Title: Bates v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DEBRA BATES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
 OF FANNIE MARIE BANKS, DECEASED 
 
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030396             JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
    March 5, 2004 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action filed by 
Debra Bates (Bates), administrator of the estate of Fannie Marie 
Banks (Banks), her deceased daughter, against the Commonwealth 
of Virginia pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code 
§§ 8.01-195.1 through 8.01-195.9.  The issue to be resolved is 
whether Bates filed a notice of claim sufficient to comply with 
the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6 with regard to the 
identification of the “place” at which Banks’ injury was alleged 
to have occurred. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On July 21, 2000, 
Banks was admitted as an inpatient at the University of Virginia 
Medical Center1 in Charlottesville (the hospital).  During the 
                     
1 During the relevant years, the hospital in question, which 
provides inpatient medical care, was designated interchangeably 
as the “University of Virginia Health Sciences Center” and the 
“University of Virginia Medical Center.”  Because the identity 
course of her treatment at the hospital, Banks required the use 
of a ventilator at various times to help her breathe while 
sleeping.  In the early morning hours of October 14, 2000, 
Banks, although on a ventilator, was found asystolic and 
unresponsive by hospital personnel.  She suffered irreversible 
brain damage and, after being removed from a life support 
system, died in the hospital on October 21, 2000. 
On August 14, 2001, Bates mailed a notice of claim by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney 
General of Virginia in which she essentially asserted that the 
medical personnel at the hospital had been guilty of medical 
malpractice that proximately caused the brain damage and 
ultimate death of Banks.  The notice of claim contained 
allegations that these personnel had negligently failed to place 
the ventilator properly in service, failed to observe the 
malfunction of the ventilator, or failed to observe that Banks 
was not receiving proper oxygenation from the ventilator.  
Pertinent to the issue presented by this appeal, the notice of 
claim identified the “PLACE OF INJURY” as “University of 
Virginia Health Sciences Center, Charlottesville, Virginia.” 
                                                                  
of this hospital is not at issue here, we will refer to it in 
this opinion as the University of Virginia Medical Center or 
simply the hospital. 
 
2
Thereafter, on March 15, 2002, Bates filed a motion for 
judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville 
(the trial court) against the Commonwealth of Virginia for the 
wrongful death of Banks.2  In response, the Commonwealth filed 
its grounds of defense, plea of sovereign immunity, and a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act. 
On November 19, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing 
on the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and motion to 
dismiss.  In order to address the issue of the Commonwealth’s 
sovereign immunity, the focus of the hearing, which was 
conducted on the pleadings, was whether Bates had sufficiently 
identified in her notice of claim the place at which Banks was 
injured.  There was no dispute that the University of Virginia 
Medical Center is a state-supported hospital and, while located 
in Charlottesville, is composed of multiple buildings, which 
contain multiple floors and multiple rooms.  Relying principally 
upon Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 252, 467 S.E.2d 
783, 785 (1996), the Commonwealth maintained that the notice of 
claim filed by Bates did not sufficiently identify the place 
                     
2 The University of Virginia was also named as a defendant 
in Bates’ motion for judgment, but was subsequently dismissed as 
a party by agreement.  The Virginia Tort Claims Act provides for 
the limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth 
and does not waive the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth’s 
agencies.  The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 
v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 246, 591 S.E.2d 76, ___ (2004). 
 
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where Banks’ injury was alleged to have occurred at this 
hospital to satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6.  
Consequently, the Commonwealth asserted that its plea of 
sovereign immunity was well taken and its motion to dismiss 
should be granted.  The trial court ultimately agreed with the 
Commonwealth and by final order entered on December 13, 2002, 
relying principally upon Halberstam, dismissed Bates’ claim 
against the Commonwealth with prejudice.  We awarded this appeal 
to Bates. 
II. DISCUSSION 
As noted by the Commonwealth in the present case and as we 
have repeatedly held, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
alive and well in Virginia.”  Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 
Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002).  “In the absence of 
express statutory or constitutional provisions waiving the 
Commonwealth’s immunity, the Commonwealth and its agencies are 
immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions of 
their agents or employees.”  Patten v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
654, 658, 553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001).  The Virginia Tort Claims 
Act constitutes an express limited waiver of the Commonwealth’s 
immunity from tort claims.  Id.  In this context and in 
pertinent part, Code § 8.01-195.3 provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of this article, the 
Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for . . . 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
 
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wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting 
within the scope of his employment under circumstances 
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, 
injury or death. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The limitation upon the waiver of the Commonwealth’s 
sovereign immunity emphasized above is expressly addressed in 
Code § 8.01-195.6.  In pertinent part, this statute provides 
that: 
Every claim cognizable against the Commonwealth . . . 
shall be forever barred unless the claimant or his 
agent, attorney or representative has filed a written 
statement of the nature of the claim, which includes 
the time and place at which the injury is alleged to 
have occurred and the agency or agencies alleged to be 
liable. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
In the present case, the parties agree that in the absence 
of compliance with the mandate of Code § 8.01-195.6, the trial 
court would lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Bates’ 
claim against the Commonwealth because in such circumstances the 
Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity is not waived.  Filing and 
receipt of the notice of claim are not at issue.  The parties, 
as they did in the trial court, dispute the sufficiency of 
Bates’ notice of claim to identify the place at which Banks’ 
injury was alleged to have occurred as contemplated by the 
above-emphasized provision of Code § 8.01-195.6.  Their dispute 
 
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is based upon their sharply contrasting interpretations of our 
holding in Halberstam. 
 
In Halberstam, the claimant fell and was injured when she 
stepped into a pothole in a parking lot at George Mason 
University, a state-supported university, as a result of the 
alleged failure of the university to properly maintain the 
surface of the parking lot.  In her notice of claim, which was 
admittedly received by the proper public official pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-195.6, the claimant identified the place where her 
injury occurred as “the school parking lot.”  It was stipulated 
that the university had “a number of parking lots and more than 
one campus.” 
We held that because the claimant did not specify in which 
parking lot she was injured, her notice of claim was “in 
essence, no notice at all.”  251 Va. at 250-51, 467 S.E.2d at 
784-85.  In holding that the claimant’s notice of claim did not 
satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6 with regard to the 
place at which the injury occurred, we also held that actual 
knowledge of that place by the Commonwealth does not obviate the 
duty of the claimant to strictly comply with the notice 
provisions of this statute.  Id. at 252, 467 S.E.2d at 785.  
With regard to the purpose of the statute, we observed that 
“ ‘[u]nless explicit notice in writing of the time and place of 
an accident is furnished the proper public official 
 
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substantially in accordance with the statute, when there is a 
claim of [the Commonwealth’s] negligence, the likelihood of 
prompt attention to the matter to protect the interests of the 
[Commonwealth] and the public is materially diminished.’ ”  Id. 
(quoting Town of Crewe v. Marler, 228 Va. 109, 113-14, 319 
S.E.2d 748, 750 (1984)). 
 
Bates contends that the trial court’s reliance upon 
Halberstam was in error.  She contends that this is so because 
her case is distinguishable on a number of grounds.  Initially, 
Bates stresses that Halberstam was a premises liability case in 
which the claimant asserted injury due to a defect in one of a 
number of parking lots at a multi-campus state university.  She 
notes that only one hospital in Charlottesville is designated as 
the University of Virginia Medical Center.  Bates also asserts 
that in a premises liability case the “precise location” of the 
alleged defect is relevant to the determination of the owner’s 
actual or constructive notice of the defect.  She contends that 
in a medical malpractice case the focus is upon the actions of 
people and the specific location where the negligent conduct 
occurs is irrelevant.  Bates seems to suggest that a different 
rule should apply to medical malpractice claims against the 
Commonwealth for this reason. 
 
In a similar vein, Bates contends that the claimant in 
Halberstam initially had superior knowledge of the place where 
 
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the alleged injury occurred.  She argues that in her case it is 
the hospital that has the superior knowledge because Banks was 
an inpatient at the hospital for approximately three months, and 
the hospital kept track of her location on a daily basis.  
Furthermore, she argues that Banks was moved to different places 
within the hospital during her stay, and there is no reason to 
believe that Bates had any control over such moves.  Bates 
concludes that such superior knowledge held by the hospital 
distinguishes Halberstam from her case. 
 
Finally, Bates contends that this Court erred when it 
recognized in Halberstam that the Virginia Tort Claims Act “is a 
statute in derogation of the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and, therefore, must be strictly construed.”  Id. at 
250-51, 467 S.E.2d at 784.  She maintains that this Act should 
be given a liberal construction so that it achieves its remedial 
purposes. 
 
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that Halberstam was 
correctly decided and is indistinguishable from the present 
case.  As it did in the trial court, the Commonwealth notes that 
in Halberstam there were multiple campuses and multiple parking 
lots; in the instant case, there are multiple buildings, with 
multiple floors and multiple rooms.  In Halberstam, the claimant 
did not specify the campus or parking lot in her notice of 
claim; in the instant case, the claimant did not specify the 
 
8
building, floor, or room in her notice of claim.  Thus, under 
Halberstam, Bates has failed to provide notice under Va. Code 
§ 8.01-195.6, and her suit was properly dismissed. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we are of opinion that, under 
the circumstances of this case, the notice of claim filed by 
Bates sufficiently complied with the requirements of Code 
§ 8.01-195.6 regarding the identification of the place at which 
the injury to Banks was alleged to have occurred.  In reaching 
this opinion, however, we expressly reject a number of the 
assertions related above by which Bates contends that her case 
may be distinguished from Halberstam or, indeed, that Halberstam 
was erroneously decided. 
The degree of specificity sufficient to comply with the 
requirement of notice of the place at which the injury is 
alleged to have occurred contemplated by this statute is not 
dictated or varied by whether the claimant asserts a premises 
liability, medical malpractice, or some other cognizable tort 
claim against the Commonwealth.  Superior knowledge of that 
place is also not a factor in determining the sufficiency of the 
mandated notice.  And most importantly, we continue to be of 
opinion that the Virginia Tort Claims Act must be strictly 
construed because it was enacted in derogation of the common law 
of sovereign immunity.  In short, Halberstam was correctly 
decided, and we in no way retreat from our holding in that case. 
 
9
 
Because the Virginia Tort Claims Act constitutes a limited 
waiver of the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity rather than a 
blanket waiver, one obvious purpose of the requirements of Code 
§ 8.01-195.6 is to provide notice to the Commonwealth of a 
facially cognizable claim so that the Commonwealth is in a 
position to investigate and evaluate that claim.  The statute’s 
mandate that the notice of claim include the “place at which the 
injury is alleged to have occurred” contemplates the reasonable 
identification of that place so that the purpose of the notice 
to the Commonwealth is accomplished in a particular case. 
The concept of reasonableness does not lend itself to a 
bright-line test or dictate separate and distinct tests based on 
the nature of the asserted claim.  Rather, its proper analysis 
and application is directed to the specific allegations of a 
notice of claim in a particular case.  Thus, in Halberstam, the 
failure to identify the parking lot in which the claimant’s 
injury was alleged to have occurred was not reasonably 
calculated to give the Commonwealth notice of that place because 
the university had a number of parking lots and more than one 
campus where the claimant’s injury might have occurred. 
 
In the present case, there is only one University of 
Virginia Medical Center in Charlottesville.  Bates’ notice of 
claim identified that place and also stated that Banks was 
admitted to that hospital and “while a patient” there was 
 
10
 
11
injured by the alleged medical negligence of the employees of 
that hospital.  In combination, these assertions reasonably 
identified the place at which Bates alleged Banks was injured so 
that the Commonwealth could investigate and evaluate the claim.  
Under these circumstances, Code § 8.01-195.6 does not mandate 
that Bates was required to identify the floor or room within the 
hospital at which the alleged injury to Banks occurred because 
that degree of specificity was unnecessary to accomplish the 
purpose of the statute. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and 
dismissing Bates’ claim with prejudice.  The judgment of the 
trial court will be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.