Title: John J. Petta v. ABC Insurance Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 18 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0610 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John J. Petta and Rachelle DeValk,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
ABC Insurance Co., DEF Insurance Co., and  
GHI Insurance Co.,  
          Defendants, 
The Travco Insurance Co.,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 241 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 153, 672 N.W.2d 146 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 21, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sawyer   
 
JUDGE: 
Norman L. Yackel   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there was a 
brief by D. James Weis and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., 
Rhinelander, and oral argument by Dana J. Weis. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in the court 
of 
appeals) 
by 
Steven 
L. 
Theesfeld 
and 
Yost 
& 
Baill, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and oral argument by Gary L. Wickert and 
Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C., Hartford. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2005 WI 18 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0610  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 24) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John J. Petta and Rachelle DeValk,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
ABC Insurance Co., DEF Insurance Co., and  
GHI Insurance Co.,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
The Travco Insurance Co.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.     
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  Wrongful death plaintiffs 
John J. Petta and Rachelle DeValk ("John and Rachelle") seek 
review of a court of appeals decision1 that concluded (1) they 
were not entitled to retain damages for medical, funeral, and 
property damage expenses because they did not pay for these 
                                                 
1  Petta v. ABC Ins. Co., 2003 WI App 241, 268 Wis. 2d 153, 
672 N.W.2d 146. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
2 
 
expenses; and (2) the "made-whole" doctrine recognized in Rimes 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 
316 N.W.2d 348 (1982), did not preclude Travco Insurance 
Company's 
("Travco") 
subrogation 
rights 
because 
John 
and 
Rachelle were not Travco's insureds. 
¶2 
John and Rachelle argue that equity requires that 
Rimes and the settlement procedure outlined in Schulte v. 
Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993), be extended to 
wrongful death plaintiffs.  We agree.  Our conclusion is driven 
by a wrongful death plaintiff's statutory right to waive and 
satisfy the estate's cause of action in connection with or as 
part of a settlement and discharge of the claim.2 A wrongful 
death plaintiff also has a statutory right to claim and recover 
medical and funeral expenses on behalf of himself or herself or 
any person who has paid or assumed liability for such expenses.3  
We acknowledge that a wrongful death relative is not necessarily 
entitled to retain the proceeds for such claims under the 
statute unless the relative incurs the costs of those expenses.  
Nevertheless, because John and Rachelle settled with the 
tortfeasor for a lump sum of money that Travco stipulated did 
not make them whole, we conclude that Travco's subrogation 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) (2001-02). All references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version, unless otherwise 
noted.  
3 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(5).  
 
No. 
03-0610   
 
3 
 
rights against the tortfeasor are extinguished.  Consequently, 
we reverse the court of appeals' decision. 
I 
¶3 
On November 14, 2001, John and Rachelle's mother, 
Dayle Petta, was killed in an automobile accident caused by 
Byron Schroeder.  Dayle's former husband, Alfred, had an 
automobile insurance policy issued by Travco that insured 
Dayle's vehicle, the vehicle she was driving at the time of the 
accident.  Travco paid in excess of $14,000 under its insurance 
policy for Dayle's funeral and medical expenses and for the 
damage to the wrecked vehicle.   
¶4 
Because Dayle was not married at the time of her 
death, Dayle's surviving adult children, John and Rachelle, 
commenced a wrongful death action against Schroeder, Whiplash 
Lake Resort (the owner of the vehicle Schroeder was driving), 
West 
Bend 
Insurance 
Company 
(Schroeder's 
and 
Whiplash's 
automobile liability insurer), and three fictitious insurance 
companies.  Believing Travco had a subrogation interest due to 
the over $14,000 in benefits it already paid, John and Rachelle 
also 
named 
Travco 
as 
a 
nominal 
defendant 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 803.03(2)(a) (2001-02).4  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.03(2)(a) provides: 
A party asserting a claim for affirmative relief 
shall join as parties to the action all persons who at 
the commencement of the action have claims based upon 
subrogation to the rights of the party asserting the 
principal claim, derivation from the principal claim, 
or assignment of part of the principal claim.  For 
purposes of this section, a person's right to recover 
No. 
03-0610   
 
4 
 
¶5 
John and Rachelle claimed Schroeder's negligence was a 
proximate cause of Dayle's death and that as a result they have 
"incurred expenses relating to the death of their mother" and 
have been, and will continue to be, "deprived of the society and 
companionship of their mother."  Travco cross-claimed against 
Schroeder, Whiplash Lake, and West Bend, asserting a subrogation 
claim for the $14,000 it previously paid.  
¶6 
In late August 2002, Travco notified the other 
defendants that John and Rachelle were not its insureds and thus 
contended that any settlement with or release by John and 
Rachelle would not bar its subrogation claim.  On September 30, 
2002, John and Rachelle settled with these other defendants for 
$280,000 ($250,000 from West Bend and $30,000 from Schroeder), 
and released and agreed to indemnify them from any of Travco's 
claims.   
¶7 
 Following the settlement, John and Rachelle moved for 
a Rimes hearing with Travco and sought an order extinguishing 
                                                                                                                                                             
for loss of consortium shall be deemed a derivative 
right.  Any public assistance recipient or any estate 
of such a recipient asserting a claim against a 3rd 
party for which the public assistance provider has a 
right of subrogation or assignment under s. 49.89 (2) 
or (3) shall join the provider as a party to the 
claim.  Any party asserting a claim based upon 
subrogation 
to 
part 
of 
the 
claim 
of 
another, 
derivation from the rights or claim of another, or 
assignment of part of the rights or claim of another 
shall join as a party to the action the person to 
whose rights the party is subrogated, from whose claim 
the party derives his or her rights or claim, or by 
whose assignment the party acquired his or her rights 
or claim. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
5 
 
Travco's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor.  John and 
Rachelle maintained that they were entitled to bring a claim for 
funeral and medical expenses pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(5),5 
and that they had a claim for the value of the destroyed car as 
a "pecuniary injury" under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).6  However, 
they submitted that they nonetheless had not been made whole for 
their damages.7  Because Travco stipulated that the entire 
settlement did not make John and Rachelle whole, John and 
Rachelle argued that Travco no longer had subrogation rights. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(5) states: 
If the personal representative brings the action, 
the personal representative may also recover the 
reasonable cost of medical expenses, funeral expenses, 
including the reasonable cost of a cemetery lot, grave 
marker and care of the lot. If a relative brings the 
action, 
the 
relative 
may 
recover 
such 
medical 
expenses, funeral expenses, including the cost of a 
cemetery lot, grave marker and care of the lot, on 
behalf of himself or herself or of any person who has 
paid or assumed liability for such expenses. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) provides: 
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action. Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) 
caps 
John 
and 
Rachelle's 
damages at $350,000 for loss of society and companionship. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
6 
 
¶8 
Travco resisted, 
claiming 
that because 
John and 
Rachelle were not its insureds, Rimes and its progeny simply did 
not apply.  The trial court disagreed.  The trial court 
concluded that because the settlement did not make John and 
Rachelle whole, and because they agreed to indemnify the 
tortfeasors, Travco could not pursue a subrogation claim against 
the tortfeasors.   
¶9 
Travco appealed, and, in the published opinion of 
Petta v. ABC Insurance Co., 2003 WI App 241, 268 Wis. 2d 153, 
672 N.W.2d 146, the court of appeals reversed.  Although John 
and Rachelle did not pay for Dayle's medical or funeral expenses 
or for the damage to her vehicle, the court agreed that John and 
Rachelle owned claims for these damages, but concluded their 
ownership was not exclusive.  Id., ¶9.  The court concluded that 
John and Rachelle could bring these claims on behalf of the 
payor, Travco, and were not entitled to retain any recovery on 
these claims because they did not pay for the expenses.  Id.  
According to the court of appeals, "[t]here should be no 
recovery where there is no injury."8  Id., ¶12.   
¶10 The court of appeals also rejected John and Rachelle's 
argument that the Rimes made-whole doctrine precluded Travco's 
subrogation claims.  The court held that Rimes applied only in 
situations of an insurer-insured relationship.  Id., ¶¶13-14.  
                                                 
8 Because of this conclusion, the court declined to consider 
whether "pecuniary injury" under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) includes 
the monetary value of Dayle's wrecked automobile.  Petta, 268 
Wis. 2d 153, ¶¶10-12. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
7 
 
Because it was undisputed that John and Rachelle were not 
Travco's insureds, the court concluded that the made-whole 
doctrine was inapplicable.  Id.  In closing, the court supposed 
that if Rimes were applied in this situation, it would set a 
dangerous precedent.  Id., ¶16.  The court posited: 
If there were multiple plaintiffs against a common 
tortfeasor based on a single incident, the plaintiffs 
could "race" to settlement.  The first to settle and 
indemnify the tortfeasor could show that he or she was 
not made whole and, if Rimes applied, extinguish not 
only subrogation claims but also the other plaintiffs' 
claims.  This takes Rimes to a place it was never 
intended to go. 
Id.   
¶11 We accepted John and Rachelle's petition for review, 
and we reverse. 
II 
¶12 Whether 
a 
party's 
subrogation 
rights 
limit 
a 
plaintiff's right to recovery is a question of law we review de 
novo.  See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 
31, 630 N.W.2d 201.  This case also requires interpretation of 
the wrongful death statute, as well as consideration of whether 
the made-whole doctrine applies to wrongful death plaintiffs.  
Both issues are questions of law we review de novo.  See Ruckel 
v. Gassner, 2002 WI 67, ¶13, 253 Wis. 2d 280, 646 N.W.2d 11.  
III 
¶13 As part of their wrongful death claim, John and 
Rachelle have asserted claims for medical and funeral expenses, 
and have disposed of a potential claim for property damage 
No. 
03-0610   
 
8 
 
expenses.  Travco has paid for all of these underlying expenses, 
and, accordingly, John and Rachelle agree that Travco has 
subrogated interests in these claims.  They further agree that 
they are not Travco's insured.  Nevertheless, they argue that 
because subrogation and its antisubrogation counterpart embodied 
in Rimes are fundamentally equitable doctrines, Rimes should 
apply to preserve their settlement proceeds that all parties 
agree have not made them whole. 
¶14 Travco counters by arguing that the Rimes made-whole 
doctrine applies only within the confines of an insurer/insured 
relationship.  Because John and Rachelle are not its insureds, 
Travco contends that Rimes protections simply do not apply to 
extinguish its subrogation interests.  Travco further argues 
that 
if 
Rimes 
is 
extended 
beyond 
an 
insurer/insured 
relationship, then in cases with multiple plaintiffs, those 
plaintiffs will be pitted against one another to race to settle 
with 
the 
defendant 
first 
in order 
to thwart 
the 
other 
plaintiffs' rights by asserting the settlement did not make the 
settling plaintiff whole.   
¶15 We agree with John and Rachelle that equity requires 
extending Rimes to wrongful death plaintiffs.  We begin with a 
discussion of the wrongful death statute and how that permits 
John and Rachelle to control the claim for property damage to 
Dayle's wrecked vehicle as well as to claim medical and funeral 
expenses even though they did not pay for these expenses.  From 
there, 
we 
discuss 
subrogation 
principles 
and 
why 
the 
"antisubrogation" rule of the made-whole doctrine should be 
No. 
03-0610   
 
