Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ABRAHAM SAFFOLD

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 30, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116710  
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
The question presented is whether the trial court’s  
failure to comply with MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) in accepting  
defendant’s guilty plea to one count of receiving and  
concealing stolen property and fourth felony offender demands  
reversal of defendant’s conviction. This undertaking is one  
where we, as our predecessor courts have done for over a  
quarter century, are interpreting and applying our own rules  
concerning guilty pleas.  MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires the  
trial court to inform the defendant that he waived his right  
at trial to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Here,  
the trial court did not inform defendant of the presumption of  
innocence during the guilty plea hearing. However, earlier in  
the day defendant was present while the same judge instructed  
the jury that convened for defendant’s trial—on the charge to  
which he subsequently pleaded guilty—that the defendant was  
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable  
doubt.  In light of the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235  
NW2d 132 (1975), the question is whether there was  
substantial, not strict, compliance with the requirements of  
MCR 6.302.  
Despite the trial court’s omission of the presumption of  
innocence during the plea hearing, we hold that defendant “was  
informed of such constitutional rights and incidents of a  
trial as reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he  
understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was  
knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a trial and  
such rights and incidents.”  Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 122.  
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate  
defendant’s plea of guilty.  
2  
I  
Jury selection for defendant’s trial1 began on the  
morning of April 13, 1998. In the afternoon of the first day  
of trial, after the first witness testified, the defendant  
decided to accept the prosecutor’s plea bargain offer.  
Pursuant to that offer defendant pleaded guilty to one count  
of receiving and concealing stolen property, MCL 750. 535, and  
to being a fourth felony offender, MCL 769.12.  The trial  
judge engaged in a lengthy hearing with defendant on his  
guilty plea.2  However, during that hearing the trial judge  
did not inform defendant that by pleading guilty he was giving  
up the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.3  On  
July 17, 1998, defendant was sentenced as an habitual  
offender, fourth offense, to a prison term of twelve to forty  
years.  
On December 14, 1998, defendant moved to withdraw his  
plea on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him  
1Defendant was charged with five counts: 
1) home 
invasion, second degree, MCL 750.110a(3), 2) home invasion, 
second degree, MCL 750.110a(3), 3) receiving and concealing 
weapons 
or 
firearms, 
MCL 750.535b, 4) receiving and concealing 
stolen property in excess of $100, MCL 750. 535, and 5) 
receiving and concealing stolen property in excess of $100, 
MCL 750. 535.  
2The transcript for the hearing totals thirty-one pages.  
3 MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c).  
3  
 
 
of the presumption of innocence.  After a hearing on  
January 25, 1999, the trial court denied the motion.  On March  
28, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum opinion4  
reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to  
withdraw his guilty plea.  The prosecution appealed to this  
Court, and we granted leave to appeal.  463 Mich 906 (2000).5  
II  
The procedures governing the acceptance of a guilty plea  
were first adopted by this Court in 19736 and are currently  
set forth in MCR 6.302. MCR 6.302(A) provides that  
[t]he court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is 
understanding, voluntary, and accurate.  Before  
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the 
court must place the defendant under oath and 
personally carry out subrules (B)—(E).  
In People v Shekoski, 393 Mich 134; 224 NW2d 656 (1974), this  
Court had held that “strict adherence to those requirements7  
is mandatory and that neither substantial compliance nor the  
4Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 28, 2000 
(Docket No. 217802).  
5 In granting leave, we directed the parties to “include 
discussion of whether the alleged error is subject to harmless 
error review and, if so, what is the appropriate harmless 
error standard in this case.” Because we hold that the trial  
court substantially complied with the requirements for taking 
a plea, we do not reach the question of harmless error.  
6389 Mich lv-lvii  
7At that time, the requirements, which were substantially 
similar to those of MCR 6.302, were found in GCR 1963, 785.7.  
4  
 
 
 
absence of prejudicial error will be deemed sufficient.”  
However, one year later in Guilty Plea Cases, supra, this  
Court renounced the Shekoski holding that “any failure of  
strict adherence to the procedure and practice specified in  
Rule 785.7 [now MCR 6.302] mandates reversal.”  Guilty Plea  
Cases, supra, p 113. Instead, the Court adopted a  doctrine of  
substantial compliance, holding that “[w]hether a particular  
departure from Rule 785.7 justifies or requires reversal or  
remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of  
the noncompliance.” Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 113.  Thus,  
the question on appeal is whether it appears on the record  
that the defendant was informed of such constitutional rights  
and incidents of a trial as is reasonable to warrant the  
conclusion that he understood what a trial is and that by  
pleading guilty he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his  
right to a trial and such rights and incidents. Id. at 113,  
122.  
To 
determine 
if 
there was substantial compliance with the  
court rule, the first question is whether the right omitted or  
misstated is a “Jaworski right.” In People v Jaworski, 387  
Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972), this Court held that a plea of  
guilty must be set aside where the record of the plea  
proceedings shows that the defendant was not advised of all  
three constitutional rights involved in a waiver of a guilty  
5  
 
 
 
plea: 1) the right to trial by jury, 2) the right to confront  
one’s 
accusers, 
and 
3) 
the 
privilege 
against 
self­
incrimination, relying on Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238; 89  
S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969).  If a Jaworski right is  
omitted from the plea proceedings, then reversal is mandated.  
However, the omission from the plea proceedings of one or  
another of the rights attendant to a trial, other than a  
Jaworski right, or the imprecise recital of any such right,  
including a Jaworski right, does not necessarily require  
reversal. 
Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 122.  
Here, the trial court failed to inform the defendant of  
the presumption of innocence.  Informing defendant of his  
right to be presumed innocent is required under MCR  
6.302(B)(3)(c)8, but is not one of the three Jaworski rights.  
We note that in some cases the Court of Appeals has stated or  
assumed that the presumption of innocence had the same status  
as the three Jaworski rights—that its omission mandates an  
automatic reversal.  See People v Russell, 73 Mich App 628,  
629-630; 252 NW2d 533 (1977), and People v Bender, 124 Mich  
App 571; 335 NW2d 85 (1983). 
In other cases, this Court and  
the Court of Appeals have reversed a guilty plea, without  
8MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires the court to advise the 
defendant 
and 
determine that the defendant understands that if  
his plea is accepted the defendant will not have a trial and 
gives up the rights he would have had at trial, including the 
right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.”  
6  
 
 
 
 
  
engaging in further analysis, when the trial court omitted the  
presumption of innocence.  See People v Lawrence, 413 Mich  
866; 317 NW2d 856 (1982)9, People v Mitchell, 125 Mich App  
475; 336 NW2d 31 (1983), and People v Heintzelman, 142 Mich  
App 94; 368 NW2d 903 (1985).10  To the extent that these cases  
9 The order in Lawrence, read, in its entirety:  
On order of the Court, the defendant having 
filed a request for review of his conviction, this 
Court having issued an order to show cause why the 
defendant’s conviction should not be reversed  
because he was not advised of the presumption of 
innocence 
as 
required 
by 
GCR 
1963, 
785.7(1)(g)(iii), and the prosecutor’s response to 
that order having been considered by the Court, 
now, therefore, it is ordered that the request for 
review be treated as an application for leave to 
appeal and, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), in lieu 
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the  
defendant’s convictions because he was not advised  
of the presumption of innocence. 
GCR 1963, 
785.7(1)(g)(iii); Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 
125; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).  We remand the cases to  
the 
Washtenaw 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
further  
proceedings. 
 
10 The dissent relies on the above-cited cases to assert  
that this Court has established a precedent that where a 
defendant is not informed of his right to be presumed 
innocent, his conviction must be set aside, and that the Court 
of Appeals has “followed this established precedent.”  Slip op  
at 8.  We would note that in Russell, supra, the Court of  
Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction despite the trial 
court’s failure to “[speak] the precise words ‘presumed 
innocent’.”  73 Mich App 631. In People v Jackson, 71 Mich  
App 468; 248 NW2d 551 (1976), the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction where, although he was not informed 
of his right to be presumed innocent at the guilty plea 
proceeding, he was informed of that right in a prior guilty 
plea entered the preceding day before the same judge. Id. at  
469-470.  
(continued...)  
7 
  
 
 
 
 
10(...continued)  
We futher note that the decision of the Court of Appeals  
in People v Ingram, 166 Mich App 433; 424 NW2d 19 (1988), did 
not involve a failure to advise, but rather an imprecise 
recital of the right to be presumed innocent.  The trial court  
stated that the defendant would be “presumed innocent of this 
offense until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The  
Court 
of 
Appeals 
affirmed the defendant’s guilty plea, finding 
that “[i]t appears on the record that defendant was  
sufficiently informed of his constitutional rights and the 
incidents of trial to warrant a conclusion that he understood  
what a trial is and that by tendering his plea he was 
knowingly and intelligently giving up his right to a trial and 
its consequent rights and protections.” Id. at 437-438.  
In Heintzelman, supra, Mitchell, supra, and People v  
Wilson, 78 Mich App 307; 259 NW2d 356 (1977), the Court of 
Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions where there was 
a total absence of advice concerning the presumption of  
innocence.  
Finally, in Bender, supra, the defendant pleaded guilty 
to an habitual offender charge after being tried and found 
guilty by a jury on the accompanying substantive offenses. 
The Court of Appeals observed that defendant was informed of 
a number of his rights through the statement of those rights 
by his counsel when the defendant expressed a desire to plead 
guilty to the habitual charge while the jury was still  
deliberating on the substantive charges.  The Court of Appeals  
stated: “Although defendant was not personally advised of a 
number of his rights by the trial court, defense counsel’s on­
the-record statement of some of defendant’s rights satisfies 
the requirement that the trial court ‘personally address’ the 
defendant as to those rights. . . . As long as defendant is 
orally informed in open court of his rights and the trial 
court can personally observe defendant’s demeanor and  
responses, the purpose of the personally address requirement 
is achieved. . . .  Nor is it fatal to the plea that defendant 
was informed of his rights before the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on the principal charge.”  Id. at 577 (citations  
omitted).
 Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Bender supports this Court’s analysis in the present case in 
determining that the recital of a right in open court at a 
time other than the actual plea proceeding is sufficient to 
(continued...)  
8 
    
 
held that the omission of the presumption of innocence from a  
guilty plea proceedings requires an automatic reversal of the  
guilty plea, we disapprove of them.11  
In Guilty Plea Cases, we did recognize that the  
presumption of innocence is “at the core of our criminal  
process and fundamental to defendant’s understanding of a  
trial.” Id. at 125. Nevertheless, the omission from a plea  
proceeding of a right attendant to trial, other than a  
Jaworski right, does not necessarily require reversal.  Id. at  
122.  If from the record it appears that the defendant has  
10(...continued) 
satisfy the “personally address” requirement; the Court 
vacated the guilty plea only because there was a total absence  
of advice concerning the presumption of innocence. We note, 
of course, that under current practice, a defendant does not 
plead guilty to an habitual supplementation.  
Therefore, while we agree with the dissent’s view that 
“[t]his line of precedent firmly establishes [that a complete 
failure] to advise [a] defendant of his right to be presumed 
innocent” will continue to result in reversal of a defendant’s  
guilty plea, we conclude that the above precedent does not 
stand for the ultimate proposition urged by the dissent:  that  
advise 
concerning 
the presumption of innocence delivered at an 
in-court proceeding close in time to the guilty plea 
proceeding is insufficient compliance with the court rule.  In  
our view, the above precedent fully supports our conclusion in 
this case that the advice imparted earlier in the case by the 
trial court was sufficient compliance with MCR 6.302(B).  
11We continue to emphasize the point we made in People v  
Williams, 386 Mich 277; 192 NW2d 466 (1971), and Jaworski, 
supra, that it is important for the trial court to make a full 
and complete record of protecting all the defendant’s rights. 
Although the trial court’s plea hearing with defendant in this 
case was otherwise exemplary, the inadvertent omission of one 
sentence gave rise to three years of appellate review.  
9  
 
been informed of his right to a trial and that this right is  
being waived by his plea of guilty, reversal is not required  
by the omission of any of the rights enumerated in the Court  
rule, even the presumption of innocence. Id.  
Here, defendant was not informed of the presumption of  
innocence during the plea hearing.  However earlier in the  
day, while defendant was present, the same judge had given the  
defendant’s jury, which was empaneled on the same charge to  
which defendant pleaded guilty, a thorough explanation of the  
presumption of innocence,12 stating:  
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be 
innocent. This means that you must start with the 
presumption that the defendant is innocent.  This  
presumption continues throughout the trial, and 
entitles the defendant to a verdict of not guilty 
unless you find from the evidence beyond a  
reasonable doubt that he is.  
Every crime is made up of parts called  
elements.  The prosecutor must prove each element 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The defendant is not required to prove his 
innocence or to do anything.  
12 Although we reversed in the Howell case for failure to  
impart the presumption of innocence information, Guilty Plea  
Cases, supra at 125, nothing in the opinion suggests that such 
information was supplied by the judge, or any other  
participant, at another stage of the proceedings. In other  
words, Howell represents a complete failure to impart the 
presumption of innocence information—not an “alternative” 
impartation of the information as in this case. The same is  
true of our summary order in People v Lawrence, 413 Mich 866  
(1982).  
10  
 
 
Should you find that the prosecutor has not 
proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty.  
A reasonable doubt is defined as a fair, 
honest doubt growing out of the lack of evidence or 
the evidence in the case.  It is, however, not an 
imaginary or a possible doubt.  Instead, it is a 
doubt based upon reason, and common sense.  It is a  
doubt which is considered reasonable after a  
careful and considered examination of all the facts  
and circumstances in the case.  
Before defendant pleaded guilty, his trial on the charge to  
which he pleaded guilty had begun.  Defendant had participated  
in having his constitutional rights to a trial by jury  
implemented, and specifically had witnessed the jury being  
informed of the presumption of innocence to which he was  
entitled.  
In Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 114-115, we approved cases  
where the trial judge did not personally address the defendant  
by informing him of the maximum sentence (Courtney) or the  
charge that the defendant was facing (Bauer). We concluded  
that the prosecutor’s statement of that information in the  
presence of the defendants was sufficient. We stated:  
These departures do not justify reversal. 
While it would be better for the judge to cover all 
the points himself, as long as he assumes the  
principal 
burden 
of 
imparting 
the 
required 
information, as did the judges in Courtney and  
Bauer, the purpose of requiring him personally to 
address the defendant and in so doing observe his 
demeanor and responses is achieved.  
A guilty plea conviction will not be reversed 
if the judge engages in the required colloquy but  
11  
fails to mention an item which the record shows was  
established through, for example, an opening 
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or 
defense counsel in the hearing of the judge and  
defendant. It is proper for the prosecutor or the 
clerk to read the information in the judge’s  
presence. [Emphasis supplied.]  
Here, 
the 
trial 
judge addressed defendant with respect to  
every right contained in the court rules save one.  That  
failure was rectified by the judge’s earlier statement, in  
defendant’s presence, that informed the jury—and defendant–at  
length concerning the presumption of innocence.  Thus, the  
judge clearly assumed “the principal burden of imparting the  
required information,” id. at 114.  
In Courtney and Bauer, this Court approved the practice  
of some of the required information being imparted by the  
prosecutor—or, indeed, as we stated later, by “an opening  
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or defense  
counsel in the hearing of the judge and defendant.”  Id. at  
114-115.  In such situations the reviewing court will rely on  
the defendant’s presence when the information regarding the  
presumption of innocence is imparted to conclude that the  
defendant is aware of that information and that, therefore,  
his plea is knowing and understanding.13  The clear import of  
13As indicated by the court rules themselves, and also by 
this Court’s discussion in Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 126­
128, the voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea is 
determined by his awareness of whether there have been any 
(continued...)  
12  
 
our statements in Guilty Plea Cases is that observing the  
demeanor and responses of the defendant when advice regarding  
the “bulk” of the rights is imparted is sufficient to  
establish 
compliance 
with 
the 
“personally 
address”  
requirement.14  
In contrast to the situations already approved by us in  
the Courtney and Bauer cases, in this case it was the judge  
who imparted the additional information.  Thus, we conclude  
that “the purpose of requiring [the judge] to personally  
address the defendant and in so doing observe his demeanor and  
responses [has been] achieved.” Id. at 114.  
III  
Apparently the dissent agrees with us on the legal  
principles involved. 
Both opinions recognize that the  
defendant’s plea must constitute a knowing and intelligent  
waiver of the defendant’s rights.  We also agree that reversal  
of defendant’s conviction is not required if there is  
13(...continued) 
plea or sentence agreements, whether he has been threatened or 
otherwise coerced into pleading guilty, and whether it is his 
own choice to plead guilty, MCR 6.302(C), not by whether he 
has received the information concerning his trial rights.  
14There is nothing in the Guilty Plea Cases opinion from  
which we could conclude that the trial judges in Courtney and  
Bauer were observing the defendants’ demeanors when the 
prosecutors imparted the “missing” information, and, of 
course, the defendants would not have made any response to 
statements by the prosecutors.  
13  
 
substantial compliance with the court rule.  
The  point of difference between the majority and the  
dissent is in the dissent’s application of the concept of  
“substantial 
compliance”. 
The 
majority 
abides 
by 
the  
interpretation of our rules set forth in Guilty Plea Cases  
that has held sway for over twenty-five years: there is  
substantial 
compliance 
with 
the 
“personally 
address”  
requirement if, even though the judge fails to recite a  
specific right at the guilty plea proceeding, the omission is  
rectified by recitation of the right in the defendant’s  
presence at some other point during the in-court proceedings.  
The dissent apparently would require strict compliance with  
MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c), and mandate reversal whenever the  
defendant was not instructed on the presumption of innocence  
at the guilty plea hearing itself. In so doing, the dissent  
would sub silentio overrule Guilty Plea Cases, and return to  
the  strict compliance rule of People v Shekoski.  We believe  
that the crucial question is whether the defendant’s plea was  
knowing and voluntary, not whether the  trial court has  
engaged in a letter-perfect “talismanic chant.”15
 Under the  
court rule, a failure to state one of the rights at the plea  
hearing does not require vacating the conviction where, as  
15People v Willsie, 96 Mich App 350, 353; 292 NW2d 145 
(1980).  
14  
here, 
the 
court 
has 
directly addressed the defendant regarding  
the enumerated rights generally and the defendant has  
otherwise been informed adequately of the omitted right.  The  
dissent has not identified any basis in the rule to support  
its contrary position.  Thus, we decline the dissent’s  
invitation to turn our backs on established precedent and re­
interpret 
“substantial 
compliance” 
to 
require 
strict  
compliance at the time of the plea-taking. 
 Finally, the dissent suggests that the presumption of  
innocence has the same status as the three Jaworski  
rights—that its omission mandates an automatic reversal. In  
Jaworski this Court held that in order for there to be a valid  
guilty plea, there must be an enumeration and a waiver on the  
record of the three federal constitutional rights as set forth  
in Boykin v Alabama, supra: the privilege against compulsory  
self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right  
to confront one’s accusers.  The United States Supreme Court  
has not held that the presumption of innocence is such a  
right. See Johnson v Ohio, 419 US 924, 925; 95 S Ct 200; 42  
L Ed 2d 158 (1974).  Although we continue to recognize the  
importance of the presumption of innocence, we decline to  
elevate it to the status of the Boykin/Jaworski rights.  
IV  
On the basis of the whole record, including the beginning  
15  
of the jury trial earlier that same day, we find that the  
trial judge’s initial determination that the defendant  
knowingly and voluntarily gave up his right to a trial and all  
the attendant rights was correct.  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals  vacating  
defendant’s guilty plea, and reinstate defendant’s conviction  
and sentence.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with  
WEAVER, J.  
16  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF THE MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 116710  
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
YOUNG, J. (concurring).  
I join in the majority opinion and fully concur that an  
omission from the plea proceedings of one or another of the  
rights attendant to trial, other than a Jaworski right, does  
not 
necessarily 
require reversal.  However, I write separately  
because I wish to clarify that, in my view, there was no  
omission of the “presumption of innocence,” and thus, no error  
under MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) occurred in this case.  
The trial court, during the plea proceeding, advised  
defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury and that he  
had a right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable  
doubt. Specifically, the trial judge directly said the  
following to defendant:  
The Court: You obviously know what a jury  
trial is.  You’ve been sitting here during jury  
 
 
selection, and you’ve seen witnesses testify so you 
understand that you’re here because you have the 
right to be here.  Meaning you have the right to 
have this trial, and you have the right to have the  
jury decide the facts, and decide whether or not  
your guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
And you’ve seen cross-examination so you understand 
you have the right to see, hear and cross-examine 
the State’s witnesses.  Am I correct in inferring 
that? [Emphasis added].  
* * *  
The Court: Do you understand that you give up 
those rights, and give up the right to a trial if 
you change your plea to guilty?  
In my view, advising defendant that he had a right to  
have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily  
encompassed the advice that he would have been presumed  
innocent.  The presumption of innocence is “nothing more than  
an amplification of the prosecution’s burden of persuasion.”  
See 2 McCormick, Evidence (5th ed), § 342, p 437.  If the  
presumption of innocence adds anything, it is merely “a  
warning not to treat certain things improperly as evidence.”  
9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 2511, p 409.   
The court did not recite literally the court rule  
terminology. However, when defendant was told that he had a  
right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he  
necessarily learned that he would be considered innocent in  
the absence of such proof of his guilt.  In my view, this  
advice adequately informed defendant of the “presumption of  
innocence.”  No single method of recital is required.  Guilty  
2  
Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 119-120; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).  
I believe that the phrase “presumption of innocence” is  
merely a shorthand way of referring to the right to have a  
jury find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Accordingly, I believe defendant was in fact informed of the  
“presumption of innocence” and that no omission of advice as  
required by the rule occurred in this case.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., concurred with YOUNG, J.  
3  
______________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116710  
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent. The issue before this Court is  
whether the trial court’s failure to comply with MCR 6.302 in  
accepting defendant’s guilty plea (to a charge of receiving  
and concealing stolen property) requires the reversal of his  
conviction.1  Contrary to the requirement of MCR 6.302, the  
1  MCR 6.302, in pertinent part, provides: 
(A) Plea Requirements.  The court may not 
accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless 
it is convinced that the plea is understanding, 
voluntary, and accurate. Before accepting a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must place 
the defendant under oath and personally carry out 
subrules (B)–(E).  
(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly  
to the defendant, the court must advise the  
defendant 
and 
determine 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands: 
(continued...) 
 
  
  
trial court failed to inform the defendant, at his guilty plea  
hearing, of his right to be presumed innocent.  The trial  
court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on  
this ground.  The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed,  
asserting that the rule required the trial court “to directly  
advise a defendant of the presumption of innocence on the  
record before accepting a guilty plea.” 
Unpublished  
memorandum 
opinion, 
issued March 28, 2000 (Docket No. 217802),  
at 2.  
I. PURPOSE AND GOAL OF GUILTY PLEA HEARING  
The primary purpose of MCR 6.302’s mandate that the  
defendant 
be 
personally 
addressed 
with 
the 
required 
statements  
is grounded in the principle that the defendant’s plea must  
constitute a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of his  
constitutional rights. McCarthy v United States, 394 US 459,  
465; 89 S Ct 1166; 22 L Ed 2d 418 (1969).  To that end, the  
rule: (1) provides the court accepting the guilty plea the  
opportunity 
to 
observe the defendant’s demeanor and the manner  
1(...continued)  
* * *  
(3) if the plea is accepted, the defendant 
will not have a trial of any kind, and so gives up 
the rights the defendant would have at a trial, 
including the right:  
* * *  
(c) to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty . . . . [Emphasis added.]  
2  
  
  
  
in which he responds to the court’s statements and questions;  
(2) impresses upon the defendant the full gravity and import  
of his plea, and that, in so pleading, he waives the right to  
a trial and all of his other related constitutional rights;2  
and (3) creates a record of factors relevant to ascertaining  
the voluntariness of defendant’s plea.3 
People v Napier, 69  
Mich App 46, 48; 244 NW2d 359 (1976), see also Guilty Plea  
Cases, 395 Mich 96, 122; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).  
II. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE  
The principle of the presumption of innocence is an  
essential foundation of our adversarial system of criminal  
justice. In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L  
2 McCarthy, supra at 465. See also McMann v Richardson, 
397 US 759, 774; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970); North  
Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31; 91 S Ct 160; 27 L Ed 2d 162 
(1970) (stating that a voluntary plea is one made with 
knowledge of fundamental constitutional rights and an  
understanding of the nature of the crimes charged); People v  
Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 511-515; 537 NW2d 891 (1995); People v  
Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 95; 506 NW2d 547 (1993),  citing Brady  
v United States, 397 US 742, 747-748; 90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 
747 (1970) (stating that “a guilty plea is the most serious 
step a defendant can take in a criminal prosecution [and] 
[f]or that reason, the plea ‘not only must be voluntary but 
must be [a] knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient 
awareness 
of 
the 
relevant 
circumstances 
and 
likely 
consequences.’”).  
3  An equally important, albeit more pragmatic, reason 
for requiring an on-the-record recitation of defendant’s 
rights is to avoid, or at least discourage, numerous and 
sometimes 
frivolous 
post 
conviction 
attacks 
on 
the  
constitutional validity of the plea.  See Orfield, Pleas in  
federal criminal procedure, 35 Notre Dame Lawyer 1, 31-32  
(1959); Hoffman, What next in federal criminal rules? 21 Wash  
& Lee L R 1, 8 (1964).  
3  
 
Ed 2d 368 (1970), see also Coffin v United States, 156 US 432,  
453; 15 S Ct 394; 39 L Ed 481 (1895).  The presumption of  
innocence 
is 
“the 
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and  
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration  
of our criminal law.”  Coffin, supra at 453.4  “The accused  
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense  
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose  
his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that  
he would be stigmatized by the conviction.” Id.  
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the fundamental  
right to a jury trial.  Parke v Raley, 506 US 20, 29; 113 S Ct  
517; 121 L Ed 2d 391 (1992). It is because of the waiver of  
4  “One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is 
that the (prosecution) has the burden of establishing guilt 
solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under 
circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair 
procedure. Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 729; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L 
Ed 2d 751 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). One of these  
safeguards is the presumption of innocence.  See also Abraham, 
The Judicial Process (7th ed), pp 104-105, stating:  
It is a cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon justice 
that an accused is presumed innocent unless and 
until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Few, if any, concepts are more deeply rooted in our 
traditions. . . . 
The layperson may quite 
naturally be quick to adjudge an accused guilty in 
his or her own mind and be sometimes joined by the 
press, particularly in America, but the Anglo-Saxon 
legal profession on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean, and throughout the English-speaking world, 
has done its best to adhere to the time-honored  
principle that an accused person is presumed to be 
innocent until proved otherwise beyond a reasonable 
doubt by due process of law.  
4  
 
  
 
these rights and because a guilty plea is itself effectively  
a self-imposed conviction, that the process “demands the  
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing  
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full  
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its  
consequence.”  Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 243-244; 89 S Ct  
1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969).  It is with this principle in  
mind that a court must review a guilty plea and determine  
whether the accused has been informed of all the rights that  
he is waiving.  
III. MCR 6.302  
MCR 6.302 states that the defendant is entitled during  
the guilty plea hearing to a direct and explicit statement  
from the court concerning the rights set forth in the rule.  
It is expressly required that the court “speak[] directly to”  
the defendant, and that the court “must advise” the defendant  
and “determine that the defendant understands” that he has the  
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.  MCR 6.302.  
Clearly, the omission in this case was more than merely  
an imprecise recital of the rights to which defendant was  
entitled and which he was surrendering by virtue of his plea.  
See People v Russell, 73 Mich App 628, 631; 252 NW2d 533  
(1977), asserting that “[t]he determinative question . . . is  
whether the trial judge omitted advice on that subject or  
merely gave an imprecise recital.” The flaw in procedure in  
5  
 
  
 
  
the instant case was not that the wrong formulation or the  
wrong articulation of defendant’s rights was provided, but  
rather that no formulation and no articulation were provided.  
As the majority recognizes, I agree that substantial  
compliance with MCR 6.302, with regard to the right to be  
presumed innocent, is all that is required.  However, the  
question in the instant case is whether there was any  
compliance with the rule.  I can only answer this in the  
negative because the statement required by the rule was not  
made, precisely or imprecisely, perfectly or imperfectly, at  
the guilty plea hearing.  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION  
The majority cites the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96,  
113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), and states that “[w]hether a  
particular departure from [the rule] justifies or requires  
reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on  
the nature of the noncompliance.”  Slip op at 5. The majority  
then asserts that the inquiry on appeal “is whether it appears  
on the record that the defendant was informed of such  
constitutional rights and incidents of a trial as is  
reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he understood what  
a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly and  
voluntarily giving up his right to a trial and such rights and  
incidents.” Id., citing Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 122. The  
actual rule itself appears to be little more than a bit actor  
6  
in this process.  
While it is true that the Guilty Plea Cases established  
that the determination whether MCR 6.302 was “substantially  
complied with” was to be part of a case-by-case inquiry, this  
Court also made clear at the time that the rule requires that  
a defendant be advised of his right to be presumed innocent,  
because such right is “at the core of our criminal process and  
fundamental to defendant’s understanding of a trial.” Id. at  
125. In Guilty Plea Cases, this Court reversed a conviction  
entered on a plea of guilty where the trial court had failed  
to inform the defendant, during the guilty plea hearing, of  
his right to be presumed innocent. Id.  
Further, this Court has had subsequent occasion to  
address whether a defendant must be advised of this right, and  
has concluded that a trial court’s failure to advise the  
defendant, at the guilty plea hearing, that he has the right  
to be presumed innocent is error requiring reversal of the  
conviction.
 In People v Allen, 396 Mich 829 (1976), the  
defendant was not advised of the presumption of innocence,  
and, as a result, had his conviction set aside. In People v  
Lawrence, 413 Mich 866 (1982), there was an omission of any  
statement to the defendant that he had the right to be  
presumed innocent and, as a result, his conviction was  
reversed.  
The Court of Appeals has also followed this established  
7  
 
 
 
precedent.  In People v Ingram, 166 Mich App 433, 437-438; 424  
NW2d 19 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant  
must be advised at the guilty plea hearing, however  
imprecisely, that he is relinquishing his right to be presumed  
innocent. In People v Heintzelman, 142 Mich App 94, 95; 368  
NW2d 
903 
(1985), 
the 
defendant’s conviction was reversed where  
the trial court had failed to advise him of his right to be  
presumed innocent.  In People v Mitchell, 125 Mich App 475,  
477; 336 NW2d 31 (1983), the Court of Appeals reversed the  
defendant’s conviction where the trial court did not advise  
him of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.  
In People v Bender, 124 Mich App 571, 578; 335 NW2d 85 (1983),  
the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he right to be presumed  
innocent is of preeminent importance and, therefore, a  
defendant must be informed of this right on the record or his  
plea is constitutionally defective.” The Court proceeded to  
reverse the defendant’s conviction where the record did not  
disclose that he was “personally informed, precisely or  
imprecisely, of his right to be presumed innocent.” Id. In  
People v Wilson, 78 Mich App 307, 308; 259 NW2d 356 (1977),  
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed the defendant’s conviction where  
the record did not establish that the trial court had advised  
him of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty  
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This line of precedent firmly establishes that, where a  
8  
  
trial court has completely failed to advise the defendant of  
his right to be presumed innocent at the guilty plea hearing,  
the defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction, and  
either to replead or proceed to trial.  In this case,  
defendant was not informed, in any manner, of his right to be  
“presumed innocent until proved guilty.”  MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c).  
A waiver of the constitutional right set forth by the  
rule is supposed to be “an intentional relinquishment or  
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v Zerbst,  
304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938)(emphasis  
added); see also People v Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 510; 537 NW2d  
891 (1975). In this case, it is impossible to conclude that  
defendant made an intentional relinquishment of his right at  
trial to be presumed innocent. People v Scott, 381 Mich 143,  
147-48; 160 NW2d 878 (1968). This is simply because defendant  
was never informed at all of this right.  Obviously, it could  
not be determined that he understood that this right was being  
“forever relinquished” with respect to the charges to which he  
pleaded guilty.  Given the circuit court’s omission in this  
case, we cannot conceivably determine whether the purpose of  
MCR 6.302 was fulfilled, i.e., whether the defendant’s pleas  
constituted a “knowing and voluntary” waiver of his  
constitutional rights.5  
5  Indeed, it appears that one fundamental difference 
(continued...)  
9 
 
I am unpersuaded by the argument of the majority that,  
while this Court has previously stated that a failure to  
advise the defendant of his right to be presumed innocent at  
the guilty plea hearing is error requiring reversal, it is not  
error if the omitted statements concerning the presumption of  
innocence were made at some point during the criminal justice  
process, although not, as expressly required, at the guilty  
plea hearing itself.  
The majority observes, in this regard, that “earlier in  
the day defendant was present while the same judge instructed  
the jury that convened for defendant’s trial—on the charge to  
which he subsequently pleaded guilty—that the defendant was  
presumed innocent until proven guilty . . . .”  Slip op at 2.  
The majority accords greater weight to this happenstance than  
to the fact that the judge failed to comply with its  
obligation that it “must . . . personally” advise defendant of  
his constitutional rights, and that it must do so at the  
guilty plea hearing. The majority opinion continues in this  
regard:  
In light of the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich  
5(...continued) 
between 
“imprecise 
recitals,” 
which 
we 
have 
deemed 
appropriate 
in most instances, and no recital at all, is that, with 
respect to the former, it can still be determined, however 
imperfectly, on the appellate review whether a defendant’s 
plea has been made knowingly and voluntarily, whereas with the 
latter, it is impossible to conclude similarly because there 
is simply no record evidence at all.  
10  
 
96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the question is whether 
there was substantial, not strict, compliance with 
the requirements of MCR 6.302.[6]  
Despite the trial court’s omission of the 
presumption of innocence during the plea hearing, 
we hold that defendant “was informed of such  
constitutional rights and incidents of a trial as 
reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he  
understood what a trial is and that by pleading 
guilty he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up 
his right to a trial and such rights and  
incidents.” [Slip op at 2, quoting Guilty Plea  
Cases, supra at 122 (emphasis added).]  
One could hardly imagine a trial proceeding where the jury has  
not been informed that the defendant has a right to enjoy the  
presumption of innocence.  Is it the majority’s new rule that  
where, as might commonly occur, a guilty plea is taken after  
a defendant has decided to abort a trial, the court need not  
comply with those aspects of MCR 6.302 that were touched upon  
in any manner during such trial?  Does such a partial trial  
effectively nullify the requirement that a pleading defendant  
be apprised of his presumption of innocence?  Is the explicit  
requirement of the rule that the trial court “speak directly”  
6  While I agree that the proper inquiry is whether the 
trial court has “substantially complied” with the court rule, 
I disagree that a complete failure to make the required 
statements can nonetheless be characterized as “substantial”  
compliance.  It is not as if, for example, the court had 
advised the defendant that he had a right to be presumed “not 
guilty” as opposed to being presumed “innocent.”  Rather,  
there has been no compliance at all. 
As noted, our 
jurisprudence clearly articulates that there is a substantial 
difference between “imprecise recitals” and situations in 
which the required statement advising the defendant of his 
rights is not made at all.  See Russell, supra at 631; Ingram,  
supra at 437-438; Bender, supra at 578.  
11  
 
to the defendant satisfied where the court instead “speak[s]  
directly” to the jury?  Is the explicit requirement of the  
rule that the trial court advise the defendant of his rights  
during the guilty plea hearing satisfied when the defendant  
overhears these words in the court’s statement to the jury?  
Is the purpose of the rule, that the defendant be advised of  
his rights when he is most focused upon the implications of  
his nearly irrevocable decision to convict himself by a guilty  
plea, fulfilled where he overhears these rights in a context  
far removed from this moment of irrevocability?7  
To all of these questions, I answer that it is the  
defendant, not the members of the jury, who must ultimately  
consider the gravity of an admission of guilt.  And it is  
unwarranted to equate, as the majority does here, the  
defendant’s possible awareness of these rights when they were  
brought to the attention of the jury with the defendant  
himself being personally advised of these rights at the guilty  
plea hearing, after he has chosen to acknowledge the crime for  
which he has been charged.8  It is not during the jury trial  
7 “[A] guilty plea is more than an admission of conduct: 
it is a conviction.” Boykin, supra at 242.  
8  I emphasize the “possible” awareness of the defendant 
because, of course, there is no certainty that the defendant 
was even paying attention to, much less apprehending, any 
particular statement by the trial court to the jury. 
Defendant, at the time, may instead have been daydreaming or 
distracted or confused or consulting with his lawyer.  The  
(continued...)  
12  
 
that the defendant has made the momentous decision to admit  
guilt, and, thus, it is not at that juncture that he must be  
impressed with the import of his decision to plead guilty and  
be apprised of the consequences of his decision. Indeed, as  
this Court stated in the Guilty Plea Cases:  
That a defendant may have been tried by a jury 
in another case or learned of his rights in an 
earlier plea-taking proceeding would no more negate 
his right to be informed of the right to and 
incidents of a trial at the time a plea of guilty  
is offered than would proof that he had seen Perry 
Mason on television or read Erle Stanley Gardner.  
Many defendants have been made aware at one 
time or another of the right to an incidents of a 
trial and the consequences of a plea of guilty. 
Nevertheless, whatever the personal history of the  
accused and the quality of his representation, the 
appearance of justice and the integrity of the 
process by which pleas of guilty are offered and 
accepted require, in the solemn moment of passage  
from presumed innocence to conviction and potential  
imprisonment, 
that 
the 
judge 
apprise 
every 
defendant of the rights he is waiving and the 
consequences of his plea and make the other  
determinations required by the rule.  However, a  
recital of rights to one defendant by one judge on  
one day, may suffice as a recital of rights to that 
same defendant by the same judge on that same day 
in 
another 
case. 
[Id. 
at 
121-122 
(emphasis 
added).][9]  
8(...continued) 
virtue of MCR 6.302 is that, because the court must personally 
address the defendant and take into consideration the nature  
of his response in determining whether to accept the guilty 
plea, appellate courts can be reasonably confident that a 
defendant has intelligently relinquished the full panoply of 
rights attendant to a jury trial.  The appellate courts can 
have no similar assurance in the instant circumstance.  
9 The implication of the majority’s reasoning is that the 
(continued...)  
13 
  
 
 
That is, a recital of rights at a previous guilty plea hearing  
in the same case of the rights that a defendant is waiving may  
suffice to satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.302.  However,  
this Court has never before subscribed to the proposition that  
the mere fact that a jury, in a partial trial, has been  
instructed on a defendant’s right to be presumed innocent is  
sufficient to obviate the specific requirements of the court  
rules.10  
The fundamental error that pervades the majority opinion  
is in its reading of Guilty Plea Cases and its holding that  
“there 
is 
substantial 
compliance 
with 
the 
‘personally 
address’  
9(...continued) 
“habitual offender,” or the defendant who has previously been 
involved in the criminal justice system, has something less 
than a full right to be informed, at the guilty plea hearing, 
of his constitutional rights in accordance with MCR 6.302, by 
virtue of his presumed familiarity with such rights.  Would  
the majority also conclude that no compliance with the rule is 
required for the defendant-lawyer or the defendant-judge 
because of his presumed knowledge of constitutional law? 
Simple adherence to the express requirements of the rule would 
avoid this Court having to determine which class of defendants 
possessed alternative means by which to become informed of the 
rights that they were relinquishing by a plea of guilty.  
10  See also People v Jackson, 71 Mich App 468, 471-72;  
248 NW2d 551 (1976) (BURNS, J., dissenting), disagreeing with 
the 
majority’s 
holding that advisement of a defendant’s rights 
at a guilty plea hearing earlier in the day constituted 
sufficient waiver of his rights at a subsequent hearing, and 
citing the Guilty Plea Cases, noting that while the  
presumption of innocence is not a Jaworski right, this Court 
“has deemed it necessary to continue to require reversal in 
cases where the guilty-pleading defendant is not advised of 
that incident of trial.”  
14  
  
