Title: Iltzsch v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Valerie K. Boots 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ryan D. Johanningsmeier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-49S02-1301-CR-57 
 
 
CARLIN ILTZSCH, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49G06-1106-FB-38359 & 49G06-0412-FB-228844 
The Honorable Jeffrey Marchal, Judge Pro Tempore  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1112-CR-1164 
_________________________________ 
 
January 24, 2013 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
Following a bench trial, Carlin Iltzsch was found guilty of burglary, a class B felony, 
adjudicated an habitual offender, and sentenced to an executed term of twenty-two years.  In 
addition, the trial court ordered Iltzsch to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $711.95.  
At issue in this appeal is the restitution order. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jan 24 2013, 3:26 pm
2 
 
 
We have said the principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and 
to impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused, and that restitution 
also serves to compensate the victim.  See Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008).  
Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a) says that a “court shall base its restitution order upon a 
consideration of:  (1) property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime, based on 
the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate)[.]”   
 
 
Here, restitution was ordered for the victim’s television set and record collection.  The 
Victim Impact Statement, included in the Pre-Sentence Report, stated in part, “[Victim] advised 
nothing was taken but the defendant destroyed his antique record collection valued at 
approximately $300.00.  In addition, his television had to be replaced and the loss was $411.95.”  
(Report, p. 13.)  At trial, the victim testified that the television set had been moved from its usual 
place and had been found on the floor of the kitchen.  (Transcript, p. 35.)  A photograph admitted 
into evidence showed the television face down on the floor after the burglary, but damage to the 
set was not illustrated.  (Exhibits, p. 11.)  The following exchange occurred at the restitution 
hearing, which the victim did not attend: 
 
[Prosecutor] 
I’d also ask that pursuant to the Victim Impact Statement that’s 
contained in the PSI, I believe the total is $711.95 worth of damage 
to a television and some antique records; that judgment be ordered, 
civil judgment to [the victim] in the amount of $711.95. 
 
[The Court] 
Anything with respect to the civil judgment or restitution, [defense 
counsel]? 
 
[Defense Counsel]  
We have no objection to that, Your Honor.   
 
* * * * 
 
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[Defense Counsel]  
And I apologize, Your Honor.  Actually I think for the 
record I would object to the restitution amount based on the fact 
that Mr. Iltzsch has maintained his innocence so we would object 
to that restitution as a civil judgment order. 
 
* * * * 
 
[The Court]  Over objection of the defense, I will order a civil judgment of 
restitution to [the victim] in the amount of $711.95.  That’s to help 
pay for the damage and the lost property. 
 
(Transcript, p. 87-91.) 
 
 
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the restitution order on grounds there was 
insufficient evidence to support the amount of restitution awarded.  Iltzsch v. State, 972 N.E.2d 
409, 412-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), vacated.  Without doubt, the better practice for the State would 
have been to present more substantial evidence about the nature and extent of the property 
damage, as outlined by the Court of Appeals.   Similarly, the better practice for a defendant 
would have been to make contemporaneous objections (for example, hearsay and lack of 
foundation) as appropriate.   
 
 
We grant transfer, though, to address whether the case can be remanded for a new 
restitution hearing.  This question divided the Court of Appeals panel.  Citing Cooper v. State, 
831 N.E.2d 1247, 1253-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the majority “believe[d] that allowing the State 
to conduct a new restitution hearing and to present additional evidence concerning the loss would 
allow the State an inappropriate second bite at the apple.”  Iltzsch, 972 N.E.2d at 415.  As Judge 
Bailey pointed out in his dissent, though, it appears the restitution in Cooper involved a claim for 
lost wages by the parents of the victim that simply were not recoverable under the statute, so 
there would have been no reason for remand.  We do not find Cooper persuasive authority for 
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prohibiting a remand for a restitution hearing under the circumstances of this case.  Rather, as the 
majority acknowledged, precedent supports remanding for additional evidence when appropriate.  
That has been the view of this Court and the Court of Appeals.  See, e.g., Clausen v. State, 622 
N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind. 1993), adopting in part Clausen v. State, 612 N.E.2d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1993) (remanding with instructions to hold a hearing to determine the cost of counseling, 
where there had been no evidence of the cost presented at the original hearing); J.H. v. State, 950 
N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (remanding for a new restitution hearing “if the State 
desired” where insufficient evidence had been presented at the original hearing).    
 
 
Accordingly, transfer of jurisdiction is granted pursuant to Appellate Rule 56(B).  This 
case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new restitution hearing at which 
the State will be permitted to present, and Iltzsch will be allowed to confront, any additional 
evidence supporting the victim’s property loss.  The Court of Appeals opinion is vacated as to 
the remand; the remaining portions of the opinion are summarily affirmed.  See Ind. Appellate 
Rule 58(A). 
 
Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur. 
Dickson, C.J., dissents.  
Dickson, Chief Justice, dissenting. 
 
            I respectfully dissent, believing that we should not remand.  As acknowledged by the per 
curiam opinion, Indiana statutory law requires that an order of restitution be "based on the actual 
cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate)."  Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a).  When on 
appeal the quantum of evidence presented by the State is found insufficient to satisfy its burden 
of proof on an issue, permitting the State a second opportunity to overcome its deficiency in 
proof is inconsistent with principles prohibiting double jeopardy.  See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 
U.S. 33, 109 S. Ct. 285, 102 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1988); Lambert v. State, 534 N.E.2d 235, 237 n.2 
(Ind. 1989).