Title: DAVID SHARP V CITY OF LANSING

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2001  
DAVID SHARP,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116171  
CITY OF LANSING,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
PER CURIAM  
In this case, Plaintiff David Sharp brought a reverse  
discrimination claim against the city of Lansing for its use  
of an affirmative action plan in hiring decisions. Plaintiff  
alleged violations of the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA)1 and  
1MCL 37.2101 et seq.  
  
the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution2.  
The trial court granted summary disposition for the city,  
finding plaintiff's claims barred by the "safe harbor"  
provision of MCL 37.2210.  The Court of Appeals upheld the  
dismissal.3 
238 Mich App 515; 606 NW2d 424 (1999).  
It is beyond question that the safe harbor of the CRA  
shields a public employer with a Civil Rights Commission­
approved affirmative action plan from liability under the CRA  
for acts undertaken pursuant to that plan.  Principally at  
issue is whether the safe harbor provision also shields such  
an employer from constitutional equal protection challenges.  
We hold that it does not. We affirm in part the decision of  
the Court of Appeals, reverse it in part, and remand the case  
to the trial court.  
I  
BACKGROUND  
Plaintiff wanted to be a firefighter with the city of  
Lansing Fire Department. He believed himself qualified, since  
he was a certified firefighter and the fire chief in Onondaga  
Township.  For six consecutive years, 1990-1995, he applied  
for a firefighter position with the city. Each time he was  
2Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
3It reversed in part, allowing plaintiff to amend his 
complaint to claim discrimination based on residency. This 
aspect of the ruling is not in dispute.  
2  
 
 
denied employment. He believes that the city wrongfully  
refused to hire him because he is a Caucasian male.  
The reason for the repeated rejection, according to  
Sharp, was the city's affirmative action plan.4 The plan was  
formally approved by the Civil Rights Commission in April  
1987, pursuant to § 210 of the CRA. That provision generally  
encourages 
employers 
to 
implement 
voluntary 
affirmative 
action  
plans and sets forth a procedure for doing so.  
Plaintiff sued the city, seeking damages, an injunction  
barring further use of the affirmative action plan, and a  
position with the city fire department. He argued that § 210  
did not bar his claim and that the city's plan operated  
unconstitutionally with respect to him. Defendant disagreed  
and moved for summary disposition on the ground that the safe  
harbor of § 210 precluded all liability. The trial court  
granted the motion before the close of discovery, relying on  
MCR 2.116(C)(8), (10). It concluded that the CRA provided the  
exclusive remedy for discrimination claims in the state and,  
therefore, such a claim was barred in this instance.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of  
4The details of the plan itself are not central to the 
questions presented in this case.  The stated goal of the plan 
was to increase the percentage of minorities and women in the 
fire department, which was composed predominantly of white 
males. In the interest of achieving its goal, the city made 
race and gender factors in hiring decisions.  
3  
 
summary disposition, relying on Cole v General Motors Corp.5  
The panel believed that it was bound by the precedent of Cole;  
but disagreed with the reasoning employed there. It stated:  
Because plaintiff does not challenge the  
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act itself, 
but only the validity of defendant's affirmative 
action plan and the actions of defendant employer, 
we believe that the ruling in Cole effectively 
resolves plaintiff's claim in this case. Were it 
not for the Cole decision, however, we would reach 
a different result. [238 Mich App 519.]  
If working from "a clean slate," the Court of Appeals  
majority6 added, it would not interpret § 210 as providing  
defendant employer with a shield from liability.  Instead, it  
would have subjected the plan itself to constitutional review  
and would have held that § 210 does not "automatically" confer  
immunity from statutory liability under the CRA. We granted  
plaintiff's application for leave to appeal.  
Plaintiff argues that the city's affirmative action plan  
should not have been approved.  He asserts that the plan  
delegates too much authority to the city by allowing the city  
to make changes to it without commission approval. 
He  
contends, also, that the trial court erred by granting summary  
5236 Mich App 452; 600 NW2d 421 (1999). Cole provided 
that an employer is insulated from liability under the CRA 
whenever it is insulated under title VII, its federal 
counterpart.  
6The per curiam opinion was signed by Court of Appeals 
Judges Michael J. Talbot and Jane E. Markey.  Judge E. Thomas  
Fitzgerald concurred in the result only.  
4  
disposition before discovery ended. A genuine issue of fact  
exists, he argues, about whether the plan ever received  
approval from the commission.  Finally, he challenges the  
lower court's decision that § 210 completely immunizes  
defendant's actions taken in accordance with its approved  
affirmative action plan.  
II  
ANALYSIS  
This case involves the interplay of the Equal Protection  
Clause of our constitution and the statutory framework of the  
CRA.  Art 1, § 2 guarantees Michigan citizens the right to be  
free 
from 
racial 
discrimination in employment by state actors.  
That clause provides:  
No person shall be denied the equal protection 
of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the 
enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercise thereof  
because of religion, race, color or national  
origin. The legislature shall implement this  
section by appropriate legislation.  
The CRA extended these protections to employment in the  
private 
sector. 
Thus, 
it 
prohibits 
racial 
employment  
discrimination by private and government employers7, while  
7Section 202 provides in pertinent part:  
(1) An employer shall not do any of the 
following:  
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
(continued...)  
5  
creating a damages remedy8 for those victimized by unlawful  
employment acts.  
Section 210 of the CRA invites employers to implement  
their own affirmative action policies. Under this section, an  
employer's actions that would otherwise violate the CRA are  
permissible, provided they are taken pursuant to an  
affirmative action plan properly approved by the commission.  
Section 210 provides:  
A person subject to this article may adopt and 
carry out a plan to eliminate present effects of 
past discriminatory practices or assure equal 
opportunity with respect to religion, race, color, 
national origin, or sex if the plan is filed with 
the commission under rules of the commission and  
the commission approves the plan.  
We presume that the Legislature intended the unequivocal  
meaning expressed in § 210. See Nation v WDE Electric Co, 454  
Mich 489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997). It provides a safe harbor  
for public and private employers who act in accordance with  
properly approved affirmative action plans. However, the safe  
7(...continued) 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status. [MCL 37.2202.]  
8Section 801(1) provides: "A person alleging a violation  
of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate 
injunctive relief or damages, or both." [MCL 37.2801.]  
6  
harbor does not shield against all claims. It merely protects  
employers from liability under the CRA for doing precisely  
what the statute itself invites them to do.  
In support of its motion for summary disposition,  
defendant presented affidavits showing that its hiring  
decisions had been made pursuant to an affirmative action plan  
approved by the Civil Rights Commission in 1987.  Plaintiff  
does 
not 
dispute 
that the commission approved defendant’s 1987  
plan.  Rather, he argues that a genuine issue of material fact  
exists whether defendant actually used the approved plan in  
making hiring decisions between 1990 and 1995.  Plaintiff  
contends that defendant followed different and unapproved  
plans when making the hiring decisions at issue.  Moreover, he  
asserts, the commission "exceeded its authority" by giving to  
defendant the discretion periodically to adjust its hiring  
goals without commission approval.  
The essence of plaintiff's position is that defendant's  
periodic revision of its hiring goals after 1987 resulted in  
the establishment of new affirmative action plans.  He argues  
that these plans should have been submitted for commission  
approval. However, plaintiff has offered no factual support  
for his assertions.  Accordingly, he has failed to create a  
genuine issue of material fact whether defendant relied on a  
series of separate, unapproved plans in making the hiring  
decisions at issue.  Moreover, he has not established that  
7  
 
 
 
 
further discovery would uncover support for that assertion.  
Therefore, we reject his argument that summary disposition  
entered prematurely with respect to the CRA claim.  
In 
a 
related 
vein, plaintiff suggests that the commission  
erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of  
law when it approved defendant's affirmative action plan.  
Plaintiff did preserve the issue whether the commission was  
required under the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.285,  
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  However, for  
the reasons set forth in the Court of Appeals decision, MCL  
24.285 is not applicable to this case.  238 Mich App 521.  
Accordingly, 
plaintiff has not preserved the issue whether the  
commission was required under § 210 to make findings of fact  
and conclusions of law.  Thus, we conclude that the safe­
harbor 
provision 
bars 
plaintiff's 
statutory 
claims 
against 
the  
city.  
But our inquiry does not end there. 
A state actor is  
involved.  Consequently, the protections provided directly by  
the state Equal Protection Clause come into play. 
When an  
aggrieved plaintiff alleges that a public employer denied his  
equal protection rights in violation of art 1, § 2, the  
employer's 
acts 
are 
subject 
to 
review 
under 
that  
constitutional provision. Injunctive and declaratory relief  
are available to restrain any acts found to violate the state  
8  
 
 
Equal Protection Clause.9  Hence, the mere existence of an  
approved affirmative action plan does not insulate a state  
employer, or its plan, from all judicial scrutiny.  
In this case, plaintiff sought constitutional relief,  
alleging that defendant's affirmative action plan violates  
art 1, § 2.10
 Defendant asserts that plaintiff did not  
vigorously 
pursue 
his constitutional theory either at trial or  
in the Court of Appeals.  It argues that such a lack of  
pursuit 
constitutes 
an abandonment of the claim, regardless of  
how it was pleaded.11 We disagree that plaintiff failed to  
pursue his constitutional claim sufficiently.  
Although plaintiff's presentation of this issue was  
somewhat scattered, the record reveals that plaintiff did  
raise the issue at various stages of the litigation. First,  
he 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality of defendant's plan in his  
own motion for partial summary disposition, which was denied.  
Next, he raised the issue in his motion for reconsideration of  
9  However, money damages are not available to an 
aggrieved plaintiff under these circumstances. See Lewis v  
Michigan, 464 Mich __ ; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).  
10In his first amended complaint, plaintiff prayed that 
the Ingham Circuit Court enter an order "enjoining Defendant 
city of Lansing from discriminating in employment on the basis 
of race, sex or national origin . . . ."  
11Defendant characterizes plaintiff's claim as an effort 
to "vindicate equal protection rights through the vehicle of 
[the CRA]." Thus, according to defendant, there is no stand­
alone claim for constitutional relief.  
9  
 
 
 
the trial court's decision granting summary disposition to  
defendant.  Finally, he raised it in the Court of Appeals.  
Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged the issue.  
The problem with the analyses of both the trial court and the  
Court of Appeals is that the lower courts apparently assumed  
that 
§ 
210 
alone 
resolved 
plaintiff’s 
constitutional  
challenge.  
Hence, we find that plaintiff pleaded and pursued his  
constitutional theory sufficiently to provide notice to  
defendant of the claims against which it would have to defend.  
Having preserved the issue, plaintiff is entitled to be heard  
on his claim for injunctive relief.  
The dissent’s conclusion that plaintiff’s constitutional  
challenge is barred fails to appreciate that the safe harbor  
provided by § 210 necessarily extends only to statutory claims  
under the CRA.  There is simply no requirement that a  
plaintiff proceed through a statutory vehicle in order to seek  
declaratory or injunctive relief against an alleged violation  
of the state Equal Protection Clause.  While the second  
sentence 
of 
art 
1, 
§ 
2 
commits 
its 
affirmative  
“implementation” to the Legislature,12 the first sentence of  
this 
constitutional 
provision 
commands 
that 
“[n]o 
person 
shall  
12  For this reason, we hold today in Lewis, supra, that  
we do not have authority to grant money damages or other 
compensatory relief for past violations of art 1, § 2.  
10  
 
 
be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any  
person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political  
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof  
because of religion, race, color, or national origin.”  The  
duty imposed on the Legislature by the second sentence of  
art 1, § 2 to implement art 1, § 2 is not a power to  
ultimately define the substantive meaning of the first  
sentence.  Accordingly, while the state judiciary cannot  
positively implement art 1, § 2, the judiciary has the  
legitimate authority, in the exercise of the well-established  
duty of judicial review, to evaluate governmental action to  
determine if it is consistent with the equal protection  
guarantees of the first sentence of art 1, § 2 and to  
invalidate such action if it is not.  In short, art 1, § 2  
commands the Legislature to adopt measures to practically  
implement 
its 
equal 
protection 
guarantees. 
This  
“implementation” language does not mean that state and local  
governmental entities are free to violate the substantive  
equal protection guarantees of art 1, § 2 merely because the  
Legislature has failed to address a particular type of  
violation.  
Our dissenting colleague relies heavily on an analogy to  
federal law, particularly United States Supreme Court  
decisions related to employment discrimination claims against  
the federal government.  The dissent portrays this case law as  
11  
 
indicating that title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act  
(“title VII”) provides the exclusive remedy for employment  
discrimination by the federal government.  From this, the  
dissent argues in essence that state statutes should be held  
to provide the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination  
claims against state or local government actors under state  
law. As the dissent forthrightly acknowledges, this federal  
case law can only be persuasive authority, not binding  
precedent, in resolving the present case, which involves only  
questions of state law. We consider the dissent’s attempted  
analogy to federal law to be unpersuasive.  
The dissent analogizes the present case to Brown v  
General Services Administration, 425 US 820; 96 S Ct 1961; 48  
L Ed 2d 402 (1976). In particular, our dissenting colleague  
relies on language in Brown “that § 717 of the Civil Rights  
Act of 1964, as amended, provides the exclusive judicial  
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.”  
Brown, supra at 835. However, as the dissent acknowledges,  
the claims in Brown were all statutory. Post at 9. Thus, at  
most, Brown can only stand for the proposition that the Civil  
Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive statutory remedy for  
discrimination 
in 
employment 
by 
the 
federal 
government 
because  
Brown did not involve a constitutional issue.  Moreover, Brown  
stated that even before the extension of title VII in 1972 to  
12  
 
 
cover federal employees “an action seeking to enjoin  
unconstitutional agency conduct would lie . . . .”  Id. at  
826.  Accordingly, consistent with our holding in the present  
case, Brown accepted as an established principle that a party  
could 
seek 
injunctive 
relief 
against 
unconstitutional  
governmental action.  
The 
dissent 
also contends that, in Great American Savings  
& Loan Ass’n v Novotny, 442 US 366; 99 S Ct 2345; 60 L Ed 2d  
957 (1979), the United States Supreme Court “made clear that  
Brown’s reasoning extended to encompass the notion that title  
VII preempts constitutionally based claims as well.”  Post at  
9.  We disagree because Novotny, a case with only private  
parties as litigants, did not involve any constitutional  
claim.
 In Novotny, the male plaintiff alleged that he  
suffered 
unlawful 
employment 
discrimination 
because 
he 
opposed  
his former employer’s practice of discriminating against  
female employees on the basis of sex in violation of the  
“anti-retaliation” provision of title VII prohibiting an  
employer from discriminating against an employee for opposing  
a violation of title VII.  In pertinent part, the plaintiff in  
Novotny attempted to bring suit against that employer and its  
directors under 42 USC 1985(3). Essentially, 42 USC 1985(3)  
was the modern codification of a Reconstruction Era civil  
rights statute that generally provided a private cause of  
13  
action against certain conspiracies to violate federally  
protected rights. The Novotny Court noted its concern that,  
if a violation of title VII could be asserted through this  
other statute, many of the provisions of title VII would be  
avoided.  Accordingly, the Novotny Court declined to allow  
such a cause of action.  
We 
consider 
the 
dissent’s effort to analogize the present  
case to Novotny unpersuasive for two critical reasons. First,  
inasmuch as Novotny did not involve a governmental defendant,  
it did not involve any constitutional claim of violation of  
the equal protection guarantees of the United States  
Constitution.  
Second, the plaintiff in Novotny was attempting  
to redress conduct that was prohibited by title VII through  
another, 
more 
generalized, federal statute, and his claim that  
title VII was violated was an essential aspect of his claim.  
In contrast, while the present plaintiff cannot proceed under  
the CRA because of the safe harbor provided by § 210, that  
does not mean that he cannot claim that the conduct at issue  
by the city of Lansing is violative of the state Equal  
Protection Clause.  Thus, Novotny is simply inapposite to  
whether injunctive relief is available against governmental  
action that is unconstitutional if it is claimed that action  
violates the constitutional equal protection guarantees.  
The dissent further cites Davis v Passman, 442 US 228; 99  
S Ct 2264; 60 L Ed 2d 846 (1979), in support of its discussion  
14  
 
  
 
 
of plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  Post at 7. However, we  
believe that Davis actually supports our analysis.  In Davis,  
a female employee of a member of congress was informed by him  
in a letter that she was removed from her position because he  
concluded that it was “essential” that the position be held by  
a man. 
At that time, congressional employees like the  
petitioner in Davis were not protected from employment  
discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See  
id. at 247 (“[w]hen § 717 was added to title VII to protect  
federal employees from discrimination, it failed to extend  
this protection to congressional employees such as petitioner  
who are not in the competitive service”). The United States  
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in Passman could bring  
a cause of action directly under the Due Process Clause of the  
Fifth Amendment on the basis of sex discrimination in  
violation of its equal protection component. Id. at 242-244.  
Properly 
understood 
then, 
Davis 
supports 
our 
treatment 
of  
the constitutional claim in the present case. The plaintiff  
in Davis was unable to seek relief under the generally  
applicable federal statute against employment discrimination  
because, as a congressional employee, she was not covered by  
that statute.  Similarly, because of § 210, the state CRA  
provides no recourse for a person who alleges that conduct by  
a 
governmental 
employer pursuant to an affirmative action plan  
15  
 
 
 
properly approved under § 210 constitutes unconstitutional  
employment discrimination in violation of art 1, § 2.  In  
effect, a person who may have suffered unconstitutional  
employment discrimination under such a plan, assuming it is  
adopted 
and 
approved, 
is 
not 
covered 
by 
the 
CRA.  
Nevertheless, as in Davis, such a person is able to directly  
challenge the alleged constitutional violation.13  Indeed, the  
Davis Court expressly stated that “this Court has already  
settled that a cause of action may be implied directly under  
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of  
the Fifth Amendment in favor of those who seek to enforce this  
constitutional right.”  Davis, supra at 242. In support of  
this principle, the Court referred to Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US  
497; 74 S Ct 693; 98 L Ed 884 (1954), in which the Court held  
that 
“equitable 
relief” 
was 
available 
to 
plaintiffs  
challenging racial segregation in the District of Columbia  
schools as violative of the Fifth Amendment.  See Davis, supra  
at 242-243. As the Davis Court noted, the action in Bolling  
was predicated directly on the Fifth Amendment. Davis, supra  
13  Of course, the type of relief that is directly 
available for a violation of art 1, § 2 is different from the 
action for money damages against the federal government 
available under Davis.  As we have discussed above, this  
Court’s holding today in Lewis, supra, makes clear that there  
is no cause of action for money damages arising directly under 
art 1, § 2.  Rather, a plaintiff may seek injunctive or  
declaratory 
relief 
against 
the 
alleged 
constitutional  
violation.  
16  
 
