Title: LINEBERGER v. WYOMING STATE BOARD OF OUTFITTERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LINEBERGER v. WYOMING STATE BOARD OF OUTFITTERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES2002 WY 5544 P.3d 56Case Number: 01-113Decided: 04/11/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

RONALD 
R. LINEBERGER, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
STATE BOARD OF

OUTFITTERS 
AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES, 

Appellee(Respondent).

                                                                                                

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, Wyoming, and 
Daniel B. Frank of Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Eugene W. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      This case comes 
before us in the form of a Petition for Review of Agency Action, certified to 
this Court by the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.  Ronald R. Lineberger (the appellant) 
raises nine separate issues in contesting the decision of the Wyoming State 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides (the Board) to deny his 2000 
application for a professional guide license.  While we conclude that the issues have 
been rendered moot by the passage of time, we do hold, since the issue will no 
doubt continue to arise, that the Board exceeded its authority by imposing a 
condition on the appellant's license to the effect that he would voluntarily 
relinquish his license if convicted of violating any state or 
federal law.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
states the issues as follows:

 

1.         
Did the Board exceed its statutory authority, abuse its discretion, and 
act arbitrarily and capriciously when it required petitioner, as a condition of 
obtaining his professional guide license, to sign a waiver agreement which 
provided that he would forfeit his license in the event he was convicted for 
violation of any law?

 

2.         
Did the Board exceed its statutory authority, abuse its discretion, and 
act arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to renew petitioner's guide 
license on the basis that he was convicted of violating a law which was 
unrelated to the occupation of guiding?

 

3.         
Did the Board exceed its legal authority, act arbitrarily and 
capriciously, abuse its discretion, and act not otherwise in accordance with the 
law when it required petitioner to execute the waiver agreement after petitioner 
was already licensed in 1989?

 

4.         
Was the Board's interpretation of the waiver agreement in which it 
interpreted the agreement to require petitioner to forfeit his guide's license 
in the event that he is convicted of violating any law proper and an abuse of 
discretion, or is the waiver agreement limited to violations of law related to a 
candidate's fitness to be a professional guide?

 

5.         
Does the administrative record contain substantial evidence to support 
the Board's decision to deny petitioner's application?

 

6.         
Did the Board include improper findings of fact outside of the 
administrative record?

 

7.         
Did a Board member who took part in the investigation improperly refuse 
to recuse himself from deliberations in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-111?

 

8.         
Did the Board engage in prohibited post hoc rationalization 
decision-making when it stated on the record that its decision was to deny 
petitioner's application, but ordered the parties to file proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to support the Board's 
decision?

 

9.         
Was the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion 
and otherwise not otherwise in accordance with the law?

 

The 
Board reduces these issues to the following:

 

I.          
Whether the Board had authority to require Lineberger to sign a waiver 
before issuing Lineberger a conditional professional guide's 
license.

 

II.          
Whether the Board was correct in denying Lineberger's application for a 
professional guide's license.

 

III.         
Whether the process was tainted when the Board member refused to recuse 
himself.

 

[¶3]      For the reasons 
set forth more fully below, we will directly answer only the following 
question:

 

            
May the Board condition the granting of a professional guide's license 
upon a licensee's agreement that he will voluntarily relinquish the license in 
the event that he is convicted of violating any state or federal 
law?

 

THE 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCT

 

[¶4]      Non-residents may 
not hunt big or trophy game animals on wilderness areas in Wyoming unless 
accompanied by a licensed professional guide or a resident guide.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-401(a) (Lexis 
Supp. 2000).  The Board is 
responsible for licensing guides under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-410 (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

            
(a)       
The board shall:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(ii)        Carry 
out the provisions of this act and in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, adopt necessary rules and regulations for carrying out this act 
including requirements for training, experience and knowledge of relevant law 
and rules and regulations as may be imposed upon outfitters and professional 
guides, the content and requirements for examination of license applicants and 
other necessary and reasonable rules[.]

