Title: Kudo v. Mitchell

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-12-0000493
26-SEP-2013
08:56 AM
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

1. BACKGROUND

on January 6, 2010, Kudo and Mitchell entered into a
two-year rental agreement under which Kudo rented his property,
an unfinished agricultural structure and two acres of surrounding
land, to Mitchell in exchange for $1 a year and all improvements
made by Mitchell becoming Kudo's property at the end of the
rental term. On May 4, 2010, Kudo filed a complaint for summary
possession against Mitchell. Kudo alleged Mitchell had violated
their rental agreement and requested a judgment tor possession
and damages.

Mitchell agreed to vacate the premises by May 31, 2010
and judgment of possession was granted. Mitchell accordingly
vacated and then filed a counterclaim against Kudo, seeking
quantum meruit for her labor on the property and for the cost of
expenditures made in renovating the property.

‘The district court conducted a bench trial then issued
its FOFCOL & Judgment in Mitchell's favor as to Kudo's complaint
‘The district court also awarded Mitchell $1,172.21 for building
materials she had purchased to improve the property, but it
denied any award for her leasehold interest because "the
property, although improved, was not being rented at the time or
in a condition that it could be rented."

After the FOFCOL & Judgment's entry, Mitchell filed a

 

motion to declare Kudo a vexatious litigant pursuant to Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 6349-7(a) (1993). The district court
entered an order granting Mitchell'e motion on July 10, 2012
‘The district court also denied motions for reconsideration filed
by Kudo and by Mitchell. On May 21, 2012, the district court
entered a second "Judgment" which awarded $294.05 in attorney's
fees to Mitchell.
II, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“In this jurisdiction, a trial court's Fors are subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review. An FOF ie clearly
erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." Chun v. Bd, of Trs. of the
Employees! Ret. Sys. of the State of Hawai'i, 106 Hawai'i 416,
430, 106 P.34 339, 353 (2005) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and ellipses omitted) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Fonce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.34 96, 104 (2004)). "An FOF is
also clearly erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence
to support the finding. [The Hawai'i Supreme Court has] defined
‘substantial evidence! as credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Leslie v. Estate of
Tavares, 91 Hawai'i 394, 399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225 (1999)
(internal quotation marke and citations omitted) (quoting state
vs Kotie, 91 Hawai'i 319, 328, 984 P.24 78, 87 (1999))
A COL is not binding upon an appellate court and ie

freely reviewable for its correctness. (The appellate

Court] ordinarily reviews COLs under the right /wrong

Standard. Thus, a COL that is supported by the trial

court's Fors and that reflects an application of the correct

Fule of law vill not be overturned. However, @ COL that

presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under

the clearly erroneous standard because the court

conclusions are dependent upon the facts and circunstanct
of each individual case

 

 

 

 

Chun, 106 Hawai'i at 430, 106 P.34 at 353 (internal quotation
marks, citations, and brackets in original omitted) (quoting
Ponce, 105 Hawai'i at 453, 99 P.3d at 104).

We review a court's determination of whether a person
is a vexatious litigant under the abuse of discretion standard.
EKv. Boggs, 102 Hawai'i 289, 294-95, 75 P.3d 1180, 1185-86
(2003)

IIT, DISCUSSION
eal,

AL
Kudo's points on appeal claim: (1) the district court's
vexatious litigant determination violated his due process rights;
(2) the district court erred in awarding $1,172.21 in
expenditures to Mitchell; and (3) Kudo was prejudiced by the
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

district court's entry of two judgments. We resolve Kudo's
appeal as follows:

(1) Kudo claims Mitchell's motion to declare Kudo a
vexatious litigant was not properly served. Kudo acknowledges he
was served with Mitchell's motion on May 21, 2012. However, that
service did not include a notice of hearing. On May 29, 2012,
Mitchell served Kudo with an incomplete notice of hearing which
set the hearing for June 4, 2012, six days later. As Kudo
correctly asserts, this service did not comply with the
requirements of District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP)
Rule 6(d), which states: "A written motion . . . and notice of
the hearing thereof, shall be served not later than 14 days
before the time specified for the hearing[.]"? Nevertheless,

 

Mitchell's noncompliance did not prejudice Kudo because the
hearing was continued to July 2, 2012. Kudo was served with
notice of the rescheduled date, and he filed a written memorandum
in opposition to Mitchell's motion before the hearing. On appeal
Kudo makes no argument that he suffered prejudice from the error,
and we conclude there was none.

We also reject Kudo's claim that the district court
deprived him of due process by basing its vexatious litigant
determination on grounds not raised in Mitchell's motion. Kudo's
argument is without merit. Mitchell's memorandum supporting her
motion argued Kudo had filed "baseless lawsuits" and
“unneritorious motions." The district court accordingly found
"Kudo's actions have been done in bad faith" and that he had

Deuce Rule (4) states in full:

For notions; affidavits. A written motion, other than
fone which may be heard ex parce, and notice of the hearing
Ehereof, shall be served not later than 10 daye before the
Eine specified for the hearing, unless a different period 12
fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an
order may for cause shown be nade. on ex parte application.
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall
be served with the motion; ané, except as otherwise provided
in Rule 58(c), pleadings, memoranda and affidavits may be
jerved not later than 72 hours preceding the nearing, unles
the court permits them to be served at sone other tine

    

 

   

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

“€iled unmeritorious motions and other matters{.]" Kudo had the
opportunity to respond to Mitchell's arguments in his memorandum
in opposition and at the hearing on Mitchell's motion.
‘Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining Kudo is a vexatious litigant. Ek v.
Boggs, 102 Hawai'i at 294-95, 75 P.34 at 1185-86 (applying abuse
of discretion standard to vexatious litigant determination) .

(2) Kudo argues Mitchell is entitled to half of the
$1,172.21 award because half of the expenditures were
attributable to Mitchell's partner. The FOFCOL and the record
show that the district court found Mitchell paid the full amount
of the expenditures. Kudo fails to establish that this factual
finding was clearly erroneous.

(3) Kudo argues the district court's entry of the two
judgments (the FOFCOL & Judgment and the May 21, 2012 Judgment
awarding attorney's fees) prejudicially affected the timeliness
of his motion for reconsideration. However, the timing did not
cause prejudice because the district court based its denial of
Kudo's motion for reconsideration on "the fact that no new
evidence was presented," not on timeliness. The timing of
Mitchell's motion for reconsideration also caused no prejudice

 

because the district court denied the motion. Lastly, Kudo's
claim that Mitchell's cross-appeal from the FOFCOL & Judgment is
untimely is without merit.
Be r ‘a Cross-Appeal

On cross-appeal, Mitchell contends the district court
erred in concluding Kudo's property “was not being rented at the
time or in a condition that it could be rented" and therefore had
no rental value, Mitchell argues the parties had stipulated that
the fair rental value of the property was $800 per month, and the
district court was bound by the stipulation. The record shows
Kudo intended the stipulated value be used as an offset against
any award on Mitchell's counterclaim for the value of her labor
while she was on the property and therefore agreed that the

 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

stipulation designated the property's fair rental value during
Mitchell's lease.

We agree the district court erred because "(t]he facts
within a stipulation are taken to be conclusive and binding upon
the parties, the trial judge and the appellate court." state v,
Woodhall, 129 Hawai'i 397, 405, 301 P.34 607, 615 (2013)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
However, the district court's error was harmless in this case
because Mitchell agreed to vacate the premise:

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the District Court of the Third Circuit's

 

April 16, 2012 "Findings Of Facts And Conclusions of Law;
Judgment and the July 10, 2012 "Order Granting Defendant Anita
Mitchell's Motion To Declare Kenneth Kudo A Vexatious Litigant
And Subject Him To A Prefiling order."

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 26, 2013.

on the briefs:

Kenneth Kudo Gey

Plaines ##/counterclain- Ws Yldlearni—
Defendant /Appeliant /Cross- cniet guage

Appellee pro se

carl Foytik :
for Defendant /Counterclain- g

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross- Associate Judge

Appellant Anita Mitchell.
ae wtlezy

Associate Judge