Title: Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist.

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

72 Wn.2d 939 (1967) 435 P.2d 936 STEPHEN CARABBA, Appellant, v. ANACORTES SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 103 et al., Respondents.[*] No. 38188. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 28, 1967. Miracle, Treadwell & Pruzan, for appellant. Harry A. Follman and Welts & Welts, for respondent Anacortes School District No. 103. Elliott, Lee, Carney & Thomas and Richard Pitt, for respondent Oak Harbor School District No. 201. Charles O. Carroll, James E. Kennedy, Richard M. Ishikawa, Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, and Earle W. Zinn, amici curiae. DONWORTH, J. This action was brought on behalf of Stephen Carabba, a minor, by his guardian ad litem to recover $500,000 for injuries sustained by Carabba while he was a participant in a high school wrestling match. The amended complaint alleged that respondent school districts, acting through their agent, the referee, were negligent in the following particulars: *941 Respondents denied that the referee was acting as their agent, denied the allegations of negligence, and affirmatively urged the bar of RCW 28.58.030, relating to athletic appliances, urged the affirmative defenses of volenti non fit injuria, assumption of risk, and failure to join an indispensable party to the action. The trial court ruled out the affirmative defenses, and instructed the jury that the referee was the agent of respondents as a matter of law. Thirty-eight witnesses testified during the 20 days of trial, and the record before this court is voluminous, the statement of facts alone consisting of over 2,300 pages. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the issues of the referee's negligence and damages. During the course of their deliberations, the jury requested an additional instruction regarding the standard of care applicable to the referee, i.e. the standard of the reasonably prudent man or that of an ordinarily prudent referee. This requested instruction was given by the court, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, which told the jury that the standard to be applied was that of the ordinarily prudent referee. The jury thereafter returned a verdict for respondents. Appellant moved for judgment n.o.v. or for new trial based primarily upon four specific instances of claimed misconduct on the part of counsel for respondents and denial of substantial justice. The trial court denied the motions, and this appeal followed. Although the factual background of this case is not material to a determination of the issues which we reach on this appeal, and the evidence regarding the material factual issues relating to liability is in substantial dispute, a brief statement of that factual background will assist in understanding the case. The jury could have found, from the evidence presented, that on January 31, 1963, a wrestling meet was held at Anacortes High School between the wrestling teams of Anacortes High School and Oak Harbor High School. The *942 meet was sponsored jointly by the student body associations of those two schools. The referee for this meet was Mr. Robert L. Erhart, a state trooper, and a member of the Northwest Wrestling Officials Association.[1] In one of the matches held during that wrestling meet, Stephen Carabba, a senior at Anacortes High School and a member of that school's varsity wrestling squad, was opposed by Roger Anderson, a senior at Oak Harbor High School. Both boys wrestled in the 145-pound-weight division. Near the end of the third round[2] of the match between these two boys, Anderson, who was well ahead on points, was attempting to pin Stephen Carabba's shoulders to the mat and thus score additional points for his team. In the course of this attempt, he was alternating half nelsons,[3] first to one side and then to the other, trying to roll Carabba into a pin position. This process had taken the boys to the northwest corner of the main mat[4] near where small side mats were placed against the main mat. The referee, Mr. Erhart, noticed a separation between the main mat and the side mat, and moved to close the gap to protect the contestants should they roll in that direction and off the *943 main mat onto the bare floor. In so doing, his attention was diverted from the boys momentarily. While the referee's attention was so diverted, Anderson applied what appeared to many of the eyewitnesses to be a full nelson.[5] The estimates made by the witnesses of the length of time during which the full nelson was applied varied from 1 to 10 or more seconds. Almost simultaneously the buzzer sounded the end of the round, the referee blew his whistle, and Anderson broke the hold on Carabba after a final lunge. Carabba slumped to the mat, unable to move due to the severance of a major portion of his spinal cord resulting in permanent paralysis of all voluntary functions below the level of his neck. Appellant assigns as error, the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial based upon four specific acts of alleged misconduct by counsel for respondents, and upon the total effect and interacting nature of that misconduct resulting in the denial of a fair trial to appellant. Each of the acts of alleged misconduct will be discussed separately. The first occurrence of alleged misconduct was on the sixth day of the trial when Dr. Donald Ray Silverman, called as a witness on behalf of appellant, was on the stand. Dr. Silverman had testified on direct examination as to the nature and extent of injuries suffered by Stephen Carraba, and the nature and cost of the care that had been and would be required in view of those injuries. He was then