Title: People v. Miranda-Guerrero

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VICTOR M. MIRANDA-GUERRERO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S118147 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
00WF1146 
 
 
November 17, 2022 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
S118147 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Victor M. Miranda-Guerrero was charged with 
six crimes and convicted of five:  kidnapping to commit rape, 
murder, attempted carjacking, assault with intent to commit 
rape, and receiving stolen property.  The jury could not reach a 
verdict on an additional assault charge, and it was dismissed.  
Although Miranda-Guerrero pleaded not guilty to all counts, the 
defense contested only the murder and assault allegations at 
trial.  The jury found true a special circumstance that the 
murder occurred during the commission or attempted 
commission of rape, and it returned a death verdict.  We affirm. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
The charged offenses occurred in Huntington Beach 
between September 1999 and May 2000. 
1.  September 1999 Kidnapping of Jamie H. 
 
On September 12, 1999, Jamie H. was asleep in her car in 
a parking structure in downtown Huntington Beach when she 
was awakened by the driver’s side window breaking.  
Miranda-Guerrero was standing outside Jamie’s car, and he 
began punching her in the face.  She fought back and tried to 
start the car.  Miranda-Guerrero grabbed her hair and slammed 
her head into the car door.  He opened the car door, pushed her 
into the passenger seat, and got into the driver’s seat.  He threw 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
a backpack into the back seat and told Jamie in broken English 
that he had “fire,” which she took to mean that he had a gun. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero started the car and drove to a 
residential area.  He pulled over, and he and Jamie continued to 
fight.  He unzipped his pants, exposed his erect penis, and told 
Jamie to get on top of him.  She refused.  He took a condom out 
of his pocket, put it on, and tried to kiss Jamie, but she turned 
away.  He started driving again, and when he reached a stop 
sign, Jamie jumped out of the car.  Miranda-Guerrero caught 
her shirt and dragged her along the street briefly before letting 
go, at which point she was able to escape with the help of a 
nearby driver. 
 
Jamie had abrasions on her thigh, elbow, and buttocks 
from the attack, and a clump of her hair was missing.  She got 
stitches on her eye and lip.  A few days later, her car was found 
with a brick, broken glass, hair, keys, and blood in it.  Blood 
found 
on 
Jamie’s 
boots 
after 
the 
attack 
matched 
Miranda-Guerrero’s DNA. 
2.  November 1999 Murder of Bridgette Ballas 
a.  Prosecution Case 
 
On the night of November 26, 1999, Bridgette Ballas went 
out for drinks with a friend in downtown Huntington Beach.  
They went to Gallagher’s Bar for a while and then walked to 
Aloha Grill, where they met several other people.  Ballas’s friend 
left around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m., but Ballas stayed at the bar.  Her 
friend testified that, at that point, Ballas was not staggering or 
otherwise showing significant signs of impairment.  She told 
police the next day that Ballas had five or six drinks during the 
time they were together. 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
 
Soon after her friend went home, Ballas left Aloha Grill 
with a small group of people, including an acquaintance with 
whom they had been sitting.  The group walked a short distance 
to the house of Jason H., where they continued to hang out and 
drink.  One woman who was part of that group testified that 
Ballas did not appear drunk and was not stumbling during the 
walk to Jason’s house.  Ballas told her at one point that she felt 
“kind of funny” because she did not know anyone at Jason’s, and 
she left the house after 30 or 40 minutes. 
 
Early in the morning of November 27, Richard B. heard 
someone scream “Oh my God” three times in quick succession.  
He looked out his window but did not see anything.  When he 
went outside later that morning, he found Ballas lying partially 
in the street with her head on the curb.  She was between two 
vehicles.  Her pants were pulled down and her shirt was pulled 
up above her breasts, and she was nonresponsive when Richard 
tried to speak to her.  The location where he found her was about 
seven-tenths of a mile from Jason’s house and about a tenth of 
a mile from her apartment.  He covered her with a blanket and 
called 911. 
 
Ballas was breathing when Officer Juan Munoz arrived, 
so Munoz called for medical care.  She was taken to Western 
Medical Center for emergency treatment.  At that point, she was 
in a coma.  A CT scan showed swelling of her brain and a blood 
clot on the left side of her brain, which was then surgically 
removed by Dr. Israel Chambi.  Part of her temporal lobe was 
removed to provide more space for her brain to swell; it was 
damaged and soft.  Dr. Chambi testified that he believed her 
injuries were consistent with blunt trauma resulting from likely 
more than one impact.  
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
The doctor who performed Ballas’s autopsy later came to 
a similar conclusion.  Ballas also had an ear injury that 
appeared to come from pulling or tugging rather than from blunt 
trauma.  No defensive wounds were found on her body, and no 
foreign DNA was found under her fingernails.  Small pieces of 
gravel were found inside Ballas’s labia, and several abrasions 
were found inside her vagina that, in the opinion of the doctor 
who conducted the sexual assault examination, were consistent 
with injuries often seen in women who have been forcibly 
penetrated.  Saliva collected from a swab of one of Ballas’s 
breasts matched Miranda-Guerrero’s DNA.  Despite treatment, 
she died after a few days from the severity of the swelling of her 
brain. 
Miranda-Guerrero presented an alternative narrative 
that Ballas fell down and hit her head on the curb after 
urinating in the street.  Police swabbed an area of the street 
around where Ballas was found for evidence.  Part of a nearby 
gutter appeared damp in crime scene photographs, but that area 
was not swabbed.  No urine was found on the swabs that were 
collected. 
Over Miranda-Guerrero’s motion to suppress, several 
hours of video from his interviews with police were played for 
the jury, including a portion of the interviews in which he told 
the officers that he had hit Ballas.  
b.  Defense Case 
 
As noted, the theory of Miranda-Guerrero’s defense was 
that the brain injury that killed Ballas resulted from her falling 
and hitting her head on the curb because she was intoxicated.  
Defense counsel argued that Miranda-Guerrero had met Ballas 
after she left Jason’s house and that he was walking with her 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
when she stopped to urinate between the two cars where she 
was found.  After urinating, she stood up and fell over.  
Miranda-Guerrero conceded that he raped her after she was 
knocked unconscious by the fall. 
Jason testified that Ballas seemed intoxicated when he 
met her on the night of November 26; he said her eyes were 
glassy and her eyelids were “a little droopy.”  But he said she 
did not fall down or seem unsteady on her feet during the time 
he was with her that evening.  A criminalist who conducted an 
analysis of Ballas’s blood the morning she was found testified 
that she likely had a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 to 0.19 grams 
percent around 2:30 a.m. on November 27.  He testified that the 
degree to which this blood alcohol level would affect a person’s 
gross motor skills depends on the individual. 
An officer who arrived at the scene before Ballas was 
taken to the hospital testified that the ground underneath her 
pelvic area on the street appeared wet, and the wetness drained 
toward the gutter.  He tried to smell the wet spot after Ballas 
was taken away, and he said it did not smell like urine.  A palm 
print from Ballas’s right hand was also found on the tailgate of 
the car parked immediately in front of where she was found.  
The fingers on the print were pointing nearly straight up, with 
the thumb facing the street. 
The radiologist who conducted the CT scan of Ballas 
testified that her injuries could have been caused by a fall from 
full height if she hit her head on the curb without breaking her 
fall.  He said the injuries would also be consistent with her head 
being slammed into the curb by an attacker.  And he said he had 
only seen a fall cause injuries like Ballas’s when the patient was 
geriatric or when the person fell from a height or the fall 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
occurred during activities like bicycling, skateboarding, or 
rollerblading. 
According to an officer who interviewed Richard after 
Ballas was found, Richard stated that the voice he heard yelling 
early in the morning on November 27 might have been male. 
3.  May 2000 Attempted Carjacking of Heidi D. 
 
On the night of May 25, 2000, Heidi D. went out with a 
few of her friends in downtown Huntington Beach.  They 
returned around midnight to the parking garage where they had 
left their car.  Miranda-Guerrero approached the group as they 
got to the car.  He started talking to the women, but he was 
incoherent.  He tried to grab the keys from Heidi, and they 
started fighting over the keys near the driver’s side door.  She 
eventually let Miranda-Guerrero take the keys, and he got into 
the car. 
 
One of Heidi’s friends went to the driver’s side door and 
told Miranda-Guerrero to give her the keys.  He grabbed her by 
the back of her head and pulled her into the car.  This conduct 
was the basis of the additional assault charge on which the jury 
could not reach a verdict.  Another of her friends opened the 
passenger door and started hitting Miranda-Guerrero and 
trying to get the keys out of the ignition.  He hit her back with 
his elbow.  Heidi and a third friend ran to a nearby bar to get 
help, and the other two friends soon got away and joined them.  
Miranda-Guerrero was gone by the time they all got back to the 
car. 
4.  May 2000 Assault on Deena L. 
a.  Prosecution Case 
 
Deena L. testified that on the evening of May 25, 2000, she 
went with her boyfriend and a few friends to Gallagher’s Bar in 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
downtown Huntington Beach.  She stayed until shortly before 
midnight and then left to walk home.  Her friends and boyfriend 
remained at the bar.  This was within an hour of the attack on 
Heidi and her friends.  Deena noticed that a man was following 
her as she walked home, and when she turned around to return 
to an area with more people, he ran and caught up to her.  He 
grabbed her hair and put his other hand over her mouth, and he 
pushed her down onto the sidewalk.  She bit his fingers to try to 
get him to release her. 
 
At that point, the man started slamming Deena’s head 
against a brick planter next to the sidewalk.  She testified that 
he slammed her head against the planter four to six times.  She 
started to lose consciousness, but she was able to get out of the 
man’s grasp and hit him.  He ran away at that point.  Deena 
found a police officer in a coffee shop and told him what had 
happened.  When she and the officer left the coffee shop, they 
spotted Miranda-Guerrero walking in a nearby alley, and he 
was arrested. 
 
Deena identified Miranda-Guerrero as the man who had 
attacked her.  DNA collected from under Deena’s fingernails and 
between her teeth matched Miranda-Guerrero’s. 
b.  Defense Case 
 
The defense theory was that the evidence was insufficient 
to show Miranda-Guerrero specifically intended to rape Deena 
when he attacked her. 
A security worker at Gallagher’s Bar testified that 
Miranda-Guerrero had come to the bar twice on the evening of 
May 25.  The worker turned him away both times because he 
was too intoxicated.  The first time Miranda-Guerrero came to 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
the bar was around 11:30 p.m.; the second time was around 
midnight, just before the assault on Deena. 
5.  Receiving Stolen Property 
 
Christine J.’s car was broken into on September 1999 
while parked in a parking structure in Huntington Beach.  A 
purse and phone were taken.  After Miranda-Guerrero was 
arrested, police obtained his backpack from the restaurant 
where he worked and found Christine’s phone inside. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
The prosecutor’s case in aggravation consisted of victim 
impact testimony from Ballas’s parents and sisters.  The 
prosecutor also discussed the facts of the other charged offenses 
and the circumstances of Ballas’s death. 
Miranda-Guerrero’s 
case 
in 
mitigation 
consisted 
principally of testimony about his childhood in Mexico and 
testimony 
from 
five 
psychologists 
about 
his 
cognitive 
functioning.  Miranda-Guerrero was one of eight children and 
grew up very poor.  His father drank too much and abused 
Miranda-Guerrero’s 
mother. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero 
started 
working at a restaurant when he was about eight years old and 
left school when he was eleven or twelve. 
Around the time Miranda-Guerrero stopped attending 
school, he went to work with Hector Ortega, the son of the 
woman for whom he had been working at the restaurant.  He 
and Ortega manufactured leather belts in a room in the home of 
Ortega’s mother.  Ortega testified that this process involved 
smearing glue onto the belts with their hands without gloves or 
masks in a room with no fans, and that they eventually made 
hundreds of belts per day.  The glue had a strong odor, and they 
would get headaches as they worked with it. 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
Dr. Antonio Puente interviewed Miranda-Guerrero and 
administered a series of neuropsychological tests.  He found that 
Miranda-Guerrero’s IQ was around 70, in the bottom two 
percentiles of the population, which he characterized as falling 
into “the mild mental retardation range or borderline 
retardation range.”  He described Miranda-Guerrero as “highly 
compromised 
intellectually, 
somewhat 
compromised 
educationally, 
and 
in 
some 
ways 
challenged 
neuropsychologically as well.” 
Dr. Robert Owen evaluated Miranda-Guerrero and 
administered a test to assess whether he showed antisocial or 
psychopathic characteristics.  Dr. Owen testified that 
Miranda-Guerrero showed a much lower degree of antisocial 
and psychopathic characteristics than the general population of 
men in the criminal justice system.  
Dr. Ricardo Weinstein examined Miranda-Guerrero on 
three 
occasions 
and 
conducted 
a 
quantitative 
electroencephalogram 
(QEEG) 
analysis, 
a 
type 
of 
neurophysiological measurement.  Dr. Weinstein testified that 
Miranda-Guerrero had an IQ between 75 and 82 and was 
functioning at the borderline of “what we consider mental 
retardation.”  He testified that Miranda-Guerrero’s cognitive 
functioning is typically equivalent to that of a person between 
the ages of six and ten, but when he is intoxicated, that level of 
functioning may deteriorate further.  Dr. Barry Sterman 
reviewed the QEEG data collected by Dr. Weinstein and 
testified that there was evidence of “significant brain 
disturbance,” particularly in areas related to moral judgment 
and impulse control. 
Finally, Dr. Mark Cunningham reviewed various records 
and reports but did not personally examine Miranda-Guerrero.  
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
He testified that Miranda-Guerrero has developmental 
impairments and “distinct brain abnormalities” that “provide 
some physiological basis for judgment, emotional and behavior 
disturbances.” 
In addition to cross-examining the defense witnesses, the 
prosecutor called Dr. David Frecker, who described the QEEG 
test used by Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Sterman as “fraught with 
many problems” and said his practice did not use that test 
because they “find it to be unreliable.”  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor played parts of the videotape of Miranda-Guerrero’s 
interviews with police and argued that his conduct during those 
interviews demonstrated that his cognitive capacities were 
greater than the doctors’ evaluations had shown. 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Admission of Statements to Police 
 
Miranda-Guerrero challenges the admission at his trial of 
statements he made to police officers during three custodial 
interrogations, which collectively spanned 12 hours between 
May 26 and May 29, 2000.  He argues that his statements were 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
(Miranda) and that they were involuntary in light of the totality 
of the circumstances.  He expresses particular concern about the 
effect of admitting statements he made near the end of his 
second interview, in which he said he may have hit Bridgette 
Ballas “maybe two times.”  We find no error. 
1.  Facts 
 
Miranda-Guerrero was arrested early in the morning on 
May 26, 2000, immediately after the attack on Deena.  His first 
interview began about six hours later.  He was interviewed by 
two detectives of the Huntington Beach Police Department, 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
Dave Dierking and Sam Lopez.  Miranda-Guerrero’s first 
question to the officers was whether they spoke Spanish.  Early 
in the interview, before Miranda-Guerrero received his Miranda 
advisement, Dierking asked in which language he was more 
comfortable proceeding.  Because his response — “maybe more 
I 
speak 
Spanish 
because 
maybe 
I 
don’t 
understand 
everything” — indicated that his command of English was 
uncertain, Lopez served as translator for the remainder of the 
interrogation. 
 
After some preliminary questions, the detectives asked 
Miranda-Guerrero how long he had been in the United States.  
He said he had been in the country two or three years.  Lopez 
then gave him an advisement as to his Miranda rights.  The full 
transcript of the advisement is reproduced below as it appeared 
in the exhibits used at Miranda-Guerrero’s trial.  The 
statements in brackets are translations included in the superior 
court’s 
exhibit 
that 
it 
used 
to 
evaluate 
whether 
Miranda-Guerrero’s statements should be suppressed.  
“[LOPEZ]:  Okay.  Lo voy hacer dos modos, Ingles y 
Espanol, okay?  You have the right to remain silent.  
Entiendes eso?  [Do you understand that?] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Of course. 
“[LOPEZ]:  Anything you say may be used against 
you in court.  Entiendes eso? 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Si, si antes estaba en la 
corte?  [If, if I was in court before?] 
“[LOPEZ]:  Todo que usted me dice, lo puedo usar en 
corte contra used [sic].  [Everything that you say may 
be used in court against you.] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Yeah. 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
“[LOPEZ]:  Okay, primero Ingles y entonces Espanol, 
okay?  [[F]irst English and then Spanish.]  Usted 
tiene el derecho . . . usted tiene el derecho, uh . . . [You 
have the right . . . you have the right, uh . . .]  or, or 
you have the right to remain silent.  Anything you 
say may be used against you in court.  You have the 
right to the presence of an attorney before and 
during any questioning.  If you cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge 
before any questioning if you want. 
“De primero.  Usted tiene el derecho para meser [sic] 
silencio.  [First of all, you have the right to remain 
silent.]  Usted no tienes que decir nada si quieres.  
Entiendes eso?  Porque aqi [sic] en este los Estados 
Unidos tene [sic] derechos.  Todo que usted me dice, 
lo puedo user . . . usar en corte contra used [sic].  
Entiendes eso?  [You do not have to say anything if 
you want.  Do you understand that?  Because here 
in the United States you have rights.  Everything 
that you tell me can be used, used in court against 
you.  Do you understand that?]  Okay. 
“Usted tiene el derecho a tener un abogado.  Y si no 
tienes dinero para un abogado, el corte de [sic] da uno 
gratris [sic] de costa.  Entiendes eso?  Eh, eh . . . usted 
tiene el derecho obtener un abogado durante unos . . . 
unas preguntas.  Entiendes eso?  Si o no?  Digame si.  
[You have the right to have an attorney.  If you do 
not have money for an attorney, the court will 
provide one free of charge.  Do you understand that?  
Eh, eh . . . you have the right to obtain an attorney 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
during the, the questions.  Do you understand?  Yes 
or no?  Tell me . . . yes.] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Mm hm. 
“[LOPEZ]:  Okay, porque es importante [because it’s 
important]. 
“[DIERKING]:  Just so I know, I speak a little, is 
that a si or no? 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Yeah. 
“[LOPEZ]:  Si.  Si no tienes dinero por un abogado, 
el corte te da una gratis de costa.  Entiendes eso?  El 
corte te da uno.  Entiendes eso?  [If you do not have 
money for an attorney, the court will give you one 
free of charge.  Do you understand that?  The court 
will give you one.  Do you understand that?] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Mm hm. 
“[LOPEZ]:  Entonces con estos derechos en mento, 
quieres hablar con nosotros . . . sobre los cargos?  
[Then, with these rights in mind, do you want to talk 
with us . . . about the charges?] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Pues no se . . . como de 
que?  [Well, I don’t know . . . like about what?] 
“[LOPEZ]:  Si o no?  Quires [sic] hablar sobre los 
cargos?  Quires [sic] hablar con nosotros?  [Yes or no?  
Do you want to talk about the charges?  Do you want 
to talk with us?] 
“[MIRANDA-GUERRERO]:  Pues si pe — [Well yes, 
bu —] 
“[LOPEZ]:  Okay. 
“[DIERKING]:  Okay, do you understand those?  
Okay?  Now you, you sorta indicated that you were 
just walking?” 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
 
The interview proceeded for about two hours without 
further advisement.  As the parties agreed during the superior 
court’s hearing on Miranda-Guerrero’s suppression motion, the 
officers did not inform him of any rights he may have had under 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and “the subject 
of consular consultations did not come up.” 
 
Miranda-Guerrero’s 
second 
interview 
began 
when 
Dierking and Lopez woke him up shortly after midnight that 
evening.  At the start of the interview, Lopez asked 
Miranda-Guerrero the following question:  “Te acuerdas cuando 
hablamos de los derechos?  Que tienes . . . permanecer silencio y 
todo eso.”  The superior court’s exhibit indicates that Lopez’s 
Spanish was deficient, but it translates his question as “Do you 
remember when we talked about the rights?  That you have . . . 
to remain silent and all that.”  Miranda-Guerrero replied “Um-
hmm.”  Lopez then asked in Spanish if Miranda-Guerrero 
wanted to talk to them again with those rights in mind.  He said 
yes, and the interview proceeded. 
 
The third interview was conducted two days later.  At the 
beginning of the interview, Lopez read Miranda-Guerrero’s 
rights to him from a card on which they were correctly 
translated into Spanish.  He had Miranda-Guerrero read the 
card as well. 
 
Although various statements Miranda-Guerrero made 
during his interviews were introduced at trial, the most 
incriminating statement regarding his murder charge came 
during 
the 
second 
interrogation. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero’s 
explanation of the circumstances of Ballas’s death changed over 
the course of his interviews.  He claimed at first that he had 
never seen Ballas, then that he was walking with her on the 
night she died but that he left before she was hurt, and 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
eventually that she fell and hit her head, the position he 
maintained at trial.  At the end of his second interview, which 
spanned more than seven hours, he told the officers that he may 
have hit Ballas twice.  On further questioning, he said he could 
not recall any other details with certainty.  Asked when he hit 
her, he said, “Maybe when she had fallen down . . . .  Maybe . . . 
maybe that’s when maybe I . . . when maybe I hit her.  Because 
I hadn’t remember [sic] that I had hit her.”  Asked if he now 
remembered hitting her, he responded, “Well . . . you’re saying 
(I did).  But I . . . .  Really, I . . . .  Well, I haven’t remembered, 
but . . . but like, like, you’d say that (. . . ?) . . . no, no, no.”  When 
the officers asked again if he remembered hitting Ballas, he 
responded, “No man.  But if I hit her maybe it was two.  But no, 
I don’t remember.” 
 
About three hours of video from the interviews were 
played 
during 
the 
trial. 
 
The 
prosecutor 
discussed 
Miranda-Guerrero’s 
statements 
and 
changing 
story, 
emphasizing them particularly in rebuttal to the defense’s 
closing argument.  As he told the jury, “[i]t took hours and hours 
and hours of questions. . . .  He didn’t admit anything.”  The 
prosecutor pointed out that the first thing Miranda-Guerrero 
said when asked if he knew what had happened to Ballas, at a 
time when he was still denying that he had ever seen her, was 
“[p]erhaps she was killed.”  “What innocent person in the 
position of the defendant would ever say that?” he asked.  “He 
repeatedly tells the police he never saw her fall,” the prosecutor 
said.  “And then only four hours into the second interview, six 
hours total, he finally tells the police the truth.  And he tells the 
police, perhaps he hit her twice.” 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
2.  Miranda Analysis 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.”  To safeguard a suspect’s 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the 
“inherently compelling pressures” of the custodial setting 
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467), the high court adopted a 
set of prophylactic measures requiring law enforcement officers 
to advise a suspect of his right to remain silent and to have 
counsel present prior to any custodial interrogation (id. at 
pp. 444–445).  “A suspect who has heard and understood these 
rights may waive them,” but the prosecutor “ ‘bears the burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the 
totality of the circumstances.’ ”  (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 
831, 843 (Leon).)  “The totality approach permits — indeed, it 
mandates — inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation,” including the defendant’s “age, experience, 
education, background, and intelligence,” and “whether he has 
the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature 
of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving 
those rights.”  (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725.)  
“A statement obtained in violation of a suspect’s Miranda 
rights may not be admitted to establish guilt in a criminal case.”  
(People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 339.)  When evaluating 
the admissibility of a defendant’s statements on appeal, we 
accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts if supported 
by substantial evidence, and we independently determine from 
the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial 
court whether the statements were illegally obtained.  (Ibid.)  
Miranda-Guerrero challenges the adequacy of the Miranda 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
advisory and waiver only with respect to the first two of his three 
interviews, although he also challenges the voluntariness of his 
statements from the third interview. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero did not argue before the trial court that 
his Miranda rights were violated due to a lack of English 
comprehension.  But the record raises some question about 
whether his English fluency was adequate for him to 
understand his rights when he was advised of them in English.  
His response to the warning that what he said could be used 
against him — “if, if I was in court before?” — indicated that he 
did not grasp that relatively straightforward admonition.  At 
several points, he struggled with questions put to him in 
English, for instance responding “Uh, it’s where?” when asked 
with whom he lived, and answering “My brother?” when asked 
if he had ever had problems with women.  When Dierking 
thanked him for cooperating with the officers during the first 
interview and said that the case would be given to the district 
attorney, Miranda-Guerrero admitted to Lopez that he didn’t 
understand what Dierking had said.  When asked where he first 
saw Deena L., he answered, “Oh because, because she’s angry 
and because she said it.”  At some points, however, Miranda-
Guerrero did respond appropriately and was able to ask 
clarifying questions. 
 
We need not decide whether the Miranda advisement 
given in English was sufficient.  Recognizing the language 
barrier, Lopez advised Miranda-Guerrero in Spanish as well.  
Some translation difficulties made the Spanish advisement 
suboptimal; it is not clear why the officers, who had access to a 
printed card with properly translated Miranda advisements, 
chose to advise Miranda-Guerrero at the first interview with a 
Spanish translation developed on the fly.  However, we conclude 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the Spanish 
admonition adequately informed Miranda-Guerrero of his 
rights. 
As to the right to remain silent and the right to court 
appointment of counsel, Lopez’s Spanish advisement was 
sufficient.  He explained that Miranda-Guerrero had the right 
to silence, that he did not have to say anything if he did not want 
to, and that whatever he said could be used against him.  He 
instructed Miranda-Guerrero twice that he had the right to a 
court-appointed attorney if he could not pay for counsel, and he 
took steps to phrase the right in clear and simple terms. 
 
It is a closer question whether Lopez adequately advised 
Miranda-Guerrero of his right to consult with an attorney prior 
to his interrogation and to have an attorney present throughout 
the interview.  Miranda admonitions require no “talismanic 
incantation,” but they must contain each of the mandatory 
warnings, either as the high court set them out in Miranda itself 
or by some “ ‘fully effective equivalent.’ ”  (California v. Prysock 
(1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359–360 (per curiam), quoting Miranda, 
supra, 384 U.S. at p. 476.)  Notifying a suspect that he or she 
has the right to a court-appointed attorney without explaining 
that this includes the right to have an attorney present before 
and during any custodial interviews is an insufficient 
admonition.  (Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 205.) 
According to the translation in the superior court’s exhibit, 
Lopez instructed Miranda-Guerrero that “you have the right to 
obtain an attorney during the, the questions.”  He did not specify 
which “questions” he was referring to, and nothing else in the 
advisement explained that Miranda-Guerrero’s right to an 
attorney applied not just during court proceedings, but before 
and during any interrogation.  Nor did Lopez take any steps to 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
clarify the ambiguous admonition, instead immediately asking 
Miranda-Guerrero to declare whether he understood the right. 
In context, however, it would be reasonable for a suspect 
in Miranda-Guerrero’s position to presume that “the questions” 
to which Lopez referred were the questions that the detectives 
were about to ask him.  And while Miranda-Guerrero may not 
have understood every aspect of the Miranda advisement he 
was given in English, the full and accurate recitation of his 
rights in English may have helped clarify any ambiguity about 
what questions Lopez was referencing in the Spanish 
admonition.  Perhaps most significantly, Miranda-Guerrero 
agreed at the beginning of the third interview that the rights he 
was advised of then — which included the right to have counsel 
present, explained multiple times and in accurate Spanish — 
were the same as the rights the detectives had discussed with 
him during the first interview.  Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that the admonition at the first 
interview was adequate to advise Miranda-Guerrero of his right 
to the presence of an attorney during the interrogation. 
Miranda-Guerrero argues that even if he was adequately 
advised of his rights, he did not understand or waive them.  He 
says he did not understand his rights because his initial 
response when asked if he understood them was “Mm hm” 
rather than something more affirmative.  But when advised of 
his rights at the third interview, Miranda-Guerrero clearly 
indicated not only that he understood his rights, but that they 
were the same rights of which he had been advised at the first 
interview.  Miranda-Guerrero similarly says he did not waive 
his rights because his initial response when asked if he wanted 
to talk to the detectives was “Pues si pe —,” which the court’s 
transcript translates as “Well yes, bu —.”  But he proceeded 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
immediately to speak with the officers, answered their questions 
without hesitation, and said nothing “ ‘that could be construed 
as an invocation of his’ ” Miranda rights.  (People v. Flores (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 371, 417.)  Under these circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that his initial answers when asked at the first 
interview if he wanted to talk, standing alone, are sufficient to 
show he did not understand or waive his rights.  (See ibid. [“ ‘A 
suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after 
acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights 
has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of 
such rights.’ ”].) 
Miranda-Guerrero also argues that the totality of the 
circumstances suggests he did not knowingly and intelligently 
waive his rights, notwithstanding the proper advisement, 
because of his relative youth and limited education, his lack of 
experience with the American legal system, and his difficulty 
understanding English.  As noted, he also claims he did not 
sufficiently express to the officers that he understood his rights 
because he answered “Mm hm” rather than something more 
affirmative when first asked whether he understood the 
advisement at his initial interview. 
Miranda-Guerrero was 22 years old at the time of his 
police interviews, and he had left school when he was eleven or 
twelve.  In Leon, we upheld the waiver of a defendant of similar 
age who had failed sixth grade, “consistently performed in the 
borderline range on intelligence tests,” whose “knowledge of the 
legal system came mainly from Mexican soap operas,” and who 
answered “ ‘uhm-hm’ ” when first asked if he understood his 
rights.  (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 840–841.)  Certain aspects 
of the record in Leon were more indicative of a knowing and 
intelligent waiver than the evidence before us here.  In 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
particular, the Spanish advisement in that case was given from 
a pre-printed form, and the interviewer, a native Spanish 
speaker, took care to give the advisement in a Spanish dialect 
with which the defendant was familiar.  (Id. at p. 840.)  But 
there are additional, affirmative indications in this case that 
Miranda-Guerrero understood the advisement he was given.  
Most notably, Miranda-Guerrero made clear at the start of the 
third interview that his understanding of the rights Lopez read 
him then from an accurately translated Spanish-language form 
was the same as his understanding from the first interview.  We 
conclude that under these circumstances Miranda-Guerrero’s 
waiver at the first interview was knowing and intelligent. 
 
The 
Attorney 
General 
does 
not 
dispute 
that 
Miranda-Guerrero was not fully advised of his rights at the 
beginning of the second interview; the sole admonition provided 
was the question, in what the translator termed deficient 
Spanish, “Do you remember when we talked about the rights?  
That you have . . . to remain silent and all that.”  However, no 
readvisement was required. 
Readvisement is not necessary following a valid 
admonition and waiver when the “subsequent interrogation is 
reasonably contemporaneous.”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 642, 668.)  “In determining whether a subsequent 
interrogation is reasonably contemporaneous, we consider the 
totality of the circumstances.  Relevant considerations include: 
‘1) the amount of time that has passed since the initial waiver; 
2) any change in the identity of the interrogator or location of 
the interrogation; 3) an official reminder of the prior 
advisement; 4) the suspect’s sophistication or past experience 
with law enforcement; and 5) further indicia that the defendant 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
subjectively understands and waives his rights.’ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504.) 
We have held that interrogations taking place as long as 
40 hours after a Miranda warning and waiver do not require 
readvisement when conducted by the same officers in the same 
location with an experienced defendant who “evinced no 
reluctance to be interviewed.”  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 405, 434–435.)  Miranda-Guerrero did not have 
experience with the criminal justice system at the time of his 
interviews, and he expressed some hesitation about proceeding 
when he was advised of his Miranda rights at the first 
interview.  But his second interview took place fourteen hours 
after the first interview, in the same location and with the same 
detectives.  He was also reminded, albeit briefly, of the original 
Miranda admonition at the beginning of the second interview.  
Considering all of the circumstances, we conclude that no 
readvisement was required at the second interview. 
3.  Voluntariness Analysis 
 
Miranda-Guerrero also argues that his statements to 
officers were involuntary because the officers’ methods were 
coercive, because he was not advised of his consular rights under 
the Vienna Convention, and because 
of his personal 
characteristics, including his limited education, inexperience 
with the criminal justice system, and lack of English proficiency.  
Under our precedents, his confession was not involuntary. 
Involuntary statements to police are inadmissible for all 
purposes.  (People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1193.)  
Statements are involuntary when they are not the product of “ ‘a 
rational intellect and free will.’ ”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 342, 404, quoting Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
398.)  To use a defendant’s statements to police at trial, the 
prosecutor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
they were voluntary.  (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 
740 (Peoples).)  On appeal, the voluntariness of the statements 
“is reviewed independently in light of the record in its entirety, 
including ‘all the surrounding circumstances — both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation.’ ”  (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779.)  
We “ ‘ “examine the uncontradicted facts surrounding the 
making of the statements to determine independently whether 
the prosecution met its burden.” ’ ”  (Maury, at p. 404.)  When 
testimony in the record is conflicting, we “ ‘ “must ‘accept that 
version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the 
extent that it is supported by the record.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the 
finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’. . . .”  (Colorado v. 
Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167.)  Coercion is not limited to 
physical abuse; it may involve “more subtle forms of 
psychological persuasion.”  (Id. at p. 164.)  These techniques 
include “ ‘repeated suggestion and prolonged interrogation.’ ”  
(People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 843, disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771.)  They 
also include deprivation of sleep and food (Greenwald v. 
Wisconsin (1968) 390 U.S. 519, 521 (per curiam)), as well as 
“deception or communication of false information” (Hogan, at 
p. 840). 
If coercive police conduct is present, we evaluate the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant’s 
statements were freely given.  (People v. Maury, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 404.)  Factors that we consider include the coercion 
discussed above, as well as “the length of the interrogation and 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
its location and continuity, and the defendant’s maturity, 
education, and physical and mental health.”  (Peoples, supra, 62 
Cal.4th at p. 740.)  A defendant’s “inexperience” and “low 
intelligence” may weigh against a finding of voluntariness, as do 
“deprivation and isolation imposed on [the] defendant during his 
confinement.”  (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 68.) 
Miranda-Guerrero asserts that several circumstances of 
the second interview raise concerns about the voluntariness of 
his confession at the end of that interview.  The officers began 
interviewing him just after midnight, and the interrogation 
continued for more than seven hours until Miranda-Guerrero 
said he might have hit Ballas twice.  Miranda-Guerrero notes 
that he “showed some signs of fatigue” (Peoples, supra, 62 
Cal.4th at p. 741), telling the detectives at one point that he was 
“very sleepy.”  Further, the officers repeatedly emphasized 
Miranda-Guerrero’s isolation and referred to the absence of any 
relationships in Miranda-Guerrero’s life and the distance from 
his family as reasons why he might have attacked Ballas.  In 
repeated accusations over the course of the night, the officers 
asserted dozens of times that he “beat,” “hit,” or “punched” 
Ballas. 
While these aspects of the second interrogation of 
Miranda-Guerrero are relevant, they ultimately do not 
distinguish this case from prior cases in which we have declined 
to find involuntary a confession given in response to overnight 
questioning.  In Peoples, for instance, we affirmed a finding of 
voluntariness in a case involving a twelve-hour overnight 
interview in which the police questioned the defendant 
“constantly for the first 10 hours of the interview.”  (Peoples, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 739.)  An expert testified in that case that 
“the detectives used coercive techniques . . . over 50 times 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
during the 12-hour interrogation.”  (Id. at p. 740.)  The interview 
in Peoples was both longer and more coercive than 
Miranda-Guerrero’s second interview.  Moreover, as in Peoples, 
Miranda-Guerrero “was given numerous breaks, drinks, and 
food,” and the officers “never offered him leniency for his 
confession and never threatened a harsher penalty if he 
remained silent.”  (Id. at p. 741.)  The defendant in Peoples also 
showed considerably greater signs of exhaustion than 
Miranda-Guerrero — “sweating, pulling out his hair, rubbing 
his skin, twitching his facial muscles, grinding his teeth, and at 
times appearing to fall asleep.”  (Id. at p. 739.)   
Miranda-Guerrero says his confession was nevertheless 
involuntary because the detectives did not advise him of his 
right under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Article 
36) to have the Mexican consulate notified of his detention, even 
though the detectives became aware early in the interviews that 
he was likely not a citizen of the United States.  Although the 
failure to notify a suspect of his or her consular rights does not 
by itself require suppression of the suspect’s statements, this 
court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized 
that “[a] consular notification claim may be raised as part of a 
broader challenge to the voluntariness of a confession.”  (Leon, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846, citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 
(2006) 548 U.S. 331, 350.)  But “[i]n most circumstances, there 
is likely to be little connection between an Article 36 violation 
and 
evidence 
or 
statements 
obtained 
by 
police.”  
(Sanchez-Llamas, at p. 349.)  Miranda-Guerrero says he would 
have invoked his Miranda rights to counsel and to remain silent 
if he had been advised of his consular rights or received consular 
assistance.  But this argument is too speculative given the 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
record in this case.  (See Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 847; People 
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 833.)  Considering the totality of 
the circumstances and our independent review of the video of 
Miranda-Guerrero’s interrogation, we cannot conclude that his 
confession 
during 
his 
second 
custodial 
interview 
was 
involuntary. 
Furthermore, the first and third interviews exhibited few 
of the troubling features of the second interview.  The first 
interview took place at 8:00 a.m. and lasted just over two hours.  
The third took place several days later at 10:00 a.m. and also 
lasted only a few hours.  The questioning during the first 
interview was not aggressive or coercive, and while there were 
periods of insistent questioning in the third interview, they were 
relatively brief.  We therefore conclude that Miranda-Guerrero’s 
statements from the first and third interviews were voluntarily 
given as well. 
B.  Consular Notification 
Miranda-Guerrero seeks a “comprehensive judicial ‘review 
and reconsideration’ of his conviction and sentence” because of 
the interviewing officers’ failure to inform him of his right to the 
assistance of the Mexican consulate under Article 36.  This 
review, he says, must “ ‘examine the facts’ ” of the conviction and 
sentence, “and in particular the prejudice” resulting from the 
violation of the convention.  He claims this entitlement flows 
from the decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(judg. of Mar. 31) (Avena), in which the court instructed that 
such review and reconsideration would be the appropriate 
remedy for violations of foreign nationals’ consular rights.  (Id. 
at pp. 59–60, ¶¶ 121–122.)   
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
 
California codified the requirements of Article 36 in Penal 
Code section 834c.  (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 845.)  In Leon, 
we assumed without deciding that the rights found in Article 36 
and section 834c are individually enforceable (Leon, at p. 846), 
and we do so here as well.  But even if Miranda-Guerrero is 
authorized to enforce Article 36 and entitled to the remedy 
described in Avena, we have already found that he has not 
shown prejudice on this record from the violation of his consular 
rights.  Any matters outside the record suggesting that 
Miranda-Guerrero was prejudiced may be raised in a petition 
for habeas corpus; we express no view here on the validity of 
such a claim.  (See In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646 
[review on direct appeal “is limited to the four corners of the 
record on appeal”].)   
C.  Denial of Presence at Certain Proceedings 
Miranda-Guerrero claims he was prejudicially denied his 
constitutional and statutory rights to be present during five trial 
proceedings: (1) a meeting on juror misconduct; (2) discussions 
regarding spectator misconduct; (3) a meeting concerning the 
portions of his police interview to be played at trial; (4) a 
conference on jury instructions; and (5) a proceeding regarding 
a response to a jury question.  We disagree. 
A criminal defendant has both constitutional and 
statutory rights to be present at certain trial proceedings.  
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230.)  “The federal 
Constitution provides a defendant the right to be present if ‘ “(1) 
the proceeding is critical to the outcome of the case, and (2) the 
defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
proceeding,” ’ ” and the state constitutional right is largely 
equivalent.  (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 478–479; see 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
 
People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1306.)  The statutory 
right is coextensive with the state constitutional right but can 
only be waived in writing.  (Cole, at p. 1231; People v. Wall (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1048, 1060.)   
Miranda-Guerrero claims that his absence from the five 
proceedings constitutes structural error, but we have said that 
“[e]rroneous exclusion of the defendant is . . . trial error that is 
reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice.”  (People v. 
Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 312.) 
1.  Meeting on Potential Juror Misconduct 
Between the guilt and penalty phases, the court informed 
the parties, in Miranda-Guerrero’s presence, that Juror No. 11 
had told the bailiff that Juror No. 1 called her spouse after the 
verdict was reached.  The following afternoon in chambers, in 
Miranda-Guerrero’s absence and without a waiver, the parties 
indicated it was unnecessary to question the jurors. 
Miranda-Guerrero had no right to be present at the 
in-chambers meeting.  In Harris, we held that “[t]he dismissal 
of a juror for misconduct is not a matter for which the defendant 
must be present.”  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1309.)  Deciding whether to investigate misconduct cannot be 
said to be more “ ‘ “critical to the outcome of the case” ’ ” than 
deciding whether to dismiss a juror for misconduct.  (People v. 
Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 478–479.)  Miranda-Guerrero 
claims that he may “have perceived something about Juror 
No. 1” that warranted investigation or dismissal.  But we have 
rejected similarly speculative theories about how a defendant 
“could have contributed to the fairness of the proceedings.”  
(Harris, at p. 1307.)  Moreover, any error was not prejudicial.  
Miranda-Guerrero was present when the court first announced 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
 
the Juror No. 1 issue and was aware that his counsel was given 
an option to request further investigation.  He had ample 
opportunity to raise any concerns he may have had about Juror 
No. 1.  “[N]othing in the record indicates” that Miranda-
Guerrero’s presence at the in-chambers meeting would have led 
to further inquiry or dismissal of the juror.  (Caro, at p. 479.) 
2.  Meetings on Spectator Misconduct 
During the trial, the parties and the court met in 
chambers twice without Miranda-Guerrero to discuss spectator 
misconduct.  It was decided at the first meeting that the court 
would give a general admonition, and at the second meeting it 
was determined that the court would individually admonish an 
audience member.  Miranda-Guerrero did not have a 
constitutional or statutory right to be present at either 
proceeding because they involved discussions on spectator 
misconduct and admonitions, which are “routine procedural 
discussions on matters that do not affect the outcome of the 
trial.”  (People v. Perry, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 312.)  Conducting 
the meetings on spectator misconduct without Miranda-
Guerrero present was not error. 
3.  Conference on Interview Excerpts To Be Played at 
Trial 
After the court ruled on the admissibility of Miranda-
Guerrero’s police interview in his presence, the prosecutor 
indicated that the parties were going to work together to select 
which portions would be played to the jury.  The parties agreed 
on the selected portions and informed the court of their 
agreement at an in-chambers meeting the following afternoon 
without Miranda-Guerrero present.  The parties and the court 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
 
then discussed the timeline and process for verifying and 
playing the tapes to the jury. 
In People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, we held that a 
defendant had both a statutory and constitutional right to be 
present at a “hearing during which the contents of [a] jailhouse 
tape were discussed and agreed upon” because the defendant 
“could have assisted his attorneys in deciphering the tape” since 
he was present when it was made.  (Id. at p. 531.)  Miranda-
Guerrero argues he had a right to be present because, as in 
Davis, he was “most familiar with the contents of the 
statements” in the tape and therefore could have “assisted his 
attorneys” in selecting the excerpts.  But unlike in Davis, the 
court here had already ruled on the admissibility of the tapes, 
and the determination of which excerpts would be played was 
made by counsel before the in-chambers meeting.  Accordingly, 
Miranda-Guerrero’s presence at the meeting could not have 
“ ‘ “contribute[d] to the fairness of the proceeding.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 479.)  Nor is it clear how a meeting 
discussing the logistics of playing preapproved portions of the 
tape could have been “ ‘critical to the outcome of the case.’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 478–479.)  
In any event, no substantive decisions on the admissibility 
of the tape or its selected excerpts were made during the 
meeting.  Miranda-Guerrero has not shown how excluding him 
from this logistical discussion could have “ ‘ “prejudiced his case 
or denied him a fair and impartial trial.” ’ ”  (People v. Caro, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 479.)  Any error in excluding him was not 
prejudicial. 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
 
4.  Conference on Jury Instructions 
At the end of the guilt phase, in Miranda-Guerrero’s 
absence, the court discussed with counsel the jury instructions 
for lesser included offenses.  We have repeatedly held that 
defendants “may ordinarily be excluded from conferences on 
questions of law, even if those questions are critical to the 
outcome of the case, because the defendant’s presence would not 
contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.”  (People v. Perry, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 312.)  These include “conference[s] on 
jury instructions.”  (Ibid.)  Excluding Miranda-Guerrero from 
this conference was not error. 
5.  Meeting on Response to Jury Question 
During jury deliberations at the guilt phase, the court and 
parties met to discuss jury questions with Miranda-Guerrero 
absent.  The court read out the jury’s latest question:  “When 
establishing intent in a count, may we take into consideration 
established and agreed upon intents in other counts?”  The court 
directed counsel to meet and confer about a proposed response.  
When the court reconvened, still without Miranda-Guerrero 
present, the court and parties settled on redirecting the jury to 
several CALJIC instructions. 
In People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 682, we held 
that a defendant “did not have a constitutional or statutory right 
to be personally present during the in-chambers discussion 
regarding how to respond to [a] jury’s question” about an issue 
of law.  This is because “[t]he formulation of an appropriate 
response to this question was a legal matter,” and “a defendant 
does not have the right to be personally present during 
proceedings, held in-chambers and outside of the jury’s 
presence, concerning questions of law.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
 
Miranda-Guerrero claims Jennings is distinguishable 
because “the question and proposed response” in Jennings “were 
read in defendant’s presence.”  But that is a distinction without 
a difference; our holding in Jennings turned on the fact that the 
jury’s question and the response to it involved legal issues.  
(People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 682.)  As in Jennings, 
“[t]he formulation of an appropriate response” to the jury’s 
intent question here was a legal matter.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, 
Miranda-Guerrero did not have a constitutional or statutory 
right to be present at the proceeding. 
D.  Juror Misconduct 
 
Miranda-Guerrero claims that his conviction must be 
reversed because the trial court failed to discharge one of the 
jurors for misconduct and failed to hold a hearing into the juror’s 
ability to serve after a suggestion of misconduct was raised.  
Even 
assuming 
the 
juror’s 
actions 
were 
misconduct, 
Miranda-Guerrero was not prejudiced. 
 
As noted, after the jury reached its guilt phase verdict but 
before the verdict was announced, Juror No. 1 informed her 
spouse on a phone call that she would be done later than 
expected.  She also told her spouse that the jury had reached a 
verdict.  The jury foreperson informed the bailiff of this call, the 
bailiff informed the court, and the court informed the parties.  It 
was not clear whether Juror No. 1 told her spouse what the 
verdict was, but the court instructed the parties to assume she 
had for the purposes of deciding what to do about the issue. 
 
In the court’s view, the actions of Juror No. 1 did not 
constitute misconduct.  Its position was that there was no need 
to discuss the issue further with the jury foreperson who 
reported the conversation, but it deferred to the parties about 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
 
whether to pursue further inquiry either with the foreperson or 
with Juror No. 1.  After considering the issue, the parties 
advised the court that they did not believe there was need for 
further inquiry. 
 
“It is misconduct for a juror during the course of trial to 
discuss the case with a nonjuror.”  (People v. Danks (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 269, 304.)  Juror misconduct raises a “presumption of 
prejudice,” but that presumption is rebutted when the reviewing 
court determines, based on the record as a whole, that “ ‘ “there 
is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered 
actual harm.” ’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1309.) 
The jurors in this case were admonished not to talk about 
the proceedings with anyone outside the jury.  Assuming 
without deciding that Juror No. 1 committed misconduct when 
she told her spouse that a verdict had been reached, no prejudice 
flowed from her actions.  Juror No. 1 told her spouse that she 
would be done late, that a verdict had been reached, and possibly 
what the verdict was.  There is no reasonable probability that 
conveying this information to her spouse biased Juror No. 1 
against Miranda-Guerrero or made her incapable of serving as 
a penalty phase juror.  (See People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
at p. 1303.)  Miranda-Guerrero also argues that the trial court 
erred by declining to hold a hearing to inquire further into the 
juror’s alleged misconduct.  But “ ‘ “ ‘[a] hearing is required only 
where the court possesses information which, if proven to be 
true, would constitute “good cause” to doubt a juror’s ability to 
perform his duties . . . .’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
401, 506.)  The trial court assumed that Juror No. 1 told her 
spouse what verdict the jury had reached and properly 
concluded that Miranda-Guerrero was not harmed even under 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
 
those circumstances.  It was not required to hold a hearing to 
further investigate the juror’s actions. 
E.  Motion for a New Trial 
 
Shortly after the trial concluded, a newspaper article was 
published detailing various lawsuits and disciplinary actions 
against one of the prosecutor’s medical experts, Dr. Israel 
Chambi, who was the medical witness most skeptical of 
Miranda-Guerrero’s theory that a fall caused Ballas’s injury.  
Miranda-Guerrero moved for a new trial, arguing that the 
article constituted new evidence “that could have affected the 
outcome of both the guilt and penalty phase of the trial.”  The 
court denied his motion.  
Miranda-Guerrero asks that we remand the matter for the 
superior court to reconsider its ruling on the motion for a new 
trial in light of additional evidence he presents here in a request 
for judicial notice.  This evidence consists of two unpublished 
Court of Appeal opinions from 2002 in suits against Dr. Chambi, 
which he says substantiate “several of the incidents documented 
in the newspaper article.”  We take judicial notice of the 
existence of the opinions but not the statements of fact contained 
therein.  (See People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455.) 
Under Penal Code section 1181, a new trial is warranted 
“[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, 
and which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial.”  (Pen. Code, § 1181, 
subd. 8.)  “ ‘ “To grant a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence, the evidence must make a different result 
probable on retrial.”  [Citation.]  “[T]he trial court has broad 
discretion in ruling on a new trial motion . . . ,” and its “ruling 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
 
will be disturbed only for clear abuse of that discretion.” ’ ”  
(People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 667.) 
Miranda-Guerrero is not entitled to a remand for a further 
hearing on his new trial motion.  He does not claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion based on the 
evidence before the court at the time.  And our review on direct 
appeal “is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal.”  
(In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 646.)  We decline to 
remand on the basis of evidence not presented to the trial court. 
Nor in any event would the outcome be different on 
remand as a result of the Court of Appeal opinions he presents 
in his request for judicial notice.  Those opinions were available 
when the trial took place.  They would not be an appropriate 
basis for a new trial because Miranda-Guerrero could, “with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced” them at his 
original trial.  (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 8.)  
 
Miranda-Guerrero also contends that the due process 
principles expressed in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 
required the prosecutor “to investigate the credibility” of Dr. 
Chambi before calling him as “a critical expert witness.”  He 
does not claim a Brady violation, but he suggests that the 
prosecutor’s failure to investigate supports his request for 
remand to reconsider his new trial motion. 
 
We are not persuaded by Miranda-Guerrero’s claim that 
he is entitled to reconsideration of his new trial motion because 
of the prosecutor’s failure to investigate Dr. Chambi.  He argues 
that if the prosecutor had investigated Dr. Chambi’s credibility, 
the prosecutor “would have found” the Court of Appeal opinions 
that Miranda-Guerrero presents in his request for judicial 
notice.  Again, these opinions would not have supported his new 
trial motion because they were available at the time of the trial.  
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
 
(See Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 8.)  He further suggests that the 
prosecutor’s investigation might have revealed “information at 
the Medical Board of California about the professional status of 
its witness, Dr. Chambi.”  But he does not provide any such 
records, nor does he claim that the prosecutor’s failure to 
uncover this information violated Brady or that there is a 
Brady-based duty to investigate witness credibility. 
 
In sum, Miranda-Guerrero does not argue that the court 
abused its discretion in denying that motion on the basis of the 
record before it, and he has not demonstrated that the evidence 
he now proffers to support his new trial motion was unavailable 
at the time of trial.  In light of the limited scope of our review of 
a trial court’s decision to deny a new trial motion, 
Miranda-Guerrero is not entitled to a remand for further 
proceedings on his motion. 
Finally, Miranda-Guerrero argues in passing that the fact 
that the impeachment evidence against Dr. Chambi was not 
introduced at trial made the proceedings “fundamentally unfair 
and violated appellant’s rights to due process, to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, to the effective assistance of counsel 
and to a reliable penalty determination.”  Again, he does not 
claim a Brady violation, nor does he claim that the trial court 
improperly limited his impeachment of Dr. Chambi.  In the 
absence of argument to support these constitutional claims, we 
conclude they supply no basis for relief. 
F.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Miranda-Guerrero claims that two groups of statements 
made by the prosecutor constituted misconduct and deprived 
him of a fair trial:  comments about the police investigation, 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
 
which Miranda-Guerrero claims amounted to improper 
vouching, and derogatory comments directed at defense counsel. 
During opening and closing argument, the prosecutor 
mentioned the quality of the work of the police officers who 
investigated Miranda-Guerrero’s case.  At the time these 
statements were made, Miranda-Guerrero did not clearly object 
or ask for a jury admonition.  Midway through the prosecutor’s 
closing argument, after almost all of these statements had 
occurred, defense counsel asked to speak with the court and 
prosecutor outside the presence of the jury and expressed 
concern that “we’re getting into the area of improper personal 
vouching for the police department.”  Counsel noted that the 
defense had “not objected this far, but I think we’re getting a 
little bit astray.”  Counsel’s statement was insufficient to 
preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant 
must generally object “in a timely fashion — and on the same 
ground,” and must “request[] that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 795, 841.)  Because defense counsel did neither, 
Miranda-Guerrero has forfeited this claim. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero also argues that his trial was tainted 
by two parts of the prosecutor’s closing argument in which he 
discussed defense counsel’s conduct:  questions about why 
defense counsel had elicited evidence regarding Ballas’s liver 
and a kiss she shared with Jason on the night in question, and 
statements that an argument made by defense counsel was 
“ ‘intellectually dishonest’ ” and “ ‘an insult’ ” to the jury’s 
intelligence.  The questions about the defense’s evidence 
immediately prompted the sidebar at which defense counsel 
mentioned concerns about vouching.  Before raising the issue of 
improper vouching, counsel expressed concern that the 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
 
prosecutor had been “insinuati[ng] that the defense is doing 
something underhanded.”  Defense counsel further expressed 
that the prosecutor’s comments could not “go any further 
without running some serious risks in the case in terms of 
potential misconduct.”  After the prosecutor said he did not 
intend to go further, the court told the attorneys that it had “not 
noted any error by the district attorney.” 
Later in the prosecutor’s argument, defense counsel 
objected to the statement that part of the defense’s argument 
had been “intellectually dishonest,” though counsel did not 
reiterate that objection when the prosecutor subsequently said 
the argument was insulting to the jury.  Counsel did not state 
the basis for the objection, and in context it is not clear that the 
objection was about the disparagement of the defense’s position.  
In any event, even if these comments and the discussion of the 
defense’s evidence strayed beyond appropriate commentary on 
the strength of the defense’s argument into personal 
commentary on defense counsel, they were not so egregious that 
they made the trial unfair, nor is it reasonably probable that the 
jury would have come to a different outcome if the prosecutor 
had not made these statements.  (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 731, 760, 772.) 
G.  Instructional Errors 
 
Miranda-Guerrero raises a number of claims concerning 
the guilt phase jury instructions, each of which we have rejected 
previously.  First, he argues that it was error for the superior 
court to instruct the jury on theories of first degree murder and 
felony murder because the information charged him only with a 
violation of Penal Code section 187, which he says describes only 
second degree murder.  We have rejected this claim when it has 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
 
been brought in the past.  (See, e.g., People v. Contreras (2013) 
58 Cal.4th 123, 148 (Contreras).)  We decline to reconsider our 
precedent on this issue. 
 
Second, Miranda-Guerrero argues that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as 
interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
require more specificity in the charging instrument.  We have 
rejected this claim as well (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 
555) and decline to revisit our precedent. 
 
Third, 
Miranda-Guerrero 
contends 
that 
six 
jury 
instructions used during his trial undermined the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  We have previously rejected 
this claim as to all of the instructions he identifies.  (People v. 
Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 553–554 [CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 
2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 
130 [CALJIC No. 2.21.1].)  Miranda-Guerrero presents no 
persuasive reason why we should reconsider our holdings on 
this issue. 
 
Fourth, he argues that the superior court erred by not 
requiring the jury to come to a unanimous verdict about which 
theory of first degree murder applied (premeditated murder or 
felony murder), so long as the jury unanimously concluded that 
he was guilty of first degree murder under some theory.  As he 
acknowledges, we have rejected this claim before.  (People v. 
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 973.)  He presents no persuasive 
reason why we should reconsider our past holdings on this issue. 
H.  Cumulative Error 
 
Miranda-Guerrero contends that the cumulative effect of 
the errors he claims occurred at the guilt phase warrants 
reversal even if no individual error does so.  The only potential 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
 
errors, such as the possibility that a few comments by the 
prosecutor exceeded the bounds of appropriate argument, were 
minor.  The cumulative effect of these errors does not rise to the 
level of prejudice necessary to reverse any of his convictions. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES  
 
Miranda-Guerrero argues that the admission of the 
statements he made in his police interviews requires reversal of 
his death sentence because the prosecutor used his statements 
to counter evidence of his cognitive impairments.  Because we 
find no error in the admission of his statements, we need not 
consider their effect on the penalty verdict. 
 
Miranda-Guerrero also argues that the death sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to the crime of felony murder absent a 
showing of some particular mens rea as to the killing.  We have 
rejected this argument before (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 163), and we do so again here.  He also argues that imposing 
the death penalty for felony murder violates international law 
and that this international law principle is binding on our state 
because of the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution.  We 
have rejected this claim as well.  (Contreras, at pp. 165–166.) 
 
Miranda-Guerrero argues that various other aspects of 
California’s death penalty scheme are unconstitutional, while 
noting that our court has rejected these arguments in the past.  
He 
argues 
that 
our 
death 
penalty 
statutes 
are 
unconstitutionally overbroad because of the number of potential 
special circumstances; that the aggravating factor related to the 
circumstances of the crime is overbroad as well; that the lack of 
jury instruction regarding a burden of proof in the weighing of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors 
undermined 
his 
constitutional rights; that the phrase “so substantial” in the jury 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
 
instruction on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances is impermissibly vague; that the jury should have 
been instructed to find whether death is “appropriate” rather 
than whether it is “warranted”; that the jury should have been 
instructed that there is a presumption favoring a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole; that the jury should have been 
required to make written findings during the penalty phase; 
that the use of adjectives such as “extreme” and “substantial” in 
the sentencing factors creates an improper barrier to the 
consideration of mitigating evidence; that the jury should have 
been instructed as to which of the factors were mitigating and 
which were aggravating; that intercase proportionality review 
is required; and that equal protection requires more procedural 
protections for capital defendants than California law provides.  
We have rejected all of these arguments.  (Contreras, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at pp. 169–170, 172–173.)   
He also argues that the jury should have been instructed 
that it must return a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole if the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating 
factors, and he says that California’s use of the death penalty as 
a “regular form of punishment” violates international norms.  
We have rejected these arguments as well.  (People v. Jackson, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 373–374.) 
Miranda-Guerrero further claims that California’s death 
penalty scheme is constitutionally deficient because it does not 
require unanimous jury findings as to the aggravating 
circumstances and does not require the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt any aggravating factors except prior felony 
convictions or violent crimes that did not result in a conviction.  
We have rejected these claims in the past (People v. McDaniel 
PEOPLE v. MIRANDA-GUERRERO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
 
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142–143; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 543, 601) and decline to revisit our precedent here. 
 
Finally, because we find no error in the penalty phase, we 
reject Miranda-Guerrero’s claim that cumulative error infected 
the penalty determination. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We C 
oncur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Miranda-Guerrero 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S118147 
Date Filed:  November 17, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Francisco P. Briseño 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the 
Supreme Court, Denise Kendall, Assistant State Public Defender, and 
Evan Young, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 
General, Holly D. Wilkens, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Meredith S. 
White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Denise Kendall 
Assistant State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Meredith S. White 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9069