Title: State v. William F. Schweda

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1507 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
William F. Schweda, Jeffrey G. Schweda, and ECI 
Special Waste Services, Inc., 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 14, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs by John E. 
Machulak, Susan R. Robertson, and Machulak, Robertson & Sodos, 
S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by John E. Machulak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Joanne 
F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 100
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1507  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV504) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William F. Schweda, Jeffrey G. Schweda, and ECI 
Special Waste Services, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the circuit court for 
Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge.  Affirmed and cause 
remanded to the court of appeals.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (2005-06).1 The defendants, William F. 
Schweda, Jeffrey G. Schweda, and ECI Special Waste Services, 
Inc. (collectively, ECI) appeal an order and a judgment of the 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
2 
 
circuit court for Fond du Lac County, Judge Peter L. Grimm 
presiding. The order granted the State's motion to strike ECI's 
demand for a jury trial.  The circuit court concluded that the 
constitutional right to a jury trial does not attach to an 
action seeking forfeitures for violations of waste disposal 
regulations.2 After a trial to the court, the circuit court 
entered a judgment in favor of the State. 
¶2 
ECI maintains that the circuit court erred in striking 
its demand for a jury trial. It contends that the causes of 
action asserted by the State are analogous to common law 
nuisance claims.  It further contends that because common law 
nuisance claims existed in 1848, and because such claims were 
actions at law in 1848, the State's claims fulfill the criteria 
for a constitutional right to a jury trial under Village Food & 
Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 
N.W.2d 177. 
¶3 
Applying the Village Food test, we determine that the 
claims asserted in the State's complaint do not give rise to a 
constitutional right to a jury trial. Common law nuisance causes 
of action are not sufficiently analogous to be considered 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals certified the case to this court with 
the following question. "Under the test set forth in Village 
Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, does the constitutional right to a 
jury trial attach in an action for violations of waste disposal 
regulations where 
common-law nuisance theory provides the 
foundation for modern environmental law, but forfeiture actions 
for improper treatment of wastewater and hazardous waste did not 
exist in 1848?" 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
3 
 
"essential counterparts" to the modern day regulatory claims 
asserted here. Therefore, ECI fails the first prong of the 
Village Food test because the claims asserted did not exist, 
were not known, and were not recognized at common law at the 
time the state's constitution was adopted. Id., ¶16. 
¶4 
Our determination, however, does not preclude the 
constitutional right to a jury trial in all environmental 
regulatory cases. Such a right exists if the asserted claim has 
an essential counterpart that existed at common law in 1848 and 
was recognized as an action at law in 1848. Id. 
I 
 
¶5 
William and Jeffrey Schweda are owners of ECI Special 
Waste Services, Inc., a "centralized waste treater" pursuant to 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.03(2e)(Oct., 2002). ECI collects waste 
from client industries, transports the waste to its treatment 
facility, and pre-treats the waste to comply with specific 
discharge limitations which are governed by a pretreatment 
permit issued by the City of Fond du Lac ("City").  ECI then 
discharges the waste into a sanitary sewer that goes into the 
City's municipal wastewater treatment plant.  ECI's permit 
requires 
compliance 
with 
effluent 
limitations, 
monitoring 
requirements, and other conditions which are set forth in the 
permit.  ECI also must comply with Wis. Admin. Code ch. 211, 
which governs centralized waste treaters. 
¶6 
William Schweda began working at ECI as a salesman in 
1999 and part of his compensation was shares of stock in the 
company. In July 2001 William's brother, Jeffrey Schweda, 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
4 
 
purchased the remaining shares of stock from the founder for 
$225,000. This purchase made the Schweda brothers the owners of 
ECI. 
 
¶7 
In January 2002 the City's wastewater treatment plant 
experienced an upset condition that caused the City to exceed 
its discharge limits under its permit for oxygen-consuming 
organic waste and total suspended solids.3 In March and April of 
2002, the City again experienced an upset and consequent permit 
violation.  The City was able to determine that the upsets of 
the treatment facility were due to high concentrations of 
surfactants in the wastewater.  
¶8 
The City began sampling the discharges coming from 
ECI's treatment facility and the samples revealed that ECI 
persistently exceeded the discharge limits in its permit. During 
the year in which they operated ECI, the Schwedas used almost no 
chemicals, disposed of almost no sludge, tested only for pH, did 
not use the one machine in their laboratory that determined how 
to treat metals in the wastes they accepted, and did not send 
any waste samples out for independent laboratory testing. In 
August 2002, the City revoked ECI's permit to operate as a 
wastewater treatment facility and the Schwedas closed the 
facility. 
¶9 
The State brought suit against the Schwedas, alleging 
that ECI failed to comply with the conditions of their permit 
and with requirements under the state administrative code and 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 205.03(41)(May, 2001).  
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
5 
 
state statutes during the time that the Schwedas owned ECI. The 
complaint asserted fifteen claims for relief arising out of 
ECI's operations. The State sought forfeitures for ECI's 
violations 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 281.98(1), 
283.91(2), 
289.96(3)(a), and 291.97(1), penalties pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.05(1)(a), and the environmental assessment available under 
Wis. Stat. § 299.93. 
¶10 ECI demanded a jury trial, and the State moved to 
strike. 
The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
the 
State's 
motion, 
determining that ECI failed to demonstrate that the State's 
action met either of the two prongs of the test for a 
constitutional right to a jury trial set forth in Village Food.  
¶11 The case was tried to the court.  The circuit court 
determined that ECI was liable for some, but not all, of the 
violations alleged, and imposed forfeitures for the time period 
the Schwedas owned and managed ECI. ECI appealed, and the court 
of appeals certified the case on the question of a right to jury 
trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
II 
¶12 This case addresses the issue of whether a cause of 
action gives rise to a right to a jury trial under Article I, 
Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Whether there is a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial for a 
particular cause of action requires us to interpret a provision 
of the state constitution, which we do independently of the 
determination rendered by the circuit court.  Vill. Food, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶7. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
6 
 
III 
¶13 ECI maintains that the circuit court erred in striking 
its demand for a jury trial. It contends that the causes of 
action asserted by the State are analogous to common law 
nuisance claims. It further argues that because common law 
nuisance claims existed at common law in 1848, and because such 
claims were actions at law in 1848, the State's claims fulfill 
the criteria for a constitutional right to a jury trial under 
Village Food.  
¶14 We disagree. Applying the Village Food test, we 
determine that the claims asserted in the State's complaint do 
not give rise to a constitutional right to a jury trial. Common 
law nuisance causes of action are not sufficiently analogous to 
be considered "essential counterparts" to the modern day 
regulatory claims asserted here. Therefore, ECI fails the first 
prong of the Village Food test because the claims asserted did 
not exist, were not known, and were not recognized at the time 
the state's constitution was adopted. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
7 
 
¶15 Our conclusion is consistent with the determinations 
of other states which have addressed a similar issue.4 Like other 
                                                 
4  In Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993), the Texas Supreme Court  determined that 
the state's constitution provided the right to a jury trial for 
only those types of cases tried to a jury at the time of its 
adoption in 1876. The court determined that in 1876 there were 
no regulatory schemes comparable to those constituted by the 
state's 
environmental 
statutes 
and 
regulations. 
Thus, 
it 
concluded 
that 
the 
state's 
assessments 
of 
penalties 
for 
violations of the modern environmental regulations were not 
analogous to any type of action tried in 1876, and that those 
assessments did not give rise to a constitutional right to a 
jury trial. Id. at 451.  
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined whether the 
defendants had a constitutional right to a jury trial for an 
environmental enforcement action in Commonwealth, Dep't of 
Envtl. Res. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 348 A.2d 765 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).  The court examined Article 1, Section 6 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution which states:  "Trial by jury 
shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate."  
The court commented that this language exists exclusively for 
the purpose of preserving jury trials as provided by common law.  
Ultimately the court concluded that "the constitutional right to 
a jury trial does not extend to respondent in these proceedings, 
which are wholly a creature of recent statutory law." Id. at 
768.    
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
8 
 
states, we begin our examination by reviewing our state 
constitution.  
¶16 Under 
Article 
I, 
Section 5 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
the 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial 
"shall 
remain 
inviolate." Section 5 provides in full: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law. Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
¶17 While Article I, Section 5 provides that the right 
"shall remain inviolate," it does not apply to all matters. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court examined its 
state constitutional provision when addressing the issue of 
whether there was a constitutional right to a jury trial for the 
enforcement of environmental regulations in Comm'r of Envtl. 
Prot. v. Connecticut Bldg. Wrecking Co., Inc., 629 A.2d 1116 
(Conn. 1993). The Connecticut Constitution "guarantees a jury 
trial in all cases for which 'there was a right to a trial by 
jury at the time of the adoption of that provision,' which was 
1818."  Id. at 1121 (quoting Conn. Const. Art. I., Sec. 19 
(2007))(brackets omitted).  The petitioner did not claim that 
environmental enforcement actions existed at common law in 1818, 
but rather that such actions were substantially similar to 
actions in debt, which existed at common law in 1818 and could 
be tried to a jury.  The Connecticut court rejected the argument 
and concluded that, consistent with Connecticut's common law 
history, there was no constitutional right to a jury trial.  Id. 
at 1122. See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Pollution Control 
Bd., 314 N.E.2d 350, 357-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)(holding that 
defendant "cannot argue" that right to trial by jury had been 
abridged in the context of administrative proceedings for 
violations of state environmental protection statute which were 
unknown at common law.) 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
9 
 
Historically, it has been interpreted to apply only to civil 
cases.  Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶13, 285 Wis. 2d 
519, 699 N.W.2d 890; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74, 14 N.W. 
912 (1883). Jury trial in criminal cases falls under the purview 
of Article I, Section 7.  
¶18 Moreover, Section 5 has been interpreted to mean that 
the right is preserved to the extent that it existed at the time 
of the adoption of the state constitution in 1848. See McGrew, 
285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶15; Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 
Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962). Three cases comprise 
this state's recent jurisprudence on the question of when the 
right to a jury trial as it existed in 1848 creates a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in a contemporary cause of 
action, 
State 
v. 
Ameritech 
Corp., 
185 
Wis. 2d 686, 
517 
N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994), Village Food, and McGrew.  
¶19 In Ameritech, the court of appeals adopted a two-prong 
test for determining whether a statutory cause of action gives 
rise to a constitutional right to a jury trial. It determined 
that there is such a right where "(1) the statute codifies an 
action known to the common law in 1848; and (2) the action was 
regarded as at law [i.e., rather than at equity] in 1848." 185 
Wis. 2d at 690 (emphasis in original). 
¶20 This court examined the Ameritech decision in Village 
Food. 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶9. We refined the first prong of the 
Ameritech test so that an action need not be based on the 
codification of a specific common law action that existed in 
1848. Rather, the action must have existed, been known, or been 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
10 
 
recognized at common law in 1848.  We stated the test as 
follows: 
[A] party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when: (1) the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848; and (2) the 
action was regarded as at law in 1848. 
Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.  
¶21 This court has been unanimous in concluding that the 
Village Food test is the correct test to apply in determining 
whether a cause of action gives rise to a constitutional right 
to a jury trial. The application of the test to particular 
causes of action has not occasioned similar consensus. The 
Village Food and McGrew decisions were both divided on the 
question of application. Regardless of those divisions, however, 
the court has been univocal in rejecting the temptation to carve 
out a constitutional right to a jury trial based on broad 
analogies between modern causes of action and causes of action 
at statehood.   
¶22 Village Food involved allegations that the defendant 
violated Wis. Stat. §§ 100.30(2)(am)1m.c and 100.30(3) (1999-
2000), which require minimum mark-ups for the sale of motor 
vehicle fuel. In applying the two-part test, the Village Food 
majority 
explicitly 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
attempt 
to 
analogize the cause of action to that in Getty v. Rountree, 2 
Pin. 379 (Wis. 1850), which involved fraud and breach of implied 
warranty. Although the two cases were similar insofar as both 
involved business torts in which one party alleged harm, such 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
11 
 
broad-brush similarity was insufficient for the court to 
conclude that the cause of action for violating minimum mark-up 
laws existed, was known, or was recognized at common law. Vill. 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶25. 
¶23 Instead, the court determined that the mark-up laws 
are "of the same 'nature'" as the common law crimes of 
forestalling the market, regrating, and engrossing. Id., ¶27 
(citing, inter alia, 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, ch. 12, at 158-59 (1778)). Thus, the Village 
Food majority rejected drawing an analogy between a modern 
statutory cause of action and a common law cause of action based 
on exceedingly general descriptions. Rather, it employed a 
narrower description of the actions to determine whether they 
were analogous. Because the claims at issue were "essentially 
counterparts" 
to 
the 
common 
law 
offenses, 
the 
majority 
determined that the claims gave rise to a constitutional right 
to a jury trial. Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶28 (citing 
Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d at 697). 
¶24 The concurrence/dissent in Village Food agreed with 
the majority regarding the test for determining whether there is 
a right to a jury trial, but disagreed regarding whether 
violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.30 met the test. Id., ¶35 
(Wilcox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It 
viewed the Unfair Sales Act as a "detailed scheme for the 
regulation of commercial pricing practices . . . ." Id., ¶45, 
and concluded that the claims alleged did not exist, were not 
known, and were not recognized at common law. Id., ¶47.  
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
12 
 
¶25 Further the concurrence/dissent warned that such a 
broad classification would render the Village Food test a 
nullity because "present causes of action of all sorts assessed 
under this test will only have to be compared generally . . . in 
order to invoke the constitutional protection to a trial by 
jury." 
Id., 
¶46. 
Thus, 
the 
Village 
Food 
majority 
and 
concurrence/dissent agreed on the appropriate test, and agreed 
that the constitutional right to a jury trial cannot be based on 
a very broad analogy to a cause of action at statehood. They 
disagreed only on the matter of how narrow the analogy may be. 
¶26 In McGrew, this court split on the question of whether 
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in a cause of 
action for speeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h)(2001-
02). In the lead opinion, three justices rejected the view that 
speeding was analogous to the common law nuisance offenses of 
"annoyances 
in 
highways, 
bridges, 
and 
public 
rivers, 
by 
rendering the same inconvenient or dangerous to pass . . . ."  
285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶24 (quoting 4 Blackstone, supra, at 167).  
¶27 The lead opinion stated that "the class of actions 
categorized 
as 
'nuisances' 
[is] 
simply 
too 
broad 
to 
be 
analogized 
to 
a 
speeding 
violation. . . . [T]hey 
are 
not 
'essentially counterparts.'" Id., ¶25. It warned that analyzing 
causes of action in terms so broad "would lead to a jury trial 
in virtually every forfeiture case." Id., ¶28. 
¶28 The concurrence and dissent in McGrew, totaling four 
justices, concluded that the defendant did have a constitutional 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
13 
 
right to a jury trial.5 However, the conclusion was not premised 
on drawing an analogy between speeding and the very broad 
category of nuisances for "annoyances in highways, bridges, and 
public rivers by rendering the same inconvenient or dangerous to 
pass . . . ." Rather, it was based on the narrower analogy 
between speeding and the rules of the road set forth in 
Wisconsin's statutes of 1849. Id., ¶59 (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(citing Wis. Stat. ch. 33 (1849)); see also id., ¶74 (Butler, 
J., dissenting). Similar to Village Food, the court agreed on 
the test for whether a cause of action gives rise to a right to 
a jury trial, and it agreed that such a right cannot be based 
upon a very broad analogy between the claim at issue and a cause 
of action at statehood. The court's disagreement concerned 
precisely how narrowly to draw the analogy in the first prong of 
the Village Food test. 
¶29 Turning to the present case, we must determine whether 
ECI has a constitutional right to a jury trial for the causes of 
action in the State's complaint under the Village Food test. As 
noted, the first prong of the test is whether the cause of 
action "existed, was known, or recognized at common law at the 
time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848." 
Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16. In applying the first part of 
the test, we are again confronted with the question of how 
                                                 
5 The concurrence and dissent differed as to whether the 
defendant had a constitutional right to a jury of six or a jury 
of twelve. Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶70 n.1, 285 
Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 890 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
14 
 
narrowly to draw the analogy between the claims at issue and 
causes of action at statehood.  
¶30 ECI raises only one argument for why the causes of 
action in the State's complaint meet the first part of the 
Village Food test. It maintains that it has a right to a jury 
trial for the claims in the State's complaint because those 
claims are "essentially a counterpart to common law nuisance." 
The State's claims are based upon statutes and regulations that 
are "environmental" in nature. At statehood, environmental 
protection was achieved by common law actions in public and 
private nuisance. ECI therefore contends that the environmental 
nature of the State's claims and the environmental aspect of 
common law nuisance warrant the conclusion that the State's 
claims "existed, [were] known, or recognized at common law at 
the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848." 
Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.6  
                                                 
6 ECI bases its claims on both public and private nuisance. 
Private 
nuisance 
has 
historically 
been 
defined 
as 
an 
"interference with the use and enjoyment of land." W. Page 
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 87 at 619 (5th 
ed. 1984). It includes, for example, erecting buildings so near 
to a person's house that it obstructs the light, keeping noisy 
animals so near another's house "that the stench of them 
incommodes him and makes the air unwholesome." 3 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 13 at 217-
18 (1765-69). While these could be broadly understood as 
"environmental," private nuisances involve injuries to private 
property. In contrast, public nuisance involves more generalized 
harms. See Attorney-Gen. v. The Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., 43 
Eng. Rep. 119, 125 (1853); George V. Yool, An Essay on Waste, 
Nuisance, and Trespass, 85 (1863).  
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
15 
 
¶31 There is no question that modern environmental law 
finds its roots in common law nuisance. A leading treatise on 
environmental law states:  
The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental 
law 
are 
found 
in 
principles 
of 
nuisance. . . . 
Nuisance 
actions have involved pollution of all 
physical media——air, water, land——by a wide variety of 
means. . . . 
Nuisance 
actions 
have 
challenged 
virtually 
every 
major 
industrial 
and 
municipal 
activity which is today the subject of comprehensive 
environmental regulation . . . . Nuisance theory and 
case law is the common law backbone of modern 
environmental and energy law. 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Handbook on Environmental Law, § 2.1, 
at 100 (1977).  
¶32 However, there are vital differences between nuisance 
law and modern environmental regulatory law. For one, nuisance 
is a sprawling concept. Historically, "nuisance" has been a term 
so broad that it could encompass a vast array of causes of 
action. It included everything from an alarming advertisement to 
a cockroach baked in a pie. 
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the 
entire 
law 
than 
that 
which 
surrounds 
the 
word 
"nuisance." It has meant all things to all people, and 
has been applied indiscriminately to everything from 
an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a 
pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable 
of any exact or comprehensive definition. Few terms 
have afforded so excellent an illustration of the 
familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a 
catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a 
problem . . . . 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, there are no allegations of harms to private 
property. Therefore the appropriate focus of our analysis is on 
whether the claims are analogous to public nuisance.  
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
16 
 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 86, at 
616-17 (5th ed. 1984).  
¶33 Such vagueness is demonstrated by the mélange of 
causes of action characterized as public nuisances. Prosser and 
Keeton further detail such offenses as eavesdropping on a jury 
and being a common scold as constituting public nuisance. Id., 
§ 90, at 643-44. 
¶34 This court has demonstrated its wariness of basing a 
constitutional right to a jury trial on such a broad analogy. 
See 
McGrew, 
285 
Wis. 2d 519, 
¶¶25, 
28; 
Vill. 
Food, 
254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶¶23-25. We are therefore cautious here as well. 
Having "doctrinal roots" in nuisance is not alone sufficient for 
a modern cause of action to be "essentially a counterpart" to 
nuisance actions. We note that a modern statutory claim may 
codify a common law nuisance action that existed, was known, or 
recognized in 1848 and thereby meet the first prong of the 
Village Food test. However, the modern cause of action requires 
more than a passing resemblance to the action. As we put it in 
Village Food, it must be "essentially [a] counterpart." Id., 
¶28.  
¶35 Here, the causes of action are not essentially 
counterparts to the public nuisance actions that existed at 
common law. A cause of action for public nuisance requires a 
showing of substantial and unreasonable harm to interests in the 
use and enjoyment of land. See Keeton, supra, at 580. Under 
historic common law nuisance, a party should not seek recovery 
"until an actual nuisance has been committed, or at all events 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
17 
 
until it is quite clear that the [conduct] will inevitably 
result in a nuisance." George V. Yool, An Essay on Waste, 
Nuisance, 
and 
Trespass, 
95 
(1863). 
Modern 
environmental 
regulatory laws, however, "regulate more subtle and attenuated 
harms than the common law of nuisance does; a land use that 
creates a common law nuisance is thus likely to be an a fortiori 
violation of statutory environmental law." Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 505 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
¶36 Thus, while a complaint must allege harm in order to 
state a claim for nuisance, the claims alleged in the State's 
complaint do not depend upon allegations of harm in order to 
lie. Rather, the defendants are liable for violations regardless 
of harm.7 
¶37 Claim 3, for example, alleges violations of Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 211.16(1)(c)(Oct., 2002), which requires that a 
centralized waste treater submit a report to the municipality 
identifying the types of waste it intends to treat at least 180 
days before commencing discharge. It also alleges violations of 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.16(2), which requires the treater to 
                                                 
7 The concurrence/dissent states that the proper course is 
to "determine whether the claim alleges some harm that  . . . is 
direct and immediate, and not merely speculative or remote." 
Concurrence/dissent, ¶114. The appropriate question, however, is 
not whether the complaint happens to allege some harm. Rather, 
the appropriate question is whether the cause of action is 
contingent upon allegations of harm. Whether a defendant has a 
right to a jury trial should not depend upon whether the 
plaintiff alleges harms that are not necessary for the cause of 
action to lie. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
18 
 
notify the municipality at least 60 days before accepting a new 
type of categorical waste not identified in its initial report. 
Such violations do not require that any actual harm result from 
the failure to identify the types of waste or notify the 
municipality of the acceptance of new types of categorical 
waste.  
¶38 Claims 1, 4, 5, and 7-14 exhibit the same pattern: 
• Claim 1 alleges that ECI "cause[d] or significantly 
contribute[d] to" the City of Fond du Lac exceeding its 
discharge permit limits for oxygen-consuming organic 
waste and total suspended solids in violation of Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 211.10(1)(Oct., 2002).  
• Claim 
4 
alleges 
violations 
of 
the 
limits 
on 
concentrations of pollutants in discharges incorporated 
into ECI's pretreatment permit pursuant to Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 261.22(2)(Sept., 1997).  
• Claim 5 alleges that ECI failed to notify the City of 
substantial changes in the character of ECI's discharges, 
thereby violating Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.15(6)(Oct., 
2002).  
• Claim 7 alleges that ECI operated its facility "in ways 
inconsistent with the approved plans," in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 281.98.  
• Claim 8 alleges that ECI neglected its obligations as a 
centralized waste treater under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
211.16(3)(Oct., 2002) and "improperly accepted wastes 
they were incapable of properly treating, and wastes 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
19 
 
reasonably expected to cause exceedances of the City's 
effluent limits." 
• Claim 9 alleges that the defendants failed to take 
representative samples of their effluent to assess 
compliance with their permit limits in violation of Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 211.16(4). 
• Claim 10 alleges that ECI violated Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
211.16(5)(Oct., 2002), which requires centralized waste 
treaters to submit to the City semi-annual reports 
containing information about wastewater treated and 
discharged into the City's treatment system. It alleges 
that ECI's reports from the second half of 2001 and the 
first half of 2002 were incomplete because the reports 
omitted required information, including "the name and 
address of each waste's generator, the volume and date of 
arrival 
of 
each 
wastewater; 
and 
the 
applicable 
pretreatment standards." 
• Claim 
11 
alleges 
that 
the 
defendants 
"failed 
to 
characterize the waste generated by treatment of the 
waste . . . in violation of Wis. Stat. § 291.21." 
• Claim 12 alleges that ECI disposed of hazardous waste at 
a landfill not licensed to accept such waste, contrary to 
the requirements under Wis. Stat. § 291.21(9). 
• Claim 13 alleges that that the defendants violated the 
prohibition on operating a hazardous waste facility 
without an operating license pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 291.25(2)(b) by storing hazardous waste. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
20 
 
• Claim 14 alleges that the defendants failed to properly 
label containers used for storage of hazardous waste. The 
State alleges that this violated Wis. Stat. § 291.21(3) 
and Wis. Admin. Code § NR 615.05(4)(a)5 (May, 1998). 
¶39 None of the alleged violations is premised upon a 
showing of harm. Rather, they are regulatory violations for 
which the defendants are liable regardless of whether harm 
results. This is an important difference with nuisance. Harm is 
essential to nuisance, and no cause of action for nuisance may 
lie absent some allegation of harm. With respect to the claims 
here, no harm is necessary, and none need be alleged. The 
kinship between nuisance and these claims is therefore but a 
distant 
relationship. 
Thus, 
they 
cannot 
be 
considered 
"essentially counterparts."8 
                                                 
8 The concurrence/dissent cites to a number of cases to 
support its contention that some of the State's claims are 
analogous to common law public nuisance actions. Each of the 
cases misses the mark. The salient feature of the cases is that 
an allegation of harm is necessary for a cause of action to lie. 
People v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. 1834) involved 
pollution causing a basin in the Hudson River "to be foul, 
filled and choked up . . . whereby the citizens were not only 
deprived 
of 
the 
benefit 
and 
advantage 
of 
using 
the 
water . . . but the mud . . . became offensive and nauseous, 
corrupting the water, and causing noisome and unwholesome 
smells, infecting the air to the damage and common nuisance of 
the citizens." Id.; concurrence/dissent, ¶¶116-117. Luning v. 
State, 2 Pin. 215 (Wis. 1849), involved causing a water overflow 
that "created unpleasant and unwholesome vapors and sickness to 
the inhabitants . . . ." Id. at 218; concurrence/dissent, ¶119. 
Thus, in both cases people were actually deprived of an 
unpolluted environment and forced to experience infected air or 
water. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
21 
 
¶40 The breadth of nuisance is so great that we must 
narrowly construe the actions that we analogize to nuisance, 
lest we render the Village Food test a nullity because "present 
causes of action of all sorts assessed under this test will only 
have to be compared generally . . . in order to invoke the 
constitutional protection to a trial by jury." Vill. Food, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶46 (Wilcox, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Similar to the lead opinion in McGrew, we determine that "the 
class of actions categorized as 'nuisances' [is] simply too 
broad to be analogized to" the present cause of action. McGrew, 
285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶25. 
¶41 ECI has proffered no other cause of action at 
statehood as an essential counterpart to the causes of action 
here. Similarly, the State maintains that there were no other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, in State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203 (1836), the 
defendants threw an animal carcass into a well, infecting a 
family's water with "noisome particles and effluvia" and causing 
the family to partake of "poisonous and unwholesome water." Id. 
at 205; concurrence/dissent, ¶127. The salient allegation in 
Buckman is not that the animal carcass was "inappropriately 
handled and disposed of at an inappropriate site," as the 
dissent posits. Rather, it is that the inappropriate handling 
and disposal of the animal carcass caused harm. Here, harm is 
not necessary for any of the causes of action to lie.  
Finally, Kilvington v. The City of Superior, 83 Wis. 222, 
225-26, 53 N.W. 487 (1892), discusses the authority of the 
government to exercise its power "by ordinance, resolution, law, 
or vote" to "prevent or abate nuisances" by removing "garbage, 
manure, or dead animals" from the village and contracting for 
their cremation. The existence of such a power, however, does 
not render ordinances analogous to common law nuisance. Further, 
the concurrence/dissent does not provide an argument that 
violations of such ordinances were subject to jury trial in 
1848.  See concurrence/dissent, ¶108 n.23. 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
22 
 
causes of action at statehood that are essential counterparts to 
the regulatory violations at issue here. Finally, in our own 
research we have found no causes of action at statehood 
sufficiently analogous to conclude that the State's regulatory 
claims existed, were known, or were recognized at common law in 
1848.9 
                                                 