9 
 
extended to wrongful death plaintiffs.  And before closing, we 
comment on Travco's and the court of appeals' concern that 
extending Rimes outside the insurer/insured relationship will 
result in injustice.   
A 
¶16 A wrongful death action is purely a creature of 
statute, since at common law no such right to recovery existed.  
Weiss v. Regent Properties, Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 
N.W.2d 766 (1984).  The purpose of the wrongful death statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04, 
is 
"to 
compensate 
for 
loss 
of 
the 
relational interest existing between the beneficiaries and the 
deceased."  See Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 
Wis. 2d 549, 560-61, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (citations omitted).  
To this end, § 895.04(4) allows wrongful death plaintiffs to 
recover pecuniary injury, as well as loss of society and 
companionship.  
¶17 A "pecuniary injury" is the loss of any benefit that a 
beneficiary would have received from the decedent if the 
decedent had lived.  See Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 151 
Wis. 2d 455, 460, 444 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1989).  This includes 
claims for loss of support, contribution, and inheritance.  See 
Schaefer v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 531 
N.W.2d 585 (1995); Holt, 151 Wis. 2d at 460; 1 The Law of 
Damages in Wisconsin §§ 16.29 (Russell M. Ware et al. eds., 
2000).  A lost inheritance is "the pecuniary value of the 
addition to the estate which the decedent in reasonable 
probability would have accumulated and left to his or her heirs 
No. 
03-0610   
 
10 
 
had the decedent lived a natural life span."  Schaefer, 192 Wis. 
2d at 775. 
¶18 Concerning the property damage, Travco notes that John 
and Rachelle did not establish that they would have derived a 
benefit from the vehicle had Dayle survived; nor did they 
establish a reasonable probability that Dayle would have left 
the vehicle to them.  Thus, Travco argues John and Rachelle are 
not entitled to retain any settlement proceeds for the property 
damage expense. 
¶19 John and Rachelle argue that they might have inherited 
the 
vehicle; 
they 
just 
have 
not 
established 
this 
yet.  
Alternatively, John and Rachelle argue that if this claim 
belonged to Dayle's estate, Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) provides that 
where a person's wrongful death "creates a cause of action" in 
favor of both the decedent's estate and a spouse or relative, 
"such spouse or relatives may waive and satisfy the estate's 
cause of action in connection with or as part of a settlement 
and discharge of the cause of action of the spouse or 
relatives."9 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(6) reads: 
Where the wrongful death of a person creates a cause 
of action in favor of the decedent's estate and also a 
cause of action in favor of a spouse or relatives as 
provided in this section, such spouse or relatives may 
waive and satisfy the estate's cause of action in 
connection with or as part of a settlement and 
discharge of the cause of action of the spouse or 
relatives. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
11 
 
¶20 Wrongful death beneficiaries are not automatically 
entitled to recover for pecuniary loss resulting from a parent's 
wrongful death.  Keithley v. Keithley, 95 Wis. 2d 136, 138, 289 
N.W.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1980).  It is well-established that "the 
survivors must prove their loss."  Id.  Travco correctly notes 
that John and Rachelle have not established they incurred any 
inheritance loss or loss of benefit due to the vehicle's 
destruction.  But we agree with John and Rachelle that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) empowers them to control the settlement 
of any claims the estate had against the tortfeasor.   
¶21 Here, the accident that caused Dayle's death clearly 
created a cause of action for property damage in favor of her 
estate.  Consequently, to the extent that they have a cause of 
action, John and Rachelle were allowed to "waive and satisfy" 
that cause of action "in connection with or as part of" their 
wrongful death settlement.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6).  Having 
apparently done so as part of their full settlement and release, 
the question is what happens to Travco's subrogated interest for 
the payments it made for the property damage.   
¶22 Before answering that question, we must next turn to 
John and Rachelle's ability to claim the medical and funeral 
expenses Travco has already paid, for these claims also carry 
Travco's subrogated interests. 
B 
¶23 The wrongful death statute allows relatives of the 
deceased to seek more than the "loss of relational interest 
existing between the beneficiaries and the deceased."  See 
No. 
03-0610   
 
12 
 
Chang, 182 Wis. 2d at 560-61.  The legislature has specifically 
provided the relative of a decedent a claim to recover expenses 
that 
the 
relative 
may 
not 
have 
incurred.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(5) states, "the relative may recover 
such medical expenses, funeral expenses, including the cost of a 
cemetery lot, grave marker and care of the lot."  Recovery is 
not contingent on the relative having paid these expenses, as 
the claim can be made "on behalf of himself or herself or any 
person who has paid or assumed liability for such expenses."10  
Id.   
¶24 John and Rachelle agree they did not pay for the 
medical or funeral expenses, but claim that because the statute 
specifically gives them the right to claim funeral and medical 
expenses, they are nonetheless entitled to recover them.  John 
and Rachelle are correct.  In Chang, 182 Wis. 2d at 561, this 
court concluded that "[t]he right to sue and recover under the 
wrongful death statute is vested in the classes of beneficiaries 
listed in the statute."11  John and Rachelle are among the 
beneficiaries 
listed 
in 
the 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  Thus, John and Rachelle have the right 
                                                 
10 Had Dayle not died, it is well-settled that she could 
have brought a claim for medical expenses.  See Koffman v. 
Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶46, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201.    
11 A wrongful death action is also designed to compensate 
for the loss of the relational interest existing between the 
beneficiaries and the decedent. Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 
703, 709-10, 148 N.W.2d 86 (1967); Weiss v. Regent Properties, 
Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984). 
 
No. 
03-0610   
 
13 
 
to claim and recover funeral and medical expenses, even though 
they did not pay for them.12 
  
¶25 The right to sue under the wrongful death statute, 
however, is distinguished from the ownership of the recovery.  
Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 230;  see also Chang, 182 Wis. 2d at 561.  
In Chang, this court noted that "[r]ecovery under the wrongful 
death statute is keyed to actual loss."  Id. at 560.  Thus, 
                                                 
12 It is unclear on whose behalf John and Rachelle brought 
this claim.  At oral argument, John and Rachelle initially 
suggested that they brought it on their mother's behalf, since 
the mother's estate would have brought the claim if they had 
chosen to fashion the wrongful death action on behalf of the 
estate.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.04(1) (allowing a wrongful death 
action to be brought "by the personal representative of the 
deceased person or by the person to whom the amount recovered 
belongs"); § 895.04(5) (allowing personal representative to 
"recover the reasonable cost of medical expenses, funeral 
expenses . . . .).  Later, John and Rachelle suggested that they 
brought the claim on Travco's behalf, as the "person" who 
"assumed liability for such expenses."  See Wis. Stat. § 
895.04(5); see also Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 191 Wis. 2d 
244, 250, 528 N.W.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1995) (wrongful death 
plaintiff who has not paid for medical and funeral expenses may 
bring a claim for those expenses, but the claim is brought on 
behalf of the person who actually paid the expenses).   
Travco, on the other hand, at first conceded that John and 
Rachelle actually brought the claim on their own behalf, even 
though they had not paid the underlying expenses.  After being 
pressed by this court, however, Travco withdrew from that 
position and argued, as the court of appeals concluded, that the 
claim was brought on its behalf. 
For purposes of this decision, it does not matter on whose 
behalf the claim was made. The pertinent inquiry is whether 
Travco can assert its subrogation interest against a lump-sum 
settlement when it concedes that John and Rachelle have not been 
made whole. 
 
No. 
03-0610   
 
14 
 
notwithstanding the wrongful death beneficiaries' vested right 
to claim and recover damages listed in the statute, and to 
"waive and satisfy" the estate's claim for property damage as 
part of their settlement, the actual ownership of that recovery 
requires the existence of damages, which in turn requires proof 
of loss.  Id. at 561.  In other words, wrongful death plaintiffs 
are not entitled to a windfall simply because the statute has 
provided them with a claim or ability to recover damages they 
have not incurred.   
¶26 John and Rachelle agree that they did not pay for the 
medical, funeral, and property damage expenses, so they have no 
ownership rights to any proceeds on those claims.13  But 
concluding that John and Rachelle have no ownership interest in 
any recovery for these claims does not answer whether Travco can 
invade John and Rachelle's lump-sum settlement to recoup the 
payments it made.  Travco has a subrogated interest in those 
claims.  As such, if Travco is entitled to recovery from the 
settlement, that recovery must stem from subrogation.  We now 
turn attention to that concept.14  
                                                 
13 As noted above, John and Rachelle did not establish that 
they had an inheritance interest in Dayle's vehicle. 
14 There are three types of subrogation:  (1) legal (also 
known 
as 
equitable); 
(2) 
conventional 
(also 
known 
as 
contractual); and (3) statutory.  See Ruckel v. Gassner, 2002 WI 
67, ¶18, 253 Wis. 2d 280, 646 N.W.2d 11; The Law of Damages in 
Wisconsin §§ 32.6-32.9 (Russell M. Ware ed., 3d ed. 2000).  
Because John and Rachelle were not Travco's insureds, there is 
no right to subrogation implicated by contract.  And the 
wrongful death statute does not provide for subrogation.  Thus, 
if Travco is entitled to subrogation, it must be through equity. 
No. 
03-0610   
 
15 
 
C 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because there is no statutory right to subrogation here, we 
note that the court of appeals in this case erred by relying on 
Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 191 Wis. 2d 244, 528 N.W.2d 492 
(Ct. App. 1995), for determining whether Travco was entitled to 
share the settlement proceeds.  
In Cavanaugh, the court of appeals concluded that a 
wrongful death plaintiff who brought a claim for medical 
expenses paid by Milwaukee County was prohibited from retaining 
any proceeds for that claim because the County had a subrogated 
interest in those expenses.  Id. at 267.  The County's 
subrogated 
interest 
for 
medical 
expenses 
stemmed 
from 
Wis. Stat. § 49.65 
(1995-1996), 
now 
Wis. Stat. § 49.89.  
Cavanaugh, 191 Wis. 2d at 266.  However, the court of appeals 
previously interpreted that statute to abrogate the common law 
subrogation made whole doctrine.  See Waukesha County v. 
Johnson, 107 Wis. 2d 155, 320 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1982).   
In Waukesha County, the court of appeals observed that 
"[u]nder common law subrogation, the subrogor must be made whole 
before the subrogee may recover from a third-party tort-feasor."  
Id. at 160.  The court nevertheless concluded "that sec. 49.65, 
Stats., on its face, renders the common law subrogation 
principles 
inapplicable 
to 
counties 
seeking 
reimbursement 
pursuant to that section."  Id. at 161-62; See also Ruckel, 253 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶42 n.7. ("In some instances, legislatively-
sanctioned subrogation may override the made whole principles 
discussed in this case."). 
Because Travco has no statutory ground for asserting 
subrogation, Cavanaugh is not binding here.       
No. 
03-0610   
 
16 
 
¶27 It has long been recognized that subrogation rests 
upon principles of equity.15  Equity generally grants that "one 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Paulson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶29, 
263 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 744 ("Wisconsin case law has clearly 
provided that application of subrogation is controlled by 
equitable 
principles."); 
Ruckel, 
253 
Wis. 
2d 
280, 
¶26 
("[S]ubrogation 
is 
recognized 
or 
denied 
upon 
equitable 
principles without differentiation between 'legal subrogation' 
which arises by application of principles of equity and 
'conventional subrogation' arising from contract or the acts of 
the parties.")(citation omitted); Ives v. Coopertools, 208 Wis. 
2d 55, 71, 559 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (Geske, J., concurring) 
("Application of the subrogation principle depended upon the 
equities, and thus upon the facts at hand."); Wisconsin Patients 
Comp. Fund v. Wisconsin Health Care Liab. Ins. Plan, 200 Wis. 2d 
599, 620, 547 N.W.2d 578 (1996) (Subrogation "'is proper in all 
cases to allow it where injustice would follow its denial.'") 
(citations omitted); Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 628, 
500 N.W.2d 305 (1993) ("The doctrine of subrogation is based 
upon equitable principles."); Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 270-71, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982) ("[T]he 
effect of 'conventional subrogation' was the same as 'legal 
subrogation,' which arises by application of the principles of 
equity, 
and 
that, 
accordingly, 
the 
contractual 
terms 
of 
subrogation agreements in an insurance policy were to be applied 
according to the rules of equity."); Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. 
Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977); American Ins. 
Co. v. Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 2d 346, 352, 187 N.W.2d 142 (1971) 
("Subrogation 
is 
recognized 
or 
denied 
upon 
equitable 
principles."); D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Products Co., 19 
Wis. 2d 390, 401, 120 N.W.2d 70 (1963).  
The only exception to this rule is legislatively-sanctioned 
subrogation that overrides subrogation's equitable foundation.  
As noted in Ruckel: 
In 
some 
instances, 
legislatively-sanctioned 
subrogation may override the made whole principles 
discussed in this case.  Some examples include: (1) 
self-funded employee pension and benefit plans under 
The Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (see FMC Corp. v. 
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58-65 (1990); Petro v. D.W.G. 
Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 725, 727-28, 436 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. 
App. 1989)); (2) government subrogation rights for 
No. 
03-0610   
 
17 
 
(other than a volunteer) who pays for the wrong of another 
should be permitted to look to the wrongdoer to the extent he 
[or she] has paid, and be subject to the defenses of the 
wrongdoer."  Ruckel, 253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶14.  However, the purpose 
of subrogation is to prevent an injured party from being 
unjustly enriched by obtaining double payment.  Garrity v. Rural 
Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).  
Thus, subrogation ordinarily does not arise until the underlying 
debt or loss has been fully paid.  Ruckel, 253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶16; 
Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 271; Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 541.  This 
"antisubrogation rule" is commonly known as the Rimes made-whole 
doctrine.  See Ruckel, 253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶16. 
¶28 In Rimes, this court held that "one who claims 
subrogation rights, whether under the aegis of either legal or 
conventional subrogation, is barred from any recovery unless the 
insured is made whole."  Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 272.  The Rimes 
court reaffirmed the principle that a cause of action against a 
tortfeasor is indivisible.  Id. at 275.  "Accordingly, it is 
only when there has been full compensation for all the damage 
elements of the entire cause of action that the insured is made 
                                                                                                                                                             
certain public assistance payments under Wis. Stat. § 
49.89 (formerly Wis. Stat. § 49.65) (see Waukesha 
County v. Johnson, 107 Wis. 2d 155, 320 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. 
App. 1982)); and (3) subrogation rights in worker's 
compensation cases under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) (see 
Martinez v. Ashland Oil, 132 Wis. 2d 11, 390 N.W.2d 72 
(Ct. App. 1986)). 
Ruckel, 253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶42 n.7.  
No. 
03-0610   
 
18 
 
whole."  Id.  That is, the made-whole doctrine established a 
rule of priority, such that "only where an injured party has 
received an award by judgment or otherwise which pays all of his 
elements of damages, including those for which he has already 
been indemnified by an insurer, is there any occasion for 
subrogation."  Id. 
¶29 This court amplified Rimes in Schulte.  In Schulte, 
this court recognized that "settling plaintiffs and subrogated 
insurers usually compete in a practical sense for limited 
settlement funds."  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633.  The reality of 
settlements, this court stated, was an equitable factor that 
could not be ignored.  Id.  Coupled with a policy recognition 
that "the injured party should have the right to settle on its 
own terms," id. at 634, this court outlined the settlement 
procedure plaintiffs were to utilize to determine how a 
settlement impacted an insurer's subrogation rights.  Id. at 
637.  That procedure requires the plaintiff to (1) settle with 
the tortfeasor without resolving the subrogated insurer's claim; 
(2) request a Rimes hearing to determine if the settlement made 
the insured whole; and (3) provide the insurer an opportunity to 
participate in that hearing.  Id.  If the circuit court 
determines that the settlement did not make the settling 
plaintiff whole, then the insurer's subrogation rights are 
extinguished.  Id.   
No. 
03-0610   
 
19 
 
¶30 Even 
though 
Rimes 
and 
Schulte 
used 
terminology 
including 
"settling 
plaintiff"16 
and 
"injured 
party,"17 
we 
acknowledge that those terms were used interchangeably with 
"insured."18  Nonetheless, John and Rachelle contend equity 
requires 
extending 
these 
principles 
to 
wrongful 
death 
plaintiffs, 
while 
Travco 
clings 
to 
the 
insurer/insured 
relationship as vital to the application of the made-whole 
doctrine.  We agree with John and Rachelle for the following 
reasons. 
¶31 First, the Rimes doctrine is essentially one of 
priority, as it determines who gets paid first among competing 
claims.  In this case, wrongful death plaintiffs' claims must 
take priority.  If the made-whole doctrine was inapplicable to 
wrongful death plaintiffs, the wrongful death statute's purpose 
of compensating wrongful death beneficiaries for the loss of 
relational interest between the beneficiaries and the deceased 
                                                 
