Title: People v. Dalton

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
KERRY LYN DALTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
S046848 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
135002 
 
 
May 16, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. DALTON 
S046848 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Kerry Lyn Dalton was convicted of conspiracy 
to commit murder and the first degree murder of Irene Melanie 
May.  (Pen. Code former § 182, subd. (a)(1), § 187, subd. (a), 
former § 189 (all further undesignated statutory references are 
to this code).)  The jury also found true lying in wait and torture-
murder special-circumstance allegations and an allegation that 
Dalton personally used a deadly weapon in committing the 
murder.  (Former §§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), (a)(18), 12022, 
subd. (b).)  In a separate proceeding, Dalton admitted a prior 
serious felony conviction for burglary and a prior prison term.  
(Former §§ 459, 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b), 1192.7, 
subd. (c)(18).)  At the penalty phase, the jury returned a death 
verdict, and the trial court entered a judgment of death.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, 
subd. (b).)   
For the reasons below, we vacate as unauthorized the 
death sentence imposed (and stayed) on the conspiracy to 
commit murder count (Count I).  We further vacate the lying in 
wait special-circumstance true finding.  We remand and direct 
the trial court to state on an amended abstract of judgment a 
sentence of imprisonment for 25 years to life, stayed pursuant 
to section 654, on the conspiracy count (Count I), and to strike 
the lying in wait special-circumstance true finding.  We affirm 
the judgment, as modified, in all other respects.  
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
On June 26, 1988, Dalton, her boyfriend Mark “TK” 
Tompkins, and Sheryl Ann “John Boy” Baker murdered 23-year-
old Irene Melanie May in Joanne Fedor’s trailer located in the 
Live Oak Springs Trailer Park in Boulevard, California.  Her 
body was never found.   
Dalton and her coperpetrators were jointly charged, but 
Dalton’s trial was severed.  Tompkins pled guilty to first degree 
murder.  Baker pled guilty to second degree murder in exchange 
for testifying at the 1995 trial against Dalton.  The prosecutor 
also agreed to other terms, including notifying the Department 
of Corrections or Board of Prison Terms of Baker’s cooperation 
and her level of culpability in Dalton’s case, requesting she serve 
her prison time out of state, and transporting her to and from 
court separately from Dalton.  Baker had not yet been sentenced 
at the time of her testimony.   
Because Dalton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
for every charged count and special circumstance allegation, we 
review in detail the evidence in support of the prosecution’s case.   
1. Prosecution evidence 
a. Events before the murder 
1) Events before arriving at Fedor’s trailer 
Sheryl Baker, who had been previously convicted of grand 
theft auto, and in 1988 used crystal methamphetamine several 
times a day, testified that in June 1988, she was living in 
Lakeside and had known Irene Melanie May (May) for about two 
months.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
May was married to Bobby May and had three children.  
On Saturday, June 25, 1988, May had been evicted from her 
Lakeside apartment, and she and Baker were shooting 
methamphetamine and moving May’s belongings into storage.  
Bobby May was incarcerated at the time, and a man named 
George, whom Baker met for the first time that day, and several 
other individuals helped them.  Dalton, whom Baker had known 
since 1986, and who other testimony established had previously 
lived with May and Bobby May, also arrived with two women, 
Patricia Collins and Pamela McGee.  Dalton angrily told Baker 
much of the furniture in the apartment was hers and she wanted 
it, and she was looking for certain pieces of jewelry.  Baker told 
Dalton she would look for her property, and Dalton left.  Collins 
testified she bought a dresser from May.  Collins had not met 
May before and described her as a “[s]kinny little speed freak.”   
At about 5:00 p.m., Baker, May, and George went to a 
convenience store to meet May’s connection to obtain drugs.  
While waiting at the store, Baker called Dalton and told her she 
had not found her jewelry.  Dalton, who lived nearby, arrived at 
the store a few minutes later with Mark Tompkins in a small 
yellow pickup truck.   
Baker, Dalton, and Tompkins decided to locate and steal 
a Trans Am that belonged to an individual they knew, and May 
and George accompanied Baker because they were “partying 
with” her.  May expressed concern about going because she was 
afraid of Dalton.  About 6:00 p.m., the group left the store in two 
trucks; Dalton and Tompkins were in their truck, and Baker, 
George, and May followed in George’s truck.  No plan had been 
discussed other than to steal the car.  They drove for hours, and 
eventually happened to come upon Dalton’s acquaintance 
Joanne Fedor.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
Fedor, who was accompanied by her three- and four-year-
old children, testified she had pulled her truck over to the side 
of the road because of an electrical fire.  She encountered Dalton 
and her group about 11:30 p.m.  Dalton offered to drive Fedor’s 
children to Fedor’s home in case the fire resumed.  Fedor agreed 
and left, followed by the two trucks.  According to Baker, the 
group following Fedor then lost their way, and the truck 
carrying Dalton and Tompkins broke down.  Dalton, Tompkins, 
and Fedor’s children joined Baker, May, and George in George’s 
truck.   
2) Events at Fedor’s trailer the night and 
morning of June 26, 1988 
Fedor testified that about 2:30 a.m. on the morning of 
June 26, 1988, Dalton and her companions arrived at Fedor’s 
trailer.  Baker recalled Fedor was “freaking out” and thought 
her children had been kidnapped.   
Baker testified that the group and Fedor stayed up all 
night and some individuals used drugs.  Baker used about a 
gram of methamphetamine “throughout the time of this.”  By 
the following morning Baker had been up at least 24 hours.   
At some point during the night or the following morning, 
Dalton and Baker searched through papers in George’s truck 
because they did not know him, and Dalton wanted to be sure 
he was not connected to law enforcement.  Also at some point 
Dalton emptied May’s purse and “found some of her jewelry.”  
Dalton was upset, and “started making [May] her slave and 
making her clean [Fedor’s] trailer,” performing chores such as 
washing dishes and cleaning the kitchen.  May told Baker she 
was “very scared.”   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
Fedor testified she asked her guests several times during 
the night “to please be quiet, that my neighbor next door was 
nosey, I didn’t need no problems.  At one point . . . the neighbor 
sent somebody over to complain.”  During the night, Fedor heard 
Dalton and May arguing, and someone said May was a “snitch, 
ratting her old man off.”  Fedor also heard Dalton say that while 
May thought Dalton was in jail, May had held a yard sale that 
included Dalton’s belongings.  During this discussion, Dalton 
sounded angry, and May sounded “scared to death.”  At some 
other point that night, Fedor heard Dalton, Baker, and May 
using drugs in the bathroom.  Dalton and Baker became angry 
with May when they learned they had all shared a needle and 
May had hepatitis.   
Later that morning, Fedor, like Baker, observed Dalton 
treat May “like a slave,” “[c]ommanding her” to wash dishes, 
clean the house, and make breakfast for and dress Fedor’s 
children.  At one point when Fedor was drying dishes with May, 
May “had a knife” and “wanted to use it on [Dalton], because she 
was scared.”  May asked Fedor “how she could get out.”  Fedor 
replied, “if you are afraid, go outside because there [are] mobile 
homes on both sides, scream,” and gave May directions to the 
freeway.  Fedor also, at May’s request, left a message for Nina 
Tucker, the child protective services worker assigned to May’s 
family, that May would be unable to attend a scheduled meeting 
with Tucker.   
Fedor did not see May alone in the trailer.  Dalton 
appeared to tell the others what to do, and Fedor did not observe 
Baker or Tompkins refusing to do anything Dalton told them to 
do.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
Baker testified that sometime that morning, she, 
Tompkins, and George left the trailer for about an hour to repair 
and return with the truck that had broken down.   
3) Emergency medical technicians 
Lona Agnew testified that in June 1988 she was a 
volunteer emergency medical technician for the Boulevard Fire 
and Rescue Department and lived in the same trailer park as, 
and knew of, Joanne Fedor.  Early on the morning of June 26, 
1988, she responded to a page regarding a person having 
difficulty breathing and a possible asthma attack at Fedor’s 
trailer.  A woman who was not Fedor and a short white man 
were outside, and the man took Agnew into the trailer.   
The trailer was very dirty, and there were clothes and 
other items “all over.”  A tall man with long hair appeared and 
asked Agnew what she was doing there.  Agnew said she was 
from the fire department and they had received a medical call.  
The man said, “No, there is no problem here.”  Agnew showed 
the man the report of an asthma attack.  The man again said, 
“No, there is no problem here.”  He seemed angry Agnew was 
there, and instructed the other man to “[g]et her out of here.”   
Once outside, and as Agnew began walking back to her 
trailer, Fedor leaned out a window and asked if Agnew had a 
bronchial inhaler, explaining her son had asthma and was 
having difficulty breathing.  Agnew said no, and that there was 
nothing she could do unless Fedor let her in to see the patient.  
Fedor would not let her in, and said, “No, I just need one of those 
inhal[ers].”   
A short time later, Agnew and her supervisor, Lou 
Faulkner, returned to Fedor’s trailer in a marked fire and rescue 
truck.  As Faulkner exited the truck, he was met by three 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
persons, the man and woman who had been outside earlier, and 
the tall man who had been inside the trailer.  Agnew did not see 
Fedor.  The tall man asked what was going on, and Faulkner 
said they had “received a report of medical aid.”  The tall man 
said, “No, there is no problem here.”  Agnew and Faulkner left.   
Fedor testified that at some point on the morning of 
June 26, May was having difficulty breathing.  Baker and 
Tompkins went to a nearby convenience store to get May a 
product that would help her breathe.  Afterward, Agnew arrived 
at Fedor’s trailer.  Dalton and Tompkins were upset that “911” 
had been called, and blamed Fedor.  Tompkins said:  “[W]hen 
they come here everybody stays inside.  I’ll go out, tell them it 
was me that called, that I’m okay.”  When Agnew arrived, 
Tompkins went outside.  Tompkins told Agnew that the medical 
report concerned him, but he was all right and she could go.  
Fedor then asked Agnew for an inhaler.   
4) Trip to La Cima Honor Camp and Lakeside 
Fedor testified that at about 11:30 a.m., just after the 
emergency medical technicians left, Baker, Tompkins, and 
George drove Fedor and her two children to visit Fedor’s 
boyfriend, who was incarcerated at La Cima Honor Camp, 
located about 45 minutes away.  Baker, in her testimony and 
statement to police, said that only Baker and Tompkins — not 
George — gave Fedor and her two children a ride to the camp.   
Fedor testified that Dalton and May stayed in the trailer.  
Before Fedor left, she had tried to reenter the trailer, but Dalton 
and May did not let her in.   Once Fedor arrived at the camp, the 
others left.  Fedor understood they would pick her up when 
visitation ended at 3:30 p.m.  They did not do so, and so after 
waiting until about 4:00 p.m., Fedor and her young children 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
hitchhiked home.  Fedor did not tell sheriffs at the camp there 
was a problem at her trailer because “[t]here was no problem at 
my trailer as far as I was concerned.”   
Baker testified that after dropping Fedor off at the camp, 
she and Tompkins went to a home in Lakeside.  They left 
immediately after learning that the police had been there the 
night before because Fedor had been looking for her children.  
Baker and Tompkins then went to the home of Baker’s dealer so 
Baker could obtain drugs.  Tompkins left the home for about 
10 minutes to use a telephone.   When he returned, he was “in a 
panic.”  He told Baker to get in the truck, “we have to go, 
something happened.  We have to get back up there.”  Baker was 
disinclined to go because “[i]t was very boring” at the trailer, but 
Tompkins was insistent.  They drove “[d]irectly back to” Fedor’s 
trailer, which was a “long drive.”  On the way, Tompkins said 
“things happen for a reason,” and “things just happen and to go 
with the flow.”   
Baker agreed with defense counsel that from the time she 
left the Lakeside area until they reached Fedor’s trailer “there 
was no discussion between [her] and George and [Tompkins] 
and Kerry Dalton about doing anything to” May.  She also 
agreed she had “no discussions” or “plan to do anything” to May 
“at any time” from the time that Baker left Lakeside on 
Saturday, June 25, 1988, all through the time when she left to 
go to the honor camp with Fedor on Sunday, June 26, 1988.   
b. Events during the murder 
Baker and Tompkins arrived at the trailer at about 
3:30 p.m.  George was outside and Dalton was inside the trailer.  
Baker and Tompkins had been gone from the trailer at least 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
three hours.  Dalton asked Tompkins why he had brought Baker 
with him.   
A person completely covered by a sheet was seated in a 
chair in the kitchen.  Rope encircled the sheet and tied the 
person to the chair.  Dalton was upset, and told Baker that 
Baker did not “know what happened when [she] was gone, and 
something had happened, and that they were going to kill” May.  
Dalton also said that “[y]ou don’t know what we went through” 
and that May “tried to get away or something.”  Dalton led this 
discussion for 10 to 15 minutes, and Tompkins “was going along 
with” Dalton.  Baker testified she did not know and was never 
told what had happened at the trailer while she and Tompkins 
were gone.   
Tompkins joined George outside.  Dalton took Baker to the 
“back bathroom where there [were] . . . four or five syringes 
filled with what she told [Baker] was” battery acid.  The content 
of the syringes resembled methamphetamine or water.  Dalton 
said, “[W]e were going to shoot her up with battery acid; it would 
be really quick and easy, that it would be over with.”  Dalton 
also said the battery acid would “kill her instantly.”  Dalton told 
Baker that Baker “had to be a part of it” because Tompkins 
wanted to kill Baker, and “in order for him not to” kill her, “if 
[she] helped, that [she] would be guilty, too” and would not “tell 
on them.”   
Dalton and Baker returned to the kitchen, and Dalton told 
May she was going to give her a sedative to calm her.  Dalton 
asked Baker to try to inject May with a hypodermic needle, but 
apparently because of May’s drug use, Baker could not find a 
vein.  Dalton was angry, took the syringe, and depressed it once 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
into May’s leg.  There was no blood in the syringe, which 
indicated to Baker that Dalton had not penetrated a vein.   
Dalton told Baker that May was not dead and was 
suffering and that they “had to do something about it.”  Dalton 
handed Baker a cast iron frying pan from the stove and told 
Baker to hit May with the pan.  Baker hit May once in the head 
with the pan.  May did not bleed, but the pan broke.  Dalton said 
they were “going to have to get” Tompkins because “[t]his isn’t 
working.”  Baker told police Dalton “couldn’t do it and she didn’t 
wanna tell” Tompkins.  When Tompkins came back inside, he 
“was mad, [and] called us stupid bitches that couldn’t handle 
nothing.”  Tompkins and Dalton decided to stab May, and 
Tompkins stabbed May twice.  Tompkins may have also hit May 
with a breaker bar.  Baker did not see an extension cord with 
“bare” ends, nor was such an extension cord used against the 
person in the chair.   
There was no blood on the sheet, but there was a small 
amount on the floor that Dalton cleaned up.  Tompkins and 
George wrapped May in a carpet, placed her body in the back of 
George’s truck, and left to dispose of May’s body.  About half an 
hour passed between the time Baker and Tompkins returned to 
the trailer and when Tompkins stabbed May.   
On cross-examination, Baker testified she never saw the 
face of the person under the sheet, and the person made no 
sound or movement.  She could not tell if the person was injured 
in any way.  She did not know if the person was alive when she 
and Tompkins returned to the trailer.  On redirect, she agreed 
that in March 1992 she had told officers May had said, “I don’t 
wanna die,” and, “[p]lease don’t kill me, I’m sorry.”  On recross-
examination, Baker agreed with defense counsel that in July 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
1994, during her second interview with law enforcement, she 
had told officers she had given “the wrong answers” in her first 
interview in March 1992, not because she had lied but because 
she did not want to remember what happened.  Baker told 
officers in July 1994 that she did not know whether May was 
alive when Baker returned to the trailer, and testified at trial 
that this was the truth.   
Donald McNeely testified that for three months, from 
June to August of 1992, he had shared a cell at the San Diego 
County jail with Tompkins.  During this time, Tompkins told 
McNeely he was “in on a murder charge” and called it a “torture 
slaying.”  Tompkins said the victim was “Melanie May,” and the 
murder occurred in June of 1988 in a “house trailer” in the “Live 
Oak Springs, Boulevard area.”  Tompkins said that he was 
“really into violence,” that he “tortured the hell out of her,” and 
that “pain was the name of the game.”  In McNeely’s view, 
Tompkins “seemed to enjoy it.”  Tompkins said the “original plan 
was to give Miss May a hotshot” and that Tompkins did so.   
Tompkins also mentioned a screwdriver, knife, and a 
heavy kitchen skillet, saying “they work wonders on the knees.”  
Tompkins “got tired of it” and “just wanted it to end,” so he 
stabbed May with a knife.   
c.  Events after the murder 
Tompkins told McNeely he put May’s body into a vehicle 
and took it to a nearby Indian reservation.  He then 
dismembered the body so it would be more difficult to locate.   
Baker testified that Dalton said Tompkins and George 
were going to burn the body.  Dalton and Baker took showers 
and cleaned the trailer.  Baker collected a breaker bar, 
screwdriver, and the frying pan; Baker and the others took these 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
items with them when they left Fodor’s trailer.  Tompkins had 
the knife.  Baker did not see a bloody pillow, pillow case, or bar 
of soap, or notice any blood outside the kitchen.   
When Fedor returned, Baker was in the yard picking up 
items.  Dalton told Fedor that she and May “got in a fight,” and 
May had left.  Dalton also told Fedor they were going to the 
store, and Dalton, Baker, Tompkins, and George left in George’s 
truck.   
After leaving Fedor’s trailer, the group stopped at an 
Alpine gas station to get “rid of the stuff that we had with us”; 
Baker threw away the screwdriver, frying pan, and breaker bar.  
The group then went to El Cajon where Dalton sold a leather 
jacket.   
Patricia Collins testified she saw Dalton “a couple of days” 
after the two had attended the yard sale.  Dalton tried to sell her 
a black leather jacket.  Dalton seemed scared and nervous 
because “she kept saying that she needed money, she needed a 
place to stay.”   
Baker testified that she, Dalton, George, and Tompkins 
checked into a hotel in El Cajon.  Dalton and Tompkins argued.  
Tompkins wanted to blow up Fedor’s trailer, but Dalton said “he 
couldn’t do that because children were there.”  George drove 
Baker to her parents’ home for the night.  As she was getting 
out of George’s truck she saw in the truck Dalton’s knife that 
Tompkins used to stab May.  It was an “old kind of buck knife” 
with a fixed brown handle.   
Sherri Fisher testified that about three days after she saw 
May leave Fisher’s home with Baker, she saw Baker, who was 
hysterical and crying, and said she had to leave.  Baker 
described a murder, saying the victim had died slowly and 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
“wouldn’t die.”  Baker left with Fisher’s mother.  A couple of 
hours after they left, Dalton came to Fisher’s home and asked 
for May’s belongings; Fisher gave her a purse and some papers.   
Fisher’s mother, Marsha Watson, testified that on 
June 30, 1988, she traveled with Baker to Watson’s home in 
Yucca Valley.  Baker had a purse with papers including May’s 
birth certificate and birth certificates for “[s]ome boys.”  Baker 
left the papers at Watson’s house when she departed.  Watson 
described Baker as “spun,” or someone who had “taken too 
much” methamphetamine.  At this time, Watson was a heroin 
addict who also used crystal methamphetamine.   
Dalton made several statements to Baker at various times 
after the murder.  Dalton told Baker that Tompkins and George 
had burned May’s body and it “would never be found.”  Dalton 
observed, “There was no body, there was no case,” and said that 
“if we kill [Tompkins], then if this case ever came up, that we 
could blame him.”  Dalton said Baker “should never talk about 
it,” but Baker did speak to several individuals because she was 
“scared that they were going to kill” her.   
On October 31, 1991, Fedor identified Dalton, Tompkins, 
and Baker from photographic lineups as individuals who had 
been at her trailer.  In 1992, Fedor identified Tompkins in a live 
lineup.   
In 
1988, 
Fedor 
was 
using 
a 
quarter 
gram 
of 
methamphetamine two or three times a day by injecting it with 
a syringe, snorting it, or eating it.  On June 25, 1988, Fedor used 
methamphetamine “[p]robably at least two or three” times, and 
she used this drug at about 8:30 a.m. on June 26, 1988.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
d. Physical evidence  
1) Fedor’s testimony 
Fedor testified that when she returned to the trailer 
between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. on the afternoon of June 26, 1988, it 
was in disarray.  A recliner, bedding, and clothes were missing, 
and her bed had been moved.  The kitchen trash can had been 
dumped on the children’s bedroom floor.  Baker was washing the 
kitchen floor with shampoo.   
Dalton was in Fedor’s bedroom and asked to borrow 
clothes so she could take a shower.  Fedor noticed clothes, 
sheets, towels, and blankets she had thrown on her bed were 
missing.   She asked Dalton where these items were, and Dalton 
explained she had accidentally cut herself, “got blood all over,” 
and the items were taken to be washed.  Dalton also said 
Tompkins and George had taken May back to Lakeside.   
After Dalton showered, the soap bar was bloody.  The 
trash can outside of the trailer contained a “dripping wet” bloody 
pillow.  Fedor asked Baker about the pillow, and Baker and 
Dalton had a discussion in which Dalton became angry.   
Tompkins and George arrived at the trailer; Tompkins 
had white dust on him.  Dalton, Baker, Tompkins, and George 
left in George’s truck between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., when it was 
starting to get dark, leaving behind their second truck.   
Immediately after Dalton and her companions left, Fedor 
called the Sheriff’s Department.  Fedor then found a screwdriver 
with what appeared to be blood, hair, and scalp material on it 
and a bloody pocketknife.  A standup heater was “full of blood 
spatters.”  A substance like blood had splattered on her kitchen 
paneling.  Fedor placed the screwdriver, the trash can 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
containing the bloody pillow, and the bloody knife and soap in 
her truck.   
San Diego County Deputy Sheriff David Wilson responded 
at about 9:00 p.m.  Fedor tried to show him the screwdriver and 
bloody knife that she had placed in her truck, but he would not 
let her go outside because it was too dark, and said he would get 
them in the morning.  She did not mention the bloody soap, did 
not give him the heater, and could not recall whether she 
mentioned the bloody pillow or the truck her guests had left 
behind.  While they spoke, Dalton and Tompkins called and 
Tompkins heard the officer’s walkie-talkie.  Tompkins told 
Fedor “not to bother the blue truck” and “not to talk to anybody 
or tell anybody.”  After this call, Deputy Wilson asked Fedor if 
she wanted to file burglary charges, and she said no.  Deputy 
Wilson said he would return the following day but “never came 
back.”  A day or two later her guests’ second truck was gone.   
After Deputy Wilson left, Fedor found her bedroom 
chandelier was gone.  One end of the cord to the chandelier had 
been cut, and the other end was still “plugged in,” apparently to 
an outlet.  On the cut end of the cord, part of the plastic 
protective covering was melted, exposing the electrical wire.  
Although the record is not entirely clear, Fedor also found at 
least one extension cord in the shape of a figure eight.  Another 
extension cord was tied in the shape of two figure eights with a 
different cord connecting the two figure eights.  She did not 
contact law enforcement to inform them of this discovery.   
Fedor did not stay in her house for four to six weeks after 
“things happened” because she was “in fear of [her] life.”  In July 
1988, Fedor gave the heater to Darlene Burns, her child 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
protective services worker, to help Fedor “find out what 
happened at my house.”    
At some point Mike Hissom, an acquaintance of Fedor’s, 
as a joke took the screwdriver and knife from her truck and 
placed them in a freezer.  Fedor never saw them again.  The 
bloody pillow at some point disappeared, and the extension 
cords and bloody soap were “lost in the shuffle.”   
On cross-examination, Fedor testified that in September 
1988, law enforcement took samples from her bedroom, kitchen, 
family room, “pop-out” room, and living room.  These included 
samples from the carpet, carpet pad, and kitchen floor.  In 
November 1988, law enforcement officers returned to the trailer 
and took samples from both inside and outside the trailer.  In 
early 1989, Fedor moved out of the trailer.  (Further testimony 
about the 1988 forensic searches was adduced in the defense 
case.  (See post, pt. I.A.2.a.)) 
2) Deputy Wilson’s testimony 
Deputy Wilson testified that on June 26, 1988, at 8:55 p.m. 
he received a telephone call to go to Fedor’s trailer in the Live 
Oak Springs Trailer Park to investigate a burglary report.  
There were approximately 30 trailers in the park, and the park 
was situated in a retirement community “like a little village” 
that also included homes, A-frame motel units, a store, a 
restaurant, and a gas station.   
Deputy Wilson arrived at Fedor’s trailer at 9:02 p.m.  
Fedor appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine.  
She was “very excited,” did not “complete her sentences,” and 
seemed “very paranoid.”  When Deputy Wilson tried to ascertain 
what Fedor was afraid of, she would speak rapidly, ramble, and 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
not answer his questions.  Deputy Wilson testified, “[I]t was like 
trying to talk to somebody who was mentally ill.”   
The lighting inside the trailer was dim, so Wilson also 
used his flashlight to examine the kitchen, living room, and 
master bedroom.  He saw a stack of dirty clothes in the doorway 
to the bedroom and dirty clothes piled on the bathroom floor.  On 
a chair were car parts.   
Deputy Wilson asked Fedor what had been taken from the 
house, and she said a yellow trash can and a chair slipcover.  
Fedor also said she had found a blood-soaked pillowcase on her 
bed.  Deputy Wilson did not observe such an item or any blood 
on Fedor’s bed.  Fedor then said “they put it in a box” and it was 
under the trailer.  Deputy Wilson looked under the trailer with 
his flashlight from five different positions, but did not see a box 
or pillowcase.  Fedor suggested Deputy Wilson look in the trash 
that was in her pickup truck.  Deputy Wilson looked briefly in 
the back of the truck, but did not see a bloody pillowcase or other 
bloody item, and the bags of trash and boxes looked undisturbed.   
Deputy Wilson did not see any blood in the kitchen, living 
room, or master bedroom, nor did Fedor point out any blood in 
the trailer or ask him to look at her heater, carpet, or walls.  Nor 
did Fedor tell him there was a screwdriver with blood and hair 
on it in the back of her truck or give him a screwdriver, knife, or 
bar of soap.   
At one point Fedor received a telephone call.  She asked 
Deputy Wilson to turn off his portable radio because she did not 
want “them to hear.”  Fedor seemed afraid and was crying.  She 
refused to tell Deputy Wilson who “they” were because she was 
concerned for either her safety or that of a friend who had been 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
there earlier.  Fedor refused to tell Deputy Wilson the name of 
the friend.   
Deputy Wilson did not see any evidence that a burglary 
had occurred, and therefore did not write a report about the 
incident until several months later, on September 15, 1988.  On 
that day, he happened to see Sheriff’s Department detectives 
from the violent crimes team at the trailer park, and they 
requested he write the report.  Fedor did not call Deputy Wilson 
after June 26, 1988.   
3) 1991 forensic testing 
Gary Dorsett, an evidence technician with the San Diego 
Police Department Crime Laboratory, testified that on 
August 12, 1991, at about 6:00 p.m., he and Annette Peer, a 
DNA criminalist at the same laboratory, went to a trailer (that 
had previously been Fedor’s trailer) in the Live Oak Springs 
Trailer Park in Boulevard.  The trailer was occupied.  Dorsett 
observed “very small” spots on the living room and master 
bedroom walls, floors, and ceiling that tested positive for the 
presumptive presence of blood.  On August 24, 1991, at about 
noon, Dorsett returned to the trailer with two law enforcement 
officers and performed additional testing.  He then marked, 
photographed, and took samples for further testing of the areas 
of the living room, master bedroom, and “pop-out” room that 
tested positive for the presumptive presence of blood.   
Gary Harmor, a forensic serologist at the Serological 
Research Institute in Richmond, California, testified that in 
April 1992 he tested six samples from Fedor’s trailer to 
determine ABO blood type and species origin.  He obtained 
readings of type O on some samples and type A on other 
samples.  Both type A and type O were found on one sample, and 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
Harmor was of the view that different donors had deposited 
blood on the sample, although he could not tell if they had done 
so at the same time.  The sample might also have consisted of 
only type A blood because type A blood contains type O blood.  
Harmor was unable to determine the age of the samples or 
whether the six samples were of human or animal origin.   
The parties stipulated that May and Tompkins had type A 
blood, and Dalton and Baker had type O blood.  Harmor testified 
that 50 percent of whites and blacks, 65 percent of Hispanics, 
and 32 percent of Asians had type O blood.  Thirty-six percent 
of whites, 26 percent of blacks, 31 percent of Hispanics, and 
38 percent of Asians had type A blood.  Animals, including dogs, 
rodents, squirrels, and mosquitos carrying blood, also have ABO 
blood types.   
Jennifer Mihalovich, a criminalist at Forensic Science 
Associates in Richmond, California, testified that the size of 
most of the samples she examined was about one millimeter or 
the size of a pinhead.  She was unable to obtain DNA results 
from tested samples because the amount of DNA present was 
insufficient.  Mihalovich also examined a heater received from 
Investigator Cooksey and did not detect the presence of blood on 
the heater.   
Investigator Cooksey, who was assigned to the case of 
May’s disappearance in July 1991, testified he conducted two 
unsuccessful searches for her.  Both searches involved about 
20 individuals and several dogs trained to locate human bodies.  
One search lasted nearly a day and was conducted north of 
Fedor’s trailer.  Another search was performed on the Viejas 
Indian reservation.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
4) Fedor “corroboration” 
The prosecution presented numerous witnesses in an 
effort to corroborate Fedor’s testimony.   
San Diego County Deputy Sheriff Richard Baumann 
testified that during the night of June 25 to June 26, 1988, he 
received a call to investigate a kidnapping.  He was told to look 
for Dalton at a house in Lakeside.  When he arrived at the house, 
the dispatcher told him the reporting person had her children.   
Alisha Fedor, Joanne Fedor’s daughter, testified she was 
about 12 years old on June 26, 1988, and spent that weekend 
away from home.  When she returned on Monday, she noticed a 
recliner was missing from the living room, and much of the 
remaining furniture in the trailer had been moved outside.   One 
corner of the wall-to-wall living room carpet had been pulled up 
and flipped over.  White powder was on the living room windows.  
The heater appeared to have blood on it.  In her bedroom, trash 
had been “dumped everywhere.”  In her mother’s bedroom, the 
cord to a hanging lamp had been cut, and the wire was exposed.  
The cord appeared to have been burned, and the room “smelled.”  
She did not recall seeing bedding on her mother’s bed.  Small 
dark brown or reddish-brown spots were on her mother’s 
bedroom carpet, and similar spots were on the floor and wall of 
the pop-out room.  Outside, a large screwdriver with hair and 
what appeared to be blood, was lying in a space underneath an 
open truck bed.   
Kathy Eckstein testified she knew Joanne Fedor and had 
visited her trailer.  One Sunday between 2:00 p.m. and 
3:00 p.m., her son Fred and his friend Mike Howard were 
dropped off at Fedor’s trailer.  About a half hour later, Fred 
called home and asked to be picked up.  When Eckstein arrived 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
at Fedor’s trailer about 5:00 p.m., it was dark outside.  The 
trailer was “a mess,” and clearly visible nickel and dime sized 
red spots that appeared to be dried blood were “all over the 
place,” including the carpeting, walls, and blankets on the bed 
in Fedor’s bedroom.  Fedor showed Eckstein a bar of soap with 
teeth marks and a cut extension cord with two loops.   
Eckstein did not call law enforcement to report seeing 
blood 
in 
Fedor’s 
bedroom. 
 
Eckstein 
was 
using 
methamphetamine occasionally during this time period, but not 
on the weekend addressed in her testimony.  Eckstein was not 
sure of the year, month, or time of year these events had 
occurred, but was certain they had occurred on a Sunday.  She 
said it started to get dark in June at about 5:00 p.m., and noted 
that at the time of her testimony in February it got dark “later 
around 6:30” p.m.   
Fred Eckstein, Kathy Eckstein’s son, who in June 1988 
was about 14 years old, testified he would stay at Fedor’s trailer 
for several days at a time and often babysat for her.  Fedor drove 
Fred to her trailer “that evening, after it happened.”  Fedor 
pointed out spots on the living room carpet and walls that 
appeared to be blood.  Fedor also showed him a rusty 
screwdriver.  Fred saw extension cords on the living room floor 
that were tied in a knot “like something was bound in them and 
cut,” and a telephone cord.  Fedor’s bedroom had a pungent odor 
“like fish after being out all day.”  About two days later, Fred 
replaced Fedor’s living room carpet and padding and took the 
old carpet outside.   
Fred did not recall the date, month, or the day of the week 
these events occurred.  He did not think it was in June.  School 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
was still in session, although Fred was suspended at the time.  
“It had to be summer” because the days were long.   
At this time, Fred was using methamphetamine two or 
three times a day.  He obtained it from Fedor, and had been 
using it for “quite awhile.”  He had used methamphetamine on 
the day he saw the unusual things in her trailer.   
Jeanette Bench testified that one day in the summer of 
1988, Bench was speaking with her friend Lacy Grote outside of 
Grote’s home in Santee.  Fedor, who was hysterical, walked up 
the driveway carrying a screwdriver about 12 inches long with 
what appeared to be skin, hair, and dried blood on the metal 
part, but not the tip, of the screwdriver.  Bench had suffered five 
prior felony convictions, had used a number of aliases, and in 
1988 was injecting methamphetamine “quite a bit.”   
Patrick Woods testified that in June 1988 his girlfriend 
was Lacy Grote.  Woods recalled at some point — he did not 
know the year or month — throwing out an “old, odd-ball 
screwdriver” he found in his garage freezer.  The screwdriver 
was in a dirty paper bag, had grease or blood and lint or dog hair 
on it, and was “chipped up” and looked old.  At this time in his 
life, Woods was regularly injecting methamphetamine.   
Darlene Burns testified that in 1988 she was Joanne 
Fedor’s San Diego County social worker.  On August 17, 1988, 
Burns visited Fedor’s trailer.  Fedor was distraught and 
nervous, and showed Burns areas of her carpet.  Burns observed 
dark spots that looked like blood on the living room carpet, and 
advised Fedor to contact the sheriff.  On September 7, 1988, 
Burns again visited Fedor’s home.  Fedor gave her a knife and a 
heater that Burns took to the local sheriff’s station.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
e. Dalton’s admissions 
Laurie Carlyle testified that in 1992 she had been 
incarcerated with Dalton.  On one occasion, Carlyle told Dalton 
their mutual acquaintance Patricia Collins had said hello.  
Dalton said she did not want to be associated with Collins 
because Collins could get her in trouble by “run[ning] her 
mouth.”  Dalton asked Carlyle not to mention Dalton in any 
letters to Collins because “it could cause [Dalton] problems.”   
Dalton also spoke to Carlyle about Sheryl Baker, whom 
Dalton called “John-Boy,” saying Baker also could cause Dalton 
problems.  Dalton said she, Baker, and Mark Tompkins were 
involved in the murder of Melanie May in the “Live Oaks” area.  
May had been killed by battery acid, and her body was at the 
bottom of a well on an Indian reservation.  Carlyle exchanged 
correspondence with Baker in 1993, and at one point told Baker 
that she, Carlyle, had never met Dalton.  Carlyle did not speak 
to either Baker or Patricia Collins about the case that she was 
testifying about, but she did hear “a few things” in 1992 from 
fellow inmate Sue Aguilar.  Carlyle had suffered prior felony 
convictions, including a California forgery conviction, a 1993 
New Mexico theft conviction, and three or four 1993 New York 
grand larceny convictions.   
Patricia Collins testified that a “couple of months” after 
Dalton tried to sell Collins the leather jacket, the two were in 
jail together.  Collins asked Dalton why she killed May, and 
Dalton said because May “was a rat” who “deserved to die.”  
Dalton gave Collins no details about the murder.  On another 
occasion, when Dalton visited Collins in jail, she told Collins 
that if it appeared Collins was going to be “blamed for the 
murder that [Dalton] would turn herself in.”  In a third 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
conversation — Collins did not recall when — Dalton was upset 
Tompkins was taking credit for “killing somebody that he didn’t 
kill.”  Dalton also said that she “didn’t think that there would be 
a case because there wasn’t a body” and that she wanted to leave 
town because she did not want to be caught.  On cross-
examination, Collins recalled Dalton also said that May must be 
alive and that May was not dead but had left with her boyfriend.  
On redirect, Collins said Dalton “flopped back and forth all of 
the time” or apparently gave inconsistent explanations for May’s 
disappearance.   
To avoid being blamed for May’s murder, and because it 
was a “sick crime,” Collins agreed to cooperate with law 
enforcement.  In November 1988 she engaged in taped telephone 
conversations with Baker.  Collins was released from jail 
15 days early as a benefit for this cooperation.   
Collins had used methamphetamine intravenously from 
1988 to 1991.  She had suffered a 1986 felony conviction for 
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.   
Jeanette Bench testified she had been incarcerated with 
Dalton at Las Colinas Women’s Detention Facility (Las Colinas).  
In 1992, Bench called Dalton a “tramp” or other name, and 
Dalton “came at” Bench but was stopped by a deputy.  This 
occurred after Bench told authorities about seeing Fedor with 
the screwdriver.  In December 1994, Dalton called Bench a 
“lying bitch” and said either “I ought to have you killed” or “I 
ought to kill you.”  Bench was frightened, contacted law 
enforcement, and was moved.   
On another occasion, Dalton walked by and spat on 
Bench’s window.  Investigator Cooksey testified Bench said 
during an interview that before Dalton spat, she told Bench, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
“You don’t know anything about this case and that she was dead.  
She is a dead woman.”   
At some point, Sherri Fisher was interviewed by 
Investigator Cooksey about May’s disappearance.  Immediately 
after the interview, Fisher went to a park and saw Dalton, who 
told Fisher “to say I don’t know . . . [May], [May] never lived 
with me, never say the names [sic] again.”  Fisher had sold and 
occasionally intravenously used methamphetamine in the past, 
but was not a methamphetamine user when she spoke to 
Investigator Cooksey.   
The prosecution introduced a handwritten note the parties 
stipulated was written between July 9, 1988, and December 7, 
1988, that said:  “Look Bud — don’t worry, . . . they’ve got 
Nothing and will NEVER have anything — dig?  I get out 
February 2, we’ve got to leave bud — work on that for me, . . . 
try to find me a place to hide out till you get out and we’ll 
split . . . I’m scared they’re not gonna cut me loose — so if they 
do — I’ve Got to DISAP[P]EAR!  [¶]  Help ME — [¶]  I Love You,  
[¶]  Lots.”  Sheryl Baker and Patricia Collins identified the 
handwriting as Dalton’s.  David Oleksow, a forensic document 
examiner, testified he had compared the note to Dalton’s known 
handwriting exemplars and was of the view that Dalton was 
“probably responsible” for the handwriting on the note.   
Judy Brakewood, a drug dealer, testified that in 1988 she 
was living in El Cajon and knew Dalton.  Late one night in May 
or June 1988, she brought methamphetamine to Steven Nottoli, 
also known as “Streaker,” who was in a green van parked at a 
7-Eleven store in Spring Valley.  In the van with Nottoli was a 
woman Brakewood did not recognize.  Dalton was about 10 to 
15 feet away from the van speaking on a pay telephone.  While 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
Dalton was away from the van and Brakewood was in the van 
with Nottoli and the unidentified woman, Nottoli told 
Brakewood “they had shot up this girl with battery acid” and 
“burned her.”  When Dalton returned to the van at the “tail end 
of a conversation,” she said, “Yep, we really fucked that girl up.”  
Brakewood described Dalton as “exuberant.”   
f. Evidence May was dead 
Although May’s body was never found, there were several 
indications she was dead.  Bobby May, May’s husband, testified 
May had a daughter from a prior relationship and the couple 
had two sons.  At one point their children were placed in 
protective custody.  May and Bobby attended a parenting class 
and made great efforts to be reunited with their children.  Kandy 
Koliwer, May’s attorney, testified May attended all of the court 
hearings held before June 30, 1988.  Nina Tucker testified that 
in December 1987, she was the San Diego County Child 
Protective Services worker assigned to the May family.  At that 
time, May and Bobby had custody of their three minor children 
under a reunification plan.  May made about three court 
appearances, was present when Tucker visited the May’s home, 
and telephoned Tucker about three times.  During a home visit 
in March or April 1988, May appeared very lethargic and 
undernourished, and Tucker recommended she seek medical 
treatment.   
On June 10, 1988, Tucker, a social worker, and a law 
enforcement officer again removed the children from May’s 
home.  May subsequently admitted to Tucker she had been 
abusing drugs and neglecting her children.  May appeared with 
Koliwer at a hearing on June 15, 1988.  On June 24, May called 
Tucker and said she wanted to get her children back, was tired 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
of being on the street, and wanted to make changes in her 
lifestyle.  Tucker asked May to call her so they could meet at 
9:00 a.m. the following Monday (June 27).  May seemed pleased, 
but Tucker did not see or hear from her again.  May also failed 
to appear with Koliwer at a hearing on June 30, 1988, and 
Koliwer had not seen her since that time.   
In Koliwer’s view, May’s children were the “most 
important people in [May’s] life.”  May did not indicate she was 
interested in leaving or abandoning her children, and did not 
appear to be suicidal.  Tucker similarly believed that May loved 
and was responsive to her children, and gave no indication she 
would abandon them.   
Bobby testified he had not seen May since June 17, 1988, 
when Bobby was arrested.  Bobby also testified, however, that 
he had seen May after he was released from jail in July 1988.   
Phyllis Cross testified that she met Bobby May at some 
point after May disappeared, and was his girlfriend at times for 
about three years.  Bobby was “very serious” in his efforts to find 
May.  At some point Tompkins told Bobby to stop looking for his 
wife.  Dalton told Cross she thought May was dead; Cross noted, 
“[T]hat is just what everybody thought.”   
Sherri Fisher testified that around June 1988, she met 
May, who was homeless, and invited May to live with her.  The 
last time Fisher saw May, May was leaving the apartment with 
Sheryl Baker.   
Marsha Watson, Sherri Fisher’s mother, met Bobby May 
“months” after she traveled with Sheryl Baker to Yucca Valley 
in June 1988.  He asked for the papers Baker had left at the 
home.  He told Watson he could not find his wife and would like 
to do so to put her to rest.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
Howard Simmons, a document custodian for the San 
Diego County Department of Social Services (DSS), testified 
that May and Bobby May received $859 in Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and $166 in food stamps each 
month from April 1986 to June 1987, and from October 1987 to 
June 1988.  May received DSS checks on June 1, 1988, and 
June 15, 1988, that were cashed by her.  The checks stopped in 
June 1988 because May had not filed the required monthly 
paperwork by the June deadline.  May did not reapply for 
assistance, and DSS had no further contact with her.   
Marla Tottress testified that she was a teletype operator 
for the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, and in June 
1994 and February 1995 she ran a complete records check on 
the names Irene Louise Clair (May’s maiden name), Irene May, 
Melanie May, and Irene Miller in 50 states and Puerto Rico.  In 
particular, Tottress looked for persons with one of these names 
on a driver’s license or identification card, vehicle registration, 
arrest warrant, restraining order, “missing persons” report, 
“criminal history” (meaning if any such individual had been 
fingerprinted or arrested), and whether such an individual 
owned real property in San Diego.  Tottress found Irene Melanie 
May had been arrested on June 2, 1988, in San Diego and the 
case had been dismissed, but Tottress did not otherwise locate a 
person by any of these names.   
g. Expert testimony 
Dr. Brian Blackbourne, a pathologist, testified as an 
expert on the effect of battery acid and electricity on the human 
body.  He explained battery acid is sulfuric acid mixed with 
water.  Sulfuric acid is a corrosive acid that kills “local cells 
where [it] is placed.”  The process begins immediately when the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
acid contacts the cells.  If pain fibers are present, they sense pain 
until they are destroyed by the acid.  If battery or sulfuric acid 
were injected into a muscle, it would cause a “Charl[ey]-horse 
type of pain” in that muscle.  If the acid were injected into a vein, 
it would be “much more painful,” causing pain for a “short time, 
seconds” until it was “neutralized by the tissue.”  Battery acid 
that had only a local effect would not be lethal.  If enough acid 
were injected to “get into the blood stream to cause the whole 
body acid base balance to be affected” and “go into acidosis, that 
could be serious,” and would probably take several hours to 
occur.  On cross-examination, Dr. Blackbourne agreed with 
defense counsel that persons can also die from natural causes, 
asthma attacks, hepatitis, or methamphetamine overdoses.   
The hypodermic syringe generally used by drug users was 
one cubic centimeter.  This amount of acid would have 
predominantly local effects and not cause death, but 
Dr. Blackbourne would expect the person to scream and jerk 
around.   
Electricity has “two effects,” the first of which effect is 
local.  Skin “has a fairly high resistance to electricity,” so as 
electricity passes through the skin it “causes intense heat to be 
produced just at that local place.”  If the voltage is 110V, or 
normal household current, and the current is sustained for 
minutes, the electricity would cause a burn.  The second effect 
is electrocution, which occurs when “electricity goes through the 
body,” and “in so doing goes through either the heart or the 
brain.”  Combining an injection of battery acid with an electrical 
contact would result in two sources of pain that were additive.   
Only “awfully severe” pain causes unconsciousness.  A 
severe enough blow from a pan could cause unconsciousness.  It 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
was “usually quite certain” that if a person were going to become 
unconscious as the result of a blow, he or she would “utter some 
sort of sound.”   
2. Defense evidence 
a. Physical evidence 
Investigator Cooksey testified that the folding knife 
Joanne Fedor gave Darlene Burns tested negative for the 
presence of blood.  On September 15, 1988, and November 16, 
1988, law enforcement forensic teams unsuccessfully searched 
Fedor’s trailer for the presence of blood.   
Randolph Robinson, the supervising criminalist for the 
San Diego Sheriff’s Crime Lab, testified that on September 15, 
1988, he and several law enforcement officers searched Fedor’s 
trailer in Live Oak Springs for three hours for the presence of 
blood.  Robinson checked the carpets, baseboards, walls, and 
ceilings in every room in the trailer, as well as appliances and 
other items, and did not detect the presence of blood.   
Criminalist Walter Fung, who in 1988 worked for the San 
Diego County Sheriff’s Department, testified that on November 
16, 1988, he and two law enforcement officers searched Fedor’s 
trailer for two and a half to three hours.  Fung visually searched 
the carpets, ceilings, and walls of the master bedroom and 
bathroom, living room, and parts of the kitchen and pop-out 
room for blood.  He took three pieces of the carpet pad under a 
bed in the master bedroom, a piece of carpet from the kitchen 
and the living room threshold area, and a piece of tile from 
under the refrigerator in the kitchen back to the Sheriff’s 
Department laboratory for testing.  None of the items tested 
positive for the presence of blood.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
Lauren Najor testified her husband was one of the owners 
of the trailer park in Live Oak Springs, and they lived in 
space 23.  In June 1988, Fedor lived in space 25.  Between the 
time Fedor moved out of the trailer and the 1991 forensic 
testing, the trailer was occupied by a series of at least three 
different renters.   
b. Second Baker interview 
In its case-in-chief, the prosecution played for the jury the 
redacted tape of Sheryl Baker’s March 4, 1992 interview with 
law enforcement in which she told officers that May had said, “I 
don’t wanna die,” and “[p]lease don’t kill me, I’m sorry.”  The 
defense played for the jury the tape of Baker’s July 5, 1994 
interview with law enforcement in which she told police she did 
not think May was alive when Baker and Tompkins returned to 
the trailer because May made no sound during the attack, and 
Baker was not sure whether she had moved.  Baker also said 
she did not recall seeing a bloody pillow or any other bloody 
object.  Baker fell asleep on the way to the honor camp and 
apparently woke up when Tompkins was dropping Fedor off.  At 
that time, Fedor did not tell them when her visit would end or 
ask them to pick her up.   
c. Impeachment of prosecution witnesses 
As explained more fully in part II.A.1.c., the defense 
theorized that Mark Tompkins made no statements concerning 
the murder to his cellmate Donald McNeely, but rather McNeely 
surreptitiously read materials regarding the case that 
Tompkins possessed in the cell.  Alan Fenton, a defense 
attorney, testified that in May 1992 he had been appointed to 
represent Mark Tompkins.  By June 1992, Fenton had received 
two to three thousand pages of case reports related to the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
charges 
against 
Tompkins. 
 
Fenton 
gave 
Tompkins 
documentation of his statements to others regarding his alleged 
involvement, copies of his codefendants’ interviews, and press 
releases relating to his case.  These materials included 
references to giving someone a “hotshot,” placing a body into a 
car, and cutting up a body, as well as references to the location 
of the alleged homicide, a skillet, an Indian reservation, and the 
phrase “to help her out of her misery.”  They also included 
references to other locations where the body or parts of the body 
could be found, as well as conflicting stories as to whether the 
body had been burned or cut up.   
Investigator Cooksey testified that when he interviewed 
Alisha Fedor on September 12, 1991, she was not sure whether 
she had seen a screwdriver.   
Pamela Aitchison testified that Patricia Collins had a 
reputation in the community as a dishonest person and a thief.   
d. Expert testimony 
Apparently to impeach those prosecution witnesses who 
used methamphetamine and to support a defense theory that 
May could have died from natural causes, the defense called 
Dr. Clark Smith, a psychiatrist who served as the medical 
director of Vista Pacifica, a drug and alcohol treatment hospital, 
and the clinical director for the drug and alcohol treatment 
programs at Mesa Vista Hospital and Vista Hill Foundation.  
Dr. Smith testified as an expert on the effects of 
methamphetamine use.   
Intravenous use of methamphetamine was the most 
severe form of addiction and had the greatest effect on the 
person using the drug.  Methamphetamine is a type of 
amphetamine.  A quarter of a gram or 250 milligrams of 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
methamphetamine was 50 times the amount of amphetamine in 
a typical diet pill and a “dangerous amount” for a person to use.   
Intravenous methamphetamine use commonly causes 
psychosis or “truly believ[ing]” one sees or hears something that 
is not really there.  The possibility of psychosis, including 
psychotic delusions and visual or tactile hallucinations, 
increases 
as 
the 
individual 
uses 
more 
amphetamine.  
Hallucinations are common with methamphetamine abuse, 
occurring in close to 90 percent of users.  Seeing blood that is not 
in fact present is a common visual hallucination reported by 
individuals Dr. Smith had treated.  If impurities are present in 
the methamphetamine used, it can cause hallucinations “for 
protracted periods of time with unexpected severity using what 
seems to be a small amount of the drug.”  Psychotic delusions, 
such as believing that “the police . . . are after you” or persons 
on the street are discussing you, are also common.  Individuals 
might contact law enforcement because they believe they are 
victims of a crime that has no basis in fact.  Distortion of a 
person’s perception of time and reality is exacerbated by the 
extreme sleep deprivation that results from methamphetamine 
abuse.   
When a person has used methamphetamine over a period 
of time and injects a quarter of a gram, eight to 10 hours later 
the drug remains in the brain and bloodstream, the user is still 
under its influence, and the user can experience psychosis, 
paranoia, hypervigilance, and delusions that someone is 
attacking him or her.  Hallucinations and delusions generally 
cease after a person completely stops using methamphetamine 
and the drug is cleaned out of his or her system.  Dr. Smith had 
repeatedly 
observed 
individuals 
who 
were 
clean 
of 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
methamphetamine but “still believe[d] the psychotic delusions” 
they had experienced because the delusions had been “so vivid.”   
Methamphetamine use changes the physiology and 
chemical balance of the brain, often depriving the brain of its 
“normal neurotransmitter, such as the normal adrenalin that’s 
in the brain.”  Methamphetamine also constricts vessels and 
cuts off the blood supply to the brain causing “microscopic 
strokes” or small portions of the brain to die.   
Impurities in methamphetamine can damage the heart, 
liver, and kidneys.  For those who suffer from asthma, 
impurities can cause a pulmonary embolism and can trigger 
severe asthma attacks that may result in death.  Combining 
asthma medication and methamphetamine can cause heart 
attacks or heart fibrillation.  If a user has decreased liver 
function due to hepatitis, a usual dose of methamphetamine can 
be lethal.   
On cross-examination, Dr. Smith testified that if a person 
were under the influence of methamphetamine and hence more 
likely to be dehydrated, have poor nutrition, and be in a 
generally weakened state, electricity “would probably hurt the 
person.”   
B. Prior Convictions 
In a separate proceeding outside the presence of the jury, 
Dalton admitted that in March 1984 she had suffered felony 
convictions for credit card forgery and petty theft with a prior 
conviction (former §§ 484, 666), she had served a prison term for 
these offenses, and she had not remained free of prison and the 
commission of an offense resulting in a felony conviction for five 
years after her release from prison.  (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).)  
She also admitted that on June 4, 1985, she suffered a prior 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
serious felony conviction for burglary.  (Former §§ 459, 667, 
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(18).)   
C. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
Cynthia Johnson testified that in February 1992, she was 
living with her husband in a recreational vehicle in Jamul.  
Johnson was caring for her mother, who lived in a house on the 
property and was dying of cancer.  Johnson’s mother was taking 
large doses of morphine.  About 11:30 on the morning of 
February 3, 1992, Johnson was alone in the trailer.  A man with 
a white hockey mask and a woman in a ski mask entered 
through her unlocked screen door.  The man hit Johnson 
repeatedly in the head with a flashlight.  While he did so, the 
woman took Johnson’s purse and jewelry case and her mother’s 
medication, and left.  Johnson bit the man, and he fled.  Johnson 
ran after them.  The man removed his mask, and the woman got 
into a car.  Johnson wrote down the license plate number and 
called 911.  About 15 minutes later, Johnson identified the man, 
the woman, who was Dalton, and Johnson’s purse to police.  
Johnson suffered a slight concussion and continued to get 
headaches at the time of her testimony.  Two months after the 
attack, her mother died and Johnson suffered a nervous 
breakdown.  The parties stipulated that Dalton pled guilty to 
robbery for this offense.   
Dawn Crawford testified that in October or November of 
1994, she was incarcerated at Las Colinas in room 169 of the B-
1 housing area.  Each room had a door rather than bars in front.  
At some point during this time period Dalton was housed next 
door to Crawford in room 168.  Through an emergency call box 
on the wall, Crawford could hear voices in the next room.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
On one occasion, when the doors to both room 168 and 
room 169 were closed, Crawford heard Dalton speaking with 
inmate Terry Carbaugh.  Dalton said she had participated in a 
murder.  She referred to the victim as “the bitch” and said the 
victim had owed Dalton $80.  The victim was tied and injected 
with battery acid.  Dalton said that “hearing her scream was the 
greatest high that she has ever experienced.”  The victim was 
stabbed in the head and “cut up and mutilated.”  Dalton 
mentioned an Indian reservation.  Dalton also mentioned a 
woman named “John-Boy” and said “John-Boy better keep 
quiet.”  During the conversation, Dalton was “laughing . . . like 
it was no big deal.”   
On cross-examination, Crawford testified it was common 
knowledge at Las Colinas that conversations could be heard 
between the rooms through the call boxes.   She had taken notes 
of the conversation when it occurred, but she could not find 
them.  At some point Crawford was housed in the same area as 
Sheryl Baker and spoke to her.  Crawford had “received a lot of 
death threats from inmates about this case” and was “very 
concerned about [her] safety.”   
In October or November of 1994, Crawford was facing an 
assault with a deadly weapon charge and a weapon 
enhancement allegation.  On November 30, 1994, she pled guilty 
to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, 
and the weapon allegation was dismissed.   
Pamela Johnson testified that on September 13, 1993, she 
was incarcerated at Las Colinas and had been subpoenaed to 
appear in court regarding Dalton’s case.  Johnson had 
previously participated in a taped interview about Dalton’s case 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
with Investigator Cooksey.  Apparently as a result, the two 
women were to be kept separate from one another.   
On September 13, Johnson was sitting in the Las Colinas 
visiting area, a “holding area for inmates going to court,” 
speaking to another inmate.  Dalton approached and told the 
other inmate to leave.  Dalton said that Johnson “was a snitch, 
and that if I snitched out on her I would pay for it.”  Dalton also 
said, “[N]o matter where I was, whether I was in jail or out of 
jail, she could get to me; if I snitch[ed] on her that I would die.”  
Dalton also asked Johnson how it felt “having a son of a junkie, 
just like me.”  When Johnson started to get up, Dalton said 
Johnson could not get away from her, and Dalton elbowed 
Johnson in her right rib area, bruising her.  Dalton said Johnson 
was going to die, and asked Johnson if she had heard from her 
husband or son lately.  Johnson yelled for Dalton “to get out of 
my face.”  Deputies intervened and separated the women.   
Johnson and Dalton were subsequently placed on a bus to 
the courthouse.  Dalton told the inmate to whom she was 
handcuffed that Johnson was a “snitch” and causing Dalton “to 
serve lots of time.”  To be called a “snitch” in custody meant 
“you’re turning on your own kind,” and “that you have to pay for 
it.”  Johnson had suffered prior convictions for welfare fraud and 
credit card forgery.   
The parties stipulated to Dalton’s prior convictions and 
the dates on which she was in custody in state prison.   
2. Defense Case 
Victoria Perez, Dalton’s sister, testified that Dalton’s 12-
year-old daughter Hannah had been adopted by Perez.  Hannah 
had lived with Dalton until she was two and a half years old.    
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
Perez had moved to Washington State about a year before 
her 1995 testimony.  Before then, she had lived in San Diego and 
had visited Dalton at the Las Colinas jail weekly.  Perez also 
wrote to and spoke on the telephone with Dalton and had 
continued to do so after her move to Washington.  Hannah and 
Perez’s other children loved Dalton.   
Perez was religiously devout, and her visits with Dalton 
often were about their shared faith.  Perez was impressed by the 
depth of Dalton’s knowledge of scripture and her understanding 
of Christianity.  Dalton was repentant and understood “she 
hadn’t walked the way [the] Lord wants her to.”  Dalton was 
enrolled in a theology school and hoped to minister to others in 
prison, help them to know they were loved by God, and break 
the cycle of being incarcerated.  Dalton had been a blessing to 
Perez and her family the past three years, and Perez did not 
want her to die.   
Todd Thorpe, Dalton’s brother, testified that Dalton had 
“turned her life around” and was trying to “do good for herself 
and others.”  Thorpe loved Dalton and wanted her to live.  He 
believed she could touch other lives in prison and “lead them to 
make the right decisions in their life and turn things around.”   
Rosalie Thorpe, Dalton’s mother, testified Dalton was born 
on January 24, 1960.  She had two sisters and a brother.  Dalton 
had five children, three girls and two boys, who were six to 16 
years old.  Two of Dalton’s daughters, Brianne and Christiana, 
lived with and had been adopted by Rosalie.  Brianne stopped 
living with Dalton when she was two months old, and 
Christiana had gone home with Rosalie after she was born.  
Dalton’s oldest child, David, lived with his father and had not 
lived with Dalton since he was four and a half years old because 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
of Dalton’s drug use.  Her other son, Jason, who was 10, lived 
with Dalton for about eight months, before living with Dalton’s 
sister Laurie.   
Rosalie, Brianne, and Christiana had started visiting 
Dalton about five months before Rosalie’s March 1995 
testimony.  Rosalie had heard from other family members and 
Dalton’s chaplain that Dalton had changed long before then, but 
Rosalie could not “comprehend it.”  Brianne and Christiana 
loved Dalton “very much.”  During the visits, the girls sang 
songs to Dalton over the phone, longed to touch her, and blew 
her kisses and said “I love you” as they left.  At night Christiana, 
who was six years old, prayed Dalton could rejoin her family.   
Rosalie believed Dalton had “completely changed” and 
knew in her heart, “as her mother, that she is different.”  In 
Rosalie’s view, “drugs took [Dalton] from our family,” “[s]he is 
now back,” and it was “a miracle.”  Rosalie and the rest of 
Dalton’s family “pray[ed] that she lives.”   Rosalie did not believe 
Dalton had “killed anybody.”   
Keith LaChance, Dalton’s father, testified that he left the 
family in 1966 when Dalton was six years old.  He next had 
contact with Dalton when she was 15 years old, and she came to 
live with LaChance for a few months in Fairbanks, Alaska.  
Dalton was well-behaved, and did not use drugs or alcohol.  The 
next time he saw Dalton was in August of 1992 when she was 
32 years old and had been arrested for murder.  Since 1992, he 
had become close to Dalton, saw her on a regular basis, and 
wrote to her when he needed to travel.  He had sacrificed “just 
about everything to have this relationship, and I hope I get to 
continue it.”   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
Reverend Romie Cervantes, who supervised the chaplains 
at Las Colinas, testified that she had known Dalton since 1992.  
At first, Dalton was “mean,” profane, and argumentative.  
Reverend Cervantes met weekly with Dalton, and had watched 
her “grow into a beautiful Christian woman.”  Dalton 
“soak[ed] . . . up” “everything that we’ve taught her,” and 
Reverend Cervantes believed her religious commitment was 
genuine.  Because Reverend Cervantes was a volunteer, she 
considered her time valuable and thus spent it with people who 
“are hungry and [who] really want God, not just . . . somebody 
that’s playing church in jail.”  Although Dalton had not shared 
the details of her past, she told Reverend Cervantes she had 
“done awful things” and had expressed remorse for “everything 
that she’s done.”  Reverend Cervantes did not want Dalton to 
receive the death penalty because she had witnessed the 
difference Dalton made in other inmates’ lives.   
Charlene Gill, a church ministry volunteer, testified she 
led a Bible Study twice a month at Las Colinas.   She had known 
Dalton since October 1992, or nearly two and a half years.  
Dalton had been faithful in her attendance, paid attention, and 
asked questions.  She related well, often “lovingly,” to her 
classmates.  Dalton was strongly “committed to the Lord, and 
she’s trying to live her life for him now.”   
Duetta Bellamy testified that she had been a Bible study 
teacher at Las Colinas for about 15 months.  During that time 
Dalton had actively participated in the group and was kind and 
supportive to other members.  Once when another inmate had a 
seizure, Dalton immediately comforted and prayed for her until 
the guards arrived.  Dalton’s cell mates who were in the group 
thought “very highly of her and look[ed] up to her as a . . . 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
witness of the Lord.”  Bellamy believed Dalton would be of 
assistance to other inmates as a lay minister.   
In 
response 
to 
Dawn 
Crawford’s 
testimony, 
on 
February 28 and March 2, 1995, Marion Pasas and Allan 
Cotten, licensed private investigators, conducted an experiment 
at Las Colinas.  They were unable to locate rooms 168 and 169 
in the B−1 housing area (the rooms testified to by Dawn 
Crawford) but did locate rooms 268 and 269.   
Cotten entered room 268 and Pasas entered room 269, and 
the doors to each room were closed.  Cotten spoke in a 
conversational tone in room 268.  Pasas stood in different parts 
of room 269 but could not hear him.  The two then switched 
rooms and repeated the experiment with the same result.  Pasas 
then put her ear to the vent in room 268, which was not 
physically possible for her to do in room 269, and heard muffled 
voices and a woman yelling.  Except for the woman who was 
yelling, Pasas could not distinguish any voice or understand 
their conversation.  Pasas heard no sound through the call box.  
The call box in room 269 was located higher on the wall than the 
call box in room 268.  Pasas and Allan did not bring a tape 
recorder.   
Theresa Carbaugh, who had suffered a prior felony 
conviction for drug possession for sale, testified that in the fall 
of 1994 she had been incarcerated in the B−1 housing area at 
Las Colinas and shared a room with Dalton.  Dalton was 
religiously devout, sensitive, caring, and thoughtful to others.  
The two studied scripture together, and Dalton encouraged 
Carbaugh to attend church and not to judge others.   
Dalton never discussed her case with Carbaugh and, in 
particular, did not describe cutting up or mutilating a woman, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
refer to anyone in her case as a “bitch,” tell her that the victim 
was tied up and injected with acid, say that hearing someone 
scream was the greatest high she had ever experienced, mention 
an Indian reservation, or say that John-Boy should keep quiet.   
On the wall of the room Carbaugh and Dalton shared, 
there was a small box through which inmates could contact 
deputies and deputies could at all times listen to inmates.  The 
box was not used to listen to other inmates’ conversations, and 
it was not possible to understand a conversation in the next 
room.   
Dawn Crawford was incarcerated in the room next to 
Carbaugh and Dalton.  In Carbaugh’s opinion, Crawford was “a 
liar” and had a reputation for being a dishonest person.   
Robin Wilson testified she was incarcerated in housing 
area B−2 at Las Colinas.  She had suffered prior felony 
convictions for attempted robbery and grand theft, and had used 
various aliases, birth dates, and social security numbers.  She 
testified that persons who spoke into the intercom speakers on 
the walls of the rooms in housing area B−2 could be heard by 
deputies in the coffee shop if the deputies’ switch was on.  The 
intercom did not need to be activated to be used, but a button 
could be pushed by an inmate to alert deputies that the inmate 
wanted to speak with them.  Wilson also said that if she was in 
her room with the door locked, she could not hear normal 
conversation in a room next door through the intercom.   
Gwyndolyn Coleman testified she had been incarcerated 
at Las Colinas since July 1994 and had suffered felony 
convictions for assault on a cohabitant, assault with a deadly 
weapon, robbery, and forgery.  Coleman was the lead trustee for 
the B−1 housing area and also had access to the B−2 housing 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
area.  Coleman believed Dalton to be compassionate because she 
regularly gave food items from the jail store to needy inmates, 
and she described Dalton as one who “mostly reads her Bible” 
and “minds her own business.”  Dalton had never spoken with 
Coleman about her case.  Crawford had been housed in both the 
B−1 and B−2 housing areas, and had a reputation for being 
“deceitful, evil and a liar.”   
Judith Reeves testified that in 1994 she had managed an 
apartment building in which Crawford was a tenant for about 
three and a half months.  At no time was Crawford honest with 
Reeves — “everything was upside down, wrong, a lie.”  Crawford 
also had a reputation for dishonesty in the community.   
Jeannie Shim lived at the same apartment complex as 
Reeves and had met Dawn Crawford about one and a half years 
before her testimony.  “[J]ust about everything [Crawford had] 
ever told [Shim] ha[d] turned out to be a lie.”   Crawford had also 
stabbed Shim and pled guilty to the crime, and had stolen from 
her.   
Cameo Brooks testified that in September 1993, while 
incarcerated at Las Colinas, she was in the jail visiting room 
with Pamela Johnson waiting to be taken to court.  Dalton 
entered the room and conversed with Brooks.  While they spoke, 
Johnson “got hysterical,” screamed for the deputies, and said, 
“I’m not supposed to be in the same room with this lady.”  
Deputies removed Dalton.  Dalton had neither threatened nor 
struck Johnson.   
Brooks, Dalton, and Johnson were then taken on the bus 
to court.  Dalton did not speak of Johnson while they rode and, 
in particular, did not threaten her or call her a “rat.”  Brooks 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
had previously suffered convictions for possession of a stolen 
vehicle and second degree burglary.   
Michele Pease testified that she was incarcerated at Las 
Colinas.   She had previously suffered convictions for grand theft 
and possession of a check with intent to defraud.  Pease had 
lived in the same housing area as Dalton from October 1994 to 
February 1995, and the two had studied the Bible together 
nearly every day.  When Pease spoke with Dalton in Dalton’s 
room, the two did not discuss their cases but rather their 
children and the difficulties of being incarcerated.  Although it 
was possible to hear voices in the room next door, it was not 
possible to discern what was being said.   
The parties stipulated that Dalton had appeared in court 
43 times between October 26, 1992, and February 6, 1995, when 
evidence was first introduced at trial.   
3. Rebuttal 
San Diego County Probation Officer Carol Roberts 
testified that in February 1987, she interviewed Dalton while 
preparing a probation report for her.  Dalton denied having a 
substance abuse problem and said she had been attending 
Narcotics Anonymous meetings.  In Dalton’s written statement 
submitted to Roberts, Dalton “talked about making some life 
changes,” said she had been “talking with a Christian drug 
program leader for Victory Outreach,” a Christian residential 
treatment program, and wondered, “If God cannot show me . . . 
I wonder if it’s possible for anyone or anything to help[?]”  On 
March 7, 1987, Dalton was admitted to a substance abuse 
program called New Entra Casa.  
The parties stipulated that between December 1992 and 
January 1995, Dalton had committed 12 rule violations at Las 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
Colinas that had resulted in disciplinary action.  No criminal 
charges had been filed.   
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office Investigator 
David Decker testified that on March 2, 1995, he and 
Investigator Cooksey visited rooms 268 and 269 in the 
B−1 housing area at Las Colinas.  One investigator went into 
room 268 and the other into room 269, and the doors to each 
room were closed.  Although not aligned, the speaker boxes in 
each room were mounted back to back on the same six-inch thick 
cinder block wall.  The speaker boxes were also used to monitor 
the room electronically.  Investigators Decker and Cooksey were 
able to communicate through the “air space in the speaker.”   
On March 4, 1995, Investigators Decker and Cooksey 
returned to the rooms and successfully repeated their 
experiment while using a tape recorder.  Decker started a foot 
from the speaker box, moved away and then back toward the 
box.  The investigators also removed the speaker grills and 
observed a four-inch long hollow electrical conduit that 
connected the speaker boxes and conducted the sound.  The tape 
made during this visit was played for the jury.   
Investigator Cooksey also testified regarding the speaker 
experiment.  On cross-examination, he said he had placed the 
tape recorder about one to two inches from the speaker box.  
When he interviewed Dawn Crawford on February 3, 1995, she 
had “referred to the device that she heard the conversation 
through as the vent.”   
Athena Shudde testified she was an attorney who had 
previously represented Mark Tompkins.  On October 1, 1993, at 
a pretrial hearing attended by Tompkins and Dalton, Dalton 
spat in the direction of Tompkins.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Jailhouse informant 
Dalton contends the trial court erred in admitting the 
hearsay statements of Mark Tompkins through the testimony of 
jailhouse informant Donald McNeely and in limiting her cross-
examination of McNeely.  We reject the claim.   
Before trial Dalton filed a motion to preclude admission of 
Tompkins’s statements to McNeely on the grounds that they 
were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1230 and 
violated her right to confrontation.  Dalton also asserted that 
because Baker would be testifying, the prosecution no longer 
needed “codefendants’ hearsay statements in order to establish 
corpus.”  The trial court admitted the statements under 
Evidence Code section 1230 (as statements against interest), 
redacted the statements, including changing all plural personal 
pronouns to singular personal pronouns, and allowed the 
statements to be used to “establish that events occurred in the 
trailer,” or “corpus,” such as the use of electric shock, the “hot 
shot,” and a knife, but not to implicate Dalton.   
Before McNeely testified, Dalton again unsuccessfully 
objected, as relevant here, on the grounds raised before trial.   
McNeely, who had suffered 12 California burglary 
convictions and four Missouri felony convictions, testified that 
for three months, from June to August of 1992, he had shared a 
cell at the San Diego County jail with Tompkins.  As noted, 
McNeely testified that during their time as cellmates, Tompkins 
told McNeely he was “in on a murder charge” and called it a 
“torture slaying.”  (See ante, p. 11.)  Tompkins said the victim 
was “Melanie May,” and the murder occurred in June of 1988 in 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
a “house trailer” in the “Live Oak Springs, Boulevard area.”  
Tompkins said that he was “really into violence,” that he 
“tortured the hell out of her,” and that “pain was the name of 
the game.”  In McNeely’s view, Tompkins “seemed to enjoy it.”  
Tompkins said the “original plan was to give Miss May a 
hotshot” and that Tompkins did so.  Tompkins also said he had 
given May a “shock treatment,” and McNeely believed he 
mentioned an electrical cord.  Tompkins also mentioned a 
screwdriver, knife, and a heavy kitchen skillet, saying “they 
work wonders on the knees.”  Tompkins “got tired of it” and “just 
wanted it to end,” so he stabbed May with a knife.  Tompkins 
told McNeely he put May’s body into a vehicle and took it to a 
nearby Indian reservation.  He then dismembered the body so it 
would be more difficult to locate.   
After cross-examining McNeely, Dalton unsuccessfully 
moved for a mistrial based on his testimony.   
Investigator Cooksey testified that McNeely did not 
request, and he was not promised and did not receive, any 
benefit for testifying.  On cross-examination, Investigator 
Cooksey agreed with defense counsel that Investigator Cooksey 
told McNeely that in exchange for his cooperation, a letter might 
be written by the district attorney’s office to the sentencing 
judge advising the judge of McNeely’s cooperation.   
The trial court instructed the jury that McNeely was an 
“in-custody informant” and that his testimony “should be viewed 
with caution and close scrutiny.”   
a. Statement against interest 
Dalton 
asserts 
that 
“[i]ntroduction 
of 
Tompkins’ 
unreliable hearsay statements . . . violated the state hearsay 
rule.”   We reject the contention. 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
Evidence Code section 1230 provides in relevant part:  
“Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient 
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the 
statement, when made, . . . so far subjected him to the risk of . . . 
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be 
true.”  “To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is 
admissible as a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of 
such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that 
the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when 
made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to 
warrant admission despite its hearsay character.’  [Citation.]  ‘In 
determining whether a statement is truly against interest 
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is 
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take 
into account not just the words but the circumstances under 
which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the 
declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’ ”  
(People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).)  The 
determination of whether a statement was against the 
declarant’s interest when made is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 143 (Valdez).)   
Here, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that 
Tompkins’s statement to his cellmate describing his torture and 
murder of May “so far subjected [Tompkins] to the risk of . . . 
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in [Tompkins’s] 
position would not have made the statement unless he believed 
it to be true.”  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)   
Dalton 
claims 
that 
Tompkins’s 
statements 
were 
unreliable because McNeely and Tompkins both lacked 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
credibility.  As to McNeely, “[w]e have previously rejected the 
argument that ‘in considering the admissibility of evidence 
offered under’ Evidence Code section 1230 ‘the trial court could 
properly consider the credibility of the in-court witness,’ and 
observed that ‘[n]either the hearsay rule nor its exceptions are 
concerned with the credibility of witnesses who testify directly 
to the jury.’ ”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1219 
(Rangel).)   
As to Tompkins, Dalton asserts that a “statement of one 
inmate bragging to another inmate about crimes committed is 
not necessarily against penal interest at the time or under the 
circumstances it was made.”  In her view, “[i]t appears that . . . . 
Tompkins was not confiding in McNeely so much as bragging or 
puffing” and that Tompkins “was in custody and wanted to be 
perceived of as tough.”  But Dalton’s argument shows “ ‘only that 
a court might perhaps have been able to arrive at the conclusion 
that [Tompkins’s] statement did not so far subject him to the 
risk of criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position 
would not have made it unless he believed it to be true.  [It] 
simply do[es] not show that a court was unable to arrive at the 
opposite conclusion.  Therefore, [it does] not establish an abuse 
of discretion.’ ”  (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 144.) 
As to this and other claims, Dalton alleges for the first 
time that the error complained of violated her federal 
constitutional rights.  To the extent that in doing so she has 
“raised only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ ” on a claim preserved 
below, that new aspect of the claim is not forfeited.  (People v. 
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler).)  At the same time, “ ‘[n]o separate 
constitutional discussion is required, or provided, when 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection 
of [the] constitutional theory . . . .’ ”  (Ibid.)   
b. Reliability 
Dalton contends that Tompkins’s statements were 
unreliable and hence their admission was improper under Ohio 
v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 (Roberts) and violated her right to 
due process.  In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 
(Crawford), the United States Supreme Court overruled 
Roberts, “which had held that the confrontation right does not 
bar admission of the out-of-court statements of an unavailable 
witness if the statements ‘bear[] adequate “indicia of 
reliability.” ’  Rejecting this approach, Crawford held that, in 
general, admission of ‘testimonial’ statements of a witness who 
was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.  (Crawford, at pp. 59−60, 
68.)”  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)   
Contrary to Dalton’s assertion, the high court “ ‘has made 
clear that Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56, and its progeny are 
overruled for all purposes, and retain no relevance to a 
determination whether a particular hearsay statement is 
admissible under the confrontation clause.’ ”  (Rangel, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 1217−1218.)  Rather, “a statement cannot fall 
within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was 
testimonial.”  (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. __, __-__ [135 S.Ct. 
2173, 2179-2180]; People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 129 
(Cortez).)  It “ ‘is the testimonial character of the statement that 
separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional 
limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
Confrontation Clause.’ ”  (Rangel, at p. 1217, italics omitted, 
quoting Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821.) 
Here, Tompkins’s statements to his cellmate “were not 
made to law enforcement officers, nor were they otherwise made 
under circumstances suggesting a primary purpose of creating 
evidence” for Dalton’s prosecution.  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
at p. 1217.)  The statements therefore were not testimonial.  
(Ibid.; cf. Ohio v. Clark, supra, __ U.S. at pp. __−__ [135 S.Ct. 
2173, 2181−2183] [three-year-old’s statements to his preschool 
teachers not testimonial because they “clearly were not made 
with the primary purpose of creating evidence for [the 
defendant’s] prosecution”].)   
In her reply brief, Dalton appears to acknowledge that 
Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. 813, filed six months 
before 
her 
opening 
brief, 
foreclosed 
her 
claim 
that 
nontestimonial statements continue to be subject to the test in 
Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56.  She therefore attempts to recast 
her confrontation clause claim as one under the due process 
clause, asserting:  “While the full scope of Davis is not clear, it 
is wholly inconsistent with due process to admit into evidence at 
a capital trial the unreliable hearsay statement of a declarant 
who lacks credibility and is not available for cross-examination, 
through the testimony of a skilled con artist-informant.”   
We have rejected above Dalton’s claim that Tompkins’s 
statements were so unreliable they failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Evidence Code section 1230.  (See ante, 
pt. II.A.1.a.)  Dalton cites no additional compelling basis for 
concluding these statements were nonetheless so unreliable 
that their admission violated the due process clause.  
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
Nor does Dalton cite any persuasive basis for concluding 
that McNeely’s testimony recounting Tompkins’s statements 
was so unreliable as to violate the due process clause.  We 
conclude below that the challenged limitations on McNeely’s 
cross-examination were either not erroneous or not prejudicial.  
(See post, pt. II.A.1.c.)  Moreover, “ ‘ “[a]lthough an appellate 
court will not uphold a judgment or verdict based upon evidence 
inherently improbable, testimony which merely discloses 
unusual circumstances does not come within that category.  
[Citation.]  To warrant the rejection of the statements given by 
a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must 
exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their 
falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or 
deductions.  [Citations.]  Conflicts and even testimony which is 
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a 
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or 
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or 
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ”  
(People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 519 (Maciel).)  Here, 
nothing about McNeely’s testimony was inherently unbelievable 
or implausible.   
c. Restricted impeachment 
Dalton asserts that the trial court prejudicially precluded 
impeachment of McNeely with the prosecutor’s characterization 
of him in a different case as a “manipulator” and with the 
circumstances underlying his prior felony and misdemeanor 
convictions.  We reject the claim.   
 
1) Factual background 
Before McNeely’s testimony in Dalton’s case, he had 
previously been prosecuted for 12 counts of burglary by Deputy 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
District Attorney Jeff Dusek, the prosecutor in Dalton’s case, 
and Deputy District Attorney Robert Phillips.  In the 
prosecution’s 1989 statement in aggravation in eight of 
McNeely’s burglary cases, Deputy District Attorney Dusek 
described how McNeely dressed as an exterminator to gain 
entry to one of his wealthy victims’ homes, went to the home 
when only a housekeeper was present, and stole jewelry worth 
$65,000.  Deputy District Attorney Dusek stated:  “This is 
perhaps one of the most sophisticated burglary series [of crimes] 
to come through this court,” and although McNeely’s “outward 
appearance[] and lifestyle[]” was not that of a “typical burglar,” 
examination of his “soul and conscience” reveal a “confirmed 
thief and conman.”  He continued:  “The only difference between 
this burglar and the vast majority is that this defendant is not 
satisfied with a ‘nickel and dime haul,’ ” and “has the looks, 
brains, and wherewithal to make the big score.  In fact, he scored 
big eight separate times.”   
McNeely pled guilty.  In January 1990, he moved to 
withdraw his plea, attaching a supporting declaration by his 
mother.  McNeely’s mother stated that at the preliminary 
hearing, she had seen Deputy District Attorney Dusek showing 
what appeared to be photographs to individuals who appeared 
to be witnesses entering the courtroom, heard the witnesses say, 
“That is him,” and therefore believed the prosecutor was 
showing the witnesses photographs of McNeely and “verifying 
that . . . this was the person who they were going to see in 
Court.”  In the prosecution’s opposition to McNeely’s motion to 
withdraw his plea, Deputy District Attorney Dusek described 
McNeely as a “manipulator” and a “desperate man” whose “day 
of judgment is near and [who] will resort to any tactic to 
postpone a lengthy prison sentence.”   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
Before trial in this case, Dalton subpoenaed Deputy 
District Attorneys Dusek and Phillips as defense witnesses.  The 
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office moved to quash the 
subpoenas, and the trial court granted the motion.  As to Deputy 
District Attorney Dusek, the court stated that no attorney 
involved in a case should be called as a witness without an 
“absolute compelling need,” and no such need was demonstrated 
here because McNeely could be impeached with his prior 
convictions.  Dusek’s testimony would therefore be cumulative.  
The court also found Dusek had not stated an opinion as to 
McNeely’s veracity in the statement in aggravation and that the 
statement in aggravation was inadmissible hearsay.   
At trial, during his testimony on direct, McNeely testified 
he had previously suffered 12 California burglary convictions 
and four Missouri felony convictions for burglary and firearm 
theft.  He also said he had come forward about Tompkins’s 
statements because “I’m not a violent person myself, and . . . 
after hearing it over the course of days and weeks . . . it really 
got to me after awhile; and . . . you start the [sic] feel for 
this — .”  Dalton’s objection was sustained, but the court 
declined her request to strike the answer, stating, “The answer 
will stand.”   
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, “[D]o you 
consider yourself to be a confirmed thief and con man?”  
McNeely replied, “I would say at one time, yeah, that[] . . . would 
have been appropriate.  Prison has changed me somewhat.”  
Counsel asked, “Would you agree with this statement about you, 
that you’re a manipulator?”  The trial court sustained the 
prosecutor’s relevance objection.  Counsel asked, “Mr. McNeely, 
are you a manipulator?”  McNeely said, “I don’t know.  Some 
people may say that. . . .  I wouldn’t say it.”  Counsel 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
subsequently asked if during the felonies McNeely “posed as an 
exterminator.”  The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s 
relevance objection.  At sidebar, defense counsel explained that 
in their view McNeely was manipulating the court and had read 
Tompkins’s documents and was simply testifying to what he 
read.  They sought to ask McNeely about his method of operation 
in posing as an exterminator in eight of the burglaries and a 
drapery cleaner in the four other burglaries to obtain trust and 
access to money and jewelry, and to demonstrate “he is a 
manipulator” and “an imposter.”  The trial court denied the 
request on the ground that “the law of impeachment of prior 
felonies is you get to ask the nature of the felony and when it 
occurred; and I’ve allowed you to do that.”   
Dalton also sought to impeach McNeely with the 
circumstances surrounding his misdemeanor convictions.  The 
trial court excluded the evidence, finding the convictions were 
remote in time, and would involve undue consumption of time 
given that McNeely could be impeached with at least 10 prior 
felony convictions.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)   
 
2) Analysis 
 
 
(a) 
Subpoena 
Dalton asserts the trial court erred in quashing her 
subpoena of Deputy District Attorney Dusek because his 
statements in the statement in aggravation and opposition to 
McNeely’s motion to withdraw his plea were admissible as 
statements of a party-opponent under Evidence Code 
section 1220.  Evidence Code section 1220 provides:  “Evidence 
of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a 
party in either his individual or representative capacity, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
56 
regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual 
or representative capacity.”  Dalton did not raise this ground of 
admissibility below, and it is therefore forfeited.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 354; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 779.)  
Even if the issue was preserved, and assuming the 
statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1220, 
Dalton fails to demonstrate that Deputy District Attorney 
Dusek should have been called as a witness.  “ ‘Only in 
extraordinary circumstances should an attorney in an action be 
called as a witness, and before the attorney is called, defendant 
has an obligation to demonstrate that there is no other source 
for the evidence he seeks.’ ”  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
1146, 1186 (Linton).)  In this case there was another source for 
the evidence Dalton sought, i.e., McNeely.  That is, Dalton could 
have simply asked McNeely who had been the prosecutor in his 
burglary cases and what were the circumstances underlying 
those convictions.  We therefore turn to Dalton’s claim that her 
cross-examination of McNeely was improperly limited because 
she was precluded from eliciting the circumstances underlying 
his burglary convictions.   
 
 
(b) 
Imposter evidence  
As noted, on cross-examination Dalton unsuccessfully 
sought to impeach McNeely with the circumstances underlying 
his 12 California burglary convictions.  In particular, Dalton 
sought to demonstrate McNeely’s insidious nature by eliciting 
testimony that he had successfully posed as an exterminator or 
drapery cleaner in order to gain entry to numerous homes of 
wealthy persons and steal their money and property.  The trial 
court sustained objections to this line of questioning on the 
ground that a party could only impeach a witness with the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
57 
“nature of the felony and when it occurred,” presumably relying 
on Evidence Code sections 787 and 788.  Dalton contends this 
was error that violated her rights to confrontation and cross-
examination, presentation of a defense, a fair trial, due process, 
and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty.  We conclude 
any error in limiting the cross-examination was harmless.  
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson).) 
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling and to the Attorney 
General’s position in this court, admission of relevant evidence 
of the circumstances underlying a felony conviction is no longer 
generally barred in criminal cases.  It is true that Evidence Code 
section 787 provides:  “Subject to Section 788, evidence of 
specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to 
prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to attack or support 
the credibility of a witness.”  And section 788 generally provides:  
“For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may 
be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of 
the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony.”  Before 
June 1982, these sections as well as former Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2051, the predecessor of section 788, had been 
interpreted to generally provide that although “the testimony of 
a witness may be impeached by proof that he has suffered the 
prior conviction of a felony,” the “details and circumstances 
comprising the prior offenses are not admissible.”  (People v. 
David (1939) 12 Cal.2d 639, 646; see People v. Wagner (1975) 
13 Cal.3d 612, 618; People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 790.)   
In June 1982, the voters adopted Proposition 8, an 
initiative that amended the California Constitution to effect 
(among other things) criminal procedure reforms.  (Ballot 
Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33.)  
Proposition 8 added article I, former section 28, subdivision (d) 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
58 
(now § 28, subd. (f)(2) (§ 28(f)(2))), the “Truth-in-Evidence” 
amendment, which provides in relevant part:  “Except as 
provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the 
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence 
shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including 
pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial 
or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in 
juvenile or adult court.  Nothing in this section shall affect any 
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or 
hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103.”  
“Proposition 8 applies only to prosecutions for crimes committed 
on or after its effective date.”  (People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
251, 258.) 
“By its plain terms, section 28[(f)(2)] 
requires the 
admission in criminal cases of all ‘relevant’ proffered evidence 
unless exclusion is allowed or required by an ‘existing statutory 
rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay or Evidence 
Code, [s]ections 352, 782 or 1103,’ or by new laws passed by two-
thirds of each house of the Legislature.”  (People v. 
Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 292 (Wheeler), italics omitted.)  We 
have said it is “manifest” that the electorate intended to repeal 
“both judicially created and statutory rules restricting 
admission of relevant evidence in criminal cases . . . except 
insofar as section 28[(f)(2)] expressly preserves them.”  (People 
v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081−1082; accord, In re 
Freeman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 630, 640, fn. 5 [section 28(f)(2) 
“ ‘supersedes all California restrictions on the admission of 
relevant evidence except those preserved or permitted by the 
express words of section 28[(f)(2)] itself’ ”].)  We have also 
observed that “section 28[(f)(2)] contains no . . . exception that 
would preserve the exclusionary rule of Evidence Code 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
59 
sections 786−790, when the evidence relates to a witness’s 
conduct, but is offered to attack or support the credibility of the 
witness.”  (Harris, at p. 1081.) 
Thus, 
section 28(f)(2) 
abrogates 
Evidence 
Code 
section 787’s prohibition on admission of specific instances of 
misconduct that are “relevant only as tending to prove a trait of 
[a witness’s] character.”  (Evid. Code, § 787.)  Evidence of 
circumstances underlying a conviction is admissible to impeach 
credibility if the proponent demonstrates that the evidence has 
“any tendency in reason” to disprove credibility.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 210; see ibid. [defining relevant evidence as “having any 
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action” including 
“evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness”]; Evid. Code, 
§ 780 [“the court or jury may consider in determining the 
credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his [or her] 
testimony at the hearing . . .”].)  Trial courts retain discretion to 
exclude such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability 
that its admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of 
time or . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  We disapprove 
of People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 830 (Casares) 
[“Under California law, the right to cross-examine or impeach 
the credibility of a witness concerning a felony conviction does 
not extend to the facts underlying the offense.”]; People v. 
Ardoin (2011) 
196 Cal.App.4th 
102, 
120; 
People v. 
Szadziewicz (2008) 
161 Cal.App.4th 
823, 
842; People v. 
Shea (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1267; People v. Santos (1994) 
30 Cal.App.4th 
169, 
176−177; 
People v. 
Thomas 
(1988) 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
60 
206 Cal.App.3d 689, 700, fn. 6; and People v. Heckathorne (1988) 
202 Cal.App.3d 458, 462, to the extent they are inconsistent 
with our opinion. 
Here, certain statements by the trial court suggest it may 
have been unaware that it had discretion to admit the 
circumstances underlying McNeely’s felony convictions.  But 
even assuming such an error, there is no reasonable probability 
that a different outcome as to the conspiracy and murder counts 
and the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation (the 
matters to which McNeely’s testimony was arguably relevant) 
would have resulted if the excluded line of questioning had been 
presented.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837; see People v. 
Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1296−1297 (Prince).)  
The defense theory was that McNeely had fabricated the 
conversations to which he testified after surreptitiously 
examining documents in Tompkins’s case, such as his 
statements to others regarding his alleged involvement, copies 
of his codefendants’ interviews, and press releases relating to 
his case that were available to McNeely in the cell he shared 
with Tompkins.  According to Dalton, evidence that McNeely on 
12 occasions had successfully impersonated an exterminator or 
a drapery hanger in order to gain access to wealthy persons’ 
homes and steal their valuable property “suggest[ed] not only a 
proclivity to lie, but also an ability to do so quite well.”   
We do not agree that this evidence would have cast 
McNeely’s credibility in a significantly different light.  The jury 
was aware that McNeely had suffered 12 California burglary 
convictions and four Missouri felony convictions for burglary 
and firearm theft, and McNeely testified he had committed 
“probably a few more” burglaries.  The specifics of McNeely’s 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
61 
burglaries might have illustrated more vividly his intelligence 
and skill in deception, but would not have left the jury with a 
materially different impression of his credibility.  The mere 
existence of these 16 felony convictions and additional 
unadjudicated crimes cast doubt on McNeely’s veracity because 
“ ‘it is undeniable that a witness’ moral depravity of any kind 
has “some tendency in reason” [citation] to shake one’s 
confidence in his honesty.’ ”  (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 
p. 295.)  We have also recognized that the commission of 
numerous crimes involving moral turpitude “may be more 
probative of credibility than a single crime.”  (People v. Clark 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932.)  Moreover, McNeely agreed with 
defense counsel that at one time he had been a “confirmed thief 
and con man,” but believed prison had changed him “somewhat.”  
He further conceded “[s]ome people” might describe him as a 
“manipulator.”   
In addition, when McNeely was asked if he had developed 
“some sort of friendship or relationship” with Tompkins, 
McNeely called him an “acquaintance” and said they shared not 
“quite a friendship” but “kind of a bond.”  McNeely agreed with 
defense counsel that Tompkins “didn’t want to talk about his 
case to other people” and apparently warned other inmates not 
to discuss their cases.  These circumstances tended to 
undermine the probative value of McNeely’s testimony that 
Tompkins had enthusiastically and repeatedly for three months 
divulged to McNeely intimate details of his torture and murder 
of May.  As noted, the trial court instructed the jury that 
McNeely was an “in-custody informant” and that his testimony 
“should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny.”   
Nor did McNeely’s testimony materially bear on the 
charges of conspiracy and murder or on the torture-murder 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
62 
special-circumstance allegation.  As to the charges of conspiracy 
and murder, the comments by Tompkins that McNeely conveyed 
did not refer to or implicate Dalton.  Moreover, as to conspiracy, 
although Tompkins referred to a “plan,” no details as to how or 
when that plan was developed were provided by McNeely’s 
testimony.  As to murder, Dalton was connected to the crime by 
evidence that she covered May in a sheet and bound her to a 
chair and prepared four or five hypodermic needles of battery 
acid for the purpose of killing her, told Laurie Carlyle that she 
had been involved in May’s murder and that May had been 
killed with battery acid, and told Patricia Collins that she had 
killed May because May “was a rat” who “deserved to die” (ante, 
pp. 9−10, 23−24).   
As to the special circumstance allegation of torture 
murder, we have said that torture is the infliction of “ ‘ “pain and 
suffering in addition to death.” ’ ”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 658, 716 (Edwards).)  “The torture-murder special-
circumstance allegation requires an ‘ “intent to cause cruel or 
extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, 
persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.” ’  [Citation.]  Unlike 
torture murder, it also requires an intent to kill and, at the time 
of [May’s] murder, required ‘proof of the infliction of extreme 
physical pain no matter how long its duration’ on a living victim.  
(Former § 190.2, subd. (a)(18), as added by Prop. 7, § 6, 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); [citations].)  It 
does not require a premeditated and deliberate intent to torture 
[citation], a causal relationship between the torturous act and 
death [citation], or proof the victim subjectively experienced 
pain [citation].  ‘Distilled, the statutory language requires intent 
to kill, intent to torture, and infliction of an extremely painful 
act upon a living victim.’ ”  (Edwards, at p. 718).  
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
63 
The statements by Tompkins that McNeely recounted did 
not refer to Dalton, so they were not relevant to her intent to kill 
or to her intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for 
a sadistic purpose.  Although the statements were relevant to 
whether May had suffered the infliction of extreme physical 
pain while alive, they were cumulative to other evidence of this 
element.  Dalton told Carlyle that May had been killed with 
battery acid, and the prosecution expert testified that if battery 
acid were injected into a person’s vein, it would be “much more 
painful” than a Charley-horse.  Baker testified that after Dalton 
injected a syringe of battery acid into May’s leg, Dalton told 
Baker that May was suffering.  Baker further testified that she 
(Baker) hit May on the head with a cast iron frying pan with 
such force she broke the bottom of the pan.  Tompkins stabbed 
May twice to kill her and may have also hit her with a breaker 
bar.   
In addition, Fedor testified that the cord to her bedroom 
chandelier had been cut and that part of the plastic protective 
covering was melted, exposing the electrical wire, while the 
other end was apparently still plugged into an outlet and several 
extension cords had been either tied into shapes or together.  
She also found a screwdriver with blood, hair, and scalp 
material on it.  The jury could reasonably infer based on Fedor’s 
testimony that these objects were used in the attack on May.  
Further, Baker testified that she saw a screwdriver but could 
not recall what it was used for, and that she did not see an 
extension cord with “bare” ends or see an extension cord used 
against the person in the chair.  From this testimony, the jury 
could reasonably infer that the injuries from the cords and the 
screwdriver were inflicted on May before Baker and Tompkins 
returned home or at a time when May was alive.  Finally, May 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
64 
was bound; although restraint of a victim is not dispositive, it is 
one circumstance for the jury to consider in determining 
whether a victim was tortured.  (See People v. Elliot (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 453, 468, fn. 4.)  Thus, the statements by Tompkins 
that McNeely recounted were cumulative to other evidence on 
the issue of whether extreme physical pain was inflicted on May 
while she was alive. 
In sum, we conclude that any error in limiting McNeely’s 
cross-examination was harmless as to the conspiracy and 
murder charges and as to the torture-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.)  
For the same reasons, we reject Dalton’s further claim that the 
trial court’s limitation of McNeely’s cross-examination violated 
her constitutional right to confrontation.  “ ‘ “[A] criminal 
defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by 
showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise 
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical 
form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby, ‘to expose 
to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ”  
[Citation.]  However, not every restriction on a defendant’s 
desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional 
violation.  Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the 
trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination 
that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of 
marginal relevance. . . .  Thus, unless the defendant can show 
that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a 
significantly different impression of [the witnesses’] credibility’ 
[citation], the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard 
does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Linton, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1188.)  Even assuming the trial court had 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
65 
exercised its discretion to allow impeachment of McNeely with 
the circumstances underlying his 12 California burglary 
convictions, no significantly different impression of his 
credibility would have resulted here.   
 
 
(c). 
Misdemeanor convictions  
Dalton further contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in precluding cross-examination as to evidence of the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
McNeely’s 
misdemeanor 
convictions.  She does not delineate what those underlying 
circumstances were or why they were important.  Thus, even 
assuming that the trial court erred in precluding cross-
examination as to these circumstances, Dalton fails to 
demonstrate that such cross-examination “ ‘would have 
produced “a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 
credibility.” ’ ”  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 52 
(Dement).)    
 d. Corpus delicti 
Dalton asserts the prosecutor improperly relied on 
Tompkins’s out-of-court statements to prove the corpus delicti of 
the charged crimes because hearsay statements of an accomplice 
cannot be used to prove corpus.  We conclude that the corpus 
delicti of murder and torture was established by Fedor’s 
testimony.  
In the memorandum in support of Dalton’s motion to 
exclude “confessions prior to proof of the corpus delicti,” she 
asserted that “the corpus must be proven independently and 
without 
consideration 
to 
defendant’s 
or 
codefendant’s 
extrajudicial statements.”  She also asserted that “[p]roof of the 
corpus delicti includes both proof of the alleged homicide, . . . 
[and] also proof of the special circumstances.”  The trial court 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
66 
instructed the jury:  “No person may be convicted of a criminal 
offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime 
independent of any admission made by her outside of this trial.”   
 “To convict an accused of a criminal offense, the 
prosecution must prove that . . . a crime actually occurred.”  
(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1164.)  “[T]he corpus 
delicti or body of the crime . . . cannot be proved by exclusive 
reliance on the defendant’s extrajudicial statements.”  (Id., 
p. 1165.)  “The independent proof may be circumstantial and 
need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it 
permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal 
explanation is also plausible.  [Citations.]  There is no 
requirement of independent evidence ‘of every physical act 
constituting an element of an offense,’ so long as there is some 
slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a 
criminal agency.  [Citation.]  In every case, once the necessary 
quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant’s 
extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full 
value to strengthen the case on all issues.”  (Id., p. 1171.)   
Tompkins’s out-of-court statements, which referenced no 
other perpetrator, were relevant to the charge of murder and to 
the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation, but not to 
the charge of conspiracy to commit murder.  The Attorney 
General contends that the “corpus delicti rule does not apply to 
special circumstances” because in 1990, two years after May was 
murdered, the voters passed Proposition 115, which provided in 
part that  the “corpus delicti of a felony-based special 
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of 
Section 190.2 need not be proved independently of a defendant’s 
extrajudicial statement.”  (§ 190.41, added by Prop. 115, as 
approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) § 11.)  Dalton 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
was 
charged 
with 
torture-murder 
under 
section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(18), 
not 
a 
special 
circumstance 
under 
subdivision (a)(17), and we have in any event held that 
section 190.41 cannot constitutionally be applied to crimes 
“committed before the measure’s effective date.”  (Tapia v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 297–298.)   
We have also held that the corpus delicti requirement 
applies to special circumstance findings that “require proof of 
some crime other than the murder in question.”  (People v. 
Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1175.)  Here that crime — 
torture under section 206 — was also enacted by Proposition 115 
in 1990, and so was not a separate crime when May was 
murdered, although the torture-murder special-circumstance 
allegation required proof of similar elements.  (§ 206, added by 
Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) 
§ 13; see Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 718 [delineating the 
elements of torture-murder at the time of May’s murder].)  
Even assuming the prosecutor was required to satisfy the 
corpus delicti requirement for both murder and the torture-
murder special-circumstance allegation, the Attorney General 
correctly asserts that Fedor’s testimony did so.  Fedor testified 
that when she returned to the trailer on the afternoon of 
June 26, 1988, Dalton and Baker were present, but May was 
not.  The trailer was in disarray, Baker was washing the kitchen 
floor with shampoo, and clothes, sheets, towels, and blankets 
Fedor had thrown on her bed were missing.  When Fedor asked 
Dalton where these items were, Dalton explained she had 
accidentally cut herself, “got blood all over,” and the items were 
taken to be washed.  Fedor found a “dripping wet” bloody pillow 
in the trash can outside of the trailer, and after Dalton 
showered, Fedor noticed the soap bar was bloody.  Fedor 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
68 
subsequently found a screwdriver with what appeared to be 
blood, hair, and scalp material on it.  She also discovered that 
the cord to her bedroom chandelier had been cut and that part 
of the plastic protective covering was melted, exposing the 
electrical wire, and the other end was apparently still plugged 
into an outlet.  In addition, several extension cords had been 
either tied into shapes or together.  (See ante, pp. 14–16.) 
Thus, unlike Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 
390, 397, on which Dalton relies (and without addressing the 
validity of that case), the corpus delicti of the crimes charged 
here was not established solely by Tompkins’s out-of-court 
statements.  Fedor’s testimony was prima facie evidence that 
May had been killed that was independent of Tompkins’s and 
Dalton’s statements.  Fedor’s testimony also permitted an 
inference — independent of these statements — that May had 
been tortured.   
Dalton further claims the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that Tompkins’s statements were admissible 
only to establish the corpus or that the crime occurred, and that 
its failure to do so allowed the prosecutor to rely on Tompkins’s 
statements “to establish Dalton’s guilt.”  We reject the claim.  
Dalton did not request such an instruction, and the trial court 
had no duty to so instruct on its own motion.  (Valdez, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 139.)  To the extent Dalton asserts admission of 
Tompkins’s statements violated her Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the witnesses against her, we have concluded above 
that Tompkins’s statements were not testimonial.  (See ante, 
pt. II.A.1.b.)   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
69 
e. Undue prejudice 
Dalton contends McNeely’s testimony was unduly 
prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  Assuming the 
claim is preserved, we reject it. 
Although Dalton asserts the probative value of McNeely’s 
testimony was “slight,” she also asserts that Tompkins’s 
statements “should have been excluded because they were ‘so 
[rife] with condemning facts against [her] that they [were] 
devastating or crucial to [her] case.’ ”  We rejected a 
substantially similar argument in Valdez:  “[T]he test for 
prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 is not whether the 
evidence in question undermines the defense or helps 
demonstrate guilt, but is whether the evidence inflames the 
jurors’ emotions, motivating them to use the information, not to 
evaluate logically the point upon which it is relevant, but to 
reward or punish the defense because of the jurors’ emotional 
reaction.”  (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 145.)  Here, Dalton 
does not suggest how Tompkins’s statements, which did not 
mention Dalton, prejudiced her in this manner.   
2. Further cross-examination issues  
Dalton contends that the trial court improperly limited 
her cross-examination of prosecution witnesses Joanne Fedor, 
Sheryl Baker, Kandy Koliwer, Fred Eckstein, Jeanette Bench, 
Judy Brakewood, Patricia Collins, Phyllis Cross, Laurie Carlyle, 
and Pamela Johnson, in violation of her rights to confrontation, 
to present a defense, a fair trial, due process of law, and a 
reliable determination of guilt and penalty.  We conclude there 
was no prejudicial error.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
70 
a. Joanne Fedor 
Dalton asserts the trial court erroneously precluded 
Dalton from cross-examining Fedor regarding her pending 
charges of grand theft and forgery, and from impeaching Fedor 
with the conduct underlying her four misdemeanor convictions.   
Before Fedor’s testimony, the trial court ruled that Dalton 
could not impeach Fedor with the conduct underlying her 
1982 misdemeanor convictions for forgery, petty theft, and 
possession of a hypodermic needle because they were too remote 
and would require an undue consumption of time, or with the 
conduct underlying her 1983 misdemeanor battery conviction 
because the crime did not involve moral turpitude.  The court 
subsequently ruled that defense counsel could not impeach 
Fedor with her pending charges of grand theft and forgery, 
stating, “[I]t’s obviously not usable for impeachment, since it’s 
pending and she may be found not guilty.”  The charges had been 
filed in August 1994, and the preliminary hearing was 
scheduled to be held 10 days after Fedor’s February 1995 
testimony in Dalton’s case.  The prosecutor said he had not 
“interceded on her behalf in any way . . . to affect the charges, 
her custody status, any disposition, anything whatsoever.”   
Dalton contends that cross-examination on the pending 
charges would have demonstrated Fedor had a motivation to lie 
in her testimony.  The Attorney General agrees that a witness 
may be impeached with pending charges but appears to contend 
that the trial court exercised its discretion in limiting the cross-
examination as to the pending charges.  The record appears 
otherwise.   
Even assuming that the trial court erred in summarily 
precluding cross-examination on the pending charges, however, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
71 
Dalton fails to demonstrate that cross-examination as to these 
charges “ ‘would have produced “a significantly different 
impression of [the witness’s] credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)  Fedor was impeached by the circumstance 
that Deputy Wilson examined her trailer immediately after 
Dalton and the others left, yet he saw no blood or cut electrical 
cords and was not shown items she testified were in or near the 
trailer, such as the bloody bar of soap.  Two subsequent forensic 
searches that same year revealed no evidence of blood in the 
trailer, and the heater and knife Fedor deemed suspicious tested 
negative for the presence of blood.  Fedor was further impeached 
by her methamphetamine use generally and on the day of May’s 
murder, by evidence she regularly supplied her 14-year-old 
babysitter with methamphetamine, and by Deputy Wilson’s 
description of her on the night of the murder as akin to 
“somebody who was mentally ill.”  Although Fedor testified that 
Dalton had spent the night a “couple weeks” before June 26, 
1988, she acknowledged she had previously told law 
enforcement that on June 26, 1988, she had not seen Dalton 
since 1981.  Indeed, Fedor was deemed so lacking in credibility 
by the prosecutor that he called numerous witnesses to, in his 
words, “corroborate[]” her testimony.  For these same reasons, 
Dalton fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying impeachment of Fedor concerning the circumstances 
underlying her misdemeanor convictions.   
b. Sheryl Baker 
Dalton asserts the trial court erroneously precluded 
Dalton from cross-examining Baker regarding a prior juvenile 
adjudication and certain prior convictions.  We reject the claim. 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
The trial court precluded cross-examination of Baker with 
(1) the true finding in her 1980 juvenile adjudication for forgery 
because it was not a serious or violent offense, (2) the conduct 
underlying her 1983 misdemeanor conviction of receipt of stolen 
property, 1984 misdemeanor conviction for weapon possession, 
and 1986 or 1988 misdemeanor theft conviction because they 
were too remote and their probative weight was outweighed by 
the consumption of time, (3) her 1990 misdemeanor conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance because it was not a 
crime of moral turpitude, (4) her 1986, 1988, and 1989 
misdemeanor convictions respectively for loitering, false 
representation to a police officer, and possession of hypodermic 
needles because they were not crimes of moral turpitude and 
because their probative weight was outweighed by the 
consumption of time, and (5) her 1989 misdemeanor conviction 
for receipt of stolen property because the court had admitted her 
1987 felony conviction for receipt of stolen property and hence 
the misdemeanor conviction had little probative value and 
would consume undue time.   
At trial, Baker testified she had suffered a 1987 felony 
conviction for grand theft auto.  Moreover, Baker was impeached 
by her admitted role in May’s murder and the favorable terms 
of her second-degree murder guilty plea.  She was further 
impeached by the fact that she would not be sentenced until 
after her testimony in Dalton’s case, by her failure to inform law 
enforcement about the murder for nearly four years and then 
only after she learned she had been apparently caught on tape 
describing the murder to a friend, and by her testimony that she 
used a significant amount of methamphetamine during the time 
she observed the events to which she testified.  Her cross-
examination consumes more than 40 pages of the reporter’s 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
73 
transcript.  Dalton fails to demonstrate that cross-examination 
as to the prior convictions and juvenile adjudication “ ‘would 
have produced “a significantly different impression of [the 
witness’s] credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)   
“Moreover, ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of 
evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to 
present a defense.’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)  
Dalton was “given considerable leeway to challenge [Baker’s] 
veracity and suggest [her] motivation to lie.  [Dalton] was not 
precluded from attempting to demonstrate that [Baker] was not 
worthy of belief; [s]he was merely precluded from proving it with 
time-consuming and remote evidence that was not obviously 
probative on the question.”  (Ibid.)  
c. Patricia Collins 
Dalton contends the trial court erred by precluding Dalton 
from cross-examining Patricia Collins regarding her prior 
convictions and limiting cross-examination regarding her role as 
an informant.  We reject the claim. 
The trial court precluded cross-examination regarding 
Collins’s 1987 and 1988 convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance because they were not crimes of moral turpitude and 
the 1987 offense was too remote.  It also excluded her 
1990 conviction for firearm possession because it was not an 
offense involving moral turpitude.  The trial court instructed the 
jury that Collins was an “in-custody informant” and that her 
testimony “should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny.”   
At trial, Collins was impeached by her 1986 felony 
conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.  
She was also impeached by the fact that, in part to avoid being 
blamed for May’s murder, she had agreed to cooperate with law 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
enforcement.  In November 1988, Collins engaged in secretly 
taped telephone conversations with Baker, and Collins was 
released from jail 15 days early as a benefit for this cooperation.  
Collins was further impeached by her methamphetamine use 
from 1988 to 1991 and her use of numerous aliases.  Dalton fails 
to demonstrate that cross-examination as to the circumstances 
underlying 
her convictions 
“ ‘would 
have 
produced 
“a 
significantly 
different 
impression 
of 
[the 
witness’s] 
credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)   
Dalton further contends the trial court “improperly 
restricted cross-examination of Collins regarding her possible 
prior work as an informant in other cases, including work 
with . . . [Police Officer] Lusardi, with whom she worked in this 
case and for whom she tape-recorded telephone conversations 
with Sheryl Baker.”  The claim is not further elaborated, and to 
support this assertion, Dalton simply cites to two pages of the 
record.  On the first page, defense counsel asked Collins on 
cross-examination, “Miss Collins, before this date when you 
made a phone call for Mr. Lusardi, you had a prior relationship 
with him, is that correct?”  The prosecutor’s objection on the 
grounds of relevance, beyond the scope, and Evidence Code 
section 352, was sustained.  Defense counsel then asked, “Well, 
you had worked with Mr. Lusardi before on cases; is that 
correct?”  Collins replied, “No.”  Dalton does not explain in what 
way she believes the cross-examination was curtailed.   
On the second cited page, defense counsel asked, 
“Miss Collins, you had an interview[] with a Detective 
Wisniewski, Mr. Lusardi, and Mr. Samms; isn’t that correct?”  
Collins replied, “I don’t recognize the names.”  Counsel asked, 
“[O]n March 15, 1989; isn’t that correct?  Three law enforcement 
officers up there?”  Collins again replied, “I don’t recognize the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
75 
names.”  Counsel asked, “And if Detective Wisniewski indicated 
that you were an informant for the Metropolitan Homicide Task 
Force, would that be a truth or lie?”  The prosecutor successfully 
objected that the question misstated the evidence and that it 
addressed a time period after Collins “did the phone calls.”  
Defense counsel then asked, “Miss Collins, do you consider 
yourself an informant?”   She replied, “No.”  Counsel asked, “You 
gave information while you were in jail; is that correct?”  Collins 
replied, “Yes.”  Defense counsel then said, “Nothing further,” 
and the witness was excused.  Again, it is not clear in what way 
Dalton 
believes 
the 
cross-examination 
was 
improperly 
restricted.   
d. Kandy Koliwer  
Kandy Koliwer had been appointed to represent May in 
June 1987 after May and Bobby’s three children were removed 
from the couple’s home.  On cross-examination at trial, defense 
counsel asked Koliwer, “You were certainly aware that . . . May 
did have a methamphetamine drug problem, weren’t you.”  The 
trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection on the grounds of 
relevance and lack of personal knowledge.  Defense counsel then 
said, “I have no further questions.”   
Dalton contends the trial court erroneously sustained the 
prosecutor’s objection because Koliwer had testified about May’s 
devotion to her children and, in Dalton’s view, believed that 
“regular drug use was not an issue in the case she was handling 
for May.”  Dalton contends Koliwer’s “knowledge, or lack of 
knowledge, regarding May’s drug use would certainly relate to 
her credibility and reliability as a witness about May.”   
But Koliwer testified on cross-examination that a 
condition of May’s getting her children back in 1987 was that 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
76 
she remain drug-free.  She further testified that according to 
allegations in the petition filed in court by the Department of 
Social Services, May’s children were again removed in June 
1988 — the month May disappeared — from her home in part 
because May had been arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance and had been away from the home for three days 
before the social worker’s visit.  Furthermore, Koliwer testified 
that May’s children were improperly supervised and that drug-
related activities appeared to be occurring at the home.  Dalton 
fails to demonstrate that cross-examination as to Koliwer’s 
personal knowledge of May’s drug use “ ‘would have produced “a 
significantly 
different 
impression 
of 
[the 
witness’s] 
credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)    
e. Fred Eckstein  
On cross-examination of Fred Eckstein, defense counsel 
asked, “[W]ere your parents using methamphetamine?”  The 
trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection on the grounds of 
relevance and speculation.  Dalton contends this ruling was 
erroneous because Fred’s mother, Kathy Eckstein, had testified 
about seeing small spots of dried blood, a soap bar with teeth 
marks, and a knotted extension cord in Fedor’s trailer, and 
hence 
Fred’s 
“observations 
of 
his 
mother’s 
use 
of 
methamphetamine around the time of her alleged observations 
would have been important impeaching evidence of Kathy’s 
credibility and powers of observation.”  No error appears.  Kathy 
Eckstein testified that she was using methamphetamine during 
this period, but not on a regular basis.  Kathy’s reliability as a 
witness was further diminished by the circumstance that she 
did not call law enforcement to report seeing blood in Fedor’s 
trailer.  Her reliability was also called into question by her 
confusion about some basic facts:  she was not sure of the year 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
77 
or month these events occurred, believed it started to get dark 
in June at about 5:00 p.m., and noted that at the time of her 
testimony in February it got dark “later around 6:30” p.m.  
Dalton fails to demonstrate that cross-examination as to Fred’s 
knowledge of his mother’s drug use “ ‘would have produced “a 
significantly 
different 
impression 
of 
[his 
mother’s] 
credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)   
f. Judy Brakewood 
Dalton asserts that the trial court precluded cross-
examination regarding Brakewood’s 1989 concealed weapon 
possession conviction because it was not a crime of moral 
turpitude.  Dalton makes no effort to explain why this was 
erroneous.  Moreover, Brakewood was impeached by the fact 
that at the time of the events to which she testified, she had been 
a methamphetamine dealer and was injecting three-quarters of 
a gram to one gram of methamphetamine a day.  She was 
further impeached by her failure to come forward about the 1988 
conversation until she read a 1992 newspaper article that 
recounted Investigator Cooksey’s testimony, apparently at the 
preliminary hearing, that “ ‘May was then injected with a hot 
shot of battery acid’ ” and that Tompkins said he “ ‘took May’s 
body to an Indian reservation.’ ”   
Dalton 
further 
asserts 
without 
elaboration 
that 
“[a]lthough counsel attempted to question [Brakewood] about 
her sales of methamphetamine, the court cut [counsel] off.”   She 
cites two record pages, only one of which contains an objection.  
On this page, Brakewood testified that she started selling 
methamphetamine in 1987 and was selling this drug in 1988.  
When defense counsel asked Brakewood how often she sold 
methamphetamine, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
78 
objection under Evidence Code section 352.  Dalton makes no 
effort to explain how the frequency with which Brakewood sold 
methamphetamine “ ‘would have produced “a significantly 
different impression of [the witness’s] credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)    
g. Bench, Cross, Carlyle, and Johnson 
As to Jeanette Bench, Phyllis Cross, Laurie Carlyle, and 
Pamela Johnson, Dalton simply lists the prior convictions on 
which she sought to cross-examine the witnesses and notes the 
trial court’s reasons for precluding admission of each one.  She 
makes no effort to demonstrate that the trial court’s rulings 
regarding each of these prior convictions was an abuse of 
discretion.  Rather, she broadly asserts:  “The court’s rulings 
unduly restricted [Dalton’s] right to cross-examine witnesses, 
violating her rights to confrontation and cross-examination, to a 
fair trial, to due process of law, to present a defense, and to a 
reliable determination of both guilt and penalty.  [Citations.]  
The perceived volume, breadth and recidivist nature of the 
witnesses’ prior convictions and conduct was severely and 
qualitatively diminished by the court’s rulings.  There is a 
reasonable probability that the suppressed impeachment 
evidence would have affected the jurors’ assessment of each 
individual witness’s credibility, which would have diminished 
the strength of the prosecution’s case in general.  The 
suppression of the impeachment evidence was prejudicial, and 
this Court must reverse the convictions, special circumstance 
findings and death judgment.”   Such general allegations fail to 
demonstrate that “the ‘cross-examination would have produced 
“a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 
credibility.” ’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.) 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
79 
h. Cumulative prejudice 
Dalton asserts that even if any individual error in 
restricting cross-examination of these witnesses was not 
prejudicial, the errors were prejudicial as cumulated.  We have 
assumed error, but concluded there was no prejudice, in the 
restriction of McNeely’s and Fedor’s cross-examination.  Nor do 
we 
conclude these 
assumed 
errors 
were 
cumulatively 
prejudicial.   
3. Nottoli statements 
Dalton contends the trial court erred in admitting Judy 
Brakewood’s testimony regarding Steven Nottoli’s statements 
because they did not qualify as an adoptive admission, were 
irrelevant, and were unduly prejudicial.  (Evid. Code, § 1221.)  
We conclude there was no error. 
a. Factual background 
Before 
Brakewood 
testified, 
Dalton 
unsuccessfully 
objected to the testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant 
because Brakewood was not certain whether the conversation 
occurred in the spring of 1987 or 1988, and that it was unduly 
prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  In response, the 
prosecutor said that the conversation occurred after the alleged 
murder and that Brakewood would testify Dalton was “excited 
about the murder, about having taken the body . . . to an Indian 
reservation; that battery acid was used and it was fun torturing 
the victim.”   
Brakewood’s 
actual 
testimony 
diverged 
from 
the 
prosecutor’s representation.  Brakewood testified that in 1988, 
she was living in El Cajon and knew Dalton.  In 1992, she had 
read a newspaper article about a case that caused her to recall 
a conversation she had previously had with Dalton.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
80 
Brakewood testified that after receiving a call from 
Nottoli, also known as “Streaker,” she brought drugs to a green 
van parked at a 7-Eleven store in Spring Valley.  The van was 
older, and the doors opened but did not slide.  In the van were 
two persons:  Nottoli and a woman Brakewood did not recognize.  
Nottoli was in the driver’s seat, and Brakewood and the 
unidentified woman were sitting on the floor of the van because 
there was no back seat.  Dalton was “not in the van at this time” 
because she was speaking on a telephone.  Brakewood was 
“making it up,” meaning preparing the drugs for use.   
The prosecutor asked, “While Kerry Dalton was gone, did 
you have a conversation?”  Brakewood replied, “Yes, I did.”  After 
establishing that Dalton eventually returned to the van, the 
prosecutor then asked, “[W]here did [Dalton] go in the van?”  
Brakewood replied, “She went into the passenger seat,” and 
confirmed that Brakewood was near Dalton and could hear her 
when she spoke in the van.  The prosecutor asked, “What did 
she say?”  Brakewood replied, “She came in on the . . . tail end 
of a conversation; and she said, ‘Yep, we really fucked that girl 
up.’ ”  Brakewood described Dalton as “[e]xuberant, excited, 
happy,” but said Dalton did not provide any details about what 
she meant.   
The prosecutor then asked, “Was [Dalton] there when 
Mr. Nottoli said anything about what . . . really fucked her up, 
then?”  Brakewood replied, “I don’t think that she was in there 
at the time.”  The prosecutor asked, “When the two of them were 
still there, was anything else said about the girl?”  Brakewood 
replied that while she was preparing the drugs, Nottoli “was 
mentioning to me how . . . they had —”  Defense counsel objected 
on the ground of hearsay.  The trial court overruled the 
objection, stating, “It’s foundational.”  Brakewood said, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
81 
“[Nottoli] had told me how that — that they had shot up this girl 
with battery acid and — and burned her.”  Brakewood did not 
recount any explanation by Nottoli of who “they” were.  Defense 
counsel objected, stating:  “Your honor, I ask that it be stricken.  
It’s hearsay.  It’s not foundational.”  The trial court said, “Let 
me hear the next question first.”  The prosecutor asked 
Brakewood, “Did Miss Dalton acknowledge or say anything 
about that conversation?”  Brakewood replied, “And directly 
after that, ‘Yeah, we really fucked that girl up.’ ”  The trial court 
then overruled the hearsay objection.  When the prosecutor 
subsequently asked whether Dalton was present when Nottoli 
described the location of the body, Brakewood replied, “I don’t 
believe so.”   
On cross-examination, Brakewood testified that she 
received Nottoli’s call late at night in the spring of 1988.  While 
Brakewood was with Nottoli in the green van, Dalton was 
speaking on a telephone (presumably a pay phone) that was 
located about 10 to 15 feet away from the van.  Brakewood did 
not recall whether the van windows were open.  While Dalton 
was away and on the phone, Brakewood and Nottoli had a 
conversation in which he mentioned battery acid and an Indian 
reservation.  Dalton came in on the tail end of the conversation 
and said, “ ‘We really fucked that girl up.’ ”  Dalton provided no 
details, and Brakewood did not know who they were talking 
about or when the girl had been “fucked . . . up.”   
Brakewood identified the 1992 newspaper article she had 
read.  The article mentioned Dalton, Tompkins, and Baker, and 
recounted Investigator’s Cooksey’s testimony (apparently at the 
preliminary hearing) that “ ‘May was then injected with a hot 
shot of battery acid,’ ” and that Tompkins said he “ ‘took May’s 
body to an Indian reservation.’ ”   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
82 
Brakewood and Nottoli met in the summer of 1987 and 
had dated until the end of that year.  In 1988, Brakewood was a 
drug dealer who injected three-quarters of a gram to one gram 
of methamphetamine a day.   
On redirect, the prosecutor established that Brakewood’s 
conversation with Nottoli had occurred in May or June of 1988.  
At that time, her drug use did not prevent her from satisfying 
her responsibilities in managing an attorney’s office.   
No evidence was introduced at trial linking Nottoli to 
May’s disappearance or murder.  Nottoli was called by the 
defense and denied making the statements, denied hearing 
Dalton say, “Yep, we really fucked that girl up,” denied ever 
driving a green van, and denied ever being in a white van (the 
color van Nottoli possessed in February 1988) with Brakewood 
and Dalton.  Nottoli and Brakewood had been friends but had a 
falling out in December 1987 after traveling to Boston together, 
and Nottoli had not seen her since that time.  Nottoli and Dalton 
were friends and had been physically intimate, but Nottoli had 
not seen her since 1988.  Nottoli had suffered prior felony 
convictions for grand theft auto, burglary, robbery, forgery, and 
receiving stolen property.  He became addicted to drugs while 
serving in Vietnam, and in the late 1980’s he used 
methamphetamine.   
In closing argument, the prosecutor said:  “Nottoli is 
talking about the battery acid and burns” and “the defendant 
says, ‘Yeah, we really fucked up that woman.  We really got 
her.’ ”  The prosecutor also said:  “Did [the torture] happen?  Yes 
it did. . . .  Judy Brakewood told you how giddy [Dalton] was 
when the discussion came up in that . . . van out in Spring 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
83 
Valley; happy, excited, exuberant.  ‘Yeah, we really fucked up 
that bitch.’  She was proud of it.”   
b. Analysis 
Evidence Code section 1221 provides:  “Evidence of a 
statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by 
the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with 
knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct 
manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”  “In 
determining 
whether 
a 
statement 
is 
admissible 
as 
an adoptive admission, a trial court must first decide whether 
there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that: (a) the 
defendant heard and understood the statement under 
circumstances that normally would call for a response; and 
(b) by words or conduct, the defendant adopted the statement as 
true.”  (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535; Evid. Code, 
§§ 403, 1221.)  If so, the jury then determines whether these 
preliminary facts actually occurred.  (See Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary com., 29B pt. 1B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2011 ed.) 
foll. § 403, p. 18 [“the jury must finally decide whether the 
preliminary fact exists”].)    
As an initial matter, we conclude that Dalton’s statement 
on its own, “ ‘Yep, we really fucked that girl up,’ ” and her 
accompanying exuberance were admissible as a party statement 
under Evidence Code section 1220.  We further conclude that 
this statement by Dalton manifested her adoption of Nottoli’s 
inculpatory statements.   
Although the record fails to precisely reflect what the “tail 
end” of the conversation was, that is, what portion of the 
conversation Dalton heard, her statement upon entering the van 
demonstrated awareness of the topic of conversation and, in 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
84 
particular, Nottoli’s statement that the victim had been burned 
and injected with battery acid.  Brakewood testified, “[Nottoli] 
had told me . . . that they had shot up this girl with battery 
acid . . . and burned her.”  Defense counsel objected, and the 
court said it would “hear the next question first” apparently 
before ruling.  The prosecutor asked, “Did [Dalton] acknowledge 
or say anything about that conversation?”  Brakewood replied, 
“And directly after that, ‘Yeah, we really fucked that girl up.’ ”   
The jury could reasonably infer that Brakewood used the 
phrase “[a]nd directly after that” in reference to Nottoli’s 
statement that “they” had injected a girl with battery acid and 
burned her.  This evidence is sufficient to “sustain a finding that:  
(a) the defendant heard and understood the statement under 
circumstances that normally would call for a response; and 
(b) by words or conduct, the defendant adopted the statement as 
true.”  (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 535; Evid. Code, 
§§ 403, 1221.)  We therefore conclude the court acted within its 
discretion in implicitly admitting Nottoli’s statements as 
Dalton’s adoptive admission, and their weight was for the jury 
to decide in light of all the other evidence, including Nottoli’s 
denial the conversation ever occurred.   
Dalton further contends that Brakewood’s testimony was 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code 
section 352.  At the time the trial court ruled, that is, before 
Brakewood’s testimony, the evidence was relevant to the 
torture-murder special-circumstance allegation given Baker’s 
testimony that Dalton had injected the victim with battery acid.  
Although Brakewood may have been uncertain of the date of her 
conversation with Nottoli before her testimony, this uncertainty 
went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.  
(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 57 (Merriman) [“the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
85 
reliability of a witness’s testimony is a matter for the jury to 
decide and therefore concerns the weight of the evidence, and 
not its admissibility”].)  Likewise, the circumstance that 
Dalton’s statement “ ‘Yep, we really fucked that girl up’ ” could 
have “meant many and various things” does not render it 
irrelevant given one possible meaning was as a reference to 
May’s murder.  (See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 502 
(Lewis) [rejecting argument that the amplifier found in the 
defendant’s car should not have been admitted because a 
witness testified only that it resembled the relevant amplifier, 
“ ‘[m]illions of other amplifiers could also have looked like the 
amplifier[] in question,’ ” and the prosecutor failed to compare 
brand name, serial numbers, and wattage].)  
Nor was the probative value of the evidence of 
Brakewood’s testimony substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission would “create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  The jury was required to decide if 
May had been tortured, and the court’s ruling was within its 
discretion at the time it was made. 
4. State of mind evidence 
Dalton contends that the trial court erred when it 
permitted Nina Tucker to offer a lay opinion of May’s state of 
mind based on hearsay.  There was no error.   
a. Factual background 
As explained, Nina Tucker testified that in December 
1987, she was the San Diego County Child Protective Services 
worker assigned to the May family.  (See ante, pp. 26−27.)  At 
that time, May and Bobby had custody of their three minor 
children under a reunification plan.  May made about three 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
86 
court appearances, was present when Tucker visited the Mays’ 
home, and telephoned Tucker about three times.  On June 10, 
1988, Tucker, a social worker, and a law enforcement officer 
again removed the children from May’s home.  May 
subsequently admitted to Tucker she had been abusing drugs 
and neglecting her children.   
On June 24, May called Tucker and said she wanted to get 
her children back, was tired of being on the street, and wanted 
to make changes in her lifestyle.  Tucker asked May to call her 
so they could meet at 9:00 a.m. the following Monday (June 27).  
May seemed pleased, but Tucker did not see or hear from her 
again.  Tucker believed that May loved and was responsive to 
her children, and gave no indication she would abandon them.  
May had “verbalized” to Tucker that she “loved her children very 
much.”   
b. Analysis 
Dalton contends the trial court improperly permitted 
Tucker to state a lay opinion based on hearsay.  A “ ‘lay witness 
may offer opinion testimony if it is rationally based on the 
witness’s perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness’s testimony.’  (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 601; 
see Evid. Code, § 800.)  ‘By contrast, when a lay witness offers 
an opinion that goes beyond the facts the witness personally 
observed, it is held inadmissible.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 583, 602.)  Here, Tucker’s opinion that May loved and 
was responsive to her children and wanted to keep them was 
based on her personal observations of and conversations with 
May over a six-month period, and was properly admitted.  “[A] 
witness may testify about objective behavior and describe 
behavior as being consistent with a state of mind.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
87 
Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 397.)  Indeed, although 
Tucker’s testimony was admitted as a lay opinion, it was her job 
as May’s Child Protective Services worker to observe and draw 
conclusions regarding May’s engagement with and attitude 
towards her children.   
Dalton claims the trial court erred in allowing Tucker to 
recount May’s June 24, 1988 hearsay statement to Tucker that 
she wanted to get her children back, was tired of being on the 
street, and wanted to make changes in her lifestyle.  The 
statement was not hearsay, but circumstantial evidence of 
May’s then existing state of mind that gave rise to the inference 
she would not abruptly abandon her children.  This inference in 
turn supported the prosecution theory May was dead.  (See 
Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 71 [murder victim’s earlier 
statement that the defendant had sexually assaulted her was 
not admitted for its truth but for the nonhearsay purpose of 
demonstrating that the victim would not have consented to 
sexual activity with the defendant on the night of the murder]; 
People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9 [describing the 
difference between testimonial use of state of mind evidence, 
which is hearsay, and circumstantial use of such evidence, 
which is not hearsay].)   
Dalton contends that the “circumstances under which May 
made 
the 
statements 
to 
Tucker 
indicate 
a 
lack 
of 
trustworthiness” and hence were inadmissible under the 
Evidence Code section 1250 state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule.  Again, “[t]he evidence was admitted for a purpose 
other than for the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore 
need not have met the reliability requirements of a hearsay 
exception.”  (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 72, and cases 
cited.)  Dalton’s challenge to the reliability of May’s statement 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
88 
to Tucker, “at most, goes to the weight of the evidence, and not 
its admissibility.”  (Ibid.)  We further reject Dalton’s claims that 
Tucker’s testimony erroneously “collaterally operated as victim 
impact evidence” because it “engendered great sympathy for the 
victim and her family,” or “distorted the fact-finding process to 
such an extent that the resulting verdict could not have 
possessed the reliability required by the Eighth Amendment.”   
Dalton asserts that because Tucker was employed by 
Child Protective Services and had initiated judicial proceedings 
to remove May’s children, “May’s statements were testimonial” 
and their introduction violated Dalton’s Confrontation Clause 
rights.  Dependency proceedings are civil in nature, and 
“[b]ecause Crawford is based on the Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation, its rule has not been extended to civil 
proceedings.”  (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 680, 
fn. 6; see In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915 [detailing 
differences between criminal and dependency proceedings]; In 
re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 959−960, 991−992 [noting 
reasons criminal defendants and parents in dependency 
proceedings are not similarly situated].) 
5. Baker’s statements  
Dalton contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
Sheryl Baker’s March 4, 1992 redacted statement to police.  We 
conclude there was no error.   
a. Factual background 
Baker gave videotaped statements to police on March 4, 
1992, and July 5, 1994, and testified at the 1995 trial.  After her 
trial testimony, the prosecutor sought to play for the jury much 
of Baker’s 1992 statement as either prior consistent statements 
(Evidence Code sections 791, 1236) or inconsistent statements 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
89 
(Evidence Code sections 770, 1235).  Dalton opposed the motion.  
The trial court granted the motion, redacting the statement to 
remove any reference to Baker giving a blood sample, an 
incident in an El Cajon motel room, and Dalton belonging to a 
gang or cult.  The court further allowed Dalton to play for the 
jury — over the prosecutor’s objection — much of Baker’s 1994 
statement.   
Before opening statements, the trial court instructed the 
jury:  “[S]tatements of the lawyers during the course of the trial 
are not evidence. . . .  Questions the attorneys ask a witness are, 
likewise, not evidence.  The question is only relevant to your 
consideration if the question gives meaning to the answer that 
the witness gives.  It’s the answer to the question that’s 
evidence.”  Before the redacted tape of Baker’s 1992 statement 
was played, the trial court instructed the jury:  “We’re going to 
be playing a videotape here momentarily. . . . [W]hen we get to 
the playing of the tape there’ll be an investigator on there asking 
questions.  The same admonition I gave you earlier about 
statements of counsel not being evidence applies to statements 
of the investigator on the tape.  The statements of the 
investigator on the tape are relevant to your determination of 
the facts in this matter only in that the question gives meaning 
to the answer that’s given by the person on the tape; so that 
same admonition applies.”   
b. Analysis 
1) Prior consistent statements 
Evidence Code section 791 provides:  “Evidence of a 
statement previously made by a witness that is consistent with 
his testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to support his 
credibility unless it is offered after:  [¶] . . . [¶] (b) An express or 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
90 
implied charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing 
is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper 
motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for 
fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”   
Dalton contends that Baker’s March 1992 statement was 
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 791 as a prior 
consistent statement because her motive to fabricate arose 
before she gave the statement.  On cross-examination of Baker, 
defense counsel explored the details of her 1994 plea agreement 
and established that under the deal she would not be sentenced 
until after her testimony in Dalton’s case.  Defense counsel’s 
questioning of Baker “ ‘raised an implicit charge that the “deal” 
provided [Baker] with an additional motive to testify 
untruthfully.  This, in turn, entitled the prosecution to show 
that [the accomplice’s] testimony was consistent with the 
recorded statement [she] gave shortly after [her] arrest but 
before the “deal” was consummated, that is, before the 
subsequent, specific motive to fabricate arose.’ ”  (People v. Jones 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1106 (Jones).)   
Dalton contends that Baker was also motivated to 
minimize her role in May’s murder during her March 1992 
statement so that she would receive a “good deal.”  But we have 
held that Evidence Code section 791 does not require a witness 
to be free from all possible bias at the time of her prior consistent 
statement.  Rather, “a prior consistent statement is admissible 
if it was made before the existence of any one or more of the 
biases or motives that, according to the opposing party’s express 
or implied charge, may have influenced the witness’s 
testimony.”  (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 609; see 
People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1014 [“That there may 
always have been present a motive to fabricate does not deprive 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
91 
a party of his right to show that another motive, suggested by 
the evidence, did not also affect his testimony”].)  The 
circumstance that Baker may have been motivated to be 
untruthful during her March 1992 statement so that she would 
receive a favorable plea bargain was simply a factor the jury 
could consider when deciding what weight to give that 
statement.  (Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)   
Dalton further contends that our long-standing precedent 
in this area is inapplicable because Baker’s “one and only motive 
to fabricate her account of the events was to receive favorable 
treatment by the prosecution.”  For purposes of Evidence Code 
section 791, however, our cases treat fear of voiding a plea 
bargain as a motivation to fabricate that arises at the time the 
plea bargain is entered into, and as a different motivation from 
the more general “desire to obtain leniency at defendant’s 
expense.”  (People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 210; see 
Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)  For this reason, People v. 
Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, on which Dalton relies, and 
which involved only one motivation, is distinguishable.  
(Andrews, at pp. 210–211 [distinguishing Coleman].)   
2) Prior inconsistent statements 
As Dalton acknowledges, portions of Baker’s 1992 
statement were admissible as prior inconsistent statements.  At 
trial, Baker testified that the person under the sheet made no 
sound during the attack, and Baker did not know whether the 
person was alive when Baker and Tompkins returned to the 
trailer.   She was impeached by her 1992 statement in which she 
said that May had spoken during the attack.  Baker further 
testified that she did not clean in the kitchen and did not clean 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
92 
any floors, and she was impeached with her 1992 statement in 
which she said she cleaned some blood off the kitchen floor.   
Dalton asserts that because Baker was impeached by 
certain statements in her 1992 statement during her testimony, 
the trial court should have exercised its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 and precluded the prosecutor from 
then playing for the jury the redacted videotape of her 1992 
interview that contained these inconsistent statements.  She 
contends 
that 
playing 
the 
videotape 
was 
repetitious, 
cumulative, and gave undue weight to the statements.  Even 
assuming the trial court had discretion to exclude the redacted 
videotape on this basis, we discern no possible undue prejudice 
from the jury hearing these few statements a second time.  (See 
Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1235; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1266, 1294 [“ ‘A statement by a witness that is inconsistent with 
his or her trial testimony is admissible to establish the truth of 
the matter asserted in the statement under the conditions set 
forth in Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770.’ ”].)  Moreover, as 
discussed above, the remaining portions of the redacted 
videotape were relevant to demonstrate Baker’s prior consistent 
statement to police before she negotiated her plea agreement.   
3) Evidence Code section 352 
Dalton contends that admission of Baker’s 1992 statement 
was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  In 
particular, she claims the probative value of the statement was 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
would “create substantial danger of undue prejudice” (Evid. 
Code, § 352) because the officers’ “interview techniques 
minimized Baker’s role, involved leading questions, introduced 
unsupported and inadmissible aggravating information, . . . 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
93 
misled and confused the jurors with false and extraneous 
evidence,” and contained “inadmissible victim impact evidence.”   
As set forth above, the court instructed the jury that the 
investigator’s statements were not evidence and were relevant 
only to the extent they gave meaning to Baker’s answers.  We 
presume the jury understood and followed that instruction.  
(People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 28 (Romero and 
Self).)   
6. Expert testimony  
Dalton contends that the trial court erred in allowing 
Dr. Brian Blackbourne, a pathologist, to testify generally as an 
expert on the effect of battery acid and electrical current on the 
human body because the testimony lacked foundation, was 
irrelevant, and was unduly prejudicial.  We reject the claim. 
a. Foundation 
Dalton asserts Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony lacked 
foundation because “there was absolutely no evidence 
concerning the use” of electricity and battery acid.  Foundation 
for Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony regarding the effect of battery 
acid on the human body appears in Baker’s testimony that 
Dalton showed her several syringes filled with what she told 
Baker was battery acid and that Dalton subsequently injected 
this substance into May.  In addition, Dalton told Carlyle that 
May had been killed by battery acid.   
Foundation for Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony regarding the 
effect of electricity on the human body appears in Fedor’s 
testimony that after Deputy Wilson’s visit on June 26, 1988, she 
found the cord to her bedroom chandelier had been cut and the 
other end was still “plugged in” (apparently to an outlet).  On 
the cut end of the cord, part of the plastic protective covering 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
94 
was melted, exposing the electrical wire.  Although the record is 
not entirely clear, Fedor also found at least one extension cord 
in the shape of a figure eight.  Another extension cord was tied 
in the shape of two figure eights with a different cord connecting 
the two figure eights.   
b. Relevance 
Dalton 
asserts 
Dr. 
Blackbourne’s 
testimony 
was 
irrelevant because the “jurors did not need an expert to explain 
to them that electric shock and acid cause pain.”  Evidence Code 
section 801 “qualifies a matter as the proper subject for expert 
testimony if it is ‘sufficiently beyond common experience that 
the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’  That is 
not to say, however, that the jury need be wholly ignorant of the 
subject matter of the expert opinion in order for it to be 
admissible.  [Citation.]  Rather, expert opinion testimony ‘ “will 
be excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s 
common fund of information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is 
one of such common knowledge that [people] of ordinary 
education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the 
witness’ ” [citation]. ’ ”  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 60.)   
Here, Dr. Blackbourne explained that acid injected into a 
vein would be more painful than when it was injected into a 
muscle.  He also explained that electricity can have a local effect 
on the area where it is applied, or can cause electrocution if it 
goes to the brain or heart.  Hence Dr. Blackbourne’s “medical 
expertise provided additional insight above and beyond the 
jury’s general knowledge” in the area of whether these 
injuries — if inflicted — were extremely painful within the 
meaning of the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation.  
(Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 709.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
95 
Dalton further contends Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony was 
irrelevant because the issue as to the torture-murder special-
circumstance allegation was whether Dalton intended to inflict 
pain, not whether Dr. Blackbourne believed the acts caused 
pain.  As noted, at the time of May’s murder the prosecutor was 
required to prove the infliction of extreme physical pain on a 
living person.  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 718; see ante, 
pt. II.A.1.c.2.b.)  Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony was relevant to 
this issue.   
c. Evidence Code section 352 
Dalton asserts that Dr. Blackbourne’s expert testimony 
was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  
“ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative’ ” 
under Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘if, broadly stated, it poses an 
intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the 
reliability of the outcome [citation].” ’ ”  (People v. Riggs (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 248, 290.)  No such intolerable risk was present here.   
We 
have 
rejected 
above 
Dalton’s 
claim 
that 
Dr. Blackbourne’s testimony did not assist the jury in 
understanding the effects of battery acid and electricity on the 
human body.  (See ante, pt. II.A.6.b.)  Nor, contrary to Dalton’s 
assertion, did Dr. Blackbourne testify that a victim would suffer 
a “prolonged and painful death” when inflicted with electric 
shock and battery acid.  Moreover, the trial court instructed the 
jury that simply because the court permitted a hypothetical 
question to be asked did not mean the court had found “all the 
assumed facts have been proved.  It only determines that those 
assumed facts are within the probable or possible range of the 
evidence.  It is for you, the jury, to find from all the evidence 
whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical question 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
96 
have been proved.”  We presume the jury followed this 
instruction.  (See Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 28.)   
7. Blood evidence  
Dalton contends the trial court erroneously admitted over 
her objection evidence of the presence of blood in Fedor’s former 
trailer.  We conclude any erroneous admission of this evidence 
was not prejudicial.   
a. Factual background 
At the preliminary hearing, Investigator Cooksey testified 
that in September and November 1988, the trailer had been 
unsuccessfully searched by law enforcement for the presence of 
blood.  On August 12, 1991, Investigator Cooksey, along with 
crime technician Gary Dorsett and serologist Annette Peer, 
again searched Fedor’s former trailer for the presence of blood.  
In August 1991, Fedor no longer lived in the trailer, and it was 
occupied by a different tenant.  Spots from the living room and 
master bedroom that tested presumptively positive for the 
presence of blood were collected on a later date, and six samples 
were sent to the Serological Research Institute in Richmond, 
California, for analysis by forensic serologist Gary Harmor.   
Harmor testified that many of the blood samples from the 
trailer were small.  He could not determine the age of the blood 
stains.  Nor could he identify their species origin; he testified 
they could have come from any mammal.  ABO blood testing 
indicated some samples were type O blood and others were type 
A blood; all mammals have ABO blood groups.  About 48 percent 
of the white human population has type O blood, and about a 
third has type A blood.  DNA testing produced no results.  May 
and Tompkins had type A blood, and Dalton and Baker had type 
O blood.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
97 
Before trial, Dalton unsuccessfully moved to exclude the 
blood evidence on the grounds that the evidence was irrelevant, 
speculative, and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code 
section 352.  At trial, the trial court granted Dalton a standing 
objection to evidence of blood in Fedor’s former trailer.   
Substantially similar evidence to that presented at the 
preliminary hearing was presented at trial.  (See ante, 
pts. I.A.1.d.3., I.A.2.a.)  In addition, evidence was introduced 
that the heater and knife Fedor gave Darlene Burns tested 
negative for the presence of blood.   
Fedor testified that before she moved into the trailer, it 
had been an illegal drug laboratory, and while she lived there 
on many occasions before and after June 1988, friends visited 
and used methamphetamine by injecting it with a syringe.  
Fedor 
and 
Baker 
testified 
that 
when 
they 
injected 
methamphetamine, blood would get into the syringe.  Baker said 
she would at times clear the syringe by pressing the blood out, 
noting, “[Y]ou could squirt it anywhere.”  She said, “I sure have,” 
when asked if she had seen other people shoot the blood into the 
room in which they were using methamphetamine.   
Fedor moved out of the trailer around March 1989.  
Between the time Fedor moved out of the trailer and the 1991 
forensic testing, the trailer was occupied by a series of at least 
three different renters.   
b. Analysis 
Dalton contends that the 1991 blood evidence was not 
relevant and that its probative value was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudice.  Even assuming the blood evidence 
should not have been admitted, there is no reasonable 
probability the verdict would have been different absent this 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
98 
error given the blood evidence’s weak probative value.  Thus, as 
the jury was fully apprised, a search of Fedor’s trailer on the 
night of the 1988 murder uncovered no evidence of blood; two 
searches by law enforcement forensic experts later in 1988 also 
uncovered no evidence of blood; the 1991 search uncovered 
minute samples of blood but the prosecution expert could not 
determine either the age of the blood or whether it was of human 
origin, several different tenants had occupied the trailer 
between the time of the 1988 murder and the 1991 search, and 
the presence of blood in the trailer could be explained by the 
clearing of blood in hypodermic needles.  Much of this evidence 
was also before the court when it correctly ruled before trial that 
the evidence was not unduly prejudicial.   
For these same reasons, we reject Dalton’s further claim 
that her rights to due process and to reliable fact finding in a 
capital case were violated by admission of the 1991 blood 
evidence.  Dalton asserts that the blood evidence suggested a 
“link between Dalton and a bloody torture-murder that 
otherwise was supported by no physical evidence.”  Even if 
correct, such a weak and attenuated link was not, as Dalton 
contends, “ ‘so inflammatory as to prevent a fair trial.’ ”   
Dalton also asserts that the prosecutor argued that 
“[w]hen the people who had the time, took the time, had the 
equipment, used the equipment, went back, they found evidence 
of this torture, of this blood-letting.  They found the drops of 
blood around the room, and the pictures are here.”  The 
prosecutor also argued that the blood evidence “corroborate[d]” 
Baker’s testimony.  Dalton contends that the erroneous 
admission of the 1991 blood evidence thus allowed the 
prosecutor to rely on irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.  We 
have concluded, however, that the evidence was not prejudicial.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
99 
8. Mistrial motion  
Dalton contends that the trial court erred in denying her 
mistrial motion.  We disagree. 
During Fedor’s testimony on direct, Fedor interjected, 
“Does she have to stare at me the whole time?”  Defense counsel 
objected, and the court advised Fedor, “Just don’t look at her.”  
Fedor responded, “Your honor, she molested my kids.”  The court 
struck the comment and admonished Fedor, “Don’t talk like 
that.”  Defense counsel asked to approach the bench, and the 
court said, “No, that was just stricken.”  Counsel said, “Well, I 
would like to go on the record,” and the court replied that could 
be done during the recess.  The court then admonished the jury:  
“[I]f you heard her last comment, disregard it.  It is stricken.”   
At the next recess, Dalton moved for a mistrial.  The court 
denied the motion and admonished the witness, “Don’t mention 
anything like that again in front of this jury.”   
The following morning, the trial court with the parties’ 
agreement questioned each juror and three alternate jurors 
individually as to whether he or she had heard Fedor’s comment 
regarding her children that had been struck from the record.  If 
the juror had heard the comment, the court told the juror that 
the comment was a completely unfounded allegation and asked 
the juror whether he or she could follow the court’s admonition 
and give Dalton a fair trial.  Each juror who heard the comment 
stated he or she could disregard it and give Dalton a fair trial.  
Following the questioning, the trial court inquired 
whether Dalton was still moving for a mistrial.  Defense counsel 
said, “Yes, your honor.”  The motion was denied.   
“ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.  
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
100 
[Citation.]  Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial 
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial 
motions.  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  A motion for a mistrial should 
be granted when “ ‘ “a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair 
trial have been irreparably damaged.” ’ ” ’  (People v. Collins 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198.)”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 
p. 703.)  We conclude here that Fedor’s assertion Dalton had 
molested her children was not “so incurably prejudicial that a 
new trial was required.”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
641, 683.)   
Fedor’s isolated comment was brief and not solicited by the 
prosecutor’s questioning.  Moreover, the trial court went to great 
lengths to ensure Dalton was not prejudiced by Fedor’s 
statement.  The court immediately struck the comment, 
admonished the jury to disregard it, and admonished Fedor, 
“Don’t talk like that.”  The following day, each juror was 
privately questioned by the court in the presence of counsel and 
asked if he or she had heard Fedor’s comment.  Every juror who 
heard the comment or part of the comment was admonished that 
the allegation was completely unfounded, and stated he or she 
could disregard the comment and give Dalton a fair trial.  On 
this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the mistrial motion.   
9. Conspiracy 
a. Statute of limitations   
Dalton contends that her conviction for conspiracy to 
commit murder (Penal Code § 182) must be reversed because 
that crime is subject to a three-year statute of limitation, but the 
information charging her was filed more than three years after 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
101 
June 26, 1988, the date of May’s murder, which was the last 
overt act and the object of the conspiracy.  We reject the claim. 
A claim that a charge was filed outside the statute of 
limitation can be raised at any time “if the charging document 
indicates on its face that the charge is untimely,” and there has 
been no express waiver of the statute of limitations.  (People v. 
Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338.)  The Attorney General 
points to no such waiver here.  The relevant limitation periods 
here are found in Penal Code sections 799−801.  These sections 
were repealed and reenacted in 1984 in response to 
recommendations made by the California Law Revision 
Commission.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 2764 (1983−1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 16, 1984, p. 2; 
Recommendation Relating to Statutes of Limitation for Felonies 
(Jan. 1984) 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984)  pp. 313−324 
(Commission Report).)  Before 1984, “most felonies [were] 
subject to a three year period of limitation,” and the “crimes for 
which there [was] no period of limitation [were] specified.”  
(Assem. Com. on Criminal Law and Public Safety, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2764 (1983−1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 7, 
1984, pp. 2−4.)  “The Commission’s primary recommendation 
[was] that felony statutes of limitation should generally be 
based on the seriousness of the crime as reflected by 
classification of the crime as a felony, a misdemeanor or an 
infraction, and by the term of imprisonment imposed for the 
offense.”  (Id., at p. 1.)  “To implement this basic 
recommendation” (ibid.), Assembly Bill 2764 repealed and then 
reenacted the statutes of limitation that were then in effect in 
1988 when Dalton was alleged to have conspired to murder May.   
Thus, in 1988 when the conspiracy is alleged to have 
occurred (and currently in § 799, sub. (a)), section 799 provided, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
102 
“an offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state 
prison for life or for life without possibility of parole, or for the 
embezzlement of public money,” has no statute of limitations.  
(Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 2, p. 4335.)  Section 800, which applies 
to offenses punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 
eight years or more, “[e]xcept as provided in Section 799,” 
provided a statute of limitation of six years.  (Stats. 1984, 
ch. 1270, § 2, p. 4335.)  Section 801 provided, “[e]xcept as 
provided in Sections 799 and 800, prosecution for an offense 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison shall be 
commenced within three years after commission of the offense.”  
(Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 2, p. 4335.)  “An offense is deemed 
punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by statute 
for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or 
imposed.”  (§ 805, subd. (a).)   
In 1988 (and currently in § 182, subd. (a)), section 182 
provided that “in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, . . . 
the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first 
degree,” which at that time was 25 years to life.  (Stats. 1983, 
ch. 1092, § 247, p. 4026; Stats. 1987, ch. 1006, § 1, p. 3367; see 
People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1226 [conspiracy to 
commit 
murder 
is 
necessarily 
conspiracy 
to 
commit 
premeditated first degree murder, and “is therefore punishable 
in the same manner as first degree murder pursuant to the 
provisions of Penal Code section 182.”].)  Thus, the language of 
sections 182 and 799 is clear that because conspiracy to commit 
murder is punishable by 25 years to life in prison, it has no 
limitation period.  (People v. Sconce (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 
701, fn. 3 [“there is no statute of limitations applicable to the 
crime of conspiracy to commit murder in California”].)   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
103 
In contending that the applicable statute of limitations for 
conspiracy to commit murder is three years under section 801, 
Dalton relies on the 1984 Commission Report and on the 
legislative history of unpassed bill Senate Bill No. 951 
(2013−2014 Reg. Sess.).  Because the language of sections 182 
and 799 is unambiguous, we need not consider these materials.  
(People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [if the statutory 
“ ‘language is clear and unambiguous there is no need . . . to 
resort to indicia’ ” of the Legislature’s intent].)   
Dalton also relies on dicta in People v. Prevost (1998) 
60 Cal.App.4th 
1382, 
and 
People v. 
Milstein 
(2012) 
211 Cal.App.4th 1158.  In Prevost, a case involving convictions 
for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, the court broadly 
stated that “[c]riminal conspiracy is governed by a three-year 
statute of limitations,” and if a person were “charged with 
conspiracy to commit certain offenses like murder, where the 
underlying offense is not governed by a statute of limitations, 
the three-year statute of limitations for conspiracy would 
govern.”  (Prevost, at p. 1401; see id. at pp. 1387−1388, 1390, 
fn. 3.)  Prevost relied on People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, a 
case 
decided 
long 
before 
the 
1984 reenactment 
of 
sections 799−801, at a time when most felonies were governed 
by a three-year statute of limitation.  (Prevost, at p. 1401; see 
Commission Report, supra, at p. 307 [in and before January 
1984, “most felonies [were] subject to a three-year” statute of 
limitation.]; see also Assem. Com. on Criminal Law and Public 
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2764, supra, at p. 4.)  
Although we cited Prevost with approval in People v. Johnson 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 262, we did so not in deciding the issue of 
the applicable statute of limitations for conspiracy to commit 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
104 
murder, which was not before us, but for the proposition that “it 
is possible to conspire to commit a misdemeanor.”   
Likewise, in People v. Milstein, the court held that the 
statute of limitation for conspiracy to defraud by false pretenses 
or false promises, proscribed by section 182, subdivision (a)(4), 
was “governed by the three-year limitations period generally 
applicable to criminal conspiracies,” not the four year period for 
crimes involving fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation.  
(People v. Milstein, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164; see id. at 
pp. 1163−1165.)  Milstein also relied on a pre-1984 case of this 
court and on the statement in Prevost quoted above for the 
proposition that even in cases of conspiracy to commit murder, 
the three-year statute of limitations applied.  (Milstein, at 
pp. 1167−1168.)  We disapprove People v. Milstein (2012) 
211 Cal.App.4th 
1158 
and 
People 
v. 
Prevost 
(1998) 
60 Cal.App.4th 1382, to the extent they are inconsistent with 
this opinion.   
In sum, in 1988 the allegation that Dalton conspired to 
commit murder had no statute of limitation.  Hence, the filing of 
the information four and a half years after May’s murder, which 
was the last overt act and the object of that conspiracy, was 
timely.  
b. Sufficiency of the evidence 
Dalton contends that no substantial evidence supports her 
conspiracy conviction.  We reject the claim.  
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in 
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 
it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
105 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’  (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)  
We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’  (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 
319.)  In so doing, a reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the 
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 
deduce from the evidence.’  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
978, 1053.)  The same standard of review applies to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting special circumstance 
findings.”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 715.)  
“ ‘Conspiracy requires two or more persons agreeing to 
commit a crime, along with the commission of an overt act, by at 
least one of these parties, in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ”  
(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 870.)  “ ‘Evidence is 
sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime “if it supports 
an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a 
mutual understanding to commit a crime.  [Citation.]  The 
existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, 
relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators 
before and during the alleged conspiracy.” ’ ”  (Maciel, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at pp. 515−516; Homick, at p. 870 [the element of 
agreeing to commit a crime “must often be proved 
circumstantially”].)  
“ ‘One who conspires with others to commit a felony is 
guilty as a principal.  (§ 31.)   “ ‘Each member of the conspiracy 
is liable for the acts of any of the others in carrying out the 
common purpose, i.e., all acts within the reasonable and 
probable consequences of the common unlawful design.’ 
[Citations.]” [Citation.]’  (In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
106 
1025−1026.)  ‘[A]ll conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily 
conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first degree 
murder.’ ”  (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 515, italics omitted.) 
Significant to the conspiracy conviction was Baker’s 
testimony to the following:  After Fedor was taken to the honor 
camp, Tompkins and Baker were at the house of Baker’s drug 
dealer in Lakeside.  Tompkins left for about 10 minutes to 
telephone Dalton, returned in a “panic,” and told Baker 
“something happened” and “[w]e have to get back up there.”  As 
they drove, Tompkins said “things just happen and to go with 
the flow,” and “things happen for a reason.”  (See ante, p. 8.)  
When Baker and Tompkins returned to the trailer, May was in 
a chair in the kitchen covered with a sheet and bound.  Dalton 
was upset and told Baker that Baker did not “know what 
happened when [she] was gone, and something had happened, 
and that they were going to kill” May.  Dalton had prepared 
several syringes of battery acid and injected one into May.  
Baker hit May with a heavy pan, and Tompkins stabbed and 
killed May. 
The jury could reasonably infer based on these 
circumstances that during the telephone call between Tompkins 
and Dalton, Tompkins learned something had gone awry while 
Dalton and May were at the trailer and conspired with Dalton 
to kill May.  (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 121; 
Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 516.)  Because the object of the 
conspiracy was to kill May, her “murder satisfied the element of 
an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  
(Maciel, at p. 518; see Jurado, at p. 121 [“Commission of the 
target offense in furtherance of the conspiracy satisfies the overt 
act requirement.”].)   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
107 
Dalton argues that Baker’s testimony is not corroborated 
as required by section 1111.  Evidence corroborating Baker’s 
testimony was required for each count as to which Baker was an 
accomplice as a matter of law.  (See Romero and Self, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 40.)  We have explained that under 
section 1111, “the corroboration must connect the defendant to 
the crime independently of the accomplice’s testimony.”  (Romero 
and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 36.)  “ ‘The entire conduct of the 
parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct may be taken into 
consideration by the trier of fact in determining the sufficiency 
of the corroboration.’  [Citations.]  The evidence ‘need not 
independently establish the identity of the victim’s assailant’ 
[citation], nor corroborate every fact to which the accomplice 
testifies [citation], and ‘ “may be circumstantial or slight and 
entitled to little consideration when standing alone.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 32.)   
The Attorney General generally asserts that lack of 
corroboration is not properly raised on appeal because “the jury 
decided the facts, and already resolved inconsistencies in favor 
of the judgment.”  Contrary to the Attorney General’s assertion, 
“[t]he requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is 
an ‘ “exception[]” to the substantial evidence’ rule.  [Citation.]  It 
is based on the Legislature’s determination that ‘ “because of the 
reliability questions posed by” ’ accomplice testimony, such 
testimony ‘ “by itself is insufficient as a matter of law to support 
a conviction.” ’ ”  (Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32.)  
For this reason, “[t]he trier of fact’s determination on the issue 
of corroboration” is not binding on the reviewing court if the 
“corroborating evidence . . . does not reasonably tend to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the crime.”  (People v. 
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986.)   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
108 
We first conclude Baker’s testimony regarding May’s 
murder was corroborated.  Dalton’s statement to Carlyle that 
she, Baker, and Tompkins were involved in May’s murder, and 
her response to Collins that May “was a rat” who “deserved to 
die” when Collins asked Dalton why she had killed May, 
connected Dalton to May’s murder independent of Baker’s 
testimony.  (Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 36; 
People v. Davis (1930) 210 Cal. 540, 558 (Davis) [a “defendant’s 
own statements and admissions, made in connection with other 
testimony” may corroborate an accomplice’s testimony].)  
Baker’s testimony was further corroborated by Fedor’s 
testimony that Dalton, May, Baker, and Tompkins had been at 
her trailer during the relevant time period, that Dalton was 
upset because May had held a yard sale that included Dalton’s 
belongings and had acted controlling toward May, that Dalton 
was left alone in the trailer with May before May’s 
disappearance, and that when Fedor returned late that 
afternoon, May was gone and Dalton told her she had cut herself 
and the bloody linens and clothes had been taken to be washed.  
(See ante, pp. 4−5, 7, 14−16.) 
As to the conspiracy to commit murder, it is not clear as a 
preliminary matter whether the trial court properly instructed 
the jury that Baker was an accomplice as a matter of law.  As 
the Attorney General notes, the prosecutor conceded at the 
hearing on the motion for acquittal that Baker was not part of a 
conspiracy and “she should probably be removed from that 
conspiracy.”   
Assuming Baker was an accomplice as to a conspiracy to 
murder May, we have said that the “existence of a conspiracy 
may be proved by uncorroborated accomplice testimony; 
corroboration of accomplice testimony is needed only to connect 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
109 
the defendant to the conspiracy.”  (People v. Price (1991) 
1 Cal.4th 324, 444 (Price), italics added.)  Here, the jury could 
reasonably infer the existence of a conspiracy to kill May from 
Baker’s testimony that Tompkins left the Lakeside home they 
were visiting for about 10 minutes to make a telephone call, 
returned in a “panic,” told Baker “something happened” and 
“[w]e have to get back up there,” and as they drove, said “things 
just happen and to go with the flow,” and “things happen for a 
reason.”  When Baker and Tompkins returned to the trailer, 
May was in a chair in the kitchen covered with a sheet and 
bound, and was shortly thereafter killed.  These facts 
demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy between Tompkins 
and someone else to kill May. 
Moreover, 
Baker’s 
testimony 
regarding 
Dalton’s 
involvement in the conspiracy to kill May was corroborated.  
Dalton was independently linked to the conspiracy by her 
statement to Carlyle that she, Baker, and Tompkins were 
involved in the murder of May in the “Live Oaks” area, and that 
May had been killed by battery acid.  (Romero and Self, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 36; Davis, supra, 210 Cal. at p. 558.)  This 
statement corroborated Baker’s testimony that when she and 
Tompkins returned to Fedor’s trailer (located in the Live Oak 
Springs Trailer Park), Dalton had already prepared several 
syringes of battery acid and subsequently injected one into May.  
The circumstance that Dalton had already prepared the 
syringes suggests planning and an agreement between 
Tompkins and Dalton to kill May.  
Fedor also corroborated Baker’s testimony by stating that 
when she returned to her trailer between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. on 
the afternoon of June 26, 1988, it was in disarray, May was 
gone, and Dalton and Baker were cleaning items from the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
110 
trailer.  (Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1257 [accomplice’s 
testimony was corroborated in part by the accomplice’s and 
defendant’s presence together shortly after the crime].)  In 
addition to placing Dalton at the murder scene shortly after 
Tompkins and Baker had returned from Lakeside, Fedor further 
testified that Tompkins and George then returned to the trailer, 
and Dalton, Tompkins, Baker, and George left in the same truck 
that evening.  (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 679 
[evidence of the defendant’s “flight after the crimes were 
committed supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and 
constitutes an implied admission, which may properly be 
considered as corroborative of the accomplice testimony”].)  
In sum, substantial evidence supports the conspiracy to 
commit murder conviction.  The judgment as to this count 
nonetheless must be modified.  The trial court erred in imposing 
(and staying) a death sentence based upon the conspiracy 
conviction (Count I) because conspiracy to commit murder does 
not render a defendant death eligible.  (People v. Vieira (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 264, 294; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 
171−172; People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 864–870.)  
The Attorney General concedes the sentence was unauthorized, 
and the parties agree that the proper sentence is 25 years to life.  
(§ 1260; see Vieira at p. 294; Lawley, at pp. 171−172.)  Since the 
object of the conspiracy was to kill May, the reduced sentence 
must be stayed under section 654.  (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 539 [“under section 654, defendant may not be punished for 
both the underlying crimes and the conspiracy, because there 
was no showing that the object of the conspiracy was any 
broader than commission of the underlying crimes”].)  We direct 
the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
111 
reflecting a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years to life, stayed 
pursuant to section 654, on the conspiracy count.   
10. Additional sufficiency of the evidence claims  
Dalton further contends that no substantial evidence 
supports her conviction for first degree murder or the true 
findings for the lying in wait and torture-murder special-
circumstance allegations.  We conclude substantial evidence 
supports her conviction for first-degree murder and the torture-
murder special-circumstance true finding, but that no 
substantial evidence supports the lying in wait special 
circumstance true finding.   
a. First degree murder  
 “Three categories of evidence are helpful to sustain a 
finding of premeditation and deliberation in a murder case:  
(1) planning activity; (2) motive; and (3) manner of killing.”  
(People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658 (San Nicolas).)  
These factors are simply a “framework to assist reviewing courts 
in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that 
the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of 
considerations,” and do “not refashion the elements of first 
degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any 
way.”  (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.)   
Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that 
Dalton premeditated May’s murder.  The circumstance that 
Dalton covered May in a sheet and bound her to a chair, and 
prepared four or five hypodermic needles of battery acid for the 
purpose of killing her, demonstrates planning and a manner of 
killing that supports a finding of premeditation and 
deliberation.  (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 658−659; 
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 332.)  Evidence of Dalton’s 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
112 
belief that May had stolen from her and shared a hypodermic 
needle while suffering from hepatitis provided a motive for her 
to kill May.  We have rejected above Dalton’s claim that Baker’s 
testimony lacked corroboration.  (See ante, pt. II.A.9.b.) 
b. Lying in wait 
At the time of May’s murder, the “lying-in-wait special 
circumstance required an intentional killing, committed under 
circumstances that included a physical concealment or 
concealment of purpose; a substantial period of watching and 
waiting for an opportune time to act; and, immediately 
thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a 
position of advantage.”  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 
201, fn. omitted (Stevens); see People v. Sandoval (2015) 
62 Cal.4th 394, 415.)  “The factors of concealing murderous 
intent, and striking from a position of advantage and surprise, 
‘are the hallmark of a murder by lying in wait.’ ”  (Stevens, at 
p. 202.)  “Concealment of purpose is not by itself ‘sufficient to 
establish lying in wait’ because ‘many “routine” murders are 
accomplished by such means.’ ”  (Sandoval, at p. 416.)   
The prosecutor introduced no evidence of such a surprise 
attack on May.  Sheryl Baker testified that other than Dalton’s 
statement that May “tried to get away or something,” Baker did 
not know and was never told what had happened at the trailer 
while she and Tompkins were gone.  Nor did the prosecutor 
introduce any other evidence of what happened before Baker 
and Tompkins returned to the trailer.  May’s body was never 
found and hence cannot provide any evidence of how she was 
subdued.   
In sum, nothing but speculation supports the special 
circumstance finding that Dalton killed May while lying in wait, 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
113 
and we therefore vacate it.  Double jeopardy principles preclude 
retrial of this special circumstance allegation.  (Burks v. United 
States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18 [“the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the 
evidence legally insufficient”]; People v. Thompson (1980) 
27 Cal.3d 303, 332–333 [insufficient evidence supported the 
jury’s special circumstance allegation findings, “those findings 
must be set aside, and further proceedings on these allegations 
are barred by the double jeopardy clause”].) 
For this reason, we need not address Dalton’s further 
contention that the lying in wait special circumstance is 
unconstitutional.   
c. Torture-murder 
Dalton contends that no substantial evidence supports the 
jury’s torture-murder special-circumstance true finding and 
that the trial court erred in denying her motion for acquittal on 
this ground after the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  The 
trial court also denied Dalton’s motion for a new trial on this 
ground.   
“ ‘The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a 
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is 
the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 
that is, “whether from the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial 
evidence of the existence of each element of the offense 
charged.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘The purpose of a motion under 
section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as possible those few 
instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima 
facie case.’  [Citations.]  The question  ‘is simply whether the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
114 
prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to present the 
matter to the jury for its determination.’  [Citation.]  The 
sufficiency of the evidence is tested at the point the motion is 
made.  [Citations.]  The question is one of law, subject to 
independent review.”  (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 200.) 
As noted, torture is the infliction of “ ‘ “pain and suffering 
in addition to death.” ’ ”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 716.)  
The torture-murder special-circumstance allegation “requires 
an ‘ “intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the 
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic 
purpose.” ’  [Citation.]  . . . [I]t also requires an intent to kill and, 
at the time of [May’s] murder, required ‘proof of the infliction of 
extreme physical pain no matter how long its duration’ on a 
living victim.”  (Id. at p. 718; ante, pt. II.A.1.c.2.b.)   
We conclude substantial evidence exists — and existed at 
the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief — to demonstrate 
these elements.  Dalton’s intent to kill was demonstrated by her 
statement to Baker that they were going to kill May by injecting 
battery acid and her action in then injecting the victim with that 
substance.  The infliction of extreme physical pain while May 
was alive was demonstrated by Tompkins’s statements that he 
“tortured the hell out of [May]” before killing her and that “pain 
was the name of the game,” Dalton’s injection of May with 
battery acid and her statement that May was suffering after the 
injection, Fedor’s discovery of a cut and melted cord, cords tied 
together, and a screwdriver with blood, hair, and scalp material 
on it, the perpetrators’ use of a heavy kitchen skillet on May 
before stabbing her to death, and Baker’s first statement to 
police in which she said May had spoken before she was killed.   
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
115 
Dalton’s intent to cause May cruel or extreme pain and 
suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for 
any sadistic purpose was demonstrated by Dalton’s statements 
and the circumstances surrounding the murder.  (People v. 
Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1137, italics omitted [“The 
intent to torture ‘is a state of mind which, unless established by 
the defendant’s own statements (or by another witness’s 
description of a defendant’s behavior in committing the 
offenses), must be proved by the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offense’ ”]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1158, 1172, 1214 [the defendant’s statements after the murder 
that he was angry with the victim and wanted to kill her permit 
an inference of intent to inflict extreme pain]; People v. Wilson 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 804, italics omitted [“[T]he torture-
murder special circumstance requires proof that the defendant 
h[er]self intended to torture the victim”].)  
Here, May was covered with a sheet and bound to a chair, 
and hence unable to see her assailants or resist their attack.  
(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1188 [“to 
establish an intent to torture [citation], it is appropriate to 
consider whether the victim was bound and gagged, or was 
isolated from others, thus rendering the victim unable to resist 
a defendant’s acts of violence.”]; see Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th 
at p. 717 [evidence that the victim had been bound and gagged 
and had a hood placed over her head “suggest[s] a methodical 
and prolonged attack rather than an explosion of violence”].)  
These physical limitations heightened the terror of any inflicted 
violence.   
Dalton’s injection of May with battery acid, a substance 
that the prosecution expert testified would be quite painful if 
injected into a vein, indicates an intent to make her suffer.  
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
116 
Indeed, Dalton falsely told May she was giving her a sedative to 
calm her, thus lowering May’s guard and adding shock to her 
ensuing pain.  Although Dalton told Baker the substance would 
kill May “instantly” and appeared to express concern that May 
was suffering as a result of the injection, the jury was not 
required to credit these statements or to view them as negating 
Dalton’s intent at the time she injected May.  (People v. Williams 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 364 [“a trier of fact is permitted to credit 
some portions of a witness’s testimony, and not credit others”].)  
The jury could discount this testimony in light of other evidence 
that Dalton had prepared four or five syringes of battery acid, 
thus indicating she did not in fact believe a single injection 
would kill May, Dalton’s anger and controlling behavior toward 
May on the day of the murder, Dalton’s later exuberance in 
telling Brakewood, “ ‘Yeah, we really fucked that girl up’ ” in 
response to Nottoli’s description of shooting up a girl with 
battery acid and burning her, and Dalton’s motivation to have 
Baker participate in the attack so that Baker would also be 
culpable and hence not implicate Dalton.   
11. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct 
a. Guilty plea  
Dalton contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct during closing argument in relying on Baker’s guilty 
plea and that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a 
limiting instruction on its own motion regarding the use of the 
plea.  We disagree.   
“A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
117 
trier of fact.”  (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 711.)  “As a 
general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of 
prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on 
the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of 
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 795, 841 (Samayoa).)  “When attacking the 
prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the defendant must show that, 
‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the instructions’ 
[citation], there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood 
or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or 
erroneous manner.’ ”  (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 
667 (Centeno).) 
At trial, Baker testified she had pled guilty to second-
degree murder in exchange for testifying at trial against Dalton.  
The prosecutor also agreed to other terms, including notifying 
the Department of Corrections or Board of Prison Terms of 
Baker’s cooperation and her level of culpability in Dalton’s case, 
requesting she serve her prison time out of state, and 
transporting her to and from court separately from Dalton.  
Baker had not yet been sentenced at the time of her testimony.   
Dalton does not contend that evidence of Baker’s plea 
agreement was improperly introduced.  Evidence of Baker’s plea 
agreement bore on her credibility and was properly before the 
jury to show Baker’s possible bias and motivation to testify.  (See 
Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 446.)  Indeed, defense counsel began 
Baker’s cross-examination by exploring the details of the plea 
agreement and introduced Baker’s second statement to 
police — in which her counsel delineated the terms of the plea 
agreement — in the defense case.   
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Dalton asserts that the prosecutor improperly relied on 
the plea agreement during closing argument.  The prosecutor 
said:  “Sheryl Baker is another eye witness. . . .  She 
participated. . . .  She knows this woman is dead. . . .  Not only 
that, she put her money where her mouth is.  She pled guilty to 
the murder of Irene Melanie May.  She knows what happened.”   
Dalton asserts that this argument was improper because 
the prosecutor used the plea as evidence that the murder 
occurred.  Dalton did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or 
seek an admonition.  She now contends that any such objection 
would have been futile because the trial court had previously 
ruled that Tompkins’s guilty plea was admissible to 
demonstrate the corpus delicti of murder.  Although the 
prosecutor ultimately decided not to introduce Tompkins’s plea, 
Dalton asserts that defense counsel had no reason to anticipate 
an objection to the prosecutor’s reliance on Baker’s plea to show 
corpus would prevail.   
Assuming that the claim is preserved and that Dalton is 
correct that Baker’s plea could not be used as substantive 
evidence a murder had occurred in a prosecution against 
someone other than Baker, no prejudice is apparent.  Contrary 
to Dalton’s assertion, the guilty plea was not the “only evidence 
that a crime even occurred.”  Rather, in addition to Dalton’s 
statements to Laurie Carlyle that she had been involved in 
May’s murder and that May had been killed with battery acid, 
and Dalton’s statement to Patricia Collins that she had killed 
May because May “was a rat” who “deserved to die,” the corpus 
delicti of murder was established by Baker’s lengthy testimony 
at trial and statements to police, May’s disappearance, and 
Fedor’s testimony regarding May’s absence and the state of 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
119 
Fedor’s trailer when she returned home on the evening of 
June 26, 1988.   
Dalton also contends the prosecutor’s statement infringed 
on Dalton’s presumption of innocence because it implied that 
Dalton’s “failure to act similarly to Baker and plead guilty 
implied that Dalton did not want to take responsibility for her 
actions.”  The reasonable import of the prosecutor’s remarks was 
that Baker would not have pled guilty to second-degree murder 
if May were not in fact dead.  There is no reasonable likelihood 
the jury would have construed the remarks as referring 
implicitly to Dalton.   
Baker also challenges the prosecutor’s remark that “[May] 
was alive.  Sheryl Baker tells you she was alive, and she pled 
guilty to murder, which tells you she was alive when she got 
back and did what she did.”  The prosecutor also said that Baker 
“pled guilty to murder, not mutilating a corpse.”  Dalton 
contends that these remarks improperly rely on the plea as 
evidence May “was alive when she was injected, hit and 
stabbed.”  Dalton did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or 
seek an admonition.  
Assuming that the claim is preserved, and that there is a 
reasonable likelihood the jury so understood the prosecutor’s 
comments, there is no prejudice.  Any inference from Baker’s 
guilty plea that May was alive when Baker and Tompkins 
returned was cumulative to Baker’s March 1992 statement to 
police.  In Baker’s first statement to police in March 1992, which 
was played for the jury, she told officers May had said, “I don’t 
wanna die,” and “[p]lease don’t kill me, I’m sorry.”   
Dalton also challenges the prosecutor’s argument that 
Baker’s “guilty plea corroborates what she says.”  Dalton did not 
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120 
object to the prosecutor’s argument or seek an admonition, and 
no exception to the general rule requiring an objection and 
request for admonition applies.  The claim is therefore forfeited.  
(Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.)   
On the merits, Dalton is correct that Baker’s guilty plea 
does not corroborate her testimony.  As we observed earlier, 
under section 1111, “the corroboration must connect the 
defendant to the crime independently of the accomplice’s 
testimony.”  (Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 36; see 
ante, pt. II.A.9.b.)  Baker’s plea did not connect Dalton to May’s 
murder.  (See People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1322 
[nontestifying codefendant’s guilty plea did not corroborate 
accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was involved in the 
crime].)  Again, however, no prejudice is apparent.  The trial 
court correctly instructed the jury on the evidence necessary to 
corroborate Baker’s testimony, and we presume it followed that 
instruction.   
Dalton asserts, relying on United States v. Halbert (9th 
Cir.1981) 640 F.2d 1000, that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on its own motion that Baker’s guilty plea could 
be used only to assess her credibility.  We rejected a 
substantially similar argument in People v. Williams, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p.  668, and Dalton cites no persuasive reason to 
revisit our conclusion.  In any event, for the reasons stated 
above, even assuming the trial court had such a duty, we see no 
prejudice from failing to so instruct. 
b. Burden of proof and presumption of innocence 
Dalton contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
his rebuttal closing argument by telling the jury Dalton’s 
presumption of innocence was gone and by diluting and 
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121 
trivializing the People’s burden of proof.  We conclude Dalton 
forfeited this argument by failing to object at trial, and even 
assuming the claim was preserved, there was no prejudicial 
prosecutorial misconduct.   
1) Factual background 
Because the prosecutor’s challenged remarks occurred in 
his rebuttal closing argument, we first recount defense counsel’s 
argument.   
 
 
(a) 
Defense counsel 
During Dalton’s closing argument, defense counsel spent 
significant time on the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He stated:  “Ladies and gentlemen, when we 
started this case at the beginning, . . . I indicated to you that the 
evidence in this case would not prove [Dalton] guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  You’ve heard the evidence in this case.  In a 
moment you’ll hear the law from the judge. . . . [A]fter you have 
listened to the law in this case and apply it to the evidence in 
this case, I think that you will find that Kerry Dalton has not 
been proven guilty of the charges against her.”   
Defense counsel asserted:  “[O]ne of the most important 
instructions that the judge will give you and that you’ve been 
told already by the judge is the standard, the standard by which 
you judge.”  “Basically, it says that:  A defendant in a criminal 
action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, 
and in the case of a reasonable doubt whether her guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, she is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.  
This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving 
her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  “There’s three separate 
concepts here. . . . . The first one is the concept of presumption 
of innocence. . . . Our law says that that person who has been 
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122 
accused, Kerry Dalton, is presumed to be innocent; and it wraps 
around Kerry Dalton a . . . protective shield, that presumption 
of innocence, and that shield remains there unless it is torn 
away beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [U]nless that shield is torn 
away beyond a reasonable doubt, the shield remains, and she is 
entitled to your verdict of not proven guilty.”   
Defense counsel continued:  “The second concept that is 
discussed in this instruction is the idea of the burden of proof.  
That burden of proof places upon the prosecution the burden of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . . [N]owhere does 
the law place on Kerry Dalton the responsibility of having to 
prove herself not guilty.”  “[T]he third concept here is the 
standard of proof, and that standard of proof is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In the law we refer to this as the highest 
standard of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
Defense counsel then read the instruction the jury would 
receive defining reasonable doubt.  (See post, pt. II.A.11.b.1.c.)  
Apparently using a chart that included the words “not guilty” on 
it, defense counsel explained that the instruction meant that if 
the prosecution demonstrated that the evidence was evenly 
divided as to guilty or not guilty, then Dalton was entitled to a 
verdict of not guilty.  Counsel then discussed the standard of 
preponderance of the evidence in civil cases, and said that if 
“[i]t’s more likely than not that the defendant committed the 
crime . . . [t]here’s still reasonable doubt, and the defendant is 
entitled to a verdict of not guilty.”  Counsel made similar 
arguments for standards of “[p]robably guilty” and clear and 
convincing evidence.  Defense counsel defined reasonable doubt 
as “that state . . . of the evidence above all of these which leaves 
the minds of the jurors in the condition they cannot say they feel 
an abiding conviction — an abiding conviction — to a moral 
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123 
certainty — a moral certainty — of the truth of the charge.  And 
that concept of moral certainty applies to a discussion that we 
had back when we were asking questions during voir dire, and 
that was if you were sitting where Kerry Dalton is sitting, how 
would you want to be judged?  If you have to make decisions in 
your life that are the most important decisions, wouldn’t you 
want to use the concept of a moral certainty before you would 
act?  If not, there is reasonable doubt; and if there’s reasonable 
doubt, then there has not been proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and Kerry Dalton is entitled to your verdict of not proven guilty.”   
Defense counsel continued:  “[T]o find a person guilty, you 
have to certify that that person has been proven guilty.  To find 
a person not guilty or not proven guilty, you’re only saying that 
you have not been presented evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, because, once again, there is no burden of proof on the 
defense and there is no burden of proof on Kerry Dalton’s part 
to have to prove that she did not commit this crime.  Now, that’s 
the law, and that’s what the judge will give you; and basically 
that’s essential as a foundation to go through the evidence and 
discuss what you have heard in this case.  That wasn’t discussed 
this morning.  It’s the basic foundation in looking at the evidence 
in this case, because no one is asking you to say, well, you 
know . . . ‘I’m disturbed by some of this evidence.  I’m concerned 
with some of this evidence.  Some of this evidence certainly 
indicates guilt.’  That’s not your job.  Your job is to look at all the 
evidence; and unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
a moral certainty, then Kerry Dalton is entitled to your verdict 
of not proven guilty.  Now, that’s part of the law.”   
Toward the end of defense counsel’s argument, he 
returned to the issue of the prosecutor’s burden of proof:  “If 
there is 99 percent proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there is 
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124 
one percent reasonable doubt that Irene May may have died, if 
she died, of natural causes, then the law requires a finding of 
not guilty because proof beyond a reasonable doubt has not been 
made. . . .  Again, the prosecution has the burden of proof, the 
prosecution has the burden to remove all proof that there is a 
presumption of innocence to take away the shield to present 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  “What I ask you to do is to 
understand that this is not a game, is to ask you that this is not 
about name calling and calling people evil.  This is a situation 
where Kerry Dalton deserves to be judged the way that you 
would be judged.  That this is a lasting decision.  It is not a 
decision for today or for tomorrow, next week, next month, next 
year.  It is a lasting decision.  And that the law requires that 
there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges against 
Miss Dalton which are conspiracy to commit murder, and 
murder.  Based on the evidence in this case, Kerry Dalton has 
not been proven guilty and that is why we ask you for your 
verdict of not guilty as to the charges against her.”   
 
 
(b) 
Prosecutor 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:  “Counsel made 
comments regarding the presumption of innocence and, truly, 
the defendant had it . . . when we started this case.  Now that 
the evidence is here, now that you heard it all, it is gone.  The 
evidence shattered that presumption of innocence.  It only lasts 
until the evidence of guilt has been shown.  It has been shown.  
She’s no longer protected by that presumption.”   
The prosecutor continued:  “The defendant spent a great 
deal of time and perhaps every other sentence talking about 
reasonable doubt and had this chart for you.  Certainly I have 
to prove my case beyond a reasonable doubt.  That’s why we 
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125 
spent so much time picking a jury, when people thought maybe 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, anything beyond that.”   
The prosecutor then discussed the chart used by defense 
counsel:  “This was the chart they gave you.  Man, we got not 
guilty all over this thing.  We don’t even have the courage to put 
guilt up there when it does get to reasonable doubt.  And this is 
perhaps a little misleading.”   
The prosecutor then apparently showed the jury his chart, 
saying:  “Let me give you another one, not formal, not fancy, 
handwritten, but another way of looking at it.  Using this as 
kind of like a thermometer — and don’t worry about the gaps 
between all these.  That doesn’t mean anything.  The law doesn’t 
tell you anything about what the gap is between them, but those 
are standards of proof that can be or could be established or 
required; and when you hear the instructions regarding 
reasonable doubt, you’ll hear about possible doubt and 
imaginary doubt.  Certainly, if there’s no proof, the defendant 
is . . . innocent.  That’s the way we start the case.  There’s no . . . 
evidence.  Will you vote now?  She’s got to be not guilty.  She’s 
presumed innocent.  We work our way up the thermometer.  If 
we get to preponderance of the evidence, that’s not enough in a 
criminal case.  That’s not enough.  She’s still not guilty.  If I can 
only establish beyond clear and convincing evidence, that’s not 
enough.  But . . . when we get to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that is enough.  Reasonable doubt.  Subject to reason; not 
guesses, not hopes, not hunches, not attorneys’ arguments.  And 
we can still go above that.  The law could require more than that, 
but it doesn’t.  I do not have to prove the case beyond a possible 
doubt.  I don’t.  You’ll hear that.  You saw that in this chart.  I 
do not have to prove this case beyond an imaginary doubt.  
Anybody can come up with some imaginary doubt; we heard an 
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126 
hour of it.  I do not have to prove the case beyond a shadow of a 
doubt.  That is not the same thing as reasonable doubt, make no 
mistake about that; and I do not have to eliminate all doubt.”   
The prosecutor argued:  “Drunk driving, petty theft, car 
thefts, robberies, rapes, murders, it’s the same standard in them 
all.  That’s all I have to establish.  I’ve gone way beyond that in 
this case.  The defendant scared the daylights out of Jeanette 
Bench.  When she spoke with her out at . . . Las Colinas, 
threatened her, called her names, told her what was going to 
happen to her.  Don’t let the same thing happen to you.  Don’t 
let the same thing happen to you as to what your job your 
function is.  It’s the same job, the same function as any jury in 
any criminal case; and don’t let the attorneys, myself included, 
convince you of what the evidence is or shouldn’t be or what is 
reasonable doubt and what isn’t.”   
The prosecutor then said, “Let me give you an example.  
Those of you that are married, or . . . living with somebody. . . .  
Comes the end of the evening, TV show is over, it’s time to go to 
bed; time to lock up the house, turn out the lights and go to bed.  
It’s your job to do that.  You go over and you lock the door, turn 
the TV off.  You switch the lights out.  You do it that way every 
night, because that’s your job and you do it.  You go up.  You get 
ready for bed.  You climb in bed and your wife says, ‘Did you 
turn that light off?  Did you turn that light off?’  And now you’re 
a big dummy.  You never turn it off, you big goof ball.  You forgot 
your socks the other day.  You probably didn’t turn it out.  And 
all of a sudden, she starts creating a reasonable doubt in your 
mind, . . . or it’s not reasonable, because when you went to bed 
you knew you turned it out.  Don’t let me create that doubt; don’t 
let him create that doubt.  The guy goes downstairs and, sure 
enough, the lights were off and the doors were locked.  You knew 
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127 
what you had done.  You did it right.  You did it conscientiously, 
just like you’ll do it in this case.”   
The prosecutor continued:  “Great deal was spent about 
circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial evidence is 
dynamite stuff, and it just about has to be circumstantial 
evidence in a case like this.”  He then discussed the lack of 
probity of the blood evidence, and said:  “Circumstantial 
evidence, though, what’s the reasonable interpretation?  That’s 
all we’re looking for.  What is reasonable?  What isn’t?  And the 
good thing . . . about circumstantial evidence — let’s wipe out 
the blood.  Let’s get rid of the blood, assuming the blood is 
garbage, cross it off.  Okay?  Now look at the rest.  Look at the 
rest of the circumstantial evidence.  That’s what you do with 
circumstantial evidence, you have to look at [it] in totality.  If 
one or two or some of you don’t buy into one of it, discard it.  
Look at what else you have.  ‘Do I still have enough?’  That’s 
all we’re talking about, is what’s reasonable.  Is this the 
reasonable interpretation?”   
 
 
(c) 
Jury Instructions 
After arguments were concluded, the trial court instructed 
the jury:  “[Y]ou must determine the facts from the evidence 
received in this trial and not from any other source.”  “If 
anything concerning the law said by the attorneys in their 
arguments . . . conflicts with my instructions on the law, you 
must follow my instructions . . . . Statements made by the 
attorneys during the trial are not evidence . . . .”   
On the issue of Dalton’s presumed innocence and the 
prosecutor’s burden of proof, the court instructed the jury:  “A 
defendant in a criminal trial is presumed to be innocent until 
the contrary is proved, and in the case of a reasonable doubt 
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128 
whether her guilt is satisfactorily shown, she’s entitled to a 
verdict of not guilty.  This presumption places upon the people 
the burden of proving her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not a mere possible 
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and 
depending upon moral evidence, is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt.  It’s that state of the case which, after the 
entire comparison and consideration of the evidence, leaves the 
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they 
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of 
the charge.”  The written instructions were given to the jury for 
its deliberations.   
2) Analysis 
Dalton did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or seek 
an admonition, and no exception to the general rule requiring 
an objection and request for admonition applies.  The claim is 
therefore forfeited.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.)  
Even assuming that the claim is preserved and that portions of 
the prosecutor’s argument constituted misconduct, there is no 
reasonable probability that a result more favorable to Dalton 
would have occurred absent the error.  (Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p.  837.)  For this reason, we further reject Dalton’s 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object. 
“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”  
(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364.)  A “defendant is 
entitled to the presumption of innocence until the contrary is 
found by the jury” (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 185 
(Booker)), and is “entitled to have his guilt or innocence 
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129 
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at 
trial” (Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 485).  “We have 
recognized the ‘difficulty and peril inherent’ ” in the “use of 
reasonable doubt analogies or diagrams in argument,” and have 
discouraged such “ ‘ “experiments” ’ ” by prosecutors.  (Centeno, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)   
Dalton 
contends 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct by (1) telling the jury Dalton’s presumption of 
innocence “is gone,” (2) urging the jury to convict Dalton based 
on a “reasonable” account of the evidence rather than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) using a chart that placed the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard below what he argued were 
four higher standards, and (4) trivializing the burden of proof 
and deliberative process by comparing them to someone lying in 
bed wondering if he had remembered to turn off the lights and 
lock the door.   
As to the first two challenged instances, we conclude there 
was no misconduct.  In telling the jury that Dalton’s 
presumption of innocence was gone, it appears that the 
prosecutor “simply argued the jury should return a verdict in his 
favor based on the state of the evidence presented.”  (Booker, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 185.)  Likewise, the prosecutor’s 
comments that “when we get to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that is enough,” that “[r]easonable doubt” was “[s]ubject to 
reason; not guesses, not hopes, not hunches, not attorneys’ 
arguments,” and that circumstantial evidence should be 
considered in its totality and reasonably interpreted, merely 
urged the jury to “reject impossible or unreasonable 
interpretations of the evidence,” which “is permissible.”  
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672.)   
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More troubling is the prosecutor’s “example” of a person in 
bed wondering if he forgot to turn off the lights and lock the door.  
Dalton asserts “the analogy equated proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt to everyday decision-making in a juror’s own life.”  (See 
People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 36 [“prosecutor’s 
argument that people apply a reasonable doubt standard ‘every 
day’ and that it is the same standard people customarily use in 
deciding whether to change lanes trivializes the reasonable 
doubt standard”].)  It appears from the record, however, that the 
prosecutor used this analogy as an example of the confidence the 
jury should feel in its ability to conscientiously consider the 
evidence to determine whether Dalton was guilty, not as a 
definition of reasonable doubt.  Such analogies are ill-advised 
because of their potential to confuse, if not mislead, the jury, 
which, unlike a reviewing court, cannot leisurely examine the 
prosecutor’s transcribed words.   
As to the prosecutor’s use of a chart, we observe that the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard is generally not susceptible 
to pictorial depiction on a chart or a diagram.  Although we have 
previously stopped short of “categorically disapproving the use 
of reasonable doubt . . . diagrams in argument” (Centeno, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 667), we caution that the use of such charts or 
diagrams to explain the standard presents a significant risk of 
confusing or misleading the jury and that it is better practice 
not to use such visuals. 
Nonetheless, any misconduct in the prosecutor’s use of the 
chart or the bedtime example here was not prejudicial.  It is 
“significant that defense counsel emphasized the court’s 
instructions on reasonable doubt numerous times during closing 
argument.”  (Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 132.)  Moreover, the 
trial court’s correct instructions defining reasonable doubt were 
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131 
read to the jury after the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, and so 
the prosecutor’s chart and example were not the “last 
explanation of reasonable doubt the jury heard.”  (People v. 
Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1154.)  “We presume that 
jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by 
a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an 
advocate in an attempt to persuade.”  (People v. Clair (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8.)  Indeed, the court’s instructions 
informed the jury that “[i]f anything concerning the law said by 
the attorneys in their arguments . . . conflicts with my 
instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions,” and 
that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are 
not evidence . . . .”  The court also gave the written instructions 
to “the jury to consult during deliberations.”  (Cortez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 131.)   
12. Instructional error 
a. Accomplice testimony  
Dalton contends the trial court erroneously failed to 
instruct the jury that Tompkins was an accomplice as a matter 
of law and that his testimony could not corroborate the 
testimony of another accomplice.  Tompkins did not testify, nor 
were his “out-of-court statements made under questioning by 
police or under other suspect circumstances.”  (People v. 
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 190; see People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245–246.)  “Hence no instruction under 
section 1111 was required.”  (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 
p. 529.)   
Dalton further contends that the trial court erroneously 
failed to instruct the jury that Baker’s testimony could not be 
corroborated by Tompkins’s statements because Tompkins was 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
132 
also an accomplice.  (See Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1222 
[testimony of one accomplice cannot corroborate that of another 
accomplice].)  Even assuming for the sake of argument that 
Tompkins had been an accomplice under section 1111, the 
purpose of the corroboration rule is to require evidence 
independent of the accomplice testimony that links the 
defendant to the crime.  (Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 32.)  Here, Tompkins’s statements merely recounted the 
circumstances of the crime.  They did not refer to Dalton and 
therefore did not link her to the crime, and hence could not have 
been relied on by the jury to corroborate Baker’s testimony that 
Dalton was involved.   
b. Motive  
Baker testified that on June 25, 1988, when she was 
helping May move, Dalton came by and angrily said much of the 
furniture in the apartment was hers and she was looking for 
some jewelry.  Dalton later found some of her jewelry in May’s 
purse, became angry, and made May perform certain household 
chores.  Dalton contends that the trial court erroneously failed 
to sua sponte instruct the jury that Dalton’s “oral statement of 
motive” before the murder should be viewed with caution.   
The trial court instructed the jury: “Motive is not an 
element of the crimes charged and need not be shown,” but “you 
may consider motive . . . as a circumstance in this case.  
Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt.  Absence of 
motive may tend to establish innocence.  You will therefore give 
its presen[ce] or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which 
you find it to be entitled.”  The court further instructed the jury:  
“An admission is a statement made by the defendant other than 
at her trial which does not by itself  acknowledge her guilt of the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
133 
crimes for which such defendant is on trial, but which statement 
tends to prove her guilt when considered with the rest of the 
evidence. . . .  Evidence of an oral admission of the defendant 
should be viewed with caution.”   
These instructions collectively conveyed to the jury the 
concept that Dalton’s oral statement of motive, which might 
tend to establish her guilt, should be viewed with caution.  
Moreover, the broad language “a statement made by the 
defendant other than at her trial” would include the time period 
before the offense.  (Italics added.)   
In a related claim, Dalton contends that the motive 
instruction allowed the jury to find her guilty of murder based 
solely on evidence of her motivation and thereby lessened the 
prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and 
shifted the burden of proof to Dalton to prove her innocence.  We 
previously have rejected similar claims and do so again here.  
(See People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1122–1124; 
People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 552–553, and cases 
cited (Nelson).)    
c. Consciousness of guilt 
Dalton contends the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury in the language of CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06, which 
respectively allow a jury to consider a defendant’s willfully false 
or deliberating misleading statements, and attempts to 
suppress evidence, as circumstances tending to show a 
consciousness of guilt.  We have repeatedly rejected claims 
similar to Dalton’s that these instructions improperly duplicate 
the circumstantial evidence instructions, are partisan and 
argumentative, or permit the jury to irrationally infer guilt.  
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
134 
(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 971 [CALJIC No. 2.03]; 
Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 52–53 [CALJIC No. 2.06].)   
Dalton notes, as did the defendant in Dement, that many 
of this court’s cases have cited the protective nature of the 
consciousness of guilt instructions.  (See Dement, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 53, fn. 27, citing People v. Jackson (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224 [the “cautionary nature of the 
instructions benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to 
circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be 
considered decisively inculpatory”].)  Dalton “asserts we 
abandoned this ‘rationale’ in People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
598, 673, when we held that error in not giving a consciousness 
of guilt instruction was harmless because the instruction ‘would 
have benefited the prosecution, not the defense.’  It is not, 
however, inconsistent to observe that an instruction that 
informs the jury it may consider certain evidence as tending to 
show a consciousness of guilt benefits the prosecution while at 
the same time noting that language in the instruction limiting 
that consideration protects the defendant.”  (Dement, at p. 53, 
fn. 27.)   
d. Bolstering credibility 
The trial court instructed the jury in the language of 
CALJIC No. 2.13:  “Evidence that on some former occasion a 
witness made a statement or statements that were inconsistent 
or consistent with his or her testimony in this trial, may be 
considered by you not only for the purpose of testing the 
credibility of the witness, but also as evidence of the truth of the 
facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion.  If you 
disbelieve a witness’[s] testimony that he or she no longer 
remembers a certain event, such testimony is inconsistent with 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
135 
a prior statement or statements by him or her describing that 
event.”  Dalton contends this instruction impermissibly 
bolstered Baker’s credibility by:  (1) “telling the jurors only that 
they could consider those prior inconsistent statements for their 
‘truth,’ but not telling them that they could also consider those 
statements for their ‘falsity’ ”; and (2) “telling the jurors to 
consider the prior statements as evidence of the truth of ‘the 
facts’ as stated by the witness on those former occasions, by 
definition it strongly implied to them that the prior statements 
were factual.”  We have previously rejected a substantially 
similar claim, and Dalton cites no persuasive reason to revisit 
our conclusion.  (See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 20–
21.)   
e. Reasonable doubt 
Dalton contends the trial court’s instructions in the 
language of CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 
2.27, 2.51, 2.90, 8.20, 8.83, and 8.83.1 undermined and diluted 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Dalton 
advances no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior rejection 
of substantially similar challenges to these instructions, and we 
decline to do so.  (See Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 43; see People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 572−574; 
Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th 698, 723–725 [rejecting challenge to 
CALJIC No. 8.83]; Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 553–554 
[rejecting challenge to CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83 and 8.83.1]; 
Casares, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 831 [CALJIC No. 2.01 did not 
“create an impermissible mandatory presumption by requiring 
the jury to draw an incriminatory inference whenever such an 
inference appeared ‘reasonable’ unless the defense rebutted it 
by producing a reasonable exculpatory interpretation”]; Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 437 [rejecting 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
136 
challenge to CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.21.2, 2.22, 
2.27, 2.51, 2.90, and 8.20]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 
129 [CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 8.83 and 8.83.1 did not inform jury it 
could find the defendant guilty if he “ ‘reasonably appeared’ ” to 
be guilty].)  Moreover, as Dalton acknowledges, she requested 
the trial court use the version of CALJIC No. 2.90 that contained 
the language “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” that she 
now challenges rather than the revised version.   
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Crawford’s testimony  
Dalton contends that the trial court erroneously admitted 
Dawn Crawford’s testimony regarding Dalton’s description of 
May’s murder.  (See ante, p. 36.)  We disagree.   
Crawford testified that she heard Dalton say she had 
participated in a murder.  Dalton referred to the victim as “the 
bitch” and said she had owed Dalton $80.  The victim was tied 
and injected with battery acid.  Dalton said that “hearing her 
scream was the greatest high that she has ever experienced.”  
The victim was stabbed in the head and “cut up and mutilated.”  
Dalton mentioned an Indian reservation.  Dalton also 
mentioned a woman named “John-Boy” and said “John-Boy 
better keep quiet.”  During the conversation, Dalton was 
“laughing . . . like it was no big deal.”   
Dalton contends the testimony was improper evidence of 
her lack of remorse.  Although a prosecutor may not argue lack 
of remorse as an aggravating factor, Dalton cites no basis for 
excluding evidence of a defendant’s statements regarding the 
capital offense that may indicate a lack of remorse.  Rather, 
Dalton’s statement that “hearing [May] scream was the greatest 
high that she has ever experienced” was an admission and was 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
137 
properly admitted as a circumstance of the crime.  (§ 190.3, 
factor (a); People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 77–78 [the 
detective’s question related to the defendant’s emotions during 
the burglary, and the “defendant’s answer tended to show his 
attitude at that time”].)  Contrary to Dalton’s assertion, the 
circumstance that she made this statement six years after the 
crime does not render it unreliable or inadmissible.   
Dalton further contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not excluding Crawford’s testimony under 
Evidence Code section 352.  Contrary to her assertion, the 
evidence was not unduly prejudicial merely because it was 
“devastating” to Dalton’s case.  Nor, contrary to Dalton’s 
assertion, was the evidence collateral, confusing, or unduly 
time-consuming simply because Dalton chose to call numerous 
witnesses to rebut it.   
2. Spitting  
Dalton contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
rebuttal evidence Dalton spat in the direction of then 
codefendant Tompkins during a pretrial hearing.  (See ante, 
p. 46.)  Even assuming admission of this evidence was 
erroneous, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility the 
penalty verdict would have been different absent this evidence.  
The behavior was incidental in comparison to the capital crimes 
and other evidence of Dalton’s unadjudicated criminal activity.   
3. Asserted instructional error  
Dalton contends the trial court erroneously refused to give 
requested defense instructions.  We have previously rejected 
substantially similar claims and do so again here.   
Dalton’s first requested instruction provided:  “Life 
without the possibility of parole and death mean just that.  You 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
138 
must assume, for purposes of determining the penalty, that 
either sentence will be carried out.  If you sentence Ms. Dalton 
to life without the possibility of parole, she will spend the 
balance of her [natural] life in prison with no possibility of 
parole.”  There was no error.   (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 99, 206 [disapproving of instructing a penalty phase 
jury to “ ‘assume’ or ‘presume’ that the sentence will be carried 
out”].)   
Dalton also requested instructions on mitigation and the 
role of mercy and sympathy that provided:  (1) “The mitigating 
circumstances which I have read for your consideration are 
given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you 
may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a 
death sentence upon Kerry Lyn Dalton.  You should not limit 
your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific 
factors.  You may also consider any other circumstance 
presented as reasons for not imposing the death sentence.”  
(2) “The mitigating circumstances that I have read for your 
consideration are given merely as examples of some of the 
factors that a juror may take[] into account as reasons for 
deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case.  A juror 
should pay careful attention to each of those factors.  Any one of 
them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision 
that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case.  But 
a juror should not limit his or her consideration of mitigating 
circumstances to specific factors.  [¶]  A juror may also consider 
any other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant 
as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death 
penalty.  [¶]  A mitigating circumstance does not have to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  A juror may find that a 
mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
139 
support it no matter how weak the evidence is.  [¶]  Any 
mitigating circumstance may outweigh all the aggravating 
factors.  [¶]  A juror is permitted to use mercy, sympathy and/or 
sentiment in deciding what weight to give each mitigating 
factor.”  (3) “In determining the appropriate penalty for Kerry 
Lyn Dalton, you may consider as a circumstance in mitigation 
her potential for rehabilitation and leading a useful and 
meaningful life while incarcerated.”  (4) “You may recommend a 
life sentence without finding the existence of an alleged 
statutory mitigating circumstance and even should you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an alleged statutory 
aggravating circumstance.  In other words, you may, in your 
good judgment, recommend a life sentence for any reason at all 
that you see fit to consider.”  Dalton’s alternative requested 
instruction provided:  “However, it is not essential to a decision 
to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole that you find mitigating circumstances.  You may spare 
the life of Kerry Lyn Dalton for any reason you deem 
appropriate and satisfactory.”  (5) “In determining whether to 
sentence Kerry Lyn Dalton to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole or to death, you may decide to exercise 
mercy on behalf of Ms. Dalton.”  (6) “If the mitigating evidence 
gives rise to compassion or sympathy for the defendant, the jury 
may, based upon such sympathy or compassion alone, reject 
death as a penalty.”   
We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing these 
requested instructions.  The United States Supreme Court has 
held a trial court is not required to instruct the jury that 
mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 633, 
642] [“our case law does not require capital sentencing courts ‘to 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
140 
affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances 
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”]; accord, 
Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 862.)  
The remaining portions of the requested instructions were 
cumulative to instructions given.  The trial court instructed the 
jury it could consider “[a]ny other circumstance which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime[,] even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime[,] and any sympathetic or other 
aspect[] of the defendant’s character or record that the 
defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, 
whether or not related to the offense[] for which she is on trial.”  
The court defined a “mitigating circumstance” as “any fact, 
condition or event which . . . does not constitute a justification 
or excuse for the crime in question[,] but may be considered as 
an 
extenuating 
circumstance 
in 
determining 
the 
appropriateness of the death penalty,” and explained, “[y]ou are 
free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value that you 
deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors that you 
are permitted to consider.”   
4. Constitutionality of the death penalty statute  
Dalton contends California’s death penalty statute and 
implementing instructions are constitutionally invalid in 
numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, 
and Dalton provides no persuasive reason to revisit our 
decisions.   
“[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 813.)  We further “reject the claim that section 190.3, 
factor (a), on its face or as interpreted and applied, permits 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
141 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death.”  
(Ibid.; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975–976, 
978.)   
“The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to 
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing . . . or constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment on the ground that it does not require 
either unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances 
or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) 
evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)  
Nothing in Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 616], 
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
affects our conclusions in this regard.  (Rangel, at p. 1235, 
fn. 16.)   
“No burden of proof is constitutionally required, nor is the 
trial court required to instruct the jury that there is no burden 
of proof.  [Citations.]”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 55.)  The 
trial court need not instruct that there is a presumption of life, 
that if the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors 
the jury should impose a sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole, or that a jury need not be unanimous in 
finding the existence of a mitigating factor.  (People v. Williams 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1204; People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
541, 581; People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1139–1140.)  
The trial court was not required to delete inapplicable factors 
from CALJIC No. 8.85 (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 
701), or “instruct that the jury can consider certain statutory 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
142 
factors only in mitigation.”  (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
268, 311.)  “Written findings by the jury during the penalty 
phase are not constitutionally required, and their absence does 
not deprive defendant of meaningful appellate review.”  
(People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.)   
The 
jury 
may 
properly 
consider 
a 
defendant’s 
unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People v. Martinez (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 911, 968.)  The language “so substantial” and 
“warrants” in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly vague.  
(Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 56.)  “Use of the 
adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in section 190.3, factors (d) 
and (g) is constitutional.”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 57.)   
“The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment 
[citations], do not require intercase proportionality review on 
appeal.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.)  “Moreover, 
‘capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated 
and therefore may be treated differently without violating’ a 
defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws, due process of 
law, or freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.”  (People 
v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 971.)  “ ‘The death penalty as 
applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through 
operation of international laws and treaties.’ ”  (People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373.)   
5. Cumulative prejudice  
Dalton contends the cumulative effect of guilt and penalty 
phase errors requires us to reverse the judgment.  Having 
concluded no substantial evidence supports the lying in wait 
special-circumstance true finding, we vacate that finding.  We 
have also concluded that the trial court erred in imposing the 
PEOPLE v. DALTON  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
143 
death penalty for Dalton’s conviction of conspiracy to commit 
murder.  We have assumed error in the trial court’s preclusion 
of impeachment of McNeely with the facts underlying his felony 
convictions, and of Fedor with her pending charges, in the 
admission of evidence of blood in Fedor’s former trailer and of 
Dalton spitting in the direction of Tompkins, in certain aspects 
of the prosecutor’s guilt phase closing argument, and in the trial 
court’s failure to instruct on its own motion that Baker’s guilty 
plea could only be used to assess her credibility.  These errors 
and assumed errors, whether considered individually or 
cumulatively, do not require reversal of Dalton’s murder or 
conspiracy convictions, nor do they require us to vacate the 
personal use of a deadly weapon true finding. 
  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we vacate as unauthorized the 
death sentence imposed (and stayed) on the conspiracy to 
commit murder count (Count I).  We further vacate the lying in 
wait special-circumstance true finding.  We remand to the trial 
court, and direct the court to state on an amended abstract of 
judgment a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years to life, stayed 
pursuant to section 654, on the conspiracy count (Count I), and 
to strike the lying in wait special-circumstance true finding.  We 
affirm the judgment, as modified, in all other respects.  
LIU, J. 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dalton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S046848 
Date Filed: May 16, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Michael D. Wellington and Thomas J. Whelan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, Denise Anton and Jolie Lipsig, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly Wilkens, Pat Zaharopoulos and Christen 
Somerville, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jolie Lipsig 
Deputy State Public Defender 
770 L Street, Suite 1000 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Christen Somerville 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3856