Title: Wilk v. Wilk

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Wilk v. Wilk (2000-316); 173 Vt. 343; 795 A.2d 1191

[Filed 22-Feb-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-316

John F. Wilk	                       Supreme Court

                                       On Appeal from
     v.	                               Rutland Superior Court

Joseph P. Wilk 	                       March Term, 2001 

David A. Jenkins, J.

Arthur E. Crowley, Jr., Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard S. Bloomer, Rutland, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.    Defendant Joseph P. Wilk appeals the decision of the
  superior court in this  action for partition ordering him to transfer his
  one-eighth interest in a parcel of property located in  the Town of West
  Rutland to Plaintiff John F. Wilk in exchange for one eighth of the fair
  market  value of the parcel as determined by a panel of court-appointed
  commissioners.  Defendant argues  that the court erred by failing to order
  a public sale of the property and a subsequent dispersal of the  proceeds
  to himself and plaintiff.  He contends that the facts of this case are
  controlled by our  holding in Billings v. Billings, 114 Vt. 512, 49 A.2d 179 (1946), and that Billings mandates such 

 

  an outcome.  We take this opportunity to overrule Billings and its progeny
  and affirm the trial court's  ruling.

       The property at issue is a one-acre parcel of land with a house,
  commercial garage and office  located on it.  Plaintiff has operated a
  paving business out of the buildings on the property, and  defendant -
  plaintiff's brother - operates a junk yard on an adjoining parcel of land. 
  In May 1997,  both parties acquired a one-eighth interest in the property
  by inheritance from their mother, as did  their six siblings.  Plaintiff
  subsequently purchased the interests of his six siblings, subject to a life 
  estate held by one of his sisters, and filed this partition action in the
  superior court.  The court  appointed three commissioners who prepared a
  report and submitted it to the court.  The  commissioners concluded that
  the parcel could not reasonably be divided between plaintiff and  defendant
  and that the fair-market value of the property was $125,000.  Both parties
  sought an order  from the court conveying the other's interest in exchange
  for the value of the respective shares in the  property.  Following a
  hearing on the merits, the court concluded that the equities favored
  plaintiff  and ordered defendant to convey his one-eighth interest in the
  property in exchange for $15,625 (one  eighth of $125,000).

       Defendant argues that the facts of this case are controlled by our
  holding in Billings v.  Billings, 114 Vt. 512, 49 A.2d 179 (1946) and that
  the trial court was bound to order a public sale of  the contested parcel. 
  In Billings, this Court split three-to-two over the interpretation of the
  statutory  scheme governing partition.  The language at issue was identical
  to that of the statutes in effect  today.  Compare id. at 514, 49 A.2d  at
  181, with 12 V.S.A. §§ 5174-75.  The majority in Billings  concluded that,
  when two parties own equal shares in a piece of property and both wish to
  take  assignment of the other's share, the statutory scheme requires public
  sale of the property.  

 

  Billings, 114 Vt. at 517, 49 A.2d  at 182.  Although this case involves two
  parties owning unequal  shares in a property, because the facts are
  sufficiently analogous and the Court made no distinction in  its
  interpretation of the statutory scheme between multiple parties with equal
  shares and multiple  parties with unequal shares willing to take
  assignment, Billings would control.  For reasons  explained below, however,
  we overrule Billings and hold that, under the statutory scheme, a trial 
  court may consider the relative equities of multiple parties wishing to
  take assignment of an  outstanding interest in a parcel and assign that
  interest to one of the parties, instead of ordering a  public sale. 

       Under the common law, courts were limited to the remedy of partition
  in kind, or partition by  allotment, when individuals decided to end
  co-tenancy.  See P. Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored  Looking Glass: A View
  of Judicial Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 
  737, 752 (2000); see also Blanchard v. Cross, 97 Vt. 370, 373, 123 A. 382,
  383 (1924).  Partition by  sale and related powers such as assignment were
  statutory remedies, created to augment the equitable  powers of the courts. 
  See Blanchard, 97 Vt. at 373, 123 A.  at 383 ("The right to partition by 
  allotment was a common law right, but the right to partition by sale is
  purely statutory.  Such a  statute [is] an innovation upon the common law .
  . . ."); Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced  Partitioning Sales:
  Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. Rev. 755, 760 (1986) (noting that states 
  promulgated statutes allowing partition by sale to address situations where
  partition in kind was  impractical or inadvisable).  Section 5174 is such a
  statute.  It states: 

    [w]hen it appears that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
    cannot be  divided without great inconvenience to the parties
    interested, the  court may order it assigned to one of the
    parties, provided he pays to  the other party such sum of money,
    at such times and in such manner  as the commissioners judge
    equitable.

 

  12 V.S.A. § 5174.  The only exception, or limitation, to this statutory
  power is found in § 5175,  which provides, "[i]n case one of the parties
  interested will not take such assignment and pay such  sum, the court shall
  order the commissioners to sell such estate at public or private sale."  12
  V.S.A.  § 5175. 

       In Billings, this Court was called upon to mediate the interplay of
  these two statutes when  parties owning equal interests in a piece of
  property both were willing to take an assignment and pay  the other for the
  half-share of the property.  The two dissenting judges in that case noted
  that, in  addition to providing remedies beyond those available in the
  common law, the language of § 5174  was permissive with respect to the
  assignment remedy (when property cannot be conveniently  divided, "the
  court may order it assigned to one of the parties") (emphasis added). 
  Billings, 114 Vt.  at 519-20, 49 A.2d  at 183-84 (Moulton, C.J., dissenting
  with whom Jeffords, J. joins).  From this  they discerned an intent to give
  the trial court discretion when making an assignment, allowing it to  do so
  even when competing parties sought such a remedy.  Id., 49 A.2d  at 184
  (permissive language  "carries the implication of a power to make a choice,
  and in the exercise of a sound discretion to  order an assignment to one or
  the other of the parties").

       This conclusion is consistent with the principle that remedial
  statutes ought to be liberally  construed.  See Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168
  Vt. 48, 53,