9 The concurrence/dissent's discussion of Tull v. United 
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), is inapt. Concurrence/dissent, ¶114 
n.28. 
The 
Court 
explicitly 
rejected 
the 
idea 
that 
the 
appropriate way to determine whether the Seventh Amendment 
provides for the right to a jury trial was to find a close 
analogue to the modern cause of action at issue: 
[W]e need not decide the question. As Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. [363], at 375 [(1974)], 
cautioned, the fact that the subject matter of a 
modern statutory action and an 18th-century English 
action are close equivalents "is irrelevant for 
Seventh Amendment purposes," because "that Amendment 
requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common 
law."  
Id. at 420. Rather, the approach of the federal courts in 
interpreting the federal Constitution places emphasis on the 
character of the relief sought. "[C]haracterizing the relief 
sought is 'more important' than finding a precisely analogous 
common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh 
Amendment guarantees a jury trial." Id. at 421 (quoting Curtis 
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196. (1974). 
Our approach in interpreting this state's constitution is 
different, as we have made clear in McGrew and in Village Food. 
We determine whether (1) the cause of action existed, was known, 
or was recognized at common law in 1848 and (2) whether the 
cause of action was regarded as at law in 1848.  McGrew, 285 
Wis. 2d 519, ¶18; Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.  
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
23 
 
¶42 Thus, where such a vital aspect of a common law 
nuisance cause of action, i.e., harm, is not part of a 
contemporary cause of action, it is our determination that the 
two are not sufficiently analogous to pass the first prong of 
the Village Food test. Rather, the causes of action here are 
part of a "detailed scheme [of] regulation" of the sort the 
Village Food concurrence/dissent discerned in the Unfair Sales 
Act.  Vill. Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶45 (Wilcox, J., concurring 
and dissenting). Because the causes of action fail the first 
prong of the Village Food test, they fail the second prong of 
the test as well. If they did not exist in 1848, they could not 
have been regarded as actions at law in 1848. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶43 In sum, applying the Village Food test, we determine 
that the claims asserted in the State's complaint do not give 
rise to a constitutional right to a jury trial. Common law 
nuisance causes of action are not sufficiently analogous to be 
considered "essential counterparts" to the modern day regulatory 
claims asserted here. Therefore, ECI fails the first prong of 
the Village Food test because the claims asserted did not exist, 
were not known, and were not recognized at common law at the 
time the state's constitution was adopted.  
                                                                                                                                                             
We are not bound by the federal courts' interpretation of 
the federal Constitution in construing our own constitution. 
Additionally, we note that the Seventh Amendment is one of the 
few amendments that does not apply to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 
(1875). 
No. 
2005AP1507   
 
24 
 
¶44 Our determination, however, does not preclude the 
constitutional right to a jury trial in all environmental 
regulatory cases. Such a right exists if the asserted claim has 
an essential counterpart that existed at common law in 1848 and 
was recognized as an action at law in 1848. Vill. Food, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶16. 
¶45 We also note that ECI raised two additional issues on 
appeal. It alleged insufficiency of the evidence and an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
assessing 
statutory 
forfeitures. In its certification the court of appeals stated, 
"[w]e are satisfied that these arguments can be addressed under 
existing law." We agree. Accordingly, we remand the case to the 
court of appeals for consideration of ECI's arguments regarding 
sufficiency of the evidence and erroneous exercise of discretion 
in assessing statutory forfeitures.  
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1507.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Bradley's opinion.   
 
¶47 I write separately to add that I would not remand to 
the court of appeals the questions of the sufficiency of 
evidence and the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 
¶48 Although this court has the power to remand issues to 
the court of appeals, this court should decide the entire appeal 
in the instant case in the interest of judicial economy, speedy 
resolution of appeals, reduced costs to litigants, and finality 
of decisions.  In the instant case, "[r]emand is a wasteful 
duplication of decisional effort, even when, as in this case, 
the court of appeals did not consider the issues being remanded 
as worthy of certification."1 
¶49 The court of appeals does not certify, and this court 
does not take jurisdiction over, discrete legal questions within 
the appeal.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 808.05(2), 809.61 (2005-06).  
Upon certification from the court of appeals, this court takes 
jurisdiction of the entire case.  As our standard certification 
order explains, "[w]hen this court grants direct review upon 
certification, it acquires jurisdiction of the case, Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 3(3), that is, the entire appeal, which includes all 
issues, not merely the issues certified or the issue for which 
                                                 
1 State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 
N.W.2d 82 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis. 2d 26, 
45, 330 N.W.2d 201 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
No.  2005AP1507.ssa 
 
2 
 
the 
court 
accepts 
certification. 
 
State 
v. 
Stoehr, 
134 
Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986)." 
¶50 For the reasons set forth, I write this separate 
concurrence. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶51 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  This case is before the court on certification by the 
court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-
06).1 
¶52 We are asked to address whether defendants have a 
constitutional right to a civil jury trial when they are 
prosecuted for alleged violations of several categories of 
environmental regulation. 
¶53 ECI 
Special 
Waste 
Services, 
Inc. 
(ECI) 
is 
a 
"centralized waste treater" that, by permit, collects wastewater 
from industrial customers, processes the wastewater to reduce 
the concentrations of certain pollutants, and discharges the 
processed water via sanitary sewer into the City of Fond du 
Lac's (the City) municipal wastewater treatment plant.  William 
and Jeffrey Schweda (the Schwedas) are co-owners of ECI.  The 
State sued ECI and the Schwedas (collectively, ECI) for 
violations of the terms of the company's permit, as well as 
violations of requirements imposed by the state statutes and 
administrative code.  In its prayer for relief, the State sought 
mainly forfeitures under various provisions of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.   
¶54 When ECI demanded a jury trial, the State moved to 
strike the jury demand.  The Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
2 
 
County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge, granted the State's motion, 
reasoning that ECI failed to show that any of the causes of 
action in this case satisfied either prong of the test for 
entitlement to a jury trial set forth in Village Food & Liquor 
Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 
N.W.2d 177.  Thereafter, the case was tried to the court, and 
the court found ECI liable for some but not all violations 
alleged in the complaint. 
¶55 ECI appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred in 
denying its request for a jury trial.  The court of appeals 
certified the case to us with the following question: "Under the 
test set forth in Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, 
Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, does the 
constitutional right to a jury trial attach in an action for 
violations 
of 
waste disposal regulations where common-law 
nuisance theory provides the foundation for modern environmental 
law, but forfeiture actions for improper treatment of wastewater 
and hazardous waste did not exist in 1848?"   
¶56 This question requires us to apply the test set forth 
in Village Food, which provides: 
[A] party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when: (1) the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848; and (2) the 
action was regarded at law in 1848. 
Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16. 
¶57 Applying this test, I conclude that civil defendants 
have a constitutional right to trial by jury for certain 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
3 
 
categories of environmental claims that were recognized as 
public nuisance actions at common law.  Specifically, in this 
case ECI had a constitutional right to a civil jury trial on 
claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 because these claims meet the Village 
Food test.  These claims are of the same nature as public 
nuisance actions at common law, which were regarded as actions 
at law in 1848.  They are similar to public nuisance actions 
because they seek to punish activity that causes harm to public 
health or public property, especially the waters of the state.  
Although the harm addressed in some environmental laws is not 
always of the same magnitude as the harm required at common law, 
the harm is measurable, tangible, and serious because it affects 
the integrity of our land and water.  The harm addressed in 
these five claims is direct and immediate, not speculative or 
remote.  Environmental claims that require a civil jury trial 
are thus distinguishable from claims that require testing, 
record-keeping, labeling, or reporting——violations that do not 
directly cause environmental damage.   
¶58 The right to civil jury trial in Wisconsin is 
"inviolate," which means that the legislature may not diminish 
the right as it existed in 1848.  The legislature, however, may 
expand the right to jury trial by statute.  Consequently, 
judicial interpretation of the constitutional right to a civil 
jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution cannot always be linked to legislative action.  
Nonetheless, our legislature has confirmed this interpretation 
of the constitution by labeling the violations alleged in this 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
4 
 
case a "public nuisance" and by creating criminal counterparts 
for most of the claims.2  The existence of criminal counterparts 
is an indication of the seriousness with which the legislature 
regards these claims.   
¶59 Claims 3, 8, 11, 13, and 14 are not of the same nature 
as public nuisance at common law.  They involve ECI's improper 
acceptance or storage of waste, including hazardous waste.  
These claims attempt to head off the improper disposal of waste 
by prohibiting the improper acceptance or storage of waste.  
Hence, the harm to water or land is contingent upon disposal.  
The harm may be probable, but it is not direct and immediate.  
¶60 Claims 9 and 10 are also not of the same nature as 
public nuisance at common law.  These claims do not allege 
direct and immediate harm to water or land.  They are typical of 
modern regulation in that they impose requirements for sampling, 
analyzing, and reporting.   
¶61 Even though the legislature has provided the option 
for criminal prosecution of violations alleged in claims 3, 8, 
9, 10, 11, 13, and 14, ECI did not have a constitutional right 
to a jury trial on these claims, as long as they were prosecuted 
civilly.  Claim 6 was dropped by the State. 
 
¶62 I would affirm the findings and conclusions of the 
circuit court with respect to claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 
                                                 
2 None of the violations in claim 7 is subject to criminal 
prosecution.  However, claim 7, as pled, alleges direct harm 
through the discharge of wastewater.  Therefore, because claim 7 
satisfies the test in Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S 
Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, 
ECI was entitled to receive a jury trial on claim 7. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
5 
 
and remand the cause to the court of appeals for consideration 
of ECI's other objections to the judgment on these claims.3  I 
would reverse the findings and conclusions of the circuit court 
with respect to claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 to give ECI a jury 
trial on these claims.   
BACKGROUND 
¶63 In 1998 Timothy Miller (Miller) founded ECI, a 
"centralized waste treater" within the meaning of Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 211.03(2e) (Oct., 2002).  As part of its operation, 
ECI would collect wastewater from industrial customers, process 
the 
wastewater 
to 
reduce 
the 
concentrations 
of 
certain 
pollutants, and discharge the processed water via sanitary sewer 
into the City's municipal wastewater treatment plant.  Miller 
received approval from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) to obtain a permit from the City to operate ECI.  
The City issued a pretreatment permit that authorized ECI to 
discharge wastewater into the City's sewer system but only in 
accordance 
with 
the 
effluent 
limitations,4 
monitoring 
requirements, and other conditions set forth in the permit and 
                                                 
3 On appeal, ECI Special Waste Services, Inc. (ECI) also 
alleged insufficiency of the evidence and an erroneous exercise 
of discretion in assessing statutory forfeitures.  In its 
certification, the court of appeals noted that it "was satisfied 
that these arguments can be addressed under existing law." 
4 "'Effluent limitation' means any restriction established 
by the department, including schedules of compliance, on 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, 
biological, and other constituents which are discharged from 
point 
sources 
into 
waters 
of 
this 
state."  
Wis. Stat. § 283.01(6).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
6 
 
in compliance with the requirements of Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 
211 (Oct., 2002). 
¶64 In 1999 Miller hired William Schweda as a salesman and 
compensated him in part with ECI stock.  In July 2001 Miller 
sold his remaining shares of ECI to William Schweda's brother, 
Jeffrey.  Ownership of ECI was therefore transferred entirely to 
William and Jeffrey Schweda, but the Schwedas retained Miller to 
provide consulting services. 
¶65 In January 2002 the City experienced an upset at its 
wastewater treatment plant, causing the City to exceed the 
City's discharge limits under its permit for oxygen-consuming 
organic waste and total suspended solids.5  As part of a broad 
DNR audit of the City's operation, the City scheduled a formal 
inspection of ECI's facility in February 2002.  Representatives 
of both the DNR and the City participated in the inspection.  
The DNR issued no citations to ECI at that time, but 
representatives of both the City and State suggested that the 
Schwedas make some changes in ECI's operations. 
¶66 In March/April 2002 the City experienced another upset 
causing another violation of its permit.   
                                                 
5 An upset means "an exceptional incident in which there is 
unintentional and temporary noncompliance with permit effluent 
limitations because of factors beyond the reasonable control of 
the permittee.  An upset does not include noncompliance to the 
extent 
caused 
by 
operational 
error, 
improperly 
designed 
treatment facilities, lack of preventative maintenance, or 
careless 
or 
improper 
operation." 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code. 
NR 
§ 205.03(41) (May, 2001).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶67 On May 17, 2002, the DNR served the City with a Notice 
of Violation, after which the City began a program of collecting 
and testing samples from ECI. 
¶68 On August 21, 2002, the City revoked ECI's permit on 
the following grounds: (1) ECI made unlawful discharges into the 
City's sewer system; (2) ECI repeatedly and intentionally 
falsified sampling and monitoring data; (3) ECI failed to comply 
with several monitoring and reporting requirements and/or failed 
to retain records of such monitoring; (4) ECI failed to report 
changes in the content and volume of wastewater ECI was 
discharging into the City's system; (5) ECI caused the City to 
violate the terms of its permit on one and possibly more 
occasions; (6) on several occasions, ECI discharged wastewater 
into the City's system far in excess of its permit limits for 
copper, cyanide, lead, mercury, oil, grease, and zinc; and (7) 
ECI adjusted the discharge of wastewater, process water, and/or 
mixed waste streams with the intention of diluting a discharge. 
¶69 A year later, on September 11, 2003, the State sued 
ECI, alleging violations of the terms of the City permit, as 
well as violations of requirements imposed by the state statutes 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
8 
 
and state administrative code.6  The State made 15 claims for 
relief.7 
¶70 Claim 1.  The State alleged that ECI caused the City 
to exceed the discharge standards under its permit and therefore 
violated 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
211.10(1) 
(Oct., 
2002).  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 211.10(1) prohibits industrial users 
from discharging pollutants into a municipal system "which pass 
through or interfere with the operation or performance of the 
[treatment plant], and thereby cause or significantly contribute 
to a violation of the [municipality's] WPDES permit."8  The State 
alleged that "the wastewater defendants discharged into the 
City's sewer system interfered with the operation of the City's 
wastewater treatment plant, resulting in the upset, and caused 
                                                 
6 On September 30, 2003, the State also sued the City of 
Fond du Lac, claiming that the City repeatedly violated its DNR 
permit by exceeding its effluent limits of harmful wastes into 
Lake Winnebago.  The State alleged that the City failed to 
effectively monitor 
its industrial users and specifically 
pointed to its failure to effectively monitor ECI.  The City and 
the State stipulated to a judgment on the same day and agreed to 
the following: (1) the City would pay the State $25,000; (2) the 
City would cooperate with the State in any enforcement action 
the State or the Department of Natural Resources might pursue 
against ECI; and (3) the City would continue with facilities 
planning and implement the selected alternative for upgrading 
its wastewater treatment facility. 
7 The State amended its complaint on November 30, 2004.  The 
following description of the claims for relief reflects the 
allegations made in the amended complaint.   
8 WPDES permit stands for "Wisconsin pollutant discharge 
elimination system permit" and "means a permit issued to a POTW 
[publicly owned treatment works] under s. 283.31, Stats., for 
the purposes of controlling pollutant discharge."  Wis. Admin. 
Code NR § 211.03(22) (Oct., 2002); see Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
208.03(11) (Nov., 2004).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
9 
 
or significantly contributed to the violations of the City's 
discharge limits."  Specifically, the State alleged that ECI 
began accepting increasing loads of surfactant-laden wastewater 
from one of ECI's customers.  This type of wastewater destroys 
microbes that are necessary to properly treat the City's 
wastewater.  The State alleged that ECI's discharge of this 
wastewater caused the City to violate the discharge limits under 
its permit on two different occasions, once in January and once 
in March/April 2002.  
¶71 Claim 2.  The State did not appeal the circuit court's 
dismissal of this claim.   
¶72 Claim 3.  The State alleged that ECI accepted waste 
streams that it was not permitted to accept.  Under Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 211.16(1)(c) (Oct., 2002), a centralized waste 
treater, such as ECI, must submit a report to the municipality 
identifying the types of waste it intends to treat at least 180 
days before commencing discharge.  The State alleged that ECI 
identified metal finishing waste as the only type of categorical 
waste it intended to treat, and this formed the basis for its 
permit limitations and the DNR's approval of plans for its 
treatment facility.  Under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.16(2), if a 
centralized waste treater intends to accept a new type of 
categorical waste not identified in its initial report, it must 
notify the municipality at least 60 days before accepting such 
waste.  The State alleged that on a number of occasions ECI 
accepted 
categorical 
wastes 
other 
than 
the 
type 
it 
had 
previously disclosed to the City and the DNR.  The unauthorized 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
10 
 
wastes 
included 
organic 
chemical 
wastewater 
on 
61 
days, 
pharmaceutical wastewater on 97 days, surfactant-laden waste on 
66 days, phosphorus-laden waste on 21 days, unknown waste on 77 
days, and septage on 24 days.  The State alleged that ECI's 
treatment system was not designed to properly treat any of the 
wastes and that the City was not given the opportunity to 
evaluate the impacts of the waste and amend the permit limits as 
appropriate.   
¶73 Claim 4.  The State alleged that ECI exceeded its 
discharge limits.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 261.22(2) (Sept., 
1997) imposes limits on the concentrations of pollutants in 
discharges, and those limits were incorporated into ECI's permit 
and required under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.11(1) (Oct., 2002).  
The State alleged that ECI violated its oil and grease discharge 
limits 6 times, its copper limits 18 times, its zinc limits 37 
times, its lead limits 17 times, and its cyanide limits 2 times. 
¶74 Claim 5.  The State alleged that ECI failed to notify 
the City of substantial changes in its discharges.  Wisconsin 
Admin. Code § NR 211.15(6) (Oct., 2002) requires industrial 
users 
to 
"notify 
the 
[municipality] 
in 
advance 
of 
any 
substantial change in the volume or character of the pollutants" 
in the discharge.  The State alleged that ECI accepted 
wastewater with a substantial change in the character of the 
pollutants without notifying the City.  Specifically, the State 
alleged that ECI accepted wastewater that contained high 
concentrations of phosphorus, BOD5, and COD; wastewater that 
contained high levels of surfactants that was anti-bacterial in 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
11 
 
nature; wastewater that was of unknown character; and wastes 
with high concentrations of metals. 
¶75 Claim 6.  The State dropped claim 6 in its amended 
complaint. 
¶76 Claim 7.  The State alleged that ECI failed to comply 
with approved plans that are required under Wis. Stat. § 281.41 
(2003-04).  Specifically, the State alleged that ECI (1) 
discharged wastewater without adequately treating it on at least 
163 days; (2) operated without a flow meter or sampler on 80 
days; (3) discharged wastewater without passing through the 
specified site and/or the flow meter on at least 78 days; (4) 
discharged wastes and sludge through the truck bay manhole on 
108 days; (5) accepted wastes other than from the metal 
finishing category and non-categorical wastes, as alleged in the 
third claim; (6) followed improper waste acceptance procedures, 
failed to ensure that wastes being accepted conformed to the 
types of waste in ECI's original waste profile, and accepted 
wastes without proper waste profiles on at least 54 days. 
¶77 Claim 8.  The State alleged that ECI failed to 
implement proper waste acceptance procedures and, as a result, 
accepted wastes it was incapable of properly treating and wastes 
reasonably expected to cause exceedances of the City's effluent 
limits.  This failure resulted in a violation of Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 211.16(3) (Oct., 2002), which requires ECI to 
"implement waste acceptance procedures sufficient to ensure that 
wastes accepted for treatment are within the centralized waste 
treater's treatment capabilities and have no characteristics 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
12 
 
that could reasonably be expected to prevent compliance with the 
applicable pretreatment standards and requirements." 
¶78 Claim 9.  The State alleged that ECI failed to 
adequately monitor its effluent.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 
211.16(4) (Oct., 2002) requires ECI to undertake sufficient 
sampling and analysis of its effluent to assess its compliance 
with its permit limits.  The State alleged that ECI's permit 
required it to take "24-hour flow proportional composite 
samples" of its wastewater discharges into the City's sewerage 
system.  The State alleged that on at least 260 occasions, ECI 
failed to take representative samples to assess compliance with 
permit limits. 
¶79 Claim 10.  The State alleged that ECI failed to submit 
complete semi-annual reports.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 
211.16(5) (Oct., 2002) requires ECI to submit to the City a 
semi-annual report containing various types of information about 
the wastewater it has treated.  The State alleged that two of 
ECI's semi-annual reports were incomplete and failed to include 
information such as the name and address of each waste's 
generator, the volume and date of arrival of each wastewater, 
and the applicable pretreatment standards. 
¶80 Claim 11.  The State alleged that ECI failed to 
characterize hazardous waste.  Wisconsin Stat. § 291.21 requires 
any person who generates solid waste to determine if the solid 
waste is a hazardous waste.  The State alleged that ECI accepted 
waste from two circuit board manufacturers and that the 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
13 
 
treatment of this waste generated a hazardous waste.  The State 
alleged that ECI failed to characterize this waste as hazardous. 
¶81 Claim 12.  The State alleged that ECI improperly 
disposed of the hazardous waste.  Under Wis. Stat. § 291.21(9), 
a generator of hazardous waste must ensure that hazardous waste 
is transported, treated, stored, or disposed of at licensed 
hazardous waste facilities.  The State alleged that at least 5 
times ECI disposed of hazardous waste at a non-hazardous, solid 
waste landfill not authorized to accept such wastes. 
¶82 Claim 13.  The State alleged that ECI operated a 
hazardous waste facility without an operating license pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 291.25(2)(b).  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 
615.05(4)(a) 
(May, 
1998) 
provides 
that 
a 
generator 
who 
accumulates hazardous waste on-site in containers or tanks for 
more than 90 days is deemed an operator of a hazardous waste 
facility.9  The State alleged that ECI generated and stored 
hazardous wastes for over 90 days without a license and 
therefore unlawfully operated a hazardous waste facility. 
¶83 Claim 14.  The State alleged that ECI illegally 
handled hazardous waste.  Wisconsin Stat. § 291.21(3) requires 
any person generating hazardous waste to label any container 
used for storage of hazardous waste to accurately identify its 
contents and associated hazards.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 
                                                 
9 Effective August 1, 2006, Wisconsin's hazardous waste 
rules (NR 600 series) were repealed and completely replaced with 
new rules in the NR 600 series.  See Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 
New 
Hazardous 
Waste 
and 
Used 
Oil 
Rules, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/wm/hazard/newrules.htm 
(last 
visited 
July 5, 2007).  
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
14 
 
615.05(4)(a)5. (May, 1998) requires a generator who accumulates 
waste on-site for periods of 90 days or less to mark each 
storage container with the date upon which each period of 
accumulation began.  The State alleged that ECI had accumulated 
hazardous waste in a tank and failed to label the tank as 
containing hazardous waste or to identify the accumulation start 
date.  In addition, the State alleged that the tank was open in 
violation of Wis. Admin. Code § NR 615.05(4)(a)2.e. (May, 1998). 
¶84 Claim 15.  The State did not appeal the circuit 
court's dismissal of this claim. 
¶85 Based on these claims, the State sought, among other 
things, forfeitures under Wis. Stat. §§ 281.98(1), 283.91(2), 
289.96(3)(a), and 291.97(1);10 the penalty assessment provided 
for in Wis. Stat. § 757.05(1)(a) (2003-04); the environmental 
assessment provided for in Wis. Stat. § 299.93; and reasonable 
and necessary expenses, including the costs of investigation and 
monitoring 
as 
well 
as 
attorney 
fees, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 281.98(2), 283.91(5), and 289.96(3)(b).  The State 
also asked the court to order appropriate injunctional relief. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. chs. 281, 283, 289, and 291 provide 
penalties for any person who violates the respective chapter or 
any 
rule 
promulgated 
under 
the 
chapter. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 281.98(1), 283.91(2), 289.96(3)(a), and 291.97(1).  
The State alleged certain violations of chapters NR 211, 261, 
and 615 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  Chapters NR 211 
and 261 are promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 283.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code NR § 211.01 (Oct., 2002); Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
261.01 (Sept., 1997); see also Wis. Stat. § 283.21(2).  Chapter 
NR 
615 
is 
promulgated 
under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 
291. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 291.05; Wis. Admin. Code § NR 615.01 (May, 1998).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶86 ECI demanded a jury trial, and the State moved to 
strike.  The circuit court granted the State's motion, reasoning 
that ECI failed to show the causes of action in this case 
satisfied either prong of the test for entitlement to a jury 
trial set forth in Village Food.  The case went to trial, and 
the circuit court found ECI liable for 529 violations alleged in 
the amended complaint.11  The circuit court entered judgment for 
the State against ECI in the amount of $365,373.54.12 
¶87 ECI appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred in 
denying its request for a jury trial.  The court of appeals 
certified 
the 
case 
to 
this 
court, 
asking 
whether 
the 
"constitutional right to a jury trial attach[es] in an action 
for violations of waste disposal regulations where common-law 
nuisance theory provides the foundation for modern environmental 
law, but forfeiture actions for improper treatment of wastewater 
and hazardous waste did not exist in 1848?"   
                                                 
11 The circuit court found ECI and the Schwedas liable for 
the following: 8 violations under claim 1 at $5000 per 
violation; 24 violations under claim 3 at $500 per violation; 80 
violations under claim 4 at $1000 per violation; 28 violations 
under claim 5 at $10 per violation; 80 violations under claim 7 
at $100 per violation; 54 violations under claim 8 at $10 per 
violation; 120 violations under claim 9 at $500 per violation; 2 
violations under claim 10 at $2500 per violation; 2 violations 
under claim 11 at $100 per violation; 5 violations under claim 
12 at $100 per violation; 120 violations under claim 13 at $100 
per violation; and 6 violations under claim 14 at $100 per 
violation.  The total forfeitures awarded by the court were 
$219,120. 
12 The judgment comprised the following: forfeitures of 
$219,120; statutory surcharges of $76,801; attorney fees of 
$40,000; costs of $4452.54; and costs of investigation to the 
DNR of $25,000.  
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
16 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶88 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
governs a civil litigant's right to a jury trial in a Wisconsin 
court.  The court is asked to decide whether Article I, Section 
5 guarantees ECI the right to a jury trial.  "Whether there is a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial for a 
particular cause of action requires us to interpret a provision 
of the state constitution, which we do independently of the 
lower courts."  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶7.   
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial and the 
Village Food Test 
¶89 Trial by jury is a highly valued attribute of American 
government.  It was regarded by the founders as "an essential 
bulwark of civil liberty."  Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 
372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting in part, concurring in 
part).  In Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942), Justice 
Murphy cautioned: 
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common 
law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system 
of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the 
Seventh Amendment.  A right so fundamental and sacred 
to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution 
or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by 
the courts.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
17 
 
Id. at 752-53.  The Seventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects civil jury trials in federal courts.13  
Although the Supreme Court has not applied the Seventh Amendment 
to the states,14 most states have embodied a right of trial by 
jury in civil cases in their own constitutions.  Only three have 
not.15  In most of the 47 states that do have a constitutional 
                                                 
13 The Seventh Amendment provides, "In Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by 
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law."  U.S. 
Const. amend. VII.   
14 See Sarah A. Monroe, Note, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: Will the Right to a Jury Trial Remain 
Inviolate?, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 931, 941 (2000) (citing Minneapolis 
& St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916), and 
Colclasure v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 720 S.W.2d 916, 918 
(1986)). 
15 See id. at 942 n.106 (citing Colorado, Louisiana, and 
Wyoming as those states that do not provide a right to a civil 
jury trial).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
18 
 
right, there is emphatic language in the text to the effect that 
the right shall "remain inviolate."16   
 
¶90 The Wisconsin Constitution is one of the constitutions 
that includes such language.  It provides in relevant part, "The 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend 
to 
all 
cases 
at 
law 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
amount 
in 
controversy."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.  The meaning of the 
phrase "shall remain inviolate" has been subject to extensive 
debate.  As one commentator has noted, "For a right to remain 
inviolate, it must not diminish over time and must be protected 
from all assaults."  Joseph D. Jamail, Jr., Essay, The Jury 
System, 43 Houston Lawyer 18, 19, Sept.-Oct. 2005.  This court 
has noted that the phrase, "the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate," refers "to the state of the law as it existed 
at the formation of the constitution, and means that this right 
shall continue as it was at the time of formation and adoption 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. I, § 11; Ariz. Const. art. 
II, § 23; Ark. Const. art. II, § 7; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 16; 
Conn. Const. art. I, § 19; Fla. Const. art. I, § 22; Ga. Const. 
art. I, § 1, ¶11; Idaho Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art. I, 
§ 13; Ind. Const. art. I, § 20; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9; Kan. 
Const. Bill of Rights § 5; Ky. Const. Bill of Rights § 7; Minn. 
Const. art. I, § 4; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 31; Mo. Const. art. 
I, § 22(a); Mont. Const. art. II, § 26; Neb. Const. art. I, § 6; 
Nev. Const. art. I, § 3; N.J. Const. art. 1, § 9; N.M. Const. 
art. II, § 12; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 
(stating, "the ancient mode of trial by jury . . . shall remain 
sacred and inviolable); N.D. Const., art. I, § 13; Ohio Const. 
art. I, § 5; Or. Const. art. 1, § 17; Okla. Const. art. II, 
§ 19; Pa. Const. art. I, § 6; R.I. Const. art. I, § 15; S.C. 
Const. art. I, § 14; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 6; Tenn. Const. art. 
I, § 6; Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; Wash. Const. art. I, § 21; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
19 
 
of the constitution."  Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 [*503], 494 
[*506] (1857).   
¶91 The phrase "shall remain inviolate" does not extend 
the right of trial by jury; rather, it preserves the right in 
civil cases as it existed at the time our constitution was 
adopted.  It is important to note that in 1848, as now, not all 
civil matters were tried to a jury.  "Issues in actions at law 
were so tried, with some exceptions; issues in suits in equity 
were not, unless the chancellor in his discretion sent an issue 
to a jury for an advisory verdict."  James Fleming, Jr., Right 
to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655, 655 (1962-
63).  The phrase "clearly indicates that non-statutory causes of 
action at law, where a jury trial was guaranteed before the 
passage of the state constitution, would continue to have a 
guaranteed right to a jury trial attached even after the passage 
of the constitution."  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶10.   
 
¶92 The question of a constitutional right to a civil jury 
trial becomes murkier when statutory causes of action are 
involved.17  Statutory causes of action are by definition not 
common law causes of action; however, this court has declined to 
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution narrowly to exclude all 
statutory 
causes 
of 
action 
from 
the 
purview 
of 
the 
constitutional right to a civil jury trial.   
                                                 
17 The legislature may explicitly provide a statutory right 
to a civil jury trial, as it did for statutory actions under 
Wis. Stat. chs. 26-31.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50, 23.77.  Where 
the legislature does not explicitly provide a statutory right to 
a civil jury trial, as is in this case, the question remains 
whether the constitutional right to a civil jury trial attaches 
to the statutory cause of action.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.01. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
20 
 
¶93 In State v. Ameritech Corp., 185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 
N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals set forth a two 
part test to determine whether a party has a constitutional 
right to have a statutory claim tried to a jury: "(1) the 
statute codifies an action known to the common law in 1848; and 
(2) the action was regarded as at law in 1848."  Id. at 690.  In 
Village Food, we expanded upon the first prong of the test, 
finding that it resulted in too narrow an interpretation of our 
Constitution.  We restated the test as follows: 
[A] party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when: (1) the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848; and (2) the 
action was regarded as at law in 1848.   
Id., ¶16.   
¶94 Three years later, the Village Food test was applied 
to a motorist's demand for a 12-person jury in a civil 
forfeiture trial for speeding.  Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 
130, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 890.  We concluded that the 
motorist had a constitutional right to a jury trial of six 
persons as existed for certain offenses in 1848, even though we 
could find no practical counterpart for speeding at common law.  
The majority determined that the court should not focus narrowly 
on individual traffic violations but rather on whether "rules of 
the road" existed at common law at the time the Wisconsin 
Constitution was adopted.  Id., ¶¶56-58 (Bradley, J., concurring 
on behalf of four justices).  Thus, McGrew gave an expansive 
interpretation to the Village Food test.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
21 
 
B. 
Application of the Village Food Test 
¶95 In this case, the State sued ECI, alleging violations 
of the Wisconsin Statutes and the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
It is thus necessary to apply the Village Food test to the 
State's causes of action to determine whether ECI had a 
constitutional right to have the State's claims tried to a jury.  
The analysis begins with the first prong of the Village Food 
test to resolve whether the causes of action in this case 
existed, were known or recognized at common law at the time of 
the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
1. 
First Prong of the Village Food Test 
 
¶96 The inquiry under the first prong requires that we 
examine the statutory causes of action in this case and to 
determine whether they are "of the same nature" or are 
essentially "counterparts" to any causes of action that existed 
at common law in 1848.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶¶27, 
28.  We search for common law causes of action that were the 
"forerunners" of the statutory causes of action in this case.  
Id., ¶27.  The fact that the present causes of action "differ 
slightly" from a common law cause of action does not vitiate the 
analogy.  Id., ¶28.   
¶97 The State alleged violations of requirements imposed 
by the Wisconsin Statutes and by the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code, namely certain provisions in Wis. Stat. chs. 281, 283, 
289, 291, and certain provisions in Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 
211, 261, and 615.  Before delving into the specific allegations 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
22 
 
of the claims the State took to trial, I review the general 
nature of the statutory chapters.   
¶98 Wisconsin Stat. chs. 
281 
(Water 
and 
Sewage), 
283 
(Pollution Discharge Elimination), 289 (Solid Waste Facilities), 
and 291 (Hazardous Waste Management) are environmental statutes 
designed to enable the State to carry out its role in protecting 
the environment and public health from improper management of 
wastewater and hazardous waste.18  The purpose of subchapter II 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 281 is to "grant necessary powers and to 
organize a comprehensive program under a single state agency for 
the enhancement of the quality management and protection of all 
waters of the state, ground and surface, public and private."  
Wis. Stat. § 281.11.  Any person who violates this chapter or 
any rule promulgated under this chapter is subject to civil 
forfeitures for each violation.  See Wis. Stat. § 281.98(1).  
The policy of Wis. Stat. ch. 283 is to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of [Wisconsin] 
waters to protect public health, safeguard fish and aquatic life 
and scenic and ecological values, and to enhance the domestic, 
municipal, recreational, industrial, agricultural, and other 
uses of water."  Wis. Stat. § 283.001.  The provisions of this 
chapter are intended to effectuate that policy.  Id.  Any person 
who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated under this 
chapter may be proceeded against civilly or criminally.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 283.91(1), (2), and (3).  Chapter 289 requires the 
                                                 
18 One of the first explicit environmental statutes appeared 
in 1923 and was entitled "Water, Ice, Sewage, and Refuse."  Ch. 
448, Laws of 1923 (codified at Wis. Stat. ch. 144 (1923)).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
23 
 
promulgation of rules establishing minimum standards for the 
location, 
design, 
construction, 
sanitation, 
operation, 
monitoring, 
and 
maintenance 
of 
solid 
waste 
facilities.  
Wis. Stat. § 289.05(1).  Any person who violates this chapter or 
any rule promulgated under this chapter is subject to civil 
forfeitures. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 289.96. 
 
The 
policy 
of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 291 is to ensure proper management of hazardous 
waste in order to protect against substantial danger to the 
environment, public health, and safety.  Wis. Stat. § 291.001.  
Any person who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated 
under 
this 
chapter 
may 
be 
proceeded 
against 
civilly 
or 
criminally.  See Wis. Stat. § 291.97(1) and (2).   
¶99 Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. NR 211 is a set of rules 
promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 283 and its purpose is 
to: 
establish, 
under 
s. 
283.55(2), 
Stats., 
the 
responsibilities of industrial users and of publicly 
owned 
treatment 
works 
[POTW] 
in 
preventing 
the 
discharge into publicly owned treatment works of 
pollutants which will interfere with the operation of 
the POTW, which will pass through the POTW treatment 
works insufficiently treated, or which will impair the 
use or disposal of POTW sludge. 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.01 (Oct., 2002).  Wisconsin Admin. 
Code ch. NR 261 is also promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 
283, and its purpose is to establish standards of performance, 
effluent limitations, and pretreatment standards for discharges 
of wastes from the metal finishing point source category into 
the waters of the state and POTWs.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 261.01 
(Sept., 1997); see Wis. Stat. § 283.21(2).  Finally, Wis. Admin. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
24 
 
Code ch. NR 615 is promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 291 and its 
purpose is to "specify the requirements that apply to the 
generators of large quantities of hazardous waste."  Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 615.01 (May, 1998); see Wis. Stat. § 291.05. 
¶100 The court must decide whether causes of action brought 
under these chapters existed, were known or recognized in 1848.  
ECI argues that these causes of action were cognizable in 1848 
as common law nuisance actions.  The court of appeals certified 
the case to us with a question that implicitly asked us to 
compare the causes of action in this case to common law 
nuisance.  Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether the statutory 
causes of action in this case are of similar nature or are 
essentially counterparts to the common law nuisance action.19 
                                                 
19 To answer this inquiry, I refer to a variety of sources, 
such as the 1849 Revised Statutes of Wisconsin; case law from 
Wisconsin, other states, and England pre-dating and surrounding 
the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution; William Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69); the 1787 
ordinance establishing the Northwest Territory; and the 1836 
ordinance establishing the territorial government in Wisconsin.  
See Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶¶23 n.18, 26, 285 
Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 890; Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S 
Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶¶ 23-24, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 
N.W.2d 177.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
25 
 
¶101 At common law, nuisances were of two types: public or 
common 
nuisances 
and 
private 
nuisances. 
 
The 
historical 
definition of a public nuisance was very broad and "came to 
include 'any act not warranted by law, or omission to discharge 
a legal duty, which inconveniences the public in the exercise of 
rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.'"  William L. 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 86, at 572 (4th ed. 
1971) (quoting Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of 
England 
105 
(1890)). 
 
William 
Blackstone 
defined 
public 
nuisances as "a species of offences against the public order and 
[]economical regimen of the state; being either the doing of a 
thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or the 
neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires."  4 
                                                                                                                                                             
I refer to case law from England and other states to 
understand the common law as it existed in 1848.  "Article XIV, 
Section 
13 
[of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution] 
specifically 
incorporates the common law of England as it existed in 1776 
into the law of this state."  State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 
Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381.  Article XIV, Section 13 provides: 
"Such parts of the common law as are now in force in the 
territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, 
shall be and continue part of the law of this state until 
altered or suspended by the legislature."  Although English 
decisions issued after the American Revolution in 1776 are not 
specifically incorporated into Wisconsin's common law, see 
Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 133, 221 N.W.401 (1928), we may 
refer to them and cases from other states "to ascertain the 
principles and rules of the common law."  15A Am. Jur. 2d Common 
Law § 4 (2007).  We refer to Blackstone's Commentaries because 
they "have been accepted as a satisfactory exposition of the 
common law of England."  Id., § 1.   
I examine the 1849 Revised Statutes of Wisconsin because 
they were intended to "'collate and revise all the public acts 
of the state of a general and permanent nature,' as of July 
1848."  See McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶23, n.18 (citing Revised 
Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) at iii). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
26 
 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 13, 
at 166-67 (1769).  A classic example of a public nuisance was 
obstructing the king's highway and all those who happen to 
travel there.  Soltau v. De Held, (1851) 61 Eng. Rep. 291, 295.  
Other historic examples of public nuisances include the keeping 
of hogs in any city or market town, disorderly inns or ale 
houses, lotteries, and the making and selling of fireworks.  4 
Blackstone, supra, at 167.20   
                                                 
20 Public nuisances also included: 
interferences with the public health, as in the case 
of a hogpen, the keeping of diseased animals, or a 
malarial pond; with the public safety, as in the case 
of 
the 
storage 
of 
explosives, 
the 
shooting 
of 
fireworks in the streets, harboring a vicious dog, or 
the practice of medicine by one not qualified; with 
public 
morals, 
as 
in 
the 
case 
of 
houses 
of 
prostitution, illegal liquor establishments, gambling 
houses, indecent exhibitions, bullfights, unlicensed 
prize fights, or public profanity; with the public 
peace, as by loud and disturbing noises, or an opera 
performance which threatens to cause a riot; with the 
public comfort, as in the case of bad odors, smoke, 
dust and vibration; with public convenience, as by 
obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or 
creating a condition which makes travel unsafe or 
highly 
disagreeable, 
or 
the 
collection 
of 
an 
inconvenient crowd; and in addition, such unclassified 
offenses as eavesdropping on a jury, or being a common 
scold. 
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 86, at 572 
(4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).   
 
This court provided a contemporary definition of public 
nuisance in Physicians Plus v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co., 
2002 WI 80, ¶2, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777: "[A public 
nuisance is] a condition or activity which substantially or 
unduly interferes with the use of a public place or with the 
activities of an entire community."   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
27 
 
¶102 A private nuisance, on the other hand, was defined as 
an "invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land."21  
Id.  Historic examples of private nuisances include the erection 
of a house or other buildings so near to another's that they 
obstruct the "ancient lights" or windows; the keeping of hogs or 
other noisy animals so near the house of another "that the 
stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwholesome"; 
and the act of diverting water "that used to run to another's 
meadow[] or mill."  3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, ch. 13, at 217-18 (1768). 
¶103 In 
sum, 
private 
nuisances 
involve 
injuries 
to 
individual property, and public nuisances involve injuries to 
the properties of mankind.  Attorney-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas 
Consumers' Co., (1853) 43 Eng. Rep. 119, 125.  Private nuisances 
were brought at the suit of the individual, while public 
nuisances were brought at the suit of the attorney general.22  
                                                 
21 This court summarized the difference between a public and 
private nuisance in Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶30, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 
N.W.2d 658: 
 
In sum, a nuisance exists if there is a condition 
or activity that unduly interferes with the private 
use and enjoyment of land or a public right.  If the 
interest invaded is the private use and enjoyment of 
land, then the nuisance is considered a private 
nuisance.  Conversely, if the condition or activity 
interferes with a public right or the use and 
enjoyment of public space, the nuisance is termed a 
public nuisance.   
22 A private plaintiff could bring a claim for public 
nuisance 
where 
the 
private 
plaintiff 
"suffer[ed] 
some 
extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the king's subjects."  
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 
13, at 220 (1768). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
28 
 
George V. Yool, An Essay on Waste, Nuisance, and Trespass 85 
(1863).   
¶104 Nuisance actions were often authorized by statute.  
For instance, Section 129 of the 1827 Revised Code of Laws of 
Illinois authorized prosecution of any person who "shall in any 
wise obstruct or pollute any water course, lake, pool, marsh, or 
common sewer, or continue such . . . pollution, so as to render 
the same offensive or unwholesome."  Revised Code of Laws of 
Illinois, § 129, p. 150-51 (1827).  Section 129 provides: 
 
If any person shall obstruct or injure or cause 
or procure to be constructed or injured, any public 
road or highway, or common street or alley of any town 
or village, or any public bridge, causeway, public 
river, or other stream declared navigable by law; or 
shall continue such obstruction, so as to render the 
same inconvenient or dangerous to pass; or shall erect 
or establish any offensive trade, manufacture or 
business, or continue the same, after it has been 
erected or established to the common disturbance, 
annoyance, nuisance or detriment of the county, town, 
village, or neighborhood where the same may be erected 
or established; or shall in any wise obstruct or 
pollute any water course, lake, pool, marsh, or common 
sewer, or continue such obstruction or pollution, so 
as to render the same offensive or unwholesome to the 
county, town, village or neighborhood thereabout; 
every person so offending shall, upon conviction 
thereof, be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; 
and every such nuisance may, by order of the circuit 
court before whom the conviction shall take place, be 
removed and abated by the sheriff of the proper 
county; and any inquest and judgment thereon had, 
under the provisions of any law authorizing a writ of 
ad quod damnum, shall be no bar to prosecution under 
this section.   
Revised Code of Laws of Illinois, § 129, p. 150-51 (1827) 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
29 
 
¶105 In 1832 the Territory of Michigan authorized local 
officials to "take such measures as they may deem effectual for 
the preservation of the public health."  Laws of the Territory 
of Michigan, § 1,  p. 561 (1833).  "Every person who shall 
violate any order, rule, or regulation, made in pursuance of the 
powers granted to the said [local officials], shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, in 
the discretion of the court before whom the offender shall be 
tried."  Id., § 2, p. 562.  Other parts of this Act describe 
"putrid articles" and "articles likely to endanger the public 
health."  Id., § 4, p. 562.   
¶106 In 1839 the Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin 
contained a similar provision for preservation of the public 
health. 
 
The 
statute 
addressed 
"any 
unsound 
or 
putrid 
articles . . . likely to endanger the public health."  Statutes 
of the Territory of Wisconsin, § 5, p. 125 (1839).  Failure to 
remove such articles resulted in a forfeiture.  Id.  There were 
also forfeitures for persons who destroyed dams or filled 
ditches or drains.  Id., § 34, p. 355; § 44, p. 112. 
¶107 In 1848 Wisconsin recognized actions for both public 
and private nuisances.  Chapter 110 of the Wisconsin Revised 
Statutes of 1849 recognized actions for private nuisances, while 
chapter 26 recognized actions for public nuisances.  See Wis. 
Rev. Stat. chs. 26, 110 (1849).   
¶108 The public nuisance statute reads: 
The 
board 
of 
health 
may 
examine 
into 
all 
nuisances, sources of filth, and causes of sickness, 
and make such regulations respecting the same as they 
may judge necessary for the public health, and safety 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
30 
 
of the inhabitants; and every person who shall violate 
any order or regulation, made by any board of health, 
and duly published agreeably to the provisions of this 
chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, 
or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 
three months.   
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849).23  Notably, the Revised 
Statutes also provided for a forfeiture of a sum not to exceed 
                                                 
23 A variation on this statute appears in the 1889 Wisconsin 
Statutes: 
 
20. To appoint a board of health, which shall 
have all the powers of such boards under the general 
laws of the state; to provide hospitals and regulate 
the burial of the dead, and the return of bills of 
mortality; to declare what are nuisances, and to 
prevent or abate the same; to require the owner or 
occupant of any grocery, cellar, tallow chandler's 
shop, soap factory, tannery, stable, barn, privy, 
sewer, 
or 
other 
unwholesome 
or 
nauseous 
house, 
building or place, to remove or abate the same, or to 
cleanse it as often as may be deemed necessary for the 
public health; to direct the location and management 
of slaughter houses subject to the provisions of 
section one thousand four hundred and eighteen, and to 
prevent the erection, use or occupation of the same, 
except as authorized by them; to prevent persons from 
bringing, depositing or leaving within the village any 
putrid carcass, or other unwholesome substance; to 
require the owners or occupants of lands to remove 
dead animals, stagnant water, or other unwholesome 
substance from their premises, and to provide for the 
cleansing and removal of obstructions from any river, 
stream, slough or water course within the limits of 
the village, and to prevent the obstruction or 
retarding of the flow of water therein, or the putting 
of anything into the same which may be prejudicial to 
the health of the village. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
31 
 
fifty dollars if the owner failed to remove the nuisance within 
twenty four hours.  Wisconsin Rev. Stat. ch. 26, ¶5 states,  
Whenever any nuisance, source of filth, or cause of 
sickness shall be found on private property, the board 
of health shall order the owner or occupant thereof, 
at his own expense, to remove the same within twenty-
four hours; and if the owner or occupant shall neglect 
to do so, he shall forfeit a sum not exceeding fifty 
dollars. 
Thus, nuisances were prosecuted under the Wisconsin Statutes. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sandborn & Berryman Ann. Stats. of Wis., § 892, p. 519 (1889) 
(emphasis added).  Paragraph 20 gives a village board the power 
"to appoint a board of health, which shall have all the powers 
of such boards under the general laws of the state . . . to 
declare what nuisances are, and to prevent or abate the 
same . . . to prevent the obstruction or retarding of the flow 
of water . . . or the putting of anything into the same which 
may be prejudicial to the health of the village."  This section 
is cited in Kilvington v. City of Superior, 83 Wis. 222, 53 N.W. 
487 (1892), where the court said: 
The power "to prevent or abate nuisances"——that which 
occasions public hurt or inconvenience——is necessarily 
a very broad and comprehensive one . . . .  It would 
hardly be questioned by any one if garbage, manure, or 
dead animals were found within the village, in the 
interest of good order, cleanliness, and public health 
the board of trustees would have power to abate such 
nuisances . . . .  To this end it might provide for 
destroying them, instead of fouling the waters of a 
lake or stream of water with them, to be again cast 
up, to the prejudice of the public, or depositing them 
where they would create a new nuisance. 
Id. at 225-26. 
 
Section 4608 of the 1889 statutes provides for the 
enforcement of orders and regulations of any board of health: 
"Any person who shall wilfully violate, any law relating to the 
public health, or any order or regulation of any board of 
health, lawfully made and duly published, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail, not more than three months, or 
by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars."  Sandborn & 
Berryman Ann. Stats. of Wis., § 4608, p. 2317 (1889). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
32 
 
¶109 In determining whether the causes of action in the 
present case are similar to actions at common law, the 
appropriate focus is on public nuisance rather than private 
nuisance.  Nonetheless, private nuisance cases may serve to 
illustrate the kind of injuries to land or water that were 
actionable at common law and that might be deemed public 
nuisances if they harmed or seriously inconvenienced the public.  
Cf., Walker v. Shepardson, 2 Wis. 282 [*384], 291 [*396] (1853) 
(concluding that a public nuisance that caused private and 
special injury to the plaintiff was actionable in law or 
equity).   
¶110 The causes of action in this case, dealing with water 
pollution and hazardous waste, are based upon what can be fairly 
characterized as environmental statutes.  Scholarly commentary 
recognizes the link between modern statutory environmental law 
and the common law of nuisance.  As one commentator has noted, 
"The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are 
found in principles of nuisance."  William H. Rodgers, Jr., 
Handbook on Environmental Law § 2.1, at 100 (1977).  The Seventh 
Circuit in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996), 
acknowledged that the "interests [of environmental statutes] 
overlap to a great extent the interests that nuisance law 
protects."  Id. at 505.  Other commentators have noted that 
"[w]hen you go back to the early history of environmental law, 
the one substantive area that you would want to turn to more 
than any other would be the common law of nuisance."  Richard A. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
33 
 
Epstein, Regulation——And Contract——In Environmental Law, 93 W. 
Va. L. Rev. 859, 862 (1990-91).   
¶111 Yet another commentator has noted, "Because of its 
flexibility, common law nuisance continues to play a vital role 
in 
complementing 
statutory 
environmental 
enforcement 
tools . . . .  Environmental harm is the quintessential public 
nuisance.  In fact, modern environmental and energy statutes are 
codifications of the common law of public nuisance."  Matthew F. 
Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The National Media's 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
34 
 
Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 485, 
487-88 (2006).24   
                                                 
24 See also Charlie Garlow, Environmental Recompense, 1 
Appalachian J.L. 1 (2002); Melanie R. Kay, Environmental 
Negligence: A Proposal for a New Cause of Action for the 
Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
149, 151 (2006); Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered 
Species, and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on 
Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 Iowa 
L. Rev. 297, 326 (1995) (stating, "A better explanation may be 
the close relationship between environmental laws and their 
genesis, the law of nuisance.  In the beginning, there was 
nuisance law."); Ray Kirsch, What's the Buzz? Common Law for the 
Commons in Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources, 29 
Hamline L. Rev. 338, 349 (2006) (stating, "The common law is the 
historical root of environmental law, and prior to World War II, 
was the primary means of addressing environmental harms.  During 
this period, state and local governments were forefront in 
addressing issues of public health and nuisance and did so by 
balancing community interests and imposing (or not) liability 
for harms."); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in 
Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 897, 899 (2006) (stating, 
"Nuisance actions [are] the precursors to modern environmental 
law."); Randy Lowell, Private Actions and Marine and Water 
Resources: Protection, Recovery and Remediation, 8 S.C. Envtl. 
L.J. 143, 161 (2000); Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, 1 
State Envtl. L. § 11:1 (2006) (stating, "Before the advent of 
modern environmental law, parties employed nuisance law to 
resolve disputes over water pollution."); Jonathan L. Mayes, The 
Right to Trial by Jury in Environmental Cost-Recovery and 
Contribution Actions: United States v. England, 10 Alb. L. 
Envtl. Outlook 71, 80 (2005) (stating, "Nevertheless, the truth 
remains that the common law ancestors of nuisance and trespass 
law produced the theoretical framework for modern environmental 
law."); 
John 
C. 
O'Quinn, 
Not-So-Strict 
Liability: 
A 
Forseeability Test for Rylands v. Fletcher and Other Lessons 
From Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather PLC, 24 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 287, 287 (2000); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The 
Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36 Hous. L. 
Rev. 679, 680 (1999) (stating, "The legal roots of air pollution 
control are found in common law tort remedies."); J.B. Ruhl, 
Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of "The Fragile Land 
System", Natural Res. Envt., Fall 2005, at 3, 3; J.B. Ruhl, 
Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
Ecology L.Q. 263, 315 (2000) (stating, "It has often been said 
that the statutory form of modern environmental law is built on 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
35 
 
