Title: WHEELER v CARLSON TRANSPORT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

1 4 0 . 84-479 IN THE SUPREPIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 LLOYD WHEELER, Claimant and Appellant, CARLSON TRANSPORT, Employer, and INSUFiANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Lynaugh, Fitzgerald & Hingle; Thomas Lynaugh, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Steven Harman, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 9, 1985 Decided: August 5, 1985 Filed: 4; - 1985 Clerk Mr. Justice L . C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. Claimant Lloyd Wheeler appeals from an order of the Workers ' Compensation Court dismissing his petition for a rehearing. We affirm. Claimant appeals from his second hearing regarding his occupational accident and injury. The injury occurred on February 10, 1981. Claimant suffered a crush injury to his left foot while employed with Carlson Transport. Carl son ' s carrier, the respondent, Insurance Company of North America (INA) accepted liability and began paying medical and compensation benefits. On September 21, 1981, claimant filed a petition with the Workers ' Compensation Court contending, among other things, that he suffered a back injury due to his foot condition. In that petition, claimant alleged a preexisting spinal stenosis condition which was aggravated by his limp or "favoring" of the injured left foot. A hearing was held before the Workers' Compensation Judge. Evidence was admitted both as to the causal connection between claimant's foot injury and the back condition, and the level of claimant's disability. The court entered its findings and conclusions on June 10, 1982. Most significant to this case is the finding that claimant's back instability was unrelated to the foot injury claimant suffered in his industrial accident. In this regard the court stated : I1 . . . " (2) Claimant contends that insurer is liable to claimant for benefits related to claimant's back instability or spinal stenosis. Claimant's theory here is that the foot injury aggravated claimant's unstable back through unnatural stress caused by claimant's gait necessitated by the foot injury. "The medical evidence does n o t support t h e c a u s a l l i n k between c l a i m a n t ' s crushed f o o t i n j u r y and h i s subsequent back problems. D r . H u l l , c l a i m a n t ' s t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n , admitted r e l u c t a n t l y t h a t it was p o s s i b l e t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s back condition was caused by t h e f o o t i n j u r y , b u t he was i n c l i n e d a g a i n s t such a connection being made. "There i s ample evidence t o s u p p o r t D r . H u l l ' s opinion i n t h e f a c t t h a t claimant d i d n o t complain about h i s back problems u n t i l a f t e r f o u r months had elapsed from t h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y . Since s e c t i o n 39-71-119(1), MCA, t h e i n j u r y s t a t u t e , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e must be a c a u s a l connection between t h e i n j u r y and c l a i m a n t ' s physical c o n d i t i o n , c l a i m a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n r e g a r d i n g b e n e f i t s f o r t h e s p i n a l s t e n o s i s must be denied f o r l a c k of proof o f t h e c a u s a l connection, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r by aggravation, r e q u i r e d by t h e i n jury s t a t u t e . " Claimant's permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y level was set a t f i v e p e r c e n t impairment, and I N A commenced payments thereupon. Subsequently, i n J u l y o f 1983, claimant underwent an o p e r a t i o n t o remove a neuroma on t h e crushed f o o t . A f t e r t h a t o p e r a t i o n INA r e i n s t a t e d c l a i m a n t ' s temporary t o t a l b e n e f i t s . D r . Hull i n d i c a t e d t o I N A t h a t claimant would be a b l e t o r e t u r n t o work approximately s i x weeks from t h e d a t e o f surgery. I N A wrote t o claimant and h i s a t t o r n e y on August 1 6 , 1983 i n d i c a t i n g t o them t h a t based on D r . H u l l ' s prognosis t h a t b e n e f i t s would be discontinued f o u r t e e n days from t h e d a t e o f t h e letter. Apparently, I N A continued t o pay claimant temporary t o t a l b e n e f i t s beyond f o u r t e e n days a f t e r t h e n o t i c e letter. These b e n e f i t s w e r e p a i d u n t i l November 1, 1983. O n November 22, 1983 INA wrote t o claimant and h i s a t t o r n e y e n c l o s i n g f i n a l payment t o November 1, and i n d i c a t i n g t h a t payments would be discontinued. On December 19, 1983 claimant, through a n e w a t t o r n e y f i l e d a second p e t i t i o n f o r hearing. H e claimed an aggravation o f t h e previous i n j u r y ; t h a t new evidence was a v a i l a b l e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s back i n j u r y was c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o h i s f o o t i n j u r y ; and f i n a l l y t h a t INA had f a i l e d t o g i v e t h e r e q u i r e d f o u r t e e n days n o t i c e . Defendant f i l e d a motion and b r i e f opposing c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n t o r e - l i t i g a t e t h e c a u s a l connection between t h e f o o t i n j u r y and back c o n d i t i o n . The Workers' Compensation Court i s s u e d an opinion on t h i s i s s u e . The c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y reserved i t s r u l i n g on d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o dismiss c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n , b u t set f o r t h t h e scope o f t h e second hearing: "Thus, it appears t h a t t h e claimant has a l l e g e d s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s necessary t o s u s t a i n t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Evidence o f new medical f i n d i n g s o r subsequent e v e n t s must f i r s t be reviewed by t h i s Court b e f o r e a d e c i s i o n on a motion t o dismiss can be made. A d i s m i s s a l may be i s s u e d , a f t e r a review o f t h e new evidence, under s e c t i o n 25-11-102, MCA o n l y i f t h e new evidence i s u n l i k e l y t o change t h e r e s u l t upon a new t r i a l ; it may be dismissed under s e c t i o n 39-71-2909, MCA only i f t h e r e does n o t appear t o be a new and more s e r i o u s f e a t u r e o f t h e p r i o r i n j u r y . " Fol-lowing t h e h e a r i n g , t h e c o u r t made t h e following f i n d i n g s : "12. The Court f i n d s no new evidence was presented which would l i k e l y change t h e r e s u l t upon a new t r i a l . 1 3 The Court f i n d s t h e r e does n o t appear t o be a n e w and more s e r i o u s f e a t u r e o f t h e p r i o r i n j u r y . " Based upon t h e s e f i n d i n g s , t h e c o u r t dismissed c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n . Claimant a p p e a l s , r a i s i n g t h e following i s s u e s : (1) The c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o award claimant b e n e f i t s f o r h i s back i n j u r y . ( 2 ) The c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o f i n d t h a t claimant is e n t i t l e d t o f u r t h e r temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s by reason of h i s f o o t i n j u r y alone. (3) Whether t h e defendant f a i l e d t o g i v e t h e proper f o u r t e e n day n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s . A determination o f occupational i n j u r y and award made thereon by t h e Workers1 Compensation Court maybe reopened on e i t h e r o f two grounds. F i r s t by a u t h o r i t y o f s e c t i o n 39-71-2909, MCA which s t a t e s i n p a r t : "Authority t o review, diminish, o r i n c r e a s e awards--limitation. The judge may, upon t h e p e t i t i o n o f t h e claimant o r an i n s u r e r t h a t t h e d i s a b i l i t y o f t h e claimant h a s changed, review, diminish, o r i n c r e a s e i n accordance w i t h t h e law on b e n e f i t s a s set f o r t h i n c h a p t e r 71 of t h i s t i t l e , any b e n e f i t s p r e v i o u s l y awarded by t h e judge o r b e n e f i t s received by a claimant through s e t t l e m e n t agreements. " Secondly, s e c t i o n 25-11-102, MCA, provides t h a t a former v e r d i c t o r d e c i s i o n may be vacated and new t r i a l granted upon a p p l i c a t i o n i f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f t h e a p p l i c a n t w e r e m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d by: " . . . newly discovered evidence m a t e r i a l f o r t h e p a r t y making t h e a p p l i c a t i o n which he could n o t , w i t h reasonable d i l i g e n c e have discovered and produced a t t r i a l . . . l1 Moen v. P e t e r K i e w i t and Sons Co. (Mont. A t t h e h e a r i n g on c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n , t h e s o l e i s s u e was whether t h e evidence presented warranted, under e i t h e r ground s t a t e d above, a reopening o f t h e 1981 o r d e r . A s t o t h e former, Finding no. 13, t h a t " t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e does n o t appear t o be a new and more s e r i o u s f e a t u r e o f t h e p r i o r i n j u r y " mandates t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t s e c t i o n 39-71-2909, MCA, d i d n o t warrant a reopening of t h e o r d e r . Claimant argues t h a t subsequent t o t h e p r i o r h e a r i n g , it became apparent t h a t h i s back i n j u r y was c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e occupational f o o t i n j u r y . The c o u r t i n t h e p r i o r o r d e r s p e c i f i c a l l y found, a s s t a t e d above, t h a t t h e r e was no c a u s a l relation between the two. Larson, in this treatise, states the general rule: "At the administrative level, awards can be reopened by the compensation board for modification to meet changes in claimant's condition, such as increase, decrease or termination of disability. . . . On a reopening for changed condition. no other issues mav be relitiga ted , and the claimant ' s eviience must bear directly upon the comparison between his former and present disability. A few jurisdictions afford their commission's broad power to reopen cases in the interest of justice or for anv aood reason. " Larson, Workmen's 2 . a Compensation Law, Vol. 3, S81.00 (1983 ed. ) (Emphasis added. ) The first question presented here is whether section 39-71-2909 is a change of condition statute or a "broad reopening" type of statute. We find that the language of the statute is clear in that it requires that the Workers' Compensation Division may only reopen an award if it finds that "the disability of the claimant has changed." Thus, claimant's reliance on O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, lnc. (1971), 404 U.S. 254, 92 S.Ct. 405, 30 L.Ed.2d 424, in which the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Longshoremen's Act as being a broad reopening type of statute (characterized by Larson as the "sweeping concept or' the re-opening power under the Longshoremen ' s Act" Larson , Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 3, §8l152B, (1983 ed.) is inapposite. Under a "change of condition" statute such as 39-71-2909, MCA the reopening proceeding may not be used to retry issues originally settled. Again, Larson states: I1[T]he issue before the board is sharply restricted to the question of extent of improvement or worsening of the injury on which the original award was based. If the original award held that there was no connection between the accident and claimant's permanent disability, there is nothing to reopen, and claimant cannot retry the issue of work-connection through the device of a reopening petition." Larson, supra, S81.32A. This result is supported by case law from other western states. In Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund (0r.App. 1978), 576 P.2d 35, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that claimant's disability could not be relitigated in a reopening petition. The Oregon court in that case noted: "At the heart of claimant's position is his belief that his initia 1 determination was erroneous and that he should have been found permanently totally disabled. However that may be, the initial determination cannot be relitigated in an aggravation claim." Supra at 35. The same observation applies to this proceeding. In Judd v. Industrial Commission (Ariz.App. 1975) , 532 P.2d 196, the Arizona Supreme Court held that, absent mistake or misrepresentation in a prior proceeding, any determination of causal relation is res judicata. Again, the Arizona Supreme Court made an observation applicable here: "The claimant in this case was represented by able counsel throughout the numerous hearings before the Commission; the issues of the relationship of claimant's back problem to his industrial injuries were fully 1 itigated before the hearing officer Ellig; Hearing Officer Ellig in a formal award held there was no causal connection between claimant's back problem and his industrial injury; the claimant has never sought review of that award; following that award the claimant sought and was granted a change of hearing officers; claimant attempted before a new hearing officer and with new medical experts to relitigate the issue of the causal connection between his back problem and his industrial injury." Since the causation issue is res judicata, the only issue presented to the Workers1 Compensation Court in this second proceeding was whether claimant's original occupational foot injury had in some way changed. The Workers' Compensation Court found that it had not, and that i n f a c t h i s c o n d i t i o n had improved. W e have examined t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s r e g a r d and f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t err i n making t h i s f i n d i n g . T h i s Court h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e test o f s u f f i c i e n c y o f evidence i s whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t ; and w e w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h e Workers' Compensation Court i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e weight and c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e g i v e n t h e testimony. Lamb v. Universal I n s u r a n c e Company (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 684 P.2d 498, 4 1 St.Rep. 1414. Here t h e c l a i m a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a b l e t o g e t around b e t t e r on h i s f o o t . Subsequent medical t r e a t m e n t c o n t i n u a l l y improved h i s f o o t . Testimony b o t h o f c l a i m a n t ' s medical d o c t o r and a v o c a t i o n a l s p e c i a l i s t b o t h supported d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t c l a i m a n t was i n c r e a s i n g l y a b l e t o g a i n l i m i t e d employment. T h i s f i n d i n g was supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and t h u s it w i l l n o t b e o v e r t u r n e d . The second ground upon which a new t r i a l may b e g r a n t e d i s t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 25-11-102, MCA, quoted above. I n Moen v. P e t e r K i e w i t and Sons Co., s u p r a , w e e x p l a i n e d t h i s s t a t u t e : "This decade' s-old s t a n d a r d h a s been f l e s h e d o u t by c a s e law e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t o r deny a new t r i a l is w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , . . . and w i l l n o t b e o v e r t u r n e d a b s e n t a showing o f a m a n i f e s t abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . . . To w a r r a n t t h e g r a n t i n g o f a new t r i a l on t h e ground o f newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e , it must a p p e a r t o t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , upon a r e t r i a l , t h e evidence proposed w i l l change t h e r e s u l t . " ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) s u p r a , 655 P.2d a t 487, 39 St.Rep. a t 2215. I n F i n d i n g no. 12 t h e c o u r t found "no new evidence . . . p r e s e n t e d which would l i k e l y change t h e r e s u l t upon a new t r i a l . " D r . H u l l , c l a i m a n t ' s t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e c o u l d n o t s a y w i t h any d e g r e e o f medical c e r t a i n t y t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s back problem was caused by h i s f o o t i n j u r y . H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he had no o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g s a s t o c l a i m a n t ' s low back p a i n . D r . H u l l ' s n o t e s o f v a r i o u s examinations o f c l a i m a n t suggested t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s back p a i n was c y c l i c a l i n n a t u r e . T h i s i n d i c a t e d t o t h e d o c t o r t h a t t h e r e was n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n between t h e two i n j u r i e s . Claimant h i m s e l f t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s back had g o t t e n a l i t t l e b e t t e r i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s i n t h a t he s t i l l had t h e same p a i n b u t n o t a s o f t e n . Claimant a r g u e s t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation Court e r r e d i n s o f a r a s it set f o r t h " r e a s o n a b l e medical c e r t a i n t y " a s t h e s t a n d a r d c l a i m a n t was r e q u i r e d t o m e e t . H e cites S t r a n d b e r g v. Reber C o . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 173, 587 P.2d 18, and contends t h a t it s t a n d s f o r t h e r u l e t h a t a l l a c l a i m a n t is r e q u i r e d t o show i s t h a t it was "medically p o s s i b l e " a n o c c u p a t i o n a l i n j u r y aggravated a p r e - e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n . The p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n o f S t r a n d b e r g , s u p r a , s t a t e s a s fo1I.ows: "All t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y i s t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t aggravated o r a c c e l e r a t e d t h e p r e e x i s t i n g d i s e a s e o r d i s a b i l i t y . Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e c l a i m a n t must 'produce s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e , d i r e c t , i n d i r e c t or c i r c u m s t a n t i a l t o c a u s e i n t h e u n p r e j u d i c e d mind a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t such was t h e f a c t . ' . . . Proof t h a t it was m e d i c a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r a n i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t t o a g g r a v a t e a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n i s a c c e p t a b l e p r o o f o f d i s a b i l i t y . " ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) Supra, 179 Mont. a t 176, 587 P.2d a t 20. See a l s o Bykonen v. Montana Power C o . (Mont. 1 9 8 5 ) , P.2d , (Cause N o . 