16 See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633 ("Given the realities of 
settlements, settling plaintiffs and subrogated insurers usually 
compete in a practical sense for limited settlement funds."). 
17 See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634 ("More importantly, we 
believe the injured party should have the right to settle on its 
own terms."); Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 275 ("[O]nly where an 
injured party has received an award by judgment or otherwise 
which pays all of his elements of damages, including those for 
which he has already been indemnified by an insurer, is there 
any occasion for subrogation."   
18 See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 635 ("Given the differing 
incentives and motives of the insured, the subrogated insurer, 
and the tortfeasor and his insurer, it may be that only the 
injured party and the tortfeasor can reach an agreement to 
settle."). 
No. 
03-0610   
 
20 
 
would be impinged.  See Chang, 182 Wis. 2d at 560.  We have 
already established that John and Rachelle were statutorily 
entitled to manage a claim for property damage, as well as make 
claims for medical and funeral expenses as part of their 
wrongful death cause of action.  Rimes confirmed that a cause of 
action against the tortfeasor is indivisible.  Rimes, 106 Wis. 
2d at 275.  Thus, these claims are inseparable from John and 
Rachelle's claims for their own losses of pecuniary injury and 
loss of society and companionship.   
¶32 Here, John and Rachelle disposed of these claims by 
fully settling and releasing the defendants (other than Travco), 
but they did so with a lump-sum settlement.  Ordinarily, we have 
no way of knowing what damages the lump-sum, non-apportioned, 
settlement covers.  That is why Rimes requires a hearing to 
prove up damages so that the settlement's reach in relation to 
actual damages can be determined.  In this case, however, we do 
know 
that 
the 
entirety 
of 
the 
settlement 
insufficiently 
compensated John and Rachelle for their losses because Travco 
stipulated that the settlement did not make them whole.  It 
would be contrary to the wrongful death statute's purpose to 
subject John and Rachelle to further loss by forcing them to pay 
out funds to another from a settlement that by itself is 
inadequate.19  Thus, their claim must take priority. 
                                                 
19 See also Wurtzinger, 33 Wis. 2d at 709.  In Wurtzinger, 
this court held that the equitable doctrine of contribution 
could not be used against the beneficiaries of a wrongful death 
action.  Id.  This court stated, "The wrongful-death action does 
not belong to the deceased and the proceeds of the action should 
not be subject to his obligations."  Id. at 710.   
No. 
03-0610   
 
21 
 
¶33 Second, we see no conceptual difference between a 
personal injury case involving a subrogated insurer, as in 
Rimes, and a wrongful death case involving a subrogated insurer.  
In a personal injury case where the plaintiff is insured, the 
plaintiff's insurer will ordinarily pay for any medical expenses 
and property damage.  Travco did that here.  In the personal 
injury plaintiff's suit against the tortfeasor, the plaintiff 
will claim as damages the medical expenses and property damage 
even though the plaintiff did not actually pay for those 
expenses.  John and Rachelle did that here.  In the personal 
injury plaintiff's settlement with the tortfeasor, there will 
usually be a full settlement and release.  That was done here.  
And in the plaintiff's personal injury case, this court has said 
that the subrogated insurer cannot invade the plaintiff's 
settlement unless the plaintiff has received an award which pays 
"all of his [or her] elements of damages, including those for 
which he has already been indemnified by an insurer."  Rimes, 
106 Wis. 2d at 275.  We see no reason why this conceptual 
framework does not apply to wrongful death plaintiffs. 
¶34 Third, because "[e]quity does not lend itself to the 
application of black letter rules," subrogation "depends upon a 
just resolution of a dispute under a particular set of facts."  
Vogt v. Schroeder, 129 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 383 N.W.2d 876 (1986).  
The equitable considerations balanced by the made-whole doctrine 
are "an insurer's right to recoup benefits paid and an injured 
person's right to obtain full compensation."  Schulte, 176 
Wis. 2d at 630.  Here, the two considerations being balanced are 
No. 
03-0610   
 
22 
 
the wrongful death plaintiffs' right of full recovery and to 
manage their wrongful death action according to the wrongful 
death statute against an insurer's right to recoup benefits 
paid.  What has traditionally tipped the balance in favor of an 
injured person's right to be made whole as the just resolution 
is that the insurer has been paid to accept the risk that it may 
go unpaid.  Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d 542.  We see no reason, and 
neither has Travco provided us with one, why John and Rachelle's 
lack of status as "insureds" shifts the equitable balance in 
Travco's favor.  Although John and Rachelle have not paid Travco 
the premiums, Travco was nonetheless paid a premium to accept 
the risk that it would go unpaid.  We therefore conclude that 
the equitable balance still tips in the injured person's favor, 
in this case the wrongful death plaintiff's right, to obtain 
full recovery.    
¶35 Fourth, the Schulte court recognized that "settling 
plaintiffs 
and 
subrogated 
insurers 
usually 
compete 
in 
a 
practical sense for limited settlement funds."  Schulte, 176 
Wis. 2d at 633.  That competition is just as real here.  And as 
in Schulte, this competition is an equitable factor we cannot 
ignore.  See Id. 
¶36 Fifth, if Rimes did not apply, this state's policy of 
encouraging settlement would suffer in wrongful death actions.  
See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634 ("Wisconsin has a 'long-standing 
policy in favor of settlements.'") (citations omitted).  Just as 
in personal injury contexts, a tortfeasor in a wrongful death 
action "may quite reasonably not be willing to offer the maximum 
No. 
03-0610   
 
