Title: LAURA LEE PERRITT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LAURA LEE PERRITT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 121120 P.3d 181Case Number: 04-88Decided: 09/23/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
LAURA 
LEE PERRITT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, Justice, filed a 
specially concurring opinion.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Laura 
Lee Perritt (Perritt), seeks review of her conviction for obtaining property by 
false pretenses.  She contends that 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, that the district court 
erred by including an award of restitution to the State as a part of her 
sentence, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct throughout her trial, that 
irrelevant evidence was admitted concerning her husband's bad behavior that 
prejudiced her right to a fair trial, and that the cumulative effect of trial 
errors mandate reversal of her conviction.  
We will reverse the judgment and sentence of the district court on the 
basis that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction and remand 
to the district court with directions that the information be dismissed with 
prejudice.

 
 
[¶2]      Perritt raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Was there insufficient evidence that [Perritt] obtained "property" from 
the State of Wyoming through false 
pretenses?

 
 
II.          
Did the trial court err in ordering [Perritt] to pay restitution to the 
State of Wyoming?

 
 
III.         
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct in opening statement and closing 
argument?

 
 
IV.        Did 
the trial court err in admitting irrelevant, prejudicial information concerning 
[Perritt's] husband?

 
 
V.        Does 
cumulative error warrant reversal of [Perritt's] 
conviction?

 
 
The 
State's recitation of the issues essentially conforms to that of 
Perritt.

 
 

[¶3]      On August 6, 
2000, Perritt submitted an Application for Day Care Certification to the 
Department of Family Services (DFS).  
The application form included a requirement that Perritt answer this 
question:  "Have you or anyone in 
your home/staff been charged with a felony or the subject of a substantiated 
child abuse/neglect investigation?"  
Perritt answered the question "No."  
The record is clear, and Perritt makes no contention to the contrary, 
that she knew that her husband, Kris Perritt (Kris or Husband), had been 
convicted of sexual assault in the second degree on June 11, 1996.  However, she characterizes her answer as 
truthful, or at least not false, on the basis that she did not consider Kris to 
be "in her home" or "on her staff" because, although married to him, they were 
separated and he did not live in their home on a regular basis.  She also contended that he was to have 
nothing to do with the day care business, and was to have no unsupervised 
contact with the children1 served by her business.  There was some evidence presented that 
Perritt admitted to DFS investigators that she did not disclose to DFS that her 
husband resided with her because she assumed that certification of her business 
would not be forthcoming if DFS knew of the marriage and the extent to which the 
Perritts still "lived" together.  
Perritt denied that she made such a statement.2

 
 
[¶4]      On August 18, 
2000, in response to her application, Perritt received Certificate No. 6975 
authorizing her to operate a family day care home.  On August 21, 2000, Perritt submitted a 
Provider Registration Form (DFS 203).  
Completion of that form allowed Perritt to receive payments for child 
care services from DFS on behalf of eligible clients.  One provision of that form was 
this:

 
 
2.  The 
provider must furnish the name and Social Security Number of all adult 
household members and any substitute provider(s) who have access to the children 
placed in care.  Each adult 
listed below must provide a signed and dated Authorization Release of Child or 
Disabled Adult Central Registry and Wyoming Criminal History Record Information 
(SS-26).  A favorable Child 
Abuse-Neglect Record Check and a Criminal History Prescreening Report must be 
received for these individuals as well as the provider.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Perritt 
listed only herself on this form for the same reasons that she did not include 
her husband on her initial application.

 
 
[¶5]      At the bottom of 
that form, Perritt was required to sign this 
"Certification:"

 
 
I 
certify I have read and agree to the conditions listed above.  I certify all answers and statements 
made by me on this form are true and correct.  I understand providing false information 
can result in loss of registration status as a child care provider.  I understand the loss in registration 
status will result in my business no longer being eligible to receive DFS 
subsidized child care payments and could result in prosecution allowable under 
the law.

 
 
By 
signing that form, Perritt also acknowledged that she understood that DFS would 
not pay her if she committed fraud against DFS.

 
 
[¶6]      On April 17, 
2001, Perritt submitted an Application for Day Care Certification so as to 
expand her business from a "Family Day Care Home (2-6 Children)," to a "Group 
Day Care Home (7-11 Children)."  In 
that form, she also answered the question posed in her initial application in 
the negative, i.e., that no one in her home/staff had been charged with a felony 
or had been the subject of a substantiated child abuse/neglect 
investigation.  On April 17, 2001, 
Perritt received Certificate No. 6975, authorizing her to operate a group day 
care home.

 
 
[¶7]      DFS rules 
governing "Child Care Provider Eligibility and Payment Requirements" were an 
important part of the evidence against Perritt.  Indeed, those rules were given to the 
jury in the form of Instruction No. 13:

 
 
Section 
14.  Child Care Provider Eligibility 
and Payment Requirements.

 
 
(a) The 
selected child care provider must:

(i) Be 
someone other than a mother, father, stepparent, member of the assistance unit, 
or foster parent who keeps or cares for a minor at the request of the 
parent(s)/caretaker(s) or an agency that is legally responsible for the child 
and receives payment for that care.

(ii) Be 
at least (eighteen) 18 years old or be emancipated in accordance with W.S. 
14-1-101.

(iii) Be 
licensed by the State of Wyoming unless the provider is legally exempt 
from licensing under W.S. 14-4-102.

                  
(iv) Provide care within the State of Wyoming.

                  
(v) Complete the provider registration 
process.

      (vi) Meet 
all state, local and federal laws related to operating a child care 
business.

(vii) Meet 
the minimum health and safety standards including:

(A) An 
operable smoke alarm or detector must be installed on all floor levels and an 
operable telephone must be available where the child care takes place.  Exception:  A telephone is not required when the 
care is provided in the child's own home.  
However, there needs to be a phone nearby that can be used in case of an 
emergency and the case file must be documented when this exception 
applies.

(B) The 
provider must keep immunization records of the children.

(viii) Receive 
a favorable Child Abuse-Neglect Record Check and a Criminal History Prescreening 
Report or good cause has been shown.

(A) The 
provider must furnish the name, Social Security number and a signed 
authorization of release from all adult household members and any substitute 
provider(s) who have access to the child(ren) placed in 
care.

(I) A 
Child Abuse-Neglect Record Check and a Criminal History Prescreening Report will 
be done on these individuals.

(II) The 
provider will be held responsible for the actions of any employee, substitute or 
household member who has contact with the child(ren) while the child is in 
care.

(1.) Refusal 
of the provider to furnish the name(s) and Social security Number(s); 
or

(2.) The 
presence of any person(s) in the child care facility against whom there has been 
substantiated child abuse/neglect may make the provider ineligible to receive 
payment from DFS for child care services. (W.S. 14-3-213)

(ix) Allow 
parental access any time during business hours. (45 CFR 
98.31)

(x) Make 
the Provider Registration Form available for public viewing upon 
request.

(xi) The 
substitute provider must meet the minimum health and safety standards and 
complete the provider registration process if the care goes beyond twenty-four 
(24) hours during a month because the provider is no longer considered a 
substitute.

(xii) Child 
care providers must meet the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.

(xiii) The 
provider must maintain accounting records and other evidence services were 
provided in accordance with each authorization and make these records available 
to state and federal auditors upon request.

      (b) Payment 
for provider services is allowed only to providers who meet the criteria listed 
in (a) above as verified by the parent/caretaker.

      
(c) Payment for provider services is not 
allowed:

(i) For 
the period of time the provider is in violation of any federal, state, or local 
law, rules and/or regulations applicable to a child care 
business.

(ii) Payment 
is not allowed when abuse or neglect has been substantiated, unless a good cause 
determination has been made in accordance with W.S. 14-3-213(c).

(iii) Payment 
is not allowed to a provider when one of the natural, adoptive parents or 
stepparents is in the home and available to care for the child(ren).  Payment to a provider is allowable if 
the child(ren) will be at risk of neglect or abuse as verified by Child 
Protective Services (CPS) if the stepparent or the grandparent in a minor parent 
situation provides the care.

(iv) An 
E & T participant is not entitled to the dependent care reimbursement if a 
member of the E & T participant's Food Stamp assistance unit provides the 
dependent care services. (7 CFR 273.7)

      (d) The 
child care provider is not considered a State of Wyoming DFS employee.

      (e) The 
child care provider is required to complete the prescribed DFS form for child 
care expenses and return it to the DFS field office within ninety (90) days of 
when the month of service was provided for DFS to make any payment.  Failure to submit the bill within the 
ninety (90) days will mean the provider's payment is forfeited unless the delay 
was the result of agency error.

(i) The 
DFS payment amount will cover and not exceed the actual eligible authorized 
hours used at the lowest rate of actual charge, local market rate, or statewide 
limit.

(ii) Payment 
is not allowed to more than three providers per child within a six month period 
unless good cause has been established.

      (f) The 
State of Wyoming and DFS have no responsibility for 
unpaid bills for child care fees charged above state rates or for the 
parent's/caretaker's obligation for the cost of care.

      (g) The 
provider has the right to establish the child care rates for his/her 
facility.

(i) The 
rates charged to those receiving assistance from DFS must be the same rates as 
those charged to non-DFS clients.

(ii) When 
the provider has a rate other than hourly, the provider's rate must be converted 
to an hourly scale.  The rate paid 
on the hourly scale cannot exceed the provider's daily, weekly, or monthly 
maximum rate.

(iii) Providers/Directors 
must submit any change of their rates to DFS using a prescribed DFS form and a 
copy of the rate sheet they use for non-DFS clients.

(iv) DFS 
will use the new rate when the provider submits the new rate more than five (5) 
working days prior to the effective date of the change.  When the new rate is submitted less than 
five working days prior to the change, the new rate will be effective five (5) 
working days after it is received.  
The new rate applies only to authorizations written after the rate 
change.

      (h) Payments 
may continue when a provider requests an administrative hearing pending action 
taken by the Child Care Licensing Unit unless there is a substantiated child 
abuse or neglect case.

(i) Overpayment, 
fraud and intentional program violation disqualification procedures in section 
13 apply.  [Emphasis added.]3

 
 
[¶8]      Because DFS 
believed it had proof that Kris was present in Perritt's home during parts of 
the time the day care business was in operation, on September 20, 2001, DFS 
issued an Order of Summary Suspension prohibiting Perritt from continuing to 
operate her day care business.  
However, DFS personnel continued to investigate this matter and its 
potential as a criminal matter to be presented to the Natrona County District 
Attorney for prosecution.  Upon 
completion of the investigation, the results of that investigation, including an 
alleged admission by Perritt that she had deliberately concealed Kris's presence 
in her home from DFS, was promptly referred to the Natrona County District 
Attorney for criminal prosecution.  
We will discuss other essential facts in the context of each issue 
presented.

 
 

 
 

 
 

[¶9]      In 
addressing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  When 
considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence 
with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard 
the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not reweigh the 
evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Pacheco v. State, 2004 WY 160, ¶6, 102 P.3d 887, 889 (Wyo. 2004); Mascarenas v. 
State, 2003 WY 124, ¶3, 76 P.3d 1258, 1260 
(Wyo.2003)).

 
 
[¶10]   The elements of the crime of 
obtaining property by false pretenses are readily gleaned from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-407 (LexisNexis 2003), which provides:4

 
 
§ 6-3-407.  Obtaining 
property by false pretenses; penalties.

 
 
            
(a) A person who knowingly obtains property from another person by 
false pretenses with intent to defraud the person is guilty 
of:

(i) A 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more; or

                        
(ii) Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 44, § 3.

            
(iii) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six 
(6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or 
both, if the value of the property is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00). 

 
 
[¶11]   The sense of that statute is 
supplemented by some statutory definitions.  For instance, "[p]erson' includes an 
individual, partnership, corporation, joint stock company or any other 
association or entity, public or private."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2005).  "Property" is defined as:  "anything of value whether tangible or 
intangible, real or personal, public or private."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(viii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶12]   The State's theory of the case was 
that Perritt's false pretense was her failure to disclose that her husband Kris 
was living in her home during the period September 26, 2000, through December 
31, 2001.  Furthermore, the State 
argued that she concealed that fact so that she could collect money from DFS on 
behalf of parents who were eligible for day care services.  The State also asserted that Perritt 
received eighteen checks from the State in the total amount of $25,938.21.5  It is not contended that Perritt did not 
actually perform the services for which she was paid, rather it is contended 
that she was not entitled to those payments because of her false representations 
to DFS about her husband.  The jury 
was given these instructions in that regard:

 
 

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Obtaining Property by False Pretenses, as 
charged in this case, are:

            
1.         
On or about September 26, 2000 through and including on or about December 
21, 2001;

            
2.         
In Natrona County, 
Wyoming;

            
3.         
The Defendant, Laura Lee Perritt;

            
4.         
With the intent to defraud another person, to-wit: the State of 
Wyoming;

            
5.         
Knowingly obtained property from that person, to-wit: the State of 
Wyoming;

            
6.         
By false pretenses; and

            
7.         
That the value of property obtained was $500.00 or 
more.

 
 
If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.  If, on the other hand, you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has 
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
not guilty.

 
 
[¶13]   The jury was also given the 
statutory definitions of "person" and "property."  The jury was informed that DFS is an 
agency of the State of Wyoming.  
This instruction was also given:  
"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that a license is not property as between the 
licensing authority and the license holder.  A license is merely a privilege to be 
granted or denied."  We note for the 
purpose of clarity that, although the statute speaks of a certification process 
and the piece of paper issued is denominated a "certificate," DFS referred to 
this process as licensing in its rules and regulations and in its organizational 
structure, and routinely referred to the "certificate" as a "license."  This lack of discipline in the use of 
terminology is of no consequence to the resolution of this 
case.

 
 
[¶14]   The jury was also 
instructed:

 
 

 
 
            
You are instructed that to prove the crime of Obtaining Property by False 
Pretenses it is sufficient if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the pretense proved to be false was a controlling part of the moving causes 
inducing the owner to part with its property  regardless of the presence of 
other inducing factors or statements which may have been 
true.

 
 
[¶15]   The crime of false pretenses has 
deep roots in Anglo-American law.  
That crime is defined in slightly different ways in the various 
jurisdictions but as a general rule has five elements:  (1) a false representation of a material 
present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass title to (4) his 
property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and 
(b) intends to defraud the victim.  
3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.7 at 114-115 (2nd ed. 2003).

 
 
[¶16]   We have articulated our views on 
the elements of this crime in various ways over the years.  For instance, in Martins v. 
State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 P. 709, 712-13 (1908) we 
said:

 
 
There 
can be no question upon the face of this statute that the property so obtained, 
in order to constitute the offense, must be obtained from the owner by means of 
false pretenses.  There can be no 
party defrauded within the purview of this statute except the owner or one 
having a special ownership in, and who is induced by false pretenses to part 
with, his property.  The fraud 
contemplated is the fraud which is perpetrated against the owner of the 
property.  In this respect our 
statute is different from that of some states, where intent alone is sufficient, 
regardless of whether it be to defraud any specific person (19 Cyc. 415), or 
when the attempt to obtain goods by false pretenses is made a distinct 
felony.  Having no statute making it 
a crime to attempt to obtain goods by false pretenses, decisions under such a 
statute are inapplicable to the case before us.  Under the statute the intent to defraud 
the person from whom the property is obtained by means of false pretenses is an 
essential element of the crime.  In 
the absence of such intent the crime is not complete, and even if such intent be 
present the crime is still not complete unless the party from whom the goods 
were so obtained was actually defrauded. 19 Cyc. 411, and cases there 
cited.  Naked possession by an agent 
of his principal's property does not vest title of ownership in such agent.  It is said subdivision "d," at page 408 
of 19 Cyc.:  "To constitute an 
obtaining of property, defendant must in the first place acquire at least a 
voidable title to the property; that is, the owner must intend to invest him 
with the title, as distinguished from the mere custody or possession of the 
goods."  This text is fully 
supported by citations in the footnotes.  
Under a similar statute the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said:  "The crime is defined in section 4423, 
St. 1898, and consists in obtaining the money 
or property of another by false pretenses.  
It must be obtained from the owner by false pretenses."  Owens v. State, 83 Wis. 496, 53 N.W. 736; 
section 472, 2 Bishop's New Criminal Law.  
The crime is statutory, and the information should set forth all the 
requisites of the statute to constitute it.  The ownership should by the averments of 
the information be correctly stated.  
Bishop's New Criminal Proc. § 173; Wharton's Criminal Law (8th Ed.) §§ 
1211, 1223, 932, 977; Wharton's Criminal Ev.  § 94; 19 Cyc. 425, 426, 434, and cases 
cited; Leobold v. State, 33 Ind. 484; Halley v. State, 43 Ind. 
509; State v. Miller, 153 Ind. 229, 54 N.E. 808; State v. 
Lathrop, 15 Vt. 279; Washington v. State, 41 Tex. 
583.

 
 
            
In the case before us the information charges that the money was obtained 
from Julius Mayer, and while the ownership is not laid in any one else-nor is it 
directly laid in Mayer for that matter-yet the inference is that it was his 
money.  Without discussing the 
sufficiency of the information in this respect, as that question has not been 
here presented, but conceding for the purpose of this case alone that it is 
sufficient, we pass to a consideration of the evidence to see if it be 
sufficient to support a verdict, and whether or not the verdict is contrary to 
the evidence.

 
 
            
From the evidence it appears that the money obtained from Mayer was not 
his money, but was the money of one Robert Freedman, by whom Mayer was employed, 
and that Mayer had authority to receive and cash checks as agent for his 
employer.  It is not alleged in the 
information how or in what capacity Mayer held the money, or the relation if any 
he sustained to Freedman, nor is it alleged that the money so obtained was 
Freedman's money.  Owens v. 
State, supra; Jacobs v. State, 31 Neb. 33, 47 N.W. 422; 
People v. Krummer, 4 Parker, Cr. R.  
(N. Y.) 217.  The defendant 
was not charged with obtaining Freedman's money by false pretenses, but with 
obtaining money from Mayer by false pretenses.  In view of the uniform holdings, under a 
statute similar to ours, that ownership is a material averment and must be 
proved as laid, it is difficult to understand how A. can be convicted upon an 
information which charges the obtaining of money under false pretenses from B. 
upon proof of ownership of the money in C.  
The issue tendered, if any, was that Mayer was the owner of the 
money.  The proof was that Freedman 
was the owner.  It is not alleged in 
the information that Mayer was the agent of Freedman, and that pursuant to 
authority of his principal he acted upon the false representations, and for that 
reason his agency or right to pay out money other than his own was not in 
issue.  Proof of ownership in 
Freedman of the money obtained which was offered and submitted by the state was 
inconsistent upon the face of the information with ownership in Mayer as therein 
alleged, and, in the absence of allegations showing ownership in Freedman and 
the agency and authority of Mayer to cash the check with Freedman's money, must 
be considered and treated as proof of a separate and distinct crime.  Such evidence disproved defendant's 
guilt of the crime as charged.  No 
false pretenses other than those to Mayer are alleged or proven.  He was not defrauded, for the money 
obtained did not belong to him, and upon the evidence in this case, if any one 
was defrauded, it was Cordove or Romero, and no false representations were made 
to either of them.  The crime, if 
any was proven, was not the crime charged.  
It is not necessary to discuss the question as to whether proof alone of 
possession by Mayer of the money which defendant obtained would be prima facie 
sufficient to support the verdict if ownership were directly laid in Mayer.  Upon the evidence the latter had nothing 
more than the mere naked possession (Owens v. State, supra), and 
it is sufficient to say that the proof is not limited to his possession alone, 
but upon the record it is undisputed that Freedman was the owner for whom Mayer 
was acting.  There was more than a 
variance in the proof; there was a failure to prove the crime, if any, as 
charged, although proof was submitted tending to prove a separate and distinct 
crime and with the commission of which the defendant was not charged.  The verdict is contrary to the 
evidence.

            
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial, or 
such further proceedings as may be deemed proper not inconsistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
[¶17]   In Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo. 1990), we held:

 
 
In order 
to demonstrate a violation of § 6-3-407(a), the State had to establish the 
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) the 
pretenses;

(2) their 
falsity;

(3) the 
fact of obtaining property by reason of the pretenses;

(4) the 
knowledge of the accused of their falsity;  
and

(5) the 
intent to defraud.

Miller 
v. State, 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo.1987); Driver v. State, 589 P.2d 391 
(Wyo.1979).

 
 
[¶18]   In Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 113-14 (Wyo. 1997) we held:

 
 
In 
Wyoming, 
convictions for the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses have been 
limited to misrepresentations of an existing or past fact.  In Driver v. State, 589 P.2d 391 
(Wyo.1979), this Court acknowledged that it had not yet decided whether a false 
promise of future action, which at the time of its making the promisor does not 
intend to perform, will constitute a false pretense under the Wyoming 
statute.  Id. at 393.   It remains an open question.  At one time, most courts limited the 
crime of obtaining property by false pretenses to those cases of a 
misrepresentation of existing fact, but an increasing number of states are 
applying it to future acts.  The 
reasoning for the change has been explained as follows:

 
 
While a 
large number of jurisdictions, sometimes invoking the danger of persons who are 
guilty of no more than a breach of contract being held criminally liable, have 
continued to adhere to the traditional rule that the crime of obtaining money or 
property by false pretenses can only be predicated upon a misrepresentation of a 
past or existing fact and not upon an intention not to comply with a promise or 
a statement as to a future act, an increasing number of jurisdictions, usually 
stressing the opportunities for fraud with impunity under the traditional rule, 
have held that a present intent not to comply with a promise or a statement as 
to a future act can be the basis of the crime of obtaining money or property by 
false pretenses.

 
 
Michael 
A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Crime of False 
Pretenses Cannot Be Predicated Upon Present Intention Not To Comply With Promise 
Or Statement As To Future Act, 19 A.L.R.4th 959, 964 
(1983).

 
 
            
Because early common law did not recognize the crime of obtaining 
property by false pretenses when the pretenses amounted to "merely a promise of 
future conduct, and common prudence and caution would have prevented any injury 
arising from it," it became a generally accepted notion that the failure to pay 
back money or use it as specified at the time of borrowing raised the concern 
that disgruntled creditors will instigate criminal proceedings against those who 
blamelessly encounter ordinary commercial defaults.  People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 
267 P.2d 271, 280-82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900, 75 S. Ct. 222, 99 L. Ed. 707 (1954).  It 
is thought by some that allowing the crime to include cases involving future 
conduct would create a considerable risk of prosecuting one who is guilty of 
nothing more than a failure or inability to pay his debts.  Commonwealth v. True, 16 
Mass.App.Ct. 709, 455 N.E.2d 453, 454 (1983); Ashley, 267 P.2d  at 
282.

 
 
            
We, however, agree with the conventional wisdom of Ashley, and a 
growing number of courts that this result is avoided because something more than 
mere nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's intent not to perform 
his promise, and proof of nonperformance alone is not sufficient in criminal 
prosecutions based on false promises.  
True, 455 N.E.2d at 454;  
State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 358 A.2d 46, 49-50 (1976);  Ashley, 267 P.2d  at 282.   Specific intent is an essential 
element of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses in Wyoming.  In order to succeed in a prosecution for 
a promise to perform future acts, the State is required to prove that a 
defendant had the intent not to perform a promise as well as the falsity of the 
promises/pretenses, that property was obtained by reason of the pretenses, and 
the knowledge of the accused of their falsity.  Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 
1152 (Wyo.1990);  Miller v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1054, 1063-64 (Wyo.1987).

 
 
[¶19]   All of these authorities are 
instructive, although neither the parties nor the district court made much 
effort to steer the evidence toward proving, or disproving, the elements of the 
crime.  We have over 1500 pages of 
transcripts and hundreds of pages of record materials and exhibits.  Yet, we are unable to discern in this 
material the evidentiary facts required to fulfill the basic elemental 
requirements of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses.6  It would not enhance our jurisprudence 
in this regard, or serve the interests of justice, to attempt to force the facts 
proven at this trial into a mold that clearly will not contain them.  When the statute is read in a logical 
manner, and in light of the more than five centuries worth of incrustations left 
by the common law, Perritt simply did not run afoul of the law that protects 
society from those who would obtain money by false pretenses with the intent to 
defraud.

 
 
[¶20]   Here, Perritt made a statement to 
the effect that her husband did not live in her home, and/or that he did not 
have "access to the children" placed in her care.  The prosecution's argument to the jury 
appeared to be that Perritt would be guilty of obtaining the money by false 
pretenses if the jury found she lied on the initial application for 
certification, or if she lied in her application to become 
eligible to serve DFS clients, or if she lied in each of her 
applications to DFS for payments.  
There was no special verdict form, so we are left to guess as to which of 
these the jury might have agreed upon unanimously.  There was some evidence that she made a 
false statement, and perhaps certainly a less than candid statement, but the 
proof that it was false cannot be said to be proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The evidence is even more 
infirm that the information was withheld with the intent to defraud DFS of 
property.

 
 
[¶21]   Moreover, it is clear that if there 
were false pretenses at all, it was only in her actual applications for the 
payments.  That application did not 
require her to identify any household member who may have been convicted of a 
felony, but rather only those household members "who had access to the 
children."  The State appeared to 
have proved that Perritt's husband frequented her home.  His frequent presence does not conflict 
with the statements Perritt made, given that he was father to one of Perritt's 
children and shared custody of that child with her, and was stepfather to her 
other two children.  Perritt 
presented credible evidence that the two of them were separated, and that they 
were attempting to work out their marital problems while living apart.  The State did not meaningfully 
contradict that evidence.  When 
viewed in the most favorable light conceivable under these circumstances, the 
State's evidence placed Husband at Perritt's home on several occasions, but 
never under circumstances where he had unsupervised access to the children.  The State's evidence did not establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Perritt's statements were either false pretenses, 
as contemplated by the governing statute, or that they were intended to have the 
effect of defrauding DFS of child care moneys, as the meaning of the phrase 
"with intent to defraud" is contemplated by the governing statute.7

 
 
[¶22]   Because we hold that the evidence 
was not sufficient in this regard, we need not further address other matters 
raised by Perritt with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence.  However, because we reverse, the 
sentence, and the provisions for restitution, are also reversed.  In this regard, we would be remiss if we 
did not comment that we would have been compelled to reverse the restitution 
portion of the sentence on the basis that the State did not prove "actual 
pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-9-103(b) (LexisNexis 
2005); Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶¶11-15, 79 P.3d 1178, 1183-85 (Wyo. 
2003).  Certainly we do not condone 
in any way Perritt's lack of candor or her attempt to rationalize her subjective 
interpretation of the forms she completed, in order that she could obtain a 
certificate to operate a day care and to qualify for DFS day care funding 
programs.  Her conduct most 
certainly justified the revocation of her license, perhaps she violated some 
criminal law, and it is possible that she may be subject to some civil 
suit.  Nonetheless, to the extent 
Perritt obtained property from the State in these circumstances, she "did it the 
old-fashioned way, she earned it."

 
 
[¶23]   Although this disposes of the 
appeal we will, nonetheless, make brief comment on other issues Perritt raises 
in the event there are further proceedings on remand to the district 
court.

