Title: Winborne v. Virginia State Lottery

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
ROGER WINBORNE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No.  081477  
   JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
     June 4, 2009 
VIRGINIA LOTTERY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we consider whether the Virginia Lottery 
offers a program, service, or activity within the meaning of the 
Virginians with Disabilities Act, Code § 51.5-1 et seq. (“VDA”) 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
seq. (2006) (“ADA”), and whether the Virginia Lottery has an 
obligation to disabled persons under the VDA and ADA. 
Roger Winborne, Gregg Morrell, Charles Holliday, and John 
Dehaven (collectively “the Petitioners”) filed suit in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond against the Virginia 
Lottery and the Director of the Virginia Lottery (collectively 
“the Director”), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief.  The circuit court held a hearing on cross motions for 
partial summary judgment and granted the Director’s motion.  
Upon request of counsel, the circuit court entered final 
judgment in favor of the Director.  The Petitioners appeal. 
 
 
FACTS 
The Virginia Lottery was established to produce revenue to 
be used for public purposes.  Code § 58.1-4001.  The state 
lottery department is an independent agency of the Commonwealth.  
Code § 58.1-4003.  The Virginia Lottery sells tickets, shares, 
and other products (“lottery tickets”) to raise revenue.  Code 
§ 58.1-4001; Code § 58.1-4009.  The Virginia Lottery is 
authorized to license lottery sales agents who are authorized to 
sell lottery tickets.  Code § 58.1-4009. 
In their petition in chancery, the Petitioners sought a 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the 
Director had violated the VDA and ADA because certain lottery 
sales agents (“lottery retailers”) lack accessible parking 
spaces, ramps, and paths of travel for disabled persons.  
The Petitioners identified sixteen of the Virginia 
Lottery’s retailers and alleged that they have been denied 
access to lottery tickets because those retailers are 
inaccessible to them.  The Petitioners, who use wheelchairs, 
claim that those sixteen retailers lack accommodations necessary 
for the Petitioners to enter those lottery retailers’ businesses 
to purchase lottery tickets.  The Petitioners contend that state 
and federal laws require the Virginia Lottery to ensure that 
they can access the premises of lottery retailers at which 
tickets are sold. 
 
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The Petitioners filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment.  In the motion, the Petitioners requested the court to 
hold that the Virginia Lottery had a legal obligation to ensure 
that the Petitioners were able to access lottery tickets at the 
premises of lottery retailers.  The Petitioners stated that 
there were no material issues of fact regarding their request 
for partial summary judgment. 
Thereafter, the Director filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment requesting the court to hold the following:  
1. 
The Virginia Lottery does not offer a program, 
service, or activity within the meaning of the ADA or 
VDA; 
2. 
The Virginia Lottery and its executive director are 
without power to make physical changes to retailers’ 
premises, control those retailers’ day-to-day 
operations, or specify the manner in which any 
retailer expends its percentage of compensation from 
lottery ticket and game card sales; 
3. 
Under Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633 (4th 
Cir. 2007), the Virginia Lottery and its executive 
director are not liable for the alleged claims of 
disability discrimination against the Petitioners; and 
4. 
Pursuant to Bacon, injunctive relief may not issue 
against the Virginia Lottery and its executive 
director because they played no part in the alleged 
disability discrimination against Petitioners. 
 
 
The circuit court, after a hearing, granted the Director’s 
motion for partial summary judgment and denied the Petitioners’ 
motion for partial summary judgment.  The circuit court held 
that the Virginia Lottery does not offer a program, service, or 
activity within the meaning of the VDA or ADA.  As an additional 
 
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reason for granting the Director’s motion for partial summary 
judgment, the court cited Bacon and held that the Virginia 
Lottery is not charged by law with the operation and maintenance 
of the retailers and, therefore, is not responsible for any VDA 
or ADA violations by the lottery retailers.  Counsel agreed that 
the circuit court’s rulings were dispositive of the Petitioners’ 
suit, and the circuit court, therefore, entered final judgment 
in favor of the Director. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Petitioners claim that the circuit court erred in 
denying their motion for partial summary judgment, granting the 
Director’s motion for partial summary judgment, and entering 
final judgment on behalf of the Director.  Specifically, the 
Petitioners argue that the court incorrectly held that the 
Virginia Lottery does not offer a program, service, or activity 
within the meaning of the VDA or ADA.  The Director asserts that 
the Virginia Lottery does not offer a program, service, or 
activity within the meaning of the VDA or ADA. 
 
The VDA states as follows: 
No otherwise qualified person with a disability 
shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination . . . under any program or 
activity conducted by or on behalf of any state 
agency. 
 
Code § 51.5-40.   
 
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Title II of the ADA states as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
The parties do not dispute that the Petitioners are 
qualified individuals with disabilities.  Further, the parties 
do not dispute that the Virginia Lottery is a state agency 
within the meaning of the VDA and a public entity within the 
meaning of the ADA.  The question in dispute is whether the 
Virginia Lottery offers a service, program, or activity. 
In order to answer that question, we must first determine 
what constitutes a service, program, or activity within the 
meaning of the VDA and ADA.  Such a determination presents a 
pure question of law, which is subject to a de novo review.  
Virginia Cellular LLC v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 276 Va. 
486, 490, 666 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2008). 
Under principles of statutory construction, we must 
consider the ordinary and plain meaning of statutory terms.  
Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 277 Va. 250, 269, 673 S.E.2d 
170, 179 (2009).  This Court interprets the law as written in 
the Virginia Code and in accordance with the intent of the 
 
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legislature.  Virginia Cellular, 276 Va. at 490, 666 S.E.2d at 
376. 
“Program” is defined as “a plan of procedure: a schedule or 
system under which action may be taken toward a desired goal.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1812 (1993).  
“Activity” is defined as “natural or normal function or 
operation.”  Id. at 22. 
The Virginia Lottery, in order to accomplish its 
statutorily stated purpose, sells lottery tickets to produce 
revenue.  Code § 58.1-4001.  The Virginia Lottery is authorized 
to license lottery sales agents to sell lottery tickets.  Code 
§ 58.1-4009.  Because the selling of lottery tickets is the 
system used by the Virginia Lottery to raise revenue, the 
selling of those tickets is part of the Virginia Lottery’s 
normal function and operation.  Thus, under the VDA, the selling 
of lottery tickets, whether by the Virginia Lottery itself or by 
the Virginia Lottery’s licensed retailers, is a program and an 
activity undertaken by the Virginia Lottery, a state agency.  
The circuit court erred in holding otherwise. 
The ADA does not define “program,” “service,” or 
“activity.”  However, the ADA directs as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser 
standard than the standards applied under title V of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) 
 
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or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant 
to such title. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). 
 
The Rehabilitation Act is, therefore, instructive in 
defining terms under the ADA.  Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468 
(4th Cir. 1999).  Congress has directed courts to construe the 
ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the 
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.  Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); Yeskey v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 
1997)(using the definition of “program or activity” from the 
Rehabilitation Act to interpret “services,” “programs,” and 
“activities” under the ADA).  The Rehabilitation Act defines 
“[p]rogram or activity” as “all of the operations of . . . a 
department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or of a local government.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(b). 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regulations are also 
instructive.  Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 170-71; see Blum v. Bacon, 457 
U.S. 132, 141 (1982).  The DOJ regulations state that the ADA 
applies to “all services, programs, and activities provided or 
made available by public entities.”  28 C.F.R. 35.102(a) (2008). 
Interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 in light of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the DOJ regulations, and the plain meaning 
 
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of the terms therein, we hold that the Virginia Lottery offers a 
program, service, or activity within the meaning of the ADA, and 
the circuit court erred in holding otherwise.  Thus, the 
Virginia Lottery is subject to the requirements of the VDA 
pursuant to Code § 51.5-40, and to the requirements of the ADA 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
We disagree with the circuit court’s analysis that the 
holding in Bacon supports a contrary result.  In Bacon, 475 F.3d 
at 639, the United States Court of Appeals held that the City of 
Richmond was not responsible for ADA violations in the Richmond 
city schools because Virginia law vested the School Board with 
exclusive control over the city schools.  The Court explained 
that only the party with control over the challenged program can 
be held responsible for the ADA violations regarding that 
program.  Id. at 640. 
The Virginia Lottery, however, is required by statute to 
operate the lottery.  Code § 58.1-4001; Code § 58.1-4003; Code  
§ 58.1-4006(A).  The Virginia Lottery is permitted to license 
authorized agents to sell lottery tickets.  Code § 58.1-4009;  
11 VAC § 5-31-40.  The lottery retailers that Petitioners 
alleged were inaccessible, for wheelchair use, were licensed 
agents of the Virginia Lottery. 
Privately operated retailers are liable under the VDA and 
ADA pursuant to Code § 51.5-44 of the VDA and Title III of the 
 
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ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182.  The Virginia Lottery has no 
responsibility and cannot be held liable for violations of Code 
§ 51.5-44 of the VDA and Title III of the ADA made by individual 
retailers.  See Bacon, 475 F.3d at 640.  However, this 
liability, which is the individual liability of the retailers, 
is separate and apart from the responsibilities that the 
Virginia Lottery, as a public entity, owes to disabled persons 
pursuant to the VDA and ADA.  See Code § 51.5-40; Code § 51.5-
44; 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 
It is correct that the Virginia Lottery has no power to 
make physical changes to the lottery retailers’ premises or to 
control the day-to-day operations of the retailers.  However, 
this does not absolve the Virginia Lottery of its obligations 
under the VDA and ADA.  Because the Virginia Lottery is 
responsible for the operation of the lottery, it is responsible 
for any VDA or ADA violations involving the Virginia Lottery’s 
duties under Code § 51.5-40 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132.  See Bacon, 
475 F.3d at 640. 
The Petitioners are not seeking a determination of their 
rights as against the retailers, pursuant to Code § 51.5-44 and 
42 U.S.C. § 12182, but rather a determination of their rights 
and the Virginia Lottery’s obligations under Code § 51.5-40 of 
the VDA and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 of the ADA.  In short, although 
the Virginia Lottery is not responsible for the violations of 
 
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the lottery retailers concerning their individual retail sites, 
the Virginia Lottery is responsible for its own violations in 
failing to provide disabled persons access to the Virginia 
Lottery’s programs and activities. 
 
To the extent the circuit court granted the Director’s 
motion for partial summary judgment and entered judgment in 
favor of the Director on the Petitioners’ claim because the 
Virginia Lottery was without power to make physical changes to 
the retailers’ premises and was not liable for claims made 
directly against the retailers for disability discrimination, 
the circuit court was in error.  The VDA and ADA impose an 
obligation upon the Virginia Lottery separate from the 
obligation that the individual retailers owe to disabled 
persons. 
Because the selling of lottery tickets is a program or 
activity within the meaning of the VDA and ADA, we hold that the 
Virginia Lottery has an obligation under the VDA and ADA to 
ensure that disabled persons are not excluded from participation 
in or denied access to such program or activity of the Virginia 
Lottery.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
granting the Director’s motion for partial summary judgment. 
 
The Petitioners next claim that the circuit court erred in 
failing to grant their motion for partial summary judgment.  We 
disagree. 
 
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In their motion for partial summary judgment, the 
Petitioners requested the circuit court to rule, as a matter of 
law, that the Virginia Lottery has a legal obligation under the 
VDA and ADA to ensure that the Virginia Lottery’s services are  
accessible to the Petitioners at all lottery retailers.*  While 
the Virginia Lottery does have an obligation to ensure that its 
activities and programs are accessible to the Petitioners, there 
is no legal requirement regarding how this must be accomplished.  
Therefore, it cannot be determined, by summary judgment, that 
Petitioners as a matter of law must be granted physical access 
to particular retailers or whether the Virginia Lottery may 
provide access, consistent with the VDA and ADA, by other means.  
Further, the ADA does not require complete accessibility; the 
ADA simply requires that a public entity operate each service, 
program, or activity so that it is accessible, when viewed in 
its entirety, to disabled persons.  28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a).  
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying 
Petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will reverse the 
circuit court’s judgment granting partial summary judgment to 
the Director, affirm the circuit court’s judgment denying the 
                     
* The Petitioners acknowledged that they did not seek 
summary judgment on the factual question of whether the Virginia 
Lottery failed to meet its legal obligation to ensure that the 
Petitioners were able to access lottery products and services. 
 
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Petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment, and remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
 
Reversed in part, 
affirmed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
 
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