Title: Commonwealth v. Dykens

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11879 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENNETH DYKENS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 5, 2015. - February 17, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Attempt.  Burglary.  Burglarious Implements.  Practice, 
Criminal, Plea, Postconviction relief, Duplicative 
convictions, Double jeopardy, Indictment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 31, 2005. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea and vacate convictions, filed 
on October 11, 2013, was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This case is before us following the denial by a 
Superior Court judge of Kenneth Dykens's motion to vacate 
several convictions resulting from his guilty pleas in 
2 
 
connection with a February, 2005, arrest for attempted burglary 
and other offenses.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  Specifically, he seeks to vacate two 
of his three convictions of attempted unarmed burglary in 
violation of G. L. c. 274, § 6, contending they are duplicative 
of his conviction on the third, and thus barred under principles 
of double jeopardy.  He also seeks to vacate his conviction of 
possession of a burglarious tool or implement (a rock) in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 49, on the ground that the 
indictment failed to state a crime, and the Superior Court 
therefore lacked jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea and impose 
a sentence on it. 
 
We transferred Dykens's appeal to this court on our own 
motion to decide whether, where a defendant has pleaded guilty 
to multiple counts of attempted unarmed burglary, he may 
subsequently challenge his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (a), on double jeopardy grounds or whether he has 
waived any such claim by pleading guilty; and whether, where a 
defendant over the course of a single late evening and early 
morning unsuccessfully tried to break into a home through three 
different access points, he may be charged with multiple counts 
of attempted unarmed burglary pursuant to G. L. c. 274, § 6, or 
whether those acts constitute a single continuous course of 
conduct rendering conviction on multiple counts duplicative. 
3 
 
 
We conclude that although Dykens the defendant may bring 
his claim under rule 30 (a), the attempt statute, G. L. c. 274, 
§ 6, permits multiple convictions for discrete, completed 
attempts of unarmed burglary; that whether separate indictments 
or complaints adequately charge separate attempts must be 
determined on the particulars of each case; and in the present 
case, that Dykens's multiple convictions and punishments were 
for separate attempts, and therefore his multiple convictions 
and punishments do not violate double jeopardy.  We further 
conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to accept Dykens's 
guilty plea as to the indictment charging possession of a 
burglarious tool or implement because the indictment failed to 
allege a crime.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part the denial of Dykens's motion for postconviction relief. 
 
1.  Background.  In the early morning hours of February 10, 
2005, John and Jacqui Cram of Malden telephoned 911 after they 
heard the sounds of breaking glass and saw a figure moving 
around on their property.  Malden police Officers Southbridge 
and Killian responded to the call and observed the following on 
their arrival:  (1) a ladder that the Crams had last seen lying 
on the ground had been placed against the house to provide 
access to a second-story window; (2) a screen had been torn off 
a first-floor window; and (3) a sliding glass door at the rear 
of the house had been smashed.  A large rock which had not 
4 
 
previously been on the deck lay nearby and apparently had been 
used to break the glass. 
 
The officers observed fresh footprints in the snow, which 
Southbridge followed through neighboring streets and yards and 
over a chain link fence; he discovered Dykens hiding among some 
rocks.  The officer ordered Dykens not to move, but Dykens 
attempted to escape.  The two men scuffled, and Killian 
eventually arrived to assist.  After a struggle, the officers 
were able to subdue Dykens and handcuff him.  As they stood him 
up to transport him to the police station, Dykens kicked Killian 
in the face with a shod foot. 
 
In March, 2005, a grand jury indicted Dykens on seventeen 
counts stemming from his arrest, including three counts of 
attempted unarmed burglary1 and one count of possession of a 
                                                          
 
 
1 Three separate indictments were returned charging Kenneth 
Dykens with violating G. L. c. 274, § 6, "on or about February 
10."  The first indictment charged, in relevant part, that 
"Kenneth Dykens . . . did attempt to break and enter the 
dwelling house of John Cram and Jacqui Cram in the nighttime 
with intent to commit a felony therein, and in such attempt did 
smash a glass sliding door in order to facilitate entry into the 
home . . . but did fail in the perpetration of said offense, or 
was intercepted, or prevented in the perpetration of the said 
attempted offense" (emphasis added).  The second indictment at 
issue charged, in relevant part, that "Kenneth Dykens . . . did 
attempt to break and enter the dwelling house of John Cram and 
Jacqui Cram in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, and 
in such attempt did remove an outer screen in order to 
facilitate entry into the home . . . but did fail in the 
perpetration of said offense, or was intercepted, or prevented 
in the perpetration of the said attempted offense" (emphasis 
 
5 
 
burglarious instrument (a heavy rock), which are at issue in 
this appeal.2  Dykens pleaded not guilty to all charges at his 
arraignment, and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss eight of 
the seventeen indictments.  As to two counts of attempted 
unarmed burglary, Dykens argued that they were duplicative of a 
third count.  A judge denied the motion as to the multiple 
indictments for attempted unarmed burglary. 
 
On October 17, 2005, Dykens pleaded guilty to the three 
counts of attempted unarmed burglary, being a habitual offender, 
assault with intent to maim, assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon, possession of a burglarious instrument, 
assault and battery on a public employee, and resisting arrest.  
Dykens was sentenced to from seven years to seven years and one 
day in State prison on the indictment charging him with assault 
with intent to maim, five years in State prison concurrent with 
that sentence on the indictment charging him with attempted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
added).  The third indictment at issue charged, in relevant 
part, that "Kenneth Dykens . . . did attempt to break and enter 
the dwelling house of John Cram and Jacqui Cram in the nighttime 
with intent to commit a felony therein, and in such attempt did 
position a ladder in order to facilitate entry into the home 
. . . but did fail in the perpetration of said offense, or was 
intercepted, or prevented in the perpetration of the said 
attempted offense" (emphasis added). 
 
 
2 Dykens also was indicted for assault with the intent to 
maim, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (a shod foot), 
malicious destruction of property with a value over $250, 
assault and battery on a public employee (two counts), resisting 
arrest, and being a habitual offender. 
6 
 
unarmed burglary as a habitual offender, and five years 
probation from and after his completed sentences on the other 
counts.  
 
After Dykens was released from prison, a probation 
violation warrant issued.  On March 22, 2013, a Superior Court 
judge held a final probation surrender hearing.  He found Dykens 
in violation of the term of his probation and sentenced him to 
two years in a house of correction on the charge of assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon, and an additional two years on 
the charge of possessing a burglarious implement, to be served 
from and after that.  The judge also terminated Dykens's 
probation on the remaining convictions. 
 
On October 11, 2013, Dykens moved to vacate two of his 
convictions of attempted armed burglary and his conviction of 
possessing a burglarious tool or implement pursuant to rule 
30 (a).  In his motion, Dykens asserted that the convictions of 
attempted burglary were duplicative, and should therefore be 
vacated and dismissed.  He also argued that the rock he used to 
break the sliding door was not a burglarious instrument within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 266, § 49, and that his conviction under 
the statute should be vacated because the indictment was 
defective for failing to state a crime.  On September 2, 2014, 
the judge denied the motion.  Dykens timely appealed. 
7 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a. Collateral attack on guilty plea.  Both 
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Massachusetts common law prohibit the 
imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense.  
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 70 (2014), citing 
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012).  It is well 
settled in our jurisprudence that a "guilty plea will not 
preclude a court from hearing a constitutional claim that the 
State should not have tried the defendant at all."  Commonwealth 
v. Negron, 462 Mass. 102, 104 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 379 Mass. 623, 626 (1980). 
 
A guilty plea is "an admission of the facts charged and is 
itself a conviction" (quotation and citation omitted), Negron, 
462 Mass. at 105, and is properly challenged under rule 30 (a), 
which provides: 
 
"Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is 
restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at 
any time, as of right, file a written motion 
requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to 
correct the sentence then being served upon the ground 
that the confinement or restraint was imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30. 
 
In Negron, 462 Mass. at 106-107, we held that a defendant 
is not precluded from challenging his convictions (based on 
guilty pleas) on double jeopardy grounds where the defendant 
8 
 
claims that the charges pleaded to are duplicative on their face 
and further expansion of the record or evidentiary findings are 
not required.  Having concluded that the defendant could 
challenge the convictions as duplicative, the court went on to 
analyze whether they were in fact duplicative.3  Id. at 108-111. 
 
The relevant convictions in Negron were for different 
crimes, armed assault in a dwelling and aggravated burglary, 
under different statutes, but arising out of the same criminal 
conduct.  Id. at 103.  The court analyzed the elements of the 
crimes and concluded that the former was not a lesser included 
offense of the latter.  Id. at 109-111.  Consequently, they were 
not duplicative and convictions of both did not violate double 
jeopardy.  Id. at 109. 
 
Dykens's double jeopardy challenge to his multiple 
convictions of attempted unarmed burglary does not involve a 
claim that some of the charges are lesser included offenses of 
the others (and thus duplicative), but rather that the 
underlying conduct on which they are based constitutes but a 
single continuing offense and thus multiple convictions and 
                                                          
 
 
3 The court in Commonwealth v. Negron, 462 Mass. 102, 108 
n.6 (2012), left open the question whether the defendant, having 
pleaded guilty, would relinquish his entitlement to bring a 
double jeopardy challenge where a claim of duplicative 
convictions required an expansion of the record or an 
evidentiary hearing.  We need not answer that question in this 
case. 
9 
 
punishments for that offense are duplicative and violative of 
his right to be free from double jeopardy. 
 
The record in this case includes the three indictments, 
each alleging a different act in furtherance of each attempt, 
and the transcript of the hearing at which Dykens pleaded guilty 
to all three.  During the plea hearing, the prosecutor briefly 
described the evidence that would have been presented as to each 
of the three indictments, including Dykens's failed efforts to 
gain entry by different means through three separate points of 
access:  a window on the second floor (toward which he placed a 
ladder against the house); a window on the first floor (from 
which he removed a screen); and a sliding glass door on the 
first floor in the rear of the home (which he shattered with a 
rock).  Dykens admitted that he had done each of the things 
alleged by the prosecutor with the intent to enter the home 
through the three different access points, and thus, that he was 
guilty of three different attempts to burglarize the same home. 
 
Where the indictments on their face charge three attempts 
to burglarize the same residence on or about the same date, and 
the record includes at least a minimal description of the key 
evidence establishing each of those attempts, we can decide 
whether the indictments are duplicative without going beyond the 
record, and therefore, Dykens may bring a double jeopardy 
challenge. 
10 
 
 
b.  Duplicative convictions.  Where a single statute is 
involved, we must decide "whether two [or more] discrete 
offenses were proved under that statute rather than a single 
continuing offense" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Traylor, 472 Mass. 260, 268 (2015). 
 
Our inquiry starts with what "unit of prosecution" the 
Legislature intended as the punishable act for violations of the 
attempt statute, G. L. 274, § 6.  See Rollins, 470 Mass. at 70; 
Commonwealth v. Rabb, 431 Mass. 123, 128 (2000).4  We begin with 
the language and purpose of the statute to determine whether it 
explicitly addresses the appropriate unit of prosecution, and if 
it does not, "to ascertain that unit, keeping in mind that any 
ambiguity that arises in the process must be resolved, under the 
rule of lenity, in the defendant's favor."  Rollins, supra, 
quoting Rabb, supra.  Also "[r]elevant to discerning a criminal 
statute's unit of prosecution is the continuous offense 
doctrine, which recognizes that certain criminal statutes are 
intended to punish just once for a continuing course of conduct, 
rather than for each and every discrete act comprising that 
                                                          
 
 
4 Although many of our cases have defined the appropriate 
unit of prosecution under a particular statute, we have not 
defined the term itself.  We decide now that a unit of 
prosecution is a criminal act or course of conduct punishable at 
law.  See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 
U.S. 218, 225-226 (1952). 
11 
 
course of conduct."  Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 450 
(2013). 
 
The Massachusetts attempt statute, G. L. 274, § 6, punishes 
"[w]hoever attempts to commit a crime by doing any act toward 
its commission, but fails in its perpetration, or is intercepted 
or prevented in its perpetration . . . ."  Here, we construe the 
attempt statute in conjunction with the underlying substantive 
offense of unarmed burglary.5 
 
The language of the attempt statute is not explicit as to 
the permissible unit of prosecution.  Dykens asks us to 
interpret the language in § 6 according to the rules for 
construction of statutes set out in G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth, 
which provides in relevant part that "[w]ords importing the 
singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or 
things, words importing the plural number may include the 
singular . . ." (emphasis added).  When applied to the language 
of the attempt statute, in Dykens's view, "any act" becomes "any 
act or acts."  Accordingly, Dykens believes, we can infer 
                                                          
 
 
5 General Laws c. 266, § 15, punishes "[w]hoever breaks and 
enters a dwelling house in the night time, with the intent [to 
commit a felony], or, having entered with such intent, breaks 
such dwelling house in the night time, the offender not being 
armed, nor arming himself in such house, with a dangerous 
weapon, nor making an assault upon a person lawfully therein 
. . . ." 
12 
 
legislative intent that all overt acts directed toward the 
commission of a crime be punished by a single attempt charge. 
 
We are not persuaded by Dykens's reasoning.  By its plain 
language, the purpose of the attempt statute is to penalize 
those individuals who would have achieved their criminal 
objective but for factual circumstances that result in failure, 
interception, or prevention of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20 (1897) ("aim of the [attempt statute] 
is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external 
results").  Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature did not 
intend to reward a defendant who, on failing to accomplish his 
criminal endeavor in one manner, undertakes to achieve the 
substantive crime anew in another. 
 
Nor do we conclude that the continuing offense doctrine 
advances Dykens's reading of the statute to impose a single 
punishment for distinct attempts.  Dykens relies on a decision 
from the Appeals Court for the proposition that charged offenses 
are duplicative where the acts underlying the offense are part 
of a "continuous stream of conduct occurring within a short time 
frame and governed by a single criminal design," and thus united 
in "time, place, and intent."  Commonwealth v. Howze, 58 Mass. 
App. Ct. 147, 153 (2003), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 700-701 (2015).  In Howze, 
supra at 147, 153, the Appeals Court held that, where the 
13 
 
defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a 
child and of rape of a child, "the act of removing the victim's 
clothing was sufficiently bound up with and necessary to the act 
of penetration that due process [forbade] separating the conduct 
into discrete units for prosecution."  See also Commonwealth v. 
Suero, 465 Mass. 215, 220-221 (2013) (conviction of indecent 
assault and battery vacated as duplicative of rape convictions 
where former rested on removal of rape victim's underwear that 
was "incidental and necessary to the rape"). 
 
Howze and Suero are inapposite.  Although Dykens's acts 
occurred close together in time and at the same home, his acts 
were not "bound up with and necessary to" one another as the 
defendant's actions were in those cases.  Howze, 58 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 153.  Rather, his attempts to gain access via different 
entry points of the dwelling each could have resulted in a 
successful break of the dwelling.  A different conclusion could 
be drawn if the defendant was charged with three separate 
attempts based on the acts of:  (1) the placement of a ladder to 
reach a window, (2) the removal of the screen from that same 
window, and (3) the use of a rock to then break the glass on 
that window in an effort to gain access.  In such circumstances, 
the three acts would in fact be "bound up with and necessary to" 
the completion of a single crime, much as the removal of 
underwear in the perpetration of a rape. 
14 
 
 
Dykens also points to our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Bolden, 470 Mass. 274, 274-275 (2014), in which we held that a 
defendant could not be twice convicted of aggravated burglary 
under G. L. c. 266, § 14, for breaking and entering a single 
dwelling.  In that case, the defendant broke into a dwelling 
where a husband and wife resided and assaulted the husband in 
the basement.  Id. at 275-276.  He then broke through an 
interior door leading to the first floor and assaulted the wife.  
Id. at 276.  He was subsequently charged with two counts of 
aggravated burglary, one premised on the break into the house 
and the assault of the husband, and the other on the break of 
the interior door and assault of the wife.  Id. at 276.  We 
vacated the conviction on the second indictment, concluding that 
"once a dwelling is 'broken,' any subsequent breaks occurring 
therein -- reasonably close in time and purpose -- are but a 
continuation of the offense and thus insufficient to support 
separate convictions under § 14."  Id. at 279.   We stated: 
 
"Once a person has broken and entered any part of 
the dwelling, at night, . . . with intent to commit a 
felony therein, the predicate offense of burglary as 
to that dwelling is complete.  Because arming oneself 
with a dangerous weapon and assaulting the inhabitants 
of that dwelling merely aggravate that singular 
predicate offense, the Commonwealth may not aggregate 
such actions into multiple units of prosecution under 
§ 14." 
 
Id. at 280.  Dykens argues that if multiple breaks of a single 
dwelling do not create distinct, punishable offenses, then 
15 
 
multiple attempted breaks into a single dwelling must also 
constitute a continuous offense. 
 
Dykens's reliance on Bolden is misplaced.  The unit of 
prosecution for aggravated burglary is different from the unit 
of prosecution for attempted burglary.  For the latter the 
proper unit of prosecution is the act necessary to prove the 
inchoate offense of attempt, and not the substantive crime of 
burglary.  Thus, although in Bolden the unit of prosecution was 
the act of breaking and entering a singular dwelling, the unit 
of prosecution for attempted burglary is "any act toward [the 
substantive crime's] commission."  G. L. c. 274, § 6. 
 
We have consistently interpreted the attempt statute to 
require "a showing that the defendant, after preparing to commit 
the crime, has taken such overt acts toward fulfilling the crime 
that 'come near enough to the accomplishment of the substantive 
offence to be punishable.'"  Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 
408, 412 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 
271 (1901).  Moreover, where distinct acts form the basis of 
separate indictments, the Commonwealth must still prove all 
elements required by the attempt statute for each charge.6 
                                                          
 
 
6 Dykens does not dispute that he possessed the requisite 
intent, nor does he contest that he failed to achieve the 
substantive crime of unarmed burglary.  We therefore focus on 
whether the facts alleged in each indictment support a finding 
of distinct overt acts that support independent convictions. 
16 
 
 
Here, each of Dykens's acts, as alleged in the indictments, 
fit squarely within the definition of an overt act.  See 
Commonwealth v. Foley, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 115 (1987) 
(complaint or indictment charging attempt must specify overt 
act).  Positioning a ladder to facilitate entry into the 
dwelling, removing an outer screen to facilitate entry into the 
dwelling, and smashing a glass sliding door to facilitate entry 
each constitute an independent act sufficient to warrant a 
charge of attempt.  In each instance, Dykens, after having 
entered upon the Crams' property with the intent to break into 
their home, was in a position to accomplish the substantive 
offense absent his apparent inability to gain entry at the 
different access points.  In other words, with each failure to 
break into the dwelling, the crime of attempt was complete. 
 
Although the proximity in time, manner, and place of 
Dykens's conduct is relevant to distinguishing discrete acts 
from a continuous act, such factors are not in and of themselves 
dispositive.  Rather, Dykens's attempts to gain entry at 
different access points of the dwelling weigh heavily against a 
determination that there was a "continuous stream of conduct."  
Howze, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 153.  With each failure to gain 
entry, Dykens had the opportunity to abandon his endeavors.  
Instead, he moved on to another potential point of access to the 
home and committed further unrelated acts in an effort to break 
17 
 
in, finally fleeing when he awakened the residents inside.  The 
Legislature surely did not intend to reward such persistence by 
encompassing multiple, discrete attempts within a single unit of 
prosecution. 
 
Of course, our analysis is not so granular as to say that 
picking up a ladder is not part of the same course of conduct 
where the defendant then proceeds to place the ladder against a 
house.  Similarly, a defendant who repeatedly batters a single 
door with the purpose of gaining entry has likely committed only 
one attempt at breaking and entering.  Dykens's case highlights 
a long-standing comprehension in our jurisprudence of the 
distinction between constituent acts that, taken together, may 
amount to an attempt and discrete acts that, in and of 
themselves, establish the elements required to prove the 
inchoate offense.  See Peaslee, 177 Mass. at 271 (distinguishing 
between act sufficient to establish attempt and those 
preparatory actions that, taken together, may amount to 
attempt).7  See also Commonwealth v. Burns, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 
                                                          
 
 
7 A similar distinction is made in United States v. 
Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109 n.5 (2007), which Dykens 
relies on in his brief for the position that "an attempt 
involving multiple overt acts might conceivably qualify for 
several separate offenses, thus perversely enhancing, rather 
than avoiding, the risk of successive prosecution for the same 
wrong."  In Resendiz-Ponce, the defendant, a Mexican citizen, 
was charged with attempting to unlawfully enter the United 
States based on the following acts:  he walked into an 
 
18 
 
196 (1979), citing Peaslee, supra at 271-274 ("The essence of 
the crime of attempt is that the defendant has taken a step 
towards a criminal offense with specific intent to commit that 
particular crime. . . . It is not enough to allege that a 
defendant has formed the intent to commit a crime or that he has 
merely made preparations for the commission of a crime" 
[quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
Thus, we conclude that multiple attempted breaks of a 
single dwelling furthered by separate acts, each coming near to 
the accomplishment of the crime of burglary, and not bound up 
with and necessary to each other, may be charged as separate 
offenses.  The question whether factual allegations within 
multiple indictments adequately charge separate attempts so as 
to permit their prosecution is one of fact and law and dependent 
on the particulars in each case.  The question is one that, in 
the first instance, may be for the motion or trial judge in the 
context of a motion to dismiss and, should the case proceed to 
trial, is a factual question that a properly instructed jury 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
inspection area; presented a misleading identification card; and 
lied to the inspector.  Id. at 103, 109.  The United States 
Supreme Court explained that "[i]ndividually and cumulatively, 
those acts tend to prove the charged attempt -- but none was 
essential to the finding of guilt in this case.  All three acts 
were rather part of a single course of conduct culminating in 
the charged 'attempt.'"  Id. at 109.  Thus the charged conduct 
constituted a single attempt, which failed a single time.  In 
contrast, Dykens committed acts at three separate access points. 
19 
 
must decide.  In any event, after a jury verdict of guilty on 
multiple convictions, and on the request of defense counsel for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, "a judge also must 
determine whether the convictions violate the defendant's 
rights" under the principles of double jeopardy.  Suero, 465 
Mass. at 222.8 
 
c.  Jurisdictional defect.  Dykens also asserts that his 
conviction under G. L. c. 266, § 49, for possession of a 
burglarious tool or implement must be vacated because a rock is 
not a tool or an implement within the meaning of the statute.9  
                                                          
 
 
8 Under the doctrine of merger, where the facts support 
multiple attempt charges but where the defendant ultimately 
succeeds in committing the substantive crime, the attempt 
resulting in completion of the crime would merge with the 
substantive offense.  Any other charged attempts, however, could 
stand as separate convictions so long as the Commonwealth proved 
the requisite elements of the separately charged attempts 
including the intent to commit the underlying crime, and an 
overt act coming near to its accomplishment.  The analysis here 
is straightforward where Dykens admitted to having the requisite 
intent in connection with each attempt to break and enter the 
Crams' home, as well as to having committed separate overt acts 
while on the victims' property in his efforts to gain access to 
the home through three different points of entry. 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 266, § 49, punishes "[w]hoever makes or 
mends, or begins to make or mend, or knowingly has in his 
possession, an engine, machine, tool or implement adapted and 
designed for cutting through, forcing or breaking open a 
building, room, vault, safe or other depository, in order to 
steal therefrom money or other property, or to commit any other 
crime, knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the 
purpose aforesaid, with intent to use or employ or allow the 
same to be used or employed for such purpose, or whoever 
knowingly has in his possession a master key designed to fit 
 
20 
 
He seeks review on the ground that the indictment was defective 
in failing to allege a crime, and the court lacked jurisdiction 
to accept his plea and impose a sentence for such conduct.  "No 
court has jurisdiction to sentence a defendant for that which is 
not a crime."  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 
418, quoting Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 580, 582 (1924).  
We agree. 
 
"We interpret statutory language to give effect consistent 
with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an absurd or illogical 
result" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 
355, 358 (2013).  In 1853, the Legislature enacted the 
predecessor of G. L. c. 266, § 49, entitled, "An Act concerning 
Implements of Burglary."  See St. 1853, c. 194.  The statute 
came after the Committee on the Judiciary was tasked with 
"consider[ing] the [e]xpediency of providing for the punishment 
of persons making [b]urglar tools, or having such in their 
possession, with intent that they shall be used." 1853 House J. 
at 629.  The bill containing the apparent final version of the 
statute was reported from the Committee on the Judiciary and 
passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more than one motor vehicle, with intent to use or employ the 
same to steal a motor vehicle or other property therefrom 
. . . ." 
21 
 
there is no mention of any amendments to the bill.  See 1853 
House J. at 680, 762; 1853 Senate J. at 529, 538, 551. 
 
From this history we can infer that the statute was enacted 
with the purpose of punishing individuals making or possessing 
burglar's tools.  A question remains, however, as to what 
constitutes a "tool" or "implement" under § 49, as the statute 
does not define these terms.  We therefore look to the ordinary 
meaning of the word as of 1853, the year the statute was 
enacted.  See Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 111 n.5 (1997) 
(where term in statute is undefined, we may conclude that 
Legislature intended definition that would have been available 
at time original statute enacted).  The 1845 edition of 
Webster's dictionary defined "tool" as "[a]n instrument of 
manual operation, particularly such as are used by farmers and 
mechanics; as, the tools of a joiner, cabinet-maker, smith or 
shoemaker."  An American Dictionary of the English Language 798, 
vol. II (1845).  "Implement" was defined as "[w]hatever may 
supply wants: particularly, as now used, tools, utensils, 
vessels, instruments; the tools or instruments of labor . . . ."  
An American Dictionary of the English Language 870, vol. I 
(1845). 
 
From these definitions, we can conclude that the words 
"tool" and "implement" refer to man-made, rather than naturally 
occurring, items.  This conclusion is supported by other 
22 
 
language in the statute, which further describes tools and 
implements as those "adapted and designed for cutting through, 
forcing or breaking open."  G. L. c. 266, § 49. 
 
Our reading of § 49 to exclude naturally occurring objects 
is also consistent with this court's prior interpretations of 
the statute.  We have long recognized that the statute 
encompasses both ordinary tools and those designed specifically 
for burglary.  See Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 8 Gray 375, 381 
(1857) ("A chisel or centre-bit, though a tool in common use for 
ordinary purposes, is quite as efficacious in the hands of a 
burglar to carry out his felonious intent, as a jimmy or a lock-
picker, which is made for the sole purpose of being used to 
break and enter buildings."); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Mass. 
170, 176-177 (1969) (ordinary tools may take on character of 
burglarious tools if they are intended to be used for 
burglarious purposes).  See also Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 
Mass. 727, 731, S.C., 360 Mass. 848 (1971) (battering ram a 
burglarious implement under § 49); Commonwealth v. Faust, 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 498, 500-501 (2012) (screwdrivers, knife, and 
flashlights are burglarious instruments under § 49); 
Commonwealth v. Aleo, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 916-917 (1984) 
(screwdrivers and dent pullers are burglarious implements under 
§ 49); Commonwealth v. Dreyer, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 565 (1984) 
(screwdriver a burglarious implement under § 49).  In no case 
23 
 
have we found that a naturally occurring object, such as a rock, 
is a tool or an implement within the meaning of the statute. 
 
Notwithstanding this fact, the Commonwealth contends that 
the rock used by Dykens to smash the Crams' glass door could 
have been altered in some way to make it more efficacious in 
smashing windows.  Even if this were the case, in light of the 
purpose and meaning of § 49, we cannot conclude that a rock is a 
tool or an implement designed or adapted to effect an 
individual's burglarious intent.  Rather we hold that the words 
"tool" and "implement," as they appear in § 49, refer to man-
made instruments. 
 
In one of our earliest cases addressing § 49, we held that 
an indictment alleging a violation of St. 1853, c. 194 is 
supported by proof that some of the implements described in the 
indictment were in the possession of the defendant, and "adapted 
and designed for the unlawful purpose specified."  Tivnon, 8 
Gray at 380.  Here, the indictment failed to identify an 
implement "adapted and designed" for breaking into a building, 
G. L. c. 266, § 49, because a rock is not a tool or implement 
within the meaning of § 49.  Where an indictment fails to allege 
a fact necessary to constitute an offense, it is defective, and 
"no court has jurisdiction to entertain it."  Commonwealth v. 
Cantres, 405 Mass. 238, 239-240 (1989).  Because we conclude 
that a rock is not a tool or implement under § 49, the 
24 
 
indictment in Dykens's case failed to allege a crime for which 
the court could accept a guilty plea, and Dykens's conviction 
must be vacated. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed herein, the 
denial of Dykens's motion to vacate two of his convictions of 
attempted unarmed burglary is affirmed.  The denial of his 
motion to vacate his conviction of possession of a burglarious 
tool or implement is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for the dismissal of that indictment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
DUFFLY, J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk and Hines, JJ., 
join).  The court today upholds three convictions of attempted 
unarmed burglary of a single dwelling on a single night, based 
on the defendant's guilty pleas acknowledging his intent to 
commit unarmed burglary of the dwelling.  It is conceivable that 
a person properly could be convicted of three attempts of 
unarmed burglary of the same dwelling in a single night, and the 
defendant here acknowledged in his plea that he intended to 
commit an unarmed burglary and undertook the acts separately 
alleged in the indictments:  removing an outer screen, 
positioning a ladder, and smashing a glass door with a rock.  As 
to the indictment alleging the overt act of "smash[ing] a glass 
sliding door in order to facilitate entry into the home", I 
concur in the judgment of the court that the evidence supports a 
conviction of attempted unarmed burglary.  In addition to 
acknowledging that he had smashed the glass door with a rock, 
intending to burglarize the dwelling, the defendant agreed with 
the prosecutor's statement at the plea colloquy that, before 
fleeing, he had been standing on the deck, at the rear door, and 
that he "had been trying to force the rear door." 
As to the other two acts which form the basis of the other 
two indictments, but were "not the final act in a necessary 
sequence," Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass.    ,     (2016) 
(McWilliams), the evidence fails to show that each act was "so 
2 
 
close to the commission of the crime that a reasonable jury 
could conclude that it was virtually certain that he would have" 
committed the substantive offense of unarmed burglary.  Id.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
The attempt statute, G. L. c. 274, § 6, was enacted in 
1832.  See St. 1832, c. 62.  It criminally punishes "[w]hoever 
attempts to commit a crime by doing any act toward its 
commission, but fails in its perpetration, or is intercepted or 
prevented in its perpetration . . . ." The analytical framework 
which heretofore has informed our understanding of the statutory 
crime of attempt was developed well over a century ago and has 
remained unaltered to this day.  As we recently reiterated, 
"[t]here are two categories of attempt."  McWilliams, supra at    
.  In the first category, a defendant has undertaken "the last 
act required to complete the crime, but for some unanticipated 
reason, his or her efforts are thwarted, whether by bad aim or a 
mistake in judgment."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 
408, 413 (2009) (Bell), quoting Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 
Mass. 267, 271 (1901) (Peaslee).1  Ascertaining "criminal 
                                                          
 
1 The "last act" required to be undertaken by a defendant 
refers to the act "which sets in motion natural forces that 
would bring [the substantive crime] about in the expected course 
of events" or to "an act which is intended to bring about the 
substantive crime and would bring it about but for a 
mistake . . . ."  See Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 
271 (1901). 
3 
 
liability for this sort of failed attempt is uncomplicated and 
noncontroversial."  Bell, supra at 424 (Gants, J., dissenting).  
In the second category, which we have described as "more 
complicated," McWilliams, supra at    , a defendant has been 
interrupted in the "preparatory mode," before having undertaken 
the last act necessary to commit the offense.  See id.; Bell, 
supra at 413. 
 An overt act, even when coupled with the intent to commit 
a crime, "commonly is not punishable if further acts are 
contemplated as needful."  Peaslee, supra at 272.  Where, as 
here, a defendant has been interrupted before having undertaken 
the last necessary act, the focus of the inquiry is whether a 
defendant's "overt acts . . . , although not the final act in a 
necessary sequence, were so close to the commission of the crime 
that a reasonable jury could conclude that it was virtually 
certain that he would have" committed the substantive offense.  
McWilliams, supra at    .  See Bell, supra at 413-414; Peaslee, 
supra at 272.  The distance between the overt act and the 
completion of the "crime must be 'relatively short' and 
'narrow,'" McWilliams, supra at    , quoting Bell, supra at 415. 
How narrow depends on "the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty 
of the result, and the seriousness of harm that is likely to 
result."  McWilliams, supra at    , citing Bell, supra at 414.  
4 
 
See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (1897).2  See also 
Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 365 Mass. 116, 121 (1974). 
In this case, where each indictment alleged a nonviolent 
crime, not directed against a person, perpetrated by an unarmed 
individual, the degree of proximity between the overt act and 
completion of the crime must be quite narrow.  Contrast 
McWilliams, supra at    .  In the circumstances here, a 
defendant's conduct at the point when he or she was interrupted 
must have brought the defendant so close to perpetration of the 
offense as to render it "virtually certain" that, but for the 
interruption, the defendant would have committed the substantive 
crime.  See id.  To determine whether a defendant properly may 
be convicted of attempt requires that we examine any acts 
remaining in the sequence, as well as "all conduct short of the 
last act as 'preparation'".  See Bell, supra at 428 (Gants, J., 
dissenting), quoting Peaslee, supra at 272.3 
                                                          
 
2 As stated by Chief Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. 
Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (1897), "the gravity of the crime, the 
uncertainty of the result, and the seriousness of the 
apprehension, coupled with the great harm likely to result from 
poison even if not enough to kill, would warrant a holding of 
liability for an attempt to begin at a point more remote from 
the possibility of accomplishing what is expected than might be 
the case with lighter crimes." 
 
3 Examining all relevant prior acts undertaken by a 
defendant that culminate in the overt act is also necessary to 
determine whether the defendant harbored the intent necessary to 
commit the substantive offense.  See McWilliams, 473 Mass.    ,     
 
5 
 
Here, the indictments alleged that the defendant "did smash 
a glass sliding door," "did remove an outer screen," and "did 
position a ladder in order to facilitate entry into the home."  
To find the defendant guilty of three separate crimes of 
attempt, each act must be considered independently, without the 
context provided by the other acts alleged. 
Considering first the conviction based on the defendant's 
admissions that he removed an outer screen from a first-floor 
window and that he intended to commit a burglary, nothing in the 
indictment or in the plea colloquy indicates that the absence of 
the screen alone would have enabled the defendant to enter the 
dwelling without undertaking several additional steps.  If the 
window were located anywhere above the basement level (the 
record does not indicate the location or size of the window), 
entry might have required locating the means, such as a box, to 
reach the window to achieve entry; the defendant then would have 
had to climb or stand on that object; if the window were locked, 
the defendant would have had to break or pick the lock, or break 
the window, having first obtained an implement with which to do 
so, before attempting entry into the dwelling.  On this record, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2016).  Here, on the basis of each separately indicted act, it 
is not possible to determine whether the defendant intended to 
commit a burglary, but because he admitted that he harbored the 
necessary intent, this requirement needs no further 
consideration. 
6 
 
given the steps that remained before the defendant could have 
completed the substantive offense, I cannot agree that the act 
of merely removing an outer screen was "so close to the 
commission of the crime that a reasonable jury could conclude it 
was virtually certain that he would have" burglarized the house.  
McWilliams, supra at    . 
The conviction based on the defendant's admission to 
placing a ladder against the house raises similar concerns.  The 
defendant agreed only that he moved a ladder "in order to 
facilitate entry" into the dwelling.4  Based on the facts in the 
record, even if the ladder had been placed directly under a 
second-floor window, and had been long enough to reach the 
window (neither fact being established in the record and, given 
the actions with the rock, the contrary apparently being the 
case), the defendant still would have had to climb the ladder in 
                                                          
 
4 This language appears in the indictment.  The grand jury 
heard testimony from a police officer that "a ladder that [the 
homeowner] kept at the side of the house had been moved to the 
deck and was partially propped up against the house."  At the 
plea colloquy, the defendant agreed to the prosecutor's 
statement that a "ladder that had been [lying] flat behind the 
house had been moved to provide access to a second-story window 
by some unknown party."  The prosecutor's account, to which the 
defendant agreed, certainly establishes that the defendant moved 
the ladder with the intention to use it to enter the home, but 
it does not establish as a factual matter how close the 
defendant came to breaking into the house with the use of the 
ladder.  It is possible that the defendant found the ladder to 
be too heavy to use, or too short to reach the window, and so he 
left it "partially propped" horizontally against the house.  The 
record contains no other facts concerning the ladder. 
7 
 
order to reach the window and thereafter find a way to break 
either the lock or the window in order to enter the house.  In 
the context of the established facts, these are acts of 
preparation that involve arranging the means necessary in order 
to be able to commit a burglary, not sufficient overt acts to 
permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that it was 
"virtually certain" that he would have committed the burglary 
with each discrete act. 
The court concludes that each act came near enough "to the 
accomplishment of the crime of burglary" to be punishable, ante 
at    , without explaining how it arrives at this conclusion.  
In light of the scant facts in the record and the gaps discussed 
above, the court must be inferring from the defendant's guilty 
pleas the existence of the additional facts that would be 
required to show that he came sufficiently close to committing 
burglary to support three convictions of attempt.  Such an 
inference, however, is improper; "an admission to a crime 
generally will not function in itself as an admission to all of 
the elements of that crime."  Commonwealth v. Sherman, 451 Mass. 
332, 337 (2008).  See id. at 336-338 (discussing dismissal of 
guilty plea where defendant claimed his agreement to facts 
recited by prosecutor did not satisfy elements of crime).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.