Title: The Florida Bar v. Warren R. Trazenfeld

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-2571
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
WARREN R. TRAZENFELD,
Respondent.
[November 14, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report and order dismissing the Florida Bar’s
complaint against Warren R. Trazenfeld.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15,
Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we disapprove the referee’s order and
remand this case to the referee for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
On December 13, 2000, the Bar filed a complaint against Trazenfeld alleging
that he violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain a
1.  The Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Lent v. Baur, Miller &
Webner, P.A., 710 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), details the facts of
Trazenfeld’s representation of Lent in 1996 during a legal malpractice action against
her former attorney.  In that case, the trial court entered an order instructing Lent to
execute a consent to allow a potential witness to be deposed.  Trazenfeld, without
notifying opposing counsel or the trial court, wrote a letter to the witness stating
that Lent’s consent was not voluntary, and if the witness testified, Lent would
pursue all relief available to her against the witness.  After becoming aware of
Trazenfeld’s letter, opposing counsel filed a motion for sanctions seeking dismissal
of Lent’s complaint with prejudice.  After a hearing, at which Lent testified that she
knew of and consented to Trazenfeld’s actions, the trial court entered an order
dismissing Lent’s complaint with prejudice.  Lent appealed the order arguing that
the trial court abused its discretion.  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal order, finding that Lent and Trazenfeld willfully
disregarded the trial court’s order instructing Lent to execute a consent and also
acted in bad faith in attempting to assure noncompliance with the court’s order by
intimidating a key defense witness.  See id. at 158.
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matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation) and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) in the context of
Trazenfeld’s representation of Monika Lent.1  Trazenfeld responded by filing a
“motion for summary resolution” arguing that the Bar, having issued a no probable
cause finding in a 1998 case addressing the Lent litigation, is now precluded by the
res judicata doctrine from pursuing further disciplinary actions against him in a case
involving the same underlying facts.  The Bar filed a response, arguing that the res
judicata doctrine does not apply to grievance committee proceedings because the
grievance committee is without authority to adjudicate Trazenfeld guilty of rule
2.  The referee incorporated the order granting summary resolution into the
referee’s report filed in this case.
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violations or issue a final judgment.  This Court appointed a referee who held a
hearing on Trazenfeld’s motion.  The referee entered an order wherein she made the
following findings of fact.2  
In 1998, under Florida Bar number 98-71,747(11f), a Florida Bar grievance
committee conducted an investigation into Trazenfeld’s conduct during the Lent
litigation.  That investigation addressed allegations that Trazenfeld violated Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 4-4.4
(respect for rights of third persons), and 4-8.4 (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  On or about July 9, 1999, the
grievance committee issued a “notice of no probable cause and letter of advice” to
Trazenfeld advising him that it had found no probable cause in the case against him
and that the complaint was dismissed.
Based on the foregoing facts and consideration of the parties’ oral arguments
and briefs, the referee entered an order granting Trazenfeld’s motion for summary
resolution and dismissing the Bar’s complaint.  In reaching her conclusion, the
referee noted that rule 3-7.4(j)(3) states that “a finding of no probable cause by a
grievance committee shall not preclude the reopening of the case and further
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proceedings therein.”  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.4(j)(3).  However, the referee
found that there is no case law specifically addressing the issue of whether the res
judicata doctrine applies in Bar grievance committee proceedings.  The referee
relied on this Court’s decision in Florida Bar v. Gentry, 447 So. 2d 1342 (Fla.
1984), to reach her conclusion that Bar grievance committee findings are in fact
subject to the res judicata doctrine when the subsequent proceedings are based on
the same underlying facts.  The referee also found that there was nothing in this
case which indicated that the Bar did not have a full and fair opportunity to both
investigate and litigate all possible disciplinary matters involved in the Lent litigation
in 1998.  Finally, the Bar did not allege any facts before the 2000 grievance
committee which were not known or which could not have been known by the 1998
committee.  Thus, the referee found that the res judicata doctrine required dismissal
of the entire action and granted Trazenfeld’s motion for summary resolution and
dismissed the Bar’s complaint.  
The Bar has petitioned for review of the referee’s order granting Trazenfeld’s
motion.
ANALYSIS
A referee’s conclusions of law are not given the same presumption of
correctness afforded to a referee’s findings of fact.  See Florida Bar re Inglis, 471
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So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1985).  In the instant case, the Bar argues the referee erred in
finding that the res judicata doctrine applies to grievance committee proceedings
and in dismissing the Bar’s complaint.  The Bar claims the res judicata doctrine is
not applicable to Bar grievance committee proceedings because grievance
committees do not make final determinations of guilt and rule 3-7.4(j)(3) permits the
Bar’s filing of the instant complaint against Trazenfeld.  On the other hand,
Trazenfeld argues the referee’s order should be approved because the Bar should
have sought review of the 1998 grievance committee finding of no probable cause
under rule 3-7.5.  Trazenfeld argues that the Bar should not be allowed to disregard
its own rules and then rely on inaction to bring further proceedings based on the
same set of facts.
Rule 3-7.4 discusses grievance committees, which can be described as
investigatory panels that conduct proceedings, which may be informal, wherein the
panels make recommendations on the alleged misconduct in the Bar’s complaints. 
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.4.  One of the recommendations the grievance
committee can make is a finding of no probable cause.  Rule Regulating Florida Bar
3-7.4(j) states in pertinent part:
(j) Finding of No Probable Cause.
(1) Authority of Grievance Committee.  A grievance committee
may terminate an investigation by finding that no probable cause exists
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to believe that the respondent has violated these rules.  The committee
may issue a letter of advice to the respondent in connection with the
finding of no probable cause.
. . . . 
(3) Effect of No Probable Cause Finding.  A finding of no
probable cause by a grievance committee shall not preclude the
reopening of another case and further proceedings therein.
Although we may agree with the referee’s conclusion that there is no
determinative case which expressly and specifically addresses the issue of whether
the res judicata doctrine applies in Bar grievance committee proceedings, this Court
has previously commented sufficiently on the nature of grievance committee
proceedings to provide insight for the present issue.  In Florida Bar v. Swickle, 589
So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 1991), the respondent alleged that numerous due process
errors had occurred during the grievance committee proceedings.  In rejecting the
respondent’s due process claims, this Court stated that grievance committee
proceedings are principally investigatory and are comparable to proceedings before
a grand jury because the proceedings are nonadversarial.  See id. 
Likewise, in Florida Bar v. Wagner, 175 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1965), this Court
held that the respondent was not entitled to a bill of particulars at the grievance
committee stage because the only function of a grievance committee was to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to recommend to the Board of
Governors of the Bar a finding that probable cause for discipline existed.  This
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Court further noted that a grievance committee does not render the determining
judgment that probable cause exists; it merely recommends its findings to the
Board.  See id. at 34-35. 
In the instant case, the referee relied on this Court’s decision in Florida Bar
v. Gentry, 447 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1984), to support the conclusion that the res
judicata doctrine is applicable to grievance committee proceedings.  We conclude
that the referee’s reliance on Gentry was misplaced.  In Gentry, the respondent
argued that the res judicata doctrine barred a finding of guilt on count one charged
in the complaint because the transaction in question had already been the subject of
a previous disciplinary proceeding in which the respondent was found guilty of
misconduct and given a private reprimand.  See Gentry, 447 So. 2d at 1343.  This
Court did a brief res judicata analysis and found that the doctrine was not
applicable because the two proceedings in question did not possess the requisite
identity of facts.  See id. 
Gentry is clearly distinguishable from the instant case because the issue of
the res judicata doctrine being applicable to grievance committee proceedings was
never even addressed in that case.  Moreover, the facts of Gentry are
distinguishable because the previous full disciplinary proceeding against Gentry had
resulted in a finding of guilt of misconduct and the imposition of a private
3.  Rule 3-7.5(a)(1) states the disciplinary review committee shall review
those grievance committee matters referred to it by a designated reviewer.  See R.
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.5(a)(1).  
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reprimand.  Therefore, a final determination on the merits was made within the
context of a full adversarial proceeding.  In the instant case, the 1998 proceedings
against Trazenfeld only reached the stage of the grievance committee which issued
a no probable cause finding.  The Board of Governors did not take any action on
these earlier proceedings and there certainly was never any type of adversarial
proceeding.
Additionally, despite Trazenfeld’s argument that the Bar failed to seek review
of the 1998 grievance committee’s finding of no probable cause, nothing in the
rules requires or even suggests that the Bar must seek review of a grievance
committee finding.  Rule 3-7.5 details the procedures before the Board of
Governors.  Specifically, rule 3-7.5(b) states a designated reviewer may review the
actions of the grievance committee.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.5(b).3  The
word “may” when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than
the mandatory connotation of the word “shall.”  See Harper v. State, 217 So. 2d
591, 592 (Fla. 1968).  We reject Trazenfeld’s argument because the language of rule
3-7.5(b) is permissive rather than mandatory.
Finally, case law from other jurisdictions supports the Bar’s argument that
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the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to Bar grievance committee
proceedings.  In State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1972), the members of
a local grievance committee sought mandamus to command a district judge to
vacate an order that temporarily enjoined the grievance committee from concluding
a hearing on matters before the committee which had been previously considered
by the committee at two earlier hearings.  The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the
circuit court’s injunction and held that the committee’s prior decisions did not rise
to the level of a final determination on the merits of the complaints before them. 
See id. at 718.  Therefore, the matters before the grievance committee were not
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  See id.; see also State v. Russell, 610 P. 2d
1122, 1130 (Kan. 1980) (holding that a review committee of the Kansas Board for
Discipline of Attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney
with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the
nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later
proceedings on the same matter); Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210,
214 (Miss. 1987) (proceedings under complaint were not precluded by dismissal of
former complaint where there was no final judgment entered on merits of former
complaint); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Kirshen, 441 N.W.2d 161,
177 (Neb. 1989) (holding res judicata doctrine did not apply to bar proceedings
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where the committee’s dismissal of the first complaint occurred at a preliminary
inquiry stage).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the referee erred in
concluding that res judicata applied to bar these proceedings.  Accordingly, we
disapprove the referee’s order granting Trazenfeld’s motion for summary
resolution and dismissing the Bar’s complaint and remand this case to the referee
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and
HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida; and Randolph Max Brombacher, Bar Counsel,
Miami, Florida,
for Complainant
Robert M. Klein and Marlene S. Reiss of Stephens, Lynn, Klein, Lacava, Hoffman
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& Puya, Miami, Florida; and Patricia S. Etkin of Weiss and Etkin, Plantation,
Florida, 
for Respondent