Title: People v. Fane

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2021 IL 126715 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
(Docket No. 126715) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
TWIQWON R. FANE, Appellee. 
Opinion filed December 16, 2021. 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Justices Garman, Overstreet, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Michael J. Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Anne 
M. Burke and Justice Neville. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by giving the jury a 
modified version of Illinois Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction No. 3.17 (2011) 
(hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.17), the accomplice witness instruction, when the 
alleged accomplice witness provided exculpatory testimony for defendant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Twiqwon R. Fane. We conclude that the Stephenson County circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion; therefore, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment. 
¶ 2 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
In December 2016, defendant was charged with, among other crimes, 
residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2016)), aggravated battery of a 
victim over 60 (id. § 12-3.05(d)(1)), home invasion (id. § 19-6(a)(2)), and resisting 
or obstructing a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)). 
¶ 4 
At trial, Sergeant Timothy Weichel from the Freeport Police Department 
testified first for the State. Weichel explained that, on November 18, 2016, at 2:23 
a.m., a 911 operator alerted him to a home invasion in progress. As Weichel 
approached the home, he heard a woman screaming. When he arrived at the door 
on the north side of the residence, Weichel saw a man standing inside the home. 
Weichel ordered him to get down, but the man fled. At trial, Weichel identified the 
man as Drean McGee. 
¶ 5 
The woman continued to scream as though she were being attacked, which 
suggested to Weichel that there was another perpetrator. By the time he entered the 
home, the woman told him that the suspects had fled. Weichel described the woman 
as distraught and noted that she had been injured. 
¶ 6 
Weichel left the residence to pursue the suspects. Hearing noise to the east of 
the home, he ran in that direction and radioed incoming units to inform them that 
the suspects were headed eastward. Roughly five minutes later, another officer 
reported that two people were running in a field approximately four blocks from 
the victim’s home. When Weichel arrived, the other officer had two men in custody. 
Weichel identified defendant as the second man apprehended that day along with 
McGee. Weichel also explained that “there was a small area between the shed and 
the building where [defendant] was taken into custody.” Weichel found a white T-
shirt there. He directed another officer to collect the white T-shirt as evidence. 
¶ 7 
Freeport police corporal Ben Johnson testified that he heard Weichel’s call for 
backup that morning and drove in the direction of the suspects. Johnson saw two 
men sprinting across a field. He got out of his squad car and ran after them, ordering 
- 2 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
them to stop running several times. Ultimately, the men ran into a dead end. When 
Johnson caught up to them, McGee was “standing in the open,” while defendant 
“attempt[ed] to conceal himself behind a shed along the building.” Johnson 
withdrew his taser and ordered them to the ground. When another officer arrived, 
both men were handcuffed. 
¶ 8 
Freeport police officer James Darren Hodges testified that he transported 
defendant to the police station that morning. According to Hodges, while they were 
en route to the station, defendant volunteered that his girlfriend Gabby’s car had 
been stolen the night before. After transferring defendant into custody, Hodges 
returned to the field where defendant and McGee were caught. Sergeant Weichel 
asked Hodges to retrieve a white T-shirt from where officers found defendant 
hiding. After taking a picture of it, Hodges placed the T-shirt into a bag to be placed 
into evidence. That morning, another officer also transferred a set of keys, key fob, 
and a key chain over to Hodges to be processed into evidence. 
¶ 9 
The other officer, Daniel Moore, testified that on November 18, 2016, he was 
sent to the victim’s home around 2:30 a.m. While speaking with the victim, Voncile 
Modlinger, he noticed a set of car keys on the floor in front of the piano in the living 
room. Moore picked them up and asked Modlinger if they belonged to her. She said 
that they did not. Moore retained the keys “for the time being” before eventually 
giving them to Hodges to be put into evidence. 
¶ 10 
Defendant’s former girlfriend Gabrielle Gill testified that she gave defendant 
and McGee permission to use her car the night before the incident. She further 
acknowledged that the prosecution possessed what appeared to be her keys for that 
car. 
¶ 11 
Modlinger was 92 years old at the time of trial. By November 2016, she had 
lived at her residence for more than 50 years. Her home was first broken into on 
November 12, 2016. That time, the intruder stole money and her cell phone. 
Modlinger bought another phone and kept it in bed beside her at night because she 
was frightened. 
¶ 12 
Six days later, on November 18, 2016, Modlinger heard a noise in the middle 
of the night. She immediately called 911 to report that someone had broken into her 
home. Modlinger gave the dispatcher her home’s intersection when two men 
- 3 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
walked into the room. One of them had a “white thing” covering his face; he hit 
Modlinger in the face with a plastic laundry basket that she kept near her bed. 
¶ 13 
The assailant whose face was covered ordered her to get out of bed, and when 
she did, he lifted her mattress to search for money. He then grabbed Modlinger and 
started beating her. She described being “pounded up and down and thinking [her] 
legs [were] breaking.” The next thing she remembered was that a police officer 
arrived. Modlinger testified that her face was bleeding and that she suffered 
physical pain that continued through the time of trial. 
¶ 14 
McGee testified on defendant’s behalf. He acknowledged that he had pled 
guilty to residential burglary and home invasion of Modlinger’s residence. 
According to McGee, around midnight on the morning of the break-in, he, 
defendant, defendant’s girlfriend, and others traveled by car to a tavern. After 
leaving the tavern, members of the group parted ways until defendant, McGee, and 
a man named James Beales were left in the car. McGee testified that Beales drove 
and that he ultimately dropped off defendant on a corner. McGee and Beales then 
drove around for 20 minutes or so and smoked cannabis while plotting the break-
in. 
¶ 15 
McGee testified that Beales selected Modlinger’s home. When they arrived, 
Beales kicked the door in. Beales then dragged Modlinger out of bed while McGee 
searched for money. McGee stated that they had been in her home for 10 to 15 
minutes when he opened the curtain to “check[ ] the premises.” At that point, a 
police officer shone his light on McGee. McGee told Beales that they had to leave, 
and both men ran from the home in different directions. 
¶ 16 
As he ran, McGee encountered defendant. McGee expressed surprise at seeing 
defendant but advised him to run too. Defendant told McGee that he had just 
conducted a drug deal and he felt that he had been set up. McGee was about to 
inform defendant of the break-in when an officer cornered them and ordered them 
to the ground. 
¶ 17 
McGee testified that he and defendant had been friends for more than 15 years. 
McGee and defendant’s half-sister were cousins, although defendant was not 
related to him by blood. 
- 4 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 18 
At the jury instructions conference, instructions such as IPI Criminal No. 2.03 
(“Presumption Of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt—Burden Of Proof Generally”) 
and IPI Criminal No. 3.12 (“Impeachment Of A Witness By Prior Conviction”) 
were given without objection. Defendant did, however, object to the State’s tender 
of IPI Criminal No. 3.17 (“Testimony Of An Accomplice”). IPI Criminal No. 3.17 
provides: “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with 
the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be 
considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other 
evidence in the case.” 
¶ 19 
Relying on this court’s decision in People v. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d 279 (1995), the 
State argued that this instruction was proper regarding McGee’s testimony. It 
acknowledged that certain appellate court decisions had deemed it inappropriate to 
give IPI Criminal No. 3.17 when the accomplice witness’s testimony completely 
exonerated the defendant, but the State argued that Rivera superseded those cases. 
The State also observed that McGee’s testimony did not exonerate defendant with 
respect to the charge of resisting arrest. 
¶ 20 
The trial court recognized that the issue was significant. Therefore, it took a 
recess to review Rivera and other relevant cases. Upon its return, the trial court 
discussed Rivera, People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332 (1935), and other decisions in detail. 
In the court’s view, the cases provided that where a defense witness’s testimony 
failed to completely exonerate the defendant—and in fact, corroborated the State’s 
case in an important way—the trial judge has discretion to give IPI Criminal No. 
3.17. 
¶ 21 
Here, the trial court found that aspects of McGee’s testimony corroborated the 
State’s case on the charge of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. It also observed 
that McGee had pled guilty to offenses related to the break-in at issue in the 
proceedings. The trial court found that it was proper for the jury to hear McGee’s 
testimony, but the court found it equally proper “for the jury to be alerted that this 
is the kind of testimony that Illinois courts have said should be treated with 
caution.” Under these circumstances, where McGee admitted involvement in the 
offense and where, in the court’s view, his testimony tended to implicate defendant, 
the court found that it should give the instruction to the jury, though with a 
modification. Taking language from People v. Jackson, 79 Ill. App. 3d 660 (1979), 
- 5 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the trial court suggested that the instruction be modified to state, “if the *** witness 
testified that he participated in the crime with which the defendant is charged.” The 
court found that language to be “undeniable.” 
¶ 22 
For his part, defendant opposed giving the instruction and strenuously opposed 
any modification of it. In his view, a plain reading of IPI Criminal No. 3.17 showed 
that the instruction did not apply. Although McGee’s testimony may have 
supported the charge of resisting arrest, defendant argued that such an insignificant 
charge should not be used to justify issuing such a meaningful instruction. 
Defendant also reminded the court of the importance of McGee’s testimony to his 
defense. He noted the plethora of other ways available to the State to discredit his 
testimony. Defendant argued that to further instruct the jury to discredit McGee’s 
testimony would significantly undermine his defense. He requested that the court 
decline to exercise its discretion to allow the instruction. 
¶ 23 
In response, the State observed that the proposed modification was an accurate 
statement of the law and, thus, should be given. The State further asserted that 
McGee’s testimony was suspect for many reasons and argued that it should not be 
prevented from presenting each of those reasons. 
¶ 24 
The trial court asked the State to draft an instruction that was consistent with 
the one it had earlier suggested. When the State tendered its revised instruction, the 
trial court observed that it had been labeled “non-IPI.” The court also noted that the 
instruction was “partially derived” from IPI Criminal No. 3.17 and Jackson. After 
confirming that defendant had no additional objection, the court noted that the 
instruction would be given over defendant’s objection. 
¶ 25 
The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of residential burglary, aggravated 
battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace 
officer. The court entered judgment on the verdicts. Defendant moved for a new 
trial, in part, on the ground that the trial court improperly gave the jury the modified 
version of IPI Criminal No. 3.17. Noting that it had thoroughly addressed the issue 
during the jury instruction conference, the court denied defendant’s motion. 
¶ 26 
The trial court initially sentenced him to 40 years’ imprisonment. Defendant 
moved the court to reconsider the sentence, arguing, in part, that the court erred in 
finding defendant—who was 24 years old at the time of sentencing—to be beyond 
- 6 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rehabilitation. The court determined that its earlier sentence had not adequately 
considered defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, it granted the 
motion and modified defendant’s sentence to 30 years’ imprisonment. Defendant 
appealed. 
¶ 27 
The appellate court stated that IPI Criminal No. 3.17 existed “to warn the jury 
that the witness might have a strong motivation to provide false testimony for the 
State in exchange for immunity or some other lenient treatment.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) 2020 IL App (2d) 180151, ¶ 33. Given the relationship 
between such a witness and the State, the court noted that “there may be a strong 
motivation to testify falsely for the accomplice who seeks, hopes or expects lenient 
treatment by the State in return for favorable testimony.” (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Id. 
¶ 28 
The appellate court acknowledged that in Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d at 292, this court 
upheld the trial court’s issuance of the accomplice witness instruction even though 
the witness had been called by the defendant. 2020 IL App (2d) 180151, ¶ 34. 
However, the appellate court noted that an unmodified version of IPI Criminal No. 
3.17 was given to the jury in Rivera, so it found that that case was distinguishable. 
Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Reconciling Rivera and other decisions, the appellate court concluded 
that “the accomplice-witness instruction may be given where an alleged accomplice 
witness implicates a defendant” in a crime. Id. ¶ 38. Conversely, where an 
accomplice witness wholly exculpates a defendant, the court ruled that IPI Criminal 
No. 3.17 should not be given. Id. 
¶ 29 
In this case, where McGee’s testimony represented defendant’s entire defense 
and resolution of this case turned on the relative credibility of McGee and the 
State’s witnesses, the appellate court found that the trial court’s error could not be 
deemed harmless. Id. ¶ 40. The appellate court therefore reversed the trial court’s 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing the 
second issue defendant raised on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 30, 43. 
¶ 30 
This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) 
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020). 
- 7 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 31 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 32 
As we explained at the outset, the issue is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by giving a modified version of IPI Criminal No. 3.17 to the jury. 
¶ 33 
“Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a)) requires a trial court to 
instruct the jury pursuant to the IPI criminal instructions unless the trial court 
determines that the IPI instruction does not accurately state the law.” People v. 
Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 399-400 (2006). And where there is no IPI jury instruction 
regarding a subject on which the court determines the jury should be instructed, the 
court has discretion to give a non-IPI instruction. Id. at 400. We review the trial 
court’s decision to instruct a jury using nonpattern instructions for an abuse of 
discretion. People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 211 (2002). “Whether a court has 
abused its discretion will depend on whether the nonpattern instruction tendered is 
an accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the law.” 
Id. 
¶ 34 
This court has observed that “juries are composed of laypersons who are not 
trained to separate issues and to disregard irrelevant matters.” Dillon v. Evanston 
Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (2002). As such, jury instructions “provide the jury 
with correct legal principles that apply to the evidence, thus enabling the jury to 
reach a proper conclusion based on the applicable law and the evidence presented.” 
People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 500 (2006). Given the prominent role they play 
at trial, jury instructions “must state the law fairly and distinctly and must not 
mislead the jury or prejudice a party.” (Emphasis omitted.) Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 
507. 
¶ 35 
This court has long deemed it appropriate to advise juries that an alleged 
accomplice’s testimony may be viewed with suspicion. For instance, in People v. 
Grove, 284 Ill. 429, 434-35 (1918), we referenced “the rule of law that testimony 
of an accomplice is to be received with caution and carefully scrutinized, and is 
only to be accepted where the jury, after careful examination and consideration, are 
convinced of its truth.” See People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977) (observing 
that this court has never questioned the wisdom of treating an accomplice witness’s 
testimony with skepticism and suspicion). The underlying rationale is that it is fair 
to question the testimony of a witness who has admittedly participated in the crime 
at issue in the proceedings. See, e.g., Hoyt v. People, 140 Ill. 588, 595 (1892) 
- 8 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(“Accomplices, upon their own confession, stand contaminated with guilt” and are 
“of a tainted character, giving their testimony under the strongest motives to 
deceive.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (citing 1 Esek Cowen, Notes to 
Phillips’ Treatise on the Law of Evidence 111 (5th ed. 1868))). 
¶ 36 
IPI Criminal No. 3.17 reflects this rule. The instruction provides that, when “a 
witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant,” 
that witness’s testimony is subject to suspicion and should be treated with caution. 
And, consistent with this court’s prior rulings, the instruction applies to witnesses 
who testify for either the State or the defendant. 
¶ 37 
For example, in Touhy, after three accomplices to a kidnapping testified at trial, 
the jury was instructed, in part, that the “testimony of an accomplice is competent 
evidence but such testimony is liable to grave suspicion and should be acted upon 
with great caution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Touhy, 361 Ill. at 352. One 
of the witnesses testified on the defendant’s behalf, and the defendant argued that 
a different rule should apply to the State’s witnesses than to his witness. 
¶ 38 
This court observed that, “although the term ‘accomplice’ is generally applied 
to those testifying against their fellow-criminals [citation], an accomplice is one 
who is in some way concerned in or associated with another in the commission of 
a crime.” Id. at 353. We further concluded that there was no reason “why one who 
is in fact an accomplice should not have his testimony scrutinized carefully before 
it is relied on, no matter on which side of the case he testified.” Id.; see People v. 
Krush, 120 Ill. App. 3d 614, 618 (1983) (“The credibility of accomplice testimony 
cannot realistically be determined solely on the basis of which side called him as a 
witness ***.”); see also United States v. Bolin, 35 F.3d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“There is sound reason for a jury to examine closely the testimony of a former 
accomplice because his credibility is suspect, no matter which side has called him 
to testify or whether his testimony is exculpatory or inculpatory.”); State v. 
Anthony, 749 P.2d 37, 44 (Kan. 1988) (holding “that a cautionary instruction on 
accomplice testimony is proper in all circumstances where an accomplice testifies” 
and noting that “[s]uch testimony on behalf of defendants is becoming more 
prevalent ***, particularly by spouses or convicted friends of the accused who have 
nothing to lose by taking the blame”). 
- 9 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 39 
This court reaffirmed the rule recognized in Touhy in Rivera. There, accomplice 
witnesses who testified for both the State and the defendant had changed their 
stories regarding what transpired during the murder for which the defendant was 
ultimately convicted. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d at 283-86. Before this court, the defendant 
argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury that IPI Criminal No. 
3.17 applied only to the State’s witness, not to his witness. Id. at 291. This court 
saw no reason why testimony from an accomplice on behalf of the defendant should 
not be scrutinized as cautiously and strictly as testimony from an accomplice on 
behalf of the State. Id. at 292. Reasoning that the defense witness’s credibility “was 
clearly suspect,” we ruled that “the trial judge should have discretion to decide 
whether to advise the jury to accept an accomplice’s testimony with caution.” Id. 
at 293. Following Rivera, the Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in 
Criminal Cases has recommended that IPI Criminal No. 3.17 “be given any time an 
accomplice testifies.” IPI Criminal No. 3.17, Committee Note (approved Oct. 17, 
2014). 
¶ 40 
Returning to this case, the trial court determined that IPI Criminal No. 3.17 
could not be given in its unmodified form. IPI Criminal No. 3.17 applies “[w]hen 
a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant.” 
McGee testified, however, that he and another man committed the crime and that 
defendant did not participate. Thus, it may have confused the jury to receive IPI 
Criminal No. 3.17 as written because the language of the instruction did not 
correspond with McGee’s testimony. 
¶ 41 
That said, the trial court also recognized that McGee was indisputably 
associated with defendant in the crime of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, 
making him an accomplice. See Touhy, 361 Ill. at 352. And the court determined 
that the jury should be advised that McGee’s testimony was of the sort that Illinois 
courts have treated with caution. Therefore, in reliance on People v. Jackson, 79 Ill. 
App. 3d 660 (1979), the trial court modified IPI Criminal No. 3.17. See generally 
People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008) (observing that the record must contain 
some evidence to justify a jury instruction and noting that the trial court has 
discretion to determine whether an instruction should be given). 
¶ 42 
In Jackson, the defendant’s witness had been convicted as a participant in the 
robbery with which the defendant was charged. The witness testified that he and 
- 10 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
another man committed the robbery, not the defendant. On appeal, the defendant 
contended that, because the witness exonerated him, the trial court erred in giving 
IPI Criminal No. 3.17. The appellate court ruled that IPI Criminal No. 3.17 was 
“not a correct instruction when a witness testifies that he participated in the crime 
with which the defendant is charged, but exonerates the defendant.” Jackson, 79 Ill. 
App. 3d at 665. Rather, the court determined, 
“[i]t would have been better if the trial court had cautioned the jury 
concerning testimony of a witness who testifies he participated in the crime with 
which the defendant is charged, rather than of a witness who testifies that he 
was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 666. 
That said, the court found that there was “nothing inherently unfair about a trial 
court cautioning the jury concerning the value of such testimony, at least when 
some basis exists for believing the witness had a motive to fabricate testimony 
favorable to defendant.” Id. at 665. 
¶ 43 
Against that legal background, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in giving the jury the challenged instruction. This court has determined 
that an accomplice witness’s testimony may be treated with skepticism, whether 
the witness testifies for the State or for the defendant. Further, the trial court has 
discretion to give a non-IPI instruction so long as it is an accurate, impartial, and 
nonargumentative summation of the law. The instruction here met those criteria. It 
warned the jury to be cautious of McGee’s testimony as an accomplice, but because 
McGee did not testify that he committed the crime with defendant, the trial court 
appropriately adjusted the wording of the instruction. 
¶ 44 
Defendant contends that the only purpose of the accomplice witness instruction 
is to warn the jury that an accomplice may have a strong motive to provide false 
testimony for the State in exchange for immunity or some other lenient treatment. 
Defendant relies on decisions like People v. Dodd, 173 Ill. App. 3d 460, 466-67 
(1988), where the court ruled that the instruction “should not be given where the 
witness’ testimony completely fails to implicate the defendant, because the 
instruction may tend to unduly derogate the defendant’s ability to use favorable 
testimony by an accomplice.” Thus, in defendant’s view, the trial court’s modified 
instruction failed to accurately convey the law. 
- 11 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 45 
Plainly, one of the purposes of the accomplice witness instruction is to caution 
the jury that the witness may be testifying falsely in exchange for favorable 
treatment from the State. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 232 (1991) 
(“The testimony of an accomplice witness ‘ “has inherent weaknesses, being 
testimony of a confessed criminal and fraught with dangers of motives such as 
malice towards the accused, fear, threats, promises or hopes of leniency, or benefits 
from the prosecution.” ’ ” (quoting People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 47-48 (1989), 
quoting People v. Hermens, 5 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (1955))). Yet, it is equally plain that 
courts have looked askance at an accomplice’s testimony regardless of which party 
offers it and have upheld issuing the instruction when the witness gave exculpatory 
testimony for the defendant. Touhy, 361 Ill. at 353; Krush, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 618 
(“[W]hether the accomplice testifies for the State or defendant, the trial court should 
have discretion to advise the jury to accept the testimony with caution.”). 
¶ 46 
We also reject defendant’s argument that tendering IPI Criminal No. 3.17 (and 
any modifications of it) to the jury is appropriate only when the accomplice witness 
implicates the defendant in a crime. Notably, the defendant’s witness in Touhy did 
not claim that the defendant was involved in the kidnapping. See 361 Ill. at 342-43. 
This court nonetheless determined that the trial court did not err in giving the 
accomplice witness instruction as to the witness. We adhere to that position and 
maintain that a trial court need not find “implication” before giving the accomplice 
witness instruction. 
¶ 47 
Defendant further observes that a defendant’s spouse, friend, or business 
partner usually brings bias to court when testifying, but he argues that only the 
potential bias of seeking leniency from the prosecution warrants instructing the jury 
to consider the testimony with suspicion and caution. However, as this court has 
noted, the testimony of an accomplice is that of a “confessed criminal.” Williams, 
147 Ill. 2d at 232. And though the accomplice’s testimony is competent evidence 
(People v. George, 49 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1971)), we have found that a trial court does 
not abuse its discretion in cautioning the jury about the accomplice’s testimony, 
(Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d at 293). 
¶ 48 
Settled law provides that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial 
court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no 
reasonable person would agree with it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). People 
- 12 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 35. Here, where the court gave the jury an instruction 
that accurately described the law on testimony from an accomplice and that 
conformed to the witness’s testimony, no abuse of discretion occurred. 
¶ 49 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 50 
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in instructing the jury with 
a modified version of IPI Criminal No. 3.17. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate 
court’s judgment and remand to the appellate court to consider defendant’s 
remaining claim. 
¶ 51 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 52 
Cause remanded. 
¶ 53 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE, dissenting: 
¶ 54 
The accomplice witness instruction (Illinois Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 
No. 3.17 (2011) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.17)) is designed to alert the jury to 
a witness’s motivation to testify falsely for the State in exchange for leniency. See, 
e.g., People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977). The pattern instruction should be 
given at the request of the defendant if the totality of the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom establish probable cause to believe that the witness 
participated in the crime, either as a principal or under a theory of accountability. 
People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 89 (2000). 
¶ 55 
Defendant did not request IPI Criminal No. 3.17, and I agree with the majority 
that the record does not support the use of the pattern instruction. Supra ¶ 43; 
People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008). 
¶ 56 
However, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the State’s cautionary 
instruction was appropriate in this case, where McGee testified to his involvement 
in the charged offenses but exonerated defendant. The trial court abused its 
discretion in giving the nonpattern instruction because it distorted the definition of 
“accomplice” and the law on which IPI Criminal No. 3.17 is based. The errant 
- 13 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
instruction unduly prejudiced defendant’s ability to use favorable testimony from 
McGee. 
¶ 57 
Furthermore, the error was avoidable, as McGee’s testimony was already 
covered by the general pattern instruction on witness credibility, IPI Criminal No. 
1.02, which was given to the jury. When a witness admits his own involvement in 
the charged offense but denies the defendant’s involvement, IPI Criminal No. 1.02 
can be used to instruct the jury to consider the witness’s biases and prejudices that 
potentially affect his testimony. Today, the majority has opened the door to giving 
nonpattern instructions that misstate the law on accomplice witness testimony and 
conflict with IPI Criminal Nos. 1.02 and 3.17. 
¶ 58 
I further conclude that the State forfeited its argument that any error resulting 
from the nonpattern instruction was harmless. Because the instructional error 
entitles defendant to a new trial, I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 59 
A. IPI Criminal No. 3.17 and the Nonpattern Instruction 
¶ 60 
The majority holds that, when a witness testifies to his involvement in the 
charged offense, a cautionary instruction is appropriate regardless of whether the 
testimony implicates or exonerates the defendant. The majority cites Hoyt v. 
People, 140 Ill. 588 (1892), People v. Grove, 284 Ill. 429 (1918), and Wilson for 
the proposition that the nonpattern cautionary instruction was appropriate in this 
case because IPI Criminal No. 3.17 is based on the witness’s diminished credibility 
from admitting his own involvement in the charged offense, not on his status as the 
defendant’s accomplice. At first blush, Hoyt, Grove, and Wilson seem to support 
the majority’s rationale, but a closer reading of those decisions shows cautionary 
instructions are given because the witness implicates himself and the defendant. 
¶ 61 
The majority cites Hoyt for the underlying rationale that “ ‘[a]ccomplices, upon 
their own confession, stand contaminated with guilt’ ” and “ ‘it is fair to question 
the testimony of a witness who has admittedly participated in the crime at issue in 
the proceedings.’ ” Supra ¶ 35 (quoting Hoyt, 140 Ill. at 595, citing 1 Esek Cowen, 
Notes to Phillips’ Treatise on the Law of Evidence 111 (5th ed. 1868)). But Hoyt 
actually undermines the majority’s position, as it teaches that the skepticism 
accorded accomplice testimony is rooted in the witness’s motivation to blame the 
- 14 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
accused, not just in the witness admitting involvement in the charged offense. The 
Hoyt court explained that testimony is worthy of skepticism when the witness 
implicates the accused, because the witness is motivated by the possibility of 
prosecutorial leniency: 
“[Accomplice testimony] is liable to grave suspicion, and should be acted upon 
with the utmost caution, for otherwise the life or liberty of the best citizen might 
be taken away on the accusation of the real criminal, made either to shield 
himself from punishment or to gratify his malice ***: Accomplices, upon their 
own confession, stand contaminated with guilt. They admit a participation in 
the very crime which they endeavor, by their evidence, to fix upon the prisoner. 
They are sometimes entitled to even a reward upon obtaining a conviction, and 
always expect to earn a pardon.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoyt, 140 
Ill. App. 3d at 595 (citing Cowen, supra, at 111). 
¶ 62 
The majority’s reliance on Grove is similarly misplaced. As in Hoyt, the witness 
in Grove admitted involvement and inculpated the accused. The Grove court 
explained, 
“If an accomplice gives testimony which tends in any degree to exonerate 
himself or to lay the blame of the transaction upon another or it appears that he 
will be the gainer in any way by his testimony, such facts should have great 
weight with the jury and trial court ***.” Grove, 284 Ill. at 435. 
¶ 63 
Finally, the majority points out that, in Wilson, we observed that this court has 
never questioned the wisdom of treating an accomplice witness’s testimony with 
suspicion. Supra ¶ 35. But the Wilson court emphasized that accomplice testimony 
“is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity 
and malice toward the accused.” Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d at 349. 
¶ 64 
The concerns expressed in Hoyt, Grove, and Wilson are embodied in IPI 
Criminal No. 3.17. The pattern instruction is labeled “Testimony Of An 
Accomplice” (IPI Criminal No. 3.17), and People v. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d 279, 292­
93 (1995), holds that the instruction may be used when a witness testifies (or his 
prior statement is admitted as substantive evidence) that he acted as an accomplice 
together with the defendant in committing the charged offense. According to the 
instruction’s unambiguous language, a witness does not qualify as an “accomplice” 
- 15 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for purposes of IPI Criminal No. 3.17 unless he commits the crime with the 
defendant. 
¶ 65 
The majority refers to the nonpattern instruction used at trial as a “modified” 
version of IPI Criminal No. 3.17, when in fact the instruction turned the accomplice 
witness instruction on its head. The nonpattern instruction redefined “accomplice” 
simply as someone who was involved in the charged offense. Because an 
accomplice is one who is in some way concerned in or associated with another in 
the commission of a crime (supra ¶ 38), a person who testifies he committed a 
crime without the defendant’s involvement cannot be considered the defendant’s 
accomplice unless the witness is presumed to be lying. Thus, the nonpattern 
instruction distorted the pattern instruction to effectively instruct the jury that the 
witness should not be believed. 
¶ 66 
IPI Criminal No. 3.17 is based on the unique relationship between the 
prosecution and an accomplice who gives testimony against the defendant. People 
v. Howard, 130 Ill. App. 2d 496, 498 (1970). The relationship may create a strong 
motivation for an accomplice to seek, expect, or hope for favorable treatment by 
the prosecution if his testimony favors the State. Id. 
¶ 67 
By contrast, a witness who admits involvement in the charged offense but 
exonerates rather than implicates the defendant is risking disfavor by the 
prosecution, and the same reasons for discrediting the witness’s testimony do not 
exist. Id. The decisions cited by the majority do not support giving a cautionary 
instruction when a witness like McGee gives testimony that attempts to shield the 
defendant from blame. 
¶ 68 
In People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332 (1935), and Rivera, this court held that IPI 
Criminal No. 3.17 may be given regardless of whether the witness is called by the 
prosecution or the defense. But neither decision compels the result reached by the 
majority. 
¶ 69 
In Touhy, three witnesses gave testimony regarding the defendant’s 
involvement. Two admitted their guilt and testified for the State. The third witness 
had been convicted of the offense but persisted at Touhy’s trial in denying that an 
offense occurred. The Touhy court held the cautionary instruction applied to all 
three, regardless of which side they testified for. Id. at 352-53. 
- 16 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 70 
The State argues the instruction was appropriate in Touhy simply because the 
witness who implicated the defendant was not credible. But the Touhy court did not 
cite poor credibility as a reason to give the instruction. Id. at 352 (“The only 
objection made at the trial to this instruction by counsel for the defendants was, 
‘that [the witness] does not come in the class of accomplice, not having been called 
by the State but having been called by defendants.’ ”). The policy underlying the 
accomplice witness instruction did not inform Touhy’s analysis. Howard, 130 Ill. 
App. 2d at 497-99. 
¶ 71 
Moreover, the Touhy court’s ruling can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the 
disparate treatment of witnesses who give conflicting accounts of the defendant’s 
involvement in the charged offense, a concern that is not raised in this case. Touhy, 
361 Ill. at 353 (the jury should view the testimony of each witness similarly, “no 
matter on which side of the case he testified”). 
¶ 72 
Like Touhy, Rivera involved multiple witnesses who admitted involvement in 
the charged offenses but gave conflicting testimony regarding the defendant’s 
involvement. Norman, a codefendant, testified that he acted alone. Meger testified 
that Rivera also was involved. This court held that the accomplice witness 
instruction could be given for Norman even though he gave trial testimony 
exonerating Rivera. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d at 291-92. This court stated: 
“We continue to adhere to this court’s position in Touhy. We can think of 
no reason why codefendant Norman’s testimony should not be scrutinized as 
cautiously and strictly as Meger’s testimony. Norman was a convicted murderer 
and admitted perjurer, and his testimony at Rivera’s trial was inconsistent with 
his prior testimony at his own trial. Norman’s credibility was clearly suspect, 
and in such a case, the trial judge should have discretion to decide whether to 
advise the jury to accept an accomplice’s testimony with caution. The trial 
court, therefore, did not err in refusing to limit the accomplice instruction to 
Meger.” Id. at 293. 
¶ 73 
Although Norman attempted to exonerate Rivera at Rivera’s trial, Norman’s 
testimony at his own trial implicated Rivera and the inculpatory testimony was 
admitted as substantive evidence at Rivera’s trial. The pattern instruction applied 
to Norman because the jury heard his prior testimony that he was involved in the 
commission of the offense with Rivera. 
- 17 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 74 
In contrast to Norman, McGee gave testimony that was “wholly exculpatory.” 
2020 IL App (2d) 180151, ¶ 39. The Rivera court must have deemed Norman’s 
prior testimony sufficient to trigger giving the accomplice instruction; otherwise, 
the trial court would have modified the instruction like the trial court did here. Id. 
¶ 37. 
¶ 75 
Touhy and Rivera illustrate that the prosecution and the defense can present 
witnesses who admit criminal involvement but offer conflicting testimony 
concerning the defendant’s involvement. When the jury hears conflicting testimony 
on the defendant’s culpability, the testimony should be viewed similarly, subject to 
suspicion and considered with caution according to IPI Criminal No. 3.17. By 
contrast, this case involves a single witness who exonerated defendant, so IPI 
Criminal No. 3.17 does not apply. Touhy and Rivera are each factually 
distinguishable from this case and do not compel the result reached by the majority. 
¶ 76 
The majority endorses the use of a nonpattern instruction that is not supported 
by the underlying rationale of IPI Criminal No. 3.17, which is to aid the defense. 
The majority radically expands the permitted use of cautionary instructions to 
specifically derogate witnesses giving testimony favorable to the defense, contrary 
to the purpose of the pattern instruction. This decision could be interpreted to mean 
exculpatory testimony generally warrants giving a nonpattern cautionary 
instruction whenever a witness admits criminality and displays a bias in favor of 
the defendant. Supra ¶ 38 (“ ‘[s]uch testimony on behalf of defendants is becoming 
more prevalent ***, particularly by spouses or convicted friends of the accused who 
have nothing to lose by taking the blame’ ” (quoting State v. Anthony, 749 P.2d 37, 
44 (Kan. 1988))). An accomplice’s motive for prosecutorial leniency or animus 
toward the defendant warrants giving IPI Criminal No. 3.17 because the instruction 
applies to the unique bias arising when a witness testifies to his involvement in the 
commission of the crime with the defendant. But the majority suggests a cautionary 
instruction may be given for any witness who has “nothing to lose by taking the 
blame.” 
¶ 77 
The majority mentions that the trial court found that McGee was associated with 
defendant in the crime of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. Supra ¶ 41. But 
if McGee’s testimony sufficiently inculpated defendant, the trial court could have 
used IPI Criminal No. 3.17. The court, by using the nonpattern instruction, 
- 18 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
effectively disregarded the inculpatory testimony concerning the resisting charge. 
This supports defendant’s argument that the resisting charge was trivial compared 
to the other offenses of which he was convicted. 
¶ 78 
B. IPI Criminal No. 1.02 
¶ 79 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) requires a trial court to 
instruct the jury pursuant to the IPI criminal instructions unless the trial court 
determines that the IPI instruction does not accurately state the law. Supra ¶ 33. 
The majority concludes the nonpattern instruction was appropriate because there 
was no IPI jury instruction on the subject of McGee’s credibility. I respectfully 
disagree. 
¶ 80 
IPI Criminal No. 1.02 (“Jury Is Sole Judge Of The Believability Of Witnesses”), 
broadly addresses the credibility of witnesses, including those who are implicated 
in (or already convicted of) the charged offense and are motivated to give testimony 
helpful to the defense. 
¶ 81 
IPI Criminal No. 1.02 provides, 
“Only you are the judges of the believability of the witnesses and of the 
weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In considering the 
testimony of any witness, you may take into account his ability and opportunity 
to observe, [his age,] his memory, his manner while testifying, any interest, 
bias, or prejudice he may have, and the reasonableness of his testimony 
considered in the light of all the evidence in the case. 
[You should judge the testimony of [ (a) (the) ] defendant[s] in the same 
manner as you judge the testimony of any other witness.]” (Emphasis added.) 
¶ 82 
IPI Criminal No. 1.02 permits the State to argue against the credibility of a 
witness who admits involvement in the charged offense but exonerates the 
defendant; the pattern instruction sufficiently addressed McGee’s interest in 
swearing defendant out of the charges. Because IPI Criminal No. 1.02 could be 
applied to McGee’s testimony, the nonpattern cautionary instruction used at trial 
was not an accurate, impartial, or nonargumentative statement of the law. 
- 19 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 83 
This court has acknowledged the relevance of IPI Criminal No. 1.02 to 
accomplice witness testimony, albeit in the context of the errant omission of IPI 
Criminal No. 3.17. In McCallister, we rejected an ineffective assistance claim based 
on trial counsel’s failure to request IPI Criminal No. 3.17. This court held that, even 
if counsel’s omission amounted to deficient performance, the defendant did not 
show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
omission did not prejudice the defendant, in part, because the trial court used IPI 
Criminal No. 1.02. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d at 90-91. 
¶ 84 
This court observed that, “while the jury in this case did not receive the 
accomplice witness instruction with respect to [the witness], it did consider, in 
general terms, any ‘interest, bias or prejudice’ that [the witness] had in testifying as 
he did.” Id. at 96. We concluded the trial court’s use of the general instruction on 
witness credibility “may be considered as one factor, among others, which 
establishes that [the] defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 
tender the accomplice witness instruction.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 97. 
¶ 85 
The McCallister court held the general instruction on witness credibility may 
not, by itself, be enough to cure the errant omission of an accomplice witness 
instruction when the witness implicates the accused. Id. at 96. But in doing so, this 
court acknowledged the overlap between IPI Criminal Nos. 1.02 and 3.17. 
¶ 86 
To be clear, IPI Criminal No. 1.02 is not a substitute for IPI Criminal No. 3.17 
in situations where the accomplice witness instruction is required. However, the 
general instruction on witness credibility instructs the jury to consider a witness’s 
interest, bias, or prejudice and applied to McGee’s testimony in this case. By 
contrast, a cautionary instruction used to single out a witness who admits 
involvement in an offense but has a motive to give testimony favorable to the 
defendant runs contrary to IPI Criminal Nos. 1.02 and 3.17. 
¶ 87 
C. Harmless Error 
¶ 88 
The State argues that any error was harmless because the outcome would not 
have been different if the nonpattern instruction had not been used at trial. 
Defendant responds that the State forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in its 
petition for leave to appeal. See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 122-23 (2006). 
- 20 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant speculates that the State deliberately omitted the harmless error 
argument from the petition because it would have diminished the general 
importance of the question presented. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). 
Defendant describes the forfeiture as strategic, because this court would have been 
less inclined to grant the State’s petition if the appeal could have been decided 
without clarifying our prior decisions concerning accomplice witness testimony. 
¶ 89 
The State concedes in its reply brief that its petition for leave to appeal did not 
include a harmless error argument. However, the State claims forfeiture is a 
“principle of administrative convenience,” not a jurisdictional bar to supreme court 
review. The State contends the harmless error issue is reviewable because it is 
“inextricably intertwined” with the jury instruction issue. See In re Rolandis G., 
232 Ill. 2d 13, 37 (2008). I disagree. 
¶ 90 
This court routinely holds defendants to their forfeiture of issues not raised 
below. It is only fair to hold the State to the same standard, especially when the 
forfeiture conferred a tactical advantage earlier in the proceedings. I conclude the 
State should be held to its forfeiture of the harmless error issue because it failed to 
raise it in the petition for leave to appeal. 
¶ 91 
If this court were to reach the issue, I would further conclude that the trial 
court’s erroneous use of the nonpattern instruction was not harmless, though the 
harm resulting from the error is a very close issue. 
¶ 92 
The State asserts “defendant’s jury had ample reason to doubt McGee’s veracity 
even without receiving IPI [Criminal No.] 3.17.” According to the State, McGee’s 
account of the events was not credible. He testified that he drove with defendant to 
the victim’s neighborhood, dropped off defendant before committing the home 
invasion with someone else, and then coincidentally crossed paths with defendant 
just before the arrest. McGee and defendant were caught together four blocks from 
the crime scene and five minutes after the police saw McGee flee from the victim’s 
home. Defendant was arrested with a white T-shirt, something that could have been 
used as the face covering the victim saw on the second offender. 
¶ 93 
Nevertheless, the appellate court found the instructional error was not harmless 
because “McGee’s testimony represented defendant’s entire defense, and 
- 21 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resolution of this case turned on the relative credibility of McGee and the State’s 
witnesses.” 2020 IL App (2d) 180151, ¶ 40. I agree. 
¶ 94 
The defense was based on challenging identity, which depended entirely on 
McGee’s credibility. Instructing the jury that McGee’s testimony was especially 
suspect derogated the credibility of the only witness giving testimony favorable to 
the defense. I conclude the trial court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless. For 
these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court, and remand the cause for further proceedings. The 
evidence presented at defendant’s trial was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Therefore, double jeopardy would not preclude a retrial. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 
2d 382, 393 (1995). 
¶ 95 
CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE and JUSTICE NEVILLE join in this 
dissent. 
- 22 -