Title: State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. WILKINSON ET AL. v. REED, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit common pleas court from exercising 
jurisdiction over complaint of union challenging the proposed closure of 
Lima Correctional Institution by the Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction — Union’s complaint sought injunctive relief to require 
bargaining over closure decision — Complaint alleges conduct that would 
constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(5) — 
Common pleas court lacks jurisdiction to proceed — Writ granted. 
(No. 2003-0727 — Submitted May 13, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On March 1, 2000, the state of Ohio and the Ohio Civil Service 
Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO, entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement effective from March 2000 through February 28, 2003.  
The union, which includes corrections officers employed by relator Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), is the sole and exclusive 
bargaining representative for approximately 37,000 public employees.  The 
collective bargaining agreement contains a five-step grievance procedure 
culminating in final and binding arbitration. 
{¶2} 
In January 2003, ODRC announced the closure of Lima 
Correctional Institution (“LCI”), a state prison, effective July 12, 2003.  In order 
to comply with various collective bargaining agreements, timelines were 
developed to implement the layoff process.  ODRC had determined that closing 
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LCI provided the “most effective means of responding to the on-going budget 
deficiencies.” 
{¶3} 
In April 2003, the union filed a grievance challenging the ODRC 
decision to close the prison.  The union claimed that the ODRC rationale for 
closing the prison was flawed and that the state had failed to bargain on the issue 
of closing the prison.  On April 11, 2003, following a hearing on the grievance, 
ODRC denied it. 
{¶4} 
On April 14, 2003, instead of proceeding with the next step in the 
grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement or filing an 
unfair labor practice charge against the state, the union filed a complaint in the 
Allen County Court of Common Pleas, a respondent herein, against ODRC, its 
director, Reginald A. Wilkinson, LCI Warden Terry Tibbals, the Office of 
Collective Bargaining of Ohio of the Ohio Department of Administrative 
Services, and its deputy director, Steven Loeffler, all relators in this action.  In its 
complaint, the union alleged that the relators’ refusal to bargain with the union 
over their decision to close LCI, reassign bargaining-unit work, relocate 
bargaining-unit work, and lay off bargaining-unit employees violated R.C. 
4117.09(B)(1), 4117.11(C), and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. 
{¶5} 
The union requested a temporary restraining order “preventing 
[relators] from closing LCI, reassigning bargaining unit work, relocating 
bargaining unit work or lay[ing] off [ODRC] employees until full good faith 
bargaining on that subject has resulted in an agreement or ultimate good faith 
impasse.”  The union also requested a preliminary and/or permanent injunction 
“prohibiting [relators] from closing LCI and preserv[ing] the status quo keeping 
LCI open beyond [relators’] expected closure date with the bargaining unit 
members continuing to work at that location until good faith bargaining on that 
subject has resulted in an agreement or ultimate good faith impasse.”  The union 
did not allege anything about its grievance, nor did it specifically request an 
January Term, 2003 
3 
injunction against the prison closure and layoff of bargaining-unit employees 
pending the arbitration of its grievance. 
{¶6} 
The trial court denied the union’s request for an ex parte temporary 
restraining order and set the matter for consideration on April 16.  On April 16, 
relators moved to dismiss the union’s action or change venue.  In their motion, 
relators contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the union’s claims.  
Respondent Judge Jeffrey L. Reed of the common pleas court took the matter 
under advisement and gave the union time to respond. 
{¶7} 
Judge Reed then heard evidence concerning the union’s request for 
a temporary restraining order.  A union employee testified that the union could 
have filed an unfair labor practice charge with the State Employment Relations 
Board (“SERB”) to challenge the state’s refusal to bargain over the LCI closing.  
Instead, the union decided as a matter of legal strategy to seek relief in the 
common pleas court.  Relators presented affidavits stating that the daily payroll of 
LCI was $78,025 and that a restraining order stopping the prison-closing process 
would cause irreparable harm to ODRC.  Relators noted that to close LCI on the 
scheduled date of July 12, 2003, ODRC needed to supply the union’s members 
with layoff notices between April 17 and 23. 
{¶8} 
After the hearing, Judge Reed granted a temporary restraining 
order to prevent relators “from implementing the paper lay-off procedure under 
Article 18 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at Lima Correctional 
Institution until after a full hearing on the [union’s] request for a preliminary 
injunction on April 30, 2003.”  Judge Reed conditioned the temporary restraining 
order on the union’s posting of a $50,000 surety bond or a $10,000 cash bond. 
