Title: Stallworth v. Holt

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

534 So. 2d 1063 (1988)
Willie Frank STALLWORTH
v.
Billy G. HOLT, et al.
86-1516.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 30, 1988.
*1064 Richard E. Browning and Andrew T. Citrin of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, Mobile, and George K. Elbrecht, Monroeville, for appellant.
Carroll H. Sullivan and Rudene B. Crowe of Clark, Scott & Sullivan, Mobile, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a JNOV for certain defendants and an order granting a new trial for the other defendant in this action against co-employees. Willie Frank Stallworth filed suit in Mobile County against R.W. Richardson, Billy G. Holt, Orland C. Harp, and David Lowell Gray, all of whom were co-employees of Stallworth. The case was transferred to Escambia County. Richardson had not been served *1065 prior to trial, and the claim against him was severed from the remaining claims. The present case was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of Stallworth against Harp, Holt, and Gray in the amount of $500,000. Following post-trial motions, the court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in favor of Harp and Holt and a new trial in favor of Gray. Stallworth appeals from the judgment of the trial court.
Stallworth worked in the "caustic area" of Container Corporation of America's Brewton mill. The caustic area of the mill is the site of a chemical process whereby wood chips are cooked in a highly caustic substance in the early phases of the paper making process. A chemical dust that is a by-product of the process mixes with moisture in the air and settles, caking onto surfaces in the area. This substance corrodes metal onto which it accumulates. On November 30, 1983, Stallworth, in performance of his duties, was walking on an elevated catwalk that had been weakened by this corrosive substance. The catwalk collapsed underneath him. Stallworth was able to grab the handrails and prevent himself from falling, but his back was injured in the process.
Harp was safety coordinator at the Brewton mill for six or seven years directly preceding Stallworth's injury. At the time of the accident, Harp was being phased out as safety coordinator, and Gray was being phased in at that position. Holt was the assistant pulp mill superintendent.
The trial court stated in its order granting JNOV in favor of Harp and Holt that Stallworth had failed to show that either Harp or Holt had been delegated or had assumed a personal duty to provide Stallworth with a reasonably safe place to work.
This Court addressed the issue of co-employee liability in Clark v. Floyd, 514 So. 2d 1309 (Ala.1987):
514 So. 2d  at 1316.
This Court has indicated that sufficient evidence of a duty to provide a reasonably safe place of employment includes such factors as frequent visits to the work site and direct dealings with the workmen or direct work on safety or on the defect which caused the injury. Hall v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 271 (Ala.1987); Welch v. Jones, 470 So. 2d 1103 (Ala.1985).
Harp was called by Stallworth as an adverse witness and testified that in his capacity as safety coordinator he would tour the mill and make oral reports to the line managers if there were problem areas.
During Stallworth's examination of Harp, the following exchanges took place:
". . .
This testimony is evidence from which a jury could have determined that, while Harp may not have been delegated a duty to inspect the catwalks for defects, he had assumed a duty to do so. All that is necessary to avoid a directed verdict, and therefore a JNOV, is a scintilla of evidence. Gary v. Kirkland, 514 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 1987).
This Court has held that a co-employee cannot be held liable merely because of his general superintendence of the overall safety program of his employer. Kennemer v. McFann, 470 So. 2d 1113 (Ala.1985). See also Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala.1980) (Jones, J., concurring in the result).
When Harp inspected the catwalks and made decisions as to whether they should be repaired, the results of his decisions impacted directly on the workers in the caustic area of the mill. This conduct went beyond a general superintendence of the overall safety program and imposed on Harp a personal duty to the workers directly affected by his decisions.
Holt was also called by Stallworth as an adverse witness. Holt testified that in his capacity as assistant pulp mill superintendent he had responsibilities and duties for the safety of the employees below him in Container Corporation's hierarchy.
". . .
". . .
". . .
In addition to Holt's own testimony, Stallworth presented the deposition testimony of Gus Vidana, who was also an assistant pulp mill superintendent at the time of Stallworth's injury. Vidana testified as follows:
This testimony could lead a jury to the inference that Holt owed a duty to the workers in the caustic area to provide them with a safe place to work. Like Harp's, Holt's duty goes beyond a general superintendence of the overall safety program and is a personal duty owed to the workers directly affected by Holt's actions.
Because there is evidence from which a jury properly could determine that Harp *1068 and Holt owed Stallworth a duty to provide a safe workplace, the trial court erred in granting JNOV for Harp and Holt.
Stallworth also argues that the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the claim against Gray. After giving its reasons for denying a JNOV for Gray, the court continued:
Stallworth argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard in reaching this decision. This Court has held that the standard of review in Alabama regarding the propriety of an attorney's closing argument is as follows:
Otis Elevator Co. v. Stallworth, 474 So. 2d 82, 84 (Ala.1985), quoting Estis Trucking Co. v. Hammond, 387 So. 2d 768, 771-72 (Ala.1980) (emphasis in Estis).
We have, in effect, two separate standards. The first standard is to be used in cases where the trial court does not order the jury to disregard the statement and the second is to be used when the trial court does instruct the jury accordingly.
In the present case, the trial court applied the first standard in reaching its decision to order a new trial for Gray. Stallworth argues that the court erred in using this standard.
A review of the record reveals that an objection was made immediately after Stallworth's attorney made the remark that is in issue, and the court sustained the objection. The record also shows that no instruction was given to the jury at that time or at any time thereafter concerning the remark made by Stallworth's attorney. Based on a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not commit reversible error in applying the first standard in reaching its decision to order a new trial.
Stallworth argues that the remarks made by counsel constitute a reply in kind and therefore were not improper.
"Arguments which are replies in kind or are provoked by arguments of opposing counsel do not amount to reversible error." Osborne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Langston, 454 So. 2d 1317, 1322 (Ala.1984).
During closing arguments, counsel for Harp, Holt, and Gray argued that Stallworth was suing the wrong defendants. Stallworth asserts that his attorney's statements were made in reply to that argument. At no time did counsel for Harp, Holt, and Gray state that they were not paid by Container to do a specific job. The statement by Stallworth's counsel goes beyond a reply to statements made by counsel for Harp, Holt, and Gray.
Stallworth also contends that the remarks made by counsel were not improper. The trial court held that the remarks improperly injected the wealth of the defendants into the case. Stallworth argues that the trial court erred in reaching this decision.
The question to be answered is whether the remarks made by Stallworth's counsel might have unlawfully influenced the jury. Otis Elevator, supra. The trial court held that the remarks may have done so. After carefully listening to the tape of the closing argument, this Court cannot say that the trial court erred in holding that the remarks were improper.
The final issue on appeal is raised by Harp and Holt. Harp and Holt argue that in the event that the JNOV in their favor is reversed, they are also entitled to a new trial due to the improper argument of Stallworth's counsel. Stallworth asserts that the trial court did not grant a conditional new trial as to Harp and Holt and as a result, upon reversal of the JNOV in their favor, the verdict of the jury should be reinstated.
This Court has held that:
Luker v. City of Brantley, 520 So. 2d 517, 522 (Ala.1987), quoting 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice § 50.14 (2d ed. 1986).
Although the court did not specifically order a new trial for Harp and Holt in the event that its JNOV for them was overturned, it clearly indicated that "all three Defendants would be entitled to a new trial because of argument of counsel." We agree that the prejudicial effect of the closing *1070 argument worked as much against Harp and Holt as it did against Gray. Because we affirm the granting of a new trial in favor of Gray, we conclude that Harp and Holt are similarly entitled to a new trial.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
JONES, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.