 
 

 
 
[¶24]   Although Perritt correctly 
identifies significant portions of the prosecutor's argument as misconduct, we 
decline to discuss these matters in detail because the conclusions we reached 
above are dispositive of this appeal.  
However, we would be remiss if we did not note that significant portions 
of the prosecutor's argument were improper and may well have constituted 
reversible error in their own right.  
The prosecutor exhorted the jury to convict Perritt because her conduct 
constituted "welfare fraud" when that simply was not the case.  The prosecutor pandered to the jury's 
passions by encouraging the jury to convict Perritt because her husband was a 
"child molester."  He incited the 
jury to view Perritt as a person who had a "criminal mind" and to convict her on 
that basis, when there was no foundation in the evidence for such an 
argument.  He vouched for his own 
expertise and experience in identifying persons who have "criminal minds" and 
beseeched the jury to convict Perritt on that basis.  See People v. Seifke, 195 
Ill.App. 3d 135, 141 Ill.Dec. 833, 551 N.E.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 
1990).  He counseled the jury to 
convict Perritt because she had endangered young children, although that was not 
an element of the offense with which she was charged.  Misconduct by the prosecutor of this 
magnitude often requires reversal of a defendant's conviction because it 
deprives the defendant of a fair trial.  
See Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶¶47-52, 94 P.3d 1034, 
1053-54 (Wyo. 2004); and Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93 ¶¶26-27, 74 P.3d 699, 
710-11 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
Error in Admission of Irrelevant and Highly 
Prejudicial Evidence Concerning Perritt's 
Husband

 
 
[¶25]   The central feature of Perritt's 
alleged wrongdoing was her failure to reveal that her husband, a convicted 
felon, was in her household where she was going to conduct a day care 
business.  As the gravamen of the 
offense at issue here, the prosecution needed to prove that Perritt's husband 
had been convicted of a felony and that he was in the home and had access to the 
children.

 
 
[¶26]   Throughout his argument to the jury 
and in the presentation of the evidence, the prosecutor managed to present to 
the jury, on dozens of occasions, that not only had Kris Perritt been convicted 
of a felony, but that he was a convicted "child molester."  Although, identifying his crime with 
specificity may have been proper in that the judgment and sentence was admitted 
as an exhibit, we conclude that the repetitive use of the phrase "child 
molester" was improper and likely prejudicial to Perritt's right to a fair 
trial.  We also are comfortable in 
concluding that the prosecutor's tactics in this regard were deliberate and 
repetitive, and not fleeting and inadvertent.

 
 
[¶27]   Through the testimony of witness 
Sherri Rollins, the prosecution sought to prove that Kris Perritt was in the 
household and that he had access to children.  In the course of that testimony, the 
prosecution also revealed, over the objections of defense counsel, that Kris 
allegedly had spanked Rollins' child on her bare bottom.8  We think it obvious that that testimony 
was irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and that it may have deprived 
Perritt of a fair trial, in and of itself.

 
 
[¶28]   Through the testimony of George 
Mills, a police officer for the Town of Evansville where the Perritts lived, the 
prosecution attempted to show that Kris was occasionally at the home where 
Perritt conducted her day care business.  
A significant part of his testimony only placed a vehicle owned by Kris 
at the residence.  Much of Mills' 
testimony tended to place Kris in the light of engaging in unlawful conduct, 
although the only relevance of his testimony was to place Kris at the day care 
business during its hours of operation.  
Mills' testimony should only have been admitted to the extent it actually 
placed Kris at the residence on several occasions over the course of some 13 or 
14 months.  

 
 
[¶29]   Through the testimony of witness 
Tammy Dominguez, the prosecutor managed to portray Kris as an out of control, 
very angry man, who abused his own children and his dog.  Defense counsel objected throughout her 
testimony, but all objections were overruled.  The only relevance of Dominguez's 
testimony was to place Kris at Perritt's residence, especially at times when the 
day care was in operation.

 
 

 
 
[¶30]   We hold that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain Perritt's conviction for the crime of obtaining property by 
false pretenses.  The matter is 
remanded to the district court with direction that the judgment and sentence be 
vacated and that the amended information be dismissed with 
prejudice.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶31]   
I concur almost entirely with the rationale and result of the 
majority opinion.  I write 
separately only because, for several reasons, I am not convinced that these 
circumstances would always result in insufficient evidence for a 
conviction.  First, the question of 
whether a license or certificate fits this State's particular statutory 
definition of "anything of value whether tangible or intangible," has not been 
adequately briefed or argued in this case, and I believe the matter, therefore, 
remains open for future decision.  
Second, inasmuch as the jury was instructed without objection that a 
license is not property, the law of the case doctrine may dictate a particular 
result in this case that would not be dictated in another.  Third, in addition to the license or 
certificate, money was also obtained from the State, and it seems to me that 
with appropriate proof, such could be considered the very conduct forbidden by 
the statute.  And fourth, as the 
majority points out, the allegations of the Information, coupled with the jury 
instructions, leave considerable doubt as to what act or acts of the appellant 
supposedly constituted the crime.  
In regard to this final point, I would add that this case exemplifies the 
considerable difficulties created by charging documents that cover a broad 
period of time and a broad range of conduct, yet charge only a single 
crime.

 
 
 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1Indeed, a 
condition of Husband's probation was that he was not to have unsupervised 
contact with children, except his own child and his stepchildren.  That condition of his probation was in 
effect during almost all of the time period that was the subject of the criminal 
charges against Perritt.  The only 
evidence at trial on this subject was that Kris had successfully completed his 
probation, and that he would not have been discharged from probation, and his 
probation likely would have been revoked had he violated that 
condition.

 
 
   2An interesting 
sidelight of this case is that Perritt was not permitted to have her mother 
accompany her when she was interrogated by investigators from the DFS 
Prosecution, Recovery, Investigation, Collection and Enforcement (PRICE) 
unit.  At trial, Perritt challenged 
the voluntariness of many of her statements, as well as the accuracy of the 
investigators' written summary of the tape recorded interrogation session that 
lasted almost two and one-half hours.  
A DFS investigator testified that it was their policy to have two 
investigators present during such interrogations, one to be the questioner and 
one to be a "witness."  However, the 
subject of the interrogation was not permitted to have a "witness" present.  Eventually, DFS lost the tape recording 
of the session, so Perritt was placed into the position of being in a 
credibility contest with the DFS investigators.

  
3We have 
presented this instruction in an edited format.  As presented to the jury, this 
instruction was almost indecipherable.  
Only the portions of the instruction that we have highlighted above (they 
were not highlighted in the actual instruction) were pertinent to this case, and 
we are hard pressed to understand why the instruction was not edited for 
content, as well as for decipherability, particularly in light of the 
prosecution's argument to the jury that it should ignore most of the 
instruction.

 
 
  
4This statute was 
amended in 2004, increasing the breaking point between the felony level and the 
misdemeanor level to $1,000.00.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-407 (LexisNexis 2005).

   5In this regard 
see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-410 
(LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
§ 6-3-410. Value of property may be 
aggregated in certain cases.

 
 
            
The amount of property involved in violations of W.S. 6-3-402 through 
6-3-404 and 6-3-406 through 6-3-408 committed pursuant to a common scheme or the 
same transaction, whether the property is taken from the same person or 
different persons, may be aggregated in determining the value of the 
property.

 
 
   6However, in this 
regard see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-303 (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
§ 6-5-303.  False swearing in 
nonjudicial or nonadministrative proceeding; false claims or vouchers; 
penalties.

 
 
            
(a) A person commits a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than two (2) years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00), or both, if, while under a lawfully administered oath or 
affirmation in a matter where an oath is authorized by law, he knowingly makes a 
false certificate, affidavit, acknowledgment, declaration or statement other 
than in a judicial or administrative proceeding.

            
(b) A person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than two (2) years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00), or both, if he knowingly submits a false claim or voucher with 
intent to defraud.

 
 
Also see 6 Weil's Code of Wyoming Rules, Department of Family 
services  Child Care Facility Certification, Child Care Facility Rules, Chapter 
4, Section 2 (b), 049 185 001-6 through 001-7 (2001) (licensed may be 
denied, revoked or suspended for furnishing or making any misleading or false 
statement or report to a licensor).

 
 
Also see Instruction 13 above 
wherein it is provided that DFS need not pay claims for services if information 
provided is incomplete, incorrect, or false.

 
 
Finally, compare and contrast State 
v. Clark, 690 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa App. 2004), 
2004 WL 2002423 (unpublished table decision).

 
 
  
7Although the 
context is different, these words from Justice Blume must continue to be a 
guiding force in criminal justice matters:

 
 
[W]e cannot let the conviction of a man, 
of a crime of which he is not properly proven to be guilty, stand.  There must be an orderly, systematic 
administration of justice, else it will end in chaos, and the guilt or innocence 
of a man will come to depend upon the caprice of jurors or judges.  Despite the momentary temptation to let 
the man convicted of a crime of which he is not properly proven guilty suffer 
under that conviction, though wrong, the penalty of that of which he may be 
guilty, we must set our faces sternly against that temptation, in order not to 
subvert our whole structure of civilization.  While we continually aim to let the 
principle of justice prevail in each particular case, yet we cannot lose sight 
of the fact that justice in the long run is absolutely dependent upon the fact 
that it must be administered according to the law of the land, and in an 
orderly, lawful method, and the justice administered in a particular case must 
be consistent with and meted out in the spirit of that fundamental principle 
which sustains our civilization, not for today or tomorrow, but for the ages to 
come.

 
 
Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 375 (1922); also see 
Misenheimer v. State. 2001 WY 65, ¶22, 27 P.3d 273, 282 (Wyo. 2001) (Lehman, 
J. specially concurring) ("[I]t is not the purpose or end of government to 
incarcerate as many of its citizens as possible."  (quoting Hubble v. State, 41 
Wyo. 275, 285 P. 153, 155 (1930)).

 
 
  
8We also note in 
passing, that this evidence was the purest form of hearsay and that its content 
was never substantiated, even after dogged investigation by 
DFS.