Title: Commonwealth v. Sun

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12870 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHENG SUN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 11, 2022. - July 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Evidence, 
Joint venturer, Intent, Present recollection refreshed, 
Credibility of witness.  Intent.  Witness, Refreshment of 
recollection, Credibility.  Practice, Criminal, Opening 
statement, Conduct of prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 28, 2011. 
 
The cases were tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
Joseph M. Kenneally for the defendant. 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In the early morning hours of September 27, 
2011, the defendant, Cheng Sun, and two others, Sifa Lee (Lee) 
and Jun Di Lin (Lin), broke into a restaurant and attempted to 
rob the sixty-two year old owner, Shui "Tony" Woo, who was 
2 
 
sleeping in a back room.  When the victim would not provide the 
robbers with access to the onsite safe, they beat, stabbed, and 
strangled him to death.  On February 25, 2016, a jury convicted 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder.1  The defendant 
appeals on several grounds.  He argues first that the 
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Next, the defendant argues that 
he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct 
during both the prosecutor's opening statement and her closing 
argument.  He also contends that the improper admission in 
evidence of (1) the Commonwealth's plea agreement with Lin and 
(2) Lin's prior statements as refreshed recollections gave rise 
to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise its 
discretionary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict to either murder in the second degree or 
manslaughter.  After a careful review of the record and 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of the predicate felony 
of stealing by confining or putting in fear, G. L. c. 265, § 21; 
as well as armed assault of a person age sixty or older with 
intent to rob or murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (a).  He was 
sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder, and 
to concurrent terms of from forty to sixty years and from 
eighteen to twenty years on the remaining charges. 
3 
 
consideration of the defendant's arguments, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and decline to exercise our authority 
under § 33E. 
Prior proceedings.  The defendant, Lee, and Lin were 
charged with (1) murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1; (2) stealing by 
confining or putting in fear, G. L. c. 265, § 21; and (3) armed 
assault of a person age sixty or over with intent to rob or 
murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (a).  Lin reached a plea agreement 
with the Commonwealth.  In exchange for his testimony, Lin 
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of manslaughter.2  A joint 
trial commenced against the defendant and Lee, but the case was 
severed over concerns surrounding the availability of 
interpreters.  In a separate trial, Lee was convicted of all 
charges.  Commonwealth v. Sifa Lee, 483 Mass. 531, 532 (2019).  
Those convictions later were affirmed.  Id.  Following nearly a 
month-long trial, a jury convicted the defendant of all charges.  
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for later discussion.  
Lin, a Boston-area taxicab driver, first met the defendant and 
Lee at Foxwoods Resort and Casino (Foxwoods) in early September 
2011.  They spoke about owners of a number of restaurants in the 
 
2 Lin also pleaded guilty to the remaining charges without 
alteration. 
4 
 
Chinatown neighborhood of Boston and exchanged cell phone 
numbers.  Over the next few weeks, the defendant and Lee saw and 
spoke with Lin several times.  The defendant and Lee told Lin 
they did not have any money, and Lin gave them free rides in his 
taxicab.  Lin had a portable global positioning system (GPS) 
device, and his taxicab also was equipped with a separate device 
that captured time and date stamped information about the 
taxicab, including its location, speed, and direction. 
In the very early hours of September 27, 2011, Lee 
telephoned Lin, asking Lin to pick up him and the defendant in 
Chinatown.  Lin picked up the defendant and Lee in his "personal 
car," and then drove them to his taxicab, which was parked in 
the South Boston section of Boston.  Either Lin or the defendant 
put a dark tool bag (bag) in the trunk of the taxicab. 
As Lee directed, Lin then drove the group to Ipswich and 
parked in the parking lot of a business next to a restaurant.3  
After the three men got out of the car, Lin took the bag out of 
the trunk, and Lee removed metal clippers and walked away, 
returning several minutes later.  Lee again walked away, this 
time with the defendant.  During this excursion, the defendant 
and Lee cut the power cords to the restaurant's telephone line 
 
3 Lin had activated his global positioning system (GPS) 
device but did not use it because Lee had not provided him with 
their destination's exact address. 
5 
 
and electric meter.  On their return, they were wearing gloves, 
Lee was wearing a ski mask and holding the clippers and a 
crowbar, and the defendant was wearing a hat or ski mask that 
did not cover his face and was holding a flashlight. 
The defendant and Lee told Lin there was a large safe in 
the restaurant and asked for his assistance to steal money from 
it.  Lin agreed.  All three men, gloved, with Lin carrying the 
tool bag, and with the defendant carrying a knife, then entered 
the building through a skylight above the restaurant kitchen.  
Leaving Lin in the kitchen with the tool bag, the defendant and 
Lee went to another room.  Lin heard a scream and a man speaking 
Cantonese.  The defendant and Lee returned to the kitchen and 
told Lin that there was a man in the next room.  Lin ran to the 
dining area, followed by Lee.  Lee and Lin, now carrying the 
tool bag, then went to the room from where the scream had come, 
where Lin saw a large safe and the victim; the defendant was 
restraining the victim on a cot by holding a knife to the 
victim's neck.4 
The victim had been "badly hit" and "looked like he was 
being tormented."  While the defendant restrained the victim at 
knifepoint, Lee repeatedly beat him with the crowbar.  Although 
the defendant, along with Lin, pleaded with Lee to stop hitting 
 
4 Lin testified that he never saw the defendant stab or 
strike the victim. 
6 
 
the victim and asked Lee whether he were "crazy" and "why [he 
was] doing this," the defendant nevertheless continued to 
restrain the victim at knifepoint.  At the defendant's 
suggestion, Lee bound the victim's hands and feet while the 
defendant continued restraining the victim at knifepoint.  Lee 
temporarily paused the beating during this time.  The victim 
agreed to the defendant's demand that he open the safe, but the 
victim was unable to stand on his own and was held upright by 
Lin. 
As the victim struggled to open the safe, Lee resumed 
beating the victim, first with the crowbar and then with a 
hammer.  During this period of the beating, the defendant 
attempted to shield the victim's head from Lee's blows, but also 
"nudged" the victim's head to get him to open the safe and told 
him that if he did not open it, Lee would kill him.  The victim 
eventually collapsed without opening the safe, and Lin and 
either the defendant or Lee took the victim to a hallway behind 
the safe and laid him on the floor.  At Lee's insistence, the 
three men left the restaurant through the skylight in the roof 
and returned to the taxicab, bringing their tools with them.  
Before leaving, Lee repeatedly kicked and stomped on the victim, 
7 
 
who remained on the floor.5  Each man had the victim's blood 
"everywhere" on him. 
The defendant had sustained an injury to the back of his 
hand, and both of his hands were bleeding.  At Lee's 
instruction, Lin drove the group to Foxwoods.  As they neared 
the casino, Lee called a man named Yusheng Tan (Tan) and asked 
Tan to meet them when they arrived, which Tan did.  Tan got in 
the car with the group, and at Lee's instruction, Lin then drove 
to the Mohegan Sun Casino (Mohegan Sun).  After they arrived at 
Mohegan Sun, and again at Lee's instruction, Tan retrieved Lee's 
and the defendant's clothing from a hotel room.  The group then 
returned to Foxwoods and dropped off Tan.  They then parked in a 
Foxwoods parking lot, where Lee and the defendant changed into 
the clothes Tan had brought for them.  Lee then went into 
Foxwoods and bought new pants, shoes, and socks for Lin using a 
 
5 From these attacks, the victim suffered blunt force wounds 
"over his entire body."  He had more than twenty-five bone 
breaks caused by blunt force.  He also had five lacerations on 
the top of his head, and contusions and abrasions all over his 
body, including "small bruises on his brain."  The victim had 
two "stab wounds" on his lower back, "puncture wounds" on his 
left upper chest and left upper back, and incised wounds on his 
arms.  The victim also had an abrasion on his neck, soft tissue 
hemorrhage of the neck muscle, bilateral fractures of the 
thyroid cartilage, and bleeding in the lining covering the 
whites of the eyes, all indicative of strangulation.  Most, if 
not all, of the injuries were extremely painful.  The victim's 
cause of death was multiple blunt and sharp force injuries and 
asphyxia due to strangulation.  Anywhere from seconds to minutes 
elapsed between injury and death. 
8 
 
Foxwoods "rewards" card belonging to the defendant and using a 
personal identification number given to him by the defendant. 
On Lee's return to the car, the three men took the bloody 
clothing they had been wearing and washed them at a nearby 
laundromat before throwing the clothing into a Dumpster and 
returning by car to Mohegan Sun.  The defendant and Lee took the 
bag containing the hammer and crowbar inside the casino.  Lee 
then returned to the car alone, and Lin drove Lee to Quincy, 
where he dropped off Lee before picking up a taxicab customer. 
Meanwhile, a few hours earlier restaurant employees found 
the bound, badly beaten body of the victim in the restaurant, 
just outside the room where he kept a bed and safe.  Police 
found a bloodied serrated knife on the floor near the victim's 
body and the safe.  In the kitchen was a baseball hat containing 
deoxyribonucleic acid with a major profile matching Lee and a 
minor profile potentially contributed by Lin. 
The day after the killing, September 28, 2011, after 
learning that the victim had died, Lin decided to flee to China, 
obtained a visa, and purchased plane tickets for this purpose.  
Lin later decided differently, and on September 29, he met with 
police at his attorney's office and "turned [himself] in."  Lin 
made several statements, which he later admitted were false, in 
an attempt to minimize his role in the victim's death.  Lin 
later was arrested at the Canadian border while attempting to 
9 
 
flee the country.  On October 17, police arrested the defendant 
in New York City and Lee in New Jersey. 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder.  The 
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
his conviction on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
where the defendant did not participate in the fatal attack on 
the victim and did not act with the requisite malice.  Instead, 
the defendant contends that the attack on the victim "was a 
senseless and spontaneous outburst of violence, perpetrated by a 
single individual [Lee], that prevented the men from achieving 
their alleged objective."  The Commonwealth counters that this 
court need not consider the defendant's argument where the jury 
also convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of felony-murder and the defendant does not challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence on that theory.  The 
Commonwealth further argues that the evidence was sufficient to 
permit the defendant's conviction as a joint venturer on each 
theory. 
It is true that where the jury convict a defendant "on two 
theories of murder in the first degree, the verdict 'will remain 
undisturbed even if only one theory is sustained on appeal.'"  
Sifa Lee, 483 Mass. at 548 n.14, quoting Commonwealth v. Nolin, 
10 
 
448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007).  And this court has, at times, 
declined to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence as to one 
theory of murder where the jury convicted a defendant on two 
theories.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 
135 (2012).  However, given this court's responsibility pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to review "the whole case," we think the 
better practice here is to consider the defendant's sufficiency 
claim as to his conviction on the basis of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty even where the defendant does not contest the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction on the basis of 
felony-murder.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 154-
155 (2013) (although sufficiency not challenged, court concluded 
on § 33E review that evidence was insufficient to sustain 
conviction of murder in first degree on theory of felony-murder 
but sufficient to sustain conviction on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and sustained 
verdict on those bases).  Additionally, a determination of the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant is 
relevant to our determination as to whether any alleged errors 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice or 
otherwise prejudiced the defendant.6  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
 
6 Additionally, although we affirm the judgments in this 
case, in a case where this court were to find reversible error, 
the Commonwealth would be precluded from pursuing at a new trial 
a theory for which this court concluded there was insufficient 
11 
 
Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 755 (1999), S.C., 483 Mass. 1004 (2019) 
("In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt, . . . we conclude that the admission of this evidence did 
not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice").  Thus, we will examine the sufficiency of the 
evidence as to both bases of the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the first degree. 
"In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the conviction, we consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, including issues of 
credibility" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 
Mass. 268, 275 (2022), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), and Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 
770, 785 (1997).  "Proof of the essential elements of the crime 
may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, 
and the inferences a jury may draw 'need only be reasonable and 
possible and need not be necessary or inescapable'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980). 
a.  Felony-murder.  The defendant rightly does not contest 
the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction on the 
basis of felony-murder.  The evidence of such crime was 
 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 636, 641 
(1996). 
12 
 
overwhelming.  "At the time of the defendant's trial,[7] a 
conviction of felony-murder required proof of three elements:  
first, that the defendant committed or attempted to commit a 
felony with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment [either as a 
principal or a joint venturer]; second, that the killing 
occurred during the commission or attempted commission of that 
felony; and third, that the felony was inherently dangerous, or 
that the defendant acted with conscious disregard of human 
life."  Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 Mass. 498, 504 (2019).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673 (2019). 
Here, the defendant was convicted of stealing by confining 
or putting in fear, which carries a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.  G. L. c. 265, § 21.  The statute does not require 
that a defendant successfully steal, as that word is 
colloquially understood.  Under the first part of the statute, 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, "[1] with intent to commit larceny or any felony, [2] 
confines, maims, injures or wounds, or attempts or threatens to 
 
7 In 2017, this court prospectively abolished the common-law 
felony-murder doctrine.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 
807 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  In cases 
commenced after the date of that opinion, "felony-murder is 
limited to its statutory role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an 
aggravating element of murder," and a defendant may not be 
convicted of felony-murder absent proof of one of the three 
prongs of malice.  Id.  Because this case commenced prior to our 
decision in Brown, the common-law felony-murder doctrine 
applies. 
13 
 
kill, confine, maim, injure or wound, or puts any person in 
fear, [3] for the purpose of stealing from a building, bank, 
safe, vault or other depository of money, bonds or other 
valuables."  Id. 
The defendant conceded at trial that he "broke into [the] 
restaurant with the intent to steal."  Lin testified that the 
defendant spoke about owners of a number of restaurants in the 
weeks leading up to the robbery; brought gloves, a hat, 
flashlight, and knife to the restaurant the night of the 
robbery; and told Lin that they were all going to go into the 
restaurant together because there was a "huge safe."  Lin 
further testified that, once inside the restaurant, the 
defendant held the victim down on a cot at knifepoint while Lee 
brutally beat the victim with a crowbar; told the victim he 
would be killed if he did not open the safe; and, while still 
holding the knife, "nudge[d]" the victim's head to get him to 
open the safe.  Lin testified that he never saw the defendant 
stab the victim.  However, Lin also testified that only the 
defendant had a knife, and that there was at least one period of 
time when the defendant was with the victim while Lin was not 
present.  The medical examiner testified that the victim had 
multiple "incised wounds" that could have been caused by "any 
instrument with a sharp edge," multiple "puncture wounds" that 
could have been caused by "anything with . . . a sharp . . . 
14 
 
point on it," and multiple "stab wounds" that were "suggestive 
of . . . an injury with a knife-like weapon" and were 
"consistent with a knife."  Thus, a rational juror could have 
concluded that the defendant stabbed the victim. 
This evidence overwhelmingly showed that the defendant, 
with the intent to commit larceny, confined and injured the 
victim for the purpose of stealing from the safe in the 
restaurant and, thus, that the defendant engaged in the 
predicate felony.  This evidence -- particularly the evidence 
that the defendant stabbed the victim and enabled a brutal 
beating of the victim with a crowbar -- also overwhelmingly 
showed that the defendant acted with conscious disregard of 
human life.  See Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 108-109 
(1994), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 
Mass. 87 (2013) (felony-murder liability appropriate where 
"homicide occurs in the commission of an offense while armed, 
. . . because a defendant's willingness to use a weapon 
demonstrates a conscious disregard for human life"). 
Finally, the evidence likewise was overwhelming that the 
killing occurred during the commission of the predicate felony.  
"To support a conviction of felony-murder in the first degree, 
the killing need not have occurred during the course of the 
predicate felony itself, but only 'as part of one continuous 
transaction,' a standard which is met if the two 'took place at 
15 
 
substantially the same time and place.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 680 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 422 (2017) (collecting cases).  The victim 
was stabbed and beaten to death while the defendant, Lee, and 
Lin were attempting to gain access to the victim's safe, thus 
satisfying the requirement that the felony and homicide take 
place at substantially the same time and place.8 
b.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  To convict a defendant as 
a joint venturer of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth must "prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the commission of the crime charged, and that the defendant had 
or shared the required criminal intent" (quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 162 (2021), quoting 
Britt, 465 Mass. at 100-101.  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the 
 
8 As to the felony-murder conviction, it is no defense under 
the common-law felony-murder doctrine applicable at the time of 
trial that the defendant claims he lacked any intent to kill or 
injure the victim.  "Once a defendant participates in the 
underlying felony, with the intent or shared intent to commit 
that felony, he or she becomes liable for a death that 'followed 
naturally and probably from the carrying out of the joint 
enterprise,'" and "it is no defen[s]e for the associates engaged 
with others in the commission of [the felony], that they did not 
intend to take life in its perpetration, or that they forbade 
their companions to kill" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 421 (2017).  Nevertheless, as discussed 
infra, there was more than sufficient evidence here that the 
defendant possessed the third prong of malice. 
16 
 
evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant participated in 
the killing of the victim, which was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and that the defendant had the requisite 
intent to do an act that, in the circumstances known to him, a 
reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that the victim would die. 
i.  Knowing participation.  Where the actual killing was 
committed by another, the Commonwealth must prove that "the 
defendant was present at the scene of the murder, with the 
knowledge that another intend[ed] to commit a crime or with 
intent to commit the crime[,] and by agreement was willing and 
available to assist if necessary" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 712 (2016).  Here, a 
rational juror could have concluded from the evidence that the 
defendant restrained the victim at knifepoint while Lee brutally 
beat the victim with a crowbar.  Thus, the defendant not only 
witnessed Lee beating the victim to death.  He enabled and 
assisted that beating knowing that the attack would almost 
certainly lead to the victim's death.9  Viewing the evidence in 
 
9 A rational juror could have concluded that the defendant's 
statements to Lee during the beating -- calling Lee "crazy," 
asking Lee "why [he was] doing this," and pleading with Lee to 
stop -- conveyed that the defendant was aware that Lee, in 
beating the victim, was acting in a way that would cause the 
17 
 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, the 
evidence showed that the defendant stabbed the victim and that 
both the beating and stabbing caused the victim's death. 
The defendant argues that he either did not participate in 
or withdrew from the killing where, when the beating commenced, 
he pleaded with Lee to stop and, later, shielded the victim's 
head from some of Lee's blows.  This argument is unavailing.  
"In order to support a theory of withdrawal or abandonment of a 
joint venture, there must be at least an appreciable interval 
between the alleged termination and [the commission of the 
crime,] a detachment from the enterprise before the [crime] has 
become so probable that it cannot reasonably be stayed, and such 
notice or definite act of detachment that other principals in 
the attempted crime have opportunity also to abandon it."  
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 74, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 
907 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 118 
(2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011).  Here, there was no 
time between the alleged withdrawal and the commission of the 
crime, as the crime was already in the process of being 
committed when the defendant pleaded with Lee to stop and 
shielded the victim's head.  Additionally, the defendant's 
expressions were far from sufficient to constitute withdrawal; 
 
victim's death.  Despite this knowledge, the defendant continued 
to restrain the victim at knifepoint. 
18 
 
when considered with the act of the defendant continuing to 
restrain the victim at knifepoint and his statements suggesting 
to Lee that they bind the victim's hands and feet and 
threatening that the victim would be killed if he did not open 
the safe, the defendant's expressions instead confirmed the 
defendant's knowing participation in the killing of the victim.  
Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that 
the defendant did not withdraw from the killing. 
Finally, as discussed supra, the evidence was sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that the defendant stabbed the victim.  
Even if the defendant successfully withdrew from the beating, 
which we conclude he did not, the stabbing was sufficient on its 
own to prove participation in the killing where there was 
evidence that the victim died from blunt force, sharp force, and 
strangulation-related injuries. 
ii.  Intent.  The requisite criminal intent is "malice 
aforethought."  West, 487 Mass. at 800.  "[M]alice 
[aforethought] is defined 'as an intent [1] to cause death, [2] 
to cause grievous bodily harm, or [3] to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow."  Watson, 487 Mass. at 164, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 377 (2006).  A defendant need 
19 
 
not intend "to commit the murder in an extremely atrocious or 
cruel way."  Watson, supra at 165. 
The defendant's argument that he lacked the requisite 
malice where he intended neither to kill nor to injure the 
victim is without merit where there was sufficient evidence for 
a rational juror to conclude that the defendant possessed the 
third prong of malice, an intent "to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow."  Watson, 487 Mass. at 164.  As discussed supra, 
the defendant restrained the victim at knifepoint while Lee 
repeatedly and brutally beat the victim with a crowbar, and 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the defendant stabbed the victim.  A rational 
juror could have concluded that, in these circumstances, a 
reasonable person would have known that the defendant's actions 
of stabbing the victim and restraining the victim during a 
brutal beating gave rise to a plain and strong likelihood of the 
victim's death.  See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass. 24, 32 
(2014), citing Commonwealth v. Semedo¸ 422 Mass. 716, 720 (1996) 
(sufficient evidence of third prong of malice "where reasonable 
person would have known that victim could suffer death as 
beating progressed"); Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 379 
(reasonable person would have recognized plain and strong 
20 
 
likelihood of victim's death from nature of severe beating with 
multiple stabbings by multiple attackers). 
iii.  The Cunneen factors.  Finally, the evidence of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty here was overwhelming.  As of the 
time of the defendant's trial, a killing is committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty where the Commonwealth shows at 
least one of the following:  "indifference to or taking pleasure 
in the victim's suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering 
of the victim, extent of physical injuries, number of blows, 
manner and force with which delivered, instrument employed, and 
disproportion between the means needed to cause death and those 
employed."10  West, 487 Mass. at 800 & n.7, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  Here, the evidence 
showed that the victim was repeatedly beaten with a crowbar, a 
hammer, and Lee's foot; stabbed with a knife; and strangled.  
The victim had more than twenty-five bone breaks caused by blunt 
 
10 This court since has refined this standard in 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 860-866 (2020).  We 
concluded in that case that the victim's consciousness or degree 
of suffering may not support a finding of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty "where it stands alone as a factor, divorced from the 
egregiousness of the defendant's conduct."  Id. at 864.  
Although the jury need not find that a defendant intended to 
commit an extremely atrocious or cruel murder, the jury are no 
longer permitted "to find extreme atrocity or cruelty based only 
on the degree of a victim's suffering, without considering 
whether the defendant's conduct was extreme in either its 
brutality or its cruelty."  Id. at 864-865.  The change is 
inconsequential here, where the evidence supported a finding 
that all Cunneen factors were present. 
21 
 
force; five lacerations on the top of his head; contusions, 
abrasions, and blunt force wounds all over his body; two stab 
wounds on his lower back; puncture wounds on his left upper 
chest and left upper back; incised wounds on his arms; an 
abrasion on his neck; soft tissue hemorrhage of the neck muscle; 
bilateral fractures of the thyroid cartilage; and bleeding in 
the lining covering the whites of the eyes.  The medical 
examiner testified that the victim's death could have taken 
anywhere from seconds to minutes and that most, if not all, of 
the victim's injuries were painful.  Lin's testimony tended to 
show that the victim survived at least long enough for two 
separate beatings to take place and for the defendant to speak 
briefly with the victim, urging him to open the safe, following 
the first beating. 
This evidence tends to show the presence of all of the 
Cunneen factors -- that the victim was conscious and suffering; 
that at least Lee was indifferent to that suffering; that the 
victim had extensive physical injuries inflicted over a high 
number of blows administered with massive force using a crowbar, 
a hammer, and a knife; and that the force used was far greater 
than necessary to cause death.11  That Lee was responsible for 
 
11 Under the current formulation, the factors are 
articulated as follows: 
 
22 
 
several of these factors does not alter our conclusion.  "The 
defendant was responsible for [Lee's] actions because he [had] 
the requisite malice aforethought and he knowingly participated 
in the murder."  Watson, 487 Mass. at 165.  In these 
circumstances, where Lee's "actions warrant a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the [defendant] is responsible for those 
actions."  Id., quoting Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 379-380. 
2.  Opening statement and first witness.  The defendant 
argues that he was denied a fair trial where the prosecutor 
improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathy by "eulogizing" the 
victim in her opening statement and by eliciting from the 
victim's son significant irrelevant testimony regarding the 
victim's background and character.  The Commonwealth contends 
that the prosecutor's opening statement and direct examination 
 
"[1] whether the defendant was indifferent to or took 
pleasure in the suffering of the deceased[;] . . . [2] 
whether the defendant's method or means of killing the 
deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or 
prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased[; and] 
. . . [3] whether the means used by the defendant were 
excessive and out of proportion to what would be needed to 
kill a person.  In considering this final factor, juries 
may consider the extent of the injuries of the deceased; 
the number of blows delivered; the manner, degree and 
severity of the force used; and the nature of the weapon, 
instrument, or method used.  A jury cannot make a finding 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty unless it is based on one of 
these three factors, although, as we have stated 
previously, the jury need not unanimously agree on which of 
the factors underlie their verdict."  (Citations omitted.)  
 
Castillo, 485 Mass. at 865-866. 
23 
 
of the victim's son constituted permissible humanizing of the 
proceedings.  We agree that the prosecutor's statements and 
lines of questioning regarding the victim's character were 
improper, but we conclude that they did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
"[T]he prosecutor is entitled to tell the jury something of 
the person whose life ha[s] been lost in order to humanize the 
proceedings."12  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 495 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998).  However, we have previously cautioned that 
the prosecutor "must refrain, when 'personal characteristics are 
not relevant to any material issue, . . . from so emphasizing 
those characteristics that it risks undermining the rationality 
and thus the integrity of the jury's verdict,'" Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 
831 (2022), quoting Santiago, supra, and must avoid "slip[ping] 
into emotionally provocative argument," Commonwealth v. Alemany, 
488 Mass. 499, 511 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 
Mass. 319, 322 n.4 (2000).13  In other words, where a prosecutor 
 
12 We decline the defendant's invitation to prohibit 
absolutely the admission of humanizing evidence. 
 
13 For cases where we have previously reprimanded 
prosecutors for improper appeals to sympathy, see Alemany, 488 
Mass. at 513 (reference to victim "never being able to 'walk 
down the aisle with her dad on her wedding day'" exceeded bounds 
of excusable hyperbole); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 
24 
 
chooses to provide background information about a victim, he or 
she must take care not to cross the line from permissibly 
humanizing the proceedings to making an improper appeal to 
sympathy "to ensure that the verdict was 'based on the evidence 
rather than sympathy for the victim and [his] family.'"  
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 253 (2012), quoting 
Santiago, supra at 494. 
Because defense counsel did not object to the 
Commonwealth's opening statement or during the relevant portions 
of the examination of the first witness, we determine whether 
any error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 377 (2009).  
"For an error to have created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, it must have been likely to have 
 
443 (2015) (unnecessary emphasis on loss suffered by victims' 
families is improper); Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 253 
(2012) (statement that victim "was a sister, she was a daughter, 
she was a niece, and she is none of these things anymore because 
of what he did to her" and that her body was discovered 
"literally in a state of humiliation" were "better left 
unsaid"); Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 445 (2009) 
(prosecutor should not have brought feelings of victim's husband 
and members of community to jury's attention); Commonwealth v. 
Rock, 429 Mass. 609, 615-616 (1999) (statement that victim could 
not testify because "he's dead" but spoke to jury during trial 
may have been "excessive"); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 428 Mass. 
852, 857 (1999) (prosecutor should not have stated victim "will 
be seventeen forever because he was killed," did not have jury, 
did not have trial, did not have any opportunity, and had "[n]o 
breaks"); Santiago, 425 Mass. at 495 (prosecutor improperly 
appealed to sympathy by repeated references to victim's personal 
characteristics). 
25 
 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 486 
Mass. 328, 333 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 
155, 160 (2020). 
The prosecutor began her opening statement by discussing 
the victim's immigration story.  She detailed how the victim 
moved to this country from China, got married, became a United 
States citizen, had two children, and worked long hours at 
multiple jobs to support his family.  She described how the 
victim and his wife bought a restaurant and "made it a practice 
in homage to their heritage . . . to employ other Chinese 
immigrants, many of who[m] spoke no English."  She explained 
that the victim was active in his community, sponsored little 
league teams, and "was a Mason, a group whose motto is '[b]etter 
men make a better world.'"  She described how, on the night of 
the killing, "[a]s the final hours of Tony Woo's life ticked 
away," the victim's younger adult son, then in his late 
twenties, was getting ready for bed, the victim's wife was busy 
sewing at her at-home sewing business, and the victim's older 
son "lay next to his wife, asleep in their home in Braintree." 
The prosecutor then called the victim's younger son to 
testify.  Although the son properly testified to several 
relevant issues, such as the layout of the restaurant, the 
prosecutor devoted significant time at the start of the son's 
testimony to eliciting irrelevant evidence of the victim's 
26 
 
character.  In addition to eliciting testimony consistent with 
the assertions made in her opening statement, the prosecutor 
elicited the following statements from the victim's son:  (1) 
the victim did not decrease his hours as he got older until the 
victim's son began working at the restaurant, because "it was 
his baby, so he -- it was hard for him to do that"; (2) the 
victim always wore a collared shirt when working in the 
restaurant so he could be presentable, and would wear an apron 
over his clothing if he was cooking or bartending; (3) on the 
night of the murder, the victim's son "got the courage" to tell 
the victim he would be leaving the restaurant for a new job; (4) 
the victim was "ecstatic" at this news and made the victim's son 
a steak to celebrate; and (5) the victim made the best steak in 
the world, and the victim's son "can't even eat anybody else's 
steak now."  The prosecutor also used the victim's son to 
introduce in evidence a photograph of the victim. 
The defendant objected at a pretrial hearing on motions in 
limine to the proposed admission of the photograph of the 
victim.  Thus, we determine whether the photograph's admission 
constituted error.  Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 580 
n.14 (2019).  If so, then we consider whether the error was 
prejudicial to the defendant.  Id.  "An error is not prejudicial 
only if the Commonwealth can show 'with fair assurance . . . 
that the judgment was not substantially swayed' by it."  
27 
 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 647 (2020), cert. denied, 
141 S. Ct. 1519 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 428 
Mass. 76, 79 (1998).  We conclude that the admission of the 
photograph of the victim was not error where it is well 
established that a predeath photograph of a victim properly may 
be admitted as humanizing evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 193 (2017); Degro, 432 Mass. at 323.  
The same cannot be said, however, of much of the prosecutor's 
opening statement and examination of the first witness, the 
victim's son. 
Much of the prosecutor's opening and lines of questioning 
of the victim's son were improper.  However, for the reasons 
discussed infra, we conclude that they did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  First 
addressing the impropriety of the challenged statements, the 
start of the prosecutor's opening statement was entirely devoted 
to providing a history of the victim's life, with particular 
emphasis on his positive contributions to the community.  The 
prosecutor then began her direct examination of the first 
witness, one of the victim's sons, by eliciting further 
sympathetic details about the victim's life.  The contested 
statements and lines of questioning "were [not] limited in 
number and scope."  Degro, 432 Mass. at 323.  They went far 
28 
 
beyond the basic biographical details that we permit to humanize 
proceedings. 
The Commonwealth argues that any statements as to the 
victim's character were not "emphasized" where they were not 
repeated in closing arguments.  However, we conclude that the 
prosecutor emphasized the victim's good character where she 
began her opening statement with an extensive history of the 
victim's life, during which she provided multiple distinct 
examples of the victim's good character, and where she then 
elicited from the first witness evidence repeating and expanding 
on these examples.  By the time the jury were provided with the 
first piece of relevant evidence in the case, the image of the 
victim's life and character had been more than solidified for 
them. 
Although some of the more basic biographical statements, on 
their own, might have constituted permissible humanizing, taken 
together, the above-described statements and lines of 
questioning "had no relevance to the defendant's guilt and 
[were] an improper appeal to the passions or sympathies of the 
jury."  Alemany, 488 Mass. at 513.  We observe that the portions 
of the prosecutor's opening statement and examination of the 
first witness addressing the victim's life and character went 
beyond the bounds of proper humanizing of the proceedings, and 
we emphasize our strong disapproval of her tactics. 
29 
 
Having determined that there was error, "we consider, 'in 
the context of the arguments and the case as a whole,' whether 
the improper statement[s and examination] created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 201 (2017).  The judge 
provided instructions to the jury, both at the beginning and end 
of trial, that mitigated the error.  At the beginning of trial, 
the judge told the jury multiple times that opening statements 
are not evidence and instructed them to decide the case "without 
bias, without prejudice, and without sympathy, according to the 
evidence."  When charging the jury at the close of the case, the 
judge stated, 
"You, alone, determine what evidence to accept, how 
important the evidence is that you do accept, and what 
conclusions you should draw from the evidence.  You must be 
completely fair and completely impartial.  You can't be 
swayed by any biases or prejudices or personal likes or 
dislikes to either side, or because a charge is either 
popular or unpopular with the public.  If there are 
conflicts in the testimony, it's your responsibility to 
resolve the conflicts and to determine where the truth 
lies.  And you must do this based solely on a fair 
consideration of the evidence.  You must be completely fair 
and impartial.  So you can't be swayed by any personal 
likes or dislikes toward either side, or because the 
charges are popular or unpopular with the public." 
 
Although it would have been preferable for the judge to remind 
the jury at the end of trial that opening statements are not 
evidence, we conclude that the judge's instructions were 
sufficient to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's improper 
30 
 
statements such that they did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140-141 (2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 
(2017).  See Mejia, 463 Mass. at 253; Commonwealth v. DelValle, 
443 Mass. 782, 794 (2005).  The judge's instructions were 
likewise sufficient to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's 
improper line of questioning and resulting testimony from the 
victim's son.  The judge instructed both at the beginning and 
close of trial that the jury should "try this case . . . without 
sympathy" and that they "must be completely fair and completely 
impartial" and "can[not] be swayed by any biases or prejudices 
or personal likes or dislikes to either side." 
Further, the improper statements did not go to the heart of 
the defense strategy and were irrelevant to any disputed issue 
of fact.  In light of the statements' irrelevance to the case 
and the judge's instructions, we also conclude that the jury 
reasonably would have been able to sort out the excessive 
statements made by the prosecutor.  Finally, as discussed supra, 
the Commonwealth's case against the defendant was overwhelming 
as to felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Thus, 
although portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and 
examination of the first witness were improper, when considered 
in the context of the whole case, the errors did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
31 
 
3.  Refreshed recollection testimony.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor twice improperly submitted evidence of Lin's 
pretrial statements under the guise of refreshing Lin's 
recollection where Lin's testimony was inconsistent with his 
prior statements but his memory was not clearly exhausted.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that, in both instances, the prosecutor 
showed that Lin's memory was clearly exhausted, satisfying the 
sole prerequisite to refreshing a witness's recollection.  
Because defense counsel did not object to either instance at 
trial, we determine whether any error gave rise to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Taylor, 455 Mass. at 
377. 
 
"An examiner may refresh the recollection of a witness 
during [his or] her testimony," and "[t]he only prerequisite to 
refreshing recollection is a showing that the witness's memory 
is clearly exhausted."  Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 
478 (1995).  "A witness whose memory has been exhausted may have 
that memory refreshed in the presence of the jury by any means 
that permits the witness to testify from his or her own memory."  
Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 731 (2012), citing 
O'Brien, supra.  A showing that a witness's memory is clearly 
exhausted generally occurs where a witness "is unable to recall 
the subject of that questioning," in which case "the witness 
must state that his or her memory is exhausted."  Woodbine, 
32 
 
supra at 731-732.  Although we do not require specific language 
as part of this showing, it must be clear that the witness is 
experiencing a failure of memory, rather than either providing a 
response the examiner did not expect or indicating he or she 
never had knowledge of the subject of examination.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 662 n.8 (1982) (witness 
testimony that she could not recollect particular statements 
allegedly made in her presence by defendant sufficient to permit 
examiner to refresh her recollection); Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Publicker Indus., Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1363 (2d Cir. 1981) 
("There is no required, ritualistic formula for finding 
exhaustion of memory").  See also Commonwealth v. McGee, 469 
Mass. 1, 15 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 
791, 796 n.4 (2011) (negative response not equivalent to failure 
of memory); Kaplan v. Gross, 223 Mass. 152, 156 (1916) (examiner 
may not refresh witness's recollection as to "matter about which 
he never had any knowledge"); National Labor Relations Bd. v. 
Federal Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 488 n.3 (1st Cir. 1962), 
quoting United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 
1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949) (device of refreshing 
recollection may not be used improperly to suggest to witness 
testimony expected of him). 
In the first challenged instance here, the prosecutor asked 
Lin whether he saw the defendant with a knife before he, the 
33 
 
defendant, and Lee entered the restaurant.  Lin stated, "Before 
we entered, I really didn't pay attention to him," and then that 
he was "[n]ot too sure" whether he had seen whether the 
defendant had any weapons during that period of time.  The 
prosecutor then asked whether Lin had "a memory of whether [the 
defendant] did or did not have a weapon at that point in time," 
to which Lin replied, "Really, I don't recall.  I don't recall 
if he had any weapons."  At that point, the prosecutor refreshed 
Lin's recollection with a transcript of Lin's interview with 
police on September 29, 2011.  Lin then testified that the 
defendant "was carrying a fruit knife" prior to entering the 
restaurant.  Prior to having his memory refreshed, Lin never 
definitely answered the prosecutor's question, either 
affirmatively or negatively, and twice indicated that his memory 
on the questioned point was failing him -- first by stating he 
was "[n]ot too sure" and then by stating, "Really, I don't 
recall."  Thus, the prosecutor properly refreshed Lin's memory 
in this instance. 
In the second challenged instance, when the prosecutor 
questioned Lin about the defendant's actions while standing near 
the safe and about whether Lin saw what the defendant had done 
with the knife, Lin initially answered, "I didn't see it.  I 
don't remember where it went."  The prosecutor pressed further, 
asking, "Did you see [the defendant] with the knife over by the 
34 
 
safe?"  The defendant responded, "Not any more."  The prosecutor 
then refreshed Lin's recollection, after which Lin testified, "I 
do remember now.  Just now I thought I didn't see the knife, but 
now, having read that, I'm able to remember yes, he had a knife 
in his hand."  As the Commonwealth concedes, this exchange 
presents a closer question.  Although Lin twice stated that he 
did not see the knife, he also, unprompted, stated, "I don't 
remember where it went."  Although it would have been preferable 
for the prosecutor to further probe Lin's failure in memory 
before refreshing his recollection, we conclude that the 
exchange meets the bare minimum requirement of a showing that 
Lin's memory was exhausted.  In any event, we fail to see how 
this exchange created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice where there was testimonial and physical evidence 
indicating that the defendant previously (1) held the victim 
down at knifepoint to enable Lee to beat the victim with a 
crowbar and (2) stabbed the victim.  Whether or not the 
defendant had a knife in his hand after these actions, where it 
was not suggested that he made further use of the knife at that 
point, was unlikely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  
Thus, we conclude that neither instance of refreshed 
recollection constituted reversible error. 
4.  Plea agreement.  The defendant argues that the entry of 
the unredacted plea agreement in evidence was improper where the 
35 
 
jury were provided with evidence that Lin was required to tell 
the truth at trial and that, if the prosecutor felt he was not, 
the agreement could be revoked and Lin could then be charged 
with murder in the first degree.  The defendant also contends 
that it was improper where the unredacted signatures of the 
prosecutor and Lin's attorney may have led the jury to believe 
they were attesting to Lin's credibility.  The Commonwealth 
argues that there was no error where (1) defense counsel 
specifically requested that the plea agreement be admitted in 
evidence in its full, unredacted form; (2) the prosecutor made 
no mention of the disputed provisions in her closing; (3) there 
was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (4) the 
trial judge instructed the jury that they were the sole arbiters 
of whether Lin's testimony was truthful and that, further, the 
prosecutor was "not in a position to have any specialized 
knowledge or opinion about whether Mr. Lin's testimony [was] 
truthful."  We agree that there was no error. 
Where testimony is offered pursuant to a plea agreement, 
there is a risk that the jury may "believe that the government 
has special knowledge of the veracity of the witness's 
testimony."  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 Mass. 488, 500 (2002).  
Thus, when plea agreements are submitted in evidence, it is 
preferable for the judge to redact both the signatures of the 
attorneys and provisions indicating the agreement is contingent 
36 
 
on the witness's truthfulness, "on request by a defendant" 
(emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 262 
(1989).  See Marrero, supra at 501.  However, "in the absence of 
an objection, 'such redaction [is] not required.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 34 (2014), quoting Marrero, supra. 
The circumstances surrounding the admission of Lin's plea 
agreement share several similarities with the circumstances 
presented in Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 85, 100 (2014), in 
which we found no error.  There, as here, "not only was there no 
request for such redaction, but also trial counsel specifically 
indicated he did not want anything redacted."  Id.  Where one of 
defense counsel's primary tactics was to discredit Lin's 
testimony, the unredacted language "went to the heart of the 
defense."14  Id.  As in Roman, the judge in this case provided 
extensive instructions to the jurors cautioning them that they 
were the sole arbiters of the truthfulness of Lin's testimony, 
that the district attorney had no specialized knowledge of Lin's 
credibility, that the jury should consider whether the agreement 
was a possible incentive that would affect Lin's credibility, 
and that the jury should particularly scrutinize Lin's testimony 
 
14 Defense counsel began his closing argument as follows:  
"If you admit you had the knife, you're going to get life.  And 
Jun Di Lin knew this.  He knew this when he told this story to 
the government when he was attempting to negotiate a deal." 
37 
 
because he was an alleged accomplice.   See id. at 99 (describing 
similar instructions to jury).  There was no error here. 
5.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that several 
errors in the prosecutor's closing argument deprived him of a 
fair trial.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor variously 
improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy, vouched for Lin's 
credibility, and misstated evidence or stated facts not in 
evidence, and that the cumulative effect of these errors gives 
rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The Commonwealth contends that the prosecutor's closing argument 
was entirely proper.  The Commonwealth urges that, even if the 
prosecutor made errors in her closing argument, any errors were 
sufficiently mitigated by the judge's instructions to the jury.  
"We examine [all] the challenged statements 'in the context of 
the entire closing, the jury instructions, and the evidence 
introduced at trial.'"  Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 
159, 180 (2020), quoting Martinez, 476 Mass. at 198. 
a.  Appeal to sympathy.  The defendant asserts that the 
prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the 
victim by stating that Lin and Lee may "get less than they 
deserved," implying that, as a result, the jury should harshly 
punish the defendant to ensure some retribution for the victim.  
The Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor's statement that the 
jury should not concern themselves with the fact that Lin and 
38 
 
Lee, who may have been "equally culpable, may deserve worse than 
they may get," was proper rebuttal to defense counsel's 
assertion that Lin's testimony was fabricated in an attempt to 
get a lower sentence.  Because defense counsel did not object to 
this statement at trial, we determine whether any statements 
were improper and, if so, whether they created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Taylor, 455 Mass. at 
377. 
As discussed supra, it is improper for a prosecutor to 
"play on . . . the jury's sympathy or emotions" or "comment on 
the consequences of a verdict."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 
Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987).  However, "[a] prosecutor is entitled 
to respond to an argument made by the defense at closing."  
Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 539 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7 (1989). 
Here, defense counsel began his closing argument by 
implying that Lin's testimony was fabricated in an attempt to 
secure a lower sentence for himself.  Defense counsel stated, 
"If you admit you had the knife, you're going to get life.  And 
Jun Di Lin knew this.  He knew this when he told this story to 
the government when he was attempting to negotiate a deal."  
Defense counsel later stated, "[A]s time goes on, [Lin] figures 
out, I'm going to be in an awful lot of trouble. . . .  And then 
he decides, I'm going to get a lawyer, and I'm going to go under 
39 
 
the table to see if I can cut my deal first."  Defense counsel 
went on to detail for the jury that Lin was facing a sentence of 
life without parole for murder in the first degree, and that, in 
negotiating a plea agreement, 
"[Lin] has to tell a story that's good enough so that he 
can negotiate his deal.  And he went in there, and he got 
himself a deal. . . .  His sentencing is pending based upon 
his testimony in this case, and based upon his testimony in 
Lee's case.  If things go well, he will receive a sentence 
with a bottom number of fifteen years when he hits parole, 
and that number could be less, depending on behavior while 
you're incarcerated.  It's a pretty good deal." 
 
Defense counsel also argued throughout that the attack on the 
victim was carried out not by the defendant, but by Lee and Lin. 
The prosecutor was entitled to respond both to the argument 
that Lee and Lin were the only ones to carry out the murder and 
to the argument that Lin received a lower sentence than he 
deserved as a result of his negotiations with the Commonwealth.  
The prosecutor began by asserting, "[I]t will be clear to you 
that all three men are guilty.  But you are here, sworn, to 
decide a verdict on one man, Cheng Sun."  She then continued by 
arguing that, although others "who are equally guilty may have 
been more vicious, more violent, may have been equally culpable, 
may deserve worse than they may get, [that] should not distract 
[the jury] from judging the evidence about Cheng Sun.  [Bec]ause 
he's the one here that is on trial."  These statements were 
proper rebuttal to defense counsel's focus on Lee and Lin as the 
40 
 
perpetrators of the murder and to defense counsel's assertion 
that Lin received a greatly reduced sentence as a result of 
clever negotiating, and they were thus "within the right of 
retaliatory reply."15  Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 775 
(2018).  See Kozec, 399 Mass. at 519 (although prosecutor may 
not "fight fire with fire" and exceed proper limits of argument, 
defense counsel's argument may justify particular rebuttal). 
b.  Vouching.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor 
twice improperly vouched for Lin's credibility.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the prosecutor properly argued from 
the evidence why Lin should be believed.  Because defense 
counsel objected to what he perceived to be improper vouching 
for Lin, sought a curative instruction, and asked that the 
prosecutor's statement to the effect that "certain things have a 
ring of truth to them" be struck, "we consider whether the 
prosecutor's comments were improper and, if they were, whether 
the error was prejudicial."  Goitia, 480 Mass. at 775.  There 
was no error. 
 
15 Additionally, the judge instructed the jury that they 
"may not consider any sentencing consequences in any way in 
[their] deliberations, since that has nothing to do with [their] 
role as the judges of the facts of the case," thus mitigating 
any potential improper inference to be made from the 
prosecutor's statements.  Santiago, 425 Mass. at 495 ("trial 
judge's instructions are generally adequate to cure errors in 
the arguments"). 
41 
 
It is improper for an attorney to vouch for a witness's 
credibility.  Commonwealth v. Koumaris, 440 Mass. 405, 414 
(2003).  "However, it is permissible to comment and draw 
inferences regarding the evidence at trial," Id., and "where the 
credibility of a witness is an issue, counsel may argue from the 
evidence why a witness should be believed" (citation omitted), 
Wilkerson, 486 Mass. at 179.  "Improper vouching occurs where an 
attorney 'expresses a personal belief in the credibility of a 
witness, or indicates that he or she has knowledge independent 
of the evidence before the jury.'"  Mejia, 463 Mass. at 254, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 181 (2004). 
In the first challenged statement, the prosecutor asserted, 
"[D]espite what's been argued to you [by defense counsel, Lin's] 
testimony is reliable, and accurate, and I suggest you should 
believe it to a moral certainty."  As a preliminary matter, 
defense counsel put Lin's credibility at issue during both his 
cross-examination of him and his closing argument, suggesting 
that Lin fabricated his story to secure a favorable plea deal.  
As a result, "the prosecutor legitimately could defend the 
credibility" of Lin.  Koumaris, 440 Mass. at 414.  Additionally, 
we do not consider this statement alone, but in the context of 
the entire closing argument.  Wilkerson, 486 Mass. at 180. 
Immediately following the challenged statement, the 
prosecutor provided the reasons that the jury should believe 
42 
 
Lin's testimony, saying, "Consider all of the evidence that he 
gave."  She then extensively detailed how Lin's testimony was 
corroborated by independent evidence, including by cell tower 
information; GPS tracking data; video surveillance and 
photographs; a computer report; footprints, a hat, a knife, and 
a cord found at the scene; lack of fingerprint evidence found at 
the scene; tool marks at the scene; blood transfer at the scene; 
the injuries to the victim's body; the testimony of another 
witness, Tan; and receipts and transaction records. 
This summary of the evidence corroborating Lin's testimony 
was immediately followed by the prosecutor's second challenged 
statement, as follows: 
"Layer upon layer upon layer of objective, irrefutable 
evidence corroborates Jun Di Lin, and that's why you can 
rely on it to a moral certainty.  But there's more.  
Sometimes things just have what's called a 'ring of truth' 
to them.  Just a common sense saying.  I'm sure everyone in 
this courtroom has used that phrase, heard that phrase, 
know what it means.  It means that something just sort of 
seems right.  It makes sense." 
 
She later explained this statement by stating, "The sense I'm 
referring to is that when you ask a series of questions about 
how his testimony matches the evidence that you heard, it does, 
in fact, make sense." 
 
Placed in their proper context, it is clear that neither of 
the challenged statements constitutes improper vouching.  The 
prosecutor neither expressed a personal belief as to Lin's 
43 
 
credibility nor indicated she had knowledge independent of the 
evidence before the jury.  Instead, the prosecutor argued the 
evidence and a fair inference regarding Lin's credibility that 
could be drawn from the evidence in light of defense counsel's 
earlier attack on Lin's credibility.  Koumaris, 440 Mass. at 
414.  See Goitia, 480 Mass. at 775 (evidence presented to jury 
required them to decide between conflicting versions of events, 
and prosecutor properly could argue which version of evidence 
was more credible).  Additionally, it is clear in context that 
the prosecutor's statement referencing a "ring of truth" was 
nothing more than a suggestion that the jury should use their 
common sense in evaluating Lin's testimony in context with the 
corroborating evidence.  This was not improper.16  See Ortega, 
441 Mass. at 181 & n.18 (prosecutor suggested that if jury used 
their common sense, they would believe officers' testimony); 
Santiago, 425 Mass. at 498 (no error to tell jurors to use 
common sense where "[j]urors should use common sense to assist 
in reaching their verdict"). 
c.  Misstatements of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor made three misstatements of evidence or 
 
16 Contrary to the defendant's argument, we also find no 
error with the prosecutor's assertion that the jury could 
believe Lin's testimony "to a moral certainty."  See 
Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 304 (2009) (prosecutor's 
statement that "[t]hose people[']s corroboration are your moral 
certainty" not improper vouching). 
44 
 
statements of facts not in evidence.  Defense counsel did not 
object to these statements at trial.  Thus, we determine whether 
any statements were improper and, if so, whether they created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Taylor, 455 
Mass. at 377.  Although "counsel may argue the evidence and the 
fair inferences which can be drawn from the evidence," 
Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 378 (1978), "a prosecutor 
should not . . . misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in 
evidence," Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516.  "Arguments that are 
unsupported by the evidence and thus are speculative and 
conjectural are, of course, improper."  Id. at 522, citing 
Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 853 (1984), and others.  
"References to facts not in the record or misstatements of the 
evidence have been treated as serious errors where the 
misstatement may have prejudiced the defendant."  Santiago, 425 
Mass. at 499-500. 
First, the defendant argues that the prosecutor mistakenly 
stated that Lin knew that dispatch could track his taxicab at 
times, and thus he would not have used his taxicab the night of 
the killing had he known that the defendant and Lee were 
planning to commit a crime.  The Commonwealth asserts that Lin 
testified that the taxicab company would be "aware if [he] 
picked up [a] customer" and "would be able to track [his] 
movements as to where [he] drove that customer" and the 
45 
 
prosecutor said only that Lin knew the company could track the 
taxicab "at times."17  Lin testified that he knew that "the 
[taxicab] company could track [his] route if [he] turned the 
meter on" and also that the company could know where the taxicab 
was if he was logged in as the driver.  He also testified that 
he did not know whether the company could track his taxicab when 
the meter was off.  Thus, the evidence tended to show that Lin 
was aware the company could track the taxicab when the meter was 
on, but not whether it could track the taxicab when the meter 
was off.  In other words, he was aware that, "at times," i.e., 
when the meter was on, the company could track the taxicab.  
Although the inference that Lin was aware the company could 
track the taxicab's movements at times did "not . . . flow[] 
inevitably from the evidence," the prosecutor's statement "asked 
the jury to draw an inference that was 'reasonable and 
possible.'"  Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 58 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 452 (1993). 
 
17 The prosecutor stated, in relevant part:  "Why is [Lin] 
there -- if he knew that this robbery was going to take place, 
not even the murder, that they gratuitously engage in, that he 
knew that a robbery was going to take place, why does he get rid 
of his personal car, pick up his cab, that has a Garmin, that 
has GPS in it?  He knows dispatch can track it at times.  It's 
custom painted in multiple colors.  And it's got his individual 
hackney license, 513, painted and emblazoned on its front, on 
its back, and on the side of the cab." 
46 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor also misstated the 
evidence when she purportedly asserted that the defendant "took 
no steps to protect [the victim] from Lee's attack."  The 
Commonwealth asserts that the prosecutor properly argued that, 
where the defendant took some steps to protect the victim from 
Lee's attack, his actions were motivated by his desire to gain 
access to the safe, not to safeguard the victim's health.  The 
prosecutor did not misstate the evidence. 
Prior to making the challenged statement, the prosecutor 
correctly stated that the evidence showed injuries to the 
defendant's hands that were consistent with his trying to stop 
Lee from beating the victim.  She also stated that the defendant 
pleaded with Lee to stop.  She then went on to argue what 
inferences could be drawn from those actions in light of all the 
evidence.  Defense counsel had argued that the defendant's 
actions showed withdrawal from the criminal enterprise.  In 
response, the prosecutor countered that, considering the 
evidence that the defendant acted as he did amidst his ongoing 
efforts to get the victim to open the safe, the defendant's 
actions were not motivated by an intent to withdraw or 
altruistically protect the victim, but were "a calculated move 
to ensure that [the victim] is able to get the money that he's 
gone there to steal.  That's what that is."  Thus, placed in the 
context of the closing argument as a whole, the prosecutor's 
47 
 
statement was within the bounds of proper argument.  Mazariego, 
474 Mass. at 57 (prosecutor permitted to make arguments to 
assist jury in analyzing evidence and to suggest conclusions 
they should draw from evidence). 
Finally, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor 
improperly stated that, before Lin entered the restaurant, the 
defendant and Lee told him that someone was inside.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the prosecutor merely identified 
occasions when Lin was not in a position to see what the 
defendant and Lee were doing when she stated, "[The defendant 
and Lee] go into the restaurant and somehow have learned, and 
state their knowledge, that there's a man inside.  Jun Di Lin 
wasn't with them," and the defendant knew the victim was inside 
where he armed himself with a weapon before entering the 
restaurant.  This statement was improper. 
Lin testified that, prior to entering the restaurant, the 
defendant and Lee told him that no one was inside, and that 
assertion informed his decision to agree to go into the 
restaurant with them.  On further questioning, Lin confirmed 
that he "had no information that there was someone else inside 
the restaurant before [he] went in the restaurant."  Lin had 
previously testified that the defendant and Lee only informed 
him that someone was inside after they had already entered the 
restaurant and after Lin had heard a scream coming from another 
48 
 
room.  There is no evidentiary support for the argument that, 
prior to entering the restaurant, the defendant and Lee 
"state[d] their knowledge" that a man was inside.  Although not 
challenged below or on appeal, we likewise conclude that there 
was no support for the prosecutor's statement, "[S]omehow [the 
defendant and Lee] know there's a man inside.  And I believe you 
can reasonably infer from that they had to have been in the 
restaurant to know that."18 
Although improper, the misstatements were limited to the 
collateral issue of whether Lin, Lee, or the defendant knew 
there was a person in the restaurant before they went inside.19  
Additionally, the judge instructed the jury three times -- at 
the beginning of trial, before closing arguments, and during the 
charge to the jury -- that closing arguments are not evidence.  
 
18 It would have been preferable for the prosecutor to 
refrain from using the language, "I believe."  In context, 
however, it is clear that she was arguing what inference was 
reasonable from what she incorrectly thought was the evidence, 
rather than improperly "express[ing] a personal belief in the 
credibility of a witness, or indicat[ing] that . . . she ha[d] 
knowledge independent of the evidence before the jury" (citation 
omitted).  Mejia, 463 Mass. at 254. 
 
19 Where the defendant was convicted on theories of felony-
murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty but not deliberate 
premeditation, prior knowledge that someone was in the 
restaurant was not relevant to either theory pursuant to which 
the defendant was convicted.  See supra for a discussion of the 
elements the Commonwealth had to prove to convict the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder or 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
49 
 
"[W]e must and do recognize that closing argument is identified 
as argument, the jury understand[] that, instructions from the 
judge inform the jury that closing argument is not evidence, and 
instructions may mitigate any [potentially improper impact from] 
the final argument."  Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517.  "A certain 
measure of jury sophistication in sorting out excessive claims 
on both sides fairly may be assumed."  Id.  In the context of an 
otherwise proper closing argument, where the misstatements went 
only to a collateral issue, and where the jury were repeatedly 
instructed that closing arguments are not evidence, we do not 
see how the misstatements made a difference in the jury's 
conclusion or created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
this court to exercise its discretionary authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict to either murder in the 
second degree or manslaughter.  The defendant contends that 
sustaining a verdict of murder in the first degree would 
constitute a miscarriage of justice where the defendant did not 
participate in the killing of the victim and never intended to 
injure or kill the victim.  Additionally, the defendant asks us 
to reduce the verdict where he could not have been convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder had his 
trial commenced after this court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
50 
 
Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 825, 832-833 (2017) (Gants, C.J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), which abolished 
the common-law felony-murder doctrine.  In effect, the defendant 
asks this court to apply Brown's holding retroactively to this 
case. 
First, this court made clear in Brown that its abolition of 
the common-law felony-murder rule was "prospective, applying 
only to cases where trial begins after" the date of the opinion.  
Brown, 477 Mass. at 834 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  Thus, we 
will not entertain the defendant's request to apply Brown's 
holding retroactively to this case.  Further, to do so would be 
inconsequential where, in addition to being convicted of murder 
in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, the 
defendant was also convicted on the theory of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty -- a theory that remains legally valid today, G. L. 
c. 265, § 1, and where there was sufficient evidence of malice,20 
as required for a felony-murder conviction today.  Finally, as 
discussed supra, the defendant participated in the killing.  
After a thorough review of the record, we discern no reason to 
exercise our authority under § 33E to reduce the verdict. 
 
20 As discussed supra, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
evidence that the defendant possessed the third prong of malice, 
an intent "to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain 
and strong likelihood that death would follow."  Watson, 487 
Mass. at 164. 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.