Title: JACK DOLLARHIDE V. SCOTT BANCROFT and MURRAY SHATTUCK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JACK DOLLARHIDE V. SCOTT BANCROFT and MURRAY SHATTUCK2008 WY 113193 P.3d 223Case Number: S-07-0236Decided: 09/29/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JACK 
DOLLARHIDE,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
SCOTT BANCROFT and 
MURRAY 
SHATTUCK,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert E. Schroth, 
Schroth & Schroth, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Scott P. Klosterman, 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]         
Appellant, Jack 
Dollarhide, challenges the district court's order dismissing his case for lack 
of prosecution.  We will 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]         
Mr. Dollarhide raises 
a single issue:

 
 
Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff's/Appellant's Complaint for Lack of 
Prosecution?

 
 
Appellees present this 
additional issue:

 
 
Should this appeal be 
dismissed because of Appellant's noncompliance with W.R.A.P. 
7.01?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]         
On August 3, 2001, Mr. 
Dollarhide was injured while working for Bancroft Construction, Inc.  On August 29, 2003, he filed a complaint 
against Scott Bancroft, the owner of Bancroft Construction, and Murray Shattuck, 
the general construction superintendent, asserting claims of co-employee 
liability.  On December 6, 2004, 
Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Shattuck filed their first motion to dismiss for lack 
of prosecution, contending that Mr. Dollarhide had done nothing to 
prosecute his action in the fifteen months since the complaint was filed.  On January 12, 2005, 
Mr. Dollarhide's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing a conflict of 
interest.  On January 24, 2005, the 
district court held a hearing on the motions.  It denied the motion to dismiss, and 
granted the motion to withdraw, but with this warning:

 
 
I'm allowing you to 
withdraw, but . . . put the other attorney on notice that this is a fast-track 
case and there will not be the usual time that the Court usually allows for 
discovery, expert witnesses, and whatever, but this will be on a fast 
track.

 
 

[¶4]         
On February 4, 2005, 
Mr. Dollarhide's new attorney entered his appearance.  He soon filed a request for a scheduling 
conference.  The district court held 
a scheduling conference on April 21, 2005, and issued an order that 
established deadlines for the completion of discovery, designation of experts, 
and filing of dispositive motions and final pretrial memoranda.  The final pretrial conference was 
scheduled for September 23, 2005.  
No trial date was set.  
Rather, the scheduling order stated that the trial would be scheduled at 
the final pretrial conference.

 
 

[¶5]         
The scheduling order 
set a deadline of July 1, 2005, for the filing of any dispositive motions.  Despite this deadline, Mr. Bancroft and 
Mr. Shattuck filed a motion for summary judgment on August 5, 2005.  The scheduling order had provided that 
dispositive motions would be heard on August 9, 2005.  The record contains no order vacating or 
rescheduling that hearing, although it appears that no hearing was held on the 
scheduled day.  Instead, the 
district court set the summary judgment hearing on the same day as the final 
pretrial conference, September 23, 2005.  
While there is no transcript of the proceedings that day, the parties 
agree that the district court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment, 
but did not conduct the final pretrial conference.  On March 1, 2006, the district court 
entered its order denying the motion for summary judgment.  It did not reschedule the final pretrial 
conference or set a trial date.  

 
 

[¶6]         
On December 7, 2006, 
Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Shattuck filed another motion to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution.  Mr. 
Dollarhide resisted the motion, informing the district court that settlement 
negotiations had been occurring between the parties, and that he was "prepared 
to proceed to trial as soon as the [c]ourt sets a date."  He also filed a second request for a 
scheduling conference, asking the court to schedule a final pretrial conference 
and trial.  The district court took 
no action on Mr. Dollarhide's request.  
Instead, on January 16, 2007, it 
held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.  
Nearly four months later, on May 1, 2007, the district court entered its 
order of dismissal, concluding as follows:

 
 

15.             
In this case, there 
has been no bona fide action of record whatsoever taken towards disposition of 
this case since March 1, 2006, when this [c]ourt entered its Order Denying 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.  
The last bona fide action of record towards disposition taken by 
[Mr. Dollarhide] was on September 16, 2005, when he filed his Pretrial 
Memorandum, Proposed Jury Instructions and Opposition to Defendants' Motion in 
Limine.

 
 

16.             
There is no discovery 
occurring between the parties.  All 
discovery in this case has been completed and the discovery cut off has long 
expired.  There is no pretrial 
preparation at this time as [Mr. Dollarhide] has never requested a trial 
date.

 
 

17.             
It has been over 
nineteen (19) months since [Mr. Dollarhide] has taken any action, let alone 
bona fide action, towards disposition of this case.  [Mr. Dollarhide's] failure to 
prosecute this case and bring the matter to trial with due diligence is 
inexcusable given the previous motions to dismiss filed by [Mr. Bancroft and Mr. 
Shattuck].  At the January 4, 2005 
motions hearing, this [c]ourt specifically advised [Mr. Dollarhide] that this 
case is a "fast track case."

 
 

18.             
[Mr. Dollarhide] 
failed to heed this [c]ourt's previous instructions.  [Mr. Dollarhide] cannot escape the duty 
of expediting his case and he may not rest upon the failure to secure a trial 
date.

 
 
Mr. Dollarhide has 
appealed the district court's order of dismissal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Failure to Comply with 
W.R.A.P. 7.01

 
 

[¶7]         
Because it is 
potentially dispositive, we address first the claim by Mr. Bancroft and Mr. 
Shattuck that this appeal should be dismissed because Mr. Dollarhide failed to 
comply with W.R.A.P. 7.01.  This 
issue requires a two-step analysis:  
Did Mr. Dollarhide violate W.R.A.P. 7.01; and if so, is dismissal an 
appropriate sanction?  The pertinent 
portion of Rule 7.01 provides as follows:

 
 
The brief of appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated:

 
 
(a)          
A title page which must include:

      . . 
.

 
 
(2)  Identification of party filing the 
brief; and

. . .

 
 
(j)   An appendix, which shall contain a 
copy of the judgment or final order appealed from and the trial court's written 
and/or oral reasons for judgment, if any, and the statement of costs required by 
rule 10.01.

 
 

[¶8]         
Mr. Bancroft and Mr. 
Shattuck contend that Mr. Dollarhide violated this rule because the title 
page of his brief identifies the filing party as "John" Dollarhide rather than 
"Jack" Dollarhide, and because the brief's appendix does not contain a copy of 
the order appealed from or a statement of costs.  These errors and omissions are apparent 
on the face of the brief, and we conclude that Mr. Dollarhide violated 
W.R.A.P. 7.01 in these respects.  

 
 

[¶9]         
Mr. Bancroft and Mr. 
Shattuck seek dismissal of the appeal.  
Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03, the untimely filing of a notice of appeal 
is jurisdictional, while "failure to comply with any other rule of 
appellate procedure . . . is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate."  Thus, dismissal 
is not required in this case.  We 
have previously declined to dismiss an appeal in which, despite technical 
violations of the appellate rules, the pleadings supplied adequate notice, and 
meaningful review was not precluded.  
Montoya v. Montoya, 2005 WY 
161, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 265, 268 (Wyo. 2005); Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, LTD., 
2007 WY 98, ¶ 12, 160 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Wyo. 2007).  Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Shattuck do 
not assert that they were confused by Mr. Dollarhide's use of the wrong 
first name.  They do not claim to 
have been misled about which district court order was being appealed, or to have 
been prejudiced in any way.  Mr. 
Dollarhide's rule violations do not preclude meaningful review by this Court, 
and we decline to dismiss this appeal.

 
 
Dismissal for Lack of 
Prosecution

 
 

[¶10]       
"The dismissal of a 
suit for want of prosecution lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court."  Johnson v. Board of Comm'rs of 
LaramieCounty, 588 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1978).  Accordingly, we review the district 
court's order dismissing a case for abuse of discretion.  Randolph v. Hays, 665 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1983).  "In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did."  
Id.  The party appealing an order to dismiss 
has the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion.  Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We keep in mind, however, 
that dismissal is not a favored course of action, because it "has always been 
the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have 
their day in court on the merits of a controversy."  Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1294 
(Wyo. 1985), quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 
(Utah 
1976).

 
 

[¶11]    
Under W.R.C.P. 41(b), 
the district court may dismiss "any action not prosecuted or brought to trial 
with due diligence."  Rule 203(c) of 
the Uniform Rules for District Courts is more specific, indicating that cases 
"in which no substantial and bona fide action of record towards disposition has 
been taken for 90 days are subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution."  The parties have cited only a handful of 
Wyoming cases 
dealing with dismissals for lack of prosecution, and none with facts similar to 
this case.  This scarcity of cases 
may be due to the fact that dismissal of an action is "the 
most severe of penalties, which ought to be assessed only in the most extreme 
situations."  Glatter v. American Nat'l Bank, 675 P.2d 642, 644 (Wyo. 1984).  Extreme situations are rare, so that "no 
precise rule may be laid down as to what circumstances justify a dismissal for 
lack of prosecution."  Instead, "the 
circumstances surrounding each case must be examined, keeping in mind the 
conflict between the need for the court to manage its docket for the purpose of 
preventing undue delay on the one hand, and the policy favoring disposition of 
cases on the merits on the other hand."  
Randolph, 665 P.2d  at 503.  

 
 

[¶12]    
With that background, 
we turn to the circumstances surrounding Mr. Dollarhide's case.  From its beginning, this case moved 
slowly.  The scheduling conference 
was not held until nineteen months after the complaint was filed, and then at 
the request of Mr. Dollarhide's new counsel.  In the order issued after the scheduling 
conference, the district court established deadlines for the completion of 
discovery, designation of experts, and filing of dispositive motions and final 
pretrial memoranda.  It is 
significant, we think, that Mr. Dollarhide appears to have complied with 
all of those deadlines.1  

 
 

[¶13]    
The scheduling order 
set a date for the final pretrial conference, and provided that the trial date 
would be set at that time.2  Because the final pretrial conference 
was never held, no trial date was ever set.  In its dismissal order, the district 
court criticized Mr. Dollarhide for failing to request a trial date.  That may be appropriate criticism, but 
considering the circumstances of this case, we think that responsibility for the 
slow pace of this litigation must be spread more broadly.  When the scheduled date for the final 
pretrial conference arrived, the district court instead held a hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment.  It did 
not conduct the final pretrial conference.  
Mr. Dollarhide was not at fault for that turn of events.  After oral argument on the summary 
judgment motion, the district court took the matter under advisement.  Six months later, it issued an order 
denying summary judgment.  
Mr. Dollarhide cannot be blamed for that delay.

 
 

[¶14]    
Nine more months 
passed, with no apparent action from the parties or the district court.  Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Shattuck then 
filed another motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.  In response, Mr. Dollarhide 
informed the district court that his counsel had tried to arrange mediation of 
the dispute, and had engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations.  The district court made no mention of 
these settlement efforts in its order dismissing the case.  Compare Randolph,  665 P.2d  at 501 (district court, 
apparently unaware that discovery was continuing, abused discretion in 
dismissing case for lack of prosecution).

 
 

[¶15]    
While it is true that 
Mr. Dollarhide could have requested a trial date, there is no reason that 
Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Shattuck could not have done the same.  The law places the "duty of expediting 
the case" chiefly with the plaintiff.  
Johnson, 588 P.2d  at 238.  It does not, however, relieve the 
defendant of all obligations regarding the progress of litigation.  In this case, Mr. Bancroft and Mr. 
Shattuck complained that the passage of time made it more difficult to have 
their witnesses available for trial.  
If so, one way to alleviate the problem would have been to request a 
trial setting.  In this regard, it 
is worth noting that the district court made no findings that Mr. Bancroft 
or Mr. Shattuck had been prejudiced by Mr. Dollarhide's actions or 
inactions.  Finally, we can perceive 
no reason that the district court could not have set the trial date on its own 
motion.

 
 

[¶16]       
In summary, the 
district court had warned that this case would be set on a fast track.  Mr. Dollarhide complied with all of 
the deadlines imposed in the scheduling order, and in accordance with that 
order, he was "ready 
for trial in all respects by the time of the final pretrial conference."  Due to no fault of 
his, the final pretrial conference was never held.  It was never rescheduled, and no trial 
date was ever set.  But despite the 
slow pace of this litigation, the district court found no prejudice resulting 
from any lack of prosecution.  Under 
these circumstances, the district court could not reasonably conclude that this 
was the sort of extreme situation justifying dismissal for lack of 
prosecution.  Given our policy of 
allowing parties their day in court, we deem that it was an abuse of discretion 
to dismiss Mr. Dollarhide's suit for lack of prosecution.  We reverse that decision and remand the 
case to the district court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In his final pretrial memorandum, Mr. 
Dollarhide stated that discovery had not been completed because he had been 
unable to locate and depose one witness.  
Nevertheless, in its order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution, 
the district court concluded that "[a]ll discovery in this case has been 
completed and the discovery cut off has long expired." 

 
 

2The scheduling order required that 
the "case must be ready for trial in all respects by the time of the final 
pretrial conference."  This 
requirement is consistent with W.R.C.P. 16(d), which directs that the 
"final pretrial conference shall be held as close to the time of trial as 
reasonable under the circumstances."  
However, the scheduling order also indicated that the district court 
would not set the trial date until the final pretrial conference.  This practice can create a significant 
practical problem.  If the trial 
date is not set until the final pretrial conference, and is held soon after the 
final pretrial conference, then trial counsel and witnesses receive only short 
notice of the trial date, and could find it difficult to make themselves 
available for trial.  See Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 896 
(Wyo. 1984) 
("[F]ive days notice of trial is presumptively not reasonable notice.").  It would be a better practice in most 
cases to set a trial date earlier in the proceedings.  This could be done, for example, in the 
initial scheduling order.  "A system 
that provides adequate notice of scheduled events and certainty that they will 
occur as scheduled is more likely to encourage timely and effective case 
preparation."  Maureen Solomon & 
Douglas K. Somerlot, Caseflow Management 
in the Trial Court Now and For the Future, A.B.A., at 5 
(1987).