Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES DAVIS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 8, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121668  
CHARLES DAVIS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
This case presents the question whether defendant may be  
convicted twice of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, one conviction  
being based on the theft from the driver of the vehicle and  
the other conviction being based on the theft of the same  
vehicle from the passenger.  We hold that defendant committed  
only one carjacking offense.  Accordingly, we reverse in part  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate one of  
defendant’s two carjacking convictions.  
I  
On the afternoon of August 24, 1999, Coy Anderson drove  
his automobile to his sister’s house.  Tiara Hughes was a  
passenger in the automobile. Anderson parked his car in the  
street and walked to his sister’s house, while Hughes remained  
in the car.  Anderson left the keys in the ignition and the  
motor running.  As Anderson returned to his car, defendant  
approached Anderson’s car, pointed a gun at Anderson and  
warned him to get back, then pointed the gun at Hughes and  
told her to leave the car.  Anderson and Hughes complied.  
Defendant entered Anderson’s car and drove away. A n d e r s o n   
estimated that he was never closer than twelve to fifteen feet  
from defendant.  
A jury convicted defendant on two counts of carjacking,  
MCL 750.529a, and one count of possession of a firearm during  
the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.  Defendant was  
sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 120 to 240 months  
for the carjacking convictions and to the mandatory two-year  
consecutive term 
for 
the 
felony-firearm 
conviction.  The Court  
of Appeals affirmed. 250 Mich App 589; 649 NW2d 118 (2002).  
II  
This case requires us to consider the meaning of MCL  
750.529a.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that  
we review de novo.  Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich  
57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002); Crowe v Detroit, 465 Mich 1, 6;  
631 NW2d 293 (2001).  
III  
The goal of judicial interpretation of a statute is to  
2  
 
 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  
People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002).  To  
accomplish this objective, we begin by examining the language  
of the statute.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, “no  
further construction is necessary or allowed to expand what  
the Legislature clearly intended to cover.”  Id. 
Stated  
another way, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous  
statute that is not within the manifest intent of the  
Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.”  
Roberts, supra at 63.1  
Michigan’s carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a, provides:  
(1) A person who by force or violence, or by 
threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear 
robs, steals, or takes a motor vehicle as defined 
in section 412 from another person, in the presence 
of that person or the presence of a passenger or in 
the presence of any other person in lawful  
possession of the motor vehicle, is guilty of 
carjacking, a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
life or for any term of years.  
(2)  A sentence imposed for a violation of 
this section may be imposed to run consecutively to 
any other sentence imposed for a conviction that 
arises out of the same transaction.  
A straightforward reading of this language shows that the  
conduct to which the statute applies is the taking of a motor  
vehicle under certain circumstances.  Those circumstances  
1  The analysis of the Court of Appeals relies in part on 
a Senate legislative analysis.  Such a legislative analysis is 
generally not a persuasive tool of statutory interpretation. 
See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 
587 n 7; 624 NW2d 180 (2001).  
3  
 
include the nature of the taking and from whom the motor  
vehicle is taken.2
 The core and focus of the offense,  
however, are the taking of a motor vehicle.  Because defendant  
took one motor vehicle, the language of the carjacking statute  
allows only one carjacking conviction.  
It is clear that defendant committed the offense of  
carjacking when, in order to steal Anderson’s car, he forced  
Hughes at gunpoint to get out of the car.  Defendant used a  
threat of force or violence directed at Hughes, who was a  
passenger in the car, to steal the car.  While the elements of  
the carjacking offense might also be based on the threat  
defendant directed at Anderson, it is unnecessary to decide  
whether the facts regarding Anderson also establish a  
carjacking, because only one motor vehicle was taken.  
In concluding that defendant committed two carjacking  
offenses, the Court of Appeals reasoned in part that both  
Anderson and Hughes suffered a loss of transportation.  While  
that is true, the language of the carjacking statute does not  
identify “loss of transportation” as an element of the  
offense.
 In effect, the Court of Appeals expanded the  
language of the statute. Our Legislature could have made it  
2  Carjacking must be (1) “by force or violence, or by 
threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear” and (2) 
must be “from another person, in the presence of that person 
or the presence of a passenger or in the presence of any other 
person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle . . . .”  MCL  
750.529a.  
4  
 
 
 
 
a crime to deprive a person of transportation, but it did not.  
Similarly, the fact that both Anderson and Hughes were  
threatened does not mean that there were two carjackings.3  
IV  
The carjacking statute is structured in a manner similar  
to the armed robbery statute, MCL 750.529,4 but the focus of  
the armed robbery statute is significantly different.  The  
focus of the armed robbery statute is on the person assaulted.  
The nature of the assault and the conduct accompanying the  
assault are then further defined by the statute.  This  
perspective explains the decision in People v Wakeford, 418  
Mich 95; 341 NW2d 68 (1983), in which the defendant, who took  
property from two employees of a grocery store, was properly  
3  The Court of Appeals noted that a similar California 
carjacking statute was found to support multiple convictions 
where only one vehicle was stolen.  People v Hamilton, 40 Cal 
App 4th 1137; 47 Cal Rptr 2d 343 (1995).  While it is  
unnecessary to distinguish the California decision because we 
are interpreting the language of the Michigan carjacking 
statute, we note that the California decision, like the Court 
of Appeals decision, recognized that all occupants of a 
carjacked vehicle suffer a loss of transportation.  
4  MCL 750.529 provides in relevant part:  
Any person who shall assault another, and 
shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his 
person, or in his presence, any money or other 
property, which may be the subject of larceny, such 
robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any 
article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the  
person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be 
a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 
life or for any term of years.  
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convicted of two counts of armed robbery.  
In contrast, 
the 
carjacking 
statute 
focuses on the taking  
of a particular type of property, a motor vehicle, rather than  
on the person from whom the property is taken.  In terms of  
the language used in Wakeford, for armed robbery the  
appropriate focus is the person assaulted and robbed, while  
the appropriate focus for carjacking is the stolen vehicle.  
V  
Defendant’s presentation raises four other issues, the  
first of which is a double jeopardy5 challenge to his multiple  
convictions for carjacking.  Given that we have determined  
that the carjacking statute does not permit multiple charges  
arising from a single carjacking, it is unnecessary to reach  
defendant’s double jeopardy argument.  
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals that  
defendant’s claim that improper prosecutorial comments denied  
him a fair trial is meritless.  Further, because we have  
vacated one of defendant’s carjacking convictions, and  
defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit,  
defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of his  
particular claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
Defendant further contends that he is entitled to be  
resentenced if one of his carjacking convictions is vacated.  
5  US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  
6  
We find no reason to remand for resentencing.  Rescoring of  
the guidelines 
to 
reflect 
only 
one carjacking conviction would  
result in the same recommendation under the guidelines.  
Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the  
sentencing judge, who imposed identical concurrent sentences,  
viewed defendant’s criminal episode as a single event, and  
sentenced defendant accordingly.  No reason exists to believe  
that defendant’s convictions on two counts of carjacking  
rather than one affected either sentence.  
VI  
Accordingly, 
we 
vacate 
one 
of 
defendant’s 
convictions 
and  
the related sentence.  In all other respects we affirm the  
decision of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
KELLY, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Marilyn Kelly  
7