Title: State v. Ambrose A. Harris

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The Supreme Court affirmed Harris' murder conviction and death sentence in 1998. This appeal addresses Harris' request for proportionality review of his death sentence. On the morning of December 17, 1992, twenty-two year old Kristin Huggins drove her red Toyota MR2 from her parents' home in Pennsylvania to the Trenton Club in downtown Trenton to paint a mural. When she did not return home on the 17th, her parents reported her missing. Huggins' car was found by authorities the next day. Her body was eventually recovered in February 1993, two months after she disappeared. Gloria Dunn led police to the location of Huggins' body, claiming to have seen it in a psychic vision. She also made inquiries regarding the reward money that was being offered. Eventually, however, police learned that Dunn was present when Huggins was murdered. Dunn identified Harris as the murderer and provided numerous statements concerning the circumstances surrounding the murder. Some of those statements were inconsistent. At trial, Dunn was the State's chief witness, providing the only direct evidence linking Harris to the crime. Dunn testified that she and Harris met on the morning of December 17, 1992, to carry out their plan of robbing a luncheonette. Harris was on a bicycle, and armed with a .22 caliber revolver. It was raining, and Harris said he would carjack someone to avoid walking in the rain. As they approached the Trenton Club, Huggins drove her red MR2 into the parking lot. Harris said to Dunn, I'm going to get that bitch, and followed Huggins' car to the rear driveway of the Club. Dunn stayed in the front area of the premises. Harris returned, driving the car with Huggins sitting in the front seat. Dunn testified that Harris ordered her into the front seat to sit with Huggins on her lap. Harris drove to a deserted area under the Southard Street Bridge in Trenton. Dunn testified that Harris was concerned about the appearance of two African-Americans driving in a two-passenger sport vehicle with a white female passenger. Harris forced Huggins into the front-trunk of the car, where she was required to lie in a fetal position. He then drove back to the Trenton Club to retrieve his bicycle. Throughout her confinement in the trunk, Huggins pleaded for help. This infuriated Harris, who commented to Dunn that he should have killed Huggins earlier. Harris returned to the area under the Southard Street Bridge. He ordered Huggins out of the trunk and ordered her to take off her clothes. According to Dunn, Huggins was crying and shaking badly. Harris anally raped Huggins, despite her pleas for help. Harris then ordered Huggins back into the trunk and contemplated his next move, eventually deciding to kill Huggins. Harris again ordered Huggins out of the trunk. As Huggins tried to get out, Harris shot her in the back of her head. Harris dragged the body a short distance and hid it under a discarded mattress. He drove to his mother's house to retrieve two shovels. Harris returned to the crime scene, removed the mattress lying on top of Huggins, and shot her point-blank in the face to ensure she was dead. Harris and Dunn then dug a shallow grave and placed Huggins' body in it face down. They covered the body with dirt and threw some additional debris on top. Harris went through Huggins' belongings, taking $30 in cash and her ATM card. Testimony at trial revealed that Harris drove around in Huggins' car the remainder of the day before abandoning it. In addition, a bank ATM security video showed that Harris attempted to withdraw $400 from Huggins' account on December 17th. Experts testified that Huggins died as a result of two gunshot wounds to the head. Prosecution experts opined that Huggins may have lived as long as one hour after the first shot and ten to thirty minutes after the second, noting that an autopsy found dirt in her lungs. A defense expert rebutted that, testifying that Huggins died immediately following the second shot. Harris was arrested ten days after the murder on an unrelated matter. At the time of Harris' arrest, the .22 caliber pistol used during the murder of Huggins was found on Harris. A Mercer County Grand Jury indicted Harris on June 8, 1994, on charges that included murder, felony murder, kidnaping, robbery, and aggravated sexual assault. The Prosecutor served notice of the following aggravating factors in support of a death penalty prosecution against Harris: (1) the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection; and (2) the murder was committed while Harris was engaged in the commission of robbery, kidnaping, and/or aggravated sexual assault. Because of the extensive publicity, Harris requested a change in venue from Mercer County. Ultimately, he was tried before a jury selected from Burlington County. On February 20, 1996, the jury found Harris guilty on all counts. In the penalty phase, the State relied on the evidence submitted during the guilt phase. Harris' defense attorneys submitted 180 mitigating factors concerning Harris' early childhood and the abuse he endured during his childhood. The trial court consolidated all of those factors into one omnibus, catch-all mitigating factor. Three defense experts were offered during the penalty phase, all concluding that Harris was raised in an extremely dysfunctional family environment. Harris' father abused his mother, later abandoning the family. Harris' mother neglected him, and she and her boyfriend physically abused him. At a young age, Harris became involved in violent conduct and sexual activity, and also experimented with drugs. School officials could not control his antisocial behavior. At one point, Harris was diagnosed as mentally retarded and institutionalized in a State mental hospital. Harris accumulated twelve convictions as an adult, spending less than one year out of prison during the period from 1974 to 1992. Harris has not shown any remorse for his actions. Throughout the trial, he acted with contempt toward all involved in the case, including his own attorney. During sentencing on the non-capital offenses, Harris addressed Mr. and Mrs. Huggins and told them they owed him an apology because of the conviction. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the omnibus mitigating factor and sentenced Harris to death. On the non-capital charges, Harris was sentenced to a total of two life terms plus sixty-five years, with an eighty-two-and-one-half year parole disqualifier. The Supreme Court affirmed Harris' convictions and sentences, State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122 (1998), reserving on his request for proportionality review. HELD: Harris' death sentence is not disproportionate. 1. In 1999, the Court determined that proportionality review methodologies were in need of review and reconsideration. It appointed the Honorable David S. Baime as a Special Master to examine the proportionality methodology used by the Court and to make findings and recommendations. His report enabled the Court to reevaluate certain aspects of individual proportionality review. In re Proportionality Review Project, 161 N.J. 71 (1999) (Proportionality Review I). This case is among the first of the proportionality reviews conducted in the wake of Proportionality Review I. As before, there remains a two-part framework for reviewing a death sentence to determine whether it is proportional. The first part is frequency analysis, a statistical measure of the numerical frequency with which similar cases have resulted in sentences of death. The second part is precedent-seeking review, a traditional judicial way of comparing similar cases to determine whether a death sentence is aberrational or the result of impermissible influences. It is a defendant's burden to show that a death sentence is disproportionate. (Pp. 12-14) 2. Different basic categories have been created that differentiate capital murder cases based on statutory aggravating factors. Where the principal salient factor is a sexual assault, the AOC has classified such cases as D category homicides. Harris' case falls into this category. Judge Baime recommended subdividing the D category for purposes of analysis into two subcategories: aggravated killings (D-1) and non-aggravated killings (D-2). Generally, cases that fall within the D-1 aggravated category include murders that involve multiple wounds from a gun, knife, or physical beating; murders that involve mutilation or pain; and murders involving a minor victim. The AOC assigned Harris to the D-2 subcategory, stating that the victim suffered only a single fatal gunshot wound and no other contributing injuries. The Court is not convinced that the assignment of Harris' case to the subcategory of D-2 correctly reflects the degree of particular violence or terror Harris inflicted on Huggins. Harris' case appears to fit more appropriately in the D-1 category, based on evidence that Huggins did not die quickly from a single gunshot wound; that she suffered as a terrorized prisoner of Harris for approximately two hours; that she was brutalized in the sexual assault; and that she likely died sometime after the second gunshot wound to her face. However, both parties here agree that the D category cases should be consolidated. That approach is more compelling because of the Court's view that the D-2 category is inappropriate and because the D-2 category has so few cases. (Pp. 14-19) 3. Under frequency analysis, the Court uses statistical methodology to help determine whether the death penalty sentence in the case before it is disproportionate. The salient-factors test distinguishes cases by the fact that would most likely influence the decision to sentence a defendant to death. The salient-factors test demonstrates that category D cases are considered more deathworthy than most other categories. A greater percentage of these cases are likely to involve prosecutions that seek the death penalty and to have a death sentence imposed than all other death-eligible cases. These percentages do not change significantly in the overall D and D-1 categories when Harris' case is excluded. Therefore, the salient-factors test demonstrates that defendant's death sentence is not disproportionate. (Pp. 19-23) 4. In precedent-seeking review, the first step requires examination of a defendant's criminal culpability. This involves considerations of a defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and defendant's character. Harris is highly blameworthy. Huggins' murder was coldly pre-meditated. She was terrorized for two hours as a prisoner and confined to the cramped, small trunk of her own car. She was allowed out only twice - once to be sodomized and later to be shot. The degree of victimization is therefore also high. Consideration of Harris' character only heightens the Court's view of his criminal culpability. Harris, who was forty-one at the time of the murder, has an extensive prior criminal record, and spent less than a year out of prison during the 20-years preceding the murder. In addition, he has shown no remorse for his actions. Although Harris documented that he suffered from a mental disorder during his childhood, that history is substantially outweighed by other factors that demonstrate a high level of blameworthiness. (Pp. 23-31) 5. Precedent-seeking review requires examination of factually similar cases to determine whether the death sentence is disproportionate in comparison with the culpability levels of those cases. Generally, the Court uses the same comparison group as that used in the salient-factors test. Considering the cases that are factually similar to Harris' case, the imposition of the death sentence on Harris is not disproportionate. The cases in the D category that were not prosecuted capitally, or in which the defendants were not found guilty or not sentenced to death, are distinguishable. The defendants in those cases usually established the mitigating factors of mental disturbance and/or diminished capacity in addition to the catch-all factor found by the jury here. Harris failed to prove any diminished capacity or extreme mental condition affecting him at the time of his crime. This was a premeditated homicide, carefully executed. Harris offered no remorse and never acknowledged any responsibility for his crime. (Pp. 31-56) The death sentence imposed on Harris is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting, is of the view that because of the AOC's assignment of Harris to the D-2 sub-category, in which no other defendant has received the death penalty, Harris' death sentence was influenced by the pre-trial and mid-trial publicity. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN and STEIN join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 43 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AMBROSE A. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ Argued March 14, 2000 -- Decided On proportionality review of a death sentence imposed in the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County. Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender and Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. Certain groups are subdivided by criteria that attempt to distinguish the murder based on circumstances that serve either to aggravate or to mitigate the blameworthiness of the defendants in those cases. Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 328 (quoting State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 33 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995)); see Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 301. In Proportionality Review I, we adhered to the principle of unique assignment in the salient factor review. [T]he principle is that even though a case may contain multiple identifying factors, e.g., killing a public official and robbing or torturing the official, the case is assigned to one category for salient-factor review. Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 89. Where the principal salient factor in a death-eligible murder is a sexual assault, the Administrative Office of the Courts ( AOC ) has classified such cases as D category homicides. Defendant's case falls into that category. Judge Baime has recommended subdividing the D category for purposes of analysis into two categories: aggravated killings (D-1 category) and non-aggravated killings (D-2 category). Proportionality Review I, 161 N.J. at 88. The recommendation was to distinguish sexual assault murders committed with particular violence or terror because juries and prosecutors tended to view such defendants as more deathworthy. Id. at 88. Generally, cases that fall within the D-1 aggravated category include murders that involve multiple wounds from a gun, knife or physical beating, murders that involve mutilation or wounds intended to cause pain, and murders involving a minor victim. Judge Baime emphasized the need for strict guidelines when distinguishing among those cases so as to avoid the inherent subjectivity in defining the subcategories. In furtherance of that objective, the AOC in December 1999 proposed a typology to distinguish between the D-1 and D-2 categories: Category D-1 - Includes cases in which the victim suffers multiple wounds, such as multiple stab wounds, multiple gunshot wounds or multiple blows to the head. Also includes cases in which the victim suffers multiple types of wounds, such as those resulting when the victim is beaten, stabbed, and then strangled or suffocated. Beatings in this category typically result in death, unconsciousness, fractured bones, and/or internal injuries. Also includes cases in which the defendant inflicts pain, rather than death. Examples include, but are not limited to, cases which involve stab wounds to the genital area, cigarette (or similar) burns, injuries to the victim's eyes, injuries caused by biting, or wounds which a Medical Examiner can attest were intended to cause pain. Also includes cases in which the [] victim was under the age of 14, regardless of the victim's injuries or cause of death. Category D-2 - Includes cases in which the victim suffers a single fatal wound, such as a stab wound to the heart, a slit throat, or a gunshot wound to the head. Also includes cases which involve a single cause of death, with no contributing injuries. Beatings in this category typically result only in isolated bruising or minor lacerations, and are generally intended to subdue, rather than harm, the victim. In this matter, the AOC has assigned defendant to the D-2 category stating the victim was not under the age of fourteen when she was killed, and because she suffered only a single fatal wound with no other contributing injuries. When we reviewed Judge Baime's recommendations in Proportionality Review I, we agreed that the frequency analysis should consist only of the salient-factors test, and that that test should be modified to contain fewer subcategories. 161 N.J. at 87-89. Only a few discrete subcategories were recommended for retention; one of them was the sexual assault classification. Id. at 88. We did not object to the recommendation to subdivide the sexual assault category of cases when we adopted Judge Baime's general recommendations improving on the salient-factors test in Proportionality Review I, 161 N.J. at 87-88. But the instant matter highlights the difficulty with attempting to subcategorize cases within this classification of death-eligible cases. Trying to create objective criteria that consistently distinguish among sexual assault murders on the basis of the degree of particular violence and terror is problematic. Cases of this nature inherently involve subjective factors, particularly when the determinative linedrawing is supposed to focus on particular violence or terror (emphasis added). We are unconvinced that the AOC's assessment of this matter, assigning it to the non-aggravated subcategory of D-2, correctly reflects the degree of particular violence or terror defendant inflicted on Huggins. We believe defendant's case is more similar to the cases that fall within the D-1 category than D-2. The evidence militates in favor of a conclusion that Huggins did not die quickly from a single gunshot to the head. She suffered as a terrorized prisoner of the defendant for approximately two hours. She was brutalized in the sexual assault and she did not die from a single gunshot wound to the head. She likely died sometime after the later second gunshot wound to her face. The facts of this case appear to fit more appropriately in the D-1 subcategory. However, we need not so conclude because both parties here agree that the D category cases should be consolidated for purposes of reviewing defendant's case. That approach is more compelling under the circumstances because of our view of the questionable appropriateness of the D-2 category and because the D-2 category has so few cases with which to compare defendant. To perform a complete analysis of defendant's murder, consolidation of the entire D category offers a more appropriate sampling of cases like defendant's to assess deathworthiness. Accordingly, we will compare the facts of defendant's case to those similar cases within the D category as a whole. B. Frequency Analysis Frequency analysis is the first step in the proportionality review process. Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 77. Through its simple statistical methodology, it helps us determine whether the frequency of death sentences in similar cases involving defendants with similar culpability supports a determination that the death penalty sentence in the case before us is not aberrational. State v. Chew, 159 N.J. 183, 201-02 (1999) (Chew II). The salient-factors test allows the Court to compare the case under review with other similar cases, and to distinguish those cases by their most salient factor, i.e., the fact that would most likely influence the decision to sentence a defendant to death. Turning to the raw data for the frequency with which the death penalty is imposed, we will review both the D category of cases and all death-eligible cases. The following chart summarizes that data when defendant's death sentence is included and excluded: Principal salient-factors Cases that Cases at the Death-sentencing and the number of cases proceeded penalty phase rate among all to the where the death death-eligible cases penalty penalty was imposed phase ______________________________________________________________________________________ D. Sexual Assault 59 Death Eligible Cases 44% (26/59) 35% (9/26) 15% (9/59) Exclude Harris 43% (25/58) 32% (8/25) 14% (8/58) D-1. Aggravated Sexual Assault 47 Death Eligible Cases 49% (23/47) 35% (8/23) 17% (8/47) Exclude Harris 48% (22/46) 32% (7/22) 15% (7/46) D-2. Other Sexual Assault Thus, the Court has examined claims of racial disproportionality for proof of discrimination that would require the overturning of a death sentence. Id. at 213. Our most recent comprehensive analysis is revealed in the Court's decision in In re Proportionality Review Project (II), ___ N.J. ___ (2000) (Proportionality Review (II)), also decided today. In that decision we reviewed Judge Baime's report that concluded that no reliable statistical evidence of race effect in the application of the death penalty has been produced. We find no reliable statistical evidence that the race of the defendant influences death sentencing either at the penalty trial stage or in the larger death-eligible sample of cases. Nor does the statistical evidence support the thesis that the race of the defendant affects which cases progress to penalty trial. Further, the statistical evidence suggests that the race of the victim does not affect death sentencing rates - killers of white victims are no more likely to receive the death penalty than killers of non-white victims. Finally application of our monitoring system discloses no consistent statistical evidence indicating that the race of the victim affects which cases progress to a penalty trial. However, some of the evidence in that respect is conflicting, and the issue should be revisited when the database increases. V. Agreed Upon Cases 1. State v. Marko Bey On April 26, 1983, Carol Peniston left Neptune High School around 9:20 p.m. after attending a computer course at the school. She did not return home nor report to work the next day because Marko Bey accosted her in front of her apartment building.See footnote 66 He demanded that she give him money, but once he heard someone coming, he led her into a nearby shed and killed her. Bey admitted to killing Ms. Peniston, but did not know why he did it and acknowledged that it should not have happened. He stated that four-and-one-half hours before the murder, he had consumed 120 ounces of malt liquor, some straight rum and smoked a considerable amount of marijuana. Bey informed police that he became scared when he noticed that the victim looked at him while he rifled through her pocketbook. He stated that once Ms. Peniston saw his face, that's when I started hitting her, it just went too far, something that shouldn't have went on. Bey repeatedly struck Ms. Peniston, sexually assaulted her, took eight dollars and her car keys from her pocketbook, and left her to die. While on his way to Newark in her car, he collided with an iron fence. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the rear-view mirror of the abandoned car. Ms. Peniston's body was not found until May 3, 1983. Her pocketbook was found by someone near an old industrial building in Asbury Park. Shortly thereafter, the police discovered her body in a shed located near the building. An autopsy disclosed that she had been dead for several days before her body was found. The autopsy further disclosed that she had been beaten, sexually assaulted, and strangled. The medical examiner concluded that Ms. Peniston's assailant had stomped on her chest because the assailant left an imprint of his sneaker on her chest. Her ribs were fractured and there was evidence of hemorrhaging of her right lung, vertebral column, and right atrium of the heart. It was determined that the ultimate cause of death, however, was ligature strangulation. Subsequent police investigation revealed that characteristics of spermatozoa found on the victim's coat were consistent with those of defendant's saliva, and that the imprint of defendant's sneakers was similar to the impression left on the victim's chest. Bey was charged with murder, felony murder, kidnaping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, and theft. The State alleged two aggravating factors: extreme suffering, and murder during the course of a felony. While awaiting trial for Ms. Peniston's murder, Bey was found guilty of murder and sexual assault in an unrelated criminal proceeding. That murder had been committed before the murder of Ms. Peniston. He was sentenced to death for the unrelated murder. A jury convicted defendant Bey for knowingly or purposely murdering Carol Peniston. The jury also convicted defendant of felony murder, first-degree kidnaping, second-degree aggravated assault, first-degree aggravated sexual assault, first-degree robbery, and third-degree theft. The State filed notice of two aggravating factors: c(4)(c) (extreme suffering) and c(4)(g) (during the course of a felony), and relied on the evidence adduced at the guilt phase, in addition to several photographs. The defendant presented testimony by his aunt and mother and an expert from the Center of Applied Social Research at Northeastern University. His mother and aunt's testimony was summarized by the Court as follows: Defendant's aunt testified about defendant's parents and childhood, stating that defendant was an illegitimate child whose father rejected him and whose mother, the sister of the witness, became an alcoholic and abused defendant. According to his aunt, when defendant was fourteen years old, he began to drink alcoholic beverages and use drugs. He overdosed on alcohol and marijuana, and was hospitalized twice. Defendant's mother confirmed her sister's testimony and placed the blame for her son's conduct on herself. Defendant testified on his own behalf, apologized to Ms. Peniston's family, and stated that maybe if I never would have taken drugs it would never have happened. The jury found that the State proved aggravating factors and that the defendant failed to prove any of the mitigating factors asserted: c(5)(a) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance), c(5)(d) (impairment by intoxication), c(5)(c) (age) and c(5)(h) (catch-all). The jury sentenced him to death. This Court upheld the convictions, but reversed the death sentence. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 (1998). Although not in this category for comparison purposes, Bey's retrial of his penalty resulted in a jury verdict sentencing him to death a second time for the murder of Ms. Peniston and this Court affirmed that capital sentence. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557 (1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 (1995). Thereafter, Bey's death sentence was held not aberrational. State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 (1995). B. State v. Bruce Cunningham On February 3, 1983, thirty-four-year-old Bruce Cunningham began drinking heavily at 9:15 in the morning. At 1:00 that afternoon, Cunningham went to his ex-wife's house and found his ex-wife in her bedroom with another man. The man left and Cunningham tried to rape his ex-wife, but his son walked into the room causing Cunningham to stop. As his ex-wife and son left the house to go to the police, Cunningham followed, at one point mentioning that he had a knife in his knapsack. Cunningham boarded a bus to return home, carrying a new supply of rum and beer. He met a woman on the bus and was later seen with that woman at his bus stop. According to Cunningham, they decided to find a secluded place to have sex, but an argument broke out while they were having sex. The State contended that during their walk, Cunningham kidnaped the woman, forced her to a deserted area, struck her in the head with a rock, stabbed her in the abdomen, and raped her. Afterward, Cunningham buried the woman's body and went to a nearby tavern. Someone at the tavern noticed that Cunningham's hands were covered in blood. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AMBROSE A. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ LONG, J., dissenting. I believe that because Ambrose Harris's death sentence was impermissibly influenced by extensive, adverse publicity prior to and during his trial, meaningful proportionality review is impossible to conduct. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent. NO. A-43 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998 ON APPEAL FROM ON CERTIFICATION TO ON PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF A DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, MERCER COUNTY STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AMBROSE A. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 2, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justice Coleman and Justice Long The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d) states that it is a mitigating factor if the jury finds: The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. Finally, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) states that it is a mitigating factor where the jury or the court finds: Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.