Title: Crawford v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
ANTHONY DALE CRAWFORD 
 
v.  Record No. 100202  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 January 13, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Anthony Dale Crawford (“Crawford”) was convicted in the 
Circuit Court for the City of Charlottesville of capital 
murder, abduction with intent to defile, use of a firearm in 
the commission of a murder, use of a firearm in the commission 
of an abduction, rape, and grand larceny.  Among the several 
issues we address in this appeal is Crawford’s contention that 
the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an affidavit 
in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below1 
 
On Thursday, November 18, 2004, John and Irene Powers 
("the Powers") had dinner with their thirty-three-year-old 
daughter, Sarah Crawford ("Sarah") at a local restaurant in 
Manassas, Virginia. When they left the restaurant that night 
at about 8:30 pm, it would be the last time that they would 
see their daughter alive. Twelve hours later Sarah would be 
                     
1 The Facts and Proceedings below are taken almost verbatim 
from the compelling narrative written by Judge Humphreys in his 
en banc opinion in the Court of Appeals, 55 Va. App. 457, 462-
70, 686 S.E.2d 557, 559-63 (2009). 
dead, and her husband, the appellant, Anthony Dale Crawford 
("Crawford") would be wanted for her murder. 
 
The Powers had a "very close" relationship with their 
daughter and saw her frequently. Sarah and her mother talked 
on the phone often. During dinner, Sarah told her parents of 
the latest events in her life, including her job as an office 
manager for a television production company. Sarah mentioned 
to her mother that she had a hair appointment on Saturday and 
that, on Saturday afternoon, she had plans to go to a concert 
with a man she recently met. Sarah was, according to her 
mother, "really very happy" that night. 
 
Sarah had every reason to be happy. She had a good job 
with a small company that she enjoyed and found fulfilling. 
She had gastric bypass surgery in the summer of 2002 and 
reached her goal of losing one hundred and fifty pounds. In 
addition, Sarah had just gotten a raise and moved into her 
own apartment. And, most significantly, Sarah had recently 
decided to end her relationship with her abusive husband, 
Crawford. 
 
Sarah and Crawford had been married since 1999, and had 
been together for several years before that. The couple had a 
troubled history, and Sarah was growing increasingly fearful 
of her husband. In October of 2004, Sarah and Crawford 
separated. Following their separation, Sarah expressed to a 
 
2
number of friends and co-workers that she was afraid that 
Crawford might physically harm her. This concern caused Sarah 
to make a number of significant changes in her life. Sarah 
found a new apartment in a rural area that her mother 
described as "wooded, desolate," and "well-hidden." Sarah 
chose the apartment because it had a long driveway, so that 
she could "make a phone call" or "get out" if she saw someone 
coming. 
     On October 29, 2004, Sarah and the Powers went to 
Crawford's apartment to pick up a few of Sarah's things.  
Before they separated, Sarah shared the apartment with 
Crawford. Sarah tried to get Crawford tickets to a sporting 
event to get him out of the apartment because she was "afraid 
of an incident" arising from her move. However, Crawford was 
present in the apartment when Sarah and the Powers arrived. 
As Sarah expected, Crawford was hostile toward her, refused 
to allow her to take any of her belongings, and, ultimately, 
called the police. When the police arrived, they asked 
Crawford to calm down and to allow Sarah to take her things. 
However, despite the police officer's request, Crawford's 
hostile behavior toward Sarah continued. According to the 
police officer, as Sarah packed up her belongings, Crawford 
approached her and whispered something in her ear. The 
officer could not determine what Crawford said to Sarah, but 
 
3
the officer testified that "it was something that obviously 
upset [Sarah]," because she "immediately stood up and stepped 
back away from [Crawford]." Sarah then asked Crawford to 
repeat what he said and asked if Crawford was threatening 
her. The officer ordered Crawford to back away from Sarah; 
however, he had to repeat this command several times before 
Crawford complied. At one point, Mrs. Powers heard Crawford 
tell Sarah, "You'll pay for this." 
 
Eventually, the police officers left the apartment, but, 
sensing that things might not remain peaceful, they remained 
nearby. After the officers left, Sarah mentioned that she 
wanted a side table that her parents had given her, and she 
asked Crawford to unlock the bedroom door so she could 
retrieve it. Instead of unlocking the door, Crawford said 
that he would get the table. Mr. Powers was packing up some 
of Sarah's belongings, when he heard Crawford say, "Here's 
your god-damned table" and the table "came flying over [Mr. 
Powers'] right shoulder and . . . landed near the sofa and 
broke . . . ." At that point, the Powers called the police 
and the same officers immediately responded. The police 
stayed until Sarah and her family finished packing her 
things, and then followed them for about a mile to make sure 
that they got away safely. 
     Following her encounter with Crawford at the apartment, 
 
4
Sarah went to the Prince William County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court (the "JDR court") and requested a 
preliminary protective order in order to prevent Crawford 
from having any further contact with her. In the affidavit 
for preliminary protective order (hereinafter "the 
affidavit"), which Sarah signed, she recounted past incidents 
in which Crawford forcibly raped her, threatened her life, 
and physically and verbally abused her. In the affidavit, 
Sarah also stated 
[o]n October 30, 2004, [Crawford] called me and 
told me that I must want to die. He also said he 
understands why husbands kill their wives. He told 
me that he would find me and would come to my work. 
. . . I am afraid of [Crawford]. I fear he may 
physically hurt me or even kill me. I want him to 
stay away from me and my family. 
 