 
 
requirement . . . even though the judge fails to recite a  
specific right at the guilty plea hearing . . . .”  Slip op at  
13.  The focus of the majority opinion in this regard is on  
the language found at 114-115 of Guilty Plea Cases. There,  
the Court addressed the requirement of the rule that the judge  
“personally address[] the defendant” at the guilty plea  
hearing.  The Court concluded in one of the twenty-four  
consolidated cases, Courtney, that the judge did not  
“personally advise the defendant of the maximum sentence but  
in moving to add a second count the prosecutor stated the  
maximum penalty of five years.” Id. at 114. The Court next  
addressed Bauer, a case in which “the judge did not state the  
charge but the prosecutor read the information on the plea  
record.” Id.(emphasis added).11  This Court stated:  
These departures do not justify reversal. 
While it would be better for the judge to cover all 
the points himself, as long as he assumes the 
principal 
burden 
of 
imparting 
the 
required 
information, as did the judges in Courtney and  
Bauer, the purpose of requiring him personally to 
address the defendant and in so doing observe his 
demeanor and responses is achieved.  
A guilty plea conviction will not be reversed 
if the judge engages in the required colloquy but 
fails to mention an item which the record shows was  
established through, for example, an opening  
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or  
defense counsel in the hearing of the judge and  
11 
Courtney and Bauer were the only two cases among the 
twenty-four cases consolidated in Guilty Plea Cases that  
specifically 
concerned 
the 
“personally 
address” 
requirement 
of 
MCR 6.302.  
15  
 
 
 
defendant. It is proper for the prosecutor or the  
clerk to read the information in the judge’s  
presence. [Id. at 114-115 (emphasis added).]  
Both Courtney and Bauer involved the assessment of  
statements occurring during the guilty plea hearing itself in  
order to determine whether there had been substantial  
compliance with the rule. Contrary to the majority opinion,  
Guilty Plea Cases does not rely upon statements or events  
occurring outside the four corners of the guilty plea  
hearing.12 
 
Therefore, 
I 
reject 
its 
assertion 
that 
“twenty-five  
years” of precedent establish that the required statements do  
not have to be made at the guilty plea hearing. Rather, the  
precedent cited in this opinion establishes that for twenty­
five years, since the Guilty Plea Cases, Michigan courts have  
adhered to the principle that a defendant must be informed at  
the guilty plea hearing that he has a right to be presumed  
innocent.  The majority’s extrapolation from focusing upon  
substantial compliance at the guilty plea hearing to focusing  
upon substantial compliance over some indeterminate period  
surrounding the hearing runs counter to this well-established  
precedent.  It also runs counter to the principle that, in  
order for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, a  
defendant must be informed of the rights he is surrendering at  
12  One of the reasons for requiring that a guilty plea 
hearing be conducted in a discrete proceeding is to preserve 
the overall integrity of the defendant’s decision to plead 
guilty.  
16  
 
 
 
that time, at that hearing at which he finally decides to  
admit guilt.13  
The majority seeks to distinguish the right to be  
presumed innocent until proved guilty from the rights  
identified in Jaworski of which a defendant must be informed.14  
However, the mere fact that the Jaworski rights have not  
encompassed the presumption of innocence does not indicate  
that this right is of any less consequence or should be  
treated in any different fashion, nor does the majority  
suggest any rationale for such treatment. In Russell, supra  
at 629-630, the Court of Appeals noted that, in the Guilty  
Plea Cases, this Court “elevated the presumption of innocence  
to the same status as the three Jaworski rights.”15  See also  
13  Further, contrary to the majority’s statement at 14 
that “[t]he dissent has not identified any basis in the rule 
to support” its position that trial judges must personally 
advise the defendant at the guilty plea hearing concerning the 
right to be presumed innocent, I believe that my position is 
adequately supported by the language of MCR 6.302(B).  This  
rule requires the court to “[s]peak[] directly to the 
defendant, . . . advise the defendant and determine that the 
defendant understands . . . .”  Only by a great stretch can 
this rule be read to authorize a situation where, as here, the 
defendant was never directly addressed in regard to the 
presumption of innocence.  
14  See People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21, 28-29; 194 NW2d 
868 (1972), holding that a defendant must be advised of the  
three constitutional rights enumerated in Boykin: (1) the 
privilege 
against 
compulsory 
self-incrimination, 
(2) 
the 
right 
to trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one’s 
accusers.  
15 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he 
(continued...)  
17  
 
  
Johnson v Ohio, 419 US 924, 926; 95 S Ct 200; 42 L Ed2d 158  
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), in which one justice, in  
dissenting to a denial of certiorari, observed that “[t]he  
Boykin enumeration [of rights to which a pleading defendant is  
entitled to be advised] was illustrative, not exhaustive.”16  
V. RESPONSE TO THE CONCURRENCE  
I also respectfully disagree with the concurrence that  
15(...continued) 
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the 
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our 
system of criminal justice.”  Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 
503; 96 S Ct 1691; 48 L Ed 2d 126 (1976). See also Abraham, 
note 4 supra at 105, stating:  
[T]he presumption of the innocence of the 
accused is transformed into courtroom procedure in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries.  Essential to it are the  
ancient, 
basic 
safeguards 
inherent 
in 
that  
philosophy of the law, safeguards which, to a 
greater or lesser degree, are fundamental to the 
notions of liberty and justice that pervade the 
political system of the liberal democratic West. 
Among these are the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination; the right to cross-examine  
witnesses; the writ of habeas corpus . . . perhaps 
the most basic right of all, dating at least to the 
Magna Carta (1215)—and many others in the same 
general category.  
Notably, the rights referred to in this passage along with the 
presumption of innocence, are the Jaworski rights.  
16  It is not my view that the trial court is required 
during the guilty plea hearing to “strictly” comply with the 
obligation that a defendant be advised of his right to be 
presumed innocent, or with regard to any other particular 
obligation, beyond what is required by Jaworski. 
I do  
believe, however, that the extent of a court’s compliance with 
the requirements of MCR 6.302 must be assessed in terms of 
what has occurred at the guilty plea hearing.  
18  
 
advising the defendant at his guilty plea hearing that he was  
relinquishing the right to have the jury decide whether his  
guilt could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt sufficiently  
imparted the idea that he was also relinquishing his right to  
be 
presumed 
innocent.  MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires a statement  
to the defendant that the judge, jury, and prosecutor are to  
presume his innocence until his guilt is proven.  MCR  
6.302(B)(3)(d) requires a separate statement informing the  
defendant that it is the prosecutor’s burden to prove his  
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, subrules (c) and (d)  
are distinct requirements of the guilty plea hearing.17  
17 
In 
note 
10, 
the 
majority, 
perhaps 
inadvertently, 
adopts 
the premises of the concurrence that the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” instruction embodied in subrule (3)(d) is sufficiently 
equivalent to the “presumption of innocence” instruction 
contained in subrule (3)(c) to warrant a finding that the 
former instruction suffices in lieu of the latter.  This is  
because Russell approved the instruction given to the  
defendant, during the guilty plea hearing, that the  
“[p]rosecutor 
must 
prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” 
even though, as the majority observes, the judge “never spoke 
the 
precise 
words 
‘presumed innocent.’” Russell, 
supra at 631.  
Yet, as explained here, the two instructions clearly are 
distinct, both conceptually and in the specific context of the 
language of MCR 6.302. As Guilty Plea Cases made clear, and 
as evidenced by the change in the court rules, see GCR 1963, 
785.7(1)(d)(ii) 
(which 
combined 
the 
two 
instructions), 
and 
GCR 
1963, 785.7(1)(g)(iii), (iv) (which separated the two  
instructions), the presumption of innocence is a distinct 
right that should always be stated in advising the defendant 
at the guilty plea hearing.  
Concerning the other cases referenced by the majority in 
that note, as the dissent has already observed, (a) in 
Jackson, the defendant was informed of his right to be 
presumed innocent at a guilty plea hearing; (b) in Ingram, 
(continued...)  
19  
 
 
The distinction between the presumption of innocence and  
the “reasonable doubt” standards has been extensively  
discussed by the United States Supreme Court.  Coffin v United  
States, supra at 460-461 (holding that a trial judge’s failure  
to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence required  
reversal, notwithstanding the adequacy of instructions  
provided on the closely related reasonable doubt standard).  
In Coffin, the Court traced the “presumption of innocence”  
back to ancient law, and stated of the argument that “proof  
beyond a reasonable doubt” and “presumption of innocence” are  
equivalent:  
To say that the one is the equivalent of the 
other is therefore to say that legal evidence can 
be excluded from the jury, and that such exclusion 
may be cured by instructing them correctly in 
regard to the method by which they are required to 
reach their conclusion upon the proof actually 
before them; in other words, that the exclusion of 
an important element of proof can be justified by 
correctly instructing as to the proof admitted. 
The evolution of the principle of the presumption 
of innocence, and its resultant, the doctrine of 
reasonable 
doubt, 
make 
more 
apparent 
the  
correctness of these views, and indicate the  
necessity 
of 
enforcing 
the 
one 
in 
order 
that 
the  
17(...continued) 
defendant was instructed on the presumption of innocence at 
his guilty plea hearing; (c) in Bender, supra at 579, 
defendant’s 
conviction 
was 
reversed 
because 
the 
defendant 
“was  
not personally informed of his right to be presumed innocent”; 
and (d) in Heintzelman, Mitchell, and Wilson, the Court of  
Appeals held that a defendant must be given the required 
instruction.  
20  
 
 
 
other may continue to exist. [Id. at 460.][18]  
Subsequently, in Taylor v Kentucky, 436 US 478, 484; 98 S Ct  
1930; 56 L Ed2d 468 (1978), the Supreme Court observed:  
[T]he requirement that a jury be informed both  
of the presumption of innocence and of the  
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] 
derives from a perceived salutary effect upon lay  
18 See also Chambers, Reasonable certainty and reasonable  
doubt, 81 Marq L R 655, 671, 674 (1998), stating:  
The 
reasonable 
doubt 
standard 
and 
the  
presumption of innocence work in tandem to help 
assure that defendants are convicted fairly. 
Reasonable doubt requires that jurors be thoroughly 
convinced of a defendant’s guilt before conviction. 
The presumption of innocence effectively requires 
that jurors begin and end their inquiry with a 
skeptical mindset.  
* * *  
That reasonable doubt and the presumption of 
innocence are related is undeniable.  Understanding 
the relationship between them requires recognizing 
that the pairing of the two concepts forces a juror 
to move from a subjective state of disbelief 
regarding the prosecution’s claims of defendant’s 
guilt to a subjective state of justified certainty 
regarding defendant’s guilt.  That the juror must 
be so transformed ensures that the evidence used to  
convict a defendant will be powerful.  Reasonable  
doubt requires only that a juror be subjectively 
certain that defendant committed the crime before  
voting for guilt. A juror can reach a subjective, 
but possibly unjustified, state of certainty in the 
absence of a presumption of innocence. 
The  
presumption of innocence requires that jurors think 
more deeply than they otherwise would about whether 
all reasonable doubts have been eliminated before  
convicting a defendant  
See also Diamond, Note, Reasonable doubt: To define, or not to  
define, 90 Colum L R 1716, 1730-1731 (1990).  
21  
 
jurors.  While the legal scholar may understand  
that 
the 
presumption 
of 
innocence 
and 
the  
prosecution’s 
burden 
of 
proof 
are 
logically 
similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw  
significant additional guidance from an instruction 
on the presumption of innocence.  
In my judgment, this reasoning applies with equal force to the  
guilty plea hearing, where a criminal defendant is faced with  
the decision to admit or deny guilt.  Omitting the instruction  
on the presumption of innocence deprives such a defendant of  
an opportunity to fully assess his own circumstances and  
intelligently reflect upon his options.  
While a scholar of the law may well recognize the close  
philosophical and constitutional connection between (indeed  
the inextricability of) the right to be presumed innocent and  
the right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, MCR  
6.302 understandably sets these apart as discrete rights to be  
explained to the pleading defendant.  The rules do so because,  
considered 
together, 
these 
formulations 
explain 
more  
thoroughly and more clearly to the nonscholar, to the  
defendant, the full measure of the rights that he is  
relinquishing by his guilty plea.19  
CONCLUSION  
The Guilty Plea Cases established that a trial court’s  
19 By the concurrence’s analysis, the trial court could 
just as well advise the defendant that he is entitled to “due 
process” of law, and have such an instruction suffice to 
satisfy MCR 6.302 in lieu of instructions concerning the 
individual components of due process set forth in the rule.  
22  
 
failure to comply with MCR 6.302 and advise the defendant of  
his right to be presumed innocent constituted error requiring  
reversal.  Until today, this Court has not wavered from  
adherence to this principle.  In my judgment, the trial court  
is obligated under the Michigan rule to inform the defendant  
of his presumption of innocence at the guilty plea hearing,  
and the extent to which there has been “substantial  
compliance” with this obligation must be assessed in terms of  
what occurred at such hearing. Because there was a complete  
failure on the part of the trial court in this case to comply  
with MCR 6.302 by advising defendant, at his guilty plea  
hearing, of his right to be presumed innocent, I would affirm  
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
decision 
reversing 
defendant’s  
conviction.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
23