Title: Ahearn v. Ahearn

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ahearn v. Ahearn1999 WY 169993 P.2d 942Case Number: 98-39, 98-40, 98-215Decided: 12/14/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
FRANCIS B. AHEARN, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

KATHLEEN S. AHEARN, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

FRANCIS B. AHEARN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

CHUCK LEWIS; and FIRST 
STATE BANK OF WHEATLAND, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

FRANCIS B. AHEARN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

RICKARD; and CHUCK LEWIS, 
Appellees (Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Platte County: The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Francis B. 
Ahearn, Pro Se., representing Appellant.

Kathleen Ahearn 
and Chuck Lewis: Fred W. Phifer, Wheatland, WY First State Bank: Stephen N. 
Sherard of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, WY, representing 
Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Acting pro se, as 
he did in the district court, Francis Ahearn appeals from three orders entered 
by that court. After consolidating these cases and reviewing Ahearn's various 
claims, we conclude that the district court's rulings were appropriate in all 
respects. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Francis 
Ahearn recites multiple issues in each of these cases. In case No. 98-39, he 
presents the following issues for our review:

I. Can a Court 
Order one and only one parent to provide all of the child support for both 
children and not hold the other parent accountable for equal support of the 
children?

II. Can a Court 
Order child support funds from a savings account to be returned to the savings 
account after the funds have been given to the children for their support when 
the funds have been expended in accordance with the Divorce 
Decree?

[¶3]      The appellee in 
case No. 98-39, Francis Ahearn's former wife, Kathleen Ahearn, states the issues 
in this fashion:

1. Did Mr. 
Ahearn, Appellant, take the money out of his children[']s college funds in 
violation of the Judgment and Decree? 

2. Did the court 
err in ordering the Appellant to refund the money taken from the college 
funds?

In case No. 
98-40, Francis Ahearn advances five issues:

I. Does a person 
who is NOT a party to a Divorce Decree, and who bears no legal or family 
relationship to either of the parties or their children have any legal standing 
to monitor how child support payments are to be spent on the 
children?

II. Does 
delivery of a recorded Notice of Default of an Agreement for Warranty Deed to a 
client's attorney constitute legal notice and due process when that client is in 
default, and has departed the area, and has left no forwarding address and 
directed the parties to conduct business through his attorney in his 
absence?

III. Does a bank 
which is serving as escrow agent and who has an obligation to account for and 
disburse funds to the Sellers have the right to refuse to disburse funds to the 
Sellers in direct opposition to the written escrow 
instructions?

IV. Are escrow 
funds that are NOT disbursed to the Sellers in accordance with the escrow 
instructions allowed to be construed by the Court as having been received by the 
Sellers when, in fact, the escrow agent's records and sworn testimony show that 
such funds have not been received by the Sellers?

V. Is it a 
conflict of interest for an attorney to represent both the Buyer and one of two 
Sellers in a contested escrow case where the results will clearly benefit one 
party and serve as a loss to the other?

One of the 
appellees in case No. 98-40, Chuck Lewis, condenses the issue to 
one:

1. Did the court 
err in granting Appellee's, Mr. Lewis's, Petition for Declaratory Judgment and 
finding that Mr. Ahearn, Appellant, failed to give proper notice of default to 
Mr. Lewis under the 1987 Agreement for Warranty Deed?

[¶4]      The second 
appellee in case No. 98-40, First State Bank of Wheatland, believes there are 
two issues:

1. Did the First 
State Bank of Wheatland properly withhold the escrow documents and tendered 
payments pursuant to an agreement for Warranty Deed and escrow instructions 
pending consent by one of the parties or a Court Order?

2. In any event, 
did Appellant, Francis B. Ahearn, prove his damages as a result of the actions 
of the First State Bank of Wheatland?

[¶5]      In the third and 
final consolidated case, No. 98-215, Francis Ahearn tells us the issues 
are:

I. Does actual 
service of a Notice of Default delivered in person by the sheriff to a party in 
a civil action fulfill the requirements of service by due 
process?

II. If an 
Agreement for Warranty Deed calls for the payment of both principal and interest 
and there is no provision for abatement of payments of either principal and/or 
interest during a period of litigation, does the failure to pay principal and/or 
interest during and after litigation constitute a default in the terms of the 
Agreement?

III. Can the 
issue of a failure to properly account for funds in an escrow account achieve 
res judicata status when there had been incomplete testimony on the issue and 
when the escrow holder, as Plaintiff, claims to not be a party to the action in 
which the faulty conduct of the escrow was discovered and the other Plaintiff in 
the action refused to be present and testify at the 
hearings?

IV. Can an 
attorney represent two Plaintiffs in a civil action where one is a Buyer and one 
is a Seller of real property and at the same time and in the same civil action 
also represent one of the opposing Defendants in a Quiet Title action where the 
outcome will clearly only benefit the one side to the detriment of the 
other?

[¶6]      The appellee in 
case No. 98-215, Chuck Lewis, simply repeats Francis Ahearn's statement of the 
issues. The Rickards, who were party to this case in the district court, do not 
appear.

FACTS

No. 98-39 (The 
Divorce Case)

[¶7]      Francis B. Ahearn 
(Mr. Ahearn) and Kathleen S. Ahearn (Mrs. Ahearn) were married in 1974. Two 
children were born of their union, a son in 1977 and a daughter in 1980. The 
couple divorced in 1992. As part of the divorce decree, Mr. Ahearn was to 
generally superintend the bank accounts belonging to the two children. The 
divorce decree provided:

Any amounts in 
the savings accounts established for [son and daughter] will be used solely for 
their education beyond high school. All funds resulting from the Lewis contract 
for sale1 on the trailer shall also be placed 
in a college fund. If that contract for sale goes into default and the trailer 
is taken back by [Mr. Ahearn], it will be resold and proceeds will be placed in 
the college fund.

[Mrs. Ahearn] 
shall be given a copy of quarterly bank statements for the fund, and [Mr. 
Ahearn] shall consult with [Mrs. Ahearn] and get her consent regarding any 
expenditures from the fund.

[¶8]      Pursuant to the 
divorce decree, Mrs. Ahearn was awarded custody of the children and moved with 
them to Colorado. In the fall of 1993, the daughter moved back to Wheatland to 
live with her father. Since her return to Wheatland, the daughter has flourished 
under her father's care, and all parties appear to be pleased with this 
arrangement.

[¶9]      In August of 
1997, Mrs. Ahearn filed a motion for order to show cause, claiming that Mr. 
Ahearn should be held in contempt for withdrawing $9035.00 from the children's 
college funds without Mrs. Ahearn's consent. At a bench trial2 on the order to show cause, Mrs. 
Ahearn introduced withdrawal slips, some signed by Mr. Ahearn, indicating 
withdrawals from both the son's and the daughter's accounts. Bank statements 
established that, since March of 1993, $8,180.00 had been withdrawn from the 
son's account and $5,312.83 from the daughter's. Mrs. Ahearn testified that, 
over the years, she had consented to only three expenditures from the college 
accounts. Mr. Ahearn essentially admitted that he had withdrawn money from the 
children's accounts, but protested that the money had been applied to meet the 
children's needs, especially the needs of the daughter under his 
care.

[¶10]   In its decision letter, the 
district court noted that, as far as the evidence showed, Mr. Ahearn had applied 
the money to the children's welfare. Nevertheless, the district court wrote: 
"the money was theirs, and not his, and should be returned to their accounts, as 
contemplated by the divorce Decree." The district court ordered Mr. Ahearn to 
refund $8,180.00 to the son's account and $5,312.83 to the daughter's 
account.

No. 98-40 (The 
Declaratory Judgment Action)

[¶11]   The facts pertinent to this case 
are confused somewhat by multiple sales of the subject trailer home. During 
their marriage, the "hearns purchased a trailer home and accompanying real 
estate. In April of 1987, the "hearns sold the trailer home by entering into an 
Agreement for Warranty Deed with Chuck and Shirley Lewis (the Ahearn/Lewis 
contract). After their 1992 divorce, the "hearns remained joint record owners of 
the trailer home.

[¶12]   In 1997, the Lewis' marriage met 
the same fate as the Ahearn's, and, pursuant to their divorce, Shirley Lewis 
quitclaimed her interest in the trailer home to Chuck Lewis. Chuck Lewis, as 
seller, then entered into a Contract for Warranty Deed with the Helgesons (the 
Lewis/Helgeson contract). Before doing so, Lewis obtained the `hearns' consent 
to the sale. At this time, both the Ahearn/Lewis and the Lewis/Helgeson 
contracts remained in effect.

[¶13]   Like their predecessors, the 
Helgesons' marriage did not endure, and they were divorced in November of 1997. 
During the tumultuous time preceding the Helgesons' divorce, no payments were 
made on the Ahearn/Lewis contract for three months. On August 19, 1997, Mr. 
Ahearn sought to default Lewis on the Ahearn/Lewis contract. Mr. Ahearn recorded 
a Notice of Default with the Platte County Clerk and hand-delivered a copy of 
the notice to Lewis' attorney. He also mailed of copy of the Notice of Default 
to the Helgesons. On September 19, 1997, Mr. Ahearn recorded a Notice of 
Termination of Agreement in which he asserted that the Ahearn/Lewis contract was 
"Terminated Due to Default as of midnight September 22, 
1997."

[¶14]   On September 23, 1997, Mr. Ahearn 
wrote a letter to the Ahearn/Lewis escrow agent, the First State Bank of 
Wheatland (Bank). The letter asserted that the Ahearn/Lewis contract had been 
terminated and requested the escrow be closed and no more payments be received. 
Two days later, Lewis tendered $675 to the Bank to cure any delinquency. Because 
Mr. Ahearn had instructed the Bank not to accept any more payments on the 
Ahearn/Lewis contract, the Bank simply held onto the 
payment.

[¶15]   Lewis filed suit on September 30, 
1997, seeking a declaration that Mr. Ahearn's notice of default was invalid. 
Lewis also joined the Bank as a party. Mr. Ahearn filed a resistance to Lewis' 
petition and made claims against both Lewis and the Bank. Mr. Ahearn alleged 
that the Bank had acted improperly by failing to disburse the funds from the 
escrow to the children's accounts and/or by failing to close the 
escrow.

[¶16]   After a bench trial, the district 
court agreed with Lewis that Ahearn's notice of default was defective, 
specifically finding the notice failed to comply with the terms of the agreement 
in two respects: (1) Ahearn had failed to send the notice by certified mail and 
(2) the notice was not sent to Lewis at the address specified in the Agreement. 
Besides declaring the notice of default invalid, the district court also ruled 
the Bank had not acted improperly in administering the 
escrow.

No. 98-215 (The 
Quiet Title Action)

[¶17]   After the district court issued its 
decision letter in the preceding two cases, Mr. Ahearn again attempted to 
default Lewis on the Ahearn/Lewis contract. On October 16, 1997, Mr. Ahearn 
recorded another notice of default. He also sent, by certified mail, a copy of 
the notice to Lewis at an address in Jamestown, North Dakota, but the notice 
went undelivered.

[¶18]   In the meantime, Lewis defaulted 
the Helgesons on the Lewis/Helgeson contract. On November 6, 1997, Lewis sold 
the trailer again, this time to the Rickards. This sale accelerated payments on 
the Ahearn/Lewis contract, and on the same day Lewis tendered the balance of 
Ahearn/Lewis contract to the bank. Again, because the bank had been instructed 
by Mr. Ahearn not to receive any more payments, it simply held Lewis' 
payment.

