Title: LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Insurance Agency

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as LGR 
Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Ins. Agency, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-334.] 
 
*Reporter’s Note: This cause was decided on January 16, 2018, but was released to the public on 
January 31, 2018, subsequent to the resignation of Justice William M. O’Neill, who participated in 
the decision. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-334 
LGR REALTY, INC., APPELLEE, v. FRANK AND LONDON INSURANCE AGENCY, 
APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Ins. Agency, Slip 
Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-334.] 
Delayed-damage rule does not apply to cause of action alleging negligent 
procurement of professional-liability insurance policy or negligent 
misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy at issue 
contains provision specifically excluding the type of claim the insured 
alleges it believed was covered by the policy. 
(No. 2016-1307—Submitted September 12, 2017—Decided January 16, 2018.*) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 15AP-1072,  
2016-Ohio-5044. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
presents the question whether the delayed-damage rule, which modifies the general 
rule for when a cause of action accrues, is applicable to this cause of action alleging 
negligence related to the procuring of a professional-liability insurance policy.  
Because we agree with appellant, Frank and London Insurance Agency (“F&L”), 
that the delayed-damage rule does not apply and that the cause of action in this case 
accrued on the date the policy was issued, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint filed by 
appellee, LGR Realty, Inc. (“LGR”), as untimely. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} F&L procured for LGR a “Real Estate Agents Errors and Omissions 
Liability Insurance Policy” from the Continental Casualty Insurance Company 
(“Continental”) that was effective from May 12, 2010, through May 12, 2011. 
{¶ 3} A liability claim was made against LGR within the policy period in a 
complaint styled Milligan Communications, L.L.C. v. Plaza Properties, Inc., 
Franklin C.P. case No. 10 CV 1471 (“Milligan lawsuit”).  LGR made a claim 
against the policy for Continental to defend LGR against the Milligan lawsuit and 
to indemnify LGR for any damages that it might be liable for.  However, on April 
26, 2011, Continental denied the claim on the basis of an exclusion provision in the 
policy regarding Plaza Properties.  LGR incurred over $420,000 in attorney fees 
and expenses defending against the Milligan lawsuit. 
{¶ 4} On April 17, 2015, LGR brought an action against F&L alleging that 
F&L had been negligent in failing to procure an appropriate professional-liability 
insurance policy and had negligently misrepresented the coverage contained in the 
policy.  As a result, LGR claimed, F&L had breached its duty to procure an 
appropriate insurance policy—one that would have provided coverage for 
defending and indemnifying LGR in the Milligan case.  Attached to LGR’s 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
complaint was a copy of the policy, which included a specific-entity-exclusion 
endorsement explaining that the policy does not apply to any claim made against 
LGR by Plaza Properties.  F&L filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss LGR’s 
complaint.  Relying in large part on Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mtge. 
Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, F&L argued that the 
cause of action accrued on the date the policy went into effect, May 12, 2010, and 
therefore, LGR’s complaint, which was filed on April 17, 2015, was time barred by 
the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09. 
{¶ 5} LGR, relying primarily on Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 1 Ohio 
St.3d 79, 437 N.E.2d 1194 (1982), countered that under the delayed-damage rule, 
its cause of action did not accrue until it suffered an “injury,” which occurred, at 
the earliest, when Continental denied LGR’s claim for defense and indemnity on 
April 26, 2011.  Therefore, LGR argued, its April 17, 2015 complaint was filed 
within four years of the accrual date and was not time barred. 
{¶ 6} The trial court determined that LGR’s cause of action accrued on the 
day the insurance policy went into effect, May 12, 2010, and it dismissed LGR’s 
action on the basis that it had been filed outside the four-year statute-of-limitations 
period set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).  Concluding that Kunz had been “eroded” by 
subsequent cases, including Flagstar, the court “decline[d] to apply the delayed 
damages rule to this case involving insurance agents.” 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals, holding that Flagstar did not overrule Kunz, 
reversed the trial court’s judgment.  In its decision, the court of appeals noted that 
although language in the body of the Flagstar opinion suggests a broad holding that 
would overrule Kunz, the syllabus of Flagstar is written more narrowly, leaving 
Kunz intact. 
{¶ 8} On appeal to this court, F&L presents two propositions of law for 
consideration.  The first proposition of law asserts that the delayed-damage rule 
enunciated in Kunz was abrogated by Flagstar and therefore “[a] cause of action 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
for insurance agent or agency negligence accrues for purposes of the four-year R.C. 
2305.09(D) statute of limitations when the allegedly wrongful act is committed.”  
F&L’s second proposition of law quotes Rep.Op.R. 2.2, which provides that the 
law in an opinion of the Supreme Court is “contained in its text, including its 
syllabus, if one is provided, and footnotes,” and asserts that under this rule, all parts 
of the decision are coequal, “with no part of the decision taking precedence.” 
{¶ 9} In response to F&L’s first proposition of law, LGR argues that Kunz 
has not been overruled and that its holding is determinative in this case.  In response 
to F&L’s second proposition of law, LGR agrees that this court’s entire opinion 
sets forth the law, but it argues that Kunz is distinguishable from Flagstar and that 
Kunz controls in this case. 
II.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 10} “An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to 
de novo review.”  Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-
4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.  In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.  Mitchell v. Lawson 
Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).  A complaint should not 
be dismissed unless it appears “beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.”  O’Brien v. Univ. Community 
Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus.  Under 
Civ.R. 10(C), “[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different 
part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.  A copy of any 
written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”  
A motion to dismiss based upon a statute of limitations may be granted only when 
the complaint shows conclusively on its face that the action is time-barred.  Velotta 
v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 433 N.E.2d 147 (1982), 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
III.  Law and Analysis 
{¶ 11} The parties do not dispute that R.C. 2305.09(D) provides a four-year 
statute-of-limitations period for tort actions not specifically covered by other 
sections of the Revised Code.  Nor do the parties dispute that the professional-
negligence claims at issue here are governed by R.C. 2305.09(D).  See also 
Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 546 N.E.2d 206 (1989) 
(“R.C. 2305.09 provides a general limitations period of four years for tort actions 
not specifically covered by other sections of the Ohio Revised Code” [footnote 
deleted]). 
{¶ 12} The parties do not agree, however, on when the negligent-
procurement and negligent-misrepresentation claims in this case accrued, 
triggering the start of the statute of limitations.  F&L argues that the claims accrued 
and the four-year statute-of-limitations period began to run when the professional-
liability insurance policy containing the exclusion was issued, and it directs the 
court’s attention to Investors REIT and Flagstar, 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-
1961, 947 N.E.2d 672. 
{¶ 13} LGR argues that the claims accrued and the four-year statute-of-
limitations period began to run when the claim to defend and indemnify was denied, 
and it directs our attention to the application of the delayed-damage rule in Kunz, 1 
Ohio St.3d 79, 437 N.E.2d 1194. 
{¶ 14} This court has long recognized that a “[s]tatute of limitations 
commences to run so soon as the injurious act complained of is perpetrated, 
although the actual injury is subsequent * * *.”  Kerns v. Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio 331 
(1831), syllabus.  While this remains the general rule in Ohio today, see O’Stricker 
v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 87, 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983), and Flagstar at 
¶ 13, there are two primary exceptions to the rule. 
{¶ 15} One exception to the general rule is the discovery rule, which 
provides that “[w]hen an injury does not manifest itself immediately, the cause of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
action does not arise until the plaintiff knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, that he had been injured by the conduct of the 
defendant, for purposes of the statute of limitations.” O’Stricker at paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} The second exception to the general rule is the delayed-damage rule, 
which this court first adopted in Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 
Ohio St.2d 376, 433 N.E.2d 147 (1982).  Under the delayed-damage rule, “where 
the wrongful conduct complained of is not presently harmful, the cause of action 
does not accrue until actual damage occurs.” Id. at 379. 
{¶ 17} In reversing the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to 
dismiss, the Tenth District Court of Appeals agreed with LGR that Kunz is still 
good law, and it relied on Kunz in holding that the delayed-damage rule was 
applicable in this case.  Therefore, an examination of Kunz is central to resolving 
this matter.  However, we first turn our attention to F&L’s second proposition of 
law regarding the Rules for Reporting Opinions. 
A.  Rep.Op.R. 2.2 
{¶ 18} Neither party disputes the import of Rep.Op.R. 2.2 as it is currently 
written, and F&L’s second proposition of law correctly restates the rule—no part 
of an opinion takes precedence over another part.  However, because the current 
Rep.Op.R. 2.2 became effective in 2012 and the cases upon which the parties rely 
were decided between 1982 and 2011, the current rule cannot be relied upon when 
determining which part of those opinions, if any, takes precedence over another.  In 
fact, at the time Kunz was decided, in 1982, this court had not yet adopted rules for 
reporting opinions.  See 3 Ohio St.3d xxi-xxiii (setting forth the Rules for the 
Reporting of Opinions “applicable to all cases reported on and after March 1, 
1983”).  However, before the rules were promulgated, case law determined the 
matters later addressed in the Rules for Reporting Opinions.  In State ex rel. Canada 
v. Phillips, we held that “[o]nly what is stated in a syllabus or in an opinion per 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
curiam or by the court represents a pronouncement of the law by this court.”  Id., 
168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), paragraph six of the syllabus.  And a per 
curiam opinion must be read in light of the facts of the particular case.  See Simpson 
v. Holmes, 106 Ohio St. 437, 440, 140 N.E. 395 (1922). 
B.  Accrual of Cause of Action for Professional Negligence 
Related to Procuring Insurance 
{¶ 19} In Kunz, a per curiam opinion without a syllabus, the insureds, 
Walter Kunz and his concrete company, began purchasing business insurance from 
their insurance agent in 1952.  Id., 1 Ohio St.3d 79, 437 N.E.2d 1194.  In 1969, the 
insureds purchased an insurance policy written by Buckeye Union Insurance 
Company (“Buckeye Union”) that provided “all risk” coverage on a crane.  Later 
that year, Kunz and his insurance agent discussed consolidating the various 
individual policies on the insureds’ equipment into a single omnibus policy. 
{¶ 20} In April 1970, the insurance agent presented Kunz with a three-year 
consolidated policy from Buckeye Union that Kunz believed provided the same “all 
risk” coverage that the insureds formerly had.  In 1973, the insureds renewed the 
consolidated policy, again assuming that the coverage was as good as the pre-1970 
individualized policies. 
{¶ 21} On April 21, 1975, the crane owned by the insureds was damaged.  
Initially, Buckeye Union informed Kunz that the loss would be covered.  But in 
June 1975, Buckeye Union denied the claim, citing exclusions in the consolidated 
policy that had not been part of the pre-1970 insurance contract on the crane. 
{¶ 22} On April 20, 1977, the insureds filed a complaint alleging that their 
insurance agent had negligently failed to obtain the requested coverage for the crane 
and/or failed to disclose a change in the coverage of the crane.  Holding that the 
four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09 applied and that it began to run no 
later than April 1, 1973—the date the consolidated insurance policy was renewed—
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance agent.  The court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
{¶ 23} On appeal to this court, the insureds argued in support of applying 
the delayed-damage rule.  In determining that the delayed-damage rule applied, this 
court relied on the reasoning set forth in Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 536 
(Alaska 1968).  In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a cause of action 
for negligent failure to procure insurance coverage for damage caused by an 
earthquake accrued not when the defective policy was issued but years later, when 
an earthquake caused property damage.  Therefore, even though the insureds’ 
policy in Kunz was purchased in 1970 and renewed in 1973, the court held that their 
cause of action did not accrue until their crane was damaged in 1975.  
Consequently, the insureds’ complaint filed in April 1977 was timely filed. 
{¶ 24} While this case, like Kunz, involves the purchase of insurance, the 
factual similarities of the cases end there.  LGR purchased a professional-liability 
insurance policy, and when the policy was issued to LGR, the specific-entity 
exclusion upon which Continental relied in denying the claim was contained in the 
policy.  In Kunz, the insureds purchased a property insurance policy providing “all 
risk” coverage on a crane.  When that individual policy was consolidated into the 
omnibus policy, the insureds believed, incorrectly, that the “all risk” coverage 
continued. 
{¶ 25} Because the pronouncement of law in a per curiam opinion must be 
read in light of the facts of the case, Kunz is not controlling here.  See Simpson, 106 
Ohio St. at 440, 140 N.E. 395.  Therefore, we turn to the question whether the 
delayed-damage rule should be extended to apply in this case. 
{¶ 26} The general rule is that a statute of limitations begins to run when 
the injurious act is committed.  See O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 87, 447 N.E.2d 727; 
Flagstar, 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 13.  It is only in 
the narrow circumstances in which application of the general rule “ ‘would lead to 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by 
the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence,’ Wyler v. Tripi 
(1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168, 267 N.E.2d 419,” that we have judicially created 
or recognized an exception.  O’Stricker at 87, citing Kunz and Velotta, 69 Ohio 
St.2d 376, 433 N.E.2d 147.  Those narrow circumstances do not exist here. 
{¶ 27} To establish actionable negligence, one must show that there was a 
duty, that the duty was breached, and that an injury resulted from the breach.  
Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).  On the facts 
before us, we hold that LGR’s cause of action accrued, that is, LGR’s injury 
occurred, when F&L issued to LGR the professional-liability insurance policy that 
specifically excluded coverage for claims related to services performed for Plaza 
Properties. 
{¶ 28} If, as LGR argues, it was injured by the insurance policy containing 
the specific-entity-exclusion provision provided by F&L, then LGR was damaged 
the moment it entered into the contract and became obligated to pay a premium for 
a professional-liability insurance policy that was less than the coverage that it 
believed it would receive.  Therefore, the harm to LGR was complete when F&L 
issued the insurance contract setting forth the specific-entity-exclusion provision. 
{¶ 29} We hold that the four-year statute-of-limitations period began to run 
when F&L issued the insurance policy setting forth the specific-entity exclusion.  
LGR’s action, therefore, is time-barred. 
{¶ 30} F&L argues that the holding in Kunz has been eroded by Investors 
REIT and Flagstar.  Because we need not reach that issue to resolve this case, we 
decline to do so.  See Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 123 Ohio St.3d 216, 2009-
Ohio-4231, 915 N.E.2d 622, ¶ 9-10 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 31} Based on these facts, the delayed-damage rule does not apply to a 
cause of action alleging negligent procurement of a professional-liability insurance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
policy or negligent misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy at 
issue contains a provision specifically excluding the type of claim that the insured 
alleges it believed was covered by the policy.  The cause of action in such a case 
accrues on the date the policy is issued.  Therefore, the complaint filed by LGR in 
this case was untimely.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing LGR’s complaint. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’DONNELL and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 
 
ROBB, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’NEILL, J. 
 
CAROL ANN ROBB, J., of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring. 
{¶ 32} I agree with the majority’s determination that the cause of action 
accrued at the time the insurance policy was issued.  I write separately to make 
explicit what is implicit in the majority’s decision today: a cause of action for 
professional malpractice under R.C. 2305.09(D) will always accrue at the time of 
the negligent act. 
{¶ 33} The majority concludes that under the facts of this case, a cause of 
action relating to the negligent procurement of an insurance policy accrues at the 
time the policy is issued.  The result the majority reaches is in line with—actually, 
is mandated by—two prior decisions of this court: Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 
46 Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206 (1989), and Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline 
Union’s Mtge. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672.  The 
result is also irreconcilable with a decision of this court that predates both those 
decisions, Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 1 Ohio St.3d 79, 437 N.E.2d 1194 
(1982).  In Kunz, we held that a cause of action relating to the negligent 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
procurement of an insurance policy accrued on the date that the insureds suffered 
property damage, not on the date that the policy was issued. 
{¶ 34} The majority opinion states that because we do not need to reach the 
issue whether Kunz has any enduring validity to resolve the case, we will not do so.  
But it seems to me that we already have.  It would be best for everyone if we would 
just say so. 
Kunz Applies the Delayed-Damage Rule 
{¶ 35} Like this case, Kunz involved a lawsuit against an insurance agency 
and agent for the negligent procurement of insurance coverage.  The insureds 
believed that they had “all-risk” coverage on a crane; but when the crane was 
involved in an accident, the insurance company denied coverage, citing certain 
exclusions in the policy.  The question in Kunz, as in this case, was when the cause 
of action accrued for purposes of R.C. 2305.09.  The insurance agency argued that 
the claim accrued on the date the policy was issued.  The court, however, found that 
the delayed-damage rule applied and, thus, the cause of action “did not accrue and 
[the] statute of limitations did not begin to run” until the date of the accident.  Id. 
at 82. 
Post-Kunz:  We Hold that a Professional-Negligence Claim Accrues at the 
time of the Wrongful Act 
{¶ 36} A few years after Kunz, we switched course.  In Investors REIT, 46 
Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206, we considered professional-negligence claims 
brought against an accounting firm and its accountants.  The issue was whether the 
claims accrued and the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the allegedly 
negligent accounting activities or at the time the injury was discovered.  We 
rejected application of the discovery rule and held that the claim accrued and the 
statute of limitations “commenced to run when the allegedly negligent act was 
committed.”  Id. at 182.  In reaching this result, we relied on the fact that “[t]he 
legislature’s express inclusion of a discovery rule for certain torts arising under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
R.C. 2305.09, including fraud and conversion, implies the exclusion of other torts 
arising under the statute, including negligence.”  Id. at 181. 
{¶ 37} Two years later, we decided Grant Thornton v. Windsor House, Inc., 
57 Ohio St.3d 158, 566 N.E.2d 1220 (1991).  We framed the issue before us for 
review as “whether this court intends to stand by our 1989 decision in Investors 
REIT One v. Jacobs.”  Id. at 160.  We answered in the affirmative and again held 
that the statute of limitations for accountant-professional-negligence claims begins 
to run from the time of the injury, not the time of discovery. 
{¶ 38} In Flagstar, 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, 
¶ 27, we made clear that the rule articulated in Investors REIT applies to all 
professional-negligence claims.  The claim in Flagstar was that an appraiser had 
negligently performed real-property appraisals.  The bank that had been injured by 
the faulty appraisals argued that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
it had suffered damage—for example, when some of the properties were sold at 
foreclosure, leaving a deficiency balance.  The bank maintained that Investors REIT 
and Grant Thornton were distinguishable because those cases involved the 
discovery rule and the bank was relying upon the delayed-damage rule.  We 
rejected that theory and held that neither the discovery rule nor the delayed-damage 
rule was applicable.  We said:   
 
Both the discovery rule and the delayed-damages rule relate 
to when a cause of action for negligence accrues. Nevertheless, with 
regard to claims for professional negligence governed by R.C. 
2305.09, this court has clearly stated that the cause of action accrues 
when the allegedly negligent act is committed.  * * * 
* * * 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
We continue to adhere to the rule of law established in 
Investors REIT One. A cause of action for professional negligence 
accrues when the act is committed. 
 
Flagstar at ¶ 25 and 27. 
{¶ 39} Flagstar is fairly read as announcing a general rule that all 
professional-negligence claims governed by R.C. 2305.09(D) accrue at the time of 
the wrongful act.  This holding is directly at odds with our decision in Kunz.  But 
we did not say explicitly in Flagstar that we were overruling Kunz.  (We even cited 
Kunz in Flagstar in a general discussion of the delayed-damage rule without saying 
anything about whether it had any continuing validity.  Flagstar at ¶ 20.)  Our 
failure to come out and say that we were overruling Kunz has proved to be a 
mistake. 
Our Failure to be Explicit Has Caused Confusion 
{¶ 40} The case before us today evidences the confusion wrought by our 
failure to say directly in earlier cases that Kunz was overruled.  So do a host of 
conflicting lower-court decisions.  For example, the First District and Second 
District Courts of Appeals concluded that in Flagstar, this court “implicitly 
overruled” Kunz.  Chateau Estate Homes, L.L.C. v. Fifth Third Bank, 1st Dist. 
Hamilton No. C-160703, 2017-Ohio-6985, ¶ 22; Auckerman v. Rogers, 2d Dist. 
Greene No. 2011-CA-23, 2012-Ohio-23, ¶ 17.  Accordingly, both courts held that 
the statute of limitations on a claim for the negligent procurement of an insurance 
policy began to run at the time the policy was issued.  Chateau Estate at ¶ 25; 
Auckerman at ¶ 18.  The Ninth District has also read Flagstar to hold that the 
discovery rule and delayed-damage rule do not apply to professional-negligence 
claims involving the procurement of insurance coverage.  Infocision Mgt. Corp. v. 
Michael D. Sammy Ins. Agency, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26939, 2014-Ohio-
4653, ¶ 28. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
{¶ 41} In contrast, the Eleventh District—similar to the Tenth District in the 
instant case—has said that it will not “discard[] Kunz without an express 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court.”  Vinecourt Landscaping, Inc. v. Kleve, 11th 
Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3142, 2013-Ohio-5825, ¶ 24.  Thus, the court held that 
the statute of limitations began to run when the injury occurred, not when the 
negligent act occurred.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
We Ought to be Clear 
{¶ 42} Unfortunately, the majority decision today lacks the “express 
pronouncement” that at least some lower courts are waiting for.  Instead, the 
majority opinion states that because we do not need to reach the issue whether Kunz 
has any enduring validity to resolve this case, we will not do so. 
{¶ 43} But the majority’s opinion today is yet more proof that Kunz has no 
enduring validity.  There are no meaningful distinctions between the facts before 
the court today and those before the court in Kunz.  In both cases, an insured 
received less coverage than it thought it had purchased, an injury occurred, 
coverage was denied, and a lawsuit was filed more than four years after the policy 
had issued. 
{¶ 44} In today’s decision, the majority holds that the insured “was 
damaged the moment it entered into the contract and became obligated to pay a 
premium” for a policy that provided “less than the coverage that it believed it would 
receive.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 28.  Had today’s rule been applied in Kunz, we 
would have been compelled to find that the claim there was barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Had the rule that was applied in Kunz been applied in today’s case, 
LGR Realty’s claim would not be barred by the statute of limitations.  The 
majority’s opinion today and the decision in Kunz cannot both be the law. 
{¶ 45} Clarity matters.  “Statutes of limitations foster important public 
policies: ensuring fairness to the defendant, encouraging prompt prosecution of 
causes of actions, suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and avoiding the 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
inconvenience engendered by delay and by the difficulty of proving older cases.”  
Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009-Ohio-2523, 909 N.E.2d 1244,  
¶ 22, citing O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 88, 447 N.E.2d 727 
(1983).  It is critical, then, that there not be confusion as to when statutes of 
limitations begin to run. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} A cause of action for professional negligence under R.C. 2305.09(D) 
accrues at the time of the wrongful act.  Kunz has been overruled.  We should not 
be shy about saying so. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
ROBB, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s 
conclusion that a cause of action for professional negligence against an insurance 
agency accrues on the date the policy is issued.  “To establish actionable 
negligence, one must show * * * the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty and 
injury resulting proximately therefrom.”  (Emphasis added.)  Mussivand v. David, 
45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).  Until there is “actionable 
negligence,” the statute of limitations should not begin to run.  Allowing the statute 
of limitations to start running on the date of the breach of duty is equivalent to 
promulgating a rule that automatically attributes an injury when a duty has not been 
fulfilled.  A cause of action does not accrue until there is a discernible injury 
proximately caused by the breach of duty.  Here, the cause of action accrued on the 
date of the denial of the claim, i.e., when there was an injury proximately caused 
by the agency’s failure to meet its duty.  Being uninsured is not in itself an injury; 
instead, it merely exposes the uninsured to a risk of injury.  Therefore, the complaint 
was filed within the statute of limitations and should not have been dismissed on 
those grounds. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Hollern & Associates and Edwin J. Hollern; and Barkan Meizlish, L.L.P., 
and Neal J. Barkan, for appellee. 
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman, & Goggin, Samuel G. Casolari Jr., 
and David J. Oberly; and Hunton & Williams, L.L.P., and Syed S. Ahmad, for 
appellant. 
Rutter & Russin, L.L.C., and Robert P. Rutter, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, the Ohio Association for Justice. 
_________________