Title: Gates v. Gates

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gates v. Gates  (96-412); 168 Vt. 64; 716 A.2d 794

[Opinion Filed 27-Mar-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 11-Jun-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-412

                               JUNE TERM, 1998

Ellen M. Gates	                    }	APPEALED FROM:
                                    }
                                    }
     v.	                            }	Bennington Family Court
                                    }	
Winfield P. Gates, Jr.	            }
                                    }	DOCKET NO. 234-8-92Bndm

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff's motion to reargue, filed April 10, 1998, fails to identify
  points of law or  fact overlooked or misapprehended by this Court.  The
  motion is therefore denied.  See V.R.A.P.  40.

       Dooley, J., dissenting.  The nucleus of plaintiff's motion for
  reargument is contained in  the following statement:
  
     As precedent, the Supreme Court's holding stands for the proposition 
     that, as a jurisdictional matter, a course of willful, intentional and 
     deliberate parental conduct, warranting the finding of contempt, the 
     imposition of a $4,500.00 monetary sanction and the suspension of all 
     parent-child contact pending completion of a parenting course, in 
     conjunction with the complete cessation of all parent-to-parent 
     communication, does not constitute a real, substantial and unanticipated 
     change of material circumstances.

  Appellant goes on to argue that if these facts do not show a change of
  circumstances to meet the  jurisdictional requirement, it is hard "to
  imagine what does qualify."

       Like many arguments of advocates, plaintiff's statement puts the facts
  in the light that  support her desired result.  It is, however, a more
  accurate portrayal of the facts and claims in this  case than the
  majority's statement that she claimed only that "the inability of the `log'
  to facilitate  communication between the parties caused a substantial
  change in circumstances."  I do not think  it is fair to characterize
  contemptuous misconduct as an example of poor communication.

       Our rule indicates that reargument is appropriate when this Court has
  "overlooked or  misapprehended" a point raised by an appellant.  V.R.A.P.
  40.  Neither the original opinion in  this case, nor the one-sentence
  denial of reargument, responds to the main appeal argument  plaintiff has
  made in the context of the facts of the case.  At least, plaintiff deserves
  an 

 

  explanation why contemptuous misconduct cannot be changed circumstances to
  meet the applicable  jurisdictional requirement.  As a result, I conclude
  that reargument is warranted under our rule  and dissent from the refusal
  to grant it.  I am authorized to state that Justice Morse joins in this 
  dissent.

                                         BY THE COURT:

Dissenting:

                                         ______________________________________
___________________________________	 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
         
                                         _______________________________________
___________________________________	 Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
         
                                         _______________________________________
                                         Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

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       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-412

Ellen M. Gates                               Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Bennington Family Court

Winfield P. Gates, Jr.                       September Term, 1997

Paul F. Hudson, J.

Lon T. McClintock of Jacobs, McClintock & Scanlon, Bennington, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

Winfield P. Gates, Jr., pro se, Bennington, Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson, and Skoglund JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.   Mother Ellen M. Gates appeals the decision of the
  Bennington Family Court, which denied her request for modification of a
  parental-rights-and-responsibilities order. Mother contends that the court
  erred when it (1) concluded that there was no basis to modify either the
  parties' shared-legal-responsibilities agreement or the visitation rights
  of father, Winfield P. Gates, Jr.; (2) failed to bifurcate the modification
  hearing; and (3) ordered the parties to submit future disputes regarding
  shared-legal responsibility to mediation and binding arbitration before
  seeking judicial relief.  Father cross-appeals a part of the decision that
  conditioned the resumption of his visitation rights with the children upon
  the payment of half of mother's attorney's fees and court costs and his
  completion, to the court's satisfaction, of a parenting-and-empathy-raising
  course.  We affirm the court's denial of mother's motion to modify the
  parties' shared-legal-responsibilities agreement and the
  parent-child-contact agreement.  We strike, however, the court's order that
  the parties first attempt mediation or arbitration before bringing future
  disputes to the court.  In addition, we strike the court's requirement that
  father must first pay mother's attorney's fees and court costs before he
  can

 

  resume visiting with his children.
  The parties were divorced on February 12, 1993, after thirteen years of
  marriage. Pursuant to a stipulation developed by the parties with the help
  of two mediators, the court awarded mother physical rights and
  responsibilities for the parties' three children.  Legal rights and
  responsibilities, however, were to be shared by the parties.  In addition,
  father was awarded visitation with the children.  The stipulation and
  resulting divorce order included a provision wherein the parties agreed to
  seek mediation, arbitration, or judicial remedy, in the event they could
  not resolve a disagreement themselves.

       The parties soon experienced serious difficulty communicating with one
  another, and numerous conflicts arose between them.  Less than a year after
  the divorce, mother was granted a relief-from-abuse order prohibiting
  father from communicating with her, except with regard to the children.  In
  an attempt to facilitate communications, the parties began using a journal,
  which was mailed back and forth between them, to discuss issues involving
  the children.

       The conflicts between the parties concerning the children, however,
  continued unabated. Over the next few years, both parties petitioned the
  court on numerous occasions, and the court twice amended the final divorce
  order.  The first amended order, of January 1994, which was the result of a
  stipulation reached by the parties after the father sought a modification
  of parental rights, provided greater specificity regarding parent-child
  contact.  It explicitly incorporated by reference the majority of the
  divorce order, including the section dealing with dispute resolution.
  Shortly after the issuance of the first amended order, mother was granted
  an extension of the relief-from-abuse order, which retained all of the
  terms of the original relief-from-abuse order.

       Less than a year later, after mother filed a motion for modification
  of parental rights, the final order was amended again by stipulation of the
  parties.  The second amended final order of November 1994 again added
  greater specificity regarding parent-child contact.  Although quoting
  nearly verbatim the provisions of the first amended final order, this order
  did not include the section dealing with dispute resolution.

 

       In addition to the motions to amend or extend the previous court
  orders, each party asked the court, on several occasions, to find the other
  party in contempt for violating one or another of the various court orders. 
  For example, in May 1995, mother filed a motion to find father in contempt
  for failure to abide by visitation schedules.  Two months later she amended
  the contempt motion and claimed that father failed to return their oldest
  son, then fifteen years old, on the day specified in the visitation
  schedule.  Furthermore, mother reported this incident to the Bennington
  County State's Attorney and the police, and father was charged with
  custodial interference.(FN1) In July 1995, concurrent with filing the
  amended contempt motion, mother also filed two motions -- one for
  modification of parental rights, requesting that the court grant her sole
  legal responsibility for the children, and the other to modify father's
  visitation rights.

       The court subsequently notified both parties that it would hear both
  mother's contempt petition and motions to modify in a bifurcated hearing. 
  The court indicated that it would first hear the contempt petition and the
  "alleged basis for modification of the child custody order." If mother met
  the required burden of proof concerning the modification order then, at a
  later date, the court planned to hear evidence concerning the "best
  interest of the children."  After the initial hearing, the court found that
  father had willfully, intentionally, and deliberately violated a court
  order and, therefore, was in contempt of court.  Because he was in contempt
  of court, the court ordered that father's visitation rights be suspended
  until he completed an approved parenting-and-empathy-raising course and
  paid half of mother's reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.

       In addition, the court found that no real, substantial, and
  unanticipated change of circumstances had occurred and, therefore, the
  court denied mother's motions to modify the shared-legal-responsibilities
  agreement and to limit or extinguish father's visitation rights.  The court
  also found that the parties' original agreement failed to contain a
  dispute-resolution plan

 

  and, therefore, ordered that the parties attempt to resolve any future
  disputes through mediation or binding arbitration before resorting to the
  court system.  These appeals followed.

                                     I.

       Mother first contends the court abused its discretion by finding that
  there was no substantial change in the circumstances to support a
  modification of the parties' shared-legal-responsibility agreement or
  father's visitation.  Specifically, she claims that the inability of the
  "log" to facilitate communication between the parties caused a substantial
  change in circumstances.  We conclude, however, that the court did not
  abuse its discretion.  The parties' allegations concerning the
  circumstances existing from the time of the divorce, the evidence presented
  at the modification hearing, and the court's findings, document a situation
  that has not changed substantially.

       This Court will uphold the trial court's decision concerning whether
  there has been a substantial change in circumstances "unless `the
  discretion of the lower court was exercised on grounds or for reasons
  clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.'"  Hayes v. Hayes,
  144 Vt. 332, 336,