Title: Petersen v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 
 
2019 WY 132 
 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 30, 2019 
 
 
ELMER R. PETERSEN, 
 
Appellant 
(Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 
 
S-19-0136 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County 
The Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge  
 
 
Representing Appellant: 
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel. 
 
Representing Appellee: 
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Russell Farr, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General. 
 
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ. 
 
 
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 
final publication in the permanent volume. 
 
 
1 
DAVIS, Chief Justice. 
 
[¶1] 
Elmer Petersen pled guilty to domestic battery and failure to register as a sex 
offender.  On appeal, he claims he did not receive adequate credit for his presentence 
confinement.  We affirm.   
 
ISSUES 
 
[¶2] 
Mr. Petersen presents a single issue that we restate as two issues: 
 
1. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. 
Petersen’s request for additional credit for time served? 
 
2. 
Did the district court violate Mr. Petersen’s due process 
rights by inducing him to plead guilty?   
 
FACTS 
 
[¶3] 
In 2009, Mr. Petersen was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and 
interference with child custody.  The conviction arose from an incident in which he 
sexually assaulted his estranged wife and absconded with their young child.  He was 
sentenced to a prison term of four to sixteen years for the sexual assault and one to two 
years for the interference, to be served concurrently.  He completed his sentence on the 
interference count in June 2010, and on February 20, 2013, he was granted parole on the 
sexual assault count.   
 
[¶4] 
On March 29, 2018, Mr. Petersen’s girlfriend reported two recent incidents during 
which Mr. Petersen became angry and injured her.  She reported that the first occurred on 
March 21, and that Mr. Petersen placed his hand around her throat and kept her from 
breathing for about a minute.  She reported that the second occurred the next evening, and 
that he grabbed her by the arm and then pushed her, causing her to fall to the ground.  The 
law enforcement officer who took the report observed bruising on the girlfriend’s neck and 
arm that was consistent with her report.   
 
[¶5] 
On March 30, 2018, a warrant issued for Mr. Petersen’s arrest on one count of 
strangulation of a household member and one count of domestic battery.  On April 4, 2018, 
law enforcement officers went to Mr. Petersen’s last known address to serve the arrest 
warrant and were told that he no longer lived at that address.   
 
 
2 
[¶6] 
On May 9, 2018, Mr. Petersen was arrested in Pennsylvania for violation of his 
Wyoming parole.1  He waived extradition and was returned to Wyoming, where he was 
immediately placed in the State’s medium security correctional facility, pending parole 
revocation.  On July 10, 2018, his parole was revoked, and he resumed serving his sentence 
on the 2009 sexual assault conviction.  
 
[¶7] 
On May 21, 2018, while Mr. Petersen’s parole revocation was still pending, a 
warrant issued for his arrest on a charge of failure to register as a sex offender.  On August 
30, 2018, the State served Mr. Petersen with that arrest warrant and with the March 2018 
warrant for the domestic battery and strangulation charges.  On August 31, 2018, the circuit 
court issued two appearance bonds, one for the failure to register charge and one for the 
strangulation and domestic battery charges.  The bonds conditioned release on Mr. 
Petersen’s personal surety of $50,000, and each also included a note that Mr. Petersen was 
in the custody of the Department of Corrections and not subject to release.   
 
[¶8] 
On September 17, 2018, Mr. Petersen was arraigned and pled not guilty to the 
charges.  He later reached a plea agreement with the State, and on January 16, 2019, the 
district court held a change of plea hearing.  The parties outlined the plea agreement as 
follows: 
 
[THE COURT]: 
. . . So as I understand, [Defense Counsel], 
there’s some kind of a plea agreement here today, is that it? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is, Your Honor.  He’s going 
to plead to failure to register, two to three imposed; DV battery 
six months imposed; strangulation dismissed.  All to run 
concurrent with what he’s doing now in the system. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And what is that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Four to 16. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
For what kind of an offense? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Second degree sexual assault. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
I see.  And when did you start your 
sentence on that? 
 
                                               
 
1 The record indicates that the parole violations that led to Mr. Petersen’s arrest were failure to maintain 
contact with his parole agent and a 2017 domestic battery to which he pled no contest in March 2018. 
 
3 
THE DEFENDANT: 
I started it in 2009, and I just went 
to my parole revocation in July, and they took 1653 days of my 
street time away, so now I got to go until 2027. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
Okay.  And, [Prosecutor], is that 
essentially the gist of the agreement, from your standpoint? 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
[¶9] 
After the above exchange, the court asked Mr. Petersen to confirm his understanding 
of the plea agreement.   
 
[THE COURT]: 
Okay.  And, Mr. Petersen, you’ve heard 
this plea agreement recited orally here into the record.  Is that 
your understanding of the agreement? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes. 
 
 
I’d also like to ask if I could get my time for when this 
started, when I was locked up since May, because I’ve been 
sitting down there in Torrington since May on this charge, and 
I’d like all my time to count, you know. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
Well, you’re certainly entitled to credit 
for time served from the time you were taken into custody on 
these charges. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Okay.  I just want that part of the 
plea agreement. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And that’s, whether part of the plea 
agreement or not, you’re entitled to that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Okay. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And we may not be able to nail down that 
number today, but when it comes time for sentencing, 
hopefully that number will be nailed down. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Okay. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And it runs from when you were taken 
into custody. 
 
4 
 
[¶10] After additional questioning to ensure Mr. Petersen’s guilty pleas were knowing and 
voluntary, the district court accepted his pleas and dismissed the strangulation charge.  The 
court also ordered his appearance bonds revoked.   
 
[¶11] On April 26, 2019, the district court held a sentencing hearing.  Per the plea 
agreement, it sentenced Mr. Petersen to a prison term of two to three years for the failure 
to register and a term of 180 days for the domestic battery, to run concurrently with each 
other and the sentence he was already serving.  Mr. Petersen again raised the question of 
credit for time served and asserted that he was entitled to credit from May 9, 2018, the date 
on which he was arrested in Pennsylvania.  The court conferred with the attorneys and Mr. 
Petersen’s parole officer and concluded that because Mr. Petersen was not arrested on the 
failure to register and battery charges until August 30, 2018, he was not entitled to credit 
from the time of the May arrest.  The court found that Mr. Petersen was held without bond 
on the failure to register and battery charges for 102 days (two days before the bonds issued 
and 100 days after the bonds were revoked) and gave him credit for that time served.  Mr. 
Petersen timely appealed his sentence to this Court. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
[¶12] “Whether an imposed sentence is illegal because the defendant was not properly 
credited for his confinement prior to sentencing is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo.”  Hutton v. State, 2018 WY 88, ¶ 14, 422 P.3d 967, 970 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Baker 
v. State, 2011 WY 53, ¶ 8, 248 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2011)).  We also recognize, however, 
that a sentencing court may award credit that a defendant may not otherwise be entitled to 
receive.  Askin v. State, 2016 WY 9, ¶ 9, 365 P.3d 784, 786 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Daniels 
v. State, 2014 WY 125, ¶ 11, 335 P.3d 483, 486 (Wyo. 2014)).  We review a denial of any 
such credit for an abuse of discretion.  Askin, ¶ 8, 365 P.3d at 786.  “An abuse of discretion 
will not be found unless the court acts in a manner that exceeds the bounds of reason.”  Sam 
v. State, 2019 WY 104, ¶ 9, 450 P.3d 217, 221 (Wyo. 2019). 
 
[¶13] Mr. Petersen’s due process claim asserts a constitutional violation that we review 
de novo.  Daniels, ¶ 6, 335 P.3d at 485 (citing Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, ¶ 11, 214 
P.3d 236, 240 (Wyo. 2009)). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
Discretionary Award of Credit 
 
[¶14] A sentencing court must award credit for time that a defendant spends in official 
detention on a charge before sentencing.  Askin, ¶ 9, 365 P.3d at 786 (quoting Daniels, ¶ 
11, 335 P.3d at 486).   
 
 
5 
District and circuit courts must determine the amount of 
time a defendant has spent in presentence confinement when 
they impose sentence. Hagerman v. State, 2011 WY 151, ¶ 12, 
264 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2011); W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) (the 
judgment and sentence must “[i]nclude a finding of all time 
served by the defendant in presentence confinement for any 
sentenced offense”). Presentence confinement is incarceration 
resulting from the failure to post bond on the offense for which 
the sentence is entered, and does not include “other 
confinement that would continue to exist without regard” for 
the posting of bond on that offense. Sweets v. State, 2001 WY 
126, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1130, 1131 (Wyo. 2001). In most cases, 
calculation of the time spent in presentence confinement 
requires the court to do no more than determine how long the 
defendant was held in county detention pending trial on the 
offense before the court, or whether he was serving time on 
some other sentence and would have been held regardless of 
ability to post bond. The defendant receives a day of 
presentence credit for any part of a day spent in confinement. 
 
Cothren v. State, 2013 WY 125, ¶ 27, 310 P.3d 908, 915 (Wyo. 2013); see also Mitchell v. 
State, 2018 WY 110, ¶ 33, 426 P.3d 830, 839 (Wyo. 2018). 
 
[¶15] While a sentencing court must award credit when a defendant is in official detention 
for the offense on which he is being sentenced, the court also has discretion to award credit 
for other confinement, so long as “the sum of such time spent plus the sentence does not 
exceed the maximum allowable sentence.”  Askin, ¶ 9, 365 P.3d at 786 (quoting Daniels, ¶ 
11, 335 P.3d at 486).  We have held that a court errs if it denies a defendant’s request for 
such discretionary credit based on a mistaken belief that it does not have the legal authority 
to award it.  
 
Based on our decisions in Daniels and Sweets, the 
district court had authority to award Appellant credit for time 
spent in presentence confinement. . . . In this case, the district 
court was under the mistaken impression that it lacked the 
requisite authority to award credit for time served in 
presentence confinement. We note that the district court is not 
required to award Appellant credit. It must, however, make that 
decision with the understanding that it has the discretionary 
authority to award the requested credit. 
 
Askin, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d at 787-88.  
 
 
6 
[¶16] Because Mr. Petersen’s confinement from May 9, 2018 to August 30, 2018, was 
unrelated to the failure to register and domestic battery charges on which he was being 
sentenced, he was not entitled to credit for that time, and he does not contend otherwise.  
He instead argues that the district court had discretion to award him the credit, and, as in 
Askin, it erred when it mistakenly concluded that it did not.  In support of his argument, he 
points to the following statement by the court during sentencing: 
 
 
Okay.  And let me just say on that, through the colloquy 
the Court’s had with counsel, this is all the credit the Court 
feels [it] is legally permitted to give, under the analysis the 
Court expressed.  Maybe I’m wrong.  And if counsel want to 
do some research amongst themselves, because there needs to 
be countersignature on this Order, and come up with some 
other number for credit, and can justify it to the Court, then I’m 
happy to go along with that.   
 
[¶17] While the above-quoted statement may suggest that the district court believed its 
authority was limited, the court later clarified its position. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
All right, so there will be credit for 102 
days served. 
 
 
And you know, this is a – you claim that the discussion 
was for credit from May 9, and the State’s Attorney is telling 
me the discussion was you’d be receiving credit for whatever 
you were legally entitled to receive credit for, which 
unfortunately is the two days plus this extra hundred, since the 
16th of January. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: And, Your Honor, just to be clear, I want 
to say I don’t remember discussing it all.  You know, the State 
is of the opinion, that whatever he’s entitled to, he’s entitled to. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
Right. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: I’m saying I don’t recall a discussion at 
all.  Now, I may – and maybe [defense counsel] or I should 
look at the transcript and see if there was a different 
understanding.  But I guess just for clarity’s sake, I don’t recall 
it being in a discussion at all. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Usually my practice, Your Honor, 
is if there is an extraneous term beyond the Statement of 
 
7 
Agreement, to try to get it on the record.  And I don’t know, 
but that’s my standard operating procedure. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And you know, I didn’t read the entire 
transcript, I tried to zero in on – 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
-- the discussion of this point.  But like I 
say, if the two of you want to take a look at the transcript, it’s 
right here in the court file. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. 
 
[THE COURT]: 
And if I’m wrong and you find something 
different, that there was some kind of a discussion, I guess 
that’s fine.  Of course that begs the question of the propriety of 
the Court giving credit for time that wasn’t served on this case, 
but we have instances where that happens, where people are in 
treatment and that kind of thing, so I’m not going to have a lot 
of heartburn on that, if the two of you agree on something. 
 
[¶18] It is apparent from the entirety of the discussion that the district court understood 
that it had the discretion to award the credit Mr. Petersen requested.  The court did not do 
so because Mr. Petersen did not show that the parties had agreed on the award as part of 
the plea agreement.  We find nothing unreasonable in that approach, and we therefore find 
no abuse of discretion in the denial of the requested credit. 
 
B. 
Due Process Claim 
 
[¶19] Mr. Petersen claims in the alternative that the district court violated his due process 
rights by giving him the impression that he would receive credit for time served from his 
May 9 arrest.  We find no violation.   
 
[¶20] A party claiming a due process violation “has the burden of demonstrating both that 
he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible 
way.”  Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45, ¶ 30, 393 P.3d 1265, 1276 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting KC 
v. State, 2015 WY 73, ¶ 16, 351 P.3d 236, 241-42 (Wyo. 2015)).  “The question is whether 
there has been a denial of fundamental fairness.”  Id. 
 
[¶21] “A district court’s failure to award proper credit for presentence confinement results 
in an illegal sentence and violates the defendant’s right to due process of law.”  Daniels, ¶ 
7, 335 P.3d at 485 (citing Gomez v. State, 2004 WY 15, 85 P.3d 417 (Wyo. 2004); Cothren 
 
8 
v. State, 2013 WY 125, 310 P.3d 908 (Wyo. 2013)).  This is true whether the award relates 
to credit the defendant is entitled to receive or to credit that the sentencing court has 
promised in its discretion to allow.  See Daniels, ¶¶ 7, 13, 335 P.3d at 485, 487 (finding a 
due process violation where the court ruled first that it would allow credit for time in 
treatment, but later held that it lacked authority to allow credit).  Mr. Petersen has therefore 
made his first required showing that he has a protected interest in the credit at issue. 
 
[¶22] We agree with the State, however, that Mr. Petersen has failed to show that his 
interest has been affected in an impermissible way.  In Daniels, we found the defendant’s 
interest was affected because the district court told him that he would receive credit for 
time he spent successfully completing in-patient treatment.  Daniels, ¶ 13, 335 P.3d at 487. 
The record in this case contains no such assurances or promises. 
 
[¶23] At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel put the plea agreement on the record: 
“He’s going to plead to failure to register, two to three imposed; DV battery six months 
imposed; strangulation dismissed.  All to run concurrent with what he’s doing now in the 
system.”  The court then asked Mr. Petersen if this was his understanding of the agreement, 
and he responded, “Yes. I’d also like to ask if I could get my time for when this started, 
when I was locked up since May . . . .”  The court responded, with our emphasis added, 
“Well, you’re certainly entitled to credit for the time served from the time you were taken 
into custody on these charges.”  The court explained that the amount of credit was not a 
question of the plea agreement but rather what Mr. Petersen was entitled to receive.  The 
court further explained that the amount of credit he would receive had not yet been nailed 
down but hopefully would be by the time of sentencing. 
 
[¶24] The terms of the agreement that defense counsel put on the record did not include 
an agreement concerning credit for time served, and the district court made no comments 
that we are able to construe as assurances that Mr. Petersen would receive credit for all or 
even part of the time served since his May 2018 incarceration.  Moreover, the parties’ 
written plea agreement was filed after the hearing, and it likewise contained no term 
addressing credit for time served.  Because Mr. Petersen was not promised credit in 
addition to that to which he was entitled by law, he was not impermissibly induced to plead 
guilty, and his protected interest in the credit was not affected.  We therefore find no due 
process violation.   
 
[¶25] Affirmed.