Title: JOHN DAVID MARTINEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN DAVID MARTINEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 164169 P.3d 89Case Number: 06-238Decided: 10/17/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JOHN DAVIDMARTINEZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna 
D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In two separate 
cases, the appellant, John D. Martinez (hereinafter "Martinez"), was convicted 
of three felony drug charges, a domestic violence charge, property destruction, 
and criminal entry.  At sentencing, 
Martinez was 
credited 211 days for time previously served (31 days in the drug cases and 180 
days in the domestic violence cases).  
Following sentencing on all charges, Martinez filed a series of motions challenging 
the legality of his sentences.  In 
each of these motions, Martinez contended that he should have been 
awarded more credit for time served.  
Each of his motions was denied.   Although Martinez appealed from one 
of the denials, he voluntarily dismissed the appeal prior to adjudication.  Following his dismissal of that appeal, 
Martinez filed 
yet another motion to correct.  That 
motion was denied and Martinez now brings the denial before this 
Court for review.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue here is whether Martinez's appeal is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata inasmuch as the parties, 
the subject matter, the issue, and the parties' capacities are the same in the 
present proceeding as they were in a previous proceeding.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 18, 2002, 
Martinez was 
arrested and charged with three counts of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver.  Martinez was released on 
bond on August 1, 2002.  On August 
28, 2002, the district court modified the terms of Martinez's release adding 
a requirement that he stay away from his estranged wife's home.  Martinez violated that condition and was 
arrested on October 18, 2002.  On 
November 4, 2002, Martinez was released on bond.  Martinez was again arrested on November 7, 
2003, for an August 23, 2003 incident involving domestic violence, and was charged with one felony, 
third-offense battery of a household member, and two misdemeanors, destruction 
of property and criminal entry. 
 The above-described cases were 
docketed as 27-283 (hereinafter the "drug case") and 27-946 (hereinafter the 
"domestic case"). 

 
 
[¶4]      On December 11, 
2003, Martinez 
was sentenced in the drug case.  The 
district court sentenced Martinez to 18 to 36 months on Count I and four 
to six years on Counts II and III.  
Martinez 
was given 31 days of credit for time served in the Laramie County Detention 
Facility while awaiting disposition of the matter.  On June 15, 2004, judgment and sentence 
was entered in the domestic case.  
Martinez 
was sentenced to 20 to 24 months on the felony count and six months on each of 
the misdemeanor counts.  The court 
ordered that all three sentences be served concurrently and awarded 180 days 
credit for time served.

 
 
[¶5]      Following 
Martinez's 
sentencing, he filed a number of motions in an effort to receive more credit for 
time served.  His first motion was 
filed on February 23, 2005.  
Martinez 
filed a pro se Motion for Correction 
of an Illegal Sentence in both the drug case and the domestic case asking the 
court to award him credit for 180 days of presentence confinement in the drug 
case.  This motion was denied on 
March 17, 2005, and Martinez did not appeal from that 
denial.

 
 
[¶6]      On March 30, 
2005, Martinez 
filed a second pro se Motion for 
Correction of an Illegal Sentence in the domestic case asking for credit for 270 
days of presentence confinement.  
This motion was denied on April 29, 2005, and Martinez did not appeal 
from the denial.

 
 
[¶7]      On May 9, 2005, 
Martinez filed 
yet another pro se Motion for 
Correction of an Illegal Sentence in the domestic case asking for "75 total days 
credit for time served in [the domestic case]."  Although not clear from the motion, 
Martinez 
apparently was requesting the 75 days in addition to, rather than in place of, 
the 180 days he was originally awarded.  
The district court declined to consider the motion because Martinez did not serve it 
on the district attorney.

 
 
[¶8]      Finally, on July 
11, 2005, Martinez filed his last pro se Motion for Correction of an 
Illegal Sentence again asking that he be given credit for 75 additional days in 
the domestic case.  This motion was 
denied on July 15, 2005.  Martinez filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on August 9, 
2005, and the appeal was docketed on November 8, 2005.  On December 5, 2005, this Court 
dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution because Martinez had not filed a 
brief.  The appeal, however, was 
reinstated on January 31, 2006, and on March 17, 2006, the district court 
appointed the Wyoming Public Defender to represent Martinez.  After this Court twice extended the 
deadline for Martinez to file a brief, we 
dismissed the appeal pursuant to Martinez's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of 
Appeal on June 29, 2006. 

