Title: The Florida Bar v. Kelley Andrea Bosecker

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1387 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
KELLEY ANDREA BOSECKER, 
Respondent. 
 
September 27, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, 
Kelley Andrea Bosecker, be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation 
of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) and disbarred.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  Bosecker has sought review of the 
referee’s report.  For the reasons that follow, we approve in part the referee’s 
factual findings and recommendations as to guilt, and approve the recommended 
disciplinary sanction of disbarment. 
FACTS 
 
Previously, in case number SC15-1592, Bosecker was the subject of a  
 
 
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Florida Bar (Bar) disciplinary proceeding in which the Court approved the 
uncontested report of the referee and found her guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-3.1 
(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and imposed a forty-five day suspension.  Fla. Bar v. 
Bosecker, No. SC15-1592, 2016 WL 2595926 (Fla. May 5, 2016). 
 
Nearly three months later, on August 1, 2016, the Bar filed a “Petition for 
Contempt and Order to Show Cause” against Bosecker, alleging that she was in 
contempt of the suspension order in case number SC15-1592, effective May 27, 
2016.  Specifically, Bosecker failed to comply with Bar Rule 3-5.1(h), the 
notification requirement, and had also continued to engage in the practice of law 
during her suspension by having direct contact with her clients, engaging in 
discussions with opposing counsel, and contacting court personnel pertaining to the 
following cases in which she was counsel of record:  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Rucker, 
case number 2013-CA-002913, in the Fifth Judicial Circuit (Lake County, 
Florida); Bank of New York Mellon v. Hodge, case number 14-006510-CI, in the 
Sixth Judicial Circuit (Pinellas County, Florida); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. 
Investor Trustee Services, LLC, case number 2013-CA-000689, in the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit (Lake County, Florida); DeParedes v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 
case number 5D15-3412, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal; and Investor 
 
 
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Trustee Services, LLC v. PNC Bank N.A., case number 2D15-4549, in the Second 
District Court of Appeal. 
As a result of her alleged improper conduct, the Bar sought disbarment.   
On August 3, 2016, the Court issued its order to show cause, directing 
Bosecker to show cause why she should not be held in contempt or otherwise 
disciplined.  Bosecker filed her response on September 7, 2016, stating:  
[At] no time during the suspension period did she hold herself out to 
be an attorney, represent to anyone that she was an attorney, send any 
correspondence or email representing that she was an attorney; nor did 
Respondent take any action that violated the terms of her suspension 
from the Bar. 
 
Based upon her responses to the Bar’s allegations, the case was referred to a 
referee.   
Following a final hearing, the Report of Referee was filed with the Court on 
May 25, 2017.  The referee recommended that Bosecker be held in contempt of the 
order in case number SC15-1592, and recommended that she had violated Bar 
Rules 3-5.1(e) (Suspension), 3-5.1(h) (Notice to Clients), 3-6.1(c) (Notice of 
Employment Required),1 and 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
                                          
 
 
1.  While the Report of Referee makes reference to Bar Rule 3-6.1(c) and to 
the fact that Bosecker was employed during her suspension without complying 
with the requirements of Bar Rule 3-6.1, the referee also concluded that Bosecker 
violated the rule “by having direct client contact while suspended.”  Accordingly, 
it appears that the referee also intended to reference Bar Rule 3-6.1(d)(1) 
(Prohibited Conduct; Direct Client Conduct). 
 
 
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involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  The referee further 
recommended that Bosecker be disbarred.  Bosecker filed her “Notice of Intent to 
Seek Review of Report of Referee,” and briefs have been filed by the parties. 
The Referee’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt.  
Based upon the testimony presented and the evidence admitted at the hearing, the 
referee made the following findings and recommendations of guilt. 
 
First, the referee found that Bosecker violated Bar Rule 3-5.1(h), as follows.   
The Supreme Court of Florida issued an order dated May 5, 
2016, in The Florida Bar v. Kelley Andrea Bosecker, Case No. SC15-
1592, suspending Respondent from the practice of law for forty-five 
(45) days (the” [sic] Suspension Order’).  The Suspension Order was 
to be effective thirty (30) days so that Respondent could protect the 
interests of her existing clients, unless she notified the court that the 
30 days was not needed to protect her clients’ interests.  Respondent 
was ordered to accept no new business from the date of the 
Suspension Order until reinstated, and ordered to fully comply with 
Rule 3-5.1(h), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.  TFB Exh. 1. 
  