 

            
* * *

 

            
(c)        The 
board shall license and regulate outfitters and professional guides in this 
state and shall:

 

            
(i)         
Examine applicants for licensure under this act;

 

            
(ii)        Deny 
or approve applications for licensure and may revoke or suspend licenses in 
accordance with this act and its rules and regulations;

 

            
(iii)       
Conduct hearings upon complaints received relative to 
licensees;

 

            
(iv)       
Impose reasonable restrictions and limitations upon licensees as 
necessary to implement this act;

 

            
(v)        
Designate areas within the state as recommended by the commission for 
game management purposes in which a licensee may conduct outfitting or 
professional guiding under the license[.]

 

 

[¶5]      Specific 
statutory qualifications for a professional guide's license are contained in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-412(a) (LexisNexis 2001):

 

            
(a)       
An applicant for a professional guide's license under this act shall meet 
the following qualifications:

 

            
(i)         
At least eighteen (18) years of age;

 

            
(ii)        
Employed by or operating under an independent contract with a licensed 
outfitter[.]

 

The same 
statute, in subsection (e), adds the following 
requirements:

 

            
(e)       
In addition to subsection (a) of this section, an applicant for a 
professional guide's license shall report:

 

            
(i)         
Any conviction or forfeiture of any bond amount for a violation of 
federal or state law or applicable regulation relating to wildlife, game and 
fish within five (5) years before the date of filing license 
application;

 

            
(ii)        Any 
felony conviction; and

 

            
(iii)       
Any conviction for a violation of federal or state law relating to 
criminal fraud and occurring within five (5) years prior to the date of filing 
application.

 

[¶6]      The Board's 
authority to require examination before licensure is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-413 (LexisNexis 2001).  Under 
subsection (c) of that section, the Board is authorized to "investigate the 
qualifications of the applicant to ensure compliance with this act."  Once the applicant has passed the 
required examination and the Board has "determine[d] the applicant is otherwise 
in compliance with the requirements of this act and its rules and regulations," 
the Board "may" issue a license.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-414(a) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶7]      Of specific 
significance to the issue at hand is the limitation found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-414(b):

 

A 
license issued under this act is valid for the calendar year in which issued and 
shall expire on December 31 of that year unless earlier expiring pursuant to 
W.S. 23-2-412(b) or otherwise suspended or revoked.

 

FACTS

 

[¶8]      In 1993, the 
appellant was convicted of three federal wildlife-related felonies.  He served a year in prison and three 
years of probation.  In 1998, the 
appellant applied to the Board for a professional guide's license.  The Board granted the application, but 
only after conditioning the license for a period of five years.  The appellant signed an agreement on 
August 10, 1998, with the following specific condition:

 

            
I agree to a five year conditional license, wherein if I am convicted of 
violating any game & fish, Board law or rule and regulation, Forest Service, 
State or Federal law for this duration, I will voluntarily relinquish my guide's 
license to the Board and I waive any right to appeal or hearing 
procedure.

 

[¶9]      The appellant 
received his conditional professional guide's license in 1998 and again in 
1999.1  He applied again on June 20, 2000.  His application was not granted; 
instead, it was returned to him with instructions to appear before the Board at 
its next meeting so renewal could be considered in light of the appellant's 
"current conviction."  That "current 
conviction" is the basis of the present petition for 
review.

 

[¶10]   On June 9, 2000, a Judgment and 
Sentence was entered in the County Court of Park County, Wyoming (now referred 
to as Circuit Court), adjudicating the appellant guilty of two counts of 
misdemeanor property destruction.  
The convictions were the result of a plea agreement between the appellant 
and the Park County and Prosecuting Attorney.  The Judgment and Sentence neither 
mentions the nature of the property destroyed nor names the recipient of the 
$4,000.00 in restitution ordered to be paid by the appellant.  The only hint that the charges may have 
involved wildlife is the following paragraph in the Written Plea Agreement of 
Defendant:

 

7.         
The State of Wyoming further expressly represents and agrees that no 
other criminal charges or investigations whether they be State and/or Local will 
be filed, sought and/or pursued pursuant as against the Defendant, Mr. Ronald R. 
Lineberger, as relates to the original criminal information filed in this 
matter, and including any copper tags attached to the snares or traps inscribed 
with the name Ronald R. Lineberger the same or similar to such tags presently in 
the possession of the State of Wyoming, and referenced as State of Wyoming v. 
Ronald R. Lineberger, Criminal No. Cr-9909-4-COD.

 

[¶11]   It is at this point that we must 
digress a bit to at least mention how odd it is that we are called upon in this 
case to decide whether the Board may condition a professional guide's license 
upon the violation of any law as opposed to a 
wildlife or game and fish law.  Appendix E attached to the Board's 
appellate brief is a copy of the original Summons issued to the appellant in 
October 1999, in Case No. CR-9909-4-COD.  
That summons alleges three counts of wanton destruction of a big or 
trophy game animal and one count of failing to report the unlawful trapping of a 
deer.  No doubt, it is within the 
province of the Park County and Prosecuting Attorney's duties to plea bargain a 
violation of the game and fish statutes to a violation of the criminal 
code.  Unfortunately, however, the 
divergence between the original charges and the eventual convictions 
precipitated an administrative process that cannot be characterized as a search 
for the truth.  Eventually, even the 
Board joined the appellant's attempt to pretend that the "current conviction" 
had nothing to do with wildlife.

 

[¶12]   The appellant appeared at the 
Board's regular meeting on August 26, 2000.  Since the conditions imposed by the 
Board in 1998 were still in effect, the minutes of the meeting reflect the 
appellant's appearance as being "for violating the terms of the issuance of his 
1998 Professional Guide's license."  
A lengthy discussion ensued at the meeting between Board members and the 
appellant, with the Board members trying to get the appellant to admit that the 
property destruction convictions involved the destruction of wildlife, and with 
the appellant eventually "claiming the Fifth Amendment" in response.  The end result was Board denial of the 
appellant's 2000 application.

 

[¶13]   The appellant requested a contested 
case hearing following the denial of his application.  The Board held that hearing on February 
27, 2001.  What transpired at that 
hearing is remarkable, for several reasons.  The first thing that should be noted is 
that the license application being considered was for the year 2000.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-414(b) mandates 
that, had such a license been granted, it would have been valid only until 
December 31, 2000.  The contested 
case hearing took place nearly two months after that date.  While counsel and the hearing examiner 
grappled with the question of whether the matter before the Board was the denial 
of a new application or denial of a renewal application, they never squarely 
faced the fact that any application for a 2000 license was 
moot.

 

[¶14]   The second remarkable feature of 
the contested case hearing was the agreement of the parties to limit the issue 
to whether the Judgment and Sentence showing the two misdemeanor property 
destruction convictionsbeing violations of any state or federal lawwere 
violations of the 1998 agreement.  
While it is, perhaps, not surprising that the appellant would be 
delighted by the exclusion of any evidence as to the original wildlife charges, 
it is not nearly so clear why the Board made this concession.  In any event, the result was that the 
Board chose to take a stand on the limited question of whether the Board can 
impose a condition that a licensee may not violate any 
law:

 

            
[ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL]:  
Actually I will speak to that.  
He just talked at length about significant wildlife violations, and I'm 
saying it doesn't matter whether there's a wildlife violation or 
not.

 

            
What happened was Mr. Lineberger sent a letter to the Board saying I 
would like to request a probationary license.  The Board granted a probationary 
license.  The conditions on that 
probationary license were, one, the conditions would stay in effect for five 
years; two, he would not violate any state or federal laws, and then there were 
other conditions dealing with Game and Fish regulations, Board regulations, 
Forestry Service regulations, but it said also in there no violations of state 
or federal law.

 

            
Now, the Board placed those restrictions on the license under Wyoming 
Statute 23-2-410(c)(iv), and I'll read that to you, and it says, "The Board 
shall impose reasonable restrictions and limitations upon licensees as necessary 
to implement this act."  That's what 
they did when they established those restrictions.

 

[¶15]   The third unusual feature of the 
contested case hearing, which we will note in passing, is that, after the 
parties agreed to exclude the testimony of anyone who knew anything about the 
events underlying the misdemeanor convictions, the next thirty pages of the 
hearing transcript are devoted to voir dire of the Board by the 
appellant's counsel to make sure that, in case any Board members did know the 
facts, they would not be influenced by them!

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶16]   The standard for judicial review of 
administrative agency action is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001):

 

            
(c)        To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

            
(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

            
(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

            
(A)       
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

            
(B)       
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

            
(C)       
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

 

            
(D)       
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

 

            
(E)       
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.

 

See also 
Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2002 
WY 24, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 2002).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶17]   We have recently answered several 
of the questions raised by this petition for review.  In particular, we have stated that:  (1) by conditioning a professional guide 
license for a number of years, the Board has not granted a multi-year license, 
since such is beyond the Board's statutory powers; and (2) the Board may impose 
licensing qualifications beyond the limited ones set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-412(a).  Clark, 2002 WY 
24, ¶¶ 10-14, 39 P.3d  at 1109; 
Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, 
¶¶ 11-20, 30 P.3d 36, 41-44 (Wyo. 2001).  In addition, in a case of this nature, 
the licensing issues have become moot:

 

            
We stated in the case of Smith Keller & Associates v. Dorr, 4 P.3d 872, 876 (Wyo.2000) (citing Bard Ranch Co. v. Frederick, 950 P.2d 564, 566 (Wyo.1997)):

 

"Our 
general law on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues 
which have become moot.  Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 233 
(Wyo.1985).  We do not decide cases 
when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters that might arise 
in the future.  McLain v. 
Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo.1997).  A case is moot when the determination of 
an issue is sought which, if provided, will have no practical effect on the 
existing controversy.  
Id.  Therefore, if 
events occur during the pendency of an appeal that cause a case to become moot 
or make determination of the issues unnecessary, we will dismiss it.  Id.; see also Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 924-25 
(Wyo.1989)."

 

In 
Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149, 150 (Wyo.1999), we further elaborated 
that a case is moot when the matter upon which a determination is sought 
presents no actual controversy or when a decision can have no practical 
effect.  We have also recognized the 
general rule that the issue of mootness constitutes a question of law and may be 
properly addressed by a court sua sponte.  Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wyo.2000) (citing, in part, Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 
89 F.3d 128, 132 (2nd Cir.1996); see also Northern Utilities, Inc. 
v. Public Service Comm'n, 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 
(Wyo.1980).

 

            
* * *

 

            
Any determination by this court relating to the bases upon which the 
Board denied the 1999 license is moot in that it would be wholly ineffectual and 
of no practical effect.  Indeed, if 
this court were to rule that Clark should not have been denied his 1999 guide 
license, this determination would be completely inconsequential as the issuance 
of this license almost two years after the 1999 year has ended would be of no 
practical value to Clark.  
Similarly, if this court were to uphold the Board's action in denying 
Clark his 1999 guide license and reverse the ruling made by the district court, 
such would be equally of no worth at this late date.

 

Clark, 2002 
WY 24, ¶¶ 9-15, 39 P.3d  at 1108-09.

 

[¶18]   One circumstance, however, leads us 
to conclude that the single question we proposed earlier herein should be 
answered:

 

            
May the Board condition the granting of a professional guide's license 
upon a licensee's agreement that he will voluntarily relinquish the license in 
the event that he is convicted of violating any state or federal 
law?

 

[¶19]   The conditioning of any license 
granted to the appellant was for a five-year period, 1998-2002.  It is likely that the appellant will 
apply for a 2002 license, and that the Board will attempt once again to impose 
the restriction that the appellant not violate any law.  Perhaps that is even the reason the 
Board so carefully posited this as the only issue at the contested case 
hearing.  At any rate, since the 
question has been fully developed and argued in this case, and since it is 
likely to arise again with the appellant, and likely with other applicants, we 
will address it.

 

[¶20]   In a case substantially similar to 
the one now before this Court, although involving the revocation of a license 
rather than the denial of an application, we said the following about the 
authority of administrative agencies:

 

            
It is well established that:

 

"An 
administrative agency is limited in authority to powers legislatively 
delegated.  Administrative agencies 
are creatures of statute and their power is dependent upon statutes, so that 
they must find within the statute warrant for the exercise of any authority 
which they claim.'"

 

Amoco 
Production Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 12 P.3d 668, 673 (Wyo.2000) (citations omitted).  "An agency is wholly without power to 
modify, dilute or change in any way the statutory provisions from which it 
derives its authority."  Platte 
Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 975 
(Wyo.1998).

 

Disciplinary 
Matter of Billings, 2001 
WY 81, ¶ 24, 30 P.3d 557, 568 (Wyo. 2001).  We then held that, where the statute 
provided for license revocation only for violation of a 
significant law pertaining to wildlife, the Board could not revoke 
a license for violation of any law pertaining to wildlife.  Id. at ¶ 25, 30 P.3d  at 
569.

 

[¶21]   The same principle applies in the 
instant case.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-410(c)(iv) generally empowers the Board to impose "reasonable" restrictions 
and limitations to implement the act.  
More specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-412(e) requires license 
applicants to report convictions for (1) federal or state laws or regulations 
relating to wildlife or game and fish; (2) felonies; and (3) federal or state 
laws relating to criminal fraud.  
This subsection clearly indicates the legislature's intent as to what the 
Board may require in this regard.  
The Board is not free to add "(4) any federal or state 
law."

 

[¶22]   We strictly construe statutory 
language when determining the powers granted to an administrative agency.  US West Communications, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Com'n, 958 P.2d 371, 374 (Wyo. 1998).  The power of a board to grant or refuse 
a license must be based upon the qualifications of the applicant indicated in a 
statute.  Peterson v. 
Incorporated Town of Guernsey, In Platte County, 26 Wyo. 272, 183 P. 645, 
647 (1919).  While licensing acts are passed for the 
public's protection, licensing requirements must be reasonable and not 
arbitrary.  Allhusen v. State By 
and Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 
885 (Wyo. 1995).  Fundamentally, the licensing requirement 
must be rationally related to the applicant's fitness for the occupation.  Frank v. State By and Through Wyoming 
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 965 P.2d 674, 679 (Wyo. 1998).2  See also Karan v. Adams, 
807 F. Supp. 900, 907 (D.Conn. 1992); 
Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners, 17 Cal. 4th 763, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 952 P.2d 641, 657 
(1998) and Indiana State Bd. of Registration 
and Ed. for Health Facility Administrators v. Cummings, 180 Ind.App. 164, 
387 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1979).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   For the reasons set forth above, 
most of the issues presented by the parties in this case are moot.  As to the single issue identified by 
this Court for resolution, we conclude that the Board does not have the 
statutory authority to impose a restriction upon a professional guide's license 
that requires the licensee voluntarily to relinquish the license in the event he 
is convicted of violating any state or federal law.  The Board's authority in such regard is 
limited to the convictions and bond forfeitures specified by the legislature in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-412(e).

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1We made it clear 
in Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2002 WY 
24, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 2002), that "the Board is expressly limited 
to granting a guide license for a period of no more than a one-year period" and 
that the Board could not issue a multi-year license even if it desired to do 
so.

  2This Court has 
used the same rationale in invalidating a statute that authorized suspension of 
drivers' licenses for persons under the age of majority who illegally possessed 
alcohol, where the violation bore no rational relationship to driver's 
licensing.  Johnson v. State 
Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 167 (Wyo. 1992).  
While Johnson had more to do with equal protection than it did 
with administrative law or statutory construction, the underlying concept of the 
state interfering with the exercise of a right or privilege is the 
same.