Title: RUNGE v WATTS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14313 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 THOMAS KENT RUNGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, CECIL T. WATTS, JR., as Special Administrator of the estate of David Allen Watts, Deceased; CECIL T. WATTS, JR., individually MARLENE WATTS, his wife; and DORIS M. POPPLER, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Krutzfeldt and Haker, Miles City, Montana William J. Krutzfeldt argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondents: Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana McNamer, Thompson and Cashmore, Billings, Montana Charles R. Cashmore argued, Billings, Montana Filed: Submitted: December 18, 1978 Decided : JArI 1 : 1 : ; s M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f brought t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n Yellowstone County a l l e g i n g negligence on t h e p a r t of defendant i n serving alcohol t o a minor whose i n t o x i c a t i o n allegedly r e s u l t e d i n a c a r accident causing p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. P l a i n t i f f appeals from an order and judgment dismissing h i s complaint a g a i n s t defendant Poppler on t h e ground t h a t it f a i l s t o state a claim upon which r e l i e f can be granted. O n April 26, 1975, David Allen Watts, then a minor, attended a party a t t h e home of defendant, Doris Poppler, and drank some beer, allegedly furnished by defendant. P l a i n t i f f , Thomas Runge, l e f t t h e party with Watts and w a s subsequently injured when Watts' c a r l e f t t h e road and struck a u t i l i t y pole. The i s s u e presented f o r review is whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m a g a i n s t defen- dant, Doris M. Poppler. Stated another way, does Montana recognize a claim f o r r e l i e f a g a i n s t one furnishing l i q u o r t o a minor i n favor of those injured a s a consequence of t h e minor's intoxication? P l a i n t i f f seeks t o impose l i a b i l i t y upon defendant Poppler on t h e b a s i s of common law p r i n c i p l e s of negligence and negligence -- per se. Defendant argues t h a t i n the absence of a s p e c i a l dramshop a c t s p e c i f i c a l l y c r e a t i n g a c i v i l remedy and c i v i l cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l purveyor of intoxicants, no remedy o r cause of a c t i o n can be maintained. I n r e c e n t months t h i s Court has had two opportunities t o address t h e i s s u e of t h e l i a b i l i t y of one furnishing alcoholic beverages t o a person who subsequently s u s t a i n s i n j u r i e s by v i r t u e of the resulting intoxication. Swartzen- berger v. Billings Labor Temple Association (1978), Mont. , 586 P.2d 712, 35 St.Rep. 1625; Folda v. City of Bozeman (1978), Mont. , 582 P.2d 767, 35 S t . Rep. 1019. I n each of those cases, however, the p l a i n t i f f ' s recovery was barred by h i s own contributory negligence. In contrast the i n s t a n t case involves injury t o a t h i r d party. Contributory negligence on the p a r t of Watts, then, does not bar recovery by a t h i r d party. A similar question t o the one presented i n the i n s t a n t case arose i n a commercial context i n Deeds v. United S t a t e s (D. Mont. 1969), 306 F.Supp. 348. I n Deeds the Honorable William J. Jameson held, under the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of t h a t case, t h a t "the s a l e and serving of liquor t o Tanberg i n v i o l a t i o n of Montana law was a proximate cause of the accident and r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s t o p l a i n t i f f . " 306 F.Supp. a t 361. However, we do not find Deeds controlling i n the i n s t a n t case. Rather, we follow the general rule: " . . . i n the absence of a s t a t u t e t o the con- t r a r y . . . there can be no cause of action against one furnishing liquor i n favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person t o whom it has been . . . furnished . . . so long a s the person t o whom the liquor was sold o r given was not i n such a s t a t e of helplessness . . . a s t o be deprived of h i s willpower o r responsibility f o r h i s behavior." 45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors S554. The problem we face i n so deciding is a d i f f i c u l t one. Montana law does provide sanctions t o discourage furnishing alcoholic beverages t o minors. F i r s t , section 4-3-306 (1) ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947, provides: " (1) N o licensee o r h i s o r her employee or employees, nor any other person, s h a l l sell, deliver, o r give away o r cause o r permit t o be sold, delivered o r given away any alcoholic beverage to: " (a) Any person under the age of eighteen (18) years. " B y v i r t u e of section 4-6-404, R.C.M. 1947, violation of t h i s provision is a misdemeanor. While t h i s provision does not apply t o a s o c i a l purveyor of alcoholic beverages, section 94-5-609 (1) (b) , R.C.M. 1947, does: "(1) A person commits the offense of unlawful transactions with children i f he knowingly: " (b) s e l l s o r gives intoxicating substances t o a child under the age of majority . . ." These sanctions, however, do not by themselves c r e a t e a c i v i l cause of action i n favor of a t h i r d person injured a s a r e s u l t of a minor's having been furnished alcoholic bev- erages. Establishing such a c i v i l cause of action involves considerations of public policy f a r beyond those presented by the circumstances of the i n s t a n t case. Traditionally, there has been greater j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r imposing l i a b i l i t y on a commercial purveyor than on a s o c i a l purveyor. There i s a greater need f o r some check on the pecuniary motives of those engaged i n the business of s e l l i n g alcoholic beverages. In addition a commercial vendor is i n a b e t t e r position t o observe h i s customers and monitor t h e i r l e v e l of intoxication by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t the s e l l e r i s more l i k e l y t o communicate with the patron each time he serves a new drink. Taking t h i s i n t o consideration, we a r e r e l u c t a n t t o extend the l i a b i l i t y of persons serving alcoholic beverages t o a s o c i a l s e t t i n g when the l e g i s l a t u r e has t o date f a i l e d t o extend t h a t l i a b i l i t y t o commercial vendors by v i r t u e of dramshop legislation. W e a r e aware of the high incidence of automobile accidents a t t r i b u t a b l e t o intoxication. W e a l s o recognize t h a t innocent t h i r d p a r t i e s stand t o suffer substantial harm i n such situations. However, t o hold purveyors of alcohol, especially s o c i a l furnishers, l i a b l e f o r t h i s harm would be contrary t o the current s t a t e of Montana law and would infringe upon a matter more appropriately within t h e province of the legisla- ture. Our recent holdings have reaffirmed our statement of the law i n Nevin v. Carlasco (1961), 139 Mont. 512, 515-16, "The r u l e followed by most courts is t h a t when damages a r i s e from voluntary intoxication, the s e l l e r of the intoxicant is not l i a b l e i n t o r t f o r the reason t h a t h i s a c t is not the e f f i c i e n t cause of the damage. The proximate cause is the a c t of him who imbibes the liquor." Under current Montana law, a s affirmed i n Folda and Swartzen- berger, Watts' drinking and not defendant's serving the beer was the proximate cause of the accident which resulted i n p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. The judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e Concur: / / J u s t i c e I - c - L- ~t/dv r J u s t i c e s ,' / L ' ' M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, deeming himself disqualified, did not s i t i n t h i s case.