{¶9} 
On April 17, 2003, on the union’s emergency motion, Judge Reed 
amended the temporary restraining order to further restrain relators “from 
transferring inmates out of LCI for the purpose of furthering the planned closure 
of that facility in July 2003.”  Judge Reed recognized that the trial court “may 
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very well not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the [union’s] grievance 
against [relators] since that grievance has rightfully been processed according to 
terms of the CBA” and that the court “may not have the right to address any 
perceived unfair labor practice.”  Nevertheless, Judge Reed determined that the 
trial court had “equitable jurisdiction to maintain the status quo of the parties 
while the grievance/arbitration process is taking place to protect both parties’ 
guaranteed right to effectively arbitrate their labor dispute and to protect the well 
recognized public interest in enforcing the arbitration clause in the CBA and to 
uphold the general favor that arbitration enjoys in Ohio.” 
{¶10} On the day that the trial court issued the amended temporary 
restraining order, the state and the union agreed on the procedure to be used for 
the LCI closure and layoffs.  The state and the union did not agree on the 
propriety of the closure and layoffs in the agreement.  On April 22, relators 
moved to dissolve the trial court’s April 16 and 17 temporary restraining orders. 
{¶11} On April 24, 2003, relators filed this action for a writ of 
prohibition to prevent respondents from exercising further jurisdiction over the 
union’s case.  Relators also filed a motion in which they requested an emergency 
peremptory or alternative writ.  On April 25, we shortened the response time from 
21 days to 12 days.  On May 7, respondents filed an answer and a memorandum 
in opposition to relators’ motion for emergency relief, and the union filed a 
motion to intervene and an answer.  The city of Lima and the Allen County Board 
of Commissioners also filed motions to intervene.   
{¶12} This cause is now before the court for our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) 
determination.1 
                                                 
1. 
We grant the union’s motion to intervene.  We deny the motions of Lima and the Allen 
County Board of Commissioners to intervene because they failed to comply with Civ.R. 24(C).  
See State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 144, 656 
N.E.2d 1277; State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
69, 70, 647 N.E.2d 769. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination 
{¶13} We must now consider whether dismissal or the issuance of a 
peremptory or an alternative writ is warranted.2 
{¶14} If an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction 
over the cause, a writ of prohibition will be granted to prevent the future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.  State ex rel. Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 
37, 2002-Ohio-3317, 770 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 24. 
{¶15} The union’s common pleas court case is premised on alleged 
violations of R.C. 4117.09(B)(1), R.C. 4117.11(C), and the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement.  Although the union couches its complaint’s allegations in 
this manner, the wording used is insufficient in and of itself to vest jurisdiction in 
the common pleas court.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health v. 
Nadel, 98 Ohio St.3d 405, 2003-Ohio-1632, 786 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 21 (mere fact that 
employee couched allegations of application to vacate arbitration award in 
language comparable to R.C. 2711.10 is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in 
common pleas court to resolve employee’s claim of unfair representation). 
{¶16} “Exclusive jurisdiction to resolve charges of unfair labor practices 
is vested in SERB in two general areas:  (1) where one of the parties files charges 
                                                                                                                                     
 
2. 
{¶a} 
On May 14, 2003, the union filed a “notice of change of circumstances and 
settlement” as well as a “notice of settlement and settlement agreement” concerning the trial court 
proceeding.  These filings indicate that in the trial court case, relators moved to compel arbitration 
under R.C. 2711.02 and requested a stay of the underlying proceedings.  The union did not object 
to the stay, and on May 14, the trial court stayed the case pursuant to the parties’ agreement 
pending arbitration.  The trial court ordered that the status-quo injunction that it had previously 
ordered would remain in effect pending the arbitration.   
 
 
{¶b} 
These developments do not moot this case.  In moving to compel arbitration, 
relators specified that they did not concede that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claims 
raised in the union’s complaint.  Further, relators have not dismissed this case.  In addition, 
respondents have not terminated their exercise of jurisdiction in the case.  Moreover, the union 
does not specifically assert in its May 14 filings that this case is moot.  Finally, the interest of Ohio 
taxpayers is at stake.  Therefore, we proceed to the merits of this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11; or (2) where a 
complaint brought before the common pleas court alleges conduct that constitutes 
an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11.”  State ex rel. 
Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929. 
{¶17} Respondents assert that “[b]y its terms, the Union’s complaint 
merely alleges that the State’s closing of the prison, and the activities associated 
therewith, are subjects of mandatory bargaining that must be pursued under the 
grievance/arbitration procedures made a mandatory part of arbitration 
agreements under R.C. 4117.09(B)(1).”  (Emphasis added.)  The union’s 
complaint, however, is devoid of any allegations concerning arbitration or the 
five-step grievance procedure.  Instead, the union’s complaint challenges relators’ 
refusal to bargain about the closing of LCI and the transfer and layoff of 
bargaining-unit employees. 
{¶18} Here, as with the underlying claims in Nadel and Fraternal Order 
of Police, the union’s claims allege conduct that would constitute an unfair labor 
practice, i.e., a violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(5),3 by the failure of relators and the 
state to collectively bargain over their decision to close LCI and lay off and 
transfer ODRC employees. 
{¶19} Moreover, despite the union’s reliance on R.C. 4117.09(B)(1), the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate District held that this statute “does not 
provide a right to an original action in the court of common pleas.”  Johnson v. 
Ohio Council Eight (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 348, 352, 766 N.E.2d 189.  Instead, 
R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) merely “requires that any collective bargaining agreement 
contain a two step procedure—a grievance procedure with arbitration first, and 
                                                 
3. 
Under R.C. 4117.11(A)(5), it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer, its agents, 
or representatives to “[r]efuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees 
recognized as the exclusive representative or certified pursuant to Chapter 4117. of the Revised 
Code.” 
January Term, 2003 
7 
ultimately the right to file in common pleas court.”  Id.  SERB has initial and 
exclusive jurisdiction over any grievance for an unfair labor practice.  Id. at 351, 
766 N.E.2d 189.  Respondents do not argue that Johnson is either distinguishable 
or incorrectly decided. 
{¶20} Furthermore, if a collective bargaining agreement between a public 
employer and an exclusive employee representative “provides for a final and 
binding arbitration of grievances, public employers, employees, and employee 
organizations are subject solely to that grievance procedure * * *.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 4117.10(A).  Insofar as the union claims that relators’ actions 
violated the collective bargaining agreement, binding arbitration is its exclusive 
remedy. 
{¶21} Thus, Judge Reed and the trial court lack jurisdiction to consider 
the claim.  See, generally, Brannen v. Kings Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(2001), 144 Ohio App.3d 620, 628, 761 N.E.2d 84 (“to the extent that appellants 
claim that the actions of [the board of education] violated their rights under the 
collective bargaining agreement, binding arbitration is their exclusive remedy and 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of their complaint”); Null 
v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities (2000), 137 
Ohio App.3d 152, 738 N.E.2d 105 (final and binding arbitration clause of 
collective bargaining agreement divested common pleas court of jurisdiction over 
state-law claim); Bryant v. Witkosky (Mar. 29, 2002), Portage App. No. 2001-P-
0047, 2002 WL 480078 (common pleas court lacks jurisdiction over settlement 
agreements arising out of public employee collective bargaining agreement); 
Middleton v. State ex rel. Devies, Stark App. No. 2001CA00366, 2002-Ohio-
3481, 2002 WL 1467773, ¶ 48 (“the trial court lacked jurisdiction to interpret the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to completion of this necessary predicate 
of the arbitration process”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶22} As SERB noted in dismissing a comparable unfair labor practice 
charge filed by the same union when the state recently closed another correctional 
institution, “any alleged contractual violations would be best addressed in the 
parties’ grievance-arbitration process.”  Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn., AFSCME, 
Local 11, AFL-CIO v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Apr. 4, 2002), 19 Ohio Pub. 
Emp. Rep. ¶ 1460. 
{¶23} Judge Reed nevertheless relied on Toledo Police Patrolman’s 
Assn., Local 10, IUPA, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Toledo (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 450, 
713 N.E.2d 78, to support the trial court’s assertion of equitable jurisdiction to 
issue a status-quo injunction pending the determination of arbitrability of the 
union grievance.  The union also cites this case in its motion to intervene. 
{¶24} Toledo Police Patrolman’s Assn., however, is distinguishable.  In 
that case, the union specifically requested “a temporary restraining order 
enjoining the city from instituting one-officer patrol units until the issue was 
arbitrated under the procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id., 127 Ohio App.3d at 456, 713 N.E.2d 78.  By contrast, the 
union here sought injunctive relief pending relators’ bargaining over the closure 
of LCI and the layoff and transfer of ODRC employees.  It did not seek injunctive 
relief pending its pursuit of arbitration under the parties’ collective bargaining 
agreement.  In fact, as noted previously, there is no allegation in the union’s 
underlying complaint about the grievance procedure or, for that matter, that the 
union even filed a grievance or pursued arbitration.  Therefore, Toledo Police 
Patrolman’s Assn. does not support the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
the union’s claims. 
{¶25} Respondents now also cite Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, Local 770 (1970), 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199, and Lever 
Bros. Co. v. Internatl. Chem. Workers Union, Local 217 (C.A.4, 1976), 554 F.2d 
115, in support of their exercise of further jurisdiction in this case. 
January Term, 2003 
9 
{¶26} These cases, however, interpreted federal labor provisions rather 
than R.C. 4117.10(A). 
{¶27} More important, it is not clear whether the parties who sought 
injunctive relief in those cases specified, as did the union in Toledo Police 
Patrolman’s Assn., that the relief they were seeking was an injunction preserving 
the status quo pending arbitration. 
{¶28} In addition, following Boys Markets, the United States Supreme 
Court emphasized that “it [is] clear that a Boys Markets injunction pending 
arbitration should not issue unless the [disputed action] is arbitrable.”  
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Internatl. Longshoremen’s Assn. (1982), 457 
U.S. 702, 721, 102 S.Ct. 2672, 73 L.Ed.2d 327.  Here, the agreement provides 
that the union be given advance notice if the state “plans to close an institution or 
part thereof” and that the union be given only the “opportunity to discuss the 
planned closure with the Employer.”  (Emphasis added.)  The agreement does not 
provide that this specific action must be bargained.  See Internatl. Union United 
Auto., Aerospace & Agriculture Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Lester Eng. 
Co. (C.A.6, 1983), 718 F.2d 818 (union not entitled to status-quo injunction 
pending arbitration where decision of employer to close manufacturing facility 
was not arbitrable).  Therefore, the cited federal precedent does not require a 
contrary result. 
{¶29} Even assuming that this federal labor law is considered persuasive 
authority here, “injunctions generally may not be issued simply to forbid an 
employer’s allegedly improper acts when the injunction is not in aid of 
arbitration.”  5 Lareau, National Labor Relations Act:  Law and Practice (2 
Ed.2002) 41-35, Section 41.08[3][c].  Yet this is the very relief that the union 
requests in its common pleas court complaint: to forbid the state and relators from 
proceeding with the closure of LCI unless they engage in collective bargaining on 
the issue.  In fact, in its answer here, the union admits relators’ allegation that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“[t]he premise of [its] complaint was that the State failed to engage in bargaining 
with the union regarding the decision to close Lima Correctional Institution, in 
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between OCSEA and the 
State of Ohio.”  (Complaint, ¶ 8; Int. Resp. Answer, ¶ 1.)  The union never 
requested the status-quo injunctive relief pending arbitration that the trial court 
entered here.  Rather, it appears to have deliberately chosen, as part of its legal 
strategy, to avoid alleging anything about its previously filed grievance or the 
five-step grievance procedure in its complaint. 
{¶30} Based on the foregoing, Judge Reed and the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the union’s claims.  Because it appears 
beyond doubt that relators are entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition, we 
grant a peremptory writ.  State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 447, 452, 727 N.E.2d 900.  
Furthermore, because the relators will lose a significant amount of money, we 
grant the peremptory writ immediately. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, COOK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., 
concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶31} Granted, the relief sought by the union in its requests for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary and/or permanent injunction was 
broad.  However, Judge Reed tailored the temporary restraining order he issued to 
fit within what he was jurisdictionally empowered to do.  The trial court properly 
determined that it had “equitable jurisdiction to maintain the status quo of the 
parties while the grievance/arbitration process is taking place to protect both 
January Term, 2003 
11 
parties’ guaranteed right to effectively arbitrate their labor dispute and to protect 
the well recognized public interest in enforcing the arbitration clause in the CBA 
and to uphold the general favor that arbitration enjoys in Ohio.”  Judge Reed has 
carefully limited his exercise of jurisdiction to exclude any matters that are within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB or that fall under the terms of the CBA.  The 
parties have now agreed to enter arbitration in this case, and the trial court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction will make that arbitration meaningful.  The trial judge 
correctly prevented the state from locking the prison and throwing away the keys 
before the important issues between the parties could be resolved. 
{¶32} Moreover, Judge Reed’s jurisdiction could be invoked under other 
theories.  Given the fact that the Lima Correctional Institution  was created by an 
Act of the General Assembly and that the closing appears to be undertaken by an 
administrative act of the ODRC without legislative consultation and approval, it 
would seem that there are legitimate legal issues that may be appropriately 
litigated in Judge Reed’s court.  Those issues are vital to the interests of the state 
and the local community.  The question of who has the authority to close 
institutions is of broad interest to the General Assembly, the Governor, and to 
citizens across the state wherever legislatively created state facilities are located. 
__________________ 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Elizabeth T. 
Smith, Chief Counsel, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Richard N. 
Coglianese and Sloan T. Spalding, Assistant Attorneys General, for relators. 
 
David E. Bowers, Allen County Prosecuting Attorney; Anthony L. Geiger 
and Kevin Hawley, for respondents. 
 
Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and Andrew G. Douglas, for intervening 
respondent Ohio Civil Service Employees Association. 
__________________