Title: STATE v HOLMES

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-485 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- JAMES D. HOLMES , Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Valley, The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm; Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Judy Browning argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena David L. Nielsen, County Attorney, Glasgow, Montana Submitted: April 13, 1984 Decided: August 14, 1984 Filed: 4 ~ 5 1 Lz - 384 - - - Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t . T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s t h e t h e f t o f a l m o s t $200,000 worth of jet f u e l from t h e o l d Glasgow A i r Force Rase, now t h e V a l l e y I n d u s t r i a l Park. A p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d o f t h e t h e f t , s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s w i t h f i v e suspended and o r d e r e d t o p a y $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 i n r e s t i t u t i o n . T h i s a p p e a l f o l l o w s . The Glasgow Air Force Base is l o c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e v e n t e e n m i l e s n o r t h of Glasgow, Montana. I n 1969, t h e U.S. A i r Force c l o s e d t h e b a s e and l e t b i d s f o r g e n e r a l maintenance work t o be done on t h e base. AVCO C o r p o r a t i o n was t h e s u c e s s f u l b i d d e r and c o n t r a c t e d w i t h t h e Air Force t o be t h e c a r e t a k e r of t h e base. Defendant came t o Glasgow a s a manager w i t h AVCO. AVCO d i d t h e maintenance work u n t i l 1972 when it l o s t its c o n t r a c t t o Tumpane C o r p o r a t i o n . Defendant t h e n i n c o r p o r a t e d Montana Manufacturing, which o p e r a t e d on t h e b a s e a l s o , f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s . I n 1976, V a l l e y County purchased t h e b a s e and i n c o r p o r a t e d V a l l e y I n d u s t r i a l Park ( V I P ) . A p p e l l a n t h e l p e d n e g o t i a t e t h i s p u r c h a s e and i n November of 1976 was e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t and g e n e r a l manager o f VIP. The County Commissioners o f V a l l e y County s e r v e a s t h e Board of D i r e c t o r s of VIP. S e v e r a l l a r g e underground f u e l t a n k s a r e l o c a t e d on t h e b a s e . The t a n k s which t h i s a c t i o n c o n c e r n s were l o c a t e d below b u i l d i n g 669. The pumping s t a t i o n f o r t h o s e t a n k s was l o c a t e d i n s i d e b u i l d i n g 669. When t h e A i r Force v a c a t e d t h e base i n 1969 an i n v e n t o r y of t h e f u e l t a n k s was done and t h e s i x t a n k s u n d e r b u i l d i n g 669 w e r e l a b e l e d " p i c k l e d . " P i c k l i n g is a p r o c e s s by which t h e f u e l t a n k s a r e e m p t i e d , cleaned and filled with a mixture of caustic soda and water to prevent rusting. However in the spring of 1979, a VIP maintenance man discovered that four of the six tanks under building 669 had fuel in them. It is conceded that the fuel had been there since 1969, had been left there by the Air Force and existed to the ignorance of all concerned. Appellant ordered that samples of the fuel be extracted from the tanks. VIP maintenance employees extracted samples from the four tanks and gave the samples to appellant. Appellant and another VIP employee took the samples to Wolf Point to be tested, and it was found that the fuel was usable JP-4 jet fuel. Appellant then ordered the fuel to be transferred to the tanks under building 649. The tanks and pump station under building 649 had been depickled earlier in the year and were being used to store fuel for Boeing. Boeing was using the base as a refueling stop for their training flights. Since the pumps in building 669 had been stripped of most of their parts, appellant ordered a new portable pump for this purpose which was purchased at VIP's expense. In early 1980, the approximately 200,000 gallons of fuel were pumped from building 669 to building 649 by VIP maintenance employees. At approximately the same time, appellant informed the board of directors of VIP about the existence of the fuel. He told them Boeing was interested in purchasing the fuel but also said it would be very difficult to obtain insurance for the fuel. It is standard practice in the aircraft industry to obtain liability insurance in case bad fuel is sold and personal injuries or property damage result. The chairman of the board testified that he still told appellant to market the fuel for VIP. The board pursued the possibility of obtaining insurance to sell the fuel, but when appellant was told insurance could be purchased for VIP he told the board that Boeing was no longer interested in buying the fuel. Later in 1980 appellant informed the board that he had sold the fuel and credited VIP's accounts with approximately $100,000, but because of the liability problem, it would not appear in their books. Prior to this, while the pumping was being done, appellant tried to start his own fueling corporation. He first approached three maintenance employees of VIP and asked if they would be interested in forming a corporation to sell the discovered fuel. The employees testified that appellant told them the fuel belonged to VIP. They were also told to bank out of town and not make any purchases which would draw attention to themselves. The three men testified they declined the offer because they were uneasy about ownership of the fuel. Holmes then approached Leonard Lane, comptroller for VIP, who agreed to incorporate with Holmes to sell the fuel. The two incorporated Aero Fuels, Inc. Appellant informed Boeing that he and some Glasgow businessmen had bought 200,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel on speculation and were willing to sell it. The fuel was sold to Boeing. The crew supervisor from Boeing telephoned Lane when he received the bill from Aero Fuels and asked Lane who Aero Fuels was. Lane informed him it was a group of Glasgow businessmen who had purchased the fuel. In all Boeing paid Aero Fuels over $194,000 for the fuel. The money was deposited in Aero Fuels' accounts in Billings, Great Falls and Williston, North Dakota. Appellant was charged by information on November 5, 1982 with the theft of the JP-4 fuel having a value of $194,098.88. The information stated that Valley County through VIP was the owner of the fuel, and the affidavit supporting the informat ion stated ownership had been gained by virtue of a deed from the General Services Administration. Appellant pled not guilty and a trial date was set. Prior to the trial, appellant moved to suppress evidence which was obtained by the prosecution prior to the information being filed. The prosecution had obtained appellant's bank records by means of investigative subpoenas and an order of seizure issued by Judge M. James Sorte. The motion to suppress was made on the basis that Judge Sorte did not have jurisdiction to issue the subpoenas because he presided over the District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District and the crimes occurred in the Seventeenth Judicial District. The motion to suppress was denied. A jury trial was held from May 16 to May 20, 1983, and appellant was found guilty. The court sentenced him to ten years with five suspended, and ordered that he make restitution in the amount of $160,000. This appeal follows. Appellant raises the following six issues for our consideration: (1) Did the District Court lack jurisdiction to hear the case and issue final orders as the presiding judge was retired Judge Nat Allen? (2) Did the District Court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress? ( 3 ) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n denying a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s on t h e grounds t h a t t h e r e was a f a t a l v a r i a n c e between t h e c h a r g e s p r e s e n t e d and t h e c a s e proven a t t r i a l ? ( 4 ) Did t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e f u e l was abandoned and t h a t a p p e l l a n t , a s f i n d e r , took p o s s e s s i o n ? ( 5 ) Did t h e S t a t e prove t h e n e c e s s a r y i n t e n t t o s u s t a i n a t h e f t c o n v i c t i o n ? ( 6 ) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n its r e f u s a l t o g i v e c e r t a i n of a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s ? The f i r s t i s s u e has a l r e a d y been d i s p o s e d of by our d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e ex. r e l . Wilcox and Bradley v. The D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 678 P.2d 209, 41 St.Rep. 397. Judge A l l e n was c a l l e d i n under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power recognized i n Wilcox, s u p r a . Thus he p r o p e r l y assumed f u l l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e c a s e , i n c l u d i n g t h e power t o i s s u e f i n a l o r d e r s . A p p e l l a n t n e x t contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e f r u i t s o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoenas and o r d e r of s e i z u r e i s s u e d p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . The o r d e r and s u b p o e n a s were i s s u e d by J u d g e J a m e s S o r t e , who was p r e s i d i n g over a p p e l l a n t ' s t r i a l on a p r e v i o u s c r i m i n a l charge i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S e v e n t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Judge S o r t e , who is t h e e l e c t e d D i s t r i c t Judge of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , was c a l l e d i n by Judge Leonard Langen who is t h e e l e c t e d D i s t r i c t Judge f o r t h e S e v e n t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t Judge S o r t e d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o issue t h e subpoenas o r o r d e r of s e i z u r e , s i n c e he sits i n t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t and t h e crime occurred i n t h e Seventeenth J u d i c i a l District. A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n is n o t w e l l taken. S e c t i o n 45-4-301, MCA, s t a t e s : "Whenever t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o r county a t t o r n e y h a s a d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g e d unlawful a c t i v i t y , any j u s t i c e of t h e supreme c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge o f t h i s s t a t e mav cause s u b ~ o e n a s t o be i s s u e d commandi& t h e p e r i o n s t o whom t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d t o appear b e f o r e t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o r t h e county a t t o r n e y and g i v e t e s t i m o n y and p r o d u c e s u c h books, r e c o r d s , p a p e r s , documents, and o t h e r o b j e c t s a s may be n e c e s s a r y and proper t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) T h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e of t h i s s t a t u t e v e s t s e v e r y d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge with t h e power t o i s s u e i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoenas with no j u r i s d i c t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n . There simply is no requirement, e x p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t , t h a t t h e subpoena be i s s u e d by t h e s i t t i n g judge of t h e d i s t r i c t where t h e crime a l l e g e d l y occurred. A p p e l l a n t h a s read t h e venue s t a t u t e s i n t o s e c t i o n 46-4-301, MCA, which b a s i c a l l y p r o v i d e t h a t a c r i m i n a l t r i a l s h a l l be h e l d i n t h e county where t h e o f f e n s e was committed. See s e c t i o n 46-3-101, MCA e t . seq. H e t h u s concludes t h a t i f t h e subpoena was i s s u e d by anyone o t h e r t h a n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge s i t t i n g i n t h e county where t h e o f f e n s e a l l e g e d l y o c c u r r e d , it was i s s u e d by a judge w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n . However t h e r e is a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between v e n u e and j u r i s d i c t i o n . "The j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e judges of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s of t h e S t a t e of Montana. . . [ i s ] c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e S t a t e of Montana. . ." S e c t i o n 3-5-312, MCA, (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . " J u r i s d i c t i o n is t h e a u t h o r i t y t o h e a r .and d e t e r m i n e a cause. Venue is t h e p l a c e of t r i a l . " S t a n t o n T r u s t and Savings Bank v. Johnson ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 104 Mont. 235 a t 238, 65 P.2d 1188 a t 1189. J u r i s d i c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y is g r a n t e d by law. S t a t e e x r e l . Johnson v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 263, 410 P.2d 933. There is no venue problem h e r e because t h e subpoenas were i s s u e d b e f o r e t h e information was even f i l e d . The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l power o r a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoenas is g r a n t e d by law through s e c t i o n 46-4-301, MCA. S i n c e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of each d i s t r i c t c o u r t is c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e boundaries of t h e s t a t e , s o is t h e power of each d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o i s s u e i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoenas c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e boundaries of t h e s t a t e . A p p e l l a n t n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e was a f a t a l v a r i a n c e between t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e S t a t e ' s proof a t t r i a l , which r e q u i r e s t h e c h a r g e s be d i s m i s s e d . The b a s i s of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t while t h e a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t VIP owned t h e f u e l by v i r t u e of a deed from t h e U.S. Government, a t t r i a l t h e y attempted t o prove ownership by p o s s e s s i o n . G e n e r a l l y , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n charging a p a r t y w i t h a csime must s t a t e , "[Tlhe f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o f f e n s e i n o r d i n a r y and c o n c i s e language and i n such a manner a s t o e n a b l e a person of common understanding t o know what is intended." S e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 - 4 O l ( l ) ( c ) ( i i i ) . The a l l e g a t i o n s contained t h e r e i n and t h e proof must correspond f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be p r o p e r l y c o n v i c t e d . S t a t e v. Rindal ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 64, 404 P.2d 327. T h i s r u l e was developed t o p r o t e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t from being misled a t t r i a l and twice prosecuted f o r t h e same crime. R i n d a l , s u p r a . Unless t h e v a r i a n c e between t h e a l l e g a t i o n s and proof p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e c h a r g e should n o t be dismissed. S e c t i o n 46-11-403(3), MCA. A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s he was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e S t a t e ' s r e l i a n c e on proof of ownership by p o s s e s s i o n r a t h e r t h a n proof of ownership by t i t l e a s a l l e g e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t s u p p o r t i n g t h e information. H e a r g u e s t h i s was a s h i f t i n t h e o r y which d i d n o t a l l o w him t o a d e q u a t e l y defend t h e charge. T h i s argument is n o t p e r s u a s i v e . Ownership by t i t l e i s n o t r e q u i r e d u n d e r t h e c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s o f Montana. The d e f i n i t i o n of owner which is a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e is c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 45-2-101, MCA: " ( 4 6 ) 'owner' means a person o t h e r t h a n t h e o f f e n d e r who h a s p o s s e s s i o n of o r any o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d , even though such i n t e r e s t o r p o s s e s s i o n is unlawful, and w i t h o u t whose c o n s e n t t h e o f f e n d e r h a s no a u t h o r i t y t o e x e r t c o n t r o l over t h e p r o p e r t y . " Under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e S t a t e was r e q u i r e d o n l y t o prove t h a t VIP had p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f u e l . A s d i s c u s s e d above, t h e f u e l was found i n VIP-owned t a n k s , and VIP e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l over it through its employees, i n c l u d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t . The proof is c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t VIP had p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f u e l and w i t h o u t V I P ' s c o n s e n t , t h e a p p e l l a n t had no a u t h o r i t y t o e x e r t c o n t r o l over t h e f u e l . That meets t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s e c t i o n 45-2-101 ( 46 ) , MCA. A s noted above, t h e purpose of r e q u i r i n g t h e proof t o correspond w i t h t h e a l l e g a t i o n s is t o p r o t e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t from being misled a t t r i a l and from being p r o s e c u t e d twice f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . R i n d a l , s u p r a . Any change made by t h e S t a t e h e r e d i d n o t p r e j u d i c e a p p e l l a n t ' s d e f e n s e o r mislead him. A t t r i a l , a p p e l l a n t contended t h e f u e l was abandoned by t h e f e d e r a l government, and r i g h t f u l l y found by him. T h i s defense t h e o r y was based on t h e a c t s of a p p e l l a n t himself and depended i n no way upon t h e method VIP o b t a i n e d ownership of t h e f u e l . The focus was on abandonment of t h e f u e l o r how it was disposed o f , r a t h e r than on how VIP o b t a i n e d it. Likewise, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a subsequent p r o s e c u t i o n f o r t h e f t of t h e same f u e l is n o t p r e s e n t h e r e . Ownership of t h e f u e l h a s been s u f f i c i e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n V I P t o a l l e v i a t e t h i s danger. I n sum, any v a r i a t i o n between t h e proof and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n is minor and does n o t r e q u i r e d i s m i s s a l of t h e charges. No s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of a p p e l l a n t h a s been p r e j u d i c e d . A p p e l l a n t n e x t contends t h a t t h e f u e l was abandoned by t h e U.S. Government which a p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d t o f i n d and s e l l f o r h i s own p r o f i t . I n i t s b e s t l i g h t , t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e f a c t s is s p e c i o u s . I n its w o r s t l i g h t it could be termed b l a t a n t l y misleading. A p p e l l a n t contends t h a t t h e U . S . Government abandoned t h e f u e l because it had no i n t e n t i o n of going back f o r it. However, abandonment n u s t be of a known r i g h t . H i l y a r d v. Engel ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 123 Mont. 20, 209 P.2d 895. A p p e l l a n t ' s own w i t n e s s e s e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Air Force d i d n o t know t h e f u e l e x i s t e d , s o it was n o t a known r i g h t t h e y r e l i n q u i s h e d . Also, even i f t h e f u e l was abandoned, t h e VIP employees found t h e f u e l i n VIP owned t a n k s and e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l over it, n o t a p p e l l a n t h i m s e l f . The VIP maintenance men found t h e f u e l . They withdrew samples, and a p p e l l a n t along w i t h a co-worker took t h e f u e l t o be t e s t e d a t a c o s t of almost $800 t o VIP. The pump which was purchased t o move t h e f u e l was bought by VIP a t a c o s t of over $600. VIP employees moved t h e f u e l t o d i f f e r e n t tanks. A p p e l l a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t V I P may have a c i v i l a c t i o n a g a i n s t him f o r t h e c o s t of t h e s e s e r v i c e s misses t h e p o i n t . The p o i n t is t h a t VIP through its employees, i n c l u d i n g a p p e l l a n t a c t i n g a s a VIP employee, took c o n t r o l over t h e f u e l . A p p e l l a n t ' s abandonment t h e o r y is n o t borne o u t by t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d f a c t s of t h e c a s e . The n e x t i s s u e concerns a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e n t ; two e r r o r s a r e a l l e g e d h e r e . F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by n o t i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t t h e y must f i n d a bad o r e v i l i n t e n t on h i s p a r t t o c o n v i c t him. Second, h e a s s e r t s t h a t t h e f a c t s w i l l n o t bear o u t such a f i n d i n g . T h i s Court has o f t e n held t h a t g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s on i n t e n t u s i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of "knowledge" and " p u r p o s e " e l i m i n a t e s t h e need f o r f u r t h e r i n t e n t i n s t r u c t i o n s . S t a t e v. Mlein ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, and S t a t e v. Jackson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 195, 589 P.2d 1009. Here t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d e x a c t l y t h a t , and c o r r e c t l y r e f u s e d a p p e l l a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on e v i l i n t e n t . Whether t h e e v i d e n c e would have been s u f f i c i e n t t o f i n d an e v i l i n t e n t o r n o t is i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l . The j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d and r e s o l v e d t h i s q u e s t i o n of f a c t a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t . There is c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h i s f i n d i n g . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t p o i n t s t o twenty one proposed j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s he contends were improperly r e f u s e d . W e have reviewed t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s s u b m i t t e d by a p p e l l a n t and compared them w i t h t h o s e g i v e n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The i n s t r u c t i o n s given a s a whole, accurate1.y and f a i r l y s t a t e t h e law, which is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h i s Court. S t a t e v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 188, 557 P.2d 795. A p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o show how n o t g i v i n g t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s p r e j u d i c e d him i n any way. The D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d them a s r e p e t i t i o u s and a s comments on t h e evidence. A £ f irmed. W e concur: 34d&ca/!&' Chief J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s