Title: Hinckley v. Hinckley

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hinckley v. Hinckley1991 WY 85812 P.2d 907Case Number: 90-46Decided: 06/05/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES HENRY 
HINCKLEY, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

BRENDA LEE HINCKLEY, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

Sue Davidson, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Robert L. Nelson, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, 
CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and LANGDON, District Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The question in this 
case is whether an award of Social Security benefits made directly to children 
because of the Social Security disability of their father must be credited 
against unpaid child support payments and future child support obligations. The 
trial court ruled that the lump sum Social Security benefit paid to the children 
under a federal statute should not be credited against unpaid child support and, 
further, that no credit against future child support obligations would be made. 
The court also held that no material change in circumstances had been 
demonstrated that would justify an adjustment in the amount of child support 
awarded in the divorce decree. Ancillary questions are presented concerning 
discovery on the part of the husband with respect to the needs of the children 
and the income of the ex-wife and the propriety of an award of attorney fees. We 
agree with the rulings by the trial court except for the award of attorney fees. 
The award of attorney fees was not supported by evidence establishing the 
reasonableness of the fee charged as required by our rule. The order and 
judgment entered by the trial court are affirmed in all respects except for the 
award of attorney fees, which must be reversed.

[¶2.]     The father, as 
appellant, sets forth the issues on appeal to be:

"1. Whether unqualified 
monthly Social Security Disability payments awarded, post divorce, for the 
benefit of their father's disability, as a matter of law, constitute 
satisfaction of child support payments required by the divorce decree. 

"2. Whether unqualified 
monthly Social Security Disability payments awarded, post divorce, for the 
benefit of the parties' minor children because of their father's total 
disability constitutes a material change of circumstance so that monthly 
disability payments constitute satisfaction of child support payments required 
by the divorce decree.

"3. Whether a lump sum 
payment of $14,103.44 in back Social Security disability payments for the 
children for the two year period preceding the award should be credited to back 
child support arrearages especially when child support payments for the same two 
year period were current (except for a $100.00 shortage).

"4. Whether the Court 
failed to allow appellant to properly discover evidence regarding the children's 
needs and ex-wife's income situation.

"5. Whether an award for 
attorney's fees was improper since appellee failed to present evidence 
establishing the reasonableness thereof."

The mother, as appellee, 
states the issues in substantially the same way as the father.

[¶3.]     The parties in this 
case were married on August 11, 1973. In November of 1974, the father suffered 
serious back injuries while on active duty with the United States Air Force. 
Despite several surgical procedures following his injury, the Veterans 
Administration declared the father to be 100% disabled in 1977. The father then 
retired from the United States Air Force and began to receive Veterans 
Administration benefits. The father and the mother were divorced by a decree 
entered January 19, 1983. The divorce decree incorporated a separation agreement 
signed by the parties, which required the father to pay child support through 
the clerk of the court in the amount of $150 per month for each of his two 
children. The child support payments were to begin on January 1, 1983. The 
separation agreement also provided that if either party should violate its 
terms, the party in violation agreed to pay the reasonable attorney fees 
incurred by the other party in enforcing his or her rights.

[¶4.]     At the time the 
separation agreement was entered into, the father's only income was his 
disability pension from the Veterans Administration of $1,377 per month. The 
father previously had been receiving Social Security benefits, but he had waived 
those in order to go to school. Both prior to, and after, the divorce, the 
father also received from the Veterans Administration a small monthly benefit 
for his children, which he forwarded to them.

[¶5.]     In November of 1987, a 
Social Security hearing examiner found the father to be 100% disabled. Social 
Security then began providing a monthly benefit to the children of the marriage. 
This benefit was in the amount of $584 per month by May 5 of 1989. A retroactive 
lump sum award of approximately $14,000 was sent to the mother, as custodian for 
the children.1 On May 19, 1988, the father filed a 
petition for the appointment of a conservator to manage the $14,000 on behalf of 
the children. In his petition, he nominated a corporate conservator, but he also 
volunteered to serve in that capacity. At the time the petition was filed, the 
father served on the mother a set of interrogatories and a request for 
production of documents, which requested information about her income and 
finances and expenditures for the children. The mother objected to the 
interrogatories and the request for production on the grounds that they were 
irrelevant, immaterial, and beyond the scope of the issues. Subsequently, the 
trial court entered an order compelling a response to only one of the 
interrogatories and requiring that only two of the requests for production of 
documents be honored.

