Title: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colley

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colley1994 WY 35871 P.2d 191Case Number: 93-153Decided: 03/24/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE 
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant 
(Applicant),

v.

Alice 
Ione Halstead COLLEY, as personal representative of Jody Glenn Dodgion, 
deceased, and as administratrix of the Estate of Jody Glenn Dodgion, deceased, 
and on behalf of Alice Ione Halstead, as guardian and guardian ad litem for 
Jordan Jody Halstead; and on behalf of Judy Butler, Glenn Dodgion, Bryan Lee 
Butler, Amanda Colleen Butler, and Kayla Dawn Butler,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Frederick 
J. Harrison, Rawlins.

Representing 
Appellee:

Robert 
N. Williams, Meyer and Williams, Jackson.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and TAYLOR, JJ. and BROWN, J. 
(Retired).

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      An insurer 
claiming an interest in a wrongful death cause of action appeals the district 
court's denial of a motion to intervene. The insurer maintains that a judgment 
by default entered as a discovery sanction against an allegedly culpably 
negligent party prejudiced the insurer's ability to protect its interest. The 
district court ruled that the insurer's motion was not 
timely.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, identifies the following 
issues:

I. 
Whether Appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had a right to 
intervene pursuant to Wyo.R.Civ.P. 24(a).

II. 
Whether the motion to intervene was timely made.

III. 
Whether State Farm has a significantly protectable interest in the subject 
matter of this litigation.

IV. 
Whether State Farm's ability to protect its interest is impaired by its not 
being allowed to intervene.

V. 
Whether Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer can adequately represent State Farm's 
interest.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Jody Glenn 
Dodgion (Dodgion) died after suffering head injuries while riding in a truck 
owned by Steven D. Boyd (Boyd). Boyd apparently permitted the truck to be used 
to haul materials and employees of his business, Rock Springs Roofing Company. 
On September 24, 1985, Teddy Ray Dyer (Dyer), an employee of Rock Springs 
Roofing Company, drove the truck to the landfill operated by the City of Green 
River, Wyoming. Dyer and his passenger Dodgion, also an employee of Rock Springs 
Roofing Company, were leaving the landfill when the truck collided with a cable 
which was secured by a heavy steel chain. The barrier had been extended across 
the road by employees of the City of the Green River to prevent use of the 
landfill. The obstruction snapped from the impact and a length of chain 
penetrated the rear window of the truck striking Dodgion.

[¶5]      On September 23, 
1987, Alice Ione Halstead Colley, the personal representative of Dodgion's 
estate and guardian of Dodgion's son, and other claimants (collectively Colley) 
filed a wrongful death action in the Third Judicial District in and for 
Sweetwater County, Wyoming (hereinafter state district court). See Butler v. 
Halstead By and Through Colley, 770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1989) (holding mother and 
siblings could join in wrongful death cause of action brought by surviving 
child). Colley sought damages from the City of Green River and Dyer. Colley 
alleged that the City of Green River had been negligent in failing to provide a 
safe means of closing the road from the landfill. Colley also alleged Dyer was 
culpably negligent in the manner in which he operated Boyd's truck. Boyd was not 
a named party to the wrongful death action. See State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶6]      Colley failed to 
complete personal service of process of Dyer because he had apparently left 
Wyoming. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 (1988) (appointing Secretary of State 
as agent to receive service of process for non-resident motorists). Boyd's 
insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), was 
notified of the action against the driver of the truck. State Farm retained 
counsel to act on behalf of Dyer and to respond to the wrongful death 
action.

[¶7]      Despite retaining 
counsel for Dyer, State Farm maintained that under its policy of insurance with 
Boyd, it had no obligation to tender a defense or to indemnify Dyer for any 
judgment. State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming (hereinafter federal district court) 
claiming that language of the policy did not provide coverage for business use 
of Boyd's truck. The federal district court agreed that State Farm had no 
obligation to tender a defense or pay any judgment that might be entered against 
Dyer. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, No. C88-0148-B, slip op. 
at 2 (D.Wyo. July 28, 1989). On August 17, 1989, Colley appealed the federal 
district court ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. In an opinion published March 15, 1994, the decision of the federal 
district court was affirmed. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. 
Dyer, 19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994).

[¶8]      Meanwhile, the 
counsel retained to act on Dyer's behalf by State Farm filed an answer in state 
district court challenging the substituted service of process. The state 
district court ruled that service of process was defective. An appeal to this 
court reversed that ruling and remanded the matter for a hearing to determine 
whether Colley had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Dyer under 
the non-resident motorist statute. Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565, 569 
(Wyo. 1991).

[¶9]      Following remand, 
the state district court ruled that Colley had exercised due diligence in 
attempting to locate Dyer. Therefore, Colley was permitted to proceed with the 
wrongful death action against Dyer. By then, the City of Green River had reached 
a separate settlement with Colley and was dismissed from the action with 
prejudice.

[¶10]   During pretrial proceedings, Colley 
renewed an earlier motion for an order striking Dyer's answer and affirmative 
defenses as a sanction for his failure to participate in discovery. W.R.C.P. 
37(b)(2)(C). On November 2, 1992, the state district court ordered that Dyer's 
answer and affirmative defenses be struck from the record. The state district 
court also granted a judgment by default against Dyer on the issue of liability. 
The state district court scheduled a hearing to determine the amount of 
damages.

[¶11]   On March 19, 1993, State Farm filed 
a motion to intervene in the wrongful death action in state district court. 
State Farm sought to intervene to obtain an order vacating the judgment against 
Dyer on the issue of liability. State Farm also sought to intervene to assert 
various defenses, including the comparative negligence of other 
actors.

[¶12]   The state district court denied 
State Farm's motion to intervene. The state district court noted that in 
November of 1989, Colley had initially filed a motion to strike Dyer's answer 
without any effort by State Farm to intervene. The state district court ruled 
the motion to intervene was not timely. Furthermore, the state district court 
found that State Farm's interests were not prejudiced. A motion for W.R.C.P. 11 
sanctions sought by Colley was denied.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶13]   W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) permits a party 
to intervene as of right in an action:

(a) 
Intervention of right. - Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action:

* 
* * * * *

(2) 
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties.

[¶14]   Four conditions must be satisfied 
to permit intervention as of right under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). First, the applicant 
must claim an interest related to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action. Second, the applicant must be so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the 
applicant's ability to protect that interest. Third, there must be a showing 
that the applicant's interest will not be adequately represented by the existing 
parties. Fourth, the application for intervention must be timely. James S. 
Jackson Co., Inc. v. Horseshoe Creek Ltd., 650 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1982) 
(quoting Platte County School Dist. No. 1 v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 
638 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Wyo. 1982)). An applicant who fails to meet any one of 
these conditions is not permitted to intervene as of right under W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2). Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 638 P.2d  at 1280. While State 
Farm maintains its application for intervention satisfied all four conditions, 
we need only address the interest requirement of the first condition and the 
timeliness requirement of the fourth condition. W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).

[¶15]   Questions of law and judicial 
discretion are presented by the denial of a motion to intervene. Platte 
County School Dist. No. 1, 638 P.2d  at 1278. This court accords no deference 
to a district court's decisions on issues of law. Prudential Preferred 
Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993). 
Therefore, if the district court erroneously denied intervention as of right 
under the first, second or third conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), we will 
reverse. However, the determination of the timeliness of an application to 
intervene is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Curless v. 
Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 432 (Wyo. 1985). The district court is permitted to 
weigh the timeliness of an application to intervene in light of the 
circumstances of the particular case, including whether the applicant may have 
sought intervention earlier. Id. Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from a 
finding that an application to intervene is untimely, an abuse of discretion 
must be demonstrated. See also 7C Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 1923 
(1986 & Cum.Supp. 1993).

[¶16]   In Platte County School Dist. 
No. 1, 638 P.2d  at 1279, this court defined the interest necessary to seek 
intervention. We require that the party seeking to intervene as of right must 
have a "significantly protectable interest" in the subject of the litigation. 
See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S. Ct. 534, 542, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1971) (adopting significantly protectable interest test for 
F.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), which is substantially similar to W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2)). The 
"significantly protectable interest" is distinguished from one which is "merely 
contingent" or similar to the interest of any other member of the public. 
Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 638 P.2d  at 1279.

[¶17]   State Farm argues its interest in 
the litigation between Colley and Dyer is not contingent. State Farm asserts 
that despite its denial of coverage, an insurer has a right to intervene in a 
tort action to prevent an unfavorable judgment. We 
disagree.

[¶18]   In Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 632 (1st Cir. 1989), the court carefully considered 
the "significantly protectable interest" of an insurer after the insurer had 
adopted a position contesting or denying coverage for a potential claim while 
still providing a defense for the insured. The court determined the force of law 
favors a position that an insurer contesting or denying coverage has only a 
contingent interest in the liability phase of a proceeding and, therefore, is 
not permitted to intervene as of right. Id. at 638-39. "Allowing the 
insurer to intervene to protect its contingent interest would allow it to 
interfere with and in effect control the defense." Id. at 
639.

