Title: Jackson Hole Community Housing Trust v. Scarlett

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jackson Hole Community Housing Trust v. Scarlett1999 WY 52979 P.2d 500Case Number: 98-13Decided: 05/10/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

JACKSON 
HOLE COMMUNITY HOUSING TRUST, Appellant (Defendant),

 

v.

PIERCE SCARLETT and TERESA L. JILLSON, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 

                 
                

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Teton County, The Honorable

Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

  

 

Christopher H. Hawks of 
Christopher Hawks, P. C., Jackson, Wyoming, for Representing 
Appellant.

 

Teresa L. Jillson, Curt Haws 
and Charisse Haws of Haws & Haws, Jackson, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

 

 No 
timely appearance, Representing Appellee Pierce 
Scarlett.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, * 
JJ.

   * Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

    
TAYLOR, Justice, Retired.

   
[¶1]      Appellant, Jackson Hole Community 
Housing Trust (the Trust), claims the district court erred in setting aside a 
default judgment against appellees, Pierce Scarlett (Scarlett) and Teresa 
Jillson (Jillson), when it found that the failure of counsel for Scarlett and 
Jillson1 to appear at a hearing was 
excusable neglect pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b). We affirm.

 

                              
I. ISSUE

 

  [¶2]      The Trust failed to include a statement 
of the issue in violation of W.R.A.P. 7(d). Therefore, we will review the issue 
as stated and addressed by Jillson:

 

Whether the district court exercised proper 
discretion in granting plaintiffs' (appellees') motion to set aside an award of 
double costs and attorney's fees.

 

                              
II. FACTS

 

  [¶3]      The Trust initiated a project to 
construct affordable housing in Jackson Hole. Scarlett and Jillson, homeowners 
opposed to the project, filed an appeal of the Town of Jackson's permission to 
complete the project. While that action was pending, Scarlett and Jillson filed 
for an injunction. In response, the Trust claimed   that 
these legal maneuvers were without foundation, and were solely to harass the 
Trust and delay the project. On that basis, the Trust filed a motion for double 
its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-128 (Michie 
1997). 

 

  [¶4]      The hearing on the motion for fees and 
costs was originally set for December 5, 1996, but was rescheduled to the 
afternoon of December 2, 1996. On November 26, 1996, counsel for all parties 
participated in a telephone conference and agreed to change the time of the 
hearing to the morning of December 2, 1996. The district court also issued on 
November 21, 1996, an Order Setting Hearing (the Order), which set "all pending 
motions" for a date in February 1997.

 

  [¶5]      The Order was received by the Trust's 
counsel on November 29, 1996, the day after Thanksgiving. Being somewhat 
confused, he faxed a letter to the district court stating his understanding that 
the Order did not change the December 2 nd setting for the hearing on his 
client's motion for fees and costs. Copies were also faxed to counsel for 
Scarlett and Jillson and to the Town of Jackson's attorney. Counsel for the Town 
of Jackson became aware of the Order on Monday, December 2, 1996, when he 
arrived at his office. Also confused, he spoke with the Trust's counsel and was 
told that the hearing scheduled for that morning was still taking place. Counsel 
for Scarlett and Jillson also received the Order on the morning of December 2, 
1996, but assumed it applied to all hearings, and called her clients to notify 
them that the hearing was once again rescheduled. Counsel for Scarlett and 
Jillson then made a doctor's appointment and left the 
office.

  

  [¶6]      At the hearing on December 2, 1996, in 
the absence of counsel for Scarlett and Jillson, the district court granted a 
default judgment in favor of the Trust and ordered Scarlett and Jillson to pay 
the Trust's fees and costs of approximately $10,000.00.  Upon returning to the office, counsel 
for Scarlett and Jillson found the letter faxed the Friday before by the Trust's 
counsel which clarified the hearing time. Counsel for Scarlett and Jillson then 
telephoned the district court and learned that the hearing was held and that 
default judgment had been entered against Scarlett and Jillson. Counsel for 
Scarlett and Jillson immediately filed a motion to set aside the judgment 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b), with accompanying affidavits supporting a claim of 
excusable neglect.

 

  [¶7]      At the evidentiary hearing on the motion 
to set aside the judgment, the district court determined that because all three 
attorneys were confused by the Order, the failure to appear was excusable 
neglect. The district court granted the motion to set aside the judgment, and 
this timely appeal followed.

 

                       
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶8]      "Decisions resolving motions for setting 
aside the entry of default or a default judgment are made in the exercise of 
sound discretion by the trial court." Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 507 
(1998).

 

"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and             
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."

 

  Id. 
(quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

                           
IV. DISCUSSION

 

  [¶9]      W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides, in relevant 
part:

 

On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect[.]

 

  Proof of any of the grounds enumerated 
in W.R.C.P. 60(b) amount to good cause for purposes of W.R.C.P. 55(c) as it 
pertains to setting aside an entry of default. Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc., 956 P.2d  at 1134. The district court must first consider whether the filed motion 
articulates a reason for relief, which is a question of law. When an appropriate reason is set 
forth, the exercise of discretion in granting or denying relief depends upon the 
facts of the case. In making that decision, the district court is to consider 
whether the moving party established the articulated grounds and demonstrated a 
meritorious defense. Even so, the district court then must determine whether the 
plaintiff will be prejudiced and whether culpable conduct on the part of 
the defendant resulted in the default. 
Id.

 

  [¶10] 
  In this case, the grounds 
articulated by Scarlett and Jillson are authorized by W.R.C.P. 60(b). Thus, our 
task is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in finding 
this ground established by Scarlett and Jillson. Excusable neglect is "`such 
behavior as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the 
circumstances.'" Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc., 956 P.2d  at 1134 (quoting Booth v. 
Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo. 1976) and Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 303 (Wyo. 1992)). The record clearly demonstrates that all the 
attorneys were confused by the timing and the content of the Order. While the 
Trust's attorney was in his office the Friday after Thanksgiving, it is 
understandable that the other attorneys were not. Therefore, counsel for 
Scarlett and Jillson was confronted with the Order which, on first reading the 
morning of the scheduled hearing, could appear to reset that hearing. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that a reasonably 
prudent person may act in a manner similar to the counsel for Scarlett and 
Jillson under the same circumstances.

 

  [¶11] 
  We also find that Scarlett 
and Jillson had a meritorious defense, given that the district court denied any 
sanctions after hearing the evidence relating to that motion. Further, the 
motion to set aside the default judgment was filed the same day the judgment was 
entered; thus, we discern no prejudice to the Trust in setting the judgment 
aside, and no culpable conduct on the part of Scarlett and Jillson or their 
counsel. While we understand the Trust's frustration, we do not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact. Mak-M v. SM, 854 P.2d 64, 68 (Wyo. 1993); Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675, 678 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 1993)).

 

   
                         V. 
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶12] 
  Finding no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's determination that the circumstances evidence 
excusable neglect, we affirm.

           

FOOTNOTES

  1After the entry of the default 
judgment, Jillson obtained separate counsel.