Title: Nesius v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nesius v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div.1990 WY 28791 P.2d 939Case Number: 89-188Decided: 03/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
ANTHONY M. NESIUS, 

APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, 

MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, 

APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Robert T. Moxley 
of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kristin H. Lee, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      The appellant 
(Nesius) was arrested on the evening of February 4, 1988, for driving while 
under the influence (DWUI). At some point after his arrival at the jail that 
evening, Nesius was asked to take a breath test.1 He refused to take the test and his 
driver's license was suspended.2 Nesius received a hearing to 
contest the suspension;3 the hearing examiner sustained the 
suspension.4 The district court granted Nesius's 
petition of review,5 and on June 26, 1989, it issued an 
order affirming the suspension.

[¶2]      On appeal, Nesius 
seeks reversal of the hearing examiner's suspension of his driver's 
license.

[¶3]      Nesius contends 
that:

I. The jurisdictional 
sworn statement was not presented according to the statute.

A. The signed statement 
must contain the information mandated by statute.

B. The suspension order 
is reversible under the administrative procedure act as having been obtained 
without observance of procedure required by law.

II. The refusal to take a 
chemical test is excused by failure to give adequate advisement of the 
law.

A. The refusal to submit, 
to be the basis for suspension, must be voluntary and knowing.

B. The appellant's 
unadvised refusal was not voluntary.

The state asks 
whether:

I. The arresting 
officer's signed statement and attached arrest report were properly submitted 
pursuant to law?

II. [Appellant] was 
properly advised of the Wyoming implied consent law?

[¶4]      We find 
sufficient evidence to support the hearing examiner's decision. We affirm, but 
with a prospective modification of "Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement" to 
alleviate the possibility of confusion between the advisement about the chemical 
test and Miranda warnings.

BACKGROUND

[¶5]            
Nesius, accompanied by his attorney, testified before the hearing 
examiner on March 14, 1988, that he was given his Miranda warnings upon 
his arrival at the jail. Nesius alleges he made his demand to speak with an 
attorney after being given the Miranda warnings and that the "Wyoming 
Implied Consent Advisement" form was never read to him. Since Nesius did not 
subpoena the deputy, he had no opportunity to question him at the hearing.6

[¶6]      The state's 
evidence consisted of the officer's signed statement,7 on which was written, "see attached 
report." The attached report was in narrative form and consisted of three pages. 
Nesius objected to the statement and the report. The hearing examiner overruled 
the objection and admitted the signed statement and report into evidence, 
apparently as a "certified record."8 

[¶7]            
According to the attached report, the officer observed Nesius's pickup 
speeding, cross the center line twice, and drive onto the shoulder of the 
highway four times. It goes on to note that Nesius had balance problems, smelled 
of alcohol, and had red and watery eyes. Nesius admitted, in the report, that he 
had drunk two beers. The report also chronicles Nesius's poor performance in 
various field sobriety tests. From these observations, the officer believed he 
had probable cause to arrest Nesius for DWUI.

[¶8]      In the report the 
police officer additionally stated Nesius was advised that9 1) he was under arrest for DWUI; 2) 
his failure to submit to all required tests requested of his blood, breath, or 
urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content 
of his blood would result in the suspension for six months of his Wyoming 
driver's license and his privilege to operate a motor vehicle; 3) if a test was 
taken and the results indicated he was under the influence of alcohol, he may be 
subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver's license and his 
privileges to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for ninety days; and 4) 
he may be taken to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all required 
tests at his own expense or he could have the tests administered by a person at 
a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the officer's 
agency. The officer stated that the above warning was given while Nesius was in 
the jail.

[¶9]      The report also 
states that Nesius refused to take the breath test. When Nesius was asked if he 
intended to have the test administered at his own expense, he indicated that he 
wanted to see an attorney before consenting to the test. Nesius was then issued 
a "Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming Driver's License."10

[¶10]   The hearing officer issued his 
"Implied Consent Order of Suspension" on March 18, 1988. The hearing officer 
ruled that the state, through the certified record, had established by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the four elements necessary to uphold the 
suspension.11 The hearing officer found, inter 
alia, that Nesius "was advised of the requirement to submit to all requested 
tests and the consequences of taking or refusing to take a test."

DISCUSSION

[¶11]            
Nesius's first argument focuses on the officer's use of the attached 
report, instead of the signed statement, to document the arrest. Nesius argues 
that the language of W.S. 31-6-102(d) is mandatory; all of the statutory 
elements must be found on the signed statement.12 The reason for this requirement, 
according to Nesius, is that the signed statement is deemed a sworn statement, 
and subject to the penalties for perjury.13 Nesius claims that because the 
signed statement contains none of the required elements (all of the necessary 
elements are, instead, found on the attached "unsworn" report), the state's 
certified record violates the statute.

[¶12]   The force of Nesius's argument is 
undercut, however, because he acknowledges that the signed statement could 
incorporate the attached report, notwithstanding the "mandatory" statutory 
language. He claims the officer failed to explicitly incorporate the report; 
therefore, we should find the certified record deficient and set aside the 
suspension. Our implied consent statutes are silent on incorporation of the 
officer's investigative report into his signed statement. We believe the proper 
resolution of this issue focuses not on whether the attached report was properly 
incorporated, but on whether the attached report was accurate. The means to make 
that inquiry are already in place.

[¶13]            
Through discovery, the officer's signed statement and any accompanying 
documentation submitted by the arresting officer14 are accessible before the hearing. 
The individual with his attorney15 may challenge the suspension both 
before a hearing examiner and the district court. The power to subpoena the 
officer to question his preparation of the report is also available. Finally, 
the signed statement submitted by the peace officer shall be deemed a sworn 
statement and shall be subject to penalties for perjury. This provision subjects 
police officers to charges of perjury for attaching false reports to their 
signed statements.

[¶14]            
Nesius's attorney reviewed the attached report. He did not directly 
challenge the report's accuracy; instead, he argued of the potential "danger" in 
police attaching "unsworn" reports to their signed statements. If Nesius truly 
believed that the officer attached a false or inaccurate report to the signed 
statement, he should have subpoenaed the officer to testify at the hearing. 
Justice Urbigkit has correctly noted: "[i]t will be the driver and not the State 
that will bear the responsibility of challenging the validity of the 
implied-consent suspension action through subpoenaing the officer to testify 
when the decision is made to challenge the veracity or validity of the filed 
form." Hull, 751 P.2d  at 356.

[¶15]   The hearing examiner complied with 
the statute.16 We believe the necessary tools are 
available to individuals to challenge suspect reports; therefore, we decline the 
invitation to add an unnecessary layer to the law by requiring a determination 
of whether the report was properly incorporated. The attached report 
established: the officer had probable cause to believe Nesius was driving on the 
public streets while under the influence of alcohol; Nesius was arrested for 
DWUI; Nesius was properly informed of his rights vis-a-vis submitting to a 
chemical test; and Nesius refused to take a test.

[¶16]   Nesius also argues that the 
Administrative Procedures Act provides independent grounds to reverse the 
suspension because the signed statement was not filled out according to the 
statutes. For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the signed statement 
does comport with the statutes.

[¶17]            
Nesius's second argument states that "the refusal to take a chemical test 
is excused by failure to give adequate advisement of the law." Nesius claims 
that he understood the Miranda warning to mean that he had the right to 
consult with an attorney before taking the chemical tests. He suggests that if 
the officer would have informed him that he had no right to an attorney before 
deciding whether to take the tests, his decision might have been different. 
Nesius argues that "the only way to ensure fairness is to make a rule that the 
officer must further explain that the right to counsel does not apply to implied 
consent decisions."

[¶18]            
Wyoming's implied consent law, W.S. 31-6-102(a)(i), provides, in 
pertinent part: "The test or tests shall be: (A) Incidental to a lawful arrest; 
(B) Given as promptly as possible after the arrest." In other words, the 
individual is arrested, and may or may not be given the Miranda warning, then 
read the consent form and asked to submit to a "chemical test or tests of his 
blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled 
substance content of his blood." Id. "Wyoming'[s] Implied Consent Advisement" 
does not alert the individual that the right to an attorney, expressed in the 
Miranda warning, only applies in the context of an arrest for DWUI, and not to 
the question of implied consent.

[¶19]   The Utah Supreme Court noted the 
importance of the distinction between Miranda and implied 
consent:

[W]hen a driver suspected 
of driving under the influence is arrested, he is at that point involved in a 
criminal proceeding and must be given the Miranda warning * * *. Almost 
contemporaneous with the giving of the Miranda warning a request to take 
a test pursuant to the Implied Consent Statute may be made and the driver 
informed that he has no right to consult an attorney prior to taking the test. 
These two propositions are not inconsistent with each other; but it is important 
that each proposition be stated fully, clearly and understandably so that the 
driver understands that his affirmative duty to take a blood test is not 
obviated by the Miranda warning.

Holman v. Cox, 
598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979).

[¶20]   In Arizona, the following implied 
consent form is read to the individual:

1. Those [Miranda] 
rights of which you have just been advised, that is the right to remain silent 
or to speak with an attorney, have an attorney present during questioning, or to 
have one appointed for you, do not apply to this request.

2. If you remain silent, 
your silence will be considered a refusal to take the test. Likewise, you are 
advised that regardless of what an attorney may advise you regarding submission 
to this test, if you refuse to take the test, your right to drive will still be 
suspended * * *.

Gaunt v. Motor 
Vehicle Division, Department of Transportation, 136 Ariz. 424, 666 P.2d 524, 525 
(1983).

[¶21]            
Similarly, individuals arrested for DWUI in Colorado are told that 
"proceedings under the implied consent law are civil in nature, not criminal, 
[and] as a matter of law you have no right to consult with an attorney before 
deciding to submit to, or refuse, a chemical test of your blood, breath, or 
urine." Drake v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 674 P.2d 359, 361 n. 5 (Colo. 1984).

[¶22]   We believe that Arizona, Colorado, 
and Utah's implied consent forms reflect a pragmatic view of the possible 
confusion between Miranda and implied consent. We do not foresee any 
burden in ruling, prospectively, that police officers add a brief statement in 
the "Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement" which includes some combination of the 
above information.

[¶23]   We continue to adhere to our 
previous ruling:

[I]f the arrested person 
is reasonably informed of his rights, duties and obligations under our implied 
consent law and he is neither tricked nor misled into thinking he has no right 
to refuse the test to determine the alcohol content in his blood, urine or 
breath, the test will generally be held admissible.

Olson v. State, 
698 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶24]   Our ruling, today, is simply this: 
In an attempt to prevent future claims of "confusion," police officers, whether 
or not they give a Miranda warning to the individual, should include a 
brief statement that the individual has no right to an attorney before deciding 
whether to take the chemical test.

[¶25]            
Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom MACY, Justice, joins.

[¶26]   The pervasive issue of this appeal, 
while serving shortcuts and convenience, is how much should we dilute procedural 
and substantive guarantees provided to protect basic constitutional interests. 
This court, by majority decision, authenticates some kind of business record 
hearsay arrangement to create useable administrative agency documentation in 
substitute for the minimum standard of a statutorily required signed statement. 
I do not, and consequently dissent.

[¶27]   The legislature, with the 
subsequent concurrence of this court, has gone a long way to approve "efficient" 
arrangements as a substitute for real first-party evidence in driver's license 
suspension hearings. Hooten v. State, Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, 751 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Wyo. 1988); Drake v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, 
751 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Wyo. 1988). The approved arrangement included a signed 
report of the individually involved arresting officer and an opportunity for the 
defendant driver to subpoena the officer for adverse party testimony at the 
suspension hearing.

[¶28]   This case extends that arrangement 
by authenticating the execution of a "blank" form as a statement and then 
arranging for someone, sometime, somehow to attach the office investigative 
record without initialling or explicit identification for adoption of the 
attachment by the arresting officer.1

[¶29]   The test, I submit, is whether the 
author of the "report" can be prosecuted for perjury if the information is false 
or, conversely, whether he can defend any inaccuracies by statements that he was 
not responsible for what was said on the form which someone else attached to the 
document which he had signed. As those of us who have labored in the documentary 
world of private practice come frequently to know only too well, there is a 
simple solution. The arresting officer should either include the information on 
the face of the signed form or, if provided by attachment, then sign the 
attachment as explicit approval and certification of the factual 
statements.

[¶30]   At issue in this case is a 
controversy about what occurred prior to and at arrest. The documentation 
submitted by the state motor vehicle division is a computer print out from the 
office of the sheriff which, as an internal record, would certainly not, in 
itself, be admissible in a civil trial or for prosecutorial evidence in a 
criminal proceeding. This record does not demonstrate when Deputy Heller signed 
the FSFR-5 form, that he ever read the "standard trailer," or, in fact, 
that it actually existed at that time. If the FSFR-5 form was attached to 
the standard trailer as it is stated, it had to be signed before the office 
record narrative document was completed.2 What we do know is that the hearsay 
document - standard trailer - was typed four days after arrest and approved 
two days before it was typed.

[¶31]   It may seem insignificant to this 
court, but not to me, that the critical document in this proceeding has no 
independent evidentiary validity. We do not know what information may be subject 
to challenge, what supplementation occurs in the dictation and typing process, 
and whether the arresting officer is willing to swear to every typed statement 
found on the form under penalty of perjury. We have converted what was a 
first-party hearsay process for a driver's license hearing into a second or 
double hearsay substitute. A public record hearsay exception cannot properly be 
extended to this double hearsay opinion and conclusion content. Cf. State v. 
Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833, 784 P.2d 485 (1989).

[¶32]   All that would be needed is for the 
arresting officer to read, approve and specifically sign any "attachments" so 
that the required certification adopts the office record as his statement and 
asserts that the information contained is true and correct. I will not accept an 
undated form as real evidence or something that is sufficient to provide due 
process. An incomplete certification sheet which does not contain any actual 
information and a computer office record form prepared four days after the date 
of arrest by another person does not comply with W.S. 31-6-102(d) or even the 
Rules of the Wyoming State Tax Commission, ch. 1, § 6(e). It certainly provides 
neither reliability nor due process. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); 
Jennings v. C.M. & W. Drilling Co., 77 Wyo. 69, 307 P.2d 122 (1957); Cooley 
v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446 (1951); Brown v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of 
Cheyenne, 38 Wyo. 469, 269 P. 40 (1928).

[¶33]   The especially troubling aspect of 
this decision is this court's conclusion that the burden rests on the individual 
driver to challenge what is clearly an unsigned and unattested document. There 
is absolutely nothing wrong with requiring proper execution in accordance with 
the statutes so that the certification applies to the information upon which 
hearing relevancy and decision is to be vested. Basic rights are involved, see 
Com. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1989); protection by minimal requirements 
should not be ignored. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶34]   I would reverse and require either 
the presence of the officer for the hearing or documentary evidence which is, in 
fact, certified to be true and complete as constituting not more than 
first-party hearsay.

FOOTNOTES

1 Under Wyoming's "Implied 
Consent to Chemical Testing," W.S. 31-6-101 through 31-6-106, an individual 
arrested for DWUI "who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle * * * is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this 
act, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose 
of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of his blood." W.S. 
31-6-102(a)(i).

2 W.S. 31-6-102(d) states 
that:

If a person under arrest 
[for DWUI] refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical 
test * * * none shall be given. The peace officer shall submit his signed 
statement to the department [of revenue and taxation]. Upon receipt of the 
statement the department shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license * * 
* for six (6) months subject to review as provided in this act.

3 W.S. 31-6-103(a) 
provides for a hearing before a hearing examiner, if the request is timely. It 
also stays the suspension.

4 "At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the hearing examiner shall order that the suspension either be 
rescinded or sustained." W.S. 31-6-103(b).

5 W.S. 31-6-104(a) 
provides for district court review of the hearing examiner's suspension of a 
driver's license.

6 The arresting officer, 
unless subpoenaed, is not required to appear at the hearing. Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1988).

7 W.S. 31-6-102(d) 
provides that "The [signed] statement submitted by the officer shall 
contain:

(i) His probable cause to 
believe the arrested person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle:

(A) On a public street or 
highway in this state;

(B) While under the 
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which rendered him 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; and

(ii) That the person 
refused to submit to a test upon the request of the peace officer."

8 The Wyoming State Tax 
Commission has promulgated rules found in Chapter I, § 6(e) of the "Rules of 
Practice and Procedure For Hearing Before The Independent Hearing 
Examiner."

(e) For any hearing held 
in accordance with the Implied Consent Law and/or Administrative Per Se 
Suspension, W.S. 31-6-101 through 31-6-106, the Department of Revenue and 
Taxation may present evidence by direct testimony or certified record, whichever 
they so desire. The certified record shall be made a part of the record of the 
proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and shall consist of:

(i) The peace officer's 
signed statement of probable cause;

(ii) The notice of 
suspension and opportunity for hearing;

(iii) A copy of the 
temporary license, if issued;

(iv) The operational 
check list or chemical test result provided * * *; and

(v) All other evidence 
which is material to the matter being reviewed. (emphasis added)

We 
have upheld the state's use of the "certified record" at suspension hearings. 
See Drake v. State ex. rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 751 P.2d 1319, 
1322 (Wyo. 1988); and Hooten v. State, Department of Revenue and Taxation, 751 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Wyo. 1988).

9 Before the chemical 
tests can be administered, the arresting officer is required to read to the 
individual the "Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement" (the language mirrors W.S. 
31-6-102(a)(ii)(A) through (C)). State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458, 462 (Wyo. 
1979).

10 See W.S. 
31-6-102(f).

11 Under W.S. 31-6-103(b), 
the scope of the hearing is limited to the following four issues, which the 
hearing examiner decides:

[W]hether a peace officer 
had probable cause to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in 
this state while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a 
degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving the vehicle, whether the 
person was placed under arrest, whether he refused to submit to a test upon 
request of the peace officer * * * and whether * * * he had been advised that 
his Wyoming driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be 
suspended for six (6) months if he refused to submit to a test and suspended for 
ninety (90) days and subject him to criminal penalties if he submitted to the 
test and the results indicate the person is under the influence of 
alcohol.

12 See supra footnote 
7.

13 W.S. 31-6-102(g): "For 
the purposes of this section, the signed statement submitted by the peace 
officer shall be deemed a sworn statement and shall be subject to penalties for 
perjury."

14 W.S. 
31-6-103(c).

15 The tax commission rules 
provide for an attorney in Chapter I, at § 6(b) of the "Rules of Practice and 
Procedure For Hearing Before The Independent Hearing Examiner."

16 See supra footnote 
11.

  

FOOTNOTES for the 
Dissent

1 The forms, as appearing 
in the record, are attached to this dissent as appendices to identify the 
specific subject of this appeal.

2 The hearing testimony 
consisted of the State's usage of the double hearsay office record and the 
incomplete FSFR-5 signed form which provided no information. The evidentiary 
dispute was created by the sworn testimony of the arrested driver which directly 
contested information found on the form. What we have is a decision based on 
acceptance of double hearsay instead of the present testimony of a live witness 
who is available and subject to cross-examination.