Title: Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v Sheriff of Onslow County

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-953 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 August 2014 
 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
   v. 
 
Alamance County 
No. 09 CRS 056388 
 
EDDIE DANIEL BERRY  
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 February 2013 
by Judge James E. Hardin Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 April 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Sarah Y. Meacham, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender 
Nicholas 
C. 
Woomer-Deters, 
for 
defendant-
appellant. 
 
STEELMAN, Judge. 
 
In accepting a stipulation of the parties and giving an 
instruction to the jury on how to consider the stipulation, the 
trial court did not express an opinion on a question of fact to 
be decided by the jury in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1222 or express an opinion as to whether a fact had been proved 
in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1232. Plain error review 
is not applicable to appellate review of a stipulation entered 
- 2 - 
 
into by defendant at trial. The record does not provide 
sufficient information for this court to rule on defendant’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and that claim is 
dismissed without prejudice to defendant raising the claim in a 
motion for appropriate relief filed by the trial court. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Eddie D. Berry (defendant) met Annalean Rogers (Annalean) 
in June of 2000. Shortly thereafter he moved into the apartment 
she shared with her four children: daughters A.R. and B.R. and 
sons C.R. and D.R. Defendant married Annalean on 5 July 2004 and 
assumed the role of stepfather to A.R. and her siblings. 
 
At the time of the trial, A.R. was eighteen years old. A.R. 
testified that defendant sexually assaulted her for the first 
time a couple of weeks before defendant and Annalean got 
married. A.R. testified that the sexual assaults continued for 
several years. The final incident occurred on 4 July 2009. After 
this incident, A.R. called her uncle, Roy Rogers (Roy), and told 
him what had happened. A.R. called the police and gave a 
statement to Officer Robert Lovette (Officer Lovette) of the 
Graham Police Department. On 15 February 2010, defendant was 
indicted 
for 
taking 
indecent 
liberties 
with 
a 
child. 
A 
superseding indictment was issued on 26 November 2012 charging 
- 3 - 
 
defendant with one count of indecent liberties with a child and 
one count of statutory rape. 
At trial, by stipulation of the parties, the State entered 
into evidence a redacted interview report by Janet Hadler 
(Hadler), a clinical social worker who interviewed A.R. Her 
report contained some statements that contradicted A.R.’s trial 
testimony. The report also contained the following: 
TSCC: This report should be used as only one 
source of information about the individual 
being 
evaluated. 
In 
this 
respect, 
no 
decisions should be based solely on the 
information contained in this report. The 
raw and standardized scores contained in 
this report should be integrated with other 
sources of information when making decisions 
about this individual. [A.R.]’s TSCC is 
considered to be valid. . . . [A.R.]’s 
scores were in the clinically significant 
range 
for 
the 
following 
TSCC 
Clinical 
Scales/Subscales: Anxiety (T-score 67), . . 
. Fantasy (T-score 68), Sexual Concerns (T-
score 120), Sexual Preoccupation (T-score 
105), and Sexual Distress (T-score 133.) 
According to the manual, T-scores at or 
above 
65 
are 
considered 
clinically 
significant. For the SC (sexual concerns) 
scale and it’s [sic] subscales SC-P and SC-
D, T-scores at or above 70 are considered 
clinically significant. The manual states, 
“children with especially elevated scores on 
the SC scale may have been prematurely 
sexualized or sexually traumatized. This can 
occur as a result of childhood sexual abuse, 
[sic] exposure to pornography, witnessing 
sexual acts, or, in the case of adolescents, 
sexual assault by a peer.” 
 
- 4 - 
 
Hadler was unable to testify at trial due to a family 
illness. The parties stipulated that redacted portions of 
Hadler’s report be received as evidence for the purpose of 
corroborating A.R.’s testimony. The stipulation read as follows:   
Janet 
Hadler, 
licensed 
clinical 
social 
worker, performed a child family evaluation 
of [A.R.] in September and October of 2009. 
Ms. Hadler is unavailable due to family 
illness. The parties have stipulated that 
the portion of her report of her interview 
with [A.R.] may be entered into evidence 
without her presence. This evidence may be 
considered for the purpose of corroboration 
of the witness, [A.R.]. 
 
During a conference with counsel outside of the presence of 
the jury, the trial judge indicated that he would allow the 
report to be entered into evidence as State’s Exhibit 6 pursuant 
to the agreed upon stipulation, which would be marked as State’s 
Exhibit 7. The trial judge further indicated that:  
I'll then give a limiting instruction that 
is 
consistent 
with 
pattern 
instruction 
101.41 out of the civil pattern instructions 
regarding 
stipulations 
which 
will 
essentially say that the State of North 
Carolina and the defendant have agreed or 
stipulated 
that 
certain 
facts 
shall 
be 
accepted by you [members of the jury] as 
true without further proof. Those facts have 
been stated in the record as it relates to 
stipulation as described in State's Exhibit 
7 since the parties have so agreed. You will 
take these facts as true for the purpose of 
this case. 
 
- 5 - 
 
The State’s attorney and defendant’s trial counsel assented 
to this instruction, and made no objection. 
 
In the presence of the jury, the State’s attorney read the 
agreed-upon 
stipulation 
to 
the 
jury 
and 
moved, 
without 
objection, to enter State’s Exhibits 6 and 7 into evidence. The 
State’s attorney then moved to publish copies of Hadler’s 
redacted report to the jury. The trial judge, before allowing 
the redacted report to be published to the jury, instructed the 
jury as follows: 
Now, 
before 
we 
proceed, 
ladies 
and 
gentlemen, I want to make sure that you 
understand that the State of North Carolina 
and the defendant have agreed or stipulated 
that certain facts shall be accepted by you 
as true without further proof. 
 
The agreed facts in this case relate to what 
is marked as State's Exhibit 7 and now 
received 
as 
a 
stipulation 
and 
State's 
Exhibit 
6, 
portions 
of 
an 
interview 
conducted 
by 
the 
relevant 
parties 
as 
described. 
 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to 
take these facts as true for the purposes of 
this case. 
 
 
On 26 February 2013, the jury returned guilty verdicts 
against defendant for one count of taking indecent liberties 
with a minor and one count of statutory rape; he was sentenced 
to 336 to 415 months active imprisonment.  
 
Defendant appeals. 
- 6 - 
 
II. Stipulation and Limiting Instruction 
In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury to accept as true a redacted 
interview report by a licensed social worker that was entered 
into evidence by the State. We disagree. 
A. Standard of Review 
 
A trial judge’s expression of opinion on a question of fact 
violates the statutory mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1222 
and 1232, and therefore is preserved for de novo appellate 
review as a matter of law. See State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 
494, 380 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1989). 
B. Analysis 
The parties advised the trial judge that they had agreed to 
the following stipulation: 
Janet Hadler, a licensed clinical social 
worker, performed a child family evaluation 
of [A.R.] in September and October of 2009. 
Ms. Hadler is unavailable due to family 
illness. The parties have stipulated that a 
portion of her report of her interview with 
[A.R.] may be entered into evidence without 
her 
presence. 
This 
evidence 
may 
be 
considered for the purpose of corroboration 
of the witness, [A.R.] 
  
 
This stipulation was read verbatim to the jury by Mr. 
Thompson, the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting the case. 
Mr. Thompson then clarified, “That stipulation, Your Honor, is 
- 7 - 
 
State’s Exhibit 7. The actual portion of the evidence we’re 
introducing is State’s Exhibit 6.” Judge Hardin then gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury which stated that, “The agreed 
facts in this case relate to what is marked as State’s Exhibit 7 
and now received as a stipulation and State’s Exhibit 6, 
portions of an interview conducted by the relevant parties as 
described. Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take 
these facts as true for the purpose of this case.” 
 “A stipulation is a judicial admission and ordinarily is 
binding on the parties who make it.” State v. Murchinson, 18 
N.C. App. 194, 197, 196 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1973) (citing Farmer v. 
Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963)).  
On appeal, defendant argues that the limiting instruction 
given by the trial judge violated N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-1222 
because it constituted “an opinion in the presence of the jury 
on any question of fact to be decided by the jury.” Defendant 
argues that the wording of the instruction and the fact that the 
jury was handed only Exhibit 6 (the interview report) after the 
stipulation was read, rather than Exhibit 6 and 7 (the 
stipulation), that the jury could have reasonably interpreted 
the instruction to mean they should take the facts of Hadler’s 
redacted report as true, resulting in a prejudicial error to 
defendant. 
- 8 - 
 
The stipulation, as read to the jury, stated that the 
redacted 
report 
“may 
be 
considered 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
corroboration of the witness, [A.R.].” The trial judge then gave 
his limiting instruction. The redacted report was admitted 
pursuant to the stipulation that it may be used for purposes of 
corroboration. There is no indication whatsoever that the trial 
judge expressed an opinion on any question of fact to be decided 
by the jury in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1222 or as to 
whether a fact had been proved in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
15A-1232. 
The 
information 
contained 
in 
Exhibit 
7, 
the 
stipulation, was to be accepted by the jury as true without 
further proof. The information in Exhibit 6, the redacted 
report, was to be used for the purposes of corroboration of 
A.R.’s testimony. There was no question of fact for the trial 
judge to express an opinion, with regard to either the 
stipulation or the redacted report. 
“In determining whether the trial judge has expressed an 
impermissible opinion in its instructions to the jury, ‘[t]he 
charge of the court must be read as a whole, in the same 
connected way that the judge is supposed to have intended it and 
the jury to have considered it.’” State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App. 
107, 120, 584 S.E.2d 830, 838 (2003) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 
N.C. 205, 214, 176 S.E.2d 765, 770 (1970)). As long as the jury 
- 9 - 
 
instructions, viewed in context, present the law “fairly and 
clearly to the jury, the fact that some expressions, standing 
alone, might be considered erroneous will afford no ground for 
reversal.” 160 N.C. App. at 120, 584 S.E.2d at 839. We hold that 
these principles apply not only to the final jury charge, but 
also to limiting instructions given by the court during trial. 
The parties clearly stated that the stipulation was Exhibit 
7 and that the interview referenced therein was Exhibit 6. When 
reading the stipulation, Mr. Thompson stated, “That stipulation, 
Your Honor, is State’s Exhibit 7. The actual portion of the 
evidence we’re introducing is State’s Exhibit 6.” Judge Hardin 
then stated, “I want to make sure that you understand that the 
State of North Carolina and the defendant have agreed or 
stipulated that certain facts shall be accepted by you as true 
without further proof.” (emphasis added) This makes it clear 
that the facts to be accepted as true were those contained in 
the stipulation (Exhibit 7). 
“[U]nless it is apparent that such infraction of the rules 
might reasonably have had a prejudicial effect on the result of 
the trial, the error will be considered harmless.” State v. 
Green, 129 N.C. App. 539, 545, 500 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1998) aff'd, 
350 N.C. 59, 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (citing State v. Larrimore, 
340 N.C. 119, 154-55, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995)). There is no 
- 10 - 
 
reason to believe that the stipulation or limiting instruction 
had a prejudicial effect on the result of the trial. 
Judge Hardin did not express any opinion to the jury in his 
instructions concerning the stipulation. Judge Hardin simply 
instructed the jury as to the parties’ stipulation. Nothing in 
his instructions to the jury indicated any personal opinion as 
to the facts of the case. 
The 
dissent 
acknowledges 
that 
a 
“totality 
of 
the 
circumstances” test should be used to determine whether a trial 
court has made an improper expression of opinion. State v. 
Mucci, 163 N.C. App. 615, 620, 594 S.E.2d 411, 415 (2004) 
(quoting State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 402, 555 S.E.2d 557, 
578 (2001). However, it then proceeds to parse the language used 
by Judge Hardin to support its conclusions. 
The trial court did not express opinion in his limiting 
instruction to the jury, and taken as a whole, the instructions 
did not prejudice defendant. 
This argument is without merit. 
III. Admissibility of Report 
In his second argument, defendant contends that the trial 
court committed plain error by admitting Hadler’s redacted 
report into evidence. We disagree. 
A. Standard of Review 
- 11 - 
 
For error to constitute plain error, a 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
fundamental error occurred at trial. See 
Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378. To 
show that an error was fundamental, a 
defendant 
must 
establish 
prejudice—that, 
after examination of the entire record, the 
error “had a probable impact on the jury's 
finding that the defendant was guilty.” See 
id. (citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Walker, 316 N.C. at 39, 340 S.E.2d 
at 83 (stating “that absent the error the 
jury probably would have reached a different 
verdict” and concluding that although the 
evidentiary error affected a fundamental 
right, viewed in light of the entire record, 
the error was not plain error). Moreover, 
because plain error is to be “applied 
cautiously 
and 
only 
in 
the 
exceptional 
case,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 
378, the error will often be one that 
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 
or 
public 
reputation 
of 
judicial 
proceedings,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 
S.E.2d at 378 (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d 
at 1002). 
 
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 
(2012). 
B. Analysis 
Defendant’s 
trial 
counsel 
made 
no 
objection 
to 
the 
information contained in the report at trial and stipulated to 
the admission of the redacted report into evidence. However, 
even in the face of his trial stipulation, defendant argues on 
appeal that the admission of Hadler’s redacted report is still 
reviewable under plain error.  
- 12 - 
 
Generally, plain error analysis applies only to jury 
instructions and evidentiary matters. State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 
62, 81, 505 S.E.2d 97, 109 (1998). We have been unable to find 
any case law supporting the proposition that evidence received 
pursuant to a stipulation may be reviewed under plain error. See 
State v. Marlow, ___ N.C. App. ___, 747 S.E.2d 741, 745 (2013) 
(finding that “while the law is clear on when our courts are 
permitted to use the plain error analysis, it is not clear 
whether 
stipulations 
fall 
within 
the 
purview 
of 
such 
parameters.”), appeal dismissed, ___ N.C. ___, 752 S.E.2d 493 
(2013). 
“Plain error review is appropriate when a defendant fails 
to preserve the issue for appeal by properly objecting to the 
admission of evidence at trial.” State v. Perkins, 154 N.C. App. 
148, 152, 571 S.E.2d 645, 648 (2002) (citing State v. Rourke, 
143 N.C. App. 672, 675, 548 S.E.2d 188, 190 (2001)).  
A stipulation is a judicial admission, voluntarily made by 
the parties to admit evidence at trial. In the instant case, 
defendant entered into a written stipulation with the State. It 
would be indefensible to allow a defendant to enter into a 
stipulation and then to challenge the evidence admitted pursuant 
to the stipulation on appeal. The essence of plain error is the 
failure of a defendant to object, coupled with a “fundamental 
- 13 - 
 
error” by the trial court in allowing the evidence to be 
received even in the absence of an objection. See State v. 
Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). “Once a 
stipulation is made, a party is bound by it and he may not 
thereafter take an inconsistent position.” Rural Plumbing and 
Heating, Inc. v. H. C. Jones Const. Co., 268 N.C. 23, 31, 149 
S.E.2d 625, 631 (1966) (citing Austin v. Hopkins, 227 N.C. 638, 
43 S.E.2d 849 (1947)).  
The conduct of defendant in entering into a stipulation at 
trial and then seeking to repudiate it on appeal is more akin to 
invited error than plain error. “[A] defendant who invites error 
. . . waive[s] his right to all appellate review concerning the 
invited error, including plain error review.” State v. Jones, 
213 N.C. App. 59, 67, 711 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2011) (quoting State 
v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001)). 
Therefore, “[a]lthough defendant labels this [issue on appeal] 
as ‘plain error,’ it is actually invited error because, as the 
transcript reveals, defendant consented to the manner in which 
the trial court gave the instructions to the jury.” State v. 
Fox, 216 N.C. App. 153, 160, 716 S.E.2d 261, 266-67 (2011) 
(citing State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 235–36, 474 S.E.2d 
375, 396 (1996)).  
- 14 - 
 
In the instant case, defendant agreed to the language of 
the stipulation and limiting instruction at trial. Defendant 
made no objection at trial to the limiting instruction, 
stipulation, or to the substance of the redacted report when it 
was entered into evidence. We hold that the concept of plain 
error is not applicable to stipulations entered into at trial. 
This argument is without merit. 
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In his third argument, defendant contends that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney 
stipulated to the admission of the report and failed to object 
to the trial court’s instruction regarding the report.  We 
disagree. 
A. Standard of Review 
To 
prevail 
on 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
first show that his counsel’s performance 
was 
deficient 
and 
then 
that 
counsel’s 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
his 
defense. 
Deficient 
performance 
may 
be 
established 
by 
showing 
that 
counsel’s 
representation 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard of reasonableness. Generally, to 
establish prejudice, a defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  
 
- 15 - 
 
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 
(citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
867, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2006). 
B. Analysis 
Generally, to establish a claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 
reasonable 
probability 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). The Supreme Court 
has noted that, “Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must 
be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to 
second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse 
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude 
that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” 
466 U.S. at 689, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694.  
In the present case, the record does not provide sufficient 
information to determine whether trial counsel’s decision to 
agree to the stipulation of the report was the result of a 
legitimate trial strategy. The report that was entered into 
evidence 
arguably 
bolstered 
defendant’s 
position 
by 
- 16 - 
 
demonstrating the victim’s lack of coherence in her story of the 
events. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is 
dismissed 
without 
prejudice 
to 
filing 
a 
motion 
for 
appropriate relief in the trial court. 
NO ERROR IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART. 
Judge BRYANT concurs. 
Judge HUNTER, Robert C. concurs in part and dissents in 
part. 
 
NO. COA13-953 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 August 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Alamance County 
No. 09 CRS 056388 
EDDIE DANIEL BERRY 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 
I concur with the portions of the majority opinion 
regarding plain error review of stipulations on appeal and 
defendant’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel.  However, because I believe that the trial court’s 
instruction could have been reasonably interpreted by the jury 
as a mandate to accept certain disputed facts of this case as 
true, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1222 and 15A-1232 
(2013), I respectfully dissent and conclude that defendant 
should be granted a new trial.  
Background 
 
Defendant was indicted for taking indecent liberties with a 
child on 15 February 2010.  A superseding indictment charging 
defendant with one count of indecent liberties with a child and 
one count of statutory rape was issued on 26 November 2012.  
 
 
 
-2- 
 
At trial, defendant’s stepdaughter, A.R., testified that 
defendant sexually abused her repeatedly over a number of years, 
beginning when she was either ten or eleven years old.  By 
stipulation of the parties, the State entered into evidence a 
redacted interview report by Janet Hadler (“Hadler”), a clinical 
social worker who interviewed A.R.  The report contained 
numerous accusations of abuse by A.R., specifically that: (1) 
defendant sexually abused A.R. and her sister beginning when 
A.R. was eleven years old; (2) defendant had sexual intercourse 
with A.R. and took her virginity; and (3) defendant continued to 
have sex with A.R. “every time he can get away from [A.R.’s] 
mother.”  The report also contained Hadler’s professional 
opinion as to these accusations, which appeared as follows: 
[A.R.]’s TSCC1 is considered to be valid. . . 
. [A.R.]’s scores were in the clinically 
significant range for the following TSCC 
Clinical Scales/Subscales: Anxiety (T-score 
67), . . . Fantasy (T-score 68), Sexual 
Concerns (T-score 120), Sexual Preoccupation 
(T-score 105), and Sexual Distress (T-score 
133.) According to the manual, T-scores at 
or 
above 
65 
are 
considered 
clinically 
significant. For the SC (sexual concerns) 
scale and it’s [sic] subscales SC-P and SC-
D, T-scores at or above 70 are considered 
clinically significant. The manual states, 
“children with especially elevated scores on 
the SC scale may have been prematurely 
sexualized or sexually traumatized. This can 
                     
1 It is unclear from the record what “TSCC” stands for.  
 
 
 
-3- 
occur as a result of childhood sexual abuse 
exposure to pornography, witnessing sexual 
acts, or, in the case of adolescents, sexual 
assault by a peer.”  
 
Hadler was unable to testify at trial due to a family 
illness.  According to the stipulation, the parties agreed to 
let redacted portions of her report come in for the purpose of 
corroborating A.R.’s testimony.  The stipulation read as 
follows:   
Janet Hadler, a licensed clinical social 
worker, performed a child family evaluation 
of [A.R.] in September and October of 2009. 
Ms. Hadler is unavailable due to family 
illness. The parties have stipulated that 
the portion of her report of her interview 
with [A.R.] may be entered into evidence 
without her presence. This evidence may be 
considered for the purpose of corroboration 
of the witness,[A.R.]. 
 
While the jury was dismissed, the trial judge indicated to 
counsel that he would allow the report to be entered into 
evidence as State’s Exhibit 6 pursuant to the agreed-upon 
stipulation, which would be marked as State’s Exhibit 7.   
 
Following the bench conference, the jury returned to the 
courtroom. 
 
The 
State’s 
attorney 
read 
the 
agreed-upon 
stipulation to the jury and moved, without objection, to enter 
State’s Exhibits 6 and 7 into evidence.  The State’s attorney 
then moved to publish copies of Hadler’s report to the jury, 
 
 
 
-4- 
whereupon the trial judge, before granting the motion to 
publish, instructed the jury as follows: 
Now, 
before 
we 
proceed, 
ladies 
and 
gentlemen, I want to make sure that you 
understand that the State of North Carolina 
and the defendant have agreed or stipulated 
that certain facts shall be accepted by you 
as true without further proof. 
 
The agreed facts in this case relate to what 
is marked as State’s Exhibit 7 and now 
received 
as 
a 
stipulation 
and 
State’s 
Exhibit 
6, 
portions 
of 
an 
interview 
conducted 
by 
the 
relevant 
parties 
as 
described. 
 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to 
take these facts as true for the purposes of 
this case.  
 
 
On 26 February 2013, the jury returned guilty verdicts 
against defendant for one count of taking indecent liberties 
with a child and one count of statutory rape; he was sentenced 
to 336 to 415 months active imprisonment.   
Discussion 
Defendant argues that the trial judge failed to give a 
promised limiting instruction and violated statutory mandates of 
sections 15A-1222 and 15A-1232 prohibiting a trial judge from 
expressing an opinion (1) as to whether or not a fact has been 
proved and (2) on any question of fact to be decided by the 
jury, because the judge inadvertently instructed the jury to 
 
 
 
-5- 
consider the facts contained in Hadler’s report as true.  After 
carefully reviewing the record and transcript of the trial, I 
agree.  I would hold that the trial court inadvertently erred in 
its jury instruction on the stipulation, and because this error 
prejudiced defendant, I would order a new trial.  
 
Typically, in order to preserve an argument for appellate 
review, a defendant must have “presented the trial court with a 
timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific 
grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not 
apparent.”  State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 
814 (1991); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2013).  Defendant 
here failed to object to the trial court’s instruction.  
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that 
“[w]henever a defendant alleges a trial court made an improper 
statement by expressing an opinion on the evidence in violation 
of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1222 and 15A-1232, the error is preserved for 
review without objection due to the mandatory nature of these 
statutory provisions.”  State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 123, 623 
S.E.2d 11, 20 (2005).  Defendant has made such allegations in 
this 
case, 
and 
thus, 
these 
arguments 
are 
preserved 
notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at trial.  See id.  
On appeal, the burden is on the defendant to show that he was 
 
 
 
-6- 
prejudiced by the allegedly improper remarks.  See State v. 
McNeil, 209 N.C. App. 654, 666, 707 S.E.2d 674, 683 (2011).  
That is, he must show that “there is a reasonable possibility 
that, had the error in question not been committed, a different 
result would have been reached” by the jury.  Id.; see also N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2013).   
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1222 provides that a trial judge “may 
not express during any stage of the trial, any opinion in the 
presence of the jury on any question of fact to be decided by 
the jury.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1232 further states in 
relevant part that “[i]n instructing the jury, the judge shall 
not express an opinion as to whether or not a fact has been 
proved[.]”  Prejudicial error results where “the jury may 
reasonably infer from the evidence before it that the trial 
judge’s action intimated an opinion as to a factual issue, the 
defendant’s guilt, the weight of the evidence or a witness’s 
credibility[.]”  State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 
S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985).  “Whether a trial court’s comment 
constitutes an improper expression of opinion is determined by 
its probable meaning to the jury, not by the judge’s motive.  
Furthermore, a totality of the circumstances test is utilized 
under which defendant has the burden of showing prejudice.”  
 
 
 
-7- 
State v. Mucci, 163 N.C. App. 615, 620, 594 S.E.2d 411, 415 
(2004) 
(alteration 
in 
original) 
(citations 
and 
internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
Here, while outside the presence of the jury, counsel for 
defendant and the State conferred with the trial judge regarding 
the stipulation.  The substance of the stipulation was that: (1) 
Hadler was unavailable to testify at trial; (2) portions of her 
report were to be admitted into evidence; and (3) these redacted 
portions may be considered for the purpose of corroborating 
A.R.’s testimony.  The trial court informed counsel that it 
would instruct the jury as to this stipulation based on N.C.P.I. 
Civil 
101.41, 
which 
provides 
that 
juries 
are 
to 
accept 
stipulated facts as true without further proof.  Specifically, 
the trial court informed counsel that it would instruct the jury 
as follows:  “[F]acts have been stated in the record as it 
relates to stipulation as described in State’s Exhibit 7 since 
the parties have so agreed.  You will take these facts as true 
for the purpose of this case.”  However, when the jury returned 
to the courtroom, the following colloquy took place:   
THE COURT: All right. The jurors are now 
present with us in the courtroom.  Mr. 
Thompson [counsel for the State], ready to 
proceed? 
 
MR. THOMPSON: We are, Your Honor. 
 
 
 
-8- 
 
Your Honor, at this time the State would 
make this following tender of stipulation. 
 
Janet Hadler, a licensed clinical social 
worker, performed a child family evaluation 
of [A.R.] in September and October of 2009. 
Ms. Hadler is unavailable due to family 
illness.  The parties have stipulated that 
the portion of her report of her interview 
with [A.R.] may be entered into evidence 
without her presence. This evidence may be 
considered for the purpose of corroboration 
of the witness, [A.R.]. That stipulation, 
Your Honor, is State’s Exhibit 7. 
 
The actual portion of the evidence we’re 
introducing is State’s Exhibit 6.  We move 
to enter 6 and 7 at this time.  
 
THE COURT: What says the defendant? 
 
MR. MARTIN [defense counsel]: No objection. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Without objection 
what is marked as State’s Exhibit 6 and 
State’s Exhibit 7 each is admitted and 
received.  
 
MR. THOMPSON:  At this time, Your Honor, we 
ask to publish the copies to the jury. 
 
THE COURT:  Now, before we proceed, ladies 
and gentlemen, I want to make sure that you 
understand that the State of North Carolina 
and the defendant have agreed or stipulated 
that certain facts shall be accepted by you 
as true without further proof. 
 
The agreed facts in this case relate to what 
is marked as State’s Exhibit 7 and now 
received 
as 
a 
stipulation 
and 
State’s 
Exhibit 
6, 
portions 
of 
an 
interview 
conducted 
by 
the 
relevant 
parties 
as 
 
 
 
-9- 
described. 
 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to 
take these facts as true for the purposes of 
this case. The motion to publish is allowed. 
 
It’s my impression, ladies and gentlemen, 
you all each have a copy of State’s Exhibit 
6.  If you will read that to yourselves, 
again, without comment.  And once you’ve 
completed your review of the document, pass 
that back down to the bailiff so that we 
know that you’ve completed your examination 
of that report.   
 
(Whereas State’s Exhibit No. 6 was published 
to the jury.) 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The State argues, and the majority agrees, that the trial 
court did not violate sections 15A-1222 or 15A-1232 because it 
did not instruct the jury to read Hadler’s report as true.  
Rather, the statement that “the agreed facts in this case relate 
to . . . State’s Exhibit 6” merely indicated that the actual 
stipulation in State’s Exhibit 7 related to the admissibility of 
State’s Exhibit 6.   
However, 
on 
appeal, 
this 
Court 
is 
to 
consider 
the 
instruction’s “probable meaning to the jury” under the totality 
of the circumstances.  Mucci, 163 N.C. App. at 620, 594 S.E.2d 
at 415.  The attendant circumstances and wording of the 
instruction leads me to conclude that the jury could have 
 
 
 
-10- 
reasonably interpreted the trial court’s statement as requiring 
the jury members to accept Hadler’s report as true, in clear, 
but inadvertent, violation of sections 15A-1222 and 15A-1232.   
First, the trial court told the jury that “[t]he agreed 
facts in this case relate to what is marked as State’s Exhibit 7 
and now received as a stipulation and State’s Exhibit 6, 
portions of an interview conducted by the relevant parties as 
described.”  (Emphasis added.)  The use of the conjunctive “and” 
in this instruction unavoidably combined both exhibits under the 
umbrella of what the “agreed facts . . . relate to,” even though 
the trial judge told counsel during the bench conference that he 
would only instruct the jury that “facts have been stated in the 
record as it relates to stipulation as described in State’s 
Exhibit 7 since the parties have so agreed.  You will take these 
facts as true for the purpose of this case.”  Thus, the trial 
court’s instruction to the jury differed materially from the 
instruction it promised counsel it was going to make while the 
jury was outside the courtroom, indicating that the reference to 
State’s Exhibit 6 was unplanned and inadvertent.  
Furthermore, the trial court failed to clarify that the 
redacted portions of Hadler’s report were not to be considered 
for substantive purposes at all.  Despite the agreement made 
 
 
 
-11- 
between counsel outside the presence of the jury that the report 
would only be admitted for corroborative purposes, the trial 
court never specifically instructed, either before or after 
publishing the document to the jury, that there were limits on 
the admissibility of Hadler’s report.  The stipulation itself 
provided only that Hadler’s report “may be considered for the 
purpose of corroboration of the witness, [A.R.].”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The jury was never instructed at any point of the trial 
that it may not consider the report as substantive evidence of 
defendant’s guilt.  During the jury charge, the trial court 
instructed the jury that:  
Evidence has been received tending to show 
that at an earlier time a witness made a 
statement which may be consistent or may 
conflict with the testimony of the witness 
at this trial.   
 
You must not consider such earlier statement 
as evidence of the truth of what was said at 
that earlier time because it was not made 
under oath at this trial.   
 
If you believe that the earlier statement 
was made and that it is consistent or does 
conflict with the testimony of the witness 
at this trial, then you may consider this 
and 
all 
other 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
bearing upon the witness’ truthfulness in 
deciding 
whether 
you 
will 
believe 
or 
disbelieve the testimony of the witness.  
 
 
 
 
-12- 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the trial court failed to specify that 
Hadler’s report, which included not only statements from A.R. 
but 
also 
Hadler’s 
professional 
opinion 
on 
the 
clinical 
significance 
of 
those 
statements, 
was 
only 
admitted 
to 
corroborate A.R.’s testimony and was not to be considered for 
any other purpose.  See State v. McMillan, 55 N.C. App. 25, 30, 
284 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1981) (finding error where the trial court 
instructed on prior statements of “a witness” but failed to 
specify the limit on admissibility related solely to the 
specific witness’s statements).  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
instruction to “take these facts as true,” with the facts 
“relating to” both the stipulation and Hadler’s report, was more 
amenable to being interpreted as invitation to read Hadler’s 
report as true given the lack of specific limiting instructions 
on that exhibit.    
Second, only Hadler’s report, and not the stipulation 
itself, was published to the jury immediately following the 
trial court’s ambiguous instruction.  I believe that the jury 
could have reasonably inferred that what was being published to 
them was the subject of the instruction; or in other words, that 
Hadler’s report was the document that the jury members were to 
read as true.  This conclusion is especially availing given that 
 
 
 
-13- 
the trial court said “you are to take these facts as true for 
the purposes of this case” immediately after saying “[t]he 
agreed facts in this case relate to . . . State’s Exhibit 6, 
portions of an interview conducted by the relevant parties as 
described,” just before publishing State’s Exhibit 6 to the 
jury, and without any clarification regarding the stipulation 
that Hadler’s report “may be considered for the purpose of 
corroboration[.]”  (Emphasis added.) 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Mucci, 163 N.C. 
App. at 620, 594 S.E.2d at 415, I would hold that the challenged 
instruction could have been reasonably interpreted by the jury 
as requiring them to read Hadler’s report as true.  In giving 
this instruction, the trial court both bolstered the credibility 
of the prosecuting witness, A.R., and afforded undue evidentiary 
weight to Hadler’s conclusions in the report regarding the 
clinical significance of A.R.’s “T-scores.”  Each of which 
constitutes prejudicial error.  See Blackstock, 314 N.C. at 236, 
333 S.E.2d at 248 (“[I]n a criminal case it is only when the 
jury may reasonably infer from the evidence before it that the 
trial judge’s action intimated an opinion as to a factual issue, 
the defendant’s guilt, the weight of the evidence or a witness’s 
credibility that prejudicial error results.”).   
 
 
 
-14- 
Therefore, 
while 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
this 
error 
was 
inadvertent, the jury may have reasonably believed that they 
were instructed to read the statements in Hadler’s redacted 
report as true, in which case the trial court inherently 
intimated an opinion as to the weight of this evidence, and 
prejudicial error resulted.  See Blackstock, 314 N.C. at 236, 
333 S.E.2d at 248.   
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that the trial judge 
inadvertently erred by giving an instruction constituting an 
impermissible expression of judicial opinion in violation of 
sections 15A-1222 and 15A-1232.  Because this error bolstered 
the credibility of the prosecuting witness and afforded undue 
weight to a report admitted solely for corroborative purposes, I 
would conclude that defendant was prejudiced by this error, 
requiring a new trial.