Title: Joan A. German v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0250 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Joan A. German, Arnold Merkle and Bryan Vergin,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Division 
of State Patrol, State of Wisconsin, Charles 
Thompson and William L. Singletary,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 525, 589 N.W.2d 651 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 21, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
P. Charles Jones 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
SYKES, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners the 
cause was argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, assistance attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Bruce M. Davey and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Bruce M. Davey. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by Bruce Meredith 
and Marilyn Windschiegl, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Education Association Council. 
 
2000 WI 62 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0250 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joan A. German, Arnold Merkle and Bryan 
Vergin, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
Division of State Patrol, State of 
Wisconsin, Charles Thompson and William L. 
Singletary, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner, the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation (DOT)1 seeks review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, German v. DOT, 223 Wis. 2d 
525, 589 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1998).  The court of appeals 
affirmed an order of the circuit court denying DOT's motion to 
dismiss a wage claim brought by officers of the Wisconsin State 
                     
1 The defendants in this case are the State, the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation, and two individual defendants sued 
in their official capacity, Charles Thompson and William L. 
Singletary, all of whom we will refer to collectively as "DOT".  
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
98-0250 
 
2 
Patrol (officers).  The officers brought a claim based upon Wis. 
Stat. § 109.03(5)(1995-96)2, alleging that they are on-duty 
during their lunch break and are therefore owed wages for that 
time pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code. § DWD 274.02(3) (May, 1997). 
This section of the administrative code requires employers to 
pay employees for meal periods that are not free from work.   
¶2 
The first issue is whether the officers can bring a 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5) seeking wages for on-duty 
meal periods, or whether the officers' exclusive remedy is the 
administrative procedures in Wis. Stat. § 103.005.  If we 
determine the action may be brought under Wis. Stat. ch. 109, 
then the second issue we must decide is whether the legislature 
has waived sovereign immunity in ch. 109 for this type of claim. 
¶3 
We hold that Wis. Stat. § 103.005 is not the exclusive 
means to enforce a wage claim grounded upon Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.02(3) and that the right of action created by Wis. 
Stat. § 109.03(5) allows for claims based upon the hours and 
overtime regulations to be brought in circuit court without 
first obtaining administrative review by the Department of 
Workforce Development (DWD).  In addition, we agree with the 
court of appeals that the legislature has waived the state's 
immunity in Wis. Stat. ch. 109.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
                     
2 All statutory references are to the 1995-96 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, unless otherwise noted.  
98-0250 
 
3 
¶4 
In 1996 officers of the Wisconsin State Patrol filed 
suit against their employer, the DOT, in Dane County Circuit 
Court. The officers asserted they were neither relieved from 
duty during their 30-minute lunch breaks, nor compensated for 
this on-duty time as required by Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02(3).3  As a result, the officers alleged that they were 
entitled to compensation for these hours worked.  Their suit to 
compel payment of wages due was filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 109.01 and 109.03, the Wage Payments, Claims and Collections 
Law (wage claim law). 
¶5 
The DOT moved to dismiss the suit.  This motion was 
denied by the Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable P. 
Charles Jones presiding.4  
¶6 
The DOT sought expedited review by the court of 
appeals.  The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit 
court. The DOT appealed to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.10 (1997-98), which we granted. 
Standard of Review 
                     
3 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.02(3): 
The employer shall pay all employes for on-duty 
meal periods, which are to be counted as work time.  
An on-duty meal period is a meal period where the 
employer does not provide at least 30 minutes free 
from work.  Any meal period where the employe is not 
free to leave the premises of the employer will also 
be considered an on-duty meal period. 
 
4 Additional claims brought by the officers under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
were dismissed by the circuit court and are not at issue here.   
98-0250 
 
4 
¶7 
We are asked to review denial of a motion to dismiss. 
 To determine the sufficiency of the complaint, we must examine 
the statutory authority cited by the plaintiffs as the basis for 
their claim to determine two issues.  First, we must determine 
whether Wis. Stat. ch. 109 is a vehicle to enforce Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 274.01(3), a rule promulgated by the authority vested 
in the DWD under the hours and overtime law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.02, or whether this administrative code section can only 
be enforced by the administrative review procedures in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 103. Second, we must determine if the legislature has 
waived sovereign immunity in ch. 109.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law which we review de novo.  Morris v. Juneau 
County, 219 Wis. 2d 543, 550, 579 N.W.2d 690 (1998).  Our goal 
in interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the 
legislature. Id.   
Analysis 
¶8 
We first resolve whether the officers' claim is 
properly brought under the wage claim law, Wis. Stat. ch. 109.  
The plain language of ch. 109 broadly defines the word "wage" in 
relevant part as "remuneration payable to an employe for 
personal services" and cites as examples salaries, vacation pay, 
and overtime pay.  Wis. Stat. § 109.01(3).5  The breadth of this 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 109.01(3):  
"Wage" or "wages" mean remuneration payable to an 
employe for personal services, including salaries, 
commissions, holiday and vacation pay, overtime pay, 
severance 
pay 
or 
dismissal 
pay, 
supplemental 
unemployment compensation benefits when required under 
98-0250 
 
5 
definition encompasses the employer's obligation under Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 274.02 to pay an employee for on-duty meal 
break wages.  This administrative code provision requires 
"remuneration" 
for 
"personal 
services," 
comparable to the 
examples listed in § 109.01(3).  We see little difference 
between a claim under ch. 109 by an employee seeking overtime 
wages with the officers' claim for on-duty meal break wages.  In 
both cases the employee asserts that work has been performed and 
wages are now due. 
¶9 
The DOT contends that a claim under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.02(3) can only be resolved through the administrative 
procedures in Wis. Stat. § 103.005.  Where the legislature 
enacts an administrative scheme to enforce a statute, the 
administrative mechanism is presumed exclusive unless there is 
an affirmative legislative indication of the contrary.  Bourque 
v. Wausau Hosp. Center, 145 Wis. 2d 589, 594, 427 N.W.2d 433 
(Ct. App. 1988).  The DOT argues that resolving whether meal 
breaks are compensable on-duty work time is an issue that arises 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 103, the Hours of Work Law and is to be 
brought forward in the administrative review procedures in that 
chapter – not through Wis. Stat. ch. 109. 
¶10 The provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 109 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.02 address two sides of the same coin.  Under the 
authority of § 103.02 the DWD has promulgated an administrative 
                                                                  
a binding collective bargaining agreement, bonuses and 
any other similar advantages agreed upon between the 
employer and the employe or provided by the employer 
to the employes as an established policy. 
98-0250 
 
6 
rule requiring employers to pay employees for on-duty meal 
periods.  Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.02(3).  In Wis. Stat. 
§ 109.03(5), the legislature has provided employees with the 
right to bring an action in court against an employer for wages 
due without first pursuing administrative review with the DWD. 
As the court of appeals noted: 
 
We acknowledge the 
DOT's 
argument 
that the 
officers are really seeking a determination of whether 
their lunch periods are "hours of work," but that is 
part and parcel of their claim for wages due.  The 
amount 
of 
pay-or 
possibly, 
compensatory 
time-the 
officers may ultimately be found to have due them must 
necessarily await a determination of whether any 
compensation 
is 
due 
them 
for 
lunch 
periods.  
Nonetheless, the essence of the officers' claim is 
that they are due compensation that the DOT has not 
paid. 
German, 223 Wis. 2d at 539 n.5. (emphasis in the original).  
Combined, these statutory provisions create a system to assure 
that each employee is compensated for his or her labor. 
¶11 Statutes on the same subject matter are interpreted in 
a manner that harmonizes them, giving each statute full force 
and effect.  McDonough v. Department of Workforce Dev., 227 
Wis. 2d 271, 279-80, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999) (quoting State v. 
Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997)).  
The DOT's argument vitiates an employees' private right of 
action for wages due in Wis. Stat. ch. 109.  The reasoning of 
the court of appeals is compelling. 
 
If an employee-initiated wage claim could not be 
brought under ch. 109 merely because it was disputed 
on hours and overtime grounds, an employer could 
defeat an employee's suit merely by alleging that the 
98-0250 
 
7 
employee was "off-duty" during part of the time for 
which the employee is claiming wages due.  The "off-
duty" allegation would require an interpretation of 
WIS. ADM. CODE § DWD 272.12(12)(2)(b) (which is made 
applicable to hours and overtime disputes by virtue of 
WIS. ADM. CODE § DWD 274.045).  Thus an employer could 
convert the employee's ch. 109 claim for wages due to 
a ch. 103 claim to determine whether wages were due, 
thereby avoiding the employee-initiated suit and the 
penalties provided by ch. 109. 
German, 223 Wis. 2d at 543.   
¶12 Further, and as the court of appeals notes, "the 
presumption that an administrative remedy is exclusive does not 
apply if there is legislative expression to the contrary.  Id. 
at 538 (citing Gardner v. Gardner, 175 Wis. 2d 420, 428, 499 
N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1993)).  Wisconsin Stat. § 103.005(14)(a) 
provides 
that 
the 
DWD 
shall 
administer 
laws 
related 
to 
employment and the regulation of employment "so far as not 
otherwise provided for in the statutes."  We find that the plain 
meaning of § 103.005(14), when read together with Wis. Stat. ch. 
109, is that employees are authorized by the legislature to seek 
enforcement of Wis. Admin. Code § 274.02(3) through Wis. Stat. 
§ 109.03(5). 
¶13 The relationship between Wis. Stat. ch. 103 and Wis. 
Stat. ch. 109 is demonstrated in legislative history.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 109.03 was created by ch. 380, Laws of 1975.  The new 
law was proposed by a Special Committee on Employe Protection in 
Business 
Closing 
to 
the 
1973-75 
Legislative 
Council 
and 
consolidated existing wage payment and wage claim laws with new 
protections, including a plant closing notification law.  The 
newly created  § 109.03 imported most of the provisions of the 
98-0250 
 
8 
former Wis. Stat. § 103.39 (1973).6  The statutory language 
relating to court actions on wage claims adopted in ch. 380, 
Laws of 1975, was substantially identical to that which had been 
provided in ch. 103. 
¶14 In addition, ch. 380, Laws of 1975 § 3 provided that 
the department was to investigate wage claims and specifically 
to enforce Wis. Stat. § 103.02.7  This language remains in Wis. 
Stat. § 109.09(1).  Subsequently, 1993 Wis. Act 86 amended that 
portion of Wis. Stat. ch. 109 allowing employees to bring an 
action for wages in circuit court, adding that the action could 
be brought without first filing a wage claim with the department 
under § 109.09(1).  As the court of appeals stated, we find "no 
indication that the legislature intended the scope of employee-
initiated wage claim actions to be more limited than the scope 
of the actions that DWD is authorized to pursue on the 
employee's behalf."  German, 223 Wis. 2d at 542.  
¶15 The relationship between Wis. Stat. chs. 103 and 109 
is also evident in Wis. Admin. Code ch. DWD 274.  The penalties 
provision of that chapter states in relevant part that "[a]ny 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.39(1) (1973) provided in relevant 
part that "each employe coming within the meaning of this 
section shall have a right of action against any such person for 
the full amount of his wages due on each regular pay day as 
herein provided in any court of competent jurisdiction." 
7 Chapter 380, Laws of 1975, § 3 provides in relevant part: 
"109.09 Wage claims, collection.  (1) The department shall 
investigate and attempt 
equitably 
to 
adjust 
controversies 
between employers and employes as to alleged wage claims.  The 
department shall enforce this chapter and ss. 66.293, 103.02, 
103.49, 103.82 and 104.12."  
98-0250 
 
9 
employer who violates order s. DWD . . . 274.03 . . . shall be 
subject to the penalties provided in ss. . . . 109.11."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § 274.07.   
¶16 Based upon the plain language of Wis. Stat. ch. 109, 
the legislative history of ch. 109 and Wis. Stat. ch. 103, the 
absence of any bar to this claim in ch. 103, and the need to 
harmonize ch. 109, ch. 103 and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.03(2), 
we conclude that the officers have properly brought this action 
under ch. 109. 
¶17 The second issue we must then consider is whether the 
legislature has waived sovereign immunity in Wis. Stat. ch. 109. 
 The State of Wisconsin's sovereign immunity derives from 
Article IV, § 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution.8  It is axiomatic 
that the state cannot be sued without the express consent of the 
legislature.  Bahr v. State Inv. Bd., 186 Wis. 2d 379, 521 
N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1994); Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 
Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976); Chicago, M. & St. P.R. 
Co. v. State, 53 Wis. 509, 512-13, 10 N.W. 560 (1881).  If 
sovereign immunity is properly raised, then the court is without 
personal jurisdiction over the state.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 
291.   
¶18 The state's sovereign immunity from suit extends to 
the state's agencies and arms.  Id.  Sovereign immunity does not 
apply 
to 
the 
activities 
of 
a 
state-created 
agency 
with 
                     
8 Article IV, § 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
"The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what 
courts suits may be brought against the state."  
98-0250 
 
10
independent proprietary powers and functions (an "independent 
going concern"). Id. at 292.  There is nothing in this case that 
suggests the independent going concern exception is applicable. 
 The DOT is a state agency.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.01(5), 15.46.9  The 
officers have neither argued that the DOT is an independent 
going concern nor that they do not have to demonstrate that the 
legislature has consented to the action that has been commenced. 
 Instead, the officers assert that the legislature has expressly 
consented to state employees initiating their claim in circuit 
court and point to Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.005(14)(a).10  We agree. 
¶19 The officers argue that sovereign immunity is waived 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 109 because the state is included in this 
chapter's definition of employer and because ch. 109 expressly 
allows employees to bring wage claims directly to the circuit 
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 15.01(5) states: "'Department' means the 
principal administrative agency within the executive branch of 
Wisconsin state government, but does not include the independent 
agencies under subch. III." 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 15.46 
states: 
"Department 
of 
transportation; creation.  There is created a department of 
transportation under the direction and supervision of the 
secretary of transportation." 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.005(14)(a) states: "The department 
shall administer and enforce, so far as not otherwise provided 
for in the statutes, the laws relating to child labor, 
employment, employment offices and all other laws relating to 
the regulation of employment."  
98-0250 
 
11
court, without passing through administrative review.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 109.01(2)11 and 109.03(5).12  
¶20 The state's immunity is waived in Wis. Stat. ch. 109. 
 Chapter 109 expressly defines "employer" to include the state 
and its political subdivisions.  Wis. Stat. § 109.01(2).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) allows an employee to bring a cause 
of action against an employer for wages.  This is express 
consent by the legislature to suits brought against the state.  
When the legislature wishes to enact a statute excluding the 
state from the definition of employer it expressly does so.  See 
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 109.01(2) states:  "Except as provided 
in s. 109.07(1)(d), "employer" means any person engaged in any 
activity, enterprise or business employing one or more persons 
within the state, including the state and its political 
subdivisions 
and 
charitable, 
nonprofit 
or 
tax-exempt 
organizations and institutions." 
This section of the statutes was amended by 1997 Wis. Act 
237, § 354n.  The amendment does not impact our analysis in this 
case. 
12 Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5):   
Enforcement.  Except as provided in sub. (1), no 
employer may by special contract with employes or by 
any other means secure exemption from this section.  
Each employe shall have a right of action against any 
employer for the full amount of the employe's wages 
due on each regular pay day as provided in this 
section and for increased wages as provided in s. 
109.11(2), in any court of competent jurisdiction.  An 
employe may bring an action against an employer under 
this subsection without first filing a wage claim with 
the department under s. 109.09(1).  An employe who 
brings an action against an employer under this 
subsection shall have a lien upon all property of the 
employer, real or personal, located in this state as 
described in s. 109.09(2). 
 
98-0250 
 
12
Wis. Stat. § 111.02(7) ("The term 'employer' means a person who 
engages the services of an employe . . . but shall not include 
the state or any political subdivision thereof . . . ."); Wis. 
Stat. § 111.51(5)(a) ("'Public Utility Employer' means any 
employer, other than the state or any political subdivision 
thereof . . ..").  Sovereign immunity is waived in ch. 109.  On 
this point there is no ambiguity. 
¶21 However, DOT argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 109 is simply 
a mechanism to compel employers to issue paychecks promptly and 
is not a means to enforce any other claim in which back wages 
are sought as a remedy.  Any waiver of sovereign immunity in ch. 
109, it is argued, is for the sole purpose of compelling the 
issuance of a paycheck.  The DOT claims that there is no clear 
and express waiver of sovereign immunity in ch. 109 for the type 
of claim brought by the officers in this case.  We disagree. 
¶22 The state presented a similar argument in Butzlaff v. 
Department of Health and Family Services, 223 Wis. 2d 673, 590 
N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1998).  In Butzlaff, the state argued that 
under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13) of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) the legislature had expressly waived sovereign 
immunity for suits by state employees who had been successful in 
underlying 
administrative 
proceedings 
and 
judicial 
review.  
However, the state claimed that the statute was ambiguous as to 
whether § 103.10(13) permitted suit by employees who were 
unsuccessful in the administrative procedure and its related 
judicial review.  The state asserted in Butzlaff, as well as in 
the case at hand, that if there is any ambiguity in the statute 
98-0250 
 
13
concerning whether or not the claim can be brought, then 
sovereign immunity is not waived.  Id. at 681-82.   
¶23 The court of appeals correctly noted in Butzlaff that 
the state's argument  
 
confuses the statutory consent to suit against the 
state and its agencies with the statutory conditions 
for suit that apply to all parties.  The former must 
be clearly expressed to constitute a waiver of 
sovereign 
immunity.  
The 
latter 
are 
interpreted 
according 
to 
the 
ordinary 
rules 
of 
statutory 
construction.   
Id. at 682.  In this case it is evident that the legislature in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 109 consented to suit against the state for wage 
claims. 
¶24 Although we reach the same conclusion as the court of 
appeals, we disagree with one point in its method of analysis.  
In finding that sovereign immunity had been waived for the type 
of claim brought by the officers, the court of appeals relied in 
part upon Bahr.  German, 223 Wis. 2d at 532-33.  The issue in 
Bahr was whether or not the State Investment Board was an 
independent going concern and thus ineligible for sovereign 
immunity.  In Bahr, the court of appeals determined that the 
State Investment Board was an independent going concern in part 
because it was authorized by statute to "'sue and be sued in 
[its own] name.'"  Bahr, 186 Wis. 2d at 399 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 25.17 (1993-94)).  We have already concluded that the 
"independent going concern" question is not at issue in this 
case.  Although Bahr did not correctly illustrate the court of 
98-0250 
 
14
appeals' point, we concur with the court's final conclusion in 
the case at hand. 
¶25 The DOT presents a number of arguments against our 
conclusions in this case.  We find none of them persuasive. 
¶26 First, the DOT argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 109 is a 
penal statute and must be strictly construed to exclude the 
officers' claim.  Wisconsin Stat. § 109.11(3) subjects an 
employer 
with 
the 
ability 
to 
pay 
wages 
due, 
but 
who 
intentionally fails to do so with the intent to obtain a 
reduction in the debt or with intent to annoy, harass, oppress, 
hinder or defraud the employee, to a fine of not more than $550, 
90 days in jail, or both.   
¶27 Our opinions have long recognized that, the rule of 
strict construction of penal statutes is not a "'rule of general 
or universal application;  . . . .  Sometimes a strict and 
sometimes a liberal construction is required, even in respect to 
a penal law, because the dominating purpose of all construction 
is to carry out the legislative purpose.'"  State v. Kittilstad, 
231 Wis. 2d 245, 262, 603 N.W.2d 732 (1999) (quoting State v. 
Boliski, 156 Wis. 78, 81, 145 N.W. 368 (1914)).  When the intent 
of the legislature is unambiguous or if strict construction 
thwarts the purpose of the legislation, the rule of strict 
construction does not apply.  Id. at 262 (citing State v. Rabe, 
96 Wis. 2d 48, 70, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980)).  In this case the 
DOT's interpretation would thwart the legislative purpose in 
giving employees a right of action under Wis. Stat. ch. 109.  
98-0250 
 
15
Our construction of the statute is in keeping with the clear 
purpose of ch. 109.   
¶28 Next, the DOT cites Arndt v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Corrections, 972 F.Supp. 475, 478 (W.D.Wis. 1996), arguing that 
it seemingly conflicts with our conclusions.  Although in Arndt, 
the federal district court examined Wis. Stat. chs. 109 and 103, 
its inquiry is distinguishable from the case at hand.  First, in 
Arndt the court concluded that ch. 109 contained no waiver of 
sovereign 
immunity. 
 
We 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
this 
conclusion.13  Second, the district court characterized chs. 109 
and 103 as two distinct statutory schemes.  However, as the 
court of appeals noted, and as we have already stated, chs. 109 
and 103 are not nearly so distinct.  German, 223 Wis. 2d at 539-
40.  The "legislature did not intend to prevent the enforcement 
of ch. 103 by wage claim actions when it moved the wage claim 
                     
13 The concurrence labels our discussion of Arndt v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 972 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Wis. 
1996) as a "criticism" of the district court and "ill advised." 
 Neither assertion is correct.  The district court was asked to 
and did specifically address whether Wis. Stat. ch. 109 contains 
a waiver of the state's immunity:  
Plaintiffs look to the private cause of action allowed 
under chapter 109 [to find statutory waiver] . . ..  A 
waiver of the state's immunity by the legislature will 
be found only where stated by the most express 
language or by such overwhelming implication from the 
text as to leave no room for any other reasonable 
construction. 
 
Id. at 479.  The district court found no waiver of sovereign 
immunity in ch. 109.  Our differing conclusion here is not a 
criticism of the district court; we simply, but respectfully, 
disagree. 
98-0250 
 
16
enforcement provisions to [ch. 109]."  Id. at 541.  In sum, we 
do not find the reasoning set forth in Arndt persuasive. 
¶29 The DOT also cites state cases14 that, it contends, 
characterize Wis. Stat. ch. 109 as a law narrowly focused on 
assuring the prompt payment of wages actually due rather than as 
a broad jurisdictional grant. Our analysis of ch. 109 with Wis. 
Stat. ch. 103 and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274 gives full effect 
to the wage payment purpose of the statutes.  We conclude it is 
in keeping with the well-established purpose of ch. 109, to 
assure prompt payment of wages.  As the circuit court judge 
noted, Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5) allows an employee to bring a 
private cause of action for "the full amount" of wages due.  We 
believe that this statute contemplates a situation such as that 
presented by the officers in this case, where the issue is not 
that the employees have never received a paycheck, but that they 
seek to obtain the full amount of wages due to them. 
¶30 In addition, the DOT contends that affirming the 
officers' ability to bring their action under Wis. Stat. ch. 109 
will raise federal constitutional concerns.  According to the 
DOT, state statutes such as 109 have been found constitutional 
in the past because they were narrowly focused.  In support of 
                     
14 Pfister v. MEDC, 216 Wis. 2d 243, 250-51, 576 N.W.2d 554 
(Ct. App. 1998); Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., Inc., 222 
Wis. 2d 384, 400, 588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1998); Erdman v. 
Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 749 n.6, 512 N.W.2d 487 (1994); 
Kenosha Fire Fighters v. City of Kenosha, 168 Wis. 2d 658, 665, 
484 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1992); Employees Local 1901 v. Brown 
County, 146 Wis. 2d 728, 733-35, 432 N.W.2d 571 (1988); DILHR v. 
Coatings, Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 338, 344-46, 376 N.W.2d 834 (1985).  
98-0250 
 
17
this proposition DOT cites St. Louis Iron Mountain & Saint Paul 
Railway Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 406-10 (1899); Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 692-705 (1914); Ribnik v. McBride, 
277 U.S. 350, 375 (1928), overruled in part by Olsen v. State of 
Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n., 313 U.S. 236 
(1941); and Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of District of Columbia, 
261 U.S. 525, 547 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  We are not persuaded.  
"Simply to label a claimed error as constitutional does not make 
it so, and we need not decide the validity of constitutional 
claims broadly stated but never specifically argued."  State v. 
Scherreiks, 153 Wis. 2d 510, 520, 451 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted).   
¶31 The DOT further argues that upholding the decision of 
the court of appeals will open the door to additional claims in 
which the administrative review procedure established by statue 
is by-passed because the employee asserts a claim for wages and 
proceeds directly to circuit court under Wis. Stat. ch. 109.  To 
illustrate its point the DOT cites a string of statutes 
involving wages.  For example, the DOT cites Wis. Stat. 
§ 46.21(2)(i), a statute involving a work allowance to inmates 
at county 
institutions; 
Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.31-111.395, the 
Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment 
Act; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.10, 
the 
Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act; and Wis. Stat. § 103.49, 
relating to prevailing wage rates.  
¶32 We concur with the court of appeals that the DOT's 
concerns on this point are "unwarranted and overstated."  
98-0250 
 
18
German, 223 Wis. 2d at 542.  The DOT does not discuss whether 
the statutes it cites contain an administrative remedy and, if 
so, whether that remedy is exclusive.  The administrative remedy 
in Wis. Stat. § 103.005 is not exclusive.  Nor does the DOT 
discuss the relationship between the statutes it cites and Wis. 
Stat. ch. 109.  As we have set forth already, there is a 
significant relationship between Wis. Stat. ch. 103 and ch. 109. 
 In this case, we are considering only the statutes directly 
necessary to resolve the issue before the court; we will not 
speculate on the outcome when other statutes are involved and a 
complete argument is not presented. 
¶33 Finally, the DOT argues that even without considering 
the issue of sovereign immunity, dismissal is warranted because 
the officers have failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  The DOT did not raise this issue in its petition 
for review, and we decline to consider it here.15 
¶34 In sum, the DWD has classified on-duty meal periods as 
compensable time.  Wis. Stat. § 103.02; Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02(3). Under Wis. Stat. § 190.03(5) state employees can 
bring claims for wages due pursuant to this classification.   
                     
15 In this court's order granting review, we asked the 
parties to brief two additional questions.  The first question 
was whether the plaintiffs were required to serve a notice of 
claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3).  The second issue was 
whether the fact that no notice of claim was filed impacts 
resolution of the case on the merits.  Because the parties agree 
that § 893.82 is inapplicable to the State of Wisconsin and the 
Department of Transportation we need not address these issues 
further. 
98-0250 
 
19
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
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No. 98-0250.ssa 
 
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¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
do not join in ¶ 28 of the majority opinion.  The majority 
opinion's criticism of Arndt v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 
972 F.Supp. 475 (W.D.Wis. 1996), is, in my opinion, ill advised. 
 Arndt turns in large part on the U.S. Constitution and 
federalism concerns, issues not present in the case at bar.  
¶36 For the reasons stated, I do not join in ¶ 28 of the 
opinion. 
¶37 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this concurrence. 
 
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