Title: Mangrum v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

299 S.W.2d 80 (1957) Clyde MANGRUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 4856. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 18, 1957. Rehearing Denied March 18, 1957. McCourtney, Brinton, Gibbons & Segars, Jonesboro, for appellant. Tom J. Gentry, Atty. Gen., and Roy Finch, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. McFADDIN, Justice. Appellant, Clyde Mangrum, was convicted of the crime of sodomy, § 41-813, Ark. Stats.; and prosecutes this appeal. The motion for new trial contains twenty-three assignments which we group and discuss in topic headings. I. Sufficiency Of The Evidence. The act of sodomy charged by the information in this case was, "unnatural sexual relations with Edward Brasshire, another male, being aged 9 years old, by forceably placing his sex organ in the mouth of said child". Such information charged an offense denounced by § 41-813, Ark.Stats. See Woolford v. State, 202 Ark. 1010, 155 S.W.2d 339; Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003; and Hummel v. State, 210 Ark. 471, 196 S.W.2d 594. The testimony of Edward Brasshire (hereinafter referred to as "the boy") was: that he was at the home of Mr. Harbin, along with Mangrum, Byrd Ashburn (the boy's uncle), and several other people; that Mangrum lured the boy to a place in the back yard behind the chicken-house, and there committed the filthy act, as charged in the information. Byrd Ashburn, the *81 boy's uncle, testified that when he went in search of the boy he saw the entire performance. The testimony of either the boy or his uncle was sufficient to take the case to the jury. Giving the testimony of the State its full force and effect, as we do on appeal in cases like this one,[1] the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. II. Competency Of The Boy To Testify. The boy was blind and only nine years old; and appellant urges that the Trial Court failed and refused to make sufficient interrogation of the boy before allowing him to testify on original examination. Appellant relies most strongly on some of our language in Crosby v. State, 93 Ark. 156, 124 S.W. 781, 782, 137 Am. St.Rep. 80, reading as follows: Our cases recognize that the determination of the competency of a child, of such years as the one here involved, to testify at all is a question for decision by the Trial Judge. In Paxton v. State, 114 Ark. 393, 170 S.W. 80, 81, we said: We have many times reaffirmed what we said in the early case of Flanagin v. State, 25 Ark. 92: The questions asked the boy by the Courtto determine his competency as a witnessconsumed two pages in the transcript. At the conclusion of such examination, the Court held that the boy was competent to testifyadding, of course, that the credibility of the boy's testimony was entirely a matter for the jury to decide. We hold that the Court ruled correctly in the matter of the competency of the boy as a witness. Here is the Court's summary: III. Refusal Of The Court To Allow The Witness, Russell Baxter, To Testify As To The Competency Of The Boy As A Witness. When the State first offered the boy as a witness, the appellant not only (a) *82 objected as to his competency, as shown in Topic II, supra, but also (b) sought permission to call Russell Baxter to testify against the competency of the boy. This request was refused; and then later, after the State had rested its case in chief, the appellant again sought to call Russell Baxter to testify to the boy's competency as a witness. This request was also refused. Appellant saved his exceptions to each adverse ruling and in the proper manner has brought into the record the offered and refused testimony of Russell Baxter on the boy's competency. Here is a summary of the preferred testimony: Mr. Baxter is a Counsellor of Vocational Rehabilitation for the Blind, where the boy has been a pupil. In the early part of 1956, Mr. Baxter had occasion, in his official duties, to give intelligence tests to the boy. Such counselling continued for some time and in the course of it, Mr. Baxter tested the boy by the Wexler Intelligence Scale for Children, which Mr. Baxter says is an accepted test for handicapped children. Under this test a grade of 69 and below shows a mental defective; from 70 to 79 is a borderline case; from 80 to 89 is dull normal; and from 90 to 100 is normal. Mr. Baxter says that in this test the boy made 70, which is above the mental defective range, but is a "borderline case". From the Wexler test and from Mr. Baxter's personal observation of the boy, Mr. Baxter gave as his professional opinion regarding the mental status of the boy: Appellant most earnestly insists that the Court committed error in refusing to allow the jury to hear the foregoing testimony of Russell Baxter; and appellant cites Thrash v. State, 146 Ark. 547, 226 S.W. 130; and Mell v. State, 133 Ark. 197, 202 S.W. 33, L.R.A.1918D, 480. In the last cited case, we said of a witness who had testified for the State and against whom offered testimony as to mental competency was rejected: We understand that the insanity or the mental delusions of a witness may be shown by the testimony of another witness. But that is not the situation in the case at bar: here it is not claimed that the boy was insane or suffered mental delusionsit is only claimed that he was dull of comprehension and could be easily imposed on. The Court asked the witness, Baxter, as to the insanity of the boy: And the Trial Court in its ruling summed up the entire situation as follows: The cases and the textbook writers are sharply divided on this matter of offering testimony to impeach a witness on the basis of low mentality. To review all of the authorities would constitute a treatise. In Isler v. Dewey, 1876, 75 N.C. 466, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that it was proper to allow one witnessa laymanto testify that an opposing witness has a memory "below medium". Again, in the later case of State v. Armstrong, 1950, 232 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50, 51, a doctor was not allowed to testify to the jury concerning a witness: "I would classify her as a lowclass moron, equivalent of a nine-year-old child". The North Carolina Court held such evidence should have gone to the jury, saying: Many courts hold directly opposite from the holdings above mentioned. In Bell v. Rinner, 1864, 16 Ohio St. 45, the Ohio Supreme Court held that it was reversible error to permit witnesses to testify of an opposing witness, that she was not of ordinary intelligence. The Ohio Supreme Court said: The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Blanchard v. People, 1922, 70 Colo. 555, 203 P. 662, 663, followed the holding of the Ohio Court. Witnesses were allowed to say of opposing witness that he was of a "low order of intelligence". In holding the admission of such testimony to be reversible error, the Colorado Court said: In Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, § 935, the arguments are listed on this question of admissibility of evidence to dispute competency; and cases are cited to sustain each side.[2] Also in McCormick on Evidence, page 97 et seq, this matter is discussed: Without further laboring the point, we think our own case of Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S.W.2d 400, 401, indicates the course that our holding should take in the case at bar. In the Criglow case, Judge Frank G. Smith stated the issue and the holding in this language: We agree that evidence may be offered to the jury regarding the insanity of a witness or mental delusions that a witness may suffer. This is because a witness may testify ever so brilliantly to the jury, and yet his insanity or mental delusions may not appear. But, when we come to the question of whether a witness has low mental comprehensionabsent, as here, any claim of insanity or mental delusionsit seems that the trial judge should have discretion to decide whether the trial should be prolonged by calling witnesses to give their opinions to the jury, or whether the matter is sufficiently clear for the jury to intelligently determine credibility without the trial being prolonged by such testmony *85 as to the mental comprehension of another witness. We hold that the trial judge has discretion in this matter; and we cannot say that he abused his discretion in the case at bar. IV. Other Assignments. We have examined all the other assignments urged by the appellant and find none to constitute reversible error. Affirmed. [1] See Allgood v. State, 206 Ark. 699,177 S.W.2d 928 and cases there cited. [2] See also Annotation in 15 A.L.R. 9J2: "Impeachment of witness by expert evidence fending to show mental or moral."