Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Character

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2902.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2902 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHARACTER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Character,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2902.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple and repeated violations of the Disciplinary 
Rules and the Rules of Professional Conduct — Respondent disbarred. 
(No. 2010-1693 — Submitted January 19, 2011 — Decided June 23, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-037. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Dea Lynn Character, currently incarcerated in 
Marysville, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0042158, was admitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 
{¶ 2} In September 1998, we imposed a six-month conditionally stayed 
suspension on respondent’s license based upon her failure to maintain complete 
records of all funds coming into her possession, failure to promptly pay or deliver 
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funds or property that the client is entitled to receive, withdrawal of unearned or 
disputed fees from a client trust account, charging a clearly excessive fee, 
dividing fees with attorneys outside her firm without the prior consent of the 
client, and neglecting a legal matter entrusted to her.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Character-Floyd (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 306, 699 N.E.2d 922. 
{¶ 3} On October 30, 2009, we suspended respondent’s license to 
practice law on an interim basis as a result of her felony convictions for engaging 
in a pattern of corrupt activity, theft by deception, and money laundering.  In re 
Character, 123 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2009-Ohio-5708, 915 N.E.2d 1228.  And on 
November 3, 2009, we imposed an attorney-registration suspension.  In re 
Attorney Registration Suspension of Character, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-
5786, 915 N.E.2d 1256.  Those suspensions remain in effect. 
{¶ 4} In May 2006, the Cuyahoga County Bar Association filed a two-
count complaint charging respondent with professional misconduct.  After 
amending the complaint several times, the bar association transferred the matter to 
relator, Disciplinary Counsel, who has charged respondent with 20 counts of 
misconduct in a sixth amended complaint. 
{¶ 5} The panel has granted relator’s motions to dismiss five counts, 
recommends the dismissal of four more based upon insufficiency of the evidence, 
and has agreed to bifurcate count 20 pending the resolution of respondent’s 
criminal appeal. 
{¶ 6} Based upon findings that respondent has committed more than 40 
violations of the ethical rules governing the conduct of attorneys in Ohio, the 
panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law.  The board has adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, but 
citing “the astonishing record of misconduct in this case,” recommends that we 
permanently disbar respondent. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 7} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
on the ground that they are not supported by the evidence.  She further contends 
that the disciplinary procedures employed in her case deprived her of her due 
process and that her conduct does not warrant permanent disbarment. 
{¶ 8} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, with the 
exception of certain alleged violations in counts four and 19.  We overrule 
respondent’s remaining objections and conclude that her extensive record of 
serious misconduct involving multiple clients warrants permanent disbarment. 
Misconduct 
Count 1 
{¶ 9} In April 2004, respondent accepted a $750 flat fee to represent a 
woman who had been discharged from her employment with University Hospitals 
of Cleveland.  Although respondent did not perform any work until after she had 
received the fee, the board found that she did not deposit the fee into a client trust 
account and that she admitted, through counsel, that she did not always maintain 
such an account. 
{¶ 10} While representing this client, respondent held herself out as a 
member of the firm of Character, Character & Associates.  Respondent admitted, 
however, that her “associates” were attorneys outside her office with whom she 
co-counseled on a regular basis.  Respondent’s counsel admitted in his opening 
statement that respondent did not have malpractice insurance and did not obtain 
signed acknowledgements from her clients. 
{¶ 11} The board found that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-104(A) 
through (C) (requiring a lawyer to disclose to the client that the lawyer lacks 
professional liability insurance and maintain a copy of that disclosure, signed by 
the client, for five years after termination of the representation),  1-102(A)(6) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 2-102(B) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing 
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under a name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyers practicing under 
the name, or a firm containing names other than those of one or more of the 
lawyers in the firm), 2-102(C) (prohibiting a lawyer from holding himself or 
herself out as having a partnership with one or more lawyers unless they are in 
fact partners), 9-102(A) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients separate 
from the lawyer’s own property), 9-102(A)(2) (requiring funds belonging in part 
to a client and in part presently or potentially to a lawyer to be deposited in a 
client trust account and permitting the lawyer to withdraw the undisputed portion 
belonging to him or her), and 9-102(E) (requiring a lawyer to maintain funds of 
clients or other third parties in a separate interest-bearing account). 
{¶ 12} Because the board found no evidence that respondent had failed to 
provide files to the client or that she had assumed the responsibility of filing a 
wrongful-termination suit or representing the client at any hearings, we dismiss 
alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and engaging 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) through (3) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his 
client, failing to carry out a contract of employment for legal services, and 
prejudicing or damaging a client during the course of the professional 
relationship), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver 
funds and property to which a client is entitled). 
{¶ 13} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that they are not supported by clear and convincing evidence because the 
client did not testify, and therefore, there is no evidence to contradict respondent’s 
own version of the events.  Accordingly, respondent argues, the entire count must 
be dismissed. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 14} Respondent cites Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Newman, 124 Ohio St.3d 
505, 2010-Ohio-928, 924 N.E.2d 359, Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 448, 2004-Ohio-6560, 820 N.E.2d 318, and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Wilson, 
127 Ohio St.3d 10, 2010-Ohio-4937, 935 N.E.2d 841, for the proposition that this 
court must dismiss allegations of misconduct that are not supported by sworn or 
certified documentary prima facie evidence from the grievants themselves. 
{¶ 15} It is true that all findings of misconduct must be supported “by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J).  In the context of default 
proceedings, like those at issue in Newman, Sebree, and Wilson, Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(F)(1) requires the motion for default to contain “[s]worn or certified 
documentary prima facie evidence in support of the allegations made.”  This 
requirement ensures that sufficient authenticated, admissible evidence exists to 
support findings that the alleged misconduct occurred. 
{¶ 16} In Sebree, we held that the “summary, conclusory, and hearsay-
filled affidavits” of the relator’s investigator, who lacked first-hand knowledge of 
the attorney’s conduct, did not constitute prima facie evidence sufficient to 
support findings of attorney misconduct.  Id.,104 Ohio St.3d 448, 2004-Ohio-
6560, 820 N.E.2d 380, ¶ 9, 12, 14.  On remand, we instructed relators in default 
disciplinary proceedings to submit the affidavits of the grievants themselves in 
support of relators’ motions for default judgment.  Id. at ¶ 9.  We remanded 
Newman for further proceedings upon discovering that the relator had failed to 
submit a certified copy of the attorney’s felony conviction in support of its default 
motion seeking disbarment.  Newman, 124 Ohio St.3d 505, 2010-Ohio-928, 924 
N.E.2d 359, ¶ 4 and 9.  And in Wilson, 127 Ohio St.3d 10, 2010-Ohio, 4937, 935 
N.E.2d 841, — another default proceeding — we adopted the board’s 
recommendation to dismiss an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation) because the record contained no evidence proving 
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that an overdraft of the attorney’s trust account resulted from her dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 17} This case differs from Newman, Sebree, and Wilson in that 
respondent appeared and aggressively defended herself against the allegations of 
misconduct.  She entered into a number of factual stipulations with regard to this 
count and testified about her conduct in this matter, and the parties submitted a 
total of 129 joint exhibits, several of which relate to this count.  Although the 
client involved in this count did not testify or submit an affidavit describing her 
interaction with respondent, the record does contain clear and convincing 
evidence to support the board’s findings of fact and conclusions that respondent 
has violated DR1-102(A)(6), 1-104(A) through (C), 2-102(B) and (C), and 9-
102(A), (A)(2), and (E).  However, in accordance with the board’s 
recommendation, we dismiss the alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5), 6-
101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1) through (3), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count 4 
{¶ 18} Count 4 of the amended complaint relates to respondent’s 
representation of a client in a bankruptcy proceeding.  The parties stipulated that 
when respondent electronically filed the bankruptcy proceeding, the case was 
erroneously assigned three separate case numbers (the “triple-filed case”) and that 
respondent had represented herself as an attorney with the firm of Character, 
Character & Associates. 
{¶ 19} The board found that in April 2005, the bankruptcy court issued an 
order for respondent to appear and show cause why the filing fees had not been 
paid with respect to 11 bankruptcy cases, including one of the cases from the 
triple-filed case.  The show-cause hearing was adjourned to May 10, 2005, to 
permit respondent to pay the required fees.  Respondent testified that she had 
experienced technical difficulties in getting the electronic filing system and the 
bankruptcy clerk to accept and process her credit card payments. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 20} The board also found that respondent had failed to appear at the 
May 10th hearing and at a July 26th hearing to show cause why she had failed to 
file certain documents under one of the triple-filed case numbers, resulting in the 
dismissal of that case.  The board found, however, that respondent had testified 
that she could not understand why the hearing had been scheduled, given that the 
case had been dismissed in May. 
{¶ 21} The board found that respondent’s conduct violated DR1-
102(A)(5) and (6) 6-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from handling a legal matter 
without adequate preparation ) and (A)(3), and 7-101(A)(1) through (3). 
{¶ 22} Respondent objects and argues that there is not sufficient evidence 
to support the board’s findings of misconduct because the client did not testify, 
and there was no evidence to contradict her testimony.  Having conducted an 
independent review of the record, we find that even in the absence of the client’s 
own testimony, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that 
respondent handled this client’s case without adequate preparation and neglected 
it, and that her actions adversely reflected upon her fitness to practice law and 
were prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
{¶ 23} Finding no evidence that respondent held herself out as a partner in 
a non-existent law firm in her representation of this client, the board recommends 
that we dismiss alleged violations of DR 2-102(B) and (C).  We observe, 
however, that respondent has stipulated that she had held herself out as an 
attorney with the firm of Character, Character & Associates with regard to this 
count.  She testified that she considered her outside co-counsel to be her 
associates.  Therefore, we find that relator has proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent has violated DR 2-102(B) and (C) with respect to this 
count. 
