Title: Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1998 WY 79960 P.2d 504Case Number: 97-325Decided: 06/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the 
Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of William SHAFFER, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Natrona County, Dan Spangler, Judge.

 

Keith R. Nachbar, Casper, 
for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 

[¶1] Appellant William 
Shaffer (the claimant) appeals from the district court's order which affirmed 
the hearing examiner's dismissal of his worker's compensation 
case.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The claimant presents 
two issues for our review:

 

Where William Shaffer mistakenly checked the box 
marked "independent contractor" on a worker's compensation injury report at his 
employer's direction, and was therefore denied worker['s] compensation benefits, 
should he be given a hearing on his application to reopen his case to correct 
the mistake or fraud?

 

Was the hearing examiner's summary dismissal of 
Shaffer's application to reopen his case in accordance with 
law?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] On August 27, 1991, the 
claimant sustained an injury while he was at work. In his injury report, he 
stated that he was a truck driver, and he indicated that he was an independent 
contractor. The claimant had been driving for Underwood Oil and Gas Company for 
approximately two months when the injury occurred. Appellee Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division (the division) issued an initial review on 
September 16, 1991, denying the claimant's request for benefits on the basis 
that he was an independent contractor and did not, therefore, fall within the 
statutory definition of "employee." The claimant did not object to this 
determination.

 

[¶5] On August 22, 1995, 
nearly four years after he was injured, the claimant filed an application for a 
modification of benefits pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1997) and an 
affidavit in support of his application. He claimed that he was entitled to 
reopen his case because he was an employee of Underwood Oil and Gas Company when 
he was injured and that he had indicated he was an independent contractor on his 
injury report only because his supervisor had directed him to do so. He 
maintained that he was, therefore, entitled to receive worker's compensation 
benefits for his 1991 injury. The division denied the claimant's application, 
and the case was referred to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.

 

[¶6] The division filed a motion, seeking to have the case 
dismissed and a summary disposition of the claimant's application rendered in 
its favor. It argued that the claimant was not entitled to reopen his case 
because he had not previously been awarded worker's compensation benefits and 
there was, consequently, nothing to be modified under § 27-14-605(a). After 
holding a hearing, the hearing examiner granted the division's motion. The 
claimant appealed to the district court, and the district court affirmed the 
hearingexaminer's decision. The 
claimant perfected his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review

 

[¶7] WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c) (1997) governs the judicial review of an agency action. See also 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a). When a worker's compensation case comes before the Wyoming 
Supreme Court, we do not accord special deference to the district court's 
decision.  Cabral v. Caspar Building 
Systems, Inc., 920 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1996). We review the case as if it had 
come directly from the hearing examiner. Id.

 

[¶8] Summary judgments are 
available in worker's compensation cases. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Wyo. 1995). A summary judgment should be granted when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to have a 
judgment as a matter of law. 899 P.2d  at 62; see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). No 
disputed issues of fact were presented in this case; therefore, we are required 
to review only the hearing examiner's conclusions of law. We do not give 
deference to those conclusions of law. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 922 P.2d 863, 864 (Wyo. 1996). Instead, if the hearing 
examiner has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we remedy 
the errors. Devous v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 
414 (Wyo. 1993). See also Bhutto v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 933 P.2d 481, 483 (Wyo. 1997).

 

B. Section 27-14-605

 

[¶9] The claimant contends 
that the hearing examiner erred when it refused to allow him to reopen his case. 
He claims that he should be allowed to reopen his case pursuant to 
27-14-605(a)1 because he was not afforded a 
hearing on his claim.

 

[¶10] In Erhart v. Flint 
Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo. 1997), this Court parsed 
the language of § 27-14-605(a) and concluded that only claimants who have 
previously been awarded benefits can reopen their cases under that statutory 
section.  We held that § 
27-14-605(a) is not available to claimants who have been denied benefits but 
that unsuccessful claimants can request to have their cases reopened under 
W.R.C.P. 60(b).2 939 P.2d  at 
722-23.

 

[¶11] The claimant attempts 
to distinguish his case from Erhart by pointing out that Erhart had a hearing 
while he did not have one.  Section 
27-14-605(a) does not differentiate between those unsuccessful claimants who had 
hearings and those unsuccessful claimants who did not have hearings. The Erhart 
ruling, therefore, applies to all unsuccessful claimants.

 

[¶12] In this case, the 
claimant was denied worker's compensation benefits in the division's initial 
review of his claim. He did not object to that ruling, and, accordingly, a 
contested case hearing was not held. The claimant was not entitled to reopen his 
case under the procedure set forth in § 27-14-605(a) because he had not 
previously been awarded worker's compensation benefits. Erhart, 939 P.2d  at 
722-23.

 

C. W.R.C.P. 60(b)

 

[¶13] The claimant did not 
argue at his administrative hearing that, under W.R.C.P. 60(b), he was entitled 
to be relieved from the division's denial of his worker's compensation claim. 
Nonetheless, he asserts that this Court should, on its own motion, construe his 
§ 27-14-605(a) application as being a request for relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b). 
He relies on Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1983), to support his 
argument. In Herring, this Court treated Herring's application to reopen his 
worker's compensation case as a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. 660 P.2d  at 367. That 
case involved unique circumstances in which the district court and the clerk of 
the district court disregarded express statutory requirements in handling 
Herring's claim. 660 P.2d  at 366-67. The statutory violations rendered the 
judgment against Herring void, and the totality of the circumstances of that 
case justified giving Herring relief from the adverse judgment. 
Id.

 

[¶14] The circumstances of 
the case at bar are different from those circumstances which were presented in 
Herring. The record does not show that the division violated the worker's 
compensation law. The Herring ruling, therefore, is not applicable in this case, 
and we will not, on our own motion, construe the claimant's application to 
reopen his case under § 27-14-605(a) as being a W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion.

 

[¶15] The claimant waived 
his right to argue on appeal that he was entitled to have relief under W.R.C.P. 
60(b) because he did not present that issue to the hearing examiner. "As we have 
consistently stated over many years, Wyoming appellate courts do not review 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. This rule is equally applicable to 
appeals from administrative decisions as to those from district courts." Nelson 
v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶16] The claimant also 
contends that public policy dictates that he should be allowed to reopen his 
case. We have recognized that the worker's compensation law seeks "to balance 
the concept of finality with the desire to see that a claimant receives no less 
and no more than that to which he is lawfully entitled." State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 249 (Wyo. 1994). 
Although the claimant may have been entitled to receive worker's compensation 
benefits, he did not follow the proper procedures to reopen his case, and public 
policy does not require that we abandon the concept of finality to correct the 
claimant's mistake.

 

[¶17] 
Affirmed.

 

          
          

FOOTNOTES

  1Section 27-14-605(a) states in 
pertinent part:

 

(a) If a 
determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits 
under this act, an application may be made to the division by any party within 
four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional benefits or for 
a modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or decrease 
of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud.

 

 

  2W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
provides:

 

(b) Other Reasons. - On motion, and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons 
(1), (2), and (3)not more 
than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a party against whom a 
judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication as 
provided by statute. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and 
bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and 
the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.