Title: State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1505.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1505 
THE STATE EX REL. MOTOR CARRIER SERVICE, INC., APPELLANT, v. RANKIN, 
REGISTRAR, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
THE STATE EX REL. MOTOR CARRIER SERVICE, INC. v. RANKIN, 
REGISTRAR, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1505.] 
Public records—R.C. 149.43—Driver’s Privacy Protection Act—18 U.S.C. 
2721—R.C. 
4501.27—Driving 
records—Qualified 
person 
seeking 
unredacted driver’s record of another that contains “personal 
information” must make request in conformity with Ohio Adm.Code 
4501:1-12-02(D)(2) by completing form BMV1173 and paying required 
fee. 
(Nos. 2012-1264 and 2012-1394—Submitted April 10, 2013—Decided  
April 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 10AP-1178, 2012-Ohio-2590. 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This consolidated case is a public-records matter dealing with the 
interplay of (1) Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, (2) the federal Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 2721 et seq. and its counterpart in 
Ohio, R.C. 4501.27 (collectively, “the DPPA”), and (3) a Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles (“BMV”) rule, Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2). 
{¶ 2} Case No. 2012-1394 is an original action in which relator, Motor 
Carrier Service, Inc. (“MCS”), an Ohio trucking company, seeks a writ of 
mandamus to compel respondents, BMV Registrar Mike Rankin and Ohio 
Department of Public Safety Director Thomas P. Charles, to provide an 
unredacted, noncertified copy of the driving records of an MCS employee at cost.  
The case is consolidated with case No. 2012-1264, a direct appeal from the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, involving the same parties and the same issues, but a 
different driving record. 
{¶ 3} In both cases, MCS requested unredacted copies of the driving 
records of its employees from the BMV at cost.  The BMV refused to provide 
unredacted copies at cost—five cents per page—but instead, following the BMV 
rule, required MCS to specify the basis for its entitlement to an unredacted copy 
on form BMV1173 and to pay a $5 fee for a certified copy.  MCS claims that it 
does not need a certified copy and that it should be able to receive an unredacted 
copy at cost under the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 4} MCS is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because disclosure of 
the records is prohibited by the DPPA unless a requester can demonstrate a 
permissible use, which it must do by complying with the procedure outlined in the 
rule, Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2).  The BMV properly promulgated the 
rule under its rule-making authority.  The rule creates a procedure for requesting 
DPPA-governed materials, which includes filling out and submitting form 
BMV1173 and paying the $5 fee.  The specific provisions of R.C. 4501.27 and 
January Term, 2013 
 
3
Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) prevail over the general provisions of R.C. 
149.43, including the provision requiring that public records should be provided 
“at cost.” 
{¶ 5} For the following reasons, we affirm the Tenth District in case No. 
2012-1264 and deny the writ in case No. 2012-1394. 
Facts 
{¶ 6} The BMV is a division of the Ohio Department of Public Safety 
(“DPS”) and is a public office within the meaning of the Public Records Act.  
State ex rel. Mancini v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 69 Ohio St.3d 486, 633 
N.E.2d 1126 (1994). 
{¶ 7} The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of 
personal information that the BMV has in connection with a driving record. R.C. 
4501.27(A); 18 U.S.C. 2721(a). However, the DPPA permits disclosure for use by 
an employer or insurer to obtain or verify information about the holder of a 
commercial driver’s license.  R.C. 4501.27(B)(2)(j); 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(9).  The 
federal DPPA does not establish a procedure for requesting protected material 
from the BMV, but Ohio’s statute grants the BMV rule-making authority to carry 
out its duties.  R.C. 4501.27(E).  BMV promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-
02 under this authority. 
Case No. 2012-1264 
{¶ 8} On August 31, 2010, MCS submitted a public-records request to 
the BMV seeking an unredacted copy of the driving record of one of its 
employees.  In its request, MCS stated that the record was necessary to verify 
information about the employee’s commercial driver’s license as required by the 
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.  MCS did 
not submit a form BMV1173 with its request, nor did it pay any fee. 
{¶ 9} The BMV provided MCS with a copy of the driving record, but 
with the employee’s personal information redacted.  In a subsequent letter, an 
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attorney for DPS explained that the redaction is required by R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) 
and the DPPA, unless the request is made by a statutorily exempted requestor for 
statutorily defined purposes. 
{¶ 10} MCS filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, claiming that it was entitled to an unredacted copy of the driver’s record 
at cost.  The respondents countered that disclosure was prohibited by the DPPA 
and that MCS had failed to demonstrate that any exception applied, because it 
filed a request under the general public-records provision, Ohio Adm.Code 
4501:1-12-02(D)(1), rather than under Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2), 
which allows the requester to obtain unredacted records after showing that it 
meets the statutory conditions and paying the $5 fee. 
{¶ 11} The Tenth District magistrate recommended denial of the writ, 
finding that because MCS had applied under Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(1) 
rather than (D)(2), it was entitled only to a redacted copy.  The majority panel 
agreed, finding that a requester is not authorized to obtain an unredacted copy 
unless the request conforms to section (D)(2) of the rule.  State ex rel. Motor 
Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Williams [Rankin], 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1178, 2012-Ohio-
2590.  The BMV “has promulgated a rule requiring a requester to provide specific 
information regarding the purpose of the intended use accompanied by a 
certification of truthfulness.”  Id. at ¶ 17.  MCS did not follow this procedure, but 
made a general public-records request.  One member of the panel dissented in part 
on the merits, asserting that the BMV, while authorized to promulgate the rule 
requiring a special application for restricted information, went too far in its 
requirement that an eligible requester “choose either a public records request to 
receive a redacted copy or the completion of form BMV1173, request for a 
certified abstract, and payment of a $5 fee to get a full copy.”  Id. at ¶ 30 (French, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
5
Case No. 2012-1394 
{¶ 12} On July 3, 2012, MCS submitted a request, including a completed 
BMV form, but again lacking the $5 fee, to BMV Registrar Rankin for a copy of 
the unredacted, noncertified driving record of an employee.  MCS again specified 
that its request was to verify information relating to its employee’s commercial 
driver’s license that is required under the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
of 1986.  The DPS again provided only a redacted version of the requested 
driving record, citing the DPPA and Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02. 
{¶ 13} On August 14, MCS filed case No. 2012-1394 as an original action 
in this court for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, BMV Registrar Mike 
Rankin and DPS Director Thomas P. Charles, to provide access at cost to an 
unredacted, noncertified copy of the employee driving record MCS requested in 
its July 3, 2012 request.  On October 1, 2012, an alternative writ was granted.  
133 Ohio St.3d 1403, 2012-Ohio-4477, 975 N.E.2d 1022.  At the same time, case 
Nos. 2012-1394 and 2012-1264 were consolidated for consideration by the court.  
Id. at 1402. 
{¶ 14} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Analysis 
Request for Oral Argument 
{¶ 15} The phrase “Request for Oral Argument” appears on the front page 
of MCS’s Memorandum in Support of Writ in case No. 2012-1394, without 
explanation in the memorandum or in any pleading. As part of their response to 
the motion to consolidate, BMV and DPS concur in that request, although again 
with no explanation as to why oral argument is needed here. 
{¶ 16} In cases in which oral argument is not mandatory—such as original 
actions and direct appeals from cases originating in a court of appeals, see 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A)—we have discretion to grant oral argument, and “ ‘in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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exercising this discretion, we consider whether the case involves a matter of great 
public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional 
issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.’ ”  State ex rel. Jean–Baptiste v. 
Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 10, quoting 
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-
5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 17} No conflict in the lower courts has been identified, and the case 
involves an important, but narrow, issue of public-records law.  The briefs are 
sufficient for us to resolve the appeal here. Jean–Baptiste at ¶ 13, citing State ex 
rel. Otten v. Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2011-Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 809, 
¶ 19.  We therefore proceed to decide the merits of the case without oral 
argument. 
Public Records Act analysis 
{¶ 18} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  Although “[w]e 
construe the Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any 
doubt in favor of disclosure of public records,” State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey 
Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6, 
the relator must still establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief by 
clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 
2011-Ohio-6117, 958 N.E.2d 1235, paragraph three of the syllabus (“Relators in 
mandamus cases must prove their entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing 
evidence”). 
 
Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof 
which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not 
January Term, 2013 
 
7
to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the 
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 
established.” 
 
State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 
1215, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} R.C. 4501.34(A) specifies that “all documents in the registrar’s 
possession are public records.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires a public office to 
make copies of public records available at cost on request and within a reasonable 
period of time.  However, records or parts of records are exempt from this 
requirement if their release is prohibited by state or federal law.  R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v). 
{¶ 20} In 1994, the federal government enacted the DPPA to regulate the 
disclosure and resale of personal information in the records of state motor-vehicle 
departments.  Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099; Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S 141, 
143, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000).  In 2000, the Ohio General 
Assembly followed suit, amending R.C. 4501.27 to comply with federal 
requirements.  2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 600, 148 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6524, 6535; 
Bailey v. Ohio Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-378, 2002-Ohio-
7361, ¶ 30.  Both the federal DPPA and its Ohio counterpart prohibit the BMV 
from “knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or 
entity” any “personal information” about an individual that the bureau obtained 
“in connection with a motor vehicle record.”  18 U.S.C. 2721(a)(1); R.C. 
4501.27(A).  The Ohio statute defines “personal information” as “information that 
identifies an individual, including, but not limited to, an individual’s photograph 
or digital image, social security number, driver or driver’s license identification 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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number, name, telephone number, or medical or disability information, or an 
individual’s address other than the five-digit zip code number.”  R.C. 
4501.27(F)(3); see also R.C. 4501.27(F)(5) (defining “sensitive personal 
information”). 
{¶ 21} DPPA’s ban on disclosure has exceptions, some requiring 
disclosure (not pertinent here) and some permitting disclosure.  One exception 
allows the BMV to disclose personal information “[f]or use by an employer or by 
the agent or insurer of an employer to obtain or verify information relating to the 
holder of a commercial driver’s license or permit that is required under the 
‘Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986,’ 100 Stat. 3207-170, 49 U.S.C. 
2701, et seq., as now or hereafter amended.”  R.C. 4501.27(B)(2)(j).  MCS claims 
to be such an employer. 
{¶ 22} Ohio’s DPPA establishes a procedure for requesting DPPA-
protected material from the BMV, by granting the BMV rule-making authority.  
Specifically, R.C. 4501.27(E) states that “[t]he registrar of motor vehicles may 
adopt any forms and rules, consistent with but no more restrictive than the 
requirements of [the federal DPPA] that are necessary to carry out the registrar’s 
duties under this section * * *.” 
{¶ 23} Under that authority, the BMV promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 
4501:1-12-02, which articulates the prohibitions and exceptions in the DPPA and 
creates a procedure for requesting a motor-vehicle record.  The rule creates two 
options for requesting such records. 
{¶ 24} First, the requester may make a public-records request under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(1).  A request made under this section entitles the 
requester to a copy of the record at cost, but with personal information redacted. 
{¶ 25} A requester seeking an unredacted record containing personal 
information may make a request under Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2).  
Under this section, the requester must complete form BMV1173 and submit “the 
January Term, 2013 
 
9
fees statutorily authorized in the Revised Code.” Form BMV1173 requires the 
requester to provide proof of identity and to state which of the statutory 
exceptions to nondisclosure of personal information applies.  See Ohio Adm.Code 
4501:1-12-02(G)(1) and (2).  R.C. 4509.05(B) authorizes a fee of $5 for a 
certified abstract of a driving record. 
Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02 does not conflict with the Public Records Act 
{¶ 26} A well-settled principle of Ohio law is that when two statutes, one 
general and one specific, cover the same subject matter, the special provision is to 
be construed as an exception to the general statute that might otherwise apply.  
See State ex rel. Slagle v. Rogers, 103 Ohio St.3d 89, 2004-Ohio-4354, 814 
N.E.2d 55, ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Dublin Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of 
Securities, 68 Ohio St.3d 426, 429, 627 N.E.2d 993 (1994).  This rule has also 
been codified at R.C. 1.51: 
 
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local 
provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is 
given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is 
irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an 
exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is 
the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general 
provision prevail. 
 
{¶ 27} MCS’s argument here appears to be that the provisions of Ohio’s 
Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are immune from that principle.  MCS argues 
that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) is invalid because it “conflicts with 
Ohio’s public records statute” and is “wholly inconsistent with the plain language 
of R.C. 149.43.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 28} More specifically, MCS complains that the rule “effectively 
prohibits a DPPA-authorized requester from ever obtaining an unredacted, 
uncertified copy of the record pursuant to Ohio’s public records laws.”  The rule 
also “forces the DPPA-authorized requester to pay a $5.00 fee for a certified 
copy—a product which is not being requested, nor wanted.”  MCS also complains 
that R.C. 149.43 and 4501.34 and the DPPA, “when read together, mandate 
disclosure of the unredacted records to MCS.” 
{¶ 29} Contrary to MCS’s position, the Public Records Act is not immune 
from R.C. 1.51.  The federal and state DPPAs prohibit the BMV from disclosing 
personal information except under specific circumstances, and the General 
Assembly is permitted to establish an exception or partial exception to the Public 
Records Act to accommodate that law.  The General Assembly chose to do that in 
R.C. 4501.27, and it chose to permit the BMV to promulgate rules that specify a 
procedure for qualified requesters to obtain information as long as the requester 
pays a fee and states which exception to the ban on disclosure applies.  Under 
R.C. 1.51, these specific provisions cannot be overcome by the more general 
provisions of the Public Records Act.  Rather, the opposite is true: the specific 
prevails over the general.  Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) allows the BMV 
to verify that the requester is qualified to receive the information and will follow 
the nondisclosure rules in the statute. 
{¶ 30} MCS appears to agree with the first two requirements of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2), as it has filled out form BMV1173 for at least 
one of its requests and identified the DPPA exception that applies.  MCS’s main 
objection seems to be to the $5 fee.  But we have specifically held on more than 
one occasion that the “at cost” provision of the Public Records Act is also 
amenable to R.C. 1.51 and that a statutory provision for a specific fee is 
considered an exception to the general “at cost” provision.  State ex rel. Slagle v. 
Rogers, 103 Ohio St.3d 89, 2004-Ohio-4354, 814 N.E.2d 55.  In Slagle, we held 
January Term, 2013 
 
11
that the “at cost” provision of R.C. 149.43(B)(1) means “the actual cost of making 
copies, ‘unless the cost is otherwise set by statute.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State ex 
rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 625, 640 N.E.2d 174 
(1994).  In Hutson, we cited 1989 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 89-073 for the same 
proposition.  Moreover, Slagle cited another Attorney General Opinion, requested 
by the relator in Slagle, which also held that where a specific statute establishes a 
method for determining the amount a party must pay for a photocopy of a 
transcript, that statute applies rather than the “at cost” provision in R.C. 149.43.  
2002 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2002-014. 
{¶ 31} Thus, under Slagle and the precedent cited there, a specific statute 
establishing a fee or a method for determining a fee for a requested public record 
acts as an exception to the general “at cost” language in R.C. 149.43.  Here, the 
BMV permissibly set up a special procedure for the release of certain records, 
together with a special provision requiring the payment of a specific fee for that 
release.  Under R.C. 1.51 and Slagle, these are special provisions that supersede 
the general language of R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 32} Therefore, MCS cannot get an unredacted copy of the driver’s 
record without applying for it under Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) by 
completing form BMV1173 and by paying the $5 fee. 
The BMV is not estopped from arguing that  
Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02 is valid 
{¶ 33} The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a party from taking a 
position inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by the 
same party in a prior proceeding.  Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324, 
2007-Ohio-6442, 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 25.  MCS contends that the arguments made 
by the DPS and the BMV in another case—Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603 (6th 
Cir.2011)—estop them from making the arguments they make here.  We disagree.  
Roth is factually distinguishable and was decided based on federal law alone.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Moreover, at the time relevant to the facts in Roth, Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02 
did not contain the two options now found in sections (D)(1) and (D)(2).  2000-
2001 Ohio Monthly Record 58.  Finally, the arguments made there by BMV are 
not at odds with the arguments made here. 
{¶ 34} The issue in Roth was whether the DPS director and the BMV 
registrar had qualified immunity under the federal DPPA for their disclosure of 
personal information in bulk to a company, Shadowsoft, Inc.  Shadowsoft had 
applied for personal information of Ohio drivers in bulk, asserting that it had a 
legitimate reason for the information, and signed an agreement that it would use 
the information in conformity with all applicable laws governing personal 
information.  According to the plaintiffs in Roth, Shadowsoft later sold the entire 
database to an entity that placed it on a public website, in contravention of the 
DPPA.  The plaintiffs—Ohio drivers whose personal information, as defined by 
the federal DPPA, was posted on the website—sued the BMV and the DPS, 
attempting to hold them liable for Shadowsoft’s improper use. Roth, 650 F.3d 
603, 607-609.  Shadowsoft had apparently submitted form BMV1173 and 
apparently paid the fee required at the time.  Id. at 608. 
{¶ 35} MCS contends that the DPS and the BMV in Roth argued that 
when a requester fills out the proper forms, asserts that the disclosure is for a 
proper purpose, and pays the proper fee, as Shadowsoft did, the BMV is required 
to disclose under the Ohio Public Records Act.  MCS claims that this argument is 
inconsistent with the arguments made here.  But MCS ignores the fact that Ohio 
Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02 was amended after the events at issue in Roth to include 
the two separate options in sections (D)(1) and (D)(2) and their related 
requirements.  2000-2001 Ohio Monthly Record 58.  Whatever might have been 
the factual situation in Roth, MCS must comply with the rule as it exists now, and 
BMV is not estopped from arguing that MCS must follow that rule. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
13
Motor Carrier Service is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
{¶ 36} Because MCS’s public-records mandamus claim lacks merit, it is 
not entitled to an award of attorney fees.  State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom–Carroll 
Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 34. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} MCS cannot get an unredacted copy of an employee’s driving 
record without applying for it under Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) by 
completing form BMV1173 and by paying the $5 fee. We affirm the judgment of 
the Tenth District in case No. 2012-1264 and deny the writ in case No. 2012-
1394. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Lisa Pierce Reisz, Kenneth J. 
Rubin, and Thomas E. Szykowny, for relator in case No. 2012-1394 and appellant 
in case No. 2012-1264. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William J. Cole and Hillary R. 
Damaser, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents in case No. 2012-1394 
and appellees in case No. 2012-1264. 
______________________