Title: Devers-Scott v. Office of Professional Regulation

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Devers-Scott v. Office of Professional Regulation (2005-481)

2007 VT 4

[Filed 12-Jan-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                  2007 VT 4

                                No. 2005-481


  Roberta Rose Devers-Scott                      Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Washington Superior Court


  Office of Professional Regulation              May Term, 2006


  Helen M. Toor, J.

  Lisa Chalidze of Lisa Chalidze, P.C., Benson, and Michael H. Sussman,
    Goshen, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Edward G. Adrian, State Prosecuting Attorney, Montpelier, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶ 1.  REIBER, C.J.   Plaintiff Roberta Devers-Scott appeals a
  Washington Superior Court decision affirming a ruling by an administrative
  law officer (ALO) revoking Devers-Scott's license to practice midwifery. 
  She contends that: (1) the record does not support the ALO's findings; (2)
  the ALO erred in concluding that she violated certain unprofessional
  conduct statutes and midwifery rules; (3) she was stripped of her license
  based on her attitude and was thereby denied due process of law; and (4)
  the sanction imposed was too severe.  We affirm.
   
       ¶ 2.      The State filed a complaint with the Office of
  Professional Regulation (OPR) seeking immediate summary suspension of
  Devers-Scott's license to practice midwifery. The OPR conducted a summary
  suspension hearing, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 814(c).  The results of that
  hearing were not reviewed by the superior court or by the ALO, and so are
  not considered herein. The issues raised on this appeal arise out of
  proceedings commenced when the state subsequently filed a specification of
  charges against Devers-Scott for alleged unprofessional conduct in
  connection with her care for three clients: A.B., L.S., and K.B.  The
  specification of charges sought the permanent revocation of Devers-Scott's
  license to practice midwifery in Vermont, as contemplated by 26 V.S.A. §
  4188(c).

       ¶ 3.      The OPR appointed an ALO to conduct a full hearing on the
  merits of the charges, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. §129(j) and 26 V.S.A. §
  4186(c).  At that hearing, the burden of proof was on the State to show by
  a preponderance of the evidence that Devers-Scott had committed
  unprofessional conduct.  3 V.S.A. § 129a(c).  The ALO conducted a seven-day
  hearing in late September 2004 and issued a ruling in December of that
  year.  In that ruling, the ALO found that Devers-Scott had "committed
  multiple acts constituting unprofessional conduct," and that "[a]
  substantial number of those acts had implications for the care and safety
  of clients and their to-be-born children."  The ALO further found that
  Devers-Scott had been reprimanded for unprofessional conduct in Vermont in
  2001 because of a 1996 indictment for practicing midwifery without a
  license in New York.  Based on those findings, the ALO permanently revoked
  Devers-Scott's license to practice midwifery in Vermont.  Devers-Scott
  appealed to the superior court, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 129(j).  The
  superior court affirmed the ALO's decision on October 12, 2005.  This
  appeal followed.

                            I. Standard of Review

       ¶ 4.  "Where there is an intermediate level of appeal from an
  administrative body, we review the case under the same standard as applied
  in the intermediate appeal."  Tarrant v. Dep't of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 195,