Title: People v. Blacksher

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 8/25/11 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S076582 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
ERVEN R. BLACKSHER, 
) 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 125666 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury found defendant Erven R. Blacksher guilty of the first degree murder 
of his nephew, the second degree murder of his sister, and being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.
1  It also found true the firearm-use allegations and the 
special circumstance of multiple murder.
2  The jury concluded defendant was sane 
and returned a verdict of death.   
This appeal is automatic.  We affirm. 
                                              
1  
Penal Code sections 187, 189, and 12021.  All further statutory references 
are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.   
2  
Sections 1203.06, 12022.5, and 190.2, subd. (a)(3). 
 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution’s case  
In 1989, after the death of his father, defendant moved in with his mother, 
Eva Blacksher, at her home in Berkeley.  Defendant was Eva‘s youngest and 
favorite child.3  She provided for him.  He did no work and paid no rent.  
Defendant was very controlling with his mother.  He demanded that his siblings 
not visit the home, insisting he could take care of everything on his own.   
In 1990, however, as Eva grew ill, defendant‘s sister, Versenia Lee, began 
caring for her.  Versenia moved into the home with her ex-husband, Sammie, and 
their son, Torey.  To make room for them, defendant moved into a small cottage 
behind the house.  Defendant became jealous as Eva‘s attention shifted away from 
him and towards Torey.   
By May 1995, the relationship between the 40-year-old defendant and 21-
year-old Torey became increasingly hostile.  Early on the morning of May 7, 1995, 
defendant visited his brother, Elijah Blacksher.  Defendant was angry, saying that 
Torey was ―fucking with‖ him.  Torey and his friends had threatened defendant 
and thrown rocks at his car.  Torey was dishonoring Eva by selling cocaine at her 
home.  Defendant asked Elijah to get him a gun so he could kill Torey.  Elijah 
refused and tried to reason with defendant, explaining that Torey was part of the 
family.  Elijah asked defendant not to return home but to spend the rest of the night 
at his residence.  Defendant refused and left.   
                                              
3 
Several members of the Blacksher family testified at the preliminary 
hearing and at trial.  We refer to these witnesses by their given names to avoid 
confusion and repetition. 
 
 
 
3 
Later that same day, defendant called and revisited Elijah.  On the telephone 
and in person he repeated his threats against Torey and said he was trying to find a 
gun.  When Elijah could not calm defendant, Elijah drove defendant to the home of 
their eldest brother, James, hoping James would have better success.   
There, defendant remained very angry.  In front of Elijah, James, and 
James‘s wife, Frances, he paced the floor and kept repeating that he was going to 
kill ―that punk‖ Torey and would also kill his sister Versenia if she got in the way.  
At various points, defendant threatened to ―knock‖ Torey‘s ―brains out‖ with a 
baseball bat and to get a gun and ―shoot the place up.‖  James urged defendant to 
calm down, leave Torey alone, and get some rest.  When defendant refused to 
listen, James told him to leave.  Defendant did so, saying he was going to buy a 
gun on the street.   
The next evening, defendant and Torey argued in the driveway outside 
Eva‘s home.  Versenia eventually broke up the argument and convinced Torey to 
come inside.   
 Hearing of the argument, Elijah visited defendant in the cottage.  Elijah 
told defendant to stay away from Torey, but defendant again said he was going to 
get a gun and shoot Torey.  Defendant said, ―Man, I done thought about it and 
thought about it and thought about it, I‘m going to kill him.‖   
About 11:00 p.m. that evening, Versenia reported the threats to police.  She 
told the responding officer, Officer Luis Mesones, that defendant was 
schizophrenic, had stopped taking his medication, and would sometimes become 
angry at people for no apparent reason.  Because defendant was not at home at the 
time, Officer Mesones had Versenia sign a citizen‘s arrest form.   
Between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., a noise awakened Versenia.  She found 
defendant sitting in the darkened living room with a baseball bat.  He said he was 
 
 
 
4 
waiting for Torey to come home so he could kill him.  Versenia again called the 
police, and Officer Mesones returned.  When Officer Mesones asked defendant if 
he had threatened Torey, defendant said Torey had ―disrespected my mother by 
bringing his friends in the house.‖  According to the officer, defendant was 
somewhat incoherent and stared ahead not looking at him.  Officer Mesones 
arrested defendant.   
About 3:00 a.m., defendant called his sister, Ruth Cole, and asked her to 
bail him out.  He repeatedly told her he wanted to kill Torey because Torey was 
being disrespectful towards Eva.   
On the morning of May 9, 1995, Eva and Versenia went to court and 
obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant.  After defendant was 
released from jail, he went to Eva‘s home and discovered his keys no longer 
worked.  He confronted Eva and demanded she give him the keys.  He told her to 
make Versenia and her family leave the house.  Eva relented and gave defendant 
the keys.  Versenia made arrangements to move by the first of the month.   
Later that day, defendant visited his sister Ruth, told her he knew about the 
restraining order, and repeatedly said he was going to kill Torey.  Ruth did not take 
defendant seriously, but reminded defendant that he was Torey‘s uncle.  Ruth‘s 
husband Willie arrived, and defendant told him he was going to kill Torey.  Asked 
why, defendant showed him a dent on his car and said that Torey had hit it with a 
brick.  Defendant also claimed Torey and his friends had been threatening him.  As 
defendant left Ruth‘s home, however, he said he was not going to kill Torey and 
that he did not want to ―get his hands dirty.‖   
The next day, on May 10, 1995, defendant went see to Elijah.  He restated 
his decision to kill Torey, and said he had found someone who was willing to sell 
him a .357 Magnum.  He did not care about the cost and had already withdrawn 
 
 
 
5 
money from the bank for the purchase.  Elijah asked defendant to give him the 
money, but defendant refused, saying he would get the gun and hurt Torey.   
Elijah called defendant the next morning, May 11, 1995, at 6:30 a.m.  When 
defendant admitted he had a gun, Elijah begged him to stay in his cottage until he 
got there.  Defendant hung up.   
About 7:00 a.m., Eva‘s next-door neighbor, John Adams, saw defendant 
back his car down to the end of the driveway.  Adams and defendant 
acknowledged each other and exchanged hellos.  Defendant went to his mother‘s 
bedroom, where Eva was still in bed.  He spoke briefly to her, and left her room.  
Eva heard Versenia exclaim that she had heard a gunshot and that she was going to 
check the house.  Eva then heard a single gunshot.  Eva got out of bed and saw 
Versenia fall to the ground, bleeding.  Eva then ran outside.
4   
Adams heard the gunshots and called 911.  Three other neighbors heard the 
gunshots as well.  One neighbor saw defendant leave Eva‘s house ―as if he was in 
a hurry,‖ just after she heard the gunshots.   
                                              
4  
By the time of trial, Eva Blacksher had been found incompetent to testify 
because of Alzheimer‘s dementia.  She had testified at the preliminary hearing but, 
due to her memory problems, she was unable to remember her prior statements 
made to a police officer and in an application for the temporary restraining order.  
Her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury by a deputy district 
attorney.  At trial, Eva‘s preliminary hearing testimony was impeached by 
Berkeley Police Inspector Alan Bierce, who had interviewed Eva the day after the 
murders. In Eva‘s statements to Inspector Bierce, she described hearing two 
gunshots soon after defendant had left her room.  Eva then saw Versenia enter the 
hallway and face the dining room, where Torey had been sleeping.  Eva heard 
Versenia ask someone, ―What are you doing?‖ or ―What is wrong with you?‖ just 
before hearing the third shot and seeing Versenia fall to the ground.   
 
 
 
6 
 Torey died of a gunshot wound to the back of his head.  A second bullet 
had missed Torey‘s head and passed through a nearby pillow.
5  Versenia died of a 
gunshot wound to the right side of her head.  Apparently, the bullet initially passed 
through her right index finger.  The bullets were fired by the same gun, either a 
.357 Magnum or a .38 Special revolver.   
About 7:40 a.m., defendant called James‘s home and spoke with his wife 
Frances.  Defendant nervously told her that he had heard gunshots at his mother‘s 
house and said someone should check on Eva.  Frances suggested he should do so, 
but defendant said he did not want to be a witness to whatever happened.  About 
7:45 a.m., defendant called his sister Ruth and told her he had heard gunshots and 
screaming at his mother‘s house.  He claimed he saw two masked men on the front 
porch, and asked Ruth to call the police.  She asked why he did not do so.  
Defendant said he was afraid they would question him.  He claimed he was calling 
from a friend‘s house but would not identify the friend.   
Later in the day, defendant went to a travel agency, bought a bus ticket to 
Reno, and booked a room at a hotel casino.  He made the reservations using Ruth‘s 
address.  The bus left at 12:55 p.m. that afternoon.   
Nearly 38 hours later, about 2:30 a.m. on May 13, 1995, defendant 
surrendered to Officer Martin Heist as he was sitting in his patrol car outside the 
Berkeley police station.  Defendant was carrying toiletries and wore a T-shirt that 
read, ―Reno, Nevada.‖   
                                              
5  
Toxicology tests showed that Torey had traces of morphine, codeine, 
cocaine, and methamphetamine in his bloodstream and three bundles of rock 
cocaine in one of his socks.   
 
 
 
 
7 
2.  Defense case  
The defense played the recording of Adams‘s 911 call.  During that call 
Adams said he believed defendant suffered from mental illness.   
The defense also presented evidence that, during the 1980‘s, the Social 
Security Administration found defendant eligible for benefits based on paranoid 
schizophrenia.   
A clinical psychologist, Gerald Davenport, examined defendant to 
determine his competence to stand trial in both 1984 and in 1996.
6  In 1984, he 
diagnosed defendant as a paranoid schizophrenic in remission, but found him 
competent.  In 1996, he did not formally diagnose defendant but, based on an 
interview, Dr. Davenport believed that defendant was still suffering from 
schizophrenia.  Defendant appeared hyperactive, suspicious, and overly boisterous, 
used ―bizarre verbiage,‖ and was inappropriately ―euphoric‖ at times.  He behaved 
as if he were hearing voices, although he denied experiencing hallucinations.   
Dr. Davenport also recounted defendant‘s history of mental illness.  
Between 1975 and 1986, defendant was hospitalized at least five times due to 
suicidal thoughts, schizophrenia, psychotic depression, paranoia, and religious 
delusions.  Between 1986 and 1996, he received mental health treatment at least 
eight different times.  Medical records showed defendant had been repeatedly 
diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia.   
Defendant was convicted as charged and the trial moved to the sanity phase. 
                                              
6  
The trial court instructed the jury that Dr. Davenport‘s testimony was 
admitted only to impeach the testimony of several of defendant‘s family members 
who had claimed they were unaware that defendant suffered from mental illness.   
 
 
 
8 
B.  Sanity Phase 
1.  Defense case  
Defendant‘s juvenile delinquency history began with a burglary at the age 
of eight.  Between the ages of nine and 17, defendant committed at least 13 
different offenses, including malicious mischief, extortion, burglary, theft, and 
robbery.  He was confined to the California Youth Authority intermittently during 
his teenage years.  Following his last juvenile offense, the court referred defendant 
for a 90-day psychiatric evaluation.  His IQ tested in the low-normal range.  An 
earlier IQ test, subsequently criticized for racial bias, yielded a score in the 
retarded range.  Defendant admitted using drugs, including heroin, LSD, 
methamphetamine, and barbiturates beginning at the age of 16.   
He was hospitalized for the first time at the age of 21 in 1975.  His 
probation officer reported that he was depressed with suicidal thoughts.  When 
admitted to Napa State Hospital, he was described as being in a ―confused, 
disorganized, agitated state as a result of recent drinking.‖  He was discharged 
after three days.   
In December 1977, defendant was hospitalized at Highland Hospital. The 
mental health unit at the county jail reported he had complained of hearing voices 
and seeing a small man sitting on his bed.  Defendant told his treating clinician that 
he resented his father for ignoring him during childhood.  The clinician did not 
believe defendant was schizophrenic, but thought he was suffering from a 
psychotic reaction to alcohol abuse.   
Just over a week later, defendant was again hospitalized, claiming he heard 
voices, had hallucinations of a little man criticizing him, and felt suicidal.  He 
claimed he had been seeing the little man for two years and the hallucinations were 
becoming so severe that he did not feel like living any more.  Defendant reported 
 
 
 
9 
consuming a pint of scotch daily in the months before his incarceration.  He also 
claimed two incidents of untreated head trauma during his childhood, one of which 
resulted in a day of nausea and vomiting.  Defendant was diagnosed with psychotic 
depressive reaction, received the antipsychotic drug Mellaril, and released five 
days later.
7   
Throughout 1978, defendant remained in jail but continued to have follow-
up examinations by mental health specialists.  One of these specialists, Sophia 
Miles, noted that defendant continued to be depressed but was slowly improving.  
She diagnosed a depressive reaction with alcohol abuse and maintained him on 
Mellaril.   
Upon release defendant stopped taking his medication.  On November 30, 
1979, he was referred to Highland Hospital for a 72-hour involuntary commitment.  
He had stopped taking Mellaril and had become ―acutely psychotic,‖ with 
―auditory hallucinations [and] alterations in visual perception.‖  He held the 
paranoid belief that people were trying to kill him.  The treating physician at the 
hospital diagnosed a resurgence of schizophrenia.  Defendant was injected with 
antipsychotic medication, improved, and was released.   
On March 28, 1980, defendant was recommitted for 12 days.  His treating 
physicians described him as suffering from auditory hallucinations, with thought 
                                              
7  
Ruth Gades was a licensed social worker who treated defendant during this 
time.  She testified during the sanity phase that, in retrospect, she was skeptical of 
defendant‘s claims of seeing a little man.  She had never seen any of her other 
patients describe that kind of hallucination.  Based on her subsequent experience in 
treating inmates, Gades believed that defendant could have manipulated his 
caregivers in order to be admitted to a mental health facility.  Gades also believed 
that defendant‘s hallucinations were not the result of schizophrenia but were from 
―alcohol psychosis‖ due to the lingering effects of chronic alcohol abuse on the 
brain.   
 
 
 
10 
interruptions most likely stemming from the high-pitched voices he heard.  While 
hospitalized, defendant appeared depressed and suicidal.  Again diagnosed with 
psychotic depressive reaction, defendant was given Mellaril, and released.  In 
follow-up visits, defendant appeared to be taking his medications and was no 
longer psychotic.  In June 1981, defendant attempted suicide by overdosing on 
sleeping pills.   
In August 1981, defendant was again incarcerated.  While in custody he 
was committed for a mental health evaluation and treatment.  He complained that 
his incarceration had prevented him from taking his medications and that he again 
heard voices.  His treating physician saw no direct signs of hallucinations.  He 
diagnosed a major depressive disorder with psychotic features and antisocial traits, 
and represcribed Mellaril, which was later changed to another antipsychotic, 
Thorazine.  Sophia Miles, who saw defendant on his follow-up visits, described 
defendant as depressed, but not psychotic or out of touch with reality.
8   
On June 18, 1984, defendant‘s future wife brought him to the hospital 
because he had not slept for five days and was preoccupied with religion.
9  
Defendant arrived holding his girlfriend with one hand and clutching a Bible in the 
other, claiming that certain Bible passages referred directly to him.  He was given 
Mellaril and discharged, but committed the next day having overdosed on the 
                                              
8  
Miles testified that if defendant were actually suffering from schizophrenia, 
any prolonged period without medication would most likely result in his 
hospitalization because his illness would easily draw the attention of others.   
9  
Defendant was married twice, had a son with his second wife in 1985, and 
two more sons with other women in 1988 and 1994.  The prosecution elicited 
testimony from Dr. Pierce that defendant reportedly had been violent towards his 
ex-wives during their relationships.   
 
 
 
11 
Mellaril.  Medical records described defendant as depressed, paranoid, mumbling 
incoherently, and pacing.  He was discharged on June 25, 1984.   
On August 2, 1984, defendant was yet again committed after his mother and 
sister-in-law reported that he appeared to hear voices, was paranoid and agitated, 
talked incoherently, and appeared disoriented.  Straight-jacketed and given 
Mellaril, defendant calmed down enough to be sent home.  His fiancée‘s mother 
strongly protested his release.   
In October 1984, defendant again began acting strangely.  His family 
persuaded his parole officer to return defendant to jail so he could receive 
treatment.  A jail therapist evaluated defendant and had him committed because he 
was paranoid, expressed a preoccupation with sex and religion, and appeared to be 
having auditory and visual hallucinations.  Defendant was released after 35 days.  
During his stay, he was slow to improve.  He complained of hallucinations and 
said ―men and women had been entering his body through suction.‖  His treating 
physicians tried various psychotropic medications.  Defendant responded 
somewhat to Mellaril and lithium, which is used to treat mania.  Defendant‘s 
discharge diagnosis was bipolar disorder with psychotic features.   
In 1985, defendant was moved to the California Medical Facility at 
Vacaville.  Before his scheduled release in the summer of 1986, the Board of 
Prison Terms ordered a mental health evaluation.  Defendant was diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, with paranoid features in remission, and with mixed substance 
abuse and antisocial personality disorder.  The report noted that defendant did not 
appear psychotic in interviews but did choose his words carefully and sometimes 
laughed and smiled inappropriately, as if responding to internal stimuli.  While in 
prison, defendant was unable to hold a job due to ―bizarre‖ behavior.  The report 
predicted that defendant would likely deteriorate upon release.   
 
 
 
12 
On October 6, 1986, defendant‘s parole officer had him committed because 
defendant declared he was a woman.  He had insisted on using the women‘s 
bathroom at church and claimed he had been mistakenly raised as a man.  He 
objected to being addressed as ―sir,‖ and made frequent religious references.  He 
denied hallucinations, but laughed inappropriately as if responding to internal 
stimuli.  Defendant was forcibly injected with Haldol, a potent antipsychotic 
medication.  Defendant did not appear to be a threat to himself or others, but the 
medication did not alleviate defendant‘s delusion that he was a woman.  Against 
the advice of his treating physician, defendant discharged himself at the end of the 
72 hours and balked at the idea of taking any medication.  Defendant was 
diagnosed as having chronic and delusional paranoid schizophrenia.   
From 1987 to 1988, defendant was again incarcerated at the California 
Medical Facility at Vacaville.  There, he claimed he was homosexual and insisted 
he be housed only with other gay inmates in administrative segregation.  He 
refused to take his medication.  Staff and fellow inmates reported that defendant 
was paranoid, and sometimes incoherent, and would yell and laugh 
inappropriately.  He was given the probable diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.   
Defendant had no further mental health institutionalizations after January 
21, 1988, but continued to receive disability payments for mental illness until his 
arrest for the present offenses.  Defendant‘s girlfriend said defendant continued to 
suffer delusions after his release from incarceration in the early 1990‘s.  Defendant 
at various times believed he had two heads or the head of a dog, thought people 
looked like devils, believed he was Jesus and his mother was ―the Earth Mother,‖ 
and was convinced he was the only man with male genitalia.   
Dr. Michael Levin, who had diagnosed defendant with paranoid 
schizophrenia in 1986, testified that schizophrenia is a severe, lifelong mental 
 
 
 
13 
illness in which a person‘s ―internal psychiatric or psychic life‖ becomes more real 
and important to him than the outside world.  It impairs his ability to assess reality.  
A schizophrenic will often stare off into space or laugh inappropriately, because he 
is responding to internal stimuli or hallucinations.  Some patients with milder 
symptoms are able to function well if medicated.  Nonmedicated schizophrenics 
may remain ―out of trouble‖ because they are withdrawn and keep to themselves.  
Schizophrenics commonly do not recognize themselves as mentally ill.   
Dr. William Pierce testified that during a psychotic episode a schizophrenic 
would be extremely impulsive and would respond to internal stimuli.  The person 
would be in a manic state and nonresponsive to external reality.  A psychotic 
episode would disrupt the person‘s cognitive functions and severely affect the 
ability to concentrate, anticipate, and plan.   
Based upon defendant‘s mental health records, interviews of defendant‘s 
friends and family, prior competency examinations, 10 and his own 1995 and 1997 
examinations of defendant, Dr. Pierce believed defendant suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia.  During interviews, defendant was rambling and incoherent, with 
tangential and disordered thinking.  Defendant launched into grandiose rants about 
Moses, Ali Baba and the 40 thieves, Africa and the Middle East.  He claimed he 
knew Alexander the Great and was related to Caesar and Cleopatra.  According to 
Dr. Pierce, during testing defendant appeared internally preoccupied when directed 
to perform certain tasks.  Dr. Pierce believed defendant had a poor ability to 
control a ―vivid fantasy life‖ and that he would have difficulty separating his 
internal experiences from external reality.  Based on Officer Mesones‘s description 
                                              
10   
The defense also introduced evidence of defendant‘s 1996 competency 
examinations.  (See post, at p. 61.) 
 
 
 
14 
of defendant on May 8, 1995 as he waited in his mother‘s living room with a 
baseball bat, Dr. Pierce believed defendant was having a psychotic episode.  In his 
opinion that incident alone would have justified an involuntary mental health 
commitment.   
But Dr. Pierce could not state with confidence whether defendant was 
having a psychotic episode at the time of the murders.  In fact, he stated defendant 
probably could have distinguished between right and wrong before the murders 
given that, at one point, he told his sister Ruth he was not going to ―get his hands 
dirty‖ by killing Torey.  Dr. Pierce also acknowledged there was no overt evidence 
that defendant was suffering from hallucinations around the time of the murders.  
His efforts to conceal the crime and flee to Reno showed his cognitive functions 
were not completely impaired.   
2.  Prosecution’s case  
To rebut the defense‘s claim of insanity, the prosecution presented the 
testimony of defendant‘s older siblings, his statements to police, and the testimony 
of law enforcement personnel who had observed defendant after his incarceration 
for these offenses. 
Defendant‘s elder brother, Artis Blacksher, Jr., testified defendant was his 
mother‘s favorite child.  Their father was a strict disciplinarian who beat the 
children when they misbehaved.  Their parents prohibited fighting and taught them 
to obey rules.   
As defendant grew into an adult, both Artis and his sister Ruth said 
defendant mocked the idea of working for a living.  Defendant told his siblings 
that working was not his ―thing‖ and that he was going to ―beat the system.‖  
 
 
 
15 
Defendant repeatedly rejected his siblings‘ attempts to encourage him to find 
work.
11   
Artis, who moved out of the family household when defendant was five 
years old, was unaware that defendant was ever hospitalized.  He knew of no other 
family members who ever required psychiatric care.   
About a month after the murders, defendant wrote a letter to his mother, 
referring to Torey, not by name, but as ―the punk.‖  Defendant also wrote several 
letters to Ruth in which he made numerous religious references.   
Two days after the murders, defendant was interrogated by Deputy District 
Attorney Richard Moore and Berkeley Police Investigator Douglass Wright.  In the 
tapes of that interview, defendant claimed he walked out of his cottage on the 
morning of the murders, backed his car down the driveway, and exchanged 
pleasantries with his neighbor.  He went inside the house, spoke to his mother 
briefly, and saw Torey asleep and Versenia lying in bed.  After using the 
bathroom, he left through the front door and discovered two masked men on the 
front porch.  They motioned for him to leave.  He did not see any weapons, but 
they carried themselves as if they were armed.  As defendant got into his car, he 
saw the men enter his mother‘s home then heard what sounded like gunshots.  He 
thought the men were there for Torey and believed they would leave his mother 
and sister alone if he did not interfere or try to call the police.  He acknowledged 
he called his sister Ruth to report what had happened and later went to a restaurant 
for breakfast.  He decided to leave town because he did not want to be involved 
with the police.  He eventually went to Reno because he did not want to face the 
                                              
11  
Defendant‘s employment history was meager, but records indicated he 
briefly worked as a cook in 1984.   
 
 
 
16 
reality that something may have happened to his mother.  His clothes were worn, 
so he left them in his hotel room and bought new ones.  Defendant claimed Torey 
was his favorite nephew, but admitted having problems with him in the days 
before the murders.  He repeatedly denied telling family members he wanted to kill 
Torey, but admitted saying he wanted to hurt him.  Defendant also denied having 
any mental problems.   
According to law enforcement personnel, during his incarceration for the 
present offenses, defendant never reported any mental illness or hallucinations, and 
was on no medication.  He did, however, insist that he was homosexual.  Jail 
officials later removed him from administrative segregation, over his protest, 
believing there was no basis for his claim.  One deputy sheriff described defendant 
as having ―temper tantrums.‖  According to the deputy, he saw defendant scream 
and yell at people a few times without apparent provocation.  Once, defendant 
began screaming and banging his cell door for no apparent reason.   
The jury rejected defendant‘s insanity claim and the penalty phase began. 
C.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution’s case  
a.  Defendant’s prior violent offenses 
On October 10, 1984, defendant, while waiting in a holding cell, was 
agitated and pacing, making comments about ―whitey.‖  He assaulted two White 
inmates in the holding cell, hitting one of them on the back of the head and 
punching the other inmate in the face, causing profuse bleeding.   
On January 25, 1988, at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, 
defendant punched another inmate in the face after an argument in the shower.  
The inmate was knocked to the ground and suffered swelling around the eye.   
 
 
 
17 
On January 5, 1989, defendant threatened his father with a butcher knife 
during an argument about defendant‘s failure to pay rent.  The father, who was 
terminally ill with stomach cancer, was nervous and shaking.  When defendant 
refused to put down the knife, Eva and defendant‘s sister, Ruth, shielded the father 
and took him to another room.  As his mother guarded the other side of the door, 
defendant repeatedly hit the door frame with the knife, threatening to kill his 
mother if she did not get out of his way.  When the police arrived, the father 
declined to have defendant arrested.   
On February 17, 1990, while Ruth and Artis were visiting their mother, 
defendant complained about Artis‘s presence.  When Artis refused to leave, 
defendant picked up a butcher knife and began pacing and complaining about his 
brother‘s presence.  Artis kept defendant at bay with a chair and umbrella, while 
Ruth and Eva tried to convince him to put down the knife.  Eva called the police, 
but defendant left just before they arrived.  Later that day, defendant returned and 
told his mother that she had to choose between him or his siblings.  He told Ruth 
and Artis that he did not want them coming to the house anymore.   
On July 10, 1991, defendant created a disturbance on a bus. The driver 
contacted the police to have him removed.  As a deputy sheriff began to escort him 
off the bus, defendant walked down the aisle and punched a teenage boy in the 
face.   
On April 16, 1995, defendant picked up his girlfriend, LaDonna T., at the 
airport, and drove her to his cottage instead of her residence as she had requested.  
As LaDonna sat on defendant‘s bed, he suddenly jumped on her and punched her 
in the face.  Defendant continued to punch her, and kicked her after she fell to the 
floor.  Defendant accused LaDonna of having an affair while she was gone.  Torey 
came to the door and yelled at defendant to leave her alone, but defendant told 
 
 
 
18 
Torey to mind his own business.  Defendant ordered LaDonna to take off her 
clothes and raped her.  Afterwards, defendant took her home and acted as if 
nothing had happened.  Fearful, LaDonna did not report the rape, but discontinued 
their relationship.  LaDonna testified defendant had an erratic personality and 
would sometimes swear at strangers in public.  Defendant once claimed he saw a 
man with four legs sitting outside a restaurant.   
The parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of seven prior 
felonies, including five burglaries, an assault, and possessing narcotics for sale.   
b.  Victim impact testimony 
Ruth last spoke with her sister Versenia two days before her murder.  
Versenia was crying because Eva had let defendant back in the house.  Ruth was 
unable to console Versenia because defendant was in Ruth‘s house during the 
phone call.  Ruth deeply regretted her inablity to comfort her sister during their last 
conversation.  Ruth was ―devastated‖ by the loss of her sister and nephew.  She 
described panicking when seeing all the bloodstains on the floor and furniture in 
her mother‘s home.  She had difficulty accepting that her sister and nephew were 
dead until she saw their bodies at the mortuary.  She spent $8,000 on funeral 
expenses.   
Ruth also described her mother‘s reaction to the murders.  Eva cried 
constantly over the loss of her daughter and grandson.  Ruth frequently took her 
mother to visit their graves, which seemed to give her some relief.  Eva repeatedly 
asked why defendant killed them.   
 
 
 
19 
Sammie Lee, Torey‘s father and Versenia‘s ex-husband,12 said he ―went 
off‖ when he discovered that they were dead.  Sammie was in disbelief and had 
difficulty concentrating at work.  For a time he stayed at Ruth‘s home, but decided 
that staying at Eva‘s home would help him get over his feelings.  Once there, 
surrounded by pictures of Torey and Versenia, he could not sleep, and began 
drinking heavily.  Sammie eventually lost his job, and Ruth urged him to seek help.   
 
Artis said he felt like he had been ―run over by a train‖ when he learned that 
his sister and nephew were dead.  He tried unsuccessfully to find and hurt 
defendant after the murders.   
The prosecution also displayed the clothes Torey and Versenia wore at the 
time of their murders.   
2.  Defense case 
Defendant‘s brother Elijah, sister Georgia Hill, Georgia‘s ex-husband 
Ronald Hill, and Versenia‘s ex-husband Robert Ruffin13 testified as to defendant‘s 
family history and character. 
Defendant‘s father was an alcoholic and often absent.  He abused his wife 
and was frequently unfaithful.  Defendant would sometimes try to stop his father 
from striking his mother.  The father had a reputation for wielding a knife during 
arguments.   
Defendant‘s mother was protective of defendant because he was the 
youngest child and had mental problems.  As a child, defendant was obese and 
                                              
12  
Versenia and Sammie had divorced in 1987.  Versenia‘s second marriage 
also ended in divorce.  By the time of the murders, Sammie and Versenia had 
reunited, were living together, and intended to remarry.   
13  
Robert Ruffin was married briefly to Versenia in 1992.  During that time, 
he was a frequent visitor to Eva‘s home and saw defendant often.   
 
 
 
20 
often teased.  At school, he would do peculiar things like get lost or wander into 
the girls‘ bathroom.  He would often talk to himself, and was sometimes difficult 
to converse with.  His mind wandered and he seemed distant.   
Defendant was repeatedly fired from jobs because he would wander off.  He 
was fired as a cook because he let a pan catch on fire and simply laughed as it 
burned.  Defendant‘s behavior became more unusual after he saw his cousin Floyd 
shot to death by police.  Defendant subsequently began hallucinating, laughing out 
loud without reason, and offering his own bizarre interpretations of the Bible.   
Other family members suffered from alcoholism and mental illness.  An 
aunt committed suicide; a cousin attempted suicide; a niece had signs of mental 
illness.   
Defendant‘s siblings were deeply divided.  Older siblings, Ruth, Artis, and 
James, were fairly uninvolved in the upbringing of their younger siblings, having 
moved from the household to start their own families.14  Defendant‘s mother 
added defendant‘s name to the deed of her home and named him a beneficiary in 
her will because she wanted to provide for him in case something happened to her.  
The older siblings were jealous of the attention and support his mother gave 
defendant.  They refused to believe he had any disabilities.  The younger siblings, 
however, expressed compassion for defendant, and believed he suffered from a 
mental disability.  Georgia and Elijah thought that the older siblings stood to gain 
from defendant‘s death by inheriting their mother‘s assets and that they were ―in 
denial‖ about the problem of mental illness in the family.   
                                              
14   
Another sibling, Ruby Lindsey, lived in Texas and had little involvement in 
any of the family disputes.   
 
 
 
21 
Defendant got along well with Elijah‘s family.  He was close to Elijah‘s 
children and to his sister Versenia.  He was also very involved in the life of his 
youngest child and tried to be a good father to him.  Elijah and Georgia‘s ex-
husband Ronald Hill were surprised that he hurt Versenia and expressed doubt that 
he actually killed her.  Elijah, Georgia, and Ronald all believed defendant should 
not be put to death because of his mental problems.   
  Friends of the Blacksher family also testified on defendant‘s behalf.  Many 
had frequently observed defendant talking to himself, making abrupt changes in 
topics of conversation, and staring off into space.   
Longtime family friend Alisa Nelson, a former peace officer and an 
associate governmental analyst with the California Department of Alcohol and 
Drug Programs, believed defendant suffered from a mental disorder.  Nelson saw 
defendant pace and talk to himself.  Sometimes he would quote from the Bible 
inaccurately.  On one occasion, defendant glared at her and verbally abused her for 
no apparent reason.  When she asked him what he was doing, defendant ―snapped 
out of it,‖ as if he suddenly realized he had been talking to the wrong person, and 
walked away.   
 Eva‘s neighbor, Diane Marks, knew defendant well, and he always treated 
her with respect, frequently cared for her dog, and offered to help with her 
yardwork.  Eva once told Marks that defendant could become angry if he did not 
take his medication.   
According to Clarence Burrell, a former San Quentin correctional officer 
and a friend of defendant‘s sister Georgia, defendant appeared to be living in the 
past and kept a 1960‘s hairstyle.  Once, defendant professed that either he was 
―crazy‖ or ―the world‘s crazy.‖   
 
 
 
22 
Patricia White-Brown, the mother of defendant‘s ex-girlfriend Tracy and 
the grandmother of defendant‘s youngest son, said she never noticed anything 
unusual about defendant‘s behavior.  Defendant was respectful to her and worked 
hard to help get her daughter off drugs.  White-Brown thought defendant was a 
good father.   
Alisa Nelson, Diane Marks, and Patricia White-Brown all said they were 
against capital punishment.  Marks and White-Brown believed defendant did not 
deserve to die because he was a good person.  Nelson thought defendant should 
live because he had a son.  He was mentally ill, and the family had already suffered 
enough tragedy.    
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A.  Defendant’s Competency to Stand Trial  
Defendant claims he was denied federal due process of law because he was 
incompetent to stand trial.  He contends the court abandoned the duty to exercise 
its discretion by appointing and relying on a ―tie-breaking‖ third expert when the 
first two experts disagreed as to defendant‘s competency.  He further argues the 
court abused its discretion by relying on the allegedly insufficient examinations of 
the two experts who concluded defendant was competent.  We find no abuse of 
discretion and no error in the competency determination. 
1.  The Competency Proceedings 
On April 19, 1996, defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant‘s 
competence to stand trial.  Under sections 1367 and 1368, the court 
suspended proceedings and appointed Psychologist Gerald Davenport and 
Psychiatrist Joel Fort to examine defendant.  They submitted conflicting reports.   
Dr. Davenport found defendant incompetent to stand trial, but believed he 
could regain competence through medication and psychological treatment.  During 
 
 
 
23 
his interview, defendant ―talked non-stop for approximately an hour and fifteen 
minutes.‖  Although defendant initially presented ―a logical thought process,‖ his 
―thought confusion‖ gradually revealed itself.  Defendant appeared suspicious and 
had ―severe mood swings‖ throughout the interview.  At times, he appeared 
―anxious and depressed,‖ while at other times he appeared ―euphoric and laugh[ed] 
wildly‖ for no apparent reason.  Although defendant denied any hallucinations, ―he 
clearly was responding to internal stimuli.‖  He spoke loudly, repeated himself, 
could not sit still, had ―delusions of persecution,‖ engaged in loose and tangential 
thinking, and used bizarre verbiage.  Defendant occasionally could think 
abstractly, ―but unfortunately would very quickly become overly involved in his 
thought process,‖ ―lose his focus,‖ and use strange words.  Defendant‘s 
presentation was ―so severe‖ that Dr. Davenport questioned whether he was 
malingering, and asked to review his mental health records.  According to Dr. 
Davenport, those records showed that defendant had received ―very little 
intervention over time.‖  Although defendant appeared to understand the charges 
against him and the roles of the participants in the courtroom, Dr. Davenport 
believed he was not capable of assisting in his own defense.   
Dr. Fort concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.  He reviewed 
defendant‘s background information, including the circumstances of these offenses 
and his mental health history.  During defendant‘s interview, he was ―cooperative, 
talkative, oriented,‖ and appeared to have ―average intelligence and memory.‖  Dr. 
Fort reported defendant understood the charges against him, the roles of the 
participants at trial, and the purpose of his next court appearance.  Dr. Fort also 
noted defendant was able to summarize the testimony of three witnesses, and was 
able to read and approve a lengthy motion.  Dr. Fort noticed no signs of 
hallucinations or delusions except that defendant claimed he did not exist anymore 
 
 
 
24 
because he ―died in 1984 and someone else took control.‖  Dr. Fort did not believe 
this delusion affected defendant‘s mental state or was related to the crimes.   
Noting that the doctors‘ reports were ―at opposite ends of the opinion 
scale,‖ on May 23, 1996, the court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Fred Rosenthal, to 
conduct a third competency examination.   
Dr. Rosenthal found defendant competent.  He described defendant as 
―calm and in control‖ during his interview, although he was ―somewhat rambling,‖ 
exhibited ―indications of paranoid thoughts‖ about his case, and had ―a somewhat 
distorted, self-justifying attitude about his current problems.‖  Defendant ―seemed 
to maintain his hold on reality to some extent,‖ and there were no indications he 
was suffering from any hallucinations or any other severe cognitive deficits.  
Based on defendant‘s interview and mental health history, Dr. Rosenthal believed 
defendant suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was in denial about 
his mental disorder.  Dr. Rosenthal reported that defendant was able to understand 
the charges against him and discuss his legal situation in a ―coherent‖ and ―fairly 
reasonable manner,‖ except when he professed his innocence and exhibited 
paranoid thoughts about being falsely accused and victimized by the justice 
system.  Dr. Rosenthal reported that defendant was willing to cooperate and work 
with his attorney ―because he agreed with him on his innocence.‖   
On July 3, 1996, the parties submitted the issue of defendant‘s competency 
on Dr. Rosenthal‘s report.  The court found defendant competent ―[b]ased upon 
the contents of the report‖ and reinstituted the criminal proceedings.   
2.  Analysis 
―The criminal trial of a mentally incompetent person violates due process. 
(Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354.)  However, a defendant is not 
incompetent if he can understand the nature of the legal proceedings and assist 
 
 
 
25 
counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner.  (See ibid.; § 1367.)‖  
(People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1047.)  A defendant is 
presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence by the party contending he or she is incompetent.  (§ 1369, subd. (f); 
Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
870, 881-885; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(e)(2).)  In reviewing on appeal a 
finding of competency, ―an appellate court must view the record in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial 
evidence.‖  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.) 
Defendant argues the court‘s reliance on Dr. Rosenthal‘s report was an 
abuse of discretion because the report did not provide substantial evidence of his 
competence.  Specifically, he argues Dr. Rosenthal‘s report only established that 
defendant was willing to cooperate with his attorney, but failed to establish that 
defendant was able to assist his defense counsel in a rational manner.  In fact, he 
asserts, the report noted he became irrational, paranoid, and had a limited ―hold on 
reality‖ when it came to questions of his innocence. 
Because defendant failed to raise these objections below, they are forfeited.  
Defendant argues the application of the forfeiture rule here ―is akin to arguing that 
a failure to object to evidence on hearsay grounds would prevent an argument on 
appeal that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the verdict.‖  
Defendant ignores a crucial distinction.  Unlike the adjudication of criminal guilt, 
which presumes a defendant‘s innocence and places the burden of proof on the 
state, here defendant is presumed competent.  Because he raised the issue of his 
competency, he assumes the burden of proof.  (§§ 1096, 1369, subd. (f).)  Under 
these circumstances, by failing to object below, defendant deprived the prosecution 
of the opportunity to rebut any objections with evidence supporting the 
 
 
 
26 
presumption of competency.  (See In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199; see 
also People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 904 [―Having submitted the 
competency determination on the two psychiatric reports, defendant may not now 
relitigate that question with arguments he did not make below‖].)  Because 
defendant submitted the question of his competency on Dr. Rosenthal‘s report, he 
has forfeited the claims that the court abused its discretion by determining 
competency on the ―majority vote‖ of the experts or by relying on allegedly 
insufficient reports.  
In any event, there is no merit to defendant‘s claim that the court failed to 
exercise its discretion by relying on the ―majority vote‖ of the three appointed 
experts.  Instead, the record demonstrates that the parties agreed to submit the 
issue of defendant‘s competency on Dr. Rosenthal‘s report and the trial court made 
its ruling based on that report.  The court‘s decision to obtain a third report and its 
reliance on that single report was not an abuse of discretion.  (See People v. 
McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1168-1169; § 1369, subd. (a).) 
Moreover, it was defendant‘s burden to prove he was legally incompetent, 
and Dr. Rosenthal‘s report does not support such a determination.  Although Dr. 
Rosenthal believed defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, he concluded 
defendant remained ―sufficiently in contact with reality to be considered mentally 
competent to stand trial.‖  He based this conclusion on an examination of 
defendant and consideration of his prior mental health history.  Although Dr. 
Rosenthal did not state in so many words that defendant was capable of assisting 
in his defense, that conclusion was evident in his report.  Dr. Rosenthal concluded 
defendant understood the charges against him, was able to discuss his legal 
situation coherently, and was willing to cooperate with his attorney.  These 
circumstances demonstrated that defendant was capable of assisting in his defense.  
 
 
 
27 
An insistence upon innocence is not unknown among those accused of crime.  That 
was the position defendant consistently maintained following the murders.  Indeed, 
his steadfast contention that two masked men were responsible reflected an ability 
to formulate a defense to the charges against him.  In the end, nothing in Dr. 
Rosenthal‘s report established as a matter of law that defendant was 
incompetent.15 
B.  Defendant’s Absence from Certain Proceedings   
Defendant contends the court violated his constitutional and statutory rights  
by conducting proceedings in his absence on 17 different occasions.  ―A criminal 
defendant‘s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed under the federal 
Constitution by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is also required by section 15 of 
article I of the California Constitution and by sections 977 and 1043.‖16  (People v. 
Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81.)  ―Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant 
                                              
15  
Moreover, although Dr. Davenport deemed defendant incompetent, his 
opinion was initially tempered by a belief that defendant may have been 
malingering.  He also found defendant able to understand the charges against him 
and the roles of the participants in the courtroom.  Dr. Fort‘s report further 
supported the finding of competence.  According to Dr. Fort, defendant understood 
the proceedings against him and the rulings in the case, understood and approved 
of a motion filed in the case, and was able to summarize the testimony of 
witnesses.  On this record, we find neither error nor prejudice. 
16  
Under section 977, subdivision (b)(1), a felony defendant ―shall be present 
at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those 
portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time 
of the imposition of sentence,‖ and ―shall‖ also attend ―all other proceedings,‖ 
unless he or she executes a written waiver of the right to be present ―in open 
court.‖  Section 1043, subdivision (a), states in part that, ―Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, the defendant in a felony case shall be personally present 
at the trial.‖ 
 
 
 
28 
has the right to be personally present at any proceeding in which his appearance is 
necessary to prevent ‗interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-
examination.‘ ‖ (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861, quoting Kentucky  v. 
Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 744–745, fn. 17.)  ―Due process guarantees the right 
to be present at any ‗stage … that is critical to [the] outcome‘ and where the 
defendant‘s ‗presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‘ ‖  
(Butler, at p. 861, quoting Stincer, at p. 745.)  ― ‗The state constitutional right to be 
present at trial is generally coextensive with the federal due process right.  
[Citations.]‘  Neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor the statutory 
requirements of sections 977 and 1043, require the defendant‘s personal 
appearance at proceedings where his presence bears no reasonable, substantial 
relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.  [Citations.]‖  
(Butler, at p. 861, quoting People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1306.)  
―Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his absence prejudiced his case or 
denied him a fair trial.‖  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357.) 
In each of the 17 complained-of proceedings, defendant‘s presence was not 
necessary for effective cross-examination or to contribute to the fairness of the 
procedure.  His absence did not deprive him of the full opportunity to defend 
against the charges. 
Most of the complained-of proceedings require little discussion, as they 
involved pretrial matters or occurred before the presentation of evidence at the 
guilt phase.  On one occasion, defendant had agreed to his absence on the record 
the day before, and the proceedings merely involved corrections to the jury 
questionnaire and the record.  Two of the proceedings were postponed specifically 
because of defendant‘s absence.  Nine of the proceedings concerned routine legal 
and procedural matters involving discovery, record corrections, stipulated juror 
 
 
 
29 
hardships, and exhibit list correction.  In one proceeding, the prosecutor and 
defense counsel briefly appeared to set the matter for trial, and defense counsel 
withdrew defendant‘s time waiver.  At the next appearance, defendant approved of 
the withdrawal on the record.  Once in midtrial, the parties discussed the guilt 
phase jury instructions.  Defendant fails to explain why his presence was necessary 
for that proceeding.  (People v. Butler, supra,  46 Cal.4th 847, 865 [discussion of 
jury instructions is not a critical stage of the proceedings requiring defendant‘s 
presence].)   
Only three of defendant‘s absences require greater discussion.  First, during 
jury selection, defendant was not present at an in-chambers discussion of a defense 
motion made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79  (Batson) and 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  The discussion was brief, and 
the court repeated its ruling in defendant‘s presence.  Defendant voiced no 
objection to his absence from chambers.  He fails to explain why his presence was 
necessary or how his absence prejudiced his case. 
Second, defendant was absent when a juror was replaced during the penalty 
phase deliberations but defendant had been present at the prior proceeding where 
the parties agreed to excuse that particular juror if the deliberations had not 
concluded in time.  The next day, in defendant‘s presence, the juror was replaced 
with an alternate, and defendant voiced no objection.  Given these circumstances, 
defendant fails to explain why his presence was required. 
Third, defendant was absent when the parties discussed penalty phase 
instructions and defense counsel withdrew defendant‘s request for allocution, 
 
 
 
30 
stating, ―[w]e are not pursuing that.‖17  ―[W]e have repeatedly held there is no 
right of allocution at the penalty phase of a capital trial.‖  (People v. Lucero (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 692, 717.)  Therefore, even assuming defendant did wish to address the 
court before his sentencing, defense counsel did not violate any cognizable right by 
withdrawing defendant‘s request for allocution. 
In sum, defendant fails to show how any of his absences affected his ability 
to defend himself or otherwise prejudiced his case. 
C.  Batson/Wheeler Claims  
Upon defendant‘s objection, the court found no prima facie showing that 
the prosecutor exercised two peremptory challenges on racial grounds.  Defendant 
challenges the ruling.  There was no evidence of racial bias and no error. 
The prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective 
jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity, violates a defendant‘s right to 
trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution and his right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  (Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97; Wheeler, supra,  22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.)  These 
procedures apply when a defendant makes such an objection:  ―First, the defendant 
must make out a prima facie case by ‗showing that the totality of the relevant facts 
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‘  [Citation.]  Second, once the 
defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‗burden shifts to the State to 
explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering permissible race-neutral 
                                              
17  
Previously, just before the start of the penalty phase and in defendant‘s 
presence, defense counsel had mentioned his intention to make a motion ―on the 
right of Mr. Blacksher to allocute.‖   
 
 
 
31 
justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‗[i]f a race-neutral explanation is 
tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike 
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Johnson v. California 
(2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted; see also People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 50, 74.) 
At issue here is whether defendant made a prima facie showing of group 
bias.  To do so, the defendant must demonstrate ― ‗ ―that the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‖ [Citations.]‘ ‖ (People 
v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016, quoting Johnson v. California, supra, 
545 U.S. 162, 168.)  Where, as here, it is unclear whether the court relied on the 
recently disapproved ―strong likelihood‖ standard, rather than the correct 
―reasonable inference‖ standard, ―we review the record independently‖ to 
determine whether defendant‘s showing met the ―reasonable inference‖ standard.  
(Howard, at p. 1017.)  
Defendant is African-American.  During jury selection, the prosecutor used 
his fourth and eighth peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors M.P. and 
L.W., African-American women.  Defense counsel lodged an objection in 
chambers, arguing there was ―a strong likelihood that both of those jurors were 
excluded on the basis of their race.‖  The court found no prima facie showing, 
noting there were still two African-American jurors on the panel and that the 
defense had exercised one of its own challenges against an African-American 
juror.  Jury selection resumed.  The final jury included six African-American 
jurors.   
Based on our independent review, we agree with the court that defendant 
did not make a prima facie showing of group bias.  Defendant offered no 
circumstances relevant to his claim of discriminatory intent.  Defense counsel 
 
 
 
32 
made no attempt to argue that the excused jurors were not, apart from their race, as 
―heterogeneous as the community as a whole‖ or that the prosecution engaged 
them in desultory voir dire.  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597.)  Defense 
counsel failed to show that the prosecution had struck most or all members of the 
identified group or had used a disproportionate number of challenges against the 
group.  (Ibid.) 
In fact, other circumstances demonstrate a lack of discriminatory purpose.  
The prosecutor did not challenge several other African-American jurors, and, as 
noted, six ultimately served on the jury.  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 
70 [concluding a challenge raised no inference of bias, ―particularly in view of the 
circumstance that the other African-American juror had been passed repeatedly by 
the prosecutor from the beginning of voir dire and ultimately served on the jury‖]; 
People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168 [―While the fact that the jury included 
members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an 
indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for 
the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection‖].)  
Moreover, race-neutral grounds supported the prosecutor‘s challenges.  
Prospective Juror M.P. wrote that she had  ―ambivalent feelings‖ toward the death 
penalty.  She expressed discomfort in playing any role in deciding to impose a 
death sentence.  She believed no one has the right to take a life and such a decision 
might be akin to ―playing ‗God.‘ ‖  Prospective Juror L.W. stated in her 
questionnaire that she was only ―moderately‖ in favor of the death penalty and 
believed a life sentence was a more severe penalty.  (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 297, 317 [the use of ―peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors 
who expressed scruples about imposing the death penalty‖ is proper].) 
 
 
 
33 
Furthermore, M.P. wrote that, based upon a racial-profiling incident 
involving her brother and the police, she might treat police testimony with 
skepticism.  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138 [―a close relative‘s 
adversary contact with the criminal justice system might make a prospective juror 
unsympathetic to the prosecution‖].)  Finally, L.W. was a psychology major and 
characterized that discipline as a ―science.‖  Her background thus posed the danger 
of having her own specialized knowledge influence her decisionmaking regarding 
the significance of the claims of defendant‘s mental illness.  (People v. Howard 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156 [prospective juror‘s professional training as a nurse 
suggested a possible ground for the prosecutor‘s challenge].)  
The court properly found no prima facie case of discrimination and did not 
err in denying defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler motion. 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Admission of Eva Blacksher’s Statements  
Defendant contends the court erred by admitting several hearsay statements 
of Eva Blacksher, who was deemed incompetent to testify at trial due to dementia.  
The court allowed the prosecutor to present her preliminary hearing testimony 
under Evidence Code sections 1290 and 1291.18  Because portions of Eva‘s 
preliminary hearing testimony were inconsistent with statements she had made 
                                              
18  
Evidence Code section 1290 defines ― ‗former testimony,‘ ‖ in relevant part, 
as ―testimony given under oath in:  [¶] . . . [a]nother action or in a former hearing 
or trial of the same action[.]‖  (Evid. Code, § 1290, subd. (a).) 
 
Evidence Code section 1291 is the hearsay exception allowing a party to 
admit against the opposing party the former testimony of an unavailable declarant, 
provided that the opposing party ―had the right and opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the 
hearing.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).)  
 
 
 
34 
before that hearing, the court also allowed the prosecution to present several of her 
previous statements.  Defendant lodged hearsay and confrontation clause 
objections to most of these statements below, and renews these objections on 
appeal.  He now also argues that some of these statements were inadmissible under 
the subsequent rule of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).  In 
Crawford, the high court held that the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause 
prohibits the ―admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear 
at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 53-
54.)  
Eva‘s statements fall under three broad categories:  1) statements she made 
in relation to the restraining order she obtained against defendant two days before 
the murders; 2) statements she made to a police officer and family members soon 
after the murders; and 3) statements she made to a detective the day after the 
murders.  All of the challenged statements were properly admitted. 
1.  Statements concerning the restraining order 
a)  Background 
In the preliminary hearing transcript read to the jury, Eva denied obtaining a 
temporary restraining order against defendant.  She could not remember signing an 
application for the order and denied writing that she was afraid of defendant.  She 
also denied knowing that defendant and Versenia had any problems before the 
murders.   
Eva‘s daughter, Ruth Cole, testified at trial about statements Eva and 
Versenia made on their way to court to obtain the restraining order.  As Ruth drove 
Eva and Versenia to the courthouse, they discussed how defendant‘s appearance 
with a baseball bat the night before had made them fearful.  Ruth described how 
 
 
 
35 
Versenia and Eva spent hours at the courthouse waiting in line and filling out 
forms.  Ruth saw Versenia read the application forms to Eva and fill them out, saw 
Eva sign them, and then saw them submit the forms to the court clerk.  Ruth 
recognized Versenia‘s handwriting and her mother‘s signatures on the forms.   
During the course of Ruth‘s testimony, defense counsel objected to several 
questions regarding whether Eva knowingly and willingly went to the courthouse 
to obtain the order, claiming the questions called for speculation and a conclusion 
as to Eva‘s mental state.  Defense counsel also made a general objection to Eva‘s 
statements to Ruth on confrontation grounds.  The prosecution argued that Ruth‘s 
testimony was admissible to show that Eva feared defendant and to impeach Eva‘s 
preliminary hearing testimony in which she either denied or could not remember 
being involved in the application for the restraining order against defendant.  The 
court overruled the defense objections, initially ruling the statements were 
admissible as prior inconsistent statements19 and to show Eva‘s state of mind.20  
Later, however, the court questioned whether Eva‘s state of mind was relevant 
                                              
19  
Evidence Code section 1235 states:  ―Evidence of a statement made by a 
witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent 
with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.‖  
 
Evidence Code section 770 states, in relevant part:  ―Unless the interests of 
justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that 
is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded 
unless:  [¶] . . . [t]he witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an 
opportunity to explain or to deny the statement[.]‖  (Evid. Code, § 770, subd. (a).) 
20  
Evidence Code section 1250 states, in relevant part:  ―evidence of a 
statement of the declarant‘s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical 
sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, 
pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when:  [¶] . . . 
[t]he evidence is offered to prove the declarant‘s state of mind, emotion, or 
physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the 
action[.]‖  (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a).) 
 
 
 
36 
and, instead, instructed the jury that Eva‘s statements to Ruth about obtaining the 
restraining order were admissible only to impeach Eva‘s prior testimony ―and for 
that purpose only.‖  In light of this clarification and instruction by the trial court, 
we review the question of whether the statements were properly admitted for 
impeachment. 
Defendant here repeats the objections he made below.  He also argues that 
Ruth‘s testimony was inadmissible to impeach Eva‘s preliminary hearing 
testimony because, under Crawford, Eva‘s failing memory effectively denied him 
his right to cross-examine her at the preliminary hearing.  He claims her 
preliminary hearing testimony revealed she was often unable to understand 
questions posed to her and to remember relevant details, thereby preventing him 
from engaging her in any meaningful cross-examination.  
First, we deal with defendant‘s contention that Ruth‘s testimony 
impeaching Eva‘s former testimony should not have been admitted because 
defendant was denied his right to effectively cross-examine Eva at the preliminary 
hearing.  Then, we will address defendant‘s additional arguments that, 
notwithstanding any defects at the preliminary hearing, Ruth‘s testimony 
impeaching Eva was not admissible under the confrontation clause and that her 
testimony constituted improper opinion evidence as to Eva‘s mental state. 
b)  The Right to Cross-Examination at the Preliminary Hearing  
Concerning any defects at the preliminary hearing, we note that defendant 
did not challenge Eva‘s competence at the preliminary hearing.  Further, at trial, he 
made no objection to the admission of Eva‘s preliminary hearing testimony.  
Although the high court‘s decision in Crawford came well after the proceedings in 
this case, our statutory law governing the admission of former testimony has long 
required the prior opportunity to cross-examine as a foundational prerequisite 
 
 
 
37 
under Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2).  Consequently, defendant 
has forfeited any claim that Eva‘s preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible.  
He twice failed to urge that Eva‘s mental state precluded a meaningful opportunity 
for cross-examination. 
The claim also lacks merit.  The fact that, at the preliminary hearing, Eva 
had some difficulty initially understanding the questions posed to her or 
remembering some of her previous statements did not render defendant‘s cross-
examination opportunity meaningless.  ―The right of confrontation does not protect 
against ‗testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.‘ ‖  
(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 742, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer 
(1985) 474 U.S. 15, 22; see also United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 
560.)  To be sure, Eva expressed some minor confusion, but she was able to 
respond to the questions posed and rephrased to her and was otherwise lucid.  
Nothing in her testimony revealed ―an inability to distinguish truth from falsehood 
(or perception from imagination)‖ or a failure to appreciate her ―obligation as a 
witness to tell the truth.‖  (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 622.) 
c)  The Confrontation Clause and Evidence Code Section 1202 
Notwithstanding any alleged defects at the preliminary hearing, we also 
reject defendant‘s claim that Ruth‘s testimony impeaching Eva‘s former testimony 
was not admissible on confrontation grounds under either state or federal law. 
We first note that Eva‘s statements to Ruth about the restraining order were 
not admissible for their truth as prior inconsistent statements under Evidence Code 
sections 1235 and 770.  Those sections permit admission of inconsistent statements 
made by a witness who actually testifies at the proceeding.  (People v. Williams 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 669.)  Because Eva did not testify at trial, those sections do 
not apply here. 
 
 
 
38 
Nevertheless, as the trial court eventually recognized, Eva‘s statements to 
Ruth were admissible not for their truth but solely to impeach her former 
testimony.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 4 West‘s Ann. Evid. Code 
(1995 ed.) foll. § 1202, p. 27; Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2010) § 2.17, pp. 
86-87.)  Although the court did not admit the evidence under a specific Evidence 
Code section,21 the statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1202, 
which governs the impeachment of hearsay statements by a declarant who does not 
testify at trial.  The jury was properly instructed on this point.22  
Defendant argues for a more narrow interpretation of Evidence Code 
section 1202.  He urges that the section forbids the prosecution from impeaching 
its own unavailable hearsay declarant with an inconsistent statement.  He 
maintains that Evidence Code section 1202 allows only the opposing party to 
introduce the inconsistent statement.  His argument fails. 
                                              
21  
―If a judgment rests on admissible evidence it will not be reversed because 
the trial court admitted that evidence upon a different theory, a mistaken theory, or 
one not raised below.‖  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901.) 
22  
Evidence Code section 1202 states, in relevant part: ―Evidence of a 
statement or other conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a statement by 
such declarant received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissible for the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not given and has 
not had an opportunity to explain or to deny such inconsistent statement or other 
conduct.‖  ―Section 1202 deals with the impeachment of a declarant whose hearsay 
statement is in evidence as distinguished from the impeachment of a witness who 
has testified.  It clarifies two points.  First, evidence to impeach a hearsay 
declarant is not to be excluded on the ground that it is collateral.  Second, the rule 
applying to the impeachment of a witness  —  that a witness may be impeached by 
an inconsistent statement only if he is provided with an opportunity to explain or 
deny it  —  does not apply to a hearsay declarant.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. 
reprinted at com., 29B pt. 4 West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1202, p. 27.) 
 
 
 
39 
Defendant relies on People v. Beyea (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 176 (Beyea), in 
which the prosecution introduced the preliminary hearing testimony of two 
unavailable witnesses.  It impeached that evidence with one witness‘s testimony 
from a different preliminary hearing and with the other witness‘s statements to 
police.  The prosecutor in Beyea, however, did not impeach the witnesses at the 
defendants‘ preliminary hearing.  Instead, the impeaching statements were offered 
only at trial, after the witnesses had become unavailable.  Although the decision 
does not make this point clear, it appears the inconsistent statements were admitted 
both for impeachment and for their truth.  (Beyea, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d 176, 186, 
193, fn.6.) 
The Beyea court concluded it would be unfair to allow a party to impeach 
the former testimony of its own unavailable witnesses with their inconsistent 
hearsay statements unless the opposing party was able to cross-examine the 
declarant about the inconsistent statements.  (Beyea, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 193, quoting Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc. (1967) 255 
Cal.App.2d 526, 542.)  Beyea acknowledged that the language of Evidence Code 
section 1202 contains no such limitation, but referred to the Law Revision 
Commission‘s comment to section 1202, which states that the statute provides ― ‗a 
uniform rule permitting a hearsay declarant to be impeached by inconsistent 
statements in all cases, whether or not the declarant has been given an opportunity 
to explain or deny the inconsistency,‘ ‖ with the caveat that ― ‗[i]f the hearsay 
declarant is unavailable as a witness, the party against whom the evidence is 
admitted should not be deprived of both his right to cross-examine and his right to 
impeach.‘ ‖  (Beyea, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 193.) 
The court in People v. Osorio (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 603, however, 
disagreed with Beyea’s conclusion.  In Osorio, the prosecution introduced the 
 
 
 
40 
spontaneous statement of the victim to a paramedic.  It then impeached that 
statement with one the victim made during a later police interview.  The victim 
died before trial and the defense never had the opportunity to cross-examine her.  
The trial court admitted the victim‘s statement to police for the limited purpose of 
impeaching the spontaneous statement.  The Osorio court held the prosecution 
could impeach the hearsay statements of its own unavailable witness with her later 
inconsistent hearsay statement.  (Id. at pp. 615-617.)  Osorio reasoned there is 
nothing in the plain language of Evidence Code section 1202 ―that gives rise to 
any ambiguity or lends support to Beyea’s interpretation.‖  (Osorio, at p. 616.)  
Moreover, Osorio noted that when the comments to the section were drafted in 
1965 there was a general rule against impeaching one‘s own witness, but that rule 
was abrogated by the passage of Evidence Code section 785, part of the same bill 
that added Evidence Code section 1202, which allows the credibility of a witness 
to be attacked by any party.  (Osorio, at pp. 616-617.)  Because the Legislature did 
not expressly make Evidence Code sections 785 and 1202 mutually exclusive, 
Osorio concluded that both sections should be read together and ―as a single 
statute, these two sections allow a prosecutor to use a prior inconsistent statement 
to partially impeach a hearsay statement the prosecutor had previously introduced.‖  
(Id. at p. 617.)  
Accordingly, if the statements in Beyea were admitted for their truth, the 
Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the admission was error.  The Beyea 
defendants were deprived of their opportunity to cross-examine as to those 
inconsistent statements not brought forward during the preliminary hearing.  
Similarly, the result in Osorio was also correct.  The inconsistent statements at 
issue in Osorio were not hearsay because they were not admitted for their truth.  
 
 
 
41 
Accordingly, the defendant‘s inability to cross-examine the declarant about those 
statements raised no confrontation clause concerns. 
In sum, the confrontation clause does not prohibit the prosecution from 
impeaching the former testimony of its own unavailable witnesses with their 
inconsistent statements, provided those statements are admitted only for 
impeachment purposes.  However, under Evidence Code section 1202, the 
prosecution may not offer for their truth the inconsistent statements of a declarant 
who does not testify at trial.  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 669.)  Any 
language to the contrary in People v. Beyea, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d 176,  is 
disapproved. 
Here, Eva‘s statements to Ruth about the restraining order were not 
admitted for their truth.  They were relevant for the limited purpose of 
impeachment and properly admitted.23 
d)  Opinion Evidence 
We also reject the contention that Ruth‘s testimony constituted improper 
opinion testimony about what Eva was thinking and intending when she obtained 
the restraining order.  ―Generally, a lay witness may not give an opinion about 
another‘s state of mind,‖ but ―a witness may testify about objective behavior and 
describe behavior as being consistent with a state of mind.‖  (People v. Chatman 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 397.)  Ruth‘s testimony was based on Eva‘s objective 
behavior.  Eva verbalized her own state of mind.  (Evid. Code, § 1250.)  The  
actions Ruth observed that day were entirely consistent with that mind set.  
                                              
23  We will discuss the holding in Crawford in greater detail below.  It is 
sufficient to observe that because the statements were not offered for their truth 
they do not implicate the confrontation clause under the Crawford rule.  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9.) 
 
 
 
42 
Moreover, Eva‘s expression of fear and her desire to obtain a restraining order 
were not admitted for their truth, but to impeach her preliminary hearing testimony 
in which she denied writing that she was afraid of defendant and denied knowing 
about a restraining order.   
2.  Eva’s statements after the murders 
Relying on the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. 
Code, § 1240), the prosecutor filed a pretrial motion to introduce hearsay 
statements Eva made to her neighbor, John Adams, immediately after the shooting, 
statements she made to an arriving police officer, and statements she made about 
an hour later to her son James and his wife in the presence of a city mental health 
worker.  Defendant opposed the admission of these statements, arguing they did 
not qualify as spontaneous statements, were improper opinion testimony, were 
more prejudicial than probative, and were unreliable and untrustworthy in violation 
of due process and his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  The court rejected 
defendant‘s arguments, admitting all of these statements under Evidence Code 
section 1240.  Defendant challenges each of these rulings. 
a)  Eva’s Statements to Officer Nielsen 
Based on the dispatched report of a murder-suicide, Officer Nicholas 
Nielsen contacted Eva and her neighbor outside Eva‘s home.  In the 911 call, 
neighbor John Adams had erroneously reported that defendant had killed his sister 
and then shot himself.  The dispatcher repeated Adam‘s report in sending officers 
to the scene.  Nielsen described Eva as teary-eyed, distraught, and very agitated.24  
She appeared anxious to talk with him.  As he approached her, Eva spoke first, 
                                              
24  
Adams described Eva similarly, and noted she appeared to have blood on 
her feet. 
 
 
 
43 
telling him her daughter and grandson had been shot and were probably dead.  
Because Eva‘s statement suggested an armed murderer was at large, Officer 
Nielsen asked questions to obtain more information before the officers risked 
going inside the home to aid the victims.  Eva explained that defendant had come 
into the house earlier and had spoken with her briefly.  He then argued with his 
sister and shot the victims.  Eva said she did not see defendant carrying a gun, but 
assumed he had concealed it.  Nielsen asked if defendant was still inside the home.  
Eva said she did not know, and described the clothing defendant had been wearing.  
According to Nielsen‘s report, Adams pointed out that defendant was probably 
gone because his car was no longer in the driveway.  Nielsen spoke with Eva and 
Adams for 10 to 15 minutes.  Eva remained upset throughout the conversation.  
Nielsen took notes as they spoke so he could accurately relay information to the 
dispatcher and his fellow officers.  Three to four minutes into the conversation 
with Eva and Adams, other officers arrived and went inside the main house.  After 
the conversation, Nielsen checked defendant‘s cottage but did not find him there. 
Because Eva‘s statements were made out of court and admitted for their 
truth, they constituted hearsay.  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)25  We first 
consider whether they fell under a California hearsay exception and then whether 
their admission violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
it has been applied in Crawford and its progeny.26 
                                              
25 
― ‗Hearsay evidence‘ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by 
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) 
26  
For trial courts considering the question of admissibility, this is the proper 
order of analysis.  If a proffered statement does not satisfy a hearsay exception, it 
is inadmissible and a further Crawford consideration is unnecessary. 
 
 
 
44 
i)  Spontaneous Statement  
―Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or 
event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.‖  (Evid. 
Code, § 1240.) 
Defendant does not dispute that Eva was hysterical when she spoke with 
Officer Nielsen.  Under these circumstances the court properly concluded that the 
statements were made when Eva was under the domination of nervous excitement 
caused by the event, so that her utterances were spontaneous and unreflecting. 
Instead, defendant argues that the statements were inadmissible because 
there was insufficient foundation that she had ―witnessed‖ the killings.  She did 
not tell anyone she had actually seen the shootings, and told an inspector the next 
day that she could not see into the dining room where the shots were fired. 
Defendant‘s argument fails. 
The Evidence Code does not use the term ―witnessed by.‖  Rather, it refers 
to an act, condition, or event ―perceived by‖ the declarant.  (Evid. Code, § 1240, 
subd. (a).)  While the phrase ―witnessed by‖ was used in People v. Gutierrez 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 809-810, the phrase was used to describe the circumstances 
in that case.  It was not used to modify the language of the statute itself by 
imposing a different foundational requirement.  More importantly, in People v. 
Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, the court noted spontaneous statements may include 
the ― ‗sincere expression‘ ‖ of the speaker‘s ― ‗actual impressions and belief.‘ ‖ 
(Id. at p. 318, quoting Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 
468.) 
 
 
 
45 
There are many ways someone can acquire the personal knowledge required 
to support a conclusion that the person perceived an event.  Eva saw defendant 
enter her room and leave.  Shortly thereafter, she heard Versenia‘s exclamation 
followed by a gunshot. She emerged from her room to see Versenia fall, bleeding.  
She was understandably traumatized by what she perceived: a shooting in her 
home, her daughter and grandson lying on the floor mortally injured.  These 
observations were clearly relevant to the circumstances of the shooting.  Nothing 
indicated she was insincere in her quite logical belief that defendant had shot the 
victims.  At best, the issue of whether Eva actually saw defendant fire the shots 
went to the weight of her statements, not their admissibility.  (People v. Riva 
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 996.)  Accordingly, Eva‘s statements to both John 
Adams and Officer Nielsen properly qualified as spontaneous statements. 
ii)  Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation 
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court reexamined the application 
of the Sixth Amendment to the admission of hearsay statements.  Crawford did not 
replace a conventional hearsay analysis.  Instead, it added a second layer of inquiry 
when hearsay is offered against a criminal defendant.  Crawford established, 
except in circumstances not relevant here, if a hearsay statement is testimonial in 
nature it cannot be introduced against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is 
unavailable, and the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 53-54.)  The Crawford court did not 
give a comprehensive definition of the term ―testimonial‖ and subsequent cases 
have addressed how the rule should be applied.  The court has recently considered 
that question in Michigan v. Bryant (2011) ___ U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 1143] 
(Bryant). 
 
 
 
46 
There, the court reviewed the evolution of the Crawford rule and iterated 
that ― ‗the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.‘ ‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. 
___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1152], quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 50.)  ―[T]he 
word ‗witnesses‘ in the Sixth Amendment‖ is defined as ―those who ‗ ―bear 
testimony.‖ ‘ ‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1152-1153], 
quoting Crawford, supra, at p. 51.)  ―Testimony,‖ in turn, is a ― ‗ ―solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.‖ ‘ ‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1153], quoting 
Crawford, supra, at p. 51.)   
The majority opinion in Bryant again pointed out that ―not all those 
questioned by the police are witnesses‖ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and 
not all ― ‗interrogations by law enforcement officers‘ [citation], are subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1153], 
quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53.) 
Bryant noted that in the cases decided to date, the term ―police 
interrogation‖ has been used to describe ― ‗interrogations solely directed at 
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to 
convict) the perpetrator.‘ ‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 
1153], quoting Davis v. Washington (2009) 547 U.S. 813, 826 (Davis).)  In Bryant, 
the court contrasted the companion cases decided by Davis, State v. Davis (Wn. 
2005) 111 P.3d 844 and Hammon v. State (Ind. 2005) 829 N.E.2d 444, to tease out 
the factors at play in determining what facts make a hearsay statement 
―testimonial.‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1153-1156].) 
 
 
 
47 
In State v. Davis, a woman called 911 to report her boyfriend was beating 
her with his fists.  Her statements were made in the present tense and the police 
operator asked for the perpetrator‘s name, which the caller gave.  She then told the 
operator the boyfriend had driven off.  The 911 tape was admitted at defendant‘s 
trial when the caller failed to appear.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. 
at p. 1153], citing Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 817-819.) 
In Hammon v. State, police went to the Hammon home following a report 
of domestic violence.  They arrived to find Amy Hammon alone on her front 
porch.  She initially told them that nothing was wrong.  Officers went inside with 
Amy‘s permission.  There, they found broken glass on the floor and Hershel 
Hammon in the kitchen.  One officer kept Hershel there while Amy was taken into 
the living room and told the other officer what happened.  Amy then wrote and 
signed a ―battery affidavit,‖ summarizing Hershel‘s assault on her.  When Amy 
failed to appear at Hershel‘s trial, both her oral and written statements were 
admitted through an officer‘s testimony.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 
S.Ct. at p. 1154], citing Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 819-820.) 
As discussed in Bryant, the Davis court distinguished the two cases, holding 
the statements in Hammon v. State were testimonial while those in State v. Davis 
were not.  The Bryant court summarized the differences between them.  In Davis, 
the events related to the operator were actually happening, as opposed to past, 
completed events.  The beating of the caller was an ongoing emergency that the 
statements were elicited to resolve.  The statements were not formal but a call for 
help.  By contrast, in Hammon v. State whatever had occurred was over when the 
officers arrived.  Amy said there was nothing wrong and there was no apparent 
ongoing danger. The questioning of Amy was part of an investigation into past 
conduct.  Finally, the circumstances in which Amy was subjected to, organized and 
 
 
 
48 
structured questioning in a separate room focused on past events that were 
potentially criminal and resulted in the preparation of a written and signed 
affidavit, were sufficiently formal to be consistent with the acquisition of a 
testimonial statement.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1154-
1155].) 
The Bryant court concluded from its review of Davis, ―[t]hus, the most 
important instances in which the [Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction 
of out-of-court- statements [offered for their truth] are those in which state actors 
are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence 
for trial.  [Fn. omitted.]‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1155].)  
While the court specifically reserved whether ―statements made to someone other 
than‖ a law enforcement officer might be testimonial (id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at 
p. 1155], fn. 3), the only cases the high court has considered to date have involved 
statements by or to a government agent.27  (Cf. People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
965, in which statements made by a victim to a police officer were held to be 
testimonial while substantially similar statements given to a physician were not 
testimonial.) 
It is the ―primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony‖ that implicates the confrontation clause.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. 
___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1155].)  Consequently, if a statement is not offered for its 
truth, or is nontestimonial in character, the confrontation clause is not a bar to 
                                              
27  
Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) ___ U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2705] and 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 2527], both 
involved forensic laboratory reports written by analysts employed at a state 
laboratory required by law to assist in police investigations, and, in both cases, the 
high court concluded the analysts‘ statements were testimonial. 
 
 
 
49 
admission.  Thus, the touchstone questions are whether a statement is hearsay 
offered against a criminal defendant, whether the statement is otherwise admissible 
under a hearsay exception, and, if so, whether the statement is testimonial. 
Bryant counsels that to determine the primary purpose with which a 
statement is given by the declarant or obtained by an officer a court must consider 
a number of factors:   
1)  The court must objectively evaluate the circumstances of the encounter 
along with the statements and actions of the parties.  In this latter regard,  ―the 
relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved 
in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would 
have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements and actions‖ in the given 
situation.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1156].) 
The inquiry is on the primary purpose of both officer and declarant.  A 
majority of the court in Bryant recognized that both participants may have mixed 
motives.  An officer, even when responding to an emergency, remains an 
investigator and, thus, is not indifferent to the gathering of evidence.  Likewise, 
victims and other declarants may or may not want to see a perpetrator ultimately 
prosecuted.  The question remains, when viewed objectively, what is the primary 
purpose of both declarant and officer?  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 
S.Ct. at p. 1161].) 
2)  The court should consider whether an ― ‗ongoing emergency‘ ‖ exists, or 
appears to exist, when the statement was made.  Such an ongoing emergency 
focuses the participants on something other than obtaining evidence for trial.  
(Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1157].)  Again, the analysis is 
objective.  Even if hindsight reveals that an emergency did not, in fact, exist, if it 
reasonably appeared to exist based on the information known when the statement 
 
 
 
50 
was made the emergency test is satisfied.  (Id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1157], fn. 
8.)   
The majority took care to clarify that the existence of an emergency is not 
the only circumstance in which a hearsay statement may not qualify as testimonial.  
(See Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1155] [―[T]here may be 
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not 
procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony‖]; id. at p. 1157, fn. 9 [discussing other exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
which, ―by their nature [were] made for a purpose other than for use in a 
prosecution‖].) 
3)  Whether an ongoing emergency exists is a ―highly context-dependent 
inquiry.‖  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1158].)  Even when a 
threat to an initial victim is over, a threat to first responders and the public may 
still exist.  The type of weapon involved may expand or limit the duration and 
scope of the emergency.  A situation created by the use of fists may involve less 
ongoing danger than the use of a firearm.  (Ibid.)   
4)  The medical condition of the declarant is a relevant consideration, as it 
bears on both the injured declarant‘s purpose in speaking and the potential scope 
of the emergency.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1159].)  As 
the high court describes it, the declarant‘s medical condition ―sheds light on the 
ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police questions 
and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial 
one.‖  (Ibid.) 
5)  A nontestimonial encounter addressing an emergency may evolve, 
converting subsequent statements into testimonial ones.  A real or apparent 
emergency may resolve itself.  The disarming or capture of a perpetrator may end 
 
 
 
51 
the danger.  It may become clear from the declarant and officer‘s statements or 
behavior that the focus has shifted from meeting the emergency to obtaining 
evidence for trial.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1159-
1160].) 
6)  Finally, regardless of the existence of an emergency, the informality of 
the statement and the circumstances of its acquisition are important considerations.  
Inquiries that are conducted in a disorganized way and in turbulent circumstances 
are distinguishable from a jailhouse interview, as in Crawford, or the sequestered 
and formal preparation of an affidavit, as in Hammon v. State.  (Bryant, supra, ___ 
U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1160].) 
In Bryant, police responded to a report that a man had been shot.  The 
arriving officers found the victim lying on the ground next to his car at a gas 
station parking lot, bleeding and mortally wounded by a gunshot to his abdomen.  
(Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1150].)  The officers asked the 
victim ― ‗what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The victim said Bryant had shot him outside Bryant‘s home, 
and provided the details of how he had been shot.  He relayed that he fled from 
Bryant‘s home, and drove himself to the gas station.  The victim‘s conversation 
with police lasted 5 to 10 minutes, ending when paramedics arrived.  (Ibid.) 
In applying the previously described factors to the facts before it, the high 
court concluded that the encounter between the police and the victim did not 
produce testimonial hearsay.  (Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at 
p. 1167].)  The court noted the continuing emergency went beyond any private 
dispute between Bryant and the victim.  Neither the victim nor the police knew the 
current location of the armed shooter.  (Id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1164].)  In 
addition, because the victim did not disclose the motive of the shooting, ―[t]he 
 
 
 
52 
police did not know, and [the victim] did not tell them, whether the threat was 
limited to him.‖  (Ibid.)  There was no indication that the emergency had ended 
because the victim gave the police ―no reason to think that the shooter would not 
shoot again if he arrived on the scene.‖  (Id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1166].)  The 
court also noted that the victim was bleeding, ―had difficulty breathing and 
talking,‖ and was in considerable pain.  These facts did not suggest that he made 
his statements with the ― ‗primary purpose‘ ‗to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 
1165], quoting Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822.)  As for the informality of the 
encounter, unlike a formal stationhouse interrogation, ―the questioning in this case 
occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of emergency medical 
services, and in a disorganized fashion‖ and the circumstances revealed that ―the 
situation was fluid and somewhat confused,‖ as different officers arrived with each 
asking ― ‗what had happened.‘ ‖  (Byrant, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___, ___ [131 
S.Ct. at pp. 1160, 1166].)  Finally, the court considered the statements and actions 
of the parties.  The officers, by asking the victim what had happened, who had shot 
him, and where the shooting took place, posed ―the exact type of questions 
necessary to allow the police to ‗ ―assess the situation, the threat to their own 
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim‖ ‘ and to the public [citations], 
including to allow them to ascertain ‗whether they would be encountering a violent 
felon,‘ [citation].‖  (Id. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1166], quoting Davis, supra, 547 
U.S. at pp. 827, 832.) 
 
 
 
 
53 
iii)  Eva’s Statements to Nielsen and Adams Were Not 
Testimonial 
We apply the Bryant analysis to the case at hand.  Eva‘s statements to 
Officer Nielsen and her neighbor John Adams were hearsay because they were 
made out of court and offered for their truth.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  As we have 
explained, they satisfied the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  
They were offered against defendant at his criminal trial.  However, we conclude 
they were not testimonial.  
Officer Nielsen arrived within four minutes of Adams‘s 911 call.  The 
bodies were still inside.  Eva did not know if defendant was still present.  During a 
10 to 15 minute conversation Officer Nielsen asked Eva questions about the 
shooting, what defendant was wearing and whether he was armed.  Nielsen took 
notes so he could relay information to the dispatcher and other officers.  During 
this period it was ascertained that defendant was neither in Eva‘s house nor the 
cottage behind it.  Thus, the shooter had fled the scene and was presumed to be 
armed with the firearm that was the murder weapon.  His motive and whereabouts 
were unknown.  The audio recording of police radio traffic confirms that during 
the initial 15 minutes following the 911 call officers were trying to assess the 
emergency and determine whether the shooter was dead or still in the 
neighborhood.  It was objectively reasonable to believe that an armed shooter 
remained at large and presented an emergency situation. 
Objectively, the primary purpose of both Eva and Officer Nielsen was to 
deal with that emergency, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.  Instead, the primary purpose for both of them was to determine 
defendant‘s whereabouts and evaluate the nature and extent of the threat he posed. 
Eva was greatly upset throughout her encounter with Officer Nielsen.  The 
discussion in her yard, in the presence of a neighbor, was in an open setting and 
 
 
 
54 
under chaotic conditions.  As a result, it was much more similar to the parking lot 
questioning in Bryant than the more calm and formal circumstances of Crawford28 
and Hammon v. State. 
As noted, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether statements ―to 
someone other than law enforcement personnel‖ can ever qualify as testimonial.  
(Bryant, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1155], fn. 3; see discussion, 
ante, at p. 48.)  Setting this question aside,  just as the statements to Nielsen were 
nontestimonial, Eva‘s exclamations to neighbor John Adams as she ran from her 
home were not made or received to create an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony. 
b)  Eva’s Statements to James and Frances Blacksher 
Inspector Alan Bierce testified that he arrived at the crime scene after 
Officer Nielsen and made contact with Eva.  He placed Eva in his patrol vehicle 
and, because she appeared ―distressed‖ and ―fragile,‖ he decided not to take a 
statement from her, but instead called city mental health worker Darryl Brand to 
assist her.  When Brand arrived, Officer Bierce directed her to help Eva and left 
them alone.  Brand asked Eva if she wanted any of her family members called to 
the scene, and Eva asked for James and Frances Blacksher.  They arrived shortly 
thereafter and went to the patrol car to comfort Eva, who remained upset and was 
screaming.  James and Frances separately asked Eva what had happened.  She told 
each of them that defendant had shot the victims and that Versenia had fallen into 
her arms after she had been shot.   
                                              
28 
In Crawford, the declarant was in police custody and a possible suspect 
when she gave her tape-recorded statements in response to questioning by 
detectives.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 38, 65.)   
 
 
 
55 
Although they were made well over an hour after the murders, this lapse of 
time did not purge Eva‘s statements of their spontaneity.  ― ‗The crucial element in 
determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under 
this exception to the hearsay rule is . . . the mental state of the speaker.  The nature 
of the utterance — how long it was made after the startling incident and whether 
the speaker blurted it out, for example — may be important, but solely as an 
indicator of the mental state of the declarant . . . .  [U]ltimately each fact pattern 
must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable 
discretion in the matter.‘ ‖  (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541, quoting 
People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903-904.) 
In People v. Brown, we concluded that a statement was properly admitted as 
spontaneous under Evidence Code section 1240, even though made two and one-
half hours after the shooting.  The witness was still crying and trembling at the 
time he expressed his belief that the defendant had shot and seriously injured the 
victim.  (People v. Brown, supra,31 Cal.4th at p. 541.)  Similarly, Eva ―continued 
to labor mightily under the emotional influence of the disturbing events‖ she had 
perceived.  (Ibid.)  Frances described Eva as ―very angry‖ and ―terribly upset.‖29  
James described his mother as hysterical, upset, and  ―screaming and hollering.‖  
                                              
29  
Frances, however, initially described Eva as ―very calm‖ and more calm 
then herself when she first made contact with Eva at the patrol car.  She also 
described Eva as having a ―drawn‖ and ―cold‖ demeanor.  In any event, we need 
not reweigh any conflicting evidence as to Eva‘s demeanor when she spoke to 
Frances.  Even assuming Eva‘s statements to Frances were not spontaneous for 
purposes of Evidence Code section 1240, their admission could not have been 
prejudicial by any standard because they were identical to the statements Eva made 
to James, and were therefore cumulative. 
 
 
 
56 
On this record, the court properly concluded Eva‘s statements to James and 
Frances were spontaneous and admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. 
Defendant also claims these statements were testimonial because they were 
made while Eva was in a police car, in the presence of a city mental health worker, 
and with multiple officers nearby.  Yet, these statements were not made in 
response to police interrogation or to any police agent, but to family members 
whose presence she had requested.  These statements of a distraught mother and 
grandmother to those offering solace completely lacked the ―formality and 
solemnity characteristic of testimony.‖  (People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 965, 984.)  The presence of a city mental health worker and officers outside the 
vehicle is irrelevant.  Ms. Brand was not part of the police investigation, but 
present to assist an emotional and fragile person.  The fact that officers were 
somewhere at the scene did not transform Eva‘s words to family members into 
―testimonial statements‖ as that term is understood in the Crawford context.  (Cage 
at p. 987.)   
3.  Eva’s Written Statements to Inspector Bierce the Day After the 
Murders 
Defendant also challenges the admission of Eva‘s statements to Inspector 
Alan Bierce, made during a police interview the day after the murders, which he 
reduced to a writing she then signed.  In those statements, Eva described seeing 
defendant exit her bedroom, walk down the hallway, and turn into the dining room.  
Thereafter, she heard gunshots.  Eva then saw Versenia enter the hallway, turn 
toward the dining room and say something like, ―What are you doing?‖ or ―What 
is wrong with you?‖ before hearing a single shot and seeing Versenia fall to the 
floor.  She heard a total of three shots.   
 
 
 
57 
Defendant argues that these statements were admissible only if defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Eva about them.  Although he did have 
the opportunity to cross-examine Eva at the preliminary hearing, he claims this 
cross-examination was ineffective because of her failing memory.  He further 
argues the statements were not admissible as prior inconsistent statements.   
Defendant has forfeited any appellate challenge to this evidence by failing 
to object to it below.  Before trial, defendant did not challenge the admission of 
Eva‘s statements to Inspector Bierce, and the court made no pretrial ruling on their 
admission.  When Inspector Bierce testified at trial, defense counsel made no 
objection when the prosecutor asked him to repeat Eva‘s statements to him.  Some 
of Eva‘s statements to Bierce were beneficial to defendant‘s case, and defense 
counsel solicited them in cross-examining Inspector Bierce.30  Under these 
circumstances, defendant had a tactical reason not to block Bierce‘s testimony, and 
he cannot now claim that the testimony was admitted in error.  (People v. Riel 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185 [rejecting a similar evidentiary claim, noting that the 
defendant there ―did not object to this evidence at trial; indeed, he elicited some of 
it himself‖].)   
 
                                              
30  
The defense emphasized the following points in regard to Eva‘s statements 
to Inspector Bierce:  Eva describing defendant‘s demeanor as normal and 
unagitated when he greeted her before the shootings; Eva describing how she 
could not see into the dining room where the shots occurred and did not see 
defendant after the gunshots; her failure to mention that Versenia fell into her arms 
after being shot; and the lack of any statement indicating that Eva believed 
defendant was the shooter.   
 
 
 
58 
B.  Evidentiary Rulings Concerning Defendant’s Mental Problems  
Defendant contends the court improperly prevented him from introducing 
evidence of his mental health problems and from impeaching the testimony of his 
family members who claimed not to know of these problems.  He also claims the 
court treated the prosecution deferentially, allowing that side to present evidence 
rebutting defendant‘s claims on this topic.  He maintains the court‘s rulings denied 
him his federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense.  His 
contentions lack merit.  The court properly ruled that the evidence was either 
irrelevant or called for inadmissible hearsay, and defendant made no offer of proof 
to establish the admissibility of the disputed evidence. 
A trial court has broad discretion in determining relevancy, but it cannot 
admit evidence that is irrelevant or inadmissible under constitutional or state law.  
(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 724.)  ―The proponent of proffered 
testimony has the burden of establishing its relevance, and if the testimony is 
comprised of hearsay, the foundational requirements for its admissibility under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  [Citations.]  Evidence is properly excluded when the 
proponent fails to make an adequate offer of proof regarding the relevance or 
admissibility of the evidence. [Citations.]‖  (Ibid.; Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) 
 Defendant complains the court erred in sustaining the prosecution‘s 
objections to defense counsel‘s questions:  1)  Whether Sammie Lee, defendant‘s 
former brother-in-law, had heard ―other family members‖ refer to defendant as 
―crazy;‖ 2)  Whether Eva had told her neighbor, John Adams, that defendant had 
mental problems; 3)  Whether Officer Nielsen, in responding to the scene of the 
murders, heard either the radio dispatch or Adams mention that defendant had 
mental problems; 4)  Whether defendant‘s sister, Ruth Cole, had read Officer 
Mesones‘s police report, in which he described defendant as ―schizophrenic and 
 
 
 
59 
paranoid;‖ 5)  Whether James, defendant‘s brother, had been told that defendant 
became agitated and difficult when he was off his medication; 6)  Whether Officer 
Nielsen was personally aware of defendant‘s mental condition based on his prior 
visits to the Blacksher household; and 7)  Whether James thought defendant was 
acting in a paranoid manner when defendant visited him a few days before the 
murders.  
With the exception of the last two rulings, all of defense counsel‘s inquiries 
called for hearsay, and defense counsel made no attempt to offer a relevant hearsay 
exception.  As a result, the court properly sustained the prosecution‘s hearsay 
objections.   
Furthermore, although Sammie Lee, Ruth Cole, and James each denied 
having any prior knowledge of defendant‘s mental problems or related 
hospitalizations, none of the proffered hearsay statements impeached their prior 
knowledge, but instead involved the beliefs of other persons.31  In addition, the 
issue of whether Officer Nielsen or John Adams believed or knew that defendant 
had mental problems had no relevance to any matter in the proceedings because 
they were not in a position to evaluate defendant‘s mental state in the days leading 
up to the murders.  Furthermore, Officer Nielsen and Adams did not deny having 
knowledge of defendant‘s psychiatric history.  Thus, a prior inconsistent statement 
exception was not available. 
Whether James believed that defendant was ―paranoid that everyone was 
against him‖ when defendant visited him a few days before the murders may have 
                                              
31  
In contrast, the evidence the prosecution was allowed to admit, over 
defendant‘s objection, did not call for hearsay or the beliefs of other third parties.  
Instead, the evidence involved the witness‘ own descriptions of defendant‘s 
relationships with Eva and Torey.   
 
 
 
60 
been relevant, but the court sustained the prosecution‘s objection to this question 
on the ground it called for a ―medical conclusion.‖  It appears that defense counsel 
was seeking a lay description of defendant‘s behavior, not an expert evaluation of 
paranoia.  Even assuming an error that defendant did not forfeit, however, James‘s 
description of defendant as behaving in a paranoid manner on the night he visited 
him would have added little to defendant‘s case.  James, his wife Frances, and 
defendant‘s brother Elijah all testified in great detail as to defendant‘s behavior 
that night, and the jury was free to draw its own conclusion as to whether 
defendant behaved abnormally then.   
Finally, we reject defendant‘s contention that, despite the rules of evidence, 
the federal constitutional right to present a defense prevails over state evidentiary 
rules to invalidate the court‘s rulings.  Again, defendant forfeited this contention 
by not raising it below, and it lacks merit in any event.  ―As a general matter, the 
ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused‘s right to 
present a defense.‖  (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834.)  Defendant fails to 
persuade us that the application of these rules prejudiced the ability to defend his 
case.  
Here, defendant was permitted to introduce extensive evidence relevant to 
his mental defense.  The excluded evidence was of slight value in comparison to 
the substantial evidence admitted.  In order to impeach those family members who 
denied knowing any of defendant‘s mental history, defendant was permitted to 
introduce Dr. Davenport‘s detailed testimony regarding his numerous 
hospitalizations and various diagnoses.  The jury also learned that defendant had 
received government disability payments based on his diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia.  Finally, they also heard John Adams testify and state in his 911 call 
that he believed defendant had had a ―case of mental illness . . . over the years‖ 
 
 
 
61 
and was ―crazy.‖  Given the volume of other evidence admitted under the ordinary 
rules of evidence, defendant‘s constitutional challenge to those rules lacks merit. 
C.  Failure to Limit Cross-examination of Defense Expert  
Defendant claims the court improperly permitted the prosecution to cross-
examine Dr. Davenport on matters that went beyond the limited purpose for which 
his testimony was admitted:  to impeach family members who claimed not to know 
of defendant‘s mental problems.  He argues the cross-examination elicited 
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony and violated his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent by discussing statements defendant had made during his prior 
competency evaluations.  We disagree. 
 
The court admitted Dr. Davenport‘s testimony about defendant‘s 
psychological history to impeach the family members who claimed to be unaware 
of it.  The court told the jury that the testimony could be only considered for that 
purpose, and not as evidence that defendant suffered from a mental illness when 
the charged crimes occurred or that he lacked the mental state to commit them.   
In 1975 defendant was committed to Napa State Hospital for suicidal 
thoughts.  Over defendant‘s objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Dr. 
Davenport about the circumstances of that commitment.  Through a hypothetical 
question, the prosecutor elicited from Dr. Davenport that it would be unusual for a 
person not to manifest any acute symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, assuming 
he had the disorder and had received no mental health treatment in the eight-year 
period between 1986 and 1994.32  Over defendant‘s objection, Dr. Davenport 
                                              
32   
Defendant also argues he was prejudiced by the prosecutor‘s use of this 
hypothetical because it incorrectly assumed defendant received no treatment for 
mental illness between 1986 and 1994.  But the parties later recognized the error 
and stipulated that the jury be told that defendant had received medical treatment 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
 
62 
admitted on cross-examination that this gap in treatment would cast doubt on the 
accuracy of a schizophrenia diagnosis.  Over defendant‘s objection, Dr. Davenport 
also testified that 1984 medical records indicated defendant had refused to take his 
medications.  The prosecutor asked for a definition of ―malingering‖ and 
questioned the doctor about his 1984 and 1996 competency evaluations of 
defendant.  According to Dr. Davenport, in 1996 defendant denied having any 
hallucinations, did not appear delusional, understood the charges against him, and 
―vehemently denied‖ any involvement in the murders.  According to Dr. 
Davenport, in 1984 defendant did not manifest any signs of psychosis or mental 
disorder, appeared to be able to think rationally, and was otherwise competent to 
stand trial.   
In chambers, the prosecutor asked to have Dr. Davenport return on the 
following court day for additional cross-examination.  The court refused and 
admonished the prosecutor, stating that he was getting ―way beyond‖ the purpose 
of the doctor‘s testimony.  The court noted that the defense had not made 
―objections in depth‖ to the prosecutor‘s questions about Dr. Davenport‘s 
competency evaluations and that the defense had opened the door to some of that 
testimony by raising the doctor‘s reports on direct examination.  Defense counsel 
noted that he had objected ―as long as [he] could, but [he] kept getting overruled.‖   
Under the state and federal Constitutions, the privilege against self-
incrimination applies to competency examinations.  Consequently, a defendant 
cannot be ― ‗convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
for a psychiatric disorder eight times between 1986 and 1996.  The effect of any 
error was substantially minimized by that stipulation. 
 
 
 
63 
[competency] examination.‘ ‖  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 960, 
quoting People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 522; see also People v. Pokovich 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1246.)  Unless the defendant has made a valid waiver 
under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, the statements he or she makes 
during a competency examination enjoy immunity and cannot ―be used by the 
prosecution to prove its case-in-chief as to either guilt or penalty‖ or to impeach a 
defendant at trial.  (People v. Pokovich, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1246, 1253; see 
also People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960, citing Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d 
at p. 523, and Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454.) 
Defendant lodged unsuccessful objections to many of the prosecutor‘s 
questions on various grounds, but did not specifically object to the questions about 
Dr. Davenport‘s competency examinations of defendant.  To the extent defendant 
failed to lodge a Fifth Amendment objection to the prosecutor‘s questions about 
the prior competency examinations, this claim is forfeited.  (People v. Weaver, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th 876, 961.)  We disagree that any objection would have been 
futile, given the clarity of case law on this subject and the fact that the court 
sustained at least one of defendant‘s objections during the prosecutor‘s cross-
examination.  Even if the in-chambers discussion could be construed as evidence 
that defense counsel was objecting generally to this evidence, counsel failed to 
state any Fifth Amendment basis for the objection.  (See People v. Kennedy (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 595, 612.)  As the court noted, however, it was the defense that began 
the inquiry by asking about those interviews on direct examination. 
Even assuming error, defendant fails to show prejudice.  In cross-
examination, the prosecutor elicited statements defendant had made during the 
1996 competency evaluation in which he denied experiencing any hallucinations, 
denied being delusional, said he understood the charges against him, and denied 
 
 
 
64 
guilt.  But on redirect examination, Dr. Davenport stated that during his 1996 
competency evaluation defendant appeared to be responding to hallucinations and 
made delusional statements, and explained it was common for mentally ill persons 
to deny their illness.  This testimony helped clarify Dr. Davenport‘s earlier cross-
examination testimony and to impeach the testimony of family members who 
denied knowing of defendant‘s mental illness.  As to defendant‘s statements about 
understanding the charges against him and denying his guilt, defendant‘s actions 
after the murders showed that he understood his culpability and that he was trying 
to deflect guilt from himself and, initially, to avoid apprehension.  Before he fled 
the state, defendant telephoned his relatives, claiming that masked men were 
responsible for gunshots inside his mother‘s home.  Moreover, the court instructed 
the jury that Dr. Davenport‘s testimony could be considered only to impeach 
defendant‘s family members who denied knowing that defendant suffered from 
any mental illness, not ―to show or negate the capacity of the defendant to form 
[the mental states] required for the commission of the crimes charged.‖  Under 
these circumstances, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People 
v. Pokovich, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1254-1255, citing Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18.) 
As for the remaining portions of the prosecutor‘s cross-examination, there 
was no error.  ―It is settled that the trial court is given wide discretion in 
controlling the scope of relevant cross-examination.‖  (People v. Farnam, supra,  
28 Cal.4th 107, 187.)  Moreover, ― ‗it is well settled that the scope of cross-
examination of an expert witness is especially broad; a prosecutor may bring in 
facts beyond those introduced on direct examination in order to explore the 
grounds and reliability of the expert‘s opinion. [Citations.]‘ ‖  (People v. Loker 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 739, quoting People v. Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 
 
 
 
65 
105.)  Given that the defense went into some of the details regarding defendant‘s 
prior hospitalizations and medications, the court properly allowed the prosecution 
to point out that Dr. Davenport did not personally observe defendant during those 
commitments and that defendant refused to take his medication, yet had not been 
committed in the eight years preceding the murders.  This inquiry was relevant to 
support the prosecution‘s argument that it was possible for defendant‘s family 
members not to have noticed any signs of his mental problems.   
D.  The Court’s Biased Treatment of Counsel  
Defendant contends the court treated counsel differently and made 
disparaging remarks to defense counsel, thus aligning itself with the prosecution in 
violation of defendant‘s federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.  
We disagree. 
― ‗Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the 
conduct of the trial [citation], the court ―commits misconduct if it persistently 
makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit 
the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution‖  
[citation].  Nevertheless, ―[i]t is well within [a trial court's] discretion to rebuke an 
attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, 
ignores the court's instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying 
behavior.‖  [Citation.]  Indeed, ―[o]ur role . . .  is not to determine whether the trial 
judge‘s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments 
would have been better left unsaid.  Rather, we must determine whether the judge's 
behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a 
perfect, trial.‖  [Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 373, 
quoting People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.) 
 
 
 
66 
At the outset, because defendant raised no objection below on the grounds 
he now raises on appeal and did not ask for a jury admonition to address the 
court‘s alleged intemperance towards his defense attorneys, he has forfeited this 
claim.  (People v. McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 373.) 
Even if the issue had been preserved, we have reviewed each complained-of 
remark, and find no error. 
On one occasion, Defense Counsel Thomas Broome tried to elicit what a 
witness believed defendant knew, and the prosecutor objected to the question as 
speculative.  Defense counsel‘s only response to this objection was, ―It is a 
question.  It is cross-examination,‖ and the court sustained the objection, 
commenting that ―we don‘t throw out the rules of evidence just because you‘re on 
cross.‖  On another occasion, Broome tried to introduce Elijah‘s hearsay 
statements about Torey‘s behavior as prior inconsistent statements when, in fact, 
they were not inconsistent with Elijah‘s testimony.  When counsel tried a second 
time to admit similar inadmissible hearsay, the court again sustained the 
prosecutor‘s objection and said, ―nice try.‖  Counsel, undeterred, unsuccessfully 
tried a third time, stating, ―I have to keep trying, judge.‖   
It can be difficult to ascertain the emotional content of such exchanges from 
a cold record.  However, to the extent the court‘s comments to Broome were a 
reflection of frustration and irritation at counsel‘s repeated efforts to elicit 
inadmissible hearsay, they were not  improper.  ―[S]uch manifestations of friction 
between court and counsel, while not desirable, are virtually inevitable in a long 
trial.‖  (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th 43, 78-79.) 
In beginning her cross-examination of Elijah, Defense Counsel Trina 
Stanley commented on the prosecution‘s repeated use of a transcript of Elijah‘s 
police interview to refresh his memory during direct examination.  She asked 
 
 
 
67 
Elijah to turn over his copy of the transcript, telling him ―we‘re not going to be 
restricted to the script.‖  The prosecutor said the comment was inappropriate and 
the court remarked, ―That was uncalled for, Ms. Stanley.‖  Soon after, defense 
counsel unsuccessfully tried to elicit from Elijah speculation about whether other 
family members knew defendant had mental problems.  After the court sustained 
two objections on the subject, Stanley, apparently while reading from Elijah‘s 
police interview transcript, asked a third question that called for inadmissible 
evidence.  The court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection and remarked, ―Going 
back to the script now, Ms. Stanley?‖  Later, Stanley tried to establish that Elijah 
was a reluctant witness by asking him whether police officers were present to 
prevent him from leaving the courtroom.  The prosecutor objected to this question 
as ―really improper,‖ and the court warned defense counsel, ―Please don‘t make 
me have to admonish you in front of the jury again.‖  Finally, during his cross-
examination of Dr. Davenport, the prosecutor asked hypothetically whether the 
doctor would doubt defendant‘s prior diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia if he 
had received no mental health treatment since 1986.  Defense Counsel Stanley 
objected, asserting the hypothetical lacked foundation and was ―skirting on 
misconduct.‖33  The court told defense counsel, ―I don‘t know how many times I 
have to ask you not to do that,‖ and the court told the jury it was improper for the 
defense to use ―that kind of language regarding misconduct in an attempt to 
persuade you one way or the other about [the prosecutor‘s] conduct.‖   
The court‘s comments to Defense Counsel Stanley were appropriate; she 
repeatedly asked questions designed to elicit inadmissible evidence.  The court‘s 
                                              
33  
Defense Counsel Stanley did not properly explain the basis of her objection 
until a subsequent in-chambers discussion.  (See ante, fn. 32.) 
 
 
 
68 
comment relating to defense counsel‘s use of the transcript may have been 
sarcastic but did not amount to judicial misconduct.  
E.  The Admission of Autopsy Photographs  
Defendant claims the court erroneously admitted autopsy photographs of 
the victims that were irrelevant, cumulative, and unduly prejudicial in violation of 
his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.  The complained-of 
photographs include two photographs showing the exit and entry wounds in the 
back of Torey‘s head (People‘s exhibits Nos. 57 and 58), one photograph showing 
the entry wound to Versenia‘s head (People‘s exhibit No. 61), and one photograph 
showing the wound to her right forefinger (People‘s exhibit No. 64).  The four 
photographs were properly admitted. 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion stating a general objection to the 
admission of ―all evidence of photographs of the victims . . . [taken] after they 
were deceased‖ as irrelevant, cumulative, inflammatory, and prejudicial.  The 
motion identified no individual photographs and offered to stipulate to the victims‘ 
deaths and the location of their wounds.  But later, at the hearing to determine the 
admissibility of the particular photographs that the prosecutor sought to introduce, 
defense counsel only contended the autopsy photographs as a group were 
cumulative to the photos taken at the crime scene.  The only autopsy photographs 
the defense specifically objected to were two additional photographs:  one showing 
Versenia‘s face (People‘s exhibit No. 63) and the other a closer view of the wound 
to her forefinger (People‘s exhibit No. 65).  The court ruled that People‘s exhibits 
Nos. 57, 58, 61, and 64 were admissible but excluded exhibits  Nos. 63 and 65 as 
cumulative.  At the end of the guilt phase, however, exhibits Nos. 63 and 65 were 
 
 
 
69 
pronounced admitted by the court and given to the jury without objection by either 
party.34   
As to People‘s exhibits Nos. 57, 58, 61, and 64, defendant has forfeited any 
claim that they were inflammatory and prejudicial.  Although defendant‘s written 
motion made a general objection to any ―bloody photos of the victims‖ as 
prejudicial and inflammatory , that objection was insufficient to preserve the issue 
for appeal because it did not identify any particular autopsy photograph, making it 
impossible for the court to ―determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate 
context.‖  (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190, disapproved on another 
point by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1; see also People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1172.)  The autopsy photographs were not 
identified to the court until the hearing to determine their admissibility.  At that 
hearing defense counsel failed to renew his specific objection to exhibits Nos. 57, 
58, 61, and 64 as being prejudicial and inflammatory.   
In any event, all of the admitted photographs were relevant to the 
prosecution‘s case and none were ―so gruesome as to have impermissibly swayed 
the jury.‖  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 974.)  In fact, the autopsy 
photographs depict cleaned wounds showing far less blood than photographs of the 
crime scene showing the position of the bodies.  They were also not cumulative to 
the other photographs or other evidence.  The autopsy photographs were the only 
evidence showing the nature and placement of the fatal wounds, and ―[t]he 
prosecution was not obligated to ‗accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of 
photographic evidence.‘ ‖  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 705, quoting 
                                              
34 
Defendant does not make any contention on appeal regarding People‘s 
exhibits Nos. 63 and 65, and has, in any event, forfeited this claim.  
 
 
 
70 
People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.)  Moreover, the photograph showing 
the wound to Versenia‘s finger indicated she was in a defensive position just 
before she was shot, which was relevant to issues of malice and intent to kill.  
(People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 243.) 
Finally, although the court, in contravention of its earlier ruling, admitted 
exhibits Nos. 63 and 65, their admission was of no significance.  Exhibit No. 63, 
the autopsy photograph of Versenia‘s face, showed blood flow across her face in 
virtually the same manner as exhibit No. 40, which was taken at the crime scene 
and admitted into evidence.  Exhibit No. 65, which was a closer view of 
Versenia‘s forefinger, was not misleading and was relevant because it corroborated 
testimony that her finger was ―almost severed‖ by the bullet.  Although exhibits 
Nos. 63 and 65 may have had some overlap with other photos, they were neither 
confusing nor misleading. 
F.  Prosecutorial Misconduct in Guilt Phase Closing Argument  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in various acts of misconduct 
during his guilt phase closing argument in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.35  Defendant fails to show entitlement to relief. 
                                              
35  
― ‗A prosecutor‘s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 
conviction a denial of due process.‘  [Citations.]  Under California law, a 
prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion commits 
misconduct even if such actions do not render the trial fundamentally unfair.  
[Citation.]  Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable on 
appeal unless the defendant made a timely objection and requested an admonition. 
[Citation.]‖  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 444.)  In order to be entitled 
to relief under state law, defendant must show that the challenged conduct raised a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable verdict.  In order to be entitled to relief 
under federal law, defendant must show that the challenged conduct was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 608.) 
 
 
 
71 
Defendant claims the prosecutor violated defendant‘s Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent by making two references to statements defendant had made 
to Dr. Davenport during his 1996 competency evaluation.  In the first, the 
prosecutor stated defendant had claimed someone else had committed the murders 
and, according to Dr. Davenport, had ―vehemently denied‖ guilt and had claimed 
―the masked men came in the house and did this.‖  Defense counsel interrupted, 
and said, ―That‘s not it,‖ and the court replied, ―Sustained.‖  In the second, the 
prosecutor again mentioned that defendant had ―vehemently denied the charges‖ to 
Dr. Davenport, but the jury would be able ―to tell‖ the doctor ―the truth of what 
[defendant] did that day —.‖  Defense counsel again interrupted with an objection 
to the form of the statement, but the court overruled the objection.   
Defendant has forfeited this claim on appeal for several reasons.  First, as 
discussed ante at page 63, despite the immunity attached to such statements, 
defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor elicited defendant‘s 
competency statements from Dr. Davenport during cross-examination.  When 
evidence is admitted without objection, it is difficult ―to fault the prosecutor for 
simply referring to [statements] that had been admitted by the court.‖  (People v. 
Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 301.)  Second, defendant‘s objections during the 
prosecutor‘s closing argument were clearly not made on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.  Defense counsel‘s first objection of ―[t]hat‘s not it‖ simply noted that 
defendant had never said the masked men had committed the murders, only that he 
saw them enter the house.  Defense counsel‘s second objection was to the form of 
the prosecutor‘s statement asking the jury to send a message to Dr. Davenport.  
These objections failed to inform the court of the Fifth Amendment issue so it 
could consider the interest at stake and make a fully informed ruling.  (See People 
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.)  Third, defendant did not request an 
 
 
 
72 
admonition that the jury not consider defendant‘s statements to Dr. Davenport 
either at the time of the doctor‘s testimony or during the prosecutor‘s closing 
arguments.  ―Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is preserved for 
appeal only if the defendant objects in the trial court and requests an admonition, 
or if an admonition would not have cured the prejudice caused by the prosecutor‘s 
misconduct.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 726.)  
Defendant fails to show why an objection and admonition would have been futile. 
Moreover, even assuming defendant has not forfeited this claim, and 
assuming the prosecutor‘s comments violated the immunity afforded to 
defendant‘s statements made during his competency examination, defendant fails 
to show prejudice.  As discussed ante at page 63, the jury heard evidence that 
defendant tried to deny any culpability by blaming the murders on masked gunmen 
he saw enter his mother‘s house.  Accordingly, the complained-of statements 
touched on other, properly admitted, remarks made by defendant.  As explained in 
People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 627, a claim of prejudice ―is substantially 
undercut, however, by similar evidence in the record which is not challenged.‖ 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor improperly argued matters outside the 
record concerning Eva‘s memory and what she may have witnessed during the 
shootings.  The prosecutor argued Eva had been traumatized by the murders, but 
suggested her inability to recall certain facts damaging to defendant‘s case in her 
preliminary hearing testimony was due to her bias as his mother.  About her prior 
statements, the prosecutor suggested that ―the only way [Eva] could have said the 
things she did is because she was able to figure out what happened inside the 
house.‖  Defense counsel objected to these statements as improper or as referring 
to matters outside the record, but the court properly overruled the objections.  It 
was not unreasonably speculative to argue that Eva was biased in favor of her son 
 
 
 
73 
or that she was able to conclude that defendant had shot the victims.  The 
prosecutor‘s statements were ―reasonable inferences or deductions that may be 
drawn from the evidence.‖ (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 726.) 
Defendant also takes issue with statements the prosecutor made during 
argument about whether defendant‘s family members had seen signs that he was 
mentally ill.  First, the prosecutor claimed no one in defendant‘s family had seen 
signs of mental illness.  In response to defense counsel‘s objection, the court 
corrected the prosecutor and said, ―there were some people who said yes.‖  Given 
that the court ―promptly and properly corrected the erroneous statement of the 
prosecutor,‖ any error was avoided.  (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 
962.)  The prosecutor also argued that defendant‘s family members did not know 
of defendant‘s mental health history because, according to Dr. Davenport‘s 
testimony, the treatment occurred while defendant was incarcerated.  The defense 
unsuccessfully objected.  Although Dr. Davenport did not specifically state that 
defendant‘s mental health records were mainly from his periods of incarceration, 
the doctor testified that he was relying on medical records provided by ―Criminal 
Justice Mental Health.‖  In addition, Elijah Blacksher testified that defendant had 
―spent the majority of his life in jail.‖  The prosecutor‘s comment fell within the 
―wide latitude‖ of advocates ―to make fair comment upon the evidence.‖  (People 
v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 726) 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly suggested that 
defendant wanted ―no part of the special circumstance‖ because ―he knows what it 
means‖ and that he believed the defense was going to argue that defendant had 
committed the murders.  But the court sustained defendant‘s objection that it was 
improper for the prosecutor to discuss what the defense might argue.  In any event, 
we have never categorically prohibited a prosecutor from making fair comments 
 
 
 
74 
on anticipated trial strategy, and nothing said here portrayed defense counsel 
unfairly.  (See People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 338-339; People v. 
Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1213; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 
538-539.) 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor mischaracterized the record regarding 
defendant‘s Social Security disability payments, as reflecting a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia.  The prosecutor noted that the jury appeared unsettled 
when the defense introduced the document, and said, ―we have no information 
available concerning [defendant‘s] medical condition or the names or addresses of 
his treating or diagnostic physician.‖  Defendant claims the prosecutor‘s comments 
mischaracterized the stipulation that accompanied the document, but, in fact, the 
prosecutor quoted the stipulation verbatim.  The stipulation made clear that the 
supporting documentation for the disability payments was unavailable.  The 
prosecutor properly emphasized what the stipulation made clear:  it was impossible 
to review how defendant was diagnosed or found to qualify for the disability 
payments.  Finally, defendant fails to show that the prosecutor improperly 
characterized the jury as being ―unsettled‖ when the court read the lengthy 
stipulation for the Social Security records and then allowed the jury to review the 
one-page document, which cryptically lists only the dates and payment amounts 
defendant received.  In any event, the defense successfully objected to the 
description.  It is difficult to discern any possible prejudice.  Jurors surely knew 
whether they were ―unsettled‖ or not and their lack of composure over a 
government document could not have unduly influenced the verdict. 
G.  Instructional Error Concerning Defendant’s Mental State  
Defendant contends the court‘s instructions erroneously led the jury to 
believe it could not consider whether defendant‘s mental illness precluded him 
 
 
 
75 
from forming the intent to commit murder.  Specifically, he claims the court‘s 
instruction on the presumption of sanity and the failure to give a requested 
pinpoint instruction hampered his mental illness defense and lowered the 
prosecution‘s burden of proof in violation of his due process rights. 
The court properly instructed the jury that:  ―In the guilt trial or phase of 
this case, the defendant is conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time [] 
the offenses . . . are alleged to have been committed.‖  Defense counsel did not 
object to this instruction and requested no further definition of sanity.  Defendant 
now argues that this instruction effectively negated the defense that because of his 
mental illness he could not form the mental state required for murder.  Yet the jury 
was given CALJIC No. 3.32, which is the standard instruction for this very 
defense.36  As defendant acknowledges, we rejected an identical argument in 
People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 584-585, overruled on other grounds 
in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, footnote 13, and we are 
neither persuaded nor bound by any contrary decisions of the lower federal courts.  
(People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431) 
                                              
36 
The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32 as follows:  ―You have 
received evidence regarding a mental disease, mental defect or mental disorder of 
the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime[s] charged in counts one 
and two or the lesser crimes thereto, namely, second degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter. You should consider this evidence solely for the purpose of 
determining whether the defendant actually formed the required specific intent, 
premeditated and deliberated or harbored malice aforethought, which are elements 
of the crime charged in counts one and two, namely, first-degree murder; whether 
he formed the required specific intent or harbored malice aforethought, which are 
elements of the lesser crime of second-degree murder; or whether he formed the 
required specific intent, which is an element of the lesser crime of voluntary 
manslaughter.‖   
 
 
 
76 
Defendant also requested a pinpoint instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.32 
but with the addition that, if the jury believed defendant suffered from mental 
illness, then in order to find him guilty of first degree murder it must also be 
―convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act while under the 
influence of‖ his mental illness; if not so convinced, then the jury was required to 
conclude that the illness ―negated the specific intent required for first degree 
murder.‖  The court rejected this instruction, concluding it was ―basically covered‖ 
by CALJIC No. 3.32.   
Defendant‘s proposed instruction is both an incorrect statement of law, and 
confusing to the point of near incomprehensibility.  Unlike CALJIC No. 3.32, the 
proposed instruction would have required the jury to presume that defendant‘s 
mental illness negated the mental state required for first degree murder if it was not 
convinced that he did not act under the influence of that mental illness.  The mere 
fact that defendant acted under the influence of mental illness does not necessarily 
mean he lacked the required mental state.  The question, as it is properly phrased in 
CALJIC No. 3.32, is ―whether the defendant actually formed the required specific 
intent.‖  This question is considered in the context of any evidence regarding 
mental illness.  Defendant‘s proposed instruction would, in effect, have resurrected 
the defense of diminished capacity, a defense this state has long rejected.  (§ 28, 
subd. (a) [―Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall not 
be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state . . . .‖].) 
To the extent defendant argues the proposed instruction was necessary to 
establish it was the prosecution‘s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant had the requisite mental state for first degree murder, other instructions 
conveyed the same point.  No further instruction was required. 
 
 
 
 
77 
H.  Instructional Error on Manslaughter  
The parties agree that the court erroneously instructed the jury that an intent 
to kill is a necessary element of voluntary manslaughter.  Defendant argues the 
error denied him his federal constitutional right to due process and to correct 
instructions to support his theory of defense.  There was no prejudicial error. 
Murder involves the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought, but a defendant who intentionally commits an unlawful killing 
without malice is guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.  (People v. Breverman 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153.)  For purposes of voluntary manslaughter, an 
intentional unlawful killing can lack malice when the defendant acted under a 
― ‗sudden quarrel or heat of passion‘ ‖ or when the defendant acted under ―[an] 
unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense.‖  (Id. at p. 154.)  
Two years after the trial here, in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, we 
clarified that voluntary manslaughter may also apply where a defendant ―acting 
with conscious disregard for life and knowing that the conduct endangers the life 
of another, unintentionally but unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion.‖  (Id. at p. 104.)  We further explained that ―the presence or absence of an 
intent to kill is not dispositive of whether the crime committed is murder or the 
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter‖ (id. at p. 110) and that it was error to 
instruct the jury otherwise.  (Id. at p. 111.)  Accordingly, the trial court erred here 
when it instructed the jury that voluntary manslaughter requires a finding that the 
―killing was done with the intent to kill.‖   
But there was no evidence supporting a manslaughter theory, let alone any 
theory of unintentional murder.  Defendant repeatedly stated his intention to kill 
Torey days before the murders, and rejected pleas that he reconsider.  According to 
Frances Blacksher, defendant also said if Versenia got in the way, he would kill 
 
 
 
78 
her, too.  Defendant had expressed dissatisfaction that Versenia‘s family was 
living in his mother‘s house and that Versenia had helped their mother obtain a 
restraining order against him.  These circumstances and the time over which 
defendant repeated his complaints are not consistent with heat of passion. 
The brief duration between defendant‘s entry into the home and the firing of 
shots does not comport with a sudden quarrel and there was no evidence of such a 
quarrel.  The physical evidence showed that Torey was shot from behind, in his 
sleep.  Defendant does not articulate how Torey could have incited violence while 
he was asleep and facing away from defendant.  The fact that Versenia came to 
Torey‘s aid immediately thereafter could not constitute sufficient provocation to 
generate a sudden quarrel or heat of passion for purposes of voluntary 
manslaughter.  ―Indeed, ‗[n]o case has ever suggested . . . that such predictable 
conduct by a resisting victim would constitute the kind of provocation sufficient to 
reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter.‘ ‖  (People v. Kanawyer (2003) 
113 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247, quoting People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 
306.)  
Therefore, although the court gave a manslaughter instruction, defendant 
received a benefit to which he was not entitled and, by any standard, could not 
have been harmed by any error in failing to give additional manslaughter 
instructions setting forth the alternate voluntary manslaughter theory we described 
in People v. Lasko.  (See People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253-1254.) 
I.  Instructional Error on Hearsay Evidence  
Defendant contends the court erred by not giving the jury his two proposed 
pinpoint instructions concerning Eva Blacksher‘s hearsay statements, and that this 
error violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and to 
present a defense.  Specifically, he claims the instructions actually given deprived 
 
 
 
79 
his right to have the jury decide whether Eva had witnessed the shootings and 
whether her statements were spontaneous as a result.  The claim is both forfeited 
and lacks merit. 
Defendant‘s first proposed instruction would have told the jury that if the 
prosecution could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that ―Eva 
Blacksher was able to perceive the shooting of‖ the victims, then the jury could not 
consider in its deliberations her statements implicating defendant.  His second 
proposed instruction stated that if the prosecution could not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that ―Eva Blacksher actually made any statements 
implicating‖ defendant in the shootings, then the jury could not consider such 
statements in its deliberations.  Both proposed instructions further cautioned the 
jury not to rely ―upon such evidence, in whole or part, to convict the defendant 
unless the prosecution has proven the existence of the preliminary fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖   
On the record, the court acknowledged these proposed defense instructions, 
stated that it had conferred with defense counsel, and explained that counsel had 
agreed to a modified ―special instruction‖ derived from the instruction for 
Evidence Code section 1240.  This special instruction told the jury that Eva‘s 
statements were admitted as spontaneous statements, explained that such 
statements were admissible if they met the criteria for spontaneous statements, 
listed those criteria, and stated that, ―Whether the declarant perceived the events 
described in the statements and the weight to which these statements are entitled is 
a matter for you to decide.‖   
Given that defense counsel specifically agreed to substitute the instruction 
ultimately given to the jury for the ones they had previously requested, defendant 
has forfeited this claim.  In any event, there was no error.  The instruction given 
 
 
 
80 
properly told the jury to decide whether Eva had actually perceived the events 
described in her statements.  Defendant, therefore, was not deprived of his right to 
have the jury determine this issue.  (Evid. Code, § 403, subds. (b), (c)(1).) 
Defendant also complains that the instruction given precluded the jury from 
determining whether Eva‘s statements were in fact spontaneous.  This is not a jury 
question.  A determination of ―[w]hether the requirements of the spontaneous 
statement exception are satisfied . . . is vested in the court, not the jury.‖  (People 
v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318.)  The only exception to this rule is where the 
preliminary fact establishing the admissibility of the evidence is also ―a fact in 
issue in the action‖ because ―it would be prejudicial to the parties for the judge to 
inform the jury how he had decided the same factual question that it must decide in 
determining the merits of the case.‖  (Evid. Code § 405, subd. (b); Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 1 West‘s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) 
foll. § 405, p. 377.)  Whether Eva had personal knowledge of the facts contained in 
her statements was an issue for the jury, as they were properly told.  Whether Eva‘s 
statements were spontaneous was not ―a fact in issue in the action.‖  (Evid. Code 
§ 405, subd. (b).)  The spontaneity of the statements was a legal question for the 
court to resolve.  The instruction did not suggest the court had already decided that 
Eva‘s statements were accurate.  There was no error.   
J.  Cumulative Guilt Phase Error  
Defendant argues we must reverse his conviction because of the cumulative 
effect of errors in the guilt phase of his trial.  We assumed for the sake of argument 
that the prosecution improperly elicited statements from defendant‘s competency 
examination, but concluded that those statements were similar to defendant‘s other 
admissible statements in which he shifted blame for the murders.  We also 
assumed for the sake of argument that it was error not to allow defendant‘s brother 
 
 
 
81 
to describe defendant‘s behavior as ―paranoid,‖ but concluded that this description 
would have been of marginal value and, given the extensive psychiatric testimony, 
its exclusion was not prejudicial.  Considered cumulatively, the assumed errors 
described above could not have prejudiced defendant at the guilt phase. 
IV.  SANITY PHASE 
A.  Failure to Limit Cross-Examination of Defense Witness  
Defendant faults the court for admitting, over his objection, Ruth Gades‘s 
testimony on cross-examination that, in light of her intervening 20 years of 
professional experience, she now doubted her original diagnoses of defendant in 
1978 and 1980.  Defendant argues that this cross-examination was irrelevant and 
prejudicial in violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair 
trial.  We disagree. 
On direct examination, Ruth Gades, who had a master‘s degree in 
psychology and was a licensed social worker, described her intake evaluations of 
defendant in 1978 and 1980 when he was involuntarily committed to Highland 
Hospital while incarcerated.  Defense counsel asked Gades her diagnosis of 
defendant in each evaluation.  In 1978, she concluded defendant suffered from 
psychotic depression with auditory and visual hallucinations and suicidal ideation.  
In 1980, she diagnosed him with psychotic depression.   
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked whether Gades would still give 
defendant the same diagnoses.  Defense counsel objected on relevancy and 
foundational grounds, 37 but the court overruled the objection, stating, ―You asked 
                                              
37  
Respondent contends defendant failed to object below on the federal ground 
he now asserts, but the court had granted defendant‘s pretrial motion to 
―federalize‖ all his objections.  In any event, the new federal arguments are based 
on factual or legal standards no different from those the trial court was asked to 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
 
82 
her what her opinion was, [the prosecutor] can certainly cross on that.‖  Gades then 
explained that her intervening 20 years of experience would cause her to doubt 
whether defendant‘s hallucinations were genuine and that it was very common for 
inmates to exaggerate their symptoms to gain access to a mental health facility.   
Although defendant claims he did not call Gades as an expert witness, 
defense counsel went beyond asking about her observations of defendant.  He 
asked directly for her prior diagnosis and clinical impressions.  Thus, the defense 
questions were clearly ―directed toward medical expertise,‖ going beyond mere lay 
opinion and into ― ‗a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that 
the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.‘ ‖  (People v. Thornton 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 449, quoting Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)  After the 
defense solicited Gades‘s prior diagnoses, opposing counsel was entitled to cross-
examine the witness about what those diagnoses were based on and whether the 
expert witness remained confident in the accuracy of her conclusions.  (See People 
v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 359.)  The cross-examination was proper.  
B.  The Court’s Biased Treatment of Counsel  
Defendant again argues the court made inconsistent evidentiary rulings at 
the sanity phase that were biased in favor of the prosecution, in violation of his 
federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.  Defendant argues the 
court treated the parties differently in allowing and disallowing certain questioning 
of defense witness Dr. William Pierce.  Defendant also argues the court allowed 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
apply, and merely raise the additional legal consequence of violating the federal 
Constitution.  ―To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not 
forfeited on appeal.‖  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.) 
 
 
 
83 
the prosecution to take advantage of its own discovery violation in cross-
examining Dr. Pierce.  There was no error. 
As with his similar guilt phase claim (see ante at pages 65-68) defendant 
raised no objection below on the grounds he now raises on appeal, and thus has 
forfeited this claim.  (People v. McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 373.) 
Even had the issue been preserved for appeal, the court‘s evidentiary rulings 
concerning Dr. Pierce‘s testimony were not inconsistent and there was no judicial 
misconduct.   
Defendant faults the court for not permitting him to ask Dr. Pierce, over the 
prosecution‘s objections on grounds of speculation, whether defendant‘s mental 
health status would have been assessed and what would have happened to him had 
he been involuntarily committed on the night he was arrested for appearing at 
Eva‘s house with a baseball bat.  Defendant also faults the court for allowing the 
prosecution to ask Dr. Pierce, over defense objections, how defendant would have 
acted if he were suffering from a psychotic episode at the time of the murders, 
whether the doctor believed there was a plausible reason why defendant went to 
Reno immediately after the murders, and whether defendant‘s telephone calls to 
his siblings immediately after the murders indicated he was lying to protect 
himself.  Defendant also faults the court for allowing the prosecution to ask Dr. 
Pierce whether defendant intended to kill Torey, over the defense objection that 
the question called for a legal conclusion.  These rulings were not inconsistent and 
are not evidence of judicial misconduct. 
The defense questions concerning what would have happened to defendant 
or how he might have been diagnosed had he been involuntarily committed called 
for improper speculation.  The prosecutor‘s questions, on the other hand, were not 
rooted in speculation, given that defendant had offered Dr. Pierce‘s expert opinion 
 
 
 
84 
that defendant had suffered numerous psychotic episodes in the past and was 
probably experiencing one the night he appeared at Eva‘s home with the baseball 
bat.  On cross-examination, Dr. Pierce said he did not know for certain whether 
defendant was also suffering from a psychotic episode at the time of the murders, 
but stated that his examination of defendant and his past history indicated he 
―definitely has a potential to have psychotic episodes,‖ and it was ―very possible‖ 
defendant was in a psychotic state when he shot the victims.  
As we have already noted, ― ‗the scope of cross-examination of an expert 
witness is especially broad‘ ‖ and ― ‗a prosecutor may bring in facts beyond those 
introduced on direct examination in order to explore the grounds and reliability of 
the expert‘s opinion.  [Citations.]‘ ‖  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 739, 
quoting People v. Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 105.)  Given Dr. Pierce‘s 
opinions and his testimony that psychotic episodes severely disrupt cognitive 
functioning, the prosecutor‘s questions were all relevant to the question of whether 
defendant was suffering from a psychotic episode when the murders occurred.  
The court‘s rulings, therefore, were not inconsistent, but merely reflected the fact 
that cross-examination of expert witnesses is not narrowly circumscribed. 
Finally, although the prosecution was late in disclosing a tape recording of 
defendant‘s statements to police, the recording was turned over before trial began.  
As a result, defense counsel had nearly three months to allow Dr. Pierce to listen to 
that tape before his appearance at the sanity phase.  The doctor did not do so.  
Under the circumstances, there was nothing unfair in allowing the prosecutor to 
ask Dr. Pierce whether he had listened to that tape. 
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his sanity 
phase closing argument in violation of his Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
 
 
 
85 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.  There was no prejudicial 
error. 
We agree with defendant that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
suggesting he did not call any experts at the sanity phase because it would have 
wasted the jury‘s time.  In his opening statement for the sanity phase, the 
prosecutor claimed he intended to call ―two mental health experts‖ to show that 
defendant was capable of planning and carrying out a course of action and was 
―goal oriented.‖  But the prosecutor called no such witnesses during the sanity 
phase.  In closing argument, the prosecutor said, ―I really thought I was going to 
call two psychologists and two psychiatrists,‖ but then explained that during the 
testimony of defense expert Dr. Pierce he had seen the jury ―falling asleep, 
shuffling, waiting for him to close that book and stop this mess and come on up 
here and get real in 1998 instead of flashing back in the past in 1978.‖  The 
prosecutor continued, ―I said, man, if I put on any psychiatric testimony these 
people are going to kill me.‖  Defense counsel interrupted and objected to the 
comment as ―inappropriate and irrelevant,‖ but the court overruled the objection 
stating, ―It is all right.‖  The prosecutor continued, claiming the jury would ―have 
[his] head,‖ so he ―said no.‖  The prosecutor further explained, ―I don‘t think Dr. 
Pierce had anywhere to go, so I cut the case short and deal [sic] with him on the 
basis of his own testimony because he didn‘t get there.‖   
To the extent the prosecutor claimed Dr. Pierce was not useful to 
defendant‘s case, his argument was permissible comment on the evidence.  But the 
prosecutor also implied he had evidence that defendant was not insane, but did not 
want to bore the jury or waste its time with not just two, but four expert witnesses.  
This was improper.  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 452 [misconduct 
where the prosecutor suggested ―she had evidence in her possession that supported 
 
 
 
86 
her line of questioning, but simply chose not to present it in the interest of saving 
the jury time‖]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 829 [misconduct where the 
prosecutor told the jury, ― ‗I could have had somebody come in here and analyze 
[the alleged narcotics]‘ ‖ (italics omitted)].) 
But the error was not prejudicial on either state or federal grounds.38  
Defendant was unable to present any expert testimony supporting his claim of 
insanity at the time of the killings.  At most, his expert testified that he ―might‖ 
have been insane.  Moreover, the court instructed the jury only to rely on evidence 
presented in court and not treat counsel‘s comments as evidence.  (See People v. 
Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453.)  Under these circumstances, the prosecutor‘s 
improper remarks had little significance. 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor referred to evidence outside the 
record when he argued that defendant‘s ―hook into Social Security was his 
mother‘s disability of some kind.‖  He claims this argument contravened the 
parties‘ stipulation that defendant had received disability payments due to a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.  But defendant ignores the fact that Ruth Cole 
had testified, without objection, that defendant did not want to work, wanted to 
―beat the system,‖ and had his first exposure to disability payments as a teenager 
when his mother became disabled and could not work.  The prosecutor made the 
comment not to undermine the stipulation but to argue that defendant was a ―con 
man‖ who learned early on how to take advantage of ―the system.‖  This was 
permissible argument based on the evidence.  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 
Cal.4th 1017, 1059 [―The suggestion that defendant was a ‗con man‘ was an 
                                              
38  See ante footnote 35. 
 
 
 
87 
appropriate comment, in colorful terms, upon the evidence to be introduced at 
trial‖].) 
Defendant argues the prosecutor in two instances improperly injected his 
personal beliefs into his closing arguments, but defense counsel made no 
objections to any of the comments of which he now complains.  Defendant 
contends any objections would have been futile.  But the record demonstrates that 
defense counsel had no hesitation in lodging objections to the prosecutor‘s closing 
arguments at either the guilt or sanity phases, and the court sustained many of 
defendant‘s objections.  In any event, there was no misconduct. 
Defendant first complains the prosecutor improperly maligned the 
credibility of defense expert Dr. Pierce by stating his belief that ―the doctor looked 
ridiculous and didn‘t make any sense.‖  But the prosecutor prefaced these remarks 
by explaining that Dr. Pierce‘s opinion was based in part on information provided 
by defendant, which he argued was untrustworthy.  This was permissible argument 
based on the evidence.  (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 948 [A 
prosecutor may argue ―that defense witnesses are not entitled to credence . . . [and] 
argue on the basis of inference from the evidence that a defense is fabricated‖].)   
Defendant also complains the prosecutor improperly injected his personal 
beliefs by stating he did not ―like the way it invaded your province when 
[defendant] sat in court and laughed‖ while Deputy District Attorney Richard 
Moore testified about defendant‘s statements to police.  Counsel called defendant‘s 
behavior ―cold‖ and ―wrong.‖  Defendant claims there was no indication the jury 
actually saw this conduct.  But the prosecutor mentioned he was ―glad [the jury] 
saw it,‖ and the fact that defendant did not object to this line of argument suggests 
defendant‘s behavior was readily observable during Moore‘s testimony.  
Moreover, defense counsel, in his closing arguments at the sanity phase, likewise 
 
 
 
88 
noted the jury was witness to bouts of defendant‘s inappropriate laughter during 
the course of the trial.  The prosecutor, therefore, was addressing what had 
transpired during trial, not merely describing his personal belief as to defendant‘s 
demeanor. 
It is misconduct, however, for a prosecutor to comment on a nontestifying 
defendant‘s courtroom demeanor or behavior during the guilt phase of the trial.  
(People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 197; People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
483, 524; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 434.)  We have refused to 
apply this rule during the penalty phase when a defendant‘s character is placed in 
issue as a mitigating factor.  ―Under those circumstances it was proper for the jury 
to draw inferences on that issue from their observations of defendant in the 
courtroom and therefore proper for the prosecutor to base a closing argument on 
such observations.‖  (People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 197.) 
This exception applies even more strongly here because defendant‘s 
demeanor was a significant issue in determining his sanity.  In particular, 
according to Dr. Levin, defendant‘s propensity to laugh inappropriately during his 
prior examinations and hospitalizations was a symptom relevant to his previous 
diagnoses of mental illness.  As already discussed, defense counsel raised this very 
issue during closing argument and referred to defendant‘s ―inappropriate laughter‖ 
and ―bizarre‖ demeanor during the trial.  Given the circumstances, the prosecutor 
made fair comment on defendant‘s demeanor. 
D.  Cumulative Sanity Phase Error  
The only error we have identified during the sanity phase was the 
prosecutor‘s suggestion that he could have called four experts in his favor, but did 
not do so in order to save the jury‘s time.  We concluded the error could not have 
 
 
 
89 
been prejudicial.  Consequently, there is no cumulative effect of sanity phase error 
to consider in this case. 
V.  PENALTY PHASE 
A.  Victim Impact Evidence  
Members of the Blacksher family testified about the lasting effects of the 
murders on their lives.  (See ante, at p. 18.)  Defendant contends the admission of 
this evidence violated his state and federal rights to due process and a reliable 
penalty determination.  We have previously rejected the contention that section 
190.3, factor (a) is unconstitutionally vague as to the scope of admissible victim 
impact evidence, and we reject defendant‘s further claim that such evidence should 
be limited to:  (1) testimony by family members who were personally present at the 
scene during or immediately after the killing; (2) circumstances known or 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant; and (3) the testimony of a single witness.  
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 783.) 
Defendant further argues that family members should not have been able to 
testify as to the financial impact of the murders and the lasting effects of the 
murders on their emotional and employment lives.  Defendant made no specific 
objection to this testimony below.  Even assuming he has not forfeited this claim, 
the complained-of testimony did not invite ―a purely irrational response from the 
jury,‖ nor was it ― ‗so unduly prejudicial‘ as to render the trial ‗fundamentally 
unfair.‘ ‖  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1056-1057.)  We 
have previously found similar testimony relevant to the impact of defendant‘s 
crimes.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 131-134, and cases cited therein.) 
B.  The Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence  
Defendant argues the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor‘s 
objections to questions he posed to his sister, Georgia Hill, about what other family 
 
 
 
90 
members knew of defendant‘s mental problems.  He also faults the trial court for 
sustaining the prosecution‘s objection to the question of whether Sammie Lee, 
Versenia‘s former husband, believed that the Blacksher family had ―seen enough 
death.‖  He claims the rulings excluded potential mitigating evidence in violation 
of his rights to present a defense, to confront witnesses, to due process, and to a 
reliable sentencing determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  There was no prejudicial error. 
When defense counsel tried to ask Georgia what she thought her older 
siblings did not understand about defendant or why they hated him, the court 
sustained the prosecution‘s objections as calling for speculation.  The court did not 
abuse its discretion in so ruling.  Georgia‘s belief as to what her older siblings 
thought, or why they thought so, was speculative.  (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).)  
Moreover, at issue was whether the older siblings wrongly believed that defendant 
suffered no mental illness.  Thus, her belief as to that issue was not relevant unless 
supported by adequate foundation.  In any event, defendant made no argument to 
support the admissibility of this evidence; he likewise fails to do so on appeal.  The 
evidentiary rulings were proper.  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th 698, 724.) 
The court also sustained objections to Georgia‘s characterizations of 
defendant as behaving in a ―schizophrenic‖ manner on the ground she was not 
qualified to give a medical conclusion.  Although the term ―schizophrenic‖ carries 
a technical psychiatric meaning, it also has a common or ordinary meaning as an 
adjective describing ―contradictory or antagonistic qualities or attitudes.‖  
(Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1998) p. 1041.)  Defendant made 
no effort to clarify which meaning Georgia relied upon. Even assuming a 
cognizable error, there was no conceivable prejudice.  Georgia was allowed to 
describe in detail her observations of defendant‘s odd behavior.  The mere fact that 
 
 
 
91 
she was not allowed to label that odd behavior as ―schizophrenic‖ could not have 
affected the verdict, especially in light of all the other evidence on this topic. 
Finally, when Defense Counsel Thomas Broome asked Sammie Lee if he 
felt ―this family has seen enough death,‖ the court properly sustained the 
prosecutor‘s objection on relevancy grounds.  The question was vague and called 
for speculation.  Although the defense may elicit opinions from a capital 
defendant‘s family members about the appropriate punishment (People v. 
Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th 50, 98; People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 194), 
the question posed to Sammie was not phrased in this manner.  If defense counsel 
wanted to ask Sammie whether he believed defendant should be put to death, he 
had the opportunity to rephrase his question more clearly.  He did not.  
Given our analysis of the above described rulings, we reject the further 
contention that the court‘s rulings demonstrated an ―asymmetrical application‖ of 
the rules of evidence in violation of defendant‘s due process rights.  In any event, 
defendant forfeited this claim for appellate purposes by failing to raise it below.  
(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 414.) 
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his 
penalty phase arguments in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the federal Constitution.  There was no error. 
Defendant first contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his 
penalty phase opening statement by referring to the expected testimony of Dr. Joel 
Fort, who ultimately did not testify.  The defense made a relevancy objection just 
before opening statements began.  The court did not rule on the objection until 
after the prosecutor had made his opening statement.  Hence, the prosecutor did 
not engage in misconduct by referring to the anticipated testimony.  Moreover, all 
 
 
 
92 
the prosecutor said about Dr. Fort was that he had reviewed ―some materials,‖ 
would testify as to defendant‘s state of mind at the time of the murders, and ―[h]is 
opinion will not be in any way related to paranoid schizophrenia.‖  After the court 
ruled Dr. Fort‘s testimony inadmissible, the parties agreed to a curative instruction 
in which the court informed the jury that the prosecutor had intended to call Dr. 
Fort as a witness, but the court changed its ruling so the prosecutor would no 
longer be calling him.  The court further warned the jury not to speculate about Dr. 
Fort‘s testimony or why he would not be testifying.  It also instructed the jury not 
to discuss these matters or allow them to be part of the deliberations.  Under the 
circumstances, there was no misconduct. 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made several improper arguments 
concerning remorse at the penalty phase closing argument.  ―A prosecutor may 
properly comment on a defendant‘s lack of remorse, as relevant to the question of 
whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor 
does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor.‖  (People v. 
Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 187.) 
Defendant argues it was improper for the prosecutor to comment, over his 
objection, that defendant‘s emotionless courtroom demeanor showed he had a 
―heart of ice,‖ but since defendant placed his own character at issue as a mitigating 
factor and asked for the jury‘s compassion and sympathy, the argument was 
proper.  (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 519; People v. Heishman, 
supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 197.)  Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor 
commenting that after the murders defendant ate a ―full breakfast of eggs, coffee, 
sausage and French toast and finished it off with a cigarette‖ while the victims 
bled to death.  But defendant made no objection to the prosecutor‘s comments, and 
we have found similar arguments in other cases to be fair comment on the 
 
 
 
93 
evidence.  (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 613 [prosecutor did not 
improperly introduce evidence of defendant‘s lack of remorse where defendant 
bought a new car and took his wife out for a ―romantic dinner‖ after the murders]; 
People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1215 [prosecutor did not improperly argue 
lack of remorse in pointing out that the defendant ate at a fast food restaurant after 
the murders].)  Defendant also complains the prosecutor offered a statement he 
never made, ―They can drop dead.  I won‘t care.  I am hungry and I have to have 
something to eat . . . .‖  But again, defendant did not object, and ―[t]he imagined 
statements by [defendant] were no more than sarcastic hyperbole identifying what 
the prosecutor believed to be weakness in the defense explanation of the events.‖  
(People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1303, fn. 48.)  Defendant argues the 
prosecutor improperly commented, over his objection, on defendant‘s claim to 
police about having a ―beautiful relationship‖ with the victims and his claim that 
he last saw Torey asleep and smiling.  But we have allowed similar arguments that 
a defendant‘s untruthfulness and evasiveness demonstrated a lack of remorse.  
(People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 455; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
619, 691.)  Finally, nothing in the prosecutor‘s argument asked the jury to consider 
lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. 
Defendant faults the prosecutor for repeatedly arguing in the penalty closing 
argument that there was no evidence in mitigation.  He claims, to the contrary, the 
record contained mitigating evidence and the prosecutor‘s argument was 
tantamount to an expression of his own personal belief and reference to matters 
outside the record.  Although defendant objected to some of these comments , the 
objections were properly overruled as the remarks were fair comment on the 
evidence and were consistent with the prosecutor‘s claim that defendant did not 
suffer from any mental illness.  (People v. Farnam, supra,  28 Cal.4th 107, 200 
 
 
 
94 
[prosecutor made fair comment on the evidence by describing defendant‘s ―case in 
mitigation as ‗garbage,‘ ‗a scam,‘ ‗obvious ploys,‘ ‗lies,‘ ‗baloney,‘ and ‗a fairy 
tale‘ ‖].) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor on two occasions engaged in 
―paraleipsis:‖  stating one thing but suggesting the opposite.  (See People v. Wrest 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107.)  Although defendant objected to the remarks, the 
court properly overruled the objections.  On the first occasion, the prosecutor 
described defendant‘s assault on a fellow inmate and argued that the incident, in 
light of defendant‘s prior convictions, suggested a pattern of ―violence escalating‖;  
the prosecutor, however, corrected himself and said, ―I‘m not going to comment on 
this again, because I‘ve already referred to it as a prior felony conviction and you 
can‘t double count.‖  When defense counsel objected, the prosecutor again 
repeated, ―You can‘t double count,‖ and asked the jury to ―consider this one time 
and that‘s all.‖  There was nothing misleading in the prosecutor‘s statements, 
which merely clarified a passing reference to defendant‘s record of prior 
convictions.  On the second occasion, the prosecutor described defendant‘s rape 
and beating of his ex-girlfriend and the effect of the murders on his brother, Artis 
Blacksher, Jr.  The prosecutor noted that defendant‘s crimes had made each 
witness so angry at defendant that they wanted to kill him.  Defense counsel 
objected, stating that Artis had only said he wanted to hurt defendant after the 
murders, not kill him.  After the court overruled the objection, the prosecutor 
argued that it would not be fair for the jury to base its decision on anger, and 
although they were mad at defendant, ―[a]nger is not an appropriate basis for any 
decision in this case.‖  Defense counsel made no objection to these remarks and, 
even assuming the contention was not forfeited for appeal, the prosecutor was 
merely describing the impact of defendant‘s crimes, while also making clear that 
 
 
 
95 
the jury should not let its anger permeate its decision making.  In sum, the 
complained-of comments were not improper.  (See People v. Valencia (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 268, 281-282.) 
Last, defendant claims the prosecutor injected into closing arguments his 
personal belief regarding deterrence and the benefit of his own experience as a 
prosecutor for ―many, many years.‖  Not so.  Defendant did not object to any of the 
statements he now challenges and thus has forfeited these contentions.  Moreover, 
they lack merit.  The prosecutor did not argue that his own experience made him 
believe that death was an appropriate penalty in this case.  Instead, he said that, in 
his experience, juries can sense insincerity; as a result, he had learned humility and 
restraint and he was not simply going to assume that the jury would do as he asked.  
We have never faulted a prosecutor for simply declaring his or her humility.  The 
prosecutor also suggested that the murders had caused the community to suffer ―a 
wound as a body‖ and that a death sentence for defendant would be ―a cleansing‖ 
and ―a catharsis‖ that would restore ―order and continuity to what we have.‖  
These statements do not address deterrence, but rather community retribution.  We 
have permitted similar brief statements in other cases.  (See People v. Martinez 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 965-966; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1178.) 
 
 
 
96 
D.  Instructional Error  
Defendant claims the court made various instructional errors in violation of 
his federal constitutional rights to due process and a reliable sentencing 
determination.  No prejudicial error occurred. 
Defendant correctly contends the court failed to reinstruct the jury during 
the penalty phase on the applicable principles of evaluating the credibility of 
witnesses found in CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.22, 2.23, and 2.21.1.39  Although the 
court erred, the omission was not prejudicial. 
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to ―instruct on general principles of law 
that are closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the 
jury‘s understanding of the case,‖ including instructions relevant to evaluating the 
credibility of witnesses.  (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 (Carter).)  
In Carter, not only did the court fail to give the instructions relevant to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, it also failed to instruct at the penalty phase with any of 
the applicable evidentiary instructions from CALJIC Nos. 1.00 through 3.31.  
(Carter, at pp. 1218-1219.)  As here, the court in Carter had specifically told the 
jury to disregard all other instructions given in the prior phases of the trial.  We 
assumed error in Carter, but concluded the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because, at least as to those omitted instructions regarding the 
credibility of witnesses, ―the jury expressed no confusion or uncertainty in this 
regard and never requested clarification.‖  (Id. at p. 1221.)  The same is true here. 
Defendant identifies only one way in which the failure to instruct allegedly 
prejudiced him.  He claims that the testimony of his ex-girlfriend, who claimed 
defendant had raped and beaten her, was allowed to go before the jury 
                                              
39  
Defendant below made no request for these instructions. 
 
 
 
97 
―unimpeached‖ because it was not instructed to consider her prior felony 
convictions in assessing her credibility.  (CALJIC No. 2.23.)  Of course, it is not 
the role of any instruction to ―impeach‖ or advocate.  Defendant had an ample 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness and made no effort to impeach her 
version of events.  There was no evidence she testified in exchange for any reward 
or immunity in relation to her prior criminality, which was in evidence.  Her 
testimony was detailed, vivid, and appeared otherwise credible.  In these 
circumstances, her prior convictions were of marginal impeachment value.  
Finally, given that counsel for both parties strongly argued the credibility of certain 
witnesses in their penalty phase closing arguments, defendant simply cannot argue 
that the jury was ―adrift‖ when it came to evaluating the credibility of the 
witnesses at the penalty phase.   
Defendant, therefore, fails to establish a reasonable possibility that any error 
under state law affected the verdict.  We also conclude it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict of death under the 
federal standard of review of constitutional error.  (Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 
1221-1222.) 
Defendant argues the court erred by refusing to give his requested 
instruction that the jury should not ―double-count‖ the special circumstances 
against him as aggravating factors relevant to the circumstances of the crime under 
section 190.3, factor (a).  But we have rejected identical claims, concluding that, in 
the absence of any misleading argument to encourage double-counting, the 
― ‗standard instructions do not inherently encourage the double counting of 
aggravating factors.  [Citations.]‘ ‖  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289, 
quoting People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1180; see also People v. Young 
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1225-1226.)  Here, the prosecutor made no such argument 
 
 
 
98 
and only encouraged the jury to consider the circumstances that defendant had 
murdered members of his own family; premeditated the crimes for nearly a week; 
and exploited the victims‘ vulnerability by shooting Torey while he was asleep and 
Versenia when she came to her son‘s aid.  There was no need to clarify the 
standard instructions.  
Defendant contends the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury with a 
proposed instruction directing the jury to consider:  (1) whether defendant 
committed the offenses while ―under the influence of any mental or emotional 
disturbance;‖ and (2) whether defendant‘s capacity ―to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired 
as a result of mental disease or defect, regardless of whether the capacity was so 
impaired as to constitute a defense to the charges, and regardless of whether the 
impairment caused him to commit the crimes.‖  He claims the failure to instruct 
the jury regarding these two factors violated his federal constitutional rights to 
present a defense and to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment, his right to a 
reliable sentencing determination under the Eighth Amendment, and his right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendant argues his proposed first factor was necessary because the 
standard CALJIC No. 8.85 instruction, given to the jury here, unconstitutionally 
restricted the jury to consideration of only ―extreme‖ mental or emotional 
disturbances.40  We have repeatedly rejected identical arguments, and do so again.  
(People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 543, 601; People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1230.) 
                                              
40  
Defendant did not make this specific argument below, but as this claim 
attacks the validity of the death penalty statute, it ―may be raised at any time.‖ (In 
re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 4.) 
 
 
 
99 
The second proposed factor differs from the standard instruction, which was 
given, only in that it directs the jury to consider the defendant‘s mental impairment 
even if it did not constitute a legal excuse or did not cause the crimes to occur.  But 
we have rejected claims the standard instruction is insufficient for failing to state 
that the mental impairment may be considered even if it did not influence the 
commission of crime.  (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1179; People v. 
Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1225.)  Furthermore, the court gave the ―catchall‖ 
instruction under section 190.3, factor (k), which directs the jury to consider ―[a]ny 
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not 
a legal excuse for the crime.‖  (Italics added.)  ―This instruction was sufficient to 
advise the jury of the full range of mitigating evidence.‖  (People v. Sully (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 1195, 1245, citing People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10.) 
E.  Unconstitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute  
Defendant raises numerous constitutional challenges to California‘s death 
penalty law, all of which we have repeatedly rejected for lack of merit. 
California‘s death penalty law ―adequately narrows the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty‖ and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  (People 
v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th 691, 755.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a), allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of 
the crime, does not result in the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death 
penalty.  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 211.) 
The death penalty law is not unconstitutional because it does not require 
juror unanimity on the aggravating circumstances or provide a specific burden of 
proof for aggravating factors.  Nor is the law unconstitutional because it does not 
require that the jury find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors or 
that death is the appropriate penalty under any specific burden of proof.  (People v. 
 
 
 
100 
Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th 691, 755.)  The United States Supreme Court decisions in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584, and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 do not compel a different 
result.  (Loker, at p. 755.) 
A jury in a capital case is not required to make written findings.  (People v. 
Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th 182, 212.) 
Intercase proportionality review is not required under either the state or 
federal Constitutions.  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755; People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 156-157.) 
A penalty phase jury may consider a defendant‘s unadjudicated criminal 
activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the unadjudicated crimes.  (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1038, 1059; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 927.) 
The use of restrictive adjectives, such as ―extreme‖ and ―substantial,‖ in 
section 190.3‘s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it 
unconstitutional.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 213.) 
A penalty phase jury need not be instructed as to which factors are 
aggravating and which are mitigating or to restrict its consideration of evidence in 
this regard.  (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1059; People v. Brown, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 402.)   
Capital defendants and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated; 
therefore, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection or the Eighth 
Amendment by denying capital defendants various procedural rights given to 
noncapital defendants.  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 756.)  
Finally, we again reject the contention that the death penalty violates 
international law, is contrary to international norms, or that these norms require the 
 
 
 
101 
application of the death penalty to only the most extraordinary crimes.  (People v. 
Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th 911, 968.) 
VI.  PRESENTENCING ISSUES 
A.  Failure to Conduct a Second Competency Hearing  
Defendant contends the court violated his federal right to due process 
because it lacked jurisdiction to sentence him without holding a second 
competency hearing or making an express finding that defendant was competent to 
be sentenced.  He also claims the court ignored new evidence that cast doubt on 
defendant‘s competency.  We disagree. 
Before sentencing, on November 2, 1998, defense counsel declared a 
second doubt as to defendant‘s competency, claiming defendant appeared not to 
understand the proceedings during their last two meetings.  The court stayed the 
proceedings and appointed two doctors to evaluate defendant.  Both doctors, 
however, were unable to examine defendant because he refused to leave his cell.  
At the December 7, 1998 appearance, the court noted defendant‘s refusal to 
cooperate with the court-appointed doctors and invited defense counsel to make a 
written submission concerning whether the court, under the circumstances, could 
proceed with sentencing.  The court also stated it had given counsel ―three cases 
that go to that issue.‖  Defense Counsel Thomas Broome replied that he intended 
to brief whether defendant should be represented by independent counsel because 
of the conflict between defendant and himself regarding defendant‘s mental 
condition.   
Before adjourning, the court allowed defendant to address the court.  
Defendant complained that his attorneys had not clearly explained the 
consequences of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and described his 
disagreement with some of the court‘s pretrial evidentiary rulings.  Defendant 
 
 
 
102 
insisted he did not harm his sister or nephew.  He appeared to believe that his plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity was tantamount to an admission of guilt of the 
murders, stating that if his counsel had explained to him that he ―had to admit to 
two counts of murder of my nephew and sister, no, there would have been no 
sanity trial.‖  Defendant was particularly upset that the prosecutor had accused 
defendant of malingering — a term that defendant equated with ―slander,‖ 
denigration, and racism.   
On January 25, 1999, the court denied defense counsel‘s motion to appoint 
independent counsel for defendant and set the matter for sentencing.  At no point 
did the court expressly reinstate the proceedings or make any ruling or finding as 
to defendant‘s competency, and defense counsel made no objection on this ground 
before sentencing.  On February 9, 1999, the court sentenced defendant to death.   
In People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, we concluded the court 
properly declined to hold a second competency proceeding because the defendant 
had refused to cooperate with the court-appointed experts, and, consequently, 
―there was no new evidence to introduce at a second hearing . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 734.)  
We concluded the defendant‘s ―noncooperation did not, under the circumstances, 
constitute substantial evidence of a change in circumstances necessitating a new 
hearing.‖  (Ibid.)  We also rejected the claim that the court‘s decision to appoint 
experts automatically and irrevocably triggered the need for a formal competency 
hearing because the defendant had the burden of proving his incompetency and, 
without new information, ―holding another competency hearing would be 
pointless.‖  (Id. at p. 735.) 
Although the court here did not expressly find an absence of substantial 
new evidence regarding competence, at the December 7, 1998 court appearance, it 
expressly noted defendant‘s noncooperation with the court-appointed doctors.  
 
 
 
103 
Thus, the court was obviously aware that the defense had no new evidence 
regarding defendant‘s competence.  Although the court did not expressly reinstate 
the proceedings, it had previously invited defense counsel to brief the issue of 
whether sentencing could proceed and the court gave counsel case law that was 
directly relevant to this issue.  The court, therefore, was aware of the jurisdictional 
issue.  In all, the court‘s actions in proceeding with sentencing revealed the 
obvious — that defendant failed to present a change in circumstances necessitating 
a new competency hearing and that the court was reinstating the proceedings and 
moving forward with the sentencing.  The court‘s actions could not be reasonably 
interpreted any other way.41 
Defendant acknowledges Medina, but attempts to distinguish it.  He argues 
that the court here had before it substantial evidence of changed circumstances, in 
the form of defendant‘s statements to the court on December 7, 1998.  Defendant 
argues his complaints to the court about his plea showed he did not understand the 
proceedings and his statements reflected his inability to assist in his defense. 
But defendant‘s confusion regarding his plea did not necessarily amount to 
an inability to assist in his defense.  Under section 1016, ―[a] defendant who pleads 
not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits 
the commission of the offense charged.‖  A defendant ―is wholly free to prevent 
that result by merely making the additional plea of not guilty.‖  (People v. Walker 
(1948) 33 Cal.2d 250, 262, italics added.)  Defendant entered both such pleas, 
albeit with some confusion.  The legal subtleties implicated by these different 
                                              
41  
The Attorney General argues defendant abandoned the competency issue by 
not objecting to the court‘s action.  However, determining competency ―is 
jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by counsel.‖  (People v. Hale (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 531, 541.) 
 
 
 
104 
pleas would confuse most laypersons.  The entry of both pleas means that, as a 
matter of law, defendant‘s insanity plea did not function as an admission of guilt.  
Moreover, the fact defendant appeared to understand the significance of a single 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity indicated he had the ability to grasp the 
legal consequences of his plea.   
Finally, although at times defendant did ramble in his statements to the 
court, at other times he was direct and fairly eloquent.  Furthermore, defendant‘s 
predilection to use ―bizarre verbiage‖ was nothing new to the court, as documented 
in defendant‘s medical records.  In sum, given the deference accorded to a trial 
court‘s decision on whether to hold a competency hearing, defendant‘s statements 
to the court did not constitute substantial evidence of a change in circumstances 
requiring a second competency hearing.  (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 
33 [―More is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to 
raise a doubt of competency‖ requiring a second hearing].) 
B.  Refusal to Appoint Independent Counsel  
Defendant contends the court erred and denied him due process by failing to 
address an alleged conflict between himself and defense counsel that arose after 
defense counsel declared a second doubt as to his competency.  Defendant claims 
the court should have resolved this alleged conflict either by appointing 
independent counsel to represent him or by allowing defendant to testify as to his 
competence and allowing his counsel to offer evidence of his incompetence.  We 
disagree. 
As noted ante, at page 101, before sentencing defense counsel declared a 
conflict when defendant refused to be examined by the court-appointed doctors. 
Counsel asked the court to appoint independent counsel to resolve the conflict and 
to represent defendant on the issue of his sanity.  The court denied the motions.   
 
 
 
105 
Defendant relies on People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 (Stanley) to 
argue that the appointment of independent counsel was required.  The reliance 
fails.  Stanley involved the inverse situation from that encountered here.  In 
Stanley, we held that the appointment of independent counsel for a defendant in a 
competency proceeding did not violate his due process rights, where a conflict 
arose between the defendant and his original trial counsel about the presentation of 
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  This conflict prompted original counsel 
to declare a doubt as to the defendant‘s competency, to which defendant objected.  
The trial court, without objection by any party, appointed independent counsel, in 
addition to defendant‘s original counsel, to represent defendant at his competency 
hearing.  At that hearing, the prosecutor and the independent counsel argued that 
defendant was competent, and original trial counsel argued he was not.  The trial 
court subsequently found defendant competent, and defendant ultimately allowed 
his original counsel to present the disputed mitigating evidence.  (Id. at pp. 803-
807.) 
In Stanley, we rejected the claim that the defendant‘s simultaneous 
representation by two lawyers arguing conflicting points of view amounted to a 
violation of his due process rights.  We explained the trial court was confronted 
―with a complex situation‖ and by ―appointing separate counsel to represent 
defendant‘s point of view, the trial court acted to resolve a conflict, not create 
one.‖  (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 806.)  We noted that ―the jury [heard] every 
side of the issue of defendant‘s competence, thereby assuring defendant a fair 
trial.‖  (Id. at pp. 806-807.)  We acknowledged that, under the circumstances, the 
defendant ―perhaps got more than he was entitled to,‖ but we were ―unable to 
conclude he thereby was denied due process.‖  (Id. at p. 807.)  
 
 
 
106 
 Stanley permits but does not mandate the appointment of independent 
counsel when defense counsel and a defendant disagree on the defendant‘s 
competency.  Moreover, unlike the present case, the conflict in Stanley was not 
restricted to defendant‘s competency ―because the root of the problem was 
defendant‘s refusal to permit mitigating evidence . . . .‖  (Stanley, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at p. 806.)  Accordingly, Stanley did not compel the trial court to 
appoint independent counsel to represent defendant with respect to possible 
competency proceedings. 
The Attorney General argues that the appointment of independent counsel 
was unnecessary because any ―conflict‖ here was illusory, reasoning that counsel 
does not act against a defendant‘s interest in pursuing a finding of incompetency 
even if it is against the defendant‘s wishes.  We have previously articulated this 
same proposition, limiting its application to the stage where ―there has been a 
prima facie showing of incompetence . . . .‖  (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 804; 
People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 495 [―a section 1368 hearing is held only 
after there has been a prima facie showing of mental incompetence.  Of necessity, 
therefore, defendant‘s attorney must play a greater role in making fundamental 
choices for him, and cannot be expected to seek approval of strategic decisions 
made in the course of obtaining and presenting proof of incompetence‖]; see also 
Shephard v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 23, 29 [―The rationale giving 
competent defendants ultimate authority over tactical decisions at trial, does not 
extend to this situation where defense counsel‘s duty to protect a prima facie 
mentally incompetent defendant requires contravening that defendant‘s tactical 
preferences‖]; People v. Jernigan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 131, 136 [―To permit a 
prima facie incompetent defendant to veto counsel‘s decision to argue that the 
client is incompetent would increase the danger that the defendant would be 
 
 
 
107 
subjected to criminal proceedings when he or she is unable to assist counsel in a 
rational manner‖].) 42  In these cases, counsel‘s duty to argue the defendant‘s best 
interests, regardless of the defendant‘s actual wishes, was triggered by the 
discovery of substantial evidence of the defendant‘s incompetency. 
But, counsel‘s mere opinion that defendant might be incompetent, without 
more, did not constitute substantial evidence of his incompetency.  (People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1111-1112.)  Given that a defendant is presumed 
competent and the burden is on the defense to prove otherwise (People v. Medina, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d 870), a defense attorney may be presented with a difficult 
situation if he or she genuinely believes a defendant is incompetent but the 
defendant refuses to cooperate in marshalling evidence of his condition.  This case 
is further complicated by evidence that defendant may have previously engaged in 
malingering.   
Even if we were to assume error, defendant fails to explain how the 
appointment of independent counsel would have either alleviated the alleged 
conflict or would have otherwise resulted in a more favorable outcome.  Defendant 
consistently maintained that he did not shoot the victims.  He may have been 
somewhat unclear about all the legal intricacies of an insanity plea.  He correctly 
understood, however, that such a plea, standing alone without an accompanying 
not guilty plea, would acknowledge that he had, indeed, fired the fatal shots.  It 
was to this acknowledgment that he objected.  Defendant refused to participate in 
any further competency proceedings, and nothing in the record indicated his 
                                              
42   
All of these cases used the term ―prima facie‖ where substantial evidence of 
incompetency existed either in the form of an expert‘s evaluation that the 
defendant was incompetent or where the trial court independently declared a doubt 
as to the defendant‘s competency.  
 
 
 
108 
refusal was uniquely tied to his defense counsel.  Even if the court had appointed 
independent counsel, it is speculative to assume defendant would have cooperated 
with new counsel and allowed the doctors to evaluate him.  Moreover, it is also 
speculative to assume that the results of any competency evaluation would have 
been favorable to defendant. 
Finally, defendant complains that the alleged conflict could have been 
resolved by the procedure described in People v. Bolden (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 
375.  There, the defendant and his counsel disagreed as to his competence.  
Counsel resolved this dispute by allowing the defendant to testify as to his own 
competence and defendant allowed defense counsel to present a psychiatrist to 
testify to the contrary.  But the procedure in Bolden, which reflected a compromise 
between client and counsel, was uniquely tailored to the presentation of evidence 
at a competency trial.  As with the procedure employed in Stanley, we have never 
suggested that the Bolden procedure was mandatory under any circumstance. 
C.  Cumulative Error Affecting the Reliability of Defendant’s 
Sentencing Determination  
Defendant finally contends that the collective impact of errors during all 
phases of the proceedings deprived him of his Eighth Amendment right to a 
reliable sentencing determination.  We have concluded that any errors or assumed 
errors were not prejudicial.  Viewing them cumulatively, we conclude defendant is 
not entitled to reversal of his judgment.   
 
 
 
109 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
ARMSTRONG, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________ 
* 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Blacksher 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S076582 
Date Filed: August 25, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Larry J. Goodman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kathy Moreno, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Dane R. Gillette, Assistant 
Attorneys General, and Michele J. Swanson, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kathy Moreno 
P. O. Box 9006 
Berkeley, CA  94709 
(510) 649-8602 
 
Michele J. Swanson 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5703