Title: Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Smith

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

311 N.E.2d 424 (1974)
TRANSPORT MOTOR EXPRESS, INC., Appellant (Defendant-below),
v.
Delores J. SMITH et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs-below), and Riss and Company, Inc., Appellee (Defendant-below).
No. 574S99.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 21, 1974.
T.E. Cunningham, John T. Rocap, Indianapolis, for appellant; Rocap, Rocap, Reese & Young, Indianapolis, of counsel.
F. Boyd Hovde, W. Scott Montross, Indianapolis, for appellees (plaintiffs below) Delores J. Smith, James Michael Jessee, Kenneth Wayne Jessee, Gina Renee Jessee; Townsend, Hovde & Townsend, Indianapolis, of counsel.
David A. Steckbeck, William C. Moore, Steckbeck & Moore, Indianapolis, for appellee (defendant below) Riss & Co., Inc.
GIVAN, Justice.
On February 7, 1967, the decedent, James Willard Jessee, died as a result of accidental injuries received during his operation of a truck, owned by Riss & Company, Inc. The question for decision in this case is whether or not Transport Motor Express, Inc., was also to be considered an employer of Jessee by reason of the fact he was operating a truck which had been leased by him as agent for Riss to Transport Motor Express, Inc., for the purposes of a single trip.
The plaintiffs below were Jessee's widow and his three minor children, each of whom was his dependent at the time of his death.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals which we are reviewing today was handed down December 4, 1972, and reported in 289 N.E.2d 737, 34 Ind.Dec. 42. In a prior opinion reported in 279 N.E.2d 262, 29 Ind.Dec. 417, the Court of Appeals had returned this case to the Industrial Board stating that the Board's findings of fact were insufficient and directing that the Board make additional findings of fact to support its award and specific enough to permit the Court of Appeals "intelligently to review said award."
The Industrial Board, pursuant to the opinion by the Court of Appeals, submitted additional findings of fact. However, the Court of Appeals in the decision which we are now reviewing still contends that even these additional findings of fact submitted *425 by the Industrial Board are insufficient for proper review. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and find that upon examining the findings of fact by the Industrial Board that those findings do, in fact, meet the standards which are set out in the Court of Appeals' decision and with which we agree.
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the law, but has failed to apply that law to the facts in the case at bar. The amended findings of fact filed by the Industrial Board with the Court of Appeals, omitting caption and signatures, reads as follows:
The Court of Appeals takes the position that the above findings of fact are fatally defective because they fail to resolve the dispute between the parties as to the "factual inferences" to be drawn from the trip lease agreement when that agreement is *427 considered with reference to what took place before and after its execution.
The Court of Appeals has used the terminology "factual inferences" when they are actually referring to legal conclusions which may be drawn from the facts as stated by the Industrial Board.
The Court of Appeals contends the Industrial Board did not resolve the "factual inferences" which TMX now contends should have been concluded from an examination of the lease instrument. TMX contends the lease is a "mere fiction," a device made necessary by what TMX calls "some archaic regulation of ICC." The attempt by some public carriers to present such an argument is not new in our courts.
In Daniels v. Terminal Transport Company, Inc. and Borinstein (1954), 125 Ind. App. 28, 119 N.E.2d 554, the Court of Appeals responded to an identical argument. In that case the Court stated at page 34, 119 N.E.2d at page 557:
The question before us is whether or not there are sufficient facts set out in its findings by the Industrial Board upon which the Court of Appeals or this Court can render a judicial determination as to the law applicable to such facts. When we examine the facts filed by the Industrial Board we see that they find:
1. That the decedent was dispatched by Riss with the intent to trip lease himself and his equipment to TMX.
2. That Riss at that time had no Interstate Commerce Commission or Public Service Commission authority to carry explosives in Indiana over the distances in this case.
3. That TMX had Interstate Commerce and Public Service Commission authority for the cargo and the route involved in this case.
4. That Riss had no terminal in Terre Haute and that TMX did have a terminal in Terre Haute and one in Joliet, Illinois.
5. That on February 5, 1967, the decedent reported to the Terre Haute terminal of TMX where he entered into a trip lease agreement on behalf of Riss, pursuant to which he acquired TMX placards which were placed on the vehicle. Those placards showed TMX to be the lessee and carried the Interstate Commerce Commission numbers and Public Service Commission numbers.
6. The decedent then drove the truck which was subject to the trip lease agreement to Crane, Indiana, where it was loaded with explosives.
7. Decedent's destination under the trip lease agreement was the TMX terminal in Joliet, Illinois, at which point the trip lease was to terminate.
8. At the time of his death, decedent was enroute from Crane, Indiana, to the TMX terminal in Joliet, Illinois, and had not completed the trip called for by the terms of the lease.
9. While operating under the trip lease agreement, the decedent was required by TMX to follow a specific route and to keep a log of his activities which was furnished to TMX.
10. During the trip lease TMX had the right to stop the driver and equipment and to require replacement of either the driver or equipment for any violation of ICC or PSC rules and regulations.
*428 In the case of Jackson Truck Co. v. Interstate M.F. System (1952), 122 Ind. App. 546, 104 N.E.2d 575, the Court of Appeals, after reciting almost an identical set of facts as above set out, at page 557, at page 580 of 104 N.E.2d stated the following:
See also Long v. Sims Motor Transport Co. et al. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 504, 117 N.E.2d 276.
As we perceive this case, if there are any facts which have been omitted by the findings of the Industrial Board, they would be merely incidental. It is difficult to conceive of any fact which could be added to those recited which would change the legal conclusions found by the Board. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals in Daniels, supra, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals should concern itself with "facts" which had been presented and argued by the trucking company that the ICC regulations are archaic, and that a lease is not, in fact, a lease so long as ICC requires such leases and so long as they are executed and used in the manner described by the findings of fact by the Industrial Board.
In this case the parties are, as a matter of fact, joint employers of the driver of the vehicle. We recognize that as stated in previous decisions, cases of this nature must be decided upon their facts, and that different arrangements might be made in different leases. However, the facts recited in this case are quite ample for the application of existing law.
Transfer is, therefore, granted, and the decision of the Industrial Board is sustained.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and HUNTER, J., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion in which PRENTICE, J., concurs.
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
There are three elements missing from these findings of facts, the presence of which are necessary to render the findings sufficiently specific to permit a rational and properly limited court review.
1. The findings do not identify which facts produced the Board's conclusion that James Jessee was an employee of Transport Motor Express at the time of the accident. The findings of facts, are merely a list of all facts found, stated in chronological sequence.
2. The findings do not include factual inferences, which a reading of them indicates, had to have been made in order for the Board to have reached its determination that a relationship of employment as defined by the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act of 1929, I.C. 1971, 23-3-6-1, being Burns § 40-1701, existed between James Jessee and Transport Motor Express. There is no finding, for example that the lease agreement reached between Riss & Company, James Jessee, and Transport Motor Express was in reality a contract of hire, or that James Jessee was to be paid by Transport Motor Express for his services.
*429 3. The findings do not reveal to the reader the factual theory underlying its determination that James Jessee was an employee of Transport Motor Express. The significance which the Board attributed to the various findings is not stated. The majority opinion is erroneous in formulating its own factual theory and then identifying the facts which the Court deems supportive of a successful application of that theory. This is the function and the work of the Board and not a court on review.
The Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case to the Board for further specification of facts.
For the reasons stated above, and for the additional reason that I do not consider this case to fall within the framework of our transfer jurisdiction since the Second District of the Court of Appeals has not decided the case on the merits adversely to either party, I cannot concur in the disposition of this case made by the majority.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.