Title: William Earl Sweet v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1509
____________
WILLIAM EARL SWEET,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[January 31, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
William Earl Sweet appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction relief
after an evidentiary hearing.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's order denying
Sweet postconviction relief.
Sweet, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the offenses, was
convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder,
and burglary.  See Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 1993).  The facts of
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the crime are detailed in this Court's opinion on direct appeal.
On June 6, 1990, Marcine Cofer was attacked in her apartment
and beaten and robbed by three men.  She could identify two of the
men by their street names.  On June 26, 1990, she was taken by
Detective Robinson to the police station to look at pictures to attempt
to identify the third assailant.  When Robinson dropped Cofer off at
her apartment, William Sweet was standing nearby and saw her leave
the detective.  Unknown to Cofer, Sweet had previously implicated
himself in the robbery by telling a friend that he had committed the
robbery or that he had ordered it done.  Cofer asked her next-door
neighbor, Mattie Bryant, to allow the neighbor's daughters, Felicia,
thirteen, and Sharon, twelve, to stay with Cofer in her apartment that
night.  Mattie agreed, and the children went over to Cofer's apartment
around 8 p.m.
At approximately 1 a.m. that evening, Sharon was watching
television in the living room of Cofer's apartment when she heard a
loud kick on the apartment door.  She reported this to Cofer, who was
sleeping in the bedroom, but because the person had apparently left,
Cofer told Sharon not to worry about it and went back to sleep. 
Shortly thereafter, Sharon saw someone pulling on the living room
screen.  She awakened Cofer.  The two then went to the door of the
apartment, looked out the peephole, and saw Sweet standing outside. 
Sweet called Cofer by name and ordered her to open the door.
At Cofer's direction, Felicia pounded on the bathroom wall to
get Mattie's attention in the apartment next door, and a few minutes
later Mattie came over.  The four then lined up at the door, with Cofer
standing in the back of the group.  When they opened the door to
leave, Sweet got his foot in the door and forced his way into the
apartment.  Sweet's face was partially covered by a pair of pants.  He
first shot Cofer and then shot the other three people, killing Felicia. 
Six shots were fired.  Cofer, Mattie, and Sharon were shot in the thigh,
ankle and thigh, and buttocks, respectively, and Felicia was shot in the
hand and in the abdomen.
Id.  The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, and the
1.  These aggravators included: (1) Sweet had previously been convicted of
several violent felonies, including armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, riot, resisting arrest with violence, and the contemporaneous
attempted murders and burglary; (2) the murder was committed to avoid arrest; (3)
the murder was committed during a burglary; and (4) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated.  See id.
2.  The trial court gave this nonstatutory mitigator "slight weight."  Id.
3.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  See Sweet v.
Florida, 510 U.S. 1170 (1994).
4.  These claims included: (1) Sweet was denied access to public records;
(2) the one-year time limitation for filing a rule 3.851 motion for postconviction
relief violates Sweet's due process and equal protection rights; (3) the "felony
murder" statutory aggravating circumstance constitutes an unconstitutional
"automatic statutory aggravating circumstance"; (4) the "avoid arrest" statutory
aggravator was inapplicable in this case and the jury was erroneously instructed
regarding this aggravator because the trial court improperly failed to further instruct
the jury that the aggravator can only be found where it is the "dominant or only"
motive for the defendant's commission of the murder; (5) the trial court's jury
instruction on the "cold, calculated, and premeditated" aggravator was erroneous
because it failed to instruct the jury that this aggravator required "heightened
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trial court followed this recommendation.  See id.  The trial court found four
aggravators1 and no statutory mitigators, but found as a nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that Sweet "lacked true parental guidance as a teenager."  Id. at 1142.2
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Sweet's convictions and sentence of
death.  See id. at 1143.3  Sweet timely filed a motion for postconviction relief on
August 1,1995, and filed an amended motion on June 30, 1997, raising twenty-eight
claims.4  A Huff5 hearing was held on February 20, 1998.  The trial court 
premeditation" and the evidence failed to establish the necessary heightened
premeditation necessary to support this aggravator; (6) the Jacksonville Sheriff's
Office destroyed all of the evidence in this case, depriving Sweet of his right to
conduct an independent analysis of this evidence using his own experts; (7)
ineffective assistance during the guilt phase by: (a) failing to conduct an adequate
pretrial investigation and preparation of Sweet's case; (b) failing to investigate other
possible sources who would have had a motive to kill Marcine Cofer; and (c)
failing to properly cross-examine Marcine Cofer and Solomon Hansbury; (8)
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and prepare available mitigation
evidence regarding Sweet's background; (9) Sweet was denied his right to a fair trial
as a result of his jury being subjected to improper influences; (10) the jury was
given inadequate instructions on the "prior violent felony," "great risk," "avoiding
arrest," and "cold, calculated, and premeditated" aggravators; (11) Rule Regulating
the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which prohibits attorneys from interviewing jurors,
caused his postconviction counsel to render ineffective assistance of counsel; (12)
Sweet is innocent of first-degree murder and innocent of the death penalty; (13) the
record fails to show his presence or his counsel's presence at five sidebar
conferences and counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object; (14)
improper prosecutorial comments during the penalty phase in arguing that the jury
should not be sympathetic towards Sweet and ineffective assistance in failing to
object to this comment and in failing to request a "mercy instruction"; (15) alleged
omissions in the record on appeal deprived him of meaningful appellate and
postconviction review and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
ensure a complete record; (16) the trial court's failure to ensure that Sweet had a
complete record on appeal deprived him of a proper direct appeal; (17) Sweet
received a fundamentally unfair trial due to the sheer number and types of errors
committed; (18) the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to
Sweet to show that death was not the appropriate sentence for the jury to
recommend; (19) the State's misleading evidence and improper argument deprived
Sweet of a fair trial; (20) Sweet's contemporaneous felonies were improperly used
to support the prior violent felony aggravator; (21) the State failed to prove that
Sweet "knowingly"created a great risk of causing the death of other persons given
that his mental state at the time of the murder prevented him from knowing this fact;
(22) the trial court improperly used a prior possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon conviction as a statutory aggravator because the conviction was
unconstitutionally obtained; (23) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional
-4-
on its face and as applied; (24) the trial court erred in failing to consider
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (25) the State's introduction of and argument
regarding nonstatutory aggravators deprived Sweet of a fair sentencing
recommendation; (26) the State's closing argument and the jury instructions during
the penalty phase improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in the
sentencing process; (27) trial counsel failed to provide the two court-appointed
mental health examiners with sufficient background information to allow them to
adequately evaluate Sweet's competency to stand trial; and (28) the mental health
officials that examined Sweet failed to render adequate mental health assistance.  
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
6.  These issues are: (1) whether counsel was ineffective during the guilt
phase for failing to investigate and present evidence of other suspects; (2) whether
counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase; (3) whether the trial court erred in
failing to consider the cumulative effect of the newly discovered evidence
concerning Sweet's innocence with the evidence that was not presented due to trial
counsel's ineffectiveness; (4) whether counsel was ineffective regarding Sweet's
competency evaluation by a mental health expert; (5) whether the trial court erred in
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granted an evidentiary hearing, which was held from January 25 through January 28,
1999, on the following four claims: (1) trial counsel, Charlie Adams, failed to
investigate and present evidence of other suspects; (2) Adams failed to present, as
potentially mitigating evidence, Sweet's background history; (3) Adams failed to
present background information to the mental health experts; and (4) the mental
health experts conducted an inadequate evaluation.  The trial court summarily
denied Sweet's remaining claims.  After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied relief on the four remaining claims.  Sweet now appeals the trial court's
denial of postconviction relief, raising six issues for this Court's review.6 
summarily denying a hearing on Sweet's claims related to trial counsel's
ineffectiveness and the State's misconduct that must be considered for their
cumulative effect on the outcome of the guilt and penalty phases; and (6) whether
the record on appeal is so incomplete that Sweet cannot meaningfully raise claims
in this appeal.  We conclude that Sweet's sixth claim, that the transcript in this case
is missing pages 1594-95 and page 1601, and as a result, he is "being denied his
right to appeal because this Court's review cannot be constitutionally complete," is
without merit because the State correctly explains that the record of the evidentiary
hearing in this case is complete. 
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1.    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING GUILT PHASE
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must prove two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Rutherford v. State,
727 So. 2d 216, 219-20 (Fla. 1998).  To establish deficiency, "the defendant must
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" based on "prevailing professional norms."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688.  To establish prejudice "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 694.  Ineffective
assistance claims present a mixed question of law and fact which is subject to
plenary review.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999).  "This
requires an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving
deference to the trial court's factual findings."  State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342,
350 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, because the "Strickland standard requires
establishment of both prongs, where a defendant fails to make a showing as to one
prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the
other prong."  Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001). 
In Sweet's first claim, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
ineffective assistance claim during the guilt phase with regard to Adams' failure to
investigate and present evidence of other suspects and individuals who would have
refuted the State witnesses' identification of Sweet as the shooter.  Sweet contends
that his theory of defense was that he was innocent and that the State's witnesses
misidentified him as the shooter.  Sweet claims that three witnesses--Dale George,
Jesse Gaskins, and Anthony McNish--were available to either identify other
individuals as the shooter or to establish that Sweet was not the shooter, and that
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trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to utilize these witnesses at
trial.
As to Dale George, Sweet contends that Adams rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to investigate George as a suspect.  George was Marcene
Cofer's boyfriend, and he lived with Cofer at the time of the shooting.  Sweet
maintains that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate George
as a possible suspect for several reasons.  First, Adams had police reports
containing several domestic violence petitions that Cofer filed against George,
alleging that George had threatened to kill her and that Cofer feared for her life. 
Second, the evidence at trial showed that in the afternoon preceding the night of the
shooting, George took the clip out of Cofer's gun.  Third, evidence was presented
at trial that George was involved in drug-dealing activity with Cofer, and Sweet
alleges that this could have provided an alternative motive for the shooting.  Fourth,
the State's theory of prosecution in this case originated with George, and Sweet
contends that this should have raised a red flag that a potential suspect was trying
to shift the blame to another.
Although Adams' theory of defense in this case was that someone else killed
the victim, Adams never put on evidence of other suspects at trial.  At the
evidentiary hearing, Adams admitted that evidence of other potential suspects
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would have been helpful.  However, Adams stated that he never considered George
a suspect because there was no credible reason why Cofer and her neighbor,
Sharon Bryant, could not identify George if he was the shooter.  Bill Salmon, who
was accepted at the evidentiary hearing as an expert on capital cases, stated that the
failure to investigate George as a suspect presented a "close question" as to
whether Adams acted deficiently.  Salmon ultimately concluded, however, that
Adams should have presented George to the jury as an alternative suspect.  At a
minimum, Salmon concluded, Adams should have investigated and considered
George before making the determination of whether George should take the stand.  
In rejecting Sweet's contention that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to investigate George as a potential suspect, the trial court explained:  
In the defendant's second claim under this ground, he alleges
that counsel failed to investigate other possible suspects who would
have had a motive to kill Marcine Cofer. . . .  The only other person
that the defendant suggests had a motive to kill Cofer was Dale
George.  Dale George was not only Cofer's boyfriend, he lived with
Cofer, and he was known to Sharon Bryant.  There was no evidence
presented as to why George would have had any problem getting into
the home that he lived in, as did the murderer, nor why either Cofer or
Bryant would not have identified George as the person they saw
through the peep hole in the front door and who had shot them.
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Adams' performance was not
deficient in failing to pursue George as a possible suspect.  There was no evidence
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in this case that George was involved in the shooting, and Sweet presented no
evidence at the evidentiary hearing that George was a possible suspect.  Further,
there was no evidence that the police ever considered George to be a suspect so as
to lead us to a conclusion that Adams was deficient in not pursuing George as an
alternative suspect.  See Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 470-71 (Fla.
1997) (holding that counsel's decision not to use a possible witness was not "so
patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen" to forego the
witness's testimony). 
Sweet next contends that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
call Jessie Gaskins as a witnesses.  At a pretrial deposition, Gaskins stated that
someone pulled a gun on him and made him knock on Cofer's door on the night of
the murder.  Gaskins described the person as wearing a ski mask and did not
mention whether or not the person was wearing jewelry.  Sweet contends that this
testimony is inconsistent with the identification of Sweet by Cofer and Bryant.  
At trial, Bryant described the shooter as wearing rings on his fingers and a
beaded necklace with a crucifix on the end.  Moreover, Bryant stated that the
shooter was wearing a blue jean pant leg over his face.  Bryant also identified Sweet
in a photographic spread at the police station and at trial.  Although she stated that
she saw Sweet directly through the door peephole, she also testified that she did
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not actually see the face of the shooter.  Furthermore, Cofer described the shooter
at trial as having something covering his face, like "a piece of clothing."  She
testified that this clothing was not covering the shooter's entire face, and that she
recognized Sweet's eyes, nose, and a "partial of his face" through the clothing. 
Cofer identified Sweet as the shooter when the police came to investigate the
murder scene, and while she was in the hospital, she picked Sweet out of a
photographic spread.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Adams testified that he did not use Gaskins as a
witness because Gaskins had made an out-of-court statement identifying Sweet as
the shooter after he saw Sweet on television.  Moreover, Adams explained that
Gaskins gave the police a signed statement saying that the man Gaskins saw on
television looked like the man who made him knock on Cofer's door.  Therefore,
Adams did not want to risk the possibility of a third eyewitness identification of
Sweet as the shooter.
When asked about Adams' performance with regard to Gaskins, Salmon
stated:  "Gaskins would at least have given the jury something to think about . . .
food for thought" with regard to Sweet's identification.  Salmon stated that this
"food for thought" also would have carried over to the penalty phase in allowing
the jury to consider a penalty less than death.  With regard to Gaskins' identification
-12-
of Sweet as the shooter, Salmon stated that he believed that the identification would
not have been admissible because of either relevancy or materiality.  Moreover,
Salmon felt that Gaskins' identification was "equivocal," and that he would not have
been troubled by putting Gaskins on the stand even with Gaskins' out-of-court
statement.  However, upon cross-examination, Salmon admitted that the State
could have brought out Gaskins' statement if Gaskins testified, and that it may have
been a strategic decision not to put him on the stand.
We conclude that Adams
was not deficient in deciding not to call Gaskins.  The record demonstrates that
Adams made a strategic decision not to call Gaskins as a witness based upon the
possibility that Gaskins' out-of-court identification could have come in at trial.  See
Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) (holding that counsel's strategic
reason not to call alibi witness could not constitute deficient performance); Rose v.
State, 675 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1996) (same).
Finally, Sweet contends that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing
to ensure that Anthony McNish appear at trial.  Adams had subpoenaed McNish to
appear at trial, but he did not show up.  At trial, Adams told the court that McNish
would have testified that he was on his way home at the time of the shooting and
that he passed Cofer's house.  McNish would have testified that he saw three black
males come up to the apartment in the alley, but also would have testified that it was
-13-
dark.  McNish had known Sweet for five or six years, and would have testified that
none of the three men walked like Sweet or were built like Sweet.  Adams also told
the trial court that McNish was supposed to come to court the day before, and,
when he did not show up, Adams contacted McNish.  McNish stated that he was
confused as to the date, but assured Adams that he would appear the following
day.  That next day, when McNish failed to appear, Adams requested a thirty-
minute continuance to find McNish, and the trial court granted him fifteen minutes. 
Forty-five minutes later, Adams told the trial court that he went to both McNish's
residence and McNish's grandmother's residence, and that McNish could not be
found.  The trial court stated: "It seems like you've certainly made extraordinary
efforts to locate Mr. McNish and have him here."
McNish testified at the evidentiary hearing.  McNish stated that the three men
at Cofer's door walked differently than Sweet, and that the three men each had a
different skin complexion and physical build than Sweet.  McNish admitted that he
received the subpoena Adams sent, but that he never read it.  Moreover, McNish
stated that he read the date of the subpoena, but did not read the part of the
subpoena instructing him to call Adams.  McNish claimed that he did not go to
court on the date instructed because he had to watch his daughter.  McNish stated
that he ultimately did call Adams, and told Adams that he had no transportation. 
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Adams disputed that McNish ever told him that he needed transportation.  
The State established on cross-examination that McNish had been convicted
of seven felonies, including crimes involving dishonesty.  Further, although he
stated at a pretrial deposition that he could not see any of the three mens' faces at
Cofer's door, that it was dark, and that he had bad eyesight, he explained at the
evidentiary hearing that, after thinking about it, he had a good idea of what the three
men looked like.  However, he repeated at the evidentiary hearing that he had bad
eyesight and never got a good look at the three men.  Moreover, McNish never saw
any of the men wearing a mask, and he did not actually see the men knock on the
door.  Finally, McNish stated at the evidentiary hearing that he could identify one of
the men that was at Cofer's door now, but he refused to reveal the name of the
person.  He did state that the man is not Sweet. 
The trial court found that Sweet failed to demonstrate either deficient
performance or prejudice, explaining:  
The evidence at the hearing established that counsel had listed and
intended to use McNish as a witness, that McNish appeared at a
deposition by the State pursuant to subpoena, that McNish had
assured counsel that he would appear at trial, that he had been
subpoenaed by counsel to appear at trial (but had not read that
subpoena), and that counsel secured a recess in the trial to go to
McNish's house and to McNish's grandmother's house in order to
locate McNish, but was unsuccessful in his efforts.  This Court
specifically finds that counsel was not ineffective in his efforts to
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secure McNish's appearance at trial.  Moreover, given McNish's
inconsistent testimony at the evidentiary hearing and complete
evasiveness regarding a critical piece of newly divulged evidence -
some eight years after the fact, the jury would find McNish's testimony
to be as incredible as this Court found it to be, and therefore, the
defendant has also failed to show any actual prejudice as well.
We agree with the trial court that Sweet demonstrated neither deficient performance
nor prejudice with regard to McNish.  
In short, none of these claims refute the overwhelming evidence of guilt
presented by the State.  Further, "[e]ven assuming any deficiency in trial counsel's
guilt-phase performance, there is no reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine
our confidence in the outcome, that the result of the proceeding would have been
different."  Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 220.   
2.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DURING PENALTY PHASE
In Sweet's second claim, he asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to present readily available mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase.  Sweet actually raises several separate but related claims.  First,
Sweet contends that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting the testimony of  his
sister, Deonne Sweet, during the penalty phase.  Second, Sweet argues that Adams
was ineffective in failing to present Sweet's mother, Bertha Sweet, and Sweet's
foster mother, Emily Shealey, during the penalty phase.  Finally, Sweet maintains
7.  This testimony is somewhat contradicted by Deonne's testimony at the
evidentiary hearing.  She stated that Adams spoke to her on the phone several
times, and that she went to his office once.  She stated that Adams spoke to her
more like a friend, telling her about his girlfriends and other unrelated matters.  She
also claimed that Adams never told her that he tried to get in touch with Sweet's
mother during the trial.  Nevertheless, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of
any witnesses, and we are obligated to give deference to the trial court's factual
findings.  See Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001).
-16-
that Adams was ineffective in failing to present available mental mitigation during
the penalty phase.  We address each claim individually, but also evaluate the
cumulative effect of the additional mitigation in order to determine whether Sweet
has demonstrated prejudice.
At the penalty phase, Adams relied solely on Deonne Sweet to provide
mitigation testimony.  Adams explained at the evidentiary hearing that he had several
meetings with Deonne where he discussed the types of things he would ask during
the penalty phase.  He asked Deonne if she had the names of any family members
he could speak to, and he stated that she did not give him any information.7 
Deonne testified to the following at trial.  She and Sweet grew up without a
father.  Growing up with her mother was "normal."  However, she also testified that
their mother was an alcoholic "on and off."  Deonne stated that she did not know if
their mother's alcoholism affected Sweet, but that it did not affect her.  Deonne
-17-
explained that she raised Sweet for a period of time, and that Sweet was a good
uncle to Deonne's daughter.  Deonne testified that Sweet never caused any
problems for her when she was raising him.  Finally, Deonne stated that she and
Sweet were in a foster home because of their mother's neglect and alcoholism, and
that Sweet was in a foster home for approximately two years.
At the evidentiary hearing, Deonne elaborated on her prior trial testimony. 
The new portions of her testimony included the fact that Sweet never knew his
father, and that his father never acknowledged Sweet as his son.  Sweet sometimes
witnessed their mother fighting with her boyfriends and their mother would
sometimes hide from them.  Sweet had behavioral problems in school and could
not sit down and pay attention.  Furthermore, Sweet had a stuttering problem for
which he went to speech therapy.  Sweet was sent to a juvenile facility in Marianna. 
Sweet was never physically abused.
Sweet contends that defense counsels' lack of preparation in presenting
Deonne's testimony constituted deficient performance.  However, we need not
decide this issue, as we conclude that, based solely on Deonne's testimony at the
evidentiary hearing, Sweet has failed to establish prejudice.  See Waterhouse, 792
So. 2d at 1182 (where defendant fails to make showing as to one prong of
Strickland, it is unnecessary to analyze the other prong).  We conclude that
-18-
although Deonne elaborated on her trial testimony during the evidentiary hearing,
this additional testimony was essentially cumulative. 
 
As to Sweet's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to have his
mother and foster parent testify, the trial court found that Adams did speak to
various potential witnesses concerning mitigation, including Sweet's mother, his
girlfriend, his girlfriend's mother, and his foster parents.  Furthermore, we note with
regard to this mitigation, that this is not a case where Adams failed to investigate
any available mitigating witnesses.  See, e.g., Rose, 675 So. 2d at 572; Heiney v.
State, 620 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 1993).  
We do not, however, reach the issue of whether Adams was deficient in
failing to have addition penalty phase witnesses testify, because, having reviewed
the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, we agree with the trial
court that Sweet did not establish prejudice under this claim.  Although Bertha
Sweet's testimony at the evidentiary hearing did present some new facts concerning
Sweet's childhood, the majority of the testimony was cumulative to Deonne's trial
testimony.  Not only was the testimony cumulative to Deonne's testimony that was
actually presented at trial, but presenting Bertha as a witness would have opened the
door to cross-examination about Sweet's juvenile record.
For example, Bertha stated that Sweet got into trouble a number of times as a
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juvenile and was sent away to the Dozier School for Boys in Marianna.  Sweet was
suspended from school for misconduct and he would get into fights at school. 
Bertha testified that Sweet was arrested for battery in 1981 for hitting another child
and that he was taken into custody for being ungovernable.  Moreover, Sweet
began stealing things at a very young age and this continued into his teenage years. 
Bertha also testified that Sweet was once arrested for stealing a bicycle.  Thus, to
the extent that the jury may have benefitted from this additional testimony, the jury
also would have heard potentially damaging information regarding Sweet's juvenile
record and prior violent behavior.  Moreover, none of Bertha's testimony
established any statutory mitigation or refuted any statutory aggravation. 
We also reject Sweet's ineffective assistance claim with regard to the failure
to call Sweet's foster mother, Emily Shealey, as a witness during the penalty phase.
Adams spoke with Shealey before trial.  At the evidentiary hearing, he stated that he
did not present her as a witness because of "something she said," although he
could not remember what specific thing she said that caused him concern.  At the
evidentiary hearing, Shealey testified that when Sweet arrived at her house, Sweet
told her that his mother was not taking care of him and was drinking a lot.  Shealey
also stated that Sweet did not do well in school at first, but Shealey "straightened
him out" and placed him on Ritalin.  Moreover, Sweet behaved well in Shealey's
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home, and got along with Shealey's son.  However, she also acknowledged that
Sweet stole from a store at least three times and misbehaved a lot in class.  Salmon
conceded at the evidentiary hearing that by placing Shealey  (as well as Bertha
Sweet) on the stand, the State would have been able to elicit Sweet's juvenile
criminal history through cross-examination.
Similar to Bertha Sweet's testimony, we conclude that Shealey's testimony
was cumulative to that of Deonne's.  In fact, Shealey's testimony probably would
have been damaging, in that Sweet's juvenile criminal history would likely have been
disclosed to the jury.  Moreover, none of Shealey's testimony established any
statutory mitigation or refuted any statutory aggravation in this case. 
 
Sweet's final contention of penalty phase ineffectiveness is that Adams
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request the appointment of a mental
health expert to evaluate Sweet.  At the evidentiary hearing, Sweet presented the
testimony of Drs. Ernest Miller and Jethro Toomer.  Dr. Miller, a retired professor
of psychiatry, was appointed by the trial court to evaluate Sweet for competency. 
Dr. Miller rendered a report in which he found Sweet competent to stand trial. 
However, Adams never submitted the competency report into evidence or pursued
with Dr. Miller the potential for further examination of Sweet in order to establish
mental mitigation.  
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As we stated in Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 223: 
In evaluating the Strickland prongs of deficiency and prejudice,
it is important to focus on the nature of the mental mitigation
Rutherford now claims should have been presented.  This focus is of
assistance when determining whether trial counsel's choice was a
reasonable and informed strategic decision, as well as whether the
failure to present such testimony (assuming that the failure amounted
to a deficiency in performance) deprived the defendant of a reliable
penalty phase proceeding.
Dr. Toomer, a clinical and forensic psychologist, evaluated Sweet for the
purposes of the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Miller's testimony contradicted Dr.
Toomer's testimony.  Dr. Toomer testified that he did not administer the Minnesota
Multiphastic Personality Inventory ("MMPI") because "there is nothing suggesting
the existence of any severe form of mental illness or major mental illness" with
regard to Sweet.  Dr. Toomer testified about Sweet's family background and also
stated that Sweet had an IQ of 88, which fell in the low-average range.  Dr. Toomer
stated that he did not test Sweet for organic impairment, but that Sweet did fall
within the range of psychological problems.  Dr. Toomer explained that, based on
Sweet's background, there were a number of "red flags" concerning overall
functioning.  Dr. Toomer stated that Sweet was suffering from a personality
disorder, in that he was dependent upon others, but did not suffer from an
antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Toomer explained that he found no sign of
-22-
organic brain damage and that Sweet did not fall into the mentally deficient
category.  
Further, Dr. Toomer testified that Sweet could not have committed the crime
in a cold and calculated manner because, based upon Sweet's background, he did
not act in a logical, premeditated manner.  Moreover, Dr. Toomer stated that Sweet
was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, based upon his
impulsivity, and therefore, Sweet should have been able to establish a statutory
mental mitigator.  On cross-examination, Dr. Toomer conceded that Sweet had
been able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law while in jail, but
explained that this was due to the fact that he was in a structured environment. 
Moreover, Dr. Toomer stated on cross-examination that Sweet knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he committed the murder.  Dr. Toomer also
explained that Sweet was under the influence of an emotional disturbance at the
time of the murder based upon his borderline personality disorder, and thus Sweet
would have been able to establish another statutory mitigator.   
In contrast to Dr. Toomer, Dr. Miller testified that Sweet suffered from an
antisocial personality disorder.  However, Dr. Miller explained that people who
suffer from antisocial personality disorders may be capable of engaging in planning. 
Moreover, Dr. Miller stated that Sweet would sometimes have the capacity to
-23-
satisfy the CCP aggravator, and that at other times Sweet would act out
impulsively.  Dr. Miller stated that Sweet was capable of engaging in long-range
planning and forming the design to kill someone after deliberation.  Yet Dr. Miller
also testified that the defense might have been able to argue against CCP because
of Sweet's impulsive behavior.  Moreover, Dr. Miller stated that Sweet could
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.  Dr. Miller testified that he saw no
evidence of brain damage or mental illness.  Dr. Miller concluded that it was
difficult to find anything directly and openly mitigating in this case and that the facts
of this case suggest premeditation and planning.
In rejecting the testimony that Sweet could not have formed the
premeditation sufficient to establish the CCP aggravator and that Sweet was under
an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, the trial court evaluated
not only the testimony of the expert witnesses, but the other evidence at trial
regarding the heightened premeditation that surrounded the planning and execution
of this murder:
However, this Court finds that the evidence in this case contradicts Dr.
Toomer's opinions.  The evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed the
defendant's motive and intent to eliminate the victim/witness to his
prior robbery of that victim, and the defendant's own inculpatory
statements to Manuela Roberts and Solomon Hansbury provide the
icing on the cake.
-24-
We conclude that it is not reasonably probable, given the nature of all the
additional mitigation, that this "altered picture would have led to the imposition of a
life sentence, outweighing the multiple substantial aggravators at issue in this case." 
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 226.  We have carefully reviewed the evidentiary hearing
testimony of Dr. Miller and Dr. Toomer and agree with the trial court that, given the
nature of the mental health mitigation presented by these experts at the evidentiary
hearing, Sweet has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of a reliable penalty
phase hearing.  Moreover, we cannot conclude that the presentation of the
testimony would have led to the imposition of a sentence other than death, given the
four strong aggravators and the nature and extent of the additional mitigation
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.  We find this case similar to
Rutherford:
Even if the additional mitigation evidence Rutherford presented
at the 3.850 hearing had been heard and considered by the jury and
original judge, it is not reasonably probable, given the nature of the
mitigation offered, that this altered picture would have led to the
imposition of a life sentence, outweighing the multiple substantial
aggravators at issue in this case (HAC, CCP, and robbery/ pecuniary
gain).  Rutherford was not deprived of a reliable penalty proceeding.  
727 So. 2d at 225-26; see also Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466, 471
(Fla.1997) ("In light of the substantial, compelling aggravation found by the trial
court [i.e., under sentence of imprisonment, prior violent felonies, committed
-25-
during a burglary, and CCP] there is no reasonable probability that had the mental
health expert testified, the outcome would have been different.").  
As to the additional mitigation evidence presented through Deonne Sweet,
Bertha Sweet and Emily Shealey, we conclude that the testimony is both cumulative
and potentially harmful, as the testimony might have opened the door for the State
to present negative information concerning Sweet's background.   See Rutherford,
727 So. 2d at 224-25 (explaining that essentially cumulative testimony presented
during 3.850 evidentiary hearing was insufficient to establish prejudice in failing to
present additional mitigation); see also Ventura v. State, 794 So. 2d 553, 570 (Fla.
2001) (holding that defendant could not establish prejudice where the mitigation
presented at evidentiary hearing was cumulative of evidence presented at trial);
Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla.1997) (affirming denial of 3.850 relief
where "the three aggravating factors we have previously affirmed [prior violent
felony, during course of burglary, and HAC] overwhelm whatever mitigation the
[3.850] testimony of [the defendant's] friends and family members could provide"). 
Accordingly, we reject Sweet's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the
penalty phase. 
  3.    CUMULATIVE ERROR UNDER STATE v. GUNSBY, 670 So. 2d 920
(Fla. 1996)
-26-
In Sweet's third claim on appeal, he asserts that this Court must consider the
evidence concerning Sweet's innocence disclosed during the evidentiary hearing in
conjunction with Sweet's allegations of ineffective assistance.  Specifically, Sweet
asserts that because Solomon Hansbury, a witness at trial who claimed that Sweet
confessed to the murder while they were in jail together, recanted his testimony at
the evidentiary hearing, the trial court erred in failing to consider the cumulative
effect of all the evidence not presented at Sweet's trial.  In making this claim, Sweet
relies upon this Court's decision in State v. Gunsby, 670 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1996). 
In Gunsby the Court explained: 
[W]hen we consider the cumulative effect of the testimony presented
at the rule 3.850 hearing and the admitted Brady violations on the part
of the State, we are compelled to find, under the unique circumstances
of this case, that confidence in the outcome of Gunsby's original trial
has been undermined and that a reasonable probability exists of a
different outcome.
Id. at 924.  
However, before we engage in a cumulative error analysis under Gunsby, we
must first consider Hansbury's testimony.  The trial court expressly rejected
Hansbury's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, in which he recanted his earlier
statement, as "incredible."  As this Court explained in Armstrong v. State, 642 So.
2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994), in rejecting a new trial based upon recanted testimony:
-27-
Recantation by a witness called on behalf of the prosecution
does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial.  In determining
whether a new trial is warranted due to recantation of a witness's
testimony, a trial judge is to examine all the circumstances of the case,
including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for
the new trial.  "Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly
unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is
not satisfied that such testimony is true.  Especially is this true where
the recantation involves a confession of perjury."  Only when it
appears that, on a new trial, the witness's testimony will change to
such an extent as to render probable a different verdict will a new trial
be granted. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Certainly, the testimony of Hansbury standing alone would not rise to the
level of requiring the granting of a new trial, and Sweet does not contend that he
was entitled to a new trial based solely on Hansbury's recantation.  Considering all
of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing in this case, we reject Sweet's
claim under Gunsby.  As noted above, Sweet has failed to establish an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim with regard to the guilt-phase proceedings.  Therefore,
we deny relief on this claim.
4.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN FAILING TO PROVIDE COMPETENCY
EXPERTS WITH SWEET'S BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In Sweet's fourth claim, he contends that Adams rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to provide Dr. Miller and Maritza Cabrera with information
concerning Sweet's background.  The trial court rejected this claim, concluding: 
-28-
This Court appointed two independent mental health
professionals to examine the defendant, Dr. Ernest C. Miller, M.D.,
and Maritza Cabrera, M.A., CRC. . . .  The [professionals'] report
shows that the examiners were, in fact, aware of much of the
information that the defendant contends his counsel did not provide
them with.  The information in the report is stated in concise
summarizations, as opposed to being recited in the detail that the
defendant has stated it in his motion.  The defendant did not call Dr.
Miller as a witness at the hearing to establish his alleged lack of
adequate information; rather, the State called Dr. Miller and established
that his opinion would not have been different even when specifically
considering the facts not specifically noted in his report.  Therefore,
this Court finds that the evidence failed to establish any prejudice to
the defendant's mental health examination. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  The trial court's factual conclusions are supported by
competent substantial evidence and we likewise conclude that Sweet has failed to
demonstrate any prejudice.  See Patton v. State, 784 So. 2d 380, 393 (Fla. 2000)
(holding that defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice where competency
expert testified that his opinion would not have changed even after considering
additional information).
In a related claim, Sweet asserts that the mental health professionals who
examined him failed to render adequate mental health assistance.  Sweet contends
that the professionals relied almost exclusively on what Adams provided, which
was inadequate, and did not conduct an independent investigation into Sweet's
family history.  Sweet contends that the professionals might have reached a
-29-
different conclusion as to Sweet's competency if they had engaged in a more
thorough investigation of Sweet's background.  However, because there is no
evidence to support the conclusion that either of the experts' opinions would have
changed regarding competency, we reject this claim. 
5.    MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS
In his fifth claim, Sweet makes several different subclaims.  First, Sweet
asserts that the trial court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing on only one aspect
of his claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase. 
Second, Sweet claims that the trial court should have considered the additional
examples of Adams' ineffectiveness and the State's alleged misconduct in
conjunction with his claim that Adams failed to properly investigate other suspects. 
Finally, Sweet contends that the trial court should have considered the improper
actions of the trial judge in conjunction with Sweet's ineffective assistance claim
regarding Adams' failure to investigate other suspects.  Each of these claims shall
be addressed in turn.
Sweet's first subclaim is that the trial court erred in granting an evidentiary
hearing on only one aspect of Sweet's ineffectiveness claim.  Sweet asserts that he
raised three separate bases for Adams' ineffectiveness during the guilt phase in his
postconviction motion.  These bases were: (1) Adams failed to conduct an
-30-
adequate pretrial investigation and preparation of the case; (2) Adams failed to
investigate and present evidence of other suspects; and (3) Adams failed to
properly impeach the State's witnesses, Marcine Cofer and Solomon Hansbury. 
The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing for only Adams' alleged failure to
investigate and present evidence of other suspects.  However, during the
evidentiary hearing, defense counsel did present evidence in an attempt to establish
ineffectiveness under the first and third subclaims. 
As this Court explained in Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1999): 
Under rule 3.850, a postconviction defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing unless the motion and record conclusively show
that the defendant is not entitled to relief.  The movant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if he
alleges specific "facts which are not conclusively rebutted by the
record and demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced
the defendant."  Upon review of a trial court's summary denial of
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, we must accept all
allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively
rebutted by the record.
 
(Citations and footnote omitted.)  Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if the postconviction motion is legally insufficient on its face. 
See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000); Peede v. State, 748 So.
2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).  
In this case, the trial court rejected Sweet's claim that Adams was ineffective
-31-
for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and preparation of the case,
explaining:
The defendant's first claim under this ground is that counsel
allegedly failed to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation and
preparation of the defendant's case.  As the defendant acknowledges,
the defendant was initially represented by the Public Defender's Office,
and his trial counsel was not appointed until five months after the
defendant's arrest, only one month prior to when the speedy trial
period would have expired.  Counsel sought and was granted two
continuances of several months in duration for investigative purposes,
and two continuances of a few weeks in duration for health reasons. 
When counsel attempted to obtain yet another, this Court denied that
request.  The defendant makes the conclusory allegations that his
attorney's preparation was inadequate due to counsel's health
problems, and due to a break down in communications between he
and his attorney.  The defendant cites to a statement he made in court
as support for his allegation that there was a break down in
communications.  In point of fact, the defendant's statement clearly
shows that the defendant was pushing counsel bring the case to trial,
and was unhappy that counsel was not doing so, which is diametrically
opposed to counsel being able to take the time to adequately prepare
for trial.  Further, this Court denied counsel's additional requests for
more continuances.  This Court finds that this claim is, at best, facially
insufficient.  The defendant also makes the conclusory allegations that
counsel "failed to conduct an adequate voir dire; to object to the
introduction of inflammatory and improper evidence; and failed to
present adequate argument to the jury."  The defendant merely cites to
the record on appeal in support of these allegations.  This Court finds
these allegations to be facially insufficient.   
Moreover, with regard to Sweet's assertion that Adams rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to impeach the State's witnesses, the trial court made the
following conclusion:
-32-
The defendant's third claim under this ground is that counsel
allegedly failed to properly cross-examine Marcine Cofer and Solomon
Hansbury at trial (Hansbury testified at trial regarding the defendant's
confession to him).  The defendant contends that counsel should have
attempted to impeach Cofer's identification of him through evidence of
her drug usage.  The defendant acknowledges that counsel was
restrained in his efforts to do this through a pre-trial order of this
Court.  The trial transcripts rebut this claim, in that the jury did hear
evidence that Cofer sold drugs, used drugs, and that she had drugs in
her system on the night of the murder.  Moreover, the defendant fails
to alleged why the jury would disbelieve Cofer's positive identification
of the defendant in the face of such corroborating evidence as the
positive identification of the defendant by Sharon Bryant, the
defendant's possession of the jewelry he had stolen from Cofer during
the prior robbery, and the testimony of the defendant's confession to
both Solomon Hansbury and Manuela Roberts.  As for Solomon
Hansbury, the trial transcripts show that counsel did extensively cross-
examine Hansbury and the defendant fails to allege what additional
cross-examination counsel should have performed.  As part of this
claim, the defendant presented the recanted testimony of Hansbury at
the evidentiary hearing.  However, Hansbury admitted that he is now
serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, that snitches
are not highly regarded in prison, and that the inmates consider it an
admirable thing to testify on behalf of another inmate.  Hansbury's trial
testimony was consistent with the other evidence in this case.  This
Court finds Hansbury's current testimony that he lied at trial to be
incredible.  This Court finds that there is no reasonable probability that
any of the claims raised under this ground would probably have
resulted in a different outcome at trial.  Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.
2d 84 (Fla. 1994); Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).
We agree with the trial court and conclude that these claims are either legally
insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record.  Also, to the extent that Sweet
did introduce evidence at the evidentiary hearing regarding Hansbury, the trial
-33-
court's factual findings are supported by the record. 
Sweet's second subclaim is that the trial court should have considered the
additional examples of Adams' ineffectiveness and the State's alleged misconduct in
conjunction with his claim that Adams failed to properly investigate other suspects,
and that the trial court erred in denying a hearing on these claims.  However,
because on appeal Sweet simply recites these claims from his postconviction
motion in a sentence or two, without elaboration or explanation, we conclude that
these instances of alleged ineffectiveness are not preserved for appellate review. 
See Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999); Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.
2d 849, 851-52 (Fla. 1990).
In Sweet's third subclaim, he asserts that the trial court made various errors
throughout his trial, and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
First, Sweet contends that despite the presentation of evidence supporting several
mitigators, the trial court found no statutory and only one nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance (lack of parental guidance).  Specifically, Sweet contends that he
presented the following nonstatutory mitigation in this case: (1) organic brain
damage; (2) broken home; (3) difficult and impoverished background; (4) potential
for rehabilitation; (5) positive traits; (6) drug abuse problems; (7) alcohol abuse; (8)
potential to contribute to society; (9) acceptable behavior at trial; (10) emotional
-34-
disturbance or instability; (11) personality change from drugs; and (12) mother was
an alcoholic.  Moreover, Sweet contends that Adams rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to effectively use this evidence to argue for a life sentence.  
However, we agree with the trial court's conclusion with regard to this claim:
This Court finds this claim to be procedurally barred, in that it could
and should have been raised in his direct appeal.  Additionally, this
Court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing failed to
establish his proposed mitigators of "organic brain damage," "potential
for rehabilitation," "positive traits," "drug abuse problem," "alcohol
problem," "could contribute to society," "emotional disturbance or
instability," and "personality change from drugs."  The remainder of
the proposed mitigators were presented at trial through the testimony
of the defendant's sister.  As the defendant's quotation from this
Court's sentencing order demonstrates, this Court did take into
account those factors which resulted in the defendant having a
disadvantaged childhood.  As the quotation also notes, however,
those disadvantages were largely offset by numerous positive
influences which would have allowed the defendant to overcome his
disadvantages, just as his sister Deonne did.  Moreover, had the jury
been presented with additional evidence in regard to the defendant's
proposed mitigators, the State would have been able to bring out a
wealth of evidence of the defendant's anti-social personality. 
Accordingly, this Court finds that there is no reasonable probability
that the jury would have reached a different sentencing decision had
they been presented with additional evidence by both parties.  
(Citations omitted.)   
Second, Sweet contends that he was denied a right to a fair sentencing
hearing because the jury was instructed on unconstitutionally vague aggravators. 
However, this argument appears to be a repeat of his ineffectiveness claim
-35-
discussed above, and for the reasons already discussed, was properly denied.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Frederick Tygart, Judge - Case No. 91-2899-CF
Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Counsel - Northern Region, John M. Jackson,
Assistant CCRC, and Kimberly L. Sharkey, Assistant CCRC - Northern Region,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee