Title: Beam v. Taylor

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 2/14/14
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120678
____________________
Michael D. Beam
v.
Ellen Ann Beam Taylor et al.
Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court
(CV-09-0114)
____________________
1120679
____________________
Michael D. Beam
v.
Ellen Ann Beam Taylor et al.
Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court
(CV-09-0025)
BRYAN, Justice.1
In appeal no. 1120678, Michael D. Beam appeals from
orders 
entered 
by 
the 
Chilton 
Circuit 
Court 
in 
a
conservatorship proceeding.  In appeal no. 1120679, Michael
appeals a will-contest proceeding that is currently pending 
in
the Chilton Circuit Court.  For the reasons set forth herein,
we dismiss both of Michael's appeals.
Procedural History
On November 18, 2004, Willodene Beam, the wife of James
Troy Beam, and Michael, one of James and Willodene's sons,
were appointed  by the Chilton Probate Court as co-guardians
of James and co-conservators of his estate.  Before that, the
probate court had appointed Fletcher D. Green as James's
guardian ad litem.  In January 2008, Willodene died, and, in
March 2008, Michael was appointed as James's sole guardian and
conservator.  On March 31, 2008, at Michael's request, the
Chilton Probate Court appointed Janice Hull to conduct an
This case was assigned to Justice Bryan on November 19,
1
2013.
2
1120678, 1120679
accounting of any and all financial transactions handled by
Michael and Willodene from the date of their appointment on
November 18, 2004, through March 20, 2008.  In January 2009,
James died and Fletcher Green, James's guardian ad litem,
filed a motion for a final settlement of the conservatorship. 
On February 2, 2009, at Michael's request, the Chilton Probate
Court 
ordered 
James's 
conservatorship 
to 
employ 
the 
accounting
firm of Hull & Russell, P.C., to "perform and complete the
final accounting" that was required following James's death.
See § 26-5-7, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that "a final
settlement of the conservatorship must be made" upon the death
of the ward). 
On January 26, 2009, James Daniel Beam ("Jim"), another
son of James and Willodene, petitioned the Chilton Probate
Court to probate James's will.  On February 18, 2009, Ellen
Ann Beam Taylor and Carol Sue Beam Rickels, James and
Willodene's daughters, filed a will contest, a petition for
appointment of a special administrator ad colligendum, and a
"notice of removal" of the will contest pursuant to § 43-8-
198, Ala. Code 1975.   On the same day, the Chilton Probate
2
We note that § 43-8-198 provides for the transfer, as
2
opposed to the removal, of a will contest to the circuit court
3
1120678, 1120679
Court entered 
an 
order transferring 
the 
will-contest
proceeding to the Chilton Circuit Court; that action was
assigned case no. CV-09-0025.  On May 21, 2009, the Chilton
Circuit Court entered an order appointing David Karn as a
special administrator ad colligendum in the will-contest
proceeding. 
In August 2009, Karn filed a motion in the Chilton
Probate Court to remove the conservatorship to the Chilton
Circuit Court.  Karn's motion stated that his request was made
pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, and he attached an
affidavit stating that he was the administrator 
ad 
colligendum
for the estate of James Troy Beam and that, in his opinion,
the conservatorship could best be administered in the Chilton
Circuit Court.  On August 5, 2009, the Chilton Probate Court
entered an order purporting to "transfer and remove" the
conservatorship action to the Chilton Circuit Court.  On
August 27, 2009, the Chilton Probate Court transferred the
conservatorship file to the Chilton Circuit Court, and, on the
same day, the Chilton Circuit Court assigned that action case
no. CV-09-0114.  The Chilton Circuit Court ("the circuit
from the probate court.
4
1120678, 1120679
court") immediately ordered Michael "to provide a full
statutory accounting of the conservatorship of James Troy
Beam."  On August 31, 2009, at the request of Carol Sue and
Ellen Ann, the circuit court consolidated the conservatorship
action and the will-contest action.  
On November 10, 2009, Michael filed in the circuit court
a "Petition for Final Settlement of Conservatorship[;] Claim
by Conservator for Compensation[; and] Claim by Conservator
for Reimbursement." Michael asked the circuit court to accept
Hull's accounting for the period between November 18, 2004,
and March 31, 2008,  and to accept the final accounting
3
attached to his petition for the period from March 31, 2008,
through February 28, 2009.  Michael requested, among other
things, "fair and just compensation to the Conservator for the
faithful execution of his duties as Conservator"; an award "to
the Conservator of reimbursement for those funds expended by
him individually for benefit of [James] and 
[Willodene] 
during
the 
period 
of 
the 
Conservatorship"; 
and 
"reasonable
compensation for the personal services the Conservator
Although the probate court ordered an accounting for the
3
period ending March 20, 2008, Michael filed an accounting for
the period ending March 31, 2008.
5
1120678, 1120679
performed for the benefit of [James] and [Willodene] during
the period of the Conservatorship."
Jim filed an objection to Michael's petition for final
settlement of the conservatorship estate, arguing (1) 
that the
petition did not contain the vouchers required by statute, (2)
that the accounting submitted was "confusing, incomplete, and
fail[ed] to account for all receipts and disbursements of the
Conservator," and (3) that the accounting submitted contained
"claims for compensation and reimbursements ... which are
exorbitant, not supported by vouchers or other records, and on
their face are contradictory of other disbursements asserted
in the accounting."  Ellen Ann and Carol Sue also filed an
objection 
to 
Michael's 
final 
settlement 
of 
the 
conservatorship
and to Michael's claim for compensation and reimbursement. 
They alleged, among other things, that Michael's final
accounting was inconsistent with prior 
records he 
had 
produced
and included numerous cash disbursements for which there was
no explanation.  On September 20, 2010, Ellen Ann and Carol
Sue also filed a petition to assess liability against Michael
as the conservator of James's estate. 
6
1120678, 1120679
The circuit court conducted an ore tenus hearing on
Michael's petition for final settlement, and the objections
thereto, on August 24, 2011.  On February 8, 2012, the circuit
court entered an "Order on Petition for Approval of
Conservator's 
Accounting, 
Claim 
for 
Compensation 
and 
Claim 
for
Reimbursement."  The circuit court purported to enter a
judgment in favor of James's estate and against Michael in the
amount of $352,205, plus the costs of the proceeding.  The
4
circuit court also purported to rule on Michael's request for
compensation and reimbursement of expenses, and it reserved
ruling on a request for attorney fees by Jim, Ellen Ann, and
Carol Sue.
In May 2012, Jim, Ellen Ann, and Carol Sue filed
petitions seeking attorney fees related to their 
objections 
to
Michael's petition for final settlement.  Michael objected to
the requests for attorney fees and filed a "motion to reopen
and reconsider 
order on petition for approval 
of 
conservator's
accounting."  On September 25, 2012, the circuit court
conducted a hearing and entered an order denying Michael's
The circuit court also purportedly entered a judgment in
4
favor of James's estate against Western Surety Company, the
surety of Michael's conservator's bond, in the amount of the
$50,000 bond.
7
1120678, 1120679
motion to reopen and reconsider the order "for approval of
conservator's accounting." 
On October 2, 2012, the circuit court entered an order
awarding Ellen Ann, Carol Sue, and Jim attorney fees they had
incurred in contesting Michael's final settlement of James's
conservatorship.  The attorney for Ellen Ann and Carol Sue was
awarded $25,000; the attorney for Jim was awarded $14,763.87. 
The circuit court ordered the administrator ad colligendum to
pay those amounts from the estate in trust to the attorneys. 
The circuit court then entered a judgment in favor of James's
estate against Michael in the sum of $39,763.87 to reimburse
the estate for the attorney fees and expenses awarded to Ellen
Ann, Carol Sue, and Jim.
On October 25, 2012, within 30 days of the entry of the
October 2, 2012, order, Michael filed a postjudgment motion
pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., challenging, among other
things, the assessment of attorney fees.  Michael's motion was
denied by operation of law on January 23, 2013. See Rule 59.1,
Ala. R. Civ. P.  On March 5, 2013, within 42 days of the day
his postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law,
Michael filed a notice of appeal in case no. CV-09-0144, the
8
1120678, 1120679
conservatorship proceeding (appeal no. 1120678), as well as 
in
case no. CV-09-0025, the will-contest proceeding (appeal no.
