Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL V. FOWERBAUGH. 
 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___.] 
When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-
102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually suspended from 
the practice of law for an appropriate period of time. 
Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Misleading or lying to a client 
concerning a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer by a client --When 
an attorney engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation, the attorney will be actually suspended from 
the practice of law for an appropriate period of time. 
 
(No. 95-394 -- Submitted September 13, 1995 -- Decided  
December 12, 1995.) 
 
On Certified Report by the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-25. 
 
Relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint with 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court (“board”), charging respondent, Albert E. 
Fowerbaugh of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0001535, 
with violating DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without 
 
2
preparation adequate in the circumstances), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting 
an entrusted legal matter), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and 1-
102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects upon his 
fitness to practice law).  Respondent stipulated to all charged 
disciplinary violations, as well as many of the allegations in the 
complaint.  The matter was heard by a panel of the board on January 
13, 1995. 
 
The stipulations and testimony before the hearing panel 
establish that in April 1992, Patricia Veale, a resident of Florida, 
retained respondent to represent her in obtaining a parentage and 
child support order for her minor child.  Beginning in May 1992, 
respondent conducted negotiations with the attorney for the putative 
father concerning a settlement on these issues.  By July 1993, Veale 
had become concerned with respondent’s representation after 
numerous telephone calls to respondent were made without 
response.  Moreover, respondent had ignored Veale’s requests to 
 
3
have the putative father pay the cost of the blood test used in 
determining paternity.  
 
Apparently in an attempt to placate his client, respondent 
misrepresented to Veale that he was proceeding with a paternity 
action in Summit County Juvenile Court.  In late September 1993, 
Veale repeatedly inquired as to the status of her case and requested 
copies of court documents that would confirm to her that respondent 
had actually filed the paternity action.  On September 28, 1993, 
Veale received what appeared to be a copy of a complaint filed in 
Summit County Juvenile Court.  Actually, the document was a fake. 
 
Respondent testified that shortly after misrepresenting to Veale 
about the filing of the case, he attempted to file the complaint with 
the juvenile court.  The court refused to accept the complaint for filing 
as the case should have been filed with the Child Support 
Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”).  However, the CSEA would not 
accept the complaint because of Veale’s non-resident status.  In an 
effort to stall his client’s inquiries, respondent created a false 
document by superimposing an official time stamp from another 
 
4
document onto the rejected complaint, adding a fictitious case 
number, and “assigning” an actual Summit County judge to the 
action.  Respondent then faxed the fabricated document to his client. 
 
After receiving the fraudulent “complaint”, Veale called the 
Summit County Juvenile Court to determine if a complaint had been 
filed.  The clerk informed her that the court was not issuing numbers 
in the range of the case number appearing on the “complaint”.  
 
Respondent perpetuated his dishonest conduct by falsely 
indicating to Veale that a hearing on her paternity action had been 
scheduled for November 4, 1993.  Continuing to mislead his client, 
respondent called Veale in late October 1993 to confirm the fictitious 
hearing date.  Still suspicious, Veale nonetheless purchased an 
airline ticket in anticipation of attending the hearing.  Further 
deceiving his client, respondent prepared and sent to Veale what 
appeared to be an official request for production of documents.   
 
Shortly before the fictitious hearing date, respondent falsely 
represented to Veale that the November 4 court date, which had 
never been scheduled, had been canceled due to a scheduling error 
 
5
by the court.  After this final blatant misrepresentation, respondent 
sent a letter to Veale terminating the attorney-client relationship and 
returning the retainer fee.  Nowhere in the letter did respondent 
acknowledge his failure to file the action with the juvenile court or his 
subsequent pattern of misrepresentation to her. 
 
The hearing panel found that despite the testimony of the 
complaining witness and respondent’s stipulations that he had 
violated all the Disciplinary Rules charged in the complaint, the 
evidence supported only a violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) for “handling” 
a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances and 
a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) for engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  
 
In recommending a public reprimand for this misconduct, the 
hearing panel considered that respondent did not create financial 
hardship or pecuniary loss to Veale, that Veale was receiving $450 
per month which respondent had negotiated, that he had practiced 
for thirty years with no history of disciplinary violations, and that he 
had been candid with the panel.  The panel also considered that 
 
6
respondent had been suffering personal problems and upheaval in 
his office, both of which have since been corrected.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings and recommended that respondent 
receive a public reprimand.  
----------------------------- 
 
Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Alvin E. Mathews, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Albert E. Fowerbaugh, pro se. 
----------------------------- 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This disciplinary case presents the court with an 
opportunity to provide guidance to certified grievance committees 
and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in all 
cases where an attorney engages in a pattern of conduct of 
misleading or lying to a client concerning a legal matter entrusted to 
the lawyer by the client.  DR 1-102(A)(4) is straight forward and 
unambiguous.  It states that a “lawyer shall not *** [e]ngage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” 
 
7
 
In discipline cases where an attorney has deceived a client, we 
have imposed a varying range of sanctions.  In Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Gwyn (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 8, 640 N.E.2d 1141, we publicly 
reprimanded an attorney for violating DR 6-101(A)(3) and 1-
102(A)(4).  In Gwyn, the respondent told his client that he had filed a 
lawsuit when in fact he had not filed the suit.  The misrepresentations 
continued for two years.  The respondent even fabricated pleadings 
falsely indicating that the case had been filed and dismissed.  During 
that time, however, the respondent made other efforts to resolve the 
matter, including research into the legal issues involved in the case 
and attempts at discovery.  Because of respondent’s forthright 
testimony and numerous character witnesses, the court adopted the 
board’s recommendation that respondent receive only a public 
reprimand.  Gwyn, 71 Ohio St.3d at 10, 640 N.E.2d at 1142. 
 
In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Dzienny (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 173, 648 
N.E.2d 499, the respondent failed to file a medical malpractice 
lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired.  Converting an act of 
malpractice into a violation of the Code of Professional 
 
8
Responsibility, respondent concealed his malpractice and continually 
misled his clients regarding the status of the lawsuit.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found that the 
respondent had violated both the DR 6-102(A) and 1-102(A)(4), and 
recommended a six-month suspension that should be stayed.  In 
rejecting respondent’s plea for a public reprimand the court adopted 
the board’s recommendation, stating that “[i]n light of the significant 
and lengthy deception of his clients, the respondent’s argument that 
he deserves the lightest punishment possible under the rules is 
without merit.”  Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d at 175, 648 N.E.2d at 501, 
(Moyer, C.J., dissenting to the stay of the suspension).   
 
More recently we moved closer to the rule we announce today.  
In Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Speros (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 101, 104, 
652 N.E.2d 681, 683, we stated that “[d]ishonesty toward a client, 
whose interests are the attorney’s duty to protect, is reprehensible.  
And, as we continue to see such violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), we 
recognize that this misconduct may hereafter require more severe 
 
9
discipline than we have previously imposed.”  Respondent was 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months. 
 
We express our growing concern with the increase in the 
discipline matters referred to us by the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline in which members of the bar of Ohio have 
deceived their clients or a court.  A lawyer who engages in a material 
misrepresentation to a court or a pattern of dishonesty with a client 
violates at a minimum, the lawyer’s oath of office that he or she will 
not “knowingly employ or countenance any *** deception, falsehood 
or fraud.”  Gov. Bar R.I(8)(A).  Such conduct strikes at the very core 
of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client.  Respect 
for our profession is diminished with every deceitful act of a lawyer.  
We cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are honest if we have 
not yet sanctioned those who are not.  Therefore, recognizing that 
the sanctions that we have imposed heretofore against lawyers who 
have violated DR 1-102(A)(4) are apparently not causing some 
lawyers to understand the importance of being honest with courts 
and clients, we announce a rule that will be applied to this case and 
 
10
future cases.  When an attorney engages in a course of conduct 
resulting in a finding that the attorney has violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 
the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of law for an 
appropriate period of time. 
 
In the instant case, respondent engaged in a continuing course 
of deceit and misrepresentation designed to cover up his inaction on 
an entrusted legal matter.  After lying to his client about proceeding 
with the case, respondent fabricated documents to perpetuate the 
fraud until he finally withdrew from the case.  Respondent argues that 
his cover-up was merely an effort to stall his client’s inquiries, and 
that his reliance on misinformation that he received from the juvenile 
court necessitated the deception.  We find these arguments to be 
spurious.  Rather than accepting personal responsibility for his 
actions, respondent attempts to justify his conduct.  Furthermore, 
respondent’s protracted deception would not have been uncovered if 
his client had not taken it upon herself to verify her own attorney’s 
actions.  
 
11
 
 While we are cognizant of the pressures and demands, both 
professional and personal, that attorneys may face, this court “cannot 
permit attorneys who lie either to their clients or to the court to 
continue practicing law without interruption.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Greene (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 13, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___.  
Therefore, we hold that when an attorney engages in a course of 
conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.   
 
In spite of respondent’s stipulation that he violated DR 6-
101(A)(2), 6-101(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), and 1-102(A)(6), the hearing 
panel and the board dismissed both the 6-101(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(6) 
charges because they believed these charges had not been proven 
by clear and convincing evidence.  We defer to the board and will not 
disturb that finding.  However, we remind the board that an attorney’s 
conduct may constitute neglect when the attorney fails “‘to advance a 
client matter for which he has been retained.  Neglect is different 
from negligence and usually requires a pattern of disregarding 
 
12
obligations or repeated omissions by an attorney.’  [Citation omitted].”  
Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d at 176, 648 N.E.2d at 502.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, we order that respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio for six 
months.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
WRIGHT, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for six 
months, stayed. 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J., concurring in judgment.  For the reasons set 
forth in my dissenting opinion in Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 13, ___ N.E.2d ___, I concur in judgment only.  It is the 
responsibility of this court to give guidance as to what conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Disciplinary Rules.  It is not the province of this court to use 
syllabus law to mandate a particular sanction once a violation has been 
found.  The sanction in each individual’s case should be determined based 
upon the unique facts and circumstances of that case. 
 
13
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.