Title: STONHAM v. WIDIASTUTI

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STONHAM v. WIDIASTUTI2003 WY 15779 P.3d 1188Case Number: 02-246Decided: 12/04/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

DAVID 
H. STONHAM,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

ERNI 
WIDIASTUTI, a/k/a

SARA 
STONHAM,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Mary Elizabeth Galvan, Laramie, Wyoming; and Donald J. Keenan, Riverton, 
Wyoming.

 

Guardian 
ad Litem:

 

            
Carol Serelson, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      David H. Stonham 
(Father) appeals the district court's decision awarding Erni Widiastuti, a/k/a 
Sara Stonham (Mother),1 an Indonesian woman, sole custody 
of their two children, ordering that visitation occur in the community where the 
children reside, and requiring that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as a condition 
to exercising visitation.  Father 
claims that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion and/or 
arbitrary and capricious.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues raised 
in this appeal are as follows:

 

1.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded sole custody 
to Mother, who intended to take the children and return to 
Indonesia?

 

2.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it required that 
Father's visitation occur in the community where the children reside until the 
younger child reaches the age of ten?

 

3.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by requiring, as a condition 
to exercising visitation, that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as security against 
attorney's fees Mother may incur in enforcing her custody 
rights?

 

4.         
Is Mother entitled to sanctions against Father?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Father, a 
citizen of the United States, and Mother, a native and citizen of Indonesia, 
became acquainted after Father responded to an advertisement Mother had placed 
in a dating magazine.  After they 
corresponded for a number of months, Mother traveled to California and stayed 
with Father for about six months.  
She then returned to Indonesia, and approximately four months later, 
Father went to Indonesia where they were married.  After a honeymoon in Bali, the couple 
returned to the United States.  
Mother was only able to secure a tourist visa, which visa expired after 
six months, thereafter rendering her an illegal alien.2

 

[¶4]      After 
approximately ten months of marriage, Mother gave birth to their first child in 
California.  In October 2000, they 
moved to Lander, where Father had taken a position with Fremont Motor 
Company.  After eight months in 
Lander, Mother left the marital home with their son and went to a 
safehouse.  Upon arriving home that 
evening, and finding Mother and son gone, Father telephoned local law 
enforcement and reported that his wife and child had been kidnapped.  He also called the Indonesian Embassy 
and reported that his wife had kidnapped their son.  Two days later, Father filed for 
divorce.

 

[¶5]      A guardian ad 
litem for the children3 was appointed and, on the parties' 
stipulation, the district court ordered that Dr. Martha Schilling, Ph.D., 
conduct a custody evaluation.  Dr. 
Schilling's report was completed in November of 2001.  The next month, at a temporary custody 
hearing, Father's counsel attempted to present, for the district court's 
ratification, a "Custody & Separation Agreement," which had been prepared by 
Father and signed by Father and Mother.  
Pursuant to this agreement, the parties hoped to accomplish a "legal 
separation" with no time limit, and to establish the terms of that 
separation.  However, the district 
court declined to ratify the proposed agreement.  Although the parties represented that 
they were attempting to reconcile, the district court entered a temporary 
custody, support, and visitation order.

 

[¶6]      The parties' 
attempted reconciliation was unsuccessful and a divorce trial was set for August 
1 and 2, 2002.  At trial, Father 
testified and called three lay witnesses to testify on his behalf.  All three testified regarding their 
perceptions of the parties' relationship and respective parenting styles and 
abilities.  Mother also testified, 
and called Malcolm Stonham (Father's father) and Maura Strong (Father's sister) 
as witnesses.  Both stated that they 
thought Mother should be awarded custody.  
Malcolm Stonham reasoned that although he did not think that Father would 
intentionally harm the children, he worried that he was not "in control," that 
he might "snap," or "that something might happen."  Maura Strong explained how Father had 
asked her to testify falsely on his behalf, that she felt he was capable of 
hurting the children, and that he had made threats to members of their 
family.

 

[¶7]      Both parties also 
relied on the opinions of experts.  
Father called Mark Russler, a licensed counselor with a master's degree 
in social work.  Mr. Russler had met 
with Father approximately sixteen times, and Mother ten times, over an 
eleven-month period.  Father's 
one-hour sessions focused mainly on helping him cope with the difficult life 
changes he was confronting.  Mr. 
Russler testified that, in his opinion, Mother's desire to return to Indonesia 
was "completely selfish."  
Nonetheless, he concluded that both Father and Mother were capable and 
caring parents, and recommended a custody arrangement where both parents would 
have "frequent, regular contact [with the children] in their environment 
here."4

 

[¶8]      Although she was 
not called as a witness, Dr. Schilling's custody evaluation was offered and 
received into evidence without objection.5  Dr. Schilling has a Ph.D. in psychology 
and is a Wyoming licensed psychologist.  
In preparing her custody evaluation, Dr. Schilling met with Mother for 
seven and one-half hours and Father for ten hours, during which time she 
performed a clinical interview and administered a series of tests.  Dr. Schilling also made a number of 
collateral contacts and reviewed relevant documents.  She made very specific clinical findings 
with respect to both parents, and her report will be examined in more detail 
later in this opinion; however, with respect to custody and visitation, she 
concluded:

 

It 
is my opinion, at this time, the mother is better equipped to make reasonable 
decisions about the child's welfare, provide a stable nurturing home 
environment, and presents no risk of verbal or emotional abuse to the child, and 
should therefore have primary custody.  
I recommend liberal visitation with the father.

 

[¶9]      The district 
court took the matter under advisement, and approximately one month later issued 
a Judgment and Decree granting the divorce and awarding Mother primary custody 
and control of the two children.  
The district court stated that in reaching this conclusion, it had 
considered the applicable custody factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201 (LexisNexis 2001), and made the following findings: Mother has been the 
primary caretaker of the children; Mother is better emotionally equipped to care 
for the children and to make reasonable decisions about the welfare of the 
children; Father's father and sister both testified that Mother would be a 
better parent; Father is unable to maintain stable, long-term relationships; 
Father's behavior indicated that he had little or no respect for Mother; and 
there was substantial evidence that Father was not truthful in his testimony or 
his responses to discovery.  The 
district court granted Father two weeks of visitation in the fall, two weeks in 
the spring, and four weeks in the summer and ordered that the visitation be 
restricted to the community where the children reside until the younger child 
reaches her tenth birthday.  
Finally, the district court ordered that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as 
security against any attorney's fees that Mother may incur in enforcing her 
custody rights under the Decree of Divorce.

 

[¶10]   On September 6, 2002, Father filed 
a Notice of Appeal. 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]   This Court has clearly 
articulated the standard for reviewing a district court's decision regarding 
custody and visitation:

 

"Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court.  It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle.

 

A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the district court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party 
every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented 
by the unsuccessful party.  Findings 
of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the 
great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is 
ignored."

 

In 
re MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998)).  We have further stated that "[j]udicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.'"  Cobb v. Cobb, 
2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) and Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 
704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1985)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

The 
Children's Best Interests

 

[¶12]   Father begins his argument by 
referencing a number of cases regarding the "best interests of the child" 
standard and citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a), which states the factors a 
district court shall consider in determining the best interests of the 
child.  He then summarily concludes 
that had the district court fully considered all of the relevant factors in this 
case, the district court would have recognized that the interests of the 
children would best be served if they were under his primary care, custody and 
control.  He claims that ruling 
otherwise was a clear abuse of discretion.

 

[¶13]   Without question, the primary 
consideration in custody matters must be the welfare of the children 
involved.  In Pace v. Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d 861, 865 (Wyo. 2001), 
we stated:

 

"The 
law affords wide discretion to the district court when fashioning custody and 
visitation provisions for the best interests of the children."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431. We 
recognize such discretion encompasses one of the most difficult and demanding 
tasks assigned to a trial judge.  
Id.  Ultimately, the 
"goal to be achieved is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of 
each of the parents, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and 
needs of the children."  Leitner 
v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo.1965); see also Dowdy v. Dowdy, 
864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo.1993).

 

[¶14]   In determining what is in the 
child's best interest, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 requires the district court to 
consider nine enumerated factors and any other factor it deems relevant.6  Each case requires the trial court 
carefully to weigh the relevant factors while looking to the unique and 
individual family relationships in reaching a resolution that is in the best 
interests of the children in that family.  
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.

 

[¶15]   Father asserts that the district 
court did not adequately address these factors.  In Produit v. Produit, 
2001 WY 123, ¶ 12, 35 P.3d 1240, 1243-44 (Wyo. 2001) (footnote 
omitted), 
we articulated the role that this statute should play in a district court's 
custody determination:

 

Although 
explicit findings are not generally compelled, we note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2001) became effective July 1, 2000, and sets out the 
factors the court shall consider in the proper disposition of children in a 
divorce.  2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
34, §§ 1, 8.  This statute, although 
not specifically requiring findings as to the various factors, does direct the 
factors the court shall consider in ordering the disposition of children.  On appeal, this court can ascertain 
whether the factors have been appropriately weighed only if the district court's 
consideration is reflected in the proceeding transcripts, by opinion letter, or 
as findings in the written order.

 

[¶16]   We have consistently encouraged 
district courts to spell out the reasons for their conclusions so that we may 
evaluate the soundness of those reasons; however, they are not required to do 
so.  Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999); 
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431-32.  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
require only that the district court issue findings of fact where "one of the 
parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view of 
excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the 
trial . . .."  W.R.C.P. 52(a).  Consequently, the general rule is that 
absent a request pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a), no specific findings by the 
district court are required.7  Produit, 
2001 WY 123, ¶ 10, 35 P.3d  at 1243.  Nevertheless, although 
the district court is not required to make specific findings with regard to each 
factor listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201, "[r]emand may be necessary if the 
consideration of [the] factors is not patent in the district court 
record."  Fergusson 
v. Fergusson, 
2002 WY 66, ¶ 16, 45 P.3d 641, 646 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶17]   In the present case, the district 
court, being fully aware that Mother was an Indonesian resident and planned to 
return to that country with the children, was confronted with an especially 
difficult and demanding custody and visitation decision.8  The district court's decision was based 
on evidence indicating that Mother had been the children's primary caretaker; 
that she was emotionally better equipped to care for the children; and that she 
had the support of a stable, supportive and loving family in Indonesia.  The district court also found, and the 
record indicates, that Father was unable to maintain stable, long-term 
relationships; that his attitude reflected that he had little or no respect for 
Mother; and that there was substantial evidence that Father was not truthful in 
his testimony or response to discovery.

 

[¶18]   The district court's custody 
determination also was consistent with Dr. Schilling's custody evaluation.  Dr. Schillings' relevant clinical 
findings were as follows:

 

[Mother] 
is quite outgoing and sociable and likes to be around others.  She is nurturing and protective and 
feels especially good about herself when she has been helpful or has given 
attention to the needs of others.  
She is skillful in building strong attachments between people, especially 
family and friends.  She tends to 
have a positive self-image and is optimistic about the 
future.

 

[Mother] 
is logical and practical.  She is 
willing to take risks and shows initiative and spontaneity.  She is energetic and task oriented.  [Mother] has an easy going and 
self-confident personal style.  She 
seeks approval by acting in a charming manner.  She knows when and how to be affable and 
accommodating.  She knows 
intuitively how to make others feel special and interesting.  

 

[Mother] 
has an estimated IQ around the 70th percentile.  

 

            
. . .

 

[Father] 
is strongly motivated to achieve his goals.  His ambition drives him to be not only 
successful, but also to be among the best in his field.  He is prepared to work hard for long 
periods to obtain what he believes he deserves.  He is generally optimistic about his 
chances of success.  [Father] is 
organized and meticulous, inefficiency or laziness may cause him to be 
overbearing.  He is quite 
comfortable with himself.

 

[Father] 
takes charge of his life making things happen rather than waiting for them to 
occur.  He controls and modifies his 
environment and relationships, arranging events to suit his needs and 
desires.  He takes the initiative 
and intervenes in the affairs of others.  
He is not overly concerned about pleasing others, and can be inattentive 
and insensitive to their feelings and wishes.  [Father] prefers to do things his own 
way and usually makes his decisions with little formal advice from others.  He may fail to listen to views contrary 
to his own.  He is self-assured and 
confident of the correctness of his opinions.  

 

[Father] 
demands that others conform to his rules and principles.  He prefers to be surrounded with 
compliant people.  He can be 
arrogant, for example, he provided numerous written instructions to [Mother] on 
the proper care of [their child].  
He prefaced copies of his instructions to the GAL with ". . . [Mother] 
doesn't understand basic childcare and needs to be reminded to take care of her 
own son."

 

[Father] 
lacks insight and projects blame onto others.  He bitterly insisted that [Mother] will 
"kidnap" [their child] and defy any court order giving him custody, at the same 
time, he justified "snatching" [their child] if the court does not rule in his 
favor.

 

[Father] 
distorts and exaggerates risk, for example he said ". . . [Mother] would get 
extremely depressed . . . suicide was always on my mind with her . . . with 
those killings in Houston, the woman who murdered her five children, and 
Munchausen's disease (syndrome) . . . I always keep my eyes peeled just in case 
. . . we talked about it quite a bit with her doctor in CA."  Dr. Cvar, [Mother's] ob/gyn in CA, said 
". . . I didn't think [Mother] was depressed as much as sad and lonely, which 
was an appropriate mood given her situation . . . I always felt that there was 
something not right, but she wouldn't say anything . . . it was almost 
like he was keeping her a prisoner . . . he kept her away from people . . . he 
was domineering and hypervigiliant . . . I had a hard time trying to talk to her 
alone . . . he would hover by the door . . . I'm not surprised she left 
him."

 

[Father] 
makes a good first impression, however, his relationships tend to be 
superficial.  He has stormy family 
relationships.  He ruminates over 
perceived injustices and has been unable to sustain any intimate/family 
relationships over time.

 

[Father] 
has an estimated full scale IQ around the 14th percentile.  However, his verbal IQ is at the 
75th percentile and his performance IQ is at the 4th percentile, a difference that is significant 
at the .05 level.  The IQ test 
suggests that [Father] has some perceptual-organizational disturbances, 
particularly with reasoning and analytical thinking.  His mother said that perceptual problems 
were identified when he was placed in special education as a 
child.

 

[¶19]   Dr. Schilling also made a number of 
specific findings.  Her report 
stated that joint custody would not be appropriate because of the parties' 
inability to communicate with each other, lack of sound problem-solving and 
decision-making skills, and the fact that they would not likely reside in the 
same community following the divorce; that Father presented a moderate risk of 
verbal and emotional abuse to the child; that although both parties are capable 
of being adequate parents, Father's parenting skills are limited by "his 
inability to show the child good coping skills, his lack of sensitivity to 
signals from the child, his impatience and lack of flexibility, his problems 
sustaining intimate family relationships, his risk of verbal and emotional abuse 
to the child, and the amount of time the child will be in the care of another 
when [Father] works;" and that Mother has been the primary caretaker of the 
child.

 

[¶20]   In addition to Dr. Schilling's 
report, the district court relied on the evidence presented at trial by the 
guardian ad litem, which evidence was favorable to Mother.9  Even Father's own family members 
testified that they felt he should not be awarded custody and that Mother was a 
better parent.

 

[¶21]   We cannot agree with Father's 
contention that the district court did not adequately or accurately address the 
factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann § 20-2-201, or that its determination of custody was 
not in the children's best interests.  
Father did not request that the district court make findings of fact 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a), and without making such a request, a party "will not 
be heard to complain of the absence of formal findings."  Resor, 987 P.2d  at 
148.  Also, although the district court did 
not make specific findings with respect to each factor listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann 
§ 20-2-201, there is ample evidence in the record and in the district court's 
findings to support its determination that awarding Mother primary physical 
custody was in the children's best interest.  Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court's award of custody and visitation as a "reasonable balance of the rights 
and affections of each of the parents, with paramount consideration being given 
to the welfare and needs of the children."  
Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965).

 

The 
Effect of Geographic Distance on the Visitation Rights of the Non-Custodial 
Parent

 

[¶22]   Father next argues that his right 
to associate with his children was violated by the district court's visitation 
order.  He asserts that a move by 
the custodial parent should be a major factor considered under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201(a).  He also cites Love 
v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Wyo. 1993), 
for the proposition that when assessing the reasonableness of a custody award 
and visitation arrangement, the district court should consider "whether 
reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining parent."  Finally, he references a Colorado case 
that sets out four factors a court should consider when fashioning a custody and 
visitation arrangement where the custodial parent is going to move from the 
state with a child.  In re 
Marriage of Donovan, 36 P.3d 207, 209 (Colo.App. 2001).10

 

[¶23]   We have held, and our statutes 
provide, that the district court must consider, and weigh accordingly, the 
effect of geographic distance on the visitation rights of the non-custodial 
parent.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
20-2-201(a)(viii) and Resor, 987 P.2d  at 151.  This factor seems particularly relevant 
here, where the parties would be separated by thousands of 
miles.

 

[¶24]   While Father argues that the 
district court did not properly weigh this factor, he directs us to no evidence, 
nor do we find any in the record, to support this assertion.  To the contrary, the evidence indicates 
that the district court was well aware of the potential difficulties involved 
with the substantial geographic distance:

 

This 
case would be very simple but for the fact that [Mother] intends to go back home 
to Indonesia if she is given custody of the children.  Both [Father] and [Mother] testified as 
to the living conditions in Indonesia.  
[Mother] described a stable, supportive and loving family in 
Indonesia.  [Mother] has stayed in 
weekly contact with her family and her mother has visited upon, at least, two 
occasions.  [Mother's] mother was in 
Lander staying with her daughter and [the children] at the time of the 
hearing.  [Mother] desires to go 
back to college (she has attended two years of college in Indonesia studying 
English) and then work after the children reach school age.  [Mother] described her family home in 
somewhat different terms than did [Father].  Such descriptions lead the Court to 
believe that [Mother] and her family live in a clean, safe and stable 
environment.  Bearing in mind the 
state of economic and political turmoil in Indonesia, it is still the Court's 
opinion that [Mother] is, and will be, the better parent to [the 
children].

 

[¶25]   The establishment of visitation 
schedules has always been within the sound discretion of the district 
court.  Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1990). 
 When examining the exercise of 
discretion of a district court, we will evaluate the "reasonableness of the 
choice made by the trial court.'"  
Fergusson, 
2002 
WY 66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d  at 644 (quoting Vaughn, 962, P.2d at 151). 
 Father was granted two weeks of 
visitation in the spring, two weeks in the fall, four weeks in the summer, and 
any other visitation that he may be able to exercise.  Although Father's visitation may have 
been less than what he had hoped for, and more burdensome than he would like, we 
find it reasonable under the circumstances.  See Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 355 (Wyo. 1995) ("[t]he hardship of a visitation schedule 
on one parent will not, without more, be viewed as an abuse of discretion, 
particularly where the parties are separated by great geographical distances.") 
and Rowan, 786 P.2d  at 890-91.

 

Visitation 
Restricted to Community Where Children Reside

 

[¶26]   Father also claims that the 
district court abused its discretion by restricting his visitation to the 
community where the children reside.  
This claim is mentioned only in the "Summary of the Argument" and 
"Conclusion" sections of Father's appellate brief and is completely devoid of 
cogent argument, factual support, or citation to pertinent legal authority.  Consequently, we will summarily affirm 
the district court's decision regarding this issue.   VJL v. RED, 2002 WY 25, ¶ 
20, 39 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000) and May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 
1191 (Wyo. 1997)).

 

$50,000.00 
Bond Requirement

 

[¶27]   Finally, Father argues that his 
right to visit his children effectively has been negated by the district court's 
requirement that he post a $50,000.00 bond as a condition to exercising 
visitation.  He asserts that 
although in the past he has been well employed, he is now deeply in debt as a 
result of the divorce, and that he will not be in a position to post a bond 
every time he wants to see his children.  
He claims that to impose this monetary condition is "quite simply unfair, 
onerous, punitive, and not sustainable."

 

[¶28]   A bond-posting requirement, used to 
ensure compliance with a decree in visitation and custody cases, is within the 
discretion of the district court and finds support in the law.  See Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953, 
954 (Wyo. 1962) (court had right to add to the order that 
a bond be furnished if children removed from the state); Leitner, 402 
P.2d at 716 (order requiring mother to post bond to 
assure performance of her obligations under the decree was valid and 
enforceable); Matter of Marriage of Miller, 600 S.W.2d 386, 388 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1980) (court upheld order requiring that father 
post a $5,000.00 bond before taking the children for a two week annual 
visitation); and 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 634 at 207 (1986 & 2002 Cum. 
Supp.).  Where there is evidence that the 
non-custodial parent may fail to return the child, a court does not abuse its 
discretion by requiring a bond as a condition to visitation.  See generally Grimditch 
v. Grimditch, 
71 Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142, 142 (1951) (court struck down bond where there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that the father would violate a judgment of 
the court) and Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla.App. 
1980).  A bond must not be penal, but rather 
remedial in nature, and must have some relationship to the expense that the 
other party may incur in enforcing the decree to which the bond 
relates.  See 
Metz v. Metz, 
108 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla.App. 1959).  Determination of the proper amount of a 
bond is within the discretion of the district court, and "the amount should 
neither be so large that the noncustodial parent is unable to provide the bond, 
nor so small that it will not ensure compliance with its limitations."  McCullough 
v. Hudspeth, 
120 R.I. 598, 389 A.2d 1242, 1245 n.4 (1978).

 

[¶29]   Here, the district court 
characterized the $50,000.00 bond as "security against any attorney's fees 
[Mother] may incur in enforcing her custody rights under the Decree of 
Divorce."  The district court 
evidently felt this was necessary given the fact that Father had told Dr. 
Schilling, during their interview, that if he was not awarded custody, he had a 
plan to kidnap the children.  Father 
claimed that he had already made contact with individuals in Indonesia and that 
he would hire a "snatch team" to carry out his plan.  He also asserted that "snatching [his 
children] would not be against the law . . . Muslim law and Indonesian law give 
the children to the father."  
Additionally, Mother reports that he made similar threats to her just a 
week prior to trial.

 

[¶30]   In light of these reported 
statements by Father and the contentious nature of this case, we hold that the 
bond requirement was a reasonable exercise of the district court's 
discretion.  Although $50,000.00 is 
a considerable amount, we find no evidence that the bond is penal in nature and 
conclude that it bears a reasonable relationship to the expenses Mother would 
incur if she were compelled to enforce the Decree of Divorce from halfway around 
the world.

 

Sanctions

 

[¶31]   Mother requests that we certify 
that there is no reasonable cause for this appeal and that we award sanctions 
against Father.  We decline to do so 
because this case does not rise to the level of "those rare circumstances where 
an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent 
authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to 
adequately cite to the record."  
Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997); 
Phifer 
v. Phifer, 
845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 1993).  Although parts of Father's argument were 
lacking, we did not consider any position advanced that was not supported by 
cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority.  Basolo v. Gose, 994 P.2d 968, 970 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶32]   The district court was confronted 
with the difficult task of fashioning a custody and visitation arrangement that 
would balance the welfare and needs of children with the rights and affections 
of parents who would be living on opposite sides of the globe.  Although Father claims that the district 
court abused its discretion in making its determination, we do not agree.  While the great distance separating 
Father and his children is unfortunate, and visiting them in Indonesia may prove 
difficult, this result is the inevitable product of an international divorce, 
not an abuse of the district court's discretion.

 

[¶33]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Mother's name is spelled differently 
throughout the record.  Therefore, 
we will refer to the spelling of her name as Erni Widiastuti.

 

  2At the time of trial, Mother was an 
illegal alien and subject to deportation. The parties dispute the reasons that 
Mother was not able to secure permanent residency.  Father claims that he completed all the 
necessary paperwork and went to great lengths to secure residency for his wife, 
including contacting a local congressman.  
Mother, however, asserts that she was not able to gain residency because 
Father refused to sponsor her, told INS agents that she was a prostitute, 
withheld information sent to her from the immigration office, and that she could 
not complete the necessary paperwork because of her limited knowledge of the 
English language.

 

  3Mother was pregnant when she left in 
June of 2001 and gave birth to a daughter on January 5, 2002.  Although Father did not contest 
paternity at the divorce proceeding, he initially claimed that he did not know 
if the child was his, alleging that his own father may have impregnated his 
wife.  However, the district court 
did not find Father's allegations credible, especially in light of the fact that 
his father had had a vasectomy many years prior.

 

  4Although Mr. Russler did not specify 
what he meant by "here," his prior testimony would indicate that "here" meant in 
the United States, and probably in Lander.

 

  5Father deposed Dr. Schilling and a 
transcript of the deposition was also admitted into evidence without 
objection.

 

  6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) 
provides:

 

(a)           
In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the 
establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120, the court 
may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most 
expedient and in the best interests of the children. In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

 

(i)         
The quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

 

(ii)         
The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child 
throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's 
care by others as needed;

 

(iii)        The 
relative competency and fitness of each parent;

 

(iv)        Each 
parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a 
willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish 
care to the other parent at specified times;

 

(v)         
How the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a 
relationship with each other;

 

(vi)        How 
the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

 

(vii)       The ability 
and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care without 
intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, including the 
right to privacy;

 

(viii)       Geographic 
distance between the parents' residences;

 

(ix)        The 
current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

 

(x)        Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

 

  7One notable exception to this 
general rule applies where a district court awards split custody.  In that circumstance, the district court 
"must provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the 
record.  A reasoned explanation and 
an expression of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court 
that a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the 
award of custody."  Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d  at 867.

 

  8We acknowledge that the 
international element of this case complicates the matter and magnifies the 
effect of the divorce on the parties and the children.  Although we have not had prior occasion 
to address a case such as this, where one parent plans to relocate with the 
children to a foreign country, other courts have.  See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, 
Court-Authorized Permanent or Temporary Removal of Child by Parent to Foreign 
Country, 30 A.L.R.4th 548 (1984 & 2002 Supp.) and M. David LeBrun, Annotation, 
Propriety of Awarding Custody of Child to Parent Residing or Intending to 
Reside in Foreign Country, 20 A.L.R.4th 
677 (1983 & 2002 Supp.).

 

The 
compiled cases illustrate the competing benefits and limitations in awarding or 
denying custody to a foreign parent.  
Many of the potential issues in the case before us have been addressed by 
other courts, including: effect of international custody arrangements on the 
non-custodial parent's visitation rights; the general cultural and sociological 
considerations as affecting the propriety of such an award; living conditions, 
ideals and cultural opportunities of the foreign country as they affect the 
child's best interest; and the impact and significance of different educational 
opportunities in foreign countries.  
Despite the factual differences in these cases, there is one common 
analytical thread in virtually every case: the best interest of the child is 
paramount in any award of custody and visitation, and the trial court has a 
large measure of discretion in making that award.  Whether one parent is moving with the 
children across town or across the world, the analysis remains the 
same.

 

  9In this appeal, the guardian ad 
litem joins in Mother's brief and contends that the district court's 
order should be affirmed in all respects.

 

  10Father does not apply these factors 
to the particular facts of this case nor does he argue for adoption of them by 
this Court.  Although we acknowledge 
that consideration of these factors may be worthwhile to a district court making 
a custody determination where a parent is leaving the jurisdiction, we do not 
adopt them.  Nonetheless, they could 
potentially be considered as "other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant" in determining the best interest of the child pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(x).  The four 
factors are:

 

1) 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the proposed move will enhance the 
quality of life for the child and the custodial parent; 2) whether the court is 
able to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule for the noncustodial parent 
after the move and the extent of the noncustodial parent's involvement with the 
child at the old location; 3) whether there is a support system of family or 
friends, either at the new or old location; and 4) the educational opportunities 
for the child at the new and old locations.

 

In 
re Marriage of Donovan, 36 P.3d  at 209.