Title: Fountain v. Permatile Concrete Products

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

582 So. 2d 1069 (1991)
Frank FOUNTAIN, et al.
v.
PERMATILE CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY.
1900322.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 31, 1991.
*1070 B.J. McPherson, Oneonta, for appellants.
Hugh A. Nash of Nash & Associates, Oneonta, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a default judgment against Frank Fountain, individually; J. Frank Fountain III, individually; J. Frank Fountain III, Inc.; and Frank Fountain Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Southeastern Machinery. (All these are referred to hereinafter as "Fountain.") We affirm.
On April 19, 1990, Permatile Concrete Products Company ("Permatile") filed a two-count complaint against Fountain in Blount County Circuit Court, seeking to recover damages for breach of warranty and fraud in connection with Permatile's purchase of certain machinery from Fountain. Fountain was served with the complaint on April 26, 1990. On July 10, 1990, a "default" was entered by the trial court and a hearing was set to take testimony on the question of damages. On August 15, 1990, the court entered a default judgment against Fountain for $55,030 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. The court also ordered Fountain to return certain machinery to Permatile or, in the alternative, to pay Permatile its alternative value of $2,000. On October 26, 1990, Fountain filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Ala.R.Civ.P., to set aside the judgment. That motion read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Fountain also filed on October 26, 1990, a motion, pursuant to Rule 62(b), Ala.R. Civ.P., to stay execution on the judgment pending a ruling on the Rule 60(b)(1) motion. That motion stated:
The record indicates that Fountain presented no evidence to the trial court in support *1071 of either of these motions.[1]
In DaLee v. Crosby Lumber Co., 561 So. 2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ala.1990), this Court stated:
The Court in DaLee also acknowledged that the three-factor analysis discussed in Kirtland, applicable to motions to set aside default judgments pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., was also applicable to motions to set aside default judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b). In addition, the Court noted that "[a] trial court's discretionary authority under Rule 60(b) is much broader than it is under Rule 55(c)." 561 So. 2d  at 1090, n. 3.
To meet the meritorious-defense element, Fountain did not have to satisfy the trial court that he would necessarily prevail at a trial on the merits, only that he was prepared to present a plausible defense. To meet his burden in this regard, it was incumbent upon Fountain to show in his Rule 60(b)(1) motion, not by conclusory allegations, but by definite recitation of *1072 facts, that an injustice probably had been done by the judgment, in that he had a valid defense to Permatile's claims. Again, we quote from DaLee:
561 So. 2d  at 1090.
The record shows that Fountain failed to recite specific facts, either in his Rule 60(b)(1) motion or in his Rule 62(b) motion to stay execution of the judgment, to show that he had a meritorious defense to Permatile's claims. Fountain's conclusory allegations in his Rule 62(b) motion were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the meritorious-defense element.
Because Fountain recited no specific facts in either of his motions to show the existence of a meritorious defense and presented no evidence to the trial court in support of those motions, the trial court would certainly have been justified in assuming that no meritorious defense existed and, consequently, that Permatile would be unfairly prejudiced by any further delay in its attempt to recover damages for wrongs that it allegedly had suffered.
Finally, the record is insufficient to show that the default judgment was not the fault of Fountain's own culpable conduct. Conduct committed willfully or in bad faith constitutes culpable conduct for purposes of determining whether a default judgment should be set aside. Negligence, by itself, is insufficient. Kirtland at 607. Fountain's conclusory allegations that he thought the suit had been settled were insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a finding that the default judgment was not the result of culpable conduct on Fountain's part.
Fountain alleged in his motions that the default judgment was the result of "inadvertence or excusable neglect" on his part; however, the record shows that Fountain was served with the complaint on April 26, 1990. From the record we know that Fountain's attorney had not been employed to represent Fountain as of July 10, 1990, approximately two and a half months after Fountain had been served with the complaint. Although Fountain's attorney underwent open-heart surgery on August 7, 1990, and was out of his office until the middle of September 1990, from all that appears in the record, Fountain's attorney was not employed until after he had returned to his office after undergoing the surgery. It does not appear that Fountain's delay in retaining an attorney to appear and defend against this suit was the result of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Rule 60(b)(1). Fountain's conclusory allegations that he thought the suit had been settled were insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a finding that the default judgment was due to be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1). In order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1), Fountain had to show, in addition to satisfying the trial court that setting aside the default judgment was not precluded under the three-factor analysis established in Kirtland, that the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) were satisfied. In DaLee the Court noted:
"In McDavid v. United Mercantile Agencies, Inc., 248 Ala. 297, 301, 27 So. 2d 499, 503 (1946), the Court set out the duty of a party when legal process is duly served upon him:
561 So. 2d  at 1091.
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against Fountain.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Fountain did submit to this Court the affidavit of his attorney in support of his motion to stay execution of the judgment pending appeal. That affidavit was not before the trial court when it ruled on Fountain's request to set aside the judgment; therefore, being bound by the record, we cannot rely on that affidavit as a basis for finding an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Ex parte Singleton, 475 So. 2d 186 (Ala.1985); King v. Smith, 288 Ala. 215, 259 So. 2d 244 (1972). We note that even if we could consider Fountain's affidavit, our holding in this case would be the same.