Title: Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay Corp.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
WILLIAM D. RIDGWELL, ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 961978 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                     October 31, 1997 
BRASCO BAY CORPORATION 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
 
Joseph F. Spinella, Judge Designate 
 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether an owner of land 
burdened by an easement is barred from placing a gate across the 
right of way. 
 
In 1994, William and Mary Ellen Ridgwell purchased about 30 
acres of land bordering U.S. Route 250 in Albemarle County that 
is subject to an easement held by Brasco Bay Corporation 
(Brasco).  The easement extends from Brasco's property, across 
the Ridgwells' property, to U.S. Route 250.  The easement was 
created by a deed establishing a "right of way for ingress and 
egress" which "shall be 50 feet in width and shall follow the 
route as designated on plat of R.O. Snow and Associates dated 
July 25, 1974, a copy of which plat is attached hereto and made a 
part of this deed."   
 
A paved road on the Ridgwells' property leading from U.S. 
Route 250 is partially located on the right of way.  This paved 
road provides the only means of access to the building in which 
the Ridgwells conduct their garden and nursery business.  As a 
security measure, the Ridgwells placed a 36-foot-wide gate across 
the paved road to limit vehicular access from U.S. Route 250 when 
their business is closed.  However, the gate also blocks Brasco's 
right of way to U.S. Route 250. 
 
The Ridgwells lock the gate at all times when their business 
is closed.  They offered Brasco a key to the lock, but Brasco 
declined the offer and demanded removal of the gate.  The 
Ridgwells refused to remove the gate. 
 
Brasco filed a bill of complaint seeking, among other 
things, a permanent injunction restraining the Ridgwells from 
interfering with Brasco's use of the right of way and requiring 
them to remove the gate.  Since Brasco intended to develop its 
property at a future date, Brasco also requested the trial court 
to declare that the right of way "was intended to provide an 
unobstructed right of way and a right of way upon which a road 
way could be built to State Department of Highway standards to be 
included as a part of the State Highway System of Virginia."  
 
At a bench trial, the court held that the Ridgwells were 
required to remove the gate because the plat showed an 
unobstructed right of way.  The trial court also enjoined the 
Ridgwells from interfering with Brasco's use of the way.  
However, the trial court declined to rule that the right of way 
was intended to allow construction of a road that could be 
adopted as part of the state highway system.  The trial court 
held that such a ruling would be premature because Brasco had not 
taken action to develop the property and there was insufficient 
evidence regarding the future use of the property. 
 
On appeal, the Ridgwells concede that, since the present 
gate is 36 feet wide, it obstructs Brasco's full use of its 50-
foot right of way.  However, the Ridgwells argue that Code 
§ 33.1-202 allows them to place a gate greater than 50 feet wide 
across the right of way, and that the trial court erred in 
permanently enjoining them from erecting such a gate. 
 
In response, Brasco contends that the documents creating the 
right of way establish that it was intended to be free from any 
obstruction, including the 50-foot-wide gate proposed by the 
Ridgwells.  Brasco further asserts that, since the Ridgwells do 
not have fences extending to each side of the right of way, they 
cannot rely on Code § 33.1-202 to erect a gate. 
 
Brasco also assigns cross-error to the trial court's refusal 
to declare that the easement was intended to allow construction 
of a road that could be adopted as part of the state highway 
system.  Brasco notes that the deed to the Ridgwell property 
includes a road maintenance agreement which declares that Brasco, 
as owner of the right of way, "shall have the right to upgrade 
and dedicate the road to the State Highway System of Virginia."  
Thus, Brasco argues, the trial court should have confirmed 
Brasco's right to build such a road to accommodate future 
subdivision of its property. 
 
We first consider the Ridgwells' contention that Code 
§ 33.1-202 gives them the right to place a 50-foot-wide gate 
across Brasco's right of way.  That section provides, in relevant 
part, that  
 
[a]ny person owning land over which another or others 
have a private road or right-of-way may, except when it 
is otherwise provided by contract, erect and maintain 
gates across such roads or right-of-way at all points 
at which fences extend to such roads on each side 
thereof. 
 
Under this portion of the statute, the Ridgwells are barred as a 
matter of law from placing a gate across Brasco's right of way 
only if they are subject to a contractual provision prohibiting 
the installation of a gate. 
 
We conclude that there is no such contractual restriction.  
In examining the Ridgwells' deed, we give effect to the plain 
meaning of the language used by the parties.  Amos v. Coffey, 228 
Va. 88, 92, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984); Arbern Realty Co. v. 
Swicegood, 201 Va. 30, 34, 109 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1959).  The only 
mention of the easement in the deed is that a right of way is 
provided "for ingress and egress" and "shall be 50 feet in width 
and shall follow the route as designated on [the attached] plat." 
 The plat appended to the deed shows the route of the easement 
and does not indicate any restrictions that would prohibit the 
placement of a gate across the easement.  In addition, there is 
no evidence that the Ridgwells and Brasco executed any agreement 
limiting the Ridgwells' right to place a gate over the easement. 
 
Although the Ridgwells are not prohibited by contract from 
placing a gate across the easement, they have failed to comply 
with the requirement in Code § 33.1-202 that any gate placed 
across an easement be attached to a fence on each side of the 
right of way.  Since the Ridgwells do not have fences that extend 
to each side of the right of way, they have not established a 
right under the statute to erect a gate.  Therefore, we will 
uphold the portion of the trial court's injunction requiring the 
Ridgwells to remove the existing gate because the trial court 
reached the correct result, despite its use of the wrong reason 
in obtaining that result.  See Mathy v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 
356, 362, 483 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1997); Doswell Ltd. Partnership v. 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 251 Va. 215, 225, 468 S.E.2d 84, 90 
(1996); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Auth., 251 Va. 201, 214, 468 S.E.2d 90, 98 
(1996). 
 
We next conclude that the trial court erred in permanently 
enjoining the Ridgwells from building a gate across the right of 
way.  This portion of the trial court's decree improperly denies 
the Ridgwells the opportunity to build a fence that complies with 
the requirements of Code § 33.1-202.
*
 
Finally, we find no merit in the cross-error assigned by 
Brasco.  Brasco did not present sufficient evidence from which 
the trial court could determine whether Brasco has a right to 
build a roadway to accommodate a subdivision of its property.  A 
trial court cannot enter a declaratory judgment based on future 
or speculative facts, because to do so would constitute the 
rendering of an advisory opinion.  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Va. v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Richmond, Inc., 245 Va. 24, 35, 426 
S.E.2d 117, 123 (1993); Mosher Steel-Virginia, Inc. v. Teig, 229 
Va. 95, 100, 327 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1985); City of Fairfax v. 
Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1964). 
 
For these reasons, we will uphold the portion of the trial 
court's injunction requiring the Ridgwells to remove the 36-foot-
                     
     
*The Ridgwells do not have a right to maintain a locked gate 
once they can demonstrate they have complied with the terms of 
the statute.  Nothing in Code § 33.1-202 provides such a right.  
See Craig v. Kennedy, 202 Va. 654, 660, 119 S.E.2d 320, 324 
(1961). 
wide gate, dissolve the permanent injunction preventing them from 
erecting a gate in compliance with Code § 33.1-202, and enter 
final judgment in favor of Brasco. 
                                           Affirmed in part,
                                           reversed in part,
                                           and final judgment.