[¶6.]     A little less than a 
month after the petition for appointment of conservator was filed, and at the 
same time the mother responded to that petition, she filed, in the divorce 
action, a "Motion to Find Defendant in Contempt, Complaint for Judgment of Back 
Child Support, Medical and Other Bills, Motion for Attorneys Fees." In that 
pleading, the mother alleged that the father had failed to pay child support 
pursuant to the order of the court in the divorce case; had failed to maintain 
medical care for the children; and had failed to pay certain medical debts as 
required by the decree of divorce. In her pleading, the mother also requested 
attorney fees incurred by her in bringing the proceeding. The father then 
counterclaimed, requesting, among other things, that the Social Security 
benefits paid on his account to the children be set off against any arrearages 
in child support that might be due from him and also be credited against his 
future child support obligation.

[¶7.]     On July 14, 1988, the 
father filed a motion to consolidate the two proceedings. A number of 
intervening pleadings then were filed before November 2, 1988, when the trial 
court entered an order consolidating the conservatorship proceeding and the 
proceedings pending in the divorce case for purposes of trial. On July 29, 1988, 
they were consolidated for purposes of a hearing on the motion to compel 
discovery. A trial of all of the issues in the case was held on May 5, 1989 and, 
after the submission of written arguments by the parties, the court, on January 
2, 1990, entered its "Judgment and Order Finding Defendant/Petitioner in 
Contempt and Denying Certain Motions." That judgment and order denied the 
request of the husband for a conservatorship; found that the husband had not 
demonstrated a substantial or material change in circumstances; denied his 
request for modification of the amount of child support; found the husband to be 
in arrears for child support payments in the amount of $5,500 as of May 1, 1989; 
awarded the wife reimbursement for medical expenses and marital debts she had 
paid; and awarded her attorney fees against the husband in the amount of 
$2,799.60. The trial court also found that the husband was in contempt for 
failure to comply with the original divorce decree. This appeal was taken from 
that judgment and order.

[¶8.]     The first two issues 
asserted by the father concern the effect of Social Security disability payments 
upon the father's future obligation for child support. The father contends that 
the Social Security payments either should be considered as satisfying his 
obligation for future child support because they replace the money due from him 
under the decree or that the mother's receipt of the money constitutes a 
substantial and material change in circumstances that should justify the 
reduction of his support obligation. The trial court did not accept either of 
these arguments, and it refused to either suspend or modify the father's 
obligation for future child support.

[¶9.]     Turning first to the 
father's argument that the Social Security benefit payments made to the wife 
should serve to satisfy his obligation for child support, our review of 
pertinent Wyoming authority reveals no prior case in 
which this point was raised. The father directs our attention to decisions from 
other jurisdictions that have permitted an obligor for child support to satisfy 
that obligation through payment of benefits by the government. The father 
particularly relies upon Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649 (1975).

[¶10.]  In Andler, the obligor, who became 
disabled prior to the entry of the divorce decree, was ordered to pay $160 per 
month for child support. One month after the divorce decree was entered, the 
ex-wife started to receive a Social Security disability benefit of $221.10 per 
month for the children because of the father's disability. The Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the disability benefit had satisfied the father's child support 
obligation each month from the time the ex-wife began to receive those payments. 
The court responded to the contention that the benefit payments constituted a 
"gratuity" which should not be applied to the father's obligation by 
saying:

"The United States 
Congress has seen fit to place the federal government in the role of insurer in 
order to afford members of the work force the protection and security of 
insurance against future disability. The fundamental nature of the Social 
Security system is a form of insurance in every sense of that word. Benefits 
paid out by a governmental insurer, under a policy of insurance for which the 
insured has paid premiums, are no more gratuitous than benefits paid out by a 
private insurance company." Andler, 538 P.2d  at 653.

[¶11.]  The rationale employed in Andler has been 
invoked by a number of courts to justify credit for Social Security benefits 
paid to or on behalf of an obligor's children. See, e.g., Binns v. Maddox, 57 
Ala. App. 230, 327 So. 2d 726 (1976); Potts v. 
Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1976); Horton v. 
Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963). See generally 
Annotation, Right to Credit on Child Support Payments for Social Security or 
Other Government Payments Made for Benefit of Child, 77 A.L.R.3d 1315 § 5(a) 
(1977). These cases appear to be premised, at least in part, on equitable 
concerns that arise when a non-custodial parent sustains a substantial reduction 
in his earning capacity because of some disability. Todd v. Norman, 840 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1988); Gibson v. Gibson, 110 
Mich. App. 
666, 313 N.W.2d 179 (1981).

[¶12.]  We acknowledge that, in an instance in 
which the obligor has become disabled after the entry of an order for child 
support and is unable to work, the receipt of Social Security benefits by the 
children of the obligor may render the previous support order inequitable. The 
question is whether we should allow the obligor to unilaterally apply Social 
Security benefits that are received by his children to fulfill his obligation. 
Our precedents in Wyoming authority are antithetical to the 
course pursued by the father. We adopt the rule that the receipt of payments 
from Social Security by the children of one obligated to pay child support may 
constitute a change of circumstances giving rise to justification for a petition 
for modification of the decree.

[¶13.]  In Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584 
(Wyo. 1974), 
we espoused the principle that a party who seeks to reduce an indivisible order 
of child support because of the fact that some of the children had been 
emancipated should petition the court for modification rather than unilaterally 
reducing his payments. "We think it a high-risk adventure for a party to the 
action to take it upon himself to interpret a decree of court, particularly in 
view of the continuing accessibility of the court." Redman, 521 P.2d  at 587-88. 
The same rationale pertains in this instance. If we were to permit the obligor 
to make a unilateral modification of the support requirements in the divorce 
decree, that would divest the trial court of its discretion to determine whether 
its previous order of support should be modified in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of the case. See § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1987 
Repl.); Burnham v. Burnham, 743 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App. 1987). The Washington court has 
aptly explained the principle in this way:

"The disability and 
resulting entitlement to Social Security are changes in condition of the parties 
to be considered in a modification proceedings but do not give rise to a 
modification or deduction without affirmative action by the court for they are 
not necessarily determinative. The father may be independently wealthy; or he 
may, in the interim, have inherited property. Benefits from private or public 
retirement systems may have accrued and become payable to him. In short, many 
developments affecting the economic condition of the parties may have occurred 
which would not permit or warrant a modification of the decree to the extent of 
deducting the Social Security benefits for dependent children from the child 
support ordered in a decree of divorce." Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145, 149 (1968).

[¶14.]  We hold that the receipt of Social 
Security benefits by the children is one factor to be considered by the district 
court in making its determination as to whether a significant, material change 
of circumstances has occurred that is sufficient to justify modification of a 
non-custodial parent's obligation for support. See Burnham; Gerlich v. Gerlich, 
379 N.W.2d 689 (Minn.App. 1986); In re Marriage of Robinson, 651 P.2d 454 
(Colo. App. 
1982); Chase. See generally Annot. 77 A.L.R.3d 1315. In order to receive credit 
against the child support obligation for the Social Security payments, the party 
obligated to make those payments has an affirmative duty to seek modification of 
the support order. See Burnham; Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1990).

[¶15.]  In anticipation of our adoption of this 
rule, the father argues that the trial court should have modified his obligation 
for child support based on the change of circumstances that occurred when his 
children began to receive the Social Security benefits. The trial court denied 
the father's request for modification. Our rule is that the determination of 
whether to modify an obligation for child support lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and that court's determination will not be 
disturbed except for grave abuse of discretion or for the violation of some 
legal principle. See Scaling v. Scaling, 805 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1991); Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1990); Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo. 1985); Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1981). The burden is 
assigned to the party who seeks to have the support obligation modified to 
establish that a substantial or material change in circumstances has occurred 
since the entry of the decree. Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1986); 
Manners.

