Title: Hlatky v. Steward Health Care System, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12688 
 
LYNN HLATKY vs. STEWARD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, LLC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 9, 2019. - April 28, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Performance and breach, Implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, Damages.  Damages, Breach of contract, 
Remittitur, Interest.  Interest.  Judgment, Interest.  
Practice, Civil, Interest. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 7, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Karen F. Green, J., and motions 
to amend the judgment, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
and for a new trial were heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kevin P. Martin (Brian T. Burgess, of the District of 
Columbia, also present) for the defendant. 
 
Joseph L. Bierwirth (M. Patrick Moore, Jr., also present) 
for the plaintiff. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Law 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BY THE COURT.  After a trial that was bifurcated on the 
issues of liability and damages, a jury in the Superior Court 
found that the defendant, Steward Health Care System, LLC 
(Steward), committed a breach of the express terms of its 
contract with the plaintiff, Lynn Hlatky, as well as the 
contract's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, when 
Steward withdrew its support for Hlatky's cancer research 
laboratory, causing the laboratory to close its operations.  The 
jury awarded Hlatky in excess of $22 million in damages for the 
breach.  The trial judge denied Steward's motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, to amend the 
judgment.  However, the judge conditionally ordered a new trial 
unless Hlatky agreed to remit all but $10.2 million of the 
damages awarded; this figure represented $200,000 incurred by 
Hlatky in out-of-pocket mitigation costs and $10 million that 
she testified was necessary to reestablish her laboratory.  
Hlatky accepted the remittitur while reserving her right to 
appeal. 
 
Both sides appealed.  Steward makes three principal claims.  
First, it argues that the judge erred as a matter of law in 
allowing Hlatky to recover damages for the cost of 
reestablishing her laboratory, where she did not personally own 
any of the laboratory's equipment or have any ownership interest 
in the Federal grants that the laboratory received to fund its 
3 
 
operations.  Second, Steward argues that, even if Hlatky could 
be awarded damages for the cost of reestablishing a laboratory, 
the judge abused her discretion in awarding Hlatky $10.2 million 
on remittitur because, in the absence of expert testimony or 
other competent evidence as to the cost of reestablishing the 
laboratory, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
support any award other than the out-of-pocket mitigation costs 
incurred by Hlatky in the amount of $200,000.  Third, Steward 
claims that the judge erred in granting prejudgment interest 
from the date of the breach rather than the date that Hlatky 
filed her complaint.  In her cross appeal, Hlatky argues that 
the judge abused her discretion in conditionally ordering a new 
trial and remitting the award of damages to $10.2 million. 
 
Six Justices participated in this appeal.1  The Justices 
unanimously agree that the trial evidence supported the finding 
that Steward, by withdrawing its promised support for the 
research laboratory, committed a breach of both the express 
terms of the contract and the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; that, in the unique circumstances of this case, 
the cost of reestablishing a cancer research laboratory was a 
permissible element of the damages, as it would restore Hlatky 
to the position in which she would have been had Steward 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the New England Law 
Foundation. 
4 
 
complied with its contractual obligations; that the judge did 
not abuse her discretion in conditionally ordering a new trial 
and a remittitur of all but $10.2 million of the award of 
damages; and that prejudgment interest should run on the award 
of damages from February 7, 2014, the date Hlatky commenced this 
action by filing her complaint.  As to these aspects of the 
appeal, all Justices agree with the reasoning set forth in parts 
1.a, 2, 3, and 4 of Chief Justice Gants's opinion, post. 
 
The Justices are equally divided, however, as to one aspect 
of the award of damages.  Three Justices -- Chief Justice Gants, 
joined by Justices Gaziano and Lowy -- are of the view that the 
amount of damages attributable to the cost of reestablishing 
Hlatky's laboratory ($10 million) should not go to Hlatky 
outright, but rather should be subject to a restriction that 
would ensure that this portion of the award (plus the 
prejudgment interest attributed to it) would be devoted solely 
to reestablishing a functioning cancer laboratory or supporting 
comparable cancer research, and would not be used by Hlatky for 
other purposes.  Post at    -    .  Three other Justices -- 
Justice Lenk, joined by Justices Budd and Cypher -- would impose 
no such restriction, for the reasons set forth in Justice Lenk's 
concurring opinion, post at    -    .  Because the court is 
equally divided on this point, the award of damages (after the 
remittitur) shall stand without any restriction. 
5 
 
 
Therefore, by a unanimous court, the judgment on liability 
is affirmed.  The judge's order denying Steward's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, to 
amend the judgment, and her order conditionally granting a new 
trial unless Hlatky remitted all but $10.2 million of the award 
of damages, are also affirmed by a unanimous court.  By an 
equally divided court, the award of damages outright to Hlatky 
without restriction is also affirmed.  Finally, the judge's 
order concerning prejudgment interest is vacated, and, in its 
place, an order shall enter stating that the prejudgment 
interest runs from the date of the commencement of this action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
with whom Gaziano and Lowy, JJ., join).  As explained in the 
foregoing opinion, I am joined by all of my colleagues on the 
quorum with respect to parts 1.a, 2, 3, and 4 of the 
"Discussion" section below.  With respect to part 1.b, however, 
I write only for myself and for Justices Gaziano and Lowy. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  The facts that the jury reasonably 
could have found from the evidence are as follows. 
 
Lynn Hlatky is a cancer researcher who received her Ph.D. 
in physics and biophysics from the University of California-
Berkeley (Berkeley) in 1985.  While at Berkeley, Hlatky was 
awarded her first research grant from the National Cancer 
Institute to develop what she characterized as a "model for 
cancer" using physics.  Her model became the standard in the 
field and helped her achieve professional prominence. 
 
Thereafter, Harvard Medical School (Harvard) recruited 
Hlatky, and in 1989 she joined the radiation and oncology 
department as a faculty member.  At Harvard, Hlatky established 
her first research laboratory, in part using equipment she 
brought with her from Berkeley.  Hlatky worked at Harvard for 
sixteen years, conducting "wet lab" or benchtop research, with a 
focus on combining the fields of mathematics and cancer biology 
to improve cancer treatment modeling.  In 2004, Hlatky applied 
for and received a $10 million research grant from the National 
2 
 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and served as the 
principal investigator for the grant.1 
 
In the world of Federal grant funding for scientific 
research projects, grants are typically awarded based on an 
evaluation of the ability of the principal investigator, the 
quality of the science, and the institutional support for the 
project.  The principal investigator is the person responsible 
for the research, and essentially runs the laboratory, but the 
grant is awarded to and administered by the nonprofit 
organization or institution, which receives and disburses the 
grant funds and serves as the project administrator.  Usually, a 
research administrator at the nonprofit institution is 
responsible for helping the principal investigator apply for 
grants and ensures that all funds are used in accordance with 
applicable law and grant requirements. 
 
When a laboratory purchases equipment for a research 
project, the institution incurs the expense and then seeks 
                                                          
 
 
1 Federal grants fund both the direct and indirect costs 
associated with a research program.  Direct costs are project-
specific costs that are approved by the granting agency and go 
directly to the proposed research, such as the costs of project 
equipment, and payroll for the research team.  Indirect costs 
are the costs for the institution to provide support not 
directly related to the science, such as facility and 
administrative costs.  In grant administration parlance, when 
one speaks about the amount of an award -- say, $10 million -- 
it refers to the direct cost of the research, not the additional 
funding an institution receives for indirect costs. 
3 
 
reimbursement by the Federal grantor from awarded grant funds.  
If a principal investigator wishes to move her research and 
grant funding from one institution to another, the current 
institution could relinquish the remainder of the grant, and the 
next institution would apply to take over its administration.  
The principal investigator might also request to take the 
equipment that was purchased with Federal grant funds to her new 
laboratory.  When there is a dispute between the investigator 
and the institution regarding the transfer of grant funding or 
of laboratory equipment, the Federal grantor decides whether the 
funding and equipment follow the principal investigator. 
 
In 2005, after Hlatky secured the research grant from NASA, 
she moved her laboratory to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, which was 
part of the Caritas Christi Hospital system (Caritas).  Hlatky 
brought with her to Caritas not only the NASA grant, but also 
her team members, equipment, reagents, and, most importantly, 
cell samples generated through her research.  The cell samples 
were stored in small vials, tens of thousands of which were 
placed inside large, specialized freezers containing liquid 
nitrogen.  After moving to Caritas, Hlatky founded the Center of 
Cancer Systems Biology (Center) and continued to expand her 
laboratory by obtaining additional Federal grant funding.  She 
used the funds to renovate her laboratory space, hire additional 
researchers, and purchase specialized equipment, such as 
4 
 
incubators, sterile hoods, and "minus 80 degree" freezers for 
her samples. 
 
Steward Health Care System, LLC (Steward), a private, for-
profit hospital system, acquired Caritas in November 2010.  
After the acquisition, Hlatky continued to manage the Center and 
work as the principal investigator without a contract from 
Steward for more than a year.  During this period, other 
institutions, including Tufts Medical Center, encouraged Hlatky 
to relocate the Center to their respective institutions, but she 
wished to stay at Steward if possible because of the difficulty 
involved in moving her laboratory.  At that time, Hlatky and her 
team had developed a unique method for transforming healthy, 
normal cells into cancer cells without radiation or other 
methods, which she described as the "Holy Grail" of research 
findings.  Her team's findings generated additional grant 
funding, with the ultimate goal of eventually developing cancer 
vaccines. 
 
In February 2012, Hlatky and Steward agreed to a three-year 
contract, retroactive to October 1, 2011, renewable by mutual 
agreement, for Hlatky to continue to serve as the Center's 
director.  The contract declared that it was Steward's "vision" 
that under Hlatky's leadership, the Center would "evolve into an 
internationally competitive program."  Under the contract, 
Hlatky would initially report to Dr. Peter Catalano, Steward's 
5 
 
medical director of research, while Steward formalized the 
Steward Research & Specialty Projects Corp. (SRSPC), a new 
nonprofit entity to which Hlatky eventually would report.2  The 
contract provided that Hlatky would receive an annual salary of 
$425,000, and that Steward would supply $323,000 in annual 
funding "to be used for recruitment of research personnel, 
laboratory supplies, animal expenses, and expenses required to 
support [Hlatky's] research."  Finally, the contract stated that 
Steward would "continue to provide support and suitable office 
space" for the Center.  On July 1, 2012, Hlatky began to report 
to the newly-created SRSPC, but because Steward was its sole 
member, its creation did not materially affect the operations of 
the Center. 
 
Hlatky entered into the contract believing that it would 
assure her a degree of security and stability for her research 
samples, team, and funding.  Instead, in the fall of 2012, 
Steward decided to transition away from benchtop research -- the 
type of research performed by the Center.  Steward had, in fact, 
been contemplating getting out of benchtop research prior to 
entering into the three-year contract with Hlatky, but did not 
tell her of these internal conversations.  On December 31, 2012, 
                                                          
 
 
2 Steward is a for-profit entity, but it was necessary that 
Hlatky report to a nonprofit entity to comply with the 
conditions of the Center's Federal grant funding. 
6 
 
Steward resigned and withdrew as the sole member of SRSPC, and 
the nonprofit entity was renamed GeneSys Research Institute 
(GeneSys).  Dr. Catalano, Daniel Meyers, and David Horowitz 
replaced Steward as GeneSys's members, and only two months 
later, Catalano ended his association with GeneSys.  Steward did 
not perform due diligence on Meyers or Horowitz, who were not 
previously associated with Steward, to determine whether they 
were qualified to lead a nonprofit entity with millions of 
dollars in Federal grant funding. 
 
The transition to GeneSys proved disastrous for Hlatky's 
laboratory.  When Steward withdrew, all of the operations of 
SRSPC that Steward had been providing were shut down and thus 
had to be rebuilt for GeneSys.  Dr. Catalano in his testimony 
described it as essentially trying to "start up a new business," 
including management, payroll, benefits, maintenance, lease 
agreements, and information technology.  But because of the 
rapid nature of the transition, which occurred within weeks, 
GeneSys was not ready to take over the administration of the 
Center's research laboratory.  Steward, even though no longer a 
member of GeneSys, continued to be involved in GeneSys's 
administration, including maintaining control of the Center's 
research bank accounts, equipment, payroll, and benefits.  And 
this lingering involvement caused further confusion and delay, 
as Steward employees were unclear whether Steward or GeneSys was 
7 
 
handling accounts payable, accounts receivable, and purchasing 
for the Center.  Nevertheless, Steward proceeded to demand 
payment from GeneSys for the Center's laboratory space -- 
something the Center previously did not have to pay for when 
SRSPC was the administering institution -- and appeared to 
charge the Center for the use of the research equipment and 
administrative services. 
 
During the transition to GeneSys, the Center did not have a 
designated research administrator to apply for and administer 
the Center's Federal grants.  The confusion regarding research 
administration, and having to reestablish a research 
administration within GeneSys, eventually led to GeneSys failing 
to file a timely grant proposal with NASA on the Center's 
behalf.  Another effect of spinning GeneSys off from Steward was 
that Hlatky could no longer cite Steward's institutional support 
in her grant applications even though Steward refused to turn 
over millions of dollars in research funding to GeneSys or the 
Center. 
 
GeneSys chose not to renew Hlatky's contract, which ended 
September 30, 2014.  GeneSys paid Hlatky her full salary, but 
terminated her employment as well as the employment of most of 
the Center's team -- approximately thirty people.  GeneSys 
retained all of the Center's assets, including specialized 
equipment and research samples.  Less than a year later, in July 
8 
 
2015, GeneSys filed a petition for bankruptcy, in large part due 
to millions of dollars of debt owed to Steward.  In short, a 
reasonable jury could have found that Steward spun GeneSys off 
as a separate nonprofit entity and then proceeded to extract 
millions of dollars from GeneSys, which was largely funded by 
the Center's grants. 
 
A bankruptcy judge granted the Chapter 11 trustee 
permission to sell the Center's research and other equipment at 
public auction and to dispose of biological materials, including 
the cell samples.  Hlatky objected to the sale of the equipment 
and samples, arguing that the assets were held in trust by 
GeneSys for the benefit of government agencies, like the 
National Institute of Health and the United States Department of 
Energy, which funded the Center's valuable research.3  The judge 
allowed the sale to proceed, finding that Hlatky had not "shown 
any rights or interests in, or to, the [e]quipment being sold, 
and [did not have] standing to assert the rights or interests of 
the United States concerning research grants."  Ultimately, the 
equipment was auctioned off and the cell samples were destroyed. 
                                                          
 
 
3 The Department of Energy also filed an objection to the 
sale of the assets, maintaining that the United States had a 
right to control the biological materials and equipment needed 
to continue department-funded research.  The judge overruled the 
department's objections. 
9 
 
 
2.  Procedural history.  On February 7, 2014, before the 
Center was shut down and GeneSys filed for bankruptcy, Hlatky 
filed suit against Steward for breach of contract and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Hlatky 
alleged that Steward committed a breach of the February 2012 
contract by "fail[ing] to provide a suitable facility and 
environment," and failing to support and oversee GeneSys in a 
way that would permit Hlatky to conduct her research.  Hlatky 
did not seek specific performance or other injunctive relief; 
she demanded money damages for the alleged breach.4 
 
On June 5, 2017, the judge bifurcated the case for trial.  
During the liability phase of the trial, the jury concluded in 
their special verdict that Hlatky's contract was with Steward, 
not SRSPC; that Hlatky performed her obligations under the 
contract; and that Steward committed a breach of both the 
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Although the jury were not asked in the special 
verdict to identify the term in the contract that Steward had 
breached, we can discern from the evidence and closing arguments 
that the jury determined that Steward had failed to fulfill its 
obligation to "continue to provide support and suitable office 
                                                          
 
 
4 Steward filed counterclaims against Hlatky, which it 
agreed to dismiss with prejudice before trial. 
10 
 
space" to Hlatky for the work of the Center.  Steward does not 
contest on appeal the jury's findings as to liability. 
 
Before the damages phase of the trial, Steward filed a 
motion in limine to limit the permissible scope of Hlatky's 
claim for damages.  In her supplemental answers to 
interrogatories, Hlatky asserted that she was seeking 
$11,793,793 in damages from Steward to allow her to rebuild the 
laboratory that Steward had effectively destroyed through its 
breach.  In determining this amount, she calculated that the 
total cost of recreating the laboratory was $10,187,516 based on 
Steward's proof of claim during the bankruptcy proceeding, and 
she added to this amount $1,606,277 in grant funding that she 
claimed was available to the Center at the time of the breach.  
In addition, Hlatky sought $24,444,404 in damages to compensate 
her for the loss of future grant funding the Center allegedly 
would have obtained but for Steward's breach. 
 
Steward argued that all of these categories of damages must 
be excluded from trial for two independent reasons.  First, it 
argued that the damages claims were not supported by expert 
testimony5 and that, to the extent they relied on Hlatky's 
testimony, they were speculative and not based on personal 
                                                          
 
 
5 The judge precluded Hlatky from introducing expert 
testimony as to her damages because she failed to timely 
disclose the identity of any damages expert prior to trial. 
11 
 
knowledge.  Second, Steward contended that Hlatky did not 
"suffer[]" these damages "in her individual capacity," because 
she did not have an ownership interest in the grants, the 
research equipment, or the samples. 
 
As to Steward's first argument, Hlatky responded that, as 
the principal investigator for the Federal grants and as the 
person who created and managed the Center, she had sufficient 
personal knowledge to offer admissible testimony regarding the 
cost of rebuilding a comparable laboratory.  As to Steward's 
second argument, Hlatky countered that that the destruction of 
the laboratory was a foreseeable consequence of Steward's breach 
of its obligation to "continue to provide support" for the 
Center, and that she was entitled to the benefit of that 
bargain.  Here, that meant the amount of money necessary to 
restore her to the position she would have been in if Steward 
had provided the support it promised in the contract, that is, 
for her to have a functioning laboratory supported by grant 
funding.  Hlatky did not contend that she had any ownership 
interest in the grants, laboratory equipment, or cell samples, 
but claimed that she did have an individual interest in being 
able to continue her life's scientific work, which Steward 
destroyed through its breach. 
 
The judge allowed Steward's motion in limine in part.  As 
to the claim for $24.4 million in future grant funding, she 
12 
 
allowed the motion because she found the claim to be "highly 
speculative," noting that "neither the amount calculated nor the 
appropriateness of the methodology used to perform that 
calculation is supported by expert testimony."  The judge also 
declared that, "even if [Hlatky] were to receive future grants, 
she would not be the actual recipient of those grant funds." 
 
As to the damages calculation of nearly $11.8 million, the 
judge ruled that it rested on an inadequate foundation, noting 
that "fully $10.2 million of it appears to be based on a 
calculation prepared by [Steward] in connection with [GeneSys's] 
bankruptcy for a purpose other than the one for which plaintiff 
seeks to admit it and the plaintiff has made no showing that she 
has personal knowledge of its basis."  The judge added that 
"plaintiff herself testified during her deposition that the 
$10.2 million is a 'speculative or fictitious number.'"  
Although the judge ruled that Hlatky could not testify as an 
expert on valuation, the judge did not prohibit Hlatky from 
arguing that she was entitled to damages for the cost of 
reestablishing a functioning laboratory if she could prove those 
damages by lay testimony based on personal knowledge.  The judge 
declared that her ruling was "without prejudice to [Hlatky] 
offering evidence as a lay witness during the damages phase of 
the trial on the consequential damages she alleges she suffered 
as a result of the defendant's breach."  When Hlatky's attorney 
13 
 
sought clarification of the judge's ruling, noting that "the 
fact of the matter is, she had a lab, and now she doesn't," the 
judge declared, "I don't think you're precluded from offering 
evidence as to damages by virtue of this ruling."  The judge 
also did not foreclose the possibility of Hlatky recovering 
damages based on what a reasonable entity in Steward's position 
would have understood as the natural and probable consequences 
of withdrawing support from the Center. 
 
At the damages phase of the trial, Hlatky testified on 
redirect examination that Steward's withdrawal of support caused 
her to lose her life's work -- twenty-five years of cancer 
research and the prospect of future funding -- when she was at 
the peak of her career.  She stated that she was seeking, 
through money damages, to restore her laboratory to some 
"minimal-functioning place" that would allow her to once again 
compete for funding and complete her research.  When asked how 
much she would need to accomplish that, she answered:  "We 
need[] $10 million to even get a functional lab together, get 
people together, and try to redo these projects, and we want[] 
$24 million as future funding."  Steward objected to Hlatky's 
answer, and the judge allowed Steward's motion to strike the 
reference to $24 million.  But the judge denied Steward's motion 
to strike the reference to $10 million, finding that, as to this 
part of the answer, Steward's counsel had opened the door on 
14 
 
cross-examination by asking Hlatky whether she had priced the 
cost of reestablishing her laboratory.6  Steward did not question 
Hlatky on recross-examination about her testimony that it would 
cost $10 million to build a functional laboratory.  Hlatky also 
testified that it cost approximately $3.75 million to $4 million 
annually to run the Center in 2012, that she spent approximately 
$200,000 of her own money between 2013 and 2015, including the 
cost of hiring a strategic communications consultant, in a 
failed attempt to save the laboratory, and that she had not 
worked in benchtop cancer research since she left Steward in 
2014.  She did not, however, offer any testimony concerning lost 
future wages. 
 
At the charge conference in the damages phase of the trial, 
the judge asked Hlatky's counsel whether he planned to suggest a 
                                                          
 
 
6 The following exchanges occurred on cross-examination of 
Hlatky: 
 
 
Q.:  "Dr. Hlatky, you've done nothing to identify the cost of 
specific items for starting up a lab; is that correct?" 
 
 
A.:  "I would say that's incorrect.  I mean, for example, 
we've been very active in Bankruptcy Court, and in Bankruptcy 
Court we identified, you know, like the confocal was [$] 500,000 
-- okay? -- and it sold at auction for under [$] 10,000.  Okay?  
But the replacement -- plus, we identified the alumina as being 
an 80,000-dollar piece of equipment with 40,000 dollars' worth 
of software and other accessories." 
 
 
Q.:  "And you have done nothing to price out what a build-
out today would be, correct?" 
 
 
A.:  "That I disagree with.  I've done a lot of things." 
15 
 
damages figure during his closing argument.  Counsel stated he 
did not intend to advocate for a final figure, but planned to 
mention Hlatky's estimate that it would take $10 million to 
restore her laboratory.  Steward did not object, either at the 
charge conference or in Hlatky's closing argument itself, to 
Hlatky's claim for damages based on the $10 million testimony. 
 
In closing argument, Steward's counsel essentially asserted 
two points.  First, that Steward did not cause Hlatky's damages 
because there were "a number of decision points and 
opportunities" for Hlatky, as chief executive officer (CEO) of 
the Center, "to save her science" and her laboratory, but she 
made "a series of bad business decisions" and now was blaming 
Steward for her own failures.  Second, Steward asked the jury to 
not award damages to Hlatky to replace equipment she never owned 
and grant money she did not personally receive.  Hlatky's 
counsel, in closing, argued that it was foreseeable the Center 
would be destroyed if Steward failed to honor its contractual 
commitment to provide support, and that the demise of the 
laboratory followed directly from that lack of support.  He 
asked the jury to help "recreate a world where Steward hadn't 
abandoned" Hlatky so that she could continue to perform cancer 
research for at least six more years.  And he asked the jury to 
credit Hlatky's testimony that "it's going to take $10 million 
16 
 
to put this lab back together," because "[t]he CEO knows what it 
costs." 
 
In her instructions to the jury, the judge said that Hlatky 
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Steward's breach "caused her individually" some damage and 
that Hlatky could recover monetary damages only for harm that 
"she suffered" as a result of the breach.  The judge explained: 
"[Hlatky] is entitled to recover damages sufficient to 
give her the benefit of her contractual bargain as 
long as such damages are reasonably proved.  In other 
words, [Hlatky] is entitled to those damages that 
would put her in a position to obtain that which she 
bargained to obtain so far as compensation and money 
can be computed by rational methods upon a firm basis 
in fact. . . .  Thus, in determining any damage 
amount, you should consider what, if any, damages 
claimed by [Hlatky] were the natural and probable 
results of the breach, what the parties knew or 
reasonably could be presumed to have known at the time 
they entered into the contract on January 19, 2012, 
and whether the damages [Hlatky] claims were 
foreseeable to [Steward] at that time." 
 
Neither party objected to the judge's final instructions.  The 
jury in their answers to special verdict questions found that 
Steward's breach of the contract and of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing caused Hlatky actual damages 
"individually" in the amount of $22,637,500.  Judgment was 
entered the same day with the statutory rate of prejudgment 
interest running from the date of the complaint -- February 7, 
2014. 
17 
 
 
The parties each filed postjudgment motions.  Hlatky moved 
to amend the judgment to reflect statutory interest commencing 
from the date of the breach, which Hlatky asserted was December 
31, 2012, rather than the date the complaint was filed.  The 
judge allowed Hlatky's motion. 
 
Steward moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a 
new trial, or amendment of the judgment to reduce the award of 
damages.  Steward contended that the only damages Hlatky placed 
before the jury were the loss of laboratory equipment and grant 
funds in bank accounts, all of which were institutional assets 
belonging to GeneSys, not her.  Steward also argued that Hlatky 
failed to present sufficient evidence to support an award of 
over $22 million.  In the alternative, Steward asked the judge 
to amend the judgment to, at most, the $200,000 in out-of-pocket 
expenses Hlatky incurred. 
 
The judge rejected Steward's argument that Hlatky failed to 
prove any personal contract damages.  The judge noted that the 
"long-established rule for breach of contract damages is that 
the plaintiff should receive the benefit of her bargain and be 
placed in as good a position as she would have been in if the 
contract had been performed."  She acknowledged that Hlatky did 
not seek to recover for lost grant funds and did not claim a 
property interest in the equipment used by the Center.  And she 
recognized that "[i]t is difficult to apply these standard 
18 
 
principles to the unique facts of this case."  But she concluded 
that, "in the context of a case involving the foreseeable 
destruction of a longstanding scientific research program as the 
result of a breach of a contract and its implied covenant of 
good faith," Massachusetts law "permits a plaintiff to recover 
damages representing the benefit of her bargain to place her in 
as good a position as she would have been in if the contract had 
been performed."  Applying that principle in this case, she 
held: 
"[T]he defendant's breach foreseeably resulted in the 
destruction of a researcher's life work.  Although 
Hlatky has no ownership interest in the Center's 
equipment or samples, which were funded by the 
taxpayers, she had an expectation interest in the 
continuation of the research program that she created, 
operated for twenty-five years, and helped fund by 
using talents and efforts to obtain federal grants.  
The destruction of Hlatky's life work in cancer 
research resulted in damages personal to her that she 
may recover under Massachusetts contract law." 
 
Having so found, the judge denied Steward's motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, to amend 
the judgment to reduce the award of damages. 
 
However, as to Steward's motion for a new trial, the judge 
concluded that the award of over $22 million was not supported 
by the evidence presented at trial.  Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 59 (a), 365 Mass. 827 (1974), she conditionally ordered a new 
trial on damages unless Hlatky accepted a remittitur to $10.2 
million -- $10 million to reestablish a laboratory and $200,000 
19 
 
for Hlatky's out-of-pocket expenses.  Hlatky moved for 
reconsideration of the remittitur, claiming that, where there 
was evidence in the record that it would cost $10 million to 
reestablish a minimally functional laboratory and that the cost 
per year to operate the laboratory was between $3.75 million and 
$4 million, there was sufficient evidence to support an award of 
damages of over $22 million.  The judge denied Hlatky's motion 
for reconsideration, concluding that an award of future 
operational costs would constitute a windfall to Hlatky where 
she presented no evidence that she required uninterrupted 
financial support of operational costs for several years in 
order to restore her laboratory to a position where it could 
realistically apply for Federal grants.  Hlatky accepted the 
reduced award, reserving her right to cross-appeal the 
remittitur decision. 
 
Steward timely filed a notice of appeal and Hlatky cross-
appealed.  This court allowed Steward's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We confront four arguments in these cross 
appeals -- three by Steward and one by Hlatky -- which we 
address in turn. 
 
1.  Measure of damages.  a.  Cost of recreating the 
laboratory.  Steward argues that the judge erred as a matter of 
law in allowing Hlatky to recover damages for the cost of 
20 
 
rebuilding a laboratory, where she did not personally own any of 
its equipment or have any ownership interest in the Federal 
grants it had received.  Steward contends that the judge should 
have amended the amount of the judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
59 (e) to $200,000, compensating Hlatky only for her out-of-
pocket mitigation costs.  
 
Steward does not contend that the judge erred in 
instructing the jury regarding damages.  Nor, reasonably, could 
it, where it offered no objection to the jury instructions, 
allowing them to become the law of the case.  See Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 51 (b), 365 Mass. 816 (1974); Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. 
Boylston, 419 Mass. 548, 559, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 931 (1995) 
("Neither party objected to these instructions, which, 
therefore, became the law of the case").  Rather, Steward claims 
that, even though the judge did not preclude Hlatky from 
offering evidence regarding the cost of rebuilding a laboratory, 
the judge's instructions limiting damages to those Hlatky 
suffered personally effectively precluded the jury from 
considering the cost of rebuilding in determining damages.7 
 
Whether the judge applied the proper measure of damages is 
a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Twin Fires Inv., 
                                                          
 
 
7 The parties agree that Hlatky did not seek damages for or 
introduce evidence relating to reputational harm, emotional 
distress, or lost future earnings arising from Steward's breach 
of contract. 
21 
 
LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 424 
(2005).  "The usual rule for damages in a breach of contract 
case is that the injured party should be put in the position 
[she] would have been in had the contact been performed."  
Situation Mgt. Sys. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 Mass. 875, 880 (2000); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 344(a) (1981) 
(plaintiff in breach of contract action is entitled to damages 
to protect "his 'expectation interest,' which is his interest in 
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a 
position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed").  I agree with the trial judge that it is difficult 
to apply these principles to the unique facts of this case. 
 
It is important to recognize that the contract that Hlatky 
entered into with Steward was not merely an employment contract; 
Steward committed not only to employ Hlatky as the director of 
the Center until September 30, 2014, but also to "provide 
support" to the Center, which it envisioned would evolve, under 
Hlatky's leadership, "into an internationally competitive 
program."  The structure and terms of the contract, which 
Steward, a sophisticated entity, negotiated, involved more than 
contracting for Hlatky's labor.8  Hlatky founded the Center 
                                                          
 
 
8 Steward requested that the judge instruct the jury during 
the damages phase that, "[i]n employment cases, where, as in 
this case, the employment contract was for a fixed period of 
time, the employee is entitled to recover the unpaid balance of 
22 
 
before Steward acquired Caritas and, according to industry 
custom and Federal regulations, she could expect to be able to 
relocate the Center, its equipment, researchers, cell samples, 
and grant funding to another institution if she chose.  Indeed, 
she did just that when she left Harvard for Caritas.  When 
Steward entered into the contract with Hlatky, it was not only 
gaining the benefit of her employment, but also gaining the 
recognition and funding that flowed from the Center's Federal 
grants.  The jury determined that Steward committed a breach of 
the contract by withdrawing support for the Center, and the 
judge further found that this breach foreseeably resulted in the 
destruction of Hlatky's life's work. 
 
Steward's theory that Hlatky is entitled only to the salary 
and benefits she was promised under the contract, plus the out-
of-pocket costs she incurred while trying, unsuccessfully, to 
save the laboratory, trivializes and misrepresents the loss that 
Hlatky truly suffered from its breach.  If Steward had fulfilled 
its obligation to provide support to the Center, Hlatky 
reasonably would have expected, at minimum, to have at the end 
                                                          
 
her compensation for the remainder of the contract, less any 
amounts the employee earned or reasonably could have earned 
during that time."  The judge declined to include this 
instruction in her final instructions to the jury, and Steward 
did not object to the final instructions, waiving any objection.  
See Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. Boylston, 419 Mass. 548, 559, 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 931 (1995). 
23 
 
of the three-year contract access to a functioning, turnkey 
laboratory with the capacity to continue the cancer research 
that had become her life's work.  Because of Steward's breach, 
Hlatky lost her laboratory, equipment and, most importantly, the 
cell samples -- the culmination of twenty-five years of work. 
 
So while damages principles are difficult to apply in this 
case, the judge did not err in concluding that Hlatky personally 
suffered harm from the foreseeable destruction of her life's 
work.  Nor did she err in concluding that the jury reasonably 
could have sought to restore Hlatky to the position she would 
have been in if Steward had complied with its obligations under 
the contract by awarding her the amount of money needed to 
reestablish a functioning cancer laboratory -- which, based on 
Hlatky's testimony, the judge determined to be $10 million. 
 
This is consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
analysis in Ferrer v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 573 Pa. 310 
(2002), which is the only case identified by the parties or that 
I can find which presents circumstances roughly comparable to 
those in the instant case. In Ferrer, a tenured professor was 
sanctioned by the university in violation of university 
procedures, and prohibited from conducting certain research in 
his laboratory for two years.  Id. at 315-316, 319.  The 
university also informed significant funders of the professor's 
research about the sanctions.  Id. at 330.  As described by the 
24 
 
court, the effects of the sanctions were devastating -- Ferrer's 
research was completely shut down, his animal colonies were 
dismantled, his unique herd of cattle could no longer be 
maintained and had to be sold, and he lost significant future 
funding.  Id. at 333.  The jury found that the university's 
procedures concerning investigating misconduct were part of the 
terms and conditions of Ferrer's employment agreement, and that 
the university committed a breach of the agreement by imposing 
sanctions on Ferrer even though a formal investigation had 
concluded that he was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.  Id. 
 
A divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Ferrer was 
not seeking damages for the loss of future funding by third 
parties or for lost salary or benefits; rather, he sought to 
recover damages arising from the university's prohibition 
against his conducting animal research in his laboratory for two 
years, which "resulted in the complete dismantling and 
destruction of his research program."  Id. at 335.  The court 
agreed with the trial court that Ferrer was entitled to 
expectation damages for the breach of contract "necessary to 
make [him] whole again for the loss of his research program," 
based on "evidence regarding the amount of money needed to 
restore [his] program to its preexisting level when the 
sanctions were imposed."  Id. at 334.  And it affirmed an award 
of damages of $2.9 million as the amount needed to rebuild the 
25 
 
research program.  Id. at 344.  There is no indication in the 
opinion that any restriction was imposed on Ferrer to ensure 
that he used the award of damages for this purpose. 
 
Hlatky's claim for expectation damages in the amount needed 
to restore the Center's laboratory is even stronger than 
Ferrer's claim.  In Ferrer, the employment contract did not 
include a commitment by the university to provide support for 
Ferrer's research, and thus there was no alleged breach of that 
commitment.  Instead, the breach was the violation of university 
procedures that the jury found were incorporated as terms and 
conditions of Ferrer's employment agreement as a tenured 
professor.  See id. at 316.  Here, Steward failed to fulfill its 
contractual commitment to "provide support" for the Center's 
research, and Hlatky's claim for expectation damages arises 
directly from Steward's breach. 
 
b.  Restriction on the award of damages.  I would, however, 
part ways from the Ferrer opinion in the form of the damages 
remedy allowed.  Hlatky did not seek damages for loss of future 
earnings, reputational harm, or emotional distress arising from 
the breach of contract.  Apart from the $200,000 she sought to 
reimburse her for the expenses she incurred in retaining a 
public relations consultant in a failed attempt to save the 
laboratory, Hlatky sought damages only for the loss of her 
expectation interest in the contract, "which is [her] interest 
26 
 
in having the benefit of [her] bargain by being put in as good a 
position as [she] would have been in had the contract been 
performed."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 344(a) (1981).  
Had she owned the laboratory, or any of its equipment, reagents, 
or cell samples, she could have sought the lost monetary value 
of the laboratory or its components.  But she does not claim any 
such ownership interest. 
 
Instead, she asked the judge and jury for the funds needed 
to put her in the position she would have been in if Steward had 
complied with its contractual obligation to "continue to provide 
support" to the laboratory -- the principal investigator of a 
functioning cancer research laboratory.  With the remittitur 
ordered by the judge, $10 million of the $10.2 million in 
damages was awarded to put Hlatky in that position.  But the 
award of damages allowed by the judge is presently without 
restriction.  Nothing would prevent Hlatky from spending the $10 
million on a house or a yacht rather than on the reestablishment 
of a cancer research laboratory.  I do not suggest that she 
would do so; she testified that she would not.9  But the fact 
remains that she could do so, and thereby put herself in a 
                                                          
 
 
9 Hlatky testified that, with her lawsuit, she "is trying to 
recoup a lab."  Later in her testimony, in answer to the 
question, "What are you seeking?", she replied that she "was 
seeking to restore a lab to some minimal-functioning place and 
to bring in funding that could allow [her] to do the kind of 
work" she had done before. 
27 
 
financial position she would never have been able to attain 
under the contract.  Had the contract been honored, Hlatky, as 
principal investigator, could have sought to move the laboratory 
to another research institution, but she could not have sold the 
laboratory, its equipment, or cell samples to realize a personal 
financial gain. 
 
If, however, the judge ensured that the $10 million is 
invested in the reestablishment of a functioning cancer 
laboratory or in support of comparable research, there would be 
no possibility that the award of damages would provide a 
financial windfall to Hlatky and it would be guaranteed that the 
award of damages would place her in roughly the same position 
she would have been in if Steward had honored its contract to 
support the laboratory.  This was the theory of damages 
presented to the jury by Hlatky's counsel in closing argument, 
without objection by Steward,10 and it is a theory that is 
                                                          
 
 
10 Hlatky's counsel argued in closing: 
 
"We know how much the lab cost to refit, if you take Dr. 
Hlatky's testimony as credible, and I think you should.  We 
know how much money they had to do the research that they 
were doing.  Okay?  Dr. Hlatky said she planned to be in 
research for at least another six years.  And I think 
that's enough data for you all to figure out how to put the 
wheels back on.  Okay?  Because that's what the goal is 
here and has always been here.  This has never been about a 
windfall.  And I think you've heard that term a couple of 
times.  It's never been about a windfall.  It's about 
trying to recreate a world where Steward hadn't abandoned 
Dr. Hlatky." 
28 
 
consistent with the judge's instructions to the jury regarding 
damages, which also were without objection.11 
 
Just as form should follow function in architecture, so, 
too, should form follow function in law.  In the unique 
circumstances of this case, to prevent the contractual 
expectation damages allowed by the judge from putting Hlatky in 
a position she would never have been in had the contract been 
honored, I would vacate the judgment, apart from the $200,000 
awarded to compensate Hlatky for her out-of-pocket expenses, and 
remand the matter to the judge.  I would direct the judge, in 
consultation with the parties, to fashion a form of judgment 
that would ensure that the remaining $10 million of the judgment 
(plus the prejudgment interest attributed to this amount) be 
devoted solely to the reestablishment of a functioning cancer 
laboratory or to support comparable cancer research.  How that 
could best be accomplished, whether through the creation of a 
trust or another comparable vehicle, or through other means, I 
would leave to the sound discretion of the judge, preferably 
                                                          
 
 
11 I also note that during the appellate oral argument, 
Hlatky's attorney declared that she "wants to use these funds to 
benefit the science, to drive the science, further her life's 
work in cancer research, without a doubt."  When counsel was 
asked about there being no restriction as to how Hlatky could 
use the $10 million, he responded that it was simply "a function 
of an award of damages in contract law." 
29 
 
with the agreement of the parties.12  Only by doing so would 
Hlatky truly be placed in a position comparable to where she 
would have been but for Steward's breach. 
 
I recognize that we have not before imposed such a 
limitation on the use of funds awarded in a breach of contract 
case, and that we might not need to do so again to ensure that 
justice is done.  But in the unique circumstances of this 
particular case, I believe that structuring the judgment to 
ensure that $10 million of the award of damages will be used by 
Hlatky solely for the purpose of reestablishing a laboratory or 
supporting comparable cancer research is the fairest and most 
appropriate outcome to this litigation.  As noted, Hlatky relied 
on Steward's commitment of support in deciding to remain at 
Steward rather than seeking to move the laboratory, and its 
grant funding, to other interested institutions.  While she did 
not "own" the laboratory or its equipment, she devoted herself 
entirely to its success and entered into a contract to protect 
her life's work.  And Steward did not just commit a breach of a 
contract term.  The jury also found that Steward committed a 
                                                          
 
 
12 Justice Lenk, in her separate opinion, correctly notes 
that, if Hlatky's restored laboratory is to receive Federal 
funds, she could not be both the owner of the laboratory and its 
principal investigator.  See post at    .  That is among the 
reasons I give the judge broad discretion in fashioning an 
appropriate form of judgment, which potentially could include a 
commitment by Hlatky to transfer the funds to a nonprofit entity 
that would be the legal owner of the cancer research laboratory. 
30 
 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
"[T]he implied covenant exists so that the objectives of the 
contract may be realized."  Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 
443 Mass. 367, 385, cert. denied sub nom. Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 (2005).  Steward may not sign a contract 
which promises support, and instead withdraw that support and 
frustrate Hlatky's objectives of the contract -- security for 
her research, her laboratory, and her team -- without remedy.13  
Conceptually, requiring Steward to pay damages in order to 
rebuild a minimally functioning cancer laboratory is, in 
essence, nothing more than "you broke it, you fix it."14 
 
Justice Lenk argues that the fact that Hlatky did not own 
the laboratory is irrelevant to her entitlement to damages and 
that she is entitled to compensation for the loss of the 
laboratory without any restriction on how she ultimately spends 
the money.  But ownership surely does matter here.  If Hlatky 
had owned the laboratory that Steward destroyed through its 
breach of contract, she would have suffered personal financial 
loss from the loss of her laboratory, and her expectation 
                                                          
 
 
13 When asked why she entered into a contract with Steward, 
Hlatky testified that in "getting a contract, I wanted to assure 
that whatever the transition was, . . . I wanted to make sure I 
had security for my research, my team and my funding agencies." 
 
 
14 Similarly, because Steward is still paying damages, even 
if to be used for a specified purpose, the remedy I propose is 
not a form of specific performance. 
31 
 
damages would have included the fair market value of the lost 
laboratory, which might be approximated from the cost of 
reestablishing the laboratory.  In that hypothetical case, no 
restriction would be appropriate on the award of damages 
compensating her for her financial loss.  But where Hlatky did 
not own the laboratory, the loss of the laboratory was not a 
personal financial loss but instead the loss of the ability to 
be the principal investigator of that specific laboratory and to 
conduct the research that had become her life's work.  To put 
Hlatky in the position she would have been in had Steward 
honored her contract, she is not entitled to the restoration of 
financial loss as measured by the fair market value of the 
laboratory; instead, she is entitled under the contract only to 
the restoration of the laboratory in which she had conducted her 
research.  By granting her the $10 million in damages without 
restriction, the court is granting her a remedy she would have 
been entitled to only if she owned the laboratory.  And on the 
premise of granting her expectation damages, the court is 
putting her in a position that she would never have been in had 
Steward honored the contract.15 
                                                          
 
 
15 Justice Lenk also contends that imposing this restriction 
on the award of damages would open "the Pandora's box of unknown 
future harm to the predictability of contract law."  Post at    
.  But the result of today's opinion, allowing a plaintiff in 
such circumstances to keep the award of damages without 
restriction, will pose a far greater risk of harm, especially to 
32 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence of damages.  Steward argues 
that, even if Hlatky could, in theory, recover damages for the 
cost of reestablishing the Center's laboratory, the judge abused 
her discretion in awarding Hlatky $10.2 million on remittitur 
because, apart from the $200,000 in mitigation costs, the amount 
is unduly speculative and not supported by expert opinion.  A 
judge's determination regarding the amount of damages is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See Twin Fires Inv., LLC, 
445 Mass. at 424-425.  "[A] judge's discretionary decision 
constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge 
made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant 
to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
Steward argues the judge erred initially in admitting in 
evidence Hlatky's testimony that she needed $10 million to 
rebuild the laboratory.  As earlier noted, the judge before 
trial precluded Hlatky from testifying that the cost to 
reestablish the laboratory was $10.2 million, where in her 
deposition she rested that estimate on a calculation prepared by 
                                                          
 
research institutions.  It will treat principal investigators 
who do not own their laboratories as if they did and allow them, 
based on a successful claim of breach of an employment contract, 
to be placed in a financial position they could never have 
achieved under the contract. 
33 
 
Steward for another purpose in the bankruptcy action.  But the 
judge expressly stated that she did not intend by her rulings to 
preclude Hlatky from presenting evidence as a lay witness 
regarding her consequential damages, provided that evidence was 
based on her personal knowledge.  Then, on cross-examination, 
Steward's counsel asked Hlatky whether she had done anything to 
"identify the cost of specific items for starting up a lab" or 
to "price out what a build-out today would be."  The judge ruled 
that these questions opened the door to Hlatky's testimony 
regarding the cost of reestablishing a comparable laboratory. 
Whether opinion testimony from a lay witness should be 
admitted rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial 
judge.  See Menici v. Orton Crane & Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 
505 (1934).  And whether counsel has opened the door to 
testimony, through his questioning, that might not otherwise be 
admissible is also within the sound discretion of the judge.  
See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 641, 648 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 479 & n.15 (2010).  
Steward did not argue in moving to strike this testimony that 
the estimate was without foundation, seek a voir dire to test 
its foundation, or question Hlatky to examine its foundation.  
See Hastings Assocs. v. Local 369 Bldg. Fund, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 
162, 173 (1997) (lay witness opinion testimony was properly 
before jury where defendant did not move to strike testimony as 
34 
 
being without foundation).16  Instead, Steward chose not to 
address Hlatky's testimony regarding the $10 million estimate 
during trial and now claims that it is insufficient to support 
Hlatky's award of damages.  In these circumstances there was no 
abuse of discretion in the judge allowing Hlatky to testify to 
her estimate of the cost of restoring her laboratory after 
Steward's counsel suggested by his question that she had failed 
to "price out what a build-out today would be." 
 
Steward also contends that determining the amount of money 
needed to rebuild a laboratory is an inherently complex task 
requiring expert testimony.  The judge did not err, however, in 
finding that, even without expert testimony, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conclusion that it would cost $10 
million to restore the laboratory to a minimal level of 
                                                          
 
 
16 Indeed, it is not even clear that Steward objected to the 
admission of the $10 million estimate.  When asked on redirect 
examination about what she was seeking, Hlatky responded, "We 
needed $10 million to even get a functional lab together, get 
people together and try to redo these projects, and we wanted 
$24 million as future funding."  Steward's counsel objected 
after Hlatky mentioned the $24 million.  During the parties' 
discussion at sidebar, Steward's counsel stated that he was "a 
little concerned with this 24-million number that she just 
mentioned," which the judge proceeded to strike.  Counsel did 
not mention at sidebar an objection to the $10 million figure, 
nor did counsel object when Hlatky's counsel stated for the 
record that his "understanding of the ruling [on the objection] 
was that the lab piece was not stricken, but that the grant 
piece was."  We give Steward the benefit of the doubt in 
construing its objection to include both the $10 million and $24 
million estimates. 
35 
 
functionality.  It certainly would have been preferable for 
Hlatky to offer expert testimony on this subject.  But we have 
held that "[a]n owner of real estate or personal property having 
adequate knowledge of his property may express an opinion as to 
its value."  Southwick v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 339 
Mass. 666, 668 (1959).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 note (2019).  
This rule "does not rest upon [the owner] holding the legal 
title, but is based upon his familiarity with the 
characteristics of the property, his knowledge or acquaintance 
with its uses, and his experience in dealing with it."  Blais-
Porter, Inc. v. Simboli, 402 Mass. 269, 272 (1988), quoting 
Winthrop Prods. Corp. v. Elroth Co., 331 Mass. 83, 85 (1954).  
See also Menici, 285 Mass. at 504 ("Persons not owners but 
sufficiently familiar with the property in controversy to 
express an opinion upon its value have been allowed to do so 
though not regarded as experts").  We have extended this rule to 
corporate officers testifying as to corporate property when they 
have sufficient knowledge or familiarity.  Winthrop Prods. 
Corp., 331 Mass. at 85.  As the founder and director of the 
Center, Hlatky was sufficiently familiar with what would be 
necessary to reestablish her laboratory because she was the 
person who had established it in the first place.17 
                                                          
 
 
17 In fact, Steward in its closing argument characterized 
Hlatky's role as "CEO of her lab" and "CEO of her company." 
36 
 
 
Additionally, as the judge noted, other evidence admitted 
at trial buttressed Hlatky's lay testimony that $10 million was 
a reasonable estimate of the cost to reestablish a cancer 
research laboratory.  The jury heard evidence that Hlatky spent 
$4 million in 2005 to purchase additional equipment and 
customize her laboratory when she moved from Harvard to Caritas.  
The Center's administrative coordinator estimated that the 
replacement cost of only some of the equipment at the Center 
totaled $1.5 million.  The laboratory employed thirty staff at 
the time it closed, Hlatky's salary alone was $425,000 annually, 
and her contract with Steward provided that it would pay 
$323,000 annually for personnel and laboratory supplies.  This 
is in addition to evidence that Hlatky had been accumulating 
equipment for years which she brought with her from Berkeley to 
Harvard, to Caritas, and then to Steward.  When determining 
damages for a breach of contract, the plaintiff need not prove 
her damages with mathematical certainty, as long as the damages 
are not too remote, speculative, or hypothetical.  See Lowrie v. 
Castle, 225 Mass. 37, 51 (1916). See also Pierce v. Clark, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (2006).  The judge did not err in 
concluding that the $10 million figure was not too speculative 
to form the basis for an award. 
 
3.  Remittitur.  Hlatky in her cross-appeal argues that the 
judge abused her discretion in ordering a new trial unless 
37 
 
Hlatky agreed to remit all but $10.2 million of the jury's award 
of damages of $22,637,500.  She contends that remittitur was 
improper in this case because the jury's calculation is entitled 
to deference and the evidence introduced at trial clearly 
warranted a verdict in the amount awarded by the jury when one 
adds future operational costs to the cost of reestablishing the 
Center. 
 
Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (a), "[a] new trial shall not be 
granted solely on the ground that the damages are excessive 
until the prevailing party has first been given an opportunity 
to remit so much thereof as the court adjudges is excessive."  
The rule "does not require the judge to give the plaintiff the 
opportunity to remit only so much of the amount of the verdict 
as exceeds the maximum amount which the jury warrantably might 
have allowed."  D'Annolfo v. Stoneham Hous. Auth., 375 Mass. 
650, 661 (1978).  The trial judge has the "discretion to fix the 
amount of remittitur to bring the verdict anywhere within the 
range of verdicts supported by the evidence."  Id. at 662.  
Given this standard, it is not surprising that we rarely 
conclude that a judge abused her discretion in ordering a 
plaintiff either to remit an amount the judge deems excessive or 
proceed to a new trial.  See Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 471 
Mass. 272, 299 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 896 (2016), 
quoting Loschi v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 361 Mass. 714, 715 
38 
 
(1972) (abuse of discretion in grant of new trial "on the ground 
of excessive damages 'can so seldom be found that actual 
instances in which this court has set aside the action of the 
trial judge . . . are almost nonexistent, and it has repeatedly 
been stated that occasions when this court can do so are 
exceedingly rare'").  Applying this standard, the judge here did 
not abuse her discretion in ordering a new trial unless Hlatky 
accepted the remittitur of $10.2 million. 
 
We do not know how the jury calculated the damages they 
awarded.  The special verdict asked only for the total amount of 
damages, and did not ask them to specify how they reached that 
total.  The judge found that an award of over $22 million in 
damages was "grossly disproportionate to the proven injury 
Hlatky suffered from the destruction of her life's work."  The 
judge acknowledged that there was testimony that the Center had 
procured $30 million in Federal grants, and that some of that 
money remained after Steward's breach.  But the judge ruled, and 
Hlatky concedes, that none of the Federal grant monies would go 
directly to Hlatky.  The judge also rejected Hlatky's argument 
that, based on evidence at trial that it costs between $3.75 
million and $4 million per year to operate the Center, and that 
Hlatky expected to continue her research for at least six years, 
the jury could have awarded her a substantial amount to continue 
to pay for the future operations of the Center.  The judge 
39 
 
declared that such an award would be a windfall to Hlatky, 
because she was not entitled to recover for the cost of future 
operations. 
The judge acted within her discretion in determining that 
the award of damages was excessive to the extent it exceeded the 
amount of Hlatky's out-of-pocket expenses and the amount she 
testified would allow her to reestablish a cancer research 
laboratory to some "minimal-functioning place."  I also note the 
absence of any evidence in the record that a laboratory would 
need to be in operation for a number of years before it could 
reasonably apply for Federal funding, so there is no evidence 
that reestablishing a laboratory necessarily includes financial 
support for future operational expenses.  See Ferrer, 573 Pa. at 
341-343 (researcher whose laboratory was destroyed due to breach 
of contract could recover cost of rebuilding laboratory, which 
was not premised on future funding). 
 
4.  Prejudgment interest.  Finally, Steward contends that 
the judge erred in allowing Hlatky's motion to amend the 
judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (e) to award 
prejudgment interest from the date of the alleged breach, 
December 31, 2012, rather than from the date Hlatky filed her 
complaint.  I agree that interest should run from the date the 
complaint was filed. 
40 
 
 
Under G. L. c. 231, § 6C, prejudgment interest on a 
judgment resulting from a breach of contract claim is calculated 
from the date of the breach or demand but, if that date is not 
established, interest runs from the date of the commencement of 
the action.  Establishing the "date of an alleged breach is a 
question of fact for the trier of fact."  Karen Constr. Co. v. 
Lizotte, 396 Mass. 143, 149 (1985).  Where a trial has proceeded 
before a jury, neither the trial judge nor an appellate court 
may make such a determination.  Id.  If the judge does not 
instruct the jury to make a special finding as to the date of 
the breach, and the plaintiff fails to object to that omission, 
interest properly runs from the date of the complaint.  Deerskin 
Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118, 125-
126 (1986). 
 
Here, the jury were not asked in the special verdict in the 
liability phase of the trial to find the date of the breach.  
Nor were they asked to identify the term of the contract that 
was in breach or the nature of the breach; they were simply 
asked whether Steward had "breached any terms of the Contract."  
And Hlatky did not object to the absence of questions asking for 
more specific findings. 
 
The judge, however, determined that the jury had implicitly 
found that Steward committed a breach of the contract on 
December 31, 2012, when it withdrew from SRSPC, because in her 
41 
 
jury instructions during the liability phase of trial she 
stated:  "Now, Dr. Hlatky alleges that Steward Health Care LLC 
breached the contract when it resigned as the sole member of 
Steward Research & Specialty Projects Corporation on December 
31, 2012."  But this statement merely summarized Hlatky's theory 
of the case; the absence of objection to this statement cannot 
be deemed the equivalent of a stipulation regarding the date of 
breach.  There is certainly evidence in the record to support a 
finding that Steward committed a breach of the contract on 
December 31, 2012, but the availability of evidence in the 
record "does not satisfy the requirement that the trier of fact 
establish the date for breach."  Aimtek, Inc. v. Norton Co., 69 
Mass. App. Ct. 660, 668 (2007).  Nor is the date of breach 
crystal clear from the evidence.  To be sure, Steward withdrew 
from SRSPC on December 31, 2012, but it did not withdraw its 
support from the Center on that date; it continued to make 
payroll and perform other obligations of the project 
administrator even when it no longer served in that capacity.  
The jury reasonably could have found that the breach occurred, 
not when Steward withdrew from SRSPC, but when it effectively 
withdrew its support for the Center. 
 
The burden rests with the plaintiff to establish the date 
of breach.  Where the plaintiff fails to request a special 
finding during a jury trial (or object to its omission), and 
42 
 
fails otherwise to meet that burden, prejudgment interest 
properly runs from the date the complaint was filed, which here 
was February 7, 2014.  See Deerskin, 398 Mass. at 125-126. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, with 
whom Budd and Cypher, JJ., join).  I agree that Dr. Lynn Hlatky 
suffered personal harm due to the defendant's breach of 
contract, as well as its breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  I agree that her harm -- the loss of the 
benefit of her bargain with Steward Health Care System, LLC 
(Steward) -- was compensable by money damages.  I also agree 
that Hlatky properly was permitted to testify as to the costs of 
rebuilding the laboratory that she brought to Steward and that 
was necessary to sustain her cancer research.  The evidence at 
trial was sufficient to undergird the remittitur award of $10 
million, the cost to rebuild a "minimal-functioning place," 
possibly allowing for requisite future grant funding and the 
resumption of Hlatky's once-vibrant research. 
 
I write separately because I disagree with Chief Justice 
Gants's remedy, one that would control how Hlatky may spend the 
damages that were awarded her.  The Chief Justice acknowledges 
that his remedy is unprecedented, see ante at    , and arises 
from his concern that, because she did not own the laboratory 
itself, and testified that she wanted the money to rebuild the 
laboratory, it somehow would be an unfair windfall were Hlatky 
to be permitted to spend the money damages in any other way.  
See ante at    .  The Chief Justice, moreover, is satisfied that 
the circumstances here are sufficiently unique so as to have no 
2 
 
effect on future cases.  See ante at    .  I disagree with him 
on both counts. 
 
To begin, it is the Chief Justice's remedy itself that is 
unfair. So far as I can tell (and as the Chief Justice himself 
agrees, see ante at    ), those awarded money damages by a jury 
have never before been told by a court that they may spend the 
award only to restore what was lost.  Once a plaintiff's 
recognized loss has been assessed and measured by the finder of 
fact, and then transformed into fungible money damages, it has 
been for the plaintiff to decide how to spend that compensatory 
award of damages.  I see no good reason to depart from that 
well-established course by singling out for different treatment 
this distinguished woman, whose life's work as a scientist was 
derailed by a breached contract.  That breach resulted in the 
foreseeable loss of the laboratory necessary to sustain her 
work, and all of the experimental samples she had created.  
Whether she wishes to start again, whether she even could start 
again after so much time has passed and her faculty position has 
been lost, whether she wishes to use the money to fund different 
research or others' research in the same field, or whether she 
wants to hike the Appalachian trail -- these matters simply are 
not our concern. 
 
The Chief Justice views this departure from the norm as 
warranted both because Hlatky did not own the laboratory itself, 
3 
 
and because, by testifying that she intended to rebuild the 
laboratory, she somehow waived the right to use the money 
damages awarded her in any other way.  While I can see how her 
not owning the laboratory might be relevant to an argument that 
she has not herself been harmed and simply cannot have suffered 
compensable damage (a view that the Chief Justice and I both 
reject),1 it has no evident connection to the scope of damages 
she may receive. 
 
The Chief Justice seems to think, unsupported by treatise 
or case law, that this fact of nonownership distinguishes 
Hlatky's case from all other contract cases, and that it thereby 
implicates a  fairness calculus, i.e., if she does not own the 
laboratory, she does not fully own the loss, and any money 
damages cannot really be fully hers.  Fairness, as the Chief 
Justice sees it, requires that money awarded to her has to come 
with strings attached -- it can be spent only to rebuild the 
laboratory, or in support of "comparable cancer research," and, 
in the interim, must be held in some form of trust.2  Yet there 
                                                          
 
1 Compare Ferrer v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 573 Pa. 
310, 349-352 (2002) (Cappy, J., dissenting). 
 
 
2 The alternative limitation that the Chief Justice would 
impose on Hlatky's award of damages -- that it be used to 
support "comparable cancer research"-- is curious, at best.  It 
has nothing to do with Hlatky's expectation damages.  The Chief 
Justice indicates elsewhere that the measure of her personal 
damages is that amount of money necessary to restore her to the 
position she would have been in had Steward provided the support 
4 
 
is no requirement in the Restatement of Contracts, nor in our 
prior cases, that a plaintiff own the property at issue.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 344(a) (1981) (in breach of 
contract claim, plaintiff is entitled to damages to protect 
"h[er] 'expectation interest,' which is h[er] interest in having 
the benefit of h[er] bargain by being put in as good a position 
as [s]he would have been in had the contract been performed").3  
See e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151-152 (Ex. 
Ch. 1854); Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. 459, 462-464 (1813). 
As the Chief Justice recognizes, see ante at    , far from 
being unique, the form of arrangement at issue here is typical 
                                                          
 
it had promised her -- being able to "continue her life's 
scientific work" at the "peak of her career" by having a 
functioning laboratory supported by grant funding.  See ante at    
.  Even if the $10.2 million remittitur award were all that the 
evidence supports -- a questionable assumption in my view, given 
that she also expected a faculty position, support staff, 
researchers, the use of her irreplaceable cell samples, the 
ongoing money necessary to run the laboratory, as well as other 
"indirect costs," see ante at     n.1, it hardly would include 
supporting other "comparable cancer research."  Moreover, one 
readily could envision how the $10.2 million would be eroded by 
legal fees if this mandated alternative were invoked:  for 
starters, just what cancer research in fact would be 
"comparable"?  To be sure, however, Hlatky would be free to use 
her award of damages to support other cancer research of her 
choice, if she elected to do so. 
 
3 "Expectation damages for breach of contract include 
consequential damages, i.e., 'those that cannot be reasonably 
prevented and arise naturally from the breach, or which are 
reasonably contemplated by the parties.'"  Selmark Assocs., Inc. 
v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 545 (2014), quoting Polaroid Corp. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 414 Mass. 747, 762 (1993). 
5 
 
in scientific research.4  The sponsoring institution may "own" 
the laboratory for purposes of scientific neutrality in 
government-sponsored work, but it has no ability to control the 
use of the equipment and materials, to maintain custody of the 
laboratory, or to direct the researchers.  The laboratory is a 
creature of the principal investigator, and would not exist 
without her. 
Nor is it in the least surprising that Hlatky testified, in 
support of her claim for money damages, as to the importance of 
the hoped-for rebuilding of her laboratory.  In order to 
establish the amount of damages she claimed, it was necessary 
(and typical) that she focus on the cost of such intended 
rebuilding, rather than -- even if relevant -- the immeasurable 
harm done to her cancer research resulting from the loss of her 
                                                          
 
4 The principal investigator brings in grant funding based 
on her standing and reputation in the field, develops the 
laboratory using her knowledge, training, skill, and experience, 
hires and supervises the laboratory staff and subordinate 
researchers attracted by the principal's scientific standing and 
reputation, and is entitled to move all of this, along with any 
remaining grant funding, to any other institution she chooses.  
See ante at    .  See generally National Science Foundation, 
Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide (Dec. 26, 
2014), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf15001 
/gpg_print.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ8Q-EBLM]; 2 C.F.R. § 200.56 
(2014) (indirect facilities and administrative costs).  See also 
National Science Foundation, Indirect Cost Rates, https:// 
www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/caar/indirect.jsp [https://perma.cc/W3Z4-
2RF3], NASA Grant and Cooperative Agreement Manual (Dec. 26, 
2014, rev. Aug. 22, 2019), https://prod.nais.nasa.gov 
/pub/pub_library/srba/documents/Grant_and_CooperativeAgreement 
Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2L-GSCX]. 
6 
 
laboratory.  That she did so testify does not operate as a form 
of waiver as to any other use of the awarded damages and in no 
way warrants the extraordinary limitation that the Chief Justice 
would impose. 
I am not persuaded that the Chief Justice's remedy, a 
curious mixture of expectation damages coupled with partial 
specific performance,5 is either necessary or appropriate.  "One 
cannot have damages for the breach of a contract, and a decree 
also for its specific performance.  Not because the remedies are 
inconsistent.  On the contrary, they are alternative."  
Perroncello v. Donahue, 448 Mass. 199, 204 (2007), quoting 
Slaughter v. La Compagnie Francaises Des Cables Telegraphiques, 
119 F. 588, 588–589 (2d Cir. 1902), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 574 
(1903).  See, e.g., Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 
411 Mass. 451, 478-479 (1991); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 
                                                          
 
5 Specific performance "is usually granted in disputes 
involving the conveyance of land," which is considered unique 
and where money damages will not suffice to make a plaintiff 
whole.  McCarthy v. Tobin, 429 Mass. 84, 89 (1999).  "[U]nder 
traditional principles of contract law, courts normally do not 
enforce employment contracts with orders for specific 
performance."  Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orch., Inc., 557 F. 
Supp. 230, 234 (D. Mass. 1983), quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 
600 F.2d 1003, 1023 n.34 (1st Cir. 1979), overruled on another 
ground, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 
(1985).  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 364(b), (c) 
(specific performance will be "refused if such relief would be 
unfair"). 
7 
 
579, 583-584 (1973), discussing Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114 
(1929). 
I also do not agree with the Chief Justice's view that the 
limitation on the damages awarded Hlatky is the only "fair" 
thing to do in this case.  The circumstances here are on all 
fours with Ferrer v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 573 Pa. 310, 
334-335 (2002).6  As in Ferrer, supra, I believe that Hlatky 
should receive the money damages the jury awarded, just as she 
would in any other case of breach of an employment contract.7  
Indeed, as the Chief Justice observes, see ante at    , Hlatky 
appears to have a much stronger claim to damages than did the 
professor in Ferrer.  She suffered the loss of a laboratory that 
she created for her cancer research, and that she had built up 
over twenty-five years; she brought to Steward her laboratory, 
her research staff, and her irreplaceable cell samples, only to 
see it all destroyed through Steward's actions and failures to 
act.  See, e.g., Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 272, 286-
288 (D.C. 2016); Moncton vs. Argonne Nat'l Lab., No. 03-C-3989 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2005). 
                                                          
 
6 In Ferrer, 573 Pa. at 334-335, money damages were awarded 
to compensate a professor for the costs of restoring his 
research laboratory and Federally-funded program, including 
research animals, to its level prior to the university's breach. 
 
 
7 Indeed, the Chief Justice correctly characterizes the 
contract here as "not merely an employment contract." See ante 
at    . 
8 
 
To be sure, while uncommon in the employment context,8 
Hlatky herself might have sought specific performance of the 
contract, requiring the defendant to provide her with "non-
capital funds in the amount of $323,000 per year for a period of 
[three] years . . . to be used for recruitment of research 
personnel, laboratory supplies, animal expenses, and expenses 
required to support [her] research," as well as "to continue to 
provide support and suitable office space" for her Center of 
Cancer Systems Biology.  She did not do so, electing instead to 
pursue a damages remedy.  It is not for this court to second 
guess the plaintiff and to impose retroactively even a modified 
form of the road not taken. 
Indeed, among the unintended consequences of the Chief 
Justice's novel hybrid remedy is this:  the Chief Justice 
justifies his remedy by its focus upon Hlatky not "owning" the 
laboratory, and by the avoidance of a purported windfall.  Yet 
the remedy, even if it were feasible, would render her the owner 
or beneficiary of any rebuilt laboratory made possible by the 
use of her funds.  Ironically, Federal funding requirements 
                                                          
 
 
8 See Redgrave, 557 F. Supp. at 234, quoting Loeb, 600 F.2d 
at 1023 n.34. 
 
9 
 
generally do not permit such ownership by a principal 
investigator.9 
Quite apart from these concerns, I am not at all confident 
that, if adopted here, the Chief Justice's hybrid remedy would 
be the "one-off" that he anticipates.  There are at least nine 
teaching hospitals and more than sixty acute care hospitals in 
Massachusetts, as well as over one hundred colleges and 
universities.  However well intentioned, the admixture the Chief 
Justice has devised is Solomonic only in the sense that 
splitting the baby becomes a real risk.  That similar situations 
could well arise again in our research-rich environment is 
hardly unthinkable.  See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of the 
D.C. v. Vossoughi, 963 A.2d 1162, 1179-1182 (D.C. 2009) 
(affirming award of damages for value of researcher's "life's 
work," conducted with grant funding, and rejecting contention 
that jury should be instructed that plaintiff did not have 
ownership rights in materials purchased with university funds); 
                                                          
 
 
9 See, e.g., National Science Foundation, Prospective New 
Awardee Guide (Jan. 2018), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2018 
/nsf18033/nsf18033.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94R-4UW3]; National 
Science Foundation, Grantee Standards, NSF 05-131 (July 2005), 
https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/manuals/gpm05_131/gpm5.jsp#510 
[https://perma.cc/7N7A-3F9S].  Neither the Chief Justice nor I 
have expertise in the intricacies of Federal grants to 
laboratories; that being said, however, I rather doubt that a 
former owner or beneficiary of a laboratory, who then 
transferred her funds to a nonprofit entity to hold title, could 
thereby qualify to be the requisite neutral principal 
investigator. 
10 
 
Mossberg v. University of Or., 240 Or. App. 490, 492-493, 503-
506 (2011) (professor sued university for money damages for 
destruction of laboratory and equipment he had acquired with 
Federal grants and brought with him to his new university, as 
well as additional equipment acquired through grants after his 
arrival).10 
It is not doctrinal purity for its own sake that matters 
here; it is that settled expectations about fundamental legal 
concepts do have value.  Contract law is based on 
predictability.  Parties expect to get the benefit of their 
negotiated bargains and, with recognized exceptions few in 
number, to have the law enforce them.  The prospect that 
reviewing courts will, at unanticipated times and on an ad hoc 
basis, craft and impose unique remedies that the parties did not 
envision hardly furthers needed predictability.  Introducing 
unnecessary contractual uncertainty in an economy so heavily 
dependent as Massachusetts's is upon education, medicine, and 
technological innovation is simply not prudent. 
For the reasons I have given, and because I would not open 
the Pandora's box of unknown future harm to the predictability 
                                                          
 
10 See also Embury v. King, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1085-1087 
(N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 361 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2004); Tavolini 
v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 984 F. Supp. 196, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 
aff'd, 198 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1999). 
11 
 
of contract law upon which contracting parties have relied for 
hundreds of years, I respectfully dissent.