Title: Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc.1989 WY 43769 P.2d 364Case Number: 86-228Decided: 02/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARY 
TURNER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
FLOYD C. 
RENO & SONS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

 
 
Wade 
Brorby, Morgan, Brorby, Price & Roberts, Gillette, for appellant.

 
 
Peggy 
Taylor Pfau, Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, Gillette, for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The primary question 
raised in this case is whether the district court could award damages for 
trespass and title to land to one who claimed ownership by virtue of adverse 
possession in the absence of a finding of all of the elements of adverse 
possession.1 A collateral question which must be 
resolved is whether the evidence of record would justify the trial court in 
finding all of the elements of adverse possession as to all of the lands in 
question. We hold that, in order to award damages for trespass or title to land 
when ownership is based upon a claim of adverse possession, the court, in an 
instance such as this, must find that all of the elements of adverse possession 
have been established. In the absence of finding all of the elements, the 
judgment of the district court must be reversed, which we do. We further hold 
that the record does not justify a claim of hostile possession to those lands 
situated in Section 27, and the award of damages for trespass upon, and title 
to, those lands must be reversed. The case is reversed and remanded for further 
consideration by the district court in accordance with this opinion, but with 
direction to delete any award of damages or adjudication of title relating to 
lands situated in Section 27.

 
 

[¶2.]     Mary Turner, as 
appellant, articulates two issues in her brief. They are:

 
 
"1. Does 
the evidence educed at trial support the trial court finding of adverse 
possession by the plaintiff/appellee against the property of the 
defendant/appellant as the same is located in Campbell County, Wyoming?

 
 
"2. Was the 
award of damages to the plaintiff/appellee properly 
calculated?"

 
 
Floyd Reno 
and Sons, Inc. (Reno) does not offer any statement of its own 
with respect to the issues and is deemed to be satisfied with the issues 
articulated by Turner.

 
 

[¶3.]     Turner and Reno are adjoining 
landowners. In the summer of 1983, Turner employed a surveyor to establish the 
correct boundary lines between her land and the Reno land. The survey confirmed that existing 
fences separating the lands of Turner and Reno did not follow the true boundary lines. 
Turner then employed contractors to build new fences on the true boundaries and 
remove existing fences.

 
 

[¶4.]     Reno then filed suit 
contending that Turner was trespassing by virtue of the fencing activities; that 
Reno was the owner of certain lands in the west half of Section 27 and the east 
half and the south half of Section 33 by virtue of adverse possession; or, 
alternatively, that Reno was entitled to an easement with respect to those lands 
encompassed within existing fences. By way of relief, an injunction was sought 
to prohibit the building of the fence; actual and punitive damages were sought; 
a judgment that Reno had acquired title by adverse possession 
of the lands in question was requested or, in the alternative, that the claimed 
easement existed. Prior to trial, the parties conducted negotiations with the 
goal of reaching a settlement. Reno claimed that 
an oral settlement was reached, but Turner refused to sign it after Reno's counsel had reduced 
it to writing. Reno then persuaded the court to adopt the oral 
settlement, and an order to that effect was entered. When Turner appealed that 
order, we reversed the trial court, holding that an oral settlement constitutes 
an attempt to transfer an interest in land in violation of the statute of frauds 
and is void. Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1985). The case was 
remanded to the district court and, following discovery, a trial was held. The 
trial court decided the case in favor of Reno, quieting title in it to the disputed 
land, and awarding damages in the amount of $9,003.17.

 
 

[¶5.]     All of the land in 
dispute is located in CampbellCounty. Reno has title by conveyance to 
the east half of Section 27 and all of Section 34 in Township 42 North, Range 73 
West, 6th P.M., and to Section 4 in Township 41 North, Range 73 West, 6th P.M. 
Turner owns the record title to the west half of Section 27 and all of Section 
33 in Township 42 North, Range 73 West, 6th P.M. The true boundary separating 
the lands owned of record is not in dispute. That boundary line runs north to 
south separating the east one-half and the west one-half of Section 27; it then 
turns west following the boundary separating Sections 27 and 34 to the northwest 
corner of Section 34; it then turns south along the boundary separating Sections 
33 and 34 to the southeast corner of Section 33; and then west along the 
boundary separating Sections 33 and 4. An exhibit which demonstrates the 
boundary line and reflects existing fences is attached as Appendix 
A.

 
 

[¶6.]     Many years earlier, 
predecessors in interest of Turner and Reno constructed fences which separated their 
lands but were not situated on the true boundary lines. The discrepancy was most 
marked in Section 27 in which the fence runs diagonally from a point 
approximately 190 feet west of the true boundary line at the northern end to a 
point 1,455 feet west of the true boundary line at the southern end. The fence 
separating Sections 33 and 34 deviated only fifty-three feet at the south end 
from the line between the two sections. As to the fence separating the lands in 
Section 33 from those in Section 4, that deviation ranged from 153 feet at the 
west end of the section line to 196 feet at the east end of the section 
line.

 
 

[¶7.]     There was no evidence 
presented at trial with respect to the actual construction of the original 
fences separating these lands. There was information relating to the rebuilding 
of earlier fences. Mathew Reno, the corporate president, recalled that his 
father had rebuilt an existing fence on Section 27 in 1948. Mathew's brother, 
Floyd Reno, testified that he helped rebuild a fence on Section 27 in either 
1947 or 1948. Neither of them could say when the fence was erected initially, 
except that it was in existence prior to 1947. Mathew Reno testified that the 
fence between Section 33 and Section 34 was rebuilt in 1957 or 1958, and he 
thought it was initially constructed in 1920. As to that fence, Floyd Reno's 
testimony was that his father told him the fence was first built in 1919 and had 
been based on the 1883 public land survey. Mathew Reno testified about the fence 
between Section 33 and Section 4. He said that his knowledge of the history of 
the surrounding country caused him to believe that the fence was first 
constructed in 1919 or 1920 but, again, his personal knowledge was limited to 
the rebuilding of the fence in 1957 or 1958. There also was testimony that the 
entire fence line was repaired periodically by Reno.

 
 

[¶8.]     The surveyor who worked 
for Turner testified that, in establishing the correct boundaries of these 
lands, he observed several monuments from prior surveys which did substantially 
coincide with his survey so far as the boundaries were concerned. He located 
several boundary markers which had been set by the Bureau of Land Management 
during a 1955 survey. The sightings that he established and the BLM monuments 
were "fairly close" to the natural monuments which had been identified in the 
1883 survey.

 
 

[¶9.]     With respect to the 
deviation of the fence in Section 27, Mathew Reno testified that he first became 
acutely aware that it was not on the correct boundary in 1972, in the course of 
a conversation with Leland Turner, Mary Turner's son. He further testified on 
cross-examination that, when he was informed of the boundary discrepancy by 
Leland Turner, he stated his understanding that the discrepancy between the 
fence line and the true boundary was in accord with an exchange of land use 
agreement pursuant to which the Turners were permitted to use portions of land 
leased by Reno in exchange for Reno's use of the disputed land in Section 27. 
Mathew Reno further admitted to a conversation with George Turner, another of 
Mrs. Turner's sons, that took place sometime between 1978 and 1982, at which 
time he again stated that any discrepancy was satisfied by the trading of land 
use. Mrs. Turner's testimony, to the effect that Mathew Reno advised her that he 
was aware that the fence was not on the true boundary and that if she ever 
desired to have the land re-surveyed she then could move the fence to the true 
boundaries, was not contradicted. In addition, Thomas Kass, Mrs. Turner's 
grandson who had worked on the Turner ranch, testified by deposition. Kass 
testified about several conversations he had with Mathew Reno relating to the 
correction of the discrepancy between the existing fence line and the true 
boundaries. Kass stated that Mathew Reno had said that he would agree to what 
Mrs. Turner decided, but that he would prefer to purchase the Turner lands lying 
to the east of the existing fence line in Section 27, or accomplish some further 
suitable land trade. There was no testimony at trial which conflicted with or 
contradicted this testimony. Furthermore, it is clear that Turner paid the taxes 
on the disputed lands for all prior years. 

 
 

[¶10.]  Following trial, the court made these 
findings of fact with regard to ownership of the disputed 
land:

 
 
"1. With 
regard to Section 27: a) the west half was purchased by the defendant from the 
Moore's in 1972; b) the east half was acquired by the plaintiff's in 1973; c) 
the plaintiffs began leasing the east one-half of Section 27 from the former 
owners in 1927; d) the original fence was reconstructed in 1948; e) the parties 
and their predecessors in title believed the original fence line to be the 
property boundary from 1927 until 1983.

 
 
"2. With 
regard to Section 34: a) the property was acquired by the plaintiff in October 
of 1938; b) the fence between Sections 34 and 33 was first built in 1920 and 
reconstructed in 1957 and 1958; c) both parties and their predecessors in 
interest believed the original fence line to be the property boundary from 1920 
until 1983.

 
 
"3. With 
regard to Section 4: a) the plaintiffs predecessors in interest acquired the 
property in 1935; b) the original fence between Section 4 and Section 33 was 
constructed in 1920 and reconstructed in 1957 and 1958; c) from 1920 until 1983 
both parties and their predecessors in interest believed the original fence to 
be the boundary line between their property.

 
 
"4. With 
regard to all the land in controversy, the plaintiff held said land in actual 
open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous possession for a period of 
more than ten years.

 
 
"5. 
Defendant tore down the old fence on the property adversely possessed by 
plaintiffs and erected a new one."

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 

[¶11.]  The elements of adverse possession have 
been definitively established in Wyoming. In order to establish title in this 
way, a claimant must demonstrate actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous possession for the statutory period, hostile, and under color of 
title or claim of right. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1987); Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 1982); Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895 (Wyo. 1979); City of Rock 
Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929). It 
is clear that the findings of fact by the trial court omitted any finding as to 
whether Reno's 
claim was under color of title or claim of right. No deed to Reno embraced the disputed 
property, and it could not assert color of title. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932 
(Wyo. 1983). 
As to some of the land in dispute, a claim of right may be inferred from the 
record, but it is for the trial court to evaluate the evidence to sustain that 
element of the cause of action upon reversal and remand.

 
 

[¶12.]  With respect to that portion of the land 
which is situated in Section 27, Mathew Reno, Reno's president, testified that Reno's possession was 
premised upon an exchange of land use. Mathew Reno's testimony is unrefuted and 
is consistent with the claim of Mary Turner, when she testified, that Mathew 
Reno agreed to the relocation of the fence. The record does not support the 
finding of the trial court that Reno's possession of the land in Section 27 was 
hostile; the evidence is only consistent with a finding that the possession was 
consensual. This court has held that:

 
 
"In order 
to establish title through adverse possession of real estate, the possession 
must be `with the intent' to assert such adverse claim against the true owner, 
thus the intention of the parties involved, most often is controlling, Bryant v. 
Cadle, 1909, 18 Wyo. 64, 86, 104 P. 23, 27, modified on rehearing, 18 Wyo. 95, 
106 P. 687, with doubtful situations to be submitted to the trier of facts. The 
intention may be established by words or acts. City of Rock 
Springs v. Sturm, 1929, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1. In the 
situation here, rather than establishing any intent on the part of plaintiffs to 
claim title to the disputed land, the evidence presented reflects exactly the 
contrary." Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 

[¶13.]  While the Gray case involved a situation 
in which the unrefuted evidence supported the finding of fact by the trial 
court, the accurately stated principle is not limited to such situations. It 
must be invoked here because the only evidence addressing Reno's intent as to its 
possession is contrary to the finding of the trial court that the possession was 
hostile so far as the land in Section 27 is concerned.

 
 

[¶14.]  Beyond the application of that principle, 
Gray, which disposes of the dispute over the land in Section 27 (Meyer v. Ellis, 
411 P.2d 338 (Wyo. 1966)), charts the course for the further disposition of this 
case. None of the deeds to Reno describe any of the disputed land and, 
consequently, the color of title prong of the alternative last element of 
adverse possession is not available. The enclosure of the other lands by 
fencing, coupled with the long period of exclusive use by Reno, justifies a presumption that Reno's possession was 
hostile and under a claim of right. The effect of that presumption is that it is 
incumbent upon Turner to produce evidence contrary to the presumption, which may 
be found in Turner's general statements about Reno's permission to locate the fences. If that 
is sufficient to overcome the presumption, then the burden clearly is upon 
Reno to 
establish by its evidence that its possession of the other lands was hostile and 
under a claim of right.

 
 

[¶15.]  We acknowledge other Wyoming cases in which 
the enclosure of lands by a fence coupled with a long period of grazing use, 
when grazing was the appropriate utilization of the land, can support a 
determination of title by adverse possession. E.g., Near v. Casto, 613 P.2d 577 
(Wyo. 1980); 
Shores, 591 P.2d 895; Meyer. In other cases, however, the constructed fence has 
been perceived as simply a convenient separation of pasturing land. Sowerwine v. 
Nielson, 671 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1983); State v. 
Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 19 P.2d 955 (1933); Sturm. As the 
court said in Sturm, 273 P. at 913:

 
 
"* * * Now 
there are undoubtedly cases when a man has taken possession of a strip of land 
of his neighbor by mistake, when he does not have any intent to claim ownership 
thereof. In case of wild prairie land, for instance, we can readily see that a 
man, in order to make an enclosure for his cattle, and with that as his main 
purpose in mind, might put up a fence on what he conceives to be the approximate 
line of his land, without intending definitely to fix that as a 
line."

 
 

[¶16.]  With respect to the remaining lands, the 
applicable rules were summarized in Ferguson, 739 P.2d  at 757, as 
follows:

 
 
"In order 
to establish a claim of adverse possession, the claimant must demonstrate 
`actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of another's real 
property for the statutory period, which possession is hostile and under a claim 
of right or color of title.' Farella v. Rumney, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 185, 186 (1982); Shores v. 
Lindsey, Wyo., 
591 P.2d 895 (1979); City of Rock Springs v. 
Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929). In addition, we have said that an intent to 
assert an adverse claim is necessary to establish title by adverse possession. 
Gray v. Fitzhugh, Wyo., 576 P.2d 88 (1978); Bryant v. Cadle, 18 Wyo. 64, 104 P. 23 
(1909), reh. denied 18 Wyo. 95, 106 P. 687 (1910). The intent to 
assert an adverse claim must be established by objective evidence, that is there 
must be objective indications of an intent to adversely possess the land of 
another. Testimony as to the claimant's subjective intent does not suffice. City 
of Rock Springs 
v. Sturm, supra."

 
 
We have 
held that the character of possession of land is ascertained better by acts 
consistent with a claim of possession than the words of the claimant. Rutar 
Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1129 (Wyo. 1982); Shores; Sturm. The objective 
indications present in this case which evidence adverse possession of the lands 
other than those in Section 27 are the construction and maintenance of a fence 
together with the continuous use of the land up to the fence line for grazing 
livestock. That evidence may be sufficient for the trial court, following 
remand, to find that the land in Section 33 has been adversely possessed. The 
court must weigh against that the uncontroverted evidence that taxes were paid 
by Turner and Turner's testimony that Reno had agreed to the relocation of the 
fences. 

 
 

[¶17.]  In this latter regard, it is important to 
note that Reno's predecessors in interest may 
have acquired title by adverse possession prior to the conveyance to Reno. Meyer, 411 P.2d 338. 
In those circumstances, any statements by Mathew Reno with respect to such lands 
well might be ineffective because they would be entitled to little, if any, 
weight with respect to the acquisition of title by adverse possession on the 
part of Reno's 
predecessors in interest. The same thing cannot be said with respect to the land 
in Section 27 because, as the trial court found, Reno began leasing the east half of that 
section as early as 1927. The record does not establish what the situation was 
prior to that time, or even that the lessor owned the land for ten years prior 
to 1927. However, Reno's statements with respect 
to the consensual use would, in our judgment, reach back to the time when 
Reno's use was 
commenced. Consequently, the record did not satisfy any possibility of title to 
the land in Section 27 having been obtained by adverse possession by Reno's predecessors in 
interest. An owner of land can acquire title through adverse possession of 
adjacent land by his lessee, but the owner is bound by the nature of the 
lessee's possession. See Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561 (1946). Cf. Snell v. 
Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916 (Wyo. 1978). See also cases cited in 3 
Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 25 (1986).

 
 

[¶18.]  The doctrine of adverse possession has 
never been intended to permit the acquisition of title to another person's land 
under the guise of permissive use. Rutar, 651 P.2d 1129; Meyer. In an instance 
such as this, in which the evidence indicates that the true boundaries could 
easily be identified, coupled with the admissions consistent with Gray, 576 P.2d 88, so far as the lands in Section 27 are concerned, no finding of hostile 
possession under a claim of right can be justified.

 
 

[¶19.]  The decision of the trial court quieting 
title to the disputed lands in Section 27 and awarding damages for trespass is 
reversed. The decision of the trial court quieting title to the disputed lands 
in Section 33 and awarding damages for trespass with respect to those lands is 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The trial 
court invoked its discretionary authority to make special findings in accordance 
with Rule 52, W.R.C.P.