Title: South Trail Fire Control District v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

273 So. 2d 380 (1973)
SOUTH TRAIL FIRE CONTROL DISTRICT, SARASOTA COUNTY, Florida, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, and the Taxpayers, Property Owners and Citizens of the South Trail Fire Control District, Sarasota County, Florida, Including Nonresidents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, et al., Appellees.
SOUTH TRAIL AREA FIRE CONTROL DISTRICT, a Florida Corporation, Appellant,
v.
TOWN HALL et al., Appellees.
Nos. 42824, 42825.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 21, 1973.
*381 Nelson, Stinnett, Surfus, Korp & Payne, Venice, and Freeman, Richardson, Watson, Slade & McCarthy, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Henry P. Trawick, Jr., of Millican & Trawick, Sarasota, for appellees.
ADKINS, Justice.
These related causes, consolidated for convenience, are direct appeals from two dependent judgments of the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, one declaring Ch. 70-933, Laws of Florida, to be unconstitutional, and a second denying validation of a bond issue. We have jurisdiction. Fla. Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
Appellant, Fire District, a special taxing district created by the Legislature, sought to issue $200,000 in bonds to help provide fire protection for the property encompassed by the Fire District in Sarasota County. The financing would come from taxes based on an assessment plan authorized by the Legislature in Ch. 70-933, Laws of Florida, and approved by the voters *382 in a referendum election. The statute contains the following:
Town Hall and other commercial property owners, hereafter referred to as "Owners," filed suit against the planned assessment, attacking the validity of Ch. 70-933, Laws of Florida. The Circuit Court held the act to be unconstitutional and then denied the validation of the bond issue because part of the repayment plan had been invalidated.
The Owners submit the following question in their brief:
The Owners say the primary question is one of discrimination in that business and commercial property owners were paying 17.2% of the total assessments, while the value of their property was only 10.8% of all of the property in the district and they receive only 6% of the actual services of the district. The percentage of benefit was attempted to be shown by analyzing the number of fire calls. However, the evidence indicates that 34% of the structural fires in 1971 occurred in commercial structures. The Chief of the Fire District testified that the average would be around 27% to 28% of all structural fires, which is well above the 17% of the cost borne by the commercial property owners.
There is evidence that a commercial fire automatically demands more man power and equipment because of the condition surrounding a commercial structure, the size of the building, the density of buildings in a commercial area, and the volume of flammable materials collected in a commercial or business structure. Commercial *383 owners receive an annual fire inspection, which is available to residential owners only on demand. The following discussion of the rules relating to determination of benefits from a special assessment is found in 48 Am.Jur., Special or Local Assessments, § 29, pp. 588-589:
In Ch. 70-933, Laws of Florida, the Legislature made a specific finding that the maximum rates of assessment set forth therein were "found, determined and declared to be reasonable and in such amounts as not to exceed the benefits accruing to said property within the district." A matter of this kind depends largely upon opinion and judgment as to what will, or will not, prove a benefit to the district and the Court should not substitute its opinion and judgment for that of the Legislature in the absence of a clear and full showing of arbitrary action or a plain abuse. Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County, 95 Fla. 632, 116 So. 771 (1928); Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449 (1928).
The facts in the case sub judice fail to show that the Legislature has acted in an arbitrary and unwarranted manner.
In Meyer v. City of Oakland Park, 219 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1969), we said:
In Meyer v. City of Oakland Park, supra, we approved a legislative authorization for assessments upon a square foot basis as to all properties specially benefited. The statute under consideration authorized the special assessment to be by any one or combination of the methods set forth therein. See also Fire District No. 1 of Polk County v. Jenkins, 221 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1969), where the Court held that special assessments against mobile homes rental spaces were not arbitrary or discriminatory.
Apportionment of the cost of a public improvement is essential to the validity of the assessment therefor, and the assessment must represent a fair proportional part of the total cost of the improvement. The assessment must not be in excess of the proportional benefits as compared to other assessments on other lots and tracts affected by the improvement. See McQuillin, Volume XIV, Municipal Corporations, § 38.121 (1970). The manner of the assessment is immaterial and may vary within the district, as long as the amount of the assessment for each tract is not in excess of the proportional benefits as compared to other assessments on other tracts. The mere fact that some property is assessed on an area basis, and other property is assessed at a flat rate basis, does not in itself establish the invalidity of the special assessment.
In the case sub judice, all that has been shown is the comparative value of the commercial property involved and the fact that the taxes have risen sharply for the Owners. Other considerations, including frequency of fires, man power and equipment requirements, and benefits extended to commercial properties are not sufficiently rebutted. We cannot see that the Owners have met the burden of clearly showing the invalidity of the act.
Accordingly, the two judgments of the trial court appealed from are, and must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further bond validation proceedings, not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.