Title: Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Bd., No. 82136 
     (11/20/97) 
 
     NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
     filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to 
     modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the 
     mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip 
     opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this 
     matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official 
     copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's 
     Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
     action by the Court. 
 
            Docket No. 82136--Agenda 19--September 1997. 
          MICHAEL RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. THE ROCK ISLAND 
      COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al. (Susan Carpentier 
                        et al., Appellants). 
                  Opinion filed November 20, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
          The dispute in this constitutional law case centered on the 
     number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot to 
     dissolve a township. The Illinois Constitution provides that townships 
     may be dissolved, "when approved by a referendum in the total area in 
     which township officers are elected." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 5. 
     The Constitution, however, has left it to the General Assembly to 
     prescribe by statute the procedure for determining the validity and 
     sufficiency of a petition to initiate a referendum. Specifically on the 
     issue of signatures, the Township Code, at the time the petitions were 
     circulated, provided: 
                    "Upon the petition of at least 10% of the legal voters 
                    of any county, as determined on the date the petition is 
                    filed, that has adopted township organization, the county 
                    board shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters 
                    of the county, at the next general election, the question of 
                    the continuance of township organization." (Emphasis 
                    added.) 60 ILCS 1/25--5 (West 1996). 
     The circuit court of Rock Island County held that this provision of the 
     Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, because a 
     petitioner could not ascertain the number of signatures required prior 
     to filing since the minimum number of signatures was "determined on 
     the date the petition is filed," and thus created a moving target. 
          This case is before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
     302(a)(1), which authorizes direct appeals to this court from final 
     judgments of the circuit court in cases where a state statute is held 
     invalid. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1). The parties asked us to decide whether 
     the circuit court erred in holding that (1) the signature requirement in 
     the Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and (2) the prior law 
     therefore controlled the disposition of the case. For the reasons that 
     follow, we dismiss the appeal. 
 
                                I 
          Michael Richardson filed a petition to add a referendum to the 
     November 5, 1996, election ballot which would have allowed the general 
     population to vote on whether township government should be dissolved 
     in Rock Island County. Richardson had collected 9,913 signatures in 
     support of his petition. Susan Carpentier and six other individuals filed 
     an objection to the petition, challenging 2,484 of the signatures. After a 
     hearing, the Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board (Board) 
     concluded that the Township Code required a petitioner to collect 9,023 
     signatures to place a referendum on the ballot. The Board sustained 
     objections to 1,445 signatures in Richardson's petition and denied 
     Richardson's petition--with 8,468 valid signatures--because of an 
     insufficient number of signatures. 
          Richardson filed a petition for judicial review. After a hearing, the 
     circuit court held that the language of the Township Code (60 ILCS 
     1/25--5 (West 1996)) which fixed the number of required signatures to 
     10% of the registered voters as of the day the petition is filed was 
     unconstitutionally vague. In the absence of a valid Township Code 
     provision, the circuit court applied the following provision from the 
     Election Code: 
                    "Whenever this Code or another Statute requires 
                    that a nominating petition or a petition proposing a public 
                    question shall be signed by a specified percentage of the 
                    registered voters *** the total number of voters to which 
                    the percentage is applied shall be the number of voters 
                    who are registered *** on the date registration closed 
                    before the regular election next preceding the last day on 
                    which such petition may be filed in accordance with the 
                    general election law." 10 ILCS 5/3--1.3 (West 1996). 
     Under this formula, 9,020 signatures were required; the petition 
     contained only 8,468 valid signatures, and accordingly the circuit court 
     confirmed the Board's decision. 
          Richardson filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the 
     previous version of section 25--5 of the Township Code should be applied 
     rather than the Election Code. The circuit court agreed and set aside the 
     Board's decision. Under the earlier version of the Township Code, the 
     number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot was 
     10% of the votes cast in the preceding presidential election. Under this 
     formula, only 7,373 signatures were required. The circuit court ordered 
     that the referendum be placed on the ballot; Carpentier and the Board 
     filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court stayed the circuit court's 
     order and transferred the cause to this court under Supreme Court Rule 
     365, which permits the transfer of cases between the supreme court and 
     the appellate court when a case is appealed to the wrong court. 155 Ill. 
     2d R. 365. The case is properly before this court on a direct appeal from 
     a final judgment of the circuit court holding a state statute invalid. 134 
     Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because of the stay order, the petition to abolish 
     township government in Rock Island County did not appear on the 
     November 5, 1996, ballot. 
 
                               II 
          This appeal is now moot. The function of this court is to decide 
     controverted issues between real parties. An appeal is considered moot 
     when it " `presents or involves no actual controversy, interests or rights 
     of the parties, or where the issues have ceased to exist.' " First National 
     Bank v. Kusper,  98 Ill. 2d 226 , 233 (1983), quoting People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 278-79 (1949). The test for mootness is whether " `the issues 
     involved in the trial court no longer exist' because intervening events 
     *** [have] render[ed] it impossible for the [reviewing] court to grant the 
     complaining party effectual relief." In re A Minor,  127 Ill. 2d 247 , 255 
     (1989). 
          Here, the referendum in question did not appear on the ballot and 
     the election has long since come and past; there is then no relief which 
     this court can offer these parties. This fact alone would not necessarily 
     doom the appeal, however, because we review moot issues under the 
     public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Where there is a 
     substantial public or private question involved, where there is a need for 
     an authoritative determination for future guidance, and where the issue 
     is likely to recur, review is indicated. See People ex rel. Wallace v. 
     Labrenz,  411 Ill. 618 , 622 (1952); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 513 
     (1997). None of these factors, however, are present here. Since this 
     controversy arose, the Illinois General Assembly amended the provision 
     of the Township Code which was held invalid by the circuit court. The 
     Township Code now reads: 
                    "Upon the petition of at least 10% of the registered 
                    voters of each township of a county, as determined on the 
                    date registration closed before the regular election next 
                    preceding the last day on which the petition may be filed, 
                    that has adopted township organization, the county board 
                    shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters of the 
                    county, at the next general election, the question of the 
                    continuance of township organization." (Emphasis added.) 
                    Pub. Act 90--112, eff. January 1, 1998 (amending 60 ILCS 
                    1/25--5). 
     Where a challenged statute is amended to remove or to alter the 
     ostensibly unconstitutional language while the cause is pending, the 
     constitutional challenge to the statute becomes moot. Johnson v. Edgar, 
     176 Ill. 2d  at 511. Moreover, this amendment to the statute forecloses 
     the possibility that the issues presented in this appeal will recur in a 
     future case. Accordingly, this case is moot and does not fall within the 
     public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. 
          Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 
 
                                                Appeal dismissed.