Title: DAVID EUGENE HUBBARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID EUGENE HUBBARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 12175 P.3d 625Case Number: 06-235Decided: 02/05/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DAVID 
EUGENE HUBBARD,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Galen 
Woelk of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Faculty 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director; 
and Jennifer Reece, Student Intern.  
Argument by Mr. Johnson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

Hill, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Appellant David Eugene Hubbard ("Hubbard"), pled guilty to one 
count of third-degree sexual assault and one count of immodest, immoral, or 
indecent acts with a minor.  On 
appeal, Hubbard claims that he was substantially prejudiced and deprived of due 
process during his sentencing proceeding because an improper Victim Impact 
Statement and Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") had been previously filed 
with the district court.  Hubbard 
further argues that his sentence of not less than 17 nor more than 25 years of 
incarceration was 
disproportionate to the magnitude of his crimes and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Hubbard presents 
these issues for our review:

 
 

I.          
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced 
Hubbard.

II.         
Whether the State's misconduct substantially prejudiced Hubbard and 
deprived him of his right to due process and a fair sentencing 
hearing.

 
 
The 
State has set forth the issues to be:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court commit procedural error when it sentenced 
[Hubbard]?

II.         
Did the district court commit plain error when the judge did not recuse 
himself?

III.        Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
[Hubbard]?

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The felony 
information filed in this case charged Hubbard with two counts of third-degree 
sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005), and one count of immodest, immoral or indecent acts with a minor in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2005).1  The facts of the incidents were obtained 
from forensic interviews with the victims.

 
 
[¶4]      The earliest 
incident occurred over the Easter weekend in 2005.  The victim was S.W., a 13-year-old girl 
from Nebraska.  S.W. stated in her interview with 
authorities that her 12-year-old friend, C.R., had invited her to visit C.R.'s 
uncle, David Hubbard, at his residence in Laramie, Wyoming.  
S.W. alleged that during her weekend stay at the residence, Hubbard 
touched S.W. on three separate occasions.  
The first incident occurred when S.W., C.R., and Hubbard were playing a 
game of ping-pong in Hubbard's basement.  
S.W. claimed that when C.R. went upstairs, Hubbard hit the ping-pong ball 
off the table and when S.W. went to pick up the ball, Hubbard followed her.  As S.W.'s back was turned to Hubbard 
when she reached down to pick up the ball, Hubbard came up behind her, reached 
underneath her shirt, and touched her stomach.

 
 
[¶5]      S.W. stated that 
the second incident occurred the next day when she was sitting on the living 
room couch with C.R. and Hubbard.  
Hubbard was sitting between the two girls, and the three were covered 
with a blanket.  S.W. claimed that 
Hubbard proceeded to put his hand underneath her shirt and bra and touch her 
breasts for approximately 15 to 20 minutes, after which S.W. left the 
couch.

 
 
[¶6]      S.W. maintained 
that the third and final incident occurred on the night before she returned to 
Nebraska.  S.W. stated that Hubbard had invited her 
to sit on the couch next to him to watch a movie, but she declined and opted to 
sit on the floor.  When Hubbard 
continued to ask S.W. to sit by him, S.W. finally agreed.  Hubbard then placed a blanket over the 
two of them and placed his hand on S.W.'s hip outside of her 
clothing.

 
 
[¶7]      The other 
significant report of abuse came from A.L., a 14-year-old girl also from Nebraska.  In A.L.'s interview, she stated that 
over the Fourth of July weekend in 2005, she had accompanied K.A., her 
13-year-old girlfriend, to visit the Hubbard residence.  A.L. stated that one evening she, K.A., 
and Hubbard were playing a computer game.  
A.L. claimed that K.A. was sitting at the computer while A.L. and Hubbard 
were seated on separate chairs behind and out of view of K.A.  A.L. reported that Hubbard began rubbing 
her back with his right hand and proceeded to put his hand inside her shirt 
via the right armhole and rub her chest and breasts underneath her 
bra.  Hubbard allegedly also moved 
his hand down her shorts and underwear touching her pubic 
area.

 
 
[¶8]      A.L. also claimed 
that later this same evening, Hubbard was sitting next to A.L. on the couch when 
Hubbard stretched A.L.'s right leg out across his lap and began to rub her leg 
and asked A.L. to rub his arm.  A.L. 
stated that she did so reluctantly.

 
 
[¶9]      When the Laramie 
Police interviewed Hubbard, he admitted to touching S.W.'s breasts while playing 
ping-pong in the basement and while sitting on the couch in his living 
room.  Hubbard claimed that on both 
occasions, he touched S.W. under her shirt, but over her bra, and admitted doing 
so for sexual gratification.  When 
questioned in regard to A.L., Hubbard admitted to touching A.L.'s breasts, under 
her shirt but over her bra, but he denied putting his hand in A.L.'s 
shorts.  Hubbard also admitted doing 
so for sexual gratification.

 
 
[¶10]   As noted above, pursuant to 
Hubbard's plea agreement, he agreed to plead guilty to Counts II and III, 
involving S.W. and A.L., and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss Count 
I.  However, there was no sentencing 
recommendation agreement between the State and Hubbard.

 
 
[¶11]   Subsequent to Hubbard's guilty 
plea, but prior to his sentencing, Hubbard obtained a Forensic Psychosexual 
Evaluation.  Also prior to 
sentencing, the Albany County Victim Witness Program prepared and delivered a 
Victim Impact Statement to the district court and to Wyoming Probation and 
Parole.  Although the Victim Impact 
Statement contained the statements of S.W., and the parents of S.W. and A.L., 
the document also contained the statements of several other individuals beyond 
those affected by the charged crimes.

 
 
[¶12]   After Hubbard's counsel received a 
copy of the Victim Impact Statement, he contacted the CountyAttorney in writing, and requested that the CountyAttorney stipulate to redact the portions 
of the Victim Impact Statement that referred to the additional "victims."  The State responded that Hubbard's 
counsel should instead file a motion with the district 
court.

 
 
[¶13]   Accordingly, on May 22, 2006, 
Hubbard filed a Motion to Strike Victim Impact Statement and for Order of 
Compliance moving the district court to strike the Victim Impact Statement from 
the record.  However, while a 
decision on Hubbard's motion was pending, the Victim Impact Statement was 
incorporated into Hubbard's PSR, which was delivered to the district court on 
May 25, 2006.  Hubbard then filed 
his Objection to Inaccurate Information in the Presentence Investigation and 
Motion to Strike because, inter alia, the PSR referenced multiple victims 
other than S.W. and A.L.

 
 
[¶14]   On June 30, 2006, after hearing 
arguments on Hubbard's motions, District Court Judge John C. Brooks ordered that 
the victim impact statements that were filed by individuals other than S.W., 
A.L., and their families, could not and had not been considered by the 
court.  The district court also 
ordered that the recommendations from the PSR investigator should be stricken 
and that the PSR should be amended so that it would only reflect the appropriate 
statements.  The district court 
explained that because it had received the victim impact statements "almost 
simultaneously" with Hubbard's objections, the only victim impact statements 
that the court had considered were those of S.W., A.L., and their 
parents.

 
 
[¶15]   Shortly after granting Hubbard's 
motions, the parties proceeded to sentencing.  At sentencing, the State argued that 
Hubbard should receive the maximum composite sentence of 25 years.  In response, Hubbard and his counsel 
presented several mitigating factors for the court to consider, such as the fact 
that Hubbard had no prior employment problems, no prior criminal offenses, no 
substance abuse problems, no suicidal ideation, and he had exhibited remorse for 
his conduct.

 
 
[¶16]   The district court ultimately found 
that Hubbard's crimes were "particularly egregious" and sentenced Hubbard to 
consecutive sentences of 11 to 15 years on Count II, and 6 to 10 years on Count 
III.  The district court explained 
that Hubbard's Forensic Psychosexual Evaluation provided that without 
significant counseling, Hubbard had a high risk of re-offending.  The district court also stated that 
Hubbard had repeatedly committed these crimes while acting with the full 
knowledge that his actions were wrong.  
In regard to the consecutive nature of sentence, the court determined 
that this was appropriate because Hubbard's crimes were those of a sexual 
predator who had purposefully groomed his victims.

 
 
[¶17]   The Judgment, Sentence and Order of 
Incarceration was filed on August 4, 2006, after which Hubbard timely filed his 
notice of appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Procedural 
Error

 
 
[¶18]   Although the district court 
explicitly stated that it had not and would not consider the disputed victim 
impact statements and PSR materials, Hubbard maintains that the mere submission 
of these materials resulted in a procedural error that substantially prejudiced 
Hubbard and compromised his right to due process.  Specifically, Hubbard claims that "but 
for" this procedural impropriety, his sentence would not have been "as 
unreasonable."

 
 
[¶19]   Hubbard's burden in this regard is 
an arduous one.  A sentence will not 
be disturbed due to sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct 
prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.  See Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, 
¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003); see also Monjares v. State, 2006 WY 71, 136 P.3d 162 (Wyo. 2006).  Although due 
process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information, to 
prevail on appeal the appellant must also prove that the district court relied 
upon the inaccurate statements.  
See Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 
292 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶20]   While a district court is required 
to gather and consider certain information prior to sentencing, see Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, 
¶ 23, 36 P.3d 1133, 1141 (Wyo. 2001), our legislature has limited 
the admissibility of victim impact statements to the victims of the particular 
crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.  See Bitz, ¶ 22, 78 P.3d  at 263 
(interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 2003)).  Likewise, 
this Court has recognized that where a defendant alleges a factual inaccuracy in 
a PSR, the district court must either make a finding as 
to the contested matter or make a determination that no finding is necessary 
because the matter will not be considered for sentencing.  Bitz, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d  at 262 
(interpreting W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)).

 
 
[¶21]   In this case, there can be no 
dispute that the district court properly followed the sentencing procedures as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A) and (C).  
When Hubbard objected to the Victim Impact Statement and PSR, the 
district court heard arguments from the parties and ultimately struck the victim 
impact statements made by persons other than S.W. and A.L.  Accordingly, as the district court acted 
in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, there does not 
appear to have been any procedural error.

 
 

[¶22]   However, even if we were to assume 
for the purposes of this opinion that an error was present in the sentencing 
procedure, Hubbard could not establish that this 
procedural error 
resulted in any prejudice.  See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 2002 WY 
78, ¶ 15, 46 P.3d 884, 890 (Wyo. 2002).  Here, the district court specifically 
stated that it had not and would not consider any statements that were not those 
of S.W., A.L., and their parents.  
Although Hubbard maintains that the mere submission of improper material 
to the district court will suffice to create prejudice, we have never ruled so 
in the past, and we refuse to do so here.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶23]   Hubbard also asserts that the State 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it knowingly and intentionally 
presented the district court with the improper victim impact statements, and by 
later refusing to stipulate to the redaction of the disputed 
material.

 
 
[¶24]   Where there has been an objection 
below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for harmless error, which occurs 
if there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome may have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. See Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, 
¶ 11, 169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Butcher v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005)).  Wyoming law clearly provides that a 
sentencing decision cannot be based upon unreliable information, undocumented 
information, or inaccurate information, see Manes, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 
293, and a prosecutor's act of bringing undocumented allegations to the district 
court's attention so that the court would consider that allegation in sentencing is prosecutorial misconduct.  
Id. (citing DeLoge v. State, 
2002 WY 155, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1233, 1239 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 

[¶25]   In this case, we decline to hold 
that prosecutorial misconduct arises from the mere submission of victim impact 
statements that may contain statements from individuals beyond 
those who were affected by the charged crimes.  Furthermore, 
even if we were to conclude that such a submission constituted misconduct, 
Hubbard cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice.  The 
district court explicitly stated that it had only considered the statements of 
S.W., A.L., and their parents, and it had not and would not consider the 
statements from any other individuals.  
Therefore, 
based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that a reasonable 
possibility exists that Hubbard's sentence would have been more favorable to him 
in the absence of the disputed Victim Impact Statement and 
PSR.

 
 
Disproportionate 
Sentence

 
 

[¶26]   Hubbard's final argument 
is that 
his sentence of not less than 17 nor more than 25 years of incarceration 
is 
disproportionate to the magnitude of his crimes and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  Hubbard maintains that the mitigating 
factors that he presented to the district court were significant and that, as a 
result, the district court's sentence is excessive and 
unreasonable.

 
 
[¶27]   In Wyoming, when the district court's imposition 
of a criminal sentence is within the limits set by the legislature, the sentence 
will not be overturned, absent a clear abuse of discretion.  See Watters v. State, 2004 WY 155, 
¶ 32, 101 P.3d 908, 920 (Wyo. 2004).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Id. at 921 (quoting Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  Furthermore, when a defendant pleads 
guilty, he is exposed to criminal liability up to, and including, the maximum 
sentence for each of his crimes.  See Garcia v. State, 2007 WY 48, 
¶ 14, 153 P.3d 941, 945 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶28]   Here, the sentences imposed by the 
district court were well within the statutory sentencing range fixed by the 
legislature, and Hubbard does not dispute this.  Hubbard pled guilty to one count of 
sexual assault in the third-degree, and one count of immodest, immoral, or 
indecent acts with a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-304(a)(ii) and 
14-3-105(a), respectively.  A 
conviction of third-degree sexual assault carries a maximum sentence of 15 
years, and Hubbard received a sentence of 11 to 15 years.  A conviction of immodest, immoral, or 
indecent acts with a minor carries a maximum sentence of 10 years and Hubbard 
received a 6 to 10 year sentence.

 
 
[¶29]   Although Hubbard cites to several 
cases in support of his argument that his sentence is excessive as compared with 
those of others convicted of similar crimes, this Court has repeatedly held that 
it will not participate in such comparisons unless the mode of punishment is 
unusual or where the relative length of the sentence to imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the offense.  See Watters, ¶ 33, 101 P.3d  at 
921; Blakeman v. State, 2002 WY 177, ¶ 11, 59 P.3d 140, 
142-43 (Wyo. 2002); Sampsell v. State, 2001 WY 12, ¶ 10, 17 P.3d 724, 728  (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶30]   Hubbard has failed to persuade us 
that the relative length of his sentence was extreme when compared to the 
gravity of his crimes.  As noted by 
the district court, Hubbard repeatedly and intentionally assaulted S.W. and A.L. 
for the purpose of achieving his own sexual gratification, while knowing that 
his actions were wrong.  Although 
Hubbard did express some remorse for his actions, he nonetheless behaved as a 
sexual predator who groomed and took advantage of his young victims.  Given these circumstances, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion.  Accordingly, Hubbard's sentence will not 
be disturbed.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   The mere submission of a Victim 
Impact Statement and PSR that contains statements from individuals who may be 
beyond those affected by the charged crimes, does not, without more, constitute 
a procedural error in sentencing or prosecutorial misconduct.  Additionally, a review of the record 
reveals that Hubbard's sentence was not disproportionate when compared to the 
extent of his crimes.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1One of the 
two third-degree sexual assault charges was dropped pursuant to Hubbard's plea 
agreement, thus, this opinion will 
only discuss the relevant facts in relation to the two remaining 
charges.