Title: Peters v. Mindell

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 91-478

 Michael Peters and Margaret Peters           Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 Richard Mindell and Leslie Mindell           November Term, 1992

      v.

 G. Norman Schreib and General Products, Inc.


 Stephen B. Martin, J.

 Craig Weatherly of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for defendants-appellants,
      Richard and Leslie Mindell

 John T. Leddy of McNeil & Murray, Burlington, for third-party defendants-
      appellees, G. Norman Schreib and General Products, Inc.


 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      GIBSON, J.   Third-party plaintiffs, Richard and Leslie Mindell, appeal
 from a decision granting summary judgment in favor of third-party defend-
 ants, G. Norman Schreib and General Products, Inc.  The Mindells claim that
 the court erred in finding that there were no material facts in dispute and
 in concluding that third-party plaintiffs had no right to indemnification as
 a matter of law.  We reverse.
      In September 1987, plaintiffs Michael and Margaret Peters purchased
 from defendants Richard and Leslie Mindell a house defendants had
 constructed.  In June 1988, the Peters filed a complaint against the
 Mindells alleging various defects in the home, including that (1) the septic
 system did not conform to the approved design on file with the town zoning
 office, (2) the system's mound had broken out of the toe, (3) the mound was
 too close to the foundation drain, (4) the mound was partially on the
 adjoining neighbor's lot, (5) the septic system did not perform satis-
 factorily, and (6) no certificate of occupancy had been issued by the town
 because the engineer had not approved the septic system.
      In April 1989, the Mindells filed a third-party complaint against
 third-party defendants, engineer G. Norman Schreib and General Products,
 Inc., alleging that the Mindells had engaged the services of Schreib and
 General Products to design and certify construction of a mound septic system
 on the lot later sold to the Peters, that the Mindells had constructed the
 mound septic system in accordance with the design, and that Schreib had
 certified that it had been completed according to the design.  The Mindells
 claim that to the extent the Peters are entitled to recover from them for
 defects in the septic system, it is because of the negligence in the design
 or certification of the system by Schreib and General Products.  The
 Mindells request that Schreib and General Products indemnify them for any
 sum due to the Peters as a result of defects in the mound septic system.
      On March 29, 1990, the Chittenden Superior Court entered summary
 judgment for third-party defendants, Schreib and General Products, on the
 ground that the relationship between the Mindells and General Products was
 not one that implied a right of indemnification.  On March 8, 1991, the
 Mindells moved for reconsideration of the court's summary judgment decision.
 The court denied the request for reconsideration because the motion was
 filed "substantially out of time" and, thus, reconsideration would be "very
 prejudicial" to Schreib and General Products.  The court also concluded that
 the motion did not raise any new facts or points of law that were not
 considered in the previous order.
      Schreib and General Products then moved for entry of final judgment
 pursuant to V.R.C.P. 54(b).  The court granted the motion, and the Mindells
 took this appeal.
      Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we briefly address the
 procedural issue raised by Schreib and General Products.  They claim that
 this Court should affirm the superior court's order denying reconsideration
 because the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
 motion was untimely, was prejudicial to third-party defendants, and failed
 to raise any points not previously addressed.  We agree that it was within
 the court's discretion to deny the motion for reconsideration on these
 grounds.  This is not dispositive of the appeal, however, because the
 Mindells have not appealed from the denial of reconsideration but rather
 from the final judgment.  The final judgment was based on the findings and
 conclusions of the original summary judgment order, which was not appealable
 until entry of final judgment under V.R.C.P. 54(b).  Accordingly, on appeal
 we consider the merits of the summary judgment order.
      We apply the standard enunciated in V.R.C.P. 56(c) in reviewing a
 decision to grant summary judgment.  Thus, the moving party has the burden
 of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it
 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Kelly v. Town of Barnard,
 155 Vt. 296, 299, 583 A.2d 614, 616 (1990).  Moreover, we regard all
 allegations made in opposition to summary judgment as true, if supported by
 affidavits or other evidence.  Messier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 154
 Vt. 406, 409, 578 A.2d 98, 99-100 (1990).
      In reviewing the summary judgment decision, we therefore accept the
 facts as advanced by Richard Mindell in his affidavit dated March 8, 1990.
 According to Mindell, he engaged the services of third-party defendants on
 the basis of representations by Schreib that he was a licensed professional
 engineer with the competence required to design and certify construction of
 a mound septic system.  The town septic permit was granted solely on the
 condition that it be constructed in accordance with Schreib's design, and
 inspected during and after construction.  Moreover, the town required
 written certification that the system was in compliance with the design.  On
 October 15, 1987, after a site inspection, Schreib wrote to the town
 stating that the system was installed in accordance with the design plan
 submitted to the town and that it operated satisfactorily. (FN1)
      Mindell supervised construction of the mound, which was installed
 substantially in accordance with the plans and specifications of Schreib.
 In preparing the ground for construction, Mindell followed oral
 instructions given by Schreib, and the mound was located precisely as shown
 on the site plan prepared by third-party defendants.
      During construction, Mindell repeatedly requested inspections by
 Schreib, who declined to make a site visit until the final inspection of the
 completed system because he did not have the time.  The alleged deficiencies
 in the system would have been visible to Schreib had he made an inspection,
 and Mindell could then have corrected any failure to comply with the design
 during construction.  The Mindells relied on the design and certification by
 Schreib when they sold the home to the Peters.  In sum, the Mindells argue
 that any defect in the mound septic system is due to negligence in design,
 location or certification, for which they contracted with third-party
 defendants, and that Schreib and General Products must indemnify them to the
 extent that they are held liable to the Peters for defects in the septic
 system.
      Vermont law precludes contribution among joint tortfeasors but
 recognizes a right of indemnity if (1) there is an express agreement by one
 party to indemnify the other, or (2) the circumstances are such that the law
 will imply such an undertaking.  Bardwell Motor Inn, Inc. v. Accavallo, 135
 Vt. 571, 572,