Title: City of Indianapolis v. Sablica

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

342 N.E.2d 853 (1976)
State of Indiana, CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
Michael John SABLICA, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 175S12.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 3, 1976.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1976.
*854 Charles B. Huppert, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Gary R. Landau, Corp. Counsel, Indianapolis, for appellant.
R. Davy Eaglesfield, III, Indianapolis, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
Defendant-appellee was charged with "interfering with or taunting officer" in violation of Indianapolis Municipal Ordinance § 10-1021. Municipal Court, Room 9, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the information, holding in part:
On appeal to the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division Four, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. In our opinion which follows, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the information. In so doing we find it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of Ind. Code § 18-5-11-1 (Burns 1974) [violations of city and town ordinances providing for fines or imprisonment shall be misdemeanors] and Ind. Code § 18-1-1.5-1, -2, -19 [Powers of Cities Act of 1971 purporting to give cities the power to define misdemeanors].
In Medias v. City of Indianapolis, (1939) 216 Ind. 155, 165, 23 N.E.2d 590, 594, it is stated:
A review of Medias reveals that a conflict would be found where an ordinance sought to prohibit that which a statute expressly permitted, but no conflict would be found where an ordinance sought to supplement the burdens imposed by the statute, provided the additional burdens were logically consistent with the statutory purpose.
Article IV, sections 22 and 23, of the Indiana Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from enacting local laws for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors and mandates that laws defining crimes and misdemeanors shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state. Under these provisions of the constitution, when the legislature has enacted a general law defining a crime or a misdemeanor, such action necessarily implies that "there is no room for supplementary or complementary local legislation, even if the subject were otherwise one properly characterized as a `municipal affair,'" Lancaster v. Municipal Court For Beverly Hills, (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 805, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681. Under Article IV, sections 22 and 23, an impermissible conflict between a city ordinance and a criminal law of the state will exist whenever the ordinance *855 contradicts, duplicates, alters, amends, modifies or extends the subject matter of the statute, and to the extent that Medias v. City of Indianapolis sanctions penal ordinances which do not directly contradict a criminal statute, it is hereby overruled.
With these principles in mind, we review Indianapolis Municipal Ordinance § 10-1021 which provides:
The penalty for § 10-1021 is found in § 10-1023 which provides:
The following statute, being Ind. Code § 35-21-4-1 (Burns 1975), must also be considered:
Upon comparison of Ind. Code § 35-21-4-1 (Burns 1975) with § 10-1021 of the Indianapolis Municipal Ordinances, we hold the ordinance to be invalid as an attempted local law where the legislature acting under the constitution has determined that a general law shall apply.
In so holding, we place no reliance upon Ind. Code § 35-1-12-1 (Burns 1975) which provides:
or the case law under this section, see e.g., Mitsch v. City of Hammond, (1954) 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21, 126 N.E.2d 247, for this preemptive statute is merely a legislative recognition of the constitutional mandate.
*856 For the reasons stated herein, it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider the constitutionality of the statutes set forth in number four of its judgment order and that order is hereby set aside. The judgment of dismissal is, however, affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and ARTERBURN, DeBRULER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.