Title: Gustave Jeffrey Totsky v. Riteway Bus Service, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0530 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Gustave Jeffrey Totsky, a/k/a G. Jeffrey Totsky 
and Kristine Totsky,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Riteway Bus Service, Inc., Sharon Y. Williams 
and National Continental Insurance Co., an Ohio 
Corporation, a part of the Progressive Insurance 
Group,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corp., a 
Wisconsin Corporation and Quad/Med Claims, 
Quad/Graphics, Inc.,  
 
Defendants, 
Maxicare Health Insurance Company, a California 
Corporation,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
City of Milwaukee and State Farm Mutual  
Automobile Ins.,  
 
Respondents.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 889, 584 N.W.2d 188 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 28, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Skwierawski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and PROSSER, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Robert C. Angermeier, Mark J. Rogers and 
Angermeier & Rogers, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark J. 
Rogers. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs 
by Vicki L. Arrowood and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., and 
Emile H. Banks, Jr, Yolanda Y. McGowan and Emile Banks & 
Associates, LLC, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Emile H. 
Banks, Jr. 
 
 
For the respondent, City of Milwaukee, there was 
a brief by Ellen H. Tangen, assistant city attorney, with whom on 
the brief was Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0530 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gustave Jeffrey Totsky, a/k/a G. Jeffrey  
Totsky and Kristine Totsky,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Riteway Bus Service, Inc., Sharon Y.  
Williams and National Continental  
Insurance Co., an Ohio Corporation, a  
part of the Progressive Insurance Group,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance  
Corp., a Wisconsin Corporation and  
Quad/Med Claims, Quad/Graphics, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Maxicare Health Insurance Company, a  
California Corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
City of Milwaukee and State Farm Mutual  
Automobile Ins.,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   G. Jeffrey Totsky and Kristine 
Totsky, the petitioners, seek review of a published decision of 
the court of appeals, Totsky v. Riteway Bus Serv. Co., 220 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark, Acting  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
2 
Wis. 2d 889, 894, 584 N.W.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1998), which reversed 
a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judgment.  The judgment vacated 
a jury verdict that found a Riteway school bus driver was not 
negligent in going through a stop sign, a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.46(1)(1991-92).1  The jury was instructed on the 
emergency doctrine as set forth in Wis JICivil 1105A.  It 
apparently accepted the emergency doctrine in finding no 
negligence in the actions of the bus driver, Sharon Y. Williams, 
who skidded through the stop sign when the bus hit a patch of 
ice.  In skidding through the stop sign, Williams' bus collided 
with Jeffrey Totsky's vehicle.  After the jury found Williams 
was not negligent, the circuit court, the Honorable Michael W. 
Skwierawski presiding, entered a judgment in favor of the 
Totskys on their renewed motion for directed verdict and 
conditionally granted a new trial.   
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that "the 
emergency doctrine can apply [in a negligence per se action] if 
a violation of the safety statute is caused by a loss of 
management and control through no fault of the driver, presuming 
the other requirements for invoking the emergency doctrine are 
met."  Totsky, 220 Wis. 2d at 903.  The court of appeals also 
held that credible evidence supported the "application of the 
emergency doctrine in this case."  Id. at 904.  We affirm the 
court of appeals' decision.  The emergency doctrine applies to a 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1991-92 text unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
3 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) under the facts of this 
case, because a violation of § 346.46(1) is concerned with an 
issue of management and control.  We further hold that two of 
the subrogated parties in this case, the city of Milwaukee and 
Maxicare Health Insurance Corporation, were not required to file 
a separate petition for review to preserve their subrogated 
interests on appeal, because they stipulated to waive their 
rights to participate at trial and to be bound by the judgment. 
 However, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, which did not 
enter into such a stipulation, was required to file an 
individual petition for review to preserve on appeal its 
subrogated interest, which is separate from the Totskys' claim. 
I. 
¶3 
This case revolves around an accident where a bus 
skidded through an intersection on ice and collided with another 
car.  The accident occurred just before 7:00 a.m. on February 
10, 1993, at the intersection of Morgan Avenue and 80th Street 
in the city of Milwaukee.  Morgan Avenue is an arterial roadway 
and does not contain any stop signs where it intersects 80th 
Street.  A stop sign controls the northbound lane of 80th 
Street.  Jeffrey Totsky (Totsky) was driving to work heading 
east on Morgan Avenue.  At that same time, Sharon Williams 
(Williams) was driving a Riteway school bus north on 80th 
Street.  
¶4 
Williams began work that day at 6:00 a.m.  Before 
leaving the bus yard, she checked the general condition of the 
bus, including the brakes, and was satisfied that the bus was 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
4 
working properly.  Williams noticed that the roads looked damp, 
but she knew that some ice existed on the roads as well.  She 
was on her first route to pick up children when she initially 
skidded.  Her bus skidded a couple of times, but each time, she 
apparently could see the ice on the road before she encountered 
the skid.  The first encounter on the ice caused the bus to 
slide to the side approximately one or two feet.  The second 
skid was similarly minimal.   
¶5 
Totsky noticed that the road looked wet as he left for 
work, but he did not skid before the accident or encounter 
slippery conditions.  He also testified at the trial that the 
road did not look slippery near where the bus stopped after the 
accident; it just looked wet. 
¶6 
Williams saw the stop sign for northbound traffic as 
she approached the intersection of 80th Street and Morgan 
Avenue.  When she was approximately 100 feet from the stop sign, 
she began to apply her brakes.  She estimated at trial that she 
was travelling at about 12-14 miles per hour2 when she began to 
apply the brakes, and that the road looked wet, not icy.3  The 
bus began to skid when Williams braked.  As the bus skidded, she 
pumped the brakes and tried to turn the wheel of the bus into 
the skid.  However, she was unable to stop the bus.  Robert 
                     
2 During a deposition, Williams testified that she was 
driving about 10-15 miles per hour.  (R. at 89:12.)  
3 Williams apparently testified at trial that before the 
accident, she did not skid on any patches of the road that 
merely looked wet.    
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
5 
Krenz, Riteway's expert, estimated that when Williams began to 
skid, the bus was travelling between 16-23 miles per hour, and 
struck the Totsky vehicle at a speed between 11-16 miles per 
hour. 
¶7 
The bus skidded completely through the parking lane 
and into the intersection.  Totsky saw the bus skidding through 
the intersection and accelerated in an attempt to avoid a 
collision.  The bus struck Totsky's vehicle on the right rear 
corner, denting the right rear fender.  Upon impact, Totsky's 
vehicle went into a spin turning clockwise, only stopping when 
it struck a signpost broadside.  Krenz estimated that Totsky was 
driving at 8-12 miles per hour when his vehicle hit the 
signpost.   
¶8 
When the bus hit the car, Totsky was knocked out of 
the shoulder harness into the passenger seat, but the lap belt 
still secured his hips and legs.  He attempted to sit up and 
counter-steer out of the spin, but as the vehicle hit the curb 
and signpost, his head and body slammed into the left front 
door.  Totsky almost immediately felt pain in his back, for 
which he later took painkillers and muscle relaxants.  He 
ultimately completed three months of therapy, was treated by 
several doctors, and missed eight months of work. 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
6 
¶9 
Williams had picked up two4 children prior to the 
accident, but neither Williams nor the children was injured 
during the collision. 
¶10  The Totskys sued Riteway.  Before the trial, both 
Maxicare Health Insurance Corporation (Maxicare) and the city of 
Milwaukee waived their right to participate at trial.  However, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (State Farm) did not 
waive its right to participate at trial.      
¶11 In November 1996, the case was tried to a jury.  At 
the close of the evidence, the Totskys moved for a directed 
verdict on the issue of Williams' negligence.  The court took 
the motion under advisement, and permitted the case to go to the 
jury.   
¶12 Among the jury instructions given were Wisconsin Civil 
Jury Instructions 1105Management and Control, 1105AEmergency 
Doctrine, 1280Skidding, and 1055Lookout.  The first question 
of the special verdict asked:  "Was Sharon Williams negligent in 
the operation of her vehicle on February 10, 1993?"  The jury 
responded "no."  The jury also responded "no" to the third 
question:  "Was G. Jeffrey Totsky negligent in the operation of 
his vehicle on February 10, 1993?"  The jury thought that the 
following sums of money would reasonably compensate Totsky for 
his damages:  $37,000 for past medical and hospital expenses; 
$60,000 for future medical and hospital expenses; $20,324 for 
                     
4 There seems to be some discrepency as to how many children 
were on the bus.  The accident report states there were two, but 
Williams testified at trial that there were three.  
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
7 
past loss of earnings; $100,000 for loss of future earning 
capacity; and $50,000 for past and future pain, suffering, and 
disability.  The jury further determined that $10,000 would 
reasonably compensate Kristine Totsky for the loss of consortium 
sustained by her. 
¶13 Since the jury returned a verdict that neither 
Williams nor Totsky was negligent, the Totskys renewed their 
motion for a directed verdict.  They also moved in the 
alternative for a new trial in the interest of justice and 
claimed that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 
 Judge Skwierawski granted both motions.   
¶14 The court granted the motion for a directed verdict 
for several reasons.  Williams was negligent per se, the court 
found, since she violated a safety statute.  Moreover, the court 
found that the emergency doctrine could not excuse Williams' 
negligence as this case did not solely present an issue of 
management and control.  Finally, she was negligent as a matter 
of law because her excessive speed produced the emergency that 
she encountered, and therefore, the emergency doctrine did not 
apply. 
¶15 The circuit court also conditionally granted the 
motion for a new trial in the event that on appeal, the court's 
judgment would be reversed or vacated. 
¶16 The court of appeals reversed both of the circuit 
court's rulings.  Totsky, 220 Wis. 2d at 894.  The emergency 
doctrine can apply to the violation of a safety statute, which 
results in negligence per se, the court of appeals decided.  Id. 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
8 
at 899.  For support, it looked to La Vallie v. General Ins. Co. 
of Am., 17 Wis. 2d 522, 117 N.W.2d 703 (1962), in which this 
court applied the emergency doctrine to a violation of a safety 
statute.  The court of appeals explained that La Vallie stands 
for the proposition that if a driver's loss of management and 
control causes a violation of a safety statute, the emergency 
doctrine can apply, assuming the other prerequisites for the 
emergency doctrine also apply.  Totsky, 220 Wis. 2d at 903.   
¶17 The court of appeals also distinguished Leckwee v. 
Gibson, 90 Wis. 2d 275, 280 N.W.2d 186 (1979), a case the 
petitioners rely upon greatly.  That case arguably precludes the 
use of the emergency doctrine in cases of a safety statute 
violation.  Totsky, 220 Wis. 2d at 903 n.3.  Leckwee was 
inapposite, the court of appeals recognized, because in Leckwee, 
the court did not even address the emergency doctrine issue, 
since it was not raised at the circuit court level.  Id. (citing 
Leckwee, 90 Wis. 2d at 289). 
¶18 The court of appeals concluded that here credible 
evidence supports the application of the emergency doctrine.  
Totsky, 220 Wis. 2d at 904.  The alleged negligence related to 
management and control.  Id. at 906.  Credible evidence also 
supported the other two requirements for application of the 
emergency doctrine:  the time in which Williams needed to act 
was "short enough to preclude action sufficient to avoid the 
accident," and she was free of negligence in causing the 
accident because she was unable to see the icy patch that made 
the bus skid.  Id. 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
9 
¶19 The court of appeals also addressed the issue of 
negligence as a matter of law.  The circuit court had found 
Williams negligent as a matter of law since "she was going too 
fast and in view of the fact that she knew there was a danger 
that morning that ice existed on the roadways . . . ."  Id. at 
905.  This finding was in error, the court of appeals stated, 
because a reasonable jury could have found, according to 
credible evidence, that Williams was driving between 10 and 16 
miles per hour when she hit the ice patch that caused the skid. 
 Id.  Her speed was not excessive and, therefore, she was not 
negligent as a matter of law.  Id.   
¶20 The Totskys petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals' decision.  The three subrogated parties, the 
city of Milwaukee, Maxicare, and State Farm, did not join the 
petition.  Further, none of the subrogees filed a timely 
petition of their own.  The Respondents therefore filed a motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
subrogees 
as 
parties 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.10(1997-98) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.62(1997-98), 
claiming that the subrogees waived their right to a review of 
the claims.  The subrogees did not respond to the Respondents' 
motion.  Finally, the subrogees only filed briefs in opposition 
to the motion to dismiss when they were warned that the motion 
would be summarily granted absent a failure to respond.5   
                     
5 The letter from the Office of the Supreme Court Clerk was 
sent to the subrogees' attorneys on April 29, 1999, and 
specifically stated: 
A motion to dismiss the City of Milwaukee, State Farm 
Mutual 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Company 
and 
Maxicare 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
10
II. 
 
¶21 The first issue we address is whether the emergency 
doctrine can apply to a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1), the 
statutory section requiring vehicles to stop at stop signs.  
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) as it relates to the 
emergency doctrine presents a question of law.  Burnett v. Hill, 
207 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997)(stating that 
statutory interpretation is a question of law).  Questions of 
law are reviewed independently without deference to a circuit 
court's decision.  Id. 
¶22 The emergency doctrine excuses an individual from 
negligence.  See Seif v. Turowski, 49 Wis. 2d 15, 23, 181 N.W.2d 
388 (1970).  See also Geis v. Hirth, 32 Wis. 2d 580, 588, 146 
N.W.2d 459 (1966).  Three requirements must be met for the 
emergency doctrine to apply: 
 
First, the party seeking the benefits of the emergency 
doctrine 
must 
be 
free 
from 
negligence 
which 
contributed to the creation of the emergency.  Second, 
the time element in which action is required must be 
short enough to preclude deliberate and intelligent 
choice of action.  Third, the element of negligence 
being 
inquired 
into 
must 
concern 
management and 
control before the emergency doctrine can apply. 
                                                                  
Health Insurance Corporation from this review has been 
filed but not responded to by any of the named 
entities.  Failure to file a response to this motion 
by Monday, May 10, 1999 will result in this pending 
motion being summarily granted. 
 
 
  
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
11
Gage v. Seal, 36 Wis. 2d 661, 664, 154 N.W.2d 354 (1967)(quoting 
Geis v. Hirth, 32 Wis. 2d 580, 586, 146 N.W.2d 459 (1966)). 
¶23 The rationale underlying the emergency doctrine "is 
that a person faced with an emergency which his conduct did not 
create or help to create is not guilty of negligence in the 
methods he chose, or failed to choose, to avoid the threatened 
disaster if he is compelled to act instantly without time for 
reflection."  Seif, 49 Wis. 2d at 23 (citing Papacosta v. 
Papacosta, 2 Wis. 2d 175, 85 N.W.2d 790 (1957)).  Stated another 
way:  "[t]he application of the emergency rule rests upon the 
psychological fact that the time which elapses between the 
creation of the danger and the impact is too short under the 
particular circumstances to allow an intelligent or deliberate 
choice of action in response to the realization of danger . . . 
."  Gage, 36 Wis. 2d at 664 (quoting Cook v. Thomas, 25 Wis. 2d 
467, 471, 131 N.W.2d 299 (1964)). 
¶24 Before discussing why the emergency doctrine can apply 
to a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46, we first note that the 
stop sign statute is a safety statute, the violation of which 
constitutes negligence per se.  "A safety statute is a 
legislative enactment designed to protect a specified class of 
persons from a particular type of harm.  Betchkal v. Willis, 127 
Wis. 2d 177, 184, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985)(quoting Leahy v. Kenosha 
Memorial Hospital, 118 Wis. 2d 441, 449, 348 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. 
App. 1984)).  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.46 is a safety statute.  See 
Wis JICivil 1325Stop at Stop Signs, and 1325AStop at Stop 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
12
Signs (Alternate)(the headings of both jury instructions refer 
to the stop sign statute as a safety statute). 
   
¶25 The violation of this safety statute constitutes 
negligence per se.  Negligence per se arises from the violation 
of a safety statute if three requirements are met: 1) the safety 
statute was designed to prevent the harm inflicted, 2) the 
person injured was in a protected class, and 3) the legislature 
has expressed its intent that the statutory section serve as a 
basis for the imposition of civil liability.  Betchkal, 127 
Wis. 2d at 184 (citing Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 268-
69, 301 N.W.2d 447, 454, 455 (1981).  First, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.36(1) was designed to prevent collisions resulting from 
vehicles that do not stop and yield to traffic having the right-
of-way.  Second, the statute was created to protect highway 
users, not merely to regulate the flow of traffic.  The 
protected 
class 
is 
"vehicles 
which 
have 
entered 
or 
are 
approaching the intersection upon a highway which is not 
controlled by an official stop sign or traffic signal."  Wis. 
Stat. § 346.46(1).  Totsky was within the class of persons to be 
protected because his vehicle was on an arterial highway that 
did not contain a stop sign.  Finally, the legislature's intent 
that § 346.46 serve as a basis for civil liability is implied by 
the language of the statute itself.  See Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 
271 (stating that "requisite intent may be supplied by necessary 
implication from the language of the statute.")  See also Leahy, 
118 Wis. 2d at 450 (recognizing that legislative intent to 
impose civil liability may be stated directly or by implication 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
13
in a statute).  Section 346.46(1)'s language "is such a clear 
expression of concern for the safety of highway users, committed 
so plainly to the responsibility" of the operators of vehicles 
approaching stop signs, that we conclude that the legislature 
intended to impose civil liability on those individuals who 
violate the statute.  Cf. Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 271.  
¶26 We agree with the court of appeals that the violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) constitutes negligence per se, and 
that such violation can be excused through application of the 
emergency doctrine.  We agree with the court of appeals’ 
analysis for several reasons. 
¶27 First, the court of appeals correctly relied upon La 
Vallie for the proposition that when the emergency doctrine 
applies it excuses a violation of a safety statute, thus 
precluding a finding of negligence.  In La Vallie, the 
defendant's car skidded into another car after it hit a patch of 
snow and ice on the highway, but "[t]he jury absolved the 
plaintiff of negligence."  17 Wis. 2d at 525.  This court found 
that the "jury was properly instructed on the emergency 
doctrine," 
even though the 
defendant's 
alleged 
violations 
pertained to two safety statutes.  Id. at 527.  In holding that 
the jury was properly instructed on the emergency doctrine, we 
stated that "the emergency doctrine would excuse any alleged 
violation of sec. 346.34(1) [proscribing a change of direct 
course upon a roadway], since the change of direct course 
occurred at a time when the La Vallie car was out of control 
through no fault of the driver."  Id.  This statement not only 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
14
demonstrates that the emergency doctrine may apply in a 
negligence per se case, but also that management and control was 
at issue in La Vallie. 
¶28 The Totskys argue that La Vallie does not control this 
issue.  We find the Totskys’ arguments unpersuasive.  The 
Totskys attempt to distinguish La Vallie on the basis that La 
Vallie dealt with the issue of position on the highway, which 
they contend merely creates an inference of negligence.  (Pet. 
Br. at 15)(citing Geis, 32 Wis. 2d at 591).  In contrast, they 
argue that the duty to stop at a stop sign is absolute.  (Pet. 
Br. at 15)(citing Wis JICivil 1325).  However, the Totskys 
misconstrue the language in Geis that they rely upon.  In Geis, 
32 Wis. 2d at 591, we stated that a party’s “position on the 
wrong side of the road created an inference of negligence unless 
it was shown that this was beyond her control.”  See also 
Kempfer v. Bois, 255 Wis. 312, 314, 38 N.W.2d 483 (1949), and 
Zeinemann v. Gasser, 251 Wis. 238, 243, 29 N.W.2d 49 (1947).  
While this inference of negligence may not exactly equate with 
negligence per se, the inference establishes a prima facie case 
of negligence, which cannot be rebutted without a showing of 
circumstances beyond a party’s control; in other words, an 
emergency.  As such, La Vallie is persuasive authority in this 
case.  A valid distinction between a so-called inference of 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
15
negligence and negligence per se cannot be drawn under these 
circumstances.6    
¶29 Second, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts permits the application of the 
emergency doctrine, even though a safety statute is involved.  
While we recognize that this issue is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, we find the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A 
persuasive because it demonstrates that emergency is a generally 
accepted excuse to negligence per se.  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 288A, Excused Violations, (1965) states: 
 
