Title: People v. Beck

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES DAVID BECK and GERALD DEAN CRUZ, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S029843 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
110467-A and 110467-B 
 
 
December 2, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
S029843 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendants James David Beck and Gerald Dean Cruz 
were convicted of the first degree murders of Dennis Ian 
Colwell, Emmie Darlene Paris, Franklin Delano Raper, and 
Richard Talmadge Ritchey, and of conspiracy to commit 
murder.  (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a), former 
§ 189 (all further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code).)  The jury also found true, as to both Beck and 
Cruz, a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation and 
allegations of personal use of a deadly weapon (baseball bats, 
knives, and a baton).  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), former § 12022, 
subd. (b).)  After separate penalty phases before the same jury, 
the jury returned death verdicts — first for Cruz and then for 
Beck — and the trial court entered judgments of death.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); 
§ 1239, subd. (b).)  
We vacate as unauthorized the multiple-murder special-
circumstance true findings as to Count V (conspiracy to commit 
murder) for Beck and Cruz, as well as the death sentences 
imposed for that count.  (See post, pt. II.C.5.)  As so modified, 
we affirm the judgments, including the judgments of death 
based on the murders. 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
Shortly after midnight on the night of May 20, 1990 and 
early morning hours of May 21, 1990, Beck, Cruz, Jason 
LaMarsh, Ronald Willey, Richard Vieira, and Michelle “Missy” 
Evans, entered a house located at 5223 Elm Street in Salida 
and killed Colwell, Paris, Raper, and Ritchey.  A fifth resident, 
Donna Alvarez, escaped the house during the attack and 
subsequently identified LaMarsh as one of the perpetrators.  
The original complaint charged all six perpetrators, but 
the cases of Vieira and Evans were severed.  Following a 
change of venue from Stanislaus County to Alameda County, 
Beck and Cruz were tried with LaMarsh and Willey, but the 
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against the 
latter two men.   
Evans entered a plea agreement under which, as 
relevant here, she would plead guilty to being an accessory and 
the district attorney would recommend a sentence of one year 
(less six months for time served, and further reduced by 
conduct and work credits) in exchange for her truthful 
testimony at trial against Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey.  
The crime of accessory carried a maximum term of three years 
of imprisonment and a fine not exceeding $5,000.   
1. Prosecutor’s evidence 
a. Events before May 20 
In late 1989, Cruz, his girlfriend Jennifer S., and his two 
small children moved into a studio apartment in a residential 
area of Salida known as the “Camp.”  Around the same time, 
Beck and Vieira moved into a large trailer in front of the 
studio.  At some point, LaMarsh began to date Evans and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
frequently stayed in a smaller trailer located behind Beck and 
Vieira.  Cruz, Beck, and Vieira often wore camouflage clothing.   
In January 1990, Raper, who was about 50 years old, 
moved his trailer into the Camp.  Raper had several friends 
who frequently visited, including Debbie “Little Debbie” 
Smelser and James “Fat Cat” Smith.  Raper had an 
acrimonious relationship with Beck, Cruz, and LaMarsh.  Cruz 
told an acquaintance before the May 20, 1990 murders that he 
would “like to get his hands on” Raper.   
At least six weeks before the murders, Beck, Cruz, and 
LaMarsh hooked Raper’s trailer to Beck’s van and moved it to 
nearby 5223 Elm Street.  A group of men, including Beck, 
Cruz, Vieira, and LaMarsh, then pushed Raper’s car off the 
property.  The car was then set on fire.   
Tanya Miller, Michelle Evans’s younger half-sister, had 
previously lived with Evans at 5223 Elm Street.  In April 1990, 
while Miller was still living at 5223 Elm Street, she received a 
30-day eviction notice.  She left her furniture in the house and 
moved in with Evans at their grandmother’s house.  She 
received a three-day notice shortly before the murders, became 
anxious to move her furniture, and asked Evans to help her 
move.   
On Friday, May 18, 1990, about 9:00 p.m., Evans, Cruz, 
Beck, LaMarsh, Willey, and Vieira went to 5223 Elm Street to 
move out furniture.  Cruz brought a 12-pack of beer and shared 
it with everyone there, including victims Colwell, Ritchey, 
Raper, and Paris.  Raper and LaMarsh spoke for about 
10 minutes and then briefly engaged in a fistfight.  Beck and 
Willey then started wrestling with Vieira.  No furniture was 
moved.  After 45 minutes to an hour, Evans and the others 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
returned to the Camp.  Later that night, Colwell visited the 
Camp and was beaten by Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, and 
Vieira before being permitted to leave.   
b. Events on May 20 and May 21, 1990 
Around noon on May 20, Smith visited Raper at 
5223 Elm Street.  Victims Ritchey and Colwell were also there.  
Sometime between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Smith observed 
LaMarsh visit the neighbor next door to Raper.   
Sometime on the evening of May 20, Vieira visited Cruz’s 
next-door neighbor, Dee Ann Messinger; Vieira was dressed in 
camouflage clothes, a dark ski cap that resembled a cap found 
at the murder scene, and black boots.  He was carrying a silver 
or gray bat that resembled the color and length of a bat found 
at the murder scene and asked to borrow spray paint.   
Around 6:00 p.m. on May 20, Evans visited the Camp.  
Cruz asked Evans to draw a floor plan of the house at 
5223 Elm Street.  As she did so, Cruz sharpened a Ka-Bar 
knife, a fixed blade about 10 inches long with serrations on one 
side.  Cruz also told Evans to call her half-sister Miller and 
“tell her not to go home tonight.”   
Late at night on May 20, Patricia Badgett was visiting 
her boyfriend Willey when he received a telephone call from a 
person who sounded like Cruz.  Willey lived in Ceres and had 
shoulder-length hair.  Willey asked Cruz, “Can we move a 
different day?” and explained he did not feel well.  Willey left a 
few minutes later.   
Later that evening, Evans, Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, Willey 
(whose hair was in a ponytail), and Vieira gathered in 
LaMarsh’s trailer and were given assignments of what to do at 
5223 Elm Street.  Everyone but Evans and LaMarsh was 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
wearing camouflage clothing.  Cruz pointed to Evans’s floor 
plan, gave each person a specific entrance and time to enter, 
and said they should “go and do them all and leave no 
witnesses.”  Evans understood “do them all” to mean kill them 
but did not believe Cruz was serious.  Evans was to “count the 
people and get them in the living room,” and then open the 
back bedroom window for Beck and Vieira.  Cruz said if 
“anyone didn’t do their job right, they would join the people in 
the house.”  Cruz also said that if Little Debbie was there, 
“she’s his,” and that he hoped Fat Cat was there.  Cruz handed 
out four paintball or camouflage masks to Beck, Willey, Vieira, 
and himself.  Cruz said that handguns would not be used 
because they were “too noisy.”  There was no discussion of 
moving furniture.   
Around midnight, Evans, Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, 
and Vieira, who were carrying weapons, drove to 5223 Elm 
Street.  Evans and LaMarsh were dropped off, and the others 
parked the car.  Evans entered the home and then from a 
window observed Beck, Cruz, Willey, and Vieira running 
toward the house wearing masks.  Vieira also wore a dark ski 
cap.  Beck and Vieira entered the house through the window 
where Evans was standing.  Beck and Vieira ran toward the 
living room, and about 30 seconds later Evans heard Paris 
screaming, “Oh, God, oh, God,” and “I didn’t do it, I didn’t do 
it,” and pleading for her life.  Evans left the house and went to 
the car.  On the way, she saw Willey sitting on the back of a 
person lying facedown in the street; Willey and Cruz, who had 
a baton, did something to this individual.   
Donna Alvarez, who was homeless and had been offered 
a place to stay at 5223 Elm Street on May 20 by victim 
Ritchey, fell asleep in a back bedroom around 8:00 p.m.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
Alvarez was awakened around midnight by a woman she now 
knew as Evans, who said Evans’s sister needed the bedroom 
and Alvarez had to get up.  Alvarez went into the living room 
and asked Raper if there was anywhere else she could sleep.  
He said she could sleep wherever she liked, so Alvarez, joined 
by Ritchey, went into the other bedroom.  A man, whom 
Alvarez later identified as LaMarsh, was holding a silver gun 
and said, “Everyone into the living room.”  Alvarez ran and hid 
under clothes in the garage.  She heard people “wrestling” and 
a woman scream.  She managed to push up the garage door 
and escape, and sought help from a neighbor who called the 
police.   
Around midnight, Earl Creekmore, who lived near 
5223 Elm Street, heard someone running next to his house and 
then a loud bang on his air conditioner.  Creekmore went 
outside to investigate.  He saw two men “beating up on one 
guy” on his knees in the street; the victim was screaming, “Oh, 
God, help me.”  The victim also said, “No, stop, please don’t.”  
The assailants were kicking the victim in the ribs and 
punching him in the back of the head.  One assailant, whom 
Creekmore identified at trial as Willey, had a ponytail that 
reached the middle of his back.  The other, whom Creekmore 
identified at trial as Cruz, was heavyset and wore a red 
baseball cap.   
Creekmore asked the men what was going on, but they 
did not respond.  Cruz went into the house at 5223 Elm Street 
and then immediately returned to the street.  By this time, the 
beating victim had fallen over and was lying motionless on his 
back in the street.  Cruz straddled the victim, picked him up by 
his shirt, and “made a cutting motion on his throat.”  The 
victim made a gurgling sound.  Creekmore started to leave, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
looked back, and saw Willey swinging what appeared to be a 
two-by-four over his head.  Creekmore returned home, and his 
roommate called 911.   
Also around midnight, Kathy Moyers arrived at a friend’s 
home, located across the street from 5223 Elm Street.  She saw 
three people “scuffling” on the shoulder of the street.  One 
person appeared drunk because he was falling down.  When 
she exited her car, she heard the man on the ground saying, 
“Please don’t, no, please,” and “please, no, help me, stop.”  He 
was on his knees, and the other two were standing over him.  
The other two persons were reaching for the fallen man to pick 
him up.  One of the assailants had broad shoulders, weighed 
about 260 pounds, and was about five feet eight inches tall.  He 
had on a ski cap and resembled Cruz in size and shape.  The 
other assailant was smaller, about five feet five inches tall, 145 
to 160 pounds, with a light-colored ponytail, and resembled 
Willey in size and shape.  Moyers called the police.  She then 
saw the body lying in the street and the assailants entering the 
house at 5223 Elm Street.   
About four minutes later, Moyers observed four persons 
leave the house, including the two assailants and two men 
similar in build to Beck and LaMarsh.  They were all dressed 
alike in heavy, dark clothing, and they wore ski caps similar to 
one found at the crime scene.  They looked at the body in the 
street and walked toward the tracks.   
Around 12:45 a.m. on May 21, William Duval, the rental 
manager for 5223 Elm Street who lived nearby the home, was 
awakened when something hit his bedroom window.  He saw a 
woman crawling on her hands and knees across his lawn.  He 
went outside and a few minutes later observed four men 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
leaving 5223 Elm Street in single file, going east “double-time” 
or “trotting.”  They all appeared to be dressed the same.  The 
two men at the front of the line were six feet to six feet two 
inches, and weighed about 165 pounds.  Beck’s and Willey’s 
physical builds were consistent with these men.  The third 
man was five feet ten inches to six feet tall and heavyset, 
weighing about 350 pounds.  Cruz’s physical appearance was 
consistent with this man.  The last man was much shorter and 
had a darker complexion than the other men.  LaMarsh’s 
general physical build was consistent with the last man.  
LaMarsh and Vieira had the same complexion, but Vieira was 
a bit shorter.  The men held their hands at “port arms 
position,” or one hand on the chest, and the other toward the 
shoulder; Duval could not tell if they were carrying anything.   
When Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, and Vieira returned 
to the car where Evans was waiting, Beck was covered in blood 
and carrying a bloody knife, Cruz had blood on his hands, and 
LaMarsh’s bat was bloody.  The group drove to Willey’s home 
in Ceres.  On the way, LaMarsh said he did not think Raper 
was dead, and Beck replied, “He’s dead.  I saw his face crumble 
as I was walking out the door.”  Beck also said it was a “waste 
that they only got three dudes and a chick.”  Willey said, 
“Someone watched us do” or kill “the guy in the front yard,” 
and Cruz became angry because they did not kill the person 
watching.  Vieira said he had thrown away the Ka-Bar knife, 
his bat, and the baton.  LaMarsh wanted to throw his bat out 
the window, but Cruz said he should keep it.  Cruz was 
disappointed Little Debbie and Fat Cat had not been there 
because he would have liked to kill them.   
When the group arrived at Willey’s house, everyone but 
Evans and LaMarsh laundered their clothes.  Vieira said he 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
left his hat at the crime scene, and Vieira and Willey said they 
had left their masks.  Cruz directed Vieira to clean the blood 
off Cruz’s shoes and from the car.  The remaining masks and 
weapons were put under Willey’s house.  Willey later moved 
the weapons from this location.   
Evans subsequently asked LaMarsh what he saw inside 
the house, and he appeared frightened and said, “Missy, it was 
the worst thing you ever want to see.”  LaMarsh described 
Raper raising his arm and LaMarsh then hitting Raper with 
the bat and breaking his arm.  LaMarsh also said he had 
knocked down with the bat three individuals who were 
attempting to flee the home.   
About 1:00 am on May 21, 1990, Stanislaus County 
Deputy Sheriff Charley Corle received a call regarding an 
assault in the area of Elm and Mason in Salida.  He arrived 
about four minutes later, saw an ambulance next to a body 
lying in the street, and was directed by Alvarez to 5223 Elm 
Street.  A blood-stained camouflage mask was found between 
Ritchey’s legs, and a dark knit cap and a second camouflage 
mask were found on the front lawn of 5223 Elm Street.  Shoe 
prints in the gutter area in front of the house were the same 
size and type as shoes belonging to Evans.   
Found nearby in a field and in the same general area 
were a metal baton, a bloody aluminum bat, and a Ka-Bar 
knife.  About 15 feet from the knife was a knife sheath.   
c. Additional evidence linking Beck and Cruz to 
the murders 
Shortly after the murders, Beck told an acquaintance, 
Phillip Wallace, that “we” or “I” “slit some throats.”  Wallace 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
was shocked and said something like, “You’re not serious.”  
Beck smirked.   
Sylvia Zavala worked at Crescent Supply Company, an 
Army surplus store in Modesto that Beck and Cruz had 
previously visited.  On February 27, 1990, Zavala showed Cruz 
camouflage masks that were similar to one found at the 
murder scene.  A store receipt for the purchase on that date of 
four masks and camouflage clothing was found in Cruz’s home.  
Sometime after February 27 and before March 13, Cruz 
purchased 16-by-16-foot camouflage netting.  On March 13, 
1990, Cruz purchased a Ka-Bar knife similar to one found at 
the murder scene; a receipt for the purchase on that date of 
two knives was found in Cruz’s home.   
Steve Miller worked at Gun Country, a retail gun shop in 
Modesto.  Cruz and the prosecutor stipulated that several 
weeks before the murders, Cruz purchased the police baton 
found at the murder scene.  Cruz was accompanied by Beck.  
The parties also stipulated that Exhibit No. 87, a .380-caliber 
weapon that resembled the gun Alvarez saw LaMarsh holding 
on the night of the murders, was purchased on July 25, 1989 
and registered to Beck.   
Dr. William 
Ernoehazy, 
a 
pathologist, 
performed 
autopsies on Raper, Colwell, Paris, and Ritchey.  Raper had 
suffered extensive and fatal head injuries by a blunt force 
instrument, most likely a baseball bat but possibly a baton.  
The outline of his head and his facial features were distorted, 
and bone fragments had been driven deep into his brain.  He 
had also been stabbed in the neck, with his right carotid artery 
and larynx cut, and his left arm was broken.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Colwell had suffered a skull fracture, cut and stab 
wounds to his face, multiple stab wounds to his skull, stabbing 
and slicing wounds to his neck that cut his jugular vein, 
carotid artery, and larynx, a slicing wound to his liver, stab 
wounds to his chest, and defensive wounds to his left hand.  
The cause of death was stab wounds to the neck and abdomen.   
Paris had suffered multiple contusions and lacerations of 
her scalp from a blunt force instrument, stab wounds to her 
neck and chest, and defensive hand wounds.  The cause of 
death was a severed throat, a wound that cut her carotid 
vessels, jugular vein, and larynx, and extended down to her 
spine.   
Ritchey had suffered stab wounds to his neck, back, 
abdomen, and liver, and multiple defensive wounds on his 
hands.  There were slicing wounds of his heart and pulmonary 
artery that caused extensive hemorrhaging in his chest cavity.  
His jugular vein, windpipe, and carotid artery were cut; these 
wounds extended down to the cervical vertebrae.  Either the 
stab wound to his chest or his severed neck would have caused 
death.   
Department of Justice Crime Laboratory Criminalist 
Marianne Vick testified that blood on the baton was consistent 
with Colwell’s blood, blood on the bat and the Ka-Bar knife was 
consistent with Paris’s blood, and blood on one of the 
camouflage masks was consistent with Ritchey’s blood. 
2. Defense evidence 
Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, and Willey each testified in their 
own defense.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
a. Cruz 
1. Cruz’s testimony 
Cruz denied killing anyone on the night of May 20, 1990, 
or conspiring to kill anyone on May 20 or in the preceding 
days.  On cross-examination, Cruz testified that in January 
1990, Raper’s trailer appeared at the Camp about 50 feet from 
Cruz’s home.  Fat Cat, Little Debbie, and Colwell frequently 
visited Raper.  Raper was verbally abusive and uncooperative, 
and Cruz was disturbed by the frequent fights and visible drug 
use.   
Raper had been arrested for tearing down Cruz’s fence.  
Raper threatened Cruz by giving him an “evil eye” and saying, 
“Better not press charges.”   
Cruz, Beck, and others moved Raper’s trailer out of the 
Camp after a child was seen playing with a discarded syringe.  
After Raper left, his car was moved out of the Camp and 
burned, but Cruz denied involvement.   
Sometime after Raper’s car was burned, Raper — while 
on the other side of a fence from Cruz — pulled a knife on Cruz 
in front of Jennifer and Cruz’s children and told Cruz “he was 
going to kill” him.  Cruz could not recall whether he had 
reported this incident to the police.  Raper returned to the 
Camp several times after making the threat.  On one occasion, 
he stood at the end of the driveway and yelled obscenities 
“towards” Cruz and said he would kill Cruz “pretty soon,” 
“[m]aybe today,” “[m]aybe tomorrow.”  Raper then crossed the 
street, stood completely still, and watched Cruz for a long time.  
Cruz did not recall reporting this incident to the police.   
About a month before May 20, 1990, Cruz began to hear 
that the Camp might encounter problems with Raper’s biker 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
friends.  In response, Cruz, Beck, and Vieira performed armed 
patrols of the Camp perimeter.  Cruz reported this information 
at some point to the Sheriff.   
Before the murders, Cruz had been to 5223 Elm Street 
once.  A week or some days before the murders, he went to the 
home with Beck, Evans, Willey, LaMarsh, and Vieira to help 
move a refrigerator and furniture; the group brought a 12-pack 
of beer as a goodwill gesture.  At different points during the 
visit, Raper, Colwell, Ritchey, and Paris were there, as well as 
Little Debbie and a woman named Diane Kiernan.  Cruz 
denied Colwell was beaten later that night.   
On the evening on May 20, Evans told Cruz she needed 
to retrieve some clothes, including a bridal gown that was an 
heirloom, from 5223 Elm Street, and wanted Cruz and others 
to accompany her for protection.  Evans did not draw a 
diagram of the house.  Also that evening, Evans told Cruz that 
Raper had threatened to kill Cruz and her, and said that 
“Raper was sharpening knives.”  Evans used “crank” (i.e., 
methamphetamine) and greatly disliked Raper and Paris.   
Around midnight, Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, Willey, Vieira, 
and Evans, some of whom were armed, drove to 5223 Elm 
Street.  Cruz saw no one with a gun, black watch cap, or mask.   
Cruz dropped off Evans and LaMarsh near 5223 Elm 
Street and then parked where his car would not be noticed by 
Raper’s friends.  Beck, Willey, and Vieira got out of the car and 
suddenly started running toward the victims’ house.  Cruz 
heard someone say something like “what’s up” and “he’s gone 
crazy.”  He assumed at the time of his testimony this had been 
Earl Creekmore.  Cruz exited the vehicle and started walking 
with a cane toward the house.  He saw Willey and a person he 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
later learned was Ritchey fighting in the middle of the street.  
They were “rolling around, socking each other.”  Cruz told 
Willey, “Let’s go,” but Willey and Ritchey continued fighting.   
Cruz entered the house and saw Raper sitting in a chair 
“look[ing] like what’s on the film”; he did not move and did not 
look to be in “good shape.”  Cruz’s attention was diverted by 
Beck pulling Colwell off Vieira and throwing him.  Cruz told 
Beck that somebody was “out there by Ron,” and Beck ran out 
the front door.  Vieira and Colwell continued fighting.  Cruz 
yelled, “Let’s go now,” and Evans “pop[ped] up” from behind 
the counter.  Vieira pulled out his Ka-Bar knife, and Cruz 
turned away.  Cruz asserted he was not physically capable of 
fighting another individual on the night of the murders and 
denied stabbing any of the victims, hitting Raper on the head, 
or directing Vieira to cut Paris’s throat.   
Cruz left the house, and later the entire group returned 
to the car and drove off; Willey asked to be taken home.  There 
was no conversation.  At Willey’s house, Cruz saw blood on 
Evans’s face, and her hair was matted.  Cruz denied he 
“order[ed] anyone about” and specifically denied ordering 
Vieira to clean blood off Cruz’s shoes or to clean the blood out 
of the car on the night of the murders.   
Cruz called Jennifer and told her to get out of town and 
to meet him at an Oakdale hotel.  Cruz, Beck, and Vieira left 
Willey’s house and joined Jennifer at the Oakdale Motel.  Cruz 
did not call the police to report what had happened because he 
would then “be involved.”   
Cruz met with Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective 
Gary Deckard on May 21, 1990 and denied being at 5223 Elm 
Street on the night of the murders.  Cruz asserted he did not 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
believe in the use of deadly force except in self-defense.  He did 
not like violence and did not want to see anybody get hurt.   
2. Physical evidence 
Detective Deckard testified he had seized Cruz’s cane 
from him, visually inspected it, and saw no evidence of the 
presence of blood.   
Apparently in an effort to demonstrate that Cruz did not 
match witness descriptions of the perpetrator, Stanislaus 
County Sheriff’s Detective Darrel Freitas testified that at the 
time of his arrest, Cruz weighed 350 pounds.   
Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Michael Dulaney 
testified he arrived at 5223 Elm Street at about 2:30 a.m. on 
the morning of May 21, 1990.  He did not bag the hands of 
Raper, Paris, or Colwell because the coroner said that it was 
unnecessary to do so.  He did not collect into evidence a knife 
with food particles found in the kitchen because it appeared 
unrelated to the murders.  Deputy Dulaney also attended the 
autopsies of the four victims and did not observe the 
pathologist taking fingernail scrapings.   
3. Prior witness statements 
Detective Freitas testified that when he spoke to Kathy 
Moyers on May 21, 1990, she told him that all of the 
individuals she observed were large and wearing dark clothing.  
Moyers was with another person and appeared hesitant to 
speak with Detective Freitas.  Earl Creekmore said that he 
saw two individuals, and one was larger than the other.  One 
had a long ponytail, was about six feet one inch tall, and 
weighed about 170 pounds, and was beating someone on the 
ground.  The other was about six feet three inches tall, 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
weighed about 250 pounds, had short hair, and was wearing a 
baseball cap.   
4. Evans impeachment 
Detective Deckard testified he had interviewed Evans 
four times.  On October 12, 1990, after Evans reached a plea 
agreement with the district attorney’s office, she made a 
complete statement to Detective Deckard.  After testifying at 
the preliminary hearing, Evans called Detective Deckard to 
say that she now recalled she had been carrying a small 
survival knife on the night of the murders.  Evans appeared 
concerned this information might affect her plea bargain.   
Michelle Mercer, who was 18 years old, testified that she 
had known Evans for 10 to 15 years, and that Evans was “not 
well liked in the community” and had a reputation for violence 
and dishonesty.  About a week before the murders, Mercer had 
observed Evans and Paris partially undressed and kissing.  In 
June 1991, Evans told Mercer she had been involved in killing 
Paris and described in detail to Mercer “how they sliced 
[Paris’s] throat and she loved every minute of what Raper got.”  
Evans said she had “watched Franklin die, and . . . it was kind 
of neat.”  Evans was concerned that Mercer was going to 
assault Evans’s little sister and threatened Mercer, saying that 
she “still had friends out there that could take care of [her] 
too.”   
James Richardson testified that Evans had been a friend 
since childhood.  In May 1990, Evans told Richardson that she 
had watched the murders the night before and had laughed as 
she did so.  She also said she had planned the murders.  
Richardson said Evans had a reputation for being untruthful 
and “exaggerated a lot.”   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective Mark Ottoboni 
interviewed Evans on May 22, 1990, and she appeared to be 
under the influence of Valium or alcohol.  Evans said on the 
night of the murders she had seen Paris hiding under the 
kitchen table.  Someone approached Paris who was of small 
stature, was of Mexican descent, and was wearing camouflage 
clothing and a mask.  Evans also said that Colwell was beaten 
up outside and that Beck was not at 5223 Elm Street during 
the murders.  Evans made several conflicting statements 
during this interview.  At some point Detective Ottoboni 
caused Evans and Beck to be placed in a room together and 
surreptitiously observed they had a whispered discussion 
about the murders.   
5. Raper 
Cruz introduced certain testimony regarding alleged 
illegal activity by Raper, apparently to demonstrate that Raper 
could be violent.  On April 16, 1990, at about 9:45 a.m., 
Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Bryan Grimm met with 
Cruz at 4510 Finney Road and took an initial report of a 
disturbance.  Deputy Grimm returned later that day in 
response to a call, and Cruz showed him a damaged fence.  
Cruz made a citizen’s arrest of Raper, and Deputy Grimm 
accepted the arrest and took Raper to jail.  Deputy Grimm was 
required to accept a citizen arrest regardless of its validity.  
Raper told Deputy Grimm he had the money to post bail, and 
he could then “be back on the street to harass” Cruz.  Raper 
was not hostile or violent in any way to Deputy Grimm.   
In about February 1990, Robert Bowers, who had rented 
Cruz the studio apartment at the Camp, hired Cruz to manage 
the Camp.  Cruz did not collect rent and was not authorized to 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
evict Raper.  Raper did not have a lease agreement with 
Bowers.  Bowers received complaints about an unauthorized 
trailer at the Camp, but did not know the occupant, and took 
no steps to remove it.  On cross-examination, he testified he 
did not know Beck, Vieira, and LaMarsh were living there, and 
their trailers would have also been illegal.   
Greg Boynton had an automotive repair store in Salida.  
At some point Raper moved his trailer onto a vacant lot next to 
Boynton’s business.  Raper was about 50 years old, about five 
feet seven inches tall, and weighed about 100 pounds.  Raper 
and Boynton had an altercation in which Raper spoke 
disrespectfully about Boynton’s father, and Boynton pushed 
Raper down.  Several days later, on October 13, 1989, Raper 
and another man, perhaps named Fat Cat, arrived in a vehicle 
and confronted Boynton, saying Fat Cat was going to kill 
Boynton.  Raper and Fat Cat then spun donuts in the vacant 
lot until their car stalled, and they were beaten by Boynton 
and his father James Boynton.  James Boynton then had 
Raper’s trailer moved.  Thereafter he saw Raper frequently in 
Salida.  Raper said that “he was going to get” James Boynton 
and would “holler or cuss” at him, making insulting gestures.   
On August 18, 1989, about 4:00 a.m., Stanislaus County 
Sergeant Jane Irwin encountered Raper sitting in his car in 
Salida.  She observed a knife handle and, when backup 
arrived, she removed Raper from the car and searched it.  
Raper was belligerent, refused to put his hands up, and told 
officers to “[g]o ahead and shoot me.”  He was carrying an ice 
pick, and a razor and knives were found in his car.  He did not 
resist arrest.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
b. Beck  
Beck testified he was close friends with Cruz and Vieira 
and had lived with Rosemary M. in Oakdale.  On May 20, 
1990, Beck was 34 years old and weighed about 260 pounds.   
That evening at the Camp, Evans told Beck and Cruz 
that she had gone to 5223 Elm Street earlier to retrieve certain 
items.  Raper refused to let her take the items and said he and 
his friends were going to go to the Camp and kill Evans and 
those with whom she associated there.  “A little later” Beck 
drove to Ceres and picked up Willey to “help us protect 
ourselves.”  They returned to the Camp about 11:30 p.m. and 
found Cruz, Evans, LaMarsh, and Vieira there.  Evans said it 
was urgent she retrieve a wedding gown and other clothes from 
5223 Elm Street and asked that someone accompany her so 
that Raper would not again interfere.  There was no discussion 
of “leaving no witnesses,” and no weapons were distributed.  
No map of 5223 Elm Street was drawn, nor did Evans orally 
describe the house layout.   
The entire group went “in case something happened, so 
they wouldn’t be caught so then they couldn’t get out.”  
Although Beck was concerned for his life, he was not armed 
when he and the others went to the Elm Street house.   
Evans and LaMarsh were dropped off at the Elm Street 
house and left the car carrying bats.  After the car was parked 
in a different location, Beck, Vieira, and Willey got out and 
began walking toward the house.  They heard a girl scream, 
and the three men ran toward the house.  When Willey, who 
was ahead of Beck, reached the yard, he was confronted by a 
man and they began to fight.  Beck followed Vieira into the 
house and observed LaMarsh holding a baseball bat and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
standing in front of Raper.  Raper was sitting down and Beck 
watched his body “slump[] down.”  Beck was “shock[ed],” stood 
there briefly, and then moved toward noises in the house.  He 
saw Vieira and Colwell struggling.  Vieira’s back was on the 
floor, and Colwell was on top of Vieira.  Beck hit Colwell 
“pretty good” a “few times” on his back and then threw him 
several feet into the cupboards.  Beck observed Evans on top of 
victim Paris, punching her.   
Cruz said someone was “out there by” Willey, so Beck ran 
outside.  He observed Willey “standing over there by a guy 
laying down there on the ground,” and “some guy walking off.”  
Beck told Willey, “Let’s go,” and Willey started running to the 
car.  Cruz exited the house, and he and Beck walked back to 
the car.  Evans and Vieira ran past them.  No one walked in  
single file.  Beck and Cruz were the last members of the group 
to return to the car.  They drove to Willey’s house.  Beck denied 
saying, “[O]nly three guys and a chick, what a waste,” having a 
bloody arm, or waving around a knife.  He saw no weapons, 
other than the bats, and no blood on anyone.  Beck had never 
seen Cruz run, and he did not run the night of the murders.  
Beck did not know anyone had died on Sunday night until late 
Monday morning or early afternoon.   
Beck denied killing anyone, cutting anyone’s throat, or 
doing anything wrong on the night of May 20.  Beck was 
present, but denied fighting with victim Colwell when Colwell 
visited the Camp two nights before the murders.  He denied 
telling Phillip Wallace he had cut someone’s throat.  He 
identified a mask found at the crime scene as the type of mask 
he had seen in Cruz’s home.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
Beck was arrested the night after the murders.  He was 
untruthful in his statement to police because he did not want 
to “get [his] friends in trouble.”   
c. LaMarsh  
LaMarsh testified that he met Beck, Cruz, and Vieira 
about two months before the murders.  Soon after, while at the 
Camp, LaMarsh heard someone yelling and saw Beck standing 
at attention with Vieira standing at attention behind him, and 
Cruz next to Beck.  Cruz yelled at Vieira that he was “going to 
have to learn more responsibility.”  Cruz then said, “Okay, 
Dave,” and Beck “socked” Vieira.  Vieira “doubled over and fell 
on the ground,” and Beck said, “Get up.”  Vieira stood up and 
was crying.   
Cruz, Beck, and Vieira appeared to be a survivalist 
group.  During LaMarsh’s first conversation with Cruz, Cruz 
showed him about 30 weapons.  Cruz, Beck, Vieira, and Willey 
invited LaMarsh to their group by having LaMarsh cut himself 
and leave a bloody print on a piece of paper.  About the time 
Cruz had Raper arrested for pulling up a fence signpost, Cruz 
told LaMarsh, “[I]t would be a lot easier if they had just went 
in the trailer and did him” or killed Raper “than going through 
all this hassle.”   
On the night of May 20, LaMarsh returned to his trailer 
about 11:30 p.m.  Cruz, Evans, and Vieira visited, and Evans 
said they were going to 5223 Elm Street so that Evans could 
retrieve some of her clothes and items that belonged to her 
half-sister Miller.  Evans asked LaMarsh to accompany her 
into the house.  LaMarsh brought a bat in case “there was any 
problems,” along with a gun Cruz had lent him two weeks 
earlier.  LaMarsh did not agree to beat anyone up.  He was told 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
“nothing about murder” or that “they were going to kill 
anybody.”   
Once at 5223 Elm Street, LaMarsh encountered Raper 
and broke his arm in self-defense.  Cruz then hit Raper several 
times on the head with his baton.  LaMarsh saw Beck stab 
Colwell in the stomach.  LaMarsh fled out a window because 
“all hell had broken loose and these guys were in there doing 
serious shit.”   
After the murders, in the car on the way to Willey’s 
house, Cruz asked Evans how many people were in the house, 
and she said there were five.  Cruz asked Beck, “Well, how 
many did we get?”  Beck said, “Four,” and Cruz said, “Fuck,” 
and was angry that one person had escaped.  Cruz then asked 
Beck, “[W]ho all did we get?”  Beck replied, “Dennis [Colwell], 
some dude, a chick, and Frank [Raper].”  Cruz said, “[T]hey’re 
all dead, aren’t they?”  Beck replied, “Yeah.”  LaMarsh said, 
“Well, Frank [Raper] ain’t dead.”  Beck laughed and said:  
“He’s dead.  I seen his face crumble on the way out the door.”   
At Willey’s house, Cruz ordered Vieira to clean the blood 
off Cruz’s shoes and to clean the car; Vieira did so.  Beck had 
fresh scratches on his stomach.  Cruz told Beck, “We’re going to 
have to get an alibi.”   
Rosemary testified she had known Beck and Cruz for 
about seven years and Vieira for about five years, and she had 
lived with them for about two years.  Rosemary and Beck had 
been romantically involved.  Beck and Cruz told Vieira what to 
do, and Vieira would do it “on command” and be “very 
obedient,” including standing at attention for long periods of 
time.  Cruz was the leader, even when Beck, Cruz, and 
Rosemary lived in Beck’s home, and Beck and Rosemary 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
obeyed him.  Beck and Jennifer were allowed to object, but 
Rosemary had never seen Beck refuse to do something Cruz 
wanted him to do.  Beck and Cruz would not “physically hurt 
anybody” but would “tell them that’s the way it was going to 
be.”  Rosemary, Beck, Vieira, and a man named Steven Perkins 
were the ones in the household who were employed, but Beck 
and Cruz received all of their earnings.  Beck, Cruz, and Vieira 
were nice to LaMarsh to get him to join their group, and 
Rosemary had observed them attempt to similarly recruit 
other members.   
On the evening of May 20, 1990, Cruz called Rosemary 
and asked that she and her boyfriend, Phillip Wallace, come 
over, and that Rosemary stay with Jennifer.  He said, “[T]he 
guys were going to go even a score, get in a fight” at a house 
“on the other side of the park there” in Salida.  Cruz said he 
wanted to settle a score with Fat Cat.   
The following evening, Beck visited Rosemary.  Beck was 
wearing brand new sneakers.  When asked by the prosecutor 
whether Beck had mentioned doing anything to the people who 
were killed, Rosemary testified that Beck said, “[T]hey had to 
do them.”  Beck also said Vieira had been ordered to clean the 
blood off “everybody’s shoes at Ron Wi[l]ley’s house.”  He 
smiled and said he had purchased new shoes because his were 
covered in blood and he could not get them clean.   
d. Willey  
Willey testified he had known Beck and Cruz since 1985.  
In 1986 he attended a one-year trade school in Phoenix, and 
when he returned to California in 1987, his relationship with 
Beck and Cruz had changed.  Beck and Cruz were “best 
friends,” Cruz “was the one that was running the show,” and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
Beck “always did whatever [Cruz] said.”  Cruz told Vieira how 
to act, when he could go to bed, and what he could do when he 
was awake.  Beck, to a lesser extent, also gave orders to Vieira.  
If Vieira did not act as expected, Beck would slap him on the 
back of his head or punch him in the stomach.  Sometimes 
Cruz told Beck to inflict pain on Vieira.   
In the beginning of May 1990, Cruz called Willey and 
invited him over to the Camp.  Willey had not had any contact 
with Cruz for about eight months and did not know where he 
lived.  At some point after Willey arrived, a group including 
Willey, LaMarsh (whom Willey met that night), Beck, and 
Cruz, gathered in a small trailer.  Cruz had LaMarsh sign a 
piece of paper, cut his hand and place a bloody fingerprint on 
the paper, and said that he was joining their group.  Willey 
had engaged in a similar ritual in 1985.   
On May 20, about 11:15 p.m., Cruz called Willey and 
asked him to help move furniture from 5223 Elm Street.  After 
they arrived at the home, Willey had a fistfight with Ritchey 
outside.  Beck suddenly knocked Willey off Ritchey, fell on 
Ritchey, and slit Ritchey’s throat.  Later at Willey’s house, 
Evans and LaMarsh appeared nervous and frightened.  Willey 
did not kill anyone and did not know anyone was going to be 
killed that night.   
3. Rebuttal 
Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Myron Larson 
testified he searched Cruz’s home on May 21, 1990 after the 
murders but did not find a Ka-Bar knife or camouflage masks.  
Detective Deckard similarly testified that he had examined all 
the evidence found in Cruz’s home, and there were no masks.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
4. Cruz surrebuttal 
Pete Rarick testified he had previously been married to 
Rosemary.  Rosemary had lied to Rarick, and he did not trust 
her.   
B. Penalty Phase 
Many of the testifying individuals shared the same 
surname, so for clarity, we use first names to identify certain 
witnesses.  
1. Prosecutor’s case against Cruz 
Jennifer, Cruz’s former girlfriend and the mother of his 
three children, testified.  Jennifer met and moved in with Cruz 
in 1987 when she was about 16 years old and he was 25 years 
old.  Jennifer had known Vieira and Steven Perkins, another 
person who had lived with Jennifer and Cruz, for about the 
same amount of time she had known Cruz.  On about 
25 occasions between 1987 and 1990, Cruz made Vieira stand 
in the middle of the room and punched him in the stomach as 
hard as he could.  Cruz told Vieira to “stand still and take it.”  
Cruz performed a similar ritual about 50 times against 
Perkins, at least once causing injuries that sent Perkins to the 
hospital.   
Cruz also on several occasions and without warning used 
a Scorpion stun gun on Vieira; Vieira would scream and jump.  
Cruz twice used the stun gun on Jennifer.  Cruz once placed a 
loaded long-barreled rifle in Rosemary’s mouth and threatened 
to kill her.  On that same occasion Cruz also placed the rifle in 
Jennifer’s mouth and asked, “Are you going to get your shit 
together or are you going to die?”   
On January 6, 1990, when Jennifer was about two 
months pregnant, Cruz pushed her to the ground.  He then 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
kicked her in the stomach and between her legs, causing 
bleeding.  Jennifer fled barefoot and without a jacket to a 
woman’s shelter for four days.  Cruz asked Jennifer to return 
and was kind to her, so she moved back in with him.   
During their relationship, Cruz struck Jennifer about 
100 times with a cane or other object.  Whenever Cruz thought 
Jennifer had “got[ten] out of line” or the couple fought, Cruz 
would threaten to kill her.  Cruz also told Jennifer the “only 
way out of this relationship is when one of us dies.”   
Cruz hit their infant daughter A. on her legs or bottom 
with a fly swatter or a ruler.  When A. was less than six 
months old, Cruz punished A. by placing her in a dark room 
and allowing Jennifer to feed, hold, or change her only every 
six hours.  When Jennifer objected to this treatment, Cruz beat 
her.  When A. was less than a year old, Cruz would suspend 
her in a halter in the middle of a device he called the “rack,” 
and attach to her legs Mason jars filled with water.  He would 
then make her cry so that her legs would go up and down.  
Cruz also gave their daughter “clappings” in which he would 
slap the back or side of her head with his open hand leaving 
bruises on the inside of her ears.  When A. was learning to 
walk, Cruz found it humorous to ask A. if she wanted a 
clapping, and watch her respond by falling to the ground and 
hiding her head between her hands.   
On cross-examination, Jennifer testified that at some 
point after Raper had been moved out of the Camp, he had 
returned and threatened to kill Cruz.  On the night of May 20, 
Evans told Cruz something similar to that “Raper was coming 
over that night with some people to wipe everybody out.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
The parties stipulated that an agreement had been made 
between Jennifer and the district attorney’s office that if 
Jennifer testified truthfully in various proceedings, including 
the Cruz penalty phase, two felony cases pending against her 
would be dismissed.   
2. Cruz defense case 
a. Family and friends  
Cruz and several of his relatives testified on his behalf, 
and their recollections of his childhood and identification of 
who was in which familial role were at times inconsistent.  
Cruz presented evidence that he had been confused while 
growing up as to who his biological parents were and that he 
had experienced several situations in which he was 
disappointed by the response of medical or law enforcement 
personnel.   
Cruz was born in Modesto in March 1962.  Hortencia 
Cruz, Cruz’s mother, testified that his father was Ausencio 
Cruz.  Because Ausencio had gone to Mexico and had not 
returned, Hortencia put the name of a friend — Lawrence 
Jimmy Cox — on Cruz’s birth certificate.  At that time, the 
family lived on a ranch in Oakdale owned by Drummond 
Augustus Sproul and performed chores for him, apparently in 
exchange for housing.   
When Cruz was a young boy, he was told by Jesus 
Hernandez, Hortencia’s former husband, that Ausencio was 
not his father and that his father was a “drunk.”  Cruz then 
confirmed with Hortencia that she was his mother, and said, 
“Well, as long as I know who my mother is, I don’t care who my 
father is.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
Hortencia worked hard to provide for her children, and 
Cruz never went without food or clothing.  Hortencia and 
Ausencio raised Cruz to tell the truth and to know right from 
wrong.  He rarely misbehaved or was physically disciplined.  
He enjoyed playing with the many sheepdogs on the ranch and 
running through the fields.  He and Ausencio played together 
and would “come home happy and laughing.”  Cruz enjoyed 
reading throughout his childhood.   
Ausencio Cruz testified that he married Hortencia in 
1961.  Cruz was Ausencio’s only child.  He learned he had a son 
when Cruz was two years old.  When Ausencio returned from 
Mexico, Cruz had a different last name, so Ausencio was 
advised to adopt him.  He was not advised to get an amended 
birth certificate.   
Ausencio and Cruz were very close, and Ausencio 
watched him play Little League Baseball, took him to Oakland 
Athletics’ baseball games and to the movies, and taught him 
how to drive.  Ausencio did not believe Cruz had “anything to 
do with all of that,” apparently referring to the capital crimes, 
and if he did, Ausencio would “love him more.”  If Cruz 
received the death penalty, Ausencio would “feel like dying.”   
Esperanza Hope Castillo Cruz (Hope), Cruz’s half-sister, 
also testified that Hortencia was Cruz’s biological mother and 
Ausencio was his biological father.  When Cruz was born, Hope 
was about 21 years old and a partner in a restaurant.  The 
family ran the restaurant for five or six months from 1961 to 
1962 and during the day kept baby Cruz in a bun drawer.  
After they left the restaurant, the family worked picking fruit 
in Fresno from 1962 to 1964 and slept on a mattress placed 
next to their car.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
Ausencio returned from Mexico and was surprised to 
learn he had a two-year-old son (Cruz).  When Cruz was about 
three years old, the family settled in Oakdale on Sproul’s 
ranch.  They worked on the ranch and it was a “beautiful time” 
for the family.  Sproul loved Cruz and spent significant time 
with him.  In 1970, the family purchased a large trailer to live 
in on the ranch and, in 1976, purchased a house in Oakdale.   
When Cruz was about six months old, Hope dropped him 
and he hit his head on a concrete porch.  He cried, had a bump, 
and was uncomfortable that day.  They could not afford to take 
him to a doctor.  Hope did not observe any lasting effects other 
than that Cruz was not interested in taking a bottle for an 
unspecified period of time.  When Cruz was about four years 
old, he went through a windshield when the car in which he 
was riding stopped suddenly.  He was stunned and weak after 
the accident.  The family thought he was “okay” and did not 
consider the injury serious.   
Hope had seen Jennifer frequently slap A. and once 
throw her outside.  Hope had never seen Cruz mistreat A.   
Hope did not believe Cruz had done “these terrible acts,” 
but even if he had, she would still love him.   
Marlene Hernandez, Cruz’s half-sister, testified she was 
14 years old when Cruz was born.  Hope had been gone for a 
period of time before she came home with baby Cruz, and said 
someone had given her Cruz to care for.  Marlene recalled 
battles between her mother and Hope as to who would care for 
Cruz, and the two women were “screaming at him all the 
time.”  Marlene saw Cruz disciplined with a switch, rope, iron 
cord, and a hanger.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
Marlene left her mother’s home when she was about 
14 years old to live with her father in Los Angeles County, but 
occasionally visited her mother.  When Cruz was about 
14 years old, he visited Marlene.  He was well-mannered and 
did not seem disturbed in any way.  Marlene told him that his 
mother was Hope, and his father was a man named Jim Cox.   
At some point Hortencia’s pet canary was eaten by a cat, 
and Hortencia slit open a cat’s stomach to see if the bird was 
inside.  When Cruz was about 17 years old, Hortencia was 
angry that a neighbor’s dog had wandered into her yard, and 
she cut off its back legs with an axe.   
Marlene loved Cruz but believed the death penalty would 
be fair.   
Hope testified that Ausencio did not know that Hope and 
her siblings were Hortencia’s children; they were referred to as 
her nieces and nephews so that Ausencio would not learn 
Hortencia had previously been married.  Similarly, Armando 
Hernandez, who was Cruz’s half-brother and who was about 
24 years older than Cruz, testified that Hortencia told 
Armando not to call her “Mom” because Ausencio did not know 
she had been previously married.  Ausencio thought that 
Armando was a “friend.”  Marlene similarly testified that in 
1979 or 1981, Hortencia told her not to call her “[M]om” or 
“mother” when Ausencio was around because he believed 
Hortencia was Marlene’s aunt and that Marlene’s mother had 
died.  Marlene was never permitted to discuss her father.   
Sharon Dennis, Cruz’s fourth grade teacher, knew him as 
Gerald Cox and described him as “pretty bright” and a “good 
reader,” but an unambitious student who preferred to engage 
in activities other than schoolwork.  It frustrated Dennis that 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
Cruz did not apply himself.  He was not a troublemaker, and 
she did not recall him as unkempt or dirty.  In testimony from 
an evidentiary hearing that was read into the record, Dennis 
described being told by a school faculty member that Cruz 
lived with his mother and sister but did not know that his 
mother was actually his grandmother and his sister was his 
mother.  The information was not “idle gossip” but given in 
confidence to Dennis to assist her in evaluating any problems 
with Cruz in class or any emotional problems.  She did not 
believe this information was common knowledge, and she 
never heard it discussed by other teachers or children.   
Cruz testified that he first learned that his last name 
might be Cox when he was in the first grade and his teacher 
referred to him by that name.  Until then he had thought his 
last name was Cruz.  Cruz was teased in school about not 
having a father and about his hair and clothes.  In the third or 
fourth grade, he returned to the classroom during recess and 
overhead his teacher and another person “saying . . . it was a 
question . . . who [his] mom was.”  Cruz immediately left.  
Ausencio told Cruz that Hortencia had had a sister who died 
and that all the other children in the home were Hortencia’s 
nieces and nephews.   
Cruz rarely completed a full elementary school year 
because his family traveled and he neglected assignments to be 
performed while he was away from school.  He had no friends 
in elementary school until the fourth grade.   
Cruz believed he had been treated unfairly in elementary 
school.  On one occasion, his teacher left his class unsupervised 
for an extended period of time and then spanked him in front 
of the class because he went to the restroom while she was 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
gone.  On another occasion, he was disciplined for throwing 
sawdust at children who had beaten and bullied him, but the 
other children received no discipline.  On cross-examination, 
Cruz agreed with the prosecutor that it was common for 
children to be teased at school but that in his view he was 
teased excessively.  At some point Cruz was hit in the head 
with a rubber mallet by an acquaintance, and shortly after this 
incident, he took up karate.  Cruz dropped out of high school in 
the tenth grade.   
Cruz’s mother was strict and his parents disciplined him 
by hitting him with objects such as a stick, umbrella, coat 
hanger, or iron cord.  Cruz was of the view that his mother 
raised him properly and that he was not abused.  His parents 
did not socialize, and Cruz was not allowed to date or to have 
girls over to the house.   
Sproul was a father figure and best friend to Cruz, and 
the two spent a significant amount of time together.  Sproul 
expressed disdain for “stool pigeons” or persons who contacted 
the police when they observed a crime or socially unacceptable 
behavior, or who participated in an activity but then blamed 
someone else.   
Cruz asked Beck to make the rack for his daughter A. to 
help her stand and to strengthen her legs.  He did not use large 
Mason jars but baby food jars.  Cruz wanted A. to be strong 
physically, emotionally, and mentally.  He hit her with a fly 
swatter to assist her efforts to crawl.  He denied he ever 
“clapped” her or slapped her.  Jennifer resented the attention 
Cruz gave A.   
Cruz denied ever hitting Vieira and said he hit Perkins 
only when the two “sparred.”  The stun gun was a first aid 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
treatment for snake bites.  He had used the gun on Jennifer 
but “[n]ot the way she says,” and claimed the gun made a 
“wicked sound, . . . but it doesn’t do anything.”   
Cruz felt “bad” that Paris was killed because she had 
been “exploited” and apparently “wasn’t there because she 
wanted to be.”  Cruz also felt bad that Raper was killed, was 
sure that Raper’s relatives loved him, and felt bad that “his 
relatives are suffering.”  Cruz also felt bad because of what he 
and his parents were going through.   
Several witnesses testified to Cruz’s negative experiences 
with Sproul and with medical and law enforcement personnel.  
Hope and Hortencia testified that Sproul had said Cruz would 
inherit some of Sproul’s land when he died.  After Sproul’s 
death, his will could not be located.   
Hope and Hortencia also testified that when Cruz was 
about eight, the family went back into the restaurant business 
in Hughson.  Cruz and other family members worked in the 
restaurant, and it was a happy period for the family.  They 
took business from a pool hall next door, and one night the pool 
hall owners bombed the restaurant.  Police responded an hour 
and a half later.  Cruz’s family fled the restaurant, leaving 
behind all their possessions.  It was a traumatic experience for 
Cruz “because he was so young.”   
Hope once observed a man siphoning gas from her car 
and followed him home.  At some point Cruz, who was about 
17 years old, joined her.  The police came but said they could 
not do anything about it and suggested she make a citizen’s 
arrest.  She did so, and the police handcuffed the man and 
another man hiding in the back of a car.  The second man told 
Hope and Cruz they would be sorry.  Hope filed a complaint, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
but the district attorney said the case was not worth 
prosecuting.  The second man was released the next day and 
threatened Cruz.   
Cruz was close to one of his half-brothers, Fred 
Hernandez, who died from an aneurysm in 1976, after being 
kicked or struck in the head by his wife.  The wife was not 
prosecuted.   
Emanuel Furtado, Jr., met Cruz in the fifth or sixth 
grade.  Furtado and Cruz had a mutual friend, Alan Lutz, who 
was killed when the pickup truck in which he and others were 
riding crashed.  Furtado and Cruz understood that if the 
responding ambulance had been able to locate Lutz in the 
weeds he might have been saved.   
Hartley Bush, a lawyer, initiated a stepparent adoption 
for Ausencio Cruz in about 1972.  He obtained a 1965 divorce 
decree between Hortencia and Hernandez and a 1968 marriage 
certificate for Hortencia and Ausencio.  The adoption 
proceedings were later abandoned.  About this time in 1972, 
Cruz was charged in a juvenile proceeding with spray painting 
an automobile and given probation.   
b. Expert testimony 
Dr. Hugh Ridelhuber, a psychiatrist, interviewed Cruz 
twice, each time for three to four hours.  He also interviewed 
Dennis and Cruz’s sister Hope, reviewed “voluminous records” 
from counsel, spoke to the defense investigator, and performed 
testing on Cruz.   
Dr. Ridelhuber believed that Cruz had a reluctance to 
rely on authoritarian figures to protect his family when he 
perceived they were in danger.  Cruz was unsure who his 
parents were, and that had “a very disturbing effect on him.”  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
He began a search for an identity that “compensated for his not 
knowing and . . . his insecurity.”  Cruz formed an “oddball” 
belief about who he was “that gave him some sort of 
satisfaction of feeling important.”   
Cruz recounted several instances in which he had 
experienced law enforcement or medical personnel not being 
responsive or capable of dealing with the situation, such as 
when his family’s restaurant was bombed, when someone 
siphoned gas out of a car, and when Lutz was not immediately 
discovered after the truck accident.  Cruz told Dr. Ridelhuber 
that he had called the police regarding Raper’s threats and 
that Raper had been arrested and taken in, but was then 
released and continued to harass Cruz.  These circumstances 
“really undermined his trust in authority.”  Cruz also told 
Dr. Ridelhuber he understood Sproul was going to leave the 
ranch to him when Sproul died, and when that did not occur, 
Cruz believed that a “shyster attorney” and other individuals 
“had cheated them out of it” and that the court system did not 
prevent this result.   
In addition, Dr. Ridelhuber testified, teachers and other 
school officials are “part of the authoritarian system that a 
child adjusts to” and “needs to respect.”  Dr. Ridelhuber 
believed it was a “fairly common experience” for children to be 
punished by a teacher when they are in fact the victims.  For a 
child who already has questions about authority, “that would 
be an additional wedge in breaking . . . the sort of needed trust 
that children have in authority.”   
Cruz had great difficulty succeeding in society, so he had 
withdrawn and collected around himself a band of people 
“almost like a Neanderthal clan.”  Dr. Ridelhuber believed the 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
punitive behavior Cruz had inflicted “towards his own clan and 
family . . . [was] consistent with the way he was treated as a 
child growing up.”  Cruz was not a sadist but had a false belief 
that his behavior would make people stronger and that similar 
treatment had made him stronger.   
Cruz’s loss of his half-brother Fred and friend Lutz 
caused him to have a tendency to overreact to protect 
remaining friends and family.  Cruz had also suffered a major 
loss when the identity of his biological parents was called into 
question and when his purported parents did not give him a 
sense of security or a feeling of being valuable and lovable.  As 
a result of his experiences, Cruz would have perceived Raper’s 
behavior as a “mounting kind of catastrophic threat” because 
Raper did not cease his behavior when confronted, because 
Cruz did not perceive “police[] as being able to protect him,” 
and because of Cruz’s own sense of fear or vulnerability.   
Although Cruz had some of the traits of a borderline 
personality and “some characteristics of a paranoid” person, he 
did “not fit clearly into a definable disorder.”  During 
Dr. Ridelhuber’s interview of Cruz, he was “struck by how 
normal he can be.”   
Dr. Ridelhuber had spoken to some of Cruz’s jailers and 
understood that he was a model prisoner.  Dr. Ridelhuber 
opined that Cruz would adapt well to prison because he was 
30 years old and had an IQ of 130 that would allow him to 
manage his affairs when a clear structure was provided.  
Moreover, Cruz was “not a sociopathic or antisocial character,” 
had “no history of violence outside of this crime,” and had no 
“history of rebelling against authority.”  In Dr. Ridelhuber’s 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
view, Cruz could “use the intellect that he has to  . . . learn a 
trade . . . in the prison system and be productive.”   
The parties stipulated that “prison life is very structured 
and authoritarian in nature for a person sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.”   
3. Prosecutor’s case against Beck 
Cynthia S., Jennifer’s younger sister, testified that she 
met Beck in about 1987 when she was 16 years old.  At the 
time, Cruz and Jennifer were living together in Modesto.  From 
1987 to 1989, Cynthia worked with Beck, Vieira, and Perkins 
installing vinyl and hardwood flooring.  Once, when Cynthia 
was working with Perkins, he accidentally cut an orange 
extension cord with an electric saw and received an electric 
shock.  Several months later when Cynthia visited Jennifer’s 
home, she observed Perkins on his hands and knees on the 
floor feverously sanding a gun cabinet.  An orange extension 
cord was also on the floor.  Beck and Cruz were seated to her 
right, and Cruz asked Cynthia to flip on the light switch that 
was adjacent to the door she entered.  When she did so, 
Perkins “started flopping around and screaming in the middle 
of the living room like a fish out of water.”  Cynthia shut off 
the switch.  Beck and Cruz were laughing, and Perkins started 
moaning from the pain.  Cynthia saw that the exposed wires of 
the extension cord were wrapped around Perkins’s toes and 
secured with duct tape, and the other end of the cord was 
plugged into a wall outlet activated by the light switch.  The 
last time Cynthia had seen Perkins’s feet, they were “burnt 
from shock, . . . still very infected, . . . like open wounds.”   
Cruz appeared to be in control of the household, and 
Beck and Perkins did what he requested.  Cynthia frequently 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
witnessed Beck punch and kick Perkins and Vieira after being 
ordered to do so by Cruz; neither Perkins nor Vieira fought 
back.  Cruz once put a rifle in Cynthia’s mouth and threatened 
to pull the trigger because he believed she had stolen one of his 
guns.  Beck was present but did not intercede on her behalf.   
Cynthia lost contact with Beck and Cruz for a time, and 
she reestablished contact about two months before the murders 
when she visited their home at the Camp.  Cruz appeared to 
still have the same control over individuals in the household.   
Steven Perkins (Steven), the father of Perkins, testified 
that in about 1987, when Perkins was about 20 years old, he 
left home to live with Beck and Cruz and Cruz’s family for 
about 17 months.  During this period, his father saw him two 
or three times.  When Perkins left home, he was six feet five 
inches tall and weighed about 370 pounds, and was happy-go-
lucky and outgoing.   
When Perkins came home at the end of September 1989, 
he had lost about 125 pounds since his parents had last seen 
him at Christmas.  His personality had also dramatically 
changed.  He was withdrawn and moody and would not speak 
to anyone or answer the telephone, would not go outside, and 
was intensely claustrophobic.  Perkins refused to discuss what 
happened when he lived with Beck and Cruz.  
A few days after Perkins arrived home, he was 
hospitalized.  There Steven learned Perkins’s feet were 
severely infected, he had shackle marks above his ankles, and 
he had a large bruise covering his chest.  Perkins subsequently 
admitted himself to a psychiatric unit because he was afraid he 
would hurt his parents or others.  Steven observed Perkins had 
begun to have mental lapses, and at the time of Steven’s 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
testimony, Perkins had trouble remembering what day of the 
week or what month it was.   
Perkins testified that the Becks were family friends and 
that he had known David Beck, who was about 10 years older 
than Perkins, since Perkins was about four years old.  Perkins 
had also grown up with Cruz.  Perkins once told Cruz he had 
observed Jennifer and her sister Cynthia engaging in oral sex.  
Apparently in retaliation, Jennifer took Perkins to a house 
where he was repeatedly kicked in his naked groin and 
electrocuted through his legs and toes.  After this attack, 
Perkins tried to kill himself by having a motorcycle accident.  
About a month later, shortly after moving back in with his 
father, he was admitted to the hospital because he had severe 
athlete’s foot and “chest problems,” and learned he had broken 
his ribs, shattered his breast bone, and hurt his spleen in the 
motorcycle accident.  Once he was released, he tried to kill 
himself again by attempting to overdose on prescription 
medication.  He was referred for psychiatric counseling 
because he had hit his head in the accident and was having 
cognitive difficulties.   
Perkins was still friends with Cruz and spoke with him 
on the telephone.  He denied ever being hit, tortured, or 
assaulted with a stun gun by Beck or seeing Beck beat Vieira.   
Jennifer met Beck in 1986 about the same time she met 
Cruz.  In July 1987, Beck, Cruz, and Jennifer shared an 
apartment.  Jennifer had witnessed Beck beat Perkins about 
30 times.  Beck’s beatings of Perkins were sometimes on his 
own and not at the direction of Cruz.  Beck and Cruz used an 
“orange line treatment” against Perkins and Vieira, where they 
would attach an orange extension cord to the toes of one of 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
these individuals and turn on the electricity.  Jennifer had also 
seen Beck use a Scorpion stun gun on Vieira; Vieira would 
jump and yell and try to escape.   
Cruz was the leader of “The Cause,” which was 
“supposed to be the advancement of mankind.”  In Cruz’s 
journal were signatures and fingerprints of individuals, such 
as Beck, who had agreed to be in The Cause.  The Cause 
became “sick, distorted, [and] perverted,” Cruz’s “idea of some 
type of twisted control over people.”  Perkins “was beaten until 
he could hardly move and then he had to go to the hospital.”  
Jennifer denied arranging for Perkins to be beaten and 
electrocuted.  Cruz told Perkins to tell anyone who asked about 
his injuries that he had been in a motorcycle accident.   
Jennifer was beaten by Cruz several times while Beck 
was present.  She did not leave Cruz because she was afraid he 
would kill her.  Beck was devoted to Cruz.  Jennifer never saw 
Cruz beat Beck or put a gun in his mouth.   
Rosemary testified that she met Beck in 1982 and, eight 
months to a year later, began dating him.  About two years 
later, they moved in together, were happy, and frequently 
discussed marriage.  But at some point, Beck told Rosemary he 
had to give her to Cruz because “that was the thing to do.”  
Cruz told her that marrying her was the only way he could 
ever control her and prevent her from leaving.   
Rosemary and Beck eventually lived for six to eight 
months on Claret Court in Modesto with Cruz, Jennifer, their 
infant daughter A., Vieira, and Perkins.  At one point, 
Rosemary’s hand was cut and her bloody fingerprint placed in 
a book “[s]o that you would . . . belong to them.”  “[A]fter you 
did that, they owned you.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
Cruz and Beck were the leaders of the group, but Cruz 
was in charge.  Cruz’s word was “[e]verybody’s law,” he 
declared punishments, and Beck’s role was to administer 
punishment to other members.  Beck might be reprimanded, 
but he was not punished in the same way as “everyone else.”  
In Rosemary’s view, Cruz and his group were members of a 
strange religious cult.  They discussed Satanism and astrology.   
Beck tied filled Gatorade bottles to A.’s ankles when she 
was learning to crawl.  If A. cried, Beck would give her ice-cold 
water until she found it difficult to breathe.   
While living with Beck, Rosemary was subjected to 
physical violence by him.  Once when she tried to leave, Beck 
and Perkins drove after her, threw her into a van face first, 
and took her back to the house.  Beck then kicked her in the 
back as she walked up the stairs.   
Once, because someone lost an envelope containing 
several postage stamps, Rosemary was forced to open her 
mouth in the presence of Beck, Cruz, Vieira, Jennifer, and 
Perkins, and someone placed a loaded rifle in her mouth.  On 
another occasion, Cruz told Rosemary in front of Beck that he 
was going to take Rosemary’s “head off and keep it for a 
trophy.”  Beck seemed to agree with Cruz, but Rosemary noted, 
“not all the time did we tell [Cruz] what . . . we really felt.”  In 
December 1988, Rosemary went to visit her parents for 
Christmas and never returned to Claret Court, leaving behind 
everything she owned.   
4. Beck defense case 
a. Beck’s family and friends 
Several of Beck’s family members and friends testified.  
Beck had grown up in Oakdale.  His mother was strict but 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
caring and was respected in the community.  When Beck was 
about 17 years old, his father was sent to Atascadero State 
Hospital for molesting his two younger sisters.  His parents 
divorced, and his mother married his father’s brother.  They 
were still married at the time of Beck’s penalty phase trial.  
Beck got along well with his stepfather.   
Beck presented evidence that he had regularly attended 
Bethel Assembly of God church in Oakdale.  He sang in the 
choir for at least three or four years, and he was faithful in 
attending church and choir rehearsals.  The choir recorded an 
album, and Beck’s photograph was on the back of the album 
cover.  Beck also played the trumpet at church, participated in 
youth group activities, and his brother Steven observed he 
knew the Bible “from front to back.”  Beck and his close friend 
David John Sondeno had built a six-foot kite together for a 
church outing that featured a cross and the number one to 
symbolize “[t]here’s only one way, and that’s through Christ.”  
Sondeno described Beck as outgoing, pleasant, and generous 
with his time and money even though he came from a family of 
limited resources.   
G.W. Wingo testified that he had been Beck’s wrestling 
coach at Oakdale Union High School for four years.  He saw 
Beck every day for about three months of each year.  Beck was 
a quiet person who did everything that was asked of him, did 
not cause any problems, and “got along well with everybody.”  
Wingo could not have “asked for a better person during the 
wrestling program.”  Wingo had not had contact with Beck 
since he graduated from high school about 20 years before 
Wingo’s testimony.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
In 1978, Beck married a woman named Barbara; they 
had three children.  He and his young family lived in Coalinga 
in a three- or four-bedroom house with a swimming pool.  Beck 
attended oil well drilling school and worked in the oil business.  
He got along well with his coworkers and supervisors, and did 
not miss work.  Beck later worked as a floor installer from 
daylight to dark efficiently performing quality work.  Beck 
continued to attend church, and the preacher at times visited 
Beck’s home.  Beck was easygoing and not violent.   
After the marriage ended, Barbara did not have custody, 
and Beck and his children moved in with his mother and 
stepfather so they could provide child care.  Christy Shulze, 
Beck’s stepsister and former cousin, testified that Beck was 
gentle with his children and took care of them, and they loved 
Beck “very much.”  He was also good at interacting with 
Shulze’s children, and they thought of him like a big brother.  
She had never observed Beck to be violent or mean, or to 
mistreat children.  His half-sister Linda Willis testified that he 
was a “[v]ery concerned and caring father” and his children 
were happy.  He did not physically discipline his children.  
Beck was generous to others, and he once left food and 
Christmas presents for one of Willis’s needy neighbors.   
After Beck’s divorce from Barbara, he began to spend 
time with Cruz and his friends.  Beck spent little time with his 
children or his family, and his sister Angela Morgan testified 
he “just wanted to be with” Cruz.  She agreed with defense 
counsel that he was “the opposite person” and “seem[ed] like 
somebody [she] didn’t know.”  Although she would drive Beck 
home when he lived with Cruz, she was never allowed inside 
their home.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
Beck’s brother Steven agreed with the prosecutor that 
after Beck started associating with Cruz, he “didn’t care about 
anything or about anybody,” and “when you were talking to 
him,” it would “be like talking to a wall.”  At one point Beck 
told Steven, “I’ll take your soul.”  Beck also told Steven he was 
going to kill their sister Debbie apparently over a monetary 
dispute, and Beck also threatened Steven’s infant son.   
Raymond Greer met Beck in church about 18 years 
before his testimony and recalled that Beck had attended 
prayer meetings, carried a Bible with him everywhere, and 
counseled youth group members.  Greer last saw Beck about 
five years earlier during Beck’s divorce.  Beck was not his 
usual “bubbly self,” but rather was disillusioned and did not 
believe God could help him.   
Willis met Cruz on several occasions and described him 
as controlling and manipulative.  Beck would only speak when 
Cruz allowed.  Cruz called himself a high priest and told Willis 
he had powers and could place curses on individuals.  Beck 
appeared to believe Cruz’s claims and began to act like Cruz.  
They spoke to Willis about Satanism and the occult, and at 
some point tried to get Willis to join a Satanic church.  It 
appeared to Willis that Beck’s entire belief system had 
changed.   
About two weeks before the murders, Beck, Cruz, and 
several other men visited Willis.  Beck and the others appeared 
to be controlled by Cruz.  Cruz spoke to Willis in front of the 
others about taking care of or taking out a person named 
Raper, who lived in a trailer park, apparently because he was 
dealing drugs to children in the trailer park.  Willis understood 
this to mean killing Raper.  Cruz said, “I can do anything and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
if I don’t like somebody, I’ll take them out.”  He said that he 
had powers and that “nobody could stop him or get in his way.”  
Willis grew uncomfortable with the discussion and asked them 
to leave.  Everyone left but Beck, who tried to calm Willis by 
saying that “nothing was going to happen and everything was 
going to be all right.”  Beck said that he believed in Cruz and 
that Cruz was Beck’s friend.  Willis told Beck he “better think 
about what he was doing and get away from what was going 
on.”  She said he was headed for trouble and should 
disassociate from Cruz.  Beck said he was “involved, he 
couldn’t get out.”  Willis asked about others who would be 
affected by Beck’s and Cruz’s actions.  Beck said he knew what 
he was doing, and the “only ones who are going to get hurt are 
the ones who deserve it.”   
Willis visited Beck in jail after the murders.  Beck said, 
“Don’t worry.  I’m going to get out of this.”  He said that Cruz 
was “going to make sure” by using contacts on the outside and 
that things were going to happen to people.  Beck appeared to 
feel remorse for the murders because he kept his eyes down 
and would not look at Willis.  When Beck’s brother Steven 
visited Beck in jail after the murders, Beck laughed and said, 
“If I had a chance to do it all over, I would.”   
The parties stipulated that Beck had not been housed in 
the general population in Alameda County and had not been a 
disciplinary problem while incarcerated there.  They further 
stipulated that Beck had been in custody in Stanislaus County 
from May 1990 to February 1992.   
b. Expert witnesses 
Jerry Enomoto, a former Director of the Department of 
Corrections, testified that that he had reviewed Beck’s 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
Stanislaus County custodial records.  After being informed of 
evidence concerning Beck’s lack of custody and court 
disciplinary problems in Alameda County, Enomoto agreed 
with counsel that Beck would be an appropriate candidate for 
housing in the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation system.   
Randy Cerny, president of Central Valley Consultants, 
Inc., a consulting firm that trained law enforcement officers in 
the investigation of ritualistic activity, testified as a cult 
expert.  From 1979 to 1991, he was a Stanislaus County 
Sheriff’s deputy and studied groups that exhibited cult-like 
behavior.   
Cerny defined a cult as group of individuals bound 
together by a philosophy usually espoused by a central leader.  
The leader usually has total control of the group and will use 
various techniques to control the group members.  Cults were 
like gangs, except cults had an underlying religious 
philosophy.  Cults were also much more cohesive and the level 
of control was more important than in a gang.  Members had 
little sense of individuality, lived at the whim of the leader, 
and were subject to various types of mind control techniques 
including torture.  Members generally became mirror images of 
their leader.   
In September 1985, then Deputy Cerny learned of the 
“Cruz Group” from Rosemary.  Cerny had since performed 
additional investigation by reading diaries, court transcripts of 
cases involving the Cruz “situation,” and speaking to law 
enforcement personnel.  In his view, the Cruz Group was a cult 
that continued at the time of Cerny’s testimony.  Cruz was a 
charismatic leader who demanded total allegiance from group 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
members and was very skilled in emotional manipulation.  The 
Camp had the characteristics of a cult compound.   
The diaries Cerny read described ritualistic practices at 
some of the homes in which Beck and Cruz had lived.  They 
also described Perkins’s torture with an orange cord and by 
forced acts of sodomy and bestiality.  Cerny read no accounts of 
Beck being tortured or mistreated; rather, Beck was the one 
who administered punishment at Cruz’s direction.  Cruz was 
the leader, and Beck was “second in command and everybody 
else fell in underneath him.”  Beck was Cruz’s enforcer and 
was controlled by Cruz.   
James Moyers, a psychotherapist who had published an 
article on the religious psychotherapy issues of former 
fundamentalists, testified he had interviewed Beck to assess 
how his religious background might be involved in the case.  
Beck had a Pentecostal background, and members of this 
fundamentalist religious group tended to rely on spiritual 
leaders to determine how to live their lives.  When a 
Pentecostal follower finds he can no longer believe in the 
church’s teachings and breaks from the church, he or she can 
experience “shattered faith syndrome.”  This involves 
confusion, often deep depression, and a sense of emptiness.  
“There also can almost be a compulsive search for something to 
give one’s life meaning and to explain one’s experiences . . . 
some real desperate need to fill up a spiritual vacuum.”   
Moyers opined that Beck had suffered from shattered 
faith 
syndrome. 
 
Beck 
had 
described 
his 
growing 
disillusionment with and departure from the church.  His 
marriage to a woman he had recently met was characteristic of 
someone with the syndrome.  In addition, a few weeks after the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
marriage ended, Beck met Cruz and became “intensely 
involved with him.”  Cruz’s teachings seemed to have provided 
Beck “with an explanation and meaning in his life that he 
really hadn’t felt like he had had before.”   
Shattered faith syndrome was common, and Moyers 
agreed with defense counsel that “most of these people don’t 
run out and kill four people.”  Beck “had the misfortune of 
being in a very vulnerable place and coming across something 
in . . . Cruz that led him to the killings.”  Had the timing been 
different, or if he had come across someone with similar 
teachings that did not lead to a violent episode, “things would 
be far different.”  Beck’s abandonment of his fundamentalist 
background made him “particularly vulnerable to anybody who 
had something that seemed to be true, that seemed to give him 
some direction and meaning. . . . [I]t was unfortunate that it 
happened to be [this] particular person and . . . set of 
teachings.”   
Dr. Lowell Cooper, a clinical psychologist, testified he 
had administered psychological tests to Beck to gather 
descriptive information about his functioning.  These tests 
included the Rorschach inkblot test, the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, the Thematic Apperception test, the Draw-
a-Person test, and the Babcock Story Recall test.  Dr. Cooper 
concluded based on these tests that Beck had an “empty hole in 
him” that consisted of “not having any emotions, not knowing 
where they are, not knowing what they should be.”  Much of 
his functioning was driven by trying to manage this empty 
hole.  Beck was also unusual in the way he thought about 
“what goes on around him” and was “definitely off the mark 
relative to the way most people see these test materials and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
respond to them.”  Dr. Cooper believed Beck would do well or 
would at least appear normal in a structured situation.   
Beck was not violent, as his “feelings of aggression are as 
absent as any other feeling.”  He was “always on the search for 
people who will fill up the emptiness, provide direction, provide 
routine, provide structure.”  His “loyalty is intense to the point 
where he really loses the distinction between himself and the 
other person” because if he loses the other person, “he will be 
thrown . . . back into the emptiness.”  Beck’s “social judgment” 
was “the worst area of his intellectual functioning.”  Dr. Cooper 
agreed with defense counsel that when “Beck looks for 
somebody or something, he’s looking [for] . . . something that 
fulfills spiritual needs, his ideas of betterment for self and 
mankind.”   
On cross-examination, Dr. Cooper testified Beck did not 
suffer from any mental disease, he had found no mental defect, 
and there were no indications of brain damage.  Beck had a 
full-scale IQ of 102.  Beck displayed no remorse about the 
crimes.  Nothing in the evaluation indicated that Beck was in a 
dark hole and “functioning in some absurd manner” on the day 
of the murders.   
Richard Ofshe, a sociology professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley, specialized in issues of influence and 
control.  He had interviewed Beck, read Beck’s diaries and his 
penalty phase testimony, reviewed documents relating to 
Vieira’s prosecution, and interviewed Vieira, his sister, and his 
brother-in-law.  Cruz’s group included “an ideology of belief in 
magic, in the occult, that was to result in benefits to people.”  
In Professor Ofshe’s view, the group was a “high control 
group,” although Cruz’s techniques “were substantially more 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
brutal” than most groups he had studied.  The fact that Beck 
did not need to be tortured in order for Beck to accept orders 
from Cruz “suggests that Mr. Cruz’s control over Mr. Beck was 
at least as great, if not greater,” than for the other group 
members.   
Beck refused to tell Professor Ofshe how the Cruz group 
developed or operated.  Beck said that he had taken an oath 
and that if he broke his oath, “people would be hurt.”  When 
Professor Ofshe told Beck, “[Y]ou’re afraid someone will kill 
your children or your family,” Beck became visibly upset and 
started to cry.  Professor Ofshe subsequently said to Beck, 
“Gerald Cruz is threatening to have your children killed if you 
talk.”  Beck did not affirm or deny the statement.  In Professor 
Ofshe’s view, on the night of the murders, Beck was “under 
very substantial pressure to conform to the directives” of Cruz, 
and he was experiencing duress because “Cruz’s control 
involved . . . a general threat of death, should he not follow . . . 
Cruz’s orders and break with the group.”   
Dr. Daniel Goldstine, a psychologist, interviewed Beck 
for 12 to 15 hours and relied on other information, including 
listening to Cruz testify in his penalty phase and reading the 
diaries of Beck, Cruz, Vieira, Perkins, Jennifer, and Rosemary, 
Beck’s autobiographical sketch, notes from the defense 
investigator, and trial transcripts.   
Beck had no significant history of aggression but “was 
simply a victim of a very despicable cult led by” Cruz.  Beck 
had suffered significant disappointments that made him 
vulnerable, such as moving frequently during his childhood, 
his father’s arrest for molesting his sister[s], the breakup with 
his longtime girlfriend Sheryl for whom he had purchased an 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
engagement ring and whose father was more of a father to 
Beck than his own father, and Barbara’s abuse of his trust and 
the breakup of their marriage.   
In Dr. Goldstine’s view, Cruz made Beck feel like a 
lieutenant when he “was at best like a sergeant.”  In the 
interviews, Beck “simply defend[ed] Mr. Cruz all the time and 
basically stuck with that loyalty.”  “Never once did [Beck] say, 
‘I was a victim myself of Mr. Cruz, I was manipulated.’ ”  
Rather, Beck believed “he was a co-equal partner, that he [had] 
joined in freely.”  Beck denied punishing Vieira or Perkins, or 
that Cruz had been cruel to the group members.  When 
Dr. Goldstine “would confront him with obvious evidence of 
some of the monstrous acts that went on in this group, he 
simply denied it” and was “clearly lying.”  Dr. Goldstine 
believed that Beck was still under Cruz’s control and that Beck 
had lied in his guilt phase testimony.   
Beck was not suffering from any mental illness and had 
no brain damage.  There was no history of head injuries or 
fetal alcohol syndrome.  Dr. Goldstine opined that Beck’s “flat 
affect” and “his guardedness” were “directly attributable to 
being part of this cult and what [had] happened to him.”  In 
Dr. Goldstine’s view, Beck had exhibited remorse.   
5. Prosecutor’s Beck rebuttal 
Jennifer testified that her daughter A. was born in 
July 1988.  Sometime later that year, Beck, Cruz, and Vieira 
placed a tape recorder next to A. in her crib.  As she was falling 
asleep, they snuck up on her and screamed at her.  A. woke up 
and started to scream and cry.  The tape recording of this 
incident was played for the jury.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
Jennifer received numerous threatening phone calls from 
Cruz while he was in jail after the murders.  They stopped just 
before Cruz’s penalty phase when he learned Jennifer would be 
a witness.  Jennifer also received threatening phone calls from 
Perkins.  Jennifer had been afraid of Beck because “he would 
do what [Cruz] told him to do.”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
As to many claims, Beck and Cruz “allege for the first 
time that the error complained of violated their federal 
constitutional rights.  To the extent that in doing so defendants 
have raised only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ on claims 
preserved below, that new aspect of the claims is not forfeited.  
However, ‘[n]o separate constitutional discussion is required, 
or provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily 
leads to rejection of [the] constitutional theory.’ ”  (People v. 
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler).) 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Motion to suppress  
Cruz contends the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress items seized during the May 21, 1990 search of his 
studio apartment located at 4510 Finney Road, No. 7 in Salida.  
(Former § 1538.5.)  He contends the affidavit submitted by 
Detective Deckard to obtain a search warrant failed to 
establish probable cause to search his home.  He further 
contends that even if the affidavit did demonstrate probable 
cause to search the studio, Detective Deckard improperly 
withheld material information from the affidavit that would 
have undercut this showing.  He also contends that 
information obtained before the search warrant was executed 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
— that the suspect “Jason” stayed in one of trailers — vitiated 
probable cause to search the studio.  We conclude there was no 
error.   
a. Factual background 
The murders occurred shortly after midnight on May 21, 
1990.  At 10:19 a.m. that day, Detective Deckard obtained a 
warrant to search the studio apartment and any trailers.  (The 
original search warrant and supporting affidavit were 
apparently destroyed.  The parties rely on a copy of the 
affidavit that was attached to the suppression motion and 
made part of the settled record.)   
Detective Deckard’s supporting affidavit and attached 
statement of probable cause (the affidavit) stated that around 
2:00 a.m. on May 21, he arrived at the quadruple murder 
scene.  Surviving victim Donna Alvarez described her 
assailant, who was holding a handgun, as “a white male adult, 
20 to 25 years of age, 6−0, medium build with brown afro type 
hair.”  Around 3:00 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with 
Kenneth Tumelson outside the victims’ house.  Tumelson said 
that a person he knew as “Jason” was “approximately 21 years 
of age, ha[d] brown afro-type hair,” and frequented the victims’ 
residence.  Jason was “staying in a group of apartments located 
across the street from the Laundromat on Finney Road.”  
Around 4:00 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with Frank Raper, 
Jr. (Frank), the son of victim Franklin Raper.  Frank stated 
that his father had experienced problems with someone named 
“Jason” and had asked to borrow a gun because he “feared for 
his life.”  Jason had set fire to and destroyed Raper’s car about 
a month earlier.  Frank understood that Jason was “supposed 
to be staying in a[n] apartment across from the Laundromat,” 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
and Frank described the residence “as having a large amount 
of camo type material draped in front of the residence” and 
said it was “located in the back or the rear of those . . . 
apartments.”   
The affidavit further recounted that around 5:00 a.m., 
Detective Deckard and other law enforcement officers went to 
4510 Finney Road, No. 7.  It appeared no one was home.  A 
“large camo type of material [was] in front of the residence.”  
Around 5:30 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with Kevin 
Brasuell, who said that someone named “Jerald” lived in No. 7, 
which was the manager’s apartment.  Brasuell said a “white 
male with a brown afro type hair . . . frequents that residence,” 
but Brasuell did not know his name.  Brasuell had seen 
“several people coming and going out of the manager’s 
apartment.”   
At the suppression motion hearing, Detective Deckard 
testified that when he arrived at 4510 Finney Road on May 21, 
he spoke with Brasuell, who lived in front of the studio.  
Brasuell said that a person fitting the suspect’s description 
frequented the studio and the small trailer, and that Gerald 
and his wife lived in the studio.  The studio was a freestanding 
building.  Deckard observed an extension cord running from 
the studio to the small trailer.  A SWAT team officer entered 
the large trailer to see whether any perpetrators were inside.  
The small trailer was not entered apparently because officers 
were able to see all of the interior simply by looking through a 
window.  Before Detective Deckard left to obtain the warrant, 
he was of the view that the two trailers were “part and parcel 
of” the studio.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
Brasuell testified that on May 21, he told Detective 
Deckard that Jason lived or “frequently stayed” in the small 
trailer and “frequently stayed” at the studio.  Detective 
Deckard asked him “who all stayed back there,” which Brasuell 
took to mean the studio and trailers.  The studio and the two 
trailers were “all one unit close together.”  He told Detective 
Deckard that Cruz, Jennifer, Beck, Jason, and Vieira “all lived 
there together.”  Brasuell testified it appeared to him that 
these individuals “all had access to each and every other 
thing.”  Brasuell had several conversations with Detective 
Deckard on May 21 and could not recall when during the day 
he made each particular statement.   
Detective Deckard further testified that when he 
returned with a search warrant, he had information that at 
least four individuals had committed the murders and that 
“Jason” was in a group that frequented the studio and the 
trailers.  Jennifer was standing outside the studio.  Detective 
Deckard asked Jennifer whether LaMarsh lived in the studio 
or in either trailer.  Jennifer said that Jason slept in the small 
trailer.  Detective Deckard at this point came to the view that 
there were separate living accommodations in the trailers or 
that Jason “stay[ed] in the small trailer” while Beck and Vieira 
“stay[ed] in the large trailer.”  After Detective Deckard read 
the warrant to Jennifer, officers searched the studio.   
Jennifer testified that on May 21, 1990, she lived with 
Cruz and her two infants in a studio apartment located at 
4510 Finney Road, No. 7.  There were two trailers on wheels at 
that location.  They did not have separate unit numbers.  The 
small trailer in which LaMarsh lived was about 20 feet away.  
It lacked toilet facilities and obtained electricity from the 
studio through an extension cord.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
56 
The trial court granted the suppression motion, as 
relevant here, as to items seized from the large trailer where 
Beck and Vieira resided.  It denied the motion as to Cruz’s 
studio “only” on the ground of good faith (see United States v. 
Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897), implicitly finding that the search 
warrant was not supported by probable cause.  The court 
stated:  “Of the three pieces of property searched, the actual 
Apartment No. 7 [the studio] has caused the Court the most 
difficulty.  As I previously commented, Mr. Deckard, in the 
Court’s opinion, had probable cause to obtain a search warrant 
for Apartment 7 and he properly did so.  However, by the time 
he returned with the search warrant to search Apartment 7, he 
knew now or by then that it was a separate residential 
accommodation and he knew that Mr. LaMarsh actually lived 
in the small trailer.  However, he also knew that Mr. LaMarsh 
frequented Apartment No. 7 and may in fact have stayed in it 
at times, and he did have a search warrant authorizing its 
search.  Here the court did not say that Mr. Deckard was not 
acting in good faith and reasonably believing that if he had 
returned to the magistrate with the additional information 
that Mr. LaMarsh actually lived in the trailer right next to the 
apartment and connected to that apartment with an extension 
cord, that the magistrate would also have authorized a search 
of the trailer in addition to the apartment rather than just 
substituting the trailer for the apartment.  Thus on the Leon 
good faith doctrine and on that doctrine only, the search of 
Apartment 7 is ruled valid and what is adequately described in 
the search warrant is not suppressed.”   
b. Analysis 
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
57 
express or implied, if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  [Citation.]  We exercise our independent judgment in 
determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . .”  
(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.)   
Here, it appears that the trial court implicitly found as to 
the studio that although the search warrant was supported by 
probable cause when it was issued, Detective Deckard’s 
subsequent discovery that LaMarsh actually lived in the 
smaller trailer vitiated that probable cause.  We reach a 
different conclusion.   
In determining whether a search warrant is supported by 
probable 
cause, 
we 
consider 
“whether, 
given 
all 
the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”  (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 
213, 238; People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 601.)  
“ ‘[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.’ ”  (Maryland v. 
Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87.)   
We agree with the trial court that the search warrant 
affidavit, which referred to an individual matching the 
description of one of the murder suspects living in the same 
residential area as the studio and “frequent[ing]” the studio, 
set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate a fair probability that 
evidence of the murders would be found in the studio.  (See 
Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238; People v. Farley 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1099−1100.)  Detective Deckard’s 
subsequently acquired information that LaMarsh actually 
lived in the small trailer while frequenting and at times 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
58 
staying in the studio does not vitiate the fair probability that 
evidence of the murders would be found in the place LaMarsh 
frequented, i.e., the studio.  There was also evidence that the 
small trailer was dependent on the studio for electricity; it was 
so small as to be able to be thoroughly visually inspected for 
suspects from a window, and it was “part and parcel of” the 
studio.   
To the extent Cruz’s claim that the affidavit’s reference 
to firearms, blood spatters and clothing tending to establish 
the identity of the perpetrator, documents or videotapes of the 
victim or others tending to show motive, and documents 
identifying who controlled the premises failed to describe 
evidence relating to the four murders and thus establish 
probable cause, is preserved, we reject it.  Cruz does not claim 
the warrant lacked particularity in its description of the items 
sought, and given that Alvarez had described her assailant as 
displaying a firearm and there were four slain victims, these 
items related to the circumstances surrounding the murders.  
Moreover, it was “necessary to establish” who had “control over 
any evidence seized.”  (Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 370.)  
Cruz contends the warrant was invalid because Deckard 
omitted material information from his affidavit, rendering it 
deliberately or recklessly false and misleading.  (Franks v. 
Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155–156, 171–172.)  A “warrant 
is presumed valid,” and a “defendant claiming that the 
warrant or supporting affidavit is inaccurate or incomplete 
bears the burden of alleging and then proving the errors or 
omissions.”  (People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 393.)   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
59 
“This court has applied the rule in Franks to deliberate 
omissions of material facts from an affidavit for a search 
warrant. . . .”  (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 409 
(Sandoval).)  At the same time, we have recognized “that a 
claim that material facts were omitted from an affidavit differs 
from a claim that the affidavit contains falsehoods:  ‘Though 
similar for many purposes, omissions and misstatements 
analytically are distinct in important ways.  Every falsehood 
makes an affidavit inaccurate, but not all omissions do so.  An 
affidavit need not disclose every imaginable fact however 
irrelevant’. . . . ‘[A]n affiant’s duty of disclosure extends only to 
“material” or “relevant” adverse facts.’  [Citation.]  ‘[F]acts are 
“material” and hence must be disclosed if their omission would 
make the affidavit substantially misleading.  On review under 
section 1538.5, facts must be deemed material for this purpose 
if, because of their inherent probative force, there is a 
substantial possibility they would have altered a reasonable 
magistrate’s probable cause determination.’ ”  (Sandoval, at 
pp. 409–410.) 
Cruz contends Detective Deckard should have included 
information in his affidavit that the trailers were used as 
residences and that Cruz, Jennifer, and their two infants lived 
in the studio.  We have concluded that the search warrant 
affidavit set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate a fair 
probability that evidence of the murders would be found in the 
studio.  Information that the trailers were also used as 
residences would not lessen that probability.  Thus, the 
affidavit was not substantially misleading in this respect.   
As for the number of studio occupants, although Deckard 
testified that Brasuell told him that “Jerald” and his wife lived 
in the studio, his affidavit stated that he spoke to Brasuell, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
60 
who said that someone named “Jerald” lived in the studio.  
Cruz fails to demonstrate how omitting mention of “Jerald’s” 
wife in the affidavit constituted a “deliberate falsehood” or 
“reckless disregard for the truth.”  (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 
438 U.S. at p. 171.)  Nor is it clear that Detective Deckard 
knew that the couple’s two infants also lived in the studio 
before the warrant was issued or how such a circumstance 
“ ‘would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause 
determination.’ ”  (Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)  Cruz 
fails to persuasively demonstrate that these omissions from 
Detective Deckard’s affidavit rendered the search warrant 
invalid.   
Cruz also challenges the execution of the warrant, 
relying on Maryland v. Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. 79.  In 
Garrison, an officer obtained a warrant to search the third 
floor apartment of a suspect named McWebb; the officer 
reasonably believed McWebb’s apartment was the only one on 
the third floor.  (Id. at p. 81.)  When officers arrived, they 
encountered McWebb, who used his key to give the officers 
access to the third floor vestibule.  There, the officers 
encountered the defendant, Garrison, and saw two open doors.  
They entered one of the doors and observed heroin, cash, and 
drug paraphernalia.  At that point, the officers realized there 
were two apartments on the third floor and that they had 
entered Garrison’s, not McWebb’s.  The officers immediately 
discontinued the search of Garrison’s apartment.  (Ibid.)  The 
high court concluded that execution of the warrant in 
Garrison’s apartment was objectively reasonable based on the 
information available to the officers.  (Id. at pp. 88−89.)   
Cruz contends that here, unlike in Garrison, Detective 
Deckard wrongly executed the search warrant and searched 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
61 
the studio after learning from Jennifer that LaMarsh did not 
live there, and that Cruz and Jennifer lived there with two 
children.  In fact, Detective Deckard’s affidavit stated that 
“Jerald” lived in the studio and Jason “frequent[ed]” the studio.  
Deckard’s interview of Jennifer merely confirmed those 
circumstances, and the presence of two infants would not 
reasonably have led Detective Deckard to believe Jason did not 
frequent the studio.   
In sum, we conclude Cruz’s suppression motion was 
properly denied. 
2. Severance  
Beck and Cruz contend the trial court erred in denying 
their severance motions.  There was no error.  
a.  Factual background 
Before trial, Beck moved for severance on the ground 
that items seized from his trailer had been suppressed as to 
him, but each of his codefendants planned to introduce the 
evidence in their defense.  Cruz moved for severance on the 
grounds that certain evidence had been suppressed as to some 
defendants but not others, that some of the defendants had 
made statements that would be damaging to other defendants, 
and that he was entitled to a separate penalty phase from the 
other defendants.  At the hearing, Cruz asserted severance was 
also warranted because the defendants would present 
inconsistent defenses.   
As to Beck’s motion, at the severance motion hearing, the 
prosecutor said he would not introduce at trial any evidence 
found in Beck’s trailer or Willey’s home that was later 
suppressed.  The trial court stated that the purpose behind the 
exclusionary rule was to prevent police misconduct and ordered 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
62 
the prosecutor not to use the evidence found in Beck’s trailer at 
trial.  It further stated that the other defendants were not 
precluded from using this evidence, and defense counsel would 
have a “full and through opportunity to cross-examine any of 
the witnesses” presenting that evidence.  On that basis, it 
denied Beck’s severance motion.   
As to Cruz’s motion, Detective Deckard testified that 
none of the defendants had implicated any other defendant in 
his statements to law enforcement.  LaMarsh had made 
incriminating statements to his friend Karen Spratling but 
had not incriminated any other defendant.  The prosecutor 
said it appeared Spratling was not “going to be able to testify.”   
The trial court denied Cruz’s severance motion.  It said it 
was aware of no authority holding that defendants were 
entitled to separate trials simply because there were 
inconsistent defenses.  Although the court was concerned about 
LaMarsh’s statement to Evans that Cruz had “helped him beat 
Raper,” it found that this statement, in light of other 
statements by LaMarsh made in Cruz’s presence, did not 
warrant severance.  The court incorporated that portion of its 
ruling on Beck’s severance motion stating that defendants 
were not precluded from using evidence suppressed as to some 
but not all defendants, and that defense counsel would have a 
“full and through opportunity to cross-examine any of the 
witnesses” presenting that evidence.  It also ruled there would 
be separate and sequential penalty phases for each defendant, 
with Cruz going first, then Beck, LaMarsh, and Willey.   
Beck unsuccessfully filed a motion to reconsider the 
denial of his severance motion and the order of the penalty 
trials and a writ challenging that denial.  At the end of trial, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
63 
the court instructed the jury, “You must decide separately 
whether each of the defendants is guilty or not guilty.”   
b. Analysis 
Section 1098 states in relevant part:  “When two or more 
defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, 
whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, 
unless the court order [sic] separate trials.”  This provision 
indicates the Legislature’s “strong preference for joint trials.”  
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 455 (Winbush).)  
“Joint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system’ ” 
because they “promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of 
justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent 
verdicts.’ ”  (Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 537.)  
“Joint proceedings are not only permissible but are often 
preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises 
out of a single chain of events.  Joint trial may enable a jury ‘to 
arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or 
innocence of a particular defendant. . . .’ ”  (Kansas v. Carr 
(2016) 577 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 633, 645]; see People v. 
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 819 (Daveggio 
and Michaud).)  We have found persuasive the high court’s 
statement that when defendants are properly joined, severance 
should be granted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint 
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the 
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 
judgment about guilt or innocence.”  (Zafiro v. United States, at 
p. 539 [addressing severance under Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 
rule 14]; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 452 
(Lewis).)   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
64 
“We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for 
abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the 
time the court ruled on the motion.”  (People v. Avila (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 491, 575.)  As can be seen, the concerns raised by 
Beck and Cruz in their severance motions were ameliorated by 
the prosecutor’s representations and the trial court’s rulings.  
None of the four defendants had implicated any other 
defendant in his statement to police; the prosecutor was 
precluded from introducing against any defendant evidence 
suppressed as to some defendants; the prosecutor said 
Spratling was unable to testify; and the defendants were 
granted separate penalty phases.   
Cruz contends that the trial court made a blanket 
rejection of the argument that inconsistent defenses warranted 
severance without considering the potential prejudice in this 
case.  But throughout the motion hearing the court actively 
sought to clarify what evidence was expected to be introduced 
and noted in its ruling that although it was concerned about a 
statement LaMarsh had made to Evans about Cruz, that 
statement alone did not warrant severance given other 
statements LaMarsh had made in Cruz’s presence.  
Cruz further contends that the trial court ignored 
relevant information “crucial to an informed evaluation” of the 
potential “undue prejudice from a joint trial.”  In particular, he 
contends LaMarsh offered to provide “specific information 
about documents and evidence regarding prior acts of 
LaMarsh’s codefendants which he intended to introduce” and 
that he anticipated would elicit vigorous objection from the 
codefendants, but the trial court “failed to hold the requested 
in camera hearing, without comment.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
65 
In the colloquy to which Cruz refers, however, it appears 
LaMarsh was discussing evidence he intended to introduce at 
the penalty phase, not at the guilt phase.  LaMarsh stated, 
“[E]ven though the guilt phase is not severed, the Court 
[should] seriously consider a separate penalty phase” because 
of prior acts evidence LaMarsh would seek to introduce and to 
which his codefendants would “object vigorously.”  Because the 
court then ordered separate penalty trials for each defendant, 
the court had no need to hold an in camera hearing to evaluate 
the evidence of any codefendant’s prior acts that LaMarsh 
would seek to introduce at the penalty phase. 
“[E]ven if a trial court acted within its discretion in 
denying severance, ‘ “the reviewing court may nevertheless 
reverse  a conviction where, because of the consolidation, a 
gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial or due process of law.” ’ ”  (People v. Thompson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1079 (Thompson).)  “Defendants bear 
the burden of establishing that the trial was grossly unfair and 
denied them due process of law, and ‘a judgment will be 
reversed on this ground only if it is “reasonably probable that 
the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its verdict of 
guilt.” ’ ”  (Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 821.)  
Beck and Cruz contend that such gross unfairness arose here 
because “the four defendants presented differing defenses.”   
“Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per 
se.”  (Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 538.)  
Although Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey “each may have 
sought to cast blame on [each] other, it was undisputed that 
[all] had been involved in some manner” in the murders.  
(Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 820.)  “The only 
material inconsistency concerned the degree to which each 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
66 
participated in the murderous acts.”  (Winbush, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 457.) “Moreover, when there is sufficient 
independent evidence of the defendants’ guilt, the actual 
presentation of conflicting defenses at trial does not reduce the 
prosecution’s burden or otherwise result in gross unfairness.”  
(Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 380.)   
Here there was sufficient evidence of Beck’s and Cruz’s 
guilt for the charged crimes that was independent of their 
codefendants’ testimony.  Shortly before the May 1990 
murders, Cruz, accompanied by Beck, purchased the police 
baton that, according to a stipulation by Cruz and the 
prosecutor, was found near the crime scene.  Also, on 
February 27, 1990, a store clerk had shown Cruz camouflage 
masks similar to one found at the crime scene.  A receipt for 
four masks purchased on that date was found in Cruz’s home 
after the murder, but no masks were found during that search.  
Beck and Cruz testified at trial that on the night of the 
murders they traveled to 5223 Elm Street with Evans, 
LaMarsh and Vieira, and went into the home.  Evans testified 
Beck and Cruz had participated in the planning and 
commission of the murders, and that when they returned to 
the car, Beck was covered in blood and carrying a bloody knife, 
and Cruz had blood on his hands.  Cruz was identified by a 
witness as one of the assailants who attacked Ritchey.  Shortly 
after the murders, Beck told acquaintance Wallace that “we” or 
“I” “slit some throats.”  The jury could reasonably infer Beck 
was referring to the murder of the victims in this case, the 
throats of three of whom were slit and the fourth stabbed.  
Rosemary testified that Beck visited her on the evening of 
May 21, 1990.  When the prosecutor asked whether Beck had 
mentioned doing anything to the people who were killed, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
Rosemary testified that Beck said, “[T]hey had to do them,” 
and that he had purchased new shoes because his were covered 
in blood and he could not get them clean.   
Cruz contends that severance was compelled because the 
evidence of conspiracy was weak and provided only by Evans; 
hence, in his view, it is reasonably probable a different verdict 
would have resulted absent “the antagonistic tactics of 
LaMarsh and Willey.”  We conclude more fully below, in 
rejecting Beck’s claim, joined by Cruz, that no substantial 
evidence supports his conspiracy conviction, that even aside 
from Evans’s testimony, there was substantial evidence of a 
conspiracy.  (See post, pt. II.B.1.a.)   
Cruz further contends that evidence that he, Beck, and 
Vieira were a “close-knit group and secretive” had no probative 
value against him, and therefore the guilty verdicts for Cruz 
and Beck and hung jury for LaMarsh and Willey must have 
resulted from LaMarsh’s and Willey’s “prejudicial and 
inflammatory character evidence.”  But evidence that Cruz, 
Beck, and Vieira were close and secretive was relevant to the 
prosecutor’s theory that the three had conspired with LaMarsh 
and Willey to commit murder.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 1060, 1135 (Rodrigues) [“ ‘The existence of a 
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, 
interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and 
during the alleged conspiracy.’ ”].)  We also reject below Cruz’s 
claim that evidence of the relationship between Cruz, Beck, 
and Vieira was prejudicial character evidence.  (See post, 
pt. II.B.2.)   
Cruz asserts that LaMarsh and Willey acted as 
additional prosecutors because “[t]heir testimony, and the 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
68 
evidence they presented through other witnesses, clearly 
constituted far more evidence of [Cruz’s] guilt than anything 
the prosecution presented or would have been able to present 
at a separate trial.”  Beck makes a similar argument but 
identifies 
Cruz, 
LaMarsh, 
and 
Willey 
as 
additional 
prosecutors.   
Specifically, Cruz contends that LaMarsh’s claim that 
Cruz, not LaMarsh, “committed the fatal assault on Raper,” 
LaMarsh’s defense expert’s opinion that a baton rather than a 
bat had caused Raper’s wounds, and Rosemary’s emotional 
testimony against Cruz would not have occurred in a separate 
trial, thus avoiding prejudicial character evidence against 
Cruz.  But evidence regarding the instrument likely used to 
inflict Raper’s wound would have been admissible in a separate 
trial, and the trial court sustained objections to questions by 
LaMarsh asking Rosemary if she was afraid of Cruz.  Nor is it 
obvious how LaMarsh’s assignment of blame was unduly 
prejudicial.  Beck similarly contends that evidence regarding 
the “cult-like” nature of the group was introduced by his 
codefendants and could not have been admitted in a separate 
trial, but the trial court sustained objections to testimony 
about cults, white supremacy, and the occult.  Nor was 
LaMarsh’s single statement that Beck, Cruz, and Vieira 
appeared to be a “survivalist” group so grossly prejudicial that 
severance was required.  Moreover, as discussed below in 
rejecting Cruz’s character evidence claim, evidence that Beck 
possessed firearms was not unduly prejudicial since none of the 
firearms was illegal or used to shoot any victim.   
Beck also contends that a Ka-Bar knife box from his 
trailer that had been suppressed was introduced by LaMarsh.  
During LaMarsh’s cross-examination of Beck, Beck denied 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
69 
having seen a Ka-Bar knife box on May 20, 1990.  After 
marking a box as an exhibit, counsel asked why the box had 
been found in Beck’s trailer, and Beck’s foundation objection 
was sustained.  Beck was then asked whether any police officer 
had asked him about “any Ka-Bar box that was found in your 
trailer after May 20, 1990,” and Beck said “Yes.”  Even 
assuming this evidence was improperly introduced, it was not 
prejudicial in light of other evidence of Beck’s guilt and did not 
render the joint trial grossly unfair.  (Ante, at pp. 67–68.)   
Beck further contends that he was prejudiced by the 
denial of his severance motion when considered with the order 
of the separate penalty trials.  In particular, he asserts that 
the prosecutor “exploited the jury’s knowledge of the Cruz 
evidence during Beck’s penalty trial by calling many of the 
same witnesses to testify that Beck was present or had 
knowledge of Cruz’s bad acts.”   
In Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 633], the 
high court rejected a similar claim.  Carr involved two 
defendants who were brothers.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 637].)  The older brother claimed he was prejudiced at their 
joint penalty trial “by his brother’s portrayal of him as the 
corrupting older brother,” and by his brother’s cross-
examination of their sister, who equivocated about whether the 
older brother had admitted to her he was the shooter.  (Id. at 
p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].)  The younger brother claimed that 
“he was prejudiced by evidence associating him with his 
dangerous older brother, which caused the jury to perceive him 
as an incurable sociopath,” and by the jury’s observation of his 
older brother in handcuffs.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644]; 
see id. at p. __, fn. 4 [136 S.Ct. at p. 644, fn. 4].)   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
70 
The high court held that joint capital sentencing 
proceedings do not violate the Eighth Amendment right to an 
individualized sentencing determination.  (Kansas v. Carr, 
supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].)  Although the 
due process clause protects defendants against unduly 
prejudicial evidence that would render a trial fundamentally 
unfair, that standard was not met by the “mere admission of 
evidence that might not otherwise have been admitted in a 
severed proceeding.”  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 645]; see id. 
at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].)  The high court observed that the 
trial court had instructed the jury that it must give “ ‘separate 
consideration to each defendant’ ” and that evidence admitted 
as to one defendant should not be considered as to the other 
defendant.  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 645].)  The high court 
presumed that the jury followed these instructions, while 
observing such limiting instructions “ ‘often will suffice to cure 
any risk of prejudice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the high court 
concluded that the penalty verdicts were not a result of the 
challenged penalty evidence against one brother or the other, 
but of the guilt phase evidence of “acts of almost inconceivable 
cruelty and depravity.”  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 646.].)   
Likewise here, the court instructed the jury that it must 
“[d]isregard any . . . evidence that you heard during Mr. Cruz’s 
penalty phase” and “determine what the facts are from the 
evidence received during the guilt phase of the trial and this 
penalty phase.”  We presume it followed this instruction.  
Moreover, no evidence of Beck’s unadjudicated criminal acts 
was introduced at Cruz’s penalty trial.  Thus, as in Carr, the 
Beck penalty verdict was not based on “guilt by association” 
with Cruz, as Beck contends, but on penalty evidence that 
Beck had tortured Perkins, physically assaulted Vieira and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
71 
Rosemary, and physically abused Cruz’s infant daughter, and 
on the guilt phase evidence that Beck had participated in 
planning and committing four murders.   
3. Reopening of jury selection  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends that the trial court erred 
in finding there was good cause to reopen jury selection to 
allow the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge 
against Prospective Juror M.L.  We reject the claim. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 226, subdivision (a) 
provides:  “A challenge to an individual juror may only be 
made before the jury is sworn.”  “Subdivision (d) of [Code of 
Civil Procedure] section 231 then explains:  ‘Peremptory 
challenges shall be taken or passed by the sides alternately, 
commencing with the plaintiff or people; and each party shall 
be entitled to have the panel full before exercising any 
peremptory challenge.  When each side passes consecutively, 
the jury shall then be sworn, unless the court, for good cause, 
shall otherwise order.’ ”  (People v. Cottle (2006) 39 Cal.4th 246, 
255, italics omitted.)  After the parties have passed on the jury 
but before the jury is sworn, the trial court may reopen jury 
selection and allow a peremptory challenge to be exercised if 
good cause is shown.  (Id. at p. 256 [“ ‘[T]he jury is sworn’ when 
those 12 trial jurors have been sworn.”].)   
When Prospective Juror M.L. was asked on his juror 
questionnaire if his “religious views [would] in any way affect 
[his] service as a juror,” and whether “[f]or religious or any 
other reason, do you feel you cannot sit in judgment on the 
conduct of a fellow human being,” he responded “No” to each 
question but commented, “I’m not sure in certain cases.”  When 
asked his “general feelings regarding the death penalty,” M.L. 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
answered, “Undecided.”  When asked which “entry . . . best 
describes your feeling about the death penalty,” he chose “[w]ill 
consider” the death penalty.  He was “[n]ot sure” how he would 
vote if the issue of whether California should have a death 
penalty law were on the ballot.  When asked, “Under what 
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is 
appropriate,” he answered, “On extreme cases, when the public 
is or will be endangered and the criminal is beyond reform.”  In 
response to the question, “Could you set aside your own 
personal feelings regarding what you think the law should be 
regarding the death penalty, and follow the law as the Court 
instructs you,” he replied, “Yes.”   
On voir dire, the trial court observed Prospective 
Juror M.L. had answered he was “[u]ndecided” about the death 
penalty and asked if he had heard anything in court that 
allowed him to further describe his feelings.  M.L. replied 
“Yes,” explaining:  “Your explanation of the law.  I would have 
to follow the law.”  The court asked, “Are you satisfied that you 
could follow the law regarding the death penalty as I’ve 
explained it to you?”  M.L. answered, “Yes.”  M.L. answered 
“No” when asked if he had “feelings about the death penalty 
which are so strong that [he] would never impose the death 
penalty in any case whatsoever,” or “feelings about the death 
penalty which [he] believe[d] would substantially interfere 
with [his] ability to function as a juror in this case.”  When 
asked if he had “any thoughts about [when] the death 
penalty . . . should be imposed,” he replied, “I believe it should 
be applied to some cases.”  The court asked, “Do you have any 
preconceived ideas as to what cases it should be applied to?”  
M.L. replied, “No, I don’t.”  M.L. was passed for cause by all 
parties.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
73 
The following day, after both sides had passed the jury 
and the trial court was preparing to have the jury sworn, the 
court inquired of the prospective jurors:  “Ladies and 
gentlemen, do any of you feel there is any reason that you 
could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case?  If so, 
please raise your hand.  I see no one raising their hand.”  The 
court also inquired, “Are there any rules of law that I 
explained that you could not follow?  I see no affirmative 
responses.  Ladies and gentlemen, please stand and be sworn 
as the jurors of this case.”  As the clerk began to swear the 
jury, she observed Prospective Juror M.L. had raised his hand.  
Outside the presence of the other prospective jurors, 
Prospective Juror M.L. told the court and counsel:  “I am not 
really certain about the death penalty, sir, whether I can 
render [the] death penalty as a judgment.  I would rather 
choose life in prison for the convicted person.  I am not sure 
because of religio[us] reasons and other reasons that . . . I can 
render [the] death penalty.  I believe that a man [who] has 
done something wrong, that he should be punished.  I just am 
not absolutely certain right now, due to religious reasons, that 
I’m doing the right thing if I have to decide on the death 
penalty.”  After the court conferred with counsel about what 
questions to ask, Beck and Cruz then changed their position 
and unsuccessfully objected to any questioning.  The court 
asked M.L., “[A]s you sit here right this minute, do you know 
for a fact that you could vote for the death penalty if you felt it 
was appropriate?”  M.L. replied he could do so in “one case,” 
explaining, “[i]f the persons are repeat offenders or the [c]ourt 
can prove that they will kill again.”  When the court asked if 
M.L. had “feelings about the death penalty which are so strong 
that [he] would never impose the death penalty in any case 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
whatever,” he replied, “No, sir.”  The court asked whether M.L. 
had “feelings about the death penalty which [he] believe[d] 
would substantially interfere with [his] ability to function as a 
juror in this case?”  M.L. responded, “I’m not sure whether that 
is substantial to your point of view or to the other people’s 
point of view[,] but as I have stated . . . when I first answered 
my questionnaire, I am really not sure about the death penalty 
in the sentencing of a person to death.  I know I can go through 
Phase 1 and find the person — you know, whether he’s guilty 
or not.  I’m just not absolutely sure whether I’m doing the right 
thing if I have to sentence a person to death.”  Beck and Cruz 
objected to any further questioning of M.L.  The court 
nonetheless continued, subsequently asking M.L., “[H]ave your 
feelings about the death penalty changed in any manner since 
you answered the questions yesterday?”  M.L. replied, “Sir, 
since you mentioned last week that this is a case regarding 
[the] death penalty, I have been asking myself . . . how to judge 
the case or what to do in case I get selected.  To this point I’m 
not one hundred percent sure whether . . . I can do it or 
not . . . .  [I]f I get selected as a juror, I don’t want to be the last 
person to say or to be the only different person.”  After further 
colloquy, the court explained that M.L. was not “to concern 
[him]self . . . in any manner” with the possibility of a hung 
jury, noting, “That’s allowed by the law, and it certainly 
happens.  Do you understand that?”  M.L. replied, “Yes, sir.  
And I just have this feeling inside that if it comes to the death 
penalty, it may end up that way, sir.”  The court asked, “Do 
you know whether it will end up that way?”  M.L. replied, “No 
sir.”   
The prosecutor moved to reopen jury selection to exercise 
a peremptory challenge on the grounds that Prospective 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
75 
Juror M.L.’s comments that day indicated “he would not follow 
the law and would only be able to impose the capital penalty in 
one limited situation.”  Beck and Cruz opposed the motion, and 
Beck asked the court to swear the jury.  The trial court initially 
denied the prosecutor’s request to reopen jury selection, but it 
delayed having the jury sworn to allow the prosecutor time to 
file a writ challenging the ruling.  The prosecutor instead filed 
a motion for reconsideration, and the court ultimately granted 
the motion to reopen jury selection, ruling that although M.L. 
was not subject to a challenge for cause, “[i]n the instant case 
there were new facts, [M.L.’s] return to his questionnaire state 
of mind. . . .  The Court finds that [M.L.’s] volunteered 
comments to the Court, along with his subsequent answers to 
questions put to him, establish the good cause for the district 
attorney to reopen to exercise peremptory challenges.”  The 
prosecutor subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge 
against M.L.   
When originally questioned on voir dire, Prospective 
Juror M.L. expressed no hesitation about setting aside his 
feelings about the death penalty and applying the law as he 
was instructed by the court and stated he had no preconceived 
idea of the cases in which the death penalty would be 
appropriate.  But the following day, M.L. so questioned his 
ability to impose the death penalty he believed it possible he 
would be the cause for a hung jury.  He was now of the view 
that he could only impose the death penalty in “one case,” 
which would be “if the persons are repeat offenders or the 
[c]ourt can prove that they will kill again.”  Under these 
circumstances the trial court properly found good cause and 
acted well within its discretion in reopening jury selection.  
(See People v. DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 503−504 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
76 
[the trial court properly found good cause to reopen jury 
selection when before the jury was sworn a juror “concluded it 
would be difficult for him to serve on the jury because it would 
require him to stay up all day and night for several days in a 
row”].)  Contrary to Beck’s assertion in his reply, nothing in 
Code of Civil Procedure former section 231, subdivision (d), 
required the trial court to immediately have the jury sworn 
once the court initially denied the motion to reopen jury 
selection.  Rather, the court had authority to stay its ruling 
and allow the prosecutor time to file a writ or, as the 
prosecutor actually filed, a motion for reconsideration.   
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
reopening jury selection and allowing the prosecutor to 
exercise a peremptory challenge.   
4. Excusals for cause  
a. Prospective Juror D.D.  
Beck and Cruz contend that the trial court wrongfully 
excused Prospective Juror D.D. for cause based on her death 
penalty views.  We reject the claim.   
1. Factual background 
Prospective Juror D.D.’s juror questionnaire was lost 
after trial, but the court recounted without objection or 
correction by counsel many of her written responses in its 
ruling on the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.   
At voir dire, the trial court explained the general factual 
circumstances of the murders to the prospective jurors.  It also 
described the guilt and penalty phases, defined mitigating and 
aggravating evidence, and explained “only if the jury decides 
the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
77 
the mitigating factors that death is warranted, can the jury 
impose the death penalty.”   
At voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror D.D., 
“What are your feelings about the death penalty?”  D.D. 
responded, “I am against the death penalty.”  The court asked, 
“If called upon as a juror in this case or if you are selected as a 
juror in this case and the jury got to the place where the 
penalty was to be decided, and that if after hearing all the law 
and the evidence you felt that the death penalty was the 
appropriate disposition, would you be able to vote for it?”  She 
replied, “If I felt it was appropriate, yes.  I guess the thing is 
whether or not I would believe it was appropriate.”  The court 
asked, “Do you believe there are any circumstances, any types 
of murders, where the death penalty could be appropriate?”  
D.D. replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I think that somebody such as 
someone like Jeffrey Dahmer, if the death penalty had been 
appropriate in his case, I may be able to go with the death 
penalty.  Severe human crimes, mass murders of numbers, lots 
of different people, and other, I guess, heinous circumstances 
involved would lead me to impose the death penalty; but it 
would have to be something very extreme and very severe.  
Otherwise, I really am not — I do not believe that the death 
penalty serves any purpose.”  The court asked, “Are your 
feelings about the death penalty so strong that you would 
never vote for first degree murder?”  D.D. replied, “No.”  The 
court asked, “Are your feelings about the death penalty so 
strong that you would never find a special circumstance to be 
true?”  D.D. replied, “Possibly.”  The court asked, “Are your 
feelings about the death penalty so strong that you would 
never impose a death penalty in any case whatsoever?”  D.D. 
replied, “No.”   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
78 
The trial court asked, “Do you believe your feelings about 
the death penalty are so strong that they would substantially 
interfere with your ability to function as a juror in this case?”  
Prospective Juror D.D. replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I would be 
fine during the guilt phase of the proceeding; but once we got 
to the penalty phase, I’m sure that it would . . . take a lot — it 
would take really a serious leap of some sort — and I’m not 
sure I’d be able to make it — to impose the death penalty.”  
The court asked if D.D. understood that she would have to 
choose a sentence of life imprisonment if “the mitigating 
factors outweighed the aggravating factors” or if the factors 
“were essentially equal,” and D.D. replied that she did.  The 
court then asked, “Do you understand that if the aggravating 
factors were so bad in comparison with the mitigating factors 
that death was warranted, that you could impose the death 
penalty?”  She replied, “I understand.”  The trial court asked, 
“If . . . the only evidence presented in the penalty phase were 
aggravating factors, bad things about the defendants, and they 
were very bad, would you be able to vote for the death 
penalty?”  D.D. replied:  “Well, when you say very bad, it would 
have to be very bad.  I mean, it’s a qualitative statement.  
What is very bad?  You know, what’s very bad to me is 
probably different from 
what’s very bad to someone 
else . . .  [W]e may have the same feelings about what is very 
bad, but I would still believe it was not right to have a part in 
the death of someone else in this manner.”  The court asked, 
“Is your belief such that you do not believe that you have the 
right to take part in a decision which would deprive a person of 
his life?”  D.D. replied, “Yes.”  The court asked, “Do you believe 
that you could ever participate in a [courtroom] decision that 
would result in the taking of a person’s life?”  D.D. replied, 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
79 
“Possibly, the case I mentioned before.  It would have to be 
something very bad.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror D.D. for 
cause.  Beck and Cruz objected, and Cruz also objected to 
denial of their request for sequestered voir dire.  Cruz 
requested the court present D.D. with “a hypothetical of the 
Dahmer case and see if she would consider that would be very 
bad where she would look for the death penalty.”  Beck 
asserted that D.D. was death qualified and that although she 
had “indicated that it would be very difficult for her to impose 
the death penalty,” he was sure the prosecutor “doesn’t want 
people who would find it easy to impose the death penalty.”   
The trial court sustained the challenge for cause.  In its 
ruling, the court reviewed Prospective Juror D.D.’s answers on 
the written juror questionnaire.  The court stated:  “[I]n her 
questionnaire [D.D.] has stated that . . . she felt she could be 
fair to both parties, she was an unbiased person.”  She said 
that “she does not believe in the death penalty except in 
extreme Dahmer-type cases, where a death penalty should not 
be entirely ruled out.”  “[S]he strongly opposes the death 
penalty.”  When asked about “a situation where the death 
penalty could be appropriate,” she responded, “multiple 
murders, if no remorse or promise of rehabilitation,” and 
further stated she “could follow the law, although it would not 
be easy for her to sentence someone to death.”  She believed 
that the “death penalty should only rarely be imposed when 
there is absolutely no . . . hope of rehabilitation” and that “she 
would vote against the death penalty were it on a ballot.”  
D.D. stated that “life without [the] possibility of parole is okay 
for the most heinous crimes imaginable.”  She “acknowledge[d] 
that the death penalty may be appropriate for only repeat 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
80 
offenders” and stated “the death penalty is never appropriate 
for first-time offenders.”  When asked, “Is there anything about 
your present state of mind that you feel any of the attorneys 
would like to know,” she responded, “I doubt seriously that I 
would impose a death penalty.  My verdict would be affected if 
I was asked to vote guilty with a punishment of death as 
opposed to guilty with life imprisonment.”  Upon considering 
Prospective Juror D.D.’s written and oral responses, the court 
found that her “current state of mind is such that her feelings 
against the death penalty would substantially interfere with 
her ability to perform as a juror in a case in which the death 
penalty was a possible penalty.”   
2. Discussion 
“ The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a 
prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital 
punishment is ‘ “[w]hether the juror’s views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of h[er] duties as a juror 
in accordance with h[er] instructions and h[er] oath.” ’ ”  
(People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56, quoting Uttecht v. 
Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7.)  “ ‘ “There is no requirement that 
a prospective juror’s bias against the death penalty be proven 
with unmistakable clarity.” ’ ”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 472, 497.)  As the high court has observed, many 
prospective jurors “simply cannot be asked enough questions to 
reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably 
clear’; these [prospective jurors] may not know how they will 
react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be 
unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.  
Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, 
there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the 
definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
81 
faithfully and impartially apply the law.”  (Wainwright v. Witt 
(1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424–426, fn. omitted.)  “[W]hen there is 
ambiguity in the prospective juror’s statements, ‘the trial 
court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the 
prospective juror’s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor 
of the State.’ ”  (Uttecht v. Brown, at p. 7.)  We review the trial 
court’s ruling for substantial evidence.   
Prospective Juror D.D. said she was against the death 
penalty and did not believe that she had the right to take part 
in a decision that would deprive a person of his life.  She also 
believed her feelings about the death penalty would 
substantially interfere with her ability to function as a juror in 
this case and were so strong she “[p]ossibly” would never find a 
special circumstance to be true.   
Although Prospective Juror D.D. acknowledged her 
feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that she 
would never impose the death penalty in any case, she 
described a death verdict as “really a serious leap of some sort 
— and I’m not sure I’d be able to make it — to impose the 
death penalty,” and she said she “doubt[ed] seriously that [she] 
would impose a death penalty.”  She suggested she might be 
able to impose the death penalty on “someone like Jeffrey 
Dahmer, if the death penalty had been appropriate in his 
case. . . .  Severe human crimes, mass murders of numbers, lots 
of different people, and other . . . heinous circumstances 
involved would lead me to impose the death penalty; but it 
would have to be something very extreme and very severe.”   
Beck and Cruz also assert Prospective Juror D.D. was 
qualified to serve because she offered examples of when she 
believed the death penalty was appropriate.  “But the mere 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
82 
theoretical possibility that a prospective juror might be able to 
reach a verdict of death in some case does not necessarily 
render the dismissal of the juror” erroneous.  (People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 432.)  We concluded 
substantial evidence supported the excusal of the prospective 
juror in Martinez (id. at p. 433) who said she might be able to 
impose the death penalty for “ ‘particularly heinous’ ” crimes, 
to “recidivists” (id. at p. 428), and “ ‘it would have to be 
something that would push me beyond the way I normally feel 
about the death penalty’ ” but “ ‘that could happen’ ” (id. at 
p. 429).  The same reasoning supports the excusal of D.D.  The 
trial court, which heard D.D.’s responses, was left with the 
definite impression that she was substantially impaired, and 
that determination is supported by substantial evidence. 
Beck asserts that the trial court’s voir dire was 
inadequate because it denied counsel the opportunity to ask 
Prospective Juror D.D. follow-up questions or to rehabilitate 
her.  Likewise, Cruz asserts that no deference is due a trial 
court’s determination of a prospective juror’s state of mind 
when the defense objects to excusal but is not permitted to ask 
follow-up questions and that the erroneous refusal to allow 
counsel to ask questions on voir dire was prejudicial.   
The United States Constitution “does not dictate a 
catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded 
an impartial jury.”  (Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 
729, italics omitted.)  At the time of the 1992 trial, the jury 
selection provisions of Proposition 115, codified in Code of Civil 
Procedure former section 223, applied to this case.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., former § 223, added by Prop. 115, as approved by voters 
Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 282, 299−300 [jury voir dire provisions of Prop. 115 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
83 
apply to all trials occurring after the proposition’s effective 
date].)  Former section 223 provided in relevant part:  “In a 
criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of 
prospective jurors.  However, the court may permit the parties, 
upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination 
by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself 
submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such 
additional questions by the parties as it deems proper.”  
Accordingly, the trial court here properly assumed primary 
responsibility for questioning prospective jurors.  (People v. Box 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1178−1179.)  Moreover, as Cruz’s 
counsel observed when discussing the voir dire of a different 
prospective juror, “[t]he Court has permitted us to submit 
questions in the course of jury selection.”   
In addition, a trial court “has wide discretion in deciding 
what questions should be asked on voir dire to determine 
potential jurors’ biases.  [Citation.]  ‘It abuses that discretion if 
its failure to ask questions renders the defendant’s trial 
“ ‘fundamentally unfair’ ” or “ ‘ “if the questioning is not 
reasonably 
sufficient 
to 
test 
the 
jury 
for 
bias 
or 
partiality.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 831 
(Harris); People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 540 (Stitely) 
[“the trial court has broad discretion over the number and 
nature of questions about the death penalty”].)  Here, Beck and 
Cruz fail to identify how the trial court’s voir dire was lacking 
or what questions trial counsel could have asked Prospective 
Juror D.D. that would have resolved the ambiguity in her 
responses. Hence they fail to demonstrate the trial court 
abused its discretion in not permitting the parties to further 
question D.D.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
84 
Beck and Cruz further contend that Prospective 
Juror D.D.’s missing juror questionnaire and proposed voir dire 
questions counsel submitted to the court render the record 
inadequate for appellate review and require reversal of the 
penalty judgment.  Although we do not condone the loss of any 
prospective juror questionnaires in a capital case (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.610(a)(1)(R)), “[t]he record on appeal is 
inadequate . . . 
only 
if 
the 
complained-of 
deficiency 
is 
prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to prosecute his appeal.  
[Citation.]  It is the defendant’s burden to show prejudice of 
this sort.”  (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8 
(Alvarez); cf. People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 69 [record 
lacking either specification of “the materials the trial court 
reviewed in ruling on the Pitchess motion or any particularized 
description of them, is inadequate to permit meaningful 
appellate review”].)   
As can be seen from the discussion above, much of 
Prospective Juror D.D.’s now missing juror questionnaire was 
read into the record during the trial court’s ruling on the 
challenge for cause.  At no time did any of the four defendants 
or the prosecutor object that the trial court had misstated a 
question or answer in the questionnaire.  “In the absence of 
any indication from defense counsel at the time of the trial 
court’s ruling” that the court “was misrepresenting the 
contents of the questionnaire[] upon which” the court relied, we 
see no reason to question the court’s recitation of that 
questionnaire.  (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 971 
(Heard).)  Nor is it apparent how D.D.’s responses to other 
questions not recounted by either the trial court or counsel 
could possibly remove the ambiguity present in her voir dire 
responses or alter the deference accorded to the trial court’s 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
85 
ruling.  (See People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 305−306 
[“Defendant fails to show prejudice because he does not explain 
how the missing juror questionnaires undermine” the 
circumstance that on voir dire “each of the challenged jurors 
gave equivocal or conflicting statements as to whether they 
could impose the death penalty”].)   
As for counsels’ proposed questions to Prospective 
Juror D.D., we have already observed that Beck and Cruz fail 
to identify how the trial court’s voir dire was lacking or what 
questions trial counsel could have asked D.D. that would have 
resolved the ambiguity in her responses.  Contrary to their 
assertion, they could provide this information on appeal 
without reference to the proposed questions actually given to 
the trial court that are apparently now no longer in the record.  
Hence the absence of what questions counsel previously 
proposed does not deprive them of meaningful appellate 
review.  In sum, the record is adequate to address Beck and 
Cruz’s claims that the trial court improperly excused 
Prospective Juror D.D.  
b. Other Prospective Jurors  
Cruz further asserts that the trial court erred in 
sustaining challenges for cause to Prospective Jurors B.D. and 
C.F. based on their death penalty views.  Beck also challenges 
the excusal of these two prospective jurors as well as the 
excusal of Prospective Jurors E.D., C.S., C.D., D.M., C.G., P.J., 
and E.M.   
1. Prospective Juror B.D.  
On Prospective Juror B.D.’s juror questionnaire, when 
asked, “What are your general feelings regarding the death 
penalty,” B.D. replied, “Undeci[d]ed.”  When asked, “Do you 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
86 
feel that a jury should determine the punishment in a criminal 
case,” he 
replied 
“No.” 
 When 
asked, “Under 
what 
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is 
appropriate,” he answered, “None.”  When asked, “Under what 
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is 
not appropriate,” B.D. replied “All.”  In response to the 
question, “Could you set aside your own personal feelings 
regarding what you think the law should be regarding the 
death penalty, and follow the law as the Court instructs you,” 
he replied, “No,” explaining, “I can’t change my opp[osition] of 
the [d]eath penalty.”   
Prospective Juror B.D. also responded, “No,” when asked 
if either the death penalty or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole “should be automatic for any particular 
type of crime.”  He believed in the adage, “[a]n eye for an eye.”  
He answered, “Not sure,” when asked how he would vote if the 
issue of whether California should have a death penalty law 
were on the ballot.  When asked if he believed “the state should 
impose the death penalty on everyone who, for whatever 
reason, murders another human being,” B.D. responded “No,” 
explaining, “not in self-[d]efen[s]e.”   
Prospective Juror B.D. did not provide answers to 
numerous other questions regarding the death penalty, such as 
whether his views about the death penalty had changed 
substantially in either intensity or nature in the last few years, 
his feelings about the punishment of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole, his level of support for imposition of 
the death penalty, what purpose he believed the death penalty 
served, what information he would like to make a penalty 
decision, and whether he believed the death penalty was 
imposed too often, too seldom, or randomly.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
87 
On voir dire, the court asked Prospective Juror B.D., 
“Have 
your 
views 
about 
the 
death 
penalty 
changed 
substantially in the last few years?”  He answered, “No.”  The 
court asked, “What are your feelings about punishment of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole?”  B.D. responded, “I 
agree with it.”  The court asked B.D. about a question that had 
asked B.D. to pick a response that most accurately described 
his view on the death penalty and for which he had not 
provided a written answer.  B.D. replied, “Oppose,” but also 
noted that in his view the death penalty served as a deterrent.  
The court asked, “Do you feel the death penalty . . . is imposed 
either too often, too seldom, or randomly?”  B.D. replied, 
“Randomly.”  The court noted when B.D. was asked on the 
questionnaire, “ ‘Under what circumstances, if any, do you 
believe the death penalty [is] appropriate’ you put down, 
‘None.’  Could you go ahead and explain what you meant by 
that answer?”  B.D. replied, “I don’t believe in the death 
penalty.  I don’t believe it’s my place to judge a man.”   
The court subsequently asked, “Do you have feelings 
about the death penalty which are so strong that you would 
never vote for first degree murder,” or “find a special 
circumstance to be true?”  Prospective Juror B.D. replied, “No.”  
The court asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty 
which are so strong that you would never impose the death 
penalty in any case whatsoever?”  B.D. replied, “Yes.”  The 
court asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty 
which you believe would substantially interfere with your 
ability to function as a juror in this case?”  B.D. replied, “Yes.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror B.D. for 
cause, and the trial court sustained the challenge, and denied 
defense counsels’ requests for sequestered voir dire and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
88 
submission of written questions.  The trial court stated:  
“[B]ased on [Prospective Juror B.D.’s] answers to questions in 
the questionnaire,  . . . he believed the death penalty was 
appropriate in no circumstances  . . . [and] was not appropriate 
in all cases. . . . [H]e cannot change his opinion regarding the 
death penalty.  His failure to answer a number of death 
penalty related questions, the Court feels that those answers 
indicate a very strong opinion, feeling against the death 
penalty, which far outweighs his undecided answer in 
[response to a question asking for his general feelings 
regarding the death penalty].  His general feelings about the 
death penalty — his feelings I believe are confirmed by his 
answers orally in court, that he would never impose the death 
penalty under any circumstances whatsoever.  Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that [B.D.] has feelings about the death 
penalty that are so strong that . . . his ability to serve as a 
juror in this case would be substantially impaired if he were to 
come to the point where he had to vote on which sentence was 
appropriate, death or life without the possibility of parole.”   
No error appears in excusing Prospective Juror B.D. for 
cause.  Although on his questionnaire he stated that he 
believed in the adage “[a]n eye for an eye” and that he did not 
believe the death penalty should be imposed in cases of self-
defense, his voir dire responses, which the trial court observed, 
were consistent with respect to his inability to consider the 
death penalty.  Substantial evidence supports the court’s 
ruling.   
2. Prospective Juror C.F.  
Prospective Juror C.F.’s juror questionnaire is not 
contained in the record.  On voir dire, the trial court asked, “In 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
89 
answering the questionnaire, you said that your feelings about 
the death penalty were very mixed.  Will you tell us what those 
mixed feelings are?”  C.F. replied, “I would have a hard time 
going for the death penalty,” explaining, “I don’t really think 
it’s the ultimate answer.”  The court asked, “Do you have any 
religious or other reasons that you feel that you could not sit in 
judgment on the conduct of a fellow human being?”  C.F. 
replied, “No.”  The court asked, “What are your feelings about 
[the] punishment of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole?”  C.F. replied, “I could handle that.”  When asked, 
“What purpose do you believe the death penalty serves,” she 
replied, “I don’t think it serves any purpose.”  The court 
subsequently asked, “Can you tell us any circumstances where 
you think the death penalty is appropriate and not 
appropriate?”  C.F. responded, “I don’t think it’s appropriate.”  
The court again asked, “Is there any situation in which you 
believe the death penalty is appropriate?”  C.F. replied, “No.”  
When asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty 
which are so strong that you would never be able to vote for 
first degree murder,” or “find a special circumstance to be 
true,” C.F. replied, “Yes.”  The court asked, “Do you have 
feelings about the death penalty which are so strong that you 
would never impose the death penalty in any case 
whatsoever?”  C.F. replied, “Yes.”  The court asked, “Do you 
have feelings about the death penalty which you believe would 
substantially interfere with your ability to function as a juror 
in this case?”  C.F. replied, “Yes.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror C.F. for 
cause.  Both Beck and Cruz unsuccessfully sought sequestered 
voir dire and the “opportunity of giving follow-up questions.”  
The court sustained the challenge, stating:  “The Court feels 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
90 
that the answers given here in open court clearly reflect 
[C.F.’s] state of mind and belief against the death penalty.  She 
would never impose it.  She feels it so strongly, she would 
never even vote for a first degree murder conviction.  Her 
ability to perform her duties as a juror in this type of case 
would be substantially impaired.  The Court finds in the 
written questionnaire, her answer to [No.] 108 she had mixed 
feelings, [No.] 110 she did not feel that the death penalty 
should be automatic for any particular type of crime . . . .  All of 
those answers clearly reflect her feeling, and the Court finds 
that those feelings and beliefs are not diminished by the one 
answer to [No.] 115 that she would consider the death 
penalty.”   
No error appears in excusing Prospective Juror C.F. for 
cause.  Although on her questionnaire she stated that her 
views on the death penalty were “mixed” and that she would 
consider the death penalty, her voir dire responses were 
consistent with respect to her inability to consider the death 
penalty, and substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling.   
Beck and Cruz further contend that Prospective 
Juror C.F.’s missing juror questionnaire and the missing 
proposed questions counsel submitted to the court render the 
record inadequate for appellate review, and require reversal of 
the penalty judgment.  But the court recited in its ruling 
without 
objection 
several 
of 
Prospective 
Juror 
C.F.’s 
questionnaire 
responses, 
and 
any 
ambiguity 
in 
her 
questionnaire regarding her feelings on the death penalty was 
clarified in her consistent answers on voir dire that she would 
never impose the death penalty in any case.  Thus, the absence 
of the questionnaire from the record does not prevent 
meaningful review of defendants’ claim C.F. was wrongfully 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
91 
excused for cause.  (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 196, fn. 8.)  
As for counsel’s proposed questions to C.F. that are now no 
longer in the record, Beck and Cruz fail to identify how the 
trial court’s voir dire was lacking or what questions could have 
been asked of C.F. that would have mitigated her absolute 
refusal to impose the death penalty — information that Beck 
and Cruz could have provided in their briefing without 
reference to the proposed questions that counsel actually gave 
to the trial court.  In sum, the record is adequate to address 
Beck and Cruz’s claim regarding the excusal of C.F. 
3. Remaining challenged prospective jurors  
Beck 
also 
summarily 
challenges 
the 
excusal 
of 
Prospective Jurors E.D., C.S., C.D., D.M., C.G., P.J., and E.M.  
He broadly contends that “in almost every instance” for these 
seven prospective jurors, the trial court based the excusal on 
the prospective juror’s questionnaire, made “little or no 
attempt to rehabilitate or inquire into these jurors’ opinions,” 
but merely asked the standard four “Witherspoon-Witt” 
questions, apparently refused to ask “additional written 
questions posed by defense counsel,” and refused to allow 
defense counsel to rehabilitate the prospective jurors before 
they were excused.  He claims this procedure is similar to the 
error by the trial court in Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, and 
speculates that had these prospective jurors been further 
questioned, they “may well have been passed for cause.”   
We conclude there was no error with respect to any of 
these jurors in light of the following substantial evidence in the 
record supporting the trial court’s rulings: 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
92 
 
(a) Prospective Juror E.D. 
On the juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror E.D. 
replied “Yes” when asked if her “religious views [would] in any 
way affect [her] service as a juror,” explaining, “Here the death 
penalty is a possibility.”  When asked, “For religious or any 
other reason, do you feel you cannot sit in judgment on the 
conduct of a fellow human being,” she said “No,” explaining, 
“Only if it didn’t involve the death penalty.”  When asked, “Do 
you have any beliefs about the guilt or innocence of the 
defendants or the penalty, if any, they should receive if found 
guilty,” E.D. replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I don’t believe in the 
death penalty.”  When asked her “general feelings regarding 
the death penalty,” E.D. answered, “I could never in good 
consci[ence] vote for the death penalty.  I believe only God has 
that right.”  When asked, “Have your views about the death 
penalty changed substantially in either intensity or nature in 
the last few years,” she answered, “I have always felt I couldn’t 
vote for the death penalty.”  When asked which “entry . . . best 
describes your feeling about the death penalty,” she chose, 
“Will never under any circumstances impose [the] death 
penalty.”  When asked, “If called upon to decide penalty, what 
information would you like to have to help you make that 
decision,” she answered, “No info would help in view of my 
feelings.”  In response to the question, “Could you set aside 
your own personal feelings regarding what you think the law 
should be regarding the death penalty, and follow the law as 
the Court instructs you,” she replied, “No,” explaining, “I feel 
too strongly against the death penalty.”  When asked, “Do you 
have any reason whatsoever to think you might not be a 
completely fair and impartial juror in this case,” she responded 
“Yes,” explaining, “My feelings on the death penalty.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
93 
On voir dire, the court asked Prospective Juror E.D., “Do 
you have feelings about the death penalty which are so strong 
that you would never impose a death penalty in any case 
whatsoever?”  She answered “Yes.”  When asked if her feelings 
were “so strong that you would never even convict somebody of 
first degree murder,” she responded, “I could convict them, but 
I could never follow through on the second phase of the death 
penalty.”  The court asked, “Do you have feelings about the 
death penalty which you believe would substantially interfere 
with your ability to function as a juror in this case?”  E.D. 
answered, “With a Phase Two.  It would affect probably the 
other, although I think I could do the other probably up to that 
point.”  The court asked, “How about Phase Two,” and she 
replied, “Phase Two I have problems with.”  The court asked, 
“How severe would those problems be?”  She said, “I think I 
would have trouble living with myself.”  The court asked, “The 
feeling about having trouble living with yourself, would that be 
if you voted to impose the death penalty?”  She replied, “I feel 
that I would have to oppose it; and if everyone else was for it, I 
feel that it’s the law and that is the right they should have; but 
I couldn’t do it and I wouldn’t want to foul up the case by being 
the only one to not vote for it, because I feel so strongly.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror E.D. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating:  “I will find, in view of [E.D.’s] answers 
orally given here in court, as well as those set forth in her 
questionnaire, that [E.D.] never under any circumstances in 
any case would impose a death penalty.  I think all of her 
answers make that unmistakably clear.  The manner in which 
she has given those answers leads the Court to believe that she 
is completely honest . . . . I find [E.D.] completely truthful and 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
94 
her beliefs are very deep and long lived and that she cannot 
perform her function as a juror in this case in that there may 
be a time when the jurors have to decide whether the death 
penalty is the penalty to be imposed.”  The court also observed 
that “when a juror makes it absolutely and unmistak[ably] 
clear that he or she . . . [would] never impose a death penalty, 
there is no requirement that there be an attempt to  . . . 
‘rehabilitate’ . . . that juror.”   
 
(b) Prospective Juror C.S.  
On the juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror C.S. 
replied “Yes” when asked if his “religious views [would] in any 
way affect [his] service as a juror,” explaining, “No capital 
punishment.”  When asked, “For religious or any other reason, 
do you feel you cannot sit in judgment on the conduct of a 
fellow human being,” he said “No,” explaining, “Unless my 
absolute opposition to the death penalty is involved in such 
judging.”  When asked, “If you were in the position of the 
defendants or the prosecutor, would you be satisfied to have 
your case tried with 12 jurors of your present frame of mind,” 
C.S. replied, “Not if anyone is looking for the death penalty.”  
When asked his “general feelings regarding the death penalty,” 
C.S. answered:  “Life is sacred.  Life is a gift.  Neither men nor 
the State have a moral right to take life.”  Although C.S.’s 
writing is difficult to decipher, he appears to also say:  
“Any[one] who does so has God’s judgment upon him.  Men and 
states punish by killing — only to perpetuate the cycle, which 
is a sin against love.”   
When asked which “entry . . . best describes your feeling 
about the death penalty,” Prospective Juror C.S. chose, “Will 
never under any circumstances impose [the] death penalty.”  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
95 
He explained, “There is no other alternative possible for a 
religious consciousness where the ultimate issue of Life is Love 
or death.”  When asked, “Under what circumstances, if any, do 
you believe that the death penalty is appropriate,” he 
answered, “Never.”  In response to the question, “Could you set 
aside your own personal feelings regarding what you think the 
law should be regarding the death penalty, and follow the law 
as the Court instructs you,” he replied, “No,” explaining, 
“Never.”  When asked, “Do you have any reason whatsoever to 
think you might not be a completely fair and impartial juror in 
this case,” he responded “No,” adding, “[e]xcept for the death 
penalty.”   
On voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror C.S., 
“Do you have feelings about the death penalty which are so 
strong that you would never impose the death penalty in . . . 
any case whatsoever?”  He answered, “Yes.”  The court asked, 
“Do you have feelings about the death penalty which you 
believe would substantially interfere with your ability to 
function as a juror in this case?”  After discussion regarding 
whether a yes or no answer was sought, C.S. said, “If the case 
puts the defendants at risk for the death penalty, then I 
believe my feelings are such that they would not make me . . . 
an appropriate juror.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror C.S. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating:  “I think his answers to the questionnaire 
and in open court make it absolutely clear that [C.S.] is 
completely opposed to the death penalty and would never 
impose it in any case whatsoever under any situation 
whatsoever.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
96 
 
(c) Prospective Juror C.D.  
On the juror questionnaire, when asked his “general 
feelings regarding the death penalty,” Prospective Juror C.D. 
answered:  “Because of the irrevers[i]bility of the penalty and 
because of the chance, no matter how remote, that an innocent 
person could be found guilty, I do not believe that it is an 
appropriate penalty.  Mistakes do happen.”  When asked if he 
felt “life without [the] possibility of parole should be automatic 
for any particular type of crime,” he answered, “Yes,” 
explaining, “[m]urder.”  When asked which “entry . . . best 
describes your feeling about the death penalty,” he chose, “Will 
never under any circumstances impose [the] death penalty.”  
When asked, “Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe 
that the death penalty is appropriate,” he answered, “None.”  
In response to the question, “Could you set aside your own 
personal feelings regarding what you think the law should be 
regarding the death penalty, and follow the law as the Court 
instructs you,” he replied, “Yes,” but commented, “Could not 
support death penalty.”   
On voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror C.D., 
“Do you have feelings about the death penalty which are so 
strong that you would never find a special circumstance to be 
true?”  He answered, “Yes.”  The court asked,  “Do you have 
feelings about the death penalty which are so strong that you 
would never impose the death penalty in any case 
whatsoever?”  He answered, “Yes.”  The court asked, “Do you 
have feelings about the death penalty which you believe would 
substantially interfere with your ability to function as a juror 
in this case?”  He answered, “Yes.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
97 
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror C.D. for 
cause.  The court sustained the challenge.   
 
(d) Prospective Juror D.M.  
No juror questionnaire for Prospective Juror D.M. 
appears in the record.  On voir dire, the trial court asked D.M. 
if she felt the death penalty was “imposed too often, too 
seldom, or randomly?”  D.M answered:  “I know we have people 
on death row right now.  I would assume that once is too often, 
for me too often.”  The court asked, “Do you have feelings about 
the death penalty which are so strong that you would never 
impose the death penalty in any case whatsoever?”  She 
answered, “Yes.”  The court asked, “Do you have feelings about 
the death penalty which you believe would substantially 
interfere with your ability to function as a juror in this case?”  
She answered, “Yes.”   
The court described the alternative penalties and when a 
jury was permitted to choose the death penalty.  After it 
finished this explanation, D.M. stated she was “for life 
without.”  The court asked, “Would you ever be able to vote for 
the death penalty?”  D.M. said, “I’ve never been in this 
situation. . . .  I believe in life imprisonment without parole.”  
The court asked, “My question to you, though, is this:  Under 
the law of the state of California, the death penalty is an 
alternative under circumstances that I’ve described to you.  If 
you found those circumstances, would you be able to put your 
beliefs aside and vote for the death penalty?”  D.M. replied, “I 
don’t think so.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror D.M. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating:  “The Court will find that the answers of 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
98 
[D.M.], both orally and in writing, and the manner of giving 
those answers leads the Court to believe that [D.M.] has a 
belief against the death penalty which would substantially 
impair her ability to serve as a juror in this case should she get 
to the point where the death penalty was an option.  I cite 
specifically question No. 108, she does not believe in the death 
penalty.  [No.] 115, she opposes it.  [No.] 116, it serves no 
purpose.  [No.] 118, one imposition of the death penalty is too 
much.  [No.] 122, she would vote against it.  [No.] 127, the 
death penalty is never appropriate.  And [No.] 128, life without 
possibility of parole would always be appropriate.”   
Beck contends that Prospective Juror D.M.’s missing 
juror questionnaire renders the record inadequate for appellate 
review and requires reversal of the penalty judgment.  But the 
court recited in its ruling without objection several of D.M.’s 
questionnaire responses, and at voir dire, she consistently 
stated she would never impose the death penalty in any case.  
Thus, the absence of the questionnaire from the record does 
not prevent meaningful review of Beck’s claim D.M. was 
wrongfully excused for cause. 
 
(e) Prospective Juror C.G.  
No juror questionnaire for Prospective Juror C.G. 
appears in the record.  At voir dire, the trial court asked 
Prospective Juror C.G., “What are your feelings about the 
death penalty?”  She replied, “I’m against it.”  The court asked, 
“Do you have feelings about the death penalty which are so 
strong that you would never impose the death penalty in any 
case whatsoever?”  She replied, “Right.”  The court asked, “Do 
you have feelings about the death penalty which you believe 
would substantially interfere with your ability to function as a 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
99 
juror in this case?”  She replied, “I guess so.”  The court asked, 
“Would you be able to put your beliefs against the death 
penalty aside and vote to impose the death penalty after 
hearing the law and the evidence if you felt that the death 
penalty was the appropriate . . . disposition?”  C.G. replied, 
“No, I wouldn’t.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror C.G. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating:  “Based on [C.G.’s] answers to Question 
No[s]. 108, . . . 115, 122, 127, and answers given here orally in 
court, I will find that [C.G.’s] personal beliefs and feelings 
about the death penalty are such that her ability to serve as a 
juror in this type of case would be substantially impaired.”  
The absence of C.G.’s questionnaire from the record does not 
prevent meaningful review because any ambiguity in C.G.’s 
juror questionnaire regarding her feelings on the death penalty 
was clarified in her consistent answers on voir dire that she 
would never impose the death penalty in any case. 
 
(f) Prospective Juror P.J.  
On the juror questionnaire, when asked her “general 
feelings regarding the death penalty,” Prospective Juror P.J. 
answered:  “I am opposed to it because I don’t think [the] 
government should be in the position of taking human life.”  
When asked which “entry . . . best describes your feeling about 
the death penalty,” she chose, “Strongly oppose.”  When asked, 
“Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the 
death penalty is appropriate,” she answered, “Can’t think of 
appropriate case.”  When asked, “Under what circumstances, if 
any, do you believe that the death penalty is not appropriate,” 
she responded, “All cases.”  In response to the question, “Could 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
100 
you set aside your own personal feelings regarding what you 
think the law should be regarding the death penalty, and 
follow the law as the Court instructs you,” she replied, “No,” 
explaining, “I could not set aside my own feelings about what is 
right and impose [the] death penalty.”   
On voir dire, the trial court observed that Prospective 
Juror P.J. had stated in her questionnaire that she might not 
be able to follow the law for religious reasons, and the court 
asked if she had thought about that further.  She replied, 
“What I was concerned about was I would not impose the death 
penalty, and that’s the only reason why I marked that 
question, why I answered that question that way.”  The court 
asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty which are 
so strong that you would never impose the death penalty in 
any case whatsoever?”  She answered, “Yes.”  The court asked, 
“Do you have feelings about the death penalty which you 
believe would substantially interfere with your ability [to] 
function as a juror in this case?”  She answered, “Probably.”  
The court asked, “Do you understand that if selected as a juror 
and the jury got to the penalty phase that one of the decisions 
you would have to make would be whether under the law and 
the evidence, the death penalty was the sentence which should 
be imposed?”  P.J. replied, “Yes.”  The court asked, “If under 
the law and the evidence you felt that was the appropriate 
penalty, would you be able to vote to impose it?”  P.J. 
answered, “No.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror P.J. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating:  “Based on [P.J.’s] answers here in court 
that she would not be able to impose the death penalty under 
any circumstances, . . . and the Court finding nothing in [P.J.’s] 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
101 
oral or written answers to suggest that there’s anything to the 
contrary, I’ll find that her beliefs against the death penalty 
would substantially impair her ability to be a juror in this 
case.”   
 
(g) Prospective Juror E.M.  
On the juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror E.M. 
answered “Yes” when asked if any of her “religious views 
[would] in any way affect your service as a juror” and whether 
“[f]or religious or any other reason, do you feel you cannot sit in 
judgment on the conduct of a fellow human being,” explaining 
“I’m against killing” in response to the first question, and “I 
feel that killing another human being is wrong” in response to 
the second question.  When asked if she had “any beliefs 
about . . . the penalty, if any, [Beck and Cruz] should receive if 
found guilty,” she replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I’m against the 
death penalty regardless of the crime.”  When asked her 
“general feelings regarding the death penalty,” E.M. answered, 
“I’m against the death penalty.”  When asked which “entry . . . 
best describes your feeling about the death penalty,” she chose, 
“Will never under any circumstances impose [the] death 
penalty.”  When asked, “Under what circumstances, if any, do 
you believe that the death penalty is appropriate,” she 
answered, “None.”  In response to the question, “Could you set 
aside your own personal feelings regarding what you think the 
law should be regarding the death penalty, and follow the law 
as the Court instructs you,” she replied, “No.”   
At voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror E.M., 
“[A] function of the jury, in this case, if it gets to the point of 
determining penalty, is to determine whether the penalty 
should be death or life in prison without the possibility of 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
102 
parole.  Would you be able to . . . vote for one particular 
penalty or the other?”  E.M. replied, “Yes.”  The trial court 
observed that on the jury questionnaire, E.M. had answered, 
“No” to the question, “If you were in the position of the 
defendants or the prosecutor, would you be satisfied to have 
your case tried with 12 jurors of your present frame of mind?”  
He asked E.M if that was “still [her] feeling,” and she replied, 
“I think the reason that I answered that is because I’m against 
the . . . death penalty and I feel I would be biased.”  The court 
asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty which are 
so strong that you would never impose the death penalty in 
any case whatsoever?”  E.M. answered, “Yes.”  The court 
asked, “Do you have feelings about the death penalty which 
you believe would substantially interfere with your ability to 
function as a juror in this case?”  She again answered, “Yes.”   
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror E.M. for 
cause.  Over defense objection, the court sustained the 
challenge, stating that based on E.M.’s answers on her juror 
questionnaire and “the answers given here orally in court, the 
Court finds that [E.M.’s] belief against the death penalty is 
such that her ability to serve in this type of case would be 
substantially impaired.”  As to Beck’s contention that 
Prospective Juror E.M.’s missing juror questionnaire renders 
the record inadequate for appellate review, this court on 
January 23, 2008 accepted the parties’ stipulation that E.M.’s 
questionnaire had been located, and we augmented the record 
to include it. 
5. Jury selection procedures  
Beck 
and 
Cruz 
challenge 
certain 
jury 
selection 
procedures.  We conclude there was no error.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
103 
a. Sequestered voir dire 
Beck and Cruz contends the trial court erred in denying a 
defense motion for individual and sequestered death-
qualification voir dire for all prospective jurors.  As defendants 
acknowledge, we have repeatedly rejected similar claims, and 
defendants cite no persuasive reason to revisit our conclusion.  
(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 862–
864.)  Moreover, in denying the motion, the trial court observed 
individual sequestered voir dire might be required in some 
circumstances and that counsel would have “full opportunity to 
submit” proposed follow-up voir dire questions.   
b. Questionnaire 
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends that the trial court erred 
in denying his request to ask prospective jurors on the juror 
questionnaire their “perception of the meaning of the term ‘life 
without the possibility of parole.’ ”  He contends that “the 
overwhelming majority of California capital jurors erroneously 
believe that a life-without-parole sentence does not foreclose 
the possibility of parole.”  We reject the claim.  The 
questionnaire asked prospective jurors “[w]hat are your 
feelings about the punishment of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole?”  This inquiry was sufficient to elicit 
any concern by a prospective juror that the punishment would 
not in fact be imposed.  Indeed, during voir dire, LaMarsh’s 
counsel 
observed 
that 
“after 
reviewing 
these 
questionnaires, . . . there are a number of people [who] are 
skeptical of the meaning of life [imprisonment] without 
parole.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
104 
c. Partisan procedures  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends that the trial court’s jury 
selection procedures favored the prosecutor.  We reject the 
claim.   
Beck contends that “although the trial court informed 
both sides that it would allow counsel to submit written 
questions to be asked of the jurors . . . , the court, with rare 
exception, refused to ask defense counsel’s proposed questions.”  
As noted, the trial occurred at a time when voir dire was 
primarily performed by the trial court.  (See Code Civ. Proc., 
former § 223; see ante, pt. II.A.4.a.2.)  A trial court “has wide 
discretion in deciding what questions should be asked on voir 
dire to determine potential jurors’ biases.  [Citation.]  ‘It 
abuses that discretion if its failure to ask questions renders the 
defendant’s trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair’ ” or “ ‘ “if the 
questioning is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias 
or partiality.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 831; see 
Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 540.)   
Although Beck notes at least one occasion where it 
appears the trial court did not ask certain follow-up questions 
suggested by the defense, he fails to demonstrate that the 
prosecutor received more favorable treatment.  Beck contends 
that the trial court allowed the prosecutor to use voir dire in 
aid 
of 
peremptory 
challenges 
to 
improperly 
exclude 
Prospective Juror M.L.  We have rejected Beck’s claim that the 
trial court erred in finding there was good cause to reopen jury 
selection to allow the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory 
challenge against Prospective Juror M.L.  (See ante, pt. II.A.3.)  
As pertinent here, the court solicited questions for M.L. from 
counsel.  Beck, Cruz, and the prosecutor suggested questions.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
105 
But once the court began its first question to M.L., Beck and 
Cruz changed their minds and objected to any questions.  The 
court overruled the objection and asked M.L. the very 
questions Beck and Cruz had proposed.  Beck and Cruz then 
objected to any further questioning on the grounds that M.L. 
was qualified to serve and that further questioning would 
prejudice the defendants.  These circumstances do not 
illustrate partisan jury selection procedures. 
Beck further contends that the “trial court also gave the 
prosecution the exclusive benefit of expanded voir dire to 
rehabilitate” Prospective Juror M.N.  In fact, during the voir 
dire of M.N., Cruz suggested a question that the court 
immediately asked.  The prosecutor was subsequently 
permitted to ask a hypothetical question.  As the prosecutor 
started to ask a second question, Beck’s counsel objected and 
then successfully challenged M.N. for cause.  Beck fails to 
demonstrate how this scenario “demonstrat[es] a clear bias in 
favor of the prosecution.”   
Finally, citing as an example Prospective Juror D.D., 
whose excusal for cause we have upheld (see ante, pt. II.A.4.a.), 
Beck contends that “in every instance where a prospective 
juror stated that he or she was opposed to the death penalty, 
the trial court not only denied the additional written questions 
posed by defense counsel, but refused to allow defense [counsel] 
any opportunity to question the juror or to pose hypothetical 
questions or otherwise rehabilitate these jurors.”  Beck does 
not claim the prosecutor’s suggested questions for D.D. were 
asked or assert any other persuasive basis for concluding the 
jury selection procedure was unfair.  To the extent Beck 
summarily contends the trial court “made no attempt to 
rehabilitate or inquire into” the opinions of Prospective 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
106 
Jurors B.D and C.F., we have exhaustively reviewed the record 
regarding these prospective jurors and concluded that the trial 
court did not err in sustaining these challenges for cause.  Nor 
is any partisan procedure evident.  We have also exhaustively 
reviewed the record regarding the remaining seven prospective 
jurors Beck claims were improperly excused but for whom he 
offers no specific argument, and these portions of the record 
also 
reveal 
no 
partisan 
procedure. 
 
(See 
ante, 
pt. II.A.4.b.3.a−g.) 
6. Security measures  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends that courtroom security 
measures violated his right to due process.  We reject the 
claim.   
a. Factual background 
Before trial, LaMarsh objected to having three bailiffs sit 
behind the four defendants.  The trial court stated it did not 
“see any prejudice to counsel or their clients by the seating 
configuration.  Your clients and counsel are approximately two 
feet apart, one right behind the other.  The Court does not see 
any undue prejudice by having three deputy sheriffs seated 
against the back rail.”   
On the morning jury selection began, Beck arrived 
wearing a short-sleeved shirt and no jacket, making a jail 
armband visible.  Outside the presence of the prospective 
jurors, Beck asserted that the armband was an indicia of 
incarceration and asked that it be placed around his ankle or 
removed.  The trial court offered to explain to the prospective 
jurors that Beck and his codefendants were in custody.  Beck 
noted that the other defendants were wearing jackets that 
“might cover these armbands, and so just at first glance, it 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
107 
might appear that [he is] the only one in custody.”  The court 
clarified it was offering to instruct the prospective jurors that 
in a “capital case the defendants have no right to bail, they’re 
in custody . . . , and that the jury should not hold that against 
the defendants in any manner.”  Beck asked the court to so 
instruct the prospective jurors, which it did.   
At the end of the guilt phase, the court instructed the 
jury:  “The fact that there was increased courtroom security 
during the trial is not to be discussed or considered by you.  
Such security measures should have no bearing on your 
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”   
The trial court’s order settling the record states as to 
security measures during trial:  “There was increased security, 
including additional uniformed bailiffs in the courtroom, 
perhaps one per defendant, one in an adjoining room not 
visible to jurors.  The courtroom was referred to as a ‘high 
security courtroom.’  Entrance to the courtroom was through 
more than one security entrance and could be locked 
preventing both entrance and exit.  During jury selection, the 
lights went out for a minute or two, leaving the courtroom in 
total darkness.  One or more defense counsel loudly told their 
clients not to move.  [¶] On one occasion when the lights were 
turned off during the presentation of slides, bailiffs shined 
flashlights on the defendants.  The record speaks for itself as to 
any hearings and findings on security issues and defense 
objections.  Judge Lacy did discuss security with the bailiffs 
and perhaps the courtroom clerk and court reporter.  These 
discussion[s] may not have been reported.  No findings about 
the content of these discussions are possible.”  The court also 
found that “[d]efense counsel sat at the table to the right; the 
[defendants] sat behind their attorneys.  The bailiffs sat behind 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
108 
the [defendants].  The district attorney and his investigator sat 
at the table to the left.  There was no change at the penalty 
trial for Cruz except that there were fewer bailiffs in the 
courtroom.  After the first day of Beck’s penalty trial, the 
matter was moved to another courtroom.”   
b. Analysis 
Beck contends the trial court prejudicially erred by 
“ordering heightened security measures without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing and without making a proper showing on 
the record of a manifest need for such measures.”  Beck 
appears to contend that the trial court was required to hold an 
evidentiary hearing and find a “manifest need” for his visible 
arm band and for several security measures mentioned in the 
trial court’s order settling the record.  Assuming this claim is 
preserved, it is meritless.   
“Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that ‘one 
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence 
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at 
trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, 
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof 
at trial.’ ”  (Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 567.)  
“[E]xtraordinary security practices carry an inordinate risk of 
infringing upon a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial” and 
“must be justified by a particularized showing of manifest need 
sufficient to overcome the substantial risk of prejudice they 
pose.”  (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 632 (Stevens).)  
For example, requiring a defendant to wear a visible physical 
restraint or prison clothing when appearing before the jury 
“may erode the presumption of innocence because [it]  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
109 
suggest[s] to the jury that the defendant is a dangerous person 
who must be separated from the rest of the community.”  (Id. 
at pp. 632−633; People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 494 
[prison clothing]; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 
290−291 [physical restraint].) 
“This does not mean, however, that every practice 
tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the 
courtroom must be struck down.”  (Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 
475 U.S. at p. 567.)  Rather, a “ ‘trial court has broad power to 
maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings,’ ” and 
“decisions regarding security measures in the courtroom are 
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  (Stevens, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 632.)  Only “when the court imposes a measure 
that is inherently prejudicial to the defendant’s right to assist 
in his defense, competently present his own testimony, or enjoy 
the presumption of innocence,” must the court “find a manifest 
need sufficient to justify the risk of prejudice.”  (Id. at p. 643.)   
We consider first Beck’s claim regarding his armband.  
Beck’s appearance at the first day of jury selection without a 
jacket made visible an armband that, although the record is 
not clear, apparently identified him as a jail inmate.  Although 
a defendant has a right not to stand trial wearing clothing or 
other items that identify him or her as incarcerated, any 
possible prejudice from the prospective jurors’ awareness that 
Beck was in custody was ameliorated by the trial court’s 
concomitant instruction to the prospective jurors that capital 
defendants have no right to bail and are in custody, and that 
the jury should not hold that against the defendants in any 
manner.  Moreover, at the end of the guilt phase, the court 
instructed the jury that the “fact that there was increased 
courtroom security during the trial is not to be discussed or 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
110 
considered by you” and “should have no bearing on your 
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”  We 
presume the jury understood and followed these instructions.  
(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1178 
(Hajek and Vo).)   
Beck also challenges the presence of deputies in the 
courtroom.  He asserts that “[w]ithout an evidentiary hearing 
on the issues of courtroom security, including the courtroom 
configuration and previously existing security measures, it is 
impossible to conclude that the presence of four deputies, with 
three sitting directly behind the defendants, was ‘reasonable.’ ”  
In Duran, “we specifically distinguished shackling from the use 
of armed guards in the courtroom.  [Citation.]  We explained 
that unless the guards ‘are present in unreasonable numbers, 
such presence need not be justified by the court or the 
prosecutor’. . . . California courts have long maintained this 
distinction between the presence of security officers and the 
imposition of physical restraints.”  (Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th 
at p. 634, citation omitted.)  Here, the court reasonably 
assigned three bailiffs to sit behind the four defendants.  (See 
Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 571 [“Four troopers 
are unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything other 
than a normal official concern for the safety and order of the 
proceedings,” and “any juror who for some other reason 
believed defendants particularly dangerous might well have 
wondered why there were only four armed troopers for the six 
defendants”].)  Likewise, no inherent prejudice is shown by 
guards shining flashlights on the backs of the defendants when 
the lights were turned off so that slides could be shown.  Nor 
was there inherent prejudice when defense counsel told 
defendants not to move when power was lost once during the 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
111 
trial, assuming that counsel’s action could be imputed to the 
court. 
Beck also asserts that requiring spectators and witnesses 
to pass through more than one security entrance to enter the 
courtroom was inherently prejudicial, but he cites no evidence 
the jury was aware of this security measure.  Nor is such a 
measure inherently prejudicial.  (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 900, 996 [use of a metal detector outside of a 
courtroom is not inherently prejudicial].)   
Beck also notes the courtroom was referred to as a “high 
security courtroom,” although again he does not assert the jury 
was aware of that characterization.  Likewise, he notes the 
circumstance that the “entrance to the courtroom could be 
locked preventing both entrance and exit,” but does not state 
the courtroom was ever locked when the jury was inside the 
courtroom; nor does he explain how this circumstance was 
prejudicial.   
Beck contends that “the heightened security measures 
reinforced the prosecutor’s theory at the penalty phase that 
Beck was deserving of death because of his future 
dangerousness.”  As noted, Beck’s penalty trial took place in a 
different courtroom, about which he created no record below.  
Nor have we found any inherent prejudice in the security 
measures employed during the guilt phase.   
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion as to 
the challenged security measures.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
112 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Substantial evidence  
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in 
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 
it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.’  (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 
27.)  We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’  (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 
443 U.S. 307, 319.)  In so doing, a reviewing court ‘presumes in 
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier 
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ”  (People v. 
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.)  “ ‘We review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement using 
the same standard we apply to a conviction.’ ” (People v. Wilson 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.) 
a. Conspiracy to commit murder  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends that no substantial 
evidence supports his conspiracy conviction.  We disagree.   
“ ‘Conspiracy requires two or more persons agreeing to 
commit a crime, along with the commission of an overt act, by 
at least one of these parties, in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ”  
(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 870 (Homick).)  
“ ‘Evidence is sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime 
“if it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly 
came 
to 
a 
mutual 
understanding 
to 
commit 
a 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
113 
crime.  [Citation.]  The existence of a conspiracy may be 
inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and 
activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the 
alleged conspiracy.” ’ ”  (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 
515−516 (Maciel); Homick, at p. 870 [the element of agreeing to 
commit a crime “must often be proved circumstantially”].)  
Beck 
first 
contends 
Evans’s 
testimony 
was 
“so 
contradictory and inherently unreliable as to violate due 
process.”  He asserts that she had participated in the murders 
and was motivated to “save her own life,” “threatened with 
losing her child[],” had “sold drugs and committed theft,” and 
had lied to the police when interviewed.   
“ ‘ “Although an appellate court will not uphold a 
judgment 
or 
verdict 
based 
upon 
evidence 
inherently 
improbable, 
testimony 
which 
merely 
discloses 
unusual 
circumstances does not come within that category.  [Citation.]  
To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness 
who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either 
a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must 
be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.  
[Citations.]  Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to 
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, 
for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to 
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of 
the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ”  (Maciel, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 519.) Here, Evans’s testimony was 
properly impeached by the factors Beck cites, but nothing 
about 
her 
testimony 
was 
inherently 
unbelievable 
or 
implausible.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
114 
Beck further asserts that Evans’s testimony was the 
“evidentiary foundation” of a conspiracy and was not 
sufficiently corroborated.  The court instructed the jury, “If the 
crime of murder or the crime of conspiracy to commit murder 
was committed by anyone, the witness Michelle Evans was an 
accomplice as a matter of law and her testimony is subject to 
the rule requiring corroboration.”   
The “existence of a conspiracy may be proved by 
uncorroborated accomplice testimony,” but corroboration of 
accomplice testimony is required “to connect the defendant to 
the conspiracy.”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 444 
(Price).)  Here, Evans’s testimony regarding her meeting on the 
night of the murders with Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, and 
Vieira is sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy to 
murder.   
Moreover, Evans’s testimony connecting Beck and Cruz 
to the conspiracy was corroborated.  We have explained that 
under section 1111, “an 
accomplice’s 
testimony 
is 
not 
corroborated by the circumstance that the testimony is 
consistent with the victim’s description of the crime or physical 
evidence from the crime scene.  Such consistency and 
knowledge of the details of the crime simply proves the 
accomplice was at the crime scene, something the accomplice 
by definition admits.  Rather, under section 1111, the 
corroboration must connect the defendant to the crime 
independently of the accomplice’s testimony.”  (People v. 
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 36 (Romero and Self).)  
“ ‘The entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, acts, 
and conduct may be taken into consideration by the trier of 
fact in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration.’  
[Citations.]  The evidence ‘need not independently establish 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
115 
the identity of the victim’s assailant’ [citation], nor corroborate 
every fact to which the accomplice testifies [citation], and 
‘ “may be circumstantial or slight and entitled to little 
consideration when standing alone.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 32.)   
Here, both Beck and Cruz testified in their defense cases 
that they were at the scene of and therefore were connected to 
the murders.  Cruz was identified by a witness as one of the 
assailants in the street attacking Ritchey.  Shortly after the 
murders, Beck told acquaintance Wallace that “we” or “I” “slit 
some throats.”  The jury could reasonably infer Beck was 
referring to the murder of the four victims in this case, whose 
throats were slit or stabbed.  Shortly before the murder, Beck 
and Cruz purchased the police baton the parties stipulated was 
found near the crime scene, and Cruz purchased masks similar 
to those found at the crime scene, including a mask found 
between the legs of one victim.  Evans’s testimony was also 
corroborated by witnesses who testified regarding the close 
relationship between Beck and Cruz.  This evidence was 
collectively sufficient to corroborate Evans’s testimony and to 
demonstrate that Beck and Cruz were part of a conspiracy to 
kill the victims.   
Moreover, even aside from Evans’s testimony, there was 
substantial evidence of a conspiracy to murder in the 
nonaccomplice testimony.  The murders occurred in a short 
time period late at night.  The throats of all four victims were 
slit or stabbed, a similarity in the manner of killing that 
indicates planning and an intent to kill.  Four men all dressed 
alike in dark clothing were observed leaving the crime scene 
together in single file.  A dark knit cap and camouflage mask 
were found on the victims’ front lawn and a second camouflage 
mask was found between Ritchey’s legs, evidence that 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
116 
demonstrates planning and an effort to avoid detection.  
(Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1111 [agreement may be 
shown by the “ ‘ “conduct of the defendants in mutually 
carrying out an activity which constitutes a crime” ’ ”]; 
Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1135 [evidence that when the 
surviving victim opened the door for an expected female guest 
(the defendant’s accomplice), two male assailants immediately 
rushed into the apartment and started attacking the victims 
and coordinated their actions with one another, demonstrated 
“that the two male assailants agreed and coordinated with 
each other and with [the female accomplice] to forcibly gain 
access to the apartment for the purpose of robbing or stealing 
from the brothers,” and “sufficiently established” the existence 
of a conspiracy].)  Nothing of value was taken from the house, 
indicating the motivation was revenge, not theft.  (Price, supra, 
1 Cal.4th at p. 444 [defendant’s connection to conspiracy 
demonstrated in part because “[n]othing of significant value 
was taken from the home, suggesting that revenge, and not 
gain, was the motive”].)  In addition, the jury could reasonably 
infer that Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey visited 5223 Elm 
Street two nights before the murders to learn the layout of the 
home and that LaMarsh, who, according to Smith, had visited 
the house next door to the victims on the afternoon before the 
murders, did so to see who was in the victims’ house and to 
make sure Raper and perhaps Colwell were still staying there.  
Finally, Rosemary’s testimony that Beck, Cruz, and Vieira 
lived together and pooled financial resources supported the 
prosecutor’s theory of conspiracy.  Because the object of the 
conspiracy was to kill everyone present at 5223 Elm Street and 
leave no witnesses, the murders of Raper, Ritchey, Colwell, 
and Paris “satisfied the element of an overt act committed in 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
117 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”  (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 
p. 518; 
People v. 
Jurado 
(2006) 
38 Cal.4th 
72, 
121 
[“Commission of the target offense in furtherance of the 
conspiracy satisfies the overt act requirement.”].)   
In sum, there was substantial evidence of conspiracy. 
b. Personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon  
The jury found that Beck and Cruz had each personally 
used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the murders of all four 
victims.  (Former § 12022, subd. (b) (section 12022(b)).)  The 
trial court imposed one additional year for Ritchey’s murder 
(Count I) as to both Beck and Cruz and stayed imposition of 
the use enhancement for the remaining counts.  Beck, joined 
by Cruz, contends that no substantial evidence supports the 
jury’s true finding of the allegations that he personally used a 
deadly or dangerous weapon in the murders of Raper 
(Count II) and Paris (Count IV).  We reject the claim.   
At the time of the murders, former section 12022(b) 
provided in relevant part:  “Any person who personally uses a 
deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of such felony or 
attempted felony, in addition and consecutive to the 
punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of 
which he or she has been convicted, be punished by an 
additional term of one year . . . .”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1284, § 2, 
p. 5058.)  “ ‘In order to find “true” a section 12022(b) allegation, 
a fact finder must conclude that, during the crime or attempted 
crime, the defendant himself or herself intentionally displayed 
in a menacing manner or struck someone with an instrument 
capable of inflicting great bodily injury or death.’ ”  (Hajek and 
Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1197.)  In determining whether 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
118 
there was substantial evidence of deadly and dangerous 
weapon use, “we may properly consult cases construing the 
term ‘uses’ in other enhancement statutes under ‘ “The 
Dangerous Weapons’ ” Control Law.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1198.)  In 
that context, “ ‘[u]se’ means, among other things, ‘to carry out a 
purpose or action by means of,’ to ‘make instrumental to an 
end or process,’ and to ‘apply to advantage.’ ”  (People v. 
Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672.)  “The obvious legislative 
intent to deter the use” of deadly and dangerous weapons in 
the commission or attempted commission of a felony “requires 
that ‘uses’ be broadly construed.”  (Ibid.)  
Here, Beck does not dispute there was substantial 
evidence that he stabbed Colwell in the stomach and slit 
Ritchey’s throat.  Moreover, substantial evidence supports the 
jury’s finding that he and his coperpetrators had conspired to 
kill everyone present at 5223 Elm Street, and Beck and Cruz 
each arrived at the house armed with a deadly or dangerous 
weapon.  Colwell, Paris, and Raper were killed inside a small 
portion of the home in a short period of time.  Evans testified 
that she heard Paris screaming and pleading for her life about 
30 seconds after Beck and Vieira went toward the living room 
from a bedroom, and two to three minutes after she saw Cruz 
running toward the house.  LaMarsh testified that after Cruz 
struck Raper in the head several times with a baton, LaMarsh 
turned around and saw Vieira trying to pull Paris, who was 
crying, out from under a kitchen table.  At the same time, 
LaMarsh saw Beck grab Colwell and stab him in the stomach.  
Our review of a crime scene videotape indicates the bodies of 
Colwell and Paris appear to be just several feet apart, and 
Raper’s body just several more feet away from both of them.  
Given these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
119 
Beck’s knife use on Colwell and Cruz’s baton attack on Raper 
facilitated the perpetrators’ plan to murder everyone present 
in the house.   
In People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 570, 572, on which 
Beck relies, we construed former section 12022.7, which as 
relevant here imposes an enhancement for a defendant who 
“ ‘personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person,’ ” to 
apply “only to a person who himself inflicts the injury.”  
Contrary to Beck’s assertion, however, here the prosecutor was 
not required to prove that Beck personally inflicted physical 
harm on Raper or Paris for the former section 12022(b) 
personal 
use enhancement 
to 
apply. 
 
Unlike former 
section 12022.7, 
former 
section 12022(b) 
imposes 
an 
enhancement for a defendant who “personally uses a deadly or 
dangerous weapon in the commission or attempted commission 
of a felony,” not for his or her conduct in personally inflicting 
injury on a victim.  As explained above, “use[]” is broadly 
construed to include acts other than the physical infliction of 
injury.  Nor is such personal use of a deadly or dangerous 
weapon obviated when a coperpetrator also uses a deadly or 
dangerous weapon to personally inflict physical harm on a 
victim.   
In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury’s true 
finding of the allegations that Beck and Cruz personally used a 
deadly or dangerous weapon in the murders of Raper and 
Paris.  We also reject Beck’s further claim that the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury that “vicarious liability is 
not a 
basis for 
a 
‘true’ 
finding 
under Penal 
Code 
section 12022(b).”  This claim is likewise predicated on the 
erroneous assertion that the use enhancement applies only 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
120 
when the defendant personally inflicts physical harm on the 
victim.  
2. Firearms and relationship evidence  
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends that the trial court erred 
in 
admitting 
evidence 
regarding 
Cruz’s 
firearms, 
his 
relationships with Beck and Vieira, his mistreatment of Vieira, 
and his cult activity, which he collectively describes as 
irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence.  We conclude 
there was no error.  
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), provides 
that generally “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his 
or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his 
or her conduct on a specified occasion.”  At the same time, 
evidence is admissible to show “that a person committed a 
crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some 
fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, . . .) other 
than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”  (Id., 
subd. (b).)   
Cruz contends that there “was no legitimate inference 
from the firearm evidence [that] could be drawn under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).”  We disagree.  
Cruz conceded that some evidence regarding the firearms was 
admissible.  Nor did he consistently object each time the 
subject of firearms was raised.  Moreover, all four defendants 
denied that there was a conspiracy to commit murder.  In 
support of this denial, Willey and LaMarsh contended that the 
firearms evidence demonstrated a lack of planning, reasoning 
that if there was a conspiracy to kill the victims, the 
defendants would have taken advantage of the weapons 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
121 
stockpile available to them rather than relying on knives and 
bats.  As the Attorney General notes, “[i]t is natural to assume 
that if a group planned to [kill] a house full of people . . . they 
would take along the most effective weapons they had.”  In 
addition, evidence that Cruz and Beck had militaristic aspects 
to their lifestyles, such as possessing numerous firearms, 
visiting gun stores, frequently wearing camouflage clothing, 
and at times patrolling their residential area at night, 
supported eyewitness Duval’s testimony that he observed four 
men leave the Elm Street house in a single file, dog-trotting, 
and with their hands in a port arms position.  Finally, the 
evidence was not unduly prejudicial; there was no evidence any 
of the weapons were illegal, and the trial court curtailed 
extraneous inquiry, such as sustaining objections to Willey 
asking Cruz if he was a “gun nut” and to LaMarsh’s counsel 
asking LaMarsh if he ever saw a certain rocket in Cruz’s home.  
The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the 
evidence under Evidence Code section 1101(b).   
The court also properly admitted evidence of Cruz’s 
relationship with Beck and Vieira and Cruz’s mistreatment of 
Vieira.  As noted, the “ ‘existence of a conspiracy may be 
inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and 
activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the 
alleged conspiracy.’ ”  (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)  
Evidence that Beck, Cruz, and Vieira had formed a tight-knit, 
hierarchical group who lived together and pooled financial 
resources supported the prosecutor’s theory of conspiracy.  
(People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 126 [“The very 
nature of this case and the theory of the prosecution compel 
reference to circumstantial evidence of the conduct and 
relationship of the parties.”].) Likewise, evidence that LaMarsh 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
122 
and Willey had each separately performed a ritual (cutting a 
hand and leaving a bloody fingerprint) to join that group was 
relevant to the relative culpability of each defendant and his 
willingness to participate in the conspiracy.   
Contrary to Cruz’s assertion, the court refused to admit 
evidence regarding “anything like Nazism,” “White Aryan 
supremacy, [or] the occult.”  The fact that questions were asked 
regarding the purpose of the group, Satanism, or Cruz’s title as 
head of the household, to which objections were sustained, does 
not give rise to prejudice.  The court instructed the jury that 
“when an objection is sustained you are to disregard either the 
question that was asked or if an answer was given, also the 
answer.”  We presume the jury understood and followed this 
instruction.  (Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1178.)   
Finally, even if the trial court erred in admitting the 
evidence of firearms or of Cruz’s controlling behavior, there is 
no reasonable probability the verdict would have been 
different.  Cruz admitted to being at the murder scene, a 
nonaccomplice witness observed Cruz cutting Ritchey’s throat, 
and Cruz stipulated his bloody baton was found near the 
murder scene.   
3. Mistrial motion  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends the trial court erroneously 
denied his mistrial motion.  We disagree. 
Cruz testified in his own defense.  On cross-examination 
by Willey, Willey’s counsel, William Miller, began to ask Cruz, 
“You’ve been incarcerated on this matter since —”  Cruz’s 
counsel, Amster, objected.  Miller observed that “the jury was 
informed that all defendants are incarcerated on this matter 
without bail.”  The trial court agreed and allowed the question.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
123 
Miller asked, “You’ve been incarcerated on this matter since 
May 23 of 1990 . . . is that correct?”  Cruz replied, “I don’t 
believe so.”  Miller asked, “Have you been out any time since 
th[en]?”  Amster objected, “[I]t’s a trick question” that 
“assum[ed] facts.”  Amster added that if counsel wanted to “ask 
the question if [Cruz has] been in custody with the police 
shortly after . . . they found [him] at the Camp, that’s fine and 
we can go on with this.  But the way the question’s being 
posed, I object strongly and . . . I’d like a sidebar on this.”  
Miller explained the question was foundational, and he was 
asking “has he been in custody continuously since his arrest on 
this matter.”  Amster said, “Fine.  That’s different,” and the 
court instructed Cruz to answer the question.  Amster then 
objected on relevance grounds, saying, “I don’t want this to be 
used as foundational aspect of opening up another door.  I 
think this is going into [a] collateral purpose.”  Miller said, “If 
Mr. Amster didn’t want his client questioned, he shouldn’t 
have put him on the stand.”  Amster replied, “Well, let’s knock 
it off,” and unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial.  The court 
instructed Cruz, “[Y]ou may answer the question as to whether 
or not you’ve been in custody continuously since the time of 
your arrest in this matter.”  A short time later, out of the 
presence of the jury, Beck’s counsel, Kent Faulkner, joined by 
Amster, moved for a mistrial on the ground that Miller’s 
comment, “If Mr. Amster didn’t want his client questioned, he 
shouldn’t have put him on the stand,” had so tainted the jury 
that if Beck did not testify, the jury would assume Faulkner 
did not want his “client questioned and he has something to 
hide.”  Amster explained that he had objected to Miller’s line of 
questioning because Cruz had initially been arrested in “the 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
124 
bomb case,” and Amster was concerned Cruz’s response would 
open the door to exploring this charge.   
The trial court denied Beck’s mistrial motion.  Neither 
Beck nor Cruz moved for the jury to be contemporaneously 
admonished.  
“ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.  
[Citation.]  Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial 
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 
mistrial motions.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  A motion for a 
mistrial should be granted when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of 
receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198.)  We conclude 
here that Miller’s statement was not “so incurably prejudicial 
that a new trial was required.”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 641, 683.)   
Miller’s statement was brief and isolated.  Moreover, at 
the beginning and the end of the guilt phase, the court 
instructed the jury that statements of the attorneys are not 
evidence.  We presume it followed this instruction.  (People v. 
Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 574.)  Beck claims the trial court 
erred in not contemporaneously admonishing the jury to 
disregard Miller’s comment and instructing the jury a 
defendant had the absolute right not to testify, but Beck did 
not request such an admonition.  In sum, the trial court acted 
within its wide discretion in denying the mistrial motion.   
4. Presence of defendant  
Cruz, 
joined 
by 
Beck, 
citing 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional and statutory provisions, contends he was 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
125 
denied his right to be present at critical stages of his trial.  
(U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 15; 
§§ 977, 1043.)  We disagree.  
“ ‘Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right 
to be personally present at any proceeding in which his 
appearance is necessary to prevent “interference with [his] 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.” ’  (People v. Butler 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861 (Butler), quoting Kentucky v. Stincer 
(1987) 482 U.S. 730, 744–745, fn. 17.)  In addition, a defendant 
has a due process right ‘to be present at any stage of the 
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his 
presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’  
(Kentucky v. Stincer, at p. 745.)”  (People v. Lynch (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 693, 745–746 (Lynch).)   
A defendant also has a state statutory right to be 
present.  Former section 977, subdivision (b) (section 977(b)) 
states in relevant part that in all felony cases, “the accused 
must be present . . . during those portions of the trial when 
evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the 
imposition of sentence” and in general at “all other 
proceedings.”  And section 1043, subdivision (a) generally 
provides that a felony defendant “shall be personally present at 
the trial.”   
We have held that “[n]either the state nor the federal 
Constitution, nor the statutory requirements of sections 977 
and 1043, require the defendant’s personal appearance at 
proceedings 
where 
his 
presence 
bears 
no 
reasonable, 
substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges 
against him.”  (Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 861.)  In 
People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
126 
711, fn. 2, 712 (Safety National), for purposes of applying the 
bail forfeiture statutes, we declined to apply this limitation to 
former section 977(b), reasoning that the phrase “at all other 
proceedings” in that section “does not distinguish between 
critical and noncritical proceedings” and “suggests the 
provision’s reach is inclusive, i.e., subsuming those court 
proceedings not specifically listed in section 977.”  We did not 
reach “the precise scope of section 977 as it relates to the 
constitutional right to be present”; we simply held that “a 
defendant’s 
presence 
at 
an 
‘other 
proceeding[]’ 
under 
section 977(b)(1) constitutes a ‘lawfully required’ appearance 
for which his or her unexcused absence may justify the 
forfeiture of bail.”  (Safety National, at p. 716.)  
Here, Cruz challenges his lack of presence at numerous 
sidebar conferences.  In Safety National, we observed there is 
no indication in former section 977, subdivision (b)(1), which 
addresses “all other proceedings,” that “sidebars at the bench 
or conferences in chambers, i.e., those proceedings that do not 
occur in open court and that are often impromptu and 
unscheduled, are within the scope” of that subdivision.  (Safety 
National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 716.)   
Moreover, Cruz fails to demonstrate that his “personal 
presence was necessary for an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, would have contributed to the trial’s fairness, or 
bore a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend the charges against him.”  (Lynch, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 746.)  Rather, the “proceedings at issue were 
all similar to those involved in prior cases in which we rejected 
a claim that a defendant’s right to presence was infringed.”  
(People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 959 (Carrasco); see, 
e.g., Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 745−746 [the defendant 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
127 
need not be present at hearings regarding discussion of an 
allegation that a juror smelled of alcohol and the questioning of 
the juror]; People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 312 [“a 
defendant may ordinarily be excluded from conferences on 
questions of law, even if those questions are critical to the 
outcome of the case, because the defendant’s presence would 
not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding”]; People v. Riel 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1195–1196 [the defendant’s presence at 
discussions of television coverage, jury instructions, or which 
exhibits to send to the jury “would neither have contributed to 
the fairness of the procedure nor have affected the fullness of 
his opportunity to defend against the charges”].)  Indeed, one of 
the challenged hearings occurred after the guilt verdicts 
against Beck and Cruz had been read, and after defendants 
had been remanded to custody until the penalty phase; it 
involved the court addressing the jury on its inability to reach 
verdicts on the charges against LaMarsh and Willey.  It is 
inconceivable Cruz’s presence at this hearing would have had 
any bearing on the already adjudicated charges against him.   
5. Reopening  
Beck contends that the trial court erred in allowing 
Willey to reopen his defense to allow him to enter into evidence 
an autopsy photograph.  We conclude there was no abuse of 
discretion.   
a. Factual background 
During the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the pathologist who 
performed Colwell’s autopsy testified that the cause of death 
was “stab wounds to the neck and to the abdomen.”  On May 
12, 1992, during the defense case, the court excused the jury 
until 1:30 p.m. the following day.  Outside the presence of the 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
128 
jury, Willey successfully moved for admission of exhibits 183 
and 184, and subsequently rested.  The following day, during a 
hearing between the court and counsel, and before the jury 
returned, Willey informed the court he had just realized he had 
neglected to seek admission of exhibit 185, an autopsy 
photograph.  He sought leave to reopen to have the photograph 
admitted, and he invited a stipulation by the parties that it 
was a photograph taken at Colwell’s autopsy.  The prosecutor 
agreed to stipulate, but Beck and Cruz refused to do so.  The 
prosecutor stated in the absence of a stipulation he would ask 
the pathologist, who was already scheduled to be recalled to 
testify on rebuttal, whether the photograph was of “the 
stomach area of Mr. Colwell as [the pathologist] saw it at the 
time of the autopsy.”  Beck objected on the grounds that the 
photograph was improper rebuttal and unduly prejudicial.   
Willey explained he had not offered the photograph 
sooner “because [he] had mistakenly thought that it . . . was in 
evidence since it was a photograph of a major wound.”  Beck 
objected that the photograph of Colwell’s wound held no 
evidentiary value as to Willey because Willey asserted he was 
never in the house (where Colwell had been stabbed), and 
Willey’s motion for admission of the photograph was untimely.  
Willey asserted the photograph was probative because when it 
was compared to exhibit 115, a photograph already in evidence 
of victim Ritchey, it demonstrated Colwell and Ritchey had 
suffered nearly identical wounds.  Willey’s defense was that 
Ritchey had been stabbed in the house before he ran outside to 
the street and encountered Willey.   
The court granted Willey leave to reopen.  When the jury 
returned to the courtroom, the court explained it was 
permitting Willey to reopen and call the pathologist “to go over 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
129 
one brief area,” but because the pathologist had not yet 
arrived, the prosecutor would first present two rebuttal 
witnesses.  Later that afternoon, Willey called the pathologist, 
who identified exhibit 185 as a photograph taken during 
Colwell’s autopsy, and the photograph was admitted into 
evidence.  The jury was shown both exhibit 115, the 
photograph of Ritchey’s wound, and exhibit 185.  Willey again 
rested, and the prosecutor resumed his rebuttal case.   
b. Analysis 
“A ‘motion to reopen [is] one addressed to the [trial] 
court’s sound discretion.’  (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
1183, 1202.)  In determining whether an abuse of discretion 
occurred, the reviewing court considers four factors: ‘ “(1) the 
stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; 
(2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the 
new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the 
new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the 
evidence.” ’ ”  (Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 881.) 
Here, after the jury had been excused and before it 
returned, Willey rested and then moved the following day to 
reopen and admit a single autopsy photograph.  The 
pathologist was already scheduled to testify that same 
afternoon in the prosecutor’s rebuttal case.  Under these 
circumstances, whatever lack of diligence existed on Willey’s 
part in not noticing exhibit 185 had not been admitted earlier, 
the stage of the proceeding at which his motion was made 
caused no prejudice to Beck.  Nor on this record is it 
reasonably likely the jury accorded exhibit 185 undue weight.  
Willey’s questioning of the pathologist and the admission of the 
photograph consume merely two pages of the reporter’s 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
130 
transcript.  Moreover, the probative value of exhibit 185 was 
that it arguably demonstrated Colwell’s wound was nearly 
identical to Ritchey’s wound.  This similarity was equally 
probative regardless of when it was presented to the jury.  
Although Beck asserts the photograph was cumulative, he does 
not explain what already admitted evidence demonstrated the 
similarities in the wounds.  Likewise, although Beck asserts on 
appeal that the photograph had been previously excluded in 
response to a motion in limine, he offers no citation to the 
record or the basis on which it was purportedly excluded.  In 
sum, the trial court acted well within its discretion in allowing 
Willey to reopen his defense for the limited purpose of seeking 
admission of the photograph.   
6. Rebuttal argument  
Beck and Cruz contend that the trial court erred in 
denying their request for rebuttal argument to the closing 
arguments of their codefendants regarding the conspiracy 
charge.  We reject the claim. 
The trial court set the order of closing argument as 
follows: Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, and Willey.  At the end of trial, 
and before closing arguments, Cruz expressed concern that his 
codefendants would argue that Cruz, Beck, and Vieira had 
formed a conspiracy to kill the victims.  Cruz, joined by Beck, 
requested the court allow Cruz the opportunity to present a 
“short argument” about conspiracy or “anything else that 
would be detrimental to my client . . . on those grounds” after 
the codefendants’ closing arguments but before the prosecutor’s 
rebuttal argument.  Cruz did not object to “anybody having 
rebuttal after me, as long as the rebuttal stays within what I 
might argue at that point.”  The trial court solicited comment 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
131 
from LaMarsh, Willey, and the prosecutor, all of whom 
objected.  They noted that Cruz could anticipate codefendants’ 
arguments and address them in his summation, and the 
prosecutor added that allowing such rebuttal would result in 
“being here all month doing rebuttal arguments.”  The trial 
court denied the motion.   
Section 1093, subdivision (e), provides:  “When the 
evidence is concluded, unless the case is submitted on either 
side, or on both sides, without argument, the district attorney, 
or other counsel for the people, and counsel for the defendant, 
may argue the case to the court and jury; the district attorney, 
or other counsel for the people, opening the argument and 
having the right to close.”  The trial court has discretion to 
depart from this order “for good reason[]” or when required by 
the “state of the pleadings.”  (§ 1094.) 
Beck contends that counsel simply “requested the 
opportunity to rebut the arguments of the other ‘prosecutors’ 
after counsel had an opportunity to hear the claims of the other 
attorneys” and that the “request was narrowly drawn in an 
unusual situation in a capital case.”  Cruz contends that the 
trial court “denied [the] request for rebuttal argument . . . 
without any acknowledgement of its discretion to grant the 
request.”  The trial court clearly understood it had discretion to 
grant the request when it solicited comment from the 
codefendants and the prosecutor.  It was not required to 
explain its reasons for not deviating from section 1093, nor do 
Beck and Cruz demonstrate it abused its discretion in 
following the statute’s general provisions.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
132 
7. Instructional error  
a. Conspiracy  
1. Intent to kill  
Beck and Cruz contend the trial court erroneously failed 
to instruct the jury that conspiracy to commit murder requires 
express malice.  The Attorney General concedes there was 
instructional error.  We conclude the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
(a) Factual background 
The court instructed the jury that murder is the unlawful 
killing of “a human being with malice aforethought.”  It 
explained:  “ ‘Malice’ may be either express or implied.  Malice 
is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to 
kill a human being.  Malice is implied when:  One, the killing 
resulted from an intentional act.  Two, the natural 
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life.  And, 
[t]hree, the act was deliberately performed with knowledge of 
the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.  
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional 
doing of an act with express or implied malice, no other mental 
state need be shown to establish [the] mental state of malice 
aforethought.”   
The court then instructed the jury on premeditated first 
degree murder and second degree murder:  “All murder which 
is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is 
murder of the first degree. . . . If you find that the killing was 
preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the 
part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of 
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
133 
formed upon preexisting reflection and not under a sudden 
heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of 
deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.”  As to second 
degree murder, the court stated:  “Murder of the second degree 
is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully 
to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to 
establish deliberation and premeditation.”  Subsequently, the 
court instructed the jury that “conspiracy is an agreement 
entered into between two or more persons with the specific 
intent to agree to commit the public offense of murder.”   
Later in the instructions, the court stated:  “In each of 
the crimes charged in the information, namely, murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder, there must exist a certain 
mental state in the mind of the perpetrator.  Unless such 
mental state exists, the crime to which it relates is not 
committed.  In the crimes of first degree murder and 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the necessary 
mental states are malice aforethought, premeditation, and 
deliberation.  In the crime of second degree murder and 
conspiracy to commit second degree murder, the necessary 
mental state is malice aforethought.”   
During the prosecutor’s closing argument, he addressed 
the elements of murder:  “Express[] malice, which is what you 
have to have for first degree murder, is a manifestation of an 
intention unlawfully to kill a human being.  Now, you have 
that in this case.”  The prosecutor then cited evidence he 
asserted supported this view.  After briefly describing implied 
malice, the prosecutor stated:  “In this case the [p]rosecution is 
alleging it’s a first degree murder because it’s premeditated 
and it’s deliberate, and I think that that’s obvious in this case 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
134 
when you look at the evidence that the intention to kill these 
people was planned well ahead of time.”   
The prosecutor then turned to the conspiracy to commit 
murder count, stating that there must be “a meeting of the 
minds, an agreement, specific intent to agree and specific 
intent to commit the murders.”  The prosecutor argued that an 
agreement to commit murder was demonstrated by the 
meeting in the trailer in which the “plan was made to go over 
and do the people and leave no witnesses”; everyone was given 
assignments based on the house diagram; by the “damning 
evidence” of possession of masks to conceal their identity; and 
by the testimony of Donna Alvarez, whom the prosecutor 
characterized as a disinterested witness, that LaMarsh, while 
pointing a gun, had ordered everyone to go to the living room 
where the murders were to be committed.  When discussing 
the elements of the multiple-murder special-circumstance 
allegation, the prosecutor noted at least one murder must be 
first degree, and argued, “I would submit to you that all four of 
them are first degree murders in this particular case.”  He 
asserted that when the jury looked at all of the evidence, it 
would “conclude that each and every one of these defendants 
conspired to go over there on Elm Street and kill whoever was 
there.”  He asked the jury to “return verdicts of guilty of first 
degree murder with the special circumstance and guilty of 
conspiracy to commit murder . . . as to each and every one of 
these defendants.”   
On Friday May 29, 1992, the jury completed and signed 
all of the guilt phase verdict forms for Beck and Cruz.  Also on 
this day, the jury sent the court a note asking, “If we find a 
defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and proceed 
to completing the individual murder counts, does the finding of 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
135 
first/second degree murder need or have to be the same for all 
four counts?”  That afternoon, after consulting with counsel, 
the court responded, “No.”  Later that same day, the jury 
asked, “Should we turn in completed jury forms 1) when we 
complete an individual defendant[,] 2) when we complete all 
defendants?” 
On Monday June 1, 1992, the court instructed the jury as 
to when it should turn in the completed verdict forms:  
“[L]adies and gentlemen, that’s up to you.  You can do it either 
way you wish.”  The court cautioned the jury that if it returned 
verdicts as to one or more defendants and then it had second 
thoughts while deliberating regarding a different defendant, 
the verdicts that had been returned could not be changed.   
On the morning of Wednesday, June 3, the jury asked, “If 
we cannot reach an agreement on a conspiracy charge and 
begin to consider the individual charges of murder, should an 
individual . . . who feels that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy 
put that feeling aside and only consider the direct evidence 
linking the defendant and a specific victim or hold their feeling 
that if the defendant is guilty of conspiracy, the defendant is 
guilty of the crimes against all the defendants?”  The court 
instructed the jury:  “If the jury does not find a particular 
defendant guilty of conspiracy, neither the jury, nor any 
individual juror, can find a defendant guilty of a crime based 
on the theory that it was an act done in the furtherance of the 
alleged conspiracy.  However, the failure to find a defendant 
guilty of conspiracy does not preclude the juror, any individual 
juror, from determining whether the defendant is guilty of any 
crime on any individual victim as an aider and abettor.  I refer 
you back to CALJIC 3.00 and 3.01, which you have with you in 
the jury room, which define[] aiding and abetting.  Any juror 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
136 
who believes an individual defendant did not aid and abet a 
particular crime can only consider that defendant’s guilt as to 
that crime based on that defendant’s own commission of that 
crime which can be based on direct or circumstantial evidence.”   
During the afternoon of June 4, 1992, the jury informed 
the court it had reached unanimous verdicts on all charges 
against two defendants and were unable to reach unanimous 
verdicts against the other two defendants.  The court observed 
that the verdicts against Beck and Cruz were dated May 29, 
1992, and asked, “Can I assume that you arrived at these 
verdicts on May the 29th and have been deliberating on the 
other two defendants since then?”  The foreperson replied, 
“Yes.”   
 
(b) Analysis 
Contrary to the court’s instruction, there is no crime of 
“conspiracy to commit second degree murder. . . .”  Rather, “all 
conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to 
commit premeditated and deliberated first degree murder.”  
(People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1237 (Cortez).)  
In contrast to the trial court’s instructions here, 
CALCRIM No. 563 currently provides in relevant part, “The 
defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more 
of] (the other defendant[s] . . .) to intentionally and unlawfully 
kill,” and the bench notes to this instruction state: “Do not 
cross-reference the murder instructions unless they have been 
modified to delete references to implied malice.  Otherwise, a 
reference to implied malice could confuse jurors, because 
conspiracy to commit murder may not be based on a  theory of 
implied malice.”  (Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. 
(2019), Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 563, p. 312.)  Both 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
137 
CALCRIM No. 563 and the corresponding CALJIC No. 6.10 
would avoid any possibility of confusion if they told the jury 
that when it refers to the instructions that define murder, it 
should not consider any instructions regarding implied malice 
because conspiracy to commit murder may not be based on a 
theory of implied malice.  Conspiracy to commit murder may 
be based only on express malice, i.e., an intent to kill.  (See 
People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653 [“Express malice 
is an intent to kill”].)  Alternatively, because “all conspiracy to 
commit 
murder 
is 
necessarily 
conspiracy 
to 
commit 
premeditated and deliberated first degree murder” (Cortez, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1237), references to “conspiracy to 
commit murder” and “intent to commit murder” in the 
standard conspiracy instructions could be changed along the 
following lines.  The instructions should make clear that what 
is required is a conspiracy to commit first degree murder and 
an intent to commit first degree murder, respectively.  That 
would also avoid any confusion about the nature of the intent 
required for this type of conspiracy. 
The error here in instructing on conspiracy to commit 
second degree murder was nonetheless harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Based on the remaining instructions, the 
prosecutor’s argument, and the jury verdicts, we conclude that 
the “jury necessarily found the defendants guilty of conspiracy 
to commit murder on a proper theory, i.e., based on express 
malice or intent to kill.”  (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
593, 607 (Swain).)  
It is true that there is possible ambiguity in the 
instructions insofar as the court defined malice aforethought to 
include both express and implied malice, and later stated that 
the mental state for second degree murder was simply “malice 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
138 
aforethought.”  Critically, though, when specifically instructing 
the jury on second degree murder, the court — at the request 
of both Cruz and the prosecutor — instructed on what we have 
termed 
“unpremeditated 
murder 
with 
express 
malice.”  
(Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 601.)  The court stated, 
“Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought when there is 
manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but 
the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and 
premeditation.”  Thus, in specifically instructing the jury on 
premeditated first degree murder and second degree murder, 
the court defined both as requiring express malice or an intent 
to kill.  In light of that instruction, the jury had no occasion to 
consider the instructions defining implied malice.  
Indeed, the prosecutor had also requested an instruction 
on implied malice murder, but the court denied the request, 
stating:  “I don’t think this is applicable.”  The prosecutor 
responded, “That would only be applicable if they were alleging 
that they went over to beat them up.”  The court said, “Right.  
So this is not going to be given.”  Neither Beck nor Cruz 
objected.  Nor do they contend here that the trial court should 
have instructed on implied malice murder. 
Beck and Cruz rely on Swain, where the trial court 
instructed the jury on “the elements of murder, including 
principles of implied malice second degree murder.”  (Swain, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 602, italics omitted.)  The jury returned 
general verdicts, which did not state “on what theory they 
found the requisite element of malice necessary to convict on 
the charges of conspiracy to commit murder.  Under the 
implied malice instructions, the jury could have found malice 
without finding intent to kill.”  (Id. at p. 607.)  The “prosecutor 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
139 
repeatedly referred to implied malice in the closing arguments, 
stating at one point that ‘ . . . this could very easily be an 
implied malice case.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “Swain was found not guilty of 
murder and its lesser offenses,” and his codefendant “was 
convicted of second degree murder, which conviction itself 
could have been based on a theory of implied malice.”  (Ibid.)  
On this record, this court concluded that the conspiracy to 
commit murder convictions must be reversed.  (Ibid.) 
Here, by contrast, the court did not instruct on implied 
malice murder when it specifically instructed on premeditated 
first degree murder and second degree murder.  Nor did the 
prosecutor invite the jury to convict Beck or Cruz of either 
murder or conspiracy to commit murder on a theory of implied 
malice, but rather urged the jury to find them guilty of first 
degree premeditated murder.  Moreover, Beck and Cruz, 
unlike the defendants in Swain, were found guilty of the first 
degree premeditated murders of all four victims.  Under the 
court’s instructions, this entailed a finding that each of the 
killings “was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate 
intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result 
of deliberation and premeditation . . . formed upon preexisting 
reflection.”  Although Swain did not delineate what overt facts 
were found true by the jury in that case, here the jury 
expressly found that Beck and Cruz had committed five overt 
acts for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy: Beck and 
Cruz “obtained and armed themselves with weapons to be used 
to commit the murders,” “drove and rode in a vehicle to the 
area of the scene of the murders,” “put on military type face 
masks in an attempt to conceal their identities,” “entered the 
residence located at 5223 Elm Street,” and “killed Franklin 
Raper, Richard Ritchey, Emmie Darlene Paris and Dennis 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
140 
Colwell in the furtherance of the conspiracy.”  These findings of 
participation in acts of preparing to murder and then in the 
killing of the victims support a conclusion that the jury found 
Beck and Cruz conspired to kill the victims.   
Further, as Beck’s briefing acknowledges, “a conspiracy 
to commit an implied malice murder is a logical impossibility 
under the law.”  Implied malice murder is established “in part 
through hindsight” once the defendant commits “some act 
dangerous to human life” that results in a killing.  (Swain, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 603.)  Conspiracy, by contrast, is an 
inchoate crime that establishes criminal liability before the 
target crime is committed.  (Ibid.)  Conspiracy to commit 
implied malice murder “would be at odds with the very nature 
of the crime of conspiracy . . . precisely because commission of 
the crime could never be established, or be deemed complete, 
unless and until a killing actually occurred.”  (Ibid.)  In light of 
the court’s instructions and the way the prosecution argued 
this case to the jury, we find no reasonable possibility that the 
jury embraced the “logical impossibility” of a conspiracy to 
commit implied malice murder as opposed to convicting Beck 
and Cruz of conspiracy to commit murder upon a finding of 
intent to kill. 
Finally, Beck asserts that “the jurors obviously were 
confused about the relationship between the conspiracy 
instruction and the substantive murder charges” because it 
asked the two questions noted above.  The second question was 
asked after the jury had already reached verdicts for Beck and 
Cruz and were only deliberating on the charges against 
LaMarsh and Willey.  The first question, “If we find a 
defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and proceed 
to completing the individual murder counts, does the finding of 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
141 
first/second degree murder need or have to be the same for all 
four counts,” to which the court simply answered, “No,” does 
not suggest that the jury failed to find an intent to kill for 
either the conspiracy to commit murder or the murder counts.  
That question, which focused on whether the degree of murder 
found (first or second) must be the same for all four counts, 
contains no hint that the jury found or considered finding any 
defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder based on 
implied malice. 
2. Natural and probable consequences  
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends that the trial court’s 
conspiracy instructions improperly allowed him to be convicted 
of first degree premeditated murder as an aider and abettor 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.  (People 
v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158−159 [a natural and probable 
consequences theory of liability cannot serve as a basis for a 
first degree premeditated murder conviction].)  The Attorney 
General concedes the error.  We conclude there is no 
reasonable probability Beck and Cruz were prejudiced by any 
error.   
The trial court instructed the jury:  “A member of a 
conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his 
knowledge his confederates agreed to and did commit, but is 
also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any 
crime or act of a coconspirator to further the object of the 
conspiracy, even though such crime or act was not intended as 
a part of the agreed upon objective and even though he was not 
present at the time of the commission of such crime or act.  You 
must determine whether the defendant is guilty as a member 
of a conspiracy to commit the originally agreed upon crime or 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
142 
crimes and, if so, whether the crime alleged in Count I, II, III, 
and IV was perpetrated by coconspirators in the furtherance of 
such conspiracy and was a natural and probable consequence 
of the agreed upon criminal objective of such conspiracy.”   
Beck and Cruz were charged with conspiracy to murder, 
not conspiracy to commit a lesser crime that resulted in 
murder.  There is thus no possibility they were found guilty of 
murder on a natural and probable consequences theory.  
Indeed, the prosecutor proceeded on a theory that Beck and 
Cruz were direct perpetrators of the murders, directly aided 
and abetted the murders, or were coconspirators to commit 
murder.  The prosecutor did not proceed on a theory that Beck 
and Cruz were guilty of murder under the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine; the “prosecutor never argued 
that one defendant intended only to commit one particular 
crime, but that the other defendant committed a different 
crime, which was the natural and probable consequence of the 
commission of the first, thereby making both defendants guilty 
of the second offense.”  (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 99, 184 (Letner and Tobin).)  Nor, despite 
mentioning the natural and probable consequences doctrine in 
the conspiracy instruction, did the trial court instruct the jury 
on this theory of murder.   
b. Multiple murder  
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends that the trial court failed 
to instruct the jury that the multiple-murder special-
circumstance allegation required intent to kill.  We conclude 
any ambiguity in the multiple-murder special-circumstance 
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
143 
“When there is evidence from which a jury could base its 
convictions for multiple counts of murder on the theory that 
the defendant was guilty as an aider and abettor, and not as 
the actual perpetrator, the trial court must instruct the jury 
that to find true a multiple-murder special-circumstance 
allegation as to that defendant, it must find that the defendant 
intended to kill the murder victims.  (§ 190.2, subds. (b)-(c); 
People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 192.)”  (People v. Nunez 
and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45.)  Contrary to both the 
Attorney General’s and Cruz’s erroneous assertions, these 
principles 
remain 
true 
even 
after 
the 
passage 
of 
Proposition 115 in 1990.  (Nunez and Satele, at p. 45.)  We 
conclude these principles were satisfied here.   
The trial court instructed the jury:  “If you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant was either the actual killer, 
a co-conspirator, or an aider and abettor, but you are unable to 
decide which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill, participated as a 
co-conspirator with or aided and abetted an actor in the 
commission of at least one murder in the first degree and in at 
least one additional murder of the first or second degree in 
order to find the special circumstances to be true.  On the other 
hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
was the actual killer of at least one person in the first degree 
and at least one additional person in the first or second degree, 
you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human 
being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.”   
Cruz contends that under the court’s instruction, “the 
jury was required to find an intent to kill only if they could not 
decide whether [a defendant] was the actual killer, an aider 
and abettor, or a coconspirator,” and that if the “jury did 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
144 
determine that [a defendant] was guilty as an aider and 
abettor, or as a coconspirator, this instruction required no 
finding of intent to kill.”  But we have previously described a 
substantially similar instruction as merely “ambiguous.”  
(Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 180−181.)  
Moreover, we concluded there was “no reasonable likelihood 
the jury misunderstood or misapplied this instruction.”  (Id. at 
p. 182.)  We reasoned:  “Although we conclude the instruction’s 
meaning concerning the intent of an aider and abettor was not 
‘unmistakable,’ certainly the jury could draw from the 
instruction as a whole the inference that an aider and abettor 
was required to have an intent to kill.  In addition, the 
prosecutor presented a correct and complete statement of the 
law in h[is] arguments following the trial court’s instructions.”  
(Ibid.)  Nor did the prosecutor “identify one defendant as 
having killed [the victim], but instead argued exclusively that 
the evidence demonstrated that both defendants had the intent 
to kill [the victim],” and also did not argue “that the jury, 
pursuant to that part of the instruction addressing an actual 
killer, need not find intent to kill as to one of the two 
defendants. . . . Accordingly, despite the ambiguity in the 
instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
found one defendant was the actual killer, and then based its 
special circumstance findings as to the other defendant upon 
an erroneous notion that an aider and abettor need not possess 
the intent to kill.”  (Letner and Tobin, at pp. 182−183.) 
Similarly here, “the jury could draw from the instruction 
as a whole the inference that an aider and abettor” or 
coconspirator “was required to have an intent to kill,” and the 
prosecutor did not argue that the jury need not find intent to 
kill as to either Beck or Cruz.  (Letner and Tobin, supra, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
145 
50 Cal.4th at p. 182.)  Moreover, we have already concluded in 
connection with the erroneous conspiracy to commit murder 
instruction that the jury necessarily found Beck and Cruz 
acted with an intent to kill.  (See ante, pt. II.B.7.a.1.)  Hence 
any ambiguity in the multiple-murder special-circumstance 
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
c. Self-defense and imperfect self-defense  
The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense only as 
to the charge that LaMarsh had murdered Raper.  Beck, joined 
by Cruz, contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury on self-defense as to each of them.  Beck and Cruz further 
contend the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
imperfect self-defense.  No substantial evidence supported such 
instructions.   
As noted, Beck testified that between April 10, 1990, 
when Raper’s trailer was removed from the Camp, and May 20, 
1990, the night of the murders, Beck received no threats from 
Raper.  On May 20, 1990, Evans told Beck and Cruz that she 
had gone to her sister’s house earlier to retrieve some items.  
Raper refused to let her take the items and said he and his 
friends were at some unspecified time going to go to the Camp 
and kill Evans and those with whom she associated at the 
Camp.  Evans said it was urgent she retrieve a wedding gown 
and other clothes from 5223 Elm Street, and asked that 
someone accompany her so that Raper would not again 
interfere.  The entire group went to the Elm Street house “in 
case something happened, so they wouldn’t be caught so then 
they couldn’t get out.”  Beck was unarmed.  Evans and 
LaMarsh apparently entered the home first, and after hearing 
a woman scream, Beck followed Vieira into the house and 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
146 
observed LaMarsh holding a baseball bat and standing in front 
of Raper.  Raper was sitting down, and Beck watched his body 
“slump[] down.”  Beck was “shock[ed],” stood there briefly, and 
then moved toward noises in the house.  He saw Vieira and 
Colwell struggling.  Vieira’s back was on the floor, and Colwell 
was on top of Vieira.  Beck punched Colwell several times on 
his back and then threw him several feet into the cupboards.  
Beck denied killing Colwell, Ritchey, or Paris, or doing 
anything wrong that night.  
Cruz testified that on the evening on May 20, Evans told 
Cruz she needed to retrieve some clothes, including a bridal 
gown that was an heirloom, from 5223 Elm Street, and wanted 
Cruz and others to accompany her for protection.  Also 
sometime that evening, Evans told Cruz that Raper had 
threatened to kill Cruz and her, “Raper was sharpening 
knives,” and Raper was going to call his biker friends “to come 
and kill everyone in the camp that night.”  Cruz told Evans 
that Raper had also previously threatened him.  Cruz denied 
hitting, stabbing, or killing anyone on the night of May 20, 
1990 or directing Vieira to cut Paris’s throat.  He testified he 
was not physically capable of fighting another person on the 
night of the murders.   
“Self-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that 
killing is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or 
great bodily injury, is a complete justification, and such a 
killing is not a crime.”  (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 
133−134.)  Here there was no evidence of such imminent 
threat.  Indeed, neither Beck nor Cruz described being 
attacked by anyone, and both denied killing anyone.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Beck contends that although he denied any participation 
in the victims’ deaths, the jury could have found he committed 
such acts based on LaMarsh’s testimony that Beck stabbed 
Colwell in the stomach and Willey’s testimony that Beck 
knocked Willey off Ritchey, fell on Ritchey, and slit his throat.  
He further asserts that such acts “might have been in self-
defense” because Raper was a “violent, dangerous individual” 
who had a “history of hostilities toward and violent 
confrontations with Beck and his friends.”  “Thus, Beck and 
the others could reasonably fear for their safety in any 
confrontation with Raper and his buddies.”  Such speculation 
is 
not 
substantial 
evidence 
warranting 
a 
self-defense 
instruction.   
Beck and Cruz further contend the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense.  Assuming 
this claim is preserved as to Beck, no substantial evidence 
supported such an instruction for either defendant.   
“ ‘ “Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the 
trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person 
because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the 
defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus 
can be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary 
manslaughter.” ’ ”  (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 
581.)  Imperfect self-defense “obviates malice because that 
most culpable of mental states ‘cannot coexist’ with an actual 
belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one’s own 
death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.”  (People v. Rios 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461.)  “This doctrine is a ‘ “narrow” ’ one 
and ‘will apply only when the defendant has an actual belief in 
the need for self-defense and only when the defendant fears 
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immediate harm that “ ‘ “must be instantly dealt with.” ’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 97–98.)   
There is no substantial evidence that Beck or Cruz 
possessed an actual but unreasonable belief of imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury.  Again, neither Beck nor 
Cruz described being attacked by anyone, and both denied 
killing anyone.  The prosecutor’s evidence and the testimony of 
LaMarsh and Willey showed that Beck and Cruz executed a 
surprise attack on the victims and brutally murdered them, 
and thus also provides no substantial basis for an instruction 
on imperfect self-defense.  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
768, 773, fn. 1 [the imperfect self-defense doctrine may not be 
invoked “by a defendant who, through his own wrongful 
conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the 
commission of a felony), has created circumstances under 
which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified”].)   
In sum, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct 
the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense.   
d. Sudden quarrel and heat of passion 
The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter based on heat of passion.  Beck, joined by Cruz, 
contends that the court improperly defined sudden quarrel and 
heat of passion when instructing the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter and erred in refusing to give four proposed 
instructions.  We disagree. 
“ ‘Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a 
lesser included offense of murder.’  [Citations.]  ‘Although 
section 192, subdivision (a), refers to “sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion,” the factor which distinguishes the “heat of passion” 
form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is provocation.’ ”  
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705 (Avila).)  “To be 
adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an 
emotion so intense that an ordinary person would simply react, 
without reflection. . . .  [T]he anger or other passion must be so 
strong that the defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought 
process to such an extent that judgment could not and did not 
intervene.”  (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 949 
(Beltran).)  “ ‘ “[I]f sufficient time has elapsed for the passions 
of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing is 
murder, not manslaughter.” ’ ”  (Avila, at p. 705.)  “ ‘The 
provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct 
in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], 
or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have 
been engaged in by the victim.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Beck requested four supplemental instructions:  (1) “The 
right of self-defense is available to a person engaged in a 
sudden quarrel.  The mere fact that the parties are engaged in 
a sudden quarrel, which may be a mere altercation of words, 
cannot deprive one of the right to defend himself against real 
or apparent danger”; (2) “The passion necessary to constitute 
heat of passion need not mean rage or anger but may be any 
violent, intense, overwrought or enthusiastic emotion which 
causes a person to act rashly and without deliberation and 
reflection”; (3) “Any type of provocation is sufficient if it is of 
such character and degree as naturally would excite and 
arouse such heat of passion, and verbal provocation may be 
sufficient”; (4) “A defendant may act in the heat of passion at 
the time of the killing as a result of a series of events which 
occur over a considerable period of time.  Where the 
provocation extends for a long period of time, you must take 
such period of time into account in determining whether there 
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150 
was a sufficient cooling period for the passion to subside.  The 
burden is on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in the hea[t] of passion.”   
Beck contends that unlike his proposed instructions, the 
court’s instructions failed to “inform[] the jury that the period 
of provocation might occur over ‘a considerable period of 
time.’ ”  As he concedes in his reply, the court instructed the 
jury:  “Legally adequate provocation may occur in a short, or 
over a considerable, period of time.  The question to be 
answered is whether or not at the time of the killing the reason 
of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an 
extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of 
average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and 
reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.”   
Beck further contends that the court failed to instruct the 
jury that intense emotions other than anger and rage could 
operate to “reduce the murder charge.”  As noted, the focus of 
the jury in evaluating whether a defendant has committed 
voluntary 
manslaughter 
is 
properly 
on 
the 
asserted 
provocation.  (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 705.)  “To be 
adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an 
emotion so intense that an ordinary person would simply react, 
without reflection. . . .  [T]he anger or other passion must be so 
strong that the defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought 
process to such an extent that judgment could not and did not 
intervene.” 
 
(Beltran, 
supra, 
56 Cal.4th 
at 
p. 949.)  
“[P]rovocation is sufficient not because it affects the quality of 
one’s thought processes but because it eclipses reflection.”  (Id. 
at p. 950.)  These concepts were adequately conveyed in the 
court’s instruction.   
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Finally, Beck contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing his proposed instruction that verbal provocation may 
be sufficient to reduce the alleged crime from murder to 
manslaughter.  This concept was adequately addressed by the 
court’s lengthy instructions to the jury of what constitutes 
adequate provocation.  These instructions do not, as Beck 
contends, “limit[] provocation to physical provocation by the 
victim.”   
e. Order of charges  
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury to consider the charges in a particular 
order.  There is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood 
the instructions in this manner.   
At the close of the guilt phase, the court instructed the 
jury:  “[Y]ou are to determine whether the defendants are 
guilty or not guilty of the crime charged and any degree thereof 
or of any lesser crime as specified in this instruction.  In doing 
so, you have discretion to choose the order in which you 
evaluate each crime or consider the evidence pertaining to it.  
You may find it productive to consider and reach a tentative 
conclusion on all charges and lesser crimes before reaching any 
final verdicts.  However, the Court cannot accept a guilty 
verdict on a lesser crime unless you have unanimously found 
the defendant not guilty of the crime charged.”   
During deliberations, the jury sent the following question 
to the court:  “CALJIC 17.10.  Please clarify must be found 
unanimously not guilty of each applicable count before 
considering lesser charge.”  (Sic.)  The court told counsel it had 
prepared a response, it had shared that proposed response 
with the prosecutor and Beck’s counsel, and both had agreed 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
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152 
that the proposed response could be read to the jury in their 
absence.  At the hearing, counsel for Cruz also agreed to the 
proposed instruction.   
The court then instructed the jury:  “In response to your 
question, ‘please clarify must be found unanimously not guilty 
of each applicable count before considering lesser charge,’ let 
me tell you there is a very lengthy CALJIC instruction dealing 
with lesser included offenses which has not been read to you.  
If you want that instruction read to you, I will read it to you 
tomorrow morning.  However, in the meantime, I will attempt 
to respond to your specific question with the following 
instruction:  For example, before you can find a defendant 
guilty of second degree murder as to a particular count, all 
12 of you must find him not guilty of first degree murder as to 
that count.  Before you can find him guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter as to that count, all 12 of you must find him not 
guilty of both first and second degree murder as to that count.  
Before you can find him guilty of one of the lesser nonhomicide 
crimes, as to that count, all 12 of you must find him not guilty 
of first and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter 
as to that count.  Okay?”  The court then sent the jury back to 
continue deliberations.   
Here, Beck acknowledges that his counsel agreed to the 
second instruction given during deliberations but contends the 
instruction was erroneous.  Assuming this claim has not been 
waived, we reject it.   
Contrary to Beck’s assertion, the instruction is not 
reasonably understood to mandate that the jury consider the 
charges in a particular order.  Reading the two instructions 
together, the jury would have reasonably understood it could 
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153 
consider the crimes in any order but could not return a guilty 
verdict on a lesser included crime unless it had unanimously 
found the defendant not guilty of the crime charged.   
f. Consciousness of guilt 
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends that the trial court 
erroneously instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt 
evidenced by willfully false statements, suppression of 
evidence, and flight.  We reject the claim.   
The court instructed the jury with the language of 
CALJIC No. 2.03:  “If you find that before this trial a 
defendant made a willfully false and deliberately misleading 
statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being 
tried, you may consider such statement as a circumstance 
tending to prove a consciousness of guilt on the part of such 
defendant.  However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to 
prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters 
for your determination.”  Cruz contends the court erred in 
denying his requested addition to this instruction, which 
provided in part:  “The defendant’s consciousness of guilt, if 
any, is relevant upon the questions o[f] whether the defendant 
was afraid of being apprehended and whether the defendant 
thought he had committed a crime.  Consciousness of guilt may 
not be considered [in determining the degree of defendant’s 
guilt] [or] [in determining which of the charged offenses the 
defendant committed].”   
The court also instructed the jury with the language of 
CALJIC No. 2.06:  “If you find that a defendant attempted to 
suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by 
attempting to induce a person to alibi for him or by destroying 
or concealing evidence, such attempt may be considered by you 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
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154 
as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  
However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, 
and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your 
consideration.”   
In addition, the court instructed the jury with the 
language of section 1127c and CALJIC No. 2.52:  “The flight of 
a person immediately after the commission of a crime or after 
he is accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish 
his guilt.  It is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by 
you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the 
question of his guilt or innocence.  The weight to which such 
circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.”  
Cruz contends the trial court erred in refusing to add the 
following language:  “The defendant’s consciousness of guilt, if 
any, is relevant upon the questions o[f] whether the defendant 
was afraid of being apprehended and whether the defendant 
thought [he] [she] had committed a crime.  Consciousness of 
guilt may not be considered [in determining the degree of 
defendant’s guilt] [or in determining which of the charge[d] 
offenses the defendant committed].”   
Cruz contends that the challenged consciousness of guilt 
instructions 
improperly 
duplicated 
more 
general 
circumstantial evidence instructions, were unfairly partisan 
and argumentative, and permitted the jury to draw irrational 
permissive inferences about Cruz’s guilt.  We have rejected 
substantially similar challenges, and he offers no persuasive 
reason for us to reconsider these conclusions.  (See, e.g., 
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 438 
[CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.06, and 2.52]; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
p. 761 [CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.06, and 2.52]; People v. Hartsch 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
155 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 505 [CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06]; People 
v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 152–154 [CALJIC No. 2.52].)   
Cruz also asserts the instructions were unfairly partisan 
and argumentative because they allowed for an inference of 
consciousness of guilt only as to Cruz and his codefendants 
when Evans also made false statements, attempted to suppress 
evidence, and fled.  We disagree.  The instructions merely 
informed the jury that if it found Cruz had made false 
statements, attempted to suppress evidence, or fled, such 
activities “could indicate consciousness of guilt, while also 
clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove 
a defendant’s guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the 
weight and significance assigned to such behavior.”  (People v. 
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224 (Jackson).)  The jury did 
not need to know how to consider such evidence against Evans 
because she was not on trial.  Defense counsel was nonetheless 
free to argue that the activities of Evans following the murders 
demonstrated her consciousness of guilt.  (See People v. 
Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 53 (Dement) [rejecting a 
substantially similar claim].)   
Cruz further contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing his requested modification of CALJIC No. 2.03.  We 
have previously rejected claims challenging the denial of 
similar proposed modifications, and Cruz offers no persuasive 
reason to reconsider our conclusion.  (People v. Thornton (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 391, 439; Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1224.)   
g. Reasonable doubt  
Cruz, joined by Beck, contends the trial court’s 
instructions in the language of CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 1.02, 2.01, 
2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.50, 2.51, 2.52, 2.90, 8.20, 8.83, and 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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8.83.1 undermined and diluted the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  He advances no persuasive reason 
to reconsider our prior rejection of substantially similar 
challenges to these instructions, and we decline to do so.  
(Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 43; see People v. 
Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 572−575; People v. Grimes (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 698, 723–725 [rejecting challenge to CALJIC 
No. 8.83]; People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 553–554 
[rejecting challenge to CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 2.52, 8.83 and 
8.83.1]; People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 831 [CALJIC 
No. 2.01 
did 
not 
“create 
an 
impermissible 
mandatory 
presumption by requiring the jury to draw an incriminatory 
inference whenever such an inference appeared ‘reasonable’ 
unless the defense rebutted it by producing a reasonable 
exculpatory interpretation”]; Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 437 [rejecting challenge to CALJIC 
Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, and 
8.20]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 129 [CALJIC 
Nos. 2.02, 8.83 and 8.83.1 did not inform jury it could find the 
defendant guilty if he “ ‘reasonably appeared’ ” to be guilty]; 
People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1106 [CALJIC 
No. 2.50]; Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 54 [modified CALJIC 
No. 1.02].)   
h. Firearms and relationship evidence 
Cruz asserts the trial court erroneously instructed the 
jury on the proper use of the firearms and relationship 
evidence.  (See ante, pt. II.B.2.)  There was no error.   
The court instructed the jury in a modified form of 
CALJIC No. 2.50 (5th ed. 1988):  “Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that one or more of the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
157 
defendants committed acts similar to those constituting crimes 
other than that for which he is on trial.  Such evidence, if 
believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to 
prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he 
has a disposition to commit crimes.  Such evidence is received 
and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
determining if it tends to show:  The existence of the intent 
which is a necessary element of the crime charged.  The 
identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, for 
which the defendant is accused.  A motive for the commission 
of the crime charged.  The defendant had knowledge or 
possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary 
for the commission of the crime charged.  The crime charged is 
a part of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy.  The 
existence of a conspiracy.  For the limited purpose for which 
you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same 
manner as you do all other evidence in the case.  You are not 
permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.”  
The court further instructed the jury that if evidence was 
admitted against one or more defendants “it could not be 
considered . . . against the other defendants.”   
Cruz contends that the instruction was erroneous 
because it did not identify or describe what acts were “similar 
to those constituting crimes.”  There is no reasonable likelihood 
that the jury understood the instruction to refer to Cruz’s 
ownership of firearms because there was no evidence any of 
these firearms were illegal.  The jury would have reasonably 
understood the instruction to refer to evidence of violence 
before the murders, such as Cruz directing Beck to hit Vieira 
and LaMarsh and Willey beating Colwell.  The instruction 
informed the jury of the proper use of this evidence, providing, 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
158 
“[s]uch evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be 
considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person of 
bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.”  
Again, we presume the jury understood and followed this 
instruction.  (Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1178.)  As 
the United States Supreme Court has said in upholding a 
similar modification of CALJIC No. 2.50 against a due process 
challenge, the “use of the evidence of prior offenses permitted 
by this instruction was . . . parallel to the familiar use of 
evidence of prior acts for the purpose of showing intent, 
identity, motive, or plan.  [Citation.]  Furthermore, the trial 
court guarded against possible misuse of the instruction by 
specifically advising the jury that the ‘ . . . evidence, if believed, 
was not received, and may not be considered by you[,] to prove 
that [the defendant] is a person of bad character or that he has 
a disposition to commit crimes.’ ”  (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 
502 U.S. 62, 75; see id. at p. 67, fn. 1.)   
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Rebuttal evidence  
Beck contends that the trial court erroneously admitted 
rebuttal evidence.  We disagree. 
As noted, on rebuttal, Jennifer testified that in 1988, 
when her daughter A. was no more than six months old, Beck, 
Cruz, and Vieira placed a tape recorder next to A. in her crib.  
As she was falling asleep, they snuck up on her and screamed 
at her.  A. woke up and started to scream and cry.  The tape 
recording of this incident was played for the jury.   
“Rebuttal evidence is relevant and thus admissible if it 
‘tend[s] to disprove a fact of consequence on which the 
defendant has introduced evidence.’  [Citation.]  The trial court 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
159 
is 
vested 
with 
broad 
discretion 
in 
determining 
the 
admissibility of evidence in rebuttal.”  (People v. Clark (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 856, 936; see People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 
195 [the trial court has “broad power to control the 
presentation of proposed impeachment evidence”].)  Here, as 
the trial court observed, evidence that Beck had screamed at a 
sleeping infant so that he could be amused by her resulting 
terror and crying tended to undermine Beck’s penalty defense 
evidence that he was caring to young children.  The trial court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
testimony and tape.   
Nor did admission of the evidence contravene Evidence 
Code section 352.  “ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial 
than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it poses an 
intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the 
reliability of the outcome.” ’ ”  (People v. Riggs (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 248, 290.)  No such intolerable risk was present 
here.  Nor, contrary to Beck’s contention, is a trial court 
required to “ ‘expressly weigh prejudice against probative value 
or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a 
whole shows,’ ” as here, that “ ‘the court was aware of and 
performed its balancing function under Evidence Code 
section 352.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1285.)   
Beck further contends the tape was not newly discovered 
evidence and should have been admitted in the prosecutor’s 
case-in-chief.  He does not articulate on what basis the tape, 
which was not relevant to the circumstances of the crime or 
Beck’s prior criminal conduct, would have been admissible in 
the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.  Rather, the tape only became 
relevant after Beck’s penalty defense witnesses testified to his 
care of and positive interactions with young children.   
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2. Tape exclusion  
Beck contends that the trial court erred in excluding 
during the prosecutor’s rebuttal case a tape of a threatening 
telephone call from Perkins to Jennifer.  We disagree.   
Jennifer testified on rebuttal that she had received 
numerous threatening telephone calls from Cruz while he was 
in jail after the murders.  They stopped just before Cruz’s 
death penalty phase when he learned Jennifer would be a 
witness.  Jennifer also received threatening telephone calls 
from Perkins.  A tape of one threatening call from Cruz was 
played for the jury.  Jennifer testified she had been afraid of 
Beck because “he would do what [Cruz] told him to do.”   
Beck contends that evidence of Perkins’s “threat was a 
critical component of trial counsel’s argument to the penalty 
phase jury that [Beck] was under the control of Cruz,” and the 
“fact that Perkins was making threats on behalf of Cruz when 
[Beck] was not even present would have given significant 
support to that claim.”  Jennifer testified that Beck did 
whatever Cruz told him to, and the jury was informed that 
Perkins had made threatening telephone calls to Jennifer.  The 
trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the tape 
itself, which was remote evidence of Cruz’s control over Beck 
and, as the trial court observed, might have necessitated 
Perkins’s further testimony at this late stage of trial.   
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Beck and Cruz contend that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument in their respective penalty 
phases.  There was no prejudicial misconduct.   
“ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
161 
render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or 
involves deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to 
persuade the trier of fact.’  [Citation.]  ‘As a general rule a 
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same 
ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and 
requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
impropriety.’  [Citation.]  ‘When attacking the prosecutor’s 
remarks to the jury, the defendant must show’ that in the 
context of the whole argument and the instructions there was 
‘ “a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the 
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous 
manner.” ’ ”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1219 
(Rangel).)   
a. Biblical references 
Beck and Cruz challenge the prosecutor’s reliance on the 
Bible in closing argument.   
1. Factual background 
At Cruz’s penalty phase, the prosecutor argued:  “I want 
to briefly talk about a subject that is, I want to make clear to 
you, is not aggravating in any sense of the word.  The only 
reason I mention it is because maybe some of you that had a 
little problem with the subject of religion.  Again this is not 
aggravating in any way. You know, when you hear the 
opponents of the death penalty talking, they invariably bring 
up passages from the Bible, as do the proponents.  And the 
opponents always say, ‘Well, the Bible says “ ‘ “Thou shalt not 
kill” ’ ” and it says “ ‘ “Vengeance is mine saith the Lord.” ’ ”  
But right after the passage about vengeance is . . . Paul, who is 
speaking, says, ‘The ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is 
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162 
the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that 
do it evil.’  Now, when he’s talking about the ruler he’s talking 
about the government there.  The first five books of the Old 
Testament I believe are called the Torah in the Judeo-
Christian ethic, and they start off . . . . with the book of 
Genesis where it says ‘Adam, human being, whoever sheds the 
blood of man by man shall his blood be shed, for in his image 
did God make man.’  Now, the opponents of the death penalty 
say that’s all well and good but God didn’t punish Adam for 
killing Cain and — or Abel.  And, in any event, the most 
important concepts in that are that capital punishment for 
murder is necessary in order to preserve the sanctity of human 
life, and only the severest penalty of death can underscore the 
severity of taking a life.  There are several other passages in 
the Bible that speak of death or killing, so forth.  The most 
interesting, I think, is Exodus, [c]hapter 21, [v]erse 12 
through 14.  It says, ‘Whoever strikes another man and kills 
him shall be put to death.  But if he did not act with intent but 
they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place which I 
will appoint for you.’  This is the Lord speaking.  In other 
words, if it’s an accidental type killing, it wasn’t done with 
intent, there’s a sanctuary, there’s a haven.  It’s kind of like life 
in prison without possibility of parole.  But the Lord goes on to 
say, ‘If you didn’t do this intentionally, then there’s a 
sanctuary’ — well, I’m sorry, that was my words.  It goes on to 
say, ‘If a man has the presumption to kill another by treachery, 
you shall take him even from my altar to be put to death.’  The 
Lord says if you kill by treachery, there’s no sanctuary.  ‘Take 
him from my altar and put him to death.’  Now, again that’s 
not aggravation.  It’s just in the event any of you have any 
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concerns about where religion fits in, hopefully that will be of 
some assistance to you.”   
At Beck’s penalty phase, the prosecutor similarly argued:  
“Very briefly, I want to touch on a subject that you’ve heard a 
lot of evidence on in this phase of the trial.  It’s not aggravating 
in any sense.  The subject of religion.  Mr. Beck had a very 
strong religious upbringing.  It’s very obvious.  Mr. Beck 
preached the Bible to others, carried it with him all the time, 
knew it front to back.  If any of you have any problem with the 
role that the death penalty plays in religion, I’d like to indicate 
to you that there are a number of passages in the Bible that 
deal with the subject.  I’m sure that Mr. Beck is aware of it.  
One especially fitting is in Exodus where it indicates that — 
the Lord of the Christian religion speaking, ‘Whoever strikes 
another man and kills him shall be put to death, but if he did 
not act with intent, but they met by act of God, the slayer may 
flee to a place which I will appoint for you.’  This is an 
accidental, unintentional killing.  The Lord says there’s a 
sanctuary, ‘I will keep you safe.’  I suggest to you that it’s like 
life without parole.  But the Lord goes on to say, ‘If a man has 
a presumption to kill another by treachery, you shall take him 
even from [m]y altar to be put to death.’  ‘Taken from [m]y 
altar.’  There is no haven, there is no sanctuary, for an 
intentional, treacherous killer.  That’s exactly what you have 
here.  Again, it’s not aggravation.  It’s just in case any of you 
have any problems with religion in the case.  I’m going to 
conclude shortly. 
“I would like to read a statement that was made many, 
many years ago by a Justice in a country other than ours, a 
Justice in England, that in spite of the fact that they didn’t 
have a death penalty, made a very fitting statement.  And it 
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goes:  ‘Punishment is the way in which society expresses [its] 
denunciation of wrongdoing; and in order to maintain respect 
for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave 
crime should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great 
majority of citizens for them.  It is a mistake to consider the 
object of punishment as being a deterrent or reformative or 
preventive and nothing else.  The truth is that some crimes are 
so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment 
because the wrongdoer deserves it.’ ”   
Beck responded in his closing argument:  “[The 
prosecutor] talked about the Bible.  One thing you have to 
remember, there was a passage in the Bible I think is so 
important in this particular context.  And as I recall it very 
vaguely, the circumstances, someone was going to punish 
somebody else I think by killing them, and God said 
‘Vengeance is mine.’  ‘Vengeance is mine,’ saith the Lord.  It 
doesn’t belong to you.  And he was talking to people, to human 
beings.  He said ‘I take vengeance.  I punish.’ ”   
2. Analysis 
Beck and Cruz did not object to the challenged argument 
or seek an admonition, and no exception to the general rule 
requiring an objection and request for admonition applies.  The 
claim is therefore forfeited.  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 795, 841 (Samayoa).)   
On the merits, we have previously held that reliance on 
the same British justice’s quote was not misconduct, and Beck 
cites no persuasive reason to revisit our conclusion.  (People v. 
Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 298 (Vieira).)  Here, as in Vieira, 
the prosecutor “merely asked the jury to make the 
individualized determination that this defendant deserved 
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165 
death for these crimes because they were particularly 
outrageous, regardless of whether or not his execution would 
deter other crimes.”  (Ibid.)  
As to the remaining portions of the prosecutor’s 
arguments, we have previously concluded that a substantially 
similar argument in Vieira’s penalty trial was misconduct.  
(Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 296−298.)  The “ ‘ “primary 
vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is 
that such argument may ‘diminish the jury’s sense of 
responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher 
law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the 
court’s instructions.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
136, 184 (Powell).)   
But here, as in Vieira, the misconduct was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because “the biblical argument 
quoted above was only a small part of a prosecutorial 
argument that primarily focused on explaining to the jury why 
it should conclude that the statutory aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors.”  (Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 
at p. 298.)  In both Beck’s case and Cruz’s case, the biblical 
references were only a small part of the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, which spanned 28 pages of transcript in Beck’s case 
and 26 pages in Cruz’s case, and the prosecutor largely focused 
on “explaining to the jury why it should conclude that the 
statutory aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors.”  (Vieira, at p. 298.)  Moreover, on both occasions the 
prosecutor reminded the jury that the biblical passages were 
not aggravating evidence and “did not urge the jury to apply a 
source of law other than the court’s instructions.”  (Powell, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 185.)  There was no prejudice. 
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In Vieira, we observed that the prosecutor’s 1991 
argument had occurred before our “our statements clearly 
condemning prosecutorial reliance on biblical authority in 
penalty phase closing argument were made in a series of cases 
filed in late 1992 and 1993.”  (Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 298, fn. 11, citing People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 
260−261, People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 193-194, 
People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107 [filed Nov. 1992].)  
We reserved the question of “whether prosecutorial biblical 
argument that postdates and deliberately contravenes the 
holdings in those decisions constitutes a more serious form of 
prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal of the penalty 
phase judgment.”  (Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 298, fn. 11.)  
Here, the prosecutor’s challenged comments were made in July 
1992, and so this case does not present an opportunity to 
consider this issue.  
b. Role of jury 
Beck contends that the prosecutor attempted to “shame 
the jury into imposing a sentence of death.”  The prosecutor 
argued:  “[A]ll the People ask you on this case is to consider 
everything that you’ve heard and to arrive at an appropriate 
decision.  The severest punishment in our society is death. . . .  
It’s punishment for what you did.  That’s justice.  Justice is 
what you get for what you did.  If it’s anything less than you 
deserve, it’s not justice.  It’s unjust enrichment.  This 
defendant does not deserve to be unjustly enriched by you, the 
jury.  He deserves just punishment for what he did. . . . We use 
the criminal justice system to punish, and it protects society 
from physical danger and strengthens society by administering 
fitting punishments that express and nourish the vigor of our 
values.  We should be ashamed, and indeed alarmed, to live in 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
167 
a society that does not intelligently express through you, 
members of our jury, the public’s proper sense of proportionate 
punishment for the likes of people like James David Beck.”   
There was no misconduct.  The prosecutor simply 
expressed the view that juries reflect the general public’s sense 
of proportionate punishment and that, in the prosecutor’s view, 
the death penalty would be a just sentence for Beck’s crimes.  
There is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the 
prosecutor’s comments to mean, as Beck argues, “they 
individually should be ashamed of themselves if they don’t 
impose death, [and] that they would not act ‘intelligently’ if 
they did not reach a death verdict.”   
c. Comparisons 
Beck contends the prosecutor improperly described 
situations that would or would not “call” for the death penalty.  
The prosecutor argued:  “Now, there are only a few crimes in 
our society that call for the death penalty.  I’m not going to say 
call for the death penalty.  That subject one to the death 
penalty.  Because death is never a mandatory sentence. . . .  
This is one of them.  This is one of the most horrible crimes 
that one man could commit against others.  You take the very 
life, the very life from four people, senselessly, in a brutal 
fashion, that, ladies and gentlemen, calls, in my opinion, for 
the death penalty.  When I say calls, again, it’s not mandatory.  
It’s a death penalty type crime.  And my opinion doesn’t count, 
by the way.  There are murders that we can — we can 
understand, not condone but understand.  A person comes 
home and catches his wife unfaithful, we can understand if he 
pulls a gun, shoots his wife and his neighbor, his best friend.  
We can say it’s not right, but we understand it.  And the death 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
168 
penalty is probably not appropriate in that particular case, 
depending on the individual, of course.  And we can 
understand it if a guy is under so much pressure at work that 
he flips out, as we’ve seen time and again, flips out, kills the 
boss, kills a co-worker.  We don’t condone that at all.  It’s not 
right. . . . . 
[B]ut 
at 
least 
there’s 
some 
underlying 
circumstances that help us appreciate what’s happened and 
help us determine what’s the appropriate punishment.  In this 
particular case, the only thing that makes any sense is that 
these people — Gerald Cruz, Dave Beck, Ricky Vieira, those 
people, that group — were mad at Frank Raper, maybe Dennis 
Colwell.  So they decided to do something about it, and they 
did.  They went over there and in cold blood slaughtered four 
people, two of whom . . . they didn’t have any animosity 
towards. . . .  That just transcends the imagination.  Brutal, 
senseless murders.  And this person right here is responsible.”   
There was no misconduct.  The prosecutor simply argued 
that 
premeditated 
murder 
was 
deserving 
of 
greater 
punishment than impulsive murder and that based on the 
evidence the murders here were deserving of the death 
penalty.   
d. Willey testimony 
Beck contends that the prosecutor improperly made 
inconsistent arguments about Willey’s testimony at the guilt 
phase and the penalty phase.  The arguments were not 
inconsistent. 
As noted, Willey testified that after he and the other 
perpetrators arrived at the victims’ home, Willey had a 
fistfight with Ritchey outside.  Beck suddenly knocked Willey 
off Ritchey, fell on Ritchey, and slit Ritchey’s throat.  During 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
169 
his guilt phase argument, the prosecutor said:  “Now we have 
the person that can really tell us who it was.  We have Ron 
Willey.  Ron Willey can tell us who cut Ritchey’s throat, 
because Ron Willey was . . . out there with Mr. Ritchey.  Of 
course, he didn’t stab him either.  But he was out there 
fighting with him.  And he tells you that it was Dave Beck that 
came out and cut the throat.  Now, why would he tell you 
that? . . . We’re back to the tag team now.  He’s got to back up 
Mr. LaMarsh.  If he puts Mr. Cruz out there cutting his throat, 
then Mr. Cruz couldn’t be in there playing hardball with 
Mr. Raper’s head.  So Mr. Beck is taking the fall for cutting 
Mr. Ritchey’s throat when, in fact, I would submit to you that 
it was Gerald Cruz [who] cut Mr. Ritchey’s throat after 
Mr. Willey had stabbed him a bunch of times.”   
At Beck’s penalty phase, when discussing section 190.3, 
factor (j), which asks the jury to consider whether the 
defendant’s participation in the crime was relatively minor, the 
prosecutor argued:  “We know that it was not relatively minor.  
[Beck] played a major part in the commission of those murders.  
Regardless of which witness that you want to believe or all the 
witnesses you want to believe, his part in those murders was 
major.  In fact the testimony of . . . Michelle Evans, . . . he 
came through the back window like Rambo . . . with his big 
knife charging down the hallway.  The testimony of Jason 
LaMarsh that this is the man right here that he saw thrust 
that big knife all the way up to the hilt in the belly of Dennis 
Colwell.  The testimony of Ron Willey that this is the man 
right here that came out and knocked him off of Richard 
Ritchey and cut his throat while he lay in the street pleading 
for his life.  Now, I don’t know what part of those testimonies 
that you believe:  Any, all, or none.  That’s entirely up to you.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
170 
But there was ample evidence presented at the penalty [sic] 
phase of this trial that Mr. Beck took a major part in the 
commission of these crimes.”   
There was no inconsistency or misconduct.  At the guilt 
phase, the prosecutor argued that Willey’s testimony that Beck 
slit Ritchey’s throat should not be credited.  At the penalty 
phase, the prosecutor said he did not know which testimony 
the jury had found credible in convicting Beck, but none of the 
testimony on which it could have relied demonstrated Beck’s 
participation in the crime was relatively minor.  No misconduct 
is demonstrated. 
4. Instructional error  
Beck and Cruz contend the trial court’s modification of 
CALJIC No. 8.87 was erroneous because it did not identify the 
unadjudicated criminal activity and allowed the jury to 
consider evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) 
that did not meet the requirements of the statute.  We reject 
these claims.   
The court instructed the jury at Cruz’s penalty phase in 
the modified language of CALJIC No. 8.87:  “Evidence has 
been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant 
has committed criminal activity which involved the express[] 
or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or 
violence.  Before a juror may consider any of such criminal 
activity as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror 
must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal activity.  A juror 
may not consider any evidence of any other criminal activity as 
an aggravating circumstance.  It is not necessary for all jurors 
to agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
171 
that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider 
that activity as a fact[or] in aggravation.  If a juror is not so 
convinced, that juror must not consider that evidence for any 
purpose.”  The court then defined reasonable doubt.  
Substantially similar instructions were given at Beck’s penalty 
trial.   
Cruz submitted a proposed instruction in the language of 
CALJIC No. 8.87 that the trial court modified.  During the 
Cruz instruction hearing, the court asked the prosecutor if he 
had any objection to CALJIC No. 8.87.  The prosecutor replied, 
“No, other than we have to specify the —”  The court 
interjected, “I’m going to read it as follows,” and then read the 
language in which the jury was instructed noted above.  The 
prosecutor said, “All right,” and Cruz did not object or request 
that the court identify the criminal acts that involved force or 
violence.   
During the prosecutor’s closing argument at Cruz’s 
penalty phase, he argued without objection that the jury could 
consider the following unadjudicated criminal activity under 
section 190.3, factor (b):  placing a rifle in the mouths of 
Jennifer, Rosemary, and Vieira and threatening to kill them; 
repeatedly beating Vieira and Perkins, clapping his infant 
daughter on the side of the head (which left bruises on the 
inside of her ears); hanging water bottles from her legs while 
she was suspended in a harness and making her cry so her 
lungs would be strong; and kicking Jennifer while she was 
pregnant between the legs so hard she bled.  During the 
prosecutor’s closing argument at Beck’s penalty phase, he 
asserted without objection that the unadjudicated criminal 
activity under factor (b) included beating Perkins and Vieira, 
and electrocuting Perkins’s toes so that they fused together.  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
172 
The prosecutor stated that the tape of A. crying that was 
introduced on rebuttal was not aggravating evidence because it 
was not an act of violence, but had been introduced in response 
to Beck’s defense mitigating evidence to show that Beck was 
“not always real good . . . with children.”   
Cruz contends that the incidents relied on by the 
prosecutor under section 190.3, factor (b), did “not constitute 
the use or threat of use of force or violence.”  He did not object 
on this ground below, and the claim is therefore forfeited.  
(Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 966−967.)  Moreover, all the 
incidents relied on involved force or violence.   
Beck and Cruz contend that the trial court erred in not 
identifying what behavior fell within section 190.3, factor (b), 
and what crime had been committed by that behavior.  Here, 
the prosecutor “during closing argument explicitly identified 
the evidence to be considered as other crimes under factor (b), 
and the jury instructions . . . explicitly required that such 
evidence be considered only if it involved” force or violence or 
the threat of force or violence.  (People v. Mitcham (1992) 
1 Cal.4th 1027, 1075.)  “Therefore, the trial court’s failure to 
list the other crimes relating to factor (b) could not have 
affected the verdict.”  (Ibid.)   
Citing dicta in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 
55, footnote 19, Beck and Cruz contend that “this [c]ourt has 
held that the jury should be instructed as to the specific crimes 
being alleged by the prosecution in order to make certain that 
the jury will not improperly consider other acts.”  In People v. 
Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1267, we observed in 
response to the defendant’s reliance on the same language in 
Robertson:  “We have not imposed any sua sponte duty to 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
173 
instruct in this area.  [Citations.]  There may even be tactical 
reasons why the defendant would not wish such an 
instruction.”  Likewise, in People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
574, 656, we stated:  “[W]e have held that absent a request, the 
trial court has no duty to specify the names or elements of the 
unadjudicated crimes when instructing the jury on factor (b) 
evidence.  [Citations.]  The premise of this rule is that, for 
tactical reasons, most defendants prefer not to risk having the 
jury place undue emphasis on the prior violent crimes.”   
Cruz further contends that the prejudice from evidence 
at the guilt phase that he possessed assault weapons, knives, 
and grenades was likely compounded at the penalty phase by 
the trial court’s challenged instruction.  He points to a single 
fleeting reference to his possession of grenades at the guilt 
phase and no evidence that any of the weapons he possessed 
were illegal.  Nor did the prosecutor rely on evidence Cruz 
possessed 
assault 
weapons, 
knives, 
and 
grenades 
as 
aggravating evidence under factor (b).  Nothing supports 
Cruz’s speculative claim that the evidence might have been 
considered by a juror “as criminal activity involving a threat of 
violence.”  For similar reasons, we reject Cruz’s claim that a 
juror might have considered his juvenile misconduct of spray 
painting a car as aggravation under factor (b).  Indeed, this 
evidence was not presented by the prosecutor, but elicited by 
Cruz’s defense counsel in his penalty defense case.   
Beck contends that “the jury was not properly guided in 
their consideration” of the tape of A. crying because the court’s 
instruction did not limit the type of evidence the jury could 
consider under the factor (b).  The instruction stated the jury 
could only consider “criminal activity which involved the 
express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
174 
or violence,” and the prosecutor told the jury this did not 
include the tape of A. crying.  Beck fails to demonstrate how 
the jury lacked guidance. 
5. Death sentence for conspiracy  
Beck and Cruz assert that even if their conspiracy 
convictions are supported by substantial evidence, the trial 
court erred in imposing a death sentence based upon this 
conviction because conspiracy to “commit murder alone cannot 
make a defendant death eligible.”  That, as the Attorney 
General concedes, is correct.  (Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 
294; People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 864−870; 
People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 171−172.)  Therefore, 
as to both Beck and Cruz, we vacate as unauthorized the 
multiple-murder special-circumstance true findings as to 
Count V (conspiracy to commit murder), as well as the death 
sentences imposed for that count.  Under our statutory power 
to modify an unauthorized sentence (§ 1260), “we shall direct 
the trial court to issue . . . amended abstract[s] of judgment 
reflecting the appropriate sentence for conspiracy to commit 
murder, which the Attorney General in this case agrees is 
imprisonment for 25 years to life.”  (Lawley, at pp. 171−172; 
see § 182; Cortez, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1226.)   
Here Cruz instructed the perpetrators to “go and do them 
all and leave no witnesses.”  For that reason, contrary to Cruz’s 
contention, we do not direct the trial court to stay these 
convictions under section 654 because the object of the 
conspiracy to commit murder was not limited to the actual 
victims killed, but rather included anyone found at 5223 Elm 
Street and any witnesses.  (Cf. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 539 [“under section 654, defendant may not be punished for 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
175 
both the underlying crimes and the conspiracy, because there 
was no showing that the object of the conspiracy was any 
broader than commission of the underlying crimes”].)   
6. New trial motion  
Following the penalty verdict, Beck and Cruz filed 
substantially similar new trial motions asserting there was 
newly discovered evidence and Brady error.  (§ 1181, subd. 8; 
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.)  Beck, joined by Cruz, 
contends that the trial court erred in denying his new trial 
motion.  We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.   
a.  Newly discovered evidence 
Cruz attached to his new trial motion a September 23, 
1992 letter from inmate Alfred “Kip” McDonnell (that Cruz 
asserted was intended for Cruz) that said:  “When I was on X’s 
Jason LaMarsh told me that he and Michelle Evans had 
tricked [Beck] and [Cruz] into going over to her sister’s house.  
Where Jason and Michelle had some drugs hidden.  Which 
they could not get out because Raper and some people were 
staying there.  [¶] Jason said that he and Missy had plan[n]ed 
for a fight to break out over at her sister[’]s between [Beck] and 
[Cruz] and the people staying at her sister[’]s house, while 
Jason and Missy got the drugs out.  [¶] Jason started laughing 
and said that [Beck] and [Cruz] had no idea of what was going 
to happen when they showed up at her sister[’]s house.  [¶] I 
heard Jason telling Ron that if he ‘Ron’ went along with his 
story that they would walk, because his story will be close to 
Missy’s story and Missy won’t say anything bad about Ron and 
Jason.  That she[’]ll only dump on [Beck] and [Cruz] which 
they must also do to convince the jury.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
176 
At the hearing on the new trial motion, Cruz’s counsel 
said his investigator had contacted McDonnell and asked him 
to sign an affidavit containing “the same thing as what’s in the 
letter.”  McDonnell refused to sign the affidavit and said that if 
he “was brought to court he would take the Fifth.”  The trial 
court ruled that “even if the Court were to treat this 
handwritten letter as a declaration and as signed by Mr. Alfred 
McDonnell, the Court still feels that in view of the evidence 
presented at the trial that no different result would have 
occurred had Mr. McDonnell testified in accord with his letter.  
His letter deals only with the testimony of co-defendants 
Mr. LaMarsh and Mr. Willey.  There’s substantial other 
evidence which the jury is certainly entitled to rely on in 
reaching their verdict of guilty for Mr. Cruz and Mr. Beck.”   
“ ‘To grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence, the evidence must make a different result probable 
on retrial.’  [Citation.]  ‘[T]he trial court has broad discretion in 
ruling on a new trial motion . . .,’ and its ‘ruling will be 
disturbed only for clear abuse of that discretion.’ ”  (People v. 
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 308 (Verdugo).)   
Beck asserts that “Evans was the state’s key witness and 
the only witness to supply evidence of a conspiracy to commit 
murder.  It was on the basis of her testimony that Beck and 
Cruz were convicted of capital murder.  Had the McDonnell 
evidence been given to the jury, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury would have doubted Evans and would have been 
more inclined to return convictions of lesser included second 
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or assault with a 
deadly weapon.”  Beck contends McDonnell’s testimony would 
have provided “strong independent corroborative evidence in 
support of Beck’s defense.”   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
177 
Even assuming the letter purportedly from McDonnell 
could be properly considered, we have concluded that there was 
substantial evidence of a conspiracy to murder even aside from 
Evans’s testimony.  (See ante, pt. II.B.1.a.)  Moreover, Beck 
was connected to that conspiracy by his own statement to 
Wallace that he alone or with others had slit some throats, his 
statements to Rosemary that “they had to do them” and that 
he had purchased new shoes because his were covered in blood 
and he could not get them clean, and his presence with Cruz 
when he purchased the baton later found at the crime scene.  
Cruz was connected to the conspiracy by Creekmore’s 
identification of him as the person who slit Ritchey’s throat, 
and his purchase of the baton.  In addition, the letter was 
cumulative in part to trial evidence that LaMarsh and Evans 
had been romantically involved and that several days after the 
murders the house at 5223 Elm Street had been broken into 
and a garbage disposal taken that Cruz’s counsel argued had 
contained drugs.  Finally, the letter lacked any probative detail 
as to how LaMarsh and Evans had tricked Beck and Cruz to go 
to Evans’s sister’s house, or how they orchestrated a fight that 
resulted in four deaths.  We conclude the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Beck’s new trial motion based 
on McDonnell’s letter.   
b. Asserted Brady and discovery violation 
On May 8, 1992, during the guilt defense case, Detective 
Deckard interviewed Jennifer.  Beck and Cruz learned of and 
were provided tape recordings and transcripts of the interview 
after the guilt phase had concluded.  Jennifer did not testify at 
the guilt phase.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
178 
In their new trial motions, Beck and Cruz challenged the 
failure of the prosecutor to disclose evidence of Jennifer’s 
interview earlier to the defense.  The trial court ruled that 
Jennifer’s statements during the interview would not have 
been admissible because they were made during plea 
negotiations, and therefore they were also not discoverable.  
The court further concluded that even if the prosecutor erred 
in not disclosing the evidence, that the failure was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
On appeal, Beck notes Jennifer told investigators that 
when she met Cruz at a hotel on the night of the murders, 
Cruz told her that they had gone to “the place where Franklin 
lived,” that “there was a big fight, and it just like took on a life 
of its own,” and “there was blood everywhere.”  She also 
recalled Cruz said that “something had gone wrong.”  Jennifer 
stated that Raper had “made threats towards us and stuff” and 
had told Cruz, “Hey man if you don’t leave me alone I’m going 
to kill you.”  Beck asserts Jennifer also stated that LaMarsh 
blamed Cruz for the incident and for ruining LaMarsh’s life.  
Our review of the interview tape and transcript indicates 
Jennifer was actually referring to Willey and said she had seen 
LaMarsh in court but had not spoken to him on the telephone 
or visited him.   
Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, “ ‘the 
prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence 
whether the defendant makes a specific request (id. at p. 87), a 
general request, or none at all. . . .’  [Citation.]  ‘For Brady 
purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts 
the prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution witness.  
[Citations.]  Evidence is material if there is a reasonable 
probability its disclosure would have altered the trial result.’ ”  
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
179 
(Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 279.)  “A ‘reasonable 
probability’ of a different result” does not mean “the defendant 
would more likely than not have received a different verdict 
with the evidence,” but “is . . . shown when the government’s 
evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome 
of the trial.’ ”  (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 434.)  
“ ‘Materiality includes consideration of the effect of the 
nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies.  
[Citations.]  Because a constitutional violation occurs only if 
the suppressed evidence was material by these standards, a 
finding that Brady was not satisfied is reversible without need 
for further harmless-error review.’ ”  (Verdugo, at p. 279.)   
Section 1054.1, 
the 
reciprocal 
discovery 
statute, 
“independently requires the prosecution to disclose to the 
defense, . . . certain categories of evidence ‘in the possession of 
the prosecuting attorney or [known by] the prosecuting 
attorney . . . to be in the possession of the investigating 
agencies.’ ”  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1133.)  
Evidence subject to disclosure includes any “[r]elevant written 
or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the 
statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at 
the trial” (§ 1054.1, subd. (f)), and “[a]ny exculpatory evidence” 
(id., subd. (e)).  “Absent good cause, such evidence must be 
disclosed at least 30 days before trial, or immediately if 
discovered or obtained within 30 days of trial.  (§ 1054.7.)”  
(Zambrano, at p. 1133.)   
We conclude that Jennifer’s statements were not 
material, hence there was no Brady violation.  (People v. 
Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 908 [evidence was not material 
under Brady when “it would have added little to the 
cumulative impact of . . . other . . . evidence”].)  We further 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
180 
conclude any violation of the prosecutor’s state law reciprocal 
discovery obligations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Jennifer’s statement that Cruz told her they had gone to “the 
place where Franklin lived,” that “there was a big fight, and it 
just like took on a life of its own,” “there was blood 
everywhere,” and “something had gone wrong,” was consistent 
with Beck’s and Cruz’s trial testimony, and hence was not 
material.  Evidence that Willey blamed Cruz for the incident 
and for ruining Willey’s life was cumulative to Willey’s 
testimony that he did not kill anyone and did not know anyone 
was going to be killed that night, and to his closing argument 
that on the night of the murders he was in Ceres, a town 
different from where Beck and Cruz lived, when “Cruz had 
already decided something was going to happen.”  Finally, 
Jennifer’s statements that she had heard Raper threaten to 
kill Cruz were cumulative to Cruz’s testimony that before the 
murders Raper had threatened to kill him and that on the 
night of the murders Evans told him Raper was going to call 
his biker friends “to come and kill everyone in the camp that 
night.”  They were also cumulative to Beck’s testimony that 
Evans told him on the night of the murders that Raper wanted 
to kill Evans and those with whom she associated at the Camp.   
In sum, the trial court acted within its discretion in 
denying Beck’s new trial motion.   
7. Constitutionality of the death penalty statute  
Beck and Cruz contends California’s death penalty 
statute and implementing instructions are constitutionally 
invalid in numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected 
similar claims, and Beck and Cruz provide no persuasive 
reason to revisit our decisions.   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
181 
“[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 813.)  We further “reject the claim that section 190.3, 
factor (a), on its face or as interpreted and applied, permits 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death.”  
(Ibid.; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975−976, 
978.)   
“The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to 
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing, deprive defendant of 
the right to a jury trial, or constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment on the ground that it does not require either 
unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances or 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) or 
(c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)  
Nothing in Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 616], 
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
affects our conclusions in this regard.  (Rangel, at p. 1235, 
fn. 16.)   
“No burden of proof is constitutionally required, nor is 
the trial court required to instruct the jury that there is no 
burden of proof.”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 55.)  The 
trial court is not required to instruct the jury that “if it 
determines the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating 
factors, it is required to return a sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.”  (Id. at p. 56.)   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
182 
Nor is the trial court required to instruct the jury that if 
the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
are 
so 
substantial 
in 
comparison to the mitigating circumstances, it may still return 
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  Choice of penalty is a normative decision, and CALJIC 
No. 8.88 properly explains to the jury that it may return a 
death verdict only if the aggravating circumstances are so 
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
that it warrants death, not that it must do so.  (People v. Bivert 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 124.)  We disapprove of People v. Smith 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 370 to the extent it is inconsistent with 
this principle.  In Smith we said, “[T]he jury is not free to 
return a life verdict regardless of the evidence,” but rather “[i]f 
[the] aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with mitigating circumstances as to warrant the 
death penalty, then death is the appropriate penalty.”   
The trial court need not instruct that there is a 
presumption of life, or that a jury need not be unanimous in 
finding the existence of a mitigating factor.  (People v. Adams 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 581; People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1104, 1139–1140.)  Nor is the trial court required to instruct 
the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. at 
p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 642] [“our case law does not require 
capital sentencing courts ‘to affirmatively inform the jury that 
mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ ”]; accord, Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 862.)   
The trial court was not required to delete inapplicable 
factors from CALJIC No. 8.85 (People v. Watson (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 652, 701), or “instruct that the jury can consider 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
183 
certain statutory factors only in mitigation.”  (People v. 
Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311.)  “ ‘ “[T]he statutory 
instruction to the jury to consider ‘whether or not’ certain 
mitigating factors were present did not impermissibly invite 
the jury to aggravate the sentence upon the basis of 
nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 369.)  “Written findings by the 
jury during the penalty phase are not constitutionally 
required, and their absence does not deprive defendant of 
meaningful appellate review.”  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.)  “The jury may properly consider 
evidence 
of 
unadjudicated 
criminal 
activity 
under 
section 190.3, factor (b). . . .”  (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
620, 653.)  The language “so substantial” and “warrants” in 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly vague.  (Romero and 
Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 56.)  “Use of the adjectives 
‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g) 
is constitutional.”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 57.)   
“The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment 
[citations], do not require intercase proportionality review on 
appeal.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.)  
Moreover, “ ‘capital and noncapital defendants are not 
similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently 
without violating’ a defendant’s right to equal protection of the 
laws, due process of law, or freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment.”  (Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 971.)  “ ‘The 
death penalty as applied in this state is not rendered 
unconstitutional through operation of international law and 
treaties.’ ”  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373.)   
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
184 
8. Cumulative prejudice  
Beck and Cruz contend the cumulative effect of guilt and 
penalty phase errors requires us to reverse the judgment.  We 
have found error but no prejudice in the trial court’s 
instruction on conspiracy to commit murder, the prosecutor’s 
reliance on biblical argument at the penalty phase, and the 
imposition of the death penalty for convictions of conspiracy to 
commit murder.  (See ante, pts. II.B.7.a.1., II.C.3.a., II.C.5.)  
Likewise, we have assumed error but found no prejudice in 
testimony regarding a Ka-Bar knife box found in Beck’s trailer, 
the reference to natural and probable consequences in the 
conspiracy instruction, and ambiguity in the multiple-murder 
instruction.  (See ante, pts. II.A.2., II.B.7.a.2., II.B.7.b.)  We 
further conclude that these errors and assumed errors are not 
prejudicial when considered cumulatively.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we vacate as unauthorized the 
multiple-murder special-circumstance true findings as to 
Count V (conspiracy to commit murder) for Beck and Cruz, as 
well as the death sentences imposed for that count.  We 
remand to the trial court to state on amended abstracts of 
judgment sentences of imprisonment for 25 years to life on the 
conspiracy count (Count V) and to strike the multiple-murder 
special-circumstance true findings for that count.  We affirm 
the judgments, as modified, in all other respects.  
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
185 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Beck and Cruz 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S029843 
Date Filed: December 2, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Edward M. Lacey, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Andrew Parnes, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant James David Beck. 
 
William T. Lowe; Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant Gerald Dean Cruz. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and 
Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, 
Glenn R. Pruden and David M. Baskind, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
(208) 726-1010 
 
William T. Lowe 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 871 
El Cerrito, CA 94530 
(510) 230-4285 
 
David M. Baskind 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3759