Title: People v. Malchow

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88228-Agenda 15-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								CARL MALCHOW, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether defendant has met his
burden of showing that the Sex Offender Registration Act
(Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and the
Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law
(Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 1998)) are
unconstitutional. We hold that he has not.
BACKGROUND
	On December 17, 1997, the State indicted defendant, Carl
Malchow, with one count of failure to register as a sex offender
(730 ILCS 150/10 (West 1998)). The State alleged that defendant
was required to register as a sex offender because of his 1988
conviction of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 38, par. 12-16). Defendant moved to declare the
Registration Act and the Notification Law unconstitutional. The
trial court denied the motion. Following a stipulated bench trial,
the court found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to 18
months' conditional discharge and fined him $500. Defendant
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction.
The court reaffirmed its earlier holding in People v. Logan, 302 Ill.
App. 3d 319 (1998), that the Registration Act and the Notification
Law are constitutional. 306 Ill. App. 3d 665. The court, however,
reversed defendant's sentence because it was illegal and void.
Because the trial court failed to sentence defendant to the
mandatory minimum of seven days' confinement in the county
jail, the appellate court remanded the cause for resentencing. 306
Ill. App. 3d 676. We granted defendant's petition for leave to
appeal to determine whether the Registration Act and the
Notification Law are constitutional.
	Defendant argues that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law are unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) they violate the constitutional prohibition against the ex post
facto application of laws; (2) they impose cruel, unusual, and
disproportionate punishment; (3) they impermissibly infringe upon
a person's right to privacy; (4) they subject a defendant to double
jeopardy; (5) they violate the due process and equal protection
clauses; and (6) Public Act 89-8, which made the Registration Act
and Notification Law applicable to defendant, was passed in
violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).
	The Registration Act and Notification Law set out a
comprehensive scheme providing for the registration and
community notification of sex offenders. Pursuant to the
Registration Act, all persons who are sex offenders (730 ILCS
150/2(A) (West 1998)) under the Act are required to register with
local law enforcement officials (730 ILCS 150/3 (West 1998)).
The category of sex offenders includes any person who is
convicted of one of the Registration Act's enumerated sex offenses
or who is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West
1998)).
	The registrant must provide identification and documentation
that substantiates proof of residence at the registering address and
must pay a $10 registration fee and $5 annual renewal fee.(1) 730
ILCS 150/3(c)(6) (West 1998). Additionally, the registrant must
provide a written and signed statement, and registration may also
include the registrant's fingerprints and photograph. 730 ILCS
150/8 (West 1998). Registrants must keep law enforcement
officials notified of any change in address and must report
periodically to the appropriate law enforcement agency. 730 ILCS
150/6 (West 1998). The duty to register lasts for 10 years after a
conviction, or, in the case of a sexually dangerous person who is
released or found to be no longer sexually dangerous and
discharged, for the rest of his or her natural life. 730 ILCS 150/7
(West 1998). Failure to comply with the Registration Act is a
Class 4 felony. 730 ILCS 150/10 (West 1998).
	Pursuant to the Notification Law, the Department of State
Police is required to maintain a sex offender database for the
purpose of identifying sex offenders and making information
about them available to the persons specified in the Act. 730 ILCS
152/115 (West 1998). The appropriate law enforcement agency is
responsible for disclosing the name, address, date of birth, and
offense or adjudication of all sex offenders required to register
pursuant to the Registration Act. The information is disclosed to
the school board, school principals, and child care facilities in the
county where the offender resides. 730 ILCS 152/120(a) (West
1998). Additionally, that same information may be disclosed to
any person likely to encounter a sex offender (730 ILCS
152/120(b) (West 1998)), and the information is also made
available for public inspection at municipal police departments
and county sheriff's offices. 730 ILCS 152/120(c) (West 1998).
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
	A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. In re
K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550 (1999). This court has a duty to construe
a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality
if it can be reasonably done. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448
(1998). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that
we review de novo. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d  at 448.
Ex Post Facto Law
	Defendant first argues that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex
post facto laws. See U.S. Const., art. I, §§9, 10; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §16. These constitutional provisions restrain Congress and
the state legislatures from enacting arbitrary or vindictive
legislation and assure that statutes give fair warning of their effect.
Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 229 (1997). A law is ex post
facto if it is both retroactive and disadvantageous to the defendant.
Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d  at 230. A law disadvantages a defendant if it
criminalizes an act that was innocent when done, increases the
punishment for a previously committed offense, or alters the rules
of evidence by making a conviction easier. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 107 (1990).
	There is no question that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law have retroactive effect. At the time of
defendant's offense, he was not required to register as a sex
offender. Under the version of the Act at issue in this case, he is
required to register. See 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1), (B)(1), 3(c)(2)
(West 1998). 
	Defendant further contends that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law disadvantage him because they increase the
punishment for previously committed offenses. Resolution of this
contention turns on the question of whether the provisions of the
Registration Act and the Notification Law constitute punishment.
In People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381 (1991), we upheld an earlier
version of the Registration Act. As part of that decision, we held
that requiring sex offenders to register is not punishment. Adams,
144 Ill. 2d  at 386-90. Adams does not completely dispose of
defendant's argument, however, because the community
notification provisions were not in effect at the time of that
decision. We thus consider defendant's ex post facto argument as
it relates to the Notification Law.
	In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the United States Supreme Court considered
whether Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act constituted
punishment. The defendant in that case argued that the Kansas law
violated the ex post facto clause because it imposed additional
punishment for past conduct for which he had already been
convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence. The Supreme
Court first considered the legislative intent behind the law and
held that the Kansas legislature intended to create a civil
commitment scheme. Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 361, 138 L. Ed. 2d 
at 515, 117 S. Ct.  at 2082. The Supreme Court then examined
several factors to determine whether the law had a punitive effect
despite its nonpunitive intent, and concluded that it did not.
Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 362-69, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 515-19, 117 S. Ct. 
at 2082-85. Subsequently, several states have used the "intent-effects" test to determine whether sex offender registration and/or
notification laws amount to punishment in violation of the ex post
facto clause. See, e.g., Keller v. Fayetteville Police Department,
339 Ark. 274, 5 S.W.3d 402 (1999); People v. Logan, 302 Ill.
App. 3d 319, 327-31 (1998); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396
(Iowa 1997); State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570
(1998); Meinders v. Weber, 604 N.W.2d 248 (S.D. 2000).
	We first consider the legislative intent behind the Notification
Law. In Adams, we held that the legislature's intent in requiring
registration of sex offenders was to create an additional measure
of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual
assault and child abuse. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 387. We likewise
believe that protection of the public, rather than punishing sex
offenders and child murderers, is the intent of the Notification
Law. 
	Defendant argues that public notification is the modern day
equivalent of "branding and shaming," and that "historically,
stigmatization and banishment have been considered punitive
measures." A simple reading of the act shows, however, that the
intent of the Notification Law is not to stigmatize and shame sex
offenders. Rather, the Act is carefully tailored so that the
information is disseminated in such a way to protect the public.
The name, address, date of birth, and offense or adjudication of
sex offenders is given to school boards and child care facilities.
Additionally, the information may be given to anyone likely to
encounter a sex offender. Otherwise, the information, which is
already a matter of public record, is kept at law enforcement
headquarters and is available on request. The limited
dissemination of the information clearly demonstrates that the
Notification Law is intended to protect the public rather than to
punish sex offenders.
	Even if the legislature's intent is not to create a punitive
scheme, in certain circumstances the legislature's intent will be
disregarded where the party challenging the statute demonstrates
by "the clearest proof" that the statute's effect is so punitive that
it negates the legislature's intent. Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 361, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 515, 117 S. Ct.  at 2082. 
