Title: Friends of the Rappahannock v. Caroline County Bd. of Supervisors

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
FRIENDS OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK, ET AL. 
 
    
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120874 
    JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
   June 6, 2013 
CAROLINE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAROLINE COUNTY 
Joseph J. Ellis, Judge 
 
The Friends of the Rappahannock ("Friends"), together with 
several local landowners and one lessee, (collectively, 
"individual complainants") appeal the order of the Circuit Court 
of Caroline County sustaining a demurrer and motion to dismiss 
to their complaint challenging a Special Exception Permit 
("permit") issued by the Caroline County Board of Supervisors 
("Board") that approved the use of land adjacent to the 
Rappahannock River for a sand and gravel mining operation.  We 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the 
complaint for failure to allege a sufficient basis to 
demonstrate standing. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings 
In 2011, the Board issued a permit, subject to certain 
enumerated conditions, to appellees Black Marsh Farm, Inc. and 
Vulcan Construction Materials, L.P., (collectively, "Black 
Marsh") for the development of a sand and gravel mining 
operation on a 514 acre tract bordering the Rappahannock River 
in Caroline County.  Under Article IV, Section 5 of the Zoning 
2 
Ordinance of Caroline County ("zoning ordinance"), extraction of 
natural materials is specifically included as a permitted use in 
the applicable Rural Preservation District, but requires 
issuance of a permit.  After appropriate review, the Board 
granted Black Marsh's application and granted a permit subject 
to 33 conditions pursuant to Article XVII, Section 13 of the 
zoning ordinance. 
Friends, a non-profit organization committed to the 
preservation of the Rappahannock River, and the individual 
complainants challenged the Board's decision to issue the permit 
by filing a complaint entitled "Petition for Review and 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" in the Circuit Court of 
Caroline County.  Friends alleged that Black Marsh's use of the 
river for product transport will interfere with and harm 
Friends' interests in water quality protection, preservation of 
the river's scenic beauty, and public education efforts in land 
use and resource conservation advocacy. 
The complaint also alleged bases for standing for each of 
the individual complainants.  John D. Mitchell holds a leasehold 
interest and a right of first refusal in property adjacent to 
the Black Marsh site.  Mitchell uses the property for duck 
hunting, fishing, and river access.  Mitchell complains that the 
land disturbance, noise and industrial activity at the site will 
frighten away the wildlife, prevent or deter new wildlife from 
3 
entering the area, and render the property useless for hunting, 
causing him harm. 
Sally Jane Raines Kizer is the owner of 164 acres of 
farmland adjacent to the site.  A tenant lives in Kizer's 
farmhouse.  Kizer contends that mining activities at the site 
will interfere with her right-of-way to the river, make it more 
difficult to find tenants for the farmhouse, and create 
problematic noise and airborne particulate conditions.  Kizer 
also alleges that Black Marsh's permit contains requirements 
that are insufficient to ensure that the pond left on the 
reclaimed site will not become a stagnant lake and thereby a 
nuisance. 
The other four individual complainants, Elizabeth Lanyon 
Reynolds, Ronald S. Mosley, and Kurt and Brenda Kuberek live 
directly across the river in King George County, approximately 
1,500 feet away from the Black Marsh property.  Each of the 
complainants owns a private residence on a one-quarter to one-
third acre lot in a residential development known as Hopyard 
Farm, and each residence is separated from the river by 
approximately 200 feet of open space owned by the Hopyard Farm 
Homeowners' Association.  These individual complainants allege 
that the industrial activities on the site will end the scenic 
beauty of the location.  Also, they allege that the activities 
will increase noise, dust, and traffic from barges and 
4 
commercial boats in a manner that will alter their quiet 
enjoyment of the area.  In addition, the Kubereks allege that 
the industrial use of the property will harm their recreational 
use of the river for wading and observing wildlife, and that 
they are concerned for the long term health and well-being of 
their children, one of whom is asthmatic, from the dust and 
particulate pollution from the proposed operation. 
In response to the complaint, the Board filed a demurrer 
and Black Marsh filed a motion to dismiss.  The Board and Black 
Marsh argued that Friends and the individual complainants lacked 
standing to bring the suit because they failed to show they were 
aggrieved parties, their alleged injuries were based on 
speculative grievances, the facts as pled were insufficient as a 
matter of law to grant standing, and they were seeking to 
vindicate interests shared by the entire public.  Friends and 
the individual complainants filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the motion to dismiss in which they argued that, under Code 
§§ 8.01-184 and 15.2-2285(F), they did not need to show that 
they are "aggrieved," but merely that they have a "justiciable 
interest." 
After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court issued a 
letter opinion in which it held that Friends and the individual 
complainants lacked standing.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court accepted Black Marsh's argument that there is a two-step 
5 
test to determine standing:  first, the court must consider the 
complainants' proximity to the objectionable use; and second, 
the court must determine whether the challenged use will deny 
rights or impose burdens different from those suffered by the 
general public.  The court held that the claims alleged were not 
supported by sufficient facts, and that the allegations were 
conclusory and did not show a loss of some personal or property 
right "different from that suffered by the public generally." 
Friends and the individual complainants declined the 
opportunity to amend their pleadings and the circuit court 
entered an order sustaining the demurrer and the motion to 
dismiss.  Friends and the individual complainants filed a 
petition for appeal, which the Court granted as to two issues.  
In their first assignment of error, Friends and the individual 
complainants argue that the circuit court erred in applying the 
"aggrieved person" standard in evaluating whether they had 
standing to appeal the Board's decision to grant the permit when 
the complaint was filed pursuant to the Virginia Declaratory 
Judgment Act, which applies the "justiciable interest" test for 
standing.  In the second assignment of error, which was granted 
only as to the individual complainants and not as to Friends, 
the individual complainants challenge the circuit court's ruling 
that they had alleged only "non-particularized harms" 
insufficient for standing. 
6 
II. 
Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review applicable to the circuit court's 
decision to sustain a demurrer is well established.  "A demurrer 
accepts as true all facts properly pled, as well as reasonable 
inferences from those facts."  Steward v. Holland Family Props., 
LLC, 284 Va. 282, 286, 726 S.E.2d 251, 253-54 (2012).  A 
demurrer, however, does not admit "inferences or conclusions 
from facts not stated."  Arlington Yellow Cab Co. v. 
Transportation, Inc., 207 Va. 313, 319, 149 S.E.2d 877, 881 
(1966) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
At the demurrer stage, it is not the function of the trial 
court to decide the merits of the allegations set forth in a 
complaint, but only to determine whether the factual allegations 
pled and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are 
sufficient to state a cause of action.  Riverview Farm Assocs. 
Va. Gen. P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Charles County, 259 Va. 
419, 427, 528 S.E.2d 99, 103 (2000).  To survive a challenge by 
demurrer, a pleading must be made with "sufficient definiteness 
to enable the court to find the existence of a legal basis for 
its judgment."  Eagle Harbor, L.L.C. v. Isle of Wright County, 
271 Va. 603, 611, 628 S.E.2d 298, 302 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  "A trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer 
7 
presents a question of law which we review de novo."  Harris v. 
Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 196, 624 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2006). 
B. 
Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Applying the "Aggrieved 
Person" Standard to Determine Standing 
 
Friends and the individual complainants argue that the 
appropriate analysis of standing in declaratory judgment 
actions, as expressed in Cupp v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County, 227 Va. 580, 590, 318 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1984), is whether 
the complaining party has a "justiciable interest" in the 
subject matter of the suit.  Thus, Friends and the individual 
complainants contend that the circuit court inappropriately 
applied an "aggrieved person" standard to the declaratory 
judgment action in the case at bar because such a standard is 
not present in either the Court's precedent or within the 
language of Code §§ 8.01-184 or 15.2-2285(F).*  Further, they 
contend that our decision in Braddock, L.C. v. Board of 
                     
* Under Code § 15.2-2285(F), a decision of a Board of Supervisors 
in granting or failing to grant a special exception may be 
challenged in the circuit court: 
 
Every action contesting a decision of the 
local governing body adopting or failing to 
adopt a proposed zoning ordinance or 
amendment thereto or granting or failing to 
grant a special exception shall be filed 
within thirty days of the decision with the 
circuit court having jurisdiction of the 
land affected by the decision. However, 
nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to create any new right to contest 
the action of a local governing body. 
8 
Supervisors of Loudoun County, 268 Va. 420, 601 S.E.2d 552 
(2004), in which we discussed a requirement that neighbors 
bringing suit to challenge rezoning be "aggrieved" to have 
standing, and upon which Black Marsh relies, is irreconcilable 
with the authorities on which it is based. 
 
