Title: Elisa B. v. Sup. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/22/05 (opns. filed this date should appear in this sequence:  S125912, S125643, & S126945) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ELISA B., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125912 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C042077 
THE SUPERIOR COURT 
) 
 OF EL DORADO COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
El Dorado County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PFS20010244 
EMILY B. et al., 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted review in this case, as well as in K.M. v. E.G. (Aug. 22, 2005, 
S125643) __ Cal.4th __, and Kristine H. v. Lisa R. (Aug. 22, 2005, S126945) 
__ Cal.4th __, to consider the parental rights and obligations, if any, of a woman 
with regard to a child born to her partner in a lesbian relationship. 
In the present action for child support filed by the El Dorado County 
District Attorney, we conclude that a woman who agreed to raise children with her 
lesbian partner, supported her partner’s artificial insemination using an 
anonymous donor, and received the resulting twin children into her home and held 
them out as her own, is the children’s parent under the Uniform Parentage Act and 
has an obligation to support them. 
 
 
2
FACTS 
On June 7, 2001, the El Dorado County District Attorney filed a complaint 
in superior court to establish that Elisa B. is a parent of two-year-old twins Kaia B. 
and Ry B., who were born to Emily B.,1 and to order Elisa to pay child support.2  
Elisa filed an answer in which she denied being the children’s parent. 
A hearing was held at which Elisa testified that she entered into a lesbian 
relationship with Emily in 1993.  They began living together six months later.  
Elisa obtained a tattoo that read “Emily, por vida,” which in Spanish means Emily, 
for life.  They introduced each other to friends as their “partner,” exchanged rings, 
opened a joint bank account, and believed they were in a committed relationship. 
Elisa and Emily discussed having children and decided that they both 
wished to give birth.  Because Elisa earned more than twice as much money as 
Emily, they decided that Emily “would be the stay-at-home mother” and Elisa 
“would be the primary breadwinner for the family.”  At a sperm bank, they chose 
a donor they both would use so the children would “be biological brothers and 
sisters.” 
After several unsuccessful attempts, Elisa became pregnant in February, 
1997.  Emily was present when Elisa was inseminated.  Emily began the 
                                              
1  
In order to protect the confidentiality of the minors, we will refer to the 
parties by their first names. 
2  
Family Code section 17400, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part:  
“Each county shall maintain a local child support agency . . . that shall have the 
responsibility for promptly and effectively establishing, modifying, and enforcing 
child support obligations . . . and determining paternity in the case of a child born 
out of wedlock.  The local child support agency shall take appropriate action, 
including criminal action in cooperation with the district attorneys, to establish, 
modify, and enforce child support . . . .” 
 
 
3
insemination process in June of 1997 and became pregnant in August, 1997.  Elisa 
was present when Emily was inseminated and, the next day, Elisa picked up 
additional sperm at the sperm bank and again inseminated Emily at their home to 
“make sure she got pregnant.”  They went to each other’s medical appointments 
during pregnancy and attended child birth classes together so that each could act 
as a “coach” for the other during birth, including cutting the children’s umbilical 
cords.  
Elisa gave birth to Chance in November, 1997, and Emily gave birth to Ry 
and Kaia prematurely in March, 1998.  Ry had medical problems; he suffered 
from Down’s Syndrome, and required heart surgery. 
  They jointly selected the children’s names, joining their surnames with a 
hyphen to form the children’s surname.  They each breast fed all of the children.  
Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents on her tax returns and obtained a 
life insurance policy on herself naming Emily as the beneficiary so that if 
“anything happened” to her, all three children would be “cared for.”  Elisa 
believed the children would be considered both of their children. 
Elisa’s parents referred to the twins as their grandchildren and her sister 
referred to the twins as part of their family and referred to Elisa as their mother.  
Elisa treated all of the children as hers and told a prospective employer that she 
had triplets.  Elisa and Emily identified themselves as coparents of Ry at an 
organization arranging care for his Down’s Syndrome.  
Elisa supported the household financially.  Emily was not working.  Emily 
testified that she would not have become pregnant if Elisa had not promised to 
support her financially, but Elisa denied that any financial arrangements were 
discussed before the birth of the children.  Elisa later acknowledged in her 
testimony, however, that Emily “was going to be an at-home mom for maybe a 
 
 
4
couple of years and then the kids were going to go into day care and she was 
going to return to work.”  
They consulted an attorney regarding adopting “each other’s child,” but 
never did so.  Nor did they register as domestic partners or execute a written 
agreement concerning the children.  Elisa stated she later reconsidered adoption 
because she had misgivings about Emily adopting Chance. 
Elisa and Emily separated in November, 1999.  Elisa promised to support 
Emily and the twins “as much as I possibly could” and initially paid the mortgage 
payments of approximately $1,500 per month on the house in which Emily and the 
twins continued to live, as well as other expenses.  Emily applied for aid.  When 
they sold the house and Emily and the twins moved into an apartment in 
November, 2000, Elisa paid Emily $1,000 a month.  In early 2001, Elisa stated she 
lost her position as a full-time employee and told Emily she no longer could 
support her and the twins.  At the time of trial, Elisa was earning $95,000 a year. 
The superior court rendered a written decision on July 11, 2002, finding 
that Elisa and Emily had rejected the option of using a private sperm donor 
because “[t]hey wanted the child to be raised exclusively by them as a couple.”  
The court further found that they intended to create a child and “acted in all 
respects as a family,” adding “that a person who uses reproductive technology is 
accountable as a de facto legal parent for the support of that child.  Legal 
parentage is not determined exclusively by biology.” 
The court further found that Elisa was obligated to support the twins under 
the doctrine of  equitable estoppel, finding Emily “agreed to have children with 
Respondent, and relied on her promise to raise and support her children.  She 
would not have agreed to impregnation but for this agreement and understanding.”  
“The need for the application of this doctrine is underscored by the fact that the 
 
 
5
decision of Respondent to create a family and desert them has caused the 
remaining family members to seek county assistance.  One child that was created 
has special needs that will require the remaining parent or the County to be 
financially responsible of those needs.  The child was deprived of the right to have 
a traditional father to take care of the financial needs of this child.  Respondent 
chose to step in those shoes and assume the role and responsibility of the ‘other’ 
parent.  This should be her responsibility and not the responsibility of the 
taxpayer.”  Elisa was subsequently ordered to pay child support in the amount of 
$907.50 per child for a total of $1815 per month. 
Elisa petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, and the court 
directed the superior court to vacate its order and dismiss the action, concluding 
that Elisa had no obligation to pay child support because she was not a parent of 
the twins within the meaning of the Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, §  7600 et 
seq.).  We granted review. 
DISCUSSION 
We must determine whether the Court of Appeal erred in ruling that Elisa 
could not be a parent of the twins born to her lesbian partner, and thus had no 
obligation to support them.  This question is governed by the Uniform Parentage 
Act (UPA).  (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.)3  The UPA defines the “ ‘[p]arent and 
child relationship’ ” as “the legal relationship existing between a child and the 
child’s natural or adoptive parents . . . . The term includes the mother and child 
relationship and the father and child relationship.”  (§ 7601.)  One purpose of the 
UPA was to eliminate distinctions based upon whether a child was born into a 
                                              
3  
Further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless otherwise noted. 
 
 
6
marriage, and thus was “legitimate,” or was born to unmarried parents, and thus 
was “illegitimate.”  (Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 88.)  Thus, the UPA 
provides that the parentage of a child does not depend upon “ ‘the marital status of 
the parents’ ” (Johnson, supra, at p. 89), stating:  “The parent and child 
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the 
marital status of the parents.”  (§ 7602.) 
The UPA contains separate provisions defining who is a “mother” and who 
is a “father.”  Section 7610 provides that “[t]he parent and child relationship may 
be established . . . :  [¶] (a) Between a child and the natural mother . . . by proof of 
her having given birth to the child, or under this part.”  Subdivision (b) of section 
7610 states that the parental relationship “[b]etween a child and the natural father 
. . . may be established under this part.” 
Section 7611 provides several circumstances in which “[a] man is 
presumed to be the natural father of a child,” including: if he is the husband of the 
child’s mother, is not impotent or sterile, and was cohabiting with her (§ 7540); if 
he signs a voluntary declaration of paternity stating he is the “biological father of 
the child” (§ 7574, subd. (a)(6)); and if “[h]e receives the child into his home and 
openly holds out the child as his natural child” (§ 7611, subd. (d)). 
Although, as noted above, the UPA contains separate provisions defining 
who is a mother and who is a father, it expressly provides that in determining the 
existence of a mother and child relationship, “[i]nsofar as practicable, the 
provisions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply.”  
(§ 7650.) 
The Court of Appeal correctly recognized that, under the UPA, Emily has a 
parent and child relationship with each of the twins because she gave birth to 
them.  (§ 7610, subd. (a).)  Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded, Emily is the 
 
 
7
twins’ natural mother.  Relying upon our statement in Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 
Cal.4th 84, 92, that “for any child California law recognizes only one natural 
mother,” the Court of Appeal reasoned that Elisa, therefore, could not also be the 
natural mother of the twins and thus “has no legal maternal relationship with the 
children under the UPA.” 
The Attorney General, appearing pursuant to section 17406 to “represent 
the public interest in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations,” 
argues that the Court of Appeal erred, stating:  “Johnson’s one-natural-mother 
comment cannot be thoughtlessly interpreted to deprive the child of same-sex 
couples the same opportunity as other children to two parents and to two sources 
of child support when only two parties are eligible for parentage.”  As we shall 
explain, the Attorney General is correct that our statement in Johnson that a child 
can have “only one natural mother” does not mean that both Elisa and Emily 
cannot be parents of the twins. 
The issue before us in Johnson was whether a wife whose ovum was 
fertilized in vitro by her husband’s sperm and implanted in a surrogate mother was 
the mother of the child so produced, rather than the surrogate.  (Johnson v. 
Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th 84, 87.)  The surrogate claimed that she was the child’s 
mother because she had given birth to the child.  No provision of the UPA 
expressly addresses the parental rights of a woman who, like the wife in Johnson 
v. Calvert, has not given birth to a child, but has a genetic relationship because she 
supplied the ovum used to impregnate the birth mother.  But, as noted above, the 
UPA does provide that provisions applicable to determining a father and child 
relationship shall be used to determine a mother and child relationship “[i]nsofar 
as practicable.”  (Former Civ. Code, § 7015, now Fam. Code, § 7650.)  
Accordingly, we looked to the provisions regarding presumptions of paternity and 
 
 
8
concluded that “genetic consanguinity” could be the basis for a finding of 
maternity just as it is for paternity.  (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th 84, 92.) 
We concluded, therefore, that both women – the surrogate who gave birth 
to the child and the wife who supplied the ovum – had “adduced evidence of a 
mother and child relationship as contemplated by the Act.”  (Johnson v. Calvert, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th 84, 92.)  Anticipating this result, the American Civil Liberties 
Union appearing as amicus curiae urged this court to rule that the child, therefore, 
had two mothers.  Because it was undisputed that the husband, who had supplied 
the semen used to impregnate the surrogate, was the child’s father, this would 
have left the child with three parents.  We declined the invitation, stating:  “Even 
though rising divorce rates have made multiple parent arrangements common in 
our society, we see no compelling reason to recognize such a situation here.  The 
Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son and have provided him, 
by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and nurturing home.  To recognize parental 
rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since 
shortly after the child’s birth would diminish [the wife]’s role as mother.”  (Id. at 
p. 92, fn. 8.)  We held instead that “for any child California law recognizes only 
one natural mother” (id. at p. 92), and proceeded to conclude that the wife, rather 
than the surrogate, was the child’s mother:  “We conclude that although the Act 
recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a 
mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, 
she who intended to procreate the child – that is, she who intended to bring about 
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own – is the natural mother 
under California law.”  (Id. at p. 93, fn. omitted.) 
In Johnson, therefore, we addressed the situation in which three people 
claimed to be the child’s parents: the husband, who undoubtedly was the child’s 
 
 
9
father, and two women, who presented conflicting claims to being the child’s 
mother.  We rejected the suggestion of amicus curiae that both the wife and the 
surrogate could be the child’s mother, stating that a child can have only one 
mother, but what we considered and rejected in Johnson was the argument that a 
child could have three parents: a father and two mothers.4  We did not address the 
question presented in this case of whether a child could have two parents, both of 
whom are women.5  The Court of Appeal in the present case erred, therefore, in 
concluding that our statement in Johnson that a child can have only one mother 
under California law resolved the issue presented in this case.  “Language used in 
any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then 
before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein 
considered. [Citation.]”  (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2.)6 
                                              
4  
We have not decided “whether there exists an overriding legislative policy 
limiting a child to two parents.”  (Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
417, 427, fn. 6.) 
5  
The situation is analogous to that in Sharon S. v. Superior Court, supra, 31 
Cal.4th 417, in which we held that a mother could consent to a “second parent” 
adoption by her lesbian partner despite our earlier dictum in Estate of Johnson 
(1912) 164 Cal. 312, 317, that the “duties of a child cannot be owed to two fathers 
at one time.”  We explained that this statement was “uttered in the context of 
concluding that a birth father who ‘by virtue of the adoption proceeding [in that 
case], ceased to sustain the legal relation of father’ could not thereafter inherit the 
adopted person’s estate [citation], we did not consider the contingency before us 
today – viz., two parties who voluntarily have waived the benefit of section 8617 
in order to effect a second parent adoption, where the natural parent’s relationship 
with the child is not superseded.”  (Sharon S., at p. 430, fn. 7.) 
6  
Elisa also relies upon our observation in Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1043, 1051, that “In essence, therefore, our statutory scheme creates three 
classes of parents: mothers, fathers who are presumed fathers, and fathers who are 
not presumed fathers. [Citation.]”  The issue in that case was whether an unwed 
father was a presumed father and thus could withhold his consent to the mother’s 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
10
We perceive no reason why both parents of a child cannot be women.  That 
result now is possible under the current version of the domestic partnership 
statutes, which took effect this year.  (§ 297 et seq.)  Two women “who have 
chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of 
mutual caring” and have a common residence (§ 297) can file with the Secretary 
of State a “Declaration of Domestic Partnership” (§ 298).  Section 297.5, 
subdivision (d) provides, in pertinent part:  “The rights and obligations of 
registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the 
same as those of spouses.” 
Prior to the effective date of the current domestic partnership statutes, we 
recognized in an adoption case that a child can have two parents, both of whom 
are women.  In Sharon S. v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.4th 417, we upheld a 
“second parent” adoption in which the mother of a child that had been conceived 
by means of artificial insemination consented to adoption of the child by the 
mother’s lesbian partner.  If both parents of an adopted child can be women, we 
see no reason why the twins in the present case cannot have two parents, both of 
whom are women. 
Having determined that our decision in Johnson does not preclude a child 
from having two parents both of whom are women and that no reason appears that 
a child’s two parents cannot both be women, we proceed to examine the UPA to 
determine whether Elisa is a parent to the twins in addition to Emily.  As noted 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
planned adoption of their child.  We did not consider the questions raised in the 
present case. 
 
 
11
above, section 7650 provides that provisions applicable to determining a father 
and child relationship shall be used to determine a mother and child relationship 
“insofar as practicable.”  (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th 84, 90; In re 
Marriage of Buzzanca (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1418 [the declaration in 
section 7613 that a husband who consents to artificial insemination is “treated in 
law” as the father of the child applies equally to the wife if a surrogate, rather than 
the wife, is artificially inseminated, making both the wife and the husband the 
parents of the child so produced].) 
Subdivision (d) of section 7611 states that a man is presumed to be the 
natural father of a child if “[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child.”  The Court of Appeal in In re Karen C. (2002) 
101 Cal.App.4th 932, 938, held that subdivision (d) of section 7611 “should apply 
equally to women.”  This conclusion was echoed by the court in In re Salvador M. 
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357, which stated:  “Though most of the 
decisional law has focused on the definition of the presumed father, the legal 
principles concerning the presumed father apply equally to a woman seeking 
presumed mother status.  [Citation.]”7 
Applying section 7611, subdivision (d), we must determine whether Elisa 
received the twins into her home and openly held them out as her natural children.  
There is no doubt that Elisa satisfied the first part of this test; it is undisputed that 
Elisa received the twins into her home.  Our inquiry focuses, therefore, on whether 
she openly held out the twins as her natural children. 
                                              
7  
The fact that questions involving the determination of parentage “focus on 
paternity is likely due to the fact the identify of a child’s birth mother is rarely in 
dispute.”  (In re Karen C., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 932, 936.) 
 
 
12
The circumstance that Elisa has no genetic connection to the twins does not 
necessarily mean that she did not hold out the twins as her “natural” children 
under section 7611.  We held in In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 that the 
presumption under section 7611, subdivision (d), that a man who receives a child 
into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural child is not necessarily 
rebutted when he admits he is not the child’s biological father. 
The presumed father in Nicholas H., Thomas, met the child’s mother, 
Kimberly, when she was pregnant with Nicholas.  Nevertheless, Thomas was 
named as the child’s father on his birth certificate and provided a home for the 
child and his mother for several years.  Thomas did not marry Kimberly.   When 
Nicholas was removed by the court from Kimberly’s care, Thomas sought custody 
as the child’s presumed father, although he admitted he was not Nicholas’s 
biological father. 
We held in Nicholas H. that Thomas was presumed to be Nicholas’s father 
despite his admission that he was not Nicholas’s biological father.  The Court of 
Appeal had reached the opposite conclusion, observing that “ ‘the Legislature has 
used the term ‘natural’ to mean ‘biological’ ” and concluding that the presumption 
under section 7611, subdivision (d) is rebutted under section 7612, subdivision (a) 
by clear and convincing evidence “that the man is not the child’s natural, 
biological father.”  (In re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, 62-63.)  We noted, 
however, that the UPA does not state that the presumption under section 7611, 
subdivision (d), is rebutted by evidence that the presumed father is not the child’s 
biological father, but rather that it may be rebutted in an appropriate action by 
such evidence.  (In re Nicholas H., supra, at p. 63.)  We held that Nicholas H. was 
not an appropriate action in which to rebut the presumption because no one had 
raised a conflicting claim to being the child’s father.  Applying the presumption, 
 
 
13
therefore, would produce the “harsh result” of leaving the child fatherless.  (Id. at 
p. 59.)  We quoted language from the Court of Appeal opinion in Steven W. v. 
Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116-1117, recognizing that “ ‘ “ ‘ “[a] 
man who has lived with a child, treating it as his son or daughter, has developed a 
relationship with the child that should not be lightly dissolved . . . . This social 
relationship is much more important, to the child at least, than a biological 
relationship of actual paternity. . . .” ’ ” ’ ”  (In re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 65; In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 604 [“the statute did not contemplate 
a reflexive rule that biological paternity would rebut the section 7611 presumption 
in all cases, without concern for whether rebuttal was ‘appropriate’ in the 
particular circumstances”].) 
The Court of Appeal in In re Karen C., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 932, 938, 
applied the principles discussed in Nicholas H. regarding presumed fathers and 
concluded that a woman with no biological connection to a child could be a 
presumed mother under section 7611, subdivision (d).  Twelve-year-old Karen C. 
petitioned for an order determining the existence of a mother and child 
relationship between her and Leticia C., who had raised her from birth.  Leticia 
admitted she was not Karen’s biological mother, explaining that Karen’s birth 
mother had tried unsuccessfully to abort her pregnancy and then agreed to give the 
child to Leticia.  The birth mother falsely told the hospital staff that her name was 
Leticia C. so that Leticia’s name would appear on the child’s birth certificate.  The 
birth mother gave Karen to Leticia promptly after the child was born.  The 
juvenile court denied Karen’s petition, ruling that Leticia could not be Karen’s 
mother because she had not given birth to her and had no genetic relationship.  
The Court of Appeal reversed, determining that Leticia was the child’s presumed 
mother under section 7611 because she had taken Karen into her home and raised 
 
 
14
her as her child.  (In re Karen C., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.)  The court 
remanded the matter to the juvenile court to apply the rule in Nicholas H. to 
determine whether this was “ ‘an appropriate action’ ” in which to find the 
presumption that Leticia was Karen’s mother was rebutted by the fact that she had 
not given birth to her.  (Ibid.) 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in In re Salvador M., supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357-1378, held that a woman who had raised her half brother 
as her son could be the child’s presumed mother under section 7611, subdivision 
(d).  In that case, the child’s mother died when he was three years old and he was 
raised by his 18-year-old half sister, who had a four-year-old daughter of her own 
and later gave birth again.  The child believed that his half sister was his mother 
and that her offspring were his siblings.  His half sister revealed her true relation to 
the child “ ‘in official matters, such as school registration,’ ” but maintained that 
“ ‘to the rest of the world [the child] is my son.’ ”  (In re Salvador M., supra, at p. 
1356.)  The Court of Appeal applied section 7611, subdivision (d), stating:  “The 
paternity presumptions are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state’s 
interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family.  [Citation.]”  (In 
re Salvador M., supra, at pp. 1357-1358.)  The court concluded that the half sister 
had openly held out the child as her own, despite admitting to various officials that 
she was the child’s half sister, noting that “the most compelling evidence” that she 
held out the child as her own was that the eight-year-old child “believed appellant 
was his mother” which supported the conclusion that she held the child “out to the 
community as her son.”  (Id. at p. 1358.)  Having concluded that she was the 
child’s presumed mother under section 7611, subdivision (d), the court concluded 
that this was “clearly not an appropriate case” to find the presumption was 
rebutted by the fact that she was not the child’s birth mother, “because there was 
 
 
15
no competing maternal interest and to sever this deeply rooted mother/child bond 
would contravene the state’s interest in maintaining the family relationship.”  (In 
re Salvador M., supra, at p. 1359.) 
We conclude that the present case, like Nicholas H. and Salvador M., is not 
“an appropriate action” in which to rebut the presumption of presumed parenthood 
with proof that Elisa is not the twins’ biological parent.  This is generally a matter 
within the discretion of the superior court (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th 588, 
606), but we need not remand the matter to permit the superior court to exercise its 
discretion because it would be an abuse of discretion to conclude that the 
presumption may be rebutted in the present case.  It is undisputed that Elisa 
actively consented to, and participated in, the artificial insemination of her partner 
with the understanding that the resulting child or children would be raised by 
Emily and her as coparents, and they did act as coparents for a substantial period 
of time.  Elisa received the twins into her home and held them out to the world as 
her natural children.  She gave the twins and the child to whom she had given birth 
the same surname, which was formed by joining her surname to her partner’s.  The 
twins were half siblings to the child to whom Elisa had given birth.  She breast fed 
all three children, claimed all three children as her dependents on her tax returns, 
and told a prospective employer that she had triplets.  Even at the hearing before 
the superior court, Elisa candidly testified that she considered herself to be the 
twins’ mother. 
Declaring that Elisa cannot be the twins’ parent and, thus, has no obligation 
to support them because she is not biologically related to them would produce a 
result similar to the situation we sought to avoid in Nicholas H. of leaving the 
child fatherless.  The twins in the present case have no father because they were 
conceived by means of artificial insemination using an anonymous semen donor.  
 
 
16
Rebutting the presumption that Elisa is the twin’s parent would leave them with 
only one parent and would deprive them of the support of their second parent.  
Because Emily is financially unable to support the twins, the financial burden of 
supporting the twins would be borne by the county, rather than Elisa. 
In establishing a system for a voluntary declaration of paternity in 
section 7570, the Legislature declared:  “There is a compelling state interest in 
establishing paternity for all children.  Establishing paternity is the first step 
toward a child support award, which, in turn, provides children with equal rights 
and access to benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, health 
insurance, survivors’ benefits, military benefits, and inheritance rights. . . .” 
By recognizing the value of determining paternity, the Legislature 
implicitly recognized the value of having two parents, rather than one, as a source 
of both emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation to support 
the child would otherwise fall to the public.  (See Librers v. Black (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 114, 123 [“whenever possible, a child should have the benefit of two 
parents to support and nurture him or her”]; In re Marriage of Pedregon (2003) 
107 Cal.App.4th 1284 [recognizing the importance to a child of having the support 
of two parents]; Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 662.) 
We observed in dicta in Nicholas H. that it would be appropriate to rebut 
the section 7611 presumption of parentage if “a court decides that the legal rights 
and obligations of parenthood should devolve upon an unwilling candidate.”  (In 
re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, 70.)  But we decline to apply our dicta in 
Nicholas H. here, because we did not consider in Nicholas H. a situation like that 
in the present case. 
Although Elisa presently is unwilling to accept the obligations of 
parenthood, this was not always so.  She actively assisted Emily in becoming 
 
 
17
pregnant with the expressed intention of enjoying the rights and accepting the 
responsibilities of parenting the resulting children.  She accepted those obligations 
and enjoyed those rights for years.  Elisa’s present unwillingness to accept her 
parental obligations does not affect her status as the children’s mother based upon 
her conduct during the first years of their lives. 
Further, our observation in Nicholas H. that the obligations of parenthood 
should not be forced upon an unwilling candidate who is not biologically related 
to the child must be understood in light of the circumstances before us in Nicholas 
H.  In that case, as noted above, the presumed father met the child’s mother when 
she was pregnant and voluntarily accepted the unborn child as his own.  When the 
child later was removed from the mother’s custody, the presumed father was 
denied custody of the child because he was not the child’s biological father. 
In the present case, Elisa did not meet Emily after she was pregnant, but 
rather was in a committed relationship with her when they decided to have 
children together.  Elisa actively assisted Emily in becoming pregnant, with the 
understanding that they would raise the resulting children together.  Having helped 
cause the children to be born, and having raised them as her own, Emily should 
not be permitted to later abandon the twins simply because her relationship with 
Emily dissolved. 
As we noted in the context of a husband who consented to the artificial 
insemination of his wife using an anonymous sperm donor, but later denied 
responsibility for the resulting child:  “One who consents to the production of a 
child cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but 
the arrangement must be of such character as to impose an obligation of 
supporting those for whose existence he is directly responsible.”  (People v. 
Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 285; Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 
 
 
18
171, 191.)  We observed that the “intent of the Legislature obviously was to 
include every child, legitimate or illegitimate, born or unborn, and enforce the 
obligation of support against the person who could be determined to be the lawful 
parent.”  (People v. Sorensen, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 284-285, fn. omitted.)  
Further:  “a reasonable man who, because of his inability to procreate, actively 
participates and consents to his wife’s artificial insemination in the hope that a 
child will be produced whom they will treat as their own, knows that such 
behavior carries with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and criminal 
responsibility for nonsupport. . . .  [I]t is safe to assume that without defendant’s 
active participation and consent the child would not have been procreated.”  (Id. at 
p. 285; see Dunkin v. Boskey, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.) 
We were careful in Nicholas H., therefore, not to suggest that every man 
who begins living with a woman when she is pregnant and continues to do so after 
the child is born necessarily becomes a presumed father of the child, even against 
his wishes.  The Legislature surely did not intend to punish a man like the one in 
Nicholas H. who voluntarily provides support for a child who was conceived 
before he met the mother, by transforming that act of kindness into a legal 
obligation. 
But our observation in Nicholas H. loses its force in a case like the one at 
bar in which the presumed mother under section 7611, subdivision (d), acted 
together with the birth mother to cause the child to be conceived.  In such 
circumstances, unlike the situation before us in Nicholas H., we believe the 
Legislature would have intended to impose upon the presumed father or mother 
the legal obligation to support the child whom she caused to be born.  As stated by 
amicus curiae the California State Association of Counties, representing all 58 
counties in California:  “A person who actively participates in bringing children 
 
 
19
into the world, takes the children into her home and holds them out as her own, 
and receives and enjoys the benefits of parenthood, should be responsible for the 
support of those children – regardless of her gender or sexual orientation.” 
We conclude, therefore, that Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins under 
section 7611, subdivision (d), because she received the children into her home and 
openly held them out as her natural children, and that this is not an appropriate 
action in which to rebut the presumption that Elisa is the twins’ parent with proof 
that she is not the children’s biological mother because she actively participated in 
causing the children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise 
the children as her own together with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted 
the rights and obligations of parenthood after the children were born, and there are 
no competing claims to her being the children’s second parent. 
Elisa relies upon the Court of Appeal decisions in Curiale v. Reagan (1990) 
222 Cal.App.3d 1597, Nancy S. v. Michele G. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 831, and 
West v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 302, for the proposition that “non-
biological partners from a same-sex relationship, who have not adopted their 
partners’ children, are deemed ‘nonparents’ for purposes of custody or visitation” 
and thus “must also be deemed nonparents for purposes of establishing child 
support orders for those same children.”  As we explain below, these decisions 
predated our recognition in Nicholas H. and Jesusa V. that a person with no 
biological relationship could be a presumed parent under section 7611, 
subdivision (d).  Accordingly, we do not find these cases persuasive. 
Curiale involved a situation similar to that in the present case in which two 
women in a lesbian relationship agreed that one of them “would conceive a child 
through artificial insemination and that the child would be raised by both of 
them.”  (Curiale v. Reagan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 1597, 1599.)  The couple’s 
 
 
20
relationship dissolved when the child was two years old, and the plaintiff filed “ ‘a 
complaint to establish de facto parent status/maternity and for custody and 
visitation.”  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s 
reliance upon the UPA, stating “it has no application where, as here, it is 
undisputed defendant is the natural mother of the child.  [Citation.]”  (Curiale v. 
Reagan, supra, at p. 1600.)  The decision, therefore, did not consider the 
applicability of the predecessor to section 7611, subdivision (d), which was former 
Civil Code section 7004 (Stats. 1987, ch. 192, § 1, p. 1155).  The court concluded, 
without discussion or explanation:  “The Legislature has not conferred upon one in 
plaintiff’s position, a nonparent in a same-sex bilateral relationship, any right of 
custody or visitation upon the termination of the relationship.”  (Curiale v. 
Reagan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1600.)  But the court’s reasoning was 
circular, because it began its analysis by assuming the plaintiff was a “nonparent” 
even though the issue to be decided was whether the plaintiff was a parent under 
the UPA. 
Nancy S. involved two women in a lesbian relationship who had two 
children by artificially inseminating Nancy on two occasions.  (Nancy S. v. 
Michele G., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 831, 834.)  Michele was listed on the birth 
certificates as the father and the children were given Michele’s family surname.  
The children referred to both Nancy and Michele as “mom.”  After the couple’s 
relationship dissolved, Nancy filed an action under the UPA to obtain a 
declaration that she was the sole parent of the children.  The Court of Appeal 
determined that Michele was not a parent under the UPA based in part on the 
circumstance that “[i]t is undisputed that [Michele] is not the natural mother” of 
the children.  (Nancy S., supra, at p. 836.)  Nancy S. was decided before we 
 
 
21
recognized in In re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, that “natural” as used in the 
UPA does not always mean “biological.”   
In West v. Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 302, two women in a 
lesbian relationship agreed that one of them, Barbara West, would conceive a 
child through artificial insemination and that the child would be raised by them 
jointly.  When the couple’s relationship ended, West’s partner, Pamela Lockrem, 
filed an action to be declared the child’s parent under the UPA.  The same Court 
of Appeal that had decided Curiale simply relied upon its earlier decision without 
providing additional authority or analysis and concluded that Lockrem had no 
parental relationship with the child. 
As noted above, we held in In re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, and In 
re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th 588, 604, that a natural parent within the meaning 
of the UPA could be a person with no biological connection to the child, and the 
Court of Appeal in In re Karen C., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 932, 938, held that a 
woman with no biological connection to a child could be a presumed mother 
under section 7611, subdivision (d).  Similarly, the Court of Appeal in In re 
Salvador M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357, held that a woman who was the 
half sister of a child could, nevertheless, be the child’s natural mother under the 
UPA.  The courts in Curiale v. Reagan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 1597, Nancy S. v. 
Michele G., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 831, and West v. Superior Court, supra, 59 
Cal.App.4th 302, did not have the benefit of this authority and did not consider the 
applicability of section 7611, subdivision (d) regarding presumed fathers.  
Accordingly, these decisions do not aid our analysis and we disapprove them to 
the extent they are inconsistent with the present opinion. 
 
 
22
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s decision.  I write separately to point out that, in 
my view, this court’s recent decision In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 
(Nicholas H.), which holds that a nonbiological father may nonetheless meet the 
statutory definition of a “presumed” father, makes the majority’s outcome in this 
case a foregone conclusion. 
I. 
 
Emily and Elisa began living as a couple in 1993.  Each woman wanted to 
bear her own child; eventually each underwent artificial insemination with sperm 
from the same donor so that their offspring would be genetically related.  In 1997, 
Elisa gave birth to a son, Chance.  In 1998, Emily gave birth to twins (son Ry and 
daughter Kaia).  Ry was born with serious health problems, including Down’s 
syndrome.  All three children were given the same hyphenated surname.  As they 
had planned, Emily stayed home and cared for the three children, while Elisa 
worked to support the family.  Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents 
for tax purposes and on an application for health insurance, and she described 
herself in a job interview as the mother of triplets. 
 
In late 1999, the couple separated, but for some time Elisa continued to pay 
rent and living expenses for Emily and the twins.  In December 1999, Emily began 
receiving public assistance from El Dorado County.  In May 2001, Elisa told 
Emily that because she no longer had a full-time job she could not continue to 
support Emily and the twins.  The next month, the county filed a petition in the 
 
 
2
superior court to determine that Elisa was a parent of the twins born to Emily, the 
first step in making Elisa financially responsible for them. 
 
The trial court, relying on this court’s test in Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 84 (the preconception intent to become a parent), ruled that Elisa had 
intended to bring about the birth of Emily’s children, and thus her obligation to 
them should be “the same legal duty and responsibility of a man found to be a 
presumed father”—that is, a man who has received a child into his home and 
openly held it out as his natural child.  (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).)1  It ordered 
Elisa to pay child support for the twins.  Elisa successfully petitioned the Court of 
Appeal for writ relief.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that under California’s 
statutory scheme Elisa was neither the natural nor the adoptive mother of her 
partner’s twins, nor could she be their father, and therefore Elisa had no legally 
recognized parental status with respect to the twins.  Accordingly, it directed the 
trial court to vacate the child support order. 
II. 
 
Under California law, a man “is presumed to be the natural father of a 
child” in various circumstances involving his marriage or attempted marriage to 
the child’s mother, or if he “receives the child into his home and openly holds out 
the child as his natural child.”  (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).)  Section 7650 
expressly directs that “[i]nsofar as practicable,” the provisions pertaining to the 
father and child relationship apply in determining the existence of a mother and 
child relationship.  (§ 7650.) 
 
In Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, this court held that a nonbiological 
father who receives a child into his home and holds the child out as his natural 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Family Code. 
 
 
3
child can be the “presumed” father of the child.  If a nonbiological father can by 
his conduct meet the statutory definition of a presumed father, then by parity of 
reasoning a nonbiological mother can become a presumed mother, as the majority 
concludes.  Here, Elisa became a presumed mother of the twins to which Emily 
gave birth when she both received the twins into her home and openly held them 
out as her natural children.  (§ 7611, subd. (d).) 
 
