Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CS, Minor Child: LS a/k/a LA, V. JOHNSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO TS, Minor Child: LS a/k/a LA V. JOHNSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CS, Minor Child: LS a/k/a LA, V. JOHNSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO TS, Minor Child: LS a/k/a LA V. JOHNSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2006 WY 130143 P.3d 918Case Number: C-05-16Decided: 10/13/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE TERMINATION

OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CS, Minor Child:

 
 
LS a/k/a 
LA,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHNSON 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE TERMINATION

OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO TS, Minor Child:

 
 
LS a/k/a 
LA,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHNSON 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jan 
Flaharty of Sheridan, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General

 
 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

            
Tonia Hanson of Buffalo, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      LS appeals a jury 
verdict terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children contending 
it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that she had abused or 
neglected the children and that she was denied due process when an employee of 
the Johnson County Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to provide her 
with transportation to the termination hearing.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      LS puts forward 
two issues for appellate review:

 
 
A.  Whether 
it was established by clear and convincing evidence that LS abused or neglected 
her children within the meaning of "abuse" and "neglect," as those terms are 
defined by Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-3-202(a)(ii) and (vii).

 
 
B.  Whether 
LS was deprived of her due process rights to a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, guaranteed under Article 1, § 6, of the Wyoming Constitution and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, when the 
Department of Family Services refused at the last moment to transport LS to the 
termination hearing.

 
 

FACTS

[¶3]      LS is the natural 
mother of CS and TS who were born on February 13, 2003, and June 9, 2000, 
respectively.  Both children were 
born at home and neither birth certificates nor social security numbers were 
ever obtained for either of them.  
In October of 2003, LS and the children moved from Montana to Buffalo, Wyoming, where they lived in a one-room cabin 
with LS's father and his wife.  On 
December 19, 2003, DFS and law enforcement personnel went to the cabin to 
investigate after LS's father reported that LS was abusing the children.  LS's father reported that LS would place 
CS, then eight months old, in a fleece sleeping bag, tie the top closed with a 
handkerchief, and leave the child inside whenever he cried.  He also reported that LS would pinch the 
fingers of TS as a form of punishment until TS screamed; she would hold CS over 
the potty for extended periods of time in an attempt to train him at the age of 
eight months; and she did not provide adequate nutrition for the children.  In addition, there were allegations that 
LS refused to seek medical care for the children or provide the care prescribed 
and recommended by a doctor.  The 
children were taken into protective custody at that time.

 
 
[¶4]      LS agreed to 
leave the children in foster care and a case plan with the goal of reuniting the 
family was established.  LS failed 
to follow the case plans.  She did 
not maintain stable residences  moving seventeen times between January of 2004 
and March of 2005  or employment and paid no child support.  LS only made about forty percent of 
scheduled visitations with the children.  
On February 23, 2005, DFS filed a petition to terminate LS's parental 
rights alleging that LS had abused and neglected the children, reasonable 
efforts at rehabilitation and reunification had been unsuccessful, and that the 
children's health and safety would be jeopardized if custody was returned to 
LS.  It was also alleged that the 
minor children would be in foster care under the responsibility of the State of 
Wyoming in 
excess of fifteen of the previous twenty-two months.

 
 
[¶5]      Trial before a 
jury was scheduled to commence on Monday, August 15, 2005.  On Sunday, LS had contacted a DFS 
employee about receiving a ride from her home in Sheridan to the trial in Buffalo.  The employee initially agreed to provide 
the ride but she contacted LS later that same day and informed her that DFS 
could not provide transportation.  The employee cited safety concerns if the 
trial went adversely for LS as the reason.  LS was unable to arrange alternative 
transportation and she was not present during the first day of the trial.  No continuance was requested and the jury 
was informed about the reason for LS's absence.  LS appeared for the second and third days 
of trial and during her testimony, she explained the reason for her absence to 
the jury.

 
 
[¶6]      At trial, LS's 
father described LS's conduct with the children that led to his decision to 
contact DFS.  There was testimony 
from a mental health professional that LS suffered from a narcissistic 
personality disorder that prevented her from focusing on the needs of the child 
emotionally or developmentally and that the children's health and safety would 
be at risk if they were returned to her.  
Testimony from several counselors and social workers who observed LS 
interact with the children during rehabilitation efforts agreed with that 
conclusion after observing emotional abuse and other inappropriate behavior by 
LS.  In her testimony, LS did not 
generally deny any of the conduct attributed to her but defended it as 
appropriate parenting behavior and asserted her competence to raise the children 
and disputed the characterizations that the health and safety of the children 
would be jeopardized if she retained custody.  After hearing the witnesses and evidence 
of both parties, the jury returned a verdict finding that LS's parental rights 
to both children should be terminated pursuant to the provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v) (LexisNexis 2005).1  A Judgment and Decree terminating LS's 
parental rights to CS and TS was entered on October 3, 2005.  LS appeals.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When we review 
the granting of a petition to terminate parental rights, our review is pursuant 
to the following standards:

 
 
Due to 
the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, application of 
statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter for strict scrutiny. 
 TR v. WashakieCounty Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. 
Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 1987).  As part of this strict scrutiny standard, 
a case for termination of parental rights must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a) (Michie 1997); In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 773 
(Wyo. 1987); 
D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & 
Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980).  Clear and convincing evidence is that 
kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 
(Wyo. 1984). 
 Rigorous though this standard may 
be, we apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 
(Wyo. 1996). 
 Thus, we examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable 
evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  Id.; D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. 
Servs., 607 P.2d at 919-20; In 
Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 773. In 
Re ZKP, 979 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1999); see also In Re IH, 2001 WY 100, ¶ 14, 33 P.3d 172, ¶ 14 (Wyo. 2001); Matter 
of TLC, 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

In re 
K.L.S., 2004 
WY 87, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d 1025, 1027-28 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting SD v. Carbon County Department of Family 
Services (In re SED), 2002 WY 
168, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1235, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶8]      LS also claims a 
denial of due process under Wyoming Constitution Article 1, § 6 and the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.

 
 

Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6, provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law."  The similar provision found in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  "Notice 
and the opportunity to be heard are touch stones of this due process of law." 
 Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 
942 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1997).  The notice and hearing opportunity must 
be "appropriate to the nature of the case," and the opportunity to be heard must 
be " at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Moore v. Board of Educ. of Fulton Public School No. 58, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 
(Mo. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 916, 113 S. Ct. 1270, 122 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1993)).  The 
party claiming an infringement of his right to due process has the burden of 
demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such interest has 
been affected in an impermissible way. Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1989).  The question is whether there has been a 
denial of fundamental fairness. Id.

 
 

In re 
"H" Children, 2003 
WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      LS contends that 
there was no clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support termination of 
her parental rights as her conduct did not constitute "abuse" or "neglect" as 
those terms are statutorily defined.  LS insists that she is simply being 
punished for her "unorthodox" parenting beliefs.

 
 
[¶10]   After reviewing the entire record 
and taking due consideration of the appropriate statutes, we conclude that the 
jury's determination is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii), three 
elements have to be shown by clear and convincing evidence before a parent's 
rights can be terminated: (1) the child has been abused or neglected by the 
parent; (2) reasonable efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family 
has refused rehabilitative treatment; and (3) the child's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent. LS 
does not contest that the latter two elements were established; she only 
challenges whether or not there was abuse or neglect.2 

 
 
[¶11]   By reference in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-308(a)(i) and (a)(vi), the terms "abuse" and "neglect" are statutorily 
defined as:

 
 
"Abuse" 
means inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger 
to the physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental 
means, including abandonment, unless the abandonment is a relinquishment 
substantially in accordance with W.S. 14-11-101 through 14-11-109, excessive or 
unreasonable corporate punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by 
reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing 
the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by 
law:

 
 
(A)  "Mental 
injury" means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of 
a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability 
to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to 
his culture;

 
 
(B)  "Physical 
injury" means any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, 
impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if greater in magnitude than minor 
bruising associated with reasonable corporal punishment, bleeding, burns, 
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial 
malnutrition;

 
 
(C)  "Substantial 
risk" means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;

 
 
(D)  "Imminent 
danger" includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or 
status which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or 
physical or mental injury.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).

"Neglect" 
means a failure or refusal by those responsible for the child's welfare to 
provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical 
or any other care necessary for the child's well being. Treatment given in good 
faith by spiritual means alone, through prayer, by a duly accredited 
practitioner in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church 
or religious denomination is not child neglect for that reason 
alone[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶12]   LS's father testified that when CS 
was crying, LS would put the eight month old in a fleece sleep sack and then tie 
the opening shut with a handkerchief to prevent the child from getting out and 
would leave him inside for extended periods of time.  When her father removed CS from the bag 
on one occasion, he observed that the child was hot and sweaty.  He described how LS would punish TS by 
pinching his fingers until the child screamed in pain. 

 
 
[¶13]   The jury could reasonably conclude 
that placing an eight month old baby in a fleece bag and tying it shut placed 
the child in imminent risk of physical injury, and that pinching a child's 
fingers until he screamed in pain constituted a physical injury resulting from 
excessive or unreasonable corporate punishment.  We cannot agree with LS's contention 
that, as a matter of law, this conduct was not "abuse" as those terms are 
defined by our statute. 

 
 
[¶14]   There was also evidence of neglect. 
 There was evidence of inappropriate 
or inadequate nutrition:  LS forced 
three-year-old TS to eat adult sized portions, while she underfed CS.  There was evidence of inadequate medical 
care:  LS's father testified that LS 
refused to seek medical care for TS despite his vomiting and high fever.  After her father took the child to the 
emergency room, LS would not provide the care prescribed by the doctor.  LS refused to obtain social security 
numbers for the children preventing them from getting public assistance for 
medical care.  After the children 
were placed in foster care, the State had to obtain court orders to allow 
medical treatment for the children because of LS's refusal to approve the 
medical treatment.  LS attempts to 
frame the issue of medical care as one of concern about the side effects of 
immunizations and the consequences of over-prescribing antibiotics.  While those may be legitimate concerns, 
they do not explain LS's refusal to seek or allow medical care in the first 
instance or her refusal to follow prescribed care that did not involve 
immunization shots or taking antibiotics. 

 
 
[¶15]   Furthermore, failure to comply with 
a case plan can constitute evidence of neglect and support termination of 
parental rights.  In re K.L.S., ¶ 24, 94 P.3d  at 
1031-32 (see also In re Termination of 
Parental Rights to IH, EBH v. Hot Springs Department of Family Services, 
2001 WY 100, 33 P.3d 172 (Wyo. 2001); and In the Interest of DG, WR v. Natrona County 
Department of Family Services, 916 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1996)).  LS did not comply with her case plans: 
she did not maintain stable residences or employment, she paid no child support, 
and she made less than half of the scheduled visitations with the 
children.

 
 
[¶16]   The flaw in LS's view of the 
evidence is that her argument perceives each instance of abuse or neglect as an 
independent incident.

 
 
[I]n the 
termination of parental rights, we must consider all of the factors, incidents 
and conditions that demonstrate neglect. [MS v. Kuchera, 682 P.2d 982, 988 
(Wyo. 1984)]. 
 Rarely do we find a single 
condition or incident standing alone justifies termination.  Instead, neglect is usually manifested by 
numerous incidents and conditions extending over a considerable length of time. 
Id.

 
 

In re 
K.L.S., 
¶ 16, 94 P.3d  at 1029.  Considering the evidence in the record in 
its entirety, there is clear and convincing proof sufficient to support the 
jury's findings of abuse and neglect.

 
 
[¶17]   In her second issue, LS contends 
that she was deprived of due process when DFS refused to transport her to the 
trial as they had initially promised.  LS contends that she was unable to obtain 
alternative transportation in time and consequently missed the first day of 
trial.  LS argues that DFS had 
provided her with transportation in the past and so she reasonably relied upon 
their representation that they would do so for the trial, and she claims 
prejudice because it led the jury to question her commitment to her 
children.

 
 
[¶18]   There was testimony that DFS would 
provide transportation in certain circumstances during attempts to reunify a 
family and that they did so for LS on occasion during that process.  However, LS does not cite any authority 
that required DFS to provide her with transportation once the proceedings had 
progressed to the termination phase.  Even assuming that DFS incurred some sort 
of obligation to LS, prejudice cannot be established under the facts of this 
case.  LS did not request a 
continuance of the trial.  The court 
explained the reason for LS's absence to the jury and LS herself related it to 
the jury when she testified later in the trial.  Furthermore, the jury verdict was 
supported by sufficient evidence.  An error warrants reversal of a judgment 
only when it is prejudicial and affects a substantial right.  Smyth v. Kaufman, 2003 WY 52, ¶ 29, 
67 P.3d 1161, 1169-70 (Wyo. 2003).  To the extent any error occurred, it was 
harmless under the circumstances of this case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The jury verdict terminating LS's 
parental rights to CS and TS is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 14-2-309. Grounds for 
termination of parent-child relationship; clear and convincing 
evidence.

            
(a)  The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if 
any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and 
convincing evidence:

            
. . . .

(iii)  The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and 
reasonable efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have 
been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused 
rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent. 

. . . 
.

(v)  The child has been in foster care under the responsibility 
of the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent 
twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody 
and control of the child[.]

 
 

2The jury 
also found that LS's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) which has two elements: (1) the child has been in foster 
care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen of the most 
recent twenty-two months; and (2) the parent is unfit to have custody and 
control of the child.  In a single 
paragraph in her brief at the end of her argument on the issue of sufficient 
evidence, LS briefly argues that there was no justification for the initial 
removal of the children from her custody because the conduct complained of did 
not constitute abuse or neglect.  LS 
concludes that since there was no justification for removal, the time the 
children spent in State foster care should not have counted for purposes of 
termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v).  LS cites no authority for this 
proposition.  The record suggests 
that LS in fact consented to the children's placement in foster care. Moreover, 
LS did not file any appeal from the dispositional hearing in the juvenile court 
that found that the children had been abused and neglected.  LS may not challenge the validity of 
that order in this termination proceeding.  In 
re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 30, 120 P.3d 992, 1003 (Wyo. 2005). 
 Given LS's failure to provide any 
cogent argument, we could summarily affirm the termination of LS's parental 
rights based on the jury's findings under § 14-2-309(a)(v).  Nevertheless, given the importance of the 
rights at issue, we will address the substance of LS's argument that her conduct 
did not constitute abuse or neglect.