Title: City of Casper v. Bowdish

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Casper v. Bowdish1986 WY 23713 P.2d 763Case Number: 84-14Decided: 01/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE CITY OF 
CASPER, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYER/DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
RALPH C. BOWDISH, 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE/PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

James R. Bell, Deputy 
City Atty., Casper.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

David A. Drell, Casper.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN, and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

 
 
** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this case the City 
of Casper questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of 
permanent total disability pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act (§§ 
27-12-101, W.S. 1977, et seq.) under the "odd-lot" doctrine. The district court 
found that Ralph C. Bowdish was permanently incapacitated from performing any 
work at any gainful occupation for which he was reasonably suited by experience 
or training. In order to make this finding the district court must have been 
satisfied that Bowdish had met his burden of proof in demonstrating total 
permanent disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine thereby shifting to the City 
of Casper the burden of establishing that light work of a special nature which 
Bowdish could perform but which is not generally available in fact was available 
to Bowdish. The City of Casper did not offer any evidence of the 
availability of light work of a special nature which Bowdish could perform. We 
agree with the disposition of this case by the district court, and we 
affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     The City of Casper states the issue in 
the case in this way:

 
 
"Did the District Court 
err in finding Ralph Bowdish permanently incapacitated from performing any work 
at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or 
training, and thereby awarding permanent total disability benefits based upon 
such finding?"

 
 
Bowdish essentially 
restates the same issue in his Brief of Appellee.

 
 

[¶3.]     In presenting its 
argument the stance of the City of Casper is that the evidence before the court 
was not sufficient to bring Bowdish within the "odd-lot" doctrine under our 
decisions in Schepanovich v. United 
States Steel Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522 (1983); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 (1979); and In re Iles, 56 
Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). The argument of Ralph C. Bowdish is that he did 
bring himself within that line of authority, and the City of Casper failed to assume 
the burden of proof then cast upon it by the "odd-lot" 
doctrine.

 
 

[¶4.]     Ralph C. Bowdish 
injured his back in February of 1982 when he slipped on ice and fell while 
getting out of the cab of a truck. He struck the edge of the cab or the seat 
with his lower back and in attempting to catch himself caught the door with his 
right arm, which jerked his upper back. Initial treatment was conservative, and 
Bowdish actually returned to his employment as an automotive mechanic and welder 
for the City of Casper, under a release by the treating 
physician which specified no heavy lifting. In that instance, however, his 
symptoms reoccurred, and conservative treatment was continued. When he was not 
working he received temporary total disability benefits under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act. At one point in time the City of Casper withdrew its 
approval of the temporary total disability benefits, but later it changed its 
position, and the payment of those benefits continued until August of 1983. The 
City of Casper then filed a petition for modification in which it asserted that 
Ralph C. Bowdish no longer was entitled to temporary total disability payments 
and that he should be evaluated as having a permanent partial disability in an 
amount not to exceed five percent of his total body. The case went to hearing in 
October of 1983, and following the hearing the district court approved an award 
of one hundred percent permanent total disability.

 
 

[¶5.]     The evidence at the 
hearing consisted of the testimony of Ralph C. Bowdish and the depositions of 
two orthopedic surgeons. One of the orthopedic surgeons was Bowdish's treating 
physician, and the other was an examining physician who saw Bowdish at the 
request of the City of Casper. The orthopedic surgeon who had treated 
Bowdish testified that he had a herniated disc in his low back, and that 
conclusion, which was reached by physical examination, had been confirmed with X 
rays and sophisticated X ray techniques. The treating physician gave his opinion 
that Bowdish was one hundred percent disabled from doing physical work. He 
defined that as doing any lifting, pulling, tugging or getting in bizarre or 
unusual positions. He estimated that if Bowdish were standing straight up 
without having to bend, lifting more than ten or fifteen pounds would cause him 
problems. If he had to bend over and lift anything, according to that doctor, he 
would be very likely to suffer a reoccurrence of the acute phase of his 
symptoms. That physician also gave his opinion that Bowdish had a thirty percent 
permanent disability of his body as a whole.

 
 

[¶6.]     The examining 
orthopedic surgeon agreed that Bowdish was one hundred percent disabled from 
being a mechanic. He explained a difference in his evaluation of Bowdish as 
having a five percent disability of his body as a whole from the thirty percent 
disability of the body as a whole given by the treating orthopedic surgeon on 
the basis of objective evaluations at the time of his examination. His testimony 
suggested that the disc condition may have spontaneously resolved itself by the 
time of his examination. Even so, he testified that of the functions which a 
mechanic might perform Bowdish could not do those that would involve vigorous 
activity, frequent bending over and heavy lifting.

