Title: In re Estate of Scheide

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

136 Nev., Advance Opinion bt
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF No. 76924
THEODORE ERNEST SCHEIDE, JR.

ST. JUDE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH 3
HOSPITAL, FILED

Appellant, DEC 31 2000
vs.

‘THEODORE E. SCHEIDE, III,

Respondent.

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition to admit a
lost will in a probate matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;

 

Gloria Sturman, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, and Michael K. Wall and Russel J. Geist, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.

Cary Colt Payne, Chtd., and Cary Colt Payne, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

 

By the Court, SILVER, J.:
Theodore Scheide, Jr’s (Theodore) will disinherited his
biological son, respondent Theodore Scheide, III (Chip), and left his estate

20-4 ¥990

 
to appellant St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. After Theodore's death,
the original will could not be found, and St. Jude petitioned to probate the
lost will. NRS 136.240(3) allows the probate of a lost will if it was in
existence at the testator’s death and at least two credible witnesses prove
the will's provisions. A copy of Theodore’s executed will existed, and St.
Jude provided affidavits of proof of lost will from the attorney who drafted
the will and the attorney's assistant. Both witnessed the will’s execution,
but only the attorney could testify to the wills provisions—the assistant did
not read the will when it was drafted. St. Jude also provided evidence to
the district court that prior to his death, Theodore repeatedly affirmed he
wanted his estate to pass to St. Jude. Chip did not contest the copy’s
accuracy, instead arguing Theodore revoked the will by destruction and that
St. Jude's witnesses did not satisfy NRS 136.240(3). Agreeing with Chip,
the district court denied St. Jude’s petition, leaving Chip free to inherit the
estate, valued at approximately $2.6 million, through intestate succession.

In this opinion, we address whether St. Jude met its burden to
show the will was in legal existence and satisfied NRS 136.240(3)s
requirement that two witnesses prove the will’s provisions. As to the
former, evidence of the testator’s unchanged testamentary intent showed
the will was in legal existence at the testator’s death. As to the latter, an
accurate copy of the will existed, the drafting attorney testified to its
contents, and the second witness testified to witnessing the will’s execution

and to her signature on the copy, thereby proving the will’s provisions for

purposes of the statute. We therefore conclude that under these facts, St.
Jude satisfied the requirements of NRS 136.240(3) and the district court
erred by denying St. Jude's petition to probate the will.

 

 
FACTS

In June 2012, Theodore executed a will leaving his estate to his
life partner, Velma Shay, or to St. Jude in Tennessee if Velma predeceased
him (the June will). St. Jude is a research hospital and nonprofit
organization that studies childhood illnesses and provides free medical care
to sick children. While alive, Theodore donated substantial sums to St.
Jude, and both he and Velma held the hospital in high esteem.

Chip was Theodore’s only biological child. ‘The two had been
estranged for more than 20 years, and Theodore expressly disinherited Chip
and Chip’s descendants in the June will. ‘The drafting attorney, Kristen
Tyler, and her assistant, notary Diane DeWalt, witnessed the June will’s
execution and signed as declarants. Theodore requested that Tyler retain
the original June will. Four months later, in October 2012, Theodore
executed a second will solely to replace the executor (the October will).
Tyler and DeWalt again witnessed the will’s execution and signed as
declarants. Theodore took the executed October will with him.

Velma died in early 2013. Theodore spoke with Tyler several
times during 2013 and 2014 and did not mention wishing to reconcile with
Chip or revoke his will. To the contrary, Theodore stated he did not want
‘Tyler to locate Chip, reiterating that he wished his estate to pass to St. Jude
now that Velma had died.

Kathy Longo, Theodore’s stepdaughter from a prior marriage,
began assisting Theodore following Velma’s death. Longo recalled seeing
the will or a copy on a shelf in Theodore's study. Longo did not know Chip
and Theodore did not mention Chip to her, although she recalled Theodore
mentioning in December 2013 that he was leaving his estate to St. Jude.
‘Theodore began to behave strangely in late 2013 and increasingly struggled

to care for himself, even with Longo's help. Theodore's residential lease

 

 
expired at the end of November, and Theodore moved into a group home, at
which time the majority of his belongings were sold. In December, Longo
informed Tyler that she could no longer help care for Theodore and he
needed a guardian.

In January 2014, Tyler visited Theodore at the group home and
‘Theodore told Tyler he kept his will with him in a bag or box with other
important papers. Susan Hoy from Nevada Guardian Services (NGS)
became Theodore’s guardian in February 2014 after a physician deemed
‘Theodore unable to care for himself. Thereafter, Hoy moved Theodore into
a nursing home and moved his belongings, including his documents, into
storage. During that move, Hoy saw a copy of the October will, on which
Theodore had written, in blue ink, “OCTOBER 2, 2012” and “UP-DATED”
and noted that he was an organ donor. Theodore had also signed the top of
that document in blue ink. Hoy later returned the documents to Theodore.

Theodore became increasingly unstable and expressed anger
towards everyone involved in his care. He died in August 2014, leaving a
multi-million dollar estate. Theodore’s facility boxed up the belongings
‘Theodore had kept with him, and Hoy's office retrieved them. Hoy was
unable to find Theodore’s original October will, although she did find the
written-upon copy, which she delivered to the estate's attorney.

‘The district court appointed Hoy the special administrator of
the estate. Hoy opened Theodore’s safe deposit box but still did not find the
original October will. Hoy speculated to the court that Theodore had
destroyed the original will and recommended the estate pass to Chip. Tyler

learned of Hoy’s recommendation and contacted the estate’s attorney and
St. Jude. Tyler also filed the original June will that she retained with the
court, noting it was substantively identical to the October copy of the will.

 

 
Hoy petitioned the court to approve distribution to St. Jude but, after Chip
contested Hoy’s recommendation, Hoy withdrew it. St. Jude petitioned to
probate the lost will.

Both Tyler and DeWalt filed affidavits of proof of lost will,
stating that they witnessed Theodore sign the October will and that, to their
knowledge, Theodore had not intentionally destroyed or revoked it. ‘Tyler
additionally provided that Theodore did not change the beneficiary
designations in the October will. Chip, however, submitted a declaration
claiming Theodore attempted to reconcile with him before his death.

‘The court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Tyler, DeWalt,
Longo, and Hoy all testified. Tyler testified to the execution of the June and
October wills, the accuracy of the copy of the October will, and Theodore's
unchanged wish to leave his estate to St. Jude. Tyler also testified that, in
early 2014, Theodore affirmatively advised her against contacting Chip.
DeWalt, a notary, likewise testified to witnessing the will’s execution and,
while she could not recall the date of execution, she verified her signature
as declarant on the copy of the October will. Longo testified to seeing either
the original will or a copy in Theodore’s study before he moved into the
group home, and testified Theodore told her in December 2013 that he
wanted St. Jude to inherit his estate. She also testified Theodore made an
annual contribution to St. Jude. Hoy testified she was not aware of

‘Theodore ever discussing his estate planning with anyone at NGS or

 

jicating to them that he wanted to change his will. Hoy maintained she

 

 
believed Theodore had destroyed his will, although she admitted this was
her own speculation.?

‘The district court denied the petition to admit the lost will.
Relevant here, it found the evidence supported that Theodore had lost the
will, but also noted Theodore’s erratic behavior before he moved into an
assisted living facility and found Theodore may have destroyed the will.
The district court further found that only Tyler's testimony satisfied NRS
136.240(3)s two-witness requirement because DeWalt could not recall the
will's provisions. And because the district court concluded that two
witnesses had not proved the lost will's provisions, it determined St. Jude
failed to meet its burden of proof to show Theodore had not revoked the will.
‘The district court therefore denied St. Jude's petition to probate the lost
will,

St. Jude appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the
petition’s denial. See In re Estate of Scheide, Docket. No. 76924-COA (Order
of Affirmance, Mar. 26, 2020). St. Jude filed a petition for review, which we
granted and limited to the issues addressed in this opinion? See NRAP
40B(g) (providing this court “may limit the question(s) on review”).

'Hoy testified Theodore once mentioned to an NGS employee that
they could find his ex-wife and Chip but, because Hoy was not present for
that conversation, she could not provide further details and neither party
called that employee to testify.

2Chip argues this court should summarily deny the petition for review
because St. Jude filed it one day late. Because St. Jude timely filed the
petition, albeit with a caption that prevented it from immediately coming to
this court, we conclude the petition was timely filed under NRAP 40B(c).

 

 
DISCUSSION
This case centers on the interpretation of NRS 136.240(3)
(2009),? which reads as follows:

[NJo will may be proved as a lost or destroyed will
unless it is proved to have been in existence at the
death of the person whose will itis claimed to be, or
is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the
lifetime of that person, nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses.

Restated more plainly, this statute prevents probate of a lost will unless
(2) the lost will either (a) existed at the time of the testator’s death or
(b) was fraudulently destroyed, and (2) two credible witnesses clearly and
distinetly prove its provisions. In this case, the two issues are whether the
will was “in existence at” Theodore’s death* and whether two witnesses
“clearly and distinctly proved” the will's “provisions.”> Id.
Standard of review

A court's “primary aim in construing the terms of a
testamentary document must be to give effect, to the extent consistent with
law and public policy, to the intentions of the testator.” Ziroveic v. Kordic,
101 Nev. 740, 741, 709 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1985) (quoting Concannon v.

°The statute was amended in October 2017 and again in 2019.
Because this case went to trial in June 2017 and the underlying events
‘occurred in 2013-14, we draw from the 2009 statute unless otherwise noted.
2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 358, § 7, at 1624-25.

4St. Jude does not contend the will was fraudulently destroyed during
‘Theodore’s lifetime, and we do not address that portion of the statute.

‘We need not address the effect of NRS 136.240(5), which the parties
did not raise below and the district court did not address. See Old Aztec
Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (holding we
need not address issues that were not raised below).

 

 
Winship, 94 Nev. 432, 434, 581 P.2d 11, 13 (1978)). NRS 132.010 instructs
courts to liberally construe statutes governing wills “so that a speedy
settlement of estates is accomplished at the least expense to the parties.”
Whether the testator revoked a will is a question for the trier fact, In re
Estate of Irvine v. Doyle, 101 Nev. 698, 703, 710 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1985), and
‘we will not disturb the district court's findings so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence, In re Estate of Bethurem, 129 Nev. 869, 876, 313
P.3d 237, 242 (2013).

We review questions of law, including statutory interpretation,
de novo. Chandra v. Schulte, 135 Nev. 499, 501, 454 P.3d 740, 743 (2019).
If the statute's language is clear, this court interprets the plain meaning.
Id. If the statute is ambiguous, this court will consider the legislative intent
and public policy in construing the statute. Id. A statute may be ambiguous
where the language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations.
Id. And “[wJhen the material facts of a case are undisputed, the effects of
the application of a legal doctrine to those facts are a question of law that
this court reviews de novo.” Am. Sterling Bank v. Johnny Mgmt. LV, Inc.,
126 Nev. 423, 428, 245 P.3d 535, 538 (2010).
Whether the will was in existence at Theodore’s death

NRS 136.240(3) states that “no will may be proved as a lost or
destroyed will unless it is proved to have been in existence at the death of
the person whose will it is claimed to be.” (Emphasis added.) St. Jude
argues the district court properly concluded the will was lost but conflated

the issue of whether the will was “in existence” with whether two witnesses

 

could establish the will’s provisions; whereas, Chip asserts the will must

 

 
have been in actual existence at Theodore’s death® and contends the
evidence supports the will was revoked by destruction.

Under common law, a will that could not be found after the
testator's death was presumed revoked by destruction. Irvine, 101 Nev. at
703, 710 P.2d at 1369, But we explained in Irvine that NRS 136.240(3) only
requires the will to be in legal existence at the testator’s death. Id. at 702-
03, 710 P.24 at 1368-69. A will is in legal existence if it was validly executed
and unrevoked by the testator, even if the will is no longer in physical
existence. Id.; see also In re Estate of Cunningham, 574 S.W.3d 214, 217
n.3 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Irvine and holding that legal existence does
not require physical existence). Thus, despite the common law
presumption, a lost will may be probated where the will’s proponent can
“prove that the testator did not revoke the lost or destroyed will during his,
lifetime.” Irvine, 101 Nev. at 703, 710 P.2d at 1369. Because the legal
existence element does not provide a burden of proof, we apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Betsinger v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,
126 Nev. 162, 165, 232 P.3d 433, 435 (2010) (explaining that in the absence
of clear legislative intent, “a preponderance of the evidence is all that is
needed to resolve a civil matter”).

“Chip relies on Howard Hughes Medical Institute v. Gavin, 96 Nev.
905, 621 P.2d 489 (1980). But Gavin, which we address further below, dealt
with NRS 136.240(3)s second requirement, the two-witness requirement.
See, eg., id. at 907, 621 P.2d at 490 (“IA] will may not be proved as a lost or
destroyed will unless it was in existence at the death of the testator and
unless its provisions can be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses.” emphasis added)).

 

 
We have never squarely addressed how the proponent of a lost
will meets its burden of proof to show the will was in legal existence at the
testator’s death. Other courts addressing this question have concluded that
the will’s proponent may meet its burden by presenting evidence of the
testator’s unchanged intent toward the will’s disposition. For example, a
Proponent may rebut the presumption of a lost will’s revocation by
presenting “evidence indicating an unchanged attitude respecting the

in the will. That may be direct evidence, such as declarations of

  

Aispositis
the testator, or circumstantial, from other acts and circumstances which
permit an inference of such an unchanged attitude,” In re Estate of Babcock,
456 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), such as “that [the testator}
entertained a kind and loving attitude toward the proposed beneficiary
under the will up to the time of death,” In re Estate of Strong, 550 N.E.2d
1201, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). See also Williams v. Miles, 94 N.W. 705, 705
(Neb. 1903) (“ITIhis is a presumption of fact only. It may be overcome by
evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to the contrary . . ..”); In re Estate of
Capps, 154 S.W.3d 242, 245-46 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the
presumption of revocation may be overcome by circumstantial evidence); In
re Estate of Wheadon, 579 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah 1978) (recognizing the

 

presumption of revocation can be overcome by evidence of the testator’s
attitude toward the beneficiaries or declarations indicating the testator's
state of mind regarding the will); Jackson v. Hewlett, 77 .E. 518, 520 (Va.
1913) (concluding that the testator's declarations showed “a continued and
unchanged purpose as to the disposition” of his estate, rebutting the
presumption of revocation); In re Auritt’s Estate, 27 P.2d 713, 715 (Wash,
1933) (holding that the presumption of revocation may be rebutted by

“evidence as to the testator’s attitude of mind and his declarations made

 

 
 

between the time of executing the will and the time of his death”); In re
Estate of Richards, 45 V.1. 2817, 289 (2003) (providing that “if the decedent's
declarations are consistent with the terms of the lost will, that fact is
evidence that the decedent did not revoke his will”).7

We likewise agree that the proponent of a lost will may show
the will was in legal existence at the time of the testator’s death by
presenting evidence relevant to whether the testator’s wishes remain
unchanged following execution of the will. This furthers the legislative goal
of ensuring the testator’s wishes are honored where the evidence supports
that the testator did not intend to revoke the lost will. See Hearing on S.B.
277 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 75th Leg. (Nev., May 6, 2009)
(testimony of Mark Solomon, Chair, Probate & Trusts Leg. Subcomm.,

 

explaining an intent to “soften{ ] up the requirements and malkle it easier
to prove a lost will when it is obvious that it was not intended to be
revoked”); Hearing on S.B. 277 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th
Leg. (Nev., Mar. 24, 2009) (testimony of Mark Solomon, Chair, Probate &
Trusts Leg. Subcomm., noting the revisions were “designed to make it easier
to prove a lost will where it is obvious that it was not intended to be
revoked”).

TAdditional relevant evidence may include the access other
individuals have to the will, as those individuals, rather than the testator,
may have destroyed the will. See, e.g., Whatley v. Estate of McDougal, 430
S.W.3d 875 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding the circumstances supported
rebuttal of the presumption where no evidence showed the testator wished
to revoke the will and parties who may have had an interest in destroying
the will had access to it); Strong, 550 N.E.2d at 1206-07 (addressing
whether evidence rebutted the presumption of revocation and noting that
many people had access to the testator’s home and that some of the
testator’s personal items were missing after her death).

ul

 
Here, the district court found the October will was lost and
therefore applied the presumption that Theodore destroyed it. We agree
with the district court on these initial points. The evidence showed that
‘Theodore kept the original October will in his possession, that at least
Longo and Hoy helped move Theodore’s belongings after the will was
executed, and that Theodore’s belongings were sold before he moved into
the group home. The record further suggested Theodore opted to keep his
important papers on his study shelves and later in a bag or box, rather than
ina secure location, Thus, the district court properly concluded the will was
lost and, because the original was never found, properly applied the
presumption of revocation. See Irvine, 101 Nev. at 703, 710 P.2d at 1369,

But the record ultimately supports that the will was in legal
existence at Theodore’s death. The parties submitted the original June will
and a copy of the October will, both of which showed Theodore wished to
disinherit Chip and leave his estate to St. Jude. Substantial evidence
supported that Theodore’s testamentary intent remained unchanged.
‘Theodore made cash contributions to St. Jude during his life, including a
substantial contribution during the year before his death and after he
executed the 2012 wills. After Velma died, Theodore reiterated several
times that he wanted his estate to go to St. Jude. Perhaps most telling,
Theodore kept an “UP-DATED” copy of the October 2012 will with him,
which he notated and signed on the first page while leaving the beneficiary
designation unchanged. Theodore and Chip had long been estranged, and

the evidence supporting Chip’s claim that Theodore's testamentary

 

 
disposition suddenly changed before his death is questionable* and
contradicted by admissible evidence showing Theodore wished to remain
estranged from Chip. And although we acknowledge that testimony
established that Theodore came to dislike those involved in his care after a
guardian had been appointed, this evidence does not support the district
court's decision that Theodore changed the beneficiary of his will in favor of
Chip. Finally, while Theodore’s erratic behavior in the months immediately
before his death provides a theory as to how the will may have gone
missing,? it does not support that the will was no longer in legal existence
at Theodore’s death.

Accordingly, we conclude the evidence shows the will was in
legal existence at the time of Theodore’s death, We next consider whether
St. Jude satisfied NRS 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement.

Whether the witnesses satisfied NRS 136.240(3)

NRS 136,240(3) states, in addition to requiring that a will be in
existence when the testator dies, that “no will may be proved as a lost or
destroyed will .. . unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by
at least two credible witnesses.”

 

"Notably, Hoy admitted her belief that Theodore had destroyed the
will was speculation. As to Theodore’s relationship with Chip, Hoy testified
that an NGS employee told her that Theodore suggested the employee find
Chip. Even assuming, arguendo, such testimony was not hearsay, see NRS
51.035; NRS 51.065; NRS 51.067, this testimony does not show that
Theodore wished to change the disposition of his will to support finding
revocation.

8We note that because Theodore lacked testamentary capacity to
revoke his will after guardianship was instituted in February 2014, his
erratic behavior during the months before his death does not support that
he revoked his will.

 

 
St. Jude argues that because Chip does not dispute the contents
of the October will and they were sufficiently proved at trial, this statute
does not require the witnesses to independently establish the contents of
the lost will and the court could consider the collective evidence to
determine the will’s provisions. And under the facts of this case, St. Jude
contends the witnesses met NRS 136.240(3/'s requirement by having
personal knowledge of either the will’s provisions or its execution. Chip
counters that this court has already held that the statute requires two
witnesses who can independently testify to the will’s contents, citing
Howard Hughes Medical Institute v. Gavin, 96 Nev. 905, 621 P.2d 489
(4980).

In Gavin, the petitioner sought to probate Howard Hughes’ lost,
or destroyed will. Id. at 907, 621 P.2d at 490. The petitioner presented
“only an unexecuted, unconfirmed draft” of the will, and evidence suggested
that Hughes may have drafted at least three other wills thereafter. Id. The
petitioner attempted to use “declarations made by Hughes” and the
statements of “others with personal knowledge of the alleged will” as
“substitute(s] for the second credible witness.” Id. We disagreed that such
evidence could establish the will's provisions as required by NRS
136.240(3). Id. We explained the testator’s statements could not supply
one of the credible witnesses and that the statute “requirels] that each of
the two witnesses be able to testify from his or her personal knowledge” as
to “the contents of the will,” calling it a “strict statutory requirementt J.” Id.
at 908, 621 P.2d at 490 (and noting that this court rejected a similar
argument in In re Estate of Duffill, 57 Nev. 224, 61 P.2d 985 (1936)). While

Chip does not contest that Tyler and DeWalt properly witnessed and
executed the October will.

 

 
we still agree with Gavin's outcome, we are cognizant of important factual
distinctions between that case and the present appeal that weigh against
woodenly applying Gavin’s rationale and holding to situations where an
authentic copy of the lost will is admitted into evidence.

‘The two-witness requirement “protect{s} against the probate of,
spurious wills,” Irvine, 101 Nev. at 703, 710 P.2d at 1369, and in Gavin,
substantial concerns existed as to whether the purported lost will
represented Hughes’ wishes: no evidence showed Hughes ever executed the

will; little evidence existed to prove the will’s provisions, which the parties

 

hotly contested; and evidence suggested subsequent wills existed, 96 Nev.
at 907-09, 621 P.2d at 490-91. No such concerns are present in this case.
‘The copy of the will shows it was executed, the provisions at issue here
remain unchanged from the earlier iteration of the will, and the parties do
not contest the will’s contents.

Other courts addressing similar situations have read the two-
witness requirement more fluidly where other evidence in the case exists—
such as a photocopy of the executed will—that lessens the necessity for both,
witnesses to testify to the will’s contents, particularly where one witness
drafted the will and can testify to the contents. In In re Moramarco’s Estate,
for example, a California appellate court addressed a lost will where the
testator intentionally omitted his brother, Frank. 194 P.2d 740, 741-42
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). The notary who prepared the will testified as to
its provisions, and the notary's wife, who had signed as a witness but had
not read the will, testified to her signature on the will. Id. at 742. As in
NRS 136.240(3), the statute at issue in Moramarco required the provisions
of the lost will to be “clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible

witnesses.” Id. at 741-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district

 

 
court probated a copy of the will over the objection of Frank’s children
(Frank had died), who argued the testator had revoked the will by
destruction and that only one of the two witnesses could testify to its
contents. Id. The appellate court rejected that argument, explaining that
while proof of the contents from two witnesses would be “an indispensable
requirement” where that testimony was the only evidence to establish the
will’s contents, the need for both witnesses to recall the contents lessened
where a copy existed and the witnesses could identify it as a duplicate of
the original will. Id. at 743. Thus, “{ilf it was proved to be a true copy, the
terms of the will were thereby established,” and under such circumstances,
the will’s proponent could meet the statute’s requirements if the credible
witnesses clearly and distinctly proved “the identity of the copy.” Id.

We recognize that Moramarco is not without opposition," and
that historically the two-witness requirement has been construed as
requiring both witnesses to have independent knowledge of the will’s
contents. See 54 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 239 (1999) ("It is generally
held that to be a credible witness, the witness must have independent

See In re Estate of Ruben, 36 Cal. Rptr. 752, 759 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(questioning Moramarco’s validity in light of the statutory language); see
also In re Estate of Lopes, 199 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428 n.7 (Ct. App. 1984) (calling
the two-witness requirement “unsettled” when a copy of the will is
available). Ruben, however, represents an outdated distrust toward copy
machines that is implicitly rejected in NRS Chapter 186. Compare Ruben,
36 Cal. Rptr. at 760 (voicing concerns that “the ubiquitous duplicating
machine” with “its sophisticated process” could “be used improperly” to
replace the witnesses), with NRS 136.240(5Xb) (providing that if the will’s
proponent makes a prima facie showing the will was not revoked by the
testator, then, in the absence of any objection, the court must accept a copy
as proof of the wills terms).

 

 
knowledge of the contents, and an authenticated copy may not be used as a
substitute for one of the required witnesses unless permitted by statute.”)
Yet it is equally established that exceptions to the two-witness requirement
exist. See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 678 (2011) (recognizing an exception that
“allowls] proof by a correct copy of the will and the testimony of one
witness”);!2 A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Proof of contents in establishment
of lost will, 126 A.L.R. Ann, 1139, 1148 (IVXeX(1) (1940) (“Although there is
little express authority on the point, there seems to be no doubt that a
properly identified copy of an alleged lost will is admissible in evidence to
prove the contents thereof... ..”). Moreover, some jurisdictions allow a copy
to provide the will’s contents where a witness can testify to the authenticity
ofthe copy. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-3415 (2012) “If a will is found to
be valid and unrevoked and the original will is not available, its contents
can be proved by a copy of the will and the testimony of at least one credible
witness that the copy is a true copy of the original.”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 11.20.070 (1998) (“The provisions of a lost or destroyed will must be proved
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, consisting at least in part of a
witness to either its contents or the authenticity of a copy of the will.”); cf.
N.Y. Sur. Ct, Proc. Act Law § 1407 (McKinney 1995) (“A lost or destroyed
will may be admitted to probate only if... {alll of the provisions of the will

12Consistent with the recognized exception, Arkansas allows a correct
copy to stand in for one witness. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-302 (1987)
No will of any testator shall be allowed to be proved as a lost or destroyed
will unless: (1) The provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two (2) witnesses, a correct copy or draft being deemed equivalent to one (1)
witness ....”).

 

 
 

are clearly and distinctly proved by each of at least two credible witnesses
or by a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and complete.”)

Pennsylvania addressed what witnesses must do to prove a will
and recognized that both witnesses need not prove a lost will’s contents
when a duly executed copy exists. In re Estate of Wilner, 142 A.3d 796 (Pa.
2016).%° In that case, the testator Isabel Wilner left her estate to her church.
Id, at 798. The drafting attorney and a legal secretary witnessed the will’s
execution. Id. The attorney kept a copy and gave the original to Wilner,
who instructed her live-in caretaker to place the original in an unlocked
metal box and put a copy ina safe. Id. Wilner’s niece unexpectedly visited
and pressured Wilner to move into a nursing home and to give the niece
“certain family documents.” Id. Shortly after Wilner died, her caretaker
realized the will and copy were missing. Id. at 799. Yet Wilner never
mentioned revoking the will to her caretaker or her attorney, who she
continued to talk to regularly. Id. The district court admitted the copy to
probate over the niece’s objection after concluding the evidence rebutted the
presumption of revocation. Id. at 799-800.

In the later appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
the witnesses must prove the validity of the signatures on the documents
and prove that the will was a valid testamentary instrument. Id. at 802-
03, In determining that both witnesses were not required to testify to the
will’s contents, the court observed that “in many cases it will be unlikely

\8Wilner addressed 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3132 (1975), which
provides that “alll wills shall be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two
competent witnesses.” See generally 142 A.3d at 802-06. Although that
statute does not expressly require the witnesses to prove the will’s contents,
the court nevertheless addressed why such proof would be unnecessary
when a copy of the will was available. Id.

18

 
 

that anyone besides the testator and the drafting attorney is aware of the
contents of the will” and that “it is unlikely that a disinterested witness—
such as an attorney's secretary or paralegal—would be able to recall the
document's contents in any event given the amount of time which may pass
between execution and death and the large number of wills such persons
may witness over time.” Id. at 803. The court explained that under
circumstances such as those present in Wilner, where a copy of the will
existed, “there is no need for such knowledge by the witnesses for them to
fulfill their role in confirming the validity of the testator’s signature.” Id.
We find the reasoning in Wilner and Moramarco persuasive.
We recognize the plain language of NRS 136.240(3) requires the will’s
provisions be “clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses.” It follows that in situations where no copy of the will exists and
the only proof of the will’s contents comes from witness testimony, the two
witnesses must each have personal knowledge of the will’s contents. See
Gavin, 96 Nev. at 908, 621 P.2d at 490.4 However, construing NRS
136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement as necessarily requiring both
witnesses to testify to the will’s contents in cases where an accurate copy of
the will exists and the drafting attorney can testify to the contents would
create an absurd result of putting an unnecessary and onerous burden on
the second witness and the petitioner. See State, Private Investigator’s
Licensing Bd. v. Tatalovich, 129 Nev. 588, 590, 309 P.34 43, 44 (2013)

