Title: Voces de la Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1152 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Voces De La Frontera, Inc. and Christine Neuman 
Ortiz, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
David A. Clarke, Jr., 
          Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Borowski 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, A., J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there 
was a brief by Oyvind Wistrom, Lindner & Marsack, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Oyvind Wistrom 
 
For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief by Peter 
G. Earle, and Law Office of Peter Earle, LLC., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Peter G. Earle 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1152 
 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV2800) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Voces De La Frontera, Inc. and Christine Neuman 
Ortiz, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
David A. Clarke, Jr., 
 
          Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed; 
writ of mandamus is quashed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the circuit court2 
that granted mandamus requiring Milwaukee County Sheriff David 
A. Clarke, Jr. (Sheriff) to provide unredacted versions of 
                                                 
1 Voces de La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2016 WI App 39, 369 
Wis. 2d 103, 880 N.W.2d 417.  
2 The Honorable David L. Borowski of Milwaukee County 
presided.  
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
2 
 
immigration detainer forms (I-247 forms) to Voces de la Frontera 
(Voces) pursuant to its public records request.  The I-247 forms 
were sent to the Sheriff's office by the United States 
Immigrations 
and 
Customs 
Enforcement 
(ICE) 
and 
contain 
immigration-related information about certain individuals held 
at the Milwaukee County Jail.   
¶2 
Our review requires us to determine whether the I-247 
forms are exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin public records 
law.  Specifically, we decide whether there is a statutory or 
common-law exemption to the public records law such that the 
forms are exempt from disclosure.  And, if there were no such 
exemption, we would decide whether the public interest weighs in 
favor of releasing or withholding the documents.  
¶3 
We conclude that I-247 forms are statutorily exempt 
from disclosure according to the terms of Wisconsin public 
records law, and therefore, we need not reach common-law 
exemptions or the public interest balancing test.  Stated more 
fully, under Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2),3 any record specifically 
exempted from disclosure pursuant to federal law also is exempt 
from disclosure under Wisconsin law.  Federal regulation 
8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2013) precludes release of any information 
pertaining to individuals detained in a state or local facility 
and I-247 forms contain only such information.  Consequently, 
read together, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
3 
 
exempt I-247 forms from release under Wisconsin public records 
law.  Furthermore, because I-247 forms are statutorily exempt 
from release, the public interest balancing test has no 
application here. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On February 5, 2015, Voces submitted a public records 
request to the Sheriff.  Voces requested copies of all I-247 
forms4 that the Sheriff received from ICE since November 2014.  
The custodian, Captain Catherine Trimboli, responded to Voces, 
but indicated that she was unable to immediately provide the 
requested forms.  She explained that she needed to speak with 
ICE.5   
                                                 
4 I-247 forms are requests by the federal government to a 
state or local entity to hold an individual for a period of time 
not to exceed forty-eight hours after the individual is released 
from state custody.  
5 Captain Trimboli did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as a reason 
for non-disclosure of the forms.  However, it is sufficient that 
Captain Trimboli recognized that I-247 forms may contain 
sensitive information and accordingly took measures to ensure 
that such information was not improperly released.  We cannot 
expect a records custodian to have expertise in federal 
immigration law sufficient to determine the effect of federal 
law on release of I-247 forms.  For this reason, a record 
custodian's failure to cite a statutory exemption to the public 
records law is of no consequence to our analysis.  Journal Times 
v. Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Com'rs, 2015 WI 56, ¶¶74-75, 362 
Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 (reasoning, this "court's de novo 
determination 
whether 
certain 
information 
is 
statutorily 
exempted from disclosure is not aided by anything a custodian 
might say in a denial letter, nor is it deterred by the 
custodian's silence." (internal quotations omitted)).  See also 
State ex rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. of Johnson Creek, 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
4 
 
¶6 
Voces filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking 
to compel the Sheriff to produce the I-247 forms.  Prior to 
ruling on the mandamus, as a compromise, the circuit court 
ordered the Sheriff to produce redacted copies of all I-247 
forms.  Accordingly, the Sheriff produced twelve I-247 forms, 
but redacted the following information:  (1) subject ID; 
(2) event number; (3) file number; (4) nationality; and (5) a 
series of boxes pertaining to immigration status.  On April 7, 
2015, the Sheriff provided forms with the detainee's nationality 
no longer redacted.    
¶7 
On June 3, 2015, the circuit court granted Voces' writ 
of mandamus and ordered the Sheriff to produce all I-247 forms, 
unredacted.  Conducting a balancing test, the court weighed 
Voces' strong interest in examining I-247 forms against the 
Sheriff's interest in protecting the information contained 
within the forms.6  The circuit court concluded that the 
balancing test weighed in favor of disclosure.  The court 
ordered the Sheriff to produce unredacted versions of the I-247 
                                                                                                                                                             
209 
Wis. 2d 377, 
387-88, 
565 
N.W.2d 140 
(Ct. 
App. 
1997) 
(explaining, "the existence of a statute exempting certain kinds 
of information from disclosure is not uniquely within the 
custodian's knowledge" and therefore a custodian's "failure to 
specifically cite the statutory exemption does not preclude us, 
or the trial court, from determining whether the Board was 
authorized to deny the request.").  
6 On June 11, 2015, the court of appeals temporarily stayed 
the circuit court's order compelling the Sheriff to provide  
I-247 forms pending review. 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
5 
 
forms to Voces within forty-eight hours, but stayed the order 
until June 12, 2015.7  
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  The 
court concluded that I-247 forms are not exempt from disclosure 
under Wisconsin public records law.  The court concluded that 
"(1) no exception to disclosure under Wisconsin's open records 
law applies; and (2) the Sheriff failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the public interest in non-disclosure outweighs 
disclosure, given Wisconsin's very strong legislative intent and 
public policy favoring disclosure."8   
¶9 
First, the court of appeals rejected the Sheriff's 
argument that I-247 forms are exempt from disclosure under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36 because a federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, 
prevented disclosure of immigration-related information in the 
possession of state or local entities.9  The court reasoned that 
the regulation applied to only those individuals currently in 
custody of the federal government.10  Because the individuals at 
issue in the present case were not currently in federal custody, 
the court of appeals reasoned, the federal regulation did not 
                                                 
7 In the interim, the Sheriff petitioned for leave to 
appeal.  But on June 17, 2015, the circuit court issued a final 
order, and the Sheriff filed a notice of appeal.  Consequently, 
on June 24, 2015, the court of appeals dismissed the Sheriff's 
petition for leave to appeal as moot.    
8 Voces, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶18.    
9 Id., ¶40.   
10 Id., ¶28.   
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
6 
 
prevent the release of I-247 forms.11  Next, the court concluded 
that the public interest balancing test weighed in favor of 
disclosure.12   
¶10 We granted the Sheriff's petition for review and now 
reverse.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶11 This is a review of a writ of mandamus.  Mandamus is a 
remedy that can be used "to compel a public officer to perform a 
duty of his office presently due to be performed."  State ex 
rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 
N.W.2d 155.  "In order for a writ of mandamus to be issued, four 
prerequisites must be satisfied:  '(1) a clear legal right; 
(2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and 
(4) no other adequate remedy at law.'"  Pasko v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶24, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72 
(quoting Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon 
Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 494, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981)).  
¶12 Our 
review 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
and 
apply 
Wisconsin public records law.  Statutory interpretation and 
application 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently, while benefiting from the analyses of the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Osborn v. Board of Regents of 
                                                 
11 Id.   
12 Id., ¶47.   
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
7 
 
University of Wisconsin System, 2002 WI 83, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 
266, 647 N.W.2d 158 (Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 
544 N.W.2d  428 (1996)).    
¶13 Moreover, our review also requires us to interpret a 
federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6.  We apply general 
principles of statutory interpretation when construing federal 
regulations.  See State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 
N.W.2d 
904 
(1998) 
("When 
interpreting 
an 
administrative 
regulation, we generally use the same rules of construction and 
interpretation as applicable to statutes."); Village of Lyndon 
Station, 101 Wis. 2d at 489 ("As a corollary to the rule that 
validly enacted administrative rules are given the effect of 
law, it is generally accepted that the rules and regulations of 
administrative agencies are subject to the same principles of 
construction as apply to the construction of statutes . . . ."); 
see also Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc., 787 F.3d 190, 199 
(3d Cir. 2015) ("In interpreting a federal regulation, we look 
to well-established principles of statutory interpretation."). 
B.  Statutory Interpretation, General Principles 
¶14 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 
2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  
Moreover, the "structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears" is important.  Id., ¶46.  And, "statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 (citing State 
v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).   
¶15 "The test for ambiguity generally keeps the focus on 
the statutory language:  a statute is ambiguous if it is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two 
or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  And, "Wisconsin courts ordinarily 
do not consult extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation 
unless the language of the statute is ambiguous."  Id., ¶50.  
Extrinsic sources are those "interpretative resources outside 
the statutory text—typically items of legislative history."  Id. 
(citation omitted).   
¶16 It is under this framework that we review whether  
I-247 forms are exempt from disclosure under the Wisconsin 
public records law.  
C.  Wisconsin Public Records Law 
¶17 Wisconsin public records law affords the public the 
right to inspect certain documents within the possession of a 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
9 
 
state entity.13  It "serves one of the basic tenets of our 
democratic system by providing an opportunity for public 
oversight of the workings of government."  Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d 
268, 273 (citing Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 433-34).  To that end, 
"we have a presumption of open access to public records, which 
is reflected in both our statutes and our case law."  Osborn, 
254 Wis. 2d 266, ¶13; see also Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (providing "it 
is . . . the public policy of this state that all persons are 
entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts of those officers 
and employees who represent them").  "This presumption reflects 
the basic principle that the people must be informed about the 
workings of their government and that openness in government is 
essential to maintain the strength of our democratic society."  
Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 811 (citing Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 433-34). 
¶18 Nevertheless, the public's right to access records is 
not unrestricted.  See Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 
194, 549 N.W.2d 699 ("However, the right to public access is not 
absolute.").  "The strong presumption of public access may give 
                                                 
13 The public records law applies only to "records."  Record 
is defined expansively:  "A 'record' subject to the Public 
Records Law is 'any material on which . . . information is 
recorded or preserved . . . which has been created or is being 
kept by an authority.'"  Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, 
¶25, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551.  In the present case, 
neither party disputes that I-247 forms are records for purposes 
of Wisconsin public records law.  
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
10 
 
way to statutory or specified common law exceptions, or if there 
is an overriding public interest in keeping the public record 
confidential."  Kroeplin v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Res., 2006 
WI App 227, ¶13, 297 Wis. 2d 254, 725 N.W.2d 286 (citation 
omitted); see also Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of 
Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Thus, 
the general presumption of our law is that public records shall 
be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory 
exception, unless there exists a limitation under the common 
law, or unless there is an overriding public interest in keeping 
the public record confidential.").  Accordingly, there are three 
ways in which a record may be exempt from disclosure:  (1) the 
record is statutorily exempt; (2) the record falls under a 
common-law exemption; or (3) the public interest balancing test 
weighs 
in 
favor 
of 
non-disclosure. 
 
See 
Linzmeyer, 
254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶¶23-24.   
¶19 Under this framework, we first examine whether the 
records at issue are statutorily exempt from disclosure.14  The 
legislature codified a presumption of public access.  It 
follows, that the legislature is similarly free to codify which 
records are subject to public inspection and which records are 
statutorily exempt from inspection.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1) 
                                                 
14 Because we ultimately conclude that the I-247 forms at 
issue in the present case are exempt from disclosure under a 
statutory exemption, we do not address the contours of the 
common-law exceptions or weigh competing interests under the 
balancing test. 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
11 
 
("Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right 
to inspect any record." (emphasis added)).   
¶20 There are statutory exemptions to the Wisconsin public 
records law's presumption of access that are codified in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(13).  For the 
types of records described in the statute, the legislature has 
determined that they are categorically exempt from disclosure to 
the public.  
¶21 Exemptions detailed in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) are 
of particular relevance in this case.  These sections provide:  
(1) APPLICATION OF OTHER LAWS.  Any record which is 
specifically exempted from disclosure by state or 
federal 
law 
or 
authorized 
to 
be 
exempted 
from 
disclosure by state law is exempt from disclosure 
under s. 19.35(1), except that any portion of that 
record which contains public information is open to 
public inspection as provided in sub. (6). 
(2) LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS.  Except as otherwise 
provided by law, whenever federal law or regulations 
require or as a condition to receipt of aids by this 
state 
require 
that 
any 
record 
relating 
to 
investigative information obtained for law enforcement 
purposes be withheld from public access, then that 
information 
is 
exempt 
from 
disclosure 
under 
s. 19.35(1).  
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2).  As the text of the statute relates, 
§ 19.36(1) prevents the release of any record that is exempted 
from disclosure under federal law.  Similarly, § 19.36(2) 
exempts from disclosure any record "relating to investigative 
information obtained for law enforcement purposes."   
¶22 Therefore, we examine whether federal law prohibits 
disclosure of I-247 forms.  In the case now before us, it 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
12 
 
follows that if 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 prohibits disclosure of 
information in I-247 forms, they are exempt from disclosure 
under Wisconsin public records law.  At oral argument, Voces 
agreed, but contended that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 did not prohibit 
disclosure of the information in I-247 forms. 
D.  8 C.F.R. § 236.6 
¶23 Our consideration of the text and purpose of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 compels the conclusion that it applies to any detainee 
for whom an I-247 form has been issued by the federal 
government.  As we explain below, to hold otherwise would flout 
the language and purpose of the federal regulation. 
¶24 We begin with an examination of the text of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 to determine its meaning.  The regulation provides as 
follows:   
No person, including any state or local government 
entity or any privately operated detention facility, 
that houses, maintains, provides services to, or 
otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the Service 
(whether by contract or otherwise), and no other 
person who by virtue of any official or contractual 
relationship with such person obtains information 
relating to any detainee, shall disclose or otherwise 
permit to be made public the name of, or other 
information 
relating 
to, 
such 
detainee. 
 
Such 
information shall be under the control of the Service 
and shall be subject to public disclosure only 
pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws, 
regulations and executive orders.  Insofar as any 
documents or other records contain such information, 
such documents shall not be public records.  This 
section 
applies 
to 
all 
persons 
and 
information 
identified or described in it, regardless of when such 
persons obtained such information, and applies to all 
requests for public disclosure of such information, 
including requests that are the subject of proceedings 
pending as of April 17, 2002. 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
13 
 
¶25 The court of appeals reasoned that the phrase "holds 
any detainee on behalf of" the federal government required that 
the individual be in federal custody at the time when I-247 form 
was served in order for 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 to apply.15  The court 
of appeals reasoned that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 applied only to those 
detainees who were then subject to the forty-eight hour hold 
requested by I-247 forms.16   
¶26 In contrast, the Sheriff contends that the first 
sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is definitional.  He reasons that 
the clause "holds any detainee on behalf of" the federal 
government refers to those individuals subject to an immigration 
detainer insofar as the facility is or was housing, maintaining, 
or servicing them prior to the federal government's potential to 
obtain custody.  Under this interpretation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is 
not temporally limited; rather, it explains which types of 
entities and individuals are subject to the regulation.  And, 
any individual that is subject to an I-247 request (an 
immigration detainer request) is a detainee who has been housed, 
maintained or provided services by a state or local entity, 
regardless of when that occurred.    
¶27 Both of these interpretations are reasonable, as 
reasonably well-informed persons could interpret the text of 
8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as the court of appeals has and as the Sheriff 
                                                 
15 Voces, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶28. 
16 Id., ¶¶28-29.  
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
14 
 
has.  The existence of two reasonable interpretations compels 
the conclusion that the regulation is ambiguous.  See Bruno, 
2003 WI 28, ¶19.  
¶28 When a regulation is ambiguous, we may consult 
extrinsic sources to interpret the regulation's meaning.  See 
State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶19, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 
N.W.2d 467 ("Finally, and most important, if the interpreting 
court concludes that the statute is ambiguous, the court may 
consider extrinsic sources such as legislative history to 
discern the meaning of the statute." (citing Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51)).  Consistent with this principle, we look to 
extrinsic sources to assist us in determining the meaning of 
8 C.F.R. § 236.6.  
¶29 The statement of purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 was 
provided by the agency that promulgated the regulation and was 
set out in the notices in the Federal Register.  It demarcates 
three purposes underlying the regulation:  (1) to protect 
privacy of detainees; (2) to guarantee uniform treatment of 
information pertaining to detainees; and (3) to prevent ongoing 
investigations from being adversely impacted.  See Comm'r of 
Correction v. Freedom of Info. Com'n, 52 A.3d 636, 647-48 (Conn. 
2012) 
("The 
regulation 
was 
intended 
to 
ensure 
that 
the 
disclosure of information about detainees would be subject to a 
uniform federal policy, to protect the privacy of detainees, 
and, most significantly, to prevent adverse impacts on ongoing 
investigations and investigative methods.").  
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
15 
 
¶30 Indeed, the privacy interests of the detainees were a 
substantial concern.  This interest is evinced in the statement 
of purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as set out in the notices:  
By channeling requests for information through the 
FOIA, which contains a privacy exception, the rule 
also protects detainees' privacy.  Just as the 
government has a substantial interest in protecting 
legitimate national security, intelligence and law 
enforcement functions under the FOIA, detainees may 
have a substantial privacy interest in their names and 
the personal information connected with their status 
as detainees.17  
Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 FR 4364-01, 4366 
(January 29, 2003).  And, allowing public access to information 
about an individual could have grave consequences for that 
                                                 
17 The notices of the regulation also explain:   
For example, individuals who were originally detained 
because of their possible connection to terrorism, 
have an overwhelming interest in not being connected 
with such activity.  And particularly with respect to 
those individuals cooperating with the government's 
law enforcement investigations, there are powerful 
reasons why such persons would wish to conceal their 
identities 
and 
whereabouts. 
 
Indeed, 
other 
INS 
regulations 
expressly 
shield 
from 
disclosure 
information pertaining to or contained in an asylum 
application.  See 8 CFR § 208.6(a).  Contrary to some 
of the commenters' suggestions, the fact that certain 
detainees may wish to publicly identify themselves, 
which they are free to do, in no way undermines this 
assessment. 
Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 FR 4364-01, 4366 
(January 29, 2003). 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
16 
 
individual.  After all, "allowing such disclosures would be 
highly adverse to the privacy interests of a detainee who does 
not wish to be identified as a possible terrorist or who, after 
his release from detention, is cooperating with an ongoing 
government investigation."  Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.3d at 
648.  
¶31 Another purpose of the regulation is to ensure the 
uniform treatment of the information contained within the forms.  
See 
Release 
of 
Information 
Regarding 
Immigration 
and 
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 
67 FR 19508-01, 19509 (2002) ("The rule bars release of such 
information by non-[f]ederal providers in order to preserve a 
uniform policy on the release of such information.").  I-247 
forms are federal records; the state does not generate or input 
information into them.  The federal government has an interest 
in seeing that the information contained within the forms is 
treated uniformly by all facilities.  
¶32 A final purpose of 8 C.F.R § 236.6 is "to prevent 
adverse impacts on ongoing investigations and investigative 
methods."  Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.2d at 648; see also Am. 
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 352 
N.J. Super. 44, 69, 799 A.2d 629 (App. Div. 2002) ("The counties 
are 
not 
privy 
to 
the 
character 
and 
extent 
of 
federal 
investigations in progress nor, apparently, do they possess any 
independently acquired information regarding the role of the INS 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
17 
 
detainees in those investigations.").  The notices containing 
the statement of purpose initially passed in 2002,18 provide:  
Release of information about a specific detainee or 
group of detainees could also have a substantial 
adverse 
impact 
on 
ongoing 
investigations 
being 
conducted by federal law enforcement agencies in 
conjunction 
with 
the 
Service. 
 
Even 
though 
an 
individual detainee may choose to disclose his own 
identity or some information about himself, the 
release by officials housing detainees of a list of 
detainees or other information about them could give a 
terrorist organization or other group a vital roadmap 
about the course and progress of an investigation.  In 
certain instances, the detention of a specific alien 
could alert that alien's coconspirators to the extent 
of the federal investigation and the imminence of 
their own detention, thus provoking flight to avoid 
detention, prosecution and removal from the United 
States.  Premature release of the identity of or 
information relating to a specific alien in detention 
                                                 
18 The regulation was initially passed as a temporary 
regulation in 2002 before being permanently enacted in 2003.  
The regulation was promulgated in response to a request for 
documents pertaining to individuals detained by, what was at the 
time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  In that 
case, "INS detainees [were] housed in the Hudson County 
Correctional Center and the Passaic County Jail pursuant to 
long-standing contracts between the INS and the counties."  Am. 
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 352 
N.J. Super. 44, 58, 799 A.2d 629, 637 (App. Div. 2002).  The 
plaintiff requested the records of the individuals detained 
pursuant to these agreements, and a trial court in New Jersey 
ordered the jails to provide the records.  Id. at 638.  As the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior court explained, 
"five days after the trial court's order and judgment were 
entered, the INS promulgated as an 'interim rule' a regulation 
barring disclosure of the information sought here, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 (2002)."  Id.  Based on the interim regulation, the 
court concluded that, "[t]o the extent the State laws involved 
may be viewed as requiring public disclosure of information 
regarding INS detainees, they would be in conflict with 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6."  Id. at 655.   
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
18 
 
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity 
of a confidential source and techniques or procedures 
for law enforcement investigations or prosecution. 
Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 FR 19508-01, 
19509 (April 22, 2002).  
¶33 Our examination of the purposes underlying 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 removes any ambiguity as to its meaning.  We conclude 
that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is not temporally limited; it applies to 
all information pertaining to those individuals subject to I-247 
forms.  It is evident after exploring the purpose of the 
regulation that "detainee" is a generalized term; it refers to 
all individuals subject to an I-247 form.19  It would be 
inconsistent with the three main purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 to 
hold that it applies only to information pertaining to those 
individuals presently in federal custody.  And, "[a]ll of these 
purposes would be undermined by allowing state and local 
entities to disclose information about a detainee . . . subject 
only to their own policies and procedures."  Comm'r of 
Correction, 52 A.3d at 648.  
¶34 The regulation must be read to protect a detainee's 
information regardless of when an I-247 form was received and 
                                                 
19 The inclusion of the phrase "such detainee" at the end of 
the second sentence of the regulation does not alter this 
analysis.  "Such detainee" merely refers back to the phrase "any 
detainee" in the preceding sentence.  8 C.F.R. § 236.6.  
Accordingly, the phrase "such detainee," like the phrase "any 
detainee," is a categorical description and does not temporally 
limit the regulation.   
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
19 
 
regardless of whether a detainee is in the forty-eight hour hold 
requested in I-247 in order to protect a detainee's privacy.  
After all, the sensitivity of a detainee's information cannot, 
and we conclude does not, depend on when the I-247 form was 
received by the state or local entity.  If the documents could 
be released at any time prior to the forty-eight hour period, 
then the privacy protections at the heart of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 
would be illusory.20  As a consequence, the regulation must be 
interpreted to cover all information contained within an I-247 
form regardless of whether the individual that is the subject of 
the detention request is solely in state or federal custody or 
has been released.  Our conclusion that the regulation is not 
temporally limited is consistent with this directive.  
¶35 Similarly, the federal government's interest in the 
uniform 
treatment 
of 
immigration-related 
records 
by 
all 
facilities requires that the regulation applies to all I-247 
forms, without a temporal limitation.  Stated otherwise, 
8 C.F.R. § 236.6 controls I-247 information pertaining to 
detainees without regard for when a facility receives that form.  
State or local entities do not have discretion to decide whether 
I-247 forms may be released.  A contrary interpretation would 
                                                 
20 We note that the intent of those seeking the information 
does not diminish the detainee's privacy interest in the 
information.  If the information can be accessed by one party, 
then it can be obtained by any other organization or individual 
that seeks the same information.  This, of course, includes 
those individuals or organizations with potentially less noble 
aspirations than Voces. 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
20 
 
vitiate consistency in treatment of I-247 forms and the 
information they contain.  
¶36 Finally, the regulation is meant to protect sensitive 
information pertaining to government criminal or immigration-
related investigations.  Surely, such an important interest 
cannot succumb to the temporal limitations that an alternative 
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 would impose.  For this 
reason alone, the regulation must be interpreted to protect the 
information contained within I-247 forms.   
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
inaccurately interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 when it added the 
requirement that an individual who is subject to a I-247 form 
must be in the custody of the federal government for 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 to apply.  The regulation is not so narrow, and the word 
"custody" is conspicuously absent from its text.  Section 236.6 
applies to any individual subject to an I-247 immigration 
detention 
request. 
 
And, 
a 
different 
federal 
regulation 
discussing detainers distinguishes between "custody" and an 
individual subject to a detainer request:   
Any authorized immigration officer may at any time 
issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of 
Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agency.  A detainer serves to advise 
another law enforcement agency that the Department 
seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of 
that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing 
the alien. 
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011).  
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
21 
 
¶38 Therefore, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 protects all information 
contained within I-247 forms pertaining to detainees that are 
housed, maintained, or held in facilities run by state or 
private entities.  Stated otherwise, the regulation is not 
temporally limited and does not apply only to those individuals 
in federal custody.  Rather, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 renders the I-247 
forms that Voces seeks "record[s] . . . specifically exempted 
from disclosure by . . . federal law," under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(1).  For similar reasons, these records also contain 
information obtained for federal law enforcement investigative 
purposes, and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(2) prevents their disclosure.21   
¶39 We are not alone in our interpretation of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut also examined the 
purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and concluded that the regulation 
prohibits 
disclosure 
of 
documents 
that 
pertain 
to 
those 
individuals that are no longer in state or federal custody.  
Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.3d at 649 ("Nothing in the language 
of the regulation differentiates between information about 
detainees who have been transferred to the custody of another 
                                                 
21 We note that our decision does not pass judgment on the 
desirability of the Sheriff's compliance or non-compliance with 
the Department of Homeland Security's immigration detention 
requests.  Rather, the issue in the present case "involve[s] the 
nature and scope of information that must be made available to 
the public concerning INS detainees.  The power to regulate 
matters relating to immigration and naturalization resides 
exclusively in the federal government."  Am. Civil Liberties 
Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. Of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 654 
(N.J. App. Div. 2002). 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
22 
 
governmental entity and information about detainees who have 
been 
released."). 
 
In 
Commissioner 
of 
Correction, 
the 
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the lower court's conclusion 
that "because the first sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 uses the 
present tense when it refers to any 'person . . . that houses, 
maintains, 
provides 
services 
to, 
or 
otherwise 
holds 
any 
detainee'; the regulation applies only to a person who currently 
engages in one of the described activities . . . ."  Id. at 646 
(internal citations omitted).  Rather, the court accepted the 
federal government's reasoning and concluded that "the use of 
the present tense . . . [is] not a temporal limitation with a 
beginning and an end."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation continues 
to prevent the release of I-247 forms even after a detainee has 
been released from custody.  Id. at 649.  Our interpretation, 
that the regulation is not temporally limited in application, is 
consistent with the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding.  
¶40 Finally, we note that our opinion does not curb the 
presumption of openness that Wisconsin public records law so 
carefully protects.  An overarching purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 
is to channel requests for federal records through federal law; 
namely the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).22  See generally 
                                                 
22 The notices explaining the purpose of the regulation 
state:  "Accordingly, any disclosure of such records will be 
made by the Service and will be governed by the provisions of 
applicable Federal law, regulations, and Executive Orders.  This 
rule does not address or alter in any way the Service's policies 
regarding its release of information concerning detainees; these 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
23 
 
5 U.S.C. § 552.  After all, the federal government is in a 
better position to determine whether there are privacy and 
safety risks innate in releasing records that it created. 
¶41 In the present case, the requested records, I-247 
forms of individuals housed in Milwaukee County Jail, fall under 
the umbrella of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6.  The individuals in the 
present case, all of whom are subject to I-247 requests, are 
detainees that were housed, maintained, or serviced by a local 
entity.23  Accordingly, federal law mandates that information 
pertaining to these detainees contained in I-247 forms not be 
released.  
¶42 Given that a federal law prevents the release of the 
information in I-247 forms, we conclude that both Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(1) and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(2) apply to exempt I-247 forms 
from disclosure under Wisconsin public records law.  As the text 
of the statute suggests, § 19.36(1) prevents the release of any 
document that is exempted from disclosure under federal law.    
¶43 Similarly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.36(2) 
exempts 
from 
disclosure any record containing information that federal law 
mandates not be released because it "relat[es] to investigative 
                                                                                                                                                             
policies remain unchanged."  Release of Information Regarding 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal 
Facilities, 67 FR 19508-01, 19509 (April 22, 2002).  
23 Neither 
party 
disputes 
that 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Sheriff's Department participates in ICE's detainer program, and 
Voces cited the Sheriff's participation in the program as one of 
the reasons it sought to obtain the requested forms.   
No. 
2015AP1152 
 
24 
 
information obtained for law enforcement purposes."  And, as 
discussed above, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 mandates that state or local 
entities are not to release information contained within I-247 
forms.  Therefore, both of these provisions exempt I-247 forms 
from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of Wisconsin public 
records law.  Accordingly, the Sheriff cannot be compelled to 
produce them.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the 
common-law exemptions or balancing test because we conclude that 
the I-247 forms are statutorily exempt from disclosure under 
Wisconsin public records law.  Stated more fully, under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2), any record exempted from disclosure 
pursuant to federal law is exempt from disclosure under 
Wisconsin law.  And, federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 
precludes 
the 
release 
of 
any 
information 
pertaining 
to 
individuals detained by a state or local facility and I-247 
forms contain such information.  Accordingly, read together, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 exempt I-247 
forms 
from 
release 
under 
Wisconsin 
public 
records 
law.  
Furthermore, because I-247 forms are statutorily exempt from 
release, the public interest balancing test has no application 
here.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed; writ of mandamus is quashed. 
¶45 Annette Kingsland Ziegler, J., did not participate. 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
1 
 
¶46 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin's 
Public Records Law "serves one of the basic tenets of our 
democratic system by providing an opportunity for public 
oversight of the workings of government."  Majority op., ¶17 
(citations omitted).  Relying on this basic tenet, Voces de la 
Frontera requests unredacted copies of federal immigration 
detainer forms issued to Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). 
¶47 The circuit court determined that Wisconsin's Public 
Records Law requires the release of unredacted copies of the 
detainer forms.  It explained that Voces de la Frontera made a 
compelling case and that Sheriff Clarke offered no good reason 
to justify any redaction. 
¶48 The court of appeals affirmed.  Noting uncontested 
facts, it rejected Sheriff Clarke's newly raised argument that 
an obscure federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, precluded 
release of the detainer forms.1 
                                                 
1 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides in relevant part: 
No person, including any state or local government 
entity or any privately operated detention facility, 
that houses, maintains, provides services to, or 
otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the Service 
(whether by contract or otherwise), and no other 
person who by virtue of any official or contractual 
relationship with such person obtains information 
relating to any detainee, shall disclose or otherwise 
permit to be made public the name of, or other 
information 
relating 
to, 
such 
detainee. . . . (emphasis added). 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
2 
 
¶49 Sheriff Clarke now contends that no detainer forms 
should be released.  He asserts that the forms are statutorily 
exempt from disclosure and that his office erred when it 
previously released redacted detainer forms to Voces. 
¶50 Reneging on previously uncontested facts and relying 
on a belatedly cited obscure federal regulation——never before 
applied to state or local detainees——Sheriff Clarke tosses a 
"hail mary" pass to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.2 
¶51 The majority catches the pass and runs with it, but 
unfortunately makes no forward progress for the people of this 
state.  Instead, a majority of this court loses ground, yet 
again chipping away at Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to 
open government.  See, e.g., Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, 2016 WI 100, 372 Wis. 2d 460, 888 
N.W.2d 584. 
¶52 Once more a majority of this court reverses a 
unanimous court of appeals decision affirming a circuit court 
order requiring the release of records to the public, further 
undermining the principle that Wisconsin Public Records Law be 
construed "in every instance with a presumption of complete 
public access."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶53 This time the majority rewrites a federal regulation 
by deleting the phrase "on behalf of the Service" from the 
                                                 
2 A "hail mary" is "a long forward pass in football, 
especially as a last-ditch attempt at the end of a game, where 
completion is considered unlikely."  Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary 859 (2d ed. 1993). 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
3 
 
regulatory language in order to reach its conclusion that yet 
another public records request must fail.  Given the cumulative 
effect of the majority's approach, one wonders if a day will 
come when we awake to find that this continuous "chipping away" 
has 
substantially 
gutted 
Wisconsin's 
commitment 
to 
open 
government. 
¶54 Contrary to the majority, I agree with the circuit 
court that Clark offers no good reason to counter the strong 
presumption of open access to these public records.  I likewise 
agree with the unanimous court of appeals that the federal 
regulation does not statutorily exempt immigration detainer 
forms from release under Wisconsin's Public Records Law.  Both 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
federal 
regulation 
and 
its 
promulgation history establish that it applies only to detainees 
in the custody of the federal government. 
¶55 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶56 I begin by setting forth more complete facts to 
provide the necessary context.  After new federal guidelines 
were released, Voces de la Frontera ("Voces") submitted a public 
records request seeking copies of immigration detainer forms (I-
247) issued by ICE to Sheriff Clarke's office.  Following a 
delay without a response, Voces filed an action seeking the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the release of the 
detainer forms under Wisconsin's Public Records Law. 
¶57 Sheriff Clarke eventually released redacted versions 
of the requested detainer forms.  In reaching a determination 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
4 
 
about what information to redact, Sheriff Clarke's record 
custodian explained that she consulted with ICE, and redacted 
certain information based primarily on ICE's advice. 
¶58 Voces sought release of unredacted versions of the 
detainer forms.  The circuit court ordered Sheriff Clarke to 
produce 
unredacted 
copies, 
concluding 
that 
Voces 
made 
a 
compelling case that it had a strong interest in ensuring its 
government was complying with federal guidelines.  It further 
observed that "there was never a very good reason given as to 
why [] information should be redacted other than ICE [] believes 
it should be redacted." 
¶59 Sheriff Clarke appealed, raising a new argument before 
the court of appeals that an obscure federal regulation, 8 
C.F.R. § 236.6, precludes release of the redacted portions of 
the detainer forms.  Relying on undisputed facts, the court of 
appeals several times observed that Sheriff Clarke "does not 
dispute the fact that the prisoners in question here were held 
on state charges which had not expired."  Voces De La Frontera, 
Inc. v. Clarke, 2016 WI App 39, ¶28, 369 Wis. 2d 103, 880 
N.W.2d 417; see also id., ¶¶25, 36. 
¶60 The court of appeals rejected Sheriff Clarke's new 
argument, concluding that the plain language of the federal 
regulation applies only to detainees held on behalf of the 
federal government.  Id., ¶28.  Applying the balancing test, it 
further determined that Sheriff Clarke failed to meet his burden 
to overcome the strong presumption in favor of release of the 
unredacted detainer forms.  Id., ¶47. 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
5 
 
¶61 Having been unsuccessful in both the circuit court and 
the court of appeals, Sheriff Clarke now turns to this court.  
At issue is whether the detainer forms are statutorily exempt 
from disclosure pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2). 
II 
¶62 The parties agree and the majority acknowledges that 
the requested I-247 forms are public records as defined by Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2).  Majority Op., ¶17 n.13.  Consequently, any 
analysis must begin with a strong presumption favoring release 
of the requested records.  See Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 
¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811. 
¶63 The majority contends that read together Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(1)-(2) and the federal regulation statutorily preclude 
release of the I-247 forms.3  Majority op., ¶3.  It posits that 8 
C.F.R. § 236.6 prohibits release of any information pertaining 
to individuals detained in a state or local facility, despite 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2) (2013-14) provide: 
(1) 
Any record which is specifically exempted from 
disclosure by state or federal law or authorized 
to be exempted from disclosure by state law is 
exempt from disclosure under s. 19.35(1), except 
that any portion of that record which contains 
public information is open to public inspection 
as provided in sub. (6). 
(2) 
Except as otherwise provided by law, whenever 
federal law or regulations require . . . that any 
record 
relating 
to 
investigative 
information 
obtained for law enforcement purposes be withheld 
from public access, then that information is 
exempt from disclosure . . . . 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
6 
 
the fact that this obscure federal regulation has never before 
been applied to state or local detainees.4  See id. 
¶64 However, the majority's non-textual interpretation is 
trumped by the regulation's plain language and the agency's 
intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.  See 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1988).  The plain 
language of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides: 
No person, including any state or local government 
entity or any privately operated detention facility, 
that houses, maintains, provides services to, or 
otherwise 
holds 
any 
detainee 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Service . . . shall disclose or otherwise permit to be 
made public the name of, or other information relating 
to, such detainee. . . . (emphasis added). 
"Service" refers to the federal government's Immigration and 
Naturalization Service ("INS").5  The phrase "on behalf of the 
Service" indicates that that the regulation applies only to 
                                                 
4 Neither the majority nor the parties cite to any case that 
has previously applied 8 C.F.R. § 236 to detainees in state or 
local custody.  Additional research yielded no such case. 
5 The INS promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as an interim rule in 
April 2002, and adopted it as a final rule without change in 
January 2003.  Release of Information Regarding Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 
Fed. Reg. 19508-11 (Apr. 22, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 4364-67 (Jan. 
29, 2003).  In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, INS was disbanded and replaced with three new federal 
agencies, one of which is ICE.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, 
Overview 
of 
INS 
History 
11 
(2012), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20
Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf. Therefore, 
in the context of this discussion of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, 
references to the INS and ICE are used interchangeably. 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
7 
 
detainees 
being 
held 
on 
behalf 
of 
federal 
immigration 
authorities.6 
¶65 Likewise, the supplementary information published in 
the Federal Register in connection with the promulgation of 8 
C.F.R. § 236.6 consistently makes clear that the regulation is 
limited to detainees held "on behalf of" federal immigration 
authorities.  Release of Information Regarding Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 
Fed. Reg. 4364 (Jan. 29, 2003) ("This final rule governs the 
public 
disclosure 
by 
any 
state 
or 
local 
government 
entity . . . of . . . information relating to any immigration 
detainee being house or otherwise maintained . . . on behalf of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service)"); 
67 Fed. Reg. 19508 (Apr. 22, 2002) ("This rule will establish a 
                                                 
6 Receipt of an I-247 form by a state or local law 
enforcement agency does not convert a state or local detainee 
into a federal detainee in the custody of ICE.  The language of 
the I-247 form explains that it is simply a request from ICE to 
a state or local agency:  "IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU:  Maintain 
custody of the subject for a period not to exceed 48 
hours . . . beyond 
the 
time 
when 
the 
subject 
would 
have 
otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take 
custody of the subject" (emphasis in the original). 
Additionally, a federal regulation explains that a detainer 
serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the federal 
government seeks custody of a detainee presently in the custody 
of a state or local agency.  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a); see also 
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3rd Cir. 2014) 
("[D]etainers are not mandatory."); Milwaukee County Board of 
Supervisors, 
Resolution 
12-135 
(June 
4, 
2012), 
https://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1
124069&GUID=3D583485-4F01-4B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF 
("[D]etainers 
are not mandatory but are considered 'requests'"). 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
8 
 
uniform policy on the public release of information on Service 
detainees") (emphasis added). 
¶66 Despite the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and the 
clear indications in the Federal Register reiterating that the 
application of the regulation is limited to detainees in federal 
custody, the majority concludes otherwise.  By positing that the 
regulation is not limited to detainees in federal custody, i.e. 
"8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is not temporally limited," the majority 
impermissibly rewrites the regulation, deleting words from it.  
See Majority op., ¶33. 
¶67 The majority concedes as reasonable the court of 
appeals' conclusion that a detainee must be in federal custody 
at the time the detainer form was served in order for 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 to apply.  Majority op., ¶¶25, 27.  Nevertheless, it 
deletes words from the federal regulation to embrace an 
alternative interpretation.  Majority op., ¶¶33-34. 
¶68 The majority embraces a conclusion of ambiguity, as it 
must, in order to be free to borrow from extrinsic sources to 
support its contention that the federal regulation applies to 
any detainee with a federal immigration detainer——even those in 
state or local custody.  Majority op., ¶¶27-28.  By deleting 
words from the regulation to render it ambiguous, the majority 
undermines 
the 
principle 
that 
statutory 
exceptions 
under 
Wisconsin's Public Records Law must be clear and explicit. 
¶69 As this court explained, "the general presumption of 
our law is that public records shall be open to the public 
unless there is a clear statutory exception . . . Exceptions 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
9 
 
should be recognized for what they are, instances in derogation 
of the general legislative intent, and should, therefore, be 
narrowly construed; and unless the exception is explicit and 
unequivocal, it will not be held to be an exception."  Hathaway 
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 
397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) (emphasis added).  If, as the 
majority contends, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is ambiguous and subject to 
alternative reasonable interpretations, it follows that the 
regulation does not present a "clear statutory exception" 
precluding release of the record to the public.  See id. 
¶70 Further evincing that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not apply 
here is the fact that neither ICE nor Sheriff Clarke cited 8 
C.F.R. § 236.6 as a justification for denying Voces' public 
records request until this case was on appeal.7  Such a void 
                                                 
7 At oral arguments, counsel revealed that Sheriff Clark's 
office consulted with two different ICE representatives and the 
ICE 
representatives 
did 
not 
cite 
8 
C.F.R. 
§ 
236.6 
as 
justification for denying the release of the requested I-247 
forms: 
The Court:  [D]id ICE tell the Sheriff's office you 
cannot release any information or these records 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236.6? 
Counsel for Sheriff Clarke:  They were not provided 
with that advice, no. The advice they received was 
certain specific information on these forms should be 
redacted and here are the reasons why under federal 
law under FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) ICE 
believed the information should be protected. 
The Court:  Then it doesn't appear that ICE was 
applying § 236.6 to these forms because they oked the 
release of the names among other arguably personal 
identifiable information. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
10 
 
highlights that this relatively obscure federal regulation was 
never intended to apply to detainees in state or local custody.  
Apparently both were unfamiliar with this obscure regulation 
upon which Clark and the majority now rely. 
¶71 It is not surprising that neither ICE nor Sheriff 
Clarke was familiar with 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 in this context.  
After all, this relatively obscure regulation was promulgated to 
protect information about individuals detained by the federal 
government on suspicion of terrorism following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 648 (N.J. App. 
Div. 2002) ("the real focus of the regulation, as evidenced by 
the rationale presented in its preamble, may be seen to be on 
the facilitation of law enforcement efforts in the wake of 
September 11."). 
¶72 Indeed, the drafting records of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 are 
replete with references to federal 9/11 detainees.  Absent from 
the Federal Register is any mention of the need to prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Counsel for Sheriff Clarke:  It appears that way. 
236.6 is a relatively obscure provision and why it 
wasn't relied upon at the trial court level I am not 
sure.  But I think it clearly applies to the facts of 
this case. 
The Court:  But not just at the trial court level, ICE 
itself was not applying 236, or were they? 
 . . .  
Counsel for Sheriff Clarke:  At the time of the open 
records request ICE did not tell Milwaukee County 
don't produce them because 236 applies. 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
11 
 
release of information about detainees in state or local custody 
who may later be transferred to federal custody.8 
¶73 In sum, I conclude that the plain language of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.6 indicates that its application is limited to federal 
immigration detainees.  This conclusion is supported by the 
promulgation history of the regulation and the fact that neither 
ICE nor Sheriff Clarke referred to this relatively obscure 
regulation until this case was on appeal.  Accordingly, unlike 
the majority, I determine that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2) when 
read in conjunction with the entire text of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 do 
not statutorily exempt the detainer forms from disclosure.9 
                                                 
8 See e.g., Release of Information Regarding Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 
Fed. Reg. 19510 (Apr. 22, 2002) ("Disclosure could reveal 
important information about the direction, progress, focus and 
scope of investigations arising out of the attack on September 
11, 
2001, 
and 
thereby 
assist 
terrorist 
organizations 
in 
counteracting 
investigative 
efforts 
of 
the 
United 
States. . . . In light of the national emergency declared by the 
President . . . with 
respect 
to 
the 
terrorist 
attacks 
of 
September 11, 2001, and the continuing threat by terrorists to 
the security of the United States, and the need immediately to 
control identifying or other information pertaining to Service 
detainees . . . ."); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 4366 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
9 The majority further missteps by concluding that the 
requested I-247 forms are exempt in their entirety without 
analysis of the possibility of redaction.  Majority op., ¶3.  In 
so doing, the majority disregards the statutory requirement that 
when a record contains some information subject to disclosure 
and other information that is not, the record custodian "shall 
provide the information that is subject to disclosure and delete 
the information that is not subject to disclosure from the 
record before release."  Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6).  Thus, once 
again, a majority of this court "renders meaningless the 
statutory direction to redact."  Democratic Party of Wisconsin, 
372 Wis. 2d 460, ¶121 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
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¶74 Having concluded that the distinction between whether 
a detainee is in federal versus state or local custody is 
dispositive, 
I 
normally 
would 
turn 
next 
to 
apply 
that 
distinction to this case.  But not here. 
¶75 Before this case reached this court it was undisputed 
that the detainees in question were in state custody.  The court 
of appeals repeatedly explained, "[i]t is undisputed that 
Sheriff Clarke held the jail prisoners in state custody and that 
custody had not expired at the time of the open records 
requests."  Voces De La Frontera, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶25; see also 
id., ¶28 ("The Sheriff does not dispute the fact that the 
prisoners in question here were held on state charges which had 
not expired. . . . Here it is undisputed that the state custody 
had not ended."); id., ¶36 ("Here the twelve detainees were 
still in custody on their state charges . . . "). 
¶76 However, 
during oral argument 
before this court 
Sheriff Clarke reneged on the previously uncontested facts.  He 
now asserts that some of the detainees in question were in 
federal custody at the time Voces submitted this request. 
¶77 Sheriff Clarke's attempt to reconstruct the factual 
record at oral arguments is unavailing.  He is not requesting, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.15(3), that this court supplement 
or correct the record because it does not accurately reflect 
what occurred in the circuit court.  Rather, it appears he now 
wants to create a different factual record.  Sheriff Clarke had 
the burden before the circuit court to present sufficient facts 
and legal arguments to overcome the presumption favoring release 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
13 
 
of the requested records.  See Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 
416, 438 N.W.2d 589 (1989).  As explained further below, he 
failed to meet his burden.  The time to develop a factual record 
is before the circuit court, not at oral arguments before this 
court. 
III 
 
¶78 Having determined that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 pertains to 
detainees in the custody of only the federal government and that 
no statutory exemptions precluding release apply here, I examine 
next whether the records should be released.  See Linzmeyer, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶24. 
¶79 This court applies "a balancing test on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether permitting inspection of the records 
would result in harm to a public interest which outweighs the 
public interest in opening the records to inspection."  Id., ¶25 
(citation omitted).  As the party seeking nondisclosure, Sheriff 
Clarke has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of 
releasing the requested I-247 forms.  See Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at 
416. 
¶80 The balancing test is first applied by the records 
custodian.  Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 
N.W.2d 179 (1979).  "If the custodian decides not to allow 
inspection, he must state specific public-policy reasons for the 
refusal.  These reasons provide a basis for review in the event 
of court action."  Id. (citations omitted); Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at 
416-17. 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
14 
 
¶81 Here, 
the 
records 
custodian 
explained 
that 
her 
decision to redact information from the I-247 forms was made 
pursuant to guidance provided by ICE.  She stated, "[w]e work 
with other law enforcement agencies and if they tell me one of 
their numbers . . . is law enforcement sensitive, yes, I believe 
them."  The records custodian did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 or 
another public policy reason as justification for her decision 
to not fully comply with Voces' public records request. 
¶82 Nevertheless, the majority declares, "it is sufficient 
that [the records custodian] recognized that I-247 forms may 
contain sensitive information and accordingly took measures to 
ensure that such information was not improperly released"  
because "[w]e cannot expect a records custodian to have 
expertise in federal immigration law . . . ."  Majority op., ¶5 
n.5. 
¶83 On appeal, Sheriff Clarke argues that "[t]he balancing 
test requires consideration of Wisconsin's presumption of 
privacy with respect to law enforcement records and personally 
identifiable information . . . ."  He also cites several FOIA 
factors generally supporting these two public policies. 
¶84 The need to protect privacy of law enforcement records 
is a valid public policy concern.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 
¶30 (explaining that records of law enforcement investigations 
can be particularly sensitive and "are generally more likely 
than most types of public records to have an adverse effect on 
other public interests if they are released.").  Additionally, 
as the Linzmeyer court explained, if the release of a police 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
15 
 
record 
would 
interfere 
with 
an 
on-going 
prosecution 
or 
investigation, the general presumption of openness will likely 
be overcome.  Id. 
¶85 Here, however, Sheriff Clarke provides no details 
about how the information contained in the I-247 forms would 
actually affect the privacy concerns for law enforcement records 
or interfere with an on-going prosecution or investigation.  
Unlike a police report which contains details about a specific 
crime 
under 
investigation, 
the 
detainer 
forms 
contain 
generalized information, much of which Sheriff Clarke already 
disclosed on his website. 
¶86 For example, evidence introduced in the circuit court 
revealed that during the course of this litigation, Sheriff 
Clarke's 
office 
posted 
on 
its 
website 
information 
about 
detainees in his custody.  Four separate posts were introduced 
with each containing the name of a detainee, his photograph and 
other personally identifying information.  In bold letters above 
each photograph appeared the word "Hold."  Below the photograph 
appeared information that indicated that it was an immigration 
or ICE hold.  This evidence undermines Clark's purported privacy 
concerns about ICE holds. 
¶87 Sheriff Clarke further argues that the strong public 
interest in protecting a detainee's privacy and reputation 
precludes release of the records.  Yet, Sheriff Clarke's concern 
about the detainees' privacy interests rings hollow considering 
the disclosures he made on his website of some of the very 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
16 
 
information he now seeks to withhold from Voces.  Before the 
circuit court Voces questioned: 
[I]s it accurate to say that the only difference 
between what Sheriff Clarke sua sponte on his own 
behalf publishes on his website about the immigration 
status of individuals in his custody and what is on 
the form and what has been redacted by Sheriff Clarke 
on this form under the pretext of a concern for 
individual privacy is that Voces' ability to monitor 
and surveil compliance with administrative priorities 
is impaired . . . ? 
¶88 On the other side of the balancing test is Voces 
attempt to provide public oversight of law enforcement and 
immigration law implementation, specifically to ensure that 
Sheriff Clarke's office is complying with federal and state law.  
Before the circuit court, Voces explained that it has an 
interest in monitoring and collecting data to ensure that 
Sheriff Clarke's office is complying with federal immigration 
guidelines.  Voces also expressed concern that non-compliance 
with federal guidelines would hinder law enforcement abilities 
by 
eroding 
public 
trust 
and 
collaboration 
between 
law 
enforcement and immigrant communities.  The circuit court found 
these interests to be "compelling."  I agree. 
¶89 Further weighing in favor of disclosure is the fact 
that Voces seeks information about the actions of an elected 
official.  See Democratic Party of Wisconsin, 372 Wis. 2d 460, 
¶18 (citing Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶29).  Additionally, "the 
process of police investigation is one where public oversight is 
important."  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶27. 
¶90 Sheriff 
Clarke 
points 
to 
the 
important 
public 
interests of the need to protect "privacy with respect to law 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
17 
 
enforcement records and personally identifiable information."  
Nevertheless, on balance, I conclude that he has failed to meet 
his burden.  Sheriff Clarke has not established that the release 
of the I-247 forms would result in harm to the public interest 
outweighing the strong public interest in providing public 
oversight of an elected official to ensure compliance with 
federal and state law.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of 
appeals decision ordering the unredacted release of the I-247 
forms. 
¶91 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2015AP1152.awb 
 
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