Title: MILLER v. BRADLEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MILLER v. BRADLEY2000 WY 1054 P.3d 882Case Number: 99-4, 99-5, 99-6Decided: 04/27/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Steve and Esther MILLER, 
Appellants (Petitioners),v. Janis K. BRADLEY, Appellee 
(Petitioner). Robert and Marie Burkhalter, Appellants (Petitioners), v. Janis K. 
Bradley, Appellee (Petitioner). Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County, 
Appellants (Respondent), v. Janis K. Bradley, Appellee (Petitioner).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

Representing 
Appellants Miller: William L. Miller of 
Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, WY;Representing Appellants 
Burkhalter: M.L. Barton of M.L. Barton, P.C., Riverton, 
WY;Representing Appellant Board of County Commissioners: Norman E. 
Young, Fremont County and Prosecuting Attorney. Argument by Messrs. Miller, 
Barton and Young.Representing Appellee: Andrew W. Baldwin of Baldwin 
& Crocker, P.C., Lander, WY. Argument by Mr. Baldwin.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] This is an 
appeal from a district court order reversing an order of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County and requiring reinstatement of an earlier order 
by the Board which established a private road in Fremont County. We affirm the 
district court order and remand to the district court with directions to remand 
to the Board of County Commissioners for reinstatement of its. original order 
and an assessment of damages.

ISSUES

[¶2] All parties 
raise the following issue:

1. Whether the district 
court erred in holding that Bradley's land does not have an outlet or a 
connection with a public road.

[¶3] The Millers 
raise the following additional issue:

2. Whether the district 
court erred in holding that the United States is not a' necessary and 
indispensable party to this action.

[¶4] The 
Burkhalters raise the following additional issues:

3. Whether Bradley 
properly gave notice of her petition to establish a private road to all affected 
landowners;

4. Whether the Fremont 
County Board of Commissioners correctly determined 
damages;

5. Whether a road 
dedicated within a subdivision but privately maintained and restricted in use is 
a "public road" for purposes of W.S. § 24-9-101.

[¶5] Bradley 
raises the following additional issues:

6. Whether the 
Burkhalters have standing to challenge an alleged injury to the rights of 
others;

7. Whether the findings 
on damages may be challenged for the first time on appeal and are clear 
error;

8. Whether the Board of 
County Commissioners has standing to appeal when it did not appear in the 
District Court proceeding;

9. Whether she is 
entitled to costs and attorney's fees pursuant to W.R.A.P. Rule 
10.05.

FACTS

[¶6] On November 
25, 1996, Bradley filed a petition for a private road with the Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 
1999). In the petition, Bradley alleged that she was the owner of a landlocked 
parcel of land located in Fremont County having no outlet to, or connection 
with, a public road. Bradley further alleged that the most convenient access to 
her land was across Eagles Road, a public road which passes through the Mile 
High Subdivision, continues north as a private road on the western boundary of 
property owned by the Millers and Burkhalters, and ends at the southern boundary 
of Bradley's property. Bradley sought the establishment of the northern portion 
of Eagle Road as a private road leading from her land to the public portion of 
Eagle Road.

[¶7] On February 
18, 1997, the Millers filed a motion to dismiss Bradley's petition for failure 
to join the United States as an indispensable party. The Millers alleged that 
the land Bradley claimed to own was held in trust by the United States and 
argued that, as trustee, the United States was a necessary party to the action. 
The Board of County Commissioners denied the motion and, on April 1, 1997, 
issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which the Board concluded that 
Bradley had no legally recognized or enforceable outlet to or connection with a 
public road and that a private road was necessary. The Board further concluded 
that Eagle Road was the most convenient access to Bradley's property. The Board 
ordered the appointment of viewers and appraisers to view and locate a private 
road and assess any damages.

[¶8] The viewers 
and appraisers met at the site on September 4, 1997, as ordered by the Board 
and, on October 20, 1997, submitted a report to the Board in which they 
concluded that Eagle Road was the most convenient access to Bradley's property 
and that the establishment of the northern portion of Eagle Road as a private 
road would cause no injury to the surrounding landowners.

[¶9] On October 
31, 1997, the Millers filed an objection to the report. A hearing was held on 
November 4, 1997, at which time the Board heard objections from interested 
parties. On January 13, 1998, the Board issued an order reversing its earlier 
order and denying Bradley's petition for a private road. The Board found that 
the lands adjoining Bradley's property to the west and south are, like her land, 
held in trust by the United States over which the Secretary of Interior is 
empowered to grant rights-of-way and that Bradley could seek a right-of-way from 
the United States. Therefore, the Board concluded, Bradley had failed to show 
her land had no legally enforceable outlet to or connection with a public road 
or that a private road was necessary.

[¶10] On January 
26, 1998, Bradley filed a petition for review in the district court pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101 et seq. and W.R.A.P. 12. On February 13, the 
Burkhalters and Millers also filed petitions for review in the district court. 
The district court consolidated the petitions, heard argument on August 19, and 
issued an order on November 11 finding that Bradley's land has no outlet to or 
connection with a public road and that Bradley is not required to seek a 
right-of-way across the adjacent U.S. government lands before applying for a 
private road pursuant to § 24-9-101. The district court reversed the January 13 
order of the Board of County Commissioners and ordered reinstatement of the 
Board's earlier order. The Millers, Burkhalters and Board of County 
Commissioners timely appealed the district court order.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11] In 
reviewing appeals from agency action, we are in the same position as the 
district court; we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency as long 
as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Gold v. Board of County 
Comm'rs of Teton County, 658 P.2d 690, 695 (Wyo. 1983). Our task is to examine 
the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the 
agency's findings of facts. Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 63 (Wyo. 1997). No 
deference is given to an agency's conclusions of law. Martens v. Johnson County 
Board of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 379 (Wyo. 1998). If the agency has not invoked 
and properly applied the correct rule of law, we are obligated to correct the 
error. Id.

DISCUSSION

Outlet to or Connection 
with Public Road

[¶12] The 
Millers, Burkhalters and Board of County Commissioners contend that the district 
court erred in finding that Bradley has no outlet to or connection with a public 
road. In essence, their argument is that the Bradley property and the adjoining 
property to the west and south are owned by the same entity (the United States); 
the adjoining property is connected to a public road (Riverview Road); Bradley 
has the ability pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 323 to seek a right of way from the 
Secretary of the Interior across the adjoining federal lands to Riverview Road; 
therefore, Bradley is not entitled to the establishment of a private road under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101.

[¶13] Section 
24-9-101 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any person whose land has 
no outlet to, nor connection with .a public road, may apply in writing to the 
board of county commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his 
premises to some convenient public road. * * * [I]f the board finds that the 
applicant has complied with the law and that the private road is necessary, the 
board shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the 
county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issue 
directing them to meet on a day named in the order on the proposed road, and 
view and locate a private road according to the application therefor, and to 
assess damages to be sustained thereby. * * * The viewers shall then proceed to 
locate and mark out a private road in accordance with the application or in such 
other manner and location they deem appropriate * * *. The proposed road * * * 
shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through 
which the private road is located.

[¶14] In 
applying this statute, we have held that the language of the provision must be 
given a sensible construction and that convenience and reason should prevail in 
establishing private roads. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980); 
Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995). We have said that the statute 
was intended to provide a procedure whereby a landowner could obtain access to 
his property in a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient 
manner. McGuire, at 1288.

[¶15] We have 
construed the statute to mean that any person whose land is so situated that it 
has no outlet, that is, legally enforceable means by which he can gain access, 
has demonstrated necessity as a matter of, law. Id. at 1286. We have also said 
that necessity is established under § 24-9-101 where a petitioner has no 
presently existing outlet to or connection with a public road. Walton v. Dana, 
609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo. 1980). 

[¶16] We have 
held that there is no requirement in § 24-9-101 that a petitioner for a private 
road must overcome every obstacle standing in his way, regardless of the expense 
and impracticability. Walton, 609 P.2d  at 463 Thus, we have held that a 
petitioner cannot be compelled to pursue a claim of common law way of necessity 
before he may seek relief under § 24-9-101. Id.; but see Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. 
Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991) (making clear that a civil action for a 
common law way of necessity is not available because of the existence of § 
24-9-101). In the same vein, we have held that the potential remedy of an 
implied easement is not relevant to the determination of whether a private road 
is necessary. Lindt, 895 P.2d  at 462-63. Section 24-9-101 contains no 
requirement that other forms of relief be pursued prior to seeking the relief 
available under its provisions. McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286; Walton, 609 P.2d  at 
463; Lindt, 895 P.2d  at 462.

[¶17] Here, 
although it was not required, the petitioner did seek other relief prior to 
filing a petition for a private road pursuant to § 24-9-101. In February of 
1996, Bradley filed an action in district court for determination of whether a 
federal easement existed on Eagle Road. The outcome of that action was an order 
from the district court ruling that no federal or implied easement under state 
law existed and that Bradley's remedy was before the Board of County 
Commissioners under § 24-9-101. In accordance with that order, Bradley filed her 
petition seeking the establishment of a private road.