{¶ 24} The record, however, does not contain sufficient evidence to 
support the board’s findings that respondent violated DR 7-101(A)(1) through (3), 
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which prohibit an attorney from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives 
of her client, intentionally failing to carry out the contract of employment for legal 
services, and intentionally prejudicing or damaging the client during the course of 
the professional relationship. 
{¶ 25} The parties have stipulated that the client’s bankruptcy was 
erroneously assigned three separate case numbers.  Although one of those cases 
was dismissed for respondent’s failure to submit the requisite documents and 
respondent was sanctioned for her failure to timely pay the fees in the two 
remaining cases, the parties jointly submitted a receipt from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Ohio, Cleveland Division, 
demonstrating that respondent paid the $194 filing fee in the oldest of the client’s 
three bankruptcy proceedings on May 9, 2005.  Respondent testified that the 
client did not complete the Chapter 13 proceeding under one of the remaining 
case numbers because he could not afford to maintain the scheduled payments.  
Relator offered no evidence to contradict this testimony.  Thus, there is no 
evidence that respondent intentionally (1) failed to seek the lawful objectives of 
this client, (2) failed to carry out the contract of employment for legal services, or 
(3) prejudiced or damaged the client.  Accordingly, we dismiss the alleged 
violations of DR 7-101(A)(1) through (3). 
Count 10 
{¶ 26} Respondent’s misconduct in this count arises from her 
representation of a mentally challenged woman in a postdecree domestic relations 
matter and certain real estate matters, beginning with the client’s eviction from 
her home in April 2002.  The panel and board found that the client was not a 
sophisticated individual and that respondent had attained a position of trust by 
taking her to dinner, socializing with her, and helping her find housing.  Despite 
the client’s mental and emotional challenges, the board found that she evidenced 
normal memory recall and comprehension during her testimony. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 27} The client testified that she did not sign a fee agreement and that 
she did not know how much respondent would charge her for the work, but that 
respondent had told her it would be “a lot of money * * * like $29,000.”  During 
the course of the representation, the client received $35,000 from her former 
husband, representing her share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital 
residence, and an additional $21,500, representing her share of his 401(K) plan.  
She also began to receive $345 per month from her former husband’s pension. 
{¶ 28} Respondent and her co-counsel received $15,000 in attorney fees 
from the $35,000 in real estate proceeds.  Respondent received an additional 
$3,000 when the client received her share of her former husband’s 401(k) and 
$3,750 when the client closed on the purchase of a new home.  Respondent also 
admitted that she and her co-counsel had received an additional $2,000 payment 
from certain funds that the client had invested with Skywater Investment Group 
and Network (“Skywater”).  Thus, respondent has acknowledged that she and her 
co-counsel received $23,750 for handling the client’s postdecree and real estate 
matters. 
{¶ 29} The board acknowledged that respondent assisted with the client’s 
real estate closing and attended one hearing related to the former husband’s 
401(k) plan, but found that “there does not appear to have been anything 
approaching $23, 500 of legal work performed by Respondent on behalf of [the 
client].”  They observed that the client had walked the motion through the court to 
obtain the funds from her former husband’s 401(k) plan and had pursued the 
monthly pension benefits on her own. 
{¶ 30} In addition to the attorney fees respondent received from the client, 
respondent also induced the client to invest $4,800 in Skywater, which was a 
division of Time Reveals, L.L.C.  (“Time Reveals”).  Respondent served as the 
senior vice president of legal and business affairs for Time Reveals and testified 
that she “was the person in charge of the money for investments.”  Respondent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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did not disclose that her boyfriend (with whom she cohabitated from 2000 to 
2007) and his brother owned the companies. 
{¶ 31} The client testified that she received no profit from her Skywater 
investment and that the principal was never returned to her.  Respondent claimed 
that she distributed the funds to several of the client’s creditors at the client’s 
direction.  The only documentation she provided was a receipt for $600 
purportedly paid to the client, but the client testified that the signature on that 
receipt was not hers. 
{¶ 32} Moreover, the panel and board found that respondent had failed to 
cooperate in the Cuyahoga County Bar Association’s investigation of this matter, 
observing that she had failed to attend scheduled interviews and was late for 
appointments and for her deposition.  She also failed to make a timely, orderly, 
and organized production of her files and other documents. 
{¶ 33} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that 
respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and (A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 1-
104, 2-106(A) and (B) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, 
charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 5-104 (prohibiting a 
lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client if they have 
differing interests unless the client has consented after full disclosure), and 5-105 
(requiring a lawyer to refuse to accept or continue employment if the interests of 
another client may impair the independent professional judgment of the lawyer), 
and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation).  But citing a lack of sufficient evidence, the board recommends 
that we dismiss alleged violations of DR 2-107(A) (permitting division of fees by 
lawyers who are not in the same firm only with prior consent of client and if 
certain conditions are met) and 9-102(A)(2). 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 34} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
reciting her version of the events without any citations to the record, and claiming 
that she performed substantial work for the client and worked without pay during 
the greater part of the representation.  Respondent, however, offered no 
documentary evidence to demonstrate how much time she spent working on the 
client’s case, and the client testified that she pursued some of the postdecree 
matters on her own.  The panel, whose findings were adopted by the board, found 
the client’s testimony more credible than that of respondent.  We defer to the 
panel’s determination because the record does not weigh heavily against it.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 
467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-
6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s objections 
and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct in count 10, as well as the 
board’s recommendation to dismiss alleged violations of DR 2-107(A) and 9-
102(A)(2). 
Count 12 
{¶ 35} In 2004, a college student retained respondent to defend him 
against criminal charges that he had stabbed two students during an altercation at 
a fraternity house and to represent him in a related suspension proceeding at the 
university he attended.  The client never executed a fee agreement, but his father 
paid respondent a $23,000 retainer to cover her representation and investigator 
and expert-witness fees.  Respondent has stipulated that she represented herself as 
an attorney with the firm Character, Character & Associates during this 
representation. 
{¶ 36} Although respondent was the attorney retained to handle the case, 
the board found that she did “virtually nothing” in the criminal matter.  
Respondent brought in two other attorneys to assist in the criminal matter without 
the client’s consent, one of whom served as lead counsel, handling court 
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appearances and filing discovery requests and motions with the court.  When he 
failed to attend a hearing, the client’s bond was revoked, although it was later 
reinstated.  The client and his father also testified that despite their repeated 
requests, they never spoke with any investigator or outside consultants or received 
the names of any such persons from respondent. 
{¶ 37} Respondent advised the client to plead guilty to two misdemeanor 
counts of assault, stating that he would probably not serve any jail time and would 
be reinstated as a student at the university.  Relying on this erroneous advice, the 
client entered a guilty plea, but he was sentenced to six months in jail and was not 
permitted to return to the university.  He obtained his early release by filing a pro 
se motion. 
{¶ 38} Respondent appeared with the client at just one hearing regarding 
his university suspension.  Although she was permitted to actively participate in 
the hearing, she only took notes.  Following that hearing, the client was 
suspended.  The client terminated the respondent’s representation two days before 
his second university hearing because she had provided virtually no assistance in 
preparing him for the hearing and had failed to obtain the appearance of witnesses 
that he needed to conduct his defense.  He requested an accounting of his fees and 
expenses, but respondent never provided one. 
{¶ 39} Based upon these facts, the board found that respondent’s conduct 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 2-102(B) and (C), 2-106(A) and (B), 6-101(A)(2) and 
(3), 7-101(A)(1) through (3), and 9-102(A).  The board also recommends that we 
dismiss an alleged violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) for lack of sufficient 
evidence. 
{¶ 40} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that she thoroughly and diligently represented the client and that her fee 
was reasonable for the time she spent and the expenses she incurred on the 
client’s behalf.  Having independently reviewed the record, we overrule 
January Term, 2011 
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respondent’s objection and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, but 
we dismiss the alleged violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Count 13 
{¶ 41} Mary Ann Rini was assigned to investigate three grievances that 
were part of the Cuyahoga County Bar Association’s initial case against 
respondent.  She testified that respondent was not cooperative and was very 
difficult to contact by letter and phone.  Rini estimated that respondent failed to 
attend five or six scheduled appointments and stated that on the occasions when 
respondent did attend, she was constantly on the telephone or would leave early.  
She recalled one occasion when, in response to a subpoena for records, 
respondent arrived four hours late with a box of disorganized records.  Although 
Rini attempted to question her about the records, she gave up because the 
documents were in such disarray.  The board determined that while respondent 
had offered several explanations as to the whereabouts of her records, the 
majority of the requested records were not promptly produced, if they were 
produced at all.  The record also contains the transcripts of three attempted 
depositions, each reflecting that respondent was aware of, but failed to attend, a 
scheduled deposition. 
{¶ 42} Respondent objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct 
and argues that over the course of the five-year investigation of these grievances, 
she submitted to a number of depositions, produce numerous documents, and 
faced a number of unexpected personal challenges that prevented her from fully 
participating in all aspects of the investigation.  While we acknowledge that 
respondent did cooperate in certain aspects of this disciplinary proceeding, the 
record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that she failed to cooperate on a 
number of occasions, causing unnecessary delay and expense.  Accordingly, we 
overrule respondent’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact, and conclude 
that respondent has violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) as found by the board. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Count 15 
{¶ 43} A woman hired respondent to resolve a judgment lien of $2,000 to 
$3,000 that a creditor had obtained against a certain parcel of her real property.  
As part of the representation, respondent was supposed to pay the judgment on the 
client’s behalf from the proceeds of a certain investment with a division of Time 
Reveals.  Respondent issued a check to the client’s creditor, but after it was 
returned for insufficient funds, the client paid the judgment herself.  Respondent 
attempted to reimburse the client with a check that she had drafted on an account 
belonging to Time Reveals.  The client witnessed respondent sign the name of one 
of the company’s owners to the check and testified that the bank refused to cash it 
for insufficient funds. 
{¶ 44} Based upon these facts, the board found that respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6) and 7-101(A)(3). 
{¶ 45} Respondent objects to the board’s findings, claiming that someone 
else drafted and delivered the check to the client without her knowledge and that 
respondent later reimbursed the client in cash.  The client’s testimony directly 
contradicted respondent’s version of the events, and the board found the client’s 
testimony more credible.  Therefore, we adopt the board findings of fact and 
misconduct.  And on the board’s recommendation, we dismiss the alleged 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. 
Count 16 
{¶ 46} In March 2006, at respondent’s request, the client discussed in 
count 15 invested $35,000 in certain property-rehabilitation projects being 
conducted by SIGN Joint Ventures, a division of Time Reveals, with a stated 
return of $10,000 for a seven-day investment. 
{¶ 47} On April 7, 2006, after the client had received the return of her 
$35,000 investment plus $12,000 in interest, she agreed to invest an additional 
$25,000 for ten days, with a stated return of $8,000.  The client wired the money 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
from her bank account into a Huntington Bank account in the name of Time 
Reveals.  The term of the investment was supposed to be only ten days, but on 
November 12, 2009, the client testified that she had received less than $5,000 of 
the $33,000 she was owed. 
{¶ 48} Respondent admitted that she had “some oversight” of the use of 
the money, although she did not have an ownership interest in the company.  She 
did not provide the client with a prospectus or information about the properties in 
which she would be investing.  Nor did she provide the client with any appraisal 
information.  Respondent blamed the client’s investment loss on the real estate 
market crash. 
{¶ 49} The board found that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) and (6), 5-104(A), and 7-101(A)(3) and recommends that we dismiss 
an alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) based upon the insufficiency of the 
evidence.  Having reviewed the record and considered the respondent’s objection, 
in which she blames the recent real estate crash and economic downturn for the 
client’s losses, we adopt these findings of fact and misconduct and dismiss the 
alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
Count 17 
{¶ 50} The testimony and stipulated facts of this case demonstrate that in 
December 2007, a mother hired respondent to represent her son in his appeal of a 
criminal conviction.  Although the mother paid respondent $5,850 between 
December 2007 and March 17, 2008, respondent did not appeal the client’s 
criminal conviction and left the matter to his court-appointed attorney. 
{¶ 51} Respondent did not enter an appearance in the client’s other 
pending criminal matters prior to trial, and he was continually represented by 
court-appointed counsel.  But when respondent advised the client’s mother that 
she would need to hire an investigator for the pending charges, his mother paid 
her an additional $600 for that purpose.  When the client’s mother expressed 
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concern that respondent would be out of town during the son’s criminal trial, 
respondent advised her that she would talk with his court appointed counsel.  The 
court-appointed attorney testified that he never spoke with the investigator 
purportedly hired by respondent and that he never discussed any particulars of the 
pending matter with respondent.  Respondent was in Florida during the client’s 
February 2008 trial, and he was represented by his court-appointed counsel. 
{¶ 52} Respondent asked the client’s mother to pay another $500 toward 
her son’s attorney fees, but she refused to pay until respondent showed her that 
the post-conviction motions had been filed on the client’s behalf.  Respondent 
prepared a motion for a new trial, a motion for judgment of acquittal 
notwithstanding the verdict, and a motion for reconsideration and/or modification 
of sentence and presented them to the mother with a notice of limited appearance 
to represent the son with respect to two of the three motions.  But the motions 
stated that they were prepared pro se and therefore did not identify respondent as 
the son’s counsel.  Respondent and the client’s mother both testified that the 
signatures on the motions were not the client’s.  Nonetheless, after receiving the 
motions, the mother paid respondent an additional $500.  While each of the 
motions bears a certificate of service dated March 13, 2008, a printout of the 
court’s docket reflects that only the motion for a judgment of acquittal 
notwithstanding the verdict was filed with the court as of June 20, 2008. 
{¶ 53} The client’s mother testified that when she left respondent 
messages, her calls were not returned and that many times she could not even 
leave a message because respondent’s voice-mail box was full. 
{¶ 54} Respondent has stipulated that although she is a sole practitioner, 
she represented herself as an attorney with the firm Character & Character.  She 
also admitted that she did not have malpractice insurance while she represented 
this client and did not have him or his mother sign an acknowledgment of that 
fact. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 55} The board found that respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 
1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not maintain 
professional liability insurance), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an 
agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 7.5(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from practicing under a firm name containing names other 
than those of the lawyers in the firm), 7.5(d) (permitting lawyers to state or imply 
that  they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the 
fact), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law). 
{¶ 56} Respondent objects to these findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that in the absence of the client’s testimony, there is insufficient evidence 
to prove her misconduct.  She contends that she was retained by the client, not his 
mother, that she took her orders directly from the client, and that he received 
appropriate representation at a reasonable cost. 
{¶ 57} The testimony of the client’s mother, based upon her personal 
knowledge of the events, refutes many of respondent’s claims.  Moreover, the 
evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that despite having received 
almost $7,000 to represent the client, respondent did not seek to obtain the 
admitted object of her representation — the pursuit of her client’s criminal appeal.  
Nor did she enter an appearance in his other criminal matters until after the client 
had been convicted — even though the client’s mother had paid her to do so.  And 
then her appearance was limited to the pursuit of postconviction motions, 
prepared by her, that state they were prepared and filed pro se.  For these reasons, 
we overrule respondent’s objections and find that the record clearly and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
convincingly establishes the violations found by the board.  Therefore, we adopt 
the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count 18 
{¶ 58} A woman paid respondent a $700 retainer to represent family 
members who were facing residential foreclosure – one in Cleveland and the other 
in Georgia.  The property owners hoped to achieve short sales and had buyers for 
both properties.  Respondent stipulated that she did not notify the woman that she 
did not carry malpractice insurance. 
{¶ 59} Although respondent filed an answer on behalf of the Cleveland 
property owner in the foreclosure proceeding, she did not oppose the mortgage 
company’s motion for summary judgment, and it was eventually granted.  The 
property owner filed a pro se motion for relief from judgment, stating that her 
“counsel just disappeared,” and she eventually resolved the matter herself. 
{¶ 60} Respondent falsely represented that she was licensed to practice 
law in Georgia.  Although respondent facilitated the filing of the Georgia property 
owner’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, he eventually lost the property to 
foreclosure. 
{¶ 61} The panel and board found that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h) and recommends that we dismiss alleged 
violations of Prof. Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.5(A) based upon the insufficiency of the 
evidence.  Respondent objects and argues that this count should be dismissed 
because the clients themselves did not testify or otherwise provide their 
testimony, and therefore, the board’s findings cannot be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
{¶ 62} We have rejected this argument in counts one and four, above, and 
we reject it here.  Because the record contains competent, credible evidence that 
clearly and convincingly supports the board’s findings of fact and misconduct 
with respect to this count, we adopt those findings. 
January Term, 2011 
19 
 
Count 19 
{¶ 63} In 2007, respondent attended a conference about setting up private 
investment funds on behalf of Time Reveals and Skywater.  While there, she and 
another acquaintance met a man who was interested in investing in real estate 
(“investor”).  The three began exchanging e-mails and telephone calls to explore 
investment opportunities.  Respondent provided the investor with information on 
the lease-back of a single-family home in Gates Mills, Ohio that could be fixed up 
and sold at a higher price. 
{¶ 64} The investor signed a contract to purchase the property for $3.5 
million as the buyer and as the “nominee for Skywater Investment Group & 
Network (buyer).”  He was supposed to obtain a mortgage to cover the purchase 
price.  Respondent stipulated that she instructed the investor to electronically wire 
$40,000 to a bank account at Key National Bank.  The evidence reveals that the 
investor wired a total of $50,000 to an account at that bank titled in the name of 
respondent’s parents.  After the investor was unable to secure financing for the 
Gates Mills property, he contacted respondent to obtain a refund, but respondent 
did not return the money.  She testified that the money the investor wired to Key 
National Bank was a nonrefundable and transferable deposit for the assignment of 
the purchase agreement. 
{¶ 65} Respondent testified that the money was wired to her mother’s 
account because Skywater owed her mother money and because respondent could 
not get to her own bank in time to transfer some of the money to another account.  
She claimed that some of the checks her mother wrote against the funds were to 
pay Time Reveals expenses, but she offered no documentary evidence to support 
this contention.  Finding that the canceled checks demonstrated that the funds 
were not used for company purposes, the panel and board rejected respondent’s 
testimony to the contrary. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 66} The board found that respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h), but recommends 
that we dismiss the alleged violation of 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) based upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence. 
{¶ 67} Respondent objects to these findings of misconduct, arguing that 
we lack jurisdiction to discipline her in this matter because her conduct “involved 
another company that is not one represented by or affiliated with Respondent” and 
does not involve her “position or conduct or duties as a lawyer.”  These 
arguments lack merit, however, because the charged misconduct relates solely to 
respondent’s own actions with respect to these transactions.  Moreover, the fact 
that respondent’s course of conduct did not arise from actions undertaken solely 
in her capacity as an attorney does not insulate her conduct from our scrutiny.  We 
have long recognized that attorneys are expected to “maintain a degree of 
personal and professional integrity that meets the highest standard.”  Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. Stein (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 77, 81, 58 O.O.2d 151, 278 N.E.2d 670.  
Paragraph three of the preamble to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct 
contemplates that attorneys may be disciplined for personal conduct:  “In 
addition, there are rules that apply to * * * practicing lawyers even when they are 
acting in a nonprofessional capacity.  For example, a lawyer who commits fraud 
in the conduct of a business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  See Rule 8.4.” 
{¶ 68} For example, we consistently discipline attorneys for personal 
conduct that violates criminal statutes.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O'Malley, 126 Ohio St.3d 443, 2010-Ohio-3802, 935 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 15 (imposing a 
two-year suspension for an attorney convicted of transporting obscene materials 
in interstate or foreign commerce by downloading this material to his home 
January Term, 2011 
21 
 
computer).  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Landis, 124 Ohio St.3d 508, 2010-
Ohio-927, 924 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 2 (imposing a one-year suspension for an attorney 
convicted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated).  And we have also 
disciplined attorneys for engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation even when it is not evident that criminal charges have resulted.  
See, e.g., Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Baxter (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 82, 83, 4 OBR 263, 
446 N.E.2d 121 (indefinitely suspending an attorney who engaged in a pattern of 
check kiting, with no mention of corresponding criminal charges). 
{¶ 69} On the record before us, we cannot determine whether the disputed 
$40,000 of the investor’s payment was intended as earnest money for the 
purchase of the Gates Mills property or whether it represented a nonrefundable 
payment for the assignment of Skywater’s rights to purchase other properties.  
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the retention of these funds was unlawful.  
Respondent’s conduct in diverting the payment intended for Skywater and 
directing it to her parents’ checking account, however, constitutes conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and adversely reflects 
upon her fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 70} Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings that respondent has 
violated Prof. Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) and dismiss the alleged violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) and 8.4(d). 
Due Process 
{¶ 71} In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against 
her, respondent also contends that the procedures utilized in this disciplinary 
proceeding have violated due process rights in three respects. 
{¶ 72} First, respondent complains that her criminal prosecution and 
conviction, as well as her subsequent appeal and petition for postconviction relief, 
somehow prejudiced her in this disciplinary proceeding and “potentially 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
compromise[d] her position with her criminal case by having and needing to 
respond to the related Grievances herein.” 
{¶ 73} Respondent cites no legal authority to support these arguments and 
makes no effort to demonstrate that she has suffered actual prejudice as the result 
of her concurrent participation in this disciplinary proceeding and her criminal 
prosecution. 
{¶ 74} Moreover, relator and respondent’s counsel agreed to bifurcate 
count 20 of the sixth amended complaint, which dealt with the conduct underlying 
respondent’s criminal convictions, in light of her pending appeal and 
postconviction proceedings.  Respondent did not object to the bifurcation, and at 
the oral argument before this court, her counsel plainly stated that she did not 
wish to stay this proceeding pending the outcome of her criminal appeal. 
{¶ 75} Next, respondent argues that her incarceration at the Ohio 
Reformatory for Women and corresponding inability to attend her disciplinary 
hearing and observe the testimony against her prejudiced her defense against 
relator’s complaint.  Once again, she fails to cite any legal authority in support of 
her argument and fails to demonstrate that she suffered any actual prejudice. 
{¶ 76} We have declared that attorney disciplinary proceedings “are 
neither civil nor criminal; they are instituted to safeguard the courts and to protect 
the public from the misconduct of those who are licensed to practice law.”  Ohio 
State Bar Assn v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 322 
N.E.2d 665.  Consequently, we have recognized that the “standards of due process 
in a disciplinary proceeding are not equal to those in a criminal matter.”  In re 
Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 667 
N.E.2d 956, citing Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Illman (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 159, 162, 
74 O.O.2d 284, 342 N.E.2d 688.  We have held that due process requirements in 
attorney discipline proceedings have been satisfied when the respondent is 
afforded a hearing, the right to issue subpoenas and depose witnesses, and an 
January Term, 2011 
23 
 
opportunity for preparation to explain the circumstances surrounding his actions.  
Cleveland Bar Assn v. Acker (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 18, 20, 58 O.O.2d 71, 278 
N.E.2d 32. 
{¶ 77} And in In re Colburn (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 141, 31 OBR 452, 507 
N.E.2d 1138, we denied an incarcerated attorney’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum to appear at his disciplinary hearing.  There, we observed 
that provisions of Civ.R. 30(A) (deposition upon oral examination) and 32(A)(3) 
(use of depositions in court proceedings) and Gov.Bar R. V (disciplinary 
procedure) provided a mechanism for the taking of depositions of incarcerated 
parties and that the submission of a such deposition testimony may constitute a 
sufficient opportunity for a respondent to present his or her testimony.  Colburn at 
142-143.  Therefore, we held that the primary means of securing the testimony of 
a prisoner in a disciplinary action should be by deposition.  Id. at 143.  The panel 
followed this procedure in respondent’s case.  It viewed the video recording of 
respondent’s deposition testimony and actually went to the Ohio Reformatory for 
Women on November 13, 2009, to question respondent.  Furthermore, respondent 
failed to object to these procedural issues at the time of her deposition and 
hearing. 
{¶ 78} Third, respondent argues that the participation of just two of the 
three panel members appointed to hear this matter has prejudiced her case.  
Because Gov.Bar R. V(6)(D)(3) (probable cause panel; appointment of hearing 
panel) provides that a “majority of the panel shall constitute a quorum” and two of 
the three appointed panel members presided over respondent’s hearing, this 
objection has no merit.  See also Section 5 (quorum of panel or board) of the 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
{¶ 79} Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that respondent was 
afforded all the process required by the Rules for the Government of the Bar of 
Ohio and our precedent.  Therefore, we overrule this objection. 
Sanction 
{¶ 80} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 81} As aggravating factors, the board found that respondent has 
committed prior disciplinary offenses, has engaged in a pattern of misconduct 
involving multiple offenses, has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
her conduct, has caused harm to vulnerable victims, and has failed to make 
restitution.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), (g), (h), and (i).  Rejecting 
the parties’ stipulation that other penalties or sanctions have been imposed, see 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f), the board found that none of the mitigating factors 
set forth in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) apply.  Respondent states that she objects 
to these findings, but she does not cite any authority or present any argument in 
support of her purported objection.  Because the board’s findings in this regard 
are amply supported by the record, we adopt them. 
{¶ 82} In his post-hearing brief, relator argues that permanent disbarment 
is the only appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.  Respondent argues 
that her license should be suspended for an unspecified period of time and that she 
should serve a period of monitored probation upon her reentering the practice of 
law. 
January Term, 2011 
25 
 
{¶ 83} The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  The board, however, recommends that 
respondent be permanently disbarred.  Respondent objects to the recommended 
sanction, arguing that due to the alleged procedural and evidentiary infirmities in 
the relator’s case, disbarment is not warranted.  We disagree. 
{¶ 84} In this case, respondent has engaged in a pattern of misconduct 
over a period of years and involving multiple clients.  She has engaged in multiple 
acts of dishonesty, charged excessive fees, handled clients’ legal matters without 
adequate preparation, neglected multiple client matters, intentionally damaged her 
clients, and entered into business relationships with her clients without making the 
requisite disclosures.  She has also failed to hold client money separate from her 
own, has failed to disclose that she did not carry malpractice insurance, and has 
falsely represented that she was part of a law firm, when in fact, she was a sole 
practitioner.  In so doing, she has engaged in multiple acts that adversely reflect 
on her fitness to practice law.  All told, she has committed more than 40 
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
{¶ 85} We have previously imposed the sanction of permanent disbarment 
for misconduct similar to that found here.  See, e.g., Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mason, 
118 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-2704, 889 N.E.2d 539, ¶ 32 (“continuous course 
of conduct involving deceit, misappropriation of clients’ funds, neglect of clients’ 
cases, failure to account for fees, failure to make restitution, and failure to 
cooperate in the investigation of this misconduct”  demonstrates that the attorney 
is not fit to practice law); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 
2004-Ohio-2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113, ¶ 15 (an attorney’s “persistent neglect of his 
clients’ interests, failure to perform as promised, failures to account for his 
clients’ money, and lack of any participation in the disciplinary proceedings” 
compel his disbarment); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
Ohio-4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231(permanent disbarment is the only result for repeated 
misconduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation, 
misappropriation of fees, intentionally damaging clients during his professional 
employment, failing to maintain records of all funds received on behalf of clients, 
handling legal matters without adequate preparation, neglect of client matters, and 
accepting legal employment when the lawyer’s professional judgment may be 
affected by the lawyer’s personal or financial interests without obtaining the 
client’s informed consent). 
{¶ 86} Therefore, we adopt the board’s recommended sanction of 
permanent disbarment.  Accordingly, Dea Lynn Character is permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather L. Hissom, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Gerald Walton, for respondent. 
______________________