Title: Mittelstadt v. Bender

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

210 N.W.2d 89 (1973) Gust MITTELSTADT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, and Thorvald Bang, Plaintiff, v. Jerry BENDER et al., Defendants and Appellees. Civ. No. 8880. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 10, 1973. *91 Freed, Dynes & Malloy, Dickinson, for plaintiffs and appellants. Marshall T. Bergerud, Killdeer, and Rausch & Chapman, Bismarck, for defendants and appellees. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. This action was brought by the plaintiffs, residents and taxpayers of Killdeer Public School District No. 16, to challenge a bond-issue election held within that district on July 13, 1972. The defendants are the members of the Board of Education of Killdeer Public School District No. 16 and Killdeer Public School District No. 16, Dunn County, North Dakota. We shall hereinafter refer to the plaintiffs as the Contestants and the defendants as the Board of Education. The election was held pursuant to Subsection 6 of Section 21-03-07, N.D.C. C., which authorizes the issuance of municipal bonds by the school board of any school district upon the approval of sixty percent of the electors voting upon the question of such issue. *92 The results of the election as determined by the school board are as follows: Based upon these figures the issue was declared passed by a 60.22% majority. The trial court disallowed three affirmative votes but this did not change the outcome of the election, the affirmative votes constituting 60.07% of the total after recalculating the results. On this appeal the Contestants' principal contention is that the trial court erred in not disallowing ten absent voters' ballots, two cast by Mr. and Mrs. Gerald Ehli, who were alleged to have lost their residency by the time they cast their votes by moving from Killdeer to Grand Forks, and eight cast by residents on the calendar day of election, alleged to be in violation of Section 16-18-05, N.D.C.C. On the question of the Ehlis' residency the trial court found: The scope of review of the findings of the trial court on appeal to this court from a case tried without a jury is governed by Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part: Sharon and Gerald Ehli did not testify in person at the trial, but their testimony was received by deposition. We have reviewed this evidence and conclude that the trial court's finding relative thereto is not "clearly erroneous". The facts appear to be that the Ehlis left Killdeer at the end of the school term, on May 30, 1972, after having resided in Killdeer for three years, and after having voted at school elections therein while Gerald was a teacher in the Killdeer Public School; they arrived in Grand Forks on May 31, 1972, where Gerald enrolled in graduate school at the University of North Dakota, and where Sharon became employed by the State Highway Department; they applied for absent voters' ballots on June 29, 1972, and cast those ballots on July 7, 1972; they did not vote or attempt to vote otherwise after leaving Killdeer. Pertinent are Subsections 3 and 7 of Section 54-01-26, N.D.C.C. In essence, the trial court found that there was not sufficient proof of union of act and intent to deprive them of the privilege of voting in Killdeer. Had the Ehlis voted in some other election, they would have disclosed an intent to establish a new residence. They had not otherwise voted as of the date of the deposition on September 12, 1972, which is a date subsequent to the primary election. The burden of proof in this case is on the parties who are attempting to disfranchise the Ehlis. The trial court found that the contesting parties had not sustained that burden. We agree. Pertinent, we believe, is what this court said in 1935. The eight other absent voters' ballots in question were applied for, voted, and delivered, all at the home of the clerk of the school district prior to 11 a. m., the time at which the polls opened on election day. Relative thereto the trial court said: The pertinent section of our Code reads: The Contestants contend that these eight ballots should be disallowed because this *94 statute not only prohibits the delivery of absent voters' ballots on the day of the election but also requires that the voter make application for such ballot within thirty days next preceding the election. Applying the rule that statutes should be liberally construed to effect their objects and promote justice (Section 1-02-01, N.D.C.C.); believing that the object of Chapter 16-18, N.D.C.C., is to extend the vote to qualified electors rather than to restrict that right; finding that the election was free from fraud and represented a free expression of the will of the voters, the trial court permitted the eight ballots to be counted, notwithstanding that it found them to be cast in violation of Section 16-18-05, N.D.C.C. In finding the ballots cast in violation of Section 16-18-05, N.D.C.C., the trial court determined that an election day is the same as a calendar day. With the analysis of Section 16-18-05, N.D.C.C., and with the conclusion that the ballots should nevertheless be counted in this case, we agree. In Great Northern Railway Company v. Esterby, 179 N.W.2d 725 (1970), this court said: The principal case referred to by the Contestants is State v. Lyon, 119 Mont. 212, 173 P.2d 891 (1946). Its pertinent language reads: As indicated by Esterby, our State has taken a more liberal view than that expressed by Montana. *95 Another North Dakota decision disclosing a reluctance to upset elections is that of Kerlin v. Devils Lake, 25 N.D. 207, 141 N.W. 756, 758 (1913). In Kerlin, the court said: See also Nordby v. Dolan, 78 N.W.2d 689 (N.D.1956), and Kiner v. Well, 71 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.1955). As our statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their objects and promote justice; as the object of Chapter 16-18, N.D.C.C., is to extend the vote to qualified electors rather than to restrict that right; as the election was free from fraud and represented a free expression of the will of the voters; as Section 16-18-05, N.D.C.C., prohibiting the issuance of absent voters' ballots on election day, does not specifically declare that compliance therewith is essential to the validity of an election, we conclude that the eight challenged absent voters' ballots were properly counted in the election, notwithstanding that they were issued and voted on the day of the election. The Contestants further contend that the failure to provide voting booths or enclosures of any kind at the polling place invalidates the election. The pertinent statute reads: The trial court found that the facilities provided ample space and accommodations to enable the voters to cast a secret ballot. In that finding we agree. The room in which the voting took place was approximately 25 feet by 65 feet. It contained a clerk's table and a judge's table for the officials. For voting purposes it contained three large banquet tables and a *96 large desk near the front of the room and one additional table in the rear of the room. The windows were located in the front of the building away from the voting area. Applying the same principles of law to this issue as to the previous issues, we conclude that the trial court properly held that the failure to comply with this statute should not invalidate the election, no abuse having resulted from a failure to provide the voting booths. By so holding, we do not mean to minimize the importance of voting booths. We do believe, however, that the failure to provide the voting booths in the election does not constitute sufficient cause to set aside this election. The last contention we must consider is that because two residents (a man who was hospitalized in Dickinson and his wife, who was staying with him) were denied the privilege of casting their votes by absent voters' ballots after 11 a. m. on election day when their votes would have been negative votes, the election must be set aside or their votes must be counted in opposition to the bond issue. The argument seems to be that since eight absent voters' ballots which were cast on election day prior to the opening of the polls at 11 a. m. were counted, two absent voters' ballots not cast but for which application was made through a son orally to the officials at the polls on election day at about 11 a. m., and which ballots would have been negative, must be counted to defeat the election. We do not agree. If we were to so rule in the absence of fraud, we would be encouraging contests in all close elections, with the attendant confusion and disruption of government. Since the election officials were uniformly applying a rule, erroneous in retrospect, that election day commenced with the opening of the polls, their action in denying absent voters' ballots to parties who were unable to cast their ballots before the opening of the polls on election day does not justify either a setting aside of the election or the counting of the two ballots not actually cast as negative votes in the bond issue, no fraud having been involved. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. VOGEL, TEIGEN, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.