 
  
at 243.  Thus, Bolling and Davis support a conclusion that  
injunctive relief is available to end a constitutional  
violation without the need for any type of implementing  
statute.14  
The United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v  
Robinson, 468 US 992; 104 S Ct 3457; 82 L Ed 2d 746 (1984),  
also fails to support Justice Kelly’s view that plaintiff may  
not directly seek injunctive relief under the Michigan  
Constitution. Smith involved claims that a handicapped child  
was denied a “free appropriate public education” in violation  
of, in pertinent part, the federal Education of the  
Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 USC 1400 et seq., and the federal  
Equal Protection Clause.  Smith, supra at 994-995. 
The  
pertinent issue in Smith was whether the petitioners could  
recover attorney fees under 42 USC 1988, which generally  
allowed such a recovery in favor of plaintiffs seeking to  
enforce federal constitutional rights when the specifically  
applicable EHA, as then in effect, made no provision for  
awarding attorney fees.  The Court concluded that attorney  
14 The dissent misapprehends our consideration of Bolling 
in stating that our use of that case “to predict the effects 
of a legislative act in 1972 evidences a remarkable twist of 
the laws of time and space.” Post at 24, n 25.  We do not in  
any way rely on Bolling as indicating the intent of Congress 
in making any amendments to title VII in 1972.  Rather, we  
rely on Bolling as indicating that a court may directly grant 
injunctive relief against a constitutional violation without 
regard to the content of any statute.  
17  
fees could not be awarded under 42 USC 1988, because Congress  
“intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a  
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly  
financed special education.” 
Smith, supra at 1009.  
Accordingly, the issue involved in Smith was actually one of  
statutory construction or application, not of federal  
constitutional law.  Thus, Smith does not support a view that  
a 
statute 
may 
preclude 
injunctive 
relief 
to 
end 
a  
constitutional violation.  
Moreover, the Smith Court stated “where the EHA is  
available to a handicapped child asserting a right to a free  
appropriate public education, based either on the EHA or on  
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the  
EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his  
parents or guardian can pursue their claim.”  Smith, supra at  
1013 (emphasis added).  At the very most, this can only  
reasonably be taken to support the view that, if a statutory  
remedy is available for an alleged constitutional violation,  
a party may be required to seek to a remedy that alleged  
constitutional violation through the procedures provided by  
the statute. However, as we have discussed above, plaintiff  
cannot challenge the alleged unconstitutional discrimination  
by defendant in this case under the CRA because of the  
immunity provided by § 210 of the CRA. Accordingly, because  
the CRA is not available to plaintiff, Smith provides no  
18  
 
 
  
support for a contention that plaintiff may not directly seek  
injunctive relief under the Michigan Constitution.  
Indeed, the Smith Court expressly stated:  
There is no issue here of Congress’ ability to 
preclude the federal courts from granting a remedy 
for a constitutional deprivation. Even if Congress 
repealed all statutory remedies for constitutional 
violations, the power of federal courts to grant 
the 
relief 
necessary 
to 
protect 
against 
constitutional deprivations or to remedy the wrong 
done is presumed to be available in cases within 
their jurisdiction. [Smith, supra at 1012, n 15.]  
This language makes clear that the United States Supreme Court  
in Smith did not regard the legislative branch as having the  
power through a statute to foreclose the ability of the  
judicial 
branch 
to 
order 
an 
end 
to 
constitutional 
violations.15  
Our dissenting colleague also attempts to analogize the  
present case to a large number of lower federal court  
decisions, see post at 16-17, in support of her position with  
regard 
to 
plaintiff’s 
constitutional 
claim, 
while 
forthrightly  
acknowledging that “[s]ome federal circuits have held that  
title VII does not necessarily provide the only remedy  
available for employment discrimination claims.” Post at 16,  
15 Consistent with our holding today in Lewis, supra, we  
reiterate that judicial authority under the state Equal 
Protection Clause is limited to providing injunctive or 
declaratory relief to nullify unconstitutional legislation or 
otherwise stop a recurring violation of the state Equal 
Protection Clause.  As discussed in Lewis, because of the  
language of the state Equal Protection Clause, any provision 
for compensatory relief or similar measures to positively 
implement the clause requires legislative action.  
19  
 
 
n 23.  Given that we have already explained why we find the  
United States Supreme Court decisions on which the dissent  
relies inapposite and that federal law can at most be  
persuasive, not binding, authority in resolving the state law  
questions involved in the present case, we will not burden  
readers of this opinion with a further discussion of case law  
from the lower federal courts.  
We note that the dissent indicates that it would not  
allow plaintiff to pursue “parallel constitutional claims to  
remedy wrongs cognizable under the CRA,” post at 28, which, in  
plain language, means that a discrimination plaintiff cannot  
say, as this one effectively has, “I do not claim that the  
statute is unconstitutional.  I only claim the way the statute  
was 
used, 
or 
applied, 
is 
discriminatory 
and, 
thus,  
unconstitutional action has been engaged in by the state.”  
In challenging such conduct as nevertheless constituting a  
violation of art 1, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution,  
plaintiff is not asserting a claim that is “parallel” to an  
alleged violation of the CRA, but rather is seeking to  
invalidate conduct that is allegedly prohibited by the  
Michigan Constitution even though it does not violate the act.  
Said plainly, the unsettling position of the dissent is that,  
if the state actor (i.e., the city of Lansing in this case),  
commits ongoing employment discrimination that violates the  
state 
Equal 
Protection Clause, without also violating the CRA,  
20  
the courts, when petitioned by the employee, have no ability  
to put an end to the unconstitutional discrimination.  In an  
era in which one of the noble contributions of the state and  
federal courts has been to give citizens aid against  
discrimination, this is a startling proposition.  
Our dissenting colleague also indicates that “the  
language of the [CRA], case law, and the legislative record  
persuasively support the proposition that our Legislature  
intended the [act] to be the sole remedy for state employment  
discrimination claims in Michigan.”  Post at 20. While the  
accuracy of this assertion may well be debatable, it is also  
irrelevant 
because 
it is axiomatic that the Legislature cannot  
grant a license to state and local governmental actors to  
violate the Michigan Constitution.
 In other words, the  
Legislature cannot so “trump” the Michigan Constitution.  
Indeed, the ultimate import of the dissent is that, at  
least in the present context, a party cannot challenge  
discriminatory acts by a state actor in connection with its  
application 
or 
use 
of 
a 
statute 
as 
constituting  
unconstitutional 
discrimination 
under 
the 
state 
Equal  
Protection Clause—at least one cannot do so without also  
attacking the validity of the underlying statute.  This is  
profoundly misbegotten because the power of judicial review  
does 
not 
extend 
only 
to 
invalidating 
unconstitutional 
statutes  
or other legislative enactments, but also to declaring other  
21  
 
  
governmental action invalid if it violates the state or  
federal constitution.  
That judicial review of governmental action for its  
constitutionality 
extends 
to 
governmental 
action 
in 
connection  
with applying a statute, without requiring a review of the  
underlying statute itself, is reflected in both modern and  
historic United States Supreme Court precedent. In Batson v  
Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986),  
the Court held that the federal Equal Protection Clause  
forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to  
remove potential jurors on the basis of their race.  The  
Batson 
Court 
did 
not 
address whether the underlying provisions  
of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure that allow a  
prosecutor to use peremptory challenges, see id. at 83, n 2,  
were unconstitutional, or in any way suggest that they were.  
In fact, the Court observed that it “has found a denial of  
equal protection where the procedures implementing a neutral  
statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial  
grounds.” 
Id. at 88. 
Likewise, in the present case, the  
courts may review whether acts undertaken by the city of  
Lansing pursuant to its affirmative action plan, which was  
approved by the Civil Rights Commission under § 210, are  
violative of the state Equal Protection Clause without any  
need 
for 
plaintiff 
to 
challenge 
§ 
210 
itself 
as  
unconstitutional.  
22  
  
  
Moreover, this is not new law.  One need only refer to  
the venerable, and celebrated, precedent of Yick Wo v Hopkins,  
118 US 356; 6 S Ct 1064; 30 L Ed 220 (1886), to understand  
this. 
Yick Wo involved two petitioners who were Chinese  
citizens and who were imprisoned upon convictions for  
violating a San Francisco ordinance that required a person to  
obtain the consent of the local board of supervisors to run a  
laundry business in a location other than a brick or stone  
building.  Such consent was denied the petitioners and “200  
others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be  
Chinese 
subjects, 
[while] 80 others, not Chinese subjects, are  
permitted to carry on the same business under similar  
conditions.” 
Id. at 374. 
In light of this obvious  
discrimination, 
the 
Court 
considered 
the 
conclusion  
irresistible that the distinction was due to “hostility to the  
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the Court held, without invalidating the San  
Francisco ordinance, that the discrimination was violative of  
the federal Equal Protection Clause and ordered the release of  
the petitioners.  Id.  Of particular note in the present case,  
the Court in Yick Wo stated:  
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and 
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make 
unjust and illegal discrimination between persons  
23  
 
 
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, 
the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the constitution. [Id. at 373-374.]  
Consistent with this recognition, it is axiomatic, and has  
been for over a century, that the plaintiff here may challenge  
the particular “application” of § 210 by defendant in  
connection with defendant’s affirmative action policies  
without asserting (or considering) whether § 210 is  
constitutional.  
We note that our decision in this case certainly does not  
deny substantial practical effect to § 210 of the CRA.16  
Indeed, we have held that plaintiff’s statutory claim under  
the Civil Rights Act (and with it the possibility of  
recovering money damages or other compensatory relief) is  
barred by § 210.  Further, plaintiff is able to bring a  
constitutional claim under art 1, § 2 because the present  
defendant, as a governmental entity, is directly bound to obey  
the equal protection guarantees of this constitutional  
provision.  At least generally, that would not be the case  
with regard to a private employer that uses an affirmative  
action plan properly approved by the Civil Rights Commission  
under § 210.  See Woodland v Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich  
188, 205; 378 NW2d 337 (1985) (“The Michigan Constitution’s  
Declaration of Rights provisions have never been interpreted  
16  We note that the present case does not involve a 
challenge to the constitutionality of § 210.  
24  
as extending to purely private conduct; these provisions have  
consistently 
been 
interpreted 
as 
limited 
to 
protection 
against  
state action”); Harvey v Aetna Life Ins Co, 72 Mich App 285,  
287; 252 NW2d 471 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection  
Clause applies “to actions of the state and not to private  
conduct”). Obviously, nothing in this opinion would prevent  
such a private employer from relying on § 210 as a bar to an  
employment discrimination claim under the CRA.  
Ultimately, the dissent would create a special rule for  
claims of employment discrimination in violation of art 1, §  
2 (or at least for such claims in the affirmative action  
context) 
that 
would 
preclude a plaintiff from directly seeking  
injunctive or declaratory relief against governmental action  
as being violative of this constitutional provision.  Rather,  
such a plaintiff would, if the dissent’s view were to prevail,  
either have to first establish a statutory violation or argue  
that a state statute is unconstitutional in order to directly  
challenge the alleged constitutional violation.  We see no  
appropriate basis for imposing such a heightened duty in this  
context.  
III  
CONCLUSION  
We conclude that § 210 bars statutory liability under the  
CRA for employment discrimination where an employer acts in  
accordance with an affirmative action plan properly approved  
25  
 
 
by the commission. The decisions of the trial court and the  
Court of Appeals dismissing plaintiff's CRA claims are  
affirmed.  
The existence of the safe harbor does not abrogate rights  
guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan  
Constitution.
 We hold that the trial court erred by  
dismissing plaintiff's constitutional claim for injunctive  
relief.  Moreover, plaintiff has preserved this claim for  
appellate review.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision on  
the constitutional claim is reversed and the case is remanded  
to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff's prayer for  
injunctive relief under art 1, § 2.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,  
concurred.  
26  
 
