Title: Ex parte James Oscar Jenkins, Sr. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: James Oscar Jenkins, Sr. v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/16/2007 Ex parte Jenkins, Sr.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051778
_________________________
Ex parte James Oscar Jenkins, Sr.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  James Oscar Jenkins, Sr.
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-95-456;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1577)
LYONS, Justice.
James Oscar Jenkins, Sr., appeals from the Court of
Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's denial of
1051778
2
his motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9, Ala.
Code 1975, the Habitual Felony Offender Act (the "HFOA"), as
amended by § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975. We reverse and remand.
On March 12, 1996, Jenkins was convicted in the Mobile
Circuit Court of robbery in the first degree, a Class A
felony. Jenkins had three prior felony convictions, none of
which was a Class A felony. Judge R.E.L. Key sentenced
Jenkins, as a habitual felony offender under § 13A-5-9, to
life imprisonment without the possibility  of parole. On
September 14, 2004, Jenkins filed a motion for sentence
reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, pursuant to Kirby v. State,
899 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 2004). Judge James C. Wood, a circuit
judge for the Mobile Circuit Court who was not the presiding
judge of that circuit, heard Jenkins's Kirby motion, which he
denied. On April 10, 2006, Jenkins filed a second Kirby
motion, which was denied by the presiding judge of the Mobile
Circuit, Charles A. Graddick.
Jenkins appealed the denial of the April 10, 2006, Kirby
motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial
with an unpublished memorandum on the ground that Jenkins's
Kirby 
motion 
was 
not 
the 
first 
motion 
for 
sentence
1051778
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reconsideration that Jenkins had filed. Jenkins v. State (No.
CR-05-1577, August 11, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2006) (table). Jenkins then filed an application for rehearing
in the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the prohibition
against successive motions for sentence reconsideration did
not apply to preclude his April 10, 2006, motion because the
judge who ruled on Jenkins's first Kirby motion was not the
sentencing judge or the presiding judge of the circuit, so his
ruling was void and the first Kirby motion was therefore never
ruled on. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied his application
for rehearing, and Jenkins filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision.  
Jenkins alleges that the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals conflicts with Bulger v. State, 904 So. 2d
219 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). In Bulger, the Court of Criminal
Appeals, relying on Kirby, held that the rule it announced in
Wells v. State, 941 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005),
prohibiting successive motions for sentence reconsideration,
does not apply when the first motion for reconsideration was
denied by a judge who was neither the sentencing judge nor the
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presiding judge. We have not yet been presented with the
occasion to address the rule prohibiting successive motions
for sentence reconsideration that the Court of Criminal
Appeals recognized in Wells, and we need not do so here if we
determine that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dispose
of Jenkins's first motion for reconsideration of his sentence.
In Bulger, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"Section 
13A-5-9.1 
specifically 
provides 
for 
the
reconsideration of a sentence 'by the sentencing
judge or the presiding judge.' As the Supreme Court
held in Kirby, '[s]ection 13A-5-9.1 is an act of
statewide application that confers jurisdiction upon
the sentencing judge or the presiding judge to apply
the 2000 amendment to the HFOA retroactively.' 899
So. 2d at 972. Although normally a trial judge loses
jurisdiction to modify a sentence more than 30 days
after sentencing, by enacting § 13A-5-9.1, 'the
Legislature vested jurisdiction in the sentencing
judge or the presiding judge to reopen a case more
than 30 days after a defendant has been sentenced.'
Kirby, 899 So. 2d at 971 (emphasis added). Thus, a
§ 13A-5-9.1 motion must be filed in the court of
original conviction, and only the sentencing judge
or 
the 
presiding 
judge 
of 
that 
circuit 
has
jurisdiction to review the motion."
Bulger, 904 So. 2d at 221. Based on this rationale, the Court
of Criminal Appeals concluded that the denial of a motion for
sentence reconsideration by a judge other than the sentencing
judge or the presiding judge of the circuit is a "void
judgment."
1051778
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Jenkins 
filed 
his 
first 
motion 
for 
sentence
reconsideration in the court of original conviction, the
Mobile Circuit Court. As was the case in Bulger, the judge who
ruled on Jenkins's first motion for sentence reconsideration
was not the judge who sentenced Jenkins. Although the record
is silent as to whether Judge Wood was the presiding judge of
the Mobile Circuit Court at the time he denied Jenkins's
motion for sentence reconsideration, the State does not
contest Jenkins's claims that Judge Wood was not the presiding
judge. Because § 13A-5-9.1 confers on a court continuing
jurisdiction over a motion for sentence reconsideration, to be
exercised by only the sentencing judge or the presiding judge,
Judge Wood, who was neither, did not have jurisdiction over
Jenkins's 
first 
motion 
for 
sentence 
reconsideration.
Accordingly, the judgment purporting to deny  that motion is
a void judgment.
The State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision in Bulger is flawed insofar as it holds that a ruling
on a motion for sentence reconsideration by a judge who is not
the sentencing judge or the presiding judge of the circuit is
void. The State argues that under this Court's holding in Ex
1051778
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parte Seymour, [Ms. 1050597, June 30, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. 2006), such a ruling should be treated as voidable. In
Seymour, we overruled a line of Alabama cases that recognized
an indictment as the circuit court's source of jurisdiction in
a criminal case, holding that "a defect in the indictment
could not divest the circuit court of its power to hear the
case." Seymour, ___ So. 2d at ___. Under our holding in
Seymour, a defect in a criminal indictment no longer deprives
the trial court of jurisdiction, as it had under the common
law, but instead is a nonjurisdictional error that may be
waived. The State argues that, because Jenkins failed to raise
the improper denial of his first motion for sentence
reconsideration in the  trial court or on appeal, the error is
waivable under Seymour, and the judgment denying his first
Kirby motion is not void, but voidable.
However, Seymour dealt with an area of the law rendered
jurisdictional through a series of judicial decisions based in
the common law. In the present case, jurisdiction over a
motion for sentence reconsideration is conferred by the
legislature in § 13A-5-9.1, as this Court recognized in Kirby
1051778
7
and as the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Bulger. In
Seymour, we stated:
"Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a
case or issue a decree.' Black's Law Dictionary 867
(8th ed. 2004). ... That power is derived from the
Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code. See
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002)
(subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's
'statutory or constitutional power' to adjudicate a
case)."
___ So. 2d at ___. Indeed, the Alabama Constitution states
that a circuit court "shall exercise general jurisdiction in
all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law." Amend.
No. 328, § 6.04(b), Ala. Const. 1901 (§ 142, Official
Recomp.). 
By enacting § 13A-5-9.1, the legislature conferred on the
trial court continuing jurisdiction over motions for sentence
reconsideration, to be exercised by only the sentencing judge
or the presiding judge. As the State acknowledges, "[a]
judgment is void only if the court rendering it lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process." Smith v.
Clark, 468 So. 2d 138, 141 (Ala. 1985). Because the judge who
denied Jenkins's first motion for sentence reconsideration was
neither the sentencing judge nor the presiding judge, under §
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13A-5-9.1 he was without jurisdiction to consider that motion,
and the denial of that motion resulted in a void judgment.
The State argues alternatively that even if Jenkins's
motion for reconsideration of his sentence is not precluded as
a successive motion, the trial court should have denied his
motion because Jenkins was convicted of an offense that is
defined by statute as a violent offense -- first-degree
robbery. See § 13A-11-70(2), Ala. Code 1975. The State further
asks this Court to issue an opinion holding that anyone
convicted of an offense that by statute is categorized as a
violent offense is a violent offender as a matter of law and
therefore not entitled to sentence reconsideration under §
13A-5-9.1. We need not, however, reach that issue here.
Because it held that Jenkins's second Kirby motion was barred
by the rule it announced in Wells precluding successive
motions for sentence reconsideration, the Court of Criminal
Appeals did not consider the merits of Jenkins's appeal. We
decline to address the merits of an issue upon which the Court
of Criminal Appeals has not yet ruled.
Because the judgment denying Jenkins's first motion is a
void judgment, any rule limiting him to one motion seeking
1051778
9
reconsideration of his sentence, assuming the validity of the
motion, does not apply to him.  Because such a rule is
inapplicable to Jenkins, we need not, as previously noted,
reach the question of the validity of that rule. We,
therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals and remand this case to that court for consideration
of the merits of Jenkins's appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
See, J., concurs in the result. 
Stuart, J., dissents.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1051778
10
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and
remand this case for that court to address the merits of
Jenkins's Kirby motion.  In my special writing in Ex parte
Butler, [Ms. 1051636, March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.
2007), I maintain that a presiding judge or a sentencing judge
does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sentence
reconsideration, as provided in § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975,
filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that
is statutorily defined as a violent offense.  Jenkins was
convicted of first-degree robbery, an offense that is defined
in § 12-25-32(28), Ala. Code 1975, as a violent offense;
therefore, Jenkins is not a "nonviolent convicted offender"
under 
§ 
13A-5-9.1, 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
never 
had
jurisdiction to entertain Jenkins's motion, regardless of what
judge entered the judgment purporting to rule on the motion.
That court's judgment is void, and this Court should dismiss
this appeal.