¶112 The Wisconsin Legislature has formally adopted this 
principle by labeling the violations of the environmental 
statutes 
at 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
"a 
public 
nuisance."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 299.95 
states, 
"For 
purposes 
of 
this 
proceeding where chs. 281 to 285 and 289 to 295 or this chapter 
or the rule, special order, license, plan approval, permit or 
certification prohibits in whole or in part any pollution, a 
violation is considered a public nuisance."  Wis. Stat. § 299.95 
(emphasis added). 
¶113 This authority supports the conclusion that, on a 
general level, the common law of nuisance is a "forerunner" to 
modern environmental statutory law.  Of course, there are 
distinctions between the common law of nuisance and modern 
environmental statutory law.  Modern environmental statutory law 
tends to be regulatory and focuses more on preventing the 
cumulative and future effects of conduct than the common law of 
nuisance.  The term nuisance, which is derived from the Latin 
                                                                                                                                                             
the backbone of the common law of nuisance."); Ronald J. 
Rychlak, Common-Law Remedies for Environmental Wrongs: The Role 
of Private Nuisance, 59 Miss. L.J. 657, 661 (1989) (stating, 
"Despite several recent legislatively enacted causes of action, 
common-law private nuisance is the 'oldest and perhaps most 
useful legal theory' for environmental plaintiffs." (footnote 
omitted)); Joseph Schilling & Leslie S. Linton, The Public 
Health Roots of Zoning: In Search of Active Living's Legal 
Genealogy, Am. J. Prev. Med., 2005, at 96, 98; A. Dan Tarlock, 
The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law" Litigation, 17 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 249 (2000); David A. Westbrook, Liberal 
Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 619, 633 
(1994); Bradford W. Wyche, A Guide to the Common Law of Nuisance 
in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 337, 338 (1994) (stating, 
"Nuisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of 
modern environmental and energy law."). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
36 
 
word nocumentum, meaning simply "harm,"25 requires a showing of 
substantial and unreasonable harm to interests in the use and 
enjoyment of land.26  See Prosser, supra, at 580.  Under the 
common law of nuisance, a party should not seek recovery "until 
an actual nuisance has been committed, or at all events until it 
is quite clear that the [conduct] will inevitably result in a 
nuisance."  Yool, supra, at 95; see also Haines v. Taylor, 
(1846) 50 Eng. Rep. 511.  Under modern environmental statutory 
law, on the other hand, the conduct need not result in actual or 
imminent harm of the same magnitude for it to be actionable.  
Modern statutory environmental law regulates "more subtle and 
attenuated harms"27 and seeks to prevent harm before it occurs. 
                                                 
25 See Wyche, supra note 24, at 349. 
26 For examples of such harm, see Tate v. Parrish, 7 T.B. 
Mon. 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 1828) (describing dead hog that was 
thrown into neighbor's spring as causing stench and corrupting 
the water of the spring); Mills v. Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. 
1832) (describing overflow of dam that caused sickness (fever 
and ague) to plaintiff and his family); Neal v. Henry, 19 Tenn. 
17 (Tenn. 1838) (describing overflow of dam that caused stagnant 
and impure water and caused plaintiff's family to become 
unhealthy and sick).  But see Wood v. Waud, (1849) 154 Eng. Rep. 
1047, 1057 (concluding that plaintiffs had been injured as of 
right even where defendant's pollution of the stream caused no 
actual damage to plaintiffs because the stream was already 
polluted by similar acts of mill owners).   
27 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating, 
"Indeed, the major difference is that environmental statutes 
regulate more subtle and attenuated harms than the common law of 
nuisance does; a land use that creates a common law nuisance is 
thus likely to be an a fortiori violation of statutory 
environmental law.").   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
37 
 
¶114 This 
distinction 
is 
not 
significant 
enough 
to 
invalidate the analogy between the common law of public nuisance 
and modern environmental statutory law.  Harm is a key element 
of public nuisance; thus some environmental claims do not 
warrant a jury trial because these environmental statutes are 
largely preventative and seek to regulate conduct in which the 
resulting harm is neither direct nor immediate.  Claims under 
other environmental statutes do warrant a jury trial because 
these environmental statutes proscribe conduct in which the 
resulting harm is direct and immediate.28  In this case, then, 
                                                 
28 When applying its test for a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
also 
found 
environmental statutory causes of action under the Clean Water 
Act to be analogous to the common law of public nuisance. 
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the 
defendant had a constitutional right to a civil jury trial under 
the Seventh Amendment on an action brought by the Federal 
Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under 
the Clean Water Act.  Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 
(1987).  "The Clean Water Act prohibits discharging, without a 
permit, dredged or fill material into 'navigable waters,' 
including the wetlands adjacent to the waters."  Id. at 414.  
The Government sued the defendant, a real estate developer, for 
dumping fill on wetlands and placing fill in a manmade waterway.  
Id.  The defendant demanded a jury trial, but his request was 
denied.  Id. at 415.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's denial of a jury trial.  Id. at 
416.   
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Seventh 
Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine liability in 
actions by the Government seeking primarily civil penalties 
under the Clean Water Act.  The Seventh Amendment provides that 
"[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved."  The Seventh Amendment requires "a jury trial on the 
merits in those actions that are analogous to 'Suits at common 
law.'"  Id. at 417.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
38 
 
the task is to analyze each claim to determine whether the claim 
alleges some harm that, although not necessarily of the same 
magnitude required at the common law, is direct and immediate, 
and not merely speculative or remote.29  The existence of a 
criminal counterpart for the claim may prove helpful in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
To determine whether the statutory action was analogous to 
a suit at common law, the Court examined both (1) the nature of 
the statutory action; and (2) the nature of the remedy sought.  
Id.  The Court concluded that "both the public nuisance action 
and the action in debt are appropriate analogies to the instant 
statutory action."  Id. at 420.  Citing William Prosser, Law of 
Torts 583 (4th ed. 1971), the Court noted that "[t]he essential 
function of an action to abate a public nuisance was to provide 
a civil means to redress 'a miscellaneous and diversified group 
of minor criminal offenses, based on some interference with the 
interests of the community, or the comfort or convenience of the 
general public.'"  Id. at 421.   
After concluding that both public nuisance actions and 
actions in debt were analogous to the statutory action, the 
Court commented that the first part of the inquiry——whether the 
statutory action had an 18th century analog——was not as 
important as the second inquiry——the nature of the relief 
sought.  Id.  The Court characterized the first inquiry as an 
"'abstruse historical' search for the nearest 18th-century 
analog[,]" id. (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 
(1970)), and reiterated its view "that characterizing the relief 
sought is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous 
common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh 
Amendment guarantees a jury trial."  Id. (quoting Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).  The Court then concluded 
that the nature of the primary remedy sought, civil penalties, 
was an action at law.  Id. at 422, 424.  Therefore, the 
defendant had "a constitutional right to a jury trial to 
determine his liability on the legal claims."  Id. at 425. 
29 The State made 15 claims in its complaint, sometimes 
alleging violations of differing statutes and administrative 
code provisions within each claim.  It is logical then to apply 
the Village Food test to each claim rather than to each 
individual statute and administrative code provision.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
39 
 
analysis by demonstrating the seriousness of the claim as 
determined by the legislature. 
¶115 In its first claim, the State alleged that ECI 
violated Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.10(1) (Oct., 2002) every time 
it caused the City to exceed the discharge standards under its 
permit.  ECI allegedly discharged surfactant-laden wastewater 
into the City's treatment system, which destroyed the microbes 
required to properly treat the City's wastewater and resulted in 
an upset at the City's wastewater treatment plant.  This, in 
turn, 
caused 
or 
significantly 
contributed 
to 
the 
City's 
violations of its permit limits for oxygen-consuming organic 
waste. 
¶116 There is similarity in this claim to the common law 
public nuisance claim in People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 
Wend. 
539 
(N.Y. 1834).  In Corporation of Albany, the 
corporation of the city of Albany was charged by indictment and 
found guilty by a jury of: 
permitting . . . the basin in the Hudson river, at the 
termination of the Erie Canal, to be foul, filled and 
choked up with mud, rubbish, and dead carcas[s]es of 
animals; whereby the citizens were not only deprived 
of the benefit and advantage of using the water for 
the convenience of themselves and families, but the 
mud . . . became offensive and nauseous, corrupting 
the water, and causing noisome and unwholesome smells, 
infecting the air to the damage and common nuisance of 
the citizens residing in the vicinity and those 
passing and re-passing the basin.   
Id.   
 
¶117 The decision speaks of the water being "corrupted" and 
that the water became "unfit for drinking or culinary purposes."  
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
40 
 
The court said a "common nuisance . . . seems to be an offense 
against the public."  Id. at 543.   
 
¶118 A more vivid case of discharging wastewater came out 
of Indiana: 
 
[Taylor] was charged with urinating in a spring 
of water near a public highway, out of which many 
persons in the vicinity, and travelers along the road, 
were accustomed to use water, thereby rendering the 
spring unfit for use . . . to the obstruction of the 
free use of the water thereof by the citizens of the 
State.  The information was quashed on the ground that 
it did not charge a public offense. 
State v. Taylor, 29 Ind. 517, 517 (May Term, 1868).  The Indiana 
Supreme Court reversed, saying: 
 
Our 
statute, 
perhaps, 
gives 
as 
accurate 
a 
definition of the term nuisance, as understood at 
common law, as can be found elsewhere: "Whatever is 
injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the 
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, 
so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property.  If the injury were 
limited to an individual, it gave a private right of 
action; if it affected the public, it was the subject 
of a public prosecution.  That the present information 
is within the common law definition is, we think, 
recognized in Sloan v. The State, 8 Ind. 312.  The 
motion to quash should have been overruled. 
Id. 
 
¶119 In a Wisconsin case, Luning v. State, 2 Pin. 215 (Wis. 
1849), the party was indicted and found guilty by a jury "for 
erecting and maintaining a mill-dam, which caused the water to 
overflow a large tract of heavily timbered land . . . and which 
was alleged created unpleasant and unwholesome vapors and 
sickness to the inhabitants of that village."  Luning, 2 Pin. at 
218-19.  At trial, witnesses testified that "an offensive 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
41 
 
effluvia was produced by the spreading of the water over a much 
larger tract of land than was covered by the stream in its 
natural state."  Id. at 216.  The court discussed the effects 
created by the dam as the public nuisance.  Id. at 220.   
 
¶120 The allegations in claim 1 are of similar nature.  
Like the corporation in Corporation of Albany, ECI allegedly 
discharged wastewater into the City's treatment plant that, in 
essence, "fouled, filled, and choked up" the City's wastewater 
treatment plant with surfactant-laden wastewater that destroyed 
valuable microbes.  Although the State in claim 1 did not allege 
harm that caused sickness to inhabitants, it did allege that 
discharged water caused upsets at the City's treatment plant.  
This allegation of direct harm is sufficient to analogize this 
claim to the common law of nuisance.  Furthermore, the 
legislature has reinforced the serious nature of this claim by 
providing the option for criminal prosecution of violations 
alleged in this claim.  See Wis. Stat. § 283.91(3).   
 
¶121 Claims 4, 5, and 7 are also similar to the public 
nuisance claims in Corporation of Albany, Luning, and Taylor 
because they involve allegations of illegal discharge of 
wastewater, which results in unauthorized pollution of the 
City's sewer system.  Again, although the State does not allege 
harm of the same magnitude required at common law, the State 
does allege direct harm in the form of unauthorized pollution of 
the City's sewer system.  Claims 4 and 5 involve violations of 
either Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 211 or 261, both of which are 
promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 283.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 283 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
42 
 
allows for criminal prosecution of violations alleged under the 
chapter 
or 
rules 
promulgated 
under 
the 
chapter.  
Wis. Stat. § 283.91 (1), (2), and (3).  Thus, the legislature 
has reinforced the serious nature of these claims and the 
violations alleged in these claims to cause direct, serious harm 
to the environment.30   
¶122 In claim 4 the State alleged that ECI exceeded its 
discharge 
limits of concentrations of certain pollutants.  
Specifically, the State alleged that ECI violated the oil and 
grease, copper, zinc, lead, and cyanide limits, meaning that ECI 
discharged these pollutants into the sewer system.  The 
exceedance of discharge limits is a direct harm to the City's 
sewer system and was likely to cause further harm, such as an 
upset described in claim 1.   
¶123 In claim 5 the State alleged that ECI failed to notify 
the City of any substantial change in the character of the 
pollutants in its discharge, namely high concentrations of 
phosphorous, oxygen consuming organic waste, surfactant-laden 
waste, and wastes with high concentrations of metals.  To 
prevail on this claim, the State was required to prove that 
ECI's 
discharges 
contained 
these 
unauthorized 
pollutants.  
Failure to notify the City of a substantial change in the 
                                                 
30 Claim 
7 
involves 
violations 
of 
ECI's 
permit 
that 
subjected ECI to liability under Wis. Stat. ch. 281.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 281.98 
does 
not 
provide 
the 
option 
for 
criminal 
prosecution.  However, claim 7, as pled, alleges some direct and 
immediate harm.  Therefore, because claim 7 satisfies the test 
in Village Food, ECI was entitled to receive a jury trial on 
claim 7. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
43 
 
character of the pollutants in its discharge reflected a direct 
harm to the City's sewer system in the form of unauthorized 
pollution.   
¶124 In claim 7 the State alleged that ECI failed to comply 
with approved plans by discharging water without adequately 
treating it, operating without a flow meter or sampler, 
discharging wastewater without passing through the flow meter, 
discharging wastes and sludge through the truck bay manhole, 
accepting unauthorized wastes, and following improper waste 
acceptance 
procedures. 
 
This 
broad 
claim 
also 
included 
allegations 
of 
direct 
harm 
in 
the 
form 
of 
unauthorized 
pollution.  For example, discharging waste without adequately 
treating it and discharging wastes and sludge through the truck 
bay manhole involved direct pollution of the City's sewer 
system.   
¶125 All 
three 
claims involved unlawful discharge of 
wastewater and therefore alleged direct harm of pollution to 
public resources.  This is the essence of public nuisance.   
 
