Title: IN RE EST OF EUGENE T CAPUZZI MD

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 2, 2004 
In re ESTATE OF EUGENE T. 
CAPUZZI, M.D., Deceased, 
MICHAEL CAPUZZI and EUGENE T. 
CAPUZZI, JR., 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
v 
No. 121106 
CHRISTINA FISHER, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.  
The issue presented is whether the death of the 
principal revokes his agent’s order to transfer limited 
partnership shares when all necessary actions by the agent 
were completed before the principal’s death, but the 
transfer was not yet completed by a third party. 
We hold 
that an agent’s actions are not revoked by the death of the 
principal 
when 
the 
agent 
has 
completed 
all 
actions 
necessary for the transaction before the principal’s death. 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals 
 
 
 
 
 
and affirm the decision of the trial court granting the 
petitioners summary disposition. 
I. FACTS 
Decedent, Eugene T. Capuzzi, M.D., owned shares in a 
limited partnership. 
Dr. Capuzzi’s will divided that 
interest equally among his three children, Michael, Eugene 
Jr., and Christina. 
A few days before his death, Dr. 
Capuzzi 
directed 
Michael 
to 
transfer 
the 
limited 
partnership shares to his sons, Michael and Eugene, Jr., 
petitioners in this case. 
Michael was acting as Dr. 
Capuzzi’s agent pursuant to a durable power of attorney 
agreement. 
The agreement gave Michael “full power and 
authority to do and perform every act and thing whatsoever 
requisite and necessary to be done.” 
The transfer would 
eliminate Christina’s interest in the limited partnership 
shares; Christina is the respondent in this case. 
Michael contacted the limited partnership on August 
10, 1998, and again on August 11, 1998, and he directed 
that the shares be transferred pursuant to the power of 
attorney and Dr. Capuzzi’s wishes. 
Dr. Capuzzi died on 
August 14, 1998. 
On August 19, 1998, the limited 
partnership 
sent 
Michael 
a 
letter 
stating 
that 
Dr. 
Capuzzi’s death had revoked the power of attorney and, 
therefore, the transfer could not be completed. 
During 
probate proceedings, petitioners objected to the shares 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
passing under the will. 
The probate court granted summary 
disposition for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded, holding that the transfer of the shares could 
not be completed because Dr. Capuzzi’s death immediately 
revoked the power of attorney.1
 This Court granted 
petitioners’ application for leave to appeal. 468 Mich 925 
(2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo questions of law. 
Hagerman v 
Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 727; 579 NW2d 347 (1998). 
Likewise, 
“we 
review 
de 
novo 
decisions 
on 
summary 
disposition motions.” 
American Federation of State, Co & 
Municipal Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 
695 (2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
It is a longstanding legal principle that a duly 
authorized agent has the power to act and bind the 
principal to the same extent as if the principal acted. 
See, e.g., Cowan v Sargent Mfg Co, 141 Mich 87, 91; 104 NW 
377 (1905); see also 1 Restatement Agency, 2d, § 12, p 57. 
A power of attorney provides the agent with all the rights 
and responsibilities of the principal as outlined in the 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 15,
2002 (Docket No. 227750). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
agreement. 
See, e.g., MCL 700.5501 et seq.; Kuite v Lage, 
152 Mich 638, 640; 116 NW 467 (1908). In effect, the agent 
stands in the shoes of the principal. 
It is also well-settled that the death of the 
principal revokes the authority of the agent, unless the 
agency is coupled with an interest. 
See, e.g., Chrysler 
Corp v Blozic, 267 Mich 479, 481-482; 255 NW 399 (1934); 
Weaver v Richards, 144 Mich 395, 413; 108 NW 382 (1906). 
Any act done by the agent after the principal dies cannot 
affect the estate. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, § 52, pp 468-469. 
This is true even if an agent performed some of the acts 
necessary in a single transaction but not all of them. 
2A 
CJS, Agency, § 122, pp 394-395. 
If an agent is in the 
midst of a transaction when the principal dies, the 
transaction cannot continue, regardless of the principal’s 
previously stated wishes. 
However, when an agent has completed all necessary 
actions and all that is left is for a third party to act to 
complete the transaction, we hold that the principal’s 
death has no effect on the validity of the transaction and 
does not relieve the requirement on the third party to act. 
This is because the agent’s actions were complete at the 
time of the principal’s death. 
See 2A CJS, Agency, § 109, 
p 386. 
Notably, if a third party requires additional 
information to confirm that the agent has the authority to 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
act or if, for example, the third party requires completion 
of an additional form indicating power of attorney, then 
the agent has obviously not completed all actions necessary 
for the transaction. 
If the principal dies before the 
agent meets the third party’s requirements, then the third 
party is not required to follow the directive of the agent. 
This is because all necessary actions have not been 
completed by the agent before the principal dies. 
When all necessary actions have been completed, just 
as the third party would be required to follow the 
directive of the principal, the third party is also 
required to follow the directive of the agent. 
See 3 Am 
Jur 
2d, 
Agency, 
§ 
1, 
p 
429 
(“the 
agent 
is 
the 
representative of the principal and acts for, in the place 
of, and instead of, the principal”)(emphasis added); 2A 
CJS, Agency, § 4, p 308 (“a person may properly appoint an 
agent to do the same acts and achieve the same legal 
consequences 
as 
if 
he 
or 
she 
had 
acted 
personally . . . .”); see also 2A CJS, Agency, § 1, p 306. 
Although the agent’s authority to act terminates when the 
principal dies, actions completed before the termination no 
longer require the agent to exercise authority. Therefore, 
the principal’s death does not revoke already completed 
actions by the agent. See 2A CJS, Agency, § 109, p 386 (“A 
5  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
revocation of the agent’s authority cannot retroactively 
affect the completed acts of the agent.”). 
In this case, in accord with Dr. Capuzzi’s wishes2 and 
acting as Dr. Capuzzi’s agent pursuant to a durable power 
of attorney, Michael contacted the third party and directed 
that the shares be transferred. 
Just as Dr. Capuzzi had 
the authority to compel the third party to transfer the 
shares, Michael, as Dr. Capuzzi’s agent, possessed the same 
authority. Once he ordered the third party to transfer the 
shares, this concluded the agent’s actions that were 
necessary to complete the transaction. 
All that remained 
was for the third party to act. 
Again, in this case, the 
agent did all that was required to transfer the shares. 
The failure to transfer the shares was solely the result of 
the third party’s delay and had nothing to do with the 
third party’s internal procedures or concerns that the 
agent did not have the proper authority. 
2 We note that there is no assertion that Dr. Capuzzi,
from the time the agent acted to the time of the doctor’s
death, ever wavered in his decision to transfer. 
The 
record also contains an affidavit from decedent’s wife of 
forty-four years averring that respondent had, for a number
of years, been estranged from her father; that despite the
affiant’s 
efforts 
to 
obtain 
reconciliation 
and 
reunification, respondent had refused to visit her parents;
and that in 1998, respondent had refused to visit her
father even though he was seriously ill. 
The affiant 
continued that her husband died not wanting his daughter to
receive the joint venture shares and that he also wanted to
divest himself of all remaining assets to avoid probate. 
6  
 
 
 
Notably, the agent acted on behalf of the principal 
before the agent’s authority was revoked by the principal’s 
death and, thus, there was nothing precluding the third 
party from relying on the agent’s authority. Because there 
was nothing prohibiting the agent from ordering the 
transfer when he did, that is, while the principal was 
still alive, there was nothing prohibiting the third party 
from acting pursuant to the validly given order. The third 
party’s authority to transfer the shares does not depend on 
the agent’s authority to act on behalf of the principal at 
the time of the transfer of the shares; rather, it depends 
on the agent’s authority to act at the time the agent 
ordered the shares to be transferred. 
Therefore, because 
the agent properly exercised his authority while the 
principal was still alive, see 2A CJS, Agency, § 88, p 364, 
the third party was not excused from acting on the agent’s 
authority. 
Although MCL 700.497 has been repealed, we are aware 
that it was in effect at the time of the agent’s order to 
transfer the shares. 
MCL 700.497(1) stated, in pertinent 
part, the following: 
The death of a principal who has executed a
power 
of 
attorney 
in 
writing, 
durable 
or 
otherwise, does not revoke or terminate the 
agency of the attorney in fact, agent, or other
person who, without actual knowledge of the 
death, acts in good faith under the power of
attorney or agency. 
An action so taken, unless 
7  
 
 
 
otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the 
principal and the principal's heirs, devisees,
and personal representatives. 
In brief, MCL 700.497(1) stated that the death of a 
principal who had executed a written power of attorney did 
not terminate the agency of the attorney in fact, agent, or 
other person who acted under the power of attorney or 
agency in good faith without knowledge of the death. 
MCL 
700.497(1) is not germane to this case because the 
principal’s agent acted before the principal died. 
Also, MCL 700.497(2) stated the following: 
In the absence of fraud, an affidavit 
executed by the attorney in fact or agent stating
that he or she did not have, at the time of doing
an act pursuant to the power of attorney, actual
knowledge of the revocation or termination of the
power of attorney by death, disability, or 
incompetence 
is 
conclusive 
proof 
of 
the 
nonrevocation or nontermination of the power at
that time. If the exercise of the power requires
execution and delivery of any instrument that is
recordable, the affidavit when authenticated for
record is likewise recordable. 
This section essentially stated that an affidavit 
executed by the attorney in fact or agent stating that he 
did not have knowledge of the principal’s death at the time 
of doing the act in question is conclusive proof of 
nontermination of the power at that time and the act must 
be enforced. Thus, if, unknown to the agent, the principal 
died, the agent’s act must be enforced nonetheless once the 
agent files an affidavit. 
The third party could not rebut 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
such an affidavit and would have no authority or basis to 
refuse to carry out the agent’s order. 
Of course, this 
section is not applicable to the facts of this case because 
when the agent completed his act the principal was still 
alive. 
And this section is not applicable to the third 
party because the statute only applied to the attorney in 
fact or agent and the third party in this case is neither. 
However, it is important to note that MCL 700.497(2) 
mandated that the actions of an agent be enforced when the 
agent was unaware of the principal’s death at the time of 
the act in question; therefore, actions taken by an agent, 
at the principal’s behest, when the principal was still 
alive are certainly enforceable. 
If we were to hold to 
the contrary, the actions of a third party could revoke the 
completed acts of an agent. 
This would circumvent the 
intent of the principal and allow a third party’s actions 
to control. 
A third party’s delay, whether intentional or 
not, should not be allowed to thwart the principal’s wishes 
when the principal’s agent has completed all necessary 
actions before the principal’s death. 
Further, to find 
that an agent had the authority to order the transfer of 
the shares but that the third party did not have to follow 
the order would render the agent’s authority a nullity. 
We note that our decision today does not affect 
situations in which an agent’s actions were not yet 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
complete at the time of the principal’s death. 
Our 
decision only addresses situations in which an agent’s 
actions were complete and the only actions remaining to be 
done are those of the third party. 
Although the 
principal’s death revokes the agent’s authority to act on 
behalf of the principal, it does not void the acts 
completed by the agent on behalf of the principal before 
the principal’s death. 
We also note that our decision 
today 
does 
not 
preclude 
a 
third 
party 
from 
taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that an agent’s order stems from 
a proper power of attorney. 
See Cutler v Grinnell Bros, 
325 Mich 370, 376; 38 NW2d 893 (1949). 
However, in this 
case, the third party’s delay was not related to any action 
being taken to ensure that the agent was not acting 
improvidently or fraudulently. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that an agent’s completed actions are not 
revoked by the death of the principal when all necessary 
actions have been taken by the agent before the principal’s 
death. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Stephen J. Markman 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re ESTATE OF EUGENE T. 
CAPUZZI, M.D., Deceased. 
MICHAEL CAPUZZI and EUGENE T. 
CAPUZZI, JR., 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
CHRISTINA FISHER, 
No. 121106 
Respondent-Appellee. 
YOUNG, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result reached by the majority because 
I believe that the probate court appropriately determined 
that the contested partnership shares belonged to the 
decedent’s sons rather the estate. 
However, the majority 
reaches beyond the simple issue presented in this case: 
whether the probate court properly applied the principles 
of MCR 2.116(C)(10) in resolving this property dispute in 
favor of the decedent’s sons. In reaching beyond what is 
essentially a simple standard of review question, the 
majority addresses other issues not squarely presented and 
blurs the distinctions between the obligations of an agent 
operating under a power of attorney and the obligations of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a third party responding to the direction of that agent. 
Consequently, I write separately to provide an alternate 
rationale–one that I believe will reduce the risk of 
unintended consequences that I suspect the majority opinion 
may create. 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
At issue is a petition in the probate court to 
determine ownership of shares in a limited partnership that 
owned a horse race track. 
Decedent owned those shares 
during his lifetime. 
Two years before his death, Eugene T. Capuzzi had 
appointed his son, Michael, to be his attorney-in-fact 
under a durable power of attorney. 
He had instructed his 
son to transfer various assets to his wife and to a 
revocable trust. In addition, he had instructed Michael to 
transfer his shares in the racetrack to his sons Michael 
Capuzzi and Eugene T. Capuzzi, Jr. 
When the estate inventory was filed in probate court, 
the 
decedent's 
daughter, 
respondent 
Christina 
Fisher, 
noticed that the racetrack shares were not included. 
She 
petitioned the court for the return of the assets to the 
estate, claiming that the racetrack shares were estate 
assets because the racetrack company had not completed the 
transfer of the shares before her father died. 
Her 
brothers filed a counter-petition, requesting that the 
2  
 
 
 
 
probate court determine the proper ownership of the 
racetrack shares. 
Among other proofs, they submitted the 
affidavit 
of 
the 
executive 
manager 
of 
the 
limited 
partnership, who stated that the limited partnership's 
general business practice with regard to share ownership 
was 
to 
transfer 
shares 
upon 
written 
or 
telephone 
communication 
directing 
a 
transfer. 
The 
sons 
also 
introduced evidence that the decedent desired the racetrack 
shares to be transferred to his sons and that this desire 
was communicated to Michael Capuzzi before the decedent 
died. 
It is not contested that the transfer order was 
communicated to the attorney-in-fact before the father 
died. 
On a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 
2.116(C)(10), the probate court ruled in favor of the two 
sons, concluding that the limited partnership's practice 
made transfer of ownership complete when the owner’s intent 
was communicated. It also found that the decedent's intent 
was communicated to his attorney-in-fact before his death 
and that the attorney-in-fact directed the transfer before 
the 
decedent’s 
death 
so 
that 
these 
communications 
successfully changed ownership to the sons. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished 
opinion.1
 The Court ruled that the power of attorney was 
effective until revoked by death. 
Because the instruction 
to transfer ownership of the shares had not been completed 
by the limited partnership's manager, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the shares remained in the decedent's name 
and were, therefore, part of the probate estate. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The probate court had jurisdiction to determine the 
title to property pursuant to MCL 700.22(1):2 
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred by
section 21 and other laws, the probate court has
concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction of
the following matters involving an estate of a
decedent, ward, or trust: 
(a) To 
determine 
property 
rights 
and 
interests. . . . 
See Noble v McNerney, 165 Mich App 586; 419 NW2d 424 
(1988). 
We review de novo the probate court’s grant or denial 
of summary disposition. 
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 
456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 15,
2002 (Docket No. 227750). 
2 This section was replaced by MCL 700.1303 effective
April 1, 2000. 1998 PA 386. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
III. The Probate Court Properly Decided
an Uncontested Motion 
The 
sons 
submitted 
evidence 
establishing 
their 
father’s desire to have his shares transferred to them as 
well as evidence regarding the transfer practices of the 
limited 
partnership. 
Both 
the 
communication 
of 
the 
decedent’s wish to have the shares transferred to his sons 
and the communication of his instruction to the racetrack’s 
transfer agent occurred before the decedent died. 
These 
facts were not contested by Christina.3
 There was no 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the authority of 
Michael Capuzzi to make the transfer order, there was no 
good faith challenge by the transfer agent to Michael's 
authority, and there was no genuine issue of material fact 
about the typical manner in which the limited partnership 
usually handled these orders. 
Accordingly, the probate 
court properly concluded that the contested shares were not 
an asset of the estate and granted judgment for the sons as 
a matter of law. 
Only this assessment of the probate court’s ruling is 
necessary for the resolution of this case. 
However, the 
3 Under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4), respondent had a
duty to oppose the sons’ motion by establishing a disputed
issue of material fact. 
By Christina having failed to do
so, the probate court was authorized by statute and court
rule to rule in the sons’ favor if they are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
majority launches into an unnecessary analysis of the 
authority of agents operating under a power of attorney 
upon the death of the principal, the general obligations of 
third parties upon receipt of instructions of an agent, and 
other issues I think wholly irrelevant to the disposition 
of this case. 
IV. Contrary to the Majority view, 
a third party is not unqualifiedly “required” 
to honor a power of attorney  
My disagreement with the majority is its overbroad and 
largely unsupported assertion that a third party is 
required to act in response to a directive from a person 
serving as an attorney-in-fact: 
However, when an agent has completed all
necessary actions and all that is left is for a
third party to act to complete the transaction,
we hold that the principal’s death has no effect
on the validity of the transaction and does not
relieve the requirement on the third party to 
act. [Ante, p 4.] 
When 
all 
necessary 
actions 
have 
been 
completed, just as the third party would be 
required 
to 
follow 
the 
directive 
of 
the 
principal, the third party is also required to
follow the directive of the agent. [Ante, p 5.] 
Although both statements are at a very general level 
accurate, 
they 
are 
unnuanced 
and 
overbroad. 
These 
statements are at odds with an established principle 
actually discussed in an unconnected fashion later by the 
majority: “[O]ur decision today does not preclude a third 
party from taking reasonable steps to ensure that an 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
agent's order stems from a proper power of attorney." 
Ante, p 10. The conclusion that an agent was authorized to 
act on behalf of the principal before the principal's death 
does not compel the conclusion that a third party is 
obligated to respond in a particular fashion.4 
It is common practice for financial institutions, 
hospitals, and other businesses to ask customers to use a 
power of attorney form created by that business. 
And the 
reason for such a request is obvious—the need to ensure 
that one who purports to act for another under a power of 
attorney is doing so with proper authority. 
Generally, a 
third party must exercise due diligence and due care to 
ascertain the scope of authority.5  A third party who acts 
in reasonable reliance on the apparent authority of an 
agent is protected: 
A third party with whom the agent deals may
rely on the appearance of authority only to the
extent that such reliance is reasonable. 
Blind 
reliance 
is 
incapable 
of 
giving 
rise 
to 
ostensible authority; reliance must be had in
good faith and in the exercise of reasonable
prudence. [2A CJS, Agency, § 144, p 420.] 
4 Indeed, because all the agent’s actions in this case
were completed before the death of the principal, it is
unclear why the majority devotes so much analysis to the
rules that apply when the principal dies before his agent
has completed all acts to effectuate the principal’s
direction—a circumstance inapposite to the facts of this
case. 
5 2A CJS, §§ 150-151, pp 426-429. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
   
Cowan v Sargent Mfg Co6 supports the principle that a 
third party has a right to inquire into the authority for a 
purported agent's commands. 
In Cowan, the defendant was a 
Michigan manufacturer of sickroom furniture who operated a 
sales showroom in New York. 
The defendant's New York 
manager 
ordered 
furniture 
from 
the 
plaintiff, 
a 
manufacturer of bedroom furniture, for delivery to friends 
in New York, purporting to act on behalf of the defendant. 
When the bills for the bedroom furniture went unpaid, the 
plaintiff sued, claiming that its agent had bound the 
company for the purchases. 
The Supreme Court held that the company was not liable 
for the manager's purchases because he acted outside the 
scope of his authority. 
Had the manager bought jewelry or 
automobiles, it would have been clear that he was operating 
outside the scope of his agency. 
The purpose of the 
defendant's New York operations was to market its Michigan­
made furniture, not to acquire furniture from other 
suppliers. 
Accordingly, the manager was operating outside 
the scope of his authority, and this Court held that the 
company was not liable for the agent’s purchases. 7 
6 141 Mich 87, 91; 104 NW 377 (1905).  
7 141 Mich 91.  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Thus, contrary to the majority’s statements, the 
longstanding principle in Michigan is that a third party 
who does not inquire sufficiently into an agent's authority 
does so at his own financial peril. That is why this Court 
must be cautious and avoid language that might imply a 
rigid duty or obligation for a third party to act. 
I agree with the majority that former MCL 700.4978 is 
not directly applicable here. 
Similarly, former MCL 
700.495 is also not directly applicable.9  Nonetheless, both 
sections show a legislative recognition of the role "good 
faith" can play—and the insecurities a third party might 
feel—by protecting a third party who acts in good faith.10 
Our law permits—indeed encourages—the third party to 
satisfy himself that the purported agent is in fact 
authorized to act. 
Nonetheless, the issue in this case is 
not the third party’s alleged “obligation” to act, because 
8 That section provided that a person who acted in good
faith without knowledge of the death was protected, but it
left open the question whether one who refuses to act
because of knowledge of the death would likewise be 
protected. 
9 Former MCL 700.495 gave legislative recognition to
durable powers of attorney. 
10 The majority cites MCL 700.5501 et seq. for the 
proposition that "[a] power of attorney provides the agent
with all the rights and responsibilities of the principal
as outlined in the agreement." 
Ante, pp 3-4. 
That 
statute, codified as the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney
Act, was effective April 1, 2000, and, therefore, does not
apply to this dispute, which arose in 1998. 
9  
 
 
  
 
the third party has not been named a party to this 
litigation. 
Rather, this is an action in probate court to 
determine the ownership of assets. 
Accordingly, this case does not require the Court to 
issue a broad statement attempting to define for all 
purposes a third-party's obligation to obey (or disobey) 
instructions from a purported agent. 
For the reasons 
stated above, I concur in the majority’s decision to 
reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of 
the probate court. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor 
10