Title: Vickers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONTA E. VICKERS, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 415, 2022 
§   
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§   
§  Cr. ID No.  1308012233A (S) 
§                                            
   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 25, 2023 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
April 10, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Donta E. Vickers, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Vickers’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
Following a two-day trial in 2014, a Superior Court jury found Vickers 
guilty of second-degree assault (as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault), 
attempted first-degree robbery, home invasion, second-degree conspiracy, and three 
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF).  
2 
 
Before sentencing, the State filed a motion to have Vickers declared a habitual 
offender under then-extant 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) and sentenced accordingly for the 
attempted first-degree robbery, the home invasion, and the three PFDCF 
convictions.  The Superior Court granted the motion and sentenced Vickers to five 
life terms and twelve years of imprisonment.  We affirmed Vickers’ convictions and 
sentence on direct appeal.1 
(3) 
In August 2022, Vickers filed a motion for correction of illegal 
sentence.  The Superior Court denied Vickers’ motion, finding that the sentence was 
reasonable, appropriate, and lawful.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for 
abuse of discretion.2  To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the 
claim de novo.3  A motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time.4  
A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, 
is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
 
1 Vickers v. State, 117 A.3d 516 (Del. 2015).  Notably, Vickers challenged his habitual-offender 
status at sentencing and on appeal. 
2 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
3 Id. 
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 
3 
 
uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.5  
(5) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Vickers argues, as he did below, that the 
General Assembly did not intend for a defendant to be sentenced as a habitual 
offender more than once for a set of felony convictions arising out of a single 
criminal episode.  But the cases to which Vickers cite stand for the proposition that 
a defendant must be given the chance for rehabilitation between his underlying 
convictions before they may be used to enhance his sentence under Section 4214.6  
Contrary to Vickers’ reasoning, we find it evident that the legislature intended for a 
defendant who is found eligible for sentencing under Section 4214 to be subject to 
the imposition of an enhanced penalty for each felony that forms the basis of the 
State’s habitual-offender petition.7   
 
5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
6 See, e.g., Buckingham v. State, 482 A.2d 327, 330-331 (Del. 1984) (“Under the [habitual-
offender] statute…, three separate convictions are required, each successive to the other, with some 
chance for rehabilitation after each sentencing, before the extreme penalty of life imprisonment 
may be brought to bear.”). 
7 See Reeder v. State, 2001 WL 355732, at *3 (Del. Mar. 26, 2001) (“Each separate … conviction 
requires a separate sentence.  Because of this, the State has the discretion to seek habitual offender 
status for each count or none.”); Perkins v. State, 2010 WL 618024, at *1 (Del. Feb. 22, 2010) 
(rejecting the argument that a defendant could only receive an enhanced sentence under Section 
4214 for one of his convictions; a defendant found eligible for habitual-offender sentencing under 
Section 4214 is subject to the imposition of an enhanced penalty for each count that the State 
enumerates in its petition). Cf. Kirby v. State, 1998 WL 184492, at *2 (Del. Apr. 13, 1998) (the 
Superior Court may not sentence a defendant as a habitual offender for any greater number of 
convictions than those identified by the State in its petition). 
4 
 
(6) 
Finally, because Vickers failed to argue to the Superior Court in the 
first instance that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, we review his claim 
for plain error.8  There is no plain error here: proportionality review under the Eighth 
Amendment is restricted to the “rare case in which a threshold comparison of the 
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”9  Vickers’ multiple life sentences for violent felony 
convictions—home invasion, attempted first-degree robbery, and three convictions 
of PFDCF—do not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm be 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”). 
9 Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 906 (Del. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).