Title: IN THE INTEREST OF KAA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF KAA2001 WY 2418 P.3d 1159Case Number: C-00-2Decided: 03/02/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                               *March 2, 2001      

 

IN THE 
INTEREST OF KAA, minor:

 

KAA,

Appellant

(Respondent),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Petitioner).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

Nicholas 
H. Carter and Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, WY.  Argument by Ms. Seeger.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions 
Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Cooley.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 

*This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on August 21, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
This case was reassigned to Justice Hill on February 5, 
2001.

 

  
            
HILL, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant KAA 
contends that the juvenile court violated his constitutional rights in allowing 
his codefendant/conspirator SS to testify that he had admitted to, and had been 
punished for, a violation of the same criminal statute, conspiracy to commit 
fourth degree arson1, which was the subject of KAA's 
dispositional hearing2.  As a result, KAA asserts the juvenile 
court's dispositional order must be reversed.

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      KAA poses the 
only issue in this appeal as follows:

 

            
Whether the juvenile court erred in allowing a codefendant witness to 
testify that he had admitted to the same charge for which the Appellant was on 
trial for and which arose out of the same set of 
circumstances.

 

The 
State rephrases that issue only slightly:

 

Whether 
the juvenile court committed reversible error in allowing one witness to testify 
that he had admitted his involvement in the events which led to Appellant's 
trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      KAA and SS were 
students at a junior high school.  
Both were 13 years of age at the time of this incident.  On April 12, 1999, a custodian walked 
into a boys' restroom in the school building.  As the custodian entered, SS was leaving 
and he stepped back a moment to alert someone else in the restroom that the 
custodian was entering.  The only 
other person in the restroom was KAA.  
The custodian noticed that there was a paper towel afire in a garbage can 
and that the fire had been going only a very short period of time.  (The flame was only ¼ inch in height, 
and only 1½ inches of the towel had burned; the custodian said he could tell it 
had just been lit.)  The custodian 
took KAA to the school principal's office and related to the principal what he 
had observed.

 

[¶5]      KAA admitted 
nothing at first, but SS immediately admitted to his and KAA's involvement in 
setting the fire.  SS related that 
he and KAA had been planning to set the fire for a couple of days, and that they 
had agreed to set the fire in order to get out of school for awhile.  During the lunch period on April 12, 
1999, they decided to set the fire that day.  SS handed one lighter to KAA and it did 
not work.  (SS may also have tried 
to use that lighter and noticed that it had no fuel in it.)  SS then handed KAA a second lighter, and 
KAA used it to set the paper towel afire.  
SS also related that he had set fire to toilet paper strung across a 
toilet seat on two occasions, and that KAA had done the same thing on two 
occasions.  Those four incidents 
were also planned by KAA and SS in tandem, though each act was committed 
individually and outside the presence of the other.  Both SS and KAA were interviewed on the 
day of the fire and neither had a lighter in his pocket, though SS admitted that 
he had one of the two lighters concealed in his shoe.

 

[¶6]      After the school 
principal had talked with both boys, the police were called.  Although KAA admitted no involvement 
initially, he eventually changed his story several times and finally admitted to 
participating in lighting the fire on April 12, 1999, as well as to setting the 
"toilet seat" fires.  However, he 
denied having conspired to set the fire.  
Because of this incident, as well as other disciplinary problems, KAA was 
expelled from school for a period of one year.  KAA appeared in person before the school 
board at his expulsion hearing.  He 
gave the board a letter in which he admitted his wrongdoing and, in the context 
of the hearing, it was clear that KAA expressed remorse for his role in the 
April 12, 1999, fire, as well as the earlier fires to which he 
admitted.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      SS was also 
expelled from school for one year and was similarly punished by the juvenile 
court, which sets up the only issue raised in this case.  During SS's testimony, the prosecutor 
asked SS about his admissions to the juvenile court and the fact that he had 
been placed on probation.  We will 
not set out in detail the objection made by counsel for KAA.  Suffice it to say that it was clear and 
directly in point.  The juvenile 
court overruled the objection and permitted the questioning which is alleged to 
be erroneous.

 

[¶8]      Recently, the 
standard of review for an issue such as this was more definitively enunciated by 
this Court, though the gist of it had always been clear.  The admission of evidence that a 
codefendant or conspirator has pleaded guilty, or been found guilty, is 
inadmissible in the trial of another codefendant or conspirator, and if such 
evidence is introduced by the prosecution, then it is error.  If no objection is interposed, then we 
review such error under the plain error doctrine.  If a proper objection is made, then we 
review it under the harmless error rule.  Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 913 
(Wyo. 2000); Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375-76, (Wyo. 1979).  Our decision in Capshaw was not 
available to the juvenile court when the instant case was tried, so we do not 
fault the district court for its failure to sua sponte provide clarifying 
instructions to the jury (KAA asked for no clarifying instructions).  While the juvenile court's decision to 
allow the testimony, over KAA's objection, was clearly erroneous, we find it to 
be harmless in the context of this juvenile matter because of the overwhelming 
evidence that established KAA's participation in a conspiracy to set the 
fire.  W.R.A.P. 9.04.  We have set out that evidence 
above.

 

[¶9]      The dispositional 
order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-3-104 and 6-1-303 (LEXIS 1999) state:

 

§ 6-3-104.  
Arson: fourth degree; penalties.

            
(a)  A person is guilty of fourth degree arson if 
he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion and intentionally, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence destroys or damages any property of 
another as defined in W.S. 6-3-103(c) which has a value of less than two hundred 
dollars ($200.00).

            
(b)  Fourth degree arson is a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.

 

§ 6-1-303.  Conspiracy; renunciation of criminal 
intention; venue.

            
(a)  A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he 
agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will 
commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the 
objective of the agreement.

            
(b)  A person is not liable under this section if after 
conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under 
circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention.

            
(c)  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county 
where the agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing 
the conspiracy or furthering the purpose took 
place.

 

            
The punishment for conspiracy to commit fourth degree arson is the same 
as the punishment for fourth degree arson itself.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-304 (LEXIS 
1999).

 

  2In accordance 
with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-223 (LEXIS 1999), the issue of whether or not a 
delinquent act had been committed was tried to a jury of six persons.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-119 
(LEXIS 1999).