Title: Richardson v. City of Suffolk

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARY RICHARDSON, ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 960372 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                  November 1, 1996 
CITY OF SUFFOLK, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 
 
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves a challenge to a zoning ordinance 
granting a conditional use permit for the operation of an 
automobile racetrack in the City of Suffolk. 
 
Following a public hearing, the City of Suffolk enacted two 
zoning ordinances.  The first ordinance, No. 1-95, rezoned 65 
acres of land owned by UA Associates from an agricultural use 
classification to B-2, General Business.  The second ordinance, 
No. 2-95, granted UA Associates a conditional use permit allowing 
the 65 acres of land to be used for an automobile racetrack 
subject to a number of conditions. 
 
Mary Richardson and other citizens of the cities of Suffolk 
and Chesapeake (collectively "the citizens") filed this 
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination, inter alia, 
that Ordinance No. 2-95 was invalid because an automobile 
racetrack is not a use for which a conditional use permit could 
be granted in the B-2 General Business district.  Following an 
ore tenus hearing, the trial court determined that the ordinance 
was valid and dismissed the motion for declaratory judgment.  We 
awarded the citizens an appeal to consider the validity of 
Ordinance No. 2-95 granting the conditional use permit. 
 
Ordinance No. 2-95 was enacted pursuant to Suffolk City Code 
§ 31-445.4(i) which permits the granting of a conditional use 
permit in a B-2 district for: 
 
Commercial recreational uses including bowling alleys, 
miniature golf, golf driving ranges, pool halls, 
billiard parlors, dance halls, penny arcades and 
similar forms of public amusement. 
 
The citizens argue that this section is an "inclusive ordinance" 
which only allows those uses specifically named and prohibits all 
others.  Wiley v. County of Hanover, 209 Va. 153, 163 S.E.2d 160 
(1968).  Applying the "associated words" principle of statutory 
construction, the citizens conclude that an automobile racetrack 
is prohibited because it is not similar in nature to the uses 
identified in City Code § 31-445.4(i).  The dissimilarities cited 
by the citizens include the spectator rather than participatory 
nature of the proposed facility as well as its size.  In 
asserting these arguments, the citizens fail to address critical, 
long-standing principles applicable to judicial review of zoning 
ordinances.  
 
When, as here, a city council reserves to itself the right 
to issue a conditional use permit, action on a request for such a 
permit is a legislative function.  Bollinger v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 217 Va. 185, 186, 227 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1976); Byrum 
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 217 Va. 37, 40, 225 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(1976).  Judicial review of the grant of a conditional use permit 
follows the same standards applicable to review of any local 
governing body's legislative zoning decision.  City Council of 
Virginia Beach v. Harrell, 236 Va. 99, 102, 372 S.E.2d 139, 141 
(1988); Fairfax County v. Southland Corp., 224 Va. 514, 522, 297 
S.E.2d 718, 722 (1982).  The legislative zoning decision is 
presumed to be valid.  If the presumptive validity of the 
decision is challenged by probative evidence that it was 
unreasonable, the governing body is required to produce 
sufficient evidence of reasonableness to make the issue fairly 
debatable.  If the issue is fairly debatable, the local governing 
body's legislative zoning decision must be sustained.  Id. at 
522-23, 297 S.E.2d at 722. 
 
In this case, the citizens have not challenged the 
conditional use permit as unreasonable, but assert that rules of 
statutory construction preclude the result reached by the city 
council.  Assuming this argument qualifies as sufficient 
probative evidence that the city council's action was 
unreasonable, we think the city council has met its burden of 
producing sufficient evidence of reasonableness to make the issue 
fairly debatable. 
 
The proposed automobile racetrack qualifies as a commercial 
recreational activity.  City Code § 31-445.4(i) clearly 
anticipates uses in addition to those specifically listed.  City 
Code § 31-445.1 states that the B-2 zoning classification is 
intended to apply to lands which by virtue of "their 
accessibility to arterial roadways and utilities" and 
relationship to defined market areas are "well suited" to provide 
commercial services and "are intended to serve larger commercial 
markets."  Uses permitted as a matter of right in the B-2 
district include such activities as theatres, parking lots, 
restaurants, hotels, motels, hospitals, schools, and colleges.  
City Code § 31-445.2.  Furthermore, the city granted the permit 
subject to a number of restrictions such as limiting the races to 
certain days of the week, times of the year, and time of day, 
requiring that the area be screened, and requiring city approved 
litter, traffic, and security controls.   
 
This evidence of the reasonableness of the city council's 
action is sufficient to make the issue whether an automobile 
racetrack is a permitted use under City Code § 31-445.4(i) fairly 
debatable.  Because the issue is fairly debatable, the city's 
zoning decision must be sustained. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent because I am of opinion that the City of Suffolk 
has violated its own zoning ordinance, which states in relevant 
part: 
 
 
"Conditional uses.  The following uses are 
permissible in B-2 districts subject to the provisions 
of Article VIII [conditional use permit regulations]: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
(i) Commercial recreational uses including 
bowling alleys, miniature golf, golf driving 
ranges, pool halls, billiard parlors, dance 
halls, penny arcades and similar forms of 
public amusement." 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the decision to grant or deny 
a conditional use permit is a legislative act.  However, the 
City's legislative prerogatives are not unlimited and, in the 
exercise of such power, the City must comply with its own 
ordinance.  Here, the City's ordinance places certain 
restrictions upon the City's power to grant conditional use 
permits; among those restrictions is the provision, one the City 
voluntarily chose to impose upon itself, limiting the type of 
commercial recreational uses permissible in B-2 districts. 
 
We have applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis when 
interpreting statutes as well as ordinances: 
 
"[W]hen general and specific words are grouped, the 
general words are limited by the specific and will be 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those things identified by the specific words." 
 
Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 302, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892 
(1982); accord Commonwealth v. United Airlines, 219 Va. 374, 389, 
248 S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978); Cape Henry v. National Gypsum, 229 
Va. 596, 603, 331 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1985).  Applying this 
doctrine, I am of the view that there is simply no degree of 
similarity between bowling alleys, miniature golf, golf driving 
ranges, pool halls, billiard parlors, dance halls, penny arcades, 
and an automobile race track with a seating capacity of 7,500 
which, undoubtedly, will cause noise and disruption adjacent to a 
residential neighborhood.