Title: Newton v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEVEN NEWTON, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 189, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. 05-06TN 
§  Petition No. 05-15053 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 18, 2006 
Decided:  October 4, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R1     
 
 
This 4th day of October 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the responses of the 
Division of Family Services (“DFS”) and the Court Appointed Special 
Advocate (“CASA”), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The respondent-appellant, Steven Newton (“Father”), filed an 
appeal from the Family Court’s March 17, 2006 and March 24, 2006 orders 
terminating his parental rights in his minor child, Carl.  The Family Court 
                                                 
1 By Order dated April 20, 2006, the Court assigned a pseudonym to the appellant.  Supr. 
Ct. R. 7(d).  In this Order, we also assign pseudonyms to the mother of the parties’ minor 
child and the minor child.    
 
2
found that Father had failed to plan adequately for Carl’s care and that the 
termination of Father’s parental rights was in Carl’s best interest.2    Father’s 
trial counsel has filed an opening brief containing Father’s arguments in 
support of the appeal and a motion to withdraw.3  DFS and CASA have 
responded to the issues raised by Father and have moved to affirm the 
Family Court’s judgment.  We agree and AFFIRM.     
 
(2) 
The record reflects that the hearing on DFS’s motion to 
terminate Father’s parental rights took place on November 22, 2005 and 
January 23, 2006.  Prior to the hearing, Doris Payton (“Mother”), assisted by 
her counsel, signed a consent to the termination of her parental rights.  The 
Family Court judge reviewed the consent with Mother on the record and 
determined that Mother’s consent was given knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily.  The Family Court heard testimony from Father, four social 
workers from DFS, two of whom were involved in monitoring Father’s case 
plan, Carl’s court appointed special advocate, Carl’s maternal grandmother, 
and four counselors from agencies that assisted Father with sobriety, 
housing, transportation and employment issues in connection with the case 
plan.   
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5). 
3 See Supr. Ct. R. 26.1(a), which provides for the continuing obligation of trial counsel in 
an appeal from a termination of parental rights.   
 
3
 
(3) 
The testimony established the following.  Carl was born on 
January 30, 2004 and lived with Mother and Father in New Castle, 
Delaware.  In early April 2004, DFS received a hotline report that Carl was 
not gaining weight.  DFS investigated, but was not able to substantiate any 
neglect or abuse.  On April 28, 2004, Father, who was serving a 
probationary sentence in connection with a criminal conviction, was sent to 
the Level IV Plummer Center for a violation of his probation.  In June 2004, 
DFS received another hotline report alleging that Carl was being physically 
neglected.  DFS again investigated and was able to substantiate the report of 
neglect.  DFS filed an emergency petition and was awarded custody of Carl 
on June 22, 2004.   
 
(4) 
DFS initially placed Carl with his maternal grandmother but, 
after several months, placed him in a foster home.4  In early December 2004, 
following his release from the Plummer Center, Father signed a reunification 
case plan with DFS.  The plan required Father to: visit with Carl once a 
week for 1½ hours; secure and maintain clean and orderly housing; choose 
appropriate caregivers for Carl; successfully complete a substance abuse 
program; and attend a Strengthening Families parenting class.  During this 
                                                 
4 Carl has remained in foster care since that time. 
 
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time period, a paternity test was conducted and Father was adjudicated the 
biological father of Carl.   
 
(5) 
The testimony presented at the hearing reflects that Father did 
not comply with the requirements of the DFS case plan.  He only visited 
with Carl approximately 21 times during the 17 months Carl was in the 
custody of DFS.5  In 2005, Father and Mother were left homeless after a 
home invasion, which apparently was perpetrated by an acquaintance of 
Father’s.  After that, Father lived first in a motel, then at the Sunday 
Breakfast Mission and, finally, at a homeless shelter.  It was not until 12 
days before the Family Court hearing that Father moved into an apartment.  
Although Father was employed at a painting company for about 13 months 
up until August 2005, he was unemployed at the time of the hearing and his 
only source of income was unemployment benefits and food stamps.  There 
was testimony from the social workers indicating that Father had been less 
than diligent and unrealistic in his search for a new job.  Father, an illegal 
drug user for more than 20 years, did not start a drug treatment program until 
a year and a half after signing his case plan.  Finally, Father did not attend 
the specific parenting class that was required by the case plan.       
                                                 
5 Eight of those visits occurred in the two months prior to the hearing and during the two-
month period between the first and second hearings. 
 
5
 
(6) 
The testimony at the hearing also reflects that Father has been 
involved in incidents of domestic violence, both with his former wife and 
with Mother.  In spite of this, Father continues to spend time with Mother, 
who now has given birth to another child fathered by him.  Father testified 
that there is a bedroom available in his current apartment for Mother, should 
she choose to use it.  Father has a significant criminal history and is 
currently on the child abuse registry for striking another one of Mother’s 
children.  Father owes a substantial amount of back child support for his two 
older children and is prohibited from visitation with them by court order.  
While Father believes that he has established a bond with Carl during 
visitation with him, there was testimony from the social workers that Carl 
does not treat Father any differently than anyone else he is friendly with.   
 
(7) 
The Family Court may terminate parental rights if DFS proves 
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a statutory basis for 
termination, and that termination is in the best interest of the child.6  Where, 
as here, termination is based upon a failure to plan, DFS also must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one additional 
                                                 
6 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
 
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statutory element,7 and that DFS made bona fide, reasonable efforts to 
reunite the family.8   
 
(8) 
On appeal from the Family Court’s termination of parental 
rights, this Court will uphold the Family Court’s factual findings if they are 
sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.9  To the 
extent that the Family Court’s rulings implicate questions of law, this 
Court’s standard of review is de novo.10  This Court will not disturb 
inferences and deductions that are supported by the record and that are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.11 
 
(9) 
In his appeal from the Family Court’s termination of his 
parental rights, Father claims that: a) he was denied counsel; b) DFS lost the 
paternity test results; c) Carl’s surname was never changed to his surname; 
d) he never received a second copy of the case plan; e) his Level IV 
detention was erroneously referred to as Level V incarceration in certain 
court filings; f) there were mistakes made regarding his name during the 
Family Court proceedings; g) he was never convicted of any crime against 
Carl; h) contrary to the testimony of the social workers, he has established a 
bond with Carl; i) he did not receive adequate assistance from DFS 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5). 
8 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989). 
9 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
10 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
11 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
 
7
regarding housing and transportation; j) Carl does not call him “dad” 
because his speech is delayed; and k) he did not abuse one of Mother’s other 
children.   
 
(10) There is no evidence in the record supporting Father’s claims 
that he was denied counsel, that DFS lost his paternity test results, that he 
did not receive adequate assistance from DFS regarding housing and 
transportation, and that Carl does not call him “dad” because his speech is 
delayed.  We, therefore, conclude that these claims are without merit.  There 
is factual support for Father’s claims that Carl’s surname was not changed to 
his surname, that he did not receive a second copy of the case plan, that his 
Level IV detention was erroneously referred to as Level V incarceration, that 
there were mistakes made regarding his name during the Family Court 
proceedings, and that he was never convicted of a crime against Carl.  
However, there is no evidence that any of these circumstances had any 
impact on the Family Court’s decision to terminate his parental rights.  In 
the absence of such evidence, we conclude that these claims, too, are without 
merit.  
 
(11) Father’s last two claims are, first, that, contrary to the social 
workers’ testimony, he has established a bond with Carl and, second, that he 
did not abuse one of Mother’s other children.  Father testified at the hearing 
 
8
that he had established a bond with Carl.  However, the social workers 
testified that, while Father showed affection towards Carl, Carl did not treat 
Father any differently from anyone else who showed affection towards him.  
We conclude that the Family Court judge, as the trier of fact, acted within 
his discretion in crediting that testimony12 and, therefore, there is no merit to 
this claim.  As for the second claim, the record reflects that Father was 
placed on the child abuse registry in connection with bruising to the face of 
one of Mother’s other children.  While Father had the chance to contest the 
finding of abuse, he chose not to do so.  We conclude that the Family Court 
judge, as the trier of fact, acted within his discretion in considering that 
evidence13 and, therefore, there is no merit to this claim.    
 
(12) We have reviewed the record, including the transcript of the 
Family Court hearing, in detail and conclude that there is clear and 
convincing evidence in the record supporting the Family Court’s finding that 
Father failed to plan for Carl’s physical needs or mental and emotional 
health and development.14  Moreover, there is clear and convincing evidence 
of the existence of at least one other required statutory factor.15  We also 
conclude that the record further supports the Family Court’s finding that 
                                                 
12 Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1997). 
13 Id. 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5). 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (5) a. 1., 2., 3., 4. 
 
9
DFS made bona fide, reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Carl.  Finally, 
we conclude that the Family Court properly determined that termination of 
Father’s parental rights was in Carl’s best interest. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motions of DFS and 
CASA to affirm are GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court is 
AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice