Title: People v. Moss

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 91012, 91013, 91044, 91045, 91046, 91047, 91048, 
91049, 91050, 91051, 91052, 91328 cons.-Agenda 12-September 
 								2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
SALATHEO MOSS et al., Appellees.-THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. SALATHEO MOSS et al., 
Appellees.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. DAVID MONTAGUEO, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE 
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOSEPH 
CAMPOS, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANGEL GARCIA, Appellee.-THE 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
MYCHAEL HORTON, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. EDDIE REESE, 
Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. JOE HUNT, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MARCO GARCIA, 
Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. ANGELO SCOTT, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DARVUS 
BARNETTE, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
 								ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEFFON MEADERDS, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The common question presented in these 12 consolidated
appeals is whether sentencing enhancements added to certain
offenses by Public Act 91-404 (Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January
1, 2000) are constitutional. Public Act 91-404 amended the
penalty portions of several statutes by adding what have been
referred to as the "15/20/25-to-life" provisions. Under these
provisions, a mandatory enhancement is added to the defendant's
sentence if a firearm was used in the commission of the offense.
The length of the enhancement varies depending on how the
firearm was used. In the case at bar, defendants were charged with
various offenses whose penalties were amended by Public Act
91-404, including attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4,
9-1 (West 2000)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)),
aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2000)),
and aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000)). In
each case, defendants filed pretrial motions alleging that the Public
Act 91-404 sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional.
	The circuit court of Cook County heard and decided the
pretrial motions. Nine of the cases were consolidated before one
judge, who found that the sentencing amendments violated the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §11) and the general prohibition against double
enhancement (People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992)).
The judge granted defendants' motions to dismiss, some in full
and some in part. A second judge heard arguments in the tenth
case and found that the amendments at issue violated the
separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. II, §1). The judge in that case dismissed the armed
robbery count against defendant. The two remaining cases were
consolidated before a third judge, who found that the amendments
violated both the proportionate penalties and the double jeopardy
clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§10,
11). Interpreting this third ruling as effectively dismissing the
relevant charges, the State appealed all three orders directly to this
court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the judgements of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
Causes Nos. 91044 Through 91052
	In cause No. 91044, defendant David Montagueo was charged
by information with one count of armed robbery with a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)). According to the
information, on January 26, 2000, Montagueo, while armed with
a handgun, took United States currency from the victim. Prior to
trial, Montagueo moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that
the additional 15-year penalty mandated for this offense violated,
inter alia, the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11) and the prohibition
against double enhancement.
	In causes Nos. 91045 and 91046, indictments charged
defendants Joseph Campos and Angel Garcia, respectively, with
multiple offenses (16 counts) stemming from the February 1,
2000, taking of a motor vehicle and other items from the victim.
Included among the charges were two counts of attempted first
degree murder, one with a firearm and one with personal discharge
of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1)
(West 2000)); two counts of aggravated vehicular hijacking, one
with a firearm and one with personal discharge of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4), (a)(5), (b) (West 2000)); two counts of armed
robbery, one with a firearm and one with personal discharge of a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(3), (b) (West 2000)); and four
counts of aggravated kidnapping, two with a firearm and two with
personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6), (a)(7), (b)
(West 2000)). Defendants in these two cases filed essentially the
same pretrial motion as did Montagueo. Campos and Garcia
moved to dismiss the relevant charges against them on the basis
that the additional 15- and 20-year penalties mandated for these
offenses were unconstitutionally disproportionate. They also
alleged, inter alia, that the penalties violated the prohibition
against double enhancement.
	The indictment in cause No. 91047 charged defendant
Mychael Horton with multiple offenses (five counts) in connection
with a shooting that occurred on March 31, 2000. Included in the
charges were two counts of attempted murder, one with a firearm
and one with personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily
harm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(D), 9-1(a)(1) (West
2000)). As in the previous cases, Horton filed a pretrial motion to
dismiss the attempted murder counts on the ground that the
additional 15- and 25-years-to-life penalties mandated for these
offenses were, inter alia, unconstitutionally disproportionate and
a violation of the prohibition against double enhancement.
	Eddie Reese, the defendant in cause No. 91048, was charged
by indictment with multiple offenses (six counts) stemming from
a shooting that occurred on February 24, 2000. Included among
the charges were four counts of attempted first degree murder, two
with a firearm (one for each of the two victims) and two with
personal discharge of a firearm (one for each of the two victims)
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)).
Reese based his pretrial motion to dismiss on the same grounds
that were cited in the previous cases.
	In cause No. 91049, defendant Joe Hunt was charged in a 10-count indictment with, inter alia, two counts of attempted murder,
one with a firearm and one with personal discharge of a firearm
causing great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B),
(c)(1)(D), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); and two counts of armed
robbery, one with a firearm and one with personal discharge of a
firearm causing great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(4),
(b) (West 2000)). According to the indictment, Hunt took United
States currency from the victim in a robbery that occurred on
August 29, 2000. Hunt filed essentially the same pretrial motion
to dismiss as was filed in the previous cases, based on the same
grounds.
	Among the charges included in a 26-count indictment against
Marco Garcia, defendant in cause No. 91050, were two counts of
attempted murder of a peace officer with personal discharge of a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1), (b)(1) (West
2000)), one for each of two Chicago police officers at whom
Garcia allegedly shot on August 20, 2000. The indictment also
charged Garcia with, inter alia, 12 counts of attempted murder, six
with a firearm and six with personal discharge of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)).
According to the indictment, Garcia shot at four other victims in
addition to the two police officers. Garcia filed essentially the
same pretrial motion to dismiss as did defendants in the previous
cases.
	In cause No. 91051, defendant Darvus Barnette was charged
in a four-count indictment with two counts of aggravated vehicular
hijacking with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4), (b) (West 2000))
and two counts of armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)). According to the allegations in the
indictment, on September 3, 2000, Barnette took a motor vehicle
from the two victims, a cellular telephone from one of them, and
United States currency from the other. Prior to trial, Barnette
moved to dismiss the indictment on the same grounds cited in the
previous cases.
	Angelo Scott, defendant in cause No. 91052, was charged by
indictment (10 counts) with, inter alia, one count of armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)).
According to the indictment, on October 14, 2000, Scott took a
wallet and United States currency from the victim. As in the
previous cases, Scott filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the 15-year additional penalty
mandated for this offense was unconstitutional.
	As noted, these nine cases were consolidated before one
circuit court judge. On January 17, 2001, the judge granted
defendants' motions to dismiss, some in full and some only in
part. The circuit court found that the 15- and 20-year additions
mandated by Public Act 91-404 violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §11). The court explicitly found that there was "no
disproportionateness in the case of the 25 years to life
enhancement in cases resulting [in] great bodily harm or death."
The circuit court also found that all of the 15-20-25 to life
provisions violated the prohibition against double enhancement.
	With regard to these nine consolidated cases, the circuit court
dismissed the following counts: cause No. 91044 (David
Montagueo), count I (armed robbery with a firearm) (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)), which constituted the entire
indictment; causes Nos. 91045 and 91046 (Joseph Campos and
Angel Garcia), counts I and VII (attempted first degree murder
with personal discharge of a firearm, and with a firearm) (720
ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(B), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000));
counts II and VIII (aggravated vehicular hijacking with personal
discharge of a firearm, and with a firearm) (720 ILCS
5/18-4(a)(5), (a)(4), (b) (West 2000)); counts III and IX (armed
robbery with personal discharge of a firearm, and with a firearm)
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3), (a)(2), (b) (West 2000)); and counts IV,
V, X and XI (aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a
firearm, and with a firearm) (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(7), (a)(6), (b)
(West 2000)); cause No. 91047 (Mychael Horton), count II
(attempted first degree murder with personal discharge of a
firearm causing great bodily harm) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(D),
9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); cause No. 91048 (Eddie Reese), counts III
and IV (attempted first degree murder with personal discharge of
a firearm) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000));
cause No. 91049 (Joe Hunt), count II (attempted first degree
murder with personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily
harm) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(D), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); and
counts IV and V (armed robbery with a firearm, and with personal
discharge of a firearm causing great bodily harm) (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(4), (b) (West 2000)); cause No. 91050 (Marco
Garcia), counts I and II (attempted first degree murder of a peace
officer with personal discharge of a firearm) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a),
(c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2000)); and counts IX through
XIV (attempted first degree murder with personal discharge of a
firearm) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000));
cause No. 91051 (Darvus Barnette), counts I and II (aggravated
vehicular hijacking with a firearm) (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4), (b)
(West 2000)); and counts III and IV (armed robbery with a
firearm) (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)), which
constituted the entire indictment; and cause No. 91052 (Angelo
Scott), count II (armed robbery with a firearm) (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)).

Cause No. 91328
	In cause No. 91328, defendant Steffon Meaderds was charged
by information with multiple offenses (seven counts) stemming
from an incident that took place on May 30, 2000. Among the
charges included in the information was one count of armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)).
According to the information, Meaderds, while armed with a
firearm, took a wallet and United States currency from the victim.
Prior to trial, Meaderds filed a motion to dismiss the armed
robbery charge on the ground that the 15-year additional penalty
mandated for this offense violated, inter alia, the proportionate
penalties clause and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; art. II, §1).
	On January 5, 2001, the circuit court of Cook County granted
defendant's motion to dismiss the armed robbery count. In its
written order, the court noted that under the amended penalty
provision in the armed robbery statute, the mandatory additional
penalties are to be "added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2000). While the circuit
court found this language unclear, it interpreted it as indicating
that someone other than the court was to impose the additional
penalties. This, the court concluded, was a usurpation of the
court's sentencing power. The court thus found that the Public Act
91-404 sentencing amendments to the armed robbery statute
violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution.(1)

Causes Nos. 91012 and 91013
	In causes Nos. 91012 and 91013, defendants Salatheo Moss
and Thomas Gibson were charged by indictment with multiple
offenses in connection with two robberies that took place on
January 2, 2000. In cause No. 91012, the charges in the four-count
indictment included one count of armed robbery with a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)). According to the
indictment, Moss and Gibson, while armed with a firearm, took
jewelry, a purse and its contents from the victim. In cause No.
91013, the charges in the five-count indictment included two
counts of armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2),
(b) (West 2000)), one count for each of the two victims. The
indictment alleges that Moss and Gibson, while armed with a
firearm, took jewelry and United States currency from the victims.
Moss and Gibson filed pretrial motions seeking a declaration that
the 15-year add-on mandated for armed robbery with a firearm
violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). Gibson's motion alleged
in addition that the sentencing provision was vague in that it failed
to state who, other than the court, was to impose the additional
penalty.
	On October 4, 2000, the circuit court of Cook County granted
defendants' motions to declare the Public Act 91-404 sentencing
amendments to the armed robbery statute unconstitutional. The
court found the amended sentencing portion of the armed robbery
statute unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the separation
of powers clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1) and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
(U.S. Const., amend. V).
	On February 9, 2001, upon motion for reconsideration by the
State, the circuit court vacated its previous order but nevertheless
found the sentencing portion of the armed robbery statute
unconstitutional, this time on different grounds. According to the
court, the Public Act 91-404 amendments to the armed robbery
statute violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). The court also found
that the amendments violated the double jeopardy clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10).
	Interpreting this third order of the circuit court as effectively
dismissing the charges of armed robbery with a firearm against
defendants in causes Nos. 91012 and 91013, the State appeals this
ruling as well as the other two (in causes Nos. 91044 through
91052, and cause No. 91328) directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
603.

ANALYSIS
	The main purpose of Public Act 91-404, as stated in the act,
is "to deter the use of firearms in the commission of a felony
offense" (Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at
720 ILCS 5/33A-1 (West 2000)). People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392, 395-96 (2002). In order to achieve this purpose, the act
amended the sentencing portions of several provisions in the
Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code), including those
criminalizing 10 offenses that the legislature felt were "the most
serious offenses" (91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May
13, 1999, at 67-68 (statements of Representative Turner)).
Included among these 10 offenses are the four at issue in the
instant appeals: attempted first degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated vehicular hijacking.
The additions to the penalties for these offenses are what have
been referred to as the "15/20/25-to- life" provisions. Public Act
91-404 also amended the penalties for armed violence (720 ILCS
5/33A-3 (West 2000)), but these changes did not include the
"15/20/25-to-life" measures. The act also added three definitions
to the "General Definitions" section of the Criminal Code.
	We begin by setting out the amended statutes relevant to these
appeals. The measures added to the "General Definitions" section
include sections 2-3.6, 2-7.5, and 2-15.5 of the Criminal Code.
Section 2-3.6 provides:
			" 'Armed with a firearm'[.] Except as otherwise
provided in a specific Section, a person is considered
'armed with a firearm' when he or she carries on or about
his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm."
720 ILCS 5/2-3.6 (West 2000).
	Section 2-7.5 states:
			" 'Firearm'. Except as otherwise provided in a specific
Section, 'firearm' has the meaning ascribed to it in
Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act
[430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2000)]." 720 ILCS 5/2-7.5 (West
2000).
	Section 2-15.5 provides:
			" 'Personally discharged a firearm'. A person is
considered to have 'personally discharged a firearm' when
he or she, while armed with a firearm, knowingly and
intentionally fires a firearm causing the ammunition
projectile to be forcefully expelled from the firearm." 720
ILCS 5/2-15.5 (West 2000).
 	The attempt statute, section 8-4 of the Criminal Code,
provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) Elements of the Offense.
			A person commits an attempt when, with intent to
commit a specific offense, he does any act which
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of
that offense.
* * *
			(c) Sentence.
			A person convicted of an attempt may be fined or
imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided
for the offense attempted but, except for an attempt to
commit the offense defined in Section 33A-2 of this Act
[armed violence],
				(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree
murder is the sentence for a Class X felony, except that
					***
					(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder
while armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for
which 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court;
					(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder
during which the person personally discharged a
firearm is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall
be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court;
					(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder
during which the person personally discharged a
firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm,
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or
death to another person, is a Class X felony for
which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court." 720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000).
	As is shown in the statute set forth above, the 15/20/25-to-life
provisions require additional terms of imprisonment where a
firearm is used in the commission of the offense. The length of the
additional term depends on how the firearm is used. Hence, where
the firearm is merely possessed, the required addition is 15 years.
Where it is personally discharged, an additional 20 years is
mandated. Finally, where the firearm is personally discharged and
it proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death, an enhancement of 25 years to
life must be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court.
	These same penalty provisions were added to the other three
statutes at issue in these appeals: aggravated kidnapping, armed
robbery, and aggravated vehicular hijacking. The aggravated
kidnapping statute, section 10-2 of the Criminal Code, provides
in pertinent part:
			"(a) A kidnaper within the definition of paragraph (a) of
Section 10-1 [kidnapping] is guilty of the offense of
aggravated kidnaping when he:
* * *
				(5) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed
with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, as
defined in Section 33A-1 of the 'Criminal Code of
1961', or
				(6) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed
with a firearm, or
				(7) During the commission of the offense of
kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm, or
				(8) During the commission of the offense of
kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent
disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another
person.
			***
			(b) Sentence. Aggravated kidnaping in violation of
paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) is a
Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(6) is a Class
X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of
subsection (a)(7) is a Class X felony for which 20 years
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court. A violation of subsection (a)(8) is a Class X
felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court." 720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000).
	The armed robbery statute, section 18-2 of the Criminal
Code, states:
			"(a) A person commits armed robbery when he or she
violates Section 18-1 [robbery]; and
				(1) he or she carries on or about his or her person or
is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon other than
a firearm; or
				(2) he or she carries on or about his or her person or
is otherwise armed with a firearm; or
				(3) he or she, during the commission of the offense,
personally discharges a firearm; or
				(4) he or she, during the commission of the offense,
personally discharges a firearm that proximately causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person.
			(b) Sentence.
			Armed robbery in violation of subsection (a)(1) is a
Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(2) is a Class
X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of
subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which 20 years
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court. A violation of subsection (a)(4) is a Class X
felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000).
	Finally, the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute, section
18-4 of the Criminal Code, provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) A person commits aggravated vehicular hijacking
when he or she violates Section 18-3 [vehicular
hijacking]; and
* * *
				(3) he or she carries on or about his or her person, or
is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon, other
than a firearm; or
				(4) he or she carries on or about his or her person or
is otherwise armed with a firearm; or
				(5) he or she, during the commission of the offense,
personally discharges a firearm; or
				(6) he or she, during the commission of the offense,
personally discharges a firearm that proximately causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person.
			(b) Sentence. Aggravated vehicular hijacking in
violation of subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Class X
felony. Aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of
subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years shall be imposed.
Aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of subsection
(a)(4) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
Aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of subsection
(a)(5) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
Aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of subsection
(a)(6) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a
term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-4
(West 2000).
	We note initially that the constitutionality of some of the
sentencing measures at issue in these appeals has already been
determined by this court. In People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470,
492 (2002), we held that "the attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4
(West 2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404, adding the
'15/20/25-to-life' sentencing provisions to the offense of
attempted first degree murder, [is] unconstitutional." In addition,
this court concluded in People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002),
that the 15-year sentencing enhancement for armed robbery while
in possession of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West
2000)) violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution and therefore was unenforceable. Accordingly, in the
instant case we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of all of the
attempted murder counts, as well as the charges of armed robbery
with a firearm. Because two of the three circuit court decisions
under review-the ruling in causes Nos. 91012 and 91013, and the
decision in cause No. 91328-involved only armed robbery with a
firearm, these two decisions are affirmed.
	The counts that remain, which were dismissed in the decision
below in causes Nos. 91044 through 91052, involve armed
robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated vehicular
hijacking. The remaining armed robbery counts include: one count
of armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm against
defendants Joseph Campos and Angel Garcia, and one count of
armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm causing great
bodily harm against defendant Joe Hunt. The remaining
aggravated kidnapping charges include: two counts of aggravated
kidnapping with a firearm and two counts of aggravated
kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm, all against
Campos and Garcia. Four counts of aggravated vehicular hijacking
are still at issue: one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking with
a firearm against Campos and Garcia; two counts of aggravated
vehicular hijacking with a firearm against defendant Darvus
Barnette; and one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking with
personal discharge of a firearm against Campos and Garcia.

Standard of Review
	A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. People
v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). This court has a duty to
construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and
constitutionality if it can reasonably be done. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 
at 418. The question of whether a statute is constitutional is
subject to de novo review. People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526
(2001).

Proportionate Penalties Violation
	In the case at bar, the circuit court judge who dealt with
causes Nos. 91044 through 91052 concluded that two of the three
Public Act 91-404 sentencing enhancements-the 15-year addition
required for carrying a firearm and the 20-year enhancement for
personally discharging a firearm-violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §11). This provision dictates that "[a]ll penalties shall be
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. The circuit court based its conclusion
that the proportionate penalties clause was violated on its
comparison of the "Public Act 91-404[ ] enactments [with] other
offenses which expressly require the possession or use of
firearms." Pointing, for example, to aggravated battery with a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000)), the circuit court first
noted the similarity of purpose between this statute, which targets
"the specific act of knowingly discharging a firearm and inflicting
injury," and the Public Act 91-404 amendments, which are aimed
at deterring the use of firearms in the commission of a felony. The
court then looked at the punishment for aggravated battery with a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)), which is a Class
X felony with a penalty of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment (720 ILCS
5/12-4.2(b) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000)).
In comparing this penalty with the 15-year enhancement required
by Public Act 91-404 when the offender is armed with a firearm,
the circuit court stated:
		"[B]ecause aggravated battery with a firearm carries a
penalty of 6 to 30 years [of] imprisonment, a person who
intentionally shoots an individual [aggravated battery with
a firearm] faces a minimum penalty that is less than a
third of the 21-year minimum [six-year Class X minimum
plus 15-year add-on] for an armed robbery where the
firearm is simply possessed, but not fired." (Emphasis
added.)
	Similarly, the circuit court found that the 20-year addition
mandated when a firearm is personally discharged produced a
penalty that was disproportionate to the punishment for aggravated
discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2000)). The
court quoted from this statute, which provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) A person commits aggravated discharge of a
firearm when he or she knowingly or intentionally:
				***
				(2) Discharges a firearm in the direction of another
person or in the direction of a vehicle he or she knows
or reasonably should know to be occupied by a person."
720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2000)).
	Noting that aggravated discharge of a firearm "requires that
a weapon be discharged in the direction of another person," the
circuit court concluded that this conduct represented a more
serious threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare than
did the conduct targeted by the second level of the 15/20/25-to-life
provisions, "which simply proscribe[s] the discharge of a firearm
during the commission of a given offense." Aggravated discharge
of a firearm is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)(2), (b)
(West 2000)) and therefore carries a lesser penalty than a Class X
felony. The court stated:
			"Given that aggravated discharge of a firearm carries a
potential sentence of probation, or 4 to 15 years
imprisonment, that penalty is clearly disproportionate to
the 26-year add[-]on [six-year Class X minimum plus 20-year addition] required where a firearm is discharged
during the course of an armed robbery."
	In evaluating whether a proportionate penalties violation has
been established, the central question is whether the penalty at
issue has been set by the legislature "according to the seriousness
of the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; see also People v.
Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998) (proportionate penalties
clause requires legislature to proportion penalties according to the
seriousness of offenses). This court has employed three separate
tests in making this determination. First, a penalty violates the
proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral
sense of the community. See People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 236
(1995); Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 474. Second, a penalty violates
the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are
compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the
public health and safety is punished more severely. See People v.
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997); Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 474.
Finally, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where
offenses with identical elements are given different sentences. See
People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 417-18 (1996); People v. Walden,
199 Ill. 2d 392, 394 (2002).
	In the case at bar, the circuit court employed the second, or
cross-comparison test, in comparing the Public Act 91-404
amendments with the aggravated battery with a firearm and
aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes. This sort of cross-comparison analysis involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the
measures being compared share "common statutory purposes"
(Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 476; Walden, 199 Ill. 2d at 395), and (2)
if the purposes are related, whether the less serious offense is
punished more harshly than the more serious offense (Lombardi,
184 Ill. 2d at 475-76; see Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 506). With regard to
the first of these two steps, it is well settled that if the statutory
purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is
inappropriate. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506. This is because, where
statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the
legislature considered different factors in establishing the
respective punishments, and we defer to the legislature's
judgment. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 476; Walden, 199 Ill. 2d  at 395.
Regarding the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry-the
determination of whether a less serious offense is punished more
severely than a more serious crime-it is a violation of the
proportionate penalties clause "if the penalty prescribed for a less
serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more
serious offense." People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (1995), citing
People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1983); see also People v.
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 504-05 (1997) ("the proportionate penalties
clause is violated where different offenses are compared and
conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and
safety is punished more harshly").
	The State argues that the circuit court erred as to both prongs
of this inquiry. According to the State, the statutes containing the
15/20/25-to-life provisions do not have the same or similar
purpose as the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated
discharge of a firearm statutes. Thus the State contends that it was
inappropriate for the circuit court to conduct comparative
proportionality review as to these provisions. Even if such review
were appropriate, the State argues in the alternative, the conduct
targeted by the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated
discharge of a firearm statutes is less serious than the conduct
proscribed by the 10 statutes containing the 15/20/25-to-life
enhancements. The State therefore contends that the disparity in
the penalties does not render the Public Act 91-404 enhancements
unconstitutionally disproportionate. We consider each of these
arguments in turn.
	Regarding the State's similarity-of-purpose argument, the
circuit court below concluded that the statutes proscribing the
offenses at issue, such as armed robbery with a firearm and
aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm,
shared a similar purpose with the aggravated battery with a firearm
and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes, respectively. In
describing the purpose of the amended statutes, the circuit court
looked to the express aim of the Public Act 91-404 amendments,
which is "to deter the use of firearms in the commission of a
felony offense." Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000
(codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000)). As to the
purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated
discharge of a firearm statutes, the circuit court noted that both
offenses "expressly require the possession or use of firearms," as
do the 10 statutes amended by Public Act 91-404. The aggravated
battery with a firearm statute targets conduct that causes injury
through the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm, and the
aggravated discharge of a firearm statute proscribes the intentional
discharging of a firearm at or in the direction of another person.
	The State argues that the circuit court's analysis is flawed
because, with regard to the 10 amended statutes, this analysis
focuses on the purpose of the Public Act 91-404 amendments
rather than on the purpose of the statutes themselves. According
to the State, the purpose of the armed robbery with a firearm
statute, for example, "is to deter/punish the unauthorized, forcible
taking of another's property." Similarly, the purpose of the
aggravated vehicular hijacking statute, the State argues, is "to
deter/punish the unauthorized taking of another's motor vehicle."
Noting that these offenses "do[ ] not necessarily involve firearms,"
the State maintains that the purposes of these statutes differ from
those of the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated
discharge of a firearm statutes, which focus on the use of firearms.
Because of this difference in purpose, the State argues that
comparative proportionality review is inappropriate here, and the
circuit court should not have proceeded to the second stage of this
review. We disagree.
	The issue regarding the first stage of a cross-comparison
analysis has already been decided. In People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), as previously noted, this court held that the 15-year
enhancement mandated by Public Act 91-404 for armed robbery
while in possession of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West
2000)) was unconstitutionally disproportionate. In reaching this
conclusion, we engaged in the same sort of cross-comparison
analysis as did the circuit court in the case at bar. In Walden we
compared the statute for armed robbery while in possession of a
firearm, the offense with which the defendant was charged, with
the statute for armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery
(720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 18-5(a) (West 2000)). In the first stage of
this analysis, we concluded that the two statutes shared "an
identical statutory purpose: to deter the use of firearms in the
commission of felonies." Walden, 199 Ill. 2d  at 396. With regard
to the armed robbery with a firearm statute, we found that this
purpose was evident in the statement of legislative intent included
in Public Act 91-404. This statement provided:
			"In order to deter the use of firearms in the commission
of a felony offense, the General Assembly deems it
appropriate for a greater penalty to be imposed when a
firearm is used or discharged in the commission of an
offense than the penalty imposed for using other types of
weapons and for the penalty to increase on more serious
offenses." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000), quoted
in Walden, 199 Ill. 2d  at 396.
Thus in Walden we equated the purpose of the Public Act 91-404
amendments with the purpose for the armed robbery while in
possession of a firearm statute.
	This analysis runs counter to the State's argument that such
legislative purposes must be determined by looking to the
underlying offense itself, e.g., robbery, rather than to the purpose
for the Public Act 91-404 amendments. The State recognizes the
disparity between its argument and Walden, and argues that
Walden was wrongly decided. We disagree, and decline the State's
invitation to overrule Walden. Instead, we hold that, based on the
reasoning in Walden, the circuit court below correctly concluded
that the statutes carrying the 15- and 20-year sentence
enhancements had a similar purpose to the statutes for aggravated
battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
Because of this similarity of purpose, the circuit court was correct
to proceed to the next step in the cross-comparison analysis.
	The State argues in the alternative that even if it were proper
to proceed to the second stage of this review, the circuit court's
analysis in the second stage also is flawed. According to the State,
the offenses carrying the 15/20/25-to-life sentence enhancements
are more serious than aggravated battery with a firearm and
aggravated discharge of a firearm. Thus there is no violation of the
proportionate penalties clause, which requires only that the penalty
for a more serious offense be equal to or greater than-but not less
than-the penalty for a less serious offense. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 144;
Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196.
	The circuit court below found that aggravated battery with a
firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm were more serious
than the offenses carrying the 15- and 20-year sentence
enhancements. It was thus a violation of the proportionate
penalties clause for the former two offenses, though more serious,
to be punished less severely.
	The State contends that the 15/20/25-to-life offenses-e.g.,
armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated kidnapping with a
firearm-are more serious because they involve elements in
addition to firearm conduct. Armed robbery with a firearm, for
example, requires the possession of a firearm while committing
the offense of robbery. Similarly, aggravated kidnapping with a
firearm involves the possession of a firearm while committing the
offense of kidnapping. By contrast, no additional felonies are
involved in aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated
discharge of a firearm, which focus on the firearm conduct itself.
	In support of its argument the State points to the legislative
findings and legislative intent sections of Public Act 91-404.
Under "Legislative findings," the act states in pertinent part:
			"Current law does contain offenses involving the use or
discharge of a gun toward or against a person, such as
aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of
a firearm, and reckless discharge of a firearm; however,
the General Assembly has legislated greater penalties for
the commission of a felony while in possession of a
firearm because it deems such acts as more serious." Pub.
Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720
ILCS 5/33A-1(a)(3) (West 2000)).
Under "Legislative intent," the act provides in pertinent part:
			"With the additional elements of the discharge of a
firearm and great bodily harm inflicted by a firearm being
added to armed violence and other serious felony
offenses, it is the intent of the General Assembly to
punish those elements more severely during commission
of a felony offense than when those elements stand alone
as the act of the offender." Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff.
January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(2)
(West 2000)).
	Based on these statements, the State asserts that the
possession or use of a firearm in the commission of certain
felonies, e.g., vehicular hijacking, is regarded by the legislature as
more serious than the use of a firearm where such use is the sole
act of the offender. Thus it is the legislature's intent that offenses
such as armed robbery with a firearm or aggravated kidnapping
with personal discharge of a firearm be punished more severely
than aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge
of a firearm. The State contends that we should defer to this
legislative judgment regarding the comparative seriousness of
these offenses. We disagree.
	In the case at bar, as noted, the circuit court concluded that
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a
firearm are more serious than the Public Act 91-404 offenses
requiring the possession or discharge of a firearm. As the court
noted, aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1)
(West 2000)) "requires injury resulting to a person through the
knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm." See Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 146. By contrast, Public Act 91-404 offenses such as armed
robbery with a firearm, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm, and
aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm require only that the
firearm be possessed, not that it be fired. "[A] person is considered
'armed with a firearm' when he or she carries on or about his or
her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm." Pub. Act
91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/2-3.6
(West 2000)).
	Similarly, the circuit court noted that the offense of
aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West
2000)) focuses on "the intentional firing of a weapon at or in the
direction of individuals." However, corresponding Public Act
91-404 offenses such as armed robbery with personal discharge of
a firearm, aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a
firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking with personal
discharge of a firearm require only that the firearm be discharged,
not that it be discharged in the direction of a person. "A person is
considered to have 'personally discharged a firearm' when he or
she, while armed with a firearm, knowingly and intentionally fires
a firearm causing the ammunition projectile to be forcefully
expelled from the firearm." Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1,
2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/2-15.5 (West 2000)).
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State argues that the
circuit court's analysis is flawed because the court accorded too
much weight to the degree of harm caused by the respective
offenses. The State notes correctly that the degree of harm is not
the only factor to be considered in determining the seriousness of
an offense. Other factors include the frequency of the crime and
the high risk of bodily harm associated with it. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at
146; People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002). Nevertheless, the
extent of harm remains a relevant consideration. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 146. Moreover, in making its determination as to the relative
seriousness of the offenses, the circuit court considered not only
the degree of harm but the risk of bodily harm as well. For
example, in comparing aggravated discharge of a firearm with the
Public Act 91-404 offenses involving personal discharge of a
firearm, the circuit court noted that the former offense focuses on
"the intentional firing of a weapon at or in the direction of
individuals" (emphasis added), while the latter offenses require
only that the firearm be discharged, not that it be discharged in the
direction of a person. The risk of bodily harm clearly is greater
where an offense involves the discharge of a firearm at someone,
than it is where the offense merely requires the discharge of the
firearm. Thus, it was not only the degree of harm that the circuit
court considered in determining the seriousness of these offenses;
the court also considered the high risk of bodily harm. See Lee,
167 Ill. 2d  at 146; Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454.
	We agree with the circuit court that the additional elements in
aggravated battery with a firearm (injury resulting from the
intentional discharge of a firearm) and aggravated discharge of a
firearm (discharge of a firearm in the direction of another person)
render these offenses a greater "threat to the public health and
safety" (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 474; see Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 503)
than the corresponding Public Act 91-404 offenses, which, with
respect to the firearm, require only its possession or its discharge.
We reject the legislature's judgment to the contrary. While such
legislative judgments normally are accorded deference (Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454; Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 502-03), we agree with the
circuit court that in this instance such deference is unwarranted.
	Having concluded that aggravated battery with a firearm and
aggravated discharge of a firearm are more serious than the
corresponding Public Act 91-404 offenses, we must determine
whether these more serious offenses are punished more or less
harshly than those creating a less serious threat to the public health
and safety. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 503, 504-05; Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 
at 474. This inquiry is not difficult. As noted, the relevant Public
Act 91-404 offenses-those involving possession of a firearm and
discharge of a firearm-require mandatory add-ons of 15 years and
20 years, respectively, creating sentencing ranges of 21 to 45 years
and 26 to 50 years. By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1), (b) (West 2000)) carries a Class X
penalty of 6 to 30 years of imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3)
(West 2000)), and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/24-1.2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is a Class 1 felony with a penalty
range of 4 to 15 years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2000)).
	The disproportionality in the penalties for these offenses was
stated clearly by the circuit court. Comparing aggravated battery
with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm, the court stated:
			"[B]ecause aggravated battery with a firearm carries a
penalty of 6 to 30 years imprisonment, a person who
intentionally shoots an individual [aggravated battery with
a firearm] faces a minimum penalty that is less than a
third of the 21-year minimum for an armed robbery where
the firearm is simply possessed, but not fired."
Similarly, in comparing aggravated discharge of a firearm with
armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm, the circuit
court stated:
			"Given that aggravated discharge of a firearm carries a
potential sentence of *** 4 to 15 years [of] imprisonment,
that penalty is clearly disproportionate to the 26-year
[minimum] required where a firearm is discharged during
the course of an armed robbery."
	We conclude, as did the circuit court below, that the less
serious conduct proscribed in the Public Act 91-404 offenses
involving possession of a firearm (15-year add-on) and personal
discharge of a firearm (20-year add-on) is punished more harshly
than is the more serious conduct targeted by the statutes for
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a
firearm. Accordingly, with regard to the statutes for armed robbery
(720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)), aggravated kidnapping (720
ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000)), and aggravated vehicular hijacking
(720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2000)), the 15- and 20-year add-ons
mandated by Public Act 91-404 violate the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.
	We therefore affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the
following charges: Causes Nos. 91045 and 91046 (Joseph Campos
and Angel Garcia): count II, aggravated vehicular hijacking with
personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(5) (West
2000)); count III, armed robbery with personal discharge of a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3) (West 2000)); counts IV and V,
aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/10-2(a)(7) (West 2000)); count VIII, aggravated vehicular
hijacking with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000));
and counts X and XI, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm (720
ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2000)); and cause No. 91051 (Darvus
Barnette) counts I and II, aggravated vehicular hijacking with a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000)).
	The only remaining charge that was dismissed by the circuit
court is count V of the indictment against defendant Joe Hunt in
cause No. 91049: armed robbery with personal discharge of a
firearm causing great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West
2000)). Under the Public Act 91-404 amendments, this offense
requires a mandatory add-on of 25 years to natural life in prison.
As previously noted, the circuit court below found that the 15-year
enhancement for carrying a firearm and the 20-year enhancement
for personally discharging a firearm violated the proportionate
penalties clause. However, the court specifically concluded that
there was no disproportionality in the 25-years-to-life
enhancement for causing great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death. Defendants have provided no
arguments sufficient to persuade us that we should deviate from
this conclusion by the circuit court. Accordingly, with regard to
the remaining charge of armed robbery with personal discharge of
a firearm causing great bodily harm (against defendant Hunt), we
adopt the finding of the circuit court that there is no
unconstitutional disproportionality in the 25-years-to-life add-on
mandated by Public Act 91-404 for this offense.
	In addition to this finding, the circuit court also concluded that
all of the 15/20/25-to-life provisions violated the prohibition
against double enhancement. This latter finding apparently formed
the basis for the court's dismissal of charges that carried the 25-years-to-life sentence enhancement, including the armed robbery
count against defendant Joe Hunt that is at issue here. We turn
then to an examination of this double-enhancement finding.

Double Enhancement
	Double enhancement occurs when a single factor is used
"both as an element of a defendant's crime and as an aggravating
factor justifying the imposition of a harsher sentence than might
otherwise have been imposed." (Emphasis in original.) People v.
Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992); see also People v. Thomas,
171 Ill. 2d 207, 223 (1996) ("Double enhancement occurs when a
factor already used to enhance an offense or penalty is reused to
subject a defendant to a further enhanced offense of penalty"). It
is assumed that the legislature, in determining the appropriate
penalty for an offense, necessarily takes into account the factors
inherent in the offense. "Thus, to use one of those same factors
that make up the offense as the basis for imposing a harsher
penalty than might otherwise be imposed constitutes a double use
of a single factor." (Emphasis in original.) Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d  at
84. The general prohibition against such double enhancement is a
rule of statutory construction. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364,
390 (1995).
	In the case at bar, the circuit court found that the 15/20/25-to-life provisions violated this prohibition. The court stated:
			"[I]t is apparent that the General Assembly has created
separate offenses proscribing the commission of certain
named offenses while carrying a firearm, personally
discharging a firearm[,] or personally discharging a
firearm that proximately causes injury to another. The
legislature has classified these offenses as Class X
felonies, which generally provide for a term of
imprisonment of 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1[(a)(3)]
(West 2000). However, in crafting the ten enactments
challenged herein, the legislature has indeed utilized the
same factor, e.g.[,] the firearm, that constitutes an element
of the amended offenses to trigger the enhancements
mandated. Hence, the use of the same factor that makes
up the offenses as a basis for imposing harsher penalties
than might otherwise be imposed has resulted in an
impermissible double enhancement."
	According to the circuit court's reasoning, the firearm factors
are used first to enhance the Class 1 felony of robbery to armed
robbery, a Class X offense. They are then used a second time to
justify the 15/20/25-to-life add-ons that are, under the statute,
triggered by these same firearm factors. The problem with this
reasoning is that the first enhancement from a Class 1 to a Class
X felony comes as a result of nonfirearm conduct. As is clearly
expressed in subsection (a)(1) of the statute, the first form of
armed robbery, which is a Class X felony, occurs when a person
commits robbery and "he or she carries on or about his or her
person or is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon other than
a firearm." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West
2000). The sentence for this form of armed robbery is the Class X
penalty of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment, with no mandatory add-ons. The Public Act 91-404 enhancements of 15/20/25-years-to-life are triggered not by this first form of armed robbery, but by the
remaining three, each of which is a Class X felony involving a
firearm. In subsection (a)(2), where the offender simply possesses
the firearm, the mandatory add-on is 15 years (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)); the required enhancement for
subsection (a)(3), which involves the personal discharge of a
firearm, is 20 years (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3), (b) (West 2000)); in
subsection (a)(4), there is personal discharge of a firearm "that
proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death to another person," and the
mandatory addition is 25 years to life in prison (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(4), (b) (West 2000)).
	As is clearly expressed in the statute, the firearm factors
account for only one enhancement-the 15/20/25-to-life additions
that are triggered by firearm conduct. By the terms of the statute,
firearm factors have nothing to do with the initial enhancement to
a Class X felony, which, as noted, comes when robbery is
committed with a dangerous weapon "other than a firearm." 720
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2000). With regard to the armed robbery
statute (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)), we conclude that the
circuit court erred in finding that there was an impermissible
double enhancement based on firearm conduct elements.
Accordingly, this finding may not serve as a basis for dismissing
the armed robbery count at issue against defendant Joe Hunt.

Double Jeopardy
	Defendants argue that there is an alternative ground on which
we may affirm the circuit court's dismissal of several of the
15/20/25-to-life charges, including the armed robbery count at
issue against Hunt. Defendants contend that the relevant
sentencing provisions violate the double jeopardy clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10) and the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 715-16, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062
(1969)). With regard to the armed robbery statute (720 ILCS
5/18-2 (West 2000)), defendants' argument is without merit.
	The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, which is construed in the same manner
as the corresponding clause in the Illinois Constitution (In re P.S.,
175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1997)), affords three protections to the criminal
defendant. "The first two, which are the most familiar, protect
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
and against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction." Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 105 L. Ed. 2d 322, 331, 109 S. Ct. 2522, 2525 (1989). The third safeguard,
which is the one at issue here, protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense. Jones, 491 U.S.  at 376, 105 L. Ed. 2d  at 331, 109 S. Ct. at 2525-26; P.S., 175 Ill. 2d  at 84.
	In the case at bar, defendants argue:
			"Because defendants were subjected to both a Class X
sentence based on the criminal conviction for possession
[or use] of the firearm and a higher penalty *** for
possession [or use] of the same firearm, they received the
prohibited multiple punishments for the same crime."
	According to this argument, if a defendant is charged, for
example, with armed robbery with a firearm, the Class X portion
of the sentence that he faces is directly attributable to the element
of firearm possession. This cannot be so, however. The reason is
that, as previously noted, a defendant charged with armed robbery
is subject to a Class X sentence even if the offense was committed
with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm. 720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2000). Therefore, the mandatory addition of 15
years to a Class X sentence for armed robbery with a firearm does
not constitute a multiple punishment for the element of firearm
possession. The only part of this sentence that is triggered by the
possession of a firearm is the 15-year addition, which represents
but a single punishment for this element.
	The same is true for the armed robbery count at issue against
defendant Joe Hunt. As noted, this count alleged that, during the
commission of armed robbery, Hunt personally discharged a
firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to the victim.
720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000). Under this charge, Hunt
faced a potential penalty of a Class X sentence plus a mandatory
add-on of 25 years to life. Just as in the case of the sentence for
armed robbery with a firearm, the only portion of Hunt's potential
sentence that was triggered by the firearm element is the 25-years-to-life addition, which constitutes a single punishment for this
element.
	With regard to the armed robbery statute, we reject
defendants' argument that the 15/20/25-to-life enhancements
violated defendants' constitutional right to freedom from multiple
punishments for the same offense. The firearm elements are not
given multiple punishments, and there was thus no double
jeopardy violation. Accordingly, this ground may not serve as the
basis for the dismissal of count V of the indictment against
defendant Joe Hunt in cause No. 91049. We therefore reverse the
circuit court's dismissal of this count, which charged Hunt with
armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily harm to the victim. 720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000).

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court's
dismissal of all but one of the counts at issue, on the ground that
the relevant sentencing amendments of Public Act 91-404 are
unconstitutionally disproportionate. Specifically, we reaffirm our
decision in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 492 (2002), that
"the attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000)), as amended by
Public Act 91-404, adding the '15/20/25-to-life' sentencing
provisions to the offense of attempted first degree murder, [is]
unconstitutional." We also reaffirm our holding in People v.
Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), that the 15-year sentencing
enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) violated the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §11. Finally, we conclude, as did the circuit
court below, that with regard to the statutes for aggravated
kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000)), armed robbery (720
ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)), and aggravated vehicular hijacking
(720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2000)), the 15- and 20-year sentence
additions mandated by Public Act 91-404 (Pub. Act 91-404, §5,
eff. January 1, 2000) are unconstitutionally disproportionate. As
noted, with regard to the armed robbery count against defendant
Joe Hunt, we adopt the finding of the circuit court that there is no
unconstitutional disproportionality in the 25-years-to-life add-on
for this offense. However, we reverse the circuit court's finding
that this penalty violates the prohibition against double
enhancement.
	Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the
following counts:
			Cause No. 91044 (David Montagueo), count I, armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West
2000)). Because this count constitutes the entire
indictment, we affirm the dismissal of the indictment
against Montagueo.
			Causes Nos. 91045 and 91046 (Joseph Campos and
Angel Garcia), count I, attempted murder with personal
discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C),
9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); count II, aggravated vehicular
hijacking with personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-4(a)(5) (West 2000)); count III, armed robbery with
personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3)
(West 2000)); counts IV and V, aggravated kidnaping
with personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/10-2(a)(7) (West 2000)); count VII, attempted murder
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(B), 9-1(a)(1)
(West 2000)); count VIII, aggravated vehicular hijacking
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000));
count IX, armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)); and counts X and XI,
aggravated kidnapping with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91047 (Mychael Horton), count II, attempted
murder with personal discharge of a firearm causing great
bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(D), 9-1(a)(1)
(West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91048 (Eddie Reese), counts III and IV,
attempted murder with personal discharge of a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91049 (Joe Hunt), count II, attempted
murder with personal discharge of a firearm that caused
great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(D),
9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)); and count IV, armed robbery with
a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91050 (Marco Garcia), counts I and II,
attempted murder of a peace officer with personal
discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C),
9-1(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2000)); counts IX through XIV,
attempted murder with personal discharge of a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(C), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91051 (Darvus Barnette), counts I and II,
aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000)); and counts III and IV, armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West
2000)). Because these counts constitute the entire
indictment, we affirm the dismissal of the indictment
against Barnette.
			Cause No. 91052 (Angelo Scott), count II, armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West
2000)).
			Cause No. 91012 (Salatheo Moss and Thomas Gibson),
count I, armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91013 (Salatheo Moss and Thomas Gibson),
counts I and II, armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)).
			Cause No. 91328 (Steffon Meaderds), count I, armed
robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West
2000)).
	For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the circuit court's
dismissal of count V, armed robbery with personal discharge of a
firearm that caused great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4)
(West 2000)) in cause No. 91049 against defendant Joe Hunt.
	In causes Nos. 91044 (David Montagueo) and 91051 (Darvus
Barnette), we affirm the dismissals of the entire indictments. In the
remaining causes, we remand to the circuit court for further
proceedings as to the counts remaining against the respective
defendants.
Nos. 91044 and 91051-Affirmed.
Nos. 91012, 91013, 91045, 91046, 91047,
91048, 91050, 91052, 91328-Affirmed and remanded.
No. 91049-Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	Contrary to the majority's thesis, cross-comparison analysis
in this case is inappropriate, as the statutes at issue do not share a
common purpose.
	In People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), this court held
that the purpose of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes is identical to that
of the armed violence statute, namely, deterring the use of
dangerous weapons in the commission of a felony. People v.
Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392, 396 (2002). In People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998), this court held that the purpose of the
aggravated battery with a firearm statute is entirely distinct from
that of the armed violence statute. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 478.
Indeed, Lombardi taught that, while the armed violence statute
targets "the risk of harm associated with the presence of a weapon
during the commission of a felony," the aggravated battery with a
firearm statute is designed to "discourage individuals from
inflicting injury by knowingly discharging a firearm."(2) Lombardi,
184 Ill. 2d  at 478. If the purpose of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes is
identical to that of the armed violence statute, while the purpose
of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is entirely distinct
from that of the armed violence statute, it is analytically
impossible for the purposes of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes and the
aggravated battery with a firearm statute to be the same. Yet this
is precisely what the majority holds. Slip op. at 20. Moreover, the
majority does so without either (1) acknowledging Lombardi's
authoritative pronouncement concerning the purpose of aggravated
battery with a firearm statute, or (2) explaining why the wholesale
overruling of that pronouncement is compelled.
	Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I am convinced that the
purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute remains
exactly what Lombardi declared it to be five years ago:
discouraging the infliction of injury by knowingly discharging a
firearm. Inasmuch as this purpose is wholly distinct from that of
the 15/20/25-to-life statutes, I prefer not to participate in the
majority's cross-comparison analysis.
	I therefore dissent.
	JUSTICES KILBRIDE and GARMAN join in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1In People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 450-51 (2002), this court rejected
the argument that, with regard to the home invasion statute (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a)(3), (c) (West 2000)), the 15-year add-on mandated by Public
Act 91-404 violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.

2.      2Although Lombardi addressed only the aggravated battery with a
firearm statute, its conclusion applies equally to the aggravated
discharge of a firearm statute, as this statute likewise targets the
endangerment of another through the knowing or intentional discharge
of a firearm, not the possession or use of a firearm in the commission of
an unrelated felony.