	Courts have generally looked to the factors enunciated in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963), to determine whether a statute has a punitive
effect despite its nonpunitive intent. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
at 362-69, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 515-19, 117 S. Ct. at 2082-85; Keller,
339 Ark. at 282-87, 5 S.W.3d at 407-10; People v. Logan, 302 Ill.
App. 3d 319, 329-31 (1998); Meinders, 604 N.W.2d at 256-62;
Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d at 418-23, 700 N.E.2d at 582-85; Pickens,
558 N.W.2d  at 398-400. Those factors are: (1) whether the
"sanction" involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2)
whether the sanction has been historically regarded as punishment;
(3) whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of
scienter; (4) whether operation of the sanction will promote
retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which the
sanction applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative
purpose to which the sanction may rationally be connected is
assignable for it; and (7) whether the sanction appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S.  at 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d  at 661, 83 S. Ct.  at 567-68.
	These factors clearly weigh in favor of the conclusion that the
Notification Law's effect is not so punitive that it defeats the
legislature's intent.  First, the Notification Law does not place an
affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. Their
movements and activities are not restricted in any way. Defendant
suggests that the Notification Law leads to public shaming and
restricts the ability of sex offenders to reenter the community. The
information, however, is not disseminated to the community as a
whole. Rather, the information is distributed only to child care
facilities, school boards, and those persons likely to encounter a
sex offender. Granted, that information is also available for public
inspection at local law enforcement agencies. As the Pickens court
noted, though, that information is "already a matter of public
record and dissemination of registration information does not
place new information into the public domain." Pickens, 558 N.W.2d  at 399. Moreover, defendant's argument consists of
speculation about the collateral consequences of community
notification, which is irrelevant to the question of whether the
Notification Law places an affirmative disability or restraint on sex
offenders.
	We next consider whether community notification has
traditionally been regarded as punishment. Defendant argues that,
historically, stigmatization and banishment have been considered
punitive measures. Although that may be true, the Notification
Law does not provide for "stigmatization and banishment."
Rather, it provides for a limited dissemination of matters of public
record to school boards, child care facilities, and those likely to
encounter sex offenders. This limited distribution clearly is not
analogous to stigmatization penalties such as branding,
stockading, pillaring, or banishment. Further, "[d]issemination of
such information has never been regarded as punishment when
done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest." E.B. v.
Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1997).
	The next factor is whether the Notification Law has a scienter
requirement. Clearly it does not. The only requirement for the
notification provisions to become effective is that the offender is
released into the community. Accordingly, this factor does not
indicate a punitive intent.
	We next consider whether community notification promotes
the traditional punishment goals of deterrence and retribution. As
stated previously, we believe that the legislature's intention in
passing the Notification Law was protection of the public from sex
offenders. The limited release of information to those likely to
encounter sex offenders could hardly be characterized as
"retribution." As to the deterrence factor, it is possible that the
Notification Law would have a deterrent effect. However, it is
unlikely that those not already deterred from committing sex
offenses by the possibility of a lengthy prison terms will be
deterred by the additional possibility of community notification.
Moreover, even an obvious deterrent purpose does not necessarily
make a law punitive. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 780, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767, 779, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946
(1994). We believe the statute's purpose is protection of the public
and that it does not significantly promote either retribution or
deterrence.
	The next factor is whether the Notification Law applies to
behavior that is already criminal. This factor weighs in favor of
defendant. The appropriate people are notified only of those
people who have committed criminal actions.
	The sixth factor is whether there is some purpose other than
punishment that can rationally be associated with the law. As set
out above, we believe the Notification Law shows on its face that
its purpose is protection of the public rather than punishment.
	The final factor is whether the law is excessive in relation to
its alternative purpose. In other words, we consider whether the
provisions of the Notification Law are excessive in relation to the
goal of protecting the public from sex offenders. As already stated,
the Notification Law provides for a compilation of information
about sex offenders and for a limited distribution of that
information. Further, the information disseminated applies only to
those people required to register as sex offenders, and the
registration requirement for most offenders terminates after 10
years (see 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 1998)). We do not believe that
the legislature has chosen excessive measures to implement its
goal of protecting the public from sex offenders.
	In sum, we conclude that defendant has not met his burden of
showing that the Notification Law has such a punitive effect that
the legislature's intent to create a nonpunitive scheme may be
disregarded. After considering all of the relevant factors, we
conclude that the requirements of the Notification Law are
nonpunitive. We have previously held that requiring sex offenders
to register does not constitute punishment. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at
386-90. Accordingly, defendant has not been subjected to
additional punishment for a previously committed offense, and his
ex post facto claim must therefore fail.