1120679).  This Court consolidated Michael's appeals on June
10, 2013, for the purpose of writing one opinion.
Jurisdiction
It is well settled that, except in limited circumstances
not applicable here, this Court does not have jurisdiction to
consider an appeal taken from a nonfinal judgment. See, e.g.,
James v. Rane, 8 So. 3d 286, 288 (Ala. 2008)(holding that this
Court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a
nonfinal judgment); and Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile,
Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 362 (Ala. 2004) ("When it is determined
that an order appealed from is not a final judgment, it is the
duty of the Court to dismiss the appeal ex mero motu."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  It is undisputed that
the circuit court has not entered a final judgment, or even
conducted a trial, in case no. CV-09-0025, the will-contest
proceeding.  Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to
consider an appeal taken from a nonfinal judgment, Michael's
9
1120678, 1120679
appeal in case no. 1120679 is due to be dismissed.  See James,
8 So. 3d at 288.5
Regarding appeal no. 1120678, Michael's appeal from the
conservatorship 
proceeding 
(case 
no. 
CV-09-0114), 
we 
conclude,
for the reasons set forth herein, that the circuit court never
obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservatorship
proceeding, that the circuit court's orders in case no. CV-09-
0144 are therefore void, and that appeal no. 1120678 is also
due to be dismissed.
"The court of probate from which the appointment of a
conservator is derived has jurisdiction of the settlement,
partial or final, of the accounts of the conservator." § 26-5-
1, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court purportedly gained
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
conservatorship
proceeding after the probate court granted the administrator
It is possible that Michael filed a notice of appeal in
5
the will-contest proceeding because some of the circuit
court's orders, including the February 8, 2012, order, which
concerned 
only 
the 
conservatorship 
proceeding, 
were 
entered 
in
both case no. CV-09-0114 (the conservatorship proceeding) and
case no. CV-09-0025 (the will-contest proceeding). We note
that, 
although 
the 
will-contest 
proceeding 
and 
the
conservatorship proceeding were consolidated in the circuit
court, the will-contest proceeding and the conservatorship
proceeding maintained separate identities and required the
entry of separate judgments. See Ex parte 3M Co., 42 So. 3d
1228, 1231 n.4 (Ala. 2010). 
10
1120678, 1120679
ad colligendum's petition to remove the conservatorship,
allegedly pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, which provided
the sole basis for the circuit court to obtain jurisdiction
over the pending conservatorship proceeding in this case. 
Section 26-2-2 states:
"The 
administration 
or 
conduct 
of 
any
guardianship or conservatorship of a minor or
incapacitated person may be removed from the probate
court to the circuit court, at any time before the
final settlement thereof by the guardian or
conservator 
of 
any 
such 
guardianship 
or
conservatorship or guardian ad litem or next friend
of such ward or anyone entitled to support out of
the estate of such ward without assigning any
special equity, and an order of removal must be made
by the court or judge upon the filing of a sworn
petition by any such guardian or conservator or
guardian ad litem or next friend for the ward or
such person entitled to support out of the estate of
such ward, reciting in what capacity the petitioner
acts and that in the opinion of the petitioner such
guardianship or conservatorship can be better
administered in the circuit court than in the
probate court."
This Court has recognized that "a marked similarity
exists between the language of § 26-2-2 and the language of
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-41, which governs the removal of the
administration of a decedent's estate from the probate court
to the circuit court." Ex parte Casey, 88 So. 3d 822, 828
11
1120678, 1120679
(Ala. 2012) (plurality opinion).  Section 12-11-41, Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"The administration of 
any 
estate 
may 
be 
removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
In Casey, this Court held that the circuit court did not
have authority to remove "'the administration or conduct of
[a] guardianship or conservatorship'" pursuant to § 26-2-2
because, at the time the petition for removal was filed in and
granted by the circuit court, the probate court had not yet
"act[ed] upon" the petition for letters of guardianship and
conservatorship 
by 
creating 
a 
guardianship 
or 
conservatorship.
88 So. 3d at 829.  We reached that conclusion after comparing
the language of § 26-2-2 and § 12-11-41 and analogizing cases
interpreting 
§ 
12-11-41 
that 
concluded 
that 
the 
administration
of an estate is subject to removal pursuant to § 12-11-41 only
12
1120678, 1120679
after the probate court "act[s] upon" a petition to administer
an estate. 88 So. 3d at 829 (citing Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d
1374, 1376 (Ala. 1993)).
In DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814 (Ala. 2011), this
Court concluded that the circuit court did not obtain subject-
matter jurisdiction over the administration of an estate
pursuant to § 12-11-41 because, at the time the estate
administration was purportedly removed to the circuit court,
the administration of the estate had not yet been initiated in
the probate court and because the circuit court never
"enter[ed] an order 
purporting to remove the 
administration of
the estate from probate court." 68 So. 3d at 822.  In DuBose,
as in the present case, the petition for removal was filed in
and was granted by the probate court, instead of the circuit
court.  This Court, in DuBose, stated that "the filing of a
petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an
order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that
court's 
acquisition 
of 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
administration 
of
an estate pursuant to § 12-11-41." Id. (final emphasis
original).  Thus, we concluded in DuBose that the circuit
court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the
13
1120678, 1120679
administration of the estate, that the judgment entered by the
circuit court was void, and that the appeal was due to be
dismissed.
Because the language from § 26-2-2 mirrors the language
in § 12-11-41, we conclude here, as we did in DuBose, that the 
"filing of a petition for removal in the circuit court and the
entry of an order of removal by that court are prerequisites
to that court's acquisition of jurisdiction over" a
conservatorship proceeding under § 26-2-2. DuBose, 68 So. 3d
at 822 (emphasis added) ("'"'Unless expressly authorized 
so 
to
do, a court has no authority to transfer a cause from itself
to another court, and thereby give the other court possession
of the case to hear and determine it, although the other court
would have had jurisdiction of the cause if it had come to it
by due process.' 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 502, p. 769 ...."'"
(quoting Allen v. Zickos, 37 Ala. App. 361, 364, 68 So. 2d
841, 843 (1953), and citing Ex parte Boykin, 611 So. 2d 322,
326 (Ala. 1992))).  This conclusion is consistent with prior
decisions of this Court applying § 26-2-2, which note that the
proper procedure is for the petition for removal to be filed
in and granted by the circuit court. See, e.g.,  Ex parte
14
1120678, 1120679
Casey, 88 So. 3d at 826-27 (noting that a petition for removal
pursuant to § 26-2-2 was filed in the circuit court and
granted by that court); Fuller v. Jackson, 519 So. 2d 936, 937
(Ala. 1988) (same); and McNairy v. McNairy, 416 So. 2d 735,
735-36 (Ala. 1982) (same).  Thus, because in this case a
petition for removal was not filed in the circuit court and
"at no time did the circuit court enter an order purporting to
remove the [conservatorship proceeding] from the probate
court," DuBose, 68 So. 3d at 822, we conclude that the circuit
court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the
conservatorship proceeding.
Furthermore, we note that the petition for removal was
filed by Karn, the administrator ad colligendum of James's
estate, and that Karn does not fall within the category of
persons who may file a petition for removal pursuant to § 26-
2-2 "without assigning any special equity."  Section 26-2-2
provides that a petition for removal, without assigning any
special equity, may be filed only by "the guardian or
conservator ... or guardian ad litem or next friend of such
ward or anyone entitled to support out of the estate of such
ward."  Karn did not assign any special equity in his petition
15
1120678, 1120679
for removal.  He simply stated that, in his opinion, "the
conservatorship can best be administered in the Circuit Court
of Chilton County under the Rules of Civil Procedure."  This
Court has held that a petition for removal filed in and
granted by the circuit court was insufficient to convey
subject-matter jurisdiction to the circuit court when the
petitioner did not fall within the category of parties set
forth in § 26-2-2 and no special equity had been assigned in
the petition for removal. See Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 51,
26 So. 2d 571, 571 (1946) (holding that the next of kin of a
deceased ward did not have the absolute right to remove the
administration of a guardianship proceeding from the probate
court to the circuit court because the predecessor statute to
§ 26-2-2 did not include next of kin in the list of persons
granted that absolute right).  Thus we conclude that Karn's
petition for removal, even if it had been properly filed in
and granted by the circuit court, was insufficient to support
removal of the conservatorship to the circuit court because
Karn did not assign any special equity to support the petition
for removal and he was not included in the list of persons in
16
1120678, 1120679
§ 26-2-2 who 
may 
petition for 
the 
removal 
of 
the
conservatorship proceeding without assigning special equity.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit
court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the
conservatorship proceeding and that the orders entered by the
circuit court in case no. CV-09-0144 are void and therefore
due to be vacated.  Because a void order will not support an
appeal, we dismiss appeal no. 1120678 and direct the circuit
court to vacate the orders entered in case no. CV-09-0144. See
Hunt Transition & Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782 So. 2d
270, 274 (Ala. 2000).  We note that, because the circuit court
never 
obtained 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
conservatorship
proceeding, jurisdiction over that proceeding remains in the
probate court. 
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, these appeals are dismissed. 
1120678 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart, Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Murdock, JJ., concur specially.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
1120679 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw,
and Wise, JJ., concur.
17
1120678, 1120679
BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially in case no. 1120678).  
I concur fully with main opinion. I write specially to
elaborate on the definition of "remove" as it relates to the
removal of the administration of a conservatorship or
guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the circuit
court, pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975:
"The 
administration 
or 
conduct 
of 
any
guardianship or conservatorship of a minor or
incapacitated person may be removed from the probate
court to the circuit court, at any time before the
final settlement thereof by the guardian or
conservator 
of 
any 
such 
guardianship 
or
conservatorship or guardian ad litem or next friend
of such ward or anyone entitled to support out of
the estate of such ward without assigning any
special equity, and an order of removal must be made
by the court or judge upon the filing of a sworn
petition by any such guardian or conservator or
guardian ad litem or next friend for the ward or
such person entitled to support out of the estate of
such ward, reciting in what capacity the petitioner
acts and that in the opinion of the petitioner such
guardianship or conservatorship can be better
administered in the circuit court than in the
probate court."
(Emphasis added.)
It is important to note that the above statute is located
in Chapter 2 of Title 26, Ala. Code 1975, the main chapter
that provided for the "Appointment of Guardians" before the
enactment of Act  No. 87-590, Ala. Acts 1987, which is
18
1120678, 1120679
codified in Chapter 2A of Title 26, and substantially based
upon the Uniform Probate Code, Article V, Parts 1, 2, 3, and
4 (1982 edition), and cited as the Alabama Uniform
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. I further note
that even though § 26-2A-20(3), Ala. Code 1975, the definition
section of the Alabama Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, § 26-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, referred
to above ("the Act") defines "court" as "[a] probate court of
this state," this definition of "court" as being a "probate
court" 
applies 
only 
to 
guardianship 
and 
protective 
proceedings
under Chapter 2A. The Act not only did not supersede Chapter
2 but it also made no attempt to include any provision
pertaining to removals addressed by § 26-2-2. Therefore, § 26-
2-2 is not a part of "the Act" and is the only statute
providing for the removal of guardianships or protective
proceedings from the probate court to the circuit court. I
further point out that the Comment to § 26-2A-31, Ala. Code
1975, setting out subject-matter jurisdiction of the Act,
states that "[t]he subject matter jurisdiction described in
this section affects the jurisdiction of the probate court
only insofar as it applies to proceedings under this chapter
19
1120678, 1120679
and it does not purport to otherwise expand the jurisdiction
of probate courts as established in other law." (Emphasis
added.) 
Section 12-11-30(4), Ala. Code 1975, provides that the
circuit court exercises a general superintendence over the
probate court, not the other way around.  Although the removal
statute does not expressly state that the petition for removal
of the guardianship or conservatorship proceeding be filed in
and ordered by the circuit court, it is apparent from decades
of caselaw that the practice and procedure has been that a
petition for removal is properly filed in, and if appropriate
granted by, the circuit court.  See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 248
Ala. 49, 51, 26 So. 2d 571, 571 (1946)("The proceedings here
complain of an order of the circuit court in equity removing
the administration of the guardianship ... from the probate to
the equity court."); Ex parte Garrison, 260 Ala. 379, 380, 71
So. 2d 33, 35 (1954)("Mrs. J.J. Burnett filed a petition in
the Circuit Court ..., asking for an order transferring the
guardianship ... to the aforesaid equity court. ... [A]n order
was entered [by the Circuit Court] removing the aforesaid
guardianship from the Probate Court to the Circuit Court, in
20
1120678, 1120679
Equity."); Fuller v. Fuller, 519 So. 2d 936, 937 (Ala.
1988)("Fuller ... petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court to
remove the guardianships ... to the Jefferson Circuit
Court."); Ex parte Coffee Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 771 So.
2d 485, 486 (Ala. 2000)(noting that "Nichols ... filed ... a
petition to remove the administration of the conservatorship
to the circuit court" and that "[t]he circuit court removed
the case"); and Ex parte Casey, 88 So. 3d 822, 826-27 (Ala.
2012)("Jo Ann filed a 'Petition for Removal/Transfer' in the
circuit court .... [T]he circuit court entered an order
granting [the] petition to remove the guardianship proceeding
from the probate court to the circuit court."); cf., however,
Scott v. Kelley, 745 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1999), a case in which
the probate judge signed an order removing the case from the
probate court to the circuit court. However, the probate
court's unchallenged removal order in  Kelley is an aberration
and a clear deviation from settled law, as can be seen from
the other cited cases.
The above cases, which involve removals pursuant to § 26-
2-2 both before and after the effective date of the Act,
demonstrate that the petition for removal of 
a 
conservatorship
21
1120678, 1120679
from the probate court to the circuit court has always been
filed in, and relief on such petition, if any, ordered by, the
circuit court.  Regarding the Act and its failure to
incorporate § 26-2-2 or a like removal provision, see Ex parte
Casey, 88 So. 3d at 828 n. 5:
"When the Alabama Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act ('[the Act]') was enacted
in 1987, § 26–2–2 was amended to reflect the
terminology used in [the Act]. Compare § 26–2–2,
Ala. Code 1975, as amended, 1987 Ala. Acts, No.
87–590, with Tit. 21, § 26, Ala. Code 1940 (1958
Recomp.) ('The administration or conduct of any
guardianship of a minor or person of unsound mind
may be removed ....;'), the language of which
remained unchanged when Tit. 21, § 26, was first
recodified as § 26–2–2 in 1975."
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1099 (1969) defines the term "remove" as to "take away."
Clearly, the probate court, under § 26-2-2, does not take the
case away from itself and give it to the circuit court. To do
so would impose upon the probate court itself the illogical
duty of ordering that the "guardianship or 
conservatorship 
can
better be administered in the circuit court than in the
probate court."  Rather, it is the circuit court that takes
jurisdiction of the conservatorship or guardianship from the
probate court, the court of original jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
22
1120678, 1120679
Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455, 459 (Ala. 2006)(regarding a
petition to remove the administration of an estate from the
probate court to the circuit court, this Court stated that
"the circuit court failed to enter the order necessary to take
jurisdiction of the estate from the probate court" (emphasis
added)). 
Accordingly, persons having standing under § 26-2-2 to
remove a conservatorship or guardianship proceeding from the
probate court to the circuit court do so by filing a petition
for removal with the circuit court.  The circuit court, if
removal is appropriate, will then order the case removed from
the jurisdiction of the probate court.
23
1120678, 1120679
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially in case no. 1120678).
I agree with the conclusion in the main opinion that the
failure of the circuit court to have entered an order of
removal means that the circuit court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the conservatorship.  I write separately to
state that my concurrence with the analysis of the main
opinion should not be read as expressing any view as to
whether, even if the circuit court had entered the order of
removal here, it would have acquired jurisdiction over the
conservatorship.  Compare Ala. Code 1975, § 26-2-2 (providing
that the administration of a guardianship or conservatorship
"may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court,
at any time before the final settlement thereof"), with Ala.
Code 1975, § 12-11-41 (providing that the administration of a
decedent's estate "may be removed from the probate court to
the circuit court at any time before a final settlement
thereof"); see also, e.g., Mobbs v. Scott, 233 Ala. 70, 71,
169 So. 698, 699 (1936) (stating, in regard to the precursor
to § 12-11-41:  "It is settled that said statute 'does not
contemplate "the ouster of the jurisdiction of the probate
courts, where that court has actually entered upon the
24
1120678, 1120679
exercise of its jurisdiction in and for a final settlement of
estates." ...  The words "at any time before a final
settlement," found in the removal act, mean 
before 
proceedings
for settlement begin, not before they are completed.'"
(citation omitted)).
25
1120678, 1120679
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting in case no. 1120678).
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons that follow, I
believe 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over
this conservatorship. 
I. Statutory Construction
The language of § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, does not
expressly 
require 
that 
the 
petition 
to 
remove 
the
conservatorship be filed in, and the removal order entered by,
the circuit court. The statute reads: 
"[A]n order of removal must be made by the court or
judge upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such guardian or conservator or guardian ad litem or
next friend for the ward or such person entitled to
support out of the estate of such ward, reciting in
what capacity the petitioner acts and that in the
opinion of the petitioner such guardianship or
conservatorship can be better administered in the
circuit court than in the probate court."
§ 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The majority's
construction of this statute goes beyond the plain language of
the statute. 
The majority opinion states that this Court has
recognized that "'a marked similarity exists between the
language of § 26-2-2 and the language of Ala. Code 1975, §
12-11-41, which governs the removal of the administration of
26
1120678, 1120679
a decedent's estate from the probate court to the circuit
court.'" ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Casey, 88 So. 3d
822, 828 (Ala. 2012) (plurality opinion)). The similarity of
the language, however, does not require us to read words into
§ 26-2-2. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is
that the court must "ascertain and effectuate" the intent of
the legislature. Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n,
367 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1979). For this task, 
"we must look to the entire Act instead of isolated
phrases or clauses; and words are given their plain
and usual meaning. Moreover, just as statutes
dealing with the same subject are in pari materia
and should be construed together, parts of the same
statute are in pari materia and each part is
entitled to equal weight."
367 So. 2d at 1380-81 (citations omitted). Both § 26-2-2 and
§ 12-11-41 provide for the removal of proceedings from the
probate court. However, the statutes are in separate chapters
of the Code, are codified from separate acts, and pertain to
different subjects; they should not be construed together. 
Section 12-11-41 provides that "an order of removal must
be made by the court," without indicating which court. Section
12-11-41 is found in Title 12, Chapter 11, Article 2, of the
Code of Alabama 1975, which concerns the jurisdiction of
27
1120678, 1120679
circuit courts. Thus, I agree that the petition for removal of
estates should be filed in, and the petition granted by, the
circuit court. 
Section 26-2-2 states that "an order of removal must be
made by the court or judge," without indicating which court,
or which judge. Section 26-2-2 is found in Title 26, Chapter
2, of the Code of Alabama 1975, which lays out procedures for
probate courts, not circuit courts. I conclude that, with
reference to this specific statutory title and chapter, "the
court or the judge" in § 26-2-2 refers to the probate court
and probate judge, not the circuit court. 
II. The Nature of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
   
The majority opinion concludes "that the circuit court
never 
obtained 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
the
conservatorship proceeding." ___ So. 3d at ___. Both the
probate court and the circuit court have subject-matter
jurisdiction 
over 
this 
conservatorship, 
that 
is,
"[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of
relief sought." Black's Law Dictionary 931 (9th ed. 2009).
Subject-matter jurisdiction "concerns a court's power to
decide certain types of cases." Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d
28
1120678, 1120679
536, 538 (Ala. 2006). The probate court has original and
general jurisdiction over conservatorships. See §§ 26-5-1 and
12-13-1(b)(6), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court is a court of
general jurisdiction, see § 12-1-2, Ala. Code 1975. General
jurisdiction is "[a] court's authority to hear a wide range of
cases, civil or criminal, that arise within its geographic
area." Black's Law Dictionary 929 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis
added). 
The 
majority 
opinion 
has 
confused 
subject-matter
jurisdiction, which is the power to decide certain types of
cases, with a procedural issue. The circuit court has subject-
matter jurisdiction over this case, regardless of whether the
administrator ad colligendum filed the petition to remove the
conservatorship in the circuit court or in the probate court. 
III. Precedent Does Not Support the Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion relies upon the plurality opinion of
Ex parte Casey, 88 So. 3d 822, 824 (Ala. 2012). "The
precedential value of the reasoning in a plurality opinion is
questionable at best." Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So.
2d 842, 845 (Ala. 2001). The Casey opinion concluded that the
29
1120678, 1120679
circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to remove a
guardianship from the probate court because
"the probate court ha[d] not entered an order
creating a guardianship or conservatorship for Jo
Ann. 
Logically, 
because 
no 
guardianship 
or
conservatorship has been created for Jo Ann, there
is 
no 
'administration 
or 
conduct' 
of 
such
guardianship or conservatorship to be removed from
the probate court to the circuit court."
88 So. 3d at 830 (emphasis added). Here, the probate court
created and then began administration of the conservatorship
before ordering it removed to circuit court. Thus, the key
fact in Casey on subject-matter jurisdiction is not present in
this case. This difference, coupled with the limited
precedential value of Casey, makes questionable Casey's
support for the majority opinion.  
The majority opinion also relies on DuBose v. Weaver, 68
So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011). Like the court in Casey, the
probate court in DuBose did not initiate the administration of
an estate. We concluded that the circuit court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction because "there was no pending estate
administration that [the circuit court] could have removed
from the probate court pursuant to § 12-11-41." 68 So. 3d at
822. 
30
1120678, 1120679
The majority opinion relies upon this statement from
DuBose: "'[T]he filing of a petition for removal in the
circuit court and the entry of an order of removal by that
court are prerequisites to that court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate pursuant to
§ 12-11-41.'" ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting DuBose, 68 So. 3d at
822). This statement in DuBose was a hypothetical contained in
dicta.  The majority opinion applies this dicta and concludes
6
that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
because the administrator filed the petition for removal in
the probate court, which court entered the order of removal.
As explained above, § 12-11-41 requires the petition for
removal of the administration of an estate to be filed in the
circuit court, but § 26-2-2 does not require the same
procedure for the removal of a conservatorship. DuBose thus
gives only questionable support to the majority opinion. 
That this statement is dicta is plain from these remarks:
6
"Moreover, even were we to conclude that the administration of
the estate was pending in the probate court when the
Washington 
Circuit 
Court 
purported 
to 
assume 
jurisdiction 
over
it, it does not appear that Sullivan's heirs filed their
transfer/removal petition in the circuit court, and at no time
did the circuit court enter an order purporting to remove the
administration of the estate from the probate court." DuBose,
68 So. 3d at 822 (first emphasis added). 
31
1120678, 1120679
The majority opinion also cites Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala.
49, 51, 26 So. 2d 571 (1946) (next of kin of deceased ward did
not have an absolute right to removal, in the absence of a
special equity). In Smith, the guardian objected to the next
of kin's petitioning for the removal of a guardianship to the
circuit court. Unlike Smith, the parties here have not
objected to how the conservatorship was removed to the circuit
court. The parties also did not object that the administrator
ad colligendum is not on the list of persons who may petition
for 
removal 
without 
assigning 
special 
equity. 
These 
procedural
irregularities under § 26-2-2 do not affect the circuit
court's subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.
VI. Conclusion
For these reasons, I believe this Court has improperly
dismissed the appeal in case no. 1120678 and improperly
ordered the circuit court's orders below vacated. 
32