 
 

[¶7.]     Bowdish testified that 
he had a twelfth grade education and had been a mechanic for some twenty-seven 
years. He stated that in his job for the City of Casper he did repair work on engines, 
transmissions, brakes, suspension, steering, and all types of repair work on 
trucks and heavy equipment. He also did welding, and that these duties involved 
a lot of heavy lifting. These functions were similar to the duties involved in 
his prior jobs. He did testify that he had been a working foreman about seven 
years during his prior experience and that he also had worked one year as a shop 
foreman. As a working, supervisory foreman he would assign work to other 
mechanics and supervise their work as well as doing mechanical work himself. In 
that capacity he spent about seventy-five to eighty percent of his time working 
as a mechanic and the balance as a supervisor. When he worked as shop foreman 
his duties were to talk to customers when they brought a vehicle in, write up 
work orders, assign mechanics to do the work, supervise the work and do paper 
work, such as receiving payment, filling out credit card slips and discussing 
warranties. In that position there was a certain amount of physical labor 
because he still was expected to assist the working mechanics when they were 
having any problems. He testified that he had episodes of pain with his back 
lasting about one or two days but these occurred probably once a month. He 
testified that he could do no physical bending or labor and that he could not 
lift anything around the yard or around the house. He said that he could sit 
comfortably for fifteen or twenty minutes and sometimes as much as a half hour 
or forty-five minutes. He said he could not stand for more than a half hour or 
forty-five minutes without discomfort.

 
 

[¶8.]     In addition Bowdish 
testified that he had followed up on two job leads suggested to him by the 
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation. He also said that he went to close to 
thirty places looking for jobs. Those included about all of the car and truck 
dealers in Casper and the larger repair shops. He 
testified that he was told either that there were no openings or that in the 
instances in which there were openings the employer would not hire him. One 
employer did have a supervisory job but they wouldn't hire him because of his 
back. Another firm also told him that they wouldn't hire him because of his 
back. In other instances no reason was given. He said that in the process he had 
looked for supervisory work and for bench work where he could deal with small 
parts or could accomplish any necessary lifting with a hoist at the bench. 
Bowdish also testified that he had sought reemployment with the City of 
Casper, but had 
been turned down because of a heart condition unrelated to the injury involved 
in this case.

 
 

[¶9.]     Section 27-12-405(a), 
W.S. 1977, defines permanent total disability:

 
 
"(a) Permanent total 
disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis or other conditions permanently 
incapacitating the employee from performing any work at any gainful occupation 
for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
Recently we held this 
statutory definition to be compatible with the odd-lot doctrine. Rose v. Westates Construction Co., 
Wyo., 703 P.2d 1084 (1985). In order to come within the odd-lot doctrine, however, it is 
the burden of the employee to establish not only that he is no longer capable of 
working at the job in which he was employed at the time of his injury, but that 
the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts, such as 
mental capacity, education, training, or age, must prima facie place him in that 
category. Rose v. Westates Construction 
Co., supra; Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, Wyo., 
698 P.2d 1141 (1985); Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, supra. Whether the evidence of the degree of obvious physical 
impairment coupled with such other facts places an injured employee prima facie 
in the odd-lot category is a factual determination to be made by the trial 
court. Schepanovich v. United States 
Steel Corporation, supra. If there is substantial evidence to support the 
factual determination that the injured workman is within the odd-lot category we 
will not change that determination on appeal. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, supra, at 669 P.2d 529, and the authorities there 
cited.

 
 

[¶10.]  In this instance, in addition to the 
evidence previously discussed, there was evidence that Bowdish had a superior 
intellectual capacity, but the same observer also noted that Bowdish's main 
interests would be in the mechanical and technical areas. His twelfth grade 
education, previous experience or training as a mechanic, and his age of about 
fifty, were before the court. In addition there was testimony that the 
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation had concluded that he would not benefit 
from retraining. From this information the district court was justified in 
concluding that Bowdish's prospects were substantially limited to mechanical 
work or general physical labor, both of which were foreclosed by his lower back 
condition. The effect of this conclusion was that the burden of proof then 
shifted to the City of Casper to establish that light work of a special nature 
which Bowdish could perform but which is not generally available was in fact 
available to him. Schepanovich v. United 
States Steel Corporation, supra; Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, supra; and 
In re Iles, supra. The City of 
Casper chose to 
rest its case without the introduction of evidence other than the deposition of 
the examining orthopedic surgeon. Obviously this was not sufficient to meet the 
burden of proof imposed upon an employer according to the authorities 
cited.

 
 

[¶11.]  In this case the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to Bowdish with the favorable inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom (Matter of Haynie, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 693 (1979); House v. State ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); Shaw v. Lewmont Drilling, Wyo., 694 P.2d 117 (1985)) supports the trial court in its statement:

 
 
"3. That the Court finds 
that Employee is permanently incapacitated from performing any work in a gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or 
training."

 
 
The order premised upon 
that finding "that the Employee's application for permanent total disability, 
and the same hereby is approved" is affirmed.