Title: State by & Through Indus. Com'n v. Wasatch Metal, Etc.

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

594 P.2d 894 (1979) STATE of Utah, By and Through the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WASATCH METAL AND SALVAGE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. No. 15376. Supreme Court of Utah. April 19, 1979. Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Mark A. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry E. McCoy, II, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. Edward M. Garrett, of Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent. *895 MAUGHAN, Justice: The State, by and through the Industrial Commission, appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing proceedings instituted, by the state, against defendant. The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff's representative presented himself with appropriate credentials at defendant's workplace for the purpose of conducting an inspection pursuant to the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, 35-9-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, as enacted 1973. Defendant refused the inspector admission to the premises. The State petitioned the district court for an order of immediate entry, which was granted. Defendant moved for an order of dismissal of the proceedings. The trial court granted the dismissal on the ground that another district judge had declared the entire act unconstitutional. On appeal, the State has attempted to broaden the issues beyond the immediate question, the constitutionality of section 35-9-8(1), and seeks a judicial declaration as to the validity of Chapter 9, Title 35. We decline to so rule on the authority of Baird v. State,[1] and confine our decision to the constitutionality of the statutory authorization of Sec. 35-9-8(1), viz., to conduct an administrative search without a search warrant. Section 35-9-8(1) provides: Section 8(1) of the Utah Act has provisions substantially similar to Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.[2] Under a factual background similar to the instant case, the constitutionality of the statutory authorization of a warrantless search under OSHA was submitted to the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.[3] The Court held the Act unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment; insofar as it purported to authorize inspections without a warrant, or its equivalent. The Secretary of Labor, Marshall, urged under Section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 657(a), (which authorizes inspection of business premises without a warrant), warrantless inspections to enforce OSHA were reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court disagreed. The Court stated it had previously held warrantless searches were generally unreasonable, and this rule applied to commercial premises as well as homes. Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations. The Court pointed out the critical fact in the case was that entry, over the objection of Mr. Barlow, was being sought by a government agent. The Court explained the owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees, in his operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are permitted, to the warrantless scrutiny of government agents. The Court rejected the Secretary's claim, viz., the enforcement scheme of the Act requires warrantless searches, and the restrictions on search discretion (contained in the Act and its regulations) protect as much privacy as a warrant would. The Court elaborated on the requisites for an administrative warrant for an OSHA inspection: The Secretary further urged that requiring a warrant for OSHA inspectors would mean that other regulatory statutes providing for a warrantless search would be constitutionally infirm. The Court responded that the reasonableness of a warrantless search would depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. The court admonished: The court continued: *897 The court reiterated the principles involving an administrative search in Michigan v. Tyler,[8] wherein it stated: Thus, insofar as Sec. 35-9-8-(1) authorizes inspections without a warrant, it is unconstitutional. It is so because it constitutes a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Sec. 14, Constitution of Utah. This opinion is grounded on the law and facts associated with OSHA. We do not hand down a rule which has general application to other administrative endeavors. WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting). On the basis of what in my judgment are sound propositions, having a vital bearing on the balance of power between the three branches of government, I dissent from declaring the statute unconstitutional. First, the only searches which are prohibited by our constitutional provisions are those which are unreasonable.[1] Second, the Legislature has fashioned this statute in obvious awareness of the foregoing, and has laden it with requirements that any such inspection must be reasonable. It must be done by a representative presenting appropriate credentials and at "reasonable times" and in a "reasonable manner." Third, it is our duty to assume that the statute will be understood, applied, and adhered to in a constitutional manner:[2] i.e., that the only inspections performed will be subject to the clearly stated restrictions of reasonableness; and therefore under those restrictions, there can be no unreasonable search authorized by the statute. In authorizing an inspection in the interests of safety and health, I see no likelihood of oppressive conduct or undue annoyance. If the proposed inspection is regarded by the inspected as unreasonable, he can refuse; then the inspector must obtain judicial approval and a warrant. Fourth: a fundamental principle of constitutional law is that the judicial branch should exercise judicial restraint, and should not intrude into the legislative prerogative[3] and not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is so beyond a reasonable doubt.[4] It is important to keep in mind that the judiciary has an awesome responsibility in that it can exercise final judgment on the prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as upon its own; and that practically the only restraint thereon is its own sense of self-restraint. It is obvious that if such restraint is not exercised the courts could arbitrarily arrogate to themselves dangerous powers which could impair or destroy the balance of power which has served so *898 well as one of the distinctive advantages of our system of government. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the judiciary resist the temptation to extend its own authority and that it exercise great care not to encroach upon the prerogatives of the other two branches. On the basis of what has been said above, it is my opinion that it is not only contrary to sound policy and well-established principles of law, but is unnecessary and ill-advised, to declare the statute unconstitutional. [1] Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). [2] 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970) [29 U.S.C.S. § 657(a)]. [3] 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978). [4] Pp. 320-321 of 436 U.S., pp. 1824-1825 of 98 S.Ct. [5] Pp. 321-322 of 436 U.S., p. 1825 of 98 S.Ct. [6] As an elaboration of this statement, footnote 20, provides: "The application for the inspection order filed by the Secretary in this case represented that `the desired inspection and investigation are contemplated as part of an inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Act and are authorized by Section 8(a) of the Act.' The program was not described, however, or any facts presented that would indicate why an inspection of Barlow's establishment was within the program. The order that issued concluded generally that the inspection authorized was `part of an inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Act.'" [7] At pp. 322-324 of 436 U.S., at pp. 1825-1826 of 98 S.Ct. [8] 436 U.S. 499, 506, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 496 (1978). [1] Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 14; U.S.Const., Fourth Amendment. [2] Vanlaningham v. Dept. of Business Regulation, Utah, 566 P.2d 1238, citing Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400. [3] Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643. [4] Salt Lake City v. Savage, Utah, 541 P.2d 1035, citing Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958; and Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234.