Title: Newton v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CASSANDRA NEWTON, 
  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 200, 2022 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 2101006787 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
     
Appellee. 
  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  January 25, 2023 
Decided:  
March 23, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that:    
 
(1) 
Delaware State Police arrested Cassandra Newton for verbal threats she 
made to a state trooper at the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles.  A New Castle 
County grand jury indicted Newton for harassment, disorderly conduct, and 
terroristic threatening of a public servant or public official.  After a two-day trial, a 
Superior Court jury found Newton guilty of harassment and disorderly conduct.  The 
court sentenced her to an aggregate of one year and thirty days at Level V 
incarceration, with credit for two days served, suspended for one year of Level II 
probation. 
2 
 
 
(2) 
On appeal, Newton raises one issue contesting her conviction—the 
Superior Court erred when it granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude 
Newton’s anticipated testimony that Corporal Snook, the state trooper subject to 
Newton’s harassment, had previous contact with her.  Newton wanted to testify that 
Corporal Snook arrested her eleven months earlier which allegedly caused her 
miscarriage, and seeing him again triggered an “emotional, visceral reaction,” to 
what she claimed was past trauma.  The Superior Court excluded the testimony under 
Rules 702 and 403 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence.  We affirm Newton’s 
conviction because the Superior Court did not exceed its discretion to exclude her 
testimony under Rule 403.  
 
(3) 
Newton’s first encounter with Corporal Snook occurred on February 9, 
2020, when he arrested her and charged her with Resisting Arrest, Disorderly 
Conduct, and Criminal Trespass.  Newton claimed that she was pregnant at the time 
of the arrest, but suffered a miscarriage immediately after, for which she blamed 
Corporal Snook.1 
 
(4) 
Eleven months later, in January, 2021, Newton encountered Corporal 
Snook at the Department of Motor Vehicles where he was working on a security 
 
1 Corporal Snook was cleared of any wrongdoing after an investigation into Newton’s allegations.  
3 
 
 
detail.  According to Newton, the sight of Corporal Snook “triggered” her.2  Jennifer 
Popo, Newton’s mother, observed that Newton sounded “very upset and excitable” 
when Newton called her from the DMV.3  After spotting Corporal Snook, Newton 
began a barrage of verbal threats and abusive language towards him, the most serious 
being a threat to “follow him home and kill him.”4  Newton also yelled other 
expletives and disparaging remarks towards Corporal Snook, calling him, among 
other things, a “murderer” and a “[b]aby [k]iller.”5   
(5) 
After her arrest, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Newton on 
three counts: terroristic threatening of a public official or public servant, harassment, 
and disorderly conduct.  Before trial, the State moved in limine to exclude all 
testimony related to Newton’s February 9th arrest and her miscarriage, including her 
use of the phrase “[b]aby [k]iller.”  The State argued that her testimony was 
irrelevant to the charges, unfairly prejudicial, and there was no evidence that 
Corporal Snook caused Newton’s miscarriage.  In response, Newton argued that the 
evidence was critical to her state of mind and lack of intent.  According to Newton, 
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A69.  Although Newton testified that the sight of Corporal Snook 
“triggered” her, she was clear and purposeful in her actions, testifying “I know exactly what I said 
to him.  I called him a murderer.  And that’s what I yelled…. That’s exactly what I said to him.”  
Id. at A69.  
3 Id. at A67. 
4 Id. at A55, A74.  
5 Id. at A9, A44, A46–47, A74.  Newton denied threatening Corporal Snook, and denied making 
derogatory statements towards him, but admitted that she called him a “murderer.”  Id. at A69, 
A72–73.  
4 
 
 
she needed to testify about the arrest and miscarriage to show that her actions at the 
DMV were a “visceral triggered reaction” and “coping mechanism to grief” rather 
than an intent to harass, annoy, inconvenience, or alarm.6   
 
(6) 
The Superior Court granted the State’s motion in limine on two 
grounds: (i) the testimony was medical evidence that required medical or expert 
proof; and (ii) the testimony was more prejudicial than probative because it would 
have led to juror confusion and required a trial within a trial to connect the February 
9th arrest and miscarriage to the threats made towards Corporal Snook at the DMV.  
The Superior Court excluded all testimony related to the February 9th arrest and 
miscarriage but allowed a statement that Newton and Corporal Snook knew each 
other from an interaction that occurred eleven months prior.  The court suggested to 
the State that it exclude any reference to “baby killer,” but allowed the State to use 
the word “murderer.”7   
 
(7) 
Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted Newton of disorderly 
conduct and harassment and acquitted her of the more serious charge of terroristic 
threatening of a public official or public servant.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Newton to an aggregate of one year and thirty days at Level V incarceration, with 
credit for two days served, suspended for one year of Level II probation.  The court 
 
6 Id. at A25.  
7 Id. at A28-29.  
5 
 
 
also imposed other conditions, including no-contact orders and continued mental 
health counseling.     
 
