Title: PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN J SILVER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 25, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117024  
SHAWN JOSEPH SILVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
In People v Cornell, 466 Mich __; ____ NW2d ___ (2002),  
we overruled contrary prior case law and explained that  
pursuant to MCL 768.32(1),1 a trial court, upon request,  
1  
Except as provided in subsection (2), upon an 
indictment for an offense, consisting of different 
degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, 
or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find 
the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree 
charged in the indictment and may find the accused 
person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior 
to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt 
(continued...)  
 
should instruct the jury regarding any necessarily included  
lesser offense, or an attempt, (irrespective of whether the  
offense is a felony or misdemeanor), if the charged greater  
offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element  
that is not part of the lesser included offense, and a  
rational view of the evidence would support it.  
We further held that the failure to instruct the jury  
regarding such a necessarily lesser included offense is error  
requiring reversal, and retrial with a properly instructed  
jury, if, after reviewing the entire cause, the reviewing  
court is satisfied that the evidence presented at trial  
“clearly” supported the lesser included instruction.2  
As explained below, consistent with People v Cornell, we  
hold that the trial court’s failure to instruct Mr. Silver’s  
jury 
regarding 
a 
necessarily included lesser offense was error  
requiring reversal.  
I  
The 
complainant, 
Amber 
Gardner, 
testified 
that 
on 
October  
12, 1997, she left her home for approximately ten to fifteen  
minutes to run to the store.  When she left, the doors to her  
1(...continued) 
to commit that offense.  
2A offense is “clearly” supported when there is  
substantial 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
requested 
lesser  
instruction. People v Cornell, supra.  
2  
 
home were closed, but unlocked. Upon returning to her home,  
she heard a noise in the kitchen.  When she entered the  
kitchen, she saw defendant standing there. She began yelling  
at him to leave.  Ms. Gardner testified that as defendant was  
leaving through the back door, he commented that “I was just  
here to use your potty,” and then ran through the field behind  
her home.  
Ms. Gardner also testified that she called 911, and  
Officer Robert Wesch arrived approximately three to five  
minutes later.  She told him what defendant said as he left  
and that, at that time, she did not notice anything missing  
from her home. A few days later she said she told Detective  
Dennis Maurey that she believed that two to three weeks’ worth  
of change, accumulated on a dresser in her bedroom and visible  
through her bedroom window, was missing. Although the change  
was never recovered, it was this missing change that gave the  
circumstantial basis for the assertion that defendant had  
entered with the intent to commit a larceny.  
Defendant testified that on the day of the incident, as  
he was walking in the neighborhood, he observed an elderly  
woman having trouble starting her lawn mower. He offered to  
help her and ended up mowing her whole yard.  When he asked to  
use her bathroom, she would not let him because she did not  
know him.  Defendant indicated his brother lived in the  
3  
neighborhood, so he left the woman’s home and went to his  
brother’s house.  However, his brother was not home.  The only  
other person he knew in the area was Ms. Gardner, with whom he  
had a “wave back and forth” relationship because he had helped  
her, about six months earlier, move some boxes into her house.  
He decided to go to her house, which was about half a block  
from his brother’s, to see if he could use the bathroom.  When  
he arrived, he knocked on the door, and, receiving no  
response, he opened the door and asked if anyone was home.  
Receiving no reply, he went in and used the bathroom. As he  
was leaving through the back door, he heard a noise and Ms.  
Gardner entered the kitchen.  She yelled at him to get out.  
As he was leaving, he told her that he was sorry and that he  
had just used the bathroom.  
On rebuttal, Ms. Gardner denied that she had ever met  
defendant, that he had helped her carry boxes into her home,  
or that she and defendant would exchange waves when they saw  
each other.  
The 
trial 
court 
instructed the jury regarding the charged  
offense of first-degree home invasion MCL 750.110a(2),3 but  
3MCL 750.110a(2) provides in relevant part:  
A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with 
intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in 
the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling 
without permission with intent to commit a felony, 
(continued...)  
4  
 
