Title: Stancil v. Superior Court

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
EDWARD STANCIL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, 
Real Party in Interest.  
 
S253783 
 
First Appellate District, Division Four 
A156100 
 
San Mateo County Superior Court 
18UDL00903 
 
 
May 3, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred concurred. 
 
1 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S253783 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
Because tenants and landlords have differing interests, 
they can disagree sharply about the nature of their relationship 
and sometimes engender disputes that end up in court.  When 
that happens, certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure — 
commonly known as the Unlawful Detainer Act (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1159–1179a1) — govern the procedures for resolving many of 
the most common legal disputes between landlords and tenants.  
In particular, the Unlawful Detainer Act addresses a 
fundamental issue in the landlord-tenant relationship:  a 
tenant’s peaceful possession of real property leased from a 
landlord.  Given society’s interest in swiftly resolving the 
balance between a tenant’s right to enjoy leased real property 
without disturbance and a landlord’s right to ownership income, 
unlawful detainer actions advance quickly — and the relevant 
statutes impose shorter procedural timelines than the ones 
governing other civil actions.  These proceedings are limited in 
scope and demand strict adherence to the statutes’ procedural 
requirements.  At the center of this dispute is the use of a motion 
to quash service of summons under section 418.10 to challenge 
an unlawful detainer complaint.   
 
The landlord in this case is the City of Redwood City (the 
City), which operates Docktown Marina (Docktown).  The City 
 
1  
Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the 
Code of Civil Procedure.  
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against a tenant of 
Docktown, Edward Stancil.  In response, Stancil filed a motion 
to quash service of summons, relying on Delta Imports, Inc. v. 
Municipal Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1036 (Delta 
Imports), in which the Court of Appeal concluded that a “motion 
to quash service is the only method by which the defendant can 
test whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful 
detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.”  The City 
opposed the motion to quash, relying on a more recent case, 
Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 
Cal.App.4th 607 (Borsuk), which disagreed with this statement 
in Delta Imports.  We granted review to decide whether a 
defendant may use a motion to quash service of summons 
pursuant to section 418.10 to challenge a complaint on the 
ground that it fails to state a cause of action for unlawful 
detainer.   
 
What we conclude is that a defendant may not use a 
motion to quash service of summons to dispute the truth of the 
allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint.  
Rather, a motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision 
(a)(1) is a limited procedural tool to contest personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant where the statutory requirements for service 
of process are not fulfilled.  In the unlawful detainer context, a 
defendant may contest personal jurisdiction where the five-day 
summons specific to unlawful detainer actions is not supported 
by a complaint for unlawful detainer.  Such instances are 
unusual, and arise only where the summons is served alongside 
a complaint for a completely different cause of action (e.g.,  
breach of contract) or a complaint that fails to allege the 
allegations necessary to assert the defendant is guilty of 
unlawful detainer as specified in the relevant subdivision of 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
section 1161.  In these rare and limited circumstances, a 
defendant may use a motion to quash to challenge the unlawful 
detainer five-day summons as improper.  But no defendant may 
use a motion to quash service of summons as a means of 
disputing the merits of the unlawful detainer complaint’s 
allegations or to argue the plaintiff failed to comply with the 
pleading requirements specific to unlawful detainer actions set 
out in section 1166.   
 
Here, the superior court correctly found that Stancil 
improperly lodged his motion to quash to dispute the truth of 
the City’s allegations concerning its legal relationship with 
Stancil.  A defendant who disputes the veracity of an allegation 
in a complaint can file an answer to the complaint.  (§ 430.10, 
subd. (b).)  But because a motion to quash is not the proper 
procedure to litigate the merits of an unlawful detainer claim, 
we affirm the Court of Appeal’s denial of writ relief from the 
superior court’s order denying Stancil’s motion to quash.   
I. 
On September 21, 2018, the City filed a summons and 
complaint in unlawful detainer against Stancil.  The complaint 
alleged that in July 2013, the City as operator and manager of 
Docktown, gave Stancil the right to use a berth for residential 
purposes.  The original term of the “Live Aboard Rental 
Agreement” was for 12 months; after expiration of the initial 
term, the agreement renewed on a month-to-month basis, 
terminable by the City upon 60 days’ notice.   
In December 2016, the City Council of Redwood City 
adopted the “Docktown Plan,” which provided relocation 
assistance to eligible Docktown residents through financial 
assistance and relocation advisory services, and also detailed 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
the process for terminating residential use at Docktown.  Some 
Docktown residents accepted the relocation benefits and 
assistance, but others — including Stancil — remained.   
The City served Stancil a 60-day notice to quit and 
surrender possession of the premises pursuant to sections 1946 
and 1946.1.  Stancil refused to surrender the premises during 
the 60-day period, so the City filed a complaint for unlawful 
detainer, requesting judgment for possession and damages for 
each day Stancil remained in the berth at the fair value rate of 
$17.19 per day.   
In response, Stancil filed a motion to quash under section 
418.10.  Stancil argued only the port department — and not the 
City — had jurisdiction over Docktown and authority to sue him 
in unlawful detainer.  Relying on Delta Imports, Stancil asserted 
that a motion to quash was the proper procedure to raise a 
challenge on these grounds.  
In its opposition, the City argued that a motion to quash 
may only be used to challenge personal jurisdiction and cannot 
be used to attack a complaint for failure to state a claim.  The 
City maintained that Borsuk expressly disapproved Delta 
Imports and controlled.   
Following a hearing on the motion, the superior court 
denied Stancil’s motion to quash and concluded his challenge to 
the City’s complaint had to be raised on demurrer.  Stancil 
requested an immediate stay, which the Appellate Division of 
the Superior Court of San Mateo County denied.  Stancil then 
filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition challenging 
the superior court’s order in the Court of Appeal, which was 
summarily denied.  He subsequently filed a petition for review 
with this court, which we granted, limiting the issue for our 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
determination to whether a motion to quash service of summons 
is the proper remedy to test whether a complaint states a cause 
of action for unlawful detainer.    
II. 
 
The parties in this case disagree about how an unlawful 
detainer defendant may use a motion to quash service of 
summons under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1).  Stancil 
argues a defendant may use a motion to quash to challenge 
personal jurisdiction where an unlawful detainer complaint is 
defective in any manner, including when an allegation in the 
complaint is not true.  In contrast, the City contends a motion to 
quash is not the proper procedure to challenge whether an 
unlawful detainer complaint states a cause of action.  We resolve 
this disagreement by first considering the distinctive role of 
motions to quash service of summons in our system of civil 
procedure, before turning to unlawful detainer actions. 
A. 
 
Ordinarily, a court gains jurisdiction over the defendant 
from the time the defendant is served with a copy of the 
summons and the complaint on which it’s based, as required 
under the Code of Civil Procedure.  (§§ 410.50, 412.20; Honda 
Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048 
(Honda Motor Co.); Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 
Cal.App.3d 108, 110.)  The summons provides the defendant 
notice that the action described in the accompanying complaint 
has been filed against them in court.  A valid summons must 
contain information such as the title of the court in which the 
action is pending, the names of the parties, and a direction that 
the defendant file a written pleading in response to the 
complaint within 30 days after the summons is served.  (§ 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
412.20, subd. (a).)  In the distinctive context of unlawful 
detainer, the summons must also adhere to section 1167, which 
subjects defendants to a drastically abbreviated, five-day 
response time.  (§ 1167, subd. (a).)   
 
Animating this dispute is the possibility that a motion to 
quash can interfere with the speedy adjudication of an unlawful 
detainer claim.  Using such a motion, a defendant makes a 
special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting 
personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective.  (Greene 
v. Municipal Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 451 (Greene); 2 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Jurisdiction, § 217.)  A 
plaintiff who files a claim for unlawful detainer has the 
substantial benefit of an expedited timeframe for the 
defendant’s response.  For the defendant, a motion to quash 
offers a potential reprieve from this expedited procedure.  
Pursuant to section 418.10, filing a motion to quash extends the 
defendant’s time to respond to the complaint.  (§ 418.10, subd. 
(b).)  And a motion to quash offers defendants procedural 
advantages a demurrer or an appeal of an unlawful detainer 
judgment cannot.  Writ review is generally unavailable to 
challenge a trial court’s decision denying a demurrer.  (§§ 1086, 
1103; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 893, 912–913 & fn. 17.)  But when a trial court denies a 
motion to quash service of summons, a defendant can file a 
petition for writ of mandate in the reviewing court, which 
effectively stays the action and extends the defendant’s time to 
respond until after the reviewing court rules on the petition, 
thereby granting the defendant additional time to remain in 
their residence.  (§ 418.10, subd. (c); Butenschoen v. Flaker 
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th Supp. 10, 14.)  A defendant appealing an 
unlawful detainer judgment is not automatically entitled to a 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
stay of proceedings.  (§ 1176, subd. (a).)  If the court grants the 
stay, the defendant must also pay the monthly rental value to 
the court as a condition of issuing the stay.  (Ibid.)  In this way, 
a motion to quash — and the subsequent writ review of its denial 
— offers an appealing alternative procedure for defendants 
concerned that their stay request may be denied or that they are 
unable to make monthly payments to the court as a condition of 
the stay.    
 
What Stancil contends here is that any defect in a 
complaint renders the unlawful detainer five-day summons 
invalid.  He urges this court to expand the scope of a motion to 
quash far beyond its typical application.  But neither the 
statutory language nor any other indicia of section 418.10’s 
purpose support Stancil’s broad assertion.   
 
A defendant may serve and file a motion to quash only for 
limited purposes.  (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  Nothing in the 
statutory language turns a motion to quash into a handy all-
purpose tool for taking on the factual support for particular 
causes of action or the merits of a complaint, as Stancil suggests.  
Why exactly we should understand section 418.10’s language or 
purpose to encompass challenges to any conceivable defect in an 
unlawful detainer complaint is not something Stancil 
persuasively explains.   
 
We find no support for such a construction.  Before the 
Legislature enacted the statutory provisions governing motions 
to quash service of summons, litigants had to specially appear 
and carefully limit their personal jurisdiction challenges, or risk 
making a general appearance.  In 1955, the Legislature enacted 
former section 416.1 et seq., which established a statutory 
motion to quash service of summons and provided an automatic 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
extension of time for the moving party to plead pending the final 
determination of the motion to quash before the trial or 
appellate court.  (Stats. 1955, ch. 1452, § 1, p. 2639; Stats. 1955, 
ch. 1452, § 3, p. 2640; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, 
Jurisdiction, § 217.)  The purpose of this legislative action was 
to correct inadequacies in the law obstructing litigants from 
raising jurisdictional objections early in litigation.  (McCorkle v. 
City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 257; Note, Special 
Appearance in California (1958) 10 Stan. L.Rev. 711, 712.)   
 
The “obvious purpose” of former sections 416.1 to 416.3 
was to permit the defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction 
without waiving the right to defend on the merits.  (Hartford v. 
Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 447, 452.)  Former sections 
416.1 to 416.3 were repealed in 1969 and their essential 
provisions were transferred to current section 418.10.  (See 
Stats. 1969, ch. 1610.)  At no point has the statutory procedure 
to quash service of summons included broad authorization to 
employ the statute to challenge defects in the complaint as 
opposed to the summons.  Essentially, Stancil contends that in 
unlawful detainer cases, defendants can use a motion to quash 
for purposes not authorized by section 418.10’s language or 
purpose.  We find no support for Stancil’s position under the 
statutory provisions or doctrine governing motions to quash, so 
we examine whether the Unlawful Detainer Act justifies 
Stancil’s rationale.  
B. 
 
The Unlawful Detainer Act governs the procedure for 
landlords and tenants to resolve disputes about who has the 
right to possess real property.  (Losornio v. Motta (1998) 67 
Cal.App.4th 110, 113; Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.)  Given the need for quick, 
peaceful resolutions of unlawful detainer actions, the statutory 
procedures must be strictly adhered to, including the stringent 
requirements for service, notice, and filing deadlines.2  (Larson 
v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 
1263, 1297; Kwok v. Bergren (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–
600 (Kwok).)  As particularly relevant here, within five days of 
service of the complaint and summons, the defendant must 
respond to the complaint with an answer, motion to quash 
service of summons for lack of jurisdiction, motion to stay or 
dismiss the action for inconvenient forum, motion to dismiss, or 
demurrer.  (§§ 1167, 1167.3, 1167.4, 418.10, 1170.)   
 
Stancil asserts a motion to quash service of summons is 
the proper procedure to challenge personal jurisdiction where 
an unlawful detainer complaint contains any defect or its 
allegations are not true.  Neither the purpose nor the provisions 
of the Unlawful Detainer Act support Stancil’s broad contention.  
A plaintiff may file an unlawful detainer complaint under 
certain circumstances detailed in section 1161.  (Bawa v. 
Terhune (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5 [“A tenant is guilty of 
an unlawful detainer and may be properly evicted only when the 
landlord proves the tenant falls within at least one of the 
enumerated circumstances” set forth in § 1161].)  Section 1161 
specifies a tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer 
 
2  
In contrast to general civil proceedings, the normal 
pretrial time periods prescribed by the unlawful detainer 
statutes are shorter for a variety of procedures, including the 
time to file a responsive pleading to the complaint, respond to 
motions to quash and for summary judgment, conduct discovery, 
and set the action for trial.  (§§ 1167, 1167.3, 1167.4, 1170.5, 
1170.8.)   
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
only in specific circumstances, where the tenant:  fails to vacate 
after their termination as an employee, agent, or licensee (§ 
1161, subd. 1; Vargas v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 902, 
906–907); is in default for nonpayment of rent (§ 1161, subd. 2; 
Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16); breaches 
a material term of the lease (§ 1161, subd. 3; Boston LLC v. 
Juarez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 75, 80); commits waste, allows a 
nuisance on the premises, or uses the premises for an unlawful 
purpose (§ 1161, subd. 4; Freeze v. Brinson (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 
Supp. 1, 3–4); or fails to deliver possession to the landlord after 
having given written notice of their intention to terminate (§ 
1161, subd. 5).  For a complaint to sound in unlawful detainer, 
it must allege the tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer under 
section 1161. 
 
The Unlawful Detainer Act also sets out pleading 
requirements specific to unlawful detainer claims.  The 
complaint must be verified; set forth the facts on which the 
plaintiff seeks to recover; describe the real property with 
reasonable certainty; state the amount of rent in default, if 
applicable; and specifically state the method of service of notice 
of termination.  (§ 1166, subd. (a)(1)–(5).) 3           
 
 
3  
A lessor must provide the tenant a three-day notice to pay 
rent or quit, and proper service of that notice is an essential 
prerequisite to a judgment in the lessor’s favor pursuant to 
section 1161, subdivision 2.  (Palm Property Investments, LLC v. 
Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.)  The plaintiff may 
not obtain judgment for possession absent evidence the notice 
was properly served in compliance with the requirements of 
section 1162.  (Liebovich v. Shahrokhkhany (1997) 56 
Cal.App.4th 511, 513.)   
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
 
No provision of the Unlawful Detainer Act expressly 
authorizes a defendant to use a motion to quash to challenge any 
defect contained in an unlawful detainer complaint, such as 
failure to comply with section 1166’s pleading requirements.  
Even section 1167.4, which pertains to motions to quash service 
of summons, specifies only the time restrictions for a defendant 
to make, file, and serve the motion.  This provision expressly 
references motions as provided for in section 418.10, subdivision 
(a), but does not set forth any alternative grounds on which a 
defendant may file a motion to quash to challenge any defect in 
an unlawful detainer complaint.  (§ 1167.4.)  We find no support 
in the Unlawful Detainer Act for Stancil’s broad assertion that 
a motion to quash service of summons affords a defendant a 
means through which to challenge any conceivable defect on the 
face of an unlawful detainer complaint, let alone the veracity of 
the plaintiff’s allegations.   
C. 
 
The unique context of unlawful detainer does not 
transform a motion to quash to encompass challenges to the 
merits of a complaint, as Stancil suggests.  Instead, the motion 
to quash remains a limited procedural tool appropriate where 
the court lacks personal jurisdiction because the statutory 
requirements for service of process are not fulfilled or the 
summons is defective.  (§§ 410.50, 412.20; Honda Motor Co., 
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.)  A defendant may not use a 
motion to quash service of summons under section 418.10, 
subdivision (a)(1) to contest any conceivable defect or the merits 
of the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint.  
A defendant may instead make use of other motions:  a 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
demurrer, motion to strike, or answer.4  Our conclusion is 
grounded in a sensible reading of the relevant statutes and the 
case law addressing motions to quash in the unlawful detainer 
context.     
 
What we also conclude is that a defendant may file a 
motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1) for lack 
of personal jurisdiction where the unlawful detainer five-day 
summons is defective because it is not supported by the 
accompanying complaint.  Personal jurisdiction is conferred only 
where the statutory requirements for service of process are 
fulfilled, so an unlawful detainer defendant may use a motion to 
quash a defective summons.  (See MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557 [explaining that 
“[s]ervice of a substantially defective summons does not confer 
jurisdiction over a party”].)  Valid service of process in an 
unlawful detainer case requires that the plaintiff serve on the 
defendant the five-day summons unique to unlawful detainer 
cases alongside a complaint that pleads a claim for unlawful 
detainer as defined in section 1161.  No unlawful detainer 
summons — and no five-day response timeline — is possible if 
 
4  
For example, a defendant who decides to waive the 
opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction may instead file a 
demurrer or answer to challenge a complaint for failure to state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  (§ 430.10, subd. 
(e).)  More specifically, a defendant may object to a complaint 
that does not adhere to the pleading requirements of section 
1166 by demurrer.  (§ 430.30, subd. (a).)  A defendant seeking to 
challenge the factual allegations contained in an unlawful 
detainer complaint may do so with an answer.  (§ 430.30, subd. 
(b).)  And, a defendant who does not consent to the court’s 
jurisdiction may file a motion to quash and simultaneously 
answer, demur, or move to strike the complaint.  (§ 418.10, subd. 
(e).)    
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
it’s supported by a complaint that, for example, only alleges a 
completely different cause of action, such as a contract or tort 
claim rather than an unlawful detainer claim.   
 
The abbreviated five-day summons period obviously 
provides a great benefit to the unlawful detainer plaintiff.  But 
the statute conferring that benefit also constrains.  A plaintiff 
who does not assert an unlawful detainer action in accordance 
with the requirements of section 1161 may not take advantage 
of the accelerated summons period exclusive to unlawful 
detainer claims.  (See Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 451–
452 [explaining the unlawful detainer five-day summons was 
inappropriate in that case “because the complaint, if it states a 
cause of action at all, states it on a theory other than unlawful 
detainer”].)  An unlawful detainer action “ ‘is a statutory 
proceeding and is governed solely by the provisions of the 
statute creating it’ ” so a plaintiff’s action to recover possession 
of real property is only an action for unlawful detainer where 
the plaintiff strictly follows the statutory requirements.  (Kwok, 
supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 600.)  Where a complaint lacks even 
the allegations minimally necessary to meet the requirements 
for unlawful detainer claims under section 1161, the complaint 
cannot support the five-day summons unique to unlawful 
detainer actions.  Because the use of the unlawful detainer five-
day summons would then be unauthorized, such summons, even 
if properly served, would not confer personal jurisdiction.  In 
these circumstances, the defendant may decide to use a motion 
to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction to challenge the 
unlawful detainer five-day summons as improper because it was 
served alongside a complaint that does not allege an unlawful 
detainer claim as defined in section 1161.  What a defendant 
may not do is deploy a motion to quash to dispute the merits of 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
the complaint’s allegations or argue the complaint fails to satisfy 
the requirements of section 1166. 
 
Our conclusion also harmonizes the existing case law 
addressing challenges to personal jurisdiction based on defects 
in an unlawful detainer complaint or summons.  Stancil urges 
us to conclude that Delta Imports authorizes his expansive 
interpretation that a motion to quash may be used to challenge 
any defect in an unlawful detainer complaint.  We decline to 
adopt Stancil’s position and instead conclude a defendant may 
choose to use a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful 
detainer five-day summons served alongside a complaint that 
does not allege an unlawful detainer claim under section 1161. 
 
Delta Imports and other subsequent appellate decisions 
approved of defendants using motions to quash service of 
summons to challenge unlawful detainer complaints.  (Parsons 
v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; Garber v. 
Levit (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1.)  But commentators and 
practitioners alike have addressed the tension between Delta 
Imports and the more recent decision in Borsuk, which expressly 
disagreed with Delta Imports’ holding that a “defendant can test 
whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful 
detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.”  (Delta 
Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036; Weil & Brown Cal. 
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) 
4:417.)   
 
