Title: People v. Pollock

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90960-Agenda 3-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								TABITHA POLLOCK, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	On November 3, 1995, defendant Tabitha Pollock was
indicted in the circuit court of Henry County on charges of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1994)) and
aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 1994))
after her three-year-old daughter, Jami Sue Pollock (Jami), died as
a result of being struck by defendant's paramour, Scott English
(Scott). A jury found defendant guilty of felony murder
(aggravated battery of a child) and aggravated battery of a child on
a theory of accountability. The conviction for aggravated battery
of a child was merged with the murder conviction and defendant
was sentenced to a term of 36 years' imprisonment for the murder
conviction.
	Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence to the
appellate court. In a published opinion, defendant's conviction for
murder was affirmed.(1) 309 Ill. App. 3d 400. Thereafter,
defendant's petition for leave to appeal was granted. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. For reasons that follow, we now reverse defendant's
convictions.
BACKGROUND
	The evidence of record indicates the following.
	At 4:58 a.m. on October 10, 1995, a Kewanee ambulance
manned by two emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived at
720 Pleasant Street in Kewanee, Illinois, in response to a 911 call
that a three-year-old child was not breathing. Upon their arrival,
the EMTs were immediately directed to the upstairs of the home,
where they found defendant performing cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) on a small child, later identified as Jami.
According to James Heisner, one of the EMTs, Jami's skin tone
was bluish and she was unresponsive, but her body was warm.
Scott told Heisner that he discovered Jami's lifeless body wrapped
in her blankets when he checked on Jami and her brother, Preston,
who had been sleeping on a waterbed in another bedroom.
	 Jami was immediately transported to Kewanee Hospital.
Defendant rode in the ambulance and assisted in continuing CPR
on Jami while en route. They arrived at the hospital at 5:05 a.m.
There the emergency room staff, headed by Dr. Renato Parungao,
took over resuscitation efforts. Dr. Parungao and his staff worked
on Jami for nearly an hour, but Jami never showed any signs of
revival. When the hour passed without any success, resuscitation
efforts were terminated and Jami was pronounced dead.
	Although one police officer who responded to the English
home testified that defendant appeared emotionless, several other
witnesses testified otherwise. Heisner, one of the EMTs, testified
that defendant was working diligently at trying to revive Jami
when they arrived at the English home. When his partner took
over doing CPR, Heisner said, defendant appeared shaken and
frightened. Defendant asked to accompany Jami in the ambulance
and seemed deeply concerned.
	Karen Heying, a nurse at the hospital, testified that she was
assigned to stay with defendant while the emergency room staff
worked on Jami. Heying described defendant as "frantic." Heying
said she and defendant paced the floor in an attempt to keep
defendant calm, but when defendant was told that Jami could not
be saved, defendant had a complete emotional break down.
	After Jami was pronounced dead, defendant was allowed to
hold Jami. She sat rocking Jami for a long while. When they took
Jami from defendant, defendant collapsed on the floor and cried
uncontrollably.
	There was no apparent cause for Jami's death. Dr. Parungao,
having noticed some bruises on Jami, asked an emergency room
nurse to make a detailed record of Jami's physical condition,
documenting every noticeable mark on Jami's body. In addition,
the coroner ordered that an autopsy be performed.
	Dr. Parungao previously had seen Jami on October 7 when
Jami was brought to the emergency room by Scott, who reported
that Jami hit her head on the sink when she fell off a cookie tin in
the bathroom while trying to brush her teeth. Dr. Parungao sutured
a cut on Jami's head. He accepted the story given him by Scott and
saw nothing at that time which made him suspect that Jami was
being abused.
	Terri Chapman, a registered nurse at Kewanee Hospital, was
working in the emergency room on the morning of October 10,
1995. She assisted Dr. Parungao in attempting to resuscitate Jami
and, when their attempts failed, she called the coroner, who, in
turn, reported the death to the police. Upon Dr. Parungao's order,
Chapman made a detailed inspection of Jami's body. According
to her notes, there were 11 marks on Jami's body, which she
described as follows: three nickel- to quarter-sized bruises across
her upper back; one two- to five-centimeter abrasion down the
middle of her back; one quarter- to half-dollar-sized bruise just
above her left elbow, one half-dollar-sized bruise on her left
buttock; one half-dollar-sized bruise on her right hip; three
quarter-sized bruises on her left rib area; and a bruise on her shin.
Chapman also noted the healing laceration on Jami's head, where
Jami had received stitches a few days earlier. Chapman later
testified at defendant's trial that, based on her knowledge and
experience regarding bruises and their coloration over time, she
was of the opinion that Jami's bruises were of different ages.
Some of the bruises were "bluish," indicating to her that the bruise
was 2 to 3 days old. Some bruises were "greenish," indicating an
age of 4 to 5 days and some were "brownish-yellow," indicating
an age of 10 to 14 days old. Chapman said the bruises on the hip,
buttocks, and shin appeared to be the oldest, while the ones on
Jami's rib area and upper back appeared to be newer.
	On the afternoon of October 10, 1995, the date of Jami's
death, Dr. Violette Hnilica, a forensic pathologist, began an
autopsy on Jami's body to determine the cause of her death. The
autopsy first involved an external examination, followed by an
internal examination which was conducted the next day. Dr.
Hnilica testified that the autopsy took a great deal of time because
she, in conjunction with police investigators and crime-scene
technicians, collected and preserved evidence throughout the
autopsy. Using various techniques, including ultraviolet light,
Jami's body, as well as her clothing and bed linens, were
examined, and attempts were made to match patterns from various
items to marks found on Jami's body.
	In general, Dr. Hnilica's external examination revealed
"bruises of various ages over her body" and "splotchiness of color
over her face with areas of pallor or paleness." A detailed visual
inspection of Jami's body revealed the following: a greenish-blue
bruise on the upper-right chest; a greenish-blue bruise mid-chest,
near the right breast; a bluish-green bruise in the right abdomen;
a greenish-brownish bruise on the left chest, near the armpit; a
green contusion mid-chest, near the left breast; and a greenish
bruise on the mid to upper back. Dr. Hnilica testified that the
above-noted bruises were ones that appeared to be older in age-at
least days in duration. She later admitted on cross-examination
that none of these older injuries appeared life-threatening and all
of the bruises could have been attributable to accidental childhood
injuries.
	With the aid of ultraviolet light, however, Dr. Hnilica found
several additional bruises or marks which, in her opinion, had
occurred just minutes or, at the most, hours prior to Jami's death.
The recent injuries included: an area of swelling just above the
right ear; a faint purple bruise on the tip of the right ear and a
larger purplish bruise on the lower part of the right ear; "splotchy
coloration" (mixed areas of paleness and pinkness) of the face
(across the cheeks, bridge of nose, and mouth); abrasions on the
sides and tip of the nose; a bruise and scraped area under her chin;
a large area of bruising (extensive and not well-defined) across her
chest, accompanied by "curved claw marks" which were later
matched to Jami's own left-hand fingernails; bruising to the left
breast area and upper abdomen; and two areas of scrapes in the left
lower chest area. On Jami's back there were bruises to the skin
along the vertebral process (spine) and faint bruises over the upper
back area. Slightly older bluish bruises were found on the right
buttocks, the left hip, and the right forearm, but on the left forearm
there was a newer pinkish bruise.
	Dr. Hnilica explained that areas of pallor, such as that
observed on Jami's face, can occur "when something presses the
blood out of the facial tissues," as in smothering. Also, asphyxia
can cause petechia-ruptures of the tiny blood vessels-in the
eyelids, face, oral mucosa, as well as the upper neck and in the
thymus gland. Petechia were found in the conjunctiva of Jami's
eye and her thymus gland, consistent with her being smothered.
Further, the clawing marks found on Jami's chest were also
indicative of smothering. Dr. Hnilica testified that a smothering
victim often will claw at the thing obstructing their ability to
breath and, in doing so, injure themselves in this manner.
	When conducting the internal examination of Jami, Dr.
Hnilica peeled back Jami's scalp. In doing so, Dr. Hnilica was able
to determine that the swelling, which had been observed over
Jami's right ear, was due to torn blood vessels, which allowed
blood to pool in the tissues. This type of injury, Dr. Hnilica said,
was likely caused by a massive, heavy blow to the head. In
addition to this one massive injury, the doctor was able to discern
13 distinct areas of hemorrhage, each representing an injury to the
head. It was noted, however, that estimating the age of these
bruises is not an exact science and that several, perhaps as many
as eight of these bruises, were not recent injuries.
	Dr. Hnilica concluded that the injury to Jami's head,
evidenced by the large area of hemorrhage, caused the brain to be
"shaken up." This caused Jami's brain to swell to the size of an
adult brain. Dr. Hnilica identified several photographs which had
been taken during the autopsy, depicting the injury to the brain, as
well as the areas of bruising, as described above.
	Dr. Hnilica opined that the swelling of the brain, which was
likely caused by a heavy blow to the head, was the most significant
injury suffered by Jami. However, there was also evidence of
injury to the abdomen. The injury here was consistent with a
massive, rapid or heavy force being applied to the abdomen-as
with being kicked, "stomped," or "kneed" in the abdomen area.
	Based on all of the evidence from the autopsy, Dr. Hnilica
concluded that Jami's death had been caused by blunt force trauma
to the head (brain edema) and asphyxia. In her opinion, either
cause, standing alone, could have resulted in death. However,
since there was evidence of both, it was impossible to say "the
relative proportion that each contributed" to causing Jami's death.
	On the evening of October 11, 1995, defendant and Scott met
with police at the Kewanee police station, where they were
questioned, individually, about what had transpired prior to Jami's
death.(2) Defendant, who was 25 years old at the time, told police
that she and her children, Preston, age five, Jami, age three, and
David, age two, began staying with Scott English, who is David's
father, after she resumed her relationship with Scott sometime in
August 1995. In late September 1995, they moved in with Scott at
the home of Scott's parents, Hilda and Raymond English, at 720
Pleasant Street in Kewanee. Pam, the girlfriend of Scott's brother
(who was in jail), and Pam's young son also lived at the home.
Defendant told police that she and Scott slept in one of the upstairs
bedrooms. Their son, David, had a bed in the same room. Preston
and Jami slept together in another upstairs bedroom.
	When asked if she was aware of any bruises on Jami,
defendant stated that she gave Jami a bath on October 9, 1995,
sometime between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. At that time, she
noticed only a few small bruises. Some of the bruises could have
been attributed to the fact that, on October 7, 1995, Jami had fallen
off a round tin in the bathroom and hit her head. Jami was taken
to the hospital and received stitches. This was the only "owie" on
Jami that defendant knew about. Defendant recalled, however, that
two to five days before Jami's death, Jami hit her head on the
bannister of the stairs as she was going upstairs. Defendant also
remembered another occasion when Jami's head got bumped into
the bannister as Scott was carrying Jami upstairs. Other than those
instances, defendant was unaware of any injuries to Jami.
Defendant denied ever striking her children, except for a small
swat on the behind, and she assured police that, to her knowledge,
no one in the English home had ever mistreated them.
	Defendant told police that, on the evening of October 9, she
and the children ate dinner at about 6:30 p.m. and, when Pam and
her son came home at about 7 p.m., the children had some ice
cream. The children played together downstairs until about 9:15
p.m., when defendant took her children upstairs to her bedroom to
watch some television. David fell asleep in his own bed in her
room. Preston and Jami fell asleep in her bed. Defendant said she
moved Jami and Preston to their own bed around 11:30 p.m. and
then went downstairs to do some laundry. When she checked on
Jami and Preston at about 12:15 a.m., they seemed fine.
	Defendant noted that Scott arrived home at about 12:40 a.m.
and, sometime after his arrival, she noticed that the kids "were a
little restless." She went to check on them and found Scott at the
foot of their bed, telling them to go back to sleep. Defendant said
she immediately left the bedroom and stood outside the door
because she was afraid that the kids would wake up if they saw
her. Scott then went downstairs to get something to eat and came
back upstairs to eat with her in the bedroom. She and Scott talked
while Scott ate. Then they each took showers.
	Defendant explained that, to get to the bathroom, it was
necessary to walk through the bedroom where Jami and Preston
slept. Defendant recalled that, when Scott returned after taking his
shower, he told defendant that he checked on the children and they
were fine.
	Defendant said that after she and Scott showered, they
watched some television until about 3 or 3:30 a.m. and then went
to bed. Before going to sleep, Scott went to the bathroom and, on
his way, checked on the children once again. When he returned, he
told defendant that Jami had been wrapped in her covers and he
had fixed them. Sometime later that morning, defendant and Scott
were awakened by David crying. David had a fever, so Scott gave
David some Tylenol. When he did, David spit up on Scott. Scott
went to wash up and, again, passed through the children's room.
Shortly thereafter, Scott said something about hearing a noise. The
next thing defendant remembered was Scott, standing in the
bedroom doorway, yelling at her, waking her up, and telling her
that Jami was not breathing. Scott told her that he went into the
bedroom, found Jami wrapped in her blankets and, when he
unwrapped her, found her lifeless and not breathing. Defendant
said that she went to Jami's room, picked her up and brought her
into her own bedroom, where she started doing CPR. She
screamed at Scott to call 911. Defendant said that Scott later told
her that he had tried performing CPR on Jami, too, but she did not
know for how long.
	At this point in the interview, Lieutenant Rod Huber, one of
defendant's interviewers, advised defendant of her Miranda rights
and informed her that a preliminary report from the autopsy
revealed that Jami had not died of natural causes, but that she had
died from swelling of the brain caused by blunt force trauma and
asphyxia-cutting off her air supply by suffocation. Lieutenant
Huber described defendant's response to this information as one
of shock and astonishment. He said she seemed to have difficulty
grasping the meaning of what he was telling her. Defendant did
not understand how Jami could have been hurt because, she said,
to her knowledge no one in the English household had ever hit or
mistreated her children. Defendant also maintained that she had
done nothing to harm Jami in any way.
	The interview was then interrupted by Dee Shannahan, a
DCFS investigator, who asked to speak with Lieutenant Huber.
Outside the interview room, Shannahan informed Huber that Scott
had made admissions regarding hitting Jami. Huber returned to the
interview room and told defendant that Scott admitted striking
Jami. Lieutenant Huber said that defendant seemed to have
difficulty believing that Scott had done anything to Jami because,
defendant said, she had never known Scott to be abusive toward
her children in the past. Defendant maintained that she was
completely unaware that Scott had done anything to Jami. In fact,
after learning of Scott's complicity for her daughter's death,
defendant noted that it now made sense that, since Jami's death,
Scott had continually sought reassurance from her that she loved
him and had even asked her to marry him. Defendant also said she
now understood why, before coming to the police station, Scott
told her that he was scared because "they always blame the one
who finds the dead child and I'm just scared I'll get blamed."
	As indicated above, while defendant was being interviewed
in one room at the police station on the evening of October 11,
1995, Scott was being questioned in another room. In the course
of this questioning, he admitted striking Jami on the head on the
morning of October 10, 1995. Scott made a voluntary statement,
which was tape recorded. His taped statement was played for the
jury at defendant's trial. Jurors were also given copies of the
transcript to follow along with as the tape was played.
	In this statement, Scott corroborated much of what defendant
told police. He said he had gone to work at 4 p.m. on October 9,
1995, and worked until 12:30 a.m. on October 10, 1995, arriving
home about 12:50 in the morning. When he got home, he checked
on Jami and Preston and found that Jami was "bundled up" in her
blanket. He said he went to his own bedroom and told defendant
that Jami was bundled up in her blankets. Scott and defendant then
went back into Jami and Preston's bedroom to fix the blankets.
The children heard defendant's voice and began to wake up and
cry for their mom. Defendant hurried out of the room so the
children would go back to sleep. Scott then "unbundled" Jami and
"set them [the blankets] the right way."
	Scott said that, after fixing the blankets, he got something to
eat, talked with defendant, and then showered. Scott then went
downstairs to get David his bottle. On the way back, he checked
on the children again and they were fine. He watched television
until about 3 a.m. and, before going to sleep, went to the
bathroom. At that time he checked on the children once again.
Scott said that when he turned the light on briefly, Preston opened
his eyes, but Scott told him to go back to sleep. Scott said Jami
was wriggling under her blankets and she was all bundled up
again. Scott said, "Then I yelled at her and I hit her twice in the
back of the neck or the head, one of them with the palm of my
hand." Scott described the first strike as a "hammering motion,"
but said the second strike was softer. He said Jami cried, but not
loudly. He said he "didn't mean anything. I just wanted to let her
know that she shouldn't be covering up like that."
	Scott said he went back to bed and was awakened around 4:30
a.m. by David crying. David had a fever, so Scott got up to get him
some medicine. When he gave David the medicine, David spit it
up and Scott spilled medicine all over his hands and the sheets.
Defendant took David into their bed to settle him down, while
Scott went to the bathroom to wash up. When Scott walked
through the children's room to the bathroom, Preston woke up
briefly, but then lay back down. Jami, however, was still all
bundled up in her blankets. Scott said,
			"Then I pulled the blankets up and she spun and there
was no movement. She was lifeless and I proceeded to do
CPR after that. I leaned down to listen if she was
breathing or if she had any pulse and then I did CPR."
	Scott estimated that he performed CPR for about five minutes
before calling anyone because he was "panicking." He said,
			"I didn't want this to happen. When I corrected her I
never knew that I was going to hurt her that bad."
	The police asked,
			"So at the time you were doing CPR you believed that
it was because of the hitting that you had done?"
	Scott responded,
			"Yes. Because that's the only thing that I have done to
her. I have never layed [sic] a hand on her. I loved her so
much."
	Scott told police that defendant was not aware that he struck
Jami and that, until then, he had told no one what he had done. He
then asked if he could be allowed to speak to defendant so he
could tell her himself what had happened to Jami.
	Scott adamantly maintained that he hit Jami only twice on the
morning of October 10, 1995. When asked to explain other bruises
found on Jami, Scott told police that Jami had bruises as a result
of three accidental incidents which occurred on October 7, 1995.
Scott said that, on the morning of October 7, he "accidentally"
grabbed Jami by the neck. This happened, Scott said, because Jami
had been misbehaving at the breakfast table-keeping food in her
mouth without chewing or swallowing. Both he and defendant
corrected Jami and, when Jami refused to behave, Scott ordered
her to her room. Jami got off her chair and started to run toward
her mother. Scott grabbed Jami to prevent her from going to her
mother. Scott said that he "meant to grab her by the shoulders and
my hand, I caught her by the neck."
	Scott also told police that, after breakfast, he gave his son,
David, and Jami a bath together. Scott said that, during the bath,
Jami stood up in the tub and stepped on David's leg. David started
to scream. Scott said he "leaped toward David to move him out of
the way and I sort of put my elbow in the way of the collision and
Jami and I might have pushed her back a little bit. She fell
backwards and hit her head or back or what have you however she
landed." Scott said Jami fell onto the linoleum floor.
	Later that same day, October 7, Jami fell in the bathroom and
hit her head, requiring stitches. Scott insisted, however, that he had
done nothing to cause the incident. He said that Jami climbed up
on a cookie tin to get to the toothpaste when she accidentally
slipped and fell.
	 On October 12, 1995, Scott was arrested and charged by
information with two counts of murder and one count of
aggravated battery of a child. On the afternoon of October 12,
1995, Sherry Ranos, a criminal investigator with the Illinois State
Police, accompanied by DCFS Investigator Dee Shannahan and
Kewanee Police Officer Ken Ince, went to the Pollock residence
at 100 South Burr Boulevard in Kewanee to speak with defendant.
At that time, in response to questions regarding Scott's behavior
toward defendant's children and with the benefit of the knowledge
that Scott had murdered Jami, defendant was able to recall other
incidents which she had previously dismissed as accidents, but
which now suggested that Scott had been abusive to her children
in the past. One such incident occurred in July 1995 and involved
defendant's son Preston. Defendant explained that Scott had been
baby-sitting Preston and Jami for her on this occasion. When she
picked up the children, she noticed some scrapes on Preston's
neck. Defendant said that Scott told her that Preston started to slip
in the bathtub and, when Scott went to grab him, Scott accidentally
caught Preston by the neck. Preston, who was five years old, gave
different explanations for the injury-at first, Preston told defendant
that Scott choked him and held him under the water, but later he
said that kids hit him with sticks.
	Defendant also recalled that, a week or two prior to Jami's
death, there was an incident when defendant had been away from
the home and Scott was watching the children. When defendant
returned home she saw some bruises on Jami. Scott told her that
Jami had fallen down the stairs. Defendant said that she
questioned Scott about the fall, but that Scott's father had
corroborated that Jami had fallen down the stairs. Defendant
admitted that Jami had complained sometimes that Scott was
mean, but she thought it was because Scott made Jami stand in the
corner for "time-out."
	In November 1995, the grand jury heard evidence on the case
and returned three-count indictments against both defendant and
Scott for murder and aggravated battery of a child. Count I alleged
knowing murder, count II alleged felony murder based on
aggravated battery of a child, and count III alleged aggravated
battery of a child. The State later dismissed counts I of both
indictments.
	Scott was tried by a jury and found guilty of first degree
(felony) murder and aggravated battery of a child. He was found
ineligible for the death penalty and was sentenced to natural life
imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on August 18, 2000,
in a Rule 23 order. People v. English, No. 3-96-0767 (2000)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	Defendant's jury trial commenced on June 17, 1996. In
opening statements, the State told the jury that Jami "was beaten
and asphyxiated on October 10th of 1995, and prior to that, Jami
had been abused, specifically on October 7th of 1995." The State
also told the jury:
		"In the last few hours of Jami's death, only two adult
people had contact with Jami: The defendant and her
boyfriend, Scott English. In this case, the State is going to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jami's mother, the
defendant, either murdered Jami herself or allowed her
boyfriend, Scott English, to murder Jami by giving him
access and control over Jami when she knew or should
have known of his abusive nature and his danger to Jami."
	This mens rea standard-knew or should have known-was
repeated numerous times throughout the State's opening
statement. Defense counsel also referred to this standard, stating
in opening argument:
			"So you are going to hear people, a lot of people, get on
the stand and say that Tabitha apparently was a terrible
mother, but a terrible mother doesn't go to prison for
killing her child. You have to specifically find that she
knew or should have known-and I mean a very strong
should have known-that Scott English had done anything
prior to Jami Sue's death to lead her to believe that he was
going to do it at the time that he did."
	During trial, both the State and the defense produced several
witnesses. The majority of the evidence focused on the events
surrounding Jami's death and prior incidents of Scott's
mistreatment of defendant's children, which, the State argued,
should have placed defendant on notice that Scott was a danger to
the children. However, that evidence was countered by the
testimony of several witnesses, including defendant's mother and
sister, as well as Scott's mother and father, who testified that,
despite being aware of some bruises on Jami, they never suspected
that Scott had been mistreating defendant's children. Every
witness stated that, prior to October 11, 1995, they believed that
Jami's bruises, none of which were life-threatening, had been the
result of accidental injuries.
	Over defense counsel's objection, the State presented
evidence that defendant had neglected her children and that they
were often dirty and disheveled. There was testimony from one
witness that defendant, on one occasion in 1994, slapped Jami on
the head. Also, a nurse practitioner from the Family Medical
Clinic in Galva testified that she filed a report against defendant
with DCFS in August 1994. The nurse practitioner testified that,
when defendant brought Jami in for a vaccination, she noticed that
Jami had a red, swollen area around her right eye. Defendant
explained that this was a bug bite, but the nurse was skeptical. The
nurse also noted a bruise on Jami's left ear, which defendant said
was caused by a fall against a chair. There was also a bruise on
Jami's forearm, which the nurse believed looked like a
"thumbprint" mark, but defendant said was a bee sting. Later, a
DCFS representative testified that, as a result of this report,
defendant was "indicated" for environmental neglect, medical
neglect (failure to follow the recommended vaccination schedule),
and risk of harm due to cuts and bruises. The report made by the
nurse practitioner was defendant's only indicated report and no
further action was taken. The sum of the evidence established that
defendant, though neglectful, was not known to be physically
abusive to her children.
	Dr. McCaw testified that, after Jami's death, he was asked by
DCFS to examine Preston and David to determine whether they
showed signs of abuse. Though both had minor bruises, Dr.
McCaw testified, he did not feel that the bruises were indicative of
abuse.
	In closing argument, the State advised the jury that
accountability may be shown by evidence of a common criminal
design, which the prosecutor defined as "evidence that a
defendant, a parent, knew or should have known about a danger
from another person, a boyfriend, and continues to allow that
boyfriend access to the child knowing of that danger." The State
further argued:
			"It's clear and it's beyond a reasonable doubt in this
case that she knew or should have known what was going
on here. And that's important: Knew or should have
known. And you can use your common sense and
experience in life when you look at everything here. She
should have known. She should have done something.
Because any loving, reasonable, caring parent would have
seen it; they would have done something about it.
			But not Tabitha Pollock. All she did was continue to
allow Scott English to have control over Jami. She
continued to give him access and allowed him in the end
to do what he ultimately did. And for that, she's as guilty
as Scott English of murder and aggravated battery of a
child. Because for [sic] without Tabitha Pollock, Scott
English could not have carried out this murder. Without
Tabitha Pollock, Jami Sue Pollock would have never been
at 720 Pleasant Street, and she would have never been
murdered.
			And the law in the area of accountability has expanded
over the years to include just this type of situation. And
it's clear that a parent who does not protect that child
from a known danger, or when they should have known
about the danger and continue to allow access to that child
by this danger, this person that's a danger, that makes her
accountable for everything that happened."
		After hearing all of the evidence, the jurors were
instructed on the law. In addition to the Illinois Pattern Instruction
(IPI) on accountability, three non-IPI instructions (Nos. 10, 11, and
13) were given over defendant's objection. Instruction No. 10
provided:
			"A parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the
parent knows or should have known about a danger to the
child and the parent has the physical ability to protect the
child.
			Criminal conduct may arise not only by overt acts, but
by an omission to act where there is a legal duty to do so."
Instruction No. 11 provided:
			"Actual presence at the commission of the crime is not
a requirement of accountability."
Instruction No. 13 provided:
			"For accountability, intent to promote or facilitate crime
may be shown by evidence that the defendant shared a
criminal intent of the principal or by evidence that there
was a common criminal design."
	After four hours of deliberation, the jury found defendant
guilty as charged of first degree (felony) murder and aggravated
battery of a child. The trial court sentenced defendant to 36 years'
imprisonment on the murder conviction, stating, "[T]he finding of
guilty was based not upon her own direct action, but upon her
failure to act to protect her child from the actions of her live-in
boyfriend."
	Defendant's conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal
by the appellate court. 309 Ill. App. 3d 400. This court then
granted her petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS
	The first issue raised by defendant in the appeal before this
court is whether the jury was properly instructed. Defendant
argues that because her convictions for felony murder (predicated
on aggravated battery of a child) and aggravated battery of a child
were premised on a theory of accountability, an essential element
of the charged offenses is the mens rea requirement for
accountability. Aggravated battery of a child is an offense which
requires a knowing or intentional state of mind (720 ILCS
5/12-4.3 (West 2000)), and "[a]ccountability, tied as it is to the
crime charged, must comport with the requirements of that crime"
(People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234 (1992)). Thus, defendant
argues that in order for her to be held accountable for the predicate
felony-aggravated battery-the jury was required to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that she possessed a knowing or intentional state
of mind. Defendant contends, however, that one of the nonpattern
jury instructions given to the jury (Instruction No. 10), and the
prosecutor's argument based on this instruction, misstated the
mens rea requirement and told the jury that defendant could be
held accountable for aggravated battery of a child based on a
negligent state of mind, that is, the jury was told that defendant
could be accountable if she did not know, but "should have
known," that Scott had abused Jami in the past.
	Defendant also argues that, based on the evidence presented
at trial, no properly instructed jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that she was accountable for the aggravated battery of her
daughter, which formed the underlying basis for her felony-murder
conviction. In a supplemental brief, defendant further argues that,
in light of this court's recent opinion in People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001), aggravated battery can never serve as the predicate
felony for a charge of felony murder and, accordingly, her felony-murder conviction cannot stand.
	We first consider defendant's challenge to the propriety of the
jury instructions. Our task is to determine whether the instructions
given to the jury in the case at bar, " 'considered as a whole, fully
and fairly announce the law applicable to the respective theories
of the People and the defense.' " People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508,
516 (1984), quoting People v. Kolep, 29 Ill. 2d 116, 125 (1963).
	It is undisputed in the present appeal that defendant was
convicted of aggravated battery of a child and felony murder based
on an accountability theory. Accountability is not a crime in and
of itself but, rather, a mechanism through which a criminal
conviction may result. People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 547
(1998). Section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/5-2(c) (West 2000)) provides that a person may be held
accountable if, "[e]ither before or during the commission of an
offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such
commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such
other person in the planning or commission of the offense."
Accountability for felony murder exists only if the defendant may
be deemed legally responsible for the felony that accompanies the
murder. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 325 (1998).
	 In the case at bar, the court instructed the jury using Illinois
Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 5.03 (3d ed. 1992),
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.03), the standard pattern
instruction on accountability. Similar to section 5-2(c) of the
Code, this instruction provides:
			"A person is legally responsible for the conduct of
another person when, either before or during the
commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote
or facilitate the commission of the offense, he knowingly
solicits, aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the
other person in the planning or commission of the
offense." (Emphasis added.) IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.03.
	Over defendant's objection, however, the court also instructed
the jury using three nonpattern instructions on accountability
tendered by the State. Included among these three nonpattern
instructions was Instruction No. 10, which told the jury that "a
parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent knows or
should know about a danger to the child." Based on this
nonpattern instruction, the State repeatedly argued to the jury that
defendant could be held accountable for the murder of her child if
she should have known that Scott had been physically abusive to
Jami in the past.
	A trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, draft and
give nonpattern instructions. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 412
(2000); see also People v. Swartwout, 311 Ill. App. 3d 250, 264-65
(2000). The decision to instruct a jury using nonpattern
instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People v.
Pinkney, 322 Ill. App. 3d 707, 720 (2000). Whether a court has
abused its discretion will depend on whether the nonpattern
instruction tendered is an accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and
nonargumentative statement of the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a);
People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 536 (1992). As a general rule,
where an appropriate IPI instruction exists on a subject upon
which the trial court has determined the jury should be instructed,
the IPI must be used. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 412; People v. Macri,
185 Ill. 2d 1, 70 (1998). Illinois pattern instructions were
"painstakingly drafted with the use of simple, brief and unslanted
language so as to clearly and concisely state the law," and, for that
reason, "the use of additional instructions on a subject already
covered by IPI would defeat the goal that all instructions be
simple, brief, impartial and free from argument." People v.
Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1980). Thus, while nonpattern
instructions may be given, the instructions, as a whole, must not
be misleading or confusing. People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 254-55 (1993). Moreover, if conflicting instructions are given, one
being a correct statement of law and the other an incorrect
statement of law, the error cannot be deemed harmless. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d  at 254; People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1980). This
is because a jury instructed with contradictory instructions is not
given proper guidance and, thus, cannot perform its constitutional
function. People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 67 (1977).
	In the case at bar, the State argues that the jury was properly
instructed. Conceding, as it must, that accountability requires an
intentional or knowing mental state of mind or mens rea, the State
contends that the jury was correctly instructed on this matter when
the trial court, using IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.03, the standard pattern
instruction on accountability, told the jury that defendant, to be
accountable, had to knowingly solicit, aid, abet, agree to aid, or
attempt to aid the principal in the commission of the offense.
Nonetheless, the State contends that it was necessary to further
instruct the jury on a related matter not covered by the pattern
instructions-a parent's legal duty to her child. Relying solely on
this court's opinion in People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218 (1992),
the State contends that Instruction No. 10, which formed the basis
for much of its argument to the jury, is an accurate definition of "a
parent's legal duty to protect her child from harm" and "has
absolutely nothing to do with the mental state" required for
holding a parent accountable for murder. We find the State's
reliance on Stanciel to be misplaced.
	In Stanciel, this court addressed the consolidated appeals of
two mothers (Violetta Burgos and Barbara Peters) who, like
defendant in the present case, were each held accountable for her
child's murder by a live-in boyfriend. The defendant-mothers each
argued that she could not be held accountable for the murder of
her child unless it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she
aided and abetted the commission of an offense with the
concurrent specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission
of that offense. Addressing this argument, we held in Stanciel that,
to sustain a conviction for murder on an accountability theory, it
was sufficient to show that a defendant had the general intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, i.e., "that the
defendants voluntarily and willfully committed an act, the natural
tendency of which is to destroy another's life." Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 
at 234. Explaining further, we held that the "intent to promote or
facilitate a crime" requirement for accountability could be shown
by evidence that a defendant "shared the criminal intent of the
principal" or by evidence that there was a "common criminal
design." Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 234-35. Applying this rule to the
facts presented, we decided that there was sufficient evidence that
each defendant-mother intended to promote or facilitate the
criminal offense that led to her child's death. We held that the
mothers' knowledge that their children were the victims of an on-going pattern of abuse, in conjunction with the mothers' continued
sanctioned exposure of the children to this abuse, was sufficient to
support the inference that the defendant-mothers shared the
principal's criminal intent or that there had been a common
criminal design.
	After determining in Stanciel that the "intent to promote or
facilitate" element of accountability had been satisfied, we
addressed the second argument advanced by the defendant-mothers-that they could not be held accountable for the murders
of their children where there was no evidence that the mothers had
voluntarily or knowingly committed any act which would have
demonstrated that the mothers aided or abetted the criminal
offenses which led to their children's deaths. In rejecting this
argument, we recognized that parents have a common law duty to
protect their children from known threats, such that, under certain
conditions, the omission to act will give rise to criminal liability.
In the cases under consideration in Stanciel, it was determined that
the mothers could be found legally responsible for the murders of
their children based on their failure to protect their children from
what they knew was serious on-going abuse. We held: "[T]he aid
rendered may be found in [the mother's] act of placing [the child]
in the control of the principal, a known abuser." Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 237. In response to the mothers' expressed concern that the
recognition of such a duty would "result in the prosecution of
parents for crimes committed upon their children solely by virtue
of the common law duty to protect and care for them," we held:
		"Defendant's argument ignores the point that intent is still
a requirement, and that guilt must still be proven through
the knowledge and sanction of a danger." Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 238.
	The State, however, points to additional language in Stanciel
which, it claims, supports the premise that parental duty
encompasses what the parent knew or should have known. Thus,
the State contends that Instruction No. 10 and its argument to the
jury were accurate statements of the law with regard to parental
duty. We disagree.
	The language from Stanciel, relied upon by the State, is as
follows:
		"Although both Peters and Burgos argue they did not aid
the principals in the pattern of abuse which resulted in the
death of the children, the evidence presented against both
defendants is sufficient to provide the inference that they
both either knew or should have known of the serious
nature of the injuries which the victims were sustaining."
(Emphasis added.) Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 236-37.
	It is a misconstruction of Stanciel for the State to claim that
a parent's legal duty to protect her child may be imposed if she
does not know, but should know, of a danger to her child. It is
axiomatic that there can be no breach of the duty to act unless
there is knowledge of the need for action. The term "knew or
should have known" was used in Stanciel in reference to the
mother's awareness of the severity of the injuries being sustained,
not the mother's awareness of the existence of abuse.
	Rather than diluting the knowing or intentional mens rea
requirement for accountability, Stanciel, instead, stands for the
proposition that when proof that a parent aided and abetted an
offense is to be deduced from an omission to act, the parent must
know of a serious and immediate threat to the welfare of the child.
That is, there must be evidence from which it can be inferred that
the parent knew that the child was sustaining injury and, based on
the severity of the injuries being sustained, knew that there was a
substantial risk that death or great bodily would result if the parent
did not act to protect the child.
	In sum, we conclude that a parent may not sit idly by while
another person abuses her child. Parents are required to intercede
on their child's behalf and, if they fail to act, they risk being held
responsible for the other person's criminal conduct. By failing to
act, the parent may be deemed to have implicitly sanctioned the
criminal behavior and, therefore, may be held accountable for the
abusive conduct. Even in situations where the parent is not present
at the time when the abuse resulting in death takes place, the
parent may be held accountable for the criminal conduct resulting
in death, if it is proved that the parent knew that the child had been
abused by the principal in the past and, because of the nature of
previous injuries sustained by the child, also knew there was a
substantial risk of serious harm, yet took no action to protect the
child from future injury by the abuser.
	In the case at bar, the law of accountability was misstated,
both in Instruction No. 10 and when the prosecutor repeatedly told
the jury throughout the trial that defendant could be held
accountable for the offenses charged if she did not know, but
should have known, that Scott was abusing Jami. It is clear that the
jury was not held to the task of finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for felony murder
predicated on aggravated battery of a child. Because defendant's
conviction was premised upon the State's theory that defendant
was accountable for the actions of Scott English, accountability
was a fundamental element of the offense charged and the error in
instruction cannot be deemed harmless. Moreover, in light of the
prosecutor's high degree of emphasis on the "should have known"
standard, the fact that the jury was also instructed using the IPI
standard instruction on accountability does not alter our opinion
that reversal is required.
	Having decided to reverse defendant's conviction for
aggravated battery of a child and, thus, the conviction for felony
murder predicated on that felony, we address defendant's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether
remand would subject defendant to double jeopardy. See People
v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 134 (1997); People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 201 (1988). Defendant argues that the evidence, viewed
with a correct understanding of the law of accountability, is
insufficient to support her conviction for felony murder predicated
on aggravated battery. In other words, defendant argues that the
evidence presented at trial did not, and could not, establish that she
knew Scott was abusing Jami and, accordingly, she did not possess
the requisite intent to be held accountable for Scott's conduct
which resulted in Jami's death.
	A criminal conviction will not be set aside on grounds of
insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or
unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353 (2001).
The standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is well settled. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal, the relevant inquiry is
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); People v.
Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 430-31 (2000); People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 231-32 (1997). The same standard of review applies when
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in all criminal cases,
regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d  at 431; People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24,
43 (1997); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515 (1996).
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction
where it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements
of the crime charged. See People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420,
444 (1995).
	As our discussion of Stanciel makes clear, a parent may be
criminally accountable for the murder of her child if there is
evidence to support the inference that the parent aided and abetted
the commission of the offense, either by acts of commission or
omission, while having the concurrent intent to promote or
facilitate the offense. The necessary intent element may be shown
by evidence that the parent knew that her child was the victim of
an on-going pattern of physical abuse and, while having that
knowledge, continued to sanction the abuser's control over the
child. Although a defendant's presence during the commission of
the offense is not required to prove accountability (Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 237; 720 ILCS 5/5-2 (West 2000)), absence is a factor to
be considered when deciding whether the defendant possessed the
requisite intent.
	It is clear from the record that, in the case at bar, defendant
was not present when the aggravated battery leading to Jami's
death took place. According to the forensic pathologist, Jami died
as a result of a massive blow to the head, which caused edema or
swelling of the brain, and from asphyxiation. The pathologist
believed the blow to Jami's head occurred shortly before Jami's
death. This is consistent with Scott's admission that he discovered
Jami's lifeless body at about 4:30 a.m. on October 10, 1995, about
an hour after he struck Jami near the base of the skull because he
found Jami "wriggling" around and getting tangled in her blankets.
According to Scott's statement, defendant was not in the room
when Scott struck Jami and defendant knew nothing of Scott's
conduct until after he confessed to police two days later. The trial
judge, who had the benefit of hearing all of the evidence presented
at trial, when ruling on a post-trial motion, said, "I think the Court
would have to resort to speculation, almost total speculation, to
consider this a murder by the defendant as the principal[;] *** she
did not commit the act of killing, nor did she intend to kill the
child, nor was she present in the room when her boyfriend killed
the child." Certainly, then, there is no proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant aided in the commission of the felony or that
she was present at the time it was committed.
	Having concluded that there is no evidence to support a
finding that defendant was present when the aggravated battery
took place, the intent element necessary to establish defendant's
accountability for murder must be founded on evidence that
defendant knew that the principal (Scott) was abusing her child;
that defendant knew, from the extent and severity of the injuries
sustained by Jami, that there was a substantial risk of serious harm
if defendant did nothing to protect her child from the principal
(Scott); and, despite this knowledge, continued to permit the
principal (Scott) to have access and control over Jami.
	In its rebuttal closing argument, the State summarized the
evidence which it believed supported defendant's knowledge of
abuse, and thus, her conviction by accountability: (1) that in July
1995, Preston had some small scrape marks on his neck, which
Preston said were caused by Scott choking him and holding him
under water; (2) that Scott, on some unspecified occasion,
allegedly kicked Preston in the genital area; (3) that Jami, on an
unspecified occasion, had an unexplained line of bruises that went
around her head like a headband; (4) that Jami once said Scott
tried to choke her; (5) that Jami's grandmother saw a tiny circular
bruise on Jami's foot, which Jami said Scott caused by holding her
too tight; (6) that Jami fell down the stairs; (7) that Scott admitted
that, on October 7, he grabbed Jami by the neck and "elbowed" her
when she stepped on David in the bathtub; and (8) that on October
7 Jami received stitches to her head after falling in the bathroom.
	Viewing these incidents, both individually and collectively,
we find insufficient evidence to support the inference that, prior to
Jami's death, defendant knew Scott was abusing her children or
that defendant sanctioned the abuse of her children by Scott. First,
there was no evidence that abuse by Scott was the cause of the
bruises on Jami's head which were described as a "headband." Nor
was there any evidence that Scott was in any way responsible for
either of the falls Jami had. Scott's father testified at defendant's
trial that he heard a noise and, upon investigation, found Jami at
the foot of the stairs. Scott's father also testified, however, that he
heard an upstairs door open and then saw Scott come to the top of
the stairs to see what had happened. The fall, therefore, was simply
a fall. It was not evidence of Jami's abuse by Scott.
	The same is true of the fall that resulted in Jami's receiving
stitches. Scott adamantly maintained, even after admitting to
causing Jami's death, that Jami had fallen off a cookie tin while
trying to brush her teeth. There was no evidence presented by the
State to show otherwise. Dr. Parungao, who treated Jami for the
injury, did not suspect that the injury was the result of abuse,
rather than a fall, as reported. The State implies that, because Scott
was caring for Jami when the falls occurred, they were evidence
of his abuse. But to draw such a conclusion, one must resort to
conjecture and speculation. Moreover, even if the falls were a
result of Scott's abuse, defendant's awareness of that fact was not
established.
	The other injuries to defendant's children, cited by the State,
did not establish that Scott was engaging in an on-going pattern of
abuse against defendant's children. Nor did the evidence establish
that at any time defendant was a witness to Scott's abusing her
children. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
State, the few isolated incidents of injury to defendant's children 
that were linked to Scott's conduct suggest, with the benefit of
hindsight, that Scott abused defendant's children. But whenever
defendant discovered bruises on her children, she always
questioned Scott and received what, at the time, appeared to be
plausible explanations for the injuries. Moreover, the injuries
sustained by defendant's children were never so extensive or
severe that defendant was put on notice that Scott posed a serious
threat to her children. This was confirmed by the pathologist, who
testified that all of Jami's bruises which were not the result of
injuries received in the minutes or hours prior to Jami's death,
were not life threatening and could have been attributable to
childhood injury. We also find it significant that, after Jami's
death, defendant's other two children were examined by a doctor
and, despite the fact that both children had some bruises, the
doctor did not believe that the children showed signs of abuse.
	The circumstances surrounding Jami's death do not suggest
that defendant was aware of any foul play. In the early morning
hours of October 10, 1995, when Scott discovered that Jami was
not breathing, defendant immediately sought medical assistance
and began CPR. Even after the paramedics arrived, defendant
continued to work frantically to resuscitate Jami. By all accounts,
defendant was anxious and concerned while efforts were being
made at the hospital to revive Jami. When defendant was told that
Jami did not survive, she was distraught and unconsolable. There
was no indication that defendant suspected that Jami's death had
been due to other than natural causes. Lieutenant Huber testified
that when defendant was questioned by police on October 12,
1995, defendant maintained that no one in the English household
had ever mistreated her children and, when told that Jami's death
had been caused by Scott, defendant appeared genuinely shocked
and unable to comprehend what was being told her. Once
defendant learned of Scott's complicity for the murder of her
child, she cut off all ties with him and did everything in her power
to assist the police in his prosecution.
	Although each case must be evaluated on the basis of its own
evidence, we note that the facts of the cases in Stanciel stand in
stark contrast to the facts of the case at bar. In Stanciel, one of the
mothers, Violette Burgos, had been warned by DCFS to sever all
ties with her paramour because of his previous physical abuse of
her child. Burgos, however, not only renewed contact with her
paramour, she allowed this known abuser to act as the child's
disciplinarian. According to both Burgos and her paramour, on the
day Burgos' three-year-old daughter died, the paramour
"disciplined" the child for urinating on the floor by spanking her
until her buttocks were raw. Later that same day, when the child
threw up, the paramour punched the child in the stomach and bit
her. When the child lost consciousness, Burgos did not seek
medical assistance but, rather, carried the child's limp body to
Burgos' separate apartment, which she kept to conceal her
relationship with the paramour from DCFS. Only when Burgos'
attempts to revive the child failed did she call the paramedics.
Forensics showed that Burgos had inflicted some of the
approximately 21 bite marks found on the child. Furthermore, the
autopsy revealed that the blunt force trauma which resulted in the
child's death had caused "a ruptured viscus and intestines, as well
as injuries to her bowel and liver." There were numerous old
bruises and scars, as well as evidence of sexual abuse and a
scalding burn on the child's leg. When questioned by police about
her child's death, Burgos initially covered up the fact that she had
renewed her relationship with her paramour and attributed the fatal
injuries to a fall.
	In the second case discussed in Stanciel, Peters' 20-month-old
son died as a result of bilateral subdural hematomas from blunt
trauma. There was evidence that, when the child was less than 18
months old, the child had bruises covering his entire buttocks. In
the months that followed, the child sustained bruises on his face,
a split lip, and welts across his back. Each time the injuries were
attributed to "falls." On one occasion, the child had a "raw and
pussy" burn on his leg, which Peters said was caused by the
child's clothes rubbing against his skin. On another occasion the
child was burned when the paramour "accidentally" spilled hot tea
on the child. Although there was evidence that this burn went
"from the top of his scalp down his neck and one shoulder," the
child was not taken to the hospital, apparently for fear that the
paramour would be arrested for abuse. On the day that Peters'
child died, a nurse at the hospital overheard Peters tell her
paramour, "I told you not to get so angry, I told you not to get so
angry, I told you this would happen." The child's autopsy revealed
that "based upon the autopsy, the constellation of injuries, the
varying ages of the injuries, and [the child's] pediatrician's
records, [the child's] physical condition at the time of autopsy was
'the direct result of on-going abuse.' " Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 228.
Further, when questioned by police, Peters indicated that she
thought her paramour was responsible for her child's death, that
she had not really wanted the boy, and she did not really care what
happened to him.
	In concluding that the facts of these cases supported the
inference that the defendant-mothers shared the principals' intent,
we held that the defendant-mothers' knowledge of injuries to the
children, which were both extensive and severe, indicated that the
mothers had knowledge of the on-going abuse of their children
and this knowledge, coupled with the mothers' continued,
sanctioned exposure of the children to this abuse, was sufficient to
hold the defendant-mothers accountable for the murder of their
children. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d  at 232. In other words, a reasonable
inference to be drawn from the facts of these cases was that the
mothers shared the intent of the principals.
	In the case at bar, the evidence does not establish that
defendant intended to promote or facilitate the aggravated battery
which caused Jami's death. The evidence simply does not support
the inference that Jami was the victim of an on-going pattern of
abuse that the mother knew about and sanctioned. After reviewing
all of the evidence presented at defendant's trial in this case, we
are convinced that no rational jury, given proper guidance
regarding the law of accountability, could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant is accountable for the murder of
her daughter, Jami.
	Because we find there is insufficient evidence to support
defendant's conviction for aggravated battery, we need not
consider the argument raised in defendant's supplemental brief,
that a conviction for aggravated battery can never support a felony-murder conviction.
CONCLUSION
	For these reasons stated, we reverse defendant's
convictions without remand.
Reversed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I agree with the majority that the law of accountability was
misstated so that defendant's convictions for aggravated battery of
a child and for felony murder based upon a theory of
accountability must be reversed. I write separately, however,
because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that, viewing the
evidence under a proper theory of accountability, the evidence at
defendant's trial was not sufficient to support defendant's
convictions.
	A criminal conviction should not be set aside unless the
evidence is so improbable, unreasonable or unsatisfactory as to
justify a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt. People
v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353 (2001). A reviewing court should
not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact with regard
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.
People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000). Although the
evidence in this case certainly was closely balanced, the evidence
was not so improbable, unreasonable or unsatisfactory that no
rational jury could convict defendant.
	As the majority notes, in order to hold defendant accountable
for Scott English's conduct, the evidence must show that
defendant knew that Scott was abusing Jami, that there was a
substantial risk of serious harm if defendant did nothing to protect
Jami from Scott, and despite this knowledge, that defendant
continued to permit Scott to have access and control over Jami. I
believe there is evidence to support such a conclusion.
	The evidence at trial included testimony that there were more
than 100 bruises in various stages of healing on Jami's body, the
oldest of which were at least one week old. There were 13 distinct
hemorrhagic injuries to Jami's skull, eight of which were three to
four days old. The defendant's mother, her sister, a friend and a
baby-sitter testified that they had observed bruises on defendant's
children only after defendant moved in with Scott. With regard to
the incident where Preston claimed that Scott had choked him and
held him under water, defendant's sister, Sue Ostrowski, testified
that Preston had marks on his neck that looked like finger marks.
Sue recalled that defendant brought Preston to her mother's house
to show her the injury and to ask her mother's opinion about how
Preston could have sustained such an injury. In addition, defendant
once brought Jami to Sue's house to ask Sue's opinion of how
Jami could have sustained an injury to her ear and neck. Scott had
told defendant that those injuries were sustained when Jami fell
down the stairs. Sue, however, told defendant that Jami's injuries
did not appear to be of the type that would result from falling
down the stairs.
	Defendant's mother, Sandra Pollock, also testified at trial that
Preston told defendant that Scott had choked him and held him
under water. On another occasion, Jami told Sandra that Scott had
caused an injury to her foot when he held her foot very tight.
When Sandra told defendant about the injury to Jami's foot,
defendant told Sandra that Jami was making up the story. With
regard to the injuries that Jami allegedly sustained in a fall down
the stairs, Sandra did not believe that the injuries were the result
of a fall. When Sandra confronted defendant about those injuries,
defendant told Sandra that Scott's parents had confirmed the story
about a fall.
	Leslie Huber testified at trial that she baby-sat for defendant's
children. Leslie testified that a few weeks before the murder, Jami
told her mother in Leslie's presence that Scott had choked her.
When Leslie asked defendant if she heard Jami, defendant told
Leslie that Jami could be making up the choking story. Five days
before Jami's death, Leslie saw bruises on Jami's head running
across her hairline and saw a red, knotted mark on Jami's
forehead. Defendant asked Leslie's mother, Sue Huber, to look at
the marks on Jami's head. Defendant told Sue she did not know
what had caused those marks.
	Sherry Ranos, a criminal investigator with the Illinois State
Police, testified that she had interviewed defendant after Jami's
death. With regard to the incident where Scott told defendant that
Jami had fallen down the stairs, defendant told Ranos that she did
not believe the marks on Jami's body were the result of falling
down the stairs. Defendant also told Ranos that three days before
Jami's death, Jami had three separate "accidents" in one day: (1)
the incident where Scott "accidentally" grabbed Jami by the neck;
(2) the incident where Scott "accidentally" pushed Jami in the
bathtub, causing her to fall backward and hit her head: and (3) the
incident where Jami fell in the bathroom and required stitches to
her head. Defendant also revealed that Jami told defendant that
Scott was mean.
	In addition to the foregoing evidence, portions of defendant's
grand jury testimony were read into evidence at trial. Defendant
had testified before the grand jury that she did not believe Scott's
story concerning how Preston had received his neck injuries, so
she brought Preston to her mother for a second opinion. While she
was at her mother's home, defendant learned from Preston that
Scott had choked him and tried to drown him. Defendant also
testified that after Jami allegedly fell down the stairs, defendant
asked her mother and her sister their opinion concerning the
accident. Defendant's sister told defendant that the injuries looked
"kind of funny" for falling down the stairs. At trial, defendant
acknowledged that Jami's injuries occurred only when defendant
was away from the home.
	I believe the foregoing evidence is sufficient to create a
question for the trier of fact as to whether defendant knew Scott
was abusing Jami. The injuries to defendant's children first
occurred after defendant moved in with Scott. In addition, Jami
and Preston told defendant that Scott had choked them. Although
defendant testified that Scott had explanations for all of the
injuries to her children, defendant nonetheless was suspicious
enough that she asked her mother, her sister, and Sue Huber for
their opinions concerning the various injuries. Based upon this
evidence, I believe a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, given
the closeness of the evidence, a determination concerning
defendant's guilt under the proper theory of accountability is better
left to the trier of fact. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's
finding that this case need not be remanded for a new trial.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this partial concurrence and
partial dissent.
1.      1In the appellate court, defendant contested the constitutionality of
the Truth In Sentencing Law enacted by Public Act 89-404. Based on
this court's holding in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), the
appellate court ruled that the law was unconstitutional and that
defendant was entitled to receive credit for good conduct. That ruling
is not a part of this appeal.

2.      2Much of what defendant told police during this interview was
admitted into evidence at defendant's trial through the testimony of
Lieutenant Rod Huber, through defendant's grand jury testimony
(portions of which were read to the jury), and through defendant's trial
testimony.