Title: Grimes v. Grimes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-016


 Beverly Grimes                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windsor Family Court

 Keith Grimes                                 September Term, 1992


 Amy M. Davenport, J.

 P. Scott McGee of Hershenson, Carter, Scott, McGee & Gray, Norwich, for
   plaintiff-appellant

 Tavian Mayer and Christopher C. Cassidy, Law Clerk (On the Brief), South
   Royalton, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Beverly Grimes appeals from the Windsor Family
 Court decision granting the motion of defendant Keith Grimes to modify
 child support payments.  She also claims the court erred in striking a
 provision from a stipulation between the parties, incorporated into a 1987
 court order, that waived the application of 15 V.S.A. { 660(b) with respect
 to future modifications of child support.  We affirm.
      Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on June 3, 1985.  Defendant was
 ordered to pay child support for the two minor children in the amount of
 $225 per week, to be increased annually by 5% to reflect increases in the
 cost of living.  Payment disputes arose, leading to a contempt motion by
 plaintiff and a request to reduce the child support amount by defendant.  On
 November 11, 1987, in settlement of the disputes, the parties entered into a
 stipulation with the following terms:  (1) defendant acknowledged that under
 the previous order, with its cost-of-living-increase provision, he owed $260
 per week in child support; (2) the parties agreed to recharacterize the
 obligation as $175 per week in child support and $75 per week in
 maintenance; (3) both of these amounts would be increased by 5% annually;
 (4) the accrued arrearage would be paid according to a specified schedule;
 and (5) both parties waived and released any future right to modification of
 the child support and maintenance award under 15 V.S.A. { 660(b).
      The statute, 15 V.S.A. { 660(b), had become effective on April 1, 1987,
 and provided that any child support amount which deviated by more than 15%
 from the amount calculated under the applicable child support guidelines
 "shall be considered a real, substantial and unanticipated change of
 circumstances." (FN1) The presence of a real, substantial and unanticipated
 change of circumstances is grounds for modification of a child support
 order.  15 V.S.A. { 660(a).  On December 11, 1987, the Windsor Superior
 Court entered a judgment order, incorporating the terms of the stipulation.
 Based on the incomes of the parties, the child support amount defendant
 agreed to pay was more than 10% in excess of that calculated under the
 applicable child support guideline. (FN2)
      Payment disputes arose again, and in November of 1990 plaintiff again
 moved for contempt, alleging that defendant was more than $3000 in arrears
 and had unilaterally lowered his payments to $150 per week.  In February
 1991, defendant again responded with a motion to modify, alleging that
 reductions in his income constituted sufficiently changed circumstances to
 justify the reduction.  These motions were heard on October 1, 1991.  On
 November 15, 1991, the Windsor Family Court issued an order reducing the
 child support award to $155 per week and the maintenance award to $45 per
 week, both amendments retroactive to February 1991.  The court also
 established an arrearage amount, set a schedule for its payment, ordered
 that any further modifications would be based on the child support
 guidelines, and established a civil penalty for tardy payment.  The court
 also struck from the order the provision prohibiting modification based on
 15 V.S.A. { 660(b).  It relied, however, on the reduction in defendant's
 income and the increase in plaintiff's income as grounds for modification,
 not the deviation from the guidelines recognized by { 660(b).
      On appeal, plaintiff raises four issues:  (1) the changes in the
 incomes of the parties did not amount to a real, substantial and
 unanticipated change in circumstances warranting modification of the child
 support amount; (2) the agreement that 15 V.S.A. { 660(b) cannot be used as
 grounds for modification is valid and should not have been struck; (3) the
 decision to modify the 1987 order was an abuse of discretion, particularly
 because the recharacterization of part of the payment as maintenance was
 continued; and (4) the court erred in failing to award plaintiff all of her
 legal fees.
      We begin with the second issue because we find it to be determinative
 of the first.  That is, if 15 V.S.A. { 660(b) applies to this proceeding, it
 is undisputed that it would provide the change of circumstances needed for
 modification of the award.  Thus, if the section applies, we do not have to
 decide whether the findings with respect to the incomes of the parties were
 sufficient to allow the court to conclude that changed circumstances were
 present. (FN3)
      The child support guidelines were adopted to ensure adequate child
 support orders, eliminate discrepancies in awards between children in
 similar circumstances and increase the efficiency of child support
 adjudication.  See Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103, 106, 574 A.2d 772,
 774-75 (1990).  They are embodied in tables, promulgated by the Secretary of
 Human Services, reflecting the percentage of the combined parental income
 that should be spent on the children and an allocation between the parents
 for the payment of that amount.  15 V.S.A. {{ 654, 656.  Consistent with the
 purposes of the guidelines, the Legislature has required the court to review
 any parental agreement on child support for adequacy in relation to the
 guidelines.  15 V.S.A. { 655.  As noted above, the Legislature has
 authorized modification of child support orders where there is a "real,
 substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances," including where the
 child support amount varies more than 10% from that calculated under the
 guidelines.  15 V.S.A. {{ 660(a), (b).  The power to modify an order exists
 "whether or not the order is based upon a stipulation or agreement."  15
 V.S.A. { 660(a).  The statutes do not specify, however, whether a parental
 waiver of the right to seek modification pursuant to the statutory standards
 is effective.
      Because the children are the real beneficiaries of child support, the
 court must protect their interest.  Therefore, we have consistently
 recognized the authority of the court to override the terms of child support
 agreements.  See Frink v. Frink, 128 Vt. 531, 534,