Title: Trickett v. Ochs

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Trickett v. Ochs (2001-311); 176 Vt. 89; 838 A.2d 66

2003 VT 91

[Filed 10-Oct-2003]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 6-Nov-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 91

                                No. 2001-311

  George and Carole Trickett                     Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Addison Superior Court

  Peter and Carla Ochs                           September Term, 2003 (FN1)

  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  Paul S. Gillies of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.

  Peter F. Langrock and Abby C. Moskovitz of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP,
    Middlebury, for Defendants-Appellees.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Michael O. Duane, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae State of Vermont. 
                    

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J. (Ret.)
            and Gibson, J.(Ret.) Specially Assigned    
                              
        
       ¶  1.    SKOGLUND, J.   Plaintiffs George and Carole Trickett
  brought this nuisance and trespass action against their neighbors, Peter
  and Carol Ochs, alleging that defendants' operation of an apple orchard
  interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their land and caused them
  emotional distress.  Following an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs'
  request for injunctive relief, the Addison Superior Court dismissed the
  action based upon its conclusions that defendants' activities were
  protected by Vermont's right-to-farm law, 12 V.S.A. § 5753, and that, in
  any event, previous rulings by the Town of Orwell zoning administrator and
  zoning board of adjustment collaterally estopped plaintiffs from bringing
  their claims.  Plaintiffs argue on appeal that (1) the right-to-farm law
  does not apply under the circumstances; (2) even if it does, the law did
  not create an irrebuttable presumption that barred plaintiffs' nuisance
  action as a matter of law; (3) applying an irrebuttable presumption would
  effect a taking of plaintiffs' property without just compensation; (4)
  rulings by the zoning administrator and board of adjustment did not have
  any collateral estoppel effect on plaintiffs' claims; and (5) the court
  failed to address plaintiffs' trespass claim.  Based on our conclusion that
  neither the right-to-farm law nor collateral estoppel applies under the
  circumstances of this case, we reverse the superior court's decision and
  remand the matter for further consideration of plaintiffs' claims.

                                     I.
    
       ¶  2.    Plaintiffs purchased their home from defendants in
  1992.  At the time of the purchase, the residence was the homestead for an
  apple orchard and was directly across the road from the barn that served as
  the main collecting point for the apples.  Defendants continued to operate
  the apple orchard after the sale of the farmhouse, though the business
  initially had little impact on plaintiffs because most of the apples were
  immediately transported following harvest to the Shoreham Food Co-op, where
  they were stored for sale.

       ¶  3.    During the mid-1990s, defendants expanded their operation in
  response to changes in market demands.  They began waxing their apples and
  storing them on-site in refrigerated tractor trailer trucks.  Tractor
  trailer trucks also came to the barn to take apples to market.  During the
  winter months, these trucks began arriving in the predawn hours and
  continued throughout the day.  Because the barn is very close to
  plaintiffs' home, additional noise and light glare entered the home and
  disturbed plaintiffs.

       ¶  4.    Before initiating this action, plaintiffs complained to
  various town and state officials.  Because these complaints, and the
  ensuing actions, are related to one of the issues on appeal, we summarize
  them here to the extent that they are reflected in the record before us. 
  Plaintiffs first went to the Town of Orwell selectboard, which detailed the
  complaints and suggested ways to resolve them in an April 1996 letter to
  defendants.  Plaintiffs' complaints concerned (1) lack of maintenance of
  the road in front of the orchard; (2) blockage of the road by tractor
  trailer trucks; (3) location of vehicles and farm equipment too close to
  the road to allow snow plowing or maintenance; (4) excessive noise; (5)
  glare from truck headlights; and (6) diesel fumes and trespass by tractor
  trailer trucks on plaintiffs' lawn.  Apparently, the letter did not lead to
  a resolution of the complaints.

       ¶  5.    In August 1997, plaintiffs complained to the Orwell zoning
  administrator, claiming that defendants were violating the town's zoning
  ordinance in a number of respects.  Two months later, the zoning
  administrator rejected the complaint, making several rulings.  First, the
  administrator ruled that defendants were not conducting a light
  manufacturing operation by constructing pallets and bins on the orchard
  site.  Relying on an earlier letter by the commissioner of agriculture
  indicating that construction of the pallets and bins was in support of the
  orchard and thus an incidental accepted agricultural practice, the zoning
  administrator concluded that the construction was incidental to the
  operation of the orchard.  Second, the administrator ruled that the
  orchard's operations did not cause (1) glare or light that was a nuisance
  to other property owners in violation of § 1120 of the Orwell zoning
  ordinance, or (2) noise incompatible with the reasonable use of the
  surrounding area in violation of § 1140 of the zoning ordinance.  Third,
  the administrator found that he was without jurisdiction to consider
  plaintiffs' complaint that defendants were operating a public building
  without a permit, but noted that the commissioner of agriculture had
  decided this question adversely to plaintiffs in an earlier ruling. 
  Finally, the administrator concluded that defendants were not improperly
  storing and using chemicals and pesticides in violation of § 1130 of the
  zoning ordinance, and further noted that the commissioner had previously
  ruled that defendants were not violating state pesticide regulations. 
  Plaintiffs appealed these rulings, and, in January 1998, the Orwell board
  of adjustment denied the appeal without explanation.

       ¶  6.    Plaintiffs renewed and expanded their complaints in January
  2000, this time by letter from their attorney to the zoning administrator. 
  The zoning administrator ruled that nothing had changed since 1997, and
  that defendants continued to be in compliance with the Orwell zoning
  ordinance.  On appeal, the board of adjustment stated that it would no
  longer hear complaints regarding defendants' orchard that had already been
  decided by any state agency.  Plaintiffs appealed the board's decision to
  the environmental court, but later withdrew the appeal.  They complained
  again to the zoning administrator in November 2000, but we have no record
  of the disposition of that complaint.

       ¶  7.    The zoning board's reference to state agency decisions
  concerning the orchard apparently was directed at two communications from
  the department of agriculture.  The first was a letter from the
  commissioner in October 1997 in response to a complaint from plaintiffs
  that defendants' construction of pallets and storage and shipping bins,
  allegedly a major source of the noise, was not an accepted agricultural
  practice.  The commissioner determined that because operation of the
  orchard was an accepted agricultural practice and the pallets and bins were
  used exclusively for defendants' apples grown on-site, those land uses were
  exempt from local zoning regulation.  The commissioner indicated further
  that the department was continuing to investigate whether defendants were
  violating pesticide regulations.  The second communication was a letter
  from a department attorney at the request of the zoning administrator and
  in regard to plaintiffs' January 2000 complaint.  The attorney noted that
  24 V.S.A. § 4495 prevented the town from regulating defendants' activities
  to the extent that the zoning bylaws were more restrictive than state law
  regarding agricultural and farming practices.  The attorney also stated
  that the right-to-farm law might be implicated.

       ¶  8.    Plaintiffs brought this action in November 2000, alleging
  that (1) the noise from defendants' operations, specifically the trucks and
  packing equipment and machinery, interfered with the use and enjoyment of
  plaintiffs' property; (2) defendants had allowed pesticides and polluted
  surface water from their operations to flow onto plaintiffs' property; (3)
  the trucks and defendants' dogs had trespassed on plaintiffs' property; and
  (4) defendants had shouted obscenities at plaintiffs and assaulted them. 
  Plaintiffs sought an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages. 
  Defendants answered and moved to dismiss on the ground that the
  right-to-farm law immunized their activities from a nuisance action.

       ¶  9.    The superior court reserved the motion to dismiss, and the
  case went to trial.  The witnesses were plaintiffs, defendant Carla Ochs,
  and a sound expert who took measurements of noise from defendants'
  property.  During the trial, defendants asserted that collateral estoppel
  barred the action, arguing that the findings of the zoning administrator
  and board of adjustment had preclusive effect as to whether the apple
  orchard was a "protected agricultural activity."  Following the hearing,
  the court concluded that (1) the right-to-farm law barred plaintiffs'
  nuisance claims because plaintiffs moved to the site of a known,
  pre-existing farming operation; and (2) plaintiffs' claims were also barred
  by the prior findings and conclusions of the department of agriculture and
  the Town of Orwell regarding defendants' orchard operations.  On appeal,
  plaintiffs argue that the superior court erred by applying collateral
  estoppel to dismiss their claims, by ruling that the right-to-farm law
  barred their claims, and by failing to address their trespass claim.  We
  address these issues in turn.

                                     II.

       ¶  10.    The superior court ruled that the decisions of the zoning
  administrator, the zoning board of adjustment, and the commissioner of
  agriculture collaterally estopped plaintiffs from bringing their nuisance
  claims.  Collateral estoppel "bars the relitigation of an issue, rather
  than a claim, that was actually litigated by the parties and decided in a
  prior case."  In re Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 172 Vt. 14, 20,