Title: Relsolelo v. Fisk

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90623-Agenda 23-September 2001.
MURISOL VELOZ RELSOLELO, Special Adm'r of the Estate of 
Jose Humberto Arellano, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. JOHN 								FISK, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 21, 2001.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether article
I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§10) provides a privilege against self-incrimination based upon a
person's fear of criminal prosecution by a foreign sovereign.
Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of Venezuelan nationals or
residents against defendant John Fisk (the sole defendant in the
instant case), AT&T Corporation, AT&T subsidiaries and
employees, and other American corporations, seeking recovery for
personal injuries and wrongful deaths caused by a natural gas
pipeline explosion in Venezuela. Following a motion to compel
discovery, defendant refused to answer numerous questions,
asserting his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
V). Defendant contended that his answers could subject him to
criminal prosecution in Venezuela.
	The circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion to compel. While
the court found that defendant harbored a reasonable fear that his
testimony could be used against him and that he could be
extradited to Venezuela, the court further found that United States
v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 141 L. Ed. 2d 575, 118 S. Ct. 2218
(1998), foreclosed defendant's reliance on the fifth amendment
and article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate
court reversed, finding that the privilege against self-incrimination
provided by article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution is
broader than that of its federal counterpart and protected
defendant, who feared his testimony would be used in a
prosecution by another sovereign. 317 Ill. App. 3d 798, 804.
	We granted plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315. On appeal to this court, plaintiffs primarily argue that (1)
the circuit court erred in finding that defendant was subject to
extradition to Venezuela; and (2) the lower courts' decisions are
unclear as to whether defendant can be compelled to testify about
third parties and their conduct. Plaintiffs fail to raise the issue of
whether the appellate court properly reversed the trial court by
interpreting the scope of the Illinois Constitution's privilege
against self-incrimination to extend to fear of foreign prosecutions.
The issue was, however, adequately briefed below. We therefore
consider it (see People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Board
of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 523 (1990) (we may consider issues
of constitutional magnitude sua sponte) and hold that defendant
cannot invoke the article I, section 10, privilege against self-incrimination based on a fear of prosecution in a foreign
jurisdiction. As a result, we need not reach the remaining issues.

BACKGROUND 
	Plaintiffs allege that, in September 1993, defendant worked
as a project manager for a company that was overseeing the
installation of an underground fiber-optic telephone cable in
Venezuela. While the project was underway, a rotoexcavator
operated by a subcontractor came into contact with a natural gas
pipeline near a Venezuelan highway. Plaintiffs seek recovery for
the multiple injuries and deaths caused by the resulting explosion.
	After the incident, Venezuelan authorities filed criminal
charges against defendant for incendio in forma culposa(1) and
issued a warrant for his arrest. Likewise, a Venezuelan citizen
filed criminal charges against defendant, also for the offense of
incendio in forma culposa.(2) Defendant has since returned to the
United States and has not answered the criminal charges.
	Numerous civil lawsuits also ensued, including the one sub
judice. In the instant case, plaintiffs pursued discovery through
interrogatories and a deposition. Throughout the discovery
process, defendant refused to answer most of the interrogatories
and questions posed during deposition, expressly relying upon his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically,
defendant refused to answer questions relating to his job title,
duties, and involvement in the project. Plaintiffs filed a motion to
compel. In opposition, defendant contended that his testimony
could be used against him in conjunction with the criminal charges
pending in Venezuela, that he was charged with an extraditable
offense, and that he had a reasonable fear of self-incrimination if
he testified.
	The trial court originally agreed with defendant, finding that
he had a reasonable fear of prosecution and extradition, and that
the questions posed to him fell within the parameters of the
privilege. While holding that defendant could assert the privilege,
the trial court did not cite its basis for believing defendant
possessed a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution. Plaintiffs later
sought reconsideration of the trial court's ruling based upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Balsys. In Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 700, 141 L. Ed 2d at 601, 118 S. Ct.  at 2236, the Supreme
Court held that a witness cannot assert his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination out of fear of foreign prosecution.
Defendant countered that the privilege could nevertheless be
exercised through article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution.
The trial court rejected defendant's argument and granted the
motion to compel, finding that, there being no case law directly on
point in Illinois, the rationale in Balsys should control. Defendant
made known to the trial court his plan to continue to assert the
privilege. In order to expedite the appeal (see 155 Ill. 2d R.
304(b)(5)), the circuit court entered an order holding him in
contempt and fining him $10.
	The appellate court reversed, finding that article I, section 10,
of the Illinois Constitution provides an independent source for the
privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that Illinois
does not always interpret article I, section 10, in "lockstep" with
its federal analogue. In fact, the court observed, in appropriate
circumstances, the Illinois Constitution's guarantees may be
interpreted more broadly than those in the federal constitution. See
People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994) (rendering a more
expansive reading of article 1, section 10, right to counsel than the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment right to
counsel as articulated in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (holding that police do not
have to inform a criminal defendant that an attorney is waiting to
speak to them in order to obtain a valid waiver of fifth amendment
rights)); but see People v. Perry, 147 Ill. 2d 430 (1992)
(interpreting article I, section 10, lockstep with the fifth
amendment interpretation in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991) (holding that request
and appointment of counsel for a defendant under the sixth
amendment did not constitute request of counsel for fifth
amendment purposes when the police chose to interrogate a
defendant on uncharged offenses)). After considering the policies
underlying this state's privilege against self-incrimination, the
appellate court determined that the protections of article I, section
10, extend to defendants having a reasonable apprehension of
foreign prosecution. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 804. We now reverse.

ANALYSIS
	In finding there was no privilege against self-incrimination in
regard to a foreign prosecution embodied in article I, section 10,
the trial court expressly relied on, and the appellate court expressly
rejected, Balsys. In particular, the trial court stated:
			"Concerning United States versus Balsys ***
			In my opinion it is unequivocal that the fear of foreign
prosecution does not form a basis to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
			***
			*** The case law is clear *** that the Illinois Supreme
Court is not bound by [the] federal interpretation of self-incrimination issues.
			Defendant Fisk has not provided this Court with any
case law which supports [his] interpretation of the Illinois
Constitution as protecting a person from testifying while
[he is] in fear of foreign prosecution."
	In Balsys, the respondent, Aloyzas Balsys, was a resident alien
who was deposed in a deportation proceeding instituted by the
office of special investigations of the Department of Justice's
criminal division, a unit having special responsibility for matters
relating to suspected Nazi war criminals. Balsys asserted his
federal fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
asked to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and
1944 and his immigration to the United States. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at
670, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 583, 118 S. Ct.  at 2221. His invocation of
the privilege was premised upon a fear of prosecution by such
foreign nations as Lithuania, Israel, and Germany. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 670, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 583, 118 S. Ct.  at 2221. The Supreme
Court held that the respondent's fear of foreign prosecution was
beyond the scope of the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 700, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 601, 118 S. Ct.  at
2236.
	The Court reasoned that the privilege, like all of the other
guarantees embodied within the fifth amendment such as grand
jury proceedings, defense against double jeopardy, due process,
and compensation for property taking, is only implicated by action
of the government that it binds. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 673, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 585, 118 S. Ct.  at 2223. Thus, according to the Court, the
privilege may be asserted when the defendant reasonably fears
"prosecution by the government whose power the Clause limits,
but not otherwise." Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 673-74, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at
585-86, 118 S. Ct.  at 2223. The Court further relied on the fact
that a grant of full immunity by the government compelling the
witness to testify is equivalent to the protection furnished by the
privilege. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 677, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 587, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2225. As a result, the sovereign seeking the testimony has the
choice to exchange the witness' privilege against self-incrimination for immunity from prosecutorial use of such
compelled inculpatory testimony. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 682, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 590, 118 S. Ct.  at 2227. In other words, the restraints
imposed by the fifth amendment do not furnish personal
testimonial inviolability, but rather a conditional protection of
testimonial privacy, subject to the immunity doctrine. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 692-93, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 597, 118 S. Ct.  at 2232. The
policies and purposes behind the privilege would therefore be
frustrated if the privilege were extended to fear of foreign
prosecutions, concluded the Court, because domestic courts are
unable to enforce grants of immunity abroad. Balsys, 524 U.S.  at
693, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 597, 118 S. Ct.  at 2232.
	We acknowledge, as did the trial court and the appellate court
in this matter, that we are not bound to interpret our own
constitutional provisions lockstep with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal constitution. People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 217 (1995). Indeed, we have often stated that this court
may interpret provisions of our state constitution to provide
broader protections than their federal constitutional counterparts.
See McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 426; In re May 1991 Will County
Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1992); People v. Perry, 147 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (1992); People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 243 (1984).
We have, however, crafted certain limitations that define the
exercise of this right. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d  at 217. Most
importantly, we have often stated that " '[w]e must find in the
language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee
reports of the constitutional convention, something which will
indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be
construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal
constitution.' " Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d  at 217, quoting Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d  at 245; see, e.g., People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994)
(rendering a more expansive reading of article I, section 10, right
to counsel than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth
amendment right to counsel as articulated in Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986)); Tisler,
103 Ill. 2d  at 245 (finding no basis to implement a broader
construction of our search and seizure provision than that used by
the federal judiciary to interpret the fourth amendment).
	In this case there is absolutely no indication in either the
Record of Proceedings or the Committee on the Bill of Rights of
the Constitutional Convention that the drafters intended the
Illinois privilege to differ from the federal counterpart as regarding
fear of foreign prosecution. See 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention 1376-80, 1390; 6 Record of
Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 43-44. Nor
is there any evidence in the language of article I, section 10, that
points to an intention to construe that provision differently than the
federal judiciary interprets the fifth amendment in this context.
The language of the provisions is virtually identical. Compare Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §10 ("No person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to give evidence against himself"), with U.S. Const.,
amend. V ("No person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself"). Thus, the substantial grounds
necessary for this court to depart from the federal interpretation of
the self-incrimination clause are not present in this case. See
Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d  at 219; Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d  at 245.
	Such grounds were, however, present in McCauley where the
article I, section 10, right to counsel was considered by this court.
The McCauley defendant was brought to the police station for
questioning in connection with a murder. He was advised of his
Miranda rights and did not request an attorney. Unbeknownst to
the defendant, however, his family had retained an attorney for
him. The defendant's attorney phoned the police station and
ultimately went there, requesting to speak with the defendant. The
police officers refused the attorney access to the defendant and
also failed to inform the defendant that his attorney was present at
the station and seeking to consult with him. The defendant
subsequently gave an inculpatory statement to the police in
response to their questioning. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the statement. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 418-20.
	We affirmed the suppression of the defendant's statement on
the ground that the conduct of the police violated the defendant's
rights under the Illinois Constitution. In so doing, we declined to
adopt the United States Supreme Court decision in Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
In Burbine, the court rejected the contention that police conduct,
such as that at issue in McCauley, violated a defendant's right to
counsel under the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Burbine, 475 U.S.  at 423, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 422, 106 S. Ct.  at 1142. Nevertheless, this court in McCauley held that such
conduct violated the defendant's right to counsel under article I,
section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. We thus concluded
that the right to counsel under the Illinois Constitution should be
construed more broadly than its federal counterpart was construed
in Burbine. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 423-24.
	While construing the right to counsel under article I, section
10, in McCauley, this court indicated that the status of that fifth
amendment right was changed dramatically by the Supreme
Court's decision in Burbine. In particular reference to the Burbine
decision, we stated:
			"The day is long past in Illinois *** where attorneys
must shout legal advice to their clients, held in custody,
through the jailhouse door. *** The incommunicado
interrogation and surrounding coercive environment likely
to result from [the] objectionable practice [of preventing
a custodial suspect from speaking to his attorney who is
immediately available] is exactly the sort of scenario
previously condemned by the United States Supreme
Court in Escobedo and Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona
(1966), 384 U.S. 436, 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 714, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1619 ('[t]his atmosphere carries its own badge
of intimidation'); Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 487, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 984, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 ('it
"would be highly incongruous if our system of justice
permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the
State, to extract a confession from the accused while his
own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from
him by the police" ')." McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 423-24.
	This court specifically noted that the 1970 Illinois
Constitutional Convention debates indicated that the delegates
intended that article I, section 10, incorporate then existing federal
constitutional principles regarding incommunicado interrogation
as represented by the Escobedo and Miranda decisions. McCauley,
163 Ill. 2d  at 439-40. We also noted that a member of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who had argued Escobedo before
the Supreme Court, assured the convention at large that the
committee had decided that " 'the existing state of the law would
remain unchanged.' "(Emphasis added.) McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at
440, quoting 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention 1377. In other words, the McCauley decision
represents this court's refusal to allow this state's counterpart to
the fifth amendment right to counsel to diminish the way the
federal right had in Burbine. Rather than join the divergence
regarding incommunicado interrogation undertaken by the federal
judiciary in Burbine, this court decided in McCauley to stay true
to the path begun in Miranda and Escobedo.
	The case at hand provides no such substantial grounds for
departing from the federal interpretation of the self-incrimination
privilege. In this way, the instant case is more similar to People v.
Perry, 147 Ill. 2d 430 (1992). In Perry, we had another occasion
to decide whether to interpret article I, section 10, lockstep with its
federal counterpart.
	The Perry defendant requested an attorney while being
arraigned on a murder charge and the circuit court appointed a
public defender. The police, however, obtained a "hold order" to
keep the defendant in jail for an additional day. The following day
the officers interrogated the defendant and he gave an inculpatory
statement. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the
statement and the defendant was later convicted of murder. He
appealed, arguing that the police violated his fifth amendment
right to counsel and the appellate court reversed. People v. Perry,
205 Ill. App. 3d 655 (1990). Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). In McNeil,
the Court held that a defendant's invocation of his sixth
amendment right to counsel in a judicial proceeding did not
constitute invocation of his fifth amendment right to counsel under
Miranda as to uncharged offenses. McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 175-76,
115 L. Ed. 2d  at 166-67, 111 S. Ct.  at 2207-08.
	The State appealed the appellate court's decision in Perry to
this court, arguing that, in light of McNeil, the appellate court's
decision was flawed. We agreed. However, defendant countered
that his confession was void under article I, section 10, of the
Illinois Constitution. We disagreed and stated in pertinent part as
follows:
		"In appropriate cases, this court certainly has the right and
the obligation to interpret our State Constitution more
liberally than similar provisions of the Federal
Constitution. In this case, however, we find that the
Supreme Court's analysis and conclusion in McNeil
adequately safeguard the competing objectives of
effective law enforcement and an individual's privilege
against self-incrimination confronting us. Consequently,
for the reasons set forth in McNeil v. Wisconsin, we find
that defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was
not violated under either the United States Constitution or
the State of Illinois Constitution." Perry, 147 Ill. 2d  at
436.
Thus, we found no grounds to depart from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a defendant's invocation of his fifth amendment
right to counsel. Likewise, we are without a basis to stand apart
from Balsys with regard to the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in relation to fear of foreign prosecution.
	Defendant, nevertheless maintained below that this court's
decisions in People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586 (1924), People v.
Rockola, 346 Ill. 27 (1931), and People v. Burkert, 7 Ill. 2d 506
(1955), run counter to the rationale behind the Balsys decision.
Specifically, according to defendant, Balsys represents a rebirth of
the "same sovereign" principle used in self-incrimination cases
that was rejected by this court in the Boyle-Rockola-Burkert line
of cases. Defendant's argument misses the mark for at least two
reasons.
	First, the same sovereign doctrine with respect to fear of
prosecution by a foreign government has never been specifically
addressed by this court and was addressed for the first time by the
Supreme Court in Balsys. See Balsys, 524 U.S.  at 670, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 582, 118 S. Ct.  at 2221-22 (noting the court had granted
certiorari in cases raising this question twice before but did not
reach the merits of the question in either case). Thus, the question
presents a unique factual situation of constitutional magnitude not
previously addressed by this court or the United States Supreme
Court.
	Second, of the three cases cited by defendant, only Burkert
involved the issue of whether fear of prosecution by another
sovereign could be the basis to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in Illinois. Boyle involved the propriety of a court
order requiring the defendant in that case to answer questions
outside the scope of the immunity order he had been granted.
Boyle, 312 Ill.  at 604-05. Likewise, Rockola simply dealt with the
sufficiency of the immunity order granted to the defendant.
Rockola, 346 Ill.  at 39-40. In Burkert, on the other hand, we
specifically held that a defendant could invoke a statutory privilege
against self-incrimination found in the Illinois Witness Immunity
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 38, par. 580a) because answers to
questions posed to him might incriminate him under federal law.
This was so because the statute in question specifically provided
that the court could not compel a witness to testify or give
evidence if it reasonably appeared "that such testimony or
evidence *** would subject such witness to an indictment,
information or prosecution *** under the laws of another State or
of the United States." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch.
38, par. 580a. Hence, the only Illinois case cited by defendants to
have directly addressed the "same sovereign" principle was
decided upon a statutory basis that specifically provided that fear
of prosecution by another state or the federal government was
sufficient to raise the privilege.

CONCLUSION
	For the above-stated reasons, we hold that article I, section 10,
of the Illinois Constitution does not provide a person with a
privilege against self-incrimination in regard to a potential
criminal prosecution by a foreign sovereign. The judgment of the
appellate court is therefore reversed and the judgment of circuit
court of Cook County is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 
1.      1According to the record, under Venezuelan law, incendio en forma
culposa is the rough equivalent of negligent arson. Incendio en forma
culposa is codified in article 357 of the Venezuelan Criminal Code.
Article 357 provides as follows:
		"He who, by acting imprudently or with negligence, or with
inexperience in his trade, or through failure to observe
regulations or orders, has caused any fire, explosion, flood, or
shipwreck, or caused a dangerous situation or disaster, shall be
punished with a prison term of three to fifteen months. In
addition, if these acts endanger lives, the prison term shall be
between three and thirty months, and if it results in death, the
prison term shall be between one and ten years."

2.      2Evidence in the record indicates that Venezuela allows private
citizens to initiate criminal proceedings.