 
 
[¶9]      On June 26, 2006, 
Martinez filed 
another Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence in the drug case requesting credit 
for 150 days of presentence confinement.  
This motion was denied on August 7, 2006, and Martinez filed a Notice of 
Appeal on August 11, 2006.  This 
appeal is presently before us for consideration. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   On appeal, Martinez argues that his 
June 26, 2006 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence should have been 
granted.  Before responding to 
Martinez's substantive arguments, the State 
contends that Martinez's appeal is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata.  

 
 
[¶11]   We have repeatedly held that 
motions to correct an illegal sentence, and other claims brought pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), are subject to the principles of res judicata. McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 525 (Wyo. 
1996); Lacey v. State, 
2003 WY 148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003); Dolence v. State, 2005 WY 27, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 176, 178 
(Wyo. 2005); Amin v. State, 2006 WY 84, ¶ 5, 138 P.3d 1143, 
1144 (Wyo. 2006).   

 
 
In 
determining whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, we examine four 
factors: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues 
are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the 
persons are identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues 
between them. 

 
 

Lacey, ¶ 
11, 79 P.3d at 495  (quoting Markstein v. Countryside I, LLC, 2003 WY 122, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 389, 394 (Wyo. 2003).  In Martinez's case, the 
parties, the subject matter, and the capacities of the parties have been the 
same in all motions previously filed in this matter.  Therefore, our analysis of the res judicata question will focus on 
whether Martinez 
raised, or had the opportunity to raise, the same issue presently before us in 
this appeal in any previous proceeding.

 
 
[¶12]   We need look no further than 
Martinez's first 
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, filed February 23, 2005.  See supra at ¶ 5.  Martinez 
brought this motion in both the drug case and the domestic case and the issue 
raised was whether the sentence imposed was illegal; that is, whether Martinez's presentence 
confinement had been properly calculated and credited.  The district court concluded that 
Martinez had 
been awarded the proper amount of credit in each case and concluded that the 
sentence should not be disturbed.  
No appeal was taken from this order.  

 
 
[¶13]   For reasons not revealed in the 
record, the district court entertained three additional motions to correct an 
illegal sentence filed by Martinez (including that which is the subject 
of the present appeal).  See supra at ¶¶ 6-9.  Although the district court appears to 
have decided these motions on their merits, we refuse to continue down this 
course as Wyoming law mandates that all of 
Martinez's 
challenges to the legality of his sentences filed subsequent to his first motion 
to correct an illegal sentence should have been barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  

 
 
[¶14]   In Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356 (Wyo. 
1997), the defendant filed a petition to vacate or set aside an illegal sentence 
asserting that his sentence:  1) 
violated the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; 2) was based on erroneous 
information regarding his prior criminal record; and 3) prosecutorial misconduct 
prejudiced his sentencing.  
Id. at 
1358.  This petition was denied. 
 Id.  Five years later, the defendant filed a 
second petition to correct an illegal sentence based on a different legal 
theory.  Id.  
The district court denied this petition as barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata.  Id.

 
 
[¶15]   On appeal the defendant asserted 
that res judicata could not bar his 
second petition because W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), the rule governing correction or 
reduction of sentences, provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal 
sentence at any time."  Hamill, 948 P.2d  at 1358.  The defendant evidently read this 
language to mean that if he had not alleged a particular error in a previous 
petition, then the principles of res 
judicata would not preclude him from raising additional legal arguments in 
subsequent petitions.  We rejected 
this notion stating:

 
 
Contrary 
to Hamill's assertion, the doctrine of res judicata is not limited to 
only those issues which were actually 
decided in an earlier proceeding.  Issues which could have been 
raised in an earlier proceeding may also be foreclosed from subsequent 
consideration.  Kallas [v. State], 776 P.2d [198,] 
199 [(Wyo. 1989)]; Cutbirth [v. State], 751 P.2d [1257,] 
1261 [(Wyo. 
1988)]. Thus, unless Hamill can show good cause why the issue was not raised at 
an earlier opportunity, or that the interests of justice require consideration 
of his claim, the court may refuse to consider the issue in a later 
proceeding.

