Title: Commonwealth v. Tavares

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11264 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PAULO TAVARES. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 8, 2019. - July 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Threshold police 
inquiry, Probable cause, Fruits of illegal search, Standing 
to object.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause, Standing, Investigatory stop, Harmless 
error.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Probable Cause.  Error, 
Harmless.  Evidence, Result of illegal search, Prior 
misconduct, Wiretap.  Electronic Surveillance.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, New trial, 
Discovery, Standing, Assistance of counsel, Harmless error. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29, 2007. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joseph 
M. Walker, III, J.; the cases were tried before Charles J. Hely, 
J., and motions for a new trial, filed on August 27, 2014, and 
for postconviction discovery, filed on October 31, 2014, were 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Janet Hetherwick Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Paulo Tavares, 
of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  On appeal, the 
defendant raises three main issues.  First, he argues that a 
Superior Court judge (motion judge) erred in denying his 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search 
and seizure of a motor vehicle in which he was a passenger.  
Second, he argues that a second Superior Court judge (trial 
judge) improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's 
involvement in a prior shooting.  Finally, he argues that the 
trial judge erred in denying the defendant's postconviction 
motions for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel and for discovery of wiretap recordings of his 
conversations with a confidential informant. 
 
For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that the 
motion judge committed reversible error in denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress.  We also find that the 
defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied, but that 
his motion for discovery should have been granted.  Accordingly, 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was also found guilty of armed assault with 
intent to murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. 
 
3 
 
 
 
we vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial consistent 
with this opinion.2 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for discussion of legal issues. 
 
On the evening of May 21, 2007, John Lima was driving his 
sister's Nissan Altima automobile, along with his friend Jorell 
Archer, on a street in Brockton.  According to Archer, another 
car sped up and began to "tail" them with its high beam lights 
activated.  Lima became "aggravated" and applied his brakes, 
giving the car behind him a "brake job" as it followed them.  
The other car then drove up to the passenger's side of the 
Altima, and someone fired seven or eight gunshots at them. 
 
Lima attempted to shield himself from the shots but could 
not do so because he was driving.  He then turned into a nearby 
parking lot, where the Altima slowed down and rolled into an 
apartment building.  At that point, Archer noticed that Lima had 
been shot.  Lima stated, "I'm hit, I'm hit," and twice indicated 
to Archer that he believed he was dying.  The other car quickly 
sped away before Archer could determine the type of car or the 
number of people inside it. 
                                                          
 
 
2 Because we vacate the defendant's convictions, the 
defendant's additional claim of error set forth in a separate 
brief that he contends is filed in accordance with Commonwealth 
v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208-209 (1981), and which concerns 
the adequacy of the trial judge's instruction on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, is moot. 
4 
 
 
 
 
Police found the Altima crashed into the building with all 
four of its windows shattered.  Archer was standing in front of 
the open driver's side door, while Lima was lying unresponsive 
in the driver's seat.  Lima was immediately transported to the 
hospital, where he died shortly thereafter.  An autopsy later 
revealed that he had been shot three times.  The medical 
examiner concluded that the cause of death was due to gunshot 
wounds. 
 
At the scene, the police interviewed an eyewitness, 
Nicholas Melo, who had been sitting on his porch when he heard 
eight or nine loud bangs.  Melo then witnessed a car round the 
corner near his house, hit the curb, and speed down the street.  
Melo initially told the police that he saw a Chevy Malibu Max, 
but later described it as a regular Chevy Malibu. 
 
The day after the shooting, a police officer, accompanied 
by a State police trooper, was driving in an unmarked police 
cruiser in Brockton when he passed a Chevy Malibu.  The officer 
began searching for the Malibu, believing that he recognized an 
individual with an active arrest warrant in the back seat.  A 
few minutes later, he identified the Malibu and stopped it. 
 
As he approached the vehicle, the officer quickly realized 
that the individual he was looking for was not in the back seat.  
Instead, he found Christopher Hanson in the driver's seat, the 
defendant in the front passenger's seat, and Eddie Ortega in the 
5 
 
 
 
back seat.  The officer made brief conversation with the three 
occupants before learning that Hanson was not on the rental 
agreement for the vehicle.  The officer then advised Hanson that 
because he was not listed on the rental agreement, the vehicle 
would have to be towed.  All three occupants left on foot.  The 
officers did not search the Malibu before towing it to the 
police station.  The officers then brought Melo to the police 
station, where he told the officers that he was "sure" that the 
Malibu was the same car he had seen the night before and stated 
that it should have scrape marks underneath the front driver's 
side quarter and the rear passenger's side quarter -- where the 
car had gone over the curb.  He and a detective both looked 
under the Malibu, and the detective observed what appeared to be 
fresh scrape marks in the area where Melo said they would be. 
 
At trial, Ortega testified about the moments immediately 
preceding the motor vehicle stop.  While riding in the back seat 
of the Malibu, Ortega heard the defendant and Hanson discuss the 
shooting that had occurred the previous night.  During this 
conversation, the defendant stated that he had shot the wrong 
person, and that the shooting was not supposed to "go down" like 
it had.  Ortega also heard the defendant admit to using a .22 
caliber handgun in the shooting.  Additionally, Ortega testified 
that just before the vehicle was stopped, Hanson quickly turned 
onto a side street.  At that moment, the defendant took a .22 
6 
 
 
 
caliber handgun out of the glove compartment and threw it onto a 
nearby residential lawn.  After their encounter with the police 
officer, the three occupants returned to the side street and 
retrieved the gun. 
 
The Commonwealth's primary witness at trial was Raymond 
Grinion, one of the defendant's friends and business associates.  
The defendant and Grinion sold drugs together in Brockton.  For 
several years prior to the shooting, Grinion worked on and off 
with Brockton Police Detective Christopher McDermott as a paid 
confidential informant. 
 
Sometime between December 2006 and January 2007, Grinion 
stole a .22 caliber handgun from a residence in New Hampshire.  
He kept it for about two weeks before selling it to Jose Santos.  
In March or April 2007, Santos gave the handgun to the 
defendant.  Grinion testified that he saw the defendant in 
possession of the gun "on numerous occasions." 
 
The day after the shooting, Grinion received a call from 
the defendant.  During the call, the defendant told Grinion to 
get rid of his cell phone because the police had "snatched up" 
his girlfriend and she had given his cell phone number to them.  
When Grinion asked for details, the defendant responded that it 
was about the "homeboy" he had "bodied last night."  Grinion 
testified that he believed this to mean that the defendant had 
killed someone the night before. 
7 
 
 
 
 
Following this conversation with the defendant, Grinion 
apparently told Detective McDermott that he believed the 
defendant was involved in the murder of Lima.  He also informed 
McDermott that the defendant admitted to using a .22 caliber 
handgun in the shooting.  Grinion then made arrangements with 
the police to conduct a controlled purchase of the gun from the 
defendant. 
 
Over the next several days, the defendant made various 
incriminating statements to Grinion about his involvement in the 
shooting.  Two days after the shooting, Grinion told the 
defendant that Santos was upset about the murder of Lima.  In 
response, the defendant stated, "I know that.  That was my man 
too," and he further indicated that "it was the wrong dude.  We 
hit the wrong dude."  The defendant also stated that he was not 
worried about his earlier encounter with the police because "he 
ha[d] shooting cases in the past," and because he knew "how to 
get out of the car and to shoot."  He further explained that the 
officer was joking with him and that "he [didn't] think they 
[had] much evidence."  A few days later, Grinion met the 
defendant at an apartment in Fall River, where he saw the 
defendant with the .22 caliber handgun. 
8 
 
 
 
 
On May 28, 2007, Grinion conducted a controlled purchase of 
the .22 caliber gun from the defendant.3  When he gave Grinion 
the gun, the defendant instructed him not to "drop any of the 
shells" if Grinion used the gun because it was connected to a 
murder and another shooting.  Grinion asked whether the 
defendant had used the gun to kill someone, and the defendant 
responded that "whoever bought it, they don't need to know all 
that." 
 
On May 31, 2007, Grinion returned to the apartment to meet 
with the defendant.  At that time, Grinion again told the 
defendant that Santos was upset about the shooting.  The 
defendant became irritated and responded that Grinion had "a big 
mouth."  He also indicated that he did not want Santos to know 
that he had lied about his involvement in the murder. 
 
On June 1, 2007, the police executed an arrest warrant for 
the defendant.  The police then searched the Fall River 
apartment and recovered thirteen .22 caliber live rounds.  At 
trial, the Commonwealth introduced ballistics evidence collected 
from the scene of the shooting, which occurred on Main Street 
(Main Street shooting), including several .22 caliber shell 
                                                          
 
 
3 Before meeting with the defendant, Grinion allowed the 
police to search his person and his motor vehicle.  The police 
then followed Grinion's vehicle to the Fall River apartment, 
where he met with the defendant.  When Grinion left the 
apartment, the police immediately stopped him to retrieve the 
gun. 
9 
 
 
 
casings.  A ballistics expert compared these shell casings to 
the .22 caliber gun recovered from the controlled purchase, and 
concluded that at least some of the casings were fired from that 
gun. 
 
Over the defendant's objection, the Commonwealth also 
introduced evidence relating to the defendant's involvement in 
an earlier shooting that occurred about one month prior to 
Lima's killing on Exchange Street in Brockton (Exchange Street 
shooting).  Grinion testified that the defendant admitted to 
using the .22 caliber handgun in the Exchange Street shooting.  
A ballistics expert also confirmed that three .22 caliber shell 
casings recovered from the scene of the prior shooting were 
fired from the .22 caliber handgun introduced in this case. 
 
The jury eventually returned guilty verdicts on all three 
charges.  The defendant now appeals. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant argues 
that the motion judge erred in denying his pretrial motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from the search and seizure of the 
Malibu. 
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 
the motion judge's "subsidiary findings absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015), quoting Commonwealth 
10 
 
 
 
v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 742 (2015).  The judge's subsidiary 
findings may be supplemented with "uncontroverted and 
undisputed" evidence "where the judge "explicitly or implicitly 
credited the witness's testimony."  Jones-Pannell, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), 
S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). 
 
a.  Relevant facts.  We recite the facts as found by the 
motion judge.  In the middle of the afternoon on May 22, 2007, 
Brockton Police Detective Michael Schaaf and State Police 
Trooper Robert Fries were driving an unmarked police cruiser in 
Brockton.  The two were assigned to warrant apprehension duty.  
Earlier that day, Detective McDermott briefed Schaaf about the 
prior night's shooting and summarized Melo's description of the 
suspect vehicle.  Specifically, McDermott described the suspect 
vehicle as a Chevy Malibu Max that was "tannish or goldish in 
color" and had a "sloped back."  He also stated that Melo 
believed the vehicle would have scrape marks on the bumper.  
McDermott distributed copies of a printed photograph, provided 
by Melo, depicting what Melo believed the vehicle looked like. 
 
Later that afternoon, while traveling on a street in 
Brockton, Schaaf observed a "grayish-green" Chevy Malibu headed 
in the opposite direction.  From the police cruiser, Schaaf 
observed three occupants in the vehicle.  Based on a three-
second view of the vehicle, Schaaf believed that the rear 
11 
 
 
 
passenger was Jose Correia, an individual who had an outstanding 
arrest warrant. 
 
Schaaf and Fries reversed their direction, losing sight of 
the vehicle for about a minute before eventually finding it 
again.  From this position, Schaaf was only able to view the 
back of the rear passenger's head.  Schaaf thereafter effected a 
stop by activating the cruiser's lights. 
 
Schaaf approached the vehicle on the driver's side, while 
Fries approached from the passenger side.  As he approached, 
Schaaf realized that the rear passenger was not Correia.  He 
apologized to the three occupants and informed them that he had 
mistakenly thought the rear passenger saw someone else.  Schaaf 
had some familiarity with the passengers, and they recognized 
him.4  The occupants and Schaaf then engaged in some small talk. 
 
While talking with the occupants, Schaaf asked Hanson for 
his driver's license.  Hanson provided a valid driver's license 
and told Schaaf that the defendant had rented the vehicle.  
Schaaf was then informed that the defendant's girlfriend had in 
fact rented the vehicle.  Based on this verbal exchange, Schaaf 
asked to see the rental agreement.  He reviewed the agreement 
                                                          
 
 
4 Detective Schaaf testified that he recognized the 
defendant as the front passenger and Ortega as the rear 
passenger, and that although he could not remember the name of 
the driver (Hanson), he had spoken with him on previous 
occasions. 
12 
 
 
 
and observed that none of the vehicle's occupants was listed as 
authorized operators. 
 
Schaaf then informed all three occupants that they were not 
allowed to drive the vehicle, and that he intended to secure the 
vehicle for the renter to retrieve it.  The three occupants left 
on foot.  Schaaf did not conduct a search of the vehicle or the 
occupants at that time. 
 
After the occupants had left the scene, Schaaf realized 
that the vehicle might be the same vehicle suspected of being 
involved in the prior night's shooting.  He noted that although 
the vehicle was a regular Chevy Malibu, not a Malibu Max as Melo 
had initially described, and was "grayish-green" rather than 
gold or tan in color, he believed it had a "sloped back" similar 
to Melo's description.  Schaaf then contacted Detective 
McDermott and described the vehicle to him.  Based on Schaaf's 
description, McDermott ordered the car towed to the police 
station, where it was parked in the station's garage and 
cordoned off with yellow police tape. 
 
At the police station, McDermott and another detective 
spoke to the renter of the vehicle, Deolinda Andrade.  During 
the conversation, Andrade stated that she had given someone else 
permission to drive the rental car.  McDermott informed Andrade 
that she may have violated her rental agreement by allowing an 
unlisted individual to drive the vehicle.  He then called the 
13 
 
 
 
rental company and was informed that Andrade's rental agreement 
would be terminated due to the violation.  Based on this 
information, McDermott decided not to release the vehicle to 
Andrade. 
 
Several hours later, the police brought Melo to the police 
station so that he could look at the exterior of the vehicle.  
Melo immediately recognized the vehicle as the one he had 
observed the night before. 
 
The following day, McDermott obtained written consent from 
the rental company to search the vehicle.  The vehicle was then 
transported to State Police headquarters, where it was searched.5 
 
The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress, arguing 
that the stop, seizure, impoundment, and search of the Malibu 
violated his rights under Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Specifically, the defendant sought to suppress the 
following evidence that resulted from the search:  (i) Melo's 
identification of the vehicle, (ii) the exterior damage to the 
vehicle, and (iii) the fingerprints obtained from the vehicle.  
The motion was denied after a hearing. 
                                                          
 
 
5 In the course of the search, the investigators obtained 
latent fingerprints from the vehicle's interior.  An expert 
witness later testified at trial that three of these prints were 
individualized to the defendant. 
14 
 
 
 
 
b.  Analysis.  On appeal, the defendant reprises the 
arguments he made in support of his motion to suppress.  He 
claims that the officers should not have stopped the Malibu once 
they realized that they had mistakenly identified the rear 
passenger, or at least that the stop should have been 
immediately discontinued.  He also asserts that the officers had 
no basis to impound the vehicle or tow it to the police station, 
and that the subsequent search of vehicle was therefore 
unconstitutional.  We agree that the stop should have been 
discontinued once the officers determined that Correia was not 
in the vehicle, and that the unnecessarily prolonged stop 
constituted an illegal seizure.  We further conclude that, under 
the circumstances here, the evidence obtained from the 
subsequent impoundment and search of the Malibu was the direct 
result of the illegal seizure of the defendant, and that the 
Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of proving that the 
evidence from the Malibu was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal seizure such that it should not be deemed a forbidden 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" under art. 14.  Accordingly, the 
motion judge erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained from the search of the Malibu. 
 
i.  Initial stop of the vehicle.  Under the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14, an individual has the right to be free 
from all unreasonable searches and seizures.  Commonwealth v. 
15 
 
 
 
Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 865 (2018).  A motor vehicle stop 
constitutes a seizure of all individuals detained in the stop.  
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810 (1996); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 773 (2015).  The 
police may stop a motor vehicle to "make a threshold inquiry 
where suspicious conduct gives the officer reason to suspect 
that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit a crime."  Commonwealth v. Watson, 430 Mass. 725, 729 
(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 
(1974).  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).  In 
reviewing the constitutionality of a motor vehicle stop, we must 
determine "first, whether the initiation of the investigation by 
the police was permissible in the circumstances, and second, 
whether the scope of the search was justified by the 
circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 140 
(1990), citing Silva, supra at 21. 
 
To effect a valid investigatory stop, the police must have 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity "based on specific and 
articulable facts and the specific reasonable inferences which 
follow from such facts in light of the officer's experience."  
Silva, 366 Mass. at 406, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  Here, 
the officers had sufficiently articulable facts to support a 
reasonable suspicion that the passenger in the back seat of the 
vehicle had an active warrant for his arrest.  Cf. Commonwealth 
16 
 
 
 
v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 599 (1993) (motor vehicle stop 
warranted by reasonable belief that registered owner, who had 
active warrant for his arrest, was driving vehicle).  The motion 
judge credited Detective Schaaf's testimony that he had previous 
knowledge of Correia's active arrest warrant.  Schaaf also 
testified that he was familiar with Correia's physical 
appearance.  Although his view of the Malibu was both distant 
and brief, Schaaf's observation of the Malibu's occupants 
supported his reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that Correia 
was the rear passenger.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 
43, 46 (2008) (motor vehicle stop warranted by mistaken belief 
that registered owner was driving with suspended license).  
Thus, the motion judge properly concluded that the initial stop 
was reasonable. 
 
ii. Duration of the stop.  We must next determine whether 
the scope of the stop was justified under the circumstances.  
The motion judge found that although Detective Schaaf quickly 
realized Correia was not the rear passenger, his request for 
Hanson's driver's license was a "minimal intrusion upon the 
operator."  The motion judge also concluded that Schaaf acted 
reasonably in requesting the rental agreement, thereby 
continuing the stop, because he had received "concurrent 
conflicting information regarding who had rented and was 
legitimately responsible for the Malibu."  We disagree. 
17 
 
 
 
 
A valid investigatory stop "cannot 'last longer than 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'"  
Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465 (2011).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 323 (2001).  The scope 
of a stop may only extend beyond its initial purpose if the 
officer is confronted with facts giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that "further criminal conduct is afoot" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 243 (2017).  
Where an officer conducts an "uneventful threshold inquiry 
giving rise to no further suspicion of criminal activity, he may 
not prolong the detention or expand the inquiry" (citation 
omitted).  Buckley, 478 Mass. at 873.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (noting that individuals do 
not expect police officers conducting traffic stops to engage in 
"stalling tactics, obfuscation, strained conversation, or 
unjustified exit orders, to prolong the seizure in the hope 
that, sooner or later, the stop might yield up some evidence of 
an arrestable crime"). 
 
Because the initial purpose of the stop in this case was to 
apprehend Correia, the stop should have concluded as soon as 
Detective Schaaf realized he had mistakenly identified the rear 
passenger, and nothing else had caused concern.  At that moment, 
the officers had no reason to continue the stop.  Garden, 451 
18 
 
 
 
Mass. at 46 (purpose of stop completed when officers discovered 
that registered owner of vehicle, who officers knew to have 
suspended license, was not driving).  See Cordero, 477 Mass. at 
242, quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 
(2015) ("Police authority to seize an individual ends 'when 
tasks tied to the [detention] are -- or reasonably should have 
been -- completed'").  Thus, Detective Schaaf's request for 
Hanson's driver's license, coupled with his continued 
questioning of the occupants, including the defendant, 
constituted an unlawful seizure of the Malibu and its occupants. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the officers acted reasonably 
in extending the stop to clarify ownership of and responsibility 
for the Malibu.  To the extent Detective Schaaf received 
conflicting information6 from the occupants on this point, this 
exchange did not provide a sufficient basis to continue the stop 
for the purpose of investigating the Malibu's rental status.  
Schaaf credibly testified that he had no reason to believe that 
the Malibu had been stolen, or that Hanson lacked authorization 
from the renter to drive it.  The record provides no evidence 
that the occupants appeared nervous or responded evasively to 
                                                          
 
 
6 The motion judge found that Hanson initially informed 
Detective Schaaf that the defendant had rented the Malibu, but 
that the defendant then stated that his girlfriend was in fact 
the renter. 
 
19 
 
 
 
Schaaf's inquiries.  The mere fact that the Malibu was rented,7 
without more, could not alone support a reasonable suspicion 
that the occupants were engaged in criminal conduct.  See 
Commonwealth v. Locke, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 497, 502 (2016) 
(defendant's statement that another individual rented vehicle 
did not contribute to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity); Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 471 
(1996) (officer's knowledge that vehicle was rented by another 
individual did not support reasonable suspicion that defendant 
was engaged in drug-related activity).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 346-347 (2010) (officer's 
knowledge that vehicle was rented, coupled with defendant's 
evasive explanation as to ownership of vehicle, contributed to 
reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity).  In addition, 
the verbal exchange between Schaaf and the vehicle's occupants 
occurred after the officers had already completed the purpose of 
the stop.  Therefore, Schaaf's knowledge of the vehicle's rental 
status derived solely from an "investigatory conversation for 
                                                          
 
 
7 During his initial verbal exchange with the occupants, 
Detective Schaaf had not yet reviewed, or requested to see, the 
rental agreement.  Before reviewing the agreement, he had no 
basis to believe that the occupants lacked authority to operate 
the Malibu.  See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 475 Mass. 611, 622 
(2016) ("absence of the defendant's name on the rental agreement 
provided [the officer] with a basis to investigate whether the 
authorized renter had permitted the defendant to use the 
vehicle"). 
20 
 
 
 
which [he] had no lawful basis."  Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 
472.  The initial stop was therefore unreasonably extended and 
constituted an illegal seizure.  Cf. Cordero, 477 Mass. at 247 
(where purpose of motor vehicle stop was effectuated, and where 
no reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, police 
"did not have a legitimate basis to detain the defendant, and 
the defendant should have been allowed to drive away"); 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 163 (1997) (continued 
detention of passengers after purpose of stop had been satisfied 
constituted illegal seizure).  See J.A. Grasso, Jr. & C.M. 
McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 4-4[b] 
(2017) ("investigative detention must be temporary and must last 
no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop").  The motion judge therefore erred in finding that the 
officers validly extended the scope of the initial stop. 
 
iii.  The impoundment and search of the Malibu as fruit of 
the poisonous tree.  Rather than letting the occupants drive 
away in the vehicle, as the police were required to do, the 
police continued their investigatory questioning and eventually 
forced the passengers out of the Malibu and impounded it.  
Evidence resulting from a subsequent search of the vehicle 
included Melo's identification of the vehicle as the one he had 
seen on the night of the shooting, the exterior damage to the 
vehicle, and the latent fingerprints belonging to the defendant 
21 
 
 
 
obtained from the interior of the vehicle.  The defendant argues 
that all of this evidence should have been suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule.  We agree. 
 
As an initial matter, the Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant does not have standing to challenge the admission of 
this evidence because, as the passenger of a rental vehicle 
operated by someone other than the renter, the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the impounded Malibu or its 
exterior.  This argument, however, misses the mark. 
 
Standing under the Fourth Amendment requires the defendant 
to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or the item seized.  Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 
385, 391 (2010).  Under art. 14, by contrast, the question of 
standing remains separate from the question of reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 
203, 208 (2009) (standing and reasonable expectation of privacy 
are "interrelated," but considered "separately").  Ordinarily, a 
defendant has standing if he or she has either "a possessory 
interest in the place searched or in the property seized or if 
[he or] she was present when the search occurred."8  Id. 
                                                          
 
 
8 For possessory offenses, including passengers in 
automobiles, we have concluded that defendants have automatic 
standing.  Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 392 (2010).  We 
also have concluded that passengers in an automobile subject to 
extensive global positioning system or cell site location 
information monitoring likewise have standing, even when they 
22 
 
 
 
 
There is no question that the defendant had standing to 
challenge the legality of the seizure of his person when police 
stopped the Malibu and detained its occupants for an extended 
period of time.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 809–810 ("Temporary 
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the 
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited 
purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons'" under Fourth 
Amendment).  He also would reasonably expect that the police 
would leave him and the other passengers in the vehicle alone 
and let them drive away if the police had no proper reason for 
detaining them and the vehicle.  See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 663 
("Citizens do not expect that police officers handling a routine 
traffic violation will engage, in the absence of justification, 
in stalling tactics, obfuscation, strained conversation, or 
unjustified exit orders, to prolong the seizure in the hope 
that, sooner or later, the stop might yield up some evidence of 
an arrestable crime" [emphasis added]).  Thus, at least during 
the unreasonably prolonged detention of the defendant and the 
vehicle in which he was traveling, there is no question that he 
had standing to challenge the seizure.  As this prolonged 
detention was unconstitutional, and the evidence at issue flowed 
                                                          
 
have no possessory interest in the automobile, as their 
reasonable expectations of privacy are implicated.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 77-78 (2019); 
Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013). 
23 
 
 
 
therefrom, the proper focus is on fruit of the poisonous tree, 
not whether the defendant had standing or a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Malibu at the time of its 
impoundment.  See Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 78-79 
(2019). 
 
"Under what has become known as the 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence 
derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure."  Fredericq, 
482 Mass. at 78.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-488 (1963).  In determining whether the evidence is 
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree, we consider "'whether 
. . . the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation of 
[that] illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"  Fredericq, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453 
(2005). 
 
It matters not whether the defendant in this case had 
standing or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Malibu 
once it was impounded by the police.  As we have recently noted, 
evidence may be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree "even 
if it is found in a place where the defendant has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy."  Fredericq, 482 Mass. at 78, discussing 
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486-487.  Accordingly, we have held that 
persons subjected to an illegal seizure are "entitled to 
24 
 
 
 
suppress the fruits of that seizure even where the evidence was 
discovered in places where it is indisputable that the person in 
question did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy."  
Fredericq, supra at 79. 
 
The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that the 
evidence it has "obtained and intends to use is sufficiently 
attenuated from the underlying illegality so as to be purged 
from its taint" (quotation omitted).  Id. at 78, quoting 
Damiano, supra at 454.  We conclude that the Commonwealth has 
failed to meet that burden here.9  The Commonwealth obtained the 
evidence identified supra as a direct result of the illegal 
seizure of the defendant and the car in which he was traveling.  
Indeed, without the illegal seizure, the police would have had 
no grounds to impound the vehicle and conduct a search of it.  
Rather, the defendant and the other occupants of the vehicle 
would have, and should have, been free to leave in the vehicle 
following the initial stop.  The impoundment and subsequent 
search occurred close in time to the illegal seizure, and there 
were no intervening circumstances between the illegal conduct 
and the later discovery of the evidence that would have been 
sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal seizure.  See 
                                                          
 
 
9 Indeed, apparently content with its argument that the stop 
of the vehicle did not amount to an illegal seizure, the 
Commonwealth did not even argue attenuation on appeal. 
25 
 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Long, 476 Mass. 526, 536 (2017) (factors bearing 
on attenuation include "length of time between the [illegal act] 
and the discovery of the evidence [temporal attenuation]; 
whether any circumstances intervened between the illegal act and 
the discovery of the evidence [intervening circumstances]; and 
how integral the unlawful search was to the acquisition of the 
evidence [purpose and flagrancy of the unlawful conduct]").  
Although the illegal police misconduct here may not have been 
flagrant, this factor is not dispositive when balanced against 
the other two.  Cf. Fredericq, 482 Mass. at 81-85 (no 
attenuation where evidence was obtained in close proximity to 
illegality and there were no intervening circumstances, even 
where police misconduct was neither flagrant nor purposeful); 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 864-865 (2015) (same).  
Accordingly, the seizure of the evidence from the Malibu was 
derived as a result of the exploitation of the illegal seizure, 
rather than by "means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint" (citation omitted).  Damiano, 444 Mass. at 
453. 
 
The evidence therefore should have been suppressed as the 
fruit of the poisonous tree.  Cf. Torres, 424 Mass. at 163 
(continued detention of defendant and passenger no longer 
necessary after defendant satisfied purpose of stop by producing 
license and registration; all evidence seized after that point 
26 
 
 
 
suppressed as fruit of poisonous tree).  Its admission in 
evidence at trial was thus error.10 
                                                          
 
 
10 As we conclude that the defendant had standing to 
challenge the prolonged detention of his person and the vehicle 
in which he was traveling, and that the evidence at issue 
derived from this unconstitutional seizure was thus the fruit of 
the poisonous tree, we need not resolve the issue of whether he 
would otherwise have had standing to challenge the impoundment 
and ultimate search of the Malibu where he was neither the 
person who rented the vehicle nor the driver.  We do note, 
however, that the impoundment of the vehicle was improper.  We 
addressed this issue in Campbell, 475 Mass. at 612, where a 
lawful stop of an automobile for a traffic violation ended in an 
impoundment of the vehicle once the officer discovered that the 
operator of the rental car was not authorized by the rental 
agreement.  In that case, the operator was the son of the person 
who rented the car.  Id.  As we explained, "[a] renter's 
decision to allow a person who is not a permitted driver 
according to the rental agreement to drive a rental vehicle may 
be a breach of that agreement, but it does not also result in a 
violation of criminal law."  Id. at 620-621.  We therefore 
determined that the impoundment was unreasonable, concluding 
that "the absence of the defendant's name on the rental 
agreement . . . by itself could not establish probable cause to 
conclude that the defendant was in violation of the statute 
[G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a)]," id. at 622, which provides, in 
relevant part, "whoever uses a motor vehicle without authority 
knowing that such use is unauthorized shall . . . be punished," 
id. at 616. 
 
 
Here, Detective Schaaf testified at the motion hearing that 
he decided to tow the Malibu because the rental agreement did 
not list any of the occupants as authorized operators.  As in 
Campbell, this finding alone is not sufficient to find probable 
cause for a statutory violation and impoundment of the motor 
vehicle.  Schaaf testified that Hanson produced a valid driver's 
license and that the detective did not believe the vehicle was 
stolen.  It appears, then, that "[o]ther than the fact that [the 
driver's] name was not on the rental agreement, [the officers] 
had no basis to believe" that use of the vehicle was 
unauthorized.  Id. at 613.  See Commonwealth v. Locke, 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. 497, 502 (2016) (no basis to continue motor vehicle 
stop, despite absence of driver's name on rental agreement, 
27 
 
 
 
 
iv.  Harmless error.  Because the defendant moved to 
suppress this evidence before trial, we review the 
constitutional error to determine whether it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 700 
(2010), quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
Our review under this standard considers a number of factors, 
including:  
                                                          
 
where driver produced valid driver's license and informed 
officer that renter provided permission). 
 
 
There was also no other basis to seize, impound, and search 
the vehicle.  According to Schaaf's testimony, the detective did 
not suspect that the vehicle was connected to the shooting until 
after he had ordered the occupants out of the vehicle.  Nor 
could he have had a reasonable basis to do so.  The detained 
Malibu varied substantially from Melo's description of the 
suspect vehicle.  Whereas Melo described a gold or tan Chevy 
Malibu "Max," Schaaf had observed a regular "grayish-green" 
Chevy Malibu.  The record does not show, and the motion judge 
did not find, that Schaaf made any effort to examine the 
exterior vehicle damage prior to towing the vehicle.  Although 
he did observe that the detained Malibu had a "sloped back," 
this alone was insufficient to link the vehicle to the previous 
night's shooting.  See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 411 
Mass. 157, 162-163 (1991) (probable cause to conduct warrantless 
search of vehicle where physical evidence collected from scene 
of hit-and-run accident matched fibers found on vehicle 
exterior); Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 560 (1973) 
(probable cause to conduct warrantless search where vehicle's 
color, appearance, and exterior damage were consistent with 
witness description of prior hit-and-run accident).  In 
addition, neither the vehicle's physical location at the time of 
the stop nor its temporal proximity to the shooting could 
support a finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Holness, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 373-374 
(2018) (probable cause to search vehicle identified several 
minutes after fatal shooting where stop occurred one-half mile 
from scene of crime). 
28 
 
 
 
"[1] the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's 
case; [2] the relationship between the evidence and the 
premise of the defense; [3] who introduced the issue at 
trial; [4] the frequency of the reference; [5] whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of 
properly admitted evidence; [6] the availability or effect 
of curative instructions; and [7] the weight or quantum of 
evidence of guilt." 
 
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 467-468 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006).  We then 
must decide, based "on the totality of the record before us, 
weighing the properly admitted and the improperly admitted 
evidence together, [whether] we are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the tainted evidence did not have an 
effect on the jury and did not contribute to the jury's 
verdicts."  Tyree, 455 Mass. at 701. 
 
The evidence obtained from the Malibu and introduced in 
evidence by the Commonwealth was particularly important in 
connecting the defendant to the shooting.  Through Melo's trial 
testimony and the distinctive scraping found underneath the car, 
the Commonwealth sought to prove that the impounded Malibu was 
the suspect vehicle involved in the shooting.  At trial, Melo 
testified that he saw a gold or tan Chevy Malibu round the 
corner near his house, hit the curb on the right side of the 
intersection, and drive down his street at a high rate of speed.  
Melo's testimony was compelling, particularly because he stated 
that the bottom of the right side of the Malibu would have 
29 
 
 
 
distinctive scrape marks from when the vehicle rounded the turn, 
and the car proved to have such marks.  Melo also unequivocally 
identified the Malibu once he saw it at the station.  This 
identification was corroborated by police testimony 
demonstrating that the Malibu's exterior damage was consistent 
with damage to the Altima that Lima was driving at the time of 
the shooting. 
 
Although this evidence does not conclusively connect the 
defendant to the crime, his presence in the Malibu the following 
day strongly suggested his involvement in the murder.  The 
Commonwealth unmistakably relied on this evidence, highlighting 
its significance during opening and closing arguments.  Indeed, 
without the evidence obtained from the Malibu, the 
Commonwealth's case falls predominantly on Grinion's testimony 
and ballistics evidence collected from the scene.  Although this 
untainted evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, we 
cannot say that it was "so powerful as to nullify any effect 
that the improperly admitted evidence might have had" on the 
jury or the verdict (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 537, cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 132 (2016).  As Grinion was an informant with a troubled 
history, his credibility was vulnerable.  We therefore conclude 
that the erroneous admission of evidence deriving from the 
illegal seizure of the defendant was not harmless beyond a 
30 
 
 
 
reasonable doubt.  The defendant's convictions must therefore be 
vacated. 
 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction 
without the evidence derived from the illegal seizure, we 
address other claims of error that are likely to recur upon 
retrial.11 
 
2. Prior bad acts evidence.  The defendant claims that the 
trial judge erred in admitting evidence relating to the 
defendant's involvement in a prior shooting.  On April 28, 2007, 
less than one month before the Main Street shooting on May 21, 
2007, there was a shooting on Exchange Street in Brockton.  The 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant may be retried only if the untainted 
evidence admitted at trial, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support his 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 27 
(2011); Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 798 (1985).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  At 
trial, Grinion and Ortega testified extensively about the 
various incriminating statements the defendant made in the days 
following the shooting.  Despite the defendant's attempts to 
discredit these witnesses, the testimony was sufficient to 
support a guilty verdict.  The Commonwealth also introduced 
ballistics evidence linking the defendant's .22 caliber handgun 
to several spent shell casings found at the scene of the crime. 
Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found the 
essential elements of murder in the first degree beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 
343, 351 (2007) (defendant's possession of two weapons 
consistent with murder weapon supported finding that defendant 
shot victim); Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 267-268 
(1994) (defendant's inculpatory statements to friends following 
victim's death supported finding that defendant killed victim).  
Therefore, double jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial of 
this case.  See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 589 
(2012). 
31 
 
 
 
police recovered three .22 caliber shell casings from the scene 
of the Exchange Street shooting.  They later found ten .22 
caliber shell casings and four .40 caliber shell casings at the 
scene of the Main Street shooting. 
 
At trial, the jury heard testimony about the defendant's 
involvement in the prior Exchange Street shooting.  Grinion 
testified that the defendant told him that he had used a .22 
caliber handgun -- the same handgun Grinion recovered from a 
controlled purchase on May 28, 2007 -- in a shooting on Exchange 
Street the previous month.  Ortega also testified that the 
defendant admitted to his involvement in a prior shooting on 
Exchange Street.  Both witnesses testified that they had seen 
the defendant in possession of the .22 caliber handgun on more 
than one occasion prior to May 21, 2007. 
 
A ballistics expert examined the three .22 caliber casings 
from the Exchange Street shooting and the ten .22 caliber 
casings from the Main Street shooting.  He also test-fired the 
.22 caliber handgun that Grinion retrieved from the defendant.  
At trial, the expert testified that eight out of the ten casings 
from Main Street and all three of the casings from Exchange 
Street were fired from that same .22 caliber handgun. 
 
This evidence was the subject of a motion in limine at 
trial.  After hearing from both parties, the trial judge allowed 
the admission of this evidence, concluding that it was relevant 
32 
 
 
 
to identify the defendant as the person who shot Lima, and to 
show that he had the means to commit the crime.  In his 
postconviction motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that 
the probative value of this evidence was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  The motion judge, who was 
also the trial judge, denied the motion. 
 
As the defendant objected to the admission of this evidence 
at trial, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 586 (2018).  We must first determine 
whether the judge committed an error of law or an abuse of 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 591 (2015).  
A judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of 
discretion where the judge makes a "clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  If we find such an error, we then 
ask whether it was prejudicial.  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass 
589, 561 (2005). 
 
As a general rule, evidence of a defendant's prior bad act 
is inadmissible to show the defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit a crime.  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417 
Mass. 830, 835 (1994).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2019). 
This type of evidence may be admissible, however, if it is 
33 
 
 
 
relevant "for some other purpose . . . such as to show a common 
scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, 
identity, intent, or motive" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Copney, 468 Mass. 405, 412 (2014).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  It may also be admitted to show that the defendant 
had the means to commit the crime.  Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 
Mass. 307, 322 (2009).  The trial judge must exclude such 
evidence, even if relevant, where its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  Where a trial judge admits 
evidence of a defendant's prior bad act, the court must 
determine whether the judge committed palpable error.  
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015). 
 
To admit a defendant's prior bad act as relevant to 
identity, there must be "a special mark or distinctiveness in 
the way the acts were committed" that tends to prove the 
defendant committed the crime charged.  Commonwealth v. 
Brusgulis, 406 Mass. 501, 505 (1990).  It is not enough that 
there is some "general, although less than unique or distinct, 
similarity between the incidents."  Id. at 507.  In addition, 
the prior incident and the crime charged must be proximate in 
both time and place.  Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. 782, 
786 (1999). 
34 
 
 
 
 
In this case, the trial judge concluded that evidence of 
the defendant's involvement in the prior Exchange Street 
shooting was relevant to prove his identity as the shooter who 
killed Lima.  We agree.  Based on the defendant's own admissions 
to Grinion and Ortega, the jury could have reasonably concluded 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant used a .22 
caliber handgun in the prior Exchange Street shooting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 415 (2000); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(b).  See also Commonwealth v. Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
303, 308 n. 13 (2019), quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 690 (1988).  The ballistics evidence admitted at trial 
linked this same .22 caliber handgun to both the Exchange Street 
shooting and the Main Street shooting.  In addition, these two 
shootings were proximate in both time and place, as they each 
occurred in Brockton approximately one month apart.  See 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 228 n.13 (1986) ("There 
is no bright-line test for determining temporal remoteness of 
evidence of prior misconduct").  Additionally, this evidence 
corroborated Grinion's testimony that the defendant had been 
involved in the Exchange Street shooting.  Thus, the trial judge 
properly concluded that evidence of the defendant's involvement 
in the prior Exchange Street shooting was relevant to establish 
his identity as the shooter in this case. 
35 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, evidence that the defendant possessed the .22 
caliber handgun, and used it in the prior shooting, was also 
relevant to show that he had the means to commit the crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012) ("A weapon 
that could have been used in the course of a crime is 
admissible, in the judge's discretion, even without direct proof 
that the particular weapon was in fact used in the commission of 
the crime").  See also Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 
448-449 (2017) (witness testimony that defendant was observed 
with firearm one month prior to shooting was admissible absent 
definitive evidence that firearm was not murder weapon); 
Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014) (evidence that 
defendant possessed firearm consistent with type of weapon used 
to kill victim was admissible to show that defendant had means 
to commit crime); Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 744 
(2000) (evidence of two knives found in defendant's bedroom four 
days after victim's death was admissible where one knife matched 
description of murder weapon). 
 
Finally, we find that the trial judge correctly concluded 
that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by 
the risk of unfair prejudice.  At trial, the judge limited the 
evidence to testimony that the defendant admitted to possessing 
and shooting the .22 caliber handgun in the prior Exchange 
Street shooting, and ballistics evidence that the same .22 
36 
 
 
 
caliber handgun was used in the shooting of Lima.  The jury were 
not permitted to hear evidence that the defendant shot, or 
intended to shoot, anyone in the Exchange Street shooting.12  In 
addition, the judge instructed the Commonwealth to use leading 
questions so as to limit the testimony presented.  In light of 
the highly probative nature of the evidence, we find that these 
restrictions adequately prevented any prejudice to the 
defendant.  We therefore find no error in the judge's decision 
to admit evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts. 
 
3.  Motions for postconviction discovery and a new trial.  
Prior to trial, defense counsel was provided copies of the 
wiretap recordings obtained by Grinion through his work as a 
confidential informant.  Defense counsel moved to suppress the 
recordings, which consisted of conversations among the 
defendant, Ortega, and Grinion occurring between May 29 and 31, 
2007.  These recordings were authorized by a search warrant 
pursuant to G. L. c. 272, § 99, and Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 
Mass. 61, 66 (1987). 
 
In support of the motion to suppress, trial counsel 
successfully argued that the wiretap recordings were obtained 
unlawfully, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, because the 
                                                          
 
 
12 Prior to the jury charge, defense counsel asked the judge 
not to instruct the jury as to the admissibility of evidence 
relating to the defendant's prior bad acts because he did not 
wish to call the jury's attention to this evidence. 
37 
 
 
 
investigation was not in connection with organized crime.  The 
motion was allowed and upheld by this court on appeal.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 290 (2011).  
The suppressed recordings were not admitted at trial, nor was 
there any mention that the defendant's conversations were 
recorded. 
 
Following his conviction, the defendant filed a motion for 
a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to seek the suppression of evidence 
derived from the wiretap recordings pursuant to G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 P.  He also filed a motion for postconviction discovery to 
obtain copies or transcripts of the wiretap recordings.  The 
motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motions.13  
The defendant now appeals.  As we have determined that a new 
trial is required due to the failure to suppress the evidence 
derived from the motor vehicle stop, we only resolve those 
issues necessary for any subsequent trial. 
 
Under the Massachusetts wiretap statute, a criminal 
defendant "may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted 
wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom" if the 
                                                          
 
 
13 The defendant filed a petition with this court seeking 
review of the denial of his motions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  A single justice denied the petition, as well as a 
subsequent motion for reconsideration.  This court affirmed that 
decision.  See generally Tavares v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 1024 
(2018). 
38 
 
 
 
interception was made in violation of the statute.  G. L. 
c. 272, § 99 P.  A witness's live testimony about a recorded 
conversation, however, need not be suppressed if it is "not the 
product of an unauthorized interception but is independent of 
it."  Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 384 Mass. 293, 299-300 (1981).  
By contrast, the testimony should be suppressed if the witness 
relies on his or her "listening to the unlawfully obtained 
recording."  Id. at 300 n.7.  See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 431 
Mass. 134, 142 (2000) (no error in admitting undercover 
officer's live testimony based on his "investigation and 
recollection of the criminal events"). 
 
 We agree with the motion judge's finding that the 
defendant failed to identify any specific evidence admitted at 
trial that was derived from the unlawful recordings.  The 
suppressed recordings were not admitted as evidence, nor was 
there any mention at trial that the defendant's conversations 
were recorded.  During the pretrial proceedings, trial counsel 
reminded the court that the wiretap recordings had been 
suppressed, and reiterated his concern that one of the witnesses 
would inadvertently discuss the recordings.  In his affidavit, 
trial counsel also stated that he did not file a motion to 
suppress because he "did not think that any evidence had been 
derived from the wiretap recordings involved in this case." 
39 
 
 
 
 
The defendant has thus failed to demonstrate with any 
specificity how the unlawful recordings may have affected the 
admissibility of Grinion's trial testimony.  The defendant 
argues more persuasively, however, that his ability to do so was 
hamstrung completely by the denial of his motion for posttrial 
discovery of the recordings themselves.  The defendant asserts 
that, without access to the recordings on appeal, he could not 
effectively argue in support of his motion for a new trial.  An 
examination of the recordings, he contends, is necessary to 
identify the specific evidence introduced at trial which derived 
from the recordings.  He further asserts that the Commonwealth's 
"refusal to produce the tape or transcript of the illegal 
wiretap" violated his constitutional right to due process of law 
under both the Federal and State Constitutions.  See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 
412 Mass. 401, 405 (1992). 
Although we need not decide whether a new trial is 
warranted for this reason alone, we conclude that the defendant 
is entitled to another copy of the transcript prior to any 
retrial.  This transcript will enable defense counsel to examine 
whether there is any improper reliance on the suppressed 
recordings at any future trial.  Grinion's testimony will be 
critical at any subsequent retrial, providing further 
40 
 
 
 
justification for defense counsel's access to the suppressed 
recordings. 
 
Because the defendant is entitled to discovery of the 
recordings, we need not address the validity of his 
constitutional claims.  The Commonwealth is hereby ordered to 
disclose the suppressed wiretap recordings, or a copy of the 
recording transcripts, to the defendant prior to any retrial. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, vacate the 
defendant's convictions, and remand for a new trial consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.