Title: Henry v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-578 
____________ 
 
LEIGHDON HENRY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 19, 2015] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
We have for review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Henry v. 
State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), holding that Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010), does not apply to term-of-years prison sentences because such 
sentences do not constitute life imprisonment.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Because we find that Graham does apply and that the 
sentence at issue will not provide a meaningful opportunity for release, we quash 
the decision below and remand for resentencing consistent with our rationale 
provided below. 
 
 
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BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
When he was seventeen years old, Leighdon Henry was tried as an adult and 
convicted for committing multiple nonhomicide offenses, including three counts of 
sexual battery while possessing a weapon, two counts of robbery, one count of 
kidnapping, one count of carjacking, one count of burglary of a dwelling, and one 
count of possession of marijuana.  The trial court sentenced Henry to life for the 
sexual battery offenses, plus an additional sixty years’ imprisonment for the 
remaining offenses, to run consecutively.  Henry was thus sentenced to life plus 
sixty years’ imprisonment.  Henry appealed.   
During the pendency of Henry’s appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its Graham decision.  Thereafter, Henry filed a motion pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) predicated on the Graham holding.  The 
trial court granted the rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, in part, and resentenced Henry to 
concurrent thirty-year sentences for the sexual batteries; the remaining sentences 
were to run consecutively.  Henry was thus sentenced to ninety years’ 
imprisonment.  The Fifth District affirmed Henry’s convictions and revised 
sentences, concluding that “Henry’s aggregate term-of-years sentence is not 
invalid under the Eighth Amendment . . . .”  Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089.   
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
The review of a decision of a district court of appeal construing a provision 
of the state or federal constitution concerns a pure question of law that is subject to 
de novo review.  Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 
134, 139 (Fla. 2008) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 
2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004)).   
Merits 
 
In Graham, the Supreme Court conducted a thorough examination of the 
constitutional requirements for states that subject juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
to terms of life imprisonment as if these offenders had been adults when they 
committed their offenses.  After careful consideration of the overall issue, the 
Graham Court concluded and repeatedly emphasized that because of their 
immaturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, juveniles are more 
vulnerable or negatively influenced by external forces than are adults.  Graham, 
560 U.S. at 67-68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).  The Supreme 
Court further determined that juveniles constitute a category of offenders that are 
not as capable of engaging in conduct that is as “morally reprehensible” as adults 
and, therefore, cannot be reliably “classified among the worst offenders.”  Id. at 68 
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 
 
 
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(1988) (plurality opinion)).  In addition, the Supreme Court held that juveniles 
possess a greater potential for change or positive character growth than adults.  Id. 
(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).   
 
Building upon its prior precedent that explicitly emphasized the special 
status of juvenile offenders for purposes of criminal punishment, in Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms 
that it is the offenders’ juvenile status that implicates the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (“To start with the first set 
of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing.  Because juveniles have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving 
of the most severe punishments.’ ” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68)); Id. at 2465 
(“Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in determining the 
appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.  In 
the circumstances there, juvenile status precluded a life-without-parole sentence, 
even though an adult could receive it for a similar crime.”); Id. at 2469 (“By 
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest 
prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment. . . .  But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we 
 
 
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think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon.”); Id. at 2466 (“But the mandatory penalty schemes at 
issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central 
considerations. . . .  That contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational 
principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders 
cannot proceed as though they were not children.”). 
The Court concluded that the status of juvenile offenders warrants different 
considerations by the states whenever such offenders face criminal punishment as 
if they are adults.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“Three general differences 
between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot 
with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.  Juveniles’ susceptibility 
to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’  [Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835].  Their 
own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate 
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for 
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.  See [Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brenan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Roper, 
543 U.S. at 551].  The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity 
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.  The Thompson plurality 
 
 
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recognized the import of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16.  
487 U.S. at 833-38.  The same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.  
Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that neither of 
the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence 
of capital crimes by prospective offenders, e.g., [Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
319 (2002)]—provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty on 
juveniles.”); Id. at 561 (“[T]he Thompson plurality stressed that ‘[t]he reasons why 
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.’  Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.”).   
Emphasizing the distinction between juveniles and adults, the Court 
explained:  
Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. 
543 U.S. at 569.  As compared to adults, juveniles have a “ ‘lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’ ”; they “are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as 
well formed.”  Id. at 569-570.  These salient characteristics mean that 
“[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between 
the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”  Id. at 573.  Accordingly, “juvenile offenders 
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”  Id. at 
569.  A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but 
his transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”  
Thompson, [487 U.S.] at 835 (plurality opinion).   
 
 
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.  Then, the Court stated that compared to the sentence of 
death, a sentence of life without parole is “the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law.”  Id. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that the status of the juvenile nonhomicide offender 
and the nature of the offense committed must be considered when determining 
whether life in prison without parole is a constitutionally permissible punishment.  
Id. 
In evaluating the relative harshness of life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles, the Supreme Court analyzed the cognizable penological justifications for 
such prison sentences employed by the states and found that only a theory of 
rehabilitation—which forms the basis for parole systems—is a valid constitutional 
basis for sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  Id. at 70-74.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from 
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to terms of imprisonment in which the 
states pre-establish that these offenders “never will be fit to reenter society.”  Id. at 
75.  Further, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[c]ategorical rules tend to be 
imperfect, but one is necessary here.”  Id.  Consequently, it held that Florida law, 
which permits juvenile nonhomicide offenders to be sentenced to life-without-
parole terms of imprisonment, violates the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 76.  
 
 
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In so doing, the Supreme Court intended to ensure that the states would 
provide all juvenile nonhomicide offenders who were sentenced to life terms of 
imprisonment with meaningful future opportunities to demonstrate their maturity 
and rehabilitation.  Id. at 79 (noting that the “categorical rule gives all juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”).  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court reversed our First District’s decision in Graham v. State, 982 
So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and remanded Graham’s case “for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.”  Id. at 82.   
In the time since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Graham, our 
district courts of appeal have not agreed on how to decide if lengthy term-of-years 
sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders should be evaluated for whether such 
sentences violate Graham.  Our Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of 
Appeal have applied Graham literally and determined that the holding in Graham 
should not be applied to aggregate term-of-years prison sentences for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders.  See, e.g., Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 932-33, 936 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (affirming concurrent thirty-year prison sentences for which 
ten years of probation followed); Guzman v. State, 110 So. 3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2013) (affirming a sixty-year prison sentence for violation of probation); 
Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089 (affirming aggregate prison sentences totaling ninety 
years).  Notably, our First and Third District Courts of Appeal have applied 
 
 
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Graham on a case-by-case basis when addressing the sentences of juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders.  Compare Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2011) (affirming concurrent fifty-year sentences); Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 
558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (affirming concurrent prison sentences of fifty and thirty 
years, respectively); with Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) 
(reversing consecutive forty-year sentences because there was no meaningful 
opportunity for release required under Graham); Adams v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly 
D1865 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 8, 2012) (reversing a sentence that required a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender to serve at least fifty-eight and one-half years because the 
sentence exceeded the offender’s life expectancy).   
 In response, we hold that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment under Graham is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender’s sentence does not afford any “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
Graham requires a juvenile nonhomicide offender, such as Henry, to be afforded 
such an opportunity during his or her natural life.  Id.  Because Henry’s aggregate 
sentence, which totals ninety years and requires him to be imprisoned until he is at 
least nearly ninety-five years old, does not afford him this opportunity, that 
sentence is unconstitutional under Graham.   
 
 
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We conclude that Graham prohibits the state trial courts from sentencing 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure these offenders will be 
imprisoned without obtaining a meaningful opportunity to obtain future early 
release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.   
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s long-held and consistent view 
that juveniles are different—with respect to prison sentences that are lawfully 
imposable on adults convicted for the same criminal offenses—we conclude that, 
when tried as an adult, the specific sentence that a juvenile nonhomicide offender 
receives for committing a given offense is not dispositive as to whether the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is implicated.  Thus, we believe 
that the Graham Court had no intention of limiting its new categorical rule to 
sentences denominated under the exclusive term of “life in prison.”  Instead, we 
have determined that Graham applies to ensure that juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders will not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment without affording them a 
meaningful opportunity for early release based on a demonstration of maturity and 
rehabilitation.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
In light of Graham, and other Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that 
the Eighth Amendment will not tolerate prison sentences that lack a review 
mechanism for evaluating this special class of offenders for demonstrable maturity 
 
 
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and reform in the future because any term of imprisonment for a juvenile is 
qualitatively different than a comparable period of incarceration is for an adult.  
See id. at 70-71 (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve 
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. . . .  
This reality cannot be ignored.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“Their own vulnerability 
and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles 
have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative 
influences in their whole environment.” (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395)).   
Because we have determined that Henry’s sentence is unconstitutional under 
Graham, we conclude that Henry should be resentenced in light of the new juvenile 
sentencing legislation enacted by the Florida Legislature in 2014, ch. 2014-220, 
Laws of Fla.  See Horsley v. State, No. SC13-1938, slip op. at 3. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons that we set forth above, we hereby quash the Fifth District’s 
decision.  Furthermore, we remand Henry’s case to his sentencing court in order to 
address its present sentencing order in accordance with this opinion.   
 
It is so ordered.   
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and 
POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – 
Constitutional Construction 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D08-3779 & 5D10-3021 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
Peter D. Webster of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and David L. Luck, 
and Christopher Bryan Corts of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Kellie Anne Nielan, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Wesley Harold Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, 
Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Bryan Scott Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
 
Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and George 
E. Schulz, Jr., of Holland & Knight, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center 
 
Angela Coin Vigil of Baker & McKenzie LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Former Members of Judiciary, Former Prosecutors and Bar 
Leaders