Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL THOMAS JACKSON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117594  
MICHAEL T. JACKSON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
In 1985 the defendant was found guilty following a bench  
trial of first-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed  
on appeal. 
In 1998, he filed a motion for relief from  
judgment under MCR subchapter 6.500.  Relief was denied by the  
circuit court, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to  
appeal.  Defendant has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  In addition to arguing the substantive  
issues, he maintains that the limitations on relief provided  
by MCR 6.508(D) should not apply to him because his conviction  
predated the effective date of the rule.  He claims that it  
would constitute a due process violation to apply the rule  
retroactively to his case.  
We 
conclude 
that the subchapter 6.500 procedures do apply  
to convictions before the effective date of the rule and that  
there is no constitutional impediment to doing so.  On the  
facts of this case, the defendant has not established  
entitlement to relief as required by MCR 6.508(D), and the  
order of the circuit court denying relief is affirmed.  
I  
On 
December 
13, 
1983, a fourteen-year-old girl was beaten  
to death in her Saginaw County home.  Attention focused on the  
defendant when it was learned that he had been there that day.  
Defendant was then sixteen years old, and thus proceedings  
began in the probate court.  After several days of waiver  
hearings, the juvenile division of the probate court waived  
jurisdiction on August 20, 1984, and the defendant was bound  
over on a charge of first-degree (premeditated) murder.  
Defendant waived a jury and presented an insanity  
defense, making no effort to dispute that he killed the  
victim.  The circuit judge found him guilty as charged on  
April 18, 1985, and imposed the mandatory life sentence on  
May 31, 1985. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied  
in an opinion issued November 21, 1986.  
Defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed on  
2  
September 7, 1988.1  We denied leave to appeal on April 25,  
1989.2  In his direct appeal, among other issues, the  
defendant raised claims regarding the waiver of jurisdiction  
by the juvenile division of the probate court and the  
admissibility of his confession.  
In July 1998, the defendant filed a motion for relief  
from judgment in the Saginaw Circuit Court, once again  
challenging the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and the  
admissibility of his confession. 
He also argued that  
MCR 6.508(D) should not be applied retroactively to his case.  
The circuit court’s consideration of the motion took  
place in several stages.  First, on August 12, 1998, the  
court3 issued an opinion and order dealing with the issues  
regarding admissibility of the defendant’s statement.  
The 
court 
noted 
that the voluntariness of the defendant’s  
statement had been tested in both the juvenile court and the  
circuit 
court 
with 
evidentiary hearings under People v Walker,  
374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), and resolved against the  
defendant.  Further, on his initial appeal, the defendant  
raised for the first time the question of police compliance  
with former Juvenile Court Rule 3.3.  The Court of Appeals  
held that no miscarriage of justice would result from failure  
1 171 Mich App 191; 429 NW2d 849 (1988).  
2 432 Mich 896 (1989).  
3 
 The circuit judge who presided at trial had retired, 
and the motion was assigned to his successor.  
3  
 
 
to review the objections, but went on to say that despite the  
police failure to carry out their duties under JCR 3.3,  
defendant’s 
statement 
was 
properly 
admitted 
under 
the 
totality  
of the circumstances.  
Finally, the circuit court addressed the defendant’s new  
claim that the confession was inadmissible as the product of  
an illegal arrest. The court discussed the issue at length,  
finding no error. It said:  
While it is true that only a short time 
elapsed between defendant’s seizure and statement, 
he was, during that period, twice advised of his 
Miranda[4] rights. 
Nor does the Court find the  
police conduct in this case particularly flagrant 
or of such character as to justify the remedy  
sought.
 It is undeniable the police lacked  
probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
defendant 
at 
his  
residence.  They did, however, clearly have a right 
and need to question him about his presence at the 
victim’s home and any knowledge he may have had of 
the killing.  In this regard, the entire purpose of 
taking him into custody was not to place him under 
arrest, but to hold him until he could properly be 
questioned in the presence of his father.  Although 
there apparently was a failure to comply with all 
appropriate procedures governing questioning of a 
minor, the officers were at least aware that  
different procedures and rules applied and did 
their best to comply with them.  There is nothing 
in this case to suggest that their actions were 
part of some illegal plan or scheme or product of 
improper motivation. 
As noted above, no attempt 
was made to question defendant until his father was 
present.
 Mr. Jackson was contacted as soon as  
possible, arriving at the post a short time after 
his son. Both of them were given Miranda warnings 
and the defendant made his statement. As noted by 
the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the father was not fully 
able to exercise his free will and protect the 
rights and interests of his son. 
Under the  
4 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d  
694 (1966).  
4  
 
 
 
circumstances, the Court finds that any taint of 
initial police misconduct was sufficiently purged 
and the statement admissible under the Fourth  
Amendment.  It follows that any neglect of trial or 
appellate counsel in failing to raise this issue 
was of no consequence.  For the same reasons, it 
also follows that any consent obtained from the 
defendant and his father to search the premises in 
question was voluntary and otherwise proper, and 
that any evidence seized as the result of that 
consensual search was properly admitted at trial.  
The court then turned to the other issue raised in the  
motion regarding the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.  
The circuit court said that from the motion and supporting  
brief it could not say that the issue raised was without merit  
and that defendant was plainly not entitled to relief.  
Accordingly, the court ordered the prosecutor to respond to  
the motion.  
Following the response, the court issued a second  
opinion and order on May 28, 1999, rejecting the defendant’s  
claim.  After reviewing the testimony, as well as the  
applicable legal principles, the court concluded:  
Having reviewed the testimony presented, this 
Court is not left with any firm and definite 
conviction defendant was improperly waived to the 
adult system. 
Although there was sufficient  
indication that Michael was amenable to treatment  
and that the juvenile system could provide the type 
of treatment required, the evidence and testimony 
clearly supports the conclusion that there simply 
was not enough time to sufficiently resolve the 
underlying psychological problems that helped 
trigger this tragic event before Michael reached 
nineteen and juvenile jurisdiction ended, and that 
he would likely remain a danger to the public if 
released at that time.  Nor does the Court find, as 
suggested by defendant, that the Probate Judge 
ignored key testimony or otherwise misinterpreted 
the evidence.  In this regard, the Court notes that 
while Michael could have been placed in Yorkwood  
5  
 
and then transferred to the adult unit at Ypsilanti 
State Hospital at age eighteen, there would be no 
way to ensure continued treatment after age 
nineteen except through a petition for involuntary 
commitment and hospitalization.  Although Judge 
Barber made no mention of Yorkwood in his opinion, 
he apparently found, and this Court agrees, that 
the scenario envisioned by defendant was neither 
likely [n]or viable.  In summary, the Court finds 
the decision to waive jurisdiction to be supported 
by substantial and credible evidence on the record. 
It follows that any claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel must also fall.  
Defendant filed a delayed application for leave to  
appeal.  The Court of Appeals denied the application, “for  
failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to  
relief under MCR 6.508.”5  
II  
Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules, containing  
the procedure for motions for relief from judgment, was added  
by order of March 30, 1989, and was effective October 1, 1989.  
It was part of an overall revision of the rules governing  
criminal procedure.  The amendments adopted at that time  
included several related provisions applicable to criminal  
appeals, including the addition of MCR 7.205(F)(2), limiting  
a criminal defendant to a single appeal by right or leave from  
a conviction, and the amendment of MCR 7.205(F)(3) to make the  
eighteen-month limit6 on granting delayed application for  
leave to appeal applicable to criminal cases.  
5 
  Unpublished order, entered July 18, 2000 (Docket No. 
225416).  
6 Since shortened to twelve months.  
6  
 
 
 
The rules themselves, and the order adopting them, did  
not say anything about the applicability of the rules to cases  
that had already been commenced or cases involving crimes  
committed before the effective date of the amendments.  The  
general provision of the Michigan Court Rules regarding the  
application of the rules to pending actions is MCR 1.102,  
which provides:  
These rules take effect on March 1, 1985. 
They govern all proceedings in actions brought on 
or after that date, and all further proceedings in 
actions then pending.  A court may permit a pending 
action to proceed under the former rules if it 
finds that the application of these rules to that 
action would not be feasible or would work  
injustice.  
Those principles have been applied not only to the  
initial adoption of the rules, but also to later adopted or  
amended rules.  See Reitmeyer v Schultz Equipment & Parts Co,  
237 Mich App 332, 337; 602 NW2d 596 (1999). Subchapter 6.500  
has been consistently applied in cases involving convictions  
and appeals concluded before October 1, 1989, by both this  
Court and the Court of Appeals.  See, e.g., People v Reed, 449  
Mich 375; 535 NW2d 496 (1995); People v Carpentier, 446 Mich  
19; 521 NW2d 195 (1994); People v Ross, 242 Mich App 241; 618  
NW2d 774 (2000); People v Watroba, 193 Mich App 124; 483 NW2d  
441 (1992).7  
7 In addition, we have cited MCR 6.508 in numerous orders 
denying leave to appeal from denial of motions for relief from 
judgment.  E.g., People v Davis, 440 Mich 866; 486 NW2d 722  
(1992); People v Dunham-Bey, 441 Mich 855; 489 NW2d 766  
(1992); People v Yousif, 444 Mich 878; 511 NW2d 683 (1993); 
People v Selby, 452 Mich 874; 552 NW2d 176 (1996).  
7  
 
III  
MCR 6.508(D) provides the standards for determining  
whether a defendant is entitled to relief:  
(D) Entitlement to Relief. The defendant has  
the burden of establishing entitlement to the 
relief requested.  The court may not grant relief 
to the defendant if the motion  
(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction 
and sentence that still is subject to challenge on 
appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter 
7.300;  
(2) alleges grounds for relief which were 
decided against the defendant in a prior appeal or 
proceeding under this subchapter, unless the  
defendant establishes that a retroactive change in 
the law has undermined the prior decision;  
(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than 
jurisdictional defects, which could have been  
raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence 
or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless 
the defendant demonstrates  
(a) good cause for failure to raise such 
grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and  
(b) 
actual 
prejudice 
from 
the 
alleged 
irregularities that support the claim for relief. 
As used in this subrule, "actual prejudice" means 
that,  
(i) in a conviction following a trial, but for 
the alleged error, the defendant would have had a 
reasonably likely chance of acquittal;  
(ii) in a conviction entered on a plea of 
guilty, 
guilty 
but 
mentally 
ill, 
or 
nolo  
contendere, the defect in the proceedings was such  
that it renders the plea an involuntary one to a 
degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow 
the conviction to stand;  
(iii) in any case, the irregularity was so 
offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial 
process that the conviction should not be allowed 
to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of 
the case;  
8  
 
 
(iv) in the case of a challenge to the 
sentence, the sentence is invalid.  
The 
court 
may 
waive 
the 
"good 
cause"  
requirement of subrule (D)(3)(a) if it concludes 
that there is a significant possibility that the 
defendant is innocent of the crime.  
The requirements of showing good cause for failure to  
raise the issue on direct appeal and prejudice from the  
alleged error to entitle a defendant to relief are derived  
from United State Supreme Court decisions involving federal  
habeas corpus challenges to state convictions and collateral  
review of federal ones.  See Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72; 97  
S Ct 2497; 53 L Ed 2d 594 (1977); United States v Frady, 456  
US 152; 102 S Ct 1584; 71 L Ed 2d 816 (1982); Davis v  
United States, 411 US 233; 93 S Ct 1577; 36 L Ed 2d 216  
(1973).  The provision of subrule (D)(2) regarding issues that  
were decided against the defendant in a prior appeal state  
familiar principles drawn from the doctrines of res judicata  
and law of the case.  
Before the adoption of subchapter 6.500 and the related  
appellate procedure provisions, our rules were silent on the  
matter of delayed motions for new trial.  We had said that the  
courts do not look with favor on such long delayed motions,  
People v Barrows, 358 Mich 267, 272; 99 NW2d 347 (1959), but  
there was no bar to repeated filings of such motions without  
any limitation period. Id., p 273; Reed, supra at 388.8  
8 We reiterate the principle stated in Barrows that long­
delayed 
motions 
seeking 
relief 
from 
convictions 
are  
disfavored.  See People v Ward, 459 Mich 602, 611-614; 594 
NW2d 47 (1999).  
9  
 
IV  
The defendant makes no claim that on their face the  
provisions of subrule (D)(3) are unconstitutional.  Such a  
claim would be futile in light of the United States Supreme  
Court’s 
recognition 
of those standards.  Rather, the defendant  
argues that it constitutes a denial of due process to apply  
MCR 6.508 to him, because his crime, conviction, and direct  
appeal occurred before the effective date of the rule.  He  
relies principally on Rogers v Howes, 144 F3d 990 (CA 6,  
1998).  
Rogers was a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 USC 2254.  
The defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder in  
1965.  In 1992, he filed a motion for relief from judgment,  
which the trial court denied on the ground that the defendant  
failed to raise the claims on direct appeal and did not  
establish good cause for the failure to do so.  The defendant  
filed a habeas corpus petition in United States District  
Court, which held that because the issues raised were  
procedurally 
defaulted under Michigan law, it could not review  
the claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for  
the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the MCR  
6.508(D)(3) procedure was not “a firmly established and  
regularly followed rule of the Michigan courts at the time of  
petitioner’s conviction . . . .” Id. at 995. Thus, it did  
not constitute “an adequate and independent state ground”  
barring review of petitioner’s habeas petition in federal  
10  
 
  
court. Id.  
Defendant’s reliance on Rogers is misplaced. Rogers did  
not hold that the defendant is denied due process by  
application of MCR 6.508(D)(3) to his motion.  Rather, Rogers  
must be understood in the context of federal habeas corpus  
review of state court convictions.  The federal courts will  
not review a habeas corpus petition where the state prisoner  
has not first presented his federal claims to the state courts  
and exhausted all state court remedies available.  See, e.g.,  
Rust v Zent, 17 F3d 155, 160 (CA 6, 1994). Further, when a  
habeas corpus petitioner is denied the opportunity to present  
a federal claim in state court because of failure to comply  
with 
state 
procedural rules, that decision may preclude habeas  
corpus review where the state procedural rule constitutes an  
“independent and adequate state procedural ground” for the  
decision. 
Wainwright, supra at 87. 
Under federal law, a  
procedural bar does not operate to preclude federal habeas  
corpus review unless it is (1) independent of the federal  
claim at issue, (2) serves as an adequate basis for barring  
review, and (3) was “firmly established and regularly  
followed” at the time to which the rule is to be applied.  See  
Ford v Georgia, 498 US 411, 424; 111 S Ct 850; 112 L Ed 2d 935  
(1991).  In Rogers, the Sixth Circuit concluded that MCR 6.508  
was not such a firmly established and regularly followed rule  
at the time of the petitioner’s conviction and appeal, and  
11  
 
 
 
thus the federal court was not barred from considering the  
habeas corpus petition.  
Thus, viewed in context, Rogers does not constitute  
authority that Michigan courts may not apply MCR 6.508(D)  
retroactively, but only that our decision to do so will not  
restrict the federal courts in exercise of their authority  
under 28 USC 2254.  
V  
That 
leaves 
the 
question 
whether 
application of  
MCR subchapter 6.500 to the defendant’s conviction denies due  
process.  The principles are similar to those regarding  
retroactive 
application of statutes that are alleged to impair  
vested rights.  In general, an act relating to remedies or  
modes of procedure may be given retroactive effect.  As we  
said in In re Certified Questions (Karl v Bryant Air  
Conditioning Co), 416 Mich 558, 572; 331 NW2d 456 (1982):  
[R]etrospective application of a law is  
improper where the law “takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or 
attaches 
a 
new 
disability 
with 
respect 
to  
transactions or considerations already past”. 
Hughes [v Judges’ Retirement Bd, 407 Mich 75, 85; 
282 NW2d 160 (1979)].  
“Statutes related to remedies or modes of  
procedure which do not create new or take away 
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a 
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing 
will, in the absence of language clearly showing a 
contrary 
intention, 
be 
held 
to 
operate 
retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued, 
pending or future, there being no vested right to 
keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free  
12  
 
from amendment.” 
[Quoting Hansen-Snyder Co v  
General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286 
(1963) (headnote no. 1).]  
See also Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 531;  
462 NW2d 555 (1990), aff’d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed  
2d 328 (1992).  
On the related question whether retroactive procedural  
statutes violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post  
facto laws, we have explained that not every enactment that  
works to the detriment of a party constitutes such a  
violation.  See People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 592-593; 487  
NW2d 698 (1992):  
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has  
consistently held that the Ex Post Facto Clause, US 
Const, art I, § 10, cl 1, was intended to secure 
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and 
oppressive 
legislation, 
and 
not 
to 
limit  
legislative control of remedies and procedure that 
do not affect matters of substance.  In Dobbert v  
Florida, 432 US 282, 292-293; 97 S Ct 2290; 53 
L Ed 2d 344 (1977), the Court stated:  
“It is settled, by decisions of this Court so 
well known that their citation may be dispensed 
with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an 
act previously committed, which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission, or which  
deprives one charged with crime of any defense 
available according to law at the time when the act 
was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.  
* * *  
“Even though it may work to the disadvantage 
of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post 
facto. For example, in Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574 [4 
S Ct 202; 28 L Ed 262] (1884), as of the date of 
the alleged homicide a convicted felon could not 
have been called as a witness. Subsequent to that 
date, but prior to the trial of the case, this law 
was changed; a convicted felon was called to the  
13  
 
 
stand and testified, implicating Hopt in the crime 
charged against him.  Even though this change in 
the law obviously had a detrimental impact upon the 
defendant, the Court found that the law was not ex 
post facto because it neither made criminal a  
theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime 
previously 
committed, 
nor 
provided 
greater 
punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to 
convict. Id. at 589.”  
An enactment will not escape a court’s  
scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause merely 
because a legislature has given it a procedural 
label.  However, legislation will not be found  
violative of the clause simply because it works to 
the disadvantage of the defendant.[9]  
We can discern no theory upon which the defendant can be  
said to have a vested right in the procedures—or lack  
thereof—for bringing long delayed challenges to criminal  
convictions 
extant 
before 
the 
adoption 
of  
MCR subchapter 6.500. 
In 1989, the defendant had been  
convicted, that judgment had been affirmed by the Court of  
Appeals, and we denied leave to appeal.  At that point, the  
judgment was final.  The defendant had no due process or other  
constitutional right to further review of his convictions.  
See Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 556-557; 107 S Ct 1990;  
95 L Ed 2d 539 (1987); McKane v Durston, 153 US 684, 687-688;  
14 S Ct 913; 38 L Ed 867 (1894).  There being no vested right  
in such procedures, there is no due process impediment to  
subjecting the defendant to the new subchapter 6.500  
procedure.  
9 For a similar analysis of the retroactive effect of the  
new federal limits on habeas corpus relief, see Libby v  
Magnusson, 177 F3d 43, 46-47 (CA 1, 1999).  
14  
 
 
 
The 
federal 
courts 
have 
faced 
similar 
questions 
regarding  
the limitations on second or successive petitions recently  
adopted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death  
Penalty Act.  PL 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996). 
Those  
restrictions have been applied even where the petitioner’s  
first petition preceded the effective date of the statute.  
See, e.g., Pratt v United States, 129 F3d 54, 58 (CA 1, 1997):  
The filing dates of Pratt’s two section 2255 
petitions straddle AEDPA’s effective date.  On this  
basis, Pratt maintains that the question whether 
the statute applies to his second petition must be 
answered in the negative because doing so would 
place an impermissible retroactive burden on his 
petition. We disagree.  
We begin our analysis by remarking the  
obvious:  applying a statute to a pleading that was 
filed after the statute’s effective date is not  
really a “retroactive” application in the classic 
sense.  Here, moreover, we know on the best of 
authority that Congress intended that AEDPA apply 
to all section 2255 petitions filed after its 
effective date (April 24, 1996).  See Lindh v  
Murphy, 521 US 320, 325-326; 117 S Ct 2059; 138 L 
Ed 2d 481 (1997).  
We know, too, that the Supreme Court recently 
and uncritically applied AEDPA to a prisoner’s 
second habeas petition even though the prisoner had 
filed 
his 
first 
petition 
prior 
to 
AEDPA’s  
enactment. See Felker [v Turpin, 518 US 651, 656­
657; 116 S Ct 2333; 135 L Ed 2d 827 (1996)]. 
Several courts of appeals have followed suit.  See,  
e.g., In re Medina, 109 F3d 1556, 1561-62 (CA 11,  
1997); Roldan v United States, 96 F3d 1013, 1014 
(CA 7, 1996); Hatch v Oklahoma, 92 F3d 1012, 1014 
(CA 10, 1996).  This approach is sound not only 
from a legal perspective but also from the  
standpoint of common sense. 
After all, if  
pre-AEDPA jurisprudence somehow attached to an 
entire course of post-conviction proceedings by 
virtue of a prisoner’s having filed a pre-enactment 
petition at some point along the way, then the 
Court’s opinion in Felker would be drained of all  
meaning.  
15  
 
 
VI  
Defendant also maintains that, concerning his claim  
regarding improper waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile  
division of the probate court, he is not required to show good  
cause for failure to raise the matter on appeal or actual  
prejudice.  MCR 6.508(D)(3) expressly excepts “jurisdictional  
defects.”  He maintains that the circuit court never properly  
obtained subject matter jurisdiction, entitling him to review  
of the issue.  
Regardless of whether this claim is a jurisdictional one  
within the meaning of MCR 6.508(D)(3), the defendant is not  
entitled to relief. 
Pursuant to MCR 6.508(D), "[t]he  
defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the  
relief requested." 
The circuit judge’s second opinion  
discussed the merits of the juvenile court waiver issue and  
found it to be without merit.  Accordingly, the defendant  
failed to establish his entitlement to relief.  Thus, the  
defendant has not been deprived of review of that issue by the  
operation of subrule (D)(3).10  
VII  
In addition to his arguments regarding the applicability  
of MCR 6.508, the defendant argues that he had shown good  
10 Nor does the Court of Appeals citation of the court  
rule indicate otherwise. 
The Court of Appeals cited  
MCR 6.508(D), of which subrule (3) is only a part.  The Court  
of Appeals order cited the rule in the context of its 
statement that the defendant had not met his burden, and did 
not refer to this as a failure to establish good cause or 
prejudice.  
16  
 
 
 
 
cause for failing to raise the issues in his appeal of right  
because of prior counsel’s ineffectiveness in dismissing the  
juvenile waiver appeal and in failing to raise the police  
violation of JCR 3.3.  As noted earlier, the circuit judge  
carefully reviewed and discussed the merits of these claims,  
finding them without merit.  This, in effect, amounts to a  
determination 
that 
defendant 
failed 
to 
establish 
the 
prejudice  
aspect of the MCR 6.508(D)(3) standard.  That made it  
unnecessary for the court to address the good cause question.  
See Reed, supra at 400-401.  
We find no error in the judge’s analysis of the prejudice  
question and therefore affirm.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
17