The legal presumption of fatherhood or motherhood created by receiving 
and holding out the child as one’s natural child “may be rebutted in an appropriate 
action only by clear and convincing evidence.”  (§ 7612, subd. (a).)  We 
concluded in Nicholas H, supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, that the action was not an 
appropriate one in which to allow rebuttal of the presumption, because the result 
there would have been to leave Nicholas fatherless. 
 
This case too is not “an appropriate action” in which to rebut the 
presumption of presumed motherhood.  (§ 7612, subd. (a).)  The county, which 
since 1999 has provided the twins with public financial assistance and medical 
care, brought on their behalf an action in superior court to establish their parentage 
as a predicate to obtaining a court order requiring Elisa to pay child support.  
Young Ry and Kaia, no less than any other children in this state, have a right to 
support from both their parents.  Those parents are Emily, as the biological 
mother, and Elisa, because she meets the statutory definition of a presumed 
mother.  To permit rebuttal of the legal presumption that Elisa is the presumed 
mother of the twins would leave the twins with the support of only one parent, 
Emily, who, until now, has been receiving financial support and medical care from 
the taxpayers of the county in which she and the twins reside.   
 
Had a man who, like Elisa, lacked any biological connection to the twins 
received them into his home and held them out as his natural children, this case 
 
 
4
would, under this court’s holding in Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, 
undoubtedly have resulted in a determination that he met the statutory criteria for 
being the presumed father of the twins.  These legal principles apply with equal 
force in this case, where Elisa, whom the county seeks to hold financially 
accountable for support of the twins, meets the statutory criteria of a presumed 
mother, a status that brings with it the benefits as well as the responsibilities of 
parenthood.  The flip side of a familiar adage comes to mind:  What is sauce for 
the gander is sauce for the goose.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Elisa B. v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 118 Cal.App.4th 966 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125912 
Date Filed: August 22, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: El Dorado 
Judge: Gregory W. Dwyer, Commissioner 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Hanke & Williams and Shelly L. Hanke for Petitioner. 
 
Liberty Counsel, Mathew D. Staver, Rena M. Lindevaldsen and Mary E. McAlister for Kristina Sica as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, James M. Humes, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Thomas R. Yanger, Assistant Attorney General, Frank S. Furtek, Mary 
Dahlberg, Margarita Altamirano and Kara Read-Spangler, Deputy Attorneys General; Louis B. Green, 
County Counsel, Edward L. Knapp, Chief Assistant County Counsel; Mary A. Roth; and May Jane 
Hamilton for Real Party in Interest County of El Dorado. 
 
National Center for Lesbian Rights, Shannon Minter and Courtney Joslin for Real Party in Interest Emily 
B. 
 
Valerie Ackerman and Shannan Wilber for National Center for Youth Law and Legal Services for Children 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Emily B. 
 
Alice Bussiere for The Center for Children’s Rights at Whittier Law School, The Legal Aid Foundation of 
Los Angeles, The National Center for Youth Law, The Youth Law Center and Joan Heifetz Hollinger and 
the Children’s Advocacy Project, Boalt Hall as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Emily B. 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S125912 – counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Jennifer C. Pizer and Amber Garza for Children of Lesbians and Gays Everywhere, Equality California, 
Family Matters, Family Pride Coalition, Growing Generations, Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Our Family Coalition, the Pop Luck Club and Southern 
California Assisted Reproduction Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Emily B. 
 
Debra Back Marley and Robert C. Fellmeth for Children’s Advocacy Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Real Party in Interest Emily B. 
 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Clare Pastore, Christine Sun; ACLU Foundation of Northern 
California, Alan Schlosser; ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, Jordan Budd, Elvira 
Cacciavillani; ACLU Foundation Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and James Esseks for the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties and the American Civil Liberties 
Union as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Emily B. 
 
Maxie Rheinheimer Stephens & Vrevich, Darin L. Wessel; Laura J. Maechtlen; and Vanessa H. Eisemann 
for Tom Homann Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Lesbian and Gay Lawyers 
Association of Los Angeles, and Sacramento Lawyers for the Equality of Gays and Lesbians as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest Emily B. and El Dorado County. 
 
Donna Wickham Furth; Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney and William A. Gould, Jr., for Northern 
California Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Counsel for Children and The 
California Psychological Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
Geragos & Geragos, Gregory R. Ellis; and Rebekah A. Frye for The Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
The San Fernando Valley Bar Association and its Family Law Center, The Family Law Section of the 
Beverly Hills Bar Association, The Bar Association of San Francisco, The Association of Certified Law 
Specialists and Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Ruth N. Borenstein and Johnathan E. Mansfield for California NOW, Inc., and 
California Women’s Law Center as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Shelly L. Hanke 
Hanke & Williams 
12437 Lewis Street, Suite 201 
Garden Grove, CA  92840 
(714) 750-5330 
 
Kara Read-Spangler 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-0356 
 
Courtney Joslin 
National Center for Lesbian Rights 
870 Market Street, Suite 370 
San Frnacisco, CA  94102 
(415) 392-6257 
 
Mary Jane Hamilton 
78 Coverted Bridge Road 
Carmichael, CA  95608 
(916) 487-9371