[¶18] Given the 
procedural history of this case, a holding by this court requiring Bradley to 
seek relief from the Secretary of Interior under the federal statutes would 
frustrate the purposes of § 24-9-101; reason and convenience would not prevail 
from such a holding. That other relief may be available to Bradley under the 
federal statute is not relevant to her right to proceed under the Wyoming 
statute. She has no presently existing outlet to or connection with a public 
road and was entitled to seek relief under § 24-9-101.

United States as 
Necessary or Indispensable Party

[¶19] The 
Millers argue that the United States, as trustee of the lands held by Bradley, 
is a necessary and indispensable party to this action. Rule 19 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure governs the joinder of persons needed for a just 
adjudication. In determining whether joinder is required, a court must first 
determine if the person in question meets the criteria contained in Rule 19 (a). 
Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 985 P.2d 433, 439 (Wyo. 1999). Section (a) 
of Rule 19 provides:

(a) Persons to be joined 
if feasible. - A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if: (1) in the person's absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or (2) the 
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may: (i) as 
a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that 
interest; or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.

[¶20] If these 
criteria are met, the person is to be joined if feasible. Lamb, at 439. In cases 
where joinder is not feasible, the court must then determine whether, in equity 
and good conscience, the action should proceed with the parties before it or be 
dismissed based upon consideration of the four factors identified in Rule 19 
(b). Id.

[¶21] We 
conclude that the criteria contained in Rule 19 (a) have not been met. Contrary 
to the Millers' claim, we find that, on the narrow issue presented, complete 
relief can be accorded among the parties before the court without the joinder of 
the United States. Unlike the authorities cited by Miller, this is not a case in 
which title to the Bradley property is at issue. If such were the case, 
dismissal likely would be warranted absent the United States as a party. At 
issue here, however, is the trust beneficiary's right of access to the trust 
property. This issue can be adequately addressed, and complete relief can be 
afforded, in an action between the beneficiary and the landowners across whose 
property access is sought.

[¶22] Our 
inquiry does not end there, however. Rule 19 (a) alternatively provides that 
joinder is required if the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and his absence may impair his ability to protect that interest or 
may leave a party to the action subject to a substantial risk of double, 
multiple or inconsistent obligations. While recognizing the United States may 
have an interest in the technical sense as owner of the Bradley property, we do 
not find as a practical matter that its interest is subject to being impaired in 
this action. No party is seeking to establish a private road across lands held 
in trust by the United States, so its interest will not be impaired in that way. 
Nor do we see how the establishment of a private road providing access to the 
federal trust land for the benefit of the beneficiary will impair or impede the 
government's interest. Likewise, we do not see a substantial risk that double, 
multiple, or inconsistent obligations may be imposed upon any of the existing 
parties in the absence of the United States as a party. While the Millers are 
correct that the outcome in this case is not binding on the United States in its 
absence, we must examine practical, not merely legal, effects of allowing the 
action to go forward. Lamb, 985 P.2d  at 439. In this case, it seems highly 
unlikely that the United States would have reason in the future to challenge a 
ruling establishing access to federal trust lands across non-federal lands for 
the benefit of its beneficiary.

[¶23] Under the 
particular facts of this case, the United States is not "a person needed for 
just adjudication" within the meanings of W.R.C.P. 19, and the motion to dismiss 
for failure to join an indispensable party was properly 
denied.

Notice to Affected 
Landowners

[¶24] The 
Burkhalters claim that Bradley failed to give notice to all affected landowners 
as required by § 24-9-101. Bradley counters this argument by claiming that the 
Burkhalters are not alleging they personally failed to receive notice and do not 
have standing to appeal that issue on behalf of other nonparty landowners. We 
will address the merits of the Burkhalters' claim.

[¶25] Bradley 
gave notice to the owners of the property which the proposed route crosses. The 
Burkhalters contend notice should have been provided to all landowners within 
Mile High Subdivision because they will all be affected by Bradley's proposed 
use of Eagle Road due to increased traffic. The plain language of § 24-9-101 
requires a petitioner to "give notice in writing to the owner, resident agent or 
occupant of all lands over which the private road is applied for." The statute 
does not require a petitioner to give notice to all landowners who might be 
affected by the proposed road. Bradley gave notice as required by § 24-9-101. We 
will not expand the plain language of the statute to encompass requirements 
beyond those clearly set out by the legislature. Dunning, 936 P.2d at 64-65; 
McGuire, at 1287.

Damages

[¶26] The 
Burkhalters claim that the Board of County Commissioners incorrectly determined 
the damages which would result from the proposed road. Specifically, they claim 
there was no comparison made of the value of adjoining lands before 
establishment of the road and the value of those lands after the road was 
established as required in Lindt, 895 P.2d  at 463. Bradley argues that because 
the Burkhalters raised the damage issue for the first time on appeal to this 
court, it should not be considered.

[¶27] The record 
reveals that neither the Board of County Commissioners' order nor the district 
court order includes a determination as to damages. The only determination made 
with respect to damages was that contained in the report of the viewers and 
appraisers. That report is not a final order susceptible to review by this court 
or the district court. We, therefore, remand to the district court, with 
directions to remand to the Board for an assessment of 
damages.

[¶28] Because it 
is unclear from the record before us how the viewers and appraisers arrived at 
their assessment of. damages, we emphasize that any damages must be assessed in 
accordance with Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 (Wyo. 1995). That is, the 
viewers and appraisers' must: first, determine the value of the property over 
which the road crosses before the private road is established; second, determine 
the value of the property over which the road crosses after the private road is 
established; and third, subtract the "after" value' from the "before" value, 
which equals the damages due the owners of land over which the road crosses. In 
applying this formula, the viewers and appraisers are to determine the "before" 
and "after" value only of those lands over which the private road crosses; not, 
as the Burkhalters argue, the "before" and "after" value of all surrounding 
lands affected by the proposed road. If application of the Lindt formula 
confirms the viewers' and appraisers' earlier conclusion that no damages are due 
the landowners, that is permissible under § 24-9-101.

Public 
Road

[¶29] The 
Burkhalters claim that Eagle Road is not a public road for purposes of § 
24-9-101. They argue that it is really a private road which is privately 
maintained by and for the use of residents of Mile High Subdivision. There is no 
question from the record that Eagle Road is a public road as it passes through 
Mile High Subdivision. From there, it continues north as a private road passing 
along the western boundary of the Burkhalter and Miller properties, and ending 
at the south end of the Bradley property.

[¶30] Section 
24-9-101 provides a means for a landlocked landowner to apply for a private road 
leading from his property to "some convenient public road." The "convenient 
public road" to which Bradley seeks a connection is the public portion of Eagle 
Road which passes through Mile High Subdivision. There is no support in the 
record for the Burkhalters' assertion that the portion of Eagle Road which 
passes through Mile High Subdivision is not a public road within the meaning of 
§ 24-9-101.

Board of County 
Commissioner's Right to Appeal

[¶31] Bradley 
claims that the Board of County Commissioners is precluded from appealing the 
district court order to this court by its failure to file an appeal with the 
district court. The Board of County Commissioners is not a "person" as defined 
by the relevant statutes. See Brandt v. TCI Cablevision of Wyoming, 873 P.2d 595 
(Wyo. 1994); Basin Electric Power Co-op., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 970 P.2d 841 
(Wyo. 1998); W.R.A.P. 12.01. Therefore, that board could not appeal to the 
district court and cannot be scored for its failure to do so. Additionally, as a 
practical matter, the Board of County Commissioners has no reason to appeal to 
the district court from its own decision - we assume it is not "aggrieved or 
adversely affected" by it own decision. See W.R.A.P. 12.01. However, an 
"aggrieved party may obtain review of any final judgment of the district court 
by appeal to the supreme court." W.R.A.P. 12.11; Safety Medical Servs., Inc. v. 
Employment Security Comm'n, 724 P.2d 468, 471 (Wyo. 1986); W.R.A.P. 12.11. 
Because the Board of County Commissioners was a proper party' below, it is not 
precluded from appealing the district court order to this 
court.

Costs and Attorney 
Fees

[¶32] Citing 
W.R.A.P. 10.05, Bradley seeks her costs and attorney fees in responding to this 
appeal. To warrant taxing of costs and attorney fees under Rule 10.05, we must 
certify that there was no reasonable cause for the appeal or that appellants' 
arguments are specious and frivolous and lack cogent argument. W.R.A.P. 10.05; 
Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167-68 (Wyo. 1989). We are not 
willing to make that certification in this case.

CONCLUSION

[¶33] Reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Board 
of County Commissioners is a proper party in the action before the district 
court because it acts as a "regulatory" body, not as an "adjudicative" body, 
under the private road statute. See Antelope Valley improvement Dist. v. Board 
of Equalization [Clarification], 2000 WL 365086, 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 
2000).