Title: Farnham v. Inland Sea Resort Properties, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Farnham v. Inland Sea Resort Properties, Inc. (2002-223); 175 Vt. 500;
824 A.2d 554

2003 VT 23

[Filed 28-Feb-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 23

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-223

                             JANUARY TERM, 2003

  David R. Farnham III	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Grand Isle Superior Court
                                       }	
  Inland Sea Resort Properties, Inc.,  }
  d/b/a	} Apple Tree Bay Resort and    }
  Campground	                       }	DOCKET NO. 9-2-00 Gicv

                                                Trial Judge: Ben W. Joseph

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiff David Farnham III appeals from an order of the
  Grand Isle Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant,
  Inland Sea Resort Properties, Inc., thus defeating his claims sounding in
  negligence.  Plaintiff was injured in a car accident on defendant's
  campground and subsequently sued for damages, alleging that: (1) defendant
  owed and breached its duty to control consumption of alcohol by underage
  drinkers on its property; and (2) defendant owed and breached its duty to
  adequately warn of a dangerous curve in the entrance road to defendant's
  campground.  While we affirm summary judgment as to plaintiff's first claim
  of negligence, we reverse and remand as to the second. 

       ¶  2.  The following facts were undisputed.  Defendant owns a large
  campground, known as Apple Tree Bay Resort and Campground, in South Hero. 
  For a fee, defendant rents individual campsites to members of the public. 
  Those renting a campsite must register and pay the rental fee at the
  campground's registration desk upon their entrance to the campground.  The
  registration desk closes at 9:00 p.m.  However, the entrance and campground
  road remain open to the public and no gate blocks access to the campground
  after 9:00 p.m.  To register after-hours, individuals are directed to the
  home of the campground manager, Rick Abare.

       ¶  3.  At approximately 1:45 a.m. on August 10, 1996, plaintiff, who
  was then sixteen-years-old, arrived at a party held on defendant's
  property.  The previous evening, defendant had rented one of its 300
  campsites to eighteen-year-old Tonya Horrican, who hosted the party at the
  site.  The party began at approximately 8:00 p.m. with between six and
  eight individuals under the age of twenty-one in attendance.  The party
  lasted until approximately 2:00 a.m.
     
       ¶  4.  Plaintiff remained at the campground for approximately
  forty-five minutes, where he smoked marijuana, but did not consume alcohol. 
  Plaintiff then asked his friend, Matt Hazen, who had driven plaintiff to
  the party, for a ride home despite plaintiff's knowledge that Matt Hazen
  had consumed alcohol that evening.  With plaintiff as a passenger, Matt
  Hazen drove off a sharp curve in the campground road and crashed his car. 
  As a result of the accident,  plaintiff sustained injuries.  Other than a
  small speed-limit sign posted near the registration desk, no speed or other
  signs warning drivers of the sharp curve existed on the campground road at
  the time of the accident. 

       ¶  5.  Plaintiff sued defendant to recover for his injuries
  sustained in the car accident.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant was
  negligent in failing to control the underage drinking at the campground,
  and negligent in its failure to warn of the sharp curve in the campground
  road.  Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the law
  imposes no duty on landowners who are unaware of underage drinking on their
  property to prevent that drinking, and that the law imposes no duty upon
  landowners to warn trespassers of dangerous conditions on their property,
  or to warn of dangers that are either open, obvious, or known to
  trespassers.  The superior court agreed with defendant and issued an order,
  which stated in its entirety that:

    [t]he plaintiff was a trespasser in the defendant's campground at
    the time of the accident.  He went there at about 1 a.m. to attend
    a party where other teenagers were drinking.  He was smoking
    marijuana.  He asked an intoxicated driver to give him a ride
    home.  The driver crashed the car on the way out and the plaintiff
    was injured.  The defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

  Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
  rejected by finding that "[t]here is no evidence that supports the
  plaintiff's claims."  This appeal followed.  

       ¶  6.  In his appeal to this Court, plaintiff claims that the trial
  court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant based on its
  conclusion that plaintiff was a trespasser to whom defendant owed no duty
  of care.  Our review of summary judgment is de novo, and in proceeding with
  that review, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court. 
  Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Agency of Transp., 13 Vt. L. W. 334, 335
  (2002).  Summary judgment is appropriate only where, accepting the
  allegations of the nonmoving party as true, there exist no genuine issues
  of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
  of law.  Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass'n., 167 Vt. 473, 477,