Title: County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S239907 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D068657 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2014-00005050-CU-WM-CTL 
 
 
November 19, 2018 
 
Justice Cuéllar filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Meehan concurred.   
 
 
1 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE 
MANDATES 
S239907 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
When convicted sex offenders have a diagnosed mental 
disorder making it likely they would engage in sexually violent 
behavior if released, they are subject to civil commitment 
proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA; 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).  County governments are 
responsible for filing the commitment petition, providing 
counsel and experts for all hearings on the petition, and housing 
the individual potentially subject to commitment while the 
petition is adjudicated.  Carrying out these tasks takes more 
than diligence and organization from counties –– it takes 
money.  What we must decide in this case is who pays for the 
duties the SVPA imposes on county governments.   
For the first 15 years of the SVPA’s existence, it was the 
State of California that –– according to the Commission on State 
Mandates (Commission) –– had to foot the bill.  But in early 
2013, the Department of Finance (Department) asked the 
Commission to reconsider its earlier decision and declare that 
the SVPA was no longer a state-mandated program.  The 
Department argued that the state’s financial responsibility 
ceased on November 7, 2006, when the voters enacted The 
Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act:  Jessica’s Law 
(Proposition 83), which “substantively amended and reenacted 
various sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code that had 
served as the basis for the Commission’s Statement of Decision.”  
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
(See Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (f) [duties that are “expressly 
included in” or “necessary to implement” a ballot measure do not 
constitute “costs mandated by the state”].)  The Commission 
approved the Department’s request for redetermination in part 
and identified six county duties (and part of a seventh) that, 
effective July 1, 2011,1 no longer constituted reimbursable state 
mandates.  (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of 
Decision 
No. 
12-MR-01 
(Dec. 
6, 
2013), 
pp. 
54-55 
 [as of November 
15, 2018]; all Internet citations in this opinion are archived by 
year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.)   
Soon thereafter, the counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, 
Orange, Sacramento, and San Bernardino (collectively, the 
Counties) filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and 
a complaint for declaratory relief against the Commission, the 
State of California, the Department, and John Chiang in his 
then-official capacity as State Controller (collectively, the State 
respondents).  The San Diego County Superior Court denied the 
petition and dismissed the complaint.  The Court of Appeal 
reversed, finding that Proposition 83 did not alter in any way 
the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties for the costs of 
implementing the SVPA.  (County of San Diego v. Commission 
on State Mandates (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 12, 18 (County of San 
Diego).). We agree that the Commission erred when it treated 
Proposition 83 as a basis for terminating the state’s obligation 
to reimburse the Counties simply because certain provisions of 
                                        
1  
Under Government Code section 17557, subdivision (e), a 
test claim submitted on or before June 30 following a fiscal year 
establishes “eligibility for reimbursement for that fiscal year.”    
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
the SVPA had been restated without substantive change in 
Proposition 83.  But we also remand the matter to the 
Commission so it can determine, in the first instance, whether 
and how the initiative’s expanded definition of an SVP may 
affect the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties for 
implementing the amended statute.   
I. 
A. 
The state has conditional authority to enlist a local 
government in carrying out a new program or providing a higher 
level of service for an existing program.  Only when the state 
“reimburse[s] that local government for the costs of the program 
or increased level of service” may the state impose such a 
mandate on its local governments.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, 
subd. (a).)  No reimbursement is required, though, where “[t]he 
statute or executive order imposes a requirement that is 
mandated by a federal law or regulation and results in costs 
mandated by the federal government” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. 
(c)) or where “[t]he statute or executive order imposes duties 
that are necessary to implement, or are expressly included in, a 
ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide or local 
election” (id., subd. (f)).   
Predictably, local governments often disagree with the 
state about who is responsible for funding new programs.  For 
the first five years after article XIII B was adopted, such 
unresolved disputes ended up in court.  This arrangement led to 
unnecessary litigation, burdened the judiciary, delayed 
reimbursement, and injected uncertainty into budget planning 
at both the state and local levels.  (See Kinlaw v. State of 
California (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331; Gov. Code, § 17500.)  
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
Eventually, the Legislature created the Commission to 
streamline resolution of these disputes (Gov. Code, §§ 17525, 
17551), and adopted procedures for submission and adjudication 
of reimbursement claims (§ 17500 et seq.).  So when the 
Legislature now enacts a statute imposing obligations on a local 
agency without providing adequate funding to allow the locality 
to discharge those obligations, the local entity may file a “test 
claim” with the Commission.  (§ 17521; see Lucia Mar Unified 
School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 833.)  The 
Commission then decides, after a hearing, whether the statute 
that is the subject of the test claim under review (i.e., the test 
claim statute) mandates a new program or an increased level of 
service and, if so, the amount to be reimbursed.  (§§ 17551, 
17557.)  Either the local agency or the state may challenge the 
Commission’s decision in court by filing a petition for writ of 
administrative mandate.  (§ 17559, subd. (b).)    
In 2010, the Legislature enabled either party to request 
reconsideration of a prior Commission decision.  Using formal 
procedures prescribed by statute, an affected state or local 
agency may ask that the Commission “adopt a new test claim 
decision to supersede a previously adopted test claim decision 
. . . upon a showing that the state’s liability for that test claim 
decision . . . has been modified based on a subsequent change in 
law.”  (Gov. Code, § 17570, subd. (b).)  Section 17570, subdivision 
(a)(2) defines a “ ‘[s]ubsequent change in law’ ” as a “change in 
law that requires a finding that an incurred cost is a cost 
mandated by the state, as defined by Section 17514, or is not a 
cost mandated by the state pursuant to Section 17556.”  Under 
the Commission’s regulations implementing these provisions, 
the request for a new test claim decision proceeds in two steps.  
At the first hearing, the Commission decides whether the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
requesting agency “has made an adequate showing” of “a 
subsequent change in law . . . material to the prior test claim 
decision.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 1190.5, subd. (a)(1).)  A 
showing is “adequate” if the Commission finds the requesting 
agency “has a substantial possibility of prevailing at the second 
hearing.”  (Ibid.)  At the second hearing, the Commission decides 
“whether the state’s liability . . . has been modified based on the 
subsequent change in law alleged by the requester, thus 
requiring adoption of a new test claim decision to supersede the 
previously adopted test claim decision.”  (Id., subd. (b)(1).)  If so, 
the Commission “shall adopt a new decision that reflects the 
modified liability of the state.”  (Ibid.)   
B. 
The SVPA was enacted by the Legislature in 1995 to 
enable the involuntary civil commitment of certain persons.  The 
individuals subject to civil commitment under the SVPA are 
those who, following completion of their prison terms, have a 
diagnosed mental disorder that makes them likely to engage in 
sexually violent behavior.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. 
(a)(1); see People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 984.)  
Subsequently, the County of Los Angeles filed a test claim 
seeking reimbursement from the state for the costs of complying 
with the duties imposed by the SVPA.  On June 25, 1998, the 
Commission adopted a statement of decision approving 
reimbursement for the following eight specific local government 
duties (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 
CSM-4509 (June 25, 1998) p. 12  [as of November 15, 2018]): 
1.  Designation by the County Board of Supervisors of the 
appropriate district attorney or county counsel who will be 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
responsible for the SVP civil commitment proceedings (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i)); 
2.  Initial review of reports and records by the county’s 
designated counsel to determine whether the county concurs 
with the state’s recommendation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, 
subd. (i));   
3.  Preparation and filing of the petition for commitment 
by the county’s designated counsel (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, 
subd. (i));   
4.  Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 
counsel and indigent defense counsel at the probable cause 
hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602);   
5.  Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 
counsel and indigent defense counsel at trial (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 6603, 6604);   
6.  Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 
counsel and indigent defense counsel at subsequent hearings 
regarding the condition of the SVP (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6605, 
former subds. (b)-(d), 6608, subds. (a) & (b), former subdivisions 
(c) & (d));   
7.  Retention of necessary experts, investigators, and 
professionals for preparation for trial and subsequent hearings 
regarding the condition of the SVP (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603, 
6605, former subd. (d)); and  
8.  Transportation and housing for each potential SVP at 
a secured facility while the individual awaits trial on the SVP 
determination.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602.) 
The Department then began reimbursing counties in a 
manner consistent with the Commission’s decision.  For fiscal 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
year 2012-2013, the state reimbursed counties approximately 
$20.75 million to cover the cost of implementing the SVP 
mandate.  The Department estimated the mandate costs for 
fiscal year 2013-2014 to be approximately $21.79 million.   
In January 2013, though, the Department sought to 
terminate these payments by requesting that the Commission 
adopt a new test claim under Government Code section 17570.  
In the Department’s view, the state mandate ended when the 
voters enacted Proposition 83 at the November 7, 2006, General 
Election.  The Department argued that each of the state-
mandated duties was now either “expressly included in” or 
“necessary to implement” Proposition 83, “a ballot measure 
approved by the voters in a statewide . . . election.”  (Gov. Code, 
§ 17556, subd. (f).) 
It is true that Proposition 83 included several of the 
statutory mandates on which the Commission’s 1998 ruling 
relied.  But as the parties concede, these provisions were 
reprinted in Proposition 83 solely because the California 
Constitution requires that “[a] section of a statute may not be 
amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 9.)  Both parties admit Proposition 83 made no 
changes to many of the provisions the Commission had 
identified as imposing state-mandated duties on local 
governments and revised the remainder only in nonsubstantive 
ways.  Nonetheless, on July 26, 2013, the Commission 
determined that the Department had made a sufficient showing 
of a “ ‘subsequent change in law’ ” within the meaning of 
Government Code section 17570, subdivision (a)(2) to raise a 
substantial possibility of prevailing at the second hearing.  (Cal. 
Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 
(July 26, 2013), p. 13  [as of November 15, 2018]; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 
2, § 1190.5, subd. (a)(1).)  The Commission deemed it “irrelevant 
. . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive changes to the 
SVP code sections” and instead found it sufficient that the 
“ballot measure expressly includes some of the same activities 
as the test claim statutes that were found to impose a 
reimbursable mandate” in the Commission’s 1998 ruling.  (Cal. 
Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 
(July 26, 2013), supra, at p. 18, italics added.)   
Following 
the 
second 
hearing, 
the 
Commission 
determined that Proposition 83 had transformed six of the eight 
listed local government duties (and part of a seventh) from 
reimbursable state-mandated activities into nonreimbursable 
voter-mandated activities.  Once again, the Commission deemed 
it “irrelevant . . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive 
changes at all to the SVP code sections.”  (Cal. Com. on State 
Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), 
supra, at p. 39.)  What proved pivotal for the Commission 
instead was “that Proposition 83 amended and reenacted 
wholesale most of the code sections that gave rise to the 
mandated activities found in the [original] test claim.”  (Ibid.)   
Accordingly, local government duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 
7, which were “expressly included” in the ballot measure, were 
no longer reimbursable.  (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 
Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at pp. 
23-25.)  The Commission further reasoned that local 
government duty 5 (the preparation and attendance at trial by 
the county’s designated counsel and appointed counsel for 
indigents), the remainder of local government duty 7 (the 
retention of necessary experts for trial), and part of local 
government duty 8 (transportation and housing of SVP while 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
awaiting trial) were “required in order to satisfy due process.”  
(Id. at p. 34; see id. at pp. 36-37.)  Because these activities were 
“necessary to implement” the ballot measure, they likewise were 
no longer reimbursable.  (Id. at pp. 36-37.)  Only local 
government duty 4 (preparation and attendance by counsel at a 
probable cause hearing) and the remainder of local government 
duty 8 (transportation to and from a state-mandated probable 
cause hearing) were deemed by the Commission to be 
reimbursable costs:  the statutory provisions underlying these 
activities were neither reenacted in the ballot measure nor 
required by due process.  (Id. at pp. 33, 37, 54-55.)  In declaring 
that local government duties 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and part of 8 were 
no longer state mandates, the Commission did not rely on — let 
alone discuss — the theory that these duties might be 
nonreimbursable because they are necessary to implement 
Proposition 83’s expanded definition of an SVP.2   
The Counties responded by filing a petition for a writ of 
administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief.  
The writ petition sought an order setting aside the 
Commission’s statements of decision issued on July 26, 2013, 
                                        
2  
Proposition 83 expanded the definition of “sexually violent 
predator” to include those who have a diagnosed mental disorder 
rendering them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior and 
have been convicted of a sexually violent offense “against one or 
more victims.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1), italics 
added.)  Prior to Proposition 83, an SVP included only those who 
had been convicted of a qualifying offense “against two or more 
victims.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, former subd. (a)(1), italics 
added; Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 53, p. 2661.)  Prior law also 
permitted only one prior juvenile adjudication of a sexually 
violent offense to be used as a qualifying conviction (§ 6600, 
former subd. (g); Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 53, p. 2661), but 
Proposition 83 removed that limitation.  (§ 6600, subd. (g).) 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
and December 6, 2013.  The complaint asked for a declaration 
that Government Code sections 17556, subdivision (f) and 17570 
are unconstitutional and that the costs incurred by localities in 
carrying out the SVPA continue to be reimbursable.  The trial 
court denied relief.  The court reasoned that Proposition 83 
broadened the definition of an SVP and thus “was more than a 
mere restatement” of existing law.  Even if Proposition 83 were 
construed as a “simple reenactment,” though, “the effect of 
voter-approval cannot be ignored as transforming certain 
requirements of the Act into voter-approved mandates.”  The 
court 
also 
rejected 
the 
Counties’ 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of the two statutes.  
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter to 
the Commission for reconsideration.  It found that the statutory 
duties identified in the Commission’s 2013 test claim ruling 
were neither necessary to implement nor expressly included in 
Proposition 83 “[b]ecause the duties imposed by the statutes at 
issue were not affected by Proposition 83.”  (County of San Diego, 
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.)  The court declined to accord any 
significance to the ballot measure’s expanded definition of an 
SVP (see fn. 2, ante) because the Commission’s 1998 decision 
had previously concluded that the definition set forth in Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 6600 “was not a basis for any of 
the duties for which the Counties sought reimbursement.”  
(County of San Diego, at p. 36.)   
We granted the State respondents’ petition for review to 
consider whether Proposition 83, by amending and reenacting 
provisions of the SVPA, constituted a “subsequent change in 
law” sufficient to modify the Commission’s prior decision, which 
directed the State of California to reimburse local governments 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
for the costs of implementing the SVPA.  (Gov. Code, § 17570, 
subd. (b).) 
II. 
To resolve the question before us, we must consider four 
distinct legal principles.  First, the state must reimburse local 
governments for the costs of discharging mandates imposed by 
the Legislature.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a).)  Second, 
this reimbursement requirement does not apply to those 
activities that are necessary to implement, or are expressly 
included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters.  (Gov. 
Code, § 17556, subd. (f).)  Third, a statute must be reenacted in 
full as amended if any part of it is amended.  (Cal. Const., art. 
IV, § 9.)  And fourth, the Legislature is prohibited from 
amending an initiative statute unless the initiative itself 
permits amendment.  (Id., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)  The 
determination whether the statutes at issue here impose a state 
mandate — and thus require reimbursement — is a question of 
law we review independently.  (See Department of Finance v. 
Commission on State Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, 762; 
County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 
109.) 
A. 
We begin with the requirement that the state reimburse 
local governments for costs incurred when the state enlists their 
assistance in implementing a state program.  (See Cal. Const., 
art. XIII B, § 6.)  The voters added this requirement to the state 
Constitution soon after enacting Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. 
XIII A), a measure that “severely restricted the taxing powers of 
local governments.”  (County of Fresno v. State (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
482, 487.)  The purpose of article XIII B, section 63 was to 
prevent the state from unfairly shifting the costs of government 
onto local entities that were ill-equipped to shoulder the task.  
(County of Fresno, at p. 487.)  As a result, the state now, with 
certain exceptions, must “ ‘pay for any new governmental 
programs, or for higher levels of service under existing 
programs, that it imposes upon local governmental agencies.’ ”  
(County of San Diego v. State of California, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 81.)   
Government 
Code 
section 
17556 
outlines 
six 
circumstances where duties imposed by statute on local 
governments are not deemed “costs mandated by the state.”  
Among these is the circumstance where “[t]he statute . . . 
imposes duties that are necessary to implement, or are expressly 
included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters in a 
statewide or local election.”  (§ 17556, subd. (f).)  In other words, 
the state must reimburse local governments for mandates 
imposed by the Legislature, but not for mandates imposed by 
the voters themselves through an initiative.  (See California 
School Boards Assn. v. State of California (2009) 171 
Cal.App.4th 1183, 1207.)  Where the Legislature cannot use the 
ordinary legislative process to amend or alter duties imposed by 
the voters (see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c)), it can no 
longer be reasonably characterized as the source of those duties.   
                                        
3  
Article XIII B, section 6, subdivision (a) of the California 
Constitution provides in relevant part that “[w]henever the 
Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 
higher level of service on any local government, the State shall 
provide a subvention of funds to reimburse that local 
government for the costs of the program or increased level of 
service . . . .”   
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
The question left unresolved by these provisions is what, 
precisely, qualifies as a mandate imposed by the voters.  
Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f) exempts from 
reimbursement only those “duties that are necessary to 
implement, or are expressly included in, a ballot measure 
approved by the voters.”  The boundaries of this subdivision 
depend, then, on the definition of a “ballot measure” in section 
17556.  Our reading of the provision’s text, the overall statutory 
structure, and related constitutional provisions persuades us 
that not every single word printed in the body of an initiative 
falls within the scope of the statutory terms “expressly included 
in . . . a ballot measure.”  (§ 17556, subd. (f); see People v. Chavez 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 779.)  Discerning the extent of the state’s 
obligation to reimburse local governments for existing state 
mandates in the wake of a voter-approved initiative that 
includes the text of a previously enacted law –– and the 
Legislature’s power to amend any of its provisions — takes a 
more nuanced analysis. 
Many voter initiatives (such as Proposition 83) amend 
existing statutory sections.  Among these are statutory sections 
that have already been determined to impose reimbursable 
duties on local governments.  When an existing statutory section 
is amended — even in the tiniest part — the state Constitution 
requires the entire section to be reenacted as amended.  (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 9; see Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 978, 990 (Yoshisato) [“The effect of this section is that 
voters considering an initiative . . . that seeks to make discrete 
amendments to selected provisions of an existing statute, are 
forced to reenact the entire statute as amended in order to 
accomplish the desired amendments”].)  The rationale for 
compelling reenactment of an entire statutory section when only 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
a part is being amended is to avoid “ ‘the enactment of statutes 
in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes 
deceived in regard to their effect’ ” and the risk that “ ‘the public, 
from the difficulty of making the necessary examination and 
comparison, failed to become appr[]ised of the changes made in 
the laws.’ ”  (Hellman v. Shoulters (1896) 114 Cal. 136, 152.) 
Consequently, a substantial part of almost any statutory 
initiative will include a restatement of existing provisions with 
only minor, nonsubstantive changes — or no changes at all.   
Proposition 83 is an example.  It reenacted verbatim 
subdivision (i) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6601, 
which the Commission’s 1998 ruling had identified as the source 
of local government duties 1, 2, and 3.  The initiative made 
changes to individual subdivisions of Welfare and Institutions 
Code sections 6605 and 6608, which the Commission’s 1998 
ruling had identified as the source for local government duties 6 
and part of 7.  But the minor changes to the procedures 
governing the filing of a petition for conditional release had no 
effect on those mandated duties.  The ballot measure made only 
one minor, nonsubstantive change to section 6608, subdivision 
(a) but otherwise restated the statute verbatim.  The voters also 
reenacted verbatim former subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 
6605 and, while amending former subdivision (b), made no 
changes to the mandated duties.  Whatever else Proposition 83 
accomplished, it effectively left undisturbed these test claim 
statutes and the various mandates imposed therein.   
The Commission nonetheless found the mere existence of 
Proposition 83 sufficient to transfer fiscal responsibility for the 
costs of these duties from the state to county governments.  In 
the Commission’s view, “the extent and degree of substantive 
amendments” made by a ballot measure are “immaterial” to the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
source of the mandate.  (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 
Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at p. 
39.)  The Commission believed “it is irrelevant to the analysis 
. . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive changes at all 
to the SVP code sections.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  What mattered 
instead, from its perspective, is that “Proposition 83 amended 
and reenacted wholesale most of the code sections that gave rise 
to the mandated activities found in the [1998] test claim.”  (Ibid.)  
Relying simply on the fact that certain SVPA provisions were 
restated in Proposition 83, the Commission concluded that local 
government duties 1, 2, 3, and 6 (as well as part of 7) were 
“expressly included in” a ballot measure within the meaning of 
Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f).  
We conclude that the Commission’s approach is at odds 
with the constitutional requirement that the state reimburse 
local governments for the costs of complying with state 
mandates.  (Cf. Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 989 [rejecting 
an interpretation that “assigns undue import to the technical 
procedures for amending statutes”].)  If the term “ballot 
measure” in Government Code section 17556 were defined as 
automatically 
including 
every 
provision 
subject 
to 
constitutionally compelled restatement in an initiative, it would 
sweep in vast swaths of the California Code.  Neither the 
Commission nor the other State respondents point to anything 
indicating that the Legislature intended to terminate 
reimbursement for existing state mandates simply because the 
provisions creating the mandate happened to be restated 
without change in an initiative statute.   
According pivotal significance to a mere technical 
restatement also would prove difficult to reconcile with 
Government Code section 9605.  What this statute provides is 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
that “[w]here a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not 
to be considered as having been repealed and reenacted in the 
amended form.  The portions which are not altered are to be 
considered as having been the law from the time when they were 
enacted; the new provisions are to be considered as having been 
enacted at the time of the amendment . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 9605; 
see People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44, fn. 4 [where voter-
approved amendments “did not substantively change the credits 
provision” in existing law, “there were no reenactments”].)  As 
we have long held, “ ‘[t]he portions of the amended section which 
are copied without change are not to be considered as having 
been repealed and again re-enacted, but to have been the law all 
along.’ ”  (Vallejo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. (1918) 177 
Cal. 249, 255.)  Statutory provisions that are not actually 
reenacted and are instead considered to “ ‘have been the law all 
along’ ” (ibid.) cannot fairly be said to be part of a ballot measure 
within the meaning of Government Code section 17556, 
subdivision (f).   
Nor does the Commission persuasively reconcile a 
sweeping transfer of financial responsibility whenever a ballot 
measure happens to restate a provision containing a state 
mandate with the voters’ intended purpose in California 
Constitution, article IV, section 9.  The purpose of the ban on 
unfunded mandates was to protect the strapped budgets of local 
governments in the wake of Proposition 13.  (See Ballot Pamp., 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979) argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 18 
[“this measure WILL NOT allow the state government to force 
programs on local governments without the state paying for 
them”]; cf. California School Boards Assn. v. State of California, 
supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215 [language of former section 
17556, subdivision (f) “must be limited” because it “so clearly 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
contravenes the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 4”].)  
We have no basis to presume such stark fiscal effects would arise 
from these provisions’ compelled restatement, when those 
provisions are conceded to be bystanders relative to the changes 
wrought by a voter initiative.  (See County of Sacramento v. 
Pfund (1913) 165 Cal. 84, 88 [“to construe a statute amended in 
certain particulars as having been wholly re-enacted as of the 
date of the amendment, is to do violence to the code and all 
canons of construction”].) 
By treating those untouched statutory bystanders no 
differently from materially changed or newly added provisions, 
the Commission’s approach leads to results “that no one would 
consider reasonable.”  (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 650; see People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 
583, 605.)  The Commission’s view implies that merely restating 
a state-mandated duty in a ballot measure to renumber the 
section, correct punctuation or grammar errors, or substitute 
gender-neutral language (see, e.g., Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
at pp. 983, 985) automatically relieves the state of its obligation 
to reimburse local governments for performing their assigned 
role.  Ironically, such wholesale reallocation of financial burdens 
would occur under the Commission’s theory even if nothing in 
the initiative changed any activities the local governments were 
required to perform.  Conversely, if the local government duties 
listed here happened to appear in a completely separate statute 
not subject to technical reenactment rather than appearing in 
the section Proposition 83 amended in other respects, they 
would have remained state mandates.  The mere happenstance 
that the mandated duties were contained in test claim statutes 
that were amended in other respects not clearly germane to any 
of the duties — and thus had to be reenacted in full under the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
state Constitution — should not in itself diminish their 
character as state mandates.   
So it is telling that the State respondents conspicuously 
avoid embracing the full scope of the Commission’s reasoning.  
What they argue instead is that the compelled reenactment of 
the test claim statutes transformed the state mandate into a 
voter-imposed mandate because the voters simultaneously 
limited the Legislature’s ability to revise or repeal the test claim 
statutes.  They point to Proposition 83’s amendment clause, 
which provides in relevant part:  “The provisions of this act shall 
not be amended by the Legislature except by a statute passed in 
each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of 
the membership of each house concurring, or by a statute that 
becomes effective only when approved by the voters.  However, 
the Legislature may amend the provisions of this act to expand 
the scope of their application or to increase the punishments or 
penalties provided herein by a statute passed by a majority of 
each house thereof.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 
7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, § 33, p. 138 (Voter Guide).)  In their 
view, these provisions no longer qualify as legislatively imposed 
mandates because the Legislature now lacks the power to 
amend or repeal these test claim statutes using the ordinary 
legislative process. 
We disagree.  The strict limitation on amending initiatives 
generally — and the relevance of the somewhat liberalized 
constraints imposed by Proposition 83’s amendment clause — 
derive from the state constitution.  Article II, section 10, 
subdivision (c) of the California Constitution provides that an 
initiative statute may be amended or repealed only by another 
voter initiative, “unless the initiative statute permits 
amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.”  The 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
evident purpose of limiting the Legislature’s power to amend an 
initiative statute “ ‘is to “protect the people’s initiative powers 
by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people 
have done, without the electorate’s consent.” ’ ”  (Shaw v. People 
ex rel. Chiang (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 577, 597 (Shaw).)  But we 
have never had occasion to consider precisely “what the people 
have done” and what qualifies as “undoing” (ibid.) when the 
subject is a statutory provision whose reenactment was 
constitutionally compelled under article IV, section 9 of the 
Constitution.   
The State respondents’ argument depends on one crucial 
assumption:  that because of article II, section 10, subdivision 
(c) of the state Constitution, none of the technically restated 
provisions may be amended, except as provided in the 
initiative’s amendment clause.  Yet the parties and amicus 
curiae California State Association of Counties and League of 
California Cities have identified at least nine legislative 
amendments to statutes technically restated in Proposition 83 
that — under the view espoused by State respondents — would 
be in violation of the initiative’s amendment clause.  (See Voter 
Guide, supra, text of Prop. 83, § 33.)  These amendments 
contained provisions that neither expanded the scope of the 
initiative, increased the punishment, nor garnered a two-thirds 
vote of each house.  (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 443 [amending Pen. 
Code, § 667.5, subd. (a), which was technically restated in § 9 of 
Prop. 83]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 468 [amending Pen. Code, 
§ 3000, subd. (b), which was technically restated in § 17 of Prop. 
83]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 472 [amending Pen. Code, § 3001, 
subd. (a), which was technically restated in § 19 of Prop. 83]; 
Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 473 [amending Pen. Code, § 3003, subd. 
(a), which was technically restated in § 20 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011, ch. 12, § 10 [amending Pen. Code, 
§ 667.5, subd. (b), which was technically restated in § 9 of Prop. 
83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, § 139 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 
6601, which was technically restated in § 26 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 
2012, ch. 24, § 143 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604, which 
was technically restated in § 27 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, 
§ 144 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605, which was 
technically restated in § 29 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, 
§ 146 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6608, which was 
technically restated in § 30 of Prop. 83].)  If the State 
respondents are correct that any amendment to a provision that 
happens to have been technically restated in a ballot measure 
must follow the amendment process provided in the initiative, 
then all of these amendments would be invalid.      
The State respondents take a narrow view of the 
Legislature’s power to amend a statutory provision when its 
reenactment in a ballot measure was compelled by the state 
Constitution.  But they concede only “limited authority” 
supports this view.  Indeed, the lone case cited by the State 
respondents is Shaw, but that case analyzed a legislative 
amendment aimed at the heart of a voter initiative, not a 
bystander provision that had been only technically restated.  At 
issue in Shaw was Proposition 116, a 1990 voter initiative that 
in relevant part amended Revenue and Taxation Code section 
7102, subdivision (a)(1) to direct that a portion of sales and use 
taxes related to motor vehicle fuel (hereafter spillover gas tax 
revenue) be transferred to the Public Transportation Account 
(PTA), which was newly designated as “ ‘a trust fund’ ” within 
the State Transportation Fund.  (Shaw, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 588-589.).  The trust fund was to be used “ ‘only for 
transportation planning and mass transportation purposes.’ ”  
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
(Id. at p. 589.)  Proposition 116 also added section 7102, 
subdivision (d), which allowed the Legislature to amend section 
7102 by means of a statute passed with a two-thirds vote of both 
houses, but only “ ‘if the statute is consistent with, and furthers 
the purposes of, this section.’ ”  (Shaw, at p. 590.)  
Notwithstanding these provisions, the Legislature in 2006 and 
2007 further amended section 7102, subdivision (a)(1) to qualify 
the required transfer of spillover gas tax revenue with the words 
“ ‘except as modified as follows’ ” (Shaw, at p. 601) and added 
other provisions that “[e]ssentially . . . appropriated money that 
was otherwise directed to the PTA to various other government 
sources and obligations.”  (Shaw, at p. 592; see id. at p. 602.)  
The new subdivisions added by the Legislature went so far as to 
order these diversions from the PTA “notwithstanding any other 
provision of this paragraph or any other provision of law.”  
(§ 7102, subd. (a)(1)(G) & (H).)     
As the Court of Appeal readily observed, the Legislature’s 
2007 amendment was suspect for a specific reason:  it sought to 
undo the very protections the voters had enacted in Proposition 
116.  (Shaw, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597-598.)  Unlike 
Proposition 83, Proposition 116 had not merely restated a key 
provision without change.  Rather, Proposition 116 had added 
language to Revenue and Taxation Code section 7102, 
subdivision (a)(1) designating the PTA as “ ‘a trust fund,’ ” and 
elsewhere stated that the funds were available “ ‘only for 
transportation, planning and mass transportation purposes.’ ”  
(Shaw, at p. 589.)  So when the Legislature –– a decade and 
seven years later –– sought to undermine the voter-created trust 
fund by adding new provisions to divert those funds from uses 
the voters had previously designated, it was not amending a 
provision that had merely been technically restated by the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
voters.  (Shaw, at p. 597; see id. at p. 601 [“The voters’ intent to 
preserve spillover gas tax funding of the PTA would be 
frustrated if the Legislature could amend section 7102, 
subdivision (a)(1) to modify the amount of spillover gas tax 
revenue making it to the PTA.”].)  Instead, the 2007 amendment 
sought to alter the voters’ careful handiwork, both the text and 
its intended purpose, and therefore was required to comply with 
the limitations in the initiative’s amendment clause.  (Id. at pp. 
597-598.)  To grant the Legislature free rein to tinker with 
spillover gas tax revenue and thereby undermine the PTA’s 
integrity would have defeated a core purpose of Proposition 116 
— “to convert the PTA to a trust fund dedicated to supporting 
transportation planning and mass transportation projects, and 
to preserve the funding of the PTA for such projects with 
spillover gas tax revenue according to the formula specified in 
section 7102, subdivision (a)(1).”  (Shaw, at p. 601.)     
By contrast, nothing in Proposition 83 focused on duties 
local governments were already performing under the SVPA.  
No provision amended those duties in any substantive way.  Nor 
did any aspect of the initiative’s structure or other indicia of its 
purpose suggest that the listed duties merited special protection 
from alteration by the Legislature.  According to the Voter 
Guide, the intended purpose of Proposition 83 was to increase 
penalties for violent and habitual sex offenders; prohibit 
registered sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of a 
school or park; require lifetime electronic monitoring of felony 
registered sex offenders; expand the definition of an SVP; and 
change the then-existing two-year commitment term for SVPs 
to an indeterminate commitment.  (Voter Guide, supra, Official 
Title and Summary of Prop. 83,, p. 42.)  Indeed, no indication 
appears in the text of the initiative, nor in the ballot pamphlet, 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
to suggest voters would have reasonably understood they were 
restricting the Legislature from amending or modifying any of 
the duties set forth in the test claim statutes.  Nor is an 
overbroad construction of article II, section 10 of the California 
Constitution necessary to safeguard the people’s right of 
initiative.  (See Bartosh v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners 
(1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 486, 491-496.)  To the contrary:  Imposing 
such a limitation as a matter of course on provisions that are 
merely technically restated would unduly burden the people’s 
willingness to amend existing laws by initiative.   
