Title: Vickers v. Idaho Bd of Veterinary Medicine

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47270 
 
KIRBY VICKERS, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO 
BOARD 
OF 
VETERINARY 
MEDICINE; JODY ROCKETT, DVM, in her 
official capacity as Board Member of Idaho Board 
0f 
Veterinary 
Medicine; 
B. 
MATTHEW 
DREDGE, DVM, in his official capacity as Board 
Member of Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine; 
JEFF HEINS, DVM, in his official capacity as 
Board Member of Idaho Board of Veterinary 
Medicine; WILLIAM J. MAUPIN, DVM, in his 
official capacity as Board Member of Idaho Board 
of Veterinary Medicine; ROBERT N. PIERCE, 
DVM, in his official capacity as Board Member of 
Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine; KATHY 
SIMPSON, in her official capacity as Board 
Member of Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents. 
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Boise, June 2020 Term 
 
Opinion filed: August 7, 2020 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Nancy Baskin, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Arkoosh Law Offices, Boise, for Appellant.  Charles Arkoosh argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondents.  Cynthia 
Yee Wallace argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice 
 
Kirby Vickers filed a grievance letter with Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine (the 
Board”) against a veterinarian requesting that they take various disciplinary actions. After an 
investigation, the Board declined to take any action against the veterinarian. Vickers then filed 
 
 
 
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suit in district court, seeking to compel the Board to hold a hearing. The district court dismissed 
his suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Vickers argues that his letter to the 
Board initiated a contested action for which he is entitled to judicial review. For the following 
reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 29, 2018, Kirby Vickers contacted Canyon Veterinary Clinic (“the Clinic”) at 
5:30 PM because his kitten was gravely ill. This kitten had previously been treated at the Clinic 
by Dr. Kelly Collins. An employee at the Clinic told Vickers that it could not provide immediate 
care for the kitten and recommended that he take it to West Vet, a local veterinary hospital that 
provides emergency care after normal business hours. Angered by the Clinic’s response, Vickers 
declined and informed the Clinic he was going to file a complaint with the Idaho Board of 
Veterinary Medicine. The next day, Dr. Collins called Vickers to inform him that she was 
terminating their professional relationship and cancelling his upcoming appointment. According 
to Vickers, Dr. Collins said this was done “in retribution for threatening to file a complaint with 
the Vet Board.”  
These events were laid out in a letter Vickers mailed to the Board on March 5, 2018. 
Vickers’s letter also claimed that Dr. Collins had been negligent in caring for another one of his 
cats in December of 2017, and alleged Dr. Collins and West Vet had colluded to violate ethical 
standards for veterinary medicine. He then asked the Board to suspend Dr. Collins’s veterinary 
license for two months and require her to take a veterinary ethics course as a condition for 
reinstatement.  
The Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine is a state board with its procedures and 
disciplinary proceedings governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), Idaho 
Code section 67-5201 et seq. See e.g. I.C. § 54-2105(8)(c) and (g). The Board has the 
responsibility for enforcing the state’s veterinary laws, which includes the power to initiate 
complaints and conduct investigations relating to the practice of veterinary medicine.  I.C. §§ 54-
2105(8), 54-2105(8)(f). After receiving Vickers’s letter, the Board notified him that it had 
received his complaint against Dr. Collins and would begin a review “of the case against the 
content of the Idaho Veterinary Practice Act.” On August 24, 2018, the Board’s liaison officer 
wrote to Vickers to inform him that the case was closed. Notably, while the Board stated that it 
 
 
 
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conducted an investigation, the appellate record does not contain any records of an investigation 
beyond these two letters mailed to Vickers.  
Vickers filed a complaint in the district court on September 20, 2018, requesting a writ or 
order requiring the Board conduct a hearing on the matter. In response, the Board filed a motion 
to dismiss the case under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Following a hearing, the 
district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that dismissal was 
proper because (1) there was no order from a contested case that permitted judicial review under 
the APA and (2) Vickers was not an aggrieved person for the purposes of Idaho Code sections 
67-5270(2) and 54-2116. Accordingly, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the dispute because Vickers “lacks standing to bring a complaint for judicial review forcing 
the Board to initiate a contested case and hold a hearing where [he] would be allowed to testify.” 
Vickers timely appealed.  
II. 
  STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The district court dismissed Vickers’s complaint pursuant to a justiciability challenge 
brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We have noted that “there is a distinction” 
between a 12(b)(1) challenge that is facial in nature, as opposed to a factual challenge: “[f]acial 
challenges provide the non-movant the same protections as under a 12(b)(6) motion. Factual 
challenges, on the other hand, allow the court to go outside the pleadings without converting the 
motion into one for summary judgment.” Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm’n, 141 Idaho 129, 133 
n.1, 106 P.3d 455, 459 n.1 (2005) (citations omitted).  
Because the Board presented a facial challenge to Vickers’s standing, we apply the same 
standard of review as we would to a motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6):  
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), [it] appl[ies] the same standard of review we apply to a motion for 
summary judgment. After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in 
favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has 
been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. 
Joki v. State, 162 Idaho 5, 394 P.3d 48, 51 (2017) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 
672–73, 183 P.3d 758, 760–61 (2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). We review an 
appeal from an order on a motion for summary judgment de novo, which is the same standard 
utilized by a trial court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Id. Thus, we freely 
review this facial challenge to justiciability. See id.  
 
 
 
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III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Vickers lacked standing to pursue judicial review under Idaho’s Administrative 
Procedure Act.  
Vickers contends that he initiated a contested case under the APA, which requires the 
Board to conduct a hearing. The district court determined that Vickers lacked standing because 
(1) there was no contested case and (2) he was not an aggrieved person for the purposes of the 
APA. We agree. 
We begin by noting that “[a]ctions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review 
unless expressly authorized by statute.” Laughy v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 149 Idaho 867, 870, 
243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1)). Without statutory authority, the reviewing 
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Under the APA, a party can seek judicial review in 
two circumstances: either (1) where there is “a party aggrieved by a final order in a contested 
case decided by an agency other than the industrial commission or the public utilities 
commission,” or (2) where there is a “a person aggrieved by final agency action other than an 
order in a contested case.” I.C. § 67-5270(2)–(3). Notably, there must be a contested case and an 
aggrieved party in either circumstance. Id.  
1. A private citizen cannot initiate a “contested case” with a grievance letter.   
As noted, Idaho Code section 67-5270(2)–(3) expressly limits judicial review to a 
“contested case.” We previously held in Vickers v. Lowe, a case in which Vickers was also the 
appellant, “[t]he Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA) governs contested cases before 
state agencies, …” 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011). Further, the APA defines a 
“contested case” as “[a] proceeding by an agency, other than the public utilities commission or 
the industrial commission, that may result in the issuance of an order.” I.C. § 67-5240 (emphasis 
added). Logically, this can only mean that the proceeding must be brought by an “agency.” See 
Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 139 Idaho 107, 111, 73 P.3d 721, 725 (2003) (“To 
be a contested case, the proceeding must be by an ‘agency’. . .”). The APA defines agency as 
follows: 
“Agency” means each state board, commission, department or officer authorized 
by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does not include the 
legislative or judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of 
the constitution of the state of Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and 
exclusively from the constitution, the state militia or the state board of correction. 
 
 
 
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I.C. § 67-5201(2). As noted, the Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine, is a state board with its 
procedures and disciplinary proceedings governed by the APA. See e.g. I.C. § 54-2105(8)(c) and 
(g).  
The APA also expressly provides that the decision to initiate a case is discretionary: “an 
agency or a presiding officer may decline to initiate a contested case.” I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a). This 
provision “recognizes that some agencies have a prosecutorial function and, when exercising that 
function, have discretion to decline to prosecute.” Laughy, 149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061. In 
Laughy, this Court explained the role of agency discretion in that process:  
Agencies can have both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. As IDAPA 
04.11.01.420 states, “[w]hen statute assigns to an agency both (1) the authority to 
initiate complaints or to investigate complaints made by the public, and (2) the 
authority to decide the merits of complaints, the agency is required to perform two 
distinct functions: prosecutorial/investigative and adjudicatory.” The prosecutorial 
function includes deciding whether or not to issue a complaint. As IDAPA 
04.11.01.420.01 states, “[t]he prosecutorial function includes presentation of 
allegations or evidence to the agency head for determination whether a complaint 
will be issued....” A “complaint” charges a person with a violation of the law. “All 
pleadings charging other person(s) with acts or omissions under law administered 
by the agency are called ‘complaints.’ ” IDAPA 04.11.01.240.01. The filing of a 
complaint initiates a contested case. See IDAPA 04.11.01.210 (“Pleadings in 
contested cases are called applications or claims or appeals, petitions, complaints, 
protests, motions, answers, and consent agreements.”). Idaho Code § 67–
5241(1)(a) simply provides that an agency has discretion to decline to 
prosecute—to decline to initiate a contested case. 
149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061. The agency’s discretion also extends to settling matters 
informally, such as through negotiation, stipulation, settlement, or a consent order. I.C. § 67-
5241(1)(c) (“Informal settlement of matters is to be encouraged.”). Where “an agency or a 
presiding officer declines to initiate or decide a contested case . . . the agency or the officer shall 
furnish a brief statement of the reasons for the decision to all persons involved.” I.C. § 67-
5241(3).  
Idaho law vests only the Board with the responsibility for enforcing the state’s veterinary 
laws. I.C. § 54-2105(8) (“The responsibility for enforcement of the provisions of this chapter is 
hereby vested in the board.”). The Board has the power and authority on “its own motion or upon 
any complaint, to initiate and conduct investigations on all matters relating to the practice of 
veterinary medicine.” I.C. § 54-2105(8)(f). In addition, the Board can “[i]nitiate and conduct 
disciplinary hearings or proceedings on its own or through its designated hearing officer.” I.C. § 
 
 
 
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54-2105(8)(g). Thus, concomitant with the Board’s discretionary authority to initiate a contested 
case, is its reciprocal authority to “decline to initiate a contested case.” I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a).  
Vickers points to the language in Laughy—“[t]he filing of a complaint initiates a 
contested case”—to argue that any public citizen can file a complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (“IDAPA”) 04.11.01.240.02 and begin a 
contested case. However, both the APA and the corresponding IDAPA rules, as laid out above in 
Laughy, address only agency actions. See Laughy, 149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061; Westway, 
139 Idaho at 111, 73 P.3d at 725. See also Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 
669 (2011) (“[The APA] governs contested cases before state agencies.”). IDAPA Rules 420 
through 429, on the other hand, “set forth procedures to be followed by the agency head, agency 
attorneys, agency staff and hearing officers in processing these complaints or responding to 
citizen inquiries.” IDAPA 04.11.01.420. Thus, Vickers cannot apply these rules to his grievance 
letter, even if it was referred to as a “complaint” in correspondence from the Board, because it is 
not an agency action under the APA or IDAPA. 
We do not read Laughy and Westway as broadly as Vickers. Neither case extended the 
meaning of “complaint” to permit citizens to initiate contested cases under the APA. As 
previously noted, the APA itself expressly defines a contested case as a “proceeding by an 
agency.” I.C. § 67-5240 (emphasis added). In addition, this Court has held that a contested case 
“must” begin with an agency proceeding. Westway, 139 Idaho at 111, 73 P.3d at 725. Vickers is 
not an agency, nor is he an official representative of one. The circumstances here simply show 
that Vickers filed a grievance letter with the Board, which included his recommendation to 
temporarily suspend Dr. Collins’s license. The Board’s liaison officer then investigated the 
claim, and concluded that no statutory rule or ethical violations had occurred. She then closed the 
case and notified Vickers pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5241(3). Thus, while Vickers’s 
letter has been continually referred to as a “complaint” in this case, it is more properly 
categorized as a grievance letter and recommendation for the Board to take action against Dr. 
Collins. Although the filing of a complaint still initiates a contested case, an agency’s complaint 
remains distinguished from a public inquiry or recommendation. See I.C. § 67-5240; IDAPA 
04.11.01.421. This difference was expressly recognized by the Court in Laughy, despite the 
frequent use of the word “complaint” in the opinion to describe both the agency’s proceedings 
and a public individual’s filing. 
 
 
 
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As IDAPA 04.11.01.420 states, “[w]hen [a] statute assigns to an agency both (1) 
the authority to initiate complaints or to investigate complaints made by the 
public, and (2) the authority to decide the merits of complaints, the agency is 
required to perform two distinct functions: prosecutorial/investigative and 
adjudicatory.” The prosecutorial function includes deciding whether or not to 
issue a complaint.  
149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061 (emphasis added). 
Although we share some of the concerns Vickers has raised regarding the lack of 
oversight and accountability provided in these statutes, we cannot agree with Vickers’s premise 
that the APA permits any private citizen to direct who shall be prosecuted and investigated by 
the governmental boards and agencies of this state. Here, the Board’s prosecutorial functions are 
clearly discretionary and disputes are meant to be resolved informally where possible. I.C. § 67-
5241(1)(c). While a professional disciplinary action can begin with a private citizen’s report, the 
ultimate prosecutorial discretion to commence a “contested case” is vested with the respective 
agency. See e.g. In re Bd. of Psychologist Examiners’ Final Order Case No. PSY-P4B-01-010-
002 ex rel. Wright, 148 Idaho 542, 544, 224 P.3d 1131, 1133 (2010).  
2. While Vickers may be personally “aggrieved,” he is not an “aggrieved party” under the 
statute.  
Vickers next contends he is an aggrieved party because the Board’s letter “adjudicated all 
of [Vickers’s] interests,” while the Board argues that Vickers has failed to articulate a palpable 
injury. Essentially, Vickers contends that he is “forever aggrieved” without a fair decision-
making process, i.e. that he has a right to a hearing as the party who initiated the case—not for 
himself to be heard, but to see Dr. Collins prosecuted per his recommendation. In his reply brief, 
Vickers expands on this, arguing that he “has the personal right to protection by the power of the 
state to promote the public health, safety and welfare by safeguarding himself and his cats by 
enforcing the professional standards and regulating veterinary health professionals.” While we 
understand Vickers’s desire for personal vindication, we disagree with his legal analysis.  
Judicial review under Idaho Code section 67-5270 requires the person or party bringing 
the petition to be “aggrieved by” either the final agency action or final order. This Court has 
previously explained that “a person is aggrieved by an order when the order affects his or her 
present personal, pecuniary, or property interest.” Ashton Urban Renewal Agency v. Ashton 
Mem’l, Inc., 155 Idaho 309, 311, 311 P.3d 730, 732 (2013). The effect on those interests, 
however, “must be more than a possible or remote consequence of the order.” Id. Put in another 
 
 
 
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way, we ask, “Would the party have had the thing if the erroneous judgment had not been 
entered? If the answer be yea, he is a party aggrieved.” Id. (quoting State v. Eves, 6 Idaho 144, 
53 P. 543, 544 (1898)).  
 
Vickers has not articulated an actual personal, pecuniary, or property interest in this case. 
Although he may contend that the loss of a kitten concerns a “property right,” the Board’s refusal 
to initiate a contested case against Dr. Collins was not the cause of that loss, nor could it provide 
a remedy for that loss. The statutory “right” Vickers cites is the Legislature’s policy declaration 
for veterinary law “to promote the public health, safety and welfare by safeguarding the people 
and animals of this state.” I.C. § 54-2101. Nothing in this statute grants Vickers a private right to 
initiate a contested case under the APA, nor does it guarantee him specific due process rights 
when writing a grievance letter to the Board. As summarized by the district court:  
Plaintiff is not an aggrieved party, for a number of reasons, and judicial review is 
not available. In the Letter, Plaintiff makes no demand for reimbursement or other 
monetary relief; he does not describe how the suspension of Dr. Collins is a 
“thing” as described in Eves that was erroneously taken away; and he does not 
describe any rights, privileges, or duties which were affected by the Board’s 
decision not to initiate a contested case. Neither has he shown how he has a 
statutory right to initiate a complaint on behalf of the Board against Dr. Collins. 
Indeed, on appeal Vickers still has not demonstrated an actual injury; rather, he seems to be 
primarily aggrieved because of his inability to force the Board to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against Dr. Collins and hold a hearing.  
In sum, Vickers neither initiated a contested case under the APA nor is he an aggrieved 
party under the APA. Therefore, the two fundamental requirements for judicial review under the 
APA have not been met. I.C. § 67-5270(2)–(3). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order 
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because of our decision on these issues, we 
need not address whether a final order or agency action occurred, nor need we address the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
B. Attorney Fees  
Both parties request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117, which states that the 
court “shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees . . . if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” Likewise, the Board also 
requests attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, which permits an award where “the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” While the 
 
 
 
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Board is the prevailing party, the question of whether a private citizen’s letter of complaint to a 
state board constitutes a contested case has not been squarely presented to us in this context. 
Because the statute was not clear with its use of the term “complaint,” and the term has been 
inadequately defined and misused in describing different documents and procedures in the past, 
we will not award attorney fees to the Board.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s order to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Costs are awarded to the Board.  
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER CONCUR.