Title: 1A Auto, Inc. v. Director of Office of Campaign & Political Finance

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12413 
 
1A AUTO, INC., & another1  vs.  DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF 
CAMPAIGN AND POLITICAL FINANCE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 6, 2018. - September 6, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Elections, Political contributions.  Constitutional Law, Freedom 
of speech and press, Freedom of association, Equal 
protection of laws. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 24, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
James Manley, of Arizona (Gregory D. Cote also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
 
Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorney General (William W. 
Porter, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the 
defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
1 126 Self Storage, Inc. 
2 
 
 
Ben T. Clements, M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Ryan P. McManus, 
John C. Bonifaz, Ronald A. Fein, & Shann M. Cleveland, for 
Common Cause & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  For more than a century, Massachusetts law, 
like Federal law, see 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012 & Supp. II), 
has prohibited business corporations from making contributions 
to political candidates or their campaigns.  See St. 1907, 
c. 581.  The plaintiffs here are business corporations who 
challenge Massachusetts's ban on corporate contributions, G. L. 
c. 55, § 8, claiming that it imposes an unconstitutional 
restraint on their rights to free speech and association.  The 
corporations also claim that, because § 8 prohibits corporations 
from making contributions but does not also prohibit other 
entities -- such as unions and nonprofit organizations -- from 
doing so, it denies them their right to equal protection under 
the law.  We affirm the Superior Court judge's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, the director of the Office 
of Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF), on both claims.2 
 
Background.  1.  Limits on corporate political spending.  
Laws limiting the political spending of corporations have a long 
historical pedigree.  The earliest such laws emerged more than a 
century ago, as growing public concern over the influence of 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Common Cause 
and Free Speech for People. 
3 
 
corporations in politics led to widespread calls for regulation.  
Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) 
(Beaumont).  See R.E. Mutch, Buying the Vote:  A History of 
Campaign Finance Reform 16-17, 33, 43-44 (2014).  In 1905, 
President Theodore Roosevelt urged Congress to take action, 
recommending a total ban on corporate political contributions in 
order to prevent "bribery and corruption in Federal elections."  
40 Cong. Rec. S96 (Dec. 5, 1905).  Congress responded in 1907 by 
enacting the Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), which prohibited 
"any corporation" from "mak[ing] a money contribution in 
connection with any election to any political office." 
 
The same year that Congress enacted the Tillman Act, the 
Massachusetts Legislature enacted its own law prohibiting 
corporations from making campaign contributions.  See St. 1907, 
c. 581, § 3.3  Over the next few decades, the Legislature further 
refined this ban on corporate contributions, while integrating 
it into its broader efforts to combat corruption in State 
elections.  See, e.g., St. 1913, c. 835, §§ 353, 356 ("Corrupt 
Practices" section of "An Act to codify the laws relative to 
primaries, caucuses and elections"); St. 1946, c. 537, § 10 ("An 
                                                          
 
 
3 The Massachusetts law initially prohibited only certain 
corporations from making campaign contributions, St. 1907, 
c. 581, § 3, but was soon amended to apply to all "business 
corporation[s] incorporated under the laws of[] or doing 
business in this commonwealth."  St. 1908, c. 483, § 1. 
4 
 
Act relative to corrupt practices, election inquests and 
violations of election laws").  In 2009, the Legislature 
extended the ban to apply not only to traditional business 
corporations but also to any "professional corporation, 
partnership, [or] limited liability company partnership."  
St. 2009, c. 28, § 33. 
 
Massachusetts's current ban on corporate contributions, 
G. L. c. 55, § 8, prohibits business corporations and other 
profit-making entities from making contributions with respect to 
State or local candidates.  It states, in relevant part: 
"[N]o business or professional corporation, partnership, 
[or] limited liability company partnership under the laws 
of or doing business in the commonwealth . . . shall 
directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute[] 
any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of 
aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election 
of any person to public office, or aiding or promoting or 
antagonizing the interest of any political party." 
 
 
To understand what a business corporation may and may not 
do to support a political candidate under current Massachusetts 
law, we need to describe the different possible ways in which 
money can be used to support a political candidate's campaign.  
One way is to make contributions, in cash or things of value, 
directly to the candidate or to a committee organized on the 
candidate's behalf.  See G. L. c. 55, § 1.  A second way is to 
establish and pay the administrative expenses of a political 
action committee (PAC), which may then raise money from various 
5 
 
sources, and use that money to support a candidate's campaign.  
See G. L. c. 55, §§ 1, 5.  A third way is to make contributions 
to a PAC.  See G. L. c. 55, § 1.  A fourth way is to make 
"independent expenditures," which are expenditures made to 
advocate for or against a candidate -- for example by purchasing 
newspaper, radio, or television advertising praising the 
candidate or criticizing his or her opponent -- that are not 
made in cooperation with or in consultation with any candidate.  
See id.  A fifth way is to make contributions to independent 
expenditure PACs, sometimes called "super PACs," which, unlike 
ordinary PACs, may only make independent expenditures and may 
not contribute to candidates.  See G. L. c. 55, § 18A (d).  See 
also OCPF, Interpretive Bulletin, OCPF-IB-10-03 (Oct. 2010) 
(rev. Jan. 2015); OCPF, Campaign Finance Activity by Political 
Action Committees in Massachusetts, 2011 & 2012, at 12 (July 
2013). 
 
Under Massachusetts law, corporations may not make any 
contributions to a candidate or to a candidate's committee, may 
not establish or administer a PAC, and may not contribute to a 
PAC that is not an independent expenditure PAC.  See Op. Atty. 
Gen. No. 10 (Nov. 6, 1980), in Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 
118-120 (1981).  See also OCPF, Advisory Opinion, OCPF-AO-00-05 
(Apr. 21, 2000); OCPF, Advisory Opinion, OCPF-AO-98-18 (July 31, 
1998).  Corporations may, however, make unlimited "independent 
6 
 
expenditures," subject to certain disclosure requirements.  See 
G. L. c. 55, §§ 18A, 18C, 18G.  They may also make unlimited 
contributions to independent expenditure PACs.  See 970 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.17 (2018).  See also OCPF, Interpretive 
Bulletin, OCPF-IB-10-03, supra. 
 
To illustrate, if a Massachusetts corporation wants to 
support a certain John Hancock for Massachusetts governor, it 
may not contribute money directly to Hancock or to Hancock's 
campaign committee.  Nor may it establish and administer a PAC 
to solicit contributions for Hancock, or contribute to a PAC 
that in turn makes campaign contributions to Hancock.  The 
corporation may, however, spend as much money as it likes 
advocating on behalf of Hancock, as long as it does so 
independently from him and his campaign.  For example, it may, 
on its own initiative and without coordinating with Hancock, pay 
for a television advertisement urging viewers to vote for 
Hancock.  It may also contribute to an independent expenditure 
PAC, which, provided it does not coordinate with Hancock, may 
spend money promoting him to the public. 
 
2.  The present action.  The plaintiffs in this case are 
two separate family-owned corporations doing business in 
Massachusetts.  1A Auto, Inc., is an automobile parts retailer 
in Pepperell.  126 Self Storage, Inc., operates a self-storage 
facility in Ashland.  Under § 8, the plaintiffs are barred from 
7 
 
making political contributions that they would otherwise choose 
to make. 
 
The plaintiffs filed suit against the director of OCPF in 
his official capacity, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the continued enforcement of § 8.  The plaintiffs 
alleged that, in banning corporate contributions, § 8 violates 
their free speech and association rights guaranteed under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 16 
and 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that § 8 violates their right to equal 
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 1 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, because it prohibits corporations from 
making political contributions without also prohibiting other 
entities, like unions and nonprofit organizations, from doing 
so. 
 
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against 
the enforcement of § 8.  A Superior Court judge denied the 
motion, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits.  Following discovery, the 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  Another 
Superior Court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted 
OCPF's motion.  As to the plaintiffs' free speech and 
association claim, the judge noted that in Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 
8 
 
154-155, 162-163, the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the Federal ban on corporate 
contributions, holding that it was justified by the government's 
important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption.  The judge concluded that, under that controlling 
precedent, § 8 was not unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment because its ban on corporate contributions is "closely 
drawn to serve the State's interest in preventing corruption or 
the appearance of corruption."  He also concluded that arts. 16 
and 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights grant a 
corporation no greater rights to make political contributions 
than the First Amendment.  As to the plaintiffs' equal 
protection claim, the judge concluded that, because the 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that corporations and 
unions are similarly situated, § 8 did not violate the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or its parallel in 
art. 1.  The plaintiffs appealed from the judge's grant of 
summary judgment, and we allowed their application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We review a decision to grant summary judgment 
de novo.  See Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 
(2014).  "[W]here both parties have moved for summary judgment, 
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
9 
 
against whom judgment is to enter" (citation omitted), in this 
case, the plaintiffs.  Id. 
 
1.  Free speech and association claim.  The corporations 
claim that § 8 violates their rights of free speech and 
association under both the First Amendment and arts. 16 and 19.  
In interpreting the United States Constitution, we are of course 
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and 
we "can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates of the 
United States Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Cote, 386 Mass. 
354, 360-361 (1982), quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 
369, 376 (1979).  We are, however, "free to interpret [S]tate 
constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to 
individual rights than do similar provisions of the United 
States Constitution."  Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 
440 Mass. 309, 328 (2003), quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
8 (1995).  We must therefore first consider whether § 8 is 
constitutional under the First Amendment, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.  If it is, we must then consider whether our 
Declaration of Rights is more protective of corporate 
contributions than the First Amendment and, if so, whether § 8 
complies with that more protective constitutional standard. 
 
a.  First Amendment.  "Discussion of public issues and 
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established in our 
10 
 
Constitution."  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per 
curiam).  For this reason, "[t]he First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression."  Id.  And 
because, in today's world, the communication of political views 
and opinions -- whether by distributing pamphlets, or through 
mass media -- almost inevitably costs money, see id. at 19, laws 
that limit political spending must be recognized as "operat[ing] 
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities," 
id. at 14.  At the same time, such limits are also an integral 
feature of campaign finance laws in this State and across the 
nation, designed to diminish the risk of government corruption, 
as well as the appearance of such corruption. 
 
Political contributions from corporations are prohibited 
not only under Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 55, § 8, but also 
under Federal law, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), as well as under the 
laws of twenty-one other States.4  See National Conference of 
State Legislatures, State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, 
2017-2018 Election Cycle (June 27,2017).  In Beaumont, 539 U.S. 
                                                          
 
 
4 See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(f); Arizona Rev. Stat. § 16-
916(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-203; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-103.7; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-613; Iowa Code § 68A.503; Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 121.025, 121.035; Mich. Comp. Laws § 169.254; Minn. 
Stat. § 211B.15; Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 23.3(3)(a); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 13-35-227; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A-1430; N.D. Cent. 
Code § 16.1-08.1-03.5; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.03; Okla. 
Stat. tit. 21, § 187.2; 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3253; R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 17-25-10.1(h); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 253.094; W. Va. 
Code § 3-8-8; Wis. Stat. § 11.1112; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-25-102. 
11 
 
at 149, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to 
the Federal ban, which prohibits corporations from making 
contributions to candidates running for Federal office.  In 
doing so, the Court relied on the long-standing distinction -- 
first articulated in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21 -- between laws 
that limit independent expenditures and laws that limit 
contributions.  As the Court stated, independent expenditure 
limits are subject to strict scrutiny, whereas contribution 
limits are reviewed under a less rigorous standard, and will be 
upheld as long as they are "'closely drawn' to match a 
'sufficiently important interest.'"  Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 
quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-
388 (2000).  This is because, as the Court first explained in 
Buckley, contribution limits encroach to a lesser extent on 
First Amendment interests than independent expenditure limits:  
whereas independent expenditures are themselves a form of 
political expression, lying "at the core . . . of the First 
Amendment freedoms," Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, quoting Williams 
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), a contribution is merely "a 
general expression of support for the candidate and his views, 
[which] does not communicate the underlying basis for the 
support."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  "[C]ontributions may result 
in political expression if spent by a candidate . . . to present 
views to the voters, [but] the transformation of contributions 
12 
 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor."  Id.  Thus, although limits on independent 
expenditures "necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience reached," id. at 19, 
limits on contributions "entail[] only a marginal restriction 
upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication."  
Id. at 20-21. 
 
This core distinction between independent expenditures and 
contributions has become a "basic premise" of the Court's 
jurisprudence concerning campaign finance laws.  Beaumont, 539 
U.S. at 161.  Indeed, in the four decades since Buckley was 
decided, the Court has declared unconstitutional almost every 
independent expenditure limit that has come before it.  See, 
e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (Federal limit on 
independent expenditures by political parties); Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 
263 (1986) (Federal ban on corporate independent expenditures as 
applied to nonprofit corporation); Federal Election Comm'n v. 
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 
(1985) (Federal limit on independent expenditures by political 
committees); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 795 (1978) (Massachusetts's ban on corporate independent 
13 
 
expenditures in connection with initiative petition).  In 
contrast, the Court has upheld most contribution limits.  See, 
e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381-382 (Missouri's contribution 
limits); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 
U.S. 182, 184-185 (1981) (Federal limit on contributions to 
multicandidate political committees).  Cf. Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
447, 465 (2001) (Colorado Republican) (upholding Federal 
coordinated expenditure limits by analogy to contribution 
limits).5 
 
The Court in Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, recognizing that 
contributions, unlike independent expenditures, "lie closer to 
the edges than to the core of political expression," held that 
the Federal ban on corporate contributions was subject only to 
"relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment."  
Applying this standard of review, the Court concluded that the 
Federal ban served four important government interests:  First, 
the ban operated to "preven[t] corruption [and] the appearance 
of corruption."  Id. at 154, quoting National Conservative 
                                                          
 
 
5 One notable exception to this pattern was the Court's 
decision in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 654-655 (1990), where the Court upheld a Michigan 
statute prohibiting corporations from making independent 
expenditures in connection with State elections.  The Court 
later overruled this decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
14 
 
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-497.  Second, 
prohibiting corporations from making contributions to candidates 
also protected the interests of dissenting shareholders who did 
not support the same candidates.  Beaumont, supra.  Third, a ban 
on corporate contributions would prevent individuals from using 
corporations as vehicles to circumvent valid limits on 
individual contributions.  Id. at 155.  And fourth, the ban 
served to "counter . . . the misuse of corporate advantages," 
combatting not only quid pro quo corruption but also the risk 
that corporations, with their unique ability to accumulate 
wealth, would thereby wield "undue influence [over] an 
officeholder's judgment."  Id. at 155-156, quoting Colorado 
Republican, 533 U.S. at 440-441.  Having concluded that the ban 
served sufficiently important interests, the Court also 
concluded that the ban was "closely drawn" to meet those 
interests, noting that it was not "a complete ban" on corporate 
political expression, because Federal law still permitted 
corporations to participate in the electoral process by 
establishing, administering, and soliciting contributions 
through a PAC.  Beaumont, supra at 162-163. 
 
Even though the Supreme Court declared in Beaumont, id. at 
163, that an absolute ban on corporate contributions is 
constitutional under the First Amendment, the plaintiffs urge us 
nevertheless to rule that § 8 violates that amendment.  "We are 
15 
 
not free," however, "to construe the First Amendment as creating 
constitutional protection broader than that established by the 
Supreme Court."  Matter of Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 631 n.8 (1980).  
It is a well-established principle that, where a Supreme Court 
precedent "has direct application in a case," lower courts must 
follow that precedent, even if it were "to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions."  Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  
Although the landscape of campaign finance law has changed 
significantly since Beaumont -- most notably because of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) -- Beaumont remains "the law of the 
land until the Supreme Court decides otherwise," and we are 
bound to follow it.  Commonwealth v. Runyan, 456 Mass. 230, 234 
(2010), overruled on another ground, Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 
Mass. 245, 256 (2013). 
 
In Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365, the Court declared 
unconstitutional a Federal law that banned corporations from 
making independent expenditures, emphasizing that, under the 
First Amendment, the government may not restrict speech "on the 
basis of the speaker's corporate identity."  Applying strict 
scrutiny, id. at 340, the Court concluded that the law was 
unconstitutional because it did not serve a sufficiently 
compelling interest.  Id. at 365.  In doing so, the Court 
16 
 
overruled earlier decisions where it had taken a broader view of 
the government interests that could support restrictions on 
corporate political spending.  Id. at 365-366.  The Court 
declared that the only sufficiently compelling interest that 
could justify a restriction on political spending was the 
government's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance 
of corruption.6  See id. at 356-362.  Moreover, the Court defined 
                                                          
 
 
6 As earlier stated, in Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 
539 U.S. 146, 154-156 (2003), the Court identified four 
important government interests that supported the ban on 
corporate political contributions.  In Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 361-362, the Court repudiated two of these interests, 
declaring that the government could not restrict corporate 
political spending in order to protect dissenting shareholders, 
or in order to combat the distorting influence that 
corporations, with their accumulated wealth, could wield over 
the political process, id. at 348, quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 
660.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348-356.  The Court 
reaffirmed, however, that the government may restrict corporate 
political spending in furtherance of its interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Id. at 356-357.  
The Court did not speak of the fourth important government 
interest identified in Beaumont -- that is, the government's 
interest in preventing individuals from circumventing valid 
limits on individual contributions by funneling the 
contributions through a corporation.  Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.  
We do not interpret the Court's silence as a repudiation of this 
important government interest, especially where it is so closely 
related to the government interest in preventing corruption and 
the appearance of corruption.  See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 
174, 195 n.21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 935 (2012) 
("Citizens United . . . does not disturb the validity of the 
anti-circumvention interest"); Thalheimer v. San Diego, 645 F.3d 
1109, 1124-1125 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he anti-circumvention 
interest is part of the familiar anti-corruption 
rationale . . . .  [N]othing in the explicit holdings or broad 
reasoning of Citizens United . . . invalidates the anti-
circumvention interest in the context of limitations on direct 
 
17 
 
corruption narrowly, limiting it to "quid pro quo corruption" -- 
that is, the exchange of "dollars for political favors" -- and 
rejected the view that corruption could also take the form of 
disproportionate influence over or access to elected officials.  
Id. at 359, quoting National Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. 
 
The Court in Citizens United did not, however, overrule its 
decision in Beaumont.  Indeed, the majority opinion did not even 
cite Beaumont.  Moreover, Citizens United left much of the 
reasoning in Beaumont undisturbed.  In Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 345, 356-359, the Court reaffirmed the key distinction 
between contributions and independent expenditures, emphasizing 
that contributions present a special risk of quid pro quo 
corruption because, unlike independent expenditures, they are 
coordinated with candidates.  See id. at 357.  For that reason, 
the Court recognized that contribution limits are "an accepted 
means to prevent quid pro quo corruption."  Id. at 359.  The 
Court also made clear that its analysis in Citizens United was 
specific to independent expenditure limits; it specifically did 
not "reconsider whether contribution limits should be subjected 
to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny."  Id.  See McCutcheon v. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
candidate contributions").  Cf. McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 218-221(2014) (plurality opinion) 
(government has interest in preventing circumvention of 
contribution limits). 
18 
 
Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 196-197 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (reiterating different standards of review for 
contribution limits and independent expenditure limits). 
 
To our knowledge, every Federal circuit court that has 
considered a constitutional challenge to laws banning corporate 
contributions since Citizens United has applied the controlling 
precedent in Beaumont and concluded that the laws were 
constitutional under the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Iowa Right 
to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 601 (8th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014); Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877-880 (8th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615-619 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013); Ognibene v. 
Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 194-197 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 567 
U.S. 935 (2012); Thalheimer v. San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124-
1126 (9th Cir. 2011).  Cf. Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n, 
793 F.3d 1, 5-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Miller 
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016) (upholding ban 
on contributions by government contractors); Yamada v. Snipes, 
786 F.3d 1182, 1204-1207 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 
Yamada v. Shoda, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015) (same); Green Party of 
Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 198-205 (2d Cir. 2010) (same). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that, even if we recognize Beaumont 
as controlling precedent (which we do), and apply its "closely 
19 
 
drawn" standard of review (which we will), we should nonetheless 
conclude that § 8 violates their First Amendment rights.  In 
support of this contention, the plaintiffs proffer two 
arguments. 
 
