Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Robert Crawford

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-0640-J 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Robert 
Crawford, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
The Honorable Robert Crawford,  
 
Respondent.  
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CRAWFORD 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 6, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent there were briefs by Thomas J. 
Crawford, Mark E. Hersh and Mark Hersh Law Office, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas J. Crawford. 
 
 
For the complainant there was a brief by Thomas 
J. Basting and Brennan, Steil, Basting & MacDougall, S.C., 
Janesville, and James C. Alexander, Wisconsin Judicial 
Commission, and oral argument by Thomas J. Basting. 
 
2 
 
2001 WI 96 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 00-0640-J 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :       
         
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the  
Honorable Robert Crawford, Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court Judge. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Robert Crawford,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding.  Judge suspended from 
office.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   We emphasize at the outset what this case 
is not about: it is not about a judge's right to comment 
publicly on or criticize the administration of the courts, the 
justice system or the district attorney's office.  Judge Robert 
Crawford did not forfeit his right to speak freely and petition 
about such matters when he took the bench, nor does any judge.  
However, the conduct at issue in this case went beyond mere 
criticism of the administration of the justice system, and 
descended into threats and attempted coercion, undertaken with 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
2 
the purpose of overcoming another judge's legitimate, reasoned 
judgment on an administrative issue.  
¶2 
This case is about Judge Crawford's attempts to 
intimidate 
another 
judge. 
 
Judge 
Crawford 
made 
numerous 
allegations against Milwaukee County's chief judge, the chief 
judge's daughter (an attorney in the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's 
office) 
and 
the 
district 
court 
administrator, 
suggesting that they had engaged in "influence peddling" and 
other misconduct in office.  He threatened to "go public" with 
his allegations unless the chief judge dropped his attempts to 
regulate Judge Crawford's court hours.   
¶3 
In other words, Judge Crawford tried to coerce the 
chief judge to change an administrative order by threatening to 
publicly accuse the chief judge, a member of his family, and his 
top administrator of professional misconduct.  That is, Judge 
Crawford tried to force the chief judge's hand, by threatening 
public disclosure of extraneous, unfounded, but nevertheless 
potentially embarrassing professional and personal matters.  
¶4 Judge Crawford's attempt to intimidate a judge in the 
performance of his official duties is a direct assault on the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary.  Supreme Court Rule 
60.03(2) states a principle of judicial independence.  It 
provides that "[a] judge may not allow family, social, political 
or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct 
or judgment."  Judge Crawford attempted to induce Chief Judge 
Michael Skwierawski to violate this provision of the Code of 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
3 
Judicial Conduct.  This case, therefore, goes to the heart of 
judicial independence. 
¶5 We conclude,1 as did the panel, that Judge Crawford's 
attempt to intimidate another judge violated SCR 60.03(1), which 
provides that "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law 
[including the Code of Judicial Conduct] and shall act at all 
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."  By attempting to 
intimidate a fellow judge to decide a disputed matter on the 
basis of family and political considerations rather than the 
merits, Judge Crawford acted in a manner that undermined rather 
than 
promoted 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
integrity 
and 
impartiality of the judiciary.2  
                     
1  We review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.91 (1999-2000), 
the judicial conduct panel's findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and recommendation for discipline.   
Section 757.91 provides:  Supreme court; disposition 
The supreme court shall review the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations under s. 
757.89 and determine appropriate discipline in cases 
of misconduct and appropriate action in cases of 
permanent disability.  The rules of the supreme court 
applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern 
the review proceedings under this section.  
All subsequent statutory references to the Wisconsin 
statutes are to the (1999-2000) edition.   
2  SCR 60.03(1) states: 
(1)  A judge shall respect and comply with the 
law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes 
public confidence in the 
integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary.  
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
4 
¶6 
The panel recommended that Judge Crawford be suspended 
from judicial office for one year.3  We conclude that a 75-day 
suspension of Judge Crawford from the bench is appropriate.   
                                                                  
The panel also found that Judge Crawford violated SCR 
60.04(2)(a) requiring a 
judge to 
discharge 
administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and encouraging 
cooperation with other judges and court officials in the 
administration of court business.  
SCR 60.04(2)(a) states: 
(2)  In the performance of the duties under this 
section, 
the 
following 
apply 
to 
administrative 
responsibilities: 
 
(a)  A 
judge 
shall 
diligently 
discharge 
the 
judge's administrative responsibilities without bias 
or prejudice and maintain professional competence in 
judicial administration, and should cooperate with 
other judges and court officials in the administration 
of court business. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) provides: 
(4)  "Misconduct" includes any of the following: 
(a)  Wilful violation of a rule of the code of 
judicial ethics. 
 
3  The panel also concluded that Judge Crawford's conduct 
violated Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4) provides: 
(1)  Whoever, either verbally or by any written 
or printed communication, maliciously threatens to 
accuse or accuses another of any crime or offense, or 
threatens or commits any injury to the person, 
property, business, profession, calling or trade, or 
the profits and income of any business, profession, 
calling or trade of another, with intent thereby to 
extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or 
with intent to compel the person so threatened to do 
any act against the person's will or omit to do any 
lawful act, is guilty of a Class D felony. 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
5 
I 
 
¶7 
On March 6, 2000, the Judicial Commission (Commission) 
filed a complaint with this court alleging that Judge Crawford 
had violated the Code of Judicial Ethics.  Judge Harry G. 
Snyder, Judge Richard S. Brown, and Judge Daniel P. Anderson, 
all of District II of the Court of Appeals, were appointed to 
serve as members of the judicial conduct panel to hear the 
Commission's allegations against Judge Crawford.  On September 
18-21, 2000, the panel conducted an evidentiary hearing in this 
matter at which both the Judicial Commission and Judge Crawford 
appeared with counsel.  
¶8 
Judge Crawford does not dispute that the events 
recited below occurred.  Further, he does not dispute that the 
various oral and written statements attributed to him were, in 
fact, made by him.   
¶9 
Although his written and oral arguments before this 
court were imprecise on the subject,4 it appears that Judge 
Crawford's specific dispute with the facts of this matter is 
reflected in the assertion that Chief Judge Skwierawski "did not 
provide neutral leadership while enforcing his stop-work order," 
                                                                  
(4)  Whoever violates sub. (1) by attempting to 
influence the official action of any public officer is 
guilty of a Class D felony.  
4  Notwithstanding general concessions on his part that, for 
example, "the factual basis may be mistaken" for the petition he 
filed with this court, he also asserts that "his beliefs were 
substantially correct" and "he continues to believe the gist of 
the petition is true." 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
6 
and that his allegations regarding the chief judge’s daughter, 
Assistant District Attorney Audrey Skwierawski, had a factual 
foundation. The panel concluded that these allegations against 
Chief Judge Skwierawski and Audrey Skwierawski were unfounded, 
and, as factual findings, its conclusions are entitled to 
deference.  In any event, however, our disposition of this 
matter does not depend on the factual basis for Judge Crawford's 
allegations about Assistant District Attorney Skwierawski or 
Chief Judge Skwierawski.  That Judge Crawford used these 
personal and professional misconduct allegations in an effort to 
gain leverage over the chief judge in an effort to pressure him 
to change an administrative order is the material point.  
¶10 We need not review or adopt every finding of fact of 
the panel since we base our decision solely on the following 
facts as drawn from those findings and as supported by the 
record.5  
¶11 Shortly after Judge Crawford took the bench in August 
1996, he began to regularly remain on the bench into the lunch 
hour and after regular business hours.  He had several 
discussions in 1997 with then Chief Judge Patrick Sheedy 
regarding the impact of these hours on Judge Crawford's staff.  
                     
5  The standard of review to be applied to the panel's 
findings of fact by this court is the clearly erroneous 
standard, formerly expressed in terms of "against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  See In the 
Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 
Wis. 2d 57, 69, 429 N.W.2d 759 (1988); In the Matter of the 
Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 509, 294 N.W.2d 485 
(1980). 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
7 
This situation resulted in the issuance of a July 2, 1997, 
administrative order ("the Sheedy order") which directed Judge 
Crawford to give the staff various breaks during the day and to 
consult with Chief Judge Sheedy before proceeding with extended 
hours.  Judge Crawford was warned that the directives in the 
order were mandatory and his failure to follow them would result 
in sanctions.  He did not question the authority of Chief Judge 
Sheedy to issue the order nor did he seek review of it by this 
court.  The Sheedy order was issued under the authority given to 
a chief judge by SCR 70.20 and SCR 70.19(1), (3)(c), and (3)(f) 
and 70.20.6   
                     
6  SCR 70.19(1), (3)(c) and (3)(f) provides: 
(1)  The chief judge is the administrative chief 
of the judicial administrative district.  The chief 
judge 
is 
responsible 
for 
the 
administration 
of 
judicial 
business 
in 
circuit 
courts 
within 
the 
district, 
including 
its 
personnel 
and 
fiscal 
management.  The general responsibility of the chief 
judge is to supervise and direct the administration of 
the district, including the judicial business of 
elected, appointed and assigned circuit judges.  
 
(3)  In the exercise of his or her general 
responsibility, the chief judge has the following 
duties: 
 
(c)  Where necessary, establishment of days and 
hours for court operation.  
 
(f)  Establishment of policies and plans.  
 
SCR 70.20 provides: Authority of the chief judge  
The 
chief 
judge 
shall 
exercise 
within 
the 
judicial 
administrative 
district 
the 
full 
administrative 
power 
of 
the 
judicial 
branch 
of 
government subject to the administrative control of 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
8 
¶12 A March 23, 1998, memorandum from Chief Judge Sheedy 
to Judge Crawford reiterated the limitations on his court 
schedule, absent prior approval from Chief Judge Sheedy.  Once 
again Judge Crawford did not seek review of this restriction.   
¶13 Chief Judge Sheedy was succeeded as chief judge by 
Judge Michael Skwierawski in August 1998.  Receiving information 
suggesting that Judge Crawford was violating the Sheedy order, 
Chief Judge Skwierawski, with the assistance of District Court 
Administrator Bruce Harvey, examined the status of Judge 
Crawford's compliance.  The information received, primarily from 
Judge Crawford's staff, was that he was continuing to deprive 
his staff of required breaks and was conducting court beyond the 
specified hours.   
¶14 As a result, Chief Judge Skwierawski requested that 
Judge Crawford meet with him on November 20, 1998.  Mr. Harvey 
and another circuit judge also attended the meeting during which 
Chief Judge Skwierawski confronted Judge Crawford with the 
information concerning his alleged noncompliance with the Sheedy 
order.7  Judge Crawford denied violating the order and accused 
Chief Judge Skwierawski of pressing this matter only because 
                                                                  
the supreme court.  The chief judge may order that his 
or her directives, policies and rules be carried out. 
Failure to comply with an order of the chief judge may 
be grounds for discipline under sections 757.81 to 
757.99 of the statutes. 
 
7  The panel further found that Judge Crawford had continued 
to violate the Sheedy order, requiring the actions taken by 
Judge Skwierawski, and that Judge Crawford's various allegations 
against the other individuals were without factual foundation. 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
9 
Judge Crawford had been previously critical of Assistant 
District Attorney Audrey Skwierawski, Chief Judge Skwierawski's 
daughter, and the district attorney's office in general.  Judge 
Crawford further accused Chief Judge Skwierawski of "influence 
peddling."  He stated he would "go public" with his criticisms 
of Audrey Skwierawski if Chief Judge Skwierawski did not drop 
the criticism of his hours.   
¶15 Judge Crawford's allegations about Audrey Skwierawski 
arose out of circumstances beginning with her assignment to 
Judge Crawford's court for a few months in 1996, after which she 
asked to be reassigned because of what she considered the 
adverse working conditions in that court. 
¶16 In May 1998 Audrey Skwierawski prepared a criminal 
complaint as a "negotiated issuance," alleging a misdemeanor 
fourth-degree sexual assault against a defendant who had already 
agreed to plead guilty to the charge as part of a plea bargain. 
 The case was assigned to Judge Crawford's court and scheduled 
for a guilty plea proceeding. 
¶17 The complaint recited the 14-year old female victim's 
account of the incident, in which she alleged that the defendant 
held a gun to her neck, threatened to kill her, and forced her 
to have non-consensual sexual intercourse.  The complaint also 
recounted the statement of the 17-year old defendant, in which 
he admitted the sexual intercourse, but said it was consensual 
and not the result of any threats, nor at gunpoint, and that the 
victim was retaliating against him because he had ended their 
relationship.  One of the investigating officers uncovered 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
10
material inconsistencies in the victim's version of the incident 
and concluded that she had either lied about or substantially 
exaggerated what had occurred.  Nevertheless, because the victim 
was underage, and consent was therefore not a defense, the case 
was charged, but as a "negotiated issuance" misdemeanor instead 
of a felony. 
¶18 Audrey Skwierawski did not handle the plea in front of 
Judge Crawford on July 22, 1998, because it was reassigned to 
the regular assistant district attorney handling matters in his 
court at the time.  During the plea colloquy, Judge Crawford 
questioned whether the case had been appropriately charged, 
although he eventually accepted the plea.   
¶19 Two months later, in September of 1998, Judge Crawford 
sent a memorandum to Milwaukee County District Attorney E. 
Michael McCann claiming that Audrey Skwierawski had filed a 
criminal complaint that "she knew was materially false."  
¶20 Chief Judge Skwierawski reissued Chief Judge Sheedy's 
hours-of-operation order for Judge Crawford's court on November 
24, 1998, ("the Skwierawski order").  In general, Judge Crawford 
was again required to adhere to the designated scheduling and 
not to deviate without permission from Chief Judge Skwierawski 
or Mr. Harvey.   
¶21 On January 11, 1999, Judge Crawford sent a memorandum 
to Chief Judge Skwierawski in which he threatened to petition 
this court if Judge Skwierawski did not vacate his work hours 
order within three days.  Judge Crawford also sought the removal 
of District Court Administrator Harvey, who is married to a 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
11
Milwaukee County assistant district attorney, complaining that 
he was "misusing his administrative position by entertaining 
complaints from the district attorney's office on my rulings."  
Judge Crawford also asserted that on several prior occasions, 
both in public and in private, Mr. Harvey had criticized his 
sentencing practices.  
¶22 Judge Crawford and Chief Judge Skwierawski met on 
January 14, 1999, with two other circuit judges present.  Judge 
Crawford denied violating either the Sheedy or the Skwierawski 
orders and claimed that Chief Judge Skwierawski was merely 
retaliating against him because of his prior criticism of Audrey 
Skwierawski and the district attorney's office.   
¶23 At this meeting, Judge Crawford also claimed that in 
March 1997 he received an anonymous letter, which he had since 
destroyed, stating that he would be a "one-term judge" and that 
he was "cuckoo."  Judge Crawford told Chief Judge Skwierawski 
that he believed, based on the handwriting and other factors, 
that Audrey Skwierawski had sent him the letter.   
¶24 Once again Judge Crawford told Chief Judge Skwierawski 
that if he did not withdraw his work hours order, he would "go 
public" 
concerning 
"influence 
peddling" 
by 
Chief 
Judge 
Skwierawski and Mr. Harvey, and about Audrey Skwierawski's 
conduct in his court, including her drafting of what he 
considered to be a false criminal complaint and her alleged 
sending of the anonymous letter.  Judge Crawford was agitated at 
this meeting and his tone and demeanor were threatening.  Chief 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
12
Judge Skwierawski informed Judge Crawford that he would not 
vacate either his order or the Sheedy order. 
¶25 Later that day Judge Crawford sent an e-mail to all 
circuit judges in Milwaukee County, recounting the meeting with 
Chief Judge Skwierawski and again threatening to "go public" 
with allegations of "insider lobbying and influence peddling," 
as well as what he perceived to be irregularities in Milwaukee 
judges' work hours.   
¶26 On January 28, 1999, Judge Crawford filed a "Petition 
for Review of Administration in First Judicial District" with 
this court, asking it to vacate the Skwierawski order, remove 
Chief Judge Skwierawski as chief judge, and fire Mr. Harvey as 
district court administrator.  The petition repeated the 
allegations against these two, as well as Audrey Skwierawski and 
the district attorney's office.  Ultimately the Judicial 
Commission took up the matter and filed a complaint against 
Judge Crawford with this court.  The matter was referred to the 
chief judge of the court of appeals for the selection of a 
judicial conduct panel.  
¶27 The panel concluded as a matter of law that Judge 
Crawford wilfully violated SCR 60.03(1) by making numerous 
unfounded allegations against other members of the justice 
system, and that this did not promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It also concluded 
that Judge Crawford wilfully violated SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. 
Stat. § 943.30(1) and (4) by his conduct during the January 14, 
1999, meeting with Chief Judge Skwierawski and his subsequent 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
13
filing of the petition before this court.  In this regard, the 
panel concluded that Judge Crawford’s conduct demonstrated that 
he had failed to maintain professional competence in matters of 
judicial and administration and failed to cooperate with Chief 
Judge 
Skwierawski 
and 
other 
court 
officials 
in 
the 
administration of court business. 
II 
¶28 Judge Crawford was charged with violating SCR 60.03(1) 
requiring a judge to act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. The panel concluded that he had violated this 
standard.8  
¶29 The Comments to the rule assist in applying the 
standard to actual conduct.  The Comments recognize that the 
standard might be violated in a variety of ways and that it is 
not practical to list every conceivable prohibited act in the 
Code itself.  Improprieties under the rule include violations of 
law, court rules or other specific provisions of the Code.  The 
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would 
create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability 
to 
carry 
out 
judicial 
responsibilities 
with 
integrity, 
                     
8  This court determines whether the facts found by the 
panel constitute a violation of this provision independently of 
the panel. See Wis. Stat. § 757.91 (rules applicable to civil 
cases govern the review); Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 
Wis., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999) (application of 
facts to pertinent law is question of law which supreme court 
reviews independently of lower courts' determinations). 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
14
impartiality and competence is impaired.  The Comment reads in 
full as follows: 
 
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by 
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.  A judge 
must 
avoid 
all 
impropriety 
and 
appearance 
of 
impropriety.  A judge must expect to be the subject of 
constant public scrutiny.  A judge must therefore 
accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might 
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and 
should do so freely and willingly. 
 
 
The prohibition against behaving with impropriety 
or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the 
professional and personal conduct of a judge.  Because 
it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the 
proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that 
extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although 
not specifically mentioned in the chapter.  Actual 
improprieties under this standard include violations 
of law, court rules or other specific provisions of 
this chapter.  The test for appearance of impropriety 
is whether the conduct would create in reasonable 
minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry 
out 
judicial 
responsibilities 
with 
integrity, 
impartiality and competence is impaired.  
¶30 As we explained previously, the events that led to 
this proceeding started with a dispute between Judge Crawford 
and two successive chief judges over the hours of his court.  
Judge Crawford had a right to disagree with the restrictions 
placed upon him, to express his disagreement publicly and to 
petition this court for redress.   
¶31 But Judge Crawford was not entitled to threaten Chief 
Judge Skwierawski in an effort to compel him to change his 
administrative decision.  In this case, the threat to Chief 
Judge Skwierawski involved members of the chief judge's family 
and the district court administrator.  In the meetings with 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
15
Chief Judge Skwierawski on November 20, 1998, and January 14, 
1999, and the January 11, 1999, memorandum, as well as in the 
January 14, 1999, e-mail, Judge Crawford attempted to force 
Chief Judge Skwierawski to change his administrative order by 
threatening to "go public" with his "influence peddling" and 
misconduct allegations.  Chief Judge Skwierawski——and Chief 
Judge Sheedy before him——was acting within the scope of his 
duties 
as 
chief 
judge 
in 
issuing 
and 
enforcing 
the 
administrative order.  Whatever the validity of his disagreement 
with those actions, Judge Crawford improperly pressured the 
chief judge to alter the situation by use of threats instead of 
reason.  
¶32 Judge Crawford's threats against the chief judge were, 
in effect, attempts to induce him to violate SCR 60.03(2).  
Judge Crawford was pressuring the chief judge to decide the 
administrative dispute on the basis of family relationships and 
political considerations rather than the merits, conduct which, 
if committed, would itself violate the Code.  Supreme Court Rule 
60.03(2) specifically provides: "[a] judge may not allow family, 
social, political or other relationships to influence the 
judge's judicial conduct or judgment." 
¶33 Judges are obligated to "comply with the law."  SCR 
60.03(1).  This includes court rules such as the Code.  SCR 
60.01(10).9 
                     
9  SCR 60.01(10) provides: 
In this chapter:  
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
16
¶34 Judge Crawford was plainly attempting to improperly 
compromise Chief Judge Skwierawski's judgment in the ongoing 
dispute over court hours by appealing to his relationship with 
his daughter, his top administrator and others in the court 
system.  Had Chief Judge Skwierawski altered his administrative 
order in capitulation to Judge Crawford's threats, Judge 
Crawford would have succeeded in coercing another judge to 
violate the Code.  
¶35 Judges are sworn to exercise independent judgment and 
to decide cases and administrative matters on the merits, 
without regard to improper extraneous influences or outside 
pressures, 
such 
as 
family, 
social, 
political 
or 
other 
relationships.  Judge Crawford threatened the chief judge in an 
attempt to overcome his otherwise legitimate, reasoned judgment 
on an administrative issue.  This conduct undermines public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in 
general10 and in Judge Crawford's integrity and impartiality in 
particular.  A judge who attempts to manipulate administrative 
                                                                  
(10)  "Law" 
means 
court 
rules, 
statutes, 
constitutional provisions and legal conclusions in 
published court decisions.  
10  See generally In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 
1970):   
[C]riticism taken by methods which prevent honest 
discussion and a fair rebuttal can be expected only to 
have a destructive result . . . [I]f the methods used 
raise suspicion of motives among the judges, and 
renders the courts all suspect to the public, the 
result can only be an increase in disrespect for law 
and order . . . . 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
17
decisions by threats of a retaliatory and personal nature 
demonstrates an attitude about the boundaries of legitimate 
judicial decision-making that is inconsistent with the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary.  Judge Crawford's conduct in 
this regard violated of SCR 60.03(1).11  
¶36 There can be no dispute that Judge Crawford's conduct 
was wilful.  Indeed, he does not assert that it was anything 
other than freely made, and does not claim that it was the 
                     
11  Judge Crawford has challenged the panel's conclusion 
that his conduct violated SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.30(1) and (4) although he has not been criminally charged 
with this offense.  With respect to the latter, it was the 
panel's opinion that once Judge Crawford threatened to "go 
public" with his allegations, he violated this statute because 
he was threatening injury to the "profession, trade or calling" 
of Judge Skwierawski, a public official, "with intent to compel" 
him to vacate his earlier order against his will.  Crawford has 
argued that this statute is overbroad as it criminalizes the 
dissemination of information which is merely fair comment on the 
administration of justice.   
We do not need to 
reach the 
issue 
concerning the 
application of SCR 60.04(2)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) to 
Judge Crawford's conduct.  As a general rule, when resolution of 
one issue disposes of a matter, we will not address additional 
issues.  See, e.g., Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 
Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998).  We have concluded 
that Judge Crawford violated SCR 60.03(1), and impose a sanction 
on that basis alone. 
We also reach no conclusion as to whether Judge Crawford 
maintained improper court hours to begin with and whether he 
violated the Sheedy and Skwierawski orders.  The sanction which 
we impose in this case does not reflect any determination with 
respect to this matter.  We do, however, caution Judge Crawford 
that after his suspension is completed he must follow these, and 
any similar, orders of the chief judge unless directed otherwise 
by this court.  
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
18
product of duress or coercion.12  Further, no judge could have 
reasonably concluded that it was proper to attempt to influence 
the actions of a chief judge by means of threats.  
¶37 We do not seek by this decision to stifle criticism by 
judges regarding matters of concern to the administration of 
justice and to the public.  But the right to voice criticism 
                     
12  The statutory definition of judicial misconduct requires 
"wilful violation" of the Code and past cases have defined that 
term.  In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 708, 729, 580 N.W.2d 307 (1998) 
stated: 
 
Prior 
judicial 
disciplinary 
cases 
have 
established that "wilful" means that the judge's 
conduct was not the result of duress or coercion and 
that the judge knew or should have known that the 
conduct was prohibited by the Code of Judicial Ethics. 
 In [citation omitted], the statutory term "wilful" 
was understood to mean "freely made and not the result 
of duress or coercion." 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
19
does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, the right must be exercised 
in a fashion that comports with the Code of Judicial Ethics.13  
III 
¶38 In imposing discipline in this case, which may be 
reprimand, censure, suspension, or removal,14 we employ the 
standard stated in In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis. 2d 121, 129, 513 N.W.2d 
                     
13  Judge Crawford asserts that his conduct is protected by 
his rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government. 
 But that defense is irrelevant as we have decided this case.  
Unlike the panel, we have not ruled on the factual basis for his 
various allegations.  Thus it is unnecessary to decide whether, 
as he claims, his conduct is sanctionable only if it violates an 
actual malice standard.  See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation claim by public official against 
newspaper requires proof of actual malice).  We also are not 
sanctioning Judge Crawford for having petitioned this court, 
whatever the truthfulness of the statements in that petition.  
Finally, we note regardless that in general judges are subject 
to some limitation on their constitutional rights that might not 
otherwise apply to private citizens.  See In the Matter of 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 
434 N.W.2d 603 (1989); In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, 70 
Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975); Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485. As 
Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 1990) stated: 
"[T]he state may restrict the speech of elected judges in ways 
that it may not restrict the speech of other elected officials." 
14  Article VII, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
Each justice or judge shall be subject to 
reprimand, censure, suspension, removal for cause or 
for disability, by the supreme court pursuant to 
procedures established by the legislature by law.  No 
justice or judge removed for cause shall be eligible 
for reappointment or temporary service.  This section 
is alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of 
removal provided in sections 1 and 13 of this article 
and section 12 of article XIII.   
No. 
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604 (1994): "[t]he discipline imposed should be determined by 
the extent that the public needs protection from unacceptable 
judicial behavior, based upon the seriousness of the judge's 
misconduct and the likelihood that it would recur."  Discipline 
is not intended to punish the judge. Further, we impose 
discipline 
on 
a 
de novo 
basis, 
although 
the 
panel's 
recommendation is entitled to some deference.  In the Matter of 
the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 513, 294 N.W.2d 
485 (1980).   
¶39 The sanction that we impose must convey to the public 
the gravity with which this court views judicial misconduct.  
Those who sit in judgment in both civil and criminal matters, in 
which the lives and livelihood of the citizens of this state are 
involved, must be above reproach.  When a judge fails to live up 
to the demanding, but necessary, standards that are imposed upon 
the elected judiciary, the integrity of the entire judicial 
process can be only reaffirmed by a sanction commensurate with 
the conduct.   
¶40 Past judicial misconduct cases before this court are 
of limited usefulness in setting the sanction appropriate for 
this case, which involves unique circumstances.  We have not 
established, nor will we here, a "bright line" standard when, 
for example, reprimand or censure is warranted as opposed to 
suspension.  Each case is different, and is considered on the 
basis of its own facts.  This individualized approach to 
discipline, however, is guided by some general principles. 
No. 
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¶41 Suspension 
and 
removal from 
office 
are "drastic 
measures," generally reserved for very serious or repeated 
violations of the Code.  Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d at 513.  Factors 
considered in establishing the length of a suspension, either in 
aggravation or in mitigation, have included a history of prior 
judicial misconduct (in Gorenstein and In the Matter of the 
Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118 Wis. 2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 
(1984)), and the presence of a remorseful and cooperative 
attitude (in Dreyfus).  
¶42 Judge Crawford has engaged in seriously unacceptable 
judicial behavior.  He has demonstrated no understanding of the 
impropriety of his behavior and therefore has expressed no 
remorse for it.  Indeed, he has continuously portrayed himself 
as 
a 
maverick, 
an 
innocent 
victim 
of 
a 
"hostile 
work 
environment" who has an absolute "right to be obnoxious in [his] 
public expression."  He apparently believes that it is perfectly 
ethical for one judge to threaten another in order to overcome 
his reasoned judgment and decide a disputed issue on the basis 
of something other than the merits, indeed, on the basis of 
extraneous 
personal 
and 
political 
considerations. 
 
This 
demonstrates a serious disregard for the responsibilities of a 
judge. 
¶43 On the other hand, Judge Crawford has not previously 
been disciplined.  Accordingly, we decline the Commission's 
invitation to remove him from office.  While Judge Crawford's 
misconduct was serious, it was not so substantial a threat to 
the public as to warrant the ultimate sanction of removal.  It 
No. 
00-0640-J 
 
22
did not occur in the performance of his adjudicative role, and 
it did not affect the specific rights of any litigant or member 
of the public.  His misconduct occurred in the context of an 
internal administrative matter, and implicated more generalized 
concerns. 
¶44 To be sure, Judge Crawford's willingness to resort to 
personal, political threats in his running feud with successive 
chief 
judges 
was 
disturbingly 
out-of-bounds 
and 
clearly 
unethical.  His tactics were vigorously and properly resisted, 
and therefore did not accomplish their purpose.  The record 
contains no evidence that Judge Crawford has engaged in 
unethical behavior in the cases that come before him on the 
bench.  Therefore, we also conclude that Judge Crawford's 
conduct does not warrant the one-year suspension recommended by 
the panel.  A lesser sanction will suffice both to protect the 
public and to convey to Judge Crawford the impropriety of his 
conduct such that it is unlikely to recur.   
¶45 Clearly, 
however, 
reprimand 
or censure 
alone is 
insufficient.  Judge Crawford misused his judicial position, 
calling into question his understanding of and capacity to abide 
by the rules that govern all judges in their conduct on and off 
the bench. 
¶46 We conclude that the appropriate sanction is a 
suspension from judicial office for a period of 75 days.  This 
period is commensurate with the gravity of Judge Crawford's 
misconduct and the extent to which it jeopardized public 
confidence in the integrity and independence of the judiciary.  
No. 
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This suspension is sufficiently long to impress upon Judge 
Crawford the fundamental requirements of judicial office and to 
demonstrate 
to 
the 
public 
the 
judiciary's 
dedication 
to 
preserving integrity within its ranks. 
¶47 IT IS ORDERED that Judge Crawford's conduct merits 
discipline.  He is hereby suspended from the office of circuit 
judge without compensation, and prohibited from exercising any 
of the powers or the duties of a circuit judge in the state of 
Wisconsin, for a period of 75 days, commencing July 31, 2001.  
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