The JDR court granted Sarah's request for a preliminary 
protective order.2 In the few weeks that the protective order 
was in effect, Sarah continued to have contact with Crawford. 
Telephone records revealed that Crawford and Sarah communicated 
on several occasions between November 1 and November 18, 2004. 
Sarah also paid for Crawford to attend a trade school in 
Kentucky. 
     As Sarah began to settle into her new life, she tried to 
                     
2 The protective order prohibited Crawford from having any 
contact with his wife.  At a court hearing on November 16, 
2004, Sarah appeared in the JDR court and asked that the 
protective order be dismissed.  The record does not establish 
why she made this request. 
 
5
take precautions for her own safety. Sarah chose the location 
of her desk at work because it overlooked the parking lot and 
allowed her to see if Crawford's vehicle was parked there. In 
addition, Sarah took a new route home every night after work. 
According to her supervisor, "[Sarah] would never go home the 
same way two days in a row because she didn't want someone to 
be able to follow her or know where she was going to be at any 
particular time, so she would always choose a new way." Sarah 
also spoke to her parents several times each day. On November 
1, 2004, Sarah sought help from a domestic violence 
intervention program in Prince William County. 
     On Thursday, November 18, 2004, Sarah apparently sought to 
sever her last remaining ties with Crawford. On that day Sarah 
prepared a document that purported to release her father from 
any liability on the lease for the apartment that she 
previously shared with Crawford. Due to Crawford's credit 
problems, Mr. Powers had co-signed the lease for their 
apartment. Sarah now wanted her father's name removed from the 
lease. Because her printer was broken, Sarah asked one of her 
supervisors to print out the release form on his printer that 
afternoon. A copy of that release was later recovered from her 
supervisor's computer. Before Sarah left work on November 18, 
she informed her supervisor that she would be late the 
 
6
following morning, but she expected to be at the office by 1:00 
p.m. 
Sarah never made it to work on Friday, November 19, 2004. 
That morning, a hunter in Fauquier County found a box along the 
road that belonged to Sarah's employer. Sarah's supervisor 
testified that she was supposed to ship that box for him. The 
box had a small amount of Sarah's blood on it. Later that day, 
the Powers received a telephone call from a person who found 
Sarah's cell phone lying in the grass near his driveway in 
Manassas.3  Worried for their daughter's well-being, the Powers 
made the first of several trips to Sarah's apartment that 
evening. When they arrived, Sarah and her car were gone, and 
the apartment was dark. The only sign of life in the apartment 
was Sarah's pet cat, which came to the glass door and cried. 
On the morning of Saturday, November 20, 2004, the Powers 
went back to Sarah's apartment. Sarah's car was still missing, 
and her cat was still at the door, crying. Mrs. Powers called 
Sarah's salon to see if she had arrived at her hair appointment 
on Saturday morning and was told she had not. The Powers made 
the fifty-minute round trip from their home to Sarah's 
apartment three more times on Saturday. Each time they 
returned, Sarah's cat cried and clawed at the door. The last 
                     
3 Records from Sarah’s cell phone revealed that Sarah 
called Crawford twice on November 19, 2004, once at 7:52 a.m. 
and again at 8:52 a.m. 
 
7
time the Powers went to Sarah's apartment on Saturday evening 
was around 8:00 p.m. They found a bottle of wine at the door 
with a note that said, "Sarah, sorry I missed you. Call me to 
let me know you're okay." Sarah had missed her Saturday 
afternoon date. 
On Sunday, November 21, 2004, the Powers were finally able 
to reach Sarah's landlord, who let them into her apartment. The 
first thing the Powers noticed was that her cat had no food or 
water. The Powers had taken care of Sarah's cat when she had 
gone out of town before, and it was uncharacteristic for Sarah 
to leave her pet unattended and without food or water. After 
taking care of the cat, the Powers began looking around Sarah's 
apartment to try to determine what had happened. Mrs. Powers 
noted that all of Sarah's luggage was still in the apartment 
and that the clothes she had worn to dinner on Thursday were on 
the floor in front of her washing machine. Mrs. Powers went to 
Sarah's bedroom and noticed that there was a book open to page 
fifty-nine lying face down on Sarah's bedside table entitled, 
“It's My Life Now: Starting Over After an Abusive Relationship 
or Domestic Violence.” 
In the early morning hours of November 22, 2004, the night 
manager of a motel in Charlottesville, Virginia found Sarah 
dead in one of the motel's rooms, her body positioned in a 
particularly gruesome and suggestive manner. Stripped naked, 
 
8
Sarah was placed on the bed in a "frog-like position." A motel 
towel concealed a fatal gunshot wound to the right side of her 
chest. An assistant chief medical examiner for the Commonwealth 
determined that the bullet passed through Sarah's right lung 
and severed her spinal cord, rendering Sarah paralyzed, unable 
to walk or struggle. The medical examiner testified that, 
without medical treatment, Sarah could have lived up to an hour 
following such an injury. Investigators found seminal fluid in 
Sarah's vagina and spermatozoa in Sarah's mouth and anus. DNA 
recovered from the seminal fluid matched that of Crawford. In 
addition, investigators found Crawford's clothing, personal 
belongings, and fingerprints in the motel room. Cigarette butts 
in the motel room's ashtray contained Crawford's DNA, and a 
pill bottle bearing Crawford's name was also found in the room. 
The motel's clerk testified that Crawford arrived at the motel 
at 11:00 a.m. on November 19, 2004. Crawford was driving 
Sarah's car at the time4 and parked in the farthest spot from 
the front desk. Crawford told the clerk that he had been 
driving all night and asked for a quiet room, which he paid for 
with a $100 bill. 
                     
4 Although characterized by the Powers and other witnesses 
as “Sarah’s car,” the evidence adduced at trial established 
that the vehicle Crawford was driving actually belonged to Mr. 
Powers. 
 
