Title: State v. Barclift

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2022 ME 50 
Docket: 
Ken-21-232 
Argued: 
March 8, 2022  
Decided: 
 September 27, 2022 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ., and HUMPHREY, A.R.J.1 
Majority: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ., and HUMPHREY, A.R.J. 
Dissent: 
JABAR, J. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
TIMOTHY BARCLIFT 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
[¶1]  Timothy Barclift appeals from a judgment of conviction based on 
two merged counts of aggravated furnishing of cocaine (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 1105-C(1)(B)(1), (D) (2018),2 entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, 
Stokes, J.) after a trial.  Barclift argues that the court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained when police officers stopped him after 
receiving an anonymous tip and searched his belongings outside a bus station 
 
1  Although Justice Gorman participated in the appeal, she retired before this opinion was certified. 
Justice Humphrey sat at oral argument and participated in the initial conference while he was an 
Associate Justice and, as directed and assigned by the Chief Justice, is now participating in this appeal 
as an Active Retired Justice. 
 
2  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-C(1)(D) has been amended since the time period relevant to this case.  
See P.L. 2021, ch. 396, § 5 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-C(1)(D) (2022)).  
The amendment has no bearing on this appeal. 
 
 
2 
in Augusta.  Because the record evidence regarding the anonymous tip and the 
subsequent efforts by police to confirm its reliability fails to establish an 
objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop, we 
vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In July 2020, a grand jury indicted Barclift on two counts of 
aggravated trafficking in cocaine (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1), (D) 
(2018).3  Barclift filed a motion to suppress evidence, on which the court held 
an evidentiary hearing.  In an order denying the motion, the court found the 
following facts, which, except as noted, are supported by competent evidence 
in the suppression record.  See State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 13, 236 A.3d 471. 
[¶3]  On January 9 and 10, 2020, the Augusta Police Department and the 
Maine Drug Enforcement Agency each received, through an online reporting 
system similar to email, a written anonymous communication containing a tip 
 
3  The charges were based on alternative theories—in one, the State alleged that Barclift trafficked 
in cocaine in a quantity of 112 grams or more, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D) (2018); in the other, 
the State alleged that Barclift trafficked in cocaine and had previously been convicted in New York of 
“an offense relating to scheduled drugs and punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one 
year,” see 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1) (2018).  Section 1105-A(1)(D) has been amended since the 
events leading to the charges, see P.L. 2021, ch. 396, § 4 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 17-A 
M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D) (2022)), but the amendment has no effect on the issues presented here. 
 
 
 
3 
concerning Barclift.4  The two tips were nearly identical in content, suggesting 
that they were provided by the same person.  The tipster wrote that Barclift 
was a rap artist known as DownLeezy and that he traveled regularly from New 
York to Maine by Concord Trailways bus carrying large quantities of cocaine or 
heroin in a bag or a backpack,5 and that he had been doing so for years.  The 
tipster also gave a date of birth for Barclift and indicated that he typically 
carried a firearm. 
[¶4]  Through internet searches, police confirmed that Barclift was a rap 
artist known as DownLeezy.  From law enforcement authorities in New York, 
they obtained a photograph of Barclift and an indication that he had a criminal 
 
4  Neither of the actual messages containing the tip was made part of the suppression record.  The 
only evidence of the tip’s content in the suppression record (and, therefore, within our scope of 
review) consists of witness testimony at the suppression hearing describing what was contained in 
the tip.  See State v. Tribou, 488 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1985) (stating that appellate review of the denial 
of a motion to suppress is limited to the evidence in the suppression hearing record); State v. Annis, 
2018 ME 15, ¶ 16 n.3, 178 A.3d 467 (“Our review . . . is limited to the record before 
the suppression court at the time of its order . . . .”). 
 
Some of the court’s findings concerning the anonymous tip’s content went beyond the evidence 
admitted during the suppression hearing.  For example, although the court found that the date of 
birth that the tipster provided “was inaccurate by a few days,” the suppression record contains no 
evidence of either the specific date of birth that the tipster provided or Barclift’s actual date of birth.  
The court also found that the tipster indicated that Barclift traveled to “Brunswick and Augusta,” but 
there is no evidence in the suppression record that the tipster described any destination more 
specific than “Maine” or “the area.”  The court also found that “the tipster stated that Barclift stayed 
in Maine for just a few days, then returned to New York, and then would come back to Maine with 
more drugs,” but there is no evidence in the suppression record that the tipster provided information 
about the duration of Barclift’s stays in Maine. 
 
5  One of the two witnesses who testified at the suppression hearing on this point testified that the 
tipster indicated that Barclift carried drugs “[i]n a backpack or a bag.”  The other testified that the 
tipster indicated that Barclift used “a bag.” 
 
