Title: Wilcox v. Village of Manchester ZBA

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-466


 Allen Wilcox                                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Bennington Superior Court

 Village of Manchester                        April Term, 1992
 Zoning Board of Adjustment



 Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

 Rodney E. McPhee of Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall, P.C., Rutland, for
   plaintiff-appellant

 W. Michael Nawrath of Whalen & Nawrath, Manchester Center, for defendant-
   appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff appeals from a superior court decision
 upholding the ruling of the Manchester Zoning Board, which prohibited the
 subdivision of his property because it would leave an undersized lot, in
 violation of the Town's minimum-lot-size ordinance.  We agree with plaintiff
 that summary judgment should not have been granted because issues of fact
 remain as to whether he qualifies for an exception to the minimum-lot-size
 requirement.  We reverse and remand.
      Plaintiff's land consists of three parcels, created and conveyed to him
 by deed from his parents in 1950.  The conveyance was prior to the adoption
 of the Manchester zoning bylaw, which established a three-acre minimum for
 the zone in which the parcels are located.  Prior to the conveyance to
 plaintiff, his grantors had sold a lot close to the middle of the property,
 reserving the property to the east, west and north of the lot sold.  Thus,
 plaintiff's grantors retained an irregularly shaped lot, which was then
 conveyed to plaintiff as three separate parcels.
      Parcel 1, the eastern-most parcel, consists of about one acre, with a
 preexisting residence.   Parcel 2, the western-most parcel, is an eleven-
 acre parcel, roughly rectangular in shape, the eastern boundary of which
 lies about 260 feet west of parcel 1.  The property lying between parcels 1
 and 2 is divided into two lots, a northern and a southern lot, both bordered
 by parcel 2 to the west and by parcel 1 to the east.  The southern lot is
 the property previously sold to another grantee, now owned by the Gordons.
 The northern lot is parcel 3, a long, narrow corridor 27' 6" wide and 260
 feet in length that runs the full width of the Gordons' lot, east to west,
 and connects parcels 1 and 2.  The purpose of parcel 3 is to serve as a
 drainage ditch for parcel 2.
      Parcel 1 is subject to a right-of-way for the benefit of the lot now
 owned by the Gordons and which runs east-west across the northern section of
 parcel 1, leading to the Gordon's lot.  The portion of parcel 1 located
 north of the right-of-way is a strip that is contiguous on its western
 border with parcel 3 for its full 27 feet.
      When plaintiff applied for a subdivision permit, the zoning
 administrator declared that lots 1 and 2 were not separate because they were
 "affiliated" by parcel 3.  The Zoning Board of Appeals affirmed, and
 plaintiff sought a declaration in superior court that parcel 1 had not been
 merged into parcels 2 and 3 and could be separately conveyed.  The sole
 issue before the court on summary judgment was whether parcel 1 was in
 "individual and separate and non-affiliated ownership" from parcels 2 and 3
 within the meaning of the bylaw and 24 V.S.A. { 4406(1), on which the bylaw
 is based. (FN1) The court concluded that there was no factual issue as to
 whether parcels 1 and 2 were separate, because they were connected by parcel
 3.  The court held that the right-of-way running through parcel 1 did not
 interfere with the contiguous nature of parcels 1 and 3 because the parcels
 still shared a boundary of 27 feet.  The court granted summary judgment for
 the Town, and the present appeal followed.
       Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is "no genuine issue as
 to any material fact."  V.R.C.P. 56(c).  The nonmoving party is entitled to
 the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences in determining whether a
 genuine issue of material fact exists.  Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co.,
 155 Vt. 44, 48, 582 A.2d 123, 125 (1990).  Plaintiff contends that the
 right-of-way created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether parcels
 1 and 2 were in "individual and separate and non-affiliated ownership."  The
 trial court decided that issue by concluding that contiguity was the only
 question.  Our law indicates otherwise.
      In Drumheller v. Shelburne Zoning Board of Adjustment, 155 Vt. 524, 586 A.2d 1150 (1990), we explained the legislative intent underlying the
 existing-small-lot language of { 4406(1):
           Lots that are smaller than the minimum lot size
           requirements are nonconforming uses, allowed only
           because the use preexists the applicable zoning
           requirement.  A goal of zoning is to phase out such
           uses.

 Id. at 529, 586 A.2d  at 1152 (emphasis added).  It is further clear from
 the plain language of { 4406(1) that the mere creation of a separate non-
 conforming lot prior to the effective date of zoning would not confer
 existing-small-lot protection, where the lot was contiguous to property in
 affiliated ownership, as in Drumheller.  The intent of the law is to limit
 nonconforming uses to uses created prior to the effective date of zoning.
 The Legislature intended to negate claims of nonconforming uses for
 contiguous lots in affiliated ownership that are functionally one property.
        The Town relies heavily on the "bright line interpretation of the
 ordinance and statutes" enunciated in Drumheller.  155 Vt. at 530, 586 A.2d 
 at 1153.  But the holding in Drumheller does not support the Town's
 position.  Appellants in that case did not argue that the lots were exempt
 under the existing-small-lot provision because the lots were noncontiguous,
 separate, and nonaffiliated.  Rather, they simply argued that because two
 homes were already located on the property, no "development" would take
 place by redividing the property.  Id. at 528, 586 A.2d  at 1151.
       Plaintiff argues that the lots are separate because they are divided by
 a right-of-way, relying on Bankers Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
 165 Conn. 624, 633-34, 345 A.2d 544, 549 (1974).  In that case, the property
 owners acquired 2.114 acres of land, including an unimproved road or right-
 of-way, forty feet in width, which divided the tract.  At that time, the
 zoning regulation called for one-acre residential zoning.  Thereafter, the
 regulations were amended to provide for two-acre zoning.  The husband then
 transferred .93 acres on the west side of the road to his wife.  The court
 found that the right-of-way "effectively served as a thoroughfare for owners
 of property who had a right to use it." Id. at 634, 345 A.2d  at 549.
 "[B]ecause the existence of the forty-foot right-of-way clearly interrupted
 the contiguity" of the two parcels, the court concluded that the parcels
 "cannot reasonably be considered a single lot under the generally accepted
 definition of a lot."  Id.
        Although contiguity is a strong indicator that two lots should not be
 deemed separate within the meaning of { 4406(1), it is not the only factor.
 See Bankers Trust, 165 Conn. at 632, 345 A.2d  at 549 ("contiguous land all
 owned by the same owner does not necessarily constitute a single lot").  The
 reasoning of the Bankers Trust case persuades us that a right-of-way which,
 because of location and function, effectively separates the parcels that it
 physically connects, so they cannot be used in the ordinary manner as a
 single "lot," may render those parcels separate for purposes of 24 V.S.A. {
 4406(1) and conforming zoning bylaws.  Similar reasoning has been applied
 where lot owners have sought to include the area occupied by an alley or
 right-of-way to achieve minimum lot size.  See, e.g., Sommers v. Mayor of
 Baltimore, 215 Md. 1, 7, 135 A.2d 625, 627 (1957)(alley excluded from the
 computation of lot area); Loveladies Property Owners Assoc. v. Barnegat
 City Serv. Co., 60 N.J. Super. 491, 500,