Title: ARIZONA PUB. SERV. v. Town of Paradise Valley

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

125 Ariz. 447 (1980) 610 P.2d 449 ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, a public service corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF PARADISE VALLEY, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Bud Tims, Ernest Garfield and Jim Weeks as members of and constituting the Arizona Corporation Commission, Defendants-Appellees. No. 14605-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 22, 1980. *448 Snell & Wilmer by H. William Fox, Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellee. Roger A. McKee and Douglas A. Jorden, Paradise Valley, for defendant-appellant. John A. LaSota, Jr., former Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Charles S. Pierson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for defendants-appellees. J. LaMar Shelley, Mesa, brief amicus curiae of League of Arizona Cities and Towns. CAMERON, Justice. We granted the petition for review of the appellant, Town of Paradise Valley, of a decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming a summary judgment in favor of Arizona Public Service and the members of the Arizona Corporation Commission. A.R.S. § 12-120.24; Rule 23, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S. There is only one question on appeal and that is whether the legislature may constitutionally delegate to cities and towns the authority to direct the undergrounding of public utility poles. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. In 1964, the Town of Paradise Valley passed Ordinance No. 30 requiring new and higher capacity utility lines to be placed underground. The ordinance stated: Criminal penalties were provided for failure to comply with the ordinance. Arizona Public Service replaced some of its existing utility poles without applying to the Town for a special use permit. As a result, Arizona Public Service was charged with a misdemeanor criminal complaint before the town magistrate. Arizona Public Service then instituted a special action in the Superior Court, joining the Arizona Corporation Commission and the Town. The Superior Court, in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, declared the ordinance invalid. The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. We granted the Town's petition for review. *449 Because this is a review from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we must look at the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been taken, in this case, the Town. Rule 56, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Hall v. Motorists Ins. Corp., 109 Ariz. 334, 509 P.2d 604 (1973). For that reason, we accept the Town's allegations that although the initial cost of undergrounding may be more, the maintenance costs are less and the long term cost is the same or less than the cost of above ground utility poles. Our Constitution reads: Early in our history, we held that the Corporation Commission's power was paramount, State v. Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company, 15 Ariz. 294, 138 P. 781 (1914), and that the legislature could not delegate powers possessed by the Corporation Commission to a local government unless the Corporation Commission was, at the same time, divested of such powers. Phoenix Railway Co. v. Lount, 21 Ariz. 289, 187 P. 933 (1920). In later cases, however, we held that the Corporation Commission's paramount power is limited to rates, charges or classifications and that, as to all other matters, the legislature has the power to take what action it deems appropriate. Williams v. Pipe Trades Industry Program of Arizona, 100 Ariz. 14, 409 P.2d 720 (1966); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 98 Ariz. 339, 404 P.2d 692 (1965). We stated: The question before the court, then, is not whether the legislature has the power to authorize the Town to pass an ordinance requiring undergrounding, but whether it has, in fact, done so. In the instant case, we believe that the legislature has given cities and towns the power to require the undergrounding of utility poles as part of the town's zoning powers. The statute reads as follows: *450 This statute is a legislative grant to the cities of the authority to regulate the use, location, height and size of utility poles as part of the towns' general planning and zoning power. The height and location of utility poles is a common subject of planning and zoning statutes and ordinances, Kahl v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 60 A.2d 754, 191 Md. 249 (1948). We find nothing in the Arizona statutes which exempts utility poles from the grant of authority to the towns to enact zoning laws. We believe this statute gives the Town the power to require the undergrounding of utility poles in the Town pursuant to statute. A second statute is cited by the Town and reads as follows: The Court of Appeals and the appellees contend that the doctrine of ejusdem generis obviously applies to this statute, and that therefore the Town has the power to regulate "poles and wires" only in connection with the laying and operation of street railways. We do not agree. Ejusdem generis is applicable to statutes in which there are listed specific categories followed by a general category: In an early case of this court wherein the legislature enumerated nine particular businesses engaged primarily in the tourist industry, such as hotels, dude ranches, etc., followed by the term "or any other business or occupation charging * * * rents," we said: A.R.S. § 9-276(A)(5) is not a case of a general category following the enumeration of specific categories. Section 5 gives the Town the power to regulate three different items the erection of poles and wires, the laying of street railway tracks, and the operation of street railways on the streets, alleys, and public grounds and plazas of the towns. Each grant of authority stands equal and alone. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, like other rules of statutory construction, is an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S. Ct. 518, 85 L. Ed. 598 (1941); Orr Ditch *451 and Water Co. v. Justice Ct. of Reno, 64 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d 558 (1947). Where the intent of the legislature is apparent, it may not be used to obscure and defeat the intent and purpose of the legislation. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 70 S. Ct. 352, 94 L. Ed. 457 (1950); People v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, 71 A.L.R.2d 580, cert. denied 358 U.S. 828, 79 S. Ct. 46, 3 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1958). We do not believe that the doctrine applies here. Appellees further rely on A.R.S. § 40-341, et seq., for the position that the legislature intended that cities and towns should not have the authority to require undergrounding at the expense of the utility. § 40-341, et seq., provide for the creation of underground conversion districts for the purpose of converting overhead electric lines to underground facilities to be paid for by the property holder in the district and not the utility. § 40-344(J) recognizes the role of the cities and towns by stating that: We do not believe this statute is evidence of a legislative intent that the cities and towns do not have power over utility poles in the town. The fact that property owners may petition for the creation of an underground conversion district and be bound to pay for the undergrounding instead of the utility, does not prevent the Town from mandating the undergrounding at utility expense. Finally, reference is made to A.R.S. § 40-360, et seq., concerning the creation of a siting committee for transmission lines of 115 KV or greater. The lines in the Town of Paradise Valley are mostly 12 KV, with some 69 KV. The statute does not apply to lines in the Town. Even so, the statute states as to the high energy transmission lines: These exceptions evidence a legislative recognition that the cities and towns have the power to act in this area. We believe that, in the absence of a clear statewide preemptive policy not shown here, local governments can prescribe undergrounding within their boundaries. See Kahl v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., supra; Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747, 170 S.W.2d 38 (1943); Central Me. Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Ren'l Auth., 281 A.2d 233 (Me. 1971); Sleepy Hollow Lake, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 352 N.Y.S.2d 274, 43 A.D.2d 439 (1974); 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 24.588 (3d ed. 1968). Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.