Title: Boller v. Key Bank of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Boller v. Key Bank of Wyoming1992 WY 34829 P.2d 260Case Number: 90-240Decided: 04/03/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lewis Murray BOLLER, Jr., 
et al., 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

KEY BANK OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Philip Nicholas 
of Nicholas Law Office, Laramie, for appellant.

Richard Gist, of 
Richard D. Gist, P.C., Lander, for appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY and BROWN, Ret. 
JJ.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellant 
contends that the Indian Tribal Court, rather than the district court, had 
jurisdiction to foreclose a mortgage given by him, an enrolled Indian, on land 
within the exterior boundaries of the Wind River Indian Reservation which had 
been fee patented to him. He appeals from a summary judgment in which the 
district court held otherwise.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The principal 
issue in this case is worded by the appellant:

"Whether the District 
Court of Fremont County, Ninth Judicial District, has jurisdiction to foreclose 
the mortgage given by an enrolled Indian of Indian land located within the Wind 
River Indian Reservation."

And by 
appellee:

"Does the District Court, 
Fremont County, Wyoming, Ninth Judicial District, have the necessary and 
requisite jurisdiction to enter a money judgment against an Indian debtor and to 
foreclose a mortgage on, and order sold, fee patented land given as security for 
the repayment of the promissory note where the promissory note and mortgage were 
executed and performed off of the Wind River Indian Reservation but the fee 
patented land owned by the Indian debtor is located within the exterior 
boundaries of said Reservation?"

[¶4]      Appellee also 
presents the following issue for the purpose of limiting consideration of the 
"other issues":

"Whether, under the facts 
of this case, appellant's stipulation to judgment, as made to the trial court at 
the scheduling conference held May 8th, 1990, was dispositive of all issues 
except as to the issue of attorneys' fees and particularly that portion of the 
attorneys' fees which were incurred in pursuing the question of jurisdiction in 
this matter?"

[¶5]      The "other 
issues" are (without bracketed material as worded by appellant, and with such 
material as worded by appellee):

"Whether the 
record in this case permits the appellee to recover any interest on the debt in 
excess of the [minimum rate of] 12.25 percent per annum specified in the 
promissory note?

"Whether the record in 
this case permits the appellee to recover attorney's fees on the promissory 
note?

"Whether, under [the 
facts in this case and] the terms of the mortgage, appellee's acceleration of 
the mortgage debt, and foreclosure, are fatally premature because appellee 
failed, [by the record] to perform [certain] conditions precedent contained in 
the mortgage terms?

"Whether the record in 
this case permits the appellee to recover on summary judgment any attorney's 
fees on the foreclosure matter in excess of $1,000.00 [and] whether the 
[appellee] is entitled to recover any attorneys' fees which it incurred for 
litigation of the jurisdictional issue?

"Whether the mortgage 
secures the payment of any of appellee's attorney's fees?"

JURISDICTION

[¶6]      Appellant is an 
enrolled member of the Shoshone Indian Tribe. Appellee bank, located in Lander, 
Wyoming, and not on the Indian Reservation, loaned appellant $112,500. The loan 
was secured by a mortgage on appellant's home and ranch, which is located within 
the exterior boundaries of the Reservation but is no longer trust land. In 1978, 
the land was converted to fee patented land in the name of appellant under the 
Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 as amended (25 U.S.C. § 331-358). The Act 
provided, among other things, for the issuance of a fee patent for 160 acres of 
grazing land or 80 acres of agricultural land on a Reservation to an enrolled 
Indian upon application by him. Upon issuance of a fee patent, the trust status 
and all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance or taxation were removed from the 
land.

[¶7]      With reference to 
this Act, the United States Supreme Court has said: "The purpose of the 
allotment system was to protect the Indians' interest and `to prepare the 
Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body 
politic.'" Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 9, 76 S. Ct. 611, 616, 100 L. Ed. 883 
(1956) (quoting Board of Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715, 63 S. Ct. 920, 926, 87 L. Ed. 1094 (1943). "The purpose of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, * * *, was to lay a foundation for integrating Indians into the mainstream 
of American society." Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391, 
1396, 202 Ct.Cl. 625 (1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961, 94 S. Ct. 1980, 40 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1974).

[¶8]      Appellant 
defaulted on the note and appellees accelerated the payment of the debt and 
brought this action to foreclose the mortgage and the accompanying security 
agreement. Appellant does not deny the debt, the obligation to repay it, or the 
mortgage. He contends that the exclusive jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage 
was in the Indian Tribal Court.

[¶9]      The district 
court obtained personal jurisdiction over appellant through service of a copy of 
the complaint and summons on him and on his wife by the deputy sheriff of 
Fremont County at a place in Fremont County and not within the Reservation 
boundaries. Appellant and his non-Indian wife are separated. She signed the 
mortgage only to release homestead rights. She did not sign the 
note.

[¶10]   Appellant argues that, contrary to 
the specific language of the General Allotment Act, the United States Supreme 
Court has rejected the establishment of state court jurisdiction in matters 
involving fee patented land on Indian Reservations inasmuch as such would cause 
"checkerboard" jurisdiction, citing Moe v. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 1634, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96 
(1976) and Brendale v. Confederate Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1989) in support of the 
argument.

[¶11]   In response, appellee properly 
notes that the Moe case dealt with trust property and not fee patented property, 
and that its holding "has been greatly undercut, if not abolished," by 
subsequent cases, including the Brendale case.

[¶12]   The latter case is a very recent 
case which involved whether State zoning regulations or tribal zoning 
regulations applied to fee patented lands on the Reservation. The Reservation 
had long been treated as divided into a "closed" area (predominantly forest land 
in the western portion) and an "open" area (predominantly range and agricultural 
land in the eastern portion). The Court differentiated between the two areas as 
follows:

"The closed area consists 
of the western two-thirds of the reservation and is predominantly forest land. 
Of the approximately 807,000 acres of land in the closed area, 740,000 acres are 
located in Yakima County. Twenty-five thousand acres of the seven hundred and 
forty thousand acres are fee land. The closed area is so named because it has 
been closed to the general public at least since 1972 when the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs restricted the use of federally maintained roads in the area to members 
of the Yakima Nation and to its permittees, who must be record landowners or 
associated with the Tribe. Access to the open area, as its name suggests, is not 
likewise restricted to the general public. The open area is primarily rangeland, 
agricultural land, and land used for residential and commercial development. 
Almost half of the land in the open area is fee land."

Brendale, 492 U.S.  at 415-16, 109 S. Ct.  at 3000 (footnote omitted).

[¶13]   Appellant's land and the 
surrounding area is similar to the area described in the Brendale case as the 
"open area." It and the surrounding area are used primarily for livestock 
grazing and rural homesites. Access to appellant's land from U.S. Highway 287 
(approximately one mile) is entirely over fee patented land, part of which is a 
housing tract subdivision. Appellant's sale of 40 acres of his fee patented land 
was to a non-Indian.

[¶14]   Four members of the Brendale court 
held that both the "closed" area and the "open" area were subject to state 
zoning. Two of the other members held that the "open" area was subject to state 
zoning and that the "closed" area was subject to tribal regulations inasmuch as 
there was insufficient fee patented land in the "closed" portion to deprive the 
tribe of zoning authority over that portion. The three remaining justices would 
have given zoning authority over both portions to the 
tribe.

[¶15]   Four members of the Court set forth 
what was to be considered in determining whether the tribe or the state had 
jurisdiction over the use of fee patented land:

"[A]s we have indicated 
above, that interest does not entitle the tribe to complain or obtain relief 
against every use of fee land that has some adverse effect on the tribe. The 
impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. This standard 
will sufficiently protect Indian tribes while at the same time avoiding undue 
interference with state sovereignty and providing the certainty needed by 
property owners."

 

Id. at 431, 109 S. Ct.  at 3008. Nothing was here presented to reflect such 
impact.

[¶16]   Two of the six justices held that 
there was insufficient fee patented land in the "closed" portion to deprive the 
tribe of zoning authority over that portion. Tribal regulations were held to 
apply only when the state regulations would change the essential character of 
land being used exclusively for the benefit of the tribe. There is no indication 
here of a contemplated change in the essential character of appellant's land or 
of any land in the area. It is not now being used for any tribal benefit, let 
alone for use exclusively for such benefit.

[¶17]   Additionally, these two cases cited 
by appellant concern the use of the fee patented land. There is no 
indication here of a change in use. A change in use of land is far more 
important to neighbors or to the governing entity than is a change in ownership. 
This difference probably explains that, in the two cases cited by appellant, the 
challenge was brought by the tribe itself, whereas the tribe has not here 
indicated any concern over the change in ownership which will result from the 
foreclosure. Of course, the tribe would probably refrain from asserting 
jurisdiction in this case in any event for fear of creating an obstacle to the 
granting of mortgage loans to tribal members by banks. If it made an appearance, 
it would likely be on the side of appellee.

[¶18]   There may be instances in which a 
change of ownership would have sufficient impact to entitle a tribe to relief, 
but such impact is not indicated here.

[¶19]   Generally, state laws are not 
applicable to tribal matters on a Reservation except where Congress has 
expressly provided that State laws shall apply. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1973). 
Appellant acquired the land under the General Allotment Act. The Act expressly 
removed the restrictions which would prevent the state law from being applicable 
in this case. With reference to the General Allotment Act, the United States 
Supreme Court said in Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S. Ct. 366, 368, 72 L. Ed. 640 (1928):

"With the issue of the 
patent, the title not only passed from the United States but the prior trust and 
the incidental restriction against alienation were terminated. This put an end 
to the authority theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the Interior by 
reason of the trust and restriction - so that thereafter all questions 
pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the 
courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there. Brown v. 
Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, [19 S. Ct. 485, 43 L. Ed. 772 (1899)]; Lane v. Mickadiet, 
241 U.S. 201, 207, et seq., [36 S. Ct. 599, 600, 60 L. Ed. 956 
(1916)]."

[¶20]   Appellee properly refers us to the 
following cases holding that state courts have jurisdiction over ownership 
rights in fee patented lands on an Indian Reservation: Dickson v. Luck Land 
Company, 242 U.S. 371, 37 S. Ct. 167, 61 L. Ed. 371 (1917); United States v. 
Waller, 243 U.S. 452, 37 S. Ct. 430, 61 L. Ed. 843 (1917); Bonds v. Sherburne 
Mercantile Co., 169 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1948); United States v. Vulles, 282 F. Supp. 829 (D.Mont. 1968); United States v. Wilson, 523 F. Supp. 874 (D.C.N.D. 
Iowa 1981); Nichols v. Rysavy, 610 F. Supp. 1245 (D.S.D. 1985); Woodtick v. 
Crosby, 169 Mont. 38, 544 P.2d 812 (1976).

[¶21]   Prior to the foreclosure, appellant 
acted in recognition of the jurisdiction of the state over his land. The Fremont 
County Treasurer has continuously taxed the property since the issuance of the 
fee patent. Appellant has paid the taxes except for the years 1987 and 1988. 
When these taxes became delinquent, the property was sold at a tax sale 
(appellee bank later paid the taxes). As noted supra, the property is 
about one mile from U.S. Highway 287. To obtain access from the highway, 
appellant filed a petition with the Fremont County Commissioners pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 24-9-101 et seq. to establish a private road across other fee 
patented land, part of which is the housing tract subdivision. Subsequently, the 
access was provided through an easement agreement. The sale by appellant of 40 
acres of his 160 acre fee patented land to a non-Indian occurred prior to the 
bank mortgage. The mortgage is on the remaining 120 acres.

[¶22]   All aspects relative to the 
negotiation and execution of the note and mortgage took place at appellee bank 
in Lander and not on the Reservation, except that appellant's wife executed the 
mortgage in the State of Arizona.

[¶23]   Even applying the conditions for 
jurisdiction which relate to "use" of land (logically more strict than those 
relating to title), nothing with reference to the mortgage transaction or of its 
foreclosure causes an "impact" that is "demonstrably serious" or which "must 
imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and 
welfare of the tribe." Brendale, 492 U.S.  at 431, 109 S. Ct.  at 
3008.

[¶24]   Appellant refers to the holding in 
State ex rel. Peterson v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1980) in support of his position. Although there may not be a 
necessity to do so, that case is distinguishable from this one on both law and 
facts. In that case, plaintiff brought an action against defendant for damages 
resulting from an accident on a highway within the boundaries of the 
Reservation. The automobile in which plaintiff was riding ran into a horse which 
defendant had failed to fence off the highway. The court held that Congress had 
not granted jurisdiction to the state and that such grant was necessary for 
state jurisdiction. This case concerns fee patented land for which Congress has 
granted jurisdiction to the state through the General Allotment Act. Another 
legal difference is that the Peterson action was in tort, whereas this one is in 
contract relating to title in land. Factual differences exist in that: (1) both 
parties in the Peterson case were enrolled Indians, whereas appellee is not, and 
(2) the entire incident in Peterson took place within the interior boundaries of 
the Reservation, whereas all of the transactions in this case took place off the 
Reservation.

[¶25]   The district court properly 
exercised jurisdiction under the facts and circumstances of this 
case.

APPELLANT'S 
REPRESENTATION RE: JUDGMENT

[¶26]   Appellant filed a motion to dismiss 
in response to the complaint in this matter alleging lack of jurisdiction. The 
court denied the motion and appellant filed an answer, again objecting to 
jurisdiction but not pleading as defenses the "other issues" here presented. 
Appellee then filed a motion for summary judgment. It was supported by 
affidavits and exhibits filed with it and by those already of record. On May 8, 
1990, the court issued a scheduling order which resulted from a telephone 
scheduling conference held with counsel on that date. It recited that during the 
conference, appellant's counsel "advised the Court that the Defendants were 
going to stipulate to judgment except as to the issue of attorneys' fees 
and particularly that portion of attorneys' fees which were incurred in pursuing 
the question of jurisdiction in this matter." (Emphasis added.) The scheduling 
order stated that "any response which the Defendants have to Plaintiffs' 
materials relating to attorneys' fees included in the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment shall be filed by the Defendants no later than May 31, 
1990." (Emphasis added.) It set a hearing with reference to "the issues of 
attorneys' fees" for July 13, 1990. On July 12, 1990, counsel for appellant, by 
telephone, requested a change in the date of the hearing "to allow him time to 
confer with his client and to prepare an affidavit in opposition to the 
affidavits of plaintiff with regard to attorney's fees." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶27]   On August 6, 1990, an affidavit was 
filed by appellant. In it, he stated that "in any event," he should be required 
to pay only such attorney fees as are "both reasonable and necessary," and that, 
if the foreclosure action had been instituted in Tribal Court, the cost would 
have been "no more than $1,000." But he also presented argument on some 
of the "other issues" presented in this appeal, viz. jurisdiction, interest and 
premature foreclosure. (For the most part, the affidavit was argumentative and 
conclusory.)

[¶28]   Accordingly, until August 6, 1990, 
and in reliance on appellant's representations of May 8, 1990 and subsequent 
thereto, the court and appellee understood the only issue to be resolved was 
with reference to allowance and amount of attorney's fees.

[¶29]   The court's Order Granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Awarding Attorney's Fees filed August 30, 1990, and its 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Awarding Attorney's Fees Nunc Pro 
Tunc filed September 19, 1990 recite in part:

"On August 10, 1990, 
approximately 20 minutes before the scheduled hearing the Court was handed a 
document entitled `Defendants' Brief Opposing Summary Judgment.' This material 
was supposed to have been filed no later than August 6, 1990, and was therefore 
not timely filed.

"* * * During the course 
of the hearing, the Court was handed a Motion to Amend Answer which had been 
filed by the defendant after the commencement of the 
hearing."

The court denied 
the Motion to Amend Answer.

[¶30]   The "brief" argued the "other 
issues" presented in this appeal, and the proposed Amended Answer presented 
these "other issues" in defense. Neither the affidavit nor the "brief" nor the 
Motion to Amend Answer contained a certificate of service or any other 
indication of service of them on appellee as is required by W.R.C.P. 
5(c).

[¶31]   It was within the court's 
discretion to accept the representation limiting the issues to attorney's fees 
made by appellant to the court and to opposing counsel at the scheduling 
conference. The representation was in the nature of a stipulation or of an 
admission contained in a pleading. Within the discretion of the court, a party 
may be bound by such when voluntarily made. Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538 P.2d 24 (Wyo. 1975); U.S. v. Campbell, 453 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 
1972).

[¶32]   Also, except for the issue 
concerning attorney's fees (part of that referred to as "costs" in the answer), 
the "other issues" were not placed before the court through the pleadings. 
Appellee attempted to do so through his Motion to Amend Answer. The time in 
which to amend the answer as a matter of right had expired. W.R.C.P. 15(a) 
provides in pertinent part:

"A party may amend his 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served, or if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted 
and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it 
at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."

[¶33]   Appellant's Motion to Amend Answer 
recognizes the necessity for leave of court to file an amended answer. In most 
instances, the leave is "freely given."

"Unless the proposed 
amendment to the pleading will unduly prejudice the opposing party, has not been 
offered in good faith, or the party seeking to amend has had repeated 
opportunities to cure the defect, leave to amend should be liberally 
granted."

Johnson v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Wyo. 1980) app. 
dis. and cert. denied 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 
(1981).

[¶34]   The repeated representations that 
the only issue (other than jurisdiction) related to attorney's fees made by 
appellant between May 8, 1990 (the time of the initial representation) and 
August 6, 1990 are set out supra. He had "repeated opportunities to cure" 
any defect.

"[T]he grant or denial of 
leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court. The matter is 
subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that 
discretion."

Breazeale v. 
Radich, 500 P.2d 74, 74 (Wyo. 1973). 

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceed the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances."

Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶35]   The court could "reasonably 
conclude as it did" after appellant represented on multiple occasions that the 
only issue before the court (after the ruling on jurisdiction) had to do with 
attorney's fees, after appellant's "out of time" filings, and after the 
presentation by appellant of the request to amend at "the 11th hour." The ruling 
did not exceed the "bounds of reason under the 
circumstances."

[¶36]   Under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, the trial court properly refused to allow appellant to add issues 
through an amended complaint contrary to appellant's previous representations 
concerning the issues.

"OTHER 
ISSUES"

[¶37]   Our holding in the previous section 
(Appellant's Representation Re: Judgment), makes unnecessary consideration of 
the "other issues" here presented, except those having to do with attorney's 
fees. The issues relative to attorney's fees are three in number: (I) Whether or 
not the record permits recovery of attorney's fees in an action for collection 
of the promissory note; (II) Whether or not attorney fees can be recovered in 
excess of $1,000 or for those incurred in litigation of the jurisdictional 
issue; and (III) Whether or not the mortgage secures the payment of appellees' 
attorney's fees.

I.          
WHETHER OR NOT THE RECORD PERMITS RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AN 
ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.

[¶38]   The complaint alleged the execution 
and delivery by appellant of the promissory note, which was attached as Exhibit 
"A." Subsequently and on July 11, 1990, appellee filed a Motion to Substitute 
for Exhibit "A." A copy of the motion was served on appellant on that date. The 
original exhibit consisted only of the front of the promissory note. The note 
consisted of a single sheet of paper with the terms on both the front and back 
of the paper. Appellee recited in the motion that the back of the note was not 
included in the original exhibit due to "error and inadvertence," and he moved 
to substitute the complete note for the front page of it. The court issued an 
order allowing the substitution.

[¶39]   Appellant founds his contention 
that the record does not permit recovery of attorney's fees on the fact that the 
provision for attorney's fees is on the back of the note, and that the back of 
it was not authenticated when filed, as was the front of the note when it was 
attached to the complaint.

[¶40]   The provision on the back of the 
note reads: "If you hire a lawyer to collect this note, I must pay his or her 
fee, plus court costs (except where prohibited by law)." The front of the note 
provides, immediately above appellant's signature, in capital letters and bold 
face print: "I agree to the terms set out on the front and back of this 
agreement." (Emphasis added.)

[¶41]   Although W.R.C.P. 56(e) requires 
that sworn or certified copies of papers be used to support a motion for summary 
judgment, we have held that the purpose of such filing is to give notice to the 
opposing party in order to afford him an opportunity to challenge the submitted 
evidence, and that a party waives his objection on appeal to the consideration 
by the trial court of materials presented on a motion for summary judgment when 
that party allows such consideration without objection. Matter of Estate of 
Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 276 (Wyo. 1988). Under the circumstances of this case, 
appellant could not challenge the existence of the back page of the note or its 
contents. He did not make a timely objection to the substitution. The 
proposition concerning waiver is stated in 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2722 (1983):

"As is true of other 
material introduced on a summary judgment motion, uncertified or otherwise 
inadmissible documents may be considered by the court if not challenged. The 
objection must be timely or it will be deemed to have been 
waived."

[¶42]   The motion to substitute the full 
copy of the note in place of the front page thereof was made July 11, 1990. 
Appellant was so notified on that date. On July 12, 1990, appellant requested a 
change in the July 13, 1990 date for hearing with reference to attorney fees. In 
the order changing the date to August 10, 1990, the court ordered that "[a]ny 
affidavits or materials in opposition to those materials filed by plaintiff with 
regard to attorney's fees shall be filed by the defendant no later than August 
6, 1990." On August 6, 1990, appellant filed his Affidavit in Response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, but it was not served on appellee. In 
it, he stated, "If the plaintiff's qualified affiant swears that the substituted 
note is true, then without further discovery, I must accept that." There is no 
suggestion that appellant could make a legitimate challenge to the back of the 
note had it been included in the original exhibit.

[¶43]   For the first time, appellant 
objected to the substitution on August 10, 1990. This was about a month after 
the Motion to Substitute was filed, and it was done in a "brief," normally an 
instrument for argument on the issues and not a pleading or instrument 
formulating the issues. It was filed four days after the time set by the court 
for filing "affidavits or materials in opposition to those materials filed by 
plaintiff with regard to attorney's fees." Appellant's objection to the 
consideration of the entire note was not timely.

[¶44]   The trial court properly allowed 
the substitution. When he signed the note, appellant knew, or should have known, 
that the note provided for payment of appellee's attorney's fees if it became 
necessary to incur such in order to make collection after 
default.

II.          
WHETHER OR NOT ATTORNEY FEES CAN BE RECOVERED IN EXCESS OF $1,000 OR FOR 
THOSE INCURRED IN LITIGATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE.

[¶45]   Appellant's contention that 
attorney's fees in excess of $1,000 should not be recoverable is premised on the 
assumption that appellee had a choice of forums: the district court or the 
Tribal Court. He further contends that the jurisdictional issue would not have 
been contested in the Tribal Court, and that "a reasonable fee for foreclosure 
in the Tribal Court would not have exceeded $1,000."

[¶46]   The contention that there is 
concurrent jurisdiction is contrary to appellant's position on the jurisdiction 
issue presented in this appeal. Our holding on that issue is that the district 
court had exclusive jurisdiction to foreclose this mortgage by virtue of the 
General Allotment Act.

[¶47]   There is a provision in THE LAW AND 
ORDER CODE OF THE SHOSHONE AND ARAPAHOE TRIBES OF THE WIND RIVER INDIAN 
RESERVATION, WYOMING for foreclosure of mortgages, but it limits its 
jurisdiction by excluding actions in which jurisdiction is placed elsewhere 
under federal laws, such as was done by the General Allotment Act. Chapter 2, 
Section 1-2-4 of THE LAW AND ORDER CODE provides:

"Subject to any 
contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained in either federal laws 
and regulations, the Courts of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court shall 
have jurisdiction over any real or personal property located on the reservation 
to determine the ownership thereof or rights therein or to determine the 
application of such property to the satisfaction of a claim for which the owner 
of the property may be liable." (Emphasis added.)

[¶48]   There may be instances in which 
foreclosure can be made under this Code but not in this case in which the 
property is fee patented land with the mortgage being held by a non-Indian, in 
which the land is "open," i.e., it and surrounding land are being used primarily 
for grazing and rural homesites in which there is other fee patented land in the 
area, and with the entire mortgage transaction occurring off the 
Reservation.

[¶49]   The court had before it: (1) an 
affidavit of appellee's attorney detailing the work performed in this matter and 
the basis for the fee, and (2) an affidavit of a practicing attorney in Lander 
setting forth details of his review of the work performed by appellee's attorney 
and the propriety of it and of the charges for it. Appellant did not file an 
affidavit in opposition to it. He argues that the charges for work required by 
the jurisdictional issue should not be included in the allowed fees since it was 
not a usual issue in a foreclosure proceeding. However, it was appellant's 
choice to test the jurisdiction under which the foreclosure action was brought, 
making necessary the work in connection therewith.

[¶50]   The award of attorney's fees is 
within the discretion of the court. The court did not abuse its discretion in 
this case.

III.         
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE SECURES THE PAYMENT OF APPELLEES' ATTORNEY'S 
FEES.

[¶51]   The Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Awarding Attorney's Fees Nunc Pro Tunc directed in part 
that the mortgaged property be sold and that "all proceeds of said sale shall be 
applied a [sic] payment or partial payment as the case may be, of the judgment 
herein awarded, plus expenses incurred in said sale, plus attorney's fees 
and costs, interest, taxes and insurance." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶52]   Appellant argues that the mortgage 
"does not provide that any attorney's fees shall be secured by the mortgage," 
and, therefore, that the proceeds of the sale cannot be used to pay attorney's 
fees. Since the note does provide for payment of attorney's fees, and since the 
mortgage provides that it "secures to Lender: * * * (c) the performance of 
Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the 
Note" (emphasis added), the mortgage does secure the payment of attorney's 
fees.

[¶53]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶54]   I concur in the result in this 
case. I agree with the holding of the majority in this case to the extent that 
it recognizes jurisdiction in the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District 
of the State of Wyoming in and for Fremont County to foreclose the mortgage on 
fee lands within the exterior boundaries of Wind River Indian Reservation. I 
also agree that the award of attorney fees was 
appropriate.

[¶55]   I must take exception to the dicta 
appearing on of the slip opinion of the majority indicating a holding that the 
state district court had exclusive jurisdiction to foreclose this mortgage by 
virtue of the General Allotment Act. I do not think the General Allotment Act 
had that effect, nor can I agree that the authorities pertaining to the General 
Allotment Act that are cited in the majority opinion really justify that 
conclusion.

[¶56]   My primary concern, however, is 
that the question posed to this court was "Whether the District Court of Fremont 
County, Ninth Judicial District, has jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage 
given by an enrolled Indian of Indian land located within the Wind River Indian 
Reservation." This question does not require us to reach the issue of 
jurisdiction of any other court once we have decided that the state district 
court has jurisdiction. I would limit our holding in that regard because I am 
not persuaded that the tribal court would not have jurisdiction. In fact, the 
somewhat sparse authority in regard to that question might lead to the 
conclusion that the tribal court would have concurrent jurisdiction, at the very 
least. See Kennerly v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S. Ct. 480, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1959); Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Ass'n 
v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986); and Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 
Mont. 298, 511 P.2d 325 (1973).

[¶57]   I recognize a number of pragmatic 
reasons for seeking foreclosure in the state district court. Not the least of 
those reasons is that the decree of a tribal court will not necessarily be 
recognized by the county clerk for purposes of title records. For that reason, 
it must be a better choice to use the state court, but I am not persuaded that, 
if parties chose to seek foreclosure in the tribal court, the tribal court would 
not have jurisdiction to proceed. In any event, that question need not be 
answered in this case.