Title: Van Duser v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Van Duser v. State1990 WY 92796 P.2d 1322Case Number: 89-54Decided: 09/07/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES MALCOLM VAN 
DUSER, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Michael K. Cornia, Asst. Public Defender, and 
Donald K. Slaughter, Student Intern (argued), for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Charles 
Van Duser was convicted after a jury trial of one count of attempted first 
degree sexual assault and one count of child abuse. He states the following 
issues:

"1. Whether the 
prosecution improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof.

"2. Whether the `911' 
tape was admissible.

"3. Whether Appellant 
should be credited for time served against his maximum sentence.

"4. Whether the trial 
court improperly imposed post incarceration conditions in direct contravention 
of Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989)."

[¶2]      We modify the 
sentence and affirm.

FACTS

[¶3]      After an evening 
of drinking, appellant drove to the victim's home where he gained access by 
breaking a basement window. The victim was awakened by the noise, looked around 
briefly, assumed her cats had caused the noise by knocking something over, and 
went back to bed. She was still awake when appellant appeared in her bedroom 
doorway, clad only in his socks. He jumped on top of the victim. She started to 
struggle and screamed for help. The victim's 13-year-old daughter, awakened by 
the noise, came to the doorway to see what was happening. Appellant grabbed the 
daughter and dragged her into the room by her hair. The daughter began screaming 
and struggling. Appellant slapped her and beat both mother and daughter. The 
three continued to struggle. While appellant was engaged in ripping off the 
victim's underwear, the daughter grabbed a can of spray deodorant and sprayed 
appellant in the face. After further struggle, during which the victim hit 
appellant in the head with a large picture frame, he left. The victim called 
"911," and appellant was arrested as he was driving home.

BURDEN OF 
PROOF

[¶4]      In his first 
argument appellant complains of the following testimony elicited by the 
prosecutor from two employees of the state crime lab:

"Q. Okay. Just one other 
question. Did [the public defender], or anyone on her behalf, to your knowledge, 
submit any other dog or cat hairs for you to analyze?

"A. I did not examine any 
other cat hair or dog hair in this case.

"Q. Were you ever 
requested to do so?

"A. No.

"Q. Would you have been 
the one to do that, had they been brought into the lab?

"A. Probably.

"Q. You've done that 
before for defense counsel?

"A. Examine 
items?

"Q. Yes.

"A. Yes.

"Q. I believe the statute 
requires you to do that for the public defender's office, doesn't 
it?

"A. That's my 
understanding.

* * * * * *

"Q. Just one brief 
question. At the time that you were at the lab, had your office in the past 
conducted examinations on evidence for defense counsel?

"A. Yes, I think 
so.

"Q. All right. Is that 
required by statute, to your knowledge?

"A. I don't 
know.

"Q. Had they submitted 
anything, other than those, for testing, would you have complied and tried the 
test what [sic] they requested?

"A. Definitely. 

"Q. Are you aware of 
anything else that they submitted for your test?

"A. Any item which was 
submitted to the lab, I did the examination.

"Q. What items [sic] was 
that?

"A. Any item which was 
submitted, and any requests which were made to the lab, I performed an 
examination.

"Q. And did you try each 
one of these items, to look for what they've indicated elsewhere?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Have you been 
involved in any cat litter that was tendered to your office, given to your 
office, for exam by defense counsel?

"A. There was not cat 
litter submitted by the defense."

There was no 
objection to this testimony at trial. Accordingly, appellant must establish that 
admission of the testimony constituted plain error. He must demonstrate that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated which denied him a substantial 
right, resulting in material prejudice. Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶5]      Appellant 
contends that this testimony was an improper attempt to shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant. Specifically, he contends that the questions concerning 
whether the defense had submitted any cat hair, dog hair, or cat litter to the 
state crime lab for testing were improper because they informed the jury that 
defense had not made use of facilities to which they were entitled by law. He 
asserts that these questions were an impermissible "attempt to diffuse the 
defense argument that the dog and cat hair or the litter found on Appellant's 
clothing came from Appellant's home."

[¶6]      Appellant in 
effect argues that any testimony which tends to show that a defense argument is 
not supported by evidence is improper, because it implies that appellant has the 
burden of proving his innocence. We disagree. It is permissible for a prosecutor 
to elicit testimony to demonstrate a lack of evidentiary support for a theory 
advanced by defense, so long as the prosecutor does not suggest that defendant 
must testify or that defendant bears the burden of proof. Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53 (Wyo. 1986). The testimony quoted above does not show that the 
prosecutor suggested either. No rule of law has been violated, and there is no 
plain error.

911 TAPE 
RECORDING

[¶7]      At trial the 
prosecution introduced a portion of a tape recording of a telephone call 
received by the Laramie County Sheriff on the "911" emergency line. The call was 
made by the hysterical victim as appellant was leaving her home after the 
attack. The prosecutor stated clearly that the tape was being offered to show 
the victim's state of mind at the time and to disprove consent. In addition, he 
stated that the recording was not offered for the truth of the statements 
contained on it.

[¶8]      Nonetheless, 
appellant now argues that the tape was inadmissible hearsay because there was 
insufficient foundation laid to introduce the tape for the purpose of rebutting 
a charge of recent fabrication. This argument ignores the trial record. The 
theory that the tape was introduced for the purpose of rebutting a charge of 
fabrication is apparently based solely on unsupported speculation by appellate 
counsel. The record plainly shows that the jury was informed that the evidence 
was offered to show state of mind, not for the truth of the statements contained 
therein. It is a fundamental principle of evidence that statements which are not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay. See W.R.E. 801(c). 
If a statement is not hearsay under W.R.E. 801(c), it is irrelevant whether 
there was foundation to introduce the evidence under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). 
Speculation about other possible uses of evidence does not change that 
principle. Since the tape is not hearsay under W.R.E. 801(c), appellant's basic 
premise is invalid, and we need not consider the argument further.

CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE 
CONFINEMENT

[¶9]      Appellant argues 
that he is entitled to credit against his maximum sentence for presentence 
confinement. This court has recently considered the question of credit for 
presentence confinement in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1990). For the 
purposes of granting credit against a prison sentence, presentence confinement 
is

"incarceration for 
inability and failure to post bond on the offense for which the sentence is 
entered and does not include revoked probation or other confinement that would 
continue to exist without regard for bond posting capabilities in [the] 
particular proceeding. 785 P.2d  at 498 n. 8." Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877 
(Wyo. 1990).

When a sentence 
to a term of imprisonment is imposed, presentence confinement must be credited 
against both the maximum term and minimum term. Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 878. If the 
defendant is incarcerated before trial for any reason other than circumstances 
as outlined above, the trial court may deny credit for the time incarcerated 
subject to two limitations. First, the maximum sentence imposed plus the time 
incarcerated cannot exceed the statutory maximum time. Second, for sentences 
entered after May 22, 1987, the minimum sentence, minus any credit given for the 
time incarcerated, may not exceed ninety percent of the maximum sentence minus 
credit, if any. Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498; see also W.S. 7-13-201. If the trial 
court did not specifically deny credit, either on the sentencing record or in 
the final sentence itself, a defendant automatically receives credit against 
both the minimum and the maximum. Id.

[¶10]   Appellant was credited with time 
served against the minimum sentence but not the maximum. It appears from the 
record that he was unable to post bond and not confined for any other reason. 
His incarceration falls into the category of presentence confinement under 
Renfro and Prejean. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to credit for time 
served against the maximum sentence in addition to the credit he received 
against the minimum sentence.

MANDATORY PARTICIPATION 
IN TREATMENT PROGRAMS

[¶11]   As a part of the sentence, the 
trial court ordered appellant to "mandatorily participate in all available 
sexual therapeutic programs" while at the penitentiary. There is no statutory 
authority for the court to impose such a condition. In Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989), we held that a sentencing court may not impose conditions of 
incarceration in the absence of statutory authority. The State notes that Keller 
was decided after the imposition of this sentence but correctly concedes that it 
is controlling.

[¶12]   In light of our resolution of these 
last two issues, we modify the sentence to strike the paragraph concerning 
mandatory participation in therapeutic programs and add provision for credit 
against the maximum sentence for time served.

[¶13]   The judgment and sentence are 
affirmed as modified.