Title: Viner v. Sweet

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/23/03 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MICHAEL VINER et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S101964 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B138149 
CHARLES A. SWEET et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC 192006 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In a client’s action against an attorney for legal malpractice, the client must 
prove, among other things, that the attorney’s negligent acts or omissions caused 
the client to suffer some financial harm or loss.  When the alleged malpractice 
occurred in the performance of transactional work (giving advice or preparing 
documents for a business transaction), must the client prove this causation element 
according to the “but for” test, meaning that the harm or loss would not have 
occurred without the attorney’s malpractice?  The answer is yes.1 
                                             
 
1  
Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages:  
determining cause in fact and considering various policy factors that may preclude 
imposition of liability.  (Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP 
et al. (June 9, 2003, S104444) ___ Cal.4th ___ [pp. 7-8]; PPG Industries, Inc. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315-316.)  This case concerns only 
the element of cause in fact. 
 
2
I 
In 1984, plaintiffs Michael Viner and his wife, Deborah Raffin Viner, 
founded Dove Audio, Inc. (Dove).  The company produced audio versions of 
books read by the authors or by celebrities, and it did television and movie 
projects. 
In 1994, Dove went public by issuing stock at $10 a share.  In 1995, the 
Viners and Dove entered into long-term employment contracts guaranteeing the 
Viners, among other things, a certain level of salaries, and containing 
indemnification provisions favorable to the Viners.  The Viners received a large 
share of Dove’s common stock and all of its preferred cumulative dividend series 
“A” stock. 
Thereafter, Michael Viner discussed with longtime friend David Povich, a 
partner in defendant law firm Williams & Connolly in Washington, D.C., the 
possibility of selling the Viners’ interest in Dove.  In the fall of 1996, Norton 
Herrick proposed buying the Viners’ entire interest in Dove.  Attorney Povich 
assigned the matter to his partner, defendant Charles A. Sweet, a corporate 
transactional attorney.  Sweet was not a member of the California Bar and was not 
familiar with California law.  During the negotiations with Herrick, Sweet learned 
that under the Viners’ employment agreements with Dove, the latter owed the 
Viners a substantial amount of unpaid dividends on their preferred stock.  Sweet 
also learned that the Viners wanted to preserve their right to engage in the 
television and movie businesses. 
When the negotiations with Herrick were unsuccessful, Ronald Lightstone of 
Media Equities International (MEI) approached the Viners.  Thereafter, in March 
1997, the Viners and MEI entered into an agreement under which MEI was to 
invest $4 million, and the Viners $2 million, to buy Dove stock.  By May 1997, 
disputes arose, and the parties to the agreement each threatened litigation.  That 
 
3
same month, Ronald Lightstone of MEI and Michael Viner, without defendant 
attorney Sweet’s involvement, agreed that MEI would buy the Viners’ stock in 
Dove and the Viners would terminate their employment with Dove.   
Defendant attorney Sweet and Lightstone of MEI negotiated the final 
agreement, which the parties signed on June 10, 1997.  The deal consisted of a 
Securities Purchase Agreement and an Employment Termination Agreement.  
Under the former, MEI agreed to buy a significant portion of the Viners’ stock for 
more than $3 million.  Under the latter agreement, the Viners’ employment with 
Dove was terminated, mutual general releases were given, and Dove was to pay 
the Viners a total of $1.5 million over five years in monthly payments, with 
Dove’s series E preferred stock to be held in escrow for distribution to the Viners 
if Dove defaulted on the monthly payments to them. 
The Employment Termination Agreement contained a noncompetition 
provision stating that the Viners would not “ ‘compete’ in any way, directly or 
indirectly, in the audio book business for a period of four years” in any state in 
which Dove was doing business.  The agreement also had a nonsolicitation 
provision that the Viners would not “directly or indirectly contract with, hire, 
solicit, encourage the departure of or in any manner engage or seek to employ any 
author or, for purposes of audio books, reader, currently under contract or included 
in the Company’s book or audio catalogues for a period of four years.” 
In addition, the Employment Termination Agreement provided that Deborah 
Raffin Viner would receive “Producer Credit” on audio book work initiated during 
her employment with Dove; that Dove would not amend documents to terminate 
or reduce its obligation to indemnify the Viners; and that disputes would be 
submitted to arbitration, whose costs were to be split equally between the parties, 
with attorney fees to the party seeking to enforce the arbitration in court. 
 
4
Defendant attorney Sweet led the Viners to believe that the Employment 
Termination Agreement gave them three years of monthly payments by Dove, 
retained the indemnity protection they had with Dove, and provided credit for 
work done before their departure from Dove.  The Viners also thought that they 
could use their celebrity contacts for any work that did not compete with Dove’s 
audio book business and involvement in film and television productions, and that 
if Dove defaulted on the agreed-upon monthly payments to them, the 
noncompetition clauses would be voided.  The contracts did not so provide. 
Later, several arbitration proceedings took place to resolve disputes between 
the Viners and MEI, including a claim by the Viners that the noncompetition 
provision of the Employment Termination Agreement violated Business and 
Professions Code section 16600’s restrictions on noncompetition agreements.  The 
arbitrator rejected the claim, and the superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s 
decision. 
On June 3, 1998, the Viners brought a malpractice action against Attorney 
Sweet and the law firm of Williams & Connolly.  Presented at trial were these 
seven claims:  (1) Sweet told the Viners that the nonsolicitation clause of the 
Employment Termination Agreement prohibiting plaintiffs from using their 
contacts to obtain work in television and movie projects applied only to the book 
and audio book parts of Dove’s business, but Dove, because the clause was 
ambiguous, asserted that the clause also encompassed Dove’s television and 
movie projects; (2) Sweet negligently agreed to the noncompetition provision, 
which violated Business and Professions Code section 16600’s restrictions on such 
provisions; (3) the Viners had asked for an attorney fees provision, but the 
Employment Termination Agreement disallowed attorney fees in any disputes, 
permitting them only in enforcing an arbitration award; (4) ambiguous language in 
the Producer Credit provision caused Dove not to give Deborah Raffin Viner 
 
5
credit as a producer; (5) the Viners lost rights to dividends on Dove’s series A 
preferred stock; (6) the Employment Termination Agreement did not contain an 
indemnity provision providing the same level of protection as the Viners’ 
agreement with Dove; and (7) the series E stock afforded inadequate security to 
the Viners if Dove defaulted on the monthly payments due them under the 
Employment Termination Agreement.   
After deliberating five days, the jury found defendants liable on all seven 
claims of malpractice, awarding the Viners $13,291,532 in damages.  Defendants 
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new 
trial, arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the Viners 
needed to prove they would have received a better deal “but for” defendant 
attorney Sweet’s negligence.  The trial court denied both motions. 
The Court of Appeal reduced the damage award to $8,085,732, but otherwise 
affirmed the judgment.  The court first noted that it was undisputed that the Viners 
did not attempt to prove that without defendants’ alleged negligence MEI would 
have given them a better deal on the contract terms here in issue.  The court 
determined that the case presented a pure question of law:  whether plaintiffs in a 
transactional legal malpractice action must show that the harm would not have 
occurred but for the alleged negligence.  It held that the “but for” test of causation 
did not apply to transactional malpractice. 
The Court of Appeal distinguished transactional malpractice from litigation 
malpractice, in which the plaintiff is required to prove the harm would not have 
occurred without the alleged negligence, and it offered three reasons for treating 
the two forms of malpractice differently.  First, the court asserted that in litigation 
a gain for one side is always a loss for the other, whereas in transactional work a 
gain for one side could also be a gain for the other side.  Second, the court 
observed that litigation malpractice involves past historical facts while 
 
6
transactional malpractice involves what parties would have been willing to accept 
for the future.  Third, the court stated that “business transactions generally involve 
a much larger universe of variables than litigation matters.”  According to the 
Court of Appeal, in “contract negotiations the number of possible terms and 
outcomes is virtually unlimited,” and therefore the “jury would have to evaluate a 
nearly infinite array of ‘what-ifs,’ to say nothing of ‘if that, then whats,’ in order to 
determine whether the plaintiff would have ended up with a better outcome ‘but 
for’ the malpractice.” 
We granted defendants’ petition for review, and thereafter limited the issues 
to whether the plaintiff in a transactional legal malpractice action must prove that 
a more favorable result would have been obtained but for the alleged negligence.2 
II 
Defendants contend that in a transactional malpractice action, the plaintiff 
must show that but for the alleged malpractice, a more favorable result would have 
been obtained.  Thus, defendants argue, the Viners had to show that without 
defendants’ negligence (1) they would have had a more advantageous agreement 
(the “better deal” scenario), or (2) they would not have entered into the transaction 
with MEI and therefore would have been better off (the “no deal” scenario). 
The Viners respond that in Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, this 
court repudiated the “but for” test of causation in tort cases alleging negligence.  
Not so. 
                                             
 
2  
The trial court refused defendants’ requested instruction on “but for” 
causation.  The court did instruct the jury that a cause of an injury “is something 
that is a substantial factor in bringing about” the harm.  Because the Court of 
Appeal addressed this case as presenting the “pure question of law” of whether the 
legal requirement of showing “but for” causation applies at all to transactional 
malpractice cases, and because we limited our review to that issue, we have not 
framed our discussion in terms of instructional error. 
 
7
In Mitchell, the parents of a boy who died while on a picnic with neighbors 
sued the neighbors for wrongful death.  The child, who could not swim, was riding a 
paddleboard in a lake when the paddleboard capsized and he drowned.  Addressing 
causation, a majority of this court held that, for use in jury instructions, the term 
“proximate cause” was “conceptually and grammatically deficient” because it could 
mislead jurors into focusing on the cause that as to time and space was nearest to the 
injury.  (Mitchell v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1052.) 
In so holding, Mitchell did not abandon or repudiate the requirement that the 
plaintiff must prove that, but for the alleged negligence, the harm would not have 
happened.  On the contrary, Mitchell stated that jury instructions on causation in 
negligence cases should use the “substantial factor” test articulated in the 
Restatement Second of Torts, and Mitchell recognized that “the ‘substantial factor’ 
test subsumes the ‘but for’ test.”  (Mitchell v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 
1052, italics added.)  Mitchell also stated that “nothing in this opinion should be 
read to discourage the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions from drafting a 
new and proper ‘but for’ instruction.”  (Id. at p. 1054, fn. 10.)  In Rutherford v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968, this court affirmed that 
“California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement 
Second of Torts for cause-in-fact determinations.” 
The text of Restatement section 432 demonstrates how the “substantial 
factor” test subsumes the traditional “but for” test of causation.  Subsection (1) of 
section 432 provides:  “Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent 
conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm  
 
8
would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.”  (Italics 
added.)  Subsection (2) states that if “two forces are actively operating . . . and 
each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s negligence 
may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.” 
Thus, in Restatement section 432, subsection (1) adopts the “but for” test of 
causation, while subsection (2) provides for an exception to that test.  The 
situation that the exception addresses has long been recognized, but it has been 
given various labels, including “concurrent independent causes” (Mitchell v. 
Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1049, 1052), “combined force criteria” 
(Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact (1997) 75 Tex. L.Rev. 1765, 
1778), and “multiple sufficient causes” (Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical Harm 
(Basic Principles) (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) § 27, com. b, p. 70).   
This case does not involve concurrent independent causes, which are 
multiple forces operating at the same time and independently, each of which 
would have been sufficient by itself to bring about the harm.  Here, the Viners 
argued that their losses were caused by defendants’ negligence, the actions of MEI 
exploiting that negligence, the underlying economic situation, and “other factors.”  
Because these forces operated in combination, with none being sufficient in the 
absence of the others to bring about the harm, they are not concurrent independent 
causes.3  Accordingly, the exception stated in subsection (2) of Restatement 
section 432 does not apply, and this case is governed by the “but for” test stated in 
subsection (1) of Restatement section 432.4 
                                             
 
3  
“Concurrent independent causes” should not be confused with “concurrent 
causes.”  The former refers to multiple forces operating at the same time and 
independently, each of which would have been sufficient by itself to bring about 
the harm.  The latter refers simply to multiple forces operating at the same time. 
 
4  
The requirement that the plaintiff prove causation should not be confused 
with the method or means of doing so.  Phrases such as “trial within a trial,” “case 
within a case,” “no deal” scenario, and “better deal” scenario describe methods of 
 
9
 
The Court of Appeal here held that a plaintiff suing an attorney for 
transactional malpractice need not show that the harm would not have occurred in 
the absence of the attorney’s negligence.  We disagree.  We see nothing distinctive 
about transactional malpractice that would justify a relaxation of, or departure from, 
the well-established requirement in negligence cases that the plaintiff establish 
causation by showing either:  (1) but for the negligence, the harm would not have 
occurred, or (2) the negligence was a concurrent independent cause of the harm. 
 
“When a business transaction goes awry, a natural target of the 
disappointed principals is the attorneys who arranged or advised the deal.  Clients 
predictably attempt to shift some part of the loss and disappointment of a deal that 
goes sour onto the shoulders of persons who were responsible for the underlying 
legal work.  Before the loss can be shifted, however, the client has an initial hurdle 
to clear.  It must be shown that the loss suffered was in fact caused by the alleged 
attorney malpractice.  It is far too easy to make the legal advisor a scapegoat for a 
variety of business misjudgments unless the courts pay close attention to the cause 
in fact element, and deny recovery where the unfavorable outcome was likely to 
occur anyway, the client already knew the problems with the deal, or where the 
client’s own misconduct or misjudgment caused the problems.  It is the failure of 
the client to establish the causal link that explains decisions where the loss is 
termed remote or speculative.  Courts are properly cautious about making 
attorneys guarantors of their clients’ faulty business judgment.”  (Bauman, 
Damages for Legal Malpractice:  An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and 
Threatening Flood (1988) 61 Temp. L.Rev. 1127, 1154-1155, fns. omitted, italics 
added (hereafter Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice).) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
proving causation, not the causation requirement itself or the test for determining 
whether causation has been established. 
 
10
 
In a litigation malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that but for the 
alleged negligence of the defendant attorney, the plaintiff would have obtained a 
more favorable judgment or settlement in the action in which the malpractice 
allegedly occurred.  The purpose of this requirement, which has been in use for 
more than 120 years, is to safeguard against speculative and conjectural claims.  
(Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 832-834.)  
It serves the essential purpose of ensuring that damages awarded for the attorney’s 
malpractice actually have been caused by the malpractice.  (Id. at p. 834.) 
 
The Court of Appeal here attempted to distinguish litigation malpractice 
from transactional malpractice in order to justify a relaxation of the “but for” test 
of causation in transactional malpractice cases.  One of the distinguishing features, 
according to the court, was that in litigation a gain for one side necessarily entails 
a corresponding loss for the other, whereas in transactional representation a gain 
for one side does not necessarily result in a loss for the other.  We question both 
the accuracy and the relevance of this generalization.  In litigation, as in 
transactional work, a gain for one side does not necessarily result in a loss for the 
other side.  Litigation may involve multiple claims and issues arising from 
complaints and cross-complaints, and parties in such litigation may prevail on 
some issues and not others, so that in the end there is no clear winner or loser and 
no exact correlation between one side’s gains and the other side’s losses.  In 
addition, an attorney’s representation of a client often combines litigation and 
transactional work, as when the attorney effects a settlement of pending litigation.  
The “but for” test of causation applies to a claim of legal malpractice in the 
settlement of litigation (Marshak v. Ballesteros (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1514, 
1518-1519; Thompson v. Halvonik (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 657, 661-663), even 
though the settlement is itself a form of business transaction. 
 
11
 
Nor do we agree with the Court of Appeal that litigation is inherently or 
necessarily less complex than transactional work.  Some litigation, such as many 
lawsuits involving car accidents, is relatively uncomplicated, but so too is much 
transactional work, such as the negotiation of a simple lease or a purchase and sale 
agreement.  But some litigation, such as a beneficiary’s action against a trustee 
challenging the trustee’s management of trust property over a period of decades, is 
as complex as most transactional work. 
It is true, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, that litigation generally involves 
an examination of past events whereas transactional work involves anticipating 
and guiding the course of future events.  But this distinction makes little difference 
for purposes of selecting an appropriate test of causation.  Determining causation 
always requires evaluation of hypothetical situations concerning what might have 
happened, but did not.  In both litigation and transactional malpractice cases, the 
crucial causation inquiry is what would have happened if the defendant attorney 
had not been negligent.  This is so because the very idea of causation necessarily 
involves comparing historical events to a hypothetical alternative.  (E.g., 1 Dobbs, 
The Law of Torts, supra, § 169, p. 411; Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause 
in Fact, supra, 75 Tex. L.Rev. at p. 1770.)   
The Viners also contend that the “but for” test of causation should not apply 
to transactional malpractice cases because it is too difficult to obtain the evidence 
needed to satisfy this standard of proof.  In particular, they argue that proving 
causation under the “but for” test would require them to obtain the testimony of 
the other parties to the transaction, who have since become their adversaries, to the 
effect that they would have given the Viners more favorable terms had the Viners’ 
attorneys not performed negligently.  Not so.  In transactional malpractice cases, 
as in other cases, the plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to satisfy his or her 
burden.  An express concession by the other parties to the negotiation that they 
 
12
would have accepted other or additional terms is not necessary.  And the plaintiff 
need not prove causation with absolute certainty.  Rather, the plaintiff need only 
“ ‘introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is 
more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the 
result.’ ”  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205, quoting Prosser 
& Keeton on Torts, supra, § 41, p. 269, fns. omitted.)  In any event, difficulties of 
proof cannot justify imposing liability for injuries that the attorney could not have 
prevented by performing according to the required standard of care.  (See Bauman, 
Damages for Legal Malpractice, supra, 61 Temp. L.Rev. at p. 1154.) 
In urging us to exempt transactional malpractice from the “but for” test of 
causation, the Viners cite California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Parichan, 
Renberg, Crossman & Harvey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 702 (CSAA).  There, an 
attorney representing both the insured and the insurer in a personal injury action 
brought by a third party car accident victim negligently failed to forward to the 
insurer a medical report showing that the tort victim’s injuries were more serious 
than previously thought.  Because of the attorney’s negligence, the insurance 
company rejected a $50,000 settlement offer but then, after learning the seriousness 
of the victim’s injuries, ultimately paid $850,000 to settle the litigation.  In the 
insurer’s malpractice action against the attorney, the trial court refused to give a jury 
instruction requiring the insurer to prove that, but for the attorney’s negligence, the 
insurer would not have suffered harm.  (Id. at p. 709, fn. 1.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the requested instruction was 
unnecessary because the issue was whether the insurance company’s settlement was 
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.  (CSAA, supra, 84 
Cal.App.4th at p. 710.)  Referring to Professor Bauman’s law review article, which 
we discussed, ante, at pages 9 to 10, the court observed:  “One commentator 
describes the difference between the proof of causation and damages in the 
 
13
‘litigation’ and ‘transactional’ malpractice contexts in this way:  ‘When legal 
malpractice takes place in a transactional setting – that is, in the advising and 
planning of business dealings – the courts take a much less structured approach to 
proof of damages.  No longer wedded to a narrow interpretation of what can 
constitute adequate proof of the fact and amount of injury, the courts tend to treat 
such actions like ordinary business cases and allow considerably more flexibility to 
plaintiffs in proving their damages.’ ”  (Id. at p. 711, quoting Bauman, Damages for 
Legal Malpractice, supra, 61 Temp. L.Rev. at p. 1150, italics added.)   
The CSAA court misunderstood the above quoted comment from Professor 
Bauman’s article as referring to both causation and damages, when it actually 
referred only to damages, specifically consequential damages.  (Bauman, 
Damages for Legal Malpractice, supra, 61 Temp. L.Rev. at pp. 1150-1153.)  
Professor Bauman thereafter observed, “[c]ourts are properly cautious about 
making attorneys guarantors of their clients’ faulty business judgment”; hence, 
courts require that it be “shown that the loss suffered was in fact caused by the 
alleged attorney malpractice.”  (Id. at pp. 1154-1155.)5   
For the reasons given above, we conclude that, just as in litigation 
malpractice actions, a plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that 
but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would 
have obtained a more favorable result. 
                                             
 
5  
California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Parichan, Renberg, 
Crossman & Harvey, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 702, is disapproved to the extent it is 
inconsistent with our decision in this case. 
 
14
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded 
to the Court of Appeal for proceedings consistent with the views expressed here.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
RAYE, J.* 
 
 
                                             
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Viner v. Sweet 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 92 Cal.App.4th 730 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S101964 
Date Filed: June 23, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: David A. Workman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Dennis C. Brown, Mark B. Helm, Allison B. Stein, Steven W. Hawkins, Paul J. 
Watford; Kester & Isenberg and Charles F. Kester for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Marshall L. Small, George C. Harris; Crosby Heafey Roach & May, James T. 
Wilson; Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, Robert A. Epsen, Paul W. Sugarman; Thelen Reid & Priest, 
Wynne S. Carvill; Farella Braun & Martel, Douglas R. Young; Pillsbury Winthrop, Ronald E. Van Buskirk 
and Robert M. Westberg for listed law firms as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Thelen Reid & Priest, Curtis A. Cole, Cyrus M. Sanai; Law Offices of Charles O’Brien, Norman L. Miley 
and Lynn F. York for The Doctors’ Company, Professional Underwriters Liability Insurance Company and 
Underwriters for the Professions Insurance Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Rogers Joseph O’Donnell & Phillips, Pamela Phillips and Richard A. Jackson for Rogers Joseph O’Donnell 
& Phillips, Barger & Wolen, Fish & Richardson, Hancock Rothert & Bunshoft, O’Melveny & Myers, 
Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Venture Law Group and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Ronald E. Mallen and Paul E. Valone as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Altschuler Grossman Stein & Kahan, Bruce A. Friedman, Jeremy E. Pendrey and David B. Dreyfus for Los 
Angeles County Bar Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley, Mark G. Bonino; Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W. 
R. Chamberlain II, Robert M. Dato, Brian P. Barrow; Robie & Matthai, Edith R. Matthai, Pamela E. Dunn 
and Natalie A. Kouyoumdjian for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of 
Northern California Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Page 2 - counsel continues - S101964 
 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
 
Parker Mills & Patel, David B. Parker, Angeli Aragon; Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Rubin & Demain, 
Fred H. Altshuler; Russo & Lowry and Jason H. Wilson for the San Francisco Bar Association and the 
Beverly Hills Bar Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Marjorie G. Fuller and Marjorie G. Fuller for Orange County Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous and Julian W. Poon for Attorneys Insurance Mutual Risk 
Retention Group, Inc., and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, Patricia L. Glaser, Mila Livitz, Peter C. 
Sheridan and Elizabeth G. Chilton for Plaintiffs and Respondents.  
 
James C. Turner, Thomas M. Gordon and Suzanne M. Mishkin for Halt, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark B. Helm 
Munger, Tolles & Olson 
355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 683-9100 
 
Patricia L. Glaser 
Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro 
2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1800 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 553-3000