Title: DAVID LEE GOULD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; TOMMY J. KOLB V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID LEE GOULD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; TOMMY J. KOLB V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 157151 P.3d 261Case Number: 05-291, 06-1Decided: 12/19/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DAVID 
LEE GOULD,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
TOMMY 
J. KOLB,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty 
(No. 05-291)

The 
Honorable John Perry, Judge

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty 
(No. 06-1)

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Pro se.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      David Lee Gould 
and Tommy J. Kolb (appellants) were convicted for committing violent felonies in 
Wyoming and then were transferred by the 
Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) to a detention center in Texas to serve their 
sentences.  The appellants filed 
parallel motions to correct illegal sentence in the district courts where they 
were convicted.  They also filed 
motions for appointment of legal counsel to assist them with their post-judgment 
efforts.  The respective district 
courts denied the motions, and appellants appealed.  Because their appeals involve very 
similar issues and arguments, they were consolidated for decision by this 
Court.  We conclude the appellants 
have not established they are entitled to correction of their sentences or to 
appointment of counsel.  
Consequently, we affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The appellants, 
who appear pro se, do not expressly 
set out their issues on appeal.1  The State phrases the appellate issues 
as:

 
 

I.                     
Did 
either district court err in denying either appellant's motion for correction of 
an illegal sentence?

 
 

II.                   
Did 
either district court err in denying either appellant's motion for appointment 
of counsel?

 
 
FACTS

                        
 

Facts 
Relevant to Mr. Gould

 
 
[¶3]      In December 2000, 
Mr. Gould entered a home in CampbellCounty without authorization and demanded 
sexual favors from a female occupant of the home.  When she refused, he severely beat 
her.  Mr. Gould pled guilty to, and 
was convicted of, one count of aggravated assault and battery, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii)  
(LexisNexis 2005),2 and one count of burglary, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005).3  The district court sentenced him to 
serve six to ten years of imprisonment on each count and ruled he would serve 
the sentences consecutively.  Mr. 
Gould filed a direct appeal of his judgment and sentence, but voluntarily 
dismissed the appeal before a decision was issued by this Court.    

 
 
[¶4]      In 2002, Mr. 
Gould filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), asking 
the district court to modify his sentences to make them concurrent instead of 
consecutive.  The district court 
denied his motion, and Mr. Gould did not appeal from the denial.  On October 24, 2005, he filed pro se motions to correct illegal 
sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) and for appointment and assistance of 
counsel.   The district court 
denied Mr. Gould's motions, and he filed this appeal.   

 
 
Facts 
Relevant to Mr. Kolb

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Kolb was 
convicted after a jury trial for the 1993 first degree pre-meditated murder4 and aggravated kidnapping5 of Christa Sallini in SheridanCounty.  Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 
(Wyo. 
1996).  The district court entered 
judgment on the jury's verdict and sentenced Mr. Kolb to serve two consecutive 
life sentences.  Id.  
Mr. Kolb appealed to this Court and we affirmed his convictions.  Id.  
In 1997, he submitted claims of ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel in a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed with the 
district court.  Mr. Kolb's petition 
was denied.  

       

[¶6]      On October 31, 
2005, nearly ten years after his direct appeal was rejected, Mr. Kolb filed pro se motions to correct illegal 
sentence and for assistance of counsel, which paralleled Mr. Gould's 
motions.  The district court denied 
both of Mr. Kolb's motions and he appealed to this Court.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶7] 
A district court has discretion in ruling on a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence; consequently, we review the district court's ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  See, Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, ¶ 6, 
110 P.3d 892, 894 (Wyo. 2005).  
However, "[t]he exercise of discretion in the context of a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence is limited to a determination by the trial court as 
to whether the sentence was legal or illegal."  Id.  The determination of "whether a specific 
rule applies to a given set of facts is a question of law, requiring a de novo review."  Sweets v. State, 2001 WY 126, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 2001). See 
also, Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 
525 (Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
[¶8]      Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104 (LexisNexis 2005), the district court has discretion as to 
whether or not to appoint counsel at non-critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding, and our review of a denial of a request for appointment of counsel 
is limited to determining whether or not the district court abused its 
discretion.  See, Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 16, 108 P.3d 838, 844-45 (Wyo. 2005).  The 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review examines the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice.  Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 148, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003); Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, 731 (Wyo. 2001).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously."  Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 394, 
396 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

A.                 
Motions 
to Correct Illegal Sentence

 
 
[¶9]      Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence may be brought at any time.  "An illegal sentence is one which 
exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same 
offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law.'"  Martinez, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d  at 396, quoting Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 
(Wyo. 
1997).  See also, Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d 489, 492 (Wyo. 2004).  
Appellants present several arguments in support of their claims the 
district court erred by denying their motions to correct illegal sentence, 
including:  1) the district court's 
orders denying their motions did not properly address their legal arguments; 2) 
their convictions should have merged for sentencing; 3) their sentences were 
enhanced on the basis of improper factors; and 4) their sentences were illegally 
executed because the DOC transferred them to a detention center in Texas to 
serve their sentences.  

 
 
1. 
        
District Court's Orders

 
 
[¶10]   Appellants argue their cases should 
be remanded to their respective district courts with directions requiring the 
courts to articulate the legal reasons for denying their motions to correct 
illegal sentence.  The appellants 
cite to general constitutional provisions but do not provide any specific 
authority indicating district courts are required to provide detailed legal 
reasons for their rulings on motions to correct an illegal sentence.    

 
 
[¶11]   In Mr. Gould's case, the district 
court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence stated, in 
pertinent part:  "The court, having 
considered said motion and the governing law, finds that defendant's motion is 
without merit and, in large part, directs the court to consider case law and 
authority that is not governing in defendant's matter."  Mr. Gould filed a motion "for reasoned 
judgment" and a motion for rehearing.  
The district court denied his motions, indicating the sentences were 
within the limits prescribed by Wyoming law and the court had discretion to 
sentence him to consecutive sentences.  
The court stated Mr. Gould's sentences were appropriate in light of his 
"extensive criminal history and the extreme violence of the case."  In Mr. Kolb's case, the district court's 
order, although brief, indicates it considered his filings and the procedural 
history of the case and denied his motions for the reasons set forth in the 
State's Traverse.6     

 
 
[¶12]   The respective orders indicate the 
district courts did, in fact, consider the appellants' legal claims.  In their arguments to this Court, 
appellants do not identify any specific authority obligating the district courts 
to make more definitive findings and conclusions in support of their 
decisions.  We, therefore, refuse to 
remand these cases to the district courts to require them to include further 
reasons for their respective denial orders.  Moreover, as is apparent from our 
decisions on the substantive issues presented in this case, such an exercise 
would have no practical effect on the outcome.  

 
 

2.                  
Merger 
of Sentences

 
 
[¶13]   Appellants argue their sentences 
were illegal because they were punished multiple times for the same conduct in 
violation of the constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy.  They do not challenge the validity of 
the underlying convictions, but argue the convictions should have merged for 
sentencing.  Compare, DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 
1993) (holding a double jeopardy challenge to multiple convictions for a single 
criminal event must be brought in a petition for post conviction relief pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101, et seq. rather than in a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a)), and Birr v. State, 878 P.2d 515 (Wyo. 1994), 
upon rehearing, 895 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶14]   Before we address the merits of the 
appellants' arguments, we consider whether their claims are barred by res judicata.   The preclusive doctrine of res judicata applies in the criminal 
context, as well as to civil matters.  
See, e.g., Beck v. State, 2005 WY 56, 110 P.3d 898 
(Wyo. 2005); Lacey, 2003 WY 148, 79 P.3d 493; Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1989).  Our precedent is clear that 
the principle of res judicata may be 
applied to claims brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a).  See, e.g., Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 
(Wyo. 
1997).  In Hamill, we rejected the appellant's 
argument that, because Rule 35 states that a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence may be brought at any time, it is not subject to bar under the doctrine 
of res judicata.   Id.   

 
 
[¶15]   
Res judicata bars relitigation of issues raised and considered in a 
prior criminal proceeding.  Lacey, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d  at 495.  Moreover, "[i]t is a longstanding rule 
that issues which could have been 
raised in an earlier proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent 
consideration."  Id.  (emphasis added).   It is, therefore, appropriate for us 
to consider application of the preclusive doctrine to appellants' Rule 35(a) 
claims that their sentences are illegal because their convictions should have 
merged for sentencing.  

 
 
[¶16]   As we stated earlier, Mr. Gould 
pled guilty to aggravated assault and battery and burglary and was sentenced to 
consecutive terms for his actions.  
He initially filed a direct appeal, but voluntarily dismissed that appeal 
before any action was taken by this Court.  
He subsequently filed a motion for sentence reduction, asking the 
district court to reconsider its decision to impose consecutive sentences.  The district court denied his motion, 
and he did not appeal that decision.  
Thus, Mr. Gould had the opportunity to argue his sentences should merge 
for purposes of sentencing in both his direct appeal and his 2002 motion to 
reduce his sentence, which he did not appeal.  The judicial interests of finality in 
criminal cases demand disciplined application of the preclusive doctrine.  See Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 51 P.3d 851 (Wyo. 2002) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the importance of 
finality in criminal cases).  
Consequently, we conclude Mr. Gould's merger issue is barred by res judicata.  

 
 
[¶17]   Although the procedural history in 
Mr. Kolb's case differs from Mr. Gould's, the same underlying principles 
apply.  Mr. Kolb was convicted after 
a jury trial of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping.  Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 1239-40.  He appealed and this Court 
affirmed.  Id.  
Although he could have presented a claim that his sentences should 
have merged in his direct appeal, he did not do so.  Under our precedent, it is clear Mr. Kolb 
had an obligation to present his claim that his convictions should have merged 
for sentencing in a timely fashion.  
Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564 
(Wyo. 2000); See also, Hamill, 948 P.2d  at 1359.  Having failed to do so, he is barred 
from litigating that issue at this late date.  

 
 
[¶18]   Further, although we are under no 
obligation to do so, we note the appellants' claims that their convictions 
should have merged for sentencing are not well-founded.  Mr. Gould pled guilty to, and was 
convicted of, burglary for entering a home without authorization to demand sex 
from the female victim.  He also 
pled guilty to, and was convicted of, aggravated assault and battery for the 
vicious beating which followed the victim's refusal to comply with his demands 
for sex.  As is obvious from the 
quotation of the relevant statutes in footnotes 2 and 3 of this opinion, the 
elements of the two crimes are very different.  Furthermore, under the rationale of 
cases like Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 
1995) and Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254-55 (Wyo. 2000), even a cursory review of the facts demonstrates 
Mr. Gould could have committed either of his crimes without necessarily 
committing the other.  His 
convictions would not, therefore, merge for sentencing 
purposes.

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Kolb was convicted of 
aggravated kidnapping and first degree pre-meditated murder.  The elements of those crimes, as set out 
in footnotes 4 and 5 of this opinion, are very different and the legislative 
intent to punish them separately is obvious.  Moreover, we concluded in Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 1247, there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Kolb's conviction for pre-meditated 
murder.  It is evident from that 
conclusion that, although the crimes occurred during an on-going criminal 
episode, the kidnapping was not an essential component of the pre-meditated 
murder charge.  Mr. Kolb's merger 
argument, therefore, also fails on its merits.  

 
 
3. 
        
Sentence Enhancement

 
 
[¶20]   As we explained earlier, both 
appellants were convicted of two crimes and sentenced to separate sentences for 
each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively.  Relying upon the United States Supreme 
Court decisions in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), appellants claim their rights under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because the 
district courts "enhanced" their sentences by ordering them to be served 
consecutively without an admission by the accused or a determination by a jury 
as to that "enhancement."7  They do not, however, identify any 
particular factors which were improperly relied upon by the district courts in 
ordering the consecutive sentences.   

 
 
[¶21]   In Apprendi, the United States Supreme 
Court held:   "Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490 
(emphasis added).  In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the State of Washington's determinate sentencing structure. 
Blakely, 542 U.S.  at 
299-300.  Blakely pled guilty to 
kidnapping which carried a maximum sentence of fifty-three months.  However, "[p]ursuant to state law, the 
court imposed an exceptional' sentence of 90 months after making a judicial 
determination that he had acted with deliberate cruelty.'"  Blakely, 542 U.S.  at 
298.   Relying on Apprendi, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled the sentencing judge's decision to increase Blakely's sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum based upon the judge's finding Blakely acted with 
"deliberate cruelty" violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Id. at 303-05.  In that decision, the Court expressly 
distinguished indeterminate sentencing schemes, like Wyoming's, and ruled they 
do not infringe on the province of the jury.  Blakely, 542 U.S.  at 
308-10.  See also, Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶¶ 20-22, 
120 P.3d 1006, 1011-12 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶22]   Applying Apprendi and its progeny in Janssen, we concluded "the district 
court was free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider 
factors relating to Mr. Janssen and his crimes in imposing an appropriate 
sentence within the statutory range." Janssen, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d  at 1012.  See also, Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411 (Wyo. 2005).  We held, 
because Mr. Janssen was sentenced under Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing structure 
and his sentence fell within the statutory maximum for his crime, Apprendi and Blakely did not support his claim.  Janssen, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d  at 1011-12.  

 
 
[¶23]   Appellants were sentenced in 
accordance with Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2005) (except Mr. Kolb's first degree 
murder conviction which mandated death or life imprisonment), and their 
individual sentences fell within the statutory maximums set out for their 
crimes.  Consequently, in accordance 
with our rulings in Janssen and Smith, there was no obvious violation of 
the constitutional principles discussed in Apprendi and Blakely.  

 
 
[¶24]   With regard to the consecutive 
nature of their sentences, we have long said the district court has discretion 
in determining whether the sentences will be served consecutively or 
concurrently.  See, e.g., Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2002); Eaton v. State, 
660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo. 1983).  Other than their argument that the 
consecutive sentences violated the Sixth Amendment under the precepts of Apprendi and Blakely, the appellants do not point to 
any specific error in the district courts' decision to order their sentences to 
be served consecutively.  The 
argument that judicial imposition of consecutive sentences violates the Sixth 
Amendment has been soundly rejected by other courts.  The Hawaii Supreme Court stated:  "[O]ther jurisdictions, including 
several federal circuits, have aphoristically dismissed the proposition that 
either Blakely or Apprendi proscribes consecutive term 
sentencing, and this court does likewise."  
State v. Kahapea, 141 P.3d 440 
(Haw. 2006), and cases cited therein.  We follow suit and conclude the district 
courts did not improperly enhance the appellants' sentences under the Sixth 
Amendment and the rationale of Apprendi 
or Blakely simply by imposing 
consecutive sentences for their separate crimes.  
 

 
 
            
D.        Transfer to TexasDetentionCenter

 
 
[¶25]   Appellants claim their sentences 
are illegal because the DOC transferred them to a facility in Texas to serve their 
terms of imprisonment.  They submit 
a myriad of complaints about the transfer, including the contract between 
Wyoming and Texas violates Wyoming 
law, and, by transferring them to another jurisdiction, the State of Wyoming "pardoned" 
them.  The threshold question, 
however, is whether a Rule 35 motion is the proper procedural mechanism to 
challenge the DOC's actions in executing their sentences.  As we stated earlier in this opinion, an 
illegal sentence is "one that exceeds 
statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, 
or otherwise violates constitutions or the law."  Brown, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d  at 491.  Our inquiry under Rule 35 focuses on the 
sentence itself, not upon the State's actions in executing the sentence.  

 
 
[¶26]   "A prisoner transfer does not work 
an increase in punishment or sentence."  
72 C.J.S. Prisons § 128 (2006).  
Thus, cases which consider the propriety of a state's actions in 
executing a sentence are typically brought by means other than a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence.  For 
example, in Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983), an inmate challenged 
his transfer from one state to another to serve his sentence in a civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Other cases concerning the transfer of prisoners between jurisdictions, 
including some cited by the appellants in support of their positions, Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 
(5th Cir. 1967) and Thompson 
v. Bannan, 298 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1962), 
are brought as habeas corpus petitions.  
Those procedures seem to be more appropriate for challenging executive 
branch transfer decisions.  Because 
the appellants are not contesting the legality of their sentences, but only the 
way in which the DOC has executed them, this issue is not properly before 
us.  

 
 
[¶27]   Appellants have not demonstrated 
the district courts abused their discretion by denying the appellants' motions 
to correct illegal sentences.  
Consequently, they are not entitled to appellate relief on this 
issue.  

 
 
            
E.        Right to 
Counsel/Law Library

 
 
[¶28]   Appellants also challenge the 
district courts' denials of their requests for appointment of counsel to assist 
them with their motions to correct illegal sentence.  Although their arguments are somewhat 
difficult to follow, the appellants apparently claim they were entitled to 
appointment of counsel because the law library at the Texas facility did not 
contain adequate legal resources or persons trained in the law to help 
them.  This issue, therefore, 
implicates not only the right to counsel, but also the right of access to legal 
materials.

 
 
[¶29]   Wyoming rules and statutes address a criminal 
defendant's right to appointment of counsel.  W.R.Cr.P. 44 (a)(1) provides:  

 
 
Any 
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation who is charged with 
a crime for which violation, incarceration as a punishment is a practicable 
possibility or with juvenile delinquency is entitled to appointed counsel.  The right extends from the first 
appearance in the court through appeal.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  Rule 44 does not indicate 
appointment is required for post-judgment proceedings.  

 
 
[¶30]   Section 7-6-104(c)(vi), which 
pertains to appointment of public defenders to represent indigent defendants, 
provides in pertinent part:  "A 
needy person . . . is entitled . . . to be represented by counsel at every stage 
of the proceedings, from the time of the initial appointment by the court until 
the entry of final judgment, at which time the representation shall end, unless 
the court appoints counsel for purposes of appeal, correction or modification of 
sentence."  Section 7-6-104(c)(vi) 
indicates appointment of counsel for post-judgment proceedings is a matter 
within the district court's discretion.

 
 
[¶31]   In Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 
2000), we discussed the constitutional requirements for appointment of 
counsel.  "The Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel accrues at the time adversary judicial proceedings are initiated 
against the defendant.  Counsel is 
required not just at trial, but at critical stages' both before and after trial 
in which the substantial rights of the accused may be affected."  Id. 
at 689.  In Duffy v. State, 837 P.2d 1047 
(Wyo. 1992), 
we recognized the United States Supreme Court's process for determining whether 
a proceeding is "critical."

 
 
In 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), the Court established a two-stage process 
to be invoked to determine whether a proceeding is "critical," and whether 
prejudicial error could flow from it.   The Court there stated that the 
confrontation between the Court and a defendant, without counsel, must be 
analyzed to determine whether it creates "potential substantial prejudice to 
defendant's rights."  Wade, 388 U.S.  at 227, 87 S. Ct.  at 1932.  The succeeding step 
of the analysis is invoked to determine if the presence of counsel either would, 
or potentially could, protect the rights of the accused.

 
 
The 
defendant's rights are jeopardized if the defendant makes some sort of admission 
against penal interest, loses a potential defense, or furnishes a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere.  We essentially have adopted the tests 
articulated in Powell and Wade.

 
 

Duffy, 
837 P.2d  at 1052.  

    

[¶32]   We held in Patrick, ¶ 16, 108 P.3d  at 843-44, a 
motion for sentence reduction was not a critical stage of the criminal 
proceedings; consequently, the district court had discretion in deciding whether 
or not to appoint counsel and we reverse the district court's decision only if 
it abused its discretion.  The Patrick ruling was consistent with Duffy because a motion for sentence 
reduction does not jeopardize any rights of the defendant.  Similarly, our rules and statutes do not 
mandate appointment of counsel to assist defendants with motions to correct 
illegal sentences and a motion to correct an illegal sentence does not 
jeopardize a defendant's rights as articulated in Duffy.  In accordance with our ruling in Patrick, we conclude a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the 
decision of whether or not to appoint counsel rests in the district court's 
sound discretion.

 
 

[¶33]   Appellants claim, under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 
(1996), the district courts should have appointed counsel to assist them in 
their cases because the law library at the Texas facility was inadequate for their 
purposes.  In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled:  "prison 
law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only 
the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'"  Lewis, 518 U.S.  at 351, quoting 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 
825, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977).  In order to establish a violation of the 
constitutional right to access to courts, a defendant must show an actual injury 
resulting from the claimed violation or deficiency.  Id. at 351-52.  A defendant must show "alleged 
shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to 
pursue a legal claim."  Id. at 351.  Although both appellants in this case 
make uncorroborated claims about the deficiencies in the legal resources 
available to them, they do not establish the actual injury required to 
demonstrate a violation of their constitutional right to access to courts.  The lack of legal resources is the basis 
for their claim that they were entitled to appointment of counsel.  Because that argument is unavailing, we 
do not find any abuse of discretion in the district courts' decisions denying 
their requests for appointment of counsel.  

 
 

[¶34]   Affirmed.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The failure to identify issues on appeal is just one of numerous 
violations of the rules of appellate procedure in the appellants' briefs.  Although we recognize we have the 
authority under W.R.A.P. 1.03 to dismiss these appeals because of the 
deficiencies in their briefs, we will consider the appellants' claims.  

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(ii) states:

 
 
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

 
 
            
(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life;

            
(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon;

            
(iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another;  
or

            
(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a 
woman whom he knows is pregnant.

 
 
(b) Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than ten (10) years.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-301states, in relevant part:

 
 
(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or 
remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

 
 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

            

4Mr. Kolb was convicted of first degree murder as defined in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1993), which stated: 

 
 
(a) 
Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or 
attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, 
resisting arrest or kidnapping, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the 
first degree.

 
 
  (b) A person convicted of murder in the 
first degree shall be punished by death or life imprisonment according to law, 
except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder 
committed before the defendant attained the age of sixteen (16) 
years.

 
 

5Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-201(a)(iii) and (d) (1988) set out the definition of aggravated 
kidnapping: 

 
 
(a) 
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place 
of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the 
removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the intent 
to:

 
 
    (i) Hold for ransom or 
reward, or as a shield or hostage;

 
 
    (ii) Facilitate the 
commission of a felony; or

 
 
    (iii) Inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim or another.

 
 
* 
* *

 
 
 (d) If the defendant does not voluntarily 
release the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, 
kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) 
years or for life except as provided in W.S. 6-2-101.

 
 
 
 

6The State's Traverse included a comprehensive discussion of the law 
pertaining to illegal sentences, merger of convictions for sentencing, and 
sentence enhancements.

 

7An argument could be made that, like the double jeopardy issue, this 
claim is barred by res judicata 
because it was not raised in an earlier proceeding.  We note, however, the United States 
Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the appellants were not published until 
several years after we affirmed Mr. Kolb's convictions.  Therefore, we are inclined to address 
this issue as to Mr. Kolb.  Because 
Mr. Gould's argument is very similar, we address his claim by 
default.