Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ERICK LIMMER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v 
No. 123553 
NICHOLAS E. HOLTSCHLAG, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123554 
JOSHUA M. COLE, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123555 
DANIEL BRAYMAN, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 123556 
ERICK LIMMER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to determine if a defendant may be 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for a homicide that 
occurred during the commission of a felony and for which 
the prosecutor proceeded under a “gross negligence” mens 
rea theory. 
We hold in the affirmative and, accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate defendant Limmer’s conviction of accessory after 
the fact to involuntary manslaughter and the remaining 
defendants’ involuntary manslaughter convictions. 
I. FACTS 
On January 16, 1999, a get-together took place at the 
home of defendant Erick Limmer. 
Along with Limmer, the 
other defendants, Joshua Cole, Daniel Brayman, and Nicholas 
Holtschlag, were watching television, drinking alcohol, and 
smoking marijuana with three fourteen-year-old girls. 
At 
least one of the defendants put gamma hydroxybutrate or 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
gamma hydroxybutyric acid (both known as GHB) in the girls’ 
drinks.1
 Two of the girls became sick and, after several 
hours, were taken to the hospital. 
One of the girls, 
Samantha Reid, died. 
The other slipped into a coma but 
eventually recovered. 
Defendants 
Brayman, 
Holtschlag, 
and 
Cole 
were 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter and two counts each 
of mixing a harmful substance in a drink, which is a 
felony. 
Defendant Limmer was convicted of accessory after 
the fact to manslaughter, mixing a harmful substance in a 
drink, delivery or manufacture of marijuana, and possession 
of GHB. 
Defendants appealed, the appeals were consolidated, 
and the Court of Appeals stated that to support an 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
conviction 
under 
a 
gross 
negligence theory, the prosecutor had to establish that 
defendants performed a lawful act in a grossly negligent 
manner.2  Because mixing a harmful substance in the girls’ 
drinks was an unlawful act that is a felony, the Court 
vacated 
the 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
convictions 
and 
1 GHB is sometimes known as the “date rape drug.” 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 27, 2003
(Docket Nos. 226715, 227941, 227942 and 241661). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
accessory after the fact conviction. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Determining the elements of common-law involuntary 
manslaughter is a question of law. 
We review questions of 
law de novo. 
People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 
30 (2002). 
III. ANALYSIS 
There are primarily two issues to address in this 
case. 
The first concerns the defendants’ contention that 
they cannot be convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
because 
the 
homicide 
at 
issue 
occurred 
during 
the 
commission of a felony and involuntary manslaughter, 
defendants argue, is, in part, defined by this Court as the 
killing of another during the commission of an unlawful act 
that is 
not a felony. 
The second issue concerns 
defendants’ contention that to be convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter under a gross negligence theory, which was the 
theory under which the prosecutor proceeded at trial, the 
homicide must have occurred during the commission of a 
lawful act, and in this case it occurred during the 
commission of an unlawful (felonious) act. 
A. IS MANSLAUGHTER PRECLUDED BECAUSE OF A “FELONY”? 
Regarding the first issue, some insight into the early 
common-law history of the crime of manslaughter and, 
4  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
particularly, its development alongside the felony-murder 
doctrine, is necessary. 
Under Lord Coke’s traditional 
“felony-murder” doctrine, a homicide that occurred during 
the commission of an unlawful act was “murder” punishable 
by death. See People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 692; 299 NW2d 
304 (1980), in which this Court thoroughly articulated the 
elusive history of the felony-murder doctrine. The premise 
behind the traditional felony-murder doctrine was the idea 
that 
the 
intention 
to 
perpetrate 
the 
unlawful 
act 
sufficiently showed the existence of malice aforethought— 
the requisite mens rea for murder.3 
Id. at 717. 
This was 
considered true whatever the nature of the underlying crime 
may have been. 
Id. at 692. 
Lord Coke’s traditional 
doctrine was heavily criticized for the harsh results it 
engendered, and it was severely limited even in early 
3 “Mens rea” is a term of art referring to the “state
of mind that the prosecutor, to secure a conviction, must
prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed). 
“Malice” is defined as: 
“1. The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit
a wrongful act. 2. Reckless disregard of the law or of a
person’s legal rights. 3. Ill will; wickedness of heart.”
Id.
 “Malice aforethought,” which is the type of malice
specifically related to the crime of murder, is defined as
“encompassing any one of the following: (1) the intent to
kill, (2) the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, (3)
extremely reckless indifference to the value of human life
(the so-called ‘abandoned and malignant heart’), or (4) the
intent to commit a felony (which leads to culpability under
the felony-murder rule).” Id. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
common-law history. 
Id. at 693-699. 
One of the earliest 
limitations on the traditional doctrine was limiting its 
application to those homicides that occurred during the 
commission of a felony or during the commission of an act 
that was intended to inflict great bodily injury. 
Id. at 
696-697. 
Additionally, in the early days of the English common 
law, the crime of “manslaughter” was developed. 
The crime 
of manslaughter in Michigan is adopted from that early 
common-law crime. 
See People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 594; 
533 NW2d 272 (1995): “‘The law of manslaughter as it exists 
today has been adopted from the old English common law.’” 
(Citation omitted). Whereas, as noted above, malice is the 
mens rea required for murder, manslaughter requires a less 
culpable mens rea. 
“‘Manslaughter is the unlawful and 
felonious killing of another without malice, either express 
or implied.’” 
People v Austin, 221 Mich 635, 643; 192 NW 
590 (1923) (citation omitted). 
Involuntary manslaughter 
has, first and foremost, always been considered the “catch­
all” homicide crime. Thus, in Datema, supra at 594-595, we 
explained, quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 
105, that “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is a catch-all 
concept including all manslaughter not characterized as 
voluntary: ‘Every unintentional killing of a human being is 
6  
 
 
  
 
 
involuntary manslaughter if it is neither murder nor 
voluntary manslaughter nor within the scope of some 
recognized justification or excuse.’” 
Thus, the catch-all 
crime 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
is 
typically 
characterized in terms of what it is not, and ascertaining 
whether a homicide is involuntary manslaughter requires 
essentially 
questioning 
first 
whether 
it 
is 
murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, or a justified or excused homicide. 
If it is none of those, then the homicide, generally, is 
involuntary manslaughter. 
In attempting to describe the catch-all crime of 
involuntary manslaughter in terms of what it is, as opposed 
to what it is not, it made sense, starting in the days of 
early common law, to refer to those homicides that occurred 
during the commission of an unlawful act that was not 
intended to cause great bodily injury. This is because, as 
already explained, under traditional common law, a homicide 
that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that 
was intended to cause great bodily injury constituted 
murder. 
Thus, as early as 1886, this Court elucidated the 
difference between murder and manslaughter in the following 
manner: 
If an act is unlawful, or is such as duty
does not demand, and of a tendency directly 
dangerous to life, however unintended, it will be 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
murder. But if the act, though dangerous, is not
directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to
life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under
condemnation 
of 
the 
law 
[i.e., 
yet 
it 
is 
unlawful], and death unintended results from it,
the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a
nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is
performed improperly, and death comes from it
unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. 
[People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 340; 28 NW 883
(1886) 
(quoting 
2 
Bishop, 
Criminal 
Law, 
§
689).][4] 
In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, 
which was by then widely accepted, this Court presented a 
somewhat modified version of Stubenvoll’s manslaughter 
characterization, 
stating 
that 
manslaughter 
is 
“‘the 
killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but 
in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor 
naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or 
in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the 
4 In Stubenvoll, the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter was premised on the nature of the danger posed
by the unlawful act rather than the categorization of the
unlawful act as being a felony or non felony.  This is 
likely because it was before the “felony-murder” doctrine
had gained widespread acceptance. 
In any case, the Court
in Stubenvoll recognized the necessity to prove malice in
order to convict of murder. Stubenvoll, supra at 332. 
Thus, it is apparent that by holding that a homicide
occurring during the commission of an unlawful act that
directly tends to cause death is murder, the Court was, in
effect, acknowledging that the existence of malice is 
sufficiently demonstrated if the defendant commits an 
unlawful act that tends to directly cause danger to human
life. 
As already noted, this is the same premise
underlying the “felony-murder” doctrine. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
negligent omission to perform a legal duty.’” 
People v 
Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923) (citation 
omitted). 
Until this Court issued Aaron, Ryczek’s description of 
the 
catch-all 
crime 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
as 
consisting of those homicides occurring without malice and 
unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death 
or great bodily harm, was more or less apt. 
This is 
because, generally, a homicide that occurred with malice or 
intentionally or in committing a felony or in committing an 
unlawful act naturally tending to cause death constituted 
murder. 
However, in Aaron, we formally abolished the 
traditional felony-murder doctrine in Michigan and held 
that a homicide that occurred during the commission of any 
crime, including a felony, constitutes murder only if the 
prosecutor specifically proves the existence of malice. 
Aaron, supra at 727-728. 
In other words, we held that the 
intent to commit the underlying felony by itself no longer 
sufficiently shows the existence of malice. Id. 
Since this Court’s 1980 abrogation of the common-law 
felony-murder rule in Aaron, it is no longer the case that 
a homicide that occurs during the commission of a felony 
is, generally, murder per se and, thus, it is no longer apt 
9  
 
 
 
  
 
 
to describe the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter 
as encompassing crimes that occur during the commission of 
an unlawful act that is not a felony. However, the premise 
of the Aaron decision was the rule that a crime is only 
murder if the prosecutor proves malice.
 We stated in 
Aaron, supra at 726-727, “‘Both murder and manslaughter 
deal with the wrongful killing of another person. . . . To 
hold that in all cases it is murder if a killing occurs in 
the commission of any felony would take from the jury the 
essential question of malice.’” 
(Citation omitted.) 
“If 
the jury concludes that malice existed, they can find 
murder . . . .”  Id. at 730 (emphasis added). Thus, Aaron 
relied 
on 
the 
long-standing 
principle 
that 
the 
distinguishing 
characteristic 
between 
murder 
and 
manslaughter is malice. This point was made by this Court 
as long ago as 1923, when we stated, “[h]omicide is the 
killing of a human being by a human being. 
It . . . is 
either murder or manslaughter . . . . 
To constitute 
murder, the killing must have been perpetrated with malice 
aforethought, either express or implied.” Austen, supra at 
644. 
“‘Manslaughter is the unlawful and felonious killing 
of another without malice, either express or implied.’” 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
Id. at 643 (citation omitted).5
 This point was recently 
reiterated by this Court in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 
536; 664 NW2d 685 (2003), in which we stated, “the sole 
element distinguishing manslaughter and murder is malice.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, it becomes clear that any post-Aaron deficiency 
in Ryczek’s description of involuntary manslaughter is not 
that the description fails now to expressly reference 
unlawful acts that are felonies, but rather that the 
description continues to reference unlawful acts that are 
not felonies. 
This is because the relevant question in 
determining whether a homicide is murder or involuntary 
manslaughter is whether it occurred with malice, and not 
whether it occurred during the commission of an unlawful 
act—felony or not. 
For this reason, defendants cannot 
opportunistically rely on Ryczek’s pre-Aaron description of 
the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter to argue 
that, because the homicide at issue occurred during the 
5 See also People v Potter, 5 Mich 1, 6-9 (1858):
“Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion
unlawfully 
kills 
[another] 
with 
malice 
prepense 
or 
aforethought, either express or implied. . . . [M]alice
aforethought is as much an essential ingredient of murder
in the second degree, as in that of the first. Without
this, the killing would be only manslaughter, if criminal
at all.” 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
commission 
of 
a 
felony, 
they 
cannot 
be 
guilty 
of 
manslaughter. That a “felony” has been committed is simply 
not dispositive in determining whether either “murder” or 
“manslaughter” has been committed and, thus, the “felony” 
language 
in 
Ryczek’s 
manslaughter 
description 
is 
essentially irrelevant.6 
Defendants argue that, if we hold that a homicide that 
occurs during the commission of a felony may constitute 
manslaughter, we nonetheless may not apply the holding in 
this case because to do so would violate the constitutional 
provision against ex post facto laws. See US Const, art I, 
§ 10, cl 1: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post 
facto Law . . . .” 
In Bouie v Columbia, 378 US 347, 353; 
84 S Ct 1697; 12 L Ed 2d 894 (1964), the United States 
Supreme Court explained that an ex post facto law is one 
“‘that makes an action done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes 
such action . . . .’” 
(Citation omitted).  We disagree 
with defendants because a homicide committed during the 
6 We note, however, that while the commission of a
felony is not dispositive in determining whether a “murder”
has been committed because, pursuant to Aaron, evidence of 
a felony is no longer sufficient proof in itself of malice,
the fact that the defendant committed a felony may still be
relevant, even if not dispositive, evidence that the 
defendant acted with malice. See Aaron, supra at 729-730. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
course of a felony could never have been considered an 
“innocent” homicide merely because it occurred during the 
commission of a felony. 
On the contrary, espousing the 
defendants’ argument in this case—that a homicide that 
occurs during the course of a felony cannot, as a matter of 
law, be manslaughter—leads to the conclusion then that the 
homicide (unless justified or excused) is instead murder. 
It does not lead to a conclusion that the homicide is 
innocent, i.e., a non offense. 
Thus, our decision in this 
case does not criminalize that which was, before this 
decision, “innocent.” 
Moreover, 
Ryczek’s 
description 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter was never meant to define the elements of the 
crime of manslaughter. 
Rather, it was meant to provide 
guidance to the courts in understanding the circumstances 
under which the catch-all crime of manslaughter may occur. 
Therefore, it has never been held by this Court that the 
prosecutor must specifically prove that the homicide 
occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that was 
not a felony in order to prove a manslaughter charge. 
On 
the contrary, this Court has implicitly and expressly 
recognized in a number of cases, some decided even before 
Aaron, 
that 
while 
a 
homicide 
occurring 
during 
the 
commission of a felony could (pursuant to the felony-murder 
13  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
doctrine) constitute murder, the homicide also could 
constitute manslaughter—this despite the “felony” language 
in Ryczek’s manslaughter description that, during the pre-
Aaron days, actually had significance. 
In People v Pavlic, 227 Mich 562; 199 NW 373 (1924), 
this 
Court 
considered 
whether 
a 
defendant 
could 
be 
convicted of manslaughter for a homicide that resulted from 
the commission of a felony. 
In Pavlic, a man died after 
drinking liquor sold by the defendant. 
At the time, 
selling intoxicating liquor was a felony. 
Notwithstanding 
the description of involuntary manslaughter given by this 
Court in Ryczek just one year before—which description, as 
noted, refers to manslaughter as “‘the killing of another . 
. . in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony,’” 
Ryczek, supra at 110 (citation omitted)—Pavlic held that 
the homicide at issue could “constitute manslaughter if 
performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent 
to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury.” Pavlic, supra 
at 566. 
The reason the Pavlic Court so held was because 
selling intoxicating liquor is only a “malum prohibitum” 
felony and not a “malum in se” felony.7 
Id. at 566-567. 
7 A “malum prohibitum” act is one that “is a crime
merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the
(continued…) 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
This may appear to be grounds to distinguish Pavlic from 
this 
case, 
but 
the 
essential 
point 
is 
that 
Pavlic 
recognized that a homicide occurring during the commission 
of a “felony” could be manslaughter. 
Moreover, in so holding, the Pavlic Court noted that 
the important consideration in determining whether a 
homicide is murder or simply manslaughter in “felony” cases 
is whether the felony is one that is “in itself directly 
and naturally dangerous to life.” 
Id. at 565. 
The 
implication is that the Pavlic Court understood that the 
important question is whether the defendant acted with 
malice. 
If the defendant committed a felony that is 
directly and naturally dangerous to life, then he acted 
with malice and, therefore, could be convicted of murder. 
If not, then a manslaughter conviction might be proper. 
Thus, even in 1924, one year after Ryczek and fifty-six 
years before Aaron, this Court impliedly acknowledged that, 
despite the commission of a felony and the “felony” 
language in Ryczek, the distinguishing element between 
murder and manslaughter is malice and, therefore, the 
killing of another in doing some unlawful act that amounts 
(…continued) 
act itself is not necessarily immoral.” 
Black’s Law  
Dictionary, supra. A “malum in se” act is a crime “that is  
inherently immoral . . . .” Id.  
15  
 
 
 
 
to a felony may constitute manslaughter rather than murder, 
depending on the facts of the case. 
In People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303; 200 NW 950 (1924), 
an elderly gentleman was tied to a bed during the 
commission of a robbery. He was eventually found dead, and 
the suspects were charged with first- and second-degree 
murder and manslaughter and were convicted of manslaughter. 
The defendants appealed, arguing that they should have been 
charged only with first-degree murder because the death 
“was occasioned by act committed in the perpetration of a 
burglary . . . .” 
Id. at 308. 
The defendants contended 
that they should have been either convicted of first-degree 
murder or acquitted, much as the instant defendants seem to 
be 
arguing. 
The 
Treichel 
Court, 
in 
affirming 
the 
defendants’ manslaughter convictions, stated: 
Conceding the verdict might have been for
murder in the first degree, because death was
occasioned by act committed in the perpetration
of a burglary, was such a verdict the only one
permissible? 
We cannot so hold. 
We think the 
evidence left the question of degree and the
included crime of manslaughter to the jury and
the court avoided instead of committed error in 
so submitting it. Id. 
Thus, in Treichel, again just one year after Ryczek, 
this Court affirmed a manslaughter conviction for a 
homicide that occurred during the commission of a felony 
despite the “felony” language in Ryczek.
 Presumably, if 
16  
 
 
 
the Court intended to preclude such convictions by virtue 
of Ryczek’s “felony” language, it would not have affirmed 
the convictions in Treichel, but, instead, would have 
agreed with the defendants that they should have been 
either convicted of first-degree murder or acquitted. 
In People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), 
the defendants burglarized a store and, while doing so, 
inflicted severe wounds on the owner of the store, who 
eventually died. 
As in Treichel, the defendants were 
charged 
with 
first-
and 
second-degree 
murder 
and 
manslaughter and were convicted of manslaughter. 
The 
defendants appealed, arguing that the manslaughter charge 
and convictions constituted error. 
Again, despite the 
“felony” language of Ryczek and the felony-murder doctrine, 
this Court affirmed the manslaughter convictions in Andrus. 
In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the pivotal issue 
is the existence of malice: 
“[W]here there is testimony 
from which the jury might find the absence of such a 
felonious intent as is necessary to constitute murder 
[i.e., malice], an instruction that they might convict of 
manslaughter should be given.” Id. at 546. 
In People v Carter, 387 Mich 397; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), 
defendants stole a car in order to rob a bank and, in doing 
so, put the owner of the car in its trunk. The victim died 
17  
 
 
 
 
as a result, and all three defendants were convicted of 
first-degree 
murder. 
In 
that 
case, 
the 
defendants 
appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed 
on 
manslaughter 
as 
well 
as 
murder. 
This 
Court, 
notwithstanding the “felony” language in Ryczek, agreed, 
vacated the defendants’ convictions, and remanded for a new 
trial. 
Simply put, case law demonstrates that the “felony” 
language in Ryczek’s description of manslaughter does not 
have the meaning ascribed to it that defendants would like 
to have. 
That is, this language does not mean, as was 
impliedly acknowledged as long ago as 1924 and was 
impliedly reaffirmed as recently as 2003, that a defendant 
may not be convicted of manslaughter if the homicide 
occurred during the commission of a felony. 
The pertinent 
question in distinguishing manslaughter from murder is, as 
was made absolutely clear in Mendoza, whether the defendant 
acted with malice. 
If not, then a manslaughter conviction 
may be proper despite the fact that the death resulted from 
the commission of an underlying felony. 
We believe that, 
in light of the long history of relevant case law and the 
fact that the homicide in question would never have been an 
“innocent” homicide, there is no ex post facto violation in 
affirming Limmer’s conviction of accessory after the fact 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
to involuntary manslaughter and the remaining defendants’ 
involuntary manslaughter convictions.8 
B. UNLAWFUL-ACT MANSLAUGHTER AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
Defendants likewise argue that their convictions of 
manslaughter cannot be sustained because “gross negligence” 
manslaughter, which is the mens rea that the prosecutor in 
this case argued that defendants possessed, requires that a 
8 We note that this Court’s order in People v Rode, 449 
Mich 912 (1995), in which we affirmed the defendant’s
convictions 
of 
second-degree 
murder 
and 
denied 
the 
defendant an instruction on manslaughter because the deaths
occurred during the commission of a felony, has already
been impliedly overruled by Mendoza, in which we held that 
manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of 
murder. 
Mendoza, supra at 548. 
Thus, we held in Mendoza 
that if a defendant is charged with murder, the jury, upon
the defendant’s request, must also be instructed on 
manslaughter if a rational view of the evidence supports
such an instruction. 
Id.
 Defendants attempt to explain
their position under Mendoza by arguing that, because 
Ryczek refers to unlawful acts that are not felonies, a
rational view of the evidence will never support an 
instruction on manslaughter in a case based on the 
commission of a felony. However, the “rational view of the
evidence” proviso in Mendoza concerns whether the facts of 
the specific case rationally fit within the legal purview
of manslaughter—the language is not meant to nullify
Mendoza’s 
statement concerning the legal elements of 
manslaughter: i.e., that “the sole element distinguishing
manslaughter and murder is malice” and that manslaughter is
an 
unintended 
homicide 
with 
a 
diminished 
mens 
rea. 
Mendoza, supra at 536, 541. 
Accordingly, as clearly
explained in Mendoza, determining whether a rational view
of the evidence may support a manslaughter conviction 
requires considering whether a rational jury could conclude
that the defendant did not act with malice, and not whether
death resulted from the commission of a felony. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
lawful act have been committed, whereas the act committed 
in this case, pouring GHB into Samantha Reid’s drink, was 
clearly 
unlawful. 
In 
support 
of 
this 
contention, 
defendants again refer to Ryczek, wherein this Court 
described manslaughter as: 
the killing of another without malice and
unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act
not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending
to cause death or great bodily harm, or in 
negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or
by the negligent omission to perform a legal
duty. 
[Ryczek, supra at 110, citation omitted,
emphasis added).] 
Defendants’ argument has no merit. 
In Datema, supra 
at 596, this Court explained that Ryczek “sets forth three 
different theories giving rise to involuntary manslaughter 
liability. These theories are not mutually exclusive, and, 
under the proper circumstances, multiple theories may be 
appropriate.” 
Thus, it is possible to determine, on the 
basis of the specific facts at issue, that the act 
committed by the defendant that resulted in death was, for 
instance, not only unlawful, but also committed with a mens 
rea of gross negligence. 
In People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 273-274; 183 NW 
177 (1921), this Court provided some early guidance 
regarding 
the 
proofs 
necessary 
to 
demonstrate 
the 
“unlawful-act” theory of involuntary manslaughter and the 
20  
 
 
    
 
 
“lawful-act” theory. Townsend provides: 
The 
distinction 
between 
involuntary
manslaughter 
committed 
while 
perpetrating 
an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony and the
offense arising out of some negligence or fault
in doing a lawful act in a grossly negligent
manner and from which death results must be kept
in mind upon the question of pleading. 
In the 
former case it is sufficient to allege the 
unlawful act with sufficient particularity to 
identify it and then to charge that as a 
consequence the defendant caused the death of the
deceased, and there is no need to aver in detail
the specific acts of the accused; but in case of
manslaughter committed through gross or culpable
negligence while doing a lawful act the duty
which was neglected or improperly performed must
be charged as well as the acts of the accused
constituting 
failure 
to 
perform 
or 
improper
performance. [Id. at 372-274.] 
This statement in Townsend essentially means that if 
the defendant committed an unlawful act that resulted in 
death, it is sufficient to allege the commission of the 
unlawful act and the resulting death; whereas, if the 
defendant committed a lawful act resulting in death, the 
prosecutor must specifically allege the manner in which the 
defendant’s actions were grossly or culpably negligent. 
That is, under Townsend, lawful-act manslaughter requires 
that the defendant acted with a mens rea of culpable 
negligence; whereas unlawful-act manslaughter does not 
require that the defendant acted with a specific mens rea— 
all that is required is that the defendant committed the 
unlawful act. 
21  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In Pavlic, this Court considered, as noted above, 
whether a defendant can be convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter for a death resulting after the defendant 
committed the unlawful act of selling intoxicating liquor. 
The Court explained that a manslaughter conviction may be 
appropriate, but that, because this unlawful act is only 
malum prohibitum rather than malum in se, it is only 
appropriate if the prosecutor specifically proves that the 
defendant acted with a culpable mens rea. 
The Court 
essentially equated malum prohibitum unlawful acts with 
lawful acts, stating 
The 
act 
of 
selling 
or 
furnishing
intoxicating liquor in violation of the statute
is what the law terms an act malum prohibitum, a 
crime existing only by reason of statutory
prohibition. 
An unlawful act of this character 
which 
unintentionally 
causes 
the 
death 
of 
another, is not in itself a sufficient basis for
a charge of involuntary manslaughter.9 But the 
commission of such an [malum prohibitum] unlawful
act will constitute manslaughter if performed
under such circumstances as to supply the intent 
9 The corollary of this assertion is that an unlawful
act which is not malum prohibitum, but is rather malum in
se, is “in itself” a sufficient basis for a charge of
involuntary manslaughter. This is essentially the position
taken in Townsend, supra, that (malum in se) unlawful-act
manslaughter does not require that defendant acted with a
specific mens rea—all that is required is that defendant
committed the (malum in se) unlawful act and that death
resulted therefrom. 
22  
 
 
 
 
to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury. . . .
The rule is well stated in Thiede v. State, 1096 
Neb 48 (182 N.W. 570 [1921]), as follows: 
“We 
believe the rule to be that though the act made
unlawful by statute is an act merely malum 
prohibitum and is ordinarily insufficient, still
when such an act is accompanied by negligence or
further wrong so as to be in its nature,
dangerous, or as to manifest a reckless disregard
for the safety of others, then it may be 
sufficient 
to 
supply 
the 
wrongful 
intent 
essential to criminal homicide [and] when such an
act 
results 
in 
the 
death 
of 
another, 
may
constitute involuntary manslaughter.” 
[Pavlic, 
supra at 566.] 
Thus, similar to Townsend, what may be gleaned from 
Pavlic is that, traditionally, commission of a malum in se 
unlawful act that results in an unintended death is 
sufficient in itself to constitute manslaughter; whereas an 
unintended death resulting from either a lawful act or a 
malum prohibitum unlawful act requires specific proof of a 
culpable mens rea, which may consist of an intent to 
inflict bodily injury or of gross negligence showing a 
reckless disregard for the safety of another. 
In a more recent case, Datema, this Court again 
addressed the mens rea necessary to sustain a manslaughter 
conviction. 
Citing Pavlic, we held that where an act is 
malum prohibitum unlawful or lawful, a mens rea of 
“criminal negligence” is required to prove manslaughter, 
and this requirement is met if the defendant either 
intended to inflict some bodily injury on another or if the 
23  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
defendant acted carelessly in such a manner that manifests 
a reckless disregard for another’s life-that is, if the 
defendant acted with gross negligence. 
Datema, supra at 
598-599. 
“Gross negligence is only necessary if an intent 
to injure cannot be established.” Id. at 605.10 
Regarding 
malum 
in 
se 
unlawful-act 
manslaughter, 
Datema first noted that under traditional common law (as 
expressed in Townsend and Pavlic), “[w]hen an unintentional 
killing occurred during the commission of [a malum in se 
unlawful] act . . , the commission of the underlying malum 
in 
se 
[act] 
supplied 
the 
mens 
rea 
for 
involuntary 
manslaughter.” Id. at 599-600. Further, Datema noted that 
“[u]nlike the second and third theories of involuntary 
manslaughter liability, the [unlawful act] rule does not 
require negligence.” Id. at 600. 
The defendant in Datema argued that, just as Aaron 
held that proof that a defendant committed the underlying 
felony is no longer sufficient to show malice and thus 
constitute murder, proof that the defendant committed the 
10 Thus, in fact, Datema makes clear that it is not the 
case, as defendants seem to assert, that lawful-act 
manslaughter requires that the prosecutor prove that the 
defendant acted with “gross negligence.”  The prosecutor
may prove lawful-act manslaughter by demonstrating that the
defendant acted with either gross negligence or with an
intent to injure. 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
underlying malum in se unlawful act should no longer “in 
itself” be sufficient to constitute manslaughter. 
We 
declined to address this issue in Datema because the 
unlawful act that the defendant committed, assault and 
battery, itself showed that the defendant acted with a 
specific intent to injure and, thus, the defendant acted 
with a culpable manslaughter mens rea. 
Thus, Datema 
concluded that the defendant was properly convicted of 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
because 
“[a]n 
unlawful 
act 
committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly 
negligent 
manner 
that 
proximately 
causes 
death 
is 
involuntary manslaughter.” Id. at 606. 
We, too, need not consider whether the prosecutor was 
required in this case to specifically prove that defendants 
acted with a culpable mens rea or whether proof that 
defendants committed the malum in se unlawful act itself 
furnishes 
a 
sufficient 
mens 
rea 
for 
involuntary 
manslaughter11 because, in either case, the prosecutor did 
prove that defendants acted with a culpable mens rea of 
gross negligence. 
Pursuant to Datema, if the prosecutor 
11 We note, however, that were we to hold that the
prosecutor was not required to specifically prove a mens
rea, defendants would not be entitled to relief on the
basis that the prosecutor, in proving a mens rea of gross
negligence, proved more than was required. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
proves that defendants committed “[a]n unlawful act . . . 
with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner 
that proximately cause[d] death,” id., an involuntary 
manslaughter conviction may be appropriate. Therefore, the 
prosecutor did not err in proceeding under a gross 
negligence theory. 
Moreover, it is apparent that, at the 
very least, the prosecutor sufficiently proved its case. 
Defendants may not seek relief on the basis that the 
prosecutor may have “over-proved” its case by demonstrating 
that defendants acted with a mens rea of gross negligence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the language in Ryczek regarding the 
commission of an “unlawful act not amounting to a felony” 
does not mean that a defendant may not be convicted of 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
for 
an 
unintentional 
death 
resulting from the commission of a felony. 
Disregarding 
the reference to an “unlawful act not amounting to a 
felony,” Ryczek’s description of involuntary manslaughter 
remains a useful tool in discerning the circumstances under 
which involuntary manslaughter may occur. 
However, we 
emphasize that Ryczek’s description is just that—a useful 
tool, and not a definitive statement regarding the elements 
of involuntary manslaughter. 
More importantly, it must be 
kept 
in 
mind 
that 
“the 
sole 
element 
distinguishing 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
manslaughter and murder is malice,” Mendoza at 536, and 
that “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is a catch-all concept 
including all manslaughter not characterized as voluntary: 
‘Every 
unintentional 
killing 
of 
a 
human 
being 
is 
involuntary manslaughter if it is neither murder nor 
voluntary manslaughter nor within the scope of some 
recognized justification or excuse.’” 
Datema, supra at 
594-595. 
If a homicide is not voluntary manslaughter or 
excused or justified, it is, generally, either murder or 
involuntary manslaughter.12
 If the homicide was committed 
with malice, it is murder.13
 If it was committed with a 
lesser mens rea of gross negligence or an intent to injure, 
and not malice, it is not murder, but only involuntary 
manslaughter. 
Defendants in this case purposefully committed a malum 
in se unlawful act when they poured GHB into Samantha 
Reid’s drink and, in doing so, caused her death. Her death 
was not voluntary manslaughter or excused or justified. 
12 Statutory exceptions to the common-law catch-all
crime of manslaughter exist. For instance, see MCL 750.324
and 750.325, regarding the crime of “negligent homicide.” 
13 Of course, if a defendant commits murder, he has
essentially 
also 
committed 
manslaughter 
because 
manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of 
murder. Mendoza, supra at 548. 
27  
 
 
 
Whether or not defendants acted with malice, the jury 
found, in either case, that they acted with a diminished 
mens rea of gross negligence sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of manslaughter. In short, defendants, by their 
purposeful, 
willful, 
reckless, 
and 
unlawful 
behavior, 
unintentionally killed another person, and this is exactly 
the type of homicide that fits within the parameters of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
Therefore, we overrule the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant 
Limmer’s 
conviction 
of 
accessory 
after 
the 
fact 
to 
involuntary manslaughter and the remaining defendants’ 
involuntary manslaughter convictions. 
Stephen J. Markman
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123553 
NICHOLAS E. HOLTSCHLAG, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123554 
JOSHUA M. COLE, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123555 
DANIEL BRAYMAN, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123556 
ERICK LIMMER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in the result only). 
I concur in the result reached by the majority; 
however, I write separately because I disagree with the 
majority’s rationale. 
Unlike the majority, I believe that 
a defendant can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
when the committed act is a felony, but only when the 
felony does not naturally tend to cause death or great 
bodily harm.1 
The manslaughter statute, MCL 750.321, provides the 
following: 
“Any person who shall commit the crime of 
manslaughter shall be guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison, not more than 15 years or 
by fine of not more than 7,500 dollars, or both, at the 
1 Although I still believe that “[g]ross negligence
should be recognized as the mens rea standard for all
common-law forms of involuntary manslaughter,” as expressed
in my dissent in People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 609; 533
NW2d 272 (1995), this interpretation of the law was not
shared by a majority of this Court. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
discretion of the court.” 
No distinction is made in the 
statute between voluntary manslaughter and involuntary 
manslaughter.2 
Because the statute at issue, MCL 750.321, does not 
define manslaughter, the common-law definition must be 
used. 
People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 588; 218 NW2d 136 
(1974). 
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as “‘the 
killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but 
in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor 
naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or 
in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the 
negligent omission to perform a legal duty.’” 
People v 
Herron, 464 Mich 593, 604; 628 NW2d 528 (2001), quoting 
People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923). 
I disagree with the majority’s claim that this Court 
did not provide a definition in Ryczek but merely offered 
“guidance” and “a useful tool.” 
Ante at 13, 26. 
I find 
this claim to be disingenuous. This Court in Ryczek, supra 
at 109, stated that the term “involuntary manslaughter” is 
“well defined” and then went on to provide the definition. 
This Court in Herron, supra at 604, stated that “the 
2 “There is but one offense of manslaughter in this
State.” 
People v Rogulski, 181 Mich 481, 494; 148 NW 189
(1914). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
definition [of involuntary manslaughter] is left to the 
common law. . . . 
This Court has defined the common-law 
offense of involuntary manslaughter as . . . .” 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
Further, in Townes, supra at 590, this Court 
similarly stated that in Ryczek, “the Court approved the 
following definition of involuntary manslaughter . . . .” 
(Emphasis added.) 
While the majority now chooses to 
characterize the definition as a descriptive tool, 
believe it is clear that the Ryczek definition is, in fact, 
a definition. 
I believe a proper reading of the definition of 
involuntary manslaughter dictates that a person cannot be 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter when he commits a 
felony that naturally tends to cause death or great bodily 
harm. 
If the defendant commits a felony that does not 
naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm, such as 
larceny of an ornamental tree, MCL 750.367, he can be 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter if death to a person 
results. 
This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s 
prior decisions. 
This Court has previously rejected the argument that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
merely because the act committed was a felony. 
See, e.g., 
People v Carter, 387 Mich 397, 422; 197 NW2d 57 (1972); 
4  
I 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
People v Pavlic, 227 Mich 562, 565-567; 199 NW 373 (1924). 
In Pavlic, a man died after drinking liquor sold by the 
defendant. 
At the time, selling intoxicating liquor was a 
felony. This Court stated that violating the liquor law is 
only criminal because it is prohibited by statute; it is a 
malum prohibitum act.3
 “It is not inherently criminal. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the statute has declared it 
to be a felony it is an act not in itself directly and 
naturally dangerous to life.” 
Id. at 565. 
The commission 
of a malum prohibitum act “will constitute manslaughter if 
performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent 
to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury.” 
Id. at 566. 
Selling intoxicating liquor was insufficient to support the 
manslaughter conviction in Pavlic because the defendant did 
not possess an intent to inflict injury or a reckless 
disregard for the safety of the victim. 
However, if the 
circumstances had been different, for example, if the 
liquor had contained certain poisonous ingredients that the 
defendant had known about, the defendant would have been 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 567. 
3 “An act is malum prohibitum if it is an ‘act which is 
not 
inherently 
immoral, 
but 
becomes 
so 
because 
its 
commission is expressly forbidden by positive law . . . .’”
Datema, supra at 597 n 13, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My reasoning is consistent with past opinions and 
orders of this Court, and does not require a finding, as 
the majority now does, that this Court’s order in People v 
Rode, 449 Mich 912 (1995), was impliedly overruled by this 
Court’s opinion in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534; 664 
NW2d 685 (2003). 
In Rode, this Court’s order peremptorily 
reinstated the defendant’s convictions of second-degree 
murder and felony-firearm possession on the basis of the 
reasoning of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals. 
The dissenting judge argued: 
Because shooting at the other vehicle full
of people was “an unlawful act” amounting to “a
felony and would naturally tend to cause death or
great bodily harm,” it was not conduct within the
definition of involuntary manslaughter for a 
killing committed “in doing some unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to
cause death or great bodily harm . . . .” [Rode, 
supra at 914 (LEVIN, J., dissenting, citing JANSEN,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 3,
1995 [Docket No. 179942]).] 
In essence, this Court adopted the dissenting judge’s 
statement that shooting at a car full of people is not 
involuntary manslaughter because that act constitutes a 
felony that would naturally tend to cause death or great 
bodily harm. 
Further, in Datema, supra at 597, this Court 
stated, “where a defendant commits an unlawful act that is 
malum prohibitum or a lawful act executed negligently that 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
causes death, involuntary manslaughter may be premised on 
criminal negligence.” While this Court was considering the 
misdemeanor-manslaughter 
rule 
in 
Datema, 
the 
general 
principles articulated are relevant to the issue at hand. 
Finally, the underlying felony in this case–mixing a 
harmful substance in a drink—does not naturally tend to 
cause death or great bodily harm.4
 There are numerous 
harmful substances that could be mixed into a drink that 
would not naturally lead to death or great bodily harm. 
Unfortunately, GHB (gamma hydroxybutrate) was mixed in the 
girls’ drinks in amounts that led to one girl’s death, but 
that does not mean that defendants’ underlying felony is 
one that naturally tends to cause death or great bodily 
harm.5
 Therefore, I believe that the prosecutor had to 
4 MCL 750.436(1) states, in pertinent part, “A person
shall not . . . (a) [w]illfully mingle a poison or harmful
substance with a food, drink, nonprescription medicine, or
pharmaceutical product . . . knowing or having reason to
know that the food, drink, nonprescription medicine,
pharmaceutical product, or water may be ingested or used by
a person to his or her injury.” 
5 GHB can have a range of effects from memory loss to
death. 
In low doses, the drug can reduce inhibitions,
which is presumably why the drug was mixed in the girls’
drinks. See United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
 (accessed July 7, 2004); Executive Office of
the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy,
 (accessed July 7, 2004).
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
specifically allege and prove, as he did, that defendants 
were grossly negligent. 
Therefore, while I agree with the result reached by 
the majority, I disagree with the majority’s rationale. 
Accordingly, I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
(…continued)
I also note that there may certainly be cases in which
the act of mixing GHB into a person’s drink is proven to be
with malice; however, in this case, the prosecutor did not
seek to prove malice. 
8