Title: Shortridge v. Delaware Hospice

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONNA SHORTRIDGE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 377, 2009 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
DELAWARE HOSPICE 
§ 
CA No. S08C-11-017 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 11, 2009 
   Decided:  November 9, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 9th day of November 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Plaintiff-Appellant Donna Shortridge (“Shortridge”) appeals from a 
June 18, 2009, decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment to 
Defendant-Appellee Delaware Hospice (“Employer”) on her claim for liquidated 
damages under Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, Inc.1  Shortridge makes two 
arguments on appeal.  First, Shortridge contends that correspondence sent on May 
22, 2008, to Delaware Hospice constitutes a valid demand.  Second, Shortridge 
                                          
 
1 432 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1981) (“Huffman”).  Complaints filed under 19 Del. C. § 2537 to collect 
unpaid worker’s compensation awards have come to be known as “Huffman” claims. See Rawley 
v. J.J. White, Inc., 918 A.2d 316, 320 (Del. 2006) (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. 
McDougall, 877 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 2005)). 
 2
contends that the correspondence sent on August 11, 2008, was an additional 
demand and not, as the Superior Court held, a waiver of the original May 22, 2008 
demand.  It is undisputed that the demand was made by neither Shortridge nor her 
attorney.  Because a proper demand was not made, we affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court. 
(2) 
On April 18, 2008, Shortridge was awarded attorney’s fees and a 
medical witness fee in the amount of $932.80, pursuant to a decision of the 
Industrial Accident Board.  On May 22, 2008, an assistant to Shortridge’s counsel 
signed and sent correspondence to Delaware Hospice’s counsel.  The assistant is 
not admitted to practice law in Delaware.  The correspondence stated:  “[t]he total 
amount of $932.80 is submitted for payment and should be reimbursed to our 
office.”  No payment was made within 30 days. 
(3) 
On August 11, 2008, 81 days after the date of the first 
correspondence, a second letter was sent.  This letter was signed by the same 
assistant to Shortridge’s counsel.  It addressed an overdue payment of the disability 
benefits to Shortridge and purported to renew the request for payment of the 
doctor’s bill and court reporter’s bill in the amount of $932.80.  The 
correspondence explained that it was “a demand in accordance with statute and 
case law, for the immediate payment of the expert fees in the amount of $932.80 
 3
and for $1,173.32 for the four weeks of temporary total disability payments due to 
our client.”  Within 30 days of this letter, the bills were paid. 
(4) 
On July 6, 2008, Shortridge filed suit for liquidated damages under 
Huffman.  The Superior Court addressed the two “demand letters” and found that 
the second letter “waived” the first demand.  The parties have argued over whether 
the first letter was a proper demand and whether the second letter constituted a 
waiver.  We have not applied the concept of waiver in this context nor is it 
necessary to do so.  This is because no demand was made by Shortridge or her 
counsel.   
(5) 
Here, both the May 22, 2008, and the August 11, 2008, letters were 
signed by a non-lawyer.  As these “demand letters” purport to secure Shortridge’s 
legal rights, the assistant could not represent Shortridge and make a proper demand 
on her behalf.2  Absent the predicate of a proper demand, Shortridge has no 
Huffman claim. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
2 Matter of Coleman, 1991 WL 28900 (Del. Feb. 25, 1991); Delaware State Bar Ass’n v. 
Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 661 (Del. 1978) (quoting In re Welch, 185 A.2d 458, 459 (Vt. 1962)).