Black Marsh, however, argues that the "justiciable 
interest" and "aggrieved person" standards are not incompatible 
with each other in a land use case.  Black Marsh therefore 
contends that the circuit court did not err in defining a 
justiciable controversy by using an "aggrieved person" standard, 
and argues that the term "aggrieved" requires having a 
sufficient proximity to the property subject to the land use 
decision and an allegation of particularized harm not shared by 
the general public. 
 
Implicit in the argument of Friends and the individual 
complainants is the contention that an "aggrieved person" 
standard provides for a more restrictive basis for standing than 
the requirement of a justifiable interest in a declaratory 
judgment action in the challenge of a land use decision.  We 
disagree. 
 
We have recently addressed the general principles requiring 
a complainant to assert a justiciable controversy for a circuit 
court to exercise its authority in a declaratory judgment 
action.  See Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators Ass'n 
9 
v. Albemarle County Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 87, 737 S.E.2d 1 
(2013).  Code § 8.01-184, the "statutory authority for 
declaratory judgment proceedings," authorizes jurisdiction "[i]n 
cases of actual controversy."  Charlottesville Area Fitness, 285 
Va. at 97-98, 737 S.E.2d at 6.  As "[t]he purpose of a 
declaratory judgment proceeding is the adjudication of rights[,] 
an actual controversy is a prerequisite to a court having 
authority."  Id. at 98, 737 S.E.2d at 6.  The pleadings, 
therefore, must allege an "actual controversy" existing between 
the parties based upon an "actual antagonistic assertion and 
denial of right."  Code § 8.01-184; see also Charlottesville 
Area Fitness, 285 Va. at 98, 737 S.E.2d at 6. 
A complainant "must establish a justiciable interest by 
alleging facts demonstrat[ing] an actual controversy . . . such 
that [the complainant's] rights will be affected by the outcome 
of the case."  Charlottesville Area Fitness, 285 Va. at 98, 737 
S.E.2d at 7 (second alteration added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Cupp, 227 Va. at 590, 318 S.E.2d at 412 
(holding that the parties had a direct stake in challenging an 
ordinance applicable to their nursery business because the 
ordinance would have impacted what they could sell in their 
business and required donation of a portion of their land to the 
county); Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. 
218, 224, 278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981) (determining that an option 
10 
holder on certain land sales contracts had standing to challenge 
rezoning of the property on which it held options); but see 
Deerfield v. City of Hampton, 283 Va. 759, 766, 724 S.E.2d 724, 
727 (2012) (holding that a committee formed under the city 
charter had no standing because it had no rights under the 
charter to file suit challenging a proposed land use after the 
purpose for which the committee had been formed had ceased to 
exist). 
The cases cited above address the "justiciable interest" 
requirement in declaratory judgment actions challenging land use 
decisions.  The particular statutory requirement, however, for 
standing in the context of a challenge to a land use decision by 
a board of zoning appeals is that the party be aggrieved: 
Any person or persons jointly or severally 
aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
zoning appeals, or any aggrieved taxpayer or 
any officer, department, board or bureau of 
the locality, may file with the clerk of the 
circuit court for the county or city a 
petition . . . specifying the grounds on 
which aggrieved within 30 days after the 
final decision of the board. 
 
Code § 15.2-2314 (emphasis added.)  Although the text of Code 
§ 15.2-2314 refers only to a board of zoning appeals, we have 
previously applied the same standard to actions originating from 
land use decisions made by local governing bodies.  See 
Deerfield, 283 Va. at 762, 767, 724 S.E.2d at 725, 728 (applying 
the "aggrieved person" standard to a city's decision to allow a 
11 
development of a residential subdivision on a portion of a 
beach); Braddock, 268 Va. at 422-25, 601 S.E.2d at 552-54 
(applying the "aggrieved person" standard to a party's challenge 
to a board of supervisors' denial of its application to rezone 
two tracts of land).  Additionally, we have stated that it would 
be inconsistent to interpret the statutory section governing 
appeals from boards of supervisors differently from the 
statutory section governing appeals from boards of zoning 
appeals.  Friends of Clark Mtn. Found. v. Board of Supervisors 
of Orange County, 242 Va. 16, 22, 406 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1991). 
 
We further disagree with complainants' argument that 
Braddock is inconsistent with the authorities on which it is 
based.  In that case, when Braddock challenged a board of 
supervisors' denial of its application to rezone two tracts of 
land, we first considered whether Braddock had an ownership 
interest in the subject property.  268 Va. at 422-23, 601 S.E.2d 
at 552-53.  We then addressed whether Braddock, as a non-owner, 
nonetheless had standing.  In determining that Braddock, as a 
non-owner, had no standing to challenge the denial of rezoning, 
we indicated that "a party, to have standing, must show that he 
has been aggrieved by the judgment or decree appealed from."  
Id. at 425, 601 S.E.2d at 554 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because Braddock did not 
have an interest in the entire property subject to rezoning at 
12 
the time of the filing of the suit, having assigned its right to 
purchase a portion of the land, and subsequently having neither 
a proprietary or a legal right affected by the rezoning, it "was 
not injuriously affected by the Board's refusal to rezone."  Id. 
at 426, 601 S.E.2d at 554. 
We affirmed in a recent case that the "aggrieved person" 
standard is appropriate in the context of a challenge to a land 
use decision by means of a declaratory judgment action.  See 
Deerfield, 283 Va. at 762, 767, 724 S.E.2d at 725, 728.  In 
Deerfield, appellants, members of the Committee of Petitioners 
of the Buckroe Beach Bayfront Park Petition, initiated a 
declaratory judgment action challenging the City's decision to 
allow the development of a residential subdivision on a portion 
of Buckroe Beach.  Id. at 761-62, 724 S.E.2d at 725.  In 
reaching our conclusion, we employed both the declaratory 
judgment "justiciable interest" language and the "aggrieved 
person" standard.  We held that the Committee lacked standing 
because it did not maintain an "ongoing justiciable right or 
interest that could be aggrieved by the development of the 
Buckroe Beach Property such as would give rise to legal standing 
by the Committee to challenge the development in a declaratory 
judgment action."  Id. at 767, 724 S.E.2d at 728 (emphasis 
added.) 
13 
As evidenced by our analysis herein, any distinction 
between an "aggrieved party" and "justiciable interest" is a 
distinction without a difference in declaratory judgment actions 
challenging land use decisions.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
did not err in applying the "aggrieved person" standard to 
determine standing in Friends and the individual complainants' 
declaratory judgment action challenging the Board's land use 
decision. 
C. 
Whether Pleadings Sufficient to Allege Standing 
To show a justiciable controversy sufficient to establish a 
claim for declaratory judgment, the individual complainants must 
articulate legally enforceable rights, and courts must be able 
to evaluate those claims of right. 
Unlike a challenge to a land use decision by a party 
claiming an ownership interest in the subject property where the 
affected property right is readily apparent, a party who claims 
no ownership interest in the subject property has standing to 
file a declaratory judgment action challenging the land use 
decision only if it can satisfy a two-step test.  First, the 
complainant must own or occupy "real property within or in close 
proximity to the property that is the subject of" the land use 
determination, thus establishing that it has "a direct, 
immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest in the decision."  
14 
Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 
231 Va. 415, 420, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902-03 (1986). 
Second, the complainant must allege facts demonstrating a 
particularized harm to "some personal or property right, legal 
or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the 
petitioner different from that suffered by the public 
generally."  Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Clark, 281 Va. 679, 
687, 709 S.E.2d 150, 155 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n, 231 Va. 
at 419-20, 344 S.E.2d at 903 (indicating that complainants must 
demonstrate that they stand to suffer a particularized harm not 
shared by the general public).  Complainants do not need to 
establish that the particularized harm has already occurred.  
Charlottesville Area Fitness, 285 Va. at 98, 737 S.E.2d at 11-12 
("The General Assembly created the power to issue declaratory 
judgments to resolve disputes before the right is violated.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Absent an allegation of 
injury or potential injury not shared by the general public, 
complainants have not established standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action in a land use case. 
When applying these requirements to the case at bar, and 
assuming without deciding that the individual complainants all 
hold property interests sufficiently proximate to the Black 
Marsh site, each is still required to plead facts sufficient to 
15 
claim particularized harms to rights not shared by the general 
public.  It is in this requirement that the pleading of each 
individual complainant fails. 
The site in question was already zoned for industrial use, 
and sand and gravel extraction activities are permitted subject 
to any conditions imposed by the permit approved by the Board.  
The individual complainants have not tied their allegations of 
harm to any activity of Black Marsh, either by reference to the 
inadequacy of the conditions imposed by the permit or otherwise.  
Although the individual complainants presented conclusory 
allegations as to possible harms, the general objections pled by 
the individual complainants present no factual background upon 
which an inference can be drawn that Black Marsh's particular 
use of the property would produce such harms and thus impact the 
complainants.  Thus, the individual complainants have not met 
their burden to provide sufficient facts in their complaint to 
allege how this particular use, Black Marsh's sand and gravel 
extraction site, causes the loss of some personal or property 
right belonging to the individual complainants different from 
the public in general. 
Indeed, the individual complainants failed to offer any 
factual background from which to infer that the proposed mining 
operation would cause sufficient noise, particulate matter, or 
pollution off site to cause actual harm.  Rather, the permit 
16 
attached to the complaint imposing conditions for operation of 
the project requires that Black Marsh adhere to county 
restrictions regarding pollution, particulate matter, and noise.  
The individual complainants do not allege any facts to indicate 
that the conditions imposed by the permit would be inadequate to 
protect their property rights. 
The individual complainants rely heavily on Riverview, in 
which we recognized that certain landowners had standing, noting 
that their location within 2,000 feet of the proposed use meant 
that they lived within sufficient proximity to have a 
"justiciable interest."  Riverview, 259 Va. at 427, 528 S.E.2d 
at 103.  As we have reiterated today, however, proximity alone 
is insufficient to plead a "justiciable interest" in a 
declaratory judgment action appealing a land use decision.  To 
demonstrate standing, a complaint must also allege sufficient 
facts showing harm to some personal or proprietary right 
different than that suffered by the public generally. 
Unlike the Black Marsh site, the property in question in 
Riverview was not already zoned for industrial use, but rather 
commercial use, and the land use decision complained of was a 
rezoning.  Id. at 422-23, 528 S.E.2d at 100-01.  Furthermore, 
plaintiffs in Riverview included in their complaint a laundry 
list of particularized harms, including:  (1) that they already 
experienced noise and disturbances from the 300 trucks a day on 
17 
adjacent roadways, which number would double to up to 600 under 
the proposal; (2) that the United States Coast Guard had 
conducted a study indicating that liquid leakage, "garbage 
juice," was draining off of a barge and into the river; and (3) 
that Virginia Department of Environmental Quality officials 
found contaminated liquid spilling from garbage containers being 
loaded onto barges.  Second Amended Complaint at 12, 18-19, 
Riverview Farm Assocs. v. Board of Supervisors, 259 Va. 419, 528 
S.E.2d 99 (2000) (Record No. 990853). 
Here, the complaint filed by the individual complainants, 
who were given leave to amend but decided against amendment, 
does not allege any factual basis for the individual 
complainants' concerns of off-site effects caused by the sand 
and gravel operation.  As a result, we conclude that the 
individual complainants have failed to meet their burden of 
alleging the particularized harms required to survive a 
demurrer. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the circuit court did 
not err in applying the aggrieved party standard in determining 
standing in a declaratory judgment action challenging a local 
governing body's land use decision.  We further hold that, based 
upon the insufficiency of allegations in their complaint, the 
18 
individual complainants did not have standing to proceed.  Thus, 
we will affirm the circuit court's judgment. 
Affirmed.