 
 
denied defense counsel’s request that the jury be instructed  
on the lesser included offense of breaking and entering  
without permission, MCL 750.115(1).4  
The trial court denied the request, indicating that it  
might cause some confusion to give the requested instruction  
and that if the jury believed defendant it would be duty bound  
to acquit him. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the  
charged offense.  
Defendant 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his  
3(...continued) 
larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a person 
who breaks and enters a dwelling without permission 
and, at any time while he or she is entering, 
present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a  
felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of home 
invasion in the first degree if at any time while 
the person is entering, present in, or exiting the 
dwelling either of the following circumstances 
exists:  
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous 
weapon.  
(b) Another person is lawfully present in the 
dwelling.  
4MCL 750.115(1) provides in pertinent part:  
Any person who breaks and enters or enters 
without breaking, any dwelling, house, . . . 
without first obtaining permission to enter from 
the owner or occupant, agent, or person having 
immediate 
control 
thereof, 
is 
guilty 
of 
a  
misdemeanor.  
5  
conviction in a divided opinion.5  All three judges of the  
Court of Appeals panel determined that the trial court erred  
in refusing to give the instruction because the only element  
in dispute was whether defendant possessed the requisite  
intent to commit larceny and there was little danger that the  
jury would become confused.  However, the majority, citing  
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), concluded  
that the error was harmless because it was not more probable  
than not that a different outcome would have resulted had the  
jury been given the lesser included instruction.  
One judge dissented from the majority’s conclusion that  
the error was harmless. The dissent noted that the jury may  
have resolved any doubts it had about defendant’s intent in  
favor of conviction. Further, the dissent was not convinced  
that the majority’s application of Lukity was correct or that  
the comparison of the tainted and untainted evidence was the  
proper approach for addressing a jury instruction error.  
Additionally, the dissent noted that the situation was not one  
in which the jury had a choice of some other lesser offense  
and had rejected it in favor of a conviction of a higher  
offense.  
This Court subsequently granted defendant’s application  
5 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 23, 2000 
(Docket No. 212508).  
6  
 
for leave to appeal and ordered his case argued with People v  
6 
Cornell. 
II  
We hold that breaking and entering without permission is  
a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home  
invasion. Breaking and entering without permission requires  
(1) breaking and entering or (2)entering the building (3)  
without the owner’s permission.  It is impossible to commit  
the first-degree home invasion without first committing a  
breaking and entering without permission.  The two crimes are  
distinguished by the intent to commit “a felony, larceny, or  
assault,” once in the dwelling.  
In this case the intent to commit a larceny in the house  
was clearly disputed at trial. 
Indeed, it was defendant’s  
unvarying position, unblemished by inconsistent statements,  
that there was an entry without permission, but that there was  
no intent to steal. The opening statement giving his theory  
of the case, the cross-examination of Ms. Gardner, as well as  
officer Wesch, and his closing argument were all directed to  
one end: that he was wrongfully inside the house, but did not  
intend to steal.  The Legislature thinks such things can  
happen.  After all, they made it a lesser crime to be in a  
6 463 Mich 958-959 (2001).  
7  
house without permission if there is no felonious intent.  
Said plainly, the person that would be guilty of this would be  
a person inside, surely with some motive, just not a criminal  
motive.  If the jurors believed defendant was such a person ,  
they realistically could not act on it unless they had an  
instruction that gave them that choice.7  Not to give them an  
instruction that allowed them to agree with defendant’s view  
of the events in this case undermines the reliability of the  
verdict.  The reason is that there was substantial evidence  
supporting 
the 
lesser offense of breaking and entering without  
permission. Accordingly, MCL 768.32(1) was violated.  
Response to the dissents  
Justice Weaver agrees that the trial court erred in  
failing to give the lesser offense instruction, but concludes  
7One might argue that the jury would have acquitted 
defendant if it believed his testimony.  However, this is too 
facile.
 The United States Supreme Court rejected such an 
argument in Keeble v United States, 412 US 205, 212-213; 93 S 
Ct 1993; 36 L Ed 2d 844 (1973), when it stated:  
[I]f the prosecution has not established  
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 
offense 
charged, 
and 
if 
no 
lesser 
offense  
instruction is offered, the jury must, as a  
theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. 
But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense  
instruction . . . precisely because he should not 
be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's 
practice will diverge from theory.  Where one of  
the elements of the offense charged remains in 
doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some 
offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts 
in favor of conviction.  
8  
the error was harmless. She finds incriminating that Silver  
was found in the kitchen, not the bathroom. However, Silver  
testified with the answer: he was in transit from the bathroom  
to the back door in this small8 house. This is why he was in  
the kitchen. Rather than being damaging to Silver’s version  
of events, this fact is consistent with it.  
Justice Markman’s dissent is notable in that he is the  
one appellate judge out of the ten who have considered this  
case who finds that the trial court did not err at all.  Save  
for him, all have agreed on the crucial issue that the lesser  
offense was supported by a rational view of the evidence.  
Justice Markman’s dissent seems to focus on what he perceives  
to be the irrationality of defendant’s story itself, i.e.,  
whether it would have been rational to go into someone’s house  
simply to use the bathroom, rather than, in accord with  
Cornell, if a rational view of the evidence supports  
defendant’s story.  It just must be said: maybe a gentleman  
such as Justice Markman would not do this, but a less discrete  
person just might. Once evidence that rationally supports a  
lesser crime has been introduced, it’s believability is for  
the jury to decide, not appellate judges.  
On the basis of these considerations, we have concluded  
that 
the 
dissents 
misapprehend the strength of Silver’s claim.  
8The house had approximately 720 square feet.  
9  
 
 
While a jury might not agree with his theory, there was  
substantial evidence to support it.  
Conclusion  
Accordingly, Silver is entitled to a new trial.  The  
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, as is Silver’s  
conviction, and this case is remanded for a new trial with a  
properly instructed jury.  
YOUNG, J., concurred with TAYLOR, J.  
10  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 117024  
SHAWN JOSEPH SILVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (concurring).  
I agree that it was error for the trial court to refuse  
to instruct the jury on the lesser included misdemeanor  
offense of breaking and entering without permission.9  I also  
agree that the error was not harmless, under either the  
Stephens10 test for lesser included misdemeanor instructions  
or under the newly articulated Cornell11 framework that  
replaces Stephens. I therefore concur in the result.  
9MCL 750.115(1).  
10People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252; 330 NW2d 675 (1982).  
11People v Cornell, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002).  
I write separately to point out that the decisions in  
Cornell and Silver evidence the difficulty of applying the  
rules established by the Cornell majority. 
The rule to be  
applied in this case, pursuant to Cornell, is that a trial  
court's erroneous refusal to deliver lesser included offense  
instructions 
requires 
reversal 
only 
where 
substantial 
evidence  
supported the instructions.  In this case, there was no  
evidence to contradict defendant's claim that he did not  
intend to steal when he entered the house.  Instead, there was  
substantial evidence supporting giving instructions for  
breaking and entering without permission.  
This is not to say that evidence supporting a requested  
instruction must always be uncontroverted to be deemed  
substantial.  I point out that the defendant in Cornell  
advanced a more convincing case for breaking and entering  
without permission than did the defendant in Silver. 
Mr.  
Cornell broke into the "Heston house," a local attraction  
because it was the boyhood home of actor Charlton Heston.  
Although there was evidence to contradict his claim that he  
did not intend to steal, there was also evidence supporting  
his position.  Moreover, the jury in Cornell believed the  
defendant when he claimed that he had no intention of burning  
the house, and acquitted him of the charged arson.  MCL  
750.73.  The jury could have believed just as easily that Mr.  
2  
 
Cornell did not intend to steal anything.  Mr. Cornell made an  
even stronger case that the error required reversal under the  
substantial evidence test than did Mr. Silver, who claimed he  
only wanted to use the bathroom.  
Unlike my dissenting colleagues, I believe that both  
Cornell and Silver were cases of error requiring reversal,  
rather than harmless error or no error at all.  The Cornell  
majority has created an unworkable rule that even it cannot  
agree to apply in more than an arbitrary fashion.  It is clear  
from today's decisions that the Cornell rule leads to  
arbitrary results.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
3  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 117024  
SHAWN JOSEPH SILVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in  
refusing to give the requested lesser offense instruction  
because 
breaking 
and 
entering is a necessarily included lesser  
offense 
of 
first-degree 
home 
invasion, 
the 
element  
differentiating the two crimes was disputed and a rational  
view of the evidence would support an instruction on the  
lesser offense. However, I dissent from its conclusion that  
the error was not harmless because, in my opinion, the  
evidence presented at trial did not clearly support a  
conviction of the lesser included misdemeanor of breaking and  
 
 
entering.
 Therefore, I would conclude that the error was  
harmless and would affirm defendant’s conviction.  
As we explained in People v Cornell, 466 Mich ___, ___;  
___ NW2d ___ (2002),  
[T]he reliability of the verdict is undermined 
when the evidence “clearly” supports the lesser 
included instruction, but the instruction is not 
given.  In other words, it is only when there is 
substantial evidence to support the requested 
instruction that an appellate court should reverse 
the conviction.  As we must consider the “entire  
cause” pursuant to MCL 769.26, in analyzing this 
question, we also invariably consider what evidence 
has been offered to support the greater offense. 
[Slip op at 37.][1]  
Applying the harmless error principles we articulated in  
Cornell to defendant Silver’s case, I would conclude that the  
error was harmless because the evidence did not clearly  
support a conviction of the lesser included misdemeanor of  
breaking and entering without permission.  Although defendant  
stated that his intent upon entering the home was to use the  
1 We also clarified that this “substantial evidence”  
standard 
for 
determining whether the error is harmless differs 
from the standard for determining whether the error occurred. 
As we explained,  
an evidentiary dispute supported by a rational view 
of 
the 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
element 
that  
differentiates the lesser from the greater offense 
will generally require an instruction on the lesser 
offense.  However, more than an evidentiary dispute  
regarding the element that differentiates the  
lesser from the greater offense is required to 
reverse a conviction; pursuant to MCL 769.26, the 
entire cause must be surveyed. [Slip op at 38.]  
2 
 
  
 
bathroom,2 the evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly  
showed the contrary.  First, the complainant testified that  
upon returning to her home, she heard a noise in the kitchen,  
not the bathroom.  When she entered the kitchen, she saw  
defendant standing there.  Defendant then fled through the  
field behind her home.  Second, an investigation by Officer  
Wesch revealed no signs that defendant had used the bathroom.  
Third, the complainant testified that she believed that  
approximately two to three week’s worth of change was missing  
from the top of a dresser in her bedroom.  Complainant  
testified that this change was visible through the bedroom  
window.  Fourth, complainant testified that, although she had  
observed defendant in the neighborhood, she did not know him,  
and he had not helped her carry boxes into her home.3  
While a rational view of the evidence supporting  
defendant’s “bathroom argument” might have warranted an  
instruction on the lesser included offense, the borderline  
nature of this argument may also be taken into consideration  
in evaluating the extent to which the failure to give such  
2 According to defendant, the elderly woman, whose yard 
he gratuitously mowed after helping her start her lawnmower, 
would not let him use her bathroom because she did not know  
him, and his brother, who lived in the area, was not home.  
3 This was contrary to defendant’s assertions that he had 
helped complainant carry boxes into her home and that they 
knew each other and would wave to each other.  
3  
 
instruction was harmful.  
I believe that the misdemeanor of breaking and entering  
without permission was not clearly supported by the evidence,  
and that the refusal to instruct on the lesser included  
offense was harmless error.  Therefore, I would affirm  
defendant’s conviction.4  
CORRIGAN, C.J., concurred with WEAVER, J.  
4 I note that the Court of Appeals remanded defendant’s 
case to the trial court for resentencing because the trial 
court failed to properly respond to defendant’s objections to 
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report. Leave  
to appeal was not sought on this determination.  
4  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 117024  
SHAWN JOSEPH SILVER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent. As stated in People v Cornell,  
466 Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2002), a trial court should instruct  
the jury regarding a necessarily included lesser offense if  
the “charged greater offense requires the jury to find a  
disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser  
included offense and a rational view of the evidence would  
support it.”  Here, I do not believe that the disputed issue,  
the element of intent to commit a felony within the dwelling,  
was supported by a rational view of the evidence.  
In this case, defendant, an utter stranger to the victim,  
was discovered inside the victim’s home, from which a small  
amount of money was subsequently found to be missing.  Upon  
being discovered in the home by the victim, defendant  
 
asserted, “I was just here to use your potty.”1  On the basis  
of this evidence, and nothing more, the majority concludes  
that the issue of defendant’s intent to commit a felony was  
placed in dispute, and that defendant’s contention that he  
lacked such intent was supported by a “rational view” of the  
evidence.  
I disagree. It is not the law that any theory asserted  
by a defendant, no matter how preposterous, must be treated as  
the equivalent of a “rational view” of the evidence, thereby  
requiring an instruction.  Trial courts need not suspend their  
common sense in assessing what constitutes a “rational view”  
of the evidence.2  Indeed, I am concerned that, while the ink  
is still not yet dry on Cornell, the majority is transforming  
the standard for instructions on necessarily included lesser  
1 As Justice Weaver’s dissent correctly points out, the 
evidence further shows that the victim testified that, upon 
returning home, she heard a noise in the kitchen, not the 
bathroom; money was missing from a dresser in her bedroom, not 
the bathroom; and there is no evidence whatsoever that 
defendant had ever used the bathroom.  Contrary to the 
majority’s contention, there are many forms of evidence that 
might suffice to show that one has recently been in a 
bathroom, 
e.g., 
fingerprints, 
shoeprints 
in 
or 
approaching 
the 
bathroom, an unflushed toilet, a raised toilet seat, a wet 
towel or basin, wet soap, and so forth.  In any event, it 
should not be seen as surprising that, the more incredible the 
defense, the less evidence can generally be found in support 
of it.  
2  That, as the majority observes, it was defendant’s 
“unvarying position” that he was merely in the home in order 
to use the “potty”  does not transform an irrational argument 
into a rational one.  
2  
 
offenses by effectively reading out of the law the requirement  
that there must be a “rational view” of the evidence in  
support of such instructions.3
 Instead, what appears  
dispositive for the majority here is that there was a  
“dispute,” a dispute evidenced exclusively by defendant’s  
“potty” statement. The mere fact of such dispute apparently  
compels an instruction, and the absence of such an instruction  
requires that defendant’s conviction be reversed.  However,  
the additional requirement of Cornell that a “rational view”  
of the evidence must exist in support of an instruction  
implies that, in some circumstances, there will be no such  
“rational 
view,” 
despite the existence of a genuine “dispute.”  
This further implies, contrary to the majority, that not all  
issues of “believability . . . [are] for the jury to decide.”  
Ante at 9. The “rational view” requirement makes clear that  
the trial court must bring some degree of judgment to its  
responsibilities, and that neither the trial court nor the  
jury need be infinitely credulous in seeking to ascertain the  
truth.  
Because I do not believe that the requested lesser  
offense instruction here was supported by a “rational view” of  
3 
 If the majority is not, in fact, altogether reading 
this requirement out of the law in this case, it is at the 
very least transforming the concept of a “rational view” of 
the evidence into a “not a logically impossible view” of the 
evidence.  
3  
  
 
 
the evidence,4 the trial court did not err, in my judgment, in  
failing to give such an instruction.  Therefore, I would  
affirm defendant’s conviction.5  
4 Much less is it the case that the evidence presented  
here 
“clearly” 
supported 
the 
defendant’s 
requested 
instruction, thereby compelling reversal in the absence of 
such an instruction. Cornell, supra.  
5  While, as the majority feels impelled to point out, I 
am in the minority on this case, this tends to be true of 
those who dissent.  Ante at 9. 
More to the point, the 
majority considerably overstates my isolation.  First, a  
review of the Court of Appeals analysis indicates that it did 
not specifically analyze the “rational view” of the evidence; 
instead, it focused on the fifth prong of the test in People  
v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 260; 330 NW2d 675 (1982), stating 
that a requested lesser included offense instruction must not 
result in undue confusion or injustice.  Specifically, the 
Court concluded that the trial court erred in its refusal to  
instruct because “the use of similar terms in the two offenses  
[would not] create confusion for the jury.”  Unpublished 
opinion per curiam, issued May 23, 2000 (Docket No. 212508) 
at 2.  Despite such a conclusion, two members of the panel 
still determined that the error was harmless.  Second, I note 
that the chasm between myself and Justice Weaver’s dissent may 
be considerably less wide than suggested by the majority; her 
dissent characterizes defendant’s “bathroom argument” as one 
that is of a “borderline nature,” ante at 3, and concludes 
that the instructional error was harmless.  Finally, I note 
that the trial judge himself, who sat through the entire 
trial, concluded that no lesser included instruction was 
warranted in this case.  
In further response to the majority, it is not merely a 
“gentleman” who would not invade the home of a stranger, but 
it is any person who is prepared to live by the fundamental 
norms of society. Ante at 9. While the majority is correct 
that the jury has a broad fact-finding role, the role has 
never been without limits.  No jury has a right to nullify, 
nor has the jury here asserted such a right to nullify, the 
fundamental rules of society by exonerating individuals 
charged with serious crimes on the basis of preposterous and 
irrational defenses.  
4