Title: Hamman v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

504 N.E.2d 276 (1987)
James Duane HAMMAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 285S62.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
February 25, 1987.
*277 Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Hector L. Flores, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for the State.
DeBRULER, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from conviction by a jury of two counts of voluntary manslaughter (counts I & II) and one count of battery (count III). Appellant was sentenced to twenty (20) years on count I, twenty (20) years on count II and eight (8) years on count III, sentences to run consecutively.
The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial judge erred in his enhancement of appellant's sentences.
Appellant was charged with two counts of murder and one count of battery, but was convicted of two counts of voluntary manslaughter, each carrying a 10 year presumptive sentence, and the battery charge, carrying a 5 year presumptive sentence. Appellant contends the court erred by sentencing him to the maximum possible sentence for each of the three counts and in running them consecutively. It is asserted in support that the judge imposed the harsh sentences to compensate for what he believed to be an erroneous jury verdict, and in doing so, invaded the province of the jury.
Following the jury verdict, the judge made the following comments to the jury:
*278 Further, at the sentencing hearing, the following comments were made by the trial judge:
The judge subsequently sentenced appellant to two terms of twenty years and one term of eight years, with the terms to run consecutively for a total sentence of forty-eight years.
It is clear from the statements above that the trial judge considered the jury verdicts erroneous. While a trial judge is not prohibited from expressing his personal disagreement with a jury's verdict, a trial judge is prohibited from enhancing a defendant's sentence based upon his personal disagreement with the verdict. Appellant asserts that the trial judge enhanced each of his sentences based on his belief that appellant should have been convicted of murder.
In Gambill v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 301 this Court stated:
In this case the trial judge displayed his hostility to the jury verdict by condemning as totally unsupported, the jury's belief that sudden heat had been present. Further, the discussion concerning the sentencing *279 range for attempted murder was improperly introduced into the sentencing hearing as though immediately applicable. And finally, the record of the sentencing hearing and the docket entry do not disclose specific conclusions reached by the trial judge which would justify an enhanced sentence. The enhancement in this case was clearly the result of improper considerations. The jury convicted appellant of voluntary manslaughter and battery, not murder and attempted murder, and appellant should have been sentenced for the lesser offense regardless of the judge's perceptions concerning the adequacy of the verdicts.
Given the statements of the trial judge, it is necessary to vacate the sentences to ensure appellant is only punished for the crimes of which he was convicted. While generally the case would be remanded to the trial court for resentencing, that result would not be optimal in this particular instance. Therefore, based on a review of the entire record, the original sentences are ordered vacated and the cause remanded for the imposition of new sentences. The presumptive term is to be given on each of the three counts, with the sentences to run consecutively. The sentences will be run consecutively due to the grave outcome of appellant's actions. There were two individuals killed and another seriously injured and concurrent sentences would not punish appellant for each of those crimes. Here, three people were shot and two of those died. Each life had a value, each act of shooting was separate, each harm was unique. To let the sentences run concurrently, appellant in reality would be punished for only one killing, rather than for taking the lives of two individuals and seriously injuring a third. The tragic outcome of this situation merits separate sentences.
This cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to resentence to ten (10) years for count I, ten (10) years for count II and five (5) years for count III, sentences to run consecutively.
GIVAN, C.J., SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., concur.
PIVARNIK, J., dissents without opinion.