Title: Commonwealth v. Ashe A.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12723 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ASHE A., a juvenile. 
 
 
October 29, 2019. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, 
Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Delinquent child, Juvenile 
Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Practice, 
Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Statute, 
Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
On February 20, 2018, a complaint issued against the 
juvenile charging him with disturbing a school assembly, in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 40, as amended by St. 1969, c. 463, 
§ 1.  He was arraigned in the Juvenile Court on the same day.  
At the time, § 40 provided that "[w]hoever wilfully interrupts 
or disturbs a school . . . shall be punished."  While the 
juvenile's case was pending in the Juvenile Court, on April 13, 
2018, the Legislature enacted "An Act relative to criminal 
justice reform" (act).  St. 2018, c. 69.  As part of the act, 
the Legislature struck the former statute in its entirety and 
replaced it.1  The statute now provides: 
 
"Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs an assembly of 
people meeting for a lawful purpose shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not more than [one] month or by a fine of 
not more than [fifty dollars]; provided, however, that an 
elementary or secondary student shall not be adjudged a 
delinquent child for an alleged violation of this section 
for such conduct within school buildings or on school 
grounds or in the course of school-related events." 
                                                          
 
 
1 In these circumstances, we consider the amendment of the 
statute to constitute an explicit repeal of the statute's 
earlier provisions.  See Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 
325, 329 n.9 (2019). 
2 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 272, § 40, as appearing in St. 2018, c. 69, § 159.  A 
judge in the Juvenile Court declined to apply the amended 
statute retroactively to the juvenile's conduct, and the 
juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in October 2018.  We granted 
the juvenile's application for direct appellate review to 
consider whether St. 2018, c. 69, § 159, should be applied 
retroactively to cases pending on April 13, 2018.2  We conclude 
that it should.  We vacate the delinquency adjudication and 
remand the matter to the Juvenile Court for dismissal of the 
complaint. 
 
 
Background.  On February 16, 2018, while sitting with other 
boys at a school lunch table, the juvenile made "prank" 
telephone calls to a help hotline and a television news station.  
When he spoke to the news station, the juvenile said something 
to the effect of:  "I didn't get my lunch, I feel like killing 
someone."  The news station contacted the police and a brief 
investigation identified the source of the calls as the 
juvenile's telephone and a tablemate's telephone.  By that time, 
the juvenile had been released from school for an unrelated 
reason.  Because the juvenile was no longer inside the school, 
the school administration ordered the students, faculty, and 
staff to shelter in place, disrupting the school routine.  The 
order remained in effect for about an hour, until both boys were 
located. 
 
 
Discussion.  The applicable principles of statutory 
construction were recently described in Lazlo L. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 328-330 (2019), and need not be 
repeated here.  To summarize, in construing a "strictly penal" 
statute,3 Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 99 (2012), the 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division and the youth advocacy foundation of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services; American Civil Liberties 
Union of Massachusetts, Inc.; Massachusetts Appleseed; Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law 
School; Citizens for Juvenile Justice; GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders; Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee; Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; and Anti-Defamation 
League. 
 
 
3 General Laws c. 272, § 40, is a penal statute.  It is 
"designed to enforce the law by punishing offenders."  Lazlo L., 
482 Mass. at. 330 ("Where a statute affects whether a child can 
3 
 
 
presumption is that "[t]he repeal of a statute shall not affect 
any . . . proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an 
offence committed . . . under the statute repealed," unless that 
construction would be "[(1)] inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the law-making body or [(2)] repugnant to the context 
of the same statute."  G. L. c. 4, § 6.  Our analysis begins, 
therefore, with the presumption that St. 2018, c. 69, § 159, is 
prospective in application. 
 
 
Lazlo L. provides the framework for discussion.  In that 
case, we considered whether either exception to the presumption 
of prospectivity applied to a different section of the same act.  
See St. 2018, c. 69, § 72.  That section amended the definition 
of "delinquent child" to, among other things, provide that a 
child who commits a first offense of a misdemeanor "for which 
the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of 
correction for not more than [six] months or both" may not be 
adjudicated a "delinquent child."  Id.  With respect to the 
first exception, we concluded that there was "inadequate 
evidence of the Legislature's manifest intent to apply § 72 
retroactively to overcome the presumption of prospective 
application."  Lazlo L., 482 Mass. at 331-332.  For the same 
reasons we explained in Lazlo L., we conclude that the first 
exception to the presumption of prospectivity does not apply to 
St. 2018, c. 69, § 159.  Neither the Legislature clearly 
established that the amendment "would apply retroactively to 
pending cases . . . [n]or are there any other provisions in the 
act that would make prospective application of [§ 159] 
'anomalous, if not absurd.'"  Lazlo L., supra at 332, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 554 (2013). 
 
 
The second exception applies where "prospective application 
would be 'repugnant to the context' of the statutory amendment."  
Lazlo L., 482 Mass. at 332, quoting G. L. c. 4, § 6.  We 
consider in this context whether "it would be contrary to the 
purpose of the statute to delay the accomplishment of that 
purpose."  Lazlo L., supra, quoting Bradley, 466 Mass. at 555-
556.  We described the legislative history of the act in Lazlo 
L., supra at 333, observing that "the Legislature understood 
that children who enter the juvenile justice system have a 
higher risk of reoffending for the remainder of their lives, and 
. . . their risk of recidivism is greater the earlier they enter 
the system."  In § 72, the Legislature narrowed the definition 
of "delinquent child" to "reduce the number of children who 
                                                          
 
be adjudicated delinquent . . . , an amendment to that statute 
necessarily implicates the potential for punishment"). 
4 
 
 
enter the juvenile justice system."  Lazlo L., supra.  See 
Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 795 (2019).  In 
§ 159, the Legislature furthered the same purpose by 
specifically removing certain school-based offenses from the 
sphere of infractions for which juveniles may be adjudicated 
delinquent.  As we said in Lazlo L., supra at 334, "[w]e see no 
reason to delay the application of an amendment aimed at 
combatting the negative effects of Juvenile Court involvement on 
children and their communities." 
 
 
Our conclusion that § 159 has retroactive application to 
cases pending on April 13, 2018, is further buttressed by the 
jurisdictional nature of the amendment.  See Lazlo L., 482 Mass. 
at 335.  As of April 13, 2018, "the Juvenile Court no longer has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate as a 'delinquent child,'" id., a 
juvenile who "interrupts or disturbs an assembly of people" 
within "school buildings or on school grounds or in the course 
of school-related events," G. L. c. 272, § 40, as appearing in 
St. 2018, c. 69, § 159.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58.  "Because 
jurisdiction is a threshold requirement for a court to decide 
any case, it would have been logical for the Legislature to 
expect that Juvenile Court proceedings against children" for 
violation of the school assembly statute "would cease and the 
cases would be dismissed on the day" that § 159 became effective 
and school-based adjudications of delinquency were removed from 
the statute.  Lazlo L., supra, citing Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 645 (2013) ("Juvenile Court is a 
court of limited jurisdiction, which has no authority in the 
absence of a specific statutory authorization" [quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted]). 
 
 
Conclusion.  We need go no further.4  Because prospective 
application of St. 2018, c. 69, § 159, would be repugnant to the 
purpose of the Legislature's amendment of the school assembly 
statute, the statute applies retroactively to cases that were 
pending as of April 13, 2018.  We vacate the adjudication of 
delinquency, and we remand the matter to the Juvenile Court for 
dismissal. 
 
                                                          
 
 
4 Because we conclude that St. 2018, c. 69, § 159, applies 
retroactively to cases pending on April 13, 2018, we do not 
address the Commonwealth's claim that the Juvenile Court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the juvenile a "delinquent child," 
for purposes of St. 2018, c. 69, § 72; or whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency under 
G. L. c. 272, § 40, as in effect prior to April 13, 2018. 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Eva G. Jellison for the juvenile. 
 
Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Melissa Allen Celli, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief.