Title: Neno v. Clinton

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM The question raised in this appeal is whether the admission of the investigating officer's opinion about the cause of the accident, as well as his recitation of hearsay statements on which that opinion was based, are errors that require a retrial. In January 1995, plaintiffs Joao Neno and Helder Neno were working at a construction site that straddled both sides of Route One in Princeton. On the day in question, they and several other workers had to walk across Route One at its intersection with Scudders Mill Road to reach another part of the site. Route One is a four-lane highway at that intersection and there are no crosswalks. The workers began to walk through the two southbound lanes of Route One when the traffic light facing them was green. They walked in front of a truck stopped in the right lane without incident. Another worker who was in front of plaintiffs successfully crossed the left southbound lane, but when plaintiffs stepped into that second lane the Route One traffic light turned green. Plaintiffs were hit by a truck driven by defendant Derek Clinton that was heading southbound on Route One in the left lane. Just prior to the collision, the driver of the truck stopped in the right-hand lane, William Burnett, saw Clinton look away from the road and into Burnett's driver's side mirror, a fact Clinton did not dispute. Clinton accelerated prior to reaching the intersection, and was traveling thirty to thirty- five miles per hour at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries. Officer Kelly, the primary investigating officer, arrived on the scene and interviewed Burnett and another driver who witnessed the accident as he approached the intersection driving his vehicle in the opposite, northbound direction. Kelly testified that both witnesses told him that the light facing Route One traffic was green when defendant's truck struck plaintiffs. The trial court allowed Kelly to testify to the content of the eyewitness statements over plaintiff's objection because both witnesses would be testifying later in the trial. The trial court also permitted Kelly to testify, over objection, that in his opinion plaintiffs were at fault because they continued to cross the road against a red light. The court explicitly refused to qualify Kelly as an expert, instead allowing Kelly to offer his opinion as a lay witness. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause for action, finding that although Clinton was negligent, his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The Appellate Division majority affirmed that judgment in an unpublished opinion. A dissenting member determined that the trial court improperly admitted the opinion of the investigating officer as to the cause of the accident, and concluded that the verdicts were inconsistent, requiring a retrial. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as of right and a petition for certification. The Supreme Court granted the petition. HELD: The admission of the investigating officer's opinion and his testimony reciting the hearsay statements of witnesses was error. The inconsistency in the verdict demonstrates jury confusion or mistake. A retrial is warranted. 1. The investigating officer's testimony regarding the eyewitnesses' statements was undoubtedly hearsay. The fact that the eyewitnesses were scheduled to testify later in trial did not render admissible their hearsay statements. (Pp. 8-9) 2. In a variety of circumstances, an investigating officer's lay opinion may be admissible. Most jurisdictions, however, do not permit lay opinion testimony that relies on inadmissible hearsay. The Court concludes that a police officer cannot provide an opinion at trial when that opinion is based primarily on the statements of eyewitnesses. Any other conclusion would defeat the purpose of the hearsay rule. Here, the hearsay statements of the eyewitnesses at the scene were critical to the investigating officer's opinion. (Pp. 9-16) 3. For a hearsay error to mandate reversal, there must be a real possibility that the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. Here, the jury heard the substance of the eyewitness statements from a police officer. A jury's deference to a police officer may have enhanced the credibility of the statements, creating improper bolstering. The jury also heard the officer's opinion, which was based on the hearsay testimony, that plaintiffs caused the accident. The jury could have ascribed almost determinative significance to that opinion. The improperly admitted testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and requires reversal. (Pp. 16-17) 4. The jury here found that defendant was negligent but his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. If defendant was negligent in failing to make proper observations or in failing to properly control his truck, the Court cannot conceive of any such act that was not also a proximate cause of the accident in these circumstances. If defendant was negligent, that conduct would have contributed to at least some of plaintiffs' damages. Apportionment of liability should take place on retrial pursuant to the Comparative Fault Act. (Pp. 17-20) 5. The trial court's initial instructions told the jury that it must determine that defendant was the proximate cause of the accident, rather than a proximate cause. The court did subsequently explain that there may be more than one proximate cause for the accident, and that proximate cause means that the defendant's negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the resulting accident. The Court concludes that the recharge cured any possible defect. The Court offers this observation only as a possible explanation for the inconsistent verdict so that the trial court can avoid a similar error on remand. The inconsistency that occurred in this case can be avoided by using a sample verdict form in the Model Jury Charges that simply asks, Was defendant negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of the accident? (Pp. 20-22) Judgement of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in this opinion. HELDER NENO, JOAO NENO and MICHELLE NENO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEREK L. CLINTON and GILSONITE MUSIC IND., INC., Defendants-Respondents, and STATE OF NEW JERSEY and "JOHN DOE", a fictitious name, real name unknown, Defendants. Argued January 17, 2001 -- Decided May 16, 2001 On appeal from and certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Arthur J. Messineo, Jr., argued the cause for appellants Joao Neno and Michelle Neno and Marc Alan Chase argued the cause for appellant Helder Neno (Messineo & Messineo and Chase & Chase, attorneys; Mr. Messineo, Mr. Chase and Nancy C. Ferro, on the briefs). Sara A. Friedman argued the cause for respondents (Mautone & Horan, attorneys; Anthony R. Mautone, of counsel and on the briefs). PER CURIAM Plaintiffs sustained serious injuries after being hit as they walked across a highway intersection by a truck owned by defendant Gilsonite Music Industries, Inc. (Gilsonite). Plaintiffs filed suit against Gilsonite and Derek Clinton (Clinton), the driver of the truck. The jury found that Clinton was negligent, but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision, and the Law Division entered judgment for defendants. The Appellate Division majority affirmed that judgment in an unpublished opinion. The dissenting member determined that the trial court improperly had admitted the opinion of the investigating traffic officer concerning the cause of the accident. The dissent also concluded that the verdicts were inconsistent, requiring a retrial. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as of right, R. 2:2-1(a), and a petition for certification. We granted the petition, Neno v. Clinton, 165 N.J. 488 (2000), and now reverse. [Emphasis added.] The court explicitly refused to qualify Kelly as an expert, instead allowing him to offer his opinion as a lay witness. Kelly based that opinion testimony on his investigation of the scene after the accident and on the eyewitness statements given to him by Burnett and Meyer. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause for action, finding that although defendant Clinton was negligent, his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. In a variety of circumstances, New Jersey courts have concluded that an investigating officer's lay opinion may be admissible. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999) (allowing officer to testify that car was speeding); State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649 (1993) (permitting officer to testify about measurements made between site of alleged drug transaction and school property); State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 295 (1990) (allowing officer to testify about footprint because footprint identification is an area in which lay-opinion testimony is acceptable ); State v. Deluca, 325 N.J. Super. 376, 393 (App. Div. 1999) (same), certif. granted, 163 N.J. 79 (2000); Trentacost v. Brussel, 164 N.J. Super. 9, 20 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 82 N.J. 214 (1980) (permitting officer to offer opinion on high-crime nature of neighborhood); State v. Perez, 150 N.J. Super. 166, 169 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 542 (1977) (permitting officer to offer opinion on voice comparison of defendant); see also Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 to N.J.R.E. 701. This case, however, adds the additional element of hearsay to the testifying officer's opinion. On the issue of the hearsay component of Officer Kelly's lay opinion, the majority and the dissent below disagreed over the import of this Court's decision in State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989), which overruled Rogalsky v. Plymouth Homes, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1968). In Rogalsky, a case involving an automobile accident, the plaintiff objected to a police officer's testimony. The officer first testified to the contents of a statement given by the defendant some time after the accident. Id. at 503-04. The court concluded that the statement was hearsay, not within any recognized exception to the hearsay bar, and should not have been admitted. Id. at 504. The officer also gave his opinion, as a lay witness, to the approximate point of impact. Id. at 504-05. The officer based that opinion on both his observation of the scene and the statement he took from the defendant. Id. at 505. The Appellate Division concluded that the officer's testimony regarding the point of impact was a proper subject for expert opinion, rather than lay opinion. Id. at 505-06. Because the trial court had not qualified the officer as an expert, the Appellate Division concluded that the court incorrectly admitted the opinion. Id. at 506. In LaBrutto, we overruled Rogalsky [t]o the extent that [it] stands for the proposition that a police officer may not offer his [or her] point-of-impact opinion as a lay witness. LaBrutto, supra, 114 N.J. at 199. In LaBrutto, a police officer investigated the scene of an accident and at trial offered his lay opinion concerning the point of impact. Id. at 191-92, 197. The Court addressed a challenge to that testimony: We find no reason why an investigating police officer should not be allowed to testify as a non-expert based on his own observations regarding the point of impact of two vehicles in an automobile accident case. We find no merit in the position that the police officer's opinion on the point of impact should be excluded because it invades the province of the jury, or that the officer's testimony is unnecessary because the average juror can readily determine the point of impact from the officer's description of the physical evidence. Nor do we agree that only a police officer who is qualified as an accident reconstruction expert can give his opinion of the point of impact. Contra Rogalsky v. Plymouth Homes, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 52 N.J. 167 (1968). To the extent that Rogalsky stands for the proposition that a police officer may not offer his point-of-impact opinion, it is overruled. [Id. at 199.] The Court concluded that the officer's opinion testimony was admissible under the predecessor to N.J.R.E. 701 because it was based on the officer's own observations at the scene and was helpful to the jury. Id. at 202. However, as the dissent below properly concluded, although LaBrutto overruled Rogalsky, it did not do so on the point that the officer was not permitted to base his conclusion on what others had told him. In the dissent's view, Rogalsky's holding that an officer could not offer a lay opinion when that opinion was based on the hearsay statement of another is still good law. See Rogalsky, supra, 100 N.J. Super. at 506 (stating that admission of opinion was error even if officer qualified as expert, because it was based, in essential part, on hearsay statement). According to the dissent, LaBrutto overruled Rogalsky on the first point, but not the second and, therefore, the second prong of the Rogalsky holding rendered Kelly's opinion testimony inadmissible. The majority, on the other hand, read Rogalsky to hold only that the point-of-impact testimony is admissible as expert, rather than lay, opinion. Ibid. ( His testimony as to the probable point of impact was nothing more nor less than expert testimony, given by one who concededly is not an expert. ). The majority below concluded that Rogalsky stood for no more than LaBrutto overruled. Neither Rogalsky nor LaBrutto unequivocally indicates which of the two views is correct. At least one other jurisdiction has expressly concluded that a testifying police officer cannot proffer a lay opinion about the cause of an accident when that opinion is based on hearsay statements from eyewitnesses. Calhoun v. Chappell, 162 S.E.2d 300, 301 (Ga. 1968) ( A police officer may not testify on the trial of a tort action resulting from a motor vehicle collision as to the manner in which the collision occurred where his testimony is based merely on statements of what the parties told him, since this is hearsay. ). Some jurisdictions reject lay opinion testimony based on inadmissible hearsay while allowing lay opinions when based on admissible hearsay. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1993) (admitting witness's opinion that your old man referred to defendant because that statement was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence); Henderson v. State, 113 So. 689, 694 (Fla. 1927) ( Provided he [or she] bases his [or her] testimony on his [or her] own knowledge and not on information furnished by another, the opinion, belief, judgment or impression of an ordinary (non-expert) witness as to the identity of a person or an object is admissible in evidence. ); R.A.P. v. State, 575 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding lay opinion testimony regarding value of damage to automobile inadmissible when opinion was based on both observations at scene and hearsay statement); People v. Turner, 235 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding lay opinion about identification inadmissible when based on hearsay); but see Coker v. Burghardt, 833 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. App. 