Title: Harris v. Harris

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

HARRIS_V_HARRIS.93-077; 162 Vt. 174; 647 A.2d 309

[Opinion Filed June 3, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-077


 Gina Harris                                  Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Grand Isle Family Court

 Frank Harris                                 March Term, 1994



 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

 Stephen S. Blodgett of Blodgett, Watts & Volk, P.C., Burlington, for
    defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   Plaintiff wife appeals a divorce judgment, arguing that the
 court abused its discretion by awarding custody of the parties' son to
 defendant father, thereby separating their two children; by awarding her
 only $10,000 of the marital property; and by declining to award her
 maintenance.  We affirm the custody determination, but reverse and remand
 the property divison and maintenance rulings.
      The parties had been married seven years when they separated in January
 1992.  Under temporary orders, the mother lived in the marital home in
 Grand Isle with both children from January to May 1992, and the husband
 lived in the marital home with the parties' son, Cole, from May to the final
 divorce hearing, four months later.  The parties' daughter, Marissa, moved

 

 from the home with her mother in May 1992, eventually to a condominium in
 Williston.  At the time of trial on September 11, 1992, Cole was just over
 five-and-one-half years old and Marissa was one day shy of her second
 birthday.
      Following the hearing, the family court ordered that Cole remain in his
 father's custody and that Marissa remain in her mother's custody, with
 visitation by both children on alternate weekends.  The father was awarded
 the marital home.  The court ordered the father to pay the mother, within
 one year of the judgment, $10,000 as her share of the marital assets, and it
 denied the mother's request for maintenance.
                                     I.
       The mother first argues that the court abused its discretion by
 awarding custody of Cole to the father, thereby separating the children.
 She contends the evidence does not support the court's finding that neither
 party was Cole's primary care giver.  In her view, the court erroneously
 gave the father custody of Cole based on the paternal grandmother's prior
 and continuing care for the boy.  She argues the evidence showed that she
 was the primary care giver, which required the court to award her custody of
 both children.  Finally, she contends that the court's findings failed to
 provide an adequate rationale for its custody award.
      We agree with the mother that the court's findings and conclusions
 regarding who was the primary care provider are equivocal.  At one point,
 the court found that it was unable to determine who Cole's primary care
 giver was because his care had been "split" between the mother, the father,
 and the paternal grandmother.  At another point, the court found that the
 father "participated in the care of the children but the care of Cole was

 

 usually divided between [his mother] and [his father's] mother," and at yet
 another point it concludes that "Cole's child care was divided between his
 mother and his grandmother."
      Our review of the record indicates that the latter statement is the
 most accurate one.  Before the separation, the mother cared for the children
 from the time they got up until noon and again from late afternoon until
 bedtime; the grandmother often cared for the children from noon until four
 o'clock in the afternoon, when the father came home from work.  Thus, this
 was a "traditional" marriage, in which the father worked and the mother
 stayed home and took care of the children.  After the mother moved from the
 marital home with Marissa, most of Cole's basic physical needs were provided
 by the paternal grandmother, who conducts a registered day care facility in
 her house, which is located only seventy-five yards from the marital home.
 She dressed Cole and fed him breakfast after the father went to work.  She
 cared for him during the day until the father got home.  More often than
 not, she served the dinner for both the father and Cole.  Frequently, Cole
 slept at her house.  In short, although the testimony indicated the father
 was very close to his son -- evidenced for the most part by their shared
 interest in fishing, hunting, and softball -- the father had only a limited
 role in providing for Cole's basic needs, even after the mother left the
 marital home.
      Although the grandmother played a significant role in caring for both
 children during the parties' marriage, and for Cole after the parties'
 separation, we conclude, focusing on all periods of the children's lives,
 Nickerson v. Nickerson, 158 Vt. 85, 90-91, 605 A.2d 1331, 1334 (1992), that
 the court erred in finding that it was unable to determine who was the

 

 primary care giver for Cole.  The evidence leaves no doubt that the mother
 was his primary care provider for his entire life until the last four months
 before the final divorce hearing.
      The court's erroneous finding does not require reversal of the custody
 award, however.  The court's error lies more in its failure to attach the
 appropriate label than to comprehend the relevant circumstances.  Indeed,
 the court's specific assessment of who provided what care for the children
 during particular times of the day was accurate.  The court acknowledged
 that the mother and paternal grandmother shared the child-care duties, and
 that the father's role in that regard was minimal.  We must determine, then,
 whether the mother's role in caring for the children entitled her to custody
 of Cole.
      "[T]he quality of the child's relationship with the primary care
 provider, if appropriate given the child's age and development," is one of
 the nonexclusive statutory factors the court must consider in making a
 custody award.  15 V.S.A. { 665(b)(6).  While we have recognized that this
 factor is entitled to great weight, we have declined to adopt "a rule that
 the primary custodian will be awarded custody as long as the parent is fit."
 Harris v. Harris, 149 Vt. 410, 418,