Title: State v. Elder

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-1485 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  17 December 2013 
 
 
DAVID M. MORGAN, 
Employee, 
 
Plaintiff 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
From The North Carolina 
Industrial Commission 
I.C. No. 875277 
MORGAN MOTOR COMPANY OF 
ALBEMARLE, 
Employer, 
 
and 
 
BRENTWOOD SERVICES, INC., 
Servicing Agent for the North 
Carolina Auto Dealers Association 
Self-Insurer’s Fund, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 27 August 
2012 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.  Heard in the 
Court of Appeals 6 June 2013. 
 
Poisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson and 
Fred D. Poisson, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant. 
 
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A. 
Hamilton and Carla M. Cobb, for defendants-appellees. 
 
 
DAVIS, Judge. 
 
 
-2- 
 
David M. Morgan (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the Opinion and 
Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Full 
Commission” or “the Commission”) denying his workers’ compensation 
claim against Morgan Motor Company of Albemarle, Inc. (“Morgan 
Motors”).  The issue before us is whether the Commission erred in 
concluding that Plaintiff’s accident did not arise out of — or 
occur in the course of — his employment with Morgan Motors.  After 
careful review, we affirm the Full Commission’s opinion. 
Factual Background 
Plaintiff is a 55-year-old man who was the Secretary-
Treasurer, Sales and Financial Manager, and 45.5% owner of Morgan 
Motors, a family-owned car dealership in Albemarle, North 
Carolina.  Morgan Motors was initially located at 304 East Main 
Street in Albemarle but relocated in 1992 to a larger location on 
Highway 52.  It continued to own the building at 304 East Main 
Street after its move to the Highway 52 location. 
In 1998 or 1999, Plaintiff and his father had an architect 
draw up plans to remodel the old dealership building at 304 East 
Main Street into a restaurant.  In 2003, Morgan Motors took out a 
$2.1 million dollar loan to pay off the mortgage on the Highway 52 
building and also to renovate the building at 304 East Main Street.  
Approximately $1.3 million of the loan proceeds was used to 
renovate and remodel the old dealership building. 
By virtue of a lease signed on 20 October 2004, Morgan Motors 
-3- 
 
leased the old dealership building to Pontiac Pointe, a limited 
liability company formed by Plaintiff and his business partner, 
John Williams.  Plaintiff’s brother, Robert T. Morgan, signed the 
lease on behalf of Morgan Motors as the landlord along with 
Plaintiff, Mellanie M. Morgan, and Pamela C. Morgan.  Plaintiff 
also signed the lease on behalf of the tenant, Pontiac Pointe.  
Paragraph 6 of the lease — entitled Maintenance, Repairs and 
Replacements — provided that 
[d]uring the term of this Lease, Landlord 
[Morgan Motors] shall be responsible for 
maintenance of the roof and structure of the 
building and for replacements of heating and 
air-conditioning equipment and facilities.  
Tenant [Pontiac Pointe] shall be responsible 
for all other maintenance and replacements, 
which do not result by fire or other casualty, 
and for all normal and routine maintenance, 
cleaning and repairs to the building, doors, 
windows and plumbing, air-conditioning and 
heating and mechanical systems.  Tenant shall 
keep the leased premises in a neat, clean and 
businesslike condition. 
 
In December 2004, Pontiac Pointe began operating a restaurant 
at the old dealership building.  Plaintiff continued in his roles 
with Morgan Motors while also acting as the financial manager of 
Pontiac Pointe.  Plaintiff would usually go to Pontiac Pointe each 
morning to pick up the restaurant’s receipts and reports and then 
make a deposit at the bank. 
On 15 January 2008, Plaintiff drove from Morgan Motors to the 
bank.  He then went to Pontiac Pointe to retrieve its cash receipts 
-4- 
 
and daily reports.  Plaintiff testified that as he was speaking 
with Jay Koral, the restaurant’s general manager, he heard a noise 
that sounded like “a bearing that was going bad” in the air-
conditioning unit on the roof.  Plaintiff explained that after 
they “had an experience of already replacing part of that unit up 
there, [he] thought [he] needed to look at it and try to determine 
whether we needed somebody to come look at the system or not . . 
. .”  Plaintiff accessed the roof via an internal ladder.  He was 
found shortly thereafter lying on the ground in the back patio 
area of the restaurant.  Plaintiff did not remember falling but 
did testify that there was black ice on the roof.  Plaintiff 
suffered a C7 spinal cord injury, leaving him paralyzed from the 
waist down.  He also broke his collarbone and several ribs and had 
to have his spleen removed. 
Defendants Morgan Motors and Brentwood Services, Inc., the 
third-party administrator for the North Carolina Auto Dealers 
Association Self-Insurer’s Fund, denied Plaintiff’s workers’ 
compensation claim on the basis that his injury did not arise out 
of — or occur in the course of — Plaintiff’s employment with Morgan 
Motors.  The matter was heard by Deputy Commissioner George T. 
Glenn, II on 7 March 2011 and 23 May 2011.  Deputy Commissioner 
Glenn filed an opinion and award on 23 January 2012 finding that 
Plaintiff “sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course and scope of his employment with Employer 
-5- 
 
Defendant [Morgan Motors].”  He determined that Plaintiff was 
therefore entitled to medical expenses, attendant care expenses, 
and compensation in the amount of $786.00 per week until further 
order or until Plaintiff returned to suitable employment at his 
pre-injury average weekly wage. 
Defendants appealed to the Full Commission.  On 27 August 
2012, the Full Commission issued an opinion reversing Deputy 
Commissioner 
Glenn’s 
opinion 
and 
award, 
concluding 
that 
Plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of, or occur within the course 
and scope of, his employment with Morgan Motors.  Plaintiff gave 
timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
Analysis 
Our review of an opinion and award of the Industrial 
Commission is “limited to consideration of whether competent 
evidence supports the Commission’s findings of fact and whether 
the findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law.”  
Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 
669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008).  With regard to review of the 
Commission’s findings of fact, this Court’s “duty goes no further 
than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending 
to support the finding[s].”  Id.  (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  The findings of fact made by the Commission are 
conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence even if 
there is also evidence that would support a contrary finding.  Nale 
-6- 
 
v. Ethan Allen, 199 N.C. App. 511, 514, 682 S.E.2d 231, 234, disc. 
review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 454 (2009).  The 
Commission’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.  
Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons, 212 N.C. App. 287, 295, 713 S.E.2d 
68, 74, disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 719 S.E.2d 26 (2011). 
I. “Arising Out Of” and “In The Course Of” Elements 
“Under 
the 
Workers’ 
Compensation 
Act, 
an 
injury 
is 
compensable only if it is the result of an accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employment.”  Chavis v. TLC Home Health 
Care, 172 N.C. App. 366, 370, 616 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2005) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 288, 627 
S.E.2d 464 (2006).  “The phrases ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the 
course of’ one’s employment are not synonymous but rather are two 
separate and distinct elements[,] both of which a claimant must 
prove to bring a case within the Act.”  Gallimore v. Marilyn’s 
Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977). 
“Arising out of employment relates to the origin or cause of 
the accident.” Hedges v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 206 N.C. App. 
732, 735, 699 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2010) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 705 S.E.2d 746 (2011).  
“The controlling test of whether an injury arises out of the 
employment is whether the injury is a natural and probable 
consequence of the nature of the employment.”  Dildy v. MBW Inv., 
Inc., 152 N.C. App. 65, 69, 566 S.E.2d 759, 763 (2002) (citation 
-7- 
 
and quotation marks omitted).  “In other words, the employment 
must be a contributing cause or bear a reasonable relationship to 
the employee’s injuries.”  Rivera v. Trapp, 135 N.C. App. 296, 
301, 519 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1999).  Thus, an injury is compensable 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act if “it is fairly traceable to 
the employment or any reasonable relationship to the employment 
exists.”  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
“The words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and 
circumstances under which an accident occurred.  The accident must 
occur during the period and place of employment.”  Chavis, 172 
N.C. App. at 370, 616 S.E.2d at 408 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  “An employee is injured in the course of his employment 
when the injury occurs ‘under circumstances in which the employee 
is engaged in an activity which he is authorized to undertake and 
which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the 
employer’s business.’”  Shaw v. Smith & Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. 
App. 442, 446, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1998) (quoting Powers v. Lady’s 
Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982)). 
In discussing the respective roles of the Industrial 
Commission and a reviewing court, our Supreme Court has made clear 
that 
(1) the Full Commission is sole judge of the 
weight and credibility of the evidence,  and 
(2) appellate courts reviewing Commission 
decisions are limited to reviewing whether any 
competent evidence supports the Commission’s 
-8- 
 
findings of fact and whether the findings of 
fact support the Commission’s conclusions of 
law. 
 
Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 
553 (2000).  When making determinations of credibility, the 
Industrial Commission is not obligated to explain why it deemed 
certain evidence credible or not credible.  Id.  This is so because 
[r]equiring the Commission to explain its 
credibility determinations and allowing the 
Court of Appeals to review the Commission’s 
explanation 
of 
those 
credibility 
determinations would be inconsistent with our 
legal system’s tradition of not requiring the 
fact finder to explain why he or she believes 
one witness over another or believes one piece 
of evidence is more credible than another. 
 
Id. 
In its Opinion and Award, the Full Commission based its 
conclusion that Plaintiff’s injury was not compensable on the 
following findings of fact: 
11. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, 
Pontiac Pointe was to pay $13,000 per month in 
rent to the dealership.  The rent amount was 
based on the $1.3 million loan that the 
dealership incurred to refurbish the 304 East 
Main Building.  Pontiac Pointe never paid any 
rent money to Morgan Motors during the entire 
time it leased the premises. 
 
12. The lease between the restaurant and 
dealership also provided the following in 
Paragraph 6: 
 
Maintenance, Repairs, and Replacements.  
During the term of this lease, Landlord 
shall be responsible for maintenance of 
the roof and structure of the building 
-9- 
 
and for replacements of heating and air-
conditioning equipment and facilities.  
Tenant shall be responsible for all other 
maintenance and replacements, which do 
not result by fire or other casualty, and 
for all normal and routine maintenance, 
cleaning and repairs to the building, 
doors, 
windows 
and 
plumbing, 
air-
conditioning and heating and mechanical 
systems.  Tenant[] shall keep the leased 
premises in a neat, clean and business 
like condition. 
 
. . . . 
 
14. In addition to being part owner of the 
restaurant, plaintiff served as the financial 
manager 
of 
the 
restaurant, 
with 
tasks 
consisting of paying bills, keeping the 
financial books, and doing payroll.  Plaintiff 
was in charge of supervising the operation of 
the restaurant, including the hiring and 
supervision of the General Manager, Jay Koral, 
hired to manage and handle the day-to-day 
affairs of the restaurant.  Mr. Koral had 
contact with plaintiff on a daily basis 
pertaining to the restaurant’s finances and 
operations, and plaintiff would usually eat 
dinner at the restaurant on Wednesday, Friday 
and Saturday nights. 
 
15. Plaintiff’s brothers, including Terry 
[Robert T. Morgan], majority co-owner of the 
dealership, had no input with regard to the 
renovations of [the] 304 East Main building 
and had no financial or managerial involvement 
with Pontiac Pointe.  Plaintiff’s brothers did 
not perform any maintenance at the restaurant 
nor were they ever asked to help with any 
maintenance or repairs or asked to inspect 
anything at Pontiac Pointe. 
 
16. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Pontiac 
Pointe paid for maintenance and repairs, 
including maintenance and repair to the HVAC 
system.  On occasion, employees of Pontiac 
Pointe would attempt to maintain or repair 
-10- 
 
equipment at Pontiac Pointe “in house” prior 
to contacting outside contractors. 
 
17. Pontiac Pointe’s responsibility for the 
maintenance and repair of all of the equipment 
at 304 East Main Street is corroborated by the 
financial records documenting payments made by 
Pontiac 
Pointe 
for 
routine 
maintenance 
contracts, repairs and maintenance to the HVAC 
system, plumbing, and mechanical systems. 
 
18. No dealership operations occurred at the 
304 East Main Street property following the 
move to Highway 52 in 1992.  Morgan Motors 
hired no employees to provide any maintenance 
work or inspections at Pontiac Pointe or to 
assist in the restaurant operations.  Based 
upon a preponderance of the evidence of 
record, the Full Commission finds that Pontiac 
Pointe and Morgan Motors were two entirely 
separate entities. 
 
19. 
Pontiac 
Pointe 
obtained 
a 
separate 
workers’ compensation policy for Pontiac 
Pointe through Travelers.  Plaintiff excluded 
himself from coverage under the restaurant’s 
workers’ compensation policy with Travelers. 
 
20. Plaintiff’s usual practice was to go to 
Pontiac Pointe first thing every morning to 
pick up the previous day’s receipts and 
reports and then make a deposit.  While 
picking up the receipts and reports, plaintiff 
would discuss the restaurant operations with 
the restaurant General Manager, Jay Koral.  On 
January 15, 2008, plaintiff first went by 
Morgan Motors to get money out of the safe and 
then made a deposit at the Bank of Stanley.  
Plaintiff then performed his usual routine of 
going to Pontiac Pointe to pick up the 
previous 
night’s 
receipts 
and 
operating 
report. 
 
21. On January 15, 2008, plaintiff arrived at 
Pontiac Pointe at approximately 8:00 a.m. to 
9:00 a.m. and met with the restaurant’s 
General Manager, Jay Koral, in the third floor 
-11- 
 
office 
to 
discuss 
the 
previous 
night’s 
specials at the restaurant and whether the 
specials had sold.  In addition, plaintiff was 
obtaining financial information about Pontiac 
Pointe’s previous night’s operations. 
 
22. While speaking with Jay Koral in the 
restaurant’s third floor office, plaintiff 
stated that he heard a noise on the roof.  Mr. 
Koral testified at his deposition that he did 
not hear any noise. 
 
23. Plaintiff testified that he went up on the 
roof because he was concerned that a “bearing” 
might be going bad; however, plaintiff had no 
general 
mechanical 
training 
or 
specific 
training in the repair or maintenance of HVAC 
systems, admitted that he did not know the 
source of the alleged noise, no noise was 
heard by Mr. Koral at all, although he was 
standing next to the plaintiff, and no 
subsequent repairs or maintenance were done on 
the HVAC system. 
 
. . . . 
 
27. Following plaintiff’s accident, neither 
Morgan Motors Company nor the new dealership 
owner had to repair or replace any part of the 
heating or air conditioning equipment at the 
restaurant, nor were there any problems with 
the HVAC system when the Pontiac Pointe 
building was eventually sold. 
 
28. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence 
of record, the Full Commission finds that 
plaintiff was acting solely on behalf of and 
for the benefit of Pontiac Pointe as the owner 
of Pontiac Pointe at all times relevant to 
this action.  The Full Commission further 
finds that plaintiff’s decision to go on the 
roof of 304 East Main Street was not in 
furtherance or related in any way to his 
employment with Morgan Motors.  The Full 
Commission finds plaintiff’s contention that 
his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors, not 
credible. 
-12- 
 
 
29. 
Furthermore, 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
plaintiff’s contention that he was worried 
about a “bearing going bad” or some other 
problem with the HVAC system is deemed 
credible, there was still no benefit to Morgan 
Motors, since the obligation for repair and 
maintenance of the HVAC system was the 
responsibility of Pontiac Pointe per the 
lease.  Any alleged benefit which plaintiff 
now contends was conferred upon Morgan Motors 
is speculative at best and is not credible 
based upon the following facts: plaintiff 
excluded 
himself 
from 
the 
workers’ 
compensation coverage for Pontiac Pointe 
through Travelers, plaintiff has an incentive 
for now contending that his actions were on 
behalf of Morgan Motors and not Pontiac 
Pointe, and since Pontiac Pointe paid no rent 
to Morgan Motors despite the $1.3 million loan 
liability the dealership incurred. 
 
. . . . 
 
31. Based on a preponderance of the evidence 
of record, the Full Commission finds that 
plaintiff’s action in going up on the roof of 
304 East Main Street had no reasonable 
relationship to his employment with Morgan 
Motors.  Plaintiff did not know the source of 
the noise, the noise was not heard by Jay Koral 
standing next to the plaintiff, plaintiff had 
no intention of replacing the HVAC system, and 
no repairs or maintenance needed to be done to 
the HVAC system following the accident on 
January 15, 2008. 
 
32. Based upon the lease provisions and the 
pattern and practice of Pontiac Pointe, 
plaintiff had no legal obligation to go up on 
the roof on behalf of Morgan Motors on January 
15, 2008. 
 
33. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence 
of record, the Full Commission finds that 
plaintiff was at Pontiac Pointe on the morning 
of January 15, 2008 for the sole purpose of 
-13- 
 
conducting 
Pontiac 
Pointe 
financial 
operations and he was there solely in his role 
as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac 
Pointe.  At no point during his decision to go 
up on the roof did plaintiff deviate from his 
role as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac 
Pointe and plaintiff’s contention that he was 
going up on the roof on behalf of Morgan Motors 
is not credible. 
 
34. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence 
of record, the Full Commission finds that 
plaintiff’s fall on January 15, 2008 did not 
arise out of his employment with Morgan 
Motors. 
 
35. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence 
of record, the Full Commission further finds 
that plaintiff’s fall on January 15, 2008 did 
not occur in the course of his employment with 
Morgan Motors. 
 
Thus, 
the 
Commission’s 
ultimate 
determination 
that 
Plaintiff’s injury was not compensable rested on its findings that 
the accident neither arose out of, nor occurred in the course of, 
his employment with Morgan Motors.  In analyzing the “arising out 
of” element, the Commission found that Plaintiff’s accident “was 
not a natural or probable consequence of his employment with Morgan 
Motors” because his act of climbing up to the roof was not 
“causally related to his duties with Morgan Motors, but was instead 
directly related to his ownership and management of Pontiac 
Pointe.”  See Mintz v. Verizon Wireless, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
735 S.E.2d 217, 221 (2012) (“[A]n injury arises out of the 
employment when it is a natural and probable consequence or 
incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its 
-14- 
 
risks, so that there is some causal relation between the injury 
and the performance of some service of the employment.”) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
Specifically, the Commission relied upon Pontiac Pointe’s and 
Morgan Motors’ respective obligations under the lease, finding 
that (1) Pontiac Pointe was responsible for maintenance or repairs 
to the HVAC system; (2) Pontiac Pointe employees would, on 
occasion, attempt to repair HVAC equipment themselves before 
contacting an outside contractor; and (3) the financial records 
documenting the past practices of Pontiac Pointe and Morgan Motors 
were consistent with the obligations of both parties as spelled 
out in the lease.  The Commission thus concluded that Plaintiff’s 
actions leading up to his accident did not arise out of his 
employment with Morgan Motors because he was not under an 
obligation to check the HVAC system on behalf of Morgan Motors and 
his actions were instead solely for the benefit of, and on behalf 
of, Pontiac Pointe. 
Similarly, the Commission concluded that Plaintiff’s injury 
did not occur in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors 
because Plaintiff 
was at the restaurant at a time he would 
normally be at the restaurant performing his 
duties as the owner/financial manager of the 
restaurant.  Plaintiff’s duties with Morgan 
Motors did not take him to the restaurant for 
anything on the day of the accident [and] 
Plaintiff was not engaged in any activity that 
-15- 
 
he was authorized to undertake for Morgan 
Motors pursuant to the lease at the time of 
the accident. 
 
See Powers, 306 N.C. at 730, 295 S.E.2d at 475 (“A claimant is 
injured in the course of employment when the injury occurs during 
the period of employment at a place where an employee’s duties are 
calculated to take him, and under circumstances in which the 
employee is engaged in an activity which he is authorized to 
undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or 
indirectly, the employer’s business.”). 
The Commission based its conclusion that Plaintiff’s accident 
did not occur in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors 
on its findings that (1) on the morning of the accident, Plaintiff 
was at the old dealership building for the purpose of conducting 
his business as the financial manager of Pontiac Pointe (and not 
pursuant to any duties he had as an employee of Morgan Motors); 
(2) he was at the building during the time of day that he typically 
conducted his business as owner and financial manager of Pontiac 
Pointe; and (3) his action of climbing up to the roof was not 
authorized by or undertaken to benefit Morgan Motors. 
While Plaintiff testified that he climbed up on the roof out 
of a concern that a bearing in the air conditioning unit was “going 
bad” (thereby potentially implicating Morgan Motors’ obligation 
under the lease to replace heating and air conditioning equipment), 
the Commission specifically found that his testimony on this issue 
-16- 
 
