Title: Supervisor v. Hartge Yacht

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County v. Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc.
No. 45, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
Mooring buoys, which are utilized by a commercial marina for the purpose of
mooring patrons’ boats, cannot be said to be “affixed” to the State-owned
river bottom and are therefore not to be classified as “real property” for
taxation purposes.  The mooring buoys at issue can be removed without
seriously damaging the river bottom, are not intended to remain on the river
bottom permanently, and do not benefit the river bottom itself.  Therefore, the
mooring buoys are not “fixtures,” which would make them real property for
taxation purposes.  The mooring buoys might be characterized, however, as
“trade fixtures,” and, if so, might be classified as personal property for
taxation purposes.  
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case #C-2002-77743 AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 45
September Term, 2003
Supervisor of Assessments of 
Anne Arundel County, Maryland
v.
Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia
Eldridge, John C.
     (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: February 12, 2004
1Under COMAR 08.04.01.14:
“‘Mooring’ means a buoy, piling, stake, or other apparatus used to secure,
berth, or moor vessels in the waters of the State.  It does not include fixed
piers connected to the shore or accessory structures directly related thereto that
are subject to separate State approval procedures.”
We note that a mooring buoy may be very different from other forms of moorings.
Our holding in the case sub judice as to the nature of mooring buoys in respect to the law
of fixtures applies only to mooring buoy apparatuses.  We do not address the character of
other types of moorings.
This case concerns the appropriate classification for taxation purposes of mooring
buoys1 located in the West River in Anne Arundel County.  Basically, the question before
this Court is whether these mooring buoys should be assessed as real or personal property
when they are placed in the waters of the State.
The case sub judice has its origins in a 1994 decision by the Maryland Tax Court,
Whitestake Associates v. Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County, No. 1051, slip
op. (Md. Tax Ct. Feb. 4, 1994), which was an administrative appeal of the 1991 real estate
tax assessment of the real property owned by Whitestake Associates Limited Partnership
(“Whitestake”) and leased to Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc. (“Hartge”) for Hartge’s marina
operations.  In that case, the Maryland Tax Court ruled that the Supervisor of Assessments
of Anne Arundel County could not assess the mooring buoys at the marina to Whitestake
because the moorings were owned by Hartge.  Judicial review of that ruling of the Maryland
Tax Court was not sought.
After the 1994 Tax Court ruling, the State Department of Assessments and Taxation
(“SDAT”) issued a real property tax assessment for the mooring buoys owned and used by
-2-
Hartge in its marina operation for tax years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.  Hartge challenged
the assessment of the moorings as real property for taxation purposes.  The Supervisor of
Assessments of Anne Arundel County, petitioner, affirmed the assessment and Hartge then
appealed to the Property Tax Assessment Appeals Board for Anne Arundel County
(“PTAAB”).  After PTAAB also affirmed the assessment, Hartge appealed administratively
to the Maryland Tax Court.  During this hearing, the Maryland Tax Court ordered that
Whitestake be brought in as a party.  In an oral opinion on November 14, 2001, the Tax
Court affirmed the classification of the mooring buoys as real property taxable to Hartge.
The Tax Court issued a final order on January 18, 2002.
Both Hartge and Whitestake sought judicial review of the Maryland Tax Court
decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  In a well-reasoned Memorandum
Opinion and Order by Judge Nancy Davis-Loomis, dated December 17, 2002, the Circuit
Court reversed the Maryland Tax Court decision.  Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals.  On July 28, 2003, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals,
we issued a Writ of Certiorari.  Supervisor of Assessments v. Hartge, 376 Md. 139, 829 A.2d
530 (2003).  
Petitioner presents one question for our review:
“Since the mooring buoys were owned and utilized by the long term
operator of the marina, had been permanently positioned in the West River for
20 to 60 years, and had been registered as a group mooring with the
Department of Natural Resources (‘DNR’) since 1989, did the Maryland Tax
Court properly apply Tax-Property Article, § 6-102(e) when it determined that
mooring buoys, together with the State owned river bottom, were taxable to
2We note that COMAR 08.04.13.02 states the limited areas in which moorings may
not be placed.  Moorings may not be established in:
(continued...)
-3-
Hartge as real property?”
We answer petitioner’s question in the negative and hold that the Maryland Tax Court
improperly applied § 6-102(e) of the Tax-Property Article in regard to Hartge’s mooring
buoys.  As we will discuss, infra, the mooring buoys at issue do not meet the elements of
“fixtures” under Maryland law and, as such, are not deemed real property for taxation
purposes.  At best, they are, under the circumstances of this case, “trade fixtures” and
properly classified as personal property for taxation purposes.  Furthermore, despite
petitioner’s argument to the contrary, the application of § 6-102(e) does not change this
classification.  Even if Hartge was “the owner of the property,” here, the relevant portion of
the river, the mooring buoys that have been placed there would still not be considered
permanent fixtures.  Under § 6-102(e), Hartge’s mooring buoys would still be classified as
personal property for taxation purposes.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County. 
I. Facts
Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc. (“Hartge”) operates a marina on the West River in Anne
Arundel County on land that it leases from Whitestake Associates, L.P. (“Whitestake”).
Since 1973, Hartge has maintained mooring buoys in the West River in conjunction with its
marina operations.2  Each buoy consists of a float with a boat tie and a steel chain connected
2(...continued)
“(1) Public shellfish beds;
  (2) Private shellfish beds, unless permission is obtained from the leaseholder;
  (3) Cable crossing areas.”
3COMAR 08.04.01.10 states that “‘Group moorings’ means the mooring by a person
of three or more vessels.”
4COMAR 08.04.13.03(A) states, in pertinent part, that:
“A person may not establish a group mooring unless validly registered with
the Department or a designated local government authority.”
Individual personal moorings are apparently not required to be registered.  Their
placement in the waters of the State, however, continues to be limited by COMAR
08.04.13.02.
5See COMAR 08.04.13.03(F).
-4-
to an anchor weighing 100 to 300 pounds.  These anchors rest on the river bottom.  The rest
of the apparatus extends upward to and on the surface.  The mooring buoys are inspected
regularly and the individual parts are replaced over time.  About every ten years, the entire
mooring assembly is pulled up by a crane on a barge for a complete inspection.  During these
inspections, any necessary repairs are done and the mooring, including its anchor, is returned
to the river.
In 1989, Hartge registered a group mooring3 with the Department of Natural
Resources in accordance with COMAR 08.04.13.03.4  Hartge was permitted to register the
group mooring because it complied with the requirements that it have an interest in the
adjacent commercially-zoned riparian land and that it provide a specified number of motor
vehicle parking spaces.  This group mooring registration is renewable every three years.5
6The rule regarding “escaped property,” in a tax context, can be found at Md. Code
(2001 Repl. Vol.), § 8-417 of the Tax-Property Article.  It states, in pertinent part:
  “(a) Defined. — In this section, ‘escaped property’ means any property that:
(1) is subject to assessment for property tax purposes; and
(2) has not been assessed.
   (b) When assessed. — Notwithstanding § 8-418 of this subtitle, after it is
discovered, escaped property is assessed in the same manner as other similar
property is assessed.”
-5-
As part of its marina operation, Hartge rents the mooring buoys to boat owners.  For
a rental fee, the boat owner receives the right to tie up and leave a boat attached to the
mooring buoy with the expectation that it will remain in place, the right to access the water
from the land at the marina, and the right to park a car at the marina.  This rent is part of the
operating income of the marina which is conducted as a business for profit.
In 1994, Whitestake successfully appealed an SDAT decision to tax the mooring
buoys as Whitestake’s property.  In 1999, the Supervisor of Assessments for Anne Arundel
County sent out two assessment notices assessing 74 mooring buoys owned by Hartge as real
property.   The notices covered fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 on the basis that the
buoys were “escaped property.”6
Witnesses for the Supervisor of Assessments stated at the Tax Court hearing that,
since approximately the 1970s, mooring buoys have been valued as real property when
considering the value of a marina for tax purposes.  These witnesses, however, did admit at
the hearing that this case was unique in that the owner of the mooring buoys was different
than the owner of the fast land associated with their use. 
7Section 6-102(e) of the Tax-Property Article provides:
  “(e) Interests in government property. — Unless exempted under § 7-
211,  § 7-211.1, or § 7-501 of this article, the interest or privilege of a
person in property that is owned by the federal, the State, a county, or
a municipal corporation government is subject to property tax as
though the lessee or the user of the property were the owner of the
property, if the property is leased or otherwise made available to that
person:
(1) by the federal, the State, a county, or municipal corporation
government; and
(2) with the privilege to use the property in connection with a
business that is conducted for profit.”
-6-
In an oral opinion rendered on November 14, 2001 and affirmed by a written “Order”
dated January 18, 2002, the Maryland Tax Court found that the river bottom is owned by the
State of Maryland and that Hartge had a “nonexclusive” privilege to place the mooring
buoys on the river bottom.  The Tax Court found that this privilege was a sufficient use to
be taxed as “real property” under Maryland Code (2001 Repl. Vol.), § 6-102(e) of the Tax-
Property Article.7  The Tax Court further found that the mooring buoys were permanent
fixtures to the river bottom.  
On judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Judge Nancy
Davis-Loomis, in a decision dated December 17, 2002, reversed both rulings of the
Maryland Tax Court.  First, the Circuit Court held that the Maryland Tax Court had wrongly
applied § 6-102(e) of the Tax-Property Article.  The Circuit Court found that Hartge had a
renewable license to use mooring buoys and had not been granted a real property interest in
the river bottom.  Therefore, the Circuit Court concluded that § 6-102(e) did not apply.
-7-
Secondly, the Circuit Court disagreed with the Maryland Tax Court’s conclusion that
the mooring buoys were permanent fixtures and therefore taxable as real property.  The
Circuit Court found that the anchors merely rested on the river bottom, were kept there by
weight only, and were not affixed in any way.  The court then applied the “trade fixture” test
and concluded that the buoy moorings were to be considered trade fixtures and, therefore,
“personal property.”
Petitioner then appealed the Circuit Court ruling to the Court of Special Appeals.  On
July 28, 2003, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a Writ of
Certiorari.  
II. Standard of Review 
We begin by noting the appropriate standard of review.  The Maryland Tax Court is
an administrative agency.  See Read v. Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County,
354 Md. 383, 391, 731 A.2d 868, 872 (1999).  Maryland Code (1988, 1997 Repl. Vol.), §
13-532(a) of the Tax-General Article provides that the final order of the Tax Court is subject
to judicial review as provided in §§ 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article,
which govern the standard of review for decisions of administrative agencies.  The standard
of review for Tax Court decisions is generally the same as that for other administrative
agencies.  Accordingly, under this standard, a reviewing court is under no statutory
constraints in reversing a Tax Court order which is premised solely upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.  See, e.g., Supervisor of Assess. v. Carroll, 298 Md. 311, 469 A.2d 858
-8-
(1984); Comptroller v. Mandel Re-Election Comm., 280 Md. 575, 374 A.2d 1130 (1977).
On the other hand, where the Tax Court’s decision is based on a factual
determination, and there is no error of law, the reviewing court may not reverse the Tax
Court’s order if substantial evidence of record supports the agency’s decision.  See CBS Inc.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 319 Md. 687, 698, 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990); Ramsay,
Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 834, 490 A.2d 1296, 1301
(1985); Rouse-Fairwood Ltd. Partnership v. Supervisor of Assessments, 120 Md. App. 667,
685, 708 A.2d 19, 27 (1998); see also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Disclosure, Inc., 340
Md. 675, 682-83, 667 A.2d 910, 913 (1995); Director of Finance v. Charles Towers
Partnership, 104 Md. App. 710, 716-17, 657 A.2d 808, 812 (1995), aff’d sub nom.,
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Director of Finance, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996).
In addition, as we stated in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase,
Inc., 377 Md. 471, 484,       A.2d      ,       (2003):
“When specifically interpreting tax statutes, this Court recognizes that
any ambiguity within the statutory language must be interpreted in favor of the
taxpayer.  In [Comptroller of the Treasury v. Gannett, 356 Md. 699, 707-08,
741 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1999)], we stated:
‘When ambiguities arise in construing tax statutes,
Maryland courts must interpret tax code provisions that aid in
determining taxable income in the taxpayer’s favor.  We noted
in Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 539, 404
A.2d 1045, 1053 (1979), that
“when . . . the applicability of a tax statute and
not a tax exemption is being construed, it is the
established rule not to extend the tax statute’s
provisions by implication, beyond the clear
import of the language used, to cases not plainly
-9-
within the statute’s language, and not to enlarge
the statute’s operation so as to embrace matters
not specifically pointed out.  In case of doubt, tax
statutes are construed ‘most strongly against the
government, and in favor of the citizen.’
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Mandel Re-
Election Comm., 280 Md. 575, 580, 374 A.2d
1130, 1132 (1977); Comptroller of the Treasury
v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107
A.2d 93, 98 (1954).”
III. Discussion
A. Fixture Analysis
The main issue in this case, as we see it, is whether the mooring buoys used by Hartge
at its marina are to be classified as “real property” or “personal property” for taxation
purposes. Under Maryland Code (2001 Repl. Vol.), § 1-101(cc)(1) of the Tax-Property
Article, “‘Real property’ means any land or improvements to land.”  Because the mooring
buoys at issue here are at least initially personal chattels and not in and of themselves land,
the initial question becomes whether these mooring buoys are fixtures that have become
“actually or constructively affixed either to the soil itself, or some structure legally a part of
such soil.”  Schofer v. Hoffman, 182 Md. 270, 274, 34 A.2d 350, 351 (1943); see also
Dudley & Carpenter v. Hurst, Miller & Co., 67 Md. 44, 47-48, 8 A. 901 (1887) (stating the
common law test for identifying fixtures).  If so, they may be considered fixtures and
therefore taxable as real property.
The fixture test, first delineated by this Court in Dudley, was more recently restated
in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. State Department of Assessments and Taxation, 371 Md. 16, 806
8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (7th ed. 1999) defines a “trade fixture” as
“[r]emovable personal property that a tenant attaches to leased land for business purposes,
such as a display counter.  Despite its name, a trade fixture is not [usually] treated as a
(continued...)
-10-
A.2d 648 (2002).  In Colonial Pipeline, we stated:
“The common law test for identifying fixtures considers the following
factors:
‘First, annexation to the realty either actual or constructive.
Second, adaptation to the use of that part of the realty with
which it is connected.  Thirdly, the intention of the party
making the annexation, to make the article a permanent
accession to the freehold, this intention being inferred from the
nature of the article annexed, the situation of the party making
the annexation, the mode of annexation, and the purpose for
which it was annexed.’
Dudley, 67 Md. at 47, 8 A. at 902.  An item is annexed to the land if it cannot
be removed without serious injury. . . .  The second element of the test,
adaptation, is met when an item ‘has become an important or essential part of
the land’s use or enjoyment.’ [RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY, § 57-45 (1969)].  This test requires a relationship between the land
itself and the fixture.  The affixed item must be adapted to the specific use of
the land for it to be characterized as a part of that land.  The intent
requirement, however, is ‘the most important,’ and takes preeminence over the
other two factors.  Dudley, 67 Md. at 48, 8 A. at 902.
“The common law annexation, adaptation, and intention factors as set
forth in Dudley continue to control resolution of questions arising under the
law of fixtures in Maryland.”
Colonial Pipeline, 371 Md. at 33-34, 806 A.2d at 658-59 (alterations added) (some citations
omitted).
While the Dudley factors do continue to control the resolution of fixture disputes,
there exists an important exception to this common law rule — property that can be
classified as a “trade fixture.”  Despite its name, a trade fixture is not actually a fixture.8  We
8(...continued)
fixture — that is, as irremovable.”
