Title: State v. Jackson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7469.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7469 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JACKSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7469.] 
Criminal law—Final, appealable order—Multiple counts in an indictment—Any 
dismissal of a count in an indictment resolves that count—Judgment of 
conviction on remaining counts is a final, appealable order. 
(No. 2016-0782—Submitted June 6, 2017—Decided September 7, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 103035, 
2016-Ohio-704. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we clarify that which we believe is already clear—any 
dismissal of a count in an indictment resolves that count and does not prevent a 
judgment of conviction from being final and appealable.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing appellee Andrew L. Jackson’s 
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appeal for lack of a final and appealable order, we reinstate Jackson’s appeal, and 
we remand the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Jackson was indicted on two counts of kidnapping under R.C. 
2905.01(A)(2), two counts of aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), and 
one count of grand theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).  The indictment also included 
firearm and forfeiture specifications for each count. 
{¶ 3} Jackson pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.  The 
jury returned a verdict of guilty on the grand-theft count and aggravated-robbery 
counts; however, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the kidnapping counts.  
The jury found Jackson not guilty of all firearm specifications.  The forfeiture 
specifications were not submitted to the jury or to the court because Jackson 
stipulated at trial that he forfeited any right, title, interest, or claim to the handgun 
introduced as an exhibit at trial. 
{¶ 4} After the trial court declared a mistrial on the kidnapping counts, the 
state orally moved to dismiss those counts against Jackson.  The trial court granted 
the state’s unopposed motion. 
{¶ 5} At sentencing, the trial court found that the grand-theft count and one 
count of aggravated robbery were allied offenses and merged those two counts.  
The court sentenced Jackson to a six-year term of incarceration on each aggravated-
robbery count to be served concurrently.  The trial court entered judgment on the 
convictions and included in the judgment entry the dismissal of the kidnapping 
counts. 
{¶ 6} Jackson appealed his judgment of conviction.  The court of appeals, 
sua sponte, dismissed Jackson’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable order after it 
determined that the trial court had dismissed the kidnapping counts without 
prejudice.  2016-Ohio-704 at ¶ 5, 11.  Relying on its precedent in State v. Cole, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88722, 2007-Ohio-3076, ¶ 8, and Fairview Park v. Fleming, 
January Term, 2017 
 
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8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 77323 and 77324, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5714 (Dec.7, 
2000), the appellate court held that “in a criminal case, a dismissal without 
prejudice does not constitute a final order under R.C. 2505.02 or Crim.R. 48.” 2016 
Ohio-704 at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 7} The state filed a motion for reconsideration and moved to certify a 
conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Manns, 5th 
Dist. Richland No. 11-CA-28, 2012-Ohio-234.  Jackson supported the state’s 
motion for reconsideration but opposed the state’s motion to certify a conflict.  The 
appellate court denied the state’s motions. 
{¶ 8} We initially declined to accept the state’s appeal for review.  146 Ohio 
St.3d 1492, 2016-Ohio-5585, 57 N.E.3d 1171.  However, the state filed a motion 
for reconsideration and, upon further review, we granted that motion and accepted 
the jurisdictional appeal on the state’s sole proposition of law: “For purposes of 
Crim.R. 32(C), any dismissal of a count disposes of that count for the purposes of 
determining if the criminal conviction is a final appealable order.”  See 147 Ohio 
St.3d 1439, 2016-Ohio-7677, 63 N.E.3d 157. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 9} The issue before us is whether a dismissal without prejudice of a count 
in a multicount indictment prevents the judgment of conviction on the remaining 
counts from being a final, appealable order.  We hold that a judgment of conviction 
is a final, appealable order if it complies with Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Lester, 
130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 14, and that counts that 
are dismissed are resolved and do not prevent the judgment of conviction from 
being final and appealable. 
{¶ 10} Pursuant to Crim.R. 48(A), “[t]he state may by leave of court and in 
open court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint 
and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate.”  (Emphasis added).  Similar to R.C. 
2945.67(A), the rule does not distinguish between dismissals with or without 
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prejudice—upon any dismissal, the prosecution shall terminate.  See State v. Craig, 
116 Ohio St.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-5752, 876 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 13; Manns, 2012-Ohio-
234 at ¶ 17.  Therefore, a dismissed count has been resolved in that proceeding.  
See State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 127 Ohio St.3d 
29, 2010-Ohio-4728, 936 N.E.2d 41, ¶ 2; State ex rel. Rose v. McGinty, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 371, 2011-Ohio-761, 944 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 11} A judgment of conviction qualifies as a final order under R.C. 
2505.02(B).  State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, 
¶ 9.  In Lester, we held that “a judgment of conviction is a final order * * * when 
the judgment entry sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the 
judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by 
the clerk.”  130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 14.  We 
have also held that a valid judgment of conviction requires a full resolution of any 
counts for which there were convictions.  See Davis at ¶ 2; McGinty at ¶ 3.  A valid 
judgment of conviction does not “ ‘require a reiteration of those counts and 
specifications for which there were no convictions, but were resolved in other ways, 
such as dismissals, nolled counts, or not guilty findings.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  
Davis at ¶ 2, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93814, 2010-Ohio-1066, ¶ 8; McGinty at ¶ 3. 
{¶ 12} In the case before us, the Eighth District concluded that Jackson’s 
appeal was not a final, appealable order because the dismissals without prejudice 
of the kidnapping counts were “not a final determination” of the parties’ rights.  
2016-Ohio-704 at ¶ 11.  The Eighth District held that for Jackson’s judgment of 
conviction to be final and appealable, the state would need to dismiss the 
kidnapping counts with prejudice or proceed to trial on those counts.  Id. at ¶ 13.  
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied on several decisions that are 
no longer good law after our opinion in Craig, 116 Ohio St.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-
5752, 876 N.E.2d 957, and that predated our opinions in Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2017 
 
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197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163; Davis, 127 Ohio St.3d 29, 2010-Ohio-4728, 
936 N.E.2d 41; McGinty, 128 Ohio St.3d 371, 2011-Ohio-761, 944 N.E.2d 672; 
and Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142.  See 2016-Ohio-
704 at ¶ 9-13. 
{¶ 13} Here, the trial court, in its judgment entry, terminated the kidnapping 
counts by dismissing them.  Crim.R. 48(A).  Pursuant to Davis and McGinty, the 
dismissed counts, regardless of whether they were dismissed with or without 
prejudice, do not prevent the judgment of conviction from being final and 
appealable.  Furthermore, the trial court’s judgment entry complied with Crim.R. 
32(C): (1) the entry set forth that Jackson was found guilty of two counts of 
aggravated robbery and one count of grand theft and that the grand-theft count 
merged with one of the aggravated-robbery counts; (2) the trial court sentenced 
Jackson to a six-year term of incarceration on both aggravated-robbery counts to 
be served concurrently; (3) the judge signed the entry; and (4) the clerk time 
stamped the entry indicating that it had been entered upon the journal.  Because the 
judgment of conviction complied with Crim.R. 32(C) and the dismissed kidnapping 
counts were resolved, the judgment was a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 14} To affirm the decision below could either prevent the state from 
exercising some of its discretionary authority or empower the state to delay or deny 
a convicted person’s opportunity to be heard on appeal.  For example, under the 
appellate court’s reasoning, if the state wanted to avoid delaying an appeal, the state 
would have to move to dismiss with prejudice the kidnapping counts.  This option 
would force the state to make a hasty decision and forego its discretion to reindict 
Jackson in order to enable an appeal.  Alternatively, the state could move to dismiss 
without prejudice the kidnapping counts and then move to immediately reindict and 
retry Jackson on those same counts.  With this scenario, however, the state would 
lose the opportunity to investigate those counts further and to exercise its 
reasonable discretion in the timing of reindicting Jackson.  The state’s final option 
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could be to move to dismiss without prejudice the kidnapping counts and, if the 
trial court granted that motion, do nothing further.  The state then would be 
empowered, in this type of situation, to let Jackson languish without any 
opportunity to be heard on appeal until the statute of limitations on the kidnapping 
counts expires.  Any of these choices would either unreasonably empower the state 
or deny it the discretion to which it is entitled.  Both results are unreasonable and 
unlawful. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals’ decision, if allowed to stand, would effectively 
stay appellate review of Jackson’s judgment of conviction and six-year sentence 
for the aggravated-robbery counts until the state either sought a new indictment or 
the 20-year statute of limitations for the dismissed kidnapping counts expired.  See 
R.C. 2901.13(A)(3)(a) and 2905.01(A)(2).  In the meantime, Jackson would stand 
as a convicted felon with all of the disabilities that flow from that status and with 
no means to exercise his right to an appeal. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 16} The prosecution of the kidnapping counts terminated once the trial 
court dismissed those counts.  The dismissal of the kidnapping counts did not 
prevent the judgment of conviction from being a final, appealable order.  Because 
the judgment of conviction complied with Crim.R. 32(C) and Lester, 130 Ohio 
St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 14, it was a final, appealable 
order.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals.  We reinstate Jackson’s appeal, and we remand the cause to the appellate 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2017 
 
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Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van and John F. Hirschauer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Nee Law Firm, L.L.C., and Matthew M. Nee, for appellee. 
Russell S. Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Cullen G. 
Sweeney and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
_________________