Title: Cooper v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
JERRY LYNN COOPER, a/k/a 
GERALD LYNN COOPER 
                                          OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 080919 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of Alleghany County on 
a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 
violation of Code § 18.2-248(C), the defendant, Jerry Lynn 
Cooper, also known as Gerald Lynn Cooper, was convicted and his 
sentence was fixed at ten years in the penitentiary and a fine 
of $10,000.00.  The circuit court upheld the conviction and 
imposed the ten-year penitentiary sentence but suspended the 
$10,000.00 fine. 
 
In an unpublished order, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction.  We granted Cooper an appeal to consider this single 
assignment of error: “That the ruling by the Court of Appeals 
that [Cooper’s] proposed jury instruction concerning alibi was 
not required is erroneous.”  Finding that the Court of Appeals’ 
ruling was erroneous, we will reverse its judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Commonwealth’s evidence showed that in late 2004, 
Angela Tucker became a paid informant for the Alleghany 
Highlands Drug Task Force of the Virginia State Police.  Tucker 
“never had any charges or pending charges” against her but was 
“concerned about the drug problem in [her] area” of the 
Commonwealth and thought she “could help with that.”  She was 
paid $100.00 for each drug purchase she made for the police, and 
at the time she testified at Cooper’s trial, she had made sixty 
such purchases. 
 
At 3:22 p.m. on April 5, 2006, Tucker told Special Agent 
Eddie Philpot of the Virginia State Police, who was attached to 
the Alleghany Highlands Drug Task Force, that she might “be able 
to purchase some crack cocaine” from Cooper, who happened to be 
her uncle.  Special Agent Philpot, accompanied by Detective 
Winfred Smith of the Bath County Sheriff’s Office, who was also 
a member of the Alleghany Highlands Drug Task Force, gave Tucker 
money for the purchase of drugs.  After searching her, the 
officers installed “body wire” on her “that broadcasts through a 
frequency through a listening post” placed on the rear seat of 
the police vehicle.  
 
Special Agent Philpot and Detective Smith then drove Tucker 
to a location in the City of Covington near Cooper’s residence.  
Tucker left the car, walked to the residence, and found Cooper 
at home.  She asked him “if he knew where to get any drugs from, 
well coke.”  He replied, “yeah,” but said he had to make a call 
to Boomie, a local “coke dealer.”  He talked to Boomie, but 
Boomie “never called back.”  At that point, Jap, a friend of 
 
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Cooper’s, “come up” and “gave [Cooper] a ride.”  Before Cooper 
left, Tucker gave him a “hundred dollar bill” she had been given 
by Special Agent Philpot and Detective Smith. 
 
Cooper could not get the drugs from Boomie but secured them 
from Van, who had “a reputation for selling drugs . . . in 
Covington.”  Cooper returned to Tucker in about ten minutes and 
“gave [her] the drugs.”  It was then 4:26 p.m.  Cooper departed 
and Tucker immediately turned the drugs over to Detective Smith, 
who was sitting with Special Agent Philpot in their police 
vehicle nearby and from which they had been observing Tucker’s 
movements and listening to her conversations.  Upon analysis, 
the drugs proved to be cocaine. 
 
In defense, Cooper denied that he had sold drugs to Tucker 
and offered an alibi.  He testified and presented testimony from 
other witnesses that between 3:22 p.m. and 4:26 p.m. on April 5, 
2006, he was at work participating in the construction of a pool 
house at a site in Clifton Forge, a town located some distance 
from Covington.  Cooper’s employer and two of his co-workers 
stated that his work schedule was 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily 
and that he worked until 4:30 p.m. on April 5, 2006.  A witness 
who shares her home with Cooper testified that he left for work 
at 8:00 a.m. on April 5, 2006, and that he was not there when 
she returned home from a meeting about 4:15 p.m., but arrived 
before she left for work at 9:00 p.m. 
 
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At the conclusion of the evidence, Cooper proffered 
Instruction A, which was refused by the circuit court.  Based 
upon 2 Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Criminal, No. 52.100, 
at 52-3 (repl. ed. 2008), the proffered instruction read as 
follows: 
 
The defendant relies upon the defense that he was not 
present at the time and place the alleged offense was 
committed.  If, after consideration of all the evidence, 
you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present 
at the time and place the alleged offense was committed, 
you shall find him not guilty. 
 
 
The circuit court refused the instruction on the ground it 
was not required because other instructions were granted on 
presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the elements of 
the offense.  The Court of Appeals held that because the circuit 
court had granted the other instructions, a “separate 
instruction on alibi was neither necessary nor required, and the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to give 
[Cooper’s] alibi jury instruction.” 
ANALYSIS 
 
As a general rule, the matter of granting and denying 
instructions does rest in the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  See Daniels v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 460, 466, 657 
S.E.2d 84, 87 (2008); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 
145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984).  “Our ‘sole responsibility in 
reviewing [jury instructions] is to see that the law has been 
 
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clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which 
the evidence fairly raises.’ ”  Molina v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 
666, 671, 636 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2006) (quoting Swisher v. 
Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)).  And in 
deciding whether a particular instruction is appropriate, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the proponent of 
the instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Cary, 271 Va. 87, 91, 623 
S.E.2d 906, 907 (2006). 
 
We have visited the appropriateness of alibi instructions 
in several previous cases starting with Thompson v. 
Commonwealth, 88 Va. 45, 13 S.E. 304 (1891), and find that we 
have expressed a variety of views in the law on the subject.  In 
Thompson, involving a charge of robbery, this Court held that it 
was not error to instruct a jury that “the burden of proving the 
alibi rests upon [the accused]” after the accused had been 
granted an instruction telling the jury that the Commonwealth 
“must prove everything essential to the establishment of the 
charge in the indictment to the exclusion of a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. at 47, 13 S.E. at 305. 
 
In Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 111 S.E. 471 
(1922), a prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, the 
Commonwealth sought and received over defense objection an 
instruction including a statement that “where the accused relies 
upon or attempts to prove an alibi in his defense, the burden of 
 
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proving the alibi rests upon him.”  Id. at 660-61, 111 S.E. at 
475.  This Court held that while the statement would constitute 
reversible error standing alone, it did not prejudice the 
defendant because of the language in the remaining portion of 
the instruction and in other instructions that were given on 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt.  Id. at 665, 111 
S.E. at 476.  Two paragraphs from an early encyclopedia of law 
are quoted approvingly in our opinion and are worthy of note.  
The first reads as follows:  
 
In 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2nd Ed.), page 53, it is said: 
“Alibi is regarded by some courts as an affirmative 
defense, but the better doctrine seems to be that it is not 
a defense in the accurate meaning of the term, but a mere 
fact shown in rebuttal of the State’s evidence; and, 
consequently, the evidence introduced to support it should 
be left to the jury, uninfluenced by any charge from the 
court tending to place it upon a different footing from 
other evidence in the case.” 
 
Id. at 661, 111 S.E. at 475.  The second paragraph is from page 
56 of the encyclopedia and reads as follows: 
 
“The true doctrine seems to be that where the State 
has established a prima facie case and the defendant relies 
upon the defense of alibi, the burden is upon him to prove 
it, not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance 
of the evidence, but by such evidence, and to such a degree 
of certainty, as will, when the whole evidence is 
considered, create and leave in the mind of the jury a 
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”  
 
Id. at 663, 111 S.E. at 476. 
 
In Fenner v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 1014, 148 S.E. 821 
(1929), involving a charge of robbery, an instruction was 
 
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granted containing the same language that was found 
objectionable in Draper, i.e., “where the accused relies upon or 
attempts to prove an alibi in his defense, the burden of proving 
the alibi rests upon him.”  Id. at 1018, 148 S.E. at 822.  This 
Court criticized the granting of the instruction, stating that 
“[i]t is strange that prosecuting attorneys continue to ask for 
this instruction and trial courts continue to give it.”  Id.  
However, the Court held that the instruction could not have 
misled the jury because other instructions told the jury it 
could not convict unless it believed the defendant guilty to the 
exclusion of every reasonable doubt.  Id. at 1021, 111 S.E. at 
823. 
 
In Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 472, 5 S.E.2d 499 
(1939), a prosecution for attempted rape, a refused instruction 
stated as follows: 
The court instructs the jury that the evidence introduced 
by the defendant, that he was not at the scene of the 
alleged crime, need not have been such as to establish this 
as a fact, to entitle him to an acquittal; but if its 
effect has been such as to bring you to that state of mind 
that you have any reasonable doubt of his presence there, 
it is as much your duty to find him not guilty in this 
case, as it would be if you were convinced he was not there 
or was otherwise not guilty. 
 
Id. at 475, 5 S.E.2d at 500.  Reversing for the trial court’s 
failure to grant the instruction, we said:  “It is patent that 
the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that the 
 
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testimony referred to required it to be given to the jury.  That 
it was not given is prejudicial error.”  Id.  
 
In Noblett v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 241, 72 S.E.2d 241 
(1952), where the defendant was charged with indecent exposure, 
we held that “[i]n so far as the decision in Mullins . . . 
approves the form of the instruction [on alibi], it is 
overruled.”  Id. at 248, 72 S.E.2d at 245.  We said, “we now 
adhere to the same view” we took in Draper and Fenner, when we 
approved the statement from page 56 of the early encyclopedia of 
law concerning alibi principles.  Reversing on other grounds, we 
said that “at a new trial the defendant will be entitled to an 
instruction on alibi which conforms to the principles which we 
have here stated.”  Id. 
 
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 16, 168 S.E.2d 97 
(1969), a statutory burglary case, we said that “in order to 
require the giving of an instruction on alibi there must be 
evidence that the accused was elsewhere than at the scene of the 
crime at the exact time or for the entire period during which it 
was or could have been committed.”  Id. at 20, 168 S.E.2d at 
100.  We held that an alibi instruction was properly refused 
because  “the evidence offered in support of the defendant’s 
claim of alibi is so lacking in the required proof of his 
absence from the scene at the time of the commission of the 
 
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crime that the trial court properly refused to grant the 
requested instructions.”  Id.  
 
In Minor v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 278, 191 S.E.2d 825 
(1972), the defendant, charged with feloniously and knowingly 
receiving money from the earnings of a female engaged in 
prostitution, was denied an alibi instruction worded in the 
language approved in Mullins but disapproved in Noblett.  We 
said that “a separate instruction on alibi was neither necessary 
nor required” because “the jury was fully and completely 
instructed on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt” and 
was further told that “ ‘if there is any reasonable doubt that 
the accused did knowingly receive such money . . .’ or if they 
had any reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of the crime 
charged against her ‘on the whole case,’ they should acquit 
her.”  Id. at 281, 191 S.E.2d at 827.  We stated further that 
“to the extent that Mullins and Noblett are in conflict with 
this holding, they are expressly overruled.”  Id. 
 
In Crabbe v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 419, 270 S.E.2d 727 
(1980), the defendant, on trial for three robberies, was denied 
an alibi instruction similar to the one approved in Mullins and 
disapproved in Noblett.  We upheld the denial.  Citing Minor, we 
said that  “[w]e reaffirm the rule that, when the jury is 
properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and 
reasonable doubt, ‘a separate instruction on alibi [is] neither 
 
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necessary nor required.’ ”  Id. at 421, 270 S.E.2d at 728.  
“Moreover,” we said, “the jurors were told in each of three 
instructions . . . that, in order to convict, they were required 
to find that Crabbe ‘was present, aiding and abetting [his 
accomplice] in the commission of such [crimes].’ ”  Id. 
Finally, in Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 
S.E.2d 844 (1981), where the death penalty was imposed for 
murder during the commission of robbery, the trial court granted 
Instruction 2, an alibi instruction in the exact same wording as 
Instruction A, involved here.  The defendant complained of the 
instruction on appeal, “arguing that it confused the jury as to 
the standard of proof required to establish an alibi.”  Id. at 
856, 284 S.E.2d at 852.  We disagreed, stating that “[a] jury 
objectively reading the instruction complained of could not be 
misled, because nowhere does it require proof of alibi beyond a 
reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
Id. at 857, 284 S.E.2d at 852. 
 
This brings us to the point of decision.  In making our 
decision, we first question the efficacy of this Court’s 
approval in Draper of the statement that “[a]libi . . . is not a 
defense in the accurate meaning of the term, but a mere fact 
shown in rebuttal of the State’s evidence.”  132 Va. at 661, 111 
S.E. at 475.  We now hold to the contrary.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) 79 defines the word “alibi” as “[a] 
 
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defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s 
guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the 
scene of the crime at the relevant time.”  And the same 
dictionary at page 451 defines the word “defense” as “[a] 
defendant’s stated reason why the plaintiff or prosecutor has no 
valid case; esp., a defendant’s answer, denial, or plea .”  Hence, we will hereafter treat alibi as a 
defense in the accurate meaning of the term. 
 
We also question the efficacy of this Court’s approval in 
Draper of the further statement that “the evidence introduced to 
support [an alibi] should be left to the jury uninfluenced by 
any charge from the court tending to place it upon a different 
footing from other evidence in the case.”  132 Va. at 661, 284 
S.E.2d at 475.  We now hold to the contrary.  Rule 3A:11, which 
deals with discovery and inspection in criminal cases, provides 
in subparagraph (c)(2) as follows: 
(c) Discovery by the Commonwealth.-If the court grants 
relief sought by the accused under clause (ii) of 
subparagraph (b)(1) or under subparagraph (b)(2) of this 
Rule, it shall, upon motion of the Commonwealth, condition 
its order by requiring that: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(2) The accused disclose whether he intends to 
introduce evidence to establish an alibi and, if so, that 
the accused disclose the place at which he claims to have 
been at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. 
 
 
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Other than insanity or feeblemindedness, Rule 3A:11(c)(3), 
alibi is the only defense that must be disclosed pretrial by the 
accused in a criminal case.  Thus, subparagraph (c)(2) has 
placed alibi on a different footing from other evidence in the 
case, and it should be left to the jury in an appropriate 
instruction on the subject, in addition to instructions on 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. 
 
Furthermore, in view of our changed consideration of the 
alibi concept, we question the wisdom of continuing our rule 
that the matter of granting or refusing alibi instructions rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial court.  Johnson makes clear 
that an alibi instruction should be granted when there is 
“evidence that the accused was elsewhere than at the scene of 
the crime at the exact time or for the entire period during 
which it was or could have been committed.”  210 Va. at 20, 168 
S.E.2d at 100.  Yet, as a review of our decisions will reveal, 
alibi instructions have been granted in some cases and refused 
in others when no discernible difference is apparent.  
Eliminating judicial discretion will promote uniformity where 
uniformity is desirable, and it is desirable in this instance.  
Hereafter, the rule will be: grant an alibi instruction when the 
evidence described in Johnson is present, refuse when the 
evidence is absent. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
Cooper’s alibi evidence fully satisfied the Johnson test.  
We approved the wording of Instruction A in Bassett, 222 Va. at 
856-57 n.2, 284 S.E.2d at 852 n.2, and no reason has been 
advanced to require withdrawal of that approval.  Accordingly, 
the instruction should have been granted.  Because it was 
refused, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
vacate Cooper’s conviction, and remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals for further remand to the circuit court for a new trial 
with the jury instructed on alibi, provided the evidence remains 
substantially the same, the instruction is in proper form, and 
Cooper requests it. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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