[¶19]   The day after Lewis tendered 
payment, Mr. Ahearn engaged the sheriff to serve process, and the sheriff 
personally served Lewis with the notice of default. To bring some order to this 
chaos, the district court, recognizing that Lewis intended to bring an action to 
quiet title, entered an Order Preserving the Status Quo on January 5, 1998. As 
expected, Lewis, along with the Rickards, brought the action to quiet title, 
naming the Ahearns among the defendants.

[¶20]   After a May 4, 1998, bench trial, 
the district court found that Lewis had satisfied the Ahearn/Lewis contract by 
tendering the full amount owed, thus extinguishing the Ahearns' interest. The 
district court ordered the payments tendered by Lewis ($6,926.42) be paid over 
to the Ahearns in satisfaction of the contract for deed. Under the terms of the 
divorce decree, this money is to be deposited in the children's college fund 
accounts. Finally, because Lewis was the only party who could provide a record 
of his interest in the property, the district court quieted title in 
Lewis.

[¶21]   Ahearn timely appeals each of these 
rulings. Upon our own motion, we have consolidated the three 
cases.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶22]   The factual findings of a judge are 
subject to a broader scope of review than a jury verdict, and the appellate 
court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. 
Springer v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-1176 (Wyo. 1997); 
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). However, 
the court's findings are presumptively correct and will not be set aside unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
Id. The court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 
Id.

DISCUSSION

No. 98-39 (The 
Divorce Case)

[¶23]   In this case, the only question is 
whether the district court properly determined that Mr. Ahearn violated the 
divorce decree when he withdrew, without Mrs. Ahearn's consent, money from the 
children's accounts. The record amply supports the district court's 
determination. First, the record reveals that Mrs. Ahearn did not consent to the 
bulk of these withdrawals. Mrs. Ahearn's testified that she had consented to 
expenditures from the accounts on only three occasions; any other expenditures 
were without her consent. The evidence also confirms that withdrawals were made. 
Besides the withdrawal tickets bearing Mr. Ahearn's signature, Mrs. Ahearn 
introduced exhibits establishing forty-four withdrawals from the son's account 
and forty-three withdrawals from the daughter's account. With this evidence, the 
record clearly supports the district court's conclusion that money was removed 
from the children's accounts without Mrs. Ahearn's consent, contrary to the 
terms of the divorce decree.

[¶24]   Mr. Ahearn argues that any money 
that was withdrawn was spent on the children and, therefore, he should not be 
made to refund it. However, even if we assume that Mr. Ahearn applied the money 
to the children's needs, there is no evidence that Mrs. Ahearn consented to 
these expenditures. While Mr. Ahearn is not completely unsympathetic because of 
his professed devotion to his children, it must be remembered that he was bound 
to abide by the terms of the divorce decree. When he failed to do so, the 
district court was well within its powers in ordering Mr. Ahearn to refund money 
to the children's accounts. Hurd v. Nelson, 714 P.2d 767, 771 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶25]   Mr. Ahearn also complains that the 
amount he was ordered to refund is incorrect. Under the terms of the divorce, 
the children's accounts were to be funded from payments by Lewis under the 
Ahearn/Lewis contract. Ahearn contends that, since the divorce, only $9034.67 
was paid under the contract for deed, and the order to refund $13,492.83 is thus 
implausible. To explain this discrepancy, Ahearn theorizes that he "might have" 
deposited money in the accounts over the years. However, when given the 
opportunity to prove that he had deposited money in the accounts and then 
withdrawn the same money, Ahearn did not come forward with any evidence to 
support his theory. Even if Mr. Ahearn had been able to substantiate his theory, 
he was bound to obtain Mrs. Ahearn's consent before making the expenditures from 
the college fund accounts. Moreover, nothing in the divorce decree precluded the 
children, their parents, or any other benefactors from making deposits to the 
college funds. Regardless, where the money came from was immaterial under the 
terms of the divorce decree. Any expenditures were subject to Mrs. Ahearn's 
consent. As discussed above, this consent was never obtained. Because Mrs. 
Ahearn presented evidence to support the amounts withdrawn without her consent, 
we conclude that the district court's determination in this respect was correct. 
The order appealed from in case No. 98-39 is affirmed.

No. 98-40 (The 
Declaratory Judgment Action)

[¶26]   In this case, the first issue is 
whether Mr. Ahearn's notice of default was sufficient under the terms of the 
Ahearn/Lewis contract. The district court specifically found that Mr. Ahearn's 
notice to Lewis did not comply with the terms of the agreement in two respects: 
(1) Ahearn had failed to send the notice by certified mail, and (2) the notice 
was not sent to the address specified in the Agreement for sending 
notices.

[¶27]   In reviewing Mr. Ahearn's claim, 
there are several principles that guide us. It is well established that this 
court generally does not favor forfeiture of contractual rights. Wilson v. Witt, 
952 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1998); Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 594 (Wyo. 
1994). Where the parties' intentions regarding default are clearly set forth in 
an agreement, we will not rewrite a default provision:

[A]fter 
competent parties have solemnly contracted and agreed to certain conditions, 
courts should exercise restraint in nullifying the terms thereof or rewriting 
the contract. It is said that this is "a dangerous jurisdiction which should not 
be extended." It does not extend so far as to authorize a court of equity to 
disregard and set aside a valid stipulation of the parties upon the performance 
of which their rights are made to depend in the absence of some equitable 
basis.

Wilson v. Witt, 
952 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Younglove v. Graham & Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 692 (Wyo. 1974) (citations omitted)).

[¶28]   Despite Mr. Ahearn's protests that 
the service of process on Lewis' attorney was sufficient, the contract clearly 
establishes a method for providing notice of default. Under the contract's 
terms, Mr. Ahearn was required to serve notice upon Lewis by certified mail at a 
certain Wyoming address. The record reflects that Mr. Ahearn did not mail the 
notice. Instead, he hand delivered a copy of the notice to Lewis' attorney. With 
these facts in evidence, the record amply supports the district court's 
conclusion that Ahearn's notice of default was not valid under the terms of the 
contract. To permit Ahearn to achieve service on the attorney would require us 
to ignore the express terms of the contract, a "dangerous jurisdiction" we 
decline to extend in this case.

[¶29]   Mr. Ahearn's third and fourth 
issues encompass his complaints against the Bank and will be treated together. 
Ahearn essentially complains that the Bank, while acting as escrow agent, 
improperly refused to disburse funds (the payments tendered by Lewis) to the 
children's accounts. We disagree.

[¶30]   The Bank was subject to the 
following instruction in regard to the Ahearn/Lewis escrow 
account:

8. In accepting 
any funds, securities or documents delivered hereunder, it is agreed and 
understood that in the event of disagreement between the parties hereto, the 
Escrow Agent will, and does, reserve right to hold any money in its possession, 
and all papers in connection with or concerning this Escrow, until a mutual 
agreement has been reached between all of said parties or until delivery is 
legally authorized by final judgment or decree of court.

[¶31]   Clearly, in this case, the Bank was 
simply holding the payments tendered by Lewis until the dispute between Ahearn 
and Lewis was resolved. Indeed, the record reflects that Mr. Ahearn had 
requested that the Bank not accept any more payments from anyone on the escrow. 
Thus, Mr. Ahearn is ill-situated to argue that the Bank improperly failed to 
disburse funds to the children's college accounts. We affirm the district 
court's order in No. 98-40. Mr. Ahearn's issue regarding attorney conduct 
coincides with his fourth issue in case No. 98-215 and will be addressed in the 
final section of this discussion.

No. 98-215 (The 
Quiet Title Action)

[¶32]   In this case, the question is 
whether title to the trailer home and accompanying property was appropriately 
quieted in Lewis. After reviewing Mr. Ahearn's three arguments that pertain to 
this issue, we conclude that it was.3

[¶33]   In performing our review of this 
case, we are faced with the problem that often arises when the record on appeal 
does not include the transcript from a proceeding. According to the district 
court's decision letter, a trial was held in this matter on May 4, 1998. 
Included in the record on appeal are the exhibits from this trial, but the 
transcripts, if any, from the trial are not included. We have often stated that 
we expect pro se litigants to comply with the Wyoming rules of appellate 
procedure in the same way that trained lawyers are expected to perform. Hamburg 
v. Heilbrun, 889 P.2d 967, 968 (Wyo. 1995); Korkow v. Markle, 746 P.2d 434, 435 
(Wyo. 1987). It is the appellant's burden to bring us a complete record on which 
to base a decision. Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 663 (Wyo. 1996). When 
no transcript has been made of trial proceedings, this court accepts the trial 
court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues which pertain 
to the evidence. Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1995); Armstrong v. Pickett, 865 P.2d 49, 50 (Wyo. 1993). In the 
absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, 
and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support those 
findings. Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d  at 771; 
Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶34]   Mr. Ahearn first argues that his 
second notice of default against Lewis was valid and served to extinguish Lewis' 
interest in the property. The record shows that Mr. Ahearn recorded the notice 
of default on October 16, 1997, and the sheriff achieved service on Lewis on 
November 7, 1997. The district court's opinion letter indicates that on November 
6, 1997, one day before he was served by the sheriff, Lewis tendered the 
remainder of the Lewis/Ahearn to the Bank. Because Mr. Ahearn presents nothing 
to refute the district court's finding that there was no default, we must 
conclude that the district court correctly determined that the second notice of 
default, although sufficient to provide Lewis with notice of any alleged 
default, was of no effect because there was no default under the Ahearn/Lewis 
contract.

[¶35]   Mr. Ahearn next contends that Lewis 
failed to make payments of principal and interest pending litigation, and this 
constitutes a default under the Ahearn/Lewis contract. This argument overlooks a 
number of important facts. First, Lewis had paid the full amount due under the 
contract to the Bank. Because Ahearn asked that the Bank not apply any payments 
to the escrow account, the Bank simply held the funds. Thus, any alleged default 
by Lewis was a result of Ahearn's refusal to accept payments from Lewis. This 
refusal by Ahearn was in contradiction to the order of the district court in the 
declaratory judgment action where the court determined that the first notice of 
default was insufficient. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that 
the Ahearn/Lewis contract was in default. Quite the contrary, Lewis tendered 
full payment on the contract, and the funds were eventually paid to Ahearn after 
the quiet title action was resolved. Again, we uphold the district court's 
conclusion on this issue.

[¶36]   In his third issue, Mr. Ahearn 
argues that the funds due under the Ahearn/Lewis contract were miscalculated by 
both the escrow agent and the district court. To the extent that the claim 
challenges the district court's determination that the Ahearn/Lewis contract has 
been satisfied, further review by this court is warranted. Mr. Ahearn's argues 
that, due to miscalculations by the district court and the Bank, he has been 
short changed by approximately $11,000 on the Ahearn/Lewis contract. Delving 
into the specifics of the alleged miscalculation, we see that the Ahearn/Lewis 
contract recited a $23,000 purchase price, but called for interest to accrue on 
only $13,000 of the purchase price. The remaining $10,000 of the purchase price 
was not to accrue interest. A problem arose because the escrow instructions 
indicated that the entire $23,000 purchase price was to accumulate interest. 
This problem was resolved when the parties to the Ahearn/Lewis contract 
(including Mr. Ahearn) executed an Addendum to Agreement for Warranty Deed on 
April 30, 1997, in which they acknowledged that the balance due under the 
Ahearn/Lewis contract was only $7,216.57 as of April 2, 1997. In its decision 
letter, the district court wrote that Mr. Ahearn's arguments were Abased, 
however, on an interest miscalculation in the original escrow documents - a 
miscalculation that is and has been well-known and obvious to everyone, and 
which provides no legitimate justification for Ahearn's demands." According to a 
letter from the Bank's attorney, the full amount due under the contract on 
November 5, 1997 was $6,926.42. Because Mr. Ahearn fails to provide a record to 
refute the district court's finding that this amount was correct, and because 
the addendum and the letter support its propriety, we conclude that the district 
court properly determined that the Ahearn/Lewis contract had been satisfied by 
the payment of $6,926.42.

Conflict of 
Interest

[¶37]   Finally, in an issue common to case 
No. 98-40 and case No. 98-215, Ahearn contends that the opposing attorney acted 
improperly by representing both Lewis and Mrs. Ahearn in these actions. The same 
attorney represented Mrs. Ahearn in case No. 98-39 (the divorce case), Mrs. 
Ahearn and Lewis in case No. 98-40 (the declaratory judgment action), and 
plaintiff Lewis in case No. 98-215 (the quiet title action). Mrs. Ahearn was 
named as a defendant in No. 98-215 (the quiet title action), but she was not an 
active litigant in the case. Although she filed an Answer and Counterclaim, she 
later withdrew this pleading.

[¶38]   Mr. Ahearn contends that the 
attorney who represented Lewis and Mrs. Ahearn had an impermissible conflict of 
interest, citing Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9. In 
response, Lewis argues Mr. Ahearn does not have standing to raise this issue. 
Lewis premises his standing argument on the lack of an attorney-client 
relationship between Mr. Ahearn and the attorney in 
question.

[¶39]   On the issue of standing, we have 
stated that:

The doctrine of 
standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most 
elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should 
refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no 
interest in vigorously advocating. * * * A litigant is said to have standing 
when he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal 
stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at 
stake.

Robinson v. 
Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted)).

[¶40]   In Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d  at 
154, the plaintiff in a personal injury case (Robinson) argued that the 
defendant's insurance company should not have been allowed to provide the 
defendant (Hamblin Jr.) with legal representation. We disagreed, determining 
that Robinson did not have standing to pursue such a claim: "Since Hamblin Jr. 
was an opposing party in this suit, Robinson has no `tangible interest' in 
Hamblin Jr.'s right to legal representation." Id.

[¶41]   Like the plaintiff in Robinson v. 
Hamblin, Mr. Ahearn has no tangible interest in either Mrs. Ahearn's or Lewis' 
choice of counsel. We acknowledge some courts recognize that a party who is not 
a former client may maintain a motion to disqualify if that party is able to 
show that the alleged conflict adversely affected the interest of the party 
seeking disqualification. Lavaja v. Carter, 505 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ill.App. 1987); 
Hawkes v. Lewis, 586 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Neb. 1998). However, even if we assume 
that a conflict exists, Mr. Ahearn has neither alleged nor established that his 
rights were prejudiced by the dual representation of Mrs. Ahearn and Lewis. 
Therefore, Mr. Ahearn has failed to bear his burden to establish that 
disqualification of counsel is warranted. Rose v. Rose, 849 P.2d 1321, 1325 
(Wyo. 1993).

CONCLUSION

[¶42]   After a review of Mr. Ahearn's 
claims, we conclude that the district court's orders should be affirmed in all 
respects. The district court was sympathetic to Ahearn's plight as a pro se 
litigant, and afforded him every appropriate courtesy. For this, the district 
court should be commended. Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 This 
contract is the subject of the dispute in No. 98-40 and will be more fully 
discussed therein.

2 In the 
district court, this action was consolidated with the declaratory judgment 
action (case No. 98-40), and the cases were tried 
together.

3 The order 
quieting title, which appears to have been prepared by Lewis' attorney, states 
that Lewis obtained title to the property by adverse possession. However, the 
district court's decision letter, which is incorporated into the order, does not 
rely on adverse possession. The order is obviously erroneous in this respect, 
and we will rely on the decision letter.