Title: Fried v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-917 
____________ 
 
NICOLE “NIKKI” FRIED, etc., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-918 
____________ 
 
CITY OF WESTON, FLORIDA, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Respondents. 
____________ 
 
January 19, 2023 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
 
This case involves whether the common law doctrines of 
legislative immunity and governmental function immunity prohibit 
 
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the statutory civil actions and penalties imposed against local 
governments and officials for certain violations of section 790.33, 
Florida Statutes (2021), the firearms preemption statute.  We agree 
with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. City 
of Weston, 316 So. 3d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), that neither 
doctrine prohibits the statutory civil actions and penalties in 
sections 790.33(3)(c), (d), and (f).1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In 1987, the Florida Legislature acted to preempt the field of 
firearms and ammunition regulation.  See ch. 87-23, § 2, Laws of 
Fla.  Section 790.33 (the “Preemption Statute”), currently provides 
as follows: 
PREEMPTION.—Except as expressly provided by the 
State Constitution or general law, the Legislature hereby 
declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation 
of firearms and ammunition, including the purchase, 
sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, 
possession, storage, and transportation thereof, to the 
exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or 
municipal ordinances or any administrative regulations 
or rules adopted by local or state government relating 
thereto.  Any such existing ordinances, rules, or 
regulations are hereby declared null and void. 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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§ 790.33(1), Fla. Stat. (2021).  The Legislature’s express intent in 
enacting the Preemption Statute was to maintain uniform firearms 
laws throughout Florida; to nullify and void all ordinances and 
regulations not enacted at the state or federal level; “to prohibit the 
enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to 
firearms, ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically 
authorized by this section or general law”; and “to require local 
jurisdictions to enforce state firearms laws.”  § 790.33(2)(a).  
Petitioners in this case do not challenge the Legislature’s authority 
to preempt the field of regulation of firearms and ammunition. 
The Preemption Statute also contains the following exceptions: 
(a) Zoning ordinances that encompass firearms 
businesses along with other businesses, except that 
zoning ordinances that are designed for the purpose of 
restricting or prohibiting the sale, purchase, transfer, or 
manufacture of firearms or ammunition as a method of 
regulating firearms or ammunition are in conflict with 
this subsection and are prohibited; 
 
(b) A duly organized law enforcement agency from 
enacting and enforcing regulations pertaining to firearms, 
ammunition, or firearm accessories issued to or used by 
peace officers in the course of their official duties; 
 
(c) Except as provided in s. 790.251, any entity 
subject to the prohibitions of this section from regulating 
or prohibiting the carrying of firearms and ammunition 
 
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by an employee of the entity during and in the course of 
the employee’s official duties; 
 
(d) A court or administrative law judge from hearing 
and resolving any case or controversy or issuing any 
opinion or order on a matter within the jurisdiction of 
that court or judge; or 
 
(e) The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission from regulating the use of firearms or 
ammunition as a method of taking wildlife and regulating 
the shooting ranges managed by the commission. 
 
§ 790.33(4)(a)-(e). 
 
In 2011, the Legislature amended the Preemption Statute, see 
chapter 2011-109, Laws of Florida, to include a series of civil 
penalties and actions, which apply to: 
Any person, county, agency, municipality, district, or 
other entity that violates the Legislature’s occupation of 
the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition, 
as declared in subsection (1), by enacting or causing to 
be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule or 
regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of 
the field shall be liable as set forth herein. 
 
§ 790.33(3)(a).  Relevant to this case, sections 790.33(3)(c)-(d) are 
applicable to local officials and provide as follows: 
(c) If the court determines that a violation was 
knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of 
up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local 
government official or officials or administrative agency 
head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred. 
 
 
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(d) Except as required by applicable law, public 
funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the 
unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly 
and willfully violated this section. 
 