In Delta Imports, the defendants filed a motion to quash 
service of summons arguing the complaint could not support the 
five-day unlawful detainer summons.  (Delta Imports, supra, 
146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035.)  The Court of Appeal explained that 
where a plaintiff claims the defendant breached the lease, the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
unlawful detainer complaint must also allege the plaintiff’s 
compliance with the notice requirements of section 1161, 
subdivision 3.  (Delta Imports, at p. 1036.)  The Court of Appeal 
examined the face of the complaint and determined it did not 
contain any of the allegations regarding notice as required by 
section 1161, subdivision 3.  (Delta Imports, at p. 1036.)  Under 
the circumstances of that case, the Court of Appeal concluded 
the complaint was not one for unlawful detainer, and therefore 
could not support the five-day summons.  (Id. at pp. 1035–1036.)  
The Court of Appeal remanded the case and directed the 
superior court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing 
the municipal court to quash service of process on the plaintiffs.  
(Id. at p. 1037.)     
 
What the Court of Appeal reasoned in its brief opinion is 
that “[a] motion to quash service is the only method by which 
the defendant can test whether the complaint states a cause of 
action for unlawful detainer and, thereby, supports a five-day 
summons.”  (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036.)  
Stancil erroneously reads this statement as other unlawful 
detainer defendants sometimes have:  as authorizing a 
defendant to challenge a complaint using a motion to quash.  
This abridged reading erroneously focuses on testing the 
complaint and ignores the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
regarding the propriety of the five-day summons.  A careful 
reading of Delta Imports reveals the Court of Appeal deemed the 
motion to quash appropriate because the underlying complaint 
did not adhere to the requirements set forth in section 1161, 
subdivision 3.  The complaint at issue was not one for unlawful 
detainer and could not support issuance of the unlawful detainer 
five-day summons.    
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
 
Delta Imports relied on Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 446.  
The Court of Appeal in Greene held that an unlawful detainer 
five-day summons did not confer personal jurisdiction when the 
accompanying complaint — though labeled as a complaint for 
unlawful detainer — in fact alleged nothing more than a claim 
for breach of a contract for the purchase of real property.  (Id. at 
p. 449.)  The Greene court reasoned the plaintiff improperly used 
the section 1167 unlawful detainer five-day summons alongside 
a complaint that pled something “other than unlawful detainer.”  
(Id. at pp. 451–452.)  The court deemed the summons 
“substantially defective in illegally purporting to shorten 
defendants’ time to plead” and concluded the court did not 
acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  (Id. at p. 452.)     
 
Relying on Greene, the Delta Imports court concluded that 
“[i]f the underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action for 
unlawful detainer, then use of the five-day summons is improper 
and the defendant is entitled to an order quashing service as a 
matter of law.”  (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 
1035, citing Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at pp. 451–452.)  
Greene and Delta Imports clarify that where a five-day summons 
is served with a complaint that fails to allege the defendant is 
guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in section 1161 or alleges 
a completely different cause of action, the summons is defective 
and may be challenged by a motion to quash under section 
418.10, subdivision (a)(1).   
 
Thirty-two years later, the Court of Appeal decided 
Borsuk.  There, the defendant filed a motion to quash, asserting 
the court lacked jurisdiction over her because the lessor failed 
to properly serve her with the three-day notice to pay or quit.  
(Borsuk, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.)  The court held that 
a defendant may not use a motion to quash to contest whether a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
landlord properly served the requisite three-day notice to pay or 
quit.  (Id. at pp. 609–610.)  In reaching that conclusion, the 
Borsuk court rejected the reasoning of Delta Imports, explaining 
the case had created confusion among practitioners and finding 
its “broad declaration that a motion to quash is the proper way 
to contest whether an unlawful detainer complaint states a 
cause of action, and to challenge service of a notice to pay or quit, 
is not supportable.”  (Borsuk, at p. 612.)  
 
What these appellate courts held is not in conflict:  under 
Delta Imports, a defendant may use a motion to quash to 
challenge service of summons on the ground the accompanying 
complaint lacks even the minimal allegations required under 
section 1161.  Under Borsuk, a defendant may not use a motion 
to quash service of summons to contest the truth of the 
complaint’s allegations.  The Borsuk court was unduly 
dismissive of the reasoning in Delta Imports and conflated the 
absence of a minimally-necessary allegation under section 1161 
with the truth of the allegation.  But because the defendant did 
not challenge the unlawful detainer five-day summons as 
defective and unsupported by the complaint, the Borsuk court 
correctly deemed her motion to quash improper.   
 
Delta Imports had a more specific holding, supported by a 
more narrowly tailored logic, than what the appellate court in 
Borsuk understood:  the defendant used a motion to quash to 
contest the unlawful detainer five-day summons as defective 
because the accompanying complaint did not allege the 
defendant was guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in section 
1161, subdivision 3.  The complaint at issue in Delta Imports 
lacked the necessary notice allegations required under section 
1161, subdivision 3, so the complaint was not one for unlawful 
detainer.  In contrast, the defendant in Borsuk sought to 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
challenge the truth of the plaintiff’s notice allegations with a 
motion to quash.  (Borsuk, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.)    
 
Having reviewed these cases, we glean two related 
conclusions.  First, a motion to quash service of summons under 
section 418.10 is as limited in unlawful detainer actions as it is 
in other civil actions:  to challenge the service of process as 
improper or the summons as defective.  These cases do not 
support Stancil’s contention that if the complaint is faulty in any 
conceivable way, the five-day summons cannot confer personal 
jurisdiction.  Nor do they expand the scope of a motion to quash 
in the unlawful detainer context.  A more sensible conclusion is 
that proper service of process under sections 412.20 and 1167, 
providing a copy of the summons and complaint to the 
defendant, confers personal jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer 
case.  (§ 410.50.)   
 
These cases also support a second, equally important 
conclusion:  that a defendant may properly use a motion to 
quash to challenge personal jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer 
case.  Section 418.10 authorizes a motion to quash only where 
the summons is improper, or the service of process is defective.  
Accordingly, an unlawful detainer defendant may properly file 
a motion to quash to contest a summons.  The accelerated five-
day summons required under section 1167 is applicable only in 
unlawful detainer cases.  So where the summons instructs the 
defendant to respond in five days but is not accompanied with a 
complaint for unlawful detainer, the summons is improper and 
may be challenged via a motion to quash.  A complaint that fails 
to even allege the defendant is guilty of unlawful detainer, as 
defined in the relevant subdivision of section 1161, cannot 
support the five-day summons exclusive to unlawful detainer 
cases.  In those limited circumstances, which we expect to arise 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
infrequently, an unlawful detainer defendant may choose to use 
a motion to quash to challenge the summons as improper.  Our 
holding does not foreclose a defendant from consenting to the 
court’s jurisdiction and responding to the five-day summons 
using a different procedural tool, like a demurrer or answer 
(§§ 430.10, 430.30).  Nor does it stop a defendant from 
simultaneously challenging personal jurisdiction and the 
sufficiency of the complaint by filing a motion to quash as well 
as a demurrer, answer, or motion to strike (§ 418.10, subd. (e)).  
D. 
 
 Stancil’s arguments in this case underscore the need for 
clarity about the statutory requirements for unlawful detainer 
complaints.  Stancil does not allege that the City’s complaint 
cannot support the unlawful detainer five-day summons.  Nor 
does he identify a defect with the summons or service of process.  
Instead, he challenges the truth of the City’s allegation that it 
has the right to terminate his rental agreement.  Stancil’s 
challenge to the City’s complaint is therefore improperly raised 
on a motion to quash.  We conclude that a motion to quash 
service of summons is not the proper procedure for Stancil to 
challenge the merits of the allegations contained in the City’s 
unlawful detainer complaint.   
 
Under the relevant statutory provisions, the speedy 
adjudication of unlawful detainer cases for lessors is balanced 
by ensuring their strict adherence to the rigorous requirements 
for service and notice.  But a motion to quash or set aside the 
summons pursuant to section 418.10 does not, and cannot 
address every issue with an unlawful detainer complaint.  In the 
context of unlawful detainer, as in other proceedings, a motion 
to quash remains a procedural tool to challenge personal 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
jurisdiction.  A defendant may use a motion to quash where the 
unlawful detainer five-day summons is unsupported by the 
accompanying complaint because it is not one for unlawful 
detainer.   
 
