Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1537.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1537 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. PRYATEL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, 
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1537.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Misuse of client funds—Knowingly making false 
statement to tribunal—Charging excessive fee—Engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty or misrepresentation—Indefinite suspension with 
reinstatement only upon specified conditions. 
(No. 2011-1727—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided April 24, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-023. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Mark Robert Pryatel, of Euclid, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0019678, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.  In 
February 2011, relator, the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, filed a two-
count complaint charging Pryatel with misuse of client funds and other 
professional misconduct involving two client matters.  Pryatel did not file an 
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answer—even though he had initially cooperated with relator’s investigation and 
received notice of the complaint by certified mail.  Relator moved for an entry of 
default, and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline appointed 
a master commissioner, who found that Pryatel had committed most of the 
charged misconduct.  The board adopted the master commissioner’s findings of 
fact and misconduct and, as a sanction, recommended permanent disbarment. 
{¶ 2} While the board’s final report was pending before this court, 
Pryatel filed motions to remand for a hearing before the board and to supplement 
the record, arguing that previously undiagnosed psychological issues interfered 
with his capacity to defend himself against the disciplinary charges.  In January 
2012, we remanded for a hearing, but limited the board’s review on remand to 
consideration of mitigation evidence and limited supplementation of the record 
accordingly.  Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, 131 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2012-
Ohio-79, 959 N.E.2d 537.  A three-member panel of the board thereafter 
conducted a hearing and, upon review of the new mitigation evidence, 
recommended reducing Pryatel’s sanction to an indefinite suspension.  The board 
agreed, and neither party has filed objections to the board’s recommendation. 
{¶ 3} We accept the board’s recommendation and indefinitely suspend 
Pryatel from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
1. Count One—The Troyan Matter 
{¶ 4} Based on the sworn affidavit of grievant Richard J. Troyan, 
Pryatel’s precomplaint deposition testimony, and other evidence, the board found 
that Troyan retained Pryatel to represent him in several criminal matters, 
including a motion for judicial release.  Troyan informed Pryatel that he was 
permanently disabled and unable to secure employment upon his release from 
prison.  Nevertheless, Pryatel wrote in the motion for judicial release that 
“Defendant Troyan has arranged for employment upon his release.”  Pryatel later 
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described this language as “boilerplate” and predicted that it would make Troyan 
“look better to the judge.”  But Troyan claimed that Pryatel misrepresented his 
ability and intent to secure employment upon his release from prison.  Even after 
ascribing “some tenuousness to the credibility of Troyan, an apparent career 
criminal,” the board found, and we agree, that Pryatel had violated Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact 
or law to a tribunal). 
{¶ 5} In addition, while in prison, Troyan received a $50,000 settlement 
check from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  Pryatel deposited the 
check into his personal bank account, rather than a client trust account.  Over the 
course of his representation of Troyan, Pryatel deducted over $29,000 in legal 
fees from the settlement proceeds, including $7,000 for responding to 70 letters 
from Troyan while he was in prison.  And at the time of the default proceedings 
below, Pryatel had not returned the remainder of the settlement proceeds to 
Troyan, despite his repeated requests for the money. 
{¶ 6} Based on these findings, we agree with the board that in addition to 
his violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1), as noted above, Pryatel violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and 
expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees 
are earned or expenses incurred), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an 
agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), and 
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
2. Count Two—The Martich Matter 
{¶ 7} Based on the sworn affidavit of grievant Luis A. Martich and other 
evidence, the board found that Martich retained Pryatel to seal his criminal 
records.  Martich’s father paid Pryatel $2,025 to settle an outstanding restitution 
order, satisfy court costs, and cover Pryatel’s legal fees.  Pryatel, however, never 
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filed the motion to seal Martich’s records, nor did he settle the restitution order or 
pay the court costs.  Pryatel also failed to respond to Martich’s repeated attempts 
to contact him, and at the time of the default proceeding below, he had not 
returned the money to Martich’s father.  As a result of Pryatel’s neglect, Martich 
also claimed that he lost his eligibility to seal his records. 
{¶ 8} The board found, and we agree, that Pryatel’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a 
client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a 
client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as 
practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 1.15(c), and 
8.4(c).  We also agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss the remaining 
charge under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) relating to Martich’s allegation 
that Pryatel’s neglect resulted in the permanent loss of his eligibility to seal his 
records.  Whether Martich lost eligibility to seal his records is a legal 
determination, and therefore the allegation in Martich’s affidavit alone is 
insufficient to warrant a finding that Pryatel’s conduct violated this rule.  
Accordingly, we dismiss this charge. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 
caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg., and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. We have already identified Pryatel’s ethical breaches to his 
clients and the legal profession.  The board determined that four of the nine 
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aggravating factors weighed in favor of a more severe sanction, including 
committing multiple offenses, failing to make restitution, refusing to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary 
process.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), (e), (g), and (i).  Initially, the board 
found only one mitigating factor in Pryatel’s favor—the absence of a disciplinary 
record—and recommended that we permanently disbar him. 
{¶ 10} However, on remand, the board determined that Pryatel 
demonstrated the existence of several mitigating factors that, along with our 
relevant case law, justify a reduction in the original recommended sanction to an 
indefinite suspension.  For the reasons explained below, we agree with the board’s 
recommendation. 
1. Pryatel’s Mitigation Evidence 
{¶ 11} On remand, Pryatel argued that all eight of the mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) weighed in his favor.  Specifically, to 
demonstrate an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, he submitted voluminous 
records from the Troyan matter—including copies of 141 letters between him and 
Troyan—to justify the legal fees that he charged for the 23-month representation.  
Pryatel also called Martich’s father as a witness, and he testified that Pryatel was 
never dishonest or selfish with him.  To demonstrate that he had attempted to 
rectify the consequences of his misconduct, Pryatel proved that he had refunded 
$20,000 to Troyan between June 2010 and April 2012 and that he had repaid the 
full $2,025 to Martich’s father in September 2011. 
{¶ 12} Pryatel further testified that he had cooperated with relator’s 
investigation by timely responding to relator’s initial inquiries, meeting with 
relator’s investigator on three occasions, sitting for two days of depositions, and 
providing all the documents requested by relator relating to those depositions.  
Pryatel blamed his subsequent failure to answer relator’s complaint and 
participate in the disciplinary proceedings on his previously undiagnosed 
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generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder, from which he was 
suffering in January 2011 when he received relator’s notice of intent to file the 
complaint.  The psychiatrist who diagnosed Pryatel with these disorders also 
testified that the prolonged illness and death, in 2011, of Pryatel’s mother—for 
whom Pryatel was the primary caregiver—contributed to his depression.  The 
psychiatrist further concluded that Pryatel’s depressive disorder was in remission 
and that Pryatel is capable of returning to the ethical and competent practice of 
law as long as he receives treatment for the disorders, including establishing a 
relationship with a treating psychiatrist.  In addition, in December 2011, Pryatel 
entered into a three-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”), which requires him to, among other things, attend group therapy, seek 
individual counseling, and make contact with OLAP three times a week. 
{¶ 13} As to Pryatel’s character and reputation, three judges of the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas submitted letters praising Pryatel as 
professional, competent, and reputable.  Judge Ronald Suster stated that Pryatel is 
respected for “filling a critical need in our criminal justice system by frequently 
representing poor defendants facing the possibility of significant prison terms.”  
Similarly, three criminal-defense lawyers testified as to Pryatel’s lengthy career, 
honesty, good character, and professional reputation in the criminal-defense field. 
{¶ 14} Finally, Pryatel informed the hearing panel that in April 2012, he 
pled guilty to a first-degree misdemeanor for aggravated theft relating to the 
Troyan matter, and in May 2012, he was sentenced to jail for six months, all 
suspended, and ordered to serve one year of probation, perform 100 hours pro 
bono work for Cleveland Legal Aid, and pay a fine of $1,000. 
2. The Board’s Treatment of the Mitigation Evidence 
{¶ 15} The board found, and we agree, that Pryatel demonstrated the 
existence of only four of the eight mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)—specifically, an absence of a disciplinary record, good professional 
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character and reputation, imposition of other penalties and sanctions, and other 
interim rehabilitation, such as the OLAP contract.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), 
(e), (f), and (h). 
{¶ 16} Despite the testimony from Martich’s father, Pryatel did not 
establish an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b)—mostly because he pled guilty to theft.  Similarly, we cannot 
conclude that Pryatel made a “timely good faith effort” toward restitution under 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c), when he waited four years to repay Martich’s 
father and did not complete restitution to Troyan until well after the disciplinary 
complaint was filed.  We likewise cannot find that Pryatel exhibited a 
“cooperative attitude” toward the disciplinary process when it resulted in a default 
proceeding against Pryatel. 
{¶ 17} Finally, Pryatel’s recent mental-disorder diagnoses do not qualify 
as a mitigating factor.  While the psychiatrist who diagnosed Pryatel concluded 
that his mental disorders contributed to his failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 
proceedings, the doctor did not conclude that the disorders contributed to the 
professional misconduct charged in this case, as required by BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(ii).  Further, as the board determined, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(iv) requires a prognosis that the lawyer will be able to return to the 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law under “specified conditions.”  
The psychiatrist here testified that the specific conditions under which Pryatel 
could return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law would 
need to be determined by a psychiatrist with whom Pryatel had established a 
relationship.  But at the time of the remand hearing, Pryatel admitted that he had 
not yet established a relationship with a treating psychiatrist. 
3. Applicable Precedent 
{¶ 18} We have previously recognized that permanent disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for cases involving the misappropriation of client funds.  See, 
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e.g., Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-1389, 
904 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 14 (“misappropriation of client funds carried a ‘presumptive 
sanction of disbarment’ ”), quoting Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 
490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15.  However, we have also previously 
imposed indefinite suspensions in misappropriation cases, based in part on the 
existence of mitigating factors.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, 929 N.E.2d 442 (indefinite suspension for an 
attorney who misappropriated client trust funds where mitigating factors included 
lack of prior disciplinary record, cooperation with the investigation, significant 
remorse, and payment of restitution); Akron Bar Assn. v. Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 
343, 2006-Ohio-1067, 843 N.E.2d 786 (indefinite suspension for an attorney who 
misappropriated client funds where mitigating factors included payment of 
restitution, waiver of earned fees, lack of prior discipline during career of more 
than 20 years, and good character). 
{¶ 19} In addition, as the board noted in its report, we have imposed 
indefinite suspensions on attorneys for misconduct that was substantially more 
egregious than Pryatel’s.  See, e.g., Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard, 131 
Ohio St.3d 97, 2012-Ohio-44, 961 N.E.2d 165 (indefinite suspension for 
misconduct involving 20 clients, including numerous instances of accepting fees 
for work not performed,  neglecting clients’ legal matters, failing to respond to 
client inquiries, and refusing to refund unearned retainers).  And we have also 
imposed indefinite suspensions on attorneys who suffered from mental illness or 
substance abuse but who failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that 
their condition qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 
376, 2011-Ohio-774, 944 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 14, and cases cited therein.  “This 
sanction serves to protect the public while leaving open the possibility that with 
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proper rehabilitation, the sanctioned attorney might one day be able to resume the 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.”  Id. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} Having reviewed the record, the aggravating and mitigating 
factors, and having considered the sanctions previously imposed for comparable 
conduct, we agree with the board that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite 
suspension.  Pryatel’s serious misconduct is tempered by the mitigating factors 
cited in the board’s report.  Accordingly, Mark Robert Pryatel is hereby 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio.  Any future 
reinstatement is conditioned on the submission of proof that Pryatel has complied 
with the terms of his OLAP contract, has obtained treatment from a psychiatrist 
for his mental disorders, has fulfilled all follow-up care and reporting 
requirements imposed by OLAP and his treating psychiatrist, and has paid the 
costs of this proceeding.  Upon petitioning for reinstatement, Pryatel shall also be 
required to submit a statement from a qualified mental-health professional 
demonstrating that he is capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law.  Costs are taxed to Pryatel. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ian N. Friedman and Ronald Frey, for relator. 
Richard C. Alkire and Dean Nieding, for respondent. 
______________________