asked the total of the charges made by University Hospital for the previous care of Stephen Carraba. The following then occurred: This occurrence took place in the presence of the jury. Appellant contends that his case was unfairly prejudiced by this occurrence in two respects. First, the jury could have concluded from the remark of counsel that, if it returned a defense verdict, appellant would still have other sources of financial help upon which he could rely. This prejudice is magnified, appellant argues, by the circumstances of this case in which the jurors could have felt that their financial interests were adverse to those of appellant, a matter that will be discussed later in this opinion. The second argument made by appellant in this regard is that the statement tended to make more credible testimony by the referee, Robert Erhart, to the effect that the day following the injury he had given a written statement conceding that he had been at fault in taking his eyes off the wrestlers momentarily, only because he was led to believe that such a statement was needed in order to qualify Stephen Carabba for assistance from some crippled children's fund. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that, first, the question was never answered. Secondly, in the absence of the jury following this incident, counsel for appellant stated to the court: The court noted Mr. Miracle's request, but no curative instruction was given by the court. No exception was taken to the trial court's failure to so instruct, nor was any request for such an instruction made later in the trial. This matter was again before the trial court on appellant's motion for a new trial after the adverse jury verdict. Regarding this incident, the trial court, in its oral opinion, stated: The second instance of misconduct upon which appellant based his motion for new trial, and upon which this appeal is based, occurred during appellant's rebuttal, and on the last day of the trial. Due to Stephen Carabba's helpless condition, his mother was required to bring him to the courtroom in a wheelchair so that he might testify on rebuttal. As she was about to take Stephen from the courtroom, counsel for respondent Anacortes School District asked to put her on the stand. He then asked her: Counsel for Oak Harbor then asked Mrs. Carabba: Regarding this occurrence, the trial court, in its oral opinion on the motion for new trial, stated that: The third instance of claimed misconduct occurred during closing argument by counsel for Anacortes wherein he stated to the jury: Regarding this incident, the trial court, in its oral opinion denying appellant's motion for a new trial, stated that: The final occurrence of alleged misconduct by counsel for respondents took place during Mr. Welts' final argument to the jury, and consisted of the following remarks: Again, in its oral opinion, the trial court referred to this incident and stated that: Appellant argues that the harm resulting from this latter act of misconduct was magnified by the fact that counsel for respondent was speaking in behalf of the prosecuting attorney who had the power to shut down the school athletic programs if such a "risk" had to be faced. Finally, appellant's argument on the cumulative effect of these acts of misconduct, which he asserts denied appellant a fair trial, is summarized in his brief as follows: We have carefully examined the arguments of respondents relating to the four incidents involved, but find no reason to disagree with the trial court's characterization of them as misconduct. Nor can they be characterized as "harmless" occurrences. The question presented, in reality, is whether these acts of misconduct were such that they were not, and could not have been, cured by the actions of the trial court, and whether appellant waived his right to obtain a new trial based on these incidents by his failure to request further action on the part of the trial court, i.e. granting a mistrial. It is respondents' position that, in this case, the answer to the second question must be yes; for, where the aggrieved party objects to prejudicial matter injected in the trial, asks for a curative instruction or admonishment from the court and receives it, he waives his right to rely upon that matter on motion for new trial unless he also requests that the court declare a mistrial. Respondent cites several cases in support of his position, e.g., Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960), Nelson v. Martinson, 52 Wn.2d 684, 328 P.2d 703 (1958), Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Cushman, 22 Wn.2d 930, 158 P.2d 101 (1945). He quotes from the latter case, at 945, the statement that: Respondents recognize the exception to the rule stated that, where the misconduct is so flagrant and prejudicial *953 that no instruction to disregard it would have cured it, but contend that the exception can apply only where there has been no curative instruction given nor objection made. In short, respondents argue that, if the aggrieved party asks for any remedy at all, he must ask for the ultimate remedy of mistrial or be held, because of his objection and request for a curative instruction, to have waived any right to further rely upon the claimed error. We do not agree with this interpretation. [1] Where objection is made to an act of misconduct and a curative instruction or admonishment is given as requested, the basis for holding that the aggrieved party is not entitled to rely upon the claimed act of misconduct must be that the instruction or admonishment was sufficient to cure the harm caused by the misconduct, not that there has been a waiver of his right of reliance by the act of objecting. The controlling case is Warren v. Hart, 71 Wn.2d 512, 429 P.2d 873 (1967), wherein, at 517, it was stated by this court, sitting en banc, that: We can conceive of no basis for distinguishing that case from the present one on the ground that appellant here did object to the misconduct at the time it occurred. The lodging of an objection cannot be deemed to constitute waiver. Prior decisions of this court, where inconsistent, must be deemed to have been overruled by Warren v. Hart, supra. *954 In this connection, we note that the trial court, in denying appellant's motion for a new trial, relied heavily upon what he felt to be "a strong element of this philosophy that we refer to as gambling on the verdict," and concluded that, "In viewing the case on its four corners, I deny the motion." We feel that this reliance was misplaced in view of the preceding discussion relative to waiver, at least where, as here, the acts of misconduct relied on by appellant occurred near or at the end of the trial. Warren v. Hart, supra. The necessary inquiry, therefore, is whether the incidents of misconduct referred to were so flagrant that no instruction of the court, or admonition to disregard, could suffice to remove the harm caused thereby. If such is the case, appellant's failure to bolster his objections by moving for a mistrial did not waive, and the instruction and admonitions by the trial court did not cure, the harm produced. The only effective remedy is a new trial, free from prejudicial misconduct of this magnitude. [2] We agree with the trial court's characterization of the four specific acts of misconduct as prejudicial and incurable. But we hold that the trial court was in error in balancing against these acts and their effect what the court referred to as "gambling on the verdict." This latter concept has no place in the court's consideration of a motion for a new trial where the acts upon which such motion is based are acts of prejudicial misconduct, which were incurable, especially where such acts occurred at or near the end of the trial. To hold otherwise would be to place appellant on the horns of an impossible dilemma. Appellant has been denied a fair trial, and the judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be reversed. Pursuant to ROA 16, respondents contend that the trial court was in error in instructing the jury that the negligence of the referee, if any, rendered the school districts liable in damages to appellant,[7] and that upon retrial of *955 this case this error should not be repeated. We are assisted in this regard by the briefs of two amici curiae. In essence, respondents contend that the school districts played no part in this wrestling competition; that the matches were sponsored by the associated student bodies, which are entities separate from the school districts; that the referee was qualified and selected by the referees' association, an entity separate and apart from either the school district or the student body associations; and that the referee, in the performance of his function, occupied the status of an independent contractor. This being the case, they contend, no liability may arise on the part of respondent school districts, however negligent the referee might have been. On the other hand, appellant contends that the school district respondents owed a nondelegable duty to protect the students participating in the interscholastic wrestling matches which took place on the school premises. [3] The duty owed by a school district to its pupils has been recently stated by this court to be: One basis for the duty thus imposed upon the school district is to be found in the relationship between the parties: *956 See, also, Rodriguez v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wn.2d 51, 401 P.2d 326 (1965); Briscoe v. School Dist. No. 123, 32 Wn.2d 353, 201 P.2d 697 (1949). In the case at bar, there is lacking the involuntary relationship. However, it is not the law that only in the case of an involuntary relationship may the school district be held liable for an injury. For example, see Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn.2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961), which involved the death of a student as a result of injuries sustained during the initiation ceremony of a high school lettermen's society; and Morris v. Union High School Dist. A, 160 Wash. 121, 294 Pac. 998 (1931), which involved injuries sustained by a student participant in a football game; and Juntila v. Everett School Dist. No. 24, 178 Wash. 637, 35 P.2d 78 (1934), which involved injuries sustained by a student in a fall from bleacher seats at a football game. The school districts in each of these cases could be held liable, although the students were not in compulsory attendance at the functions involved. It is clear, therefore, that the liability of the school district is not limited to those situations contemplated by the rationale set forth in McLeod v. Grant Cy. School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wn.2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953). It is likewise clear that potential liability on the part of the school districts is not limited to those situations involving curricular activities. The comments of Hill, J., in his special concurrence in the Sherwood case, supra, seem particularly pertinent to this question. He said, at 360, that: In the present case, it is clear that the wrestling matches were conducted "under the auspices" of the respondent *957 school districts.[8] That the school districts actively encourage participation by students in such sports programs is beyond question. The schools provide coaches for the training of participants. They provide the premises upon which such activities are engaged in by the students and the equipment which is used in the wrestling matches. Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the school districts do, in fact, owe a duty to the student participants. [4] The nature of that duty, we feel, is as stated in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214 (1957): In Comment a thereto, it is said that: *958 We feel that the duty owed the student participants in this wrestling match, under the facts of this case, is similar to that imposed upon the school districts while the students are in involuntary attendance during school hours, i.e., a duty to provide nonnegligent supervision, similar to that described in the third proviso of Comment a of the Restatement, quoted above.[9] Having carefully considered respondents' cited cases and the argument to the contrary, we conclude that the trial court was not in error in instructing the jury that, if the referee was negligent, the school district must, as a matter of law, respond in damages. [5] Also, under ROA 16, respondents contend that it was error for the trial court to refuse to submit the issue of volenti non fit injuria to the jury, since appellant did volunteer to participate in this wrestling match with the knowledge that he could be injured. However, we must agree with the trial court that one is never held to "assume the risk" of another's negligence or incompetence. The doctrine is inapplicable and the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the issue to the jury. Respondent Oak Harbor High School contends that the trial court should have submitted the issue of appellant's contributory negligence to the jury. But we find nothing of substance in the record to justify the trial court in so doing. The trial court did not err in refusing to submit this issue to the jury. We further find that respondent's proposed instruction bearing on the statutory exemption in the case of failure of athletic equipment (RCW 28.58.030) was properly excluded by the trial court because it was not applicable to the facts of this case. *959 Having carefully considered respondents' remaining contentions under ROA 16, we conclude that they are without merit. The trial court's judgment, dismissing appellant's action with prejudice and awarding respondents judgment for costs and disbursements, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for retrial to be conducted in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. FINLEY, C.J., HILL, WEAVER, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HAMILTON, and HALE, JJ., concur. NEILL, J., concurs in the result. February 14, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 435 P.2d 936. [1] The association referred to is a volunteer group, independent of any of the schools involved, whose function it was to select, train, qualify, and provide officials to referee high school wrestling matches between schools in the district. [2] In high school wrestling, each match is divided into three rounds consisting of 2 minutes of wrestling. [3] A half nelson is described by one of the witnesses, Mr. Goldbloom, a high school wrestling coach, in the following manner: "A half nelson would be one arm of the applying wrestler under the arm of the other, and somewhere on the back of the neck, or head, applying pressure to turn the opponent to the opposite side, toward the opposite direction the hold is applied." [4] The main mat, whereon the wrestling is supposed to be confined, is 24 feet square. Smaller tumbling mats are placed around the edge of the main mat to prevent the contestants from striking the hard wooden floor if they roll off the main mat. [5] The full nelson was described by Mr. Goldbloom in the following manner: "A full nelson would be the same thing [as a half nelson] with both sides where the arms go under both arms, placed on the back of the neck area, anywhere from the head, back of the neck and pressure would be applied down, forcing the person's chin to his sternum, or breastbone." [6] Instruction No. 8 stated that: "The defendant school districts owed a duty to the student participants in the wrestling match to exercise reasonable and ordinary care to protect them from injury during the wrestling match. Under the evidence in this case, the only person who was carrying out this duty of the defendants was the referee Robert Erhardt. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the defendant school districts were negligent is narrowed down to a question of whether or not the referee, Robert Erhardt, was negligent during the course of the wrestling match. If you find that the referee was negligent, then the school district defendants were negligent. If you find that the referee was not negligent, then the school district defendants were not negligent." [7] Instruction No. 8 is quoted supra at 949. [8] The fact that the wrestling matches were nominally staged by the student-body associations of the schools can afford no shield against liability on the part of respondent school districts under the facts appearing in this record, e.g., the participation of the faculty in the governing and operating of the student associations, and the full veto power possessed by the schools over proposed actions of the student associations. [9] Appellant contends that the duty owed is similar to that of a landowner to an invitee upon his premises, citing Kidwell v. School Dist. No. 300, 53 Wn.2d 672, 335 P.2d 805 (1959), wherein this court held that a pupil was an invitee upon the school premises. This court pointed out in that case: "We are not here concerned with the school district's duty to supervise its young charges." In the present case, this is precisely what we are concerned with of necessity. The cited case is inapplicable.