Title: Damien Wayne Echols v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Damien Wayne ECHOLS and Charles Jason Baldwin
v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 94-928                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 23, 1996


1.   Evidence -- standard of review -- substantial evidence. --
     Although the jury should be instructed, as it was here, that
     circumstantial evidence must be consistent with the guilt of
     the defendant and inconsistent with any other reasonable
     conclusion, this is not the standard by which the appellate
     court reviews the evidence; the appellate court's
     responsibility is to determine whether the verdict is
     supported by substantial evidence, which means whether the
     jury could have reached its conclusion without resorting to
     speculation or conjecture; the jury must be convinced of the
     accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but the appellate
     court, not having had the advantage of seeing and hearing the
     witnesses, is guided by the substantial evidence rule. 

2.   Evidence -- confession sufficient to sustain conviction if
     accompanied by other proof that offense was committed by
     someone. -- Where two witnesses testified that they overheard
     appellant Echols state that he killed the three boys, this was
     direct evidence; a confession is sufficient to sustain a
     conviction if it is accompanied by other proof that the
     offense was committed by someone.
3.   Evidence -- substantial evidence of appellant Echols's guilt.
     -- There was substantial evidence of the guilt of appellant
     Echols where, among other things, the testimony of witnesses
     placed him in dirty clothes near the crime scene at a time
     close to the murders; where two independent witnesses reported
     Echols's statement that he had killed the three boys and was
     direct evidence of the statement; where a criminalist from the
     State Crime Laboratory and a State Medical Examiner testified
     concerning the similarity of fibers found on the victim's
     clothes with clothing found in Echols's home and the serrated
     wound patterns on the three victims that were consistent with,
     and could have been caused by, a knife found in a lake behind
     appellant Baldwin's parents' residence; where, given the
     testimony of a witness that she had seen Echols carrying a
     similar knife and the testimony of the owner of a knife
     collector service regarding that type of knife, the jury could
     have reasonably concluded that Echols or Baldwin disposed of
     the knife in the lake; where Echols admitted on cross-
     examination that he had delved deeply into the occult and was
     familiar with its practices and where various items that had
     been found in his room supported the State's theory of motive
     that the killings were done in a satanic ritual; where an
     expert in occult killings testified that there was significant
     evidence of satanic ritual killings; where a detective
     testified that Echols had made a statement regarding the
     mutilation of one of the victims that the jury could have
     reasonably concluded he would not have known about unless he
     had been involved in some manner; and where Echols's testimony
     contained additional evidence of guilt.

4.   Criminal law -- mitigating circumstances -- no significant
     prior history of criminal activity -- weighed by jury. -- The
     mitigating factor in AMI Crim. 1509, which is set out at Ark.
     Code Ann.  5-4-605(6) (Repl. 1993) as "no significant prior
     history of criminal activity," does not refer to prior
     convictions; where the jury found that appellant Baldwin had
     no significant history of criminal activity but refused to
     make the same finding for appellant Echols, the fact indicated
     that the jury carefully weighed the evidence and determined
     that Echols should not be credited with the mitigating factor.

5.   Evidence -- mitigating circumstances -- jury not required to
     find. -- A jury is not required to find a mitigating
     circumstance just because the defendant puts before the jury
     some evidence that could serve as the basis for finding the
     mitigating circumstance.

6.   Evidence -- mitigating circumstances -- jury may generally
     refuse to believe defendant's mitigating evidence. -- A jury
     may generally refuse to believe a defendant's mitigating
     evidence, but when there is no question about credibility and,
     when, in addition, objective proof makes a reasonable
     conclusion inescapable, the jury can not arbitrarily disregard
     that proof and refuse to reach that conclusion; here, the jury
     was faced with neither indisputable credibility nor objective
     proof that made a reasonable conclusion inescapable; to the
     contrary, there was substantial evidence of appellant Echols's
     history of prior criminal activity.  

7.   Evidence -- mitigating circumstances -- jury did not
     arbitrarily refuse to find that appellant Echols had no
     significant history of criminal activity. -- The jury did not
     arbitrarily refuse to find that appellant Echols had no
     significant history of criminal activity where Echols admitted
     on cross-examination in the penalty phase of the trial that he
     had an altercation with his father in which a knife was
     involved and the police were called; where he admitted that he
     was hospitalized that same day and that when his father came
     to the hospital, "I told him I would eat him alive"; where he
     admitted that he tried "to claw the eyes out" of a student;
     and where a psychologist who testified for Echols admitted
     that Echols had "an all-powerful God-like image of himself,"
     that his parents were concerned with his satanism or devil
     worship, and that Echols's medical records included notations
     of statements by Echols pertaining, among other things, to his
     rage and the drinking of the blood of others.

8.   Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- when
     appropriate. -- Joinder and severance procedure is governed by
     Ark. R. Crim. P. Article VI; these rules are calculated to
     promote the expeditious disposition of criminal cases without
     putting undue strain on prosecutorial or judicial resources,
     but, at the same time, without causing prejudice to joint
     defendants; Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.2 provides for the joinder of
     defendants when the crimes were part of a joint scheme or plan
     and so the capital murder charges were properly joined; Ark.
     R. Crim. P. 22.3 provides that a trial court shall grant a
     severance if it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair
     determination of the guilt or innocence of one of the
     defendants. 

9.   Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- discretionary -
     - factors to be weighed. -- Trial courts have discretion to
     grant or deny a severance, and the appellate court will not
     disturb the ruling in the absence of an abuse of that
     discretion; in determining whether to grant a severance, a
     trial court should weigh: (1) whether the defenses of the
     defendants are antagonistic; (2) whether it is difficult to
     segregate the evidence; (3) whether there is a lack of
     substantial evidence implicating one defendant except for the
     accusation of the other defendant; (4) whether one defendant
     could have deprived the other of all peremptory challenges;
     (5) whether one defendant will be compelled to testify if the
     other does so; (6) whether one defendant has no prior criminal
     record and the other has; (7) whether circumstantial evidence
     against one defendant appears stronger than against the other;
     when defenses are antagonistic the trial court must be
     particularly careful that neither defendant is unduly
     jeopardized by a joint trial; the presence of any one of the
     factors does not necessarily require severance, as there are
     multiple factors to consider.

10.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- almost all
     factors weighed in favor of joint trial. -- Almost all of the
     factors clearly weighed in favor of a joint trial where the
     joint trial was lengthy, and separate trials perhaps would
     have taken twice as long and required twice as many jurors;
     the evidence was not difficult for the jury to segregate; the
     evidence was not significantly stronger against one defendant
     than the other; the testimony of one did not compel the other
     to testify; and there was no significant disparity in criminal
     records of the defendants; the trial judge made various
     comments when denying the severance motions, and those
     comments reflected that he thought the jurors could
     distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to
     each offense and to each defendant.

11.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- antagonistic
     defenses discussed. -- Antagonistic defenses arise when each
     defendant asserts his innocence and accuses the other of the
     crime, and the evidence cannot be successfully segregated; the
     supreme court has held that when there was no reason the jury
     could not have believed both defenses, the defenses are not
     antagonistic.

12.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- alleged
     conflicting strategies did not subject either defendant to
     compelling prejudice. -- Unless conflicting strategies go to
     the essence of co-defendants' defenses, and the conflicting
     strategies are so great that both defendants' defenses cannot
     be accommodated by the jury, a trial court is not required to
     grant a severance; here, where the defense of each appellant,
     in effect, was that he did not commit the crimes, the alleged
     conflicting strategies did not subject either defendant to a
     compelling prejudice.

13.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- alleged
     difference in strategy did not mandate severance. -- The
     alleged difference in strategy did not go to the essence of
     either defense, did not prevent the jury from considering
     either defense, did not unduly jeopardize a fair trial, and
     did not mandate a severance.

14.  Appeal & error -- argument cannot be made for first time on
     appeal. -- Where appellant Baldwin did not ask for a severance
     because of the admission of a piece of paper with doodles
     drawn on it by appellant Echols, he could not make the
     argument for the first time on appeal.

15.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- no binding
     commitment to sever -- trial court did not abuse discretion in
     denying severance. -- Where, in pretrial, the trial court
     stated that in the event one of the appellants testified, the
     other might then be compelled to do so, and "There's case law
     on that, and the other defendant would be entitled to an
     immediate mistrial," the supreme court noted that, in a
     similar case, it had held that this kind of ruling does not
     amount to a "binding commitment" to sever; where appellant
     Echols did not implicate appellant Baldwin when he testified,
     the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
     severance.

16.  Criminal procedure -- joinder and severance -- Ark. R. Crim.
     P. 22 gives trial court discretion to grant or deny severance
     in all cases. -- Although, before the Arkansas Rules of
     Criminal Procedure were adopted, the trial court had
     discretion to grant severance of defendants in all cases
     except capital cases, where they were granted severance as a
     matter of right under Ark. Stat. Ann.  43-1802 (Repl. 1977),
     the statute was superseded by Ark. R. Crim. P. 22, which gives
     the trial court discretion to grant or deny a severance in all
     cases; moreover, Ark. Stat. Ann.  43-1802 was repealed and
     not reenacted when the General Assembly adopted the Arkansas
     Code of 1987 Annotated by Act 267 of 1987.
17.  Search & seizure -- good-faith exception -- test for
     determining when warrant falls outside. -- The good-faith
     exception does not apply when the issuing magistrate was
     misled by an affiant who either knew the information given was
     false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity;
     the test for determining when a warrant falls outside the
     good-faith exception provides that a warrant should be
     invalidated if a defendant shows by a preponderance of the
     evidence that: (1) the affidavit contained a false statement
     which was made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly by the
     affiant, and (2) the false statement was necessary to a
     finding of probable cause; further, if such a finding is made,
     the false material should be excised and the remainder of the
     warrant examined to determine if probable cause still exists;
     if the truthful portion of the warrant makes a sufficient
     showing of probable cause, the warrant will not be
     invalidated; the burden of showing that an affiant knowingly
     and recklessly included a false statement is upon the
     challenger of the affidavit.

18.  Search & seizure -- warrant -- standard for invalidating
     requires knowing intent to deceive or reckless disregard of
     truth. -- The standard for invalidating a warrant that falls
     outside the good-faith exception requires a knowing intent to
     deceive, or a reckless disregard of truth; matters omitted
     must be material circumstances that contradict or dispel the
     incriminating factors in the affidavit and that render what is
     in the affidavit effectively false because of their
     nondisclosure.

19.  Search & seizure -- rest of warrant contained sufficient
     showing for probable cause. -- Even if two statements by a
     detective in the affidavit were false in material matters, and
     even if the detective knew them to be false, the rest of the
     warrant still made a sufficient showing for probable cause;
     the warrant contained a sufficient showing of the facts that
     appellants's accomplice Misskelley said that he, appellant
     Baldwin, and appellant Echols committed the murders; that
     Misskelley had knowledge of details of the crime not known to
     the public; and the statement that evidence connecting them to
     the crime could be found in the homes.

20.  Search & seizure -- affidavit -- appellant did not meet burden
     of showing that detective knowingly and intentionally stated
     falsehood. -- Where appellant Baldwin argued that the
     detective knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the truth
     when he swore that Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley were
     members of a cult, the supreme court summarily dismissed the
     argument because the accomplice Misskelley told a police
     inspector that the three were in a cult, and the detective
     testified at the suppression hearing that he had learned from
     other sources that the three were in a cult; thus, appellant
     Baldwin did not meet his burden of showing that the detective
     knowingly and intentionally stated a falsehood.

21.  Search & seizure -- trial court did not err in finding that
     issuing judge was neutral and detached. -- One of the errors
     that an officer's good faith will not cure is that which
     occurs when the magistrate who issues a warrant wholly
     abandons his detached and neutral judicial role; when a
     judicial officer becomes so involved in the investigation as
     to be deemed a participant, he has abandoned this role; here,
     the proof showed that the issuing magistrate stated the
     elements necessary for a valid warrant, and that included
     telling the officers to record on the warrant the actions they
     took when they executed the warrant; on such proof, the
     supreme court could not say that the trial court's ruling that
     the issuing judge was neutral and detached was clearly in
     error.
22.  Appeal & error -- finding that accomplice was reliable
     informant not clearly in error. -- The trial court's finding
     that the accomplice Misskelley was a reliable informant was
     not clearly in error where, even though the accomplice's
     initial statement was in error about the ligatures and the
     time of the killings, he corrected the latter and he clearly
     knew which of the victims had been castrated and that one of
     the victims had been cut in the face; where this information
     was not known by the public at the time he supplied it; where
     a detective corroborated these statements by his own knowledge
     gained at the crime scene, and through contacts at the state
     crime laboratory; and where the accomplice implicated himself
     in the murders because he admitted that one of the victims
     attempted to escape from the crime scene and that he chased
     and caught the boy and brought him back.

23.  Search & seizure -- warrant -- all items were described with
     particularity except fibers. -- The supreme court dismissed
     appellants' contention that the warrant did not describe with
     particularity the items to be seized, emphasizing that all of
     the items to be seized were described with particularity,
     except the fibers to be seized for the crime laboratory, and
     noting that it was difficult to think of a way the warrant
     could have been more specific than to describe, as it did, the
     blue, green, red, black, and purple fibers; blue, yellow, red,
     paint or plastic; and blue or red waxing-type substance.

24.  Search & seizure -- Fourth Amendment allows seizure of mere
     evidence if there is probable cause to believe it will aid in
     conviction. -- The Fourth Amendment allows the seizure not
     only of the implements of the crime but also of mere evidence
     providing there is a probable cause to believe that the
     evidence sought will aid in a conviction.

25.  Search & seizure -- nighttime search -- review of propriety. -
     - In reviewing whether the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P.
     13.2, which governs nighttime searches, were met, the
     appellate court conducts an independent determination based
     upon the totality of the circumstances and reverses only if
     the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance
     of the evidence; the evidence presented to the magistrate from
     whom a nighttime search is requested must be of facts
     justifying a warrant rather than mere conclusions.

26.  Search & seizure -- nighttime search justified. -- Where there
     were facts stated to support the conclusion that the evidence
     sought was in danger of imminent removal, the trial court's
     conclusion that the nighttime search was justified was not
     against the preponderance of the evidence.

27.  Witnesses -- expert witnesses -- qualification of. -- The
     qualification of expert witnesses is within the sound
     discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
     a showing of abuse; if there is a reasonable basis to find
     that the witness has knowledge of a subject beyond that of
     ordinary knowledge, the witness may be qualified as an expert.

28.  Witnesses -- expert witness -- witness had much more than
     ordinary knowledge of nontraditional groups -- no abuse of
     discretion in allowing him to testify. -- Where a witness had
     much more than ordinary knowledge of nontraditional groups,
     the occult, and satanism, the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in allowing him to testify as an expert witness.

29.  Evidence -- testimony that murders had "trappings of
     occultism" admitted as proof of motive. -- Where appellant
     Echols contended that an expert witness should not have been
     allowed to testify that the murders had the "trappings of
     occultism" as there was no testimony that the field of
     satanism or occultism is generally accepted in the scientific
     community, the supreme court held that the argument was
     without merit because the trial court did not allow the
     evidence to prove that satanism or occultism is generally
     accepted in the scientific community but admitted it as proof
     of the motive for committing the murders.

30.  Constitutional law -- First Amendment -- introduction of
     evidence of beliefs and associations does not violate rights
     when relevant to crime. -- The introduction of evidence of
     beliefs and associations violates a defendant's constitutional
     rights when there is no connection between those beliefs and
     associations and the crime; the United States Supreme Court,
     however, has expressly distinguished a case in which beliefs
     and associations were relevant to a murder, and this case
     falls within the ambit of the distinction.

31.  Appeal & error -- party cannot obtain relief from favorable
     ruling. -- A party cannot obtain relief from a favorable
     ruling.

32.  Evidence -- State entitled to produce evidence showing
     circumstances that explain act. -- When the purpose of
     evidence is to show motive, anything and everything that might
     have influenced the commission of an act may, as a rule, be
     shown; the State is entitled to produce evidence showing
     circumstances that explain the act, show a motive for killing,
     or illustrate the accused's state of mind.

33.  Evidence -- relevancy and prejudicial impact -- trial court's
     ruling afforded great deference. -- The trial court's ruling
     on relevancy, as well as prejudicial impact, is afforded great
     deference by a reviewing court and will not be disturbed
     absent an abuse of discretion.

34.  Juveniles -- Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-309(a) gives juvenile court
     discretion to open files. -- Arkansas Code Annotated  9-27-
     309(a) gives the juvenile court discretion to open juvenile
     court files; here, the juvenile court had, by order, opened
     appellant Echols's files for the State.

35.  Evidence -- relevance -- book on history of witches was
     relevant to show appellant Echols's interest in occult. -- A
     book on the history of witches, which was found in appellant
     Echols's room after the murders, was relevant to show
     appellant's interest in the occult.
36.  Evidence -- relevance -- testimony about clothing and staffs
     was relevant. -- Where the trial court ruled that the murders
     could have been committed with staffs and that they could have
     been occult murders, the supreme court held relevant the
     testimony of a witness that he had seen Echols, Baldwin, and
     Misskelley walking together six months before the murders,
     wearing long black coats, and carrying long sticks or staffs.

37.  Evidence -- relevancy requirement satisfied by evidence of
     occult practices. -- To be relevant, it is not required that
     evidence prove the entire case or even a single issue; all
     that is required, under Ark. R. Evid. 401, is that it have
     "any tendency" to make any fact that is of consequence to the
     determination of the action more or less probable; here, the
     State's theory was that the murders were cult-related, and
     there was additional evidence about occult practices; this
     evidence provided a circumstantial link and was therefore
     relevant.

38.  Evidence -- trial court correctly allowed evidence of
     appellant Baldwin's participation in occult activities. --
     Where one witness testified that appellant Baldwin had told
     him that he had dismembered one of the boys, sucked the blood
     from his penis and scrotum, and put the testicles in his
     mouth, and where an expert on ritual killings stated that one
     of the facts that led him to believe that the killings were
     cult-related was that one of the victims had been castrated
     and had had the blood sucked from his penis, there was
     sufficient evidence of appellant Baldwin's participation in
     occult activities, and the trial court correctly allowed the
     evidence.

39.  Evidence -- hearsay -- scholarly treatise exception --
     reliability must be established -- no foundation laid. -- The
     scholarly treatise exception to the hearsay rule, set forth at
     Ark. R. Evid. 803(18), applies to a particular statement from
     a particular treatise, not to a general opinion of another
     expert based upon a generalized familiarity with the expert;
     here, no foundation was laid about a particular treatise to
     which appellant Echols's expert witness on cult crimes could
     refer, and no foundation was laid about the reliability of the
     expert on the subject; before a treatise may be used, its
     reliability must be established; because the trial court was
     not apprised of a particular treatise or its reliability, the
     State's hearsay objection was correctly sustained; moreover,
     appellant Echols could not have suffered any prejudice from
     the ruling because the information was later given to the
     jury.

40.  Appeal & error -- law-of-the-case doctrine -- not applicable.
     -- Where appellant Echols argued that the law-of-the-case
     doctrine prohibited the trial court from making a different
     ruling on the same argument with respect to questions
     addressed to appellant's expert witness regarding two
     authorities on the occult, the supreme court held that the
     rulings were not inconsistent, but, even had they been
     inconsistent, the law-of-the-case doctrine was not applicable;
     while the doctrine is not limited to appeals and may be
     applied to issues raised in a continuing lawsuit, when applied
     in a continuing suit, the doctrine is different from when
     applied to subsequent appeals; when applied to the effect of
     previous orders on the later action of the court rendering
     them in the same case, the doctrine merely expresses the
     practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
     decided, not a limit to their power; in the present case, even
     had the same issue been involved, the trial court had the
     power to reconsider its ruling.

41.  Trial -- trial court did not arbitrarily stop appellant's
     counsel from asking proper questions of victim's stepfather. -
     - The trial court did not arbitrarily stop appellant Echols's
     counsel from asking proper questions of a victim's stepfather;
     the record showed that appellant's counsel was allowed to ask
     the questions that, on appeal, he complained he was not
     allowed to ask.

42.  Evidence -- appellant made sufficient offer of proof of
     questions for victim's stepfather. -- The supreme court held
     that appellant Echols made a sufficient offer of proof under
     Ark. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) where counsel stated the questions he
     wanted to ask a victim's stepfather and gave the answers he
     anticipated the witness would give.

43.  Evidence -- facts that witness may have been abused and may
     have committed unrelated bad acts created only reckless
     inference that he murdered victims. -- Evidence that a third
     party may have committed a crime is inadmissible unless it
     points directly to the guilt of the third party; if it creates
     no more than an inference or conjecture as to the third
     party's guilt, it is inadmissible; there should be sufficient
     connection between the evidence and the possibility of another
     person's guilt before it is admissible; here, the facts that
     the witness may have been abused and may have committed
     unrelated bad acts created no more than a reckless inference
     that he murdered his stepson and the other two victims.

44.  Evidence -- accused is not entitled to offer evidence of other
     suspects on wholly speculative basis. -- An accused is
     entitled to show that someone else committed a crime, but an
     accused is not entitled to offer evidence of other suspects on
     a wholly speculative basis and without linking the other
     suspects in some manner; here, there was nothing to indicate
     that anyone in the photospread of suspects committed the
     crimes, and the trial court correctly ruled that further
     questioning of a officer about the photospread was irrelevant.

45.  Evidence -- records of State Crime Laboratory -- evidence
     analysis -- purpose of governing statute. -- The purpose of
     Ark. Code Ann.  12-12-313(a), which provides that an evidence
     analysis made by the State Crime Laboratory shall be received
     as competent evidence subject to the applicable rules of
     criminal procedure, is to remove crime lab reports from
     exclusion under the hearsay rule, not to require that they
     always be admitted for any reason; the trial court correctly
     ruled that hearsay statements contained in a serologist's
     report were not admissible and that the names of suspects
     listed on the document would not be admitted unless there was
     some evidence to connect the suspects with the crimes;
     further, appellant Echols could not show prejudice because the
     jury was informed that a victim's stepfather was a suspect.

46.  Witnesses -- neither prosecution nor defense may call a
     witness knowing he will claim testimonial privilege. --
     Neither the prosecution nor the defense is permitted to call
     a witness knowing that the witness will claim his testimonial
     privilege; neither side should be permitted to build a case
     out of a series of invocations of the privilege, which would
     be the equivalent in the jury's minds of testimony.

47.  Evidence -- evidence of third-party guilt must have tendency
     to negate defendant's guilt -- sufficient nexus required. --
     Evidence that a third party may have committed the crime must
     have had a tendency to negate the defendant's guilt; this kind
     of evidence is inadmissible unless it points directly to the
     guilt of the third party; if it creates no more than an
     inference or conjecture as to the third party's guilt, it is
     inadmissible; there must be a sufficient nexus between the
     evidence and the possibility of another person's guilt;
     similarity and time connections are factors in determining the
     probativeness of the evidence, which must be weighed against
     the possibility of confusing the issues and wasting time;
     here, the trial court had heard a proffer and knew that an
     out-of-state witness's statement did not exculpate appellants.

48.  Evidence -- trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     refusing to allow appellants to call witness and make him
     claim testimonial privilege. --   The admission or rejection
     of evidence under Rule 404(b) is committed to the sound
     discretion of the trial court, which the appellate court will
     not disturb on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse; the
     standard of review for both relevancy determinations and the
     decision to admit evidence by balancing the probative value
     against unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues is
     similar; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     refusing to allow appellants to call an out-of-state witness
     and make him claim his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of
     the jury.

49.  Witnesses -- expert witness -- qualification discretionary
     with trial court -- no error in allowing testimony regarding
     anal injuries. -- Whether to qualify a witness as an expert is
     a matter left to the discretion of the trial court, and the
     trial court will not be reversed absent an abuse of
     discretion; once a witness is qualified as an expert, any
     weaknesses in the bases for his opinions can be brought out on
     cross-examination, and it is then for the jury to determine
     the weight and credibility to give the testimony; the trial
     court did not err in allowing an expert's testimony regarding
     the conditions of the victims' anuses and the causes
     consistent with the conditions.

50.  Appeal & error -- specific and timely objection must be made
     to preserve issue for appeal. -- To preserve an issue for
     appeal, a specific and timely objection must be made in the
     trial court, apprising the trial court of the appellant's
     arguments; having failed to object to an expert witness's
     testimony on evidence of oral sex before the trial court,
     appellant Baldwin could not raise the issue on appeal.

51.  Witnesses -- expert witness -- any weaknesses in bases for
     opinions would go to weight and credibility rather than
     admissibility. -- Where an expert witness's qualification as
     a forensic pathologist was not questioned, any weaknesses in
     the bases for his opinions concerning oral sex, as they were
     developed on cross examination, would go to weight and
     credibility rather than admissibility

52.  Witnesses -- expert witness -- weight and credibility of
     testimony for jury to determine. -- Where an expert witness
     gave a thorough foundation for his opinion, which was not that
     sticks recovered at the scene caused the victims' injuries,
     but that the wounds were consistent with being caused by the
     sticks, and where he also testified that the wounds could have
     been caused by other objects, it was for the jury to determine
     the weight and credibility to give the witness's testimony
     concerning the sticks.

53.  Evidence -- no error to allow expert's testimony regarding
     knife wounds. -- The supreme court, noting that the issue had
     not been properly preserved for appeal, held that it was not
     error for the trial court to allow an expert witness's
     testimony regarding whether some of the wounds were consistent
     with having been caused by a knife of the type found behind
     appellant Baldwin's house where the witness's opinion was
     supported with a with a factual foundation and where any
     weaknesses in his opinion that some of the wounds were
     consistent with having been caused by the knife recovered from
     behind appellant Baldwin's house went to weight and
     credibility rather than to admissibility.

54.  Appeal & error -- no reversal for asserted leading question
     where appellant did not request sanction or other relief upon
     objection. -- Even if a question asked by the State on
     redirect examination had been a leading one, the supreme court
     would not reverse where appellant Echols did not request a
     sanction or other relief when he objected; even if the
     question had been a leading question, the error did not
     constitute reversible error.

55.  Trial -- trial judge's questions did not constitute unmerited
     rebuke of defense counsel. -- Although the trial judge asked
     about the relevancy of the continued questioning and seemed to
     be irritated with defense counsel's tactics, the questions did
     not constitute an unmerited rebuke of the attorney.

56.  Appeal & error -- even constitutional arguments are waived
     when not presented to trial court. -- Where appellant Baldwin
     did not make a Confrontation Clause argument to the trial
     court, the supreme court did not consider it on appeal; even
     constitutional arguments are waived when they are not
     presented to the trial court.

57.  Evidence -- character and conduct -- inquiry on cross-
     examination limited to specific instances of conduct probative
     of veracity. -- Rule 608 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence
     provides that a witness may be cross-examined with specific
     instances of conduct, if probative of the witness's character
     for truthfulness; the rule limits the inquiry on cross-
     examination to specific instances of conduct clearly probative
     of truthfulness or untruthfulness. 

58.  Evidence -- trial court did not abuse discretion in finding
     evidence of alleged substance abuse not probative of veracity.
     -- The supreme court could not say that the trial court had
     abused its discretion in finding that the evidence of the
     alleged substance abuse of a witness who had heard appellant
     Baldwin make inculpatory statements was not clearly probative
     of veracity and, as such, would have been unfairly prejudicial
     where there was no showing that substance abuse relates to
     truthfulness or untruthfulness; where it did not appear that
     appellant Baldwin was attempting to show that a witness was on
     drugs or intoxicated when he heard appellant make an
     incriminating statement; where the questions and statements of
     the trial court indicated that there was nothing in the record
     to show that substance abuse had affected the witness's
     perception of reality or his ability to tell the truth; where
     the trial court asked appellant Baldwin's attorney if he had
     a good-faith basis for questions about the witness's drug and
     alcohol use, and counsel never responded with any fact
     indicating that the alleged substance abuse went to
     truthfulness or untruthfulness; and where the trial court
     applied the proper tests for admissibility, which are: (1)
     whether the question is asked in good faith; (2) whether the
     probative value outweighs the possibility of unfair prejudice;
     (3) whether it relates to the witness's truthfulness.

59.  Trial -- closing argument -- no abuse of discretion in
     allowing prosecutor to compare cuts made by two knives. --
     Some leeway is given in closing remarks and counsel are free
     to argue every plausible inference that can be drawn from the
     testimony; nevertheless, closing arguments must be confined to
     questions in issue, the evidence introduced, and all
     reasonable inferences and deductions which can be drawn
     therefrom; the trial court has a wide latitude of discretion
     in controlling the arguments of counsel, and its rulings in
     that regard are not overturned in the absence of clear abuse;
     the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
     prosecutor in closing argument to compare the cuts made in a
     grapefruit by a knife with a serrated blade and another with
     a regular blade.

60.  Appeal & error -- general objection cannot avail on appeal
     unless there was no reason to admit evidence. -- A general
     objection that was overruled cannot avail upon appeal unless
     there was no reason whatsoever to admit the evidence, because
     the trial judge had no way of knowing what was in counsel's
     mind; although appellant Echols argued on appeal that the
     trial court's ruling on his objection to questioning a witness
     about whether appellant had told her why he carried a knife
     was in violation of Ark. R. Evid. 404(b), he did not advance
     such an argument to the trial court; it is settled that a
     party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal; even
     if it could be said that the trial court should have sustained
     the objection under 404(b) or for any other reason, the
     supreme court would not reverse because the alleged error
     could not have had a substantial effect on the rights of the
     defendant; here, there was already ample evidence that
     appellant Echols owned knives, and the witness did not testify
     that appellant used the knife, only that he carried it because
     he did not feel safe.

61.  Witnesses -- defendant in criminal case -- credibility becomes
     issue. -- When a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case,
     his credibility becomes an issue.

62.  Evidence -- impeachment -- prosecutor properly brought up
     altercation between appellant Echols and his father. -- The
     prosecutor's questions on cross-examination had independent
     relevance with respect to appellant Echols's medication, mood
     swings, knife collection, and quick return from Oregon;
     further, where appellant responded on cross-examination that
     he did not become violent toward others when he was off his
     medication, the prosecutor properly questioned him about an
     altercation he had with his father in Oregon to impeach his
     truthfulness; while there are matters that cannot be used
     against an accused solely because he is a defendant, these
     same matters can be used against an accused when he becomes a
     witness; a witness always puts his credibility at issue when
     he takes the stand; here, the question was logically related
     to matters appellant had brought up himself: his manic-
     depressive illness and his immediate return to Arkansas.

63.  Evidence -- rebuttal evidence -- testimony of State's rebuttal
     witness was direct response to unexpected testimony of another
     State's witness on cross-examination -- name of witness did
     not have to be disclosed. -- The trial court was correct in
     allowing a second pathologist to testify about the time of the
     victims' deaths where the State could not anticipate that the
     forensic pathologist it had first called would change his
     testimony and, on cross-examination, give testimony that, when
     coupled with other evidence, would imply that appellant Echols
     could not have committed the murders because he was at home
     asleep at the time of the victims' deaths; the second
     pathologist's testimony that it was impossible to estimate the
     time of death was in direct response to the unexpected
     estimate of time given by the first pathologist on cross-
     examination; because the testimony was in response to
     testimony elicited by the defense, it was genuine rebuttal
     evidence, and the name of the witness did not have to be
     disclosed.

64.  Evidence -- relevance -- review of ruling. -- A trial court
     has discretion in determining relevance, and its ruling on
     relevance will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.

65.  Evidence -- relevance -- trial court did not abuse discretion
     in admitting knife into evidence. -- When evidence on an issue
     is circumstantial, it is never irrelevant to put in evidence
     any circumstance that may make the proposition at issue more
     or less probable; where the State offered testimony that the
     knife it introduced was like the one appellant Echols carried,
     that it was found forty-seven feet behind Baldwin's residence,
     and that it could have caused the injuries, the evidence
     provided a link to the crimes and made appellants' identities
     more probable than without the evidence; the trial court did
     not abuse its discretion in admitting the knife into evidence.

66.  Evidence -- relevance -- trial court did not abuse discretion
     in admitting two sticks found near bodies of victims. -- Where
     the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into
     evidence two sticks found near the bodies of the victims where
     it stated that they were relevant and admissible because one
     of the sticks was jabbed down in the water and had a shirt
     belonging to one of the victims wrapped around it; the other
     was found near the bodies; one contained carving; and both had
     distinguishing marks because it appeared that someone had
     removed the bark; the trial court noted that the medical
     examiner testified that the victims' head injuries were
     consistent with blunt trauma similar to that which would have
     been caused by sticks like these; the reasons given by the
     trial court were sufficient to support its ruling on
     relevance. 

67.  Trial -- jury admonition was sufficient -- mistrial is extreme
     remedy. -- An admonition is sufficient to cure any possible
     prejudice that results from an inadvertent reference to a co-
     defendant's plea of guilty; appellant Echols made neither a
     showing nor a convincing argument that the trial court abused
     its discretion in finding sufficient its admonition to the
     jury to ignore a police officer's reference, elicited by
     defense counsel, to an accomplice's statement; a mistrial is
     an extreme remedy that should only be granted when justice
     cannot be served by continuing the trial.

68.  Jury instructions -- trial court correctly gave accomplice
     instruction -- supported by evidence. -- The trial court
     correctly gave the accomplice instruction because there was
     evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that both
     defendants said they had killed the three children; fibers
     from clothing found in both defendants' homes were similar to
     fibers found on the victims' clothing; the description of a
     person who was seen with appellant Echols the night of the
     murders, also fit the description of appellant Baldwin;
     appellants were best friends and spent two or three hours
     together a day; a knife similar to one Echols had owned was
     found near Baldwin's residence; sticks similar to the ones
     both had been seen carrying previously were found at the
     scene; two different types of knots were used to tie the
     victims; there were three victims, and there was sufficient
     evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the
     murders were not committed by one person; if there is some
     evidence to support an instruction, it is appropriate for a
     trial court to give it.

69.  Constitutional law -- death penalty is not cruel and unusual
     punishment. -- The supreme court adhered to its prior
     holdings, and those of the United States Supreme Court, that
     the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment;
     sentencing within the statutory limits is not cruel and
     unusual punishment.

70.  Constitutional law -- statutory-overlapping argument rejected.
     -- Adhering to its prior holdings, the supreme court rejected
     appellant Echols's argument that the elements of capital
     murder and first-degree murder entailed a statutory overlap.

71.  Criminal law -- death sentence -- Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603
     does not contain binding instruction -- no error in denying
     motion to declare statute unconstitutional. -- Arkansas Code
     Annotated  5-4-603 does not require a mandatory death
     sentence but instead provides specified criteria that must be
     fully satisfied before the death sentence can be imposed; the
     wording of Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603 and Arkansas case law
     applying the statute make it clear that the statute does not
     contain a binding instruction; consequently, the trial court
     did not err in denying appellant Echols's motion to declare
     Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603 unconstitutional.

72.  Constitutional law -- statutory "especially cruel or depraved"
     aggravating circumstance not void for vagueness. -- The trial
     court correctly denied appellant Echols's motion to declare
     unconstitutionally vague Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-604(8), which
     concerns the aggravating circumstance of committing capital
     murder in "an especially cruel or depraved manner"; the
     statute included language substantially similar, if not
     identical, to language upheld as constitutional by the United
     States Supreme Court.
73.  Constitutional law -- statutory "especially cruel or depraved"
     aggravating circumstance not unconstitutional as applied to
     appellant Echols. -- The supreme court held that Ark. Code
     Ann.  5-4-604(8) was not unconstitutional as applied to
     appellant Echols where there was substantial evidence to
     support the jury's determination that the murders were
     committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner.

74.  Criminal law -- supreme court no longer conducts
     proportionality reviews of death sentences no longer
     conducted. -- The supreme court no longer conducts
     proportionality reviews of death sentences because comparative
     proportionality review is not constitutionally mandated in
     every case in which the death sentence is imposed; the
     bifurcated proceeding in which the jury is provided with
     information on aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
     with standards in the use of that information provides a
     statutory check on arbitrariness; additionally, appellate
     review includes a review of the aggravating and mitigating
     circumstances presented to the jury and a harmless-error
     review of the jury's findings.

75.  Attorney & client -- no showing that appellant was prejudiced
     by State's failure to pay his attorney's fees by time
     appellate brief was filed. -- Although the supreme court could
     have summarily dismissed, for failure to cite authority or
     make a convincing argument, appellant Echols's contention that
     the State's failure to pay his attorneys by the time the
     appellate brief was filed violated his right to counsel, due
     process, and equal protection, the court reached the merits
     because the penalty was death; the supreme court will not
     reverse a conviction on the basis of the constitutional
     inadequacy of the attorney's fee absent a showing that the
     defendant was prejudiced by the inadequacy of the fee; here,
     there was no showing that appellant was prejudiced in any
     manner by the State's failure to pay his attorneys' fees by
     the time he filed his appellate brief.

76.  Appeal & error -- cumulative-error argument not preserved --
     plain-error rule not employed. -- Although both appellants
     asserted that the trial court committed cumulative reversible
     error, neither preserved a cumulative-error argument because
     neither argued the issue to the trial court; even under Ark.
     Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the supreme court does not employ the
     plain-error rule.

77.  Jury -- impartiality -- deference to trial court -- jurors'
     assurances of objectivity supported refusal to grant mistrial.
     -- In matters involving impartiality of jurors, the supreme
     court has consistently deferred to the trial court's
     opportunity to observe jurors and gauge their answers in
     determining whether their impartiality was affected; when the
     record reflects, as it did here, that the trial court received
     assurance from jurors that they could maintain their
     objectivity, the supreme court has held that refusal to grant
     a mistrial rests on solid footing; the trial court did not
     abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the extreme remedy
     of a mistrial.

78.  Appeal & error -- trial court erred in discussing reported
     threats with foreman and juror out of presence of counsel --
     no prejudice resulted. -- The trial court committed error in
     initially discussing reported threats with the jury foreman
     and a juror out of the presence of counsel, but, where the
     trial court subsequently notified counsel that the discussions
     had taken place and then had counsel present when the jurors
     were questioned, there was no prejudice.

79.  Appeal & error -- argument raised for first time on appeal not
     considered -- appellant Baldwin received requested relief. --
     Where appellant Baldwin contended that the trial court should
     have denied the State a continuance for completion of
     laboratory testing of a blood-spotted necklace because the
     prosecutor did not file an affidavit as required by Ark. Code
     Ann.  16-63-402(a), the supreme court noted that the argument
     was not made to the trial court and that it would not consider
     it for the first time on appeal; moreover, appellant Baldwin
     was allowed to poll the jury, thus receiving the relief he
     requested, and, in any event, he did not suffer prejudice
     because the necklace and evidence about the blood was not put
     before the jury.

80.  Criminal procedure -- prosecutorial subpoena power discussed -
     - appellant Baldwin made no showing of abuse. -- The
     prosecutor's subpoena power granted under Ark. Code Ann.  16-
     43-212 was passed by the General Assembly to implement the
     power of prosecutors to bring criminal charges by information;
     it was designed to take the place of questioning by a grand
     jury; the statute's emergency clause states that it was
     enacted to enable prosecutors to "properly prepare criminal
     cases"; the prosecutor may use the subpoena power to
     investigate and prepare for trial as long as the power is not
     abused; the supreme court will reverse a case in which a
     prosecutor abuses the subpoena power; appellant Baldwin made
     no showing of abuse where all he proved was that the
     prosecutor subpoenaed three witnesses who did not testify at
     trial and subpoenaed his school records; the trial court's
     finding that the subpoenas were for investigation and
     preparation and did not amount to an abuse of the power was
     not in error.

81.  Appeal & error -- hearing argument made for first time on
     appeal -- appellant not entitled to new trial because he did
     not get hearing. -- Appellant Baldwin advanced his new-trial
     argument that the trial court was required to hold a hearing
     under Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.22 for the first time on appeal, and
     a party cannot raise an argument for the first time on appeal;
     even had it been argued, appellant would not be entitled to a
     new trial solely because he did not get a hearing.

82.  Courts -- disqualification -- within trial court's discretion
     -- appellant showed neither bias nor prejudice. -- The
     decision to disqualify is within the trial court's discretion,
     and the supreme court will not reverse the exercise of that
     discretion without a showing of abuse; an abuse of discretion
     can be shown by proving bias or prejudice, but appellant
     Baldwin showed neither bias nor prejudice.


     Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court; David Burnett, Judge;
affirmed.
     Val P. Price and W. Scott Davidson, for appellant Damien Wayne
Echols.
     Ford & Wadley, by: Paul N. Ford and George R. Wadley, Jr., for
appellant Charles Jason Baldwin.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., and Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice.
     Damien Echols and Jason Baldwin were convicted of the capital
murders of Michael Moore, Christopher Byers, and Steve Branch.  For
each of the capital murders, appellant Echols was sentenced to
death, and appellant Baldwin was sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.  Both appellants appeal from their convictions.
Echols separately appeals the death sentences imposed upon him.  We
affirm in full the judgments of conviction.
     Michael, Christopher, and Steve were eight years old, in the
second grade, in the same Cub Scout troop, and often played
together in their West Memphis neighborhood.  On the afternoon of
May 5, 1993, after school, Michael and Steve were riding their
bicycles while Chris was skateboarding.  Deborah O'Tinger saw the
three boys walking through her yard between 5:45 and 6:00 that
afternoon.  Her recollection was that they were pushing a bicycle. 
At about 6:00 p.m., Dana Moore, Michael's mother, saw the three
boys together.  At that time Michael was riding his bicycle. 
Between 6:30 and 6:45 Brian Woody saw four boys going into some
woods known as the Robin Hood woods.  He noticed that two of the
boys were pushing bicycles, one had a skateboard, and a fourth one
was just walking behind them.  Neither Michael, Christopher, nor
Steve returned to their homes.  Their parents called the police,
and a search was begun.
     The next morning, members of the Crittenden County Search and
Rescue Unit discovered a tennis shoe floating in a ditch just north
of Ten Mile Bayou.  The Robin Hood woods drain into Ten Mile Bayou,
and the members of the search unit knew the boys were last seen in
that area.  Detective Mike Allen walked along the ditch bank to the
place where the tennis shoe had been found.  He noticed that one
area of the ditch bank was cleared of leaves, while the rest of the
bank was covered with leaves and sticks.  He described the cleared
area on the bank as being "slick," but having "scuffs" in the
cleared-off area.  He got into the water, reached down to get the
shoe, and felt Michael Moore's body.  The corpses of Christopher
Byers and Steve Branch were subsequently found about twenty-five
feet downstream.  Policeman John Moore, who was also there, said
there was blood in the water, but none on the bank.  Detective Bryn
Ridge was also present and helped recover the boys' bodies.  He
collected the victims' clothes, three tennis shoes, and a Cub Scout
cap that was floating in the water.  He found a stick stuck in the
mud that had one of the boy's shirts wrapped around the end that
was stuck down in the mud.  He dislodged another stick as he was
removing the corpse of Michael Moore.      
     All three corpses had their right hands tied to their right
feet, and their left hands tied to their left feet.  Black shoe
laces and white shoe laces were used as ligatures.  Michael Moore's
body had wounds to the neck, chest, and abdominal regions that
appeared to have been caused by a serrated knife.  There were
abrasions over his scalp that could have been caused by a stick.
Dr. Frank Peretti, a State medical examiner, testified that there
was bruising and discoloring comparable to that frequently seen in
children who are forced to perform oral sex.  He testified that
there were defensive wounds to the hands and arms.  Moore's anal
orifice was dilated, and the rectal mucosa was reddened.  Dr.
Peretti testified this injury could have come from an object being
placed in the anus.  Finally, Dr. Peretti testified that there was
evidence that Moore was still alive when he was in the water, as
there was evidence of drowning.
     Steve Branch's corpse had head injuries, chest injuries,
genital-anal injuries, lower extremity injuries, upper extremity
injuries, and back injuries.  The body had multiple, irregular,
gouging wounds, which indicated that he was moving when he was
stabbed.  The anus was dilated.  Penile injuries indicated that
oral sex had been performed on him.  There was also evidence that
he, too, had drowned.
     Christopher Byers's corpse also had injuries indicating that
he had been forced to perform oral sex.  His head had scratches,
abrasions, and a punched-out area on the skin, and one eyelid had
a contusion.  The back of the neck had a scrape.  The inner thighs
had diagonal cuts on them.  The back of the skull had been struck
with a stick-like, broomstick-size, object.  The skin of the penis
had been removed, and the scrotal sac and testes were missing. 
There were cuts around the anus, and the hemorrhaging from those
cuts indicated he was still alive when they were made.  Many of the
cuts were made with a serrated blade knife.  Byers did not drown;
he bled to death.  
     The boys' bicycles were found nearby.    
     On May 10, four days after the bodies were found, the police
had not solved the cases.  When Detective Bryn Ridge questioned
Echols, he asked him how he thought the three victims died. 
Ridge's description of Echols's answer is abstracted as follows:
     He stated that the boys probably died of mutilation, some guy
     had cut the bodies up, heard that they were in the water, they
     may have drowned.  He said at least one was cut up more than
     the others.  Purpose of the killing may have been to scare
     someone.  He believed that it was only one person for fear of
     squealing by another involved. 
At the time Echols made the statement, there was no public
knowledge that one of the children had been mutilated more severely
than the others.  
     On June 3, or almost one month after the murders, Detective
Mike Allen asked Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr., about the murders. 
Misskelley was not a suspect at the time, but Echols was, and it
was thought that Misskelley might give some valuable information
about Echols.  Detective Allen had been told all three engaged in
cult-like activities.  Misskelley made two statements to the
detective that implicated Echols and Baldwin, as well as himself. 
The statements can be found in Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449,
459-61, 915 S.W.2d 702, 707-08 (1996). 
     Misskelley, age seventeen, Echols, age nineteen, and Baldwin,
age sixteen, were jointly charged with the capital murders of
Moore, Byers, and Branch.  Misskelley moved for a severance from
Echols and Baldwin, and the trial court granted the severance. 
Misskelley was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in the
death of Michael Moore, and second-degree murder in the deaths of
Steve Branch and Christopher Byers.  The judgments of conviction
were affirmed.  Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702
(1996).  Appellants Echols and Baldwin were jointly tried in this
case.  In the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the jury found
both Echols and Baldwin guilty of the capital murders of all three
victims.  In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed death
as the punishment for Echols and fixed life imprisonment without
parole as the punishment for Baldwin.  The trial court entered
judgments of conviction that imposed the sentences set by the jury. 
     Echols's and Baldwin's arguments together contain forty-four
points of appeal, and some of those points have subpoints.  Some of
the points of appeal are made jointly by both appellants, but many
are individual arguments.  For clarity, we group the arguments into
seven general categories.
              Sufficiency of the Evidence Arguments
     Echols questions the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
him of the three capital murders.  In one of his arguments, he
contends that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient, it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis, and cites as authority Traylor
v. State, 304 Ark. 174,