Title: State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5109.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5109 
THE STATE EX REL. HARRIS ET AL. v. RUBINO, FIN. DIR., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-5109.] 
Attorney Fees—Application granted in part—Relators are entitled to a reasonable 
fee—Reasonable fee is a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number 
of hours reasonably expended—Significant number of interoffice 
communication 
between 
lawyers 
at 
two 
firms 
and 
intraoffice 
communications between lawyers at the same firm warrant substantial 
deduction in fees awarded—Court will no longer grant attorney-fee 
applications that include block-billing, that is, lumping multiple tasks into 
a single time entry. 
(No. 2018-1129—Submitted November 14, 2018—Decided December 20, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} On September 7, 2018, we granted relators, Mark A. Harris, Richard 
N. Haig, Jacqueline L. Kogan, Cheryl L. Davis, and Travis Lane Maggard (the 
“committee”), their allowable costs and reasonable attorney fees under R.C. 733.61 
in connection with their successful petition for a writ of mandamus ordering 
respondent Solon Director of Finance Matt Rubino to certify the sufficiency and 
validity of a zoning initiative petition to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.  
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3609, ___ N.E.3d ___.  The committee has filed 
an itemized application seeking a total of $106,172.50 in attorney fees and 
$1,256.65 in costs.  We grant the application in part. 
I. ANALYSIS 
A. Scope of the Taxpayer Demand 
{¶ 2} Respondents city of Solon, Solon City Council, and Rubino (the 
“city”) do not attack the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates or the amount 
of time expended.  The city instead asks us to reject the committee’s application 
because the committee’s initial taxpayer-demand letter did not articulate the basis 
upon which this court ultimately granted a writ of mandamus.  The city is incorrect: 
the taxpayer-demand letter sought the relief that this court later granted and it 
incorporated the reasoning that this court relied on.  We find, moreover, that the 
committee “had good cause to believe that [its] allegations were well founded, [and 
that] they are sufficient in law,” R.C. 733.61. 
B. Attorney Fees 
{¶ 3} The committee is entitled to reasonable attorney fees under R.C. 
733.61.  To determine a reasonable fee, we begin by multiplying a reasonable 
hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.  Bittner v. Tri-Cty. Toyota, 
Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991).  The resulting figure provides 
an initial estimate of the value of the lawyers’ services.  Id.  We may then adjust 
the fee award upward or downward, based on the factors listed in Prof.Cond.R. 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
1.5(a).  See Bittner at syllabus.  Ultimately, what factors to apply and what amount 
of fees to award are within our sound discretion.  Id. at 146. 
1. Reasonable Hourly Rates 
{¶ 4} A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant 
community, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 
(1984), given the complexity of the issues and the experience of the attorney, see 
W. Unity ex rel. Beltz v. Merillat, 169 Ohio App.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-5105, 861 
N.E.2d 902, ¶ 28-35 (6th Dist.).  The committee has submitted the affidavit of an 
independent attorney attesting that its attorneys’ rates are reasonable.  After 
benchmarking them against rates recently approved for equally experienced 
attorneys in comparably complex cases, we agree.  See, e.g., Northeast Ohio 
Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 714-718 (6th Cir.2016); 
Palombaro v. Emery Fed. Credit Union, S.D.Ohio No. 1:15-CV-792, 2018 WL 
5312687, *5-6, *10-12 (Oct. 25, 2018). 
2. Hours Reasonably Expended 
{¶ 5} Next we must determine the hours reasonably expended, that is, 
whether the hours submitted by the committee’s attorneys were reasonable.  Hours 
not properly billed to a client are also not properly billed to an adversary.  Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).  We 
therefore exclude “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”  
Id. 
{¶ 6} This task is made extremely difficult in this case by counsel’s use of 
block billing, i.e., “lumping multiple tasks into a single time entry,” Tridico v. Dist. 
of Columbia, 235 F.Supp.3d 100, 109 (D.D.C.2017).  Block billing is disfavored 
by many clients and courts, see e.g., Caryl, Reconsidering Block-Billing Practices, 
Wash.St.B. News (Jan. 2011) 12, because “there is simply no way * * * to assess 
whether the time spent on each of those tasks was reasonable when they are lumped 
together,” Tridico at 109.  Some courts reject attorney-fee applications containing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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block-billed time entries.  See, e.g., Walker v. Gruver, M.D.Pa. Nos. 1:11-CV-1223 
and 1:11-CV-1224, 2013 WL 5947623, *13 (Nov. 5, 2013) (collecting cases).  
Others apply across-the-board cuts to account for time unreasonably billed.  E.g., 
Fulkerson v. Yaskawa Am., Inc., S.D.Ohio No. 3:13-CV-130, 2015 WL 6408120, 
*6. 
{¶ 7} We take this opportunity to clarify that this court will no longer grant 
attorney-fee applications that include block-billed time entries.  Future fee 
applications submitted to this court should contain separate time entries for each 
task, with the time expended on each task denoted in tenths of an hour.  
Applications failing to meet these criteria risk denial in full. 
{¶ 8} In its decision on the merits in this case, this court instructed the 
committee to exclude from its application any request for fees for preparing eight 
pages of the committee’s reply brief that were stricken for exceeding the page limit.  
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3609, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 36.  The committee 
does so by reducing the number of hours spent on the reply brief by 28.57 percent, 
which is the percentage of the brief that was stricken.  We approve of this 
methodology, but we find that the application undercounts the number of hours 
attributable to the reply brief, and we adjust the calculations accordingly. 
{¶ 9} In addition, we find that the hours in the committee’s application 
warrant substantial reductions.  The application includes a significant number of 
interoffice communications between the committee’s two law firms and intraoffice 
communications among lawyers at each firm that were double- or triple-billed.  See 
Howe v. Akron, N.D.Ohio No. 5:06-cv-2779, 2016 WL 916701, *11 (Mar. 10, 
2016), aff’d, 705 Fed.Appx. 376 (6th Cir.2017).  It also includes a strikingly high 
number of instances in which two or more experienced attorneys at one of the 
committee’s law firms billed a similar amount of time on the same day for 
performing the exact same tasks.  See Northeast Ohio Coalition, 831 F.3d at 704; 
Howe at *11.  While a divide-and-conquer approach is understandable in an 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
expedited case, the application instead reflects multiple attorneys performing the 
same tasks at the same times.  The application also contains a small number of 
public-relations tasks that should not have been included in a bill for attorney fees, 
see Gunasekera v. Irwin, 774 F.Supp.2d 882, 890-891 (S.D.Ohio 2011), and 
paralegal tasks that should have been billed at paralegal rates, see Howe at *15. 
{¶ 10} We conclude that the degree of overbilled communication and, in 
particular, the extent of the duplicative staffing merits substantial reductions of 30 
percent for the hours of Donald J. McTigue, Derek S. Clinger, Benjamin F.C. 
Wallace, and Robert T. McDowall, and 50 percent for the hours of Majeed G. 
Makhlouf, Jordan Berns, Sheldon Berns, and Benjamin J. Ockner.  See Howe at 
*17 (collecting cases). 
3. Calculations 
{¶ 11} Taking into account the reductions discussed above, we calculate the 
initial reasonable-fee estimate for each attorney and the total figure as follows. 
Attorney 
Reasonable 
Hours 
Reasonable Rate  
 
Reasonable-Fee 
Estimate 
Donald 
J. 
McTigue 
20.0 hours 
x $550 = 
$11,000 
Derek S. Clinger 
49.3 hours 
x $250 = 
$12,325 
Ben F.C. Wallace 4.0 hours 
x $200 = 
$800 
Majeed 
G. 
Makhlouf 
42.9 hours 
x $350 = 
$15,015 
Jordan Berns 
46.5 hours 
x $350 = 
$16,275 
Sheldon Berns 
3.6 hours 
x $450 = 
$1,620 
Benjamin 
J. 
Ockner 
1.6 hours 
x $325 = 
$520 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Robert 
T. 
McDowall 
7.6 hours 
x $250 = 
$1,900 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL 
175.5 hours 
 
$58,655 
 
{¶ 12} We find that the relevant Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors are subsumed 
within our initial calculation.  Therefore, we will not further adjust the award based 
on those factors.  See Miller v. Grimsley, 197 Ohio App.3d 167, 2011-Ohio-6049, 
966 N.E.2d 932, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). 
C. Costs 
{¶ 13} The committee seeks costs for (1) filing fees, (2) court-reporter fees 
for having two city-council meetings transcribed, and (3) postage and conference-
call expenses.  The committee’s filing fees will be refunded, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 
12.05(A)(2)(c), so we need not award them as costs.  Expenses for necessary 
transcripts of proceedings are allowable as costs under R.C. 2303.21.  However, we 
find that the council-meeting transcripts, only one of which was submitted to the 
court, were not necessary.  Postage and conference-call expenses, moreover, are 
not generally allowable as costs.  E.g., State v. Sewell, 4th Dist. Ross No. 
11CA3207, 2011-Ohio-5532, ¶ 15. 
II. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 14} In light of the foregoing, we grant in part the application for attorney 
fees and deny the application for costs.  We award relators $58,655 in attorney fees.  
In addition, we give notice that this court will no longer grant attorney-fee 
applications that include block-billed time entries. 
Application granted in part 
and denied in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and would not award 
attorney fees for activities done before July 31, 2018, the date that relators were 
notified that Solon’s law director had rejected their demand, but in all other respects 
concurs in the majority opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 15} I agree with the majority’s statement that in the future, block billing, 
that is, billing for a block of time in which several separate tasks were performed, 
will no longer be permitted in applications for attorney fees in this court and that 
tasks should be billed individually and in tenths of an hour.  I also agree that in the 
application submitted by relators, Mark A. Harris, Richard N. Haig, Jacqueline L. 
Kogan, Cheryl L. Davis, and Travis Lane Maggard (the “committee”), to recover 
attorney fees in connection with the committee’s successful petition for a writ of 
mandamus, the attorneys’ bills undercounted the hours that are attributable to the 
committee’s reply brief in the mandamus action and that the charges for preparing 
that brief are subject to a 28.57 percent reduction.  I do not agree, however, that the 
plain language of R.C. 733.61 permits the committee to be reimbursed for the 
attorney fees incurred before the Solon law director rejected the committee’s 
written demand that the law director seek a writ of mandamus to compel the city to 
submit the committee’s initiative petition to the board of elections.  Reimbursable 
attorney fees should be calculated beginning with the committee’s response to that 
rejection.  Further, as to the attorney fees incurred after the law director refused to 
bring a mandamus action, I do not agree with the majority’s “substantial 
reductions” applied across the board to the remainder of the fees that were requested 
and its refusal to award the committee its requested costs. 
{¶ 16} In our decision issuing the writ sought by the committee (the “writ 
action”), we awarded attorney fees but required the committee to file “an itemized 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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application and independent evidence supporting the reasonableness of the hourly 
rates charged and the hours billed.”  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3609, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 36.  The committee has done what we asked, submitting as 
independent evidence an affidavit from an expert that supports the reasonableness 
of the attorneys’ billing.  Respondents, city of Solon, Solon City Council, and Solon 
Director of Finance Matt Rubino (collectively, the “city”), do not dispute the 
reasonableness of the hours expended or the committee’s hiring of two law firms, 
each with expertise in the two unrelated fields of law that were brought to bear in 
this expedited elections matter involving zoning.  While the majority, under the 
guise of independent judicial review, finds that the hours expended were 
unreasonable, it does so without analyzing the actual time expended, and it leaves 
unaddressed the expert testimony submitted.  Its across-the-board deductions lack 
support in the record. 
{¶ 17} We also granted the committee its costs in the writ action, but 
contrary to the majority’s findings regarding this application for fees, the costs 
sought here are payable under the plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 733.61, 
and should be paid in full. 
I.  Attorney Fees 
A.  R.C. 733.58. 733.59, and 733.61 provide the statutory basis for the award of 
attorney fees 
{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 733.58, “when an officer * * * of a municipal 
corporation fails to perform any duty expressly enjoined by law or ordinance, the  
* * * city director of law shall apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the performance of the duty.”  If the law director fails to 
apply for the writ after a taxpayer has made a written request to do so, the taxpayer 
“may institute suit in his own name, on behalf of the municipal corporation.”  R.C. 
733.59. 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
{¶ 19} Under the “American Rule,” the “prevailing litigant is ordinarily not 
entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”  Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 
(1975).  But R.C. 733.61 contains an exception to the general rule. 
{¶ 20} The General Assembly in R.C. 733.61 states that if a court hearing a 
taxpayer action under R.C. 733.59 is “satisfied that the taxpayer has good cause to 
believe that his allegations were well founded, or if they are sufficient in law, it 
shall make such order as the equity of the case demands.  * * * [T]he taxpayer shall 
be allowed his costs, and, if judgment is finally ordered in his favor, he may be 
allowed, as part of the costs, a reasonable compensation for his attorney.” 
{¶ 21} Our duty in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the 
General Assembly.  Griffith v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-
1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-
5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20.  “When the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this 
court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.”  Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees 
v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  Rather, “[a]n 
unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio 
St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} The plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 733.61 establishes two 
criteria to recover attorney fees as part of the costs of an action filed under R.C. 
733.59.  The first provision is a gatekeeping mechanism that requires a court to find 
either that the taxpayer had “good cause to believe” his complaint was “well 
founded” or that the complaint was “sufficient in law.”  If either finding is made, 
the court must issue an order as equity demands and the taxpayer is to be awarded 
his costs.  Second, if a judgment is issued in the taxpayer’s favor, the court may 
allow, “as part of the costs, a reasonable compensation for his attorney.”  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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determination of what is “reasonable,” then, establishes the amount, if any, a 
taxpayer is entitled to recover. 
{¶ 23} The majority finds, and I agree, that the committee “ ‘had good cause 
to believe that [its] allegations were well founded, [and that] they are sufficient in 
law.’ ”  Majority opinion at ¶ 2.  Therefore, the threshold criterion is met, and 
because this court issued the writ of mandamus requested by the committee, this 
court had the discretion to award attorney fees.  Having determined in the writ 
decision that the committee is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, we now must to 
determine whether the fees requested by the committee are reasonable. 
{¶ 24} First, we must decide whether the committee is entitled to an award 
of fees for the work performed by its attorneys before the city’s law director refused 
to seek the writ of mandamus.  Construing the applicable statutes together yields 
the conclusion that the only fees that are reimbursable are those for the attorneys’ 
work after the law director refused to bring an action.  Under R.C 733.61, the court 
“hearing a case under section 733.59” may award attorney fees.  So we begin from 
the point that the case for which attorney fees may be awarded is an R.C. 733.59 
case.  Under R.C. 733.59, a taxpayer’s right to sue does not arise until after a law 
director fails to file suit.  Therefore an R.C. 733.59 case, by definition, is one that 
arises from the refusal of a taxpayer request.  It has no life before that refusal.  It 
follows that compensable costs from “a case under section 733.59” are only those 
that arose after the law director’s failure to act. 
{¶ 25} This makes sense considering the statutory scheme.  A taxpayer who 
is successful through the preparation of a written request in urging the city law 
director to bring a mandamus action does not receive compensation for the effort 
undertaken to convince the law director to bring the action.  Had the law director 
here responded positively to the committee’s demand letter, the committee would 
not have been entitled to any fees for its efforts.  The availability of attorney fees 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
arises only when the taxpayer has brought a worthy action by the taxpayer’s own 
effort. 
{¶ 26} The committee’s attorneys were notified by the law director that he 
had rejected the committee’s demand on July 31, 2018.  At that point, the 
committee’s right to bring a taxpayer suit arose under R.C. 733.59.  I would hold 
that the calculation of an award of attorney fees begins on that date.  Therefore, I 
would deduct $8,330 from the bill from Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C. (the 
“Berns firm”) and $13,280 from the bill from McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C. (the 
“McTigue firm”). 
B.  The majority abandons the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors for determining 
reasonableness 
{¶ 27} The majority cites Bittner v. Tri-Cty. Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 
145, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991), as authority for determining reasonable attorney fees.  
While I agree that Bittner gives us a road map for determining whether the time 
claimed in a fee application is reasonable, I disagree with the majority’s 
unexplained decision to abandon the road map and chart its own course. 
{¶ 28} In Bittner, we held, “When awarding reasonable attorney fees * * *, 
the trial court should first calculate the number of hours reasonably expended on 
the case times an hourly fee, and then may modify that calculation by the 
application of the factors listed in [former] DR 2-106(B) [now Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(a)].”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 29} In the first step, the “prevailing party should make a good faith effort 
to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 
40 (1983).  The number of hours reasonably expended are then multiplied by the 
reasonable hourly rate.  The resulting number is often called the “lodestar figure.”  
See, e.g., Sims v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2015-Ohio-5367, 55 N.E.3d 488, ¶ 22 (10th 
Dist.). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
{¶ 30} In the second step, Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) sets forth factors to consider 
when determining whether a fee is reasonable: 
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of 
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 
service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
{¶ 31} Although consideration of these factors is described as the second 
part of the attorney-fee-calculation process in Bittner—after the number of hours 
reasonably expended on the litigation are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate—
the two steps “may overlap * * * because several of the reasonableness factors are 
often subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation.”  Miller v. Grimsley, 197 
Ohio App.3d 167, 2011-Ohio-6049, 966 N.E.2d 932, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 32} Since step one considers the “reasonableness” of the hours charged, 
it follows that the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors should be considered when 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
determining what is reasonable.  This is especially true when dealing with a case in 
which attorney fees are awarded pursuant to R.C. 733.61, which allows as part of 
costs “a reasonable compensation for [the taxpayer’s] attorney.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Pursuant to R.C. 1.42, “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical 
or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be 
construed accordingly.”  We should construe the word “reasonableness” for the 
purpose of awarding fees under R.C. 733.61 by applying the “particular meaning” 
of reasonableness developed by this court in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
{¶ 33} The majority opinion does not analyze the time expended in light of 
the specific facts of this case or examine the reasonableness factors set forth in 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a).  In this way, the majority opinion lacks both context and 
structure.  By unmooring the reasonableness determination from the factors in 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and failing to juxtapose the time the attorneys claimed in the 
fee application with the progress of the election litigation in real time, the majority 
summarily determines that a portion of the time expended is unreasonable.  I do not 
agree with this approach. 
C.  The majority’s reasons for its substantial reductions are unavailing 
{¶ 34} The majority’s basic conclusion—sitting in judgment months after 
the maelstrom of litigation was complete—is that the committee’s legal team in this 
expedited election case was overstaffed.  It then applies drastic, across-the-board 
cuts to the fees requested apparently based on a gut reaction to the itemized 
statements in the fee application, after it reviewed the statements outside of the facts 
of the case and without considering the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) or the 
affidavit of the committee’s expert. 
{¶ 35} The majority gives lip service to the fact that this case involved an 
expedited election matter with extraordinarily tight time frames.  It acknowledges 
that a “divide-and-conquer approach is understandable in an expedited case,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 9, but decries the committee’s attorneys when they work 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
together.  For the majority, dividing work is the only acceptable way of attacking a 
case with an expedited timeline; a team approach is unreasonable.  But to the 
contrary, it makes perfect sense that in a novel area of the law, in a tight timeframe, 
more than one attorney might develop arguments and review and draft the same 
documents.  The committee had one shot to get its initiative on the November 2018 
ballot—that the law firms may have put multiple eyes on the same documents is 
not necessarily excessive.  A collaborative approach is not inherently unreasonable, 
especially considering the truncated timeframe of the writ action. 
{¶ 36} One object of the majority’s criticism is the number of interoffice 
communications between the Berns firm and the McTigue firm, the committee’s 
two law firms, and of intraoffice communications among lawyers at each firm that 
were double- or triple-billed.  In support of this criticism, the majority relies on 
Howe v. Akron, N.D.Ohio No. 5:06-cv-2779, 2016 WL 916701 (Mar. 10, 2016), 
aff’d, 705 Fed.Appx. 376 (6th Cir.2017).  However, the majority’s reliance on 
Howe is misplaced. 
{¶ 37} In Howe, Akron firefighters alleged race, age, and equal-protection 
violations under federal law.  After it rendered judgment for the firefighters on 
some claims, the court addressed the firefighters’ request for attorney fees.  It found 
that the billing statements contained “evidence of redundancy” and questioned the 
need for the involvement of two law firms given that the local law firm that had 
been hired first was considered to have expertise in the area of law.  This is not the 
case here. 
{¶ 38} The Berns law firm was handling the development project that 
required the zoning initiative and became ensnared in an unusual circumstance 
when the city failed to place the initiative on the November 2018 ballot.  The city 
instead argued that the initiative should be read by title at three separate city-council 
meetings.  Being placed between a rock and a hard place by the city, the Berns firm 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
then contacted the McTigue firm, which was quickly hired to handle the fast-paced, 
time-sensitive elections action. 
{¶ 39} The fact that these two law firms, with vastly different areas of legal 
expertise, engaged in significant interoffice and intraoffice communications while 
embroiled in the expedited elections case is to be expected.  “Multiple-lawyer 
litigation is common and not inherently unreasonable.”  Northeast Ohio Coalition 
for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 704 (6th Cir.2016).  “There is no hard-
and-fast rule as to how many lawyers can be at a meeting or how many hours 
lawyers can spend discussing a project.”  Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 
F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir.2007). 
{¶ 40} The committee’s application for attorney fees contained detailed 
billing statements from both firms, even though in some cases each firm collected 
several tasks in block entries.  If the majority believes the legal team was 
overstaffed, why doesn’t it specifically identify the offending time entries and 
reduce the fees by the amount of the fee in that entry or if the fees were part of 
block-billed entries, reduce the fees by the entire block-billed entry?  Moreover, 
what is the source of the majority’s across-the-board reduction-percentage 
formula?  It reads like a punishment. 
{¶ 41} The majority cites Howe (“See Howe at *17 [collecting cases],” 
majority opinion at ¶ 10) in support of its across-the-board reductions.  Again, 
Howe is a bad example.  In that case, the defendant mounted a robust attack against 
the reasonableness of the attorney-fee application, disputing thousands of hours of 
charges.  The court extensively reviewed the bills and found that “[t]he task of 
trimming the fat to exclude excessive or redundant hours is hindered by the fact 
that the billing records suffer from a troubling lack of detail.”  Id. at *12.  The court 
ultimately concluded, “Given the voluminous nature of the fee documentation, 
coupled with the serious and repeated documentation deficiencies, the Court finds 
that ‘an-hour-by-hour review is simply impractical and a waste of judicial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
resources.’  Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994).”  Id. at *17.  
It then applied an across-the-board reduction as some other courts have done. 
{¶ 42} Howe cited other cases that reduced fees across the board, including 
one in which the fee application contained “ ‘commingled and undifferentiated 
estimates of time’ ” spent on cases in multiple jurisdictions that resulted in differing 
levels of success.  Schwarz v. Secy. of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906 
(9th Cir.1995), quoting Schwarz v. Secy. of Health & Human Servs., D.Or. No. 92-
907-JO, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21722, *7 (July 25, 1994).  Another case involved 
deficient entries included amongst 1,129 pages of time records.  Cobell v. Norton, 
407 F.Supp.2d 140, 166 (D.D.C.2005).  Another featured “vague and incomplete 
records” and inadequate billing information in one-line summaries.  Saint-Gobain 
Autover USA, Inc. v. Xinyi Glass N. Am., Inc., 707 F.Supp.2d 737, 764 (N.D.Ohio 
2010). 
{¶ 43} But here, the fee application is neither voluminous nor deficient.  
The billing statements totaled 24 pages—including charges incurred prior to July 
31, 2018—and are well detailed.  This litigation was not a multiyear slog but a one- 
or two-month sprint. 
{¶ 44} The billing statements are detailed, organized, and manageable in 
length.  But the majority takes an ax to the entire bill anyway.  What makes a 30 
percent reduction factor appropriate for most of the attorneys of one firm and a 50 
percent reduction factor appropriate for the other firm?   
{¶ 45} One court has explained that part of the challenge of awarding 
attorney fees is that certain hours claimed cannot be verified and reviewed by the 
court: “Hours spent in reviewing records, talking to other lawyers or experts, 
preparing legal documents and the like cannot be fully verified and require the court 
to trust the lawyer’s word that the hours claimed represent necessary work actually 
performed.”  Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 150 (6th Cir.1986).  Rather than 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
trust the lawyer’s word, in this case, the majority trusts its gut.  That is no better a 
solution to determining a reasonable fee. 
D.  The context behind the charges 
{¶ 46} The amount of attorney fees must be determined on the facts of each 
case.  Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40.  This court 
should consider the context of the case and evaluate the reasonableness of the 
charges by applying the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
{¶ 47} The ultimate goal of the attorneys in this case was to compel the city 
to place an initiative petition proposing a zoning change on the November 2018 
ballot.  The zoning change was a step toward developing a proposed mixed-use 
project.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3609, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 3.  “If created, 
the mixed-use district would permit development of the property to include single- 
and multi-family dwellings, a winery, a spa, a boutique hotel, certain retail uses, a 
senior-living facility, and an underground parking garage.”  Id. 
{¶ 48} This taxpayer mandamus action was the committee’s last 
opportunity to place the initiative on the November 2018 ballot.  The arguments the 
committee presented to the court were complex and varied.  One major argument 
focused on whether state law or the city charter controlled the process for placing 
an initiative on the ballot.  The second major focus was whether, if the city charter 
controlled, the city council must certify the initiative to the board of elections 
without it having been read at three council meetings; this argument also addressed 
whether the city council’s past practice in similar situations was entitled to 
deference. 
{¶ 49} The billing statements, which are comprehensive and detailed, are a 
narrative of the development of the case and demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
fees sought by the attorneys for work performed after they had received the letter 
from the law director refusing to seek a writ of mandamus.  Here is the context for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
the services performed by the attorneys in this case once they received the director 
of law’s refusal letter. 
{¶ 50} On July 31, 2018, Jordan Berns (“Berns”) and Majeed Makhlouf of 
the Berns firm reviewed the response from the law director denying the taxpayer 
demand and forwarded the letter to Derek Clinger of the McTigue firm.  This lit the 
flame.  Soon, both firms would be engulfed in a specialized litigation process that 
would burn bright for a few weeks. 
{¶ 51} On August 1, Donald McTigue of the McTigue firm reviewed the 
law director’s letter and e-mailed Berns to schedule a conference call.  On the 
conference call, McTigue, Clinger, Makhlouf, and Berns discussed strategy.  
Clinger began drafting a reply to the law director, and McTigue inquired in the call 
whether consent of all the committee members was needed for his firm’s 
representation.  Makhlouf revised the reply letter and both he and Berns prepared 
for a course of action. 
{¶ 52} On August 2, McTigue reviewed multiple e-mails from committee 
members while Clinger revised the final draft of the reply letter to the law director.  
On that same date Berns discovered that the city council posted notice on July 31, 
2018 (the same day the board of elections certified that the petition contained 
sufficient signatures) that it was holding a special council meeting on August 2.  He 
drafted an e-mail to the law director to ask if the proposed rezoning ordinance was 
on the agenda for a first reading and sent it to McTigue for review.  After reviewing 
and approving the e-mail to the law director, McTigue reviewed and approved an 
e-mail to the committee members. 
{¶ 53} On August 3, Makhlouf and Berns discussed the city council’s 
failure at the previous day’s special meeting to forward the initiative petition to be 
placed on the ballot and analyzed constitutional issues.  McTigue conferred with 
Clinger about the mandamus complaint and edited a first draft of a complaint. 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
{¶ 54} On August 4, McTigue edited another draft of the complaint and e-
mailed it to co-counsel. 
{¶ 55} On August 5, Makhlouf revised the complaint. 
{¶ 56} On August 6, Berns discussed the complaint with Makhlouf, and 
they revised it further.  Berns also spoke with the law director regarding whether 
the city council would pass an ordinance on an emergency basis to waive the three-
reading rule.  Berns and Makhlouf prepared for that day’s council meeting and 
drafted a statement to be read during the public-comment period of the meeting 
relating to the dispute—outlining the city’s obligation to put the proposed initiative 
zoning ordinance on the ballot for the November 6, 2018 election—and attended 
the meeting.  Benjamin Ockner of the Berns firm also reviewed the complaint and 
recommended changes. 
{¶ 57} On August 7, McTigue and Clinger reviewed an e-mail from Berns 
regarding the city-council meeting.  Clinger also had a conference call with Berns 
and Makhlouf about finalizing the complaint and then discussed the call with 
McTigue. 
{¶ 58} On August 8, 2018, in preparation of the filing of the complaint, the 
Berns firm had multiple lawyers engaged in reviewing and revising the complaint 
and working on separate aspects of its filing.  On that date, Berns was engaged in 
revising the complaint—discussing aspects of the complaint with other attorneys 
on the team—and was responsible for filing the complaint with this court.  
Makhlouf worked with Berns revising the complaint, but also worked on revising 
the affidavit in support of the complaint separately, and sent multiple e-mails to co-
counsel and clients.  Robert McDowall of the Berns firm—at the request of 
Makhlouf—reviewed a portion of the argument and worked with Ockner to e-file 
the mandamus complaint with this court and sent follow-up emails.  Sheldon Berns 
from the Berns firm worked with Berns and Makhlouf on revising the mandamus 
complaint.  Ockner reviewed the mandamus complaint and changes suggested by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
the McTigue firm.  He also assisted in preparing the affidavit, conferred with 
Sheldon Berns and finalized the complaint for filing, reviewed and finalized the 
motion to establish security, and corresponded with the clients, the city, and the 
board of elections. 
{¶ 59} On that same date, McTigue reviewed the complaint and its 
revisions, conferred with Clinger, and reviewed the draft motion to set bond.  After 
speaking with Clinger, he approved a final draft of the complaint. 
{¶ 60} On August 9, the committee filed its mandamus action in this court.  
The filing of the complaint triggered an intensive period of litigation spurred by 
this court’s rules regarding expedited election matters.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.  The 
city had five days after the service of the complaint to file an answer.  Three days 
after that, the committee had to file a merit brief and evidence in support of its 
complaint.  The city’s brief in response was due in another three days.  Three days 
after that, the committee’s reply to the city’s brief was due. 
{¶ 61} Also on August 9, Berns discussed with Makhlouf and Ockner the 
evidence that was needed to support the merit brief and discussed a public-records 
request to acquire evidence from the city.  Berns drafted the public-records request, 
and after it was reviewed by Clinger and McTigue, he finalized it and submitted it 
to the city. 
{¶ 62} On August 10, Clinger began drafting the merit brief, and Berns 
corresponded with Rubino, the city’s finance director, about the public-records 
request and the production of documents. 
{¶ 63} On August 13, Berns and Makhlouf corresponded with Rubino about 
the public-records request and left a message for Cuyahoga County Assistant 
Prosecutor Brendan Doyle regarding why they had named the board of elections as 
a party in the complaint.  Berns then spoke with Doyle about voluntarily dismissing 
the board of elections from the action.  Berns then spoke with Clinger about the 
request to voluntarily dismiss the board, and Clinger discussed the matter with 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
McTigue.  Clinger also reviewed Berns’s e-mail about the public-records request 
and checked whether the complaint and a summons had been served. 
{¶ 64} On August 15, Berns began drafting the statement of facts for the 
merit brief.  He reviewed the video of a councilman’s comments from the July 2 
council meeting and identified the portions of the video that needed to be 
transcribed and offered as evidence in support of the merit brief.  Berns also 
corresponded with Rubino regarding the response to the public-records request and 
gathered and reviewed other evidence, including the rezoning application and city-
council and planning-commission minutes.  Makhlouf prepared evidence and 
reviewed the statement of facts drafted by Berns.  Berns and Makhlouf consulted 
with Clinger and McTigue regarding the merit brief and the evidence.  McTigue 
also reviewed e-mails from Rubino and reviewed the notice of the service of 
summons. 
{¶ 65} On August 16, Berns and Makhlouf continued working on the 
statement of facts and evidence.  Berns also spoke with the law director about the 
briefing schedule and the response to the public-records request.  McTigue e-mailed 
Berns about filing the merit brief on August 20, since the city would file its answer 
on August 17.  They also discussed the draft of the statement of facts and exhibits.  
Clinger continued drafting the merit brief. 
{¶ 66} On August 17, the city filed its answer to the mandamus complaint.  
McTigue conferred with co-counsel, reviewed a draft of the statement of facts, 
reviewed the city’s answer, discussed the city’s admissions in the answer, and 
conferred with Clinger about an outline of the argument for the brief.  While Clinger 
drafted the argument portion of the merit brief, Berns had a discussion with the 
clerk of the city council about the documents to be produced in response to the 
public-records request.  Meanwhile, Makhlouf worked on the evidence and 
conferred with others about the city’s handling of past initiative petitions and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
sought legislative history about a past ordinance.  He also conferred with co-counsel 
about the admissions in the city’s answer. 
{¶ 67} On August 18, McTigue, Berns, and Makhlouf reviewed the first 
draft of the brief.  McTigue spoke with Clinger about the draft, and Clinger began 
editing the brief.  Berns and Makhlouf also edited the draft and reviewed related 
documents, including a timeline, that the committee gave the attorneys containing 
additional information to be included in the statement of facts.  After an e-mail 
exchange, McTigue reviewed the committee’s documents, and Clinger scheduled a 
conference call regarding the brief. 
{¶ 68} On August 19, Clinger, McTigue, Makhlouf, and Berns had a 
conference call.  Clinger created a working document of the four attorneys’ 
comments and e-mailed it to Berns and Makhlouf.  Makhlouf and Berns prepared 
affidavits and gathered and organized exhibits for the brief.  McTigue reviewed an 
e-mail about the committee’s documents and the timeline. 
{¶ 69} On August 20, McDowall researched the standard of review.  
Sheldon Berns read the merit brief and conferred with Berns and Makhlouf.  
Makhlouf and Berns finalized the brief, the affidavits, the appendix of authorities, 
and the certificate of service for the brief.  McTigue reviewed and edited the draft, 
conferred with Clinger, exchanged e-mails with co-counsel about the appendix and 
serving the board of elections and then confirmed that the brief had been filed.  
Clinger also helped finalize the brief and the final evidence package. 
{¶ 70} On August 21, Clinger had a brief conversation with Berns about 
service of the merit brief and then began preparing the reply brief, researching 
mandamus and declaratory-judgment actions and constitutional challenges.  
McTigue briefly reviewed the filed brief and the answer filed by the board of 
elections, and he had an e-mail exchange regarding the reply brief.  McDowall 
conferred with Berns and Makhlouf and researched deference to past practices and 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
other matters.  Berns and Makhlouf discussed the city’s possible arguments and the 
committee’s responses. 
{¶ 71} On August 22, McDowall completed research regarding deference 
and drafted a memorandum summarizing federal and state law on the subject.  He 
began researching another issue, the absurdity doctrine.  Berns and Makhlouf had 
a conference call with Clinger and McTigue, and Berns read the legal research 
Clinger had completed on mandamus and declaratory-judgment actions. 
{¶ 72} On August 23, the city filed its merit brief.  McDowall finished 
researching the absurdity doctrine and drafted a memorandum to Makhlouf.  
Sheldon Berns read the city’s brief and consulted with Berns and Makhlouf.  Berns 
and Makhlouf, after reviewing the city’s brief, e-mailed the portions of the 
committee’s reply brief that they had drafted in advance to McTigue and worked 
on sections of the reply.  Clinger and Ben Wallace (of the McTigue firm) conferred 
with McTigue.  Clinger then reviewed the city’s brief.  McTigue conferred with 
Clinger and Wallace regarding their assignments. 
{¶ 73} On August 24, Wallace reviewed the briefs.  Clinger drafted his 
portion of the reply brief and sent it to McTigue.  McTigue reviewed the city’s 
evidence and e-mailed the team regarding the draft reply brief.  Berns and Makhlouf 
worked on the draft of the reply brief in regard to the plain language of the city’s 
charter. 
{¶ 74} On August 25, Berns and Makhlouf revised the introduction of the 
reply brief and discussed that work with McTigue.  They began incorporating the 
work of McTigue’s team into the reply brief and e-mailed the draft to McTigue.  
McTigue reviewed this draft and consulted with co-counsel. 
{¶ 75} On August 26, Sheldon Berns and Makhlouf reviewed the reply brief 
McTigue had edited and consulted with the McTigue team.  McTigue told Wallace 
to conduct additional research. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
{¶ 76} On August 27, the attorneys revised the reply brief.  At the direction 
of McTigue, Wallace drafted the table of contents and the table of authorities.  
McTigue approved the final draft, and Makhlouf filed the brief. 
{¶ 77} On August 28, Makhlouf and McTigue reviewed a statement of 
interest that was filed by the board of elections. 
{¶ 78} On September 7, this court issued the final decision in the writ action 
in favor of the committee.  Clinger, McTigue, Makhlouf, and Berns reviewed this 
court’s decision, and McTigue conferred with co-counsel and sent an e-mail to the 
committee. 
{¶ 79} A little over five weeks had passed since the city’s law director 
refused to seek a writ of mandamus. 
E.  Application of Prof Cond.R. 1.5(a) 
{¶ 80} The majority finds that this case was overstaffed.  I disagree.  The 
vast majority of the hours billed in the case were incurred by two lawyers at each 
firm: McTigue and Clinger at the McTigue firm and Berns and Makhlouf at the 
Berns firm.  Other lawyers performed spot duty. 
{¶ 81} Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) sets forth factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee.  This court promulgated those factors, and 
we should apply them when called upon to determine the reasonableness of attorney 
fees.  The committee’s expert relies upon these factors, but the majority ignores 
them. 
{¶ 82} In regard to the factors listed in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(1)—“the time 
and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly”—this matter hits all the marks.  This 
case involves the relatively specialized area of election law as well as the esoteric 
topics of municipal charter interpretation, home rule, and taxpayer-initiated 
complaints in mandamus.  The lawyers faced extraordinary time pressures because 
the election was looming and because this court’s rules establish a truncated 
January Term, 2018 
 
25 
briefing schedule in expedited election matters.  The case called for expertise and 
teamwork. 
{¶ 83} Also, given the compressed time schedule and the urgency and pace 
at which expedited elections matters progress, it was unlikely that the attorneys 
involved could accept other cases that would require their immediate attention.  See 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(2) and (a)(5). 
{¶ 84} The expert testified that he had reviewed the engagement letters 
between the committee and its attorneys and that the rates charged were “equal to 
or less than hourly rates which may be charged for similar services by other 
attorneys in Ohio with similar expertise.”  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(3). 
{¶ 85} Indisputably, the significance of the result the firms obtained for 
their client—the granting of a writ of mandamus forcing Rubino to certify the 
initiative petition to the board of elections to be placed on the November 2018 ballot 
in accord with Ohio law—cannot be overstated.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(4). 
{¶ 86} Finally, the expert’s affidavit asserted that the attorneys involved 
were “experts in their professional area.”  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(7). 
{¶ 87} When the time detailed in the fee application is overlaid with the 
facts of the expedited elections matter in conjunction with the reasonableness 
factors set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), the fees billed by both the Berns firm and 
the McTigue firm are reasonable. 
II. Costs 
{¶ 88} The majority refuses to award all the costs submitted by the 
committee, finding that a transcript was not necessary and that other expenses are 
not generally allowable.  The starting point of determining what costs are 
permissible must begin with the language of the statute authorizing the court to 
award costs. 
{¶ 89} R.C. 733.61 provides that if a court has good cause to believe that 
the taxpayer allegations were “well founded” or “sufficient in law,” the court shall 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
issue an order as equity demands and “the taxpayer shall be allowed his costs.”  The 
awarding of costs—except for attorney fees—is not dependent on the success of 
the action. 
{¶ 90} Despite the language of the statute, the majority refuses in part the 
committee’s request for court costs (other than the filing fee, which has been 
reimbursed by this court), relying partially on State v. Sewell, 4th Dist. Ross No. 
11CA3207, 2011-Ohio-5532, ¶ 15.  However, the majority’s reliance on Sewell is 
misplaced. 
{¶ 91} Sewell, who had been convicted of two counts of rape, challenged 
the attorney general’s reclassification under a newly enacted sexual-offender-
classification scheme.  After the reclassification was reversed by this court and he 
was reinstated to his original classification, Sewell sought reimbursement for 
various expenses of the action.  The trial court refused to award the expenses as 
costs, and the appellate court affirmed. 
{¶ 92} The appellate court noted that Sewell sought litigation expenses 
pursuant to Civ.R. 54(D), R.C. 2323.51, and Civ.R. 11 in his motion for fees.  But 
because Sewell did not argue on appeal that he was entitled to relief under either 
R.C. 2323.51 or Civ.R. 11, which allow the recovery of attorney fees for frivolous 
conduct, the appellate court rejected those claims. 
{¶ 93} Turning its attention to Sewell’s remaining claim pursuant to Civ.R. 
54(D), the appellate court held that “ ‘[t]o be taxable as a cost under Civ.R. 54(D), 
an expense must be grounded in statute.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 12, citing Keaton v. Pike 
Community Hosp., 124 Ohio App.3d 153, 156, 705 N.E.2d 734 (4th Dist.1997).  
Because Sewell failed to demonstrate any statutory basis on which he was entitled 
to recover photocopying and postage costs, the court denied those costs.  Sewell at 
¶ 15, citing Cincinnati ex rel. Simons v. Cincinnati, 86 Ohio App.3d 258, 267, 620 
N.E.2d 940 (1st Dist.1993). 
January Term, 2018 
 
27 
{¶ 94} But Sewell sought costs under Civ.R. 54(D).  R.C. 733.61, under 
which the committee pursues its costs here, provides an independent basis for the 
award of costs.  Therefore, costs awarded under that statute are not subject to the 
restrictions of Civ.R. 54(D), which provides, “Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”  R.C. 733.61 puts the award of 
costs differently, instructing the court to make an order “as the equity of the case 
demands,” as long as “the taxpayer had good cause to believe that his allegations 
were well founded, or if they are sufficient in law.” 
{¶ 95} Therefore, this court is to award costs as equity demands, not as 
caselaw interpreting Civ.R. 54(D) demands.  R.C. 733.61 recognizes that a taxpayer 
is taking on an action that the municipality should have undertaken itself.  Equity 
demands that all the costs reasonably expended to that end are to be reimbursed.  
R.C. 733.61 is akin to R.C. 4123.512(F), which awards costs to a successful 
claimant in a workers’ compensation appeal.  R.C. 4123.512(F) is “intended to 
protect a claimant who is forced to litigate an appeal.”  Holmes v. Crawford 
Machine, Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 303, 2012-Ohio-5380, 982 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 7.  Like 
R.C. 733.61, R.C. 4123.512(F) is different from Civ.R. 54(D) and awards a broader 
array of costs.  Costs such as “photocopies, postage, meals and parking” have been 
determined to be reimbursable under that statute.  Bland v. Ryan, 2012-Ohio-3176, 
977 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 1-2 (2d Dist.). 
{¶ 96} Moreover, the majority’s reliance on R.C. 2303.21 in denying the 
committees’ transcript cost is disingenuous.  Even under R.C. 2303.21, the majority 
should include in the costs awarded to the committee the amount expended for the 
city-council-meeting transcripts.  R.C. 2303.21 provides that “[w]hen it is 
necessary in [a] civil action to procure a transcript of a judgment or proceeding,  
* * * as evidence in such action or for any other purpose, the expense of procuring 
such transcript or exemplification shall be taxed in the bill of costs.”  (Emphasis 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
added.)  Even though one transcript was not filed here, the availability of both 
transcripts to all the lawyers working on the case for quick reference—rather than 
listening to the proceedings— was a worthy purpose that may even have resulted 
in less billable attorney time for reviewing the proceedings. 
{¶ 97} I would award all the costs that the committee seeks—if they were 
incurred on or after July 31—including postage and conference-call expenses and 
court-reporter fees for having both city-council meetings transcribed.  The majority 
correctly holds that since the committee’s filing fee at this court will be refunded 
pursuant to this court’s rules, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.05(A)(2)(c), we need not award 
those fees as costs. 
{¶ 98} Because R.C. 733.61 controls the recovery of costs in the 
committee’s taxpayer action, the committee is entitled to recover all costs other 
than $134.68, the filing fee reimbursed to the committee and now charged by this 
court to the city, and $87.41, the amount incurred prior to July 31.  The committee 
submitted costs totaling $1,256.65; I would award the committee $1,034.56. 
III. Reduction for additional time attributable to the reply 
{¶ 99} I agree with the majority that the attorney-fee application understates 
the charges that are attributable to preparing the committee’s reply brief in the 
mandamus action.  Charges related to that brief are subject to be reduced by 28.57 
percent because several pages of the brief were struck in the writ action when the 
brief exceeded the page limits allowed by our rule.  The Berns firm attributed 
$13,335 of its total bill to the reply brief and therefore subtracted $3,815 from its 
bill after applying the discount.  However, the entries on the billing statement that 
mention the reply brief and other entries that do not mention the brief but are related 
to it actually total $20,660.  Some of the tasks related to the reply brief appear in 
block-billing entries, and it is impossible to determine exactly how much time 
should be attributed to each task.  Therefore, the entire block-billed entry must be 
considered to be related to the reply.  Once the 28.57 percent reduction is applied 
January Term, 2018 
 
29 
to the $20,660 total fee, the Berns firm bill should be reduced by $5,902.56, not 
$3,815 as the attorneys claim. 
{¶ 100} The McTigue firm, on the other hand, underreported three hours 
that one attorney spent working on the reply.  That attorney’s rate was $200 per 
hour.  After applying the 28.57 percent discount, the McTigue firm should have 
reduced its fee an additional $171.42 from its total bill. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 101} “ ‘[T]he most critical factor’ governing the reasonableness of a fee 
award ‘is the degree of success obtained.’ ”  Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 
F.3d 802, 822 (6th Cir.2013), quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1993, 76 
L.Ed.2d 40.  If a taxpayer is forced to bring a mandamus action because a village 
or municipality refuses to perform an act that it is required to do under Ohio law, 
and the taxpayer is unable to recover attorney fees for the legal services needed to 
bring that action, the underlying intention of the General Assembly—to afford that 
taxpayer relief—would be thwarted. 
{¶ 102} The committee filed an “itemized application and independent 
evidence supporting the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged and the hours 
billed” as this court instructed it to do, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3609, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 36.  The committee submitted an affidavit from an expert that 
supports the reasonableness of its attorneys’ billing.  It has also submitted evidence 
of its costs.  The city does not dispute the reasonableness of either. 
{¶ 103} After reduction for billing for work performed prior to July 31 and 
for work on the pages of the committee’s reply brief that were struck, I would award 
the committee $61,124.94 in attorney fees for the work performed by the Berns 
firm and $21,178.58 in attorney fees for the work performed by the McTigue firm.  
Finally, I would award $1,034.56 in costs. 
{¶ 104} Because the majority awards attorney fees incurred before the 
city’s law director refused the committee’s demand to file suit, imposes drastic, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
across-the-board reductions that lack support in the record, and does not award the 
committee all of its costs, I dissent from those portions of the majority’s decision. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 105} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 106} I would award attorney fees requested in the application submitted 
in this case.  The basis for awarding these fees is twofold:  first, the application is 
fully supported by a recognized expert, attorney Thomas J. Scanlon, an 
accomplished business attorney with a well-known reputation for expertise in real 
estate law, who has attested to the reasonableness of the hourly rates and to the 
work that was performed;  second, the city of Solon, in its brief in response, has not 
objected to the expert’s affidavit nor has it contested any of the hours or the 
reasonableness of the fees in this case. 
{¶ 107} In addition, today this court has announced its objection to block 
billing and has retroactively applied a new rule on block billing to the application 
in this case.  When the court announces a rule like this, in my view, it should not 
be applied retroactively.  Accordingly, I would award fees as requested in the 
application. 
_________________ 
Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Jordan Berns, and Majeed G. 
Makhlouf; and McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey 
Colombo, Derek S. Clinger, and Ben F.C. Wallace, for relators. 
Thomas G. Lobe Co., L.P.A., and Thomas G. Lobe; Lon D. Stolarsky; and 
Todd D. Cipollo Co., L.P.A., and Todd D. Cipollo, for respondents Matt Rubino, 
Solon City Council, and city of Solon. 
_________________