Title: Graves v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ERIC M. GRAVES, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 460, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. Nos. IN01091272, IN01091273, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and IN01091274 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 16, 2003 
Decided:  February 5, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 5th day of February 2003, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
On July 10, 2001, New Castle County police arrested Erick Graves.  
A New Castle County Grand Jury later indicted him for Possession with Intent to 
Deliver a Narcotic Schedule II Controlled Substance,1 Use of a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances,2 and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.3  Trial 
began on June 11, 2002 in the New Castle Superior Court.  At the close of the 
State’s case-in-chief, Graves moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.  The 
                                                 
1 16 Del. C. § 4751. 
2 16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5). 
3 11 Del. C. § 512. 
 
2
trial judge granted the motion for two of the three counts:  Use of a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The jury 
found Graves guilty of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Narcotic Schedule II 
Controlled Substance.  In this appeal, Graves asserts two grounds of error:  (i) the 
trial judge abused his discretion by denying Graves’ motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the count of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Narcotic Schedule II 
Controlled Substance and (ii) the trial judge abused his discretion when he allowed 
a police officer to testify as an expert witness and offer an opinion that the 
packaging of drugs Graves possessed was consistent with street level drug sales.   
2. 
We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.4  
After doing so here, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for 
the jury to consider the charge of Possession with Intent to Deliver.   
3. 
At trial, the New Castle police officers testified that they pulled over a 
car in which Graves was a passenger.  The officers further testified that Graves sat 
above a sewer grate while the officers searched the car.  The record shows that 
within a few minutes after the stop, Graves approached Krista Arthur’s house and 
asked to use her phone.  Arthur overheard Graves tell someone that he had 
                                                 
4 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999). 
 
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removed something from his boot during the police stop and thrown it into the 
sewer.  Arthur called the police and reported the conversation that she overheard.  
The officer returned to the scene of the earlier incident, shined his flashlight down 
the sewer grate, and discovered two clear plastic bags containing smaller orange 
bags similar to bags found in the car during the previous stop.  The bags contained 
crack cocaine.  From this circumstantial evidence, a rational trier of fact could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Graves had knowingly possessed crack 
cocaine.   
4. 
We further conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
allowing the police officer to give expert testimony.  This court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard when “it reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony.”5 
5. 
The prosecutor elicited testimony from the officer concerning the 
officer’s training and background in narcotics investigation.  Specifically, the 
officer testified that he attended six police academy schools and received DEA 
school training.  He also worked on a DEA task force, conducted undercover drug 
buys and had participated in several hundred drug investigations.  After this 
foundation, the prosecutor asked if, in the officer’s opinion, the packaging of the 
drugs was consistent with street level drug sales.  At that point, for the first time, 
                                                 
5 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999) (quoting General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).  
 
4
defense counsel objected and raised a challenge to the officer’s “expert” testimony.  
Graves now asserts that “it is inherently unreasonable for the trial court to allow 
expert witness opinion testimony prior to opposing counsel being offered the 
chance to challenge the expert’s qualifications.”6   
6. 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 705(b) grants trial judges discretion to 
allow an adverse party, upon that party’s motion, to conduct a limited voir dire of a 
proferred  expert.7  Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, a limited voir dire of an 
expert’s qualifications is not mandated by the rule.  Nor should a trial judge be 
expected to halt an examination of a witness sua sponte to ask opposing counsel if 
there is an objection to an expert’s qualifications even where a witness, such as a 
police officer, would not necessarily be giving testimony limited exclusively to 
“expert opinion.”  Well before the State attempted to elicit expert opinion, as 
opposed to factual testimony from the officer, the defendant had several viable 
options.  The defendant had ample opportunity to file a motion in limine before 
trial.  Defense counsel could have asked the prosecutor to disclose the extent to 
which the prosecutor would attempt to elicit any expert testimony from police 
witnesses; or, simply if the prosecutor intended to elicit expert testimony at all.  
Then defense counsel could request an opportunity to examine the witness out of 
the presence of the jury on voir dire or demand that the State first qualify the 
                                                 
6 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3. 
7 D.R.E. 705(b) (2000); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 425-26 (Del. 1988). 
 
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witness outside the presence of the jury and then assert to the trial judge alone any 
objection to any part of the State’s proffer.  Defense counsel instead chose to walk 
to the edge of a precipice and then blame the trial judge for a precipitous ruling.  It 
is unlikely, given the manner and timing of defense counsel’s challenge, that any 
trial judge would have ruled otherwise.  Certainly it is unlikely given the tactics 
employed by defense counsel here.  In effect, defense counsel chose to opt for the 
tactic least likely to give the defense an effective option to attack the officer’s 
qualifications, experience, training and expertise.  Clearly, on this record, the 
officer was qualified through his training and experience to help the triers of fact 
understand the significance of the drug packaging.  When the trial judge overruled 
the objection, he was careful to instruct the jury that by overruling the objection 
that he was not endorsing the testimony but simply allowing the jury to consider it 
and give it the weight the jury deemed to be appropriate.  The trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion by admitting the officer’s expert testimony.  We conclude that 
circumstantial evidence sufficiently established knowing possession and that the 
quantity of drugs and the expert testimony supporting intent to deliver, combined 
with the trial judge’s careful caution to the jury, demonstrates that Graves’ 
argument is without merit.   
 
6
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele_________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice