Title: Glover v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

253 Ind. 121 (1969)
251 N.E.2d 814
GLOVER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 169S17.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 6, 1969.
Owen M. Mullin, Frederick J. Graf, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
ARTERBURN, J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with first degree burglary pursuant to Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 10-701(a). A trial by jury resulted in appellant being found guilty of breaking and entering the home of Mary Newland with intent to commit a felony (Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 10-704) and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years.
Briefly the evidence shows that a house owned by Mary Newland was broken into on or about December 4, 1966, and from the house was taken a TV set, a camera, a coat and other property.
About 3:00 on December 4, 1966, before the burglary was discovered, officer Mize of the Indianapolis Police Department, while patrolling in the neighborhood of the House, observed a 1951 green DeSoto leaving the vicinity of the house in question. He followed it to a service station at English and Emerson where the two occupants jumped out of the automobile and fled. Inside the car the officer found the TV set, *122 camera, the coat and other property identified as belonging to Mary Newland.
At the trial the officer identified the appellant as one of the occupants of the car who fled therefrom at the time in question. The evidence further showed that the DeSoto car in question had been given to the appellant for repair purposes at the time in question.
After officer Mize had testified as to the identity of the appellant he was called back to the stand after cross-examination, and the following testimony was elicited on re-direct examination:
It is apparent, as the trial court states, that the state opened up the testimony with reference to the informant who "put the finger on" the appellant in this case. It is also apparent that the state called officer Mize back on redirect examination to bolster the testimony of the officer as to the identity of the appellant by referring to how the officer tied the picture identifying the defendant, to the defendant.
We should recognize first that this is not one of the rather common cases in which a defendant seeks to find out in preparing his defense preliminary to trial, the name of informers, *125 nor is it a case in which the government refuses to identify and name a participant in the crime, as in the case of Roviaro v. U.S. (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639. In that case the United States charged the defendant with a sale of a narcotic drug to "John Doe" and refused to identify the individual. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to this information. If the government sought to pursue the prosecution it was necessary to a proper preparation of the defense that a defendant have such information. The court in that case reviews the problem of non-disclosures of informants as a matter of public policy. There it stated:
The court finally concludes its discussion with the statement:
The case before us involves one not so much of balancing public interests against that of protecting a defendant, but *126 rather the inherent right of a defendant to attack the probative value of the testimony and the credibility of a witness. In the instant case we have in substance, on redirect examination, an officer testifying that he had reliable testimony or credible testimony from an informant that the appellant was guilty, and he used that to help identify the appellant from a picture. All rules of evidence give a defendant the right to attack this testimony and the source of it, which in fact, is hearsay, since it repeats the statement of a party not a witness. Just how great or how small the impact of this testimony was upon the jury, is not for us to say. However, we point out the state thought it might be of sufficient value to impress the jury or it would not have called the officer back for redirect examination.
This issue arose over the identity of the defendant. Identity as an issue of fact is a troublesome problem that has confronted this Court on occasion before where it has been urged that there are grave miscarriages of justice resulting from an overenthusiastic prosecuting witness in making identifications. Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N.E.2d 641; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 786a, p. 163; Barnes v. State (1946), 246 Ind. 485, 205 N.E.2d 539.
It is important to realize that this is not a case where, on cross examination, it is brought out that officer Mize relied upon an informant in initiating the investigation and getting leads in the investigation. There may be a public policy in preventing the non-disclosure of informants used in such instances where at the trial, no evidence regarding the informant is presented to the jury. Hearsay testimony that law enforcement officers use and rely upon for investigation and the gathering of competent and material evidence, of course is not evidence properly to be used in the trial of a criminal case. Here, however, we have the state opening up the matter and the activity of two informants played up in the case, and then the state seeks to close the door after it had shown that they were "reliable" informants *127 who put the finger of identity upon the appellant. The door cannot be closed once it is opened. If the identity of an informant is to be protected, then it is up to the prosecuting attorney not to bring into the case evidence relating to the informants.
For a rather ample and extensive discussion on revealing the identity of informers in a criminal case, see the Annotation in 76 A.L.R.2d beginning at page 267.
There are other questions raised and presented on this appeal which we need not consider by reason of the viewpoint which we have taken on the question previously discussed.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to grant the appellant a new trial.
DeBruler, C.J., and Hunter, Jackson and Givan, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 251 N.E.2d 814.