Title: Brebaugh v. Hales

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Brebaugh v. Hales1990 WY 29788 P.2d 1128Case Number: 89-67Decided: 03/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
J.W. "JACK" BREBAUGH, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

KERRY HALES; WILLIAM 
BEISNER; JAMES FREEMAN; AND DRAVO COAL COMPANY, 

A DELAWARE CORPORATION, 

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, J.

J. Douglas 
McCalla of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson and Kennard F. Nelson of 
Kirkwood, Copenhaver & Nelson, Laramie, for appellant.

Patrick Dixon of 
Murane & Bostwick, Casper and John A. MacPherson of Johnson, MacPherson 
& Noecker, Rawlins, for appellees.

Stanley K. 
Hathaway of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Pamela L. Jacklin and Tracy Pool Reeve 
of Stoel, Rives, Boley, Jones & Grey, Portland, Or., for amicus curiae, 
Bridger Coal Co.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      J.W. "Jack" 
Brebaugh (Brebaugh) received injuries on January 6, 1986, while working on a 
"splicing" procedure on a conveyor belt in an underground coal mine near Hanna, 
Wyoming. He was employed by Carbon County Coal Company (CCCC), a Colorado 
general partnership formed by partners Dravo Coal Company (Dravo), a Delaware 
corporation, and Rocky Mountain Energy Company (RMEC), a Utah 
corporation.

[¶2]      Although Brebaugh 
received an award under the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
through CCCC's account as a contributing employer, he filed a tort action 
against Dravo and four supervisory co-employees, seeking to recover money 
damages for his personal injuries. He appeals from the district court's order 
dismissing Dravo under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and from that court's order granting 
summary judgment for three of his co-employees.1

[¶3]      We 
affirm.

[¶4]      The parties agree 
that the issues are as Brebaugh has stated them:2

I. Did the district court 
err in granting summary judgment to the co-employee defendants when there 
existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning culpable 
negligence?

II. Did the district 
court err in failing to allow plaintiff to conduct proper voir dire relative to 
worker's compensation benefits?

III. Is a 
corporation-partner who takes on independent duties under a separate management 
contract with the partnership to be considered an "employer contributing as 
required by law" under the Wyoming Constitution and statutes so as to acquire 
immunity under the Worker's Compensation Act from suit by an employee of the 
partnership?

FACTS

[¶5]      In CCCC's mining 
operation a main conveyor belt carried the mined coal from underground uphill to 
the surface. The main conveyor belt consisted of three sections designated as 
U-1, U-2, and U-3. The U-2 belt, on which Brebaugh was working when injured, was 
fifty-four inches wide and about 2,000 feet long, weighing at least ten pounds 
or more per foot. Resembling in general appearance an elongated rubber band, the 
belt rested on a conveyor frame suspended from the ceiling of the mine shaft. 
The bottom portion of the belt loop was about six to seven feet above the 
sloping ground. The belt was a series of sections fastened together by 
mechanical fasteners. The mechanical fastener was held together by a pin 
inserted through the fastener. 

[¶6]      On occasion CCCC 
eliminated a mechanical fastener. To do this, CCCC "spliced" the affected belt 
section. The objective in the "splicing" procedure was to separate the belt at 
the designated belt section, cut out the mechanical fastener, add more belt if 
necessary, overlap the loose ends of the belt, and melt together those loose 
ends by means of a heating device; this last step is called "vulcanizing." CCCC 
had available for use a manual, Royalon Vulcanized Splicing Manual, which 
contained instructions to keep clamps on the belt at all times while making a 
splice and to keep tension on all of the belt, except for that part of the belt 
being spliced. With this general orientation in mind, we turn our attention to 
the facts and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the accident in 
question.

[¶7]      The accident 
happened January 6, 1986, several hours into the "graveyard" shift, 12 midnight 
to 8:00 a.m., the shift Brebaugh worked. At the start of that shift, appellee 
Hales, CCCC's general foreman in charge of the work, assigned appellee Beisner, 
a section foreman, to work on splicing the U-2 belt at a location previously 
identified by Paul Kehrer, the foreman on the previous shift. Since Beisner had 
little or no experience with this procedure, Hales considered his assignment as 
a training exercise. Hales assigned Brebaugh, Hassel, Cook, and Schriner as crew 
members under Beisner. Hales chose these crew members based on their prior 
experience in the mine and with conveyor belts. Although Brebaugh had no prior 
experience splicing U-belts, he had prior experience splicing smaller section 
belts. Although modest about his experience, Brebaugh testified that as a 
production belt man of five years' experience he was probably the best trained 
person at CCCC with respect to operation, repairs, and maintenance of section 
belts. Hassel had vulcanized U-belts about ten times and had both classroom 
instruction and on-the-job training on the procedure. Cook had received 
on-the-job training on vulcanizing or splicing U-belts at CCCC and had performed 
the procedure about three times. Schriner had also received classroom 
instruction and on-the-job training on the vulcanizing and splicing procedure; 
he had performed the procedure on U-belts three or four times.

[¶8]      Hales asked 
appellee Freeman, a shift foreman, who had regularly assigned duties in another 
section of the mine, to take Brebaugh's crew to the designated work area, 
determine whether enough slack in the belt existed to permit a splice, and 
report his finding to Hales. Freeman took the crew to the area where the 
vulcanizing station was set up. They found that the U-2 belt was not centered 
properly. They worked for several hours trying to pull down slack in the belt 
using three-ton chain come-alongs. They were not able to pull down any slack. 
Freeman called Hales and told him they did not have enough slack to make the 
splice.

[¶9]      Hales told 
Freeman to go uphill to a fifty-foot section of belt located above the belt 
drive mechanism and add that section to the belt. Freeman passed that 
information on to Beisner. According to Hales, that fifty-foot section had been 
placed there some time previously in expectation of having to add it into the 
belt at a later date. Hales believed that in late 1984 sections of belt had been 
added to the U-2 belt at that same location. He believed that three supervisors 
had been in that area during that operation. The crew then moved their 
equipment, including come-alongs and clamps, uphill to the location designated 
by Hales. Freeman told them they were to put the clamps on the belt, pull the 
pin, and insert the fifty-foot section of belt. Freeman then left to perform his 
regularly assigned duties in another section of the mine.

[¶10]   At the designated location the crew 
put clamps on each side of the belt. Hassel and Brebaugh worked on one side of 
the belt; Cook and Schriner worked on the other. Working on the bottom loop 
portion of the belt, the crew put clamps both downhill and uphill from the spot 
on the belt section where the splice was to be made. Attaching the come-alongs 
to the clamps, they took up the slack until the belt dropped a little where they 
could remove the pins. After they removed the pins, they loosened the 
come-alongs on the downhill side of the splice. They removed the downhill side 
come-alongs and clamp, allowing the downhill section of the belt to drop to the 
ground.

[¶11]   At this point in the operation, 
Hassel and Brebaugh discussed the substantial tension remaining on the uphill 
section of belt. According to Brebaugh, Hassel was in charge. As they were 
discussing what to do, Hales arrived at their work area. He asked them if they 
needed belt pins, and Brebaugh answered they needed two. Then Brebaugh asked 
Hales, "What are we going to do about that upper belt?" Hales replied, "Well, 
you can take the clamp off and it'll drop to the ground." That was the substance 
of their conversation. Hales was there only a minute or so and he left. Hales 
testified that he left to attend to another work matter but intended to return 
to the splicing operation. He thought Brebaugh's crew would take a break and he 
would be back to their area before they were further along in their work. 
According to Hales, before he visited the work site he had considered that it 
was possible the uphill belt end could run because it was taut. After visiting 
the site and seeing the belt, he concluded there was enough slack in the belt so 
that the belt would not run when the clamps were released.

[¶12]   After Hales left, Hassel and 
Brebaugh again discussed the tension on the belt. Brebaugh was concerned about 
the tension because they were above the belt drive mechanism. He had concern for 
the equipment, but it never entered his mind that if the belt started running 
there was danger to human safety. He testified, "I did not foresee an unsafe 
condition there. * * * If I would have foreseen a possibility, I wouldn't have 
been there."

[¶13]   About five or ten minutes later, 
Beisner came to their location. According to Brebaugh, Beisner stayed a "very, 
very small period of time." While there, Beisner was asked by Brebaugh what they 
should do about the clamp on the belt. According to Brebaugh, Beisner echoed 
Hales' earlier remark, namely, remove the clamp and the belt would drop to the 
ground. Beisner was unaware of the possibility of the belt coming free and 
running loose. Beisner left to get some belt pins. He thought he would return 
before the crew's work went much further.

[¶14]   After Beisner left, Hassel and 
Brebaugh again discussed removing the clamp. According to Brebaugh, Hassel asked 
him, "What do you think we should do?" Brebaugh answered, "Hell, I don't know." 
Hassel then said, "Well, they told me to take the clamp off." Brebaugh then 
said, "Well, I'm not going to take it off." Brebaugh testified he was not going 
to remove the clamp because he "was afraid the belt was going to get loose and 
run." He did not see any personal danger, only danger of damaging the equipment. 
According to Brebaugh, Hassel repeated, "Well, they told me to take it off." 
Brebaugh replied, "Here's my wrench, help yourself." Brebaugh also said, "You do 
what you want to do. * * * You're in charge, I can't make a decision for 
you."

[¶15]   Brebaugh testified that Hassel made 
the decision to loosen the clamp. According to Brebaugh, Cook and Schriner on 
the other side of the belt also started loosening the clamp on their side. As 
Hassel loosened the nut on the clamp, the belt started slipping. Brebaugh said, 
"Jim, the belt's slipping." Hassel said, "Yes, I know it." Hassel stood back and 
Brebaugh gave him a 12 spud wrench. Hassel very gingerly loosened the nut and 
the belt started slipping again; then, it suddenly came loose and ran uphill. 
Hassel, Cook and Schriner ran after the belt, trying to catch it. Brebaugh 
called to them, "What are you going to do when you catch it?" Brebaugh told them 
to come on back.

[¶16]   At that point, Brebaugh thought the 
run-a-way belt would reach the top of the conveyor, come around the top, come 
down the conveyor past them, and pile up down at the belt drive. According to 
Brebaugh it took about two minutes or less for the run-away belt to reach the 
top, go around the top, and come back down. During that period of time, the 
other crew members returned to where Brebaugh was located. During that period of 
time, Brebaugh did not think there was an unsafe condition. Hassel asked 
Brebaugh where he thought the belt would end up. Brebaugh answered he did not 
know if it was going down to the drive or all the way down, and that he would go 
see. Cook and Schriner testified they could hear uphill the run-away belt as it 
was starting on its downhill course. They simply stepped back from the conveyor 
belt frame.

[¶17]   About this time Brebaugh walked 
toward the frame and was going to walk underneath it in order to go downhill to 
see where the downhill descending belt would land. As he started to pass under 
the belt frame, he heard a loud noise uphill. He described what happened next, 
"I knew something bad was happening and about that time the area filled full of 
dust and within a matter of a couple of seconds, I was hit. I had the belt 
before me and I crumbled to the ground."

[¶18]   Brebaugh testified that he does not 
think Freeman or any of the others did anything intentionally to hurt him. He 
does not think they knew the belt was going to run. In his words, "Everyone 
tried their best to keep the equipment running and keep from getting people hurt 
* * *."

[¶19]   In his complaint against Dravo and 
his co-employees Freeman, Beisner and Hales, Brebaugh alleged they were 
negligent or culpably negligent in the following ways:

Freeman sent Brebaugh and 
his crew members to do an inherently dangerous job, namely, splicing the U-2 
belt, for which they had no adequate training and in an area on the conveyor 
that he knew or should have known was unsafe for splicing. He did not provide 
supervision for the splicing operation, and the operation was done contrary to 
standard procedure.

Hales and Beisner told 
Brebaugh and his crew members to release a clamp which was securing the belt at 
a time and place where they knew or should have known that such release would 
cause the belt to run out of control.

The defending 
co-employees answered the complaint, generally denying the culpable negligence 
allegations applicable to them.

[¶20]   On July 29, 1986, Dravo filed a 
motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b).3 On September 22, 1986, the trial 
court filed its order setting the hearing on the motion for November 3, 1986. On 
October 6, 1986, Dravo filed the affidavit of the clerk of the district court, 
to which was attached a copy of the court's file of Brebaugh's worker's 
compensation claim. On October 17, 1986, Dravo filed its pleading entitled, 
"Submission of Affidavits Pursuant to Rule 12(b)," which stated Dravo had filed 
the clerk's affidavit and also the affidavit of James A. Berneburg. Berneburg's 
affidavit informed that he was vice-president, general counsel and secretary of 
Dravo; that CCCC was a Colorado general partnership formed by Dravo and RMEC; 
and that appellees Hales, Beisner, and Freeman were CCCC employees.

[¶21]   On November 3, 1986, Dravo filed 
its legal memorandum supporting its motion in which it referenced and relied on 
the affidavits of the clerk of court and Berneburg. On November 14, 1986, 
Brebaugh filed his legal memorandum in opposition to Dravo's motion in which he 
acknowledged that CCCC was a partnership formed by Dravo and RMEC and requested 
more time in which to conduct discovery to meet Dravo's motion. On March 12, 
1987, the trial court issued its decision letter in which it informed the 
parties it was granting Dravo's motion. The letter indicates the court gave 
Brebaugh from November to March to conduct discovery and that Brebaugh's counsel 
had told the court that they had conducted discovery but had no evidence to 
submit to counter the motion.

[¶22]   On March 30, 1987, the trial court 
granted Dravo's motion. In its order the court refers to Dravo's submission of 
affidavits. The order states that Dravo, as one of the partners forming CCCC, 
the partnership employing Brebaugh, is entitled to the same immunity under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act as CCCC. Although the trial court certified 
its order of dismissal as a final order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b) and Brebaugh 
filed a notice of appeal, this court dismissed the appeal because the trial 
court had failed to articulate its reasons for its certification. Tader v. 
Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1066 n. 1 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶23]   On April 13, 1987, the defending 
co-employees filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the 
motion on July 14, 1987. On October 12, 1988, a few weeks before the trial was 
to begin, the defending co-employees filed a motion to reconsider the court's 
denial of the summary judgment motion. Trial began before the trial court ruled 
on that motion. During voir dire Brebaugh's counsel told the prospective jurors 
that if a money judgment resulted from the action, Brebaugh was required by law 
to repay the worker's compensation two-thirds of the benefits he had received 
for his work-related injury. The trial court declared a mistrial.

[¶24]   The defending co-employees again 
moved for summary judgment, relying on the materials previously submitted by the 
parties and case law from this court decided since the court's previous denial 
of their earlier motion. Both parties submitted legal memoranda. After 
considering the materials submitted and the legal memoranda, the trial court 
granted the motion for summary judgment.

[¶25]   On January 3, 1989, Brebaugh filed 
a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order dismissing Dravo. Along 
with the motion, Brebaugh submitted numerous documents, including Dravo and 
RMEC's partnership agreement and CCCC and Dravo's management contract 
specifically referenced in the partnership agreement. The submission of the 
partnership agreement and the management contract obviously came too late. Dravo 
opposed Brebaugh's motion. Brebaugh submitted a legal memorandum in support of 
his motion, contending that under Dravo's management contract Dravo assumed 
duties toward CCCC's employees separate and apart from the duties that CCCC as 
employer assumed toward its employees. On February 21, 1989, the trial court 
denied Brebaugh's motion. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Dravo's 
Dismissal

[¶26]   Considering the facts surrounding 
Dravo's W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we hold that the motion was 
automatically converted to one for summary judgment. Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1096-97 (Wyo. 1987); Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160, 1164 (Wyo. 1986); and Greaser v. Williams, 703 P.2d 327, 336 (Wyo. 1985). 
Consequently, we review the trial court's order dismissing Dravo in light of our 
long-recognized and often-stated summary judgment standards. Cyr v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Platte County, 780 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo. 1989); and 
Milligan v. Big Valley Corporation, 754 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶27]   Because Brebaugh did not submit 
documents to oppose the affidavits filed by Dravo and considered by the trial 
court, we first consider whether any genuine issues of material fact exist on 
Dravo's being one of the partners forming Brebaugh's statutorily contributing 
employer, the partnership CCCC, and on Brebaugh's being an employee of that 
partnership. We find none. Next, we consider whether Dravo, as one of the 
partners forming the partnership employing Brebaugh, is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. More precisely, we are deciding, as a matter of first 
impression, whether a partner enjoys the same immunity as the partnership under 
Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶28]   The Wyoming Constitution4 and the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act5 provide that a covered employee's 
rights to compensation from the fund are in lieu of any rights and remedies 
against that employee's contributing employer. Brebaugh acknowledges that his 
employer, CCCC the partnership, is immune from tort liability. He claims that 
Dravo, one of the two partners forming that partnership, does not enjoy that 
same immunity. We disagree.

[¶29]   Recently, in Hays v. State, ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 768 P.2d 11 (Wyo. 1989), this court 
aligned Wyoming with the majority of jurisdictions, holding that a partner is 
not eligible to receive benefits as an employee under the act. We described the 
legal characteristics of partners and partnerships. We said, "[a] partnership is 
not an entity separate from its partners. 1C A. Larson [Workmen's Compensation 
Law § 54.31 (1986)]." Hays, 768 P.2d  at 14. We quoted with approval from a 1926 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals: "The copartners, of course, are the 
principals and employers * * *. Lyle v. H.R. Lyle Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67, 67-68, 47 A.L.R. 840 (1926)." Hays, 768 P.2d  at 15. In 
Claudio v. Lefrak, 100 A.D.2d 837, 473 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-35 (1984), the court 
held that the employee's compensation award through the employer partnership 
bars the maintenance of any common law action against either the partnership or 
its members. According to Professor Larson, "a member of a partnership, even if 
he is a `working partner,' is still in law the employer of employees of the 
partnership and cannot be sued" as a "third person" against whom common law 
actions may be brought for compensable injuries. 2A A. Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 72.15, p. 14-89 (1989). The vast majority of 
jurisdictions considering this issue has held that a partner is an employer. 
Swiezynski v. Civiello, 126 N.H. 142, 489 A.2d 634, 638 (1985).6 We align Wyoming with this 
majority.

[¶30]   We have said that an important 
characteristic of the employer's status is his right to control the employee's 
work performance. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 
712-13 (Wyo. 1987). Under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act the 
distinguishing features of the employment relationship become the employer's 
rights to the employee's labor and to control the employee's performance of that 
labor and the employee's corresponding rights to compensation for that labor and 
benefits if injured in a work-related incident.

[¶31]   Under Wyoming law, these 
distinguishing features are present in the relationship between a partner and a 
partnership employee. Unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, 
partners "have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership 
business." W.S. 17-13-401(a)(v) (June 1987 Repl.). Consequently, each partner 
has an equal right to control the work performance of the partnership employee. 
Likewise, partners are personally liable for partnership obligations. W.S. 
17-13-307. Professor Larson states:

[I]n any ordinary 
partnership each partner has by law an equal share in management, and is 
therefore in actual possession of the powers of the employer. Unless he has 
contracted away these powers, which he can theoretically do, he is as much the 
employer as anyone can be, not as a matter of conceptual reasoning but as a 
matter of actual functions and rights.

1C A. Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 54.32, at 9-259 (1986). Accordingly, we hold 
that a partner retaining his right of management is in an employment 
relationship with partnership employees and, consequently, is an employer under 
our worker's compensation law.

[¶32]   Our worker's compensation law 
balances the interests of the employee against those of the employer. The 
employee receives a right to receive compensation benefits for work-related 
injuries in exchange for his forfeiture of his corresponding rights of action 
against the employer. The employer receives statutory immunity from employee 
suits in exchange for his contribution of premiums to fund the benefits program. 
The effect of a ruling that a contributing employer did not include individual 
partners would be that partners would have to endure the liability for payment 
of premiums without the enjoyment of the corresponding benefit of immunity from 
employee suits. This ruling would frustrate the policy underlying this state's 
worker's compensation law. Where reasonably possible, we must construe a statute 
to carry out its underlying policy. Lehman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 752 P.2d 422, 425 (Wyo. 1988). We find it preferable to 
construe "employer" to include individual partners because it gives force to a 
policy central to the act.

II. Summary 
Judgment For Supervisory Co-Employees

A. Standards of Review - 
Summary Judgments

[¶33]   Our standards of review of the 
propriety of summary judgments in co-employee culpable negligence litigation are 
well established.7 Although we need not recite those 
standards, we shall apply them in our analysis.

B. Culpable 
Negligence in Co-Employee Litigation

[¶34]   Co-employee culpable negligence 
jurisprudence is likewise well established as the above-cited cases 
demonstrate.8 Those cases give us the following 
principles which light our way in this case. The term "culpable negligence" 
means "willful and serious misconduct." The term "willful" means "such as is 
done purposely, with knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince 
a reckless disregard of consequences." We distinguish "willful misconduct" from 
"ordinary negligence" by the aggravating factor of the tort-feasor's state of 
mind. We require a plaintiff to prove the tort-feasor acted with a state of mind 
that approaches intent to do harm. Since we appreciate that a plaintiff faces a 
difficult task in trying to prove the tort-feasor's state of mind, we allow the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that a tort-feasor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo. 1989) We stated in Bryant, 728 P.2d at 1137:

[W]hen state of mind is 
at issue and especially when willfulness of an actor's conduct is questioned, 
courts should be reluctant to grant summary judgment because the actor's 
credibility is often a central issue in such cases. [Citation.] If the evidence 
presented, however, does not raise sufficient doubt of an [actor's] credibility, 
a party's desire to test his statements by a jury will not preclude summary 
judgment.

[¶35]   In further describing the 
tort-feasor's intent, we have also said willful misconduct takes on the "aspect 
of highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a 
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. * * * [I]t must be more 
than mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more 
than mere thoughtlessness or inadventure, or simple inattention." Danculovich v. 
Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶36]   We have applied these principles in 
a variety of cases since 1986, beginning with Bryant, and most recently in 
Baros. We briefly review the facts of consequence relating to the tort-feasor's 
conduct in several of these cases to assist us in obtaining the appropriate 
perspective in our review of Brebaugh's appeal. In Baros we affirmed summary 
judgment for the supervising co-employee who knowingly operated a malfunctioning 
backhoe near the plaintiff whom he had ordered to work in an excavation area in 
violation of the supervisor's own recognized safety standard. We said that 
neither the supervisor's placing his fellow employee in the excavation contrary 
to safety policy nor the supervisor's operating a backhoe in need of maintenance 
for a known malfunction demonstrated the supervisor's intentional commission of 
an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that 
was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. Baros, 780 P.2d  at 346. We concluded that the evidence failed to show that the supervisor 
was aware of the degree of danger presented by the defective backhoe under the 
circumstances, i.e., that there was a high probability of harm. Id. at 
346.

[¶37]   In Stephenson v. Pacific Power 
& Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989), the injured employee fell from a 
scaffolding on which he was working to install a new overhead door. Before his 
fall, he had complained to four supervisory co-employees about their need to 
barricade the scaffolding area or to provide flaggers so as to prevent vehicular 
traffic from coming close to the scaffolding. These co-employees failed to 
provide barricades or flaggers. In his complaint the injured employee claimed 
the four supervisory co-employees had been culpably negligent in their failure 
to respond to his repeated complaints and requests. In affirming summary 
judgment for the supervisors, this court accepted the premise that they knew of 
the hazardous situation. We said that a fair characterization of their conduct 
was that they repeatedly passed the buck to others they assumed were more 
responsible. Nevertheless, we held their conduct did not demonstrate a state of 
mind approaching intent to do harm.

[¶38]   In Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988), an inexperienced rig hand alleged that his experienced 
supervising driller was culpably negligent when, using a three-man crew instead 
of the standard four-man crew in the operation of adding a new joint of drill 
pipe to the pipe already in the hole, the driller, suffering from a previously 
injured right shoulder, mistakenly put power to the make-up tongs at the wrong 
time, causing the tongs to slip and crush the inexperienced rig hand's left arm. 
In his deposition testimony the injured rig hand stated his observations of how 
the driller favored his injured right shoulder, but the rig hand admitted he did 
not know what that condition had to do with the accident. In response to the 
injured rig hand's use of the affidavit testimony of another driller that the 
rig could not be safely run with a three-man crew, this court characterized that 
testimony as conclusory and lacking in specific facts; such testimony was deemed 
insufficient to structure an issue of material fact as to culpable negligence. 
This court affirmed summary judgment for the supervisory driller because the 
evidence failed to demonstrate that he had acted with a state of mind 
approaching intent to harm.

[¶39]   In Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1986), this court affirmed a summary judgment for school bus mechanics 
who, contrary to the injured school bus driver's allegations, stated in their 
affidavits that they did not know the bus's parking brake was not working when 
the bus driver took the bus. The court considered the bus driver's opposing 
affidavits, which relied on violations of statutory duties and school district 
regulations, as conclusory and lacking in specific facts.

[¶40]   In Bettencourt v. Pride Well 
Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987), this court affirmed a summary judgment 
for the supervisor of the injured worker. The supervisor requested the worker to 
report for work without proper work clothing on a cold and windy night; he knew 
the worker had been celebrating his birthday by drinking intoxicating beverages 
and knew the worker had to ascend and descend a large 400-barrel oil storage 
tank using a ladder welded to the side of the tank with no safety cage, safety 
belt or any other means to prevent a fall in the event of a slip. Recognizing 
that the supervisor owed his fellow employee a duty to refrain from culpable 
negligence, this court said the evidence fell short of demonstrating the 
supervisor's intent to harm the worker or that the supervisor's actions had a 
high probability of causing harm to him.

[¶41]   In Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1986), the driver of a truck hauling waste production water 
containing some petroleum residues was injured in an explosion caused when he 
used a butane torch to thaw a valve on the truck's holding tank. His supervising 
foreman had instructed him to use the butane torch procedure. The injured driver 
sued the foreman, alleging he was culpably negligent in failing adequately to 
train and supervise him and in failing to warn him of the dangers involved in 
the valve-thawing procedure. In support of the foreman's motion for summary 
judgment, he filed his affidavit in which he stated the butane torch method was 
standard in the industry, he was unaware of any similar accident, and he had 
neither expected nor anticipated such an accident. The injured driver filed an 
affidavit from a safety director of another trucking company in which he stated 
the butane torch method was dangerous and hazardous; it was widely known in the 
industry as being dangerous, and thawing methods other than the dangerous butane 
torch method were available. In the injured driver's deposition testimony, he 
said that after the accident the foreman told him, "Gosh, we always wondered if 
something like that could happen. We didn't know." In affirming summary judgment 
for the foreman, this court found that the foreman did not act with a "culpable" 
or "willful" state of mind. The harmful consequences were unknown to him; the 
risk was not obvious; it was not highly probable that harm would follow. Bryant, 
728 P.2d  at 1136. This court found that the safety director's affidavit did not 
contain sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact and did 
not establish, directly or circumstantially, that the foreman had acted with the 
"quasi-intent" that is an essential element of culpably negligent conduct. Id. 
at 1137.

[¶42]   In sharp contrast to these several 
cases in which the alleged tort-feasor's conduct did not evince a state of mind 
approaching an intent to harm, we see two cases that provide examples of 
tort-feasor conduct that at least require the evidence to be heard by a jury. In 
Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988), this court reversed a summary 
judgment for supervisor Kennison because the evidence suggested that before the 
fatal accident he had entered the "Frac" tanks and had become aware of the 
highly dangerous and harmful nature of the fumes contained in the tanks and that 
because of his physical reaction to the fumes he had been told by the tank 
lessee's representative to have only one worker at a time in the tanks for only 
a brief period of time. Despite his awareness of the danger and the instruction 
to him, Kennison again entered the tank where the fumes were stronger than 
before and allowed co-employee Poulos to join him. Both men lost consciousness 
and had to be lifted out of the tank. Poulos died. This court said that from 
this evidence, "The trier of fact could reasonably find a known or obvious risk 
presenting a high probability of harm." Id., at 367.9

[¶43]   In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 
1989), we reversed a summary judgment for a co-employee safety director as he 
was uniquely aware of the dangerous oily and greasy condition of the boom on 
which the injured worker worked because of his personal knowledge and the 
worker's specific complaints to him about it. The injured worker claimed that 
the safety coordinator had torn up the worker's maintenance request concerning 
the boom's condition, telling him it was not his place to be writing such 
requests although company policy promoted such requests from its employees. 
Similarly, we reversed summary judgments for several other co-employees to whom 
Case had repeatedly complained about the dangerous boom condition where the 
evidence suggested they ordered him to climb the boom despite its dangerous 
condition or be fired. That evidence presented genuine issues of material fact 
concerning the alleged tort-feasor's state of mind approaching an intent to 
cause harm.

[¶44]   Having in mind these principles of 
co-employee culpable negligence and our application of them in cases from 1986 
forward, we apply them to the undisputed facts of consequence surrounding 
Brebaugh's injury.

[¶45]   We are unable to agree with 
Brebaugh's contention that the conduct of Freeman, Beisner, and Hales surmounted 
simple negligence and reached the level of culpable negligence. Brebaugh claims 
that these supervisory co-employees sent Brebaugh's crew, consisting of 
employees untrained in the dangerous splicing operation, to perform that 
operation without supervision. The undisputed evidence is that Hales was the 
supervisor in charge of the work on that shift. Hales directed Freeman to 
accompany the crew in order to look at the belt in question and report to him 
whether enough slack existed to make a splice. Beisner, having never been 
involved in the operation before, was assigned by Hales to accompany the crew as 
a training exercise for him. Thus, Freeman and Beisner had no duties with 
respect to the incident giving rise to Brebaugh's injury. In this instance, our 
focus is on Hales. The record clearly shows that Hales selected Hassel, Cook and 
Schriner to make the splice because of their prior splicing training and 
experience. It is also clear that, although Brebaugh had no U-belt splicing 
experience, he had extensive experience with section belts. Hales assigned 
Brebaugh to this crew as a training exercise on the U-belt splicing operation. 
Giving the evidence in support of Brebaugh's contention every favorable 
inference, we find that evidence fails to show that any of the supervisory 
co-employees acted or failed to act with a state of mind consistent with 
culpable negligence, which requires known or obvious risk of a high probability 
of harm.

[¶46]   Next, Brebaugh claims that the 
location where his crew was making the splice was dangerous; the location should 
have been below the drive mechanism to allow that mechanism to aid in holding 
the uphill portion of the belt in a stationary position. The undisputed evidence 
shows that Hales, not Freeman or Beisner, selected the location. He did so 
because a fifty-foot section of belt with which to make the splice was at that 
spot. The record clearly shows that Hales visited that location and evaluated 
the situation by considering the amount of tension on the belt. He had 
considered that the belt could possibly run when the clamp was released; when he 
visited the location and had a first-hand look he made his judgment call that 
enough slack on the belt existed that the belt would not run when the clamp was 
released. While in hindsight his judgment may be criticized, the record contains 
no evidence to suggest that his location selection was of such a character as to 
evince a reckless disregard of the consequences. We find no evidence that his 
exercise of judgment was of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or 
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would 
follow.

[¶47]   Brebaugh asserts that the 
supervisory co-employees knew or should have known that CCCC had the vulcanized 
splicing manual available, containing instructions to keep clamps on the belt at 
all times while making a splice and to keep tension on all of the belt while 
making a splice, except for that part of the belt being spliced. He says that 
these supervisory co-employees, particularly Hales and Beisner, failed to inform 
the crew of those instructions and failed to follow them. Instead, he says, both 
Hales and Beisner gave orders to the crew to release the clamps securing the 
uphill portion of the belt in disregard of those instructions. The undisputed 
evidence for purposes of our review shows that both Hales and Beisner told 
Brebaugh that, in their opinion, the belt would drop to the ground if the crew 
members released the clamps.

[¶48]   After Hales and Beisner left the 
crew members, intending to return before the work progressed much further, 
Brebaugh and Hassel continued to discuss whether they should release the clamps. 
Brebaugh stated that his concern was not personal safety, but rather equipment 
safety. The risk of harm to the crew members in the event of a run-a-way belt 
was not obvious to him. The evidence likewise shows that risk was not obvious to 
Hales, Beisner or Freeman.

[¶49]   According to Brebaugh, CCCC and 
these supervisory personnel were always concerned for the safety of the 
employees, as well as for the protection of equipment. Brebaugh did not think 
that these supervisory employees knew the belt would run; he did not think they 
would act or fail to act in reckless disregard for the safety of co-employees. 
Although there was a failure to follow the manual's instructions, under all the 
circumstances shown by the facts we do not find that failure to show a state of 
mind on behalf of any supervisory co-employee revealing a known or obvious risk 
of a high probability of harm in the face of that failure. We reach the same 
conclusion with respect to Hale's and Beisner's "orders" to release the 
clamps.

[¶50]   Brebaugh relies on the affidavit of 
his expert witness, Youngdahl, who opines that the acts or omissions of the 
supervisory personnel constituted unreasonable conduct in disregard of a known 
risk that made it highly probable that harm might follow. An affidavit that 
states a conclusion or categorical assertion of an ultimate fact cannot be used 
to defeat summary judgment. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 
1987). In this regard, we find Youngdahl's affidavit to be conclusory and 
insufficient to meet the burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact. We 
reached the same conclusion as to similar affidavits in Baros, 780 P.2d  at 345; 
Johnston, 758 P.2d  at 569; and Stundon, 736 P.2d  at 318. Brebaugh has presented 
no evidence showing these supervisory co-employees actually knew that a run-away 
belt and resulting personal injury were highly probable. No one recited any 
similar instances of run-away belts and injuries in prior belt splicing 
operations. As far as we can tell from the record, such an occurrence had never 
happened before at CCCC's mine. Brebaugh has raised no doubt concerning these 
supervisory co-employees' credibility. In particular, Brebaugh has not cast 
doubt on Beisner's and Hales' statements that they intended to return to the 
splicing operation before the work progressed very far and that in their 
judgment the belt would not run if the clamps were released.

[¶51]   Upon careful review of the record 
and consideration of the guiding principles of applicable law, we find no reason 
to reverse the trial judge's decision to grant summary judgment for Hales, 
Beisner and Freeman. Arguing in the alternative, Brebaugh urges us to hold that, 
although no single act or omission on the part of these supervisory co-employees 
constitutes culpable negligence, taken cumulatively they rise to that level of 
misconduct. We do not find that appropriate here and decline to so 
hold.

[¶52]   Brebaugh invites us to pass 
judgment on his counsel's jury voir dire on worker's compensation benefits 
during the aborted trial. Given our disposition of this case on the main issues 
presented, we need not accept that invitation.

[¶53]   In conclusion, we hold that Dravo, 
as a member of the partnership which employed the injured employee, enjoys the 
same immunity afforded an employer. Further, we affirm summary judgment for all 
appellees.

THOMAS, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

MACY, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶54]   I have read with interest the 
dissenting opinion in this case, and I am puzzled by the reliance there placed 
on Swiezynski v. Civiello, 126 N.H. 142, 489 A.2d 634 (1985). The rationale for 
the decision in Swiezynski is consistent in every respect with the opinion of 
the court in this case. That case was remanded only for a determination, which 
the trial court had not made, "as to whether the partnership agreement provided 
that the defendants did not retain their legal rights of management." 
Swiezynski, 489 A.2d  at 639.

[¶55]   It is clear to me that, if the 
management contract in our case1 had been before it, the Swiezynski 
court would have had no difficulty in affirming the trial court. As the 
dissenting opinion emphasizes, by quoting from the "management contract," Carbon 
County Coal Company, the partnership entity composed of Dravo Coal Company and 
Rocky Mountain Energy Company, is designated as the "Owner" that has this 
relationship to the General Manager:

"(d) General 
Manager. A General Manager, who shall have the responsibilities and 
authorities of the chief operating officer for Owner, shall be appointed by 
Owner and shall be responsible to and report to Contractor. The general 
supervision and management of the day-to-day operation of the Facilities shall 
be under the charge and control of the General Manager."

This is a 
specific retention by the partners of their legal rights of 
management.

[¶56]   The "management contract" further 
provides, in pertinent language:

"2.02. Scope of the 
Work. * * * In performance of its Work, Contractor, through the General 
Manager or otherwise, will, on behalf of, and in the name of, Owner:

"(a) hire and discharge 
all labor and employees, and such labor and employees shall be and remain the 
separate employees of Owner, shall be carried on its payroll and shall be 
subject to its full charge, supervision, and sole discretion; * * *." 
(Emphasis supplied.)

Surely, this 
language constitutes a retention of the right to control the employee's work. 
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶57]   It follows that not only is there 
an absence of any indication that in some respect the partnership agreement 
provided that the partners did not retain their legal rights of management, but 
the "management contract" specifically provided for the retention and exercise 
of such rights. Properly read and applied, Swiezynski supports the majority 
opinion. As for Mickelson v. Northern Plains Natural Gas Co., 644 F. Supp. 630 
(D.Neb. 1986), the charitable approach is to distinguish the case. If it is not 
distinguishable, it is plainly erroneous.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶58]   I would reverse the district court 
decision to grant summary judgment for Dravo Coal Company and also for the 
co-employees of Brebaugh.

Suit Against Dravo Coal 
Company

[¶59]   Dravo Coal Company and Rocky 
Mountain Energy Company formed a partnership which they called Carbon County 
Coal Company. Carbon County Coal Company, as owner, entered into a second and 
separate management contract with Dravo Coal Company from which Dravo Coal 
Company secured exclusive power and responsibility to manage the Carbon County 
Coal Company employees engaged in the mining operation. It is this management 
contract, and not the partnership agreement, that should provide the decisive 
information for settlement and resolution of this appeal.1 Within in the management contract, 
Dravo Coal Company stood in no different stead in its relation to the operation 
entity - the owner - than if it had been Peter Kiewit or Morrison-Knudsen Co., 
or some other management, engineering or construction entity. The terms of the 
contract called for Dravo Coal Company to "hire and discharge all labor and 
employees, and such labor and employees shall be and remain the separate 
employees of Owner." (Emphasis added.) Dravo Coal Company as "contractor" 
was paid $500,000 a year for its management services by the business entity 
"owner," Carbon County Coal Company.

[¶60]   It is the separate entity 
management provision in that operational contract that also altered the typical 
partnership arrangement in which all partners have an equal power and 
responsibility for direction and control. The equal right between partners to 
manage employees appears central to the argument advanced by this court, but 
that right was removed by the operational agreement. Carbon County Coal Company 
and Rocky Mountain Energy Company did not participate in the management of 
Carbon County Coal Company employees. Dravo Coal Company, in its status as an 
independent entity, hired employees in the name of the business which it 
contractually managed, Carbon County Coal Company. I would therefore hold Dravo 
Coal Company was not immune as it would be in a normal partnership. If Dravo 
Coal Company had been wearing its "partnership" hat, I would agree Dravo Coal 
Company was immune from the Brebaugh suit. Dravo Coal Company, however, was 
performing executive services as an independent contractor when Brebaugh was 
injured and was not contributing to the worker's compensation fund which would 
be necessary for immunity. Without a consolidated designation or attributable 
contribution, immunity was not properly achieved when the employee managed by 
Dravo Coal Company, but employed by Carbon County Coal Company, was injured. 
Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988).2

[¶61]   While I readily agree with the 
majority "that a partner retaining his right of management is in an employment 
relationship with a partnership employee and, thus, is an employer under our 
worker's compensation law," I am uncertain how that holding applies to this 
case. Brebaugh does not question the legal effect of a partner retaining 
joint management right, but of a partner obtaining rights not provided by 
partnership law. In this case, that extraordinary contractual right is the 
exclusive right to manage the labor of a corporate partnership. Brebaugh asks 
specifically:

Is a corporation-partner 
who takes on independent duties [as opposed to retains partnership 
rights] under a separate management contract with the partnership to be 
considered an "employer contributing as required by law" under the Wyoming 
Constitution and statutes so as to acquire immunity under the Worker's 
Compensation Act from suit by an employee of the partnership?

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶62]   Other states considering the type 
of question posed by Brebaugh have answered that the partner is not immune. The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated a trial court decision which found 
individual partners immune from suit simply because the partners were part of a 
partnership-employer under the Workmen's Compensation laws. While that court, 
like the majority in this opinion, held "a partner retaining his right of 
management is in an employment relationship with a partnership employee and, 
thus, constitutes an employer under the Worker's Compensation Law," that court 
went on to remand "for a determination as to whether the partnership agreement 
provided that the defendants did not retain their legal rights of management." 
Swiezynski v. Civiello, 126 N.H. 142, 489 A.2d 634, 637, 639 (1985). The 
majority citation of Swiezynski is inapplicable for the proposition which it is 
stated to support.3

[¶63]   It was important to know where 
managerial responsibilities resided in Swiezynski because under New Hampshire 
law, the "dispositive characteristic of the employer's status is his right to 
control the employee's work performance." Id. 489 A.2d  at 636 (accord Porter v. 
Barton, 98 N.H. 104, 105, 95 A.2d 118, 119 (1953)). Likewise in Wyoming. "The 
controlling inquiry in determining if an employment relationship exists is 
whether the alleged employer retained the right to control the alleged 
employee's work." Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 
712-13 (Wyo. 1987). The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
to remand should lead this court to reverse the district court. Only Dravo Coal 
Company retained the right to control the employees' work.

[¶64]   Similar authority is found in 
Mickelson v. Northern Plains Natural Gas Co., 644 F. Supp. 630 (D.Neb. 1986), 
where Northern Plains was a member of Northern Border, a pipeline construction 
partnership. As Dravo Coal Company did with Carbon County Coal Company, Northern 
Border entered into a construction management contract with its partner, 
Northern Plains. Northern Border, the general partnership, had purchased the 
worker's compensation insurance policy for all the contractors on the project. 
Just as with Dravo Coal Company's claim of immunity as a partner to Carbon 
County Coal Company, Northern Plains claimed "because Northern Border paid the 
premium on the policy of worker's compensation insurance under which [the 
injured worker had] been compensated, and because Northern Plains is a general 
partner in Northern Border, * * * Northern Plains is immune from [the injured 
worker's] action for damages." Id. at 631.

[¶65]   The Nebraska court disagreed with 
the position taken by Mickelson and now Dravo Coal Company. "Northern Plains had 
certain duties as the construction manager of the pipeline project. Liability 
arising out of those duties is not extinguished through its status as a partner 
in Northern Border." Id. at 632. The aggregate theory of partnerships has its 
limits in providing employer's worker's compensation immunity. Karadanis v. 
Sourwine, 783 P.2d 454 (Nev. 1989).

[¶66]   These authorities more nearly fit 
the present factual situation. For that reason and because I believe the holding 
of this court does not address the issue raised by Brebaugh and is broader than 
necessary to resolve this case, I dissent.

Co-Employees' Summary 
Judgment

[¶67]   I would also reverse the summary 
judgment granted to the co-employees of Brebaugh because careful assessment of 
the record provides a conclusion that a question of material fact exists. Baros 
v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; Poulos v. HPC, 
Inc., 765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988); Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶68]   The deposition given by Hales 
indicates that releasing the tension from the "comealongs" during splicing 
could result in "imminent danger" from a runaway belt if the conveyors 
were on a slope. He knew Brebaugh lacked previous experience in the vulcanizing 
process. Brebaugh had no supervisor to watch over his first experience in this 
area. The point on the slope where the belt was released and its total weight of 
20 tons or more almost guaranteed for anyone knowledgeable with conveyor belts 
that it could or would run if proper precautions had not been taken. First, 
proper blocking at the top and bottom pulley or belt clamps had not been 
provided. Secondly, the belt was "broke in" between the top and bottom so 
unequal weight existed, providing a gravity factor which furnished reason for 
the heavy conveyor "to run downhill." Third, the inexperienced employees were 
not warned by the supervisor of the danger that the conveyor belt could run. 
With all of this, the supervisor left the job site "at about dinner hour" and 
the unwarned employees continued into danger and tragedy. These separate acts 
should suffice for jury consideration of the required culpability for liability. 
Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363.

[¶69]   My point of departure from the 
majority occurs with the evidentiary evaluation that "[t]he risk of harm to the 
crew members in the event of a run-a-way belt was not obvious to [Hales]." 
Giving every beneficial inference from the record to Brebaugh, another possible 
evaluation of that evidence indicates a jury could find a disregard of a 
known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable. Much 
would depend on which witnesses were the most credible to the finder of fact. 
"`Evaluative judgment between two rationally possible conclusions from facts 
cannot be engaged in on summary judgment.'" Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639 
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting Fegler v. Brodie, 574 P.2d 751, 754 (Wyo. 
1978)).

[¶70]   For these reasons, I would reverse 
the grant of summary judgment.

MACY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶71]   I agree with the majority's 
decision that Dravo Coal Company is an employer which, under the facts of this 
case, enjoys the same immunity as is afforded to the partnership. I am 
concerned, however, that the majority has interpreted too broadly our decision 
in Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 768 P.2d 11 
(Wyo. 1989). While general partnership law dictates that "[a] partnership is not 
an entity separate from its partners," id. at 14, a partner could agree to exist 
as a separate entity.

[¶72]   I disagree with the majority's 
decision to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue 
of culpable negligence. The majority acknowledges that a party may establish 
culpable negligence by

demonstrating that an 
actor has intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in 
disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it 
highly probable that harm will follow.

Bryant v. 
Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo. 1989) (emphasis added).

[¶73]   In this case, Brebaugh, unlike 
Baros, presented sufficient evidence which demonstrated the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. The record shows that Brebaugh's supervisory 
co-employees failed to follow instructions in a splicing manual which directed 
workers to maintain clamps and tension on the belt while they completed the 
splicing procedure. Although the majority states that the failure to follow the 
directions in the manual did not show the requisite state of mind needed to 
establish culpable negligence, I am of the opinion that such failure and every 
favorable inference which may be drawn therefrom demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact which should be presented to a trier of fact. 
Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988); 
Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407 (Wyo. 1985). 

FOOTNOTES

1 Brebaugh does not appeal 
the district court's order granting summary judgment for co-employee Paul 
Kehrer.

2 In an amicus brief, 
Bridger Coal Company addressed this issue: Are all members of a partnership or 
joint venture, as well as the partnership or joint venture itself, the employer 
of all employees working in pursuit of the partnership's or joint venture's 
business for purposes of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act?

3 Dravo's W.R.C.P. 12(b) 
grounds included failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
known as W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

4 Art. 10, § 
4.

5 Chapter 12 of Title 27 
(Worker's Compensation, §§ 27-12-101 to 805) was repealed in 1986 and recreated 
as current Chapter 14 (W.S. 27-14-101 to 804 (1977)) effective July 1, 1987. 
This case arose under the prior act.

6 Swiezynski cites Sonberg 
v. Bergere, 220 Cal. App. 2d 681, 683, 34 Cal. Rptr. 59, 60 (1963); Carlson v. 
Carlson, 346 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Iowa 1984); Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 
22, 148 A.2d 8, 12 (1959); Greenya v. Gordon, 389 Pa. 499, 500, 133 A.2d 595, 
596 (1957); Daniels v. Roumillat, 264 S.C. 497, 501-03, 216 S.E.2d 174, 176-77 
(1975); Candler v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, 57 Wis.2d 85, 88, 
203 N.W.2d 659, 661 (1973).

7 See Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989); Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1171-72 (Wyo. 1989); Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Wyo. 1989); 
Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 
758 P.2d 566, 568 (Wyo. 1988); Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 
1986); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722, 725 (Wyo. 1987); 
Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986).

8 See also, Annotation, 
Willful, Wanton, or Reckless conduct of Coemployee as Ground of Liability 
Despite Bar of Workers' Compensation Law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888 (1987); Annotation, 
Right to Maintain Direct Action Against Fellow Employee for Injury or Death 
Covered by Workmen's Compensation, 21 A.L.R.3d 845 (1968).

9 We affirmed summary 
judgment for two other Poulos co-employees because their asserted violations of 
OSHA regulations concerning safety training and equipment did not demonstrate 
the requisite state of mind. There was no showing that these co-employees were 
aware of a high probability of harm. Instead, they had knowledge of only 
possible harm and did not know the degree of danger presented by the tank in 
which Poulos died. Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988). 

 

FOOTNOTES for 
Concurrance

1 The "management 
contract" is found as part of the record in Pool v. Dravo Coal Company, 788 P.2d 1146 (Wyo. 1990).

 

 FOOTNOTES for 
the Dissent

1 The management 
contract, with Dravo Coal Company designated "contractor" and Carbon County 
Coal Company, the partnership, designated "owner," in substantive part, 
provided:

ARTICLE I

DEFINITIONS

1.01. Definitions. For 
purposes of this Agreement, certain terms and provisions used herein are defined 
as follows:

* * 
* * * *

(d) 
General Manager. A General Manager, who shall have the responsibilities and 
authorities of the chief operating officer for Owner, shall be appointed by 
Owner and shall be responsible to and report to Contractor. The general 
supervision and management of the day-to-day operation of the Facilities shall 
be under the charge and control of the General Manager.

ARTICLE II

SCOPE AND MANNER OF 
PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK

2.01. Employment of 
Contractor. Owner hereby appoints Contractor to perform and Contractor 
hereby agrees to the Work hereinafter defined.

2.02. Scope of the 
Work. The Work shall consist of supervising the construction and completion 
of the Mine and the development and operation of the Facilities so as to 
efficiently, economically and lawfully mine coal by underground methods in the 
volume and quality required by Owner, all in accordance with such production 
programs, operational programs and budgetary authorizations as may be 
established from time to time by Owner. In performance of its Work, Contractor, 
through the General Manager or otherwise, will, on behalf of, and in the name 
of, Owner:

(a) 
hire and discharge all labor and employees, and such labor and employees shall 
be and remain the separate employees of Owner, shall be carried on its payroll 
and shall be subject to its full charge, supervision, and sole 
discretion;

(b) 
at Owner's expense purchase, construct, lease or otherwise acquire all property 
and assets including material, supplies, equipment, water, utilities and 
transportation required to carry on Owner's business (such purchases and 
acquisitions shall be made on the best terms available taking into account all 
of the circumstances); obtain such customary warranties and guarantees as are 
available in connection with such purchases and acquisitions;

(c) 
pay out of Owner's funds all of Owner's direct costs and expenses. * * 
*

(d) 
at Owner's expense procure and maintain insurance coverage pertaining to Owner's 
operations as may be required by applicable law, and, in addition, carry 
adequate Automobile Public Liability and Property Damage Insurance covering all 
automotive equipment which Owner may use in its operations and such other 
insurance, if any, as may from time to time be approved by Owner. Each policy 
carried hereunder shall name the Owner and the Partners as assured, as their 
interest may appear, and shall require the insurers to notify the Partners in 
writing ten days prior to any cancellation or modification thereof. Upon 
request, Owner will furnish each insured with a certificate issued by the 
insurance carrier or carriers showing the coverage in force 
hereunder;

* * 
* * * *

(p) 
provide Owner with the following administrative services:

(i) 
Administration, general supervision, technical and legal assistance (by 
Contractor's technical and legal staff or other regularly employed 
personnel);

* * 
* * * *

2.04. Personnel. 
Contractor shall furnish such qualified employees as may be required for the 
efficient performance of the Work.

As 
between Owner and Contractor all personnel furnished by Contractor to perform 
the Work shall be considered to be employees of Contractor.

Contractor shall have the 
right to employ consultants and to subcontract any part of the Work, subject to 
such limits as Owner may define.

2 In obvious response to 
Stratman, the Wyoming statutes on joint entity operation were changed by Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 226, § 1 (1989):

27-14-102. 
Definitions.

(a) As used in this 
act:

* * * * * *

(xix) "Joint employer" 
means any person, firm, corporation or other entity which employs joint 
employees, is associated by ownership, commonly managed or controlled and 
contributes to the worker's compensation account as required by this 
act;

(xx) "Employer making 
contributions required by this act" means the employee's employer and any joint 
employer when the employer or any joint employer reports the employee's wages to 
the division on an account or through a consolidated worker's compensation 
account and contributions are made to the fund as required by this 
act;

(xxi) "Joint Employee" 
means any person:

(A) Who has an express or 
implied contract for employment with more one (1) joint employer at the same 
time;

(B) Whose work is 
controlled by more than one (1) joint employer; and

(C) Who is engaged in the 
performance of work for more than one (1) joint employer.

(xxii) "Consolidated 
Wyoming worker's compensation account" means an account maintained by the 
Wyoming worker's compensation division to which an employer reports the wages of 
its employees and joint employees for its own account and the account of its 
joint employers, pursuant to which contributions are made to the fund as 
required by this act.

As 
actually suggested in Stratman and now detailed by the new statutory provision, 
the managerial answer is to designate the account within the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation agency as a consolidated account under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xxii) and 
include associated entities within the purview of subsection (xix). The employer 
for the consolidated account should include all entities, which by management, 
ownership or controlled relationships seek common worker's compensation coverage 
and consequently separate immunity from liability when an employee is 
injured.

We 
are not presented in this case with a consolidated account which was permitted 
under prior law, see Stratman, 760 P.2d  at 986, 987, and nothing in the record 
reflects why the account did not include those "consolidated" entities for which 
immunity is now claimed. Hopefully, corporate partnership entity businesses will 
recognize the exposure in non-action and the benefit in compliance with the 
Stratman worker's compensation statutory amendments of 1989.

3 The issue of Swiezynski, 
489 A.2d 634 for which the case was remanded by the appellate court to the 
district court following appeal for a further determination is precisely the 
issue presented here. That issue is the effect of an agreement of the 
partnership which effectively contracts away rights of equal management. That 
determination was controlling in Swiezynski and is precisely the present issue 
here where a "third party" management agreement is made between the partnership 
and one of the partners as an independent contractor. This court and 
particularly the special concurrence ignores the contracting away language found 
in the New Hampshire case which was also decisive in theory and application in 
Mickelson v. Northern Plains Natural Gas Co., 644 F. Supp. 630 (D.Neb. 1986). 
Mickelson and Swiezynski are identical in applied theory in addressing results 
of a partner or partnership contracting away rights of management. Swiezynski, 
489 A.2d  at 637.