Title: Aerosol Corporation of the South v. Johnson

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

435 S.W.2d 832 (1968) AEROSOL CORPORATION OF THE SOUTH and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Dorothy Mae JOHNSON, Defendant in Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 13, 1968. *833 Ronald M. Harkavy, Memphis, for plaintiffs in error. Don Owens, Memphis, for defendant in error. CRESON, Justice. The above case is before this Court on appeal in error from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Division I. That court entered judgment for the defendant in error upon evidence open to variant conclusions, on a basis of 40 per cent permanent partial impairment to the vision of her right eye. The case is fraught with difficulty and completely justifiable differences of opinion as to the proper conclusion to be reached. We are constrained to say that the record, as a whole, is conclusive of the notion that the trial judge gave this case a considerable degree of mature and discriminating thought, burdened with full realization of what is referred to just above. The facts of the case are not in substantial dispute. While working for Aerosol Corporation of the South, defendant in error suffered injuries to her hand and right eye, from the explosion of an Aerosol can. For something over seventeen weeks she was absent from her work; and was paid $564.95 in temporary total disability benefits, with medical expenses in addition. A noted ophthamologist of the City of Memphis, Dr. Philip M. Lewis, known to the trial judge and this Court, testified from his treatment of Dorothy Johnson. His examination indicated a rupture of the choroid, a membrane in the interior of the eye between the retina and the sclera, and a definite scar in the posterior of the eye. It was Dr. Lewis' opinion that Dorothy Johnson's vision, prior to the explosion, was, in all probability, the same in both eyes. He fixed her visual efficiency prior to the accident at 20/30, a figure indicating that her vision prior to the accident was 10 per cent below normal. He found her vision in the right eye after the explosion to be 20/100, or 50 per cent below normal. He was further of opinion, however, that 40 per cent of the visual impairment of the right eye could be attributed to the accident; and found that with use of corrective lenses the vision of the right eye was 20/50. Employing a medic arithmetic formula, Dr. Lewis found corrected visual loss in the right eye to be 16.67 per cent. *834 Dr. Charles M. King also examined Dorothy Johnson. He found a 60 per cent uncorrected impairment to the vision of her eye, and that such impairment could be corrected to a 10 per cent loss. Dr. King stated that the 10 per cent loss was a probable consequence of the explosion, but declined to attribute the 60 per cent uncorrected loss to the explosion. As indicated before, in an able memorandum opinion the trial court adopted Dr. Lewis' findings as the more logical approach to determine the amount of visual impairment on both the uncorrected and corrected basis. The trial court held that the amount of visual impairment sustained in an industrial accident should be determined upon an uncorrected basis; and that Mrs. Johnson's benefits should thus be determined upon the basis of a 40 per cent loss of use of the eye. Plaintiffs in error have filed two assignments of error, as follows: As the above assignments indicate, and the briefs verify, the one issue argued is whether or not Workmen's Compensation benefits for permanent partial loss of use of one eye are to be determined upon a basis of corrected loss of vision, or upon a basis of uncorrected loss of vision. We have searched prior decisions of this Court in compensation cases only to find that none supplies a specific, well-delineated answer to this question. It is plain, however, that the solution lies solely within the ambit of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation statute. The compensation law of this State contains a schedule of injuries to members of the body; and this schedule governs as to what award, if any, shall be made to one sustaining either total or partial loss, or loss of use, of a member scheduled. Under this statutory system, such award is not measured by diminution of the employee's earning capacity; and equally so, the award for loss of use of a member is measured by the value fixed in this statute, or a percentage thereof in case of less than total permanent loss of use. See T.C.A. § 50-1007; Catlett v. Chattanooga Handle Co. (1932), 165 Tenn. 343, 55 S.W.2d 257; New Jellico Coal Co. v. Gilburth (1948), 187 Tenn. 606, 216 S.W.2d 329. See also Shores v. Shores (1965), 217 Tenn. 96, 395 S.W.2d 388. The pertinent statutory provisions, other than the main schedule, are as follows: It is argued, and it is correct to say, that the Tennessee statutes leave a vacuum in cases such as the instant one. This is assuredly understandable, for it will take a work of legal artistry to state a comprehensive rule which will adequately resolve all the problems inherent in permanent partial loss of use cases; and critically so where degree of loss less than total is remediable by corrective measures. A painstaking and extended examination of the statutes and decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions on the issue here discloses, at its best, a wide range of opinion, *836 laboriously arrived at by frustrating effort. Apparently, those jurisdictions which predicate amount of award of compensation benefit upon diminution of earning capacity, do so upon a basis of corrected loss of vision; while those jurisdictions which utilize statutory schedules and a percentage of total in case of partial loss of use, adopt the basis of uncorrected loss of vision. We have examined a host of cases and annotations such as those in 99 A.L.R. 1498 and 142 A.L.R. 822. The divergent views appear as well as in any in the cases of Lambert v. Industrial Commission, et al. (1952), 411 Ill. 593, 104 N.E.2d 783; Hurley v. E.R. Wolcott, Inc., et al. (1967), 27 A.D.2d 788, 277 N.Y.S.2d 601; Graf v. National Steel Products Co., et al. (1931), 225 Mo. App. 702, 38 S.W.2d 518; Livingston v. St. Paul Hydraulic Hoist Co., et al. (1938), 203 Minn. 62, 279 N.W. 829. Examples can be conceived, but they do no more than reveal the difficulties and potential inequities inherent in adoption of either of the views suggested and contended for as the absolute; they are both mischievous. Each discloses a potentiality to deprive an employee of compensation which the general intendment of the Workmen's Compensation law seems to invest him with. Even more significant is the idea that such judicial result would closely approach, if not fully arrive at, usurpation of legislative function and authority. The Bench and Bar of this State know that the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation system is solely a creation of the Legislature. Further enactment in this field rests with the legislative branch of the government of Tennessee, not the judicial. In the instant case, the court below found as a fact that defendant in error sustained a 40 per cent loss of visual efficiency in her right eye. The extent of disability in a Workmen's Compensation case is a question of fact; and, if such finding be supported by material evidence, it is binding on this Court. See Armstrong v. Spears (1965), 216 Tenn. 643, 393 S.W.2d 729, and many other cases. Up to the present time, the Tennessee courts have applied a basis for determination of award for partial loss of use (1) without reduction of that degree remediable by artificial aid, and (2) without confrontation with the present contention and issue. Tennessee Products Corporation v. Atterton (1945), 182 Tenn. 110, 184 S.W.2d 371. Such application of the statute is not now to be disregarded by the Court. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs assessed to the plaintiffs in error. BURNETT, C.J., and DYER, CHATTIN and HUMPHREYS, JJ., concur.