lacked credibility.  The Commission also found that he had no 
general mechanical training or knowledge; “that he did not know 
the source of the alleged noise;” and that Koral did not hear any 
noise at all.  The Commission further determined that Plaintiff’s 
“contention that his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [was] not 
credible” and that any alleged benefit that Plaintiff “now contends 
was conferred upon Morgan Motors is speculative at best . . . .”  
These credibility determinations by the Commission are not 
reviewable on appeal.  See Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 N.C. 
App. 432, 434, 637 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2006) (“This Court may not 
weigh 
the 
evidence 
or 
make 
determinations 
regarding 
the 
credibility of the witnesses.”). 
Plaintiff concedes that the Commission found his testimony 
that “his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [was] not credible.” 
However, he argues that its findings relating to his decision to 
climb up to the roof were erroneous because, in making them, the 
Commission failed to take into account the fact that Plaintiff was 
the designated “point person” authorized to address any issues 
regarding the conditions of the old dealership building on Morgan 
Motors’ behalf.  Plaintiff thus asserts that the Full Commission’s 
finding that he “was acting solely on behalf of and for the benefit 
of Pontiac Pointe as the owner of Pontiac Pointe at all times 
relevant to this action” is erroneous.  In making this contention, 
he argues that his actions leading up to the accident could have 
-17- 
 
benefitted Pontiac Pointe yet still constituted a compensable 
injury by accident because those same actions also conferred a 
benefit upon Morgan Motors.  In support of this “dual benefit” 
argument, Plaintiff cites Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 
276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976).  In Watkins, our Supreme Court affirmed 
the Commission’s determination that an on-duty firefighter’s 
accident while assisting a co-worker in the maintenance of a 
personal automobile was compensable.  Id. at 285, 225 S.E.2d at 
583.  The Court reasoned that 
 
[a]cts of an employee for the benefit of 
third persons generally preclude the recovery 
of 
compensation 
for 
accidental 
injuries 
sustained during the performance of such acts, 
usually on the ground they are not incidental 
to any service which the employee is obligated 
to render under his contract of employment, 
and the injuries therefore cannot be said to 
arise out of and in the course of the 
employment. . . .  However, where competent 
proof exists that the employee understood, or 
had reasonable grounds to believe that the act 
resulting in injury was incidental to his 
employment, or such as would prove beneficial 
to his employer’s interests or was encouraged 
by the employer in the performance of the act 
or similar acts for the purpose of creating a 
feeling of good will, or authorized so to do 
by common practice or custom, compensation may 
be recovered, since then a causal connection 
between the employment and the accident may be 
established. 
 
Id. at 283, 225 S.E.2d at 582 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Court then determined that the plaintiff’s act of 
-18- 
 
assisting in the maintenance of a co-worker’s personal vehicle was 
a reasonable activity and a risk of his employment as a firefighter 
because (1) his superiors at the fire department had authorized 
the practice of making minor repairs to personal vehicles while on 
duty; and (2) those repairs were “to an appreciable extent a 
benefit to the fire department” because firefighters used their 
personal vehicles to respond to emergencies when they were called 
in from off duty.  Id. at 284, 225 S.E.2d at 582. 
We believe the present case is readily distinguishable from 
Watkins.  Unlike in Watkins, Plaintiff here failed to show that 
his actions leading up to the accident were authorized by Morgan 
Motors.  Moreover, competent evidence supported the Commission’s 
finding that any benefit accruing to Morgan Motors from Plaintiff’s 
actions was “tenuous, immeasurable, speculative, and remote.” 
In asserting that he was authorized by Morgan Motors to 
inspect the HVAC system and that the Commission erred by failing 
to make findings regarding his role as the “point person” for 
Morgan Motors in this regard, Plaintiff relies heavily on a brief 
portion of his brother’s testimony.  When asked on direct 
examination if he [Robert T. Morgan] had ever completed any 
maintenance or repairs at the old dealership building after Pontiac 
Pointe began leasing the property, his brother replied: “I really 
didn’t have hardly anything to do with Pontiac Point[e].  David 
did most of that because he was down there approximately every 
-19- 
 
day.”  Plaintiff contends that this testimony affirmatively 
established that he “was authorized [by Morgan Motors] to undertake 
the activity he was undertaking when his accident occurred and 
that his co-majority owner in fact relied upon him to do so.”  We 
believe, however, that the brief testimony of Plaintiff’s brother 
on this point fell well short of compelling a finding by the Full 
Commission that Plaintiff was authorized by Morgan Motors to take 
these actions or that he was acting for the benefit of Morgan 
Motors at the time of the accident. 
In a workers’ compensation action, the plaintiff “has the 
burden to prove each element of compensability.”  Holley v. ACTS, 
Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 234, 581 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003).  Plaintiff 
simply failed to offer evidence requiring the Commission to find 
that (1) his job duties with Morgan Motors included inspecting the 
HVAC system for potential malfunctions; (2) he was authorized by 
Morgan Motors to undertake these actions; (3) his accident was a 
result of a risk inherent in his employment with Morgan Motors; or 
(4) he was acting on behalf, or for the benefit, of Morgan Motors 
at the time of the accident.  Given that it was Plaintiff’s burden 
to produce such evidence and he failed to meet this burden, we 
cannot say that the Commission erred in its determination that 
Plaintiff’s accident neither arose out of nor occurred in the 
course of his employment with Morgan Motors. 
 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the dissent goes beyond 
-20- 
 
the scope of appellate review applicable in workers’ compensation 
cases.  Our Supreme Court has made clear that when reviewing an 
opinion and award from the Industrial Commission, an appellate 
court “does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide 
the issue on the basis of its weight.”  Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 
N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Our review is purely “limited to consideration of 
whether competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings of 
fact and whether the findings support the Commission’s conclusions 
of law.”  Richardson, 362 N.C. at 660, 669 S.E.2d at 584. 
Thus, while the dissent discusses the doctrine of joint 
employment — which provides that two employers may be jointly 
liable for workers’ compensation benefits to the same employee if 
he is simultaneously performing services for both at the time of 
his injury by accident — such an analysis is inapplicable here 
based on the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission.  Where 
— as here — there is competent evidence to support the Commission’s 
findings of fact and those factual findings support its conclusions 
of law, our review is at an end.  See Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & 
Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2004) (“The 
Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when 
supported by competent evidence even though evidence exists that 
would support a contrary finding.”) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
-21- 
 
We “are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set 
aside the findings of the Commission, simply because other 
inferences could have been drawn and different conclusions might 
have been reached.”  Hill v. Hanes Corp., 319 N.C. 167, 172, 353 
S.E.2d 392, 395 (1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
The dissent relies on the notions that Morgan Motors had an 
interest in “keeping tabs” on the HVAC unit and a “need to make 
regular determinations regarding the condition of its investment” 
to support its conclusion that Plaintiff’s actions provided an 
“appreciable benefit” to Morgan Motors, but these findings simply 
were not made by the Commission. 
In short, the dissent reaches a result based on findings the 
Industrial Commission could have conceivably made but did not 
actually make.  Such an analysis is inconsistent with our standard 
of review in workers’ compensation cases.  Because the result the 
Commission reached is supported by findings of fact that are 
supported by competent evidence of record, our analysis must end 
there. 
The dissent does not deny the existence of competent evidence 
in the record to support all of the findings of fact made by the 
Commission.  Nor does it explain why these findings do not support 
the Commission’s legal conclusions.  Instead, the dissent — in 
essence — is claiming that the facts of this case could have 
supported a different conclusion.  The dissent asserts that the 
-22- 
 
Commission’s findings are not “determinative” or “dispositive” on 
the issue of Morgan Motors’ liability.  However, the correct 
standard is merely whether the Commission’s factual findings 
support its conclusions — not whether other conclusions could have 
possibly been drawn.  See Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 180 N.C. 
App. 392, 400, 637 S.E.2d 251, 257 (2006) (“We may not substitute 
our own judgment for that of the Commission, even though the 
evidence 
might 
rationally 
justify 
reaching 
a 
different 
conclusion.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted)), disc. 
review denied, 361 N.C. 356, 644 S.E.2d 232 (2007). 
II. Findings of Fact 23 and 27 
 
In addition to those findings of the Commission addressed in 
his primary argument on appeal, Plaintiff also contends that 
findings 23 and 27 are not supported by competent evidence and, 
therefore, do not support the Commission’s ultimate conclusion 
that Plaintiff’s injury was not compensable.  In making this 
argument, he focuses on the specific portions of those findings 
referencing the absence of subsequent repairs or maintenance to 
the HVAC system following the accident. 
During the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Robert T. 
Morgan testified that he was not aware of any replacements of HVAC 
equipment after Plaintiff’s injury.  When asked if “[a]s part of 
the foreclosure process, was Morgan Motors asked to replace any 
equipment on top of the roof?,” he replied: “Not that I know of.”  
-23- 
 
We conclude that this testimony constituted competent evidence 
upon which the Commission could base its findings that no 
subsequent replacements or repairs to the HVAC system occurred in 
the aftermath of Plaintiff’s injury or when the building was 
ultimately sold. 
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these findings were 
unsupported by any competent evidence of record or that the 
existence 
(or 
nonexistence) 
of 
post-accident 
repairs 
or 
maintenance 
lacked 
relevance 
to 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
Plaintiff’s injury was compensable, we believe the remaining 
findings by the Commission — as discussed in detail above — 
adequately support its ultimate conclusion.  See Meares v. Dana 
Corp., 193 N.C. App. 86, 89-90, 666 S.E.2d 819, 823 (2008) (“Where 
there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent evidence 
to support the Commission’s conclusions of law, the award will not 
be disturbed because of other erroneous findings which do not 
affect the conclusions.”) (citation, quotation marks, and 
alterations omitted)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 
S.E.2d 359 (2009). 
III. Interpretation of the Lease 
 
Plaintiff also asserts that the Commission erred by failing 
to make an explicit finding as to whether Paragraph 6 of the lease 
between Morgan Motors and Pontiac Pointe was ambiguous.  Our review 
of the Commission’s findings lead us to conclude that it determined 
-24- 
 
the lease provision was unambiguous — that is, Pontiac Pointe was 
to pay for maintenance and repairs of the HVAC system while Morgan 
Motors was to pay for the replacement of HVAC system equipment.  
“When the parties use clear and unambiguous terms, the contract 
should be given its plain meaning, and the court can determine the 
parties’ intent as a matter of law.”  42 East, LLC v. D.R. Horton, 
Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 722 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2012) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  In our view, the plain language of 
Paragraph 6 of the lease makes clear the respective obligations of 
the parties regarding the HVAC system.1  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Commission did not err in its findings regarding the 
parties’ duties based on the lease.  Nor did it err in failing to 
make a finding expressly determining Paragraph 6 to be unambiguous. 
IV. Morgan Motors’ Offers of Proof 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Full Commission erred by 
failing to make express findings regarding various offers of proof 
made by Morgan Motors during the hearing before the deputy 
commissioner.  As there is no evidence that these offers of proof 
formed the basis for the Full Commission’s Opinion and Award, we 
                     
1 Plaintiff also argues that the Commission erred by failing to 
take into account Morgan Motors’ admission that it paid a 2005 
bill for a new compressor in the HVAC system.  As the payment was 
for the replacement of the compressor, however, this evidence 
simply corroborates the fact that the parties acted in accordance 
with their understanding of the unambiguous obligation of Morgan 
Motors under Paragraph 6 of the lease to replace HVAC equipment. 
-25- 
 
will not assume that the Commission relied upon this evidence in 
reaching its conclusions.  See McKyer v. McKyer, 182 N.C. App. 
456, 463, 642 S.E.2d 527, 532 (2007) (“An appellate court is not 
required to, and should not, assume error by the trial [tribunal] 
when none appears on the record before the appellate court.”) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).  This argument is 
accordingly overruled. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Opinion and Award 
of the Full Commission. 
AFFIRMED. 
Judge CALABRIA concurs. 
Judge DILLON dissents by separate opinion. 
NO. COA12-1485 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 17 December 2013 
 
 
DAVID M. MORGAN, 
 
Employee, 
 
Plaintiff 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
From The North Carolina 
Industrial Commission 
I.C. No. 875277 
MORGAN MOTOR COMPANY OF ALBEMARLE, 
Employer, 
 
and 
 
BRENTWOOD SERVICES, INC., 
Servicing Agent for the North 
Carolina Auto Dealers Association 
Self-Insurer’s Fund, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
DILLON, Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
While I believe the Commission’s findings support a 
conclusion that Pontiac Pointe may be liable for Plaintiff’s 
injuries, I also believe that these same findings compel a 
conclusion that Morgan Motors is also liable.  I do not believe 
that the Commission made any findings which compel its conclusion 
that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that the 
accident “arose out of his employment with Morgan Motors [or that 
-2- 
 
 
it] occurred during the course and scope of his employment with 
Morgan Motors.”  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
While it has been said that a person cannot serve two masters, 
this is not the rule when determining liability for workers’ 
compensation coverage under North Carolina law.  Rather, our courts 
have recognized that there may be situations where an employee 
sustains an injury while in the service of two different employers.  
Specifically, our Court has stated as follows: 
Joint employment . . . occurs when ‘a single 
employee, under contract with two employers, 
and under the simultaneous control of both, 
simultaneously performs services for both 
employers, and when the service for each 
employer is the same as, or is closely related 
to, that for the other.  In such a case, both 
employers 
are 
liable 
for 
workman’s 
compensation. 
 
Anderson v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 83 N.C. App. 634, 636, 351 S.E.2d 
109, 110 (1986) (quoting 1C, Larson, The Law of Workmen’s 
Compensation § 48.40).  Our Supreme Court has held that where two 
employers are liable for an employee’s injuries, the employee 
“ha[s] the right to proceed” against either employee or against 
both.  Leggette v. McCotter, 265 N.C. 617, 623, 144 S.E.2d 849, 
853 (1965); see also Hughart v. Dasco Transportation, Inc., 167 
N.C. App. 685, 691, 606 S.E.2d 379, 383 (2005) (recognizing the 
concept of “joint employment” where the employee has a contract, 
whether “express or implied” with each employer); Henderson v. 
Manpower, 70 N.C. App. 408, 415, 319 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1984) 
-3- 
 
 
(holding that each employer is “liable equally” in compensating 
the employee for a work-related injury).   
Our Supreme Court has stated that the “compensability of a 
claim basically turns upon whether or not the employee was acting 
for the benefit of his employer ‘to any appreciable extent’ when 
the accident occurred.”  Hoffman v. Truck Lines, Inc., 306 N.C. 
502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1982) (citation omitted).  In this 
case, I believe that the Plaintiff’s action to determine the source 
of a noise on the roof where the HVAC system was located - a system 
which his employer Morgan Motors owned – benefited Morgan Motors 
to some “appreciable extent”; and, accordingly, I believe that 
Morgan Motors is liable for Plaintiff’s injuries sustained when he 
fell off the roof.  Specifically, the Commission found that Morgan 
Motors owned the building where the accident occurred; that Morgan 
Motors borrowed $1.3 million2 to renovate the building; that Morgan 
Motors leased the renovated building to Pontiac Pointe for 
$13,000.00 per month; that Pontiac Pointe never actually paid any 
of the rent due under the lease; that under the lease, Morgan 
Motors was responsible for “replacements of [HVAC] equipment” and 
Pontiac Pointe was responsible for “all normal and routine 
maintenance [to the HVAC system]”; that Plaintiff was an employee 
                     
2 Though not included in the findings by the Full Commission, the 
Deputy Commissioner found – and the evidence is uncontradicted – 
that over $100,000.00 of the loan proceeds funded spent a new 
HVAC system for the building. 
-4- 
 
 
of both Morgan Motors and Pontiac Pointe; that Plaintiff was the 
only owner of Morgan Motors who was involved with the renovations 
of the building; and that Morgan Motors had no other employees 
whose responsibility was to oversee the condition of the building.  
Further, the Full Commission found that, on the day of the 
accident, Plaintiff heard a noise on the roof but he “did not know 
the source of the noise”; that Plaintiff climbed on the roof with 
a wrench; and that Plaintiff slipped from the roof and sustained 
injuries.   
The Full Commission made a number of findings which, 
Defendants argue, support the conclusion that Morgan Motors was 
not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries when he decided to climb on 
the roof.  However, I do not believe that any of these findings 
compel a conclusion that Morgan Motors is not liable in this case.  
For instance, the Full Commission found that “[P]laintiff’s 
contention that his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [is] not 
credible.”  I do not believe, though, that Plaintiff’s “intent” is 
dispositive on the issue of Morgan Motors’ liability.  In other 
words, I believe that under North Carolina law, Morgan Motors can 
still be found liable as Plaintiff’s employer for Plaintiff’s 
injuries even though Plaintiff had no specific intent to benefit 
Morgan Motors when he climbed on the roof to investigate the noise.  
Our Supreme Court has held that coverage may be found even where 
an employee’s intent is to benefit a third party as long as “the 
-5- 
 
 
acts benefit the employer to an appreciable extent”.  Roberts v. 
Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 355, 364 S.E.2d 417, 421 
(1988) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, even though the 
Commission failed to find that Plaintiff intended to benefit Morgan 
Motors, Morgan Motors may still be held liable since Plaintiff’s 
actions, in attempting to determine the source of the noise on the 
roof where the HVAC was located, would have some “appreciable” 
benefit to Morgan Motors as the owner of the building.  
Further, I do not believe that the Full Commission’s finding 
- that Plaintiff was at the building on the day of the accident 
“for the sole purpose of conducting [work for Pontiac Pointe and 
that] his decision to go up on the roof [did not] deviate from his 
role as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac Pointe” - is 
dispositive on the issue of Morgan Motors’ liability.  Rather, I 
believe this finding only supports a determination that Pontiac 
Pointe may also be liable to Plaintiff for his injuries.  I agree 
with the Commission that Plaintiff was acting for the sole benefit 
of Pontiac Pointe – and thereby deviated from his employment with 
Morgan Motors - when he traveled to the building to meet with the 
restaurant manager about the financial performance of the 
restaurant.  However, I believe this deviation from his employment 
with Morgan Motors ceased when he made the decision to climb on 
the roof to determine the source of the noise, notwithstanding 
that this decision might not have been a deviation from his 
-6- 
 
 
employment with Pontiac Pointe, because this decision conferred an 
“appreciable” benefit on both his employers:  Both had an interest 
in the maintenance of the building and the HVAC system.  See 
Jackson v. Dairymen’s Creamery, 202 N.C. 196, 162 S.E. 359 (1932) 
(holding that an employee who has deviated from his employment is 
covered for injuries occurring after he returns to work).   
Also, I do not believe the Full Commission’s determination 
that Morgan Motors had no “legal obligation” under its lease to 
send an employee onto the roof to determine the nature of the noise 
is determinative of Morgan Motors’ liability for Plaintiff’s 
accident.  In other words, even if Morgan Motors had no such “legal 
obligation” under its lease agreement, Morgan Motors still had a 
significant interest as the building’s owner to make sure that its 
new HVAC system was being properly maintained by its tenant.  See 
Hoffman, 306 N.C. at 507-08, 293 S.E.2d at 810 (stating that “an 
employer would not be permitted to escape his liability or 
obligations under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act through the use 
of a special contract or agreement if the elements required for 
coverage of the injured individual would otherwise exist”).  Even 
if the potential replacement of the HVAC system was merely 
“speculative and remote,” as found by the Commission, Morgan Motors 
still had a significant interest, as the owner of the HVAC system 
and building, in “keeping tabs” on the condition of its $1.3 
million investment, notwithstanding any obligation of its tenant 
-7- 
 
 
to maintain this investment in good repair.  Morgan Motors’ need 
to make regular determinations regarding the condition of its 
investment is bolstered by the Full Commission’s finding that 
Morgan Motors’ tenant was not meeting its financial obligation to 
pay rent. 
Finally, I do not believe that the Full Commission’s 
determination that Plaintiff’s activity was not “authorized” by 
Morgan Motors is relevant as to Morgan Motors’ liability based on 
the evidence in this case.  There is nothing in the evidence nor 
did the Commission make any finding to suggest that Plaintiff was 
expressly prohibited by anyone at Morgan Motors from climbing onto 
the roof of the building to make an inspection.  Rather, the 
findings by the Full Commission suggest that Plaintiff was the 
only employee of Morgan Motors who had any involvement with the 
building.  This Court has held as follows: 
[I]f an employee does something which he is 
not specifically ordered to do by a then 
present superior and the thing he does 
furthers the business of the employer although 
it is not part of the employee’s job, an injury 
sustained 
by 
accident 
while 
he 
is 
so 
performing is in the course of employment.  
This has been characterized as “being about 
his work.” 
 
Parker v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 517, 519-20, 
337 S.E.2d 589, 591 (1985); see also Hensley v. Caswell Action 
Committee, 296 N.C. 527, 531, 259 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1978) (holding 
that coverage exists where an employee’s actions, though not 
-8- 
 
 
expressly authorized, are “not so extreme as to break the causal 
connection between his employment and his [injury]”). 
 
In conclusion, I believe that the actions of Plaintiff as 
found by the Commission - that Plaintiff climbed onto the roof of 
the building to determine the source of a noise coming from the 
HVAC system owned by and paid for by Morgan Motors – served to 
benefit Morgan Motors to some “appreciable extent,” and that, 
therefore, these findings do not support a conclusion that Morgan 
Motors is not liable for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff, 
notwithstanding that Pontiac Pointe may also be liable for those 
injuries.