[¶19]   Dingwell builds upon a framework 
established in Restor-A-Dent Dental Laboratories, Inc. v. Certified Alloy 
Products, Inc., 725 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1984). The court in Restor-A-Dent 
Dental Laboratories, Inc. affirmed the denial of an application from a 
general liability insurer to intervene as of right in an action filed against 
its insured. The insurer insisted that it had no coverage obligation for a 
portion of the damages sought by the plaintiff, 
Restor-A-Dent.

[T]he 
transaction that is the subject matter of the action is [the insured's] delivery 
of allegedly defective alloy to Restor-A-Dent for the latter's use in producing 
dental products; this, in turn, led to Restor-A-Dent's claim for damages against 
[the insured] for breach of contract. [The insurer's] interest, on the other 
hand, is in the amount it will have to pay [the insured] if Restor-A-Dent wins. 
Accordingly, [the insurer] does not have an interest in the subject matter of 
the action between Restor-A-Dent and [the insured]. * * * In addition, the 
interest asserted by [the insurer] depends upon two contingencies. The first is 
a jury verdict for Restor-A-Dent, for only then will the question of [the 
insurer's] liability become relevant. The second contingency is a finding in 
litigation not yet even commenced between [the insurer] and [the insured] that 
[the insurer] is not responsible for indemnification of certain types of losses 
under the terms of the policy.

Id. 
at 875. The court held the insurer's economic interest in the outcome of the 
litigation was not a "significantly protectable interest" which would permit 
intervention as of right. Id. at 875-76.

[¶20]   Influential state court decisions 
have also adopted the view that an insurer is not permitted to intervene as of 
right when coverage is contested or denied. The insurer in Kaczmarek v. 
Shoffstall, 119 A.D.2d 1001, 500 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (1986) provided a defense 
for the insured against causes of action for negligence and intentional tort. 
However, the insurer disclaimed coverage under a homeowner's policy for any 
intentional tort. The insurer sought to intervene to provide a vigorous defense 
to the negligence action and request a special verdict from the jury. The court 
held the insurer was not entitled to intervene as of right because the coverage 
issues could be litigated in a subsequent action. Id. 500 N.Y.S.2d  at 
903. In Donna C. v. Kalamaras, 485 A.2d 222 (Me. 1984), the court 
affirmed the denial of an insurer's application for intervention as of right in 
a medical malpractice action. The insurer sought to assert various coverage 
defenses during the tort action. The court held the insurer's interests were 
contingent upon a verdict against the insured physician and a determination of 
the coverage questions. Id. at 223. See also United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co. v. Adams, 485 So. 2d 720, 722 (Ala. 1986) (holding insurer who 
contested coverage for intentional torts had only a contingent interest which 
did not permit intervention as of right) and Kuperstein v. Superior Court 
(Allstate Ins. Co.), 204 Cal. App. 3d 598, 251 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1988) 
(holding insurer who denied coverage had no direct interest in tort action which 
would authorize permissive intervention).

[¶21]   Furthermore, strong public policy 
considerations support the denial of an insurer's application to intervene in 
underlying tort litigation. "Clearly the policy of the law is to keep the issue 
of insurance out of personal injury litigation." Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Ind. App. 1984) (holding insurer is not permitted to intervene 
in underlying tort action to litigate coverage issues). W.R.E. 411 reflects this 
policy by generally prohibiting the introduction of evidence of insurance. As 
the court noted in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154, 159 (1990), permitting insurance companies to intervene and become a party 
to a tort proceeding leads to multiple problems, including forcing the insured 
to defend against both the resources of the plaintiff and the 
insurer.

[¶22]   The subject matter of the state 
district court action between Colley and Dyer is an apportionment of tort 
liability for wrongful death. State Farm claims an interest in minimizing any 
judgment for damages. However, State Farm simultaneously maintains it has no 
obligation to defend Dyer and no obligation to indemnify Dyer for any judgment 
under the terms of the policy issued to Boyd. Therefore, State Farm's interest 
in the wrongful death action is "merely contingent." Platte County School 
Dist. No. 1, 638 P.2d  at 1279; Dingwell, 884 F.2d  at 639; 
Restor-A-Dent Dental Laboratories, Inc., 725 F.2d  at 875; Adams, 
485 So. 2d  at 722; Donna C., 485 A.2d  at 223. 

