Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10944 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RYAN JONES. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     November 10, 2017. - February 20, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Mental Impairment.  Developmentally Disabled Person.  
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment.  
Practice, Criminal, Competency to stand trial, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 17, 2006. 
 
 
A hearing on the defendant's competency to stand trial was 
held before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J., and the case was tried 
before Gary A. Nickerson, J. 
 
 
 
Brett J. Vottero for the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in the death of 
Valerie Oransky on July 22, 2006.  Prior to and during trial, 
the defendant maintained that he was not competent to stand 
 
 
2 
trial due to an organic brain injury he had suffered as an 
infant and a current diagnosis of pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified.  The defendant was the subject 
of competency hearings before five different Superior Court 
judges, and was found competent to stand trial at the first, 
third, fourth, and fifth hearings.  At trial, his defense was 
that he was not criminally responsible. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge who 
conducted his third competency hearing erred in finding him 
competent to stand trial notwithstanding testimony from both 
prosecution and defense experts that the defendant was not 
competent.  He also argues that a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole, imposed on a 
developmentally disabled individual, constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of Federal and State 
constitutional rights.  Finally, the defendant asks us to use 
our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a 
new trial or reduce the verdict.  For the reasons that follow, 
we affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our authority 
to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Procedural history.  In August, 2006, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant on one charge of murder in the first 
degree.  He was arraigned in the Superior Court in September, 
2006, and pleaded not guilty.  In October, 2007, defense counsel 
 
 
3 
filed a motion seeking an examination of the defendant for 
competency pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  The defendant 
was evaluated for competency in December, 2007, and was found 
competent to stand trial.  In January, 2008, the defendant was 
committed to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) for 
evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b), after providing 
notice that he intended to rely on a defense of a lack of 
criminal responsibility.  In February, Bridgewater sought an 
extension of the commitment, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). 
In January, 2009, shortly before the defendant's then-scheduled 
trial, the judge who was to have been the trial judge ordered 
the defendant again committed to Bridgewater for observation, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b).  Later that month, the 
Department of Mental Health filed a motion for an extension of 
the commitment.  That motion was allowed.  In March, 2009, 
following a competency hearing, a different judge found the 
defendant not competent to stand trial, stayed the trial, and 
ordered the defendant to be held in the Bristol County house of 
correction for a period of six months, with a status hearing to 
be conducted at that point.  In October, 2009, the Commonwealth 
sought a competency evaluation, and the judge who had ordered 
the defendant committed in January, 2009, again ordered him 
committed to Bridgewater for observation.  In February, 2010, 
after a competency hearing, that judge found the defendant 
 
 
4 
competent to stand trial.  In August, 2010, after a subsequent 
evaluation, another judge found the defendant competent.  During 
the course of the trial in October, 2010, the trial judge (who 
had not previously been involved in the case) ordered the 
defendant evaluated for competency based on his behavior in the 
court room and in a holding cell in the court house.  The judge 
then found the defendant competent.  At the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, 
the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
Overall, the defendant was the subject of four competency 
hearings prior to trial, and a fifth competency hearing during 
trial.  He was found competent to stand trial after the first 
hearing, incompetent at the second hearing, and competent at the 
third, fourth, and fifth hearings.1 
The judge instructed the jury on murder in the first degree 
on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, murder in the second degree, manslaughter, and the 
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.  The jury convicted 
                     
 
1 Further details of the competency proceedings are 
discussed infra, in our consideration of the defendant's 
challenge of the finding of competency at his third hearing. 
 
 
 
5 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.2 
2.  Trial.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving some facts for later discussion. 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  In July, 2006, the defendant was 
working as a dishwasher at a restaurant in Dartmouth.  He had 
been working at the restaurant for more than three years, and 
his performance was generally satisfactory, but he sometimes had 
disputes with the manager (victim) over his use of the 
dishwasher to wash pots and pans.  The defendant was supposed to 
use the dishwasher for silverware, glasses, and dishes, but was 
to wash pots and pans by hand.  The victim repeatedly told the 
defendant not to put the pots and pans in the dishwasher.  He 
often would do so anyway, and undertook various methods to 
conceal this from the victim.  The two argued about the use of 
the dishwasher on many occasions. 
At some point, the defendant began to express his anger 
about the victim's instructions on dishwashing to other 
employees.  The defendant told one coworker, "I'm going to kill 
that f'ing B."  Another coworker reported that, at least once a 
week, the defendant made gestures such as holding up his middle 
finger behind the victim's back.  Another coworker said that the 
                     
 
2 At sentencing, the judge ordered that prison authorities 
be apprised of the defendant's mental condition. 
 
 
6 
defendant would "have a bung[e]e cord in his hand and he would 
snap it like he was going to choke [the victim] with it."  
Approximately two weeks before the stabbing, the defendant told 
one of his coworkers that he was going to take the victim to the 
bathroom early in the morning before the restaurant got busy and 
stab or strangle her.  Several of the restaurant employees 
reported this statement to the victim, but she interpreted it as 
a joke. 
On July 22, 2006, the defendant arrived at work earlier 
than he did ordinarily.  He told the victim that something was 
wrong with one of the toilets, and they walked toward the 
women's restroom.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the 
restroom and told a coworker that she should telephone 911 
because someone had come through the back door with a knife and 
had stabbed the victim.  By the time paramedics arrived, the 
victim was not breathing.  She had been stabbed multiple times, 
strangled, and beaten.  The medical examiner determined that the 
cause of death was multiple stab wounds, with injury to the 
aorta, lung, and kidney, and blunt trauma with brain contusions.  
A knife, a bungee cord, and a pipe from the dishwasher were 
found in the bathroom stall where the victim's body was found.  
A membership card for a wholesale club with the name of someone 
who did not work for the restaurant also was found on the floor 
near the victim. 
 
 
7 
While many of the defendant's coworkers were visibly upset 
at news of what had happened to the victim, the defendant was 
described as being calm.  One of his coworkers noticed that he 
had blood spots on his face and glasses and was hiding his left 
hand.  The defendant told some coworkers and the investigating 
officers that the perpetrator was a black man wearing a white 
shirt, black pants, a dark hooded sweatshirt, white sneakers, 
leather gloves, and a black mask.  He said that the man had come 
through the back door with a knife and initially tried to stab 
him, before stabbing the victim and running out the back door.  
Some of the defendant's coworkers immediately left the 
restaurant to look for the perpetrator; they were unable to find 
anyone matching the defendant's description.  A police officer 
with a canine trained to track scents also was unable to locate 
the suspect the defendant had described. 
Several restaurant employees had seen the defendant heading 
toward the bathroom with the victim, and the investigation 
almost immediately focused on the defendant.  Dartmouth police 
officers brought the defendant to the police station on the day 
of the stabbing and interviewed him for a number of hours.  The 
defendant initially told police the same thing he had said at 
the scene, that an unknown man had burst in through the back 
door and stabbed the victim.  The defendant had visible cuts on 
one hand and on his left side, which he said he had sustained 
 
 
8 
when he attempted to defend himself from the victim's assailant.  
Ultimately, after what the investigating officer described as 
"confrontational" questioning, the defendant told police that he 
had stabbed the victim; it was a "mistake," but he did not know 
"what else . . . he [was] going to do" because she kept 
"nagging" him. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests on the blood found on the 
defendant's glasses, socks, and watch matched the victim.  The 
defendant was a potential contributor to blood found on the 
knife, a handicapped stall in the women's bathroom that had its 
own sink, and the wholesale club card. 
b.  Defendant's case.  After the Commonwealth rested its 
case-in-chief, Dr. Ronald Ebert, a forensic psychologist, 
testified as to the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility 
on the day of the homicide.  The defendant's father also 
testified to the defendant's medical history, his developmental 
issues, and his attendance at special education courses 
throughout his schooling. 
The father provided background information on the 
defendant's mother's medical condition during pregnancy (a 
uterine infection), the defendant's hospitalization and coma as 
a result of spinal meningitis when he was six months old, and 
the first signs of the defendant's developmental deficits, when 
he was approximately two and one-half years old.  The father 
 
 
9 
described the defendant as testing above age level for certain 
skills and "well behind" for others.  Although he was placed in 
a special needs program, his ability to communicate verbally 
with others was "minuscule" and he was resistant to change.  The 
defendant's seizure disorder first became apparent when he was 
in first or second grade.  The defendant resisted taking his 
seizure medication and was hospitalized at least three times 
because of seizures. 
In elementary school, the defendant would at times act 
inappropriately, throwing tantrums and sometimes barking and 
crawling around on all fours.  The defendant was prescribed 
medication for attention deficit disorder.  In fourth grade, the 
defendant transferred to a new school, where he was regularly 
bullied and beaten up by older students.  After that, the 
defendant began to shut down and interacted with others even 
less.  The defendant's parents were separated when he was ten 
years old, and were divorced when he was thirteen; after the 
separation, he lived primarily with his mother.  In high school, 
also in a special needs program, the defendant had "decent" 
grades and did well in writing, while still demonstrating 
difficulties with verbal communication. 
After graduation, the defendant worked for brief periods at 
a number of jobs that he obtained through an agency that helped 
disabled people get jobs and then provided job coaching.  He 
 
 
10 
also qualified for supplemental security income benefits because 
of his development delays and seizure disorder.  The dishwasher 
position at the restaurant was the defendant's first long-term 
job.  The defendant's father drove him to work in the morning, 
and his mother picked him up in the afternoon; his father picked 
him up when his mother could not.  The defendant's father would 
take the defendant to a movie almost every week and noted that 
there were times when the defendant was unable to distinguish 
between the fictional people and events in the movies and 
reality. 
Ebert testified to the defendant's medical and educational 
history, and to the defendant's probable mental state at the 
time of the crime.  Based on interviews with the defendant, 
reviews of past records, neurological testing, and other 
information, Ebert concluded that, at the time of the stabbing, 
the defendant had been suffering from a mental defect that 
impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the law or to 
appreciate the criminality of his actions.  Ebert testified that 
the defendant suffers from pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified, which is a variation of autism.3  Although 
                     
 
3 The version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders in effect at the time of the defendant's 
diagnosis, the DSM-IV, defines pervasive developmental disorder 
not otherwise specified as 
 
 
 
11 
there was evidence that the defendant had planned the crime in 
advance, it was a result of his disability, and he had been 
unable to control his thought processes or behavior. 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. Karin Towers, a 
forensic psychologist who also had interviewed the defendant and 
had reviewed the relevant records while working as a forensic 
evaluator at Bridgewater.  Towers testified that, in her 
opinion, the defendant understood the wrongfulness of his 
actions and had substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law despite his pervasive developmental 
disorder.  She noted that the defendant had made decisions to 
take the victim into the bathroom where no one could see what 
was happening and to fabricate the story of the unknown 
assailant.  The defendant also told Towers that he had 
                                                                  
"a severe and pervasive impairment in the development of 
reciprocal social interaction associated with impairment in 
either verbal or nonverbal communication skills or with the 
presence of stereotyped behavior, interests and activities 
where the criteria are not met for a specific Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder, or Avoidant Personality Disorder." 
 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 84 (4th ed. 2000). 
 
 
The DSM-IV indicates that "this category includes 'atypical 
autism.'"  Id.  The most recent edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-V, notes that 
"[i]ndividuals with a well-established DSM-IV diagnosis of . . . 
pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified should 
be given the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder."  American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders 51 (5th ed. 2013). 
 
 
12 
considered whether to take the knife with him or to leave it, 
and that, previously, he had controlled his anger toward the 
victim. 
3.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
raises two claims.  First, he challenges the finding that he was 
competent to stand trial.  He focuses particularly on the third 
competency hearing, and contends that it was error for the judge 
to find him competent given that both the prosecution and 
defense experts testified that he was not competent.  Second, 
the defendant challenges the imposition of a mandatory sentence 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a 
developmentally disabled person; he argues that such a sentence 
is a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. 
a.  Finding of competency.  The defendant specifically 
challenges the finding of competency after the third hearing.  
To review adequately the appropriateness of the finding of 
competency to stand trial at the third hearing, it is necessary 
to consider the psychiatric evaluations, the previous hearings, 
and testimony prior to the judge's decision, as well as the two 
competency hearings that took place after the third hearing. 
i.  Initial evaluations and proceedings.  Following his 
arraignment, the defendant was ordered to be examined for 
 
 
13 
competency pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  In anticipation 
of the competency hearings, the defendant met with multiple 
clinicians, who also reviewed his medical and educational 
history.  Notably, the defendant contracted spinal meningitis 
when he was six months old; he was hospitalized for several 
weeks, first in a "stupor" and later in a coma.  The illness 
resulted in permanent, organic brain injury.  In addition, he 
has suffered from a seizure disorder since he was a very young 
child.  While the defendant has tested as being in the 
borderline to low-average range on intelligence quotient (IQ) 
tests, he has demonstrated significant impairment in language 
processing and verbal communication and understanding from the 
age of two years old.  He has had difficulty in interacting with 
people, was bullied as a child because of his lack of social 
skills and inability to communicate, and exhibited outbursts and 
uncontrollable behavior as a child.  The defendant initially was 
diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and oppositional 
defiant disorder, and was treated with medication for 
hyperactivity.  The defendant attended special education classes 
throughout his school career, but was able to graduate from high 
school. 
The general consensus of all the experts who testified at 
the competency hearings, as well as many of the clinicians who 
examined him as a child and as a teenager, was that the 
 
 
14 
defendant suffers from what is now known as "pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified." 
Ebert evaluated the defendant in January, 2007, at the 
request of the defendant's attorney; Ebert's October, 2007, 
report was considered at all the pretrial competency hearings.  
Ebert also referred the defendant to Dr. Nancy Hebben for a 
neuropsychological evaluation; Hebben conducted an evaluation of 
the defendant in May, 2007.  Ebert testified at the second, 
third, and fourth competency hearings, and at trial, on behalf 
of the defendant.  Dr. Karin Towers and Dr. Sara Beszterczey 
performed evaluations as ordered by the court; their reports 
were also reviewed in conjunction with each of the competency 
hearings. 
Hebben administered a series of tests during the 
neuropsychological evaluation, which she described in her 
report.  The defendant tested "low normal" or "borderline" in 
many areas of cognitive functioning, but demonstrated a 
significant deficit in verbal comprehension ability.  
Considering all of the results in concert, she concluded that 
the defendant's most appropriate diagnosis was pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified, given his 
impairments in verbal comprehension and social interaction.  
Ebert had reached the same diagnosis.  He also determined that 
the defendant suffered from deficits in receptive and expressive 
 
 
15 
language, poor social skills, and rigidity in his behavior and 
interests.  Ebert concluded that, because of these impairments 
and the defendant's inability rationally to understand the 
proceedings against him and to assist his attorney, the 
defendant was not competent to stand trial.  While the defendant 
could explain theoretically some of the roles of the 
participants at a trial, he had difficulty in attempting to 
apply those general concepts to his own situation, suggesting, 
for example, that if he apologized for his behavior he could go 
home. 
At the first competency hearing, in December, 2007, a court 
clinician, Dr. Barbara McElroy, testified, based on a brief 
interview with the defendant and the reports by Ebert and 
Hebben, that the defendant had a factual and rational 
understanding of the proceedings against him and therefore was 
competent to stand trial.  McElroy indicated that she had two 
main concerns:  the defendant was not aware of the specific 
charges he was facing, and did not seem to understand the 
concept of plea bargains.  McElroy concluded, however, that her 
concerns were minor overall, and that they could be addressed 
with continued education of the defendant by his attorney.  To 
support this finding, she noted that the defendant had a better 
understanding when she met with him than he did when he 
 
 
16 
initially was evaluated by Ebert in January, 2007.  The judge 
found the defendant competent. 
The case was assigned for trial in January, 2009.  At the 
end of December, 2008, the defendant requested another 
competency examination.  After an evaluation, a licensed 
psychologist recommended further evaluation, and the defendant 
was committed to Bridgewater for observation, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, § 15 (b).  In January, 2009, the Department of Mental 
Health moved to extend the commitment, and a different Superior 
Court judge allowed the motion.  In February, 2009, Towers 
conducted an evaluation of the defendant as ordered by the court 
In February, 2009, Towers issued a report in which she noted 
that the defendant possessed a superficial understanding of 
court proceedings, but that it was unclear whether he truly 
understood.  A second competency hearing was scheduled. 
At the second hearing, in March, 2009, Towers and Ebert 
both testified that the defendant had a basic factual 
understanding, but that they were concerned about his ability to 
make decisions rationally regarding his case.  At times, the 
defendant would answer their questions without fully 
understanding what was being asked.  Towers opined that the 
defendant might be able to overcome his deficits through 
continued education.  Ebert disagreed, testifying that, although 
the defendant could repeat information given to him, his 
 
 
17 
processing of the information and his beliefs would not 
necessarily change in response to new information.  As an 
example, Ebert referred to the defendant's belief that he would 
be able to go home if he apologized to the judge.  The judge 
noted the difference in the experts' opinions as to possible 
future competency, but concluded based on the consensus of 
Towers and Ebert that the defendant was at that time not 
competent to stand trial. 
ii.  Determination of competency at the third hearing.  The 
third competency hearing took place over the course of three 
days in January and February, 2010.  In October, 2009, 
Beszterczey performed an evaluation of the defendant as ordered 
by the court.  She and Ebert testified at the hearing, along 
with three of the defendant's former coworkers and the 
defendant's former job coach.  The lay witnesses testified that, 
other than his decision to put pots and pans in the dishwasher, 
the defendant was able to perform his job well, and that they 
occasionally would have casual conversations with him.  Ebert 
again opined that the defendant was not competent to stand 
trial.  Beszterczey commented that she believed the defendant 
might not be cooperating fully, interfering with her ability to 
complete a full competency interview, but she did not think that 
any potential malingering necessarily meant that the defendant 
was competent.  She concluded that the defendant was presenting 
 
 
18 
with significant deficits in abilities associated with 
competency to stand trial, but that it was possible he could 
become competent with further education. 
In a nine-page memorandum and order, a judge who had not 
previously been involved in the case ruled that the defendant 
was competent to stand trial.  The judge pointed to the 
defendant's low-average IQ score; his "satisfactory three[-]year 
job history, where he impressed his [coworkers] by his diligence 
and essential normality"; the experts' testimony that the 
defendant's diagnosis had not changed since the time of the 
killing; and the comments in Beszterczey's evaluation about 
potential malingering. 
iii.  Final pretrial competency hearing.  Approximately six 
months later, during a hearing before a different judge, defense 
counsel requested another competency hearing.  The defendant was 
examined for competency for a fourth time at the end of August, 
2010.  Dr. Leah Logan, a court-based clinical psychologist, 
testified after reviewing the defendant's records and meeting 
with him for approximately one hour.  Logan concluded that, 
while the defendant had needed some questions explained again in 
simpler terms, he did not have significant deficits, and there 
was no evidence that his condition had deteriorated since the 
previous hearing.  She suggested that any deficits in 
understanding the defendant did have could be overcome through 
 
 
19 
communication with his attorney, repetition and further 
explanation, and sufficient time for him to process and 
understand questions he might be asked on cross-examination.  
The judge determined that there had been no material change 
since the previous hearing, and therefore that the defendant was 
still competent to stand trial.  He found that the defendant's 
acknowledged mental impairments did not affect his competency, 
and that any potential issues could be addressed through 
preparation prior to trial. 
iv.  Midtrial competency hearing.  On the third day of 
trial, after the audio-video recording of the defendant's 
interrogation was played for the jury, a court officer reported 
to the judge that, during the lunch break, the defendant had 
begun apparently interacting with an invisible dog.  The judge 
became concerned that the defendant might be decompensating, and 
decided to bring in the court clinician to examine the 
defendant, and to review whatever records the clinician felt 
necessary, in order to determine whether the defendant remained 
competent.  On inquiry by the judge, the defendant's attorney 
observed that the defendant seemed to "decompensate" more in 
times of stress, and had been manifesting small signs of stress, 
such as writing notes to himself and repeating words, while 
sitting at counsel table during and after the playing of the 
recording of the interview. 
 
 
20 
The defendant was examined briefly by Logan.  She testified 
that she thought the defendant wanted the judge and the 
attorneys to believe that he was seeing a dog, but that she 
thought he was not actually having a visual hallucination.  She 
concluded that the defendant was simply experiencing stress, and 
provided some recommendations for measures that the defendant 
might use to handle the trial environment.  The judge concluded, 
with an oral explanation on the record, that the Commonwealth 
had fulfilled its burden of proving competency by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  In reaching that finding, he 
noted that Logan was a clinical psychologist with forensic 
experience who was aware of the defendant's history.  The judge 
additionally relied on his own observations of the defendant 
over the course of the trial, as well as during the competency 
hearing, and the reports and findings from the previous 
competency hearings. 
v.  Whether the Commonwealth established the defendant's 
competency to stand trial.  The defendant appeals from the 
finding of competency at the third hearing; he contends that the 
judge abused his discretion by disregarding the experts' 
consensus that the defendant was not at that time competent to 
stand trial.  The defendant additionally contends that the judge 
inappropriately relied on evidence from lay witnesses, who could 
testify to the defendant's behavior only at the time of the 
 
 
21 
incident and not at the time of the competency hearing, and that 
the judge used an improper balancing test by considering the 
public interest in the prosecution of those who commit crimes to 
be of equal significance to the due process concern of 
competency to stand trial. 
"It has long been accepted that a person whose mental 
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be 
subjected to a trial."  Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 
398 (1984), quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).  
In the Commonwealth, G. L. c. 123, § 15, allows the examination 
of a defendant whose competency is called into question.4  If a 
trial judge doubts whether a defendant is competent to stand 
trial, he or she must, on his or her own initiative, conduct a 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 123, § 15 (a), provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Whenever a court of competent jurisdiction doubts 
whether a defendant in a criminal case is competent to 
stand trial or is criminally responsible by reason of 
mental illness or mental defect, it may at any stage of the 
proceedings after the return of an indictment or the 
issuance of a criminal complaint against the defendant, 
order an examination of such defendant to be conducted by 
one or more qualified physicians or one or more qualified 
psychologists. . . .  When an examination is ordered, the 
court shall instruct the examining physician or 
psychologist in the law for determining mental competence 
to stand trial and criminal responsibility." 
 
 
 
22 
full hearing.5  See Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 388 Mass. 246, 250 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Scionti, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 272-273 
(2012).  At a competency hearing, the judge should determine 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 123, § 15 (b), (c), provide, in relevant 
part: 
 
 
"(b) After the examination described in paragraph (a), 
the court may order that the person be hospitalized at a 
facility or, if such person is a male and appears to 
require strict security, at the Bridgewater state hospital, 
for a period not to exceed twenty days for observation and 
further examination, if the court has reason to believe 
that such observation and further examination are necessary 
in order to determine whether mental illness or mental 
defect have so affected a person that he is not competent 
to stand trial or not criminally responsible for the crime 
or crimes with which he has been charged. . . .  If, before 
the expiration of such twenty day period, an examining 
qualified physician or an examining qualified psychologist 
believes that observation for more than twenty days is 
necessary, he shall so notify the court and shall request 
in writing an extension of the twenty day period, 
specifying the reason or reasons for which such further 
observation is necessary.  Upon the receipt of such 
request, the court may extend said observation period, but 
in no event shall the period exceed forty days from the 
date of the initial court order of hospitalization; 
provided, however, if the person requests continued care 
and treatment during the pendency of the criminal 
proceedings against him and the superintendent or medical 
director agrees to provide such care and treatment, the 
court may order the further hospitalization of such person 
at the facility or the Bridgewater state hospital. 
 
 
"(c) At the conclusion of the examination or the 
observation period, the examining physician or psychologist 
shall forthwith give to the court written signed reports of 
their findings, including the clinical findings bearing on 
the issue of competence to stand trial or criminal 
responsibility.  Such reports shall also contain an 
opinion, supported by clinical findings, as to whether the 
defendant is in need of treatment and care offered by the 
[Department of Mental Health]." 
 
 
23 
whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and . . . a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him."6  Commonwealth v. 
Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971), quoting Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).  The Commonwealth has the 
burden to prove competency by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Crowley, 393 Mass. at 400-401.  A judge's competency 
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo, 427 Mass. 464, 468-469 (1998). 
In reaching such a determination, judges may consider their 
own "observations of the defendant's demeanor and behavior 
. . . , reports of psychiatric examinations of the defendant, 
statements to the judge about the defendant's conduct and mental 
condition, and the testimony of expert witnesses."  Commonwealth 
v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 54-55 (1978).  Observations made closest 
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 123, § 15 (d), provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"If on the basis of such reports the court is 
satisfied that the defendant is competent to stand trial, 
the case shall continue according to the usual course of 
criminal proceedings; otherwise the court shall hold a 
hearing on whether the defendant is competent to stand 
trial; provided that at any time before trial any party to 
the case may request a hearing on whether the defendant is 
competent to stand trial.  A finding of incompetency shall 
require a preponderance of the evidence.  If the defendant 
is found incompetent to stand trial, trial of the case 
shall be stayed until such time as the defendant becomes 
competent to stand trial, unless the case is dismissed." 
 
 
24 
to the time of trial are the most appropriate in determining 
competency.  See Commonwealth v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 52 
(2005) ("The time frame for determining a defendant's competency 
to stand trial is 'the condition of the defendant at the time of 
trial'" [citation omitted]). 
While it may be useful for a judge to hear opinions from 
medical experts, the determination is ultimately a legal, not a 
medical, judgment.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 
(1997) (noting that legal definition of "competency" need not 
mirror its medical definition).  "The law should not, and does 
not, give the opinions of experts on either side of . . . [an] 
issue the benefit of conclusiveness."  Commonwealth v. DiMinico, 
408 Mass. 230, 235 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Lamb, 372 
Mass. 17, 24 (1977).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 
574, 579 (1993) (fact finders are not required to accept 
"uncontroverted testimony of experts"); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 
381 Mass. 340, 347 (1980) (fact finder is "not obliged to 
believe the testimony of any of the expert witnesses"). 
The judge who conducted the third competency hearing had 
the authority to exercise his discretion and choose not to 
credit the experts' conclusions that the defendant was not 
competent.  He used the correct standard to determine 
competency, appropriately placed the burden on the Commonwealth 
to prove competency by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
 
 
25 
wrote a thorough memorandum explaining the reasons for his 
conclusion.  Moreover, after that hearing, at subsequent 
hearings, two other judges found the defendant competent to 
stand trial.  Because competency may be fluid and should be 
determined as close to trial as possible, it is most significant 
that the defendant was found competent in a hearing during the 
trial.  In sum, we discern no error in the judge's determination 
at the third competency hearing. 
b.  Mandatory imposition of life sentence without 
possibility of parole on a developmentally disabled defendant.  
The defendant argues also that the mandatory imposition of a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
on a defendant who is developmentally disabled constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and cruel or unusual punishment under art. 26.  The 
defendant asks that we extend the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), that 
imposition of the death penalty on a person with an intellectual 
disability violates the United States Constitution,7 to 
imposition of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
                     
 
7 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), uses the language 
"mentally retarded."  That term subsequently has been replaced 
by the term "intellectually disabled."  See Hall v. Florida, 134 
S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014); Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 
350, 357 (2015); Pub. L. 111–256, 111th Cong., 124 Stat. 2643 
(2010) (Rosa's Law). 
 
 
 
26 
possibility of parole on defendants with developmental 
disabilities.8 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 123B, § 1, distinguishes between 
intellectual and developmental disabilities as follows: 
 
 
"[A] [p]erson with a developmental disability [is] (1) 
an individual [five] years of age or older with a severe, 
chronic disability that:  (i) is attributable to a mental 
or physical impairment resulting from intellectual 
disability, autism, [S]mith-[M]agenis syndrome or Prader-
Willi syndrome; (ii) is manifested before the individual 
attains age [twenty-two]; (iii) is likely to continue 
indefinitely; (iv) results in substantial functional 
limitations in [three] or more of the following areas of 
major life activity:  (1) self-care; (2) receptive and 
expressive language; (3) learning; (4) mobility; (5) self-
direction; (6) capacity for independent living; and (7) 
economic self-sufficiency; and (v) reflects the 
individual's need for a combination and sequence of 
special, interdisciplinary or generic services, supports or 
other assistance that is of a lifelong or extended duration 
and is individually planned and coordinated; or (2) an 
individual under the age of [five] who has a substantial 
developmental delay or specific congenital or acquired 
condition with a high probability that the condition will 
result in a developmental disability if services are not 
provided. . . ." 
 
 
"[A] [p]erson with an intellectual disability [is] a 
person who has an intellectual disability, characterized by 
significant limitations in both intellectual functioning 
and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social 
and practical adaptive skills and beginning before age 18, 
and consistent with the most recent definition provided by 
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities; provided, that in applying this definition 
the following shall be considered: (i) limitations in 
present functioning within the context of community 
environments typical of the individual's age, peers and 
culture; (ii) cultural and linguistic diversity and 
differences in communication, sensory, motor and behavioral 
factors; (iii) limitations often coexist with strengths 
within an individual; (iv) an important purpose of 
describing limitations is to develop a profile of needed 
 
 
27 
In support of this argument, the defendant relies on cases 
from the United States Supreme Court holding that imposition of 
the death penalty on juveniles is unconstitutional, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); that a mandatory sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses 
committed by juveniles violates the Federal Constitution, Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); and that a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
juveniles who commit murder is unconstitutional, Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012).  We have extended the Court's 
holding in Miller, supra, in deciding that even the 
discretionary imposition of a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole on juveniles is in violation of art. 26.  
See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 
Mass. 655, 674 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015). 
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant's argument 
would require significant extrapolation from existing precedent, 
given that the defendant is not a juvenile and is not subject to 
the death penalty; there is no precedent in this court or the 
United States Supreme Court concerning prison sentences for 
developmentally disabled individuals.  Furthermore, the 
                                                                  
supports; and (v) with appropriate personalized supports 
over a sustained period, the life functioning of a person 
with an intellectual disability will generally 
improve . . . ." 
 