(1)  An excused violation of a legislative enactment 
or an administrative regulation is not negligence. 
(2)  Unless the enactment or regulation is construed 
not to permit such excuse, its violation is excused 
when 
 
(a)  the violation is reasonable because of the 
actor's incapacity; 
                     
6 It appears that earlier Wisconsin case law does not draw a 
clear distinction between an inference of negligence and 
negligence per se.  The Oregon Supreme Court appears to use the 
term presumption of negligence in discussing negligence per se 
situations.  However, the Oregon Supreme Court's treatment of 
the presumption in such situations, and this court's treatment 
of an inference of negligence in similar situations appears 
consistent.  Compare Kempfer v. Bois, 255 Wis. 312, 314, 38 
N.W.2d 483 (1949), and Zeinemann v. Gasser, 251 Wis. 238, 243, 
29 N.W.2d 49 (1947), with Weitzel v. Wingard, 546 P.2d 121, 123 
(Or. 1976)(stating that "the violation of a motor vehicle 
statute creates a presumption of negligence," but that if a 
"party produces evidence which the court determines raises a 
question of fact whether the party acted reasonably, despite 
violation of the statute, then the question of the party's 
negligence is one for the jury.")  For a thorough discussion on 
Oregon negligence law, refer to Caroline Forell, Statutory 
Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se:  What's 
the Difference, 77 Or. L. Rev. 497 (1998).    
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
16
 
(b)  he neither knows nor should know of the 
occasion for compliance; 
 
(c)  he is unable after reasonable diligence or 
care to comply; 
 
(d)  he is confronted by an emergency not due to 
his own misconduct; 
 
(e)  compliance would involve a greater risk of 
harm to the actor or to others. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A (1965).  Section 288A 
applies to actions where there is a violation of a safety 
statute, 
because 
it 
specifically 
refers 
to 
"legislative 
enactment."  Restatement (Second) § 288A(1).  Comment b explains 
that if a person's action is excused, the person was not 
negligent in the first place:  "[i]n many of the situations in 
which the conduct of the actor is excused, such conduct is 
simply not a violation of the statute, ordinance, or regulation, 
for any purpose."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A(1) cmt. 
b.  See also Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, § 17.6 at 
641 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that if an excuse applies to a 
violation of a safety statute and, thus, otherwise would be 
negligence per se, "it means that violation of a statutory 
standard is negligence per se in a civil case only in the 
absence of evidence tending to establish some excuse that the 
court will recognize.") 
¶30 In particular, the Comment on Clause (d) accepts the 
use of the emergency doctrine.  It addresses how the emergency 
doctrine applies to a violation of a statute resulting in 
negligence per se.  It states that "[a]s in other cases of 
negligence . . . , the violation of an enactment or regulation 
will ordinarily be excused when the actor is confronted by an 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
17
emergency which is not caused by his [or her] own misconduct."  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A cmt. on clause (d) (l965). 
We find in this comment an express acknowledgment of the 
emergency doctrine's use in regard to a violation of a statute 
resulting in negligence per se. 
¶31 Finally, 
other 
leading 
authorities 
in 
tort 
law 
recognize the applicability of the emergency doctrine to a 
statute involving negligence per se.7  Prosser and Keeton note 
that violation of a statute in which no excuse is permitted 
really is strict liability.8  Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, 
                     
7 We acknowledge that another approach that might be taken 
is to eliminate the emergency doctrine, and to use a traditional 
negligence inquiry, in which a jury would assess negligence 
according to duty, breach, cause, and harm.  Harper, James & 
Gray, The Law of Torts, § 17.6, 619-20 (2d ed. 1986)(stating 
that "[i]n a substantial number of jurisdictions such a 
violation is held to be evidence of negligence to be weighed by 
the jury.")  Under the alternate approach, the most significant 
inquiries would seem to involve breach and causation.  It 
appears that the result in this case would be the same under 
either approach, however.  We disagree with the concurring 
opinion that suggests elimination of the doctrines of negligence 
per se and emergency.  Such an approach would abandon a 
significant body of precedent in Wisconsin without sufficient 
justification. 
8 Prosser and Keeton appear to regard a violation of a 
criminal statute resulting in negligence per se as strict 
liability if no excuse is permitted: 
 It is entirely possible that a criminal statute 
imposing no more than a small fine may be regarded as 
imposing an absolute duty, for the violation of which 
there is no recognized excuse, even in a tort action 
for large damages.  But this is a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Moreover, a court may see fit to 
decide that a strict liability in tort should be 
imposed on a defendant in a situation where the 
legislature has deemed it to be in the public interest 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
18
§ 36 at 227 (5th ed. 1984).  Harper, James, and Gray recognize 
the 
meritorious 
objections 
to 
the 
"Draconian" 
nature 
of 
negligence per se.  Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, 
§ 17.6, 626 (2d ed. 1986).  They point out that most 
jurisdictions 
temper 
negligence 
per 
se 
by 
allowing 
some 
consideration of excuse, such as emergency, or lack of control. 
 Id. at 637-38.  While this case is not based on policy 
considerations, the observations these authorities make are 
valid.  We agree that negligence per se, by itself, is a 
draconian measure that can lead to unduly harsh and unfair 
results, particularly when a statute does not even call for 
civil liability.  The emergency doctrine balances the obvious 
                                                                  
to impose some kind of strict liability by way of the 
imposition of a small fine. 
 
 
The 
legislature, 
within 
its 
constitutional 
powers, may see fit to place the burden of injuries 
"upon those who can measurably control their causes, 
instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in 
that regard."  In such a case the defendant may become 
liable on the mere basis of his violation of the 
statute.  No excuse is recognized, and neither 
reasonable ignorance nor all proper care will avoid 
liability.  Such a statute falls properly under the 
head of strict liability, rather than any basis of 
negligencealthough 
the 
courts 
not 
infrequently 
continue, out of habit, to speak of the violation as 
"negligence per se." 
 
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 36 at 227 (5th ed. 1984) 
(citation omitted).  The criminal statute example is analogous 
to the traffic regulation situation at issue in this case.  We 
wish to avoid, in effect, converting a safety statute violation 
into strict liability by failing to recognize any excuse.  
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
19
intended benefits of the safety statutes, with the desire not to 
punish an individual whose violation of a safety statute was due 
to no fault of his or her own. 
¶32 Since we are faced with an issue of statutory 
interpretation, it is necessary for us to construe the language 
in Wis. Stat. § 346.46.  We interpret the statute’s language to 
support the applicability of the emergency doctrine as an excuse 
for the following reasons.  The emergency doctrine may apply 
even though the statute uses mandatory language such as “shall.” 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.05, which also uses mandatory language, 
has 
been 
construed 
to 
permit 
the 
emergency 
doctrine’s 
applicability.  Geis, 32 Wis. 2d at 591.   
¶33 Although the statute’s language is mandatory, it 
already contains two exceptions.  These two exceptions indicate 
that the statute is not immutable.  Again, we look to § 346.05 
as an example.  In that statute, several exceptions have been 
listed.  Even though those exceptions were already listed in the 
statute, this court permitted the use of the emergency doctrine. 
 La Vallie, 17 Wis. 2d at 527.  In sum, the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.46 supports our conclusion that the emergency 
doctrine may apply as an excuse.     
¶34 We now examine the applicability of the emergency 
doctrine in this case.  The emergency doctrine can apply to the 
violation of a safety statute, excusing what otherwise would be 
negligence per se, but only in situations where the three 
required tests of emergency are met.  At issue in this case is 
the third test:  whether the element of negligence inquired into 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
20
concerns management and control.  Precisely at issue is to what 
extent must the negligence concern management and control for 
the emergency doctrine to apply.  We hold that management and 
control must be involved in the negligence inquiry, but it does 
not have to be the only standard of care at issue in a case.9  In 
other words, the emergency doctrine can absolve negligence as to 
management and control, even if the total negligence inquiry 
involves more standards of care than just management and 
control.10  LaVallie, 17 Wis. 2d at 527 (stating that if a 
violation of a safety statute is caused by a loss of management 
and control, without fault on the part of the driver, then the 
emergency doctrine can apply). 
¶35 First, it is important to define what exactly is meant 
by "management and control."  Management and control relates to 
a person's manner of driving.  Schmit v. Sekach, 29 Wis. 2d 281, 
289, 139 N.W.2d 88 (1965).  The emergency instruction states 
that if a "driver is compelled to act instantly to avoid 
collision, the driver is not negligent if he or she makes such a 
                     
9 By standards of care we mean the duties that comprise the 
negligence inquiry.  Sometimes this court has characterized 
management and control as a duty separate from other duties.  
See e.g., Tombal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 62 Wis. 2d 64, 71, 
214 N.W.2d 291 (1974).  At other times this court has 
characterized management and control as part of, or involved in, 
another duty.  See e.g., Simon v. Van de Hey, 269 Wis. 50, 57, 
68 N.W.2d 529 (1955). 
10 The 
Respondents 
also 
argue 
alternatively 
that 
the 
Plaintiffs waived their right to contest the jury's verdict, and 
that the skidding instruction relieved Williams of negligence.  
(Resp. Br. at 15-21.)  We decline to address these arguments 
because they are not dispositive in this case.  
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
21
choice of action or inaction as an ordinarily prudent person 
might make if placed in the same position."  Wis JICivil 1105A, 
Management and ControlEmergency.  The instruction pertaining to 
management and control further explains that "[a] driver must 
exercise ordinary care to keep his or her vehicle under proper 
management and control so that when danger appears, the driver 
may stop the vehicle, reduce speed, change course, or take other 
proper means to avoid injury or damage."  Wis JICivil 1105, 
Management and Control.  Management and control, therefore, is 
the choice of action or inaction that a person makes regarding 
his or her vehicle.  Schmit, 29 Wis. 2d at 289.  See also Edeler 
v. O'Brien, 38 Wis. 2d 691, 699, 158 N.W.2d 301 (1968).   
¶36 A driver has three duties in regard to a stop sign:  a 
driver must stop, then look, and then yield to traffic that has 
the right-of-way.  Sailing v. Wallestad, 32 Wis. 2d 435, 441, 
145 N.W.2d 725 (1966)(quoting Schlueter v. Grady, 20 Wis. 2d 
546, 553-55, 123 N.W.2d 458 (1963)).  Management and control is 
involved in the duties of both stopping and yielding.  Wisconsin 
Jury 
InstructionCivil 
1105, 
which 
the 
jury 
considered, 
specifically refers to stopping as a proper means to avoid 
injury or damage.  This court has also determined that applying 
brakes to a vehicle, which is integral to the ability to stop, 
is part of proper management.  Simon v. Van de Hey, 269 Wis. 50, 
57, 68 N.W.2d 529 (1955).  As such, stopping is a method by 
which a driver can manage and control a vehicle. 
¶37 Management and control is similarly involved in the 
duty to yield.  Sailing additionally discussed the involvement 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
22
of management and control in the duty to yield.  In that case, 
the defendant failed to yield at a yield sign and hit a vehicle 
travelling on the intersecting arterial highway.  Sailing, 32 
Wis. 2d at 436-37.  This court stated that the degree of control 
required at a yield sign is less than at a stop sign.  Id. at 
442.  By this statement, the court indicated that control to 
some extent is involved in the duty to yield.  Even so, the 
court did ultimately state that it was proper for the circuit 
court not to instruct on management and control since the 
"evidence did not reveal sufficient reaction time available for 
there to be an issue of management and control."  Id. at 445. 
¶38 Management and control is not involved, however, in 
the duty of lookout.  See Tombal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 62 
Wis. 2d 64, 71, 214 N.W.2d 291 (1974)(wherein the court stated 
that “Mrs. Tombal did make an efficient lookout and that she was 
not negligent as to speed and, further, that she was excused 
from possible negligence as to management and control by virtue 
of the emergency doctrine.”)  Even though obeying a stop sign 
includes more duties than those involving management and 
control, the emergency doctrine can still apply to the duties 
that do involve management and control.  For instance, in 
Tombal, this court applied the emergency doctrine to management 
and control, but not lookout or speed, in regard to "[the] 
statutory duty to use caution when entering an intersection 
against 
a 
flashing 
yellow 
traffic 
control 
light." 
 
Id.  
Similarly, in Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 352-53, 459 
N.W.2d 850 (1990), the court of appeals found that the emergency 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
23
doctrine was correctly applied in a case in which both speed and 
management and control were at issue.  The court specifically 
rejected the defendants' argument that because speed was at 
issue in addition to management and control, the emergency 
doctrine could not apply at all.  Id. at 353.  In its statement, 
"a driver may fail to exercise ordinary care with respect to 
both speed and management and control," the court implied that 
even though additional duties may be at issue in a case, if 
management and control is involved, the emergency doctrine could 
apply to the management and control portion of the negligence 
inquiry.  Id.  Therefore, if management and control is at issue 
in a case, the emergency doctrine may apply, even if other 
duties are also at issue.  Of course, the emergency doctrine can 
only apply to the management and control portion of the 
negligence inquiry.  Wis JICivil 1105A (stating that the 
"emergency rule is to be considered by [a juror] only with 
respect to [a juror's] consideration of negligence as to 
management and control.")  
¶39 Since management and control is involved in at least 
two of the duties pertaining to obeying a stop sign, it is 
proper for a jury to be instructed on the emergency doctrine, if 
the other two requirements for application of the doctrine are 
met.  In this case, both of those requirements were satisfied. 
¶40 First, Williams did not act negligently, thereby 
causing the emergency.  The speed at which she was travelling 
before the skid, approximately 16-23 miles per hour, was under 
the 25 miles per hour speed limit, certainly a reasonable speed 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
24
under the conditions observable by her.  Moreover, the ice upon 
which Williams skidded was not observable because that part of 
the road merely looked wet to her, and to Totsky, not icy. 
¶41 Second, whether Williams had time to take deliberate 
action was a question for the jury.  If the time frame in which 
a person must act is too short for an individual to take 
deliberate action, then a court can determine that there was an 
emergency as a matter of law.  Schumacher v. Klabunde, 19 
Wis. 2d 83, 88, 119 N.W.2d 457 (1963).  If, however, the time 
frame "was such that the confronted driver did have time for 
considered action," then there is no emergency as a matter of 
law.  Id.  The "circumstances surrounding the accident and the 
driver's 
opportunity 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
danger 
must 
be 
considered" in determining whether an individual is entitled to 
the emergency doctrine as a matter of law, or whether the issue 
should proceed to the jury.  Seif, 49 Wis. 2d at 24. 
¶42 In this case, it appears that the time frame was not 
so short as a matter of law to preclude deliberate action.  
However, the time frame was still short enough to submit the 
issue to the jury.  Krenz testified that the bus travelled the 
100 feet from the beginning of the skid to the intersection in 
approximately four to five seconds.  Under the circumstances 
surrounding the accident, we conclude that the issue of her 
opportunity to respond and to take deliberate action was 
appropriately submitted to the jury. 
¶43 In summary, it was proper for the jury to consider the 
question of Williams' negligence in light of the emergency 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
25
doctrine.  The jury could reasonably conclude that Williams did 
not create the emergency by any negligence of her own since the 
ice the bus skidded on was not observable and she traveled at a 
reasonable speed.  Moreover, the time element could reasonably 
be found to be short enough to preclude her deliberate reaction, 
and the negligence alleged concerned, at least in part, 
management and control. 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(1) provides the standard for 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
 
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
as a matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer 
in a verdict, shall be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
 
A circuit court should only grant a motion for a directed 
verdict against a party with extreme caution.  To grant such a 
motion, both a circuit court and an appellate court, including 
this court, must view the evidence in a manner most favorable to 
the party against whom the directed verdict is taken.  Tombal, 
62 Wis. 2d at 68-69 (citations omitted).  A motion for a 
directed verdict should only be granted if the "'court is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, 
there is no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of 
such a party.'"  Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 
365, 388, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995)(quoting § 805.14(1)).  "If there 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
26
is any evidence to sustain a defense or a cause of action, the 
case must be submitted to the jury."  Tombal, 62 Wis. 2d at 68 
(citing Kielich v. Whittaker, 183 Wis. 470, 198 N.W. 270 
(1924)).   
¶45 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Williams, we conclude that credible evidence supported the 
application of the emergency doctrine, and it was proper to 
instruct the jury about the doctrine.  As such, the circuit 
court erred in directing the verdict in favor of the Totskys, 
since the circuit court proceeded on an erroneous view of the 
law in regard to the emergency doctrine and its applicability in 
this case. 
¶46 The circuit court also erred in conditionally ordering 
a new trial.  Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) sets forth the grounds for 
granting a motion for a new trial.  It states that a circuit 
court may set aside a verdict and grant a new trial when there 
are "errors in the trial, or because the verdict is contrary to 
law or to the weight of evidence, or because of excessive or 
inadequate damages, or because of newly-discovered evidence, or 
in the interests of justice."  § 805.15(1).  It is true that 
"where the trial court has awarded a new trial in the interest 
of justice, this court will affirm unless there is a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion."  Bartell v. Luedtke, 52 Wis. 2d 
372, 377, 190 N.W.2d 145 (1971).  Moreover, we have recognized 
that 
 
the supreme court usually defers to the trial court's 
decision because of the trial court's opportunity to 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
27
observe the trial and evaluate the evidence, and the 
order is highly discretionary.  If one ground relied 
upon by the trial court in granting a new trial in the 
interest of justice is correct, this is sufficient to 
affirm the order of the trial court. 
Id. (quoting Hillstead v. Shaw, 34 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 150 N.W.2d 
313 (1967)).  However, in this case, we conclude that there was 
clearly an erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court 
in conditionally ordering a new trial.  As the court of appeals 
stated, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
because it erred in its finding that the emergency doctrine 
never applies to a violation of a safety statute resulting in 
negligence per se.  As we have determined, the emergency 
doctrine can apply to a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1), and 
therefore, the circuit court erred as a matter of law. 
 
¶47 We also agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court erred when it granted a new trial on the basis of 
Williams’ speed on icy roads.  This finding was in error, the 
court of appeals stated, because a reasonable jury could have 
found, according to credible evidence that Williams’ speed was 
not excessive.  Therefore, she was not negligent as a matter of 
law.  We agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion. 
 
¶48 We next address whether the subrogees have a duty to 
separately petition this court for review to preserve their 
subrogation claim.  This issue presents a question of law, which 
we also review de novo.  Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 
628, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993).  We hold that to preserve their 
claims, the subrogees must separately petition this court for 
review, unless they have entered into a stipulation to waive 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
28
their rights to participate at trial and agree to be bound by 
the judgment. 
 
¶49 "Subrogation rests upon the equitable principle that 
one, other than a volunteer, who pays for the wrong of another 
should be permitted to look to the wrongdoer to the extent it 
has paid and be subject to the defenses of the alleged 
wrongdoer."  Employers Ins. Of Wausau v. Sheedy, 42 Wis. 2d 161, 
170, 166 N.W.2d 220 (1969).  Subrogation does not create a new 
and independent cause of action.  Wilmot v. Racine County, 136 
Wis. 2d 57, 63, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987).  However, the general 
rule is that a subrogation interest represents a distinct and 
separate part of a single cause of action.  Id. at 61.  See also 
Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 331 N.W.2d 
585 (1983); Wilmot, 136 Wis. 2d at 64.  This is even though a 
subrogee and a subrogor are subject to the same procedural 
rules.  Sampson v. Logue, 184 Wis. 2d 20, 29, 515 N.W.2d 917 
(Ct. App. 1994).  The subrogor's right to be made whole is 
superior to the right of the subrogee to recover on its separate 
part of a claim.  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 637.  Therefore, even 
if an insured and a tortfeasor settle a claim, the subrogated 
party’s claim is left unsatisfied if no provision for the 
subrogated party is made as part of the settlement.  Ritt v. 
Dental Care Assoc., 199 Wis. 2d 48, 77, 543 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 
1995); Muchow v. Goding, 198 Wis. 2d 609, 633, 544 N.W.2d 218 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
 
¶50 The subrogees' interests in this case are separate.  
Maxicare stated in its counterclaim and cross-claim that "any 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
29
settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendants prior to verdict, 
will only extinguish the claim owned by the Plaintiff.  Such 
settlement will not extinguish the separate, independent cause 
of action owned by Maxicare Health Insurance Company."  (R. at 
4:2)(emphasis added.)  State Farm and the city of Milwaukee also 
attempted to preserve their separate subrogation interests.  
They both requested that in the event of a settlement between 
the Totskys and Riteway, a hearing would be held to determine 
whether State Farm and the city of Milwaukee could seek 
satisfaction of their claims. 
 
¶51 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.62 
(1997-98), 
which 
governs the criteria for petitions for review, does not 
expressly exclude from its scope petitions for review by 
subrogated parties.  The statute’s inquiry centers on whether 
the decision below was adverse.  Section 809.62 (stating that “a 
party may file . . . for review of an adverse decision . . . 
.”).  In Bortz v. Merrimac Mut. Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 2d 865, 869, 
286 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1979), a subrogee’s appeal was held not 
to be dependent on other parties’ appeals.  Moreover, Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(2)(b)(1997-98) lists the options that a joined party 
may take in litigation.  A party must exercise one of those 
statutory options to maintain the viability of a claim.  Sampson 
184 Wis. 2d at 27; Anderson v. Garber, 160 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 466 
N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1991).  Thus, a subrogated party’s 
(subrogee’s) interests on appeal are not preserved as part of a 
subrogor’s appeal. 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
30
 
¶52 Both the city of Milwaukee and Maxicare stipulated to 
waive their rights to participate at trial and agreed to be 
bound by the judgment.  Because a waiver is binding unless a 
party withdraws the waiver upon timely motion, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(2)(b)(1997-98), it appears that the city of Milwaukee 
and Maxicare’s stipulations have survived on appeal, since they 
are still bound by their stipulation.  Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. 
v. Royal Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 577, 589, 225 N.W.2d 
648 (1975) (stating that stipulations made at trial are binding 
on appeal).  Riteway did expressly agree to the stipulations 
made before trial, and therefore, must be bound by its 
stipulations with the city of Milwaukee and Maxicare.  However, 
no stipulation was entered between Riteway and State Farm.  As 
such, State Farm’s subrogated claim will be dismissed. 
IV. 
 
¶53 We conclude that the emergency doctrine applies to a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) under the facts of this 
case, because a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) is concerned 
with an issue of management and control.  We further conclude 
that two of the subrogated parties in this case, the city of 
Milwaukee and Maxicare, are not required to file a separate 
petition for review to preserve their subrogated interests on 
appeal, because they stipulated to waive their rights to 
participate at trial and agreed to be bound by the judgment.  
However, 
State 
Farm, 
which 
did 
not 
enter 
into 
such 
a 
stipulation, was required to file a separate petition for review 
No. 
97-0530 
 
 
31
to preserve its subrogated interest on appeal, because its 
subrogated interest is separate from the Totskys' claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
1 
¶54 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring).  Historically, 
this court has carefully pruned the deadwood from various tort 
doctrines to ensure that justice is done.  We abolished the zone 
of danger rule when negligent infliction of emotional distress 
is alleged in favor of traditional elements of tort action in 
negligence.  Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 183 Wis. 2d 
627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  We abolished the distinction 
between the duty owed to licensees and invitees.  Antoniewicz v. 
Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975). We abolished 
special 
rules 
of 
duty 
in 
automobile 
host-guest 
cases.  
McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 
113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).  The time has now come to abolish the 
emergency doctrine.  
¶55 In this case the majority opinion valiantly forges 
through the doctrinal jungle created by the application of the 
emergency doctrine when negligence is alleged.  I respectfully 
disagree with taking this course.  The emergency doctrine 
obfuscates clear thinking about the precise question to be 
answered in a negligence action.  Because the emergency doctrine 
jeopardizes justice, it has no place in our tort law. 
¶56 The confusion generated by the emergency doctrine 
arises under claims of negligence per se, as in the present 
case, as well as when common law negligence is alleged.  The 
doctrine should be abolished with respect to both. 
Common Law Negligence 
¶57 When common law negligence is at issue, the emergency 
doctrine does not change the standard of care required of the 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
2 
party whose conduct is in question.  As this court has already 
stated: 
 
The test of negligence in the face of an emergency is 
identical to that used in a nonemergency situation, 
i.e., was the action or inaction conformable with that 
expected of the reasonable or prudent man placed in 
like circumstances.  In the emergency situation, the 
conduct 
can 
be 
mistaken 
and 
yet 
prudent.  
Nevertheless, 
the 
prudent-reasonable-man 
test 
is 
applicable at all times prior to the emergency, during 
it, and after it. 
Zillmer v. Miglautsch, 35 Wis. 2d 691, 704, 151 N.W.2d 741 
(1967)(internal quotations and citations omitted).  In the words 
of Professor Richard V. Campbell, of the University of Wisconsin 
Law School, the emergency doctrine is nothing more than 
“orthodox negligence doctrine” and “simply says that you are 
negligent if you are negligent.”  Professor Richard V. Campbell, 
Recent Developments of Tort Law in Wisconsin, Institute of 
Continuing Legal Education, CLEW, p. 34 – 35 (1969).  Other 
courts and commentators echo this standard.11  As the Supreme 
                     
11 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts, § 33, at 196-97 (5th ed. 1984) states:  “There are, 
however, 
a 
number 
of 
limitations 
which 
have 
hedged 
the 
‘emergency’ rule.  It does not mean that any different standard 
is to be applied in the emergency.  The conduct required is 
still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances, as 
they would appear to one who was using proper care, and the 
emergency is to be considered only as one of the circumstances.” 
(emphasis added; footnote omitted).  
Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, § 16.11 (2d ed. 
1986) states:  “Conduct in emergencies.  If a person is caught 
in a sudden emergency, that is part of the circumstances in the 
light of which the person’s conduct at that time is to be 
judged.” 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
3 
Court of Kansas stated, “[t]he doctrine of sudden emergency 
cannot be regarded as something apart from and unrelated to the 
fundamental rule that everyone is under a duty to exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid injury to others. 
 A claim of emergency is but a denial of negligence.”  Lawrence 
v. Deemy, 461 P.2d 770, 774 (1969).  The emergency doctrine, as 
set forth in Wis-JI Civil 1105A, is simply a restatement of the 
ordinary prudent person standard of conduct.12 
                                                                  
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§ 296 
cmt. 
b 
(1965), 
discussing the standard of conduct in an emergency, states in 
part,  
The law does not require of the actor more than it is 
reasonable to expect of him under the circumstances 
which surround him.  Therefore, the court and jury in 
determining the propriety of the actor’s conduct must 
take into account the fact that he is in a position 
where 
he 
must 
make 
a 
speedy 
decision 
between 
alternative courses of action and that, therefore, he 
has no time to make an accurate forecast as to the 
effect of his choice.  The mere fact that his choice 
is unfortunate does not make it improper even though 
it is one which the actor should not have made had he 
had sufficient time to consider all the effects likely 
to follow his action. 
 
12 Wis JI Civil 1105A:  
When considering negligence as to management and 
control bear in mind that a driver may suddenly be 
confronted by an emergency, not brought about or 
contributed to by her or his own negligence.  If that 
happens and the driver is compelled to act instantly 
to avoid collision, the driver is not negligent if he 
or she makes such a choice of action or inaction as an 
ordinarily prudent person might make if placed in the 
same position.  This is so even if it later appears 
that her or his choice was not the best or safest 
course.   
 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
4 
¶58 Over 
30 
years 
ago 
Professor Campbell 
questioned 
whether a rule of marginal value was worth the time, energy, and 
expense it absorbed. Professor Richard V. Campbell, Recent 
Developments of Tort Law in Wisconsin, Institute of Continuing 
Legal Education, CLEW, pp. 34-37 (1969).  Professor Campbell 
pointed out that the emergency doctrine has been a substantial 
issue in many appeals, a fact that raises questions about the 
doctrine’s utility in clarifying the law.  Id. at 35.  He also 
questioned whether the doctrine was helpful to judges.  Why does 
a judge need a special doctrine regarding negligence as to 
management and control in an emergency?  Professor Campbell 
thought a judge’s “usual control over sufficiency of the 
evidence gives him adequate power.”  Id. at 36.  In addition, 
Professor Campbell noted that problems associated with the 
emergency doctrine may, in a given case, overwhelm and obscure 
important substantive issues.  To illustrate this point, 
Professor Campbell cited an opinion of this court that spent 
several pages discussing an emergency instruction that was 
erroneously given by the circuit court, while only a few 
sentences addressed the key negligence issue in the case.  Id. 
                                                                  
This 
rule 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
any 
person 
whose 
negligence wholly or in part created the emergency.  A 
person is not entitled to the benefit of this 
emergency rule unless he or she is without fault in 
the creation of the emergency.   
 
This emergency rule is to be considered by you only 
with respect to your consideration of negligence as to 
management and control. 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
5 
at 36 (citing Menge v. State Farm, 41 Wis. 2d 578, 164 N.W.2d 
495 (1969)).   
¶59 Professor Campbell has not been alone in finding the 
emergency doctrine a source of concern.  “Despite the basic 
logic and simplicity of the sudden emergency doctrine, it is all 
too frequently misapplied on the facts or misstated in jury 
instructions.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts, § 33, p. 197 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter 
“Keeton, 
Law 
of 
Torts”]. 
 
Many 
courts 
are 
concluding that: abolishing the emergency doctrine is warranted 
because 
it 
is 
potentially 
confusing; 
the 
standard 
jury 
instruction in a negligence action is sufficient; and all the 
circumstances, including those giving rise to an “emergency,” 
remain available for counsel to argue to the fact finder.  
Jeffrey F. Ghent, J.D., Modern Status of Sudden Emergency 
Doctrine, 10 A.L.R. 5th 680 (1993). 
¶60 The Mississippi Supreme Court identified two of the 
central criticisms of the doctrine.  First, even a well-drafted 
instruction can create confusion as to whether in an emergency 
the reasonable person standard applies, or some other standard. 
 “The hazard of relying on the doctrine of ‘sudden emergency’ is 
the tendency to elevate its principles above what is required to 
be proven in a negligence action.”  Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So.2d 
196, 198 (Miss. 1980).  Second, the court noted that the 
emergency instruction tended to confuse the principle of 
comparative negligence.  Id.  The Mississippi court concluded, 
“the orderly disposal of negligence cases would be best served 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
6 
by 
applying 
uniform 
principles 
of 
negligence 
under 
all 
circumstances.”  Id. at 199.   
¶61 The Hawaii Supreme Court also observed that it “would 
be foolhardy to jeopardize the outcome of trial by giving an 
instruction adding little to the basic jury charge that must be 
given in any negligence action.”  DiCenzo v. Izawa, 723 P.2d 
171, 181 (Haw. 1986).  The court stated that the risk of 
prejudicial error in giving the emergency instruction exceeds 
the possibility of error in not doing so, and the instruction 
therefore should be withheld.  The court stated that the 
circumstances purportedly constituting an emergency are proper 
matters for argument by counsel to the jury because “the conduct 
in question must always be considered in the light of all the 
surrounding circumstances.”  Id.   
¶62 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that 
the jury instruction on sudden emergency should no longer be 
used in negligence cases.  Dunleavy v. Miller, 862 P.2d 1212 
(N.M. 1993).  The court found the instruction unnecessary 
because the standard of care is already adequately stated in 
another instruction.  Id. at 1218.  It also noted that the 
emergency doctrine could create confusion by overemphasizing the 
circumstances surrounding a party’s conduct and seeming to imply 
that a different standard of care applies in a sudden emergency. 
 Id.   
¶63 In Wisconsin, the emergency instruction is already 
limited to those situations in which: the party seeking the 
instruction is free from negligence in the creation of the 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
7 
emergency; the events occur rapidly; and, the alleged negligence 
is related to management and control.  Edeler v. O’Brien, 38 
Wis. 2d 691, 697, 158 N.W.2d 301 (1968). Given its limited 
application, doubtful utility, and 
potential 
for creating 
confusion, use of the emergency instruction should end in this 
jurisdiction as well. Our negligence instruction clearly sets 
forth the standard of care.  Wis JI Civil 1001.  Trial counsel 
can argue to the jury whether a party’s actions under the 
circumstances were careless or prudent, but mistaken.13   
Negligence Per Se 
¶64 Turning next to negligence per se, it can be concluded 
that use of the emergency doctrine should end here as well.  
Understanding why the emergency doctrine should be abolished 
when negligence per se is alleged requires an analysis of the 
relationship between statutes and torts.14 
¶65 Our cases distinguish between statutory violations 
that give rise to negligence per se and those that give rise to 
“absolute liability.”  D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 639-40, 
329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).  Under the doctrine of absolute 
                     
13  The “mistaken and yet prudent” formulation describing 
the emergency principle was set down by Justice Holmes while he 
was Chief Judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  
Dunleavy v. Miller, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216 (N.M. 1993) (citing Kane 
v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry., 65 N.E. 54, 54 (1902)).   
14 A discussion of the relationship between torts and 
statutes is found in two articles by Professor Caroline Forell: 
 Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and 
Negligence Per Se: What’s the Difference ?, 77 Or. L. Rev. 497 
(1998); Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A 
Statutory /Common Law Hybrid, 23 Ind. L. Rev. 781 (1990).  
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
8 
liability, if the court determines that the legislature intended 
to place the burden for injury entirely upon the individual who 
violated the statute, then liability lies simply by establishing 
that a party violated the statute within the time period in 
which the injury occurred and then by proving damages.  Id. at 
640.  Under this doctrine, causation is not an issue and 
contributory negligence is not a defense.  Id.  A violation of 
child labor laws has been held to give rise to absolute 
liability.  Id.  Absolute liability for a statutory violation is 
a rarity.  Keeton, Law of Torts, § 36, at 228. 
¶66 On the other hand, negligence per se is “a form of 
ordinary negligence.”  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 640.  Negligence 
is conduct that “falls below a standard established by the law 
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” 
 Keeton, Law of Torts, § 31, at 170 (footnote omitted).  The 
standard of conduct of an ordinary prudent person can be 
established through several means, including a judicial decision 
or legislative enactment.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285. 
 “This court 
has 
held that 
when 
the 
legislature 
or an 
administrative agency prescribes what particular acts shall or 
shall not be done, the statute or rule may be interpreted as 
establishing 
a 
standard 
of 
care, 
deviation 
from 
which 
constitutes negligence.”  McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 
Wis. 2d 414, 418, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981) (internal quotation 
omitted); Keeton, Law of Torts, § 36, p. 230.  Only causation, 
and defenses such as contributory negligence, remains to be 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
9 
resolved.  Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 640; Keeton, Law of Torts, 
§ 36, at 230. 
¶67 To 
determine 
if 
violation 
of 
a 
safety 
statute 
constitutes negligence per se, three elements must be satisfied: 
  
 
(1) the harm inflicted was the type the statute was 
designed to prevent; (2) the person injured was within 
the class of persons sought to be protected; and (3) 
there is some expression of legislative intent that 
the statute become a basis for the imposition of civil 
liability. 
Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 66-67, 596 
N.W.2d 456 (1999) (quoting Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 Wis. 2d 735, 
743, 498 N.W.2d 232 (1993)).  
¶68 If a court determines that the requirements to 
establish negligence per se are established, then the terms of 
the statute set the standard of care.  When it applies, the 
emergency doctrine functions as an excuse.  La Vallie v. General 
Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 522, 527, 117 N.W.2d 703 (1962).  The term 
“excuse” can be somewhat misleading.15  Liability is not avoided 
under the emergency doctrine because a party is somehow 
justified in violating the statute.  Liability is avoided 
because it is concluded that under all the circumstances the 
actor’s conduct was that of an ordinarily prudent person.  This 
can only occur because the emergency doctrine changes the 
actor’s duty from compliance with the terms of the statute into 
                     
15 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 557-64 (1972) for a discussion of 
the distinction between excuse and justification.    
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
10
that of a reasonable person confronted by all the circumstances, 
including the emergency.  In other words, the party asserting 
negligence per se loses the benefit of the doctrine, which is 
having the element of duty established.  To again echo Professor 
Campbell, do we really need a special doctrine for this?   
¶69 Rather 
than 
perpetuating 
a 
nineteenth 
century16 
doctrine that arguably does more to obscure justice than to 
bring it about, use of the sudden emergency doctrine should end 
when negligence per se is alleged.   
¶70 In its place this court should simply make a clear 
statement as to the respective burden that must be carried by 
each party when negligence per se is alleged.  If a party 
establishes violation of a motor vehicle safety statute and the 
elements necessary to find negligence per se, then the burden of 
production should shift to the party against whom the action 
lies to establish that his or her conduct was that of an 
ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances.  If the 
party meets his or her burden, common law negligence becomes a 
jury question.  If the court concludes that this party has 
failed to meet his or her burden, then terms of the statute set 
the standard of care.  Causation and contributory negligence 
then remain to be established.  This is the standard that the 
Oregon Supreme Court apparently follows.  In a case expressing 
disapproval of the emergency doctrine the Oregon court held:  
                     
16 For a brief examination of the history of the emergency 
doctrine, see Dunleavy v. Miller, 862 P.2d 1212, 1215 (N.M. 
1993), and the sources cited therein.   
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
11
“When the evidence establishes that a party has violated a motor 
vehicle statute, such a party has the burden of producing 
evidence that, nevertheless, he was acting reasonably.  Without 
such evidence the party is negligent as a matter of law.”  
Barnum v. Williams, 504 P.2d 122, 126 (Or. 1972).  Whether the 
circumstances constitute an “emergency” is irrelevant.  The 
conduct in question is 
considered 
in 
light 
of all the 
surrounding circumstances. 
¶71 The majority’s yeoman-like effort to apply current law 
regarding the emergency doctrine illustrates the intellectual 
contortions the doctrine generates.  It is not enough that the 
applicable safety statute is identified.  The statute is parsed 
into additional duties, only some of them involving management 
and control and thus amenable to application of the emergency 
doctrine.  Majority Op. at ¶ 36-38.  How can we feel assured 
that this contorted process will accomplish justice? 
¶72 As the majority 
notes, 
abolishing 
the 
emergency 
doctrine and adopting an alternative approach will not change 
the result in this case.  Majority Op. at ¶31 n.7.  That is 
surely no reason to continue to use a doctrine that is at its 
best awkward and at its worst jeopardizes justice.  Therefore, 
although I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority in 
this case, I would argue that we should seize the opportunity to 
abolish the emergency doctrine in Wisconsin. 
 
