Title: State of Florida v. Hackley

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC10-2316 
_____________ 
 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
LESTER HACKLEY, 
Respondent. 
 
[July 5, 2012] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case, we consider whether a conviction for burglary of a conveyance 
with an assault qualifies a defendant for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender 
(PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006).  We have for review 
the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Hackley, 35 Fla. L. 
Weekly D2436 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 29, 2010), which held that burglary of a 
conveyance with an assault does not qualify for PRR sentencing.  The First District 
certified its decision to be in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Shaw v. State, 26 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we 
 
 
- 2 - 
agree with the Fifth District that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a 
qualifying offense under the PRR statute. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On October 3, 2006, Lester Hackley was convicted of one count of burglary 
of a conveyance with a person assaulted.  Hackley‟s conviction stemmed from a 
March 12, 2006, incident in which Hackley assaulted two individuals—one of 
whom was inside a car.  Because the offense for which Hackley was convicted 
occurred less than three years after he had been released from serving another 
sentence in state prison, the trial court sentenced Hackley to life in prison as a PRR 
pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006). 
 
On June 2, 2009, Hackley filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in the 
trial court, alleging that the crime for which he was convicted did not qualify him 
for PRR sentencing.  The trial court granted Hackley‟s motion. 
 
The First District affirmed the trial court‟s ruling, holding that burglary of a 
conveyance with an assault is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute.  
Hackley, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2436, *1.  The First District relied on this Court‟s 
decision in State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2007), which held that 
battery of a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) was not a forcible felony under 
section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2000), the statute providing enhanced sentencing 
for violent career criminals. 
 
 
- 3 - 
ANALYSIS 
 
The question of statutory interpretation presented here is subject to de novo 
review.  See Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 1220 (Fla. 2010).  
The first place we look when construing a statute is to its plain language—if  the 
meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.  Id. (citing 
Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)). 
The PRR statute provides, in relevant part: 
 
(9)(a)1. “Prison releasee reoffender” means any defendant who 
commits, or attempts to commit: 
 
a. 
Treason; 
 
b. 
Murder; 
 
c. 
Manslaughter; 
 
d. 
Sexual battery; 
 
e. 
Carjacking; 
 
f. 
Home-invasion robbery; 
 
g. 
Robbery; 
 
h. 
Arson; 
 
i. 
Kidnapping; 
 
j. 
Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; 
 
k. 
Aggravated battery; 
 
l. 
Aggravated stalking; 
 
m. 
Aircraft piracy; 
 
n. 
Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a 
destructive device or bomb; 
o. 
Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical 
force or violence against an individual; 
p. 
Armed burglary; 
q. 
Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied 
structure; or 
r. 
Any felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, or 
s. 827.071; 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility 
operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor or 
within 3 years after being released from a correctional institution of 
another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any 
possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, 
following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is 
punishable by more than 1 year in this state. 
§ 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added).1   Because burglary of a 
conveyance with an assault is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute, it 
is a qualifying offense only if it falls under subsection (o)—“[a]ny felony that 
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.”  We 
conclude that it does. 
 
Burglary of a conveyance with an assault—a first-degree felony—is the 
unauthorized “[e]ntering [of] a . . . conveyance with the intent to commit an 
offense therein,” where, “in the course of committing the offense, the offender . . . 
[m]akes an assault . . . upon any person.”  § 810.02(1)(b)1-(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006).  
“An „assault‟ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the 
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act 
which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is 
imminent.”  § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). 
                                          
 
1.  Those portions of section 775.082(9)(a)1 relevant to this decision have 
remained unchanged since the time of Hackley‟s crime, conviction, and 
sentencing.  The sole revision to section 775.082(9)(a)1 since that time has been to 
add “or s. 847.0135(5)” to subsection (r), which—prior to the revision—only 
incorporated “[a]ny felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, or s. 
827.071” into the PRR statute.  Ch. 2008-172, § 13, at 1984-85, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
- 5 - 
The plain language of the burglary, assault, and PRR statutes leads us to 
conclude that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying PRR 
offense.  Because burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a felony that 
necessarily involves the “threat by word or act to do violence to the person of 
another,” it falls within subsection (o) of the PRR statute, which covers “[a]ny 
felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an 
individual.” 
Our decision in Hearns does not require a different result.  In Hearns, we 
held that a conviction for BOLEO did not qualify a defendant for sentencing as a 
violent career criminal (VCC).  961 So. 2d at 219.  The VCC statute contains a list 
of enumerated qualifying offenses, as well as a provision incorporating “[a]ny 
forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08.”  § 775.084(1)(d)1.a, Fla. Stat. (2000).  
Section 776.08 enumerates several forcible felonies and also includes a catch-all 
provision covering “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical 
force or violence against any individual.”  § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Applying 
the “statutory elements” test set forth in Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 
1991), we reasoned that 
for an offense to be a forcible felony under section 776.08, the “use or 
threat of physical force or violence” must be a necessary element of 
the crime.  If an offense may be committed without the use or threat 
of physical force or violence, then it is not a forcible felony. 
 
 
- 6 - 
Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 215 (quoting Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1313).  We concluded 
that because BOLEO can be committed by merely intentionally touching a law 
enforcement officer against his will, it is not a forcible felony “as described in the 
final clause of section 776.08” and therefore not a qualifying offense under the 
VCC statute.  Id. at 218-19. 
 
Although Hearns involved sentencing under the VCC statute, we recognized 
that “whether BOLEO is a qualifying offense must be answered consistently under 
both the VCC statute and the PRR statute,” id. at 217, because both statutes 
extended to any felony which “involves the use or threat of physical force or 
violence against an individual.”  Id. (quoting § 775.082(9)(a)1.o, Fla. Stat. (2000)).  
We observed that “where the Legislature uses the exact same words or phrases in 
two different statutes, we may assume it intended the same meaning to apply.”  
Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217 (citing Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 
202 (Fla. 1958)).  Accordingly, we held that “[b]ecause unwanted touching under 
[the BOLEO statute] may not necessarily be a violent act, it cannot be a qualifying 
offense for PRR sentencing.”  Id. at 218. 
 
The First District correctly concluded that—after Hearns—burglary of a 
conveyance with a battery is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute.  The 
First District, however, incorrectly relied on this point in holding that burglary of a 
conveyance with an assault is likewise not a PRR qualifying offense.  The First 
 
 
- 7 - 
District reasoned that to hold otherwise would lead to “the absurd consequence of 
encouraging a defendant who has already committed burglary with an assault to 
put the victim in physical danger by committing a battery to avoid the possibility 
of PRR sentencing.”  Hackley, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2436, *1-2.  We disagree. 
 
In certain circumstances, the absurdity doctrine may be used to justify 
departures from the general rule that courts will apply a statute‟s plain language.  
See State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 414 (Fla. 2004).  We thus have recognized that 
“a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to 
absurd results.”  Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 448 (Fla. 2006).  But the 
absurdity doctrine is not to be used as a freewheeling tool for courts to second-
guess and supplant the policy judgments made by the Legislature.  It has long been 
recognized that the absurdity doctrine “is to be applied to override the literal terms 
of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances.”  Crooks v. Harrelson, 
282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 
(2002) (noting that the Supreme Court “rarely invokes such a test to override 
unambiguous legislation”). 
 
The absurdity doctrine does not apply in this case.  An assault—by 
definition—always includes the threat to do violence.  § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2006).  Battery, on the other hand, does not necessarily involve the threat or use of 
force or violence.  § 784.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 218.  The 
 
 
- 8 - 
Legislature could rationally have intended—as the plain language of the PRR 
statute suggests—to subject a defendant to PRR sentencing for committing a 
felony that necessarily involves violence or the threat of violence, but not for a 
felony that can be committed without violence or the threat of violence. 
 
The First District‟s postulate of a rational criminal calculating how to avoid 
the PRR sanction is a postulate that itself courts absurdity.  If we suspend disbelief, 
however, and entertain the First District‟s concept of such a rationally calculating 
offender deciding to escalate his offense, we would see that his calculation would 
likely be too clever by half, since battery—at least when committed in the course 
of another felony such as burglary of an occupied conveyance—is in the nature of 
things likely to be preceded by conduct that constitutes an assault. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We therefore quash the First District‟s decision on review and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We approve the Fifth District‟s decision 
in Shaw. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D10-159 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha M. Pate, Bureau Chief and Samuel A. 
Perrone, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Barbara K. Hobbs of Cummings, Hobbs & Wallace, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent