Title: In re Coyner

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 14, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
Accused.
(OSB 03-49, 03-57, 04-103; SC S53254)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 7, 2006.
Craig C. Coyner, III, Bend, argued the cause and filed the
brief for himself.
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for three
months, effective 60 days from the date of this decision.  Should
he apply for reinstatement to the Bar, the accused shall be
required to follow the procedure set out in Bar Rule 8.1(b).
*Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
This is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding in which the
accused was found guilty by a trial panel of a total of nine
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (1)
arising out of three separate matters.  The trial panel imposed a
six- month suspension from the practice of law, with the further
provision that the accused be required to apply for reinstatement
formally.  The accused appeals from that decision.  For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the trial panel's findings
respecting the accused's guilt, but modify its choice of
sanction.
We make the following preliminary observations.  The
accused's brief raises three different kinds of issues.  The
first kind of issue involves various procedural concerns about
the course of the trial panel proceedings.  We have considered
the accused's concerns, but find no basis for concluding that any
of them affected the quality or accuracy of the proceeding, or in
any way prejudiced the accused.  A more complete explanation of
them would not benefit the public, the bench, or the bar.
The second kind of issue that the accused presents
revolves around the question of his guilt of the charges against
him.  However, as we shall explain, a stipulation by the accused
at the beginning of the trial panel hearing process significantly
limits our review of those matters.
The third kind of issue involves the question of
sanction.  Unfortunately, although the accused raised the issues,
he failed to develop them in any substantive way in his brief and
did little more during his oral presentation to this court. 
However, the Bar has briefed the matter extensively, and the bulk
of the hearing before the trial panel was devoted to that
question.  We therefore have a sufficient record, even with only
limited assistance from the accused, to assess and assign an
appropriate sanction for the accused's conduct.
I.  BACKGROUND AND DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS
We turn to a discussion of the background facts and the
charges against the accused.  As noted, the Bar charged the
accused with nine violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility arising out of three separate matters.  The
accused stipulated at the beginning of the hearing before the
trial panel that the Bar could prove the facts alleged in its
Amended Formal Complaint by clear and convincing evidence.  The
trial panel therefore found the accused guilty in each matter. 
In spite of that stipulation, the accused appears (at least in
his brief) to take exception to certain of the findings of guilt. 
We review the facts of each of the matters briefly.  (The facts
stated either were stipulated to or otherwise appear to be
uncontested.)
The accused is a Bend area lawyer with 32 years of
experience.  He has a history of bipolar disorder, which went
incorrectly diagnosed for a time.  That misdiagnosis appears to
have played some role in the difficulties that arose between the
accused and the Bar, although the accused does not assert (and we
do not independently find) that his condition excuses his
conduct.
A.  The Amos Matter
The accused was appointed to represent Amos in an
appeal.  For nearly a year, the accused had no communication with
Amos and took no action with respect to the appeal.  The Court of
Appeals notified the accused that, unless he made a showing to
justify continuing the appeal, it would be dismissed.  The
accused made no effort to make that showing and the appeal was
dismissed.  The accused did not notify Amos of that fact; Amos
learned of it from an independent source nearly four months
later.  Based on the foregoing, the Bar charged (and the trial
panel found) that the accused was guilty of, among other things,
neglect of a legal matter, DR 6-101(B).
Given his stipulation that the Bar could prove the
underlying facts by clear and convincing evidence, the accused
has no ground on which to challenge the factual basis for the
trial panel's finding of guilt.  He does argue, however, that (1)
there was no arguable legal merit to the Amos appeal; (2) he
therefore could not ethically have pursued it; and (3) it follows
that he could not be found guilty of neglect of a matter "that he
could not ethically nor legally pursue."  That is not the law. 
The lawyer must communicate bad news as well as good to the
client, and failing to do so in a timely manner is neglect of a
legal matter.  See, e.g., In re Geurts, 290 Or 241, 246 n 6, 620
P2d 1373 (1980) (lawyer's opinion that client's case lacked merit
did not excuse neglect, at least to extent of so informing
client).  We find the accused guilty of neglect in his handling
of the Amos matter.
The trial panel also found the accused guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(4), in connection with the Amos matter, based on his
failure to respond to a show cause order and other inquiries by
the Court of Appeals.  The accused does not offer any discernable
defense with respect to that charge.  We find him guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(4).
B.  The Muschitz Matter
Muschitz, an Ohio resident, hired the accused to
attempt to obtain a modification of a child support obligation
imposed on Muschitz by an Oregon decree.  During the ensuing
proceedings, the opposing lawyer filed a motion to require
Muschitz to produce certain documents.  Muschitz supplied some of
-- but not all -- the documents to the accused, who then failed
to provide them to the opposing lawyer.  Eventually, that failure
led to a motion by the opposing lawyer to dismiss Muschitz's
case.  The accused did not inform Muschitz of the motion and did
not respond to the motion on Muschitz's behalf.  When the trial
court allowed the motion, the accused did not inform Muschitz of
that fact or of the fact that the trial court had included a
judgment against Muschitz.  The trial panel found that the
conduct described constituted neglect of a legal matter and that
the accused had violated DR 6-101(B).
The accused's only defense to the above charge is the
same defense that he offered in the Amos case -- there was no
merit to Muschitz's legal position and, therefore, the accused
could not ethically pursue it.  As we have explained with respect
to the Amos matter, however, that argument is unresponsive to the
charge and we reject it.  As did the trial panel, we find the
accused guilty of neglecting a legal matter in the Muschitz
litigation.
The Bar also charged the accused in the Muschitz matter
with violating two other disciplinary rules -- DR 9-101(A)
(failure to deposit client funds in a trust account) and DR 9-101(C)(3) (failure to render appropriate accountings to a
client).  The charges arose out of the fact that Muschitz sent
the accused two checks totaling $1,000 for work that the accused
would perform in the case, to be earned by the accused at the
rate of $150 per hour.  The accused deposited one of those checks
in his general account before having earned all of it and did not
deposit the other check in his client trust account at all. 
After Muschitz repeatedly asked the accused for an accounting,
the accused gave an accounting orally but never reduced the
accounting to writing.
So far as we understand them, the accused's only
arguments respecting the foregoing facts are that (1) he only
transferred a small amount of money to his own account before it
was earned; (2) although his records are insufficient to prove
it, the transfer may have been justified in full; and (3) he
thought that an oral accounting would be enough.  However, those
arguments are contrary to the accused's stipulations concerning
the Bar's evidence.  We find the accused guilty of those two
additional violations.
The Bar's investigation of the Muschitz matter led to
one more charge, this one involving failure to cooperate in a
disciplinary investigation, DR 1-103(C).  The stipulated facts
are that the accused failed on at least two separate occasions to
provide information related to the Bar's investigation. (2) 
The accused acknowledges as much, but asserts that the Bar wanted
too much too fast, given the accused's fragile (and misdiagnosed)
mental health condition.  Even if that were true at the outset of
the Bar's investigation, however, the accused does not appear to
have asked for more time during the investigation, even after he
hired another lawyer to help him.  We find the accused guilty of
violating DR 1-103(C) in the Muschitz matter.
C.  The Accused's Criminal Charges
On December 15, 2003, the accused was charged with
resisting arrest and criminal mischief.  The accused was released
conditionally pending trial.  One condition of that release
prohibited the accused from consuming alcohol and visiting bars
and taverns.  Within a month, the accused twice violated that
condition by consuming alcohol.  The accused was charged with
contempt of court respecting each of the two alcohol consumption
incidents.  Eventually, the accused pleaded no contest to the
resisting arrest charge and the two contempt charges.  He was
found guilty on all three charges and was placed on probation for
24 months.  Thereafter, the Bar requested information about the
episode from the accused.  The accused failed to respond.  
The Bar asserted, and the trial panel found, that the
facts underlying the accused's contempt convictions constituted a
violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice) and DR 7-106(A) (disregard of
tribunal's ruling during course of proceeding).  Based on the
accused's failure to respond to the Bar's inquiries, the Bar also
asserted, and the trial panel also found, that the accused had
violated DR 1-103(C) (failure to cooperate in Bar investigation).
The accused's only defense to those disciplinary
charges is that he could not have been guilty of the two contempt
offenses because there were irregularities respecting the
charging instruments.  It follows, he reasons, that the release
agreement respecting those offenses that was the basis of the two
contempt charges was derivatively invalid and, therefore, he
could not legally have been in contempt of anything.
What the accused is doing here is mounting a collateral
attack on the charges of which he was convicted.  The accused did
not appeal those convictions.  And, as this court has explained
in other settings, an unappealed conviction ordinarily becomes a
verity when the time for appeal has run.  See ORS 9.527
(providing that conviction of certain types of offense is grounds
for disbarment, suspension from Bar membership, or reprimand, and
stating that, in such matters, "the record of the conviction
shall be conclusive evidence").  See also State v. Probst, 339 Or
612, 626-25, 124 P3d 1237 (2006) (illustrating that rule). 
Nothing about the subject matter of the present proceeding or the
nature of the accused's collateral attack suggests that the
ordinary rule should not apply.  The time for the accused's
appeal of the two contempt convictions -- if there were to have
been one -- elapsed years ago.  He cannot now attack the charging
instruments collaterally.  We find the accused guilty of
violating DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-106(A), and DR 1-103(C) in the
2003 criminal matter.  
In summary, we find the accused guilty of each
disciplinary violation that the Bar alleged.  We turn to the
issue of sanction. 
II.  SANCTION 
As noted, the trial panel imposed a six-month
suspension, with the proviso that the accused be required to make
a formal application for reinstatement.  In selecting that
sanction, the trial panel appears to have fully credited evidence
offered by the accused that, during the period in question, the
accused was suffering from both an incorrectly diagnosed mental
condition and a chemical dependency problem.  (The trial panel
specifically noted that both problems now seem to be under
control, due in significant part to the accused's own efforts.) 
Respecting the sanction, the accused asks only that this court
modify the sanction to five years' probation under a set of
conditions that have been recommended by a psychiatrist who
examined him.  For its part, the Bar simply notes that the
sanction that the trial panel imposed is within the parameters
set both by the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and by
this court's case law.  In addition, the Bar particularly urges
that the accused be required to go through the formal
reinstatement process, in order better to ensure that the accused
is mentally fit to practice law.
A.  Methodology
The trial panel correctly considered the ABA Standards
and this court's case law in seeking to identify the appropriate
sanction.  We follow the same paradigm.  See, e.g., In re
Paulson, 341 Or 13, 29, 136 P3d 1087 (2006) (describing
paradigm).  This court considers three factors set out in the ABA
Standards:  (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state;
and (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct. 
ABA Standard 3.0.  Based on its evaluation of those factors, the
court then arrives at a tentative sanction, which it adjusts,
where appropriate, based on aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.  See Paulson, 341 Or at 29-34 (illustrating
process).
B.  Duties Violated
The most important duties that a lawyer owes are those
owed to the client.  ABA Standards at 5.  In his case, the
accused failed in his duty both to Amos and to Muschitz when he
neglected their legal matters.  He further failed in his duty to
Muschitz when he mishandled funds in Muschitz's case and then
failed to account for them appropriately. 
The accused also violated duties that he owed to the
legal system to avoid conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice in both the Amos case and the criminal matter.  
Equally serious was his failure to obey court orders. 
Finally, the accused violated his duty to the
profession in both the Amos and Muschitz matters when he failed
to cooperate with the Bar's investigations. 
C.  Mental State
As to the mental state element, we agree with the trial
panel and the Bar that the accused acted knowingly when he
neglected the Amos legal matter and intentionally when he failed
to respond to the order to show cause in that case.  In the
Muschitz matter, we find the majority of the accused's violations
to have been knowing, with the exception of his failure to
cooperate with the Bar's investigation:  We find that latter
violation to have been intentional.  The accused's violation of
DR 9-101(A) (respecting his failure to deposit client funds in a
trust account) was negligent.  In the criminal case, the accused
acted intentionally.
D.  Injury
An injury can be either actual or potential.  ABA
Standards at 6-7; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280
(1992).  Here, the accused's violations caused actual injury to
both Amos and Muschitz.  The Bar also was injured by the
accused's failure to cooperate, because the Bar was required to
engage in efforts that should not have been necessary to complete
its investigations.  The accused's actions in the criminal matter
injured the legal system itself by requiring contempt
proceedings.
E.  Preliminary Sanction
The combination of (for the most part) intentional and
knowing mental states with actual injury caused suggests that, at
the least, a significant period of suspension is the appropriate
sanction in this case.  ABA Standard 4.42(a) (suspension
appropriate when lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
client and causes actual potential injury to client); ABA
Standard 6.22 (suspension appropriate when lawyer violates court
order and there is actual or potential injury to client or legal
proceeding); ABA Standard 7.2 (suspension appropriate when lawyer
violates duty to profession and causes actual or potential injury
to legal system).  With that kind of presumptive sanction in
mind, we turn to the aggravating and mitigating factors.
F.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The trial panel found several aggravating factors and
two mitigating ones.  Although we do not in every instance agree
with the trial panel's assessments, we conclude that the various
factors are sufficiently balanced so that they leave the
presumptive sanction -- suspension -- unaffected.  We discuss one
mitigating factor -- mental disability or chemical dependency --
fully, because the accused relies heavily on that factor with
respect to the issue of sanction.  
The trial panel found that there was medical evidence
of both mental disability and chemical dependency (alcoholism)
and that both conditions caused or contributed to the underlying
misconduct.  See ABA Standard 9.32(i)(1), (2) (amended 1992). 
The Bar disagrees with the trial panel insofar as it relies on
chemical dependency as a mitigating factor.  The Bar does not
dispute that chemical dependence played a role in the accused's
disciplinary rule violations.  It points out, however, that, in
order for chemical dependency to be considered in mitigation of a
disciplinary rule violation, the record must show not only that
that condition played a role, but also that (1) the accused since
that time has experienced a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation; and (2) the recovery is such that
recurrence of the misconduct is unlikely.  See ABA Standard
9.32(i)(3), (4) (amended 1992) (setting those requirements); In
re Cohen (Cohen II), 330 Or 489, 502-03, 8 P3d 953 (2000)
(explaining requirements).
The trial panel concluded that the accused had met the
foregoing test.  In so concluding, it relied on testimony from a
psychiatrist, the head of the Bar's own Oregon Attorney
Assistance Program, and a number of the accused's fellow lawyers,
all to the effect that the accused met the Cohen II standard. 
The Bar, on the other hand, relies on testimony from two other
experts that casts significant doubt on the optimistic
assessments on which the trial panel relied.
A detailed recitation and review of the evidence in
question would not benefit the parties, the public, the Bar, or
the bench.  It is sufficient here for us to say that, having
reviewed all the evidence de novo, we do not find it to
preponderate in favor of the accused on the issue.  Certainly,
the accused has made significant strides.  But those strides are
too recent and too incomplete to satisfy us that the accused has
achieved remission.  Given that assessment of the record, the
accused has failed to show that the mitigating factor of chemical
dependency is present. 
G.  Case Law
We turn to this court's case law.  Our previous cases
indicate that some period of suspension is appropriate.  See,
e.g., In re LaBahn, 335 Or 357, 359-67, 67 P3d 381 (2003) 
(lawyer previously admonished for violating DR 6-101(B) given 60-day suspension for violating same rule); In re Meyer II, 328 Or
220, 970 P2d 647 (1999) (lawyer previously reprimanded for
neglect of legal matter given one-year suspension for again
violating DR 6-101(B)).  Certainly, under the precedents, the
number and breadth of the accused's rule violations also calls
for a suspension. (3)  
As to the length of the sanction, the one that the
trial panel chose doubtless is within the acceptable range. 
However, both the trial panel's choice of sanction and our own
reading of the record suggest that the accused has a very good
chance of recovering from his problems and resuming his position
as a respected member of his legal community.  We do not think
that a suspension of more than three months is necessary to make
it possible to assess the accused's condition and his ability to
rejoin the profession.  We therefore suspend the accused for
three months.  We think that, when that sanction is coupled with
the requirement that the accused go through the formal
reinstatement process, the public will be adequately protected
and, at the same time, the accused will have a reasonable
opportunity to show that he has overcome his dependency and is
once again fit to practice law. (4)
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
three month, effective 60 days from the date of this decision. 
Should he apply for reinstatement to the Bar, the accused shall
be required to follow the procedure set out in Bar Rule 8.1(b).
1. The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became
effective January 1, 2005.  Because the conduct at issue in this
case occurred before that date, we apply the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
2. One occasion was the accused's failure to make his
Muschitz file available.  A Local Professional Responsibility
Committee (LPRC) eventually had to subpoena the file.
3. The accused argues otherwise, seeking instead to have
this court reinstate him conditionally, subject to a long period
of probation.  However, the assumption underlying that
alternative approach is that we will be convinced, on this
record, not only that the accused has eliminated his chemical
dependancy problem, but also that he will be unlikely to suffer a
relapse.  As we elsewhere have indicated, however, we are not
sufficiently satisfied as to the first point and therefore cannot
have the requisite degree of confidence as to the second.  It
follows that we do not accept the accused's suggested sanction.
4. Ordinarily, a member of the Bar who has been suspended
for misconduct for a period of six months or less would be
reinstated upon the filing of a Compliance Affidavit.  BR 8.3. 
However, as BR 8.3 acknowledges, this court may give other
directions for reinstatement.