Title: State v. Media DeLao

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 49 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1638-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Media DeLao,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 132 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 304, 629 N.W.2d 825 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 7, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis Flynn   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2002 WI 49 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1638-CR 
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 496) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Media DeLao,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 7, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that reversed Media DeLao's convictions and remanded her case 
for a new trial.1  The State argues that the court of appeals 
erred in determining that the State violated its discovery 
obligations when it failed to disclose before trial oral 
statements made by DeLao.  In addition, the State asserts that 
                                                 
1 See State v. DeLao, 2001 WI App 132, 246 Wis. 2d 304, 629 
N.W.2d 825 (reversing and remanding a judgment and an order of 
the Circuit Court for Racine County, Dennis J. Flynn, Judge.  
DeLao was convicted for obstructing an officer, harboring or 
aiding a felon, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun). 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
2 
 
even if it violated its discovery obligations, it did so for 
good cause, and DeLao was not prejudiced by the admission of her 
statements. 
¶2 
We determine that the State violated its discovery 
obligations 
under 
the 
criminal 
discovery 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) 
(1999-2000),2 
when 
it 
failed 
to 
disclose DeLao's oral statements before her trial began.  In 
addition, we conclude that the State failed to show good cause 
for its violation and that DeLao was prejudiced by the 
subsequent admission of her statements.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals decision.3 
I 
¶3 
DeLao's boyfriend, Desmond Stalsberg, was a suspect in 
a May 31, 1999 robbery of a grocery store, along with another 
man, John Sabala.  Detective James Prioletta of the City of 
Racine Police Department carried out the follow-up investigation 
of the robbery. 
¶4 
One week after the robbery, Stalsberg and Sabala got 
into a fight while at DeLao's house.  Stalsberg fired shots at 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 DeLao asks that we address two other issues not decided by 
the court of appeals.  She asserts that the circuit court erred 
in (1) allowing the State to amend the information after the 
close of evidence and (2) failing to make a complete record of 
events surrounding jury deliberations.  Because we agree with 
the court of appeals that DeLao is entitled to a new trial based 
upon the State's discovery violation, we need not address these 
two issues. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
3 
 
Sabala as Sabala fled the house.  Investigator Doug Chaussee of 
the 
Mount 
Pleasant 
Police 
Department 
was 
the 
central 
investigator assigned to the shooting, and he interviewed DeLao 
at her home on the day of the incident.  She initially denied 
involvement with the shooting or knowledge of Stalsberg's 
whereabouts.  However, when Chaussee interviewed her again that 
night, she admitted that she had been present during the 
shooting and that Stalsberg had directed her to help him clean 
up the crime scene.  She told Chaussee that she was afraid and 
that Stalsberg was "acting crazy." 
¶5 
The State filed a criminal complaint against DeLao 
alleging, among other counts, that she obstructed an officer and 
harbored or aided a felon.4  The charges against her were 
connected with her conduct after the shooting.  The State 
alleged that she misled the police and cleaned up or sanitized 
the crime scene. 
¶6 
Sometime after Investigator Chaussee interviewed DeLao 
about the shooting, he told Detective Prioletta that DeLao may 
have information about the robbery.  Prioletta interviewed DeLao 
on June 28, 1999, while she was in custody, and he took notes on 
                                                 
4 DeLao was also charged with two counts of possession of a 
short-barreled 
shotgun 
or 
rifle 
and 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia.  She was acquitted of the harboring or aiding 
count as originally charged under Wis. Stat. § 946.47(1)(b), but 
at trial the State amended the information to include a 
harboring or aiding charge under § 946.47(1)(a) for which she 
was convicted. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
4 
 
her oral statements.5  The focus of his inquiry was on the 
robbery investigation. 
¶7 
Prior to trial and pursuant to § 971.23(1)(b), DeLao 
filed a discovery demand requesting that the State provide her 
with written summaries of any oral statements she made.  Her 
trial was to begin on Tuesday, July 27, 1999.  On Sunday, July 
25, Investigator Chaussee spoke with Detective Prioletta, who 
informed Chaussee of DeLao's statements, which indicated that 
she was not afraid of Stalsberg. 
¶8 
The trial proceeded as scheduled, and during DeLao's 
opening statement, her attorney told the jury that DeLao would 
testify and explain that she acted out of fear of Stalsberg.  
Her attorney said that DeLao's case could be summed up in one 
word, "survival," and concluded the opening statement with an 
acknowledgement that DeLao lied to police but did what she did 
because she was afraid. 
¶9 
After the State rested its case in chief on the second 
day of trial, the prosecutor informed the circuit court of 
DeLao's statements to Detective Prioletta.  Indicating that the 
State intended to use the statements to impeach DeLao, the 
prosecutor explained that although Investigator Chaussee knew of 
DeLao's statements before the trial began, the prosecutor had 
not learned of them until that morning.   
                                                 
5 Detective Prioletta testified that he interviewed DeLao on 
June 28, but the court of appeals decision states the date as 
June 29.  The exact date is unimportant for purposes of our 
decision. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 DeLao objected to the admissibility of the statements, 
arguing that the State violated the criminal discovery statute.  
After the circuit court overruled her objection, she moved for a 
mistrial.  Her counsel explained that DeLao's decision to 
testify had depended on the information the State provided 
before trial.  Because DeLao's theory of defense was coercion, 
it was her position that it would be prejudicial to allow the 
State to cross-examine her based on undisclosed statements that 
indicated she was not afraid of Stalsberg.  At the same time, 
counsel noted, if DeLao failed to take the stand contrary to 
what the defense promised, "then I have basically lied to the 
jury." 
¶11 Denying DeLao's motion for a mistrial, the circuit 
court disagreed that the statements would be prejudicial, and 
the State proceeded to cross-examine DeLao using the statements.  
After DeLao testified, the State called Detective Prioletta to 
the witness stand as part of its rebuttal case.  He testified 
that when he spoke with DeLao, she never expressed any fear of 
Stalsberg. 
¶12 In its closing argument, the State maintained that 
DeLao's statements to Detective Prioletta were inconsistent with 
her coercion defense.  The jury found DeLao guilty, and she 
appealed. 
¶13 Reversing DeLao's conviction, the court of appeals 
determined that the State violated its discovery obligations.  
In addition, the court determined that the State failed to show 
good cause for its violation.  Concluding that the subsequent 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
6 
 
admission of DeLao's statements required a new trial, the court 
reasoned: 
 
DeLao was caught on the horns of a dilemma, 
placed in that position by the State——either she must 
testify and accept the consequences of impeachment, or 
break her promise to the jury that she would testify 
and accept the consequences of her broken promise. 
State v. DeLao, 2001 WI App 132, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 304, 629 
N.W.2d 825.  The State petitioned this court for review. 
II 
¶14 The State asks that we address several issues in 
resolving this case.  The first question we address is whether 
the court of appeals correctly concluded that the State violated 
its discovery obligations.  This requires the interpretation and 
application of § 971.23(1)(b) to a given set of facts.  It 
presents a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  See State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 
112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997). 
¶15 Because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
State 
violated 
§ 971.23(1)(b), we must also determine whether the State has 
shown good cause for the violation, and if not, whether DeLao 
was prejudiced by the admission of her statements.  These are 
also questions of law subject to independent appellate review.  
See State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 275, 518 N.W.2d 232 
(1994) (prejudicial error); State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 
259, 479 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991) (good cause). 
III 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 Our interpretation and application of § 971.23(1)(b) 
involves an inquiry into (1) the scope of the prosecutor's 
obligation under the statute to make herself aware of evidence 
against the accused and (2) the meaning of the statutory 
language, "plans to use in the course of the trial." 
¶17 Section 971.23, entitled "Discovery and inspection" 
largely controls the scope of the State's statutory discovery 
obligations in criminal cases.  The portion of the statute that 
is the focus of our inquiry is subsection (1)(b), which reads: 
 
(1)  WHAT A DISTRICT ATTORNEY MUST DISCLOSE TO A 
DEFENDANT.  Upon demand, the district attorney shall, 
within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
 
. . . . 
 
(b)  A written summary of all oral statements of 
the defendant which the district attorney plans to use 
in the course of the trial and the names of witnesses 
to the defendant's oral statements. 
¶18 The statute requires the State to provide, within a 
reasonable time before trial begins, a written summary of the 
defendant's oral statements that the prosecutor plans to use at 
trial.  Even though the State did not disclose DeLao's 
statements to Detective Prioletta before her trial began, the 
State asserts that it complied with § 971.23(1)(b) because the 
prosecutor could not have planned to use the statements until 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
8 
 
she knew of them.  We reject the State's analysis because it 
does not comport with the requirements of the statute. 
¶19 Section 971.23 has been revised over the years, but 
many of the provisions have remained the same since its creation 
as three separate statutory sections in the comprehensive 1969 
redrafting of the criminal procedure statutes.  Jones v. State, 
69 
Wis. 2d 
337, 
348, 
230 
N.W.2d 
677 
(1975); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23, and compare with Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23-25 
(1993-94), and with Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23-25 (1971).  Most 
recently, 1995 Wis. Act 387 repealed, recreated, and renumbered 
the discovery provisions found in the present version of 
§ 971.23. 
¶20 Some of the provisions that were new or revised under 
1995 Wis. Act 387 were intended to expand the discovery and 
disclosure requirements that apply to both the State and the 
defendant.  However, the substance of many of the provisions, 
including 
what 
is 
now 
subsection 
(1)(b), 
has 
remained 
essentially unchanged.  See 1995 Wis. Act. 387; 1995 A.B. 721. 
¶21 Under § 971.23, the State's discovery obligations may 
extend to information in the possession of law enforcement 
agencies but not personally known to the prosecutor.  Jones, 69 
Wis. 2d at 349; State v. Maass, 178 Wis. 2d 63, 69, 502 N.W.2d 
913 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993). 
 
Put 
another 
way, 
under 
certain 
circumstances, the knowledge of law enforcement officers may be 
imputed to the prosecutor. 
¶22 In Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 348-49, this court interpreted 
the discovery statutes in light of Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
9 
 
344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).  Wold, in turn, adopted the American 
Bar Association (ABA) Standards Relating to the Prosecution 
Function and the Defense Function:  "The test of whether 
evidence should be disclosed is not whether in fact the 
prosecutor knows of its existence but, rather, whether by the 
exercise 
of 
due 
diligence 
[the 
prosecutor] 
should 
have 
discovered it."  Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 349 (citing Wold, 57 
Wis. 2d at 349-50).  The court further explained: 
 
The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this 
section [of the ABA Standards] extend to material and 
information in the possession or control of members of 
his staff and of any others who have participated in 
the investigation or evaluation of the case and who 
either regularly report or with reference to the 
particular case have reported to his office. 
Id.  In Wold, the court was not interpreting the criminal 
discovery statutes.  Instead, the State's discovery obligation 
was predicated on the prosecutor's agreement to produce.   See 
57 Wis. 2d at 347.  Nonetheless, Jones and subsequent cases 
citing 
Wold 
have 
interpreted 
the 
discovery 
statutes 
to 
incorporate Wold's rationale, including its reliance on the ABA 
Standards. 
 
