Title: People v. Knaff

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89827-Agenda 12-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DYRECE T. KNAFF, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Dyrece T. Knaff, was charged by indictment
in the circuit court of Adams County with two counts of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance while on a public way within
1,000 feet of public housing property (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2)
(West 1998)) and two counts of the lesser-included offense of
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)
(West 1998)). The lesser charges were based on the same conduct
as the greater charges, absent the location element. Prior to the
selection and empaneling of the jury, the State dismissed the
lesser-included charges and the cause proceeded to trial on the
greater offenses. After the State presented its case in chief, the
defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court found that
the evidence was insufficient on the location element and,
therefore, refused to allow the greater charges to be considered by
the jury. However, the trial court found that the evidence was
sufficient to prove the lesser-included offense and allowed the
State to amend its indictment, and the case was submitted to the
jury on the lesser-included offenses. The defendant was
subsequently convicted of the lesser-included offenses and
sentenced to concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment.
	The defendant appealed to the appellate court, claiming that
his convictions violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §10). The appellate court affirmed the
defendant's convictions. 314 Ill. App. 3d 676. We allowed the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule
315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.



BACKGROUND
	The record reveals that on September 3, 1998, the grand jury
returned a four-count indictment against the defendant. Counts I
and III of the indictment alleged that the defendant committed two
separate incidents of "unlawful delivery of a controlled substance
within 1,000 feet of residential property owned by a housing
agency, in that he, while on the public way within 1,000 feet of
property owned *** by the Quincy Housing Authority, a public
housing agency, knowingly delivered to another *** less than 1
gram of a substance containing cocaine." See 720 ILCS
570/407(b)(2) (West 1998). A violation of section 407(b)(2) of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (the Act) (720 ILCS
570/407(b)(2) (West 1998)) is a Class 1 felony. Counts II and IV
of the indictment alleged two counts of unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1998)), based
on the same conduct alleged in counts I and III without the
location requirements. A violation of section 401(d) of the Act is
a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1998).
	Before selection of the jury, the State moved to dismiss counts
II and IV of the indictment. As part of its motion, the State noted
that, in the unlikely event the evidence failed to show that the
transactions in question took place on the public way within 1,000
feet of housing authority property, it would request jury
instructions on the lesser-included charges. The trial court noted
that counts II and IV were lesser-included offenses based on the
same events as counts I and III and were "alleged in alternative
fashion." The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the
lesser counts, and allowed the State to reconfigure the remaining
counts as I and II. The cause then proceeded to the voir dire of the
jury and eventually trial.
	During the course of its case in chief, the State moved to
amend count I of the indictment to allege the lesser-included
offense by deleting the allegation " 'public way within 1,000 feet
of Quincy Public Housing Authority.' " The prosecutor informed
the court that Sharon Fields, the informant who had made the
cocaine purchases from the defendant, had indicated during the
recess that the first transaction had occurred inside a tavern on the
block next to the public housing and not on a public sidewalk. The
prosecutor further noted that she initially believed that the first
transaction occurred on the sidewalk because police officers had
told her that both transactions had occurred there and that it was
only after speaking with Fields that she learned that only the
second transaction had occurred on the sidewalk.
	Defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the
jury had already heard evidence, and that the issue of reducing the
degree of the offense could be addressed after all the evidence was
presented. The trial court denied the State's motion but noted that
it would later decide whether the jury could be instructed on the
lesser-included offense.
	Sharon Fields then testified that while working as a police
informant on July 20, 1998, she bought $50 worth of cocaine from
the defendant at a tavern known as D&D Corral. She then left the
tavern and met with police. She gave them the cocaine she had
bought, and the police gave her another $50 to make a second
purchase. She headed back toward the D&D Corral about 20 or 30
minutes after the first transaction. As she approached the tavern,
she found the defendant standing on a public sidewalk, whereupon
she bought another $50 worth of cocaine from him.
	After the close of the State's case in chief, the defendant
moved for a directed verdict on both counts of unlawful delivery
within 1,000 feet of public housing, the Class 1 felonies. The
defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that the cocaine sales took place within 1,000 feet of public
housing.
	The trial court took the matter under advisement, stating that
it wanted to research the question of what was necessary to prove
the distance element of the crime. The court noted that the State
had presented general testimony that the delivery occurred within
a block of public housing property and that the average city block
is approximately 850 feet long. It further noted, however, that the
State did not present any testimony as to the actual distance.
	Following a recess, the State moved to amend the indictment
by deleting the enhancing language pertaining to the location of
the offenses. The defendant objected, claiming that as a matter of
strategy the State had chosen to dismiss the lesser counts. The trial
court found that while the evidence was insufficient to prove that
the offenses occurred within 1,000 feet of public housing, the State
had clearly proved up a prima facie case for the Class 2, lesser-included offenses, which "could be decided by the jury." After
further argument, the court ruled that the State would be allowed
to amend the indictment to allege simple unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance by deleting the language that had enhanced
the offense to a Class 1 felony.
	The defendant did not present any evidence, and the trial court
submitted the case to the jury on the two lesser offenses of
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court advised
the jury that the evidence was insufficient to establish the 1,000
feet distance element and, therefore, the case was being submitted
on two lesser charges of delivery of a controlled substance.
	Following deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on
both counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, the
lesser-included offenses. Upon the defendant's motion to
reconsider, the trial court noted that it had not granted the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the greater charges.
Instead, it had merely ruled that the evidence was insufficient on
those charges, and that it had discretion to allow the State to
amend the indictment and to proceed on the lesser charges because
there was no prejudice to the defendant.
	The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions,
holding that the trial court did not acquit the defendant of the two
lesser felonies by finding the evidence in support of the greater
felonies insufficient and, therefore, his convictions for the lesser-included offenses did not violate double jeopardy principles. 314
Ill. App. 3d at 681. The appellate court noted that a defendant may
be convicted of a lesser-included offense not expressly included in
the charging instrument. Therefore, it would be an injustice under
the circumstances of this case to allow the defendant to be
exonerated from all accountability simply because the State failed
to prove an element of the greater offense. 314 Ill. App. 3d at 680.
In reaching that conclusion, the court specifically declined to rely
on the rationale of People v. Laue, 219 Ill. App. 3d 926 (1991), or
the dissent in People v. Brown, 134 Ill. App. 3d 951 (1985), which
both suggested that a defendant cannot be convicted of a lesser-included offense when evidence is insufficient to allow the greater
offense to go to the jury and the lesser offense has not been
expressly charged. We granted the defendant's petition for leave
to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.



ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, the defendant argues that the trial
court violated constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
double jeopardy when it allowed the State to proceed against him
on the lesser-included offenses after the court had found that the
evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury on the
greater offenses of delivery of a controlled substance on the public
way within 1,000 feet of public housing. The defendant maintains
that the trial court's finding that the evidence was insufficient as
to one of the elements of the greater offense was tantamount to an
acquittal barring the State from initiating further proceedings
relating to the elements of that offense. The defendant argues that
because the lesser-included offense is considered the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes, the trial court erred in allowing the
State to amend the indictment and proceed on the lesser-included
offenses of simple delivery following acquittal on the greater
charges.
	The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states
in relevant part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ***." U.S.
Const., amend. V. The same principle is contained in the Illinois
Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10; People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 428-29 (2000). A verdict of not guilty, whether
rendered by the jury or directed by the trial judge, shields the
defendant from a retrial for the same offense. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652, 661, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982).
The fundamental purpose embodied in the double jeopardy clause
has been emphasized frequently. People v. Deems, 81 Ill. 2d 384,
388 (1980). The purpose has been stated as follows:
		" 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
[our] system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.' " United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65, 71-72, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 2192
(1978), quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187-88, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1957).
