Title: Barnes v. Board of County Comm'rs

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,609 
 
VICTOR W. BARNES and NANCY BARNES, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF COWLEY COUNTY, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over official acts of administrative 
officials or boards. Absent a statutory provision for judicial review, courts are limited to 
certain equitable remedies.  
 
2. 
Public agencies and boards act in legislative, administrative, judicial, and quasi-
judicial capacities.  
 
3. 
K.S.A. 19-223 provides the exclusive method by which a district court may review 
a judicial or quasi-judicial decision by a board of county commissioners. 
  
4. 
K.S.A. 19-223 does not apply to an administrative decision by a board of county 
commissioners. 
 
 
 
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5.  
 
Assessment of a tax by a board of county commissioners is administrative in 
nature.  
 
6.  
To pursue a claim of an illegal tax under K.S.A. 60-907(a), that claim must be 
judicial in nature, not administrative, in order to avoid the requirement that litigants 
exhaust administrative remedies on tax matters. 
 
7. 
A claim is judicial in nature if it alleges an administrative official or board acted 
without authority or took action that was permeated with fraud, corruption, or conduct so 
oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious as to amount to fraud in connection with the levy of 
any tax, charge, or assessment.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 3, 2009. 
Appeal from Cowley District Court; J. MICHAEL SMITH, judge. Opinion filed September 2, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
case is remanded with directions to the Court of Appeals.  
 
Christopher A. Rogers, of Rogers & Lanning, of Winfield, argued the cause and was on the briefs 
for appellants.  
 
Edward L. Keeley, of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, P.A., of Wichita, argued 
the cause and was on the briefs for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  This is an appeal from a special tax assessment the Cowley County 
Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the 
County claims it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions 
on that property. The property owners challenge the assessment, but both lower courts 
found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and dismissed the litigation. The legal issue 
turns on whether the claims may be brought on direct review under K.S.A. 60-907(a), 
which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, 
or assessment. 
 
To answer this question, we must determine whether K.S.A. 60-907(a) or K.S.A. 
19-223 governs jurisdiction as to some or all of the allegations made. The analysis 
required is a multi-step process because K.S.A. 19-223 controls if the Board action at 
issue was taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, while K.S.A. 60-907(a) is 
applicable only to Board action taken in an administrative or legislative capacity. The 
first step is to determine whether any claims are controlled by K.S.A. 19-223. If so, those 
claims were properly dismissed. But as to any remaining claims, our inquiry does not end 
and additional steps in the analysis are required because K.S.A. 60-907(a) applies only if 
the nature of a claim is judicial. Admittedly, sifting through the various allegations made 
in this case to first determine the character of the Board action challenged before then 
exploring the nature of an individual claim can be confounding, especially since our case 
law uses similar terminology in different contexts and with different emphasis. But in the 
end, we determine jurisdiction exists for some of the claims made in this case. We 
remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the district court properly granted 
summary judgment as to those remaining claims.  
 
 
 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Victor and Nancy Barnes (property owners) own but do not reside on 
approximately 14 acres of land in Cowley County, Kansas. In August 2005, five county 
residents petitioned the Board, alleging the land contained structures unfit for human use 
and presented a nuisance because the structures were falling in, the land was overgrown 
with tall weeds, and old cars were parked around the buildings. This complaint was filed 
pursuant to Cowley County Resolution 2005-01, which the Board adopted to identify and 
clean up unsafe structures and unsightly conditions on County properties.  
 
In December 2005, Jim McGuire, a Cowley County Health Department 
Environmental Technician, visited the property owners' land to conduct a preliminary 
investigation into the allegations as a procedural step pursuant to Resolution 2005-01. 
McGuire agreed the land contained dangerous structures, an open basement unfit for 
human use or habitation, and miscellaneous debris creating a nuisance. On December 22, 
McGuire mailed the property owners a formal complaint describing the property's 
condition and giving notice of a January 17, 2006, hearing. The complaint also advised 
the property owners that they could file an answer or appear in person to present evidence 
to refute the claims, but they did neither. The property owners were temporarily living 
out of state and claim they called McGuire before the hearing to advise him they would 
return to Kansas in March or April.  
 
