Title: Harris v. One Hope United, Inc.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Harris v. One Hope United, Inc., 2015 IL 117200 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
ROBERT F. HARRIS, Appellee, v. ONE HOPE UNITED, INC., 
et al., Appellants. 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
117200 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 19, 2015 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 
Eileen Brewer, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Esther Joy Schwartz, Richard W. Schumacher and Jamie L. Budler, of 
Stellato & Schwartz, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant. 
 
Gary W. Klages, of Law Office of Daniel E. Goodman, LLC, of 
Rosemont, for appellee. 
 
John F. Watson, of Craig & Craig, LLC, of Mattoon, and Craig 
Unrath, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for amicus 
curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, 
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case, the appellant, One Hope United, Inc. (One Hope), asks us to recognize a new 
privilege in Illinois: a self-critical analysis privilege. We decline to do so, as we consider the 
matter more appropriately a subject for legislative action. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court, which similarly deferred this question of public policy to the legislature. 2013 
IL App (1st) 131152, ¶ 1. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 
to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old 
Marshana Philpot died while her family participated in One Hope’s “Intact Family Services” 
program. The Cook County public guardian (Public Guardian), acting as administrator of 
Marshana’s estate, filed this wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope, its 
employee Pixie Davis, and Marshana’s mother, Lashana Philpot. 
¶ 4 
 
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that DCFS received a complaint about Lashana’s neglect 
and/or abuse of Marshana. DCFS investigated the complaint and assigned the matter to One 
Hope. One Hope began monitoring the Philpot family for counseling services. At one point, 
Marshana was hospitalized for failure to thrive. When she was discharged, DCFS ordered that 
she live with her aunt, Marlene Parsons. Under Ms. Parsons’ care, the child began to thrive. 
Eventually, Marshana was returned to the care of her mother. According to the complaint, the 
child subsequently drowned when Lashana left her unattended while bathing her. The 
complaint alleges that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect, and should 
not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and 
her failure to complete parenting classes. 
¶ 5 
 
In the course of this litigation, attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive 
director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding 
Marshana’s case. According to the director, One Hope has a “continuous quality review 
department” which investigates cases and prepares these reports. The priority review process 
considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service 
delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” 
After One Hope refused to produce the report in response to a discovery request, the Public 
Guardian moved to compel its production. One Hope resisted, asserting that the report was 
protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. 
¶ 6 
 
The circuit court of Cook County determined that the privilege did not apply and ordered 
One Hope to produce the priority review report. The court found that One Hope’s refusal to 
produce the report after being ordered to do so was contumacious. To facilitate One Hope’s 
request for appellate review of the privilege issue, the court found One Hope’s law firm1 in 
“friendly” contempt of court and fined it $1 per day. The fine order was immediately 
appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). 
When a contempt order based on a discovery violation is appealed, the underlying discovery 
                                                 
 
1Although One Hope’s law firm is technically the only appellant in this case, for ease of reference, 
we refer herein to “One Hope’s” arguments rather than the “law firm’s” arguments. 
 
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order is also subject to review. See Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 69 (2001). 
 
¶ 7 
 
 
 
 
SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
¶ 8 
 
The self-critical analysis privilege appears to have originated in Bredice v. Doctors 
Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), a medical malpractice case. In Bredice, the court 
held that a decedent’s administratrix in a medical malpractice suit could not obtain discovery 
of the minutes and reports of a hospital staff review meeting. The court stressed that the 
confidentiality of the medical staff’s evaluation of potential improvements in its procedures 
and treatments was so essential to the self-review process that allowing discovery would chill 
the candor required for an effective internal review. Id. at 250. In particular, the court 
recognized that the long-term public benefits of improved health care outweighed the needs of 
the litigant seeking discovery, and, thus, should not be sacrificed without a showing of good 
cause. Id. at 251.2 
¶ 9 
 
The fundamental purpose of what has come to be known as a “self-critical analysis 
privilege” is to protect from disclosure documents that contain candid and potentially 
damaging self-criticism, where disclosure of those documents would harm a significant public 
interest. Scott v. City of Peoria, 280 F.R.D. 419, 424 (C.D. Ill. 2011). Although the original 
purpose of the privilege was to encourage candor when parties sought to improve their own 
procedures in providing medical care to patients, some federal courts have relied upon the 
privilege in other factual settings. When expanded to other circumstances, courts generally use 
it to encourage activities that will protect human life or public health. Deel v. Bank of America, 
N.A., 227 F.R.D. 456, 458 (W.D. Va. 2005). Whether the privilege applies in a particular fact 
situation depends in significant part on balancing the public interest furthered by 
self-assessment against the interest in pursuing the search for truth. Scott, 280 F.R.D. at 424. 
¶ 10 
 
The requisites for application of what the Deel court described as “this purported privilege” 
(Deel, 227 F.R.D. at 458) have been variously set out as either a three- or four-part test. In 
Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the “generally required” elements, “if such a privilege 
exists,” are as follow: (1) the information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken 
by the party seeking protection; (2) the public must have a strong interest in preserving the free 
flow of the type of information sought; (3) the information must be of the type whose flow 
would be curtailed if discovery were allowed; and (4) the document was prepared with the 
expectation that it would be kept confidential and has in fact been kept confidential. 
¶ 11 
 
As the Deel and Dowling courts’ comments suggest, whether the privilege should be, or 
has been generally, recognized in the federal courts is a matter of disagreement. As a district 
court has recently observed, “the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to introduce a 
peer-review privilege—sometimes referred to as a ‘self-critical analysis’ privilege—into the 
                                                 
 
2In the 1980s, our legislature recognized the desirability of a privilege in this limited context and 
enacted the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101 et seq. (West 2012)), which provides, inter alia, 
that “[s]uch information, records, statements, notes, memoranda, or other data, shall not be admissible 
as evidence, nor discoverable in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, 
agency or person.” 735 ILCS 5/8-2102 (West 2012). As this court has stated: “The purpose of the Act is 
to encourage candid and voluntary studies and programs used to improve hospital conditions and 
patient care or to reduce the rates of death and disease.” Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366 (1985). 
 
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federal common law,” a disinclination which “is consistent with the reluctance of federal 
courts to contravene the general rule in favor of admissibility by creating new privileges.” 
Williams v. City of Philadelphia, No. 08-1979, 2014 WL 5697204, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 
2014) (citing, inter alia, University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990), In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1150 (3d Cir. 1997), and 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (cautioning that privileges “are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed”)). Lower federal courts appear to have exercised caution in 
this regard. See generally Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 
351 n.12 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The self-critical analysis privilege has never been recognized by this 
Court and we see no reason to recognize it now.”); Williams, 2014 WL 5697204, at *3 
(rejecting a contention that “there is a ‘developing trend’ in the federal courts toward *** 
recognition” of the privilege); Granberry v. Jet Blue Airways, 228 F.R.D. 647, 650 (N.D. Cal. 
2005) (stating that no circuit court of appeals had explicitly recognized the self-critical analysis 
privilege); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This 
court has not recognized this novel privilege.”); Medina v. County of San Diego, No. 
08cv1252, 2014 WL 4793026, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014) (“The Ninth Circuit does not 
recognize the self-critical analysis privilege.”); Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 899 
(7th Cir. 2003) (referring to the self-critical analysis privilege as “a privilege never recognized 
in this circuit”). But see Scott, 280 F.R.D. at 423-24 (stating “[t]here can be no doubt” that the 
Seventh Circuit recognized the privilege in Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 
(7th Cir. 1985)). 
 
¶ 12 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 13 
 
The question before this court is whether Illinois should recognize the self-critical analysis 
privilege. The parties agree that a de novo standard of review applies. Indeed, the applicability 
of a discovery privilege is a matter of law (Niven, 109 Ill. 2d at 368) and rulings with respect 
thereto are subject to de novo review. Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 2012 IL 
113107, ¶ 27; Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71. 
¶ 14 
 
Our appellate court has been asked to consider recognition of the self-critical analysis 
privilege in at least three different contexts, including the case now before us: People v. 
Campobello, 348 Ill. App. 3d 619 (2004); Rockford Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. 
Morrissey, 398 Ill. App. 3d 145 (2010); 2013 IL App (1st) 131152. In each instance, the 
appellate court declined to recognize the prospective privilege. 
¶ 15 
 
The question arose in Campobello in the course of a criminal prosecution of a priest for the 
alleged molestation of a young girl. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockford (Diocese) was 
served with discovery requests by the State and refused to comply. Among the items sought 
were the Diocese’s investigative records. The Diocese urged the trial court to recognize a 
“critical self-analysis” privilege under Illinois law and rule that the privilege protected those 
records from disclosure. Campobello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 625. The circuit court rejected the 
argument that the records of the internal investigation of the defendant were protected by a 
“critical self-analysis” privilege and ordered them produced. Id. The Diocese respectfully 
requested a contempt order to facilitate an appeal, and the circuit court complied. 
¶ 16 
 
In the ensuing appeal, wherein other matters were also raised and addressed, the appellate 
court “decline[d] to consider whether the [self-critical analysis] privilege should be made part 
 
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of Illinois law.” Id. at 637. The court noted the Diocese’s concession that the privilege has 
never been recognized in Illinois common law. The court found the “closest statutory 
analogue” to be section 8-2101 of the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101 (West 2002)), 
which protects, against discovery, hospital documents related to internal quality control. The 
appellate court acknowledged the Diocese’s argument that its misconduct officer and 
intervention committee records were the product of an analogous function and should thus be 
protected from disclosure as well; however, the appellate court concluded: “Whatever the 
force of this reasoning, it does not warrant an exercise in ‘judicial legislation’ [citation]. The 
privilege that the Diocese would have us recognize implicates competing public policy 
considerations that are best weighed by the General Assembly.” Campobello, 348 Ill. App. 3d 
at 637 (citing People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 184 Ill. 2d 521 (1998)). 
¶ 17 
 
More recently, the appellate court, in Rockford, considered the question of privilege 
recognition in the context of a request for disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2006)). In Rockford, the plaintiff, pursuant to the 
provisions of the FOIA, sought, inter alia, production of a survey conducted by Rockford 
College at the behest of the Rockford police department. The defendants, including the police 
department, represented that the purpose of the survey was to assess the department’s 
performance, and was thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to “the self-critical analysis 
privilege as developed under the federal common law.” Rockford, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 148. The 
circuit court rejected that contention, ruling that “the survey was not exempt from disclosure 
either as an audit or pursuant to the self-critical analysis privilege, or any other privilege.” Id. at 
149. 
¶ 18 
 
On appeal, defendants argued multiple bases for exemption of records requested, among 
them, applicability of a self-critical analysis privilege to the survey sought in discovery. In 
rejecting defendants’ claim of privilege, the appellate court first noted that “[a] self-critical 
analysis exemption is not to be found among the enumerated exemptions” in the FOIA, and the 
court declined to read such an exemption into the Act. Id. at 152. Second, the appellate court 
observed that the self-critical analysis privilege has not been adopted by Illinois courts. The 
appellate court reiterated the general principle that “privileges are disfavored because they are 
in derogation of the search for truth” and quoted from Birkett, where this court stated that “ ‘the 
extension of an existing privilege or establishment of a new one is a matter best deferred to the 
legislature.’ ” Id. at 153 (quoting Birkett, 184 Ill. 2d at 528). Third, the appellate court noted 
that the federal cases cited by defendants are not binding upon state courts and, in any event, 
the Illinois version of the FOIA differed from the federal version. Id. Finally, the appellate 
court in Rockford, like the court in Campobello, rejected an argument that a self-critical 
analysis privilege of broader application should be recognized based upon an analogous 
statutory privilege created by the legislature in the Medical Studies Act. The appellate court 
observed that the legislature “easily could have codified the [privilege] into the FOIA, had it 
chosen to do so,” and “[t]he privilege’s presence in the Medical Studies Act juxtaposed against 
its absence in the FOIA strongly supports the opposite of defendants’ argument—that the 
legislature deliberately omitted the privilege from the FOIA.” Id. at 153-54. 
¶ 19 
 
Recognition of a self-critical analysis privilege was most recently considered, and rejected, 
by the appellate court in the case sub judice. The appellate court first acknowledged that 
“[s]ome federal courts” have recognized a self-critical analysis privilege, which, “on the 
federal level is created only by case law and not by federal statutes or specific court rules.” 
 
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2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶¶ 1, 11. The appellate court observed: “The parties do not dispute 
that the self-critical analysis privilege has never been definitively established by any Illinois 
statute, court rule, or prior state case law.” Id. ¶ 8. The appellate court noted that appellate 
panels in Rockford and Campobello had considered recognition of the privilege, “albeit in 
somewhat different contexts,” and had declined to recognize it. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
¶ 20 
 
Like the courts in Rockford and Campobello, the appellate court in this case relied upon 
this court’s decision in Birkett, in this instance, for the propositions that: (1) privileges against 
disclosure are strongly disfavored because they operate to exclude relevant evidence and thus 
work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings; (2) privileges should not be 
applied unless they promote sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative 
evidence; and (3) the extension of an existing privilege or establishment of a new one is a 
matter best deferred to the legislature. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Birkett, 184 Ill. 2d at 527-28). 
¶ 21 
 
Having acknowledged those principles of general application, the appellate court then 
considered two of defendants’ arguments specific to this case: (1) that shielding self-critical 
documents would further the purposes of the Child Death Review Team Act (20 ILCS 515/1 
et seq. (West 2012)); and (2) that the impetus behind the statutory privilege afforded by the 
Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101 (West 2012)) warrants judicial extension of an 
analogous privilege in this context. The appellate court rejected both arguments. 
¶ 22 
 
In the first instance, the court found that “a close review of the [Child Death Review Team] 
Act reveals that it encourages, rather than discourages, disclosure of information of the sort 
sought here.” 2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶ 16. “Additionally, the Act specifically states that 
‘[a]ccess to information regarding deceased children by *** multidisciplinary and multiagency 
child death review teams is necessary for those teams to achieve their purposes and duties.’ ” 
Id. (quoting 20 ILCS 515/5(7) (West 2012)). The appellate court determined that the 
overriding need to determine the truth with respect to the cause of death of an infant overrides 
the desire of One Hope to keep its self-evaluations confidential. Id. ¶ 17. 
¶ 23 
 
With respect to One Hope’s second argument, the appellate court pointed out that the 
Medical Studies Act, by its very terms, does not apply to institutions such as One Hope. 
Moreover, the appellate court observed that the Rockford court “declined a similar invitation to 
adopt the Medical Studies Act privilege to disclosure required by other statutes by analogy.” 
Id. ¶ 18. 
¶ 24 
 
The appellate court concluded while neither Campobello nor Rockford is squarely on point, 
their analyses nonetheless provided substantial support to the court’s determination that the 
self-critical analysis privilege is not recognized in Illinois. Id. “Absent the privilege, there is no 
dispute that the priority review report is discoverable, as it may contain information admissible 
at trial or lead to such information.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 19. The appellate court thus 
affirmed the circuit court’s order compelling production of the priority review report and 
vacated the contempt order, acknowledging that the failure to comply with the circuit court’s 
order involved a “good faith” effort “to secure appellate interpretation of this rather novel 
issue.” Id. ¶ 20. 
¶ 25 
 
We now turn to Birkett, the oft-cited opinion in the state appellate court decisions that have 
declined to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege. In Birkett, this court was asked to 
adopt a common law “deliberative process privilege” to exempt from discovery confidential 
advice given to those involved in making decisions and policy for state and local government. 
 
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Birkett, 184 Ill. 2d at 526. Unlike the privilege here at issue, which, at best, can be said to have 
gained a foothold in the federal courts, this court in Birkett observed that the deliberative 
process privilege was “[w]idely recognized in the federal courts.” Id. The rationale for the 
deliberative process privilege bears some similarity to that offered for the self-critical analysis 
privilege in that, in both instances, the idea is to foster candor and a frank exchange of opinion 
for decisional or remedial purposes. See id. at 527. 
¶ 26 
 
Having acknowledged the rationale underpinning the deliberative process privilege, this 
court nonetheless hastened to add that “privileges are strongly disfavored because they operate 
to ‘exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal 
proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1983)). This court noted 
that the decision to create a privilege or extend an existing one involves a determination that 
the privilege promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative 
evidence, a determination that is best deferred to the legislature. Id. at 528 (citing, inter alia, 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board v. Homer Community Consolidated School 
District No. 208, 132 Ill. 2d 29, 34 (1989), and Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d at 269 (recognizing that the 
great majority of privileges recognized in Illinois are statutory creations)). 
¶ 27 
 
Although this court in Birkett recognized that the creation of a new privilege in Illinois is 
“presumptively a legislative task,” the court acknowledged that “Homer allows for a court’s 
recognition of an evidentiary privilege, in ‘rare instances,’ where each of the following 
conditions are met: (1) the communications originated in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality is essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure 
to the relation by disclosure would be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 533 (citing Homer, 132 Ill. 2d at 35). In 
Birkett, this court disposed of the proponent’s argument based on its failure to establish the 
first element of the test. Id. at 534. 
¶ 28 
 
