Title: People v. Chapman

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85332-Agenda 1-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								REGINALD CHAPMAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Reginald Chapman, was charged in the circuit
court of Cook County with six counts of first degree murder, two
counts of aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of concealment
of a homicidal death. These charges related to the August 1994,
murders of Angela Butler and Christopher Butler. The State nol-prossed the aggravated kidnapping counts, the concealment of a
homicidal death counts, and the two felony-murder counts. The
jury returned separate general verdicts of guilty against defendant
for the first degree murder of Angela Butler and the first degree
murder of Christopher Butler.
	The same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty
based upon the following two statutory aggravating factors: that
the defendant murdered two or more individuals (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998)); and that the defendant murdered an
individual who was under 12 years of age, and the death resulted
from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1998)). Defendant waived a
jury for the second phase of the death sentencing hearing. After
considering evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court
found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the
death penalty and sentenced defendant to death.
	Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by this court. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d
Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's
convictions and death sentence.
FACTS
	The evidence at trial revealed that on September 4, 1994, a
body was reported to be floating in the water in the Calumet Sag
Channel in Alsip, Illinois. The Illinois State Police underwater
search and recovery team and members of the criminal
investigations unit were dispatched to the scene. When dive team
members recovered the body, it was floating face down, and it was
wrapped in orange and black electrical cord. The cord was
attached to two free weights, one weighing 50 pounds, and the
other weighing 25 pounds. The body was bloated, discolored, and
decomposed from being in the water.
	Investigators determined that the victim was Angela Butler.
The police interviewed Georgia Anderson, Angela's grandmother,
who told the investigators that Angela had a five-month-old son,
Christopher Butler, and that Angela had been living with the
family of her fiancé, Louis Murillo. Angela's parents lived in
Israel, which is where Angela had been raised. Angela had only
lived in Chicago, where her grandmother lived, for a few years.
Angela's grandmother informed the police that Angela had been
missing since August 27, 1994, and that a missing persons report
had been filed with the Chicago police department on August 31,
1994.
	Testimony revealed that Angela's relationship with Murillo
began soon after she moved to Chicago and lasted for a year and
a half. After Angela ended the relationship, she began to date
defendant, and they lived together for several months. On April 9,
1994, Angela gave birth to defendant's child, Christopher Butler.
Their relationship ended soon after. Angela and Murillo then
resumed their relationship and became engaged in June 1994, and
Angela moved in with the Murillo family. At the end of August
1994, Murillo returned to college in Iowa. Angela planned to
move to Iowa in October to live with Murillo.
	Curtis Taylor, Murillo's brother, testified that on August 27,
1994, he, Angela, and other members of Murillo's family planned
to attend a birthday party. At approximately 3 p.m., they stopped
at a Dominicks grocery store to buy a cake. Angela and Taylor
remained in the car. Angela's son, Christopher, was also with
them and remained in the car. As they were waiting in the car,
defendant approached, knocked on the window, and motioned for
Angela to exit. Angela asked defendant what he was doing there.
Defendant asked to see Christopher, stating that he had not seen
him in over a week. After Angela gave the baby to defendant, they
walked to defendant's car, where defendant shoved Angela into
his car. Taylor went over to defendant's car and asked Angela
where she was going. Angela responded that she was going for a
ride and that she would be back in a few minutes. According to
Taylor, Angela seemed frightened, and defendant seemed angry
and upset.
	When Taylor returned to his car, he realized that Angela had
left the baby's diaper bag in the car. When the other family
members returned from the grocery store, they waited for 10
minutes for Angela to return. When they reached the birthday
party, Taylor unsuccessfully attempted to telephone Angela.
Testimony revealed that Taylor identified defendant in a lineup as
the person he saw with Angela and Christopher on August 27,
1994.
	Testimony from police officers revealed that, on Friday,
September 9, 1994, at approximately 7 a.m., pursuant to the
ongoing investigation into the murder of Angela and the
disappearance of Christopher, officers arrived at defendant's
apartment and knocked on the door. Defendant was in the
apartment with his girlfriend, Tiffany Brownlee, and Tiffany's 18-month-old son, Jeremy. A police officer read defendant his
constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda, and defendant waived
these rights. Defendant also signed a consent to search his
apartment and his car.
	The police subsequently took defendant to the Illinois State
Police station at 83rd and King Drive. At around 9:15 a.m.,
Officers Robert Amenitsch and Officer Kizart interviewed
defendant for approximately 45 minutes after again advising
defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant stated that he did not
recall the last time he saw Angela. Defendant initially denied
owning any weight-lifting equipment, but then told the officers
that he had recently sold his weight-lifting equipment to an
individual named "Foy." Defendant subsequently told the officers
that he had given the weight-lifting equipment to his brother. As
we will discuss in detail later, throughout the course of that Friday,
authorities interviewed defendant, but when they asked defendant
if he knew the location of Angela and Christopher, he began to
cry, and the interviews were terminated.
	The next morning, Saturday, September 10, 1994, at
approximately 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., defendant, after waiving
his Miranda rights, made a statement to Assistant State's Attorney
Pierre Tismo. Tismo testified that defendant admitted that he had
spoken to Angela on August 27, 1994, at the grocery store parking
lot. Defendant stated that they met to talk about Angela's
upcoming move to Iowa. Defendant said that he, Angela, and
Christopher drove in his car to defendant's apartment, where
defendant and Angela argued. Defendant stated that he hit Angela
with his open hand, with his fist, and with a baseball bat. When
Tismo asked how Angela's body ended up in the Calumet Sag
Channel, defendant responded that he put her there. When asked
where Christopher was, defendant put his head down and cried, yet
he stated that authorities could find Christopher where they found
Angela. On September 12, 1994, Christopher's decomposed body
was recovered from the Calumet Sag Channel. Christopher's body
was tied with orange electrical cords to 40 pounds of weights.
	Tiffany Brownlee testified that she was with defendant early
in the day on August 27, 1994, the day the victims disappeared.
She woke up with defendant at his apartment that morning. Later,
they went to defendant's mother's house. They were watching
television when defendant received a telephone call. He left and
said that he would be right back. Tiffany left and went to her
mother's house at around 5:30 p.m. after waiting for 1½ hours for
defendant to return. She spent the night at her mother's house.
	Tiffany saw defendant the next day, on August 28, 1994.
Defendant picked her up in his car, and they went to defendant's
mother's house. While they were there, Tiffany saw defendant
clean out the trunk of his car. When they returned to defendant's
apartment that evening, she noticed that it was in disarray and that
certain items were missing. Among the missing items were a long
orange electrical cord that connected the television to an electrical
outlet. Also missing was defendant's weight-lifting equipment.
When shown the photographs of the electrical cords and weights
that were found on the victims, Tiffany identified those items as
the same items that were missing from defendant's apartment.
Tiffany also testified about the events of Friday morning,
September 9, 1994, when the police arrived at defendant's
apartment. Before defendant opened the door and allowed the
officers into his apartment, defendant told Tiffany to tell the police
that he had "been with you [Tiffany]."
	Crime scene investigator Dexter Bartlett testified regarding
his search of defendant's car. There was a contact blood smear on
the rubber weather strip in the trunk of defendant's car. Bartlett
recovered a pair of infant gym shoes from the trunk. These shoes
had blood splatters on them. Bartlett testified that the blood
splatters on the shoes appeared to have hit the shoes at a 90-degree
angle. Crime scene investigator Paul Smith testified regarding his
search of defendant's apartment. Smith recovered several items,
including a blanket that had bloodstains on it and a baseball bat.
Later testing revealed that the DNA extracted from the bloodstains
on the infant shoes and on the blanket matched the DNA of
Angela.
	Dr. Adrienne Segovia, a forensic pathologist, testified
regarding the autopsies of Angela and Christopher. On the back of
Angela's head, there was a one-inch laceration that indicated some
type of blunt force trauma. Underneath the laceration, between the
scalp and the skull, there was evidence of a hemorrhage.
According to Dr. Segovia, this meant that Angela was alive at the
time she sustained the laceration because bleeding occurred. The
examination also revealed that the right hyoid bone of Angela's
neck was fractured. This injury was consistent with manual
strangulation. Dr. Segovia testified that Angela's body had been
in the water for several days. Dr. Segovia concluded that the cause
of Angela's death was strangulation.
	Dr. Segovia also testified regarding the autopsy of
Christopher. Christopher's body likewise had been in the water for
several days and was severely decomposed. Portions of
Christopher's head and arms were missing, and his body showed
indications of "aquatic animal activity." The medical examiners'
opinion was that the cause of Christopher's death was suffocation;
yet, because of the decomposed state of Christopher's body from
the water, the manner of suffocation was inconclusive.
	The jury returned separate general verdicts of guilty against
defendant for the first degree murder of Angela and the first degree
murder of Christopher. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the trial
court merged the knowledge counts into the intent counts and
entered judgment of first degree intentional murder as to Angela
and first degree intentional murder as to Christopher. At the first
phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury found defendant eligible
for the death penalty based upon the following two statutory
aggravating factors: that the defendant murdered two or more
individuals (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998)); and that the
defendant murdered an individual who was under 12 years of age,
and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7)
(West 1998)). Defendant waived a jury for the second phase of the
sentencing hearing. He also waived his right to be present during
the second phase of the hearing. After considering evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, evidence which we will later discuss
in more detail, the trial court found no mitigating factors sufficient
to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced
defendant to death for the murders of Angela and Christopher.
	The trial court denied defendant's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial, and
denied defendant's motion to vacate the death sentence. The trial
court also denied defendant's pro se motion to set aside the jury
verdict and for a new trial. Defendant now appeals his convictions
and sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. Trial Issues
A. Motion to Suppress Statements
	Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress statements he made to authorities. Defendant
argues that the police interfered with his opportunity to consult
with counsel prior to custodial interrogation and thereby violated
his state constitutional right to due process (see Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §2) and right against self-incrimination (see Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §10). Defendant argues that the admission of these
statements requires reversal of his conviction and a new trial. For
the following reasons, we reject defendant's argument.
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress inculpatory
statements he made to authorities. The trial court held a hearing on
the motion to suppress at which the following evidence was
presented. On Friday, September 9, 1994, at approximately 7 a.m.,
pursuant to the ongoing investigation into the murder of Angela
Butler and disappearance of Christopher Butler, police officers
arrived at defendant's apartment. Defendant agreed to talk with the
officers and allowed them entry into his apartment. Officer James
Kizart read defendant his constitutional rights pursuant to
Miranda, and defendant waived these rights. Defendant talked
with the officers and subsequently agreed to accompany them to
the police station.
	The police took defendant to the Illinois State Police station
at 83rd and King Drive. At around 9:15 a.m., Officer Robert
Amenitsch and Officer Kizart interviewed defendant for
approximately 45 minutes after again advising defendant of his
Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant stated that he did not
recall the last time he saw Angela. Defendant initially denied
owning any weight-lifting equipment, but then told the officers
that he had recently sold his weight-lifting equipment to an
individual named "Foy." Defendant subsequently told the officers
that he had given the weight-lifting equipment to his brother.
	At approximately 11 a.m. on Friday, September 9, 1994,
Officer Kizart and Officer Carolyn Black interviewed defendant
for about an hour after again advising defendant of his Miranda
rights, which he again waived. The officers showed defendant
pictures of Angela and Christopher and asked him if he knew
where they were. Defendant responded that he did not know where
they were but that they were together. When Officer Black showed
defendant a picture of Angela's body after it had been recovered
from the Calumet Sag Channel, defendant began to sob, and the
interview was terminated.
	At approximately 2:15 p.m., Officer Tasso Kachiroubas and
another officer spoke with defendant for about 15 minutes and
asked defendant for more specific information regarding the
location of Christopher's body. Defendant did not say anything
and began to cry. Officer Kachiroubas and an assistant State's
Attorney spoke with defendant for 15 minutes at about 8 p.m. that
Friday. Officer Kachiroubas explained that divers were scheduled
to begin a search for Christopher the next morning, and that
authorities needed defendant's assistance in determining a target
area. Defendant began to sob, and the interview was terminated.
Defendant waived his Miranda rights during these conversations.
	At approximately 5:30 the next morning, Saturday, September
10, 1994, defendant was transferred from the Illinois State Police
station on 83rd and King Drive to the Blue Island police station.
Testimony revealed that the police station on 83rd and King Drive
does not have a holding facility, and it is therefore customary to
transfer suspects to other police stations when a holding facility
becomes necessary.
	At approximately 11:30 on that Saturday morning, September
10, 1994, Assistant State's Attorney Pierre Tismo arrived at the
Blue Island police station to assist in the investigation. Defendant
was advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to Tismo.
During an interview that lasted for about an hour, until 12:30 p.m.,
defendant stated that he had spoken to Angela on August 27, 1994,
at the grocery store parking lot. Defendant said that they met to
talk about Angela's upcoming move to Iowa. Defendant recounted
that he, Angela, and Christopher drove in his car to defendant's
apartment, where defendant and Angela argued. Defendant stated
that he hit Angela with his open hand, with his fist, and with a
baseball bat. When Tismo asked how Angela's body ended up in
the Calumet Sag Channel, defendant responded that he put her
there. When asked where Christopher was, defendant put his head
down and cried. Defendant stated that authorities could find
Christopher where they found Angela.
	While Tismo was interviewing defendant, Officer Carolyn
Black, who was in charge of the investigation and who had
interviewed defendant the previous day, was at home preparing to
come to work. Officer Black testified at the suppression hearing
that, at approximately 11:30 to 11:40 on that Saturday morning,
she received a page. She dialed the phone number, and the person
who answered identified himself as an attorney representing
"defendant's father." Officer Black had apparently spoken to
defendant's father at 83rd and King Drive the previous day when
defendant's father had gone there to inquire about defendant.
Defendant's father had been informed that defendant was being
questioned about the disappearance of Angela and Christopher. In
response to the caller's request for information regarding
defendant, Officer Black stated that she was at home, that she had
no way of verifying the caller's identity, and that she would not
discuss defendant's case over the telephone. According to Officer
Black, when the caller began to shout at her, she terminated the
call.
	Shortly after this telephone conversation, Officer Black left
for work. During her 70-minute drive to the Blue Island police
station, Officer Black received another page with a phone number
she did not recognize. She was not able to return this page because
she did not have a cellular phone. Officer Black arrived at the Blue
Island police station at around 1:30 p.m.
	Nathan Diamond-Falk also testified at the suppression
hearing. On Saturday, September 10, 1994, at about 10 a.m.,
defendant's father retained him to represent defendant. Diamond-Falk testified that at some time he made several telephone calls to
obtain information about defendant, and was eventually given the
name and pager number of Officer Black. He paged Officer Black,
who returned the call at about 11 a.m. but refused to give him
information without first verifying his identity. According to
Diamond-Falk, he gave Officer Black the phone number and
address of his home and office so that she could confirm his
identity. Diamond-Falk maintained that Officer Black stated that
she would call him back, but that she never did.
	Diamond-Falk then drove to the police station at 83rd and
King Drive. Diamond-Falk testified that he arrived at the police
station at approximately 12:30 or 12:45 p.m. Diamond-Falk,
however, testified that he remembered listening to the Michigan
versus Notre Dame football game on his way to the station. The
parties stipulated that on September 10, 1994, this football game
started at 1:45 p.m. Diamond-Falk stated that he arrived at the
police station in the afternoon, but did not recall the exact time.
Diamond-Falk stated that, when he was at the police station, he
informed individuals that he was an attorney and that he
represented defendant, but that he was not told defendant's
location. Diamond-Falk did not remember the description of the
person to whom he spoke when he arrived at the police station.
The officer on duty at the 83rd and King Drive police station from
7 a.m. to 3 p.m. on Saturday, September 10, 1994, testified that he
did not recall talking with Diamond-Falk. Diamond-Falk testified
that he remained at the police station for two hours, but was never
told of defendant's location. On Sunday, September 11, 1994,
defendant gave more detailed statements regarding the murders.
Diamond-Falk never met with defendant on Sunday.
	The trial court found that "the defendant was advised of his
Miranda warnings numerous times, agreed to waive those
warnings and agreed to speak to authorities; that the defendant did
not ask to speak [to] or see a lawyer; that the defendant voluntarily
consented to the searches; that the police or the state's attorney did
not coerce the defendant into giving any oral or written
statements." The trial court further found that "the move from
83rd and King to the Blue Island police station was not made in
order to hold the defendant incommunicado; that the move was
made in good faith pursuant to [a] valid investigatory process,"
and that the "immediate investigating police and state's attorney
were not aware that Mr. Diamond-Falk arrived at the 83rd Street
station." Nevertheless, the trial court held that, under People v.
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994), any statements made after
attorney Diamond-Falk arrived at the police station at 83rd and
King Drive, where defendant was last seen, must be suppressed.
The trial court found that Diamond-Falk arrived at the police
station at 2 p.m. on Saturday, September 10, 1994. Thus, the trial
court suppressed all statements given by defendant after that time.
	Defendant now contests the admissibility of the statement that
he gave to the assistant State's Attorney on Saturday, September
10, 1994, from approximately 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. Defendant
argues that this statement also should have been suppressed
because it was obtained in violation of the constitutional principles
expressed in McCauley. We note that a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence generally is subject to reversal only
if manifestly erroneous. People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 108
(1998); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1996). The issue in this
appeal, however, involves the trial court's application of the law
to uncontested facts, and we therefore conduct de novo review.
See People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998).
	A defendant's right against self-incrimination is guaranteed
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution and by article I, section 10, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970. This right includes the right to an attorney.
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 421. A defendant, however, may waive
these rights, provided that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. In determining whether this waiver is knowing and
intelligent, a court considers the totality of the circumstances,
including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the
interrogation. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 421. The State bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of
these rights. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 422. This court in McCauley
addressed these principles.
	In McCauley, the defendant was brought to the police station
for questioning in connection with a murder. The defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights and did not request an attorney.
However, unbeknownst to the defendant, his family had retained
an attorney for him. The defendant's attorney called the police
station and ultimately went to the police station and requested to
speak with the defendant. When the defendant's attorney arrived
at the police station, the police officers refused the attorney access
to the defendant and also failed to inform the defendant that his
attorney was present at the station and seeking to consult with him.
The defendant subsequently gave a statement to the police in
response to their questioning. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the statement. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 418-20.
	This court affirmed the suppression of the defendant's
statement on the ground that the conduct of the police violated the
defendant's rights under the Illinois Constitution. This court
explained that the United States Supreme Court, in Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986),
rejected the contention that such police conduct violated a
defendant's right to counsel under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Nevertheless, this court in McCauley
proceeded to consider whether such conduct violated the
defendant's right to counsel under article I, section 10, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970. This court concluded that the right
to counsel under the Illinois Constitution should be construed
more broadly than its federal counterpart. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at
423-24.
	This court in McCauley proceeded to hold that the conduct of
the police rendered the defendant's waiver of counsel invalid. The
record showed that the police refused the defendant's attorney
access to the defendant during interrogation and did not inform
defendant that his attorney "was present at the station, seeking to
consult with him." McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 445. Thus, the
defendant was denied information necessary to "knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to his attorney's presence as well as
the actual and immediately available assistance of his own
attorney." McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 446. In light of these
circumstances, this court held that the State failed to satisfy its
burden of showing that the defendant knowingly waived his right
to counsel under the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §10). McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 445-46.
	This court also concluded that, based upon the record, the
defendant's statement to the police was obtained in violation of the
defendant's due process rights under article I, section 2, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970. The court held that "due process is
violated when police interfere with a suspect's right to his
attorney's assistance and presence by affirmatively preventing the
suspect, exposed to interrogation, from receiving the immediately
available assistance of an attorney hired or appointed to represent
him." McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 444.
	Our appellate court has faced the issue of whether the holding
in McCauley applied to factual scenarios where an attorney merely
telephoned the police station to contact a client in custody. The
appellate court has reached different results in those cases.
Compare People v. Milestone, 283 Ill. App. 3d 682, 684-87 (1996)
(holding that police officers' failure to inform the defendant in
custody that his attorney was on the telephone seeking to consult
with him rendered the defendant's subsequent statements not
admissible), with People v. Albrecht, 271 Ill. App. 3d 629, 630-32,
637, 639 (1995) (holding, in a situation where the police did not
inform the defendant in custody that an attorney was seeking to
consult with him by telephone and then later in person at the
police station, that all statements made after the attorney arrived
at the police station were not admissible, but that any statements
made before the attorney arrived at the police station were
admissible). For the following reasons, we hold that, in this case,
the McCauley rule does not require the suppression of the
statement that defendant made after the time that his attorney
telephoned the police station, but before the time his attorney was
physically present at the police station. To the extent that the
appellate court decision in People v. Milestone, 283 Ill. App. 3d
682 (1996), is not consistent with our holding, it is hereby
overruled.
	This court in McCauley squarely held that a defendant's state
constitutional rights were violated where the police denied the
attorney retained for the defendant physical access to the
defendant during interrogation, and where the police did not
inform the defendant that the attorney was seeking to consult with
him at the police station. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 444-46. Under
those circumstances, the State failed to satisfy its burden of
showing that the defendant had knowingly waived his state
constitutional rights. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 445.
	The circumstances in this case are different from the
circumstances in McCauley. On Saturday, September 10, 1994,
defendant, after being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights,
confessed that he hit Angela with his open hand, with his fist, and
with a baseball bat, and that he put Angela in the Calumet Sag
Channel. Defendant made this statement between 11:30 a.m. and
12:30 p.m. Defendant's attorney did not arrive at the police station
until 2 p.m. and was therefore not "physically present" and
"immediately available" to defendant until that time. The trial
court suppressed all statements defendant made after 2 p.m. Here,
the State satisfied its burden of showing that defendant knowingly
waived his state constitutional rights. Indeed, the trial court found
that "the defendant was advised of his Miranda warnings
numerous times, agreed to waive those warnings and agreed to
speak to authorities; that the defendant did not ask to speak [to] or
see a lawyer; *** that the police or the state's attorney did not
coerce the defendant into giving any oral or written statements."
	Defendant nevertheless suggests that the police conduct in this
case was deceitful and that this conduct impacted his decision to
knowingly waive his rights. He references the fact that authorities
moved defendant from the Illinois State Police station on 83rd and
King Drive to the Blue Island police station. Contrary to
defendant's contentions, the record in this case does not reveal any
deceitful acts by the police. The trial court specifically found that
"the move from 83rd and King to the Blue Island police station
was not made in order to hold the defendant incommunicado; that
the move was made in good faith pursuant to [a] valid
investigatory process." Testimony at the suppression hearing
revealed that the police station on 83rd and King Drive does not
have a holding facility, and it is therefore customary to transfer
suspects to other police stations when a holding facility becomes
necessary. Moreover, the trial court held that any statements
defendant made after 2 p.m., the time when defendant's attorney
arrived at the 83rd and King Drive police station, were not
admissible, as this was the last known location of defendant. The
decision in McCauley focused on the deceitful acts by the police
which prevented immediately available counsel from assisting a
client during custodial interrogation. See Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d  at
106 (discussing the McCauley holding in rejecting the defendant's
argument that his statement should be suppressed because he gave
the statement after the police removed him from a room where he
was waiting to appear for a preliminary hearing on an unrelated
charge). There was no such deceitful conduct in this case.
	Defendant, however, also references Officer Black's refusal
to give attorney Diamond-Falk information when Diamond-Falk
telephoned Officer Black. We do not view Officer Black's prudent
refusal to discuss the details of defendant's case over the telephone
with a stranger to constitute deceitful conduct. This situation
exemplifies the problems inherent in expanding the holding in
McCauley to situations where an attorney who is seeking contact
with a client in custody is not physically present at the police
station. The police have no way of verifying that the voice on the
telephone is actually the suspect's attorney. Defendant suggests
that this problem could be rectified by requiring the attorney to
provide the police his or her Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission number. There is still no way to verify
that this number belongs to the voice on the telephone. Only
through physical presence may the police verify, through proper
identification, that the person in front of them is the person he or
she is claiming to be.
	We hold that, under McCauley, the statements that defendant
made after his attorney arrived at the police station were properly
suppressed. The statement that defendant made before his attorney
arrived at the police station was properly admitted at defendant's
trial. This holding strikes the appropriate balance between the
state's interest in effective crime investigation and a suspect's state
constitutional rights to due process and against self-incrimination
(see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 10).
	Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address
the State's alternative argument that, in light of all of the other
evidence of defendant's guilt, the admission of defendant's
statement was harmless error and does not require a new trial.
B. Delay Between Arrest and Preliminary Hearing
	Defendant next argues that his statement should be suppressed
because of the three-day delay between his arrest and his
preliminary hearing. Defendant was arrested at approximately 7
a.m. on Friday, September 9, 1994. According to the testimony at
the suppression hearing, defendant was brought to the Markham
courthouse for a preliminary hearing late in the evening on
Sunday, September 11, 1994, or early in the morning on Monday,
September 12, 1994. Defendant argues that this three-day delay
entitles him to a new trial at which his statement from Saturday,
September 10, 1994, must be suppressed. We reject defendant's
argument.
	Illinois law provides that a person arrested with or without a
warrant shall be brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing
"without unnecessary delay." 725 ILCS 5/109-1(a) (West 1998).
This court has held that a delay between an arrest and a
preliminary hearing is merely a factor to be considered in
determining whether a confession was voluntary and, therefore,
does not invalidate a confession per se. See People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 380 (1990). Whether a confession is voluntary is
judged by the totality of the circumstances, which include: the age,
education, and intelligence of the accused; the duration of both the
detention and the questioning; whether the accused was advised of
his or her constitutional rights; and whether the accused was
subjected to physical mistreatment. See House, 141 Ill. 2d  at 376.
Where, as here, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress a
confession involves factual determinations and credibility
assessments, a reviewing court will not disturb the ruling unless it
is manifestly erroneous. See Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 108.
	The trial court in this case found that "the defendant was
advised of his Miranda warnings numerous times, agreed to waive
those warnings and agreed to speak to authorities; that the
defendant did not ask to speak [to] or see a lawyer; that the
defendant voluntarily consented to the searches; that the police or
the state's attorney did not coerce the defendant into giving any
oral or written statements." The record shows that defendant was
an educated adult. Defendant was fully advised of his
constitutional rights. Defendant was given opportunities to eat,
sleep, and use the restroom, and the questioning was intermittent.
There was no physical mistreatment. The trial court also found that
the time between defendant's arrest and defendant's first court
appearance was not unreasonable, as the delay was attributable to
the search for the missing five-month-old Christopher. The trial
court's holding that defendant's confession was voluntary is not
manifestly erroneous.
	Defendant nevertheless argues that the delay between his
warrantless arrest and preliminary hearing violated his fourth
amendment right to a prompt determination of probable cause. See
U.S. Const., amend. IV; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975). In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 63, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670
(1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a judicial
determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest
generally passes constitutional muster. When a probable cause
determination is not made within 48 hours of arrest, the burden
shifts to the government to show the existence of a bona fide
emergency or other extraordinary circumstances to justify the
delay. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.  at 57, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 63, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1670.
	Here, as the trial court found, the delay was attributable to the
existence of the emergency of finding the missing five-month-old
Christopher. The police knew that Christopher was last seen with
defendant. Divers had been unsuccessful in their efforts to find
Christopher in the Calumet Sag Channel. Much of the questioning
of defendant that occurred during the three-day period focused on
seeking information regarding Christopher's location. We
therefore reject defendant's argument that he is entitled to a new
trial at which his statement must be suppressed.
C. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and
suppress evidence resulting from the arrest. After a hearing, the
trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court found that
the police had probable cause to arrest defendant on the morning
of Friday, September 9, 1994, when police officers arrived at his
apartment. The trial court also found that defendant allowed the
police officers into his apartment and then voluntarily signed a
form consenting to a search of his apartment and his car.
Defendant now argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant
contends that he was arrested without probable cause and that he
is therefore entitled to a new trial at which all evidence resulting
from his arrest must be suppressed. Defendant argues that the
consent-to-search form was also a product of his unlawful arrest
and that all evidence resulting from this consent therefore must be
suppressed. We reject defendant's argument and hold that the
police had probable cause to arrest defendant at his apartment on
the morning of Friday, September 9, 1994.
	Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6.
A warrantless arrest is lawful where police have knowledge of
facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime
has occurred and that the person to be arrested committed the
crime. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999); People v. Kidd,
175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1996). The determination of whether police had
probable cause to arrest focuses on the factual considerations upon
which reasonable, prudent people, not legal technicians, act. Buss,
187 Ill. 2d  at 204; Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 24. This determination
considers facts known to the police at the time the arrest was
made. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 204. A defendant has the burden of
demonstrating an illegal search or seizure. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 204;
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 22. When a trial court's ruling on a motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence involves factual determinations
and credibility assessments, a reviewing court will not reverse the
ruling unless it is manifestly erroneous. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at
204; People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998). De novo review
is appropriate, however, when there are no factual or credibility
disputes, and the appeal therefore involves a pure question of law.
Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 204-05; Wright, 183 Ill. 2d  at 21. The
resolution of defendant's argument in this appeal does not turn on
such disputes; thus, our review is de novo.
	Here, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant based
upon the following information which was known to the police at
the time of the arrest. Angela's body, bound with weights, had
been retrieved from the Calumet Sag Channel on September 4,
1994. The police interviewed Curtis Taylor, the brother of Louis
Murillo, Angela's fiancé. Taylor was with Angela in a grocery
store parking lot on August 27, 1994. As they were sitting in their
car waiting for other family members in the store, defendant
approached the car and had a discussion with Angela. Defendant
shoved Angela into his car and drove away with Angela and
Christopher. This was the last time Angela and Christopher were
seen alive. Taylor described Angela as "frightened" and defendant
as "hostile." Records showed that the car defendant owned
matched Taylor's description of defendant's car. The fact that
Angela was last seen alive when she drove away with defendant
supports the probable cause finding. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 206-08.
	Additionally, the clothing found on Angela's body was
identified as the clothing Angela was wearing on the day she
disappeared. The September 5, 1994, autopsy revealed that
Angela's body had been in the water for several days. This was
consistent with the time between when Angela disappeared and
when her body was retrieved from the channel.
	Further, a police report and interviews with Angela's
grandmother and Elaina Murillo, the sister of Angela's fiancé,
revealed some of the abuse that Angela suffered at the hands of
defendant during their relationship. Finally, Elaina Murillo also
revealed that Angela was engaged to Louis Murillo and was
planning to move to Iowa to live with him.
	These circumstances would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that a crime had been committed and that defendant
committed the crime. " '[P]robability of criminal activity, rather
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is the standard for
determining whether probable cause is present.' " Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 
at 205-06, quoting People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 370 (1990).
Here, the totality of the circumstances reveals that the police had
probable cause to arrest defendant at his apartment on the morning
of Friday, September 9, 1994.
	As a final matter, we reject defendant's suggestion that the
State did not establish probable cause to arrest him because a
police officer testified at the hearing that the police would not have
been able to obtain an arrest warrant before going to defendant's
apartment. "Probable cause is an objective standard, and an
officer's subjective belief as to the existence of probable cause is
not determinative." Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 209 (rejecting the
defendant's argument that the determination of probable cause was
affected by police officers' testimony that they did not believe that
they had probable cause to arrest the defendant). As we have
discussed, the facts demonstrate that the police had probable cause
to arrest defendant, and a subjective belief to the contrary does not
change that conclusion.
	We hold that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant
at his apartment on the morning of Friday, September 9, 1994. We
therefore reject defendant's argument that he is entitled to a new
trial at which all evidence resulting from that arrest must be
suppressed.
D. Admissibility of Autopsy and Crime Scene Photographs
	Defendant next argues that he was denied his due process
right to a fair trial when the trial court admitted into evidence
certain photographs from the autopsy and the crime scene, and
allowed six of these photographs to be sent to the jury during
deliberations. According to defendant, "[w]here the cause of death
was stated to be consistent with strangulation and suffocation, and
the State nolle prossed the concealment of homicide counts, there
was no purpose served by the admission of gory photographs from
the scene and the autopsy."
	The decision of whether a jury should be allowed to see
photographs of a decedent is a decision that rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 76-77
(1999); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319 (1990). If
photographs are relevant to prove facts at issue, they are
admissible and may be shown to the jury unless the prejudicial
nature of the photographs outweighs their probative value. Heard,
187 Ill. 2d  at 77; Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319. When a defendant
in a murder trial pleads not guilty, the prosecution is allowed to
prove every element of the crime charged and every relevant fact.
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319. Among the valid reasons for
admitting photographs of a decedent are to prove the nature and
extent of the injuries, the position, condition, and location of the
body, and the manner and cause of death; to corroborate a
defendant's confession; and to aid in understanding the testimony
of a pathologist or other witness. See Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 77;
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319-20. If photographs could aid the jury
in understanding testimony, they may be admitted even if
cumulative of that testimony. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 77; Henderson,
142 Ill. 2d  at 320.
	Here, the photographs about which defendant complains
include depictions of Angela's body in the Calumet Sag Channel;
Angela's decomposed face and body after being recovered from
the channel; Angela's back, showing the cords used to tie the
weights to her body; and Christopher's decomposed body after
being recovered from the channel. Parenthetically, we note that the
record does not include all of the actual photographs to which
defendant refers.
	The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these
photographs. The State presented these photographs to certain
witnesses during their testimony. An investigating police officer
used a photograph of Angela's body in the channel to explain his
testimony regarding the recovery of Angela's body by the dive
team. A crime scene investigator used photographs of Angela's
body in and out of the channel to explain his testimony about the
location and condition of her body and about the collection of
evidence at the scene. The pathologist used photographs of
Angela's face and back after recovery from the channel in
discussing the effects of decomposition in the water, including
skin slippage and distortion of facial features. A crime scene
investigator used a photograph of Christopher's body after
recovery to explain the extensive decomposition that occurred and
the position of the electrical cords and weights on his body. These
are all valid reasons for admitting photographs of a decedent. See
Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 77; Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319-20. As we
have discussed, the prosecution is allowed to prove every element
of the crime charged and every relevant fact.
	The trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in
allowing six of these photographs to be sent to the jury during
deliberations. The record reveals that the trial court carefully
examined these photographs and determined that they were
relevant to the issues involved in the case. The trial court then
determined that the probative value of these six photographs was
not outweighed by any prejudice. The record reflects that the trial
court chose to send to the jury what the court termed to be the least
"graphic" photographs. In doing so, the trial court allowed only six
of the photographs to be sent to the jury for deliberations. These
photographs served to assist the State in proving the position,
condition, and location of the victims' bodies. The photographs
also served to aid the jury's understanding of the testimony of the
pathologist and the crime scene investigators. We note that the
trial court also instructed the jury, prior to deliberations, that,
"[p]hotographs of the deceased have been admitted into evidence
and will be received by you. These photographs are admitted to
better help you understand the evidence in this case. The
photographs should not be allowed to influence your passions.
Neither sympathy or prejudice should influence your decision."
We therefore reject defendant's argument that he is entitled to a
new trial based on the admission of these photographs.
E. Prim Instruction

	Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the
trial court erred when it denied defendant's request, made before
the jury began deliberations, to give the jury a Prim instruction.
See People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62 (1972). The Prim instruction
informs the jury of the requirement that the verdict be unanimous;
that the jury has a duty to deliberate; that jurors must impartially
consider the evidence; and that jurors should not hesitate to
reexamine their views and change their opinions if they believe
them to be erroneous, provided the change is not solely because of
the opinion of fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning
a verdict. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d  at 75-76. It is up to the trial court's
discretion whether to give such an instruction and, if so, when to
give the instruction. People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985).
The trial court should make these determinations based upon such
factors as the length of time already spent in deliberation and the
complexity of the issues before the jury. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 328.
	In this case, before the jury began its deliberations, defendant
requested that the jury receive the Prim instruction. The State
objected to this instruction on the basis that it was premature. The
trial court agreed and denied defendant's request, stating that this
instruction "is only given when the jury is having a problem with
their coming to a verdict." We hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Prim instruction. The purpose
of the Prim instruction is to guide a jury that is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 328. Here, defendant
requested the Prim instruction before the jury even began to
deliberate. Defendant does not argue that the jury in this case had
any difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict, and the record reflects
no such difficulty.
	Defendant cites People v. McNeal, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1000
(1981), in which the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
giving a Prim instruction to the jury prior to deliberations. The
court in McNeal rejected this argument, holding that the defendant
failed to show how he was prejudiced by the instruction. McNeal,
94 Ill. App. 3d at 1004-05. Defendant's reliance on cases such as
McNeal is misplaced. Even if the Prim instruction may be given
prior to jury deliberations, the trial court's failure to do so is not
error. As discussed, it is within the trial court's discretion whether
to give such an instruction and, if so, when to give the instruction.
See Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 328.
	Defendant nevertheless argues that the trial court erred in
failing to recognize that it had the discretion to give the Prim
instruction before the jury began to deliberate. Defendant contends
that the "failure to recognize the existence of judicial discretion is
itself an abuse of discretion and requires reversal of the
convictions in this case." In support of this contention, defendant
cites People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362 (1990), and People v.
Queen, 56 Ill. 2d 560 (1974).