[¶16.]  In a case such as this, the fact that 
children become entitled to receive Social Security benefits is not the 
exclusive factor for the trial court to consider in ruling upon the petition for 
modification. A determination of the amounts of child support that are 
appropriate in an instance in which modification is sought due to a change in 
circumstances requires a consideration of the needs of the children, the ability 
of the father to contribute to those needs and his responsibility to do so, and 
the ability of the mother to contribute to those needs and her responsibility to 
do so. Nuspl. See Manners. In this case, the trial court, on the evidence that 
was presented, reasonably could have found that there was no diminution in the 
father's ability to make his $300 per month child support payment. The father 
agreed to make those payments at a time when he already was disabled and was 
receiving as his only income a disability benefit from the Veterans 
Administration of $1,377 per month. That benefit has not decreased over the 
years; instead it has increased. Not only that, but the father's income has 
increased since the time of the divorce because he also now receives benefits 
from Social Security. At the time of this proceeding, the father had an income 
of $2,300 per month, upon which no federal taxes could be collected. It is true 
that the children now receive more than the support awarded at the time of the 
divorce decree, but the father's income has been enhanced as well. There has 
been no change in the father's physical condition; he was 100% disabled before 
the divorce, and he still is 100% disabled. Under these circumstances, we cannot 
say that the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion or violated 
some legal principle in holding that there was no substantial, material change 
of circumstances that would justify a modification of the father's obligation 
for child support.

[¶17.]  The third issue that the father presents 
relates to the lump sum payment of Social Security benefits that his children 
received after the determination was made of the father's entitlement to 
benefits. The lump sum of some $14,000 was received from the Social Security 
Administration as a retroactive payment for some two years of unpaid benefits 
for the children. The father urges this court to credit this payment as a 
set-off against past-due child support and against medical and health insurance 
premium reimbursements that the court found he owed.

[¶18.]  The same analysis that we applied for 
crediting those payments against future obligations for child support is 
applicable with respect to the claim for a credit against arrearages in child 
support. That analysis leads to the conclusion that retrospective modification 
of the decree would be required in order to receive credit for such a payment 
against past-due child support. In some states that follow a similar rule, 
credit has been refused in these circumstances for precisely that reason. See, 
e.g., Moritz v. Moritz, 368 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.App. 1985); Fowler v. Fowler, 156 
Conn. 569, 244 A.2d 375 (1968).2 Our statute incorporates a rule of 
no retrospective modification of child support. Section 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977 
(June 1987 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"* * * On the petition of 
either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, 
custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires. Provisions respecting 
maintenance [i.e., child support] may be modified only as to payments or 
installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification except on 
agreement of the parties." (Emphasis added.)

See also, Parry v. Parry, 
766 P.2d 1168 (Wyo. 1989). The record contains no evidence of 
any agreement to modify the father's obligation for past child support. Because 
application of the lump sum his children received to that prior support 
obligation would amount to a retrospective modification of his support 
obligation, it is forbidden by statute. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the trial court that held the father to be in arrears with respect to his 
obligation to pay child support in the amount of $5,500 as of May 1, 
1989.

[¶19.]  The same result pertains with respect to 
a claim of set-off against the medical expenses due from the father. The divorce 
decree required the father to carry medical insurance on his minor children. The 
father failed to do so, and the trial court charged him with reimbursing to the 
wife the premiums for health and medical insurance that she had paid. No 
evidence can be found that the father sought a modification of his obligation to 
pay health and medical insurance premiums for the children and, even if he had, 
the statute also would foreclose the retrospective modification of that 
obligation in this way.

[¶20.]  We turn now to the father's claim that 
the failure of the trial court to compel answers to certain of his 
interrogatories and to compel production of certain documents constituted error. 
The interrogatories and request for production related to the wife's income, 
employment, and assets, to the children's assets, and to the wife's expenditures 
on behalf of the children. The father now claims that answers to these 
interrogatories were essential to the preparation of his case for modification 
of his support obligation. We agree with the father that, when one petitions for 
modification of child support, normally discovery should be allowed with respect 
to the assets of the other party and information relating to the needs of the 
children. Failure to permit such discovery has been held to be reversible error. 
See Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1984). We do not recede from our 
decisions in Nuspl; Manners; or Cubin.

[¶21.]  In our judgment, the facts in this case 
are sufficiently distinguishable from those in Cubin that we hold there was no 
reversible error in this instance. We note first that the interrogatories and 
request for production were filed in the case in which the conservatorship was 
sought. In fact, they were filed with the petition on May 19, 1988. The 
objection of the wife to those interrogatories and request for production, filed 
on June 13, 1988, was on the ground that they were irrelevant, immaterial, and 
beyond the scope of the issues in the conservatorship action. The father 
responded with a motion to compel answers, again in the conservatorship action, 
on June 21, 1988. On July 14, 1988, he filed another motion seeking to 
consolidate the divorce and conservatorship actions, and they were consolidated 
for purposes of a hearing on his motion to compel on July 29, 1988. On August 9, 
1988, the court entered the order that is the subject of this issue in the 
appeal, requiring the wife to answer the following interrogatory:

"11. Please provide an 
accounting as to monies received constituting underpayment of Social Security 
benefit payments received by you as the same relates to [the minor children] as 
may be evidenced by bank statement."

The order also required 
production of:

"4. Any and all documents 
reflecting trusts or any other instruments in which you or the minors, 
Christopher or Jessica, may have a real or equitable interest."

In addition, the order 
required the wife to furnish:

"7. An itemized 
accounting as to monies received by you constituting underpayment of social 
security benefit payments as the same relates to Christopher and Jessica as may 
be evidenced by bank statement and other physical documents."

[¶22.]  While the discovery was sought and the 
motion to compel discovery was presented in the conservatorship action, the 
Order on Motion to Compel Production was captioned in the divorce action. This 
probably reflects the consolidation of the divorce and conservatorship 
proceedings for purposes of the hearing on the motion to compel. However, the 
other questions posed and matters sought to be produced, relating to the income 
of the wife and the income of the children, were not relevant in either the 
conservatorship proceeding or the husband's counterclaim in the divorce action. 
The only basis for a change in circumstances that the father claimed in the 
course of the divorce proceedings was the entitlement of the children to the 
Social Security benefits. Since the change of circumstances was circumscribed in 
this way, the trial court was justified in denying the discovery that was sought 
in this instance.

[¶23.]  Generally, the question of whether 
answers to interrogatories are to be required is within the broad discretion of 
the trial court. Inskeep v. Inskeep, 752 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1988); Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 
1982). Parties are entitled to discovery only with respect to those matters that 
are relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. Rule 
26(b)(1), W.R.C.P. In this instance, the trial court reasonably could have 
determined that the questions and the requests for production that related to 
the assets of the wife and the children's needs were not relevant to the 
conservatorship action in which they were requested. Furthermore, the court 
reasonably could have concluded that those questions and request for production 
did not lead to relevant evidence in the divorce action in which the sole claim 
for relief was premised upon the availability of the Social Security benefits. 
Accordingly, we affirm the refusal of the trial court to compel answers to the 
other questions that were objected to and to compel the production of the other 
documents to which objection was made.

[¶24.]  The final issue presented by the father 
relates to the propriety of the award of attorney fees by the trial court. His 
argument is that this award cannot be sustained because of the lack of evidence 
establishing that the fees were reasonable. As we noted above, the separation 
agreement of the parties provided that, if either party violated any of its 
terms, the party committing the violation agreed to pay the reasonable attorney 
fees for the other party incurred in enforcing his or her rights under the 
agreement. At trial, the mother took the stand and the following testimony was 
elicited with respect to her attorney fees in this matter:

"Q. Have you had to incur 
attorney fees in bringing this action and defending the motions that Mr. 
Hinckley brought against you?

"A. Yes, I 
have.

"Q. I'm going to hand you 
what I've marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 20 and Plaintiff's Exhibit - this time 
I guess, I don't know. I'm going to change this to Respondent's Exhibit 20. Can 
you tell the Court who's been representing you during the entire course of this 
litigation?

"A. Mr. Robert Nelson. 

"Q. Can you tell the 
Court on the basis upon which I have been representing you, the hourly 
charge?

"A. It's a hundred 
dollars an hour for out of courtroom and a hundred twenty-five dollars in 
courtroom.

"Q. Have you had occasion 
to review Respondent's Exhibit 20 that I've just handed to you?

"A. Yes, I 
have.

"Q. Tell the Court what 
it is?

"A. The total statement 
of the fees that I have spent on this case.

"Q. Have you been 
involved in this case from the beginning?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you know whether 
or not the work that is represented on this bill was actually 
performed?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How do you know 
that?

"A. Because I've signed 
the checks.

"Q. Right. I'm talking 
about the work, not the checks. I know it's been paid. I want to know if you 
think I did the work?

"A. Yes, I 
do."

There was no other 
testimony made regarding the amount or reasonableness of the attorney fees to be 
awarded.

[¶25.]  Wyoming has adopted the federal "lodestar" 
test for the determination of the reasonableness of attorney fees. UNC Teton 
Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). See Stanbury 
v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1990). The lodestar test requires that 
two factors be considered: (1) whether the fee charged represents the product of 
reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and (2) whether other factors of 
discretionary application should be considered to adjust the fee either upward 
or downward. UNC Teton, 774 P.2d  at 595. The party who is seeking an award of 
fees has the burden of providing proof of the reasonableness of his fee. See 
Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 
1988); JonesLand & Livestock v. Federal Land Bank, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 
1987). In order to meet that burden of proof, the claimant must present not only 
an itemized billing reflecting the time and the rate, but there must be evidence 
demonstrating that the fee was reasonable. UNC Teton. In this case, there was no 
testimony or other evidence presented with respect to the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees that were charged. We must reverse the award of attorney fees as 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court in light of the applicable rule of 
law.

[¶26.]  The trial court's judgment and order is 
affirmed except for that portion of the judgment and order awarding attorney 
fees against the father. The award of attorney fees is reversed.

1 The exact amount that 
the mother received for the children is not established by the record. The 
husband indicates a figure of approximately $14,000. The husband's brief states 
the amount as a precise $14,103.44, but his citations to the record do not 
support this figure. The decision letter by the trial judge states that the 
amount received was $14,040.

2 Slightly different 
formulations of this rule may be found in Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843, 845 
(Iowa 1990) (father not entitled to restitution of Social Security benefit for 
time period in which he made child support payments); Gerlich v. Gerlich, 379 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn.App. 1986) (party seeking forgiveness of arrearages due to 
government benefits received by his children must show that his failure to pay 
was not willful); Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145, 149-50 (1968) 
(trial court had discretion to deny credit against arrearages due.)

CARDINE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶27.]  I concur in the above opinion insofar as 
the trial court held that accrued child support was due and owing and refused to 
modify retroactively. Beyond this, I dissent and would reverse and remand for 
further proceedings as outlined below.

[¶28.]  The court in its opinion 
states:

"We adopt the rule that 
the receipt of payments from Social Security by the children of one obligated to 
pay child support may constitute a change of circumstances giving rise to 
justification for a petition for modification of the decree." Maj. op. at 
911.

I agree with the 
rule adopted by the court. Having adopted this rule and having recognized the 
facts of this case as a basis for modification, the court approves the denial of 
discovery because it is said the motion for discovery was in the conservatorship 
case rather than the petition for modification case. The petition to modify and 
the application for conservatorship were consolidated. It seems that judicial 
economy and simple fairness would mandate that appellant have a right to 
discover all of the facts and circumstances that might bear upon his petition 
for modification and have a decision on that petition on the merits. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment to the extent indicated, reverse the 
order denying discovery, and remand for further 
proceedings.