¶23 In Martinez, the court of appeals stated: 
 
For purposes of the criminal discovery statutes, we 
view 
an 
investigative 
police 
agency which 
holds 
relevant evidence as an arm of the prosecution.  In 
most criminal cases, the evidence against the accused 
is 
garnered, 
stored 
and 
controlled 
by 
the 
investigating police agency.  Depending upon local 
practice, many courts and district attorneys entrust 
the custody and control of such material to the police 
even after it has been elevated to formal evidentiary 
status in a criminal proceeding. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
10 
 
166 Wis. 2d at 260; see also State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 
499, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999); Maass, 178 Wis. 2d at 69-70 
(citing Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 349-50).  The court in Maass 
determined that the ABA Standards were "codified in sec. 
971.23."  178 Wis. 2d at 70.  In short, the threads of Wold and 
Jones have become tightly woven into the fabric of criminal 
discovery in Wisconsin. 
¶24 The prosecutor's duty to obtain information from 
investigative agencies is not, however, limitless.  For example, 
due diligence does not require that the prosecutor "consult 
every law enforcement officer who conceivably could have 
information respecting a case."  Maass, 178 Wis. 2d at 71.  This 
limitation is consistent with the ABA Standards and in keeping 
with the principles in Jones and Wold.  The State is charged 
with knowledge of material and information in the possession or 
control of others who have participated in the investigation or 
evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with 
reference 
to 
the 
particular 
case 
have 
reported 
to 
the 
prosecutor's office.  Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 349; Wold, 57 Wis. 2d 
at 349 n.4. 
¶25 We turn next to examine the meaning of the language in 
§ 971.23(1)(b) limiting the State's obligation to disclose a 
defendant's oral statements to those that it "plans to use in 
the course of the trial."  The State maintains that the phrase 
"plans to use" embodies a subjective component.  According to 
the State, the prosecutor in DeLao's case could not have planned 
to use DeLao's statements before DeLao's trial began because a 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
11 
 
prosecutor cannot plan to use what the prosecutor does not 
actually know.  DeLao asserts, in contrast to the State, that 
the phrase "plans to use" in § 971.23(1)(b) embodies an 
objective standard.  We agree with DeLao that the standard is 
necessarily objective. 
¶26 In advancing a subjective standard, the State relies 
on State v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 415 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 
1987).  The central issue in Larsen was whether the defendant 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
discretionary 
reversal 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35.6  Id. at 416.  The defendant advanced a 
number of arguments in support of his assertion that justice 
miscarried.  One of his several arguments was that he was denied 
a 
fair 
trial 
because 
the 
state 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
§ 971.23(1), despite the fact that it had disclosed his 
statements before the trial began. 
¶27 The court of appeals devoted only one paragraph of 
analysis to this argument.  It noted that the district attorney 
explained that he did not intend to use the statements until the 
defendant filed his notice of alibi.  Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d at 
425.  The notice of alibi was filed two weeks before trial and 
the statements were provided to the defendant one week before 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 states in part: 
Discretionary reversal.  In an appeal to the 
court of appeals, if it appears from the record that 
the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that 
it is probable that justice has for any reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
12 
 
trial.  Id. at 417, 425.  In determining that the prosecutor's 
failure to disclose the statements sooner did not deny the 
defendant a fair trial, the court referenced the time at which 
the 
prosecutor 
actually 
decided 
to 
use 
the 
defendant's 
statements.  See id. at 425-26.  
¶28 We do not view Larsen as dispositive of the question 
before us.  The court in Larsen was addressing a pretrial 
disclosure.  In the case before us, the disclosure came after 
the trial began and after the defense committed to a trial 
strategy based on the information it had at the beginning of 
trial.  The Larsen court concluded that given the circumstances 
of the pretrial disclosure, it could not conclude that justice 
had miscarried. 
¶29 More importantly, Larsen is not dispositive because 
the court of appeals was not addressing the scope of the meaning 
of "plans to use"——the issue before us.  Rather, its discussion 
of 
the 
prosecutor's 
decision 
was 
part 
of 
its 
larger 
determination 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
a 
discretionary reversal in the interest of justice. 
¶30 Thus, the court of appeals in Larsen arguably assumed 
that 
§ 971.23(1) 
embodied 
a 
subjective 
standard, 
without 
engaging in any construction of the statute as we do today.  We 
interpret the phrase "plans to use" to necessarily embody an 
objective standard:  what a reasonable prosecutor should have 
known and would have done under the circumstances of the case.  
An objective standard is consistent with the due diligence-
imputed knowledge rule under Wold and its progeny. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
13 
 
¶31 In contrast, a subjective standard would be difficult 
if not impossible to reconcile with the rule that a prosecutor 
is responsible for exercising due diligence in obtaining 
statements of which she does not know.  The State's theory in 
this case illustrates this problem.  Under that theory, the 
State 
could 
escape 
its 
obligation 
to 
disclose 
under 
§ 971.23(1)(b) in every case where the prosecutor failed to 
exercise due diligence by asserting that the prosecutor, not 
knowing of the evidence, could not have planned to use it. 
¶32 Likewise, 
a subjective standard would 
create an 
uncomfortably large opening through the door to prosecutorial 
sandbagging 
and 
discovery 
abuse. 
 
Although 
there 
is 
no 
affirmative evidence of gamesmanship in this case, a subjective 
standard would invite it in future cases.  Moreover, a 
subjective 
standard 
would 
spawn 
cases 
requiring 
irksome 
inquiries into the intent of the prosecutor.  Thus, the phrase 
"plans to use" in the statute necessarily embodies an objective 
standard.  
¶33 Having 
examined 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
prosecutor's 
obligation under the statute and the statutory phrase "plans to 
use in the course of the trial," we turn to an application of 
§ 971.23(1)(b) to the facts of this case.  The issue becomes 
whether a reasonable prosecutor, exercising due diligence, 
should have known of DeLao's statements before trial, and if so, 
whether a reasonable prosecutor would have planned to use them 
in the course of trial.  Given all the facts here, we conclude 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
14 
 
that a reasonable prosecutor should have known of the statements 
and would have planned to use them. 
¶34 Investigator Chaussee, who knew of DeLao's statements 
before trial after speaking with Detective Prioletta, was a key 
actor in the State's case against DeLao.  Over DeLao's 
objection, 
Chaussee 
was 
not 
sequestered 
like 
the 
other 
witnesses.  He was allowed to remain with the prosecutor 
throughout the trial as the State's representative.  At the 
trial conference held prior to the entrance of the jury pool, 
the prosecutor explained, "Your Honor, Investigator Chaussee was 
the central investigator that ties all of the ends together." 
¶35 As the court of appeals concluded, the investigation 
of the robbery and the investigation of the shooting were 
"hopelessly intertwined" with respect to DeLao.  The two 
investigations overlapped substantially both in time and in the 
cast of characters involved.  The robbery and the shooting 
occurred a week apart, and DeLao's testimony revealed that she 
had a significant history with Stalsberg and Sabala. 
¶36 Detective Prioletta and Investigator Chaussee were in 
contact about their investigations.  When the discovery issue 
arose at trial, and after the parties and the court examined 
Prioletta's report, DeLao's attorney commented: 
 
Your honor, in this report given to me today, 
Investigator Chaussee's name is pretty——is made pretty 
frequent in this report.  Investigator Chaussee was 
the one that told Investigator Prioletta that Ms. 
DeLao may have information about these robberies. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
15 
 
¶37 One of the State's arguments in support of its failure 
to disclose is an assertion that DeLao's statements to Detective 
Prioletta gained relevance "only when the 'acting out of fear' 
theory of the defense was revealed during defense counsel's 
opening statement."  In contrast, DeLao maintains that her 
defense was apparent from the beginning.   We agree with the 
State that the potential relevance of evidence goes to the 
question of what a reasonable prosecutor would plan to use.  
However, the State's characterization of DeLao's theory of 
defense as materializing on the day her trial began is not 
supported by the facts.  DeLao's assessment of the record is 
more accurate, and the relevance of her statements related not 
just to the State's ability to rebut her testimony by impeaching 
her but to her entire defense. 
¶38 At oral argument in this court, DeLao's counsel 
advanced: 
 
"From 
the 
very 
first 
night 
of 
this 
crime, 
Investigator Chaussee interviewed Ms. DeLao . . . she said in 
her very first statement to him, 'I did what I did because 
Desmond Stalsberg was acting crazy and I was afraid of him.'"   
¶39 Although Investigator Chaussee's report detailing his 
conversations with DeLao on the night of the shooting does not 
appear in the record, the comments made by DeLao's trial 
attorney during opening statement, on the record, support this 
contention.  Her attorney asserted, without objection, that on 
the night of the shooting, DeLao admitted to Chaussee that she 
previously lied to the police.  DeLao's attorney stated:  
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
16 
 
" . . . and she told him why she lied to the police officer.  
She said I was afraid, Desmond was acting crazy that day." 
¶40 Even at DeLao's initial appearance, her attorney's 
comments suggested what her defense would be.  DeLao's attorney 
explained: 
 
If what is in the criminal complaint is to be 
believed, 
what 
it 
sounds 
like 
is 
that 
[DeLao] . . . basically, did not know what to do.  
This other individual is shooting at someone, out of 
control, and Ms. DeLao probably didn't know what to 
do.  She was told to clean up the porch and she picked 
up some gun casings and gave it to the person because 
there were children in the area. 
¶41 Again, at DeLao's preliminary hearing, which took 
place one and one half months before her trial, DeLao's "acting 
out of fear" defense was raised.7  DeLao's attorney questioned 
Investigator Chaussee as to whether DeLao indicated any fear of 
Stalsberg: 
 
Q. 
And that she——Did she indicate to you that she 
was afraid at the point that she was picking up those 
shells? 
 
A. 
She said she was told to pick them up by Desmond. 
 
Q. 
And did she indicate that he had a gun at the 
time he was telling her to do it? 
 
A. 
He was in possession of a firearm, that's 
correct. 
 
                                                 
7 The dissent notes that Judge Flynn, who presided over 
DeLao's trial, determined that the parties presented him with 
nothing indicating that the State was aware of any theory of 
defense before DeLao's opening statement.  See dissent at ¶124.  
However, we note that Judge Flynn did not preside at DeLao's 
preliminary hearing or initial appearance. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
17 
 
Q. 
Did she indicate she was afraid at the time she 
was doing it? 
 
A. 
I don't recall her specifically saying that. 
 
Q. 
Did she indicate to you when you talked with her 
that basically all she wanted to do was to get Desmond 
out of her house? 
¶42 On 
redirect, 
the 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
representing the State also asked Investigator Chaussee whether 
DeLao told him she feared Stalsberg, to which he replied that he 
did not recall.  Finally, on re-cross of Chaussee, the sole area 
of inquiry focused on DeLao's fear: 
 
Q. 
So are you indicating that you just simply don't 
recollect or are you saying that you just don't 
remember whether or not she was in fear for her life?  
She told you she was in fear for her life or that 
wasn't said? 
 
A. 
I don't recall it being said. 
¶43 In short, it seems that from the beginning of this 
case, DeLao maintained that she did what she did because she was 
afraid of Stalsberg.  From the outset, she admitted that she 
removed evidence from the crime scene——the basis of the 
harboring or aiding a felon charge.  She acknowledged that she 
initially lied to the police——the basis of the obstructing 
charge.  Her response to these charges rested not on denying she 
committed the acts, but rather on a defense that she committed 
them out of fear.  Thus, the record does not support the State's 
assertion that DeLao's "acting out of fear" theory of defense 
became apparent only after her trial began. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
18 
 
¶44 Also important to our analysis is the nature of the 
evidence at issue in this case.  This evidence consisted of 
DeLao's own statements, made while she was in custody, to a 
police officer who was dispatched to interview her by the lead 
investigator in the case for which she was charged.  While we do 
not suggest that a reasonable prosecutor would know of and plan 
to use any and all statements by a defendant, these statements 
were not just any statements. 
¶45 The State also relies on Maass, in which three days 
before the defendant's trial, a police officer came forward to 
the prosecutor with incriminating statements the defendant had 
made to him.  178 Wis. 2d at 65.  The defendant, Maass, moved to 
exclude any testimony by the officer, and the circuit court 
granted the motion.  Id. at 66.  The court of appeals, however, 
determined that the State did not violate § 971.23.  Id. at 73.  
It 
noted 
that 
the 
officer 
did 
not 
participate 
in 
the 
investigation or evaluation of Maass's case or regularly report 
to the district attorney.  Id. at 72.  The court reasoned that 
the officer's "failure to appreciate the significance of Maass's 
inculpatory statements and his last-minute disclosure of those 
statements to the district attorney should not deprive the state 
of this valuable evidence."  Id. 
¶46 The facts of Maass are distinguishable from DeLao's 
case in two important ways.  First, the prosecutor in Maass 
notified the defendant of his statements before trial began.  
178 Wis. 2d at 65.  Second, there was no indication that the 
officer's knowledge in Maass was the result of an investigation 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
19 
 
that was closely intertwined with the investigation that 
resulted in Maass's conviction.  The different results in 
Maass's and DeLao's cases serve to illustrate that the question 
of whether the prosecutor has exercised due diligence, though 
ultimately a question of law, will be highly fact-dependent. 
¶47 Given 
the 
coextensive 
character 
of 
the 
two 
investigations and Investigator Chaussee's pivotal role in 
DeLao's case, we determine that a reasonable prosecutor should 
have known of DeLao's statements before trial began.  Chaussee 
knew of the statements before trial began, and under the facts 
of this case, the State is charged with Chaussee's knowledge of 
those statements.8  In addition, we determine that given all the 
circumstances, including the fact that DeLao maintained from the 
outset that she acted out of fear, a reasonable prosecutor who 
was aware of DeLao's statements would have planned to use them 
in the course of trial.  Therefore, the State violated 
§ 971.23(1)(b) when it failed to disclose the statements before 
DeLao's trial began. 
                                                 
