Title: Commonwealth v. Richards

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11310 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENNETH SCOTT RICHARDS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 3, 2020.  -  October 7, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions 
and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Witness, Expert.  
Intoxication.  Evidence, Intoxication, Expert opinion, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  
Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Instructions to 
jury, Argument by counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 26, 2006. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John T. 
Lu, J.; the case was tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J.; and 
a motion for a new trial, filed on February 9, 2016, was heard 
by Lu, J. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case and authored this opinion prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In the early morning hours of June 23, 2006, 
the defendant, Kenneth Scott Richards, killed his wife, Rachel 
Richards, by beating her to death with a baseball bat at their 
home.  After officers arrived on the scene, the defendant was 
taken to a hospital where he underwent surgery for stab wounds.  
Within hours of surgery, while still impaired by the residual 
effects of anesthesia and painkillers, the defendant admitted to 
a nurse and later to law enforcement officers who questioned him 
that he had killed his wife and that the stab wounds were self-
inflicted.  At trial, however, he testified that he struck his 
wife with the baseball bat in self-defense only after she had 
stabbed him in the chest.  A Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theories 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
The defendant presents four primary claims on appeal.  
First, the defendant claims that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to retain and offer the 
testimony of an expert witness at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, and then, at trial, to support the defendant's claim 
that the statements he gave after surgery were not made 
voluntarily and that he did not make a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his Miranda rights.  Second, the defendant claims that 
the judge erred in instructing the jury regarding their 
3 
 
 
evaluation of the voluntariness of the defendant's statements 
made after surgery.  Third, the defendant claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective for conceding certain points during 
closing argument.  And fourth, the defendant claims that the 
judge erred in declining the defendant's request to instruct the 
jury regarding reasonable provocation and sudden combat and in 
providing a confusing instruction regarding the use of excessive 
force in self-defense.  We affirm the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion for a 
new trial, and after plenary review of the entirety of the 
record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce the verdict or order a new trial. 
Background.  Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
his inculpatory statements to a nurse and to the law enforcement 
officers who interviewed him at the hospital.  He argued that, 
because of his physical and mental condition, none of these 
statements was made voluntarily and, with respect to the law 
enforcement interviews, he did not knowingly and voluntarily 
relinquish his Miranda rights.  The motion was denied.  We shall 
discuss this motion in more detail when we address the 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
We summarize the evidence presented at trial, reserving 
certain details for later discussion. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Police response to the crime scene.  At 7:58 A.M. on 
June 23, 2006, Rowley police received a 911 call from the young 
daughter of the defendant and victim, who said that her father 
had a "hole" in his stomach and that "there was something wrong 
with [her] mom, too."  Asked by the dispatcher why her father 
had a hole in his stomach, the daughter said, "I don't know," 
but in response to later questioning by the dispatcher, she said 
her mother may have "dug" the hole in his stomach.  She said 
that her father was bleeding, that there was blood all over him, 
and that there was a baseball bat in her parents' room.  There 
is no evidence that the daughter witnessed what had occurred. 
A Rowley police officer, an emergency medical technician, 
responded at 8 A.M.  He saw the defendant and the victim lying 
in bed, covered in blood.  He observed a large kitchen carving 
knife lying between the defendant's left hand and his body; the 
officer removed the knife and placed it on the dresser.  On the 
floor to the right of the bed was an aluminum baseball bat.  The 
defendant, shirtless, was breathing but making "gurgling" 
sounds; he had lacerations on his wrists and neck and a puncture 
wound in his abdomen.  The victim was not breathing and had no 
pulse.  She had several indentations in her scalp indicating 
severe skull fractures, and the pillow beneath her head was 
completely soaked with blood. 
5 
 
 
2.  Medical treatment.  The defendant was transported to 
the hospital, arriving at around 8:30 A.M., where he underwent 
an exploratory laparotomy, which revealed that he had a 
lacerated diaphragm.  Medical staff inserted a tube, 
successfully re-expanding the defendant's lung.  The wounds on 
the defendant's neck and wrists were also cleaned and sutured.  
During surgery, the defendant was placed under anesthesia and 
given muscle relaxants.  He also received fentanyl, a narcotic 
analgesic, at the beginning of surgery, and then morphine while 
in the operating room, between 11:30 A.M. and 11:45 A.M.  At 
12:15 P.M., the defendant was taken from the operating room to 
the intensive care unit (ICU). 
3.  Defendant's statement to nurse.  The defendant was 
still under anesthesia when he was transported to the ICU; as he 
began to wake, he was given a drug to reverse the muscle 
relaxants and glycopyrolate to reduce secretions and make 
extubation easier.  The tube was removed at 1:35 P.M.  To assess 
his consciousness and alertness, a nurse (first nurse) asked the 
defendant his name, date of birth, and where he was; the 
defendant answered appropriately.  When she asked the defendant 
whether he knew why he was in the hospital, he replied, "Yes.  I 
stabbed myself and I killed my wife."  The defendant then began 
to cry.  Soon after, the defendant complained of chest pain and 
was administered additional morphine. 
6 
 
 
4.  First police interview.  At 1:55 P.M., Sergeant Stephen 
May of the Rowley police department and State police Trooper 
Robert LaBarge, after consulting with medical staff, began to 
interview the defendant.  Also present in the room were the 
first nurse, an ICU nurse (second nurse), and a hospital 
administrator.  The defendant was given the Miranda warnings and 
acknowledged that he understood his rights and was willing to 
speak with the officers.  He also agreed to be audio-recorded.2  
Throughout the interview, the defendant was crying, his speech 
was mumbled, and at some point he complained of being in pain.  
The officers frequently repeated back what the defendant said to 
confirm their understanding of what he had said.  Neither 
officer asked the defendant what effect the anesthesia or the 
medications he was given at the hospital were having on him. 
During the course of the interview, which was 
conversational in tone, the defendant said that between 4 A.M. 
and 5 A.M., when the defendant and the victim were in their 
bedroom, he took a baseball bat out of the closet and hit the 
victim in the head and "just kept hitting her."  The defendant 
was unable to remember how many times he struck the victim.  
                                                          
 
2 The Miranda warning was not recorded, but at several 
points during the interview the officers asked the defendant 
whether he understood that he did not have to keep speaking with 
them, which he said he did.  The defendant also confirmed on the 
recording that he did not wish to have a lawyer present. 
7 
 
 
When LaBarge asked, "Why did this whole thing happen?" the 
defendant responded, "I lost it I guess," and cried.  When asked 
why, the defendant offered that his "wife was cheating on [him]" 
for months with someone named Charlie, who lived in Exeter, New 
Hampshire.  The defendant stated that this was not the first 
time he had heard about the affair; he had learned about it "a 
long time ago."  He also said that the victim had told him the 
night before that "she didn't love [him] anymore."  The 
defendant repeatedly expressed that he did not know why he had 
attacked the victim that morning, that he wished he knew, and 
that he had not been in his "right mind." 
LaBarge asked the defendant, "Did she do anything at all to 
provoke you?  Did she argue with you?  Did she yell at you?  Did 
she come at you?  Did she do anything like that?"  The defendant 
answered "no."  The defendant denied that he and the victim had 
been arguing over the affair.  He also denied drinking alcohol 
the previous night or taking any other drugs besides his 
cholesterol medication.  The defendant correctly answered 
questions about his work, address, and living situation, and 
correctly identified the name of his mother-in-law. 
 
LaBarge told the defendant that he was going to be charged 
with murder in the first degree and later asked if there was 
"anything else" the defendant wanted to add.  The defendant 
stated that he was "guilty."  The interview ended at 2:06 P.M. 
8 
 
 
5.  Second police interview.  At 4:10 P.M. that same 
afternoon, May and LaBarge returned to the defendant's hospital 
room for a second interview.  The defendant was again informed 
of his Miranda rights, agreed to speak with the officers, and 
agreed to audio-record the interview.  At this time, the 
defendant's ability to communicate had improved and his speech 
was clearer, but when asked how he felt, the defendant responded 
that he felt "horrible" and that his chest was "sore."  When 
asked to read the Miranda card, he complained that his "eyes 
[were] all over the place," but he did read the card and later 
signed it. 
The defendant's statements in the second interview were 
largely consistent with those in the first interview, although 
he provided some additional information.  The defendant 
disagreed with the characterization that he and the victim had 
argued on the night before the killing, but conceded that they 
had a "disagreement" because the victim had told him that they 
did not have "a future together."  He stated that he did not 
think the victim was planning on leaving him at that moment but 
mentioned that there were "so many other things going on," such 
as stressors at work and losing a house that he and the victim 
had planned to buy. 
The defendant stated that during their disagreement the 
night before, the victim "was raising her voice more than [he] 
9 
 
 
was," but that she did not provoke him and did not come at him 
physically.  He repeated that the attack occurred around 4 A.M., 
and, after retrieving the baseball bat from the hallway closet, 
he hit the victim and then "just kept hitting her."  The 
defendant stated that his wife was restless but sleeping at the 
time of the attack.  When the defendant first hit her, the 
victim said "stop," but the defendant could not recall her 
saying anything else after that.  After he stopped hitting her 
with the bat, the defendant put a pillow over the victim's head.  
He then went to the kitchen and grabbed a serrated knife, cut 
his wrists and neck, and then stabbed himself in the chest.  The 
interview ended at 4:24 P.M. 
6.  Forensic and medical evidence.  A forensic biologist 
employed by the State police crime laboratory responded to the 
scene and analyzed bloodstain patterns.  He observed "medium 
velocity impact" spatter in a "cast off" pattern on the wall 
above the victim's head, consistent with multiple, downward 
strikes from a blunt or medium force.  He opined that the victim 
had been struck at least four times while lying prone or sitting 
up "slightly," and that she was not moving at the time she was 
struck. 
There were bloodstains on the bat, and "impressions" with 
ridge details that could have been hand or footprints.  He also 
determined that the kitchen knife found next to the victim had 
10 
 
 
flesh-like material along its edge and bloodstains on the blade 
and handle.  In the kitchen, a knife block with a knife missing 
contained knives consistent with the one found in the bed.  Two 
trash cans containing tissues with blood stains were also found 
in the living room.  No blood typing or deoxyribonucleic acid 
analysis was performed on blood samples. 
The medical examiner conducted an autopsy of the victim 
that showed that the cause of death was "blunt head injury with 
subarachnoid hemorrhage, hemorrhage over the brain, and . . . 
contusion of the brain."  The victim had "multiple sites of 
blunt injury" and numerous lacerations and bruising to the head, 
face, and eyes.  The victim's forearms and hands suffered blunt 
trauma, including tubular shaped bruising to her right arm, 
consistent with a bat strike; metacarpals in her right hand were 
also fractured.  The medical examiner opined that the victim had 
sustained at least six or seven separate blows –- three to one 
side of her head, one to her forehead, one to her cheek, and 
blows to both her arms and hands.  Two of the blows to her head 
could have been fatal in and of themselves and would have 
rendered her unconscious.  In addition to the blunt force 
injuries, the victim sustained a laceration to the right side of 
the forehead, lacerations to the right side of the head, a 
laceration at the left forehead above the left eye, a laceration 
and bruising to the lower left eye, and "black eyes or 
11 
 
 
ecchymosis, bleeding into the eyelids of both eyes."  He did not 
know what caused an injury to the victim's eye, or the abrasion 
on her chin, and he was unable to sequence the victim's 
injuries.  But obvious bruising and swelling of her head, hands, 
and arms showed that the victim was alive for an estimated 
fifteen to thirty minutes after the attack. 
7.  The defense.  At trial, the defense, presented 
primarily through the defendant's testimony, was that he acted 
in self-defense after the victim stabbed him.3  In his testimony, 
the defendant confirmed the accuracy of virtually all of the 
background information he provided to the police during his 
statements at the hospital, including his home address; his work 
as an engineer for the Massachusetts Highway Department; his 
mother-in-law's name; that he was on cholesterol medication; the 
recent marital discord due to the victim's affair; and their 
failed efforts to purchase a home. 
The defendant testified that the victim had been on 
medication for depression for a number of years, but that in 
late December 2005 she stopped taking her medication.  In 
February 2006, the defendant took his wife to the doctor, as she 
"seemed suicidal" and "wanted to take her life."  She was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and instructed to see a 
                                                          
 
3 The defendant also called a friend who testified to the 
defendant's reputation for peacefulness. 
12 
 
 
psychiatrist and a therapist; the defendant also testified that 
doctors were changing her medication dosages. 
On June 22, 2006, after the defendant returned home from 
work and made dinner, he and the victim had a disagreement about 
her medication.  He also testified that they had a second 
disagreement that evening when the victim refused to help their 
daughter with her schoolwork.  Later in the evening, they 
watched movies and went to bed between 10:15 P.M. and 10:30 P.M. 
At 3 A.M., the defendant woke to urinate and returned to 
bed.  Sometime after, he awoke "disoriented," with the victim 
kneeling beside him "in a trance."  The defendant "was startled" 
and "reached up and tried to touch her."  As soon as he touched 
the victim, she pushed back, and the defendant pushed her away.  
The victim "seemed to go over easy," and, as she fell, the 
defendant "slipped off the bed and . . . fell onto the floor." 
After falling, he felt like he had the wind knocked out of 
him; he could not catch his breath and had a pain in his chest.  
When he looked down, he discovered a hole in his chest with 
blood trickling from the wound.  The defendant tried to get up 
but could not; he felt under the bed, grabbed a bat, and used it 
as a "crutch" to stand.  Then: 
"When I looked up [my wife] was . . . right there.  
She was in a position lying down but moving up and 
coming toward me.  A wave of fear came over me. . . . 
And suddenly I felt she was going to hurt me. . . . I 
didn't know how to react." 
13 
 
 
 
The defendant "wasn't thinking rationally" when he picked up the 
bat and hit the victim.  The victim stated "Scott, stop, stop 
don't hit me" and reached for the bat.  The defendant released 
the bat, and the victim "held it briefly" until her hands 
"dropped" and the bat fell.  The defendant recalled hitting the 
victim only once, but admitted on cross-examination that 
evidence showed there had been more than one blow. 
 
The defendant then "crawled" to the bathroom to find 
hydrogen peroxide for his chest but "passed out" in the 
bathroom.  He awoke and crawled toward another bathroom to look 
for peroxide.  As he passed the bed, he stood briefly, and then 
passed out again.  He awoke "half on and half off" the bed, and 
when he looked over, saw that the victim was lying "very still" 
next to him.  The defendant then saw the knife from the kitchen 
lying between them.  His "reasoning was all screwed up" when he 
picked up the knife and cut both of his wrists and the left and 
right sides of his neck. 
When asked why he did not call for help after being 
attacked, the defendant testified that he "wasn't functioning 
properly" and was "thinking [about] survival."  The next thing 
he remembered was waking up in a hospital room.  The defendant 
testified that he had "no recollection of talking to the police 
at all," and no memory of meeting his lawyer later that day.  
14 
 
 
While he recognized his voice on the recorded statements he gave 
to the police, he stated that his voice in the recording was 
"drug-induced, not my normal voice." 
The victim told the defendant that she had been having an 
affair with another man in late January 2006 and asked for the 
defendant's forgiveness.  The defendant stated that he was 
"surprised" and "upset," and that he "cried" when initially told 
about the affair.  On cross-examination, he denied discussing 
his wife's affair the night of June 22, but admitted that 
earlier that week they had had a "heart-wrenching" conversation 
about it, in which the victim cried and said she wanted to kill 
herself.  Additionally, the defendant stated that in June 2006, 
he knew that the victim was "seeing" another man but believed it 
to be a "friendship" and that he did not know they were 
"sexually involved." 
8.  Motion for a new trial.  After the defendant was found 
guilty of murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, he 
moved for a new trial, making essentially the same arguments he 
presents on appeal.  Because the trial judge had retired, 
another judge, who was the same judge who had denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress, held a nonevidentiary hearing 
and denied the motion for a new trial. 
15 
 
 
The defendant appeals both from his conviction and from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Failure to offer expert testimony.  The 
defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to engage a medical expert to opine on the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements and on whether his waiver of Miranda 
rights was knowing and voluntary.  At the hearing on the motion 
for a new trial, the defendant offered an affidavit by a medical 
expert, Dr. Adam J. Carinci, who serves as the director of the 
Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Pain Medicine, and is 
board certified in both anesthesiology and pain medicine.  After 
reviewing the defendant's medical records, Carinci stated that 
"within a five hour period of time, between the hours of 8:45 
A.M. and 1:50 P.M., [the defendant] was exposed to at least 
eight distinct medications classified as either general 
anesthetics, benzodiazepines, opioids, cholinesterase 
inhibitors, or anticholinergics."  He further stated that "[i]t 
is [a] medical fact that the residual effects of" these 
medications "detrimentally impact consciousness, awareness, 
cognition, orientation, concentration, dexterity, comprehension 
and recall."  Carinci opined, "based on a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, that at the time [the defendant] was read his 
Miranda rights and made statements to [Trooper] LaBarge, he was 
still under the residual effects of" these medications, as 
16 
 
 
manifested by "evidence of garbled speech, blurred vision, dry 
mouth, and dexterity impairment."  He also opined that the 
residual effects of these medications would have "negatively 
impacted [the defendant's] ability to comprehend his Miranda 
rights at the time that they were read to him and the 
voluntariness of the statements that he made to [Trooper] 
LaBarge."  Carinci's affidavit did not specifically address the 
defendant's statement to the nurse. 
The defendant also offered an affidavit by his trial 
counsel, who declared that he should have called an expert at 
the hearing on the motion to suppress to testify regarding the 
effects of the anesthesia and medications given to the defendant 
at the hospital.  His trial counsel wrote that, had he presented 
such testimony, the Commonwealth would not have met its burden 
of proving that the defendant's statements were voluntary, or 
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights.  He also stated that, had the statements been 
suppressed, his trial strategy would have been different and he 
"cannot say with certainty that the defendant would have 
testified at trial."  The defendant, in his affidavit, went 
further and declared that, if his statements at the hospital had 
been suppressed, he would not have testified at trial. 
Where a claim of ineffective assistance is raised in a 
motion for a new trial that has been denied, and where the 
17 
 
 
appeal from the denial of that motion is raised in conjunction 
with a direct appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we determine 
whether the attorney erred and, if there was error, whether it 
resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 562 
(2013). 
We agree with the motion judge that defense counsel's 
"failure to develop and introduce expert evidence of the 
residual effects of the medications administered to [the 
defendant] for both the motion to suppress and for trial was 
error."  The defendant's statements at the hospital were 
devastating to his case -- he admitted that he was not provoked 
by the victim and that he beat her to death with a baseball bat 
for no apparent reason other than his despair at losing her.  It 
is evident from the recordings of his two interviews with law 
enforcement officers that he remained, to some extent, impaired 
by the medications he had received at the hospital and by the 
physical pain he was suffering from his wounds and from the 
surgical procedure.  Under these circumstances, it was 
manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel not to retain a 
medical expert to help him understand the effects of the 
defendant's medications and physical pain on the voluntariness 
of his statements or the knowing and voluntary nature of his 
Miranda waivers.  See Commonwealth v. Field, 477 Mass. 553, 556-
18 
 
 
557 (2017) (where defendant's mental impairment would be central 
to defense strategy, error for defense attorney to fail to 
consult with expert on issue); Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 
Mass. 437, 442 (1987) (where defendant's only realistic defense 
to murder charge was that his assault of victim was not 
proximate cause of death, error for defense attorney to fail to 
seek expert opinion).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 413 Mass. 686, 
690 (1992) ("evidence at trial that a defendant's mind may have 
been impaired at the time of a crime, due either to a mental 
disease or to intoxication by drugs or alcohol, almost always 
includes expert testimony"). 
Counsel's error, however, created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice only if it "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  See Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 
562, quoting Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 188 (2001).  
In this case, trial counsel's failure to retain and offer 
testimony of a medical expert was likely to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion only if (1) the defendant's motion to suppress 
his statements would have been allowed had the judge heard such 
expert testimony, and the jury therefore never would have 
learned of these statements; or (2) the motion was denied and 
the statements were admitted at trial, but at least one juror 
concluded under our humane practice, based on the expert's 
testimony, that there was a reasonable doubt whether the 
19 
 
 
defendant's statements were voluntary and therefore did not 
consider the statements as part of the evidence.  The defendant 
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of either of these 
results.  See Alcequiecz, supra at 563. 
a.  Motion to suppress.  The evidence at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress was essentially the same as the evidence 
admitted at trial regarding the defendant's statement to the 
nurse and his statements to LaBarge and May in the two hospital 
interviews, except that the defendant did not testify at the 
motion hearing.4  The motion judge found that, during surgery, 
the defendant received general anesthesia in the form of 
fentanyl and morphine sulfate5 and "remained under the influence 
of both [m]orphine and [f]entanyl" when questioned by medical 
personnel and during "much of the first police statement."  The 
judge also found that, after a tube was removed from the 
defendant's throat, medical personnel asked him basic questions 
about how he felt, all of which he answered appropriately, 
albeit occasionally moaning in pain.6  The judge found that 
                                                          
 
4 Additionally, the second nurse testified at the hearing on 
the motion to suppress but did not testify at trial. 
 
 
5 In fact, the evidence reflected that the defendant 
received general anesthesia and, separately, fentanyl and 
morphine sulfate. 
 
6 As found by the motion judge, the first nurse asked if the 
defendant knew where he was, and the defendant replied that he 
was in the hospital.  She asked if he hurt anywhere, and he said 
20 
 
 
during the first interview with LaBarge and May, the defendant 
"continued to feel drugged from the [m]orphine and [f]entanyl," 
and "[h]is mental functioning was impaired" by them, as well as 
by the "major surgery he had just undergone and by the injuries 
from his attempted suicide."  The judge specifically rejected 
the testimony of the two nurses that the anesthesia had 
completely worn off before the defendant's first police 
interview, concluding that the defendant's "mental functioning 
was adversely affected by the drugs."  The judge concluded that 
the defendant "was under the influence of pain medication" and 
that "his physical and mental condition were poor." 
However, the motion judge also found that, even during the 
first interview, when the defendant's voice was difficult to 
hear and he mumbled at times, the defendant's answers to the 
police interview questions "were rational and appropriate, 
indicating his full understanding of the questions."  The judge 
found it "significant that not one response was illogical, 
nonsensical, or otherwise did not make sense."  He declared that 
the defendant "knew where he was, was coherent, understood the 
questions he was asked, and his memory was intact."  The judge 
therefore concluded that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
                                                          
 
that his chest hurt.  She asked, "You stabbed yourself in the 
chest, do you remember?"  The defendant replied, "Yes, and I 
killed my wife." 
21 
 
 
waived his Miranda rights during both the first and second 
interview, and that his statements to the officers were made 
voluntarily. 
Where the motion judge already made factual findings that 
the defendant, during at least the initial part of the first 
interview, was under the influence of both morphine and fentanyl 
and was impaired by them, the question then is whether there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the motion to suppress would have 
been allowed if counsel had offered the testimony of Carinci at 
the hearing -- either because the judge would have found that 
the defendant did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his Miranda 
rights, or that the defendant's statements were not voluntarily 
made.7  See Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 755-756 (2008) 
(to prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
failure to file motion to suppress, defendant must demonstrate 
likelihood of success on motion to suppress).  We conclude that 
there is not. 
For all practical purposes, the motion judge found what 
Carinci ultimately opined -- that the defendant was "still under 
the residual effects" of the various medications he was given 
                                                          
 
7 In his motion to suppress, the defendant also asserted 
that the Miranda warnings themselves were deficient.  But 
because Carinci's affidavit has no bearing on the sufficiency of 
police procedure, the motion judge's finding that LaBarge did 
"all that was required" remains unchallenged. 
22 
 
 
when he was read the Miranda rights and answered questions 
during the first interview, and those residual effects would 
have "negatively impacted" the defendant's ability to comprehend 
his Miranda rights and the voluntariness of his statements.  
Given the similarity between the judge's findings and Carinci's 
opinion, there is no reason to believe that the expert's opinion 
would have fundamentally affected the legal determination as to 
whether the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
As the motion judge implicitly recognized in his analysis, 
in determining whether a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights is 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, a judge does not consider 
simply whether drugs, medication, or the defendant's physical or 
mental condition "negatively impacted" his ability to comprehend 
his Miranda rights.  Instead, the determination is based on the 
totality of the circumstances, which includes other factors such 
as the defendant's age, education, intelligence, and experience 
with the criminal justice system, as well as promises of 
leniency or of immunity, the manner of the interrogation, and 
the defendant's over-all behavior.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 656 (2018); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 
397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986).  A finding that the defendant was 
under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or, as here, medications 
given to the defendant before, during, and after surgery, may 
23 
 
 
certainly be considered in determining whether a defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived Miranda rights, 
but it need not be determinative, and it was not determinative 
here.  See Commonwealth v. Wolinski, 431 Mass. 228, 231 (2000), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Ward, 426 Mass. 290, 295 (1997) 
("intoxication bears heavily on the validity of a Miranda 
waiver, although it is insufficient alone to require a finding 
of involuntariness"). 
What the motion judge found most significant, and what we 
find most significant from our own review of the interview 
recordings, see Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 646, was that all of the 
defendant's answers to the questions posed were responsive, 
accurate, and, given the senseless nature of what he had just 
done, sensible.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 365 
(2004) (valid waiver of rights where defendant was on medication 
for schizophrenia that causes "memory problems," but answered 
questions appropriately and was "calm, coherent, and cooperative 
at all times").  It is apparent from the recordings that the 
defendant was horrified by what he had done, somewhat perplexed 
by why he had done it, and eager to admit his guilt.  He was a 
mature adult, a college graduate, and a supervising engineer on 
highway projects, where he had previously interacted with police 
officers who were on detail.  When the effects of the medication 
began to wear off, before the second interview, he never 
24 
 
 
expressed any regret for having spoken to the police and did not 
appear to struggle with his decision to waive his Miranda rights 
again. 
"Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to 
rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew 
he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was 
aware of the State's intention to use his statements to 
secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the 
waiver is valid as a matter of law." 
 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-423 (1986).  A defendant 
"does not need to understand or appreciate the tactical or 
strategic consequences of waiving Miranda rights" in order for 
the waiver to be knowing and intelligent. Commonwealth v. 
Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, 606 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 173 (2007). 
We also conclude that the admission of Carinci's testimony 
would not likely have changed the determination that the 
statements to the police were made voluntarily.  "The 
voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the 
voluntariness of the statements on due process grounds are 
separate and distinct issues but they are both determined in 
light of the totality of the circumstances and they share many 
of the same relevant factors."  Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 
Mass. 666, 673 (1995).  A confession made to the police or a 
civilian "is admissible only if it is voluntarily made."  
Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 192 (1997).  "In 
determining whether the defendant's statements were voluntary, 
25 
 
 
we consider whether [they] were the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 360 (2013).  "The fact that a defendant 
may have been in a disturbed emotional state, or even suicidal, 
does not automatically make statements involuntary."  
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549, 555 (2001).  And while 
"special care" is taken where a defendant has ingested drugs or 
alcohol, "intoxication alone is insufficient to negate an 
otherwise voluntary act."  Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 
383 (1995).  To be involuntary, statements must be attributable 
"in large measure to a defendant's debilitated condition," 
whether resulting from drug or alcohol abuse.  See Commonwealth 
v. Waweru, 480 Mass. 173, 180 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 455 (1985). 
Here, too, the interview recordings themselves demonstrate 
the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.  There is 
nothing in the recordings to suggest that these statements could 
be attributed "in large measure" to his medications or pain, or 
that they were not the product of a rational intellect and a 
free will.  The questions were conversational in tone; the 
defendant's answers were responsive to the questions; the 
defendant took care to attempt to answer the questions 
accurately; and, where the accuracy of the answers could be 
26 
 
 
objectively determined, they were indeed accurate.8  See 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 12 (2000) (defendant's 
statement to police voluntary despite gunshot wound to his head 
and arm where defendant remained "alert and oriented," and 
"appropriately answered all questions put to him during the 
examination"); Allen, 395 Mass. at 457 (defendant's 
incriminating statements to nurse following brain surgery were 
voluntary where defendant "seemed rational and alert" during 
conversation, and "was able to understand and his answers made 
sense"). 
The defendant correctly notes that the judge who decided 
the motion for a new trial was the same judge who decided the 
motion to suppress, and he declined to decide whether Carinci's 
expert testimony would have changed his ruling on the motion to 
suppress.  Instead, the judge rested his denial of the motion 
for a new trial on his conclusion that, given the strength of 
the physical and forensic evidence found in the defendant's home 
                                                          
 
8 We note that the motion judge found the defendant's 
statements to the nurse to be voluntary but rested his 
conclusion on a mistake of law -- that a statement may be found 
involuntary only where there was police misconduct in coercing 
the statement or otherwise overpowering the defendant's will.  
"An admission by a defendant to a civilian is only admissible if 
voluntarily made."  Commonwealth v. Waweru, 480 Mass. 173, 180 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 204 
(2005).  A statement made to a civilian may be found involuntary 
even if no police officer was present when the statement was 
made. 
27 
 
 
that was presented at trial, "there was not a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict would have been different even 
without the challenged statements."  The defendant argues that 
we should not conclude that Carinci's expert testimony would not 
have affected the outcome of the motion to suppress where the 
judge who made that decision himself did not so find. 
Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), a motion for a new trial is ordinarily decided by 
the trial judge, who shall grant it "if it appears that justice 
may not have been done."  Where, as here, the trial judge had 
retired from the bench, the regional administrative justice 
refers the motion for a new trial to another judge for decision.  
See Rule 61A(B) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2020).  If a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily includes 
an evaluation of the likelihood that a motion to suppress would 
have been allowed if the defendant had received effective trial 
counsel, the trial judge would not refer the matter to the judge 
who had heard the motion to suppress for his or her analysis; 
nor, if the claim involves an analysis of whether the jury's 
verdict would have been different, would the trial judge 
reconvene the jury.  Instead, in deciding a motion for a new 
trial, a trial judge conducts his or her own evaluation of the 
likelihood of success.  Here, the judge assigned to decide the 
motion for a new trial happened to be the judge who had decided 
28 
 
 
the motion to suppress; but he apparently chose to put himself 
in the position of the trial judge and not reevaluate whether 
his decision on the motion to suppress would have been different 
had he been provided with Carinci's testimony. 
However, the motion judge specifically noted that his 
choice not to decide the issue did not mean he would have ruled 
differently: 
"[T]he court does not indicate that had the expert evidence 
been introduced at the motion to suppress hearing the 
court's result would have been different.  The recordings 
and transcript of [the defendant's] statements to police 
contain the same indicia of voluntariness that the court 
relied upon in denying the motion to suppress.  Without 
deciding, the court could still rely upon those indicia, 
even if it credited Dr. Carinci's expert testimony." 
 
We respect the judge's choice and accept his suggestion that no 
inference should be taken from it regarding the likelihood of 
success on the motion to suppress.  We, however, address the 
likelihood of success on the defendant's motion to suppress, and 
are in the same position to make that evaluation as the trial 
judge would have been in, relying on the same record of that 
hearing, the audio recordings, and the affidavit of Carinci.  
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the defendant failed 
to show that the introduction of Carinci's testimony would 
likely have resulted in the suppression of his statements. 
 
b.  "Humane practice" instruction.  Under what we have 
described as our "humane practice," where a judge determines 
29 
 
 
that a defendant's inculpatory statements are voluntary, "the 
judge must instruct the jury that the Commonwealth has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement 
was voluntary and that the jurors must disregard the statement 
unless the Commonwealth has met its burden."  Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982).  
The jury need not agree unanimously that a defendant's statement 
is voluntary before it can be considered as evidence; each juror 
must decide the question for himself or herself, and 
individually determine whether he or she will disregard the 
defendant's statement.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 
830, 836 (1997). 
 
Therefore, in deciding whether defense counsel's failure to 
retain an expert and offer expert testimony at trial was likely 
to have influenced the jury's conclusion, we also consider 
whether any reasonable juror would likely have disregarded the 
defendant's statements had he or she heard expert testimony 
regarding the effect of the defendant's medications on the 
voluntariness of these statements.  This question is complicated 
by the defendant's claim on appeal that the judge erred in 
instructing the jury on this issue. 
 
In his final instructions to the jury, the judge declared 
in relevant part: 
30 
 
 
"[B]efore you can consider the statements, the Commonwealth 
has to prove to you by the totality of the evidence and by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] made 
those statements voluntarily, freely and rationally.  Now, 
what do I mean by that? 
 
"Well, the Commonwealth has to prove to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he made them voluntarily, that no one 
coerced him into making the statements, and the 
Commonwealth also has to prove to you beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statements were the product of his rational 
intellect; in other words, the Commonwealth must prove from 
the totality of the evidence and based on all the 
circumstances that the defendant was not at the time 
suffering from some sort of mental defect or psychological 
condition that prevented him from understanding what he was 
saying or the content of what he was saying. 
 
"The Commonwealth also has to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant at the time that he made the 
statement was not so under the influence of drugs or 
medication that those drugs or medication prevented him 
from understanding what he was saying or that he was 
actually speaking." 
 
 
The defendant maintains that the correct inquiry is not 
whether the "drugs or medication prevented [the defendant] from 
understanding what he was saying or that he was actually 
speaking," but rather whether the drugs "rendered the defendant 
incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his 
statement, or incapable of withholding it."  Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court § 3.560 (2018).  See 
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 100 n.8 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 177 (1984).  We agree 
with the defendant that the formulation approved by the District 
Court is better than the formulation provided by the trial 
31 
 
 
judge.  Although we appreciate that the judge might have sought 
to put the legal formulation in simpler language, we fear that 
too much of its meaning was lost in the translation. 
The defendant also asserts that the absence of an 
instruction to evaluate the defendant's statement with "special 
care" was error.  The District Court's model instructions 
provide:  "If there is evidence of the defendant having a 
compromised mental state and/or that he was under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol, you must take special care in determining 
whether any statement was the product of the defendant’s 
rational intellect and free will. . . . Obviously, a person 
cannot give up a valuable right freely if his brain is so 
clouded that he is not thinking straight."  Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court § 3.560.  We agree 
with the defendant that the better practice is to give this 
instruction when the evidence so warrants, as it did here.9 
                                                          
 
9 We note that the trial judge's final instruction to the 
jury regarding voluntariness was not his only instruction on 
this issue.  When the statements were initially introduced in 
evidence, the judge instructed the jury that they "may not 
consider" the defendant's statements "unless the Commonwealth 
proves by a totality of the evidence . . . and . . . beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant made these statements freely 
and voluntarily."  He further explained that, essentially, the 
Commonwealth had to prove that the statements were "a product of 
[the defendant's] own free will and rational intellect," i.e., 
that "he wasn't somehow coerced into making the statements" and 
that his "physical and mental condition" did not prevent him 
from understanding "what he was saying."  Additionally, the 
judge enumerated factors for consideration, including the 
32 
 
 
However, the defendant did not object to the judge's 
instruction, so we must determine whether it resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 842 (2006).  And in 
doing so, we must consider whether it is likely that a 
reasonable juror, with a proper humane practice instruction and 
with the benefit of Carinci's testimony, would have concluded 
that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that 
the defendant's statements to police were voluntary and 
therefore disregarded them. 
We conclude that there is no such likelihood.  The virtue 
of the humane practice instruction is that it requires jurors to 
consider the voluntariness of a defendant's inculpatory 
statements, and therefore think hard about their reliability, 
before adding those statements to the jurors' evidentiary 
calculus.  See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 439 Mass. 47, 56 (2003), 
citing Commonwealth v. Cryer, 426 Mass. 562, 571-572 (1998).  
The judge's instruction, although flawed, was adequate to 
accomplish this purpose.  And the jury, in making this 
determination, had the benefit of the oral recordings in 
                                                          
 
defendant's "age," "medical condition at the time, any sort of 
ingestion of alcohol or administration of drugs," and "any 
psychotic condition."  The defendant did not object to this 
instruction when it was given, and does not challenge it on 
appeal. 
33 
 
 
reaching this determination.  We do not believe that any 
reasonable juror, having heard those recordings, would reach the 
conclusion that the defendant's statements were not made freely 
or that the defendant's mind was so clouded by his medications 
that his statements were so unreliable that they should be 
disregarded.  Therefore, we conclude that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising 
either from defense counsel's failure to offer expert testimony 
at trial or from the judge's flawed humane practice instruction. 
 
Additionally, pursuant to our plenary power of review under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we consider an issue not raised by the 
defendant on appeal but relevant to the voluntariness analysis:  
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request an 
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 
Mass. 423, 447-448 (2004).  We declared in that case: 
"[W]hen the prosecution introduces evidence of a 
defendant's confession or statement that is the product of 
a custodial interrogation . . . and there is not at least 
an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the 
defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction 
advising that the State's highest court has expressed a 
preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever 
practicable, and cautioning the jury that, because of the 
absence of any recording of the interrogation in the case 
before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant's 
alleged statement with great caution and care.  Where 
voluntariness is a live issue and the humane practice 
instruction is given, the jury should also be advised that 
the absence of a recording permits (but does not compel) 
them to conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to prove 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
34 
 
 
Id.  Here, the defendant was in custody when he provided 
statements to the police, and the police clearly had the ability 
to record the statements, so the failure to record the Miranda 
warnings and the defendant's waiver of his rights during the 
first interview is contrary to our stated preference that the 
entirety of such interrogations be recorded whenever 
practicable.  See id. at 446.  Thus, "counsel erred in not 
requesting a DiGiambattista instruction as a result of the 
nonrecording of the defendant's initial acknowledgment and 
waiver of his rights."  Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 
393 (2019). 
 
We conclude, however, that, even with a DiGiambattista 
instruction, a reasonable juror was not likely to have found 
that the Commonwealth failed to prove the voluntariness of the 
defendant's confession to police beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Both LaBarge and May testified that the defendant was given the 
Miranda warnings before the tape recorder was activated.  
Perhaps more importantly, the first nurse testified that the 
defendant was given Miranda warnings before the first interview, 
and contemporaneously so stated in her clinical notes.  And the 
recording of the first interview shows that the defendant 
acknowledged that the officers had previously provided him with 
the Miranda warnings.  Consequently, a reasonable juror was not 
likely to conclude that the failure to record the initial 
35 
 
 
Miranda warnings suggested that the warnings were not given or 
that the defendant did not waive his rights.  Nor would a 
reasonable juror likely conclude that the delay in recording 
placed in question the voluntariness of the waiver or of the 
subsequent confession. 
2.  Closing argument.  The defendant also contends that 
trial counsel's closing argument constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel because he "conceded" that the jury could 
find murder in the first degree based on the evidence presented 
at trial and undermined the defendant's theory of excessive use 
of force in self-defense.  The defendant also raised this issue 
in his motion for a new trial, arguing specifically that defense 
counsel's statements amounted to a "concession" of guilt 
requiring a colloquy with the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Evelyn, 470 Mass. 765, 771 (2015).  The motion judge rejected 
this claim, finding that "the identified statements did not 
constitute a waiver of constitutional rights."  We agree with 
the motion judge.  Considering the closing argument as a whole, 
counsel's statement was not "tantamount to an admission of his 
client's guilt" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Triplett, 
398 Mass. 561, 569 (1986). 
In his closing argument, trial counsel did not contest that 
the defendant killed the victim but argued there was reasonable 
doubt as to whether the defendant committed murder in the first 
36 
 
 
degree.  He argued that the defendant's statements were not 
voluntary given his physical and mental condition, and that the 
jury could not find those statements credible "beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there [was] some question about what he 
said, the circumstances under which those statements were made, 
the drugs he was on at the time."  Counsel stated that, while 
the defendant's testimony was not "a model of clarity," it was 
supported by the 911 call from the defendant's daughter, in 
which she said that her mother "may" have "dug" a "hole" in her 
father.  The defendant's failure to call the police, counsel 
argued, was due to the traumatic event he had endured.  Further, 
he argued that without the defendant's statements, "the evidence 
[was] largely circumstantial."  Counsel concluded his argument 
by stating that while "it's certainly possible to come back with 
a verdict of first-degree murder, . . . I believe it's equally 
possible to come back with something less than that." 
This statement, in context, was not an admission of the 
defendant's guilt of murder in the first degree.  Instead, it 
was a recognition of the reality that it was possible for the 
jury to reach that verdict based on the circumstantial evidence 
in this case, but also a plea for the jury to consider that a 
conviction of a lesser crime was equally consistent with that 
circumstantial evidence.  Where defense counsel concluded his 
argument by suggesting that the Commonwealth failed to meet its 
37 
 
 
burden of proving murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a reasonable jury would not have inferred that defense 
counsel was conceding the defendant's guilt of this charge.  Nor 
did counsel's closing argument abandon the excessive use of 
force in self-defense theory of the case or fail effectively to 
argue that theory, leaving the client "denuded of a defense."  
Commonwealth v. Street, 388 Mass. 281, 287 (1983). 
The defendant also claims that his counsel undermined the 
defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his confessions 
when he said that, within "a matter of minutes" after he was 
awakened from general anesthesia, "he's interrogated by the 
police, questioned by the police.  Interrogation might be too 
strong.  You use your own judgment."  It was reasonable for 
defense counsel to back away from his assertion that the police 
questioning constituted "interrogation," given the 
conversational nature of the interviews, in order to maintain 
his credibility with the jury and focus the jury on the 
purportedly confused state of the defendant's mind rather than a 
claim of aggressiveness by the law enforcement officers. 
 
He also claims that his trial counsel undermined the 
credibility of the defendant's testimony by admitting it was 
"not a model of clarity."  The fact of the matter, however, is 
that the testimony was not a model of clarity, and defense 
counsel may have acknowledged this in order to maintain his 
38 
 
 
credibility with the jury in asking for a lesser verdict.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 842 (2015), S.C., 482 
Mass. 838 (2019) ("a tactical decision to focus on the most 
important or promising lines of defense, while relinquishing 
others, can serve to enhance the credibility of a defense, in 
part by warding off the impression that a defendant is grasping 
at straws"). 
 
In conclusion, we recognize that trial counsel's closing 
argument was far from compelling advocacy, but the fact that it 
might have been stronger "does not make out a claim of 
ineffective assistance."  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 
628 (2004).  Trial counsel had the formidable task of arguing 
against the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 333 (2000).  There is no 
reason to believe that a better closing argument might have 
yielded a better result for his client.10 
                                                          
 
10 The defendant also asserts that trial counsel erred by 
noting in his opening statement that "an awful lot . . . is not 
disputed."  However, trial counsel then continued:  "To be sure, 
there are issues that are disputed that you'll hear I contest on 
behalf of [the defendant]."  This statement does not support a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where there was, in 
fact, much that was undisputed, including that the victim was 
killed by the defendant's beating her over the head with a 
baseball bat and that the defendant made statements at the 
hospital admitting that he killed her and that his chest wound 
was self-inflicted. 
39 
 
 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that the trial 
judge erred by declining to instruct the jury on manslaughter 
under the theories of reasonable provocation and sudden combat, 
and by providing an inaccurate jury instruction regarding the 
manslaughter theory of excessive use of force in self-defense. 
a.  Reasonable provocation and sudden combat.  "Voluntary 
manslaughter is an unlawful killing 'arising not from malice, 
but from . . . sudden [heat of] passion induced by reasonable 
provocation, sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive force in 
self-defense.'"  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 686 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 
(2006).  In deciding whether an instruction is warranted 
regarding these mitigating circumstances, the evidence must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.  See 
Acevedo, supra. 
An instruction on reasonable provocation is required 
"where the evidence raises 'a reasonable doubt that 
something happened which would have been likely to produce 
in an ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, 
fright, or nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity 
for reflection or restraint, and that what happened 
actually did produce such a state of mind in the 
defendant.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482 Mass. 823, 826 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 Mass. 750, 756-757 (2017).  At the 
charge conference, counsel argued that a reasonable provocation 
instruction was warranted because the defendant in his testimony 
40 
 
 
reported that he was in a state of fear after his wife stabbed 
him in his belly.  The judge declined to give the instruction 
because he believed that such an instruction was warranted when 
"you beat someone because someone has just told you something or 
done something to you that has insulted your dignity in some 
way."  The judge added that the stabbing might suggest self-
defense "but it sure isn't reasonable provocation."  The judge 
erred:  the fear arising from the victim having stabbed the 
defendant in the chest, if the jury were to credit the 
defendant's testimony, warranted a reasonable provocation 
instruction.  See Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 445, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Amaral, 389 Mass. 184, 189 (1983) (defendant 
entitled to reasonable provocation instruction where "jury could 
conclude that a reasonable person in the defendant's position 
would have felt an 'immediate and intense' threat, and lashed 
out in fear as a result").  Even a "single blow," where it posed 
a risk of serious harm to the defendant, "can constitute 
reasonable provocation."  Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 444 & n. 14.  
Here, where the alleged single blow was a knife stab in the 
chest, there was abundant risk of serious harm to justify a 
reasonable provocation instruction.11 
                                                          
 
11 The defendant on appeal also claims that he was entitled 
to a reasonable provocation instruction based on what the victim 
told him earlier about her affair, and the statements she made 
that night about her no longer loving the defendant and about 
41 
 
 
Where a nonconstitutional error is preserved, we order a 
new trial unless we are "sure that the error did not influence 
the jury, or had but very slight effect."  Commonwealth v. 
Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  We 
are sure in this case that the error did not sway the jury for 
two reasons.  First, in light of the defendant's repeated 
statements in his interview with LaBarge and May that the victim 
did nothing to provoke him and that his wounds were all self-
inflicted, considered together with the physical and forensic 
evidence that were inconsistent with the defendant's testimony 
at trial, it is extremely unlikely that any reasonable juror 
would have a reasonable doubt as to whether the victim stabbed 
the defendant.  Second, if any juror did, it is extremely 
unlikely that the juror would conclude that the defendant did 
not use excessive force in self-defense but acted instead with 
                                                          
 
their having no future together.  This evidence alone would not 
have warranted a reasonable provocation instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 748–749 (2017) (no 
reasonable provocation instruction warranted where "defendant 
had prior knowledge of the victim's relationship"); Commonwealth 
v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 353–354 (2003) (same).  Nor is this an 
appropriate case to revisit whether the sudden revelation of 
infidelity should continue to suffice to warrant such an 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 317 
(1999), citing Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 383 Mass. 178, 181–82 
(1981), S.C., 390 Mass. 722 (1984) ("A sudden oral revelation of 
infidelity may be sufficient provocation to reduce murder to 
manslaughter"). 
42 
 
 
reasonable provocation.  When one combines these two 
improbabilities, we can say "with fair assurance" that the error 
had no substantial effect upon the verdict that was rendered 
(citation omitted).  Flebotte, supra. 
Having so found, we need not reach the more difficult 
question whether the facts of this case warranted a sudden 
combat instruction because, even if they did, we conclude that 
the defendant would not have been prejudiced by any such error.  
See Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018) ("Reasonable 
provocation encompasses a wider range of circumstances likely to 
cause an individual to lose self-control in the heat of passion 
than does sudden combat. . . . Thus, it is more accurate to view 
sudden combat as a form of reasonable provocation" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
b.  Excessive use of force in self-defense instruction.  
The trial judge instructed the jury: 
"In this case, you must consider whether the Commonwealth 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
used excessive force in defending himself.  If the 
Commonwealth proves to you beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant used excessive force in defense of himself 
which caused the death of the deceased, then you should 
return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter.  If the 
Commonwealth fails to prove that the defendant used 
excessive force in rightfully defending himself, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty.  . . . [Y]ou only reach 
the issue of manslaughter if the Commonwealth has failed to 
prove first-degree murder or second-degree murder." 
 
43 
 
 
The defendant asserts that the highlighted statement had the 
effect of removing the possibility of manslaughter on the theory 
of excessive use of force in self-defense.  The defendant did 
not object to this instruction, so we therefore determine 
whether there was error and, if so, whether that error created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Oliveira, 
445 Mass. at 842. 
 
"Error in a charge is determined by reading the charge as a 
whole, and not by scrutinizing bits and pieces removed from 
their context" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
437 Mass. 554, 559 (2002).  "[T]he adequacy of instructions must 
be determined in light of their over-all impact on the jury."  
Oliveira, 445 Mass. at 842, quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 
417 Mass. 592, 595 (1994).  In addition to the quoted statement, 
the judge instructed the jury that "if you find the defendant 
was legitimately acting in self-defense, that is, the 
Commonwealth has failed to prove that he was not acting in self-
defense, but you find that the defendant used excessive force in 
self-defense, then that would be what the law terms 
manslaughter"; "[i]f you find that someone was in self-defense 
but used excessive force in self-defense, then they have not 
committed murder but they have committed the crime of 
manslaughter"; and "[i]f the Commonwealth proves to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant used excessive force in 
44 
 
 
defense of himself which caused the death of the deceased, then 
you should return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter."  These 
statements conveyed "[t]he proper rule" that where excessive 
force in self-defense is used "the crime may be mitigated from 
murder to manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 
172 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 212 
(2012).  Reading the charge as a whole, the jury instructions 
clearly indicated the proper outcome should the jury find the 
defendant used excessive force in self-defense.  The offending 
statement did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
3.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to consider errors not 
raised by the defendant on appeal, apart from the other error we 
identified, supra, we address the judge's instruction to the 
jury regarding the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In his instruction,12 the judge incorporated elements of 
both our traditional reasonable doubt instruction derived from 
                                                          
 
12 The judge explained reasonable doubt to the jury as 
follows: 
 
"The term is often used and is probably pretty well 
understood by jurors, but it is not easy for judges to 
define it to jurors.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in 
the lives of human beings is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt.  On the other hand, it is not enough for 
the Commonwealth to establish a probability, even a strong 
45 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320 (1850), and the 
Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 21 
(1987).  See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 469-470 
(2015).  In doing so, "he omitted the 'moral certainty' and 
'abiding conviction' language found in the Webster charge and, 
in its place, inserted the 'firmly convinced' and 'real 
possibility' language found in Instruction 21."  Id. at 470-471.  
In Russell, where the defendant objected to essentially this 
same instruction by this same judge, we did not endorse the 
instruction and instead crafted a new Webster instruction that 
used "more modern language," id. at 477, but we concluded that 
the given instruction adequately "impress[ed] upon the [jury] 
the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the 
guilt of the accused," id. at 474, quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 
511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994).  We therefore held that it "met the 
                                                          
 
probability, that the defendant is more likely to be guilty 
than not guilty.  That is not enough. 
 
"So what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt.  There are very few 
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, 
and in criminal cases, the law does not require proof that 
overcomes every possible doubt.  If, based on your 
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced 
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you 
must find him guilty.  If, on the other hand, you think 
there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you 
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty." 
46 
 
 
minimum requirements of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and art. 12" of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Russell, supra at 474.  Here, where the defendant did 
not object to the reasonable doubt instruction, we reach the 
same conclusion and determine that the instruction did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
We have examined the entirety of the record in accordance 
with our obligation under § 33E and discern no reason to reduce 
the verdict or to order a new trial.  The defendant did not 
receive a perfect trial, but none of the errors cause us to 
believe that the trial was unfair or that the verdict of murder 
in the first degree is not consonant with justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano and Budd, JJ., 
join).  I concur.  Although I recognize, as does the majority in 
note 11, that the issue need not be resolved in this case, I 
write separately to emphasize that it is time to retire the 
legal principle that spousal infidelity, even if it is a sudden 
discovery, entitles a defendant to an instruction on reasonable 
provocation for murder.  See Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 
743, 748-749 (2017) (defendant cannot claim sudden discovery 
that would constitute reasonable provocation where he had prior 
knowledge of victim's relationship); Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 
466 Mass. 340, 356 (2013) (defendant not entitled to instruction 
that "'sudden oral revelation of infidelity may be sufficient 
provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter' [where t]here was 
ample evidence, including the defendant's testimony, that the 
idea of the victim's infidelity was not new to the defendant"); 
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 317 (1999) ("sudden oral 
revelation of infidelity may be sufficient provocation to reduce 
murder to manslaughter").1 
"The killing of a spouse (usually a wife) by a spouse 
(usually a husband)" is not an acceptable response to the 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant relied on Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 383 
Mass. 178, 181–182 (1981), S.C., 390 Mass. 722 (1984), to 
support his argument that he was entitled to a provocation 
defense.  I conclude that it is unlikely that we would decide 
Schnopps the same way today. 
2 
 
 
discovery of infidelity.  State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St. 3d 630, 
637 (1992).  Labeling such a killing as either "'reasonable' or 
'excused'" reinforces "male irrationality as normal, and 
legitimates the view of women as property."  See Milgate, Note, 
The Flame Flickers, But Burns on:  Modern Judicial Application 
of the Ancient Heat of Passion Defense, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 193, 
224–225 (1998).