A more prudent conclusion is to assign somewhat more 
limited scope to the state constitutional prohibition on 
legislative amendment of an initiative statute.  When technical 
reenactments are required under article IV, section 9 of the 
Constitution — yet involve no substantive change in a given 
statutory provision — the Legislature in most cases retains the 
power to amend the restated provision through the ordinary 
legislative process.  This conclusion applies unless the provision 
is integral to accomplishing the electorate’s goals in enacting the 
initiative or other indicia support the conclusion that voters 
reasonably intended to limit the Legislature’s ability to amend 
that part of the statute.  This interpretation of article II of the 
Constitution is consistent with the people’s precious right to 
exercise the initiative power.  (See Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 492, 501.)  It also comports with the Legislature’s ability 
to change statutory provisions outside the scope of the existing 
provisions voters plausibly had a purpose to supplant through 
an initiative.  (See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691.)  We therefore hold that where a 
statutory provision was only technically reenacted as part of 
other changes made by a voter initiative and the Legislature has 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
retained the power to amend the provision through the ordinary 
legislative process, the provision cannot fairly be considered 
“expressly included in . . . a ballot measure” within the meaning 
of Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f).4  
With that in mind, we turn to the statutory provisions 
identified by the Commission as the source for local government 
duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 7 — i.e., Welfare and Institutions 
Code sections 6601, subdivision (i), 6605, former subdivisions 
(b)-(d), and 6608, subdivisions (a) and (b) and former 
subdivisions (c) and (d).  The State respondents do not dispute 
that each of these provisions was technically restated in 
Proposition 83 under constitutional compulsion.  They offer no 
reason — putting aside for the moment the expanded SVP 
definition — why these restated provisions should be deemed 
integral to accomplishing the initiative’s goals.  Nor have they 
identified any basis for believing that it was within the scope of  
the voters’ intended purpose in enacting the initiative to limit 
the Legislature’s capacity to alter or amend these provisions.  
The Commission therefore erred in concluding that those 
provisions were expressly included in a ballot measure approved 
by the voters merely because they were restated in the 
initiative’s text.       
B. 
Similar flaws afflict the Commission’s analysis of local 
government duties 5, 7, and part of 8, which derive from Welfare 
and Institutions Code sections 6602, 6603, 6604, and 6605, 
former subdivision (d).  The Commission erred when it 
                                        
4  
We disapprove Shaw v. People ex rel. Chiang, supra, 175 
Cal.App.4th 577, to the extent it is inconsistent with this 
opinion.   
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
concluded that these activities were expressly included in the 
ballot measure simply because Proposition 83 had technically 
restated the applicable provisions of sections 6604 and 6605.  
For the reasons stated below, the Commission also erred in 
concluding that sections 6602 and 6603 were “necessary to 
implement” Proposition 83.  
The Commission’s conclusion was based on the theory that 
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6602 and 6603 were 
indispensable to the implementation of other provisions that 
— according to the Commission –– were “expressly included” in 
Proposition 83.  But we have determined that those provisions 
were not part of the “ballot measure” for purposes of 
Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f).  And while 
Proposition 83 technically reenacted a provision of existing law 
stating that “[t]he rights, requirements, and procedures set 
forth in Section 6603 shall apply to all commitment proceedings” 
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.1, subd. (b)), this did not make 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6603 “necessary to 
implement” the ballot measure, either.  The question here is not 
whether the protections in that section — i.e., trial by jury, 
appointed counsel, assistance of experts — are required by due 
process.  The critical question is instead whether the SVP civil 
commitment program, which triggers those procedures, is 
mandated by the state or by the voters.   
We considered an analogous situation in San Diego 
Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 859 (San Diego Unified).  There, we considered whether 
the costs associated with mandatory expulsion hearings for 
students found to be in possession of firearms at school (see Ed. 
Code, § 48915, former subd. (b); Stats. 1993, ch. 1256, § 2, 
pp. 7286-7287) were a reimbursable state mandate.  The 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
Commission argued that they were not, pointing out that most 
or all of the costs associated with an expulsion hearing were 
required by the federal due process clause.  (San Diego Unified, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 879-880; see Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. 
(c).)  We disagreed.  Federal law, at the time, did not mandate 
expulsion for possessing a firearm at school.  (San Diego Unified, 
at p. 881.)  While federal due process did afford certain 
protections whenever an expulsion hearing was held, it did not 
require “that any such expulsion recommendation be made in 
the first place.”  (Ibid.)  Because it was state law — and not due 
process — that required school districts to undertake an 
expulsion hearing in the first place, we held that the mandatory 
expulsion hearing costs were triggered by a state mandate and 
were fully reimbursable.  (Id. at pp. 881-882.)  Similarly, here, 
federal law does not require any inmate be civilly committed as 
an SVP.  That mandate comes from state law.   
Here again, the State respondents avoid defending the 
Commission’s reasoning.  Instead, they rely on the expanded 
definition of a “ ‘[s]exually violent predator’ ” in Proposition 83.  
(Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 83, § 24, p. 135.)  As they point 
out, the voters broadened the definition of an SVP within the 
meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 in two 
ways.  First, they reduced the required number of victims, so 
that an offender need only have been “convicted of a sexually 
violent offense against one or more victims,” instead of two or 
more victims.  (Ibid.; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).)  
Second, the voters eliminated a provision that had capped at one 
the number of juvenile adjudications that could be considered a 
prior qualifying conviction.  (Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 
83, § 24, p. 136; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (g).)  The State 
respondents contend that the specified local government duties 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
became necessary to implement the ballot measure, in that the 
Counties had been under no obligation to perform any duties for 
this class of offenders until the voters by initiative expanded the 
definition of an SVP.       
The Court of Appeal chose to dispose of this argument in 
a single sentence:  “The Commission’s 1998 decision . . . 
concluded that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 was 
not a basis for any of the duties for which the Counties sought 
reimbursement.”  (County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 36.)  The statement is true, but only to a limited extent.  The 
1998 decision, which purported to address Welfare and 
Institutions Code sections 6250 and 6600 through 6608, did 
state that “[t]he Commission denied the remaining provisions of 
the test claim legislation because they do not impose 
reimbursable state mandated activities upon local agencies.”  
(Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. CSM-
4509, supra, at p. 12.)   
Yet it would be misleading to suggest that Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 6600 was thereby rendered irrelevant 
to the duties set forth in the test claim statutes.  None of the 
specified local government duties is triggered until an inmate is 
identified as someone who may be an SVP.  (See §§ 6601, 6603, 
6604, 6605, 6608.)  Although the SVP definition does not itself 
impose any particular duties on local governments, it is 
necessarily incorporated into each of the listed activities.  
Indeed, whether a county has a duty to act (and, if so, what it 
must do) depends on the SVP definition.  (See Voter Guide, 
supra, analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, p. 44 [“This 
measure generally makes more sex offenders eligible for an SVP 
commitment”]; cf. San Diego Unified, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 884 
[acknowledging that changes in federal law concerning 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
mandatory expulsion for firearm possession “may lead to a 
different conclusion” as to whether expulsion hearings remain a 
state mandate in future years]; Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 
Statement of Decision No. 01-TC-18 (May 20, 2011), p. 39 
 
[as 
of 
November 15, 2018] [concluding that changes in federal law 
concerning mandatory expulsion for firearm possession made 
the associated hearing costs a federal mandate].)  When more 
people qualify as potential SVPs, a county must review more 
records.  It must file more commitment petitions, and conduct 
more trials.5  One can imagine that if the roles were reversed — 
i.e., if the Legislature expanded the scope of a voter-created SVP 
program — the Counties would be claiming that the burdens 
imposed by the expanded legislative definition constituted a 
state mandate.   
Unfortunately, the Commission never considered whether 
the expanded SVP definition in Proposition 83 transformed the 
test claim statutes as a whole into a voter-imposed mandate or, 
alternatively, did so to the extent the expanded definition 
incrementally imposed new, additional duties on the Counties.  
Its ruling granting the State respondents’ request for mandate 
redetermination instead rested entirely on grounds that we now 
disapprove.  Moreover, the parties admit — and the Court of 
                                        
5  
The ballot pamphlet said as much:  “This measure would 
also affect state and local costs associated with court and jail 
operations.  For example, the additional SVP commitment 
petitions resulting from this measure would increase court costs 
for hearing these civil cases.  Also, county jail operating costs 
would increase to the extent that offenders who have court 
decisions pending on their SVP cases were held in county jail 
facilities.”  (Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. 
Analyst, p. 45.)   
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
Appeal found — that the current record is insufficient to 
establish how, if at all, the expanded SVP definition in 
Proposition 83 affected the number of referrals to local 
governments.  (See County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 36, fn. 14; cf. San Diego Unified, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 889 
[additional state statutory protections that were “incidental” to 
federal due process requirements, “producing at most de 
minimis added cost, should be viewed as part and parcel of the 
underlying federal mandate, and hence nonreimbursable under 
Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c)”].)  Under the 
circumstances, we find it prudent to remand the matter to the 
Commission to enable it to address these arguments in the first 
instance.  (See Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, supra, 
44 Cal.3d at p. 837; California School Boards Assn. v. State of 
California, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217.) 
III. 
Constitutional requirements governing matters such as 
voter initiatives and the Legislature’s financial responsibility to 
local governments must be read in context.  When a ballot 
initiative is used to amend any part of an existing statutory 
section, the California Constitution requires that the initiative 
include the text of the entire statutory section to enable voters 
to understand the context of the proposed change.  (Cal. Const., 
art. IV, § 9.)  But this requirement is a modest means of 
informing voters about the proposed change by ensuring there 
is a straightforward before-and-after comparison of the 
statutory text.  Neither by its terms nor by implication does it 
prevent a future Legislature from making appropriate 
amendments to the provisions that are merely technically 
restated in a ballot measure.  (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. 
(c).)  Likewise, mere technical restatements do not necessarily 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
transform 
existing 
state 
mandates 
into 
voter-imposed 
mandates.  (See Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (f).)   
Because the Commission erred in concluding otherwise, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it 
reversed the judgment of the trial court.  We remand the matter 
to the Court of Appeal, so it can direct the trial court to modify 
its judgment as follows:  the trial court shall issue a writ of 
mandate directing the Commission to set aside the decisions 
challenged in this action and to reconsider the test claim in a 
manner consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J.
MEEHAN, J.* 
                                        
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 7 Cal.App.5th 12 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S239907 
Date Filed: November 19, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Richard E. L. Strauss 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San Diego), Timothy M. Barry, Chief Deputy County Counsel; 
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Sangkee Peter Lee, Deputy County Counsel; Leon J. 
Page, County Counsel (Orange), Suzanne E. Shoai, Deputy County Counsel; Robyn Truitt Drivon, County 
Counsel (Sacramento), Krista Castlebary Whitman, Assistant County Counsel; and Jean-Rene Claude 
Basle, County Counsel (San Bernardino), for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Laura Arnold for California Public Defenders Association and Law Offices of the Public Defender for the 
County of Riverside as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Jennifer N. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, 
Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Douglas J. Woods and Thomas S. Patterson, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Kathleen Boergers and Michael J. Mongan, Deputy State Solicitors General, 
Mark R. Beckington and Kim L. Nguyen , Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents 
Department of Finance, State Controller and State of California. 
 
Camille Shelton and Matthew B. Jones for Defendant and Respondent Commission on State Mandates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Timothy M. Barry 
Chief Deputy County Counsel 
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355 
San Diego, CA  92101-2469 
(619) 531-6259 
 
Michael J. Mongan 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3920