Title: Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Tera, 
L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1945.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1945 
TERA, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. RICE DRILLING D, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-1945.] 
Contracts—Mineral 
rights—Summary 
judgment—Lease 
terms—Extrinsic 
evidence—Because there remained genuine issues of material fact to be 
litigated, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court. 
(No. 2023-0411—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided May 23, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County, No. 21 BE 0047, 
2023-Ohio-273. 
__________________ 
 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Seventh District 
Court of  Appeals, we are asked to determine whether a lease between appellee, 
Tera, L.L.C., and appellants, Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
Corporation, granting to appellants certain mineral rights in “the formation[] 
commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale” beneath Tera’s land included the right 
for appellants to drill wells into a geological area known as the “Point Pleasant.”  
We are also asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 
trial court’s award of summary judgment to Tera on its bad-faith-trespass claim 
against appellants.  Because we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the meaning of certain terms in the lease, we reverse the judgment 
of the Seventh District and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} This case centers on the interpretation of a lease by which Thomas 
Shaw agreed to lease to Rice Drilling1 mineral rights for geological formations 
beneath the surface of Shaw’s land in Belmont County.  Tera is Shaw’s successor-
in-title to the mineral rights.  The relevant lease language granting the mineral rights 
to Rice Drilling (“the grant clause”) reads: 
 
 
Lessor, in consideration of the payments described herein 
and the covenants and agreements hereafter contained, hereby leases 
and lets exclusively to [Rice Drilling] all the oil, gas, minerals and 
their constituents (not including coal) in the formations commonly 
known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale, underlying the 
land described below for the sole purpose of exploring for, drilling, 
operating, producing and gathering the oil, gas, casinghead gasoline 
and all other gases and their respective vapors, liquid or gaseous 
hydrocarbons produced in association therewith other than as 
reserved unto Lessor below. 
 
 
1. The court of appeals’ decision states that Rice Drilling thereafter assigned a percentage of its 
leased mineral interest to appellant Gulfport Energy.  2023-Ohio-273, 205 N.E.3d 1168, ¶ 8. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
3 
(Emphasis added.)  The relevant lease language reserving certain mineral rights to 
the lessor (originally Shaw, now Tera) (“the reservation clause”) reads: 
 
Lessor reserves all rights not specifically granted to Lessee 
in this Lease.  Lessor specifically reserves the rights to all products 
contained in any formation: (1) from the surface of the Leased 
Premises to the top of the formation commonly known as the 
Marcellus Shale, (2) in any and all formations below the base of the 
Marcellus Shale to the top of the formation commonly known as the 
Utica Shale, and (3) in all formations below the base of the Utica 
Shale. 
 
{¶ 3} In 2017, Tera filed the underlying suit against appellants in the 
Belmont County Common Pleas Court.  Relevant here are Tera’s bad-faith-trespass 
and conversion claims against appellants.  In support of those claims, Tera alleged 
that appellants had intentionally drilled six wells beneath Tera’s property into the 
Point Pleasant formation, which it said falls outside of the Utica Shale formation 
and beyond the bounds of the mineral rights leased to appellants by Tera. 
{¶ 4} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Tera’s 
trespass and conversion claims.  The trial court awarded summary judgment to Tera 
on both claims.  In doing so, it stated that “it is undisputed that the Point Pleasant 
Formation is the geological formation immediately below the Utica Shale 
formation,” and it concluded that the lease contained “clear and unequivocal words 
of limitation” that granted “rights solely to the Marcellus and Utica formations” 
and reserved “rights to all formations above and below those [formations].”  The 
trial court also stated, “Even construing the available evidence most strongly in 
favor of [appellants], they have not offered any sufficient evidence” to demonstrate 
that the lease granted them the right to take oil and gas from the Point Pleasant.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
The trial court limited its summary-judgment decision to the question of appellants’ 
liability for trespass and conversion, leaving the question of damages for trial. 
{¶ 5} Prior to a trial on damages, both Tera and appellants moved for partial 
summary judgment on the question whether appellants’ trespass had been in bad 
faith.  The trial court granted summary judgment to Tera on that issue, concluding 
that appellants had “knowingly, willfully, and recklessly drilled their wells into the 
Point Pleasant.”  This conclusion was primarily based on the trial court’s finding 
that the lease language “could not be any clearer—the lease was limited to just the 
Marcellus Shale and Utica Shale, and the Point Pleasant Formation was not 
conveyed or leased” and that appellants’ interpretation of the lease was therefore 
unreasonable.  Based on its determination that appellants had trespassed in bad 
faith, the trial court stated that “the damages owed to [Tera were] to be calculated 
without any deduction for the cost of drilling, operating, transporting, and any other 
expense incurred in removing the oil and gas from [Tera’s] property.”  A jury trial 
proceeded on the issue of damages, and the jury found that Tera was entitled to net 
damages in the amount of $40,129,357.62. 
{¶ 6} The Seventh District affirmed.  2023-Ohio-273, 205 N.E.3d 1168, 
¶ 52.  In a split decision, it concluded that the lease language at issue was 
unambiguous, id. at ¶ 49-51, and that the phrase “Utica Shale” had a “technical 
stratigraphic meaning,” id. at ¶ 50.  Its reasoning was similar to that of the trial 
court: 
 
It is undisputed that the Point Pleasant is a formation below the Utica 
Shale.  Consequently, we find that Shaw unambiguously reserved 
the Point Pleasant formation from the lease.  To the extent that 
ambiguity exists with the “grant of lease” provision, we conclude 
that it is clarified by the plain language of the reservation section.  
January Term, 2024 
 
 
5 
Finally, insofar as the contract language is unambiguous, we need 
not consider any parol evidence. 
 
Id. at ¶ 51.  The dissenting judge concluded that “[t]he plain language of the lease 
clearly granted [appellants] rights in the Point Pleasant formation after employing 
extrinsic evidence on the specialized meaning of certain terminology used in the 
lease.”  Id. at ¶ 136 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 7} This court accepted appellants’ discretionary appeal on the following 
propositions of law: 
 
 
1. Gas leases are no exception to this court’s precedents 
requiring that courts consider evidence of common meaning. 
 
2. “Bad faith” trespass in energy cases—as in other cases—
turns on subjective intent. 
 
See 170 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2023-Ohio-1830, 210 N.E.3d 545. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} Under their first proposition of law, appellants ask this court to 
interpret the phrase “the formation commonly known as the Utica Shale” in the 
lease according to its common meaning, which, appellants argue, includes the Point 
Pleasant.2  Appellants assert that we should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment 
and enter summary judgment in their favor or, in the alternative, remand the case 
to the trial court so that a jury can determine the meaning of the lease. 
 
2. In the parties’ briefs here and in the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals below, 
the Point Pleasant is also referred to as the “Point Pleasant Formation” or “Point Pleasant 
formation.”  This court’s use of any particular phrase in that regard is only to describe the arguments 
presented and is not meant to accord any significance to a particular phrase. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
{¶ 9} Tera argues in response that the trial court and the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that the lease is unambiguous because the technical, geological 
meaning of the phrase “Utica Shale” excludes the Point Pleasant formation.  
Accordingly, Tera argues that this court should affirm the court of appeals’ 
judgment. 
{¶ 10} The issues in this appeal were decided below on summary judgment.  
Appellate review of summary-judgment decisions is de novo.  Grafton v. Ohio 
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).  Under Civ.R. 56(C), 
summary judgment may be granted if it is determined that: 
 
(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; 
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to 
but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in 
favor 
of 
the 
party 
against 
whom 
the 
motion 
for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that 
party. 
 
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). 
{¶ 11} Oil and gas leases are contracts and are subject to the traditional rules 
of contract interpretation.  Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 148 Ohio St.3d 
524, 2016-Ohio-7549, 71 N.E.3d 1010, ¶ 11; see also Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 
Ohio St. 118, 129, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).  We have explained: 
 
When confronted with an issue of contract interpretation, our 
role is to give effect to the intent of the parties.  We will examine 
the contract as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is 
reflected in the language of the contract.  In addition, we will look 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
7 
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the 
contract unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the 
contents of the agreement.  When the language of a written contract 
is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find 
the intent of the parties. 
 
Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Toledo Edison Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-2720, 
953 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 37.  “ ‘As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be 
given a definite legal meaning.’ ”  Id., quoting Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 12} “Extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the intent of the parties 
when the contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when circumstances surrounding the 
agreement give the plain language special meaning.”  Graham v. Drydock Coal 
Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 313-314, 667 N.E.2d 949 (1996).  “ ‘If a contract is clear 
and unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter of law and there is no issue of 
fact to be determined.’ ”  Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 
Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 (1995), quoting Inland Refuse Transfer Co. 
v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 474 N.E.2d 
271 (1984).  But terms in a contract are ambiguous when they are susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ironics, 
Inc., 168 Ohio St.3d 467, 2022-Ohio-841, 200 N.E.3d 149, ¶ 14.  It is generally the 
role of the fact-finder to resolve any ambiguity in a contract.  Westfield Ins. Co. at 
¶ 13.  In other words, whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but the 
resolution of an ambiguous term in a contract is a question of fact.  McOmber v. 
Liebrecht, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-22-05, 2023-Ohio-2019, ¶ 29; Atelier Dist., 
L.L.C. v. Parking Co. of Am., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-87, 2007-Ohio-
7138, ¶ 17. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
{¶ 13} In the lease at issue, the phrase “Point Pleasant” is not found within 
the four corners of the lease.  The operative question, then, is whether the phrase 
“the formation[] commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale,” as used in the lease to 
describe the mineral rights leased, can reasonably be read to include the Point 
Pleasant. 
{¶ 14} The trial court found that the plain language of the lease clearly did 
not grant appellants the mineral rights for the Point Pleasant.  To reach that 
conclusion, however, the trial court necessarily relied on evidence outside the four 
corners of the agreement to determine that the Point Pleasant was beneath the Utica 
Shale and thus was not part of “the formation[] commonly known as * * * the Utica 
Shale,” because nothing in the agreement itself indicates that the Point Pleasant is 
not part of the formation commonly known as the Utica Shale.  The trial court stated 
that “it is undisputed that the Point Pleasant Formation is the geological formation 
immediately below the Utica Shale formation,” and it determined that the 
reservation clause in the lease—which reserved to Tera the mineral rights “in all 
formations below the base of the Utica Shale”—demonstrated the parties’ intent to 
limit the mineral rights granted to appellants under the lease to only those for the 
Marcellus Shale and Utica Shale formations.  But the stratigraphic location of the 
Point Pleasant—meaning its geologic location within the layers of rock or 
sediment—as understood by the parties today does not answer the question whether 
the Point Pleasant was considered part of the formation commonly known as the 
Utica Shale when the parties entered into the lease.  And because the lease does not 
expressly refer to the Point Pleasant, its plain language does not answer the question 
whether the Point Pleasant was meant by the parties to be included in what they 
referred to as “the[] formation commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale.”  Without 
language in the lease specifically demonstrating the parties’ understanding of the 
stratigraphic location of the Point Pleasant or whether they intended for the Utica 
Shale to include the Point Pleasant, the lease itself offers no guidance on the 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
9 
question whether the parties had agreed that the Point Pleasant was part of the Utica 
Shale. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, in finding that the parties to the lease did not intend for it 
to grant appellants the right to take oil and gas from the Point Pleasant, the trial 
court stated that “[e]ven construing the available evidence most strongly in favor 
of [appellants], [appellants] have not offered any sufficient evidence to the 
contrary.”  This language suggests that the court did consider and weigh evidence 
outside the lease in reaching its conclusion.  Even if the trial court merely 
considered “the available evidence” in an effort to understand a technical term, it 
appears that it nonetheless conducted fact-finding rather than simply determining, 
for purposes of summary judgment, whether a disputed fact existed.  That is not a 
permissible action by a trial court at the summary-judgment stage.  See Dupler v. 
Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980) 
(noting that a court considering summary judgment “may not weigh the proof or 
choose among reasonable inferences”); see also Marshall v. Colonial Ins. Co., 7th 
Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 0169, 2016-Ohio-8155, ¶ 48; Telecom Acquisition 
Corp. I, Inc. v. Lucic Ents., Inc., 2016-Ohio-1466, 62 N.E.3d 1034, ¶ 93 (8th Dist.); 
Finn v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-02-80, 2003-Ohio-
4233, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the lease 
language was unambiguous.  It concluded that the words “commonly known as” 
within the phrase “the formation[] commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale” were 
intended to “simply memorialize[] the rule of contract interpretation that obliges a 
court to rely on the common meaning of words, unless doing so would cause an 
absurd result,” 2023-Ohio-273, 205 N.E.3d 1168, at ¶ 50.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that if the phrase “commonly known as” created any ambiguity in the 
lease, the meaning was clarified by the lease’s reservation clause.  Id. at ¶ 51.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Therefore, the court concluded, it was not necessary to consider any parol evidence.  
Id. 
{¶ 17} Again, neither the grant clause nor the reservation clause of the lease 
expressly mentions the Point Pleasant.  Nor does the lease language answer the 
question whether the parties intended for the Point Pleasant to be considered part 
of the Utica Shale when the lease was executed.  Even if we were to accept the 
court of appeals’ determination that the phrase “commonly known as” was simply 
meant to “memorialize” a contract-interpretation principle, we would still have to 
look outside the four corners of the lease to determine whether the common 
meaning of the phrase “the formation[] commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale” 
included the Point Pleasant.  In other words, were the lower courts relying on the 
common meaning or the technical, stratigraphic meaning of “Utica Shale”?  Or 
could the lower courts say, with certainty and without turning to extrinsic evidence, 
that the common meaning of the phrase “Utica Shale” when the parties entered into 
the lease was the same as its technical, stratigraphic meaning?  Because the answers 
to those questions remain unclear, we are not persuaded that the lease language 
clearly established that the Point Pleasant was or was not to be considered part of 
the Utica Shale. 
{¶ 18} The judge dissenting from the court of appeals’ decision asserted 
that extrinsic evidence was properly considered to construe a term within the 
lease—“Utica Shale”—that had a special meaning and that the evidence 
demonstrated that the special meaning of “Utica Shale” when the lease was entered 
into included the Point Pleasant.  2023-Ohio-273 at ¶ 136-141, 146 (Robb, J., 
dissenting).  But Tera cites extrinsic evidence that it contends demonstrates the 
opposite conclusion.  Thus, even when considering extrinsic evidence to understand 
the special, industry meaning of the phrase “Utica Shale” as it relates to the Point 
Pleasant, we cannot discern a clear legal meaning intended by the parties.  All we 
can discern is that the lease is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.  
January Term, 2024 
 
 
11 
Because both interpretations are reasonable, we cannot give the phrase “Utica 
Shale” a definite legal meaning based on the lease language alone.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the lease is ambiguous. 
{¶ 19} Resolving the meaning of ambiguous terms in a contract is a matter 
of factual determination for the fact-finder.  See Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 
66 Ohio St.3d 64, 66, 609 N.E.2d 144 (1993).  We have noted that “the purpose of 
summary judgment is ‘not to try issues of fact, but rather to determine whether 
triable issues of fact exist.’ ”  Smathers v. Glass, 172 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-
4595, 222 N.E.3d 554, ¶ 3, quoting Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 
7, 15, 467 N.E.2d 1378 (6th Dist.1983).  Rather than weighing the evidence, a court 
considering summary judgment must construe the evidence in favor of the 
nonmoving party, including when drawing inferences from facts or resolving 
factual ambiguities or inconsistencies.  See id. at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 20} Here, the parties’ filings and arguments demonstrate that triable 
issues of fact remain regarding whether they intended for the Point Pleasant to be 
considered part of “the formation[] commonly known as * * * the Utica Shale” 
when they entered into the lease.  As the court of appeals noted, both parties 
submitted multiple expert reports on that issue.  2023-Ohio-273, 205 N.E.3d 1168, 
at ¶ 48.  Their briefs refer to conflicting evidence from numerous depositions and 
other sources on the topic, including evidence regarding what the parties negotiated 
and what they understood at the time they entered into the lease, how the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources had referred to the geological formations in its 
publications and forms, and how the geologic formations had been referred to by 
members of the public and the news media and industry representatives.  To 
determine from all of that information the definitive legal meaning that the parties 
intended by the lease language would require this court to step into the role of fact-
finder and weigh the credibility of the witnesses and draw inferences from the 
evidence.  But it is no more proper for this court to weigh evidence and the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
credibility of witnesses to decide issues of fact at the summary-judgment stage than 
it is for a trial court to do so.3  A jury may very well come to the same conclusion 
as Tera and the dissent about the meaning of the lease’s terms, but that is precisely 
the role of the jury in a case involving disputed facts, and such disputes cannot be 
resolved on summary judgment.  Because there remain genuine issues of material 
fact to be litigated, we are unable to conclude that either party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh 
District and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
{¶ 21} Appellants’ second proposition of law concerns Tera’s bad-faith-
trespass claim and, more specifically, appellants’ assertion that the trial court and 
the court of appeals improperly determined that appellants acted in bad faith based 
merely on the court’s conclusion that the lease language did not grant appellants 
the mineral rights to the Point Pleasant formation beneath Tera’s land.  Although 
the court of appeals recognized that “[t]he question of good faith is an issue of 
ultimate fact as to whether or not there was bona fide belief of right in the action 
taken and complained of, to be arrived at by the trier of facts from all the relevant 
material evidence adduced in the case,” id. at ¶ 55, citing Bamer v. Tiger, Inc., 5th 
Dist. Muskingum No. CA-86-17, 1987 WL 11004 (May 8, 1987), it nonetheless 
concluded that based on its resolution of the lease language, “there [was] no set of 
facts by which [appellants] could demonstrate a good faith belief of right to drilling 
into and extracting minerals from the Point Pleasant,” id. at ¶ 57.  Because that 
conclusion depended on the court of appeals’ judgment with respect to the lease 
language, which we reverse, we must also reverse the court of appeals’ judgment 
 
3.  The dissent argues that everyone knows what the Point Pleasant formation is and where it lies 
and that it was clearly excluded from the lease.  The dissent’s confidence in determining that fact 
for the parties is inspiring.  But the question here is not what the Point Pleasant is or how its location 
is defined today.  The question is what did the parties to the lease intend by the phrase “the 
formations commonly known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale,” without there being any 
mention in the lease of the Point Pleasant formation by name and, more importantly, whether that 
question should ultimately be determined by this court or by the fact-finder. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
13 
on appellants’ second assignment of error below (which correlates to their second 
proposition of law here) and remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings on that issue. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh 
District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to 
Tera, and we remand the case to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FISCHER, DONNELLY, and EKLUND, JJ., concur. 
 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and 
DETERS, J. 
JOHN J. EKLUND, J., of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} This is a case about a lease that granted mineral rights to only a 
specific portion of a landowner’s subsurface estate.  By failing to construe the lease 
as a whole and by misapplying the summary judgment standard, the majority 
incorrectly concludes that the lease is ambiguous.  It reverses the judgment of the 
courts below and remands the case for a jury to consider extrinsic evidence about 
the contract’s meaning.  I would not.  Because the lease is unambiguous, I would 
uphold the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the landowner. 
The Lease Is Unambiguous 
{¶ 24} Thomas Shaw leased to Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., the mineral rights 
to a specific portion of his subsurface property.  Shaw’s remaining rights are now 
held by Tera, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation now apparently holds a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
portion of Rice Drilling’s rights.  To keep things simple, I will refer to the opposing 
parties simply as the landowner and the drilling companies. 
{¶ 25} The underlying question in this case is straightforward: Did the 
lease, by granting the drilling companies the right to drill into the geological 
formation known as the Utica Shale, also grant the drilling companies the right to 
drill into the geologically distinct Point Pleasant formation? 
{¶ 26} There is no dispute about the locations of the respective geological 
formations.  The experts in this case agreed on the Utica Shale’s basic geological 
meaning.  The Utica Shale is all the strata between the Kope and Point Pleasant 
formations.  The Seventh District Court of Appeals below noted that both sides also 
agree that as a matter of geology, the Point Pleasant formation lies below the base 
of the Utica Shale.  See 2023-Ohio-273, 205 N.E.3d 1168, ¶ 51.  And an expert for 
each side confirmed that the Ohio Department of Natural Resources identified the 
Utica Shale and the Point Pleasant formation as distinct formations at the time the 
lease was signed. 
{¶ 27} The lease identified the parameters of the subsurface property leased 
to the drilling companies in two separate—but complementary—ways.  First, the 
granting clause defined the subsurface areas that were leased to the drilling 
companies.  And in a belt-and-suspenders approach, the reservation clause defined 
the subsurface areas that were not leased to the drilling companies but were instead 
retained by the landowner.  Both provisions make clear that the Point Pleasant 
formation was not part of the subsurface area granted to the drilling companies. 
{¶ 28} In the granting clause, the landowner leased to the drilling 
companies mineral rights “in the formations commonly known as the Marcellus 
Shale and the Utica Shale.”  And in the reservation clause, the landowner reserved 
for himself all rights not specifically granted to Rice Drilling in the lease and “all 
products contained in any formation: * * * (3) in all formations below the base of 
the Utica Shale.”  Thus, the granting clause makes clear that the drilling companies 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
15 
did not have rights to the Point Pleasant formation, because the formation is not 
part of the “Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale.”  The reservation clause makes 
this doubly clear: it reserves to the landowner all formations below the base of the 
Utica Shale, and the Point Pleasant formation is indisputably below the Utica Shale.  
A covenant-and-entireties clause reinforces this understanding, providing that “[the 
drilling companies] will utilize current and future technologies to * * * maximize 
production recovery of all the oil and gas resources contained in the Marcellus 
Shale and Utica Shale * * *.”  (Emphasis supplied.) 
{¶ 29} The drilling companies’ only response to this plain reading of the 
contract is to argue that the “commonly known as” modifier in the granting clause 
changes the plain meaning of the contract.  In their view, the phrase “commonly 
known as” demonstrates that the parties meant to reject the geological meaning of 
Utica Shale and instead adopt a colloquial meaning of the term.  In support of this 
argument, they rely on a handful of news articles and other anecdotal materials in 
which they contend that the term “Utica Shale” was sometimes loosely used in a 
manner that also included the Point Pleasant formation.  The landowner counters 
that when read as a whole, the contract is plain and unambiguous and that the phrase 
“commonly known as” was simply used to reflect that the Utica Shale has different 
names depending on the area of the country in which it is found. 
{¶ 30} I don’t find persuasive the drilling companies’ argument that 
extrinsic evidence establishes that the parties intended to give a colloquial and 
imprecise meaning to the term “Utica Shale.”  To start, extrinsic evidence is only 
admissible if a contract is ambiguous.  Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 
311, 313-314, 667 N.E.2d 949 (1996).  The first question, then, is whether the lease 
is ambiguous.  It is not. 
{¶ 31} “One cannot really determine if a phrase is ambiguous on its own, 
because interpretation is contextual.”  Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 101; 
see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
(2012) (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning”).  And here, context weighs 
heavily against the drilling companies’ argument.  The idea that the parties intended 
a loose, colloquial meaning of Utica Shale does not square with the contract when 
read as a whole. 
{¶ 32} Ordinarily, oil and gas contracts lease the rights to all subsurface 
geological formations.  See, e.g., K & D Farms, Ltd. v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 
5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00038, 2015-Ohio-4475, ¶ 29.  But this lease was 
unusual.  The landowner only leased the rights to specific portions of the subsurface 
area.  Not surprisingly, then, the contract defines the areas that are the subjects of 
the lease with precise geological terms.  The reservation clause, for example, 
reserves to the landowner “all products contained in any formation: (1) from the 
surface of the Leased Premises to the top of the formation commonly known as the 
Marcellus Shale, (2) in any and all formations below the base of the Marcellus 
Shale to the top of the formation commonly known as the Utica Shale, and (3) in 
all formations below the base of the Utica Shale.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Quite 
simply, the loose, colloquial meaning of Utica Shale proffered by the drilling 
companies is at odds with the highly specific language used to detail the precise 
geological contours of the parties’ rights throughout the lease. 
{¶ 33} The drilling companies might have a stronger argument if the lease 
simply granted them the rights to drill into the geological area “commonly known 
as the Utica Shale.”  But the words “the formation” precede the phrase “commonly 
known as.”  The plain and ordinary meaning of “formation” is “any igneous, 
sedimentary, or metamorphic rock represented as a unit in geological mapping.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 893 (1993).  It was undisputed at 
the time the contract was signed—and remains undisputed today—that the Utica 
Shale and the Point Pleasant formation constitute two distinct formations.  It would 
be illogical to say that the right to drill into “the formation commonly known as the 
Utica Shale” includes the right to drill into multiple formations. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
17 
{¶ 34} Also problematic for the drilling companies is the fact that under the 
reservation clause, the landowner reserved the rights to all products “in all 
formations below the base of the Utica Shale.”  The “commonly known as” 
language is not included in this portion of the reservation clause.  Thus, to accept 
the drilling companies’ argument requires one to assume either that the granting 
clause trumps the reservation clause, or that the clauses set forth inconsistent rights.  
There is no textual basis for the first assumption.  And adopting the second 
assumption would mean that the landowner granted the drilling companies the right 
to drill into the Point Pleasant formation and at the same time reserved for himself 
all rights in the Point Pleasant formation—a nonsensical result. 
{¶ 35} Finally, the lease suggests that the parties explicitly recognized a 
potential need for the landowner to drill through the Utica Shale to reach the Point 
Pleasant formation.  The reservation clause provides, “[Landowner] also reserves 
the right to drill through any leased shale(s) subject to [the drilling companies’] 
approval which shall not be unreasonably withheld * * *.”  While not dispositive 
by itself, the inclusion of this language is another indication that the parties 
understood that the landowner was retaining rights to the formations—such as the 
Point Pleasant formation—that lie below the Utica Shale. 
{¶ 36} In finding the lease ambiguous, the majority fixates on the phrase 
“commonly known as” to the exclusion of the rest of the contractual language.  But 
that’s not the way that we read contracts.  See Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v 
Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d 199, 2018-Ohio-5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 9 (“Evaluating the 
context in which a word is written is essential to a fair reading of the text”); see 
also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 56.  When the contract is read as a whole, 
there is no ambiguity. 
{¶ 37} The majority misses this point.  It neglects to consider the contract 
as a whole and instead jumps to the conclusion that extrinsic evidence is required 
to understand the meaning that the parties ascribed to the terms of the contract.  But 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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where there is no ambiguity, a foray into extrinsic evidence is inappropriate.  
Graham, 76 Ohio St.3d at 313-314, 667 N.E.2d 949. 
The Majority Misapplies the Summary Judgment Standard 
{¶ 38} Other than its laser focus on a single phrase, the majority does not 
seriously engage with the language of the contract in its determination of ambiguity.  
Instead, it concludes that the trial court was confronted with a question of fact for 
the jury because the lease fails to specifically reference the Point Pleasant 
formation.  In so concluding, the majority states, “[T]he trial court necessarily relied 
on evidence outside the four corners of the agreement * * *, because nothing in the 
agreement itself indicates that the Point Pleasant is not part of the formation 
commonly known as the Utica Shale.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 14.  And the majority 
reasons that “because the lease does not expressly refer to the Point Pleasant, its 
plain language does not answer the question whether the Point Pleasant was meant 
by the parties to be included in what they referred to as ‘the[] formation commonly 
known as the * * * Utica Shale.’ ”  (Brackets and ellipsis in original.)  Id. at ¶ 14.  
The finding of ambiguity seems to rely wholly on the fact that it is necessary to 
look outside the four corners of the contract to understand that the Point Pleasant 
formation is not part of the Utica Shale. 
{¶ 39} Such analysis is overly simplistic and misstates the proper role of a 
court in interpreting a contract for purposes of a motion for summary judgment.  
“The construction of written contracts and instruments of conveyance is a matter of 
law.”  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 
(1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.  “As a matter of law, a contract is 
unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning.”  Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11.  It is only 
when a court determines that a contract is ambiguous that it is proper for a jury to 
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.  See Graham at 313-314.  But if 
the evidence is so clear and one-sided that no reasonable person would determine 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
19 
the disputed issue in any way but one, the court is well within its authority to decide 
the question as a matter of law.  5 Corbin on Contracts, Section 24.30 
(Rev.Ed.2018); see also Buckeye Pipe Line at 248. 
{¶ 40} The majority rests its determination of ambiguity on the fact that it 
is necessary to look outside the four corners of the contract to understand that the 
Point Pleasant formation is not part of the Utica Shale.  But that makes little sense.  
Imagine a contract that gave a party the right to distribute a product in Ohio.  A 
judge in Ashtabula might not know that Wapakoneta is part of Ohio and might need 
to look at a map to determine that the contract included the right to distribute the 
product in Wapakoneta.  But nobody would argue that because a judge had to look 
outside the four corners of a contract to ascertain the universally agreed-upon 
meaning of a term, the contract was ambiguous.  Similarly, there should be no 
objection here to looking at widely agreed-upon geological definitions and 
stratigraphic maps to understand the geological terms in the lease. 
{¶ 41} Indeed, it is commonly understood that a judge may consult 
dictionaries and other similar materials outside the four corners of a contract to 
determine the meaning of its terms.  See, e.g., Buckeye Pipe Line at 247-248 
(relying on a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in an oil and 
gas lease); see also In re Envirodyne Industries, 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir.1994) 
(“Cases in which courts use [dictionaries and similar materials] to interpret 
contractual or statutory provisions are legion”). 
{¶ 42} The majority also accuses the trial court of improperly 
“consider[ing] and weigh[ing] evidence.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 15.  As the basis 
for this claim, it points to the trial court’s statement that “[e]ven construing the 
available evidence most strongly in favor of [the drilling companies], [they] have 
not offered any sufficient evidence to the contrary.”  But despite what the majority 
says, the trial court did exactly what it was supposed to do.  When a trial court 
evaluates a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence must be construed most 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Bliss v. Johns Manville, 172 Ohio St.3d 
367, 2022-Ohio-4366, 224 N.E.3d 22, ¶ 13.  So what the majority complains about 
is simply a straightforward application of the summary judgment standard.  The 
trial court’s statement that the drilling companies had not offered sufficient 
evidence to the contrary did not constitute an improper weighing of the evidence 
but simply conveyed the court’s assessment that the evidence presented was not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.  Such an analysis is 
appropriate; indeed, it is required.  See Civ.R. 56; see also Buckeye Pipe Line, 53 
Ohio St.2d at 248, 374 N.E.2d 146 (trial court’s interpreting a contract on summary 
judgment as a matter of law was proper when affidavit submitted by nonmoving 
party provided meanings of terms as used in oil and gas industry, and evidence was 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact). 
{¶ 43} The trial court acted well within the proper standards for interpreting 
a contract as a question of law on a motion for summary judgment.  The court 
examined the contract and determined its unambiguous language constituted “a 
grant of rights solely to the Marcellus and Utica formations.”  The court also noted 
that it was “undisputed that the Point Pleasant formation is the geological formation 
immediately below the Utica Shale formation.”  Thus, the court found that “by the 
plain language [of the contract], [the drilling companies] acquired no interest in the 
oil and/or gas in the Point Pleasant formation.”  The trial court didn’t weigh the 
evidence—it applied the plain language of the contract to the undisputed evidence 
and concluded that the landowner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
{¶ 44} Thus, unlike the majority, I would affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
landowner on the contract issue. 
Good-Faith Trespass 
{¶ 45} I also find no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on 
the issue of good-faith trespass.  Under Ohio law, the act of trespass creates a 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
21 
presumption of willfulness and places the burden on the trespasser to prove that he 
acted in good faith.  See Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co. v. Tracy, 22 Ohio 
App. 21, 31, 153 N.E. 240 (4th Dist.1925), aff’d, 115 Ohio St. 298, 152 N.E. 641 
(1926); see also Brady v. Stafford, 115 Ohio St. 67, 152 N.E. 188 (1926).  The 
drilling companies contend that the question whether one has trespassed in good 
faith is purely a subjective inquiry.  But our caselaw is to the contrary.  See State 
ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country Club Co., 171 Ohio 
St.3d 663, 2022-Ohio-4345, 220 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 32 (question of good faith or bad 
faith includes an objective standard that requires consideration of whether one acted 
reasonably under the circumstances in addition to considering whether one acted 
honestly); Brady v. Stafford, 115 Ohio St. 67, 152 N.E. 188 (1926), paragraph four 
of the syllabus (good-faith trespass requires a bona fide belief that trespasser has a 
right to take minerals). The trial court properly found that in light of the 
unambiguous contract and the other materials submitted in support of summary 
judgment that the drilling companies did not have a reasonable claim of right to 
exploit the Point Pleasant formation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.  Because 
the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DETERS, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
C.J. Wilson Law, L.L.C., and Craig J. Wilson; Law Office of Elizabeth L. 
Glick, and Elizabeth L. Glick; and Myser & Davies and Richard Myser, for 
appellee. 
 
Steptoe & Johnson, P.L.L.C., John Kevin West, and John C. Ferrell, for 
appellants, Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation. 
Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P., Ragan Naresh, Joseph C. Schroeder, and Kenneth 
A. Young, for appellant Rice Drilling D, L.L.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P., and Daniel T. Donovan, for appellant Gulf Energy 
Corporation. 
Shuman McCuskey Slicer, P.L.L.C., and Natalie C. Schaefer, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae National Association of Royalty Owners—Ohio. 
 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Emily K. Anglewicz, David J. Wigham, 
Timothy B. Pettorini, and Sara E. Fanning, urging affirmance for amici curiae 
Cardinal Minerals, L.L.C.; Portland Resources, L.L.C.; Ray Norris, individually 
and as trustee of the Ray Norris Trust U/A Dated March 11, 2014; and Janice K. 
Emrick, individually and as trustee of the June E. Norris Trust U/A Dated March 
11, 2014. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Gregory D. Russell, Thomas H. 
Fusonie, and Christopher A. LaRocco, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Oil 
and Gas Association. 
 
Theisen Brock, L.P.A., and Daniel P. Corcoran, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Southeastern Ohio Oil and Gas Association. 
 
Tony Long, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Steptoe & Johnson, P.L.L.C., and Dallas F. Kratzer III, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae American Gas Association. 
_________________