It also has been stated that the prohibition at the core of the
clause's protections "prevents the State from honing its trial
strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts
at conviction," because "[r]epeated prosecutorial sallies would
unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction
through sheer governmental perseverance." Tibbs, 457 U.S.  at 41,
72 L. Ed. 2d  at 661, 102 S. Ct.  at 2218.
	The above-stated purpose of the double jeopardy clause has
been effectuated through rules that specify when jeopardy attaches
and that prohibit a retrial of an acquitted defendant. Deems, 81 Ill. 2d  at 388. But those rules should not be applied mechanically
when the interests they protect are not endangered and when their
mechanical application would frustrate society's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws. Deems, 81 Ill. 2d  at 388.
	The defendant argues that the trial court's finding regarding
the insufficiency of the evidence on the location element was
tantamount to an acquittal, citing Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977). In Lee, the defendant
was charged by information with a theft offense which required
proof of a knowledge and intent element. After the close of the
prosecution's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove the
intent element. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
the charge because of the failure of the information to allege
knowledge or intent. Thereafter, the prosecution again charged the
defendant with theft, this time by indictment setting forth all of the
required elements. The defendant was then tried and convicted of
the offense.
	In concluding that the defendant's second trial did not violate
the double jeopardy clause, the Supreme Court in Lee stated that
the critical question was whether the trial court's order
contemplated an end to all prosecution of the defendant for the
offense charged. Lee, 432 U.S.  at 30, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at 87, 97 S. Ct. 
at 2145. The Court noted that when the trial judge granted the
motion to dismiss it was not premised on any notion that the
defendant could never be prosecuted for the offense. Rather, it was
granted in contemplation of further prosecution. Lee, 432 U.S.  at
30-31, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at 87, 97 S. Ct.  at 2145-46. The Court in Lee
also pointed out in a footnote that "a trial court's ruling in favor of
the defendant is an acquittal only if it 'actually represents a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of
the offense charged.' " Lee, 432 U.S.  at 30 n.8, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at 87
n.8, 97 S. Ct.  at 2145 n.8, quoting United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 651, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1355 (1977).
	We find that the rationale of Lee is actually more supportive
of the State's case than the defendant's. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the defendant is correct in his assertion that the trial
court's finding with respect to the insufficiency of the evidence
amounted to an acquittal in this case of the greater charge, it does
not follow that the defendant was thereby acquitted of the lesser
charges. In fact, the exact opposite was intended by the trial
court's ruling. Here, the trial court found that the State had made
out a prima facie case with respect to the lesser charges. Lee did
not address the issue of whether an acquittal of a greater offense
after the close of the prosecution's case barred the submission of
a lesser-included offense to a jury. But as the Lee Court observed,
the critical question is whether the trial court's order contemplates
an end to all prosecution. In the present case, the trial court clearly
did not intend an end to all prosecution because it never did grant
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, but instead it
allowed the State to amend the indictment and present the case to
the jury on the lesser charges. Under these facts, we conclude that
Lee is more supportive of the State's position that the double
jeopardy clause was not violated in this case.
	In support of his proposition that the State could not amend
the indictment and was barred from proceeding to submit the case
on the lesser charges once the trial court found the evidence
insufficient on the greater offense, the defendant relies on People
v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163 (1990), and People v. Harrison, 395 Ill. 463 (1946). In Mink, the defendant was convicted of two drug
offenses. He then he filed a post-trial motion for a new trial
alleging that the State had failed to introduce sufficient evidence
of venue. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial, but upon the State's subsequent motion for reconsideration,
the court vacated its new trial order and reinstated the defendant's
convictions. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial
court's initial ruling on the post-trial motion was an acquittal and
that double jeopardy principles barred the trial court from
reconsidering the order. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d  at 174. This court
reversed the appellate court and held that the trial court did not
violate double jeopardy principles when it reversed the new trial
order and reinstated the convictions. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d  at 180. The
court stated that the double jeopardy clause prohibited the State
from trying the defendant again for the same offense, but the
defendant was never actually subjected to a second trial. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d  at 174.
	In Harrison, the defendant was indicted for the offense of
assault with a deadly weapon, with the intent to murder the victim.
The defendant was tried on that charge and found not guilty.
Thereafter, the victim died, and the defendant was then indicted
and tried on the charge of murder. This court held that the double
jeopardy clause did not bar the defendant's prosecution for murder
because the crime of murder was not completed until after the
victim died following the first trial. Harrison, 395 Ill.  at 472-73.
The Harrison court also distinguished the factual setting before it
from the situation where "the acquittal of a defendant on an
indictment for an offense which includes lesser offenses, operates
also as an acquittal, and as a bar to any subsequent prosecution, of
all included lesser offenses of which he might have been convicted
on the indictment charging the higher offense." Harrison, 395 Ill. 
at 466. The court noted that in the case before it, the defendant was
acquitted of the lesser offense not the greater; therefore, the
caution about a conviction for a higher offense did not apply.
Harrison, 395 Ill.  at 472-73.
	We do not find either Mink or Harrison to be on point.
Neither case, of course, addressed the precise issue here, which is
whether a trial court may allow the State to continue its
prosecution of the defendant and submit the case to the jury on
lesser charges where the court simultaneously concludes in a
single prosecution that the evidence is insufficient on the greater
but sufficient as to the lesser. We read the language from Mink and
Harrison, upon which the defendant relies, as being confined in
application to those cases in which the core purpose of the double
jeopardy clause is violated. In contrast, a ruling in the present case
barring the lesser offenses on double jeopardy grounds would not
serve any purpose of the clause. The State did not seek to hone its
trial strategies and perfect its evidence by making any repeat
attempt to convict the defendant. Instead, the State had already
rested its case when the court ruled that the evidence was
sufficient to present the lesser offense to the jury, but insufficient
with respect to the greater. Thereafter, neither the State nor the
defendant presented any further evidence in the case before it was
submitted to the jury on the lesser charges.
	It is now well established that although a person cannot be
convicted of an offense he has not been charged with committing,
a defendant may be convicted of an offense not expressly included
in the charging instrument if that offense is a lesser-included
offense of the crime expressly charged. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 105 (1994); People v. Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288, 292 (1992). It
is elementary that it is unnecessary to allege a lesser-included
offense in an indictment charging an offense of a greater degree
when, in order to convict on the greater charge, the prosecution
must prove every element necessary for a conviction on the lesser
charge. People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520, 530 (1966). In such a
case, if the charging instrument specifically charges the greater
offense, while also sufficiently alleging the conduct and mental
states required for the lesser offense, the defendant is considered
to be charged by implication with the lesser crime. People v.
Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288, 295-98 (1992).
	Additionally, the trial court has the right to instruct the jury
sua sponte on a lesser-included offense, even where the State does
not request such an instruction and the defendant objects. People
v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 282 (1999). This is because the State
clearly " 'has no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction for
a crime greater than that warranted by the evidence, but neither
does the defendant have a right to an acquittal when the evidence,
although not sufficient to establish the greater crime, is sufficient
to establish a lesser included offense.' " (Emphasis added.)
Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d  at 282, quoting State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91,
95 (Utah 1982), citing People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967).
	Applying the above-mentioned principles, we reject the
defendant's argument that the trial court erred in allowing
amendment of the indictment and the submission of the lesser
charges to the jury. We believe that it would be illogical not to
allow a trial judge presiding over a jury trial to ultimately submit
a lesser-included offense to the jury under the present
circumstances. The State's request to dismiss the lesser charges
prior to jeopardy attaching in this case was of no import, as the
defendant did not actually need to be charged with the lesser
offense in order to be convicted of it. The charging instrument
provided both the defendant and the State with a closed set of
facts, and both parties had notice of all possible lesser-included
offenses and could plan their trial strategies accordingly. See
Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 113.
	Amendments to indictments are allowed where the defect is
a matter of form. People v. Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1992). An
indictment may be amended on a motion by the State at any time
because of formal defects including "[t]he use of alternative or
disjunctive allegations as to the acts, means, intents or results
charged." 725 ILCS 5/111-5(f) (West 1998). Generally, any
attempt to broaden the scope of the indictment requires return of
the indictment to the grand jury. Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d  at 32. Here,
however, the indictment for the greater offense effectively indicted
the defendant for the lesser-included offense and, therefore, the
trial court did not err in allowing the State's amendment.
	There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the State
made a strategic decision to "go for a home run" when it initially
dismissed the lesser offenses. The State specifically informed the
court and defense counsel that it would seek to have the case
submitted to the jury on the lesser charges if it looked as though
there would be a failure of proof as to the greater charges. In fact,
the State sought leave to amend the indictment by deleting the
location element when it first became aware during a recess in its
case in chief that the drug sale described in count I occurred inside
the tavern and not on the public sidewalk. Under these
circumstances, the defendant did not suffer any prejudice and was
not unfairly surprised when he was convicted of two offenses of
simple delivery of a controlled substance.
	The statutory law cited by the defendant is not controlling.
The defendant relies upon sections 3-3(b), 3-4(a)(1), and 3-4(b)
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/3-3(b),
3-4(a)(1), (b) (West 1998)) and section 115-4(k) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4(k) (West 1998)).
Section 3-3(b) of the Code provides in part that if "several
offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of
commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution ***
if they are based on the same act." 720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West
1998). Sections 3-4(a)(1) and (b)(1) provide in relevant part:
			"(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was
formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the
same facts, if such former prosecution:
				(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or
in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant a conviction[.]
* * *
			 (b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was
formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the
same offense based upon different facts, if such former
prosecution:
				(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal,
and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of
which the defendant could have been convicted on the
former prosecution; or was for an offense with which
the defendant should have been charged on the former
prosecution *** ." 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1), (b)(1) (West
1998).
	The defendant's reliance upon the above-quoted statutory
provisions is misplaced. Novak, Jones, and Ostrand make clear
that it is unnecessary and superfluous to allege a lesser-included
offense in an indictment charging an offense of a higher degree.
See Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 105; Jones, 149 Ill. 2d at 296-98;
Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d  at 530. Moreover, both charges in this case
were prosecuted in a single prosecution, as required by section
3-3(b) of the Code. The defendant's theory ignores the definition
of "prosecution" set forth in section 2-16 of the Code (720 ILCS
5/2-16 (West 1998)). For purposes of the statute, " '[p]rosecution'
means all legal proceedings by which a person's liability for an
offense is determined, commencing with the return of the
indictment or the issuance of the information, and including the
final disposition of the case upon appeal." 720 ILCS 5/2-16 (West
1998). In the present case, the defendant was subjected to a single
prosecution, and we find no violation of these statutory provisions.
For that reason, the defendant's citations to People v. Mullenhoff,
33 Ill. 2d 445 (1965), and People v. Lewis, 112 Ill. App. 3d 626
(1983), are unpersuasive. Both cases involved multiple
prosecutions against the defendant for the same conduct, and
therefore are not applicable.
	Likewise, the defendant's reliance on section 115-4(k) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is unavailing. That section
provides:
			"When, at the close of the State's evidence or at the
close of all of the evidence, the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding or verdict of guilty the court may and on
motion of the defendant shall make a finding or direct the
jury to return a verdict of not guilty, enter a judgment of
acquittal and discharge the defendant." 725 ILCS
5/115-4(k) (West 1998).
Again, the defendant's reliance on this section ignores the reality
that the indictment charged the lesser offenses by implication. The
statute does not mandate that the trial court discharge the
defendant when it finds that the evidence is insufficient on the
greater offense but sufficient with respect to the lesser offense. It
makes no difference that a defendant is charged by implication
with the lesser offense until an amendment to the charging
instrument is allowed. The defendant's interpretation of the statute
would lead to an absurd result and would be contrary to important
policy considerations, such as society's interest in avoiding the
unjustified exoneration of wrongdoers and in punishing a
defendant only to the extent of the actual crime committed. As this
court has observed,
			"A lesser included offense is a valuable tool for a
defendant, a prosecutor, and society generally. For a
defendant, [it] provides an important third option to the
jury. If the jury believes that defendant was guilty of
something, but uncertain whether the charged offense had
been proved, it might convict defendant of the lesser
offense, rather than convict or acquit him of the greater
offense. [Citation.]
			For a prosecutor, a defendant may not automatically go
free if the evidence fails to prove an essential element of
the greater offense. For society, the punishment that it
imposes on a criminal may conform more accurately to
the crime actually committed." Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 105.
		"[I]t is *** appropriate that the trial court take into
consideration society's interest in punishing the defendant
for a crime, no more, no less, than the crime actually
committed. The trial judge must transcend the limitations
of the adversarial system and give instructions which
safeguard justice, society's interest in avoiding the
unjustified exoneration of wrongdoers and in punishing a
defendant only to the extent of his crime." Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d  at 281.
	The defendant additionally relies upon our recent decision in
People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419 (2000), to support his argument.
However, Cooper is readily distinguishable. There, the defendants
in a joint bench trial were convicted of first degree murder based
on an accountability theory (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West
1994)). The appellate court reversed the first degree murder
convictions based on the insufficiency of the evidence but
remanded the causes to the trial court for a determination of
whether the defendants were prejudiced in their defense by the
State's failure to include a charge of felony murder in the
indictments. The appellate court ordered that if the defendants
were not prejudiced, the trial court could then consider whether the
State sufficiently proved the defendants guilty of felony murder.
Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d  at 421. On review to this court, we concluded
that the double jeopardy clause precluded a second trial once the
appellate court had found the evidence legally insufficient because
first degree murder is considered "one crime" regardless of the
theory on which it was prosecuted, and because the trial court
specifically refused to consider felony murder, even though that
decision may have been erroneous. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d  at 430.
	Unlike the present case, Cooper did not involve a question of
whether a lesser-included offense not expressly charged by an
indictment would be barred by double jeopardy principles.
However, we note that state and federal appellate courts have long
exercised the power to reverse a conviction while at the same time
ordering the entry of a judgment on a lesser-included offense.
Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (E.D. Wis. 1980),
aff'd, 644 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1981) (the Seventh Circuit adopted
the opinion of the district court in its entirety); see also, e.g.,
People v. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d 870, 879-80 (1994) (where
appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove
the only charged offense, the defendant could be convicted of an
offense not expressly charged by the charging instrument if the
offense was a lesser-included offense, and because the evidence
proved the lesser charge, it was authorized pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 615(b)(3) to reduce the degree of the offense). The
authority to order the entry of judgment on the lesser-included
offense is both statutory and based on the common law; the
constitutionality of the practice has never been seriously
questioned. Dickenson, 482 F. Supp.  at 1225.
	In State v. Dickenson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the evidence presented against the defendant was insufficient to
support his armed robbery conviction, but sufficient to support a
conviction for the lesser included offense of simple robbery. State
v. Dickenson, 75 Wis. 2d 47, 50-51, 248 N.W.2d 447, 449-50
(1977). Therefore, the court remanded the cause to the trial court
to enter judgment for a robbery conviction. Dickenson, 75 Wis. 2d
at 52, 248 N.W.2d  at 450.
	Thereafter, the defendant in Dickenson argued before the
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, that under the rationale set
forth in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), his subsequent conviction for simple robbery was
barred by double jeopardy. Burks had held that where an appeals
court overturns a conviction on a ground that the prosecution
proffered insufficient evidence of guilt, that finding is comparable
to an acquittal, and the double jeopardy clause precludes a second
trial. Burks, 437 U.S.  at 16, 57 L. Ed. 2d  at 12-13, 98 S. Ct.  at
2149-50. The opinion of the district court, adopted by the Seventh
Circuit, distinguished Burks, noting that the evidence in Burks was
insufficient to prove that the defendant was sane at the time of the
robbery. Dickenson, 482 F. Supp.  at 1226. Absent a showing of
sanity, the defendant could not be convicted of the crime charged
or any other crime. Dickenson, 482 F. Supp.  at 1226. The district
court noted that if the trial court in Burks had made the correct
determination that the evidence of sanity was insufficient, it would
have had no choice but to enter a directed verdict of acquittal in
favor of the defendant. Thus, the supreme court's ruling merely
put the defendant in the position he would have been in absent the
trial court's error. Dickenson, 482 F. Supp.  at 1226. The district
court concluded by stating:
			"[H]owever, if the trial court [in defendant Dickenson's
case] had been correct in the first instance and ruled that
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that
[defendant] was armed at the time of the robbery, there
would have been no directed verdict of acquittal. Instead,
the jury would have been instructed only on the charge of
simple robbery. *** Accordingly, when the Wisconsin
Supreme Court corrected the trial court's error and
ordered that judgment be entered on the robbery charge,
it placed [defendant] in precisely the same position that he
would have been in had the error never occurred. Burks
does not require more than that." Dickenson, 482 F. Supp. 
at 1226.
	Similarly, we find that because the trial court found that the
evidence was insufficient with respect to the greater charge, but
was sufficient with respect to the lesser charge, it could properly
refuse to enter a directed verdict and instead instruct the jury on
the lesser charge of simple unlawful delivery of a controlled
substance. The defendant certainly was not placed in a worse
position by the procedure employed in this case than he would
have been if the trial judge had mistakenly allowed the greater
charge to go to the jury with a resulting reversal and reduction in
the degree of the offense by a reviewing court. Both practices are
permissible under the double jeopardy clause.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court properly
allowed the State to amend the indictment and submit the case to
the jury on the two lesser-included offenses of unlawful delivery
of a controlled substance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	When the State originally sought and obtained dismissal of
the lesser offenses, it clearly hoped that doing so would improve
its chances of persuading the jury to return guilty verdicts for the
more serious crimes. What the State failed to realize was that its
strategy turned on proof that it could not provide.
	At the close of the State's case, the circuit court determined
that the State had failed to establish the elements necessary to
convict defendant of the more serious offenses. It therefore refused
to allow the counts charging those offenses to be considered by the
jury. That action constituted a directed verdict with respect to the
more serious offenses. Because the directed verdict was based on
the insufficiency of the evidence, it constituted an acquittal for
double jeopardy purposes. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 300
(1999).
	Where, as here, a defendant has been acquitted of an offense
and no other charges are pending when the acquittal is granted, the
State may not file additional charges against the defendant based
on the same physical act. If the State wishes to pursue prosecution
of a lesser-included offense, it must proceed on both offenses
simultaneously. If it does not, prosecution of the additional offense
will be barred by the acquittal for the greater offense. See People
v. Laue, 219 Ill. App. 3d 926, 930 (1991); 720 ILCS 5/3-3(b),
3-4(b) (West 1998).
	Our decision in People v. Mullenhoff, 33 Ill. 2d 445 (1965)
supports this conclusion. In that case the defendant was charged
with attempted deviate sexual assault. At the conclusion of the
State's case, the defendant moved for a finding of not guilty.
When the court granted that motion, the State immediately
indicted the defendant for the crime of attempted rape based on the
same incident, and defendant was convicted of that offense based
on the same evidence. This court reversed. It held that because the
offenses were based on the identical conduct of the defendant and
because the conduct was known to the prosecuting officer at the
commencement of the initial prosecution, the prosecutor was
required either to elect the charge on which he wanted to proceed
or to proceed on both charges in the same prosecution. He could
not raise the charges seriatim. Accordingly, defendant's acquittal
on the initial offense precluded the prosecutor from obtaining a
conviction for the subsequently filed offense. Mullenhoff, 33 Ill. 2d  at 449.
	Nothing in People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265 (1999), cited by
the majority, suggests that we should reach a contrary conclusion
here. Garcia concerned a trial court's right to sua sponte instruct
on a lesser-included offense despite objection by the defendant. In
contrast to the present case, Garcia did not involve a situation
where the State formally dismissed the lesser offenses, then
attempted to resuscitate them after the prosecution failed and the
defendant was acquitted of the greater offenses based on the
insufficiency of the evidence.
	Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977), also cited by the majority, is likewise inapposite. At
issue there was the government's right to retry the defendant
following dismissal of the original charge for failure to allege a
necessary element of the offense. There was no question as to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant there was not acquitted
for lack of evidence, as this defendant was, and the government
did not attempt to obtain a conviction for a lesser-included offense
after failing to secure a conviction for a greater offense, as the
State did in this case.
	Other cases cited by the majority are similarly distinguishable.
People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994), for example, concerned the
wholly unrelated issue of a trial court's refusal of a lesser-included
offense instruction tendered by the defendant. People v. Griggs,
152 Ill. 2d 1 (1992), addressed the amendment of an indictment on
the day of trial to cure a formal defect, an problem not presented
by this case. At issue in People v. Deems, 81 Ill. 2d 384 (1980),
was the effect of a purported acquittal granted by the trial court
following proceedings which involved no evidence, were not an
attempt by the State to convict defendant, and amounted to a
"sham." Needless to say, none of those circumstances was present
here. The trial in this case was a contested adversarial proceeding
in which the State adduced evidence in a diligent effort to obtain
defendant's conviction.
	My colleagues suggest that there was no harm in allowing the
State to prosecute defendant for the lesser offenses following his
acquittal of the greater offenses because the lesser-included
offenses were actually included in the prosecution for the greater
offenses and were charged in the indictment by implication. They
forget, however, that the State expressly dismissed the lesser-included offenses before proceeding before the jury on the greater
offenses. Once the charges were expressly dismissed, no possible
claim could be made that the State still intended to pursue them by
implication. The very idea defies reason.
	My colleagues' reliance on Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(3)) is also ill-conceived. Where a court of
review determines that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction for the offense for which the
defendant was found guilty, but that it was sufficient to support a
conviction for a lesser-included offense, Rule 615(b)(3) allows the
court to reduce the conviction to the lesser-included offense. See
People v. Boyer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 16, 19 (1985). For this provision
to apply, however, the defendant must actually have been
convicted of the greater offense. Where the defendant has been
acquitted of that offense, as this defendant was, Rule 615(b)(3) is
inapplicable, and the State may not subsequently prosecute the
defendant for any of the lesser offenses. See People v. Reagan,
111 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 (1982), aff'd, 99 Ill. 2d 238 (1983).
	There is only one reason we are here today, and that is
because the State misunderstood what its own evidence would
show. Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe we should
compromise basic constitutional and statutory principles to save
the State from its error. If the State is made to bear the
consequences of its lapse in trial preparation, perhaps it will learn
to be more diligent in the future. There is nothing to be gained by
fabricating legal justifications for the State's errors. Once we begin
sacrificing legal guarantees in the interest of shoring up the State's
position, we may quickly find that those guarantees have slipped
so far beyond our grasp that we are unable to retrieve them.
	Defendant's convictions for the lesser-included offenses
should be reversed. I therefore dissent.