Title: Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell1983 WY 41662 P.2d 410Case Number: 5810, 5811Case Number: 5810, 5811Decided: 04/19/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, KENDALL 
BAKER, DOES I-V, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

ROSEMARIE BELL, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

ROSEMARIE BELL, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, KENDALL 
BAKER, DOES I-V, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). Nos. 5810, 5811

Appeal from the 
AlbanyCounty, District Court, 
Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

William R. Jones 
and John P. McBride of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellants in No. 5810 and appellees in 
No. 5811.

Barkley R. 
Bonine, Laramie, 
for appellee in No. 5810 and appellant 
in No. 5811.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The dispositive issue 
posed by this appeal is whether this court may recognize a judgment entered upon 
default of the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming for failure to answer a complaint 
which contains no allegation of the filing of a claim as required by statute. 
While both parties have appealed from the judgment in the district court, the 
issue which we have identified was not urged or argued either in this court or 
in the district court. The Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming instead urges that good cause 
exists to set aside the default judgment because of the showing of a meritorious 
defense, in effect asserting abuse of discretion on the part of the district 
court in failing to set aside the default judgment. The Board of Trustees also 
disputes the right of Rosemarie Bell to damages for wrongful termination of an 
employment contract under the circumstances, which include the fact of her 
status as a probationary employee at the time of her resignation. Claiming that 
her resignation was coerced, in her appeal Rosemarie Bell has presented 
arguments rejecting the right of the Board of Trustees of the University of 
Wyoming to challenge factual allegations in her complaint after the entry of 
default, and contesting the refusal of the district court to award damages as to 
all aspects of her claims or causes of action at the damage hearing held after 
entry of the default judgment. The disposition that we shall make of this case 
causes it to be unnecessary to discuss the issues which the parties chose to 
debate. Because the district court was without jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of Rosemarie Bell's complaint we must dismiss the appeal on our own 
motion, and we will remand the case to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss the complaint.

[¶2.]     In May of 1982 
Rosemarie Bell brought her action against the Board of Trustees of the 
University of 
Wyoming and Kendall L. 
Baker. Rosemarie Bell represented herself in the proceeding without the 
assistance of counsel. Kendall L. Baker, according to the complaint, was the 
Director of the Political Science Department of the University of Wyoming in which Rosemarie Bell was 
employed as an administrative secretary. The gravamen of her complaint was the 
forced resignation of Rosemarie Bell from that position under threat of 
discharge. Rosemarie Bell also complained of the failure to grant her a hearing 
prior to requesting her resignation, slander by Kendall Baker, and threatening, 
harassing, and intimidating conduct by Baker causing emotional and financial 
distress. While the complaint filed by Rosemarie Bell alleges many things, it 
does not in any way allege that she filed a claim as required by § 9-2-332, W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), or § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982).1 

[¶3.]     A motion to dismiss was 
filed on behalf of Kendall L. Baker by an Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of Wyoming. In that motion Kendall L. Baker 
asserted that Rosemarie Bell was a probationary employee; that the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-119, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1982), contains no exception to governmental immunity that relates to the 
matters asserted in the complaint; and that in any event Kendall L. Baker was 
immune from suit because of his status as a governmental employee. In August of 
1982 a hearing was held on Baker's motion to dismiss, and the court entered an 
order dismissing him from the action. In so doing the district court found that 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, supra, was applicable to this case, and 
noted specifically that the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming is a governmental entity under 
that statute. As the court stated in its order, the record reflected no service 
of the complaint upon the board of trustees or any of its members at the time of 
that order, and for that reason the court was careful to make no finding with 
respect to the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming.

[¶4.]     About ten days later a 
return of a summons was filed reflecting service upon the Board of Trustees of 
the University of Wyoming by leaving a copy with a member of the board 
at his address in Laramie, 
Wyoming. No answer or pleading was 
filed on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming, and approximately one month later 
Rosemarie Bell filed a Motion for Hearing in which she requested a hearing for 
the judge to assess the exact punitive damages on all four causes of action plus 
all costs and losses. On the same day she filed an affidavit and request for 
entry of default, and an entry of default was made in the record by the clerk of 
the district court.2 Also on the same day an order 
setting a hearing on the motion for default judgment was entered in the file. 
The hearing was set for September 8, 1982, and on September 1, 1982, the Board 
of Trustees of the University of Wyoming filed its motion to set aside the 
default. That motion was set for hearing at the same time and date as that 
previously set for the hearing for default judgment.

[¶5.]     The failure to answer 
on the part of the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming is not satisfactorily explained in 
the record. An affidavit from the trustee who was served states that he took the 
summons and complaint to the administrative offices of the University of Wyoming. An affidavit from a responsible 
official in that office reflects that no copy of the summons and complaint could 
be located in that office.

[¶6.]     In any event, after the 
hearing the district court proceeded to enter judgment against the University of Wyoming based upon the default which 
previously had been entered. In so doing the district court denied the motion to 
set aside the default which had been filed on behalf of the Board of Trustees of 
the University of 
Wyoming, finding no good 
cause had been shown under Rule 55(c), W.R.C.P. However, the judgment entered by 
the district court awarded Rosemarie Bell a judgment only on her first cause of 
action, premised upon a theory of wrongful discharge, in the total amount of 
$1,886.30. The court found that the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming was entitled to judgment against 
the plaintiff on her second, third and fourth causes of action. As noted 
previously, both the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming and Rosemarie Bell, now acting 
through counsel, filed timely notices of appeal from the judgment of the 
district court.

[¶7.]     The complaint which 
Rosemarie Bell filed in this case sounds both in contract and in tort. The 
district court noted, in dealing with the dismissal of Kendall Baker, that the 
complaint sounded in tort. The judgment which was awarded in favor of Rosemarie 
Bell, and against the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming, however, seems to encompass only 
elements compatible with breach of contract. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. 
Smith, Wyo., 637 P.2d 1020 (1981). Except for filing 
fees and costs for the service fee of the sheriff the award was premised upon 
differences in salary in two jobs held by Rosemarie Bell together with an 
apparent award for loss of salary during a period in which she was not employed. 
As we view the issue presented by this appeal, it is not necessary to classify 
the claim because any classification would not affect the result which we 
reach.

[¶8.]     If the action is 
treated as one sounding in contract, and in awarding damages that is the way the 
district court treated it, it traditionally would have been governed by concepts 
encompassed in our prior precedents. We know that an action brought against the 
Board of Trustees of the University of 
Wyoming is an action against the State 
of Wyoming. 
Section 1-35-101, W.S. 1977; Retail 
Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University 
of Wyoming, Wyo., 
531 P.2d 884 (1975). The same rule applied prior to the adoption of the statute. 
Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9 (1924). In Awe v. University of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 534 P.2d 97 
(1975), in which this court dealt with a tort claim against the University of Wyoming, we noted the requirement of § 
9-71, W.S. 1957 (now found in § 9-2-332, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982)), for filing 
a claim with the State Auditor. We there held that the statute implements Art. 
16, § 7 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming,3 and is a condition precedent to the 
filing of an action against the State of Wyoming, including the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming. The court in Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, 
relied upon Price v. State Highway 
Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946), another tort suit, and Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway 
Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933), a contract 
case.

[¶9.]     In Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, the 
claim requirement was described as a condition precedent to the filing of the 
action against the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming. This court also said, 
however:

"* * * We are discussing 
and deciding questions of serious and important prerequisite jurisdictional procedures, without which 
we might as well abandon all rules of orderly conduct of lawsuits, disregard the 
mandates of the legislature and place everything upon an equitable basis of what 
we, as judges, might think the arrangement from day to day ought to be. * * *" 
Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, 
534 P.2d  at 105. (Emphasis added.)

We also are 
cognizant of the language and holding in Utah Construction Company v. State Highway 
Commission, supra, that such a condition precedent is jurisdictional in 
nature. Although substantial compliance with the statute was recognized in Rissler & McMurry Company v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, Wyo., 582 P.2d 583 (1978), the jurisdictional 
necessity for some claim being filed was maintained. We can only conclude that 
in the absence of an allegation of the filing of such a claim the district court 
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in accordance 
with the decisions which this court has promulgated.

[¶10.]  If this matter is viewed as a contract 
claim we make no holding with respect to whether the provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, supra, the claims provisions of which are quoted above 
in footnote 1, should be invoked. It does appear that in 1980 an attempt was 
made in the legislature of the State of Wyoming to exclude contractual claims from the 
application of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, supra. In that session of 
the legislature House Bill Number 148 was introduced, and it amended § 
1-39-104(a) so the last two sentences thereof would have read as 
follows:

"Any immunity in actions 
based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to 
the extent provided in the contract if the contract was within the powers 
granted to the entity and was properly executed. The claims procedures and other 
provisions of this Act do not apply to contractual claims against governmental 
entities."

House Bill 
Number 148, however, was amended in the legislative process so that that last 
sentence now reads:

"The claims procedures of 
W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 apply to contractual claims against governmental 
entities."

It is impossible 
to conclude what the legislature intended by such an amendment. It is clear that 
there are no claims procedures found in § 1-39-105 through § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1982). Those statutory provisions contain the waivers of immunity 
from suit against the State of Wyoming, yet the preceding sentence contains 
the waiver of immunity for claims based on contract. Since, however, the claims 
provision of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1982), specifically is not mentioned, it well may be that one could 
infer an intent not to make that provision applicable to contract claims. We 
note that the legislature has maintained, as part of the law in the State of 
Wyoming, the 
general claims provision, which requires the timely filing of a claim with the 
State Auditor prior to bringing suit. Section 9-2-332, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 
1982).

[¶11.]  If one should conclude that this action 
sounds entirely in tort and, therefore, is within the provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-119, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1982), then the provisions of § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), quoted 
above in footnote 1, clearly apply. Section 1-39-119, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1982), which provides as follows:

"The provisions of this 
act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or agreement governing 
employer-employee relationships."

does not serve 
to except claims which have their genesis in tort even though they arise out of 
an employment relationship. Instead this section indicates that the provisions 
of the statute are supplementary to others which may be provided by law, 
regulation or other agreement relating to employer-employee relationships. If 
the tort action is brought, and it does arise out of the employment 
relationship, we conclude that the claims procedure of this statute must be 
followed.

[¶12.]  The same result must be reached under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, supra, as is reached under the general law even 
though the statute is not explicit with respect to whether the filing of a claim 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. It would be incongruous for the same 
result not to attach to the failure to file a claim under § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1982), and we hold that the failure to file a claim under that 
statute results in a district court having no jurisdiction over an action which 
is brought if the complaint fails to allege the filing of the claim pursuant to 
statute.

[¶13.]  Since the defect in this instance is 
jurisdictional we have no hesitancy in disposing of the case upon that basis and 
upon our own motion. As this court said in Harrington v. Hoyt, Wyo., 
648 P.2d 556, 559 (1982):

"It is recognized that 
the question of jurisdiction was not presented in argument to this court, nor 
was it presented in the district court. Nevertheless the rule is well 
established that the question of jurisdiction can never be waived, and it always 
is open to consideration by a reviewing court upon its own motion. Williams v. Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 626 P.2d 564 (1981); Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 569 
(1979); Merritt v. Merritt, Wyo., 586 P.2d 550 (1978); Pritchard v. State 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social 
Services, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523 (1975); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department v. Niezwaag, Wyo., 444 P.2d 327 (1968); and Gardner 
v. Walker, Wyo., 373 P.2d 598 (1962)."

To the same 
effect is L Slash X Cattle Company, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 623 P.2d 764 
(1981).

[¶14.]  Because the same result is reached under 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, supra, or by the application of the case 
authorities which this court has promulgated, we see no necessity in this 
instance to determine whether the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applies to 
contract actions against the State of Wyoming. We have noted some anomalous language 
in the statute, and it well may be that at some date in the future we will be 
called upon to decide that specific question. We shall reserve our judgment for 
that future occasion.

[¶15.]  Having concluded that the district court 
was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, we hold that 
the appeals of both parties to this court should be dismissed. Lest the effect 
of that dismissal be somehow construed as recognizing the viability of the 
judgment entered by the district court, we also order that the case be remanded 
to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint filed by 
Rosemarie Bell because the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of that action in the absence of an allegation in the complaint that a 
claim had been filed against the State of Wyoming in accordance with the 
appropriate procedures.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 9-2-332, W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), provides as follows:

"Except as provided by 
W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-119, persons having claims against the state shall 
exhibit the claim, with the evidence in support thereof, to the state auditor, 
to be audited, settled and allowed, within one (1) year after the claim accrues 
and not afterward."

Section 
1-39-103, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982), provides as follows:

"(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

"(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

"(b) The claim shall 
state:

"(i) The time, place and 
circumstances of the alleged loss or injury including the name of the public 
employee involved, if known;

"(ii) The name, address 
and residence of the claimant and his representative or attorney, if any; 
and

"(iii) The amount of 
compensation or other relief demanded.

"(c) Claims against the 
state shall be presented to the state auditor who shall forward a copy of the 
claim to the insurance claims division of the department of administration and 
fiscal control. Claims against any other governmental entity shall be filed at 
the business office of that entity in duplicate and a copy of the claim shall be 
forwarded by the entity to the secretary of state for informational purposes. 
Failure to file the claim with the secretary of state shall not invalidate the 
claim. In the case of claims against local governments the claim submitted need 
not be acted upon by the entity prior to suit."

2 Rule 55, W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part as follows:

"(a) Entry. - When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit 
or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default.

"(b) Judgment. - Judgment by default may be 
entered as follows:

"(1) By the Clerk. - When 
the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or for a sum 
which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the 
plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that 
amount and costs against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to 
appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person;

"(2) By the Court. - In 
all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the 
court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or 
incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, 
guardian ad litem, trustee, or other such representative who has appeared 
therein. If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought has appeared 
in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall 
be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days 
prior to the hearing on such application. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper, and 
shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by any 
statute.

"(c) Setting aside default. - For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b)."

3 Art. 16, § 7, Wyoming 
Constitution, provides:

"No money shall 
be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on 
warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands 
against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be audited, 
allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under 
penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it 
may be to audit the same."