Title: IN THE MATTER OF: JJF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; IN THE MATTER OF: CNS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF: JJF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; IN THE MATTER OF: CNS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 41132 P.3d 170Case Number: 05-91, C-05-91Decided: 04/06/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF: JJF,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF: CNS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeals 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Tom 
Sedar and Kimberly A. Corey of Law Office of Tom Sedar, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Sedar.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and H. Michael Bennett, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Bennett.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In consolidated 
cases, two registered sex offenders challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
requiring the State to prove their risk of reoffense by a preponderance of the 
evidence, arguing instead that the State's evidence must be clear and 
convincing.  One appellant also 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.1

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]     1.   Whether the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, §§ 2, 6, and 7 of the Wyoming Constitution require the standard of 
proof at a risk-of-reoffense hearing to be clear and convincing 
evidence?

 
 
           
2.   
Whether there was sufficient evidence in No. C-05-10 for the district 
court to determine that CNS posed a moderate threat of reoffense?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In 1989, JJF pled 
guilty to aggravated assault, kidnapping, and first-degree sexual assault.  In 2005, the 
Natrona County District Court heard the State's application for a 
risk-of-reoffense assessment, and designated JJF's risk of reoffense as being 
moderate.  In 
doing so, the court applied the burden of proof standard of a preponderance of 
the evidence.

 
 
[¶5]      In 1998, the second 
appellant, CNS, was convicted in Nevada of statutory sexual seduction, for 
having sexual intercourse with a person under the age of sixteen years.  His five-year 
probationary sentence was subsequently revoked for a drug offense, and he served 
out the balance of his sentence in prison.  In 2004, the Natrona County District Court 
was asked by the State to determine CNS's risk of reoffense.  After a hearing, 
but without stating the standard of proof being applied, the court found that 
CNS posed a moderate risk of reoffense.

 
 
STATUTES

 
 
[¶6]      The Wyoming Sex 
Offender Registration Act is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-301 et seq. 
(LexisNexis 
2005).  In 
addition to its registration feature, the Act provides for a risk-of-reoffense 
hearing process.  
At the time of the hearings in these consolidated cases, that part of the 
Act read as follows:

 
 
            
(c)     The division shall provide 
notification of registration under this act, including all registration 
information, to the district attorney of the county where the registered 
offender is residing at the time of registration or to which the offender 
moves.  Upon 
receipt of notification, the district attorney shall file an application for 
hearing under this subsection if the offender is an aggravated sex offender or a 
recidivist.  
For other offenders registered under this act, the district attorney 
shall file an application for hearing under this section if, based upon a review 
of the risk of reoffense factors specified in W.S. 7-19-303(d), it appears that 
public protection requires notification be provided to persons in addition to 
those authorized to receive criminal history record information under W.S. 
7-19-106.  Upon 
application of the district attorney, and following notice to the offender and 
an in-camera hearing, the district court shall, based upon its finding as to the 
risk of reoffense by the offender, authorize the county sheriff, police chief or 
their designee to release information regarding an offender who has been 
convicted of an offense that requires registration under this act, as 
follows:

         
(i)        If the 
risk of reoffense is low, notification shall be in accordance with the 
requirements of W.S. 7-19-106 to persons authorized to receive criminal history 
record information under W.S. 7-19-106;

         
(ii)       If the risk of 
reoffense is moderate, notification shall be provided to residential neighbors 
within at least seven hundred fifty (750) feet of the offender's residence, 
organizations in the community, including schools, religious and youth 
organizations, as well as to the persons authorized under paragraph (i) of this 
subsection, through means specified in the court's order;

         
(iii)      If the risk of 
reoffense is high, notification shall be provided to the public through a public 
registry and through any additional means specified in the court's order, as 
well as to the persons and entities required by paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this 
subsection.  
The division shall make the public registry available to the public 
through electronic internet technology and shall include:

(A)     The offender's name, 
including any aliases;

(B)    Physical address;

(C)    Date and place of birth;

(D)    Date and place of conviction;

(E)    Crime for which convicted;

(F)    Photograph;

(G)    Physical characteristics 
including race, sex, height, weight, eye and hair color.

(d)     In determining an 
offender's risk of reoffense under subsection (c) of this section, the court 
shall consider:

         
(i)      Conditions of release 
that minimize risk of reoffense, including whether the offender is under 
supervision of probation or parole, receiving counseling, therapy or treatment, 
or residing in a home situation that provides guidance and supervision;

         
(ii)     Physical conditions that 
minimize the risk of reoffense, including advanced age or debilitating 
illness;

         
(iii)    Criminal history factors 
indicative of high risk of reoffense, including:

(A)     Whether the offender's 
conduct was found to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior;

(B)     Whether the offender served 
the maximum term under the court order;

(C)    Whether the offender committed 
the sexual offense against a child;

(D)    Whether psychological or 
psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;

(E)    The offender's response to 
treatment;

(F)    Recent behavior, including 
behavior while confined or while under supervision in the community as well as 
behavior in the community following service of sentence;

(G)    Recent threats against persons or 
expressions of intent to commit additional crimes; and

(H)     Other criminal history 
factors, including:

(I)      The relationship 
between the offender and the victim;

(II)      Whether the offense 
involved the use of a weapon, violence or infliction of serious bodily harm;

(III)     The number, date and nature 
of prior offenses.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303 (LexisNexis 2003).  This section was 
amended in 2005 to specify that, in assessing the statutory factors, the court 
is to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(c) (LexisNexis 
2005).  That 
does not change the issue before this Court, but makes more pointed the 
outcome.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Constitutionality

 
 
[¶7]      We have previously 
determined that the registration aspect of the Act does not violate due 
process.  Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1132 
(Wyo. 1996).  In Avery v. State, 2002 WY 87, ¶¶ 6-8, 47 P.3d 973, 976 (Wyo. 2002), we recognized the specific issue now before us, but 
did not address it because it was not adequately presented.  While we will now 
take on that task in regard to the United States Constitution, we will not 
proceed with a separate state constitutional analysis, inasmuch as the 
appellants, while mentioning the state constitution, have not done so, 
either.  See Vassar v. State, 
2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶8]      The question that has 
been presented is not formulated as a question of legislative intentwhat burden 
of proof did the legislature intend to be applied by the district court at 
risk-of-reoffense hearings?  Rather, the question that has been presented 
is formulated purely in terms of constitutionalitywhether due process of law 
requires the standard of proof to be clear and convincing evidence.  That question is a 
question of law, so it is reviewed de novo by this court.  Joyner v. State, 2002 WY 174, ¶ 7, 58 P.3d 331, 334 (Wyo. 2002); Boyce v. Freeman, 2002 WY 20, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶9]      We will first 
contrast the two standards of proof at issue.  "A preponderance of the evidence' is defined 
as proof which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the 
contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.'" Thornberg v. State ex 
rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div., 913 P.2d 863, 866 
(Wyo. 1996), as modified on denial 
of reh'g (April 29, 1996) (quoting Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 
(Wyo. 1979)).  "Clear and convincing evidence," on the other 
hand, is defined as "that kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact 
that the truth of the contention is highly probable.'"  TF v. Dep't of Family 
Serv., 2005 WY 118, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 992, 999 (Wyo. 
2005) (quoting 
Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶10]   Succinctly stated, the contention of 
the appellants is that clear and convincing evidence is required in determining 
the risk of reoffense because the appellants' interests, and the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of those interests, outweigh any government interest.  That formulation of 
the issue is based upon the four-part balancing test identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976):  (1) the private interest affected by the 
official action; (2) the risk of the erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used; (3) the probable value of any alternative 
procedures; and (4) the government's interest.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellants identify their affected 
interests as being privacy and liberty.  Quoting Doe v. AG, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., 
concurring), they argue that the requirement to register is a "continuing, 
intrusive, and humiliating regulation" of the individual.  Further, they 
contend that public notification of sex offender status "puts the registrant's 
livelihood, domestic tranquility, and personal relationships with all around him 
in grave jeopardy."  
E.B. v. 
Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1107 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109, 1110 (1998).  See also Espindola v. 
State, 855 So. 2d 1281, 1288 n. 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2003) 
(ability to seek employment and housing), rev'd sub nom. Milks v. State, 894 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 126, 
S.Ct. 368 (2005).

 
 
[¶12]   The appellants compare risk of 
reoffense hearings to those situations where due process has been found to 
require clear and convincing evidence because the "loss threatened by [the] 
particular type of proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant a more than 
average certainty on the part of the factfinder . . . ."  Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 758, 
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (termination of parental 
rights).  See also Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) (civil commitment); Woodby v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86, 87 S. Ct. 483, 487-88, 17 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S. Ct. 147, 149, 5 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1960) (denaturalization); TOC v. TND, 2002 
WY  76, ¶ 11, 
46 P.3d 863, 868 (Wyo. 
2002) (adoption without consent); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 
2000) (right to earn a living); and In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1005 (Wyo. 
1984) (termination of parental rights).

 
 
[¶13]   In particular, the appellants point to 
Commonwealth v. 
Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710 (Pa. 
2003), which involved a hearing under that state's sexual offender registration 
statute.  After 
stating that the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard in a meaningful manner, the Maldonado court declared that the phrase "meaningful 
manner" includes the concept of reasonableness, leading to the question of 
"whether a reasonable manner must subsume a requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to the issue of the individual's status as a sexually 
violent predator as defined by statute."  Id. at 714.  In answering that 
question, the court provided the following analysis of the reasons for differing 
standards of proof:

 
 
Briefly, the function of a standard of proof is to instruct 
the factfinder as to the level of confidence that society believes he should 
have in the correctness of his conclusion; furthermore, different standards of 
proof reflect differences in how society believes the risk of error should be 
distributed as between the litigants.  Thus, the most stringent standardbeyond a 
reasonable doubtis applicable in criminal trials due to the gravity of the 
private interests affected; these interests lead to a societal judgment that, 
given the severe loss that occurs when an individual is erroneously convicted of 
a crime, the public should bear virtually the entire risk of error.  The 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, by contrast, reflects a belief that the 
two sides should share the risk equally; for this reason, it is applicable in a 
civil dispute over money damages, where the parties may share an intense 
interest in the outcome, but the public's interest in the result is 
"minimal."  Addington, 441 U.S.  at 423, 99 S. Ct.  at 1808; [Commonwealth v.] Williams, 557 Pa. 
[285], at 306, 733 A.2d [593,] at 604 [(1999)].  The "clear and convincing" standard falls 
between those two end-points of the spectrum . . . .

 
 

Id. at 715.

 
 
[¶14]   Before we review the holding in Maldonado, we need 
to clarify the issue facing the Pennsylvania court.  The question was 
not whether the clear and convincing standard was the minimally acceptable 
constitutional test in these casesmeaning that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard is constitutionally unacceptable.  Rather, the 
question was whether due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
sexual offender registration and classification systems.  That issue was 
engendered by the legislature specifying that the standard of proof was clear 
and convincing evidence.  Despite that difference in facts, Maldonado is 
instructive.  
First, the court concluded that the restrictions imposed by the statute 
are more substantial than the loss of money typifying a common civil 
action.  
Second, these substantial restrictions, coupled with the public interest 
in protecting citizens from sexual crimes, mean that society has a significant 
interest in the accuracy of the classification process.  Third, requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be too burdensome on the State because of 
the nature of psychological evidence.  And fourth, these laws are regulatory, rather 
than punitive, and the reasonable doubt standard should not be exported beyond 
the criminal law.  
Id. at 715-18.  The court 
summarized its conclusions as follows:

 
 
            
In summary, then, although an individual adjudicated as a sexually 
violent predator may suffer a substantial imposition upon his liberty interests, 
the harm to the public of erroneous exclusion of a sexually violent predator, 
combined with the difficulty of satisfying the reasonable-doubt standard in the 
context of resolving the types of medical and psychiatric issues involved, 
satisfy us that the intermediate evidentiary standard chosen by the Legislature 
is consistent with due process guarantees.  This conclusion, moreover, is in accord with 
the reported decisions of other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Verniero, 119 F.3d  at 1111; Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Avery, 47 P.3d 973, 976 (Wyo. 
2002); cf. Doe v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., [428 Mass. 90,] 697 N.E.2d [512,] 
at 520 [(1998)] (finding that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
satisfies due process as long as it is combined with a requirement that the fact 
finder "make detailed findings to demonstrate that close attention has been 
given to the evidence").

 
 

Id. at 718 (footnote omitted).2

 
 
[¶15]   Verniero, one of the cases cited by the Pennsylvania court, is also the case 
referenced by this Court in Avery in noting that some jurisdictions have found the 
clear and convincing evidence standard constitutionally mandated in sexual 
offender classifications.  Avery, 2002 WY 
87, ¶ 7, 47 P.3d  at 976.  After assessing the relative interests of the 
State and the registrant, the Verniero court concluded as follows:

 
 
            
We must, therefore, ask whether the preponderance of evidence standard, 
which "allocates the risk of error nearly equally" between an erroneous 
overestimation or underestimation of a registrant's future dangerousness, 
"reflect[s] properly the [ ] relative severity" of these erroneous 
outcomes.  [Santosky, 455 
U.S.] at 766, 
102 S. Ct.  at 1401.  
Addington 
supplies the answer.  Because "the possible injury to the 
individual [registrant] is significantly greater than any possible harm to the 
state," the registrant, consistent with due process, cannot "be asked to share 
equally with society the risk of error."  441 U.S.  at 427, 99 S. Ct.  at 1809.  It necessarily 
follows that the Due Process Clause requires that the state prove its case by 
clear and convincing evidence . . . .

 
 

Verniero, 119 F.3d  at 1111.

 
 
[¶16]   In Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), the court admittedly had difficulty 
balancing the factors under the Mathews v. Eldridge test because both the private 
interests and the government interests are significant, because the nature of 
the proof makes it highly susceptible to error, and because registration and 
classification  
affect every aspect of the offender's life.  The court concluded 
that these proceedings being somewhat less than full-blown criminal proceedings, 
and somewhat more than mere civil proceedings, the intermediate standard of 
proofclear and convincing evidencewas required.  Id.

 
 
[¶17]   Doe v. Pataki should be contrasted with Doe v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512 (Mass. 1998), which case also was cited by the 
Maldonado court 
as requiring a heightened standard of proof in these cases.  Unlike the New York 
court, the Massachusetts court downplayed the private interests of the 
registrant, found any risk of misclassification minimized by the fact that both 
parties would produce evidence at an evidentiary hearing, and found that a 
heightened standard would be inconsistent with promoting the State's interest in 
protecting the public.  The court concluded, therefore, that:

 
 
            
The offenders in these cases do not face a potential loss of liberty, nor 
is the stigma of being required to register as a sex offender and of having 
information regarding sex offenses disseminated to the public, sufficient to 
require a higher standard of proof than that generally required in civil 
proceedings.  
However, the fact finder must make particularized, specific, and detailed 
findings, guided by the factors set forth in [the statute], to demonstrate that 
close attention has been given to the evidence as to each offender and that the 
classification for each is appropriate.

 
 

Doe, 697 N.E.2d  at 519.  

 

[¶18]   The State counters these arguments by 
contending that due process requires the clear and convincing evidence standard 
of proof only in proceedings resulting in such a significant deprivation of 
liberty or social stigma that it must be said to amount to additional punishment 
for a criminal conviction.  Interestingly enough, the State relies upon 
many of the same cases cited by the appellants, including  Santosky, Addington, 
Woodby, and Chaunt.  It is the State's position that 
classification of sexual offenders simply does not rise to the level of 
intrusion seen in these cases, such intrusion having been characterized as 
"condemned to suffer grievous loss.'"  Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 758, 102 S. Ct.  at 1397 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 263, 
90 S. Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)).

 
 
[¶19]   In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 817 (2004), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act against an ex post facto 
challenge.  
In doing so, the Court determined that the Act established a legitimate, 
non-punitive regulatory scheme that rationally advanced its public safety 
purpose.  
Id. at 102-03, 123 S. Ct.  at 1152.  
The Court observed that public access to the registry was necessary to 
fulfill its function, and that the purpose of such access was not to punish the 
offender.  
Further, the Court found that the embarrassment that may result from 
public access is but a collateral consequence of the legitimate regulation.  Id. at 98-99, 123 S. Ct.  at 
1150.  The 
Court then rejected as mere conjecture the argument that dissemination of 
registry information violates the offender's liberty and privacy rights by 
infringing upon his ability to obtain employment and housing.  Finally, the Court 
concluded that the dissemination of factually accurate information merely 
provides the public with a more efficient means of taking precautionary steps in 
dealing with registrants.  Id. at 100-01, 123 S. Ct.  at 
1151.  See also Doe v. 
Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (publication of truthful information 
already available to the public does not infringe upon liberty and privacy 
interests), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005).

 
 
[¶20]   The Smith court also 
concluded that Alaska's Act did not have 
a severe impact upon the personal liberties of registrants.   The Court 
noted that the Act imposed no physical restraint, and left registrants free, for 
instance, to change jobs and residences.  Smith, 538 U.S.  at 100, 123 S. Ct.  at 1151.  Unlike probationers 
and parolees, sexual offender registrants do not have to ask the State's 
permission to make such changes.  Smith, 538 U.S.  at 101, 123 S. Ct. 
at 1152.

 
 
[¶21]   In assessing the privacy and liberty 
interests of registrants, the United States Supreme Court has stated that mere 
injury to reputation does not constitute infringement, much less deprivation, of 
such interests.  
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety 
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6-7, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2003).  Moreover, a registration requirement based 
upon mere fact of prior conviction, unlike a classification scheme based upon 
the finding of an additional factfuture dangerousnessdoes not even implicate 
the procedural due process requirement of an opportunity to be heard; the fact 
simply is not material under such a statute.  Id. at 4, 96 S. Ct.  at 
1163.3

 
 
[¶22]   It is difficult to identify a general 
rule as to the "correct" burden of proof under a sexual offender registration 
statute, both because statutes differ so much from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
and because the questions raised in the reported cases vary so much one from the 
other.  For 
instance, where the question was civil commitment of a person found to be a 
sexually violent predator, rather than mere registration and notification after 
completion of a criminal sentence, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that 
the State bore the burden of proving the statutory status by clear and 
convincing evidence.  
In re 
Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 218 (N.J. 2002).  The ratio decidendi of 
the decision came from Addington, cited earlier herein and relied upon by the 
appellants:

 
 
            
"[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection."  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 330-31 (1979).  In an involuntary commitment proceeding an 
individual's interest in his or her liberty is balanced against well-recognized 
state interests.  
A state's legitimate interests and authority in this area arise from two 
sources:  its 
police power to protect the community at large, and its parens patriae 
power to provide care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves 
because of their emotional disorders.  Id. at 426, 99 S. Ct. 1809; 60 L. Ed. 2d  at 331; In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 47-48, 679 A.2d 634 (1996); In re S.L., 94 N.J. 
128, 136, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983).  However, because of the significant restraint 
on the liberty of a committee, the commitment process is bounded by 
constitutional procedural guarantees and the scope of commitment is 
limited.  
Id. at 137-38, 462 A.2d 1252.

 
 

Id. at 214.  See also In re Det. of Petersen, 42 P.3d 952, 955-58 (Wash. 2002) (State bears 
burden of proof at sexually violent predator commitment proceeding and annual 
review hearings).

 
 
[¶23]   More pertinent to the specific question 
now before the courtwhether the due process clause of the federal constitution 
requires clear and convincing evidence for the government to classify sexual 
offenders as to the likelihood of reoffendingare those cases dealing with that 
limited question.   There is not unanimity, and the United 
States Supreme Court has not answered the question.  Relying upon Verniero, cited 
above, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in finding that the State had failed to prove penetration, a statutory 
factor that had been used in classifying the appellant as a moderate risk.  In Ohio, clear and convincing evidence is the 
statutory standard of proof.  State v. Anderson, 735 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. 
Ward, 720 N.E.2d 603, 616 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).  The same is true in 
Pennsylvania.  See Maldonado, 838 A.2d  at 718.

 
 
[¶24]   Two 2004 cases exemplify the opposite 
view; that is, the view that the question of a defendant's risk of reoffense 
status is subject only to a preponderance of the evidence standard.  In State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 254 (Haw. 2004), that state's supreme court concluded a lengthy state 
and federal due process analysis of the need for a hearing because of the 
lifetime requirements placed upon registrants by stating simply that "[a]t such 
a hearing, the State shall have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the sex offender is required to continue to register . . . 
."  The court 
in In re W.M., 
851 A.2d 431, 434-455 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1062 (2005) went through a similarly thorough due process analysis, 
including application of the Mathews balancing test, in finding that the State 
necessarily had the burden of proving all predicate facts necessary to classify 
sexual offenders as to the risk of reoffending, and then reached the following 
conclusion:

 
 
We do not agree that due process requires the government to 
meet that burden by more than a preponderance of the evidence, however.  The Due Process 
Clause may mandate heightened standards of proofclear and convincing evidence, 
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubtwhen fundamental rights or liberty 
interests are at stake and the risk of error should be allocated 
disproportionately to one side (the state), or perhaps when other special 
factors are present.  
See, e.g., 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 
(1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) (civil commitment).  This is not such a case.  Appellants' 
asserted liberty interests are not fundamental ones, and given the government's 
compelling interest in protecting the public from sex offenses committed by 
recidivists, it should not bear a disproportionate share of the risk of 
error.  If 
"preponderance of the evidence" is the appropriate standard for establishing 
both substantive and technical violations of probation, as we have held, see Johnson v. United 
States, 763 A.2d 707, 712 (D.C. 2000), it is the appropriate standard 
here.

 
 

Id.  at 455.

 
 
[¶25]   We agree with these last 
sentiments.  
Wyoming's statutes, like others nationwide, 
are regulatory rather than punitive in purpose.  Snyder, 912 P.2d  at 1131.  
They exist to protect the public from repeat sexual offenders, who are 
more likely than other types of offenders to reoffend.  Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 
538 U.S.  at 4, 123 S. Ct.  at 1163; McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33, 
122 S. Ct. 2017, 2024, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002).  It is our perception that the exercise of the 
police power directly to protect the citizenry in this fashion is a reasonable 
exercise of fundamental governmental authority.  We simply do not believe that the possible 
injury to a sexual offender from erroneous classification is "significantly 
greater than any possible harm to the state.'"  Verniero, 119 F.3d  at 1111 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S.  at 427, 99 
S.Ct. at 1810).  
The "possible injury" to the registrant is that he will be classified as 
a higher risk than what he actually is, with the attendant statutory 
consequences.  
The "possible harm" to the State is a new sexual assault victim, with the 
attendant shattered life.

 
 
[¶26]   This is a balancing process in which we 
find the government's interest to be very high, and the private interest of the 
registrant to be not so highin particular, not so high as the fundamental 
interest involved in the parent-child relationship, or the fundamental interest 
in not being civilly committed, or the fundamental interest in not being 
deported.  
Clearly, the sexual offender does not stand on equal footing with the 
unconvicted as far as his right to be left alone by the government is 
concerned.  The 
nature of his crime has heightened society's interest in protecting itself from 
him.

 
 
[¶27]   "Statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, with any doubts in that regard resolved in favor of 
constitutionality, and with the statute's challenger bearing the burden of 
showing unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt."  Hede v. Gilstrap, 
2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005).  
The due process challenge in the instant case simply does not accomplish 
that task.  As 
just stated, we are not convinced that the government's interests are outweighed 
by the sexual offender's interests.  In addition, the appellants have failed to 
make a compelling argument as to the remaining Mathews 
factors.  
As to the risk of erroneous classification, for example, the appellants' 
entire argument in their briefs is as follows:

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303 is a reflection of other states' Megan 
Laws.  The 
analysis the district courts are to use when determining the risk of reoffense 
is also a reflection of other state laws.  However, this is not to say that the laws 
were based upon any scientific probability that the individual will 
recidivate.  
The legislature placed in the hands of the courts the role of 
psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and psychics.

 
 
            
This is a statute based upon the speculation that an individual may 
commit a crime in the future based upon a previous action or actions.  This is not to say 
that an individual will commit a crime, but the individual's liberty interests 
are at stake based entirely on this speculation.  An individual will be held up to public 
scrutiny for a minimum of ten (10) years.  There is a high risk of erroneous deprivation 
of such a liberty interest through the procedure used.  At a minimum the 
courts should be required to base their analysis on clear and convincing 
evidence.

 
 
[¶28]   This argument ignores the fact that, in 
classifying sexual offenders as to risk of reoffense, the district court must 
apply the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d).  At the very least, 
an appellant who alleges that the statute is unconstitutional because it allows 
for classification based upon speculation must attempt to show that there is no 
relationship between these factors and recidivism.  The presumption of 
constitutionality cannot be overcome with speculation about speculation.  Similarly, the 
appellants make no effort to establish the efficacy of any alternative 
procedures, that being the final Mathews factor.

 
 
            
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 
 
[¶29]   Our standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the factual findings and legal 
conclusions of a judge after a bench trial are well known and need not be 
repeated here.  
That standard, in the very context now before the Court, can be found at 
In re Avery, 2002 WY 87, ¶ 5, 47 P.3d  
at 975-76.  
Obviously, evidence is relevant and material if it tends to prove or 
disprove any of the factors found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d), which 
factors were set forth earlier herein.  The weight to be given to the evidence is up 
to the trier of fact, and the statute does not suggest what weight to give to 
what factor.

 
 
[¶30]   We begin our review by noting that the 
district court in the CNS case clearly recognized its duty to apply, and did 
apply, the statutory factors.  Rather than paraphrase the district court's 
analysis, we will set it out verbatim:

 
 
            
I'll note some of those factors, but I did consider all of them.  They included that 
the offender is not currently under any supervision of Probation and Parole. 
 He's not 
currently receiving any counseling, therapy, or treatment for sex offense 
concerns; but he is currently receiving some counseling in the form of NA.  His current home 
situation as I see it based upon the evidence is stable and provides some 
guidance and supervision.

 
 
            
I don't think there are any physical conditions currently that he has 
that minimize the risk of reoffense.  I don't hear anything really as to advanced 
age or debilitating illnesses that indicate a physical condition minimizing risk 
of reoffense.

 
 
            
Under the criminal history factors indicative of high risk of reoffense, 
once again, these factors cut several ways.  I would agree with [defense counsel], I don't 
think the offender's conduct can be characterized as repetitive or 
compulsive.  
There may have been some compulsive nature to the underlying offense, but 
I don't see that as being a large factor in this matter.

 
 
            
In this case, the offender has served the maximum term of his 
court-ordered sentence.  I do note that that was after having his 
probation revoked.  
The offense was against a child, and in this case, a 15-year-old 
female.

 
 
            
The psychological and psychiatric profiles are interesting, and I would 
say there could be several factors that cut several different ways.  But I have to in 
this case accept Dr. Brown's evaluation that [CNS] was, under the psychiatric 
profile that he did, rated exceptionally low for reoffense.  I must also note, 
however, that that was several years ago and that there are some challenges to 
the background information upon which that psychiatric profile was 
rendered.  But 
I was also impressed with Dr. Brown's testimony and with his evaluation 
process.

 
 
            
It appears that there was perhaps some response to treatment, at least on 
the alcohol side.  
Under the section of recent behavior, it includes behavior while confined 
or under supervision.  
It says in the community.  I do note that while under probation and 
under supervision, he violated his probation and that there was drug use during 
that period of time; but I also note that there is unrefuted testimony for at 
least the more recent past, [CNS] has not been violating the law and has not 
been using controlled substances or alcohol.  And those would be factors and items of 
evidence relative to his behavior in the community following service of 
sentence.

 
 
            
There are no recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to 
commit additional crime.

 
 
            
Under the other criminal history factors, there was no relationship 
between the offender and the victim.  There was no involvement of weapons, 
violence, or infliction of serious bodily harm.  But there are a number of other misdemeanor 
offenses and probation difficulties that were noted in the criminal history or 
background.

 
 
            
So once again, as I say, [there] were factors that cut several ways.  In this case, the 
Court makes a finding that there has been a showing of a moderate risk of 
reoffense given the totality of all the evidence and the factors, and I would 
ask [the State] to prepare an order reflecting that Court finding if you 
would.

 
 
[¶31]   This is not a case where the State 
failed to produce evidence probative of the statutory factors.  The transcript of 
the classification hearing is 77 pages in length, with 53 pages of 
testimony.  The 
just-quoted statement by the district court was its application of the statutory 
factors to that testimony.  So long as sufficient evidence was presented 
that supports the district court's findings and conclusions, it is not our job 
to re-weigh that evidence or to second-guess the district court.

 
 
[¶32]   We will briefly identify some of the 
evidence relied upon by the district court.  CNS was convicted of having sexual 
intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl, to whom he had supplied alcohol.  His probationary 
sentence was revoked due to a subsequent cocaine offense, and he served the 
balance of his penitentiary term.  He had received counseling for his drug and 
alcohol problems, but only a minimal amount, if any, of sexual offender 
treatment.  
While the psychological profile of CNS suggested a low risk of reoffense, 
according to his expert witness, that profile may have been based upon a 
less-than-complete history that CNS provided.  In particular, there were several misdemeanor 
arrests, convictions, and probation violations, most of which, like the 
underlying sexual assault, involved the use of alcohol or drugs.  CNS was not, at the 
time of the hearing, under any form of supervision, nor was he receiving any 
counseling besides periodic NA attendance.  CNS was living in a home with his fiancée and 
her twelve-year-old son, the latter of whom was visited frequently by a 
twelve-year-old girlfriend.  And finally, neither advanced age nor physical 
infirmity rendered CNS incapable of reoffending.

 
 
[¶33]   We cannot say that, in the face of this 
evidence, it was unreasonable for the district court to classify CNS as a 
moderate risk of reoffense.  It should be remembered that the district 
court was not asked to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, it 
is more probable than not that CNS will reoffend.  Rather, the district court was asked to 
determine whether it was more probable than not that CNS should be classified as 
a moderate risk.  
We could characterize the three risk classificationslow, moderate, and 
highas follows:  
The offender likely will not reoffend (low), the offender might reoffend 
(moderate), and the offender likely will reoffend (high).  The quantum of 
evidence necessary to convince a district judge to classify a sexual offender as 
a moderate risk of reoffense is not very high.  All that is necessary for a finding of 
moderate risk is that the State produce enough evidence to distinguish a 
particular offender from those considered to be low risk.  That is to be done, 
as it was here, by evidence probative of the statutory factors.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   The Wyoming Sex Offender 
Registration Act does not violate the due process clause of the federal 
constitution.  
It is a legitimate regulatory device, with the primary goal of protecting 
the public.  
The governmental interest outweighs the offender's rights to privacy and 
liberty, and it is appropriate that the risk of classification error be borne 
equally by the State and the offender.  The statutory scheme provides the offender 
with notice and a right to be heard, with both sides participating in the 
evidentiary hearing.  
A heightened standard of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, 
would unnecessarily restrict the State's ability to protect the public, and the 
offender's somewhat limited rights are adequately protected by a requirement 
that the State prove any classification by a preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
[¶35]   In Case No. C-05-10, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the district court could conclude that CNS posed 
a moderate risk of reoffending.

 
 
[¶36]   We affirm in both cases.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1These cases were treated as confidential in this Court 
because the statutes provide for different levels of notice to the public for 
different risk assessments.  Affirmance of the district court negates the 
reason for confidentiality, and such need not be preserved hereafter, except as 
may be required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

2The reference to Avery is questionable.  As noted earlier herein, the present issue 
was not directly raised in Avery, but the State alluded to preponderance of the 
evidence being the correct standard.  In noting the issue, we simply commented that 
there was authority to the contrary.  Avery, 2002 WY 
87, ¶ 7, 47 P.3d  at 976.

 
 

3Because the issue was not before it, the Court declined to 
decide whether such a statutory scheme violates substantive due 
process.