Title: Bryant v. Social Services

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Howard County
Case No. 13-C-96-32892
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 93
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
JOSEPH DAVID BRYANT
v.
HOWARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
EX REL. CASSANDRA COSTLEY
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
 (Retired, Specially Assigned),
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:     May 12, 2005
The ability of a court to enforce child support orders entered by it is often difficult and
frustrating.  In many cases, the court must invoke, as a last resort, its power to punish a
wilfully non-compliant parent for contempt, but when the exercise of that power involves
incarceration – deprivation of the parent’s liberty – it is subject to certain circumscribing
conditions and limitations.  In 1997, through the adoption of Maryland Rules 15-201 through
15-208, we tried to set out criteria for the proper exercise of the power of contempt, in both
its coercive and punitive aspects.  In this case, the court did not follow the requirements and,
as a result, it entered an order that we shall be obliged to vacate. 
BACKGROUND
Jasmine B. was born out of wedlock in December, 1993.  In November, 1996, the
Howard County Department of Social Services (DSS), which was then paying public
assistance to her mother, Ms. Costley, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Howard County
to declare appellant to be Jasmine’s father and to order him and Ms. Costley to pay child
support.  Though she was the custodial parent, Ms. Costley was made a defendant because
she refused to sign an oath naming the child’s father.  See Maryland Code, § 5-1010(d)(3)(ii)
of the Family Law Article.  After a hearing before a domestic relations master, during which
appellant acknowledged paternity, the court, on February 24, 1997, entered an order that,
among other things, declared appellant to be Jasmine’s father and ordered him to pay child
support in the guideline amount of $189/month plus an additional $20/month against an
arrearage of $569.
1 Notwithstanding its request for a criminal sanction, the petition must be regarded
as one for civil contempt.  Apart from the fact that it was filed in the civil proceeding,
DSS has no authority to file a petition for criminal contempt.  Compare Maryland Rules
15-205(b) and 15-206(b).
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Appellant paid little attention to that order and, by July, 1998, had increased his
arrearage to $3,306.  When faced with the possible loss of his driver’s license as a result of
that arrearage, he entered into a stipulation and payment agreement, under which he agreed
to resume monthly child support of $189 and to pay, in addition, $92/month toward the
arrearage.  That stipulation was incorporated into a court order entered on August 4, 1998.
Appellant was as non-compliant with that order as with the first one.  By December,
2001, his arrearage stood at $11,181, and DSS petitioned to have him held in contempt.   The
petition, though captioned and filed in the civil paternity proceeding, asked, as the only
sanction for contempt, that appellant be “sentenced to a period of incarceration not to exceed
[180] days,” without regard to any provision for purging the contempt, which is a criminal
penalty not available in a civil contempt proceeding.1  After a hearing, the domestic relations
master ordered appellant to participate in the Absent Parent Employment Program and the
court entered an order to that effect on February 28, 2002.  That order required appellant to
report to the program on a weekly basis, commencing March 11, 2002, and to accept any
employment obtainable under the program.  If no employment was so obtainable, appellant
was ordered to conduct a minimum of eight job contacts per week and to continue reporting
to the program until released.  After a subsequent hearing before the master on April 26, the
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court, on May 12, 2002, ordered appellant to continue monthly support payments of $189 and
to pay an additional $47/month toward an arrearage that then amounted to $11,685.
Resolution of the contempt issue was deferred until June 3, 2002.
Because appellant arrived late, the master was unable to proceed with the hearing on
June 3, and instead scheduled a hearing before a judge on June 27, 2002.  Appellant was
advised in writing that, if he desired counsel, he should contact the Office of the Public
Defender by June 12, 2002.  Appellant did not heed that advice and showed up in court on
June 27 without counsel.  He said that he intended to retain private counsel but, by the time
he realized he could not afford a private attorney, the June 12 deadline had passed.  The court
was obviously not impressed, found no meritorious reason, and therefore proceeded with the
hearing.
Appellant did not contest the arrearage or seek to have either the arrearage or the
amount of support reduced.  From what he said and from what he implied, it was evident that
he had a history of drug abuse, that he had been incarcerated a number of times, including
for distribution, and that he had been in various recovery programs, trying to get his life in
order.  The transcript reveals that, at times, he was crying during his testimony.  He said that
he had tried to obtain employment but that, with his criminal record, he had difficulty finding
a job.  He informed the court that he had recently managed to get two jobs, at least one of
which was temporary, and, although he did not seem to know much about the jobs, he said
that he was to be paid, from each, about $8/hour.  Appellant said that Jasmine and her mother
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then lived in Georgia, and that when the mother indicated that she needed something for the
child, he tried to supply it, although he understood that voluntary gifts or payments did not
discharge his child support obligation.  Appellant advised the court that he was then on
probation in another case in the Circuit Court.
DSS noted that appellant had been employed and had earned over $6,000 in 2001, but
that he had made no payment toward his child support.  Appellant responded that he was
homeless in 2001 and had spent his earnings on hotel rooms and for food for his two other
children.
On June 27, 2002, the court entered an Order for Probation that referenced the same
case number as the paternity action but was captioned “State of Maryland vs. Joseph Bryant.”
No such case or file existed and none was created as a result of that order.  The order stated
that the “execution of the sentence of [blank] has been suspended for the offense of . . .
contempt.”  It purported to place appellant on “Supervised Probation” for a period of 18
months, effective June 27, 2002, and, in addition to the conditions usually found in probation
orders entered in criminal cases, including reporting to his probation agent as directed and
informing the agent of any subsequent arrest, made reference to an addendum.  That
addendum, which also referenced the paternity action case number, required that appellant
pay all “fines, costs, restitution, and fees as ordered by the court,” totally abstain from alcohol
and drugs, submit to alcohol and drug testing, attend NA self-help group meetings, and
2 The last-noted directive was included in the order by handwritten interlineation. 
In remarks from the Bench, the court told appellant that he was “to attend NA as directed,
and you’re to obtain a sponsor and a home group at NA within 30 days of this order and
maintain it.”  Because it is the written order, rather than the court’s often untranscribed
remarks, that constitutes the effective requirement, the order should have been more clear
just what appellant was directed to do.
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“obtain sponsor + home group w/in 30 days + maintain.” 2  The Order is signed by appellant
but is not dated or witnessed.  The addendum is not signed by appellant; indeed, the pre-
printed “Consent” paragraph is lined out.
The next day, the court entered another order, in the paternity case, that was captioned
“Order For Constructive Civil Contempt.”  Among other things, the court, in that order, (1)
declared a current arrearage of $12,189, (2) found appellant to be in contempt of the May 12,
2002 order, (3) “sentenced” appellant to 180 days incarceration in the Howard County
Detention Center, (4) suspended all but 30 days of that “sentence,” (5) directed that appellant
report to the county sheriff on August 30, 2002, to begin serving the unsuspended 30 days
of the sentence, (6) decreed that, upon payment to DSS of “a purge amount” of $1,000 on or
before August 29, 2002, appellant would be released from service of that part of the
sentence, (7) declared that service of the remaining 150 days of the “sentence” was
suspended on condition that appellant pay DSS $189/month child support and $47/month
against the arrearage, and that, upon payment in full of the arrearage, the contempt would be
purged, and (8) directed that appellant comply with “all of the conditions specified in the
attached addendum to this Order.”  One problem with that last, eighth, provision, apparently
3 It is not entirely clear whether appellant’s detention in the Howard County
Detention Center was pursuant to the warrant issued in this case or one issued in the
separate criminal case, in which appellant was also on probation. 
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unnoticed by anyone, is that there was no addendum attached to the June 28 order.  There
was an addendum attached to the June 27 Order for Probation, but neither that addendum nor
the June 27 Order of Probation was attached to the June 28 Order for Constructive Civil
Contempt.  No appeal was noted from either order.
On September 16, 2002, the Division of Parole and Probation, which assumed
supervision of appellant pursuant to the June 27 order, filed a Request for a Warrant in the
Circuit Court, alleging that the defendant had violated three conditions of probation by
failing to report to his probation officer as instructed, failing to report for drug testing 11
times, and failing to provide proof of attendance at self-help meetings or acquisition of a
home group or sponsor.   Two days later, the Circuit Court judge entered an order, in the
paternity case, directing the issuance of a bench warrant for appellant’s arrest and setting a
full cash bond of $10,000.  It was not until July, 2003, that the county sheriff was able to
locate appellant, however.  He had been arrested in Anne Arundel County on two charges of
possession of CDS paraphernalia and an additional charge of making a false statement to a
police officer and was being held in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center.  On July
8, appellant was transferred to the Howard County Detention Center.3
On August 7, 2003, the Division of Parole and Probation, responding to the arrest in
Anne Arundel County, added two more alleged violations of the probation – appellant’s
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failure to obey all laws and failure to advise his probation officer of his arrest.  The court
then, on August 7, 2003, entered an order in the paternity case but showing the docket
number of that case as “Criminal No.,” directing appellant to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of the June 27, 2002 order.  With the assistance of the Public Defender,
appellant moved to dismiss the pending contempt proceedings on the ground that the case
was one of alleged civil contempt and that none of the alleged violations constituted a proper
contempt allegation in a civil non-support case.  Relying on Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md.
535, 766 A.2d 98 (2001) and Maryland Rule 15-207, appellant maintained that the conditions
set forth in the June 27 Order for Probation, which he allegedly violated, were not proper
conditions in a civil child support case.  In argument on his motion, he added that  “[n]one
of the alleged violations has anything to do with a failure to pay child support, failure to be
employed, or failure to seek employment” and that the court had no authority to impose those
conditions in a civil non-support contempt case.  Appellant, personally, filed a separate
response, in which he contended that his girlfriend had notified the probation officer of his
arrest and that he had not been convicted of any of the Anne Arundel County offenses.
Although the current proceeding had been triggered by a report and request for a
warrant filed by the Division of Parole and Probation, the response to the Public Defender’s
motion came from DSS, which looked not to the June 27 Order for Probation but to the June
28 Order for Constructive Civil Contempt.  It contended that the alleged violations were of
that order and constituted a contempt separate from the failure to pay child support.  DSS did
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not respond to appellant’s pro se filing.
The court held a brief hearing on September 12, 2003, at which, in addition to some
amplification of the legal arguments, the court was advised that appellant had no money and
that he had been incarcerated since July 8, both in this case and pursuant to a violation of
probation charge in the separate criminal case in Howard County.  On October 9, 2003, the
court entered another Order for Constructive Civil Contempt in which it (1) found appellant
to be in contempt of the June 28, 2002 order, (2) directed that appellant not be further
incarcerated, (3) terminated the conditions specified in the “addendum to the Order for
Constructive Civil Contempt dated June 28, 2002,” (3) declared that “the remaining
conditions of the aforementioned order for Constructive Civil Contempt . . . remain in full
force and effect,” and (4) ordered that appellant inform DSS, in writing and within 10 days,
of any change in his address.  The court had explained at the hearing that the point of the
drug testing and self-help conditions, upon which the finding of contempt was based, was
“to assist [appellant] in his effort to remain drug free, and most importantly, the goal was to
keep him employed so that he could continue to pay child support.”  Appellant was ultimately
released from incarceration on October 23, 2003.
Appellant noted an appeal from the October 9 order, and we granted certiorari on our
own initiative prior to any substantive proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. 
DISCUSSION
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What Is Before Us
Before addressing the substantive issues raised by the parties, it is important to define
what is actually before us and whether it is properly before us.  As we read the record, the
Circuit Court has abrogated, prospectively, all of the conditions to the probation enunciated
in the June 27 Order for Probation and the addendum that was attached to it, including the
drug testing and self-help requirements.  The only conditions that remain in effect are those
included in the June 28 Order for Constructive Civil Contempt, and even those conditions
were substantially modified.  The June 28, 2002 Order for Constructive Civil Contempt, as
noted, “sentenced” appellant to 180 days in jail, suspended all but 30 days, directed that
appellant report to the sheriff to serve those 30 days on August 30, 2002, unless he paid a
purge amount of $1,000 prior to that date, and directed that appellant would be released from
serving the suspended 150 days if he paid $189/month child support and $47/month on the
then-existing arrearage.
In declaring, in its October 9, 2003 order, that “no further incarceration of [appellant]
is ordered,” the court effectively abrogated the “sentence” imposed in the June 28 order and
any prospect that appellant will have to serve any part of that sentence.  Only two things thus
remain.  First, even though it abrogated those conditions prospectively as well as any
prospect of enforcing them through incarceration, the court purported to hold appellant in
contempt for failing, prior to October 9, 2003, to undergo drug testing and to attend NA self-
help meetings, as directed in the addendum to the June 27 order.  Because, in announcing that
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finding of contempt, the court referred to the non-existent addendum to the June 28 order,
it is not clear that its finding of contempt was effective, even if valid, but, as the court’s
intent seems clear and appellant has not raised that as an issue, we shall, for purposes of this
appeal, treat the finding of contempt based on those two conditions as at least facially
effective.  The second directive that remains in effect is the renewal of the order that
appellant pay the $189/month child support and the $47/month on the arrearage.
It does not appear that appellant is challenging the second aspect of the October 9
order.  As noted, he has never complained about either the setting of the child support or the
arrearage.  The only issue he has raised, therefore, is whether the court had authority, in June,
2002, to impose the two conditions on which the October 9, 2003, finding of contempt was
based.  
Appealability/Mootness
The State’s initial response to that issue is that the appeal should be dismissed.  It
urges, first, that as appellant has never been incarcerated or otherwise sanctioned and, as
matters now stand, cannot be incarcerated, there is no appealable judgment.  Apart from the
declaration of “no incarceration,” the 18-month period of probation ordered in June, 2002,
to which the two conditions were attached, has expired, which, in the State’s view, renders
the issue raised by appellant moot.  The State also views the June 27 order as a consent order,
from which no appeal is permissible in any event.  Finally, it argues that the two conditions
were permissible and that a finding of contempt for their wilful violation was valid.
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Appellant views the two conditions as jurisdictionally deficient, permitting him to
challenge them at any time.  Though tacitly recognizing that any argument regarding possible
future incarceration may be moot, he urges, without any documentation, that the approach
taken in his case, of attaching drug testing and rehabilitation conditions to a probation that,
in his view, have nothing to do with his paying child support, is commonly used by the
Circuit Court for Howard County, that the issue will arise again, and that the Circuit Court
needs to be instructed that it may not use that approach.
The question, then, is whether the appeal is a permissible and sustainable one, namely,
whether the appeal is from a non-appealable consent order, whether an appeal lies from a
contempt finding that is unaccompanied by any sanction,  and whether, even if the order was
initially appealable, the issue raised by appellant – the validity of the finding of contempt
based on non-compliance with the drug testing and rehabilitation requirements – has since
become moot.  
The October 9, 2003 order that embodied the finding of contempt was approved by
appellant’s counsel as to form, but it certainly was not consented to by either counsel or
appellant.  The two conditions at issue – drug testing and attending NA self-help meetings
– emanated from the addendum that was attached to the June 27 Order for Probation, to
which appellant, uncounseled at the time, did consent and from which he did not appeal.
Although it is true that, ordinarily, a party may not appeal from a judgment to which he/she
consented – see Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65, 68, 427 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1981),
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Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24, 166 A. 599, 601-02 (1933) – it is also clear
that a party may not validly consent to a criminal sentence that is unlawful.  See Holmes v.
State, 362 Md. 190, 195-96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) and cases cited there.  If, as urged by
appellant, the conditions at issue were, when first imposed, in the nature of criminal
sanctions and, as such, not permissible in a civil contempt proceeding, they would, indeed,
constitute an unlawful criminal sentence to which no consent could be valid.  The consent
issue thus hinges on the substantive one.
As to whether an appeal may be taken from a finding of contempt unaccompanied by
any sanction, the law generally, and the jurisprudence of this Court in particular, have shifted.
In Kelly v. Montebello Park Co., 141 Md. 194, 196, 118 A. 600, 601 (1922), this Court
observed that, at common law, a court of competent jurisdiction was the sole judge of
contempts against its authority and dignity and that its judgment in such cases was final,
conclusive, and not reviewable in any other tribunal unless such review was authorized by
statute.  The Court at least suggested, however, that the unreviewability of contempt orders
in Maryland, in the absence of a statute, was limited to findings of criminal contempt, which
was the nature of the order then before the Court.  That view was confirmed in Ex Parte
Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 124-26, 136 A. 312, 316 (1927) (holding, in absence of statute, order
of criminal contempt not appealable).  At its next session, the General Assembly, by 1927
Md. Laws, ch. 593, added to the list of equity orders from which appeals may be taken, “an
order remedial in its nature adjudging in contempt of Court any party to a cause or any person
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not a party thereto (except orders passed requiring the payment of alimony).”
In Pocketbook Workers v. Orlove, 158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1930), the Circuit Court
had entered a preliminary injunction in a labor dispute, enjoining the defendants from
picketing and engaging in certain other concerted activity.  The court thereafter made the
injunctions permanent and also found the defendants in contempt for violating the
preliminary injunction. Because it found the violations not to be intentional, however, it
imposed no punishment.  This Court entertained an appeal from the injunctions, which were
vacated as being too broad, but dismissed an appeal from the contempt orders on the ground
that, even under the statute, the right of appeal “supposes the existence of some injury from
the orders to be redressed by appeal.”  Id. at 505, 148 A. at 829.  Because no punishment had
been imposed on the contempt, the Court did not regard the defendants as having been
injured.  In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 61 Md. App. 535, 487 A.2d 680 (1985), the Court of Special
Appeals followed that approach, as it was required to do, and dismissed an appeal from a
finding of contempt devoid of any punishment.
A facially similar ruling was made in Director of Fin., Pr. Geo’s Co. v. Cole, 296 Md.
607, 465 A.2d 450 (1983), although the actual basis for that ruling was not entirely the same
as in Pocketbook Workers, which was not cited by the Court.  In November, 1980, the
District Court ordered the Director of Finance of Prince George’s County to return money
that had been seized in a gambling raid.  The order was never served on the Director, who
also had not been notified of the motion seeking the return of the money and was not in court
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when the order was issued.  Nonetheless, on April 2, 1981, the court orally held the Director
in contempt of court for failing to return the money.  No sanction or purge was mentioned
in the oral ruling.  That same day, the Director noted an appeal from the oral finding of
contempt.  The next day, the court entered a written order of contempt that did contain a
sanction and purge provision, but no appeal was taken from that order.  This Court dismissed
the Director’s appeal from the oral ruling on the ground that it was premature, as not being
from a final judgment in the matter.  In explaining why the appeal was premature, the Court
noted that the oral ruling, which contained no sanction or purge provision, did “not constitute
a contempt order from which an appeal may properly be taken.”  Id. at 613, 465 A.2d at 454.
The heart of the decision was that the oral ruling on April 2 was not intended to be a
final disposition of the matter, as evidenced by the fact that, in failing to provide for a
sanction and purge, it was not a complete recitation of the court’s ultimate ruling.  The court
obviously understood that a sanction and purge were necessary if the contempt finding was
to be effective and enforceable, as those provisions were included in the written order filed
the next day.  The oral ruling was nothing more than a preliminary announcement of a partial
decision, from which no appeal will lie.
The 1927 statute was substantively rewritten in 1957 (See 1957 Md. Laws. ch. 399,
§ 4) and now appears as Maryland Code, § 12-304(a) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article.  It
provides, subject to the exception for a contempt based on the violation of an interlocutory
order for the payment of alimony, that “[a]ny person may appeal from any order or judgment
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passed to preserve the power or vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in
contempt of court.”  It is no longer part of a statute dealing just with equity orders and on its
face, plainly applies to both criminal and civil contempts, so the distinction in that regard
seemingly drawn in Kelly and Sturm no longer would be valid.  The only issue is whether the
view expressed in Pocketbook Workers and Mitchell still pertains – that a condition to
appealability under the statute is the existence of some injury and that a mere finding of
contempt devoid of any punishment does not suffice.
That view, we think, was modified in Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 677 A.2d 584
(1996).  In Lynch, the defendant was found in civil contempt for failure to pay child support.
The court sentenced her to 20 days in the detention center but provided that the contempt
could be purged by the payment of $500.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the finding
of contempt but, after concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that she
had the ability to purge the contempt, vacated the sanction.  This Court went further and held
that, absent a showing that the defendant could, in fact, meet a purge, no finding of contempt
was permissible.  That aspect of the decision has been overturned, in non-support cases, by
the subsequent adoption of Maryland Rule 15-207(e).  See Committee Note to Rule 15-207;
Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 552-53, 766 A.2d at 107-08.  The part of the
decision that remains extant and enduring, however, is the further conclusion that “a finding
of contempt, where there is no possibility of enforcing compliance with the court order to
which it relates, simply labels the defendant a contemnor and imputes guilt to him or her.
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That is a form of punishment.”  Id. at 529, 677 A.2d at 594 (emphasis added).
That conclusion is entirely valid.  A finding of contempt, even without the immediate
imposition of punishment or sanction, leaves the defendant adjudged to have wilfully
violated a court order and may well leave the defendant subject to future punishment at the
will of the court. The adjudication itself is and will remain a matter of public record, readily
accessible, and may well affect the defendant’s ability to obtain employment, licenses of one
kind or another, housing, insurance, or other benefits or opportunities.  See Williams v.
Williams, 63 Md. App. 220, 226, 492 A.2d 649, 651 (1985), aff’d, 305 Md. 1, 501 A.2d 432
(1985).  Even if we were not to regard that as punishment, the plain wording and a common
sense reading of § 12-304 indicate an intent to permit an appeal from the adjudication of
contempt itself, without regard to whether an immediate sanction is imposed.  The appeal is
allowed from “any order or judgment passed to preserve the power or vindicate the dignity
of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court.”  Maryland Code, § 12-304(a) of the
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article (emphasis added).  The statute does not require that the order be
accompanied by an immediate sanction.  For those reasons, we hold that the October 9, 2003
order was appealable, and for the same reasons, we conclude that the appeal is not moot.  The
adjudication of contempt remains on the record.
Validity of the Contempt Finding
In State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973), we observed that the
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contempt power was an ancient one and that its modern-day application was often
misunderstood.  In an effort to set forth some basic ground rules, we noted that there was a
form of grid into which contempt proceedings might fall: contempt could be criminal or civil
and it could be direct or constructive, leaving the prospect of a direct criminal contempt, a
direct civil contempt, a constructive criminal contempt, and a constructive civil contempt.
The alleged contempt here was clearly constructive, rather than direct, so we need not dwell
on the distinctions between those two forms and may, instead, look only at the civil and
criminal varieties.
In an attempt to define some boundaries, we observed in Roll and Scholl that a civil
contempt is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to an action and to
compel obedience to orders entered primarily for their benefit.  Civil contempt proceedings
are therefore remedial and coercive in nature.  They are intended not to punish for past
misconduct inflicted against the court but to force present or future compliance with the
court’s orders.  Thus, a penalty for civil contempt, if it is to be coercive rather than punitive,
must provide for purging; it must permit the defendant to avoid the penalty by some specific
conduct that is within the defendant’s ability to perform.  Criminal contempt, on the other
hand, is punitive, not coercive, in nature.  It is precisely to punish past disobedience and
therefore does not require a purging provision. 
We recognized in Roll and Scholl that the line between civil and criminal contempt
was “frequently hazy and indistinct,” and that there remained the confusing prospect of
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conduct embracing aspects of both kinds.  See id. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876.  Apart from
occasional ambiguity in pigeonholing past misconduct, there are also situations, which
frequently arise in the context of enforcing support orders, in which the court desires to
achieve both objectives, of punishing past misconduct through criminal contempt and
enforcing compliance in the future through a coercive civil contempt order.
In 1997, we attempted to bring some greater procedural clarity to the exercise of the
contempt power, particularly in support enforcement cases, through a rewriting of the Rules
governing contempt proceedings.  In Rule 15-205, we directed that a proceeding for
constructive criminal contempt be docketed as a separate criminal action and that it not be
included in the action in which the contempt occurred.  Because the action is a criminal one,
it may be initiated only by the court, a State’s Attorney, the Attorney General, or the State
Prosecutor, and if the court initiates the action, it may, and should, appoint one of those
officials to prosecute it, so that the court is not acting as both prosecutor and judge in the
same case.  See Maryland Rule 15-205(b) and (c).  If the case is in a circuit court and there
is the prospect of any imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, and that right can
be waived only in conformance with Maryland Rule 4-246.  See Maryland Rule 15-205(f);
Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 567, 750 A.2d 35, 43 (2000); Dorsey and Craft v. State, 356
Md. 324, 342, 739 A.2d 41, 51 (1999).  In a constructive criminal contempt case, the
prosecution “has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘a deliberate effort or a
wilful act of commission or omission by the alleged contemnor committed with the
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knowledge that it would frustrate the order of the court.’”  Dorsey and Craft v. State, supra,
356 Md. at 352, 739 A.2d at 56 (quoting In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564, 569, 525 A.2d 1054,
1056 (1987)).
In contrast, Rule 15-206 directs that a proceeding for constructive civil contempt be
filed in the action in which the contempt occurred, that any party to that action may initiate
the proceeding, and that, in a support enforcement case where the contempt is based on
failure to pay child or spousal support, an agency authorized by law may bring the action.
The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, not evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Maryland Rule 15-207(e)(2).  A defendant in a constructive civil contempt action is
not entitled to a jury trial.  Dodson v. Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 453, 845 A.2d 1194, 1202
(2004); Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 508-09, 754 A.2d 1018, 1027 (2000).
It is evident, just from these distinctions, that criminal and civil contempt actions are
entirely separate, in their origin, in their objectives, and in their method of adjudication.  In
the context of enforcing support orders, however, this Court, through the adoption of
Maryland Rule 15-207(e), attempted to create a method by which both kinds of proceedings
could be used in a way that was functional and practical and that yet adhered to appropriate
legal constraints.  Overturning the contrary holding in Lynch v. Lynch, supra, the Rule
permits a finding of contempt upon proof that the defendant did not pay the amount owed,
accounting from the date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing,
unless the defendant establishes either (1) that limitations has run, or (2) that, during that
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period, the defendant never had the ability to pay more than was actually paid and that he/she
made reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the
funds necessary to make additional payments.  A finding of constructive civil contempt in
non-support cases is not precluded simply because the defendant cannot meet a purge on the
day of the hearing or order.  Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 553, 766 A.2d at 107-
08.
Under the Rule, however, the finding of contempt in non-support cases is not the
toothless gesture it was thought to be when Lynch was decided.  In adopting the Rule, we
recognized that, in many cases, the problem lay in the fact that the defendant was
impecunious because he/she was not employed and had not actively and in good faith sought
employment.  Although in a civil contempt case, the defendant’s state of penury precludes
a punitive sanction, such as incarceration, that the defendant has no ability to avoid by
payment of money, the Rule authorizes the court, in consequence of the finding of contempt
– the past wilful disobedience – to enter other kinds of coercive directives reasonably
designed to produce an income from which the required support could be paid.  Rule 15-
207(e)(4) thus provides:
“If the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge the
contempt, the order may include directions that the contemnor
make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and
perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with
the direction to make payments.”
(Emphasis added).  
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A Committee Note to that provision explains:
“If the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge the
contempt, an example of a direction to perform specified acts
that a court may include under subsection (e)(4) is a provision
that an unemployed, able-bodied contemnor look for work and
periodically provide evidence of the efforts made.  If the
contemnor fails, without just cause, to comply with any
provision of the order, a criminal contempt proceeding may be
brought based on a violation of that provision.”
(Emphasis added).
The thrust of Rule 15-207(e)(4), with the gloss of the Committee Note, is that, where
the contemnor’s inability to comply with the support order is his/her lack of gainful
employment or other access to available funds, the court may address that problem directly
by ordering the contemnor to take reasonable steps to obtain such employment or access and,
if warranted, enforcing those directives through criminal contempt proceedings.  The court
obviously has some flexibility in deciding what directives to issue.  The contemnor may be
in need of employment counseling or training, and, if those services are available to the
contemnor at a cost he/she can afford, the court may order the contemnor to take advantage
of them.  If there are other impediments to employment or access that can be remedied, the
court may order the contemnor to take lawful and reasonable steps to deal with those
impediments.  That is what the domestic relations master attempted to do in February, 2002.
There are, of course, limits on how far a court may go in this regard; it cannot order things
that are either inherently punitive in nature or that are so onerous, impractical,  or unrelated
to the objective of enabling the defendant to meet his/her obligation as to become punitive.
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Subject to that constraint, however, the court is not required to give the contemnor a free ride
on unemployment and impoverishment, to the detriment of his/her children.
The Rule expressly permits those kinds of remedial orders to be enforced through
criminal contempt proceedings, but it does not preclude their enforcement through civil
contempt proceedings as well.  The Rule permits both civil and criminal contempt
proceedings to be brought against an alleged contemnor and to be consolidated for hearing
and disposition. What the rules do not permit, however, is for the two to become merged or
for the court, in a civil contempt case, to apply sanctions that are available only in a criminal
contempt case.  There can be no combined charging document, nor can a civil contempt
proceeding be converted, mid-stream, to a criminal one.  Dorsey and Craft v. State, supra,
356 Md. at 350, 739 A.2d at 55.
That, essentially, was the problem here.  This case began as, and it always remained,
a civil contempt proceeding.  There was never a criminal contempt petition filed against
appellant.  Every pleading, motion, and order, from beginning to end, referenced and was
filed in the paternity action.  The orders entered by the court on June 27 and 28, 2002,
however, when read together, were clearly in the nature of a criminal sentence.  As we have
observed, the June 28 “Order For Constructive Civil Contempt” imposed a finite 180 day
“sentence” of incarceration on appellant, of which 150 days was suspended.  Appellant was
ordered to report to the sheriff to serve the remaining 30 days unless, prior to the day he was
to report, he paid $1,000 to DSS, but there was no evidence before the court from which any
4 The only evidence bearing on appellant’s ability to meet that purge was that he
was currently earning $8/hour from employment and that he had two other children to
support.  The court gave him nine weeks to accumulate $1,000.  If he worked 40 hours a
week during those nine weeks, his gross earnings, without any deductions, would have
been $2,880.  There was no evidence as to what his net earnings would have been,
whether he could, in fact, have worked a 40-hour week if he was also required to report to
his probation officer and undergo drug testing, or what would have been required to
defray his reasonable living expenses.  The assumption that he could accumulate $1,000
during that period was sheer speculation which, in Thrower v. Support Enforcement, 358
Md. 146, 747 A.2d 634 (2000), we made clear was impermissible.  See also Rawlings v.
Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 571-72, 766 A.2d at 118.
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finding could be made that appellant would be able to pay that $1,000 by that time.4  
The June 27 Order for Probation was not only captioned “State of Maryland vs.
Joseph Bryant,” in clear distinction to the civil caption of “Howard County Department of
Social Services vs. Joseph David Bryant,” but, especially when coupled with the addendum
to it, was criminal in its form and substance.  It placed appellant under the supervision of the
Division of Parole and Probation, a unit within the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services responsible for supervising persons who have been placed on probation
after conviction of a crime.  See Maryland Code, § 6-111 of the Correctional Services
Article.  The general conditions listed in that order were those peculiar to probation entered
as part of a criminal sentence – report to probation agent and follow his/her lawful
instructions, get agent’s permission before changing job or address, notify agent if
probationer is arrested, permit agent to visit probationer’s home.  The addendum had similar
criminally-oriented provisions – pay all fines, restitution, and fees ordered by the court,
totally abstain from alcohol or drugs, attend NA meetings, participate in self-help activities,
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and submit to alcohol and drug testing.
Those kinds of directives go well beyond what is permissible under Rule 15-207(e)(4),
as they are not only quintessentially criminal in nature but have only the most strained and
tenuous connection with forcing appellant to obtain employment, which he already had, and
resuming his child support payments.  They constituted an unlawful criminal sentence
imposed in a civil contempt proceeding and were therefore invalid.  Because they were
invalid, they could not serve as a lawful basis for the finding of contempt on October 9, 2003.
The Order for Constructive Civil Contempt filed on October 9, 2003, must be vacated.  Our
vacation of that Order does not, of course, affect in any way appellant’s on-going obligation
to pay the child support and payments on the arrearage that previously had been established
and ordered.
ORDER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEM PT
ENTERED BY CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD
COUNTY AND FILED OCTOBER 9, 2003, VACATED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.