Title: Wright v. Pizel

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

168 Kan. 493 (1950)
214 P.2d 328
In the Matter of the Estates of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Lorane Wright, both deceased, W.C. WRIGHT, Administrator, Appellant,
v.
HERBERT L. PIZEL, and MARJORIE M. PIZEL, next of kin of Donald Lee Pizel, deceased, Appellees. In the Matter of the Estates of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Lorane Wright, both deceased, W.C. WRIGHT, Administrator, Appellee and Cross-appellant,
v.
RONALD LEE PIZEL, a minor, by HERBERT L. PIZEL and MARJORIE M. PIZEL, parents and next friends, Appellants and Cross-appellees.
Nos. 37,743, 37,744

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 28, 1950.
E.S. Hampton, of Salina, argued the cause, and Max Jones, of Goodland, and B.I. Litowich, LaRue Royce, H.H. Dunham, Jr., John Q. Royce, and H.G. Engleman, all of Salina, were with him on the briefs for the appellant in No. 37,743, and for the appellees in No. 37,744.
A.W. Relihan, of Smith Center, argued the cause, and T.D. Relihan, of Smith Center, was with him on the briefs for the appellees in No. 37,743, and for the appellant in No. 37,744.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
These appeals grew out of the same general facts, which may be summarized as follows: About 10:00 o'clock a.m. on January 4, 1948, Raymond C. Wright, who was driving his own automobile and who had as passengers riding with him his wife, Ida Lorane Wright, and his two grandsons, Ronald Lee Pizel and Donald Lee Pizel, four-year-old twins, drove across the Rock Island railway tracks near Kanorado and his car was struck by a train, with the result that Raymond C. Wright, Ida Lorane Wright and Ronald Lee Pizel were fatally injured and Donald Lee Pizel was seriously, though not fatally, injured.
On January 27, 1948, W.A. Wright was duly appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Lorane Wright. On June 24, 1948, Herbert L. Pizel and Marjorie Pizel, parents of Ronald Lee Pizel and Donald Lee Pizel, filed their petition in the probate court for damages for the wrongful death of Ronald Lee Pizel, in which, among other averments, were allegations tending to show that Raymond C. Wright was guilty of wanton conduct in driving upon the railroad tracks under the circumstances alleged. On the same day they filed a similar petition as next friends and on behalf of Donald Lee Pizel, seeking damages for his injuries. Upon a hearing in the probate court the claims were allowed in whole or in part and the administrator appealed to the district court.
*495 In the district court the administrator filed a motion to disallow the respective claims upon the ground that G.S. 1935, 8-122b prohibits any recovery; that the petitions showed that the respective minors were guests of Raymond C. Wright and that he was not guilty of gross and wanton negligence. The claimants filed a reply to the motion in which they alleged that G.S. 1935, 8-122b is unconstitutional and void, being in violation of section 18 of the bill of rights of the state of Kansas, and denied that the minors were guests of Raymond C. Wright at the time of the tragedy. In passing upon that motion the court held the statute (G.S. 1935, 8-122b) is not unconstitutional, but further held that the petitions for the demands contained allegations tending to show wantonness of the driver of the car at the time of the tragedy, upon which question there should be a trial by jury.
From this ruling the administrator has appealed, and this is our case No. 37,743. In this court it is conceded that the petition filed in the probate court contains allegations tending to show wanton conduct of Raymond C. Wright at the time he drove over the railroad crossing. But it is pointed out that in the hearing before the probate court testimony was received which tended to counteract those allegations. Counsel for the administrator ask us to consider that evidence as in effect modifying the allegations of the petition to disallow the respective claims upon the hearing of their motions to dismiss the respective claims. We are not justified in doing that. Upon appeal from the probate court the matter is to be tried de novo in the district court. Whether the evidence introduced in probate court will be offered in district court is unknown, and if produced the effect upon the allegations of the petition is for the triers of fact in the district court.
The result is that the appeal in our No. 37,743 must be affirmed.
The administrator filed an answer to each petition in which he denied the facts alleged in the petitions tending to show wantonness and alleged that the minor children were guests of the driver, who was not guilty of gross and wanton negligence in the operation of the car, and that claimants had no cause of action by reason of the guest statute. The claimants demurred to the answers on the ground, among others:
*496 The demurrers were overruled and claimants have appealed from that ruling in the claim for injuries to Donald Lee Pizel. This constitutes the appeal in our case No. 37,744. The only question involved in the appeal is the constitutionality of G.S. 1935, 8-122b, as construed by this court in view of section 18 of the bill of rights of our constitution.
Section 18 of our bill of rights reads:
In 1931 our legislature enacted what is commonly known as our guest statute (Chap. 81, Laws 1931), which was embodied in our General Statutes of 1935 as section 8-122b. It reads as follows:
The statute first came before this court in the case of Stout v. Gallemore, 138 Kan. 385, 26 P.2d 573, where the court held:
Counsel for appellants here contend that in reaching this conclusion we rewrote the phrase "gross and wanton negligence" used in the statute so as to read "wanton conduct," and in doing so did not correctly interpret the statute. In the opinion we took note of the fact that the phrase "gross and wanton negligence" was not well selected; that in the earlier history of the state our statutes and decisions recognized three classes of negligence  slight, ordinary and gross; that this classification lacked a firm basis, for damages resulting to one injured by the negligence of another were not increased or diminished by the classification into degrees of negligence which caused the injury; that the classification caused much trouble to courts and litigants in attempting to apply the definitions of the different degrees of negligence to the facts of a particular case, and that in harmony with the sounder reasoning and with the leading authorities elsewhere the classification of negligence into degrees was taken out of the law of this state (Railway Co. v. Walters, 78 Kan. 39, 96 Pac. 346), and that due care became and is the sole test, and the lack of due care is negligence. We pointed *497 out also that wanton conduct differs from negligent conduct not in degree but in kind, and cited authorities, including our prior decisions, making that clear. Our purpose was to determine the meaning of the language used in the statute. The words "gross ... negligence," standing alone, would mean one thing  lack of due care, inadvertence  while "wanton" conduct would mean something entirely different, an intentional act performed with knowledge that it would likely cause injury or damage to someone and with utter disregard of the consequences. If the legislature by the use of the words "gross negligence" meant lack of due care, the statute made no change in our law, for before its enactment the host was liable to the guest for injuries resulting from lack of due care. By the use of the word "wanton" in the phrase "gross and wanton negligence," the legislature intended to change the existing rule of liability of a host to his guest. Considering the statute as a whole, clearly that was the legislative purpose, and the effect to be given to the statute was only by interpreting it as we did.
We call particular attention to the Michigan guest statute (Chap. 19, Public Acts 1929), the pertinent portions of which read:
In Grabowski v. Seyler, 261 Mich. 473, 246 N.W. 189, dealing with a case which arose under the statute, the court used this language:
Citing Oxenger v. Ward, 256 Mich. 499, 240 N.W. 55, where the court analyzed the meaning of the term "gross negligence," citing many earlier Michigan cases.
Under a similarly worded guest statute the supreme court of South Dakota, in Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135, 137, followed this interpretation under the guest statute of that state, *498 which was the same as that of Minnesota, and cited our case of Stout v. Gallemore, 138 Kan. 385, 26 P.2d 573. A similar question arose in the case of Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, where the court was required to interpret the guest statute of that state, the first portion of which reads like ours, but the latter part reads as follows:
The court said:
Perhaps similar questions for interpretation of the wording of the guest statute arose in other states, but our time is not sufficient *499 to enable us to examine all of the cases to see if such a question was presented. We are satisfied with our interpretation of the statute upon this point in Stout v. Gallemore, supra.
This construction given to the statute has been followed and approved by our court in the following cases: Sayre v. Malcom, 139 Kan. 378, 379, 31 P.2d 8; Ewing v. Edwards, 140 Kan. 325, 36 P.2d 1021; Aduddell v. Brighton, 141 Kan. 617, 619, 42 P.2d 555; Anderson v. Anderson, 142 Kan. 463, 465, 50 P.2d 995; Donelan v. Wright, 148 Kan. 287, 290, 81 P.2d 50; Leabo v. Willett, 162 Kan. 236, 238, 175 P.2d 109; Srajer v. Schwartzman, 164 Kan. 241, 247, 188 P.2d 971.
Our case has been cited and approved upon this point in Perkins v. Roberts, 272 Mich. 545, 262 N.W. 305; Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135, 137; Gallegher v. Davis and Law, 37 Del. 380 (& Harr. 380), 183 A. 620, 622, and in Stevers v. Walker, 233 Mo. App. 636, 125 S.W.2d 920, in a case involving our guest statute.
See, 60 C.J.S., title Motor Vehicles (p. 991), § 399 (3), where the various guest statutes, including our statute, are discussed. See, also, 38 Am. Jur., title Negligence, § 48, dealing with willful and wanton acts, and authorities there cited.
Counsel for appellant contend that our guest statute, previously set out herein, is unconstitutional in that it violates section 18 of our bill of rights, previously set out herein. The same question was raised in Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 376, 143 A. 240, where in the opinion the court said:
Section 12 of the declaration of rights of the connecticut constitution reads:
The court did not specifically mention this provision of the constitution, nor did it specifically mention the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, but there is no reason to say that both of them were not considered. The court went ahead to say:
*501 The court held the statute valid as containing no constitutional infirmities.
The case was appealed to the supreme court (280 U.S. 117, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L.ed. 221), where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, the judgment of the state court was affirmed. The pertinent head notes read:
In the opinion the court limited its review to the single question arising under the federal constitution and said:
In support of the statement the court cited four cases: Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 47 S. Ct. 509, 71 L. Ed. 952, where the head note reads:
In New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, sustaining the validity of the New York workmen's compensation law, where the pertinent head note reads:
On page 198 the court had occasion to say:
Also cited is Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, sustaining upon similar grounds the workmen's compensation act of the state of Washington.
And, also, Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 27 S. Ct. 412, 51 L. Ed. 708, sustaining a similar mining statute of 1899. The pertinent syllabus reads:
In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77, sustaining a statute of the state of Illinois which fixed maximum charges for the storage of grain in public warehouses within the state, the head note here pertinent reads:
In the opinion (p. 134) the court used the following language:
Prompted by the last quoted sentence we take note of the fact that in our session laws enacted at any session of our legislature, aside from appropriation measures, the "new" statutes are nothing more than a modification of previously existing rules of law. The instances are rare when this is not true. In fact, any statute, and most other rules of law, have the effect of drawing a line through some human rights or activities, and to say that the law applies on *503 one side and not on the other. The design of each of them is to be of some benefit to the people. Sometimes a line so drawn so nearly fits the rights or needs of the people that it will be unchanged for many years. At other times, almost as soon as it is attempted to be applied, modifications of it in the public interest will suggest themselves, with the result that "new" statutes will be enacted by the legislature. These changes in our laws record the thought of the lawmakers as to the wants and needs of the people at the time of their enactment. This is true whether they apply to statutes previously enacted in the state or whether they apply to rules of common law. Indeed, our statute pertaining to the applicability of the common law in this state (G.S. 1935, 77-109) reads:
So it cannot be said that the common law cannot be modified by statute when the law-making body deems such a modification to be necessary or proper. Indeed, we are accustomed to speak of such changes as a matter of course. While many examples of that could be given we mention only a late one. (See State Highway Comm. v. Stadler, 158 Kan. 289, 292, 148 P.2d 296.)
Guest statutes similar to our own have been enacted in many states. Cases construing many of them are collected and commented upon in 111 A.L.R. 1011. We shall not attempt to comment on these numerous cases. A relatively late one, sustaining the guest statute of Illinois, is Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229; appeal dismissed 322 U.S. 713, 64 S. Ct. 1270, 88 L. Ed. 1555. It discusses and answers all the questions raised by counsel for appellant here, and others. Counsel for appellant cite Stewart v. Houk et al., 127 Or. 589, 271 Pac. 998, where the court held void the first guest statute of Oregon (Chap. 342, Laws 1927), which denied the right of a guest to any relief without regard to the cause. But in 1929 the legislature of Oregon passed a new guest law which provided that the guest should not have a cause of action against the owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case of accident, "unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his gross negligence or intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of others." This statute was held constitutional by the supreme court of Oregon in the case of *504 Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Or. 330, 40 P.2d 1009, which reviewed and followed many of the other cases.
Counsel for appellant also cite Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347, holding invalid the guest statute of that state, and allowed no cause of action against the owner or operator for any injuries received, death or loss sustained in case of accident, "unless such accident shall have resulted from an intentional act on the part of said owner or operator." The constitution of Kentucky contains a section substantially the same as section 18 of our Bill of Rights, and another section which reads:
And also a section which reads:
The court (two justices dissenting) held the statute to be in violation of the constitution of Kentucky. The decision may be justified for the reasons stated, but although it is referred to in a number of other cases it has not been held controlling in any of them because their constitutions did not specifically prohibit the legislature from passing acts relieving one from liability for negligence. Our constitution contains no provision so limiting our legislature.
Counsel for appellant cite and rely heavily upon Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041. In that case the court held invalid Chap. 249, Laws 1901, which, under the circumstances stated, permitted recovery in an action against any publication for libel to what plaintiff might show he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, and no other damages whatsoever. The effect of the statute was construed to be that in a publication of matter which is libelous per se, which subjected one to disgrace, ridicule or contempt, there could be no recovery. The court held the statute in violation of section 18 of our Bill of Rights. We first note there is no suggestion in that case that the statute might be sustained under the police power of the state, nor were any facts stated justifying such a holding. The case has never been cited by this court upon that point.
In Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, at page 722, 98 Pac. 281, after quoting section 18 of our bill of rights, this language was used:
In Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan. 267, 105 Pac. 509, the rule of the common law, that spoken words imputing unchastity to a female are not actionable without allegation and proof of special damages, is not in harmony with the law of this state and will not be followed.
And G.S. 1935, 21-2406, reads:
We are of the opinion that the slander and libel cases are not in point.
Counsel for appellant cite Jones v. Railway Co., 98 Kan. 133, 157 Pac. 399, which had to do with our statute (now G.S. 1935, 66-275), requiring railroads to carry passengers above the age of fifteen years upon all freight trains to which a caboose is attached, with the provision that on such trains the railroad companies shall only be liable for their gross negligence, which opinion was handed down in 1916, by showing this court recognized "gross negligence" after degrees of negligence had been abolished by judicial decree in the case of Railway Co. v. Walters, 78 Kan. 39, 96 Pac. 346, which was decided in 1908. We do not regard this as being of importance. The Jones case is really an authority to sustain the power of the legislature to limit the liability of a railroad company toward its passengers, which would exist without such a statute (see cases cited, p. 135, and G.S. 1935, 66-234), because of the particular mode of travel.
We need not write extensively upon the police power of the state. A good treatise upon that subject is found in 16 C.J.S. 537 to 578, also in 11 Am. Jur. 966 to 1092.
If, under the common law, plaintiff, a child four years of age in January, 1948, would have had any cause of action against his grandparents, in whose custody he had been placed by his parents, for damages resulting from their negligence  a fact which we do not determine since it was not presented to and ruled upon by the trial court nor argued here  the above authorities show he had no vested right in such cause of action as would prevent the legislature, *506 acting under the police power of the state, from removing it, in 1931, by G.S. 1935, 8-122b.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court from which the appeal was taken in our No. 37,744 and its judgment, therefore, is affirmed.
SMITH, J., dissenting from syllabus 3.