Title: ROBERT JULIAN McCLURE, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT JULIAN McCLURE, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 112Case Number: S-09-0243Decided: 08/05/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ROBERT 
JULIAN McCLURE, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender 
Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Craig C. Cook, 
Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Cook.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Robert 
Julian McClure, Jr., appeals from the district court's order denying his motion 
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      McClure's sole 
issue on appeal is whether the procedural aspects of the hearing on his motion 
for new trial violated his constitutional or legal rights to be present and to 
confront witnesses opposing the motion.1

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of McClure's crime are not of any significance to the issue raised in this 
appeal, so we will not recite them in detail.  It suffices to note that, on January 8, 
2009, a fifteen-year-old female reported to authorities that McClure had 
sexually abused her on two occasions.  
The State ultimately charged McClure with two counts of second degree 
sexual abuse of a minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2009).2  In June 2009, a jury found McClure 
guilty on one of the charged offenses and acquitted him on the other 
charge.  The district court 
sentenced McClure to a term of imprisonment of three to seven years.  

 
 
[¶4]      On July 21, 2009, 
McClure filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The motion alleged the existence of 
evidence purportedly showing that the victim, in collusion with her parents, had 
fabricated the sexual abuse allegations.  
The district court set the matter for hearing on August 17, 2009.  

 
 
[¶5]      On August 14, the 
Friday immediately before the hearing, McClure's counsel filed a "Request for 
Transportation Order," asking the district court to issue an order directing the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary to transport McClure to Kemmerer for the motion 
hearing.  Based in part on the 
lateness of the request, the district court declined to issue the transportation 
order and, instead, opted to allow McClure to participate telephonically in the 
hearing, which McClure did.  McClure 
did not object to the district court's ruling or to the procedures 
employed.  

 
 
[¶6]      During the 
hearing, the district court heard testimony from seven witnesses, two of whom, 
including the victim, testified by telephone.  No objection was posed to the telephonic 
testimony of either witness.  The 
district court ultimately concluded that McClure's proffered evidence was 
inadequate to warrant a new trial and denied his motion.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      McClure contends 
he was denied both his right to be present and his right to confront witnesses 
against him when the district court held the hearing on his motion for new trial 
without his physical presence.  He 
also seemingly claims his right of confrontation was abridged when two witnesses 
were permitted to testify telephonically at the hearing.  McClure did not raise these claims 
before the district court and, consequently, our only avenue of review is under 
the doctrine of plain error.  Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 505, 509 (Wyo. 2009); Belden v. 
State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 55, 73 P.3d 1041, 1090 (Wyo. 2003); Fortner v. State, 932 P.2d 1283, 1286 
(Wyo. 1997).  Under the plain error 
doctrine, McClure must prove, by reference to the record, the existence of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way and resulting prejudice to a substantial right.  Snow, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d  at 509.   We find that McClure has not 
satisfied his burden.

 
 
[¶8]      McClure claims 
the right to be present at the hearing derives from the Sixth Amendment and the 
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2009) and 
W.R.Cr.P. 43.  However, the 
constitutional provisions requiring a defendant's presence pertain only to 
proceedings that are a part of, and are critical to the outcome of, the criminal 
prosecution.  United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 
526, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1985); DeMillard v. State, 2008 WY 93, ¶¶ 9, 
11, 190 P.3d 128, 130 (Wyo. 2008); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.2(a) (3d ed. 
2007).  McClure has not directed us 
to any authority that the constitutional right to be present extends to a 
hearing on a post-trial motion for a new trial.  Additionally, the right of presence as 
set forth in § 7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 43 applies to a defendant's initial 
appearance, arraignment and plea, every stage of trial, including the impaneling 
of the jury and the return of the verdict, and imposition of sentence.  By their terms, neither provision grants 
a defendant the right to be present at a hearing on a post-trial proceeding, 
including a motion for new trial.  
In short, McClure has not shown that he had a right, constitutional or 
otherwise, to be physically present at the hearing on his motion for new 
trial.

 
 
[¶9]      Similarly, 
McClure has not demonstrated that the procedures employed by the district court 
at the hearing  requiring him to appear by telephone and allowing two witnesses 
to testify telephonically  abridged his right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment.3  The decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court establish that the right to confrontation is a "trial" right.  See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1934-35, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (it is the "literal right to 
confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values 
furthered by the Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255) ("[t]he right to confrontation is basically a 
trial right"); see also Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987).  From these decisions, it is clear that 
the confrontation requirements mandated in a criminal trial are not applicable 
to the post-trial proceeding at issue here.

 
 
[¶10]   In sum, we are unable to conclude 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed in this instance.  Consequently, we cannot find the 
existence of plain error.  
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1McClure does not challenge, in any manner, the correctness of the 
district court's denial of his motion on the 
merits.

 
 

2§ 6-2-315(a)(i) states:

 
 
(a)        
Except under circumstances constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the 
first degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an actor commits the crime of sexual 
abuse of a minor in the second degree if:

(i)         
Being seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, 
and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the 
actor[.]

 
 

3The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . ."