Title: RICE v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICE v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.2001 WY 2119 P.3d 508Case Number: 00-133Decided: 02/28/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                           
February 28, 2001

                   
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S                      

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

DAVID 
RICE,

Appellant

(Petitioner/

Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE 
OF WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee

(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Natrona 
County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Delicath.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS,* GOLDEN, KITE, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J. 
(Ret.)

 * 
concurred prior to retirement

 GOLDEN, 
Justice.

  [¶1]           
Appellant 
David Rice was denied worker's compensation benefits for a claim of injury 
resulting from chemical exposure, and he appeals.  Following a hearing, the hearing 
examiner found that Rice neither timely filed an injury report nor proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence all elements of his claim.  We hold that the finding that his injury 
report was not timely filed is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence, 
but uphold the conclusion that Rice did not prove his injury by a preponderance 
of the evidence and affirm the order denying benefits.  

ISSUES

[¶2]           
Rice 
contends that the issues presented by this appeal are:

1.  Whether Appellant's injury was not 
timely verbally reported. 

2.  Whether Appellant failed to timely file 
a written report of his injury.

3.  Whether there is substantial evidence to 
support denial of Appellant's claim and especially the finding that Appellant's 
testimony in support thereof was not credible.

The 
Division restates the issues as:

I.  Did the Hearing Examiner correctly find 
that Appellant failed to timely report his alleged injury?

II.  Did the Hearing Examiner correctly find 
that Appellant failed to prove that his employer was not prejudiced by the 
untimely filing?

III.  Did the Hearing Examiner correctly find 
that Appellant failed to establish every element of his claim by a preponderance 
of the evidence?

FACTS

[¶3]           
Rice 
claimed that during ten-hour shifts, he used a chemical paint stripper called 
Bix Spray-On Stripper to remove paint from a large oil rig.  The parties disputed the date that Rice 
used the stripper.  He claimed that 
he used it on July 19 and 20, 1998, and his employer claimed that he used it for 
only one day on August 3, 1998.  
Rice's employer did not provide protective clothing or gloves, and Rice 
removed protective eyewear after it became coated with the stripper.   No other eyewear was 
provided.  The stripper was in 
contact with Rice's skin, eyes, and mouth.  
He inhaled the stripper and unknowingly ingested it after drinking from a 
nearby cup of soda.  Rice began 
experiencing pain in his shoulder at work, appeared at a hospital emergency 
room, and received medical treatment for it on July 22, 1998.  He timely reported the incident to his 
employer, Key Rocky Mountain, and the Division, claiming that he did not know 
how he had hurt his shoulder.  The 
shoulder pain was diagnosed as a possible torn rotator cuff and treated with 
pain medication, a sling, and rest.  
The pain eased after a few days, and Rice returned to work. 

[¶4]           
Two 
weeks later, Rice experienced wrist pain and was again seen in the emergency 
room for debilitating pain.  X-rays 
did not reveal any injury, and the pain was attributed to arthritis.  Rice did not file a claim.  Pain medication was prescribed, and the 
symptoms ceased after a few days.  
Several weeks later, which would be October of 1998, Rice experienced 
pain in his other wrist and began to suspect that the different episodes in 
different body parts might be related to chemical exposure.  In total, Rice testified that he 
suffered a series of seventeen episodes of migratory pain; however, according to 
his testimony, as early as five weeks after the first incident of shoulder pain, 
he began to suspect the pain was caused by the chemical exposure.  On his own, he obtained the material 
safety data sheet (MSDS) on Bix Spray-On Stripper to investigate the effects of 
acute and chronic exposure to it.  
He wrote letters to two different doctors, including his family doctor, 
Dr. Grinstead, providing the MSDS information and asking if there was a 
relationship between his exposure and pain, and both doctors said no. 

[¶5]           
Rice saw 
Dr. Grinstead on February 23, and March 8, 1999, for severe pain, and on both 
occasions Rice indicated that he believed the pain was related to toxin exposure 
six months earlier.  Because all 
laboratory results were negative, the doctor did not believe there was a 
relationship.  Rice filed an injury 
report claiming chemical exposure was causing pain in both shoulders and 
wrist.  The Division marked that 
report as received on March 12, 1999.  
By request of the Division, Rice was seen by Dr. MacGuire, a rheumatology 
specialist, on March 16, 1999.   
She was also provided with the MSDS.  Dr. MacGuire reported that it was her 
impression that Rice's symptoms were inconsistent with those caused by chemical 
exposure.  X-rays of his cervical 
spine, right wrist and left shoulder revealed degenerative changes.  She informed the Division she had 
concluded that it was "extremely clear" that his symptoms were due entirely to 
the natural effects of aging and degenerative arthritis.  

[¶6]           
Rice's 
employment with Key Rocky Mountain had been terminated in January of 1999 for 
reasons unrelated to his health.  He 
testified that pain kept him from working after that, and in July of 1999, Rice 
saw Dr. Rebecca Painter, an internal medicine specialist.  She reviewed blood tests for indications 
of arthritis and found them to be inconclusive.  She determined the normal blood tests 
and the fact that Rice has improved over time indicated that arthritis was not 
the cause of his migratory pain.  
Based on the history he provided, she suspected that the pain was 
secondary to the chemical exposure, and it would eventually correct itself over 
a three to five year period because of the body's natural antioxidant 
mechanisms.  Rice underwent a series 
of chelation treatments and immediately began to improve.  Dr. Painter concluded that the 
improvement indicated that she was treating the cause of his joint pain, and his 
condition was caused by his exposure to Bix Spray-On Stripper.  

[¶7]           
Rice's 
symptoms completely resolved, and he returned to work for a different company on 
August 7, 1999.   The Division 
denied Rice's March claim for benefits, stating that his medical condition was 
excluded under the statutory definition of an injury when due to the natural 
aging process.  A hearing was 
scheduled, and in its disclosure statement the Division raised issues that Rice 
did not suffer a toxic chemical exposure and failed to timely file an injury 
claim in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a).   At the hearing, the Division 
presented evidence indicating that Rice had worked with the stripper on August 
3, 1998, for one day, disputing his claim that his July 19 and 20, 1998, 
exposure caused him to require medical treatment at the emergency room on July 
22, 1998. 

[¶8]           
The 
hearing examiner denied benefits for reasons that are not entirely clear but 
apparently ruled against Rice on the preliminary issues of not timely filing an 
injury report and not having proved that he was injured by a work-related 
chemical exposure.  Several findings 
of fact emphasized that Rice did not report to his doctors, supervisor, or 
employer any alleged chemical or toxin exposure until seven months after it 
occurred; found that Rice's supervisor had testified that Rice had used Bix only 
on August 3, and Rice's employer had not monitored medical treatment because it 
did not learn of the exposure until March; and found that Rice's testimony about 
events and dates of the exposure were not credible.    Based on these findings, the 
hearing examiner concluded that Rice had not timely filed his injury report 
within seventy-two hours to the employer and within ten days to the Division 
after his doctor's visit on February 23, 1998, and ruled that the employer's 
ability to monitor medical care was prejudiced because Rice was treated before 
the doctor notified the employer.  
The hearing examiner's order stated that Rice had failed to meet his 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of 
his claim.  Upon Rice's petition for 
review, the district court certified this case to this Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶9]           
When the 
district court certifies directly to this Court an administrative agency's 
decision, we review that agency decision "under the same appellate standards 
applicable to the reviewing court of the first instance."  In re Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 453 (Wyo. 
1993).  Our judicial review is 
limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (LEXIS 
1999), which provides in pertinent part:

[T]he reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

                        
* * *

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

                        
* * *

(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

[¶10]       
When 
reviewing a hearing examiner's decision that a worker's compensation claimant 
has failed to meet the burden of proof, we apply the following 
principles:

A 
claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the 
essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
contested case hearing.  Martinez 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 
1996).  When an agency decides that 
the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the 
case is reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) 
(1990).  City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995).  
On appeal the complainant . . . has the burden of proving arbitrary 
administrative action.  Knight v. 
Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); 
Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides 
v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957).  The agency, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses.  Utech, 895 P.2d  
at 451, and cases there cited.  The 
deference normally accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended 
to the administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not 
be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.  Wyoming Steel & 
Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994).  

Pederson 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); see also Nissen v. Cheyenne Frontier Days, 
Inc., 983 P.2d 722, 724-25 (Wyo. 1999); Carrillo v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 987 P.2d 690, 692-93 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶11]   In reviewing findings of fact we 
examine the entire record to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings. Weidner v. Life Care Centers of America, 
893 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1995). If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Id. Substantial evidence 
is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
conclusions of the agency.  It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence.  
Id.

Timeliness 
Finding

[¶12]       
Rice 
contends that his March, 1999, injury report preceded July 5, 1999, the date of 
Dr. Painter's correct diagnosis, and cannot be found untimely.  Alternatively, he contends that if the 
date of injury is determined to be February 23, 1999, he proved that the 
employer did not suffer any prejudice by a late filing.  

[¶13]       
Our law 
on determining the date of a compensable injury is well-established.  Wesaw v. State of Wyo. ex. rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 2001 WY 17, ¶10, 2001 WL 167776 (Wyo. 
2001).  The notice and claim requirements of the 
workers' compensation statutes do not begin to run until the employee 
becomes aware that an accident has caused an injury; and the term "injury" as 
used in the compensation statutes means compensable injury.  Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 
530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936).  
Under previous versions of the filing statutes and statute of 
limitations, we have consistently applied the concept of a "compensable injury" 
to determine timeliness of notice and claims.  Big Horn Coal Co. v. 
Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 1972) (interpreting the 
previous version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502); Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1081, 1082-83 (Wyo. 1992) 
(applying "compensable injury" concept to statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-12-503).  The burden to 
show the actual time of the compensable injury, its cause, and its relation to 
his employment at the time of injury is placed on the employee.  Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo. 1965).  

[¶14]       
"[W]hen 
determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be 
asked:  When would a reasonable 
person, under the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of 
the injury and that the injury was related to his or her employment?"  Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1082.  This question necessarily requires a 
careful evaluation of all facts to determine when an employee reasonably 
understood the nature and seriousness of his condition and that it was 
work-related.  Our previous 
decisions have never burdened an employee with filing claims for incidents or 
trivial injuries to avoid timeliness issues.  Big Horn Coal Co., 502 P.2d  at 
188 (citing Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 
1956)). However, the employee may not ignore these requirements for compensable 
injuries because notice requirements and the statute of limitations exist to 
allow employers to investigate claims, monitor medical care, and avoid stale 
claims.  Sherwin Williams Co. v. 
Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 2000).  The finder of fact is charged with 
determining the time and cause of a compensable injury; however, whether an 
employee's claim is to be barred for failure to timely file notice or a claim is 
a mixed question of fact and law.  
Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1080.  

[¶15]       
In this 
case, Rice's actions indicate that if his self-diagnosis was correct, he 
understood the nature and seriousness of his injury and that it was work-related 
as early as October 1998.  He wrote 
two doctors inquiring about a relationship, was seen by two doctors to inquire 
about a relationship, and no diagnosis established that he was correct.  Although Rice did not receive a 
diagnosis that his injury was caused by a work-related chemical exposure, he 
diligently pursued medical treatment, again pointing out to two different 
doctors that the pain might be caused by the chemical exposure and again 
receiving an arthritis diagnosis.  
Despite an arthritis diagnosis, Rice filed an injury report with the 
Division in March of 1999, well before he received in July of 1999 Dr. Painter's 
diagnosis confirming his suspicions.  
Based on these facts, we conclude that the hearing examiner's finding 
that Rice did not timely file an injury report with the employer or the Division 
is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.  We affirm the decision, however, on 
grounds that Rice did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
suffered an injury.

Proof of 
Injury

[¶16]       
At first glance, 
it would appear that the hearing examiner found the untimely report dispositive 
of the case; however, the hearing examiner's finding of fact about Rice's 
credibility is the apparent basis for the legal conclusion that Rice did not 
carry his burden of proving all elements of his claim.  One finding, stating that Rice's 
testimony about the events and dates associated with the chemical exposure was 
not credible, was preceded by a finding that the employer's testimony 
established that Rice worked with the stripper on August 3, 1998, and for one 
day only.  Consequently, Rice did 
not prove that he had suffered chemical exposure on July 19 and 20, that led to 
his first appearance at an emergency room on July 22, 1998.  Rice's medical testimony establishing 
causation was based solely on the history he provided to Dr. Painter.  If the hearing examiner did not believe 
that chemical exposure occurred immediately preceding Rice's initial shoulder 
pain, then Rice failed to establish the essential elements of his claim that he 
had suffered a work-related chemical exposure that caused his injuries requiring 
chelation therapy.  

[¶17]       
The hearing 
examiner's findings of fact, however, did not ultimately conclude that Rice had 
failed to prove an injury or causation.  
Ordinarily, having determined that the hearing examiner erred on the 
timely filing issue, we would remand for further findings to support the denial 
of benefits.  Mekss v. Wyo. Girls 
School, 813 P.2d 185 
, 202 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032 (1992).  Because of the credibility 
determination, however, we will not do so in this case because the evidence 
supports the finding that he did not prove an injury or causation and is not 
clearly contrary to the great weight of the evidence, because the Division 
provided medical evidence that Rice's pain was caused by arthritis.  Credibility determinations are the 
unique province of the hearing examiner, and we eschew re-weighing those 
conclusions.  Carrillo, 987 P.2d  at 693.  Because Rice failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a work-related chemical exposure 
that caused his injuries, the hearing examiner's decision is affirmed.  

[¶18]       
We would remind 
all hearing examiners that when they conduct contested case hearings that take 
evidence on all issues, judicial economy is served and appellate review 
facilitated when the hearing examiner makes proper findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on all issues properly before it.    

[¶19]       
We affirm the 
order denying benefits.