Title: Gray v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gray v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization1995 WY 85896 P.2d 1347Case Number: 94-19Decided: 06/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jan 
Charles GRAY,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION; and Valerie 
Reed, County Assessor, Converse County, Wyoming, 

Appellees (Respondents).

Appeal 
from District Court, Converse County, Barton R. Voigt, 
J.

Jan Charles Gray, Glenrock, 
appellant pro 
se.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Michael L. Hubbard and Clinton D. Beaver, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization.

Thomas A. Burley, Douglas, 
for appellee 
Reed.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      At issue in this 
case is the right of a taxpayer, Jan Charles Gray (Gray), to have his real 
property appraised at its purchase price by the county assessor for purposes of 
the ad valorem tax. The County Assessor (Assessor), using a formula calculation, 
the Computer Assisted Mass. Appraisal (CAMA), arrived at assessed valuations 
that were much higher than Gray's purchase prices. The assessed valuation 
actually used, however, was set by reducing the preceding year's valuation by 
twenty-five percent pursuant to 1988 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 73, § 3.1 Gray appealed these valuations to 
the Converse County Board of County Commissioners, acting as the County Board of 
Equalization (County Board), but the County Board approved the valuations set by 
the Assessor. Gray appealed that determination to the State Board of 
Equalization (State Board). The State Board affirmed the County Board, and Gray 
pursued judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the State 
Board, and Gray appeals the decision of the district court. We are satisfied the 
valuation reached by the Assessor is supported by substantial evidence and was 
arrived at by a lawful method of valuing real property. We affirm the decision 
of the district court.

[¶2]      Gray has 
represented himself throughout these proceedings and, in his Brief of Appellant, 
he has not included a statement of the issues presented for review as required 
by WYO.R.APP.P. 7.01(d). It is clear the only issue he asserts is whether the 
purchase price of real property must be accepted as establishing the value of 
that property for purposes of tax assessment. The State Board and the Assessor, 
in a Brief of Appellee State Board of Equalization, articulate two issues as 
follows:

I.          
Was there substantial evidence before the County Board of Equalization to 
support the County Assessor's 1991 valuation of Petitioner's 
property?

II.          
Was the County Assessor's 1991 valuation of Petitioner's property in 
accordance with law?

[¶3]      Our review of 
cases testing the imposition of taxes is accomplished pursuant to WYO. R.APP.P. 
12.09. We invoke the standards applicable to a reviewing court of the first 
instance. The scope of our review is defined in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). 
A tandem analysis is applied to resolve such cases. We first review the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of 
fact by the agency. Substantial evidence is that quantum of relevant evidence 
which would be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the 
conclusion. We do not substitute our judgment on the facts for that of the 
agency if substantial evidence exists, even though different conclusions might 
be drawn from that evidence. If substantial evidence supports the agency's 
resolution, we then determine whether the action is otherwise in accordance with 
law. If the action does comport with the law, it must be sustained but, if it 
does not, it will be corrected. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1992). See 
also Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 884 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶4]      In this case, it 
is useful to examine the constitutional, legislative, and regulatory system of 
ad valorem property taxation in Wyoming. In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. 
Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987), we held unconstitutional the 
statutory provisions adopted for taxing real property. We required the 
legislature to provide for uniform assessment to secure a just valuation and 
equal and uniform taxation in compliance with the pertinent constitutional 
provisions. The legislature addressed those concerns by sponsoring an amendment 
to the constitution to provide for uniformity of assessment of land and 
improvements. The provision, found in WYO. CONST. art. 15, § 11 (1890) (amended 
1988) now reads (emphasis added):

(a) All property, except as in this constitution 
otherwise provided, shall be uniformly valued at its full value as defined by 
the legislature, in three (3) classes as follows:

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(iii) All other property, real and 
personal.

*            
*           
*           
*           *           
*

(d) All taxation shall be equal and uniform within each class of 
property. The legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of all property, real and 
personal.

[¶5]      By constitutional 
provision and statutes, the State Board is charged with the administration of ad 
valorem property taxes. After amendment of the constitution, the legislature 
changed the provisions of Title 39 of the WYOMING STATUTES entitled, "Taxation 
and Revenue," adding two pertinent provisions. The first is found in WYO. STAT. 
§ 39-1-304(a)(xiii) (1994) (amended 1989) and provides:

[The board shall:] Prescribe the system of 
establishing the fair market value of all property valued for property taxation 
to ensure that all property within a 
class is uniformly valued. (Emphasis added.)

The second provision is 
found in WYO. STAT. § 39-2-102 (1994) (amended 1991) and provides, with respect 
to the role of the State Board:

All taxable property shall be annually valued at its 
fair market value. Except as otherwise provided by law for specific property, 
the board, only after recommendation from the director of the department [of 
revenue], shall prescribe by rule and 
regulation the appraisal methods and systems for determining fair market value 
using generally accepted appraisal standards. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶6]      In accord with 
the statutes, the State Board has promulgated rules and regulations, which 
authorize several methods for valuing property and provide, in pertinent 
part:

Section 6. Appraisal Methods. The appraisal techniques that may be used 
by the county assessor * * * includes [sic] the approaches described in this 
section. Each approach used shall be an appropriate method for the type of 
property being valued; that is, the property shall fit the assumptions inherent 
in the appraisal method in order to calculate or estimate the fair value of the property. Each 
approach used shall also consider the nature of the property or industry, and 
the regulatory and economic environment within which the property 
operates.

(a) The Sales 
Comparison Approach. * * *

(b) The Stock 
and Debt Approach. * * *

(c) Replacement Cost Approach. * * 
*

(d) Reproduction Cost Approach. * * 
*

(e) Historical 
Cost Approach. * * *

(f) The 
Ellwood or Mortgage Equity Method. * * *

(g) The Income 
or Capitalized Earnings Approach. * * *

(h) Computer 
Assisted Mass. Appraisal (CAMA). * * *

RULES AND REGULATIONS OF 
WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ch. XXII, Section 6. (Emphasis 
added.)

It is against these 
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions that we test the assessed 
valuations in this case.

[¶7]      Gray purchased 
various types of property in Converse County through private and public sales. 
The Converse County Assessor issued assessment schedules for these properties 
for the 1991 tax year. Gray protested the appraisal values to the Assessor in a 
letter dated May 15, 1991. The Assessor then corrected certain errors in the 
assessment schedule and applied the same method of valuation. In attacking the 
assessment schedules, Gray relies upon the following purchase prices and the 
assessed valuation, although other values can be found in the 
record:

                                                            
ACTUAL                                
ASSESSOR'S

PROPERTY                                       
SALES                                  
CAMA FAIR

INDENTIFICATION                           
PRICE                                     
VALUE

Property #1                                        
$ 45,000                                 
$234,000

Property #2                                        
$ 14,000                                 
$  
71,000

Property #3                                        
$ 23,000                                 
$173,000

Property #4                                        
$   7,848                                 
$  
30,100

Property #5                                        
$      
851                                 
$  
11,900

Property #6                                        
$   9,434                                 
$311,590

TOTAL                                               
$100,133                               
$831,816

[¶8]      Gray appealed the 
corrected values reached by the Assessor to the County Board. At the hearing 
before the County Board, Gray submitted his evidence with respect to the 
purchase prices for the several properties. He argued these purchase prices, 
which were substantially below the values assessed by the Assessor, were 
conclusive evidence of the "fair market value" for these properties. In support 
of his position, Gray relies upon the definition found in WYO. STAT. § 
39-1-101(a)(vi) (1990):

"Fair market value" means the amount in cash, or 
terms reasonably equivalent to cash, a well informed buyer is justified in 
paying for a property and a well informed seller is justified in accepting, 
assuming neither party to the transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and 
assuming the property has been offered in the open market for a reasonable time 
* * *.

[¶9]      The Assessor 
testified she had used the CAMA, which is the method of appraisal adopted in the 
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. This method of 
valuing property for purposes of ad 
valorem taxation does not rely solely on the purchase price of the property 
in arriving at the valuation.2

[¶10]   The Assessor stated certain 
calculations made by Gray were in error. Gray's position is that, using the 
Assessor's valuation figures and "comparing comparable properties" of other 
owners, the Bronco Building is taxed at only $7.33 per square foot, and the 
Higgins Hotel/Paisley Shawl is taxed at only $7.86 per square foot. He contends 
his VT Motel (property # 1) is taxed at $22.38 per square foot; La Cocina 
(property # 2) is taxed at $33.55 per square foot; and the Coachman Motel 
(property # 3) is taxed at $25.89 per square foot. The Assessor testified that 
according to the state main frame computer, the Higgins Hotel "costed" out at 
$29.14 per square foot. She stated:

I 
don't exactly understand how he [Gray] arrived at his figures, but when you 
enter the data on any specific type of building you have use codes, you have 
land codes, you have structure codes, you have quality grade, you have condition 
and function, you have all of these items that go in to build a replacement cost 
new less depreciation on any specific type of building.

We experimented with a lot of buildings up there 
[Glenrock] just to see what we were coming up with by changing and using the 
same type of use code or the same type of structure code on those, and they're 
all within the, I would say $25 to $40 range depending on the different grade, 
quality, condition, function, and so on.

[¶11]   The Assessor further testified 
sales prices can be good indicators of the market value, but they don't 
establish the market value for purposes of assessment for taxation. In her 
testimony, she explained CAMA was an appropriate method for the type of property 
being valued, and it considered the nature of the property and the regulatory 
and economic environment in which Gray's property existed. The Assessor assured 
the County Board the data for Gray's property was entered correctly as was the 
data for all other properties in the county. She explained the goal since the 
1988 legislation has been to afford uniform valuations throughout the 
county.

[¶12]   After the hearing, the County Board 
issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order and, in a letter dated 
July 22, 1991, it informed Gray it had approved the form of valuation set by the 
Assessor. Gray appealed this ruling to the State Board which affirmed the County 
Board after requesting additional findings. Gray pursued judicial review, and 
the district court affirmed the decision of the State 
Board.

[¶13]   In its decision letter, the 
district court stated Gray did not present any evidence of arbitrary or 
capricious action or an abuse of discretion by the Assessor. The court explained 
all of the statutes and rules must be read together and, in doing so, it is 
apparent the statutes were drafted to allow the development of an appraisal 
system much more complex than the mere recitation of purchase prices. The 
district court concluded substantial evidence was presented, demonstrating the 
Assessor had followed an appraisal method specifically authorized under the 
rules of the State Board. Gray appeals to this court from that ruling of the 
district court.

[¶14]   There are three factors in arriving 
at ad valorem taxes pursuant to the 
statutory scheme. Initially, the current value (full value, current market 
value, fair value) is established by the appraisal process. Next, the taxable 
value is determined by multiplying the assessed value by the debasement factor 
assigned to the properties' classification as provided by WYO. STAT. § 
39-1-101(a)(xvii) (1994) (amended 1990). The mill levy for the county then is 
applied, and the actual property tax is computed.

[¶15]   The party who asserts an improper 
valuation is assigned the burden of proof when challenging the Assessor's 
valuation of property. Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of Equalization, 735 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1987). We have said it is not the duty of this 
court

to determine which of various appraisal methods is 
best or most accurately estimates FMV [fair market value]; rather, it is to 
determine whether substantial evidence exists to support usage of the 
[particular] method of appraisal, and, if so, whether substantial evidence 
exists to support the manner in which it was used.

Holly Sugar Corp. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶16]   Our examination of the record in 
this case reveals there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the 
County Board that the Assessor correctly valued Gray's properties for 1991. The 
second aspect of our review is to determine if the action of the County Board 
was lawful. Our rule is that the constitution of the State of Wyoming requires 
"only a rational method [of appraisal], equally applied to all property, which 
results in essential fairness." Holly Sugar, 839 P.2d  at 964 (citing Teton 
Valley Ranch, 735 P.2d at 115). We conclude the CAMA, the method used in the 
valuation of Gray's property, conforms with the equal and uniform taxation 
requirements of the constitution. It "substantially covers the ground of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitution." 
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Wyoming v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 452, 143 P.2d 181, 186 (1943).

[¶17]   We construe statutes in pari 
materia with all of the relevant statutes, and we refuse to isolate one sentence 
out of the law and give it exclusive effect. We have said:

[W]e must heed this warning:

It 
is always an unsafe way of construing a statute * * * to divide it, by a process 
of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus 
separated from its context, some particular definition.

Parker Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Int'l 
Trust Co. v. Am. Loan & Trust Co., 62 Minn. 501, 65 N.W. 78, 79 (1895), as 
quoted in Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 
Ind.L.J. 335, 338 (1949)).

[¶18]   It is clear from the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming and all of the relevant statutes that discrimination in 
a class is prohibited. Property must be uniformly valued and equally and 
uniformly taxed. The rules and regulations promulgated by the State Board, 
pursuant to statutory authority, authorize several methods of appraisal which 
may be used by the assessor to provide uniformity. Reliance upon actual sales 
prices, in lieu of the methods adopted by the State Board, may well lead to 
discrimination and lack of equality and uniformity. While one method of arriving 
at assessed valuation, the sales comparison approach, may rely upon actual 
sales, it is not limited to the sale price for the particular property involved. 
We hold the Assessor followed a valuation method properly adopted by the State 
Board in this case. It was applied uniformly to all properties and, like the 
district court, we do not perceive any arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful action 
by the Assessor, nor is there any abuse of discretion.

[¶19]   The focus of Gray's argument is 
upon the use of the actual sales price to establish "fair market value." His 
contention is that, in accordance with the definition of fair market value 
articulated in WYO. STAT. § 39-1-101(a)(vi), the best and exclusive evidence of 
fair market value is the actual transaction price.

[¶20]   Gray relies on a number of cases 
cited in Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Sale Price of Real Property as Evidence in 
Determining Value for Tax Assessment Purposes, 89 A.L.R.3d 1126 (1979). Those 
cases are claimed to stand for the proposition that the "price paid for realty 
in a bona fide, arm's-length sale is conclusive evidence of property's value for 
tax assessment purposes." 89 A.L.R.3d 164, § 4 (Supp. 1994). Our examination of 
six of these cases demonstrates they do not support Gray's proposition.3 Two of these cases appear to 
support the proposition that sales price is conclusive evidence of the value of 
the property for tax assessment but the language of the constitutions in those 
states differs from the Wyoming Constitution. Our constitution requires "equal 
and uniform" taxation within each class of property. The Ohio Constitution 
provides that land "shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value." OHIO 
CONST. art. XII, § 2.4 The Constitution in Vermont 
provides that every member of society is bound to contribute his "proportion" 
towards the expense of protection of life, liberty, and property. VT. CONST. ch. 
I, art. 9. The Wisconsin Constitution provides, "[t]he rule of taxation shall be 
uniform." WIS. CONST., art. VIII, § 1.5 None of these constitutions demand 
equality. It is, indeed, easier for an assessor to address a constitution that 
requires only uniformity, and utilizing the sales price as the fair market value 
would achieve that result. It does not necessarily result in equality because, 
as we know, the market price of real property may rise and fall in 
cycles.

[¶21]   Gray's argument is defective in two 
additional respects. The use of the actual sales price for assessed value 
results in assessments that are not equal and uniform. They, therefore, would 
not be correct, and this would violate our constitutional requirement of uniform 
valuation. Gray's own situation provides a clear example. His properties # 1, # 
2, and # 3 were acquired from private individuals. His properties # 4, # 5, and 
# 6 are similar properties, but they were purchased from Converse County after 
it had acquired ownership of them for delinquent taxes. It is clear properties 
acquired in a sale by the county are not the product of a transaction in which 
the price is established by "the amount in cash, or terms reasonably equivalent 
to cash, a well informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well 
informed seller is justified in accepting, assuming neither party to the 
transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and assuming the property has been 
offered in the open market for a reasonable time * * *." WYO. STAT. § 
39-1-101(a)(vi).

[¶22]   In asserting the properties 
acquired from the county were obtained at "auctions [that] were the highest form 
of fair market value transaction," Gray disregards Union Pacific R.R. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 861 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Guild Wineries 
and Distilleries v. Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 182, 124 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 
(1975)), where we said:

[T]he California Court of Appeals defined an "open 
market transaction" for tax purposes as follows:

"An 
`open market' transaction is one where the sale price is negotiated between the 
buyer and seller as distinguished from a sale resulting from the submission of 
bids where the seller sells to the highest bidder or the buyer buys from the 
lowest bidder."

We went on to say that, in 
such a circumstance, the "fair value is not established by the sale, and the 
assessor may disregard the sale price in favor of other proper criteria used to 
determine fair value." Union Pacific R.R., 802 P.2d  at 
862.

[¶23]   In Wyoming, the receipt of sealed 
bids does not establish a fair market value sale according to the statutory 
definition. If we adopt Gray's reasoning that properties # 1, # 2, and # 3 were 
to be assessed at their sales price, but properties # 4, # 5, and # 6 were to be 
assessed at their bid price, these two categories of property would not be 
assessed equally and uniformly. Furthermore, the valuation of Gray's properties 
# 1, # 2, and # 3 when compared with other properties in Glenrock would not be 
equal and uniform. The essence of Gray's position is that he would seek to have 
us establish by our decision a rule contravening the 
constitution.

[¶24]   Gray's contention that there are 
disparities between the square foot valuation of other properties in Glenrock 
and his properties is refuted by the testimony of the Assessor. A disparity such 
as Gray asserts could demonstrate a lack of equality and uniformity, but the 
record in this case is contrary to his position. Gray also urges this court to 
require the assessment of the properties he purchased at approximately twelve 
percent of the assessed valuation reached by the Assessor. Gray's position is 
that, while it would be fair for his property to be assessed at the lower 
valuation, it would not be unfair to other taxpayers to have their property 
assessed according to the formula. He suggests a double standard for assessment 
between taxpayers which does not comport with our constitutional and statutory 
requirements.

[¶25]   We turn then to Gray's assertion 
that the twenty-five percent limitation on changes and property values imposed 
by the 1988 WYO. SESS. LAWS should not apply. The purpose of 1988 WYO. SESS. 
LAWS ch. 73, § 3, was to provide for a gradual phase-in of the new statutes 
relating to property taxation. The legislature established a ceiling and a floor 
for changes in valuation from one year to the next. Regardless of the appraisal, 
the assessed valuation could not be more than twenty-five percent above the 
preceding year's value, nor could it be more than twenty-five percent below the 
preceding year's value, for any year from 1989 through 
1992.

[¶26]   Gray contends his properties # 4, # 
5, and # 6 were not valued in 1990 when they were owned by Converse County. The 
Assessor testified these properties were valued and the twenty-five percent 
reduction in valuation was granted to the properties in 1991 in accordance with 
the statutory requirement. Gray, however, contends there was an error committed 
because 1988 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 73, § 3(b)(vii), requires the reduction for 
properties # 1, # 2, and # 3 in 1989 and 1990. The Assessor refuted that claim 
by pointing out the assessments were not protested by the owners at that time 
saying, "[u]nless these properties are protested and there is an error 
discovered, there is no error."

[¶27]   The most perplexing aspect of 
Gray's position is that, even if the Assessor had adopted purchase prices as the 
values for these properties, the assessed valuations would have been the same. 
They could not be reduced more than twenty-five percent from the assessed values 
in 1990. This may well be the controlling feature in this case, although we hold 
the method used by the Assessor in establishing the assessed valuations was 
proper.

[¶28]   Gray's final argument is that the 
valuation reached violated his rights under the Wyoming Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He also alleges his 
right to equal protection was violated. We are satisfied the statutes and the 
rules and regulations which comport with WYO. CONST. art. 15, § 11 are in accord 
with due process of law and with other provisions of the Wyoming Constitution. 
They are intended to, and do, achieve equal protection.

[¶29]   We hold the Assessor appropriately 
applied the CAMA in arriving at assessed valuations in this case and was not 
bound to utilize the purchase price of the property in lieu of the appraisal 
method. The legislature and the State Board have diligently sought to establish 
equal and uniform methods for taxation of property in accordance with the 
constitution. It would be a travesty to arbitrarily disregard that system in 
favor of the utilization of a purchase price which would lead to wide disparity 
in the context of uniformity and equality.

[¶30]   The decision of the district court, 
which affirmed the decision of the State Board, is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 1988 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 73, § 3 
provides, in pertinent part:

(a) For the tax 
year commencing January 1, 1989, and each tax year thereafter through December 
31, 1992, the assessed value of any property shall not be adjusted by more than 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the preceding year's value except as provided by 
subsection (b) of this section and except if the property did not exist in the 
same form or was not valued or taxed during the preceding tax 
year.

2 In a concurring opinion to the order of 
the State Board, the chairman explained CAMA is a relatively flexible computer 
system that automates certain appraisal methods, the replacement cost approach 
and the sales comparison approach, and is authorized under RULES AND REGULATIONS 
OF WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ch. XXII, Section 6. This system does 
not eliminate judgments made by the assessor, which significantly influence the 
"system" value estimate.

3 Foreman & Clark of Iowa, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Review of City of Cedar Rapids, 286 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1979). The appraised 
valuation resulted in the same value as the sales price when the sales price, as 
the starting point for assessment, was discounted for a defective roof and 
increased for an existing lease.

Erich Sternberg 
Realty Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 560 So. 2d 868 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 567 So. 2d 107 (1990). This court concluded a substantial 
difference can occur between the taxpayer's purchase price and "market value 
estimate" predicated upon prices paid in actual transactions and current 
listing.

Southern 
Westchester Assoc. v. Assessor of City of Yonkers, 122 A.D.2d 212, 504 N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y.A.D.2d Dept. 1986). The trial court considered the converted use of the 
building to cooperative ownership and declined to use the property's sales price 
in assessing its value.

W.T. Grant Co. 
v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761, 767, 420 N.E.2d 953, 959 (N.Y. 1981). 
The general rule as to such sales is "that the purchase price set in the course 
of an arm's length transaction of recent vintage, if not explained away as 
abnormal in any fashion, is evidence of the `highest rank' to determine the true 
value of the property at that time." (Emphasis added, citations 
omitted.)

Bliss Hotel Co. 
v. Thompson, 378 P.2d 319 (Okla. 1962). Specific circumstances depressing the 
sale price of property would affect the use of the price as evidence of the 
property's value for tax purposes.

Quad Assoc. v. 
Blair County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 62, 566 A.2d 1274 (1989). 
The price at which any property may actually have been sold either in the base 
year or in the current taxable year shall be considered, but shall not be 
controlling. The selling price, estimated or actual, shall be subject to 
revision by increase or decrease to accomplish equalization with other similar 
property within the county.

4 Spector Terminals, Inc. v. Nordonia 
Hills Sch. Dist. Bd. of Education, 10 Ohio App.3d 194, 10 OBR 266, 461 N.E.2d 16 
(1983). The court affirmed the decision to increase taxable value of property to 
the sales price as the best method of determining value, when such information 
is available, is an actual sale of such property between one who is willing to 
sell but not compelled to do so, and one who is willing to buy but not compelled 
to do so.

5 Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 167 
Wis.2d 566, 482 N.W.2d 326 (1992). This court has consistently held it is error 
for an assessor to use other factors to assess the value of property if there is 
a recent arm's length sale, however, the assessor must use other factors to 
determine if there is an arm's length sale.