Title: State ex rel. Ameen v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ameen v. Indus. Comm., 100 Ohio St.3d 161, 2003-Ohio-5362.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. AMEEN, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ameen v. Indus. Comm., 100 Ohio St.3d 161, 2003-Ohio-
5362.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for wage-loss compensation denied by 
Industrial Commission — Nurse-claimant did not forfeit wage-loss 
compensation eligibility by taking a teaching job or by stopping her job 
search in an allied medical field, when — Writ of mandamus issued 
compelling Industrial Commission to pay wage-loss compensation over 
the period requested. 
(No. 2003-0138 — Submitted August 26, 2003 — Decided October 22, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-128, 2002-
Ohio-6744. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On August 22, 1997, appellant-claimant, Jane Ameen, sustained an 
injury while employed as a nurse by appellee Trumbull Memorial Hospital.  She 
received temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”) intermittently until 
April 1998, when the hospital terminated her employment.  After April 1998, the 
hospital continued to pay TTC. 
{¶2} 
Claimant sought counseling from the Ohio Bureau of Vocational 
Rehabilitation and the Private Industry Council.  With her physical ability to 
return to her former position of employment compromised, claimant was advised 
to explore different options, and she eventually returned to college for a teaching 
degree. 
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{¶3} 
On August 17, 2000, claimant’s TTC was terminated after 
maximum medical improvement was found.  The next day, she graduated from 
college.  Ten days later, she began teaching for the Warren City School District. 
{¶4} 
Claimant’s teaching job paid slightly less than her nursing position, 
prompting her to move appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for wage-loss 
compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B).  The commission denied that request after 
concluding that claimant had voluntarily limited her income.  It specifically found 
that claimant could not return to her former position of employment but criticized 
claimant nevertheless for not seeking other nursing jobs.  It characterized 
claimant’s acceptance of a teaching job as motivated by lifestyle considerations, 
based on what it considered to be an inadequate search for a position in nursing or 
a field paying comparably. 
{¶5} 
Claimant petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a 
writ of mandamus.  The court agreed that her job search was inadequate and 
affirmed the commission’s order. 
{¶6} 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶7} 
When an employee sustains a work-related injury, the workers’ 
compensation system has two immediate goals:  to return the employee to the 
labor force as soon as possible and, until then, to ameliorate the hardship incurred 
by lost or reduced wages.  Prior to 1986, for those who had lost earnings due to an 
inability to return to the former position of employment, TTC was the traditional 
mainstay.  Unfortunately, it did not differentiate between claimants who could do 
no work and those who, while unable to resume their prior employment, could do 
some work.  Because alternate employment disqualified claimants for TTC, those 
in the latter category had little choice but to remain at home in order to preserve 
TTC eligibility.  This defeated a primary workers’ compensation objective. 
{¶8} 
In 1986, the General Assembly resolved this dilemma by 
approving wage-loss compensation.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part 
January Term, 2003 
3 
I, 718, 767.  This benefit encourages a return to employment by paying a 
percentage of the shortfall between a claimant’s pre- and postinjury income.  
Attaining wage-loss compensation requires proof of (1) actual wage loss and (2) a 
causal relationship between injury and reduced earnings.  State ex rel. Watts v. 
Schottenstein Stores Corp. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202. 
{¶9} 
Evidence of the latter can be overcome by a showing that the 
claimant voluntarily limited his or her income.  State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. 
Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 171, 718 N.E.2d 897.  This conclusion necessarily 
follows a finding that claimant’s postinjury employment was motivated by 
lifestyle, rather than medical, considerations.  Part-time employment and self-
employment, for example, provide obvious personal benefits.  Consequently, they 
receive enhanced scrutiny to ensure that such a job choice indeed followed an 
injury-induced inability to perform better paying work.  See State ex rel. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 210, 648 N.E.2d 827; State ex 
rel. Ooten v. Siegel Interior Specialists Co. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 255, 703 
N.E.2d 306.  Claimants generally bolster their petitions for wage-loss 
compensation by showing a job search of sufficient quantity and quality to 
establish that the job taken was truly the only position available. 
{¶10} The mere fact of full-time employment does not immunize a claim 
from this review.  State ex rel. Yates v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 
142, 2002-Ohio-2003, 766 N.E.2d 956, ¶ 37.  In the instant case, the commission 
felt that claimant had not conducted enough of a job search to demonstrate an 
injury-induced unavailability for higher-paying employment.  Combined with 
claimant’s complete career change, the commission concluded that claimant’s job 
was lifestyle-generated.  We disagree. 
{¶11} Employment that coincides with one’s interests, desires, or 
aptitudes is not inherently suspect.  The present claimant was permanently 
disqualified from her former position of employment, so a new career was a 
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logical option, and claimant prepared for one.  Claimant’s decision to teach rather 
than to pursue an allied medical career should not, under these circumstances, be 
viewed unfavorably. 
{¶12} The commission in its order stresses the lack of evidence of any 
search for nursing jobs.  However, its analysis ignores (1) the commission’s own 
finding that claimant could not resume the duties she had, and (2) that a search for 
any nursing opening while collecting TTC—which constituted the relevant job-
search period—may have been viewed as inconsistent with her allegation of 
temporary total disability and caused compensation termination. 
{¶13} The commission also seemingly forgets a key workers’ 
compensation goal:  returning an injured worker to the labor force as quickly as 
feasible.  In deriding the absence of a more extensive job search, the commission 
disregards claimant’s immediate success in having begun a job within days of 
TTC termination. 
{¶14} The commission has put claimant in a “Catch-22.”  If claimant had 
declined the teaching job and had kept looking for something more lucrative—as 
the order implies she should have—claimant would have been wageless.  We 
suspect, however, that had claimant applied for nonworking wage-loss 
compensation during this search period, such compensation would have been 
denied because of her failure to take the teaching job that reduced her wage loss. 
{¶15} This case differs from the full-time employment situation in State 
ex rel. Yates v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., supra.  There, the full-time clerical 
employment obtained by the claimant grossly underutilized her college degree 
and real estate license.  Her underemployment was pivotal in determining that 
claimant was required to maintain—despite her full-time job—an ongoing search 
for something more in keeping with her talents and earning capability. 
{¶16} Here, claimant exploited the intellectual abilities that allowed her 
to become a nurse and accepted a commensurate academic challenge that led to a 
January Term, 2003 
5 
new career.  Her career choice, moreover, was not one that was economically out 
of line with her former livelihood.  Unlike in Yates, the present claimant’s job has 
a future.  There is a degree of job security, the expectation of raises, and potential 
for advancement. 
{¶17} Requiring this claimant to continue looking for work with the 
expectation that she will leave her teaching job is inappropriate.  See Brinkman, 
87 Ohio St.3d 171, 718 N.E.2d 897.  Brinkman’s injury forced him from his 
police officer’s job.  After a fruitless, full-time job search, he accepted a part-time 
position that paid $20 an hour and could expand to full-time.  The commission 
denied wage-loss compensation, citing claimant’s failure to keep looking for full-
time work.  We overturned that order, criticizing the commission’s narrow 
analysis.  Looking more broadly, we emphasized that wage-loss compensation 
was statutorily limited to 200 weeks. 
{¶18} “[W]hen a claimant seeks new post-injury employment, 
contemplation must extend beyond the short term.  The job that a claimant takes 
may have to support that claimant for the rest of his or her life—long after wage-
loss compensation has expired.”  Id. at 174, 718 N.E.2d 897. 
{¶19} We cited with approval a Florida case, Stahl v. Southeastern X-Ray 
(Fla.App.1984), 447 So.2d 399, which upheld a claimant’s right to wage-loss 
compensation despite termination of a job search.  Stahl’s postinjury employment 
paid less than his former job but showed real promise for advancement.  Lauded 
by his supervisor, he had already received a significant raise despite his short 
tenure.  His boss assured him that he had a future with the company and, 
considering everything, the claimant concluded—and the court agreed—that it 
would be foolish to “leave a good thing.”  Id. at 402. 
{¶20} Applying this reasoning to the current debate, it is equally 
inappropriate to have expected claimant to decline the teaching job or to continue 
seeking other work.  As previously stated, claimant has a future with the school 
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district.  Again, there is job security, the prospect of salary increases, and 
advancement possibility.  And there are other considerations that militate against 
the commission’s determination.  Claimant’s position is presumably contractual 
and forecloses the option of leaving for another position on short notice.  Equally 
important are the intangibles.  Teaching entails commitment.  It is a disservice to 
the claimant and the administration, faculty, and students who rely upon her to 
expect her to leave midterm should a better position surface. 
{¶21} Having considered all of these factors, we find that the claimant 
did not forfeit wage-loss compensation eligibility either by taking the teaching job 
or by stopping her job search. 
{¶22} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
a writ of mandamus is issued that compels the payment of wage-loss 
compensation over the period requested. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Elliott, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill Co., L.P.A., and C. Douglas Ames, 
for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis H. Behm, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Stefanski & Associates, L.L.C., and Janice T. O’Halloran, for appellee 
Trumbull Memorial Hospital. 
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