Title: Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and 
Compton1 and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW 
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 051990    
  JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    June 8, 2006 
ARCHIE ELLIOTT, JUDGE 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of 
Virginia and Code § 17.1-902, the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission of Virginia (Commission) filed a complaint under the 
original jurisdiction of this Court against Archie Elliott, a 
judge of the General District Court of the Third Judicial 
District.  In the complaint, the Commission alleges that there 
are well founded grounds to support its determination that Judge 
Elliott committed multiple violations of the Canons of Judicial 
Conduct and that these violations are of sufficient gravity to 
warrant the censure or removal from office of Judge Elliott. 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
“The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission was created to 
investigate charges that, if true, would warrant the retirement, 
removal, or censure of a judge.”  Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 403, 568 S.E.2d 687, 688 
                     
1 Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
 
2
(2002); see also Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission, 15 VAC § 10-10-10, Rule 2(L).2  “When the Commission 
concludes, after investigation, that such a charge is well-
founded, it may file a formal complaint, resulting in a hearing 
before this Court.”  Lewis, 264 Va. at 403, 568 S.E.2d at 688; 
JIRC Rule 15(A)(2).  The rules of the Commission define the term 
“well founded” as meaning “that the Commission has found based 
upon clear and convincing evidence and supported by facts and 
sound judgment that the misconduct [by the judge] has occurred.”  
JIRC Rule 2(M); see also Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission 
v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 433 n.1, 611 S.E.2d 392, 394 n.1 
(2005).  If this Court “finds that the judge has engaged in 
misconduct while in office, or . . . has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, it shall 
censure [the judge] or shall remove [the judge] from office.”  
Va. Const. art. VI, § 10.3 
On August 26, 2004, the Commission entered an order 
suspending Judge Elliott, with pay, from the exercise of 
                     
2 Hereinafter, we will refer to the rules of the Commission 
as “JIRC Rule #.”  Subsequent to the proceedings at issue here, 
the Commission’s rules were amended effective February 14, 2006.  
None of the amendments are germane to the issues presented and, 
accordingly, we will refer to the current rules. 
 
3 Code § 17.1-906 specifically establishes the jurisdiction 
of this Court to include complaints filed against a judge of a 
district court by the Commission. 
 
3
judicial powers.  Code § 17.1-911(A).  The suspension was based 
upon the Commission’s finding that there was “probable cause to 
believe that the continued performance of judicial duties by 
Judge Elliott constitutes both a substantial and immediate 
threat to the public interest in the administration of justice.”  
That order has not been terminated. 
On October 18, 2004, the Commission issued formal notice 
advising Judge Elliott that he was being charged by the 
Commission with violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct based 
on 12 specified incidents.  JIRC Rule 3(B)(2); JIRC Rule 8(A).  
On June 14 and 15, 2005, the Commission conducted an evidentiary 
hearing at which Judge Elliott appeared and was represented by 
counsel.  JIRC Rule 13.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Commission advised Judge Elliott and his counsel that the 
Commission had decided unanimously that seven of the charged 
incidents in the notice were well founded and of sufficient 
gravity to warrant the filing of a formal complaint in this 
Court.  JIRC Rule 15(A)(2).  The charges against Judge Elliott 
that the Commission determined to be well founded are as 
follows: 
1. 
On June 14, 2004, upon being advised that he was 
not elected as chief judge, Judge Elliott reacted 
in such an extremely angry manner that his two 
fellow judges reasonably believed that he might 
commit a physical assault. 
 
 
4
2. 
On June 16, 2004, Judge Elliott confronted a 
fellow judge in a loud and angry manner and 
verbally threatened him. 
 
3. 
On July 6, 2004, Judge Elliott sent letters with 
attachments to all of the district court judges 
in Tidewater, with copies to the Chief Justice 
and the Executive Secretary.  The content and 
tenor of the material so distributed were 
calculated to embarrass and personally attack the 
two other judges of his court.  
 
4. 
On July 14, 2004, Judge Elliott inappropriately 
directed a loud and angry outburst at a member of 
his court staff.  
 
5. 
Judge Elliott has had a longstanding practice of 
telling defendants that he had a “DEA” light 
above the bench in his courtroom that detected 
whether they were using drugs.  This tactic, that 
involved an intentional falsehood, often resulted 
in incriminating statements by defendants.  Judge 
Elliott routinely would determine the defendants’ 
sentences based upon whether the defendants were 
willing to take a drug test or would admit drug 
use without the necessity of a test. 
 
6. 
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated August 26, 
2004, Judge Elliott falsely stated that he did 
not have a practice of reviewing defendants’ 
criminal records prior to adjudicating the issue 
of guilt.  Judge Elliott habitually considered 
such records prior to announcing a decision on 
the issue of guilt. 
 
7. 
In the same letter to the Chief Justice, Judge 
Elliott falsely stated that he had not prohibited 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office from 
prosecuting cases in his courtroom.  In February 
of 2002, Judge Elliott informed the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney that he did not want a 
prosecutor in his courtroom for drunk driving 
cases and that, if a prosecutor were present, the 
conviction rate in such cases would be reduced. 
 
 
5
However, the Commission further advised Judge Elliott that 
no formal complaint would be filed in this Court, and Judge 
Elliott would be permitted to resume the duties of his office 
under a supervision agreement pending his required retirement, 
if Judge Elliott abided by specific conditions set by the 
Commission for entering into that agreement.  JIRC Rule 
15(A)(4).  As will become apparent, whether the Commission and 
Judge Elliott reached an agreement and, if so, whether that 
agreement was breached were central to the positions 
subsequently advanced by the parties on brief and in their oral 
argument before this Court.  Accordingly, we will recount in 
some detail the actions of the Commission and Judge Elliott 
during and following the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 
hearing. 
After the Commission had heard extensive evidence, 
including considerable character evidence in favor of Judge 
Elliott, the Commission met in executive session to deliberate.  
After returning from the executive session, the Chairman of the 
Commission announced the Commission’s findings, listing the 
charges upon which it found “clear and convincing evidence to 
forward to the Supreme Court for removal [or] censure.”  The 
Chairman then stated: 
[H]owever, pursuant to the provisions of [JIRC] Rule 
15A(4), the Commission will offer you the conditions 
 
6
that may forego the forwarding of those charges to the 
Supreme Court on the following specific terms: 
 
1. That you submit a letter of retirement prior 
to December 31 of 2005, or such earlier date as is 
required to permit the General Assembly to select a 
successor.  The effective date of that letter of 
retirement shall be not [later] than June 30, 2006. 
 
2. That prior to any return to the bench, you 
shall write letters of apology to Judge Whitlow, Judge 
Morris and Renay Johnson.  Those letters must be 
approved by counsel for the Commission and delivered 
prior to your return to the bench. 
 
In addition, you will be required to write a 
letter, likewise approved by counsel for the 
Commission, to the Commonwealth Attorney Earle Mobley, 
acknowledging that the Commonwealth’s Attorney, or his 
assistants, are welcome to attend your court and to 
prosecute DWI’s. 
 
3. You shall discontinue the practice of offering 
conditional sentences as was done with the DEA light 
circumstances. 
 
4. That you discontinue and you may not in the 
future on any occasion review prior criminal history 
or records in advance of hearing the evidence and 
finding that the evidence was sufficient to support 
conviction, and you shall take steps to ensure that 
neither defendants nor counsel for the defendants have 
any misunderstanding with respect to your review of 
such records prior to hearing of the evidence on the 
substantive charge. 
 
5. You will submit to supervision by a judge 
selected by the Commission on terms to be determined 
by counsel for the Commission and in consultation with 
the Chairman. 
 
6. There is a set of form restrictions that have 
been approved by the Commission that include the 
necessity of not holding yourself out as being an 
expert in ethics, not conducting ethic[s] seminars, 
and some other details along those lines, we can 
provide you a copy of that. 
 
7
 
You may announce that you have been returned to 
the bench, that the resolution of the matters before 
the Commission [has] been such that you may return to 
the bench, but you may not publicly or privately, 
outside of your family and counsel, acknowledge or 
represent that you have been vindicated or a similar 
term by the Commission. 
 
These terms will be reduced to writing 
immediately.  Acceptance by your signature to these 
written terms must be received by the Commission 
office, in the Commission office, which can be by fax 
at least, followed up immediately by the hard copy, 
not later than 12 o’clock noon on this coming Friday, 
June 17th. 
 
The Chairman then asked Judge Elliott and his counsel 
whether they understood the terms of the offer for a JIRC Rule 
15(A)(4) supervision agreement that he had just recited.  
Although Judge Elliott’s counsel responded that he understood 
the terms, Judge Elliott stated that he did not because “[i]t 
was too much.” 
Counsel for the Commission indicated that the Commission 
could “have the conditions typed up by tomorrow.”  However, a 
Commission member insisted that the conditions be reviewed 
“[b]ecause there was one thing that was mentioned about if he 
accepted that offer, that once the offer has been accepted by 
signature, that” certain of the conditions would immediately be 
in force, including a condition that Judge Elliott would be 
required to expend annual leave until he returned to the bench. 
 
8
The Chairman then summarized the substance of the 
Commission’s offer again.  With specific relevance to subsequent 
proceedings before the Commission and in this Court, the 
Chairman reiterated to Judge Elliott that “you may announce, 
after the hearing here, that the determination of the Commission 
was such that you have been returned to the bench, or are 
allowed to resume your role on the bench, but you shall not 
represent to anyone that you have been vindicated by the 
Commission.”  The Chairman again stated that “we have to receive 
your signed acceptance of these terms . . . not later than 
12 o’clock Friday, June 17th [2005].” 
On June 16, 2005, counsel for the Commission sent by 
telefacsimile to Judge Elliott’s counsel a transcript of the 
chairman’s oral recitation of the terms at the conclusion of the 
June 14-15, 2005 hearing.  In addition, counsel for the 
Commission included a document styled “ACCEPTANCE OF 
CONDITIONS,” which read as follows: 
By my signature below, as well as the signature 
of my attorney, I hereby accept the conditions 
specified by the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission in the attached excerpt from the transcript 
of the Commission proceeding on June 15, 2005.  I 
fully understand that, upon my acceptance of these 
conditions, I will be required to take certain actions 
including the signing of an agreement pursuant to 
Commission Rule 15 A (4) which will set forth the 
terms of a period of supervision in accordance with 
the conditions established by the Commission.  I also 
understand that upon acceptance of the Commission’s 
conditions, I will be required to take annual leave 
 
9
until the Commission determines that I have satisfied 
the Commission’s conditions for my return to the 
bench. 
 
The acceptance of conditions included signature lines for Judge 
Elliott and his counsel, but no place for a countersignature by 
a representative of the Commission. 
In a cover letter to the telefacsimile, counsel for the 
Commission stated “[s]o that you will have as much information 
as possible to help make the decision [to accept the 
Commission’s conditions], I also am including copies of a draft 
. . . agreement that the judge eventually will be required to 
sign in order to effectuate the period of supervision.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This document specified that the anticipated 
period of supervision would commence upon the entry of an order 
by the Commission and “continue until the effective date of the 
judge’s retirement which is to be not later than June 30, 2006 
[and he] must announce his retirement no later than December 31, 
2005.”  Among other conditions set out in this document was a 
requirement that “Judge Elliott may not make any statements, and 
may not authorize or knowingly allow anyone to make statements, 
that reasonably may be construed as an assertion that he was 
exonerated or vindicated by the Commission.”  This document 
included signature lines for Judge Elliott, his counsel, and 
counsel for the Commission. 
 
10
Later on June 16, 2005, counsel for the Commission sent a 
further telefacsimile with an updated draft of the written 
agreement.  In a cover letter to this telefacsimile, counsel for 
the Commission stated that “the only thing that the judge and 
you need to sign by 5 p.m. tomorrow is the ‘acceptance of 
conditions.’ ”  He reiterated his view that the draft document 
was intended “only to give [Judge Elliott’s counsel] the general 
idea of what such . . . an agreement would look like.”  
(Emphasis in original.)  Counsel for the Commission further 
indicated that he would “not sign the agreement on behalf of the 
Commission until the Chairman and/or the other members have had 
an opportunity to review the specific language.”  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
On June 17, 2005, counsel for the Commission by a further 
telefacsimile advised counsel for the judge that “if Judge 
Elliott signs the ‘acceptance of conditions’ . . . he is not to 
make any announcement about his status or his return to the 
bench until he has received clearance from the Commission and 
the suspension order has been lifted.”  (Emphasis in original.)  
Counsel for the Commission indicated that he was making this 
further communication “[j]ust so there is no misunderstanding 
. . . I am just trying to make sure that we all are on the same 
page.”  However, counsel did not indicate that he was making 
this directive at the request of the Commission, and it would 
 
11
appear from the context that he was asserting his own 
recollection or interpretation of the Commission’s offer as 
stated by the Chairman at the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 
hearing. 
On June 17, 2005, Judge Elliott and his counsel timely 
signed the Acceptance of Conditions.  Over the next several 
weeks, Judge Elliott took steps to comply with those conditions.  
He drafted the required letters and submitted the drafts to the 
Commission.  Upon finding the drafts to be insufficient, the 
Commission suggested changes in the wording of those drafts.  
Judge Elliott prepared and signed letters in accord with the 
Commission’s proposed language and returned them to the 
Commission.4 
On July 12, 2005, counsel for the Commission advised Judge 
Elliott’s counsel that: 
At its meeting today, the Commission declined to 
sign off on the [JIRC] Rule 15A (4) agreement or to 
enter an order lifting Judge Elliott’s suspension.  
Instead, the Commission asked me to invite both you 
and the judge to appear at the Commission’s next 
meeting on August 9, 2005, at 8:30 a.m.  The purpose 
of the appearance will be to discuss the Commission’s 
concerns that you and/or Judge Elliott have not abided 
by the Commission’s directives.  No statements were to 
be made regarding the judge’s return to the bench 
                     
4 From July 8, 2005 until at least July 27, 2005, the judge 
was hospitalized and underwent surgery.  The Commission was 
advised of this situation, and the judge was not found to be 
medically incapacitated from performing judicial 
responsibilities as a result of the surgery. 
 
12
until after the Commission has approved the agreement 
and has rescinded the suspension order.  No statements 
were to be made by the judge or his representatives 
that conveyed the idea that the Commission proceeding 
was resolved in a manner favorable to him.  The 
Commission has received credible information that such 
statements nevertheless have been made.  Therefore, 
the Commission has determined that, until at least 
August 9, there will be no change in the status quo. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
On August 9, 2005, the Commission held a hearing to 
determine whether Judge Elliott had failed to comply with the 
conditions set by the Commission before he would be permitted to 
return to the bench under supervision pending his retirement.  
At that hearing, the Chairman5 stated that the Commission had 
“gotten a lot of information since [the evidentiary hearing] 
indicating there have been several communications, by [Judge 
Elliott and his counsel], with various people indicating that 
[Judge Elliott] would be back [on the bench], and quite frankly, 
we are concerned with the constraint that has had on [the 
Commission] [e]ffecting a good transition.” 
The former Chairman stated that “it was abundantly clear 
that the results of the [evidentiary] hearing were not to be 
communicated” to anyone.  The former Chairman then asked whether 
                     
5 Between the June 14-15, 2005 and August 9, 2005 hearings, 
the Commission, pursuant to Code § 17.1-901, had elected a new 
Chairman.  The former Chairman remained a member of the 
Commission and participated in the August 9, 2005 hearing in 
that capacity. 
 
13
Judge Elliott or his counsel had communicated those results to 
anyone.  Judge Elliott’s counsel replied that they had not.  The 
former Chairman then asked, “Have you made any comment to any 
person about whether you were pleased with the outcome or 
whether or not Judge Elliott was going to be coming back.”  
Judge Elliott’s counsel replied that he had “thanked [character 
witnesses for Judge Elliott at the evidentiary hearing] for 
their testimony, but I didn’t tell them the results of the 
hearing.”  Counsel conceded, however, that his “demeanor might 
have indicated that [he] was pleased.” 
Counsel for the Commission then questioned Judge Elliott, 
focusing on whether he had told a particular lawyer and deputy 
sheriff “that he was coming back” to the bench.  Judge Elliott 
testified that “three or four days after the [evidentiary] 
hearing” the deputy sheriff, who had served as a bailiff in 
Judge Elliott’s court for a long time, called him and asked “how 
did things go.”  Judge Elliott further testified that he 
responded, “I can’t say specifically how things went . . . but 
everything is going to be okay.”  Judge Elliott further 
testified that he saw the other individual, a local attorney, 
“in church” and, in response to a similar inquiry regarding the 
outcome of the hearing, told the attorney that “everything will 
be all right, everything is fine.” 
 
14
In response to repeated questioning by counsel for the 
Commission, Judge Elliott denied saying anything more than that 
“everything would be okay” or “everything would be all right.”  
Although counsel for the Commission alluded to statements 
allegedly made to “a member of the Commission” by the identified 
lawyer and deputy sheriff, no affidavits of those individuals 
were presented and no other witnesses were called to testify.  
The Commission took no express action before the conclusion of 
this hearing. 
Thereafter, counsel conducted a series of discussions 
regarding the provisions to be included in the written agreement 
contemplated in the “Acceptance of Conditions.”  Principally, 
those discussions focused on the provision providing for the 
date of the announcement of the judge’s retirement and the 
effective date for that retirement.  In a letter dated August 
12, 2005 sent by telefacsimile and postal mail to Judge 
Elliott’s counsel, the Commission’s counsel indicated that he 
had “consulted with the Chairman [who had concluded] that we 
could not alter the terms of the Commission’s proposal in a 
material fashion without taking the matter back to the full 
Commission.”  Counsel for the Commission then indicated that he 
had drafted “[a] revised proposed agreement” that permitted 
Judge Elliott to return to the bench before submitting notice of 
his retirement to the Chief Justice, but requiring him to do so 
 
15
within one week thereafter.  Counsel for the Commission stated 
that he “believe[d] that the one-week window is a reasonable 
compromise and is as far as the Commission is willing to go.”  
The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that: 
Judge Elliott will not return to the Portsmouth 
General District Court before August 25, 2005.  Before 
his suspension order will be rescinded, Judge Elliott 
must sign and deliver to his attorney, Mr. Marsh, an 
irrevocable letter to the Chief Justice announcing 
Judge Elliott’s retirement effective not later than 
January 31, 2006, and Mr. Marsh must submit to the 
Commission his written representation that he will 
deliver Judge Elliott’s letter to the Chief Justice 
not later than September 1, 2005. 
 
(Emphasis in original.) 
This document also included a provision that it 
“incorporates by reference the attached ‘Acceptance of 
Conditions’ signed by the judge and his counsel on June 17, 
2005.”  Counsel for the Commission further indicated that his 
“best chance to persuade the full Commission to accept the 
revised agreement . . . will be if I am able to present the 
matter to the members . . . in a posture where you and the judge 
already have signed the agreement.”  Judge Elliott and his 
counsel signed this agreement on August 15, 2005 and returned it 
to the Commission.6 
                     
6 The record contains a letter dated August 17, 2005 from 
counsel for Judge Elliott to counsel for the Commission stating 
that he had in his possession a letter from the judge to the 
Chief Justice stating that the judge would retire on April 30, 
 
16
In a letter dated August 19, 2005, counsel for the 
Commission advised Judge Elliott’s counsel that the matter would 
be considered by the Commission again at its next meeting on 
September 13, 2005.  Following that meeting, counsel for the 
Commission sent a letter by telefacsimile to counsel for Judge 
Elliott advising him that the Commission had decided that a 
formal complaint would be filed in this Court unless Judge 
Elliott signed an agreement, which, in pertinent part, required 
the judge to “submit to the Chief Justice a letter announcing 
his retirement effective not later than December 31, 2005.”  
Judge Elliott was advised that he was required to respond by 
5 p.m. the following day.  Judge Elliott did not sign the 
agreement as drafted by the Commission. 
By an order dated September 20, 2005, the Commission made 
specific findings regarding Judge Elliott’s conduct that had 
been the subject of the June 14-15, 2005 hearing.  The 
Commission further found that Judge Elliott had not abided by 
the conditions set by the Commission for lifting the suspension 
order and permitting Judge Elliott to resume his judicial duties 
pending his retirement.  Accordingly, the Commission directed 
                                                                  
2006.  Counsel for Judge Elliott maintains that his letter was 
hand-delivered to the Commission on August 17, 2005.  The 
Commission maintains it has no record of the letter being 
received or filed. 
 
 
17
counsel for the Commission to file a formal complaint in this 
Court.  The complaint against Judge Elliott was filed in this 
Court on September 26, 2005, and gave as the basis of the 
complaint the seven charges found by the Commission at the 
conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 hearing to have been proven 
by clear and convincing evidence and of sufficient gravity to 
warrant Judge Elliott’s censure or removal from office. 
DISCUSSION 
The censure or removal of a judge from office for 
violations of the Canons of Judicial Conduct or other 
malfeasance is a matter of great significance to the judiciary 
as well as the general public.  Public confidence in the 
judiciary and the administration of our legal system depends 
upon faithful adherence to the law and to the rules governing 
judicial conduct by those who are entrusted with the 
responsibility of sitting in judgment of others.  However, the 
desire to instill public confidence in the courts by carefully 
policing the conduct of judges must be balanced against the 
rights of the judge who is called upon to answer charges of 
misbehavior or malfeasance in the exercise of his official 
duties. 
The procedural due process requirements of the Constitution 
of Virginia compel the Commission, and this Court, to recognize 
the balance that must be struck between protecting the integrity 
 
18
of the judiciary and the rights of individual judges.  To that 
end, the Commission must employ adequate procedural safeguards 
to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of the rights and property 
interests of a judge who stands accused of official misconduct.  
See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1968).  This is so not 
merely because the removal of the judge deprives him of vested 
property rights, but also because the lesser penalty of censure 
imperils the judge’s “good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity.”  Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 
(1971); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 730 (1976); Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975); In re Deming, 736 P.2d 
639, 648 (Wash. 1987).  Accordingly, public confidence in the 
judiciary and the administration of our legal system can be 
maintained only where the Commission in the exercise of its 
authority to oversee the conduct of judges is held to the same 
high standard of fair dealing every citizen has the right to 
expect from the government. 
The Commission’s authority derives from Article VI, Section 
10 of the Constitution of Virginia, which provides that “[t]he 
General Assembly shall create a Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission consisting of members of the judiciary, the bar, and 
the public and vested with the power to investigate charges 
which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of 
a judge.”  Pursuant to that mandate, the General Assembly has 
 
19
enacted legislation creating and empowering the Commission.  
Code §§ 17.1-900 to –919.  Among the powers delegated to the 
Commission by the General Assembly is “the authority to make 
rules, not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter or of 
general law, to govern investigations and hearings conducted by 
it.”  Code § 17.1-902. 
When an administrative body is delegated rulemaking 
authority by the General Assembly, it is given broad discretion 
to determine the procedures it will employ in carrying out its 
legislative mandate, so long as the rules it adopts are not 
inconsistent with the authority of the statutes that govern it 
or with principles of due process.  See, e.g., Sargent Elec. Co. 
v. Woodall, 228 Va. 419, 424, 323 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1984).  
“Furthermore, it is an elementary principle of administrative 
law that agencies must follow their properly promulgated rules.”  
Virginia Committee for Fair Utility Rates v. Virginia Electric & 
Power Co., 243 Va. 320, 328, 414 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1992).  “ ‘For 
once an agency exercises its discretion and creates the 
procedural rules under which it desires to have its actions 
judged, it denies itself the right to violate these rules.  If 
an agency in its proceedings violates its rules and prejudice 
results, any action taken as a result of the proceedings cannot 
stand.’ ”  Id. (quoting Scott v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 172, 178-79 
 
20
(7th Cir. 1985)).  These principles are applicable to the 
Commission. 
In responding to the complaint brought by the Commission 
against him in this Court, Judge Elliott contends that following 
the June 14-15, 2005 hearing the Commission entered into an 
agreement with him that foreclosed the filing of a formal 
complaint against him in this Court.  He further contends that 
the Commission thereafter failed to abide by the terms of that 
agreement and instead continued to modify the agreement 
unilaterally.  Contrary to the findings of the Commission 
following the August 9, 2005 hearing, Judge Elliott maintains 
that he has not violated any express terms of the agreement. 
In response, the Commission maintains that there never was 
an enforceable JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision agreement between 
the Commission and the judge, either following the June 14-15, 
2005 hearing or at anytime thereafter.  Rather, the Commission 
characterizes the status of the case against Judge Elliott 
following that hearing as still pending, and further contends 
that the formation of a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision agreement 
was dependant upon Judge Elliott first satisfying the conditions 
laid down by the Commission at that hearing.  The Commission 
further maintains that, to the extent that there was an 
agreement of any kind, whether characterized as a JIRC Rule 
15(A)(4) supervision agreement or as an agreement to conditions 
 
21
that could result in a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision agreement, 
the judge’s subsequent remarks to the two individuals who had 
testified at the evidentiary hearing on June 14-15, 2005 
constituted a breach of that agreement.  Thus, the Commission 
asserts that it was permitted to bring a complaint to this Court 
based upon the charges found by the Commission to have been 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
The parties agreed during oral argument before this Court 
that the issues of whether there was an agreement between the 
parties, however it is ultimately characterized, and whether 
that agreement was breached are threshold questions to be 
resolved before this Court can review the evidence and reach its 
own findings and conclusions concerning the underlying 
complaint.7  See Peatross, 269 Va. at 443, 611 S.E.2d at 400; 
Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 689.  Accordingly, it is 
                     
7 During oral argument, counsel for the Commission contended 
that this Court owed deference to the Commission’s 
determinations that there was no JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision 
agreement and that Judge Elliott had breached the conditions 
made by the Commission for reaching such an agreement.  We 
disagree.  When a complaint is brought to this Court by the 
Commission, “we do not give ‘due weight’ to the Commission’s 
findings or their credibility determinations.  Instead, we 
accord the Commission’s findings only such weight, if any, as we 
deem appropriate in each case.”  Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 
S.E.2d at 400.  This rule applies not only to the determination 
of the evidence supporting the charges brought by the Commission 
in its complaint, but also to whether the Commission followed 
proper procedure in bringing that complaint to this Court. 
 
 
22
necessary for this Court to consider the provisions and 
application of JIRC Rule 15(A) in some detail. 
JIRC Rule 15(A) delineates the manner in which the 
Commission may dispose of charges against a judge once its 
investigation has been concluded.  Pursuant to this Rule, the 
Commission may take any of the following actions: 
1. Remove the charges from the Commission’s 
docket. 
 
2. If the Commission finds the charges against 
the judge to be well founded and of sufficient gravity 
to constitute the basis for retirement, censure or 
removal, it shall file a complaint against the judge 
in the Supreme Court of Virginia.  
 
3. If the Commission finds the charges against 
the judge to be well founded but not of sufficient 
gravity to constitute the basis for retirement, 
censure or removal, it may summon the judge before the 
Commission or designated Commission members, and 
advise the judge of its findings.  The charges shall 
then be removed from [the] Commission’s docket but 
may, nevertheless, be considered with any other future 
charges against the judge.  
 
4. If the Commission finds the charges against 
the judge to be well founded, the Commission may, with 
the consent of the judge, place the judge on a period 
of supervision under such terms and conditions as the 
Commission shall determine.  Violation of such terms 
and conditions shall be grounds for a new charge of 
failure to cooperate with the Commission.8 
                     
8 While Rule 15(A)(4) does not require the agreement to be 
in writing, undoubtedly that practice is routinely followed to 
avoid any dispute over the terms and conditions of the 
agreement.  Similarly, the Commission’s requirement that a judge 
sign an “Acceptance of Conditions” prior to formalizing the 
Commission’s terms for a period of supervision is not 
inconsistent with this rule. 
 
23
 
Finally, Rule 15(A)(5) requires the Commission to report to 
the General Assembly any instance in which “the Commission finds 
the charges against [a] judge to be well founded under [JIRC 
Rule] 15A (2), (3), or (4).”  See also Code § 17.1-918. 
The structure of the rule is significant and entirely 
consistent with the goal of confidentiality embodied in Code 
§ 17.1-913, while permitting the Commission to exercise a broad 
range of dispositional options in performing its legislative 
mandate in a fair manner in a particular case.  The first 
option, 15(A)(1), permits the Commission to remove the charges 
from the Commission’s docket.  Such an action, indicating that 
the Commission did not find the charges to be well founded, 
would end the matter with no negative consequence to the judge.  
The second option, 15(A)(2), applies when the charges are 
determined to be well founded and serious enough to warrant 
retirement, censure or removal of a judge, and permits the 
Commission to file a complaint against the judge in this Court.  
Similarly, the third option, 15(A)(3), permits the Commission to 
remove from its docket charges that it determines are well 
founded, but not by themselves serious enough to warrant 
disciplinary action, with the possibility that, in the event of 
future misconduct, consideration of the charges may be revived.  
 
24
Such a disposition provides a warning to a judge and the 
opportunity to avoid future misconduct. 
The fourth option, 15(A)(4), permits the Commission, when 
it finds the charges to be well founded and with the consent of 
the judge, to place the judge on a period of supervision under 
such terms and conditions as the Commission shall determine.  
This option affords the judge the benefit of a period of 
supervision to avoid future misconduct and also to avoid some of 
the consequences of his past misconduct, including censure or 
removal.  Rule 15(A)(4) specifically provides that a violation 
of the terms and conditions of the agreement “shall be grounds 
for a new charge of failure to cooperate with the Commission” 
(emphasis added); thus providing the basis for the Commission to 
enforce the agreement. 
The Commission’s authority to enter into an agreement with 
a judge pursuant to Rule 15(A)(4) even though the Commission has 
found the charges to be “well founded” under Rule 15(A)(2) is 
not contested in this case.  Nevertheless, we note that Rule 
15(A)(2) provides that the Commission “shall” file a complaint 
in this Court when the Commission finds the charges against a 
judge to be well founded and of sufficient gravity to constitute 
a basis for retirement, censure, or removal.  This rule must be 
interpreted and applied so as to be consistent with the 
 
25
pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to 
the authority of the Commission. 
Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia 
provides that “[i]f the Commission finds the charges [against a 
judge] to be well-founded, it may file a formal complaint before 
the Supreme Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, Code § 17.1-
902 provides that “[i]f the Commission finds the charges to be 
well-founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis for 
retirement, censure, or removal of a judge, it may file a formal 
complaint before the Supreme Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  Guided 
by these clear provisions, we are of opinion that the provisions 
of Rule 15(A)(2) are necessarily permissive, rather than 
mandatory.  This interpretation of Rule 15(A)(2) brings it 
within the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to 
the Commission’s authority and removes any potential conflict in 
the application of Rule 15(A)(2) and Rule 15(A)(4).  Beyond 
question, this interpretation affords the judge a considerable 
benefit, and is entirely consistent with principles of fair 
procedure.  Accordingly, the Commission may enter into a Rule 
15(A)(4) agreement when it has found that the charges are well 
founded and of sufficient gravity to constitute a basis for 
retirement, censure or removal, but determines that such an 
agreement is appropriate under the circumstances of a particular 
case. 
 
26
We take particular care to emphasize that the proceedings 
before the Commission are not criminal in nature, and that the 
agreement contemplated by Rule 15(A)(4) does not, and need not, 
readily lend itself to a definitive characterization.  However, 
for purposes of our analysis in this case, the agreement may be 
likened to a form of immunity agreement offered by the 
Commonwealth to a citizen who is a potential defendant in a 
criminal investigation.  When the Commonwealth offers a citizen 
immunity from prosecution in exchange for his cooperation and 
the citizen abides by the terms of the agreement, “due process 
requires that the government provide him with the benefit of his 
bargain.”  Lampkins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 709, 722, 607 
S.E.2d 722, 729 (2005).  Once such an agreement is entered into, 
the government bears the burden of establishing that the citizen 
has breached the agreement and is subject to prosecution.  Id.  
In this context, we are of opinion that an agreement reached 
between the Commission and a judge would be essentially 
meaningless and futile unless the judge, upon compliance with 
the terms and conditions of the agreement, is afforded the 
benefit of his bargain.  Clearly the most significant benefit 
would be a bar against the filing of a complaint against the 
judge in this Court pursuant to Rule 15(A)(2). 
In order to determine whether there was an “agreement” 
between the Commission and Judge Elliott in this case, we will 
 
27
apply the basic law of contracts.  See Hood v. Commonwealth, 269 
Va. 176, 181, 608 S.E.2d 913, 915-16 (2005)(noting that 
cooperation/immunity agreements are “generally governed by the 
law of contracts”).  The most basic principle of contract law is 
that when one party makes an offer that is clear, definite, and 
explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, acceptance of 
that offer by the other party will complete the contract.  See 
Chang v. First Colonial Sav. Bank, 242 Va. 388, 391, 410 S.E.2d 
928, 930 (1991). 
At the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 hearing, the 
Commission, speaking through its Chairman, expressly stated 
that, despite finding that the charges before it were well 
founded and of sufficient gravity to warrant the filing of a 
complaint in this Court, “pursuant to the provisions of [JIRC] 
Rule 15(A)(4), the Commission will offer you the conditions that 
may forego the forwarding of those charges to the Supreme 
Court.”  The Chairman then recited the clear, definite, and 
explicit terms of that offer.  The offer was conditioned upon 
Judge Elliott’s providing the Commission with his “signed 
acceptance of these terms . . . not later than 12 o’clock Friday 
June 17th [2005].”  Judge Elliott signed the “Acceptance of 
Conditions” document provided to him by the Commission which 
unambiguously served as his acceptance of “the conditions 
 
28
specified by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission in . . . 
the Commission proceeding on June 15, 2005.” 
The Commission contends, however, that Judge Elliott’s 
acceptance of the terms and conditions set forth by the Chairman 
at the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 hearing did not result 
in the formation of a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision agreement, 
but only required the Commission to offer such an agreement at a 
future date if Judge Elliott complied with those terms and 
conditions.  In support of this contention, the Commission notes 
that it never rescinded the August 26, 2004 order suspending 
Judge Elliott and, thus, there could not have been a JIRC Rule 
15(A)(4) supervision agreement. 
We are not inclined to place form over substance.  The 
Chairman’s offer at the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 
hearing was unequivocal that Judge Elliott would be permitted to 
return to the bench if he accepted the terms and conditions 
outlined at the hearing.  Judge Elliott accepted that offer and 
began the process of complying with what he would reasonably 
believe was an agreement with the Commission to avoid the filing 
of formal charges in this Court.  Indeed, the Commission 
assisted the judge in that regard by providing draft letters of 
apology it had required the judge to send under one of the terms 
of the agreement. 
 
29
The subsequent statements by counsel for the Commission in 
communications with Judge Elliott’s counsel that the draft 
written agreement the judge would “eventually” be required to 
sign had not yet been approved by the Commission and that 
counsel for the Commission would not “sign the agreement on 
behalf of the Commission” until the Chairman or Commission 
members had approved the document, reflect concerns of form 
rather than substance.  As we have noted, nothing in the 
Commission’s rules requires that a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) 
supervision agreement be in writing.  Moreover, nothing in the 
Chairman’s recitation of the Commission’s offer to the judge at 
the conclusion of the June 14-15, 2005 hearing reasonably could 
have been understood to mean that the Commission was merely 
establishing predicates for some future agreement that would 
differ from the terms of the Commission’s offer. 
While the Chairman did indicate that “these terms will be 
reduced to writing immediately,” he also indicated that Judge 
Elliott could inform others that he would be returning to the 
bench immediately “after the hearing here,” suggesting that the 
requirements for a written recitation of the terms and a written 
acknowledgement of those terms were formalities or conditions 
subsequent.  When parties execute an agreement, either oral or 
written, they will frequently contemplate that a future writing 
will be executed as part of their obligations under the 
 
30
agreement.  Such contemplation, however, does not necessarily 
render the agreement invalid or unenforceable, even if the 
contemplated writing is not immediately executed.  Cf. Golding 
v. Floyd, 261 Va. 190, 193-194, 539 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001); 
Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 385, 457 S.E.2d 
36, 41 (1995); North America Mgrs., Inc. v. Reinach, 177 Va. 
116, 121, 12 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1941); Manss-Owens Co. v. H.S. 
Owens & Son, 129 Va. 183, 195, 105 S.E. 543, 547 (1921).  
Moreover, the terms imposed by the Commission were “reduced to 
writing” in the form of the hearing transcript excerpt sent to 
Judge Elliott’s counsel along with the “Acceptance of 
Conditions,” which referenced the transcript as the source of 
the offer Judge Elliott was being asked to, and actually did, 
accept.  The substance of the agreement, regardless of its form, 
was clear. 
Nor are we persuaded that the Commission’s not having 
entered an order rescinding Judge Elliott’s suspension supports 
the conclusion that it did not intend to enter into a JIRC Rule 
15(A)(4) supervision agreement with the judge.  To the contrary, 
the conditions as set forth by the Commission and accepted by 
Judge Elliott required him “to take annual leave until the 
Commission determines that [he has] satisfied the Commission’s 
conditions for [his] return to the bench.”  If the Commission 
had intended for Judge Elliott to remain under suspension, it 
 
31
would not, indeed could not, have required him to absent himself 
from the bench by taking annual leave.  Code § 17.1-911(A).  The 
fact that the Commission did not comply with its own decision to 
lift the suspension and permit Judge Elliott to complete the 
other conditions of the JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision agreement 
while taking annual leave does not vitiate the fact that the 
Commission made such an offer and Judge Elliott accepted it. 
For these reasons, we hold that the Commission made a 
clear, definite, and explicit offer to Judge Elliott to permit 
him to return to the bench under a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) 
supervision agreement and that upon his acceptance of that offer 
the supervision agreement became effective and Judge Elliott was 
entitled to the benefit of that agreement, unless he 
subsequently violated its terms and conditions.  Having 
determined that there was a valid JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) agreement 
between the parties which would otherwise foreclose the filing 
of a complaint against Judge Elliott in this Court, we now 
consider whether the record supports the Commission’s subsequent 
finding that Judge Elliott breached that agreement. 
The Commission asserts that Judge Elliott breached the 
agreement by communicating to others the fact that he would be 
returning to the bench.  The Commission contends that the 
Chairman’s statements that Judge Elliott “may announce that you 
have been returned to the bench” and “you may announce, after 
 
32
the hearing here, that the determination of the Commission was 
such that you have been returned to the bench” are “isolated 
statement[s].”  In the Commission’s view, the full context of 
the conditions set forth by the Commission at the conclusion of 
the June 14-15, 2005 hearing was that the judge was to make no 
statement of any kind concerning the outcome of the proceeding 
until he had actually resumed his duties.  The Commission 
further contends that “even if the Chairman’s statements are 
regarded as ambiguous, any ambiguity was removed by Commission’s 
Counsel’s explicit written communication to the judge’s counsel 
on June 17, 2005, before the judge signed the ‘acceptance of 
conditions.’ ”  (Emphasis in original.)  We disagree. 
First, the Chairman’s statements were neither isolated nor 
ambiguous.  To the contrary, the Chairman’s original recitation 
of the condition and his reiteration of it at the conclusion of 
the hearing made it abundantly clear that immediately following 
the hearing Judge Elliott was free to advise others that he 
would be returning to the bench.  Nothing in the transcript of 
the proceedings suggests that the Commission intended to put an 
absolute “gag order” on the judge or his counsel.  Moreover, 
permitting Judge Elliott to reveal that he would be returning to 
the bench, but not to assert that he had been fully vindicated, 
is a condition entirely consistent with the Commission’s 
 
33
decision to enter into a JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision 
agreement to permit the judge to return to his duties. 
Nor are we persuaded that the statement made by counsel for 
the Commission in the June 17, 2005 telefacsimile was sufficient 
to alter the terms the Commission had established.  The day 
before that communication, counsel for the Commission had 
provided the first draft of the Commission’s written agreement, 
the second provision of which was an almost verbatim restatement 
of the Chairman’s oral explanation of what the judge was 
prohibited from saying.  Indeed, even in the final draft of this 
document, submitted to the judge after the August 9, 2005 
hearing in which it was stated that the Commission was requiring 
the judge to make no statements concerning the resolution of his 
case, the condition remained only that the judge could not 
assert that he had been “exonerated or vindicated” by the 
Commission. 
Reviewing the evidence received by the Commission at the 
August 9, 2005 hearing, we conclude that Judge Elliott did not 
breach the condition of the JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) supervision 
agreement that he not claim exoneration or vindication by the 
Commission.  The evidence at best showed that in response to 
unsolicited inquiries from interested parties, the judge 
responded with innocuous pleasantries to the effect that he was 
“okay” and that “everything would be all right.”  Given the 
 
34
context of these conversations, such communications were 
insufficient to establish, expressly or by implication, that 
Judge Elliott would be returning to the bench and/or that he was 
exonerated or vindicated by the Commission. 
For these reasons, we hold that the record fails to support 
the Commission’s finding that Judge Elliott breached the JIRC 
Rule 15(A)(4) agreement.  In the absence of such a breach, the 
Commission remains bound by its agreement and, consequently, was 
foreclosed from revoking the agreement and filing a JIRC Rule 
15(A)(2) complaint in this Court.  
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we hold that the complaint is not properly 
before this Court and, therefore, must be dismissed without 
prejudice.  We emphasize that our holding pertains only to 
whether the Commission’s filing of the complaint was in accord 
with the procedures set out in its rules.  We do not address and 
express no opinion on whether the charges against Judge Elliott 
enumerated in that complaint are supported by the record and, if 
so, what sanction would be appropriate.  Nonetheless, we 
recognize that these charges, particularly those pertaining to 
the improper consultation of defendants’ criminal records and 
the use of the “DEA light” fiction, are of grave concern as they 
touch upon matters at the very heart of public confidence in the 
judiciary and the judicial system. 
 
35
By dismissing the complaint without prejudice, we fully 
expect that the Commission and Judge Elliott will abide by the 
original terms of their agreement, modified as necessary to 
account for the passage of time required to bring the matter 
before this Court.  Should the judge fail to do so, the 
Commission will be empowered by JIRC Rule 15(A)(4) to bring “a 
new charge of failure to cooperate with the Commission” in this 
Court.9 
Dismissed. 
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE LACY and SENIOR JUSTICE 
COMPTON join, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  I would hold that the Commission’s 
own Rules, and the Constitution and statutes of Virginia, 
precluded the Commission from entering into an agreement with 
Judge Elliott.  Under the Commission’s rules, having found that 
the charges against Judge Elliott were of sufficient gravity and 
were well-founded, the Commission did not have authority to 
dispose of those charges by placing him under the Commission’s 
supervision.  Moreover, neither the Constitution of Virginia nor 
the Code of Virginia authorizes the Commission to enter into 
                     
9 Because we have concluded that the complaint against Judge 
Elliott is not properly before this Court, we will not consider 
Judge Elliott’s arguments that his suspension violated his due 
process rights and that the charges relating to his 
communications with the other judges, his clerk staff, and 
 
36
supervisory agreements following an investigation into the 
conduct of a judge.  Therefore, I would conclude that the 
purported agreement the Commission reached with Judge Elliott 
was a nullity, that the present complaint is properly before 
this Court, and that we are required to decide whether Judge 
Elliott must be censured or removed from office. 
The majority’s analysis rests on its determination that 
Judge Elliott had a due process right to retain the benefit of 
his purported agreement with the Commission.  The ability to 
invoke a due process right, however, presupposes the existence 
of an enforceable right.  Here, Judge Elliott’s alleged right to 
have his bargain with the Commission enforced incorrectly 
assumes that the Commission had the authority to enter into a 
bargain in the first place. 
As the majority notes, Rule 15(A) of the Rules of the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Rule 15(A)) describes 
the manner in which the Commission must proceed against a judge 
once it has concluded its investigation into the judge’s alleged 
misconduct.  Under Rule 15(A)(2): 
If the Commission finds the charges against the 
judge to be well founded and of sufficient gravity to 
constitute the basis for retirement, censure or 
removal, it shall file a complaint against the judge 
in the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
                                                                  
others are an unconstitutional infringement on his right of 
freedom of speech. 
 
37
 
(Emphasis added). 
A plain reading of this provision indicates that when, as 
here, the Commission has found that the gravity of the charges 
is sufficient to warrant retirement, censure, or removal of a 
judge, the Commission “shall” file a complaint in this Court.  
These provisions of Rule 15(A)(2) are mandatory, not 
discretionary.  I would hold that the majority’s contrary 
construction is flawed because it effectively renders the use of 
“shall” meaningless. 
I would further hold that the Commission did not have 
authority to enter into a supervision agreement under Rule 
15(A)(4) because the Commission has not been granted such 
authority by the Constitution or Code of Virginia.  The 
Constitution vests the Commission “with the power to investigate 
charges which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or 
removal of a judge.”  Va. Const. art. VI, § 10.  After the 
Commission has conducted such an investigation, the Constitution 
prescribes a single course of action that the Commission may 
take once it has determined that the charges are well-founded:  
“[The Commission] may file a formal complaint before the Supreme 
Court.”  Id.  This constitutional directive is repeated in Code 
§ 17.1-902: 
The Commission is vested with the power, and it shall 
be its duty, to investigate charges arising out of the 
 
38
present or any prior term of office which would be the 
basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge 
under Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of 
Virginia and the provisions of this chapter. . . .  If 
the Commission finds the charges to be well-founded, 
and sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, 
censure, or removal of a judge, it may file a formal 
complaint before the Supreme Court. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The above constitutional and statutory provisions do not 
authorize the Commission to enter into supervisory agreements 
when the charges are determined to be well-founded, irrespective 
whether the charges are of such gravity to support censure, 
retirement, or removal of a judge, or are of lesser gravity.10 
While the Commission is given authority to promulgate 
procedural rules, that authority is limited by statute to rules 
relating to the procedure for investigations and hearings 
conducted by the Commission.  Code § 17.1-902 provides: 
The Commission shall have the authority to make 
rules, not in conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter or of general law, to govern investigations 
and hearings conducted by it. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  This statute does not provide the Commission 
authority to promulgate rules that effectively expand its 
statutory authority. 
                     
* The single exception in which such authority is suggested 
is where a judge is considered to be unfit to serve because of 
disability.  Code § 17.1-918 refers to “remedial” action taken 
in reports to the General Assembly. 
 
39
The Commission is not an occupational regulatory board.  
Those boards, such as the Board of Dentistry, the Board of 
Medicine, the Board of Nursing, the Board of Pharmacy, the Board 
of Accountancy, and the State Bar Disciplinary Board, are given 
specific authority to regulate the activities of the members of 
their respective professions.  By statute or Rule of this Court, 
those entities are vested with specific authority not only to 
investigate charges of misfeasance, but to dispose of those 
charges by imposing license suspension, probation with or 
without terms, reprimands, and in some cases financial 
penalties.  See, e.g., Code §§ 54.1-2706, -2915, -3007, -3316,  
-4413; Va. Sup. Ct. R. part 6, § IV, para. 13(B)(5)(b).  None of 
those disposition options is given to the Commission in its 
enabling legislation.  Thus, the Commission lacks the authority 
to act as an occupational regulatory board and enter into the 
type of supervisory agreements described in Rule 15(A)(4). 
The majority fails to discuss the fact that the General 
Assembly did not choose to grant the Commission similar, 
explicit supervisory authority.  Instead, the majority relies on 
the absence of the word “shall” in the Constitution and the 
Code, and opines that because the Commission is permitted, but 
is not required, to seek the censure or removal of a judge 
before this Court, the Commission may take other actions of its 
own choosing.  This interpretation departs from established 
 
40
principles of statutory construction because it creates 
authority from the absence of authority. 
The fact that the Commission has authority under the 
Constitution and the Code to refrain from proceeding against a 
judge when the charges are well-founded and of sufficient 
gravity does not mean that the Commission is authorized to 
dispose of those charges by entering into a supervisory 
agreement with that judge.  Such powers cannot derive from the 
absence of authority.  Yet that is precisely what the majority’s 
analysis attempts to effectuate. 
Extended to its logical conclusion, under the majority’s 
analysis, there would be innumerable powers that the Commission 
may have simply because those powers are not mentioned in either 
the Constitution or the Code.  Such powers would include the 
imposition of public reprimands, fines, and other sanctions of 
the Commission’s choosing.  I cannot conclude that the General 
Assembly intended such a result.  Therefore, I would hold that 
while the Commission was authorized by statute to refrain from 
proceeding against Judge Elliott, the Commission was not 
authorized to enter into a supervisory agreement with him. 
Because the Commission lacked authority to enter into a 
supervisory agreement, Judge Elliott cannot rely on the 
Commission’s alleged breach of such an agreement.  Accordingly, 
I would conclude that this Court must examine the record to 
 
41
determine whether the charges against Judge Elliott are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  See Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Commission v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 444, 611 
S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005); Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. 
Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 405, 568 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2002). 
 
Although the record before us contains evidence 
concerning the seven separate charges made against Judge 
Elliott, I confine my review to the fifth enumerated charge 
involving Judge Elliott’s false statements to criminal 
defendants about the existence of a “DEA light” in the 
courtroom.  I would conclude that this evidence, which is 
uncontested in its substance, is overwhelming and mandates the 
sanctioning of Judge Elliott. 
The evidence established that Judge Elliott regularly told 
persons accused of crimes that the “DEA” had installed a light 
in his courtroom that would indicate whether a person was using 
illegal drugs.  There was, of course, no such light installed. 
According to the evidence, Judge Elliott ordered certain 
criminal defendants to “look up at the light,” and then informed 
them that they had the option of submitting to a drug test in 
order to have the opportunity to receive a more lenient 
sentence.  In cases in which a defendant elected to take a drug 
test and passed it, Judge Elliott often suspended the 
defendant’s jail sentence.  In cases, however, in which a 
 
42
defendant failed the offered drug test, he would receive the 
full sentence originally imposed by Judge Elliott.  In addition, 
Judge Elliott allowed certain defendants who refused a drug test 
to admit that they were currently using drugs in exchange for 
receiving a partially suspended sentence. 
The evidence also included testimony from several courtroom 
clerks, each of whom testified that Judge Elliott referred to 
the “DEA light” on a frequent basis.  Two of these witnesses 
testified that when they were assigned to Judge Elliott’s 
courtroom, he mentioned the “DEA light” at least once per day. 
During his testimony before the Commission, Judge Elliott 
admitted that the allegations about his reference to a “DEA 
light” were true but contended that he only made false 
statements of this nature over a six-month period.  Judge 
Elliott also testified that at the time he made statements from 
the bench concerning the “DEA light,” he “didn’t see nothing 
wrong” with his actions.  He later qualified that statement, 
testifying, “I knew it wasn’t right, but I didn’t think it was 
that wrong wrong [sic].”  Judge Elliott then attempted to 
justify his actions, stating, “I think all judges have some 
things like that they might do every now and then.” 
Based on this record, I would conclude that the evidence is 
clear and convincing that Judge Elliott routinely lied from the 
bench to criminal defendants over a substantial period of time.  
 
43
His conduct deceived some of those defendants into making self-
incriminatory statements, thus depriving them of rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
Such conduct on the part of a judge undermines the very 
foundation of our judicial system.  At a minimum, persons 
appearing before a judge in this Commonwealth have a right to 
expect that the judge will not lie to them or trick them into 
surrendering their constitutional rights.  In my view, this 
Court must act to ensure that our citizens can trust a judge’s 
representations on any matter related to the trial of a case in 
our Commonwealth’s courts.  Judge Elliott’s repeated dishonesty 
and disregard of citizens’ constitutional rights cannot be 
reconciled with our system of justice and with the need for 
public confidence in our courts.  Accordingly, I would hold that 
Judge Elliott’s actions necessitate his removal from office. 
Finally, I express my concern that the Court’s holding 
today has far-reaching consequences beyond the present case.  
That holding effectively provides the Commission unregulated 
authority to determine the contents of future supervisory 
agreements, because neither the Constitution nor the Code give 
this Court appellate jurisdiction to review such agreements.  
Because our jurisdiction in cases involving the Commission is 
purely original rather than appellate, a fact the majority does 
 
44
not contest, we are precluded from granting a judge an appeal to 
review the Commission’s actions in negotiating, defining, and 
monitoring the terms of a supervisory agreement.  Thus, although 
the majority opines that its interpretation today will afford 
judges “a considerable benefit [and] is entirely consistent with 
principles of fair procedure,” this Court may be powerless to 
act if the majority’s assumption is proved incorrect.