 
28 
Commonwealth argues, adults with intellectual or developmental 
disabilities may not have the same prospects for rehabilitation 
as do juveniles, whose brains have not yet fully matured.  The 
Commonwealth maintains that much of the reasoning underlying the 
United States Supreme Court's and this court's jurisprudence on 
sentences for juveniles does not apply in this case because, 
unlike juveniles, who act impulsively and are unduly influenced 
by others due to their lack of maturity, the defendant has an 
immutable condition, did not act impulsively, and was not unduly 
influenced by others. 
The Eighth Amendment and art. 26 "draw [their] meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-312, quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  See Diatchenko, supra at 669; 
Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 385 Mass. 421, 435 (1982) 
("Article 26, like the Eighth Amendment, bars punishments which 
are 'unacceptable under contemporary moral standards'" [citation 
omitted]).  In deciding whether a punishment is cruel and 
unusual, courts look to "'objective indicia of society's 
standards' . . . to determine whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue."  Graham, 
560 U.S. at 61, quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563.  See 
Good v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329, 335 (1994) 
("In divining contemporary standards of decency, we may look to 
 
 
29 
State statutes and regulations, which reflect the public 
attitude as to what those standards are").  Courts also 
"determine in the exercise of [their] own independent judgment 
whether the punishment in question violates" contemporary moral 
standards to the extent that it is a constitutional violation.  
See Graham, supra. 
"[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's 
legislatures" (quotations and citation omitted).  Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 312.  Courts that have addressed this issue to date have 
declined to extend Atkins, supra, and Miller, supra, to disallow 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for people with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities, largely in 
unpublished or unreported opinions.  See State v. Little, 200 
So. 3d 400, 405 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (rejecting downward 
departure from mandatory sentence of life without parole for 
defendant with developmental disability).  See also Pifer, Is 
Life the Same as Death?:  Implications of Graham v. Florida, 
Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole 
Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally Retarded Offenders, 43 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 1495 (2010). 
This court has "the inherent authority to interpret [S]tate 
constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to 
individual rights than do similar provisions of the United 
 
 
30 
States Constitution" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 668.  We did so in Diatchenko, supra at 
669, where we held that "the imposition of a sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for the commission of 
murder in the first degree by a juvenile under the age of 
eighteen is disproportionate not with respect to the offense 
itself, but with regard to the particular offender."  In that 
case, we considered scientific evidence on adolescent brain 
development and how it may affect a juvenile's personality and 
behavior.  Id. at 669-671. 
Similarly, in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, the United States 
Supreme Court determined that intellectually disabled 
individuals "have diminished capacities to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes 
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others," 
leading them to be less culpable than other offenders.  The 
Court therefore focused on two reasons categorically to exclude 
individuals with intellectual disabilities from execution.  Id. 
at 318.  First, neither justification for the death penalty, 
retribution or deterrence, applies to intellectually disabled 
defendants.  Id. at 318-319.  Because intellectually disabled 
individuals are less culpable, their actions do not merit that 
level of retribution, and their impairments make it less likely 
 
 
31 
that they can be deterred by the possibility of the death 
penalty.  Id. at 319-320.  Second, intellectually disabled 
individuals may receive the death penalty more frequently than 
they should, based on the facts of their cases, because of the 
increased possibility of false confessions and the lesser 
ability of intellectually disabled defendants to make a 
persuasive showing of mitigation.  Id. at 320-321.  These 
concerns are less extreme, however, when an individual is facing 
a prison sentence, even when it is life without parole, than 
when an individual faces the death penalty. 
At this time, we decline to extend Atkins, supra, and 
Miller, supra, either to eliminate sentences of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole for people with developmental 
disabilities or to require that such sentences be discretionary 
rather than mandatory.  Whether it is cruel and unusual under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments or cruel or unusual under 
art. 26 to impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole on 
a person with an intellectual disability is a difficult question 
that is not before us here, where the defendant has been 
diagnosed with a developmental disability. 
c.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
asks that we exercise our extraordinary power pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the verdict to 
murder in the second degree.  After carefully reviewing the 
 
 
32 
record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we 
decline to set aside the verdict or to reduce the degree of 
guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.