Title: State ex rel. Justice v. Dairy Mart, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Justice v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 34, 2002-Ohio-60.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. JUSTICE, APPELLANT, v. DAIRY MART, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Justice v. Dairy Mart, Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 34.] 
Workers’ compensation — Retroactive compensation adjustment following an 
average weekly wage recalculation is limited to the two years prior to the 
claimant’s recalculation motion. 
(No. 00-2147 — Submitted October 2, 2001 — Decided January 9, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-83. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant-appellant David Justice was injured on June 14, 
1986, while employed as a clerk for appellee Dairy Mart in Cleveland.  His 
average weekly wage (“AWW”) was set, and compensation and  benefits 
followed. 
 
In 1998, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio to adjust 
his AWW to $265.27, claiming that wages that he had received from other jobs in 
the year prior to injury had not been included in the calculation.  The commission 
granted the motion and raised claimant’s AWW to $258.96. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 4123.52, claimant’s rate of compensation was readjusted 
back to December 31, 1996—two years prior to claimant’s motion.  Seeking 
readjustment back to the date of injury, claimant commenced a mandamus action 
in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals denied the writ 
after finding that the commission had properly applied R.C. 4123.52’s two-year 
statute of limitations. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
R.C. 4123.52 provides: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“The jurisdiction of the industrial commission * * * over each case is 
continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is 
justified. * * *  [T]he commission shall not make any modification, change, 
finding, or award which shall award compensation for a back period in excess of 
two years prior to the date of filing application therefor.” 
 
Claimant asserts that R.C. 4123.52 does not apply because retroactive 
adjustment does not constitute an “award.”  Claimant alternatively proposes that if 
it does apply, R.C. 4123.95’s liberal-construction mandate creates an exception 
for claimants with serious injuries.  Both contentions fail. 
 
The first argument was conclusively rejected in State ex rel. Cobble v. 
Indus. Comm. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 748 N.E.2d 29, 33: 
 
“Amicus proposes that back payment does not result in an ‘award’ of 
compensation, but merely an ‘adjustment’ to compensation previously paid.  
[State ex rel.] Welsh [v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 178, 712 N.E.2d 
749] has, however, effectively dispensed with any semantics over whether a 
monetary disbursal is an ‘award,’ an ‘enforcement,’ an ‘adjustment,’ or a 
‘modification.’ ” 
 
Claimant’s second argument also lacks merit.  Neither R.C. Chapter 4121 
nor Chapter 4123 establishes a distinct and more generous statute of limitations 
for those more seriously injured. 
 
Claimant’s injury, moreover, does not explain the twelve-and-one-half-
year delay in seeking redress.  Claimant indeed suffered a devastating injury, but 
counsel offers no evidence that the injury impeded the discovery of the additional 
wage information. 
 
The lone case that claimant cites is State ex rel. Welsh v. Indus. Comm. 
Contrary to claimant’s representation, Welsh does not say that there are 
exceptions to R.C. 4123.52’s two-year statute of limitations.  It says just the 
January Term, 2002 
3 
opposite:  “[A] claimant must act diligently to secure compensation by 
commission order.  And R.C. 4123.52 explicitly states the penalty for a claimant’s 
inaction—any award will be limited to the two years preceding his or her 
application for it.”  Id. at 180, 712 N.E.2d at 751. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and issue a writ of mandamus ordering the requested relief. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Kendis & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Rachel B. Jaffy, for appellant. 
 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell and Lori A. Fricke, for appellee Dairy Mart, 
Inc. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Jacob Dobres, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
__________________