Title: Hamilton v. Industrial Comm'n

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93251-Agenda 12-November 2002.
TERRY HAMILTON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION et al. (American National Can Company,
Appellee).
Opinion filed February 6, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Terry Hamilton appeals the decision of the appellate court's
Industrial Commission Division in favor of his former employer,
American National Can Company (American Can). The issue in
this case is whether a former employer is liable to pay
compensation under the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (the
Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2000)), for an employee's
exposure to an occupational disease hazard, where the employee
was last exposed to that hazard while working with another
employer. We hold that the Act clearly limits liability to the
employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to
the hazard. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
	Hamilton began working for American Can, a metal can
manufacturer, at its Hoopeston, Illinois, facility in 1970. Over the
next 25 years, he gradually ascended the assembly department
production ladder-from stacker operator to coater operator to
"bodymaker" and "slitter" mechanic, a position which he held for
15 years. As a mechanic, Hamilton maintained and repaired the
machines that form the cylinder portion of a can. According to
Hamilton, these machines are extremely loud. Tests confirmed
Hamilton's opinion: the noise from these machines exceeded
recommendations from the Occupational Health and Safety
Agency. Hamilton often worked in close proximity to these
machines, and he was often exposed to their noise. In March 1995,
Hamilton became a millwright, a similar maintenance position that
covered the entire plant. Again, he was often exposed to extremely
loud noise. Though American Can supplied ear protection,
Hamilton chose not to wear it, because he needed to hear various
machines to diagnose problems and keep them running smoothly.
Hamilton worked full time at the plant, sometimes as long as 12
hours a day for seven days a week. On August 1, 1995, American
Can sold the plant to Silgan Container Corporation (Silgan
Container), another metal can manufacturer. Hamilton remained
at the plant and began working for Silgan Container.
	Hamilton first experienced hearing difficulty in 1986, and,
eventually, in 1996, he filed separate hearing loss claims under the
Act against American Can and Silgan Container. See 820 ILCS
310/7 (West 2000). These claims were consolidated, and,
following a hearing, an arbitrator found that Hamilton had
sustained a permanent hearing loss of 39.4% in his left ear and
42.5% in his right ear. The arbitrator apportioned this loss between
American Can and Silgan Container. The arbitrator concluded that
more than 92% of his total left ear hearing loss and more than 57%
of his total right ear hearing loss was attributable to his
employment with American Can. The remaining approximately
8% of his left ear hearing loss and approximately 42% of his right
ear hearing loss was attributable to Silgan Container. Silgan
Container paid its portion of the award; American Can sought
review by the Industrial Commission.
	The Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that under
section 1(d) of the Act, American Can was not Hamilton's
employer with whom he was last exposed to the hazard of loud
noise: "While [Hamilton] was clearly exposed to industrial noise
while working for [American Can] and had some degree of
hearing loss, he continued to be exposed to industrial noise while
the plant was owned by [Silgan Container] ***. As a result,
[Silgan Container] was the 'last employer' and is liable for
[Hamilton's] benefit's [sic] under the plain language of §1(d), and
[American Can] is not liable for [Hamilton's] hearing loss."
	The circuit court of Vermilion County and the appellate court
both affirmed. The five-member appellate court panel was divided.
The majority concluded that because American Can was not
Hamilton's employer when he was last exposed to loud noise, it
was not liable under section 1(d) of the Act. 326 Ill. App. 3d 602,
605. Justice Rarick wrote a special concurrence, which was joined
by Justices Hoffman and Holdridge. Justice Rarick stated that
section 1(d) represents a policy decision by the General Assembly
to impose the entire liability for an employee's hearing loss upon
the employer with whom the employee was last exposed to the
hazard. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 605-06 (Rarick, J., specially concurring,
joined by Hoffman and Holdridge, JJ.). Justice Rarick reasoned:
		"To do otherwise would impose upon the employee the
difficult, and often insurmountable, burden of proving
that exposure to the noise at a particular employer's
facility resulted in some degree of disability and what that
disability was. In theory, allocating liability among the
employers *** is more equitable. As a practical matter,
however, it would often work to the disadvantage of the
employee, who would have to prove how much disability
is attributable to which employer. In keeping with the
remedial goal of the Act, our legislature took the more
pragmatic approach of imposing liability for the entire
loss on the last employer in order to more readily facilitate
the employee's ability to recover." 326 Ill. App. 3d at 606
(Rarick, J., specially concurring, joined by Hoffman and
Holdridge, JJ.).
	In dissent, Justice O'Malley agreed that the "last exposure"
rule serves to protect an employee who cannot apportion damages
between successive employers. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 606 (O'Malley,
J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Malley, however, this rule
should not "thwart[ ] the humanitarian intentions behind the Act"
where an employee can apportion damages but failed to timely
seek compensation from a prior employer. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 606-07 (O'Malley, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice O'Malley would
have held:
			"[S]ection 1(d), although not permitting double
recovery, permits a claimant to recover the full measure
of compensation either from the last in a succession of
employers over the course of whose employ the claimant
suffered permanent damage from exposure to the hazard
of an occupational disease (the length of the last exposure
and the fact or degree of harm caused having no effect on
the liability of the last employer) or from an earlier
employer in the succession who the employee can prove
caused discrete permanent harm." (Emphasis in original.)
326 Ill. App. 3d at 610 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
	Justices Rarick and O'Malley filed a statement that this case
involves a substantial question warranting our consideration. We
granted Hamilton's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).
ANALYSIS
	A reviewing court may overturn an Industrial Commission
decision only if it finds that the decision was contrary to law or
that the fact determinations made in rendering the decision were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Freeman United Coal
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Ill. 2d 243, 245 (1999). In
this appeal, the parties do not dispute the Commission's fact
determinations. The issue before us is one of pure statutory
interpretation, and our review proceeds de novo. Sylvester v.
Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001).
	The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). Because
statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the
best indication of this intent, we turn to the Act. Belleville Toyota,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 342
(2002).
	Section 1(d) of the Act provides: "The employer liable for the
compensation in this Act provided shall be the employer in whose
employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the
occupational disease claimed upon regardless of the length of time
of such last exposure ***." 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2000).
Section 1(d) taps the employer with whom the employee was last
exposed to the hazard for the entire compensation provided by the
Act. That is, the focus is on the employer on the date of the last
exposure-in a sense, the "last employer." Relatedly and relevantly,
section 7130.30 of title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code,
entitled "Prior Hearing Loss," provides: "An employer shall be
liable for the entire occupational deafness to which his
employment contributed ***." 50 Ill. Adm. Code §7130.30
(1996). This regulation implies that liability for hearing loss is
indivisible.
	Hamilton contends that the appellate court's interpretation of
section 1(d) is too narrow. He relies upon Fleming v. Industrial
Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 329 (1983), and Thermos Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 83 Ill. 2d 54 (1980). We agree with the appellate court
majority: Fleming and Thermos Co. are inapposite. Both address
the date when the employee was last exposed to the hazard, rather
than the issue before us in this case: the employer when the
employee was last exposed. See H&H Plumbing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 170 Ill. App. 3d 706, 719 (1988) ("the problem in
Thermos was not determining which employer was liable under
the Act").
	When the statutory language is clear, we must apply the
statute as written. See Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America,
186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999); see also People ex rel. Devine v.
$30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 150-51
(2002). Section 1(d) imposes mandatory liability upon the
employer in whose employment Hamilton was last exposed to
loud noise. Here, that employer is Silgan Container. A contrary
holding would not only do violence to the statute as written, but
also do a disservice to employees covered by the Act. The General
Assembly chose not to apportion liability under the Act among
employers, opting instead for the more pragmatic and certain
approach of total compensation from the last employer. We refuse
to second-guess the unmistakable intent of the legislature in the
name of equity. See Concrete Structures of the Midwest, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 315 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599 (2000) ("[W]e have
no authority to make such an [apportioned] award. The issue of
apportionment of benefits among various employers is a matter for
the legislature to address first, not us"); see also H&H Plumbing,
170 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19 (rejecting a current employer's
argument that it was not liable under the Act where the current
employer failed to present evidence of the employee's exposure
after his employment with the current employer). The appellate
court correctly held that American Can was not liable for
Hamilton's hearing loss.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we affirm.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.