Title: Julie A. Kenyon v. Ralph C. Kenyon

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 147 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3041 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Julie A. Kenyon,  
          Joint-Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ralph C. Kenyon,  
          Joint-Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 844, 673 N.W.2d 410 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 15, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Moria Krueger   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the joint-petitioner-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief by Earl H. Munson and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Earl H. Munson, Jr. 
 
For the joint-petitioner-respondent there was a brief (in 
the court of appeals) by Charles Schutze and Schutze Law Office, 
Sun Prairie, and oral argument by Charles J. Schutze. 
 
 
2004 WI 147 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3041  
(L.C. No. 
91 FA 2061) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Julie A. Kenyon,  
 
          Joint-Petitioner-Appellant- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ralph C. Kenyon,  
 
          Joint-Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 15, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals decision, Kenyon v. Kenyon, No. 02-3041, 
unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003), which 
affirmed an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Moria 
Krueger, Judge, that denied Julie Kenyon's motion to increase a 
maintenance award.   
¶2 
We hold that for purposes of evaluating a substantial 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
financial 
circumstances 
during 
a 
maintenance modification proceeding, the appropriate comparison 
No. 
02-3041   
 
2 
 
is to the set of facts that existed at the time of the most 
recent maintenance order, whether that is the original divorce 
judgment or a previous modification order.  At the hearing, the 
circuit court should adhere to the findings of fact made in the 
previous proceeding and may not retry the issues decided in that 
proceeding.  It should compare the facts regarding the parties' 
current financial status with those surrounding the previous 
order in determining whether the movant has established the 
requisite substantial change in circumstances so as to warrant 
modification of the maintenance award.  Further, once a party 
has demonstrated the requisite substantial change in financial 
circumstances, the circuit court is not bound by either issue 
preclusion or claim preclusion to reinstate the amount of 
maintenance established in the original judgment of divorce, 
especially when the judgment of divorce has been previously 
revised by an order modifying maintenance payments.   
¶3 
However, we conclude that the circuit court in this 
case applied the wrong legal standard in rendering its decision 
because 
it 
focused 
chiefly 
on 
Julie 
Kenyon's 
need 
for 
maintenance at her present standard of living and whether it 
would be inequitable to force Ralph Kenyon to pay additional 
maintenance for an indefinite period.  Last term, in Rohde-
Giovanni v. Baumgart, 2004 WI 27, ¶31, 269 Wis. 2d 598, 676 
N.W.2d 452, we clarified that once a substantial change in the 
parties' financial circumstances is demonstrated, the circuit 
court must consider the dual maintenance objectives of support 
and fairness when modifying a maintenance award.  Here, in 
No. 
02-3041   
 
3 
 
conformity with the controlling precedent at the time, the 
circuit court did not consider the fairness objective in 
relation to both parties.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand for a new hearing under the 
appropriate standard.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The facts are undisputed.  Ralph and Julie Kenyon were 
married on March 25, 1977.  Both parties had been previously 
married and divorced.  The Kenyons received a judgment of 
divorce on June 30, 1993.  The divorce decree awarded an equal 
division of property.  Mr. Kenyon was awarded the family 
residence and was ordered to make the mortgage payment and other 
related payments for the residence.  In addition, Mr. Kenyon was 
ordered to obtain refinancing and compensate Ms. Kenyon $14,690 
for her interest in the marital estate.  The circuit court also 
ordered maintenance of an indefinite term to be paid by Mr. 
Kenyon in the amount of $866.66 per month.  In its findings of 
fact, the circuit court noted that Ms. Kenyon possessed extreme 
physical disabilities and that there was "no basis upon which to 
find an earning capacity."  The court noted that she was 
unemployed but was attending a technical school in pursuit of a 
degree in graphic arts.  Thus, the circuit court ordered a 
mandatory 
review 
"as 
to 
the 
amount 
and 
continuation 
of 
maintenance" in September 1995, stating "[i]t is anticipated by 
the Court that maintenance shall be paid until approximately the 
end of summer, 1995, when it is expected that Ms. Kenyon will 
have completed school and have secured employment."    
No. 
02-3041   
 
4 
 
¶5 
A 
maintenance 
modification 
hearing 
was 
held 
on 
November 21, 1995.  While the circuit court noted that Ms. 
Kenyon did not complete school and was not self-supporting as 
hoped, it nevertheless found a change in circumstances in that 
she was now steadily employed on a part-time basis making floral 
arrangements.  The circuit court found that Ms. Kenyon received 
steady income from Social Security and her part-time job.  
Specifically, the court found that Ms. Kenyon was receiving $448 
per month in disability payments from Social Security and was 
earning $563 per month as a result of her part-time job, which 
she worked 20 hours per week.  Thus, the circuit court found 
"that a reduction in maintenance is appropriate and that the 
reduction should be such that the wife has some incentive to 
increase her earned income from whatever sources she is 
capable."  The circuit court therefore ordered that maintenance 
be reduced by $500 a month and that Mr. Kenyon pay maintenance 
at a rate of $366 a month.   
¶6 
On April 11, 2002, Ms. Kenyon filed a motion to 
increase maintenance.  In her motion, she stated that her 
medical condition had substantially deteriorated to such an 
extent that she was "totally incapacitated and unemployable by 
any definition."  A hearing on the motion was held on July 18, 
2002.  While the circuit court found a substantial change in 
circumstances because Ms. Kenyon was no longer able to work due 
to her disability, the court nevertheless concluded that 
modification of the maintenance award was not warranted.  The 
circuit court concluded that Ms. Kenyon was able to live a very 
No. 
02-3041   
 
5 
 
modest lifestyle within her limited means and therefore did not 
need an increase in maintenance.  The circuit court also 
expressed its opinion that Ms. Kenyon needed to start trying to 
generate money and stated that it had never intended for Mr. 
Kenyon to be her primary source of income for the rest of her 
life.    
¶7 
Thus, on August 11, 2002, the circuit court entered an 
order denying Ms. Kenyon's motion to increase maintenance.  The 
court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion.  Kenyon, No. 02-3041, 
unpublished slip op. at 3.   
¶8 
On review before this court, Ms. Kenyon, relying on 
Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 441, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960), 
contends that the circuit court was required, as a matter of 
law, to reinstate the amount of maintenance established in the 
original divorce decree.  She argues that when parties' 
financial circumstances are essentially the same as those at the 
time of the original divorce decree, the original maintenance 
order 
controls 
by 
virtue 
of 
issue 
preclusion 
or 
claim 
preclusion.  Thus, Ms. Kenyon asserts that the original judgment 
of divorce is the baseline from which all changed circumstances 
must be evaluated and that because the parties' financial 
circumstances now are essentially the same as they were at the 
time of divorce, she is automatically entitled to the level of 
maintenance established by the divorce decree.  Further, Ms. 
Kenyon argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion because its order forces her to survive at a 
No. 
02-3041   
 
6 
 
subsistence level while allowing Mr. Kenyon to preserve the 
marital standard of living, contrary to LaRocque v. LaRocque, 
139 Wis. 2d 23, 35, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).  Ms. Kenyon states 
that a maintenance modification decision should not be based on 
whether the payee is able to live parsimoniously on a modest 
level of income.   
¶9 
In contrast, Mr. Kenyon argues that the circuit court 
was not obligated, as a matter of law, to restore maintenance to 
the level established in the divorce decree because the standard 
for reviewing post-judgment maintenance is not the same as the 
standard used to derive the initial award of maintenance.  
According 
to 
Mr. 
Kenyon, 
under 
Johnson 
v. 
Johnson, 
217 
Wis. 2d 124, 127-28, 576 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998), the 
LaRocque "fairness" standard does not apply to modification 
decisions.1  Further, Mr. Kenyon argues that although there was a 
change in circumstances in that Ms. Kenyon was no longer able to 
work, this change did not warrant an increase in maintenance 
because it did not affect her income level, due to the fact that 
she was able to decrease her expenses.  Mr. Kenyon contends that 
this court should not reverse the circuit court's decision 
because the result in this case complied with the applicable law 
and is one at which a reasonable court could arrive.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
1 Shortly after briefing was completed, this court decided 
Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgart, 2004 WI 27, ¶31, 269 Wis. 2d 598, 
676 N.W.2d 452, which abrogated the portion of Johnson v. 
Johnson, 217 Wis. 2d 124, 576 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998), upon 
which Mr. Kenyon relied in his brief.   
No. 
02-3041   
 
7 
 
¶10 A circuit court decision to modify maintenance is 
reviewed under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶17.  "A circuit court engages 
in an erroneous exercise of discretion when it fails to consider 
relevant factors, bases its award on factual errors, makes an 
error of law, or grants an excessive or inadequate award."  Id., 
¶18.  However, when reviewing a circuit court's exercise of 
discretion, we review issues of law de novo.  Id., ¶19.   
¶11 Whether claim preclusion applies to a particular 
factual scenario is a question of law subject to de novo review 
by this court.  N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 
551, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995).  In addition, the threshold inquiry 
in determining the applicability of issue preclusion is whether 
there is an identity of issues in the two actions.  State v. 
Miller, 2004 WI App 117, ¶20, ___Wis. 2d ___, 683 N.W.2d 485.  
This presents a question of law because it requires the 
application of a legal standard to undisputed facts.  Id. 
(citing Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 594 
N.W.2d 370 (1999)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
¶12 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (2001-02),2 a circuit 
court may, as part of any judgment of divorce, order either 
party to pay maintenance for a limited or indefinite time after 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2000-01 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
02-3041   
 
8 
 
considering the applicable statutory factors.3  Following a 
judgment of divorce, a circuit court may "revise and alter such 
                                                 
3 The factors a circuit court must consider in setting a 
maintenance award are:   
(1) The length of the marriage.  
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the 
parties.  
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255.  
(4) The educational level of each party at the time 
of marriage and at the time the action is commenced.  
(5) The 
earning 
capacity 
of 
the 
party 
seeking 
maintenance, 
including 
educational 
background, 
training, employment skills, work experience, length 
of 
absence 
from 
the 
job 
market, 
custodial 
responsibilities for children and the time and expense 
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party to find appropriate employment.   
(6) The 
feasibility 
that 
the 
party 
seeking 
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard 
of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during 
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary 
to achieve this goal.   
(7) The tax consequences to each party.   
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before 
or during the marriage, according to the terms of 
which 
one 
party 
has 
made 
financial 
or 
service 
contributions to the other with the expectation of 
reciprocation or other compensation in the future, 
where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties before or during the 
marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties.   
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, 
training or increased earning power of the other.   
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant.  
No. 
02-3041   
 
9 
 
judgment 
or 
order 
respecting 
the 
amount 
of 
such 
maintenance . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a).  However, "[i]n 
order 
to 
modify 
a 
maintenance 
award, 
the 
party 
seeking 
modification must demonstrate that there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances warranting the proposed modification."  
Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶30.  Yet, "[a]s a general 
rule, maintenance is always subject to modification upon a 
showing of the requisite change in circumstances."  Nichols v. 
Nichols, 162 Wis. 2d 96, 103, 469 N.W.2d 619 (1991).   
¶13 The "change in circumstances regarding the need for 
maintenance payments must relate to a change in the financial 
circumstances of the parties."  Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 
Wis. 2d 188, 195, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983).  When considering a 
request for maintenance modification under § 767.32(1)(a), the 
circuit court must reconsider the factors used to arrive at the 
initial maintenance award under § 767.26.  Poindexter v. 
Poindexter, 142 Wis. 2d 517, 531, 419 N.W.2d 223 (1988).  See 
also Vander Perren v. Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d 219, 230, 313 
N.W.2d 813 (1982)(finding an order terminating maintenance was 
arbitrary because the circuit court did not consider the factors 
listed in § 767.26).   
¶14 Ms. Kenyon argues the circuit court was required to 
compare the parties' financial circumstances at the time of the 
modification hearing to those in existence at the time of the 
divorce and was obligated, under either the doctrine of issue 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 767.26.  
No. 
02-3041   
 
10 
 
preclusion 
or 
claim 
preclusion, 
to 
provide 
an 
award 
of 
maintenance equal to that established in the original divorce 
judgment.  According to Ms. Kenyon, such a result is required 
because the parties' financial circumstances are now the same as 
they were at the time of the original divorce proceeding and the 
divorce judgment controls the amount of maintenance under these 
circumstances.  We reject this argument for several reasons.   
¶15 First, we decline to accept the premise that the 
appropriate point for factual comparison regarding the parties' 
financial circumstances at the time of a second maintenance 
modification hearing is the original divorce proceeding.  In 
Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶¶33-34, we recognized that 
during a modification proceeding following a judgment of 
divorce, the circuit court must compare the facts as they 
existed at the time of the divorce with the current facts in 
light of the substantial change in circumstances.  However, the 
present case is distinguishable from Rohde-Giovanni in that here 
the circuit court had, prior to the current motion for 
maintenance modification, previously entered an order modifying 
the maintenance award established in the divorce judgment.   
¶16 When the circuit court has previously entered an order 
modifying maintenance, it would be inappropriate to use the 
facts surrounding the original divorce judgment as a baseline 
for an evaluation of any subsequent substantial change in the 
parties' circumstances because the circuit court has already 
found the parties' original financial circumstances to be 
substantially changed in the first modification proceeding.  The 
No. 
02-3041   
 
11 
 
original divorce judgment, having been "revised" or "altered" by 
virtue 
of 
the 
first 
modification 
order, 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a), is not even in effect at the time of 
the 
second 
modification 
hearing. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(2w), "[a] revision of a judgment or order 
with respect to . . . maintenance payments has the effect of 
modifying the original judgment or order with respect to such 
payments to the extent of the revision from the date on which 
the order revising such payments is effective."  As such, once a 
maintenance award is modified, the revision is incorporated into 
the judgment of divorce, replaces the original maintenance award 
from the date of revision, and has the full force and effect as 
the original maintenance award. 
¶17 Thus, at a second modification hearing, the operative 
maintenance award from which relief is sought is embodied in the 
circuit court's latest modification order, which order was 
necessarily based on a finding of a substantial change in 
circumstances from those existent at the time of the original 
divorce judgment.  See Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶30.  It 
therefore follows that when a party asserts a substantial change 
in financial circumstances in a second modification proceeding, 
the 
"change" 
that 
is 
asserted 
is 
a 
change 
from 
those 
circumstances that necessitated the first modification order.  
Automatically reverting back to the facts at the time of the 
original divorce as the starting point for comparison in such 
circumstances would be entirely illogical and contrary to 
No. 
02-3041   
 
12 
 
§ 767.32(2w) because the original maintenance award is no longer 
part of the judgment at the time of the second proceeding.  
¶18 In addition, ignoring the facts that were found at the 
first 
modification 
hearing 
would 
be 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10), which requires a court, when setting a 
maintenance award, to consider any other factors that are 
"relevant" in each case.  This court has previously ruled that 
when setting a maintenance award, the circuit court should 
examine "all of the circumstances" surrounding the recipient's 
financial status.  Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 198.  A previous 
modification order and the parties' circumstances surrounding 
such order are certainly relevant factors at a subsequent 
modification hearing.   
¶19 In Harris v. Harris, 141 Wis. 2d 569, 576-77, 415 
N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals came to a 
contrary conclusion, determining, after brief discussion, that 
the 
circuit 
court 
should 
compare 
the 
parties' 
financial 
circumstances at the time of a second modification hearing with 
those existing at the time of the original divorce.4  The Harris 
court relied on a passage from Van Gorder, discussing the 
purpose of maintenance, which supposedly "suggested" such a 
rule.  Harris, 141 Wis. 2d at 576-77.   
¶20 However, the sole issue in Van Gorder was "whether 
continuous cohabitation of a divorced person with another person 
                                                 
4 Neither party discussed or cited Harris v. Harris, 141 
Wis. 2d 569, 415 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1987), as it relates to 
this issue.   
No. 
02-3041   
 
13 
 
is sufficient ground alone for the termination of maintenance 
payments . . . ."  Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 190.  There is 
nothing in Van Gorder that directly or indirectly "suggests" an 
answer 
to 
the 
question 
presented 
here 
and 
in 
Harris.  
Additionally, while the court of appeals in Harris did briefly 
mention § 767.32(1)(a), it merely commented that the statute was 
"broad."  Harris, 141 Wis. 2d at 576.  The Harris court never 
considered that § 767.32(1)(a) allows a circuit court to 
"revise" or "alter" a judgment; nor did it consider that under 
§ 767.32(2w), a revised maintenance award modifies the original 
divorce judgment with respect to such payments.  As such, we are 
not persuaded by the court of appeals' decision in Harris on 
this point. 
¶21 Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
during 
a 
second 
maintenance modification proceeding, the appropriate comparison 
regarding any change in the parties' financial circumstances is 
to the set of facts that existed at the time of the most recent 
maintenance order, whether such order is contained in the 
original divorce judgment or was entered as part of a subsequent 
maintenance modification proceeding.  In addition, we reject the 
argument that once the circuit court has found a substantial 
change in the parties' financial circumstances, either issue 
preclusion or claim preclusion may require the circuit court to 
reinstate the amount of maintenance established in the original 
divorce decree.   
¶22 Issue preclusion, formerly referred to as collateral 
estoppel, "refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing 
No. 
02-3041   
 
14 
 
relitigation in a subsequent action of an issue of law or fact 
that has been actually litigated and decided in a prior action."  
N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 550.  As noted supra, the 
threshold inquiry in determining the applicability of issue 
preclusion is whether there is an identity of issues in the two 
actions.  Miller, ___Wis. 2d ___, ¶20.  Under the doctrine of 
claim preclusion, formerly known as res judicata, a final 
judgment in an action is conclusive between the parties or their 
privies in all subsequent actions or proceedings in relation to 
all matters that were or could have been litigated in the former 
proceeding.  N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 550.   
 
¶23 We conclude that neither doctrine is applicable to a 
maintenance modification proceeding after a circuit court has 
found the parties' financial circumstances to be substantially 
changed, especially when the judgment of divorce has been 
revised by a previous order modifying maintenance payments.  
Simply stated, once a party has demonstrated the requisite 
substantial change in circumstances since the time of the 
operative 
maintenance 
award, 
a 
maintenance 
modification 
proceeding does not present the same issues or claims that were 
originally litigated during the divorce proceeding.  As this 
court has previously stated,  
"The [circuit] court's power to modify the provisions 
of the judgment of divorce is not the power to grant a 
new trial or to re-try the issues determined by the 
original hearing, but only to adapt the decree to some 
distinct 
and 
definite 
change 
in 
the 
financial 
circumstances of the parties . . . ."   
No. 
02-3041   
 
15 
 
Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 195 (quoting Thies v. MacDonald, 51 
Wis. 2d 296, 302, 187 N.W.2d 186 (1971)).   
¶24 Ms. Kenyon is correct that we did state in Miner, 10 
Wis. 2d at 441, that "[w]hen a court in a divorce action awards 
alimony, it is based upon the circumstances of the parties at 
the time of the judgment and is normally considered res 
adjudicata as to that situation."  (Emphasis added.)  However, 
she misconstrues this statement when she argues that the initial 
amount of a maintenance award may be binding at a subsequent 
modification proceeding.  The quoted material from Miner simply 
explained that a judgment of divorce should not be modified 
unless "there is a substantial or material change in the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
parties 
which 
would 
justify 
such 
modification."  Id.  We reiterated this point last term in 
Rohde-Giovanni, when we stated:  "More specifically, the circuit 
court deciding the modification motion may not modify a 
maintenance award based solely on the fact that, had the parties 
been before it for their divorce action, that court would have 
decided 
the 
matter 
differently." 
 
Rohde-Giovanni, 
269 
Wis. 2d 598, ¶34.   
¶25 Thus, properly understood, Miner merely reiterates the 
long-standing 
rule 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
must 
find 
a 
substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances 
before it can modify a maintenance award.  In other words, 
Miner, 10 Wis. 2d at 441, simply provides that a judgment of 
divorce, including the maintenance award contained therein, is a 
final judgment that precludes relitigation of the issues and 
No. 
02-3041   
 
16 
 
claims presented at the divorce proceeding.  However, in Van 
Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 195, we recognized that once a party has 
shown the requisite change in circumstances, a circuit court's 
subsequent decision to modify the maintenance award does not 
represent a relitigation of the issues or claims presented 
during the original divorce proceeding.  Once a circuit court 
has determined that there exists a substantial change in the 
parties' financial circumstances, the decision to modify the 
maintenance award is committed to the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶17.  Thus, 
Miner 
does 
not 
address 
the 
appropriate 
level 
at 
which 
maintenance should be set once the circuit court has found a 
substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances. 
¶26 In addition, the amount of maintenance established in 
the original divorce decree cannot be binding following a 
subsequent order modifying maintenance because, as discussed 
supra, under 
§ 767.32(2w), 
an 
order 
modifying maintenance 
revises the judgment of divorce with respect to maintenance 
payments. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
§ 767.32(2w), 
an 
order 
modifying 
maintenance revises the original judgment of divorce to the 
extent of such modification on the date the modification becomes 
effective.  Thus, at a second modification hearing, the amount 
of maintenance established in the original divorce decree, 
having been revised to the extent of the first modification 
order, is no longer part of the judgment of divorce and can have 
no preclusive effect.  
No. 
02-3041   
 
17 
 
¶27 Therefore, we conclude that for purposes of evaluating 
a substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances in 
a 
maintenance 
modification 
proceeding, 
the 
appropriate 
comparison is to the set of facts that existed at the time of 
the most recent maintenance order, whether that is the original 
divorce judgment or a previous modification order.  At the 
hearing, the circuit court should adhere to the findings of fact 
made in the previous proceeding and may not retry the issues 
decided 
in 
that 
proceeding. 
 
See 
Rhode-Giovanni, 
269 
Wis. 2d 598, ¶¶33-34.  It should compare the facts regarding the 
parties' current financial status with those surrounding the 
previous order in determining whether the movant has established 
the requisite substantial change in circumstances, such that 
modification of the maintenance award is warranted.  See id., 
¶34.  In so holding, we withdraw any language from Harris, 141 
Wis. 2d at 576-77, suggesting the contrary.  Further, once a 
party has demonstrated the requisite substantial change in 
financial circumstances, the circuit court is not bound by 
either issue preclusion or claim preclusion to reinstate the 
amount of maintenance established in the original judgment of 
divorce, especially when the judgment of divorce has been 
previously revised by an order modifying maintenance payments.   
¶28 We now address what standards the circuit court must 
apply in determining the level of maintenance once it has found 
a substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances.  
We have previously stated:   
No. 
02-3041   
 
18 
 
The payment of maintenance is not to be viewed as 
a permanent annuity.  Rather, such payment is designed 
to maintain a party at an appropriate standard of 
living, under the facts and circumstances of the 
individual case, until the party exercising reasonable 
diligence 
has 
reached 
a 
level 
of 
income 
where 
maintenance is no longer necessary.  
Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d at 230.  The "appropriate standard" 
is "a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed 
during the marriage."  Id. at 228 (emphasis omitted).  "In other 
words, the goal of maintenance is to provide support at pre-
divorce standards, and this goal may require that the recipient 
spouse be awarded maintenance above bare subsistence needs."  
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 35.   
¶29 In Rohde-Giovanni, we noted the dual objectives of 
maintenance are:  1) support of the recipient spouse "in 
accordance with the needs and earning capacities of both the 
recipient spouse and the payor spouse" and 2) "a fair and 
equitable financial arrangement between the parties."  Rohde-
Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶29.  We clarified that the fairness 
objective applies both at the original divorce proceeding and at 
any subsequent modification hearings.  We stated:  
[A] court reviewing a previous award of maintenance 
must not solely limit its inquiry to the support 
objective.  The objective of fairness also must be 
considered, even in postdivorce proceedings.  Fairness 
must be considered with respect to the situations of 
both parties in determining whether maintenance should 
be continued indefinitely, continued for a limited 
amount of time, reduced, or terminated.   
Id., ¶31. 
¶30 In so ruling, we withdrew language from Johnson, 217 
Wis. 2d at 128, that held to the contrary.  Rohde-Giovanni, 269 
No. 
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Wis. 2d 598, ¶31.  We emphasized that "the correct test 
regarding modification of maintenance should consider fairness 
to both of the parties under all of the circumstances, not 
whether it is unjust or inequitable to alter the original 
maintenance award."  Id., ¶32.  
¶31 In the present case, the circuit court found a 
substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances since 
the previous hearing because Ms. Kenyon was no longer employed 
as a result of her disability.  The circuit court noted that Ms. 
Kenyon's disability had become worse since the time of the 
original divorce decree.  However, the circuit court stated that 
while the initial maintenance decision was proper, "Mr. Kenyon 
is probably going to be on the hook forever.  And I don't think 
anybody really wanted that to happen."   
¶32 The circuit court noted that there were "some very, 
very compelling considerations on each side."  The court 
emphasized that it was aware that as a result of her disability, 
Ms. Kenyon was living a hard life and was forced to make tough 
decisions regarding her own care.  The court noted that Ms. 
Kenyon faced the hard choice of taking medication to bring her 
pain to bearable levels and maintaining some level of activity.  
However, the circuit court stated, "at some point, looking to 
Mr. Kenyon as the answer to all of this really isn’t right."  
The court stated that it was time for Ms. Kenyon to start 
thinking about generating some income.   
¶33 Regarding the appropriate level of maintenance, the 
circuit court reasoned: 
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20 
 
I'm not seeing a great need for more maintenance.  
Now, would I want to live on the amount of money that 
Ms. Kenyon is living on?  No.  Is she in any way 
asking that Mr. Kenyon support some kind of high life?  
No. 
 
I think she's amazingly penurious and I'm very 
impressed by her ability to function on such minimum 
amounts of money.  But under the order that was in 
place and even given the admitted fact that Mr. Kenyon 
was not paying maintenance for quite a period of time, 
no debts are listed.  There's no showing that Ms. 
Kenyon needs more money to maintain herself at this 
relatively modest level of living.   
¶34 The 
circuit 
court 
ultimately 
concluded 
that 
an 
increase in maintenance was not warranted:   
 
Her health situation appears to have deteriorated 
but she is getting benefits.  I don't see that Mr. 
Kenyon is making all that much more money then he was 
making at the time.  And again, I think there has to 
be some pressure placed, which is difficult to do for 
a person in Ms. Kenyon's condition, but I think just 
about every time I have come back to look at the case, 
Ms. Kenyon's focus has been restricted to her health 
situation and not towards any efforts she could make 
toward improving her financial situation.   
And it never was my intention to put Mr. Kenyon 
on the hook for being a primary source of income or 
life support for Ms. Kenyon.  So while I find a change 
in circumstances, I am having trouble finding the 
need, especially in light of Ms. Kenyon's own expert 
telling me that he believes it is possible that some 
part-time, even homework, work at home, could occur.   
 . . . .  
 . . . I'm just not seeing the need to increase 
the maintenance beyond its current amount and so I do 
deny the motion to increase maintenance and continue 
the maintenance at the level it currently is.   
¶35 When rendering its decision, the circuit court did not 
have the benefit of our recent decision in Rohde-Giovanni.  
No. 
02-3041   
 
21 
 
Under the previous standard for maintenance modification, a 
circuit court could modify a maintenance award if, after finding 
a substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances, it 
found that "it would be unjust or inequitable to strictly hold 
either party to the judgment."  Miner, 10 Wis. 2d at 441-42.  
Furthermore, under Johnson, 217 Wis. 2d at 128, a circuit court 
was precluded from considering the fairness objective when 
deciding whether to modify a maintenance award.  Here, it is 
apparent that the circuit court was proceeding under this older 
standard.  The circuit court focused almost exclusively on Ms. 
Kenyon's need for additional maintenance at her current standard 
of living and, in compliance with Miner and Johnson, whether it 
would be inequitable to force Mr. Kenyon to pay additional 
maintenance for an indefinite period.  The circuit court did not 
consider the fairness objective in relation to both parties when 
determining whether to modify the maintenance award. 
¶36 Mr. Kenyon attempts to recast the circuit court's 
decision in light of the standards established in Rohde-
Giovanni.  However, it is clear that the circuit court proceeded 
under an incorrect standard of law, and we simply do not know 
how the circuit court would have determined the matter had it 
applied the correct standard, as set forth in Rohde-Giovanni.  
Thus, because the circuit court applied an incorrect standard of 
law, we conclude that it erroneously exercised its discretion in 
denying Ms. Kenyon's motion to increase maintenance.  On remand, 
the circuit court must reconsider the matter in light of our 
decision in Rohde-Giovanni.   
No. 
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22 
 
¶37 We reiterate that while maintenance is not meant as a 
lifetime annuity, the goal of maintenance is to allow the 
parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable 
to that enjoyed during the marriage.  Vander Perren, 105 
Wis. 2d at 228, 230.  When setting the amount of maintenance or 
considering a motion to modify a maintenance award, the circuit 
court should consider the support objective "in accordance with 
the needs and earning capacities of both the recipient spouse 
and the payor spouse."  Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶29.  
In addition, the court must consider "fairness to both of the 
parties under all of the circumstances, not whether it is unjust 
or inequitable to alter the original maintenance award."  Id., 
¶32.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶38 We hold that for purposes of evaluating a substantial 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
financial 
circumstances 
during 
a 
maintenance modification proceeding, the appropriate comparison 
is to the set of facts that existed at the time of the most 
recent maintenance order, whether that is the original divorce 
judgment or a previous modification order.  At the hearing, the 
circuit court should adhere to the findings of fact made in the 
previous proceeding and may not retry the issues decided in that 
proceeding.  It should compare the facts regarding the parties' 
current financial status with those surrounding the previous 
order in determining whether the movant has established the 
requisite 
substantial 
change 
in 
circumstances, 
such 
that 
modification of the maintenance award is warranted.  Further, 
No. 
02-3041   
 
23 
 
once a party has demonstrated the requisite substantial change 
in financial circumstances, the circuit court is not bound by 
either issue preclusion or claim preclusion to reinstate the 
amount of maintenance established in the original judgment of 
divorce, especially when the judgment of divorce has been 
previously revised by an order modifying maintenance payments.   
¶39 In addition, we conclude that the circuit court 
applied the wrong legal standard when it denied Ms. Kenyon's 
motion because its decision focused chiefly on Ms. Kenyon's need 
for maintenance at her present standard of living and whether it 
would be inequitable to force Mr. Kenyon to pay additional 
maintenance for an indefinite period.  In Rohde-Giovanni, 269 
Wis. 2d 598, ¶31, we clarified that once a substantial change in 
the parties' 
financial 
circumstances 
is demonstrated, the 
circuit court must consider the dual maintenance objectives of 
support and fairness when modifying a maintenance award.  Here, 
in conformity with the controlling precedent at the time, the 
circuit court did not consider the fairness objective in 
relation to both parties.   
¶40 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand for a new hearing under the appropriate legal 
standard.  On remand, the circuit court should, pursuant to 
Rohde-Giovanni, consider the support of the recipient spouse "in 
accordance with the needs and earning capacities of both the 
recipient spouse and the payor spouse[,]" and should consider 
"[f]airness . . . with 
respect 
to 
the 
situations 
of 
both 
No. 
02-3041   
 
24 
 
parties" in deciding whether the maintenance award should be 
modified.  Id., ¶¶29, 31.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded. 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.  
 
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