Title: Hargis v. JLB Corp.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
BONNIE HARGIS,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91639 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JLB CORPORATION d/b/a 
 
) 
GOLDEN OAK LENDING, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 
The Honorable Robert Cohen, Judge 
 
Opinion issued December 20, 2011 
 
 
Bonnie Hargis appeals the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to JLB 
Corporation on her claims that (1) JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by 
procuring, preparing and assisting in the drawing of legal documents as it negotiated with 
lenders to obtain mortgages for its clients and that (2) JLB was unjustly enriched by 
charging her for document preparation services it did not provide.  So far as the record 
shows, JLB assisted Ms. Hargis only in preparing financial documents, which does not 
constitute the practice of law.  The record does not show that JLB procured or assisted in 
the drawing of Ms. Hargis’ note, deed of trust or other legal documents.  Rather, these 
documents were drawn and filled in by third parties that are not shown to have been 
controlled by or acting as an agent of JLB.  These third parties are not parties to this suit, 
and whether their conduct constitutes the unauthorized practice of law is not before the 
Court.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the grant of summary judgment to JLB as to 
Counts I and II relating to the unauthorized practice of law. 
The trial court erred in granting JLB summary judgment on Count III, which 
alleges unjust enrichment (money had and received).  The viability of that count does not 
depend on a finding that JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and JLB’s 
summary judgment motion failed to negate any element of Ms. Hargis’ unjust enrichment 
claim.  The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
JLB is a Missouri corporation that provides mortgage brokering services.  Its main 
business is matching borrowers who need a mortgage with lenders willing to finance 
them.  To successfully match a borrower with a lender, JLB first must provide the 
potential lender with financial information about the borrower, including information 
about credit history, prior mortgages, and current and past employment.  JLB then assists 
the borrower in preparing a loan application and other financial disclosure forms.  
Once a lender approves a loan, a note and a mortgage or deed of trust must be 
prepared.  The summary judgment record does not show that JLB plays a role in drawing, 
filling out or procuring these documents.  Rather, so far as the summary judgment record 
shows, JLB gathers information necessary to prepare these documents and provides that 
information to title companies, investors and/or a California company called Document 
Systems Inc.  According to the record adduced below, these third parties then prepare the 
note and a mortgage or deed of trust and send them to JLB, which then completes its 
 
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“middleman” role in the refinancing process by transferring these documents to the 
borrower.1 
In January 2009, Ms. Hargis entered into an agreement with JLB to refinance her 
home in Barnhart, Missouri.  JLB’s vice president, Mr. John Paci, testified at his 
deposition that JLB provided a number of services to obtain refinancing for Ms. Hargis, 
including matching her with a sponsoring lender, U.S. Bank N.A.; preparing her loan 
application and other financial disclosure documents; gathering information necessary for 
title companies, investors and/or Document Systems to prepare her note and deed of 
trust;2 and transferring those documents to Ms. Hargis after their completion.  JLB 
charged Ms. Hargis the following fees: (1) a $1,890.50 loan origination fee; (2) a 
$1,923.58 loan discount; (3) a $900 broker fee; (4) a $550 underwriting fee; (5) a $208 
administrative fee; and (6) an $899 processing fee.   
JLB says it charged the processing and administrative fees for helping Ms. Hargis 
prepare her loan application and disclosure documents, gathering information needed to 
 
1 Document Systems claims to be the largest loan document production services company 
in the United States.  Its hallmark product is the DocMagic computer program, which it 
uses to create notes, mortgages, deeds of trust and other documents related to real estate 
transactions. Document Systems is not a party to this case, and the record is silent as to 
whether the forms it provides to Missouri customers were drawn, procured or filled out 
by lawyers licensed in Missouri or how it charges for its services.  This Court expresses 
no opinion as to whether Document Systems’ conduct constitutes the unauthorized 
practice of law.  
2 The parties refer to the specific documents prepared for Ms. Hargis by third parties in 
various ways, including “mortgage documents,” “closing documents,” “the promissory 
note, deeds, mortgages (deeds of trust)” and “the note and deed of trust,” but include only 
the note in the record on appeal.  In Missouri, mortgage documents generally consist of a 
note and deed of trust, and that is the terminology that will be utilized here. 
 
4
                                             
complete the note and deed of trust, and transferring these documents to Ms. Hargis.  JLB 
says it played no role in drawing the note or deed of trust, which were prepared by title 
companies, investors and/or Document Systems, and did not charge for their preparation.       
 
Ms. Hargis disagrees.  In February 2009, she filed a three-count petition against 
JLB in St. Louis County circuit court.  Count I alleges that JLB engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law in violation of section 484.0103 in charging her a fee for 
preparing, procuring and assisting in the drawing of legal documents and in preparing her 
loan application and other financial disclosures as it negotiated with a lender to obtain 
refinancing for her.  In Count II, Ms. Hargis asserts that engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law in this manner was a deceptive and unfair practice that violated the 
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.  § 407.010 et. seq.    In Count III, Ms. Hargis 
alleges that JLB was unjustly enriched because it charged her various fees for services it 
did not provide. 
In August 2009, JLB filed a motion for summary judgment in which it asserted 
that: (1) it did not procure or assist in the drawing of legal documents, that it simply 
engaged in negotiations with a lender and acted as a middleman in connecting Ms. Hargis 
to the lender; (2) that acting as a middleman between a borrower and a lender is not the 
unauthorized practice of law; and (3) that it did not charge Ms. Hargis for the provision 
of legal services.  After an opportunity for discovery by Ms. Hargis and following 
briefing by both parties, on March 8, 2010, the trial court granted JLB summary 
 
3 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 
 
5
                                             
judgment on all three counts.  Ms. Hargis appealed to the Missouri court of appeals.  
After opinion by that court, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“The standard of review of appeals from summary judgment is essentially de 
novo.”  State ex rel. Koster v. Olive, 282 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Mo. banc 2009).  This Court 
“will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment 
was entered.”  Id.  “Summary judgment shall be entered if ‘there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id., 
quoting Rule 74.04(c)(6).  “A ‘genuine issue’ is a dispute that is real, not merely 
argumentative, imaginary or frivolous.” ITT Commercial Fin. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply 
Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. banc 1993). 
III. 
JLB DID NOT ENGAGE IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
 
A. 
Law Governing the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
The practice of law in Missouri, as in other states, long has been restricted solely 
to licensed attorneys so as to “protect the public from being advised or represented in 
legal matters by incompetent or unreliable persons.”  Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855, 
857-58 (Mo. banc 1952).  Since 1915,4 the Missouri legislature has had statutes defining 
the “practice of law” and providing penalties for its unauthorized practice.  See In re  
Mid-America Living Trust Associates, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Mo. banc 1996).  
 
4 See, e.g., S.B. 378, Forty-Eighth Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1915); § 666 RSMo 
1919; § 11692 RSMo 1929; § 13313 RSMo 1939.  The definitions of the “practice of 
law” and of the “law business” have remained the same since 1915.  § 484.010.  
 
6
Because the judiciary is the “sole arbiter of what constitutes the practice of law,” 
Hulse, 247 S.W.2d at 857-58, such statutes merely act in aid of this Court’s regulation of 
the practice of law and cannot “supersede or detract from, the power of the judiciary to 
define and control the practice of law.”  Id.  Nonetheless, this Court has used these 
statutory definitions of the “practice of law” as a reference point for determining the 
scope of the practice of law.  See, e.g., id.; Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 
338 (Mo. banc 2007).    
Section 484.010.1 defines the “practice of law” as: 
the appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the drawing of 
papers, pleadings or documents or the performance of any act in such 
capacity in connection with proceedings pending or prospective before any 
court of record, commissioner, referee or any body, board, committee or 
commission constituted by law or having authority to settle controversies. 
 
Id.  Section 484.010.2 defines the “law business” as: 
the advising or counseling for a valuable consideration of any person, firm, 
association, or corporation as to any secular law or the drawing or the 
procuring of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of any 
paper, document or instrument affecting or relating to secular rights or the 
doing of any act for a valuable consideration in a representative capacity, 
obtaining or tending to obtain or securing or tending to secure for any 
person, firm, association or corporation any property or property rights 
whatsoever.     
 
Id.  Beginning with its decision in Hulse in 1952, this Court repeatedly has utilized these 
statutory definitions to assist it in determining what constitutes the unauthorized practice 
of law in regard to real estate transactions.  247 S.W.2d at 856-57.   
In Hulse, real estate brokers obtained standardized form documents, including 
notes and deeds of trust, and then filled in blanks on these documents based on the 
 
7
specific information provided by their clients.  Id.  Hulse held that although notes and 
deeds of trust are legal documents, mortgage brokers are not engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law if they merely fill in blanks in standardized Missouri 
document forms so long as a Missouri attorney created the legal documents and filling in 
the blanks on the documents was ancillary to the broker’s main business.  Id. at 862.   
By contrast, the broker would be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law if it 
charged a separate fee or increased its customary charges for helping fill in the blanks, if 
it gave advice as to the legal effect of the documents or if the documents were not drawn 
by a Missouri attorney.  Id.   
 
This Court addressed the unauthorized practice of law again in In re First Escrow, 
840 S.W.2d at 841.  There, non-lawyer employees of two escrow companies had gathered 
information from the borrower, lender, and any lawyers or title companies involved in 
certain real estate transactions and used this information to prepare documents necessary 
to close the transactions. 
In re First Escrow held that non-lawyer employees of escrow companies could 
“fill in the blanks of certain standardized form documents required to close real estate 
transactions only if they do so under the supervision of, and as agents for … [a party] 
who has a direct financial interest in the transaction.”  Id. at 846-47.  Further, these 
companies “may not prepare or complete nonstandard or specialized documents” and 
“may not charge a separate fee for document preparation, or vary their customary charges 
… based upon whether documents are to be prepared in the transaction.”  Id. at 848-49. 
 
