Title: State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. LAMP, APPELLANT, v. J.A. CROSON COMPANY ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co. (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d. ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Specific safety requirements — Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-06(B)(3), read in conjunction with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
06(D)(4) and (5), requires vehicles that operate within an off-highway 
jobsite be equipped with seatbelts at all times, irrespective of where the 
vehicles are operating at the time an accident occurs. 
(No. 94-814 — Submitted September 26, 1995 — Decided March 4, 1996.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93AP-329. 
 
Eddie Duane Lamp, claimant and appellant, was employed as a plumber for 
appellee J.A. Croson Company (“Croson”), a construction contractor.  In 1988, 
Croson was involved in a construction project in Mansfield.  The jobsite was at an 
off-highway location with restricted public access. 
 
For approximately four to five months, claimant had been transported to the 
site in a company van.  Claimant was not required to use company transportation, 
but chose to as a convenience.  The van was a Ford Econoline equipped with only 
a driver and passenger seat.  Employees riding in the van rode on benches set up in 
the back.  The seats were not secured to the floor nor were any restraining devices 
provided. 
 
Construction materials were also transported with the employees.  These 
include both full and empty acetylene bottles, tool boxes, and plumbing fittings. 
 
On the morning of March 16, 1988, claimant and several co-workers were 
traveling on Interstate 71 to the jobsite when the van hit a patch of ice and flipped.  
Claimant injured his back, legs, left arm, and left shoulder. 
 
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Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed claimant’s workers’ 
compensation claim.  Claimant later moved for an additional award for a violation 
of specific safety requirements (“VSSR”), alleging that his employer had violated 
two specific safety requirements. 
 
The commission denied the application, finding that no specific safety 
requirement had been violated when Lamp sustained his injuries. 
 
Lamp filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying his 
application.  The court denied the writ. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Gibson & Robbins-Penniman and Gus Robbins-Penniman, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
Carlile, Patchen & Murphy, Denis J. Murphy and John W. Seidensticker, for 
appellee J.A. Croson Co. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER J.  The parties to this action contest whether a specific statutory 
requirement was violated when Lamp sustained his injuries.  The parties do not 
contest whether Lamp was injured during the course of his employment.  That 
issue was determined when Lamp’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed. 
 
A few simple principles should guide our analysis of whether a specific 
safety requirement was violated.  Specific safety requirements must be sufficiently 
specific to “plainly * * * apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his 
employees.”  State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257, 261, 
61 O.O.2d 488, 490, 291 N.E.2d 748, 752.  Because a VSSR results in a  penalty, 
 
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specific safety requirements must be strictly construed in the employer’s favor.  
State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 545 N.E.2d 1216. 
 
Under State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 152, 153, 
12 OBR 223, 224, 465 N.E.2d 1286, 1288, the commission “has the discretion to 
interpret its own rules; however, where the application of those rules to a unique 
factual situation gives rise to a patently illogical result, common sense should 
prevail.” 
I 
 
We first must determine whether the Ohio Administrative Code sections 
regulating construction activities apply to this case. The commission determined 
that the claimant was not engaged in a construction activity and, thus, that the 
claimant was precluded from recovering damages as the result of a VSSR.  For the 
following reasons we conclude that the commission erred when it made this 
determination.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(A) provides: 
 
“The purpose of this code is to provide safety for life, limb and health of 
employees engaged in construction activity. * * * 
 
“Activities within the scope of this code, generally referred to herein as 
‘construction’ include the demolition, dismantling, excavation, construction, [and] 
erection * * * of buildings and other structures and the installation of machinery or 
equipment and all operations in connection therewith * * *.” 
 
After examining this language governing the scope of its rules, the 
commission stated: 
 
“The claimant alleges that even though the accident occurred before he got 
to the construction jobsite that the transporting of construction materials is ‘an 
operation in connection therewith’ as defined by 4121:1-3-01(A) and thus he was 
engaged in construction activity at the time of the accident. 
 
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“This position is rejected.  It is concluded that the transporting of materials 
was an activity that is only preparatory in nature.  That is to say that at the time of 
the accident the claimant was only preparing to engage in construction activity by 
the transporting of materials to the jobsite.  Construction activity must occur at the 
jobsite itself, and being that the claimant had yet to arrive at the jobsite, his actions 
in moving materials to the jobsite would not yet be construction activity. 
 
“If the claimant had been riding in the van after it had arrived at the jobsite 
wherein it was moving within the jobsite for a construction related purpose or 
even if the van had left the jobsite after it had arrived and was returning to the 
jobsite with construction materials, then the claimant would have been engaged in 
construction activity because those activities would have taken place after the van 
arrived at the construction site.” 
 
We disagree with the commission’s conclusion that the claimant was not 
engaged in a construction activity.  While we are normally obligated to defer to the 
commission’s interpretation of its own rules, we will not defer when the 
commission’s interpretation implicitly adds language to the text of the rule. 
 
In examining the facts surrounding the claimant’s injury, the commission 
did not allow the claimant’s VSSR claim because the commission found the 
transportation of construction materials from the contractor’s off-site premises to a 
construction site to be a preparatory activity and not a “construction activity” as 
defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01.  However, this preparatory-activity 
exception to the scope of rule appears nowhere in the text of the rule. 
 
In its definition of “construction activities,” Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01 
does not focus on whether the employment activity is preparatory.  Instead, the 
rule focuses on whether the employment activity involves “demolition, 
dismantling, excavation, construction, [and] erection * * * of buildings and other 
 
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structures and the installation of machinery or equipment,” or any activity that is 
performed “in connection therewith.”  Agreeing with the commission’s conclusion 
that Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(A) excludes preparatory activities would 
require us to rewrite the rule and add a preparatory-activities exception.  However, 
it is not our role to rewrite the commission’s rules.  Only the Administrator of 
Workers’ Compensation or the General Assembly may rewrite safety 
requirements.  R.C. 4121.13. and 4121.47. 
 
Having rejected the commission’s construction of  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-01, we next examine whether the plain language of this provision covers the 
claimant.  At the time of his injury, the claimant was a passenger in a van that was 
transporting  plumbing fittings, acetylene bottles, tool boxes, and other materials 
to be used at the construction site.  Because these items are clearly connected to 
construction of the building, the transportation of the materials from the 
contractor’s off-site facility to the construction site is a construction activity and 
falls within the scope of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01. 
II 
 
We next must determine whether the commission erred when it determined 
that Croson did not violate Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(4) and (5) because 
claimant was not riding in a “motor vehicle” as defined in 4121:1-3-06(B)(3).  
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(4) and (5) provide:  
 
“(D)  Motor vehicles. 
 
“* * * 
 
“(4)  Trucks used to transport employees. 
 
“(a)  Trucks assigned to, or generally used for the transportation of 
employees shall be equipped with seats and back rests which are securely fastened. 
 
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“(b)  Tools and materials transported in the same compartment with 
employees shall be secured to prevent movement. 
 
“(5)  Seat belts. 
 
“The employer shall provide and the employee(s) shall use seat belts on all 
motor vehicles which have rollover protective structures or cabs. * * *” 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(B)(3) defines “motor vehicles” as “all those 
vehicles that operate within an off-highway jobsite, not open to unrestricted public 
traffic.” 
 
While it is undisputed that the van claimant was riding in did not have 
seatbelts or secured seats, the commission determined that because the accident 
that injured the claimant did not occur at the off-highway jobsite, the employer 
could not be penalized for the van’s lack of prescribed safety features.  The 
commission reasoned that the phrase “vehicles that operate within an off-highway 
jobsite” requires seatbelts and secured seats only while vehicles are within the 
boundaries of a jobsite. 
 
Because this interpretation again rewrites the safety requirement that the 
commission interpreted, we reject it.  If the drafters of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
06(B)(3) intended to immunize employers whose vehicles are not equipped with 
seatbelts or secured seats once the vehicles have departed the jobsite the rule 
would have defined “motor vehicles” as “vehicles while operating within an off-
highway jobsite,” not as “vehicles that operate within an off-highway jobsite.”  
Thus, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(B)(3), read in conjunction with Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(4) and (5), requires vehicles that operate within an off-
highway jobsite be equipped with seatbelts at all times, irrespective of where the 
vehicles are operating at the time an accident occurs. 
 
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In this case, the van that claimant was riding in had operated within 
Croson’s off-highway jobsite repeatedly for the past four to five months.  Thus, 
the van was a vehicle that operated within the jobsite and was required to have the 
safety restraints listed in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(4) and (5). 
 
Because we find that the commission abused its discretion when it did not 
allow Lamp’s VSSR claim, we reverse the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  
We order the commission to vacate its order and to enter a new order granting 
Lamp’s application. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
WRIGHT, J., dissenting.  The majority correctly states, “Because a VSSR 
results in a penalty, specific safety requirements must be strictly construed in the 
employer’s favor.”  However, the majority then proceeds to expansively construe 
“all operations in connection therewith,” Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(A), to the 
detriment of Croson, the employer.  That phrase, while admittedly quite inclusive, 
does not encompass every single activity connected in any way with the 
construction trade. 
 
The commission determined that accepting a ride in a company van as a 
matter of personal convenience is not an activity connected with construction.  I 
would affirm that determination because it makes common sense and it surely is 
“not patently illogical.”  See State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio 
St.3d 152, 153, 12 OBR 223, 224, 465 N.E.2d 1286, 1288.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.