¶126 Claim 12 is also similar to the common law of public 
nuisance.  Claim 12 dealt with the improper disposal of 
hazardous waste.  In claim 12 the State alleged that ECI 
disposed of hazardous waste at a non-hazardous, solid waste 
landfill not authorized to accept such waste.  This is analogous 
to dumping waste. 
¶127 This claim is similar to the claim in State v. 
Buckman, 8 N.H. 203 (1836).  In Buckman, the defendant was 
indicted for throwing into a well the carcass of an animal which 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
44 
 
tainted and corrupted the water used by a family.  The court 
held that this act constituted a public nuisance because "water 
infected with the noisome particles and effluvia of a dead 
animal thrown into it, must partake of a character so poisonous 
and unwholesome as properly to come within this class of 
offences." 
 
Id. 
at 
205. 
The 
State 
brought 
the 
action 
notwithstanding the fact that the well appeared to be private 
rather than public.   
¶128 Like the dead carcass in Buckman, the hazardous waste 
in this case was inappropriately handled and disposed of at an 
inappropriate site.  The characterization of the waste as 
hazardous implies that it is also of a character so poisonous 
and unwholesome as to qualify as a sufficient analogy to the 
harm in Buckman.  Hazardous waste is defined as "waste that——
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, 
or 
infectious 
characteristics——may 
cause 
or 
significantly 
contribute to an increase in mortality or otherwise harm human 
health or the environment."  Black's Law Dictionary 1584 (7th 
ed. 1999).  By allegedly disposing of this waste at an improper 
site, ECI caused direct and immediate harm to human health and 
the environment.   
¶129 Furthermore, claim 12 involves an alleged violation of 
Wis. Stat. 291.21(9).  The legislature has reinforced the 
seriousness of this claim by providing the option for criminal 
prosecution of the violations alleged in this claim.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 291.97.  
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
45 
 
¶130 By contrast, although the legislature has provided the 
option to proceed criminally against violations alleged in 
claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14, these claims are not 
sufficiently similar to the common law of public nuisance to 
require a jury trial because they do not involve allegations of 
direct and immediate harm.  Any harm that may result under these 
claims is remote and speculative.   
¶131 Claims 3, 8, 11, 13, and 14 involve ECI's improper 
acceptance or storage of waste, including hazardous waste.  
These claims attempt to head off the improper disposal of waste 
by prohibiting the improper acceptance or storage of waste.  
Hence, the harm to water or land is contingent upon disposal.  
The harm may be probable, but it is not direct and immediate. 
¶132 In claim 3 the State alleged that ECI failed to notify 
the City that it was accepting new types of categorical waste, 
such as organic chemical wastewater, pharmaceutical wastewater, 
surfactant-laden 
wastewater, 
phosphorus-laden 
wastewater, 
unknown wastewater, and septage.  The State alleged that ECI's 
treatment system was not designed to properly treat any of the 
wastes.  In claim 8 the State alleged ECI failed to implement 
proper waste acceptance procedures and as a result, "improperly 
accepted wastes [it] was incapable of properly treating, and 
wastes reasonably expected to cause exceedances of the City's 
effluent limits."  In claim 11 the State alleged that ECI's 
treatment of certain wastewater generated a hazardous waste and 
that ECI failed to characterize this waste as hazardous.  In 
claim 13 the State alleged that ECI operated a hazardous waste 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
46 
 
facility without an operating license.  In claim 14 the State 
alleged that ECI illegally handled hazardous waste by failing to 
label the tank as containing hazardous waste and by leaving the 
tank open. 
¶133 In sum, these claims allege conduct that could lead to 
harm, as opposed to claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 that alleged 
conduct that did lead to direct and immediate harm in the form 
of unauthorized pollution.   
¶134 Claims 9 and 10 are also not similar to a public 
nuisance.  These claims involve purely regulatory administrative 
provisions in the sense that they allege only a failure to 
sample discharge or to submit paperwork.  Purely regulatory 
requirements such as sampling discharge or submitting semi-
annual reports are not the type of actions that would have been 
recognized as a public nuisance in 1848.  Harm resulting from 
failure to sample discharge or submit paperwork is at best 
indirect.   
¶135 To illustrate, the State alleged in claim 9 that ECI 
failed to undertake sufficient sampling and analysis of its 
effluent to assess whether it complied with its permit limits.  
The complaint alleged that "on at least 260 occasions between 
July 
2001 
and 
August 
2002, 
defendants 
failed 
to 
take 
representative samples to assess compliance with permit limits."  
By implication, defendants could have taken representative 
samples on approximately 150 occasions during this period.  The 
failure to take other samples would not in itself have caused 
harm to the municipal sewer system.  Thus, the State's cause of 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
47 
 
action does not allege sufficient harm to be analogous to a 
common law nuisance action.  It is a purely regulatory 
requirement that does not require a trial by jury.   
¶136 In claim 10, the State alleged that ECI submitted 
incomplete semi-annual reports to the City.  Specifically, the 
State alleged that the reports provided sampling results data 
and 
flow 
volumes 
but 
failed 
to 
contain 
other 
required 
information, such as the name and address of each waste's 
generator, the volume and date of arrival of each wastewater, 
and the applicable pretreatment standards.  This claim does not 
warrant a civil jury trial.  Whether ECI's failure to submit 
complete semi-annual reports caused any harm is too speculative.   
 
¶137 Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 are of similar nature to a 
public nuisance because they involve allegations of harm that, 
although not of the same magnitude required at the common law, 
is direct and immediate, and not speculative or remote.  
Furthermore, the legislature reinforced the seriousness of the 
violations alleged in these claims (except claim 7) by providing 
the option for criminal prosecution.  Claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
13, and 14 are not of similar nature to a public nuisance 
because, although the legislature has provided the option for 
criminal prosecution of the violations alleged in these claims, 
they do not involve allegations of direct and immediate harm. 
2. 
Second Prong under the Village Food Test 
 
¶138 Under the second prong of the Village Food test, the 
court must determine whether a public nuisance action was 
regarded as at law in 1848.  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶16.   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
48 
 
 
¶139 Before the adoption of the constitution, "the line 
between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury 
trial) was not a fixed and static one.  There was a continual 
process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from the other."  
Fleming, supra, at 658.  This borrowing led to a very large 
overlap between law and equity.  Id.  Therefore, the historical 
inquiry into the character of the action in 1848 is a 
complicated one.   
¶140 The difference between a court of common law and a 
court of equity is best summarized "by considering the different 
natures of the rights they are designed to recognize and 
protect, the different natures of the remedies which they apply, 
and the different natures of the forms and modes of proceeding 
which they adopt."  Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence 19 (Isaac F. Redfield, addt'l author, 9th ed. 
1866) (1834)).  Historically, courts of equity were able to 
administer remedies for rights that "courts of common law d[id] 
not recognize at all; or, if they d[id] recognize them, they 
le[ft] them wholly to the conscience and good-will of the 
parties."  Id. at 21.  In addition, the remedies in courts of 
equity were often very different from the remedies in courts of 
common law. Id.   Courts of equity interfered by way of 
injunction to prevent wrongs; whereas, courts of common law were 
generally able to award only damages after the wrong was done.  
Id. at 21-22.  In cases of nuisance, courts of common law were 
also able to invoke the legal remedy of abatement.  3 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
49 
 
Blackstone, supra, at 222.31  Lastly, "[t]he modes of seeking and 
granting relief in equity [we]re also different from those of 
courts of common law.  The latter proceed[ed] to the trial of 
contested facts by means of a jury[,]  . . . [whereas] courts of 
equity tr[ied] causes without a jury."  Story, supra, at 22.  
 
¶141 The State argues that public nuisance actions were 
actions only in equity in 1848.  The State cites numerous cases 
for this proposition, such as Kamke v. Clark, 268 Wis. 465, 
478c, 67 N.W.2d 841 (1955), which stated that "[i]njunctions to 
prevent nuisances have always been rendered in courts of 
chancery and not by courts of law."   
¶142 The State's arguments do not answer ECI's arguments 
that public nuisance actions were considered criminal actions 
(actions at law) long before 1848 and before the equitable 
                                                 
31 The old common law remedies by action for abatement of a 
nuisance by a private plaintiff were two: (1) an assize of 
nuisance, which was a criminal writ in which the sheriff was 
commanded to summon an assize (a jury) and view the premises, 
and if the jury found for the plaintiff, the plaintiff would 
have judgment to have the nuisance abated and judgment for 
damages; (2) a writ of quod permittat prosternere, which 
commanded the defendant to permit the plaintiff to abate the 
nuisance, or to show cause why the defendant will not; if 
successful, the plaintiff could have judgment to abate the 
nuisance and to recover damages against the defendant.  3 
Blackstone, supra, at 221-22.   
For cases in which the State had a public nuisance abated, 
see Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 403 [*387] (1854), and Stoughton 
v. State, 5 Wis. 291 (1856).   
For a discussion of nuisance abatement as legal or 
equitable, see James Williamson, Remedies——Nuisance Abatement as 
Legal or Equitable, 39 Marq. L. Rev. 163 (1955-56).  See also 
C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 Harv. L. 
Rev. 111 (1887-88). 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
50 
 
remedy of injunction.  Case law and other historical sources 
support ECI's arguments.  To illustrate, Blackstone stated that 
"no action lies for a public or common nuisance, but an 
indictment only."  3 Blackstone, supra, at 219.  Blackstone also 
wrote 
that 
public 
nuisances 
are 
"punishable 
by 
public 
prosecution, and subject to fine according to the quantity of 
the misdemeanor."  4 Blackstone, supra, at 167.   
¶143 The 
Wisconsin 
Revised 
Statutes 
of 
1849 
also 
acknowledged criminal jurisdiction for a public nuisance.  Wis. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849).  In Luning, the plaintiff in 
error was indicted for a public nuisance and was tried before a 
jury.  In Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 403 [*387] (1854), the 
defendant was indicted and found guilty by a jury for a public 
nuisance, and the court ordered the nuisance to be abated.  In 
Stoughton v. State, 5 Wis. 291 (1856), the defendant was 
indicted and found guilty by a jury for a public nuisance, and 
the court entered a judgment for the abatement of the nuisance 
and fined the defendant $50.00 and costs. 
¶144 In Attorney General v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway 
Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874), this court noted that a public nuisance 
was historically the subject of criminal jurisdiction and was a 
proceeding at law.  The court noted the following: 
A public nuisance being the subject of criminal 
jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at 
law is by indictment or information, by which the 
nuisance may be abated, and the person who caused it 
may be punished. . . . Besides this remedy at law, it 
is now settled that a court of equity may take 
jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance, by an 
information filed by the attorney general.  This 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
51 
 
jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great 
caution and hesitancy. 
Id. at 538 (quoting Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 
91, 97-98 (1838)). 
¶145 Traditionally, 
"[c]ourts 
of 
equity 
ha[d] 
no 
jurisdiction over 
criminal proceedings, except that under 
certain circumstances, they w[ould] restrain a public nuisance."  
James P. Holcombe, An Introduction to Equity Jurisprudence 13 
(1846).  Courts of equity would interfere, however, only when 
the court of common law would not afford an adequate and 
sufficient remedy.  Denis G. Lubé, Equity Pleadings 6 (1846).32   
¶146 This authority supports a holding that a public 
nuisance action was generally an action at law in 1848 and was 
sometimes an action in equity when a party sought injunctive 
relief.  I therefore analyze the relief sought in this case to 
determine whether it would have been an action at law or an 
action in equity.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶33 
(concluding that action was legal in nature in 1848 after 
analyzing nature of relief sought by plaintiffs).   
                                                 
32 See Prosser, supra note 20, at 604.  It states: 
As to public nuisance, the remedy by injunction 
may exist in favor of the state.  Its use is somewhat 
complicated by the traditional rule that equity will 
not enjoin a crime as such, where the effect will be 
to 
deprive 
the 
defendant 
of 
his 
constitutional 
safeguards; but this will not prevent the injunction 
where the criminal penalty is inadequate to prevent 
the damage threatened by the continuation of the 
nuisance, and it has been held that there is no double 
jeopardy in such a remedy. 
(footnotes omitted).   
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
52 
 
¶147 In this case, the State did not proceed criminally 
against 
ECI, 
although 
it 
might 
have 
done 
so 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 283.91 and potentially under Wis. Stat. § 291.97.33  
The State proceeded civilly and sought forfeitures.  "A 
statutory . . . forfeiture proceeding is usually an action by a 
governmental unit for the recovery of a money penalty."  County 
of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 161-62, 288 N.W.2d 129 
(1980).  Such a proceeding smacks of a remedy at law. See id.; 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (stating, "A 
civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only 
be enforced in courts of law.").  While the State's complaint 
also asked for "appropriate injunctional relief," this prayer 
for relief was only incidental to its prayer for monetary 
compensation and therefore did not change the nature of relief 
sought.34  See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.  It is important to note 
that ECI's facility was closed for more than a year before the 
State sued. 
¶148 Finally, although the action in this case is civil, 
not criminal, that distinction is not dispositive.  "The fact 
that one is undertaken in the civil context, rather than the 
criminal context, should not deprive the parties of a jury trial 
in this instance."  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶29.   
                                                 
33 Wisconsin Stat. § 291.97(2) requires willful conduct for 
the State to prosecute criminally.   
34 In this case, the court ordered forfeitures of $219,120 
and ordered no injunctive relief. 
No.  2005AP1507.dtp 
 
53 
 
¶149 In short, a public nuisance action involving the type 
of forfeitures sought in this case was an action at law in 1848.   
¶150 A majority of this court is unable to accept this 
overall analysis.  Instead, it severs the historic connection 
between public nuisance at common law and modern environmental 
regulation.  Ostensibly, the majority does not preclude the 
right to a civil jury trial in all environmental regulatory 
cases, but it provides no guidance to circuit judges on when 
that might be appropriate.  This is a sad day for Wisconsin. 
¶151 I concur with the majority's denial of a jury trial on 
claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14.  I dissent from the 
majority's denial of a jury trial on claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12. 
¶152 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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