance in our determination of legislative intent.   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
20
Because the statute is not one in derogation of common law that 
requires strict construction, we need not hypothesize about the 
outcome of this case under pre-§ 125.035 common law.  The 
statute and its underlying policy control the outcome of this 
case, and under the statute Meier may not claim the status of 
third party in order to proceed with his claims against the 
defendants.  
¶36 Meier argues that such a reading of "third party" is 
inconsistent with the court of appeals decisions interpreting 
§ 125.035(4)(b) in Miller v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242, 555 
N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1996), and Kwiatkowski, 157 Wis. 2d 768.  
In Miller, the court of appeals concluded that an underage 
drinker who had illegally consumed alcohol was a third party and 
thus able to take advantage of the exception to immunity 
provided under § 125.035(4)(b).  204 Wis. 2d at 262.  The court 
of appeals decision in Miller does not conflict with today's 
decision, which rests upon Meier's conduct in procuring alcohol 
for Augustine.  There the third party was a fellow drinker, but 
was not deemed a provider under § 125.035(4)(a).18 
                     
18  While the court of appeals did not address the drinker's 
involvement in procuring alcohol, we did so in our review.  
Miller v. Thomack, 210 Wis. 2d 650, 657, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997). 
 However, we did not address the question of whether the 
underage drinker in question would qualify as a third party, but 
rather specifically left the question open.  Id. at 660-61 n.11. 
 Thus the court of appeals decision in Miller should not be read 
in conjunction with this court's decision in Miller to reach the 
opposite conclusion as reached in today's decision.   
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
21
¶37 In 
Kwiatkowski, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
correctly 
concluded that the § 125.035(4)(b) exception applies only when 
the injured third party is the claimant.  157 Wis. 2d at 776.  
The court did so in response to a claim against a vendor of 
alcohol brought by an underage drinker (Kwiatkowski) who injured 
a passenger in his automobile (Pederson).  In concluding that 
Kwiatkowski could not maintain an action under § 125.035(4)(b), 
the court of appeals referred to Pederson as an injured third 
party, despite the fact that Pederson procured the alcohol 
beverages for Kwiatkowski.  Id. at 771, 774.  The court of 
appeals' statement that Pederson was a third party under 
§ 125.035(4)(b) is incorrect and should not be relied on as 
valid precedent.  However, we note that the determination of 
whether Pederson was a third party was not an issue in the case 
and as such was not necessary in deciding the issue of whether 
Kwiatkowski 
could 
take 
advantage 
of 
the 
§ 125.035(4)(b) 
exception. 
¶38 Having 
concluded 
our 
statutory 
construction 
of 
§ 125.035(4)(b), we turn to a final issue that Meier raises with 
respect to the resolution of the summary judgment motion.  Meier 
argues that regardless of whether he is a third party with 
respect to those purchases of alcohol in which he was a 
provider, he is an injured third party and the defendants are 
not immune for those purchases in which he was not a provider.  
¶39 While there may have been individual transactions that 
occurred between the group and the defendants in which Meier did 
not purchase or physically obtain the alcohol, we will not 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
22
subdivide and nuance an evening of drinking into a dozen or so 
individual transactions in a case such as this.  Meier, 
Augustine, and Johnson collectively procured all of the alcohol 
and drank it as a group.  Meier himself paid for one-third to 
one-half of the alcohol that evening and may have physically 
procured alcohol that he did not personally purchase.  Where a 
provider such as Meier has provided alcohol to an underage 
drinker that was a substantial factor in causing his own 
injuries, we will not dissect the underage drinker's binge to 
determine whether one such provider may proceed against other 
providers. 
 
Meier 
never 
disassociated 
himself 
from 
the 
procurement of alcohol that evening.  Having been involved in 
the collaborative procurement of alcohol from beginning to end, 
Meier's status did not alternate from third party to provider 
with each individual purchase.   
¶40 We conclude by noting that we do not fail to grasp the 
severity of harm caused to Jason Meier.  We realize that the 
consequences of our decision may seem harsh.  The statute 
requires the outcome, and it is beyond our powers to redraft it. 
 We note that Meier is not without recourse.  Meier still may 
proceed in his  cause of action in negligence against Augustine 
and his insurer.  However, because Meier provided alcohol to an 
underage drinker and the provision of that alcohol was a 
substantial factor in causing the accident resulting in Meier's 
injuries, he cannot proceed against the defendants under the 
exception to immunity provided by § 125.035(4)(b).   
II 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
23
¶41 Finally, 
we address 
Meier's 
contention 
that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting 
Semovski's motion to enlarge time and denying Meier's motion to 
strike Semovski's answer and motion for default judgment.  Where 
a dilatory party moves for an extension of time following the 
statutory deadline for filing an answer an extension of time 
must be based on a finding of excusable neglect.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.15(2)(a); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 
468, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982).  In addition to finding excusable 
neglect, the circuit court must consider whether the interests 
of justice will be served by granting or denying a motion to 
enlarge the time to file an answer.  Id. at 469.   
¶42 The power to grant an extension of time is highly 
discretionary, and this court will not disturb the circuit 
court's decision unless it constitutes an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Id. at 467.  We will not find an erroneous exercise 
of discretion if the circuit court considered the relevant 
facts, properly interpreted and applied the law, and reached a 
reasonable determination.  Ness v. Digital Dial Communications, 
Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 592, 600, 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999).   
¶43 In the case at hand, Semovski's dilatory answer 
resulted from his failure to provide his counsel with the 
summons served on him personally and his attorney's assumption 
that Semovski and Champ's were served simultaneously.  The 
circuit court identified the controlling standard as excusable 
neglect, and after stating the simultaneous service "probably 
happens in  . . . the significant majority of cases" the circuit 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
24
court concluded that Semovski's counsel's assumption was within 
the realm of "reasonable practice."  After considering the 
"rather severe consequences" of granting default judgment and 
the "absence of any prejudice to the plaintiff" the court 
granted Semovski's motion to enlarge time and denied Meier's 
motion to strike and motion for default judgment.  Meier argues 
that neither Semovski's failure to provide counsel with both 
summonses nor his counsel's failure to inquire as to when he was 
personally served can constitute excusable neglect.   
¶44 We 
will 
not 
second-guess 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination 
that 
Semovski's 
neglect 
was 
excusable.  The circuit court applied the proper standard and 
appropriately considered the harsh consequences of default 
judgment and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff.  Because 
the circuit court reached a reasonable determination after 
application of the correct legal standard and consideration of 
the relevant factors we cannot conclude it erroneously exercised 
its discretion.   
III 
¶45 In sum, we hold that an individual, such as Meier, who 
provides alcohol to an underage person that is a substantial 
factor in causing an accident cannot be considered an injured 
third party under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  Therefore he 
cannot take advantage of the exception to the immunity provided 
by that provision in an action against another provider.  
Accordingly, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants.  Because we also conclude that the 
No. 
00-0589 
 
 
25
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
granting Semovski an extension of time to file an answer and 
denying Meier's motion to strike and motion for default 
judgment, we affirm the orders and judgment of the circuit 
court.    
 By the Court.—The orders and judgment of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
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1