8
 
Similarly, addressing the unauthorized practice of law by trust companies, this 
Court held in In re Mid-America, 927 S.W.2d at 856-58, that although “merely gathering 
information for use in a legal document does not necessarily constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law,” the trust companies’ actions there did because the non-lawyer trust 
officers “were not merely collecting information to fill in standardized forms as otherwise 
might have been approved by Hulse and In re First Escrow.  Instead, they also were 
giving legal advice to their clients about choices to be made and the legal effects of those 
choices.”  Id. at 865 (citations omitted).  This Court further distinguished the facts of In 
re Mid-America from Hulse and In re First Escrow by stating: 
In Hulse and In re First Escrow, we held that non-attorneys could properly 
fill in blanks in standard real estate forms when they performed such a 
service without compensation and ancillary to other valid duties. Mid-
America does not fall within this exception.  The documents sold are not 
standardized forms accepted generally within a particular business or 
industry, but proprietary documents unique to Mid-America.  Mid-America 
markets, 
drafts, 
and 
executes 
customized 
legal 
documents 
for 
compensation.  This service is not ancillary to any other valid business, but 
is the end business itself. 
 
Id. at 864-65 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  Mid-America’s employees could 
not charge for counseling or recommending trusts or for drawing, procuring or assisting 
in drawing trust documents.  Id. at 871.   
 
In 2007, this Court handed down Eisel, its most recent case addressing the 
unauthorized practice of law in the real estate context and explaining the importance of 
not charging or varying fees for filling in blanks on legal forms.  In Eisel, Midwest 
Bankcentre charged its clients a fee for having its non-attorney employees fill out        
 
9
                                             
pre-printed forms related to processing mortgage loans including promissory notes and 
deeds of trust.  230 S.W.3d at 337.  This Court found that promissory notes and deeds of 
trust were legal documents and that Midwest engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
by having non-attorneys prepare such documents for a fee.  Id. at 339 (finding charging a 
separate fee puts the emphasis on “legal drafting as a business rather than on the business 
of being a real estate broker.”).5 
 
B. 
What Constitutes Procuring Legal Documents 
 
The principles set out in these cases guide this Court in deciding whether JLB 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by: (1) gathering copies of pre-existing legal 
documents; (2) assisting Ms. Hargis in filling out her loan application and other financial 
disclosures; or (3) helping her obtain her note and deed of trust by providing financial 
information to third parties who then prepared these documents.    
 
In relevant part, section 484.010.2 defines the “law business” as “the drawing or 
the procuring of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of any paper, 
document or instrument affecting or relating to secular rights.”  § 484.010.2 (emphasis 
added).  This definition is consistent with this Court’s recognition in In re First Escrow 
that the practice of law involves not only “the preparation of closing documents” but 
 
5 JLB incorrectly cites Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697, 702 
n.4 (Mo. banc 2008), for the proposition that “[t]his Court has recently moved away from 
the language in In re First Escrow, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 839, 849 (Mo. banc 1992), 
concerning the varying of charges.” Carpenter concerned the charge of a separate fee for 
the preparation of legal documents and noted that the charge of such a fee is a sufficient 
basis on which to hold a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law.  Id. at 702. 
 
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“also encompasses ‘the procuring of or assisting in the drawing’ of [legal] documents.”  
840 S.W.2d at 843, quoting § 484.010.2.  
Ms. Hargis does not claim that JLB drew legal documents but does claim that JLB 
procured or assisted in drawing legal documents for valuable consideration.  To 
determine whether the record supports this claim, the Court first must determine what 
constitutes “procuring” a legal document.  Section 484.010.2 does not define it.           
Ms. Hargis says it means the same thing as gathered or obtained, while JLB says that it 
means taking part in the drafting of legal documents.   
In Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008), the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the meaning of “procure” in the context of a rule that required a witness to 
have been “kept back” or “detained” by “means or procurement” of the defendant.  The 
Supreme Court said in relevant part: 
[a]lthough there are definitions of “procure” and “procurement” that would 
merely require that a defendant have caused the witness’s absence, other 
definitions would limit the causality to one that was designed to bring about 
the result “procured.”  See 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828) (defining “procure” as “to contrive and effect” 
(emphasis added)…. Cases and treatises of the time indicate that a purpose-
based definition of these terms governed.  
 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
Missouri courts utilized a similar definition in Tabb v. Burt, 296 S.W. 820 (Mo. 
App. 1927), stating that the word “‘procure’ means “[t]o bring about by care and pains; 
effect; contrive and effect; induce; cause; as, he procured a law to be passed.”  Id. at 821.   
 
Neither Carpenter nor In re First Escrow changed the settled rule that the varying of 
 
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These definitions are consistent with more recent dictionary definitions of “procure.”  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1399 (4th ed. 2009) defines 
“procure” as “(1) to get by special effort; obtain or acquire; … (2) To bring about, effect 
….”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1327 (9th ed. 2009) says “procurement of breach of 
contract” is a form of tortious interference with contractual relations, which Black’s 
defines as “[a] third party’s intentional inducement of a contracting party to break a 
contract.”  Id. at 1627.  
What these definitions have in common is that procurement requires active 
involvement in the obtaining of some object, person or purpose; it involves acting to 
bring about or contriving to cause an effect.  While the outer parameters of what 
constitutes “procurement” may be somewhat indefinite under these definitions, it is clear 
that it involves more than merely passively gathering or obtaining information, data or 
documents from third parties or other sources.  This is consistent with In re                
Mid-America’s holding that “merely gathering information for use in a legal document 
does not necessarily constitute the unauthorized practice of law.”  927 S.W.2d at 865. 
C. 
JLB is not Shown to Have Procured Legal Documents 
Here, there are three types of documents that JLB acquired for Ms. Hargis.  If any 
of these are legal documents, and if the record shows that JLB procured or assisted in 
drawing them, then it was error to grant summary judgment to JLB on Ms. Hargis’ claims 
of the unauthorized practice of law.   
 
customary charges also can constitute the unauthorized practice of law.   
 
12
                                             
In considering this issue, this Court is limited to the record presented on summary 
judgment.  Here, JLB moved for summary judgment under Rule 74.04.  It was required to 
set out a statement of uncontroverted facts that entitled it to summary judgment.  Rule 
74.04(c)(1).  Ms. Hargis then had the opportunity to respond by admitting or denying 
each of these statements.  Rule 74.04(c)(2).  In denying any statements, she could not rest 
on the allegations of her pleadings but was required to “support each denial with specific 
references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Rule 74.04(c)(2); Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. 
Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 120 (Mo. banc 2010).  Summary judgment will be 
granted only if the summary judgment motion and responses “show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”  Rule 74.04(c)(6); Olive, 282 S.W.3d at 846. 
Initially, after JLB filed its motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted 
Ms. Hargis time to conduct discovery before responding.  Her response noted that JLB 
had failed to include a statement of uncontroverted facts, as required by Rule 74.04(c)(1).  
The trial court granted JLB leave to amend its motion to include this statement of 
uncontroverted facts.6  These allegedly uncontroverted facts were based largely on the 
affidavit and deposition testimony of Mr. John Paci, JLB’s vice president.  Ms. Hargis 
 
6 Ms. Hargis asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing JLB to amend its 
motion to include the required statement of uncontroverted facts.  But no authority is 
cited that this was not within the court’s discretion, where, as here, the court then gave 
Ms. Hargis further time to respond.  Moreover, had permission been denied, JLB simply 
could have filed a new motion with the required statement of uncontroverted facts.  
 
13
then filed a further response, alleging, principally based on Mr. Paci’s deposition 
testimony, that the facts surrounding JLB’s assistance to Ms. Hargis in gathering 
preexisting legal and financial documents, in filling out her loan application and financial 
disclosures, and in obtaining the note and deed of trust from title companies, investors 
and/or Document Systems showed that JLB had procured or assisted in drawing these 
documents and in so doing had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  This Court, 
therefore, turns to the record on which both parties rely to determine whether JLB’s 
conduct is shown to have constituted the unauthorized practice of law.  
1. 
Obtaining Pre-existing Legal and Financial Documents   
The first type of document that the record shows JLB helped Ms. Hargis obtain 
was copies of previously prepared financial documents relating to Ms. Hargis’ prior 
loans, mortgages, employment and credit history.  JLB obtained some of these documents 
from Ms. Hargis and others from her prior lenders, creditors and employers.  Ms. Hargis 
does not offer any basis as to why gathering these pre-existing financial and legal 
documents would constitute the practice of law.  As stated above, procuring documents 
requires more than the mere gathering of documents.  Because JLB simply gathered these 
pre-existing documents, Ms. Hargis’ allegations do not provide a basis for finding that 
JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  In re Mid-America, 927 S.W.2d at 856-
58 (holding that “merely gathering information for use in a legal document does not 
necessarily constitute the unauthorized practice of law.”).    
2. 
JLB Gathers Information Used by Others to Prepare Legal Documents  
 
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According to the record, JLB sent the information it gathered about Ms. Hargis’ 
financial situation to investors, title companies and/or Document Systems that prepared7 
Ms. Hargis’ note and deed of trust.  As discussed above, notes, mortgages and deeds of 
trust are legal documents and must be drawn by a lawyer licensed to practice law in 
Missouri if they are to be utilized in the financing of a Missouri property.  In re First 
Escrow, 840 S.W.2d at 848-49; Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 337.  Similarly, if a non-attorney 
procured or assisted in the drawing of a note, mortgage or deed of trust without the 
review or supervision of an attorney licensed to practice in Missouri, it would constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law.  In re First Escrow, 840 S.W.2d at 848-49; Eisel, 230 
S.W.3d at 337.  By contrast, filling in standardized forms is not the unauthorized practice 
of law so long as no fee is charged and legal judgment or discretion is not involved.  In re 
First Escrow, 840 S.W.2d at 848-49. 
Here, JLB is the only defendant.  The record shows that it did not draw the note or 
deed of trust itself.  Whether its conduct is the unauthorized practice of law depends on 
whether it procured or assisted in the drawing of these documents.  While Ms. Hargis 
says that the record shows that this occurred, her argument is based principally on her 
contention that gathering documents is legally equivalent to procuring them.  As set out 
above, however, procuring documents requires proof of more than merely obtaining or 
 
7 The record is limited and does not show whether Document Systems or any of the other 
third parties drew the note and deed of trust or merely prepared them by filling in blanks 
in standardized forms of the documents.  For ease of understanding this Court, therefore, 
will use the more generic term “prepare” when describing the document services 
provided by these third parties.   
 
15
passively gathering documents.  It requires active involvement in obtaining some object, 
person or purpose, acting to bring about or contriving to cause an effect.   
This the record does not show.  As noted, the record consists principally of the 
deposition and affidavit of Mr. Paci.  Mr. Paci explained that JLB acted as a conduit in 
transmitting necessary factual information between Ms. Hargis and title companies, 
investors and/or Document Systems, who then prepared the note and deed of trust and 
sent them back to JLB.  For example, in response to a question about who prepares “all 
the documents related to a mortgage that you guys process,” Mr. Paci testified: 
Well, we would prepare the loan application, [and] the disclosures.  We 
would get the appraisal from the appraiser.  We would get the title report 
from the title company.  But we don’t prepare those.  Those get sent to us.  
As far as the closing documents, they either get prepared by either the title 
company or the investor we sell the loan to, or there’s another document 
company called Document Systems or DocMagic.   
 
Mr. Paci’s affidavit stated that “the ‘processing fee’ and ‘administrative fee’ were 
charged for tasks associated with processing the loan, which include gathering forms and 
documents, communication with the underwriter, and obtaining additional information 
when required by the underwriter.”  When asked in his deposition whether JLB charges 
for the preparation of legal documents, Mr. Paci again stated, “I can tell you none of [our 
charges have] to do with preparing legal documents.”  He explained JLB’s role as that of 
a middleman or clearinghouse, taking various financial documents from Ms. Hargis, her 
prior lenders and employers, and others and giving them to title companies, investors or 
Document Systems, which then prepared Ms. Hargis’ note and deed of trust.     
These statements show only that JLB gathered documents about Ms. Hargis’ 
 
16
                                             
finances and transferred them to title companies, investors or Document Systems, which 
used the documents to prepare her note and deed of trust.  The statements provided no 
basis for the trial court to find that JLB was involved in procuring or assisting in drawing 
the documents or that title companies, investors and/or Document Systems acted as its 
agent in so doing.  So far as the record shows, JLB neither charged a separate document 
preparation fee8 for preparing the note and deed of trust nor disguised such a fee as part 
of an administrative or processing charge.  In sum, the record simply does not permit a 
finding of any conduct by JLB that could be found to constitute procuring or assisting in 
drawing the note or deed of trust or playing an active role in determining the content of 
these documents.  Neither is there evidence JLB charged a fee or varied its charges for 
their drawing by others at its behest or that it did more than transmit information 
provided by others to third parties, who then prepared these documents.   
 
8 Ms. Hargis suggests that she should be permitted to conduct additional discovery as to 
whether JLB charged a separate fee because it raised the issue that it has to be found to 
have charged a separate fee for its conduct to constitute the unauthorized practice of law 
only in its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment.  As this Court has 
rejected JLB’s argument that a document preparation fee may constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law only if it is stated separately rather than incorporated into other fees, this 
concern is moot.  In any event, JLB has asserted in all of its filings that it neither 
separately charged a document preparation fee (however titled) nor incorporated such a 
fee into its administrative or processing fees, as asserted by Ms. Hargis in her petition, 
and Ms. Hargis explored both issues in her deposition of Mr. Paci. This issue was not 
new, even if the now-rejected claim that a separate fee must be charged was not 
developed until the reply brief.  Moreover, Ms. Hargis had an opportunity to undertake 
additional discovery prior to the trial court’s ruling but did not do so, nor did she request 
an opportunity to do so prior to the trial court taking up the summary judgment motion, 
as she both was permitted and required to do under Rule 74.04(f) if she believed 
additional discovery was needed, and she has not identified specific additional discovery 
that she previously was unable to undertake.  
 
