Title: Preston v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TROY LAMONT PRESTON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100596 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
At a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Martinsville, Troy Lamont Preston was convicted of possession of 
a firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent, as a 
juvenile 14 years of age or older, of an act that would be a 
violent felony if committed by an adult, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-308.2(A)(iii).1  The dispositive question on appeal is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.  
Because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Preston previously 
had been adjudicated delinquent of an act that would be a 
violent felony if committed by an adult, but instead proved only 
his prior adjudication of a non-violent felony, we will reverse 
the conviction and remand for a new sentencing proceeding on the 
lesser offense. 
                     
1 Preston was also convicted of driving on a suspended 
license, third offense, in violation of Code § 46.2-301.  That 
conviction is not presently at issue in this appeal. 
 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS2 
Responding to a "disturbance" between Preston and his 
mother, a City of Martinsville police officer observed Preston 
driving away in a vehicle.  Following his apprehension a short 
time later, police found a rifle in the front passenger seat of 
the vehicle, which Preston had deserted.  No one else was 
observed in the vehicle.  With regard to the charge under Code 
§ 18.2-308.2(A)(iii), the Commonwealth introduced at trial two 
exhibits to establish Preston's prior convictions. 
One exhibit was an order from the Circuit Court of Henry 
County, showing Preston had been convicted of grand larceny, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-95.  The other exhibit was a four-page 
document from the City of Martinsville Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court.  The first page was a "Petition," 
charging Preston with breaking and entering, in violation of 
Code § 18.2-91, and bearing the case number JJ001539-02.3  The 
second page was Preston's request for the appointment of an 
attorney.  The last two pages were each titled "Record of 
Proceedings."  Both contained Preston's name as well as the same 
case number as the one listed on the "Petition," JJ001539-02.  
                     
2 We will recite only those facts relevant to the 
dispositive issue. 
3 The crime of breaking and entering in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-91 is classified as a "violent felony" in Code § 17.1-
805(C). 
2 
One page, dated March 22, 1995, indicated under the heading 
"Disposition" that Preston was found "Guilty – disp 4-19-95 
11:45 AM."  The other page, dated April 19, 1995, likewise under 
the heading "Disposition," showed that Preston received 
"Probation, 25 hrs c.s."4  The juvenile and domestic relations 
district court judge signed both pages, but neither page 
contained any information under the headings "Plea" and 
"Findings of Court." 
Preston objected to the introduction of the records from 
the juvenile and domestic relations district court, arguing that 
the document contained "no actual finding of what occurred in 
the case."  The circuit court overruled the objection, stating 
that there was "a disposition which note[d] that [Preston] was 
found guilty."  At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, 
Preston moved to strike the evidence or, alternatively, to 
reduce the charge.  Preston argued, inter alia, that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove he previously had been 
adjudicated delinquent of an act that would be a violent felony 
if committed by an adult.  According to Preston, the juvenile 
and domestic relations district court records did not show the 
crime for which he had been adjudicated delinquent.  The circuit 
court overruled Preston's motion. 
                     
4 We presume that "c.s." refers to community service. 
3 
At the close of all the evidence, Preston renewed his 
motion to strike the evidence, which the circuit court again 
overruled.  The court found Preston guilty of possession of a 
firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent of an act that 
would be a violent felony if committed by an adult and sentenced 
him to the mandatory minimum term of incarceration for five 
years.  See Code § 18.2-308.2(A). 
Preston appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction.  In an unpublished per 
curiam order, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for 
appeal.  Preston v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0751-09-3 (Nov. 12, 
2009).  The Court of Appeals concluded that the records from the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court were sufficient 
to prove that Preston previously had been adjudicated delinquent 
of an act that would be a violent felony if committed by an 
adult.  Id., slip op. at 3.  It pointed to the pages of the 
four-page document, with the exception of the form for 
requesting appointment of counsel, that referenced the same case 
number as the one listed on the "Petition" charging Preston with 
breaking and entering in violation of Code § 18.2-91.  Id.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court judge signed the page showing 
the adjudication of guilt and the page imposing probation and 
4 
community service.  Id.  On consideration by a three-judge 
panel, the Court of Appeals again denied Preston's petition for 
appeal.  Preston v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0751-09-3 (Feb. 26, 
2010).  Preston now appeals to this Court. 
ANALYSIS 
The statute under which Preston was convicted prohibits the 
knowing and intentional possession or transportation of a 
firearm by "any person under the age of 29 who was adjudicated 
delinquent as a juvenile 14 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense of a delinquent act which would be a felony if 
committed by an adult."  Code § 18.2-308.2(A)(iii).  Any person 
violating this section "who was previously convicted of a 
violent felony as defined in [Code] § 17.1-805 shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five 
years."  Code § 18.2-308.2(A).  As we have explained, "the 
Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony, 
designated as such under Code § 17.1-805, in order to establish 
that the defendant is subject to the five-year mandatory minimum 
sentence to be imposed under Code § 18.2-308.2(A)."  Rawls v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 348, 634 S.E.2d 697, 704 (2006).  In 
the absence of such proof, "the defendant is subject to 
imprisonment for a term of between two years and five years."  
Id. 
5 
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Preston previously had been adjudicated delinquent of an act 
that would be a violent felony if committed by an adult.  In 
answering that question, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial 
court.  Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 S.E.2d 
137, 139 (2008).  Sitting without a jury, the circuit court 
acted as the fact finder in this case; thus, the court's 
judgment is afforded the same weight as a jury verdict and will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is "plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it."  Code § 8.01-680; Hickson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1999).  
"However, 'it is just as obligatory upon the appellate court, to 
set aside . . . the judgment of a court, when it is, in its 
opinion, contrary to the law and evidence, and therefore plainly 
wrong, as it is to sustain it when the reverse is true.' "  
Hickson, 258 Va. at 387, 520 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Bland v. 
Commonwealth, 177 Va. 819, 821, 13 S.E.2d 317, 317 (1941)). 
Although the records from the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court, when read together as the Commonwealth 
urges, prove the fact of a conviction, they do not show the 
nature of the conviction.  According to the "Petition," Preston 
was charged with breaking and entering in violation of Code 
6 
§ 18.2-91, which if committed by an adult would be a violent 
felony under Code § 17.1-805(C).  And, each of the two pages 
titled "Record of Proceedings" contained the same record number 
as that appearing on the "Petition."  The juvenile and domestic 
relations district court judge signed those two pages: one 
showed the guilty disposition and the other evidenced the 
imposition of probation and 25 hours of community service. 
The records do not, however, prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Preston was adjudicated delinquent of breaking and 
entering.  As the Court recognized in Palmer v. Commonwealth, 
269 Va. 203, 207, 609 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2005), "a defendant 
charged with felonious conduct may be convicted of a lesser-
included offense, or the original charge may be reduced upon the 
defendant's agreement to plead guilty to the reduced charge."  
Because the sections titled "Plea" and "Findings of Court" are 
blank on the two pages signed by the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court judge, we do not know what plea Preston 
entered or to what charge.  And, the imposition of probation 
along with community service does not necessarily mean that 
Preston was adjudicated delinquent of the act of breaking and 
entering.  See, e.g., Code § 16.1-278.8 (discussing sentencing 
options for juveniles adjudicated delinquent); see also Palmer, 
269 Va. at 208, 609 S.E.2d at 310.  Because the Court is "unable 
to determine the nature of the delinquent act[]" for which 
7 
Preston was adjudicated, the Commonwealth did not meet its 
burden of proving that Preston previously had been adjudicated 
delinquent of an act that would be a violent felony if committed 
by an adult.  Palmer, 269 Va. at 208, 609 S.E.2d at 310. 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertions, our decisions in 
Palmer and Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904, 
(2006), do not compel a different result in the case now before 
us.  Although all three cases have factual differences, the 
cases are similar in that each lacked proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the fact or nature of conviction.  We explained in 
Palmer that 
[a] court may not engage in conjecture or surmise 
in determining the offense for which a defendant 
was convicted. Thus, when the Commonwealth seeks 
to prove a prior conviction as an element of a 
crime by presenting an order entered in that 
prior case, the order must show that a judgment 
of conviction was entered in adjudication of the 
charge. 
 
269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310.  Because the fact finder in 
the instant case was required to "engage in conjecture or 
surmise" to conclude that Preston previously had been 
adjudicated delinquent of an act that would be a violent felony 
if committed by an adult, the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to sustain his conviction. 
However, as the Commonwealth notes, Preston does not 
dispute that he was previously convicted of a non-violent 
8 
felony.  In addition to the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court records, the Commonwealth introduced an order 
showing Preston's prior conviction for grand larceny, a felony.  
See Code §§ 18.2-8 and –95.  In Waller v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 
731, 738, 685 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2009), the Court held that "Code 
§ 18.2-308.2(A), under which [Preston] was indicted, covers both 
an offense committed by a person previously convicted of a 
violent felony and an offense committed by a person previously 
convicted of 'any other felony.' "  Although the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Preston previously had been 
adjudicated delinquent of an act that would be a violent felony 
if committed by an adult, the evidence was, nevertheless, 
sufficient to convict Preston of the lesser offense of 
possessing a firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent of 
an act that would be a non-violent felony if committed by an 
adult.  See id. at 737-38, 685 S.E.2d at 51. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and vacate Preston's conviction for possession 
of a firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent of an act 
that would be a violent felony if committed by an adult.  We 
will remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions 
that it remand the case to the circuit court for a new 
sentencing hearing on the lesser offense of possession of a 
9 
firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent of an act that 
would be a non-violent felony if committed by an adult.5  See id. 
at 738, 685 S.E.2d at 51; Code § 19.2-285. 
Reversed, vacated and remanded. 
                     
5 This disposition is the relief requested by Preston.  In 
light of our holding, we do not need to address Preston's other 
assignment of error. 
10