Title: LEE W. SANNING V. JAMISON PIKE SANNING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEE W. SANNING V. JAMISON PIKE SANNING2010 WY 78Case Number: S-09-0202Decided: 06/15/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
LEE 
W. SANNING,Appellant(Defendant),v.JAMISON PIKE 
SANNING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C.M. 
Aron of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Devon 
P. O'Connell of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      The district 
court awarded a cabin to Jamison Sanning (Wife) as part of the property 
distribution incorporated into the parties' divorce decree.  Lee Sanning (Husband) claims the 
district court abused its discretion by relying upon sentimental value to award 
the cabin to Wife and the court's factual findings regarding the cabin were not 
supported by the trial evidence.

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion and 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Husband presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.    
Whether 
a divorcing spouse's claimed "sentimental value" in joint marital property 
permits the disproportionate division of marital assets.

 
 

2.    
Whether 
a trial court abuses its discretion when its findings on division of property in 
a divorce are not supported by the evidence.

 
 
Wife 
maintains that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the 
marital assets.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Wife's 
grandparents owned a cabin which is located on state land adjacent to Priest 
Lake in Idaho.  The grandparents had 
purchased the cabin in the 1950s, and Wife spent many summers there while 
growing up.    

 
 
[¶5]      After they were 
married, Husband and Wife spent time at the cabin.  The grandparents, who were in their 
eighties, decided that they would dispose of the cabin because it had become too 
expensive and difficult to maintain.  
They considered giving it to family members, but were worried about the 
burden of owning the cabin, so they offered it for sale.  Husband and Wife decided they would like 
the cabin, and they purchased it in 2002 for $50,000.    

 
 
[¶6]      Wife filed for 
divorce on March 5, 2008.  The 
parties were able to agree on custody of their young daughter, but could not 
agree on the distribution of the marital property.  The primary item in dispute was the 
Idaho cabin.  Evidence presented at 
trial established that Husband's family had gifted the parties the $50,000 used 
to purchase the property.  The 
evidence also indicated that Husband was fond of the cabin, had done a great 
deal of work on it and had the ability to maintain it.  Wife testified that the cabin held many 
memories for her and her family, she had paid the lease and other expenses 
associated with the cabin after the parties separated, and she could maintain it 
with her family's help.    

 
 

[¶7]      The district 
court's property distribution, explained in its decision letter, awarded the 
cabin to Wife, but required her to reimburse Husband for the purchase 
price.  After 
the district court entered the divorce decree, Husband appealed.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court has broad discretion to divide marital property in a divorce.  Root v. Root, 2003 WY 36, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 41, 44 (Wyo. 2003).  See also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 
(LexisNexis 2009).  We review the district court's 
disposition of marital property using the abuse of discretion standard.  Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 
72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).  "An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience 
of this court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people 
cannot abide it."  Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 1228, 1230 (Wyo. 2002).  In 
determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we consider only 
the evidence of the successful party and grant to that party every favorable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.  Sweat, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d  at 278.  See also, Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, ¶ 4, 81 P.3d 937, 938 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court's decision letter explained its 
rationale for awarding the cabin to Wife, as 
follows:

 
 
            
Turning attention to the item of greatest dispute in this divorce 
proceeding, the Court addresses the Priest Lake, Idaho cabin, which has been in 
[Wife's] family for generations.  
The evidence revealed that this cabin has deep roots in [Wife's] 
family.  [Wife's] childhood and her 
family history are replete with cherished memories of Priest Lake.  By all accounts, it is a place 
impossible not to love.  On the 
downside, the cabin is aging, having been built in the 1930's, and requires 
considerable yearly maintenance.  
Additionally, the lease rates continue to increase, making the cabin an 
expensive family heirloom.  Even so, 
not a single member of [Wife's] family would part with it.  While [Wife's] grandparents found 
themselves in distress years ago when they were no longer physically able to 
care for the property and none of their grandchildren could afford to care for 
it, the fact remains that this cabin is the heart and soul of the family.  That [Wife's] family sold the cabin to 
[Husband and Wife] for a significantly reduced rate is telling of their intent 
to keep the cabin "in the family."  
However, the Court also is mindful that [Husband and Wife] used funds 
gifted from [Husband's] family to fund the purchase of the cabin.  

            

The 
Wyoming Supreme Court . . . addressed a somewhat comparable situation in Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 88 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2004) (and cases cited therein), where the Court addressed 
considerable ranch property that was partially inherited and partially purchased 
by the husband.  Although the wife 
had an interest in the ranch, such was done in consideration of a continuing 
marriage.  The same can be said 
here, where, at the time of the sale, one family member raised the issue of 
divorce, which was shrugged off as an impossibility.  Given all of the factors this Court must 
consider, including (but not limited to) the respective merits of the parties; 
the condition in which the parties will be left after the divorce; the party 
through whom the property was acquired; and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of the parties and their child, this Court concludes 
that the Priest Lake cabin should be awarded to [Wife], subject to the return of 
the $50,000.00 purchase price to [Husband] in recognition of his family's 
contribution to the purchase.

            
 

[¶10]   Section 20-2-114 governs property 
disposition in divorce cases:

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. 

 
 
The 
district court has considerable discretion in determining what weight each 
statutory factor merits.  See, e.g., Boyle v. Boyle, 2006 WY 124, ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 368, 371 (Wyo. 2006); Humphrey v. 
Humphrey, 2007 WY 72, ¶ 15, 157 P.3d 451, 454-55 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶11]   Husband claims that the district 
court improperly awarded the cabin to Wife based upon an improper 
factorsentimental value.1  He argues that Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 
1985) prohibits consideration of sentimental value in awarding property.  However, his interpretation of the 
holding in Broyles is incorrect.  The discussion of sentimental value in 
that case was in the context of calculating damages for the wife's improper 
retention of property awarded to husband in the divorce decree.  We ruled that the damages for conversion 
of personal property are calculated using the fair market value of the 
property.  "Generally, a claimant 
may not recover for the sentimental or fanciful value placed 
on lost property such as 
photographs, portraits and heirlooms."  Id. at 1124.  Although Broyles states that sentimental value 
may not typically be used to establish damages for property wrongfully 
converted, it does not state that sentimental value cannot be considered in 
awarding property in a divorce case. 

 
 
[¶12]   Section 20-2-114 does not mention 
sentimental value as a factor that may be considered in making disposition of 
property.  However, it does state 
that the district court may consider a variety of factors, including the "party 
through whom the property was acquired."  
Id.  That factor may, by definition, 
incorporate the concept of sentimental value.   

 
 
[¶13]   As the district court correctly 
noted, Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 
88 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2004) bears consideration in this case.  In Wallop, we reviewed a property 
distribution that included awarding the husband a ranch that had belonged to his 
family for many years.  The evidence 
established that husband had inherited part of the ranch and then purchased his 
sisters' interests.  Id., ¶ 17, 88 P.3d  at 1028-29.  We concluded that the district court 
properly applied the statutory factors when it awarded the ranch property to the 
husband.  Id., ¶¶ 26, 32, 88 P.3d  at 1030, 
1032.  

 
 
[¶14]   Similarly, it is clear in this case that the 
district court considered the statutory factors when it awarded the cabin to 
Wife.  The evidence established that 
the cabin had been acquired through Wife's family, as it had belonged to her 
family for many years and Husband and Wife purchased it from her grandparents 
for $50,000.  Although the district 
court made no express finding on the value of the cabin at the time the parties 
purchased it, everyone agreed that the price was well below market value.  The parties stipulated that the value of 
the cabin at the time of the divorce was $350,000.  Thus, it was clear that Wife's 
grandparents provided a significant gift to the parties when they allowed them 
to purchase the cabin at the reduced price.  The district court recognized in its 
property disposition that the $50,000 used to purchase the cabin was a gift from 
Husband's family and required Wife to reimburse Husband in that amount.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
district court considered more than just "sentimental value" in awarding the 
cabin to Wife.  It appropriately 
relied upon the statutory factors, including the party from whom the property 
had been acquired, in making its determination.  

 
 
[¶15]   Husband also asserts that the 
district court's findings about Wife's emotional attachment to the cabin were 
erroneous.  Under our standard of 
review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Wife.  Husband claims that the district court's 
finding that the cabin had "been in 
[Wife's] family for generations" was incorrect.  He asserts that the cabin had 
only been in the family for half a generation.  Regardless of how the finding was 
phrased, it is clear from the record that the property had been in Wife's family 
for over fifty years and had been enjoyed by multiple generations of her 
family.  

 
 
[¶16]   Next, Husband argues that Wife's 
family was not really that attached to the cabin on Priest Lake because some of 
her family members have large cabins on a different lake and the family had 
allowed the grandparents to place the property up for sale.  These circumstances do not necessarily 
mean, as Husband suggests, that the cabin was not important to Wife's 
family.  The fact that, in the end, 
the grandparents sold the cabin to Husband and Wife for a price far below market 
value demonstrates that they wanted the cabin to stay in the family. 

 
 
[¶17]   Husband's testimony confirms that 
the cabin was important to Wife's family.  
He testified:

 
 
            
Q. . . . Mr. Sanning, this cabin, we can agree, is important to the 
[Wife's] family heritage.  You don't 
deny that, do you?

            
A.        
No.

            
Q.        And 
we can agree that [Wife's] family enjoyed many years, grandparents, 
grandchildren, what have you, many years of happy memories up 
there?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        And 
we also can agree that my client's father, his ashes are scattered on the upper 
Priest Lake, correct?

            
A.        
Correct.

            
Q.        And, 
in fact, we also can agree that a family member was married up there, [Wife's 
sister]; is that right?

            
. . . . 

            
A.        At 
Elkins Resort on the lake.  
Yes.

            
Q.        All 
right.  That lake has some pretty 
strong significance to my client and her family; fair to 
say?

            
A.        
Yes.  

 
 
[¶18]   Husband makes a somewhat strange 
argument that the family was not really attached to the cabin, but rather to 
Priest Lake.  He grounds this 
argument on the fact that Wife's father's ashes were scattered on the lake and 
Wife's sister was married at another property on the lake.  This argument is not convincing.  The cabin is situated on the lake and 
provides a place to stay while visiting the lake.  It makes no difference whether the 
family's attachment is to the cabin, to the lake or, more likely, to both; it is 
a distinction without a difference.

 
 
[¶19]   In sum, the district court 
specifically stated that it was considering the statutory factors and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate otherwise.  Under these circumstances, the award of 
the cabin to Wife does not shock our conscience or appear to be so unfair and 
inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it.  See Hall, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d  at 1230.  The district court properly exercised 
its discretion when it awarded the cabin to Wife, on the condition that she 
reimburse Husband for the money gifted by his family to purchase the 
cabin.

 
 
[¶20]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although Husband mentions the fact that the property distribution was 
disproportionate, i.e., he received property valued at $209,947.68 and Wife 
received property valued at $378,808.03, he does not specifically argue that the 
total distribution was unjust and inequitable.