Title: In re Tekela

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91577-Agenda 20-November 2001.
In re TEKELA et al., Minors, Appellants (The People of the State
of Illinois, Appellee, v. Wanda Cooper, Appellee).
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case arises from the termination of Wanda Cooper's
parental rights over her three children: Ira J., born September 23,
1990; Kaylon J., born November 25, 1989; and Tekela J., born
December 26, 1988. The circuit court of Cook County issued a
summary judgment order terminating Wanda's parental rights.
Wanda did not request a stay pending appeal. The appellate court
reversed, finding that unresolved questions of fact made summary
judgment inappropriate. 319 Ill. App. 3d 661. Unbeknownst to the
appellate court, Tekela and Ira had already been adopted. The
public guardian informed the appellate court of this development
and filed a motion to vacate the appellate court's opinion as moot.
The appellate court denied the public guardian's motion. We
granted leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d 315.
	We reverse and find that the adoption rendered Wanda's
appeal moot as to her rights over Tekela and Ira and that the
appellate court should have vacated its order as to Tekela and Ira
on that basis.

I. BACKGROUND 
	In March 1993, Ira and Tekela were placed in the foster care
system following allegations of abuse. Since that approximate
time, they have lived with the same foster parents.
	On August 13, 1997, the State petitioned the circuit court to
deem Wanda an unfit parent, terminate her parental rights, and
appoint a guardian (the Department of Children and Family
Services) with the power to consent to adoption of her three
children. In support of its petition, the State alleged in part that
Wanda was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due
to a mental illness.
	On December 7, 1998, the State filed a motion for summary
judgment. The motion incorporated earlier judicial findings, an
adjudication of wardship, a psychological evaluation, and a
parental assessment. Wanda filed a written objection and attached
supporting affidavits from her husband, David, and a psychiatrist.
	On April 30, 1999, on summary judgment, the circuit court
issued a multipart order that, among other things, terminated
Wanda's parental rights and appointed a guardian with the power
to consent to adoption. A stay was never requested or issued. The
circuit court also terminated the parental rights of the children's
father. He did not appeal that order.
	On May 7, 1999, Wanda filed a timely notice of appeal,
arguing primarily that summary judgment was inappropriate
because disputed issues of material fact existed.
	On February 20, 2001, the appellate court reversed. 319 Ill.
App. 3d 661. The appellate court's opinion thoroughly details the
factual background and evidence adduced in the parental fitness
and termination proceedings. The substantive findings on those
issues have not been appealed to this court and therefore that
information need not be repeated here. See 319 Ill. App. 3d at 663-69.
	Initially, the appellate court noted that summary judgment and
termination of parental rights are both drastic measures and must
be closely scrutinized. The court observed that few cases exist
upholding a summary determination of parental rights. Of those
cases, none involved a termination based upon mental illness. 319
Ill. App. 3d at 671. The court noted that:
			"Summary judgment may be more or less useful
depending on the subject matter of the dispute. [Citation.]
We do not wish to suggest that there are no cases in which
summary findings of parental unfitness on grounds of
mental illness or impairment would be appropriate.
However, we believe that the question of whether a parent
has a mental illness or impairment that prevents her from
discharging her parental duties, unlike the question of
whether a parent has a conviction for a particular crime,
is a nuanced, fact-intensive question that does not readily
lend itself to summary determination." 319 Ill. App. 3d at
672.
The court noted the existence of unresolved questions of material
fact and found that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment.
	On March 1, 2001, the public guardian filed a motion to
vacate the appellate court's decision as moot or, in the alternative,
for further directions. For the first time, the public guardian
informed the appellate court, that on September 27, 1999, Tekela
and Ira had been adopted by their foster parents.
	On March 16, 2001, the appellate court ordered the parties to
file, within 14 days, a "detailed legal memorandum addressing all
jurisdictional issues arising from the adoption proceeding going
forward" while the appeal was pending. The appellate court's
order further requested legal authority for the guardian's reference
to the "seem[ing] *** mootness" of Wanda's appeal. Finally, the
court requested the State to explain its position and Wanda to
advise the court of the relief she was seeking in light of the
adoption proceeding.
	On April 25, 2001, the appellate court heard oral arguments
on the public guardian's motion. At oral argument, the court
expressed doubts as to the validity of the adoptions in light of the
court's decision vacating the termination order. On April 30, 2001,
the appellate court issued a written order rejecting the public
guardian's requests. The order simply denied the public guardian's
motion and did not address the implications of the recently
discovered adoption. The appellate court issued its mandate on
May 14, 2001.
