Title: MATTER OF HALL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13452 IN THE SUPREIgE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL HALL, a Minor Child DONNA HALL NAGY, Appellant, GLEN E. WILLIAMS and DOLORES LORRAINE WILLIAMS, Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Robert J. Emmons argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: James W. Zion argued, Helena, Montana Thomas E. Boland argued for Baby Girl Hall, Helena, Montana Submitted: January 13, 1977 Decided: JUL_ ,l l(.~n Filed: ,gUe - 1 19?t;i' 7 a i w u . Q 8. y i G w Y clerk Hon. Gordon Bennett, District Judge, sitting for Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield, delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a final order of the district court, Cascade County, denying a petition for annulment of an adoption decree and, in the alternative, for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was born January 21, 1954, and gave birth to the child involved in this litigation on June 18, 1970. On July 17, 1970, the district court decreed the adoption of the child by respondents, having found the child was abandoned by its natural parents. In June 1975, petitioner discovered her child had purportedly been adopted by respondents and was living in their home. She filed her petition November 4, 1975. Respondents moved to quash. Pursuant to a written stipulation filed by the parties, the district court on November 14, 1975, issued its order determining, inter alia, that the adoption decree was invalid. It found a lack of due process because no notice was given the natural parents, and that consent had not been waived by abandonment for the required period of one year, in view of the fact the child was only 24 days old at the time of the adoption, In the same order, and again by stipulation of the parties, the court directed the local welfare office to investigate the living circumstances and parental qualifications of petitioner and respon- dents and make its recommendation as to where the child should best be placed. The report was to be made to the court with counsel for both parties present and allowed to cross-examine as to its contents. After the filing of the report and an adversary hearing on the question of the best interests of the child, the court on March 29, 1976, issued its findings of fact, conclusion of law and order, wherein it confirmed its previous conclusion that the adoption decree was invalid for lack of notice and the absence of consent by abandonment. The court then concluded petitioner was guilty of laches and was estopped from maintaining her petition because she could have commenced her action upon reaching majority on July 1, 1973, under the provisions of Art. 11, Section 14, 1972 Montana Constitution. It also concluded it was in the best interests of the child to remain in respondents' home. The court denied the petition and granted the motion to quash. We would not disturb the stipulation of the parties and the conclusion of the district court pursuant thereto that the adoption decree is invalid, as there is no request or basis presented for doing so. The decree is, however, not only invalid, it is void for all purposes. It is conceded no notice was given the natural parents. More than fifty years ago, this Court recited with approval the universally accepted general rule that notice to natural parents in these cases is indispensable to jurisdiction; if jurisdiction is not thus obtained there can be no judicial determination, and any such purported determination is void. State ex rel. Thompson v . District Court, 75 Mont. 147, 151, 242 P. 959. This Court has not deviated from this rule. See: Bascom v. Car- penter, 126 Mont. 129, 136, 246 P.2d 223, recently reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U . S . 545, 85 Sect. 1187, 14 L ed 2d 62. Nothing appears in this case that would remove it from the application of the rule. In 1921 this Court in Lamont v. Vinger, 61 Mont. 530, 546, 202 P. 769, adopted from the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U . S . 714, 728, 24 L Ed 565, the fundamental principle that: I I A judgment void when rendered w i l l always remain void. The validity of every judgment depends upon the juris- diction of the court before it i s rendered, not upon what may occur subsequently ." This principle remains undisturbed, here and elsewhere. It re- quires that we give a void decree no effect whatever a t any time and view it a s a n u l l i t y for a l l purposes. Thus it is the limited function of t h i s Court t o declare there never was a legally cognizable adoption decree i n t h i s case. That being so, the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel cannot be applied t o save the non-existent decree or. t o implement it i n any way. It i s also conceded that no consent was given by the natural parents, nor was there a valid exception t o the consent requirement of ~ o n t a n a ' s statute, section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947. W e have required s t r i c t compliance with that statute (Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377), but have not yet found failure t o comply with it jurisdictional, as have courts i n other jurisdictions. See for example: Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or.App.450, 513 P.2d 1216,1217; 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persom, 551, p. 470, and cases cited therein. W e see no reason for relaxation of the standard i n t h i s case and would s e t aside the decree, as w e did i n Biery, i f it had any validity i n the f i r s t place. Petitioner sought not only annulment of the adoption decree but the return of her child upon a w r i t of habeas corpus. Appar- ently pursuant t o the l a t t e r petition, and upon stipulation of the parties, a f u l l hearing was provided i n the d i s t r i c t court on the question of the "best interests of the child". This being the basic criterion by which custody i s determined the hearing may be considered a cugtody hearing, held with the consent of both parties. O n the basis of t h i s hearing, the court concluded a s a matter of law that it was i n the best interests of the child t o leave it with respon- dents. Having so concluded, the court granted responsents' motion t o quash and, i n effect, granted custody t o them. W e cannot quarrel with the court's conclusion a s t o the best interests of the child. The transcript reveals the case was thoroughly investigated by the county welfare department and i t s report was aired with equal thoroughness a t the hearing. There i s an abundance of substantial credible evidence t o support the court's conclusion. Thus we find no abuse of discretion by the d i s t r i c t court and must affirm its conclusion. Adoption of Biery, supra, and cases cPted therein. For the above reasons, the adoption decree involved herein should be annulled and permanent custody of the child decreed i n respondents. The cause is remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court for entry of its decrees i n accordance with t h i s opinion. Judge. W e Concu /- Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : I concur with t h a t portion of t h e majority d e c i s i o n voiding t h e adoption decree, b u t I d i s s e n t on i t s d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g permanent custody t o the adoptive p a r e n t s . For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes t h i s d e c i s i o n f o r e c l o s e s the n a t u r a l mother from e v e r s u c c e s s f u l l y p e t i t i o n i n g t o obtain custody of h e r daughter. She can have no consolation i n winning h e r case but l o s i n g h e r c h i l d . I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e s u l t would have been t h e same i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t if t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had voided t h e adoption decree, f o r i n t h a t case t h e adoptive parents would not have had any l e g a l claim t o t h e c h i l d . While t h e c o u r t would n o t have been bound t o immediately give custody t o t h e n a t u r a l mother, t h e adoptive parents would have had no l e g a l b a s i s f o r then obtaining permanent custody of t h e c h i l d . It is c l e a r however, t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t recognized t h i s problem f o r it held t h a t although t h e adoption decree was void, it r e a l l y was n o t void. The reason was t h a t t h e n a t u r a l mother was g u i l t y of laches and t h e r e f o r e had no l e g a l b a s i s t o s e t t h e adoption a s i d e . However, by upholding t h e adoptive p a r e n t s 1 claim of laches t h e c o u r t d i d n o t have t o reach a decision on t h e "best i n t e r e s t s " of the c h i l d , f o r a t t h a t point t h e n a t u r a l mother had no l e g a l r i g h t t o be heard. She was standing before t h e c o u r t a s a s t r a n g e r t r y i n g t o o b t a i n custody of a c h i l d t h a t was no longer h e r s . C e r t a i n l y t h e c o u r t was n o t going t o award permanent custody t o a s t r a n g e r . But t h i s Court by o v e r r u l i n g t h e claim of laches a s applied t o a void adoption decree, held the ; n a t u r a l mother was n o t a s t r a n g e r , and she was wronged by t h e adoptive parents p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e f i l i n g of a f a l s e adoption p e t i t k o n . But i n t h e same b r e a t h t h e Court has deprived t h e n a t u r a l mother from e v e r o b t a i n i n g l e g a l custody of h e r daughter. The p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a p p l i c a b l e t o f u r t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t proceedings i n t h i s case<, place an impossible burden on t h e n a t u r a l mother. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act went i n t o e f f e c t on January 1, 1976 and pursuant t o s e c t i o n 48-341(4) R.C.M. 1947, any f u r t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t proceedings i n t h i s c a s e must be under t h i s Act. Section 48-341(4) provides: "In any a c t i o n o r proceeding i n which an a p p e a l was pending o r a new t r i a l was ordered p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h i s a c t , t h e law i n e f f e c t a t t h e time of t h e o r d e r s u s t a i n i n g t h e appeal o r t h e new t r i a l governs t h e appeal, t h e new t r i a l , and any subsequent t r i a l o r a p p e a l . " Here, t h e t r i a l took place i n March, 1976 and an appeal was f i l e d on A p r i l 27, 1976. Therefore, f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h i s c a s e must be under t h i s Act. Under Section 48-339(1), R.C.M. 1947, a p e t i t i o n t o o b t a i n custody of a c h i l d (absent e x t e n u a t i n g and emergency s i t u a t i o n s ) can be f i l e d only once i n a two year p e r i o d . Th,is means t h e mother must endure a s u b s t a n t i a l w a i t i n g period before she can f i l e a custody p e t i t i o n . But even i f she l a t e r f i l e d a p e t i t k o n , h e r e f f o r t s would most l i k e l y be doomed t o f a i l u r e because she must overcome t h e heavy burden of proof placed on h e r by t h e Act. To be e n t i t l e d t o a h e a r i n g under s e c t i o n 48-339, R.C.M. 1947, t h e n a t u r a l mother must f i l e an a f f i d a v i t o r sworn p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s ( s e c t i o n 48-340, R.C.M. 1947) t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s "physical, mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h " i s b e i n g harmed i n h e r p r e s e n t home. Because a l l a g r e e t h a t t h e adoptive p a r e n t s have been good p a r e n t s , it would indeed take a c r e a t i v e mind t o a l l e g e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s t h a t would e n t i t l e t h e n a t u r a l mother t o a hearing. Moreover, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t has a l r e a d y determined t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s ' ' of t h e c h i l d a r e w i t h the adoptive parents, upon another h e a r i n g t h e c o u r t would be required t o r e t a i n them a s custodians u n l e s s "the c h i l d ' s present environment endangers s e r i o u s l y h i s physical, mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h , and t h e harm l i k e l y t o be caused by a change of environment i s outweighed by i t s advantages t o him." Section 48-339{2)(c). Thus we have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e s t a t e d purpose of t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of keeping t h e c h i l d i n a s t a b l e , permanent environment is depriving t h e n a t u r a l mother from e v e r obtaining custody of h e r c h i l d . his is n o t a j u s t r e s u l t , nor is it n e c e s s a r i l y , t h e long run, t h e r i g h t decision f o r t h e c h i l d . The n a t u r a l mother l i v e s only a few blocks from h e r c h i l d , b u t only knew of h e r whereabouts j u s t a s h o r t period before f i l i n g t h e p e t i t i o n i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o annul t h e adoption decree. The c h i l d does n o t know she has been adopted. However, even assuming t h e adoptive parents have been granted permanent custody it would appear t h e n a t u r a l mother now has a r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n f o r reasonable v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 48- 337(1), R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "A parent n o t granted custody of t h e c h i is e n t i t l e d t o reasonable v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s , a f t e r a hearing, t h a t v i s i t a t i o n would endanger s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d physical, mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h . It would seem most l i k e l y t h e c h i l d w i l l now f i n d out she has , -, - been adopted and t h e i d e n t i t y of h e r n a t u r a l mother. Yet t h e mother w i l l never have a meaningful opportunity t o o b t a i n t h e custody of h e r daughter. In s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e adoption decree but s t i l l leaving permanent custody i n t h e adoptive parents, t h e Court r e l i e s on Adoption O f Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377, but I f e e l t h a t r e l i a n c e is misplaced. I n Biery t h e n a t u r a l mother was served with process before t h e adoption and p a r t i c i p a t e d f u l l h e a r i n g t o determine t h e "best i n t e r e s t s " of t h e c h i l d . Also, t h e adoptive p a r e n t s i n Biery had a c t u a l custody of t h e c h i l d before t h e adoption. The reason f o r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e adoption i n Biery was because t h e r e was no f i n d i n g by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t t h e mother had abandoned t h e c h i l d f o r a period of one y e a r . A s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d t h e adoptive p a r e n t s t o prove t h e mother d i d n o t support t h e c h i l d f o r a one y e a r period and she had t h e a b i l i t y t o support t h e c h i l d during t h a t p e r i o d . Section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947. The adoption was s e t a s i d e without p r e j u d i c e . The f a c t s a r e very d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . The n a t u r a l mother was a minor when she signed a consent form t o have h e r c h i l d adopted. N o guardian ad l i t e m was appointed t o r e p r e s e n t h e r i n t e r e s t s . She was n o t served with process i n t h e guardianship proceedings. The p e t i t i o n t o adopt was f a l s e on its f a c e . It a l l e g e d abandonment, i n which c a s e t h e abandonment must have e x i s t e d f o r a period of a t l e a s t one y e a r . S e c t i o n 61- 205,R.C.M. 1947. However, t h e p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h e c h i l d was born on June 18, 1970, and t h e p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on J u l y 17, 1970, j u s t 24 days a f t e r t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h . S t i l l t h e c o u r t approved t h e adoption. The e n t i r e proceedings were devoid of even t h e rudiments of due process. The e f f e c t of t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s t h a t due process when a p p l i e d t o c h i l d custody c a s e s i s meaningless, f o r it is custody of t h e c h i l d t h a t i s important. I f a couple, however w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d , can a c q u i r e permanent custody of a c h i l d i n t h e manner done i n t h i s case, then p a r e n t a l r i g h t s a r e meaningless. I n e f f e c t , t h i s Court is holding t h a t permanent custody of a c h i l d can be acquired by a hybrid form of adverse possession and it does n o t m a t t e r t h a t t h e i n i t i a l possession was acquired by i l l e g a l means. I ~ ~ o u l c l v o ~ u the entire pr?ocezdin&s drld allow t h e a d o p t i v e uaren ts temporary custody u n t i l such time as s a t i s f a c t o r y a r r a n g e - ments could be worked o u t f o r t h e t r a n s f e r of permanent custody so t h e n a t u r a l mother.