Title: Bell v. Hegewald

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

95 Wn.2d 686 (1981) 628 P.2d 1305 JACK T. BELL, ET AL, Petitioners, v. RUDY HEGEWALD, ET AL, Respondents. No. 47169-0. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. June 4, 1981. *688 Duane Lansverk (of Landerholm, Memovich, Lansverk, Whitesides, Marsh, Wilkinson & Klossner, Inc., P.S.), for petitioners. R. DeWitt Jones, for respondents Hegewald. James F. Henriot (of Eisenhower, Carlson, Newlands, Reha, Henriot & Quinn), for respondent Louisiana Pacific Corp. DOLLIVER, J. Jack Bell, real estate broker, and Margaret Junge (now Sherman), real estate salesperson, commenced this action against Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Hegewald for breach of oral contract to pay a sales commission, and against Louisiana Pacific Corporation for breach of its promise to protect their commission. At the close of plaintiffs' case, Hegewald moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that, because the oral agreement involved the sale of real property, it was brought within the statute of frauds. The trial court denied the motion. The jury awarded Bell and Junge $197,186.04 against both Hegewald and Louisiana Pacific Corporation, plus $77,732.07 in interest against Hegewald. The trial court denied defense motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, remanding for a new trial as to Hegewald and the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the claim against Louisiana Pacific. We reverse the Court of Appeals. [1] An appellate court will sustain findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Wicklund, 93 Wn.2d 497, 610 P.2d 903 (1980). "Substantial evidence is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise." *689 Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978). [2] Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, including a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we have said that challenge Powers v. Hastings, 93 Wn.2d 709, 713, 612 P.2d 371 (1980), quoting from Davis v. Early Constr. Co., 63 Wn.2d 252, 254-55, 386 P.2d 958 (1963). We further stated that in an action for damages as opposed to specific performance, the degree of evidence required is substantial evidence, rather than evidence which is "clear and unequivocal." Powers v. Hastings, supra at 714. The evidence showed that in 1973 Junge worked as a salesperson for Bell, a real estate broker in Vancouver. Early in March of that year, Junge contacted Rudy Hegewald and inquired if he was interested in selling his sawmill complex. Junge knew at the time that Louisiana Pacific Corporation was engaged in an acquisition program and hoped to interest it in the sale. Hegewald stated that he would be interested in talking with a strong purchaser, and for her to arrange a meeting. According to Junge, she told Hegewald to be sure to include a 6 percent commission when figuring a price, but Hegewald testified contrarily that Junge had not told him she was a salesperson or that he would be responsible for the commission. Junge subsequently arranged to have representatives of Louisiana Pacific tour Hegewald's sawmill complex. At the end of the tour Junge advised Hegewald privately to be sure to include a 6 percent commission when setting a price. Sometime after the tour of the plant, Junge called *690 Hegewald in response to a request by Louisiana Pacific to ask Hegewald if he had determined a price. She again told Hegewald to include a 6 percent commission. Neither Junge nor Bell attended the actual negotiations between Louisiana Pacific and Hegewald. Bell testified that Louisiana Pacific asked him not to attend because the negotiations were usually handled strictly between the seller and themselves. Consequently, Bell testified that he asked a representative of Louisiana Pacific to cover and protect their interest. The representative answered by stating that he would see that they were protected and bring it up during the negotiations. Both Bell and Junge testified that they were aware that Louisiana Pacific never paid commissions or finder's fees. Although there was some testimony that consideration was given to the sale of real estate, the ultimate transaction was the acquisition of all the common stock of Hegewald Timber Company by Louisiana Pacific Corporation. [3] A contract may be oral. Hankins v. American Pac. Sales Corp., 7 Wn. App. 316, 499 P.2d 214 (1972). A contract may be implied in fact with its existence depending on some act or conduct of the party sought to be charged. It may arise by inference or implication from circumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, show a mutual intention on the part of the parties to contract with each other. Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128, 201 P.2d 129 (1948). On the question of whether Hegewald breached an oral contract, the trial court ruled: On the question of whether Louisiana Pacific breached its promise to protect the commission, the trial court ruled: Interpreting the evidence most strongly against the defendants and in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we agree with the trial court that the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Defendants, however, contend the commission is barred under the statute of frauds. The portion of the statute of frauds urged upon us by defendants reads: RCW 19.36.010. [4] The intent of the statute is to prevent fraud. Farley v. Fair, 144 Wash. 101, 256 P. 1031 (1927); Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wn.2d 821, 479 P.2d 919 (1971). This "statute precluding a broker or agent from recovering commission, unless his authority is in writing ... must be strictly construed, and ... will not apply to cases which are not strictly within its terms." Chambers v. Kirkpatrick, 145 Wash. 277, 280, 259 P. 878 (1927); Gronvold v. Whaley, 39 Wn.2d 710, 237 P.2d 1026 (1951). *692 [5, 6] As is stated in 1 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations § 31 (1974), at page 133: RCW 19.36.010(5) does not apply to the sale of personal property. Evans v. Marrenger, 133 Wash. 411, 233 P. 924 (1925); Merritt v. American Catering Co., 71 Wash. 425, 128 P. 1074 (1912). In considering the applicability of the statute of frauds, the trial court stated: In the judgment of the trial court as established by the pleadings and supported by the proof, the statute of frauds was not applicable. See Evans v. Marrenger, supra; Rutcosky v. Tracy, 89 Wn.2d 606, 574 P.2d 382 (1978). Under these circumstances, it was not improper for the court to refuse to submit the question of the applicability of that statute to the jury. Gross v. Lynnwood, 90 Wn.2d 395, 401, *693 583 P.2d 1197, 96 A.L.R.3d 187 (1978). We hold there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find the existence of an oral contract between the plaintiffs and both Rudy Hegewald and Louisiana Pacific, and that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to this case. The Court of Appeals is reversed. BRACHTENBACH, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, UTTER, HICKS, WILLIAMS, DORE, and DIMMICK, JJ., concur. Reconsideration denied July 22, 1981.