First, they argue that § 8 does not advance a sufficiently 
important interest, because OCPF has failed to demonstrate that 
the ban on corporate political contributions is necessary to 
prevent quid pro corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.  They contend that, to demonstrate the 
constitutionality of such a ban, OCPF would need to present 
evidence of corporate contributions leading to quid pro quo 
corruption in Massachusetts.  But imposing such an evidentiary 
burden on OCPF would be both unrealistic and unnecessary. 
 
It would be unrealistic because corporate political 
contributions have been banned under Massachusetts law for over 
a century.  Cf. Wagner, 793 F.3d at 14 ("Of course, we would not 
expect to find -- and we cannot demand -- continuing evidence of 
large-scale quid pro quo corruption or coercion involving 
federal contractor contributions [where] such contributions have 
been banned since 1940").  We cannot demand that OCPF provide 
evidence of what would happen in a "counterfactual world" where 
§ 8 does not exist.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 219 (plurality 
opinion).  See Colorado Republican, 533 U.S. at 457 (recognizing 
"difficulty of mustering evidence to support long-enforced 
20 
 
statutes" because "there is no recent experience" without them).  
Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) ("The fact that these laws have been in effect for a 
long period of time . . . makes it difficult" to demonstrate 
"what would happen without them").  All we can ask is "whether 
experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of 
abuse."  McCutcheon, supra, quoting Colorado Republican, supra. 
 
And here, experience confirms that, if corporate 
contributions were allowed, there would be a serious threat of 
quid pro quo corruption.  In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, the 
Supreme Court noted that, although actual instances of quid pro 
quo corruption can be difficult to detect, "the deeply 
disturbing" political scandals of the 1970s "demonstrate[d] that 
the problem is not an illusory one."  Sadly, the risk of quid 
pro quo corruption is no less illusory in Massachusetts.  In 
just the last decade, several Massachusetts politicians have 
been convicted of crimes stemming from bribery schemes intended 
to benefit corporations.  See, e.g., United States v. McDonough, 
727 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1177 
(2014); United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 246 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1018 (2012); United States v. Wilkerson, 
675 F.3d 120, 121 (1st Cir. 2012).  In addition, the record here 
shows that OCPF has prosecuted several cases involving 
corporations that sought to circumvent § 8 by making 
21 
 
contributions through individual employees, who were later 
reimbursed with corporate funds.  Such schemes indicate that, if 
not for § 8, the inverse also would be possible, with 
individuals circumventing the limits on their own political 
contributions "by diverting money through . . . corporation[s]."  
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.  See id. ("experience 'demonstrates 
how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the 
current law, and . . . how contribution limits would be eroded 
if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced'" [citation 
omitted]).7 
 
It would also be unrealistic for a court to require the 
Legislature to wait for evidence of widespread quid pro quo 
corruption resulting from corporate contributions before taking 
steps to prevent such corruption.  "There is no reason to 
require the [L]egislature to experience the very problem it 
fears before taking appropriate prophylactic measures."  
Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 188. 
                                                          
 
 
7 Under G. L. c. 55, an individual may not contribute more 
than (1) a total of $1,000 per year to a candidate or 
candidate's committee, (2) an aggregate of $5,000 per year to a 
political party or political committees associated with such 
party, and (3) $500 per year to a political action committee 
(PAC), other than an independent expenditure PAC.  G. L. c. 55, 
§ 7A (a) (1)-(3); 970 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(12) (2018).  There 
is no limitation on the amount that may be contributed to an 
independent expenditure PAC.  See 970 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.17(4) 
(2018). 
22 
 
 
Apart from being unrealistic, requiring OCPF to provide 
recent examples of quid pro corruption resulting from corporate 
contributions is also unnecessary because we need not insist on 
evidence of actual corruption when the government also has an 
important interest in preventing the appearance of corruption.  
See id. ("[T]o require evidence of actual scandals for 
contribution limits would conflate the interest in preventing 
actual corruption with the separate interest in preventing 
apparent corruption").  See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("the 
impact of the appearance of corruption" is "[o]f almost equal 
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements").  It 
requires "no great leap of reasoning" for us to infer that a ban 
on corporate contributions would counter at least the appearance 
of quid pro quo corruption.  Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 
200.  If corporate contributions were permitted, every time a 
political decision was made that helped or hurt a corporation's 
interests, members of the public might wonder if the 
corporation's political contributions -- or lack thereof -- 
played a role in the decision. 
 
Both history and common sense have demonstrated that, when 
corporations make contributions to political candidates, there 
is a risk of corruption, both actual and perceived.  See Florida 
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995), quoting 
Burson, 504 U.S. at 211 (speech restrictions can be justified 
23 
 
"based solely on history, consensus, and 'simple common sense'" 
[citation omitted]).  We conclude that § 8 advances the 
"sufficiently important interest" in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption and its appearance, and in preventing the 
circumvention of individual contribution limits through 
corporations. 
 
The plaintiffs' second argument is that, even if § 8 does 
advance those important interests, it is not closely drawn for 
that purpose.  The plaintiffs claim that § 8 is at once both 
overinclusive and underinclusive.  It is overinclusive, they 
contend, because it is an outright ban on corporate 
contributions, when there are other, less restrictive options -- 
such as a contribution ceiling, or disclosure requirements -- 
that could also further those important interests.  The Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument in Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162-
163, concluding that the equally comprehensive Federal ban on 
corporate contributions was nevertheless closely drawn. 
 
The plaintiffs seek to distinguish this case from Beaumont, 
arguing that in Beaumont, id. at 163, the Court was able to 
reach this conclusion only because Federal law "allow[s] 
corporations 'to establish and pay the administrative expenses 
of [PACs]'" (citation omitted), whereas under Massachusetts law 
corporations are prohibited from doing so.  The plaintiffs 
contend that, in Beaumont, the Court required as an "essential 
24 
 
constitutional minimum" that corporations be allowed to 
establish and administer a PAC.  But in Beaumont, supra at 162-
163, the Court noted the existence of a corporate-controlled 
"PAC option," not to suggest that it was a constitutionally 
mandated minimum, but rather to illustrate that corporations 
still had meaningful opportunities to participate in the 
political process. 
 
Importantly, Beaumont was decided seven years before 
Citizens United, when Federal law still prohibited corporations 
from making independent expenditures.  See Beaumont, supra. at 
149.  In Beaumont, the Court singled out the PAC option because, 
at that time, it was one of the most important outlets for 
corporate speech.  What the Court emphasized was that, because 
such outlets existed, the ban on corporate contributions was not 
"a complete ban" on all political expression by corporations.  
Id. at 162. 
 
Here, similarly, § 8 is not "a complete ban" on corporate 
political expression.  Beaumont, supra.  Although Massachusetts 
law does not permit corporations to establish and administer a 
PAC, it has, since Citizens United, permitted corporations to 
engage in a significant form of political expression that was 
not allowed when Beaumont was decided -- that is, to make 
unlimited independent expenditures as well as unlimited 
contributions to independent expenditure PACs.  See G. L. c. 55, 
25 
 
§§ 18A, 18C, 18G.  See also St. 2014, c. 210, §§ 4, 20-21, 25 
(amending G. L. c. 55, §§ 1, 18A, 18C, 18G).  And predictably, 
OCPF records indicate that independent expenditures in 
connection with State elections have risen sharply since the ban 
was lifted.  See OCPF Reports, Post Election 2016, at 2 (2016) 
(independent expenditures in 2016 State election approximately 
fifty per cent higher than in 2012 State election).  Where 
corporations in Massachusetts are free to spend as much money as 
they would like independently advocating for their preferred 
candidates, or to contribute to an independent expenditure PAC, 
we cannot conclude that § 8 denies corporations the opportunity 
meaningfully to participate in the political process.  See 
Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1125 ("[the] ability to directly 
contribute $500 to a candidate pales in significance to [the 
contributor's] ability to make unlimited independent 
expenditures . . . supporting or opposing candidates"). 
 
Nor are we persuaded that § 8 must be invalidated because 
the government has the less restrictive option of regulating 
through disclosure requirements.  In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28, 
the Court defended Federal contribution limits against similar 
arguments, concluding that "Congress was surely entitled to 
conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure," and that 
contribution limits were "a necessary legislative concomitant to 
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption."  Here, too, 
26 
 
the Legislature was entitled to conclude that disclosure on its 
own would be insufficient to meet the government's 
anticorruption interest. 
 
Having argued that § 8 is not closely drawn, and is 
therefore unconstitutional, because it restricts too much 
speech, the plaintiffs also argue that it is not closely drawn, 
and is therefore unconstitutional, because it restricts too 
little.  They contend that § 8 is underinclusive, because, 
unlike the Federal law upheld in Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 157, 
which barred both corporations and unions from making 
contributions, § 8 applies to corporations but not to unions.  
The plaintiffs suggest that, because § 8 does not also regulate 
unions, it is a "discriminatory contribution ban[]" that 
regulates only certain speakers and thereby impermissibly 
restricts speech based on viewpoint.  See Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 340 ("Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content"). 
 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]t is always 
somewhat counterintuitive to argue that a law violates the First 
Amendment by abridging too little speech."  Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015).  The government is 
not required to regulate speech to the constitutionally 
permitted maximum; "the First Amendment imposes no freestanding 
'underinclusiveness limitation.'"  Id., quoting R.A.V. v. St. 
27 
 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992).  See Wagner, 793 F.3d at 29 ("a 
regulation is not fatally underinclusive . . . simply because an 
alternative regulation, which would restrict more speech or the 
speech of more people, could be more effective" [citation 
omitted]).  Rather, we consider whether a restriction on speech 
is underinclusive only to the extent that such 
underinclusiveness "reveal[s] that a law does not actually 
advance" a sufficiently important interest, Williams-Yulee, 
supra, citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-
105 (1979), or "raise[s] 'doubts about whether the government is 
in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than 
disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.'"  Williams-
Yulee, supra, quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 
564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011).  We have already concluded that § 8 
advances an important anticorruption interest.  Thus, § 8 cannot 
violate the First Amendment for underinclusiveness unless the 
failure to include other entities within its scope demonstrates 
that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is a 
mere pretext for the prohibition against political 
contributions, and that its true purpose is to silence the 
political speech of business corporations, professional 
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability partnerships, 
while favoring the political viewpoints of those entities that 
fall outside its scope. 
28 
 
 
There is nothing in the record suggesting that the 
Legislature acted with this impermissible intent.  Without 
citing any legislative history, the plaintiffs appear to claim 
that the true legislative purpose in enacting § 8 and its 
subsequent amendments was to favor labor unions at the expense 
of corporations.  But there is no evidence to support this 
claim.  Unions are not the only entities excluded from the scope 
of § 8; nonprofit corporations and unincorporated trade 
associations are also not included.  If the Legislature intended 
§ 8 to accomplish viewpoint discrimination against businesses, 
one would certainly have expected it to include trade 
associations within its prohibition.  Here, the Legislature has 
an important interest in preventing corruption and its 
appearance, which it seeks to advance through § 8.  The fact 
that § 8 focuses on corruption stemming from corporate 
contributions -- "rather than every conceivable instance" of 
corruption -- does not call this into doubt.  Ognibene, 671 F.3d 
at 191.  See, e.g., Wagner, 793 F.3d at 32 (Federal law banning 
contributions from individual government contractors but not 
from other entities or individuals with government contracts is 
not "fatally underinclusive"); Ognibene, supra at 191-192 
(municipal law limiting contributions from individuals or 
entities "doing business" with government but not from certain 
labor organizations is not underinclusive).  After all, the 
29 
 
Legislature "need not address all aspects of a problem in one 
fell swoop; policymakers may focus on their most pressing 
concerns."  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668.  We decline to 
declare § 8 fatally underinclusive merely "because it might have 
gone farther than it did."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 105, quoting 
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).8 
                                                          
 
 
8 Justice Kafker's concurrence takes issue with our 
discussion of underinclusiveness, apparently because we fail to 
adequately address issues that he concedes we "[u]ltimately 
. . . cannot base our decision on."  Post at    .  The 
concurrence faults us for failing "to explore the complexities 
of Supreme Court case law regarding differential treatment of 
business corporations in the context of direct contributions," 
post at    , and in particular faults us for failing to discuss 
the Supreme Court's decision in Austin, 494 U.S. at 652, post at    
. 
 
 
The reason we do not rely on Austin is quite simple:  
Austin has been overruled.  In Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365, 
the Supreme Court expressly stated:  "Austin should be and now 
is overruled."  The concurrence seems to think that there is 
some uncertainty on this front, contending that -- because it is 
"far from clear" whether the reasoning in Austin may still be 
relied on, post at     -- we must take Austin into account.  But 
if the Supreme Court had intended to overrule only certain 
portions of Austin, it would have done so.  In fact, in Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 365-366, the Court specifically overruled 
only portions of its decision in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), but overruled Austin without any 
such qualification.  It may very well be that some of the 
reasoning in Austin -- a case about independent expenditure 
limits -- remains viable in the context of contribution limits, 
as the concurrence suggests.  Post at    .  But to say so would 
be speculative, and we decline to base our decision on 
speculation. 
 
 
Rather than rely on a precedent that has been expressly 
overruled, we follow the approach that the Supreme Court has 
taken more recently, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. 
 
30 
 
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that § 8 is 
constitutional under the First Amendment. 
 
b.  Arts. 16 and 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Having concluded that § 8 is constitutional under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, we must now 
consider whether it is also constitutional under arts. 16 and 19 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.9  As earlier stated, 
as the final arbiter regarding the interpretation of our State 
constitution, this Court has "the inherent authority" to declare 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ct. 1656, 1668-1670 (2015), when analyzing underinclusiveness 
under the First Amendment.  Again, because the First Amendment 
does not require the government to restrict as much speech as it 
permissibly can, we consider whether a restriction is 
underinclusive only to the extent that it raises doubts about 
whether the restriction does in fact advance a sufficiently 
important interest or indicates that the government is acting 
with an impermissible purpose.  Id. at 1668.  The concurrence 
seems to take the view that the "differential treatment" of 
corporations and unions, post at    , may render § 8 
impermissibly underinclusive.  But "differential treatment" on 
its own does not render a law unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n, 793 
F.3d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Miller v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016); Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 
191-192.  The question is whether the exclusion of entities such 
as unions, nonprofit corporations, and unincorporated trade 
associations from its scope suggests that § 8 does not advance a 
legitimate anticorruption interest, but instead serves the 
illegitimate purpose of discriminating against the viewpoints of 
corporations.  For the reasons already stated, we conclude that 
it does not. 
 
9 Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of free speech 
shall not be abridged."  Article 19 provides that "[t]he people 
have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to 
consult upon the common good." 
31 
 
that our State Constitution affords broader protection to 
individual rights than does the United States Constitution.  
Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 
Mass. 538, 558 (2012).  This does not mean, however, that we 
must "exercise [that authority] at every turn."  Id. at 559.  
Historically, we have interpreted the protections of free speech 
and association under our Declaration of Rights to be 
"comparable to those guaranteed by the First Amendment."  
Opinion of the Justices, 418 Mass. 1201, 1212 (1994).  We see no 
reason to conclude that art. 16 or 19 gives corporations greater 
rights of political participation than they enjoy under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We therefore 
conclude that § 8 is constitutional under arts. 16 and 19 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
2.  Equal protection claim.  The plaintiffs claim that § 8 
violates their rights to equal protection for the same reasons 
they claim that § 8 was underinclusive under the First 
Amendment:  because it prohibits corporations from making 
contributions, while allowing unions and nonprofit organizations 
to do so.  But this time, the plaintiffs seek to avail 
themselves of a more rigorous standard of review, contending 
that -- although under the First Amendment, § 8 need only be 
"closely drawn" to advance a "sufficiently important interest," 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 -- under equal protection principles, 
32 
 
it is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore must be 
"narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling interest."  See 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.  In essence, the plaintiffs 
seek, by reframing their First Amendment challenge, to effect an 
end run around the Supreme Court's well-established distinction 
between independent expenditure limits, which trigger strict 
scrutiny, and contribution limits, which do not. 
 
In Wagner, 793 F.3d at 32, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected precisely 
this kind of "doctrinal gambit."  The court there considered a 
comparable equal protection claim in a case where individual 
Federal government contractors challenged the constitutionality 
of a Federal law that barred them from making Federal campaign 
contributions while they negotiate or perform Federal contracts.  
Id. at 3, 32-33.  After rejecting the plaintiffs' First 
Amendment challenge, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claim 
that the Federal law violated their rights under the equal 
protection clause of the Fifth Amendment because it applied to 
individual government contractors but not to other, "similarly 
situated persons," such as regular government employees.  Id. at 
32.  The court declined to apply strict scrutiny to the Federal 
law, explaining: 
"Although the Court has on occasion applied strict scrutiny 
in examining equal protection challenges in cases involving 
First Amendment rights, it has done so only when a First 
33 
 
Amendment analysis would itself have required such 
scrutiny.  There is consequently no case in which the 
Supreme Court has employed strict scrutiny to analyze a 
contribution restriction under equal protection principles. 
. . .  This will not be the first. . . . 
 
"[A]lthough equal protection analysis focuses upon the 
validity of the classification rather than the speech 
restriction, 'the critical questions asked are the same.'  
We believe that the same level of scrutiny . . . is 
therefore appropriate in both contexts. . . . 
 
"[I]n a case like this one, in which there is no doubt that 
the interests invoked in support of the challenged 
legislative classification are legitimate, and no doubt 
that the classification was designed to vindicate those 
interests rather than disfavor a particular speaker or 
viewpoint, the challengers 'can fare no better under the 
Equal Protection Clause than under the First Amendment 
itself'" (footnote and citations omitted). 
 
Id. at 32-33. 
 
We adopt the court's reasoning here.  For equal protection 
purposes, strict scrutiny is warranted only where a law 
implicates a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right.  See 
Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 330.  Corporations are not a suspect 
class.  And, although the rights to free speech and association 
are fundamental, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, the Supreme Court 
has already explicitly stated that, because contributions "lie 
closer to the edges than to the core of political expression," 
contribution limits do not sufficiently burden those rights to 
warrant strict scrutiny.  Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161.  See 
Buckley, supra at 25.  Thus, where the challenged law is a limit 
on contributions, as here, and where that law does not implicate 
34 
 
a suspect class, we follow the Supreme Court's precedents and 
apply the familiar "closely drawn" standard, regardless of 
whether the challenge sounds under the First Amendment or under 
equal protection principles.  And, under this standard, we 
conclude that § 8 is constitutional under equal protection 
principles, for the same reasons that it is constitutional under 
the First Amendment.10 
                                                          
 
 
10 Because it is not necessary to our decision, we do not 
decide whether business corporations and the other profit-making 
entities within the scope of § 8 are similarly situated to or 
treated differently from other entities, such as unions or 
nonprofit organizations, that are outside its scope.  See Matter 
of Corliss, 424 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1997) ("One indispensable 
element of a valid equal protection claim is that individuals 
who are similarly situated have been treated differently").  We 
note that, under current Massachusetts law, it is not clear to 
what extent unions and nonprofit organizations are free to make 
political contributions. 
 
 
This is because, separate from its ban on corporate 
contributions, G. L. c. 55 also regulates certain kinds of 
organizations known as "political committees."  As defined in 
G. L. c. 55, § 1, a "political committee" includes any 
"organization or other group of persons . . . which receives 
contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of 
influencing the nomination or election of a candidate, or 
candidates . . . ."  If, under this broad definition, a union or 
nonprofit organization that makes even a nominal political 
contribution is considered a political committee, such entities 
effectively would be prohibited from making any contribution 
because, once characterized as a political committee, they would 
be required not only to meet burdensome disclosure requirements, 
but also to dedicate their resources exclusively to their 
political purpose, meaning that they could no longer serve their 
intended purposes as a union or nonprofit organization.  See 970 
Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(6)(b) (2018) ("No political committee . 
. . may pay or expend money or anything of value unless such 
 
35 
 
 
We therefore conclude that § 8 does not violate the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nor does it 
violate the plaintiffs' entitlement to equal protection under 
art. 1.  See Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 
(1986) ("For the purpose of equal protection analysis, our 
standard of review under . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transaction will enhance the political future of the candidate 
or principle on whose behalf the committee was organized"). 
 
 
In 1988, OCPF issued guidance in the form of an 
interpretive bulletin, explaining that a nonpolitical 
organization -- that is, an organization that does not solicit 
or receive funds for any political purpose -- will not be 
considered a political committee as long as it does not make 
"more than incidental" political expenditures, defined as those 
"exceed[ing], in the aggregate, . . . either $15,000 or 10 
percent of [the] organization's gross revenues . . . , whichever 
is less" (emphasis omitted).  OCPF, Interpretive Bulletin, OCPF-
IB-88-01 (Sep. 1988) (rev. May 9, 2014).  Thus, under OCPF's 
interpretation, a union or nonprofit organization can spend up 
to $15,000 or ten per cent of its gross revenues, whichever is 
less, without triggering the regulations applicable to political 
committees. 
 
 
An administrative bulletin, as opposed to a regulation that 
has benefited from the full rulemaking process, with opportunity 
for notice and comment, see G. L. c. 55, §§ 2-3, is entitled to 
substantial deference but it is not a promulgated regulation 
that carries the force of law.  See Global NAPs, Inc. v. 
Awiszus, 457 Mass. 489, 496-497 (2010) ("although 
[administrative agency's guidelines] are entitled to substantial 
deference, they do not carry the force of law").  The question 
whether OCPF's interpretive bulletin accurately interprets c. 55 
has not, to our knowledge, been addressed in a court of law.  
Because it is not necessary to our decision, because it was not 
addressed by the judge or briefed by the parties, and because a 
ruling would have substantial consequence on entities that are 
not parties to this action, we decline to address it here. 
36 
 
Rights is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution"). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, the order denying the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and allowing OCPF's 
cross-motion for summary judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
 
BUDD, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court's holding.  
However, I write separately to describe more broadly the 
interest in "limit[ing] 'the appearance of corruption stemming 
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in 
a regime of large . . . financial contributions' to particular 
candidates."  McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 
185, 207 (2014) (plurality opinion), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).  In Massachusetts, this interest is 
rooted in the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth and supports the Commonwealth's statutory scheme of 
campaign contribution regulation as a whole.  Under art. 5 of 
the Declaration of Rights, the Commonwealth has a constitutional 
interest in ensuring that its elected representatives are 
"substitutes and agents" of the people who act only in their 
interest. 
1.  Role of a representative under the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth.  A basic principle of our Constitution (and of a 
republican form of government) is that representatives are to be 
chosen by the people to represent them and their interests.  See 
Part II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.  The people, 
through the Constitution, established a legislative department 
comprised of legislators who are elected by the qualified voters 
inhabiting the districts that they represent.  See id. at c. 1, 
§§ 2,3.  The people also established an executive power 
2 
 
 
exercised by the Governor.  Id. at c. 2.  "The Governor is 
emphatically the Representative of the whole People, being 
chosen not by one Town or County, but by the People at large."  
An Address of the Convention for Framing a new Constitution for 
the State of Massachusetts Bay, to their Constituents, 13 
(1780). 
The Declaration of Rights further clarifies that the 
relationship between representatives and the people is an agency 
relationship.  Art. 5 provides as a right: 
"All power residing originally in the people, and being 
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of 
government, vested with authority, whether legislative, 
executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, 
and are at all times accountable to them." 
 
See Opinion of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 594 (1894) (opinion 
of Holmes, J.) ("confidence is put in [the Legislature] as an 
agent . . . of its principal[, the people]"). 
The core of the relationship between an agent and his or 
her principal is a duty of loyalty that the former owes the 
latter:  the law "demands that the agent shall work with an eye 
single to the interest of his principal.  It prohibits him from 
receiving any compensation but his commission, and forbids him 
from acting adversely to his principal, either for himself or 
for others."  McKinley v. Williams, 74 F. 94, 95 (8th Cir. 
1896).  See Attorney Gen. v. Henry, 262 Mass. 127, 132 (1928).  
Under art. 5, all governmental officials in the Commonwealth, as 
3 
 
 
agents of the people, are bound to "work with an eye single to 
the interests" of their principal, the public.1  McKinley, supra 
at 95. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Article 5 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights may 
recognize two valid principals whose interests a representative 
may advance:  a representative's constituents and the people of 
the Commonwealth at large.  That the Constitution may intend 
representatives to be agents of both is clarified by theories of 
representation debated at the time that the 1780 Constitution 
was drafted. 
 
 
In the Eighteenth Century, members of the British 
Parliament, once elected, were generally considered not to be 
agents of their constituencies, but representatives of the 
entire nation.  William Blackstone explained that "every member, 
though chosen by one particular district, when elected and 
returned serves for the whole realm.  For the end of his coming 
thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage 
his constituents, but the common wealth" (emphasis in original).  
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *155.  Arthur Onslow, who served 
as the Speaker of the House of Commons from 1728-1761, explained 
that "every Member is equally a Representative of the whole 
(within which, by our particular constitution, is included a 
Representative, not only of those who are electors, but of all 
the other subjects of the Crown of Great Britain at home, and in 
every part of the British empire, except the Peers of Great 
Britain) has, as I understand, been the constant notion and 
language of Parliament."  J. Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings 
in the House of Commons 47, note (1781).  This theory of 
Representation justified Parliament's imposition of taxes and 
other laws on the colonies before the American Revolution.  R. 
Luce, Legislative Principles, The History and Theory of 
Lawmaking by Representative Government 438 (1930) (Luce).  Under 
the theory, a "British subject in Massachusetts Bay or Virginia 
was represented in Parliament just as much as if he were living 
in London.  The accident of voting or not voting had nothing to 
do with the question."  Id. 
 
 
Massachusetts revolutionaries, such as Otis and the 
Adamses, rejected this theory, id.; art. 5 expresses that 
rejection.  Although the article certainly does not eliminate a 
representative's responsibilities to the entire Commonwealth of 
 
4 
 
 
2.  Campaigns for elected office.  Over the past century, 
the cost of running a feasible campaign for elected office, even 
for local positions, has increased dramatically.  See Deeley, 
Campaign Finance Reform, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 547, 550-551 
(1999); R. Luce, Legislative Principles, The History and Theory 
of Lawmaking by Representative Government, 423-425 (1930).  Most 
officials rely on campaign contributions to raise revenue in 
order to run a campaign.  This system of financing generates a 
discrete category of principals, that is, a donor class,2 
separate and distinct from "the people."  See art. 5; Bates v. 
Director of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Massachusetts, I believe the Massachusetts Constitution does 
require representatives to balance this responsibility with a 
consideration of and duty to advance the best interests (and 
perhaps expressed needs) of his or her constituents.  See art. 
5.  See also art. 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
(people have right to instruct representatives); Bresler, 
Rediscovering the Right to Instruct Legislators, 26 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 355, 360 (1991).  Contrast arts. 5 and 19 with, for 
example, the French Constitution of 1795, which stated:  "The 
members of the legislative body are not representatives of the 
departments which have elected them, but of the whole nation, 
and no specific instruction shall be given them."  Luce, supra 
at 445. 
 
 
2 Donors making donations of one hundred dollars or more in 
the period before the 1996 election made up less than one per 
cent of the Commonwealth's eligible voters.  Bates v. Office of 
Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 165 n.28 (2002).  The 
corporate plaintiffs in this case, of course, cannot be 
considered qualified voters at all.  See art. 3 of the 
Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, as amended 
(setting forth voter qualifications).  See also art. 8 of the 
Declaration of Rights (establishing elections as primary form of 
representative accountability). 
5 
 
 
165-166 (2002).  Thus, the campaign finance system has created 
incentives for representatives to act not simply with the 
interests of the public in mind, but instead with an eye toward 
balancing the interests of the donors and the public, which may 
at times be divergent.3 
3.  General Laws c. 55.  The prohibition on corporate 
campaign contributions set forth in G. L. c. 55, § 8, is one 
part of a broader scheme of statutes limiting and regulating 
campaign contributions set forth in that chapter.  We have long 
held that some rights established by the Constitution may 
contemplate "suitable and reasonable regulations, not calculated 
to defeat or impair [that] right[,] . . . but rather to 
                                                          
 
 
3 Take, for example, the comment of a congressman in 2017, 
who, in reference to a bill being considered in Congress, 
commented to members of the press:  "My donors are basically 
saying, 'Get it done or don't ever call me again.'"  GOP 
Lawmakers:  Donors are pushing me to get tax reform done, The 
Hill (Nov. 7, 2017).  See Here's one White House hopeful who 
wants to get big money out of politics, Reuters (April 18, 2015) 
(statement of Senator Lindsey Graham) ("We've got to figure out 
a way to fix this mess, because basically 50 people are running 
the whole show"); Michele Bachmann:  The Newsmax Interview, 
Newsmax (June 26, 2011) (statement of Congresswoman Michele 
Bachmann) (describing "the corrupt paradigm that has become 
Washington, D.C., whereby votes continually are bought rather 
than representatives voting the will of their constituents . . . 
.  That's the voice that's been missing at the table in 
Washington, D.C. -- the people's voice has been missing"); In 
Political Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. Times 
(Dec. 26, 1996) (statement of Congressman Barney Frank) ("We are 
the only people in the world required by law to take large 
amounts of money from strangers and then act as if it has no 
effect on our behavior"). 
6 
 
 
facilitate and secure the exercise of the right."  Capen v. 
Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 492 (1832).  Article 5 guarantees the 
people a right to a republic in which their representatives are 
their substitutes and agents.  To the extent that the lack of 
campaign finance regulation results in a system of government 
where representatives are increasingly forced to "work with an 
eye [not] single to the interest" of the public, McKinley, 74 F. 
at 95, campaign finance regulation and the limits on campaign 
contributions set forth in G. L. c. 55 may be appropriate to 
preserve the representative democracy contemplated by the 
framers of the Constitution ratified by the people of the 
Commonwealth in 1780.4 
                                                          
 
 
4 Cf. United States v. International Union United Auto., 
Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 
567, 577-578 (1957), quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (statement of 
U.S. Senator in support of limits on campaign contributions) 
("We all know that money is the chief source of corruption.  We 
all know that large contributions to political campaigns . . . 
put the political party under obligation to the large 
contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation"). 
 
 
Even assuming that voters, as principals, may consent to a 
representative that has a clearly disclosed conflict of interest 
by electing such an individual, see 1 S. Livermore, A Treatise 
on the Law of Principal and Agent 33 (1818) (principals 
responsible for "consequences of making . . . [a deficient 
agency] appointment"), voters would need a choice in order to 
consent.  If the nature of the problem is systemic, without 
regulation, voters are deprived of the ability to choose a 
candidate that does not have such a conflict and may typically 
be faced with a monopoly of choices that do not work with an eye 
single to their interests and the interests of the Commonwealth.  
See id. at 25 (without consent of principal there can be no 
 
7 
 
 
The prevention of criminal bribery alone does not 
sufficiently identify the Commonwealth's interest in its 
campaign contribution regulatory scheme.  "[L]aws making 
criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal only with the most 
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence 
governmental action."  Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n, 793 
F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. 
Federal Election Comm'n, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016), quoting Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 27-28.  Thus, I believe that the Commonwealth's 
campaign finance regulation may be justified not only to prevent 
corruption in the form of criminal bribery or the appearance of 
criminal bribery, but also to prevent the appearance of 
corruption by preserving the agency relationship between 
representatives and the people set forth under art. 5.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appointment of agent; there must be "serious and free use of 
[the consent] power[]").  See also Bates, 436 Mass. at 165 n.28 
(discussing frequency of uncontested elections). 
 
 
5 "[G]overnment regulation may not target the general 
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or 
his allies, or the political access such support may afford.  
'Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption.'"  McCutcheon 
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (plurality 
opinion), quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 
558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).  Of course, agents of corporations 
such as the plaintiffs may meet with policymakers to express 
their legitimate ideas and concerns regarding legislation.  This 
freedom of expression helps policymakers refine and solidify 
what they believe is good policy.  However, the principal-agency 
relationship set forth in art. 5 is broken not when a legislator 
is grateful to his supporters or because of access, but when an 
 
8 
 
 
 
The statute at issue in this case facilitates and helps 
secure the agency relationship between the people and their 
representatives as principals and agents, to take a step in the 
direction of preserving the constitutional directive that when 
elected officials act, their primary motivations are the 
interests of their principals, i.e., their constituents and the 
Commonwealth.6 
The statutory scheme of G. L. c. 55, which provides for the 
disclosure and regulation of campaign contributions, is 
derivative of principles in the Massachusetts Constitution 
regarding the structure of our representative democracy and 
rights of its people.  However, any encroachment on the rights 
of the plaintiffs under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, even one that occurs by operation of the State 
Constitution, must be supported by a "sufficiently important 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
elected official takes actions that he otherwise would not have 
because he feels obligated to advance the interests of his 
donors in particular, not his constituents or the Commonwealth 
has a whole. 
 
 
6 I agree with the court that it is not necessary to 
address, in the context of this case, whether the Office of 
Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF)'s Interpretive Bulletin 
OCPF-IB-88-01 (Sept. 1988, rev. May 9, 2014) accurately 
interprets G. L. c. 55.  Ante at note 10.  I note, however, the 
current guidance appears to permit nonpolitical nonprofit 
organizations to contribute as much as $15,000 in one year 
directly to a single candidate. OCPF Interpretive Bulletin, 
supra at 4. I believe that when OCPF interprets G. L. c. 55, it 
should do so in light of art. 5. 
9 
 
 
interest."7  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion), 
quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.  The Commonwealth's interests 
in facilitating and securing the art. 5 right to representatives 
who are "substitutes and agents" of the people is "a 
sufficiently important concern" and "critical . . . if 
confidence in the system of representative Government is not to 
be eroded to a disastrous extent."  Buckley, supra at 27, 
quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of 
Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).  The 
Commonwealth may limit the serious burden that, in many 
instances, campaign contributions impose on the agency 
relationship between the public and their representatives 
because that burdened agency relationship highlights "the 
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual 
financial contributions' to particular candidates."  McCutcheon, 
572 U.S. at 207 (plurality opinion), quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 27.8  Indeed, the interest concerns the form and character of 
our representative democracy itself. 
                                                          
 
 
7 However, principles similar to those contained in art. 5 
may be implicit in the United States Constitution.  See Brown & 
Martin, Rhetoric and Reality:  Testing the Harm of Campaign 
Spending, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1066, 1071-1076 (2015). 
 
 
8 Additionally, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
recognized that the Federal Constitution's grant of broad 
 
10 
 
 
Corporations such as 1A Auto, Inc., and 126 Self Storage, 
Inc., have free speech rights to educate and inform public 
discussion about issues of concern to them.  See Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010); First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).  
Both entities have a First Amendment right to make unlimited 
independent expenditures throughout the Commonwealth to 
influence directly the thoughts and opinions of the voters and 
the public at large.  Citizens United, supra at 365-366.  See 
G. L. c. 55, § 18A; 970 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.04(12) n.1, 2.17 
(2018).  However, that right does not extend so far as to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
autonomy to States to structure their governments and adopt 
rules that make electoral democracy functional: 
 
"Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States 
retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments 
. . . .  Indeed, the Constitution provides that all powers 
not specifically granted to the Federal Government are 
reserved to the States or citizens. . . .  More 
specifically, 'the Framers of the [Federal] Constitution 
intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in 
the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.'" 
 
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013), quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-462 (1991).  As in voting 
rights cases rooted in the First Amendment, perhaps in the 
regulation of campaign finance, to preserve the proper function 
of our democratic institutions, "[c]ommon sense, as well as 
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must 
play an active role[;] . . . 'as a practical matter, there must 
be substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair 
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to 
accompany the democratic process.'"  Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428, 433 (1992), quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 
(1974). 
11 
 
 
provide funds directly to candidates that cause those candidates 
to "work with an eye [not] single to the interest" of the 
people.  McKinley, 74 F. at 95.9 
6.  Conclusion.  In Thoughts on Government (1776), John 
Adams explained: 
"The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care 
should be employed, in constituting this representative 
assembly.  It should be in miniature an exact portrait of 
the people at large.  It should think, feel, reason, and 
act like them.  That it may be the interest of this 
assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an 
equal representation, or, in other words, equal interests 
among the people should have equal interests in it.  Great 
care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, 
partial, and corrupt elections.  Such regulations, however, 
may be better made in times of greater tranquility than the 
present; and they will spring up themselves naturally, when 
all the powers of government come to be in the hands of the 
people's friends.  At present, it will be safest to proceed 
in all established modes, to which the people have been 
familiarized by habit." 
 
These principles support the court's conclusion in this case. 
                                                          
 
 
9 Furthermore, "it may be that, in some circumstances, 
'large independent expenditures pose [some of] the same dangers 
. . . as do large contributions.'"  Federal Election Comm'n v. 
Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007) (opinion 
of Roberts, C.J.), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 
(1976).  See also Buckley, supra at 46 ("independent advocacy 
. . . does not presently appear to pose dangers . . . comparable 
to those identified with large campaign contributions" [emphasis 
added]). 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J. (concurring).  I write separately because the 
court does not adequately address the issue whether the law 
prohibiting corporate contributions is impermissibly 
underinclusive under the First Amendment for failing to prohibit 
contributions by other entities.  In Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-666 (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court held that treating corporations and nonprofits 
differently from unions in the context of independent 
expenditures was constitutionally permissible.  The Supreme 
Court has since overruled Austin, see Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010), and it remains 
unclear whether, and to what extent, the reasoning relied on in 
Austin and other cases focusing on the aggregation of capital 
and its effect on politics may still apply in the context of 
direct campaign contributions.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 The court, in addressing this concurrence, attempts to 
minimize the issue of differential treatment.  Here, however, 
"[t]he underinclusiveness of the statute is self-
evident."  First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
793 (1978).  General Laws, c. 55, § 8, purports to target 
corruption and the appearance of corruption but, in application, 
singles out a subset of entities for regulation.  Although the 
court attempts to dismiss the significance of such differential 
treatment, "[i]n the First Amendment context, fit 
matters."  McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 
218 (2014) (plurality opinion).  It is not enough for the 
government to advance a compelling interest -- we must still 
assess "the fit between the stated governmental objective and 
the means selected to achieve that objective."  Id. at 
199.  Yet, nowhere does the court explain why regulating 
 
2 
 
 
In my view, in the post-Citizens United world, the Supreme 
Court clearly still emphasizes the importance of preventing quid 
pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption in the 
context of direct contributions, see McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 206-208 (2014) (plurality 
opinion), and also defers to evenhanded legislative regulation 
in this area.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (per 
curiam).  A uniform ban on contributions from business 
corporations, nonprofits, and unions to prevent corruption or 
the appearance of corruption would thus appear to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
corporations differently from other organizations is closely 
drawn to the State's interest in preventing corruption.  The 
reasons provided by the majority apply equally to unions and 
nonprofits.  As discussed, the rationales that would have most 
obviously supported this disparate treatment were articulated in 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-666 
(1990). 
 
 
The court states that it does not bother to examine Austin 
for the "simple" reason that Austin has been overruled.  Yet, 
the court conveniently fails to mention that Austin, not Federal 
Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), remains the 
only Supreme Court case to squarely address the issue of 
disparate corporate treatment in the area of political finance.  
Looking solely at the court's opinion, one might assume that 
Beaumont addressed a statutory scheme mirroring to our own.  It 
did not.  Beaumont, supra at 154, involved a direct contribution 
ban that applied uniformly to unions and corporations.  Austin, 
supra, however, examined a campaign finance statute that 
regulated corporations differently from unions.  Precisely 
because Austin was overruled, it is all the more important to 
closely examine the Supreme Court's jurisprudence to determine 
whether differential treatment of business corporations may 
still be permissible in the area of campaign contributions, or 
if it has been foreclosed by Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
3 
 
 
constitutional under existing precedent.  See Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 157-159 (2003). 
The Supreme Court has, however, rejected treating business 
corporations differently simply based on the substantial 
aggregations of wealth amassed by corporations or the advantages 
of the corporate structure, at least in the context of 
independent expenditures.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350-
351.  I assume at least some of the same reasoning would apply 
to contributions as well, although this is less clear.  Campaign 
finance restrictions that stem from a desire to even the 
political playing field by reducing corporate power would 
certainly be impermissible.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207 
(plurality opinion) ("it is not an acceptable governmental 
objective to level the playing field" [quotations and citation 
omitted]).  The Supreme Court also vigilantly protects against 
viewpoint discrimination.  See Citizens United, supra at 340.  
Differential treatment of business corporations from other 
entities must then be closely drawn to the permissible State 
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, rather that these 
impermissible State interests.  Separating out legitimate 
concerns about corruption from the apparently illegitimate 
concerns discussed in Austin to justify differential treatment, 
however, remains difficult. 
4 
 
 
In the instant case, the Superior Court judge provided 
relevant context to the enactment of Massachusetts's first 
campaign finance law and the possible motivation behind its 
passage.  As he explained: 
"While [laws banning federal officers from requesting, 
giving, or receiving political contributions from other 
officers or employees] made it more 'difficult and risky' 
to 'shake down' government officials to help finance 
political campaigns, the laws also increased office-
seekers' reliance on wealthy corporations and individuals 
for campaign contributions, which created its own set of 
problems. . . .  During the 1904 presidential race, 
Republican candidate Theodore Roosevelt was accused of 
accepting large donations from corporations that expected 
special treatment if he was elected. . . .  Although 
Roosevelt denied these assertions and won the election, he 
was mindful of the accusations and, in 1905, during his 
first address to Congress, he took aim at corporations, 
recommending a ban on all corporate contributions, to 
prevent 'bribery and corruption in Federal 
elections.' . . .  President Roosevelt asserted that 'both 
the National and the several State Legislatures' should 
'forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money 
of the corporation in or about any election,' in order to 
'effective[ly] . . . stop[] the evils aimed at in corrupt 
practices acts.' . . .  Congress answered President 
Roosevelt's call in 1907 with the enactment of the Tillman 
Act, which banned corporations from 'mak[ing] a money 
contribution in connection with any election to any 
political office.' . . . 
 
"During the same year that Congress passed the Tillman 
Act, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a state law 
banning certain corporations from 'pay[ing] or 
contribut[ing] in order to aid, promote, or prevent the 
nomination or election of any person to public office, or 
in order to aid, promote or antagonize the interests of any 
political party, or to influence or affect the vote on any 
question submitted to the voters.' . . .  Thereafter, in 
1908, the Legislature passed 'An Act to prohibit the making 
of political contributions by business corporations,' which 
extended the ban to all 'business corporation[s] 
5 
 
 
incorporated under the laws of, or doing business in this 
commonwealth'" (citations omitted). 
 
Given the age of the Massachusetts statute and its apparent 
origins in a nationwide push against the influence of big 
business in politics, it is difficult to discern whether the 
basis for the statute's differential treatment of business 
corporations rests on grounds considered legitimate, 
illegitimate, or a combination of both.  It is my sense that it 
reflects some of the same combination of reasons articulated in 
Austin.  The question then becomes whether a statute singling 
out business corporations for a ban on direct campaign 
contributions for such a combination of reasons remains 
permissible.  I ultimately concur in the judgment because it is 
not clear to me how much of the reasoning of Austin and other 
Supreme Court cases such as Beaumont and Federal Election Comm'n 
v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) 
(NRWC), remain good law and how deferential the Supreme Court 
will be in the future to legislative choices regarding concerns 
about corruption even when they combine with disfavored 
considerations toward business corporations. 
I believe the court's opinion does not adequately address 
the issue of underinclusion.  The court focuses primarily on 
concerns about quid pro quo corruption stemming from business 
corporations to conclude that a ban on business corporation 
6 
 
 
contributions is constitutionally permissible.  Ante at    -   .  
See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.  The ultimate issue, however, is 
not simply whether contributions by business corporations may be 
limited due to concerns about quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance of such corruption, but whether a statutory scheme 
that bans such contributions while simultaneously permitting 
contributions by other organizations, including well-endowed 
nonprofit corporations and unions, is closely drawn to the 
State's interest in preventing corruption and its appearance. 
To justify treating business corporations differently from 
unions and well-endowed nonprofits, including single issue 
advocacy entities that are intensely involved in political 
campaigns, the court cites selective examples of corporate 
bribery scandals in Massachusetts.  See ante at    .  Most of 
the examples, however, involve personal payments put directly 
into the pockets of elected officials rather than election-
related activity or campaign contributions.  The court also 
notes that the record includes several instances of corporate 
campaign finance violations, but one could just as easily 
provide selective examples of union and nonprofit violations.  
Indeed, based simply on the record before us, unions and 
nonprofits have also sought to circumvent campaign finance laws.  
In 2013, a union political action committee (PAC) failed to 
disclose $178,000 in expenditures in violation of State 
7 
 
 
disclosure requirements.  In 2014, the American Federation of 
Teachers transferred money to a PAC through a nonprofit 
organization, which then made independent expenditures in the 
Boston mayoral race, in order to illegally disguise the source 
of the contributions.  The same year, the Office of Campaign and 
Political Finance investigated another union PAC that had failed 
to accurately report independent expenditures and direct 
contributions made to candidates.  Would these few examples 
sufficiently justify a prohibition on direct contributions by 
unions or nonprofits, but not business corporations?  Of course 
not.  But under the court's reasoning, a few such anecdotes 
appear sufficient to uphold such a statutory scheme. 
 
The court further references a "long historical pedigree" 
of laws restricting the electoral participation of corporations.  
But the court fails to mention that laws restricting union 
participation in the electoral process enjoy a long-standing 
pedigree as well for many of the same reasons.  See United 
States v. International Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 570-584 (1957) (UAW) 
(providing detailed history of Federal campaign finance laws as 
they apply to unions and the concerns that led to their 
enactment); NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208-209.  But see Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 363 (characterizing UAW as providing a "flawed 
historical account of campaign finance laws").  Indeed, many 
8 
 
 
States ban direct contributions from both corporations and 
unions,2 while only a handful of States ban contributions from 
corporations alone.3 
Rather than focusing on selective examples of campaign 
finance violations, I believe it is necessary to explore the 
complexities of Supreme Court case law regarding differential 
treatment of business corporations in the context of direct 
contributions, something the court has not done. 
The appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating a campaign 
finance law turns on the "importance of the political activity 
at issue to effective speech or political association" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161.  
Restrictions on direct contributions "lie closer to the edges" 
of political speech than restrictions on independent 
expenditures.  Id.  Thus, while laws restricting independent 
expenditures receive strict scrutiny, laws restricting direct 
contributions need only be "closely drawn" to a sufficiently 
                                                          
 
2 See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(f); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
916(a); Ark. Const. art. 19, § 28; Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, 
§ 3; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-601, 9-613, 9-614; Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 169.254; Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 23.1; Mont. Code Ann. § 13-
35-227; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A-1430; N.D. Cent. Code 
§§ 16.1-08.1-01; 16.1-08.1-03.3, 16.1-08.1-.03.5(1); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 3599.03; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 187.2; 25 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3253; R.I. Gen. Laws. § 17-25-10.1; Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 
§ 253.094; Wis. Stat. § 11.1112; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-25-102(a). 
 
3 See Iowa Code §§ 68A.102(17), 68A.503(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 121.025; Minn. Stat. § 211B.15; W. Va. Code § 3-8-8. 
9 
 
 
important government interest.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25; 
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion).  Although 
campaign finance jurisprudence is in a "state of flux" post-
Citizens United, the long-standing distinction between 
independent expenditures and direct contributions in this regard 
remains good law.  See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 
F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); McCutcheon, supra at 196-199 
(plurality opinion). 
When evaluating laws that restrict direct contributions, as 
here, courts must determine (1) whether the government has 
advanced a sufficiently important interest; and (2) whether the 
law is "closely drawn" to achieve that interest.  See Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 23-25; McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 196-199 (plurality 
opinion).  A law is not closely drawn to a stated interest if it 
is impermissibly over or underinclusive.  See, e.g., First Nat'l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978) ("the 
exclusion of Massachusetts business trusts, real estate 
investment trusts, labor unions, and other associations 
undermines the plausibility of the State's purported concern for 
the persons who happen to be shareholders in the banks and 
corporations covered by [the law at issue]"). 
There is no doubt that the government has a sufficiently 
important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption and that direct contributions to political 
10 
 
 
candidates implicate that important interest.4  See McCutcheon, 
572 U.S. at 206-207 (plurality opinion); Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 356.  Further, statutes that categorically or 
evenhandedly ban large contributions from organizations remain 
constitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent.  See 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.  The difficult issue is differential 
                                                          
 
 
4 The permissible interest in preventing corruption is more 
precisely an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.  
See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 185, 207 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
("Congress may target only a specific type of corruption -- 
'quid pro quo' corruption").  Quid pro quo corruption "captures 
the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for 
money. . . .  'The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid 
pro quo:  dollars for political favors.'"  Id. at 1441 
(plurality opinion), quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National 
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).  
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam) ("To 
the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
political quid quo pro from current and potential office 
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy 
is undermined"). 
 
 
As mentioned, the State also has a compelling interest in 
limiting "the appearance of corruption stemming from public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of 
large individual financial contributions."  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 
at 207 (plurality opinion), quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.  
See Buckley, supra, quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm. v. 
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 
(1973) ("Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance 
of the appearance of improper influence 'is also critical . . . 
if confidence in the system of representative Government is not 
to be eroded to a disastrous extent'").  Such an appearance of 
corruption "erode[s] . . . public confidence in the electoral 
process."  Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work 
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982).  Both corruption and the 
appearance of corruption "directly implicate 'the integrity of 
our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the 
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that 
process.'"  Id., quoting UAW, 352 U.S. at 570. 
11 
 
 
treatment, when corruption, or the risk of corruption, stems 
from multiple sources, but only one of which is regulated.  The 
analysis of how "closely drawn" the law is to the State's 
interest in preventing corruption and its appearance requires 
cognizance of the breadth of that interest.  That interest 
applies to corruption by unions and nonprofits as well as 
business corporations. 
The primary support for differential treatment of business 
corporations in the area of political finance appears in Austin, 
494 U.S. at 654, an independent expenditure case.  There, the 
Supreme Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of a 
Michigan law that prohibited nonmedia corporations from using 
general treasury funds for independent expenditures in State 
elections, but did not prohibit unions from doing so.  Id. at 
655, 666.  The plaintiff in Austin argued that there was no 
compelling interest to justify treating corporations differently 
from unions.  See id. at 659-660.  The Supreme Court held that 
the law was closely drawn to two compelling government 
interests, both of which have since been rejected in Citizens 
United. 
First, the Supreme Court in Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 
articulated a government interest in addressing the "corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
12 
 
 
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the 
corporation's political ideas."  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
unions and individuals alike lacked the "significant state-
conferred advantages of the corporate structure" that enhances a 
corporation's ability to amass wealth.  Id. at 665.  Thus, the 
State had a compelling interest in "counterbalanc[ing] those 
advantages unique to the corporate form," to which the law was 
narrowly tailored.  Id.  This rationale was rejected outright in 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351, where it was characterized as 
an interest in equalizing speech among different groups, 
something that had already been rejected in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
48 (no compelling interest in "equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections"). 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 665-666, also articulated a government 
interest in protecting dissenting corporate shareholders from 
financially supporting the corporation's political activities.  
Unlike a corporate shareholder, a union member who disagrees 
with the union's political activities may remain in the 
organization without being forced to contribute to such 
activities.  Id.  Thus, according to the Supreme Court in 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 666, "funds available for a union's 
political activities more accurately reflects members' support 
for the organization's political views than does a corporation's 
13 
 
 
general treasury."  The Supreme Court in Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 361-362, rejected this rationale as well, holding that 
"procedures of corporate democracy" (citation omitted) were the 
appropriate avenue for relief for dissenting shareholders, and 
that such a rationale would "allow the Government to ban the 
political speech even of media corporations," id. at 361. 
Further, the Supreme Court determined that the appropriate 
remedy for any such interest would be to "consider and explore 
other regulatory mechanisms," not to restrict corporate speech.  
Id. at 362.  Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court has 
also expressly stated that "[n]o matter how desirable it may 
seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to 'level 
the playing field,' or to 'level electoral opportunities,' or to 
'equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates'" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207 (plurality 
opinion). 
Thus, Citizens United overruled the rationales from Austin 
that would have most obviously supported disparate treatment 
among business corporations, nonprofits, and unions, at least in 
the context of independent expenditures.5  The question then 
                                                          
 
 
5 The Supreme Court has also articulated a permissible 
government interest in anticircumvention.  The court here relies 
on examples in the record of corporate campaign finance 
violations as indicative that § 8 is necessary as an 
anticircumvention measure.  See ante at    .  The court's 
 
14 
 
 
remains whether the Supreme Court would extrapolate this 
reasoning into the area of political contributions, where quid 
pro quo corruption and the appearance of such corruption are 
directly implicated and remain important concerns.  See Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 26-27.  In determining whether such extrapolation 
will occur, we must also consider another set of Supreme Court 
cases.  Although these cases involved challenges to a Federal 
statute that banned contributions from for-profit corporations, 
nonprofit corporations, and unions in a similar manner, the 
Supreme Court did include language focused on the specific 
concerns raised by corporations, including some of the same type 
of reasoning from Austin that was disavowed in Citizens United, 
at least in the context of independent expenditures. 
In Beaumont, for example, a nonprofit corporation, North 
Carolina Right to Life, Inc., challenged the constitutionality 
of the Federal ban on direct contributions.  In upholding the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reliance on anticircumvention is also questionable for two 
reasons.  First, the continued validity of the anticircumvention 
rationale as a separate compelling government interest remains 
unclear after McCutcheon.  See McCutcheon 572 U.S. at 211 
(plurality opinion) (stating that prevention of corruption and 
appearance of corruption is "only" legitimate government 
interest for restricting campaign finances, while skeptically 
referring to "Buckley's circumvention theory").  Second, to the 
extent it still is a valid interest, the court fails to indicate 
why individuals are more likely to attempt to circumvent 
individual contribution limits through a corporation than 
through a nonprofit or a union, and I discern nothing in the 
case law to suggest this. 
15 
 
 
law, the Supreme Court emphasized "the 'special characteristics 
of the corporate structure' that threaten the integrity of the 
political process," Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153, quoting NRWC, 459 
U.S. at 209, and "the public interest in 'restrict[ing] the 
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate 
form," Beaumont, supra at 154, quoting Federal Election Comm'n 
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
500-501 (1985) (NCPAC).  In so doing, the Supreme Court 
connected these war chests to the objective of preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Beaumont was not 
discussed in Citizens United, thereby raising the question 
whether the rationales rejected in the context of independent 
expenditures may still be viable in the context of direct 
contributions when connected to concerns about corruption. 
Indeed, in NRWC, another case involving direct contribution 
restrictions and the uniform Federal ban, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that "'differing structures and purposes' of 
different entities 'may require different forms of regulation in 
order to protect the integrity of the electoral process'" from 
corruption.  See NRWC, 459 U.S. at 210, quoting California Med. 
Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1982).  See 
also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154-155 (discussing "war-chest 
corruption"); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1989) (discussing "concern 
16 
 
 
over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth"); 
NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500-501 ("compelling governmental interest in 
preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence 
of political war chests funneled through the corporate form").  
The majority in Citizens United distinguished NRWC by stating 
that the law at issue in NRWC involved restrictions on direct 
contributions, "which, unlike limits on independent 
expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro 
quo corruption."  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 358-359. 
These cases also exhibit deference to legislative judgments 
about how best to target corruption in the arena of direct 
contributions, at least when confronting evenhanded bans on 
contributions, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 ("a court should 
generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its 
face imposes evenhanded restrictions").  See NRWC, 459 U.S. at 
209-210 ("The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the 
special characteristics of the corporate structure require 
particularly careful regulation" and "we accept Congress's 
judgment").  See also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155, quoting NRWC, 
supra at 209-210 ("our cases on campaign finance regulation 
represent respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special 
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly 
careful regulation'"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 ("Congress was 
surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial 
17 
 
 
measure, and that contribution ceilings were a necessary 
legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance 
of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited 
financial contributions").  But this statute is at least 
arguably not "evenhanded" as it treats business corporations 
differently from nonprofits and unions for the purposes of 
preventing corruption. 
How the Supreme Court will harmonize these cases with 
Citizens United remains unclear.  Considerations about the 
amassing of wealth and the corporate structure seem to be 
handled differently depending on the context.  It may be that 
contributions and concerns about quid pro quo corruption, or its 
appearance, allow in these considerations but independent 
expenditures, and the speech they entail, do not.  This remains 
to be seen. 
The court, here, does not confront the complexities of 
differential treatment in the case law.  Indeed, the court has 
avoided any discussion of Austin, except in two footnotes.  See 
ante at notes 5 and 8.  Upon an examination of the 
jurisprudence, it is far from clear whether the reasoning of 
Austin will allow distinctions among business corporations, 
nonprofits, and unions, and if so, how. 
 
Ultimately, however, we cannot base our decision on 
speculation over whether the Supreme Court will extend its 
18 
 
 
reasoning in Citizens United into the contribution case law and 
hold that singling out business corporations for differential 
treatment based on reasoning in Austin is impermissible.  As the 
Supreme Court itself has stated: 
"We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other 
courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by 
implication, overruled an earlier precedent.  We reaffirm 
that '[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application 
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some 
other line of decisions, [other courts] should follow the 
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions." 
 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997), quoting Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989).  Federal courts have continued to apply the existing 
jurisprudence on direct contribution restrictions, rather than 
attempting to anticipate possible changes from what the Supreme 
Court has said in the context of independent expenditures.  See, 
e.g., Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 
602-603 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014) 
(applying Austin's equal protection clause analysis to uphold 
law banning corporate contributions but permitting union 
contributions); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. 
Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Beaumont, 
as well as Austin insofar as it was not explicitly overruled in 
Citizens United, to review denial of preliminary injunction 
sought against statute that bans corporation contributions but 
19 
 
 
not union contributions); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 184 
(2d Cir. 2012) ("Since the Supreme Court preserved the 
distinction between expenditures and contributions, there is no 
basis for Appellants' attempt to broaden Citizens United").  
Supreme Court "decisions remain binding precedent until [that 
court] see[s] fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether 
subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing 
vitality."  Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016), quoting 
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-253 (1998).  For this 
reason, I concur in the judgment, as the Supreme Court has not 
yet extended its holding in Citizens United to restrictions on 
direct contributions.