On June 1, 2016, Respondent filed an “Amended Notice by 
Respondent of Commencement of Suspension,” indicating that she 
ceased practicing law as of midnight on May 26, 2016, and elected to 
commence her suspension on May 27, 2016.  TFB Exh. 3.  On June 1, 
2016, the Court entered an order making Respondent’s suspension 
effective May 27, 2016, as requested in Respondent’s notice.  TFB 
Exh. 4.  Thus, Respondent was suspended from May 27, 2016, to July 
11, 2016. 
  
From June 3, 2016, through June 13, 2016, Respondent 
requested extensions of time to submit her required sworn affidavit 
pursuant to Rule 3-5.1(h) to the Bar.  The Bar granted Respondent’s 
first request for an extension, allowing her to submit the affidavit by 
June 13, 2016.  TFB Exh. 5.  On the day the affidavit was due, 
Respondent again asked for additional time from the Bar, which was 
 
 
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denied.  She then filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File 
Affidavit of Providing Suspension Notice” with the Court seeking an 
extension solely for her affidavit by June 17, 2016.  TFB Exh. 6.  In 
her motion, Respondent stated she “has sent out the required 
suspension notices but needs additional time to finish the list of names 
and addresses required to be attached to the Affidavit before the 
Affidavit is submitted to the Bar.”  The Court entered an order on 
June 17, 2016, allowing Respondent until June 17, 2016, to provide 
the affidavit to the Bar.  TFB Exh. 9.  Respondent submitted her Rule 
3-5.1 affidavit to the Bar on June 16, 2016.  TFB Exh. 8.  Respondent 
neither requested nor was given an extension to submit the Suspension 
Order to the necessary persons or entities.  TFB Exhs. 5, 6, 9. 
 
The evidence showed, and Respondent admitted, that she was 
still furnishing a copy of her Suspension Order to clients, opposing 
counsel, and courts in mid-June 2016, and as late as June 16, 2016.  
TFB Exhs. 7, 12d, 13f, 16d, 20e.  Additionally, Respondent failed to 
provide a copy of the Suspension Order to at least one client, Daniel 
and Jill Baez.  TFB Exhs. 8, 19 a-b.  The Court heard from the 
following witnesses who each testified about Respondent’s violation 
of Rule 3-5.1(h): Melissa Mara; Respondent; Alicia Raina Whiting-
Bozich, Esq.; Julie Anthousis, Esq.; Chanelle L. Gardner; Judge 
Thomas H. Minkoff; Linda Holm; Joanne P. Simmons; Judge Vincent 
G. Torpy, Jr.; and, Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Esq. 
 
. . . . 
 
The Bar’s petition, and the evidence presented at the final 
hearing, gave examples of Respondent’s cases in which Respondent 
did not provide her clients with notice of her suspension until her 
suspension had already begun.  Respondent did not give those clients 
an opportunity to take action to protect their interests.  Additionally, 
opposing counsels, Ms. Whiting-Bozich, Ms. Anthousis, and Ms. 
Hopkins, testified that as of the dates Respondent contacted them 
regarding her clients’ cases, the attorneys had neither received notice 
from Respondent that she was suspended nor provided a copy of the 
Suspension Order.  The purpose of Rule 3-5.1(h) was entirely 
thwarted in this case, as Respondent was still furnishing a copy of her 
Suspension Order to clients, opposing counsel, and courts several 
weeks after she elected to start her suspension on May 27, 2016. 
 
 
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The referee next found facts pertaining to her recommendations that 
Bosecker was guilty of violating Bar Rules 3-5.1(e) and 3-6.12: 
The evidence presented at the hearing established clearly and 
convincingly that Respondent violated Rule 3-5.1(e) by continuing to 
practice law while suspended, and Rule 3-6.1(c) [sic] by having direct 
client contact while suspended.  Respondent improperly engaged in 
direct contact with her clients during her period of suspension, and 
improperly continued to assist her clients during her suspension.  
Respondent engaged in improper and prohibited discussions with 
opposing counsel during her suspension.  Respondent engaged in 
improper discussions with court personnel during her suspension.  
Respondent held herself out to the courts and opposing counsel as an 
attorney eligible to practice law.  Respondent was also allegedly 
employed during the period of suspension without complying with the 
requirements of Rule 3-6.1. 
 
The Referee heard from the following witnesses who testified 
about Respondent continuing to practice law while suspended, and her 
direct client contact while suspended: Respondent; Alicia Raina 
Whiting-Bozich, Esq.; Julie Anthousis, Esq.; Chanelle L. Gardner; 
Judge Thomas H. Minkoff; Linda Holm; Grace Ann Fagan, Esq.; 
Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Esq.; and, Erica DeParedes. 
  
At the final hearing, evidence was presented to support this 
Rule violation.  Respondent stated in the May 27, 2016, letter that she 
sent to her clients, opposing counsel, and the courts that she would 
monitor the clients’ cases during the suspension period and that the 
clients should as well.  TFB Exh. 2.  Respondent’s letter advised the 
clients that if they needed legal assistance during the suspension 
period, she would be happy to refer them to an appropriate attorney, 
and to feel free to contact her if they had any questions or needed 
additional information.  Respondent also sent a letter dated June 1, 
2016, on her “attorney at law” letterhead addressed to the District 
                                          
 
 
2.  As observed previously, the referee’s findings of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-
6.1 appear to pertain to both subdivisions (c) and (d)(1). 
 
 
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Court of Appeal Clerks in appellate cases she had asking that the 
District Court of Appeal Clerks provide a copy of her May 27, 2016, 
letter to the Judges assigned to her cases.  TFB Exh. 16b. 
  
Respondent’s letters are concerning and speak volumes 
regarding her intent to violate the Rules.  Respondent should not have 
been monitoring her clients’ cases during her suspension period.  
Respondent received copies of pleadings and orders filed in her 
clients’ cases throughout her suspension because she was still attorney 
of record in the cases, and did not promptly notify the courts or 
opposing counsel of her suspension.  TFB Exhs. 14c, 16c.  
Additionally, Respondent’s letter dated May 27, 2016, was not 
provided to her clients until mid-June.  To give her clients an 
opportunity to protect their interests, Respondent should have notified 
them of her suspension and provided them with an attorney referral 
prior to the effective date of suspension.  Respondent should not have 
welcomed her clients to contact her during her suspension, as she was 
prohibited from having direct contact with them.  Each of these 
actions violates the Rules and supports a finding of contempt. 
 
The Bar then presented several cases in which Respondent’s 
participation violated the Suspension Order.  In each case, the 
evidence and testimony demonstrated misconduct in the form of 
prohibited client contact, lack of employer supervision, and practicing 
law during the suspension period.  A running theme in all of these 
cases was Respondent’s assertion and testimony that other attorneys 
supervised her, namely Ann Pellegrino and Andrea Roebuck.  
However, prior to and during Respondent’s suspension, the Bar did 
not receive any notice from Ms. Pellegrino or Ms. Roebuck pursuant 
to Rule 3-6.1(c) indicating that Respondent was employed by either of 
them during the period of her suspension.  TFB Exhs. 10, 11.  In fact, 
no such notice was received until after the Bar filed its Petition for 
Contempt and Order to Show Cause in this case.  Respondent, Ms. 
Pellegrino, and Ms. Roebuck each testified that none of them had read 
Rule 3-6.1 regarding employment of suspended lawyers until about 
September of 2016, although the Bar sent Respondent a letter dated 
May 9, 2016, advising her to review Rule 3-6.1 if she intended to be 
employed while suspended.  Respondent testified that she received the 
Bar’s May 9, 2016, letter. 
 
 
 
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. . . . 
 
In each of these cases, Respondent’s suspension prohibited her 
from providing legal services and legal advice. . . . The evidence and 
testimony presented clearly and convincingly shows that Respondent 
counselled and assisted her clients throughout her suspension, which 
is the unauthorized practice of law in violation of her suspension 
order.[3] 
                                          
 
 
3.  The cases discussed by the referee include the following misconduct 
(record citations omitted): 
   
 
[1]  In U.S. Bank v. Rucker, where Respondent represented 
Emanuel Rucker.  Respondent admitted that on June 30, 2016, she 
sent an email to opposing counsel, Ms. Whiting-Bozich and Mr. 
Flicker, stating that Respondent had been in contact with Mr. Rucker 
and that they were compiling information in the case.  In the same 
email, Respondent asked if opposing counsel would be agreeable to 
extending a discovery deadline and in granting an extension for filing 
a counterclaim.  Respondent copied her client, Mr. Rucker, on the 
email.  The testimony and evidence showed that Respondent was not 
supervised by an attorney on this case and another attorney did not 
direct her to email opposing counsel. . . . 
 
 
[2]  In Bank of New York Mellon v. Hodge, Respondent 
represented Lloyd and Karin Hodge.  Respondent testified that she 
may have drafted and provided the Emergency Motion to Stay 
Application for Writ of Possession in the client’s Second District 
Court of Appeal case to her clients prior to her suspension.  The 
clients filed the motion pro se on June 1, 2016.  By order dated June 
2, 2016, the Second D.C.A. denied the motion.  The order stated that, 
“[t]he appellants should be aware…that any future pro se filings in 
this court will be subject to being stricken without further notice to the 
extent that the appellants remained represented by counsel.”  
Respondent was served with the court’s June 2, 2016, order as she 
was still counsel of record, and she failed to timely notify the court of 
her suspension. . . .   
 
Respondent admitted that on June 7, 2016, she sent an email to 
Chanelle L. Gardner, Judicial Assistant to the Honorable Thomas H. 
 
 
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Minkoff, stating that Mr. and Mrs. Hodge were requesting that the 
judge consider the motion for stay of the writ entered by the judge on 
June 1, 2016, and requesting information regarding what the clients 
needed to do to get the judge to make a determination on the motion 
the clients filed pro se.  Respondent copied her clients and opposing 
counsel on the email.  Respondent did not indicate in the email that 
she was suspended from the practice of law, or that she was not 
emailing the court as an attorney.  By sending an email to the judicial 
assistant requesting information in the client’s case, Respondent 
provided a service to her client during her suspension.  By copying 
her clients on the email, Respondent had prohibited contact with her 
clients during her suspension.   
 
. . .  Furthermore, and glaringly significant, Respondent’s email 
failed to indicate she was contacting the court on behalf of another 
attorney. . . . 
 
 
[3]  In JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Investor Trustee Services, 
Respondent represented Investor Trustee Services.  Respondent 
admitted that on or about the morning of June 14, 2016, Respondent 
left a voicemail message and sent an email to Linda Holm, Judicial 
Assistant to the Honorable Sandra Champ, indicating that the 
defendant would be filing a motion to cancel a foreclosure sale set for 
June 22, 2016, based on a pending motion for rehearing, and also 
requesting information and hearing times in the matter. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[4]  In DeParedes v. Green Tree Servicing, Respondent 
represented Erika and Eduardo DeParedes.  Respondent admitted that 
she engaged in two instances of direct contact with her client, Erica 
DeParedes, during the suspension period.  On or about June 9, 2016, 
Respondent was served with the Appellee’s Answer Brief as 
Respondent was counsel of record in the case, and failed to timely 
inform opposing counsel, Kimberly Hopkins, or the court of 
Respondent’s suspension.  Respondent admitted that she contacted 
Ms. DeParedes on or about June 9, 2016, to advise that she had 
received service of the Appellee’s Answer Brief, that a Reply Brief 
needed to be filed, and was due in 20 days. . . .   
 
 
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On June 16, 2016, Respondent emailed opposing counsel, Ms. 
Hopkins, and asked if she would consent to an extension until July 28 
for the filing of a reply brief in the case.  Respondent copied her 
client, Ms. DeParedes, on the email. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[5]  In Investor Trustee Services, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 
Respondent admitted that on June 23, 2016, during the period of 
Respondent’s suspension, she sent an email to opposing counsel, 
Kimberly Hopkins, stating that Respondent was contacting Ms. 
Hopkins on behalf of attorney Andrea Roebuck who was retained and 
would be filing a notice of appearance in the case.  Respondent’s June 
23, 2016, email asked Ms. Hopkins if she would agree to Ms. 
Roebuck filing a motion for reinstatement of the case.  The docket 
shows that Ms. Roebuck filed a notice of appearance and motion for 
reinstatement on June 23, 2016, which was denied on July 7, 2016.  In 
fact, the docket shows that nothing further happened in the appeal 
until Respondent filed a notice of appearance on July 21, 2016, which 
only provides service to opposing counsel.  Ms. Roebuck’s 
appearance and filing of the motion for reinstatement were merely 
placeholders until Respondent’s suspension ended. 
 
 
[6]  In Wells Fargo Bank v. Reed, Respondent represented 
Mealy and Betty Jo Reed.  In this case, Respondent inappropriately 
contacted opposing counsel, Ms. Anthousis, and engaged in the 
practice of law during the period of her suspension by providing legal 
services to her clients including representing the clients’ interests in 
getting a loan modification, and providing legal advice regarding what 
the clients needed to do to finalize their loan modification.  On June 2, 
2016, Respondent sent an email to opposing counsel regarding Mr. 
Reed providing proof of delivery of his April payment to Wells Fargo, 
but that the payment had not been cashed.  Respondent copied her 
client on the June 2, 2016, email.  On June 13, 2016, Respondent sent 
an email to opposing counsel stating that the Reeds were never 
provided a permanent modification agreement by the lender to sign, 
and that Respondent and the client had been requesting the agreement 
for some time.  Respondent copied her client on the June 13, 2016, 
 
 
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Lastly, the referee found facts pertaining to her recommendation that 
Bosecker was guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(c), as follows: 
Respondent admitted that on June 13, 2016, Respondent filed a 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Affidavit of Providing 
Suspension Notice, stating that Respondent had sent out the required 
suspension notices but needed additional time to finalize the list of 
names and addresses required to be attached to the Affidavit, and 
requesting an extension until June 17, 2016, to furnish her Rule 3-5.1 
sworn affidavit to The Florida Bar.  TFB Exh. 6.  However, on June 
14, 2016, and June 16, 2016, Respondent sent out the required 
suspension notice to her clients, opposing counsel, and the court in at 
least two (2) cases.  TFB Exhs. 7, 20e.  Respondent misrepresented in 
her motion filed on June 13, 2016, that she had sent out the required 
suspension notices.  Respondent knowingly made a misrepresentation 
and never corrected her misstatement to the Court.  Furthermore, 
Respondent engaged in deception and dishonesty by failing to timely 
inform her clients, opposing counsel, and the courts of her suspension.  
Although Respondent elected to start her suspension early, she waited 
for weeks before sending out the required notices.  In several of the 
cases addressed at the final hearing, Respondent’s clients were not 
given prior notice of suspension in order to protect their own interests.  
Moreover, Respondent continued to communicate with opposing 
counsel and the courts in her cases without notifying them that she 
was suspended. 
 
The Referee’s Recommended Sanction.  In determining the appropriate sanction 
to recommend, the referee first considered the following Florida Standards for 
                                          
 
email.  On June 15, 2016, opposing counsel’s assistant sent 
Respondent loan modification documents for the borrower to sign.  
Respondent thanked opposing counsel’s assistant by email also on 
June 15, 2016.  The client was copied on both emails.  Ms. Anthousis 
testified that she believed Respondent was representing the Reeds 
during this time.    
     
 
 
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Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:  3.0 (Generally); 4.61 (“Disbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally deceives a client with the intent to 
benefit the lawyer or another regardless of injury or potential injury to the client.”); 
6.11 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer: (a) with the intent to deceive the 
court, knowingly makes a false statement or submits a false document; or (b) 
improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse 
effect on the legal proceeding.”); 7.1 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer 
intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional 
with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”); and 8.1 
(“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer: (a) intentionally violates the terms of a 
prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury to a client, the public, the 
legal system, or the profession; or (b) has been suspended for the same or similar 
misconduct, and intentionally engages in further similar acts of misconduct.”). 
Additionally, the referee found five aggravating factors under Florida 
Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.22, including the following:  (a) prior 
disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (d) multiple offenses; (g) 
refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and (i) substantial experience 
in the practice of law.  The referee found that the mitigating circumstances under 
 
 
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Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.32, that Bosecker argued for, 
did not exist. 
ANALYSIS 
Rule Violations 
The Court’s review of the referee’s findings of fact as to each rule violation 
is limited, and if a referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and 
substitute its judgment for that of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 
86 (Fla. 2000); see Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  
Moreover, “[t]he referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, and his judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent 
clear and convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect.”  Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 
944 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 
1178 (Fla. 1991)).  As to the recommendations of guilt, the Court has stated that 
the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to 
support the recommendations.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 
(Fla. 2005).  Here, the referee found Bosecker guilty of violating Bar Rules 3-
5.1(e), 3-5.1(h), 3-6.1(c), and 4-8.4(c), which are discussed below in turn. 
Bar Rule 3-5.1(e) (Suspension).  With regard to Bar Rule 3-5.1(e), the 
referee found that the Bar established that Bosecker had engaged in the practice of 
 
 
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law throughout the period of her suspension.  The record evidence established, 
with respect to specific cases, that Bosecker continued to assist her clients during 
her suspension, based upon such conduct as advising her clients that she would 
monitor their cases and having had discussions with opposing counsel and court 
personnel during her suspension without advising them that she was under 
suspension.  Bosecker also received copies of pleadings and orders filed in her 
clients’ cases throughout her suspension because she was still attorney of record in 
the cases, and did not promptly notify the courts or opposing counsel of her 
suspension. 
Bar Rule 3-5.1(h) (Notice to Clients).  The evidence showed, and Bosecker 
admitted at the hearing before the referee, that, while the suspension was effective 
May 27, 2016, she was still furnishing copies of her suspension order to clients, 
opposing counsel, and courts in mid-June 2016.  In addition, in seeking an 
extension from this Court on June 13, 2016, to file her affidavit pertaining to the 
suspension notices, Bosecker represented to the Court that all notices had been 
provided.  This was a misrepresentation of fact. 
Bar Rules 3-6.1(c) (Notice of Employment Required) and 3-6.1(d)(1) 
(Prohibited Conduct; Direct Client Conduct).  Bosecker testified that she was 
working for attorneys Pellegrino and Roebuck at the time that she was suspended.  
While Bar Rule 3-6.1 allows for attorneys under suspension or disbarment to 
 
 
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perform services that may be ethically performed by nonlawyers, notice is required 
pursuant to Bar Rule 3-6.1(c).  Specifically, Bar Rule 3-6.1(c) requires that 
“[b]efore employment commences, the entity must provide The Florida Bar with a 
notice of employment and a detailed description of the intended services to be 
provided by the individual subject to this rule.”  While Bosecker admitted that no 
such notice was provided to the Bar, it appears that the hiring entity is responsible 
for providing the notice and therefore, Bosecker is not in violation Bar Rule 3-
6.1(c) under these circumstances. 
However, Bar Rule 3-6.1(d)(1) prohibits suspended or former lawyers 
employed by attorneys from having direct contact with any client.  In this case, the 
referee found numerous instances in which Bosecker had violated that rule.      
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  As previously indicated, 
Bosecker engaged in misrepresentation when she advised the Court on June 13, 
2016, that she had notified all of her clients, opposing counsel, and the courts of 
her suspension.  Bosecker was also dishonest in failing to promptly notify her 
clients, opposing counsel, and the courts of her suspension.  Although Bosecker 
argues that she was merely mistaken and did not have the intent to deceive, her 
actions demonstrate otherwise. 
Based upon the foregoing, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
 
 
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recommendations as to guilt pertaining to the violations of Bar Rules 3-5.1(e), 3-
5.1(h), 3-6.1(d)(1), and 4-8.4(c).  However, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation that Bosecker violated Bar Rule 3-6.1(c).  
Admissibility of Evidence 
With regard to the admissibility of evidence in a Bar proceeding, “a referee 
has wide latitude to admit or exclude evidence.”  Tobkin, 944 So. 2d at 224.  
Because Bar disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but are quasi-
judicial, the rules of evidence are not binding upon the referee.  Fla. Bar v. 
Shankman, 41 So. 3d 166, 169 (Fla. 2010).  Furthermore, a referee may consider 
any evidence that is deemed relevant in determining a factual question.  Fla. Bar v. 
Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999).  In addition, a referee’s decision 
regarding the admissibility of evidence will only be disturbed on review upon an 
abuse of discretion.  Fla. Bar v. D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2009).    
Bosecker argues that before the referee, the Bar improperly presented 
evidence and testimony from attorney Julie Anthousis pertaining to “the Mealy and 
Betty Reed loan modification,” and that the referee should not have heard or 
considered the claim because it was not included in the Bar’s petition.  Bosecker 
further contends that the referee should have granted her request to submit 
evidence in response to the Bar’s allegations. 
 
 
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In response, the Bar argues that the referee properly considered “uncharged 
conduct . . . that was within the scope of the specific allegations in the Bar’s 
Petition.”  The Bar explains that it filed its Final Witness List disclosing Ms. 
Anthousis as a witness in the case, and filed its Final Exhibit List showing several 
documents related to Wells Fargo Bank v. Reed as exhibits.  Counsel for Bosecker 
objected to the introduction of the exhibit as outside the scope of the pleadings.  
The referee overruled Bosecker’s objection, following argument by the Bar that the 
evidence was relevant to the guilt phase and was within the scope of the Bar’s 
allegations of misconduct. 
Here, the referee did not abuse her discretion in admitting the testimony and 
evidence relating to Bosecker’s actions with regard to the Reed case.  Rather, the 
evidence was relevant because the Bar was seeking contempt and disbarment based 
upon Bosecker’s misconduct in practicing law while under suspension, and the 
Reed case was one more instance of such misconduct.  Moreover, the referee 
properly excluded Bosecker’s evidence in response, on the basis that she sought to 
submit evidence at the end of the hearing that had not previously been disclosed to 
the Bar. 
 
Bosecker also argues that the referee erred in denying her motion to reopen 
evidence to admit additional client letters.  Without further argument or proof, 
Bosecker contends that the referee was biased against her.  The facts underlying 
 
 
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this claim are as follows.  The Case Management Order in this case, entered on 
January 3, 2017, indicated that April 7, 2017, was the deadline for the disclosure of 
witnesses and exhibits.  Bosecker received the additional mitigation letters after the 
April 27-28, 2017, final hearing.  Because the parties had been put on notice of the 
date by which evidence or witnesses had to be disclosed, Bosecker did not comply 
with the Case Management Order, and she did not seek to introduce the two 
mitigation letters before the close of the evidence, we conclude that the referee did 
not abuse her discretion in not admitting the additional mitigating evidence. 
Discipline 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  In addition, the Court views cumulative 
misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct, and cumulative 
misconduct of a similar nature warrants an even more severe discipline than might 
dissimilar conduct.  Fla. Bar v. Walkden, 950 So. 2d 407, 410 (Fla. 2007).  
 
 
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Moreover, in imposing a sanction, the Court considers the following factors:  “a) 
the duty violated; b) the lawyer’s mental state; c) the potential or actual injury 
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and d) the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating factors.”  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.0. 
 Here, the referee found the following Standards applied:  3.0 (Generally); 
4.61 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally 
deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another regardless of 
injury or potential injury to the client.”); 6.11 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a 
lawyer: (a) with the intent to deceive the court, knowingly makes a false statement 
or submits a false document; or, (b) improperly withholds material information, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party or causes a significant or 
potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”); 7.1 (“Disbarment 
is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of 
a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or 
another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or 
the legal system.”); and 8.1 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer: (a) 
intentionally violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation 
causes injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or (b) has 
been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally engages in 
further similar acts of misconduct.”).  While Bosecker argues that these standards 
 
 
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should not apply, her argument is based solely upon her own interpretation of the 
facts from her own testimony, and contrary to the referee’s findings. 
 
Next, the referee found under Standard 9.22 the following factors in 
aggravation:  (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (d) 
multiple offenses; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and (i) 
substantial experience in the practice of law.  “A referee’s findings in aggravation 
carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous 
or without support in the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928, 937 (Fla. 
2009).  Bosecker has not made this showing.  Instead, she argues her position with 
regard to the aggravating factors, and ignores the facts as found by the referee.  
“Because the referee is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
we defer to the referee’s assessment.”  Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647, 652 
(Fla. 2005).  The evidence before the referee readily supports her findings in 
aggravation.  In addition, the referee found that the mitigating circumstances under 
Standard 9.32 that Bosecker argued for did not exist.  “A referee’s decision not to 
find that a mitigating or aggravating factor applies also carries a presumption of 
correctness and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or without support in 
the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Varner, 992 So. 2d 224, 230 (Fla. 2008).  Here, Bosecker 
argues that the referee erroneously failed to find Standards 9.32(e) (full and free 
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings), 
 
 
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9.32(g) (character or reputation) and 9.32(l) (remorse).  However, “[t]he fact that 
there is some evidence in the record to support a finding that a mitigating factor 
might apply does not mean that the referee should have necessarily found it 
applicable.”  Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100, 1106 (Fla. 2009). 
 
Finally, the referee cited and discussed numerous cases in support of her 
recommendation of disbarment.  For example, the referee cited Florida Bar v. 
Brown, 635 So. 2d 13, 13-14 (Fla. 1994), for the proposition that the presumptive 
penalty for a violation of a prior disciplinary order is disbarment, absent strong 
extenuating circumstances.  In addition, Florida Bar v. Bern, 425 So. 2d 526, 528 
(Fla. 1982), provides in pertinent part that “[i]n rendering discipline, this Court 
considers the respondent’s previous disciplinary history and increases the 
discipline where appropriate.”  Here, Bosecker was found to have practiced law 
while under suspension.  Cases relied upon and supporting disbarment for such 
misconduct include Florida Bar v. Norkin, 183 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 2015); Florida 
Bar v. Lobasz, 64 So. 3d 1167, 1173 (Fla. 2011); D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d at 1220; 
and Florida Bar v. Greene, 589 So. 2d 281, 282-83 (Fla. 1991).  Additional cases 
supporting disbarment for continuing to practice law while under suspension 
include Forrester, 916 So. 2d at 654–55, and The Florida Bar v. Rood, 678 So. 2d 
1277, 1278 (Fla. 1996). 
 
 
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Lastly, Bosecker argues that “[t]he rules treat suspended attorneys that are 
working as a legal assistant differently than individuals who are not lawyers and 
working as legal assistants,” and that as a result, her equal protection rights were 
violated.  The Bar disagrees, pointing out that Bosecker is not a nonlawyer, and as 
such, is subject to the Bar Rules.  One such prohibition is that a suspended attorney 
shall not engage in direct client contact with clients.  Bosecker violated that 
prohibition.  Contrary to Bosecker’s belief, there is no constitutional right to 
practice law; rather, it is a privilege to which the Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
under the Florida Constitution to oversee.  Based upon this Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, we have “the inherent power and duty to prescribe standards of 
conduct for lawyers, to determine what constitutes grounds for discipline of 
lawyers, to discipline for cause attorneys admitted to practice law in Florida, and to 
revoke the license of every lawyer whose unfitness to practice law has been duly 
established.”  R. Regulating the Fla. Bar 3-1.2.  Having violated the Bar Rules 3-
5.1(e), 3-5.1(h), and 4-8.4(c)—i.e, having failed to provide notice to her clients and 
the courts where she had cases pending that she was under suspension, being in 
direct contact with clients and judicial staff on behalf of her clients pertaining to 
those cases, holding herself out to be authorized to practice law, and then 
continuing to act on behalf of her clients without acknowledging that she was no 
longer so authorized to act—Bosecker can hardly claim that she acted only as any 
 
 
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paralegal or legal assistant would do.  Based upon the foregoing, we approve of the 
referee’s report in part on the issue of guilt and approve the referee’s report on the 
issue of discipline.     
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Kelley Andrea Bosecker is hereby disbarred from the practice 
of law in the State of Florida.  Because Bosecker is currently under suspension, the 
disbarment is effective immediately.  Bosecker shall fully comply with Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).   
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Kelley Andrea 
Bosecker, in the amount of $3,841.03, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Chardean Mavis Hill 
and Katrina S. Brown, Bar Counsel, Tampa, Florida, and Adria E. Quintela, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida,   
 
for Complainant  
 
Kelley Andrea Bosecker, pro se, St. Petersburg, Florida,   
 
 
 
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for Respondent