Cruel, Unusual, and Disproportionate Punishment

	Defendant next contends that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law violate the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). In
Adams, we rejected an eighth amendment challenge to the
Registration Act, and held that registration of sex offenders was
not punishment. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 386-90. We determined
above that the Notification Law does not constitute punishment.
Accordingly, defendant's argument must fail.
	Defendant also argues that the Registration Act violates the
provision of the Illinois Constitution that provides that, "All
penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of
the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to
useful citizenship" (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Defendant points
out that failing to register as a sex offender is a Class 4 felony (730
ILCS 150/10 (West 1998)), and that this penalty can potentially be
applied to those sex offenders whose underlying conviction was
for only a Class A misdemeanor (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.7) (West
1998)). Defendant has no standing to make this argument. A party
may not raise a constitutional challenge to a provision of the
statute that does not affect him or her. People v. Rogers, 133 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1989). Defendant's underlying conviction was for a Class
2 felony, and he thus lacks standing to make this claim.
Right to Privacy

	Defendant next argues that the Registration Act and the
Notification Law impermissibly infringe upon the constitutional
right to privacy that is implied in the United States Constitution
(see Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
684, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 684, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016 (1977)) and
explicitly provided for in the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §6). The right to privacy under the United States
Constitution has been interpreted to apply to personal decisions
involving marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education. Carey, 431 U.S.  at
684-85, 52 L. Ed. 2d  at 684, 97 S. Ct.  at 2016; Logan, 302 Ill.
App. 3d at 333-34. The information defendant contends should not
be disclosed under the Notification Law is not within any of these
recognized areas of the right to privacy.
	Defendant also has a right under the Illinois Constitution to be
free from unreasonable invasions of privacy. This provision of our
constitution "goes beyond federal constitutional guarantees by
expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy" and this
provision is stated "broadly and without restrictions." Kunkel v.
Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 537 (1997). This provision, however,
affords protection only against unreasonable invasions of privacy.
Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d  at 538.
	Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that
the Registration Act and Notification Law are invalid under the
privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant devotes three
short sentences to arguing about the right to privacy under the
United States Constitution and never argues specifically with
respect to the Illinois Constitution. Defendant quotes the relevant
constitutional provision at the beginning of his argument and
never mentions it again. Defendant does not cite or discuss any of
this court's cases that have held that the right to privacy under the
Illinois Constitution is broader than its Federal counterpart. See,
e.g., Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d  at 537; In re May 1991 Will County Grand
Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1992). In fact, beyond the quotations
from the United States and Illinois Constitutions and the three
sentence argument relating to the United States Constitution,
defendant's right to privacy argument consists of one convoluted
paragraph that seems to be a procedural due process argument
rather than a right to privacy argument. 
	As stated earlier, a statute is presumed constitutional, and the
party challenging the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its
invalidity. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d  at 550. A party obviously cannot meet
the burden of demonstrating a statute's invalidity under the
privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution merely by quoting that
clause. Accordingly, defendant's right to privacy challenge to the
Registration Act and the Notification Law must fail.
Double Jeopardy 

	Defendant next makes a brief argument that the Registration
Act and the Notification Law subject sex offenders to double
jeopardy by punishing them a second time for an offense. As we
have held that the Registration Act and the Notification Law are
not punitive, we must reject this claim.
Due Process and Equal Protection

	Defendant next argues that the Registration Act the
Notification law violate the due process and equal protection
provisions of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
Defendant lumps both of these contentions into one seven-sentence argument. Three of those sentences are merely quotes
from the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendant's
"argument" amounts to little more than a suggestion. Glaringly
absent is any reasoned or developed argument. Accordingly,
defendant has utterly failed to satisfy his burden of showing that
the Registration Act and the Notification Law are unconstitutional
on these bases.
Single Subject 

	Defendant's final contention is that Public Act 89-8, which
amended the Registration Act in such a way that it applied to
defendant, was passed in violation of the single subject clause of
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).
Defendant's argument on this issue is once again very brief.
Defendant lists the various statutes that were amended by Public
Act 89-8 and claims that they do not relate to a single subject.
	In determining whether a legislative enactment was passed in
violation of the single subject clause, we construe the term
"subject" liberally in favor of the legislature. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 (1999). The subject of a bill may be as broad as the
legislature chooses, provided that the bill's provisions have a
natural and logical connection. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499,
515 (1997). The General Assembly violates the single subject rule
only when it includes within one act provisions that by no fair
interpretation have any natural and logical connection to a single
subject. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 354-55
(1999).
	Public Act 89-8 was entitled "An Act in relation to criminal
and correctional matters, amending named acts." Pub. Act 89-8,
eff. March 21, 1995. The Act amended the Illinois Vehicle Code
(625 IlCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1994)), the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)), the Criminal Code
of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)), the Rights of
Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West
1994)), the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et
seq. (West 1994)), the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225 ILCS
60/1 et seq. (West 1994)), the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 1994)), the Statewide Grand Jury
Act (725 ILCS 215/1 et seq. (West 1994)), the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1994)), the Interstate
Agreements on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (45 ILCS 20/0.01
et seq. (West 1994)), part 10.5 of the Civil Administrative Code
of Illinois (20 ILCS 2605/55a et seq. (West 1994)), the
Intergovernmental Missing Child Recovery Act of 1984 (325
ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 1994)), and the Child Sex Offender
Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)).
	In People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 512-13 (1999), this
court held that the legislature could pass legislation that amended
several acts, as long the amendments related to the single subject
of "crime." In that case, however, we invalidated Public Act
89-203 because some of the amendments did not have any
connection to the subject of crime. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d  at 513-18.
	As stated, Public Act 89-8 was entitled "An Act in relation to
criminal and correctional matters, amending named acts."
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that any
of the provisions of Public Act 89-8 bear no natural and logical
connection to this subject. By their titles, three of the acts that
were amended-the Medical Practice Act of 1987, the Code of
Civil Procedure, and the Civil Administrative Code-seem
unrelated to crime and correctional matters. A closer look at these
provisions, however, reveal that they are related to the single
subject. The amendment to the Medical Practice Act of 1987
explains that section 22 of that Act, which sets out various
grounds for disciplinary action, does not apply to persons who
carry out or assist in the court-ordered imposition of the death
penalty. See 225 ILCS 60/4(b) (West 1996). The amendment to
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Department of
Corrections shall notify the appropriate State's Attorney when
there is any settlement, verdict or judgment, in excess of $500
against the Department or one of its agents, for damages incurred
by a person who was committed to the Department. See 735 ILCS
5/13-202.1(d) (West 1996). The amendment to the Civil
Administrative Code made a technical change to bring it into
compliance with the name change of the Habitual Child Sex
Offender Registration Act to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
See 325 ILCS 40/6(k), 40/7(a) (West 1996).
	Defendant has failed to meet his substantial burden of
demonstrating that the provisions of Public Act 89-8 bear no
natural or logical connection to a single subject. 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE
	Defendant does not challenge the appellate court's decision to
reverse his sentence and remand the cause for resentencing. As the
appellate court properly noted, section 10 of the Registration Act
states that anyone convicted of a violation of the Act "shall, in
addition to any other penalty required by law, be required to serve
a minimum period of 7 days confinement in the local county jail"
(730 ILCS 150/10 (West 1998)). Additionally, the appellate court
correctly held that the State on appeal was properly allowed to
challenge defendant's sentence. A sentence below the minimum
term established by the legislature is void, and the appellate court
may correct the sentence without running afoul of Supreme Court
Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), which limits the State's
right to appeal. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 509-10
(1998). Thus, we affirm the appellate court's decision to reverse
defendant's sentence and remand the cause for resentencing.
CONCLUSION

	Defendant has not demonstrated that the Registration Act and
the Notification Law are unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
	Because the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act)
(730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and the Sex Offender and
Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law)
(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 1998)) unconstitutionally impose
additional punishment upon an offender who has already served
his court-imposed sentence for his crime, I dissent.
FACTS

	Following a bench trial on March 20, 1998, defendant was
convicted of failing to register as a sex offender as required by the
Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a)(2) (West
1998)). This conviction was premised upon defendant's 1988
conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a person
under the age of 18 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12-16).
For failing to comply with the Registration Act, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 18 months' conditional discharge and fined
him $500. In addition, the court ordered defendant to comply with
the Registration Act.
	On appeal, defendant argued that the Registration Act is
unconstitutional because, inter alia: (1) it violates the ex post facto
clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S.
Const., art. I, §10, cl. 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §16); and (2) it
subjects defendant to double jeopardy in violation of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §10). The appellate court rejected defendant's
arguments and affirmed defendant's conviction. 306 Ill. App. 3d
665. The majority today affirms the appellate court.
DISCUSSION
	As the majority correctly observes, several of defendant's
arguments depend upon whether or not this court characterizes the
Registration Act as punishment. Slip op. at 4. In holding that the
Registration Act does not constitute punishment, the majority
largely relies upon this court's opinion in People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381 (1991). In that case, this court upheld an earlier version of
the Registration Act after holding that requiring sex offenders to
register was not punishment. The majority notes, however, that
Adams is not completely dispositive of the case at bar, because the
community notification provisions of the Notification Law were
not in effect at the time of the Adams decision. Slip op. at 4.
Indeed, in Adams, this court relied in part upon the absence of
community notification in holding that the Registration Act did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This court held:
		"We fail to see how any stigma attaches to a registrant
that is not already present through his own actions.
Although required to register, the information conveyed
to law enforcement officials concerning the registrant's
criminal history is already available in the public record.
The Registration Act simply makes that information more
readily available to the police. Furthermore, the law
enforcement community is prohibited from disseminating
the information to the public at large on pain of criminal
sanctions. The existence of a 'stigma' requires that the
knowledge of the registrant's past transgressions be
conveyed to the general public. Since it is a criminal
offense for law enforcement officials to convey this
information to the public, it is unlikely the information the
registrant supplies will be distributed to the public, and
so no stigma attaches." (Emphasis added.) Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 389-90.
	The facts of the instant case are much different from those of
Adams. Here, pursuant to the provisions of the Notification Law
and in stark contrast to state of the law as it existed in Adams, law
enforcement officials are affirmatively required to disseminate a
registrant's personal information to numerous parties, including:
school boards; school principals; and child care facilities. In
addition, the Notification Law vests officials with the discretion to
convey registration information to any person deemed by the
officials to be "likely" to encounter any sex offender required to
register under the Registration Act. 730 ILCS 152/120(b) (West
1998). Officials are further required to make information on
registered sex offenders available for public inspection and
copying. Finally, recent amendments to the Notification Law
expressly authorize police to publish information concerning
certain sex offenders, including the offenders' photographs, in
newspapers, on television, or on the Internet. 730 ILCS
152/120(c), (d) (West Supp. 1999).
	Together, the Registration Act and the Notification Law have
the clear and unmistakable effect of imposing additional
punishment upon an offender who has already been tried,
convicted, and has served his lawful sentence. These statutes, by
design, will often result in shame and humiliation for ex-offenders,
causing significant hardship as they attempt to reenter society as
useful citizens. Whether this shame and humiliation might, in the
view of some, be deserved is beside the point. What matters is that
the State has already had its opportunity to impose whatever
measure of retribution against defendant the criminal law allows.
Once an offender has served his sentence, the punishment must
stop. Under the Registration Act and the Notification Law,
however, the punishment continues long after an offender has
served his sentence. As such, the provisions of these statutes have
far more in common with the historic punishments of branding and
banishment than with the law enforcement procedures this court
approved in Adams. Accordingly, I would hold that the
Registration Act and Notification Law unconstitutionally subject
defendant to double jeopardy. In addition, because the statutes at
issue were enacted subsequent to defendant's 1988 conviction for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, application of these laws to
defendant violates prohibitions against ex post facto laws, as well.
	I therefore respectfully dissent.
1. Defendant raises no constitutional challenge to these fees.