Title: In re Disqualification of Batchelor

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Batchelor, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-2626.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BATCHELOR. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. SMITH. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Batchelor, ___ Ohio St.3d ___,  
2013-Ohio-2626.] 
Judges—Affidavit of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Judge not automatically 
disqualified from criminal case where judge prosecuted defendant in  
earlier unrelated proceedings—Presumption of impartiality applies absent 
showing of actual bias. 
(No. 13-AP-042—Decided May 17, 2013.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Coshocton County Court of Common 
Pleas Case Nos. 12-CR-0104, 13-CR-0024, and 13-CR-0063. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Defendant Paul I. Smith has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this 
court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Robert J. Batchelor from 
presiding over any further proceedings in the three above-referenced criminal 
cases, now pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County. 
{¶ 2} Before taking the bench, Judge Batchelor was the prosecuting 
attorney for Coshocton County.  In that capacity, he prosecuted Smith in three 
separate cases and obtained prison sentences in each case.  Based on these prior 
prosecutions, Smith claims that Judge Batchelor will be biased against him in the 
three unrelated criminal matters now pending before the judge. 
{¶ 3} Judge Batchelor has responded in writing to Smith’s affidavit.  He 
acknowledges that he prosecuted Smith for various felony offenses, but he claims 
that he holds “no animus or bias” against Smith and that he will be a neutral and 
impartial judge during the pending cases. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 4} For the following reasons, no basis has been established to order 
the disqualification of Judge Batchelor. 
{¶ 5} The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge who formerly 
served as a government lawyer to disqualify himself or herself from any 
“particular matter” in which he or she personally and substantially participated as 
a government attorney.  Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(b).  Accordingly, a judge is not 
automatically disqualified from a criminal case where he or she prosecuted a 
defendant in an earlier, unrelated proceeding.  This is true not only in Ohio but 
also in a majority of other state and federal courts.  See Jenkins v. Borden-
Kircher, 611 F.2d 162, 167 (6th Cir.1979) (“This court is unwilling to adopt a Per 
se rule that a judge may never preside at a trial where he has had previous contact 
with the defendant as a prosecutor in totally unrelated criminal charges”); State v. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988) (“the majority view is that a judge who 
has had previous contact with a defendant on a totally unrelated matter is not per 
se disqualified”); Mitchell v. Class, 524 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D.1994), quoting 
State v. Reddick, 230 Neb. 218, 223, 430 N.W.2d 542 (1988) (“ ‘A judge is not 
disqualified merely because he at some earlier time prosecuted the criminal 
defendant 
appearing 
before 
him’ ”); 
see 
generally 
Flamm, 
Judicial 
Disqualification, Section 11.4 (2d Ed.2007); Garwin, Libby, Maher & 
Rendleman, Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 266-267 (2d Ed.2011).  
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained,  
 
we have never held and are unwilling to adopt a per se rule that a 
judge who had participated in the prosecution of a defendant may 
never preside as judge in future unrelated cases involving that 
defendant.  Absent some showing of prejudgment or bias we will 
not assume a trial court would not be able to provide a defendant a 
fair trial based solely on prior prosecutorial participation. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 22, 459 A.2d 727 (1983). 
{¶ 6} As noted, Ohio precedent is consistent with this majority view.  In 
In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 
N.E.2d 1016, the Chief Justice denied an affidavit of disqualification against 
Judge Hedric, despite the fact that he had previously prosecuted the defendant, 
because the judge had not acted as counsel in the particular underlying proceeding 
before him.  Specifically, Judge Hedric, while acting as an assistant prosecuting 
attorney eight years prior, had prosecuted the defendant for operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence (“OMVI”) and that defendant later appeared before 
the judge on an unrelated OMVI charge.  Id. at ¶ 2.  The later indictment even 
included a specification that the defendant had five or more prior OMVI 
convictions within the past 20 years, including the conviction obtained by Judge 
Hedric in his role as prosecutor.  Id.  Nonetheless, because Judge Hedric was not 
involved as a prosecuting attorney in the underlying action pending before him, 
disqualification was not mandated under Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(b), and the 
affidavit was denied.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 7} The same rationale applies here.  While Judge Batchelor 
acknowledges that he previously prosecuted Smith, there is no allegation that he 
personally or substantially participated in any of the three cases now pending in 
his court.  Therefore, Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7) does not mandate his 
disqualification. 
{¶ 8} In addition, Smith has otherwise failed to demonstrate the 
existence of any bias or prejudice mandating disqualification under R.C. 2701.03.  
See R.C. 2701.03(B)(1) (placing burden on affiant to demonstrate that 
disqualification is warranted).  “The term ‘bias or prejudice’ ‘implies a hostile 
feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the 
litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which 
will be governed by the law and the facts.’ ”  In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 
100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. 
Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956).  To support his 
affidavit, Smith claims that Judge Batchelor previously prosecuted him and did 
not offer Smith community control or other treatment options in those 
prosecutions.  This vague allegation, however, does not show that Judge 
Batchelor has a “hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will” against Smith, nor does it 
prove that the judge has reached a “fixed anticipatory judgment” in any of 
Smith’s pending cases.  Allegations based solely on speculation and innuendo, 
such as those here, are insufficient to establish bias or prejudice.  See In re 
Disqualification of Flanagan, 127 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2009-Ohio-7199, 937 N.E.2d 
1023, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 9} At bottom, Smith requests the Chief Justice to assume that Judge 
Batchelor is biased because he previously prosecuted Smith.  The statutory right 
to seek disqualification, however, is an “extraordinary remedy.”  In re 
Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 
23, ¶ 5.  “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions.”  Id.  Those presumptions have not been overcome here.  Absent 
some showing of prejudgment, bias, or an appearance of bias, it will not be 
assumed that a trial judge is unable to provide a fair trial based solely on prior 
prosecutorial participation in an unrelated case. 
{¶ 10} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The cases may proceed before Judge Batchelor. 
________________________