Title: DEMEULENAERE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DEMEULENAERE v. STATE2000 WY 10995 P.2d 132Case Number: 99-107Decided: 01/26/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

TYRONE GERALD DEMEULENAERE,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

W.R.A.P. 11 Certification from the 
District Court of Teton County

Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge

Representing Appellant:

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public 
Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellant Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument 
presented by Mr. Roden.

Representing Appellee:

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Robin Sessions Cooley; Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Devon O'Connell Coleman, 
Student Director.  Argument 
presented by Ms. Coleman.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ. 

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This 
matter comes before the Court as a question certified to us by the district 
court for resolution un der W.R.A.P. 11.  The appellant is Tyrone Gerald 
Demeulenaere (appellant) and the appellee is the State of Wyoming (State).  
As rephrased by this Court, the question to be decided is: 

 
Whether justice court convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance [under Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) as that 
statute existed between 1985 and 1995] before the statute was amended can be 
used to enhance the penalty for possession of a controlled substance in District 
Court under [Wyo. Stat.] § 35-7-1031(c)[(i) (Michie 1998 
Supp.)]? 

 
[¶2]      We 
answer the certified question in the affirmative and remand to the district 
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
FACTS

 
[¶3]      In 
accordance with W.R.A.P. 11.03(b), the district court provided this statement of 
all facts relevant to the question certified:

 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for 
arraignment on February 19, 1999.  The defendant was charged by information 
in Teton County Justice Court with, among other things, possession of a 
controlled substance, in violation of W.S.  § 35-7-103(c)(i)(C).  In 
the information in Justice Court and in District Court, the defendant was given 
notice that he is subject to enhanced penalties on a conviction of possession of 
a controlled substance, as is provided under § 35-7-1031(c)(i) in that the 
defendant had three separate prior convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance in Teton County Justice Court on June 3, 1993, June 17, 1993, 
September 23, 1993 and September 1, 1994.  After a preliminary hearing the 
defendant was bound over to stand trial in District Court.  During the 
arraignment in District Court, the defendant indicated that he should not be 
subject to the enhanced penalty for the reason that § 35-7-1031(c)(i) provides 
that [a]ny person convicted for a third or subsequent offense under this 
paragraph shall be imprisoned for a term not more than five (5) years, fined not 
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.'  The defendant 
argued that § 35-7-1031(c)(i) has been amended since the defendant's original 
convictions in Justice Court:  therefore, the defendant has never been 
convicted under this paragraph' as alleged in the information.  The 
undisputed facts are that Demeulenaere was convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance before the statute was amended.
  
APPLICABLE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS

 
[¶4]      At 
the time of his 1993 and 1994 convictions, Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) (Michie 
1988) provided: 
(c)  It is unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or 
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or except as otherwise authorized by this act.  Any person who violates 
this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00), or both.  Any person convicted for a third or subsequent offense 
under this subsection shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not more 
than five (5) years, fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or 
both.

 
[¶5]      As 
applicable to the offense that is the subject of this certified question, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LEXIS 1999) now provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
(c)  It is unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or 
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or except as otherwise authorized by this act.  Any person who violates 
this subsection:

 
(i)  And has in his possession a 
controlled substance in the amount set forth in this paragraph is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than twelve (12) months, a 
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both.  Any 
person convicted for a third or subsequent offense under this paragraph shall be 
imprisoned for a term not more than five (5) years, fined not more than five 
thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.

 

 
DISCUSSION

 
[¶6]      The 
gist of the appellant's argument is that any enhancement of the penalty for a 
third or subsequent conviction of possession of a controlled substance must be 
premised on convictions for possession of a controlled substance obtained under 
the most recent amendments to § 35-7-1031(c).  The conclusion the appellant 
asks us to reach is that his 1993 and 1994 convictions may not serve to enhance 
his penalty because they were not obtained under the most recent version of that 
statute.  Continuing, the appellant contends that if the Court adheres to 
its well-established principles of statutory construction and governing case 
law, we are required to answer the question in the negative, i.e., in a manner 
favoring the appellant.

 
[¶7]      In 
response, the State contends that those same principles of statutory 
construction and governing case law require that we conclude that convictions 
for possession of controlled substances, such as those obtained against the 
appellant in 1993 and 1994, can serve to enhance punishment under the most 
recent version of § 35-7-1031(c).

 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
[¶8]      The 
fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain, if possible, what 
the legislature intended by the language it used.  We begin with an inquiry 
into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature, 
according to the manner in which those words are arranged.  Farmer v. 
Department of Transportation, 986 P.2d 165, 166 (Wyo. 1999).  If the 
legislative pronouncements are written in unambiguous terms, then we are bound 
by those words.  Moreover, we construe the statute as a whole, giving 
effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts 
of the statute in pari materia.  Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo. 1999).

 
[¶9]      
Appellant relies in significant part on our holding in State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 741-742 (Wyo. 1983), where we held 
that Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-5-233(e) and 31-7-127, as they were formulated at that 
time, would not permit the courts or the Motor Vehicle Division to rely on 
"driving while under the influence"(DWUI) convictions from other jurisdictions, 
or convictions had under a municipal ordinance, for the purpose of enhancing the 
penalty for that offense.  The basis for that holding was that those 
statutes were unambiguous in providing that only convictions resulting from a 
violation of § 31-5-233 were to be considered in enhancement of penalty or 
revocation of a driver's license.  Although instructive in the 
consideration of the issues raised in this matter, that case is not dispositive 
because in the Holtz case it was unambiguous that only convictions under 
the DWUI statute could be considered for enhancement of penalty. That statute 
has been revised a dozen times over the last 20 years, and the legislature 
appears to have remedied the flaw we identified in the Holtz case.  
In this case, the State does not seek to use prior convictions that are external 
to the statute.  The question here is whether the amended statute's 
reference to prior convictions can include convictions obtained under a prior 
version of that statute.

 
[¶10]   The State's argument 
relies in significant part on our holding in Fall v. State, 963 P.2d 981 
(Wyo. 1998).  That case is also instructive here, but as with Holtz, 
it is not dispositive.  In Fall, we held that adoption of the 
appellants' statutory construction argument would have rendered meaningless the 
statute at issue there.  963 P.2d  at 983-84.  In the instant case, 
that principle of statutory construction is not directly applicable because if 
we were to adopt this appellant's argument, it would not have the effect of 
rendering the statute meaningless.

 
[¶11]   Appellant also 
contends that our construction of § 35-7-1031(c)(i) must be tempered by the 
general rule that ambiguity in penal statutes must be resolved in favor of 
lenity.  Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 224, (Wyo. 1997).  
That rule, of course, presupposes the existence of ambiguity.  Matter of 
ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 1992).  Since our holding will be that 
there is no ambiguity insofar as this case is concerned, that principle of 
statutory construction does not apply.

 
[¶12]   A comparison of § 
35-7-1031 as it existed prior to 1995, and its current form, reveals that the 
amendments enacted in 1995 served principally to more clearly distinguish mere 
possession of a controlled substance from possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver.  In 1993 and 1994, it is possible that appellant 
could have been charged with possession with intent to deliver no matter how 
much (or little) of a listed controlled substance he possessed.  After the 
1995 amendment, possession of a controlled substance is the only appropriate 
criminal charge if the amount possessed is less than the amount set out in § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(A),(B),(C),(D),(E), and (F).  Thus, the amendment to the 
statute favors the appellant in that sense.  Moreover, it is apparent that 
all of appellant's prior convictions would be as valid under the revised statute 
as they were in 1993 and 1994.  In all other respects, § 35-7-1031(c)(i), 
as it currently appears, is substantively identical to the preceding version of 
that statute, except that the words have been arranged into a paragraph and 
subparagraph, rather than a single paragraph.  See State v. 
Sundling, 248 Neb. 732, 538 N.W.2d 749, 751-52 (1995).  Thus, we find 
no ambiguity in the statute.  T he legislative intent is clear that prior 
convictions under the earlier version of § 35-7-1031(c) may be used to enhance 
the penalty under its current version.

 
CONCLUSION

 
[¶13]   Based on the 
reasoning set out above, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and 
remand this matter to the district court for trial of the appellant as currently 
charged.