“‘That court best serves the law which recognizes that 
the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation 
may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve 
another generation badly, and which discards the old 
No. 
97-0530.wab 
 
 
12
rule when it finds that another rule of law represents 
what should be according to the established and 
settled judgment of society, and no considerable 
property rights have become vested in reliance upon 
the old rule.  It is thus great writers upon the 
common law have discovered the source and method of 
its growth, and in its growth found its health and 
life.  It is not and it should not be stationary.  
Change of this character should not be left to the 
legislature.’” 
State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 581-92, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962) 
(quoting from Mr. Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process, Adherence to Precedent, 142, 150-152 (1945 ed.)). 
 
 
 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
1 
¶73 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J. 
 
(Dissenting). 
In 
its 
examination of the stop sign statute, Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1), 
the majority thwarts the plain meaning canon of statutory 
construction.  Its interpretation gives the stop sign statute a 
plain meaning that permits excused violations based on emergency 
without any language supporting the imputed interpretation.  
Additionally, the majority errs in overlooking the law that we 
must apply when reviewing the circuit court’s grant of a new 
trial in the interest of justice.    
¶74 The 
majority’s 
interpretation 
is 
primarily 
accomplished 
not 
by 
examining 
the 
words 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.46(1), but by analogizing the stop sign statute to a 
starkly different statute.  The only common thread weaving Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.46(1) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.05(1) 
is 
the 
classification of both as safety statutes.  The majority would 
have such statutes treated identically for all conceivable 
purposes.  Yet, it fails to discern that by doing so, it has 
violated legislative intent as expressed in the clear and 
unequivocal wording of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1). 
¶75 Not all safety statutes are of the same breed.  Some 
provide for the excuse of negligence "conclusively determined" 
by their violation, while others do not.  W. Page Keeton, The 
Law of Torts 230 (5th ed. 1984).  The most instructive guide in 
determining whether an excuse exists remains the wording of the 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
2 
statute.  The majority concedes the need to find a stated excuse 
in the wording of the statute and cites to the Restatement and 
other treatises as authority for that premise.17  Majority Op. ¶¶ 
29-31.  In interpreting Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) to permit the 
application of the emergency doctrine to its violation, however, 
the majority fails to explain the unmistakable absence of an 
emergency excuse from the text of the stop sign statute.   
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.46(1) is not amenable to the 
application of the emergency doctrine.  The plain language 
provides:  
                     
17 In particular, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288(A) 
provides: 
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an 
administrative regulation is not negligence. 
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to 
permit such excuse, its violation is excused when 
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor’s 
incapacity; 
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for 
compliance; 
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to 
comply; 
(d) he is confronted with an emergency not due to his own 
misconduct; 
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the 
actor or to others. 
(emphasis supplied). 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
3 
Except when directed to proceed by a traffic officer 
or traffic control signal, every operator of a vehicle 
approaching an official stop sign at an intersection 
shall cause such vehicle to stop before entering the 
intersection and shall yield the right-of-way to other 
vehicles which have entered or are approaching the 
intersection upon a highway which is not controlled by 
an official stop sign or traffic signal.    
Likewise, subsections (2m)-(4) are silent as to any excused 
transgression, based on emergency, of the duty to stop at school 
crossings, railroad crossings, and temporary stop signs. 
¶77 In the absence of expressed words allowing an excuse 
in emergency situations, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 
346.46(1) must be construed not to provide such an excuse.  
Restatement (2d) Torts, § 288(A).  See also Ball v. District 4, 
Area Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984) 
(legislature presumed to have known the import of the words it 
has chosen).  No deviation from the duty imposed by the statute 
may then be excused by a claim of emergency.  Indeed, this court 
has previously interpreted the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 
346.46(1) as imposing an absolute duty to obey a stop sign.  
Sailing v. Wallestad, 32 Wis. 2d 435, 441, 145 N.W.2d 725 
(1966). 
¶78 The legislative history of the stop sign statute 
supports this interpretation.  As originally enacted, the stop 
sign statute required all vehicles to "come to a full and 
complete stop within thirty feet of the near limits of an 
intersection at which has been erected an official stop sign or 
traffic signal."  Wis. Stat. § 85.69 (1929).  The text of the 
statute did not provide for an exception based on emergency. 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
4 
¶79 An amendment in 1943 broadened the requirement to stop 
at a stop sign to include any "device" transporting persons or 
property upon a public highway.  Ch. 152, Laws of 1943.  Again, 
no excuse to the duty of absolute compliance was provided in the 
text of the statute.         
¶80 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.46 
replaced 
the 
former 
Section 85.69 in 1957 and added language permitting a traffic 
officer 
or 
traffic 
control 
signal 
to 
direct 
cars 
into 
intersections.  § 1, ch. 260, Laws of 1957.  Additionally, the 
revised and renumbered statute required drivers to stop either 
at the stop line or before entering the crosswalk, rather than 
providing a range of 30 feet within which to make a stop.  
¶81 The statute intended that "a stop must under all 
circumstances be made at a point where the operator of a vehicle 
can efficiently observe traffic on the intersecting roadway 
before entering such intersecting roadway."  Legislative Council 
Note, 1957 S.B. 99 (emphasis added).  Yet again, no provision 
was made for an excuse based on emergency, although the 
emergency doctrine had become a prominent feature in the law of 
this state and dated back to 1915.  See Parkes v. Lindenmann, 
161 Wis. 101, 151 N.W. 787 (1915); Siegl v. Watson, 181 Wis. 
619, 195 N.W. 867 (1923).  See also Basile v. City of Milwaukee, 
250 Wis. 35, 38, 26 N.W.2d 168 (1947) (noting that "[t]he 
emergency doctrine is of course well established.").   
¶82 The majority nonetheless misinterprets the statutory 
language while discounting precedent in an attempt to capture 
the legal reasoning of LaVallie v. General Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
5 
522, 117 N.W.2d 703 (1962), and apply it to the statutory 
violation at issue in this case.  In an expansion of the holding 
in LaVallie, the majority transposes the application of the 
emergency doctrine from a statute that provides for emergency 
exceptions to a remarkably dissimilar statute that, by its very 
words, does not permit the application of the doctrine.  
¶83 The statute in LaVallie governing roadway position 
requires that the operator of a vehicle "shall drive on the 
right half of the roadway and in the right-hand lane of a 3-lane 
highway, except" when a number of excused conditions exist.18  
                     
18 Wis. Stat. § 346.05 has remained substantially intact 
since it was addressed in LaVallie and reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width the operator of a 
vehicle shall drive on the right half of the roadway and in the 
right-hand lane of a 3-lane highway, except: 
(a) When making an approach for a left turn under 
circumstances in which the rules relating to left turns require 
driving on the left half of the roadway; or 
(b) When overtaking and passing in circumstances in which 
the rules relating to overtaking and passing permit or require 
driving on the left half of the roadway; or 
(c) When the right half of the roadway is closed to traffic 
while under construction or repair; or 
(d) When overtaking and passing pedestrians, animals or 
obstructions on the right half of the roadway; or  
(e) When driving in a particular lane in accordance with 
signs or markers designating such lane for traffic moving in a 
particular direction or at designated speeds; or 
(f) When the roadway has been designated and posted for 
one-way traffic, subject, however, to the rule stated in sub. 
(3) relative to slow moving vehicles.  
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
6 
These excused conditions encompass emergency situations, as 
implied in sub. (d) and confirmed by the Wisconsin Jury 
Instructions.  Wis JI Civil 1135 and 1140.  Although the court 
in LaVallie determined that the emergency doctrine applied to 
relieve a driver of negligence per se in the violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05(1), LaVallie does not stand for the broad 
proposition that the emergency doctrine excuses all negligence 
per se, including violations of absolute statutory duties.19 
¶84 As discussed, the stop sign statute does not provide 
for an excused violation on the basis of an emergency situation. 
 Likewise, the jury instructions make no mention of potential 
excuses, emergency or otherwise.  Wis JI Civil 1325 and 1325A.  
Yet the majority relies upon the narrow language, "[e]xcept when 
directed to proceed by a traffic officer or a traffic control 
signal" and analogizes these two narrow circumstances to the 
numerous exceptions contained within Wis. Stat. § 346.05(1).  
Since both statutes list exceptions, the majority opines that 
                     
19 The LaVallie court also applied the emergency doctrine to 
excuse the violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.34(1) (1961), which 
read in relevant part: 
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection 
unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the 
roadway . . . or otherwise turn a vehicle from a 
direct course or move right or left upon a roadway 
unless and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety.   
This statutory section has remained substantively the same and 
requires that the driver deviating from a direct course exercise 
ordinary care.  Wis JI Civil 1354.  Thus, this statutory duty 
also differs from the absolute duty imposed by the stop sign 
statute. 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
7 
the stop sign statute is not "immutable" and is thus subject to 
the emergency doctrine.  Majority Op. at ¶ 33.   
¶85 The 
majority 
fails 
to 
discern 
the 
fundamental 
differences in the nature of those exceptions.  In essence, the 
narrow circumstances in Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) permit a traffic 
officer or traffic signal to assume the driver’s duty to 
efficiently observe traffic on the intersecting roadway before 
proceeding into the intersection.  See Kraskey v. Johnson, 266 
Wis. 201, 207, 63 N.W.2d 112 (1954) (legislative purpose behind 
stop sign statute not confined to duty of stopping but also 
extends to duty of observation); 
Majority 
Op. 
at 
¶ 36 
(recognizing 
the 
three-tiered 
duty 
underlying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.46(1)). 
¶86 The limited exceptions of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) do 
not address emergency conditions.  The driver still has a duty 
to obey the traffic officer or control signal.  In the absence 
of guidance from either, every driver of a vehicle shoulders the 
driver’s own duty to stop, observe, and then proceed.      
¶87 In contrast, one of the several exceptions listed 
under the 
statute 
governing 
roadway 
position 
specifically 
provides for discharge from the duty to maintain proper roadway 
position when the driver encounters obstacles on the road.  Wis. 
Stat. § 346.05(1)(d).  These obstacles may include emergency 
conditions such as an unexpected cloud of dust or a sudden 
mechanical failure.  As the Comments to Wis JI Civil 1135 and 
1140 reveal, there are numerous emergency exceptions to a 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
8 
requirement of driving in the right lane or right side of the 
road.   
¶88 Because of the essential distinctions between the 
exceptions 
provided 
under 
each 
statute, 
the 
majority 
is 
misguided in justifying the application of the emergency 
doctrine to the stop sign statute.  Its result is in direct 
contravention of the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1), 
which creates an absolute duty of compliance.  
¶89 The majority errs in its wholesale transfer of 
LaVallie’s 
legal 
reasoning 
in 
light 
of 
the 
significant 
differences between the statutes.  A better candidate for 
statutory comparison is the crosswalk statute presented in 
Edwards v. Kohn, 207 Wis. 381, 241 N.W. 331 (1932), which this 
court has interpreted as creating an absolute duty.  
¶90 In Edwards, the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle that 
was unable to stop due to slippery road conditions.  At the 
time, the plaintiff was crossing an intersection within a marked 
crosswalk.  Wisconsin Stat. § 85.44(1) governed the action and 
provided that "[t]he operator of any vehicle shall yield the 
right of way to a pedestrian crossing the highway within any 
marked or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection except at those 
intersections where the movement of traffic is being regulated 
by traffic officers or traffic control signals."  Id. at 385. 
¶91  The 
Edwards 
court 
refused 
to 
entertain 
the 
defendant’s contention that the jury should have been instructed 
as to whether he had acted reasonably under the circumstances in 
violating the statute.  Instead, the court determined that the 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
9 
defendant had an absolute duty to yield to the plaintiff’s right 
of way, a duty not excusable by the showing of reasonable action 
in the face of inclement weather conditions.  Id.         
¶92 The statute at issue in Edwards closely parallels the 
stop sign statute and provides identical exceptions.  Both 
impose an absolute duty of compliance that may not be excused by 
the emergency doctrine.  Although the label of the emergency 
doctrine was not directly invoked in Edwards, the rationale of 
the doctrine is the essence of the case.  The defendant proposed 
jury instructions seeking excuse because of the existence of 
slippery road conditions, and yet the court determined that he 
had an absolute duty to yield that was not mitigated by severe 
weather conditions.   
¶93 The majority and the concurrence suffer from the same 
infirmity: the failure to recognize that Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1) 
imposes an absolute duty to which excuses of emergency do not 
apply.  In its call to wholly abandon the doctrine of negligence 
per se and the emergency doctrine,  both of which have become 
entrenched in the law of this state, the concurrence obscures 
the actual reason why the emergency doctrine serves no purpose 
in analyzing the statutory violation before us. 
¶94 Essentially, the concurrence urges the adoption of a 
more relaxed rebuttable presumption standard for violations of 
safety statutes to replace negligence per se.  Following the 
suggestion of the concurrence would mean that rather than 
negligence 
being "conclusively determined" 
by 
a 
statutory 
violation, negligence would remain only tentative until the 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
10
defendant failed to meet the burden of production establishing 
that he or she acted reasonably under the circumstances.  
Concurring Op. at ¶ 71.   
¶95 As a result, not only may courts consider emergency 
conditions as in this case to excuse a statutory violation, but 
courts may also consider a myriad of other factors and 
circumstances surrounding the statutory violation.  Id.  The 
violation of an absolute duty set forth in a safety statute 
warrants a stricter standard than the one contemplated by the 
concurrence. 
¶96 The concurrence makes repeated references to Professor 
Richard Campbell to support shelving the emergency doctrine for 
both common law negligence and negligence per se.  Yet, there is 
no intimation that Professor Campbell advocates the abandonment 
of negligence per se that would result from an adoption of the 
rationale of the concurrence.  To the contrary, Campbell’s cited 
text recognizes the integral role that negligence per se plays 
in violations of automobile safety statutes, such violations 
being commonplace.  Campbell, Recent Developments of Tort Law in 
Wisconsin, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, CLEW, 83-85 
(1969).     
¶97 In its approval of Barnum v. Williams, 504 P.2d 122 
(Or. 1972), the concurrence also errs by embracing the rationale 
of a court that has been subject to criticism for introducing 
chaos into the law of negligence.  See Caroline Forell,  
Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: 
What’s the Difference?, 77 Or.L.Rev. 497 (1998).  The state of 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
11
confusion engendered by Oregon common law as it relates to 
liability for statutory violations has evoked an appeal to the 
legislature for clarifying guidelines to remedy the confusion.  
Id. at 532-34.  By advocating the abandonment of well-
established doctrines in exchange for an approach with uncertain 
legal vitality, the concurrence needlessly sacrifices too much.  
¶98 In this case, after apparently applying the emergency 
doctrine, the jury concluded that inclement weather resulting in 
slippery roads created an emergency that excused the duty to 
stop at a stop sign.  It found that neither party was negligent. 
¶99 Yet, as between two "innocent" parties, the absolute 
duty imposed by the legislature necessarily breaks the tie.  The 
plain language of the stop sign statute as supported by the 
legislative history allows no excuses for emergencies.  In the 
face of an absolute duty, the legislature gives the benefit to 
the innocent party not violating a safety statute, while holding 
the violator accountable.  Both the majority and the concurrence 
fail to apply the absolute duty expressed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.46. 
¶100 The majority’s error in this case is not limited to 
its disregard of the absolute duty imposed by the stop sign 
statute but also extends to its refusal to honor the circuit 
court’s grant of a new trial in the interest of justice.  Unlike 
a review of a directed verdict, in which we seek to uphold the 
jury’s findings, on review of the grant of a new trial in the 
interest of justice we seek reasons to sustain the circuit 
court’s findings and conclusions.  Krolikowski v. Chicago & N.W. 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
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Transp. Co., Inc., 89 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 278 N.W.2d 865 (1979).  
   
¶101 Because of the broad discretion vested in the circuit 
court, a reversal is warranted only in the erroneous exercise of 
its discretion.  Id.  If the court offers several grounds for 
granting a new trial in the interest of justice, only one need 
be reasonable or sufficient to sustain the contention that the 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  Loomans v. 
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 158 N.W.2d 318 
(1968). 
¶102 In granting the new trial, Judge Skwierawski expressed 
his unequivocal opinion that the jury had erred in absolving the 
defendants of negligence.  He ordered the trial on two distinct 
grounds: 1) the emergency doctrine does not apply to excuse 
negligence per se in the violation of the stop sign statute and 
2) the emergency doctrine does not apply because the bus driver 
had created her own emergency.  Majority Op. at ¶¶ 46-47.   
¶103 As to the first ground, the majority’s conclusion that 
the circuit court misapprehended the law of the emergency 
doctrine justifies reversal under its holding.   However, Judge 
Skwierawski’s alternate ground for granting a new trial does not 
warrant reversal, but rather mandates our deference.   
¶104 The majority notes that the second ground also 
constitutes an erroneous exercise of the circuit court’s 
discretion, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
the bus driver did not create her own emergency.  Majority Op. 
at ¶ 47.  In doing so, the majority completely overlooks the law 
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
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in this regard, which requires a reviewing court to look for 
reasons to sustain the circuit court.  Bartell v. Luedtke, 52 
Wis. 2d 372, 377, 190 N.W.2d 145 (1971).  
¶105 Additionally, the majority avoids mentioning the court 
of appeals’ determination that a reasonable jury may have also 
agreed with Judge Skwierawski in finding the bus driver 
negligent for creating her own emergency.  Totsky v. Riteway Bus 
Serv., 220 Wis. 2d 889, 905, 584 N.W.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1998).  
The court of appeals thus acknowledged the reasonable basis 
underlying the circuit court’s conclusion. 
¶106 The facts in this case do not present uncontroverted 
evidence that the driver of the bus was free of any negligence 
in creating her own emergency.  The driver had previously 
skidded twice on ice, and she had been aware of the slippery 
road conditions.  Based on her knowledge and past experience, 
the speed of 10 to 16 miles per hour may indeed have been 
excessive.  The circuit court’s conclusion was thus not without 
a reasonable basis, and its grant of a new trial in the interest 
of justice should be sustained.  By reversing the order, 
however, the majority fails to afford due deference to the 
discretionary authority of the circuit court. 
¶107 In sum, the majority violates the plain meaning of the 
stop sign statute by approving the application of the emergency 
doctrine.  It also overlooks the deference afforded by an 
appellate court to a circuit court’s discretion when granting a 
new trial in the interest of justice.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
No. 97-0530.awb 
 
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¶108 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.