17
                                             
Ms. Hargis raises the specter that a finding by this Court that JLB did not procure 
these documents on these facts will encourage banks, lenders, brokers and others to 
“outsource” the drawing of legal documents to third parties who will act as their agents in 
having non-lawyers draw legal documents for consideration and send them back without 
review by Missouri lawyers.   
The problem with Ms. Hargis’ argument is that this is not what the record shows 
happened here.  She is correct that, under the facts she hypothesizes, a mortgage broker 
such as JLB would fall within the definition of “procuring” or “assisting” in drawing 
legal documents, for it would be undertaking an active role or contrivance in the drawing 
of the documents and, further, because it would be doing so for consideration.  So far as 
this record shows, however, the third parties did not act as agents of JLB and JLB 
received no consideration for the drawing of the note and deed of trust.  Instead, JLB 
simply obtained the documents from title companies, investors and/or Document Systems 
and transferred them to Ms. Hargis.  This Court can review only the grant of summary 
judgment on the record before it, and that record does not show that JLB engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law in gathering information and documents and acting as a 
middleman in the use of such information and documents by unrelated third parties to 
prepare Ms. Hargis’ note and deed of trust.9 
 
9 Similarly, this Court agrees with the dissent that one can be found to have procured a 
document even if one did not draft or assist in drafting the document and that, if JLB paid 
a third party to draft or assist in drafting documents, then that party would be acting as 
JLB’s agent and JLB would be responsible either for directly assisting in drafting or for 
procuring the documents.  Both these points are made above.  But, as also just discussed, 
 
18
                                                                                                                                                 
D. 
Loan Applications and Other Financial Disclosure Forms are not Legal 
Documents  
 
 
Finally, Ms. Hargis argues that JLB engaged in the practice of law by charging to 
assist her in preparing a loan application and other financial disclosure documents 
required to obtain a loan.  In support, she notes that Hulse stated: 
A real estate broker in conferring with parties to obtain facts and 
information about their personal and property status, other than is necessary 
to fill in the blank spaces in standardized forms necessary to complete and 
close transactions in which he is acting as a broker, for the purpose advising 
them of their rights and the actions to be taken concerning them, is 
engaging in the practice of law. 
 
Id. at 863.  She further notes that bankruptcy laws require the bankrupt party to file a list 
of assets and liabilities with the court and that only an attorney can make such a filing.  
Therefore, Ms. Hargis argues, helping her prepare a financial document that requires 
consideration of what to include as assets, what to include as liabilities, how to list them 
and so forth is the practice of law. 
This argument goes too far.  Determining whether a document is legal in nature 
requires this Court to “balance the protection of the public against a desire to avoid 
unnecessary inconvenience and expense.”  See In re First Escrow, 840 S.W.2d at 283.  As 
Hulse noted, the key factor in making this determination is whether preparing the 
document requires legal judgment or discretion.  247 S.W.2d at 848-49.  Legal and 
financial knowledge often overlap, and documents regarding finances often have legal 
 
summary judgment must be granted or denied based on the record before the Court, not 
based on speculation that evidence not in the record must exist.  Here, the evidence in the 
record just does not support the dissent’s factual inferences.  
 
19
                                             
effect, such as the filing of a tax return or the filling out of a retail credit card application.  
JLB acknowledges that it did work with Ms. Hargis to prepare her loan application 
and other financial disclosures.  But this Court agrees with JLB that, unlike a note, deed 
of trust or mortgage, these applications and disclosure forms are primarily financial – not 
legal – documents, the preparation of which by members of the finance industry does not 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  Ms. Hargis cites no authority for the 
proposition that preparing a loan application or a financial disclosure document 
inherently constitutes the practice of law rather than the practice of acting as a mortgage 
services provider, and this Court declines to so hold here.10     
Although legal knowledge certainly would be helpful in determining how to fill 
out these and other financial documents, every financial document cannot for that reason 
alone be considered a legal document that must be prepared by an attorney. Were it 
otherwise, every accountant, banker, car dealer or retail clerk who helps someone pay 
taxes or fill out a credit application would have to be a lawyer or fill out the document 
under the supervision of a lawyer.  This outcome would be patently unreasonable. 
 
10 Ms. Hargis is correct that a number of bankruptcy cases have held that forms requiring 
the listing of assets and liabilities for bankruptcy filings are legal documents that must be 
prepared by attorneys.  See, e.g., In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426 (Bkrtcy. D. Mont. 1999); 
In re Guttierez, 284 B.R. 287 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Tex. 2000). Those cases are distinguishable, 
however, because in bankruptcy cases, the documents are created specifically for filing in 
court, and legal discretion may be needed to ensure assets and liabilities are characterized 
in the correct manner and put in the proper categories so that the bankrupt party can 
maintain the greatest possible amounts of her or her assets.   
By contrast, in this case the documents are created to apply for a loan, and the type 
of legal discretion needed to list assets and liabilities properly for a bankruptcy 
proceeding is not required. 
 
20
This does not mean that financial documents related to the mortgage process never 
can be legal documents, the preparation of which will constitute the unauthorized practice 
of law.  As noted in In re First Escrow, if preparation of a particular document requires 
the exercise of legal judgment or discretion, then a lawyer must prepare it or supervise its 
preparation to avoid the unauthorized practice of law.  840 S.W.2d at 848-49 (escrow 
companies may not prepare or complete “nonstandard or specialized document … or any 
other document that requires the exercise of judgment or discretion.”).     
But, so far as this record shows, that was not the case here.  Although the 
documents in question – loan applications and other disclosure documents – require 
extensive disclosure of financial information, including employment history, monthly 
income and expenses, and a comprehensive list of assets and liabilities, they are 
standardized forms. The forms state what information is required to be filled in or 
provided; accuracy, rather than discretion – legal or otherwise – is what is required.  JLB 
did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in assisting Ms. Hargis in filling out 
these financial forms. 
IV. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
 
 
In addition to granting summary judgment against Ms. Hargis on her claims in 
Counts I and II that JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the trial court 
granted summary judgment against her on her claims of unjust enrichment (money had 
and received) in Count III.     
Rule 74.04(c)(1) states in part that “[a] motion for summary judgment shall 
 
21
summarily state the legal basis for the motion.  A statement of uncontroverted material 
facts shall be attached to the motion.”  “Generally, failure to comply with Rule 
74.04(c)(1) warrants a trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion and warrants an 
appellate court’s reversal of the grant of summary judgment.” Gillespie v. Estate of 
McPherson, 159 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Mo. App. 2005).   
 
In the present case, JLB’s motion for summary judgment did not contain a legal 
basis explaining why JLB was entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Hargis’ third count, 
alleging unjust enrichment, nor did it set out uncontroverted facts that negated this claim.  
Instead, JLB merely set out facts supporting its argument that it did not engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Nevertheless, JLB asked generally for summary judgment 
in its favor, and the judgment granted JLB summary judgment on all three counts.  
Although the trial court did not explain why it granted summary judgment on Count III, 
JLB suggests on appeal that the trial court so ruled because no additional facts were set 
out in Count III in support of Ms. Hargis’ unjust enrichment claim.  Therefore, if the facts 
set out in support of Counts I and II were insufficient to prevent summary judgment for 
JLB on those counts, JLB argues, they also were insufficient to prevent summary 
judgment on Count III. 
JLB’s reasoning does not support the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on 
Count III.  Although the factual basis for Ms. Hargis’ third count was the same as that for 
her first and second counts, the legal basis for her third count, unjust enrichment, or 
“money had and received,” differed. The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are 
 
22
                                             
entirely different than those of an unauthorized practice of law claim.  Unjust enrichment 
requires a showing that: “(1) [the plaintiff] conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the 
defendant appreciated the benefit; and (3) the defendant accepted and retained the benefit 
under inequitable and/or unjust circumstances.”  Howard v. Turnbull, 316 S.W.3d 431, 
436 (Mo. App. 2010). 
Here, the basis of Mr. Hargis’ unjust enrichment claim is that JLB charged her 
fees for services it did not perform.  This claim does not stand or fall on whether she also 
has a claim for the unauthorized practice of law on the facts alleged.  Indeed, Ms. Hargis’ 
motion to amend Count III makes it evident that Count III largely is an alternative basis 
for recovery to Counts I and II; she argues that if, as JLB claims, it did not procure or 
assist in drawing the legal documents in this case, then it was unjustly enriched by 
charging her for services it did not perform.11  JLB’s motion for summary judgment did 
not make clear that JLB was seeking summary judgment on Ms. Hargis’ unjust 
enrichment claim, and the statement of uncontroverted facts did not support entry of 
summary judgment on that claim.  As a result, Ms. Hargis has not yet completed her 
 
11 JLB claims that Ms. Hargis did not timely raise its failure to set out facts supporting 
summary judgment on Count III.  But until the trial court granted summary judgment on 
that count, Ms. Hargis could not have known that the trial court would grant summary 
judgment on it based on a motion addressing only the claims of unauthorized practice of 
law.  Once the court entered that judgment, Ms. Hargis did raise this issue in her motion 
to amend, vacate, correct or modify judgment, in which she claimed “that Defendant’s 
Motion [for summary judgment] never addressed Plaintiff’s common law count for 
money had and received, and that Plaintiff was never afforded the opportunity to perform 
discovery with respect to that count.”  In any event, the trial court is permitted to grant 
summary judgment under Rule 74.04 only when the record shows there is no genuine 
 
23
                                                                                                                                                 
discovery on that count because JLB’s summary judgment motion did not make her 
aware of the need to do so.  Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
on Count III.12 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  The trial court erred in granting JLB summary judgment on Count III because 
JLB did not show it is entitled to judgment on that count as a matter of law.  The 
judgment is reversed as to Count III.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.  The 
case is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Russell, Fischer and Price, JJ., and Pritchett,  
Sp.J., concur; Teitelman, C.J., concurs in  
part and dissents in part in separate opinion  
filed; Breckenridge, J., concurs in opinion of  
Teitelman, C.J. Draper, J., not participating. 
 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
The record did not so show here. 
12 Because this Court is reversing the grant of summary judgment on Count III and 
remanding, Ms. Hargis’ claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow her to amend her petition as to that count prior to entry of summary judgment and 
some six weeks before trial is moot, as Ms. Hargis will have a new opportunity to seek 
leave to amend on remand.  State ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 282 S.W.3d 
363, 366 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding that leave to amend should be granted liberally); see 
also Rule 55.33(a) (leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”).  For 
similar reasons, this Court also declines to reach the issue raised by JLB on appeal as to 
whether the pendency of similar claims in federal court affects Ms. Hargis’ ability to 
bring these claims in state court, an issue not addressed in JLB’s summary judgment 
motion. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
BONNIE HARGIS,   
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91639 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JLB CORPORATION d/b/a 
 
) 
GOLDEN OAK LENDING, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
 
The principal opinion holds that there are no genuine issues of material fact or law 
precluding summary judgment on Ms. Hargis’ claim that JLB engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Viewing the record in the light most favorable to  
Ms. Hargis, and providing her with the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the 
record, I would hold that summary judgment is not appropriate.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent from the principal opinion to the extent it holds that summary judgment was 
appropriate with respect to Counts I and II.  I concur in the principal opinion’s reversal of 
summary judgment with respect to Count III. 
“This Court’s primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.”  Parktown Imports, Inc. v. 
Audi of America, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  Each word, clause, 
sentence and provision of a statute is presumed to have meaning and effect.  Neske v. City 
of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo. banc 2007).  Further, it is “presumed that the 
legislature did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.”  Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Bd. of Aldermen, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. banc 2003)(quoting Hyde Park 
Housing Partnership v. Director of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 1993)).   
Section 484.010.2, RSMO 2000, defines the “law business” as “the drawing or the 
procuring of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration” any legal document.  
To give each word in the statute meaning and effect, the independent statutory concepts 
of “drawing,” “procuring” and “assisting in the drawing” must be practically 
distinguishable.  The term “procuring” must mean something different than the terms 
“drawing” and “assisting in the drawing.”  This means that one can procure a legal 
document without any participation in drawing the document.  Therefore, as the principal 
opinion notes, while “merely gathering information for use in a legal document does not 
necessarily constitute the unauthorized practice of law,” In re Mid-America Living Trust 
Assocs., Inc., 927 S.W.3d 855, 865, there could be circumstances in which gathering 
legal information to produce legal documents for a fee amounts to “procuring” legal 
documents.  
 
The principal opinion concludes that the record establishes conclusively that JLB 
did not “procure” legal documents because it did nothing more than passively gather 
information that Document Systems then used to prepare legal documents.  The 
characterization of JLB’s role as passive is not compelled by the record, particularly 
when Ms. Hargis is afforded the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record as 
 
2
required by the standard of review.  See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America 
Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).   
JLB’s business is acquiring or “procuring” mortgages on behalf of its customers.  
Creating a mortgage loan requires a number of necessary legal documents.  A plausible 
reading of the facts so far developed in this case indicates that JLB procures these 
documents for its customers by specifically requesting the information necessary to 
create the legal documents underlying the mortgage.  JLB does not gather passively 
whatever information its customers see fit to offer.  Instead, JLB guides the process for 
the sole purpose of ensuring that Document Systems has the necessary information to 
draw the required legal documents.  Document Systems then relays those documents to 
JLB so that JLB can facilitate closing the loan and finalizing the legal obligations of the 
borrower and lender.   JLB was actively involved in obtaining or “procuring” for  
Ms. Hargis the legal documents necessary to finalize her mortgage loan. While JLB may 
not be the party “drawing” the legal documents, the record does not establish 
conclusively that JLB does not participate in “procuring” those documents for Ms. 
Hargis.      
The principal opinion further concludes that the record shows that JLB did not 
charge any fee relating to the preparation of any legal document.  All the record shows is 
JLB’s vice president, John Paci, testified that none of JLB’s fees relates to the preparation 
of legal documents.  While Mr. Paci and JLB may choose not to attribute any of the fees 
charged to the preparation of legal documents, commercial reality suggests otherwise.  It 
is highly unlikely that JLB simply absorbs the costs of Document Systems’ preparation of 
 
3
 
4
the legal documents.  It is almost certain that JLB wisely elects to pass these costs on to 
its customers in the form of various processing and administrative fees.  Because JLB is a 
business and not a public interest organization or charity, it is also virtually certain that 
the various fees include a profit margin to compensate JLB for the time and effort spent 
procuring legal documents for and from Document Systems.    
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Hargis, the record at this 
stage of the litigation supports her theory that JLB charges its customers a variety of fees 
totaling thousands of dollars for the express purpose of procuring for and from Document 
Systems all of the legal documents necessary to close the mortgage loan.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the summary judgment on Counts I and II.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice