Title: Titard v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

282 So. 2d 474 (1973) Alice Evelyn TITARD et al. v. LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY. No. 52773. Supreme Court of Louisiana. August 20, 1973. Rehearing Denied September 24, 1973. *475 Jacque B. Pucheu, Eunice, for plaintiffs-applicants. Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, James J. Davidson, III, Lafayette, Lewis & Lewis, John M. Shaw, Opelousas, for defendant-respondent. SANDERS, Chief Justice. Robert N. Batton, Sr. and his wife, Alice Evelyn Titard (Batton) brought this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by Mrs. Batton in a fall at the home of John Edwards in Opelousas, Louisiana. The action was brought directly against Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, Mr. Edward's home-liability carrier. In turn, Lumbermen's joined the City of Opelousas as a third party defendant. The 27th Judicial District Court rejected the plaintiffs' demand, finding that Mr. Edwards was negligent in failing to warn his guests of areas of darkness created by a power failure, but that this failure to warn was not the proximate cause of the accident. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed at 264 So. 2d 382, providing only these two paragraphs as an opinion: In Dick v. Phillips, 253 La. 366, 218 So. 2d 299 (1969), this Court held: Inasmuch as the assigned reasons for judgment in this case contain neither findings of fact nor a statement of the legal principles upon which the Court of Appeal reached its decision, we granted certiorari. 262 La. 1166, 266 So. 2d 446 (1972). We now reverse. The record reflects that Mrs. Batton was injured at the annual social gathering of the St. Landry Parish Bar Association. The event was held at Mr. Edward's home at his invitation and, for the most part, was confined to a pool-patio area which is surrounded by a seven foot high brick wall and lighted, not by electricity, but by flaming torches fueled by a combustible liquid. Accompanied by Mrs. Ruth Leger, Mrs. Batton arrived at the party about 7 o'clock p. m. At about 11:00 p. m. an electric power failure occurred at the residence. Because of the torch illumination in the patio and the wall around it, neither Mrs. Batton nor her companion knew of the electric failure when they left about thirty minutes later. Following the same route they had used on arrival, Mrs. Batton and Mrs. Leger walked out along a covered sidewalk which runs between the patio wall and the Edwards home. Some five feet from the patio gate, the walkway makes a 90 turn and goes under the carport. Both sides of the sidewalk in this area are bordered by low flower beds walled in by diagonally seated bricks. These bricks protrude 6 to 8 inches above the level of the sidewalk. The women had taken only a few steps along this sidewalk when they were confronted with sudden and total darkness. Mrs. Batton placed her hand in Mrs. Leger's. Almost simultaneously, Mrs. Leger stumbled on the brick border and fell, pulling Mrs. Batton down with her by the hand-hold. As Mrs. Batton fell her face struck one of the protruding bricks causing serious injury. The trial court, on the basis on these facts, concluded that Mr. Edwards was negligent: We agree. Although a home owner is no insurer of the safety of his guests, he has the duty of warning them of hazards of which they are unaware or of taking other reasonable precautions to protect them from injury. The shrouding of the exit in darkness created such a hazard. As we held in Foggin v. General Guaranty Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So. 2d 636 (1967) quoting Savell v. Foster, 149 So. 2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1963): In the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for his safety and is liable for injury resulting from breach of such duty. This duty includes that of exercising reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe and suitable condition or of warning invitees....of hidden or concealed perils of which he knows or should know in the exercise of reasonable care, so that those whom he has invited to enter upon or use his property shall not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger." In the trial court's view, however, the efficient cause of the accident was not this negligence but rather the holding on and pulling down by Mrs. Leger. This was, in the perspective of the original judgment, so unforeseeable as to break the chain of proximate cause. The Court of Appeal affirmed, though it did not expressly approve this rationale. Initially, we do not agree that it is unforeseeable for two persons to join hands while traversing a dark walkway to make their exit from residential premises. In so doing, they seek to aid each other in maintaining balance. Moreover, the duty to warn of the electric failure or to provide available torch lighting is in a large measure directed against the risk of stumbling and falling. The scope of protection of the rule of law includes the risk of such an occurrence involving more than one person. Even a negligent intervention does not always break the chain of causation. As we observed in Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970), on rehearing: See also Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962). The foregoing holding is consistent with the generally accepted views as to legal cause. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 442A provides: The denial of causality in the case before us cannot be squared with these principles. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed insofar as the liability of Lumbermen's is concerned. Since Lumbermen's, the third party plaintiff, took no appeal as to the third party demand against the City of Opelousas, the third party demand is not before this Court. See McCoy v. Pacific Coast Fire Insurance Co., 248 La. 389, 178 So. 2d 761 (1965). In keeping with the practice of this Court, the action shall be remanded to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal to fix damages. See Felt v. Price, 240 La. 966, 126 So. 2d 330 (1961). For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs, Robert Norton Batton, Sr., and Alice Evelyn Titard against Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, defendant, in such sums as may hereafter be fixed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for the assessment of damages. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all costs be assessed against the defendant, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company. I am of the view that plaintiff was clearly contributorily negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. See Curet v. Hiern, 95 So. 2d 699 (La.App. 1957); and Briscoe v. Bailey, 74 So. 2d 770 (La.App.1954).