At the January hearing, the Board found the property did not comply with 
standards established in Resolution No. 2005-01 because of the unsafe structures; open 
basement; inoperable and unsightly parked vehicles; abandoned tires, appliances, and 
barrels; overgrown vegetation; and miscellaneous debris. The Board adopted a written 
order, dated January 17, 2006, stating the property owners must "commence" within 30 
days:  
 
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"(1) to either repair, alter, clean-up or improve structures to render the structure 
fit for human use or habitation; to vacate and close the structure until conformance with 
thee [sic] regulations are met; or to remove or demolish such structure; [and] 
"(2) to abate or remove the accumulation of materials creating a nuisance on the 
property . . . . " 
 
The order further notified the property owners that failure to "commence within 
the time stated" or "diligently prosecute the same until the work is completed" would 
carry consequences, stating:  
 
 
"[T]he Board of County Commissioners does hereby authorize and direct county 
staff to undertake efforts using county personnel or private contractors to bring said 
property into compliance. Further, the amount of the cost of removal or demolition of a 
structure or the removal or abatement of accumulation of materials creating a nuisance on 
a lot or parcel of land by the County and the cost of providing notice, including postage, 
shall be a lien against the real property upon which such cost was incurred and such lien, 
including as part thereof allowance of all costs and necessary attorney fees, may be 
foreclosed in judicial proceedings in the manner provided or authorized by law for loans 
secured by liens on real property, or shall be assessed as a special assessment against the 
lot or parcel of land on which the structure or the accumulation of materials creating a 
nuisance was located, and the County Clerk shall at the time of certifying other taxes, 
certify the unpaid portion of the aforesaid costs and shall extend the same on the tax rolls 
of the County against said lot or parcel of land." 
 
According to Victor Barnes, he received the order sometime in early February and 
told McGuire he would hire someone to address the Board's concerns when he returned 
to Kansas in early April. He claims McGuire told him the County would not take any 
remedial action as long as cleanup work was progressing.  
 
 
6 
 
 
 
On March 14, 2006, the county counselor sent the property owners a letter stating 
that they had 21 days to comply with the Board's order or the County would complete the 
work. The letter further indicated that "[t]hese costs will be billed to you, the property 
owners, and if not paid then they will be assessed to the real estate . . . as a special 
assessment." 
 
The property owners returned to Kansas in early April and hired a contractor, 
Jacob Henderson. They claim Henderson was to raze the three buildings on the property, 
fill in the house's basement and a water well, remove dead trees and broken limbs, and 
dispose of some old appliances. In an affidavit later filed as part of the court proceedings, 
Henderson estimated the entire cleanup would cost $5,000. The property owners paid 
Henderson a $1,800 deposit. Henderson claims he spent more than 58 hours razing the 
barn and shed, tearing down the old brick house and piling the brick for salvage, filling 
the basement and the water well, disposing of tires and appliances, and cleaning up limbs 
and dead trees. But Henderson was unable to complete the project because of heavy rains 
and personal illness. Henderson claims he returned to the property to complete the work, 
but Cowley County equipment was already there and the county counselor instructed him 
over the phone not to finish the project. 
 
From May 30 to June 5, 2006, Cowley County employees performed their own 
cleanup. An affidavit by the county engineer indicates the county crew performed the 
following work:  (1) removed the porch, a 3-foot brick wall and debris, and filled in the 
basement; (2) removed a shed; (3) broke the top and sides of two cisterns and filled them 
with top soil; (4) removed the foundation and chimney base of the barn; (5) removed a 
pickup topper filled with canned beans and corn; (6) removed 194 tires and some sapling 
trees that had grown around them; (7) removed numerous metal barrels, parts of 
appliances, tin and wooden junk, fencing, barbed wire, and other debris, which required 
the removal of some sapling trees; and (8) mowed the high weeds and brush. The County 
 
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billed the property owners $11,740.75 for this work. The parties agree that when the bill 
was not paid, this amount was "placed on [the property owners'] tax statement and 
charged as an assessment, tax, or charge and instituted a lien against [the] real property."  
 
On March 27, 2007, the property owners sued the County. The petition sought an 
injunction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-907 to prevent the Board from enforcing the tax lien or 
attempting to collect the amount billed. The petition does not clearly identify the statutes 
or County activities at issue. But, highly summarized, the property owners claimed:  (1) 
the County acted without statutory authority when it completed the work and levied the 
claimed costs against the property; (2) Resolution 2005-01 was void and unenforceable 
because it contradicted Kansas nuisance abatement statutes; and (3) the County violated 
the property owners' due process and equal protection rights.  
 
The County moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction. It claimed the property owners were required to appeal the County's 
actions under K.S.A. 19-223 within 30 days of the Board's January 2006 cleanup order. 
The County argued this statute was the exclusive method by which a district court may 
review judicial or quasi-judicial board actions, and the failure to comply with the statute 
deprived the district court of jurisdiction. As an alternative argument, the County 
contended the property owners failed to state a claim because Resolution 2005-01 was 
not illegal or unconstitutional. The property owners responded and moved for judgment 
on the pleadings. 
 
The district court construed the parties' pleadings as cross-motions for summary 
judgment. It held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the property owners' claims 
because there was no appeal within 30 days of the Board's January 2006 cleanup order, 
which the court found was required by K.S.A. 19-223. But despite finding it lacked 
jurisdiction, the district court went on to reach the merits of the claims by granting the 
 
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County's summary judgment motion and denying the property owners' motion. The 
property owners appealed all adverse district court rulings. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that it lacked 
jurisdiction. It interpreted the property owners' claims as "an attack on the County's 
decision that their property did not comply with the newly adopted resolution." Barnes v. 
Board of Cowley County Comm'rs, No. 99,609, 2009 WL 929117, at *1 (Kan. App. 
2009) (unpublished opinion). The property owners petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted solely to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding no subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g)(1) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 68). 
This court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (review of Court of Appeals' 
decision).  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The sole issue is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
property owners' claims. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 286, 200 P.3d 467 (2009).  
 
Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over official acts of administrative 
officials or boards, unless there is a statute providing for judicial review. Absent such a 
statutory provision, appellate review of administrative decisions is limited to claims of 
relief from illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive official conduct through the equitable 
remedies of quo warranto, mandamus, or injunction. Umbehr v. Board of Wabaunsee 
County Comm'rs, 252 Kan. 30, 38, 843 P.2d 176 (1992). The right to appeal an 
administrative decision is not vested or constitutional; it is statutory and may be limited 
or completely abolished by the legislature. The property owners do not seek review 
through the court's equitable powers. 
 
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Instead, the property owners argue K.S.A. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive 
relief from an illegal tax, gave the lower courts jurisdiction. In contrast, the County 
argues K.S.A. 19-223, which governs appeals from decisions of boards of county 
commissioners, controls. The district court and Court of Appeals agreed with the County 
and held K.S.A. 19-223 most applicable. They held further that the property owners 
failed to comply with the statute's prerequisite provisions by not appealing the Board's 
January 2006 cleanup order within 30 days. This failure, both courts reasoned, statutorily 
deprived them of jurisdiction. 
 
But K.S.A. 19-223 applies only if the challenged county action is judicial or quasi-
judicial in nature. Dutoit v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 233 Kan. 995, 998-99, 
667 P.2d 879 (1983) (K.S.A. 19-223 is exclusive method to review a judicial or quasi-
judicial decision by a board of county commissioners; statute inapplicable to appeals 
from legislative-type decision); see also Larson v. Ruskowitz, 252 Kan. 963, 965-66, 850 
P.2d 253 (1993) (statute inapplicable when board of county commissioners acts in an 
administrative capacity to approve an employee reorganization plan and declines later to 
modify that plan). 
 
Is K.S.A. 19-223 the statute governing jurisdiction over these claims? 
 
Public agencies and boards exercise legislative, administrative, judicial, and quasi-
judicial powers. Umbehr, 252 Kan. at 33. And it is well established that K.S.A. 19-223 is 
the exclusive means to review Board conduct that is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. 
Dutoit, 233 Kan. at 998-99. K.S.A. 19-223 states:  
 
 
"Any person who shall be aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
commissioners may appeal from the decision of such board to the district court of the 
 
10 
 
 
 
same county, by causing a written notice of such appeal to be served on the clerk of such 
board within thirty days after the making of such decision, and executing a bond to such 
county with sufficient security, to be approved by the clerk of said board, conditioned for 
the faithful prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of all costs that shall be 
adjudged against the appellant." 
 
The County argues K.S.A. 19-223 applies exclusively to this appeal because the 
Board was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity when it entered its order finding 
the property did not comply with Resolution 2005-01, ordering the property owners to 
bring the land into compliance, and notifying them the County would complete the work 
at the owners' expense if they failed to diligently prosecute the order. In contrast, the 
property owners argue their challenge targets the tax assessment only and not the initial 
finding that their land did not comply with the resolution. A closer review of the claims 
supports their contention.  
 
The petition does not ask the district court to reverse the initial cleanup order. 
Rather, the prayer for relief is for "an order permanently enjoining [the Board] from 
imposing any charge, assessment, or tax on Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' real estate; and . . . 
from attempting to collect or enforce the collection of any charge, assessment or tax from 
Plaintiffs or against any real property owned by Plaintiffs." The property owners' brief to 
this court makes clear that it "is the levy of an illegal tax upon Plaintiffs' real property and 
the attempted enforcement thereof which is the basis of Plaintiffs' suit, not the finding 
that their property did not meet the standards of the resolution." Furthermore, the 
property owners' actions confirm they did not dispute the County's determination that the 
land contained unsafe structures and required cleanup. In fact, they hired a contractor and 
paid him to accomplish that cleanup. 
 
What is at the heart of this dispute is the special tax assessment amount, which is 
directly impacted by:  (1) the county staff's decisions to dismiss the property owners' 
 
11 
 
 
 
contractor and complete the work using county resources; (2) the degree of cleanup 
achieved by county personnel; and (3) the costs the County claims were reasonably 
incurred to finish the job. All of these county actions came well after 30 days from the 
date of the initial cleanup order. Therefore, even though we would agree the initial 
cleanup order is a judicial or quasi-judicial determination made by the Board, that order 
is distinct from what the Board and county personnel did after the order was issued.  
 
But the County argues this distinction is irrelevant because the special tax 
assessment stems from the January 2006 order. The County asserts the property owners 
had to appeal the initial cleanup order within 30 days to preserve the right to challenge 
any future tax assessment that may (or may not) have followed. How the property owners 
could anticipate and articulate unreasonable conduct, misconduct, or overcharging by 
county staff in some future implementation of the initial cleanup order is not explained. 
And this is an obvious weakness in the County's argument. 
 
But to support its defense, the County directs us to our Court of Appeals' decisions 
in Kirtdoll v. City of Topeka, No. 95,946, 2007 WL 570293 (2007) (unpublished 
opinion), rev. denied 284 Kan. 946 (2007), and Dahl v. City of Shawnee, No. 92,144, 
2006 WL 851232 (2006) (unpublished opinion). Kirtdoll and Dahl both deal with a 
plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under a different statute, K.S.A. 60-
2101(d), which governs appeals from a political subdivision exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. We must consider these unpublished decisions in more detail to 
explain why they differ from the case brought by the property owners here.  
 
In Kirtdoll, an administrative hearing officer found Frank Kirtdoll in violation of 
two Topeka city ordinances and ordered him to abate a property nuisance within 30 days 
by removing some abandoned vehicles and other material from his premises. The order 
authorized the City to remedy the problem if Kirtdoll did not comply. He did not appeal 
 
12 
 
 
 
that order or clean up the property, so the City secured a district court warrant to enter the 
premises to seize and dispose of the offending material. Kirtdoll sued the City for 
damages 2 years later, claiming due process violations, deprivation of property, trespass, 
and unlawful search and seizure. The City argued Kirtdoll was required to appeal within 
30 days of the original abatement order under K.S.A. 60-2101(d), and that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction because he did not exhaust administrative remedies. The Court 
of Appeals agreed, holding Kirtdoll was required to appeal within 30 days of the original 
order pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(d) and could not collaterally attack the administrative 
order through an independent tort action. 
 
In Dahl, a natural disaster damaged the foundation of Bryan Dahl's home. A City 
of Shawnee inspector determined it was a hazardous condition and ordered Dahl to repair 
or remove the foundation within 30 days. When Dahl did not comply, the Shawnee City 
Council passed a resolution setting a hearing for Dahl to show cause why the structure 
should not be repaired or demolished. At the hearing, the Council adopted a resolution 
finding the structure unsafe or dangerous. It ordered Dahl to install safety fencing and 
submit an engineering plan for the foundation's removal. Under that resolution, the City 
would remedy the conditions if Dahl failed to comply. When Dahl continued to be in 
noncompliance, the Council held another meeting after giving Dahl notice. At that 
meeting, the Council found Dahl had not complied with the resolution and accepted a bid 
to proceed. The City's contractor completed the work. Dahl later sued the City for 
property damage he alleged occurred during the demolition. The City argued Dahl was 
required to appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101(d) within 30 days of the initial resolution, and 
because he did not do so, he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of 
Appeals held the initial resolution was the only order necessary for the City to demolish 
the structure under K.S.A. 12-1755, which allowed the City to raze or remove unsafe 
structures if the owner failed to "diligently prosecute" the removal or repair, so Dahl had 
 
13 
 
 
 
30 days to appeal. Finally, the Dahl court held his failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction.  
 
Kirtdoll and Dahl are distinguishable because they are civil actions for monetary 
damages. They do not involve the levying of disputed cleanup costs as a special tax 
assessment against property. And it is well established that the assessment of a tax is 
administrative in nature. See J. Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Harvey County Comm'rs, 
253 Kan. 552, 555-56, 857 P.2d 666 (1993) (jurisdiction depends on the nature of the 
actual relief sought); Dutoit, 233 Kan. at 999 (determination of extent of benefit property 
received from a public improvement for the purpose of calculating special assessment is 
legislative or administrative in nature); Gravey Grain, Inc. v. MacDonald, 203 Kan. 1, 
29, 453 P.2d 59 (1969) (assessment and valuation of property are administrative 
functions); Harshberger v. Board of County Commissioners, 201 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 2, 442 
P.2d 5 (1968) (taxation matters are administrative in character); Silven v. Osage County, 
76 Kan. 687, 689, 92 P. 604 (1907) (matters of assessment and taxation are 
administrative, not judicial).  
 
We agree that the Board acted in a quasi-judicial capacity on January 17, 2006, 
when it investigated and weighed the facts and ultimately determined the property did not 
comply with Resolution 2005-01 and ordered the cleanup. See Brown v. U.S.D. No. 333, 
261 Kan. 134, 155-56, 928 P.2d 57 (1996) (distinguishing quasi-judicial functions from 
purely administrative or executive functions by whether the function involves the 
exercise of discretion, requires notice and a hearing, involves the application of legal 
criteria to specific facts, or carries with it any of the "normal trappings" of a judicial 
inquiry, such as the presentation of evidence or the presence of counsel). But the 
character of the County's actions shifted to administrative when the Board assessed the 
special tax. Cf. Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 597, 584 P.2d 130 (1978) 
(When the focus of a governing body shifts from legislative policy or executive duty to a 
 
14 
 
 
 
zoning determination as to one specific tract of land, the function becomes quasi-judicial 
in nature.). 
 
Moreover, the decision to levy a tax against the property was not self-executing. 
Under the Board's January 2006 order, there were two mechanisms available to the 
County to recover any costs it might incur cleaning up the land. The Board could either 
begin judicial proceedings to impose a lien on the real property or it could enter a special 
tax assessment. It chose to levy the special tax assessment at issue here. Accordingly, we 
find the County was acting in an administrative capacity when the Board decided to levy 
the tax. Therefore, K.S.A. 19-223 does not control all of the claims in this litigation as the 
district court and Court of Appeals determined.  
 
We emphasize that our analysis only establishes the character of the County's 
action, at least in part, as administrative for the purpose of determining jurisdiction; and 
we are not reaching the merits of the claim that the Board lacked the authority to levy this 
special tax assessment. We simply hold that K.S.A. 19-223 does not necessarily operate 
as a jurisdictional bar to all of the arguments made by the property owners. Therefore, we 
must examine each claim separately to determine whether it actually challenges the 
special tax assessment and avoids K.S.A. 19-223's jurisdictional bar. 
 
Does each claim avoid the jurisdictional bar?  
 
Admittedly, in some instances, deciphering the nature of the relief sought under 
each of the property owners' claims is difficult, but it is a necessary exercise. We 
categorize the claims generally as follows: 
 
(1) The property owners contend the County exceeded its statutory authority in 
violation of the County Home Rule Act, K.S.A. 19-101 et seq. when the Board enacted 
 
15 
 
 
 
the self-help and abatement remedy provisions in Section 6 of Resolution 2005-01. This 
attacks the Board's ability to levy the tax at issue. It is properly characterized as a 
challenge to a tax assessment and falls under K.S.A. 60-907(a). This claim is not 
jurisdictionally barred by K.S.A. 19-223. 
 
(2) The property owners also claim Resolution 2005-01 is void because it prohibits 
a broader class of conduct than the criminal nuisance statutes, K.S.A. 21-4106 and K.S.A. 
21-4107. This argument is two-pronged:  (a) The County is only entitled to declare a 
nuisance for conditions that injure or endanger the public health, and the property owners 
contend it goes beyond those limitations; and (b) the County exceeded its authority by 
creating its own procedures to determine whether a nuisance exists. We find the Court of 
Appeals was correct in its analysis that the nature of relief sought under these arguments 
is best characterized as a challenge to the Board's January 2006 cleanup order and only 
tangentially related to the special tax assessment. While a finding that the order was 
improperly entered would ultimately negate the tax assessment, we agree the property 
owners were required to bring this claim earlier under K.S.A. 19-223. We find both 
prongs of this argument barred.  
 
(3) The property owners further claim Resolution 2005-01 is unconstitutionally 
vague in violation of the United States Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
due process requirements because:  (a) Sections 5(a) and 5(b) are vague and overbroad 
when defining what constitutes a nuisance and an unsightly appearance, in violation of 
their right to due process; and (b) Section 5 is overly vague and gives the County's agent 
unbridled authority to determine whether a property constitutes a nuisance. Related to 
this, the property owners also argue Resolution 2005-01 is overbroad because it prohibits 
the constitutionally protected right to peaceful ownership, use, and enjoyment of property 
by prohibiting conditions that are neither injurious nor a danger to public health. We find 
these contentions are also only tangentially related to the special tax assessment and more 
 
16 
 
 
 
properly viewed as a challenge to the Board's January 17, 2006, order finding that the 
property does not comply with Resolution 2005-01. The property owners were required 
to bring these issues under K.S.A. 19-223 and may not now proceed under K.S.A. 60-
907(a).  
 
(4) The property owners further argue Resolution 2005-01 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
because it exempts farmers and those engaged in agricultural pursuits from its provisions. 
The argument made is that there is no rational basis for treating general landowners 
differently than farmers. Again, this is not directly related to the special tax assessment. It 
is better characterized as a challenge to the Board's order finding the land is not in 
compliance with Resolution 2005-01. As such, it cannot now be raised under K.S.A. 60-
907(a).  
 
(5) Finally, the property owners make various arguments that Resolution 2005-01 
was unconstitutional as applied to them and that the County's conduct toward them was 
arbitrary and capricious. They assert the following:  (a) They were not given sufficient 
notice or opportunity to attend the January 17, 2006, hearing; (b) the County's actions 
conflicted because the county environmental technician assured them by phone the 
County would not act as long as the cleanup was progressing, but then the county 
counselor sent a letter shortly thereafter requiring compliance within 21 days; (c) the 
county employees entered the property and began work despite the progress the property 
owners made complying with the order; and (d) the County engaged in arbitrary and 
capricious conduct because the work performed exceeded any legitimate goals of abating 
dangerous conditions and amounted to beautifying the property. We find the first claim in 
this series (sufficient notice of the January 2006 hearing) is essentially just another attack 
on the Board's order and needed to be raised under K.S.A. 19-223. It is subject to the 
jurisdictional bar. But the remaining claims are sufficiently tailored to challenge the 
 
17 
 
 
 
special tax assessment and survive a jurisdictional attack. These latter claims go to the 
County's decision to initiate its own cleanup efforts and the degree of work performed, 
which was ultimately determinative of the amount the County billed. Those may properly 
be seen as claims under K.S.A. 60-907(a).  
 
In summary, this analysis leads us to the conclusion that only some of the property 
owners' claims appropriately targeted the special tax assessment under K.S.A. 60-907(a). 
The Court of Appeals correctly found K.S.A. 19-223 bars review of the claims noted 
above but erred by finding all claims were barred. Our remaining question is whether the 
property owners were required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their 
surviving claims in the district court.  
 
Were the property owners required to exhaust administrative remedies?  
 
K.S.A. 60-907(a) states:  "[I]njunctive relief may be granted to enjoin the illegal 
levy of any tax, charge, or assessment, the collection thereof, or any proceeding to 
enforce the same." K.S.A. 60-907(a) has long been held to allow review of an 
administrative action taken 
 
"without statutory authority or contrary to statutory authority or to action taken by an 
administrative official or board which is permeated with fraud, corruption or conduct so 
oppressive, arbitrary or capricious as to amount to fraud in connection with the levy of a 
tax, charge or assessment." Mobil Oil Corporation v. Reynolds, 202 Kan. 179, Syl. ¶ 1, 
446 P.2d 715 (1968).  
 
 
Historically, Kansas courts only considered whether a petitioner alleged that the 
levy, charge, or assessment occurred under these circumstances when asked to determine 
whether jurisdiction exists under K.S.A. 60-907(a). See Blevins v. Board of Douglas 
County Comm'rs, 251 Kan. 374, 382, 834 P.2d 1344 (1992); Dutoit, 233 Kan. at 999; 
 
18 
 
 
 
Mobile Oil Corporation v. McHenry, 200 Kan. 211, 234, 436 P.2d 982 (1968). But this 
court's J. Enterprises decision altered the analysis to include recognition that most tax 
claims must be determined first by the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) (now the Court of 
Tax Appeals) under the doctrine of administrative remedies. Therefore, to establish 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-907(a), a plaintiff must not only allege an illegal tax as 
defined by those earlier cases, but must also make certain the alleged illegality is not 
administrative in nature because that would require exhaustion of administrative remedies 
before allowing court review. 253 Kan. at 555. 
 
In J. Enterprises, Harvey County assessed additional property taxes and a penalty 
after determining the taxpayers improperly excluded some "rent-to-own" property from 
their ad valorem personal property tax renditions. The taxpayers filed an action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 60-907(a), 
challenging the assessments. The district court granted an injunction after finding the 
rent-to-own property was exempt inventory under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 79-201m. The 
County appealed. On its own motion, this court asked whether jurisdiction existed in light 
of its recent holding in another tax case that stated:  
 
 
"In the realm of taxes, matters of assessment, exemption, equalization, and 
valuation are administrative in character. [Citation omitted.] Under Kansas law, it would 
be unwarranted for a court to entertain a tax suit on any of these matters of administrative 
expertise where administrative remedies had not been pursued." Dean v. State, 250 Kan. 
417, 421, 826 P.2d 1372, cert. denied 504 U.S. 973 (1992).  
 
After reviewing the existing statutory and regulatory scheme governing taxes, 
which appointed BOTA as the "paramount taxing authority" in the state, the J. 
Enterprises court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied 
to claims raised under K.S.A. 60-907(a). This meant that a claim for injunctive tax relief 
could only be filed directly with the district court if the plaintiff's claims were judicial in 
 
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character. If the plaintiff's claims were administrative in nature, they must be filed with 
BOTA. We said this distinction maintained the proper relationship between the courts 
and administrative agencies. J. Enterprises, 253 Kan. at 555.  
 
The J. Enterprises court reconciled the exhaustion of remedies analysis with the 
previous K.S.A. 60-907(a) cases by finding that a claim was judicial in nature if the 
plaintiff alleged an official or board acted without authority or if their actions were 
permeated with fraud, corruption, or conduct so oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious as to 
amount to fraud. 253 Kan. at 559. When determining whether a claim is administrative or 
judicial, the J. Enterprises court held jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-907(a) depends on the 
"nature of the actual relief sought." 253 Kan. at 555-56. Otherwise, a plaintiff could 
bypass administrative review in nearly all cases simply by alleging the tax was "illegal." 
253 Kan. at 556.  
 
Applying these rules to the facts in that case, the J. Enterprises court looked 
beyond the plaintiffs' facial claim that an illegal tax was imposed and emphasized that 
none of the parties challenged the validity of the tax exemption statute. Instead, the 
question before the court was whether the County erroneously interpreted that statute. It 
then held that the plaintiffs' claim was not judicial in nature because the plaintiffs did not 
assert the County had acted without authority, or that the action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or capricious. Instead, the claim was administrative in nature because it involved whether 
an exemption applied, which required statutory interpretation. 253 Kan. at 560. As such, 
jurisdiction did not arise under K.S.A. 60-907(a), and the case was dismissed for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies. 
 
It is also important to note there is a distinction between the K.S.A. 19-223 
analysis and the K.S.A. 60-907(a) analysis when it comes to the use of terms. Under a 
K.S.A. 19-223 analysis, the terms "judicial," "administrative," and "legislative" describe 
 
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the nature of the governmental conduct, which in this case is the action by the Board. 
Dutoit, 233 Kan. at 998-99 (K.S.A. 19-223 "affords jurisdiction when a board of county 
commissioners has engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial action."). In a K.S.A. 60-907(a) 
analysis, the terms "judicial" and "administrative" refer to the nature of the plaintiff's 
claims. Admittedly, the use of the same terms in our caselaw is confusing and imposes a 
more thoughtful consideration when determining whether K.S.A. 60-907(a) applies.  
 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the nature of the property owners' 
surviving claims as outlined above is judicial or administrative in character. To establish 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-907(a), a claim must allege the County either acted without 
authority or that its actions were so arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious that they 
amounted to fraud. See J. Enterprises, 253 Kan. at 559. The property owners' claims that 
survived the jurisdictional bar of K.S.A. 19-223 as discussed above must be individually 
examined to determine if any pass muster under J. Enterprises. 
 
The claim that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the 
County Home Rule Act, K.S.A. 19-101 et seq., when it enacted the self-help and 
abatement remedy provisions in Section 6 of Resolution 2005-01 is clearly judicial in 
nature because the property owners allege the Board acted without authority. And unlike 
the claim in J. Enterprises involving a Board's interpretation of a tax exemption statute, 
the property owners' claim here pertains to whether the County had authority to act as it 
did by adopting Section 6 of Resolution 2005-01 under the County Home Rule statute. 
This requires judicial analysis of K.S.A. 19-101d to determine the constitutionality of the 
Board's resolution and actions. 
 
The other claims stemming from the remaining miscellaneous attacks essentially 
allege two wrongs because the property owners argue Resolution 2005-01 was 
unconstitutional as applied to them and that the County's conduct was arbitrary and 
 
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capricious. These are the claims alleging the county environmental technician assured 
them the County would not initiate its own cleanup as long as work was progressing, 
shortly before they received a letter from the county counselor requiring compliance 
within 21 days; and the County's decision to enter the property and begin work despite 
the progress the property owners had made to comply with the order. Additionally, the 
property owners claim the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct because 
the work performed exceeded any legitimate goals of abating dangerous conditions and 
the County acted arbitrarily by beautifying the property. And even though the property 
owners' claims could have been much better articulated, the nature of their claims clearly 
assert that the County acted without any authority and/or the County's actions were 
permeated with conduct so arbitrary and capricious that it amounted to fraud. We find 
these claims are judicial in nature and could be filed directly with the district court 
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-907(a).  
  
In summary, we hold the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens 
under K.S.A. 60-907(a) on the following issues:  (1) the County exceeded its statutory 
authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act when the Board enacted the 
Resolution's self-help and abatement remedy provisions; and (2) Resolution 2005-01 was 
unconstitutional as applied, and the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct 
as noted above. 
 
Normally, our holding would require remand to the district court to determine the 
merits of the surviving claims, but the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question 
and found for the County on the merits. The property owners appealed both decisions to 
the Court of Appeals, but that court stopped short of considering the merits of any claims 
when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred by K.S.A. 19-223. Since we 
have found that the Court of Appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling, we remand 
to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the district court erred on the merits as it 
 
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relates to the surviving issues we have identified. The Court of Appeals must determine 
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on those claims that were 
not jurisdictionally barred.   
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded with directions.   
 
JAMES A. PATTON, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, 
§ 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution, Judge Patton was appointed to hear case No. 99,609 to 
fill the vacancy on the court created by the retirement of Chief Justice Robert E. Davis.