Title: CHERYL DENISE SEWELL V JEFFREY CRUSE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 30, 2001  
CHERYL DENISE SEWELL,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116528  
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and 
JOHN DOE,  
Defendants,  
and  
JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a 
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord,  
alleging negligence and unlawful eviction.  During trial, the  
defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that a  
prior judgment in the district court had resolved the issue  
whether the eviction was lawful.  The circuit court denied the  
motion and later entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  We reverse the judgments of  
the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, and remand this  
case to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
I  
Defendant 
Jeffrey Cruse owned a house at 17184 Warrington  
Drive in Detroit.  He rented a flat in the house to plaintiff  
C. Denise Sewell for $450 per month.  
Ms. Sewell soon fell behind in her rent. She says that  
she was withholding rent because of numerous unrepaired  
problems in the flat.  
In May 1995, Mr. Cruse filed a complaint in the district  
court, seeking termination of Ms. Sewell’s tenancy.1  This led  
to a consent judgment that entered twelve days later.2  The  
judgment required Ms. Sewell to pay $450 by June 2.  However,  
the judgment further provided:  
[Mr. Cruse] agrees to make repairs to side 
door, lock on front door, tile in bathroom, repair 
bathroom leak, bath ceiling, repair hot water & 
electrical; all to be made before money is due on 
6/2/95.[3]  
Mr. Cruse says he made the required repairs.  Ms. Sewell  
says he did not.  However, Mr. Cruse has testified that Ms.  
Sewell did sign a form indicating that the repairs had been  
made.  
1 Summary proceedings for the recovery of possession of 
premises are governed by MCL 600.5701 et seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et  
seq. and by MCR 4.201.  
2 MCR 4.201(K).  
3 This language is handwritten on the judgment form and 
is not entirely legible. We have added punctuation.  
2  
Using this documentation, Mr. Cruse returned to the  
district court, where he signed a June 5 application for a  
writ of restitution.4  The form indicated that Mr. Cruse had  
complied with the terms of the judgment and that Ms. Sewell  
had not met her payment obligation.  The court signed the writ  
on June 7.  The form directed the court officer to “remove  
[Ms. Sewell] from the premises described and to restore  
peaceful possession to [Mr. Cruse].”  
Ms. Sewell did not appeal the consent judgment or the  
writ of restitution. Neither did she ask the district court  
to set aside the judgment or the writ.  
Several weeks later, a district court bailiff effected  
the eviction.  There is conflicting testimony about whether he  
removed all of Ms. Sewell’s possessions from the flat. At a  
minimum, he put most of her possessions on the front lawn.  
Ms. Sewell, who had been in the hospital, learned of the  
eviction a few days later. With family members, she went to  
the flat.  Apparently while removing additional property from  
the premises, she slipped and fell. Ms. Sewell had received  
a kidney transplant in 1991 and another in 1995, and her fall  
evidently caused serious complications in that regard.  
In March 1996, Ms. Sewell sued Mr. Cruse in circuit  
court.5  In count I of the complaint, she alleged that he had  
4 MCR 4.201(L).  
5 
 The defendants named in the complaint were Clean Cut 
Management, Inc.; Mr. Cruse, individually and doing business  
3  
 
negligently maintained the premises and that she had suffered  
serious injury as the result. In count II, she alleged that  
she had been unlawfully evicted.6  
This case was tried before a jury in circuit court.  
During trial, Mr. Cruse moved for a directed verdict.  He  
argued that the district court eviction order was a binding  
resolution of the question whether the eviction had been  
legal. The court denied the motion.  
In its verdict, the jury found that Mr. Cruse had been  
negligent,7 and that his negligence had been the proximate  
cause of $4,700 in lost wages for Ms. Sewell, as well as  
$50,000 in noneconomic damages.  The jury also found that she  
had been unlawfully ejected from her premises and that her  
property loss was in the amount of $5,000.  Thus the total  
verdict was $59,700.  
as Clean Cut Management; and John Doe.  The complaint was 
answered by Mr. Cruse, doing business as Clean Cut Management, 
and he has been the only defendant to participate in this 
litigation.  Thus we will continue to refer to him as the sole  
defendant.  
6 Ms. Sewell also asked for treble damages under MCL 
600.2918(1); MSA 27A.2918(1), which provides:  
Any person who is ejected or put out of any 
lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful  
manner, or being out is afterwards held or kept 
out, by force, if he prevails, is entitled to  
recover 3 times the amount of his actual damages or 
$200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to 
recovering possession.  
7 The jury found no negligence on the part of Ms. Sewell.  
4  
 
Mr. Cruse moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict  
or, alternatively, for new trial.  He argued that the district  
court proceedings that granted him possession of the  
Warrington 
premises 
were 
res 
judicata 
and 
collateral 
estoppel.  
He also argued that, in light of the district court judgment  
and writ, Ms. Sewell had been a trespasser at the time she  
slipped and fell. The circuit court denied the motion.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed,8 citing our decision in  
JAM Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc, 461 Mich 161; 600 NW2d 617  
(1999).  
Mr. Cruse has now applied to this Court for leave to  
appeal.  
II  
The procedural history in JAM Corp was complicated by  
uncertainty regarding the proper names and identities of the  
parties.  However, there came a point when JAM9 began summary  
proceedings in district court to regain control of premises  
that had been leased to AARO Disposal, Inc.  Because of  
problems relating to the corporate status (or lack thereof) of  
JAM, the district court action was dismissed with prejudice  
(though the premises were returned to the control of JAM).  
461 Mich 162-165.  
8 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 3, 
1999, reh den February 25, 2000 (Docket No. 208148).  
9 There were several variants of the “JAM” corporate name 
but, for present purposes, they are not important.  
5  
 
Following 
the 
dismissal in district court, JAM filed suit  
against AARO in circuit court.10  The complaint stated six  
causes of action, including implied contract and unjust  
enrichment.  The circuit court dismissed the complaint with  
prejudice, finding the district court dismissal to be res  
judicata.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.11  461 Mich 165-166.  
In JAM Corp, this Court examined several sections of the  
chapter dealing with summary proceedings.  Our conclusion was  
that “[p]lainly the Legislature took these cases outside the  
realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order  
that attorneys would not be obliged to fasten all other  
pending claims to the swiftly moving summary proceedings.”  
461 Mich 168-169.  We also said that “it is evident that  
judgment 
in 
these 
summary proceedings, no matter who prevails,  
does not bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170.  
Accordingly, we reversed the judgments of the Court of  
Appeals and circuit court in JAM Corp, and remanded the case  
for further proceedings on JAM’s circuit court suit.  461 Mich  
171.  
III  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals fastened on our  
statement that judgment in summary proceedings does not bar  
10 JAM also appealed the district court dismissal, though 
the result of that appeal was unknown to us as we wrote our 
opinion in JAM Corp. 461 Mich 165.  
11 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 16, 
1998, reh den April 21, 1998 (Docket No. 193594).  
6  
 
 
other claims for relief.  Quoting that holding, it affirmed a  
circuit court judgment based on a jury’s verdict that the  
eviction had been illegal, notwithstanding that the eviction  
occurred pursuant to an unappealed district court consent  
judgment and writ of restitution.  
This is not consistent with the statute or with our  
analysis in JAM Corp. We said in JAM Corp that “judgment in  
these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails, does not  
bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170. Nothing in the  
statute or in JAM Corp stands for the proposition that, having  
litigated in the district court the issue who has the right to  
the premises, that question can be relitigated de novo in a  
subsequent suit.  Such an approach would empty MCL 600.5701 et  
seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et seq. of all significance. 
After  
repossessing premises in accord with the statute and an order  
of the district court, a landlord would remain in jeopardy of  
further litigation on that same question.  
Neither 
do 
principles of res judicata support judgment of  
the Court of Appeals.  In Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586; 597  
NW2d 82 (1999), we explained:  
Res judicata bars a subsequent action between 
the same parties when the evidence or essential 
facts are identical. Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs  
v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375; 521 NW2d 847  
(1994).
 A second action is barred when (1) the 
first action was decided on the merits, (2) the 
matter contested in the second action was or could  
have been resolved in the first, and (3) both 
actions involve the same parties or their privies. 
Id. at 375-376.  
7  
Michigan courts have broadly applied the  
doctrine of res judicata.  They have barred, not 
only claims already litigated, but every claim 
arising from the same transaction that the parties, 
exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised 
but did not. Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 
Mich 147, 160-163; 294 NW2d 165 (1980); Sprague v  
Buhagiar, 213 Mich App 310, 313; 539 NW2d 587  
(1995).  
This case obviously presents issues concerning the  
relationship between summary possession proceedings and the  
doctrine of res judicata.  As explained in Dart, Michigan’s  
broad res judicata rule bars claims arising out of the same  
transaction that could have been litigated in a prior  
proceeding, but were not. JAM Corp, 461 Mich 167.  
Our 
decision 
in 
JAM Corp recognized a statutory exception  
to this rule with respect to claims that “could have been”  
litigated in a prior proceeding. See id. at 168, citing MCL  
600.5750; MSA 27A.5750. 
There, we recognized that the  
legislative intent for this exception was to remove the  
incentive for attorneys to “fasten all other pending claims to  
swiftly moving summary proceedings.”  Id. at 169. 
Our  
decision in JAM Corp said nothing about the preclusive effect  
of claims actually litigated in the summary proceedings.  
Thus, the “other claims of relief,” described in JAM Corp at  
170, were those claims that “could have been” brought during  
the summary proceedings, but were not.  This Court was not  
describing subsequent claims involving the issues actually  
litigated in the summary proceedings.  
8  
 
In the present case, Ms. Sewell sought damages for  
personal injuries suffered on Mr. Cruse’s premises and for  
damage to personal property.  Mr. Cruse says she was a  
trespasser and that the circuit court should have granted a  
directed verdict in his favor.  We need not decide in this  
opinion the full effect of the district court’s judgment and  
writ, with respect to the status of Ms. Sewell as she entered  
the premises or the extent, if any, of Mr. Cruse’s duty toward  
her.
 However, we do hold that, where the district court  
judgment and writ have not been reversed or vacated, they are  
conclusive on the narrow issue whether the eviction was  
proper.  
Unlike JAM Corp, this case presents a question regarding  
the preclusive effect of a claim that was actually litigated  
in the summary proceeding. Therefore, the limited statutory  
exception to Michigan’s res judicata rule does not apply.  The  
circuit court thus erred in failing to grant, at least in  
part, the motion for a directed verdict.  
For these reasons we reverse the judgments of the circuit  
court and the Court of Appeals.  We remand this case to the  
circuit court.  On remand, the circuit court shall enter  
judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s wrongful  
eviction claim.  Because the verdict in favor of the plaintiff  
on her negligence claim may have been influenced by the error  
9  
 
 
 
 
with regard to her wrongful eviction claim, we remand for  
further proceedings consistent with this opinion with regard  
to the negligence claim. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
10  
 
 
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHERYL DENISE SEWELL,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116528  
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and 
JOHN DOE,  
Defendants,  
and  
JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a 
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I would not decide this case by a per curiam opinion.  
Because this case offers the opportunity to address a  
jurisprudentially 
significant issue, I would grant leave so we  
might avail ourselves of full briefing and argument by the  
parties.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.