 
4 
history of indeterminate vintage.6  They also contacted an employee of Concord 
Trailways in Boston, who said that Barclift had purchased ten bus tickets to 
Maine in the month of January 2020, made four trips to Maine within the first 
nine days of January 2020, and purchased bus tickets for travel to Maine since 
2014.7  The employee also told police that Barclift used cash to pay for his bus 
tickets.8   
[¶5]  On January 22, 2020, the Concord Trailways employee reported that 
Barclift had purchased a bus ticket for travel to Augusta that afternoon and 
described the clothing that Barclift was wearing.  A team of police officers set 
up surveillance at the Concord Trailways bus terminal in Augusta.  The bus 
arrived and passengers, including Barclift, got off.  Barclift was wearing a 
backpack and carrying a black plastic bag.  He exited the terminal building, 
 
6  The suppression record is vague in terms of what the police learned about Barclift’s criminal 
history.  One officer testified that he understood that Barclift had “a criminal history in New York for 
a narcotics violation.”  He testified that he “believed” that “there was a robbery at one point,” and he 
answered in the affirmative to a question about whether Barclift had “transported narcotics” and 
“had a prior conviction for a violent crime.”  Another officer testified that Barclift had “some prior 
criminal history.”  However, the only specific evidence of Barclift’s criminal history in the record of 
the case is the parties’ stipulation during trial that he had a 1994 drug conviction in New York.   
 
7  The dissent lists “a recent purchase of tickets” as a “corroborated” aspect of the tip, Dissenting 
Opinion ¶ 34, but the trial court did not find that the tip itself provided information about a recent 
ticket purchase and there is no evidence in the suppression record that would support such a finding. 
 
8  Two State’s witnesses testified, however, that the bus line employee reported that Barclift 
purchased the tickets using his own name, contrary to the tipster’s assertion that Barclift used a false 
name to purchase bus tickets. 
 
 
5 
approached a waiting SUV, put his backpack and bag in the back seat area, and 
started getting into the front passenger seat.  Multiple police officers and 
vehicles converged on the SUV, Barclift got out with his hands raised in the air, 
and an officer immediately placed him in handcuffs.  Eventually, officers 
searched Barclift’s backpack, found a plastic bag containing approximately 300 
grams of cocaine, and placed him under arrest.   
[¶6]  After the suppression hearing, the court concluded that the police 
officers had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that Barclift had 
been engaged in criminal activity when they stopped him on the afternoon of 
January 22, 2020, and issued a written order denying the motion to suppress 
the physical evidence seized as a result of the stop.9   
[¶7]  During a two-day trial, the court instructed the jury to consider 
aggravated furnishing of cocaine, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-C(1)(B)(1), (D), as a 
lesser-included offense if it found Barclift not guilty of aggravated trafficking.  
The jury found Barclift not guilty of aggravated trafficking but guilty of 
aggravated furnishing because of the quantity of drugs furnished, and the court 
 
9  The court granted a portion of Barclift’s motion in which he sought exclusion of statements that 
he made at the police station without having received Miranda warnings.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 
 
 
6 
found him guilty of aggravated furnishing because of a prior conviction.10  The 
court merged the two charges for sentencing, see State v. Armstrong, 2020 ME 
97, ¶ 11, 237 A.3d 185, imposed a sentence, and entered a judgment on the 
verdicts.  Barclift timely appeals from the judgment.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 
(2022); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  Barclift’s central argument is that the court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress because the police lacked a sufficient basis for the stop 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.11  See U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable” 
searches and seizures by the government, id., “extend[s] to brief investigatory 
stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest,” United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).  Here, the stop essentially began as a 
temporary seizure of Barclift’s person because the police blocked in the vehicle 
 
10  Barclift had proceeded with a jury-waived trial on the charges that alleged a prior conviction.  
See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1105-A(1)(B)(1), 1105-C(1)(B)(1) (2018).  He stipulated that he had been 
convicted in 1994 of “Criminal Sale Controlled Substance-3rd: Narcotic Drug” in New York. 
 
11  He also argues, as an alternative ground for relief on appeal, that the court did not require the 
State to prove that information contributing to probable cause to search his backpack was not the 
fruit of an earlier illegal search.  Because we conclude that the police did not have sufficient grounds 
to make the initial stop, we need not address that argument. 
 
Although Barclift included a passing reference to the Maine Constitution in the motion to suppress 
that he filed in the trial court, on appeal he has raised no independent argument specific to the Maine 
Constitution.  See State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 18 n.10, 236 A.3d 471. 
 
 
7 
that he was entering and approached him from multiple directions with guns 
drawn.  To satisfy the requirement that such a stop not be unreasonable, an 
officer must, at the time of the stop, have “an articulable suspicion that criminal 
conduct has taken place, is occurring, or imminently will occur.”  State v. Lafond, 
2002 ME 124, ¶ 6, 802 A.2d 425 (quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, “the 
officer’s assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts sufficient 
to warrant the stop [must be] objectively reasonable in the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “Reasonable articulable 
suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 
the evidence, but the suspicion needs to be based on more than speculation or 
an unsubstantiated hunch.”  State v. McDonald, 2010 ME 102, ¶ 6, 6 A.3d 283 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted); see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (“[A]n 
officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop . . . .” (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968))). 
[¶9]  Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is limited to the 
record on which the court made its ruling.  State v. Tribou, 488 A.2d 472, 475 
(Me. 1985) (“Only evidence presented to the motion Justice is considered in 
deciding whether the record supports the motion Justice’s determination.”).  
We evaluate the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions 
 
 
8 
de novo.  State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 25, 239 A.3d 648.  Where, as here, 
the historical facts are undisputed, we “assess the officer’s suspicion de novo,” 
Lafond, 2002 ME 124, ¶ 6, 802 A.2d 425, because “[w]hether an officer’s 
suspicion is objectively reasonable is a pure question of law,” State v. Sylvain, 
2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984; see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 
(1996) (“[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should 
be reviewed de novo on appeal.”). 
A. 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion and Anonymous Tips 
[¶10]  When an investigatory stop is based on information from an 
informant, “the central issue . . . is whether the informant’s information is so 
reliable and complete that it makes past, present or pending criminal conduct 
sufficiently likely to justify a stopping of the designated person for 
investigation.”  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 9.5(i) (6th ed. 2020).  In a line of fact-dependent benchmark 
cases, the United States Supreme Court has also developed the analysis for the 
constitutionality of investigatory stops that are based on information provided 
by an anonymous informer. 
[¶11]  First, in Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court made clear that 
reasonable suspicion for a stop can arise from information other than a police 
 
 
9 
officer’s personal observations where the information has sufficient “indicia of 
reliability.”  407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).  There, a police officer stopped a person 
based on a contemporaneous but unverified tip given in person by a known 
informant at 2:15 a.m. in a “high-crime area.”  Id. at 144-45.  Concluding that the 
resulting stop was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court focused on the facts that the informant “was known to [the officer] 
personally and had provided him with information in the past” and that the 
informant would have been subject to arrest and prosecution for falsely 
reporting a crime.  Id. at 146-47.  The Court noted that the case before it was, 
for those reasons, stronger than one involving an anonymous tip.  Id. 
 
[¶12]  In Illinois v. Gates, a case involving an anonymous tip in the 
probable cause context, the Court adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances test 
for probable cause but made clear that the factors central to its previous test—
the tipster’s “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge”—remained 
“highly relevant.”  462 U.S. 213, 225, 230-32, 238 (1983) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The Court stressed that the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
“permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia 
of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.”  Id. at 234.  The 
Court held that probable cause existed because police had corroborated “major 
 
 
10 
portions of the [tip]’s predictions,” including its “range of details relating not 
just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to 
future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.”  Id. at 245-46. 
[¶13]  Next, in Alabama v. White, the Court drew on Adams and Gates to 
examine whether an anonymous telephone tip, “as corroborated by 
independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide 
reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.”  496 U.S. 325, 326-27 
(1990).  In White, the anonymous telephone caller told police that Vanessa 
White would be leaving a specific residence at a specific time on a specific date 
and would be traveling to a specific motel with a specific quantity of an illegal 
drug in a specifically described container.  Id. at 327.  The police went to the 
residence that the tipster had identified, saw White enter a vehicle matching 
the tipster’s description at the indicated time, and followed the vehicle as it 
proceeded on “the most direct route” toward the named motel.  Id.  The stop 
occurred just short of the motel.  Id. 
[¶14]  Distinguishing anonymous tips from those provided by known 
informants, the Court first stated that an anonymous tip, standing alone, is 
highly unlikely to demonstrate the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.12  
 
12  “[T]he veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and 
unknowable.”  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quotation marks omitted).  The resulting 
 
 
11 
Id. at 329.  In addition, the Court explained that “[r]easonable suspicion, like 
probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed 
by police and its degree of reliability. . . . [I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of 
reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite 
quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.”  Id. 
at 330.  Although the case was “close,” the Court concluded, for two main 
reasons, that the tip had been “sufficiently corroborated” to provide reasonable 
suspicion that White was engaged in criminal activity when the police stopped 
her.  Id. at 331-32.  First, “the independent corroboration by the police of 
significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of 
reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.”  Id. at 332 (emphasis 
added).  Second, the Court found it “important” that the tipster, like the tipster 
in Gates, provided “‘a range of [predictive] details relating . . . to future actions 
of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.’”  Id. (quoting Gates, 426 U.S. at 
245).  The Court emphasized “the caller’s ability to predict [White’s] future 
behavior, [which] demonstrated inside information—a special familiarity with 
[White’s] affairs”: 
 
risk singularly presented by stops based on wholly anonymous tips is that any citizen “could face 
significant intrusion on the say-so of an anonymous prankster, rival, or misinformed individual,” 
which would contravene the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.  United 
States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
 
12 
Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an 
individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a 
person with access to such information is likely to also have access 
to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities. 
When significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were verified, 
there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but 
also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the 
stop. 
 
Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
[¶15]  The Court relied on similar reasoning to reach a different result 
ten years later in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-72 (2000).  There, an 
anonymous caller reported that a young Black man “standing at a particular bus 
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”  Id. at 268.  Two police 
officers went to the bus stop and saw three Black men there, one of whom was 
wearing a plaid shirt.  Id.  The Court concluded that the police did not have 
sufficiently reliable information to justify a stop of the man wearing the plaid 
shirt because the anonymous call “provided no predictive information and 
therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or 
credibility.”  Id. at 271.  Although the “description of the suspect’s visible 
attributes proved accurate,” the Court reasoned that “[t]he reasonable 
suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, 
not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”  Id. at 271-72 
(emphasis added).  The Court also contrasted the case with cases involving “a 
 
 
13 
tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be 
held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated.”  Id. at 270. 
[¶16]  Finally, in the Supreme Court’s most recent anonymous-tip case, 
Navarette v. California, police stopped a pickup truck that matched the 
description of a truck that an anonymous 9-1-1 caller said had run her off the 
road.  572 U.S. 393, 395-96 (2014).  Although this was another “close case,” id. 
at 404 (quotation marks omitted), the Court concluded that the call bore 
sufficient indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the allegation and make 
the stop because (1) the call was nearly contemporaneous with the allegedly 
illegal activity, placing it in a category of “especially reliable” information; 
(2) the call suggested “eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous 
driving”; and (3) the caller’s “use of the [9-1-1] emergency system” was an 
“indicator of veracity” because 9-1-1 calls can be recorded and traced and 
persons making false reports may be subject to prosecution, id. at 398-401. 
[¶17]  Our analysis is therefore guided, at the outset, by the critical 
difference between cases in which the police rely on information provided by 
an anonymous tip and those in which the information generating suspicion is 
provided by a known informant.  See, e.g., United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 
44 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Anonymous tips are a different matter.”); 4 Wayne 
 
 
14 
R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(i) (“[T]he 
anonymous tipster is generally least deserving of reliance . . . .”); Adams, 
407 U.S. at 146-47; United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 916 F.2d 1011, 1014 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]ips from known informants are more likely to be credible 
and are thus entitled to greater weight in the Terry stop reasonable suspicion 
analysis.”). 
[¶18]  The Supreme Court’s decisions also demonstrate the fact-specific 
nature of determining whether investigative information that begins with a 
wholly anonymous tip gives rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  Although “no single rule can be fashioned to meet every 
conceivable confrontation between the police and citizen,” State v. Lesnick, 
530 P.2d 243, 246 (Wash. 1975), the analysis must focus primarily on 
• the extent and specificity of predictive detail regarding future criminal 
activity contained in the tip; 
 
• the extent to which the predictive detail contained in the tip involved 
information that could be supplied only by a person with knowledge of 
the criminal activity alleged, rather than information available more 
generally or to the public at large; and 
 
• the extent to which the police were able to confirm the accuracy of the 
predictive detail in the tip through their own observation or 
independently obtained, reliable information. 
 
 
 
15 
See White, 496 U.S. at 328-32; J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72.  White establishes that the 
corroboration by police of the accuracy of an anonymous tip need not include 
observation of actual criminal activity, provided that the tip includes a 
substantial quantity of predictive description that only someone with 
knowledge of the described plan of activity could supply, and provided that the 
police through their own observation or other investigation are able to confirm 
the accuracy of the predictive description to a significant degree.  White, 
496 U.S. at 328-32.  J.L. illustrates the inverse—that an anonymous tip 
containing no prediction of future activity, but only a description of present 
circumstances visible to any passerby, is insufficient if the police have not 
confirmed the tip’s assertion of illegality through their own observation or 
through independently obtained reliable information.  J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72. 
B. 
The Stop of Barclift 
[¶19]  Here, we examine whether the police developed sufficient 
information to justify a reasonable belief that the tipster’s assertion of illegality 
was reliable, bearing in mind that the tip regarding Barclift itself was wholly 
anonymous and included no predictive information.  The tip gave some specific 
information about Barclift, but it was lacking in material respects.  The tip 
included no prediction that Barclift would be traveling to Maine by bus on a 
 
 
16 
particular date, and it included no information so personal that it suggested that 
the tipster would have been privy to any illegal activity by Barclift.  The absence 
of any prediction of Barclift’s actions at a particular future time means that the 
tip lacked an element that the Supreme Court has deemed highly material, if not 
essential, to determining the reliability of an anonymous tip: predictive 
information indicative of the informant’s insider knowledge of planned 
criminal activity.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245-46; White, 496 U.S. at 328-32; 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72. 
[¶20]  In fact, none of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions involving the 
reliability of anonymous tips involved a tip lacking any specific assertion of 
criminal activity on a particular date.  Some other courts have, however, 
analyzed the reliability of anonymous tips that, like the tip regarding Barclift, 
asserted habitual or ongoing illegal drug activity by one or more persons 
without any prediction that the asserted activity would occur on a particular 
date.  See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 750 A.2d 795, 796-99 (Pa. 2000); State v. 
Boson, 778 So. 2d 687, 688-95 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
[¶21]  In Goodwin, for example, the police received an anonymous tip that 
was highly detailed in identifying and describing the defendant and her habits, 
 
 
17 
including her practice of selling illegal drugs from her home and workplace.13  
750 A.2d at 796.  However, the tip did not include any prediction that the 
defendant would be engaged in the asserted criminal activity on a particular 
date.  Id.  When the police began to follow the defendant in her vehicle, they 
“saw no unusual activity . . . and had no reason independent of the anonymous 
tip to suspect that criminal activity was afoot.  Thus, the allegations of criminal 
conduct furnished by the anonymous tipster remained uncorroborated.”  
Id. at 799.  As a result, applying the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,14 the court held that the police had insufficient information to 
justify stopping the defendant.  Id.  Although the tip disclosed many details 
about the defendant’s age, appearance, dress, home address, and workplace, 
some of which were corroborated by police observation, the court noted that 
anyone who worked with her or otherwise knew her could have supplied that 
information.  Id. 
 
13  “The caller . . . stated that the [defendant] always carries a quarter pound of marijuana in a pink 
bag and that children buy drugs from her.  Also, the [defendant] takes a one-hour lunch break at about 
12:15 and drives a blue Mustang, registration AKA 2168, which was parked that day on the inside 
corner of a parking garage.  The caller described the [defendant] as [twenty-five] years old, with red 
hair, and stated that she was wearing a red coat and red stockings on that particular day.  The 
anonymous caller then provided the name and address of the [defendant’s] employer, the street she 
lived on, the location of the parking garage, and the route [she] took to walk to the garage.”  
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 750 A.2d 795, 796 (Pa. 2000). 
 
14  The court noted that although the defendant raised claims under both the Fourth Amendment 
and the state constitution, it had “consistently followed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in stop 
and frisk cases.”  Goodwin, 750 A.2d at 797 n.3. 
 
 
18 
[¶22]  In Boson, the police stopped and searched the defendants based on 
complaints about two individuals who “were supposed to be operating 
narcotics” from a hotel in a high-crime area.  778 So. 2d at 688 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Other than a description of the individuals and their vehicle, the 
complaints provided no predictive information about the individuals’ actions, 
and the police executed the stop as soon as they saw individuals and a vehicle 
matching the description at the hotel, without having observed any activity by 
the individuals.  Id.  Analyzing the unverified complaints as if they collectively 
constituted an anonymous tip, the court summarized the facts and the 
conclusion to be drawn from them as follows: 
There was no testimony at all about the source of the [complaints].  
The informant therefore must be assumed by this court to have 
been unknown and untested.  The officers went to the scene with 
the vague knowledge that drugs were being sold at some 
undetermined time, and that two black men who had a white LTD 
were involved in the transactions.  They immediately stopped [the 
defendants] upon seeing them.  The defendants were not 
performing any suspicious activity at the time they were stopped.  
Thus, based on the facts presented, . . . the officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop [the defendants]. 
 
Id. at 694-95 (footnote omitted). 
[¶23]  Because the tip regarding Barclift was lacking in predictive 
information that, if confirmed as accurate, might have validated the reliability 
of the tip, the police needed to obtain independent information corroborating 
 
 
19 
the tipster’s assertion of illegal conduct in order to establish an objectively 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on the day of the stop.  See Goodwin, 
750 A.2d at 799; Boson, 778 So. 2d at 691-95; Gates, 462 U.S. at 245-46; White, 
496 U.S. at 328-32; J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72.  One means of doing so would be to 
obtain reliable information through other sources.  The necessary information 
could also have been obtained through surveillance prior to a stop, among other 
means, but the police stopped Barclift without having observed anything 
suspicious.  See United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that “the police were not powerless to act on the non-predictive, 
anonymous tip they received” because they could have surveilled the 
defendant, but that there was no reasonable suspicion to support a stop “[i]n 
the absence of any observations of suspicious conduct or the corroboration of 
information from which the police could reasonably conclude that the 
anonymous tipster’s allegation of criminal activity was reliable”). 
[¶24]  The tipster’s generalized assertions that Barclift regularly rode the 
bus to Maine with a bag or backpack and that he was a rap artist do not imply 
inside knowledge of criminal activity on Barclift’s part.  Anyone who knew 
Barclift or knew about his bus travel and rap career could have provided that 
information.  See State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 34, 930 A.2d 268; 4 Wayne 
 
 
20 
R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(i). 
[¶25]  The additional information that the police were able to develop, in 
their follow-up efforts to validate the reliability of the tip, was limited and did 
not lend credibility to the assertion of illegal activity.  The police confirmed that 
Barclift had, indeed, frequently taken the Concord Trailways bus from New 
York to Maine.  Certain “[f]actors consistent with innocent travel, when taken 
together, can give rise to reasonable suspicion, even though some travelers 
exhibiting those factors will be innocent.”  United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 
981, 986 (8th Cir. 2006).  Frequent interstate bus travel, on the other hand, is 
not alone indicative of criminal activity.  See State v. Alexander, 139 A.3d 574, 
581-82 (Vt. 2016) (rejecting the notion that bus travel from out of state can 
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “because ‘a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers’ do the same” (quoting Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980))).  Corroboration of this activity lent little, if 
any, credibility to the tipster’s assertion of illegality.  The police officers also 
learned, from their source at the bus company, that Barclift paid cash for his 
bus tickets, a fact that might be deemed indicative of an effort to leave no 
traceable record of his travel and therefore probative of a criminal purpose.  
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989).  But the State’s first witness 
 
 
21 
at the suppression hearing acknowledged that the source also disclosed that 
Barclift bought the tickets in his own name, belying any notion that Barclift was 
attempting to conceal his identity.15  The police obtained information indicating 
that Barclift had a criminal history, but the suppression record is vague as to 
the details and silent on whether the criminal history was very old or very 
recent or somewhere in between.  See Monteiro, 447 F.3d at 47 (“[C]ourts have 
found that an individual’s criminal history corroborated reliable information, 
such as a police officer’s own observations, in constituting reasonable suspicion.” 
(emphasis added)).  Moreover, there is no evidence in the suppression record 
that the police corroborated the accuracy of other assertions in the tip, such as 
that Barclift habitually carried a firearm or that he used an alias to purchase 
bus tickets.16  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 (explaining that “all the various indicia 
of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip” should be 
considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis (emphasis added)).   
 
15  The witness testified that the tipster had stated that Barclift used an alias when purchasing bus 
tickets and acknowledged that “that piece of information in the anonymous tip was incorrect.”  That 
discrepancy, along with the other portions of the tip that the police could not verify, could raise doubt 
about the reliability of the tip. 
 
16  The State also urges us to consider that “[i]t is known that New York is a source state for illegal 
drugs, that transportation by bus is a widely used and common method for smuggling drugs into 
Maine, and that those involved in drug activity almost exclusively operate in cash.”  The trial court 
did not make those findings (or rely on that rationale), and there was no evidence admitted during 
the suppression hearing that would support such findings. 
 
 
22 
[¶26]  As did the United States Supreme Court in White, we acknowledge 
that this case is close, but it lands on the other side of the line.  What is lacking 
is evidence that the police were able to confirm the anonymous tipster’s 
assertion of illegality by (1) corroborating a prediction of Barclift’s actions that 
was sufficiently specific and detailed to indicate inside knowledge of a plan to 
commit a crime or (2) independently obtaining reliable information, through 
their own direct observation or from known reliable sources, corroborating the 
tipster’s assertion of illegality.17  The information that the police obtained in 
attempting to corroborate the anonymous tip was not enough to indicate that 
 
17  The dissent acknowledges the Supreme Court’s holding that the police must corroborate 
“significant aspects of the informer’s predictions” to “impart a degree of reliability to the allegations 
made by the tipster,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 30; see White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 
266, 269-72 (2000), but would conclude that the police were justified in stopping and detaining 
Barclift based on (1) a non-predictive, partly inaccurate description of past activity from an 
anonymous person who could have been any past or present acquaintance and (2) “evidence of a 
drug courier profile,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 39.  Although frequent purchases of bus tickets for travel 
between New York and Maine may fit one piece of a drug courier profile, they are not criminal acts, 
nor are they enough in themselves to generate a reasonable suspicion that the purchaser is a criminal.  
As we said in State v. Lovell, “more is required.”  State v. Lovell, 2022 ME 49, ¶ 20, --- A.3d ---.  In Lovell, 
we decided that reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing existed because the police obtained, in addition 
to information about behavior that was consistent with a drug courier profile, a known informant’s 
direct observation of evidence of a crime on a specific date.  Id. ¶¶ 23-26.  Specifically, a train 
conductor reported that the suspect had appeared impaired during his most recent short-turnaround 
train journey to and from a known source city and that the conductor had found a crack pipe on the 
seat where the suspect and his companion had been sitting.  Id.  Here, the police obtained no 
comparable confirmation of ongoing criminal activity regarding Barclift.  What they did confirm did 
not indicate the anonymous tipster’s knowledge of anything beyond Barclift’s work as a rapper and 
his frequent bus travel between New York and Maine.  They also learned that the tipster was wrong 
in asserting that Barclift used an alias to buy bus tickets—information that undermined the reliability 
of the tip. 
 
 
23 
the tipster’s assertion of illegality was reliable.  Because the stop of Barclift that 
led to his conviction lacked a constitutional basis, we vacate the judgment. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., dissenting. 
 
 
[¶27]  I respectfully dissent because I believe that the trial court properly 
considered the totality of the circumstances and did not err when it concluded 
that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity resulting 
from the two anonymous tips and the evidence suggesting that Barclift fit a 
drug courier profile. 
 
[¶28]  “When reviewing the denial of motion to suppress . . . we review 
the trial court’s findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”  State 
v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 13, 236 A.3d 471.  We uphold the trial court’s decision 
“if any reasonable view of the evidence supports [it].”  State v. Ormsby, 2013 ME 
88, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 336 (quotation marks omitted); State v. Clark, 2021 ME 12, ¶ 25, 
246 A.3d 1165 (quotation marks omitted).  The Court holds that the trial court 
erred by concluding that the anonymous tips received by law enforcement were 
 
 
24 
sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion.  Court’s 
Opinion ¶¶ 23-26.  I disagree.  I believe that a reasonable view of the evidence 
supports the trial court’s conclusion. 
 
[¶29]  An officer must have “reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal 
activity may be afoot.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 
(quotation marks omitted).  The likelihood of criminal activity does not have to 
“rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of 
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”  Id. at 274.  The concept 
of reasonable suspicion is “fluid” and “take[s] [its] substantive content from the 
particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.”  Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).  We view reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop “from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 
police officer,” id., and base it on “the totality of the circumstances.”  State v. 
Littlefield, 677 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Me. 1996).  When analyzing the totality of the 
circumstances, officers are permitted to “draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them . . . .”  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.  An 
investigatory stop must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
 
 
25 
intrusion.”  State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39, ¶ 6, 691 A.2d 179 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
[¶30]  Anonymous tips may be the basis of reasonable suspicion if 
corroborating independent police work exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability 
to create reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.  Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 326-27, 332 (1990).  Something more than an anonymous tip itself is 
required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion.  Id. at 329-30.  The 
independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s 
predictions will impart a degree of reliability to the allegations made by the 
tipster.  Id. at 331-32.  “[C]orroboration can consist of [an] officer verifying 
details such as the physical description and location of a suspect” and does not 
require that an officer observe illegal behavior.  State v. Vaughan, 2009 ME 63, 
¶ 12, 974 A.2d 930 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶31]  Here, there were two anonymous tips that supplied law 
enforcement with Barclift’s full name, his alias as a rap artist known as 
‘DownLeezy,’ his date of birth, and information that he had regularly traveled 
to Maine (both Brunswick and Augusta) from New York transporting hundreds 
of grams in illegal drugs—heroin and/or cocaine—in a backpack since 2014.  
 
 
26 
The tip also provided Barclift’s specific method of travel—by bus on Concord 
Trailways.   
 
[¶32]  To corroborate the specific allegation that Barclift was illegally 
transporting drugs from New York to Maine by bus on a regular basis, law 
enforcement contacted Concord Trailways.  From a source at Concord 
Trailways, they learned that Barclift had been purchasing tickets from 
New York to Maine for six years, dating back to 2014.  They also learned that 
Barclift had purchased ten bus tickets to Maine in January 2020 and had made 
four trips that month.  Law enforcement also determined that Barclift always 
paid cash for the tickets.  Further corroboration came on January 22, 2020, 
when law enforcement learned from Concord Trailways that Barclift had 
purchased a bus ticket for travel to Augusta for that day.   
 
[¶33]  Police also confirmed the alias supplied by the tips and confirmed 
that Barclift did use the “DownLeezy” alias when he performed rap music.  The 
officers also obtained a photo identification of Barclift and confirmed his prior 
criminal record, including a narcotics conviction.   
 
[¶34]  Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the anonymous tip, 
which contained a range of details, indicated “a fair probability” that the tipster 
had obtained their information from Barclift or someone Barclift trusted.  See 
 
 
27 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245-46 (1983).  Numerous features of the tip—
Barclift’s identity, Barclift’s use of Concord Trailways, the long period in which 
he’d been using the bus line, the large number of tickets purchased by Barclift 
since 2014, and a recent purchase of tickets—were corroborated by law 
enforcement investigation.   
 
[¶35]  The specificity of the tips and the corroboration by law 
enforcement revealed information highly consistent with the tips and in their 
totality demonstrated conduct consistent with drug trafficking.   
 
[¶36]  In State v. Lovell, we recently discussed the evidence of a drug 
courier profile and how, when coupled with some other evidence, that may give 
rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion.   
A “drug courier profile” is a loosely defined set of otherwise 
innocuous behaviors that the Supreme Court has described as “an 
abstract of characteristics found to be typical of persons 
transporting illegal drugs.”  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 
(1983); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980).  Other 
courts have held that a drug courier profile may be used as a 
starting point for an investigation; however, consistency with a 
bare profile alone cannot amount to reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity, because those who engage in the activities that the profile 
describes include large numbers of innocent people.  E.g., United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); United States v. Marrocco, 
578 F.3d 627, 633 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Torres, 949 F.2d 
606, 608 (2nd Cir. 1991); State v. Trainor, 925 P.2d 818, 827 n.8 
(Haw. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619, 624 
(Pa. 1994)).   
 
 
 
28 
When law enforcement personnel are aware of characteristics or 
behaviors that fit a drug courier profile but do not independently 
point to illegal behavior, our established case law treats that 
awareness as the equivalent of an “unsubstantiated hunch.”  In 
those instances, more is required for an officer to establish 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a violation of law has 
occurred, is occurring, or will occur.  See State v. Simons, 2017 ME 
180, ¶ 12, 169 A.3d 399; State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶¶ 7, 14, 143 
A.3d 124; State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶¶ 9, 11, 960 A.2d 321.  The 
“more” that is needed is information that is “reliable in its assertion 
of illegality,” State v. Lafond, 2002 ME 124, ¶ 10, 802 A.2d 425 
(quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)), because “in 
making a determination of [reasonable articulable suspicion] the 
relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or 
‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types 
of noncriminal acts,” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
State v. Lovell, 2022 ME 49, ¶¶ 19-20, --- A.3d ---.    
 
[¶37]  Behaviors that courts have stated are indicative of a drug courier 
profile include arrival from a source city, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 
(1989); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); payment for tickets in cash, 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 3; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1983); and 
excessively frequent travel to a source city, United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 
1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); see 27 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 
Practice - Criminal § 641.130 (Mathew Bender, 3d ed. 2022) (discussing drug 
courier profiles used throughout the United States).     
 
 
29 
[¶38]  An anonymous prediction of a person’s legal activities fitting the 
drug courier profile can be sufficient to generate a reasonable suspicion of 
illegality when the information is sufficiently detailed and confirmed to be 
accurate in its prediction of the person’s actions so that it supports a reasonable 
belief that the source of the information has inside knowledge of a plan to 
commit a crime.  See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (“When significant aspects of the 
caller’s predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the 
caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to 
justify the stop.”). 
 
[¶39]  Here, we have evidence of a drug courier profile plus two 
anonymous tips containing specific information relating to Barclift’s 
transportation of illegal drugs.  In Lovell, 2022 ME 49, ¶¶ 2-4, --- A.3d ---, the 
information was limited to assertions of numerous trips between Maine and an 
area known for drugs and a tip from a train conductor who weeks earlier 
indicated that he saw Lovell “high” and that he found a crack pipe where Lovell 
was sitting.  This is not evidence of a crime on a specific date as the Court 
asserts.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 26 n.16.  There was no definitive assertion of 
predictive behavior in Lovell, just an inference based on a train conductor’s 
observation that Lovell was transporting drugs; whereas here, the two tips 
 
 
30 
received by law enforcement asserted that Barclift would be transporting 
heroin and/or cocaine in a backpack while travelling to Maine on Concord 
Trailways.  This is much more evidence of predictive behavior than the tip from 
the train conductor in Lovell, who indicated that he saw Lovell “high” and found 
a crack pipe where Lovell was sitting.  While neither an anonymous tip nor 
evidence of a drug courier profile alone are enough to create reasonable, 
articulable suspicion, the combination of two anonymous tips and a drug 
courier profile corroborate each other and these facts were independently 
corroborated by law enforcement.  A reasonable view of the evidence supports 
the trial court’s determination of reasonable, articulable suspicion. 
 
[¶40]  I would affirm the trial court’s decision suppressing Barclift’s 
statements made while at the Augusta Police Department on January 22, 2020, 
prior to the administration and waiver of his Miranda rights but denying the 
motion to suppress in all other respects.   
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Timothy 
Barclift 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Katie Sibley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2020-115 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY