Title: GERLING KONZERN ALLGEMEINE VERSICHERUNGS AG V CECIL R LAWSON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 8, 2005  
GERLING KONZERN ALLGEMEINE 
VERSICHERUNGS AG, subrogee of
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122938 
CECIL R. LAWSON and AMERICAN 
BEAUTY TURF NURSERIES, INC.,
jointly and severally, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J. 
This 
case 
requires 
that 
we 
consider 
whether 
a 
plaintiff, who has settled an underlying tort claim with an 
injured party, may subsequently proceed on a contribution 
action against a defendant whom the plaintiff alleges was a 
joint tortfeasor whose negligence constituted a proximate 
cause of the underlying plaintiff's injuries. 
Defendants 
argue that tort reform legislation in 1995, specifically 
MCL 600.2956, MCL 600.2957, and MCL 600.6304, has abrogated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
plaintiff’s contribution action because, had the underlying 
tort action proceeded to trial, the jury or judge would 
have been required to allocate fault among all tortfeasors 
and each tortfeasor, including plaintiff, would have been 
required to pay only for its percentage of fault. Further, 
defendants maintain that, if plaintiff paid more in the 
settlement than was warranted by its percentage of fault, 
it did so as a volunteer and therefore cannot seek 
contribution from joint tortfeasors. 
These arguments are unavailing for the simple reason 
that the 1995 tort reform legislation preserved the right 
of a severally liable tortfeasor such as plaintiff to bring 
an action for contribution. 
Therefore, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arose from a three-vehicle accident that 
occurred in 1997. 
In one vehicle were Ricki Ash and James 
Nicastri, the injured parties in the underlying claim; in 
the second vehicle, owned by the Regents of the University 
of Michigan (Regents), was employee Barry Maus; and in the 
third vehicle, owned by American Beauty Turf Nurseries, 
Inc. (American Beauty), was employee Cecil Lawson. Ash and 
2  
 
 
 
 
Nicastri filed suit in the Court of Claims against Maus and 
the Regents. 
Gerling Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG 
(Gerling Konzern), the insurer and subrogee of the Regents, 
settled with Ash and Nicastri on behalf of Maus and the 
Regents, and the underlying tort action was accordingly 
dismissed with prejudice. 
In November 1999, plaintiff in this action, Gerling 
Konzern, filed a contribution action against defendants 
Lawson and American Beauty pursuant to MCL 600.2925a­
600.2925d. 
Defendants moved for summary disposition 
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the tort reform 
acts of 1995, 1995 PA 161 and 1995 PA 249, by eliminating 
joint and several liability in certain tort actions, 
including the underlying action in this case, abrogated 
plaintiff’s contribution cause of action. 
The trial court 
denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition. 
On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the 
trial court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of 
defendants, holding that plaintiff’s contribution action 
was barred as a result of the elimination of joint and 
several liability and the rule that, in tort actions in 
which liability is several only, each tortfeasor is 
required to pay only for his percentage of fault. 254 Mich 
App 241; 657 NW2d 143 (2002). 
We granted plaintiff’s 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
application for leave to appeal, 469 Mich 947 (2003), and 
subsequently 
ordered 
that 
the 
case 
be 
reargued 
and 
resubmitted. 471 Mich 855 (2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant 
or deny summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
Maiden 
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
A 
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of 
the complaint, and may be granted only where the claims 
alleged are “‘so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law 
that 
no 
factual 
development 
could 
possibly 
justify 
recovery.’” 
Maiden, supra at 119 (citation omitted). 
We 
also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. 
Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 
NW2d 126 (2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Until the enactment of tort reform legislation in 
1995, concurrent tortfeasors in Michigan were “jointly and 
severally” 
liable. 
This 
meant 
that 
where 
multiple 
tortfeasors caused a single or indivisible injury, the 
injured party could either sue all tortfeasors jointly or 
he could sue any individual tortfeasor severally, and each 
individual tortfeasor was liable for the entire judgment, 
although 
the 
injured 
party 
was 
entitled 
to 
full 
4  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
compensation only once. 
See Markley v Oak Health Care 
Investors of Coldwater, Inc, 255 Mich App 245, 251; 660 
NW2d 344 (2003); Maddux v Donaldson, 362 Mich 425, 433; 108 
NW2d 33 (1961). “At common law, contribution was not, as a 
general rule, recoverable among or between joint wrongdoers 
or tortfeasors.” 
O'Dowd v Gen Motors Corp, 419 Mich 597, 
603; 358 NW2d 553 (1984). 
The right of contribution, 
although now codified in a majority of states, evolved in 
equity. 
See 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 886A, comment c.1 
Thus, even though, at law, a “joint and several” tortfeasor 
was liable for an entire judgment, equity came to allow 
that 
tortfeasor 
to 
seek 
contribution 
from 
other 
tortfeasors. 
A primary purpose underlying “contribution” 
was to mitigate the unfairness resulting to a jointly and 
severally liable tortfeasor who had been required to pay an 
entire judgment in cases in which other tortfeasors also 
contributed to an injury. 
However, as part of the 1995 tort reform legislation, 
the Legislature enacted MCL 600.2956, which provides in 
part, “Except as provided in section 6304, in an action 
based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for 
1 
This 
remains 
apparent 
in 
Michigan’s 
relevant 
statutory provisions. 
For example, MCL 600.2925b(c)
provides, 
“[p]rinciples 
of 
equity 
applicable 
to 
contribution generally shall apply.” 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the 
liability of each defendant for damages is several only and 
is not joint.” 
MCL 600.2957(1) further provides, “In an 
action based on tort or another legal theory seeking 
damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful 
death, the liability of each person shall be allocated 
under this section by the trier of fact and, subject to 
section 
6304, 
in 
direct 
proportion 
to 
the 
person's 
percentage of fault.” Finally, MCL 600.6304 provides: 
(1) In an action based on tort . . . seeking
damages for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death involving fault of more than 1
person, 
including 
third-party 
defendants 
and 
nonparties, the court . . . shall instruct the
jury to answer special interrogatories or, if
there is no jury, shall make findings indicating
both of the following: 
* * * 
(b) The percentage of the total fault of
all persons that contributed to the death or
injury . . . . 
* * * 
(4) Liability in an action to which this
section applies is several only and not joint. 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6), a
person shall not be required to pay damages in an
amount greater than his or her percentage of
fault as found under subsection (1). 
Thus, the 1995 legislation eliminated joint and 
several liability in certain tort actions, requires that 
the fact-finder in such actions allocate fault among all 
responsible tortfeasors, and provides that each tortfeasor 
need not pay damages in an amount greater than his 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
allocated percentage of fault. 
As such, in an action in 
which an injured party has sued only one of multiple 
tortfeasors and in which §§ 2956, 2957, and 6304 apply, the 
tortfeasor would have no need to seek contribution from 
other tortfeasors, either in that same action (by bringing 
in third-party defendants) or in a separate action, because 
no “person shall . . . be required to pay damages in an 
amount greater than his or her percentage of [allocated] 
fault . . . .” 
Section 6304(4). 
Thus, the dissent is 
correct in observing that the “1995 tort reform legislation 
has . . . rendered unnecessary most claims for contribution 
in personal injury accidents.” Post at 8. 
Yet, although the 1995 tort reform legislation may 
have “rendered unnecessary" most contribution claims, this 
does not mean that it precludes every type of contribution 
claim, in particular that at issue in the instant case. 
Even before the 1995 legislation, a tortfeasor had a 
statutory right to seek contribution in the event that he 
settled a claim, see MCL 600.2925a(3), and this is the type 
of contribution at issue here. 
Contribution actions have 
not always solely been directed toward recovering monies 
that a “jointly and severally” liable tortfeasor was 
required to pay as the result of a verdict for which the 
tortfeasor was fully, although not solely, responsible. 
7  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Rather, such actions have also been directed toward 
obtaining contribution from other responsible tortfeasors 
following a settlement. We find no basis in §§ 2956, 2957, 
or 6304 to conclude that a right to seek contribution in 
these circumstances has been precluded in cases in which 
liability among multiple tortfeasors is now “several” only 
rather than “joint and several.” 
MCL 600.2925a provides, in part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
act, when 2 or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to a
person or property or for the same wrongful
death, there is a right of contribution among
them even though judgment has not been recovered
against all or any of them. 
(2) The right of contribution exists only in
favor of a tort-feasor who has paid more than his
pro rata share of the common liability and his
total recovery is limited to the amount paid by
him in excess of his pro rata share. A tort­
feasor against whom contribution is sought shall
not be compelled to make contribution beyond his
own pro rata share of the entire liability. 
(3) 
A 
tort-feasor 
who 
enters 
into 
a 
settlement with a claimant is not entitled to 
recover contribution from another tort-feasor if 
any of the following circumstances exist: 
(a) The liability of the contributee for the
injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by
the settlement. 
(b) A reasonable effort was not made to 
notify the contributee of the pendency of the
settlement negotiations. 
(c) 
The 
contributee 
was 
not 
given 
a 
8  
 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                 
 
reasonable opportunity to participate in the 
settlement negotiations. 
(d) The settlement was not made in good
faith. 
These provisions lead to the conclusion that plaintiff 
is entitled to seek contribution from defendants, and the 
tort reform legislation, in our judgment, does not alter 
this conclusion. 
The dissent’s overreaching analysis 
notwithstanding, 
this 
case 
is 
actually 
one 
of 
straightforward statutory interpretation. 
As a result of 
the underlying accident in this case, “2 or more persons 
bec[a]me . . . severally liable in tort for the same injury 
. . . .” 
Section 2925a(1). 
Thus, “there is a right of 
contribution among them even though,” as in this case, 
“judgment has not been recovered against all or any of 
them.”2 
Id. Plaintiff’s right to seek contribution exists 
because plaintiff allegedly has, “paid more than his pro 
rata share of the common liability . . . .”3
 Section 
2 
Judgment 
has 
not 
been 
recovered 
against 
any
tortfeasor in this case because the injured parties instead
settled with plaintiff. 
3 Section 2925b(a) provides that, for purposes of 
contribution, “in determining the pro rata shares of 
tortfeasors in the entire liability as between themselves
only . . . [t]heir relative degrees of fault shall be
considered.” 
Thus, in determining whether a severally
liable tortfeasor has paid more than his “pro rata” share
of the common liability such that he may be entitled to
contribution under § 2925a, § 2925b requires considering 
9  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
2925a(2). Plaintiff’s “total recovery [in the contribution 
action] is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of 
his pro rata share.” Id. 
Moreover, § 2925a(3) provides statutory support for 
plaintiff’s 
contribution 
claim 
resulting 
from 
its 
settlement. 
Plaintiff, is a “tort-feasor who enter[ed] 
into 
a 
settlement 
with 
[the 
injured 
parties]” 
and, 
therefore, “is . . . entitled to recover contribution from 
another tort-feasor” unless one of the circumstances 
enumerated in § 2925a(3)(a)-(d) exists, which is not 
alleged here to be the case. Section 2925a(3).4 
each tortfeasor’s relative degree of fault, just as § 6304
requires the fact-finder to consider the relative degree of
fault of each tortfeasor in any action subject to several
liability under that provision. 
4 Moreover, MCL 600.2925c(4) provides: 
If there is not a judgment for the injury or
wrongful death against the tort-feasor seeking 
contribution, his right to contribution is barred
unless he has discharged by payment the common
liability 
within 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
period applicable to claimant's right of action
against him and has commenced his action for
contribution within 1 year after payment, or 
unless he has agreed while action is pending
against him to discharge the common liability and
has, within 1 year after the agreement, paid the
liability 
and 
commenced 
his 
action 
for 
contribution. [Emphasis added.] 
This provision contemplates situations such as the
instant one, in which a tortfeasor is seeking contribution
even though there has been no judgment against it because 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
 
IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENT 
The dissent’s argument appears to rest on three 
grounds. 
First, it observes, correctly, that under § 
2925a(2), a plaintiff may seek contribution only if he has 
paid more than his share of the “common liability.” 
Therefore, unless a severally liable tortfeasor shares a 
“common liability” with other tortfeasors, he has no right 
to contribution. 
The dissent then concludes that, because 
the 1995 tort reform legislation made tort liability in 
relevant 
actions 
“several” 
only 
and 
not 
“joint 
and 
several,” 
there 
is 
no 
“common 
liability” 
among 
the 
tortfeasors and, thus, no right to contribution under § 
2925a(2). Post at 10-11. Essentially, the dissent equates 
“common liability” and “joint liability” and concludes that 
common liability does not exist where liability is several 
only. 
The dissent’s position is flawed. Its construction of 
“common liability” as used in § 2925a(2) is inconsistent 
with the Legislature’s express statutory directive in § 
the tortfeasor has settled with the injured parties. 
As 
long as the tortfeasor complies with the requirements of
this provision, it may proceed on its contribution claim
pursuant to sections 2925a(3)(a)-(d). 
Contrary to the
dissent’s suggestion, post at 12, a tortfeasor’s legal
liability is not “governed by the gamesmanship and legal
strategies of his fellow tortfeasors.” 
Rather, such 
liability is governed by the language of § 2925a. 
11 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
2925a(1) 
that 
contribution 
may 
be 
obtainable 
where 
liability 
is 
joint 
or 
several.
 
The 
dissent’s 
interpretation of “common liability” essentially reads the 
“joint[] or several[]” language out of the statute.5 
Moreover, in O’Dowd, this Court specifically addressed 
whether a tortfeasor who was “severally” liable was 
entitled to seek contribution under § 2925a. 
We held that 
a 
right 
to 
contribution 
existed 
because 
§ 
2925a 
specifically refers to liability that is “joint[] or 
several[]”: 
[A]ll 
that 
is 
necessary 
to 
enforce 
contribution 
[under 
§ 
2925a] 
is 
that 
the 
tortfeasors commonly share a burden of tort 
liability or, as it is sometimes put, there is a
common burden of liability in tort. . . . If the 
defendants are jointly or severally liable in
tort for "the same injury to a person" or for
"the same injury to . . . property" or for "the
same wrongful death", contribution pursuant to [§
2925a] is obtainable. 
[O’Dowd, supra at 604­
606.][6] 
5 In discerning legislative intent, a court must “give
effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute . . .
.” 
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466
Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). 
6 O’Dowd further asserted: 
The 
Legislature 
partially 
abrogated 
the 
common-law bar [to contribution] by adopting the
1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
which provided for contribution in respect of a
judgment obtained against two or more persons
jointly. . . . 
Subsequently, 
the 
Legislature 
. 
. 
. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In Salim v LaGuire, 138 Mich App 334, 341; 361 NW2d 9 
(1984), the Court of Appeals similarly observed, “(1) the 
former bar against contribution among nonjoint tortfeasors 
is abolished; (2) the right of contribution exists among 
nonintentional wrongdoers who share a common liability; and 
(3) common liability exists among individuals who are 
responsible for an accident which produces a single 
indivisible injury.” (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly, a “common liability” exists in situations 
in which multiple tortfeasors are liable for the same 
injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful 
death. 
Common liability exists in such cases because 
multiple tortfeasors are alleged to be “responsible for an 
accident which produce[d] a single indivisible injury.” 
Id. 
The 1995 tort reform legislation does not negate the 
substituted the substance of the 1955 Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act for the 1941
act. Section 1 of the statute now provides:
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
act, when 2 or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to a 
person or property or for the same wrongful
death, there is a right of contribution among
them . . . ." [Emphasis in O'Dowd.] 
. 
. 
. 
The 
revised 
act 
by 
explicitly
providing 
for 
contribution 
among 
tortfeasors 
“severally” liable in tort extended contribution
to [such tortfeasors]. [O’Dowd, supra at 603-604 
(citations 
omitted; 
emphasis 
added 
unless 
otherwise noted).] 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
existence 
of 
common 
liability 
among 
such 
multiple 
tortfeasors. 
On the contrary, § 6304(1) provides that the 
allocation provisions of that section apply to tort actions 
“for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death 
involving fault of more than 1 person,” just as the 
contribution provisions of § 2925a(1) apply “when 2 or more 
persons become . . . severally liable in tort for the same 
injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful 
death . . . .” 
Section 6304 applies specifically in those 
cases in which there is common liability among multiple 
tortfeasors, and it is inaccurate to interpret it as 
meaning that there is no longer any common liability among 
responsible tortfeasors. 
Rather, the common liability 
remains; what differ merely are the terms and conditions by 
which that liability must be satisfied. That is, by virtue 
of § 6304, in cases in which there has been a judgment, a 
tortfeasor need only pay a percentage of the common 
liability that is proportionate to his fault. 
Previously, 
where there had been a judgment, a tortfeasor could have 
been required to pay the entire amount of common liability 
and then seek contribution from other tortfeasors according 
to their degrees of fault. 
Second, the dissent relies on Restatement Torts, 3d: 
Apportionment of Liability, § 11, comment c, which states: 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
When, under applicable law, a person is 
severally liable to an injured person for an
indivisible 
injury, 
the 
injured 
person 
may
recover 
only 
the 
severally 
liable 
person's
comparative-responsibility share of the injured
person's damages. 
* * * 
c. 
Contribution 
by 
severally 
liable 
defendant. When all defendants are severally
liable, each one is separately liable for that
portion 
of 
the 
plaintiff's 
damages. 
Since 
overlapping liability cannot occur, severally
liable defendants will not have any right to
assert a contribution claim. See § 23, Comment f. 
[Emphasis in original.] 
We note that the duty of this Court is to construe the 
language of Michigan’s statutes before turning to secondary 
sources such as the Restatements. 
The specific statute at 
issue, § 2925a, allows for contribution after a settlement 
in cases in which liability is joint or several.  Moreover, 
the above Restatement section refers, specifically, to 
those situations, already discussed above, in which an 
injured party has sued only one of multiple tortfeasors and 
the court, as it is obligated to do, has applied § 6304. 
The 
dissent 
is 
correct 
in 
observing 
that 
in 
such 
situations, the 1995 tort reform legislation, because it 
provides that liability is now several only, has “rendered 
unnecessary most claims for contribution in personal injury 
accidents.” 
Post at 8. 
“[Because] overlapping liability 
cannot occur, severally liable defendants [need] not have 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
any right to assert a contribution claim.” 
Restatement 
Torts, 3d, § 11, comment c. 
However, more relevant to the specific issue raised in 
the 
instant 
case 
is 
the 
Restatement 
Torts, 
3d: 
Apportionment of Liability, § 23, which provides in part: 
(a) When two or more persons are or may be
liable for the same harm and one of them 
discharges the liability of another by settlement
or discharge of judgment, the person discharging
the liability is entitled to recover contribution
from the other, unless the other previously had a
valid settlement and release from the plaintiff.
(b) 
A 
person 
entitled 
to 
recover 
contribution may recover no more than the amount
paid to the plaintiff in excess of the person's
comparative share of responsibility. 
There is nothing in the language of § 23 or its 
comments to suggest that it does not apply in those cases 
in which the settling tortfeasor was only severally liable. 
The pertinent question is not whether liability is joint 
and several, or several only, but rather whether the 
settlement released the contributee. 
See note 10 later in 
this opinion. 
Finally, the dissent asserts, despite the fact that § 
2925a provides that it applies to cases in which liability 
is “joint[] or several[],” that contribution is barred in 
cases in which liability is several because a severally 
liable tortfeasor, pursuant to § 6304, is never required to 
pay more than his allocated share of fault. 
Thus, the 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
dissent surmises, “‘plaintiff’s decision to voluntarily pay 
pursuant to a settlement must be attributed to its own 
assessment 
of 
liability 
based 
on 
its 
insured’s 
negligence.’” 
Post at 14 (citation omitted). 
The 
dissent's analysis is defective. 
That a tortfeasor is 
never required, “in an action” to which § 6304 applies, to 
pay more than its allocated share of fault is simply not 
relevant in determining whether the tortfeasor may exercise 
its statutory right to settle with the injured party and 
then exercise its statutory right to seek contribution from 
other tortfeasors on the basis of each tortfeasor’s 
relative degree of fault. 
This is illustrated by the fact that, even before the 
1995 tort reform legislation, a tortfeasor whose liability 
was 
“joint 
and 
several” 
was 
never 
required, 
in 
a 
settlement, to pay more than what it deemed to be its fair 
share of the common liability burden. Yet, even though not 
required, the statute specifically gave (and continues to 
give) a tortfeasor who chose to settle for more than its 
fair share a right to seek contribution from other 
tortfeasors.7  Indeed, the dissent would retain that right 
7 The important consideration in determining whether a
settling tortfeasor may seek contribution from other 
tortfeasors has always been, and continues to be, not
whether the tortfeasor settled for what it considered to be 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
for tortfeasors whose liability remained joint and several. 
Because no tortfeasor, including one whose liability is 
“joint and several,” is or has ever been required to settle 
for more than his fair share of the common liability and 
yet § 2925a provides a right to contribution even after 
settling, it is evident that the dissent’s analysis on this 
point is defective and cannot be sustained.8 
Not only is the dissent’s position ungrounded in the 
its fair share of the common liability or, alternatively,
for the entire amount of the common liability, but whether
the settling party complied with the conditions set forth
in § 2925a(3)(a)-(d), including releasing through the 
settlement the contributee from further liability to the
injured party. Thus, even if a settling tortfeasor settles
for only what it presumes to be its fair share of the
common liability, if the settlement releases another 
tortfeasor, that settling tortfeasor, if it complies with
the remainder of the statutory settlement conditions, may
seek contribution from the released contributee. 
For the same reason, we find no merit in the dissent’s
suggestion, post at 16, that the majority's decision will
place parties in an “untenable position” during settlement
negotiations, because they must “pretend . . . that each is
potentially 
liable 
for 
the 
whole 
of 
a 
plaintiff’s
injuries.” 
Because a settling party may still seek 
contribution under MCL 600.2925a for payments made in 
excess of its fair share of the common liability, there is
no need to “pretend” to the contrary. 
8 The dissent has a point, as noted above, that the
1995 
tort 
reform 
legislation 
renders 
unnecessary
contribution actions that, in the absence of §§ 2956, 2957,
and 6304, would have otherwise resulted after a “jointly
and severally” liable tortfeasor has been required to pay
an entire judgment to an injured party. 
Nonetheless, that
these 
provisions 
also 
prohibit 
contribution 
actions 
resulting from a settlement is a concept, as also noted
above, that has no apparent source in Michigan law. 
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
relevant statutes, it raises an unnecessary disincentive to 
voluntary settlements, potentially harming both willing 
plaintiffs and willing defendants.9
 The dissent states 
that, “while settlements are generally favored, neither MCL 
600.2925a 
nor 
MCL 
600.6304 
makes 
clear 
that 
the 
Legislature’s goal was to promote voluntary settlement. 
Instead, their provisions place the risk of, and burden 
for, payment upon a party only to the extent that it is 
actually responsible for the injury.” 
Post at 15. 
The 
dissent may be correct in these assertions, but they are 
irrelevant. 
Section 2925a may not “clearly” reflect a 
legislative intent of encouraging settlements, but neither 
does it reflect, clearly or otherwise, any intent to 
disfavor 
settlements, 
which 
is 
what 
the 
dissent’s 
9 A tortfeasor might rationally conclude, after all,
that it is in his interest to settle for an amount greater
than his estimated pro rata liability as determined by a
trier of fact. 
Taking a case to trial and leaving the
allocation of responsibility to the trier of fact can
involve a number of transactional costs. 
There are, for
example, fees for attorneys, retained experts and other
litigation 
costs, 
possible 
fiscal 
losses 
because 
of 
negative publicity, and opportunity costs incurred by those
required to divert their time and energy from more 
productive matters to litigation.
A severally liable tortfeasor might prefer to settle
for more than his pro rata share in order to avoid these
costs. 
This incentive may be especially powerful when the
tortfeasor believes that he may be found liable for non­
economic damages that defy accurate estimation. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
construction would produce. 
Moreover, to construe § 2925a 
as affording a settling party a right to seek contribution 
from other responsible tortfeasors in cases in which 
liability 
is 
several 
only 
does 
not 
countermand 
the 
legislative intent of placing the “risk of, and burden for, 
payment upon a party only to the extent that it is actually 
responsible for the injury.” Post at 15. On the contrary, 
such a construction of § 2925a works affirmatively to 
effect that intent.10 
10 See CSX Transportation, Inc v Union Tank Car Co, 173 
F Supp 2d 696, 699-700 (ED Mich, 2001), in which the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
in a contribution claim filed after a settlement by the
settling party against other responsible tortfeasors, noted
that while § 6304 renders contribution claims unnecessary,
§ 2925a still allows such claims after a settlement, thus
furthering the legislative goals of encouraging settlements
and properly allocating fault: 
Plaintiff CSXT is seeking an allocation of
fault between the tortfeasors in this case. It is 
seeking neither "joint liability," nor "joint and
several liability." Plaintiff CSXT is entitled,
under Michigan law, to show that the Defendants
and Plaintiff CSXT were/are severally liable 
(with 
an 
appropriate 
allocation 
of 
the 
percentages of fault) for the rail tank car 
accident in January of 2000. 
Because currently, in the usual case [i.e., 
the cases that proceed to trial], the allocation
of fault is mandated, there will usually not be a
circumstance where a tortfeasor has paid more 
than his pro-rata share of the common liability.
Thus, there would be no need for a claim for
contribution. This is what Kokx v. Bylenga, 241 
Mich. App. 655, 617 N.W.2d 368 (2000) explained. 
20  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
. . . 
In the instant case, [because] Plaintiff 
CSXT . . . has settled numerous lawsuits, paying
the full share of each, CSXT can assert that it
has paid more than its pro-rata share of the
liability. Thus, under Michigan law, it has a
claim for contribution. 
If the purposes behind the Michigan tort
reform legislation were speedy settlement of 
suits, and allocation of fault, thwarting CSXT's
ability to seek contribution defies both of those
objectives. First, without the possibility of 
seeking "reimbursement" from other tortfeasors, 
CSXT would have no interest in seeking a speedy
settlement of claims. Further, allowing CSXT to
bring a claim for contribution furthers the 
purpose of holding tortfeasors responsible for
their share of the liability. 
A 
brief 
example 
explains 
a 
possible
misunderstanding of the effect of the tort reform
legislation. Assume two tortfeasors are equally
responsible for an injury. Prior to the tort
reform legislation, they could each be held 
liable for 100% of the injury. If one defendant
paid the entire balance, he could sue the second
defendant for contribution. However, after the
tort 
reform 
legislation 
abolished 
joint 
and 
several liability (in nearly all cases, and the
exceptions are irrelevant here), each could only
be held for 50% of the injury. Therefore, there
would be no need for an action for contribution. 
This does not mean that a cause of action 
for contribution was completely extinguished by
the legislation; it simply means that in the
usual case [i.e., those that proceed to trial],
it would not be needed. This is bolstered by the
fact that the legislature did not repeal the
contribution statute. 
In the instant case, the claims have been
settled 
without 
an 
allocation of 
fault. 
One 
tortfeasor has paid 100%, although there are 
likely other tortfeasors which can be allocated 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
V.
 
CONCLUSION 
MCL 600.2925a-600.2925d provide plaintiff a statutory 
right 
to 
seek 
contribution 
from 
other 
responsible 
tortfeasors after having settled with the injured parties 
in the underlying tort action, and tort reform legislation 
in 1995 does not alter this right. 
Accordingly, we hold 
that plaintiff may proceed on its contribution action 
against defendants. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
some of the fault. The statute permits a claim
for contribution in this situation -- Plaintiff 
CSXT can allege that it has paid more than its
pro-rata share of the liability. The tort reform
legislation did not erase this right. 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
GERLING KONZERN ALLGEMEINE 
VERSICHERUNGS AG, subrogee of
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122938 
CECIL R. LAWSON AND AMERICAN 
BEAUTY TURF NURSERIES, INC.,
jointly and severally, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff 
may proceed with its contribution action against defendant. 
As both the majority and the dissent note, tort reform has 
rendered 
many 
contribution 
actions 
unnecessary.1 
Nonetheless, the contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a, has 
not been repealed by the Legislature and remains in effect. 
Therefore, we must apply it to the present case. 
Further, I agree with the majority’s analysis of 
“common liability,” as that which “exists in situations in 
which multiple tortfeasors are liable for the same injury 
1 Ante at 7; post at 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to a person or property or for the same wrongful death.” 
Ante at 13. 
Multiple tortfeasors are “‘responsible for an 
accident which produce[d] a single indivisible injury.’” 
Id. (citation omitted). While a tortfeasor is now required 
to pay only a percentage of liability proportionate to the 
tortfeasor’s degree of fault, there remains a single injury 
to the person or property for which multiple tortfeasors 
may be held liable, according to their degrees of fault. 
Thus, there is “common liability.” 
The dissent’s analysis of “common liability” would, in 
essence, wipe out the contribution statute by equating 
“common liability” with “joint and several liability.” 
Post at 8-12. 
While there may be good policy reasons to 
reconsider how the contribution statute should operate in 
light of recent tort reform, these questions are properly 
resolved by the Legislature, which may repeal or amend the 
statute as it sees fit. 
In the present case, it is alleged that there are 
multiple tortfeasors responsible for “a single injury” to 
Ricki Ash and James Nicastri. 
Thus, there is “common 
liability” under the statute, and plaintiff may proceed 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
with its contribution action.2  For these reasons, I concur 
in the result of the majority opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2 Note that just because plaintiff may proceed with a
contribution action, this does not mean that plaintiff will
prevail. 
Plaintiff must establish that defendant is at 
fault in the accident, the degree of defendant’s fault, and
that it paid more than its pro rata share of the entire 
liability. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
GERLING KONZERN ALLGEMEINE 
VERSICHERUNGS AG, subrogee of
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122938 
CECIL R. LAWSON and AMERICAN 
BEAUTY TURF NURSERIES, INC.,
jointly and severally, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
Plaintiff seeks contribution from defendants for a 
portion of settlement monies paid to two third parties 
following a traffic accident involving three vehicles. 
We 
are asked to decide whether a contribution action is 
possible under the facts of this case and in light of tort 
reform legislation enacted in 1995. 
The majority finds that such an action is viable, even 
considering 
that 
Michigan 
has 
adopted 
a 
comparative 
negligence scheme for personal injury actions. 
Under it, 
plaintiff would not have been liable for defendants' 
percentage of fault had this case proceeded to trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
Because I believe that the majority misreads this tort 
reform legislation, I disagree with its conclusions. 
According to MCL 600.2956, part of the 1995 tort 
reform legislation, tortfeasors' potential liability in a 
personal injury lawsuit is several and not joint. 
Applied 
to this case, it follows that plaintiff’s insured was not 
liable for defendants' negligence. 
Hence, it could not 
have been held legally responsible to pay damages to third 
parties for injuries arising from defendants' negligence. 
When plaintiff settled with the third parties, the amount 
it agreed to pay could not be held to have included any of 
another party’s percentage of fault for the accident. 
Consequently, I would find that plaintiff cannot now 
seek contribution from the defendants for monies it paid in 
settlement of the third parties' claim. 
Thus, I would 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that any amount 
that plaintiff paid in excess of its insured’s percentage 
of fault should be deemed a voluntary payment. 
FACTS AND LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS 
This case is a secondary proceeding that arose from a 
three-vehicle traffic accident on October 21, 1997. 
One 
vehicle was occupied by Ricki Ash and James Nicastri. 
Another was driven by Barry Maus, who was employed by the 
University of Michigan Board of Regents. 
Plaintiff is the 
2  
 
 
 
 
insurer of Maus and of the regents. 
The third vehicle was 
a semitrailer driven by defendant Cecil R. Lawson, who was 
employed by defendant American Beauty Turf Nurseries, Inc. 
Ash and Nicastri sued Maus and the regents for damages 
for their injuries. 
In a separate proceeding, Lawson sued 
Maus and the regents for his injuries. 
Plaintiff settled 
both lawsuits against Maus and the regents, paying on their 
behalf approximately $2.2 million to Ash and Nicastri and 
$85,000 to Lawson. 
In November 1999, plaintiff filed a separate complaint 
seeking statutory contribution under MCL 600.2925a from 
Lawson and American Beauty Turf for a portion of the amount 
it had paid to Ash and Nicastri. 
Defendants moved for 
summary disposition in their favor, alleging that plaintiff 
and 
the 
regents 
had 
not 
complied 
with 
the 
notice 
requirements 
of 
the 
contribution 
statute. 
See 
MCL 
600.2925a(3) through (5). 
The trial court denied the 
motion and found that plaintiff had given defendants 
sufficient notice of its settlement negotiations with Ash 
and Nicastri. 
These claims are not at issue in this 
appeal. 
After the trial court's motion cutoff date passed, 
defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
They 
argued 
that 
the 
1995 
tort 
reform 
legislation, 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
specifically MCL 600.2956, 600.2957(1), and 600.6304(1), 
abrogated plaintiff's cause of action for contribution. 
Without addressing the substantive issue, the trial court 
denied the motion as untimely. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
and remanded for entry of judgment in defendants' favor. 
It held that, under the express language of the statutes at 
issue, contribution was not available to plaintiff. 
254 
Mich App 241, 248; 657 NW2d 143 (2002). 
We granted 
plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, 469 Mich 947 
(2003), and subsequently ordered that the case be reargued 
and resubmitted. 471 Mich 855 (2004). 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
This Court reviews de novo a decision on a motion for 
summary 
disposition. 
Questions 
regarding 
the 
interpretation and construction of statutes are questions 
of law that are also reviewed de novo. 
Northville Charter 
Twp v Northville Pub Schools, 469 Mich 285, 289; 666 NW2d 
213 (2003).
 When construing a statute, our goal is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature 
in writing it. 
Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 
27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). The best measure of intent is the 
words that the Legislature used. 
Chandler v Dowell 
Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998). 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, at issue here 
is the interplay between the provisions in the 1995 
amendments 
of 
the 
Revised 
Judicature 
Act1 
and 
the 
preexisting 
contribution 
provisions 
contained 
in 
MCL 
600.2925a, 600.2925b, and 600.2925c. 
The pertinent subsections of MCL 600.2925a state: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
act, when 2 or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to a
person or property or for the same wrongful
death, there is a right of contribution among
them even though judgment has not been recovered
against all or any of them. 
(2) The right of contribution exists only in
favor of a tort-feasor who has paid more that his 
pro rata share of the common liability and his 
total recovery is limited to the amount paid by
him in excess of his pro rata share. A tort­
feasor against whom contribution is sought shall
not be compelled to make contribution beyond his
own pro rata share of the entire liability.
[Emphasis added.] 
One tortfeasor can seek contribution from another 
regardless of whether a judgment has been entered against 
either. MCL 600.2925c(1). However: 
If there is not a judgment for the injury or
wrongful death against the tort-feasor seeking
contribution, his right to contribution is barred
unless he has discharged by payment the common
liability 
within 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
period applicable to claimant's right of action
against him and has commenced his action for
contribution within 1 year after payment, or 
unless he has agreed while action is pending 
1 1995 PA 161 and 1995 PA 249. 
5  
 
 
 
 
against him to discharge the common liability and 
has, within 1 year after the agreement, paid the
liability 
and 
commenced 
his 
action 
for 
contribution. 
[MCL 
600.2925c(4) 
(emphasis
added).] 
MCL 600.2925b addresses the expression "pro rata 
share" and includes considerations of fault and equity: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, in 
determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in
the entire liability as between themselves only
and without affecting the rights of the injured
party to a joint and several judgment: 
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be
considered. 
(b) 
If 
equity 
requires, 
the 
collective 
liability of some as a group shall constitute a
single share. 
(c) 
Principles 
of 
equity 
applicable 
to 
contribution generally shall apply. 
It is against this statutory backdrop that the Court 
is asked to address plaintiff's right to contribution under 
the 1995 tort reform legislation. MCL 600.2956 states: 
Except as provided in [MCL 600.6304], in an
action based on tort or another legal theory
seeking damages for personal injury, property 
damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each
defendant for damages is several only and is not
joint. However, this section does not abolish an
employer's vicarious liability for an act or 
omission of the employer's employee. 
MCL 600.2957(1) similarly states: 
In an action based on tort or another legal
theory 
seeking 
damages 
for 
personal 
injury,
property damage, or wrongful death, the liability
of each person shall be allocated under this
section by the trier of fact and, subject to [MCL 
6  
 
 
 
600.6304], in direct proportion to the person's
percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of
fault under this subsection, the trier of fact 
shall 
consider 
the 
fault 
of 
each 
person,
regardless of whether the person is, or could
have been, named as a party to the action. 
In connection with the above, the relevant portion of 
MCL 600.6304 provides: 
(1) In an action based on tort or another 
legal theory seeking damages for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death involving
fault of more than 1 person, including third­
party 
defendants 
and 
nonparties, 
the 
court,
unless otherwise agreed by all parties to the
action, shall instruct the jury to answer special
interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall
make findings indicating both of the following: 
(a) The total amount of each plaintiff's
damages. 
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all
persons that contributed to the death or injury,
including each plaintiff and each person released
from liability under section 2925d, regardless of
whether the person was or could have been named
as a party to the action. 
* * * 
(4) Liability in an action to which this
section applies is several only and not joint. 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6), a
person shall not be required to pay damages in an
amount greater than his or her percentage of
fault as found under subsection (1). 
ANALYSIS 
After reviewing the statutory provisions cited above, 
I agree with much of the rationale used by the Court of 
Appeals in this case and in its previous opinion in Kokx v 
7  
 
 
 
Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). 
The 
essence of these opinions is that the 1995 tort reform 
legislation has prevented and rendered unnecessary most 
claims for contribution in personal injury accidents. 
Contribution remains a useful tool for fault and 
liability allocation in certain other circumstances. 
The 
Court of Appeals in Kokx opined: 
[U]nder the plain and mandatory language of
the revised statutes, a defendant cannot be held
liable for damages beyond the defendant's pro­
rata 
share, 
except 
in 
certain 
specified
circumstances. Accordingly, in actions based on
tort or another legal theory seeking damages for
personal injury . . . there would be no basis for
a claim of contribution. Moreover, because joint
liability remains in certain circumstances, the
Legislature would have no reason to repeal §
2925a, 
which 
provides 
for 
a 
right 
of 
contribution . . . . [Id. at 663.] 
I agree with these observations. For example, MCL 
600.2956 continues to recognize that common or joint 
liability 
exists 
in 
claims 
involving 
“an 
employer’s 
vicarious liability . . . .” 
And MCL 600.6304(6) 
specifically provides for joint liability in medical 
malpractice cases. 
However, the statutory language at issue in this case 
supports defendants' position. In order for one tortfeasor 
to recover contribution from others, he must pay the 
complainant more than his pro rata share of the common 
8  
 
 
 
 
liability.  The amount that he may recover from the others 
is limited to the amount he paid to the complainant in 
excess of that for which he was liable. 
MCL 600.2925a(2). 
See also MCL 600.2925c(4). 
In this case, before any such 
calculation may be entertained, plaintiff must establish 
that under MCL 600.2957 or MCL 600.6304 there is common 
liability among the defendants. 
This Court has previously discussed the interplay 
between contribution and "common liability" as follows: 
The general rule of contribution is that one
who is compelled to pay or satisfy the whole or
to bear more than his aliquot share of the common 
burden or obligation, upon which several persons
are equally liable or which they are bound to
discharge, is entitled to contribution against
the others to obtain from them payment of their
respective shares. [Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401,
417; 231 NW2d 46 (1975) (emphasis added).] 
Thus, in order to enforce contribution under the revised 
act, it is necessary that the torfeasors “commonly share a 
burden of tort liability or, as it is sometimes put, there 
is a common burden of liability in tort.” 
O'Dowd v Gen 
Motors Corp, 419 Mich 597, 604-605; 358 NW2d 553 (1984). 
See also Caldwell, supra at 420 n 5. 
However, although these older cases are useful to a 
point, they do not take into account the sweeping changes 
the Legislature made in tort reform in 1995. 
Sections 
2956, 2957, and 6304 replaced the notion of common 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
liability, which also has been referred to as joint and 
several liability, with "fair-share liability." See Smiley 
v Corrigan, 248 Mich App 51, 53 n 6; 638 NW2d 151 (2001), 
citing House Legislative Analysis, HB 4508 (Substitute H­
6), April 27, 1995, p 3. 
Thus, because liability can no 
longer 
be 
joint 
but 
is 
now 
solely 
several 
under 
circumstances such as exist in this case, there is no basis 
for contribution. 
There is no "common liability" from 
which to seek it. 
See Restatement Torts, Apportionment of 
Liability, 3d, § B19, comment k, p 183. 
The majority adopts plaintiff's argument that § 
2925a(1), because it refers to persons who become “jointly 
or 
severally 
liable,” 
may 
apply 
to 
cases 
in 
which 
tortfeasors are severally liable under MCL 600.2956. 
However, 
plaintiff 
fails 
to 
evaluate 
§ 
2925a(1) 
in 
conjunction with the limitation in § 2925a(2). 
That 
subsection expressly restricts the right of contribution to 
circumstances where there has been a payment of greater 
than one’s pro rata share of “common liability.” 
See also 
§ 2925c(4). 
Thus, it is not enough that tortfeasors are “jointly 
or severally liable.” 
Before contribution can be sought, 
they must share a “common liability.” 
This does not occur 
when the liability of tortfeasors is several. As stated in 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Restatement Torts, Apportionment of Liability, 3d, § 11, p 
108: 
When, under applicable law, a person is 
severally liable to an injured person for an
indivisible 
injury, 
the 
injured 
person 
may
recover 
only 
the 
severally 
liable 
person's
comparative-responsibility share of the injured 
defendant. When all defendants 
severally 
person's damages. 
I 
also 
find 
comment 
c 
of 
the 
same 
provision 
persuasive: 
c. 
Contribution 
by 
severally 
liable 
are 
liable, each one is separately liable for that
portion 
of 
the 
plaintiff's 
damages. 
Since 
overlapping liability cannot occur, severally
liable defendants will not have any right to
assert a contribution claim. [Id., p 109.] 
Therefore, the conclusion in Salim v LaGuire,2 that 
common liability could exist among individuals responsible 
for an accident causing a single indivisible injury, may 
have been correct before the enactment of tort reform. 
However the injury involved in this case is no longer an 
“indivisible injury” under MCL 600.2925a. 
The Legislature 
has 
indicated 
its 
intention 
that 
these 
"indivisible 
injuries" now be divided. 
In essence, what the majority appears to argue is that 
we should continue our notions of what, in the past, 
constituted an indivisible injury. In so doing, it ignores 
2 138 Mich App 334, 340; 361 NW2d 9 (1984). 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
the intent of the Legislature in passing tort reform. 
The 
majority realizes that, had this case proceeded to trial, 
plaintiff 
could 
not 
have 
been 
held 
responsible 
for 
defendants' negligence. 
(Ante at 15-16.) 
Yet, because 
plaintiff chose to settle before trial, the majority 
maintains that the injury remains indivisible and thus 
plaintiff's contribution action is viable. 
I conclude that the Legislature did not intend that a 
tortfeasor's 
legal 
liability 
for 
personal 
injury 
be 
governed by the gamesmanship and legal strategies of his 
fellow tortfeasors.3  Implicit in the majority’s opinion is 
the premise that an injury only becomes divisible when a 
jury divides it. 
I cannot accept this position. 
It would 
allow the parties to circumvent the tort reform statutes 
during settlement. 
Rather, the Legislature has based 
tortfeasors' potential liability on the cause of action 
involved, and what cause is involved is determined at the 
commencement of litigation. 
The majority's analysis relies on case law decided 
before the existence of tort reform. 
It uses this law to 
frustrate the Legislature's recognition that injuries may 
3 I note that the majority omits the fact that 
plaintiff had already entered into a separate settlement
agreement with defendant Lawson before it brought this
contribution action. 
12  
 
 
now share a common origin or cause, yet result in no common 
liability or burden in tort. 
Similarly, a plaintiff should not rely on the language 
of MCL 600.2925b merely because it sets out guidelines for 
determining the “pro rata shares” of common liability. The 
statute does not expose a plaintiff to greater liability 
than it would otherwise have under § 2956, § 2957, and § 
6304. 
Where common liability exists, a review could be 
made of the measure of pro rata shares under MCL 600.2925b, 
possibly subjecting a tortfeasor to more liability than his 
actual percentage of fault. 
However, § 2925b does not 
apply where there is no common liability. 
Thus, I think it clear that a pro rata division can be 
made only when tortfeasors actually share a common tort 
burden or liability. 
Because this case is a personal 
injury action, it is governed by MCL 600.2956 and, pursuant 
to that statute, there is no common liability. 
Hence, 
plaintiff's insured was responsible only for its own 
separate liability to Ash and Nicastri. 
This fact did not 
change simply because plaintiff chose to settle instead of 
proceeding 
to 
a 
jury 
determination 
of 
the 
actual 
percentages of fault of plaintiff's insured and defendants. 
Even if plaintiff deliberately paid more than its pro 
rata share of the total liability, it cannot recover any of 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
that excess from defendants. As the Court of Appeals aptly 
stated, “plaintiff's decision to voluntarily pay pursuant 
to a settlement must be attributed to its own assessment of 
liability based on its insured's negligence.” 254 Mich App 
247-248. This view is certainly not unusual: 
In 
a 
several 
liability 
system, 
the 
nonsettling tortfeasor is held only for his 
comparative fault share. 
In determining the 
percentage 
responsibility 
of 
the 
nonsettling
tortfeasor, jurors must determine the comparative
share of every tortfeasor, including those who
have settled. 
However, a determination that A's
fault was 50% and B's fault was 50% does not 
affect A's settlement or his liability. 
It 
merely means that B is liable for 50%, no more,
no less. If A paid more than 50% of the damages,
that was his decision. 
If he paid less, the
plaintiff made a bad bargain, but none of this
matters to B's liability. 
[2 Dobbs, The Law of
Torts, Practitioner Treatise Series (2001) § 390,
p 1088.] 
The majority opinion discusses at length how my 
reading of these statutes creates a disincentive to 
voluntary settlement (Ante at 19 to conclusion.) 
However, 
it also acknowledges that "[a] primary purpose underlying 
'contribution' was to mitigate the unfairness resulting to 
a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor who had been 
required to pay an entire judgment in cases in which other 
tortfeasors also contributed to an injury." (Ante at 5.) 
Allowing a contribution action in this case does not serve 
14  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
the Legislature’s purpose in enacting tort reform, which 
changed the scheme to fair-share liability. 
Moreover, while settlements are generally favored, 
neither MCL 600.2925a nor MCL 600.6304 makes clear that the 
Legislature’s goal was to promote voluntary settlement.4 
Instead, 
their 
provisions 
are 
designed 
to 
allocate 
liability. They place the risk of, and burden for, payment 
upon a party only to the extent that it is actually 
responsible for an injury. This applies even if the injury 
traditionally would be viewed as indivisible. 
The 
logic 
of 
the 
majority’s 
position 
that 
its 
interpretation encourages settlement and mine hinders it is 
shaky. 
Once parties know the rules involving their 
negotiations, settlement will be facilitated. 
Clarifying 
the statute’s meaning so that the parties know the extent 
of their liability aids negotiations. It does not preclude 
them. 
In addition, I find questionable the assertion that 
allowing contribution actions under these circumstances 
will foster settlement goals. 
The majority fails to 
4 I recognize that the language of MCL 600.2925a(3)
discusses what must be done during settlement negotiations
to permit a subsequent contribution action. 
However, I
read this language as barring tortfeasors who do not first
seek the inclusion of other potentially liable parties in
settlement 
negotiations, 
not 
as 
a 
policy 
statement 
preferring settlement. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
recognize the untenable position in which parties will be 
placed during settlement negotiations as a result of its 
decision. 
The parties will be left to negotiate portions 
of claims for which they have no possible liability. 
The 
better position is to leave negotiations over those 
portions to the parties actually responsible. 
The parties must recognize that, under tort reform, 
each tortfeasor cannot be held responsible for more than 
his fair share of the liability for a plaintiff's injury. 
But they must also pretend the contrary, that each is 
potentially liable for the whole of a plaintiff's injuries. 
Thus, in deciding whether to settle a claim, tortfeasors 
must calculate into their settlement decisions certain 
risks for liability that the Legislature has stated do not 
exist. 
The majority's conclusions inject unnecessary 
confusion into the settlement process involving personal 
injury actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The language in MCL 600.2925a(2) and 600.2925c(4) 
allows recovery in a contribution action based on "common 
liability" only. 
MCL 600.2956 precludes common liability 
in a personal injury lawsuit. 
Because the lawsuit 
underlying this action was for personal injury, plaintiff's 
insured could not be held liable for contribution. 
It is 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
liable only for its “fair share” of the damages incurred by 
Ash and Nicastri based on its percentage of fault. 
Accordingly, plaintiff cannot justifiably state that 
when it settled with Ash and Nicastri it was at risk of 
shouldering more than its fair share of a common burden. 
It cannot now recover contribution from defendants on the 
theory that it paid more than its pro rata share of such 
liability. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
decision that contribution is possible here. 
I would 
instead affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
17