Title: Application of Trevithick

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

131 N.W.2d 440 (1964) Application of Thomas W. TREVITHICK for a writ of habeas corpus. No. 10171. Supreme Court of South Dakota. November 18, 1964. *441 Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, and Carleton R. Hoy, Sioux Falls, for appellant. Frank L. Farrar, Atty. Gen., Walter Weygint, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, J. A. Lammers, State's Atty., Madison, and Roger A. Schiager, Deputy State's Atty., Sioux Falls, for respondent. HANSON, Judge. Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. He defended himself and was convicted. He now seeks release from the State Penitentiary in this habeas corpus proceeding claiming a denial of due process of law in violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions. The question presented is whether petitioner waived his right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595, and held the Sixth Amendment right of an accused, in all criminal prosecutions, to have assistance of counsel, extended to and was obligatory upon the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Anno. 9 L. Ed. 2d 1260. However, as pointed out in the recent case of State v. Erickson, S.D., 129 N.W.2d 712, the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright currently has little impact on criminal procedures in this state as South Dakota has long recognized and honored an accused's constitutional and statutory right to counsel. Although right to counsel is fundamental in nature and guaranteed by both State and Federal Constitutions it, nevertheless, is a personal right which may be waived. State v. Hillerud, 76 S.D. 476, 81 N.W.2d 130. Neither constitution contains an inexorable command that every accused have the assistance of counsel in every case, State ex rel. Baker v. Jameson, 72 S.D. 638, 38 N.W.2d 441, and it is not within the province of a court to require an unwilling defendant to be represented by unwanted counsel. State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121. In the absence of unusual circumstances an accused who is sui juris and mentally competent has the right to defend himself in a criminal case without aid of counsel. See Anno. 77 A.L.R.2d 1233. To be binding, however, waiver of counsel must be made voluntarily and intelligently by a competent mind, State v. Haas, 69 S.D. 204, 8 N.W.2d 569, or as indicated in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70, it must be "intelligently and understandingly" done. The determination of whether there has been a valid waiver depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357. It appears from the record in this case that after petitioner was apprehended in Sioux Falls he was returned to Madison and taken before a Justice of the Peace on November 27, 1961. The Justice Docket shows "the complaint was read to the defendant and he was advised of his rights under the statute." Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over to circuit court to answer for the crime of kidnapping. On February 26, 1962, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Lake County where petitioner was arraigned and interrogated with respect to counsel as follows: On March 2, 1962, the defendant appeared before the court and the following record was made: On March 6, 1962, trial was commenced before a jury at which petitioner conducted his own defense. The subject of the kidnapping was a city police officer who had been taken at the point of a gun and handcuffed to a fence. Petitioner readily admitted kidnapping the officer but claimed he was justified, or impliedly invited to do so, by reason of the officer's negligence in failing to search for concealed weapons at the time of arrest. In State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121, 77 A.L.R.2d 1229, we held an accused has the constitutional right to defend in person or by counsel. He is not entitled as a matter of right to both. However, the constitution does not forbid a court from appointing an attorney to confer and consult with an accused before honoring a waiver of counsel or accepting a plea. We further said this salutary practice should be followed in any doubtful case to assure an effective voluntary and intelligent waiver and is particularly appropriate when the accused is young, inexperienced in criminal procedures, of questionable competency, lacking in education, or in any case where the gravity of the penalty or complexity of the crime seemingly dictates such procedure. The present case does not fall within the contemplation of the Thomlinson admonition. Petitioner was forty years of age at the time of arraignment. There is no question about his competency. His education includes four years of college. With a criminal record extending over a period of twenty years he was familiar with criminal procedures and fully understood all of his rights and the gravity of the charge against him. He referred to himself at the trial as a "talented thief" and informed the Sheriff of Lake County that he had "probably been arrested as many times as you've arrested a person". His criminal record includes a prior conviction of kidnapping. He was not indigent and was afforded an opportunity to, and did, confer with an attorney from Sioux Falls before trial. *444 The record affirmatively shows the trial court repeatedly offered assistance of counsel and petitioner intelligently and understandingly rejected such offers. In this collateral attack on the judgment of conviction petitioner has failed to sustain the burden of proving he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. The fact that at one stage of the proceeding petitioner indicated he might want counsel did not make a subsequent and final waiver ineffective. State v. Hillerud, 76 S.D. 476, 81 N.W.2d 130. Affirmed. All the Judges concur.