Title: DONALD R. FOOTE, JR. V. RONALD L. SIMEK, as owner of the MOUNTAIN MEADOW RANCH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD R. FOOTE, JR. V. RONALD L. SIMEK, as owner of the MOUNTAIN MEADOW RANCH2006 WY 96139 P.3d 455Case Number: 05-203Decided: 08/04/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DONALD 
R. FOOTE, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
RONALD 
L. SIMEK, as owner of the MOUNTAIN MEADOW RANCH,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Laurence 
W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Powell, Wyoming; and Matthew D. Winslow of 
Winslow Law Firm, P.C., Cody, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. 
Stinson.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Andrea 
L. Richard of The Richard Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ, and Arnold, DJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court granted summary judgment to the owner of a ranch where an employee was 
injured while replacing a gasket on a pivot irrigation system.  It concluded that the ranch's owner did 
not breach his duty to provide the employee a reasonably safe workplace or to 
warn the employee of unsafe work conditions, and that the employee's decision to 
replace the gasket by himself was an intervening cause of the employee's 
injuries.  We find that genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to both of these issues.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue in this appeal is whether genuine issues of material fact exist on the 
"breach of duty" and "causation" elements of the employee's cause of 
action.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ronald Simek (the 
owner) owns a "recreational ranch" near Cody.1  He hired his grandson, Ben Simek (the 
manager), to manage the ranchthe manager's duties included irrigating the hay 
fields, harvesting the crops, general ranch responsibilities, and ensuring that 
ranch employees had whatever they needed safely to perform their jobs.  Donald Foote (the employee) was hired as 
a ranch laborer in early 2002his duties included monitoring, cleaning, and 
maintaining the ranch's pivot irrigation system, lawn care, and essentially 
whatever else the manager "asked him to do."

 
 
[¶4]      In late August or 
early September 2002, a substantial leak developed near the endgun of a pivot 
system the ranch used to irrigate the "race field," a hay field where the ranch 
also hosted "grass" snowmobile races each March and October.  It appears that a blown gasket needed to 
be replaced.  The manager had 
replaced this kind of gasket once or twice prior to September 2002.  However, the employee had never replaced 
such a gasket and acknowledged that the manager "knew more about [replacing the 
gasket] than I did.  I just knew 
that it had to be replaced.  I 
wouldn't know the specific details until [the irrigation system] was taken 
apart."2  

 
 
[¶5]      On September 18, 
the manager told the employee to begin his customary morning chores when he 
arrived for work the next day, and also to prepare to replace the endgun 
gasket.  The employee stated that 
the manager's instructions were essentially as follows:  "we're" going to replace the gasket 
"first thing" and "we" need to complete the task (or the task "had" to be 
completed) the next morning.  The 
employee understood this to mean that he and the manager would work together (as 
they had on other projects) to replace the gasket; yet, he also understood that 
replacing the gasket was the next morning's "primary goal," that it had been 
"prioritized," and (based on his prior work history with the manager) that the 
employee should complete the task even if the manager was not ultimately 
available to help the employee.  The 
manager agreed that he told the employee that "we" will replace the gasket the 
next day and that "we needed to get it done," but he apparently did not give the 
employee any further instructions on how to perform the task.  When asked if he warned the employee of 
any safety issues or "something [the employee] needed to watch out for or be 
concerned about" while replacing the gasket, the manager replied "[j]ust that it 
takes two guys to do it."  The 
manager felt that this statement made it clear to the employee that he should 
not attempt to replace the gasket alone.

 
 
[¶6]      Between 7:30 a.m. 
and 8:00 a.m. on September 19, the employee assembled the new gasket, a loader, 
an extension ladder, and tools in the race field.  He "wanted" the manager to help him 
replace the gasket, and the manager was the only person who could assist the 
employee that day.  The manager 
lived on the ranch, so the employee rang the manager's doorbell, which had 
become the employee's "morning routine to get [the manager] out of bed."  No one answered the door, and the 
employee continued to work on other projects.  Between 8:45 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., the 
employee again rang the manager's doorbell, and received no answerthe employee 
stated that this was the "same reply as every other day I tried getting [the 
manager] out of bed."  The employee 
returned to the manager's house at about 10:00 a.m. and spoke with the manager's 
three-year-old stepdaughter.  He 
asked her if the manager was out of bed, and the stepdaughter replied that he 
was not,3 so the employee told the 
stepdaughter to inform the manager that the employee was "on the race 
field."

 
 
[¶7]      The employee 
ultimately decided to replace the gasket on his own.  He drained the pivot system, briefly 
reviewed a manual, positioned the bucket of the loader eighteen to twenty feet 
above the ground, and used the extension ladder to climb into the bucket.  The employee then disassembled the 
irrigation system near the location of the blown gasket.  In doing so, he released the tension 
that held the entire apparatus together.  
It began to oscillate and then came apart, knocking the employee 
backwards into the bucket, where he struck and injured his back.4

 
 
[¶8]      In March 2003, 
the employee sued the owner,5 alleging negligence in failing to 
warn the employee of the dangers associated with replacing the endgun gasket, in 
failing to provide another laborer to help the employee replace the gasket, and 
in failing adequately to train and supervise the employee.6  The owner filed a motion for summary 
judgment in August 2004 in which he argued that the employee's "decision to 
change the gasket alone, by himself, instead of waiting for [the manager], as 
instructed, was the proximate cause of the [employee's] alleged injury."  In December 2004, the owner filed a 
supplemental pleading wherein he cited Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Co., 550 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1976), and further claimed that he was not negligent because the 
employee's "injuries were caused by the risks and dangers that arose in the 
progress of the work he was performing."  
The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to the owner, and 
the employee now appeals that decision. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      "The elements of 
a prima facie case of negligence are duty, breach, causation and damages."  Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., 2004 WY 97, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d 484, 489 (Wyo. 
2004).  "Summary judgment is not 
favored in negligence actions, since such actions by their nature are factually 
dependent"; "summary judgment in negligence actions is [therefore] subject to 
more exacting scrutiny."  Id.  Our standard of review is as 
follows:

 
 
            
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element 
of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted.  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002).

 
 
            
We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by examining the same material as the district court.  Id.  We examine de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo.2000).  
If upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues 
of material fact, that doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary 
judgment.  Id.  We accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.  
Metz, ¶ 
9.

 
 

Linton 
v. E. C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The district court essentially 
analyzed two elements of the employee's negligence cause of action for purposes 
of summary judgment:  whether there 
was "a breach of duty on the part of the [owner]" and, if so, whether that was 
"the proximate cause" of the employee's injury.7  It first determined that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact.  
Relying on Mellor, it then 
concluded that:  (1) the danger that 
the employee encountered "arose in the course of the work"there was no threat 
or danger to the employee until he began dismantling the irrigation system by 
himself; and (2) the owner "complied with" his dutythere was nothing "that the 
[owner] failed to do that the [owner] should have done, or anything that the 
[owner] did that . . . [he] should not have done or that was negligent."  In the alternative, the district court 
found that the owner had no reason to anticipate that the employee would replace 
the gasket by himself, and that the employee's decision to do so was therefore 
an intervening cause of the employee's injuries.

 
 
[¶11]   A good portion of the parties' 
appellate argument focuses on the district court's reliance on Mellor.  In Mellor, 550 P.2d  at 502, the employee 
was injured while helping his employer and another individual move a heavy 
cabinet.  The employee "was 
accustomed to this kind of general handyman employment," knew how heavy the 
cabinet was, and "was familiar with all of its other physical 
characteristics."  After lifting the 
cabinet from the floor to an upright position, they began "walking" the cabinet 
towards the wall because the cabinet was so heavy that they could only move it a 
short distance at a time.  While the 
individuals were taking a five to ten minute break, "the cabinet suddenly, and 
without warning, fell backward" and seriously injured the employee.  Id. The employee sued the employer and, 
after a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the employer was not 
negligent and that the employee "was contributorily negligent and/or assumed the 
risk inherent in the moving operation."  
Id. at 
503.

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal, the employee questioned 
whether the record was sufficient to support the trial court's findings.  He first claimed that the employer 
"violated his duty of care . . . by failing to furnish him a safe place to work, 
the result of which caused injury."  
Id. at 503.  We began our discussion by stating the 
following general principles:

 
 
            
It is the duty of the employer to furnish the employee a safe place to 
work and that duty of care must be reasonable in view of the work to be 
performed and the dangers incident to the employment.

 
 
            
We said in Engen [v. Rambler Copper & Platinum Co., 20 
Wyo. 95, 121 P. 867 (1912)]:

 
 
". . . 
It is the duty of the master, in the performance of such nondelegable duties to 
exercise ordinary or reasonable care, or, as otherwise expressed, the care and 
skill that a man of ordinary prudence would observe under the 
circumstances.  And it is generally 
held that it is the master's duty for the protection of his employees to 
exercise such care and skill in the following particulars, among others:  (1) To furnish them with reasonably safe 
machinery, appliances, tools, and place to work, and to keep the same in 
reasonably safe repair.  (2) To 
employ competent and sufficient employees with whom to work . . 
."

 
 
            
The master is not, however, liable for a failure to furnish a safe place 
to work if the complaint centers upon a danger which the employer does not know 
of and concerning which he is not chargeable with knowledge, or which arises in 
the progress of the work and constitutes part of its details and risks.  We said as much in Engen: 

 
 
". . . 
The duty of the employer to guard his workmen against unnecessary and 
unreasonable risks extends, not only to those that are known to him, but also to 
such as a reasonably prudent man, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, would 
know or discover, having regard to the danger to be avoided . . ."  "As to this matter, however, there 
exists a well-recognized distinction between defects or dangers which arise in the 
progress of the work and constitute part of its details and risks, and those 
which do not.  If the defect belongs 
in the former class, the master is not liable; . . ." [Emphasis 
supplied]

 
 

Id. at 
503-04 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).8  We then applied those principles as 
follows:

 
 
            
In the instant matter, the cabinet being moved was the thing that caused 
the harm.  It really was not the place where the plaintiff was required 
to work that was the cause of the injury.  

 
 
            
Be that as it maythe danger and the cause arose during the progress of 
the work and constituted a part of its details and risks and thus is an 
exception to the safe-place-to-work requirements.  

 
 
            
Another factor requires mention and is one which, we think, prevents this 
appeal from being rescued by the safe-place-to-work theory.  There is no evidence in this record to 
show what caused the cabinet to fall.  
Negligence cannot be presumed from the mere happening of the 
accident.  It stood there for from 
five to ten minutes before falling, and when it did, it fell without 
warning.  It is contended that 
[another individual] was leaning on the cabinet and that this was the cause of 
its fall.  This was rank 
speculation.  There is no proof of 
this, and to just say itwithout proofdoes not constitute a causative fact to 
which we will assign credibility.  
There was insufficient proof to establish that [the other individual's] 
leaning on it was the cause.  
Therefore, the [employer] could hardly be held to have known of the 
danger.

 
 
            
If we, in hindsight, do not know what caused the cabinet to fallhow can 
[the employer], with foresight, be held to have been able to anticipate what the 
cabinet would do?

 
 

Id. at 504 
(footnotes and internal citations omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   The employee also claimed that the 
employer was negligent for "not employing more men and having safety devices on 
the job."  Our conclusion on that 
issue was as follows:

 
 
            
We cannot say that the [employer] was negligent as a matter of law for 
not employing more men and having safety devices on the job.  This we would have to do if we were to 
overrule the fact-finding trial court on this issue.

 
 
            
We recognize that the care required is commensurate with the danger 
involved.  But the trial court held 
the defendant to have discharged his duty of care under the facts.  

 
 
            
We have to askwhat would more tools or men have done to protect the 
[employee]?  Would additional men 
not have been doing the same thing the [employee] and the [employer] were 
doingtaking a break while the cabinet stood motionlessuntil it fell for an 
unexplained reason?  Nobody 
anticipated this unfortunate happeningincluding the [employee]and there is no 
reason to believe that the employer should have anticipated the necessity of 
more tools and more men in order that this operation would be conducted 
safely.  There were enough tools and 
men.  The problem was that nobody 
anticipated the happeningnor were they bound to have anticipated 
it.

 
 

Id. at 
504-05.9

 
 
[¶14]   In the instant appeal, the employee 
contends that our analysis in Mellor 
was essentially "based upon the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence."  He claims that the 
district court therefore improperly relied on Mellor in granting the owner summary 
judgment because "the holding in Mellor was abrogated by the adoption 
[of] comparative fault."10  We agree that, to the extent Mellor relied upon the doctrines of 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence, its reasoning did not survive 
the adoption of comparative fault.11  Furthermore, the issues in the instant 
case should be presented to the jury under the latter 
construct.

 
 
[¶15]   The circumstances that led to the 
"no negligence" finding in Mellor 
were quite limited in scope, as well as substanceafter the employee, the 
employer, and another individual lifted a cabinet to an upright position and 
moved it towards the wall, the cabinet (now stationary while the movers took a 
break) spontaneously fell on the employee for no apparent reason.  We are presented with a different 
scenario in the instant case.  This 
case is not one in which the "danger and cause" arose solely "in the progress of 
the work."  In arriving at that 
conclusion, the district court focused too narrowly on the fact that the pivot 
system came apart as it was being dismantled by the employee.  The primary consideration in this case 
is, instead, the conduct that preceded that occurrence, and the resulting 
"danger" (if any) that the employee would attempt to replace the gasket by 
himself.

 
 
[¶16]   Unlike Mellor, we also cannot conclude, as a 
matter of law, that the owner did not breach his duty to the employee in the 
instant case.  We find that genuine 
issues of material fact exist that preclude granting the owner summary judgment 
on that basis.12  The question of breach is often 
considered to be one of fact.  See generally Johnson v. Reiger, 2004 WY 83, ¶ 23, 93 P.3d 992, 999 (Wyo. 2004); Lee v. LPP 
Mortg. LTD., 2003 WY 92, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 152, 160 (Wyo. 2003); and Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., 718 P.2d 890, 897 (Wyo. 1986).  This is particularly true when "there 
appears to be no great disagreement about the evidentiary facts, but the 
evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds might 
differ as to its significance . . . ."  
Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 
(Wyo. 2000).  See also Bettencourt v. Pride Well 
Serv., 735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987) (issue should be submitted to the 
factfinder if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions and inferences 
from facts, even when facts bearing upon negligence are 
undisputed).

 
 
[¶17]   Whether the owner breached his duty 
to provide the employee a reasonably safe workplace or to warn the employee of 
unsafe work conditions in the instant case is inextricably intertwined with the 
circumstances surrounding the employee's decision to replace the endgun gasket 
by himself.  Perhaps the best 
illustration of the factual issues that are apparent in these circumstances is 
the manner in which each party emphasizes the evidence, and the reasonable 
inferences to be gleaned therefrom, in his appellate briefing.  For example, the employee emphasizes his 
work history vis a vis the ranch 
manager.  He claims that the manager 
was often unavailable (whether due to sleeping,13 watching television, or other 
reasons) to assist with tasks the manager and the employee were scheduled to 
perform jointly.14  This resulted in a "custom and practice" 
at the ranch that essentially "required" the employee to perform these joint 
tasks on his ownthe employee understood that when the manager was unavailable, 
he was "still to get it done" and when he received no answer at the manager's 
house, he was to  "go about [his] 
business."  According to 
theemployee, the manager was aware of this practice.

 
 
[¶18]   On the day the employee was 
injured, he simply "decided to proceed as [he] would on any other day and 
complete the chores" by himself.  It 
also appears that the employee felt some urgency to replace the gasket that 
morning.15  The employee's position is that the 
manager knew or should have known, based on the aforementioned practice and the 
priority that the manager placed on completing the task, that the employee would 
attempt to replace the gasket himself if the manager was not available.  That being the case, the employee was 
"never instructed not to change [the endgun] by [himself]" and the manager (who 
had replaced this kind of gasket before) failed adequately to warn the employee 
(who had never replaced this kind of gasket) of the dangers of replacing the 
gasket alone.

 
 
[¶19]   The owner, in turn, emphasizes 
other aspects of the employee's work history in which the employee worked 
jointly with the manager, especially on tasks that the employee had not 
previously completed.  For example, 
the manager trained the employee to perform daily maintenance on the pivot 
irrigation system when the employee was initially hired.  The manager told the employee how the 
control box and tires worked, and how to maintain the system, check the fluids, 
and clean the filters and sprinkler heads.  
Then, after a "couple of walkthroughs," the employee "was turned loose on 
[his] own."  The employee also 
worked "side by side" with the manager for almost two weeks while installing a 
water line in the race field.  The 
employee had never installed a water line and the manager was his "guidance" 
(the manager explained "[t]his is how we do it, and this is why we do it").  The two apparently completed this 
project just prior to September 19, 2002.

 
 
[¶20]   The owner also points to the 
manager's testimony that he told the employee that "it takes two guys" to 
replace the endgun gasket.  The 
employee acknowledged that he understood that he and the manager were to perform 
the task together (as they had in the past when the employee had not previously 
performed a certain task), the employee acted consistently with that 
understanding when he attempted to contact the manager to help him replace the 
gasket, and no one at the ranch expressly directed the employee to replace the 
gasket alone.  Accordingly, the 
owner contends that the employee, who had never replaced this kind of gasket and 
stated that the manager "knew more about it than [the employee did]," became 
"frustrated and impatient"16 and acted independently in 
deciding to replace the gasket alone.  
The employee's decision was also contrary to the manager's express 
instruction. 

 
 
[¶21]   It is apparent from both hearing 
transcripts that in granting the owner summary judgment, the district court 
essentially adopted the owner's characterization of the facts.  Because this characterization is not the 
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence presented, summary 
judgment was inappropriate.  Any 
doubt in that regard must, according to our standard of review, be resolved in 
favor of the employee.

 
 
[¶22]   The employee also contends that 
these same issues of fact preclude granting the owner summary judgment on the 
causation element.  He argues that 
the owner's breach of his duty to the employee was the "proximate cause" of the 
employee's injuries, especially in light of the aforementioned practice that the 
employee would perform joint tasks on his own if the manager was unavailable to 
help the employee.  The owner 
asserts that the employee's "independent decision to change the . . . gasket 
himself, in spite of the fact that he knew it was a two-person job that he was 
instructed to perform with" the manager, was an intervening cause of the 
employee's injuries.

 
 
"Proximate 
cause" is

 
 
explained 
as "the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the 
act of negligence."  Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo.1987); followed 
in, Natural Gas Processing Co. v. 
Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo.1994); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo.1993).  The ultimate 
test of proximate cause is foreseeability of injury.  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo.1989).  
In order to qualify as a legal cause, the conduct must be a substantial 
factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries.  Natural Gas Processing Co., 886 P.2d  at 1186; Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 
1178.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
Proximate 
cause is a question of fact in the usual case, reserved for the determination by 
the trier of fact, unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree.  Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 553 (Wyo.1995); Downen, 887 P.2d  at 520; Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 
1099.

 
 

Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51-52 (Wyo. 1997) (internal citation omitted).  An "intervening 
cause,"

 
 
if not 
reasonably foreseeable, will relieve a defendant of liability.  Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 1178.  We have defined an intervening cause as 

 
 
one that 
comes into being after a defendant's negligent act has occurred * * *.  [The intervening cause] is reasonably 
foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or 
is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created 
thereby.

 
 

Century 
Ready-Mix [v. CampbellCountySch. 
Dist.], 816 
P.2d [795,] 802 [(Wyo. 1991)] (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Wyo.1985)).

 
 

Lynch v. 
Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶23]   We agree with the employee.  In order to determine whether it was 
foreseeable that the employee would attempt to replace the gasket by himself, 
one must necessarily resolve the same factual issues that we previously 
discussed herein.  The evidence is 
such that reasonable minds could disagree as to its effect, and each party 
obviously emphasizes the same facts in arguing the causation issue as he did in 
arguing the breach of duty issue.  

 
 
[¶24]   Having found that genuine issues of 
material fact preclude granting the owner summary judgment in this case on the 
bases relied upon by the district court, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It 
appears that the ranch's only economic function was to grow and sell hay, but 
the owner indicated that there was "no profit," the ranch was not operated as a 
"profit center," and any income generated from selling hay was "not 
important."

 
 

2The 
employee was not familiar with pivot irrigation systems prior to his employment 
at the ranch.

 
 

3The 
employee added that when he encountered the manager's wife later that day, she 
was upset because the stepdaughter was to be at daycare by 9:00 a.m., and she 
and the manager "didn't get out of bed to take [her]."  However, the manager claimed that he got 
up between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. that morning and went to the site where he 
was having a new house built.

 
 

4In his 
complaint, the employee alleges that he suffered a herniated disc, as well as a 
disc protrusion, which would probably require future 
surgery.

 
 

5It is 
undisputed in this case that the owner is ultimately liable for any negligence 
attributable to the manager.  See generally Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 192 (Wyo. 1989); Abeyta v. Hensley, 595 P.2d 71, 73-74 
(Wyo. 
1979).

 
 

6The 
employee also sought punitive damages for the owner's "willful violation of the 
public trust" in failing "to carry insurance on the ranch or to advise employees 
that the ranch does not participate in the Wyoming Workers' Compensation fund or 
have insurance coverage sufficient to insure employees' medical bills were paid 
in the event of injury."  Neither 
party raises an appellate issue concerning this claim.

 
 

7The 
district court held two hearings on the summary judgment issue.  It initially held a hearing on the 
owner's summary judgment motion December 15, 2004, after which hearing it orally 
granted the owner's motion.  In 
January 2005, the employee filed a sworn declaration, developed his argument 
regarding the district court's application of Mellor to the circumstances of the 
instant case (which issue the owner had raised in a supplemental pleading filed 
the day before the first summary judgment hearing), and asked the district court 
to reconsider its ruling.  The 
employee renewed that request in March 2005.  The district court held a hearing April 
12, 2005 to consider the employee's request, after which hearing the district 
court orally denied that request.  
In doing so, the district court elaborated slightly on its decision to 
grant the owner summary judgment; however, the district court essentially ruled 
that the owner remained entitled to summary judgment for the same reasons that 
it had stated after the first summary judgment hearing.  The employee filed his notice of appeal 
July 1, 2005.  An order granting the 
owner summary judgment, and denying the employee's reconsideration request, was 
ultimately filed August 12, 2005.

 
 
We have 
subsequently held that motions to reconsider are a "nullity."  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶¶ 5-10, 
125 P.3d 1022, 1023-25 (Wyo. 2006).  
However, the owner does not question either the propriety of the district 
court's, or this Court's, consideration of the employee's sworn declaration, or 
of this Court referring to the district court's reasoning based on that 
declaration.  There also appears to 
be no jurisdictional issue concerning the employee's appeal in this case to the 
extent that the employee appeals from the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to the owner (as opposed to the denial of his reconsideration request), 
and the owner does not contend otherwise.  
See Mueller v. Zimmer, 2005 WY 
156, ¶¶ 5-7, 124 P.3d 340, 346-48 (Wyo. 2005); and W.R.A.P. 2.04 (premature 
notice of appeal "shall be treated as though filed on the same day as entry of 
the appealable order, provided it complies with Rule 
2.07(a)").

 
 

8These 
general principles appear to be consistent with those found in Restatement 
(Second) of Agency §§ 492-93, 495, 498-99, 505-07, 510 (1958), though neither 
party refers to these provisions in their appellate briefing.  The following section is particularly 
relevant to the district court's reasoning in this case:

 
 
§ 
499.  Risks Inherent in Enterprise

 
 
A master 
who has performed his duties of care is not liable to a servant harmed by a risk 
incident to the nature of the work.  

 
 
The 
commentary to this section states that a "master performs his duties to his 
servants if he provides conditions which are as safe as the nature of the work 
reasonably permits."  Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, supra, § 499 cmt. 
a. 

 
 

9The 
employee further argued that the district court's assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence findings were not supported by the record or were 
contrary to law.  We stated that 
there was "no need for us to make detailed inquiry into the facts and law" 
because we had held that the employer was "not negligent"; it therefore did not 
matter "whether the [employee] was contributorily negligent or whether he 
assumed the risk inherent in the moving operations."  Id. 
at 505.  Nevertheless, we continued 
by stating the following:  

 
 
We say 
only, with respect to the contributory negligence-assumption of the risk 
contention, that we have considered it and, according to the facts and the 
applicable law, would also affirm the trial court's rejection of this contention 
for the reason that the appellant is specifically excluded from recovery under 
the doctrine of Berry v. Iowa Mid-West 
Land and Livestock Co., Wyo., 424 P.2d 409, 411, where we 
held:

 
 
. . . 
Under the circumstances of this particular case, however, we can say it is 
apparent that if defendant's omission is assumed to constitute negligence, then 
the acts of plaintiff would necessarily and as a matter of law amount to 
contributory negligence.

Where a 
danger is as open and obvious to the servant as to the master, or where the 
servant has better means of knowledge than the master, he will be charged with 
such negligence as to bar recovery.  

In 
Restatement Second, Agency 2d § 521, p. 489 (1958), it is given as a rule that a 
master is not liable to a servant for harm caused by unsafe conditions of 
employment, if the servant, with knowledge of the facts and understanding of the 
risks, voluntarily enters or continues in the employment.  Also, this court adopted the following 
rule with respect to risks assumed by an employee:

            
A servant assumes (1) the risk of such dangers as are ordinarily and 
normally incident to his occupation, and a workman of mature years is presumed 
to know them, whether he does or not; (2) such extraordinary or abnormal 
risksusually, at least, arising out of the negligence of the masterthe 
conditions and dangers of which he (a) knows and appreciates and faces without 
complaint, or the conditions and dangers of which (b) are so obvious and 
apparent that an ordinarily careful person would, under the circumstances, 
observe and appreciate them. * * *.

 
 

Id. (some 
internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 
 

10For a 
more detailed explanation of these concepts and each concept's relationship to 
the other concepts, see generally Betts 
v. Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Wyo. 
1998); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 
(Wyo. 1981); 
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2005).

    

11The 
underlying legal precepts(1) an employer owes a duty to his employees to 
provide a safe workplace, and (2) an employer who has performed that duty is not 
liable to the employee for harm caused by risks incident to the nature of the 
workdo, however, remain viable.  See, for instance, Restatement (Second) 
of Agency, supra, §§ 492 and 499.

 
 

12We 
further note that the evidence presented in the instant case, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the employee, is not such that we are forced to presume 
negligence merely "because an accident happened."  Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 
1994).

 
 

13According 
to the employee, the manager was a "late sleeper [who] doesn't want to get out 
of bed"the manager had "a sleeping disorder of stays up late and sleeps even 
later" and it was "common" for him to not get up in the 
morning.

 
 

14The 
employee provided several examples of joint tasks that he often completed on his 
own due to the manager's unavailability:  
(1)  lubricating and changing 
oil and filters on farm equipment, and greasing "zerk fittings"; (2)  loading and stocking hay for buyers; (3) 
digging a trench for water and electrical lines to the manager's house; (4) 
working with a contractor to "stand" exterior walls at the manager's new house; 
(5) placing six-inch pipe in the race field; (6) moving a horse "lean-to" with a 
contractor; and (7) selecting and sorting trees for landscaping.  However, the employee does not 
distinguish which of these tasks, if any, he either had been trained to perform 
or had performed previously.

 
 

15The 
reasons for this sense of urgency vary:  
(1) the manager prioritized the task for completion the morning the 
employee was injured; (2) the employee knew that all the chores, including 
replacing the gasket, needed to be completed before a large truck arrived to be 
loaded with hay that day; (3) the hay in the race field needed water in order to 
growthe owner agreed that without water, the hay would not grow as fast, but 
indicated that this would not substantially impact the ranch because the income 
from selling hay was not important, and the manager agreed that ensuring that 
the irrigation system was working sometimes became a high priority; and (4) the 
leak was "tearing a rut right through the [race] field" where they typically 
held snowmobile races in Octoberthe owner and the manager acknowledged that it 
is desirable to have a fairly smooth field without a lot of ruts in it for 
snowmobile races.

 
 

16The owner 
relies on the following testimony for the proposition that the employee became 
frustrated and impatient: 

 
 
[The 
owner's counsel].  And then you 
understood that after you finished your chores and got things prepped, you were 
going to go get [the manager] so you and he would change the gasket on the 
endgun?

[The 
employee].  
Correct.

Q.  You would do it together, work together 
like you'd worked on prior occasions, such as laying the pipe; 
correct?

A.  Yes.

Q.  I take it, then, at some point you 
became somewhat impatient when [the manager] didn't answer the 
door?

A.  Yeah.  It was kind of frustrating, but it was 
normal.

Q.  And you decided, [t]he heck with it, I'm 
just going to go do it?

A.  Correct.

Q.  And then you go up to the endgun after 
you become frustrated and impatient; correct?

A.  Yes.

***

Q.  . . . And you think you would do it the 
same way today that you did it on September 19, 2002, if you were to change the 
gasket on an endgun?

A.  Everything, but I would have more 
help.

Q.  Like what you had planned on doing on 
September 19, 2002; correct?

A.  Correct.

Q.  Okay.  You would be more patient this 
time?  In other words, in waiting 

A.  I was patient then.  I don't want you to misinterpret that I 
was impatient.  I was frustrated, 
but this is a daily occurrence.