 
                                          
 
   
   
    
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
DAVID SHARP,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 116171  
CITY OF LANSING,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I  
agree that § 210 shields a public employer with an affirmative  
action plan properly approved by the Civil Rights Commission  
from liability under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL  
37.2101 et seq., but not necessarily from liability under the  
Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const  
1963, art 1, § 2. Cf., however, Lewis v Michigan, 464 Mich  
; 
NW2d 
(2001).  Furthermore, I agree with the  
analysis set forth by the majority in reaching this  
conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
However, I write separately to observe that, in order for  
an affirmative action plan to be properly approved by the  
Civil Rights Commission, it must comply fully with the  
requirements set forth in § 210.  Section 210's safe harbor  
encompasses only affirmative action plans that are “adopt[ed]  
and carr[ied] out . . . to eliminate present effects of past  
discriminatory practices or assure equal opportunity . . . .”  
MCL 37.2210. Therefore, where the commission fails to apply  
these standards in its examination of an affirmative action  
plan, the plan has not been properly approved by the  
commission.1  
Because 
plaintiff has not preserved the issue whether the  
commission complied with the requirements of § 210 when it  
1 In observing that “a complainant could challenge the 
commission’s approval of an affirmative action plan, arguing 
that the plan fails to conform to criteria required by the CRA 
for approval,” post at 30, the dissent apparently does not 
disagree with this proposition.  However, the dissent asserts 
that my “sweeping interpretation, if accurate, would render 
the safe-harbor provision unworkable.” Post at 31, n 30. I  
have difficulty understanding why my view is a “sweeping 
interpretation,” when I am merely quoting verbatim the  
statutory language, i.e., “[a] person subject to this article 
may adopt and carry out a plan to eliminate present effects of 
past discriminatory practices or assure equal opportunity . 
. . .”  MCL 37.2210. I agree with the dissent that the “safe 
harbor does not protect only those plans that succeed in  
eliminating present effects of past discrimination.”  Id.  
(emphasis added).  Rather, the safe harbor protects all 
properly approved plans that are “adopt[ed] and carr[ied] out 
. . . to eliminate present effects of past discriminatory 
practices or assure equal opportunity . . .”—but only such  
plans.  
2  
 
 
 
 
  
approved defendant’s affirmative action plan, the majority  
does not address this issue.  This silence, however, should  
not mislead some to believe that the commission possesses  
plenary authority to shield from liability any affirmative  
action plan.  Rather, the commission is confined, not only by  
the requirements of the constitution, but also by the  
requirements of § 210 itself.  To reiterate, under § 210, the  
commission only has the authority to approve, and thus to  
shield from liability under the Civil Rights Act, affirmative  
action plans that are “adopt[ed] and carr[ied] out . . . to  
eliminate present effects of past discriminatory practices or  
assure equal opportunity . . . .”2 
Id.  
2 The significance of this unremarkable observation—that 
the language of § 210 means what it says—arises largely in the 
event that the constitutionality of § 210 is ultimately 
sustained, in particular, if predicated upon the premise that 
what would otherwise be unconstitutional, i.e., a hiring plan 
allowing 
the 
government-as-employer 
to 
treat 
persons 
differently on account of religion, race, color, or national 
origin, is made constitutional by virtue of the standards set 
forth for affording an affirmative action plan a “safe 
harbor.”  See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 519; 117 S 
Ct 2157; 138 L Ed 2d 624 (1997)(“Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.  It has  
been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.  Were it not so, 
what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any 
meaningful 
sense, 
the 
‘provisions 
of 
the 
Fourteenth  
Amendment.’”); Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177; 2 
L Ed 60 (1803).  
3  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
DAVID SHARP,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116171  
CITY OF LANSING,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I agree with the majority that the safe-harbor provision1  
of the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA)2 bars statutory  
liability under the CRA where an employer acts in conformity  
with an approved affirmative action plan. I also agree that  
the mere existence of the safe harbor does not abrogate rights  
generally guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the  
Michigan Constitution.3  However, I cannot agree that acts of  
an employer that are protected by the safe harbor are subject  
1MCL 37.2210.  
2MCL 37.2101 et seq.  
3Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
 
 
  
 
to an equal protection challenge pursued directly under art 1,  
§ 2.  Accordingly, because I believe that our Legislature  
intended the CRA to provide the exclusive remedy for public  
employment discrimination claims within the act's purview, I  
register my dissent.  
Our constitution protects against discrimination at the  
hands of state actors by declaring that "[n]o person shall be  
denied the equal protection of the laws . . . . The  
legislature shall implement this section by appropriate  
legislation." Const 1963, art 1, § 2 (emphasis added).  We are  
bound to interpret these words in a manner that gives  
sufficient effect to the "law the people have made." People  
v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 119; 587 NW2d 1 (1998). 
The  
starting point for ascertaining the meaning of words used in  
the constitution is to interpret them according to their plain  
and ordinary meaning as understood by the people who adopted  
them. Bond v Ann Arbor School Dist, 383 Mich 693, 699; 178  
NW2d 484 (1970).  
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1961  
The reference to equal protection "of the laws," found in  
both 
the 
state 
and 
federal constitutions, suggests a safeguard  
against the formation and execution of laws or legislative  
classification schemes that operate unequally.  It is well  
settled that the equal protection guarantee is not a source of  
2  
substantive rights or liberties; rather, it is a measure of a  
constitution's 
tolerance 
of 
government 
classification 
schemes.  
Doe v Dep't of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 661; 487 NW2d  
166 (1992), citing San Antonio Ind School Dist v Rodriguez,  
411 US 1, 24; 93 S Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973).  
It 
seems 
likely 
from the convention record that delegates  
at the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961 had this  
principle firmly in mind as they formed art 1, § 2. Delegates  
from both political parties viewed the proposed equal  
protection clause as a general statement of Michigan's  
policies and goals with respect to public discrimination.  
Drafters of art 1, § 2, envisioned legislators, not  
constitutional delegates, as the authorities vested with the  
power to implement those goals.  James K. Pollock, Republican  
chairman of the Committee on Rights, Suffrage, and Elections  
for the 1961 convention, observed the following as he  
presented his committee's proposed equal protection clause to  
the delegation:  
We felt that, in the event we wanted to have a 
specific nondiscrimination clause, it would be 
better to state as a general policy of the  
constitution that there shall be no discrimination  
based on race, religion or national origin in the 
enjoyment of political or civil rights, and that  
the legislature should have the power to enforce  
this by appropriate legislation. [2 Official Record 
Constitutional 
Convention 
1961, 
pp 
741-742  
(emphasis added).]  
3  
  
 
To 
be 
sure, 
Delegate Harold Norris, a Democrat, expressed  
agreement with this basic principle of legislative delegation  
despite 
his 
disagreement 
with 
other 
aspects 
of 
the  
recommendation tendered by Pollock's committee. Professor  
Norris described the constitution as "a statement of goals and  
not a detailing of means."  Id. at 742.  Don Binkowski,  
another Democratic delegate on the Pollock committee,  
characterized the constitution as a guiding document that  
"must point the way" by providing a "strong, resolute and bold  
restatement of the principles on which this country has been  
founded." 
Id. at 746.  He concluded his remarks to the  
delegation by observing "[i]t is up to you to include in the  
new constitution the statement of an individual's rights to  
equal protection of the law . . . and to provide for  
legislative implementation of these principles." Id.4  
II. TITLE VII  
We 
have 
long 
recognized 
that 
federal 
courts'  
interpretations of the law under circumstances analogous to  
those before us on review are highly persuasive although not  
4See also Cramton, The powers of the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission, 63 Mich L R 5, 13 (1964) ("[Under art 1, § 
2,] the legislature is empowered to create and define the 
'civil rights' that it feels are deserving of protection. The 
nature and scope of these rights, and the remedies available 
for their violation, are left to legislative judgment."); 
Smith v Dep't of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 632; 410 NW2d 
749 (1987)(Brickley, J.).  
4  
 
 
 
necessarily binding on us. Continental Motors v Muskegon Twp,  
365 Mich 191, 194; 112 NW2d 429 (1961). See, e.g., State Bd  
of Ed v Houghton Schs, 430 Mich 658; 425 NW2d 80 (1988).  
There is no question that legislative bodies generally  
possess the power to enact detailed, comprehensive remedial  
legislation that preempts parallel claims brought directly  
under a constitution.  The United States Supreme Court  
expressly recognized this fact in Smith v Robinson5, where it  
observed:  
In light of the comprehensive nature of the 
procedures and guarantees set out in the [Education 
of the Handicapped Act] and Congress' express 
efforts to place on local and state educational 
agencies the primary responsibility for developing 
a plan to accommodate the needs of each individual 
handicapped child, we find it difficult to believe 
that Congress also meant to leave undisturbed the 
ability of a handicapped child to go directly to 
court with an equal protection claim to a free 
appropriate public education. Not only would such a 
result render superfluous most of the detailed 
procedural protections outlined in the statute, 
but, more important, it would also run counter to 
Congress' view that the needs of handicapped 
children are best accommodated by having the  
parents and the local education agency work  
together to formulate an individualized plan for 
each handicapped child's education. No federal 
district court presented with a constitutional 
claim to a public education can duplicate that 
process.  
The Smith Court held that the Education of the  
Handicapped Act (EA) provided the exclusive avenue through  
5468 US 992, 1011-1012; 104 S Ct 3457; 82 L Ed 2d 746 
(1984).  
5  
which the plaintiffs could assert an equal protection claim  
for publicly funded special education.6  Justice Blackmun  
recognized the possibility that broadly drafted legislation  
could preempt an entire field of substantive law. The Supreme  
Court further acknowledged that a comprehensive remedial act,  
such as the EA, will rightfully preclude the availability of  
parallel constitutional claims because such duplication would  
undermine the thoroughness of the statutory scheme.  
I find highly persuasive here the reasoning employed by  
the United States Supreme Court in Smith. It is the same  
rationale that backed the Court's earlier holdings that  
6The statute was later amended by Congress to allow 
statutory and constitutional claims in tandem. Nevertheless, 
the reasoning of Smith still stands for the proposition that 
a comprehensive remedial scheme will preclude parallel  
constitutional claims. See Zombro v Baltimore Police Dep't, 
868 F2d 1364, 1368 (CA 4, 1989)(using Smith for the  
proposition 
that 
"[t]he 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
similarly 
demonstrated a disinclination to entertain § 1983 actions in 
which plaintiffs have bypassed a comprehensive statutory 
remedy in favor of a § 1983 claim predicated on an alleged 
constitutional violation"); Mattoon v City of Pittsfield, 980 
F2d 1, 6 (CA 1, 1992)(relying on Smith for the conclusion that  
"even assuming a 'fundamental constitutional right' to safe 
public drinking water, it would not alter the present 
analysis. 
Comprehensive 
federal 
statutory 
schemes, 
such 
as 
the 
[Safe Drinking Water Act], preclude rights of action under § 
1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights in the 
field occupied by the federal statutory scheme"); Pfeiffer by  
Pfeiffer v Marion Center Area Sch Dist, 917 F2d 779, 789 (CA 
3, 1990)(holding that Smith is part of a consistent  
application by the Supreme Court of the doctrine that a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme will preclude parallel  
constitutional claims).  
6  
 
 
Congress intended title VII7 to provide the exclusive judicial  
remedy for discrimination claims in the federal employment  
sector. See Brown v General Services Administration;8 Great  
American Fed S & L Ass'n v Novotny9; Davis v Passman.10  
Brown involved an African-American federal government  
employee who claimed that the General Services Administration  
(GSA) had racially discriminated against him by failing to  
promote him to a higher grade.  He filed a complaint with the  
GSA, then appealed to the federal Civil Service Commission,  
both of which ruled against him. He then appealed from the  
commission decision to a federal district court.  The suit  
alleged jurisdiction under title VII as amended by the Equal  
Employment 
Opportunity 
Act 
of 
1972,11 
the 
general  
federal-question statute,12 the declaratory judgment act13 and  
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended.14  The district court  
742 USC 2000e et seq. (This was the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. References to § 717 and § 717a are to that act. Many 
courts refer to the section numbers from that act.)  
8425 US 820, 835; 96 S Ct 1961; 48 L Ed 2d 402 (1976).  
9442 US 366; 99 S Ct 2345; 60 L Ed 2d 957 (1979).  
10442 US 228; 99 S Ct 2264; 60 L Ed 2d 846 (1979).  
1142 USC 2000e et seq.  
1228 USC 1331.  
1328 USC 2201-2202.  
1442 USC 1981.  
7  
 
dismissed the entire action for failure to conform to the  
procedural requirements of § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of  
1964.15  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Brown v General  
Services Administration, 507 F2d 1300 (CA 2, 1974).  
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court engaged in a  
detailed review of the legislative history underlying the  
enactment of the 1972 amendments to title VII.  It noted that  
comprehensive administrative, judicial and remedial schemes  
have been included there.  It viewed the enactment of § 717 as  
clear evidence of what Congress intended when it passed the  
1972 title VII amendments.  It quoted extensively from  
committee reports and floor debates to ascertain the will of  
Congress, before concluding:  
This 
unambiguous 
congressional 
perception 
seems to indicate that the congressional intent in 
1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive 
administrative and judicial scheme for the redress 
of federal employment discrimination. [Brown, 425 
US 828-829.]  
Brown denounced the idea that circuitous pleading might  
enable a party to avoid the preemptive scheme set forth in  
title VII.  It observed that an attempt to circumvent the  
command of title VII would defeat Congress' purpose of  
amending the statute in 1972.  
1542 USC 2000e-16 (title VII), as amended in 1972.  
8  
 
The crucial administrative role that each  
agency together with the Civil Service Commission 
was given by Congress in the eradication of  
employment discrimination would be eliminated "by 
the simple expedient of putting a different label 
on 
(the) 
pleadings." 
It 
would 
require 
the  
suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the 
design to allow its careful and thorough remedial 
scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading. 
[Brown, 425 US 833, quoting Preiser v Rodriguez, 
411 US 475, 489-490; 93 S Ct 1827; 36 L Ed 2d 439 
(1973).]  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's  
other statutory claims were preempted by title VII. It  
affirmed the lower courts and held:  
[T]he established principle [found in Preiser] 
leads unerringly to the conclusion that § 717 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides 
the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of  
discrimination in federal employment. [Brown, 425 
US 835.]  
Though the remedies sought in Brown were all statutory,  
its holding was broader and unqualified. In Novotny, supra,  
the Supreme Court made clear that Brown's reasoning extended  
to 
encompass 
the 
notion 
that 
title 
VII 
preempts  
constitutionally based claims as well.  Novotny brought an  
equal protection claim through the vehicle of § 1985(3),16 and  
an 
action 
under 
§ 
704(a),17 
the 
retaliatory 
discharge 
provision  
of title VII.  The Novotny Court relied on the principles set  
forth in Brown to hold that title VII foreclosed plaintiff's  
1642 USC 1985(3).  
1742 USC 2000e-3(a).  
9  
 
equal protection claim. It recognized that the availability  
of parallel constitutional relief, under these circumstances,  
would dramatically undercut the effectiveness of title VII.  
Comparing Novotny to Brown, the Supreme Court stated:  
Here, the case is even more compelling.  In  
Brown, the Court concluded that § 717 displaced 
other causes of action arguably available to assert 
substantive rights similar to those granted by § 
717.
 Section 1985(3), by contrast, creates no  
rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing 
a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined  
federal right-
-
-to equal protection of the laws or 
equal privileges and immunities under the laws-
-
-is  
breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by 
the section.  Thus, we are not faced in this case 
with a question of implied repeal. 
The right 
Novotny claims under § 704(a) did not even arguably 
exist before the passage of Title VII.  The only 
question here, therefore, is whether the rights 
created by Title VII may be asserted within the 
remedial framework of § 1985(3). [Novotny, supra at  
376.]  
The 
Supreme 
Court answered this question in the negative.  
Applying 
Brown's 
holding 
broadly,18 
it 
observed 
that  
18The majority opinion relies on Davis, supra for the  
proposition that a constitutional claim can proceed where a 
plaintiff is not covered by title VII. This is accurate. 
However, in analogizing the specific facts of Davis to this  
case, the majority overlooks the distinction that the claim at 
issue in Davis did not fall under the umbrella of title VII.  
The plaintiff there, by virtue of her status as a  
congressional employee, was not eligible for coverage under 
title VII. Thus, her ability to pursue a constitutional remedy 
would not undercut title VII's remedial scheme. Indeed, the 
Davis Court reaffirmed Brown's exclusivity principle.  
By 
contrast, 
this case involves an individual, Mr. Sharp, 
who is protected by the applicable legislation, the CRA. He is 
not barred by having a status that renders him outside the 
(continued...)  
10  
 
restricting the plaintiff to an action under title VII was the  
only way to preserve the integrity of title VII's remedial  
scheme. 
Notwithstanding 
Novotny's 
broad 
constitutional 
claims,  
the Supreme Court continued:  
If a violation of Title VII could be asserted  
through § 1985(3) [in the form of a constitutional 
claim], a complainant could avoid most if not all 
of these detailed and specific provisions of the 
law. . . . Perhaps most importantly, the complaint 
could completely bypass the administrative process, 
which plays such a crucial role in the scheme 
established by Congress in Title VII.  [Id. at 375­
376.]  
The majority responds that Novotny "did not involve any  
constitutional claim[s]" and therefore does not aid us in  
determining whether a statute can ever preempt a claim brought  
directly under the constitution.19  My colleagues acknowledge  
that Novotny brought a claim under § 1985(3), but ignore the  
underlying substantive posture of any action pursued through  
the vehicle of § 1985(3).  Although § 1985 is certainly a  
statute, it "creates no rights," the Novotny Court observes,  
and is thus activated only "when some otherwise defined  
federal right-
-
-to equal protection of the laws or equal  
18(...continued) 
scope of its contemplation. His inability to state a  
successful claim under the CRA does not place him in the same 
position as the plaintiff in Davis. Factually speaking, he 
more closely resembles the plaintiffs in Brown and Novotny, 
where the Supreme Court restricted access to alternative 
parallel remedies. Davis, supra at 247, n 26.  
19Slip op at 13.  
11  
 
  
 
privileges and immunities under the laws-
-
-is breached by a  
conspiracy in the manner defined by the section." Novotny,  
supra at 376. [Emphasis added.]  
Hence, § 1985 is a remedial vehicle to pursue the  
vindication of constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
The  
Novotny Court was unequivocal when it declared that a  
violation of rights contemplated under title VII could not be  
asserted through a § 1985(3) claim.  Id. at 375-376.  It  
opined that pursuit of such a remedy would enable a  
complainant to "avoid most if not all of [the] detailed and  
specific provisions of the law." Id. 
The majority is  
inaccurate in suggesting that using § 1985(3) to vindicate a  
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional 
right 
is 
substantively 
different  
than suing directly under the constitution.  
The majority uses its flawed analysis of Novotny as a  
springboard from which to leap to the general proposition that  
a legislative act can never "trump" the constitution.  Nowhere  
in Novotny can one locate the principle that the majority  
attributes to it.  Indeed, when the Supreme Court has  
addressed 
the 
subject 
of 
statutory 
preemption 
of  
constitutional 
remedies, 
it 
has 
reached 
the 
opposite  
conclusion.20  It cannot be accurately said that Novotny lends  
20See Smith v Robinson, n 6 supra, which lists federal 
cases that apply Smith in finding a statutory preemption of 
(continued...)  
12  
 
 
credence to the conclusion that a constitutional claim can  
never be preempted by statute.  
The majority is unpersuasive in its attempt to  
distinguish Smith v Robinson, the Supreme Court case that  
directly addresses the principle of statutory preemption of  
parallel constitutional claims.21
 As discussed above, the  
Smith Court held that a complainant's equal protection claim  
was preempted by a statute, the EA.  The majority reads Smith  
to mean only that "if a statutory remedy is available for an  
alleged constitutional violation, a party may be required to  
seek to remedy that alleged constitutional violation through  
procedures provided by the statute."  Slip op at 18-19. It  
then finds that Miss Smith's claims were covered by the EA.  
and that Smith is inapposite here.  
The flaw in its logic lies in its premise.  In Smith, the  
principle claim involved the right of a handicapped child to  
a free public education.  The claim that went to the United  
States Supreme Court was for attorney fees. Under the facts  
in Smith, the plaintiff was covered by the act and was unable  
20(...continued) 
constitutional claims.  
21The majority chooses not to "burden the readers of this 
opinion with a further discussion of case law from the lower 
federal courts," slip op at 17, but opts to ignore the 
considerable line of federal cases that have applied Smith to  
find statutory preemption of constitutional claims. See n 6.  
13  
 
to obtain attorney fees under an equal protection claim.  
Under the facts in Sharp, plaintiff was covered by the act and  
sought relief for various equal protection claims.  Hence, in  
each case a statutory remedy was available to and sought by  
the plaintiff and the plaintiff sought relief, as well, for  
the same alleged wrongs through a direct constitutional due  
process claim.  Consequently, Smith is pertinent and supports  
my conclusion that a comprehensive legislative scheme can  
preempt 
certain 
constitutional 
claims 
where 
the 
Legislature 
is  
authorized and intends to preempt an entire field of law.  
In attempting to distinguish the holding in Smith from  
the one I propose today, the majority points to a footnote in  
Smith. In it, the United States Supreme Court remarks that, if  
there 
were 
no 
statutory 
remedies 
for 
constitutional  
violations,  
the power of federal courts to grant the relief 
necessary 
to 
protect 
against 
constitutional  
deprivations or to remedy the wrong done is  
presumed to be available in cases within their 
jurisdiction. [Id. at 1012, n 15, quoted ante at  
19.]  
This observation has no bearing on what the Court in Smith  
actually did decide:  when the Legislature implements a  
comprehensive 
remedial 
scheme 
to 
rectify 
certain  
constitutional equal protection rights, the scheme will  
preempt parallel constitutional claims.  
14  
 
 
 
 
The footnote is dictum because the Smith Court found that  
Congress had implemented such a comprehensive remedial scheme  
in the EA.  Examined closely, the footnote stands only for the  
proposition that, absent a statutory scheme to remedy equal  
protection violations, courts can grant appropriate relief  
directly under the constitution.  
This goes precisely to my point. Indeed, if there were  
no title VII, or no EA, there certainly would exist a role for  
the courts in remedying the constitutional deprivations those  
statutes 
address. 
The 
courts, 
within 
jurisdictional  
limitations, would fill the void in legislation and right  
wrongs 
through 
claims 
brought 
directly 
under 
the 
constitution.  
Yet the fact that Congress did enact such legislation is  
thought 
to 
manifest 
dissatisfaction 
with 
existing 
remedies 
the  
courts were providing.  It is said to evidence a desire,  
instead, 
to 
replace 
unsuccessful 
solutions 
with 
a  
comprehensive scheme that preempts the field, including the  
very preexistent constitutional claims that warranted the  
legislation.  Hence, the holding of Smith is that the EA's  
legislative history leads to the conclusion that the act "is  
the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parent or  
guardian can pursue their claim." Id. at 1013.  
Therefore, 
despite 
the 
majority's 
unsubstantiated  
assertion that a statute cannot "trump" the constitution,  
15  
 
 
 
federal 
courts 
have 
long 
acknowledged 
the 
opposite 
principle.22  
Consistent with the logic working in Smith, these courts have  
applied Brown and Novotny to hold that title VII preempts  
constitutional equal protection claims that fall within the  
jurisdiction of the statute23. See, e.g., Ethnic Employees of  
the Library of Congress v Boorstin, 243 US App DC 186, 196;  
751 F2d 1405 (1985)(observing that "[a]llowing federal  
employees to recast their title VII claims as constitutional  
claims would clearly threaten those same policies"); Day v  
Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 749 F2d 1199, 1204-1205 (CA 6, 1984);  
Kizas v Webster, 227 US App DC 327, 345; 707 F2d 524 (1983)(a  
Fifth Amendment claim based upon race and sex discrimination  
22As stated in n 6, numerous federal cases have cited  
Smith as authority for making the type of ruling that the 
majority claims cannot be made.  
23Some federal circuits have held that title VII does not  
necessarily provide the only remedy available for employment 
discrimination claims. See, e.g., Beardsley v Webb, 30 F3d 
524, 527 (CA 4, 1994). However, many of these decisions dealt 
with claims arising from facts beyond the contemplation of 
title VII, such that recognizing them would not encroach upon 
the area defined by title VII.  
Even those circuits that have interpreted Brown narrowly 
have not, as the majority suggests, done so on the basis of 
any distinction between legal and equitable remedies. See, 
e.g., Annis v Westchester Co, 36 F3d 251 (CA 2, 1994); Notari  
v Denver Water Dep't, 971 F2d 585 (CA 10, 1992). Instead, most 
have so held on the basis that they disagree about the scope 
of coverage that Congress intended. The majority offers no 
case holding that it is beyond the inherent power of any 
legislative body to enact a statutory scheme that preempts 
parallel constitutional claims.  
16  
 
 
 
was barred by title VII); Purtill v Harris, 658 F2d 134, 137  
(CA 3, 1981)(relying on Brown to hold that the Age  
Discrimination in Employment Act, modeled after title VII,  
preempts judicial remedies based directly on the constitution  
for claims of age discrimination in federal employment);  
Lawrence v Staats, 214 US App DC 438, 439-441; 665 F2d 1256  
(1981) (a Fifth Amendment claim based on race discrimination  
would be barred if § 717 applied); Davis v Califano, 198 US  
App DC 224, 225, n 1; 613 F2d 957 (1979); Hofer v Campbell,  
189 US App DC 197, 200; 581 F2d 975 (1978)(a Fifth Amendment  
claim based on national origin discrimination was barred by  
title VII); Richardson v Wiley, 186 US App DC 309, 310; 569  
F2d 140 (1977); Gissen v Tackman, 537 F2d 784, 786 (CA 3,  
1976); Lutes v Goldin, 62 F Supp 2d 118 (D DC, 1999); Brug v  
Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, 45 F Supp 2d 33, 42 (D DC,  
1999); Clement v Motta, 820 F Supp 1035 (WD Mich, 1991).  
In Kizas, the United States Court of Appeals for the  
District of Columbia rejected a reverse discrimination claim  
brought by white clerical and support employees of the Federal  
Bureau of Investigation. 
The complainants alleged that  
including affirmative action principles in the qualifying  
process for special agents violated their Fifth Amendment  
constitutional right to equal protection as well as their  
statutory title VII rights.  The court concluded that the  
17  
plaintiffs' constitutional claim was "unavoidably foreclosed  
by [the] precedent" of Brown. Kizas, at 345. 
Their sole  
remedy was under title VII. The Kizas Court observed:  
The Kizas complainants suggest, in repeated  
but 
less 
than 
lucid 
argument, 
that 
the  
Constitution's equal protection principle entails a 
stricter restraint on classification by race or sex 
than does Title VII and would shelter them against 
"reverse" discrimination that the statute may 
permit. We need not linger over this suggestion. 
. . .  
They may not circumvent the "careful and 
thorough remedial scheme" Congress ordered for 
them; their access to court is determined by that 
effective, albeit demanding statute. [Kizas, at 
345-346.]  
III. THE CRA  
In the instant case, Sharp is covered by the protections  
afforded 
through 
the 
CRA-
-
-a legislative enactment every bit as  
detailed and comprehensive as its federal counterpart, title  
VII.  
Section 717 contains a general prohibition of federal  
employment "discrimination based on race, color, religion,  
sex, or national origin." § 717(a). Michigan's CRA contains  
a proscription at MCL 37.2202(1), which provides in part:  
An employer shall not . . . :  
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status.  
18  
Section 717 also provides the Civil Service Commission  
with the power and authority to enforce the civil rights  
requirements of title VII. Michigan vests its own Civil Rights  
Commission with similar enforcement powers. Article 6 of the  
CRA delegates powers and duties to the commission, MCL  
37.2601, and the Civil Rights Department, MCL 37.2602.  
Section 602(c) establishes in the Department the authority to  
[r]eceive, 
initiate, 
investigate, 
conciliate, 
adjust, dispose of, issue charges, and hold  
hearings on complaints alleging a violation of this 
act, and approve or disapprove plans to correct 
past discriminatory practices which have caused or 
resulted in a denial of equal opportunity with 
respect to groups or persons protected by this act.  
In addition, § 717(c) outlines a detailed administrative  
grievance procedure that a complainant must follow before  
filing suit in federal district court.  It gives an aggrieved  
federal employee thirty days from a final order of the Civil  
Service Commission to register an appeal in a district court.  
Michigan's CRA provides an almost identical structure.  
See MCL 37.2605-37.2606.  Section 605 requires the state  
commission to issue written findings of fact and conclusions  
of law to support a conclusion that an employer has engaged in  
discriminatory practices.  The section also details the  
various remedies available to the commission following a  
finding of discrimination in violation of the CRA. Finally,  
§ 606 provides the complainant with the right to appeal from  
19  
 
any final decision of the commission to a circuit court within  
thirty days.  
The parallels that exist between title VII and the CRA  
are undeniable.  Similarly, the concerns apparent in Brown and  
Novotny about parallel claims that threaten to dilute the  
comprehensive scheme carefully crafted by Congress also exist  
here.  Michigan's CRA provides the kind of detailed scheme  
that the United States Supreme Court recognizes as providing  
the sole remedy for claims arising under its coverage  
umbrella.  
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT  
Moreover, the language of the act, case law, and the  
legislative record persuasively support the proposition that  
our Legislature intended the CRA be the sole remedy for state  
employment discrimination claims in Michigan.  The primary  
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give  
effect to the intent of the Legislature.  Frankenmuth Mut Ins  
v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).  
Like title VII, the CRA does not contain an express  
description of its position in the constellation of  
antidiscrimination law. Thus, it is appropriate to look for  
legislative intent in other, less obvious places.  Brown,  
supra at 825. "Where the mind labours to discover the design  
of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be  
20  
 
derived . . . ." United States v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 358,  
386 (1805).  
To begin, the language of the CRA itself manifests an  
apparent intent to establish a broad, comprehensive scheme  
that "defines" and remedies violations of civil rights. The  
preamble to the CRA begins: "An act to define civil rights  
. . . ." 
1976 PA 453 (emphasis added). 
It continues by  
describing its own purpose as "to prohibit discriminatory  
practices" and "to provide remedies and penalties . . . ." Id.  
Thus, on its face, the CRA shows that the Legislature  
envisioned it as comprehensive and detailed.  
The legislative history, as gathered from House and  
Senate bill analyses generated before the act's passage in  
1976, bears out this suggestion.  The legislative documents  
explain that the act was intended to address the problems  
caused by the splintered remedial systems that existed before  
1976 in the area of civil rights.  The report accompanying  
House Bill 4055 described the bill as a consolidation of these  
concepts into a single law that would  
place legal and procedural recourse for all civil  
rights discrimination within the Department of 
Civil Rights, enabling the Department to provide 
more effective remedies for those who have been  
victimized by unlawful discrimination. [Emphasis 
added.]  
The bill analysis further describes the bill as a means  
of "[outlining] more specifically the legal action a person  
21  
 
 
could take if that person feels that he or she has been  
unfairly discriminated against."  (Emphasis added.) 
The  
"Argument For:" section of the bill analysis includes the  
following two statements of purpose, both bearing particular  
relevance to this case:  
The bill would provide a uniform statutory  
framework to deal with the many different forms of 
discrimination. [Emphasis added.]  
* * *  
The 
bill would 
include 
the 
concept 
of  
discrimination enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
with 
respect to 
equal 
protection 
under 
the  
Constitution.  
Hence, the CRA, like its federal counterpart, was  
intended as a vehicle to define and consolidate the various  
remedial measures accorded by other statutes.  Moreover, it  
was 
envisioned 
as 
incorporating 
the 
"concept 
of  
discrimination" inherent in the Equal Protection Clause.24  
Courts have interpreted the CRA as bearing a singular  
objective in harmony with the Michigan Constitution and as an  
instrument 
to 
interpret and enforce its provisions. See, e.g.,  
Thompson v Bd of Ed Romeo Comm Schs, 519 F Supp 1373, 1380 (WD  
Mich, 1981) (interpreting Michigan law to conclude that the  
24The Equal Protection Clause of Michigan's Constitution 
is virtually identical to its counterpart contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. They 
are interpreted as embodiments of the same concepts. See, 
e.g., Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360, 370; 258 NW2d 34 (1977);  
Naudzius v Lahr, 253 Mich 216, 222; 234 NW 581 (1931).  
22  
 
 
 
"general object [of the CRA] is to define and protect certain  
civil 
rights 
of 
individuals under the jurisdiction of Michigan  
law"); Neal v Dep't of Corrections, 232 Mich App 730, 734; 592  
NW2d 370 (1998)("[t]he act is remedial and must be liberally  
construed to effectuate its ends").  
I find that the intent that appears to underlie the CRA  
supports the proposition that the Legislature meant it to  
provide the sole remedy for public employment discrimination  
claims in Michigan.  Moreover, the United States Supreme  
Court's decisive interpretation in Brown, Novotny, and their  
progeny of the breadth of § 717 of title VII renders  
convincing guidance in determining the breadth of Michigan's  
CRA.  Just as title VII provides the sole remedy for equal  
protection claims involving federal governmental employment  
discrimination, the CRA provides the sole remedy for Michigan  
governmental employment discrimination.  
V. ANALOGY  
A Michigan complainant like Mr. Sharp is in the same  
position as the complainants in Kizas. He may not circumvent  
the "careful and thorough remedial scheme" that the  
Legislature, in response to the direct call of the people, has  
ordered for him. Kizas, at 346. His access to court "is  
determined 
by 
that 
effective, albeit demanding, statute." Id.  
He may not pursue a state constitutional equal protection  
23  
 
 
claim that falls within the purview of the CRA.25  Allowing  
that a parallel and circuitous claim would dilute the CRA's  
purpose, just as allowing Novotny to seek constitutional  
redress would have diluted the carefully crafted scheme of  
title VII.  
In addition to the persuasiveness of federal analogous  
law is the sheer counter intuitiveness of allowing an equal  
protection claim to survive in this case.  If a complainant  
were entitled to relief under the state Equal Protection  
Clause as an alternative to the CRA, the safe harbor provision  
25The majority intimates that Lewis v Michigan, 464 Mich 
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), issued with this decision, holds 
that a complainant has a direct claim under the constitution 
for 
equitable 
relief 
from an approved affirmative action plan. 
Slip op at 15, n 13. The issue in Lewis is whether this Court  
should recognize the existence of a claim for monetary damages 
directly under the Equal Protection Clause. It does not 
address whether a party can seek equitable relief under the 
auspices of the constitution.  
The majority miscasts my position in this dissent as one 
that leaves certain Michigan citizens entirely without civil 
rights or constitutional protections. Also, it cites Bolling  
v Sharpe, 347 US 497; 74 S Ct 693; 98 L Ed 884 (1954) as 
assuming that Congress would amend title VII eighteen years 
later to retain the availability of equitable relief directly 
under the constitution. The use of a 1954 Supreme Court case 
to predict the effects of a legislative act in 1972 evidences 
a remarkable twist of the laws of time and space. Moreover,  
Bolling is inapposite because it describes federal employment 
discrimination remedies that existed before 1972. The 1972  
amendments of title VII were aimed at altering the legal 
foundation for pursuing federal employment discrimination 
claims in the public sector. Brown, Novotny, Smith, and each  
case upon which I rely, concern the state of employment 
discrimination law after 1972.  
24  
would be dramatically weakened.  If the safe harbor were  
destroyed, the CRA would fail in one of its essential  
purposes:  to provide for affirmative action in order to  
alleviate past instances of discrimination.  
In turn, the delegates to the 1961 Constitutional  
Convention would have failed in their attempt to draft art 1,  
§ 2 as a set of policy goals "pointing the way" for the  
Legislature.  Such a result is inconsistent with the expressed  
policy goals of the constitutional framers and the intent of  
the Legislature in enacting the CRA.  In addition, it ignores  
the persuasive direction charted by the United States Supreme  
Court in Brown,26 Novotny, and their respective progeny.  
26To 
counter 
the 
unqualified, 
direct 
holding 
of 
Brown, 
the  
majority relies on a misreading of it. Brown does not state  
that the 1972 amendments to title VII left intact the  
availability of injunctive relief for federal employment 
discrimination directly under the Fifth Amendment. There is 
little 
question 
that 
the Brown Court regarded earlier remedies 
for employment discrimination in the public sector as  
impotent. 
See 
Brown, supra at 826 ("If administrative remedies 
were ineffective, judicial relief from federal employment 
discrimination was even more problematic before 1972.") 
Injunctive relief, like the balance of remedies available 
before 1972, effected nothing to merit celebration among 
opponents of workplace discrimination.  
According to the Brown Court, that was the weakness that 
Congress intended to address through the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972.  Its aim was to preempt the field by 
providing a comprehensive, exclusive slate of remedies, 
displacing existing legal and equitable claims. I find that  
our Legislature intended the CRA to have similar preemptive 
force.  
25  
 
 
VI. SHARP'S INADEQUATELY PLEADED CASE  
A 
more 
detailed 
analysis of whether plaintiff has pleaded  
and preserved any other direct constitutional claim is  
appropriate here.  
MCR 2.111 provides:  
(B) Statement of Claim. A complaint, counter­
claim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint must 
contain the following:  
(1) 
A 
statement 
of 
the 
facts, 
without  
repetition, on which the pleader relies in stating 
the cause of action, with the specific allegations 
necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of 
the nature of the claims the adverse party is 
called on to defend[.]  
In his second amended complaint, plaintiff pleaded as  
follows:  
7. Notwithstanding rejection of Plaintiff's 
application for employment as a fire fighter in the 
Lansing fire department, Defendant city of Lansing 
and the Lansing fire department have continued to 
accept 
applications 
for 
employment 
and 
have  
continued to hire persons as fire fighters who are 
not certified fire fighters and not as well  
qualified as Plaintiff.  
***  
10. Defendant city of Lansing and its fire 
department have limited, segregated or classified 
plaintiff in a way that tends to deprive him of 
employment 
opportunities 
in 
the 
public 
fire  
department of the city of Lansing, or otherwise 
adversely affects his status as an applicant 
because of his race and sex.  
***  
13. Defendant city of Lansing has adopted a 
policy of discriminating in employment on the basis  
26  
 
 
of race, sex and national origin by means of 
treating white male applicants for employment less 
favorably than applicants who are not white males.  
14. Defendant city of Lansing has applied its 
policy of discriminating in employment on the basis 
of race, sex and national origin to the Lansing 
fire department.  
15. Defendant city of Lansing and its fire 
department 
have 
manipulated 
facially 
neutral  
testing procedures to discriminate on the basis of 
race, sex and national origin by means of giving 
second, third and fourth chances to members of 
favored races, sex or national origin.  
***  
18. 
Defendant 
city 
of 
Lansing 
obtained  
approval for a voluntary affirmative action plan in 
1987 but has abandoned the approved plan.  
19. Defendant's affirmative action plan lacks  
any 
rational 
connection 
with 
a 
legitimate 
governmental objective for the reason that ten 
years 
of 
enforcement 
of 
the 
said 
voluntary 
affirmative action plan has had no effect on the 
distribution of women and minorities in the non­
supervisory ranks of the Lansing fire department.  
20. Defendant city of Lansing adopted both its 
approved voluntary affirmative action plan, and its 
unapproved voluntary affirmative action plan with 
intent to discriminate on the basis of race and  
sex.  
21. The only effect of ten years of voluntary 
affirmative action in the Lansing fire department 
has been to deprive white males of employment 
opportunities in the Lansing fire department.  
22. Plaintiff has sustained damages in the 
premises in excess of $10,000.00, in violation of 
the form of the Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act and 
Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
27  
 
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable 
Court enter its order enjoining Defendant city of 
Lansing from discriminating in employment on the 
basis of race, sex or national origin . . . .  
Plaintiff's 
pleadings 
acknowledge 
the 
apparent  
constitutionality of an affirmative action plan that has been  
approved by the commission and enacted in conformity with  
§ 210. There is no dispute that the city's plan satisfies both  
criteria. In his answer to defendant's affirmative defenses,  
plaintiff stated:  
Plaintiff 
affirmatively 
avers 
that 
an  
affirmative action plan may be adopted and carried 
out "if the plan is filed with the commission under 
rules of the commission and the commission approves 
the plan."  
As the majority concedes, plaintiff is barred from  
pursuing a claim under the CRA.  By extension, then, he has  
failed to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection  
Clause of the Michigan Constitution.  Simply stated, he has  
nothing left to pursue on remand.  
The majority misrepresents my position as asserting that  
the only way to challenge a state actor's implementation of a  
law is to challenge the law itself.  It interprets this  
dissent as in conflict with Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106  
S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986),27 and Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118  
27Batson held that the federal Equal Protection Clause 
forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to 
remove potential jurors because of race.  
28  
 
 
  
 
 
US 356; 6 S Ct 1064; 30 L Ed 220 (1886).28 
In so doing, it  
overlooks a crucial fact that distinguishes Batson and Yick Wo  
from the instant case:  the relationship of the underlying  
"law" to the conduct alleged in this case is distinguishable  
from the relationship of those two variables as they operated  
in Batson and Yick Wo. 
The key difference is that § 210  
expressly allows the conduct in which defendant engaged. It  
permits racial discrimination within certain parameters.  The  
city of Lansing governed itself within those constitutional  
parameters.  Though he tried, Mr. Sharp could not establish a  
factual issue to the contrary.  
By contrast, the underlying law in Batson did not  
expressly allow the conduct in which the Kentucky prosecutor  
engaged.  The "law" in Batson did not permit prosecutors to  
exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race. It did  
not 
even 
address 
race. 
Thus, 
the 
unconstitutional  
implementation at work in Batson was found in the "deviation"  
from what the underlying constitutional law would allow.  That  
"law" had been applied to Batson in a way that denied him  
equal treatment under it.  I apply the same standard to Mr.  
Sharp's claim, but reach a different result because the law in  
28The Yick Wo Court found an equal protection violation 
where an otherwise neutral San Francisco city ordinance was 
applied unequally to citizens on the basis of race.  
29  
 
 
  
  
his case operated exactly as legislators intended it should.29  
There was no deviation from the scheme intended by the  
Michigan Legislature.  
However, despite Mr. Sharp's failure to articulate a  
cognizable claim, another in his position would not  
necessarily be  without a remedy. 
A complainant could  
challenge the constitutionality of the CRA generally, or of  
the safe harbor, testing whether either constitutes a  
constitutional implementation of art 1, § 2.  Sharp chose not  
to do so.  Alternatively, a complainant could challenge the  
commission's approval of an affirmative action plan, arguing  
that the plan fails to conform to criteria required by the CRA  
for approval.30  Again, Sharp chose not to pursue such a claim.  
29Similarly, in Yick Wo, the law at issue did not  
expressly authorize discrimination on the basis of race. It 
established 
an 
approval process for operating certain types of 
laundry businesses in San Francisco. The process was used to 
deny business opportunities to Chinese immigrants, while 
granting them to non-Chinese applicants. The "law" in Yick Wo  
did not authorize city officials to treat Chinese applicants 
differently than others.  Rather, it established a neutral 
permitting 
process. 
City 
officials 
applied 
that 
law 
unequally, 
thereby violating the equal protection guarantee of the 
constitution. Such a fact pattern is easily distinguishable 
from the instant case, where an admittedly constitutional 
statute prescribes the very discrimination from which  
plaintiff claims to have suffered.  
30The concurrence is mistaken in its suggestion that I 
agree that the "safe harbor encompasses only affirmative 
action plans that are 'adopt[ed] and carr[ied] out . . . to 
eliminate present effects of past discriminatory practices or 
assure equal opportunity . . . .'" Slip op at 2. The safe 
(continued...)  
30  
 
 
Finally, a complainant could articulate a challenge to a  
public employer's actions in implementing a plan, by  
demonstrating that they fell outside the scope authorized by  
§ 210.  He could establish a fact question on such a claim by  
showing, hypothetically, that the employer hired a minority  
firefighter despite the fact that the individual had failed a  
required physical examination. Hiring such a candidate, who  
would not be qualified even with the benefit of the  
affirmative action plan, would not fall within the protection  
of the safe harbor.  A complainant could establish a fact  
question 
whether 
the 
employer used some other unapproved plan,  
thereby violating complainant's rights. Such acts would not  
be protected by the safe harbor and the complainant's art 1,  
§ 2 rights could be vindicated under the CRA.  
Sharp attempted to create a fact question under certain  
of these theories, but failed.  Hence, he is now left with  
nothing by way of an action arising either under the CRA or  
directly under art 1, § 2.  With no cognizable claims  
30(...continued) 
harbor does not protect only those plans that succeed in 
eliminating present effects of past discrimination. Section  
210 contemplates protection for any properly approved plan 
that is reasonably created with the intention of eliminating 
discrimination or furthering equal opportunities in the 
workplace. The section specifically refers to plans "to" 
eliminate effects of discrimination, not plans "that" do in 
fact 
eliminate 
them. 
The 
concurrence's 
sweeping 
interpretation, if accurate, would render the safe-harbor 
provision unworkable.  
31  
 
remaining that have not already been discharged, his cause was  
properly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
I agree with the majority that the safe harbor protects  
the city of Lansing from an action against it under the CRA.  
I further acknowledge that the Legislature cannot abrogate  
constitutional rights through passage of a statute.  However,  
the constitution can delegate authority.  The CRA is the  
Legislature's response to one such constitutional delegation  
of authority.  I believe that art 1, § 2, envisioned that the  
Legislature would pass an act like the CRA that could be the  
exclusive remedy for vindicating civil rights claims against  
public employers in Michigan. I base this conclusion on the  
expressed 
intent 
of 
certain 
constitutional 
convention  
delegates and by analogy to a persuasive line of federal  
authority 
regarding 
title VII and the federal equal protection  
clause. The CRA closely resembles title VII that the United  
States Supreme Court in Brown and Novotny held preempted the  
field of employment discrimination claims under federal law.  
Allowing 
the 
pursuit 
of 
parallel 
constitutional 
claims 
to  
remedy wrongs cognizable under the CRA is not only illogical,  
it 
threatens 
to 
undermine and destroy the comprehensive design  
of the statute.  Such a contrary ruling could not reflect the  
intent of either the Legislature in passing the act or the  
32  
people in adopting the Michigan Constitution.  
The majority first misconstrues my position, then finds  
it "a startling proposition."  Slip op at 18. It states my  
position as being that, if a state actor commits ongoing  
employment discrimination violative of the state Equal  
Protection Clause but not violative of the CRA, the courts  
cannot end the discrimination.  My position is that, if a  
state actor commits employment discrimination by performing  
acts covered by the CRA, the state Equal Protection Clause  
cannot be used to end the discrimination.  
I have demonstrated that this proposition has extensive  
support in holdings of the United States Supreme Court.  
Moreover, a contrary holding, the majority's holding, sadly  
weakens the "noble contributions of the state and federal  
courts" 
in 
fighting 
discrimination that it purports to esteem.  
The majority states that my reading of the law allows the  
Legislature to "trump" the Michigan constitution.  It says  
that "it is axiomatic that the Legislature cannot grant a  
license to state and local governmental actors to violate the  
Michigan Constitution."  Slip op at 21. 
However, a close  
examination reveals that this is mere rhetoric and misses the  
mark.  
Without dispute, the constitution can delegate to the  
Legislature the task of devising a comprehensive statutory  
33  
scheme to protect specific constitutional rights.  Art 1, § 2  
contains such a constitutional provision, and it is the one  
involved in this case. It is also beyond dispute that, when  
one person's constitutional rights conflict with another's,  
courts will render a decision whereby one right is sublimated  
to the other.  
This dissent, simply stated, stands for the proposition  
that, when a state actor discriminates against a person in a  
manner made lawful by the CRA, that person's art 1, § 2 rights  
are sublimated to the art 1, § 2 constitutional rights of  
others to have the state actor discriminate in their interest.  
Art 1, § 2 delegated to the Legislature the power to implement  
it.  In turn, the Legislature authorized the sublimation of  
one person's equal protection rights over another's when it  
created § 210.  
The majority also distorts the meaning of the dissent  
when it asserts that I would prevent the Court from hearing  
plaintiff's claim that defendant discriminated against him.  
It states that the dissent would prevent plaintiff from  
recovering for defendant's acts that, although not violative  
of the CRA, violate the Due Process Clause.  However, one  
should note, it neglects to specify the acts.  What conduct by  
defendant does plaintiff claim violated art 1, § 2, but did  
not violate the CRA? 
In fact, plaintiff has named no  
34  
governmental action by defendant that survived summary  
disposition, or that should have, and that, also, violated the  
Due Process Clause.  
Here, Sharp cannot sue under the CRA because of the bar  
imposed by § 210.  Both the nature of his claim and his  
pleadings preclude the availability to him of a parallel  
constitutional claim.  The CRA  provides his exclusive remedy.  
Because the Court of Appeals properly dismissed this action,  
I would affirm.  
35