Title: State ex rel. Keller v. Cox

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Keller v. Cox, 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 1999-Ohio-264.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. KELLER, APPELLANT, v. COX ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 279.] 
Public records — Personnel and internal investigative records pertaining to 
police officers — Exemptions protected by constitutional right of privacy — 
Police officers’ files that contain the names of the officers’ children, 
spouses, parents, home addresses, telephone numbers, beneficiaries, 
medical information, and the like. 
(No. 98-1900 — Submitted January 26, 1999 — Decided April 7, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Miami County, No. 98CA24. 
 
Carl J. Faehl is the defendant in United States v. Faehl, case No. CR-3-98-
035, a criminal case pending in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, Western Division.  Appellant, Steven R. Keller, the Federal 
Public Defender for the Southern District of Ohio, was appointed to represent 
Faehl. 
 
In April 1998, Beth Goldstein Lewis, an Assistant Federal Public Defender 
in Keller’s office, sent a written request under R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records 
Act, to appellee Wilma Mahan, the Miami County Sheriff’s Department Records 
Custodian, to inspect and copy all personnel and internal affairs records relating to 
Miami County Sheriff’s Detective Paul Reece.  Keller wanted access to these 
records as part of his pretrial investigation and preparation on behalf of Faehl.  
Keller believed that Detective Reece would be called as a witness against Faehl in 
the criminal trial. 
 
In May 1998, the United States filed a motion in the federal case to order 
Faehl and his attorneys to cease and desist all efforts to obtain personal 
information about government law enforcement officers who would be witnesses 
 
 
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in the criminal case.  In the motion, the government represented that Detective 
Reece had investigated the importation and distribution of marijuana and cocaine 
in the Southern District of Ohio and that as a result of his investigation, Faehl was 
charged with the federal offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
marijuana and cocaine.  The government asserted that disclosure of the requested 
records would give Keller and Faehl access to the records that they would not 
otherwise be entitled to in the criminal case under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 or Brady v. 
Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and that such 
disclosure would also violate Detective Reece’s constitutional right to privacy. 
 
Following the government’s motion in the federal criminal case and the 
refusal of appellees, Mahan and Miami County Sheriff Charles A. Cox, to provide 
access to Detective Reece’s personnel and internal affairs records, Keller filed a 
complaint in the Court of Appeals for Miami County to compel appellees to 
provide such access pursuant to R.C. 149.43.1  Appellees filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  Appellees attached to their memorandum in support of the motion an 
affidavit of Detective Reece stating that Faehl and an individual whom Faehl had 
contacted had threatened Detective Reece and his wife.  Keller moved to strike 
Detective Reece’s affidavit and all unsworn factual allegations contained in 
appellees’ memorandum. 
 
In September 1998, the court of appeals granted appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motion and dismissed Keller’s mandamus complaint.  The court of appeals held 
that “notwithstanding the fact that personnel and internal investigative records 
pertaining to police officers are public records under [R.C.] 149.43  * * *, the 
statute is not available as a tool of discovery  * * * by criminal defendants.”  The 
court of appeals reasoned that this result was mandated by paragraph two of the 
 
 
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syllabus of State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 
N.E.2d 83, which provides that “[i]n the criminal proceeding itself, a defendant 
may use only Crim.R. 16 to obtain discovery.”  The court of appeals ruled that the 
requested records could be acquired by Keller “only via Crim.R. 16, if at all.”  The 
court of appeals did not expressly rule on Keller’s motion to strike. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Steven R. Keller, Federal Public Defender, Beth Goldstein Lewis and 
Randolph W. Alden, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
Gary A. Nasal, Miami County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Keller asserts in his various propositions of law that the court 
of appeals erred in granting appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissing his 
mandamus action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
Keller initially contends that the court of appeals erred in failing to grant his 
motion to strike and relying on improper evidence to dismiss his complaint.  The 
court of appeals in effect overruled Keller’s motion to strike by failing to rule on 
it.  “[W]hen a trial court fails to rule on a pretrial motion, it may ordinarily be 
presumed that the court overruled it.”  State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198, 201. 
 
However, we do find that the court of appeals erred in overruling Keller’s 
motion to strike the attached affidavit and unsworn factual allegations in 
appellees’ memorandum in support of their Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal motion.  
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) movants like appellees cannot rely on allegations or evidence 
outside the complaint to support their motion.  State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 96, 647 N.E.2d 788, 791. 
 
 
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Nevertheless, the court of appeals’ error in overruling Keller’s motion to 
strike did not prejudice Keller.  See State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 206, 208, 680 N.E.2d 985, 987.  Although the court of appeals cited 
some of the unsworn factual allegations contained in appellees’ memorandum in 
its decision, it did not rely on these allegations to resolve its Civ.R. 12(B)(6) legal 
determination, and the allegations cited were also contained in the government 
motion attached as an exhibit to Keller’s complaint.  Cf. State ex rel. Findlay 
Publishing Co. v. Schroeder (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 669 N.E.2d 835, 837, 
where we held that courts “cannot rely on allegations or evidence outside [a] 
complaint in determining [a] Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion”;  see, also, State ex rel. 
Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 673 
N.E.2d 1281, 1283, fn. 1 (“Material incorporated in a complaint may be 
considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12[B][6] 
motion to dismiss”). 
 
Regarding Keller’s main contentions attacking the court of appeals’ 
decision to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) his complaint for a writ of 
mandamus, we disagree with the court of appeals that Steckman applies to this 
case.  The records sought by appellant are not part of “criminal discovery” because  
they have nothing to do with the crime or the criminal case itself. 
 
But based on Kallstrom v. Columbus (C.A.6, 1998), 136 F.3d 1055, the 
requested records are exempt because they are protected by the constitutional right 
of privacy.  Police officers’ files that contain the names of the officers’ children, 
spouses, parents, home addresses, telephone numbers, beneficiaries, medical 
information, and the like should not be available to a defendant who might use the 
information to achieve nefarious ends.  This information should be protected not 
only by the constitutional right of privacy, but, also, we are persuaded that there 
 
 
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must be a “good sense” rule when such information about a law enforcement 
officer is sought by a defendant in a criminal case.  On the other hand, any records 
needed by a defendant in a criminal case that reflect on discipline, citizen 
complaints, or how an officer does her or his job can be obtained, if any exist, 
through internal affairs files in accordance with previous decisions of this court. 
 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Keller’s complaint was originally mistakenly filed in Montgomery County, 
but the court of appeals sua sponte transferred the case to Miami County. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming 
the court of appeals’ dismissal of Keller’s mandamus action.  As a preliminary 
matter, I agree with the majority that the constitutional right of privacy exempts 
certain personnel records of police officers from disclosure under the Public 
Records Act.  See Kallstrom v. Columbus (C.A.6, 1998), 136 F.3d 1055. 
 
Nevertheless, the majority’s and appellees’ reliance on the constitutional 
right of privacy does not support dismissal of Keller’s mandamus action because 
any argument that Detective Reece’s constitutional right to privacy exempts all of 
the requested records is, at this juncture, premature.  Cf. State ex rel. Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 605, 640 N.E.2d 164 
(federal constitutional right to privacy exempts disclosure of city employees’ 
 
 
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Social Security numbers).  Exemptions from disclosure must be strictly construed 
against the public records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish 
an exemption.  State ex rel. McGowan v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 518, 519, 678 N.E.2d 1388, 1389.  Based solely on the allegations of 
the complaint, appellees have not established that all of the contents of the 
requested personnel files and internal affairs investigative reports relating to 
Detective Reece are exempt.  In this regard, Kallstrom, the sole authority cited by 
the majority to support its holding, does not hold that the constitutional right to 
privacy necessarily exempts from disclosure the entire contents of the testifying 
officers’ personnel files.  Kallstrom merely holds that disclosure of testifying 
police officers’ addresses, phone numbers, and driver’s licenses, as well as the 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of their family members, violates their 
fundamental constitutional rights to privacy, but that other information in their 
personnel files would have to be analyzed to see whether it also violated these 
constitutional rights.  Id., 136 F.3d at 1069-1070. 
 
In fact, the majority concedes that personnel files that reflect discipline, 
citizen complaints, or how an officer does her or his job are public records.  By 
affirming the dismissal of Keller’s action, the majority had to have assumed, 
before the court of appeals conducted an in camera inspection of the records, that 
all of the requested personnel records in this case are of the types that are shielded 
from disclosure by the constitutional right of privacy.  Keller requested access to 
all personnel and internal affairs records relating to Detective Reece.  His request 
is broad enough to include the records that the majority concedes would be subject 
to disclosure under R.C. 149.43, i.e., records that “reflect on discipline, citizen 
complaints, or how an officer does her or his job  * * *.”  The majority’s holding, 
which assumes that all personnel records relating to Detective Reece are exempt, 
 
 
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is therefore unsupported by the record, Kallstrom, or the court of appeals’ duty 
under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) to construe the material factual allegations of Keller’s 
complaint most strongly in his favor. 
 
Finally, to the extent that the majority relies on a “good sense” rule in 
addition to the constitutional right of privacy, we have rejected analogous public-
policy exemptions by holding that “ ‘in enumerating very narrow, specific 
exceptions to the public records statute, the General Assembly has already 
weighed and balanced the competing public policy considerations between the 
public’s right to know how its state agencies make decisions and the potential 
harm, inconvenience or burden imposed on the agency by disclosure.’ ”  State ex 
rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 643 N.E.2d 126, 
130, quoting State ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 
172, 637 N.E.2d 911, 913-914; see, also, State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Snowden 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 141, 143-144, 647 N.E.2d 1374, 1378. In fact, the 
fundamental policy advanced by R.C. 149.43 is to promote open government, not 
to restrict it.  State ex rel. The Miami Student v. Miami Univ. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
168, 171, 680 N.E.2d 956, 959.  As noted previously, the applicability of any 
privacy exemption cannot yet be determined in ruling on appellees’ Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) motion because this determination is restricted to the allegations of 
Keller’s complaint.  See State ex rel. Natl. Electrical Contractors Assn., Ohio 
Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 
N.E.2d 64,  66. 
 
Based on the foregoing, it appears that after construing the material factual 
allegations of Keller’s complaint most strongly in his favor, he can prove a set of 
facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.  The court of appeals 
consequently erred in dismissing Keller’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  
 
 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings.  See State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410-411, 686 N.E.2d 1126, 1128.  Because the 
majority does not so decide, I respectfully dissent.