8 The dissent's emphasis on City of Racine Detective 
Prioletta's role in the investigation clouds the focus of the 
majority opinion.  It is Investigator Chaussee who participated 
in the investigation and evaluation of DeLao's case and reported 
to the district attorney with respect to her case.  Accordingly, 
it is Chaussee's knowledge, not that of Prioletta, which is 
imputed to the district attorney.  Thus, contrary to what the 
dissent 
suggests, 
our 
decision 
does 
not 
stand 
for 
the 
proposition that the discovery statute imposes on the district 
attorney 
"an 
undifferentiated 
duty 
to 
consult 
every 
law 
enforcement officer who conceivably could have information 
respecting a case under investigation."  Dissent at ¶79 (citing 
State v. Maass, 178 Wis. 2d 63, 71, 502 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 
1993)).  
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
20 
 
¶48 We next address the State's assertion that the court 
of appeals decision incorrectly expanded the State's discovery 
obligations to include any information requested by a defendant, 
regardless of whether the information is discoverable under 
§ 971.23.  The bulk of the court of appeals' reasoning in 
support of its determination that the State violated its 
discovery obligations consists of a discussion of the imputed 
knowledge rule of Jones and Martinez.  However, paragraph 17 of 
the opinion reads as follows: 
 
DeLao 
requested, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(b), 
"a written summary 
of 
any 
oral, 
written or recorded statements of the defendant, but 
not limited to those statements which the state 
intends to use in the course of the trial." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, DeLao asked for all statements, not just 
the ones the State intended to use at trial. The 
statements in question fell within the purview of her 
discovery demand. The State made no objection to 
DeLao's discovery demand as overbroad or beyond the 
scope of § 971.23(1)(b). 
DeLao, 2001 WI App 132, ¶17.  Thus, the State reads the court of 
appeals opinion to give import to the State's failure to object 
to DeLao's discovery demand. 
¶49 As a general rule, the discovery to which a criminal 
defendant is entitled is limited to constitutional and statutory 
requirements.  See State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 280 n.7, 
252 N.W.2d 671 (1977).  Thus, as the State asserts, this court 
has stated that the discovery statute "controls as to the rights 
of a defendant as to discovery and the procedures to be followed 
in enforcing such rights."  State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 
217, 226 N.W.2d 504 (1975). 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
21 
 
¶50 Although we agree with the court of appeals that the 
State violated its discovery obligations, those obligations 
arose under § 971.23 and not as a result of the State's failure 
to object to DeLao's discovery request.  Indeed, at oral 
argument DeLao unequivocally asserted that throughout this case 
she has relied not on the State's failure to object but on the 
statute, arguing that her statements fall within its purview.  
Accordingly, we reject the court of appeals' discussion to the 
extent it can be read to suggest that absent an objection, the 
State is required to provide materials requested by the 
defendant 
that 
fall 
outside 
the 
scope 
of 
statutory 
or 
constitutional discovery requirements. 
IV 
 
¶51 Our conclusion that the State violated its discovery 
obligations under § 971.23(1)(b) does not end our inquiry.  The 
State argues that it had good cause for failing to disclose.  
Absent a showing of good cause, the evidence the State failed to 
disclose must be excluded.  Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m); State v. 
Wild, 146 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 429 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1988).9  
However, if the State can show good cause for its failure to 
disclose, the circuit court may exclude the evidence or may 
grant other relief such as a recess or continuance.  Section 
971.23(7m); Wild, 146 Wis. 2d at 27.  The burden of proving good 
cause rests on the State.  Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 257. 
                                                 
9 This court has criticized the decision in State v. Wild, 
146 Wis. 2d 18, 429 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1988), on an unrelated 
point.  See State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 562-63, 456 
N.W.2d 143 (1990). 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
22 
 
 
¶52 The State argues it had good cause for two reasons:  
(1) it acted in good faith, and (2) even if the prosecutor had 
known of the statements, she would have had no reason to believe 
that they were relevant to DeLao's case.  We have already 
disposed of the State's second argument by determining that a 
reasonable prosecutor would have planned to use the statements 
at DeLao's trial.  Having concluded that "plans to use" in 
§ 971.23(1)(b) necessarily embodies an objective standard, we 
decline to apply a subjective analysis for purposes of good 
cause.  This would create an exception that swallows the rule. 
¶53 That leaves good faith.  Certainly, good faith is an 
important factor in a determination of good cause.  See 
Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 259; Wild, 146 Wis. 2d at 28.  However, 
it is not by itself dispositive.  Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 259.  
In any event, we conclude that the State's assertion that it 
acted in good faith is insufficient to show good cause for its 
failure to disclose.  A closer look at the Martinez case 
illustrates our conclusion. 
¶54 In Martinez, the evidence at issue was a surveillance 
tape recording of the defendant that incriminated her in a drug 
deal.  Although the State attempted to make the tape available 
to the defendant in accordance with the defendant's discovery 
request, the attempt failed and the tape was lost.  Martinez, 
166 Wis. 2d at 253-55.  The State conceded that it had "goofed 
up," but the circuit court allowed police officers who had 
conducted the surveillance to testify as to their recollections 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
23 
 
of what they heard.  Id. at 254, 256.  The court of appeals 
reversed with this explanation: 
 
The 
trial 
court 
concluded 
that the 
state's 
actions were "simply negligence" and not done in bad 
faith.  We disagree that the facts permitted this 
conclusion.  Instead, the limited facts offered by the 
state 
allowed 
for 
a 
host 
of 
speculative (not 
reasonable) inferences as to the state's conduct——good 
faith, negligence, recklessness, intentional conduct, 
or bad faith.  This points to the fundamental problem—
—the failure of the state to meet its burden under the 
statute. 
Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).  The court added that "[e]ven if 
the 
facts 
could 
be 
read 
to 
support 
the 
trial 
court's 
'negligence/no bad faith' conclusion, this still begs the 
question of 'good cause' under the statute."  Id.  The court of 
appeals refused to hold that "negligence or lack of bad faith 
constitutes 'good cause' as a matter of law."  Id.  
¶55 Thus, as did the court of appeals in Martinez, we 
conclude that even if the State acted in good faith, it failed 
to show good cause for its failure to disclose.  The State 
emphasizes that there is no indication that it engaged in 
sandbagging or otherwise acted in bad faith.  However, the 
State's assertions miss the mark because it has the burden to 
provide some explanation other than good faith. 
¶56 Finally, in asserting it has shown good cause, the 
State relies on Tucker v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 630, 267 N.W.2d 630 
(1978).  In Tucker, the State failed to supply a defendant with 
the name of an alibi rebuttal witness who was able to place the 
defendant running from the scene of the crime.  Id. at 633-34.  
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
24 
 
Another witness whose name the State had provided also placed 
Tucker at the scene of the crime.  Id.  The defendant moved for 
a mistrial, but the circuit court denied the motion.  Id. at 
635.  After determining on appeal that the State had committed a 
discovery violation, this court concluded that the defendant 
suffered no prejudice and that a new trial was unnecessary.  See 
id. at 639, 641.  In so concluding, the court noted that the 
prosecutor did not know that the rebuttal witness would identify 
the defendant until one-half hour before trial and indicated 
that this "may have been good cause for granting a recess or 
continuance."  Id. at 640. 
¶57 We are not persuaded that this language in Tucker 
means that the State has shown good cause in DeLao's case.  The 
court in Tucker did not analyze the question of whether the 
prosecutor's failure to know of the witness's statement was or 
was not excusable for good cause, and the facts recited in the 
case do not suggest an answer. 
¶58 Under Martinez, some explanation in addition to good 
faith is necessary, and the State has been unable to provide 
that explanation here.   As we have already determined using the 
objective standard embodied in § 971.23(1)(b), the fact that the 
prosecutor in DeLao's case did not actually know of the evidence 
is no explanation at all.  In short, the State has failed to 
demonstrate good cause for its violation of the discovery 
statute.  Therefore, DeLao's statements should have been 
excluded. 
V 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
25 
 
¶59 Having determined that DeLao's statements should have 
been excluded because the State violated § 971.23(1)(b) without 
good cause, we address the question of whether the admission of 
DeLao's statements was prejudicial to her case, thus requiring a 
new trial.  The State asserts there is no prejudice here.10 
¶60 When evidence that should have been excluded under 
§ 971.23 is not excluded, the defendant is not automatically 
entitled to a new trial.  State v. Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 199-
200, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984); Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 
544-45, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975).  If the defendant is to receive a 
new trial, the improper admission of the evidence must be 
prejudicial.  Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d at 199.  "The penalty for the 
breach of disclosure should fit the nature of the proffered 
evidence and remove any harmful effect on the defendant."  
                                                 
10 The court of appeals did not employ a harmless error 
analysis in deciding that DeLao was entitled to a new trial.  
Neither DeLao nor the State briefed or argued the question of 
whether a new trial is warranted in the express terms of a 
harmless error analysis.  Nevertheless, the dissent is correct 
that some of the case law addressing the proper remedy for a 
discovery violation refers to harmless error.  See State v. 
Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 198-99, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984); Wold v. 
State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-58, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).  We 
recognize that there has been a "gradual merger of this court's 
collective thinking in respect to harmless versus prejudicial 
error."  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985).  Regardless of whether the test is prejudicial error or 
harmless error, or whether any difference between the two 
remains, our conclusion in this case is the same.  The admission 
of DeLao's statements is sufficient to undermine our confidence 
in the outcome of her trial.  See id. at 545. 
 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
26 
 
Kutchera, 69 Wis. 2d at 542-43 (quoting Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 
351). 
¶61 We agree with the court of appeals that the State's 
failure to comply with § 971.23 placed DeLao on the horns of a 
dilemma from which no judicial remedy other than a new trial 
could save her.  DeLao's own statements were used against her, 
and those statements were relevant not just as impeachment 
evidence but as relating to her entire defense.  Thus, the 
State's discovery violation went to the core of her trial 
preparation and strategy. 
¶62 By the time the State disclosed DeLao's statements, 
she had committed to a defense strategy that was inconsistent 
with the statements.  When the circuit court determined the 
statements could come in, DeLao had no choice but to break her 
promise to the jury or take the stand and subject herself to 
impeachment by evidence that she had not anticipated when she 
made the promise. 
¶63 It is particularly significant that the disclosure was 
in the midst of trial.  The primary focus of § 971.23(1)(b) is 
on disclosure before trial.  Indeed, that is the very nature of 
discovery.  "If there is to be pretrial discovery, broad or 
limited, in criminal cases, defense counsel should be able to 
rely upon evidence as disclosed by the state; otherwise, the 
purpose of discovery is frustrated and more injustice is done 
than if no discovery were allowed."  Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 351. 
¶64 We note that two purposes of criminal discovery are to 
ensure fair trials and to encourage defendants to enter pleas 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
27 
 
after learning the strength of the State's case.  Irby v. State, 
60 Wis. 2d 311, 320, 210 N.W.2d 755 (1973); State v. Maday, 179 
Wis. 2d 346, 353, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993).  Both purposes 
are thwarted when the State fails to provide the information 
required of it before trial begins. 
¶65 Here, the State's discovery violation undermined the 
essence of discovery.  It placed DeLao on the horns of a dilemma 
and prejudiced her case.  She must have the opportunity to 
choose a strategy and prepare for trial in light of all the 
evidence that should have been provided her.  Therefore, we 
determine, as did the court of appeals, that she is entitled to 
a new trial.11 
VI 
 
¶66 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
State 
violated 
§ 971.23(1)(b) 
when 
it 
failed 
to 
disclose 
DeLao's 
oral 
statements before her trial began.  In addition, we determine 
that the State failed to show good cause for its violation.  
                                                 
11 The court of appeals appeared to assume that DeLao's new 
trial should encompass all three of the charges for which she 
was convicted, including the weapons possession charge, and we 
agree.  Her theory of defense was that at the time police 
searched her home, she did not know it contained guns.  She 
testified that on a previous occasion, when either Stalsberg or 
Sabala brought a gun to her house, she demanded that it be 
removed.  The State's position was that she was lying, and her 
statements to Detective Prioletta served to undermine her 
credibility.  Thus, DeLao's decision to testify coupled with her 
statements 
to 
Prioletta 
generated 
the 
evidentiary dispute 
central to the weapons charge, and her conviction on that charge 
was contaminated by the prejudicial effect of the State's 
discovery violation. 
No. 
00-1638-CR   
 
28 
 
Finally, we conclude that DeLao was prejudiced by the admission 
of her statements.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision reversing DeLao's conviction and remanding her case for 
a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶67 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).   Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.23 outlines the discovery obligations of the prosecution 
and defense in criminal cases.  This decision represents the 
most important interpretation of that statute in many years.  In 
my view, the majority opinion abandons precedent, rewrites the 
statute, and unreasonably enlarges the discovery obligations of 
prosecutors.  Its revision of discovery law is mistaken and 
unworkable.  Moreover, the court's mandate reversing the 
defendant's three convictions is a disturbing application of the 
harmless error rule.  Concerned about the consequences of the 
court's determinations, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  THE STATUTE 
¶68 The 
focus 
of 
attention 
in 
this 
case 
is 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) pertaining to oral statements of the 
defendant "which the district attorney plans to use in the 
course of the trial."  Subsection (1) must be viewed in its 
entirety, however, so that paragraph (b) can be put in context.  
Context is important because the construction given to one 
paragraph in a subsection is likely to affect the construction 
of other paragraphs. 
¶69 Subsection (1) of the statute, relating to the 
obligations of the district attorney, reads as follows: 
 
971.23 Discovery and inspection.  (1) WHAT A DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY MUST DISCLOSE TO A DEFENDANT.  Upon demand, 
the district attorney shall, within a reasonable time 
before trial, disclose to the defendant or his or her 
attorney and permit the defendant or his or her 
attorney to inspect and copy or photograph all of the 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
2 
 
following materials and information, if it is within 
the possession, custody or control of the state: 
 
(a) Any written or recorded statement concerning 
the alleged crime made by the defendant, including the 
testimony of the defendant in a secret proceeding 
under s. 968.26 or before a grand jury, and the names 
of witnesses to the defendant's written statements. 
 
(b) A written summary of all oral statements of 
the defendant which the district attorney plans to use 
in the course of the trial and the names of witnesses 
to the defendant's oral statements. 
 
 
(bm) Evidence obtained in the manner described 
under 
s. 
968.31(2)(b), 
if the 
district 
attorney 
intends to use the evidence at trial. 
 
(c) A copy of the defendant's criminal record. 
 
(d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses 
whom the district attorney intends to call at the 
trial.  This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal 
witnesses or those called for impeachment only. 
 
 
(e) Any relevant written or recorded statements 
of a witness named on a list under par. (d), including 
any videotaped oral statement of a child under s. 
908.08, any reports or statements of experts made in 
connection with the case or, if an expert does not 
prepare a report or statement, a written summary of 
the expert's findings or the subject matter of his or 
her testimony, and the results of any physical or 
mental examination, scientific test, experiment or 
comparison that the district attorney intends to offer 
in evidence at trial.  This paragraph does not apply 
to reports subject to disclosure under s. 972.11(5). 
 
(f) The criminal record of a prosecution witness 
which is known to the district attorney. 
 
(g) Any physical evidence that the district 
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial. 
 
(h) Any exculpatory evidence. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) (emphasis added). 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
3 
 
 
¶70 Subsection (7) of the statute establishes a continuing 
duty to disclose, if a prosecutor discovers additional materials 
and information.12  Subsection (7m) authorizes sanctions for 
failure to comply with discovery requirements. 
 
 
II. SCOPE OF PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATION TO FIND INFORMATION 
¶71 The first issue in applying Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) is 
the scope of the prosecutor's obligation under the statute to 
seek and find evidence concerning the accused.  See majority op. 
at ¶16.  The introductory sentence of subsection (1) directs the 
prosecutor to disclose materials and information requested under 
the subsection if the materials are "within the possession, 
custody or control of the state."  The statute does not define 
"possession, custody or control of the state," nor does it spell 
out the prosecutor's duty to locate materials and information so 
that they come within the possession, custody or control of the 
state.  Hence, the statute requires interpretation. 
¶72 Over the years, Wisconsin courts have delineated the 
prosecutor's duty to seek out information for discovery.  In 
Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 349, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973), a 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(7) reads: 
(7) CONTINUING DUTY TO DISCLOSE.  If, subsequent 
to compliance with a requirement of this section, and 
prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional 
material 
or 
the 
names 
of 
additional 
witnesses 
requested which are subject to discovery, inspection 
or production under this section, the party shall 
promptly notify the other party of the existence of 
the additional material or names.   
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
4 
 
case in which the facts predated the statute, the court tracked 
the commentary to the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards 
and stated an IDEAL: "[I]t is the prosecutor's duty to acquire 
all relevant evidence.  The duty rests upon the prosecution to 
obtain all evidence in the possession of investigative agencies 
of the state."  Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 349 (citing American Bar 
Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards 
Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, 
sec. 3.11(c) at 100, 102) (Approved Draft, 1971).  Then, 
recognizing the difficulty of achieving this IDEAL, the court 
drew back, formulating a due diligence test for the prosecutor: 
that is, "whether by the exercise of due diligence" the 
prosecutor should have discovered the materials or information 
at issue.  Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 350.   
¶73 "Due 
diligence" 
is 
defined 
as 
the 
"diligence 
reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person 
who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an 
obligation.——Also termed reasonable diligence."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 468 (7th ed. 1999).  
¶74 Several Wisconsin decisions have applied the due 
diligence test to fact situations under the statute.  In Jones 
v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 230 N.W.2d 677 (1975), the defendant 
claimed a violation of the statute because the prosecutor failed 
to produce the arrest record of a key witness until the fourth 
day of trial.  The court repeated the due diligence test, then 
quoted from the ABA Standards: 
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
5 
 
The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this 
section extend to material and information in the 
possession or control of members of his staff and of 
any others who have participated in the investigation 
or evaluation of the case and who either regularly 
report or with reference to the particular case have 
reported to his office. 
Id. at 349 (emphasis added) (quoting American Bar Association 
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to 
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, sec. 2.1(d) at 14) 
(Approved Draft, 1970). 
 
¶75 The Jones court seized upon the phrase "participated 
in the investigation or evaluation" of the case to exclude two 
law enforcement agencies——the FBI and the Los Angeles Police 
Department——from the scope of the prosecutor's search, because 
these agencies had not participated in the investigation or 
evaluation of the case.  "Therefore," the court said, "the 
prosecutor had no duty of his own accord, in response to a 
general discovery motion, to seek [a prosecution witness's] 
arrest record from these sources."  Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 349.  
The court added that "[t]o impose such a duty would create 
significant practical difficulties 
since to 
exercise 
'due 
diligence' the prosecutor arguably could thus be required to 
routinely check for possible conviction records in all 50 
states."  Id.  Under the Jones formulation, the prosecutor is 
not required to obtain information that is not discoverable by 
due diligence from the agencies investigating or evaluating the 
case, unless the defendant has designated the information and 
pointed to its source.  Id. at 349-50. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
6 
 
 
¶76 Today, the advent of the computer may have rendered 
the Jones analysis outdated with respect to criminal records.  
Today, a prosecutor may not reasonably argue that there is no 
obligation to search for the criminal records of the defendant 
and prosecution witnesses beyond the specific law enforcement 
agencies investigating or evaluating the case.  Due diligence 
requires more.  Criminal records constitute finite designated 
evidence that can often be obtained through a computer search.  
The prosecutor is expected to make a thorough effort, using the 
ordinary channels, to obtain this information. 
¶77 The Jones case is still valid, however, in limiting 
the scope of the search for information less specific and finite 
than criminal records.  The prosecutor must examine the files 
and records of the agencies investigating or evaluating the case 
to find the information listed in Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1).  But 
the prosecutor has no obligation to locate information that is 
not 
discoverable 
by 
due 
diligence——primarily 
from 
these 
agencies——particularly if the defendant has not designated the 
whereabouts of specific information.  An open-ended search for 
information beyond the investigative agency is not reasonable 
because of "significant practical difficulties."   
 
¶78 The analysis in State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 
479 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991), helps to explain the term 
"investigative agency."  The court said: "For purposes of the 
criminal discovery statutes, we view an investigative police 
agency which 
holds 
relevant 
evidence 
as an 
arm of the 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
7 
 
prosecution.  In most criminal cases, the evidence against the 
accused is garnered, stored and controlled by the investigating 
police agency."13  Id. at 260.   
¶79 Like Jones, Martinez linked due diligence to the 
agency investigating the crime.  This principle underlaid the 
decision in State v. Maass, 178 Wis. 2d 63, 502 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  In Maass, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department 
was the investigative agency in a homicide that occurred in that 
county.  Two days before trial, a part-time Town of Ixonia 
police officer advised the district attorney of an inculpatory 
statement that the defendant had made two months before the 
homicide.  Id. at 65-66.  The district attorney immediately 
informed defense counsel.  Id. at 66.  Maass claimed that the 
part-time officer's failure to disclose the statement earlier 
should be imputed to the district attorney because the district 
attorney's duty to disclose information "extend[ed] to material 
and information possessed by the district attorney's staff or 
others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation 
of the case."  Id. at 69.  The state replied that the district 
attorney's 
duty 
to 
discover 
evidence 
did 
not 
extend 
to 
information possessed by the part-time officer because the 
officer was not involved in the investigation or evaluation of 
the case and did not regularly report to the district attorney 
                                                 
13 The court noted that the police are frequently entrusted 
with "the custody and control" of material "even after it has 
been elevated to formal evidentiary status in a criminal 
proceeding."  State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 479 
N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991). 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
8 
 
or report to the district attorney in that case.  The court of 
appeals said: 
 
We conclude that the discovery statute does not impose 
on the district attorney the undifferentiated duty to 
consult every law enforcement officer who conceivably 
could 
have 
information 
respecting 
a 
case 
under 
investigation 
by 
the 
district 
attorney 
and 
the 
district attorney's investigating agency, which in 
this 
case 
was 
the 
Jefferson 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department. 
Id. at 71. 
 
¶80 The majority opinion misapplies the broad principles 
of Wold, Jones, Martinez, and Maass because it blurs the 
distinction between agencies that investigate or evaluate "the 
case" and agencies that do not, thereby unreasonably enlarging 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
prosecutor's 
obligation 
to 
search 
for 
information.  The opinion implies that due diligence requires a 
prosecutor to go beyond the agencies that investigate or 
evaluate "the case" to find materials and information that have 
not been designated by their nature and source.  Put in specific 
terms, the opinion implies that the prosecutor here had a duty 
to seek out potential evidence in the possession of the Racine 
Police Department, even though the crimes involved in "the case" 
against Media DeLao did not occur in Racine and even though the 
Racine police never "investigated" her case.  This expansion of 
due diligence will create an unreasonable burden for prosecutors 
in the future.   
¶81 To 
justify 
this 
result, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
summarizes the court of appeals decision as concluding that "the 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
9 
 
investigation of the robbery [in Racine] and the investigation 
of the shooting [in the Town of Mount Pleasant] were 'hopelessly 
intertwined' with respect to DeLao."14  Majority op. at ¶35. 
¶82 The record does not support this factual finding by 
the court of appeals.15  The record shows that on May 31, 1999, a 
grocery store was robbed in the City of Racine.  The robbery was 
investigated by the Racine Police Department, whose lead 
investigator was Detective James Prioletta.  On June 7, 1999, a 
shooting occurred in the Town of Mount Pleasant.  Media DeLao 
heard shots and, thereafter, she allegedly engaged in certain 
crimes in Mount Pleasant to obstruct the investigation.  The 
shooting and DeLao's alleged crimes were investigated by 
Investigator 
Doug 
Chaussee 
of 
the 
Mount 
Pleasant 
Police 
Department. 
 
There 
is 
no 
evidence 
that 
Prioletta 
ever 
"investigated" the Mount Pleasant shooting or DeLao's alleged 
crimes, and no evidence that Chaussee ever "investigated" the 
Racine robbery.  There is no evidence that anyone in the 
majority's "cast of characters" has ever been charged in the 
                                                 
14 The majority opinion attempts to bolster this factual 
finding with the observation that, "[t]he two investigations 
overlapped substantially both in time and in the cast of 
characters involved."  Majority op. at ¶35. 
15 In the same paragraph in which it made the "hopelessly 
intertwined" finding, the court of appeals stated that, "DeLao 
was not a mere citizen witness.  She was a suspect."  State v. 
DeLao, 2001 WI App 132, ¶135, 246 Wis. 2d 304, 629 N.W.2d 825.  
There is no evidence that DeLao was ever a suspect in the 
robbery, and she certainly was not "a suspect" in the June 7 
crimes after she had been charged with these crimes 20 days 
earlier and had already received a preliminary examination. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
10 
 
Racine robbery.  There is no reference to the Racine robbery in 
the DeLao criminal complaint, in the transcripts of DeLao's 
preliminary examination, or the transcripts of any other 
proceeding before DeLao's trial.  Circuit Judge Dennis Flynn 
described the Racine robbery as "a crime separate from what is 
alleged against the defendant here [in DeLao's case]." 
¶83 In short, while the time frame of the investigations 
overlapped 
and 
the 
"cast 
of 
characters" 
overlapped, 
the 
"investigations" of the separate crimes did not.  Chaussee did 
tell Prioletta that DeLao might have information about the 
robbery, and he did make the guns seized at DeLao's home 
available to the Racine Police Department for testing.  But the 
two cases were distinct and separate, and it is an enormous 
stretch to declare that the two investigations were "hopelessly 
intertwined."  If Desmond Stalsberg, DeLao's boyfriend, had been 
charged with the Racine robbery and if Prioletta had submitted 
his interview with DeLao concerning Stalsberg to the district 
attorney to support a Stalsberg robbery charge, the situation 
would be different.  But neither of those things happened. 
¶84 The 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
Investigator 
Chaussee "dispatched" Detective Prioletta to interview DeLao 
after she had been charged with the Mount Pleasant crimes.  
Majority op. at ¶44.  Use of the verb "dispatched" insinuates 
that Prioletta was a stalking horse for Chaussee.  This hint of 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
11 
 
improper police conduct16 is contrary to the record.  The 
majority elsewhere admits that the focus of Prioletta's inquiry 
was the robbery, not DeLao's alleged crimes.  Majority op. at 
¶6.  The most telling evidence that Prioletta was not Chaussee's 
agent is that Prioletta did not tell Chaussee about his 
interview with DeLao until 27 days after it had occurred. 
¶85 The majority opinion also sidesteps the second prong 
of the two-prong test for determining a prosecutor's duty to 
secure information.  As quoted above, the ABA Standards direct 
the prosecutor to seek out information from "others," including 
law 
enforcement 
agencies, 
"who 
have 
participated 
in 
the 
investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly 
report or with reference to the particular case have reported to 
his office."  American Bar Association Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure 
Before Trial, sec. 2.1(d) at 14 (Approved Draft, 1970). 
¶86 Here 
the 
majority 
concentrates 
on 
the 
alleged 
"investigation" prong and whisks past the "reporting" prong.  
The Racine Police Department did not regularly report to the 
prosecutor and did not report with reference to the DeLao case 
until the middle of trial.  Majority op. at ¶24. 
                                                 
16 In State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶53, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 
612 N.W.2d 680, this court discussed a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel after being charged with an offense: 
"After an attorney represents the defendant on particular 
charges, the accused may not be questioned about the crimes 
charged in the absence of an attorney."  DeLao was represented 
by counsel long before the Prioletta interview. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
12 
 
¶87 To sum up, the answer to the first question under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) is that the prosecutor was not required 
by due diligence to seek out information from the Racine Police 
Department because neither Prioletta nor his agency ever 
investigated or evaluated the DeLao case.  Moreover, the Racine 
Police Department did not report regularly to the district 
attorney and did not file a report about the DeLao case with the 
district attorney until July 28, 1999, the second day of trial.  
Any implication that the prosecutor here should have sought 
information from the Racine Police Department will alter the 
standard for due diligence, forcing prosecutors to search for 
cumulative materials and information that is neither exculpatory 
nor necessary to prosecute a case. 
 
III. PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION 
¶88 The second issue in applying Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) is 
the extent of the prosecutor's duty to disclose materials and 
information if the materials and information are in the 
possession, custody or control of the state.  The majority 
opinion concludes that the prosecutor breached her duty to 
disclose when she failed to turn over the DeLao interview as 
soon as Chaussee learned of it.  This conclusion, and the 
interpretation of the statute that is required to reach it, 
should be rejected. 
 
A. Reasonable Duty To Disclose 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
13 
 
¶89 The 
majority 
opinion 
interprets 
the 
introductory 
sentence of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) as creating an absolute duty 
to disclose certain "materials and information, if it is within 
the possession, custody or control of the state."  An absolute 
duty to disclose disregards any circumstance in which the 
prosecutor and the prosecutor's agents do not realize that they 
have the materials or information, or do not realize the 
significance of the materials and information they have.17  An  
absolute 
duty 
will 
lead 
occasionally 
and 
inevitably 
to 
unintentional breaches of the prosecutor's discovery obligation.   
¶90 The law ought to take into account the reasonableness 
of a duty to disclose information just as it takes into account 
the reasonableness of a duty to find information.  The statute 
must either create a reasonable duty to disclose on the front 
end or tolerate a reasonable breach of that duty on the back 
end.  A prosecutor's unintentional breach of an absolute duty to 
disclose should not be treated the same as a prosecutor's 
deliberate withholding of requested information.   
                                                 
17 To give an example, an investigative agency may possess 
criminal or juvenile records concerning a prosecution witness 
but not realize it because the information is recorded under a 
different name.  The law can react to such facts in various 
ways.  It can create an absolute duty to disclose and impose a 
sanction upon the prosecutor for failure to do so.  This may 
reward a defendant for a prosecutor's inadvertent error.  It can 
create an absolute duty to disclose but excuse the failure to 
disclose if the prosecutor is able to show good cause.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(f) addresses this specific example 
by creating a duty to disclose the criminal record of a 
prosecution witness "which is known to the district attorney."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(f) (emphasis added). 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
14 
 
¶91 The 
prosecutor's 
duty 
to 
disclose 
can 
be 
made 
reasonable when the defendant designates the information sought 
and indicates in which it can be obtained.  This is alluded to 
in Jones, where the court quotes commentary on the ABA Standards 
Relating to Discovery to explain why a defendant is sometimes 
required 
to 
designate 
information 
"[w]here 
the 
existence 
of . . . information is known to the prosecutor but its quality 
as matter which he is obligated to disclose is not apparent to 
him." 
 
Jones, 
69 
Wis. 2d at 
350 
(quoting 
American 
Bar 
Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards 
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, sec. 2.4 at 
83-84) (Approved Draft, 1970). 
 
¶92 The facts here show that an absolute duty to disclose 
information is not reasonable.  DeLao's attorney drafted a 
discovery demand on June 16, 1999, and filed it with the 
district attorney on June 30, 1999.  The discovery demand 
arrived two days after the Prioletta-DeLao interview.  It asked 
the prosecutor to furnish "a written summary of any oral, 
written or recorded statements of the defendant, but not limited 
to those statements which the state intends to use in the course 
of the trial."  Although this discovery demand was broad enough 
to encompass the DeLao interview at the point when the substance 
of that interview was in the possession, custody or control of 
the 
state, 
it 
went 
well 
beyond 
the 
obligations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(a) and (b), did not designate the June 28 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
15 
 
interview, and could not have contemplated that interview 
because it was drafted 12 days before the interview took place.18   
 
¶93 Although it is not clear when the prosecutor answered 
DeLao's discovery demand, it is likely that the prosecutor 
answered the demand "within a reasonable time before trial," as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1).  This would have been before 
Sunday, July 25, the date Chaussee first learned about the DeLao 
interview.  Consequently, if the new information about the 
interview had to be disclosed, it would have had to be disclosed 
under subsection (7): 
 
If, subsequent to compliance with a requirement 
of this section, and prior to or during trial, a party 
discovers 
additional 
material 
or 
the 
names 
of 
additional witnesses requested which are subject to 
discovery, 
inspection 
or 
production 
under 
this 
section, the party shall promptly notify the other 
party of the existence of the additional material or 
names. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7). 
 
¶94 The prosecutor disclosed the interview information to 
the defense as soon as she learned about it. For his part, 
Chaussee advised the prosecutor about the information as soon as 
                                                 
18 There is clear evidence that DeLao's attorney submitted a 
boilerplate discovery demand, not a document designed to alert 
the prosecutor to the existence of some important oral statement 
by the defendant.  The demand document invokes the authority of 
"Sections 971.23, 971.24, and 971.25 of the Wisconsin Statutes."  
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 971.24 and 971.25 were repealed effective 
January 1, 1997, two and one-half years before the discovery 
document was filed.  1995 Wis. Act 387, §§ 26, 29.  
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
16 
 
he could after he realized its relevance.19  Chaussee said he 
realized its relevance at about 12:30 a.m. on July 28, 1999.  He 
said his epiphany occurred at home, shortly after midnight, as 
he was thinking about the case.  This was after he heard the 
defendant's opening statement and had a chance to ruminate about 
it.   
¶95 The circuit court accepted Chaussee's version of 
events.  The court understood that Chaussee did not have a 
written report of the DeLao interview until the noon hour on 
July 28.  Prioletta had to be asked to write up that report 
during the trial.  The court also recognized that Prioletta 
never talked to DeLao about the events of June 7.  Prioletta 
discussed conversations that DeLao overheard before June 7.  In 
the interview, DeLao never told Prioletta that she was afraid of 
Desmond Stalsberg.20  Rather, she discussed her relationship with 
                                                 
19 Chaussee commenced his testimony on July 27.  He realized 
the relevance of DeLao's interview after his first day on the 
stand but was not permitted to speak to the prosecutor until he 
completed his testimony on July 28. 
20 At 
trial, 
in 
rebuttal, 
the 
prosecutor 
questioned 
Detective Prioletta: 
PROSECUTOR:  Did [DeLao] ever express to you that she 
was afraid of Desmond Stalsberg? 
PRIOLETTA:  No. 
Then, in cross-examination of Prioletta, the following exchange 
occurred: 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  And you didn't ask [DeLao] whether 
or not she was afraid of Desmond Stalsberg, did you? 
PRIOLETTA:  No, I did not ask her that. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
17 
 
Stalsberg and his friends.  Thus, it was largely DeLao's 
description of her relationship with Stalsberg and her silence 
about her alleged fear of him that were used to rebut her 
defense. 
¶96 As a result, the significance of the DeLao interview 
for 
trial 
was 
not 
immediately 
apparent 
to 
Chaussee.21  
Information from the interview was not relevant in proving the 
charges against DeLao.  It was helpful only in rebutting DeLao's 
defense which she did not make clear until trial.  Moreover, 
Investigator Chaussee did not know before trial that DeLao would 
testify. 
 
¶97 The prosecutor disclosed information about the DeLao 
interview as soon as its relevance was recognized.  The majority 
holds that this was not good enough.  It quotes Martinez, 166 
Wis. 2d at 260, to the effect that, "an investigative police 
agency which holds relevant evidence [is] an arm of the 
prosecution."  Majority op. at ¶23.  Thus, the majority says, 
the prosecutor was charged with knowledge of information in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Because you really weren't there 
about 
her 
situation; 
you 
just 
wanted 
to 
know 
information about any robberies that Desmond Stalsberg 
or John Sabala might have been in? 
PRIOLETTA:  Not any.  I was there for a specific 
reason, the robbery I was investigating. 
21 The 
significance 
of 
the 
DeLao 
interview 
was 
not 
immediately apparent to Prioletta either.  The majority fails to 
explain why Prioletta waited 27 days after the interview to tell 
Chaussee about it if he understood that the interview was 
relevant to DeLao's trial. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
18 
 
possession of the investigating police agency (Mount Pleasant), 
on and after July 25, and she violated the discovery statute by 
failing to disclose that information to the defense before 
trial. 
¶98 This conclusion does not square with a reasonable 
duty——with the reasonable diligence expected from a prosecutor 
or an investigator working with a prosecutor.  Imposing an 
absolute duty to disclose information will not withstand close 
scrutiny over time. 
 
B. Duty to Disclose Promptly 
 
¶99 Even an interpretation of the statute requiring an 
absolute duty to disclose certain "information within the 
possession, custody or control of the state" does not settle the 
issue.  For instance, where the prosecutor has made disclosure 
to the defendant, as here, the court may have to decide whether 
the disclosure was timely. 
¶100 This case is governed by Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7), which 
provides that, upon discovery of additional materials, the 
prosecutor has a duty to "promptly notify the other party of the 
existence of the additional material" (emphasis added). 
¶101 In this case, Chaussee was told about the DeLao 
interview on Sunday, July 25, 1999, and the prosecutor notified 
the defendant three days later, within minutes of learning about 
it herself. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
19 
 
¶102 The majority concludes that promptness required the 
prosecutor to make disclosure of Chaussee's new information 
before trial, probably on Monday, July 26, the only work day 
before trial.  Because the circuit court determined that the 
state made timely disclosure, the majority must reach its 
opposite conclusion as a matter of law.  In deciding this issue, 
the majority gives short shrift to the fact that Chaussee did 
not have any written report from Prioletta and did not 
immediately see how Prioletta's oral summary of the DeLao 
interview related to the trial.22  It also ignores the circuit 
court's finding that the DeLao interview was not relevant to the 
charges in her case; the interview was relevant only to her 
impeachment.  By insisting that the interview information had to 
be disclosed to the defendant before trial, the majority opinion 
treats the timing of the prosecutor's disclosure the same as if 
the prosecutor had made no disclosure at all.  
 
C. Information Subject to the Duty to Disclose 
 
¶103 A 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
materials 
and 
information in the possession, custody or control of the state 
are subject to a duty to disclose under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), 
because not all information must be disclosed.  To illustrate, 
paragraph (a) requires the prosecutor to disclose any "written 
or recorded statement concerning the alleged crime made by the 
                                                 
22 As a practical matter, the majority is saying that 
Chaussee should have asked Prioletta to prepare a written report 
as soon as he heard about the interview.   
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
20 
 
defendant." Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(a) (emphasis added).  These 
words convey a relatively clear directive to the prosecutor.  By 
its terms, paragraph (a) does not obligate the prosecutor to 
turn over a "written or recorded statement" made by the 
defendant that does not relate to the alleged crime. 
¶104 By contrast, paragraph (b) requires the prosecutor to 
disclose a "written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant." Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) (emphasis added).  If 
there were no additional language in the statute, paragraph (b) 
would seem to impose an unlimited duty upon the prosecutor to 
disclose the defendant's oral statements.  There would be no 
limit of relevance.23  Courts would be forced to ask such 
questions as: Does paragraph (b) require the prosecutor to 
disclose a defendant's oral statements about her victimization 
in an unrelated burglary or her involvement in an unrelated 
                                                 
23 The ABA Standards on Discovery recognize the problem of 
scope.  Standard 11.2.1 (Prosecutorial disclosure), in paragraph 
(a)(i), requires the pretrial disclosure of "[a]ll written and 
all oral statements of the defendant or of any codefendant that 
are within the possession of the prosecution and that relate to 
the subject matter of the offense charged, and any documents 
relating to the acquisition of such documents."  American Bar 
Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 11-2.1, at 1 (3d ed. 
1996) (emphasis added). 
The court of appeals dismissed this concern when it wrote: 
"Chaussee knew of DeLao's statements prior to trial, yet failed 
to inform the district attorney because he did not think the 
statements were relevant.  It is not Chaussee's job to determine 
the relevancy of evidence."  DeLao, 2001 WI App 132, ¶27.  This 
comment fails to recognize that police officers routinely 
determine what they consider important enough to include in 
their own police reports.  
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
21 
 
automobile accident?  Does paragraph (b) require the prosecutor 
to disclose a defendant's oral statements to an undercover law 
enforcement officer if the statements are not intended for use 
at trial?  If we were to give an affirmative answer to these 
questions, we would be requiring the release of the "names of 
witnesses 
to 
the 
defendant's 
oral 
statements."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b).  In the first example, disclosing the 
names of the witnesses would be absurd; in the second example, 
disclosing the name of the undercover officer might impair 
ongoing undercover investigations.24 
¶105 We do not have to wrestle with these problems because 
there are additional words in the statute, namely, the phrase 
"which the district attorney plans to use in the course of the 
trial."  These words place a realistic limitation on the 
prosecutor's duty to disclose the defendant's oral statements. 
¶106 Significantly, there are two clear tracks within 
subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  Paragraphs (a), (c), (f) 
and 
(h) 
and 
parts 
of 
paragraph 
(e) 
appear, 
at 
least 
superficially, to create an unconditional obligation upon the 
prosecutor to disclose certain materials and information "if it 
is within the possession, custody or control of the state."25  
They make no reference to the prosecutor's intent.  The 
                                                 
24 A protective order under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(6) will 
frequently not solve this problem. 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(f) imposes an unconditional 
obligation to disclose the "criminal record of a prosecution 
witness which is known to the district attorney"  (emphasis 
added).  Paragraph (f) poses special problems of interpretation.   
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
22 
 
unconditional obligation applies to: (1) any written or recorded 
statement concerning the alleged crime made by the defendant; 
(2) a copy of the defendant's criminal record; (3) any relevant 
written or recorded statement of a witness whom the district 
attorney intends to call at trial; (4) any reports or statements 
of experts made in connection with the case, or any written 
summary of the expert's findings or the subject of the expert's 
testimony; (5) the criminal record of any prosecution witness 
which is known to the district attorney; and (6) any exculpatory 
evidence. 
¶107 Paragraphs (b), (bm), (d), (g) and parts of paragraph 
(e) of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) are different.  They explicitly 
limit the prosecutor's obligation to turn over enumerated 
materials and information.  In each of these paragraphs, the 
prosecutor's duty to disclose information is conditioned upon 
the prosecutor's intent to use the information as evidence.  
Paragraph (b) limits the disclosure of oral statements of the 
defendant to those statements "which the district attorney plans 
to use in the course of the trial."  Paragraph (bm) limits 
disclosure of wiretap evidence unless "the district attorney 
intends to use the evidence at trial."26  Paragraph (d) limits 
the required list of witnesses to witnesses "whom the district 
                                                 
26 Without the limitation of the prosecutor's intent, 
paragraph (bm) would require the prosecutor to release wiretap 
transcripts of an investigation target to a defendant whose 
conversation happens to be recorded as part of the wiretap. 
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
23 
 
attorney intends to call at the trial."  Paragraph (e) limits 
disclosure of the results of physical or mental examinations, 
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons to those that "the 
district attorney intends to offer in evidence at trial."  
Paragraph (g) limits the disclosure of physical evidence to 
evidence "that the district attorney intends to offer in 
evidence at the trial." 
¶108 The 
majority 
opinion 
overlooks 
the 
prosecutorial 
discretion built into the statute when it rejects the state's 
interpretation of the phrase "plans to use." The majority 
writes: 
 
The State maintains that the phrase "plans to use" 
embodies a subjective component.  According to the 
State, the prosecutor in DeLao's case could not have 
planned to use DeLao's statements before DeLao's trial 
began because a prosecutor cannot plan to use what the 
prosecutor 
does 
not 
actually 
know. 
 
DeLao 
asserts . . . that the phrase "plans to use" . . .  
embodies an objective standard.  We agree with DeLao 
that the standard is necessarily objective. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
24 
 
Majority op. at ¶25.  In concluding that the phrase "plans to 
use" embodies an objective standard, the majority is simply 
rewriting the statute.27  
 
¶109 In addition, the majority's opinion departs from 
precedent.  In State v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 415 N.W.2d 535 
(Ct. App. 1987), the court noted that the state had possessed 
for some time prior to trial a written statement from the 
defendant's 
cellmate 
recounting 
"numerous 
statements 
[the 
defendant had] made about concocting an alibi defense" to the 
charges against him.  The state did not give the defendant a 
copy of the statement until a week before trial.  Id. at 425.  
                                                 
27 In State v. Ruiz, 113 Wis. 2d 273, 335 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. 
App. 1983), rev'd, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984), the 
court of appeals considered a situation in which a prosecutor 
knew of an inculpatory statement the defendant made to several 
witnesses about the crime.  The prosecutor did not disclose the 
statement to the defendant.  At trial the prosecutor asked a 
witness questions that elicited the statement.  The state later 
argued that the prosecutor did not plan to use the statement at 
trial because the prosecutor did not know how the witness would 
answer the questions.  The court responded: "To say that the 
prosecutor need disclose only what he is abundantly certain the 
witness will repeat would make a mockery of the discovery 
provisions."  Id. at 278, n.3.  The court of appeals decision 
was ultimately reversed on grounds that admission of the 
inculpatory statement was harmless error.  See infra ¶77. 
In any event, the court of appeals decision in Ruiz can be 
distinguished from the present case.  In Ruiz, the prosecutor 
hoped to elicit the inculpatory statement, even if he did not 
know whether he would succeed.  The case differs in at least 
four respects from the present case: (1) The prosecutor in Ruiz 
personally knew about the defendant's statement; (2) The 
statement related to the crime charged; (3) The prosecutor asked 
questions of a witness in the case-in-chief to elicit the 
statement; and (4) According to the court of appeals, the 
prosecutor had a history of non-disclosure.    
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
25 
 
The majority opinion views the state's disclosure in Larsen as a 
timely pretrial disclosure, but it fails to fully acknowledge 
the Larsen court's analysis: 
 
The state did not give Larsen a copy of this statement 
until a week before trial.  The district attorney 
explained that he did not intend to use the cellmate's 
statement until Larsen filed his notice of alibi.  We 
conclude that sec. 971.23(1) Stats., did not require 
the district attorney to permit Larsen to inspect and 
copy or photograph the written statement of Larsen's 
cellmate which was in his possession or provide him 
with a written summary of Larsen's oral statements 
made to his cellmate prior to the time the district 
attorney 
concluded 
he 
would 
introduce 
Larsen's 
statements at the time of trial.  There is no 
suggestion that the state always intended to use the 
cellmate's statement but, as a stratagem, waited until 
the last minute to notify Larsen of the existence of 
the statement and its intent to use it. 
Id. 
 
¶110 The Larsen analysis cannot be dismissed by hair-
splitting distinctions.  A reasonable prosecutor, including a 
Racine County prosecutor, could have relied upon Larsen as 
validating a prosecutor's good faith subjective intent to use 
evidence as a prerequisite for the prosecutor's required 
disclosure of some information.  The analysis in the majority 
opinion is directly contrary to the analysis in Larsen and in 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
26 
 
another case, State v. Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d 622, 321 N.W.2d 324 
(Ct. App. 1982).28 
 
¶111 More important, the majority opinion completely fails 
to explain the parallel language of subsection (1): "intends to 
use," "intends to call," and "intends to offer."  It is wholly 
unclear how the phrase "plans to use" could embody an objective 
standard if the other intent phrases in the subsection still 
embody a subjective standard.  There ought to be consistency 
within the context of a subsection. 
¶112 The inevitable implication of the majority opinion is 
that all paragraphs in the subsection embody an objective 
standard.29  This opens the door to the mandatory disclosure of 
materials under paragraphs (b), (bm), (d), (e), and (g) in 
circumstances in which the material is never used and was never 
intended to be used as evidence.  
                                                 
28 In State v. Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d 622, 321 N.W.2d 324 
(Ct. App. 1982), the defendant argued that the circuit court 
committed error when it admitted into evidence certain medical 
conclusions offered by the state on rebuttal even though the 
state had not produced the medical records in response to the 
defendant's discovery demand.  The court held that "the 
conclusions were properly admitted because the State did not 
intend to use the records at trial and offered the evidence only 
in rebuttal."  Id. at 623 (emphasis added).  The court noted 
specifically: "The district attorney in the present case stated 
that he did not intend to use the medical records in the 
presentation of his case-in-chief."  Id. at 627.   
29 In light of the majority opinion, an argument can be made 
that paragraph (f) concerning criminal records of prosecution 
witnesses also should be subject to an objective standard.  That 
is, the district attorney should disclose not only the "criminal 
record of a prosecution witness which is known to the district 
attorney" but also the criminal record of a prosecution witness 
which should be known to a reasonable district attorney.   
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
27 
 
¶113 To my mind, paragraphs (b), (bm), (d), (e), and (g) of 
subsection (1) contemplate a prosecutor's subjective intent.  
This subjective intent must not be tainted by bad faith.  
Circuit courts have the power to address a prosecutor's bad 
faith or manifest incompetence by excluding evidence or devising 
other 
remedies 
to 
protect 
the 
defendant. 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(7m).  But when a prosecutor seeks to use information 
that has not been timely disclosed because the prosecutor 
clearly did not intend to use it, the prosecutor should be 
permitted to explain and try to justify the shift in position, 
especially if the shift is responsive to some action or strategy 
of the defendant. 
¶114 Most important, the majority opinion is impractical.  
It insists that a prosecutor turn over not only what the 
prosecutor knows and plans to use but also what a reasonable 
prosecutor should have known and would have planned to use if 
the reasonable prosecutor had known it existed.  And it demands 
that these disclosures be made before trial.  This soars beyond 
previous decisions and is too utopian to make sense in a busy 
prosecutor's office.  It is a blueprint for second-guessing and 
attacking a prosecutor's conduct. 
 
