Title: State v. Blagg

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-66 
No. 261A20 
Filed 11 June 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA  
 
 
v. 
CHARLES BLAGG 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 271 N.C. App. 276 (2020), finding no error in a judgment entered 
on 29 January 2018 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Superior Court, Buncombe County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2021. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Nicholas R. Sanders, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Sean P. Vitrano for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss a charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine. In the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, defendant 
argued that the evidence presented by the State, while sufficient to support a charge 
of possession of methamphetamine, was insufficient to send to the jury the greater 
charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. The majority of 
the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant’s position and found no error in his 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
trial and conviction. Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable 
to the State and considering the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, 
we hold that the evidence here was sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the greater charge and to permit the jury to resolve the question of whether 
the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed 
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver. Accordingly, we affirm the 
majority decision of the lower appellate court. 
I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
According to evidence presented at trial in this case, on the evening of 4 
January 2017, Darrell Maxwell, a detective with the Buncombe County Sheriff’s 
Office, joined two other deputies in the surveillance of a residence in Weaverville that 
had been the subject of complaints of illegal drug activity. Maxwell observed a vehicle 
arrive at the residence and park in the driveway. The detective then saw a man exit 
the vehicle and enter the surveilled home. Due to the encroaching darkness of the 
evening, Maxwell did not see the individual leave the residence, but after about ten 
minutes, Maxwell saw the lights of the vehicle illuminate as it departed from the 
driveway. Maxwell followed the vehicle in his unmarked patrol car, and after 
witnessing the vehicle cross the double yellow center line on a portion of the road 
described by the detective as a “blind curve,” Maxwell initiated a traffic stop by 
activating his patrol car’s blue lights. Defendant, who was identified by Maxwell as 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the operator of the vehicle he stopped, acknowledged having crossed the double yellow 
center line when Maxwell explained to defendant the reason for the traffic stop. 
Maxwell obtained defendant’s driver’s license, performed a records check, and then 
asked defendant to exit defendant’s vehicle so that Maxwell could perform a pat-down 
of defendant’s person. Defendant consented to the pat-down, during which Maxwell 
discovered a pocketknife.  
¶ 3 
 
By this point in the traffic stop, Deputy Jake Lambert, a K-9 handler with the 
Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office, had arrived on the scene to assist. Maxwell asked 
defendant whether defendant had any contraband in his vehicle,1 and Maxwell 
specifically named several controlled substances, including methamphetamine and 
marijuana. Defendant denied the presence of any such illegal drugs. When Maxwell 
asked defendant if Maxwell could search defendant’s vehicle, defendant replied, “not 
without a warrant.” Maxwell asked Lambert to employ the K-9 to conduct an open-
air sniff of defendant’s vehicle, while Maxwell issued defendant a warning citation 
for the traffic infraction. Lambert’s K-9 alerted to defendant’s vehicle in a manner 
which was consistent with the detection of the presence of controlled substances. 
Lambert consequently began to conduct a search of the vehicle and discovered a bag 
of what appeared to be methamphetamine in the center console of the vehicle. After 
                                                 
1 The vehicle, a Ford Focus sedan, was registered to defendant’s mother. For ease of 
reading, we shall refer to the vehicle as “defendant’s vehicle.” 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
handcuffing defendant and placing him under arrest, Maxwell collected all of the 
apparent drug-related items found in defendant’s vehicle, including one large bag and 
several smaller bags of a white crystalline substance; a bag of a leafy green substance 
which Maxwell believed to be marijuana; a baggie of cotton balls; several syringes; 
rolling papers; and a lockbox or “camo safe”2 containing, inter alia, several smoked 
marijuana blunts and a number of plastic baggies. Upon defendant’s arrest, Maxwell 
informed defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant then offered to provide 
information about “Haywood[ County]’s most wanted,” a woman whom defendant 
claimed was involved in heroin trafficking and whom defendant represented that he 
was supposed to meet.  
¶ 4 
 
On 10 July 2017, defendant was indicted on charges of possession of 
methamphetamine, possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine, 
possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana paraphernalia, and the attainment 
of habitual felon status. Defendant’s case came on for trial during the 9 January 2018 
Criminal Session of Superior Court, Buncombe County, Judge Gary M. Gavenus 
presiding. Defendant failed to appear when his case was called for trial, and as a 
result, his jury trial was conducted in absentia. 
¶ 5 
 
At trial, the State offered evidence from three witnesses: Maxwell, Lambert, 
and Deborah Chancey, a forensic analyst with the State Crime Lab. With regard to 
                                                 
2 “Camo” is a shortened term for the word “camouflage.” 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine, Chancey 
rendered expert testimony at trial that the white crystalline substance in the large 
plastic baggie was methamphetamine and that its weight was 6.51 grams. Maxwell 
testified that he had five years of law enforcement experience which was specifically 
focused on drug investigations. He further testified that a typical methamphetamine 
sale for personal drug use was usually between one-half of a gram to a gram, such 
that the tested amount of methamphetamine recovered from defendant’s vehicle was 
somewhere between six and thirteen times the typical single use quantity. Maxwell 
also testified that he and Lambert had weighed two of the smaller baggies of the 
white crystalline substance on the date of defendant’s arrest and measured the 
weights of those respective quantities—bags included—at 0.6 and 0.9 grams. The 
total weight of the methamphetamine and the untested crystalline substances 
recovered from defendant’s vehicle was over 8 grams. 
¶ 6 
 
During his trial testimony, Maxwell opined that the baggies recovered from 
defendant’s vehicle were consistent with those employed in drug sales. He and 
Lambert both acknowledged at trial that they did not recover cash from defendant’s 
person or from defendant’s vehicle, nor any cutting agents, scales, or business ledgers 
during the search of the vehicle. Both law enforcement officers also acknowledged 
that there was no evidence which they discovered during the vehicle search that 
would indicate that defendant was a high-level actor in the drug trade. With the 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
admission into evidence of the lockbox or “camo safe” and its contents, which included 
an unspecified number of plastic baggies consistent with the illegal sale of controlled 
substances, the jury was able to observe and to consider the number of plastic baggies 
as well as the other items which were recovered from defendant’s vehicle. At the close 
of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the possession with intent to sell 
or deliver methamphetamine charge because the search of his person and his vehicle 
yielded “no cash, no guns, no evidence of a hand to hand transaction[,] . . . [n]o books, 
notes, ledgers, money orders, financial records, documents, . . . [and n]othing 
indicating that [defendant] is a dealer as opposed to a possessor or user[.]” Defendant 
also moved to dismiss the possession of marijuana paraphernalia charge and the 
charge of maintaining a vehicle. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the possession of marijuana paraphernalia charge but denied defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. 
Defendant did not present any evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss the 
possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine charge. The trial court 
again denied the motion.  
¶ 7 
 
On 11 January 2018, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charges of 
possession of methamphetamine, possession with intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and having attained habitual felon 
status. The trial court sentenced defendant on 29 January 2018 to concurrent 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
sentences of 128 to 166 months and 50 to 72 months in prison. Defendant gave notice 
of appeal in open court.  
¶ 8 
 
Before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the State did not prove 
that he had the intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. The panel of the lower 
appellate court was divided on this question, with the majority rejecting defendant’s 
position. State v. Blagg, 271 N.C. App. 276, 277 (2020). In reaching this result, the 
Court of Appeals majority considered the various circumstances relevant to 
defendant’s intent and noted that defendant 
had more than six times, and up to 13 times, the amount of 
methamphetamine typically purchased. While it is possible 
that [d]efendant had 13 hits of methamphetamine solely 
for personal use, it is also possible that [d]efendant 
possessed that quantity of methamphetamine with the 
intent to sell or deliver the same. This issue is properly 
resolved by the jury. 
 
Moreover, the evidence also tended to show that 
[d]efendant had just left a residence that had been under 
surveillance multiple times for drug-related complaints. 
Defendant also admitted that he had plans to visit an 
individual 
charged 
with 
trafficking 
drugs. 
While 
[d]efendant’s actions may be wholly consistent with an 
individual obtaining drugs for personal use, the jury could 
also reasonably infer that he had the intent to sell or 
deliver methamphetamine because of the quantity of 
drugs, the other circumstantial evidence, and his 
admission. 
 
. . . . The baggies in [d]efendant’s possession are 
paraphernalia or equipment used in methamphetamine 
transactions. . . .  
 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . . Standing alone, possession of the baggies may be 
innocent behavior. However, when viewed as a whole and 
in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could 
reasonably infer that baggies in [d]efendant’s possession 
were used for the packaging and distribution of 
methamphetamine. 
 
The question here is not whether evidence that does 
not exist entitles [d]efendant to a favorable ruling on his 
motion to dismiss. That there may be evidence in a typical 
drug transaction that is non-existent in another case is not 
dispositive on the issue of intent. Instead, the question is 
whether the totality of the circumstances, based on the 
competent and incompetent evidence presented, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, permits a 
reasonable 
inference 
that 
[d]efendant 
possessed 
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver. 
 
In this type of case, where reasonable minds can 
differ, the weight of the evidence is more appropriately 
decided by a jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
denying 
the 
[d]efendant’s 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
and 
submitting the case to the jury. 
 
Id. at 281–82 (citations omitted). 
¶ 9 
 
The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals disagreed, summarizing an 
opposing view that “the record evidence in this case shows nothing more than ‘the 
normal or general conduct of people’ who use methamphetamine; thus, the evidence, 
at most, ‘raises only a suspicion . . . that [d]efendant had the necessary intent to sell 
and deliver’ methamphetamine.” Id. at 283 (McGee, C.J., dissenting) (first alteration 
in original) (quoting State v. Turner, 168 N.C. App. 152, 158–59 (2005)). On 4 June 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal in this Court based upon the Court of Appeals 
dissenting opinion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) and N.C. R. App. P. 14(b)(1). 
II. 
Appellate Standards of Review 
¶ 10 
 
We review decisions of the Court of Appeals for errors of law. State v. Melton, 
371 N.C. 750, 756 (2018). 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need 
determine only whether there is substantial evidence of 
each essential element of the crime and that the defendant 
is the perpetrator. Substantial evidence is the amount 
necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a 
conclusion. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a criminal conviction, the evidence must be 
considered in the light most favorable to the State; the 
State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every 
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. In other 
words, if the record developed at trial contains substantial 
evidence, 
whether 
direct 
or 
circumstantial, 
or 
a 
combination, to support a finding that the offense charged 
has been committed and that the defendant committed it, 
the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be 
denied. Whether the State presented substantial evidence 
of each essential element of the offense is a question of law; 
therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss de 
novo. 
 
State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 249–50 (2020) (citations and extraneity omitted).  
¶ 11 
 
This Court has long acknowledged that 
[i]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish between evidence 
sufficient to carry a case to the jury, and a mere scintilla, 
which only raises a suspicion or possibility of the fact in 
issue. The general rule is that, if there be any evidence 
tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably 
conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or 
conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to 
the jury. 
 
State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66 (1982) (emphasis added; extraneity omitted) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431 (1930)). Because “[e]vidence in the record 
supporting a contrary inference is not determinative on a motion to dismiss,” State v. 
Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 598 (2002) (citing State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 382 (2000)), 
“[c]ircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a 
conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence,” 
State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452 (1988) (emphasis added); see also State v. Butler, 
356 N.C. 141, 145 (2002) (“To be substantial, the evidence need not be irrefutable or 
uncontroverted; it need only be such as would satisfy a reasonable mind as being 
‘adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” (quoting State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581 
(2001))); State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99 (2009) (holding that “so long as the evidence 
supports a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt, a motion to dismiss is 
properly denied even though the evidence also ‘permits a reasonable inference of the 
defendant’s innocence.’ ” (quoting Butler, 356 N.C. at 145)). Courts considering a 
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence “should not be concerned with the 
weight of the evidence.” Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67.  
¶ 12 
 
“Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt may be 
drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
taken singly or in combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is actually guilty.” Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379 (citations and extraneity 
omitted). “In borderline or close cases, our courts have consistently expressed a 
preference for submitting issues to the jury.” State v. Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. 184, 193 
(2017), aff’d per curiam, 371 N.C. 108 (2018).  
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 13 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. He asserts 
that the Court of Appeals majority erred in failing to reverse the trial court outcome 
and to vacate his conviction for this offense. Specifically, defendant contends that the 
evidence introduced at trial was not sufficient to permit the charge to be submitted 
to the jury for consideration because the evidence was inadequate to permit the jury 
to reasonably infer that defendant possessed the methamphetamine discovered 
during the traffic stop with the intent to sell or deliver it. Defendant submits, and the 
dissent of the lower appellate court opines, that the evidence only supports the 
submission to the jury of the charged crime of possession of methamphetamine 
instead of the heightened indicted offense. We disagree. 
¶ 14 
 
Subsection 90-95(a)(1) of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides that 
it is unlawful for any person to “possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a 
controlled substance.” N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) (2019). Methamphetamine is a 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
controlled substance. N.C.G.S. § 90-90 (2019). In order to prove that a defendant has 
committed the offense of possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled 
substance such as methamphetamine, the State must present evidence of the 
defendant’s (1) possession; (2) of a controlled substance; (3) with intent to sell or 
deliver the controlled substance. Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. at 187–88. Only the third of 
these 
elements—intent 
to 
sell 
or 
deliver 
the 
controlled 
substance 
methamphetamine—is at issue in this appeal. 
¶ 15 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that “in ruling upon the sufficiency of 
evidence in cases involving the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver, . . . 
our case law demonstrates that this is a fact-specific inquiry in which the totality of 
the circumstances in each case must be considered unless the quantity of drugs found 
is so substantial that this factor—by itself—supports an inference of possession with 
intent to sell or deliver.” State v. Coley, 257 N.C. App. 780, 788–89 (2018). In cases 
which focus on the sufficiency of the evidence of a defendant’s intent to sell or deliver 
a controlled substance, direct evidence may be used to prove intent, but appellate 
courts must often consider circumstantial evidence from which the defendant’s intent 
may be inferred. Id. at 786. Such an inference can arise from various relevant factual 
circumstances, including “(1) the packaging, labeling, and storage of the controlled 
substance, (2) the defendant’s activities, (3) the quantity [of the controlled substance] 
found, and (4) the presence of cash or drug paraphernalia.” Id. (quoting State v. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Nettles, 170 N.C. App. 100, 106, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 640 (2005)). An example 
of drug paraphernalia which appellate courts such as ours have considered in 
determining intent to sell or deliver controlled substances is the presence of 
packaging materials, such as plastic baggies, which may be used to package 
individual doses of a controlled substance. State v. Williams, 307 N.C. 452, 457 (1983). 
¶ 16 
 
In establishing defendant’s intent to sell or deliver in the present case, the 
State introduced evidence of the manner in which the methamphetamine was 
packaged, the manner in which the methamphetamine was stored, defendant’s 
activities, the quantity of methamphetamine found, and the presence of drug 
paraphernalia. This combination of direct and circumstantial evidence satisfies the 
factors first articulated in Nettles which we hereby adopt to review a trial court’s 
assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to show a defendant’s intent to sell or 
deliver a controlled substance, while meeting the standard of the existence of 
substantial evidence to compel the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. In applying 
the long-established legal principles that the evidence must be considered in the light 
most favorable to the State upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss a criminal charge, 
that the State is entitled to every reasonable inference from the evidence in the face 
of a defendant’s motion to dismiss, and that evidence which supports a contrary 
inference is not determinative on a motion to dismiss, we determine that the trial 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
court properly and correctly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of 
possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. 
¶ 17 
 
In illustration of our determination, we now apply these factors to the evidence 
presented at trial.  
A. Packaging of the Methamphetamine 
¶ 18 
 
In his search of defendant’s vehicle, Maxwell found one large bag and several 
smaller bags of a white crystalline substance. The laboratory analysis conducted upon 
the contents of the large bag showed that the substance was 6.51 grams of 
methamphetamine. While two of the smaller bags which contained the untested 
white crystalline substance were found by Maxwell and a fellow law enforcement 
officer, Lambert, to weigh a total of 1.5 grams, there was also an additional 
unspecified number of clear plastic baggies which Maxwell testified were consistent 
with the type which are used in the sale of packaged illegal controlled substances. 
Maxwell also testified that “[u]sually a seller will individually package the substance. 
Usually in anywhere from half a gram to one gram, depending on what the buyer is 
wanting. On occasion, they will weigh out and re-package it, and sell whatever the 
buyer is seeking.”  
¶ 19 
 
In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State upon 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine, the matter of the original packaging of the verified 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
methamphetamine and the untested white crystalline substance discovered in 
defendant’s vehicle, coupled with the presence of available additional packaging in 
the form of an undetermined number of clear plastic baggies which were deemed to 
be consistent with the sale of packaged illegal controlled substances, tends to support 
an inference that defendant intended to sell or deliver methamphetamine. Such 
packaging materials can be considered a relevant circumstance in determining intent 
to sell or deliver a controlled substance. Williams, 307 N.C. at 457.  
B. Storage of the Methamphetamine 
¶ 20 
 
The methamphetamine was found in the center console of defendant’s vehicle, 
according to trial testimony regarding the joint participation of Maxwell, Lambert, 
and the drug-sniffing K-9 in the search of the vehicle. Upon the admission of evidence 
during the presentation of the State’s case that defendant had just left a residence 
which was under surveillance by law enforcement officers due to complaints of illegal 
drug activity at the home, that defendant had a pending meeting with someone whom 
he identified as a drug trafficker, along with other evidentiary aspects pertaining to 
the storage of the controlled substance in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
the trial court appropriately considered these facts in evaluating the sufficiency of 
the evidence to show that defendant had the required intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine. 
 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
C. Defendant’s Activities 
¶ 21 
 
The activities of defendant contributed to the existence of substantial evidence 
which, in turn, amounted to a sufficient quantity of evidence to authorize the trial 
court’s submission to the jury of defendant’s charge of possession with intent to sell 
or deliver methamphetamine. Such activities included defendant’s aforementioned 
endeavors of driving a vehicle to a residence which was under the surveillance of law 
enforcement officers for suspected illegal drug activity, entering the home and 
remaining inside its premises for a period of approximately ten minutes, committing 
to meet with someone whom he identified as an individual who was involved in illegal 
drug trafficking, and operating a vehicle which contained a large bag of a verified 
controlled substance and a host of items which could be readily associated with it. 
D. Quantity of Methamphetamine Found 
¶ 22 
 
The evidence at trial showed that a total of more than 8 grams of a white 
crystalline substance was recovered from defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the search 
of the car by law enforcement officers. Of this total, 6.51 grams was subjected to 
laboratory analysis and was identified as methamphetamine; the remaining quantity 
of the substance was not tested. As previously noted, during his trial testimony 
Maxwell stated that he observed, based on his training and experience, that a seller 
of methamphetamine will typically package the substance in a quantity ranging from 
one-half of a gram to a gram. Maxwell also testified that the unspecified number of 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
clear plastic baggies which were found in defendant’s vehicle during the search was 
consistent with his experience “as to the dealing and transportation of 
methamphetamine.”  
¶ 23 
 
We have previously acknowledged the arithmetic computation of the Court of 
Appeals majority in the decision which it rendered in this case that defendant “had 
more than six times, and up to 13 times, the amount of methamphetamine typically 
purchased,” such that “[w]hile it is possible that [d]efendant had 13 hits of 
methamphetamine solely for personal use, it is also possible that [d]efendant 
possessed that quantity of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver the 
same.” Blagg, 271 N.C. App. at 281. Meanwhile, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(h)(3b) establishes 
that the minimum quantity of methamphetamine for trafficking in the controlled 
substance is 28 grams; the quantity of 6.51 grams of methamphetamine which was 
verified as existent and in the possession of defendant in the instant case is 23.3% of 
the threshold amount of trafficking in methamphetamine. In sum, the amount of 
methamphetamine at issue here is greater than the amount of the substance that the 
trial evidence associates with possession for one’s personal use, yet lesser than the 
amount of the substance that the statutory law associates with trafficking for wider 
use. 
¶ 24 
 
The 
State 
is 
not 
required 
to 
disprove 
the 
possibility 
that 
the 
methamphetamine in defendant’s possession was solely for personal use in order to 
STATE V. BLAGG 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379 (holding that in 
order to survive a motion to dismiss the evidence need not “rule out every hypothesis 
of innocence” (quoting State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452 (1988))). The jury was eligible 
to draw the permissible inference from this amount of methamphetamine, in 
combination with the totality of the circumstances, that defendant had the intent to 
sell or deliver methamphetamine. See, e.g., State v. McNeil, 165 N.C. App. 777, 783 
(2004) (upholding the denial of a motion to dismiss a charge of possession with intent 
to sell or deliver where the controlled substance—cocaine—was 19.64% of the 
minimum amount to sustain a trafficking charge and additional circumstances 
included its packaging in twenty-two individually wrapped pieces placed in the corner 
of a paper bag), aff’d, 359 N.C. 800 (2005). 
¶ 25 
 
Since the quantity of the methamphetamine found in defendant’s possession 
was not dispositive of the issue concerning its presence for his personal use or its 
presence for his ability to sell or deliver the methamphetamine, we find that the trial 
court’s adherence to the principle espoused in Yisrael to submit issues to the jury in 
borderline or close cases to be both prudent and proper. 
E. Presence of Cash or Drug Paraphernalia 
¶ 26 
 
There was no currency which was recovered from defendant or from his vehicle 
as a result of the search. Likewise, items such as guns, cutting agents, scales, 
business ledgers, books, notes, money orders, financial records, documents, and 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
suspicious cellular telephone entries which are often associated with dealers of illegal 
drugs were not found by law enforcement officers in the course of the search. 
However, other items such as a “loaded” syringe, a bag of new syringes, a baggie of 
cotton balls, and other items were discovered during the search. The search also 
uncovered a lockbox or “camo safe” which was clandestinely kept in the back 
floorboard of defendant’s vehicle and contained numerous clear plastic baggies 
similar to those that were found in the vehicle’s center console; a variety of other 
items were also maintained in the container. 
¶ 27 
 
Just as any list of circumstances frequently considered on the issue of intent 
to sell or deliver a controlled substance is not exhaustive, the absence of any of those 
circumstances is likewise not dispositive. See Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. at 186, 193 
(upholding denial of motion to dismiss where no baggies, scales, written ledgers, or 
other client information were found); State v. Wilson, 269 N.C. App. 648, 655 (2020) 
(upholding the denial of a motion to dismiss where no “cash, other drug 
paraphernalia, or tools of the drug trade—such as scales or additional baggies or 
containers—which have otherwise generally supported a conviction for” possession 
with intent to sell or deliver were presented); Coley, 257 N.C. App. at 789 (upholding 
denial of a motion to dismiss where scales and plastic baggies were discovered but 
only a small amount of marijuana was possessed and no written ledgers or other 
client information was found). Rather, the appropriate inquiry is a case-by-case, fact-
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
specific consideration in which the totality of the circumstances is evaluated in the 
light most favorable to the State and which gives the State the benefit of every 
reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence which is produced at 
trial. Golder, 374 N.C. at 249–50; see also Coley, 257 N.C. App. at 788. Thus, our focus 
must be upon the presence of evidence which could reasonably support an inference 
of defendant’s possession of the methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver 
and not upon the absence of any hypothetical evidence which could have strengthened 
or added support to the State’s case. See, e.g., Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67 (holding that 
reviewing courts “should not be concerned with the weight of the evidence” when 
considering the denial of a motion to dismiss).  
IV. 
Conclusion  
¶ 28 
 
The application of the factors which we employ in the present case, the “totality 
of the circumstances” standard in assessing the evidence presented in this case, and 
the fundamental principles governing the determination of a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss with regard to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to support the charged 
offense lead us to conclude that the State presented sufficient direct and 
circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine so 
as to compel us to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals which found no error in 
defendant’s trial. 
AFFIRMED. 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
¶ 29 
 
The criminal offense of possessing a controlled substance is not the same 
offense as possessing a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver it to 
another person (PWISD). Compare N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(3) (2019) (making it unlawful 
for any person “[t]o possess a controlled substance”), with N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) 
(making it unlawful for any person “[t]o manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance” (emphasis added)). The 
Legislature chose to draw this distinction for a reason. This distinction has 
consequences. A defendant convicted under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) is guilty of a Class 
C, Class G, or Class H felony, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(b), whereas a defendant convicted 
under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(3) is guilty of a Class I felony or a misdemeanor, either of 
which typically carries a lighter sentence. 
¶ 30 
 
In concluding that the State has presented substantial evidence of defendant 
Charles Blagg’s intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine, the majority collapses 
this distinction. In the process, the majority thwarts the Legislature’s effort to tailor 
criminal liability to the nature of a defendant’s alleged criminal conduct. The 
majority’s decision also ensures that Blagg will spend ten to fourteen years in prison, 
having been convicted of a crime for which the evidence was so utterly lacking that 
the charge never should have been presented to the jury. Because the majority 
misinterprets and misapplies the substantial evidence test, I respectfully dissent. 
 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
I. 
Analysis 
¶ 31 
 
Every person who possesses any quantity of a controlled substance could 
intend to sell or deliver the drug to another person. At the same time, not every person 
who possesses a controlled substance intends to do anything other than use it for his 
or her own personal consumption. The determinative question in assessing a person’s 
potential criminal liability is the person’s intent. As we have often stated, “[i]ntent is 
a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence.” State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 
750 (1974). A defendant’s intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance must instead 
“ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.” Id. The issue 
is that possessing a controlled substance is, at least in theory, itself a “circumstance[ ] 
from which it may be inferred” that a person intends to sell or deliver a controlled 
substance. If the evidence sufficient to convict a defendant under N.C.G.S. § 90-
95(a)(3) is always sufficient to convict a defendant under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1), then 
the Legislature’s carefully drawn demarcation between two different statutory 
provisions is rendered obsolete.  
¶ 32 
 
The way we have handled this issue—at least until today—has been to require 
the State to present “substantial evidence” of the defendant’s specific intent to sell or 
deliver the controlled substance he or she possessed. This evidence can be 
circumstantial, certainly, but it cannot merely be evidence common to any individual 
who possesses a controlled substance. Critically, the “substantial evidence” must be 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant intended to 
sell or deliver the controlled substance to another person. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 
307 N.C. 452, 455 (1983). Evidence which is wholly consistent with a defendant’s 
intention to personally consume the substance cannot, standing alone, be substantial 
evidence of the defendant’s intent to sell or deliver it to someone else. If it were 
otherwise, every defendant who possessed a controlled substance could be charged, 
and potentially convicted, under either N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) or N.C.G.S. § 90-
95(a)(3), a result which would be at odds with the Legislature’s express intent. See 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259 (1994) (“[A] court should give effect 
to every provision of a statute and thus avoid redundancy among different 
provisions.”). 
¶ 33 
 
The substantial evidence test does not, as the majority correctly notes, require 
the State to “disprove the possibility that the methamphetamine in defendant’s 
possession was solely for personal use.” But the defendant does not bear the burden 
of disproving the State’s theory of the case, either. It is not enough for the State to 
present evidence which, taken in the light most favorable to the State, establishes 
only that “[w]hile it is possible that [d]efendant had 13 hits of methamphetamine 
solely for personal use, it is also possible that [d]efendant possessed the quantity of 
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver the same.” (Alterations in 
original.) “Substantial evidence” requires “more than a scintilla or a permissible 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
inference.” Lackey v. N.C. Dep’t of Hum. Res., Div. of Med. Assistance, 306 N.C. 231, 
238 (1982); see also State v. Slaughter, 212 N.C. App. 59, 68 (Hunter, J., dissenting) 
(“[E]vidence which merely shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or 
which raises a mere conjecture that it is so, is an insufficient foundation for a verdict 
and should not be left to the jury.” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Madden, 212 
N.C. 56, 60 (1937))), rev’d per curiam for reasons stated in dissent, 365 N.C. 321 
(2011). It is obviously “possible” that Blagg intended to sell or deliver the 
methamphetamine he possessed to another person. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
circumstance where it would be “impossible” for a court to infer that a person 
apprehended while possessing some quantity of a controlled substance intended to 
sell or deliver it to another person. That is why we have always required substantial 
evidence of the defendant’s specific intent to sell or deliver the controlled substance 
before allowing the case to proceed to the jury. 
¶ 34 
 
In this case, the evidence that Blagg intended to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine to another person just does not exist. Here are the facts actually 
established at trial: Blagg went to the home of a suspected drug dealer. He spent 
“approximately ten minutes” inside. As he was driving away from the home, he was 
pulled over for a moving violation. A K-9 officer noted the presence of narcotics near 
Blagg’s vehicle. A (human) officer searched the vehicle and found plastic bags 
containing what proved to be 6.51 grams of methamphetamine and 1.5 grams of an 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
untested white crystalline substance. The officers also found syringes, cotton balls, 
an untested substance that resembled marijuana, and a small safe containing used 
marijuana blunts and a number of plastic baggies, all scattered about the vehicle. 
After he was arrested, Blagg told the officers he could help them track down “a female 
who was wanted for trafficking heroin or something of that nature.”  
¶ 35 
 
People who personally consume methamphetamine obtain it from somewhere. 
Blagg’s presence at a residence where drug dealing was suspected of occurring—and 
his apparent knowledge of who in his community is dealing drugs—suggests only that 
Blagg knows where and how to purchase methamphetamine, not that he is himself a 
drug dealer. Testimony established that methamphetamine is typically sold in plastic 
baggies. It follows as a matter of logic that the manner in which a product is typically 
sold is also the manner in which it is typically purchased. The fact that Blagg had 
some number of plastic baggies in his vehicle says nothing about why he obtained 
methamphetamine.1 Testimony also established that cotton balls and syringes are 
used for injecting methamphetamine. This says nothing about who the intended user 
of the methamphetamine is. And individuals who possess controlled substances for 
any reason have good reason to conceal their stash. The point is not that the evidence 
                                                 
1 If a person were observed at a store purchasing a gallon of milk and then some empty 
milk containers were found in that person’s car, would that be substantial evidence that the 
person is selling or delivering milk to other people? Or would the empty milk containers be 
evidence that the person likes to drink milk? 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
in the record excludes the possibility that Blagg intended to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine to another person. The point is that substantial evidence requires 
more than a mere possibility that something could, maybe, conceivably be true. 
¶ 36 
 
Everything the majority relies upon beyond the evidence described above—
such as its assertion that “the amount of methamphetamine at issue here is greater 
than the amount of the substance that the trial evidence associates with possession 
for one’s personal use”—is pure speculation. Worse, it is exactly the same speculative 
reasoning that the trial court explicitly prohibited the State from engaging in during 
the sole portion of a criminal proceeding where factfinding is typically permitted, the 
trial. What a given quantity of a controlled substance found in a person’s possession 
reveals about that person’s intent is “a matter familiar only to those who regularly 
use or deal in the substance[ or] who are engaged in enforcing the laws against it,” 
not an inference a jury can draw based upon its own “general knowledge and 
experience.” State v. Mitchell, 336 N.C. 22, 30 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Rogers, 371 N.C. 397 (2018). The trial court did not permit the State to argue 
that the amount of methamphetamine found in Blagg’s vehicle signified his intent to 
sell or deliver it because there was “no evidence as to [the amount of 
methamphetamine being] more than [for] personal use. Absolutely none. [The State] 
never elicited that testimony from the officer. . . . There was no testimony as to that. 
None.” Apparently, on this matter, the majority knows better than the trial court, 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
even though there is “[a]bsolutely no[ ]” evidence in the record telling us what 
possessing 6.51 grams of methamphetamine implies. We may not always like the 
facts as established by the trial court but, as appellate jurists, we are not at liberty 
to find our own. Desmond v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 375 N.C. 21, 44 n.16 (“Were 
we to . . . make our own factual determinations on the evidence . . . we would 
impermissibly invade the province of the jury . . . .”), reh’g denied, 376 N.C. 535 (2020). 
¶ 37 
 
Lacking what is typically required to support a legal inference drawn from the 
quantity of methamphetamine at issue—evidence in the record—the majority casts 
about for something else. It lands on math. According to the majority, 6.51 grams is 
both “more than six times, and up to 13 times, the amount of methamphetamine 
typically purchased” and “23.3% of the threshold amount of trafficking in 
methamphetamine.” This calculation is not substantial evidence of PWISD. The only 
evidence in the record supporting the first half of the equation is Detective Maxwell’s 
testimony that “[u]sually a seller will individually package [methamphetamine] . . . 
in anywhere from half a gram to one gram.” His testimony does nothing to establish 
how much or how many packages an individual user of methamphetamine might 
typically purchase for personal consumption in a single transaction. Nor does 
Maxwell’s testimony include any statement supporting the majority’s unfounded 
conclusion that “a typical methamphetamine sale for personal drug use [i]s usually 
between one-half of a gram to a gram.” (Emphasis added.) His testimony solely 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
addresses how a seller typically packages methamphetamine, not a buyer’s 
purchasing habits or preferences. Regardless, Maxwell explicitly qualified his 
statement by noting that a seller might package methamphetamine in different 
quantities “depending on what the buyer is wanting.”  
¶ 38 
 
Further, the majority’s reliance on the trafficking threshold amount as proof 
of Blagg’s intent is an unjustified stretch of our precedents. The very purpose of a 
threshold amount is to establish the point beyond which the amount possessed 
becomes legally salient. Although we have previously described the quantity of a 
controlled substance in a defendant’s possession in relation to the trafficking 
threshold amount, in that case, the amount considered “more than an individual 
would possess for his personal consumption” and relevant to the defendant’s intent 
to sell or deliver was over two-thirds the amount required to support a conviction for 
trafficking. Williams, 307 N.C. at 457. The majority does not explain why 23.3% of 
the trafficking threshold amount is substantial enough to support a PWISD 
conviction. Without an explanation, there is no way to predict whether possessing 
15% of the threshold quantity, or 5% of the threshold quantity, would be indicative of 
a defendant’s intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance. The majority’s reasoning 
leaves defendants and lower courts to guess the point beyond which possessing a 
quantity of a controlled substance less than the statutory threshold amount 
heightens a defendant’s potential criminal liability.  
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 39 
 
The State presented no testimony or evidence regarding how much 
methamphetamine an individual user typically consumes in a single sitting, the 
number of doses a single purchase typically covers, or how frequently a regular 
consumer of methamphetamine purchases and uses the drug. Absent any of this 
necessary context, the fact that Blagg possessed 6.51 grams of methamphetamine is 
meaningless, beyond establishing that Blagg possessed methamphetamine in a 
quantity insufficient to sustain a trafficking charge. 
¶ 40 
 
The majority’s rejoinder is that while the quantity of methamphetamine Blagg 
possessed is “not dispositive,” it is still evidence of Blagg’s intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine “in combination with the totality of the circumstances,” at least 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Again, those circumstances do 
nothing to distinguish Blagg from any other individual who purchases 
methamphetamine exclusively for personal consumption. As the majority 
acknowledges, “items such as guns, cutting agents, scales, business ledgers, books, 
notes, money orders, financial records, documents, and suspicious cellular telephone 
entries which are often associated with dealers of illegal drugs were not found by law 
enforcement officers in the course of the search.”  
¶ 41 
 
The majority then goes on to cite various cases in which this Court or the Court 
of Appeals concluded that the State had presented substantial evidence of a 
defendant’s intent to sell or deliver in purportedly similar circumstances as presented 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
here. Yet in each of those cases, the record disclosed that the defendant had been 
found with or done something unusual for a person solely intending to personally 
consume the controlled substance. The defendant in Yisrael “was carrying a large 
amount of cash ($1,504.00) on his person” in small denominations when he was 
apprehended “on the grounds of a high school while possessing illegal drugs” with a 
stolen and loaded handgun inside his vehicle. State v. Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. 184, 190 
(2017). The defendant in Wilson “attempted to hide the larger amount of cocaine while 
leaving the smaller corner bag—associated with only personal use—in plain view.” 
State v. Wilson, 269 N.C. App. 648, 655, review denied, 376 N.C. 532 (2020). The 
defendant in Coley was found with marijuana, “a digital scale[,] and an open box of 
sandwich bags.” State v. Coley, 257 N.C. App. 780, 789 (2018). The defendant in 
Williams was in constructive possession of a residence where drug sales were proven 
to have occurred, Williams, 307 N.C. at 456, and his fingerprints were found on one 
of many “tinfoil squares, a material frequently used to package heroin for sale,” found 
inside, id. at 457. Invoking the totality of the circumstances is no substitute for the 
State’s burden to present substantial evidence of Blagg’s intent to sell or deliver 
methamphetamine. The cases relied upon by the majority all included additional 
facts inconsistent with possession merely for personal use. 
¶ 42 
 
Perhaps anticipating the harsh consequences of its gloss on the substantial 
evidence test, the majority emphasizes that it is not the ultimate arbiter of Blagg’s 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
guilt. The majority explains that it finds “the trial court’s adherence to the principle 
. . . to submit issues to the jury in borderline or close cases to be both prudent and 
proper.” Yet our responsibility for ensuring fair and equal application of the law in 
all cases is not discharged by references to the role of the jury as factfinder. It requires 
us to consistently apply the law as enacted by the Legislature and interpreted though 
our precedents. 
¶ 43 
 
Finally, the majority’s analysis does not clearly identify the basis for its 
holding. According to the majority, “[j]ust as any list of circumstances frequently 
considered on the issue of intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance is not 
exhaustive, the absence of any of those circumstances is likewise not dispositive.” 
What the majority appears to be saying is that even if prior cases have enumerated 
factors determined to be indicative of a defendant’s intent to sell or deliver a 
controlled substance, when confronted with a case in which none of those factors are 
present, a court may choose to redefine the test to include new factors. This manner 
of deciding cases is out of step with our traditional respect for precedent.  
The doctrine of stare decisis, commonly called the “doctrine 
of precedents,” has been firmly established in the law . . . . 
It means that we should adhere to decided cases and 
settled principles, and not disturb matters which have been 
established by judicial determination. The precedent thus 
made should serve as a rule for future guidance in deciding 
anal[o]gous cases . . . . This is not only a sensible, but a just, 
principle, and a contrary rule would manifestly be 
inequitable. . . . We have repeatedly said that the 
weightiest reasons make it the duty of the court to adhere 
STATE V. BLAGG 
2021-NCSC-66 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
to its decisions. 
Hill v. Atl. & N.C. R.R. Co., 143 N.C. 539, 573–75 (1906). As we have long recognized, 
judicial inconstancy comes at a cost to litigants and to our institutional legitimacy. 
¶ 44 
 
Because the majority’s decision lends the erroneous impression that any time 
a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 90-95(a)(3), there is substantial evidence that the defendant possessed the 
substance with the intent to sell or deliver it to another person within the meaning 
of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1), I respectfully dissent. 
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.