[¶23]   State Farm maintains that without 
intervention, there will be no ability to assert defenses including, for 
example, the comparative negligence of the actors. This argument ignores the 
obligation of the state district court to make an allocation of damages after 
granting a judgment by default. While the judgment entered by the state district 
court established Dyer's liability for his actions, as a matter of law, the 
apportionment of damages required by Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(i) or (ii) (1988) 
remains to be determined. See W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) (providing for a damages 
hearing or a trial by jury when permitted by statute following an order for a 
judgment by default).

[¶24]   W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) requires that an 
applicant seeking to intervene as of right claim an "interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action * * *." We hold State 
Farm's application for intervention failed to meet this condition. The decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, supports our position. If no appeal is forthcoming of that decision, 
State Farm will have no interest under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) in the outcome of this 
litigation.

[¶25]   There is contrary authority, upon 
which State Farm relies; however, we agree with the court in Dingwell, 
884 F.2d  at 638-39 n. 13, that this authority may be distinguished. In 
Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377 (Miss. 1987), the court 
held an insurer, who learned of a tort suit only after a judgment by default had 
been entered, would be permitted to intervene as of right. While the insurer 
denied coverage, the court chose to follow some pre-1966 federal authorities 
which permitted insurers to intervene under a former version of F.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2). Pittman, 501 So. 2d  at 383-84 n. 4. Recently, in Perry County 
v. Ferguson, 618 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (Miss. 1993), the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi distinguished the "unique facts" supporting intervention in 
Pittman:

(1) 
A default judgment had been taken against the putative 
insured;

(2) 
The putative insured had sued Guaranty National Insurance Company in a separate 
action for actual and punitive damages alleging it guilty of bad faith in its 
handling of the case, and in particular, its failure to indemnify and 
defend;

(3) 
The judgment debtor was apparently unable to pay the $400,000.00 
judgment;

(4) 
The judgment creditor had filed garnishment proceedings against Guaranty to 
collect the judgment, and Guaranty by counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment 
to determine if the judgment debtor was an "insured" under its insurance 
contract;

(5) 
Guaranty hired separate counsel for the judgment debtor and by its own attorney 
sought intervention for the limited purpose of setting the default judgment 
aside; and

(6) 
The judgment debtor took no appeal from the judgment.

Without 
proof of these "unique facts," the court in Ferguson held that an applicant with 
only a contingent economic interest in the outcome of tort litigation would not 
be permitted to intervene as of right. Ferguson, 618 So. 2d  at 1273. The 
"unique facts" identified in Pittman are not all present to support State 
Farm's application for intervention as of right.

[¶26]   Similarly, other authority upon 
which State Farm relies may be distinguished by unique facts. In Su Duk Kim 
v. H.V. Corp., 5 Haw. App. 298, 688 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1984), the court 
permitted an insurer to intervene in a tort action because the insureds had 
effectively removed themselves from the case by negotiating a deal with the 
plaintiff. Under terms of a stipulation entered into by the insureds, issues of 
liability and damages were determined and the plaintiff agreed to a covenant not 
to execute the judgment against the insureds. Id. at 1160. These events 
all occurred after a partial summary judgment was entered in a related 
declaratory judgment action which found the insurer had no coverage obligation. 
Id. The partial summary judgment was later set aside and the insurer then 
sought to defend the tort action. Id. See also Campbell v. Plank, 
133 F.R.D. 175, 176 (D.Kan. 1990) (permitting insurer to intervene after 
plaintiff and insured entered into settlement agreement with covenant not to 
execute judgment against insured); McGough v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 143 Ariz. 26, 691 P.2d 738, 741 (1984) (permitting insurer to 
intervene after plaintiff and putative insured stipulated to liability and 
damages with covenant not to execute judgment against insured and to seek 
recovery only from insurer); and Brandt v. John S. Tilley Ladders Co., 
145 Ill. App.3d 304, 99 Ill.Dec. 534, 537, 495 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (1986) 
(permitting insurer to intervene to protect subrogation rights after judgment by 
default was entered against insured as a discovery sanction). The unique facts 
present in these authorities do not support State Farm's application for 
intervention.

[¶27]   The application of State Farm to 
intervene was also not timely. The timeliness of an application to intervene as 
of right under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is determined by an evaluation of the totality 
of the circumstances. Curless, 708 P.2d  at 432. Stallworth v. Monsanto 
Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977) identified four factors that are used 
to evaluate the timeliness of an application to intervene as of right. First, 
the length of time the applicant for intervention knew or reasonably should have 
known of its interest in the case before the application for leave to intervene 
was filed. Id. Second, the extent of the prejudice that the existing 
parties to the litigation may suffer as a result of the applicant's failure to 
seek intervention as soon as the applicant actually knew or reasonably should 
have known of its interest in the case. Id. at 265. Third, the extent of 
the prejudice that the applicant for intervention may suffer if the application 
is denied. Id. Fourth, the existence of unusual circumstances militating 
either for or against a determination that the application is timely. Id. 
at 266. See also Annotation, Timeliness of Application For 
Intervention as of Right Under Rule 24(a) of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 57 A.L.R.Fed. 150 (1982) (collecting cases using totality of the 
circumstances evaluation of timeliness).

[¶28]   The analysis applied to the four 
timeliness factors is illustrated by Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 
20-24 (1st Cir. 1980). In Culbreath, four labor unions sought to intervene in a 
class action lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the hiring and promotion 
practices of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. at 17. The labor 
unions waited more than four years after initiation of the action but filed 
their application for intervention within two months of the submission of a 
consent decree settling the suit. Id. The court determined that each of 
the four labor unions did not act in a timely manner because the unions knew or 
should have known of the filing of the complaint and the possible effect of the 
action on union members long before the applications for intervention were 
filed. Id. at 20. The court saw "little merit" in the unions' contention 
that they learned of their interest in the action only after the class was 
certified and the consent decree was submitted. Id. at 21. It was 
"obvious," according to the court, that from the inception of the action, the 
unions may have had an interest; however, they failed to act in a timely manner. 
Id.

[¶29]   The court in Hartford Acc. and 
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 78 Md. App. 343, 553 A.2d 251, cert. 
denied, 316 Md. 427, 559 A.2d 790 (1989) addressed the timeliness of two 
insurers' applications for intervention in a tort action. The plaintiffs were 
injured when a truck collided with their car. The plaintiffs filed a personal 
injury action against several potentially negligent parties, including the truck 
driver. Id. at 252. The insurers retained counsel for some party 
defendants, but denied any coverage responsibility for the truck driver. 
Id. After the truck driver failed to answer the complaint, a judgment by 
default was granted in favor of the plaintiffs and against the truck driver. 
Id. at 253. As a trial on damages neared, the insurers attempted to 
intervene as of right claiming their interests would be unrepresented because of 
the judgment against the truck driver and the dismissal of the insured parties 
from the action. Id. at 254. The court noted that the insurers were aware 
in 1983 that the plaintiff intended to hold them liable for any judgment that 
might be rendered against the truck driver. Id. at 258. Despite this 
knowledge, however, the insurers waited for nearly three years before seeking 
intervention. Id. at 259. After those applications for intervention were 
denied and the district court's denial was affirmed on appeal, Hartford Ins. 
Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. App. 615, 519 A.2d 219 (1987), the insurers renewed 
their motions to intervene more than twenty-two months after the damages had 
been determined by jury verdict. Birdsong, 553 A.2d  at 256. The court 
affirmed that the renewed motions were also untimely. Id. at 
259.

[¶30]   Similarly, State Farm failed to act 
in a timely manner. From the inception of the action by Colley against Dyer on 
September 23, 1987, State Farm has known of its contingent interest in the 
litigation. Because of that interest, State Farm retained counsel on Dyer's 
behalf while seeking declaratory judgment in federal district court that there 
was no coverage obligation. During this time period, State Farm was also aware 
that Dyer was unavailable and that Colley had first sought to strike Dyer's 
answer on November 13, 1989. Only after the motion to strike was renewed and an 
order granting the motion was issued on November 2, 1992, did State Farm attempt 
to intervene. Even then, State Farm waited until March 19, 1993, more than five 
years after this litigation was commenced, to file its application to intervene. 
We hold the state district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
State Farm's application to intervene as untimely. Curless, 708 P.2d  at 
432; Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 20-24; Birdsong, 553 A.2d  at 
258-59.

[¶31]   Finally, Colley requests that we 
certify that there was no reasonable cause for this appeal and tax as costs 
$5,000.00 in attorney's fees. W.R.A.P. 10.05. We decline the invitation. In 
James S. Jackson Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 677 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1984), we 
held that awarding costs is inappropriate when the appeal involves a 
discretionary ruling on an application for intervention as of right. Therefore, 
the request for costs is denied.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶32]   Intervention as of right requires 
that the applicant demonstrate an interest in the action sufficient to satisfy 
W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). The interest State Farm asserted was contingent. Furthermore, 
the application for intervention as of right was untimely. The state district 
court properly denied the application for intervention as of 
right.

[¶33]   The decision of the state district 
court is affirmed.