1992) ( Lay witness opinion may be based on hearsay. ). Thus, in most jurisdictions, lay opinion testimony that relies on inadmissible hearsay ordinarily is itself inadmissible. We conclude, as did the dissent below, that a police officer cannot provide an opinion at trial when that opinion is based primarily on the statements of eyewitnesses. Any other conclusion would allow an officer to subvert the prohibition against hearsay and pass along the essence of those hearsay statements to the jury even when the officer is not permitted to testify to the substance of the witness's statements under the hearsay rule. Further, the fact that those statements were the basis for Kelly's lay opinion will not render them admissible because to do so would defeat the purpose of the hearsay rule. The purpose of N.J.R.E. 701 is to ensure that lay opinion is based on an adequate foundation. A lay witness's opinion cannot rely on the inadequate support of inadmissible hearsay without the benefit of an exception. Consequently, a police officer cannot advance an opinion when it is primarily based on the hearsay statement of an eyewitness. New Jersey's requirement of personal knowledge also supports that conclusion. The rule provides, in pertinent part, that a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. N.J.R.E. 602. A person who has no knowledge of a fact except what another has told him [or her] does not, of course, satisfy the present requirement of knowledge from observation. McCormick on Evidence 10 (5th ed. 1999); see also Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, 309 N.J. Super. 443, 454-55 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that hearsay cannot satisfy the basis for personal knowledge certification under Rule 1:6-6). When the underlying statement is hearsay, there can be no personal knowledge of the substance of the statement, but only knowledge of the fact that the statement was made. In this case, Officer Kelly based his opinion concerning plaintiffs' fault in causing the accident not only on his on- scene investigation but on Burnett's and Meyer's hearsay statements. Over objection, Officer Kelly testified: [B]ased on all the statements and the investigation that I did at the accident - - of this accident[,] the pedestrians failed to properly cross the intersection. The sequence of events suggest[s] the pedestrians began to cross the roadway after the [Scudders] Mill Road signal turned red and before US Route 1 signal turned green. A slight delay of approximately 4 seconds is utilized where all signals are red. This allows the intersection to clear prior to US Route 1 receiving a green signal. [Emphasis added.] The statements given by Burnett and Meyer at the scene detailed the timing of the stop lights, a critical element of Kelly's opinion. Because those statements were hearsay, the dissent properly concluded that Kelly's opinion was inadmissible. For a hearsay error to mandate reversal, '[t]he possibility [of an unjust verdict] must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.' State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 410 (1990) (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)). Officer Kelly testified prior to Burnett's and Meyer's testimony, giving the jury an opportunity to hear the substance of their statements from a police officer before hearing their own accounts. A jury may be inclined to accord special respect to such a witness. Deference to a police officer in turn may have enhanced the credibility of the statements of Burnett and Meyer. It is safe to say that Officer Kelly's testimony created improper bolstering. Prejudice against plaintiffs may well have resulted from the admission of those statements. It is true that prejudice may have been lessened because Burnett and Meyer both testified at trial, providing plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the statements. Officer Kelly based his opinion on the statements and an investigation that resulted in a fifteen page report. The trial court improperly admitted the opinion testimony of Officer Kelly, which squarely pointed to plaintiffs' fault when he stated that the sequence of events suggest[s] the pedestrians began to cross the roadway after the [Scudders] Mill Road signal turned red and before US Route 1 signal turned green. That opinion primarily relied on the witnesses' statements, rather than on the investigation. The jury heard from a law enforcement officer trained in accident investigation that he believed plaintiffs caused the accident. The jury could have ascribed almost determinative significance to that opinion, which went to the heart of the case. The improperly admitted testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, R. 2:10-2, requiring reversal. NO. A-129 HELDER NENO, JOAO NENO and MICHELLE NENO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEREK L. CLINTON and GILSONITE MUSIC IND., INC., Defendants-Respondents, and STATE OF NEW JERSEY and JOHN DOE , a fictitious name, real name unknown, Defendants. DECIDED May 16, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz