Title: People v. Evans

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Evans (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 83457-Agenda 5-November 
1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of 
the court:
Defendant, Johnnie Lee Evans, petitioned the 
circuit court of Cook County for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing 
Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996). The circuit court dismissed 
defendant's amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals 
directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In defendant's direct appeal, this court recited 
the details of his crimes. See People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50 (1988). 
We need not repeat those details here. Defendant was charged with, inter 
alia, the knowing, intentional, and felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, 
ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)) and the attempted rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1983, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 11-1) of 16-year-old Adrian Allen. At the close of the 
evidence, the jury returned general verdicts of guilty of murder and attempted 
rape.
Defendant waived a sentencing jury. At the first 
stage of the death sentencing hearing, the trial judge determined that defendant 
was eligible for the death penalty because he murdered the victim in the course 
of committing another felony, i.e., attempted rape. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6). At the close of the second stage of the death 
sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death on the murder 
conviction and to an extended prison term of 30 years on the attempted rape 
conviction.
Defendant appealed directly to this court. Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. While defendant's appeal was 
pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). On May 1, 
1987, this court entered a supervisory order remanding the cause to the circuit 
court for a Batson hearing. People v. Evans, No. 60705, 506 N.E.2d 1314 (1987). The circuit court found that defendant had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the 
State's exercise of its peremptory challenges.
On return of the case, this court affirmed 
defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50 
(1988). The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ 
of certiorari. Evans v. Illinois, 490 U.S. 1113, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1036, 109 S. Ct. 3175 (1989).
On June 27, 1990, defendant filed in the circuit 
court a petition for post-conviction relief. Nearly seven years later, defendant 
filed an amended post-conviction petition. On May 17, 1997, the circuit court, 
in the person of the same judge who sentenced defendant, granted the State's 
motion to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We will discuss 
additional relevant facts in the context of the issues raised on 
appeal.
DISCUSSION
A proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act (Act) is not an appeal of a defendant's underlying judgment. Rather, 
it is a collateral attack on the judgment. The purpose of the proceeding is to 
resolve allegations that constitutional violations occurred at trial, when those 
allegations have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously. To 
be entitled to post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional 
rights. Also, determinations of the reviewing court on the prior direct appeal 
are res judicata as to issues actually decided; issues that could have 
been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived. People v. 
Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1998); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 
(1995).
The petitioner in a post-conviction hearing is 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of right. Rather, the Act permits 
summary dismissal of a nonmeritorious petition. The allegations in the petition, 
supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, must 
show a substantial violation of constitutional rights. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 187; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 370-71; Mahaffey, 
165 Ill. 2d  at 452. For the purpose of determining whether to grant an 
evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any 
accompanying affidavits, in light of the original trial record, are to be taken 
as true. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-82 (1998); People 
v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995). The circuit court's dismissal 
of a post-conviction petition is reviewed de novo. Coleman, 
183 Ill. 2d  at 387-89.
On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied 
his constitutional rights at trial due to the: (1) prosecution's discriminatory 
use of its peremptory challenges during voir dire to exclude 
African-American venirepersons from the jury; (2) ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel at the death sentencing hearing; and (3) cumulative effect of 
these errors.
I. Batson Claim
Defendant contends that the prosecution used its 
peremptory challenges during voir dire to exclude African-American 
venirepersons from the jury. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principle that the State denies an African-American defendant the 
equal protection of the laws when it tries the defendant before a jury from 
which members of the defendant's race have been purposely excluded. 
Batson, 476 U.S.  at 85, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 80, 106 S. Ct.  at 1716; see 
Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 62. The ramifications of Batson continue 
to be realized. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
Batson requires that a defendant first 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S.  at 93-94, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 85-86, 106 S. Ct.  at 1721. Once the defendant 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to 
come forward with race-neutral and trial-specific reasons for striking the 
African-American venirepersons. Batson, 476 U.S.  at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d  
at 88, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723. The trial court must then consider those explanations 
and determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. 
Batson, 476 U.S.  at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 88-89, 106 S. Ct.  at 1724; see 
People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 219-20 (1991); People v. 
Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (1992).
In this case, the circuit court found that 
defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination. On direct review, this court upheld that finding. 
Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 61-67; see People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 469 (1993) ("a trial judge's determination that a defendant failed to 
establish a Batson prima facie case is a finding of fact and 
will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence").
In his post-conviction petition, defendant 
points to one observation of this court in its discussion of this issue on 
direct review:
Defendant assigns error to this observation. The 
petition, supported by affidavits, alleges that the trial record fails to 
indicate the race of most of the witnesses and, further, that 8 of the 15 
witnesses who testified at the guilt phase of the trial were white. The circuit 
court found that this claim was res judicata.
Before this court, defendant argues 
that,"[b]ecause [defendant's] claim was supported by new evidence, res 
judicata did not apply." The State initially responds that defendant failed 
to include the race of the trial witnesses in the record of the Batson 
hearing. Thus, the State contends, "because defendant's 'new evidence' is not 
really new, and could have been made part of the record on direct appeal, it is 
insufficient to overcome res judicata." In his reply, defendant denies 
the existence of "a requirement that, to avoid res judicata, it is 
necessary that the new evidence at issue could not have been part of the record 
on direct appeal."
Defendant's contention lacks merit. "It is well 
established that the scope of post-conviction review is limited to 
constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously 
adjudicated." People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995); accord 
People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987); People v. 
Derengowski, 44 Ill. 2d 476, 479 (1970). Therefore,"[t]he judgment of the 
reviewing court on a previous appeal is res judicata as to all issues 
actually decided, and any claim that could have been presented to the reviewing 
court in the direct appeal is, if not presented, thereafter barred under the 
doctrine of waiver." Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d  at 365; accord 
Derengowski, 44 Ill. 2d  at 479; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill. 2d 81, 85 (1960). We note that these procedural bars occasionally may be relaxed 
when fundamental fairness requires. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 522; 
Derengowski, 44 Ill. 2d  at 479; People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 408 (1966).
We remanded this cause to the circuit court 
specifically for a Batson hearing. This was defendant's opportunity to 
establish a Batson prima facie case. At the Batson 
hearing, defendant and the prosecution stipulated to the race of the selected 
jurors and the peremptorily excused venirepersons. Defendant knew the race of 
the trial witnesses, and could have easily included those facts in the record of 
the Batson hearing. Such facts are part of the totality of relevant 
circumstances a trial court may consider when determining whether there was 
discrimination. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 63-64, citing United States 
v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other 
grounds, 485 U.S. 58, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54, 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988). Defendant 
carried the burden of preserving those facts in the record of the 
Batson hearing. See Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 190; People v. 
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 279-80 (1990). Defendant's failure to do so 
constitutes a waiver of this issue in this post-conviction proceeding. Further, 
no reason based on fundamental fairness suggests itself as to why the waiver 
rule should not apply to this claim. The circuit court properly dismissed this 
claim.
II. Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel: Death Sentencing Hearing
Defendant next claims that he was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the second stage of 
the death sentencing hearing. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, §8. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984); see Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 245-46.
The test is composed of two prongs: deficiency 
and prejudice. First, the defendant must prove that counsel made errors so 
serious, and that counsel's performance was so deficient, that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment. A court measures 
counsel's performance by an objective standard of competence under prevailing 
professional norms. To establish deficiency, the defendant must overcome the 
strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction might have been the 
product of sound trial strategy. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 
73-74 (1997); Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 457-58.
Second, the defendant must establish prejudice. 
The defendant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. The prejudice prong of Strickland entails 
more than an "outcome-determinative" test. The defendant must show that 
counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or 
the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74. In the 
context of a death sentencing hearing, a defendant must prove that there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer 
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 
466.
A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the 
Strickland test. However, if the ineffective-assistance claim can be 
disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer prejudice, a court 
need not decide whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 380-81. 
Defendant makes three contentions in support of this claim.
A. Failure to Investigate: 
Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance
Defendant contends that trial counsel failed to 
introduce available evidence to support the statutory mitigating factor that 
"the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 
9-1(c)(2).
The State initially responds that the issue is 
waived in this post-conviction proceeding. We disagree. The trial record does 
not include the evidence which defendant now presents to substantiate his claim 
of ineffective assistance. "Rules of waiver and res judicata will be 
relaxed where the facts relating to the issue of counsel's incompetency do not 
appear on the face of the record." People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 
167 (1995). Therefore, we will address the merits of this issue. See, 
e.g., People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163, 184-85 (1996); 
People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528 (1991).
The issue of whether defendant received 
effective assistance of counsel must be determined from the totality of 
counsel's conduct. People v. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d 470, 493 (1984). At 
the close of the guilt phase of the trial, defendant's trial counsel sought a 
30-day continuance so defendant could receive a psychiatric evaluation from Dr. 
Alan Rosenwald. The trial court inquired as to the purpose of the examination. 
Counsel responded: "Judge, it would go to the indicia-mitigation. I believe one 
of the factors in mitigation is that extreme, emotional distress." The trial 
court granted the continuance.
At the second stage of the death sentencing 
hearing, defendant's mitigation witnesses were himself and Dr. Rosenwald, in 
that order. Defendant, during direct examination, testified at length as to his 
troubled and disadvantaged life. He also denied committing the present crimes. 
During cross-examination, defendant denied having any knowledge of or 
involvement in the attempted rape and murder of the victim. He testified that he 
did not know the victim and that he was not in the elevator with her. Defendant 
testified that his inculpatory statement was not voluntary; he falsely confessed 
in exchange for a promise of a lesser charge and police protection for his 
family.
Dr. Rosenwald next testified. Defendant's trial 
counsel asked Dr. Rosenwald whether he was "able to a degree of reasonable 
certainty, able to determine whether or not [defendant] is acting under an 
extreme emotional or mental distress?" Dr. Rosenwald answered: "Well, if extreme 
is chronic, I have trouble with the term extreme. I think this is a 
long-standing mental disturbance, and that consequently there would be periods 
of time where [defendant] would be acting under extreme duress. That he has been 
chronically ill for many years." On cross-examination, Dr. Rosenwald again 
concluded "that it was highly probable that [defendant] was under emotional 
factors which could contribute to the crimes that he committed." Also, during 
cross-examination, Dr. Rosenwald testified that defendant's trial counsel had 
not asked him to consider, thus his report did not discuss, whether defendant 
was acting under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he 
committed the murder.
Now, in this post-conviction proceeding, 
defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit 
testimony from Dr. Rosenwald that tracked the language of the statutory 
mitigating factor, i.e., that defendant was acting under the influence 
of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the 
offense. See Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 89. Defendant's post-conviction 
petition includes affidavits from Dr. Rosenwald, Dr. Gerard Girdaukas, and 
Arlene Messner-Peters, attesting that defendant was under such a disturbance at 
the time of the murder.
This contention fails both the deficiency and 
prejudice prongs of the Strickland test. First, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the performance of defendant's 
trial counsel was objectively incompetent. It is true that "[u]nder the Illinois 
murder statute, evidence that a defendant was acting under the 
influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder is one 
of the factors to be considered in mitigation, and may be a basis for imposing a 
sentence other than death." (Emphasis added.) People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 490 (1995). In this case, however, defendant testified that he 
did not act, i.e., he was not involved in the murder in any 
way. "Defendant's insistence of innocence colors the understanding of his 
claim." People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325, 330 (1994). "The 
reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially 
influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.
It would have been difficult for defendant's 
trial counsel to elicit testimony from Dr. Rosenwald and, based thereon, argue 
that defendant acted under the influence of an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murder when defendant had just finished 
testifying that he did not act in any way. For counsel to have 
presented evidence of this mitigating mental state, as defendant now contends, 
would have been inconsistent with defendant's own testimony. See People v. 
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1996). "Defense counsel's decision to forgo 
the presentation of mitigation evidence that would be inconsistent with the 
defendant's sworn trial testimony has been held constitutionally adequate." 
People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356, 373 (1995).
Should trial counsel have presented a defense 
that contradicted defendant's protestations of innocence? Should counsel have 
labelled their client a liar so they could additionally label him a murderer who 
acted under an extreme emotional disturbance? Rather, closing argument reveals 
that trial counsel's sentencing strategy was to portray defendant as the 
neglected and unwanted victim of an abusive childhood, who raped women in a 
misguided quest for love. "A reasoned decision to make the best of a bad 
situation by pursuing a particular line of defense satisfies the constitutional 
minimum." Kokoraleis v. Gilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 
1997).
Second, this contention fails the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test. In other words, defendant has failed to 
show a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel presented evidence that 
defendant had acted under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the 
murder, the trial judge would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. See Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 466.
The aggravation evidence is plentiful and 
significant. Initially, defendant admitted his involvement in these crimes; his 
inculpatory statement was admitted at trial. Many details of his statement were 
corroborated by other evidence.
The record contains the following additional 
aggravation evidence. Between 1969 and 1974, defendant committed several 
offenses including criminal trespass, theft, and disorderly conduct. In 1974, 
defendant raped Tina Yancy at knifepoint in an elevator; however, charges based 
on this incident were subsequently dismissed. In 1975, 20 days after his release 
from the county jail on the charges brought by Yancy, defendant raped Loretta 
Brown in an elevator. One week later, he raped Ruby Coleman in an elevator. 
Defendant was tried, convicted and imprisoned. In 1978, nine days after his 
release from prison, defendant raped Gail Carroll at knifepoint in an elevator. 
Again, defendant was tried, convicted, and imprisoned. In 1983, 24 days after 
his release from prison, defendant attempted to rape Annie Webb in an elevator. 
Instead, he battered her and one of her children and stole her purse, which 
contained a pearl-handle knife bearing the word "Lion" on the handle. The next 
day, defendant attempted to rape Diane Smith at knifepoint in her apartment. 
Smith resisted, defended herself with a kitchen knife, and forced defendant from 
her apartment. The day after that, defendant raped Maeline Mitchell at 
knifepoint in an elevator; Mitchell identified defendant's knife as the one 
defendant had stolen from Webb. Four days later, on January 22, 1983, defendant 
stabbed the victim in this case to death in an attempt to rape her in an 
elevator.
Additional aggravation evidence included the 
following. While defendant was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, he 
sent letters to Paula Banks, a 16-year-old sister of another inmate. In those 
letters, defendant asked Banks to be his girlfriend. In one letter, defendant 
threatened her life if she did not comply. While he was incarcerated at Graham 
Correctional Center, defendant was disciplined for grabbing a female 
correctional officer's buttocks. When defendant was released on parole, he did 
not cooperate with his parole officer and made no effort to find employment. A 
petition for violation of parole was filed as a result of the charges in this 
case.
First, given all of the evidence before the 
trial judge, there is no reasonable probability that the additional evidence now 
offered by defendant would have caused the trial judge to find the existence of 
this statutory mitigating factor. A defendant is under the influence of an 
extreme emotional disturbance when the defendant's emotional state at the time 
of the murder is at such a fragile point as to leave him or her with little to 
no emotional control. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 206, quoting People 
v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 534 (1989). Here, the aggravation evidence, 
including defendant's inculpatory statement, shows that defendant's overall 
mental state was one of rationality and composure. Also, since defendant 
initially lied to police prior to giving his inculpatory statement, he 
apparently appreciated the criminality of his acts. See Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 206; Foster, 168 Ill. 2d at 491-92; Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d  at 534-35.
Second, it must be remembered that:
In light of the overwhelming aggravation 
evidence, we hold that even if defendant had established the existence of this 
statutory mitigating factor, there is no reasonable probability that the trial 
judge would have imposed a sentence other than death. The circuit court properly 
dismissed this claim.
B. Failure to Investigate: 
Other Mitigation Evidence
Defendant next contends that trial counsel 
failed to investigate and present evidence of other nonstatutory mitigating 
factors. We earlier described the aggravation evidence. Defendant's mitigation 
witnesses were himself and Dr. Rosenwald.
Defendant's testimony touched on many aspects of 
his life. Defendant gave extensive, detailed testimony regarding neglect, abuse, 
and sexual molestation from family, coworkers, and strangers during his 
childhood and teenage years. Defendant testified regarding his married life. He 
described his first wife and their children, and how the family was separated 
due to his jail record and his first wife's neglect of their 
children.
He admitted committing all of the rapes with 
which he was charged, except for the rape of Tina Yancy. Defendant explained 
that he "didn't mean to rape [those] women," but that he did so due to a "need 
of affection." He explained: "I had to prove that I was a man," and "I just 
wanted somebody to love me."
Also, defendant explained that he did not grab 
the buttocks of the female correctional officer; rather, he accidently touched 
her from behind his back. At first, the officer accepted his apology. However, 
she subsequently saw defendant laughing with other inmates; she believed that 
defendant was talking about her. At that point, she reported the touching to her 
supervisor, who ordered her to formally report the incident. Additionally, 
defendant denied writing letters to Paula Banks, but acknowledged that the name 
and prison identification number on the letter were his.
Dr. Rosenwald performed a psychiatric 
examination of defendant. Dr. Rosenwald believed that defendant felt "very 
impotent and empty and dependent" and "victimized." Defendant also felt anger as 
a result of neglect and abuse by his family. Dr. Rosenwald described defendant 
as "chronically a depressed human being who feels helpless, rejected, abandoned, 
unloved."
Dr. Rosenwald also testified that defendant: 
might have considerable difficulty in understanding the feelings and emotions of 
other people; did not have very good control of his own emotions, which would 
emerge in a "tumultuous" fashion; and had "a kind of psychopathology in the 
sexual area."
Dr. Rosenwald opined that defendant: had average 
intelligence; was able to conform his thinking to conventional standards "when 
emotional situations are not in play," was "chronically depressed"; and felt 
himself to be a victim of society and, therefore, "would not see himself as 
primarily responsible." Dr. Rosenwald opined that defendant could benefit "from 
some kind of psychotherapeutic intervention," but defendant "without treatment 
is indeed a danger to society."
Now, in his post-conviction petition, defendant 
contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present evidence of defendant's: (1) social history, as 
described in the affidavit of Messner-Peters, and (2) mental impairments, as 
described in the affidavit of Dr. Girdaukas. We disagree.
The evidence of defendant's social history 
described in the Messner-Peters affidavit would have been cumulative to 
defendant's extensive mitigation testimony and, thus, of no effect on the 
outcome of the death sentencing hearing. See Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d at 
490-91; cf. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 521 (1998) 
(proffered mitigation evidence not cumulative where mitigation evidence 
presented at death sentencing hearing "devoid of detail regarding defendant's 
life"). Further, such evidence is not inherently mitigating. Stewart v. 
Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1996). The trial judge might have 
considered such evidence to be an aggravating factor. The judge could have 
regarded defendant's troubled life, with his criminal record, as an indicator of 
defendant's future dangerousness. See Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 467; 
People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 335-37 (1992).
Similarly, evidence of mental impairments as 
described in Dr. Girdaukas' affidavit is not inherently mitigating. Holman 
v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882-84 (1997). Proof of defendant's mental 
handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could 
have demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness. See Foster, 168 
Ill. 2d at 490-91; Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 467-68.
"Moreover, we must assess prejudice in a 
realistic manner based on the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, it is 
improper to focus solely on the potential mitigating evidence. As our cases 
illustrate, the nature and extent of the evidence in aggravation must also be 
considered." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 538 (collecting cases). In this 
case, the aggravation evidence was overwhelming. We conclude that the 
introduction of the evidence now proffered by defendant regarding his background 
and mental health would not have created a reasonable probability of a different 
sentence. See Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 539; People v. Thomas, 
164 Ill. 2d 410, 424-29 (1995). The circuit court properly dismissed this 
claim.
C. Failure to Object: Victim's 
Pregnancy
Defendant next contends that trial counsel 
failed to object to aggravation evidence and argument that the victim was 
pregnant. Edmund Donaghue, deputy chief medical examiner of Cook County, 
testified that the victim was five months' pregnant at the time she was killed. 
Defendant notes Dr. Donaghue's testimony that the victim's pregnancy was not 
externally visible; thus, defendant was unaware that she was pregnant. During 
closing argument, both the prosecution and defendant's trial counsel referred to 
this evidence. Defendant's trial counsel failed to object to this evidence and 
argument.
Defendant argues that such evidence and argument 
were irrelevant, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial. Dismissing this claim, 
the circuit court found that defendant's trial counsel was not deficient and 
defendant was not prejudiced.
This issue is barred by operation of res 
judicata and waiver. A petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by 
rephrasing issues, which were previously addressed, in constitutional terms, 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277-78 (1992) (and cases cited therein). This court found that defendant 
was not prejudiced by this evidence and argument. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 
94-96. Defendant cannot now argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to what this court has previously concluded to be nonprejudicial. See 
Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d  at 420-21. The circuit court properly dismissed 
this claim.
III. Cumulative Effect of Alleged 
Errors
Defendant lastly claims that the cumulative 
effect of these alleged errors violated his constitutional rights. The circuit 
court properly dismissed this claim. We have rejected each claim in this 
post-conviction petition. Thus, there can be no cumulative effect. See 
People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 105 (1990); People v. 
Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 82-83 (1984).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the 
circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to 
enter an order setting Tuesday, May 18, 1999, as the date on which the sentence 
of death entered in the circuit court is to be imposed. The defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden 
of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICES HEIPLE and RATHJE took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
I agree that no basis exists for disturbing 
Evans' convictions or the sentence he received for the attempted rape of Adrian 
Allen. In my view, however, Evans' death sentence should not be allowed to 
stand. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), this state's present death penalty law does not meet the 
requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Accordingly, we should 
vacate Evans' death sentence and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
imposition of a sentence other than death.