	In Queen, the trial court refused a jury's request during
deliberations for a review of the defendant's testimony. The trial
court erroneously responded that it did not have discretion to allow
the request. Queen, 56 Ill. 2d  at 565. This court reversed and
remanded for a new trial. We noted that error occurs "when a trial
court refuses to exercise discretion in the erroneous belief that it
has no discretion as to the question presented." Queen, 56 Ill. 2d 
at 565. This court held that, under the circumstances of the case,
where the jury's determination of the defendant's credibility was
a critical factor, the trial court's error was of such substance as to
require a new trial. Queen, 56 Ill. 2d  at 565-66.
	In Gibson, the trial court granted the public defender's motion
for leave to withdraw as standby counsel for a pro se defendant
based upon the mistaken belief that the court did not have statutory
authority to make such an appointment. Consequently, the
defendant represented himself pro se in a capital murder case.
Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d  at 372-74. This court, however, determined
that the trial court possessed the discretion to appoint standby
counsel and was authorized by statute to appoint the public
defender's office as standby counsel. We held that, under the
circumstances of the case, the failure to appoint standby counsel
would have been an abuse of discretion, and the trial court's
refusal to continue the public defender's appointment as standby
counsel prejudiced the defendant such that a new trial was
required. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d  at 380-83. Significantly, this court
held that, in light of this holding, it need not consider the
defendant's argument, based on Queen, that the trial court's failure
to exercise its discretion, without more, requires reversal.
Nevertheless, we noted that the defendant's reliance on Queen for
this proposition was questionable and that "the utility of the
defendant's suggested rule of automatic reversal is doubtful."
Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d  at 380. "For example, if it could be determined
that the refusal to appoint standby counsel would not have been an
abuse of discretion, there would be no purpose now in remanding
the cause for further proceedings solely on the ground that the trial
judge failed to exercise his discretion." Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d  at 380.
	A review of Queen and Gibson demonstrates that "the effect
of such a failure to exercise discretion must be assessed in the
context of the entire proceeding [citation]." Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d  at
379. Here, even if the trial court may give the Prim instruction
prior to deliberations, and assuming that the trial court failed to
recognize that it had the discretion to give the jury the Prim
instruction prior to deliberations, and that this was error, this is not
an error of such magnitude that a new trial is warranted. Defendant
has offered no argument to suggest any prejudice resulting from
the trial court's purported failure to recognize that it had the
discretion to give the jury the Prim instruction prior to
deliberations. The record does not reflect that the jury had any
difficulty in reaching a unanimous verdict. We therefore reject
defendant's argument that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis
of the trial court's failure to give the jury the Prim instruction.
F. Appointment of Additional Counsel
	Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the
trial court erred in failing to appoint two attorneys to represent him
at trial. Defendant essentially contends that this court should
interpret Illinois law to require that all capital defendants be
represented at trial by two attorneys.
	The State argues that this issue is waived because defendant
failed to raise it in his post-trial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). We note also that defendant never raised
this argument at trial. Defendant argues in his brief in this court
that "[o]n November 14, 1997, Mr. Chapman [defendant]
requested the circuit court to review his situation wherein he was
represented by a single defense counsel." The record does not
support this argument. Defendant cites a colloquy that occurred
between defendant and the trial court at a hearing preceding the
trial court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress his
statements. Defendant complained of counsel's failure to use
certain alleged impeachment evidence.
	Defendant nevertheless argues that, even if he waived this
contention, we should address it under the plain error doctrine. To
preserve an alleged error for review, a defendant must raise a
timely objection at trial and identify the alleged error in a written
post-trial motion. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191 (1996).
Failure to preserve an alleged error in such a manner constitutes a
procedural default of that error on appeal. People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (1991). Nevertheless, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), this court may review an
argument not properly preserved if we determine that plain error
affecting a substantial right has occurred. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 326 (1998). Before invoking the plain error exception,
however, we determine whether any error occurred. People v.
Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1989).
	Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because
the trial court erred in failing to appoint two attorneys to represent
him at trial. In support of this argument, defendant cites Supreme
Court Rule 607(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 607(a)), which provides in
relevant part: "When a death sentence has been imposed, the court
may appoint two attorneys, one of whom it shall designate as the
responsible attorney and the other as assistant attorney for the
appeal." Defendant argues that Supreme Court Rule 607(a) must
be read in pari materia with the statutes governing the
appointment of counsel in capital cases. See, e.g., 725 ILCS
5/113-3(b) (West 1998) (governing the appointment of counsel in
cases where a defendant is indigent); 725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West
1998) (governing the payment of expert witnesses in capital cases
where the defendant is indigent); 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1 (West 1998)
(governing payment for court-appointed counsel). According to
defendant, if the statutes are read together with Supreme Court
Rule 607(a), they show that two attorneys should be appointed for
the trial phase in a capital case.
	In People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 52-53 (1997), this court
rejected the same argument. We noted that the record showed that
the defendant was in fact represented by two attorneys during trial.
Howery, 178 Ill. 2d  at 53. We then stated: "[S]ection 113-3 does
not require the appointment of more than one attorney for a
defendant at the trial stage. We reject the defendant's contention
that Supreme Court Rule 607(a) dictates otherwise in a trial
context. Rule 607(a) governs the appellate process and permits the
appointment of two attorneys on appeal." Howery, 178 Ill. 2d  at
53. In conclusion, Illinois law does not mandate that all capital
defendants be represented by two attorneys at trial, and the trial
court here did not err in failing to appoint two attorneys to
represent defendant at trial. Consequently, we find no plain error
and no basis to excuse defendant's procedural default of this
argument.
G. Pro Se Post-Trial Motion
	Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not appointing
a new attorney to argue his pro se post-trial motion which alleged
that his trial counsel was ineffective. Defense counsel filed a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
alternatively, a new trial. Defense counsel also filed a motion to
vacate defendant's death sentence. In addition to these post-trial
motions, defendant filed a pro se "motion to set aside jury verdict
and motion for new trial." Defendant alleged that his trial
attorneys, Antonio DeCristifaro and Neil Kauffman, provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. We note that DeCristifaro
represented defendant on some of the pretrial matters. While the
hearing on the motion to suppress defendant's statements was
pending, the trial court granted DeCristifaro leave to withdraw
from the case because he was the subject of an Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) proceeding
involving unrelated matters. The trial court appointed the office of
the public defender to represent defendant. However, before the
hearing on the motion to suppress resumed, the trial court granted
the office of the public defender leave to withdraw when
Kauffman entered an appearance on defendant's behalf, and
Kauffman remained defendant's trial attorney. Previously,
Kauffman had been the subject of an ARDC proceeding involving
unrelated matters, and had been suspended from the practice of
law for 18 months, but was reinstated to practice law at the time
he entered his appearance in defendant's case. The record reflects
that Kauffman had represented defendant at some earlier point in
this case.
	Defendant argued in his pro se post-trial motion that
DeCristifaro and Kauffman were ineffective in "failing to provide
competent representation, failing to act with reasonable diligence,
and [for engaging in] conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation." Defendant referenced documents filed in
the underlying ARDC proceedings. Defendant also argued that "at
all times from June 1997 [when Kauffman began to represent
defendant] until start of the trial in March 1998, defendant had one
contact with Kauffman," and that Kauffman was not adequately
prepared to represent defendant.
	Following a hearing on the motion to vacate defendant's death
sentence, defendant presented the trial court with this pro se
motion. The trial court repeatedly inquired as to precise allegations
of ineffectiveness. In response, defendant stated that trial counsel
failed to call two witnesses despite defendant's request to do so.
The first person was Angela's "best friend she grew up with in
Israel, who lives in Indiana." Defendant did not provide the trial
court with her name. In response to the trial court's inquiry about
the proposed purpose of this individual's testimony, defendant
maintained that this individual had lived with him and Angela and
could have testified about the relationship between defendant and
Angela. The second person was Denise Thigpen, Angela's former
supervisor at work. Thigpen testified at defendant's sentencing
hearing regarding instances when Angela told Thigpen that
defendant had abused Angela. Defendant told the trial court that
Thigpen's testimony was not credible.
	In response to the trial court's continued inquiry into precise
allegations of ineffectiveness, defendant stated that trial counsel
should have checked defendant's phone records and bank records
for the day that Angela and Christopher disappeared. According to
defendant, he told trial counsel that on the day of the victims'
disappearance, he was "at a cash station at 63rd and Drexel. I think
I was withdrawing money, twenty dollars or whatever." When the
trial court asked what that would prove, defendant replied that it
would show that "if I was at a cash station or the house instead of
traveling throughout the whole state searching for someone and
preconceiving a crime to the victim that I don't even know where
they're at in the first place."
	After considering the evidence presented by defendant, the
trial court denied defendant's pro se post-trial motion. The trial
court extensively reviewed trial counsel's performance and found
that defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. The
trial court concluded, therefore, that it did not have a duty to
inquire further regarding defendant's allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. During the course of its ruling, the trial court
also stated that the evidence to which defendant cites "would not
alter the *** verdict of guilty in this particular case, because the
evidence was overwhelming in this particular case. And as far as
the mitigation and aggravation, it would not alter my opinion,
based on the facts and circumstances of the case, considering both
the aggravation and mitigation, that the death sentence is the
appropriate sentence in this particular case."
	Defendant now argues that the trial court erroneously
evaluated defendant's claim under the prejudice prong of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), rather than first determining whether new counsel
should be appointed to argue defendant's assertions regarding the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Defendant argues that we should
remand the matter to the trial court with directions to appoint new
counsel and to hold a hearing on defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. We reject defendant's argument.
	This court has never held that new counsel must be appointed
when a defendant presents a pro se post-trial motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453,
466 (1996). Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se post-trial
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should
first examine the factual basis for the defendant's claim. If the trial
court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to
matters of trial strategy, then new counsel need not be appointed,
and the trial court may deny the pro se motion. See People v. Bull,
185 Ill. 2d 179, 210-11 (1998); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 44-45
(1996). If the allegations show possible neglect of the case, then
new counsel should be appointed. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 210; Kidd,
175 Ill. 2d  at 45. The appointed counsel may then independently
evaluate the defendant's claim and avoid the conflict of interest
that trial counsel would experience if counsel had to justify his or
her actions contrary to the client's position. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at
210. " '[T]he operative concern for the reviewing court is whether
the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se
defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.' "
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 210, quoting People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97,
125 (1994).
	Here, defendant presented the trial court with a motion
containing conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The record reveals that the trial court made a significant
effort to explore the matters that defendant raised in the motion.
The trial court elicited defendant's allegation that trial counsel
failed to call two witnesses: Angela's best friend, whose name
defendant did not supply, and Denise Thigpen, whom the State
called as a witness during defendant's sentencing hearing. This
allegation did not require the trial court to appoint new counsel.
Whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of trial strategy,
generally reserved to the discretion of trial counsel. See Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 44-45 (holding that the trial court did not err in failing to
appoint new counsel to represent the defendant on his pro se post-trial motion, which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to call certain alibi witnesses). The trial court also elicited
defendant's allegation that trial counsel failed to present evidence
of defendant's bank records. Defendant argued that his bank
records would have shown that he withdrew money on the day that
the victims disappeared, and that this would show that he was not
preparing to murder Angela. A review of the record shows that the
fact that defendant withdrew money on the day that the victims
disappeared would not have had any bearing on the case. This
claim simply has no merit.
	We hold that the trial court adequately inquired into
defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The fact that during this inquiry the trial court also referenced the
Strickland prejudice prong does not affect the fact that the matters
about which defendant complains lack merit and involve a
question of trial strategy. The trial court reviewed counsel's
performance and concluded that counsel provided effective
representation. Defendant's allegations did not show possible
neglect of the case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing
to appoint counsel to assist defendant in presenting the pro se
post-trial motion.
II. Sentencing Issues
A. Eligibility
	As set forth above, the eligibility phase of defendant's capital
sentencing hearing was conducted before the same jury as at trial.
Consequently, defendant could be found eligible for the death
penalty only if the jury unanimously found that the State had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was at least 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense and that
at least one statutory aggravating factor existed. See 720 ILCS
5/9-1(f), (g) (West 1998); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435
(1999). In this case, defendant's eligibility for the death penalty
was predicated upon the "multiple-murder" statutory aggravating
factor set forth in section 9-1(b)(3) and upon the "exceptionally
brutal or heinous" statutory aggravating factor set forth in section
9-1(b)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(7) (West 1998). The jury returned separate
eligibility verdicts finding defendant eligible for the death penalty
on both statutory aggravating factors. Defendant challenges both
of the jury's death penalty eligibility verdicts. We address
defendant's arguments relating to each eligibility factor separately.
	Defendant first challenges the jury's finding of eligibility
based on the multiple-murder statutory aggravating factor, which
authorizes the imposition of the death penalty where the defendant
has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals
"regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the
same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the
deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one
person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause
death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the murdered individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3)
(West 1998). In conjunction with instructing the jury on the
multiple-murder eligibility factor, which here was based solely on
the mental state of intent, defendant asserts that the trial court
erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the definition of
intent. We disagree.
	Prior to the eligibility phase of the capital sentencing hearing,
defendant requested that the sentencing jury receive the following
instruction on the definition of intent: "A person acts with intent
to accomplish a result or engage in conduct when his conscious
objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that
conduct." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.
5.01A (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The State
objected and the trial court ruled that it would give the instruction
if the jury requested assistance on the concept of intent after it
retired for deliberations. The jury did not make such a request.
Nevertheless, the jury did receive the following instruction on the
multiple-murder eligibility factor: "The defendant has been
convicted of murdering two or more persons so long as the deaths
were the result of an intent to kill more than one person, regardless
of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of
several related or unrelated acts." See IPI Criminal 4th No.
7B.07(3) and Committee Note.
	We find that the sentencing jury was instructed sufficiently on
the mental state necessary for finding defendant eligible for the
death penalty based on the murders of Angela and Christopher.
The element of intent was included in the eligibility instruction
given to the jury. Moreover, the word "intent" has a plain meaning
within a jury's common understanding. See People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430, 493 (1990), judgment vacated on other grounds &
rem'd, 501 U.S. 1202, 115 L. Ed. 2d 966, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
Any additional instruction on the meaning of intent therefore was
not necessary in this case.
	We also reject defendant's reliance on Supreme Court Rule
451 as requiring the trial court to instruct the jury on the definition
of intent because it was a pattern jury instruction. Our Rule 451(a)
provides that whenever the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions
contain an instruction applicable in a criminal case, giving due
consideration to the facts and the governing law, and the court
determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the
pattern instruction shall be used. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a). This rule
does not mandate the giving of any instruction merely because one
exists on defendant's theory of the case. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 355 (1995). Instead, whether to give an instruction
remains a matter for the court's determination. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 
at 355. Where the court determines that the jury should be
instructed on a particular subject and an appropriate IPI instruction
exists, it will be used. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 519
(1996); Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at 355. In the case at bar, the trial court
determined that the jury should be instructed on the multiple-murder aggravating factor. Consequently, the jury was properly
given the IPI instruction for multiple murder. The trial court also
found that there was no necessity for the additional instruction
regarding the definition of intent. In light of the multiple-murder
instruction given to the jury and the failure to show any confusion
on the jury's part regarding the term "intent," the trial court did not
err in denying defendant's request for a jury instruction defining
intent.
	In a related argument, defendant contends that he was not
properly found eligible for the death penalty based on the multiple-murder eligibility factor where the eligibility verdict was legally
insufficient because the verdict form omitted the culpable mental
state necessary to support a finding of death eligibility. Defendant
argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing pursuant to
this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995).
	The State responds that defendant cannot raise this issue on
appeal because he failed to object to the eligibility verdict form at
sentencing and failed to raise the sufficiency of the form in his
post-sentencing motion. Alternatively, the State argues that a new
sentencing hearing is not necessary. The State does not dispute
that the eligibility verdict form was deficient under this court's
decision in Mack. Nevertheless, the State argues that Mack does
not require vacating defendant's death sentence.
	We find that defendant has waived this issue for review
because he failed to object at sentencing and in his post-sentencing
motion. See Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 170. Defendant asserts, however,
that the defective verdict form constituted plain error. We hold
that, under the facts of this case, the omission of the mental state
from the eligibility verdict is not so fundamental a defect that it
amounted to plain error.
	In Mack, the defendant was found guilty of murder and armed
robbery at a bench trial. The sentencing hearing was conducted
before a jury, which was instructed to determine whether the
defendant was eligible for the death penalty solely on the basis of
the statutory aggravating factor of murder in the course of another
felony (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). The jury
then returned a verdict finding the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. The eligibility verdict form read: " 'We the jury,
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following
aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack
killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.' " Mack,
167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. The defendant alleged in his post-conviction
petition that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on
direct appeal that the death-eligibility verdict was legally
insufficient. The defendant argued that the jury failed to find that
the statutory aggravating factor was proven given that the
eligibility verdict form omitted the culpable mental state required
to establish murder in the course of a felony. The trial court found
appellate counsel ineffective, vacated the defendant's death
sentence, and ordered a new sentencing hearing.
	A majority of this court affirmed and held that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failure to seek reversal of the
defendant's death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility
verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. In so holding, we found
appellate counsel's performance to be deficient for failing to
recognize the fundamental importance of a legally sufficient
eligibility verdict, which must include a finding on all essential
elements of the statutory aggravating factor at issue where the
verdict attempts to set forth the elements of that factor. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533, 538. In support of our holding, we pointed out that
a culpable mental state of intent to kill or knowledge of a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm is an essential element of
the particular statutory aggravating factor upon which the
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty was based, namely,
murder in the course of a felony. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. Next,
we found that, had appellate counsel raised the issue of the
defective eligibility verdict, there is a reasonable probability that
the defendant's death sentence would have been reversed. Mack,
167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. We based this finding on a determination
that the meaning of the jury's eligibility verdict could not be
determined clearly and without speculation from the record, which
included a discrepancy between the jury instructions and the
verdict form at the eligibility phase. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 535-37.
The court therefore concluded that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue that the
death eligibility verdict was legally insufficient because the jury
had not found the mental state necessary for finding the defendant
eligible for the death penalty. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
Accordingly, the court vacated the defendant's death sentence and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 539.
	In this case, the State relied on the multiple-murder statutory
aggravating factor. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998). To be
eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3), a defendant
must have been convicted of murdering two or more individuals
"regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the
same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the
deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one
person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause
death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the murdered individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3)
(West 1998). The jury was instructed as to the elements for finding
defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3),
which in this case was limited to the mental state that the "deaths
were the result of an intent to kill more than one person." The
eligibility verdict form returned by the jury stated:
			"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Reginald Chapman, is eligible
for a death sentence under the law. We unanimously find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 18
years old or older at the time of the murders for which he
was convicted in this case; and the following statutory
aggravating factor exists: The defendant has been
convicted of murdering two or more persons, regardless
of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same
act or of several related or unrelated acts."
	The circumstances surrounding the multiple-murder eligibility
verdict form in this case contrast sharply with those present in
Mack. As noted, in Mack the defendant was found guilty at a
bench trial but was found eligible for the death penalty by a jury.
Consequently, the sentencing jury in Mack had not made a
determination at the guilt phase of the trial regarding the
defendant's mental state while committing the murder. Thus, the
jury's decision as to whether the State proved the defendant's
mental state for purposes of finding the defendant eligible for the
death penalty under the aggravating factor of murder in the course
of a felony aggravating factor could not be ascertained from the
record. See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 537 (explaining that all parts of
the record will be searched and interpreted together in determining
the meaning of a verdict).
	Unlike in Mack, the record in this case provides assistance in
determining the meaning of the jury's eligibility verdict. Here, the
same jury that found defendant eligible for the death penalty had
previously found defendant guilty at trial of the first degree murder
of Angela Butler and the first degree murder of Christopher Butler.
Although the jury returned general guilty verdicts at trial, it had
been instructed only on intentional and knowing murders (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)), which formed the basis of
the jury's general verdicts. See People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403,
411 (1994) (noting that where an indictment contains several
counts arising out of a single transaction and a general verdict is
returned, the effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in
each count to which the proof is applicable). At trial, the jury was
instructed for each victim that in order to find defendant guilty of
first degree murder it would have to find that he intended to kill or
do great bodily harm to the victim, or he knew his acts would
cause death to the victim, or he knew that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim. The same
mental states of intent and knowledge are required for a finding of
eligibility on the basis of the multiple-murder aggravating factor.
At eligibility, the jury was instructed that it must find intent to kill
more than one person on the part of defendant. The jury also was
instructed to consider evidence from the guilt phase of the trial.
The record at the guilt phase of defendant's trial reveals that the
jury heard evidence of intentional murder on the part of defendant.
More specifically, the jury was presented with evidence that
defendant struck Angela with an open hand, his fist and a baseball
bat, causing a laceration on the back of her head; that defendant
bound both victims with electrical cords, strapped heavy weights
to their bodies, and dumped them into the Calumet Sag Channel.
The jury's eligibility verdict, when viewed in conjunction with the
evidence heard by the jury at the guilt phase of trial along with the
instructions and guilty verdicts, supports the conclusion that the
jury found intent at eligibility. Therefore, the meaning of the
eligibility verdict and the intention of the jury is clear and requires
no speculation on the part of this court. Accordingly, there was a
valid death-eligibility finding by the sentencing jury.
	Defendant next contends that the jury improperly found him
eligible for a death sentence based on the "exceptionally brutal or
heinous" statutory aggravating factor contained in section
9-1(b)(7) of the death penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West
1998)) because that factor is unconstitutional and unsupported by
the evidence. We need not address defendant's arguments because,
regardless of the validity of this aggravating factor, defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty is not altered.
	As noted, the jury found defendant eligible for the death
penalty based on two separate statutory aggravating factors: (1)
"the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more
individuals" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998)) and (2) "the
murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death
resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative
of wanton cruelty" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1998)). Before a
defendant may be sentenced to death in Illinois, the existence of
one valid statutory aggravating factor must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b), (f) (West 1998); West,
187 Ill. 2d  at 445. It has been recognized by this court that the
Illinois death penalty statute does not place special emphasis on
any one aggravating factor and does not accord any special
significance to multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single
aggravating factor. People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998);
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 321 (1998). As such, when a
defendant is found eligible for the death penalty under multiple
statutory aggravating factors, the eligibility finding may stand
despite the invalidation of one of those factors, provided there is
a separate, valid aggravating factor that supports the defendant's
eligibility. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 165 (1996). Because
the jury found defendant independently eligible for the death
penalty based on the multiple-murder aggravating factor, which we
affirm, defendant remains eligible for the death penalty, even if the
"exceptionally brutal or heinous" aggravating factor is invalid. See
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 226 (1999).
	Moreover, the sentencing judge's consideration of the
"exceptionally brutal or heinous" aggravating factor does not
require remand for a new second stage sentencing hearing.
Assuming arguendo the "exceptionally brutal or heinous"
aggravating factor is invalid in this case, the sentencing judge,
nonetheless, was entitled to consider defendant's conduct in
murdering Christopher in making his sentencing determination.
See People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 103 (1996); People v. Pasch,
152 Ill. 2d 133, 189-90 (1992). Such evidence is not reduced by
the elimination of the "exceptionally brutal or heinous"
aggravating factor. See People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 92
(1992) (concluding that, although the defendant's commission of
murder in the course of a residential burglary was not sufficient to
establish the defendant's eligibility for the death sentence, the
defendant's conduct in committing that crime could properly be
considered at the second phase of the sentencing hearing).


B. Denial of Continuance


	Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying defendant's request for a continuance of his capital
sentencing hearing. According to defendant, he was prejudiced by
the denial of the continuance because his mitigation specialist was
left with only two weeks to prepare her report and was unable to
make a complete investigation, namely, she was not able to speak
with defendant's friends in the military, Angela's family or the
police.
	This court has held that the granting or denial of a
continuance is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and a reviewing court will not interfere with that decision
unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. People v.
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 92 (1996). We find no such abuse by the
trial court in this case. On January 30, 1998, almost three weeks
before trial, defendant requested a 60-day continuance of the trial
to provide his mitigation specialist with additional time to prepare
for the capital sentencing hearing. The trial court denied the
request, noting that it was "a very old case." On February 17,
1998, the trial was continued by agreement of the parties to March
9, 1998. As a result of this continuance, the mitigation specialist,
Joanne Glass-Watson, did not testify until March 20, 1998, which
was close in time to the original 60-day continuance requested by
defendant. Through the testimony of Joanne Glass-Watson and
Lynn Rittenberg, both licensed clinical social workers, defendant
was able to introduce evidence of his childhood, family history,
educational history, employment history, religious background,
military background, prison records and police reports. In addition,
defendant presented further evidence in mitigation through the
testimony of defendant's family members, jail personnel and
clergy. They provided testimony as to defendant's good character
and background, including his lack of a criminal history.
Defendant has failed to assert how additional conversations with
defendant's friends in the military, Angela's family or the police
would have added to the mitigation evidence presented. Defendant
therefore was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. See
People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238, 262-63 (1986) (determining
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's denying
a continuance of the trial).
	In conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying defendant's request for a continuance. See Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 91-93 (holding that the denial of defendant's request for
a continuance of the second stage of the capital sentencing hearing
was not an abuse of discretion because the mitigation specialist
and the other defense witnesses provided extensive mitigation
evidence such that further evidence would likely have been
cumulative).
C. Defendant's Absence from the Second Phase of the
Sentencing Hearing
	Defendant argues that the trial court committed error when it
allowed him to waive his right to be present in the courtroom
during the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing
hearing.
	This court has held that a defendant can waive his right to be
present for a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Nielsen, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 293 (1999). In Nielsen, we held that where a defendant
voluntarily absents himself from a courtroom and refuses to be
present for further proceedings, he is deemed to have waived his
right and cannot claim any advantage on account of his absence.
Nielsen, 187 Ill. 2d  at 293. Here, the record reveals that defendant
freely and voluntarily waived his right to be present for the
aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing. Before
the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, defendant asked the
court's permission to leave the courtroom and not to be present
during the remainder of the capital sentencing hearing. After
admonishing defendant about his right to be present and allowing
defendant to confer with counsel, the trial court granted
defendant's request and accepted his waiver. Defendant later
reaffirmed twice that he did not want to be present during the
proceedings when asked by the trial court. The record also reveals
that the trial judge informed defendant that he was free to return
to the courtroom at any time.
	Defendant now argues that section 115-4.1(a) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a) (West 1998))
prohibits a defendant from waiving his presence from a capital
sentencing hearing under any circumstances. Section 115-4.1(a)
provides: "If a defendant absents himself before trial on a capital
felony, trial may proceed as specified in this Section provided that
the State certifies that it will not seek a death sentence following
conviction." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a) (West
1998). This court rejected such reliance on section 115-4.1(a) in
Nielsen, where we held:
		"Section 115-4.1(a) in no way prohibits the sentencing of
an absent capital defendant. It prohibits only the
commencement of a capital trial against a defendant who
absents himself before trial. Defendant did not absent
himself before trial. On the contrary, defendant was
present throughout his trial, absenting himself only after
the jury found him guilty. Accordingly, section 115-4.1(a)
is wholly inapplicable to this case." (Emphasis in
original.) Nielsen, 187 Ill. 2d  at 294.
As in Nielsen, defendant here was present before and during the
trial. In light of our holding in Nielsen, section 115-4.1(a) does not
support defendant's argument. For these reasons, the trial court did
not err by conducting the second phase of the capital sentencing
hearing in defendant's absence.
D. Victim Impact Statement
	Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the introduction
of a victim impact statement from Angela Butler's father at the
sentencing hearing. At the aggravation and mitigation phase of the
sentencing hearing, the State sought to introduce a one-page
victim impact statement in the form of a signed letter prepared by
Angela's father and Christopher's grandfather, Dillon Butler, who
faxed the letter from his home in Israel. The State excised certain
portions from the statement including a comment by Mr. Butler
that "Reginald Chapman has shown that he deserves the maximum
penalty allowed." Defense counsel objected to the victim impact
statement on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative
because the witness was not there in person to confirm the
statement, and the statement was in the form of a faxed and signed
letter. The sentencing judge ruled that the State could publish the
letter by reading it into the record. Before the statement was read
by the assistant State's Attorney, the sentencing judge specifically
stated that he would disregard any improper material contained in
the letter and that he would only consider the evidence which is
relevant and reliable. The victim impact statement was read as
follows:
			"It is with a heavy heart and great sorrow that I have
prepared this statement. Because of situations beyond my
control I am unable to be present at this proceeding, so
unfortunately, this statement will have to suffice.
			I am Dillon Butler, father and grandfather of the victims
of this vile and senseless crime. There are no words that
can adequately express my grief and sorrow at the loss of
my oldest daughter, Angela, and my first grandchild,
Christopher.
			My initial shock and anger has given way to a genuine
desire to come to grips with this monstrous deed. There is
a saying, 'Time heals all wounds.' I beg to differ, for
when your heart and soul have been pierced as mine has,
there is no healing balm, no, not even time, that can
assuage the pain of such a loss.
			For Angela to have had her life taken at such an early
age is truly incomprehensible, but for it to have been done
in such a gruesome and heinous fashion is still the more
perplexing. She was only twenty years old, with a full and
promising life before her. But because of this demonic act
she will never have a chance to realize her dreams and
aspirations. She will never have the joy of experiencing
her child's growth and development, nor will she ever
know the blessings of obtaining wisdom, knowledge, and
understanding, things that come with the joy of living a
full and right life.
			My daughter, Angela, was a warm and caring person,
vibrant and full of life, whom at approximately five feet
and weighing between ninety-five and one hundred
pounds, posed no threat to anyone. As I remember back
on her bright and beautiful smile my heart is pained at the
thought that I will never see nor speak to her again in this
life. And if all this loss and grief weren't enough, I must
then bear the weight of my precious grandson,
Christopher, a mere infant of four months, whom has
been robbed of the most precious gift that one can receive,
life itself.
			I constantly ask myself what possible reason could there
be for ending his life, and then to have had this demonic
act committed in such a horrific manner, adds to my daily
distress and agony.
			Finally, after much prayer and thought, I can with clear
conscience and peace of mind, state to this court in no
uncertain terms, that there must be no mercy shown to this
nefarious criminal.
			I am thankful to have had this opportunity to express to
the court my pain and inner feelings at the loss of my
precious loved ones, and I pray that this court will honor
my request for justice and act accordingly."
 	Defendant now argues that Mr. Butler's statements that "there
must be no mercy shown to this nefarious criminal" and that the
sentencing judge "honor my request for justice and act
accordingly" improperly influenced the sentencing judge in his
decision that no sufficient mitigation existed to prevent the
imposition of the death penalty. According to defendant, Mr.
Butler's statements were improper and prejudicial because they
expressed his opinion that the death penalty be imposed on
defendant.
	In People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 155-58 (1991), this
court adopted the view announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720,
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), allowing the State to present victim
impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. In so allowing the
introduction of victim impact evidence, this court agreed with
Payne's reasoning that for the sentencing authority to assess
meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase
evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. Howard,
147 Ill. 2d  at 158. This court, however, has held that the opinions
of witnesses regarding proper punishment in a capital case are
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at a capital sentencing
hearing. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 324. In the case at bar, the
majority of the victim impact statement describes the impact that
the murders of Angela and Christopher had on Mr. Butler's life.
Such comments fall squarely within the permissible range of
victim impact evidence. We do not view the two comments
challenged by defendant as a request that the judge sentence
defendant to death. In fact, the section of Mr. Butler's letter where
he expressed clearly his opinion on death as the appropriate
penalty for defendant was carefully excised before the statement
was read to the court.
	Nevertheless, even if the complained-of comments by Mr.
Butler indicated an improper opinion on the appropriate penalty,
any error was harmless and no prejudice resulted to defendant
from their admission. See Towns, 174 Ill. 2d  at 469-70 (applying
harmless error analysis to improper testimony about the
appropriateness of the death penalty by the victim's relatives). The
second phase of defendant's sentencing hearing was a bench
proceeding. This court has held repeatedly that reviewing courts
will assume that a trial judge considered only admissible evidence.
People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 258 (1998); People v. Harris,
182 Ill. 2d 114, 156 (1998). Here, the sentencing judge did not
refer to Mr. Butler's victim impact statement when imposing
defendant's sentence. Moreover, the sentencing judge stated that
he would not consider any improper evidence. The record
therefore reveals that the comments by Mr. Butler did not play a
role in the sentencing judge's decision to impose the death penalty
in this case. Consequently, the outcome in this case would not
have been different had the noted remarks been excluded.
	We therefore conclude that the introduction of the victim
impact statement during the second phase of the sentencing
hearing did not result in reversible error.
E. Court's Comment at Sentencing
	At sentencing, the judge remarked that the murders of Angela
and Christopher were "preconceived" or "planned." More
specifically, the judge stated: "The manner in which the deaths
occurred shows some planning. There is execution of a
preconceived idea." According to defendant, the State never
argued at trial or the sentencing hearing that the murders were
planned or premeditated. As such, defendant was lulled into a false
sense of security that he need not address the question of
premeditation or planning because it was not part of the State's
case. Defendant therefore argues that he was deprived of fair
notice of this aggravating circumstance. The State responds that
defendant's argument is waived because defendant failed to object
to the judge's comments at sentencing. Defendant counters that
plain error review is warranted.
	It is well established that failure to preserve an alleged error,
by raising a timely objection at trial and identifying the alleged
error in a written post-trial motion, constitutes a procedural default
of that error on appeal. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 191; Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 170. Here, defendant waived this argument by failing to
object to the court's comment at the sentencing hearing.
Nevertheless, this court may review an argument not properly
preserved if we determine that plain error affecting a substantial
right has occurred. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 326. Before invoking the
plain error exception, however, we first determine whether any
error occurred. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d  at 376.
	Initially, we note that this court has held that the State is not
required to specify those aggravating factors on which it intends
to rely for eligibility. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d  at 167. In fact, this court
has already rejected a due process notice argument similar to
defendant's current claim. In People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158,
198 (1996), the defendant argued that, in making the sentencing
determination, the trial court relied on aggravating factors found
in the death penalty statute as well as aggravating factors found
generally in the sentencing statute. The prosecution had not asked
the court to consider these factors and the defendant had no notice
that the court would in fact consider them. The defendant therefore
claimed that he had no opportunity to explain or deny such
aggravating factors. In rejecting defendant's contention that he was
denied proper notice that these factors would be part of the
sentencing consideration, this court noted that the "sentencing
authority is to consider 'all matters reflecting upon the defendant's
personality, propensities, purposes, tendencies, and indeed every
aspect of his life relevant to the sentencing proceeding.' " Munson,
171 Ill. 2d  at 198, quoting People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281
(1989). In addition, the sentencing body may consider any relevant
aggravating factors, statutory and nonstatutory, in the process of
selecting among that class of defendant who will actually be
sentenced to death. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 198. This court
concluded that it knew of neither a statutory nor a constitutional
mandate which would require the sentencing body, at the close of
the evidence, to recite what factors it will consider in sentencing
in order to permit a defendant an opportunity to rebut the same.
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 198-99. The court further concluded that
there was nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court's
sentencing determination was based on information that was not
known to the defendant. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 198.
	Defendant urges this court to reconsider Munson for the
reason that it did not address the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 114 L. Ed. 2d 173,
111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991). Defendant's reliance on Lankford is
misplaced. Lankford involved an Idaho case where the State
advised the defendant in a presentencing order that it would not be
seeking the death penalty. During the sentencing hearing, there
was no discussion of the death penalty as a possible sentence.
Moreover, the defendant argued only the merits of various terms
of imprisonment. The trial court, sua sponte, sentenced the
defendant to death. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
death sentence, holding that the defendant was denied due process
because he did not have adequate notice that the judge
contemplated the imposition of the death sentence. Lankford, 500 U.S.  at 126-27, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 187-89, 111 S. Ct.  at 1732-33.
	This case presents a very different situation than in Lankford.
Here, defendant cannot claim that he was misled into believing
that the death penalty was not a possible sentence. Defendant had
notice that the death penalty was being requested under two
eligibility factors, multiple murder and the exceptionally brutal or
heinous murder of a child. When the court articulated the factors
in aggravation, it merely commented on the planned and
preconceived nature of the murders. In fact, there was evidence
introduced during the trial and the sentencing hearing to support
this observation by the sentencing judge. In July of 1993,
defendant beat up Angela at the Calumet Sag Channel. In the
spring of 1994, defendant again beat Angela. In July of 1994,
defendant told Angela that "he will kill her and get away with it."
Finally, on August 27, 1994, defendant deliberately met Angela in
the Dominicks parking lot, pushed Angela into his car, and took
her and Christopher to his apartment, where he beat Angela with
his hands, fists, and a baseball bat. Defendant ultimately used
electrical cords and weights to sink the bodies of Angela and
Christopher in the Calumet Sag Channel. Such evidence indicates
planning in the commission of the murders. After hearing such
evidence during the trial and the sentencing hearing, defendant
cannot assert he was unaware of this evidence or that he did not
have notice that it may be considered for purposes of sentencing.
Therefore, Lankford does not control this case.
	In addition, this court has already rejected the broad
interpretation of Lankford urged by defendant. In People v.
Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124 (1996), the defendant argued that the
trial judge improperly relied on defendant's inability to be
rehabilitated as a basis for imposing the death penalty. This court
rejected defendant's argument that under Lankford he was entitled
to notice that the trial judge would rely on a "rehabilitative
potential" standard. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 139. This court
reasoned that, unlike in Lankford, the defendant had notice that the
State was seeking the death penalty, such that the defendant was
aware that his character, including his rehabilitative potential,
could be relied upon by the trial judge in determining his sentence.
Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 139. Similarly in this case, there is no
question that there was notice of the death penalty and that
defendant knew of the evidence of premeditation and planning.
We therefore reject defendant's argument that he was deprived of
due process. See also Brown, 169 Ill. 2d  at 167-68 (rejecting the
defendant's contention that his eligibility is invalid based on lack
of notice).
	In conclusion, the sentencing judge properly commented on
the planned and preconceived nature of these murders such that
there was no error in the sentencing judge's comments.
Accordingly, we find no plain error and no basis to excuse
defendant's procedural default.
F. Evidence of Defendant's Early Military Discharge
	Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously declined to
consider evidence of defendant's early discharge from the military
to care for his wounded brother as mitigating evidence. Thus,
defendant argues, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
	At his sentencing hearing, defendant presented evidence that,
on August 20, 1990, he received an early discharge from the
United States Marine Corps in order to assist his brother, who had
been recently injured by a gunshot wound to the back. The State,
however, proceeded to elicit evidence that, less than a month after
his discharge, defendant enrolled in college at Southern Illinois
University in Carbondale, although his injured brother lived in
Chicago. The State also elicited evidence that, at the time of
defendant's discharge from the military, defendant was training to
go to the Persian Gulf, and that this was the time of the "Desert
Storm" buildup in the Persian Gulf. During closing argument at
the sentencing hearing, the State referenced this evidence and
argued that defendant used his brother's injury as an excuse to
leave the military to avoid combat. Before rendering defendant's
sentence, the trial court discussed the aggravating and mitigating
evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and, in doing so,
stated:
		"One of the good deeds admitted was the fact the
defendant left the Marines early to take care of his what
we now know is temporarily paralyzed brother. However,
this is kind of seriously undermined by the fact that he
was released from the Marines on August 20, 1990,
applied for acceptance for Southern Illinois University
which is in Carbondale, which is in the far southern part
of the state, on September 15, 1990."
Defendant argues that the trial court's statement is not supported
by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in failing to consider
his early discharge from the military as mitigating evidence.
	Defendant waived this argument by failing to object to the
statement at the sentencing hearing, and by failing to raise the
issue in a post-trial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186.
Defendant nevertheless argues that we should consider this
argument under the plain error doctrine. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
We first determine whether any error occurred. See Wade, 131 Ill. 2d  at 376; see also People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998)
(stating that, although the defendant waived his claim that the trial
court improperly refused to consider certain mitigating evidence
at the defendant's death penalty hearing, we would review the
claim for error, as it concerned the fundamental fairness of that
proceeding).
	The trial court, for sentencing purposes, may not decline to
consider relevant and reliable evidence offered in mitigation at a
death penalty hearing. See Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 344 (and cases
cited therein); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 193-94 (1996).
Nevertheless, the trial court is not constrained to find such
evidence, in fact, mitigating. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 194. Indeed,
it is not improper for a sentencer to consider a defendant's
evidence presented in mitigation as a factor in aggravation. People
v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 369 (1997). "The sentencer and the
reviewing court 'may determine the weight to be given relevant
mitigating evidence,' but 'may not give it no weight by excluding
such evidence from their consideration.' " Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at
344, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982).
	This is not a case where the trial court refused to consider the
mitigating evidence offered by defendant. The trial court merely
disagreed with defendant's assessment of that evidence as
mitigating. The trial court found that the testimony regarding
defendant's early discharge from the military to care for his
wounded brother in Chicago was contradicted by the fact that, less
than a month after his discharge, defendant enrolled in college at
Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. The trial court made
a reasonable inference from the evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing, and determined that this piece of evidence
presented by defendant in mitigation was not necessarily
mitigating. The trial court therefore considered the evidence
regarding defendant's early discharge. It, however, was not
constrained to accept defendant's characterization of this evidence
as mitigation. Consequently, we find no plain error and no basis to
excuse defendant's procedural default of this argument.

G. Propriety of Death Sentence


	Defendant argues that the death penalty is not an appropriate
sentence in this case. Defendant argues that his sentence is
excessive "given his lack of a criminal record, excellence in his
life history and character, and the lack of a significant amount of
aggravation aside from the aberrant circumstances of the offense
for which he stands convicted." We point out that "each capital
case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on
whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of
the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death
penalty." People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). After
careful consideration of the circumstances of the crimes in this
case and the character of defendant, we conclude that the death
penalty is the appropriate penalty in this case.
	The following was presented in mitigation at the sentencing
hearing. Joanne Glass-Watson, and Lynn Rittenberg, licensed
clinical social workers, testified about information that they
collected and reviewed regarding defendant's background.
Defendant came from a close, religious family. Defendant was
raised in a neighborhood where drugs and gangs were rampant,
and yet defendant never succumbed to these problems, despite the
fact that both of his older brothers did. Defendant was an
industrious and helpful child. Defendant was also the only child to
graduate from high school, and he later earned college credits.
Defendant served in the United States Marine Corps for two years
and was honorably discharged. Defendant held many jobs
thereafter. Defendant's brother informed the social workers that,
when defendant was a teenager, he was driving in his
neighborhood when he saw a car burning. Defendant stopped and
helped the people inside the car escape. He later declined to accept
a cash reward for his actions.
	Reverend S.L. Gholar testified that he baptized defendant in
1985 at the New Hope Inspirational Church, where defendant's
father was a deacon. Reverend Gholar testified that defendant was
a member in good standing at his church and that, when defendant
was discharged from the military, defendant taught Sunday school
at the church.
	Eight family members, including defendant's father, testified
about defendant's good character and helpful manner. Defendant
was religious, interested in furthering his education, never used
drugs or alcohol, and never became involved in gangs. Testimony
also revealed that defendant had no disciplinary record in jail and
that he attended church services at the jail.
	In contrast to this mitigating evidence, the testimony from the
sentencing hearing revealed that the victim Angela Butler suffered
a long history of abuse at the hands of defendant. In July 1993,
Angela arrived to work late with a swollen face. Angela informed
Denise Thigpen, a coworker, that defendant had beaten her. Two
weeks after this incident, Angela told Thigpen that defendant had
taken her to a river, which Angela later identified as the Calumet
Sag Channel, where he beat her and taunted, "Go ahead and
scream, bitch. Nobody ain't going to hear you." Defendant refused
Angela's plea to be taken home until she agreed to have sex with
him.
	In the spring of 1994, defendant pushed Angela down a flight
of stairs while Angela held their newborn son Christopher in her
arms. Angela could barely walk from the beating. In June of 1994,
Angela told her cousin that defendant had slapped her and taken
her money and food stamps. Defendant would only return the
money and food stamps to Angela when she went to the store, and
Angela could not go to the store, or anywhere, without defendant's
permission. In July of 1994, at a time when Angela and defendant
had ended their relationship and Angela was engaged to Louis
Murillo, Angela told her cousin that she was frightened because
defendant "was following her around" and because defendant had
told Angela that "he will kill her and get away with it."
	Also in July of 1994, Angela telephoned Denise Thigpen and
told her that defendant had beaten her for approximately seven
hours. Defendant told Angela that "if he couldn't have her, that
nobody else would. He would kill her." Defendant placed a barbell
on Angela's chest and left the apartment with Christopher for
about five hours. Angela was four feet, six inches tall, and
weighed 103 pounds. With the barbell on her chest, Angela was
apparently not able to move. When defendant returned, he
removed the barbell and went to sleep. Angela escaped by
crawling out of a window.
	On July 16, 1994, Angela contacted the police after defendant
had beaten her and held her captive in his apartment. Angela also
reported that defendant had stolen her wallet, which contained her
passport, birth certificate, social security card, and public aid card.
Defendant had threatened her that "he was going to keep her from
being able to do anything."
	In addition to this tragic history of abuse, the circumstances
surrounding the murders of Angela and Christopher bespeak the
actions of a cold-blooded murderer. On the day that Angela and
Christopher disappeared, defendant appeared in the Dominicks
parking lot where Angela and Christopher were waiting in a car
with Curtis Taylor, while other members of Angela's fiancé's
family were in the store. Defendant stated that he had spoken to
Angela earlier that day and that he was supposed to meet Angela
at the store to discuss her upcoming move to Iowa, where her
fiancé was attending college. When defendant arrived at the
grocery store parking lot, he forced Angela into his car. Defendant
drove away with Angela and Christopher in the car. Defendant
took Angela back to his apartment, where he struck Angela with
his hands and his fists, and where he hit Angela with a baseball
bat. As discussed, Angela was four feet, six inches tall, and
weighed 103 pounds. Defendant was approximately six feet, four
inches tall, and weighed approximately 220 pounds. Defendant
bound the bodies of Angela and Christopher with electrical cords;
he strapped heavy weights to their bodies; and defendant threw the
bodies of Angela and Christopher into the Calumet Sag Channel.
	In support of his argument that the death penalty is excessive
in this case, defendant cites to cases in which this court has
vacated the death penalty where the defendant had no significant
criminal history and acted in response to mental or emotional
disturbances. See, e.g., People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992);
People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980).
	In People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980), the defendant was
convicted of the murders of his ex-wife and a police officer. The
defendant and his wife, after 19 years of marriage, divorced three
months prior to the murders. The defendant and his ex-wife had
planned to remarry, but his ex-wife then told the defendant that
she had a new boyfriend. Soon after learning of this news, the
defendant shot and killed his ex-wife and set fire to her home.
When the police later tried to arrest the defendant, he shot and
killed one of the officers. The defendant testified that he was
attempting to commit suicide when he accidentally shot the police
officer. Testimony revealed that the defendant had been suffering
from severe emotional and physical problems before the shootings.
Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d  at 570-75.
	Next, in People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986), the
defendant was convicted of the murders of his wife and one of
their children. The defendant and the wife were arguing about the
wife's infidelity when the wife told the defendant that he was not
the father of two of their sons. At that point, the defendant poured
gasoline on his wife and the stairs and lit a match. The defendant's
wife and one of their children died in the fire. The defendant had
a history of alcohol-related problems, including blackouts. A
psychiatrist testified that the defendant suffered from an "Isolated
Explosive Disorder" at the time of the offenses. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 
at 287-89.
	Finally, in People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992), the
defendant shot and killed his estranged wife five days before the
finalization of their divorce. Later that same night, the defendant
shot and killed his former wife and shot his former wife's new
husband. Testimony revealed that the defendant had a history of
drinking problems, including blackouts. Testimony also revealed
that, on the date of the offenses, the defendant was taking 10
different prescription drugs, including antianxiety medication and
medication containing codeine and librium. Experts testified that
these medications could affect a person's ability to reason. Leger,
149 Ill. 2d  at 365-66, 412.
	These cases are distinguishable from the instant case. There
is no evidence here that defendant suffered from any mental or
emotional problems, or that defendant was under the influence of
alcohol or drugs at the time of the murders. Defendant argues that
he "was acting under extreme emotional distress when he killed
Christopher, a distress which resulted from the killing of Angela,
which itself was an unplanned, sudden-act, murder arising out of
rage and anger and done during their argument" regarding
Angela's upcoming move to Iowa with their son. This argument
is not persuasive. At the time of the murders, defendant and
Angela had ended their relationship and defendant was living with
his new girlfriend, who was pregnant with his child. Nevertheless,
defendant was "following Angela around." When defendant beat
Angela, he warned her that "if he couldn't have her, that nobody
else would. He would kill her." The murders in this case were the
culmination of an escalating history of violence by defendant
against Angela, not a "sudden-act" murder. Defendant's
suggestion that his culpability should be diminished because he
murdered Christopher while he was under the emotional distress
of having just murdered Angela is wholly repugnant, and we will
not consider it.
	This case is analogous to People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36
(1999). In Heard, when the defendant's girlfriend, Natalie, ended
their relationship, defendant began to harass Natalie and her new
boyfriend. Defendant threatened to kill Natalie and her new
boyfriend if they did not " 'leave each other alone.' " Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 85. Defendant threatened that " 'nobody is going to have
Natalie because Natalie is mine.' " Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 88. On
one occasion, the defendant stole all of Natalie's clothes from her
apartment. Natalie let the defendant into her apartment when the
defendant offered to return the clothes, and defendant proceeded
to batter Natalie. Ultimately, the defendant broke into Natalie's
apartment and shot and killed Natalie, Natalie's new boyfriend,
and Natalie's cousin. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 85-86.
	The defendant was sentenced to death for the murders and
argued on appeal that the death penalty was not an appropriate
sentence. The mitigating evidence presented in that case included
testimony and affidavits from family, friends, business associates,
prior teachers, and jail personnel. These individuals described the
defendant as hardworking, caring, and nonviolent. The defendant's
family was described as close, supportive, and religious. Some
witnesses recounted specific instances where the defendant helped
them during a financial or emotional crisis. Other witnesses
recounted that the defendant was never involved in a gang and did
not use drugs or alcohol. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 52.
	Although the defendant had no significant criminal history,
we held that his actions in the case "reveal a person with an evil
heart." Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 86. We also noted that there was no
evidence that the defendant suffered from any mental or emotional
problems, nor was there evidence that the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the murders. The
defendant's relationship with Natalie had been over for months,
and the defendant was engaged to another woman at the time of
the murders. The murders were the culmination of an escalating
history of violence by the defendant against the victims, not a
spontaneous reaction to information such as the infidelity of a
spouse. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 88. Thus, after reviewing the
defendant's character and the circumstances of the crimes, we
affirmed the defendant's sentence of death. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at
85-89.
	Likewise, as we have discussed, the murders in this case were
the culmination of an escalating history of violence by defendant
against Angela. Although defendant has no significant criminal
history, his actions in this case, actions that are tragically similar
to the actions of the defendant in Heard, reveal a person with an
evil heart.
	Defendant nevertheless argues that the murders in this case
were "the product of an impulsive mind." In support, defendant
cites to the fact that in May 1995, defendant underwent a
psychiatric evaluation and was found unfit to stand trial.
According to the psychiatric report, "[Defendant] had the mental
capacity to understand and knowingly waive Miranda rights at the
time he was subject to interrogation. At the present time, due to
the severity of his mental illness, he is unable to cooperate with
counsel in preparing his defense. This is due to his extreme mood
depression, psychomotor retardation, and improvised thinking
processes as well as suicide ideation." Two months later, on July
12, 1995, defendant underwent another psychiatric evaluation and
was found fit to stand trial, provided he continue to receive certain
medications used to treat depression, sleep difficulties, and
psychosis. The psychiatric report also stated that defendant "was
legally sane at the time of the alleged offense" and that there "is no
indication that he [defendant] was suffering from any major
mental disorder at the time of the alleged offense." Finally,
defendant was evaluated on September 5, 1996, and was found fit
to stand trial provided he continue to receive certain medications
used to treat depression and psychosis. Again, the psychiatric
report stated that there "is no indication that [at the time of the
offenses] the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder or
defect which would have substantially impaired his ability to
understand the criminality of his act or to conform his behavior
with the requirements of the law."
	These reports do not contain any evidence that defendant was
suffering from any psychological problems at the time he
murdered Angela and Christopher. In fact, the reports state just the
opposite. The first evaluation occurred in May 1995, more than
eight months after the murders. The reports express no opinion as
to whether defendant's psychological problems existed before
defendant's arrest in this case or were the result of facing a trial for
the murders and the possibility of the death penalty. The record
reveals no evidence that defendant was acting under emotional
distress when he murdered Angela and Christopher. Indeed, the
facts surrounding the crimes bespeak the actions of a cold-blooded
murderer. After careful review of the circumstances of the crimes
in this case and the character of defendant, we conclude that the
death penalty is the appropriate penalty in this case.

H. Constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty Statute
	As a final matter, defendant raises several challenges to the
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute (720 ILCS
5/9-1 (West 1998)). This court has already considered and rejected
each of defendant's arguments. This court has held that the death
penalty statute does not place an unconstitutional burden of proof
on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of
mitigation. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 522; Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 203-05. We also have held that the death penalty statute is not
unconstitutional for allowing the sentencer to consider "any other
reason" a defendant should be sentenced to death. People v.
Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112-13 (1998); People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439 (1995). Further, we have rejected claims that the
statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently
minimize the risk of arbitrarily and capriciously imposed death
sentences. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 522; Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 205-06. Because defendant does not set forth any compelling reason
for reconsidering these holdings, we adhere to our prior decisions.
We also reject defendant's contention that individual features of
the death penalty statute, which this court has found constitutional,
when considered in their totality, render the statute
unconstitutional. See Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 113; Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 205-06.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County is affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter
an order setting Tuesday, March 20, 2001, as the date on which the
sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of Cook County,
shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner
provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of this
court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is
confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with court that defendant's convictions and sentence
must be affirmed. I write separately, however, because I do not
agree with court's analysis concerning the omission of the mens
rea from the eligibility verdict. See slip op. at 32-36. I, therefore,
do not join in that portion of the court's opinion.
	Defendant argues that his death-eligibility verdict form
contains the same defect as that found to necessitate vacatur in
People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). In Mack, the defendant
was convicted of murder in a bench trial. The sentencing hearing
was conducted before a jury. At the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing, the jury returned a felony-murder eligibility verdict that
omitted the required mens rea. This court, in examining the
validity of the eligibility verdict, acknowledged the critical
importance of the mental state to a finding of death eligibility.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. The court also warned that the process of
interpreting a jury's verdict "should not become a speculative
attempt to reconstruct the jury's deliberations and divine its
unexpressed conclusions." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 536-37. The jury
in Mack never expressed a conclusion as to whether the defendant
possessed the required mental state and, as a result, the eligibility
verdict was legally insufficient.
	In this case, the parties do not dispute that the verdict at issue
attempted to set forth the statutory aggravating factor, but failed to
do so completely, omitting an essential element.	Therefore,
pursuant to Mack, the verdict is deficient. Nevertheless, the court
today rejects defendant's claim, because, unlike the situation in
Mack, "[t]he jury's eligibility verdict, when viewed in conjunction
with the evidence heard by the jury at the guilt phase of trial along
with the instructions and guilty verdicts, supports the conclusion
that the jury found intent at eligibility." Slip op. at 36. Unlike the
justices in the majority, however, I do not believe that the strength
of the evidence is what distinguishes this case from Mack and,
hence, precludes review under plain error. As the United States
Supreme Court has held, an insufficient verdict cannot be deemed
harmless error based upon the strength of the evidence. Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078
(1993); see also People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2000)
(plurality opinion of McMorrow, J., joined by Freeman and
Rathje, JJ.).
	In the case at bar, the same jury which found defendant
eligible for the death penalty also heard the evidence during the
guilt phase of the trial. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the
trial, that jury was instructed on only one theory-intentional or
knowing murder. Therefore, the verdict returned by the jury after
the guilt phase of the trial must be viewed as a finding of guilt of
either intentional or knowing murder. In other words, because of
the way the jury was instructed, the general verdict leaves us
without doubt that defendant was convicted on either a theory of
knowing or intentional murder. As a result, we need not engage in
speculation in order to interpret the verdict in this case.
	Support for this analysis can be found in this court's recent
decision in People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63 (2000). There, at
the conclusion of the guilt phase of the defendant's trial, the jury
returned a specific verdict finding the defendant guilty of
intentional or knowing murder. At the conclusion of the eligibility
phase of the trial, the same jury returned an eligibility verdict
containing the same deficiency as that in Mack. On appeal,
defendant McCallister argued that Mack compelled the vacatur of
his death sentence. We disagreed, stating that
		"the principal concerns animating our decision in Mack
are not present ***. We need not speculate as to whether
the jury found that defendant acted with the requisite
mens rea because the jury did, in fact, make that
determination at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Nor do
we need to substitute our judgment for that of the jury to
find the defendant death eligible because, again, the jury
made the requisite finding regarding defendant's mens
rea. Consequently, although the omission of the mental
state from the eligibility verdicts was error, we cannot say
that the omission was so fundamental a defect that it
amounted to plain error. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275 (1994) (omission of mental state from felony-murder
eligibility verdict not reversible error where same jury
returned finding at guilt phase that defendant was guilty
of knowing or intentional murder)." McCallister,193 Ill. 2d  at 106-07.
As was the case in McCallister, our "interpretive process" (Mack,
167 Ill. 2d at 536) here need not devolve into "a speculative
attempt to reconstruct the jury's deliberations and divine its
unexpressed conclusions." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 536-37. Unlike a
general verdict returned at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the
trial by a jury after being instructed on all theories of murder
(intentional, knowing, and felony murder), this verdict leaves no
doubt that the jury found the required mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt. As in McCallister, because the same jury heard
both the guilt-innocence phase and eligibility phase of the trial,
and because that jury returned an unequivocal finding of the
requisite mens rea at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the
omission of that mens rea from the eligibility verdict is not so
fundamental a defect that it constitutes plain error. Thus, because
the jury did, in fact, find the necessary mental state to sustain
defendant's death eligibility, there is no reasonable probability that
the outcome of the eligibility hearing would have been different
had trial counsel objected to the verdict forms. 
	In all other respects, I concur in the court's opinion.




	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	Under the Constitution and statutes of Illinois, law
enforcement officials are prohibited from interfering with an
attorney's attempt to access and assist his client. People v.
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994). When an attorney has advised
police that he has been appointed or retained to represent a suspect
in police custody and is attempting to contact his client, the police
must discontinue questioning, notify the suspect of the attorney's
efforts to render assistance, and permit the attorney to consult with
the suspect. If the police proceed with questioning without
advising the suspect of the attorney's efforts and without allowing
the attorney to speak to the suspect first, any incriminating
statements made by the suspect during the ensuing interrogation
are deemed involuntary and must be suppressed. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 445-46.
	Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that this rule should
be limited to situations where a suspect's attorney is physically
present at the site of the interrogation. Once police are advised that
an attorney has been appointed or retained to represent a suspect
in custody and that the attorney would like to consult with the
suspect, questioning should cease. That is so whether the attorney
is at the door of the police station or calling from his home, office
or cell phone. See People v. Milestone, 283 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686
(1996); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, ___, 725 N.E.2d 169, 179 (2000); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987).
As long as the attorney has used reasonable means to give notice
to the police, the particular method employed by the attorney to
give such notice is logically and legally irrelevant.
	The rights protected by this rule are fundamental. The
administrative challenges it poses are insignificant. Application of
the rule will require law enforcement officials to track the location
of suspects in custody so that they can be reached and notified if
attorneys inquire after them. That should not be problematic,
however, in any but the largest metropolitan areas. Even there,
affordable technology exists to enable police to identify where
every suspect is during his or her detention.
	If police are concerned that individuals will begin
impersonating defense lawyers, they are free to implement policies
for identifying and verifying that individuals representing
themselves as attorneys are, in fact, attorneys. See Mavredakis,
430 Mass. at ___ n.15, 725 N.E.2d  at 179 n.15. Lawyers could, for
example, be required to fax copies of their bar cards and drivers'
licenses to the police station. Alternatively, police could demand
that attorneys appear at the police station in person within a
reasonable time after telephonic notice is given. Police would be
required to suspend questioning during that interval, but if the
attorney failed to appear before the time expired, questioning
could resume.
	By requiring counsel to be physically present at the site of the
interrogation, the majority invites police misconduct. If law
enforcement officers are free to continue interrogation until the
lawyer appears in person at the station house where the suspect is
being held, what will happen is obvious. Police will resort to
subterfuge and prevarication to delay counsel's discovery of his
client's whereabouts for as long as possible. Their goal, in every
case, will be to extract a confession faster than the attorney can
track the client down and intercede.
	The exercise of constitutional rights should not turn on a
footrace to the police station. To hold otherwise, as the majority
does, reflects a basic and unwarranted distrust for the role of
lawyers in our criminal justice system. We wrote in McCauley,
163 Ill. 2d  at 446, that
		" '[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that
if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will
become aware of, and exercise, [his] rights.' (Emphasis
omitted.) [Citation.] If our system is, indeed, such a
system, we have no reason to fear both lawful and
protected consultation."
I, for one, continue to believe in the wisdom of this rule.
Accordingly, I would hold that the circuit court should have
suppressed not only the statements made by defendant after his
attorney arrived at the police station, but also the statements
defendant made after police rebuffed his attorney's attempts to
reach him by telephone. Those statements, which included
defendant's confession, should not have been presented to the jury,
and their admission did not constitute harmless error. Defendant
should therefore be granted a new trial.
	Even if defendant were not entitled to a new trial, his death
sentence could not be allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth
in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Defendant's sentence of
death should therefore be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1998). Because defendant
was an adult and one of his victims was under the age of 12, or, in
the alternative, because defendant was found guilty of murdering
more than one victim, the term of his imprisonment must be
natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998).