84-506, decided J u l y 30, 1 9 8 5 ) ; J o n e s v. S t . Regis Paper C o . (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 639 P.2d 1140, 38 St.Rep. 2201. S t r a n d b e r g simply p r o v i d e s t h a t e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y on medical p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s competent e v i d e n c e a d m i s s i b l e i n a workers' compensation proceeding. I t i s a s t a n d a r d o f evidence and does n o t a f f e c t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s u l t i m a t e burden t o prove h i s c a s e by a preponderance o f t h e evidence. "Medical p o s s i b i l i t y " i s t o b e weighed j u s t a s any o t h e r evidence; i f supported by o t h e r , independent e v i d e n c e it is " a c c e p t a b l e " t o b e used by t h e c o u r t i n making i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Medical p o s s i b i l i t y e v i d e n c e by i t s e l f , though, d o e s n o t mandate a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t h a s m e t h i s burden o f proof under t h e A c t . I n Strandberg t h e Court went on t o q u o t e t h e unequivocal t e s t i m o n y o f two e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s t h a t it was m e d i c a l l y p o s s i b l e c l a i m a n t ' s p r e - e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n was aggravated by h i s o c c u p a t i o n a l i n j u r y . There was a l s o o t h e r independent evidence s u p p o r t i n g t h e c l a i m a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . H e r e , t h e r e c o r d i s n o t s o c l e a r . The o n l y medical e x p e r t was D r . H u l l , and h i s t e s t i m o n y was e q u i v o c a l . The o t h e r e v i d e n c e goes b o t h ways. Each p a r t y h a s been a b l e t o c u l l through t h e r e c o r d and select t e s t i m o n y and o t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e i r p o s i t i o n . Though w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t " c a u t i o u s medical testimony'' s h o u l d , whenever p o s s i b l e , b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n f a v o r o f t h e c l a i m a n t , see Larson, supra 580.32, t h e r e i s i n t h e r e c o r d s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n and t h u s it must s t a n d . C l a i m a n t ' s second and t h i r d a l l e g a t i o n s o f e r r o r a r e s i m i l a r and w i l l be d i s c u s s e d t o g e t h e r . I n t h e second, c l a i m a n t contends t h e Workers' Compensation Court e r r e d i n n o t making a f i n d i n g on whether h e was s t i l l t e m p o r a r i l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d . I n t h e t h i r d , h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t made a s i m i l a r e r r o r i n n o t f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s w e r e d i s c o n t i n u e d w i t h o u t t h e r e q u i r e d f o u r t e e n day n o t i c e . A s t o b o t h , c l a i m a n t r e q u e s t s t h i s Court t o e i t h e r e n t e r judgment i n h i s f a v o r o r remand t o t h e Workers' Compensation Court f o r f i n d i n g s on t h e s e i s s u e s . A s t o t h e above two i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d i n c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n , t h e Workers' Compensation Court i n t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s s t a t e d : "Finding no 14. The Court f i n d s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s should b e g r a n t e d . "Conclusion no. 3 . The e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t c l a i m a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o f u r t h e r b e n e f i t s now [ s i c ] [nor?] t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s w e r e w r o n g f u l l y t e r m i n a t e d . "Conclusion no. 6. The d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d t o judgment d i s m i s s i n g c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n w i t h p r e j u d i c e . " Under t h e r u l e set f o r t h i n Mondakota Gas Company v. Becker ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 Mont. 513, 445 P.2d 745, t h e FTorkers' Compensation Court o r d e r i s e f f e c t i v e t o d i s m i s s t h e s e c o u n t s o f c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n . I n Mondakota t h i s Court a d d r e s s e d a n argument s i m i l a r t o t h e one r a i s e d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r : whether t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law w e r e s p e c i f i c enough t o comply w i t h Rule 41 ( b ) M.R.Civ.P. There, under t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h a t c a s e , t h i s C o u r t upheld t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i n d i n g t h a t "no c a u s e o f a c t i o n e x i s t s or h a s been proven" i n meeting t h e f i n d i n g requirement o f Rule 41 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. Secondly, t h e Mondakota Court uphel-d t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e lower c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n o f law t h a t ; "it i s t h e r e f o r e o r d e r e d , adjudged and decreed t h a t s a i d c a u s e be and t h e same i s hereby dismissed and t h e p l a i n t i f f t a k e n o t h i n g t h e r e b y . " Supra, 151 Mont. a t 517, 445 P.2d a t 748. I n Holloway v. U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana (1978), 178 Mont. 198, 582 P.2d 1265, t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d what t y p e s o f f a c t s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o m e e t t h e f i n d i n g requirement o f Rule 4 1 ( b ) : "Findings should b e l i m i t e d t o t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t s and i f t h e y a s c e r t a i n u l t i m a t e f a c t s , and s u f f i c i e n t l y conform t o t h e p l e a d i n g s and t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e judgment, t h e y w i l l be regarded a s s u f f i c i e n t , though n o t a s f u l l and complete a s might b e d e s i r e d . " Supra, 178 Mont. a t 203, 582 P.2d a t 1268, c i t i n g Pearson v. Pearson (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , 561 P.2d 1080. Here w e f i n d t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s Conclusion no. 3 , quoted above meets t h e test set f o r t h i n Mondakota, s u p r a and Holloway, s u p r a , f o r f i n d i n g s o f f a c t . It f a i r l y conforms t o and a d d r e s s e s t h e a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n c l a i m a n t ' s p e t i t i o n . Although denominated a ''conclusion o f law" t h e s t a t e m e n t made by t h e c o u r t i s more o f a f i n d i n g o f f a c t . The mere f a c t t h a t it i s improperly denominated i s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e . S i n c e t h e requirement f o r f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s i n Rule 4 1 (b) , M.R.Civ.P., i s p r i m a r i l y t o s e r v e a n o t i c e f u n c t i o n f o r t h e purposes o f res j u d i c a t a , e s t o p p e l , and a p p e a l , t h e p r o p e r i n q u i r y i n s o f a r a s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e lower c o u r t ' s o r d e r i s t o d e t e r m i n e whether w i t h i n t h e body o f t h a t o r d e r t h e r e q u i s i t e e l e m e n t s a r e m e t . A t t h e h e a r i n g b o t h p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e and made arguments on t h e s e i s s u e s . The whole o r d e r , f a i r l y r e a d , a d d r e s s e s and s e t t l e s t h o s e i s s u e s . I t i s n o t p r o p e r t o r e q u i r e an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l t o s t r i c t l y conform t o t e c h n i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e r u l e s o f p r a c t i c e . The Workers' Compensation Court d i d i t s job; it heard and f a i r l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , and d i d n o t c l e a r l y avoid d e c i d i n g t h e former. The lower c o u r t ' s Conclusion no. 6 a s w e l l a s F i n d i n g no. 1 4 , f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d above, m e e t t h e Mondakota requirement f o r c o n c l u s i o n s o f law. F i n a l l y , w e n o t e an order d i s m i s s i n g a n a c t i o n "with p r e j u d i c e " a c t s a s a judgment on t h e m e r i t s . K e l l y v. H a r r i s (D.C.Mont. 1 9 5 8 ) , 158 F.Supp. 243. Claimant does n o t a l l e g e an i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f e v i d e n c e i n t h i s r e g a r d and t h e r e f o r e w e f i n d t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s o r d e r i n t h i s c a s e a c t e d a s a judgment a g a i n s t c l a i m a n t on t h e merits o f h i s p e t i t i o n . The o r d e r o f t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s hereby a f f i r m e d . W e concur: A - Chi)jf J u s t i c e A