	The public guardian filed a petition for leave to appeal on
behalf of Tekela and Ira. On May 29, 2001, we directed the
appellate court to recall its mandate. We subsequently allowed the
public guardian's petition for leave to appeal. We also granted the
State's motion to appear as an appellant.
	On appeal before this court, neither the State nor the public
guardian challenge the substance of the appellate court's February
20, 2001, ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate in this
case. Instead, the public guardian and State simply challenge the
appellate court's order denying the motion to vacate the February
20, 2001 opinion as moot.

II. ANALYSIS
	The public guardian and State argue that Wanda's failure to
request a stay pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305 (155 Ill. 2d R.
305) allowed the adoption to proceed legally. This failure, the
State and public guardian argue, rendered Wanda's appeal of the
termination order moot.
	Initially, Wanda counters that a stay was unnecessary because
she filed a notice of appeal. Wanda states in her brief that "stays
are discretionary, whereas the right to an appeal is absolute" and
therefore "an appellant need not secure a stay of trial proceedings
to pursue his [or her] right to appeal." Wanda also implies that
stay requests are a waste of time in this context because they "are
seldom granted."
	We disagree with Wanda's contention that a notice of appeal
acts as a substitute for a stay. Wanda correctly notes that Illinois
law provides her with a right to appellate review. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §6; Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 355 (1972).
Nonetheless, Wanda fails to cite any direct authority indicating
that a notice of appeal necessarily operates to stay a judgment. In
fact, Illinois courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), this court
noted the distinction between a notice of appeal and a stay pending
appeal. We stated in pertinent part as follows:
		"A notice of appeal is not an application of stay within the
meaning of this court's rules. Rather, our rules clearly
distinguish between a notice of appeal and motion to stay.
Compare 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b) with 155 Ill. 2d R. 305.
Further, the mere nature and effect of the notice of appeal
and motion to stay illustrate that they are not synonymous.
A notice of appeal is a procedural device filed with the
trial court, that when timely filed vests jurisdiction in the
appellate court in order to permit review of the judgment
such that it may be affirmed, reversed, or modified.
[Citation.] A motion to stay impacts the enforcement and
effect of the judgment, but does not challenge the
sufficiency of that judgment." Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d  at
528 n.4.
While the applicable stay provision in Steinbrecher was Supreme
Court Rule 305(j) (155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j)), our holding was broad
and unequivocal: absent a contrary statutory provision or supreme
court rule, an appeal by itself does not operate as a stay.(1) We see
no reason to depart from Steinbrecher here. See also Graff v.
Graff, 71 Ill. App. 3d 496, 503 (1979); accord Lawrence v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 228, 232, 73 L. Ed. 282,
286, 49 S. Ct. 106, 107 (1929) (finding that an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court does not act as a stay); 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Appellate Review §437, at 179 (1995).
	Further, without restricting the circuit court's discretion in
ruling on a stay in a termination proceeding, we disagree with
Wanda's contention that a stay request would have been a waste
of time. To the contrary, persuasive arguments existed to support
a stay request. See Stacke v. Bates, 138 Ill. 2d 295, 302 (1990)
(discussing factors a court should consider in ruling on a stay
request). An order of termination of parental rights severs a basic
fundamental liberty interest and therefore inflicts severe harm. See
In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 354-55 (1984). Further, as illustrated
by the nature of the instant controversy and the public policy
considerations favoring finality and stability of adoptions (In re
Adoption of Hoffman, 61 Ill. 2d 569, 578 (1975)), a stay  may be
necessary to preserve the status quo pending appeal. Failure to
grant a stay in a termination of parental rights case could also
preclude meaningful appellate review and deny a parent's rights
under article VI, section 6, of our constitution. See London, Stays
Pending Appeal, 3 App. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1990). This conclusion is
obvious when one notes the relatively short period of time that
may elapse between the issuance of a termination of parental rights
order and enforcement of that order (i.e., an adoption proceeding).
	Nonetheless, in this case, Wanda failed to request a stay from
either the circuit court or the appellate court. While Wanda
enjoyed a right to appeal the termination order, it remained
incumbent upon her to protect that right and to take necessary
steps to preserve the fruits of her appeal. See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 58 (2001) (stating that a defendant is not completely
absolved from all responsibility of asserting his or her fundamental
rights). The United States Supreme Court has similarly
acknowledged the importance of a party protecting their own
interests. For example, that Court has repeatedly held that, " '[n]o
procedural principle is more familiar *** than that a constitutional
right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal
having jurisdiction to determine it.' " Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 670, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565
(1991), quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 88 L. Ed. 834, 859, 64 S. Ct. 660, 677 (1944).
	Wanda failed to obtain a stay to prevent enforcement of the
termination order and therefore we necessarily conclude that the
circuit court had authority to move forward with the adoption
proceeding. Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998)) specifically authorizes the
appointment of a guardian to consent to adoption once a
termination order is issued. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998).
"Such consent is sufficient to authorize the court in the adoption
proceedings to enter a proper order or judgment of adoption
without further notice to, or consent by, the parents of the minor."
705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998). Section 5 of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/5 (West 1998)) states that an adoption proceeding
should normally be initiated by the filing of a petition within 30
days of the date the child becomes available. Neither the Juvenile
Court Act nor the Adoption Act require that this process be
suspended while a termination order is pending on appeal.
	Wanda next cites In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill. 2d 347, 350
(1994), where this court invalidated an adoption because the
father's parental rights were never validly terminated. Wanda
argues that, because of the appellate court's February 20, 2001,
opinion, her parental rights were never validly terminated. Wanda
therefore argues that the appellate court correctly denied the public
guardian's motion to vacate and that Tekela and Ira's adoptions
must be invalidated. We disagree as to both arguments.
	First, Wanda mistakenly assumes that the termination order
and the adoption order are one and the same. That is simply not
the case. The circuit court terminated Wanda's parental rights
pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
(West 1998)). The adoption order was entered pursuant to the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). An attack
on the adoptions' validity was never before the appellate court and
it is not properly before this court. In fact, the record contains only
two documents from the adoption proceeding: a copy of the
adoption order and a copy of the order closing the adoption. These
two documents were appended to the public guardian's motion to
vacate. We also note that the notice of appeal in this case is based
solely on the issue of termination of parental rights and does not
challenge the adoption proceeding or even the order granting the
guardian the power to consent to adoption. In fact, we have no
indication that the adoption order has ever been attacked either
directly or collaterally. In contrast to the instant case, the petitioner
in Doe attacked both the termination proceeding and the adoption
proceeding. See In re Petition of Doe, 254 Ill. App. 3d 405, 410
(1993). We will not invalidate an unchallenged adoption.
	Second, we disagree with Wanda's assertion that no valid
termination of parental rights occurred. Again, Wanda bases this
contention on the fact that the appellate court reversed the circuit
court's termination order. In other words, Wanda argues that the
circuit court's termination order, although jurisdictionally valid
when entered, was subsequently rendered invalid by the appellate
court's opinion. The question is, however, not whether Wanda's
parental rights were validly terminated in light of the appellate
court's February 20, 2001, opinion. Clearly, if the termination
order is properly reversed, no valid termination exists. The
question is whether the appellate court's February 20, 2001,
opinion was properly entered or, more precisely, whether it should
have been vacated as moot. If the termination issue became moot
before it was addressed by the appellate court, the remand order
should be vacated and, correspondingly, the termination order
should necessarily be reinstated and considered valid.
	For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the adoptions
and the passage of the statutory period to challenge them rendered
the termination issue moot before the appellate court made its
findings. Therefore the appellate court's opinion reversing the
termination order should have been vacated. We must again note
that, as a practical matter, the circuit court's termination order was
valid when issued and that Wanda failed to request a stay from
either the circuit court or a reviewing court to preserve the status
quo.
	The failure to obtain a stay pending appeal, by itself, does not
necessarily render an issue moot. Smith v. Goldstick, 110 Ill. App.
3d 431, 434 (1982). Absent a statute or supreme court rule to the
contrary, where no stay is sought, any rights a party gains pursuant
to a judgment may ordinarily be subject to redetermination upon
reversal by the reviewing court. For example, in First National
Bank of Jonesboro v. Road District No. 8, 389 Ill. 156, 161-62
(1945), we held that:
		"[a] party to a suit is presumed to know of all the errors in
the record, and such party cannot acquire any rights or
interests based on such erroneous decree that will not be
abrogated by a subsequent reversal thereof. If such party
has received benefits from the erroneous decree or
judgment, he must, after reversal, make restitution, and,
if he has sold property erroneously adjudged to belong to
him, he must account to the true owner for the value. ***
A party to a decree cannot acquire any rights thereunder
while the same is subject to review which he can assert
after the decree is reversed, since the effect of the reversal
is to abrogate the decree and leave the cause as it stood
prior to the entry of the decree."
Nonetheless, when an intervening event occurs making it
impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief to any party, the
case is rendered moot because a ruling on the issue cannot have
any practical effect on the controversy. See In re Adoption of
Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1999); Richardson v. Rock Island
County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1997);
Dixon v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 116 (1992). "The fact that a case is pending on appeal when
the events which render an issue moot does not alter this
conclusion." Dixon, 151 Ill. 2d  at 116, citing Bluthardt v. Breslin,
74 Ill. 2d 246, 250 (1979).
	In the instant controversy, we cannot issue a ruling having any
effect on the parties' rights. Section 20b of the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/20b (West 1998)) states that "[a] petition for relief from
a final order or judgment entered in a proceeding under this Act,
after 30 days from the entry thereof under the provisions of Sec.
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure [(735 ILCS 5/2-1401
(West 1998))] or otherwise, must be filed not later than one year
after the entry of the order or judgment." (Emphasis added.) As
with any statutory provision, section 20b is presumptively
constitutional (Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304 (1996)), and
Wanda does not challenge its validity. In this case, well over a
year has passed since the adoption order was entered and therefore
it cannot be challenged now. The adoptions in this case and the
lapse of the period to challenge them constitute intervening events
that preclude this court from providing Wanda with relief in this
case.
	We also note that this is not a case involving a building that
must be rebuilt or dissipated funds that must be replenished.
Public policy considerations require that adoptions be accorded a
certain degree of stability and finality. In re Adoption of Hoffman,
61 Ill. 2d  at 578. Other courts have been reluctant to undo
complicated situations arising through a party's failure to obtain
a stay, referring to such an endeavor as "unscrambling an egg." In
re CGI Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994). We
acknowledge the importance of this case and thus will not apply
such a colorful analogy. Nonetheless, we are reluctant to undo an
adoption finalized well over a year ago, particularly in a case
where, as here, the adoption was not procured through fraud,
deception, or other illegal means.
	While our constitution guarantees a right to meaningful
appellate review, it does not necessarily guarantee relief on the
merits or relief that will be acceptable to the appellant. Relief is
typically granted only when a final order is at issue and where
jurisdiction is properly vested in the reviewing court. See Niccum
v. Botti, Marinaccio, Desalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 7
(1998). Review is also subject to the related doctrines of standing,
ripeness, and as in this case, mootness. See In re Marriage of
Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989). As our appellate court
observed in Trompeter Construction Co. v. First Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n of Ottawa, 62 Ill. App. 3d 173 (1978), "When an
appellant is bound by the decree of the court below, even though
the questions presented are moot, he is entitled to a determination
of whether his claim is moot." Trompeter, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 176,
quoting In re Johnson, 53 Ill. App. 3d 921, 923 (1977). Wanda's
right to appellate review of the termination order is necessarily
limited by its mootness.
	Finally, we wish to express our frustration with the conduct
of the parties in this case. We are dealing with critical issues
regarding children and families. This troubling, squalid situation
could have been avoided had Wanda requested a stay of
proceedings pending appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305
(155 Ill. 2d R. 305). Additionally, either party could have
requested that the case be placed on an accelerated docket pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 311 (155 Ill. 2d R. 311) and requested an
expedited briefing schedule pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
343(c) (155 Ill. 2d R. 343(c)). The record also indicates that
Wanda filed at least two unopposed motions for extensions of time
to file briefs in the appellate court. The State and public guardian
filed at least eight unopposed motions for extensions of time to file
briefs and then, in their respective briefs, partially justified the
adoption proceeding on expediency grounds. Most importantly,
notwithstanding Wanda's failure to obtain a stay, the State and
public guardian legally but unwisely proceeded with an adoption
while Wanda's appeal was pending. This maneuver seriously
jeopardized the children's need for stability, to say the least. Then,
the State and public guardian failed to inform the appellate court
of the adoption until after the court had issued its opinion.
Children, adoptive families, natural parents, and this court demand
a substantially higher level of competency.
	Additionally, we note the compelling need for structured
reform in this area. The supplemental record contains a letter from
the presiding judge of the Cook County circuit court's child
protection division to one of the justices in the First District of our
appellate court. The letter illuminates the problems that exist in
this case and countless others. It reads in pertinent part as follows:
			"Under the Juvenile Court Act, when parental rights are
terminated, the child becomes eligible for adoption. The
adopting parents then petition for adoption in the County
Division of the Circuit Court. The child's adoption is
typically completed within three months to one year after
parental rights have been terminated.
			Little changes when a parent appeals an order
terminating parental rights. A parent who appeals a
termination of parental rights seldom requests a stay either
in the Child Protection Division or in the Appellate Court.
Accordingly, the child's case continues to progress as if
no appeal had been taken. The adopting parents petition
for adoption and a judge in the County Division finalizes
the adoption. Often the County Division judge is unaware
that a parent has appealed the order terminating parental
rights. ***
			If the appeal of the termination of parental rights is
successful and the adoption has been finalized, there may
be a need to undo the adoption. Undoing an adoption can
have traumatic effects on a child. Moreover, there are
legal difficulties in undoing an adoption. For instance, the
Adoption Act limits to one year the time period in which
to request relief under section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure. It is conceivable that that year will
have expired prior to the Appellate Court's decision.
			Even if there were no legal difficulties in vacating the
adoption, the potential traumatic effects that that action
has on a child remain. Granting a stay does not adequately
cure the problem. While it prevents the trauma caused by
vacating an adoption, it aggravates the emotional
problems that a child may experience because of a lack of
permanency. The need for permanence is one of the
purposes underlying the Juvenile Court Act and Federal
Child Welfare Legislation.
			From the child's perspective the best solution is an
expeditious resolution of the appeal. An expeditious
resolution minimizes delays for any child who is ready to
be adopted and increases the likelihood of an adoption for
a child for whom no adoptive placement has been
located."
We agree that expedience is a critical component of the adoption
process. Expediency, however, does not necessarily override
competing requirements of finality and stability. We therefore
conclude that, from the child's perspective, the best solution is an
expeditious resolution of the appeal and a stay pending that
resolution. Thus, significant, structured reforms are obviously
necessary to improve expediency while promoting finality and
stability.
III. CONCLUSION
	We hold that Wanda's filing of a notice of appeal did not
serve as a stay of the termination order. Wanda's failure to stay the
termination order allowed the adoption of Tekela and Ira to
proceed legally. The 12-month time limitation to challenge their
adoptions has passed and the adoptions were never challenged.
Therefore, the termination issue is moot as to Wanda's parental
rights over Tekela and Ira.
	We recognize that, when the appellate court issued its
opinion, it had no knowledge of the adoption and the fact that the
controversy had been rendered moot. Nonetheless, once the
appellate court learned of the adoption, it should have vacated its
opinion and, in turn, reinstated the circuit court's termination
order.
	We further hold that Wanda places the cart before the horse
when she argues that there can be no proper adoption because
there was no preceding, valid termination of parental rights. We
conclude that there was no proper reversal of the termination order
because there was a preceding, valid adoption that rendered
appellate review of the termination order moot.
	We therefore reverse the appellate court's judgment and
vacate its remand order as to Tekela and Ira. The circuit court's
order terminating Wanda's parental rights over Tekela and Ira is
reinstated. Wanda's parental rights over Kaylon are not before us
and therefore we do not disturb the appellate court's opinion and
remand order as it pertains to Kaylon.
Appellate court reversed in part 
and vacated in part;
 circuit court order reinstated in part.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	As a mother, Wanda Cooper has a fundamental right in the
care, custody and control of her children. In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (2001). As a civil litigant, Wanda Cooper has the right to
appeal any adverse final judgments rendered against her by the
courts of Illinois. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6; 155 Ill. 2d R.
301. Today's decision by the majority wrongly deprives Ms.
Cooper of each of these rights. I must therefore respectfully
dissent.
	The proceedings which gave rise to this matter commenced
when the State filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County
under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)) asking that Ms. Cooper be
declared an unfit parent, that her parental rights over her three
children be terminated, and that the Department of Children and
Family Services be appointed guardian with the power to consent
to the children's adoption.
	Because of a parent's fundamental right in the care, custody
and control of her children, the State must bear a heavy burden if
it wishes to sever parental rights without the parent's consent. In
re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d  at 365. Specifically, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an unfit person as
defined by section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)
(West 1998)). In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002); see In re
Latifah P., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1128 (2000); 705 ILCS
405/2-29(2) (West 1998).
	Adherence to this requirement is mandatory. The language of
the Juvenile Court Act is clear and unambiguous (In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 69 (1993)), and courts applying the statute must proceed
within the law's strictures (In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66).
Accordingly, a parent's rights may not be terminated without her
consent absent the requisite finding that the parent is unfit. See In
re Gibson, 24 Ill. App. 3d 981, 985 (1975). Indeed, terminating a
parent's rights involuntarily absent a prior showing of unfitness
would be unconstitutional. See In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d 468, 501 (1995).
	The appellate court held that the requisite prior showing of
unfitness has not yet been made in this case. 319 Ill. App. 3d at
673. The correctness of its judgment has not been challenged. That
being so, Ms. Cooper's parental rights remain in effect.
	Although the circuit court ruled otherwise when it granted the
State's petition to terminate parental rights and appoint a guardian
with power to consent to an adoption, that is of no consequence in
light of the subsequent reversal. Under Illinois law, a reversal
abrogates the circuit court's decree and leaves the cause as it stood
prior to entry of judgment, restoring the parties to their original
positions. See In re Marriage of Lehr, 317 Ill. App. 3d 853, 859
(2000). Once the appellate court reversed the circuit court's
judgment granting the State's petition, the circuit court's judgment
therefore ceased to have any effect. No further action by Ms.
Cooper was required. By operation of law, the finding that she was
unfit was rendered a nullity. She regained her parental rights as if
they had never been lost.
	A condition precedent to an adoption is either consent of the
parent or a finding by the court that consent is not required for the
reason of unfitness. See In re Petition of Smith, 4 Ill. App. 3d 261,
265 (1972). Because Ms. Cooper has not been found unfit and
because her parental rights remain in effect, Ira, Kaylon and
Tekela are not subject to adoption by third parties under the
Adoption Act. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998); In re
Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d  at 550 (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
("[t]ermination of parental rights is the necessary prerequisite to
granting a valid adoption").
	That the State opted to proceed with the adoption of Ira and
Tekela while Ms. Cooper's appeal of the circuit court's judgment
remained pending does not alter this conclusion. The circuit
court's judgment was a final judgment in a civil case and was
therefore appealable by Ms. Cooper as of right. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §6; 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. The only step Ms. Cooper was
required to perform in order to perfect that appeal was to file a
notice of appeal, which she did. No statute, rule of court or
principle of law obligated her to also move for a stay.
	Under the procedures established by our court, seeking a stay
pending appellate review of the trial court's judgment is optional.
It is not normally necessary in order to prevent the appeal from
being rendered moot. See O'Brien v. Cacciatore, 227 Ill. App. 3d
836, 842 (1992); Schaumburg State Bank v. Seyffert, 71 Ill. App.
3d 630, 635-36 (1979). As a result, a litigant's failure to request a
stay neither precludes him from appealing nor prohibits him from
receiving the relief he should have obtained in the lower court.
Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462,
516-17 (1988).
	A narrow and specific exception to this rule exists in cases
involving the sale of property to purchasers who were not parties
to the challenged judgment. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j); Steinbrecher v.
Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 526-28 (2001). That exception,
however, has no relevance to the matter before us here. Ira and
Tekela are not property up for sale. They are children, and Ms.
Cooper is still their mother. The appellate court was therefore
correct in denying the State's motion to vacate the court's
judgment as moot.
	In reaching this conclusion, I am as mindful as my colleagues
of the need for finality and stability in the adoption process. We
have long since established, however, that finality and stability
cannot excuse the failure to effectuate an adoption that complies
with the law. If parental rights have not been validly terminated,
an adoption based on that improper termination cannot stand, even
if the subject children are already in the custody and care of the
adoptive parents. See In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill. 2d 347 (1994);
In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d  at 501 (court will not
legitimate family relationship with adoptive parents "which has
come about in derogation of the procedural safeguards afforded fit
[parents] under the Adoption Act"-adoptive parents therefore
ordered to surrender child to his natural father despite passage of
years child spent in adoptive parents' care).
	In departing from these principles, the majority has embarked
on a dangerous course. If obtaining an adoption decree is adequate
to moot any challenge to the judgment terminating parental rights,
termination and adoption proceedings will degenerate into what
will, quite literally, be a race to judgment. Knowing that under
today's decision an adoption, once completed, will not be undone,
the State will inevitably be tempted to delay appeal of the
termination judgment as long as possible, while pursing the
adoption proceedings as quickly as possible. With proper case
management and careful timing, the adoptions, which are
technically consensual once the State is given authority by the
court to consent to the adoption, will always be concluded before
appeals of termination judgments, which will be contested. As a
result, the propriety of termination judgments will, for all practical
purposes, no longer be reviewable. No matter how flawed a
termination judgment might be, no matter how far it might depart
from statutory requirements or basic constitutional guarantees,
once the adoption decree is entered, the natural parents will be left
with no recourse.
	My colleagues will no doubt dismiss this concern with the
observation that aggrieved natural parents can stop the race simply
by seeking a stay of the termination judgment while it is being
appealed. If entry of an adoption decree cannot be undone,
however, it will not be sufficient merely to request a stay. Natural
parents will be able to preserve their parental rights and their right
to appeal the termination of those rights only if the request for a
stay is actually allowed. The problem is that under Supreme Court
Rule 305(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 305(b)), which governs such cases,
stays are not automatic. They are a matter for the court's
discretion. Accordingly, the majority's analysis ultimately places
a parent's fundamental rights wholly at the mercy of a judge's
subjective view of what is fair. While we may hope that judges
will exercise that discretion wisely, experience teaches that they
will not always do so. There will be occasions where prejudice or
ignorance prevail. No matter how rare such instances may be, I do
not believe we can sanction any system which allows even the
possibility that fundamental constitutional rights can be defeated
by a judge's personal bias or whim.
	Finally, I must take issue with the majority's attempt to place
blame for what happened here on Ms. Cooper. As noted earlier in
this dissent, Cooper did all that the law required her to do. When
the circuit court found her unfit and terminated her parental rights,
she promptly appealed. When that appeal succeeded, she regained
her parental rights by operation of law. No statute or rule of court
obligated her to take further action pending remand to the circuit
court.
	I note, moreover, that once the circuit court entered its order
terminating Ms. Cooper's parental rights and giving the State
power to consent to the children's adoption, she was not entitled
to any further notice before the adoption of her children could go
forward. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998); 750 ILCS 50/7A
(West 1998). The State was free to proceed with the adoption
surreptitiously and apparently did so. Not even the appellate court
was aware of it until it was completed. Accordingly, this is not a
situation in which a mother sat by and willingly allowed the State
to take action she knew to be contrary to her interests. Ms. Cooper
did not know what was going on, as far as this record shows, and
that is precisely what the State intended.
	Under these circumstances, I believe that if anyone is
blameworthy here, it is the State. The State had the knowledge and
power to prevent the disruption to the children's lives. Ms. Cooper
did not. The State knew full well of the pendency of Ms. Cooper's
appeal; it knew full well that the finding of unfitness and the
termination of Cooper's parental rights were subject to reversal;
and it knew full well that without the requisite finding of unfitness
and termination order, no valid adoption could stand. It
nevertheless decided to proceed with the adoption before the
outcome of the appeal was known.
	In embarking on that course of conduct, the State took the
same gamble any litigant takes when it chooses to receive benefits
from a judgment while the judgment is under appeal, namely, that
it will be divested of whatever rights it acquired under the
judgment and be required to relinquish those benefits if the
judgment is reversed. See Schaumburg State Bank, 71 Ill. App. 3d
at 636. Unfortunately, the gamble in this case involved children.
Unfortunately for the stability of the children's lives, the State's
gamble lost.
	Contrary to the majority's view, we are not left with a
situation that cannot be undone. We know where the children are,
and we know what the law requires. Until there is a valid
judgment finding Ms. Cooper unfit and terminating her parental
rights, there can be no adoption without her consent. Under the
statutes of Illinois and the federal and state constitutions, no other
conclusion is possible. We cannot allow rights as precious and
fundamental as those at stake here to be defeated by State-orchestrated deceit.
	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1Some states have implemented specific procedures for the type of
scenario that exists in the instant case. For example, Rule 9.146 of
Florida's Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that: "[t]he taking of
an appeal shall not operate as a stay in any case unless pursuant to an
order of the court, except that a termination of parental rights order with
placement of the child with a licensed child-placing agency or the
Department of Children and Family Services for subsequent adoption
shall be suspended while the appeal is pending, but the child shall
continue in custody under the order until the appeal is decided." Fla. R.
App. P. 9.146.