Title: Newport v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Newport v. State1999 WY 96983 P.2d 1213Case Number: 98-109Decided: 07/06/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

DONALD E. NEWPORT, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County, the Honorable

Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

  

 

 Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Monique McBride, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel, representing appellant.

 Gay V. Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of 
the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Christopher C. Voigt and Carl S. McGuire 
III, Student Interns for the Prosecution Assistance Program, representing 
appellee.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, 
JJ.

 

 MACY, J., delivered the opinion of 
the Court; LEHMAN, C.J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
GOLDEN, J., joined; and GOLDEN, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

 

    
MACY, Justice.

   
[¶1]      Appellant Donald Newport appeals from 
the judgment and sentence which was entered after he was convicted of taking 
indecent liberties with a minor.

 

  [¶2]      We affirm.

 

         
                      ISSUES

 

  [¶3]      Newport presents three issues for our 
review:

 

    
ISSUE I

 

Whether the admission of testimony by one of the 
state's witnesses vouching for the credibility of the victim was error per se 
and denied the appellant his right to a fair trial by 
jury.

 

    
ISSUE II

 

Was the appellant's right to a speedy trial violated 
when his trial was continued for more than six months from the date of his 
arraignment without seeking leave from the Wyoming Supreme 
Court?

 

    
ISSUE III

 

Whether the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing testimony of A. L. when defense counsel was not notified in a timely 
fashion that she would be called as a witness.

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶4]      The victim was an eight-year old girl. 
Newport had been married to her mother at one time, but he was not her father. 
On August 24, 1996, Newport picked up the victim to take her shopping for school 
supplies. They were supposed to meet several other members of Newport's family 
at his parents' house so that they could accompany Newport and the victim on the 
shopping trip. Instead of going directly to his parents' house, however, Newport 
took the victim to his mobile home.

 

  [¶5]      When they arrived at the mobile home, 
Newport told the victim to be quiet because his roommate was sleeping. They went 
into Newport's bedroom where they sat on the bed and watched television. While 
they were watching television, Newport stood up and told the victim to close her 
eyes. He unzipped his pants, and then he took the victim's hand and made her 
"feel his crotch."  Newport pulled 
the victim's pants down, but she immediately pulled them back up. He told the 
victim that, if she ever told her mother about the incident, he would say that 
she was a bad girl. Newport and the victim left the mobile home and went to 
Newport's parents' house.

 

  [¶6]      Sarah Weber and her son were living with 
the victim's family when this incident occurred. The victim told Weber's son 
about the sexual assault, and he told his mother and the victim's mother what 
she had said. The two women questioned the victim about the incident and 
reported it to authorities.

 

  [¶7]      The prosecution charged Newport with 
taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties1 with the victim (Docket No. 
24-196).  He was arraigned on 
January 8, 1997, for the charge in Docket No. 24-196 and for a second charge of 
taking indecent liberties with a minor (Docket No. 24-195). Newport was tried on 
both counts during the week of April 7, 1997. The jury was not able to reach a 
verdict in Docket No. 24-196, and the trial judge declared a mistrial on that 
count. The jury acquitted Newport of the charge in Docket No. 
24-195.

 

  [¶8]      The trial court scheduled a second trial 
in Docket No. 24-196 for April 29, 1997. The trial was, however, continued 
twice.  Docket No. 24-196 was joined 
with a third indecent liberties charge (Docket No. 24-318), and the trial on the 
two charges began on September 8, 1997. The jury convicted Newport in Docket No. 
24-196 of taking indecent liberties with the victim, but it was not able to 
reach a verdict in Docket No. 24-318. Newport appeals to this Court from his 
conviction in Docket No. 24-196.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  A. 
Vouching for the Victim's Credibility

 

  [¶9]      Newport claims that the trial court 
committed error per se when it allowed Weber, who was a witness for the 
prosecution, to vouch for the victim's credibility. The state counters that the 
trial court did not commit plain error when it allowed Weber's testimony into 
evidence. We agree with the state.

 

  [¶10] 
  Weber and her son lived 
with the victim's family. The victim told Weber's son about the sexual assault, 
and he reported it to Weber and the victim's mother. The two mothers asked the 
victim about the sexual assault. The prosecution questioned Weber at the trial 
about the victim's description of the sexual assault:

 

Q. After [your son] told you, after you actually 
talked to [the victim], what was your and [the victim's mother's] reaction to 
[the victim] at the time?

 

A. We believed her. She was scared enough - she was 
scared enough that she was very, very frightened of [Newport] hurting her. And . 
. . our main question was, why didn't you tell us when this happened and she 
firmly believe[d] he was going to hurt her.

 

  Newport 
did not object during the trial to Weber's testimony.

 

  [¶11] 
  The jury is charged with 
resolving the factual issues, judging the witnesses' credibility, and ultimately 
determining whether the accused is guilty or innocent. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988). A witness 
may not, therefore, vouch for the credibility of another witness or a victim. 
Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

  [¶12] 
In the seminal case of Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo. 1992), we 
reversed the appellant's conviction for first-degree sexual assault because a 
deputy sheriff impermissibly vouched for the victim's credibility by stating 
that he "`listened to [the victim's] story and made a determination that she had 
been raped.'" 841 P.2d  at 1337 (emphasis 
omitted). We recognized that the witness was a highly experienced law 
enforcement officer who should have known better than to make the improper 
statement. 841 P.2d  at 1339. We also noted that the case against Whiteplume was 
tenuous and that it was, therefore, difficult to measure what effect the 
officer's testimony had on the jury's verdict. Id.

 

  [¶13] 
  In 1995, this Court 
considered a case in which a sexual assault victim's mother testified that the 
victim appeared to be telling the truth when he reported the sexual assault to 
the police.  Curl, 898 P.2d  at 
373-74. The mother did not testify that she believed her son's account of the 
sexual assault, and she did not say that 
her son was telling the truth. 898 P.2d  at 374. We held that, even though the 
mother's testimony may have had the incidental effect of supporting the victim's 
credibility, the trial court did not commit plain error when it allowed the 
testimony into evidence at the trial. Id.

 

  [¶14] 
  In Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170 (Wyo. 1998), the appellant was convicted of conspiring to commit 
first-degree murder. During the trial, the prosecution asked a witness whether 
or not she had anything against the 
accused and his co-conspirator. 953 P.2d  at 1181. The witness replied: "`Just 
the fact that they killed somebody.'" Id. The appellant claimed that he was 
entitled to have his conviction reversed because the witness impermissibly 
expressed her opinion about his guilt. Id.

 

  [¶15] 
  We observed in Brown that, 
when we looked at the context of the statement, it was clear the prosecutor was 
inquiring only as to whether the witness was biased against the appellant and 
his co-conspirator. 953 P.2d  at 1182. The prosecutor did not deliberately elicit 
the witness' opinion about the appellant's guilt, and he did not attempt to take 
advantage of the witness' statement during his closing argument. Id. Applying a 
plain error analysis, we concluded that 
the witness' statement did not violate, in a clear and obvious way, the rule 
against giving opinion testimony and that a substantial right belonging to the 
appellant was not adversely affected. Id.

 

  [¶16] 
  In the case at bar, Newport 
maintains that Weber's testimony was error per se. We have determined that the 
error-per-se rule applies when the prosecution actually asks a witness to give 
an opinion as to the accused's guilt. Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 
(Wyo. 1998); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 (Wyo. 1990). When a witness 
ostensibly vouches for another witness' credibility and the accused fails to 
object to the testimony, we apply our plain error standard of review. Gayler, 
957 P.2d at 859-860; Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374. We utilize a three-part test to 
determine whether a trial court committed plain error.

 

First, the record must clearly present the incident 
alleged to be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice against him.

 

CB v. State, 749 P.2d 267, 
268-69 (Wyo. 1988); see also Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

  [¶17] 
  The first element of the 
plain error test is satisfied in this case because the record clearly reflects 
the testimony which Newport claims was erroneous. We consider next whether 
Weber's testimony violated, in a clear and obvious way, the rule which forbids 
one witness to vouch for another witness' credibility.

 

  [¶18] 
  The prosecutor questioned 
Weber, who was a lay witness, about her and the victim's mother's reactions to 
the victim's account of the sexual assault. The prosecutor had earlier asked 
Weber a similar question concerning her son:

 

Q. And what was your and [the victim's mother's] 
reaction to the information provided by [your son]?

 

A. Actually, at that point there was no anger, shock, 
[or] anything else. It was more we needed to talk to [the victim]. [My son] had 
severe ADHD. If you show him you're angry or upset, he will become very agitated 
and trying to get him to calm down takes longer than it does just to have a 
blank face. So we waited for [the victim] and [her brother] to come home so we 
could talk to [the victim].

 

The prosecutor could have 
reasonably expected to get a similar response from Weber when she asked about 
the mothers' reactions to the victim's account of the sexual assault. 
Accordingly, the prosecutor could have anticipated that Weber would testify 
about what the women did after they talked to the victim about the sexual 
assault.

 

  [¶19] 
  Weber's testimony 
concerning the victim's veracity was unexpected and was not elicited by the 
prosecution. The prosecutor did not question Weber any further about the 
victim's credibility, and she did not use the challenged testimony as a basis 
for her closing argument. Additionally, there is no indication in the record 
that Weber deliberately interjected her opinion on the victim's truthfulness 
into her testimony. See Whiteplume, 841 P.2d  at 1339.

 

  [¶20] 
  Weber's testimony was 
arguably inappropriate because she commented that she believed the victim's 
account of the sexual assault.  
Nevertheless, given the context of Weber's testimony, we do not believe 
that her isolated statement violated, in a clear and obvious way, the rule 
against allowing one witness to vouch for another witness' credibility. See 
Brown, 953 P.2d  at 1182. Furthermore, the victim testified extensively at the 
trial, and the jurors had a good opportunity to observe her demeanor and to 
judge her credibility for themselves. As a consequence, the prejudice which 
resulted from Weber's testimony was limited. Weber's single statement does not 
undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict. The trial court did not commit 
plain error when it allowed Weber's statement into 
evidence.

 

  B. 
Speedy Trial

 

  [¶21] 
  Newport contends that his 
right to have a speedy trial was violated when his second trial was continued 
for more than six months after his arraignment without the prosecution seeking 
leave from the Wyoming Supreme Court under W. R. Cr. P. 48(b)(5) to continue the 
trial. We disagree.

 

  [¶22] 
  W. R. Cr. P. 48(b) protects 
a defendant's right to have a speedy original trial; however, it does not 
address a defendant's right to have a speedy retrial following a mistrial. When 
the prosecution of a defendant is disrupted by a mistrial, the commencement of 
the original trial, if it was timely, satisfies the time requirements of W. R. 
Cr. P. 48(b), and subsequent retrials are excluded from the requirements of the 
rule. See Fisher v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 162, 164 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).  In a retrial situation, W. R. Cr. P. 
48(b) does not require the prosecution to seek permission from this Court to 
continue the trial "to a date more than six months from the date of 
arraignment." W. R. Cr. P. 48(b)(5).

 

  [¶23] 
  Courts in other 
jurisdictions have decided cases in which the defendants claimed that their 
right to have a speedy retrial was violated. Some states have court rules or 
statutes that address speedy trial concerns in retrial situations. See, e. g., 
Mustafoski v. State, 954 P.2d 1042, 1043 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Mason v. 
People, 932 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Colo. 1997) (en banc).  Other states, like Wyoming, have court 
rules and statutes which protect a criminal defendant's right to receive a 
speedy first trial but do not address retrials. See, e. g., State v. Avelar, 931 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Idaho 1997); Fisher, 497 S.E.2d  at 164; State v. Fanning, 437 N.E.2d 583, 585 (Ohio 1982); Icgoren v. State, 653 A.2d 972, 976 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App.), cert. denied, 661 A.2d 700 (Md. 1995); Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 
674 (Miss. 1990). The Idaho Supreme Court held that its speedy trial rule does 
not apply to retrials. Avelar, 931 P.2d  at 1220. Similarly, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that its statutory speedy trial rule is satisfied once a 
defendant has been timely brought to trial even if the trial results in a 
mistrial. Handley, 574 So. 2d  at 674.

 

  [¶24] 
  We hold that, because W. R. 
Cr. P. 48(b) does not apply to retrials, the prosecution did not violate W. R. 
Cr. P. 48(b)(5) when it failed to seek leave to continue Newport's retrial to a 
date which was more than six months from the date of his 
arraignment.

 

  C. 
Child Witness Testimony

 

  [¶25] 
  Newport claims that the 
trial court abused its discretion by allowing A. L., who was ten years old, to 
testify that Newport sexually assaulted her in Montana. He claims that he was 
unfairly surprised by A. L. `s appearance at his second trial because the 
prosecution did not comply with the trial court's order by providing him with sufficient notification that A. L. 
would be called as a witness. The state maintains that Newport was aware that A. 
L. was a potential witness and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it allowed her to testify. We concur with the state.

 

The trial court has discretion in determining whether 
or not evidence is admissible. We will reverse a trial court's decision on the 
admissibility of evidence only if the trial court abused its discretion. "A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
[have] reasonably conclude[d] as it did." Hilterbrand v. 
State,             930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997).

 

  Clark 
v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431, 435 (Wyo. 1998) (some citations 
omitted).

 

  [¶26] 
  On January 9, 1997, Newport 
filed a motion for notice of the prosecution's intent to introduce evidence 
under W. R. E. 404(b).  The trial 
court granted the motion and directed the prosecution to disclose information 
concerning its intention to introduce evidence of Newport's other bad acts. 
Prior to Newport's first trial, the prosecution filed a notice listing its 
witnesses and a notice stating its intent to present other-bad-acts evidence at 
the trial. Those notices did not mention A. L. as a potential witness in the 
first trial.

 

  [¶27] 
  On April 25, 1997, the 
prosecution filed a motion for a continuance of the second trial. In that 
motion, the prosecution represented that a report existed which evidenced 
"similar allegations against [Newport] in Montana." The motion continued: "If 
witnesses regarding this incident can be located, it would also be necessary for 
the Court to address the issue of the evidence in a pretrial 404(b) hearing." 
The record indicates that Newport received a copy of a Montana social worker's 
report concerning an allegation that he had sexually assaulted A. L. Further, 
Newport's trial counsel contacted A. L. during the summer before the second 
trial.

 

  [¶28] 
  On September 2, 1997, 
Newport filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that he had molested two 
children in Montana.  The 
prosecution filed a notice on September 5, 1997, stating that it intended to 
introduce evidence that Newport sexually assaulted A. L. At the hearing on the 
admissibility of A. L. `s testimony, the prosecution represented that it had 
become aware of A. L. `s location only one day before it filed the notice. 
Newport objected to the admission of A. L. `s testimony, arguing, in part, that 
he had not received adequate notice that she would be called as a witness at the 
trial. The trial court rejected Newport's argument and allowed A. L. to testify 
at the second trial.

 

  [¶29] 
  Newport claims that he was 
"ambushed" and unfairly surprised by A. L. `s appearance and testimony at the 
trial. The record belies his contention. The prosecution gave ample notification 
that it was investigating an allegation that Newport had sexually assaulted A. 
L. and that the result of its investigation could be introduced as evidence at 
Newport's second trial. Newport's trial attorney was aware of A. L. `s claim, 
had received a copy of the Montana social worker's report, and had actually 
contacted A. L. during the months leading up to the trial. Newport even filed a 
motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the incident involving A. L. The trial court did not, therefore, 
abuse its discretion when it allowed A. L. to testify at Newport's second 
trial.

 

  [¶30] 
  
Affirmed.

   

    
LEHMAN, Chief Justice, concurring, with whom GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins.

   
[¶31]   While I agree that W. R. Cr. P. 48 does 
not apply to retrials, I believe Newport's speedy trial claim must be analyzed 
under constitutional speedy trial guarantees to determine if the delay between 
mistrial and retrial deprived Newport of his right to a speedy 
trial.

 

  [¶32] 
  Preliminarily, I consider 
this issue to be properly before the court. While Newport's brief relied on Rule 
48, the important fact is that Newport argued that he was denied a speedy trial. 
It is well established that even when Rule 48 has not been violated, an 
appellant's speedy trial claim is further subject to constitutional analysis. 
Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 230 (Wyo. 1998); Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 
1370-71 (Wyo. 1996); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1995). In reliance 
on this court's practice of analyzing both the rule-based and constitutional 
arguments, the State devoted nine pages of its brief to the constitutional 
issue. In addition, "recent experience with post-conviction remedies teaches us 
that the failure of counsel to raise issues which implicate constitutional 
rights of a defendant in an appeal will result in those issues being presented 
in a subsequent proceeding under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Consequently, judicial efficiency strongly suggests the treatment of obvious 
matters in the first appeal." Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1989). 
Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation in addressing the constitutional 
speedy trial issue.

 

  [¶33] 
  I also have no hesitation 
concluding that the constitutional speedy trial protections apply to Newport's 
retrial. In Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 669-70 (Wyo. 1982), this court used 
the constitutional analysis in denying Grable's claim that he had not received a 
speedy retrial after the appellate reversal of his first conviction. Besides Grable's acknowledgment 
that the speedy trial guarantees apply to retrials, this court has consistently 
analyzed speedy trial claims under both Rule 48 and the constitution. Sides v. 
State, 963 P.2d  at 230; Hall v. State, 911 P.2d at 1370-71; Yung v. State, 906 P.2d  at 1032. Because Rule 48 does not apply in this case, the reason to apply 
the constitutional analysis is far more compelling than in the usual speedy 
trial case: the only speedy trial guarantee available upon retrial is the 
constitutional one. Furthermore, even the courts that have held their speedy 
trial rule or statute inapplicable to retrials recognize that a defendant 
retains the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Avelar, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Idaho 1997); Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 677 (Miss. 1990); 
State v. Fanning, 437 N.E.2d 583, 585 (Ohio 1982). Relying on the foregoing, I 
would go one step further than the majority and analyze the constitutional 
issue.

 

  [¶34] 
  The standard generally 
applied to determine if a criminal defendant received a speedy retrial is 
reasonableness under the federal and state constitutions. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d  at 669; State v. Fanning, 437 N.E.2d  at 585; Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d  at 
677; State v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d 541, 545-46 (Neb. 1998); People v. Tedder, 404 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ill. App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by People v. 
Tyllas, 420 N.E.2d 625, 627 n. 1 (Ill. App. 1981). In making this determination, 
we are guided by the four-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this court in Cosco v. 
State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo. 1972). This test requires us to balance 1) the 
length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of 
his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 
975 (Wyo. 1998); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d  at 1032; Grable v. State, 649 P.2d  at 
669.

 

  [¶35] 
  Turning to Newport's claim, 
the first issue to resolve is which interval should be used to calculate the 
length of delay. Should our analysis apply to the interval between mistrial and 
retrial, or should we also include the time prior to mistrial? In answering this 
question, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, after reviewing numerous cases, 
held that absent extraordinary circumstances, the only time to be considered in 
this sort of case is the time between the mistrial and the subsequent 
trial.  Icgoren v. State, 653 A.2d 972, 978 (Md. App. 1995). See also State v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d at 546-47; Arnold 
v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978); People v. Tedder, 404 N.E.2d  
at 443.  The Maryland court's 
decision is consistent with our determination in Grable v. State, 649 P.2d  at 
669-70. There, after Grable's first conviction was reversed and remanded to the 
district court, Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1979), thirteen and 
one-half months passed before Grable was retried.  649 P.2d  at 670. In rejecting Grable's 
speedy trial claim, this court considered only the interval between filing of 
the mandate in district court and the retrial. Id. Therefore, I believe the 
appropriate interval to consider is the time from mistrial to 
retrial.

 

  [¶36] 
  Here, Newport's first trial 
resulted in a mistrial on April 11, 1997. Although the district court initially 
scheduled the retrial for April 29, 1997, the State was granted two continuances 
which caused the retrial to be postponed until September 8, 1997. From April 11 
to September 8, 150 days passed from Newport's first trial to his 
retrial.

 

  [¶37] 
  A review of Wyoming cases 
indicates that a 150- day delay is insufficient to create a presumption of 
prejudice. See Yung v. State, 906 P.2d  at 1032 (delay of 171 days not 
presumptively prejudicial); Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1991) (244 
days not presumptively prejudicial but requires further analysis); Sides v. State, 963 P.2d  at 230 (146 
days). While these Wyoming cases concern speedy trial claims pertaining to a 
first trial, other jurisdictions have addressed the delay between mistrial and 
retrial. These courts have found delays similar to the one presented here 
insufficient to constitute presumptive prejudice. See Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d  at 677 (delay of 6 months between mistrial and retrial not presumptively 
prejudicial); Bryant v. State, 1998 WL 850105, *11 (Miss. App. 1998) (delay of 
165 days between mistrial and retrial does not constitute presumptive 
prejudice). In addition, although W. R. Cr. P. 48 is not applicable to this 
factual scenario, its time constraints are instructive. See McDaniel v. State, 
945 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Wyo. 1997). The 150- day delay presented here is well 
within the 180 days allowed, upon proper continuance, under Rule 48(b)(4). For 
these reasons, I would conclude that a 150- day delay is insufficient to 
establish presumptive prejudice.

 

  [¶38] 
  When the length of delay is 
neither presumptively prejudicial nor significantly long, no further analysis 
into the Barker v. Wingo factors is warranted. McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d  at 
1188; Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo. 1979); Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992). Indeed, "[t]he length of the delay is to some 
extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively 
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go 
into the balance." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101. Finally, it should be noted that Newport did not reassert his 
demand for a speedy trial after his mistrial. We have repeatedly emphasized 
"[l]ess than vigorous assertions of  the right to a speedy trial are given 
little weight." Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Yung v. 
State, 906 P.2d at 1033); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168, 171 (Wyo. 1981). I 
would hold that the 150- day delay between mistrial and retrial did not deny 
Newport his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

 

    
Golden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

 

  [¶39] 
  I concur in that part of 
the majority opinion which holds that W. R. Cr. P. 48 does not apply to 
retrials, but join in Chief Justice Lehman's separate concurring opinion that 
Newport's speedy trial claim must be analyzed under constitutional speedy trial 
guarantees; and I agree with his analysis of that point. I also concur in that 
part of the majority opinion which treats the child witness testimony issue and 
holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed A. L. to 
testify.

 

  [¶40] 
  I respectfully dissent, 
however, to that part of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court 
did not commit plain error when it allowed into evidence Sarah Weber's testimony 
in answer to the prosecutor's question:

 

Q. After [your son] told you, after you actually 
talked to [the victim], what was your and [the victim's mother's] reaction to 
[the victim] at the time?

 

  (Emphasis supplied). Weber's answer 
was:

 

A. We believed her. She was scared enough-- 
she was scared enough that she was very, very frightened of Donald [Newport] 
hurting her. And that was our main question was, why didn't you tell us when 
this happened and she firmly believe[d] he was going to hurt 
her.

 

  (Emphasis 
supplied).

 

  [¶41] 
  For one thing, the 
prosecutor's question, as phrased, obviously seeks to elicit irrelevant 
evidence: the "reaction" of Weber and the victim's mother to an out-of-court 
statement of the victim.  Their 
"reaction" has no probative value as evidence in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief. I find it suspicious that an experienced prosecutor in a case 
involving such a serious charge would ask such an irrelevant question; one gets 
an uneasy feeling that such an irrelevant question might be a signal that the 
witness give an answer that expresses an opinion of the victim's credibility. 
"Reaction" is a broad term; I believe it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
listener's "reaction" to a speaker's "statement" would encompass the listener's 
opinion of the credibility of the speaker and her 
statement.

 

  [¶42] 
  For another thing, assuming 
that the prosecutor's question was not a signal for the witness's 
credibility-opinion-testimony, and the plain error standard, not the per se 
error standard, applies, in my judgment Weber's answer, "we believed her," etc., 
is a clear and unequivocal violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. 
See, e. g., McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo. 1993) ("witness credibility 
`is the exclusive province of the jury; & and neither expert nor lay 
witnesses should be permitted to testify that another witness is or is not 
telling the truth."); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988) ("A clear 
and unequivocal rule of law exists concerning this type of testimony: The 
credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury and may not be 
the subject of expert testimony."); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 
1986); and Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Wyo. 
1977).

 

  [¶43] 
  Finally, my confidence in 
the jury verdict is undermined because this was a close case in which no 
physical evidence existed; the only eyewitnesses were the accused and the 
victim; the key issue for the jury was the victim's credibility; and the 
opinions ("reactions") of Sarah Weber and the victim's mother would reasonably have substantial influence on the 
jury's determination of that key issue. Both Weber and the victim's mother lived 
with the victim; they knew her better than anyone else. Their "reaction" to her 
story would undoubtedly impress the jury.

 

 [¶44]     I would reverse and remand for a 
new trial.

 

        

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 (Supp. 1996) (amended 1997). When this incident occurred, § 
14-3-105(a) provided in pertinent part: "Any person knowingly taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging 
any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any immoral or 
indecent act is guilty of a felony."