Title: Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 3, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2021
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Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Alabama Lockers, LLC
v.
Jefferson County Board of Education)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-20-902676)
BRYAN, Justice.
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The Jefferson County Board of Education ("the Board") petitions this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
dismiss the action brought against the Board by Alabama Lockers, LLC. 
Because the Board is entitled to State immunity, we grant the petition
and issue the writ.  
Alabama Lockers provides services regarding school lockers.  In July
2020, Alabama Lockers sued the Board, alleging breach of contract. 
Alabama Lockers also alleged that the Board had failed to follow both
"state bid laws" and its own policies and procedures regarding bidding on
locker-services contracts.  In September 2020, the Board filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting, in relevant part, that Alabama Lockers' action is
barred by State immunity.  The circuit court denied the Board's motion to
dismiss, and the Board then filed a petition for the writ of mandamus with
this Court.  
" 'A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle by which
to seek review of the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the ground of
State immunity.' "  Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 63 So. 3d
621, 625 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.,
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937 So. 2d 56, 57 (Ala. 2006)).  Typically, the denial of a motion to dismiss
or a summary-judgment motion is not reviewable by a mandamus
petition; however, the denial of such a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is one exception to that general standard.  Ex parte Haralson,
853 So. 2d 928, 931 n.2 (Ala. 2003).
"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy. 
Ex parte Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So. 2d 358, 360
(Ala. 1993).  Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus
relief unless the petitioner shows:  (1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to
perform, accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the Court.  See Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705,
708 (Ala. 2002)."
Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005).
The Board argues that Alabama Lockers' action against the Board
is barred by State immunity, which is sometimes referred to as sovereign
immunity in our caselaw.  The Board is clearly correct.
" 'Section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: "[T]he State of
Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law
or equity."  (Emphasis added.)  "The wall of immunity erected
by § 14 is nearly impregnable."  Patterson v. Gladwin Corp.,
835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).  Indeed, as regards the State
of Alabama and its agencies, the wall is absolutely
impregnable.  Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 999 So.
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2d 891, 895 (Ala. 2008) ("Section 14 affords absolute immunity
to both the State and State agencies."); Ex parte Jackson
County Bd. of Educ., 4 So. 3d 1099, 1102 (Ala. 2008) (same);
Atkinson v. State, 986 So. 2d 408, 410-11 (Ala. 2007) (same); 
[Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp.], 978 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 2007)]
(same); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 764 So. 2d 1263,
1268 (Ala. 2000) (same); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806
(Ala. 1992) (same).  "Absolute immunity" means just that -- the
State and its agencies are not subject to suit under any theory.
" ' "This immunity may not be waived."  Patterson, 835
So. 2d at 142.  Sovereign immunity is, therefore, not an
affirmative defense, but a "jurisdictional bar." Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 2007). 
The jurisdictional bar of § 14 simply "preclud[es] a court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction" over the State or a
State agency.  Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d
257, 261 (Ala. 2003).  Thus, a complaint filed solely against the
State or one of its agencies is a nullity and is void ab initio.  Ex
parte Alabama Dep't of Transp. (In re Russell Petroleum, Inc.
v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.), 6 So. 3d 1126 (Ala. 2008). ... Any
action taken by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction --
other than dismissing the action -- is void.  State v. Property
at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999).' "
Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 264 So. 3d 850, 853 (Ala.
2018) (quoting Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n, 11
So. 3d 189, 191-92 (Ala. 2008)).
In Ex parte Hale County Board of Education, 14 So. 3d 844 (Ala.
2009), this Court explained that county boards of education are entitled
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to State immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of
1901 (Off. Recomp.).  This Court stated:  " 'For purposes of § 14 immunity,
county boards of education are considered agencies of the State.  Louviere
v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So. 2d 873, 877 (Ala. 1995) ("County
boards of education, as local agencies of the State, enjoy [§ 14]
immunity.").' "  Ex parte Hale Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d at 848 (quoting
Ex parte Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 4 So. 3d 1099, 1102 (Ala. 2008)). 
"Because county boards of education are local agencies of the State, they
are clothed in constitutional immunity from suit."  14 So. 3d at 848.  Thus,
the Board, as a county board of education, is entitled to State immunity
in this case.  Accordingly, the Board has established a clear legal right to
have the action against it dismissed.
Alabama Lockers does not argue that it has a viable action under the 
controlling precedent cited above.  Rather, Alabama Lockers "disagrees ...
with the current precedent" and "strongly urges [this Court] to reassess
that precedent."  Alabama Lockers' answer at 20.  Specifically, Alabama
Lockers asks this Court to overrule Ex parte Hale County Board of
Education, supra, which, as noted above, held that county boards of
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education are agencies of the State and, thus, are immune from suit under
§ 14.  Hale, which this Court decided in 2009, explicitly overruled
Kimmons v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 204 Ala. 384, 85 So. 774
(1920), and Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education, 337 So. 2d 1310
(Ala. 1976), "to the extent that they and their progeny impose an implied
'right to be sued' on county boards of education."  14 So. 3d at 848-49.  
Before addressing the challenge to Hale, we will review the history
of State immunity as it relates to county boards of education. 
" 'During the early years of our history as a State our rule
of state governmental responsibility was directly opposite from
what it is today.  Our first Constitution provided: 
" ' "The general assembly shall direct, by law,
in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be
brought against the State."
" 'Ala. Const. Art. 6, § 9 (1819).
" 'The constitutional mandate of 1819 remained
unchanged until the Constitution of 1865 was adopted when
the provision granting a right to sue the state was changed to
read: 
" ' "That suits may be brought against the
State, in such manner, and in such courts, as may
be by law provided."
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" 'In 1875, the Legislature repealed all acts granting the
right to sue the State, and the Constitution of 1875 contained
a provision, that "The State of Alabama shall never be made
defendant in any court of law or equity."  Section 15, Const. of
Alabama, 1875. Section 14 of the 1901 Constitution is the
same as Section 15 of the 1875 Constitution.  The adoption of
the 1875 Constitution closed the door to litigants who had
claims against the State, and the door has remained closed
continuously by subsequent constitutional provisions and court
decisions interpreting those provisions.
" 'Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901
specifically prohibits the State from being made a party
defendant in any suit at law or in equity. This Court,
construing Section 14, has held almost every conceivable type
of suit to be within the constitutional prohibition.' "
Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1205-06 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 23,
256 So. 2d 281, 282-83 (1971)).  
Although constitutional provisions have clearly provided immunity
for the State since 1875, the issue whether county boards of education
enjoy such immunity has not always been as clear.  In Kimmons, supra,
a 1920 decision, a plaintiff sued a county board of education, challenging
the board's authority to issue warrants for the construction of a school
building.  This Court briefly touched on issues concerning possible
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immunity for the board.  The Court stated that the board was an
independent agency of the State for purposes of the act under which the
board had issued the warrants.  However, the Court also noted that,
under that act, the board was "given the right to sue" and, thus, that the
board was subject to "an implied right to be sued."  204 Ala. at 387, 85 So.
at 777.  Accordingly, the Court in Kimmons addressed the merits of the
plaintiff's claims against the board.  However, the Court did not address
the immunity provided by § 14 or attempt to reconcile that provision with
its observation that the board was an agency of the State.
In Sims, supra, a plurality decision released by this Court in 1976,
plaintiffs alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract against a
county board of education.  This Court again noted that a county board of
education is considered an agency of the State.  However, the Court, citing
Kimmons, also stated that a board's statutory right to sue "carries with
it the implied right to be sued."    337 So. 2d at 1313.  The Court in Sims
further noted that a board "can be sued 'within the scope of its corporate
power,' ... but our cases appear to have held that tort liability is not one
of those matters within the scope of its corporate power."  337 So. 2d at
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1316 (quoting Morgan v. Cherokee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 Ala. 201, 203,
58 So. 2d 134, 136 (1952)).  Thus, the Court concluded that the board had
immunity regarding the negligence claims but did not have immunity
regarding the contract claims.  Like the Court in Kimmons, the Court in
Sims did not address § 14.
In 2009, this Court in Hale overruled Kimmons and Sims "to the
extent that they and their progeny impose an implied 'right to be sued' on
county boards of education."   14 So. 3d at 848-49.   The Court stated that
the Kimmons decision, on which the Court in Sims had relied, had
"resulted in significant confusion." 14 So. 3d at 848.  In overruling
Kimmons and Sims, the Court in Hale "reassert[ed] the absolute
constitutional immunity of county boards of education."   Id.  The essential
reasoning supporting a finding of State immunity in Hale was
straightforward: § 14 provides absolute immunity to the State, § 14
immunity extends to agencies of the State, county boards of education are
agencies of the State,  and, thus, county boards of education have absolute
immunity under § 14.  Id.   
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Alabama Lockers argues that the Court in Hale was "misguided" in
its reading of Kimmons and, thus, that we should now overrule Hale
(Alabama Lockers does not address Sims).  Alabama Lockers emphasizes
that the Court in Hale stated that "the Court [in Kimmons] failed to
consider that county boards of education are 'local agencies of the state'
and thus immune from suit under the constitutional bar of § 14."  14 So.
3d at 848.  Alabama Lockers then asserts that the Court in Hale, in
overruling Kimmons,  incorrectly stated that the Court in Kimmons had
"failed to consider" that county boards of education are agencies of the
State.    Alabama Lockers notes that the Court in Kimmons did in fact
observe that the county board education in that case was an "independent
agency of  the state."  Kimmons, 204 Ala. at 388, 85 So. 2d at 777. 
However, we believe Alabama Lockers reads too much into the first part
of the clause in Hale that it scrutinizes.  The second part of that clause
provides important context, and we emphasize it here: "[T]he Court [in
Kimmons] failed to consider that county boards of education are 'local
agencies of the state' and thus immune from suit under the constitutional
bar of § 14."  Hale, 14 So. 3d at 848 (emphasis added).  The upshot of the
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analysis in Hale was that the Court in Kimmons had failed to consider the
crucial application of § 14 to the fact that county boards of education are
agencies of the State.  As noted, the Court in Kimmons did not address §
14 at all.  When the fact that county boards of education are agencies of
the State is considered in the context of § 14, as it was in Hale, it becomes
evident that such boards are entitled to State immunity.
Alabama Lockers also broadly contends that State immunity under
§ 14 should not immunize the State from claims based on contract.  In
support of that argument, Alabama Lockers cites the following portion of
Article IV, § 95, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.):
"There can be no law of this state impairing the
obligation of contracts by destroying or impairing the remedy
for their enforcement; and the legislature shall have no power
to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred
by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state."
Section 95 does not limit the application of the State immunity provided
by § 14 in any way.  Section 95 is found in Article IV of the Alabama
Constitution, which specifically concerns the legislative department.
Section 14 is found in Article I, which is titled "Declaration of Rights."
Section 95 limits the legislature's authority to pass legislation concerning
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contracts.  However, § 14 clearly provides the State absolute immunity
against all claims, including contract claims.  Section 14 -- a broad,
overarching constitutional provision -- is simply not limited by the
restriction on legislative action found in § 95. 
We reaffirm our holding in Hale stating that county boards of
education are entitled to State immunity.  Additionally, we note that the
law reflected in Hale is well established, having been applied in several
of our decisions since that decision was released.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 285 So. 3d 765, 774-75 (Ala. 2019); Ex parte
Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 279 So. 3d 1135, 1140-41 (Ala. 2018); Ex parte
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 270 So. 3d 1171, 1173 (Ala. 2018); Ex
parte Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 218 So. 3d 774, 778 (Ala. 2016);  Ex parte
Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 164 So. 3d 532, 534-35 (Ala. 2014) (succinctly
rejecting a challenge to the reasoning in Hale and stating that the basis
for the decision in Hale is "sound"); Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty.
v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210, 1216-17 (Ala. 2012); Ex parte Montgomery
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So. 3d 837, 841-42 (Ala. 2012); Colbert Cnty. Bd. of
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Educ. v. James, 83 So.3d 473, 478-79 (Ala. 2011); and Ex parte Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 48 So. 3d 621, 624-25 (Ala. 2010).
The Board is entitled to State immunity under § 14, and, thus,
Alabama Lockers' action against the Board must be dismissed. 
Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing
the circuit court to dismiss the action.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart,
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
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