§ 790.33(3)(c)-(d). 
Section 790.33(3)(f) is applicable to local governments and 
provides as follows: 
1. A person or an organization whose membership 
is adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation, 
measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy, 
whether written or unwritten, promulgated or caused to 
be enforced in violation of this section may file suit 
against any county, agency, municipality, district, or 
other entity in any court of this state having jurisdiction 
over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief and for actual damages, as limited 
herein, caused by the violation.  A court shall award the 
prevailing plaintiff in any such suit: 
 
a. Reasonable attorney fees and costs in accordance 
with the laws of this state, including a contingency fee 
multiplier, as authorized by law; and 
 
b. The actual damages incurred, but not more than 
$100,000. 
 
§ 790.33(3)(f)1. 
 
Petitioners in these consolidated cases consist of thirty 
municipalities, three counties, more than seventy elected officials,2 
 
2.  Adam Putnam, the then Commissioner of Agriculture, was 
a defendant named in the original complaints.  His successor, 
 
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and one private citizen.  Without enacting any of the desired 
ordinances and regulations, Petitioners brought suit seeking a 
declaration from the circuit court that the challenged provisions are 
invalid.  Petitioners brought numerous claims alleging various 
constitutional violations3 and violations of legislative immunity and 
governmental function immunity.  On summary judgment, as 
relevant here, Petitioners argued that enforcement of section 
790.33(3) against local officials would violate legislative immunity 
and enforcement of section 790.33(3)(f) and section 790.335(4)(c), 
Florida Statutes (2021), against local governments would violate 
 
Petitioner Nicole “Nikki” Fried, declined to join the State’s appeal 
and supported the trial court’s ruling before the First District. 
 
3.  Petitioners challenged both section 790.33, Florida 
Statutes (2021), and section 790.335(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), 
which penalizes governmental entities for maintaining any “list, 
record, or registry of privately owned firearms” or the owners of 
those firearms.  § 790.335(2).  Not relevant to this appeal, 
Petitioners also alleged the challenged provisions violate 
gubernatorial removal authority; are overbroad and 
unconstitutionally vague; are irrational, arbitrary, and capricious; 
violate the right to free speech, association, petition and 
instruction; violate the contract clause; and violate due process.  
Petitioners also sought declaratory judgment that certain proposed 
regulations were permissible.  The circuit court denied all 
constitutional claims, except two pertaining to the governor removal 
provision in section 790.33(3)(e), which the State did not appeal. 
 
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governmental function immunity.  The circuit court invalidated the 
challenged provisions4 on the grounds that (1) the penalties against 
local officials violate legislative immunity, and (2) the actions 
against local governments violate immunity for discretionary 
government functions.  First, while the circuit court found that “the 
legislature abrogated the common law legislative immunity,” the 
circuit court also found that “legislative immunity arising from the 
separation of powers clause in the Florida Constitution does apply 
to judicial review of local legislators and cannot be waived by 
statute.”  The circuit court explained that “[b]ecause local 
governments must have what amount to small legislatures, and 
because courts cannot interfere in legislative processes, neither this 
 
4.  The circuit court’s order refers to section 790.33(3) and 
section 790.335(4)(c) collectively as the “penalty provisions.”  For 
purposes of this appeal, the parties present no argument pertaining 
to section 790.335(4)(c).  The circuit court’s order also contained 
several “Declarations.”  One such declaration pertained to section 
790.335(4)(c) and article VIII, section 5(b) of the Florida 
Constitution, which provides that “[e]ach county shall have the 
authority to require a criminal history records check and a 3 to 5-
day waiting period, excluding weekends and legal holidays, in 
connection with the sale of any firearm occurring within such 
county.”  The circuit court “declare[d] that counties may lawfully 
enact enabling regulations to enforce the Local Option powers of 
Article VIII, Section 5(b).”  The parties did not appeal these rulings 
to this Court. 
 
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court, nor any other court in Florida, can enforce the civil penalty 
provisions of Section 790.33 against local legislators.”  The circuit 
court also ruled that “the U.S. Constitution affords local legislators 
legislative immunity.”  Further, the circuit court found that 
“governmental function immunity applies and the local 
governmental entities and their officials are immune from suit.”  
The circuit court explained that “were the penalty provisions to be 
enforced, they would necessarily subject local legislative planning 
decisions to judicial scrutiny because the penalty provisions create 
liability for enacting legislation—an inherently discretionary 
governmental function.” 
 
On appeal, as relevant here, Respondents argued that the 
circuit court erred by concluding that sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) 
violate legislative immunity and that section 790.33(3)(f) violates 
governmental function immunity.  The First District reversed the 
circuit court’s ruling, holding “that the statutory penalty provisions 
disputed on appeal are valid and enforceable.”  City of Weston, 316 
So. 3d at 404.  The First District concluded that “[g]overnment 
function immunity does not shield entities that act contrary to or 
more restrictively than state law in the completely preempted field 
 
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of firearm and ammunition regulation.  Likewise, legislative 
immunity does not shield individuals who knowingly and willfully 
act contrary to or beyond the limits of state law.”  Id.  As to 
legislative immunity, the First District explained that “the particular 
attempt to invoke [legislative] immunity here occurs in direct 
violation of state preemption,” and “[o]fficials are not immune from 
having to prove lack of knowing and willful intent to violate state 
preemption.”  Id. at 407.  The First District concluded that “[t]he 
Florida Legislature has the authority to abrogate legislative 
immunity,” and “[i]t has done so here.”  Id.  As to governmental 
function immunity, the First District explained that “[t]he trial court 
erred in elevating the separation of powers doctrine over the state’s 
superior legislative authority validly exercised in this case.”  Id. at 
405.  The First District reasoned that “[t]he separation of powers 
doctrine protects only lawful and authorized planning-level activity,” 
not “violation of state preemption statutes.”  Id. at 405-06. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Petitioners argue that sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) are invalid 
because they violate legislative immunity, and that section 
790.33(3)(f) is invalid because it violates governmental function 
 
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immunity.  Respondents counter that the First District properly 
concluded that neither legislative immunity nor governmental 
function immunity “shields local governments and officials from the 
challenged statutes.”  City of Weston, 316 So. 3d at 408.  We agree 
with Respondents and approve the First District’s decision in City of 
Weston.5 
A.  Legislative Immunity 
Petitioners first argue that the First District in City of Weston 
erred in concluding that legislative immunity does not prohibit the 
statutory penalties in sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) because local 
officials are entitled to legislative immunity for purely legislative 
acts.  However, because legislative immunity as applied to local 
officials is a common law doctrine that the Legislature abrogated in 
the context covered by the Preemption Statute, we conclude that 
legislative immunity does not prohibit the statutory penalties in 
sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d). 
 
5.  This Court’s standard of review is de novo.  See Volusia 
Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 
2000). 
 
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The challenged statutory provisions, sections 790.33(3)(c)-(d), 
applicable to local officials, provide as follows: 
(c) If the court determines that a violation was 
knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of 
up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local 
government official or officials or administrative agency 
head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred. 
 
(d) Except as required by applicable law, public 
funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the 
unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly 
and willfully violated this section. 
 
§ 790.33(3)(c)-(d). 
Legislative immunity is commonly understood as a doctrine 
that protects legislators from being sued for all actions taken in 
their lawmaking capacity and is a doctrine broadly recognized by 
federal and state courts alike.  See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 
44, 48 (1998) (“The principle that legislators are absolutely immune 
from liability for their legislative activities has long been recognized 
in Anglo-American law.”).  Petitioners argue that legislative 
immunity for local officials arises from three sources: (1) Florida 
common law, (2) separation of powers in the Florida Constitution, 
and (3) federal law. 
 
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In Florida, the doctrine of legislative immunity is based in 
common law.  See Fla. House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 
So. 3d 517, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[T]he privileges and 
immunities afforded to all government officials, including those who 
serve in the legislative branch, arise from the common law.”); cf. id. 
(“[J]udicial immunity, like legislative immunity, is based on 
principles developed in the common law.”).6  An immunity conferred 
by common law may be abrogated by statute.  See McNayr v. Kelly, 
184 So. 2d 428, 430 n.6 (Fla. 1966) (“The Legislature, for example, 
could extend absolute immunity to certain high state, county or 
municipal officials or do away with the immunity altogether.”). 
Here, the Legislature has exercised its power—since 1987—to 
preempt “the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition.”  
§ 790.33(1).  Section 790.33(3)(a) states in pertinent part that “[a]ny 
person . . . that violates the Legislature’s occupation of the whole 
 
6.  The parties do not argue that the statutory protection for 
legislators found in section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, applies in 
this case.  See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“An officer, 
employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not 
be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in 
any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, 
event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment 
or function.”). 
 
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field of regulation of firearms and ammunition . . . by enacting or 
causing to be enforced any local ordinance . . . impinging upon such 
exclusive occupation of the field shall be liable as set forth herein.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The challenged provisions, sections 790.33(3)(c) 
and (d), set forth the civil fines for local officials who knowingly and 
willfully enact a preempted firearms regulation and prohibit the use 
of public funds to defend or reimburse such officials.  The 
Preemption Statute abrogates legislative immunity in this context 
for local officials by establishing that civil penalties may be imposed 
upon local officials.  Specifically, local officials enact local 
ordinances, and by enacting the challenged statutory provisions, 
the Legislature has deprived local officials of any authority to 
legislate in this field beyond the enumerated exceptions.  
Accordingly, as the trial court and the First District in City of 
Weston concluded, the Legislature abrogated common law 
legislative immunity for local officials to the extent provided in the 
Preemption Statute. 
Petitioners next argue that legislative immunity arises from 
the separation of powers in the Florida Constitution, citing this 
Court’s decision in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida 
 
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House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135, 143 (Fla. 2013), which 
held “that a legislative privilege exists in Florida, based on the 
principle of separation of powers codified in article II, section 3, of 
the Florida Constitution.”  However, Petitioners’ cited decision in 
League of Women Voters has no application to the issue in the 
present case.  See League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 147 n.11 
(“This case does not involve legislative immunity, nor does it involve 
the liability of any individual legislator.  We note that the legislative 
privilege (that is, an evidentiary privilege against compelled judicial 
process) is different than legislative immunity from suit, even 
though federal courts have held that the legislative privilege is 
derived from the principles underlying legislative immunity.”). 
Further, we find no merit in Petitioners’ argument that section 
790.33(3) violates separation of powers principles because it 
authorizes the judiciary’s interference with legislative acts of local 
officials.  Petitioners have provided no basis in the Florida 
Constitution or precedent indicating that it would exceed the scope 
of judicial power for courts to interpret statutes and hear cases 
where parties seek to enforce statutory violations and penalties duly 
enacted by the Legislature.  To the contrary, it is within the 
 
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judiciary’s constitutional authority and responsibility to do so.  See 
art. V, Fla. Const. 
We likewise reject Petitioners’ argument that legislative 
immunity flows from article VIII of the Florida Constitution.  To the 
contrary, article VIII expressly grants the Legislature plenary 
authority over the state’s local governments, which have only those 
“powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law.”  
Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. (charter counties); see also id. § 2(b) 
(“Municipalities . . . may exercise any power for municipal purposes 
except as otherwise provided by law.”); City of Palm Bay v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013) (“The critical 
phrase of article VIII, section 2(b)—‘except as otherwise provided by 
law’—establishes the constitutional superiority of the Legislature’s 
power over municipal power.”).  Local governments, including 
counties and municipalities, are creatures of the State without any 
independent sovereignty.  See art. VIII, §§ 1-2, Fla. Const.; see also 
Weaver v. Heidtman, 245 So. 2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) 
(“[C]ounties . . . do not possess any indicia of sovereignty; they are 
creatures of the legislature, created under Art. VIII, Sec. 1, of the 
 
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State Constitution . . . and accordingly are subject to the legislative 
prerogatives in the conduct of their affairs.”). 
Section 790.33(3)(c) imposes a civil fine of up to $5,000 
against “the elected or appointed local government official or 
officials or administrative agency head under whose jurisdiction the 
violation occurred,” if a court determines the violation was “knowing 
and willful.”  Section 790.33(3)(d) prohibits the use of public funds 
to defend or reimburse such individuals for civil fines or costs of 
defense, unless another law provides to the contrary. 
By expressly preempting the field of firearms and ammunition 
regulation, the Legislature has deprived local governments and 
officials of any authority or discretion to contravene, exceed, or 
evade the Legislature’s regulation of this field (subject to the limited 
exceptions set forth in section 790.33(4)).  See Fla. Power Corp. v. 
Seminole Cnty., 579 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991) (“While the 
authority given to cities and counties in Florida is broad, both the 
constitution and statutes recognize that cities and counties have no 
authority to act in areas that the legislature has preempted.”); 
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 504 
(Fla. 1999) (“If political subdivisions were able to continue actions to 
 
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enforce ordinances that conflict with general law, the political 
subdivisions would have the power to frustrate the ability of the 
Legislature to set policies for the state.”).  While “state legislators 
are immune from civil suits for their acts done within the sphere of 
legislative activity,” Walker v. President of the Senate, 658 So. 2d 
1200, 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), as the First District held below, 
“legislative immunity does not shield individuals who knowingly 
and willfully act contrary to or beyond the limits of state law” that 
provides for statutory penalties against government officials.  City of 
Weston, 316 So. 3d at 404. 
To the extent Petitioners argue that the challenged statutory 
provisions penalize “mistaken” violations of the Preemption Statute, 
all that is required to avoid the penalties in section 790.33(3)(c) is to 
refrain from knowingly and willfully violating the Preemption 
Statute.  The narrow exceptions to the Preemption Statute are 
expressly identified in sections 790.33(4)(a)-(e).  As argued by 
Respondents, before the challenged statutory provisions were 
added, the onus was on citizens to challenge ordinances defensively 
or by way of actions for declaratory and injunctive relief.  By 
enacting these statutory provisions, the Legislature shifted the 
 
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burden to those in the position to violate the Preemption Statute.  
To the extent the parties and amici disagree with this legislative 
decision or argue that the challenged provisions are unnecessary or 
unwise, it is for the Legislature to evaluate and resolve those policy 
concerns.  See Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1978) (“The 
Legislature has a great deal of discretion in determining what 
measures are necessary for the public’s protection, and this Court 
will not, and may not, substitute its judgment for that of the 
Legislature insofar as the wisdom or policy of the act is 
concerned.”). 
Petitioners also rely heavily on federal law recognizing 
legislative immunity for state, regional, and local legislators.  See 
Bogan, 523 U.S. at 52 (extending legislative immunity to local 
government legislators); Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1979) (extending legislative 
immunity to regional legislators); Woods v. Gamel, 132 F.3d 1417, 
1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ounty commissioners can be entitled to 
legislative immunity when acting in their legislative capacities.”).  
For members of Congress, legislative immunity was established in 
the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, 
 
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which protects not only the speech and debate of legislators but 
also voting on legislative acts.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see 
also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951).  To the 
extent Petitioners rely on federal case law that has stated that 
article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution (the Speech or 
Debate Clause) creates a form of legislative immunity, Florida’s 
Constitution does not contain a Speech or Debate Clause providing 
legislative immunity to members of the Legislature.  See Tenney, 
341 U.S. at 375 n.5 (“Only the Florida Constitution has no 
provision concerning legislative privilege.”).  Further, the United 
States Supreme Court has “made clear that the holding [in Tenney] 
was grounded on its interpretation of federal common law, not on 
the Speech or Debate Clause.”  United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 
360, 372 n.10 (1980).  As the First District in City of Weston 
concluded, these cases do not apply here.  See NRP Holdings LLC v. 
City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177, 190 n.10 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining 
that the federal common law legislative immunity recognized by the 
Supreme Court protects only against federal claims, may be 
abrogated by federal statute, and affords no protection from state 
law actions for damages); League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 
 
- 20 - 
152 (“[F]ederal courts have long recognized the existence of a federal 
legislative privilege based on the explicit text of the Speech or 
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution and through 
federal common law—neither of which applies to an action in state 
court based on a specific prohibition in the state constitution.”). 
Accordingly, because legislative immunity as applied to local 
officials is a Florida common law doctrine that the Legislature 
abrogated in the context addressed in the Preemption Statute, we 
conclude that the First District properly concluded that legislative 
immunity does not prohibit the statutory penalties in section 
790.33(3)(c) and (d). 
B.  Governmental Function Immunity 
Petitioners next argue that the First District erred in 
concluding that governmental function immunity does not prohibit 
the statutory actions in section 790.33(3)(f).7  We disagree. 
Section 790.33(3)(f) is applicable to local governments and 
provides as follows: 
 
7.  The First District’s decision in City of Weston also 
addressed section 790.335(4)(c).  However, in this review 
proceeding, Petitioners make no argument with regard to this 
statute; therefore, any argument would be deemed waived, and we 
do not address this statute. 
 
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(f)1. A person or an organization whose membership 
is adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation, 
measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy, 
whether written or unwritten, promulgated or caused to 
be enforced in violation of this section may file suit 
against any county, agency, municipality, district, or 
other entity in any court of this state having jurisdiction 
over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief and for actual damages, as limited 
herein, caused by the violation.  A court shall award the 
prevailing plaintiff in any such suit: 
 
a. Reasonable attorney fees and costs in accordance 
with the laws of this state, including a contingency fee 
multiplier, as authorized by law; and 
 
b. The actual damages incurred, but not more than 
$100,000. 
 
§ 790.33(3)(f)1. 
 
Florida has a broad statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in 
tort suits for the State.  See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“[T]he 
state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives 
sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent 
specified in this act.”).  However, governmental function immunity, 
also called discretionary function immunity, is a doctrine under 
which “certain ‘discretionary’ governmental functions remain 
immune from tort liability . . . because certain functions of 
coordinate branches of government may not be subjected to 
 
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scrutiny by judge or jury as to the wisdom of their performance.”  
Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 
(Fla. 1979).  We have explained that “[i]t is ‘the nature of the 
conduct, rather than the status of the actor,’ that determines 
whether the function is the type of discretionary function which is, 
by its nature, immune from tort liability.”  Trianon Park Condo. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 918 (Fla. 1985) 
(quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)). 
Petitioners argue that the enforcement of penalties against 
local governments would violate governmental function immunity 
because the process of determining what is preempted under the 
Preemption Statute remains inherently discretionary.  However, to 
engage in conduct that is prohibited by statute is not a 
discretionary function.  As the First District concluded below, 
“[g]overnment function immunity does not shield entities that act 
contrary to or more restrictively than state law in the completely 
preempted field of firearm and ammunition regulation.”  City of 
Weston, 316 So. 3d at 404. 
 
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The Florida Constitution expressly grants the Legislature 
plenary authority over the state’s local governments, which have 
only those “powers of local self-government not inconsistent with 
general law.”  Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. (charter counties); see 
also id. § 2(b) (“Municipalities . . . may exercise any power for 
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.”).  We 
have explained that if the rule were otherwise, the state’s “political 
subdivisions would have the power to frustrate the ability of the 
Legislature to set policies for the state.”  Metro. Dade Cnty., 737 
So. 2d at 504.  The constitution also confers exclusively upon the 
Legislature the power to abrogate common law and restrict local 
government power.  See art. VIII, §§ 1-2, Fla. Const.; McNayr, 184 
So. 2d at 430 n.6 (acknowledging that the Florida Legislature has 
the authority to “do away with the immunity altogether” as it 
applied to local officials).  For example, the Legislature can abolish 
counties by general law, see art. VIII, § 1, Fla. Const. (“The state 
shall be divided by law into political subdivisions called counties.  
Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law . . . .”), and 
municipalities exist only by virtue of general law, see ch. 165, Fla. 
Stat. (2021).  The Legislature is likewise authorized to enact general 
 
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laws preempting all regulation in an area of the law.  See Metro. 
Dade Cnty., 737 So. 2d at 504 (“[W]henever ‘any doubt exists as to 
the extent of a power attempted to be exercised which may affect 
the operation of a state statute, the doubt is to be resolved against 
the ordinance and in favor of the statute.’ ”) (quoting Rinzler v. 
Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 668 (Fla. 1972)). 
By enacting the Preemption Statute, the Legislature exercised 
its power to preempt the field of firearms and ammunition (subject 
to limited exceptions).  See §§ 790.33(1), (4).  As it did in the present 
case, the Legislature has the authority to change substantive law.  
Section 790.33(3)(f) authorizes lawsuits against local governments 
and authorizes awards of damages, attorney’s fees, and costs to 
prevailing plaintiffs.  The imposition of these civil statutory actions 
for violations of the Preemption Statute does not violate 
governmental function immunity.  It is not a core municipal 
function to occupy an area that the Legislature has preempted, and 
local governments have no lawful discretion or authority to enact 
ordinances that violate state preemption.  See Fla. Power Corp., 579 
So. 2d at 107 (“While the authority given to cities and counties in 
Florida is broad, both the constitution and statutes recognize that 
 
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cities and counties have no authority to act in areas that the 
legislature has preempted.”). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the First District did not err in 
concluding that governmental function immunity does not prohibit 
the statutory actions in section 790.33(3)(f). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that neither 
legislative immunity nor governmental function immunity prohibit 
the statutory actions and penalties in section 790.33(3)(c), (d), and 
(f).  Accordingly, we approve the First District’s decision in City of 
Weston. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., 
concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
In its order granting summary judgment in favor of dozens of 
cities, counties, and elected local government officials, the trial 
court correctly observed that the Legislature has the authority to 
 
- 26 - 
abolish counties and cities if it chooses to do so.8  Additionally, the 
Legislature has the power and authority to preempt local 
government control by general law.  However, this broad legislative 
power and authority is not without limits.  The trial court explained: 
But once those governments are established, the 
Constitution mandates certain requirements for how they 
must be set up.  The establishment of a legislative county 
commission is one.  Art. VIII, Section 1(e), Fla. Const.  
Establishing municipal legislative bodies is another.  Art. 
VIII, Section 2, Fla. Const.  The legislature cannot change 
these fundamental aspects of counties and cities without 
amending the Constitution.  In following this reasoning, 
the court sees no relevance to the legislative supremacy 
argument when considering the separation of powers 
question because the legislature cannot change the 
fundamental aspects of separation of powers. 
 
Here, the majority approved a penalty provision included by 
the Legislature in section 790.33(3)(c)-(d) applicable to local 
officials.  The provision imposes a fine of up to $5,000 against 
elected or appointed local government officials or administrative 
agency heads for “knowing and willful” violations of the statute.  
 
 
8.  Article VIII, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides 
that “[c]ounties may be created, abolished or changed by law.”  
Section 2(a) provides that “[m]unicipalities may be established or 
abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or 
special law.” 
 
- 27 - 
Section (3)(d) also prohibits the use of public funds to defend or 
reimburse the public official “found to have knowingly and willfully 
violated this section.”  To make matters worse, section 790.33(3)(c) 
requires the judicial branch to determine whether the violation by 
the public official was “knowing and willful.” 
As noted by the trial court, “[j]udicial power is vested in courts 
alone and judges cannot wield executive or legislative power.  As a 
part of this separation, Florida courts cannot question any 
legislator about her or his legislative process because it would be 
impermissible judicial meddling in a purely political matter.”  
Consequently, the requirement of judicial involvement in 
determining whether the action of the public official was “knowing 
and willful” amounts to nothing less than an impermissible judicial 
intrusion into the official’s legislative thought process, and it 
undermines the official’s ability to effectuate the constituents’ will. 
 
As aptly observed by the trial court, “[b]ecause local 
governments must have what amounts to small legislatures, and 
because courts cannot interfere in legislative processes, neither this 
court, nor any other court in Florida, can enforce the civil penalty 
provisions of [s]ection 790.33 against local legislators.” 
 
- 28 - 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Direct Conflict of Decisions and 
Statutory Validity/Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District – Case No. 1D19-2819 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Genevieve Hall and Steven Hall, General Counsel, Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Nicole “Nikki” Fried, as Commissioner of Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
 
Edward G. Guedes and Jamie A. Cole of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole 
& Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
for Petitoners, Weston, Miramar, Pompano Beach, Pinecrest, 
South Miami, Miami Gardens, Cutler Bay, Lauderhill, Boca 
Raton, Surfside, Tallahassee, North Miami, Orlando, Fort 
Lauderdale, Gainesville, St. Petersburg, Maitland, Key 
Biscayne, Turkel, West Palm Beach, North Miami Beach, 
Safety Harbor, Village of Palmetto Bay, Dunedin, and Riviera 
Beach 
 
LaShawn D. Riggans, County Attorney, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Leon County 
 
Michael Cardozo and Chantel L. Febus of Proskauer Rose LLP, New 
York, New York, Matthew Triggs of Proskauer Rose LLP, Boca 
Raton, Florida, and Joseph S. Hartunian of Proskauer Rose LLP, 
Washington, District of Columbia; and Eric A. Tirschwell of 
Everytown Law, New York, New York, 
 
 
- 29 - 
for Petitioners, Dan Daley, Frank C. Ortis, Rebecca A. Tooley, 
Justin Flippen, City of Coral Springs, City of Pembroke Pines, 
City of Coconut Creek, and City of Wilton Manors 
 
Abigail G. Corbett and Veronica L. De Zayas of Stearns Weaver 
Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Coral Gables 
 
Andrew J. Meyers, René D. Harrod, Nathaniel A. Klitsberg, and 
Joseph K. Jarone, County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Broward County 
 
Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Altanese Phenelus, Shanika A. Graves, 
and Angela F. Benjamin, County Attorneys, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Miami-Dade County 
 
Robert F. Rosenwald, Jr., Rafael Paz, Aleksandr Boksner, and Raul 
J. Aguila, City Attorneys, Miami Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner, City of Miami Beach 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, and Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Eric J. Friday of Kingry & Friday, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Carry, Inc. 
 
John Parker Sweeney, James W. Porter, III, Marc A. Nardone, and 
Connor M. Blair of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, 
Washington, District of Columbia, and R. Craig Mayfield of Bradley 
Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
- 30 - 
 
for Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. 
 
Philip R. Stein, Kenneth Duvall, and Ilana Drescher of Bilzin 
Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP, Miami, Florida; and Brook 
Dooley, David J. Rosen, Anna Porto, and Andrew S. Bruns of Keker, 
Van Nest & Peters LLP, San Francisco, California, 
 
for Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors and League 
of Women Voters of Florida, Giffords Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence, Brady, and Equality Florida Institute, Inc. 
 
Michael Spellman of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; 
Kraig Conn and Rebecca O’Hara of Florida League of Cities, Inc., 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Edward G. Labrador of Florida Association 
of Counties, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida League of Cities and the Florida 
Association of Counties