Title: Sorge v. State

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Sorge v. State (98-573); 171 Vt. 171; 762 A.2d 816 

[Filed 25-Aug-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-573

Keith Sorge and Patricia Sorge	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Chittenden Superior Court

State of Vermont	                         December Term, 1999

Matthew I. Katz, J.

Mitchell L. Pearl and Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, 
  for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, Susanne R. Young, Assistant 
  Attorney General, Waterbury, and Michael O. Duane, Assistant Attorney General, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Plaintiffs Keith and Patricia Sorge appeal a
  Chittenden Superior Court  order dismissing their action against the
  Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) for  negligent
  supervision and control of a minor in its custody.  Plaintiffs argue that
  the court improperly  granted the State's V.R.C.P. 12(c) motion on the
  issue of proximate cause, and that the State is not  entitled to judgment
  on the pleadings on its alternative assertions that it owed no duty of care
  to  plaintiffs or that sovereign immunity protects it from suit.  We
  affirm.  

 

       While he delivered bundles of newspapers in Burlington on the morning
  of November 6,  1994, plaintiff Keith Sorge suffered severe injuries when
  assaulted by Cole Grant.  At the time of the  assault, Grant was a minor in
  SRS custody.   Mr. Sorge and his wife Patricia filed suit against the 
  State alleging that SRS was negligent in failing to adequately supervise
  and control Grant, and that as  a result of the State's negligence, Mr.
  Sorge sustained injuries causing Mrs. Sorge's loss of  consortium. 
  Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that SRS was aware that Grant had a history
  of violent,  assaultive and delinquent behavior.  On the weekend of the
  assault, SRS had temporarily placed  Grant with his mother.  Plaintiffs'
  complaint alleged that Grant's mother was either unlikely or  incapable of
  adequately supervising him. 

       The State's V.R.C.P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings
  advanced three arguments:  (1) the State was immune from suit for the
  performance of discretionary functions by state  employees under 12 V.S.A.
  § 5601(e)(1); (2) the State owed no duty of care to plaintiffs beyond its 
  duty to the public at large; and (3) the alleged negligence of the State
  was not, as a matter of law, the  proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 
  Assuming for the purpose of deciding the motion that SRS  was negligent in
  placing Grant with his mother, the superior court considered the central
  issue to be  "whether it was foreseeable that Grant would assault someone." 
  The court decided that it was not,  and granted the State's motion on the
  ground that SRS's negligence could not be found to be the  proximate cause
  of Mr. Sorge's injuries.  As the court explained:  

    Even if the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' complaint were 
    proved, Plaintiffs would not be able to make out a prima facie
    case of  negligence because the proximate cause of their injuries
    was not, as a  matter of law, the Department's negligent
    supervision and placement  of Grant Cole.  Rather, the direct
    cause of their injuries was the  intervening, independent act of
    Grant, an act which the Department  had no duty to anticipate. 
    Moreover, to conclude that 

 

    Grant's negligence is transferable to the State would erode the
    public  policy of rehabilitation of juveniles through
    reunification with their  families and the public, and which views
    preventative detention as a  last resort.

       When reviewing a V.R.C.P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
  the issue before the  court is whether the movant is entitled to judgment
  as a matter of law based on the pleadings.  See  Quesnel v. Town of
  Middlebury, 167 Vt. 252, 254,