Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-44.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-44 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. PRITCHARD. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-44.] 
Attorneys at law—Numerous violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Indefinite license suspension. 
(No. 2011-0815—Submitted June 21, 2011—Decided January 11, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-025. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Warren G. “Bo” Pritchard of Youngstown, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0008417, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1982.  In November 2009, we suspended his license for his failure to register with 
the Office of Attorney Registration for the Supreme Court.  In re Attorney 
Registration Suspension of Pritchard, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-5786, 915 
N.E.2d 1256.  Later that month, having been apprised of some of the misconduct 
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described below, we entered an interim remedial license suspension.  Mahoning 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard, 123 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2009-Ohio-5956, 916 N.E.2d 
812. 
{¶ 2} On June 15, 2010, relator, the Mahoning County Bar Association, 
filed an amended complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline alleging misconduct involving 20 client relationships, including 
numerous instances in which Pritchard accepted payment from clients, neglected 
their matters, failed to respond to their communications, and refused to refund 
their retainers. 
{¶ 3} Relying on the parties’ joint stipulation of facts and violations, the 
board made findings of fact and misconduct and recommended Pritchard’s 
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and payment of restitution.  With a 
few exceptions described below, we adopt the board’s findings of facts and 
misconduct, order restitution, and indefinitely suspend Pritchard from the practice 
of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
Count A 
{¶ 4} From May to July 2009, Pritchard accepted $1,350 from Margaret 
Bury to file a bankruptcy petition.  Pritchard did not file the petition, respond to 
Bury’s inquiries, or return her money.  She ultimately retained a different 
attorney. 
Count B 
{¶ 5} In April 2008, Pritchard accepted $1,200 to represent Gerald 
Cenneno in a breach-of-contract case.  Pritchard prepared and filed a complaint.  
The defendant filed a counterclaim, which Pritchard discussed with Cenneno.  
From that point forward, however, Pritchard ceased returning Cenneno’s calls and 
messages and took no further action in the case.  Unbeknownst to Cenneno, the 
case proceeded and culminated in a default judgment against him, which he 
January Term, 2012 
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eventually learned about from opposing counsel.  Cenneno spent weeks trying to 
reach Pritchard by telephone.  He finally reached Pritchard, who stated that he 
would contact the court.  Months passed, and despite many calls, Cenneno 
continued to have difficulty reaching Pritchard.  Cenneno finally called the court 
himself and learned that no pleadings had been filed on his behalf.  Further calls 
to Pritchard went unreturned.  Cenneno finally retained another attorney, but he 
was unable to overturn the default judgment. 
Count C 
{¶ 6} The probate court in Columbiana County appointed Pritchard to be 
commissioner of the estate of Steve Yancsurak.  During 2009, Pritchard failed to 
appear for several hearings.  After the last absence, the court—as it had warned it 
would do—found Pritchard in contempt and issued a warrant for his arrest.  The 
court referred the matter to disciplinary authorities but eventually recalled the 
warrant. 
Count D 
{¶ 7} A client of Pritchard’s, William DiRenzo, wished to purchase 
some real estate owned by Pritchard’s mother.  In 2004, on his mother’s behalf, 
Pritchard reached an agreement with DiRenzo and sold him the parcel.  In 2006, 
DiRenzo became interested in purchasing additional land from Pritchard, and he 
eventually contributed $29,500 to a partnership formed to that end.  The land had 
fallen into foreclosure, and despite DiRenzo’s payment, after a series of 
agreements and payments involving multiple parties, the property ended up in the 
possession of a different buyer.  At the time of the stipulation, DiRenzo had not 
received back his expenditure of nearly $30,000 and did not own any of the land. 
Count E 
{¶ 8} In September 2007, Amy and Joseph DiDomenico retained 
Pritchard to represent them in a dispute with a roofing contractor, eventually 
paying him fees totaling at least $1,700.  Pritchard took some initial steps to 
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prosecute their complaint, but they soon began to have difficulty contacting him.  
After Pritchard missed a status conference, in October 2006, the court dismissed 
the DiDomenicos’ complaint.  For the next six months, the DiDomenicos 
continued to struggle to reach Pritchard.  In March 2009, Pritchard finally filed a 
motion to vacate the dismissal.  The court scheduled the motion for hearing, but 
despite a month’s notice and reminders from the DiDomenicos, Pritchard failed to 
appear, telling the clients that the hearing was “non-oral” and that they need not 
appear.  The court nevertheless set the case for the trial.  Two months after his 
interim suspension, Pritchard withdrew from the case, and the clients retained 
new counsel.  The case remains pending. 
Count F 
{¶ 9} In April 2009, Evelyn Sue Lorent, a widow, paid Pritchard $1,300 
to advise her regarding a probate matter and possible bankruptcy.  Pritchard gave 
her a bankruptcy worksheet and developed a strategy for weighing the benefits of 
bankruptcy but then did no further work on her case.  Unable to reach Pritchard in 
over five months despite numerous attempts, Lorent found another attorney.  
Pritchard did not return the $1,300. 
Count G 
{¶ 10} In August 2008, Carol Hovanes retained Pritchard to represent her 
in a foreclosure and possible bankruptcy, paying him $1,900 in legal and filing 
fees.  Pritchard filed a motion for leave to move or plead on behalf of Hovanes.  
The motion, which was granted, proved to be the only filing Pritchard made in the 
case.  Pritchard eventually stopped responding to Hovane’s calls and messages, 
and she hired a different attorney in January 2010.  Pritchard has not returned to 
Hovanes any part of the fees that she had paid him. 
Count H 
{¶ 11} In August 2008, Duane and Tracie Corll paid Pritchard $1,300 to 
represent them in a bankruptcy proceeding.  After completing some initial tasks, 
January Term, 2012 
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Pritchard became difficult to reach.  Nevertheless, in May 2009 and at the Corlls’ 
prodding, he filed the bankruptcy petition.  The bankruptcy was eventually 
completed, subject to the filing of papers proving that the Corlls had attended 
post-hearing counseling.  After Pritchard failed to appear at a July 2009 hearing, 
the Corlls completed the counseling and paperwork but were unable to contact 
Pritchard to have it filed.  The court notified the Corlls that filing the paperwork 
now would require payment of the full filing fee again.  When the paperwork was 
not filed, the court dismissed the case. 
Count I 
{¶ 12} In July 2009, Pritchard accepted $1,000 from Tina Marie Benson 
to file a bankruptcy petition, with a balance due of $350.  Pritchard never filed the 
case, never returned Benson’s calls and letters, and never met with Benson again.  
Months later, she hired a different attorney.  Pritchard has not returned her fees. 
Count J 
{¶ 13} In October 2008, Richard Bodendorfer paid Pritchard $750 to form 
a limited liability company.  Two attempts at filing were rejected by the secretary 
of state, after which Pritchard asked Bodendorfer for an additional $250.  
Bodendorfer sent Pritchard a check, but Pritchard took no further action on his 
behalf.  Pritchard has not refunded Bodendorfer’s fee. 
Count K 
{¶ 14} In 2009, Darlene Burman retained Pritchard to assist in 
administering the estate of her deceased brother.  He did not complete the estate’s 
inventory, and without court authorization, he charged the estate $15,028 in fees 
and costs.  The court did not sanction Pritchard, however, because he had almost 
completed the inventory, and the amount he charged was less than the court’s 
compensation schedule would have called for.  Burman retained new counsel, 
who completed the estate. 
 
 
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Count L 
{¶ 15} Joyce Catterson retained Pritchard to represent her in a tort claim.  
The representation began no later than 1999 and lasted until 2007.  The last action 
taken by respondent was an appeal from a magistrate’s decision in June 2007, 
which was dismissed in July 2007 for lack of a final, appealable order.  The lower 
court, however, has apparently taken no further action on the case, and the 
stipulated facts do not disclose any developments since then.  Pritchard testified 
that following the dismissal, he had informed Catterson’s husband that “nothing is 
transpiring” and that he and they are “still waiting for the court to do something.” 
{¶ 16} Relator argued that Pritchard’s conduct violated Prof.Cond. R. 1.4, 
which requires a lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter.”  The board, however, recommended dismissing this count in its 
entirety.  It found that the record showed that nothing had happened in the case 
that needed reporting and that Pritchard had in fact informed Catterson’s husband 
of the case’s status. 
{¶ 17} We agree with the board that these facts do not clearly and 
convincingly show that Pritchard violated Prof.Cond. R. 1.4.  Accordingly, we 
dismiss this count. 
Count M 
{¶ 18} In 2006, Jennifer Coyier paid Pritchard $200 to handle an 
adoption, but he never filed the petition and did not return the money.  Later, 
Coyier and her husband Gordon retained Pritchard to represent them in a breach-
of-contract action.  Pritchard filed a complaint in 2008 but performed no other 
work on the case; after he failed to appear at a pretrial conference, the court 
dismissed the case.  Pritchard did not inform the Coyiers of the dismissal of the 
case, and they were later sued by the company that had financed the transaction 
related to the allegedly breached contract.  The Coyiers eventually settled that 
claim for $1,200. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
Count N 
{¶ 19} In 2008, Emil Forska retained Pritchard in an effort to have his 
driver’s license reinstated.  Pritchard filed a complaint and attended a few 
hearings, but then neither worked on the case nor responded to his client’s 
inquiries.  The board states that the case was then dismissed, but the stipulated 
facts state that a filing fee was never paid and that the case “remains without a 
docket assignment.” 
Count O 
{¶ 20} In June 2009, Betty Garback paid Pritchard $130 to transfer a 
property interest.  Pritchard never performed the work, never responded to her 
communications, and never returned her money. 
Count P 
{¶ 21} Beginning in December 2008, Pritchard represented Saed Khatib 
in a property dispute.  Despite accepting $300 from Khatib, Pritchard failed to 
appear for a hearing, failed to file necessary pleadings, failed to answer his 
client’s communications, and failed to return Khatib’s funds. 
Count Q 
{¶ 22} The parties stipulated to a dismissal of this count, and the board 
agreed that it had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
Count R 
{¶ 23} In July 2009, Arthur Titus retained Pritchard to transfer to Titus the 
title to property that Titus had given to his late son.  Pritchard accepted $450 from 
Titus but neither performed any work nor answered Titus’s calls and letters.  Nor 
did he return Titus’s $450. 
Count S 
{¶ 24} In 2006, Clyde Weimer retained Pritchard to represent him in a 
complaint against two men and ultimately paid him $1,900.  Well into the 
proceedings, in September 2009, the defendants filed a notice to take Weimer’s 
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deposition.  Neither Pritchard nor Weimer appeared, and a few months later, 
Weimer retained new counsel. 
{¶ 25} Regarding this count, the board found that Pritchard had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, requiring “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client.”  While we accept the stipulated facts, we are not bound by the parties’ 
stipulation to misconduct, see, e.g., Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Donlin (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 152, 155, 666 N.E.2d 1137, and we disagree that the stipulated facts 
provide clear and convincing evidence of a lack of diligence.  The only fact 
suggesting a lack of diligence was Pritchard’s failure to attend a deposition.  But 
it is not clear that Pritchard had notice of that deposition; in fact, the stipulation 
suggests that the notice of deposition was docketed in the wrong case.  The 
stipulation also states that the court sent “a copy of a hearing notice * * * to all 
parties,” but it does not explain whether this notice referred to the deposition.  
Even if it did, it was sent “by regular mail” on the day of the deposition, so it 
seems unlikely Pritchard could have received it in time.  Nothing else in the 
stipulation addresses whether Pritchard had notice of the deposition. 
{¶ 26} This assortment of facts affirmatively suggests that Pritchard did 
not receive notice of the proceeding that he missed.  Thus, without more, his 
absence does not clearly and convincingly show a lack of diligence.  Accordingly, 
we dismiss this charge. 
Count T 
{¶ 27} In 2009, Pritchard accepted $550 from John Zetts to seek a child-
support reduction.  Pritchard performed no work, did not respond to Zetts’s calls, 
and did not refund the $550. 
Lack of Professional Liability Insurance 
{¶ 28} The parties also stipulated that in each one of the representations 
listed above, Pritchard failed to advise his clients that he lacked professional 
liability insurance. 
January Term, 2012 
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Conclusions of Law 
{¶ 29} The board concluded that the conduct described above resulted in 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (requiring a lawyer to keep 
a client informed about the status of matters for which he or she was engaged and 
to comply as soon as practicable to reasonable requests for information), 1.4(c) 
(requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not maintain 
professional-liability insurance), 1.8 (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a 
business transaction with a client unless certain conditions are met), 1.15(d) 
(requiring a lawyer promptly to deliver client funds and provide a full accounting 
of such funds), and 1.16(d) and (e) (requiring a lawyer to protect a client’s interest 
upon termination of a representation and promptly to return unearned fees).  Some 
of Pritchard’s misconduct occurred while the Code of Professional Responsibility 
remained in effect; as to this conduct, the board found that Pritchard had violated 
DR 5-104(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with 
a client if he and the client have different interests) and 6-101 (prohibiting a 
lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter). 
{¶ 30} Except as noted above, we adopt the board’s conclusions. 
Sanction 
{¶ 31} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the duties that the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental 
state, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 
96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 32} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Pritchard had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, demonstrated a pattern 
of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process prior to the institution of formal proceedings, harmed 
vulnerable clients, and failed to make restitution.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (h), and (i). 
{¶ 33} As to mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Pritchard lacked a prior disciplinary record, had fully and freely disclosed his 
misconduct, had been cooperative after the institution of formal proceedings, had 
presented evidence of good character and reputation, and had suffered and been 
treated for a mental disability that contributed to his misconduct.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), (e), and (g)(i) through (iv).  But although the board 
stated that Pritchard had no prior disciplinary record, that finding is erroneous.  
As stated earlier, he received an attorney-registration suspension in November 
2009. 
{¶ 34} Before the board, Pritchard argued for a two-year suspension with 
credit for times served under the remedial suspension, but the board disagreed and 
recommended that Pritchard be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.  
The board recognized that much of Pritchard’s misconduct occurred as he was 
struggling with major depression related to marital problems.  And the board 
acknowledged that he had taken numerous steps to deal with these problems.  But 
it found that negative factors outweighed the mitigating.  Pritchard committed 
dozens of disciplinary violations that harmed approximately 20 clients, some 
irreversibly.  Moreover, it found that Pritchard’s “poor law office management” 
played a significant role in his misconduct, and his failure to establish a reliable 
system predated his marital problems.  Some misconduct preceded his marital 
January Term, 2012 
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problems, including his failure to advise clients that he lacked malpractice 
insurance.  And the board also found that Pritchard continued taking money from 
clients (without providing services) months into his personal crisis. 
{¶ 35} The board recommended that Pritchard “be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law with no credit for time served and that he pay full 
restitution.” Concerning restitution, the board was unable to “determine from the 
present record exactly how much” restitution Pritchard owes, and it suggested that 
relator make this determination.  It also recommended that Pritchard provide 
proof of continuing mental-health counseling, proof that he is fully competent to 
return to the practice of law, proof that he is in compliance with all Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”) requirements, and proof that he has attended a 
rigorous and comprehensive office-management course approved by relator.  
Further, the board recommends that we order him to comply with all applicable 
continuing-legal-education requirements, make restitution, pay the costs of the 
action, and commit no further misconduct.  The board also recommends a two-
year probationary period in the event of reinstatement, with several conditions. 
{¶ 36} We adopt the board’s recommended sanction, which is appropriate 
in this case.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 
2008-Ohio-2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 50, 52 (imposing indefinite suspension 
where respondent neglected clients, failed to return unearned fees, caused his 
clients to forfeit legal rights, and did not adequately communicate with his 
clients); Disciplinary Counsel v. Andrews, 124 Ohio St.3d 523, 2010-Ohio-931, 
924 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 18 (imposing indefinite suspension where respondent had no 
aggravating factors but committed multiple violations); see also, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-5322, 835 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 25 
(requiring payment of restitution as determined by relator).  The record, the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and precedent all support the 
board’s recommendation. 
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{¶ 37} Accordingly, Pritchard is indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law in the state of Ohio.  Prior to reinstatement, Pritchard must demonstrate 
that he has fulfilled the following conditions: (1) he must provide proof of 
continuing mental-health counseling and proof from a mental-health professional 
that he is fully competent to return to the practice of law; (2) he must comply with 
all requirements of his OLAP contract during the period of his suspension; (3) he 
must attend a rigorous and comprehensive course in law-office management 
approved by relator; (4) he must comply with any and all mandatory CLE 
requirements; (5) he must make full restitution, as determined by relator, to Bury, 
Cenneno, the DiDomenicos, Lorent, Hovanes, the Corlls, Benson, Bodendorfer, 
Jennifer Coyier, Garback, Khatib, Titus, and Zetts for any unearned fees and 
unused cost advances, completion of which must be certified by relator; (6) he 
shall not commit any further misconduct during the period of suspension; and (7) 
upon reinstatement, he shall be subject to a two-year probationary period, during 
which he must (a) continue to abide by the foregoing requirements to the extent 
they are of a continuing nature, (b) be monitored by relator, and (c) permit relator 
to monitor his attorney trust account.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ronald Slipski and David Comstock Jr., for relator. 
______________________