(8) 
Newton argues on appeal that the Superior Court erred when it granted 
the State’s motion in limine and excluded her anticipated testimony regarding 
Newton’s February 9th arrest, her miscarriage, and her use of the phrase “baby 
killer.”  She makes three points: (i) the excluded testimony was critical to negate the 
intent element of harassment and disorderly conduct; (ii) no medical or expert proof 
was required to substantiate the evidence; and (iii) excluding her testimony deprived 
her of her constitutional right to present a defense. 
 
(9) 
Newton did not make her constitutional claim below.  Thus, we review 
for plain error.8  Plain error must be “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”9  As explained below, the 
Superior Court properly excluded Newton’s anticipated testimony under Rule 403.  
Thus, there was no plain error.10    
 
(10) We review evidentiary rulings to decide whether the Superior Court 
exceeded its discretion.11  Our review is two-fold.  First, we determine whether the 
Superior Court exceeded “the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances” and 
 
8 Goode v. State, 136 A.3d 303, 312 (Del. 2016) (citing Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 285 (Del. 
2006)). 
9 Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del.2002). 
10 United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (explaining that evidence properly excluded 
under Rules of Evidence is not constitutional error).  
11 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008).  
6 
 
 
ignored “recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.”12  If the 
Superior Court exceeded its discretion and improperly excluded evidence, then we 
decide whether excluding the evidence caused such significant prejudice to deny the 
appellant a fair trial.13 
 
(11) Newton argues that the Superior Court erred in excluding the testimony 
under Rule 403 for two reasons.  First, Newton contends that the Superior Court 
used the wrong standard to decide whether her anticipated testimony should be 
excluded.  She claims that, under Rule 403, the prejudicial effect must substantially 
outweigh the probative value.  Second, Newton argues that, applying the correct 
standard, the Superior Court erred because her testimony was highly probative of 
her “motive or belief or the precipitating factor for her behavior” to negate the intent 
element of the charged crimes, and this probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by any possibility of confusion or conducting a trial within a trial.14 
 
(12) Even if the Superior Court did not use the word “substantial” in its 
decision, the Superior Court’s ruling was still fundamentally correct—its probative 
value did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.  Rule 403 allows the trial 
court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
 
12 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988).  
13 Id.; Manna, 945 A.2d at 1153.  
14 Opening Br. at 16-17. 
7 
 
 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”  Newton’s anticipated testimony went to her motive, not her 
intent, and therefore had minimal probative value.  To secure a conviction, the State 
had to prove that it was Newton’s conscious object (intent) to threaten Corporal 
Snook which caused him alarm, annoyance, or harassment.  The evidence 
established just that—Newton admitted that she screamed at Corporal Snook, and 
witnesses at the DMV testified that she threatened to follow him home and kill him.  
Newton’s motive—her belief, reason, or justification for her conduct—was 
immaterial to proving or disproving the elements of the charged crimes.  
 
(13) The prejudicial effect of Newton’s testimony also substantially 
outweighed its minimal probative value.  As explained by the Superior Court, 
Newton’s testimony would have created a trial within a trial, requiring the jury to 
consider evidence regarding the existence and cause of Newton’s miscarriage before 
addressing the elements of the charged crimes.  The testimony likely would have 
resulted in juror confusion, causing the jury to conflate (as Newton has) the two 
distinct concepts of motive and intent, only one of which had any bearing on the 
trial.  Lastly, evidence related to such a difficult, traumatic topic would have 
inflamed passions and invoked juror sympathy.  As such, the prejudicial effect of 
the testimony was significant enough to substantially outweigh the minimal 
probative value of Newton’s proffered testimony. 
8 
 
 
 
(14) The Superior Court did not exceed its discretion in excluding the 
evidence under Rule 403.  We need not reach the other grounds relied upon by the 
Superior Court to exclude the anticipated testimony.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Chief Justice