Title: ROBERT W. SIEVERS v. JOHN R. BARTON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, EX REL., OF THE ESTATE OF MERITT N. BARTON, DECEASED; MARJORIE BARTON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND GEORGE BARTON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT W. SIEVERS v. JOHN R. BARTON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, EX REL., OF THE ESTATE OF MERITT N. BARTON, DECEASED; MARJORIE BARTON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND GEORGE BARTON1989 WY 125775 P.2d 489Case Number: 88-235Decided: 06/02/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT W. SIEVERS, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

JOHN R. BARTON, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, EX REL., OF THE ESTATE OF MERITT N. BARTON, DECEASED; MARJORIE 
BARTON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND GEORGE BARTON, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Henry A. Burgess 
and Robert James Wyatt of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellant.

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and BROWN, Retired J.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     Meritt Barton and 
Caroline Barton, husband and wife, executed reciprocal wills. The residuary 
legatees in the two wills were identical. Appellant Robert W. Sievers was to 
receive one-half of the residuary estate according to each will with the balance 
to go equally to Meritt's niece and nephew.

[¶2.]     Mr. Barton survived his 
wife, Caroline, and probated her estate. He also changed his own will after his 
wife's death and made no provision for appellant. Appellant, contending that it 
was a breach of contract for Meritt Barton to change his will and eliminate 
appellant as a residuary beneficiary, filed an action for declaratory relief and 
for a redress of the rejection of his claim in probate against the estate of 
Meritt Barton. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of appellees 
John R. Barton as personal representative of the estate of Meritt Barton, 
Marjorie Barton and George Barton. This appeal followed.

[¶3.]     Appellant specifies the 
issues to be:

1. Whether Plaintiff's 
[appellant's] proffered documentary evidence and supporting testimony meet the 
requirements of Wyoming's Statute of Frauds [Wyo. Stat. (1977), § 1-23-105(a)] 
and raise issues of material fact.

2. Whether the District 
Court's failure to give Plaintiff/Appellant the benefit of all favorable 
inferences is reversible error.

3. Whether it is 
reversible error in this case for the District Court to keep Plaintiff from 
presenting his case to the jury by granting summary 
judgment.

[¶4.]     Appellees state the 
issues:

1. Did the trial court 
err in finding that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

(a) Considering the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, has he demonstrated prima 
facie that the Bartons agreed to make irrevocable wills, each promising to 
dispose of property to the other or, if the other be dead, one-half to Robert 
Sievers?

[¶5.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶6.]     Meritt N. Barton and 
Caroline R. Barton were married in 1940. During their married life, they put 
together a large and successful farm and ranching operation. Some of their 
property was held as tenants in common and some individually. In August 1977, 
Mr. and Mrs. Barton executed reciprocal wills. The residuary provisions in these 
reciprocal wills are of identical effect:

Caroline Barton 
                                            
Will Meritt N. Barton Will 

Dated August 23, 
1977                                            
Dated August 23, 1977

THIRD: If my 
husband survives                                
FOURTH: If my wife survives me                                         
                                                
me 

I give him all 
of my property of                                 
I give her all the rest of my property whatever kind and wherever 
located.                              
of whatever kind and wherever located.

FIFTH: I give my 
residuary estate                
SIXTH: I give my residuary estate to the following persons:                                             
to the following persons:

TO: ROBERT W. 
SIEVERS . . .                               
TO: MARJORIE BERTAGNOLLI

 one-half thereof                                            
. . . one-fourth thereof

TO: MARJORIE 
BERTAGNOLLI                 
TO: GEORGE BARTON . . . . . . 

one-fourth 
thereof                                          
one-fourth thereof

TO: GEORGE 
BARTON . . .                                    
TO: ROBERT W. SIEVERS . . . 

one-fourth 
thereof                                          
one-half thereof

The other 
residuary provisions in the wills were identical. Meritt and Caroline had no 
children; Marjorie Bertagnolli and George Barton are Meritt's niece and nephew. 
Robert W. Sievers is Caroline's only brother.

[¶7.]     Caroline Barton died 
May 11, 1981, and owned substantial real and personal property subject to 
probate. In the probate proceedings of Caroline's will, Meritt Barton filed a 
disclaimer to certain property in the estate consisting of $200,000 cash and 
real property located in Moorcroft, Wyoming. A partial decree of distribution, 
dated March 22, 1982, set over and distributed the property disclaimed to those 
named in the residuary clause of Caroline's will, that is, one-half to Robert W. 
Sievers, one-fourth to Marjorie Barton (Bertagnolli) and one-fourth to George 
Barton. Except for the property disclaimed, Meritt Barton received all of his 
wife's property in the probate proceedings.

[¶8.]     On February 12, 1987, 
Meritt Barton executed a new will and made no provision for appellant Robert W. 
Sievers. Meritt Barton died August 29, 1987, and his will was admitted to 
probate. On December 14, 1987, appellant filed a claim against the estate of 
Meritt Barton for one-half of decedent's residuary estate. The claim was 
rejected.

[¶9.]     On December 30, 1987, 
appellant filed this action seeking declaratory relief, pursuant to W.S. 
1-37-103 and 1-37-105, and a redress of the wrongful rejection of his claim 
against the estate of Meritt N. Barton, pursuant to W.S. 2-7-718. Both appellant 
and appellees demanded a jury trial. Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on May 26, 1988, and the motion was heard on June 21, 1988. An order 
granting summary judgment to appellees was filed July 6, 1988. On June 28, 1988, 
appellant filed a Motion for Amendment of Judgment which was heard on July 20, 
1988, and denied. That same day appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal.

[¶10.]  The trial court concluded that there was 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that appellees were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. When a case is in this posture, we review the 
record on appeal in a "`light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable inferences that can be 
drawn from the facts.'" Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 194 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987)) (emphasis added). See also 
Bowlerama, Inc. v. Woodside Realty Company, 752 P.2d 1377 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶11.]  Before appellant can prevail in this 
action, he must demonstrate that there was some evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the existence of a contract between Meritt 
Barton and Caroline Barton to dispose of their property in a certain way, that 
is, to devise and bequeath one-half of their residual estates to Robert W. 
Sievers.

[¶12.]  Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979) inferred that we may go beyond the 
two wills of the testators to determine if the testators contracted to dispose 
of their property in a certain way. Because of the absence of a contract set out 
in either Barton will, we must examine the record to see if there is other 
evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Barton contracted to dispose of their property in the 
way appellant alleges.

[¶13.]  The attorney for Meritt and Caroline 
Barton, Edward S. Halsey, prepared the August 23, 1977, wills at the request of 
Mr. and Mrs. Barton following a meeting in Mr. Halsey's office in early August 
1977. It is from this meeting that appellant claims there was an agreement. He 
directs our attention to specific testimony in the depositions of Mr. Halsey and 
appellant, which he contends is evidence of an agreement between Meritt Barton 
and Caroline Barton to have identical residuary clauses in their respective 
wills to the end that Robert W. Sievers would receive half of their residual 
estates. Appellant also alleges that the affidavits or depositions of three 
other people will tend to show the existence of an agreement. However, appellant 
does not tell us what these instruments say. Appellant further contends that the 
disclaimer in connection with the probate of Caroline Barton's will is evidence 
of an agreement.

[¶14.]  In his deposition, Halsey testified 
that:

Q. [By Mr. Burgess] They 
[Mr. and Mrs. Barton] could have had some agreement between them as to how their 
respective estates would be distributed and you would not have known about it; 
isn't that true?

A. That's 
true.

* * * * * 
*

Q. It's quite possible 
that Caroline and Meritt could have had an agreement between them in regard to 
the mutual dispositive provisions of their will of which you would have had no 
knowledge; isn't that true?

Mr. YONKEE: I object to 
the form of the question and the terminology quite possible. 
Answer.

Q. (BY MR. BURGESS) Well, 
it's possible.

A. It's 
possible.

* * * * * 
*

Q. Was there any 
conversation that you recall between Caroline Barton and Meritt Barton at that 
time concerning the making of wills?

A. I think Caroline might 
have said, right about that time, "Is that all right with you, Meritt?" And 
Meritt said words to the effect, "Whatever you want is fine with me, 
Caroline."

* * * * * 
*

Q. At that meeting, did 
Meritt Barton say anything about making a will?

A. * * * [H]e hadn't said 
anything, so I said, "How about you, Meritt, do you want to - are you going to 
make a will?" And he said, "Well, I probably should," or, "I guess I will," 
something to that effect.

And I said, "What do you 
want in your will?" And he said, "Well, make it like 
Caroline's."

* * * * * 
*

Q. (BY MR. BURGESS) When 
you were testifying just now, it was my understanding that you said that 
Caroline wanted half to her brother and half to Marjorie; is that 
correct?

A. I asked her if Meritt 
died before she did -

Q. 
Yeah.

A. - how did she want her 
property to go? And she said she wanted her brother to have part of her estate 
and leave him half and the other half to Marjorie and George, and said to 
Meritt, "Is that all right with you, Meritt?"

Q. And he said, 
"Yes"?

A. Meritt said, whatever 
you - words to the effect, "Whatever you want is all right with me, Caroline." 

Q. And then he had you 
draw a will with a similar provision?

A. Yeah. And I asked him 
if he wanted a will. He said, "I might as well have one."

I said, "What do you want 
in it?" And he said, "Make it like Caroline's."

[¶15.]  Based on the foregoing testimony from Mr. 
Halsey's deposition, appellant says in his brief:

It is 
Plaintiff/Appellant's position that Meritt and Caroline either (i) made a verbal 
agreement assuring their mutual respect for each others' intentions to keep 
their respective one-half of the total of their assets and ultimately cause it 
to descend to the designated members of their respective families before they went to Mr. Halsey's office; 
or else (ii) reached such a verbal agreement during the course of their meeting 
with Mr. Halsey the first week in August, 1977. [Emphasis in 
original.]

[¶16.]  There is nothing in the record that hints 
of an agreement existing before Mr. and Mrs. Barton went to see Mr. Halsey about 
the wills. What transpired in Mr. Halsey's office fell far short of amounting to 
an agreement to dispose of their property in a certain way. In appellant's own 
deposition of March 24, 1988, reference is made to a conversation in June 1981, 
between Meritt Barton and appellant. Appellant testified that Mr. Barton told 
him that his will was the same as Caroline's will, that appellant would get 
one-half of everything, and that he wanted to protect George and Margie. Meritt 
Barton also told appellant what "half of everything was."

[¶17.]  Regarding a conversation of a later date, 
appellant testified that Mr. Barton told him that he had changed his will and 
given the ranch to George and Margie but appellant should not worry because 
Barton had set aside two million dollars in the bank for him. Appellant stated 
he was of the impression that Mr. Barton did not realize he had disinherited 
appellant and that always, up to May 1987, Mr. Barton had indicated that 
appellant was taken care of because he had over two million dollars in the 
bank.

We summarized 
the definitions of joint, reciprocal 
and mutual wills in Shook, 599 P.2d  
at 1321 (emphasis added):

Although the courts have 
not been uniform in their use and definitions of the terms, we define "joint" 
wills, "reciprocal" wills, and "mutual" wills as follows: A "joint" will is a 
single testamentary instrument constituting or containing the wills of two or 
more persons, and jointly executed by them. "Reciprocal" wills are those in 
which each of two or more testators makes a testamentary disposition in favor of 
the other. "Mutual" wills are two or more 
separate instruments, each executed by separate testators and manifesting a 
common intention to dispose of their property in a particular manner. We do not 
include as part of the definition of a mutual will, as some courts do, the 
elements of execution by each testator pursuant to an agreement, each in 
consideration of the other. 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, §§ 11.1 and 11.3; 97 
C.J.S. Wills § 1364e(1); 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 754.

Shook also 
quoted Flohr v. Walker, 520 P.2d 833, 837 
(Wyo. 1974), 
wherein we said:

The general rule seems to 
be that a joint and mutual will executed pursuant to an agreement based on 
valuable consideration is contractual as well as testamentary and becomes an 
irrevocable obligation on the part of the surviving testator upon the death of 
the other party testate under a will which is in accord with the terms of the 
agreement. In re Estate of Wade, 202 Kan. 380, 449 P.2d 488, 493[1969]; Godwin v. 
Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, 259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456, 462-463[1963]; 
Alocco v. Fouche, 190 Cal. App. 2d 244, 11 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822[1961]; 57 
Am.Jur.Wills, § 712; 97 C.J.S. Wills, § 1367e(2), p. 307.

[¶18.]  It is not disputed that Mr. and Mrs. 
Barton made reciprocal wills. Perhaps these wills were also mutual according to 
the definition of mutual wills in Shook. That is not enough, however, to 
establish that Sievers is entitled to one-half of the Meritt Barton estate. We 
have said: 

Although the making of a 
joint or mutual will may be evidence of the contract, standing alone such will 
not be sufficient to establish it - unless, of course, the contract is recited 
in the wills. Joint wills are generally held to have a greater evidentiary 
weight in this respect than are mutual wills.

Shook, 599 P.2d  
at 1324.

The rule in this state is 
that the mere execution of mutual, reciprocal wills does not, in and of itself, 
prove the existence of an agreement between the testators. But such an agreement 
may appear by express reference thereto in the wills, or by 
inference.

Matter of Estate 
of Bell, 726 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1986). In Bell the court quoted 1 
Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 11.1, p. 544 (1960):

"The fact that joint 
wills and mutual wills are usually executed as the result of a common intention 
does not in any way mean that they are always executed pursuant to a contract 
between the parties respecting the making of such wills. * * * The sole fact, 
standing alone, that two wills were executed at or near the same time and bear 
similar provisions should in no way give rise to a presumption or an inference 
that they were made pursuant to a contract."

Bell, 726 P.2d  at 75. In 
Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 448, 240 P. 927, 929 (1925), this court said: 
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that mutual wills, made by 
separate instruments, do not afford sufficient evidence that the wills were made 
pursuant to a contract, and that, hence, if the contract is shown at all, oral 
evidence is necessary."

[¶19.]  In Bell, 726 P.2d  at 77 n. 1, the court noted it 
to be of interest that the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-701, 8 U.L.A. 155 (1983), 
provides:

"A contract to make a 
will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if 
executed after the effective date of this Act, can be established only by (1) 
provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an express 
reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of 
the contract; or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. 
The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a 
contract not to revoke the will or wills."

[¶20.]  Proof that Caroline and Meritt Barton 
executed mutual and reciprocal wills does not make out a prima facie case that 
would defeat appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. The wills alone do not 
prove an enforceable contract to make a will.

[¶21.]  After Caroline died, Meritt revoked his 
1977 will. He was free to do so. The general principles are set out in 
Canada, 240 P.  at 928 (citations 
omitted):

Wills are, as courts 
express it, ambulatory in their nature; that is to say, revocable at the 
pleasure of the testator until his death. In the absence of a contract, there is 
nothing to hinder a testator of sound mind from changing his will as often as he 
pleases. At the same time a man may make a contract to leave his property by 
will in the same manner that he may make a contract to sell it. It is said that 
such contracts are not favored, and the courts generally hold, upon good reason, 
that they must be clearly shown in order to be enforceable. If, however, they 
can be shown in the manner required by law, and if, further, they are based upon 
a valuable and sufficient consideration, there is no particular reason, we 
apprehend, why such contracts should be held to be against public 
policy.

[¶22.]  Appellant had the burden to prove that 
the 1977 will was irrevocable. In Canada, 240 P.  at 929-30, the court 
said it is not enough to prove an agreement to execute a 
will:

In the case at bar there 
is nothing in the wills executed by either party to indicate that it is made 
pursuant to a contract. The wills are in the ordinary form. While, perhaps, the 
execution thereof about the same time, indicates that there was some sort of 
understanding between the plaintiff and the deceased, the exact nature of the 
contract is not thereby shown. It is not impossible, or even improbable, that 
some conditions were attached to the contract. The decedent might have reserved 
the right to change her will upon change of circumstances, and the mere 
agreement to execute a will was not an agreement not to revoke it. We 
accordingly think that the wills alone are not sufficient memoranda to satisfy 
the statute of frauds.

[¶23.]  Appellant does not contend that there is 
a written contract and that Meritt Barton and Caroline Barton executed their 
wills according to the contract. There is no correspondence or other written 
memoranda signed by one of the deceased which evidences the existence of a 
contract. Appellant claims that there was an oral agreement, but the record does 
not support this contention. Furthermore, the Bartons did not relate such an 
agreement to appellant or their lawyer. At best, an inference may be drawn from 
Meritt Barton's statements to appellant that the 1977 wills were executed 
according to a common scheme or plan. There is nothing to show an agreement that 
Meritt's 1977 will could not be revoked. The last question asked of appellant in 
his deposition was:

Q. In any of the 
conversations that you had with Meritt or Caroline, did either one of them ever 
talk about an agreement that they would not revoke the wills they made in 
1977?

A. No, not as such 
specifically.

[¶24.]  Appellant asserts the existence of a 
contract and he carries the burden of proving it. Evidence offered in proof of 
an oral contract to make a will must be clear and convincing. Pangarova v. 
Nichols, 419 P.2d 688, 695 (Wyo. 1966). In Slover v. Harris, 77 Wyo. 295, 314 P.2d 953, 
961 (1957) (citations omitted), the court described the required standard of 
proof:

Additionally, in a case 
on an oral contract to make a will, the party seeking to establish the contract 
has a heavy burden. In 94 C.J.S., Wills § 113(2), p. 868, the rule is 
stated:

"Courts accept with 
caution and examine with scrutiny evidence offered in support of a contract to 
make a disposition of property of a deceased person different from that provided 
by law. * * * A high order of proof is required to sustain such contracts, and 
the claimant is held to a strict proof thereof, and the evidence must establish 
that the minds of the parties met on definite terms."

* * * In Clark 
v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502, 504 [1929], the court 
said:

"The plaintiff, in 
declaring specific performance of an oral contract must establish the terms 
thereof with a greater degree of certainty than is required in an action at law, 
and he must show a clear mutual understanding and a positive agreement of both 
parties to the terms of the contract."

[¶25.]  There is a lack of evidence in this case 
to prove that there was a contract as alleged by the appellant, and there is a 
failure to prove the terms of any such agreement. Appellant's testimony as to 
what Meritt Barton said is not enough. Considering his testimony in the most 
favorable light for appellant, Meritt simply said that he and Caroline made 
their wills together; that Sievers would get half of everything; and that Meritt 
Barton wanted to protect Marjorie and George. This evidence does not prove an 
irrevocable agreement. Furthermore, appellant's testimony as to what Meritt 
Barton said is not supported or confirmed by other evidence. Although Sievers' 
testimony may be admissible under W.S. 1-12-102, it cannot support a judgment 
without corroboration. Consolidated Construction, Inc. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902 
(Wyo. 
1981).

[¶26.]  It is held in Canada, 240 P. 
at 929, that an agreement to devise real estate comes within the statute of 
frauds:

A will is considered in 
the nature of a conveyance by way of appointment. A devisee comes within the 
legal definition of one who takes by purchase, and the courts are nearly 
unanimous in holding, under statutes such as we have in this state, that an 
agreement to devise real property is within the statute of frauds, and must be 
in writing.

Wyoming's present statute, W.S. 
1-23-105, is the same as W.C.S. 1920, § 4719, which was in force at the time 
Canada was decided. In pertinent part 
W.S. 1-23-105 provides:

In the following cases 
every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

* * * * * 
*

(v) Every agreement or 
contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one 
(1) year[.]

[¶27.]  This court held in Canada that the 
execution of reciprocal wills is not sufficient memoranda to satisfy the statute 
of frauds. Appellant argues that the disclaimer signed by Meritt Barton 
satisfies the "note or memorandum" requirement, but he does not show the court 
how the "disclaimer" refers to such a contract. For this to be accomplished 
there would have to be some proof that the disclaimer was done to carry out or 
partly perform the alleged contract. To the contrary, the disclaimer was not 
consistent with what the wills provided. Under Caroline's will, all of her 
property was to go to Meritt. There was no provision for Sievers to get anything 
under Caroline's will if Meritt survived. The disclaimer by Meritt was a 
gratuitous act and does not support or corroborate the notion of a contract 
between Mr. and Mrs. Barton. The only evidence concerning the purpose of the 
disclaimer was the testimony of the Bartons' accountant and their attorney who 
testified that when the disclaimer was executed Meritt Barton simply said he 
wanted Sievers to have something out of his sister's estate. Appellant can only 
speculate that some other or different motive caused Meritt Barton to sign and 
file the disclaimer.

[¶28.]  Clearly, Meritt Barton did not believe 
himself to be under any restriction as to changing his will. After his wife 
died, he made a new will which removed appellant as a beneficiary. In Slover, 
314 P.2d  at 962-63, this court set out the following 
principle:

In 94 C.J.S. 
Wills § 113(2), p. 870, it is stated:

"A will made in 
conformity with an alleged contract is strong confirmatory proof that such an 
agreement was entered into * * * but the subsequent execution of another will, 
not in conformity with the alleged contract, is strong evidence of the absence 
of such an agreement."

[¶29.]  The summary judgment was properly 
granted.

[¶30.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶31.]  After summary judgment was granted 
instead of trial, this court is presented with a factual review to re-examine 
whether a conflict issue existed. Intrinsic to me is the concern which has been 
in part motivated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, with which I 
do not agree, to move more case dispositions from live trial to papered 
presentation. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 
(1986).

[¶32.]  In this particularized factual case of a 
childless marriage, a large estate and reciprocal wills, conflict in concept 
reappears with summary judgment. Clearly, Meritt Barton and Caroline Barton, in 
joint endeavor in their attorney's office on August 23, 1977, intended to 
execute reciprocal wills so that each of them, with separate estates, would 
achieve a desired family division without regard for the happenstance of the 
first death between them.

[¶33.]  Contorted in this litigation is whether 
their conduct was mutually considered and factually adopted for action as an 
agreement or, conversely, that Meritt Barton did not enter into any 
understanding as a joint plan for the future and was only humoring Caroline 
Barton until she signed her will with mutuality to continue only until her then 
anticipated death. Normally, explicit notes of the scrivener-lawyer or explicit 
provisions in the will documents would have concluded the question one way or 
another. Unfortunately, that is neither the documentary result nor the factual 
record now presented for summary judgment. Maybe the questions were not asked; 
perhaps the answers were not given at will drafting and execution sessions. In 
any event, the instruments which were signed neither proved nor disproved a 
mutually adopted understanding between the husband and wife so that the 
testamentary beneficiaries and devisees were finitely established without 
difference as to who between them might first die.

[¶34.]  What did happen is that Caroline Barton 
died and Meritt Barton changed his will to disinherit her relative after 
receiving her estate.

[¶35.]  The circumstances of will execution and 
the identity of the results provided in consideration of their family status is 
evidence. I reject a legal conclusion from that evidence that Meritt Barton in 
effect did not intend to agree. Nothing as a matter of law convinces me that it 
was "King's-X, I did not mean it." This abbreviated factual record and totally 
inconclusive testimony from the third participant, the attorney who prepared the 
wills, does convince me that a proper trial, jury or bench, should be required 
for a factual decision, and the case should not be decided by an adjudication 
that no issue of fact exists. See Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 636 
(Wyo. 1986). 
It is not, in my opinion, possible to accurately conclude that: (1) at least 
something less than a scintilla of evidence existed of Meritt and Caroline 
Barton's mutual agreement to be found from what they actually did; or (2) that 
reasonable minds cannot differ as to factual significance of what the parties 
actually did "mutually." Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980). The legal standard that "[t]he 
motion for summary judgment should be sustained in the absence of a real and 
material fact issue considering movant's burden, respondent's right to the 
benefit of all favorable inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility 
questions to be resolved by trial," is not met by the factual ingredients of 
this reciprocal will case for proper disposition by summary non-trial 
adjudication. Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 640.

[¶36.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.