In Homer, where this court did recognize a qualified privilege protecting the strategy 
deliberations of school boards and teachers’ unions engaged in collective bargaining from 
disclosure, the court nonetheless began its analysis with this cautionary quotation from 
Sanders: 
 
“ ‘The expansion of existing testimonial privileges and acceptance of new ones 
involves a balancing of public policies which should be left to the legislature. A 
compelling reason is that while courts, as institutions, find it easy to perceive value in 
public policies such as those favoring the admission of all relevant and reliable 
evidence which directly assist the judicial function of ascertaining the truth, it is not 
their primary function to promote policies aimed at broader social goals more distantly 
related to the judiciary. This is primarily the responsibility of the legislature. To the 
extent that such policies conflict with truthseeking or other values central to the judicial 
task, the balance that courts draw might not reflect the choice the legislature would 
make.’ ” Homer, 132 Ill. 2d at 34 (quoting Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d at 271). 
¶ 29 
 
Thereafter, the court readily found three of the four conditions for recognition of a 
privilege met and proceeded to consider the fourth. Id. at 35-36. In that part of its analysis, this 
court first addressed an issue raised by the parties in the lower courts: “whether the General 
 
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Assembly created a statutory privilege for collective-bargaining matters discussed at closed 
school board meetings by exempting these matters from the Open Meetings Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1987, ch. 102, par. 41 et seq.) and the Freedom of Information Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
116, par. 201 et seq.).” Id. at 36. This court stated it was unclear from the language of the acts 
that the General Assembly intended those statutes to create a statutory privilege; however, the 
court believed the statutory language was “indicative of a legislative intent that 
collective-bargaining strategy sessions be kept confidential.” Id. at 37. Expressing concern that 
a statutory privilege based on those two acts “would apply only to governmental bodies (here, 
the school district) and would not prohibit union strategy meetings from being discovered,” the 
court “decline[d] to base any privilege solely on these statutes, but instead view[ed] these acts 
as evidence of a public policy favoring confidentiality in collective-bargaining strategy.” 
(Emphasis added.) Id. 
¶ 30 
 
Looking elsewhere for indicia of legislative intent, the court next turned to the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, ¶ 1701 et seq.). The court found 
support for recognition of a privilege in section 2(n) of the Act, which prevented employees 
who may have knowledge of, or access to, school board collective-bargaining strategy from 
joining labor organizations. That prohibition, the court reasoned, evinced legislative intent to 
protect educational employers from premature disclosure of their bargaining proposals and 
labor relations policies that could undermine their bargaining strategies, an intent that “would 
obviously be frustrated if labor organizations were allowed to obtain that same information 
through discovery.” Homer, 132 Ill. 2d at 38. 
¶ 31 
 
Finally, the court turned to federal labor law and found there, too, a policy of preserving the 
confidentiality necessary to effective collective bargaining. Id. at 38-39. 
¶ 32 
 
Based upon its examination of pertinent legislative and administrative action, this court 
concluded that “there exists a strong public policy protecting the confidentiality of 
labor-negotiating strategy sessions” and, on that basis, found that policy sufficiently satisfied 
the fourth element of the four-prong test. Id. at 39-40. This court thus held “some type of 
privilege is necessary to prevent disclosure of either party’s negotiating strategy during an 
unfair labor practice proceeding before the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.” Id. at 
40. 
¶ 33 
 
We find Birkett and Homer instructive insofar as they counsel, in the first instance, against 
judicial infringement upon what is principally a policymaking decision for the legislature, and 
in the second, for consideration of legislative enactments that are in place before deciding 
whether expressions of public policy therein warrant a “rare” exercise of judicial authority in 
furtherance thereof. See Birkett, 184 Ill. 2d at 533 (“the creation of a new privilege is 
presumptively a legislative task” and this court acts to recognize a new privilege only in “rare 
instances”). 
¶ 34 
 
In the appellate court, One Hope argued the relevance of two legislative acts: the Child 
Death Review Team Act (20 ILCS 515/1 et seq. (West 2012)) and the Medical Studies Act 
(735 ILCS 5/8-2101 (West 2012)). We find these acts significant in ascertaining legislative 
intent. See Homer, 132 Ill. 2d at 36-40 (examining, inter alia, the provisions of Illinois’s Open 
Meetings Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Educational Labor Relations Act 
before concluding “that there exists a strong public policy protecting the confidentiality of 
labor-negotiating strategy sessions”). 
 
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¶ 35 
 
First, we find the Rockford court’s reasoning sound and applicable in this context as well. 
In Rockford, the appellate court rejected defendants’ invitation to create a self-critical analysis 
privilege in relation to the FOIA, stating: 
 
“The fact that the legislature codified this privilege in relation to the internal quality 
control of medical institutions means that the legislature easily could have codified the 
provision into the FOIA, had it chosen to do so. The privilege’s presence in the Medical 
Studies Act juxtaposed against its absence in the FOIA strongly supports the opposite 
of defendants’ argument—that the legislature deliberately omitted the privilege from 
the FOIA and we should not engraft it into the FOIA.” Rockford, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 
153-54. 
As the appellate court in this case pointedly observed, “by its very terms, [the Medical Studies 
Act] does not apply to institutions such as One Hope.” 2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶ 18. 
¶ 36 
 
Obviously, the legislature could have extended this quality control privilege to myriad 
scenarios involving all kinds of entities, public and private, based upon the rationale that 
internal review might benefit others using those services or products in the future. However, 
the legislature’s approach has been targeted and narrow. This, we believe, evinces a legislative 
intent to limit, rather than expand, the scope of the privilege. 
¶ 37 
 
With respect to the specific circumstances before us, further support for this conclusion can 
be found in the Child Death Review Team Act. The stated policy of the Act, as set forth in 
subsection (3) of section 5, underscores the need for “an accurate and complete determination 
of the cause of death” as well as “the development and implementation of measures to prevent 
future deaths from similar causes.” 20 ILCS 515/5(3) (West 2012). To that end, the legislature 
has determined that “[a]ccess to information regarding deceased children and their families by 
multidisciplinary and multiagency child death review teams is necessary for those teams to 
achieve their purposes and duties.” 20 ILCS 515/5(7) (West 2012). Though section 30(b) of 
the Act limits public access to information, specifying that “[r]ecords and information 
provided to a child death review team and the Executive Council, and records maintained by a 
team or the Executive Council, are confidential and not subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act ***, as provided in that Act,” this subsection contains an important exemption: 
 
“Nothing contained in this subsection (b) prevents the sharing or disclosure of 
records, other than those produced by a Child Death Review Team or the Executive 
Council, relating or pertaining to the death of a minor under the care of or receiving 
services from the Department of Children and Family Services and under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court with the juvenile court, the State’s Attorney, and the 
minor’s attorney.” (Emphases added.) 20 ILCS 515/30(b) (West 2012). 
Thus, subsection (b) of section 30 limits public access to records provided to child death teams, 
and protects, to an even greater degree, records produced by a Child Death Review Team or the 
Executive Council. However, when a child dies who was under the care of, or receiving 
services from, DCFS and under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, disclosure of records, 
other than those produced by the Child Death Review Team or the Executive Council, is 
permissible to the minor’s attorney. 
¶ 38 
 
We read this statutory provision as further, and clearer, evidence that the legislature did not 
intend to expand any existing quality control privilege to the circumstances before us in this 
case. DCFS was ultimately responsible for Marshana’s care and well-being; One Hope was, by 
 
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assignment, an extension of DCFS. With the exception of those records actually produced by 
the Child Death Review Team or Executive Council, all other records pertinent to the child’s 
death are subject to disclosure to the minor’s attorney. The records at issue in this case address 
the circumstances of Marshana’s death and the services that were provided by One Hope. 
Subsection (b) obviously envisions the use of records in potential prosecution and litigation 
after a child’s death as it addresses and allows for disclosure of information to both the 
prosecutor and the minor’s attorney. 
 
¶ 39 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 40 
 
We conclude that relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy 
determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is 
not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege” that would protect it from disclosure. As the 
appellate court concluded: “Absent the privilege, there is no dispute that the priority review 
report is discoverable, as it may contain information admissible at trial or lead to such 
information.” 2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶ 19. 
¶ 41 
 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, including its vacation 
of the contempt order. 
 
¶ 42 
 
Affirmed.