Title: BEVAN v. FIX

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BEVAN v. FIX 2002 WY 4342 P.3d 1013Case Number: 00-199Decided: 03/21/2002
 October Term, A.D. 2001

STEVEN 
MATTHEW BEVAN; 

STEVEN 
TYLER BEVAN, a minor

through 
his next friend,

Steven 
Matthew Bevan; and

BRITTANY 
BEVAN, a minor

through 
her next friend,

Steven 
Matthew Bevan, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

v.

                                                                        
 

WILLIAM 
R. FIX, 

Appellee(Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

Robert 
E. Schroth, Jackson, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Schroth.

Representing 
Appellee:

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Kline.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J., 
Ret.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
minors, Brittany Bevan and Steven Tyler Bevan (Brittany and Steven) appeal, 
through their father and next friend Steven Matthew Bevan (Bevan), from the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee William R. Fix 
(Fix) on their claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Having determined that the record 
reveals genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment 
for the appellee on either child's claim, we reverse.  

[¶2]      After addressing 
the scope of the duty an attorney owes former clients, however, we affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Fix on appellant 
Bevan's claim of legal malpractice.  
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants 
present two issues for review:

I.  Did 
the District Court err in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because genuine issues of material fact existed to support the Plaintiff's 
Second Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress[?]

II.  Did 
the District Court err in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because genuine issues of material fact existed to support the Plaintiff's 
Fourth Cause of Action for Legal Malpractice[?] 

FACTS AND 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶4]      Pursuant to our 
standard of review for summary judgments, the recitation of facts is from the 
vantage point most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the parties opposing the 
motions, awarding them all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the 
facts.  S & G Investors, LLC 
v. Blackley, 994 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 2000) .

[¶5]      Defendant William 
Fix is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Wyoming with an 
office in Jackson.  In July of 1992, 
Bevan hired Fix to represent him as defense counsel on a charge of criminal 
battery for family violence against his then girlfriend Jenni Jones 
(Jones).  Fix represented Bevan 
throughout the course of those proceedings, which ultimately ended in a plea 
agreement. In December of 1994, Bevan and Jones married.  Brittany and Steven are the couple's 
biological children.  Brittany was 
born in August of 1991, Steven in April of 1994.  

[¶6]      In January of 
1997, Jones, represented by Fix, filed a complaint for divorce from Bevan.  Bevan was not consulted in regard to 
Fix's representation of his wife Jones nor did he consent to the representation. 
Subsequently, in June of 1997, Fix withdrew from representation of his client 
Jones because he had begun a sexual relationship with her.  Bevan further alleges that during the course of the couple's divorce 
proceedings Fix, upon hearing a rumor that Bevan was going to file a lawsuit 
against him, phoned Bevan and threatened, "if I messed with him he would bury 
me."      
             
              
      1  Bevan and Jones' divorce was finalized 
in December of 1997. 

[¶7]      The facts that 
relate to the Bevan children's claims are as follows.  On the evening of March 29, 1998, Jones and 
her children Brittany and Steven, as well as two teenage babysitters, were 
invited to Fix's home to spend the night.        
             
       2  Jones and Fix left the children in the 
care of the babysitters and spent the evening drinking in a local bar with 
various others.  After returning to 
Fix's home, the following events took place over the course of the night and the 
subsequent morning.  

[¶8]      It appears from 
the record that everyone present agrees that Fix, Jones, and at least two other 
guests continued drinking and that eventually four adults, including Fix and 
Jones, were soaking in Fix's hot tub.  
At some point while in the hot tub, a verbal altercation between Fix and 
Jones escalated into physical violence.  
Over the next several hours, this pattern of verbal and physical conflict 
between the two continued, culminating in the violent physical confrontation 
that forms the basis for the Bevan children's tort claims.  

[¶9]      According to the 
affidavit of Jones:   
  3 

In the early morning hours of March 30, 1998, I was 
awoken from my sleep by Bill Fix who was in the process of throwing me out of 
the bed.  I landed flat on my back 
on the floor.  I tried to sit up 
several times and he kept pushing me to the floor.  He then grabbed my head and started 
violently banging it against the wall.  
At the same time that he was banging my head against the wall he was 
kicking and punching me.  Although I 
was barely conscious at this time, I could see my blood spattered on the 
wall.  I finally got free of Fix and 
made it into the bathroom to call my brother and 911.  I was terrified and confused and didn't 
know what else to do.  Fix hung up 
the phone and screamed he was going to kill' me several times.  Fix then started punching and kicking me 
again.  I managed to get to the 
phone again and call 911 a second time and was told that help was on the 
way.  Fix then broke into the 
bathroom and drug me by my hair out of the bathroom, out of the bedroom and out 
into the hallway.  I believe that I 
lost consciousness briefly.  The 
next thing I remember is Fix holding me up in the air against the wall, at the 
top of the stairs, with his hands around my neck, choking me, banging my head 
against the wall, and him screaming incoherently.

I thought I was going to die at that moment and as I 
turned my head to the side I saw my three year old son looking at me in absolute 
horror.  I will never forget the 
fear and horror I saw in his face.  
Fix then looked at my son Steven Tyler Bevan and said "it's okay sweetie, 
go back to bed."  Steven then ran 
down the stairs and Fix threw me to the floor and kicked me one more time.  As I was being thrown to the floor and 
kicked again I saw my daughter and the two babysitters, Michelle and Chelsey 
standing down the hallway also watching.  
Shortly thereafter the Sheriff's Deputies arrived.[4]  

Both Fix and Jones were arrested at the scene; and, 
in the course of the investigation, police reports were generated which contain 
interviews with those witnesses present. 

[¶10]   
Relatively soon after these events, Steven began "acting out" in 
preschool.  His angry behavior 
included swearing and choking his classmates.  Brittany reportedly had difficulty 
sleeping and was experiencing nightmares. Both Steven and Brittany began seeing 
a counselor for their behaviors; and, although the counselor "felt like both 
kids were, had been impacted by, in a negative way by witnessing this violence," 
he concentrated on Steven, believing that Brittany was "very quiet and seemed to 
be kind of, either seemed to be dealing with this better or at least in a 
different way than Steven." The counselor, following consultation with Steven's 
parents, caretakers, and teachers, diagnosed Steven as suffering from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
Some months later, the children began seeing a second counselor in the 
same facility.  This second 
counselor also diagnosed Steven as suffering from PTSD and, in addition, 
diagnosed Brittany as suffering from "dysthmic disorder," a form of 
depression.  At the time summary 
judgment was granted, both children continued to see the second counselor 
therapeutically. 

[¶11]   
In addition, a clinical psychologist who specializes in treating children 
has evaluated Brittany and Steven.  
According to her deposition testimony, this psychologist disclosed that 
Brittany has been very depressed and, while being interviewed, admitted 
continued suicidal feelings, including a specific incident in the summer of 
1998.  The psychologist flatly 
stated, "I think that these children are in significant distress.  I'm quite worried about both of them." 

[¶12]   
In March of 2000, defendant Fix moved for summary judgment on all of the 
plaintiffs' claims.  The plaintiffs 
opposed this motion through memorandum supported by deposition testimony and 
affidavit.  Following a hearing on 
April 10, 2000, the district court entered its order granting summary judgment 
to Fix on all claims.  This timely 
appeal on the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and legal 
malpractice followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶13]   
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Worley v. Wyoming Bottling 
Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 2000); Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997); Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A fact is material if it establishes or 
refutes an essential element of a claim or defense.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo. 1995).  In 
evaluating summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court, 
without affording any deference to the trial court's decisions on issues of 
law.  Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress

[¶14]   
In R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 32 (Wyo. 1994), this court 
expressly adopted the third party intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cause of action found in Restatement, Second, Torts, § 46(2) (1965).  This subsection 
provides:

(2)  Where such [extreme and outrageous] 
conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
distress

(a) to a member of such person's immediate 
family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in 
bodily harm, or

(b) to any other person who is present at the 
time, if such distress results in bodily harm.

Thus, one claiming injuries for emotional distress 
caused by outrageous conduct under § 46(2)(a) must 
show:

1) that the conduct was "extreme and 
outrageous";

2) that such conduct was directed at a third 
person;

3) that the claimant is a member of the 
immediate family of the third person;

4) that the claimant was personally present when the extreme and 
outrageous conduct took place;       
      5

5) that the claimant sustained severe emotional 
distress as a result of that conduct (whether or not the claimant sustained 
bodily harm); and

6) that the person whose conduct is complained 
of "intentionally" or "recklessly" caused severe emotional distress to the 
claimant.

[¶15]   
In its application of the Restatement provision to the instant 
case, the district court premised its grant of summary judgment to defendant Fix 
on the Bevan children's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
on the first enumerated element.  
The court concluded that defendant Fix's conduct was not extreme and 
outrageous as a matter of law, and thus granted summary judgment to him on that 
basis.  The court 
determined:

[T]his case involves one isolated altercation.  There was no continuing course of abuse 
of either Jenni or the children, and under the circumstances the conduct the 
children saw, although deplorable, is not sufficient to support the Plaintiffs' 
claim.  

Disputes over boundary lines, over the cause of motor 
vehicle collisions, or over a multitude of real or imagined wrongs, are likely 
to cause tempers to flare; words (vulgar and otherwise) to be uttered in anger; 
fistsor anything else handyto be shaken; and assaults to occur.  Such happenings are wholly unplanned, 
spur-of- the-moment occurrences; unfortunately, they occur all too 
frequently.  But we cannot say that 
the brief outbursts constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct.  Wiehe v. Kukal, 592 P.2d 860, 864 
(Kan. 1979) (emphasis added)[6]

Such unfortunate occurrences occur all too often 
between intimates and are properly the subject of criminal and injunctive 
relief.  However, not every domestic 
altercation constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct or results in 
sufficiently severe emotional impact to support a third party claim.  Absent a showing of exceptional 
circumstances, such as a continuing course of abuse and facts showing severe 
emotional distress to those third party claimants as a result of what they 
witnessed, such an altercation will not support a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  
Summary judgment, therefore, is properly granted on this claim as 
well.

We disapprove the above reasoning of the district 
court and its application of the Restatement provisions to the facts of 
this case for the following reasons.  

[¶16]   
First, no language in Restatement § 46 or its accompanying 
illustrations indicates that "a continuing course of abuse" rather than a single 
"isolated altercation" is required before an actor is subject to liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In fact, none of the Restatement 
section's twenty-two illustrations, culled from actual cases, constitute a 
continuing course of conduct; rather, all involve isolated 
incidents.  For 
example:

Illustration 1: As a practical joke, A falsely tells B that her 
husband has been badly injured in an accident, and is in the hospital with both 
legs broken.  B suffers severe 
emotional distress.  A is subject to 
liability to B for her emotional distress.  
If it causes nervous shock and resulting illness, A is subject to 
liability to B for her illness.  

Illustration 11: A, who knows that B is pregnant, intentionally shoots 
before the eyes of B a pet dog, to which A knows that B is greatly 
attached.  B suffers severe 
emotional distress which results in a miscarriage.  A is subject to liability to B for the 
distress and for the miscarriage. 

[¶17]   
Clearly, no rule of law announced in Restatement § 46 requires 
that the conduct alleged be repetitive or recurrent before it can be considered 
extreme and outrageous.  Nor has 
this court in its application of the section announced such a rule.  On the contrary, in Kanzler v. 
Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wyo. 1997), a case involving sexual harassment 
in the workplace, we expressly recognized the inverse proposition: "repeated 
harassment . . . may compound the outrageousness of incidents which, 
taken individually, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant 
liability."  Id. (quoting 
Boyle v. Wenk, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1979)).  

[¶18]   
The district court was in error by reasoning that simply because the 
alleged extreme and outrageous conduct of this case constitutes domestic 
violence among intimates it somehow necessitates that the plaintiffs make a 
"showing of exceptional circumstances" such as a "continuing course of abuse" by 
the defendant.  Our affirmance of 
this conclusion would, as a consequence, impose on a certain class of plaintiffs 
a burden greater than that set forth in the general rules of Restatement 
§ 46 based solely on the subject matter of the complained conduct and the 
relationship of the parties.  We 
decline to impose such an additional burden. 

[¶19]   
Instead, a survey of this court's jurisprudence on the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress reveals that in analyzing whether 
given conduct is "extreme and outrageous" this court has consistently utilized 
the following language found in Restatement § 46 cmt. d: 

Liability has been found only where the conduct has 
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community.  
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, 
and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"[7]

The liability clearly does not extend to mere 
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 
trivialities.

See e.g. Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 
721 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Wyo. 1986); 
Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341; Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co. 
Inc, 1 P.3d  at 628 ; McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, ¶25, 24 P.3d 1162, ¶25 (Wyo. 2001). 

[¶20]   
We have further approved the Restatement description of the roles 
of both judge and jury in application of the "outrageousness" element of § 46 
found in cmt. h: 

Court and jury.  It is 
for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.  
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct 
has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.

[¶21]   
Thus, we have held, "[w]hen presented with a motion for summary judgment, 
the court, as a matter of law, makes preliminary determinations regarding the 
outrageousness of the conduct and the severity of the emotional distress."  Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d at 
1341;  see also Anderson v. 
Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 241 (Wyo. 2000).  However, as outlined in 
Restatement § 46 cmt. h, the court's preliminary determination as 
to the outrageousness of the conduct is simply to decide whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery.  If this threshold 
question can be answered either in the affirmative or by a finding 
that reasonable men and women may differ in deciding the issue, then the court 
must allow a jury to ultimately decide whether, in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.  The court's gate-keeping 
function in this regard is solely to eliminate those frivolous and meritless 
claims in which no reasonable jury, composed of a fair cross-section of the 
community, could find the defendant's conduct sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous to permit recovery.  

[¶22]   
Additionally, we disapprove the district court's reasoning that because 
appellee Fix's alleged conduct was "properly the subject of criminal and 
injunctive relief" that fact somehow militates against a determination that the 
behavior is "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."  Restatement cmt. d.  Rather, the fact 
that the alleged conduct has been criminalized would appear to weigh in favor of 
recognition that society has determined the acts to be injurious as beyond "mere 
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 
trivialities."       
             
            
      8  Id. 

[¶23]   
Lastly, while we generally agree with the district court's statement 
that, "not every domestic altercation constitutes extreme and 
outrageous conduct or results in sufficiently severe emotional impact to support 
a third party claim," (emphasis added) we have also consistently rejected 
so-called "floodgate of litigation" arguments to support denial of emotional 
distress claims.  See McCulloh v. 
Drake, 2001 WY 56, ¶26.  When 
this court adopted the tort in Leithead v. American Colloid Co. we 
expressly stated, "[w]hile these problems are not to be dismissed lightly, they 
can certainly be solved without rejecting the action entirely.  That would be the equivalent of 
employing a cannon to kill a flea.'"  
Id. 721 P.2d  at 1065 (quoting Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 79 (Wyo. 1978)).  Likewise, in 
adopting the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, this court 
explored its concerns that the new cause of action would overly burden the 
judicial system and ultimately concluded with some irony, "if the only purpose 
of our law was to unburden the court system, then we would reach the zenith of 
judicial achievement simply by closing the district courts to all litigants and 
allowing all wrongs to come to rest on innocent victims."  Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986). 

[¶24]   
Clearly, we rejected arguments to effectively close the courts to a class 
of plaintiffs in Leithead and Gates, as again we do so in the 
instant case.  We believe that 
simply because the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct can be labeled a 
"domestic altercation," does not modify the fundamental analysis undertaken in 
deciding the case.  Regrettably, 
this court must recognize the prevalence, and some argue tolerance, of domestic 
violence within our society; however, we cannot allow judicial fear of an 
avalanche of cases due to the ubiquity of the conduct alleged as "extreme and 
outrageous" to deny a remedy to those individual parties with legitimate 
claims.  Instead, we remain 
confident that lower courts are capable of properly separating those cases with 
merit from those without.  See generally Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 
54 Md. L.Rev. 183 (1995) and cases cited therein; Leonard Karp and Cheryl L. 
Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow . . . 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 Fam. L.Q. 
389 (1994) and cases cited therein; Dr. G. Steven Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing 
Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. Ky. L.Rev. 
689 (2000) and cases cited therein. 

[¶25]   Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Brittany and Steven Bevan, we find that 
Fix's alleged conduct, including beating, kicking, punching, dragging by the 
hair, and choking Jones while screaming that he wanted to kill her, is behavior 
beyond mere insults, indignities and petty oppressions and which, if proved, 
could be construed as outrageous, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community.  
At the very least, reasonable persons could differ in their conclusions 
as to whether Fix's conduct was extreme and outrageous.  Consequently, it is 
for a jury to determine whether his conduct was sufficiently outrageous to 
result in liability.  

[¶26]   However, our 
analysis does not end here.  Although the district court premised its 
grant of summary judgment to Fix solely on the first element of the children's 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, other factual issues and 
contentions have been raised by the appellee related to the remaining elements 
of the tort.  
We may uphold the grant of summary judgment upon any proper legal ground 
finding support in the record.  In re HC, 983 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Wyo. 1999); Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop 
Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 422 (Wyo. 1997).  Consequently, because the plaintiffs' failure 
to satisfy any single element would justify affirmance, in the interests of 
judicial economy and further development of the law in this area, we will 
address the remaining elements of the claim as applied to the instant case.

[¶27]   Clearly, the second and third elements 
are met.  
Appellee Fix's conduct was directed toward a third person, Jenni 
Jones.  
Brittany and Steven Bevan, as her children, are members of the immediate 
family of Jenni Jones.  As to the fourth element, appellee argues 
that Brittany Bevan was not personally present at the time Fix's alleged 
outrageous conduct took place because, when questioned by defense counsel in 
deposition, she indicated that she had not actually visually observed him beating her mother.  Instead, then eight 
year-old Brittany stated in regard to the events two years prior:  "Well, I woke up 
early and I heard screaming and shouting, and then I went back to sleep because 
I was kind of scared."  When asked what happened next, she 
replied:  "When 
I woke up I saw mom, I heard crying and I walked, I stepped down from the bed 
with the ladder, and I saw mom crying and Steven holding her and saying it's 
okay."  When 
asked what else she remembered, Brittany stated:  "Bill Fix slammed her against the wall or the 
floor.  It was 
either one of those because I heard a bounce."  

[¶28]   Appellee essentially urges that we 
reject Brittany's claim because, according to her remembrance, she was not an 
eyewitness to the alleged outrageous conduct.  First, as a purely factual matter, it is 
unclear from the record precisely what Brittany Bevan observed of the violent 
confrontation between Fix and her mother, Jones.  Jones' affidavit and sworn complaint for 
family violence protective order both state that Jones saw Brittany, along with 
her two sitters, observing the alleged beating.      
            
      9  Thus, in any event, 
a fact question remains as to the events actually visually observed by 
Brittany.  More 
importantly, however, we do not believe that either the Restatement comment and caveat or our precedent on the 
issue support the very narrow interpretation of the "presence" element urged by 
appellee.  

[¶29]   This court first had occasion to 
address the issue when we adopted the third party intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim in R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994).  
There we stated that most cases interpreting the presence requirement 
have held that "present at the time" means that the plaintiff must be present 
when the outrageous conduct occurs.  Id. at 33.  However, the 
opinion continued by citing both Restatement § 46 
cmt. l and the caveat: 

Conduct directed at a third person.  Where the extreme and outrageous conduct is 
directed at a third person, as where, for example, a husband is murdered in the 
presence of his wife, the actor may know that it is substantially certain, or at 
least highly probable, that it will cause severe emotional distress to the 
plaintiff.  In 
such cases the rule of this Section applies.  The cases thus far 
decided, however, have limited such liability to plaintiffs who were present at 
the time, as distinguished from those who discover later what has 
occurred.  
The limitation may be justified by the practical necessity of drawing the 
line somewhere, since the number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at 
the news of an assassination of the President is virtually unlimited, and the 
distress of a woman who is informed of her husband's murder ten years afterward 
may lack the guarantee of genuineness which her presence on the spot would 
afford.  The Caveat is intended, however, to leave open the 
possibility of situations in which presence at the time may not be required.

Cmt l (emphasis added).  The caveat referred 
to in the comment states:

The 
Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other 
circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the 
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.

[¶30]   Ultimately, in R.D. v. W.H., this court 
stated that "[w]e believe that it is generally a better practice to limit 
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs who were 
present when the outrageous conduct occurred. . . .  [However] [w]e hold 
that the facts of this case place it within the narrow exception to the general 
rule that a plaintiff must be present when the outrageous conduct occurs in 
order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress."  Id. at 33.  There the husband and minor child of the 
decedent sued her stepfather and his physician for acts which they contended led 
to her suicide by drug overdose.  While we recognized that the plaintiffs were 
not present either when the defendant's alleged sexual abuse of the decedent 
took place, or when the defendant provided the decedent with a firearm with 
which she attempted suicide, or when the defendant provided the decedent with 
the prescription narcotics by which she ultimately killed herself, we allowed 
the claim because "Appellant and the minor child were present in the immediate 
aftermath of the tragic results of Appellee's outrageous conduct, and the 
suicide was the final result of a continuing course of conduct instigated by 
Appellee."  Id. at 33-34.  

[¶31]   In R.D. v. W.H. 
we decided the claim by placing it outside the general rule that the 
claimant must be "present at the time" of the alleged outrageous conduct and 
therefore did not expressly address what it means to be "present" for the 
purposes of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  Accordingly, we 
consider it here as an issue of first impression, and we do not think that a 
plaintiff must necessarily visually observe the outrageous conduct to be 
considered "present at the time" that it occurs.  "Present" is defined by Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) as 
"being in one place and not elsewhere; being within 
reach, sight, or call or within contemplated limits; being in view or at 
hand; being before, beside, with, or in the same place as someone or 
something."  Id. at 1793.

[¶32]   
Therefore, we hold that in order for a plaintiff to be considered 
"present at the time" of the outrageous conduct for purposes of an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, he must simply show his sensory and 
contemporaneous observance' of the defendant's acts.  Consequently, the 
claimant is not required to have seen the outrageous acts but may still recover, 
without resort to the Restatement caveat, if he gained personal and contemporaneous knowledge 
of them through the use of his remaining senses.  We trust this holding does more than merely 
reflect "the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere," cmt. l, and instead strikes an appropriate balance between an 
actor's interest in limiting his liability to those acts committed with the 
reasonable foreseeability that they will cause a third-party witness emotional 
distress, and the interests of those claimants who have witnessed outrageous 
conduct directed toward their family members.  See generally, 
Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury as 
Affecting Right to Recover Damages for Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing 
Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833 (1981 
& Supp. 2001).  

[¶33]   
Applying the law we have herein set out to the instant case, we think the 
record discloses sufficient facts indicating Brittany's sensory and 
contemporaneous' observance of Fix's alleged outrageous conduct directed toward 
her mother to preclude summary judgment against her on this element.  Likewise, Steven 
testified in deposition among other things, "I remember when Bill Fix choked my 
mom by a wall."  
The children's statements, coupled with Jones' affidavit, are sufficient 
to preclude summary judgment for Fix on the "presence" element of the children's 
claims.

[¶34]   
As to the fifth element of Brittany and Steven's claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress that they sustained severe emotional distress 
as a result of that conduct, appellee's brief makes many factual arguments 
regarding the children's memories of the events, the manner in which they 
describe and attribute their distress, the duration and nature of their 
counseling, etcetera; however, we think these factual arguments are better 
addressed by a jury than by this appellate court.  In numerous cases 
we have approved the following language found in Restatement § 46 cmt. j 
defining severe emotional distress.  See Kanzler v. 
Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (quoting cmt. j, Restatement, Second, Torts § 46); Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 849 (Wyo. 1990); Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 
1066-67.

Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, 
mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like.  It includes all 
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, 
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and 
nausea.  It is 
only where it is extreme that the liability arises.  Complete emotional 
tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and 
trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people.  The law intervenes 
only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could 
be expected to endure it.  The intensity and the duration of the 
distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.  Severe distress must be proved; but 
in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is 
in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.  For example, the 
mere recital of the facts in Illustration 1 above goes far to prove that the claim is not 
fictitious. . . .

Addressing the court's gate-keeping function in this regard, comment j continues:

It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional 
distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, 
it has in fact existed. 

[¶35]   We conclude 
sufficient evidence of emotional distress was presented to preclude summary 
judgment for appellee.  The facts alleging the children's changes in 
behavior, their own deposition testimony, the affidavit of Jones, and the 
deposition testimony of the two counselors and psychologist who have 
subsequently interviewed and diagnosed the children's disorders are more than 
sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
Brittany and Steven's severe emotional distress. 

[¶36]   Lastly, we 
must consider whether the record discloses facts sufficient to allow a jury to 
reasonably conclude that Fix "intentionally" or "recklessly" caused severe 
emotional distress to Brittany and Steven.  Restatement cmt. i 
provides:

Intention and recklessness.  The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor 
desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such 
distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.  It applies also 
where he acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate 
disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will 
follow.  

The Restatement 
addresses reckless conduct in § 500, cmt. (a) (1965) thusly:

Types 
of reckless conduct.  Recklessness may consist of either of two 
different types of conduct.  In one the actor knows, or has reason to know 
. . . of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to 
another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious 
disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.  In the other the actor has such knowledge, or 
reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree 
of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.  An objective 
standard is applied to him, and he is held to the realization of the aggravated 
risk which a reasonable man in his place would have, although he does not 
himself have it. . . . For either type of reckless conduct, the actor 
must know, or have reason to know, the facts which create the risk.  

Recklessness requires actual or imputed knowledge.  The person who is 
reckless must have prior knowledge; he must know or have reason to know of facts 
which create a high degree of risk of harm to another, and then, indifferent to 
what harm may result, proceed to act. 

[¶37]   We find in the evidence a reasonable 
basis for expecting, and for Fix to have expected, such results.  The assault in 
question was of a type and of such a nature as would ordinarily cause emotional 
injury to mere bystanders, even more so if they were the family members of the 
person being assaulted.  Additionally, the fact that the witnesses are 
the young children of the woman assaulted would certainly cause the average 
person to anticipate that those children may experience severe "fright, horror, 
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, 
and nausea" as a result of the witnessed conduct.  Cmt. j.  At a minimum, we 
think a reasonable jury could find that by his conduct Fix "recklessly" caused 
severe emotional distress to Brittany and Steven Bevan on March 30, 1998.

[¶38]   We conclude that genuine issues of 
material fact are present on each element of the Bevan children's claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Fix.  Consequently, we 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in his favor. 

Legal Malpractice

[¶39]   Bevan contends that the district court 
committed error by granting summary judgment to Fix on Bevan's claim of legal 
malpractice, which he argues arose when Fix represented Jones against Bevan, his 
former client, in the couple's divorce proceeding.  After analysis of 
this claim in its procedural posture, we affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Fix.  

[¶40]   In Moore v. 
Lubnau, this court outlined the elements that must be satisfied by a 
plaintiff bringing a claim of legal malpractice.  Adopting the same test that applies to 
medical malpractice suits, we held that, after establishing a duty, the 
plaintiff has the obligation to establish the accepted standard of legal care; 
that the attorney's conduct departed from that standard; and that his conduct 
was the legal cause of the injuries suffered.  855 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Wyo. 1993).  We accepted that 
the standard of care to which an attorney would be held was, "that degree of 
care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a 
reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this 
jurisdiction."  
Id.  We went on to hold that a party trying to 
establish the standard adhered to by a "reasonable, careful and prudent" lawyer 
must typically use expert testimony because "most lay people are not competent 
to pass judgment on legal questions."  Id. at 1249.  We noted, however, that an exception 
exists, "when a lay person's common sense and experience are sufficient to 
establish the standard of care."  Id.  

[¶41]   In the procedural posture of summary 
judgment, this court held that the attorney, as the moving party, first must 
make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists before 
summary judgment can be granted in his favor.  Id. at 1248.  To that end, the attorney, through expert 
testimony or affidavit, is "required to demonstrate that his conduct conformed 
to the accepted standard of legal care."  Id.  In Moore v. 
Lubnau, we held that the moving attorney's own affidavit was insufficient to 
support the grant of summary judgment in his favor.  Within the opinion 
the court had first rejected the "locality rule" to establish the standard of 
care for attorneys practicing within the state reasoning that, "[a]ll attorneys 
must satisfy certain minimum requirements before being allowed to practice law 
in Wyoming.  
The level of knowledge required for admission to the bar does not vary 
from community to community.  Altering the requisite degree of knowledge 
and care because an attorney begins practicing in a certain community makes 
little sense."  
At 1249-50.  
As a consequence of this holding, the court rejected Lubnau's affidavit 
as insufficient because within it he only claimed to satisfy the standard of 
care for attorneys in Campbell County.  However, a majority of the court found the 
deposition testimony of the then-retired judge who had presided over the 
underlying case sufficient to meet Lubnau's prima facie burden.  The majority found 
that it adequately demonstrated that Mr. Lubnau met the standard of care for 
attorneys in Wyoming because the judge had specifically testified, "[m]y opinion 
is that he more than met the standards of practice in the Sixth Judicial 
District and in the State of Wyoming."  Id. at 1250.  Nevertheless, this 
court went on to state:  "Ideally, the judge would have described Ms. 
Moore's allegations of wrongful conduct, stated the ordinary manner in which 
Wyoming attorneys handle each situation, and then stated whether or not Mr. 
Lubnau's conduct conformed to that standard."  Id.

[¶42]   In Moore v. 
Lubnau, the court's discussion continued, ultimately to hold:  "Once Mr. Lubnau 
met his initial burden of proof, Ms. Moore was obligated to demonstrate through 
expert testimony that his conduct was not that of a reasonable Wyoming 
attorney.  Her 
failure to submit countervailing expert testimony established that no genuine 
issue of material fact existed and that summary judgment was appropriate."  Id. at 1251 (citations 
omitted).

[¶43]   Subsequent to our decision in Moore v. Lubnau, this court revisited the issue of the 
necessity of expert testimony to support a moving attorney's motion for summary 
judgment on a claim for legal malpractice.  In the case of Meyer 
v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1995), we applied the same reasoning which 
led to our decision in Moore v. Lubnau, and held 
that expert evidence is likewise necessary to prove proximate cause.  Consequently, we 
found that the attorney, Mulligan, was required to provide expert evidence on 
the lack of proximate cause to succeed at summary judgment.  Id. at 516.  Ultimately we held, "[b]ecause Mulligan's 
motion for summary judgment failed to include expert evidence showing that his 
alleged breach was not the proximate cause of Link's or the Meyers' injury, he 
was not entitled to summary judgment as against either."  Id. at 516-17.

[¶44]   As demonstrated by the foregoing 
discussion, in the instant case Fix, as the moving party, had the initial prima 
facie burden of presenting expert testimony either by affidavit or deposition, 
sufficient to demonstrate that his conduct conformed to the accepted standard of 
legal care and was not the proximate cause of any injury to support his motion 
for summary judgment.  
However, our review of the record including Fix's motion, as well as the 
memorandum of law supporting it, shows that he failed to include any expert evidence in 
support of the motion, even his own affidavit, although we note that both 
parties had previously designated those experts who would testify for them at 
trial.  
Clearly, under the standards we announced in Moore v. Lubnau and Meyer v. 
Mulligan, summary judgment in Fix's favor would generally be precluded 
because he had completely failed to meet his prima facie burden on the standard 
of care and its breach, as well as proximate cause.  

[¶45]   The district court, however, granted 
summary judgment to Fix on three alternate grounds.  First, the court 
found that Fix owed no duty of care to Bevan because their attorney/client 
relationship had terminated.  Second, the court found that if Bevan were 
concerned about Fix's representation of Jones, he owed a duty to object to that 
representation in a reasonably prompt manner, and failure to do so barred his 
claim.  Lastly, 
the court found that Bevan had presented no evidence on the issue of his damages 
or legal injury.  
We will herein address these conclusions in the following order: 1) duty; 
2) damages; 3) defense of waiver.  

Duty

[¶46]   "Whether a legal duty exists is a 
question of law, and absent a duty, there is no liability."  Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 198 (Wyo. 1992) (Brown, 
J., concurring); see also Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 536 (Wyo. 1991).  We agree with the district court's finding 
that Bevan was not a "current client" of Fix's at the time Fix undertook to 
represent Jones against Bevan in the divorce proceeding.  Fix's 
representation of Bevan terminated in 1992 when Bevan entered his plea and was 
sentenced on his criminal charge.  "An attorney-client relationship does not 
continue indefinitely just because it has not been formally terminated."  Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, PC, 910 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 
1996).  
However, the district court, relying on our precedent holding that an 
"attorney/client relationship is the essential element . . . for 
maintenance of a legal malpractice lawsuit," Bowen v. 
Smith, 838 P.2d  at 196; see also Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990), 
concluded, ergo Fix owed no recognizable legal duty 
to Bevan.  It 
is with this final reasoning that we cannot agree.  

[¶47]   It is true that this court has 
consistently rejected legal malpractice claims by "nonclient" plaintiffs of the 
alleged negligent attorney on the basis of several important policy 
considerations discussed within those decisions. See 
Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196; Bowen v. Smith, 
838 P.2d 186.  
Notwithstanding that line of precedent, the instant case cannot be 
pigeonholed into those analyses for the simple reason that Bevan is not a 
"nonclient" in relation to attorney Fix.  Rather, he is, in fact, a "former 
client."  These 
parties at one point in time had an attorney/client relationship.  

[¶48]   This court has not had previous 
occasion to squarely address the presence or scope of the duty an attorney owes 
to a former client and whether a breach of that duty may give rise to tort 
liability as legal malpractice.  However, courts from other jurisdictions have 
consistently recognized that an attorney continues to owe a legal duty of 
confidentiality and loyalty to former clients, although the latter duty is more 
limited in nature.  
See e.g. Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297 
(Alaska 1997); Apple v. Hall, 412 N.E.2d 114 
(Ind.App. 1980); West Virginia Canine College, Inc. v. 
Rexroad, 444 S.E.2d 566 (W.Va. 1994).  These duties are considered fiduciary 
obligations.  
Moreover, the continuing duties of confidentiality and loyalty are 
reflected in the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct §§ 1.6 and 1.9 and 
comments thereto.  

[¶49]   Appellee argues that paragraph [6] of 
the "Scope" section of the Rules of Professional Conduct prevents this court 
from recognizing those duties embodied within them when it proclaims:

Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause 
of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached.  The 
Rules are designed to give guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for 
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.  They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability. . . . Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be 
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the 
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.  

W.R.Prof.Cond. Scope ¶6. 

[¶50]   We respond to this argument simply, by 
stressing "it is important to remember that attorneys' fiduciary obligations 
substantially pre-date the ethical codes."  Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice, Adverse Representation § 17.3 
Ethical Considerations. (5th ed. 2000)  In fact, preservation of a client's 
confidences has been described as the "bedrock principle of the Anglo-American 
legal system."  
Id. at § 17.5 (quoting In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 283 Cal. Rptr. 732 
(Cal.App. 1991)).  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in 
its well reasoned opinion Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, 
Hamilton, & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1284-85 (Pa. 1992):

Long before the Code of 
Professional Responsibility was adopted, and

before the Rules of 
Professional Conduct were adopted, the common law

recognized that a lawyer 
could not undertake a representation adverse to a former

client in a matter 
"substantially related" to that in which the lawyer previously had

served the client. The 
universally recognized statement of this rule of law is

Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v.Warner Bros. Circuit 
Management Corp., 216 F.2d

920 (2d Cir. 1954). The 
Consolidated Theatres decision relied importantly 
on

T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 
supra. Both of these cases

relied on decisions of 
now more than 50 years standing such as United States 
v.

Bishop, 90 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937); and Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie

v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410 (D.C. App. 1935).

 
All of these decisions 
were rendered before there was a Code of
Professional 
Responsibility. None was a disciplinary case.  Consolidated
Theatres and United States v. Bishop 
involved disqualification, which is a civil
proceeding involving 
legal responsibilities and legal and equitable remedies. 
A
motion for 
disqualification is simply an injunctive order issued in a case 
already
pending. The Gesellschaft Telegraphie case involved misuse of 
confidences as
an equitable defense to 
an action by an attorney to collect a fee.  

 
The legal obligation of a 
lawyer to refrain from misuse of a 
client's
confidences goes even 
further back, predating the ABA Canons of 
Professional
Ethics promulgated in 
1908. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind. 498, 55 
N.E.
422 (1899), which was 
also a disqualification case. The threatened violation of 
this
duty thus has been 
recognized as the basis for an injunction for at least virtually 
a
century, as stated in the 
leading treatise on attorneys of about the same vintage.  
See, 1 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, § 180 (1914), quoted 
above.  

 

The Pennsylvania court went on to summarily reject the 
argument that appellee makes here, as do we: "The Superior Court seems to have the idea that because conduct 
is not a tort simply because it is a disciplinary violation, then conduct ceases to be a tort when it is at 
the same time a disciplinary violation. This is an  inversion of logic and legal policy and misunderstands the 
history of the disciplinary rules."  Id. at 1285.  See also Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997). 

[¶51]   In addition, the Restatements have 
codified the duties owed to former clients in Restatement, Third, Law Governing Lawyers § 33 
(2000).  This 
section provides:

A Lawyer's Duties When a Representation 
Terminates

(1) In terminating a representation, a lawyer 
must take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect the clients 
interests, such as giving notice to the client of the termination, allowing time 
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the 
client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee the lawyer has not 
earned.

(2) Following termination of a representation, 
a lawyer must:

(a) observe obligations to a former client such 
as those dealing with client confidences (see Chapter 5), conflicts of interest 
(see Chapter 8), client property and documents (see §§ 44-46), and fee 
collection (see § 41);

(b) take no action on behalf of a former client 
without new authorization and give reasonable notice, to those who might 
otherwise be misled, that the lawyer lacks authority to act for the client;

(c) take reasonable steps to convey to the 
former client any material communication the lawyer receives relating to the 
matter involved in the representation; and

(d) take no unfair advantage of a former client 
by abusing knowledge or trust acquired by means of the representation.  

Comments c and d thereto 
state:

c.  Client 
confidences.  
A lawyer's obligation to protect the confidences of a client, 
addressed in detail in Chapter 5, continues after the representation ends.

d.  Former-client 
conflicts of interest.  Following termination, the former-client 
conflict-of-interest rules apply (see § 132).  On consent, see Comment i. hereto and § 122.  On a former government lawyer, see § 
133.  

[¶52]   Lastly, in recognizing the fiduciary 
duties owed to former clients in relation to conflicts of interest, courts 
regularly recite the following language from 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 200 (1997):

Representation of interest adverse to that of former 
client

An attorney cannot, on termination of employment by 
a client, represent one whose interest in the transaction is adverse to that of 
the former client, or in a matter that is substantially related to the former 
representation.  
Underlying the rule that an attorney is prohibited from representing a 
party in a lawsuit where an opposing party is the lawyer's former client is the 
notion that an attorney, as part of his or her fiduciary obligation, owes a 
continuing duty to a former client not to reveal confidences learned in the 
course of the professional relationship.

[¶53]   Accordingly, this court herein 
expressly recognizes the fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty an 
attorney owes to a former client embodied in Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct §§ 1.6 and 1.9 as a codification of the common law.  Specifically, we 
think Rule 1.9 sets the proper limited parameters of the duty of loyalty owed to 
former clients:

(a)  A lawyer who has formally represented 
a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same 
or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former 
client consents after consultation except that when the former client is a 
governmental entity, consent is not permitted. 

[¶54]   Absent a showing of actual disclosure 
of confidences in breach of the duty reflected in Rule 1.6, we think it is only 
those cases of adverse representation falling within Rule 1.9 which potentially 
meet the following test set forth in 7 Am.Jur.2d  Attorneys at Law 
§ 200:

The test of whether the attorney's employment is 
inconsistent with his or her duty to a former client is whether acceptance of 
the new retainer will require the attorney, in forwarding the interest of the 
new client, to do anything that will injuriously affect a former client in any 
matter in which the attorney formerly represented the client, and also whether 
the attorney will be called on, in the new relation, to use against a former 
client any knowledge or information acquired in the former relationship.

[¶55]   Having established that Rules 1.6 and 
1.9 accurately reflect the parameters of the fiduciary duties owed to former 
clients, we think it is obvious that a breach of those standards by the attorney 
gives rise to potential civil liability to the former client.  Furthermore, we 
hold that a breach of the attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty will 
be analyzed within the framework of a legal malpractice action.10  The standard of care remains the same as for 
any other type of legal malpractice claim.  The plaintiff must establish, generally 
through the use of expert testimony, that the defendant attorney's conduct in 
fulfilling his aforementioned fiduciary duties fell below "that degree of care, 
skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, 
careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction."  Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d  at 1248.  While it may be 
more semantically accurate, in the context of a fiduciary duty, to label the 
requisite standard as one of conduct rather than one of care, the test remains 
essentially the same regardless the label.   

[¶56]   In our development of the law 
applicable to the analysis of an attorney's alleged breach of fiduciary duties 
to a former client, we wish to address one final point.  In this court's 
application of Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 to disciplinary actions 
and disqualification motions we have followed the majority of courts and adopted 
the most prophylactic rule that the presumption of disclosure of confidences is 
irrebuttable with respect to the individual attorney when the interests of the 
previous client are adverse to a client whom the attorney is now 
representing.  
Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 349 (Wyo. 
1988).  We 
noted, "the irrebuttable presumption with respect to the individual attorney 
offers greater assurance that confidential information will be protected and 
assists in avoiding any appearance of impropriety.  It also protects 
the former client from disclosing the very confidential information he seeks to 
protect in order to establish justification for disqualification in the later 
proceeding."  
Id.11 

[¶57]   As a consequence of the above holding, 
we further held in Carlson v. Langdon, the focus of 
the inquiry is not whether confidential information was disclosed but on whether 
the matters are related in some substantial way. Id. 
 This court 
went on to adopt the so-called "factual context" approach to determining this 
issue.  We 
said, "[i]f the two matters have common facts, the attorney is in a position to 
receive confidential information which possibly could be used to the detriment 
of the former client in the later proceeding.  Id. (citing Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

[¶58]   In regard to legal malpractice, some 
courts choose to apply the same presumptions and substantial relationship tests 
to analyze negligence claims under Rule 1.9 that they apply to disciplinary and 
disqualification cases.  See e.g. Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211 (9th Cir. 1995); West Virginia 
Canine College, Inc. v. Rexroad, 444 S.E.2d 566 (W.Va. 1994).  However, this 
approach has been criticized in the context of a professional negligence claim 
because, "the presumption that follows for purposes of disqualification lacks 
the causation element appropriate for a damage action."  Mallen and Smith, 
Legal Malpractice, Adverse Representation, Action 
for Legal Malpractice § 17.24.  In other words, these critics argue if the 
plaintiff client may simply show that his attorney represented another client 
against him in a substantially related matter and thus the irrebuttable 
presumption arises that confidentiality was breached, the plaintiff client's 
burden of proving proximate cause and legal injury has been unfairly 
lifted.  On the 
other hand, we think requiring the plaintiff client to waive his privilege and 
self-disclose all the confidences he made to the attorney during the 
representation to try to prove that they may have been used against him in the 
subsequent matter would seem to make any resolution of the case in his favor a 
pyrrhic victory.  
In addition, the attorney now represents a new client; the privilege that 
attaches to that relationship may make it exceedingly difficult for the former 
client to discover precisely whether and/or how the attorney has used his 
confidential information to the benefit of the new client and detriment of the 
former client.  

[¶59]   Our research reveals that at least one 
court has taken a middle road in attempting to balance the competing burdens and 
policies necessary to decide this issue in the context of summary judgment for 
legal malpractice.  
Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023 
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (affirmed 186 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 
1999)).  The 
case pitted Chrysler Corporation against two former attorneys who formerly 
worked at a law firm that represented Chrysler in defending various class action 
lawsuits involving alleged defects in certain Chrysler vehicles.  While at this law 
firm, both attorneys did a significant amount of work on several of these 
lawsuits.  
After leaving the firm, the two attorneys formed their own firm and 
agreed to serve as plaintiff's counsel in a putative class action against 
Chrysler, albeit involving an alleged defect different from the defects claimed 
to exist in the cases on which they had worked while at their former firm.  Chrysler, claiming 
that the attorneys' conduct was not only unethical but tortious, filed suit for 
breach of fiduciary duty.  The issues of breach, causation, and damages 
were fiercely disputed, and both sides moved for summary judgment.  Chrysler contended 
that a breach of duty of confidentiality should be presumed if the court found 
that the former and latter lawsuits were "substantially related" within the 
meaning of Rule 1.9.  
They also argued that because the attorneys could not possibly have 
"compartmentalized" the confidential information to which they had access at the 
former firm in deciding to bring the subsequent lawsuit, a reasonable inference 
should be drawn that they did indeed use it.  The court ultimately decided that sufficient 
evidence had been presented to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact on 
the issues of breach, causation and damages because when all facts were viewed 
in the light most favorable to one party or the other reasonable minds might 
differ.  

Certainly, a reasonable juror might find from all 
the evidence and inferences therefrom that [the attorneys] in fact used 
confidential information.  On the other hand, because Chrysler can point 
to no particular item of confidential information used, a reasonable juror might 
find no breach.  
The Court does not believe that under Missouri law a breach is presumed 
or somehow established as a matter of law if the matters are "substantially 
related" under Rule 1.9.  Instead, the evidence of a relationship, or 
lack thereof, between the cases are facts that the jury may consider in 
determining whether it should draw an inference that confidential information 
was used.  
Neither party is entitled to summary judgment.

For the same reasons, the Court believes that a 
reasonable juror could find or not find that defendants breached their duty of 
loyalty to Chrysler.  
The undisputed facts in this case show that [the attorneys] elected to 
prosecute a class action product liability lawsuit against Chrysler within a 
year after leaving a firm where they had performed significant work defending 
Chrysler in product liability class actions.  Given their intimate familiarity with 
Chrysler's approach to vehicular defect class actions, a reasonable juror could 
find that it was a breach of loyalty for them to turn around and bring such a 
lawsuit against Chrysler.  Again, neither party is entitled to summary 
judgment.   

Id. 
at 1033-34.

[¶60]   We agree that this is the correct 
analysis in regard to the application of Rule 1.9 to legal malpractice claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty and hereby adopt it.  Unlike cases involving disciplinary action or 
disqualification, in a claim for legal malpractice, a showing of a "substantial 
relationship" between the matter for which the attorney represented the former 
client plaintiff and the subsequent materially adverse representation does not 
give rise to an irrebuttable presumption that confidentiality has been 
breached.  It 
may however, if supported by the evidence, allow a reasonable juror to draw the 
inference that the client's confidences have been used against him in 
contravention of the attorney's continuing duties of confidentiality and 
loyalty.  

[¶61]   In the instant case, neither party has 
developed the record nor sufficiently briefed and analyzed the issues to allow 
us to apply the law to the facts and circumstances before us.  It is conceivable, 
however, that an attorney who represents a client on a charge of domestic 
battery could become privy to facts sufficiently common to those involved in a 
subsequent dissolution of marriage and custody determination proceeding to give 
rise to the inference that confidential information may have been used to the 
detriment of the former client in the later proceeding thus breaching the 
attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty.

Damages

[¶62]   The district court in granting summary 
judgment to Fix found "there is no evidence in the record which demonstrates how 
Fix's conduct as an attorney caused [Bevan] harm.  Simply asserting that Fix's conduct was 
improper or even immoral is insufficient to support a claim for 
malpractice."  
We agree with the district court's conclusion and affirm the grant of 
summary judgment to Fix on this basis.  Appellant Bevan presented no evidence of any 
injury or damages arising from Fix's subsequent representation of Jones.  He has not alleged 
any facts indicating that the outcome of his divorce proceeding would have been 
more favorable had another attorney represented his wife Jones.  He seems to argue 
that the breach of loyalty and presumed confidentiality caused through the 
adverse representation by Fix in a substantially related matter is inherently 
injurious to him as the former client.  That may very well be accepted as true in the 
context of a disciplinary proceeding where the focus is solely upon the 
attorney's alleged violation of disciplinary rules because such a violation is 
presumed to not only harm the attorney's clients but also the judicial process, 
as well as the public's perception of the legal profession.  However, in a suit 
for negligence, the plaintiff must prove all elements.  Without legal 
injury or damages, for what is he to be compensated?

[¶63]   In the case of Chrysler v. Carey, discussed infra, Chrysler claimed as damages legal expenses paid 
to a second law firm in connection with that firm's investigation of the link 
between the defendant attorney's firm and other firms in filing the lawsuit 
against Chrysler.  
They also claimed attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending the 
lawsuit filed by the defendant attorneys.  Here, Bevan claimed no damages and presented 
no evidence of injury; thus the grant of summary judgment against him was 
appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact present on that 
necessary element.  

Waiver

[¶64]   Finally, we consider the district 
court's conclusion that Bevan's failure to seek disqualification of Fix in his 
representation of Jones constitutes a waiver and thus bars his subsequent claim 
for legal malpractice.  The district court relied on our decision Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186 (Wyo. 1992).  While we did 
discuss the issue in the foregoing case, it was clearly as dicta because the case was resolved on the basis that 
no attorney/client relationship had ever existed between the minority 
shareholder plaintiffs and the defendant attorneys who had represented the 
corporation.  
Nonetheless, we did state in that opinion that, "the minority 
shareholders could have objected to the continued representation of Springer 
Jones and his company, Squaw Mountain [the majority shareholders], in the 
division litigation  
[a subsequent action in which minority shareholders sued majority 
shareholders for division of proceeds from settlement of initial litigation] if 
they had so chosen.  
Clearly, that effort was not made and any complaint either in ethical 
challenge or damage complaint is waived by intentional choice, disinterest or 
inactivity."12  Id. at 194.  

[¶65]   The prior failure of the former client 
to seek disqualification of the attorney in the adverse representation has 
become a common defense for purposes of a legal malpractice claim.  Several courts in 
particular cases have recognized this failure as a waiver of the alleged 
conflict.  See Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1996).  This court has determined waiver to be "the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right and must be manifest in some 
unequivocal manner."  
Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 392 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1992).  We have held that "the constituents of waiver 
are identified as: (1) an existing right; (2) knowledge of that right; 
and (3) an intent to relinquish it.  Ramirez v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 580 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1978); Jackson State Bank, at 1086.  

[¶66]   Clearly, under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the onus is on the attorney to consult with his former and 
current clients and seek their consent to any subsequent adversarial 
representation.  
See Wyo.R.Pro.Cond. 1.9(a).  Nevertheless, in 
the context of legal malpractice, we think it appropriate to find that the 
former client may have waived the conflict of interest by failing to disqualify 
the attorney, provided the attorney, as the party asserting the defense, meets 
his burden of showing the former client had the requisite knowledge of the right 
and intended to relinquish it.  We do not find the client's failure to seek 
his former attorney's disqualification an automatic defense precluding judgment 
for malpractice in favor of the client as a matter of law.  Rather, the issue 
will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  Regrettably, we think the source of many of 
these problems is an attorney's "failure to have adequate systems to identify 
former clients and the subject of their prior representation."  Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice, § 17.24.  Ultimately, it may 
be appropriate that the attorney, as the party most able to prevent the injury, 
bear the risk for this failure.  

[¶67]   In the case of Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, the 
defendant law firm had itself sought "qualification" by the court in the 
underlying litigation.  When the court asked Wilbourn if he wanted 
the law firm disqualified, he responded negatively.  He stated that 
after three years in federal court the firm had already breached the 
confidences, and to disqualify the firm would hinder the trial.  687 So. 2d  at 1217.  The court deciding his malpractice claim 
found that Wilbourne had waived the firm's disqualification and was thus barred 
from asserting his claim of negligence against them.  We cannot say that 
the facts before us are similar to those in Wilbourn. 
 Unfortunately, the record is not sufficiently 
developed for us to apply the law herein set out to the instant case, nor is it 
necessary for us to do so as we have affirmed the district court's judgment on 
other grounds.

CONCLUSION

[¶68]   We reverse and remand the summary 
judgment granted Fix on the Bevan children's claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress for further proceedings.  We find within the record genuine issues of 
material fact necessitating jury determination.  On Bevan's claim of malpractice against his 
former attorney Fix, we recognize the cause of action and have addressed how it 
is to be applied, but find that Bevan presented no evidence on the issue of his 
injury or damages; thus Fix is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶69]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 

FOOTNOTES

1Fix admits in 
deposition testimony that he phoned Bevan because he heard that Bevan was going 
to sue him.  
However, his version of the call is omitted from the record on 
appeal.  
Therefore, we are unable to include herein any opposing description of 
the conversation from Fix.  

2Defendant Fix's 
filed Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserts that Fix and Jones were under court order to have no 
contact with each other at the time.   

3This affidavit 
is substantially similar to a sworn complaint for family violence protection 
order filed by Jenni Jones against William Fix on March 31, 
1998.  

4According to 
his deposition testimony, Fix's version of events is essentially that Jones was 
the aggressor and instigator of the physical confrontation and that the physical 
contact between the two was much more mutually combative.  He denies hitting 
Jones or banging Jones' head into a wall and rather describes the events in the 
hallway as a hair-pulling contest.   

5This court in 
R.D. v. W.H. recognized and applied Restatement, cmt. l and the 
caveat, to this requirement as discussed infra. 

6The district 
court's reliance on the cited case is misplaced.  It is clear upon a thorough reading of the 
opinion that when the Kansas court used the term "assault," it was referring to 
tortious, rather than criminal, assault.  Wiehe v. Kukal, 
592 P.2d 860 (Kan. 1979).  It described Wiehe's alleged conduct as "a 
spontaneous verbal outburst, profane and disparaging, coupled with an assault 
upon Kukal, upon Wiehe's discovery that Kukal and Hattley were fencing part of 
Wiehe's land in with their own."  Id. at 863.  The actual "legal 
assault" alleged consisted of "mov[ing] toward one of the persons in a 
threatening manner in order to cause the person to back away from the place 
where the fence was being installed . . . ." Id. at 864. 

7Unfortunately, 
as we noted in Kanzler v. Renner, disparities in 
application of the tort are prevalent due in large part to the vague, 
subjective, and value-laden concept of "outrageousness" and the highly 
fact-specific inquiry necessary to decide claims under it.  937 P.2d  at 
1342.  See also Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Wyo. 
1996) (Golden, J., Lehman, J., dissenting).

8Lest any should 
misunderstand, this court is not holding, nor even implying, that all criminal 
conduct is per se "extreme and outrageous" for purposes of deciding an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  Rather, we simply 
note that it is a factor that cannot be used logically to militate against a 
finding that the conduct is "extreme and outrageous" in the context of a summary 
judgment proceeding on an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.

9This statement 
is corroborated by the sitters' witness interviews conducted by the police on 
the morning in question. 

10Some courts 
classify suits alleging a breach of these duties as claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  
See e.g. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & 
Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal.App. 1988).  However, this court has followed those courts 
holding that such claims are subsumed into a claim of legal malpractice.  Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d 382, 389 (Wyo. 1995).  In general, the primary practical result 
of classifying the claim is to determine the applicable statute of 
limitations.  
See generally, Anderson & Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal 
Malpractice Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L.Rev. 234 (1994).  

11This court did not adopt the second-stage irrebuttable 
presumption for those cases involving imputed knowledge to members of the 
attorney's firm. 

12To the extent 
the statement seems to imply that the former client's failure to seek 
disqualification of the attorney during the subsequent adverse representation 
waives any "ethical challenge" i.e. disciplinary action, it is an unfortunate 
overbroad statement of the law and is hereby overruled.