Title: DENISE L. ANDERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DENISE L. ANDERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 119216 P.3d 1143Case Number: S-09-0005Decided: 09/29/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DENISE 
L. ANDERSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Denise Anderson 
challenges her convictions on three counts of delivering marijuana to 
minors.  She argues the State did 
not present sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that she actually 
delivered the controlled substances to the minors.  Applying our standard of review, we 
conclude the evidence, together with the reasonable inferences flowing from it, 
was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts.  

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.      

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Anderson 
phrases the issue as:  

 
 
I.          
Did the State fail to establish a prima facie case of delivery and did 
that failure amount to insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction?

 
 
The 
State's statement of the issue is similar.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On December 
15, 2007, three Gillette police officers responded to a report that the odor of 
burning marijuana was emanating from an apartment and minors were present.  The officers located three juvenile 
males in one bedroom of the apartment and Ms. Anderson in another bedroom.  Ms. Anderson produced a number of items 
from her bedroom, including drug paraphernalia and a small amount of 
marijuana.    

 
 
[¶5]      The officers 
issued a citation to Ms. Anderson for possession of a controlled substance and 
citations to the three minors for using a controlled substance.  Later, the State filed an information 
charging Ms. Anderson with three felony counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance to a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1036(a) (LexisNexis 
2009) and 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).1  Ms. Anderson pleaded not guilty to the 
felony charges and the matter went to trial before a jury on June 30, 2008.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all 
three counts and the district court entered judgment on the jury's 
verdicts.  After the district court 
sentenced Ms. Anderson, she appealed.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      In determining 
whether there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a jury's conviction, we 
apply the following standard of review:

 
 
In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . ., we examine and accept as true 
the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. 
We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably 
concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This standard applies 
whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.  

 
 

Martin 
v. State, 2007 
WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005).  See also, Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, 100 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶7]      Section 35-7-1036 
establishes enhanced penalties for adults who distribute controlled substances 
to minors.  See, Roeschlein v. State, 2007 WY 156, ¶ 25, 168 P.3d 468, 475 (Wyo. 
2007).  "Distribute means to deliver 
other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(ix) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Section 
35-7-1002(a)(vi) defines "deliver" or "delivery" as "the actual, constructive, 
or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, 
whether or not there is an agency relationship."  Thus, delivery can be accomplished by 
sharing or giving controlled substances to another.  See, e.g., Roeschlein, ¶ 8, 168 P.3d  at 471.  Ms. Anderson maintains the State did not 
present sufficient evidence to establish that she delivered marijuana to the 
minors.  

 
 
[¶8]      Corporal Adam 
Edmondson testified at trial that, on December 15, 2007, at approximately 10:45 
p.m., he and Officers Zach Parker and Liz Beeman responded to a report that the 
odor of burning marijuana was coming from an apartment in Gillette and minors 
were present.  David Bertsch 
answered the door and Corporal Edmondson smelled burning marijuana and observed 
that it was very hazy and smoky in the apartment.  Corporal Edmondson stated that he asked 
Mr. Bertsch if people were using marijuana in the apartment, and he responded, 
"they should not be."     

 
 
[¶9]      After the 
officers brought Ms. Anderson and the three minors into the living room, 
Corporal Edmondson informed Mr. Bertsch that "it was . . . obvious that there 
was marijuana being smoked in the apartment and asked him if he was willing to 
cooperate with our investigation and show me where the remaining marijuana 
was."  Corporal Edmondson stated 
that "[Mr. Bertsch] informed me that he did not have any marijuana himself but 
they were smoking marijuana."  At 
that point, Ms. Anderson went into her bedroom and retrieved a wooden box 
containing a small amount of marijuana and other paraphernalia.  Corporal Edmondson testified that Ms. 
Anderson stated that "they had smoked a couple of roaches" and the marijuana 
that had been smoked that evening came from her supply in the wooden box.    

 
 
[¶10]   Ms. Anderson argues that the 
officer's use of the term "they" was vague and failed to sufficiently identify 
the minors as smoking marijuana.  
She claims that, without evidence the minors were smoking marijuana, 
there was no evidence that she delivered controlled substances to them that 
evening.  Ms. Anderson's argument is 
effectively refuted by other parts of Corporal Edmondson's testimony.   The officer stated:

 
 
            
Q.        Now, 
did you ask anyone if they had smoked marijuana?

 
 
            
A.        I 
asked --- prior to David Bertsch had told me they were smoking marijuana.  When all parties were brought out into 
the living room, I again asked was everyone smoking marijuana in 
here.

            

            
Q.        And 
did Ms. Anderson reply?

 
 
            
A.        Yes, 
she did.

 
 
            
Q.        What 
did she say?

 
 
            
A.        She 
looked at the three males, the juveniles, and told them to go ahead and tell the 
truth 

            
Q.        All 
right.  Did she say anything to 
you?

            
A.        She 
did not say anything to me at that time.

            
Q.        
Okay.  What happened after  
well, I assume that  let me back up here.  
After Denise Anderson asked the three juveniles to tell the truth, did 
you have conversations with them?

            
A.        A 
brief conversation.  I was awaiting 
their answer and they all stated, yes, they did smoke 
marijuana.

[¶11]   Ms. Anderson claims this exchange 
did not establish when or where the minors had smoked marijuana and, 
consequently, did not prove that she provided marijuana to them.  Our standard of review mandates that we 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.  Obviously, a reasonable interpretation 
of this exchange was that the juveniles admitted to smoking marijuana at Ms. 
Anderson's residence just prior to the officers' arrival.  Since Ms. Anderson admitted that the 
marijuana that had been smoked was from her supply, it was reasonable for the 
jury to conclude that she had provided the marijuana to the minors.  This interpretation is corroborated by 
the testimony of Officer Parker, who stated:  "[Ms. Anderson] admitted that the 
marijuana was hers and that they all smoked it in the apartment prior to our 
arrival."    

 
 
[¶12]   Ms. Anderson emphasizes the fact 
that the officers stated, on cross examination, that they could not remember the 
exact words used by the witnesses and they did not record the conversations or 
take notes of the interviews that night.  
"[I]t is the jury's 
responsibility to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses and resolve conflicts in the 
evidence, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury."  Creecy v. State, 2009 WY 89, ¶ 28, 201 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Wyo. 2009), citing Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 
11, 142 P.3d 1147, 1151 (Wyo. 2006).  
By returning guilty verdicts, the jury obviously concluded that the 
officers were credible and their recollection of the night's events was 
accurate.  It is not our role to 
second guess the jury's decisions as to the credibility of the witnesses or the 
weight of the evidence.

 
 
[¶13]   Ms. Anderson also suggests that the 
evidence was insufficient because the three minors testified in her defense at 
trial and denied smoking marijuana at her residence on that night.  As we stated earlier, the jury was 
charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 
evidence; on appeal, we disregard evidence presented by the defendant.  The jury heard Corporal Edmondson's 
testimony that the minors admitted to smoking marijuana and the minors' 
conflicting trial testimony.  We 
accept the jury's decision to give greater credence to Corporal Edmondson's 
statements than to the minors' testimony.  

 
 
[¶14]   Ms. Anderson contends that, in 
order to convict her, the jury had to infer that she was the only one with 
marijuana at the residence that night.  
She claims such an inference was not reasonable and amounted to 
speculation because the officers did not search the minors or Mr. Bertsch and, 
consequently, had no way of knowing whether they had provided the 
marijuana.  A jury's inferences 
must, of course, be based upon more than mere speculation or conjecture.  See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175-76 
(Wyo. 1998).  However, as we have 
said, a jury is entitled to rely upon reasonable inferences in evaluating the 
evidence.  Applying our standard of 
review, the evidence supported the conclusion that Ms. Anderson supplied the 
marijuana because Corporal Edmondson and Officer Parker both testified that she 
admitted the marijuana smoked in the apartment that night belonged to her.  It was entirely appropriate for the jury 
to conclude, based upon the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences 
which flowed from it, that the minors had smoked marijuana in the apartment that 
night and Ms. Anderson provided the marijuana to them.    

 

[¶15]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 35-7-1036 states in pertinent part:

 
 

            
(a) Any person eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates 
W.S. 
35-7-1031(a) by distributing methamphetamine or a 
controlled substance listed in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug to a 
person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at least three (3) years his 
junior is punishable by the fine authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(i), by a term of imprisonment 
of up to twice that authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(i), or both. Any person 
eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates W.S. 
35-7-1031(a) by distributing any other 
controlled substance listed in Schedules I, II, III, to a person under eighteen 
(18) years of age who is at least three (3) years his junior is punishable by 
the fine authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(ii), by a term of 
imprisonment up to twice that authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(ii), or both. Any person 
eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates W.S. 
35-7-1031(a) by distributing any 
controlled substance listed in Schedule IV to a person under eighteen (18) years 
of age who is at least three (3) years his junior is punishable by the fine 
authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(iii), by a term of 
imprisonment up to twice that authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(iii), or both. Any person 
eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates W.S. 
35-7-1031(a) by distributing any 
controlled substance listed in Schedule V to a person under eighteen (18) years 
of age who is at least three (3) years his junior is punishable by the fine 
authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(iv), by a term of imprisonment up to twice that 
authorized by W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(iv), or 
both.

 
 
Section 35-7-1031(a)(ii) states:

 
 
            
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance.  Any person 
who violates this subsection with respect to:

                        
. . . .

                        
(ii) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, 
is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten 
(10) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both[.]