9
Given the abundance of evidence linking him to the murder 
scene, the Charlottesville police began to search for Crawford. 
As part of that investigation, the police contacted Crawford's 
relatives. Crawford's adult daughter, who lived in South 
Carolina, reported that her father had contacted her recently 
and asked her to wire him money. With this information, the 
police then learned that Crawford was staying with his extended 
family in Jacksonville, Florida. 
The Charlottesville police informed their Jacksonville 
colleagues that they had reason to believe Crawford was in 
their area and that there was an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest for the murder of Sarah. The Charlottesville police also 
advised the Jacksonville authorities that Crawford was likely 
driving Sarah's car. The Jacksonville police located Crawford 
and arrested him; they also seized Sarah's car (which Crawford 
was driving at the time of his arrest) and sealed it for 
evidentiary purposes. The Charlottesville police later 
processed the car for evidence. The driver's window of the 
vehicle was broken, and police found Sarah's blood on both the 
driver's and rear seats. The police found gunshot residue in 
the car and a box of ammunition in the trunk. 
Crawford waived his Miranda rights and made a statement to 
the Florida police during a custodial interview. The interview 
was videotaped, and the recording was admitted into evidence at 
 
10
trial. Crawford claimed that Sarah had picked him up early 
Friday morning at his house. He said they had planned to go to 
Charlottesville for the weekend to attempt to reconcile. After 
an hour to an hour and a half drive, they arrived in 
Charlottesville at about 8:30 in the morning. Sarah was 
driving, and he was in the passenger's seat. Crawford said they 
drove directly to a McDonalds and got breakfast.5 Without any 
explanation as to why, Crawford then stated that he pulled out 
his .38 caliber revolver6 planning to commit suicide. Crawford 
said he had the gun cocked and his finger on the trigger when 
Sarah grabbed for the weapon. While they were wrestling over 
the gun, it went off and the bullet hit Sarah. Crawford claimed 
the shooting was an accident, telling the police "she basically 
did it to herself." 
 
Crawford then said that he pulled Sarah into the back seat 
and drove to a nearby hotel and rented a room. He left Sarah's 
body on the bed and her clothing in the room and "took off and 
headed south." Significantly, Crawford never offered any 
explanation for leaving Sarah's body undressed in the position 
                     
5 The autopsy report, which was admitted into evidence, 
described the contents of Sarah’s stomach as “a scant amount 
(20cc) of thin yellow fluid.” 
6 The police learned that on November 6, 2004, Crawford 
purchased a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver.  He later 
purchased a box of .38 caliber ammunition on November 13, 2004.  
Although Crawford disposed of his revolver, police found a box 
of ammunition in his possession after Sarah was shot and 
killed.  Two cartridges were missing from the box. 
 
11
in which it was found, nor for failing to seek medical help for 
Sarah. Likewise, he offered no explanation as to why his semen 
was found in her vagina and sperm was found in her mouth and 
anus.7 
 
Prior to trial, Crawford made a motion to suppress the 
affidavit executed by Sarah in support of the protective order, 
arguing that the document was testimonial hearsay and, 
therefore, inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004).  During the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth 
did not dispute that the affidavit was testimonial hearsay. 
Instead, the Commonwealth argued that under the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, the trial court should find that 
Crawford forfeited his right to confrontation with respect to 
statements by Sarah. The trial court agreed with the 
Commonwealth and admitted a redacted copy of the affidavit on 
those grounds. A jury subsequently convicted Crawford of 
capital murder, abduction with intent to defile, rape, grand 
larceny, use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and 
use of a firearm in the commission of abduction. Crawford 
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. 
                     
7 Appellant’s brief filed in the Court of Appeals stated 
that, “[d]uring the course of their travel [from Manassas to 
Charlottesville] they engaged in consensual intercourse.”  The 
record is totally devoid of any evidence to support this 
assertion. 
 
12
 
In the Court of Appeals, Crawford contended that the trial 
court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress an affidavit 
made by Sarah Crawford, which was submitted to the JDR court in 
conjunction with her application for a preliminary protective 
order and (2) failing to grant his motion to strike the charges 
of abduction with intent to defile and rape, "since there was 
insufficient evidence to permit these issues to go to the 
jury." 
 
On December 23, 2008, a divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed all of Crawford's convictions with the 
exception of his conviction for grand larceny. See Crawford v. 
Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 138, 163, 670 S.E.2d 15, 27 (2008). 
The panel majority held that the trial court's admission of the 
affidavit violated Crawford's rights under the Confrontation 
Clause. Id. at 151, 670 S.E.2d at 21.  The majority further 
held that the evidence was insufficient to support Crawford's 
convictions for rape, abduction with intent to defile, and use 
of a firearm in the commission of abduction. Id. at 163, 670 
S.E.2d at 27.  The majority also reversed Crawford's conviction 
for capital murder, since it reversed the convictions on which 
the capital murder charge was based. Id. at 163-64, 670 S.E.2d 
at 27.  The panel dissent disagreed with the majority only in 
its sufficiency analysis as to the charge of abduction with 
 
13
intent to defile.  Id. at 166, 670 S.E.2d at 28-29 (Beales, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
The Commonwealth petitioned the full Court of Appeals for 
a rehearing en banc and the Court of Appeals granted the 
petition.  Crawford v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 349, 349, 671 
S.E.2d 436, 437 (2009).  Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed all of Crawford’s convictions in the trial 
court.  Crawford v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 457, 482, 686 
S.E.2d 557, 569 (2009).  
 
Crawford timely filed his notice of appeal and we granted 
an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an 
affidavit in support of an ex parte petition for a 
protective order is not “testimonial” within the 
meaning of Confrontation Clause cases, in violation 
of Anthony Crawford’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
principle of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” applies to 
permit extra-judicial statements in cases that arise 
in domestic relations contexts, even without specific 
proof in this case that the Defendant killed the 
victim to silence her or to keep her from testifying 
against him, in violation of Anthony Crawford’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
3. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Court 
of Appeals is not bound by the trial court’s ruling 
and the prosecutor’s concession that the affidavit 
was “testimonial.” 
 
 
14
4. 
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the “right 
result/wrong reason” doctrine to uphold the 
conviction. 
 
5. 
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to address 
Appellant’s argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the convictions of abduction 
with intent to defile and rape. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
On appeal, constitutional arguments present questions of 
law that this Court reviews de novo.  Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 
270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2005).  Additional well-
established principles of appellate review guide this Court’s 
analysis.  “We consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.”  
Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 
(2000) (citing Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 564, 506 
S.E.2d 787, 789 (1998)). 
B.  Testimonial Nature of the Affidavit 
 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 
(1965), provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In Crawford v. 
 
15
Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 
“unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  541 U.S. at 53-54.  
The Court stated, “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, 
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”  Id. at 68-69. 
 
If the statement is found to be testimonial, “the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: [in-court 
confrontation or] unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”  Id. at 68.  Significantly, the Court 
declared that the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” 
include: 
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions; statements that were 
made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later 
trial. 
 
 
16
Id. at 51-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the 
Supreme Court further clarified what constitutes a 
“testimonial” statement: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is 
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution. 
 
As explained in Davis, a statement is nontestimonial if it is 
made in the context of an ongoing emergency and is given for 
the purposes of resolving that emergency.  Id.  By contrast, a 
statement is testimonial if it is given while “[t]here was no 
emergency in progress,” id. at 829, and is made for the purpose 
of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 822 (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, Sarah executed an affidavit for use in an ex 
parte court proceeding, and given the nature of the statements 
themselves, which describe violent, criminal acts, an objective 
witness would reasonably “believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  
 
17
Additionally, Sarah’s statements were not made in the context 
of an ongoing emergency in order to enable police to help 
resolve that ongoing emergency.  Instead, Sarah’s affidavit 
described past events that had taken place days, weeks, and 
even months previously--the very purpose of which was to 
“establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.  Despite the 
fact that the immediate purpose of the affidavit was to obtain 
a protective order in a civil case, the facts recited were, 
nonetheless, “potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”   
Most recently, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009), 
that affidavits (or certificates of analysis in that case) 
related to forensic laboratory tests are testimonial.  In so 
holding, the Supreme Court stated: 
There is little doubt that the documents at 
issue in this case fall within the ‘core class 
of testimonial statements’ thus described.  Our 
description of that category mentions affidavits 
twice.  See also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) ("[T]he 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by 
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they 
are contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions").  The 
documents at issue here, while denominated by 
Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite 
plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts 
 
18
written down and sworn to by the declarant 
before an officer authorized to administer 
oaths.’  Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 
2004).  They are incontrovertibly a ‘solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact.’  
Crawford, [541 U.S.] at 51 (quoting 2 N. 
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language (1828)). . . . The ‘certificates’ are 
functionally identical to live, in-court 
testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does 
on direct examination.’  Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. [at] 830. 
 
Id. 
Given the Supreme Court’s definition and examples of 
testimonial statements in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, 
we hold that the affidavit in support of Sarah Crawford’s 
petition for a preliminary protective order is testimonial in 
nature and should not have been admitted against Crawford at 
trial.  Because Sarah was unavailable to testify at Crawford’s 
trial and Crawford did not have a prior opportunity to cross-
examine Sarah concerning these statements, Crawford’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the 
affidavit was admitted into evidence against him at trial.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred when it held the 
affidavit to be nontestimonial and upheld its admission at 
Crawford’s trial. 
However, this conclusion does not end our analysis.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the admission of the affidavit in 
 
19
Crawford’s trial, if error, was harmless.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
C.  Harmless Error 
The United States Supreme Court has stressed on more than 
one occasion that, “the Constitution entitles a criminal 
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”  Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has “rejected the argument that all federal 
constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the 
circumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of 
conviction.”  Id.  Therefore, “in the context of a particular 
case, certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, 
may [be] ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the factfinding 
process at trial.”  Id. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has stated: 
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when 
a State has failed to accord federal 
constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit 
as much of a federal question as what particular 
federal constitutional provisions themselves 
mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have 
been denied. With faithfulness to the 
constitutional union of the States, we cannot 
leave to the States the formulation of the 
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed 
to protect people from infractions by the States 
of federally guaranteed rights. We have no 
hesitation in saying that the right[s] of these 
petitioners . . . expressly created by the 
Federal Constitution itself [are] federal 
right[s] which, in the absence of appropriate 
 
20
congressional action, it is our responsibility to 
protect by fashioning the necessary rule. 
 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has fashioned rules that this Court must apply 
when deciding whether errors committed in violation of a 
defendant’s federal constitutionally guaranteed rights are 
harmless in nature.  
In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963), the 
Supreme Court declared that, in conducting a constitutional 
harmless error analysis, “[t]he question is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction.”  The Supreme Court later 
clarified this rule when it stated that “[t]here is little, if 
any, difference between our statement in Fahy . . . and 
requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 
(emphasis added).  Consequently, the Supreme Court held that 
“before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the 
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  The Court explained that this 
test “will provide a more workable standard, although achieving 
the same result as that aimed at in [Fahy].”  Id. 
 
21
Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that error 
involving the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is subject 
to constitutional harmless error analysis.  Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 684.  In so holding, the Supreme Court further explained 
that “[t]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the 
damaging potential of the [error] were fully realized, a 
reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  Accordingly, 
[w]hether such an error is harmless in a 
particular case depends upon a host of factors, 
all readily accessible to reviewing courts.  
These factors include the importance of the 
[tainted evidence] in the prosecution's case, 
whether [that evidence] was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the [tainted evidence] on material 
points . . . and, of course, the overall strength 
of the prosecution's case.” 
 
Id.; Cypress v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 305, 318-19, 699 S.E.2d 
206, 213-14 (2010). 
Specifically, Sarah’s affidavit described several 
instances of Crawford’s abuse and violence towards her, 
including episodes where Crawford picked Sarah up and threw her 
against a door; episodes where he would break things and where 
he threw a glass and other items at her; where he pushed her 
down; and an episode where he falsely accused her of forging a 
prescription.  The affidavit also included various threats made 
by Crawford against Sarah, and the statement made by Sarah 
 
22
that, “I am afraid of [Crawford].  I fear he may physically 
hurt me or even kill me.  I want him to stay away from me and 
my family.”  Lastly, the affidavit included a description of an 
incident in which Crawford had raped her less than three months 
earlier. 
The overall strength of the Commonwealth’s case against 
Crawford, and the quantum, character, and quality of the other 
evidence introduced at trial, independent of the affidavit, is 
overwhelming.  The affidavit is simply cumulative of other 
evidence relating to these charges properly before the jury.  
Upon considering the factors outlined in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
at 684, including “the importance of the [tainted evidence] in 
the prosecution's case, whether [that evidence] was cumulative, 
the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the [tainted evidence] on material points [and] 
the overall strength of the prosecution's case,” we hold that 
the admission of the affidavit constitutes harmless error 
beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to Crawford’s convictions 
for capital murder, abduction with intent to defile, rape, use 
of a firearm in the commission of a murder, use of a firearm in 
the commission of an abduction, and grand larceny. 
i.  Abduction with Intent to Defile 
The evidence introduced at trial, independent of the 
affidavit, overwhelmingly demonstrates that admission of the 
 
23
affidavit was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to 
the abduction with intent to defile conviction--a predicate 
offense for the capital murder conviction. 
Code § 18.2-48 states in relevant part, “[a]bduction . . . 
of any person with intent to defile such person . . . shall be 
a Class 2 felony.”  The crime incorporates the charge of 
abduction under Code § 18.2-47(A), which states: 
Any person who, by force, intimidation or 
deception, and without legal justification or 
excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or 
secretes another person with the intent to deprive 
such other person of his personal liberty or to 
withhold or conceal him from any person, authority 
or institution lawfully entitled to his charge, 
shall be deemed guilty of “abduction.” 
The distinguishing feature between the charge of abduction and 
abduction with intent to defile is the specific intent required 
by the latter.  McKinley v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 1, 4, 225 
S.E.2d 352, 353 (1976).  Abduction with intent to defile is a 
more serious offense than abduction with intent only to deprive 
one of personal liberty. 
In order to prove the greater offense of abduction with 
intent to defile, the evidence must show that Crawford abducted 
Sarah with the intent to sexually molest her.  Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 103, 452 S.E.2d 669, 675 (1995); see 
also Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 632, 292 S.E.2d 
798, 808 (1982) (holding that the terms “sexually molest” and 
 
24
“defile” are interchangeable).  In Wilson, we upheld the 
defendant’s conviction for abduction with intent to defile 
based on evidence showing that the victim was tied to her bed, 
arms and legs spread apart, with semen observed on her body.  
Wilson, 249 Va. at 99, 103-04, 452 S.E.2d at 673, 675.    
Similarly, the evidence here, independent of the 
affidavit, was sufficient to show that Sarah did not 
voluntarily travel with Crawford, but rather that Crawford 
abducted her against her will.  Sarah had plans for a hair 
appointment and to go on a date with another man the weekend 
she disappeared. She also failed to report to work the day she 
disappeared, despite telling her supervisor she would be at 
work by 1:00 p.m.  Additionally, a box that belonged to Sarah’s 
employer was found on the side of the road, with Sarah’s blood 
on it, in Fauquier County on the morning Sarah disappeared.  
Sarah’s supervisor testified that Sarah was supposed to ship 
that box for him.  Sarah’s cell phone was also found on the 
side of the road in Manassas, Virginia that same morning.  
Records from Sarah’s cell phone showed that Sarah called 
Crawford twice on the morning of November 19, 2004, once at 
7:52 a.m. and once at 8:52 a.m.  Sarah did not appear to have 
packed anything, and she left all of her luggage at home.   
Moreover, Crawford admitted that Sarah was shot inside her 
car.  The driver’s-side window of Sarah’s car was broken and 
 
25
Sarah’s blood was found on both the driver’s and rear seats of 
the vehicle.  Crawford also admitted that he took Sarah to a 
motel in Charlottesville and left her there alone after the 
shooting.  An expert witness testified that Sarah could not 
move after she was shot because the bullet severed her spine.  
Consequently, she could not have gone to or entered the motel 
room on her own volition.  The medical examiner testified that 
Sarah could have lived for an hour after she was shot.  The 
medical examiner also testified that Sarah had several bruises, 
scratches, and abrasions on her neck and hands, injuries that 
Sarah’s parents confirmed she did not have when they last saw 
her. 
Additionally, several witnesses testified concerning 
Crawford’s violent nature and Sarah’s intense fear of him.  
Sarah’s father testified that Crawford threw a table into the 
room and broke it when Sarah attempted to remove her belongings 
from the apartment she had shared with Crawford previously.  
This incident was described in detail in the affidavit.  It was 
also offered into evidence through the testimony of Sarah’s 
father, illustrating the merely cumulative nature of statements 
contained in Sarah’s affidavit.  Sarah’s mother also testified 
that Crawford threatened Sarah when she moved out, telling her, 
“You’ll pay for this.”  A police officer, who responded to the 
couple’s home when Sarah was moving out, testified that 
 
26
Crawford acted in an intimidating and overbearing manner, and 
appeared to threaten her.  Sarah’s supervisor and co-worker 
both testified about their knowledge of Sarah’s fear of 
Crawford.  Sarah’s supervisor testified that he was not 
surprised to learn about the protective order against Crawford, 
given the “history between them.” 
Independent of the affidavit, the evidence, including the 
voluminous testimony and evidence demonstrating Crawford’s 
history of violence and threats toward Sarah, the protective 
order, Sarah’s plans for the weekend, the physical evidence of 
the box and her cell phone, Crawford’s admission that Sarah was 
shot in her car, and the fact that she was paralyzed from the 
wound, overwhelmingly demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Sarah did not go with Crawford willingly to 
Charlottesville and certainly did not go willingly from the car 
to the motel room. 
Moreover, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Crawford abducted Sarah with the intent to defile her.  
After she was shot, Crawford took Sarah directly to the motel 
room, completely undressed her and left her paralyzed on the 
bed, naked and positioned on her back with her thighs spread, 
in a sexually suggestive position.  Crawford’s semen was found 
inside Sarah’s vagina, and sperm was found in or around Sarah’s 
mouth and anus.  Just as in Wilson, 249 Va. at 98-100, 103-04, 
 
27
452 S.E.2d at 672-73, 675, this evidence alone is sufficient, 
independent of the affidavit, to conclude that Crawford 
abducted Sarah with the intent to defile her, particularly as 
Crawford was still in the process of abducting Sarah when he 
disrobed her and left her naked and paralyzed in the motel. 
Significantly, the preliminary protective order admitted 
into evidence at trial without objection by Crawford informed 
the jury that a court had recently found “evidence sufficient 
to establish probable cause that family abuse, including 
forceful detention, resulting in physical injury to [Sarah] or 
placing [her] in reasonable apprehension of serious bodily 
injury,” had “recently occurred.” 
Therefore, after considering the factors outlined in Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, including “the importance of the 
[tainted evidence] in the prosecution's case, whether [that 
evidence] was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the [tainted evidence] on 
material points [and] the overall strength of the prosecution's 
case,” we hold that the admission of the affidavit constitutes 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to 
Crawford’s conviction for abduction with intent to defile. 
ii.  Rape 
We have consistently held that, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the 
Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense 
 
28
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ This fundamental precept has been 
the bedrock of Virginia's criminal jurisprudence since the 
inception of this Commonwealth.”  Bishop v. Commonwealth, 275 
Va. 9, 13, 654 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2008) (quoting Powers v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388, 177 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1970)).  
"Because of the stringent standard of proof the law imposes 
upon the prosecution, juries must acquit unless they find each 
element of the crime charged to have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Ellison v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 254, 257-
58, 639 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2007).  We have observed that  
the burden of proof upon the [Commonwealth] in a 
criminal case was given constitutional status in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) wherein 
the [United States Supreme] Court stated “that 
the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.” 
 
Washington v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 619, 623, 643 S.E.2d 485, 
487 (2007).  In order to obtain a conviction against a 
defendant charged with a violation of Code § 18.2-61, 
therefore, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt: (1) that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the 
victim; (2) that it was against her will and without her 
consent; and (3) that it was by force, threat or intimidation.8  
                     
 
8 Although Code § 18.2-61 provides that sexual intercourse 
“through the use of the complaining witness’s . . . physical 
helplessness” also constitutes rape, the instructions given to 
 
29
Gonzales v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 375, 382, 611 S.E.2d 616, 
619 (2005); Code § 18.2-61(A). 
The affidavit alleged that Crawford had raped Sarah 
earlier in their relationship.  Describing the incident in 
detail, Sarah stated: 
I went to bed around 1 am.  I notice [sic] 
[Crawford] was not in bed and I got up.  I went 
out on the porch to smoke a cigarette.  When I 
came back, I went to bed.  He then came in and 
wanted sex.  I did not want sex.  He got mad and 
got up.  I too got up and went to the bathroom.  
He then followed me in and said I was going to do 
what he tells me.  He made me take a bath and 
also gave me an enema and made me dress up.  He 
then made me dance for him.  He would hit me in 
the head when he didn’t like how I was dancing.  
He then got a belt and hit me three times on the 
thighs and butt.  He then forced me to use a 
vibrator and he forced me to have sex with him. 
 
The evidence, independent of the affidavit, overwhelmingly 
proves that Crawford raped Sarah the morning he abducted and 
killed her.  Moreover, the allegations contained in the 
affidavit are cumulative of the evidence of substantial abuse 
suffered by Sarah at Crawford’s hands, and serve simply to 
corroborate the overwhelming direct physical and circumstantial 
evidence, including that previously discussed.9  
Cell phone records show that Sarah called Crawford at 8:52 
a.m. on the morning of her death, indicating that they were not 
                                                                 
the jury at Crawford’s trial did not include this alternative 
element.   
9 See discussion supra Part II-C(i), regarding the 
abduction with intent to defile charge.   
 
30
yet together.  Crawford admitted to taking Sarah from Northern 
Virginia to Charlottesville that same morning – a drive he said 
took an hour and a half.  The motel clerk testified that 
Crawford checked into the motel in Charlottesville (where 
Sarah’s body was found) at approximately 11 o’clock that 
morning.  Crawford told police that Sarah was shot in her car 
in Charlottesville; however, Sarah’s blood was found on a box 
in Northern Virginia.  Crawford told police that he took Sarah 
directly to the motel after she was shot, rather than to a 
hospital.  Crawford then stripped Sarah completely of her 
clothing.  He positioned her nude on her back, on the bed, with 
her thighs spread.  Crawford’s semen was found inside Sarah’s 
vagina and sperm was found in or around her mouth and anus.  
Additionally, the testimony of multiple witnesses indicated 
that, at the time of her disappearance, Sarah was deeply afraid 
of Crawford.  The medical examiner also testified that Sarah 
had several bruises, scratches, and abrasions on her neck and 
hands, injuries that Sarah’s parents confirmed she did not have 
the night before Crawford abducted and killed her. 
Considered as a whole, the evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Sarah did not engage in consensual sexual 
contact with Crawford on the morning that he killed her, 
particularly given that expert testimony indicated that she 
would have been paralyzed after having been shot.  Furthermore, 
 
31
while the affidavit did contain the allegation that Crawford 
had previously raped Sarah, it was merely cumulative of the 
mountain of other evidence indicating the horrible and abusive 
nature of their relationship, and corroborative of the direct 
physical and circumstantial evidence indicating that Crawford 
raped Sarah after he shot her on the morning of her death, 
November 19, 2004. 
Therefore, after considering the necessary factors 
outlined in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, including “the 
importance of the [tainted evidence] in the prosecution's case, 
whether [that evidence] was cumulative, the presence or absence 
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the [tainted 
evidence] on material points [and] the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case,” as it relates to this particular charge, 
we hold that the admission of the affidavit constitutes 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to 
Crawford’s conviction for rape. 
iii. Capital Murder 
Crawford was charged with one count of capital murder with 
two possible predicate offenses stated in the disjunctive.  The 
indictment charging capital murder read, in pertinent part, as 
follows: “CRAWFORD . . . did willfully, deliberately and with 
premeditation, kill and murder Sara [sic] Crawford during the 
commission of an abduction with intent to defile or during the 
 
32
commission of or subsequent to rape, forcible sodomy or object 
sexual penetration.”  (Emphasis added.)  The jury instruction 
on this issue stated in pertinent part: 
The defendant is charged with the crime of 
capital murder.  The Commonwealth must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements of that crime: . . . 
 
[3) T]hat the killing occurred in the commission 
of the abduction with intent to defile Sarah 
Crawford or that the killing occurred in the 
commission of the rape of Sarah Crawford. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Consequently, while Crawford was only 
charged with one count of capital murder, the jury had the 
opportunity to convict him of capital murder based upon both 
predicate offenses (abduction with intent to defile and the 
rape of Sarah Crawford) or based upon either abduction with 
intent to defile or rape, independently.  The jury ultimately 
found the capital murder conviction to be based upon both 
predicates.  The verdict form that was rendered by the jury 
stated: “We, the jury, find the defendant, Anthony Dale 
Crawford, guilty of the willful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing of Sarah Crawford in the commission of abduction with 
intent to defile Sarah Crawford and in the commission of the 
rape of Sarah Crawford.”  (Emphasis added.)   
The evidence in the record, independent of the affidavit, 
demonstrates that admission of the affidavit was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to Crawford’s conviction 
 
33
for capital murder, based upon the predicate offenses that the 
killing occurred in the commission of the abduction with the 
intent to defile Sarah Crawford and in the commission of the 
rape of Sarah Crawford.   
The affidavit did relate incidents when Crawford had been 
violent towards Sarah in the past and had threatened her.  
However, the record, independent of the affidavit, demonstrates 
Crawford’s abuse, violence, and threats toward Sarah.  As 
mentioned above, the preliminary protective order itself, 
admitted into evidence at trial without objection, declared 
that “[t]here is evidence sufficient to establish probable 
cause that family abuse, including forceful detention, 
resulting in physical injury to [Sarah] or placing [her] in 
reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury,” had 
“recently occurred.”  Furthermore, several witnesses testified 
concerning Crawford’s violent, abusive nature, and Sarah’s 
intense fear of him.  Considering the voluminous evidence 
demonstrating Crawford’s history of violence and threats toward 
Sarah, the affidavit’s allegations of violence and threats were 
merely cumulative in nature. 
Additionally, the evidence, apart from the affidavit, 
proved that Crawford purchased a gun and ammunition just days 
prior to shooting Sarah.  Crawford admitted that he shot his 
wife and that he took her to the motel room after shooting her.  
 
34
Crawford claimed that he shot her accidentally, but rather than 
taking Sarah to a hospital, he attempted to cover up this 
“accident.”  After he shot her, Crawford drove to a motel and 
left Sarah alone in one of its rooms.  According to expert 
testimony, even if Sarah were alive when Crawford left her in 
that room, she would not have been able to move to seek help.  
After leaving Sarah alone and immobile in the motel room, 
Crawford did not call anyone for help.  Instead, he took 
Sarah’s car and drove to Florida to visit relatives who did not 
know he was coming.  He did not mention the “accident” to them, 
and Crawford’s extended family testified that he acted normally 
during his time in Florida and that he did not seem “morose or 
sad” about anything.  The jury was entitled to disbelieve 
Crawford’s implausible account of the shooting. 
Accordingly, upon review of the record, and after 
considering the factors outlined in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 
684, including “the importance of the [tainted evidence] in the 
prosecution's case, whether [that evidence] was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
the [tainted evidence] on material points [and] the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case,” we conclude that the 
affidavit was merely cumulative of other evidence properly 
before the jury; therefore, we hold that the admission of the 
affidavit constitutes harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
35
in relation to Crawford’s conviction for capital murder, based 
upon the predicate offenses of abduction with the intent to 
defile and rape. 
iv.  Grand Larceny 
Clearly, the admission of the affidavit was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to Crawford’s conviction 
for grand larceny.  Crawford’s conviction for grand larceny 
required proof that he “wrongful[ly] or fraudulent[ly] [took] 
another’s property [valued at $200 or more] without [the 
owner’s] permission and with the intent to deprive the owner of 
that property permanently.”  Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 
251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (2001).  See also Code § 18.2-
95.  Crawford was found in possession of Sarah’s vehicle, 
without her permission, and he admitted in his statement to the 
police that he drove it to Florida.  The car was titled in Mr. 
Powers’ (Sarah’s father) name and he testified that he had 
purchased the car for his daughter.  Additionally, Mr. Powers 
testified that at the time Crawford stole Sarah’s car, it was 
worth approximately fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000). 
The affidavit simply does not contain any information, 
whatsoever, relevant to Crawford’s conviction for grand 
larceny, and the independent evidence proved that Crawford was 
guilty of grand larceny.  As such, admission of the affidavit 
 
36
constitutes harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in 
relation to Crawford’s conviction for grand larceny. 
v.  Use of a Firearm Convictions 
The admission of the affidavit was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt in relation to Crawford’s two firearms 
convictions.  Code § 18.2-53.1 provides that, “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person to use . . . any pistol, shotgun, 
rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon . . . while 
committing or attempting to commit murder . . . or abduction.”  
Just as with the grand larceny charge, the affidavit simply 
makes no allegation, whatsoever, having anything to do with a 
firearm or Crawford’s use or possession of any firearm.  The 
evidence did show, independent of the affidavit, however, that 
Crawford purchased a gun just prior to the killing.  Crawford 
admitted that he had a gun on the day of Sarah’s disappearance 
and death.  Crawford even admitted to shooting Sarah, although 
he claimed it was accidental.  Accordingly, we hold that 
admission of the affidavit was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt in relation to Crawford’s use of a firearm 
convictions.  
D.  The “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” Doctrine 
 The Commonwealth argues that even if the affidavit is 
testimonial in nature, nonetheless, it is admissible under the 
doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing.” The Court of Appeals 
 
37
discussed what it referred to as the “possibility,” left open 
by the United States Supreme Court in Giles v. California, 554 
U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), “that a defendant’s intention 
to prevent testimony might be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances, such as in a case of ongoing domestic violence.”  
Crawford, 55 Va. App. at 473, 686 S.E.2d at 564.  The United 
States Supreme Court specifically discussed this possibility in 
Giles: 
Where such an abusive [domestic] relationship 
culminates in murder, the evidence may support a 
finding that the crime expressed the intent to 
isolate the victim and to stop her from 
reporting abuse to the authorities or 
cooperating with a criminal prosecution – 
rendering her prior statements admissible under 
the forfeiture doctrine. 
 
Giles, 554 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2693 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 
court neither made the requisite factual findings showing 
Crawford’s intent to prevent Sarah from testifying against him, 
nor did the court consider the specific domestic violence 
factors discussed in Giles which may evidence such an intent.  
Crawford, 55 Va. App. at 482, 686 S.E.2d at 569.  Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals held that, “[b]y not considering 
Crawford’s intent, the trial court incorrectly applied the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, as it was defined in Giles.  
Thus, the trial court erred in its analysis for admitting the 
 
38
affidavit on that basis.”  Crawford, 55 Va. App. at 474, 686 
S.E.2d at 565.  We agree with the Court of Appeals. 
E.  The Commonwealth’s Concession and 
“Right Result for the Wrong Reason” 
 
 
In separate assignments of error, Crawford maintains that: 
(1) the Court of Appeals erred by holding it was not bound by 
the Commonwealth’s concession at trial that the affidavit was 
“testimonial;” and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in applying 
the “right result/wrong reason” doctrine.  Because we hold that 
the affidavit was testimonial in nature, it is unnecessary to 
address either of these assignments of error. 
F.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Crawford maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of abduction with intent to defile and rape.  As we 
have previously held: 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain a conviction, this 
Court reviews “the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party at trial and 
consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible from 
that evidence.”  Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 
121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008).  This 
Court will only reverse the judgment of the 
trial court if the judgment “is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.”  Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 
330 (2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680).  “If there 
is evidence to support the convictions, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute 
its own judgment, even if its opinion might 
differ from the conclusions reached by the 
finder of fact at the trial.”  Commonwealth v. 
 
39
Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 
(1998). 
 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640-41, 691 S.E.2d 
786, 788 (2010).  Additionally, we have held that when an 
appellate court is reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, “[a]ny evidence properly admitted at trial is 
subject to this review.”  Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 
465, 467, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 521, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998)) 
(emphasis added).  As such, an appellate court may not 
consider evidence illegally admitted at trial.  To hold 
otherwise would circumvent on appeal the Constitutional 
protections provided to a defendant at trial. 
The Court of Appeals held that counsel for Crawford 
“conceded that, if the affidavit were admissible, the 
evidence was sufficient to convict him of abduction with 
intent to defile and rape.”  Crawford, 55 Va. App. at 481, 
686 S.E.2d at 569 (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals 
found this concession to qualify “either as a waiver for 
purposes of Rule 5A:18 or as an express withdrawal of an 
appellate challenge to a trial court judgment.”  Id.  
Because the affidavit was improperly admitted, however, 
and because Crawford did not concede that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict him of abduction with intent to 
 
40
defile and rape without the affidavit, Crawford did not 
waive this assignment of error.  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals erred in failing to address Crawford’s sufficiency 
argument.   
After reviewing “the evidence in the light most favorable 
to [the Commonwealth,] the prevailing party at trial[,] and 
consider[ing] all inferences fairly deducible from that 
evidence,” Clark, 279 Va. at 640-41, 691 S.E.2d at 788 (quoting 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 
(2008)), we hold that the evidence, independent of the 
affidavit, is sufficient to support the jury verdict finding 
Crawford guilty of abduction with intent to defile and rape for 
the same reasons that the admission of the affidavit was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, above. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
We hold that the admission of the affidavit into evidence 
at trial, although violative of Crawford’s Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
for each of Crawford’s convictions.  Additionally, we hold that 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for 
abduction with intent to defile and rape.  Accordingly, albeit 
based upon different analysis, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed Crawford’s 
convictions for capital murder, abduction with intent to 
 
41
defile, rape, use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, 
use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction, and grand 
larceny. 
Affirmed. 
 
42