Title: Whittle v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVEAR WHITTLE, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§    No. 141, 2022 
§ 
§    Court Below—Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    Cr. ID No. 1111010324 (N) 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 22, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided:  August 12, 2022 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Davear Whittle, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The State has moved 
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Whittle’s 
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
In 2012, a Superior Court jury found Whittle guilty of second-degree 
murder, first-degree reckless endangering, possession of a firearm by a person 
prohibited, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 
(“PFDCF”).  This Court reversed the conviction on appeal and remanded for a new 
2 
 
trial.1  In November 2014, Whittle pleaded guilty to manslaughter and PFDCF.  The 
Superior Court sentenced Whittle as follows:  for manslaughter, to twenty-five years 
of imprisonment, suspended after twenty years for decreasing levels of supervision, 
and for PFDCF, to five years of imprisonment, as a minimum mandatory term under 
11 Del. C. § 1447A. 
(3) 
Whittle filed two unsuccessful motions seeking postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 612 and an unsuccessful petition for federal 
habeas corpus relief.3  Whittle then filed a motion seeking correction of an illegal 
sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  The Superior Court denied that 
motion, and Whittle has appealed to this Court. 
(4) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence under Rule 
35(a) for abuse of discretion.4  To the extent the claim involves a question of law, 
we review the claim de novo.5  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, 
violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which 
it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by 
 
1 Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239 (Del. 2013). 
2 Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016) (affirming denial of first motion for 
postconviction relief); Whittle v. State, 2017 WL 5171316 (Del. Nov. 7, 2017) (affirming denial 
of second motion for postconviction relief). 
3 Whittle v. May, 2021 WL 3676968 (D. Del. Aug. 19, 2021). 
4 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
5 Id. 
3 
 
statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of 
conviction did not authorize.6  
(5) 
We find no merit to Whittle’s arguments on appeal.  First, Whittle 
argues that the Superior Court judge who presided over his plea hearing and 
sentencing should have recused himself because, before becoming a judge, he was a 
prosecutor in the Delaware Department of Justice “when Appellant was being 
prosecuted on another offense years before.”7  Whittle contends that his concern 
about the purported conflict caused him to plead guilty in violation of his right to 
have a final say in plea decisions and that the sentence imposed by the purportedly 
conflicted judge constitutes “unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  
Whittle unsuccessfully asserted his claim of judicial bias in his postconviction 
proceedings,8 and he cannot use a motion under Rule 35(a) to relitigate that issue.9 
 
6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
7 Opening Brief at 5. 
8 See Whittle, 2016 WL 2585904, at *2 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016) (holding that Whittle’s claim that “the 
Superior Court judge should have been disqualified because he was Chief Deputy Attorney 
General less than one year before he was assigned to preside over Whittle’s case” was procedurally 
barred because he had not filed a motion to disqualify in the proceedings leading to his conviction 
and stating:  “Whittle claims that the Superior Court judge and State failed to inform him that the 
Superior Court judge’s employment as Chief Deputy Attorney eleven months before the case was 
assigned to him disqualified him from presiding over Whittle’s case, but the record reflects that 
the Superior Court judge discussed the matter with Whittle’s counsel and the State.  During that 
discussion, the Superior Court judge stated that he had no recollection of the case from his time as 
Chief Deputy Prosecutor and the prosecutor stated that a search of the Department of Justice 
records did not reflect any communications with him about the case. Whittle has not shown cause 
for the procedural default or a basis to overcome the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3).”). 
9 Hawkins v. State, 2016 WL 5335246 (Del. Sept. 22, 2016).  See also Brittingham v. State, 705 at 
578-79 (affirming denial of motions to correct illegal sentence that were based on challenges that 
had been advanced in postconviction proceedings and stating: “Brittingham cannot continue to 
4 
 
(6) 
Second, Whittle argues that his sentence is illegal because it exceeded 
the recommended sentence to which Whittle and the State agreed in the plea 
agreement.  He also argues that the sentence exceeded the guidelines adopted by the 
Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”).  These claims also provide 
no basis for relief.  The sentence imposed for each of Whittle’s offenses is within 
the statutory maximum for manslaughter and PFDCF, each of which is a class B 
felony,10 and is not illegal.  The truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form correctly stated 
the maximum statutory penalty for each offense.  Although the State agreed to 
recommend a lower sentence than what the Superior Court ultimately imposed, it is 
well-established that the Superior Court is not bound by a prosecutor’s sentencing 
recommendation or the SENTAC guidelines.11 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
litigate previously decided issues by changing the number of the Superior Court rule under which 
he seeks postconviction relief”). 
10 See 11 Del. C. § 632 (defining manslaughter as a class B felony); id. § 1447A (defining PFDCF 
as a class B felony); id. § 4205(b)(2) (providing for a sentence of up to twenty-five years for a 
class B felony). 
11 E.g., Santiago v. State, 2010 WL 376967 (Del. Jan. 15, 2010); Blue v. State, 2013 WL 3777146 
(Del. July 15, 2013).