Title: The People v. Jose Fernandez; The People v. Ernest Brannon

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 77  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Ernest Brannon,
            Appellant.
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No. 78  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Jose Fernandez,
            Appellant.
Case No. 77:
Karen M. Kalikow, for appellant.
David P. Stromes, for respondent.
Case No. 78:
Barbara Zolot, for appellant.
David P. Stromes, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
In these appeals, we are asked to decide the level of
knowledge a police officer must possess before, consistent with
the principles articulated in People v DeBour (40 NY2d 210
[1976]), he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe an
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No. 77&78
individual possesses a gravity knife, as opposed to other similar
knives such as a pocketknife, and therefore is authorized to
conduct a stop and frisk.  The Penal Law identifies gravity
knives1 as per se weapons and criminalizes the mere possession of
one (see Penal Law § 265.01 [1]).  We hold that the detaining
officer must have reason to believe that the object observed is
indeed a gravity knife, based on his or her experience and
training and/or observable, identifiable characteristics of the
knife.  An individual may not be detained merely because he or
she is seen in possession of an object that appears to be a
similar, but legal object, such as a pocketknife.
People v Ernest Brannon
On September 8, 2006, defendant was walking with a
friend along West 122nd Street in Manhattan at approximately 6:00
p.m.  Officer Kevin Blake and another officer, both in plain
clothes, were on the same side of the street and dealing with
children who were trying to manipulate the lock on a school yard
gate.  Blake testified that he observed the men and, in
particular, noticed that defendant's behavior became "somewhat
suspicious", evincing a desire to avoid walking near the
officers.  As defendant passed, Blake observed the hinged top of
1A gravity knife is defined as a knife with a blade that (1)
"is released from the handle or sheath thereof by the force of
gravity or the application of centrifugal force" and that (2)
"when released, is locked in place by means of a button, spring,
lever or other device" (Penal Law § 265.00 [5]; see People v
Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 104 [2010]).
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No. 77&78
a knife in defendant's back pocket.  He asked the men to stop
twice before defendant complied.  When defendant approached
Blake, he saw the outline of a knife through the material of
defendant's pocket.  Upon questioning, defendant admitted that he
had a knife in his pocket.  Blake then frisked defendant and
recovered the knife.  Blake testified that upon inspection, he
found that it was a gravity knife and arrested defendant.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the knife and
a statement he made to the officer at the time of his arrest.  At
the suppression hearing, Blake testified that he had been an
officer for four and a half years and had made approximately ten
arrests of his own for possession of a gravity knife and
participated in two dozen other arrests for the same crime.  He
had observed in defendant's pocket what he believed to be a
knife.  On further questioning, he described it as a "typical
pocketknife".
Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress, finding
that, under the circumstances, the stop and search was proper. 
Defendant pleaded guilty and then appealed his conviction,
arguing that the gravity knife and his statement should have been
suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure.  The
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that "the combination of
defendant's suspiciously evasive conduct, the officer's
observation that defendant was carrying what was at the least a
large and possibly dangerous knife, and defendant's
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No. 77&78
acknowledgment, in response to a proper common-law inquiry, that
he had a knife, permitted the officer to conduct a
self-protective frisk" (60 AD3d 498, 499 [1st Dept 2009]).
People v Jose Fernandez
On February 24, 2007, while walking on Ludlow Street in
Manhattan at approximately 12:30 a.m., defendant was stopped by
Officer Daniel Hoffman, who observed defendant walking on the
sidewalk with a knife clipped to his front right pants pocket,
the top or "head" of the knife protruding in plain view.  Before
any questioning, Hoffman approached defendant, retrieved the
knife from defendant's front pocket and asked defendant if he had
any other weapons.  Defendant stated that he had another knife in
his left jacket pocket.  When questioned why he was carrying the
knife, defendant answered it was for his protection.  After
retrieving both knives, Hoffman opened them, confirming they were
gravity knives. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree.  He thereafter moved
to suppress the two knives recovered from him and statements he
made to the police officer.
A suppression hearing was held at which Hoffman
testified that he had been a police officer for four years and
had made approximately 300 arrests involving gravity knives.  In
his career, he had examined around 200 gravity knives and
described the difference between a gravity knife and other types
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No. 77&78
of knives.  He explained that gravity knives are often carried in
such a way as to make them readily accessible.  Hoffman testified
that when he first saw the knife he believed it was a gravity
knife because, based on his experience, this type of knife was
typically carried with a clip on the outside of the pocket, and
with the “head" of the knife “usually sticking up outside of the
pocket."
Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress, finding
that the officer had probable cause to recover the knife that he
observed clipped to defendant's pocket.  The court noted that the
officer had concluded that the weapon was a gravity knife based
on his experience, coupled with his observation of the clip and
the "head" of the knife in plain view.  The court also found that
the officer lawfully reached into defendant's pocket to recover
the second knife, once defendant stated that he had a second
knife in his jacket pocket.  The Appellate Division affirmed (60
AD3d 549 [1st Dept 2009]). 
A Judge of this Court granted both defendants leave to
appeal.  We now reverse in Brannon and affirm in Fernandez.
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
These cases are governed by our holding in People v
DeBour (40 NY2d 210 [1976]), requiring that before a police
officer may stop and frisk a person in a public place, he must
have "reasonable suspicion" that such person is committing, has
committed or is about to commit a crime (id. at 223).  We have
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No. 77&78
defined reasonable suspicion as "the quantum of knowledge to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the
circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand" (People v
Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1957]).  It may not rest on
"equivocal or innocuous behavior" that is susceptible of an
innocent as well as a culpable interpretation (People v
Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 252 [1981]).  A stop based on
reasonable suspicion will be upheld so long as the intruding
officer can point to "specific and articulable facts which, along
with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion"
(Cantor, 36 NY2d at 113).  
Here, in each appeal, we are dealing with a statute
that criminalizes the mere possession, and not use, of a gravity
knife.  At the same time, the possession of many similar objects,
including other knives, is not illegal.  Defendants argue that
the police officers in each case did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe that the defendant was carrying a gravity
knife.  Typically, one cannot tell if a knife is a gravity knife
until the knife is opened.  Reasonable suspicion, however, does
not require absolute certainty that the knife the individual is
carrying is a gravity knife.  Rather, the issue is whether, under
the circumstances, the officer possessed specific and articulable
facts from which he or she inferred that the defendant was
carrying a gravity knife.
In Brannon, although Blake testified that he was able
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No. 77&78
to see a hinged top of a closed knife and observed the outline of
a pocketknife in defendant's pocket, he was unable to testify
that he suspected or believed it to be a gravity knife.  To the
contrary, he testified that it looked like a pocketknife.  The
officer's testimony therefore does not, as a matter of law,
support the conclusion that he had a reasonable suspicion that
the knife in defendant's pocket was unlawful.
On the other hand, in Fernandez, there is record
support for the Appellate Division's conclusion that reasonable
suspicion existed.  The officer's attention was drawn to
defendant, who was only ten to fifteen feet away, because the
officer saw, in plain view, the "head" of a knife that was
sticking out of and clipped to defendant's pants pocket.  He
testified, based on his experience that gravity knives are
commonly carried in a person's pocket, attached with a clip, with
the "head" protruding. 
We have reviewed defendants' remaining contentions and
find them without merit.  
Accordingly, in People v Brannon, the order of the
Appellate Division should be reversed, defendant's motion to
suppress granted and the indictment dismissed.  In People v
Fernandez, the order of the Appellate Division should be
affirmed. 
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People v Brannon (Ernest)
People v Fernandez (Jose)
Nos. 77 & 78
  
JONES, J. (concurring in People v Brannon and dissenting in
People v Fernandez):
Because a gravity knife can be indistinguishable from a
lawful knife in appearance, and its illegality can only be
ascertained by its operation, I would hold that a stop and frisk
based on the mere observance of a portion of a knife and the
experience of the arresting police officer is not supported by
sufficient reasonable suspicion.  Therefore, I concur with the
majority's result in People v Brannon, but respectfully dissent
in People v Fernandez, for the reasons below.
Penal Law § 265.00 (5) defines a gravity knife as:
"any knife which has a blade which is
released from the handle or sheath thereof by
the force of gravity or the application of
centrifugal force which, when released, is
locked in place by means of a button, spring,
lever, or other device."
By its very definition, a gravity knife cannot be
identified until it is operated because there is no inherently
distinguishing mark or physical trait that would allow for the
plain identification of a gravity knife.  The only manner in
which the possession of a gravity knife can be confirmed is when
the knife is activated through "the force of gravity" or
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No. 77 & 78
"centrifugal force."  Therefore, until a gravity knife is
operated, it can be easily mistaken for a pocketknife or folding
knife (neither of which is unlawful to carry).
In Brannon, on September 8, 2006, while dispersing some
young children from a schoolyard, Officer Blake testified that
his suspicions were alerted when defendant "furtively mov[ed]"
towards the curb to cross the street, an action he interpreted as
an attempt to avoid the police (even though defendant never
crossed the street).  When he further observed defendant, the
officer stated that he noticed a "half to a quarter of an inch"
of "the back portion of the knife where the joint is.  Where the
blade extends from the handle," and concluded that defendant was
carrying a "typical pocket knife."  Based on these observations,
Officer Blake forcibly stopped defendant when, without inquiry,
he ordered him to place his hands against a fence.  The
pocketknife was tested and found to be a gravity knife.
In the accompanying case of Fernandez, while on patrol
in a police vehicle on February 24, 2007, at 12:26 a.m., from ten
to fifteen feet away, Officer Hoffman observed defendant with a
knife clipped in his front right pants pocket.  Specifically,
Officer Hoffman testified that he had seen "the clip, observed
the top head of the knife and shiny metal," leading him to
believe that defendant was carrying a gravity knife.  The weapon
was confirmed to be a gravity knife when the officer recovered it
and "flick[ed] the knife open."  
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No. 77 & 78
The majority distinguishes these two cases on the fact
that the officer in Brannon testified that he observed a
pocketknife while the officer in Fernandez testified to a belief
that he had seen a gravity knife, and had training and experience
based on 600 to 700 arrests, with approximately half of those
arrests involving gravity knives.  However, this minimal
distinction is of no moment where both stops were premised on
insufficient reasonable suspicion due to the lack of inherent
criminality in the mere physical appearance of a gravity knife. 
In People v DeBour (40 NY2d 210 [1976]), we outlined
various levels of police interaction with the public and the
accompanying standards required to justify such intrusion.  To
perform a lawful, level-three stop and frisk, a police officer
must have "a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or
misdemeanor" (id. at 223).  While I acknowledge that reasonable
suspicion does not require absolute certainty of a crime, it is
equally true that "innocuous behavior" or conduct capable of
innocent interpretation cannot serve as a basis for reasonable
suspicion (see id. at 216).  Thus, since a gravity knife can bear
an unremarkable superficial similarity to other lawful knives and
its illegality cannot be confirmed until its operation, the mere
possession of a gravity knife is conduct susceptible to innocent
interpretation.  
The absence of an identifying physical trait makes it
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No. 77 & 78
equally likely that an individual possesses a lawful knife as he
or she may possess an unlawful one, and there is nothing within
the respective records of these cases to indicate that the
physical characteristics the officers observed were unique to,
and shared by, gravity knives.  That the officers viewed a clip,
a metal portion, and a handle joint of a knife protruding from
defendants' pockets is not so uncommon and innately criminal as
to differentiate it from the lawful possession of a knife in
one's own pants pocket.  In fact, in Fernandez, the only
testimony demonstrating any distinction between an illegal
gravity knife and a lawful one is the difference in operation:
"[A] folding knife does not lock in place, a gravity knife does." 
The reasonable inference to be drawn from this testimony is that
the criminality of a gravity knife can only be verified upon
inspection.  And without a more specific basis, the observations
here, based solely on police training and experience, border on
"hunches" which can never constitute reasonable suspicion (Terry
v Ohio, 392 US 1, 22 [1968]).
Additionally, a forcible stop is only justified so long
as there are "specific and articulable facts which, alone with
any logical deductions, reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion"
(People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 113 [1957]).  In these cases,
there were no specific facts supporting the beliefs that
defendants were carrying gravity knives, and justifying the
forcible stops.  In Brannon, the officer simply had no basis to
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No. 77 & 78
conclude that defendant was carrying a gravity knife.  The
allegedly "furtive" movement of defendant and the mere
observation of a knife believed to be a "typical pocket knife"
did not supply the reasonable suspicion needed to justify the
forcible stop (see People v Mendez, 68 AD3d 662, 662-663 [1st
Dept 2009]). 
Similarly, in Fernandez, the officer's testimony
was conclusory as there were no specific facts to support his
belief that defendant possessed a gravity knife.  The mere fact
that a knife may have a clip or has a metal portion cannot be
considered an identifying trait of gravity knives.  Rather, too
much credence is given to the training and experience of the
officer without evidence of specific, articulable facts
indicating the presence of a gravity knife.  Quite simply, the
only observation the officer was justified in making was that
defendant was carrying a knife; there was no other indication of
criminality.  Without further evidence that the knife in question
possessed intrinsic characteristics that would signal its
illegality as a gravity knife, there was no basis to escalate the
observation to a forcible stop of defendant.  
The likely result of the majority's holding is that it
will establish a catechism for the admission of gravity knife
evidence, permitting the admission of evidence with a minimal
basis for reasonable suspicion -- the conclusory observations of
a police officer.  The finding of reasonable suspicion based
solely on testimony regarding the training and experience of the
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No. 77 & 78
officer and the belief that a gravity knife was present is
highlighted in recent cases.  In Mendez, the Appellate Division
held that evidence should be suppressed because the officer's
testimony indicated a belief that the defendant was carrying a
"folding knife" (68 AD3d at 662-663), whereas in People v Neal
(79 AD3d 523 [1st Dept 2010]) and People v Herrera (76 AD3d 891
[1st Dept 2010]), the court concluded there was reasonable
suspicion because training and experience led the respective
officers to believe it was "more likely than not it was a gravity
knife" (Neal, 79 AD3d at 523).  
The weight given to an officer's training and
experience is evident here, in Brannon and Fernandez, as both
officers similarly observed minute, innocuous portions of a
knife, but concluded differently on the criminal nature of the
weapons.  In my view, had the officer in Brannon merely testified
that he believed a gravity knife, and not a pocketknife, was
present, then the outcome in that case would have been different. 
Instead of requiring the police and the People to articulate a
specific factual basis for reasonable suspicion justifying these
stops, in these types of cases, prosecutors will now be
encouraged to present police officers who can describe their
training and experience with gravity knives, and testify that a
gravity knife, and not a "typical pocket knife", was observed. 
Given the highly intrusive nature of these stops, the acceptance
of these conclusory statements at Mapp/Dunaway hearings as a
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No. 77 & 78
minimal basis for the admission of evidence poses a significant
danger (People v Howard, 147 AD2d 177, 181-182 [1st Dept 1989]
[court held that conclusory statements by officers at hearings
were "rote recital[s] of the words deemed necessary to
retroactively validate a patently improper search"]). 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
For Case No. 77:  Order reversed, defendant's motion to suppress
granted and indictment dismissed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott. 
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Smith
concur.  Judge Jones concurs in result in an opinion.
For Case No. 78:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott. 
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Smith
concur.  Judge Jones dissents in an opinion.
Decided May 5, 2011
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