23 
 
amount possible to settle unless he receives a complete 
release."  Id.  We have already precluded a subrogated insurer's 
ability to frustrate an insured's attempts to settle disputes 
out of court on the insured's terms.  Id. at 634-35.  Travco has 
not provided us with any persuasive reason as to why wrongful 
death plaintiffs should be treated differently.   
¶37 For these reasons, we conclude that the Rimes made-
whole doctrine and the Schulte settlement procedure apply to 
wrongful death plaintiffs.  Here, it is undisputed that John and 
Rachelle properly followed the Schulte procedure to determine 
the status of Travco's subrogation rights.  Because Travco 
stipulated that the $280,000 settlement did not make John and 
Rachelle 
whole, 
its 
subrogation 
rights 
are 
consequently 
extinguished. 
¶38 Before closing, we comment on Travco's, and the court 
of appeals', concern that our conclusion today will do harm in 
multiple plaintiff litigation.  Our conclusion today addresses 
only the extension of Rimes to wrongful death actions that 
involve a subrogated insurer.  To whatever extent that our 
reasoning can be construed as applying to multiple plaintiff 
litigation, we come full circle from where this part of the 
discussion 
began: 
 
subrogation 
and 
its 
antisubrogation 
counterpart are fundamentally equitable concepts.  Thus, equity 
is the bulwark against the horribles that Travco and the court 
of appeals fear.  Outside of situations where a person has a 
competing claim with a subrogated insurer, the equities will 
vary dramatically.   
No. 
03-0610   
 
24 
 
IV 
 
¶39 In conclusion, equity requires that Rimes and its 
progeny apply to wrongful death plaintiffs.  Wrongful death 
plaintiffs are entitled to be made whole for their losses, but 
not more than whole.  To the extent that wrongful death 
plaintiffs receive a portion of damages for expenses they have 
not incurred after having been made whole for their losses, they 
have been unjustly enriched.  However, because of Travco's 
stipulation that John and Rachelle's lump-sum settlement did not 
make 
them 
whole, 
those 
circumstances 
are 
absent 
here.  
Therefore, Travco's subrogation rights are extinguished. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
 
 
 
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶40 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I write separately 
to restate some basic rules of subrogation in order to address 
the court of appeals' concern over the application of the made-
whole doctrine in this case.  Further, I wish to state that in 
my view, the only reason the plaintiffs in this wrongful death 
action are allowed to defeat Travco's right of subrogation is 
because Travco stipulated that the plaintiffs were not made 
whole and Wis. Stat. § 895.04 (2001-02)20 allows the plaintiffs 
to assert and satisfy certain claims in which Travco has a 
subrogated interest that properly belong to the estate and could 
have been recovered as part of a survival action. 
¶41 Subrogation occurs when a subrogee "steps into the 
shoes of the subrogor to the extent it has made payment as a 
result of [an] actionable event."  Wilmont v. Racine County, 136 
Wis. 2d 57, 63, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987)(emphasis added).  Thus, 
"[p]ayment is the sine qua non for subrogation."  Muchow v. 
Goding, 198 Wis. 2d 609, 626, 544 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Without payment by 
one 
party on 
behalf 
of 
another, no 
subrogation 
relationship 
exists 
between 
the 
two 
and 
no 
subrogation rights arise.  Id.21  If a subrogation relationship 
exits, the subrogee does not possess an independent claim 
against 
the 
tortfeasor 
(whose 
injury 
of 
the 
subrogor 
                                                 
20 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
21 See also Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 
Wis. 2d 263, 271 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982)("'The primary reason for 
the 
adoption 
of 
subrogation 
is 
the 
principle 
of 
indemnity.'")(quoting Denenberg, Subrogation Recovery:  Who is 
Made Whole, FIC Quarterly, Winter 1979 at 185-86).   
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
2 
 
necessitated payment); rather, it owns part of the liability of 
the tortfeasor separate from that part owned by the subrogor.  
Wilmont, 136 Wis. 2d at 63-64.   
¶42 As the subrogee and subrogor each own part of the 
claim against a tortfeasor, they often are forced to compete for 
a limited pool of money.  When this occurs, the made-whole 
doctrine establishes an equitable rule of priority that prevents 
the subrogee from asserting its right of subrogation until its 
subrogor has been made whole for all damages suffered.  Paulson 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶¶21-26, 263 Wis. 2d 520, 649 
N.W.2d 645.  Thus, "the subrogee has no right to share in the 
fund recovered from the tort-feasor until the subrogor is made 
whole."  Garrity v. Rural Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 
547, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).  Where there is a settlement between 
the tortfeasor and the subrogor, the subrogor may request a 
hearing in which the circuit court determines whether the 
subrogor has been made whole by the settlement amount.  Rimes v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 278-79, 316 
N.W.2d 348 (1982).   
¶43 In order to foster settlements, allow an injured 
parties to settle on their own terms, and ensure that subrogees 
participate in a Rimes hearing, this court approved the use of a 
settlement agreement whereby the tortfeasor settles with the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff grants the tortfeasor a full release 
and further agrees to indemnify the tortfeasor for any claim 
made by its subrogee.  Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 633-
35, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993).  Such an agreement calls for 
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
3 
 
application of the made-whole doctrine because it "indirectly 
creates the prospect that the insurer will be competing with its 
own insured."  Id. at 633-34.   
¶44 I wish to emphasize that the Schulte settlement 
procedure is a means of ensuring application of the made-whole 
doctrine, which itself limits pre-existing subrogation rights.  
Neither Schulte nor the made-whole doctrine as set forth in 
Garrity and Rimes create subrogation rights in the first 
instance.  As such, their application is dependent upon the 
existence of a subrogation relationship between two parties, 
which, in turn, is dependent upon one party indemnifying the 
other for a loss.  That is, the made-whole doctrine applies only 
where a subrogee and subrogor compete for a limited pool of 
money.  Paulson, 263 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶23-28. 
¶45 I 
reiterate 
these 
basic 
tenets 
of 
the 
law 
of 
subrogation in response to the court of appeals' concern that 
operation of the made-whole rule in this case could result in a 
single plaintiff being able to extinguish the rights of other 
plaintiffs or insurers in a multi-plaintiff action against a 
common tortfeasor.  See majority op., ¶10.  Such a result should 
never 
occur 
under 
a 
proper 
application 
of 
established 
subrogation principles.   
¶46 Assume plaintiff A settles with a tortfeasor and 
further agrees to indemnify that tortfeasor against claims 
brought by plaintiffs B and C or their insurers.  Unless 
plaintiffs B or C or their insurers have paid part of the loss 
suffered by plaintiff A, there is no subrogation relationship 
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
4 
 
between the parties.  That is, unless some other party has 
indemnified plaintiff A, there is no relation of subrogee and 
subrogor and no subrogation rights exist.  If there is no 
subrogation relationship in the first instance, then the made-
whole doctrine has no relevance.  In the absence of inter-
plaintiff indemnification, each plaintiff possesses a separate 
independent claim against the tortfeasor.  In contrast, the 
made-whole doctrine applies where two parties each own part of a 
single claim by virtue of a subrogation relationship and are 
forced to compete for limited funds.  See Paulson, 263 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶23-28.  While a Schulte settlement forces a 
subrogee and subrogor to compete for limited funds, it does not 
create the subrogation relationship between the two.   
¶47 Thus, the fact that multiple plaintiffs may compete 
for limited funds when pursuing a common tortfeasor does not 
trigger application of the made-whole doctrine unless they each 
own part of the others' claim.  Where multiple plaintiffs each 
possess independent claims against a common tortfeasor and there 
is no subrogation relationship between them in the first 
instance, a Schulte settlement does not create subrogation 
rights and the made-whole doctrine has no application.   
¶48 However, the result of the majority opinion is 
perfectly consistent with these basic subrogation principles.  
Here, Travco paid sums of money under its insurance policy for 
Dayle's funeral expenses, medical expenses, and damage to her 
wrecked car.  Majority op., ¶3.  As these items of damages were 
incurred between the time of the tortious act and Dayle's death, 
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
5 
 
they properly belong to the estate and could be asserted as part 
of a survival action under Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1).  Weiss v. 
Regent Props. Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 233, 346 N.W.2d 766 
(1984).22   
¶49 As such, there is no doubt that Travco obtained a 
subrogation right in claims belonging to the estate to the 
extent it made payment to or on behalf of the estate.  However, 
the estate did not bring a survival action in this case; rather, 
the plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful death, claiming 
the above 
damages 
as 
well 
as losses 
stemming 
from the 
deprivation of society and companionship of their mother under 
§ 895.04.  Had the estate instead brought a cause of action, 
Travco's subrogation rights would certainly be contingent upon 
the estate being made whole for its damages.   
¶50 While a "wrongful death action is separate and 
distinct 
from 
the 
survival 
action[,]" 
id., 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(5) 
allows 
those 
bringing 
a 
claim 
for 
wrongful 
death 
to 
recover 
medical 
and 
funeral 
expenses.  
Further, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) 
allows 
a 
wrongful 
death 
plaintiff to "waive and satisfy the estate's cause of action" as 
part of a settlement agreement.  Thus, § 895.04 allows the 
plaintiffs to essentially stand as proxies for the decedent's 
estate by allowing them to assert and control claims that 
properly belong to the estate.   
                                                 
22 See also J. Ric Gass et al., 2 The Law of Damages in 
Wisconsin:  Wrongful Death § 16.7, at 12 (Russell M. Ware ed., 
3d ed. 2003)("Medical, hospital, and funeral expenses are 
properly items of damages for the estate.").   
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
6 
 
¶51 As noted, a subrogated interest is not an independent 
claim, but instead represents part ownership of the subrogor's 
claim against the tortfeasor.  Because of its payments to or on 
behalf of the estate, Travco owns part of the claims that the 
plaintiffs are able to assert and control by virtue of § 895.04.  
In essence, as a result of § 895.04, Travco has the same 
relationship with the plaintiffs (to the extent they are able to 
assert and satisfy claims belonging to the estate) as it would 
with the decedent's estate, had the estate sought recovery.   
¶52 Thus, Travco's subrogated interest in claims belonging 
to the estate is rightly subject to the plaintiffs being made 
whole, vis-à-vis the claims they assert on behalf of the estate, 
the same as it would be had the estate itself asserted these 
claims.  As Travco stipulated that the plaintiffs were not made 
whole, 
the 
made-whole 
doctrine 
appropriately 
limits 
its 
subrogation rights.  Likewise, because the plaintiffs are able 
to assert and satisfy claims that properly belong to the estate, 
use of the Schulte settlement procedure is just as appropriate 
here as it would be had the estate brought a cause of action and 
executed the same type of agreement.   
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE D. 
ROGGENSACK joins this opinion.   
 
No.  03-0610.jpw 
 
1