Title: Hines v. Armbrester

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

477 So. 2d 302 (1985)
Sheryl HINES
v.
Dr. C.R. ARMBRESTER and Enterprise Hospital and Nursing Home.
83-1181.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 20, 1985.
*303 Bill Kominos of Fuqual & Kominos, Ozark, for appellant.
Fred W. Tyson of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, for appellee The Estate of Dr. C.R. Armbrester.
Philip S. Gidiere, Jr. of Carpenter & Gidiere, Montgomery, for appellee Enterprise Hospital.
ADAMS, Justice.
This case involves a claim of medical malpractice against Dr. C.R. Armbrester and the Enterprise Hospital and Nursing Home. The gist of the action is that Dr. C.R. Armbrester negligently diagnosed and treated plaintiff's medical condition below the standards required by the medical community. Plaintiff also claims that Enterprise Hospital and Nursing Home failed to meet the standard of care of hospitals dealing with a case such as hers.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, thus bringing to a final conclusion plaintiff's litigation, hence this appeal. We affirm.
The important facts which triggered this litigation are as follows:
The plaintiff, Sheryl Hines, was first seen by Dr. Armbrester in the second trimester of her pregnancy on September 25, 1980. She continued to see him periodically, and on January 5, 1981, she was admitted to the Enterprise Hospital and Nursing Home for the delivery of her baby. The delivery was accomplished on the same day of the admission. Plaintiff's sojourn in the hospital was as uneventful as her prenatal treatment, and she was discharged from the hospital on January 8, 1981. On January 13, 1981, plaintiff called Dr. Armbrester, complaining of having afterbirth pains, and he prescribed a medication for this complaint. On January 18, 1981, plaintiff called to tell her doctor that she was passing some blood clots. Dr. Sanders, standing in for Dr. Armbrester, admitted plaintiff *304 to the hospital. On January 19, 1981, Dr. Armbrester consulted with Dr. Sanders and then treated plaintiff with medication for vaginal bleeding and discharged her on January 20, 1981. Dr. Armbrester noted that the medication was reducing the bleeding.
Again, on January 23, 1981, plaintiff complained about vaginal bleeding and again plaintiff was given medication until January 25, 1981, when she was discharged. She was not seen by Dr. Armbrester after January 25, 1981.
On January 27, 1981, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Taylor Caffee at his office in Ozark, Alabama. The next day he performed a D & C on plaintiff and within two weeks, she was completely recovered. Her uterus had returned to normal size and the bleeding had stopped.
There is only one issue in this case. That issue is whether the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment for each of the defendants in this case, based on the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions filed herein.
Plaintiff strongly urges us to observe the general principle that under ordinary circumstances summary judgment is inappropriate in negligence cases because these cases, by their very nature, involve factfinding determinations on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, which the jury is in the best position to assess. Plaintiff argues that the testimony of Dr. Taylor Caffee provided at least a gleam, glimmer, spark, or particle of evidence of negligence, thus providing the necessary scintilla which would entitle plaintiff to a jury trial to determine negligence vel non. She says that even though Dr. Armbrester, in his deposition, stated that his treatment of plaintiff, even though conservative, was in keeping with the standards of care of the medical profession for the treatment of this case, the deposition of Dr. Taylor Caffee rebutted this statement, thus providing the scintilla of evidence required to allow plaintiff to go to the jury.
Both doctors conclude that plaintiff's problem was caused by a retained placenta. Plaintiff claims that the failure to immediately remove this necrotic placental tissue, and allowing it to become inflamed in the vaginal vault, are not in keeping with the standard required in the medical community.
The damaging evidence in this case, according to the plaintiff, is Dr. Caffee's deposition testimony. That testimony is as follows:
The deposition also shows:
We certainly would agree with plaintiff that her medical expert, Dr. Caffee, had provided the necessary scintilla to allow this case to go to the jury if this were the whole of his testimony. This case is strikingly similar to a recent decision of this Court in a medical malpractice case where we said that if a portion of the testimony of plaintiff's expert were viewed abstractly, independently, and separately from the balance of his testimony it would appear sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Malone v. Daugherty, 453 So. 2d 721 (Ala.1984). However, we are not to view testimony so abstractly. We are to view the testimony as a whole, and, so viewing it, determine if the testimony is sufficient to create a reasonable inference of the fact the plaintiff seeks to prove. In other words, can we say, considering the *305 entire testimony of the plaintiff's expert, that an inference that the defendant doctor had acted contrary to recognized standards of professional care was created? We have also applied the same principle in the regular negligence context. Alabama Power Company v. Smith, 409 So. 2d 760 (Ala.1982).
Let us view the testimony of plaintiff's expert in the light of these standards:
In light of the foregoing testimony we cannot conclude that plaintiff has provided the necessary expertise required in a medical malpractice case. This Court said in Tant v. Women's Clinic, 382 So. 2d 1120 (Ala.1980):
382 So. 2d  at 1121.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that a physician would be liable just because another member of his profession would have treated the case a different way. Here, the defendant doctor proceeded to treat the condition on a conservative basis. At best, the testimony of Dr. Caffee only indicates that he would have performed the D & C sooner. In Sims v. Callahan, 269 Ala. 216, 112 So. 2d 776 (1959), this Court stated:
269 Ala. at 225, 112 So. 2d  at 783.
The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate useless and time-consuming trials where there is no genuine issue of material fact and resolution of the issue is narrowed to a question of law. Here, the physician, as well as the hospital, would have had to have breached the standard of care required by physicians and hospitals handling the same, or a similar, case. This, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, when Dr. Caffee's testimony is viewed as a whole. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. Liner v. Temple, 373 So. 2d 638 (Ala.1979).
There was no effort on the part of plaintiff to introduce a deposition or affidavit in opposition to the affidavit furnished by the defendant hospital. That affidavit, if uncontradicted, was sufficient to support summary judgment in the hospital's favor. Under such circumstances, the trial court is obligated to apply Rule 56(e) strictly:
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for both defendants. Therefore, its judgment is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.