Title: Abbott v. DeKalb

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: June 18, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JOEL TERENCE ABBOTT, 
Petitioner
on Review,
v. 
JACQUES A. DEKALB
and STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondents
on Review.
(CC
04CV0283ST; CA A131204; SC S056430)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the
briefs March 18, 2009.
Joel Terence Abbott
filed the brief on behalf of himself.
Andrew C. Balyeat filed
the brief for respondent on review Jacques DeKalb.
Erin C. Lagesen,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the brief for respondent on review
State of Oregon.
Michael A. Greene
filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers' Association.
PER CURIAM
The petition for review
is dismissed as improvidently allowed.
*Appeal from Deschutes
County Circuit Court, Barbara Haslinger,
Judge. 221 Or App 339, 190
P3d 413 (2008).
PER CURIAM
We allowed review in this case to decide
a question about the rule set out in Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221, 238,
851 P2d 556 (1993):  that a person convicted of a crime cannot sue his or her defense
attorney for legal malpractice -- and thus that the statute of limitations on such
an action does not begin to run -- until "the person has been exonerated
of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, through
post-conviction relief proceedings, or otherwise."  We now conclude that
we should dismiss the petition for review as improvidently allowed, and we
write to explain that disposition.
Plaintiff was charged and convicted
of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse.  Defendant DeKalb served as plaintiff's
appointed counsel at his criminal trial.  Although that prosecution occurred
outside the applicable statute of limitations, DeKalb did not raise the statute
of limitations issue in the trial court; neither did plaintiff's appellate
counsel raise that issue on appeal.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions, and this court denied review.   State v. Abbott, 136 Or App
547, 901 P2d 268, rev den, 322 Or 362 (1995), cert den, 517 US
1214 (1996).
Plaintiff sought, and the trial court
granted, post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court found that DeKalb had
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the statute of
limitations issue, but that plaintiff's "many other claims" (which
presumably included his claims concerning appellate counsel) were not well
taken.  The state appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and plaintiff petitioned
for review in this court.  Abbott v. Baldwin, 178 Or App 289, 36 P3d 516
(2001), rev den, 334 Or 75, cert den, 537 US 901 (2002).  This
court denied review, and the appellate judgment affirming the post-conviction
judgment issued on May 28, 2002. 
The statute of limitations for a
legal malpractice action is two years.  See ORS 12.110(1) (setting that
limitations period for "injury to the person or rights of another, not
arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter"); United
States Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 665-66, 548 P2d 966 (1976) (limitations
period of ORS 12.110(1) applies to legal malpractice actions).  On May 21, 2004
-- just less than two years after the appellate judgment had issued, but more
than two years after the post-conviction court initially had granted relief --
plaintiff filed the present malpractice action against DeKalb and the attorneys
who had handled his direct criminal appeal.  The state later was substituted as
a defendant in place of appellate counsel, because appellate counsel had been
appointed by the state.(1)
In the malpractice action, the trial
court granted a motion to dismiss filed by DeKalb and a motion for summary
judgment filed by the state.  Relying on Stevens, the trial court concluded
that the malpractice action against both defendants was barred by the statute
of limitations because plaintiff's exoneration had occurred when the trial
court granted post-conviction relief, not when the appellate judgment later issued. 
The trial court also agreed with the state that (1) issue preclusion barred
plaintiff from challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel because the
post-conviction court had held that appellate counsel had not been ineffective;
and (2) plaintiff could not show that he had been harmed by appellate counsel's
failure to argue the statute of limitations defense because plaintiff himself
had presented the statute of limitations issue to the Court of Appeals in his pro
se brief.   Furthermore, the trial court agreed with DeKalb that the claim
for relief against him was barred by the 10-year limitation in ORS 12.115(1).
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  In a split, en banc decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling in favor of DeKalb and the state.  Abbott v. DeKalb, 221 Or
App 339, 190 P3d 413 (2008).  The majority rejected the trial court's
conclusion that, under Stevens, plaintiff had been exonerated when the
post-conviction court granted relief.  The majority determined that that was
not the appropriate date from which to measure the statute of limitations
because the state had appealed the post-conviction court's judgment to the
Court of Appeals.  Id. at 343.  Instead, the majority reasoned,
exoneration occurred when, after the Court of Appeals affirmed the
post-conviction court's ruling in plaintiff's favor, the state failed to seek
review in this court.  At that point, in the majority's view, plaintiff's
exoneration had become certain; only plaintiff's decision to seek review from
this court prevented the appellate judgment from issuing.  Id. at
343-44.  Because plaintiff had not filed his malpractice action within two
years of that date, the majority concluded that the malpractice action was
time-barred.  Id. at 344.  Four judges dissented.  The dissent contended
that plaintiff had not been exonerated until the appellate judgment actually
had issued.  Id. at 346-47 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
We allowed review to consider only the
issue discussed in the Court of Appeals opinion -- whether the statute of
limitations for plaintiff's legal malpractice action had expired under Stevens,
316 Or 221.  In allowing review, however, we did not attach sufficient
significance to the sentence in the Court of Appeals' majority opinion stating
that, "[a]lthough plaintiff raises numerous assignments of error, we
reject all but one without discussion."  221 Or App at 342.  The Court of
Appeals thus effectively had affirmed the other holdings of the trial court
without opinion.  
The issue that divided the Court of
Appeals is an important one.(2) 
However, the grounds for decision that the Court of Appeals did not discuss fully
support the decision of the trial court and present independent bases to affirm
that decision, and we do not have the benefit of the Court of Appeals' analysis
of those issues.  Given those circumstances, any opinion in this case on the
merits of the statute of limitations question would address an issue that,
although significant in the abstract, would not affect the result.  We
therefore conclude that our decision to allow review was improvident.
The
petition for review is dismissed as improvidently allowed.
1. The
action against the state also was subject to a two-year statute of limitations
pursuant to a different statute, ORS 30.275(9).
2. The
facts of this case particularly reveal the ramifications of the delay
necessitated by the rule in Stevens v. Bisham, 316 Or 221, 238, 851 P2d
556 (1993).  The parties did not ask that we reconsider Stevens in light
of those ramifications.