D. Exception to Duty to Disclose for Rebuttal and Impeachment 
   Witnesses 
¶115 A prosecutor may not have to disclose some information 
to the defendant even when the prosecutor intends to use it at 
trial.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) requires the prosecutor 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
28 
 
to disclose "[a] list of all witnesses and their addresses whom 
the district attorney intends to call at the trial."  This list 
of witnesses is linked to paragraph (e), which requires the 
prosecutor to disclose "[a]ny relevant written or recorded 
statements of a witness named on a list under par. (d)."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e). 
¶116 What is vital to remember is that paragraph (d) also 
provides: "This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses 
or those called for impeachment only" (emphasis added).  The 
existence of this exception in paragraph (d) legitimizes the use 
of rebuttal witnesses who may surprise the defendant.30  This was 
shown in Lunde v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 80, 270 N.W.2d 180 (1978).  
Lunde was charged with delivering a controlled substance to a 
special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  The 
agent was introduced to Lunde by James Anderson, an undercover 
informer.  At trial, Lunde took the stand and denied the charges 
in their entirety.  He denied that he had ever seen the DEA 
agent, denied knowing Anderson, and denied knowing anything 
about the "angel dust" he had sold to the agent.  The court 
described the situation: 
 
Over objection, James Anderson, the informer, was 
called as a rebuttal witness.  Defense counsel's 
objection was based on the fact that the state had 
                                                 
30 "Surprise is not listed as a specific ground for 
exclusion of evidence.  This court has recognized that a 
continuance will generally be a more appropriate remedy for 
surprise than exclusion."  State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 
287-88, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977) (citing Frederickson v. Louisville 
Ladder Co., 52 Wis. 2d 776, 784, 191 N.W.2d 193 (1971)).  
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
29 
 
previously notified the defense that it would call 
three witnesses but had not mentioned Anderson as a 
possible witness.  The prosecutor stated that he had 
not intended to call Anderson, he did not know where 
Anderson was until after the trial commenced, and it 
was only after the defendant elected to take the stand 
and denied knowing Anderson that the decision was 
reached to call Anderson in rebuttal. 
Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).31  The court concluded that the 
state had no duty to provide the names of bona fide rebuttal 
witnesses regardless of any demand of the defendant.  Id. at 91 
(citing Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 816, 235 N.W.2d 534 
(1975), and Caccitolo v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 102, 115, 230 N.W.2d 
139 (1975)).  The court noted that Anderson's testimony was only 
necessary and appropriate when the defendant took the stand and 
denied that he knew Anderson and attempted to create a doubt as 
to his own whereabouts.  Id. at 92. 
¶117 The rebuttal/impeachment exception has implications 
for this case.  Prioletta was not listed as a prosecution 
witness.  The district attorney did not intend to call him at 
trial.  Consequently, his statement, even if it had been written 
or recorded, which it was not, need not have been disclosed 
under paragraph (e).  It would have had to be disclosed only if 
disclosure were required under some other paragraph. 
¶118 The 
majority's 
opinion 
has 
an 
unexpected 
and 
unfortunate consequence with regard to witnesses called in 
rebuttal.  Rebuttal witnesses serve the purpose of keeping a 
                                                 
31 In Lunde, this court did not repudiate the state's 
argument that the prosecutor had not intended to call Anderson 
as a witness.  Lunde v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 80, 270 N.W.2d 180 
(1978). 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
30 
 
person's testimony honest.  This includes the defendant in a 
criminal case who takes the witness stand voluntarily.  Under 
the majority opinion, however, some rebuttal or impeachment 
evidence against a defendant will be suppressed; and, in that 
situation, the defendant may be able to testify without fear of 
contradiction and with virtual immunity from prosecution for 
perjury.  See State v. Canon, 2001 WI 11, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 622 
N.W.2d 270.32 
 
IV. GOOD CAUSE FOR VIOLATION 
¶119 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.23 
does 
not 
automatically 
exclude witnesses or evidence in the wake of a prosecutor's 
failure to comply with a discovery demand.  The prosecutor may 
show the court "good cause . . . for failure to comply."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a).  The statute also explores several 
alternatives to the exclusion of evidence. 
¶120 The "good cause" provision constitutes additional 
proof that the legislature intended the statute be given a 
reasonable interpretation.  If this court expands the scope of 
the 
prosecutor's 
obligation 
to 
search 
for 
materials 
and 
information 
and 
makes 
more 
absolute 
and 
"objective" 
the 
prosecutor's duty to disclose such information, it must balance 
                                                 
32 In 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
testimony 
of 
Detective 
Prioletta, if suppressed, could not be used to support a 
subsequent perjury charge against DeLao because knowledge about 
the interview was not new and additional evidence discovered 
after trial.  See State v. Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶¶22-23, 241 Wis. 
2d 164, 622 N.W.2d 270. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
31 
 
these expanded duties against the prosecutor's good cause, or 
run the risk of creating a completely unworkable statute. 
¶121 The 
majority 
opinion 
takes 
the 
view 
that 
the 
prosecutor did not have good cause for failing to disclose the 
Prioletta-DeLao interview before trial.  The opinion asserts 
that DeLao's theory of defense was coercion.  Majority op. at 
¶10.  It further asserts that "the State's characterization of 
DeLao's theory of defense as materializing on the day her trial 
began is not supported by the facts."  Majority op. at ¶37.  In 
essence, the majority contends that as early as the night of the 
shooting, DeLao admitted to lying to the police, but explained 
that she was afraid and that Stalsberg was "acting crazy."   
¶122 The 
defense 
of 
coercion 
is 
based 
upon 
Wis. Stat. § 939.46, which provides that: 
 
(1) a threat by a person . . . which causes the actor 
reasonably to believe that . . . her act is the only 
means of preventing imminent death or great bodily 
harm to the actor or another and which causes [her] so 
to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime 
based on that act . . . . 
The jury instruction related to Wis. Stat. § 939.46 explains 
that "[t]he law allows the defendant to act under the defense of 
coercion only if a threat by another person . . . caused the 
defendant to believe that [her] act was the only means of 
preventing [imminent death or great bodily harm to herself or to 
others] and which pressure caused [her] to act as [she] did."  
Wis JI——Criminal 790.  "[T]he defendant's beliefs must have been 
reasonable."  Id.  "In determining whether the defendant's 
beliefs were reasonable, the standard is what a person of 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
32 
 
ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the 
defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the 
time of the alleged offense."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶123 Applying the coercion defense to the five crimes 
originally 
charged, 
DeLao 
would 
have 
to 
argue 
that 
she 
obstructed an officer (Chaussee); aided a felon (Stalsberg) by 
destroying, altering, hiding, or disguising physical evidence, 
with 
intent 
to 
prevent 
the 
apprehension 
and 
subsequent 
prosecution 
of 
Stalsberg; 
and 
possessed 
a 
short-barreled 
shotgun, a short-barreled rifle, and drug paraphernalia, because 
she reasonably believed these acts were the only means of 
preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to herself or 
another.33 
¶124 The majority opinion contends that the record shows 
that DeLao's coercion defense was known to the State from the 
time of Chaussee's second interview with DeLao on the evening of 
June 7.  Judge Flynn concluded otherwise, saying that "nothing 
has been presented to the court that indicates the parties were 
aware of any theory of defense in terms of the State being aware 
of it before opening statement was made." 
¶125 In an effort to overcome this finding, the majority 
opinion attempts to show that Judge Flynn's determination was 
clearly erroneous.  It turns to defense counsel's opening 
statement, partially quoted in ¶¶38-39 of the majority opinion, 
                                                 
33 The circuit court never authorized the jury to consider 
coercion as a potential defense for the weapons charges and the 
drug paraphernalia charge. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
33 
 
for its "evidence," and it attaches significance to the fact 
that the prosecutor did not interrupt the opening statement to 
object to counsel's argument. 
¶126 In the opening statement, defense counsel argued that 
DeLao was afraid because Desmond Stalsberg was "acting crazy."  
This reference must be put in context.  At trial, the defense 
attorney questioned DeLao about getting into Stalsberg's car 
after he had fled her house following the shooting and then come 
back:   
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  After you got in the car with 
Desmond, what happened then? 
 
DELAO:  We——he took off driving real fast, and I told 
him to slow down, where were we going, and he kind of 
said he didn't know, that we were just leaving and I 
was going with him, and I said where are we going, and 
he didn't really know.  He was just driving real 
crazy, and I told him to slow down because I thought 
we were gonna get in a car accident.  Then we drove 
past my mom's and I told him that I wanted to stay 
there, but he turned off, and then we ended up going 
down past Mitchell and towards Drexel, and then he 
would tell me that we're just going to go pick up the 
kids and that we were just going to leave, and I told 
him no, we weren't gonna go get my kids. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Why did you tell him you weren't 
going to get the kids? 
 
DELAO:  Because I didn't want my kids to be in the car 
with him or me at that time.  I felt like I was in 
danger and I didn't want my kids to get hurt either. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Okay, and after you told him that 
you weren't going to go anywhere with him, what 
happened? 
 
DELAO:  He——we kind of argued about it and then he 
dropped me off behind my house by the mobile homes, 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
34 
 
and that was it, and then when I got there the police 
were already at my house (emphasis added).  
¶127 This exchange was part of the defense case.  Earlier, 
in the State's case-in-chief, Chaussee was asked to recount 
DeLao's comments about this same incident: 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Did she indicate whether she left with 
Desmond Stalsberg? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  Yes, she did. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  And did she indicate why? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  No, she said she got into the car with him 
and drove away from the scene.  They argued a little 
bit in the car, and she subsequently got out of the 
car; I believe she said near St. Lucy's Church on 
Drexel Avenue west of her residence. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Did she indicate whether Desmond had 
ordered her to get in the car with him, or had forced 
her to get into the car with him, or was holding her 
at gunpoint or anything like that?   
 
CHAUSSEE:  No. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Did she indicate whether she was afraid 
of him at that point in time? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  She did say in her statement that she was 
afraid, and I believe her quote was that Desmond was 
acting crazy (emphasis added). 
¶128 Placing DeLao's quote in the proper context gives it a 
very different perspective.  The defense strategy was to 
transform an isolated comment into a full-blown defense.  The 
majority does not supply "evidence" that DeLao "explained" in 
her second interview with Chaussee why she lied to him in her 
first interview.  Such an explanation purportedly serves as the 
notice of her defense theory. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
35 
 
¶129 DeLao's own testimony at trial severely undercuts her 
theory.  She testified that she screamed at Stalsberg to stop 
shooting, refused to clean up the porch as he asked, refused to 
get her kids, refused to run away with Stalsberg, argued with 
him in his car, and prevailed on him to let her out.  Yet, when 
she was in Chaussee's car a short time later, she lied to 
Chaussee and obstructed his  investigation. 
¶130 DeLao's 
testimony 
at 
trial 
supports 
Chaussee's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing that DeLao did not 
emphasize fear of Stalsberg:   
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  And then she indicated to you that 
she had picked up some gun shells, is that correct? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  Shotgun shells, correct. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  And that she—did she indicate to 
you that she was afraid at the point that she was 
picking up those shells? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  She said she was told to pick them up by 
Desmond. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  And did she indicate that he had a 
gun at the time he was telling her to do it? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  He was in possession of a firearm, that's 
correct. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Did she indicate she was afraid at 
the time she was doing it? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  I don't recall her specifically saying 
that. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Did she indicate to you when you 
talked with her that basically all she wanted to do 
was to get Desmond out of her house? 
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
36 
 
CHAUSSEE: At what point? 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  At the point that you were talking 
to her the second time and she was telling you that 
she had picked up the gun shells—the shotgun shells, 
did she indicate to you the reason she had picked them 
up was to basically get Desmond out of her house? 
 
CHAUSSEE:  I don't believe it was ever put in that 
context, no. 
¶131 There is no evidence that Stalsberg ever threatened 
DeLao.  There is no evidence before trial that DeLao used her 
alleged fear of Stalsberg to explain picking up the shotgun 
shells or obstructing Chaussee. 
¶132 The majority opinion also relies upon a comment by 
defense counsel at DeLao's initial appearance on June 9, 1999.  
Majority op. at ¶40.  This comment was part of counsel's 
argument on bail, not an announcement of the defense theory.  
Neither the district attorney who tried the case nor Chaussee 
was present at the hearing.  Moreover, a transcript of the 
hearing was not prepared until five months after the trial.  
This offhand comment does not establish that the circuit judge 
who made his decision after reading the relevant documents and 
listening to the testimony was clearly erroneous. 
¶133 In rejecting the argument that the prosecutor had good 
cause for not turning over information about the DeLao-Prioletta 
interview before trial, the majority makes certain assumptions: 
(1) Chaussee was an arm of the prosecution and any information 
he had must be imputed to the prosecutor; (2) by July 25, 1999, 
Chaussee had in his possession oral statements the defendant 
made to Prioletta, even though he did not have them in writing; 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
37 
 
(3) Chaussee knew or should have known the defense theory as of 
June 7, 1999; (4) Chaussee’s failure to see the significance of 
the DeLao-Prioletta interview in relation to the defense theory 
is irrelevant, because any reasonable law enforcement officer 
would have understood that any reasonable prosecutor would plan 
to use the interview statements even though they would only be 
used for impeachment or rebuttal if the defendant testified; (5) 
no reasonable prosecutor who knew about the DeLao interview 
statements 
could 
have 
relied 
upon 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) and the relevant paragraph in the 
Larsen case as a basis for concluding that a prosecutor’s 
subjective intent made a difference in the duty to disclose; (6) 
no 
reasonable 
prosecutor 
could 
have 
relied 
upon 
the 
impeachment/rebuttal exception in paragraph (d) as a basis for 
withholding 
information; 
and 
(7) 
the 
good 
faith 
of 
the 
prosecutor 
has 
little 
effect 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
prosecutor has shown good cause.34 
¶134 I disagree.  In my view, the State has shown good 
cause. 
 
The 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
establish 
that 
the 
prosecutor had no intent to surprise or disadvantage the 
                                                 
34 The decision in State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 259, 
479 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991), makes clear that good faith does 
not necessarily equal good cause.  On the other hand, "an 
assessment of the State's conduct in such terms [good faith] may 
be relevant to the question of 'good cause.'"  Id.  The 
prosecutor's good faith was an important factor in the court's 
finding of good cause in State v. Wild, 146 Wis. 2d 18, 429 
N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1988).  It is very troubling that the 
majority opinion presents this case as though the State had no 
compelling facts to supplement its assertion of good faith. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
38 
 
defendant by withholding information required to be disclosed.  
There is not even a whisper of prosecutorial bad faith.  The 
prosecutor had no obligation to find the information at issue 
when it was in the possession of the Racine Police.  She had no 
obligation to disclose the information at the moment it came 
into Chaussee’s possession because it was not in writing and 
because neither the officer nor the prosecutor had any intent to 
use the information and did not see the value of the information 
until July 28.  The prosecutor disclosed the information as soon 
as its relevance and its potential use were recognized, 
demonstrating her good faith; and she used the evidence only in 
impeachment and rebuttal, not in the case-in-chief. 
 
V.  HARMLESS ERROR 
 
¶135 The majority opinion determines that the circuit court 
should have excluded the Prioletta-DeLao interview from use at 
the trial both for impeachment on cross-examination and for 
rebuttal.  "Absent a showing of good cause, the evidence the 
State 
failed 
to 
disclose 
must 
be 
excluded.  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m); State v. Wild, 146 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 429 
N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1988)."  Majority op. at ¶51.35 
                                                 
35 We cannot know how the prosecutor would have conducted 
her 
cross-examination 
of 
DeLao 
if 
all 
reference 
to 
the 
Prioletta-DeLao interview had been excluded.  However, it is not 
unrealistic to speculate that she would have asked questions 
about DeLao's relationships with Stalsberg and members of the 
Latin Kings street 
gang 
because 
at 
least 
some of 
this 
information was known to the prosecutor and Chaussee independent 
of the Prioletta-DeLao interview. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
39 
 
 
¶136 In this case, the evidence was not excluded.  It was 
used after Judge Flynn held a mid-trial hearing and offered to 
take a break for "as long as the parties want."  DeLao was 
ultimately convicted of three offenses; she was acquitted of 
three others. 
 
¶137 This court reviews a statutory discovery violation 
under a harmless error analysis.  State v. Koopmans, 202 
Wis. 2d 385, 396, 550 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State 
v. Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 198, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984)), aff'd 210 
Wis. 2d 670, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997). 
 
¶138 In Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d at 198, the court stated that the 
standard for determining whether a nonconstitutional error is 
harmless was set out in State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 163, 
330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).  Gavigan in turn had quoted Wold, 57 
Wis. 2d at 356, as follows: 
 
The test of harmless error is not whether some harm 
has resulted, but, rather, whether the appellate court 
in its independent determination can conclude there is 
sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by 
the inadmissible evidence, which would convict the 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 163.  
 
¶139 Several cases show the application of harmless error 
principles to discovery violations.  In 1973 in Wold, 57 
Wis. 2d 344, a case involving indecent liberties with a child, 
the court evaluated a situation in which the district attorney 
agreed to supply all crime laboratory reports to the defendant.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
40 
 
These reports showed no incriminating evidence against the 
defendant.  At trial, however, an analyst testified that she had 
found a seminal stain on Wold's underwear.  The defense moved to 
strike the testimony on grounds that no reference to the stain 
appeared in the disclosed reports.  In fact, the seminal stain 
had been found in a test taken after the district attorney had 
answered the discovery demand and of which he was unaware.  The 
court stated: 
 
The 
question 
presented 
is 
whether 
evidence 
allegedly unknown to the state prior to trial and not 
disclosed to the defense pursuant to an agreement to 
disclose and an order of discovery should be excluded.  
We think the court should have excluded the testimony.  
In the presentation of the case, the district attorney 
should have discovered if later tests were made and if 
so, then, in keeping with his promise to disclose, the 
tests should have been given to the defendant. 
Id. at 349. 
 
¶140 Although the Wold court cited "the strong need to 
avoid surprise of the defense in the area of scientific 
evidence" 
and 
observed 
that 
"the 
prosecutor 
could 
have 
discovered the later test through a conference with his 
witnesses," Id. at 351, the court concluded that admitting the 
testimony of the analyst about the stain was harmless error.  
Id. at 358. 
 
¶141 The court said: "Without the consideration of the 
laboratory test showing stained underwear, [the] evidence would 
be sufficient in the minds of any jury to convict Wold beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id.  "The effect of any erroneously admitted 
statement, which carries no reversal as a matter of law, must be 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
41 
 
realistically evaluated in the context of the case."  Id. at 357 
(emphasis added). 
 
¶142 Two years later, in Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 
230 N.W.2d 750 (1975), the court reviewed a set of facts under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  The state did not disclose to the 
defendant three witnesses who were later called in the case-in-
chief.  The defendant's conviction was affirmed on the basis 
that defendant failed to establish surprise or prejudice.  Id. 
at 543. 
¶143 In 1984 in Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, in which the cases 
of two homicide defendants were consolidated, the district 
attorney failed to disclose to defendant Servantez his knowledge 
of a damaging statement Servantez made admitting that he had 
disposed of "the knife" that served as the murder weapon.  The 
statement came into evidence through the questioning of a 
witness in the case-in-chief.  This court said the statement 
fell within the discovery demand and that the prosecutor did not 
demonstrate 
good 
cause 
for 
his 
failure 
to 
disclose 
it.  
Nonetheless, the court unanimously upheld Servantez' conviction, 
saying: 
 
This court faced a situation similar to the 
present case in Kutchera v. State . . . .  We reach a 
similar conclusion as to the undisclosed evidence in 
this case.  [The witness's] testimony that Servantez 
said he had disposed of the knife merely added to an 
already strong case.  Our reading of the record 
persuades 
us 
that 
the 
exclusion 
of 
Servantez' 
statement would not have affected the result. 
Id. at 199-200. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
42 
 
 
¶144 In 1996 in Koopmans, 202 Wis. 2d 385, the court of 
appeals reviewed a serious case of child abuse against the 
mother of the abused child.  The dispute involved an inculpatory 
statement the defendant made to a police officer in the presence 
of a social worker.  The state disclosed a report from the 
social worker in which the defendant was reported as saying that 
she would "hurt the child herself, which she did not, before she 
would think" her boyfriend would hurt the child.  The officer, 
whose version of the incident was not disclosed, testified that 
the defendant had said: "'I will just say I did this and we can 
just get this all behind us,' or something to that effect."  Id. 
at 390-91.  The court of appeals ruled that the defendant had 
received adequate notice through discovery.  Alternatively, 
however, it concluded that non-disclosure of the officer's 
version of the statement was harmless error.  Id. at 396. 
 
¶145 In several of these cases, the state failed to 
disclose information that surprised and damaged the defendant.  
In Wold, Kutchera, Ruiz, and Koopmans, the state presented or 
elicited the evidence in the case-in-chief.  By contrast, in 
this case, the state rested before there was any mention of the 
Prioletta-DeLao interview.  The defendant was given a hearing on 
the new evidence and as much time as the parties wanted to make 
adjustments in the defense case.  The defendant had the option 
not to testify. 
 
¶146 These four cases were decided before the court 
restated its formulation of the harmless error test in a series 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
43 
 
of cases last term.  See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 
WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727; Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila, 
2001 
WI 
110, 
246 
Wis. 2d 1, 
629 
N.W.2d 768; 
Koffman 
v. 
Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201; 
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.  
In these cases, we concluded that for an error to affect the 
substantial rights of a party, there must be a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the 
action or proceeding at issue.  A reasonable possibility of a 
different outcome is a possibility sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  Green, 2001 WI 109, ¶96; Evelyn 
C.R., 2001 WI 110,  ¶28; Koffman, 2001 WI 111, ¶51; Martindale, 
2001 WI 113, ¶32. 
¶147 This case is the first in which we apply our restated 
harmless error standard to a set of facts.  Consequently, the 
case takes on added significance. 
¶148 Considering all the facts of this case, is there a 
reasonable 
possibility 
that 
the 
Prioletta-DeLao 
interview 
contributed to the outcome of the trial in such a way that it 
undermines confidence in the outcome? 
¶149 DeLao was convicted of three offenses: (1) obstructing 
an officer; (2) harboring/aiding a felon by acting with intent 
to prevent the apprehension of Desmond Stalsberg; and (3) 
possessing a short-barreled shotgun.  She was found not guilty 
of: (1) harboring/aiding a felon by altering, destroying or 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
44 
 
hiding evidence; (2) possessing a short-barreled rifle; and (3) 
possessing drug paraphernalia. 
¶150 The jury found DeLao guilty of two offenses related to 
her statements to Chaussee in his squad car, after she had 
returned home and Stalsberg had fled.  There is no dispute that 
DeLao lied to Chaussee and misled him while she was talking to 
him in the squad car.  The only issue was whether she had a 
defense of coercion that justified her actions. 
¶151 The 
jury 
did 
not 
accept 
DeLao's 
defense 
in 
circumstances when Stalsberg was not present.  By contrast, it 
did accept her defense in relation to her conduct in picking up 
the shotgun shells and possibly cleaning up blood while 
Stalsberg was present with a gun in his hand. 
¶152 The jury also convicted DeLao of possession of a 
short-barreled shotgun.  This weapon was not tied to the June 7 
shooting and did not come into her home on June 7.  It was found 
in plain view on the bottom shelf of DeLao's linen closet.  The 
circuit court did not authorize the jury to consider coercion as 
a defense for possession of this weapon. 
¶153 All in all, the jury rejected minor charges and 
charges about which there was some factual dispute.  The jury's 
obvious discernment inspires confidence in the outcome of the 
trial. 
¶154 What 
is 
largely 
forgotten 
in 
the 
majority's 
determination that use of the interview information prejudiced 
the defendant is that DeLao knew that the authorities were aware 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
45 
 
of her relationship with Stalsberg.  She also knew what she had 
said to Prioletta.  If the import of her statements and her 
silence about fear was "objectively" obvious to Chaussee on July 
25 when he received them second-hand, it must have been 
"subjectively" obvious to the defendant from the beginning.  
Why, then, did she not tell her attorney about the interview?  
Why did she take the stand to testify?  Didn't she invite her 
own impeachment?  Was she really surprised to be confronted with 
her own history? 
¶155 The undercurrent of the majority's opinion is that 
Media DeLao was treated badly by the prosecutor and the circuit 
court.  I disagree.  The interview evidence was not presented in 
the case-in-chief.  The defendant was given a hearing on the new 
evidence during the trial and as much time as she needed to make 
adjustments to her defense.  She always had the option not to 
testify, and any decision not to testify could not be made the 
subject of adverse comment.  
¶156 This court must require reasonable diligence on the 
part of the government in meeting all its discovery obligations, 
but it should not expect clairvoyance or perfection.  No 
decision by this court can deter good faith error. 
¶157 This 
court 
has 
a 
responsibility 
to 
enforce 
a 
reasonable interpretation of the criminal discovery statute that 
recognizes the legitimate interests of both the defendant and 
the government.  Because it has failed to do so, I respectfully 
dissent. 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
46 
 
¶158 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No. 00-1638dtp 
 
 
1