Title: Gailey v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gailey v. State1994 WY 104882 P.2d 888Case Number: 93-159Decided: 10/12/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
John 
M. GAILEY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from District Court of Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid 
Program; and Shawna M. Mackey, Student Intern.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Melissa E. Westby, Student 
Intern.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument. 

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal, 
appellant challenges the admission of statements, or "unsworn narrative 
testimony," offered by the State of Wyoming during appellant's second probation 
revocation hearing. Appellant contends the revocation proceeding was flawed 
because he was not provided notice of the challenged statements and was denied 
an opportunity to confront the statements. Appellant also claims the district 
court judge was prejudiced by "unsworn narrative testimony" regarding matters 
not enumerated in the petition to revoke probation. Finally, appellant avers 
that it is bad policy to allow "unsworn narrative testimony" during revocation 
proceedings.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issue for our review:

The 
trial court erred in allowing unsworn narrative testimony by the assistant 
district attorney during the revocation phase of a probation revocation 
proceeding without prior disclosure and without providing Mr. Gailey an 
opportunity to confront the adverse testimony.

[¶4]      The State 
presents the issue as:

Did 
the district court err in revoking appellant's probation and sentencing 
appellant to prison after the attorney for the state made a dispositional 
statement to the court setting forth matters not included in the petition to 
revoke probation?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On April 15, 
1991, John M. Gailey (Gailey) pled guilty to one count of destruction of 
property. The district court deferred sentencing and placed Gailey on probation 
for a period of five years. Probation conditions included payment of 
restitution. On September 27, 1991, Gailey admitted that he violated the terms 
of his probation when he engaged in criminal activities in Arizona. Gailey's 
probation was revoked and he was sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six months in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with a recommendation that he be sent to the 
Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp (boot camp). Upon release from boot camp, Gailey 
was again placed on probation.

[¶6]      On March 15, 
1993, the State again petitioned for revocation of Gailey's probation. The 
affidavit appended to the petition to revoke probation alleged three violations 
of probation: reckless driving, resisting arrest and unlawful entry. At a 
hearing, Gailey admitted to reckless driving and unlawful entry. Following 
Gailey's admissions, the State, in response to the district court's inquiry, 
asked that the original sentence for destruction of property be 
imposed.

[¶7]      The district 
court questioned Gailey regarding a previous outstanding bench warrant for 
failure to appear to suggest a restitution plan. The district court also 
inquired about Gailey's current employment and his ability to begin payment of 
restitution. Gailey requested his probation be extended or reinstated so that he 
could continue to work and pay restitution. The State again requested that the 
original sentence be imposed, citing Gailey's failure to pay restitution; his 
criminal activities in Arizona which led to his October 1991 probation 
revocation; and his current probation violations leading to the present petition 
to revoke probation.

[¶8]      Defense counsel 
objected to the district court's consideration of allegations and statements 
made by the State which were not included in the petition to revoke probation. 
When questioned by the district court as to "[w]hat allegations," Gailey's 
counsel responded, "[f]ailure to make restitution, failure to appear." The 
district court stated that its deliberations would be limited to only those 
violations alleged in the petition to revoke probation.

[¶9]      The district 
court found that Gailey had not reformed after boot camp. The district court 
also expressed disbelief in Gailey's explanation of the unlawful entry incident. 
The district court revoked Gailey's probation and sentenced him to serve 
eighteen to thirty-six months at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with credit for 
time served at boot camp. 

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶10]   A district court's decision to 
revoke probation and impose a sentence is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. Kupec v. 
State, 835 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1992); Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 224 (Wyo. 1991). In a general judicial setting,

[a] 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.

Martinez 
v. State, 
611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). This court has discussed at length the 
discretionary nature of probation revocation hearings in Minchew v. 
State, 685 P.2d 30, 32-33 (Wyo. 1984) and Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356, 1359-60 (Wyo. 1980). We summarize those discussions by 
noting:

"All 
that is essential is the court's conscientious judgment after hearing the facts 
that the violation has occurred. This should not be an arbitrary action and 
should include a consideration of both the reasons underlying the original 
impositions of conditions, the violation of these, and the reasons leading to 
such violation."

Minchew, 
685 P.2d  at 32 (quoting State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Wyo. 
1971)). See also, Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1992) and 
Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293-94 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶11]   Probation revocation procedures are 
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and by Wyoming 
statutory and case law. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981). 
In Mason, 631 P.2d  at 1055, this court established a two-part probation 
revocation procedure based on the United States Supreme Court's rulings in 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2603-04, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) (due process in parole revocation procedures) and Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 791, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1760, 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) (applying Morrissey to probation revocation 
procedures).

[¶12]   The adjudicatory phase of a 
probation revocation proceeding requires the district court to determine whether 
the probation agreement has been violated. This determination must be based on 
verified facts and must be made pursuant to due process protections, including 
written notice of the claimed violations, the right to call witnesses and the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Mason, 631 P.2d  at 
1055; W.R.Cr.P. 39. Constitutional due process requirements (see Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10, right of accused to defend) and the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence (including W.R.E. 603, Oath or affirmation) apply during this portion 
of the procedure. W.R.E. 1101.

[¶13]  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a) provides, in pertinent 
part:

(4) 
Plea. - The probationer shall be given a copy of the petition for revocation of 
probation before being called upon to plead. The probationer shall be called 
upon to admit or deny the allegations of the petition for revocation. If 
the probationer admits the allegations of the petition, the court may proceed 
immediately to disposition, or may set a future date for disposition. * 
* *

* 
* * * * *

(5) 
Hearing. - At the hearing upon the petition for revocation of probation, the 
state must establish the violation of the conditions of probation alleged in the 
petition by a preponderance of the evidence.

(A) 
The probationer shall have the right to appear in person and by counsel, and to 
confront and examine adverse witnesses.

(B) 
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence shall apply to the adjudicative phase of the 
probation revocation hearings, but not to the dispositional 
stage.

(Emphasis 
added.) If no violation is found, the procedure ends here.

[¶14]   The dispositional phase of the 
revocation proceeding determines whether, in light of a proven violation, 
probation should be revoked. Mason, 631 P.2d  at 1055. This portion of the 
proceeding is excluded from the rules of evidence. W.R.E. 1101(b)(3). While 
general due process protections continue to attach during this phase, "`[t]he 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an order revoking probation is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Minchew, 685 P.2d  at 32 
(quoting Ketcham, 618 P.2d at 1359). A conscientious judgment 
after hearing the facts is adequate. Krow, 840 P.2d  at 
264.

[¶15]   Gailey complains of statements made 
by the State during the May 7, 1993 probation revocation hearing. The challenged 
statements include Gailey's failure to fulfill his restitution obligation, his 
failure to appear after boot camp to offer a restitution plan, and his 
activities that led to the 1991 probation revocation. Gailey labels these 
statements as "unsworn narrative testimony," and contends he was denied fair 
notice of the allegations implied by the statements. The State made these 
statements after Gailey admitted to probation violations involving reckless 
driving and unlawful entry, but before the district court actually stated it was 
"pass[ing] on to the dispositional phase."

[¶16]   Due process, as it applies to 
probation revocation proceedings, requires that the probationer receive written 
notice of the claimed violations. Mason, 631 P.2d  at 1055. "Notice" means 
advice or warning, "in more or less formal shape," intended to advise a person 
of some proceeding involving his interests. Black's Law Dictionary 1061 
(6th ed. 1990). In probation revocation proceedings, notice pertains to the 
charges regarding a violation of the conditions of probation, not to matters 
discussed during a dispositional phase. W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(4).

[¶17]   When a probationer admits to the 
allegations stated in a petition for revocation, the district court does not 
have to consider allegations of other misconduct, including any misconduct 
suggested by "unsworn testimony." Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 294-95. In 
Wlodarczyk, this court upheld a district court's finding of a probation 
violation when the state, during the revocation hearing, expressed concern that 
Wlodarczyk was "out of control," an allegation not included in the state's 
petition for revocation. Id. at 282. Wlodarczyk admitted to the 
allegations of violation stated in the petition to revoke probation, but claimed 
he was not properly apprised of the grounds on which his revocation was based. 
Id. at 281, 282-83 n. 4. This court ruled that Wlodarczyk's admission to 
the stated allegations verified that a violation of the probation agreement had 
occurred, even though other allegations of misconduct were reviewed without 
prior notice. Id. at 294.

[¶18]   Gailey was notified of the 
allegations that he had committed the offenses of reckless driving, resisting 
arrest and unlawful entry. See W.R.Cr.P. 39(a). Gailey admitted to two of 
the allegations asserted in the petition to revoke his probation. There was no 
need for the district court to consider other allegations, "unsworn" or 
otherwise, in its finding that Gailey violated his probation agreement. 
Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 294. Gailey's admissions justified a finding 
"without regard for the unnoticed events * * *." Id. at 295. The district 
court properly determined that the probation agreement had been 
violated.

[¶19]   Gailey's concern regarding notice, 
however, seems to be directed at the dispositional phase of his revocation 
hearing. Gailey hints that had he known other topics would be discussed during 
disposition besides the allegations in the petition, he would have been better 
prepared to discuss resentencing. The dispositional information was contained in 
Gailey's court file and available to him prior to the revocation hearing. After 
Gailey's counsel objected to the State's comments regarding unnoticed events, 
Gailey was given the opportunity to request a postponement of the dispositional 
phase for a week. Counsel for Gailey declined a postponement. Gailey was 
afforded the opportunity to present argument on his behalf, which he did. Gailey 
had adequate notice of any dispositional matters before the district 
court.

[¶20]   Gailey argues that the district 
court might have been prejudiced by the statements regarding his unpaid 
restitution. On appeal, this court presumes, in cases tried without a jury, 
"that the court in reaching its decision disregarded improperly admitted 
evidence unless the record affirmatively shows that the trial court's decision 
was influenced by improperly admitted evidence." Feeney v. State, 714 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶21]   Gailey's admission provided 
sufficient evidence that he had violated his probation. The district court 
acknowledged that it had read Gailey's court file, but also stated that it would 
only consider the allegations made in the petition for revocation. In a trial to 
the court where there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding, the admission 
or exclusion of incompetent evidence are not grounds for reversal. 
Feeney, 714 P.2d  at 1230. See also Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., 
675 P.2d 1271, 1279 (Wyo. 1984) and In re Shreve, 432 P.2d 271, 273 (Wyo. 
1967). We will not acquiesce to Gailey's implication that the district court was 
unable to "`sift the wheat from the chaff' * * *." Feeney, 714 P.2d  at 
1230 (quoting Yount v. Strickland, 17 Wyo. 526, 533, 101 P. 942, 944 
(1909)).

[¶22]   Finally, Gailey argues that 
allowing "unsworn narrative testimony" during probation revocation proceedings 
results in bad policy. Gailey offers no authority for this broad pronouncement. 
Therefore, we need not address this issue. The purpose of probation is 
rehabilitation without confinement and the protection of the public. 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 1550 at 141 (1989). This court said in Minchew that 
"[t]he granting of probation is addressed to the discretion of the trial court 
and is an act of grace, of clemency." Minchew, 685 P.2d  at 33. The record 
on appeal indicates that Gailey has abused two opportunities for such 
grace.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶23]   Decisions to grant or revoke 
probation are made upon the sentencing court's "own judgment of the defendant's 
potential." Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Wyo. 
1979).

A 
probation revocation hearing is not a trial on a new criminal charge. It is 
simply an extension of the sentencing procedure resulting from conviction of the 
basic charge, coupled with the requirement that the probationer be afforded due 
process of law before being deprived of the conditional right to liberty granted 
by probation.

Minchew, 
685 P.2d  at 31. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking 
Gailey's probation.

[¶24]   The order revoking Gailey's 
probation and imposing sentence is affirmed.