Title: State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, APPELLANT, v. WINKLER ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-
Ohio-1581.] 
Public records — Sealing of official records after not guilty finding or dismissal 
of complaint — R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the public’s constitutional 
right of access to public records. 
(No. 2003-0157 — Submitted October 8, 2003 — Decided April 14, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-010763, 151 
Ohio App.3d 10, 2002-Ohio-7334. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the public’s constitutional right of access to public 
records. 
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FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
In September 2001, appellee Hamilton County Municipal Judge 
Ralph E. Winkler conducted a bench trial in which the defendant was acquitted of 
all charges. On September 27, 2001, the day after the trial’s conclusion, the 
defendant filed a motion to seal the official record of his case pursuant to R.C. 
2953.52.  On November 5, 2001 (almost six weeks after the trial), Judge Winkler 
held a hearing on the motion and later granted it.  On December 6, 2001, the 
Cincinnati Enquirer, appellant, delivered to Judge Winkler a written request to 
inspect all records produced in the criminal case.  Judge Winkler refused the 
paper’s request because the court records had already been sealed. Thereafter, 
appellant filed this mandamus action in the First District Court of Appeals against 
both Judge Ralph E. Winkler and Clerk of Courts James C. Cissell, appellees. 
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{¶2} 
Initially, the court of appeals ordered Judge Winkler to weigh the 
individual’s privacy interests against the public’s legitimate interest in accessing 
the records, as required by R.C. 2953.52.  149 Ohio App.3d 350, 2002-Ohio-
4803, 777 N.E.2d 320.  In response, Judge Winkler determined that the 
defendant’s privacy interests outweighed the public’s right of access.  Thereafter, 
the court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, accepted Judge Winkler’s findings 
and declined to issue the requested writ.  The cause is now before this court upon 
an appeal as of right. 
{¶3} 
Appellant presents three arguments in this appeal.  First, appellant 
argues that it is entitled to the release of the court records, as they are public 
records as defined in the Public Records Act.  Second, appellant asserts that R.C. 
2953.52 is unconstitutional, since it is overbroad and, therefore, it cannot be used 
as an exception to the Public Records Act.  Third, appellant contends that in 
applying the balancing test, the court should have found in favor of releasing the 
records.  Appellees, however, assert that R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional and that 
records sealed pursuant to this statute lose their status as public records.  
Appellees also contend that the case was improperly brought in mandamus. 
{¶4} 
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to seek compliance with the 
Public Records Act under R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing 
Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 50.  We 
have also held that mandamus may be used when a right of access to public 
records is predicated on a constitutional challenge.  Id.  Therefore, we find that 
appellant correctly sought mandamus relief.  We turn now to the merits of the 
case and consider whether the records that appellant seeks are public records and 
whether R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional on its face and as applied. 
{¶5} 
We begin with the purpose of Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 
149.43, which is to expose government activity to public scrutiny. State ex rel. 
WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 355, 673 N.E.2d 1360.  
Moreover, we have consistently construed the Public Records Act to provide the 
January Term, 2004 
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broadest access to government records.  State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. 
Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 83, 526 N.E.2d 786.  Therefore, in keeping 
with policy, it is apparent that court records fall within the broad definition of a 
“public record” in R.C. 149.43(A)(1):  “ ‘Public record’ means records kept by 
any public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village, 
township, and school district units * * *.” 
{¶6} 
However, there are exceptions to the general rule of openness. One 
exception, found in R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), is for “[r]ecords the release of which is 
prohibited by state or federal law.”  Sealed court records fall within this 
exception, since R.C. 2953.55(B) makes it a fourth-degree misdemeanor to 
release sealed records.  Thus, once the court records were sealed under R.C. 
2953.52, they ceased to be public records.  Since the sealed records lost their 
status as public records, Judge Winkler was justified in refusing appellant’s 
request. 
{¶7} 
Appellant next argues that R.C. 2953.52 is unconstitutional on the 
ground that it violates the public’s right of access.  We reject this contention. 
{¶8} 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a 
qualified right of access to criminal proceedings.  Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 7-8, 106 S.Ct. 
2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1.  Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the 
public’s right to open courts.  This right of access found in both the federal and 
state Constitutions includes records and transcripts that document the 
proceedings.  State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 652 N.E.2d 179; Press- 
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1984), 464 U.S. 
501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629. 
{¶9} 
The right of public access, as examined in the context of a criminal 
proceeding, serves several lofty goals.  First, a crime is a public wrong, and the 
interest of the community to observe the administration of justice in such an 
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instance is compelling.  Harrison, How Open Is Open?  The Development of the 
Public Access Doctrine under State Open Courts Provisions (1992), 60 
U.Cin.L.Rev. 1307, 1322.  Also, the general right of public access promotes 
respect for and an understanding of the legal system and thus enables the public to 
engage in an informed discussion of the governmental process.  Bechamps, 
Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements:  When Does the Public Have a Right to Know? 
(1990), 66 Notre Dame L.Rev. 117, 127.  The right however, is not absolute.  “No 
one has a right to any particular degree of openness or secrecy, except as provided 
by law.”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Waters (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 321, 324, 617 N.E.2d 1110.  We have further held that it is a proper role of 
the General Assembly to balance competing private and public rights.  State ex 
rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 266, 
602 N.E.2d 1159.  The General Assembly has done so in R.C. 2953.52. 
{¶10} R.C. 2953.52 makes another exception to the general rule of 
openness.  R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) allows a defendant found not guilty of an offense 
to apply to the court to have his or her record sealed.1  The statute further requires 
that following a hearing, the court must “[w]eigh the interests of the person in 
having the official records pertaining to the case sealed against the legitimate 
needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records.”  R.C. 
2953.52(B)(2)(d).  Thus, the court’s discretion to seal records is not unfettered.  
Instead, the statute balances the public’s right of access and the acquitted 
defendant’s constitutional right to privacy.  See Pepper Pike v. Doe (1981), 66 
Ohio St.2d 374, 377, 20 O.O.3d 334, 421 N.E.2d 1303 (balancing and sealing 
within inherent power of court, without statute).  The defendant’s right to privacy 
takes into account the public policy of providing a second chance to criminal 
defendants who have been found not guilty.  State v. D.H.W. (Fla.1996), 686 
So.2d 1331, 1336. 
                                          
 
1.  The statute also permits a court to seal records following a dismissal of the charges or a grand 
jury’s no bill. 
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{¶11} The only function of this statute is to allow a court, after balancing 
the public and private interests, to limit the life of a particular record.  The 
public’s ability to attend a criminal trial is not hindered.  The media’s right to 
report on the court proceedings is not diminished.  The statute does not restrict the 
media’s right to publish truthful information relating to the criminal proceedings 
that have been sealed.  In addition, the public had a right of access to any court 
record before, during, and for a period of time after the criminal trial.  In fact, the 
public’s access to the records is unrestricted until a decision is made to seal 
records.  The statute ensures fairness by balancing the competing concerns of the 
public’s right to know and the defendant’s right to keep certain information 
private.  Therefore, on its face, R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional. 
{¶12} Nor is R.C. 2953.52 unconstitutional as applied. In this case, there 
was a full public trial with widespread media attention.  Appellant’s reporters 
presumably attended the trial in its entirety.  The court record remained open for 
more than five weeks after the trial had concluded.  Thus, appellant had ample 
opportunity to report on and to access and copy the trial record for a substantial 
period of time before its sealing. Once a case is sealed, however, the basis for 
public access to the official records does not exist. 
{¶13} We therefore conclude that R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the 
public’s constitutional right of access to public records and that the trial court 
complied with its dictates. 
{¶14} The court of appeals’ judgment denying the writ is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
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Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner and John A. Flanagan, 
for appellant. 
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Michaeil K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. 
Stevenson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
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