Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thad W. Jelinske

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1897-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thad W. Jelinske, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Thad W. Jelinske, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JELINSKE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
September 12, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 94
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1897-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Thad W. Jelinske, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Thad W. Jelinske, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
SEP 12, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of Referee Jonathan V. Goodman, which approves a stipulation 
between Attorney Thad W. Jelinske and the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) by which Attorney Jelinske pled no contest to 
15 of the 23 allegations of misconduct in the OLR's complaint. 
Consistent 
with 
the 
parties' 
stipulation, 
the 
referee 
recommended 
that 
this 
court 
suspend 
Attorney 
Jelinske's 
Wisconsin law license for 18 months, retroactive to October 16, 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
2 
 
2017.  The referee further recommended that Attorney Jelinske be 
assessed the full costs of the proceeding, which are $13,032.92 
as of August 13, 2018.  The OLR does not seek the payment of 
restitution. 
¶2 
Because no appeal has been filed, we review this 
matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2)1.  We agree with the parties' 
stipulation and the referee's determination that the allegations 
of the disciplinary complaint and the information contained 
within the over two-dozen exhibits to the parties' stipulation 
provide an adequate factual basis for Attorney Jelinske's no 
contest pleas.  We also agree with the referee's determination 
that Attorney Jelinske engaged in numerous forms of professional 
misconduct, and that the seriousness of this misconduct warrants 
an 18-month suspension of his law license.  We part ways with 
the referee in holding that, under the circumstances present 
here, the suspension of Attorney Jelinske's law license should 
not be backdated to October 16, 2017, but rather should be made 
effective as of the date of this decision.  We impose full 
costs.  No restitution was sought and none is ordered.   
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The OLR complaint alleged, and the referee found based 
on the parties' stipulation,2 the following facts. 
¶4 
Attorney Jelinske was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1986.  At all relevant times, he was a partner and 
head of the commercial litigation department at a law firm in 
Milwaukee.  He has no disciplinary history.   
¶5 
In July 2001, Attorney Jelinske's firm prepared a 
revocable trust and pour-over will for R.S.M., who had been a 
client of the firm for many years.   
¶6 
R.S.M. died on August 1, 2011.  R.S.M.'s will named 
Attorney Jelinske as the personal representative of the estate 
and successor trustee, and named Attorney Jelinske's law partner 
as an alternative personal representative and trustee. 
¶7 
Attorney 
Jelinske 
commenced 
informal 
probate 
proceedings in Waukesha County Circuit Court, despite having no 
experience in probating estates.  The court appointed Attorney 
Jelinske as the personal representative of the estate, and the 
will was admitted to probate. 
¶8 
The estate was insolvent.  R.S.M. died owing over 
$3,000,000 to one particular bank alone.   
¶9 
During the probate proceedings, Attorney Jelinske 
wrote checks from the estate account for personal expenditures 
for such things as shoes, shoe repairs, clothing, and credit 
card expenses. 
                                                 
2 See n.3, infra. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
4 
 
¶10  During the probate proceedings, Attorney Jelinske and 
the firm arranged for the firm to loan the estate $238,755.43 in 
order to pay off a mortgage on R.S.M.'s home, as the mortgage 
was in danger of foreclosure.  Attorney Jelinske, on behalf of 
the estate, executed a promissory note in favor of the firm with 
an interest rate of eight percent.  The terms of the note 
included a "success fee" to the firm of one-third of the net 
proceeds from the sale of the home.  Attorney Jelinske arranged 
for the sale of the home for $395,000.  From the proceeds, 
Attorney Jelinske repaid the firm the amount of the loan, plus a 
$42,173.22 "success fee," plus $1,117.42 in accrued interest, 
leaving net proceeds to the estate of $84,348.44.  Attorney 
Jelinske did not obtain approval from the court for the 
transactions involving the home. 
¶11 R.S.M.'s estate included an interest in a hair salon. 
The salon was in default on a commercial lease.  Attorney 
Jelinske arranged for a sale of the salon.  He double-billed the 
estate in the amount of $4,700 for legal services related to 
this sale.  He also converted to his own use $834.61 of funds 
from an estate bank account that he had created to manage 
payments to R.S.M.'s business interests, including the salon.  
This misappropriation created a negative balance in the estate 
account and triggered a non-sufficient funds fee, which he 
covered by transferring funds from another account associated 
with R.S.M.'s estate.   
¶12 Attorney Jelinske also converted to his own use two 
payments——$573.61 
and 
$1,565.52——from 
two 
separate 
life 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
5 
 
insurance policies held by R.S.M.  Attorney Jelinske deposited 
the $573.61 insurance check into the estate account and, using a 
counter check which he endorsed as the personal representative, 
withdrew that same amount in cash.  Attorney Jelinske endorsed 
the $1,565.52 insurance check as the personal representative and 
deposited the funds directly into his own checking account.  
Attorney Jelinske did not maintain complete and accurate records 
regarding these disbursements.   
¶13 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 857.05(3) (2013-14),3 Attorney 
Jelinske billed R.S.M.'s estate for both personal representative 
fees and attorney fees even though R.S.M.'s will did not 
authorize dual fees.  By September 2013, Attorney Jelinske had 
billed the estate approximately $167,463 in legal fees.  After 
payment to Attorney Jelinske and the firm for legal fees, only 
$174,885.58 remained available to distribute to creditors. 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise noted. 
Wis. Stat. § 857.05(3) provides:  
ATTORNEY 
FEES 
AND 
COMMISSIONS.  If 
the 
personal 
representative or any law firm with which the personal 
representative is associated also serves as attorney 
for the decedent's estate, the court may allow him or 
her either executor's commissions, (including sums for 
any extraordinary services as set forth in sub. (2)) 
or attorney fees.  The court may allow both executor's 
commissions and attorney fees, and shall allow both if 
the will of the decedent authorizes the payments to be 
made. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
6 
 
¶14 In October 2013, Attorney Jelinske filed an inventory 
in 
the 
probate 
proceedings 
that 
contained 
several 
misrepresentations.  The inventory did not accurately account 
for the life insurance funds that he had converted to his own 
use; it omitted the net proceeds from the sale of the hair 
salon; and it failed to disclose that he had double-billed the 
estate for his work regarding the sale of the salon. 
¶15 In June 2014, Attorney Jelinske filed an estate 
account in the probate proceedings that contained several 
misrepresentations.  He classified as "personal representative 
fees" the $834.61 amount that he had converted from the estate 
bank account used to manage payments to R.S.M.'s business 
interests.  He similarly classified as "personal representative 
fees" the $1,565.52 distribution from R.S.M.'s life insurance 
policy that he deposited directly into his own checking account.  
Attorney Jelinske also omitted the fact that he had double-
billed the estate for his work in handling the hair salon sale. 
¶16 The main creditor bank of the estate eventually began 
litigation against Attorney Jelinske and his law firm.  At a 
deposition, Attorney Jelinske falsely denied that certain checks 
he wrote from the estate account were for personal expenses.  He 
also falsely denied knowing about both the existence of the 
estate bank account that he had created to manage payments to 
R.S.M.'s business interests, and the purpose of the fund 
transfer that he made to cover the negative balance in that 
account caused by his misappropriation of funds. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
7 
 
¶17 During an ensuing trial to the circuit court, Attorney 
Jelinske 
falsely 
testified 
about 
the 
nature 
of 
certain 
expenditures he made from estate funds.  He also claimed that he 
did not recall seeing the distribution check from R.S.M.'s life 
insurance policy that he had deposited into his own checking 
account. 
¶18 At the conclusion of the trial, the court removed 
Attorney Jelinske as personal representative and found that he 
had 
violated 
his 
fiduciary 
obligation 
to 
the 
estate 
by 
converting estate assets to his own use and by arranging for the 
roughly $42,000 "success fee" in connection with his law firm's 
sale of R.S.M.'s home. 
¶19 After the trial, the parties litigated the creditor 
bank's entitlement to attorney's fees and costs.  According to a 
hearing transcript attached to the parties' stipulation,4 the 
circuit court described R.S.M.'s estate as having become "mired 
in a morass of self-dealing ethical lapses" and "conduct 
amounting to conversion."  The circuit court found that Attorney 
Jelinske "was not truthful in portions of his testimony," and 
that he made a "continued effort to evade responsibility."  The 
circuit court described Attorney Jelinske's conduct throughout 
the administration of the estate and the subsequent trial as 
                                                 
4 We read the referee's report, which approves the parties' 
stipulation, as having implicitly incorporated the information 
contained in the exhibits that the parties attached to the 
stipulation to help serve as the factual basis for Attorney 
Jelinske's no contest pleas. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
8 
 
"shocking" 
and 
"reek[ing] 
of 
bad 
faith" 
and 
"delinquent 
dishonesty."  In a subsequent written order, also attached to 
the parties' stipulation, the circuit court wrote that Attorney 
Jelinske "engaged in shocking bad faith conduct including 
obstruction of discovery, deliberate misrepresentation, self[-] 
dealing, unethical conduct, conversion, false statements[,] and 
less than truthful statements to the Court."   
¶20 During the ensuing OLR investigation against Attorney 
Jelinske, Attorney Jelinske made various misrepresentations to 
the OLR. 
¶21 The parties stipulated and the referee concluded that 
Attorney Jelinske's conduct, described above, amounted to the 
following forms of professional misconduct: 
 By paying personal expenses out of fiduciary funds and 
failing to keep all of the estate funds in trust, 
Attorney Jelinske violated former SCR 20:1.15(j)(l)5 
(Count 1). 
                                                 
5 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(j)(1) provided: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own funds or property, those funds or that 
property of clients or 3rd parties that are in the 
lawyer's 
possession 
when 
acting 
in 
a 
fiduciary 
capacity that directly arises in the course of, or as 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
9 
 
 By, on behalf of the estate, entering into a loan 
agreement with his law firm that was a prohibited 
transaction 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 860.13,6 
 
Attorney 
Jelinske violated SCR 20:8.4(f)7 (Count 2). 
 By double-billing the estate for certain legal work, 
Attorney Jelinske violated SCR 20:1.5(a)8 (Count 6). 
                                                                                                                                                             
a result of, a lawyer-client relationship or by 
appointment of a court.  
6 Wis. Stat. § 860.13 provides: 
Who not to be purchaser, mortgagee or lessee 
without court approval.  The personal representative 
may not be interested as a purchaser, mortgagee, or 
lessee of any property in the estate unless the 
purchase, mortgage, or lease is made with the written 
consent of the persons interested and of the guardian 
ad litem for minors and individuals adjudicated 
incompetent or with the approval of the court after 
petition 
and 
hearing 
on 
notice 
given 
under 
s. 879.03 to all persons interested, or unless the 
will of the decedent specifically authorizes the 
personal 
representative 
to 
be 
interested 
as 
a 
purchaser, mortgagee, or lessee. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
8 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
10 
 
 By misappropriating funds held in fiduciary accounts and 
misappropriating insurance proceeds belonging to the 
estate, 
Attorney 
Jelinske 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.15(j)(1) (Counts 8, 10, 11). 
 By failing to maintain complete and accurate records of 
disbursements involving life insurance proceeds and other 
funds belonging to fiduciary accounts, Attorney Jelinske 
violated former SCR 20:1.15(j)(5)9 (Count 9). 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
9 Former SCR 20:1.15(j)(5) provided: 
For each fiduciary account, the lawyer shall 
retain records of receipts and disbursements as 
necessary to document the transactions.  The lawyer 
shall maintain all of the following: 
a. all 
monthly 
or 
other 
periodic 
statements 
provided by the financial institution to the 
lawyer or law firm; and 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
11 
 
 By disbursing cash out of funds held in a fiduciary 
account, Jelinske violated former SCR 20:1.15(j)(3)a.10 
(Count 12). 
 By converting estate assets to his own use and denying 
having done so in his deposition, Attorney Jelinske 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c)11 (Counts 13 and 20). 
 By paying himself both a personal representative's fee 
and 
attorney's 
fees, 
Attorney 
Jelinske 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(f) (Count 14). 
 By knowingly making false statements of fact in sworn 
estate 
accountings 
filed 
with 
the 
court, 
Attorney 
Jelinske violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)12 (Counts 15 and 17). 
                                                                                                                                                             
b. all transaction records, including canceled or 
imaged checks, passbooks, records of electronic 
fund transactions, duplicates of any instrument 
issued by the financial institution from funds 
held in the account, duplicate deposit slips 
identifying the source of any deposit, and 
duplicate 
withdrawal 
slips 
identifying 
the 
purpose of any withdrawal. 
10 Former SCR 20:1.15(j)(3)a. provided:  "No disbursement of 
cash shall be made from a fiduciary account or from a deposit to 
a fiduciary account, and no check shall be made payable to 
'Cash.'" 
11 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
12 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
12 
 
 By testifying falsely in court about his use of estate 
funds for his own personal expenses, Attorney Jelinske 
violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(3)13 (Count 21). 
 By making false representations to the OLR in connection 
with the grievance investigation, Attorney Jelinske 
violated SCR 22.03(6)14 as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)15 
(Count 23). 
¶22 On the basis of this professional misconduct, the 
parties stipulated to an 18-month suspension of Attorney 
Jelinske's license, retroactive to October 16, 2017.  The 
referee adopted that stipulation as his recommendation to the 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:3.3(a)(3) provides: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the 
lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer, the lawyer's 
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered 
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial 
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, 
other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal 
matter that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
14 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance."  
15 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
13 
 
court.  He stated in his report that an 18-month suspension is 
justified by precedent; namely, In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Meisel, 2017 WI 40, 374 Wis. 2d 655, 893 N.W.2d 558 (18-
month suspension for 15 counts of stipulated misconduct, which 
included converting approximately $175,000 from two estates and 
two guardianship proceedings and engaging in misrepresentation; 
mitigating factors included attorney's serious medical condition 
and other personal and financial issues, as well as attorney's 
lack of prior discipline); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Voss, 2014 WI 75, 356 Wis. 2d 382, 850 N.W.2d 190 (18-
month suspension for 11 counts of stipulated misconduct, which 
included converting over $48,000 of client's funds and engaging 
in misrepresentation; attorney's disciplinary history consisted 
of one private reprimand and one public reprimand); In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Losby, 
2008 
WI 
8, 
306 
Wis. 2d 303, 743 N.W.2d 819 (18-month suspension for 10 counts 
of misconduct arising out of work in three estate matters, 
including failing to act with due diligence, taking funds to 
which 
attorney 
was 
not 
entitled, 
and 
engaging 
in 
misrepresentation; attorney had no prior discipline). 
¶23 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the referee's 
recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
14 
 
¶24 After careful review of the matter, we conclude that 
the record supports the referee's findings of fact.  In 
particular, we conclude that the admitted allegations of the 
complaint and the over two-dozen exhibits attached to parties' 
stipulation provide an ample factual basis for the referee's 
findings.  We therefore adopt them. 
¶25 We further conclude that the record supports the 
referee's legal conclusions that Attorney Jelinske engaged in 
multiple counts of misconduct.  We therefore adopt them.   
¶26 Having accepted the referee's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, we turn to the appropriate discipline for 
Attorney Jelinske's misconduct.  While no two disciplinary cases 
are identical, we agree with the referee that our decisions in 
Meisel, Voss, and Losby support the referee's recommendation for 
an 18-month suspension.  Like Attorney Jelinske, the respondent 
attorneys in those cases mishandled considerable sums of money 
and engaged in various forms of misrepresentation to conceal 
their behavior.  Also like Attorney Jelinske, the respondent 
attorneys in those cases had never before been suspended from 
legal practice, yet they received lengthy, 18-month suspensions 
for their serious misconduct.  The facts here easily justify 
such a suspension.   
¶27 Indeed, an 18-month suspension, on these facts, is 
modest——particularly given the pointedly critical circuit court 
findings regarding Attorney Jelinske's conduct during the 
probate proceedings and related litigation.  If Attorney 
Jelinske had been previously disciplined, a longer suspension 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
15 
 
would be necessary.  We remind Attorney Jelinske that the court 
may impose progressively severe sanctions when an attorney 
engages in repeated misconduct.  We impose the sanction to which 
the parties stipulated with the expectation that Attorney 
Jelinske will not commit future misconduct subjecting him to 
additional discipline. 
¶28 However, we part ways with the parties and the referee 
in holding that Attorney Jelinske's license suspension should be 
prospective, not retroactive.  The parties stipulated, and the 
referee agreed, that Attorney Jelinske's 18-month suspension 
should be backdated to nearly a year before the issuance of this 
decision, to October 16, 2017——the date when, according to the 
referee, Attorney Jelinske "resigned from his law firm."  We 
disagree. 
¶29 The 
parties' 
stipulation 
provides 
additional, 
important information regarding this proposed retroactive date 
for the commencement of the suspension, as well as the 
circumstances surrounding Attorney Jelinske's resignation from 
his law firm.  According to the exhibits attached to the 
parties' stipulation, almost exactly one year before the 
proposed retroactive date, on October 19, 2016, Attorney 
Jelinske pled no contest to three misdemeanor counts of theft 
related to his work on the R.S.M. estate.  The circuit court 
imposed and stayed a sentence of five months of jail time and 
placed Attorney Jelinske on probation for 18 months.  The 
circuit court ordered as a condition of probation that Attorney 
Jelinske not act in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of anyone.  
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
16 
 
Before imposing this condition, the circuit court explained that 
attorneys are "held to a higher standard" because "they're in a 
position of trust.  They act as fiduciaries for other people."  
After imposing this condition, the circuit court explained that 
Attorney Jelinske "can't be trusted with" acting in a fiduciary 
capacity.  "You have to earn your trust back," the court said. 
¶30 Almost one year later, at a hearing on October 16, 
2017 
(the 
proposed 
retroactive 
date), 
the 
circuit 
court 
apparently16 noted that Attorney Jelinske had been practicing law 
notwithstanding his probation condition prohibiting him from 
acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of anyone.  The circuit 
court scheduled a November 21, 2017 hearing to discuss this 
fact.17  At that hearing, the circuit court stated that it was 
"very shocked" to learn that Attorney Jelinske had been 
practicing 
law 
notwithstanding 
his 
probation 
condition 
prohibiting him from acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of 
anyone.  The court rejected Attorney Jelinske's attempted 
justification for his post-sentencing work as an attorney:  that 
this probation condition meant only that he could not serve as a 
personal representative or as a trustee, or hold client funds.  
The circuit court stated that its probation condition clearly 
prohibited him from acting as an attorney during the course of 
                                                 
16 We say "apparently" because the parties failed to include 
a transcript of the October 16, 2017 hearing with their exhibits 
to their stipulation. 
17 The parties included a transcript of the November 21, 
2017 hearing with their exhibits to the stipulation. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
17 
 
his probation, and the court extended Attorney Jelinske's 
probation by one year.  The court noted that it was sufficiently 
troubled by Attorney Jelinske's conduct that it had considered 
giving him additional jail time as a condition of probation, but 
it ultimately declined to do so. 
¶31 Given these facts, we cannot endorse the parties' and 
the referee's recommendation that Attorney Jelinske's 18-month 
suspension should be backdated almost a year, to October 2017.  
We have held that a retroactive suspension is generally not 
favored in the absence of some compelling circumstance that 
mitigates the severity of the discipline required; e.g., where 
the recommended suspension arises out of the same set of 
circumstances that prompted an earlier suspension.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker, 2016 WI 27, ¶¶16-
17, 
368 
Wis. 2d 57, 
878 
N.W.2d 163; 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Brown-Perry, 
2003 
WI 
151, 
¶15, 
267 
Wis. 2d 184, 672 N.W.2d 287.  No such compelling circumstances 
are present here.  Having been barred from acting as a fiduciary 
as part of his October 2016 sentencing, a wide span of cases 
should have made clear to Attorney Jelinske that he could not 
practice law during his probationary term.  See, e.g., Sands v. 
Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶53, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787 N.W.2d 384 
("Attorneys owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their clients."); 
In re Law Examination of 1926, 191 Wis. 359, 362, 210 N.W. 710 
(1926) ("An attorney occupies a fiduciary relationship towards 
his client.").  Yet Attorney Jelinske continued to practice law 
during his probationary term, stopping only after having drawn 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
18 
 
the ire of the circuit court.  We refuse to classify Attorney 
Jelinske's belated compliance with the terms of his criminal 
sentence as a compelling circumstance that justifies leniency 
sufficient to permit him to petition for reinstatement of his 
law license not long after the issuance of this decision.  See 
SCR 22.29(1) (attorney suspended for a definite period of six 
months or more is eligible to file a reinstatement petition 
three months before the end of the suspension period). 
¶32 We turn next to the issue of costs.  Our general 
practice is to impose full costs on attorneys who are found to 
have committed misconduct.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  Attorney 
Jelinske has not claimed that there are reasons to depart from 
that practice in this matter, and we have not found any reason 
to do so.  We therefore impose full costs, which, according to 
the OLR, total $13,032.92. 
¶33 Finally, we turn to the issue of restitution.  The OLR 
has not sought restitution, explaining that doing so is 
unnecessary because all restitution issues were addressed in 
R.S.M.'s estate proceeding.   We agree with the OLR's reasoning.   
No restitution is ordered. 
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thad W. Jelinske to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 18 
months, effective the date of this decision.   
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Thad W. Jelinske shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$13,032.92. 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
19 
 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thad W. Jelinske shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions with this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(3). 
 
No. 
2016AP1897-D   
 
 
 
1