Title: COSSETTE v. COSSETTE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

COSSETTE v. COSSETTE2003 WY 10776 P.3d 799Case Number: 02-183Decided: 09/05/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

 

RONALD 
GENE COSSETTE,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

KATHRYN 
MARY COSSETTE,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

DaNece 
Day Koenigs of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Dwight 
F. Hurich of Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Ronald Gene 
Cossette (Father) appeals the district court's denial of his Petition to 
Terminate Child Support.  Pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(a)(iii) and the Divorce Decree, Father was 
required to pay child support for the parties' minor daughter (Daughter) until 
the age of majority or until she turned twenty years old so long as she was a 
full-time participant in a high school or equivalent program.  Father contended that Daughter's 
repeated absences from and consequent dismissal from high school after she had 
reached the age of majority terminated his obligation to make child support 
payments.  The district court 
concluded that Daughter's sporadic attendance did not negate the fact that she 
was enrolled in high school as a full-time student, and that her subsequent 
dismissal did not warrant termination of her support payments since she had 
enrolled in an alternative educational program for the forthcoming year.  Accordingly, the district court denied 
Father's petition.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

[¶3]      Father 
raises two issues in his appeal:

A.                 
Did 
the trial court commit reversible error by failing to apply the plain language 
of the Divorce Decree and W.S. § 14-2-204 which require full-time school 
attendance for a child over the age of 18 to receive child 
support?

 

B.                 
Is 
[Father] entitled to his fees for this appeal as a matter of 
law?

 

Kathryn 
Mary Cossette (Mother) responds with a single statement of the 
issue:

Did 
the district court err when the court determined the Father's child support 
obligation should not terminate under the terms of the parties' divorce 
decree?

 

[¶4]      The parties were 
divorced in December of 1999.  
Daughter was their only child, and the decree of divorce provided that 
Father was to make monthly child support payments under the following 
conditions:

 

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that during any child's minority (until age eighteen) and 
beyond for any child who has a mental, emotional, or physical impairment 
preventing emancipation and while any 
child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty (20) is attending high school 
or an equivalent program as a full-time student, the non-custodial parent 
shall contribute to that child's support. [Emphasis 
supplied.]

 

On 
April 16, 2002, Father filed a Petition to Terminate Child Support.  Father alleged that since attaining her 
eighteenth birthday on November 3, 2001, Daughter had not attended high school 
or an equivalent program on a full-time basis.

 

[¶5]      On May 29, 2002, 
the district court held a hearing on Father's petition.  The first witness was the secretary from 
Westwood High School responsible for student records.  She testified that during the first 
quarter of the 2001-02 school year, Daughter's attendance was sufficient for her 
to be considered a full-time student.  
In the second quarter of the school year, however, Daughter's attendance 
declined to the point where the school no longer considered her a full-time 
student.  In response, the school 
required Daughter to enter into a two-week "contract" that mandated attendance 
in the absence of any doctor's excuse.  
The witness testified that Daughter was unable to comply with the 
contract so the school ordered her to withdraw.

 

[¶6]      Father was the 
next witness.  He testified that he 
had concerns over Daughter's poor grades.  
Father talked to Daughter about her grades, but he acknowledged that he 
did not discuss her attendance problems with her or Mother.  Unsatisfied with Daughter's efforts to 
improve her grades, Father took away her car.  Father had not had any contact with 
Daughter since then.

 

[¶7]      Mother testified 
that Daughter's absences were related to health problems.  Daughter was diagnosed with depression 
and suffered from a variety of physical ailments including thyroid 
problems.  Daughter was under the 
medical care of a doctor and had been prescribed medication for her 
problems.  Mother indicated that 
after Daughter was dismissed from Westwood High School, she immediately enrolled 
in an alternative school in Spearfish, South Dakota.  According to Mother, Daughter planned to 
take classes during the summer so that she could complete her high school 
education by the end of the fall of 2002.

 

[¶8]      The final witness 
at the hearing was Daughter.  She 
testified that her absences were related to her various ailments.  She confirmed the testimony from her 
mother that she had enrolled in the Spearfish high school, planned to take 
summer classes, and complete her education that fall.  Daughter also admitted that she had not 
informed her father about the depression diagnosis or her other medical issues 
because of her strained relationship with him.

 

[¶9]      After the 
hearing, the district court denied Father's petition to terminate child 
support.  The court found that 
although Daughter's attendance was poor, the school considered her a full-time 
student and she had made an effort to be present.  The court noted Daughter's efforts to 
remain in school and obtain her degree.  
It concluded that this was sufficient for her to be considered a 
full-time student and that continued support was appropriate.  Father has 
appealed.

 

[¶10]   Decisions related to child support 
are assigned to the sound discretion of the district court.  Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 
1098 (Wyo. 1999).  We will not 
disturb a district court's ruling unless we are convinced that the court has 
abused its discretion.  
Id.

 

In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  If the trial court 
could reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound 
judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be 
disturbed absent a showing that some facet of the ruling is arbitrary or 
capricious.  Id. (citing 
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)); [Basolo v. 
Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995))].

 

Jordan, 
992 P.2d  at 1098-99.

 

[¶11]   The provision in the parties' 
divorce decree requiring Father to pay child support past his daughter's age of 
majority so long as she was pursuing her high school diploma has a statutory 
basis:

 

(a)  Any 
person legally responsible for the support of a child who abandons, deserts, 
neglects or unjustifiably fails to support the child is liable for support of 
the child.  It is no defense that 
the child was not or is not in destitute circumstances.  For purposes of this section, a parent's 
legal obligation for the support of his or her children, whether natural or 
adopted, continues past the age of majority in cases where the children 
are:

. 
. . .

(iii)  Between 
the age of majority and twenty (20) years and attending high school or an 
equivalent program as full-time participants.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(a) (iii) (LexisNexis 2003).  The crux of the parties' dispute is 
whether or not Daughter was attending high school as a full-time participant or 
student.

 

[¶12]   The interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law.  In interpreting 
a statute:

 

We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent.  We begin by making an " inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.' " Parker Land and Cattle Company v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.

 

Wyodak 
Resources Development Corporation v. Board of Equalization, 
2001 WY 92, ¶7, 32 P.3d 1056, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Exxon Corporation v. 
Board of County Commissioners, Sublette County, 987 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 

[¶13]   The legislative intent behind Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(a)(iii) is apparent on the face of the statute.  The statute's purpose is to ensure the 
financial security of a child while she is pursuing a high school diploma.  The statute results from recognition by 
the Legislature of the importance of a basic education in our society.  The Legislature, however, imposed two 
limitations in the statute:  (1) the 
support ends when the child reaches twenty years of age; and, (2) the child must 
be attending a high school or equivalent program as a full-time 
participant.  The second limitation, 
of course, is the only concern before us in this case. 

 

[¶14]   Father contends that Daughter was 
not "attending" high school as a "full-time participant" in light of her 
absences.  Father argues that 
"attending" means the actual presence of the child in class.  Father's position is that the 
Legislature meant that there must be some level of physical presence by the 
child in school beyond their enrollment.  
Mother counters that Father is seeking to equate the term "attending" 
with the concept of "perfect attendance," a standard that would be impossible to 
meet.  Instead, Mother suggests that 
"attending" refers to the child's status in the school, i.e., whether she 
is enrolled as a full-time student and considered as such under the school's 
standards.

 

[¶15]   The meaning of the term "attending" 
must be ascertained within the context of the legislative intent behind the 
statute.  We think the term is 
neither so narrow as suggested by Father nor so broad as urged by Mother.  At a minimum, the term must include 
enrollment as a full-time student.  
This requirement is specified by the Legislature's use of the term 
"full-time participants."  Since the 
purpose of the statute is to ensure the continued financial support of the child 
in the pursuit of a high school education, the duty imposed upon the supporting 
parent must be matched by a concomitant duty on the part of the student to 
diligently pursue that goal.  
Nevertheless, we agree with Mother that "perfect attendance" is not 
realistic.  However, the child's 
duty to pursue the goal of the statute imposes a responsibility to attend 
class.  The question is, where is 
the line to be drawn between "perfect attendance" and "enrollment"?  The answer, we believe, cannot be drawn 
with exact specificity.  Each case 
must be determined on its particular factual situation.  There are various factors that should be 
considered when determining if a child is "attending" school as a full-time 
participant, including: (1) the reasons for any absences and the degree to which 
they were within the control of the child; and (2) what actions, if any, are 
taken by the child to continue the pursuit of an 
education.

 

[¶16]   In this case, Daughter and Mother 
testified that Daughter's absences from school were the product of her various 
health issues.  Within a month of 
Daughter's dismissal from Westwood High School, she had enrolled in an 
alternative program at a school in Spearfish, South Dakota.  Daughter indicated her intent to take 
classes during the summer so that she could complete her degree at the 
conclusion of the fall semester.  
Neither Father nor any other witness at the hearing contradicted this 
testimony.  Thus, the evidence 
indicates that Daughter's absences were due to factors beyond her control.  Daughter and Mother testified that she 
sought treatment for her various medical conditions; nevertheless, the nature of 
those ailments made it difficult for her to attend school regularly.  Furthermore, when Daughter's absences 
caused her dismissal from the high school, she took immediate remedial action by 
enrolling less than a month later in an alternative program at another 
school.  Depriving a child of 
support because she was unable to attend school on a regular basis because of a 
temporary medical condition is not consistent with the legislative intent behind 
the statute.  This is especially 
true where, as here, the child clearly exhibits intent to complete her education 
by taking steps to ensure her continued enrollment in school.  Under these circumstances, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the Daughter was a 
full-time participant in a high school or equivalent program and, accordingly, 
denying Father's motion to terminate his support payments.

 

[¶17]   Father requests that this Court 
award him attorney's fees pursuant to the divorce decree, which imposes 
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses on either party if they fail to perform any 
duty or obligation imposed by the terms of the decree.  Father did not raise this claim before 
the district court.  We do not 
review claims raised for the first time on appeal.  In re Pohl, 980 P.2d 816, 819 
(Wyo. 1999).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The district court's order denying 
Father's motion to terminate support is affirmed.