Title: Bracy v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

396 So. 2d 632 (1981) Brent BRACY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 52312. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 8, 1981. *633 Russel D. Moore, III, Binder & Moore, Firnist J. Alexander, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, SUGG and WALKER, JJ SUGG, Justice, for the Court: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for the sale of phencyclidine (PCP) and sentenced to serve a term of twenty (20) years and fined $10,000. Defendant assigns as error: Steve Mallory, agent of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, testified he purchased 5,000 phencyclidine (PCP) tablets from the defendant, William Allen Stewart and Michael Jones for the sum of $3,200, and that he made a written report pertaining to the sale. At trial defendant moved for a production of Mallory's written report to be used by his attorney in cross-examining Mallory. The trial court overruled the motion to produce the entire report but directed the state to furnish that part of the report which contained statements made by the defendant. On appeal defendant argues that he was entitled to the entire report to be used in cross-examining the witness Mallory. He relies on Shell Oil Co. v. Pou, 204 So. 2d 155 (Miss. 1967) and Mississippi Highway Commission v. W.E. Howard, Jr., 253 Miss. 556, 176 So. 2d 294 (1965). In Mississippi Highway Commission the trial court refused to make notes, which a witness had referred to during his direct examination, available to the opposite party for cross-examination of the witness. This Court held this was error and stated: This ruling of the court was in error. In 58 Am.Jur. Witnesses § 601 (1948), it is stated: The Court also held that, ordinarily refusal to require a witness to submit notes used on direct examination would be reversible error, but such failure was harmless error under Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 11. Mississippi Highway Commission and Shell Oil Co. have no application to this case because Mallory did not use his written report to refresh his memory while he was testifying on direct examination, therefore, this argument of defendant has no merit. Defendant also contends that if the report contains any exculpatory evidence, the refusal to permit counsel for defendant to examine it was error. This contention requires us to examine Mallory's report to ascertain if the failure of the Court to require the state to furnish the entire report violates due process in accordance with the rule enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and amplified in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 *634 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). In Brady the Court stated: In Agurs, the Court stated: When defendant's attorney moved for a production of Mallory's written report, the trial judge reminded him that the proper time according to the Rules[1] was not during the trial but before the trial. It was then developed that the prosecutor at least a month before trial read defendant's statements contained in Mallory's report to defendant's attorney. Defense counsel requested the court to examine the report in its entirety to which the court responded that it had examined the report but would also examine it in more detail. The court then ordered that the statements of the defendant contained in the report be excised and furnished to defendant's counsel. The court then ordered the entire report sealed for examination by this Court on appeal and also included the portion furnished defendant's counsel. We have examined the entire report but find no exculpatory matter contained in the report. The report consisted of 10 pages written in narrative form preceded by a cover sheet entitled "Prosecution Charge Sheet" and was followed by a laboratory evidence receipt. The portion of the report not furnished defendant contained a statement about an earlier sale of PCP by defendant *636 and others, a four line synopsis of the sale for which defendant was tried, an account of the arrangements for the sale, statements pertaining to surveillance units which were set up to observe the sale, a conversation between Mallory and Jones, conversations between Mallory and Stewart, Mallory's discussion about future transactions, a description of Mallory's departure from the apartment and his observation of the surveillance units, a description of the delivery by Mallory of the 5,000 tablets to the Mississippi Crime Lab, Mallory's information about defendant and his companions being stopped by a marked car of the Jackson Police Department, a description of Michael Jones and William Stewart, a description of the evidence and of the vehicle that Stewart and Bracy occupied when they departed. The trial court dictated into the record the description of defendant contained in the report. We are at a loss to understand the reluctance of the state to reveal the information contained in the report because there is nothing in the report "that would subject any person to a substantial risk of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment resulting from such disclosure." Rule 4.06. Neither did the report contain any secret affecting national security. Accordingly, the report will not remain sealed. We hold the trial court did not err in refusing to make the entire report available to defendant's counsel because there is nothing in the report that would have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial. Also, there was no material variance between Mallory's testimony and the report. It is therefore not necessary to determine whether withholding a part of the report was harmless error under the standard set forth in Agurs. In his second assignment of error defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of twenty years and a fine of $10,000 on the defendant. It has long been the rule in this state that an imposition of a sentence in a criminal proceeding is within the sole discretion of the trial judge and this Court will not set it aside if the sentence is within prescribed statutory limits. Yazzie v. State, 366 So. 2d 240 (Miss. 1979); Ellis v. State, 326 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1976); Ainsworth v. State, 304 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 1974). When this case was submitted, the Court requested additional briefs on the question of jurisdiction because we noted that defendant had filed a motion for a new trial which had not been disposed of before he perfected his appeal. We have concluded that this Court has jurisdiction under the authority of Polk v. State, 247 Miss. 734, 156 So. 2d 592 (1963) and Boydston v. State, 144 Miss. 104, 109 So. 727 (1926). In these cases we held that, when a defendant takes an appeal before his motion for a new trial is passed on by the trial court, taking the appeal constitutes an abandonment of his motion for a new trial. This is not contrary to our holding in a number of cases that a judgment of the trial court is not final until a motion for a new trial is overruled. These cases involved the time for taking an appeal and did not involve a waiver by the party making the motion for a new trial. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Forbes, 228 Miss. 134, 87 So. 2d 488 (1956); Davidson v. Hunsicker, 224 Miss. 203, 79 So. 2d 839 (1935). Neither is our holding contrary to the rule announced in Woods v. Lee, 390 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1980). In that case appellant filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and did not rule on it within six months. Appellant appealed under the provisions of section 11-1-17 Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1979) but we held the statute did not authorize appeals in cases where a judge took a *637 motion for a new trial under advisement and did not render an opinion in six months. We held appellant's remedy was by mandamus to require the judge to rule on the motion. In that case appellant did not abandon his motion for a new trial but appealed from the failure of the judge to rule on the motion within six months as an adverse ruling. We dismissed the appeal as being an interlocutory appeal and remanded the case for a ruling on the motion. No final order had been entered in that case. In the case now under consideration, a final order was entered and thus distinguishable from Woods. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was not taken within forty-five days after final judgment as required by section 11-51-5 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972). We held in Nabors v. State, 288 So. 2d 472 (Miss. 1974) that the limitations on the time to take an appeal to the Supreme Court does not begin to run with respect to a minor until his disability of minority has been removed. Appellant is a minor, and the appeal was taken before his disability of minority had been removed. We therefore overrule the motion to dismiss the appeal. MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL OVERRULED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. [1] Section 4.06 Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice.