Title: STATE HIGHWAY COM'N, ETC. v. Wieczorek

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

248 N.W.2d 369 (1976) The STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of the State of South Dakota, on Behalf of and in the name of the STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Oscar WIECZOREK and the Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Defendants and Respondents. The STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of the State of South Dakota, on Behalf of and in the name of the STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. John B. GLAUS et al., Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants. Nos. 11568, 11569 and 11606. Supreme Court of South Dakota. December 22, 1976. *371 Carl W. Quist and Gary F. Colwill, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-respondent. J. L. Morgan, Morgan & Fuller, Mitchell, A. P. Fuller, Kellar, Kellar, Fuller, Amundson & Furze, Lead, for defendants and respondents, Oscar Wiecozorek and The Federal Land Bank of Omaha, and defendants, respondents, and cross-appellants, John B. Glaus, Florine W. Glaus, and The Northwestern National Bank of Sioux Falls. TALBOTT, Circuit Judge. These condemnation proceedings were initiated in Brule County, South Dakota, by the plaintiff on April 27, 1973, under the then operative provisions of SDCL 31-29-12 and 31-29-14 which authorized the state "to acquire and improve strips of land necessary for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to federal aid highways of this state * * *." Two motions brought by the defendants to dismiss the proceedings were ruled on adversely to the defendants by the then trial judge, Thomas L. Anderst. The defendants sought permission to file intermediate appeals with the Supreme Court of South Dakota, which appeals were denied on May 1, 1974. Following the remand to the circuit court of Brule County for further proceedings, the South Dakota Legislature enacted Ch. 204, S.L.1974, which became effective on July 1, 1974. This legislation deleted from SDCL 31-29-12 and 31-29-14 any references to "for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to [federal aid] highways [of this state]." Motions were again filed by the defendants seeking to dismiss the condemnation proceedings in these cases principally on the grounds that the legislative enactment had terminated the authority of the plaintiff to condemn land for the stated purpose. On July 29, 1974, the trial judge entered his orders dismissing the separate condemnations, and appeals were perfected by the plaintiff on October 7, 1974. Defendants in the Glaus action perfected a cross appeal, primarily on the grounds that the trial court erred in not dismissing the condemnation proceedings on the basis of constitutional grounds, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, and further that the original petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At oral argument, the principal issues discussed revolved around the questions as to whether or not: That SDCL 31-8-7 would operate to permit the survival of this action cannot be seriously contended. It provides: It would indeed be strained construction to consider that the words "view" and "light" were synonymous with the former provisions of SDCL 31-29-12 and 31-29-14, authorizing acquisition by the plaintiff of strips of land "necessary for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic *372 beauty within and adjacent to federal aid highways of this state." (emphasis supplied) Also, it appears from the original petitions of the plaintiff, and particularly from Exhibits "A" thereof, that the taking intended by the state was specifically brought under the provisions of SDCL 31-29-12 and 31-29-14 "for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty." Inasmuch as our laws since March 14, 1963, have authorized the vesting in the state of title interest following the filing of a declaration of taking in certain condemnation proceedings (see SDCL 31-19-23 et seq.), we must determine if this particular procedure was available to the state in these actions as the plaintiff vigorously contends. At the time the legislature enacted Ch. 85, S.L.1966, now codified as SDCL 31-29-12, 31-29-13 and 31-29-14, authorizing acquisition of land "for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty," the laws pertaining to the filing of a declaration of taking were not codified but appeared as Ch. 195, S.L.1963. When it enacted Ch. 85, S.L.1966, the legislature specifically directed that: "Such acquisition may be by gift, purchase, exchange, or by condemnation pursuant to the procedures provided by either SDC 1960 Supp. 28.13A for the condemnation of real property by the State Highway Commission, or SDC 1960 Supp. 37.40," neither of which latter citations provided for the filing of a declaration of taking with consequent immediate vesting in the state of the title interest. Counsel for the plaintiff would have us now engage in an exercise of statutory construction so as to make available to it the vesting provisions of the 1963 law. It is a well founded legal principle that when the language of a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction and the court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute. Kalmbach v. City of Mobridge, 1964, 81 S.D. 158, 132 N.W.2d 293. It is to be presumed that the legislature had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of condemnation. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316, at p. 541. By language which we believe to be clear and free from doubt, the legislature by its 1966 enactment directed that certain specified condemnation procedures should be followed and did not authorize the use of a declaration of taking with immediate vesting for the acquisitions to be made under the 1966 scenic beauty law. It follows then that the plaintiff's use in these proceedings of the declaration of taking under the 1963 law was without authority of law and it must fail, and the state cannot be said to have a vested right in these proceedings brought to condemn land for the purposes set forth in SDCL 31-29-12. In its appeals, the plaintiff further contends that its actions, having been commenced prior to the changes effected by Ch. 204, S.L.1974, in SDCL 31-29-12 and 31-29-14, are preserved by the operation of SDCL 2-14-18, South Dakota's saving clause. We do not agree. It is general basic law that the effect of the repeal of a statute, where neither a saving clause within the repealing statute itself nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute which, except as to proceedings passed and closed, is considered as if it had never existed. See Hutton v. Autoridad Sobre Hogares De La Capital, 1948, D.C. P.R., 78 F. Supp. 988, 990. In 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 434, at page 1008, it is stated: 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 439, at page 1012, states: Thus, it can be said that the general rule is that the repeal of a statute cancels an action brought pursuant to that statute unless the action is permitted to survive by the operation of a saving clause or by the vesting of a right under the statute. South Dakota's saving clause statute is contained in the provisions of SDCL 2-14-18 which provides: This statute is identical with the old federal saving clause found at 1 U.S.C.A., § 29 (old citation) and currently found in 1 U.S. C.A., § 109. An examination of the cases annotated thereunder indicates that the words "penalty, forfeiture, or liability" have been restrictively interpreted to apply only to criminal matters, tax matters, creditor's rights, liens, performance bonds, and forfeitures. No case has been found which would make a saving clause applicable to the state's interest in a condemnation proceeding as falling within the purview of the "penalty, forfeiture, or liability" phrase. The general law appears, however, to be that a saving clause is applicable to sustain rights of a private nature only, as opposed to rights of a public nature. In this regard, in Hutton, supra, at page 993, there appears: And 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 440, at page 1016, states: And in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 254, at page 1245, it is stated: The court in Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 1941, 108 Colo. 206, 115 P.2d 389, further distinguished between private rights and remedies of a public nature created solely by statute as affected by a saving statute nearly identical with South Dakota's and held: In a lengthy opinion dealing with this matter, the court in Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, 1948, 239 Iowa 829, 33 N.W.2d 569, dealt extensively with the repeal of statutes creating strictly statutory rights and had this to say, commencing at page 586: The landmark case of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 1922, 258 U.S. 13, 42 S. Ct. 258, 66 L. Ed. 437 (cited in Vail and Kemp, supra), firmly established the law that is dispositive of these appeals. The telegraph company brought this proceeding to condemn an easement upon the right-of-way of the railroad company in exercise of a right conferred by a Kentucky statute. The first jury verdict was for $500,000, but a new trial was ordered and damages were assessed at $5,000. On March 8, 1916, the telegraph company paid into court the amount of the award and costs. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, 249 F. 385, reversed for a new jury trial not only on the question of damages but on the question of the interference by the easement with the use by the railroad of its right-of-way. On March 14, 1916, the legislature of Kentucky repealed the applicable condemnation statute. Kentucky had a law, Section 465 (no other citation) providing: "No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law as to * * * any right accrued or claim arising under a former law, or in any way whatever to affect * * * any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect. * * *" The court stated: The proceedings before us clearly have the "`congenital infirmity'" referred to in Kemp, supra, that our state's condemnation law is a statement of public policy and creates a statutory right in the state, a right that may be taken away as a matter lying solely within the control of our legislature. Our own court in Wentzel v. Huebner, 1960, 78 S.D. 471, 104 N.W.2d 476, has held: Western Union Telegraph Company, supra, is also given as the authority for distinguishing between the statutory grant of private rights and the statutory grant of public rights; see State Highway Commission v. Mitchell, 1931, 241 Ky. 553, 44 S.W.2d 533, wherein it was held: Western Union Telegraph Company, supra, was again referred to in the case of United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 1943, 319 U.S. 266, 63 S. Ct. 1047, 87 L. Ed. 1390, with this comment: Since the state's enactment of the condemnation right in the plaintiff to acquire premises for "scenic view," not a substantive right of a private nature, was an exercise by the state legislature of its sovereign right, the state had the right to say on what terms it would allow its right of eminent domain to be exercised and to say upon what property or to what extent the right of eminent domain shall be exercised. Since the state could have withheld the power from the plaintiff, the state could withdraw that power before its exercise by the plaintiff. And in this case, the exercise of that power by the plaintiff, before the legislative repeal, was not complete, and the right of the plaintiff had not reached a stage of final and unreviewable determination. As held in Vail, supra, where a statute gives rights of action upon grounds of public policy, no vested rights as to the continuance thereof are conferred and a general saving statute does not operate to permit the right of action to continue or survive. Western Union Telegraph Company, supra. The orders of the circuit court dismissing these actions are affirmed. Because of the disposition of these appeals it is not necessary to consider the other matters presented by the parties on appeal. DUNN, C. J., and ZASTROW, J., concur. WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., dissent. TALBOTT, Circuit Judge, sitting for COLER, J., disqualified. WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting). I would hold that the declaration of taking procedure set forth in SDCL 31-19-23 was available to the state in these cases and that pursuant to SDCL 31-19-24 the state acquired a vested interest for scenic easement purposes that survived the repeal of that portion of SDCL 31-29-12 that authorized the State Highway Department to acquire strips of land necessary for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty. SDCL 31-19-23 provides that the state may file a declaration of taking to acquire any land or easement or right-of-way pursuant to SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-20, inclusive, and Chapter 21-35. Once the declaration has been filed, the title to or the interest in the land affected by the declaration shall vest in the state. SDCL 31-19-24. SDCL 31-19-21 provides that the proceedings provided for by SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-19 are not to be construed to impair *377 any provisions of SDCL 21-35, but are to be construed as additional and cumulative thereto. In other words, the state in this instance could have proceeded under the provisions of SDCL 21-35 to acquire the easements in question. I see nothing in SDCL 21-35 that refers to a declaration of taking, but clearly such a declaration is authorized under that chapter by virtue of the clear language of SDCL 31-19-23. It would be anomalous to hold that had the state proceeded pursuant to SDCL 21-35, as SDCL 31-19-13 clearly authorized the state to so do, the state could have filed a declaration of taking, but because SDCL 31-29-13 purportedly limits the state to the procedures provided by SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-22, inclusive, or Chapter 21-35, the declaration of taking procedure was not available to the state under the provisions of SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-22. By its very terms SDCL 31-19-23 provides that the declaration of taking procedure is available when the state proceeds pursuant to SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-20. That being the case, there was no reason for the legislature to make any specific reference to SDCL 31-19-23 in SDCL 31-29-13. The legislature must have assumed that the declaration of taking procedure would be just as much available to the state for the purpose of taking an easement for scenic beauty under the provisions of SDCL 31-19-1 to 31-19-22 as it would have been under the provisions of SDCL 21-35. I am authorized to state that Justice WINANS joins in this dissent.