Title: John R. Consedine v. Portville Central School District

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 30  
John R. Consedine, 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Portville Central School District 
et al., 
            Appellants.
Hugh M. Russ III, for appellants.
John F. Kershko, for respondent.
New York State School Boards Association, Inc., amicus
curiae.
JONES, J.:
This appeal requires us to determine:  (1) whether a
school district can waive its statutory right to discharge a
probationary school administrator at any time during the three-
year probationary term (see Education Law § 3012 [1] [b]) by
entering into a durational, three-year employment contract; and
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(2) if so, whether defendant Portville Central School District in
fact waived that statutory right by executing the contract at
issue here.  We conclude that the first question should be
answered in the affirmative, but hold, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, that defendant school district did
not waive its statutory right under section 3012 (1) (b).
In 2002, defendant school district created a new
assistant principal position and appointed plaintiff, a tenured
teacher in another school district, to the post for a
probationary period of three years (January 1, 2003 through
December 31, 2005).  In December 2002, plaintiff and defendant
school district executed an employment contract, which, in
relevant part, stated, “[t]he District shall pay [plaintiff] for
his services an annual salary of $52,000 for the period of
January 1, 2003 through December 31, 200[5].”  In accordance with
the foregoing, plaintiff began working as an assistant principal
within the school district.  Approximately six months later (in
July 2003), defendant school district, citing budget constraints,
eliminated plaintiff’s assistant principal position and advised
him that he would not be working in that capacity in the fall. 
After serving a notice of claim, plaintiff commenced
this breach of contract action against defendants seeking
damages.  Motion practice not relevant to resolution of this
appeal ensued.  After defendants answered, plaintiff moved (1)
for summary judgment on his cause of action, (2) to dismiss
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defendants’ defenses and (3) for sanctions.  Defendants likewise
moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint.  Supreme
Court denied the motions and ruled that a trial must be held to
determine the intent of the parties.
After a bench trial, Supreme Court ruled that the
employment contract was unambiguous, rendered judgment in
plaintiff’s favor and awarded him damages.  The court stated, “as
a matter of law, . . . the employment agreement between the
parties is a contract for a three year period of employment
beginning January 1, 2003 and ending on December 31, 2005.” 
Further, the court stated, “notwithstanding Education Law § 3012,
nothing prevented the [B]oard from extending plaintiff a three
year contract . . . [A] school district is free to offer an
administrator a three year probationary contract which cannot be
terminated until the three years is over, and that is what
occurred here.”  Supreme Court alternatively ruled that “[e]ven
if the court could not make this determination as a matter of
law, the verdict would be the same” because “the extrinsic
evidence here demonstrates that a three year period was
intended.”  The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 
This Court granted defendants leave to appeal, and we now
reverse.
On appeal to this Court, defendants contend that
plaintiff cannot maintain a breach of contract claim because
Education Law § 3012 (1) (b) expressly prohibits a school
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1 Once the probationary term has expired, the superintendent
of schools shall make a written report recommending appointees
found to be competent, efficient and satisfactory for appointment
on tenure (see Education Law § 3012 [2]).  Appointees granted
tenure cannot be removed except for cause after a hearing
conducted pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a.
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district from entering a contract guaranteeing a non-tenured
administrator employment for a certain duration.  Defendants
further argue that even if no statutory prohibition existed, the
contract at issue does not guarantee plaintiff employment for a
set duration.  In their view, the contract merely established the
terms and conditions of plaintiff’s probationary appointment. 
Countering defendants, plaintiff argues, in spite of the
elimination of his position due to budget constraints, that
defendant school district must pay plaintiff’s annual salary for
the specified three year period because the contract, by its
plain terms, clearly and unambiguously accords plaintiff the
right to such payments.
The current version of Education Law § 3012 (1) (b),
enacted in 1975, provides:
“Principals, administrators, supervisors and
all other members of the supervising staff of
school districts . . . shall be appointed by
the board of education . . . upon the
recommendation of the superintendent of
schools for a probationary period of three
years.1  The service of a person appointed to
any of such positions may be discontinued at
any time during the probationary period on
the recommendation of the superintendent of
schools, by a majority vote of the board of
education.”
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In construing a statute, 
“[t]he primary consideration of courts . . .
is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature.  Of course, the
words of the statute are the best evidence of
the Legislature's intent.  As a general rule,
unambiguous language of a statute is alone
determinative.  Nevertheless, the legislative
history of an enactment may also be relevant
and is not to be ignored, even if words be
clear.  When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no rule of
law which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on superficial examination. 
Pertinent also are the history of the times,
the circumstances surrounding the statute's
passage, and . . . attempted amendments. 
Varying concerns may bear on the weight to be
given legislative history, but they do not
justify abandoning this Court's long
tradition of using all available interpretive
tools to ascertain the meaning of a statute”
(Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463-464 [2000] [internal
citations and quotation marks omitted]; see also Majewski v
Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]).
Although the language of Education Law § 3012 (1) (b)
plainly states that the service of an appointed school
administrator may be discontinued by a board of education at any
time during his or her probationary period, it does not, as
defendants argue, expressly prohibit a board of education from
entering into a durational, three-year employment contract with a
probationary school administrator.  Nor does the legislative
history of section 3012 (1) (b) clearly indicate whether the
Legislature intended to allow boards of education to (1) enter
into durational contracts during the three-year probationary term
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or (2) waive their statutory right to discontinue a probationary
appointee’s service during the probationary term for any reason
or no reason.
 The legislative history of Education Law § 3012 (1)
(b) primarily addresses whether school principals, administrators
and supervisory personnel should have tenure.  Prior to 1971,
teachers, principals and other supervisors had the same tenure
rights.  Between 1971 and 1975, the Legislature, in an attempt to
replace the tenure system, amended the statute three times (see L
1971, ch 116 [boards of education no longer authorized to grant
tenure to school administrators]; L 1972, ch 953, § 3 [boards of
education have discretion to enter into employment contracts
“with any principal, supervisor, or member of the supervising
staff for a period of from one to five years”]; L 1974, ch 952
[boards of education required to enter into employment contracts
with administrative and supervisory personnel (other than
superintendents) for one to three years for the first three years
of employment in the position and from three to five years
thereafter]).  
In 1975, Education Law § 3012 (1) (b) was amended to
its current version (see L 1975, ch 468).  These amendments
marked the removal of the language relating to employment
contracts (id. at § 3) and reinstated a tenure-based system. 
Beyond the general objective of restoring tenure, there is
nothing (such as a memorandum from an assembly or senate sponsor)
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to indicate any other legislative purpose of these amendments
(see Bill Jacket, L 1975, ch 468).  Stated differently, from the
legislative history of the 1975 amendments, we cannot glean a
clear legislative intent to prohibit school boards and districts
from entering durational employment contracts with non-tenured,
probationary school administrators or supervisors.
After the Legislature adopted the 1975 amendments, the
Commissioner of Education issued several decisions stating that
Education Law § 3012 (1) (b)–-and statutes with identical
language pertaining to city school districts–-only authorized
school boards and districts to contract for terms of employment,
not employment for a specific duration (see Matter of Charland,
32 Ed Dept Rept 291, 294 [1992]; Matter of Savino, 18 Ed Dept
Rept 485 [1979]; Matter of Hoffman, 18 Ed Dept Rept 466, 468
[1979]).  However, we do not view the Commissioner’s decisions 
as persuasive because (1) the text and legislative history of
section 3012 (1) (b) do not clearly support the Commissioner’s
conclusions and (2) they either do not reference and/or are
inconsistent with this Court’s relevant precedent construing
other Education Law provisions (see e.g., Matter of Cohoes City
School Dist. v Cohoes Teacher Assn., 40 NY2d 774 [1976]; Matter
of Candor Central School Dist. v Candor Teachers Assoc., 42 NY2d
266 [1977]).
In Cohoes, we stated that “[w]hile a [school] board may
legally agree to . . . forego its [statutory] right to discharge
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a probationary teacher during the period of probation, under the
Education Law a board cannot surrender its authority to terminate
the employment of a nontenured teacher at the end of the
probationary period” (40 NY2d at 777 [emphasis added]; see also
Candor, 42 NY2d at 272).  Although Cohoes resolved a question
involving tenure rights of a teacher in the context of collective
bargaining, there are important similarities between the statutes
involved in Cohoes and the statute relied upon by defendants in
this case.  Specifically, in Cohoes we made the above-quoted
statement regarding a board’s ability to forego its statutory
discharge rights despite statutory provisions relating to teacher
tenure rights stating that “[t]he service of a person appointed
to any of such positions may be discontinued at any time during
such probationary period” (see Education Law §§ 2509 [applicable
to small city school districts], 2573 [applicable to large city
school districts] and 3012 (1) (a) [applicable to non-city school
districts]).  Education Law § 3012 (1) (b)–-the statutory
provision at issue here–-contains the very same operative
language as the teacher tenure statutes at issue in Cohoes.
Further, Cohoes implicitly holds that a school board or
district may enter into a private employment contract with a
teachers’ union without express statutory authority for such
action.  This position is not only consistent with our precedent
(see Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 3 of Town of
Huntington v Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 NY2d 122, 129
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[1973] [Court rejected school board's argument “that, absent a
statutory provision expressly authorizing a school board to
provide for a particular term or condition of employment, it is
legally prohibited from doing so”), it is consistent with common
sense:  in performing their normal administrative and managerial
functions, school boards and districts necessarily enter into
different types of contracts that are not expressly authorized by
statute.
Because the enforcement of a contract term negotiated
by a school district and an individual, as opposed to a union, is
at issue, the question we need to resolve is whether the school
district could agree not to exercise its statutory right to
terminate a school administrator during the probationary period. 
Based on the foregoing discussion of the statutory text and
legislative history of Education Law § 3012 (1) (b), as well as
Cohoes, there is no plain and clear restriction on a school
district preventing it from entering such an agreement.  Thus, we
hold that a school district can waive its statutory right to
discharge a probationary school administrator at any time during
the three-year probationary term.  Absent an express waiver of
such right, the school district retains the right.  We now
consider whether the contract at issue established a waiver of
defendant school district’s rights under section 3012 (1) (b).
“[W]hen parties set down their [contract] in a clear,
complete document, their writing should . . . be enforced
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according to its terms” (Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison
Realty Co., 1 NY3d 470, 475 [2004], quoting W.W.W. Assoc. v
Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]).  A contract should be
read as a whole to ensure that undue emphasis is not placed upon
particular words and phrases (see South Rd. Assoc., LLC v
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 4 NY3d 272, 277 [2005], citing
Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co. v Entech, Inc., 100 NY2d 352, 358
[2003]).  Courts “may not by construction add or excise terms,
nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new
contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the
writing” (Vermont Teddy Bear, 1 NY3d at 475, quoting Reiss v
Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195, 199 [2001]).  “Whether
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law and extrinsic
evidence may not be considered unless the document itself is
ambiguous” (South Rd. Assoc., 4 NY3d at 278, citing Greenfield v
Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]).
The contract at issue provides:  “The District shall
pay the Assistant Principal for his services at an annual salary
of $52,000, for the period of January 1, 2003 through December
31, 200[5].”  Unlike the case at bar, in a private employment
contract context where the strictures of the Education Law (or
any other statutory scheme providing for probationary periods
and/or tenure rights) are not present, this language could
arguably be construed as creating a contract with a specific
duration.  Here, however, the question whether the language
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2 Because we hold that no waiver occurred here, we express
no view on what impact, if any, a school district’s conscious and
express waiver of its Education Law § 3012 (1) (b) rights would
have on an employee’s rights where the district abolished the
employee’s position for economic reasons.
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amounts to a waiver of rights must be determined in light of the
public policy concerns attending the employment of school
administrators and supervisors and a school district’s statutory
right to discontinue a probationary administrator’s service at
any time for any or no reason during the probationary period. 
Specifically, where, as here, public policy concerns are
implicated, a school district will not be deemed to have waived
its statutory rights under the Education Law without an explicit
agreement between the parties or compelling evidence that the
school district made a conscious decision to do so (see Buffalo
Police Benevolent Association v City of Buffalo, 4 NY3d 660, 663-
664 [2005]).
Applying the foregoing, we hold that the operative
contractual language is simply too equivocal to establish that
defendant school district consciously and expressly agreed to
waive its statutory right under Education Law § 3012 (1) (b).  
Moreover, the trial testimony did not yield compelling evidence
that such a waiver was contemplated by the parties.2
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed.
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed.  Opinion by
Judge Jones.  Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.
Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided April 7, 2009