Title: PEOPLE OF MI V LOUIS MOORE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 24, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 122367  
LOUIS MOORE,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had  
authority to resentence defendant because the sentencing  
judge's expectations regarding eligibility for parole had  
proved to be incorrect.  We hold that the circuit judge  
properly concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to resentence,  
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I  
Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of  
second-degree murder1 and possession of a firearm during  
1 MCL 750.317.  
commission of a felony.2  On September 22, 1981, the circuit  
court sentenced defendant to life in prison for murder,  
consecutive to the two-year mandatory term for the firearm  
offense.
 At sentencing, there were several exchanges  
regarding defendant's eligibility for parole. In imposing a  
life sentence the judge explained:  
These kinds of sentences are always difficult 
to impose, and I do not pretend to be the kind of 
expert that I hope the corrections commission has 
in the parole board. But, I'm going to impose the 
kind of sentence that, I think, will leave them 
much room to recommend when you should be released; 
which means, in affect [sic], that I am not going 
to impose a sentence of a term of years.  I want to  
leave it up to the parole board so that after a 
period of 10 years, you could be considered for 
parole if you put yourself and your life in such a 
position that you should be considered for [it].  
The judge said that he would make "no recommendation"  
regarding parole.  
Following imposition of sentence, defense counsel raised  
a question about the parole consequences of the sentence and  
had the following exchange with the court:  
Mr. Howarth: 
Only one other question.  It  
would—would it be my understanding that the Court 
has chosen a sentence of life imprisonment in this 
case based upon the thought that it is a parolable 
offense within ten years?  
The reason I saw [sic, say?] that is because  
of 
certain 
attorney 
general 
opinion's 
[sic] 
indicating that under Proposal B,[3] it might not be  
2 MCL 750.227b.  
3 Counsel's references are to the 1978 initiative known  
as "Proposal B," and an Attorney General's Opinion concluding 
that Proposal B precluded parole for even nonmandatory life  
2  
 
parolable within ten years.  
The Court: I understand that. We've had that  
kind of problem before.  
The record will be very clear that's a very 
important point because—important basis of the 
sentence.  
I do not in any way mean that this man could 
not obtain his release if that were seen as a  
realistic and reasonable thing by the parole 
authorities; so that if that becomes a problem 
after the course of time, the record is clear so 
that I can be addressed on that issue if I'm here  
or my successor.  
Mr. Howarth: In case an appellate court were 
to rule that a life sentence under murder, second 
degree is not parolable, then it would be  
appropriate under this sentence for Mr. Moore to 
ask to be resentenced.  
The Court: It's clear that my intent is that 
Mr. Moore be eligiable [sic] for parole after a 
proper amount of time.  
In his appeal of right, defendant's conviction was  
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.4  We denied leave to appeal.5  
Defendant filed a motion in propria persona for  
resentencing in 1984, which the circuit judge denied on  
April 24, 1984, on the ground that it was premature because  
the defendant had not been in prison for ten years.  The Court  
of Appeals denied leave to appeal, with an order stating that  
sentences.  OAG, 1979-1980, No 5583, p 438 (October 16, 1979). 
That 
interpretation 
of the initiative proposal was rejected in 
People v Waterman, 137 Mich App 429; 358 NW2d 602 (1984).  
4  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 28, 1983 
(Docket No. 61277).  
5  418 Mich 896 (1983).  
3  
 
 
 
 
the denial was "in light of" People v Waterman, 137 Mich App  
429; 358 NW2d 602 (1984), which had been decided a few weeks  
before.6  
On July 15, 1997, defendant filed a motion for relief  
from judgment, seeking resentencing.  He asserted that he was  
not "eligible" for parole after ten years of incarceration,  
contrary to the circuit court's assumption when defendant was  
sentenced. He noted that on April 2, 1994, the Parole Board  
had indicated that it had "no interest in taking action at  
this time" regarding defendant's parole.  
The motion was heard by the original sentencing judge,  
who denied it on July 6, 1999.  At the hearing, the judge  
explained that he may have been under something of a  
misapprehension 
at 
the time of sentencing regarding the actual  
likelihood of defendant's being paroled. The judge said:  
None of us can ever really go back 20 years  
and know exactly what we intended, whatever  
our are [sic] intentions were to be, but I think 
it's probably fair for me to conclude that I wanted 
Mr. Moore to have a reasonable chance at parole, 
given his history in prison and how he behaved 
himself.  
And I think I may have been under what now 
turns out to be somewhat of a misapprehension or 
misunderstanding that any number of parolable life 
sentences resulted in parole.  I guess it turns 
out, . . . surprisingly few parolable life  
sentences result in parole.  
The judge continued, saying that under In re Parole of  
6  Unpublished order, entered October 8, 1984 (Docket No.  
79268).  
4  
Johnson, 235 Mich App 21; 596 NW2d 202 (1999), one could argue  
that defendant had not become "eligible" for parole.  
Nevertheless, the judge concluded that he did not have the  
authority to resentence, explaining:  
Now, it was my intention that he become  
eligible for parole, but I don't believe . . . I 
have 
jurisdiction 
to 
resentence 
him, 
notwithstanding the fact that he, as a practical 
matter, has not become eligible.  
Again, I've read that transcript over and over 
again, and I guess what I'm saying is, what I said 
at the time was, Given [sic] my belief of how 
parolable life sentences work, it was my hope that 
he would be considered for parole.  
And I'm not even sure if I said explicitly if 
he's not, then I hold on to this case for  
resentencing, whether I can properly do that, or 
could have done that.  
* * *  
. . . I suppose if the law were otherwise, a 
judge in every sentence would be able to fashion 
language that, as a practical matter, would result 
to retention of jurisdiction in every case, and I'm 
not sure that would be wise public policy given the 
issues that we're talking about.  
I think the issue in this case is whether, in 
this case, because of my finding that as a  
practical matter, or as a legal matter, under the 
Johnson case Mr. Moore has not become eligible for 
parole, and given what I said at the time of 
sentence do I, under these circumstances, retain 
jurisdiction?  
I conclude, no, . . . .  
II  
The Court of Appeals granted defendant's application for  
5  
 
leave to appeal and then reversed in a two-to-one decision.7  
The majority noted the sentencing judge's statement that he  
intended defendant to become eligible for parole and that the  
judge concluded that under In re Parole of Johnson defendant  
had not become so eligible.  The Court of Appeals rejected the  
sentencing judge's view that he was without jurisdiction to  
resentence, stating:  
Having found that it sentenced under a  
"misapprehension or misunderstanding" regarding 
defendant's eligibility for parole after ten years, 
the court had authority to resentence, if it so 
chose. [Slip op at 2.]  
The majority stressed that defendant was not entitled to  
resentencing, but only that the trial court had jurisdiction  
to resentence if it determined that the misapprehension of law  
affected the sentence.  The majority remanded the case for  
proceedings consistent with its opinion.  
Judge MURPHY dissented. 
In his view, the sentencing  
judge's 
language 
at 
the sentencing hearing indicated an intent  
that the defendant be given the opportunity for parole.  
MCL 791.234(6), in fact, provided defendant with that  
opportunity.
 The sentencing judge did not express any  
intention that the defendant actually be paroled, merely that  
he be subject to parole consideration, as he was.  
III  
A trial judge has the authority to resentence a defendant  
7 
  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 9, 2002 
(Docket No. 228323).  
6  
 
 
 
only when the previously imposed sentence is invalid. In re  
Jenkins, 438 Mich 364, 368; 475 NW2d 279 (1991); People v  
Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96-97; 559 NW2d 299 (1997).  A sentencing  
judge’s misapprehension of the law can be a ground for finding  
a sentence to be invalid. People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 170;  
312 NW2d 638 (1981).  In this case, the Court of Appeals  
majority appears to have proceeded on the assumption that  
whether there is such a misapprehension is a question of fact.  
However, while identifying the judge’s understanding of the  
law may be a question of fact, whether that understanding is  
a misapprehension is a question of law, to which we apply a de  
novo standard of review. People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522;  
581 NW2d 219 (1998).  
IV  
We agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of  
Appeals that the facts of this case demonstrate no  
misunderstanding by the sentencing judge that would entitle  
the defendant to resentencing.  The sentencing judge's  
statements in 1981 merely expressed the intent that  
defendant's 
life 
sentence 
would 
not 
deprive 
him 
of  
consideration for parole.  That was a correct understanding of  
the law. 
MCL 791.234, in fact, gave the Parole Board  
jurisdiction over defendant after he had served ten years.  
As the Court of Appeals dissent noted, the sentencing  
judge did not express any intention that defendant actually be  
7  
paroled, but only that the Parole Board consider whether to  
parole him.  Defendant's motion for relief from judgment,  
itself, revealed that he received such a consideration in  
1994. While the result of that consideration was the Parole  
Board's "no interest" letter, the fact remains that the  
defendant 
received 
parole 
consideration, 
meeting 
the  
sentencing judge's expectations.  The only sense in which the  
sentencing judge expressed that he had been under a  
“misapprehension or misunderstanding” was that he did not  
anticipate the infrequency with which the Parole Board would  
grant parole to defendants sentenced to life terms.  However,  
the failure to accurately predict the actions of the Parole  
Board does not constitute a misapprehension of the law that  
could render the sentence invalid.  
The principle argued by defendant and the Court of  
Appeals majority would alter the whole framework of our  
sentencing and corrections system.  If a judge's conclusion  
that the Parole Board's later action renders the sentence  
subject to change, virtually any sentence could be revised at  
the whim of the sentencing judge.  
The Court of Appeals majority relied on the circuit  
judge’s reference to In re Parole of Johnson. 
Although  
Johnson perhaps could have been written more clearly, it  
addressed an entirely different issue from the expectation of  
a sentencing judge regarding the eligibility for parole as in  
this case. In that case the question was whether the Parole  
8  
 
 
Board's "no interest" letter constituted a denial of parole  
that was at the time subject to appeal by the defendant.8  In  
concluding 
that 
the 
“no interest” decision was not appealable,  
the Johnson opinion used language indicating that a defendant  
who receives such a “no interest” letter was not "truly  
eligible" for parole because the other conditions for parole  
had not been met—public hearing, opportunity for a sentencing  
judge to object, etc.  The Johnson Court was using the word  
“eligible” in an entirely different sense than applicable  
here.  The sort of “eligibility” with which we deal in this  
case concerns the jurisdiction of the Parole Board over a  
defendant.  Here, and in Johnson, the board unquestionably had  
the authority to consider the defendants for parole and to  
grant them parole. The Johnson Court said the defendant was  
not “eligible” in the sense that the substantive requirements  
for granting parole had not been established. 
Here the  
question is the judge's understanding that defendant would be  
subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Board and could be  
paroled 
after 
the 
board completed the requisite procedures and  
exercised its discretion to grant parole.  He was in fact  
eligible for that consideration.  
V  
The sentence imposed in 1981 was a valid one, and, thus,  
the circuit court lacked the authority to resentence  
8 1999 PA 191 amended MCL 791.234 to eliminate inmates'  
right to appeal Parole Board denials.  
9  
defendant.  Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 7.302(F)(1), in lieu  
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals, and reinstate the Wayne Circuit Court's  
order of July 6, 1999, denying defendant's motion for relief  
from judgment.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.  
We concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
10