-11-
explained the origins of the trade fixtures exception in Colonial Pipeline:
“The trade fixtures exception to the common law rule of fixtures dates
back almost as far as the common law rule itself.  Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S.
137, 143-44, 2 Pet. 137, 7 L. Ed. 374, 376-77 (1829).  In 1802, this Court held
in Kirwan that ‘where a tenant puts up any thing for the purpose of carrying
on his trade, he may remove it.’ 1 H. & J. at 291.  A trade fixture commonly
is defined as an item affixed to realty for the purpose of enabling the tenant
to perform properly a trade or profession, which can be removed without
material or permanent injury to the realty. [RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY, § 57-45 (1969)].  The touchstone for the trade fixtures test,
like the Dudley fixtures analysis, is intent . . . .  When the proper intent is
found, ‘[n]o matter how strongly [the fixtures are] attached to the soil or
imbedded in it, they are treated as personal property, and as such are subject
to removal by the person erecting them.’  N. Cent. Ry. Co. v. The Canton Co.,
30 Md. 347, 352 (1869).”
Colonial Pipeline, 371 Md. at 34-35, 806 A.2d at 659 (some citations omitted).
Under the common law fixtures test, the mooring buoys at issue in the case sub judice
are to be classified, at the most, as trade fixtures and therefore personal property for tax
purposes.  Mooring buoys, as attested to by both petitioner and respondents, are not
permanently affixed to the river bottom, but their anchors are objects that fall to the bottom
due to their sheer weight and rest on the river bottom.  As was also explained, these mooring
anchors are brought up from the river bottom, along with the entire buoy apparatus, by the
use of a crane from time to time — approximately once every ten years — for a complete
inspection to see if any repairs are needed.  As we stated in Colonial Pipeline, “[a] trade
fixture is not annexed to the soil in the manner of a fixture because it must be removable
-12-
without permanently damaging the realty; and the intent of annexing a trade fixture to the
land is to benefit the business of the party annexing the fixture to the land, not the land
itself.”  Id. at 38, 806 A.2d at 661.  That is exactly the situation in respect to the utilization
of mooring buoys described in the case at bar.  The facts of the case sub judice do not
support petitioner’s argument that the mooring buoys are fixtures to be treated as the real
property of Hartge.  For these moorings to be properly deemed fixtures, they would have to
be so affixed to the river bottom that their “removal would result in serious injury to the
property.”  Id.  While the anchors of the moorings are heavy enough to hold large boats in
the same general place, for they would be of little use if this was not so, they can be and are
periodically removed from the West River bottom without causing any damage to the river
bottom.  Petitioner provided no evidence to the contrary.  Therefore, the nature of the
mooring buoys do not meet the first prong of the fixtures test delineated in Dudley.
The most important element of the fixtures test at common law is the intent of the
party installing the fixture.  See Colonial Pipeline, 371 Md. at 37, 806 A.2d at 661 (stating
that “‘[t]he third criterion dealing with intention is preeminent, whereas the first and second
criteria constitute evidence of intention.’” (quoting Lingleville Independent School Dist. v.
Valero Transmission Co., 763 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1989)).  Hartge’s business intentions
concerning the mooring buoys cannot be said to meet the Dudley elements indicating a
permanent fixture.  At the Tax Court hearing, a representative of Hartge stated that, once
Hartge’s lease of the marina expired in 2008, he would “[s]ell [the buoys], get rid of them
-13-
in some way.”  Hartge does not intend to leave the mooring buoys in the river if it does not
renew its lease in the future, nor will the moorings, absent a purchase agreement, belong to
Whitestake after the lease terminates.  Such intent cannot be said to reflect the desire “to
make the article a permanent accession” to the river bottom.  Dudley, 67 Md. at 47, 8 A. at
902.
 Here, the obvious purpose for the installation of the mooring buoys was to generate
rent for Hartge’s marina operation.  This rent is part of the overall income generated by the
marina.  In deciding that a fixture had been designed for trade purposes, this Court in
Colonial Pipeline reasoned that a utility pipeline was used for trade purposes because the
owner was “motivated by a single factor in installing the pipeline system: to operate its
business for profit.”  Colonial Pipeline, 371 Md. at 39, 806 A.2d at 661.  Like the utility
pipeline in that case, we find no other evidence in the record that the mooring buoys were
installed for any other purpose than to provide a means for Hartge to benefit economically.
The mooring buoys do not meet the elements of fixtures under the Dudley test.  At most,
they fall within the trade fixtures exception that we discussed in 
Colonial Pipeline.  The very
reasons that the mooring buoys fail the Dudley fixtures analyses are why they may be
considered trade fixtures — the mooring buoys are not affixed to the soil, they exist simply
to provide marina users a service that Hartge directly profits from, and Hartge never
intended for the mooring buoys to permanently remain on the West River bottom and they
may be removed at any time without damage to the bottom of the watercourse.  As such, the
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mooring buoys, at best, are properly classified as trade fixtures and therefore are to be
considered personal property for tax purposes.
B. Applicability of § 6-102(e)
Petitioner contends that the mooring buoys should be classified as real property for
taxation purposes because of the language of Md. Code (2001 Repl. Vol.), § 6-102(e) of the
Tax-Property Article.  Section 6-102(e) of the Tax-Property Article states:
  “(e) Interests in government property. — Unless exempted under § 7-211,
§ 7-211.1, or § 7-501 of this article, the interest or privilege of a person in
property that is owned by the federal, the State, a county, or a municipal
corporation government is subject to property tax as though the lessee or the
user of the property were the owner of the property, if the property is leased
or otherwise made available to that person:
(1) by the federal, the State, a county, or municipal corporation
government; and
(2) with the privilege to use the property in connection with a business
that is conducted for profit.”
As is evident, the statute merely defines the taxable interest as a “property” interest.
In the case at bar that taxable property interest is a personal property interest in that, even
if the river bottom was owned by a private party the mooring buoys would be, at the most,
“trade fixtures” and not fixtures.  If they were owned by a private party for personal, not
commercial, use, they would not normally even be “trade fixtures.”
It is without question that “nearly all of the navigable waters, as well as the lands
beneath them, are owned by the State . . . .”  Harbor Island Marina v. Board of County
Commr’s, 286 Md. 303, 314, 407 A.2d 738, 744 (1979) (emphasis added).  Therefore,
generally, any use of three or more mooring buoys on the West River bottom by a single
9This authority stems from Md. Code (1973, 2000 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 8-
704(b) of the  Natural Resources Article, which states:
   “(b) Placement of buoys, mooring buoys, etc. — In order to protect the
public safety, welfare, and recreational interests in waters of the State, the
Department may adopt a program relating to the placement of buoys, mooring
buoys, and other apparatus used to secure, berth, or moor vessels in the waters
of the State.  The Department shall consult with any county affected by the
program.”
-15-
private commercial entity such as Hartge must first be registered with the appropriate State
authority.  Here, that State authority exists in the form of the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources (“DNR”).9  Under COMAR 08.04.13.03(A), “[a] person may not
establish a group mooring unless validly registered with the [DNR] or a designated local
government authority.”  As noted, Hartge first registered its group moorings with the DNR
in September of 1989.  
When determining the relevance of § 6-102(e) and whether it applies to mooring
buoys, it is of some interest to also note the language of COMAR 08.04.13.06, which states
that “[t]he placement of a mooring pursuant to these regulations does not create a property
right or an exclusive privilege . . . .” (emphasis added).  This language, in and of itself,
although not determinative, would seem to indicate that the agency does not consider that
Hartge’s mere use of the river bottom for its mooring buoys creates real property rights so
as to be taxable to Hartge under § 6-102(e).  There exists for Hartge no deed, lease, or
easement to the river bottom.  It has at most a mere certificate in the nature of a license.  It
is the apparent intention of the State that mooring “licenses” create no property rights under
-16-
the law of real property.  Petitioner argues, nonetheless, that the language in § 6-102(e) is
so expansive that any type of use by a private commercial entity of State-owned property
makes that commercial entity subject to taxation of the State property as if it was real
property under § 6-102(e).  We do not agree.
In submitting registration documents relating to its mooring buoys to the DNR,
Hartge did not obtain any property rights in or exclusive privilege to use the State-owned
river bottom or any right to affix a “fixture,” as that term is defined by the law of real
property.  It is illogical that Hartge should be taxed under a real property tax assessment
under a statutory and regulatory scheme that expressly provides that it does not create
property rights.  This is especially so when any ambiguity in the statute or regulation must
be construed in favor of the taxpayer.  
We agree with the Circuit Court in its conclusion that what Hartge does possess is a
renewable license to place moorings in the West River, provided that Hartge meets the
requirements of the DNR’s group moorings program.  As this Court has stated, “a license
is merely a privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing
any estate or interest therein.”  Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 320, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945).
See also Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 600, 5 A. 540, 543-44 (1886) (holding that “the
privilege of locating oyster lots [on State-owned river bottom] has no elements of a grant by
patent, but is simply a license, revocable at the pleasure of the Legislature . . . .”) (alteration
added).
-17-
Most pertinent in our conclusion that § 6-102(e) does not have the effect of making
Hartge’s mooring buoys real property for taxation purposes is that, even if Hartge, the “user”
of the property, “were the owner of the property,” as is theorized under § 6-102(e), we
would still find that the mooring buoys cannot be viewed as fixtures to the West River
bottom and, as such, are not taxable as real property.  The Dudley fixtures test places no
weight on whether the owner of the items at issue is the owner or lessee of the land on which
they are placed.  The fixtures test simply determines what is and what is not to be considered
a fixture.  Here, if Hartge was in fact the owner of the river bottom on which the moorings
sit, this would in no way alter the conclusion that the characteristics of the mooring buoys
make them personal property.  Therefore, § 6-102(e) has no legitimate bearing on the
classification of Hartge’s mooring buoys.  They are personal property, for they do not meet
the elements of the Dudley fixtures test, and the language of § 6-102(e) does nothing to alter
this conclusion. 
IV. Conclusion
We hold that the mooring buoys owned by Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc. are, at best, trade
fixtures and, therefore, are properly taxable, if at all, only as personal property.  The
moorings are not permanently affixed to the West River bottom, their purpose is to provide
a means by which Hartge can generate a profit from their rental, and they are not intended
to permanently remain on the river bottom and if removed cause no permanent damage.  As
such, they do not meet the definition of a “fixture” as delineated by this court in Dudley.
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They may, however, meet the definition of “trade fixtures” that this Court recently discussed
in Colonial Pipeline and might be taxable accordingly.  
We hold that the Maryland Tax Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that
the mooring buoys used by Hartge in its marina operation were to be classified as real
property for taxation purposes under § 6-102(e) of the Tax-Property Article.  While the
moorings’ anchors do rest on the bottom of the West River, which is State-owned land,
Hartge’s mere use of this river bottom creates no real property rights, interests, or privileges
so as to be taxable as real property under § 6-102(e).  This is made clear from the language
of COMAR 08.04.13.06.  Hartge’s registration of its group mooring with the DNR under
COMAR 08.04.13.03 creates, at best, merely a license, renewable every three years.  As
such, Hartge cannot be said to have a right, interest, or privilege to the river bottom as
required under § 6-102(e) for real property taxation purposes.
Furthermore, and most importantly, § 6-102(e), as presently written, has little bearing
in resolving this issue because, even if Hartge were the owner of the river bed, this Court
would still hold that the mooring buoys at issue are not fixtures under the law of real
property and absent clear and express statutory language to the contrary are, at best, to be
considered trade fixtures, i.e.,  personal property.  The mooring buoys cannot be considered
fixtures under the Dudley fixtures test.  Theoretical ownership by Hartge of the river bottom,
as § 6-102(e) posits, would do nothing to change this holding.  The mooring buoys would
remain classified as personal property and, under the language of the statute would be so
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considered for taxation purposes.
JU D G M E N T 
O F  
THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE
A R U N D E L  
C O U N T Y
AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO
PAY THE COSTS.