Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 106 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-3805.] 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CARROLL. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 
 106 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-3805.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension, stayed on condition — 
Engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law — 
Engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation. 
(No. 2004-2113 — Submitted February 16, 2005 — Decided August 10, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-017. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Gregory Alan Carroll, of West Union, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0039624, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1988.  He has engaged 
in the private practice of law in Adams County since that time, and he served one 
term as the county’s prosecuting attorney from 1993 until 1997. 
{¶2} 
On April 19, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
alleging that respondent had committed two violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Respondent was served with the complaint and filed an answer to 
it, and relator and respondent ultimately signed an agreed statement describing 
respondent’s misconduct.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline held a hearing and, based on the parties’ stipulations, testimony, 
and other evidence, made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommendation, all of which the board adopted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Misconduct 
{¶3} 
Respondent was appointed to the Ohio State Barber Board in 
January 1997 by Governor George Voinovich.  That three-person board regulates 
barbers and barber colleges throughout Ohio, under R.C. Chapter 4709.  
Respondent served on the barber board until he was hired, under R.C. 
4709.05(G), to serve as executive director of that board in September 2001.  The 
executive director’s post was a full-time position, and respondent received an 
annual salary of roughly $70,000 while serving in it. 
{¶4} 
Respondent filled out timesheets to document the hours he spent 
working as executive director of the barber board.  On 11 occasions between 
October 2001 and March 2002, the timesheets that respondent submitted were 
inaccurate.  On some of the timesheets, respondent claimed compensatory time 
for working through his lunch hour, and he also claimed some compensatory time 
in increments of less than 30 minutes.  Those practices were inconsistent with a 
directive issued by the Ohio Department of Administrative Services in July 2001.  
In addition, respondent claimed on some of his timesheets that he had put in full 
days working for the barber board when in fact he had spent part of the workday 
out of the office attending court proceedings for his private legal clients. 
{¶5} 
In December 2002, the Ohio Inspector General issued a report 
identifying approximately 90 hours of respondent’s time that had been 
inaccurately reported on his timesheets.  Respondent did not contest the report, 
and he resigned as executive director of the barber board on December 31, 2002. 
{¶6} 
After resigning, respondent paid $5,115 to the state of Ohio as full 
restitution for the inaccuracies on his timesheets.  He also entered a plea of no 
contest in June 2003 to a second-degree misdemeanor charge of dereliction of 
duty in violation of R.C. 2921.44(E).  That charge – which accused respondent of 
recklessly failing to submit complete and accurate time records while working as 
a public servant – had been filed by the Inspector General’s office.  Respondent 
January Term, 2005 
3 
was found guilty of the charge in the Franklin County Municipal Court and was 
fined $750. 
{¶7} 
Respondent cooperated fully with relator’s investigation of his 
misconduct, and he acknowledged that his actions violated DR 1-102(A)(6) 
(barring conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice law).  
The board found that respondent did in fact violate that provision. 
{¶8} 
The board also found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) 
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  
That finding was grounded on the fact that respondent’s timesheets 
misrepresented the number of hours that he had spent working for the barber 
board.  According to the board, respondent had not offered a satisfactory 
explanation for the entries on his timesheets, which reflected that he had been 
working for the barber board when he had actually been in court representing his 
private legal clients. 
Sanction 
{¶9} 
In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  
The board cited no aggravating factors in connection with respondent’s actions. 
{¶10} The board did note several mitigating factors, including the 
absence of any prior disciplinary record, respondent’s full cooperation with the 
Inspector General and relator during their investigations, his prompt payment of 
restitution to the state before any criminal or disciplinary charges were brought 
against him, and his acknowledgement of responsibility and his resignation from 
the barber board soon after the inaccuracies were uncovered.  The board also 
found no evidence that respondent acted with a selfish or dishonest motive.  His 
recordkeeping was deficient, but he was not attempting to receive pay for work he 
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4 
did not perform, according to the board.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), 
and (d). 
{¶11} The board noted these additional mitigating factors as well:  
respondent showed genuine remorse and explained his actions without offering 
excuses to justify his actions, he now practices law in a rural county and serves 
financially needy clients, his misconduct did not harm any legal clients, he had 
been subjected to criminal prosecution and had paid a fine, and several witnesses 
testified about his good character and reputation in his community.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e) and (f). 
{¶12} Relator recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for six months.  The board, however, based on its conclusion that 
an actual suspension was not needed in order to protect the public and its findings 
of significant mitigating factors and no aggravating factors, recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire 
six months stayed. 
{¶13} We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 1-
102(A)(6), and we adopt the board’s recommendation that a six-month suspension 
– which is to be stayed on the condition that respondent commit no further 
misconduct – is the appropriate sanction. A violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) usually 
requires an actual suspension from the practice of law for an appropriate period of 
time.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 
658 N.E.2d 237.  However, mitigating evidence can justify a lesser sanction.  
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 728 N.E.2d 1052 
(attorney’s misrepresentations to a government agency that did not harm client or 
change outcome of the representation warranted a stayed six-month suspension). 
{¶14} In this case, respondent’s cooperation with investigators, his 
forthright and prompt effort to remedy any harm caused by his errors, and the 
absence of any dishonest or selfish motive on his part all counsel against his 
January Term, 2005 
5 
actual suspension from the practice of law.  As we have said, the purpose of the 
disciplinary process is not to punish the offender but rather to protect the public.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 
N.E.2d 286, at ¶ 53.  Respondent has in fact already been appropriately punished 
by the criminal-justice system, and we agree with the board that the public would 
not be well served by his actual suspension, particularly given that respondent 
made full restitution and no longer holds a position in which he must account to 
the public for his work hours. 
{¶15} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he 
commit no further misconduct during that term.  If respondent violates the 
condition, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the entire term of 
actual suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶16} I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed on respondent by 
the majority.  We have held as syllabus law that “[w]hen an attorney engages in a 
course of conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237.  
Only rarely do mitigating facts warrant variation from this rule.  On the facts of 
this case, I would impose a six-month actual suspension, as recommended by 
relator. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter and Geoffrey Stern, for respondent. 
______________________