Again, we note the facts surrounding the lost will in Gavin differ
significantly from the lost will in the present case. Notably, in Gavin, there
‘was no copy of an executed will, there was evidence of at least three other
subsequent wills, and the petitioner sought to use the testator’s
declarations and statements from the testator’s deceased attorneys to
establish the will’s contents. 96 Nev. at 907, 621 P.2d at 490.

19

 
(noting we avoid interpretations that would lead to absurd results). When
an accurate copy of the will is available, a more liberal construction
comports with NRS 132.010 and the legislative history discussed above
demonstrating that the revisions to the lost wills statute were “designed to
make it easier to prove a lost will where it is obvious it was not intended to
be revoked.” Hearing on S.B. 277 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th
Leg. (Nev., Mar. 24, 2009) (testimony of Mark Solomon, Chair, Probate &
‘Trusts Leg. Subcomm.).

As pertinent here, we conclude that where an accurate copy of
the will exists and one of the witnesses can testify to the contents, the
second witness may satisfy NRS 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement by
testifying to the testator’s signature on the copy. The second witness's
testimony that the copy contains a fair and accurate depiction of the
testator’s signature on the original will, combined circumstantially with the
testimony of the other witness and the existence of an accurate copy,
confirms the witness was present when the testator executed the will and
proves the second witness's knowledge of that will. This in turn
authenticates the document and proves the will’s provisions for purposes of
the statute.

Here, Chip does not contest the will’s contents or argue the copy
is inaccurate, and the record demonstrates the following: Hoy produced a
copy of the October 2012 will, and Theodore’s estate attorney, Tyler,
produced the original June 2012 will, which is identical in substance to the

October will. Tyler also testified to the wills contents. This evidence proves
the October will’s contents. The district court found that Tyler had a
“distinct recollection of the terms of” the October will and provided
testimony sufficient to satisfy NRS 136.240(3), and the record supports this

 

 
 

finding. The second witness, DeWalt, provided an affidavit stating she had
witnessed the will’s execution by Theodore and signed the will, and at the
trial she affirmed her signature on the copy and testified to the wills
execution. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Tyler and DeWalt
satisfied NRS 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement in proving the wills
provisions and the district court erred by concluding St. Jude failed to meet
the statutory requirements to prove the lost will.
CONCLUSION

NRS 136.240(3) allows a lost will to be probated where the will
was in legal existence at the time of the testator’s death and at least two
credible witnesses clearly and distinetly prove the will’s provisions. Here,
the evidence adduced at trial showed the testator’s disposition toward the
will’s beneficiary remained unchanged, supporting that it was in legal
existence at the testator’s death. An accurate copy of the will existed. The
drafting attorney testified to the contents of the will and provided an
affidavit stating that she signed the will and that the testator signed and
executed the will. The attorney's assistant, who acted as the second
declarant, likewise provided an affidavit stating she was present at the
will’s execution, signed the will, and watched the testator sign the will, and
at trial she testified to witnessing the will’s execution and to her signature
on the copy. Under these facts, NRS 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement

‘Although at trial DeWalt could not recall the date on which she
witnessed the will’s execution, she verified her signature on the October
will, thereby ultimately authenticating that copy. Moreover, her failure to
recall the date does not create a credibility problem where she witnessed
both the June and October wills and signed both as a declarant, and the
provisions at issue here are identical in both wills.

21

 
was satisfied. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions for the

district court to probate the lost will

 

Parraguirre

RCD , J.
Stiglich
Cadish

22