The superior court was right when it found Stancil 
improperly used a motion to quash to argue the City didn’t have 
the right to terminate his rental agreement.  Unlawful detainer 
is a special procedure available only for a limited purpose, but 
so is a motion to quash.  Had the trial court concluded otherwise, 
it would have effectively countenanced the use of a motion to 
quash as a means of disputing the truth of the allegations in the 
complaint.  Instead, a motion to quash service of summons 
permits a defendant to challenge the court’s jurisdiction where 
the service of process is defective, or the unlawful detainer five-
day summons is accompanied by a complaint that is not one for 
unlawful detainer because it fails to allege the defendant is 
guilty of unlawful detainer pursuant to the relevant subdivision 
of section 1161 or alleges a different cause of action, like breach 
of contract.  This holding does not foreclose an unlawful detainer 
defendant from using other procedural tools like a demurrer to 
challenge the sufficiency of an unlawful detainer complaint.  
Nothing compels a defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction 
using a motion to quash.  And a defendant may simultaneously 
file a motion to quash, contesting the court’s jurisdiction, and a 
demurrer, without making a general appearance.  (§ 418.10, 
subd. (e).)  We therefore decline to adopt Stancil’s position that 
a motion to quash service of summons may be used to dispute 
the truth of the allegations in an unlawful detainer complaint. 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
III. 
 
Motions to quash service of summons provide defendants 
with an important tool to quickly challenge personal jurisdiction 
without waiving the right to defend on the merits or risking 
entry of default.  The unlawful detainer statutes reflect the 
importance of resolving landlord-tenant disputes quickly.  
Rather than expanding the limited scope of motions to quash in 
the unlawful detainer context, the purpose and rationale of 
these statutes reinforces the need for such limitations.  We 
therefore conclude that a motion to quash service of summons 
can’t be used to challenge any conceivable defect or the truth of 
the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint.  A 
motion to quash service of summons permits a defendant to 
challenge personal jurisdiction where the summons is improper 
or the statutory requirements for service of process are not 
fulfilled.  In the context of unlawful detainer, a defendant may 
properly file a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful 
detainer five-day summons accompanied by a complaint that 
fails to include even the minimal allegations necessary to justify 
an unlawful detainer action as defined in section 1161.  
Defendants still have at their disposal a variety of other 
procedural tools, such as a demurrer, a motion to strike, an 
answer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for 
summary judgment.  A defendant is free to use those procedural 
tools instead of a motion to quash to challenge the complaint as 
inadequate or contest the truth of the complaint’s allegations. 
 
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s denial of writ relief from 
the superior court’s order.  We conclude the superior court was 
correct in its determination that Stancil’s motion to quash was 
not the proper procedure to argue the City is not a proper 
plaintiff.  We deny Stancil’s writ and request for relief, and we 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
discharge the order to show cause.  The case is remanded to the 
First District Court of Appeal with directions to remand to the 
superior court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Stancil v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding XX 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S253783  
Date Filed:  May 3, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   Superior 
County:  San Mateo 
       
Judge:  Susan L. Greenberg       
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., Karen R. 
Frostrom, Neal A. Markowitz, David E. Kleinfeld; Madden Law Office 
and Alison Madden for Petitioner. 
 
Matthew Warren, Madeline Howard, Crystal Sims and Richard A. 
Rothschild for Western Center on Law & Poverty as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Michelle Marchetta Kenyon, Kevin D. 
Siegal, Randall G. Block and Maxwell Blum for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Heidi Palutke; Dowling & Marquez and Curtis F. Dowling for 
California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real 
Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Karen Frostrom 
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire 
2550 Fifth Ave., #1100 
San Diego, CA 92103 
(619) 236-9363 
 
Madeline Howard 
Western Center on Law & Poverty 
3701 Wilshire Blvd., #208 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 235-2628 
 
Kevin D. Siegel 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 
1901 Harrison St., Ste. 900 
Oakland, CA 94612-3501 
(510) 273-8806 
 
Curtis F. Dowling 
Dowling & Marquez, LLP 
625 Market St., 4th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 977-0444