Id. at 1358-59 (emphasis in original).  We affirmed the district court's finding 
that the defendant could not show any reason why the new issue was not raised in 
the previous petition, and that the interests of justice did not require 
consideration of his claim.  Id. at 1359-60. 

 
 
[¶16]   Also on point is our recent holding 
in McDaniel v. State, 2007 WY 
125, 163 P.3d 836 (Wyo. 2007).  In 
McDaniel, the defendant appealed two 
first-degree sexual assault convictions on the ground that his right to a speedy 
trial had been violated.  Id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 163 P.3d  at 837.  After his sentence was affirmed on 
appeal, the defendant filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b).  Id. at ¶ 4, 163 P.3d  at 837.  The basis for his motion was that he had 
been a model inmate while incarcerated.  Id.  
This motion was denied.  Id. Some time later, defendant filed a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence asserting that his two sentences should 
have merged and run concurrently.  Id. at ¶ 5, 163 P.3d  at 837.  This motion was denied and defendant 
filed a timely appeal.  Id. at ¶ 5, 163 P.3d  at 838.

 
 
[¶17]   On appeal, we began our analysis by 
stating:

 
 
We have 
repeatedly held that claims brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) are subject to 
the principles of res judicata. McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 525 (Wyo. 1996); Lacey v. 
State, 2003 WY 148, ¶ 11, 
79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003); Dolence v. State, 2005 WY 27, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 176, 178 
(Wyo. 2005); Amin v. State, 2006 WY 84, ¶ 5, 138 P.3d 1143, 
1144 (Wyo. 2006).  We have also 
repeatedly held that the res judicata doctrine applies when a defendant 
could have raised such an issue in an earlier appeal or motion for sentence 
reduction but did not do so.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Wyo. 1997); Mead v. 
State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 
(Wyo. 2000); Gould [v. 
State, 2006 WY 157,] ¶ 16, 151 P.3d [261,] 266 [(Wyo. 
2006)].

 
 

McDaniel, ¶ 9, 163 P.3d  at 838.  In affirming the decision of the 
district court on res judicata 
grounds, we noted that the defendant could have raised the claim that his 
sentences should have merged in his first motion to correct an illegal sentence, 
from which no appeal was taken, or he could have raised this claim in his direct 
appeal.  Id. at ¶ 10, 163 P.3d  at 838.  Because defendant 
failed to raise the claims when he had the opportunity, his subsequent attempt 
to do so was barred by res judicata.  Id.

 
 
[¶18]   The principles articulated in Hamill and McDaniel apply equally to the present 
case.  Martinez could have, and 
should have, presented all theories of error in his first motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.  All subsequent 
efforts by Martinez to challenge his sentence or the 
amount of credit for time served should have been barred by res judicata.  Martinez's method of filing multiple motions 
based on differing but related theories runs counter to the stated purpose of 
the doctrine of res judicata.  "The doctrine of res judicata furthers society's 
interest in having disputes conclusively resolved in a single action and 
minimizing the expense and difficulties of piecemeal 
litigation."  Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Elec. 
Ass'n, 2003 WY 81, ¶ 11, 72 P.3d 272, 276 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶19]   The interests of justice do not 
compel us to consider the merits of Martinez's claim.  In his response, Martinez does not attempt 
to articulate any reason why the theories offered in the latest motion were not 
raised in his first motion.  
Furthermore, a review of the record demonstrates Martinez had ample 
opportunity to raise the issue and theories asserted in this appeal.  Finally, the 211 days of credit for time 
served awarded to Martinez appears to have been adequate, if not 
generous.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   On February 23, 2005, Martinez filed a Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence in both the drug case and the domestic case 
asserting that the credit for time served awarded by the district court was 
inadequate.  The district court 
denied this motion and Martinez did not pursue an appeal.   After additional motions to 
correct were denied, Martinez filed an appeal, 
which appeal was eventually voluntarily dismissed by Martinez.  After dismissing his own appeal, 
Martinez filed 
one final motion to correct which was denied and from which the present appeal 
arises.  The issue raised in this 
appeal is the same issue raised in all previous proceedings:  whether the credit for time served 
awarded was adequate.  Wyoming law mandates that all efforts made after Martinez's February 23, 
2005 motion to correct was denied, including the present appeal, are barred by 
the doctrine of res 
judicata.

 
 
[¶21]   Affirmed.