Title: State v. Kevin Harris

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 64 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2433-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Kevin Harris,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 144 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 200, 667 N.W.2d 813 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Steven A. 
Koch and Seymour, Kremer, Nommensen, Morrissy & Koch, L.L.P., 
Elkhorn, and oral argument by Steven A. Koch. 
 
 
2004 WI 64 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2433-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 156) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin Harris,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State appeals from a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. Harris, 2003 WI App 144, 266 
Wis. 2d 200, 667 N.W.2d 813, which affirmed an order of the 
Walworth County Circuit Court, Michael S. Gibbs, Judge, granting 
the motion of the defendant, Kevin Harris (Harris), to withdraw 
his guilty plea to a charge of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  The circuit court granted the defendant's motion for 
plea withdrawal on the basis that the State had violated his due 
process right to receive exculpatory evidence when it failed to 
disclose that the alleged victim reported being sexually 
assaulted by her grandfather on a different occasion.  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
2 
 
I.  ISSUES 
¶2 
The issues on appeal are:  1) whether the State 
violated Harris's right to due process under the state and 
federal constitutions1 by failing to disclose, before entering 
into a plea bargain with him, that the alleged victim reported 
being sexually assaulted by her grandfather on a different 
occasion; 
2) 
whether 
this 
nondisclosure 
violated 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23 (2001-02),2 Wisconsin's reciprocal discovery 
statute; and 3) whether Harris is entitled to withdraw his plea 
if either violation is present.  We hold that the State did not 
violate Harris's right to due process because, pursuant to 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), due process does not 
require the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment 
information before a defendant enters into a plea bargain.  
However, we determine that B.M.M.'s allegation against her 
grandfather is the type of information the State was required to 
disclose pursuant to § 971.23(1)(h) because it constitutes 
evidence favorable to the accused whose nondisclosure undermines 
our confidence in the judicial proceeding.  This information is 
favorable to the accused because it constitutes impeachment 
                                                 
1 "This court has repeatedly stated that the due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions are essentially 
equivalent and are subject to identical interpretation."  State 
v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 891, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)(citing 
Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 
(1995)). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
3 
 
evidence that casts doubt on the credibility of the State's 
primary 
witnesses. 
 
The 
nondisclosure 
of 
this 
evidence 
undermines our confidence in the outcome of the judicial 
proceeding because Harris would not have pled guilty but for the 
nondisclosure of this evidence.  We further hold that in order 
to comply with the mandate in § 971.23(1) that such information 
must be turned over within a reasonable time before trial, the 
State was obligated to disclose this evidence at a point when 
Harris would have had sufficient time to make effective use of 
the information.  As Harris entered his plea bargain within two 
weeks prior to the date on which his trial was scheduled to 
commence, the State should have disclosed the suppressed 
evidence by at least this point in the proceedings in order for 
Harris to be able to effectively use it.  Given that 1) the 
evidence of B.M.M.'s allegation was the type of evidence 
required to be disclosed under § 971.23(1)(h); 2) the State did 
not disclose this evidence within a reasonable time before 
trial; and 3) Harris would not have pled guilty but for this 
nondisclosure, Harris has demonstrated that a withdrawal of his 
plea is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice.  Therefore, we 
affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Harris is a 31-year-old man with an eighth grade 
education who has a history of serious mental illness.  The 
State filed a criminal complaint against Harris on April 24, 
2001, alleging that he had sexual contact with B.M.M., a person 
who 
had 
not 
yet 
attained 
the 
age 
of 
13, 
contrary 
to 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1), and violated the conditions of his bond 
on a previous matter, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a).  
The State further alleged that Harris was a repeat offender as 
to count one.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c).  Subsequently, the 
State filed an information on May 2, 2001, alleging the same.  
The complaint alleged that Harris touched six-year-old B.M.M. on 
her vaginal area over her clothing.  The complaint also alleged 
that Harris admitted to Detective Ray Otto of the Elkhorn Police 
Department that on April 11, 2001, he had brought B.M.M. into 
his apartment and that he kissed her head and patted her on the 
leg but denied touching her in an inappropriate manner.   
¶4 
On May 2, 2001, Harris waived his preliminary hearing 
and pled not guilty to each of the two counts in the complaint.  
A jury trial was set for August 6-8, 2001.  Harris filed a 
discovery demand with the court on May 30, 2001, whereby he 
demanded that the State provide, inter alia, "[a]ll exculpatory 
evidence . . . that 
could 
form 
the 
basis 
for 
further 
investigation by the defense."3  On June 5, 2001, after 
substituting counsel, Harris changed his plea to not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) and Judge James L. 
Carlson ordered a psychiatric evaluation.  On July 11, 2001, the 
                                                 
3 In his discovery demand, Harris also requested the 
following:  1) "All exculpatory evidence . . . that would tend 
to 
negate 
the 
Defendant's 
guilt;" 
2) 
"All 
exculpatory 
evidence . . . that 
would 
tend 
to 
affect 
the 
weight 
and 
credibility of evidence used against the Defendant;" and 3) "All 
exculpatory evidence . . . that would extenuate, mitigate, or 
reduce the degree of the offense charged or the Defendant's 
punishment for the offense."  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
5 
 
State gave notice to Harris that it intended to call up to two 
expert witnesses to testify as to reactive behaviors common 
among child sexual abuse victims.4  Thereafter, on July 25, 2001, 
approximately two weeks before trial, the psychiatric evaluation 
not supporting his NGI plea, Harris entered into a plea 
agreement with the State.  Harris agreed to plead guilty to 
count one (first-degree sexual assault of a child as a repeater) 
and the State agreed to dismiss and read in count two (bail 
jumping).  In addition, the State agreed to dismiss and read in 
Harris's previous misdemeanors.  There was to be a presentence 
investigation, and the State agreed to remain silent at 
sentencing, although Harris was free to argue.  After conducting 
a plea colloquy, the court accepted Harris's plea of guilty to 
count one.   
¶5 
On September 21, 2001, Judge Carlson sentenced Harris 
to a 45-year term of imprisonment, composed of 30 years 
confinement and 15 years extended supervision.  On April 30, 
2002, Harris filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, which was amended on May 6, 2002.  In his amended 
motion, Harris alleged that shortly after the sentencing hearing 
Assistant District Attorney Maureen Boyle, at the direction of 
District Attorney Phillip Koss, informed his trial counsel that 
                                                 
4 Expert testimony "about the consistency of a sexual 
assault complainant's behavior with victims of the same type of 
crime" is commonly referred to as "Jensen evidence," in 
reference to our decision in State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 
432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).  See State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, ¶36, 
250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 112. 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
6 
 
the State had failed to disclose that B.M.M. had previously made 
an allegation that her grandfather had sexually assaulted her on 
two occasions.  A copy of an Elkhorn Police Department case 
record that was appended to Harris's motion provided that on 
June 1, 2001, B.M.M. alleged that she had been sexually 
assaulted by her grandfather on or about February 16-23, 2001.  
The document also recited that on June 8, 2001, the Walworth 
County Sheriff's Department conducted an audio and videotaped 
interview with B.M.M., wherein she provided details of the 
alleged assault.  During the interview, B.M.M. alleged that her 
grandfather, while staying at her house, had awoken her on two 
occasions, licked his fingers, and touched the front of her 
vaginal area and "butt-crack" underneath her pajamas.  Following 
the interview, B.M.M.'s mother was reluctant to have her father 
interviewed and expressed disbelief that he could have done such 
a thing.  She also stated that the following Sunday, June 10, 
2001, the family would be moving out of town.   
¶6 
Harris, relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 
(1963), and State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 497, 605 
N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999), asserted that the State's failure to 
disclose this evidence violated his constitutional due process 
right to all exculpatory evidence.  The motion was heard before 
Judge Michael S. Gibbs on July 25, 2002.  At the motion hearing, 
Harris argued that the State was required to disclose this 
information to him under State ex rel. Lynch v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 463, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978), and 
that its failure to do so required that Harris be allowed to 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
7 
 
withdraw his guilty plea under Sturgeon.  Harris argued this 
evidence tended to negate his guilt and would have been 
admissible under State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 
N.W.2d 325 (1990).5    
¶7 
Specifically, Harris argued that B.M.M.'s allegation 
concerning her grandfather's assault could be the source of 
prior sexual knowledge.  Harris noted that B.M.M.'s grandfather 
allegedly assaulted her on February 16 and 23 of 2001 and that 
the State alleged Harris assaulted B.M.M. on April 11, 2001.  
Further, Harris argued that given the fact B.M.M. did not report 
the assaults by her grandfather until June of 2001 and her 
family did not wish to prosecute her grandfather, it was 
possible that B.M.M. projected these assaults onto Harris.  
Moreover, Harris argued that such information would have been 
necessary to cross-examine the State's expert witnesses.  Harris 
noted that B.M.M. had moved out of state and was now unavailable 
for him to examine.  Finally, counsel for Harris put in an offer 
of proof that he (Harris) would not have entered into his guilty 
plea had the State complied with his discovery request and 
disclosed this information.  Harris would testify that he pled 
guilty because he thought a jury would believe the word of a 
                                                 
5 In State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990), this court created a judicial exception to Wisconsin's 
rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2), that allows a defendant 
to present evidence of a child's past sexual behavior if the 
defendant demonstrates that the evidence meets a five-part test 
and if the court determines that the State's interest in 
excluding the evidence is outweighed by the defendant's right to 
present it.  See Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶20.  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
8 
 
child and two experts over his statement without any other 
evidence supporting his case.  Harris would also testify that he 
believed he would receive a much harsher sentence had he gone to 
trial.   
¶8 
The prosecutor argued that she did not disclose this 
evidence immediately because the investigation of B.M.M.'s 
grandfather was still ongoing.  Apparently, the investigation 
was never completed because B.M.M. and her grandfather moved to 
Texas.  Thereafter, the prosecutor stated that she simply forgot 
about the prior allegation but later found the paperwork after 
Harris was sentenced.  Further, the prosecutor stated she did 
not believe that the evidence was exculpatory, as it was not 
admissible under Pulizzano because B.M.M.'s allegations against 
Harris did not demonstrate that B.M.M. possessed an unusual 
level of sexual knowledge for a child of her age. 
III.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶9 
The circuit court found that the State was required to 
disclose the disputed evidence because under Brady, "the 
Defendant has an absolute right to——absolute constitutional 
right to any exculpatory evidence which may lead to the 
investigation of finding further exculpatory evidence."  The 
court also stated that it was undisputed that Harris was unaware 
of his constitutional violation until after he was sentenced.  
The court determined that Harris would not have pled guilty but 
for the constitutional violation because the disputed evidence 
might have been admitted under Pulizzano.  Finally, the circuit 
court found that Harris did not receive a substantial benefit 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
9 
 
from the plea bargain and that he only pled guilty because he 
had no evidence to support his version of events.  Therefore, 
the circuit court granted Harris's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  On September 30, 2002, the State filed a notice of 
appeal.   
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals 
stated that its decision in Sturgeon governed whether a 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea when the State 
fails to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to a plea and that 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz did not alter 
its analysis.  Harris, 266 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶11, 30.  The court of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
under 
Brady, 
"[a] 
defendant 
has 
a 
constitutional right to all material exculpatory evidence in the 
hands of the prosecutor."  Harris, 266 Wis. 2d 200, ¶32 (citing 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).  The court of appeals held that "the 
State violates the Constitution if it withholds the type of 
information that could form the basis for further investigation 
by the defense."  Id., ¶36.  The court of appeals reasoned:  
"Here, the prosecution withheld evidence of a prior sexual 
assault.  Thus . . . we hold that this evidence is potentially 
exculpatory and that it was within the exclusive control of the 
prosecution.  As such, Harris has established a constitutional 
violation."  Id.  The court of appeals, relying on the factors 
stated in Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d at 502-04, ruled that Harris 
would 
not 
have 
pled 
guilty 
but 
for 
this 
constitutional 
violation.  Harris, 266 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶38-39, 45.  The court of 
appeals also held that Harris established a violation of 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
10 
 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) because the State failed to disclose 
the potentially exculpatory evidence of B.M.M.'s prior sexual 
assault and rejected the State's argument that the statute 
simply 
codified 
the 
requirements 
of 
Brady. 
 
Id., 
¶46.  
Therefore, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Harris 
demonstrated that a withdrawal of his guilty plea was "necessary 
to avoid a manifest injustice."  Id., ¶47.   
IV.  DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
¶11 The present appeal involves a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea based on both constitutional and statutory grounds.  
We first address Harris's constitutional argument.6  When a 
defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea on constitutional 
grounds, he must establish all of the following:  "(a) that a 
violation of a constitutional right has occurred; (b) that this 
violation caused him to plead guilty7; and (c) that at the time 
of his plea he was unaware of the potential constitutional 
challenges to the case against him because of the violation."  
                                                 
6 While generally this court does not address constitutional 
issues if it can resolve the case on statutory grounds, the 
court of appeals' constitutional analysis contains several 
misstatements of the law.  This court has not decided whether a 
portion of a court of appeals decision that is not discussed 
when the opinion is overruled on other grounds is still 
precedential.  See State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶44 
n.1,___Wis. 2d ___, 
676 
N.W.2d 475 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting).  Therefore, we address the constitutional issue 
presented in this case.  
7 We interpret the "cause" element of the test set forth in 
Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 565, 266 N.W.2d 320 (1978), to 
mean that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have 
pled guilty but for the constitutional violation.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
11 
 
Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 565, 266 N.W.2d 320 (1978).  
Having established the foregoing elements, a defendant may 
withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right.  Id.  When 
applying this test, appellate courts review the underlying 
historical facts under the clearly erroneous standard but review 
questions 
of 
ultimate 
constitutional 
fact 
independently.  
Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d at 496.   
¶12 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that 
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87.8  The prosecutor has a duty to disclose this evidence 
although there has been no formal request by the accused.  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).  Evidence is 
favorable 
to 
an 
accused, 
when, 
"if 
disclosed 
and 
used 
effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and 
acquittal."  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).  
Evidence that is favorable to the accused encompasses both 
exculpatory9 and impeachment10 evidence.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
                                                 
8 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the rule 
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is based on the right 
to due process at trial; "[i]ts purpose is not to displace the 
adversary system as the primary means by which truth is 
uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not 
occur."  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
9 "Exculpatory evidence" is defined as "[e]vidence tending 
to establish a criminal defendant's innocence."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 577 (7th ed. 1999).   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
12 
 
281-82 ("The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 
either 
because 
it 
is 
exculpatory 
or 
because 
it 
is 
impeaching")(emphasis 
added); 
Bagley, 
473 
U.S. 
at 
676 
("Impeachment 
evidence, 
however, 
as 
well 
as 
exculpatory 
evidence, falls within the Brady rule.").11  The Court has 
indicated that there is no distinction between the two types of 
evidence that are "favorable to accused" for Brady purposes.  
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 ("This 
Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment 
evidence and exculpatory evidence."). 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 "Impeachment evidence" is defined as "[e]vidence used to 
undermine a witness's credibility."  Black's Law Dictionary 578 
(7th ed. 1999).   
11 The Court first recognized that impeachment evidence fell 
within the Brady rule in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154 (1972).  The Court held:  "When the 'reliability of a given 
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' 
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within 
this general rule."  Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959)).  The Court has since referred to this type of 
evidence as "exculpatory impeachment" evidence.  United States 
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).   
In the present case, the undisclosed evidence is not 
directly exculpatory because the fact that B.M.M. had alleged 
being previously sexually assaulted by her grandfather does not, 
in and of itself, tend to negate Harris's guilt regarding the 
separate assault that B.M.M. alleged he committed.  However, as 
discussed infra, this evidence could be used to challenge the 
credibility of the State's primary witnesses (B.M.M. and any 
Jensen experts), witnesses whose reliability would have been 
determinative of Harris's guilt.  Therefore, we believe that 
this evidence is material exculpatory impeachment evidence.  
Therefore, throughout the remainder of the opinion, we shall use 
the phrase "material exculpatory impeachment evidence" to refer 
to the particular type of evidence at issue in this case.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
13 
 
¶13 In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant 
must, in addition to demonstrating that the withheld evidence is 
favorable 
to 
him, 
prove 
that 
the 
withheld 
evidence 
is 
"material."  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972)(stating that "[a] finding of materiality of the evidence 
is required under Brady").12  A Brady violation may occur under 
three circumstances:  1) if the prosecutor fails to disclose 
that the defendant was convicted on the basis of perjured 
testimony; 2) if the defendant makes no Brady request and the 
prosecutor fails to disclose evidence that is favorable to the 
defendant; or 3) if the defense makes a specific Brady request 
and the prosecutor fails to disclose the requested material.  
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-81.   
¶14 While previously the standard for materiality varied 
depending upon the type of Brady violation, see United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1976), the Court has since adopted a 
uniform standard for materiality governing all three categories 
of Brady violations:  "The evidence is material only if there is 
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
                                                 
12 Thus, Brady's disclosure requirements apply only to 
evidence that is favorable to the accused——exculpatory evidence 
and impeachment evidence——that is also material.  The Court's 
decisions in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), and 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, demonstrate that Brady's disclosure 
requirements apply to material exculpatory evidence and material 
impeachment evidence.  When referring to the type of evidence 
that is required to be disclosed under Brady generally, we use 
the phrase "Brady evidence."  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
14 
 
different. 
 
A 
'reasonable 
probability' 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 682.  Under this test, which is the same test for 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
under 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):  
[T]he 
reviewing court 
may consider directly any 
adverse effect that 
the 
prosecutor's 
failure to 
respond 
might 
have 
had 
on 
the 
preparation 
or 
presentation of the defendant's case.  The reviewing 
court should assess the possibility that such effect 
might have occurred in light of the totality of the 
circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty 
of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the 
course that the defense and the trial would have taken 
had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's 
incomplete response.   
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683.  See also State v. DelReal, 225 
Wis. 2d 565, 570-71, 593 N.W.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1999)(recognizing 
the Bagley formulation of the materiality requirement).13  As 
such, 
"strictly 
speaking, 
there 
is 
never 
a 
real 
'Brady 
violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is 
                                                 
13 The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on the 
requirement of "materiality" in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 
(1995).  
First, the Court 
explained: 
 "[A] 
showing of 
materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance 
that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted 
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal."  Id. at 434.  Second, 
the Court remarked that the Brady requirement of materiality is 
not a sufficiency of the evidence test and thus it is not 
necessary to show that there would not have been enough 
inculpatory evidence to convict once the suppressed evidence is 
discounted.  Id. at 434-35.  Third, the Court stated that once 
there has been a showing of materiality sufficient to establish 
a constitutional violation, that error cannot be harmless.  Id. 
at 436.  Fourth, the Court noted that materiality must be 
assessed by considering the effect of all of the excluded 
evidence collectively.  Id. at 436-37.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
15 
 
a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.   
¶15 The United States Supreme Court has summarized the 
three prerequisites for a Brady violation as follows:  "The 
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued."  
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.  "Prejudice," as Strickler 
provided, encompasses the materiality requirement of Brady so 
that the defendant is not prejudiced unless "'the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such 
a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'"  
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 435 (1995)).  Thus, "showing that the prosecution knew of 
an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not 
amount to a Brady violation, without more."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
437.  See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.7 ("[A] rule that the 
prosecutor commits error by any failure to disclose evidence 
favorable to the accused, no matter how insignificant, would 
impose an impossible burden on the prosecutor and would 
undermine the interest in the finality of judgments.").  As one 
court explained:  "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, prosecutors 
are required to disclose evidence that is material to either 
guilt or punishment.  A defendant's request for Brady Material, 
however, does not require a prosecutor to wade through all 
government files in search of potentially exculpatory evidence."  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
16 
 
United States v. Lov-it Creamery, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1532, 1552 
(E.D. Wis. 1989)(citations omitted).   
¶16 Therefore, the court of appeals in the instant case 
misstated the law when it held that "the State violates the 
Constitution if it withholds the type of information that could 
form the basis for further investigation by the defense[,]" and 
that a constitutional violation occurs when the State refuses to 
disclose 
"potentially exculpatory" 
evidence. 
 
Harris, 266 
Wis. 2d 200, ¶36.  This court has previously cautioned that a 
defendant 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
evidence 
beyond 
which 
the 
prosecutor 
is 
constitutionally 
or 
statutorily 
required to 
disclose.  State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶¶49-50, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 
643 N.W.2d 480 (rejecting discussion of the court of appeals 
that suggested a defendant was entitled to all evidence he 
requested 
that 
fell 
outside 
the 
scope 
of 
statutory 
and 
constitutional requirements).  As the United States Supreme 
Court has noted, "the Constitution does not require the 
prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant."  
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.  Further, "[t]he mere possibility that an 
item 
of 
undisclosed 
information 
might 
have 
helped 
the 
defense . . . does 
not 
establish 
'materiality' 
in 
the 
constitutional sense."  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10.  Thus, the 
Constitution does not require the prosecutor to "allow complete 
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice."  Id.  
See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 ("[T]he prosecutor is not 
required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only 
to 
disclose 
evidence 
favorable 
to 
the 
accused 
that, 
if 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
17 
 
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial."); 
United States 
v. 
Coppa, 
267 
F.3d 
132, 143-44 
(2d 
Cir. 
2001)(criticizing 
the 
district 
court 
for 
ordering 
the 
prosecution 
to 
disclose 
all 
impeachment 
evidence 
in 
its 
possession 
to 
the 
defendant 
without 
regard 
to 
its 
"materiality"); Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 463-64 (recognizing that 
"[t]he constitutional right to a fair trial does not entitle a 
defendant to inspect the entire file of the prosecutor").   
¶17 Harris 
claims 
that 
the 
State 
violated 
his 
constitutional right to Brady evidence by failing to disclose, 
before he entered his plea, that B.M.M. alleged that her 
grandfather had assaulted her.  Therefore, Harris asserts that 
he is entitled to withdraw his plea under Sturgeon.  We 
determine, in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Ruiz, that due process does not require the 
disclosure 
of 
material 
exculpatory 
impeachment 
information 
before a defendant enters into a plea bargain.  In Ruiz, the 
Court 
held 
that 
"the 
Constitution 
does 
not 
require 
the 
Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to 
entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant."  Ruiz, 536 
U.S. at 633.  However, Harris, following the rationale of the 
court of 
appeals 
in the 
instant 
case, 
see 
Harris, 266 
Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶15-30, argues that the Ruiz decision is limited 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
18 
 
to the context of federal "fast track" plea bargaining.14  We 
disagree.  
¶18 The defendant in Ruiz was offered a "fast track" plea 
bargain after immigration agents found a significant amount of 
marijuana on her person.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.  The agreement 
required her to waive her right to impeachment information 
relating to government witnesses or any affirmative defenses, 
although the Government was still obligated to produce any 
information that established her factual innocence.  Id.  Ruiz 
rejected the agreement, but eventually pled guilty.  Id. at 625-
26.  At sentencing, Ruiz unsuccessfully argued for the same 
sentence that the Government would have recommended under the 
agreement.  Id. at 626.   
¶19 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "fast track" 
plea bargains were unlawful due to the waiver contained therein 
because the Constitution 
requires 
prosecutors 
to disclose 
impeachment evidence prior to the entry of a plea agreement and 
a defendant cannot waive this right.  Id.  In reversing, the 
United States Supreme Court stated:  "[W]e have found no legal 
authority embodied either in this Court's past cases or in cases 
from other circuits that provides significant support for the 
Ninth Circuit's decision."  Id. at 630.  Thus, the Court held 
                                                 
14 When defendants enter into a "fast track" plea bargain in 
federal court, they waive their right to indictment, trial, and 
appeal in exchange for a recommendation of a two-level downward 
departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines.  Ruiz, 536 
U.S. at 625.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
19 
 
that there is no constitutional right to impeachment evidence 
prior to the entry of a plea bargain.  Id. at 633.   
¶20 Harris argues that Ruiz should be limited to its facts 
because the Court framed the issue very narrowly.  Harris relies 
on the Court's statement that "[t]he constitutional question 
concerns a federal criminal defendant's waiver of the right to 
receive from prosecutors exculpatory impeachment material[.]"  
Id. at 628.  We disagree that this single sentence limits Ruiz 
to its facts because the Court later framed the issue in much 
broader terms:  "We must decide whether the Constitution 
requires preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment information.  
We conclude that it does not."  Id. at 629.  Also, the holding 
of the Court was not phrased with any limiting language:  "[T]he 
Constitution does not require the Government to disclose 
material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement 
with a criminal defendant."  Id. at 633.   
¶21 Harris also asserts that much of the rationale 
underlying the Court's decision was premised on the unique 
context of federal "fast track" plea bargaining.  While the 
Court did discuss such case specific factors as the pre-guilty 
plea safeguards in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the 
obligation of the Government under the "fast track" agreement to 
provide the defendant with information establishing her factual 
innocence, and the need to protect the identity of federal 
criminal informants, id. at 631-32, these were not the only 
bases for the Court's decision.  A close examination of the Ruiz 
decision reveals that the Court's holding was based primarily on 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
20 
 
the nature of impeachment evidence and the policy considerations 
underlying the Brady rule.  For instance, the Court stated that 
the right to impeachment information is relevant to the fairness 
of a criminal trial, not whether a plea is voluntary.  Id. at 
629.  The Court also reasoned: 
It is particularly difficult to characterize 
impeachment information as critical information of 
which the defendant must always be aware prior to 
pleading guilty given the random way in which such 
information may, or may not, help a particular 
defendant.  The degree of help that impeachment 
information 
can 
provide 
will 
depend 
upon 
the 
defendant's 
own 
independent 
knowledge 
of 
the 
prosecution's 
potential 
case——a 
matter 
that 
the 
Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.  
Id. at 630.  The Court also emphasized that the Constitution 
does not require a defendant to be aware of all relevant 
circumstances surrounding his plea, noting that the Constitution 
"permits a court to accept a guilty plea . . . despite various 
forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor."  
Id. at 630.  The Court then found it difficult to distinguish 
some of these "various forms of misapprehension" from a 
defendant's ignorance of impeachment material at the plea 
bargaining stage.  Id. at 630-31.  
¶22 Further, the Court remarked that the "due process 
considerations, the very considerations that led this Court to 
find 
trial-related 
rights 
to 
exculpatory 
and 
impeachment 
information in Brady and Giglio, argue against the existence of 
the 'right' that the Ninth Circuit found here."  Id. at 631.  
The Court reasoned that any benefit to the defendant of such a 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
21 
 
right would be clearly minimal because of a defendant's limited 
knowledge of the government's case.  Id.  The Court also noted 
that such a right would undermine the interest of the government 
in "securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, 
desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient 
administration of justice."  Id.   
¶23 Therefore, 
neither 
the 
express 
holding 
nor 
the 
rationale of Ruiz was limited to the context of federal "fast 
track" plea bargaining.  Indeed, several other courts have 
recognized that Ruiz stands for the proposition that a criminal 
defendant generally does not have a constitutional right to 
receive impeachment information prior to entering into a plea 
bargain.  See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 
2003) (noting that while the Court in Ruiz held that "the Due 
Process Clause does not require the government to disclose 
impeachment information prior to the entry of a criminal 
defendant's guilty plea," due process may require government 
actors to disclose evidence of a defendant's factual innocence 
before he enters into a guilty plea); Gruning v. Dipaolo, 311 
F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Ruiz held that the 
government is not constitutionally required to disclose material 
impeachment evidence prior to entering into a plea bargain); 
United States v. Cottage, 307 F.3d 494, 499-500 & n.5 (6th Cir. 
2002) (recognizing that the Court in Ruiz held that "a defendant 
has no constitutional right to the disclosure of impeachment 
information before entering a plea agreement"); United States v. 
Dyess, 293 F. Supp. 2d 675, 688 (S.D.W.Va. 2003)(recognizing 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
22 
 
that the Ruiz decision forecloses any argument that a defendant 
is entitled to impeachment information under Brady and Giglio 
before entering a plea); People v. Moore, 804 N.E.2d 595, 598-
600 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that prosecutor did not 
violate 
defendant's 
due 
process 
rights 
when 
refusing 
to 
negotiate a plea bargain after the defendant requested the 
identity of a confidential informant because Ruiz established 
that defendants do not have a right to material impeachment 
information prior to entering into a plea agreement); In re 
Brennan, 
72 
P.3d 
182, 
186 
(Wash. 
App. 
2003) 
(rejecting 
petitioner's claim that plea was invalid because prosecutor 
failed to disclose evidence that could be used to impeach 
government witness at trial in light of the Ruiz decision that 
"rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the constitution 
requires prosecutors to make certain impeachment information 
available to defendants before pleading guilty").  We therefore 
hold, based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Ruiz, 
that due process does not require the disclosure of material 
exculpatory impeachment information before a defendant enters 
into a plea bargain.15   
                                                 
15 The State asks us to go one step further and overrule the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
in 
State 
v. 
Sturgeon, 
231 
Wis. 2d 487, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999).  We decline to do 
so.  Today's decision is limited to the scope of material 
exculpatory impeachment evidence.  We do not determine whether 
due process requires the disclosure of purely exculpatory 
information prior to a plea bargain.   
 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
23 
 
V.  DISCOVERY STATUTE VIOLATION 
¶24 However, Ruiz is not completely dispositive of the 
case before us, because unlike the defendant in Ruiz, Harris 
made 
a 
statutory 
demand 
for 
exculpatory 
evidence 
under 
§ 971.23(1), which requires the prosecutor to disclose certain 
materials to the defendant within a reasonable time before 
trial.  As will be discussed further below, a defendant making a 
statutory 
discovery 
demand 
may 
be 
entitled 
to 
material 
exculpatory impeachment evidence before he enters into a plea 
bargain if the plea bargain is entered into within the time 
frame when the prosecutor would have been statutorily required 
to disclose the information. 
¶25 When a defendant seeks a plea withdrawal on non-
constitutional grounds, he may withdraw his guilty plea after 
demonstrating that a withdrawal is necessary to avoid a 
"manifest injustice."  Hatcher, 83 Wis. 2d at 564.  When 
proceeding on this theory, "the defendant has the burden of 
proving grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea by clear and 
convincing evidence."  Id.  The fact that the defendant has 
waived certain defenses by entering into a guilty plea is not 
dispositive:  "'The question on a motion to withdraw a plea is 
not whether the accused has waived his rights but whether he 
should be relieved from such a waiver.'"  Id. at 565 (quoting 
Brisk v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 584, 588, 172 N.W.2d 199 (1969)).  
Harris argues he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea as a 
result of the State's violation of the discovery statute.  
Determining whether the court of appeals correctly concluded 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
24 
 
that the State violated its discovery obligations requires the 
interpretation and application of the discovery statute to a 
given set of facts and presents a question of law subject to 
independent appellate review.  DeLao, 252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶14.  
¶26 Harris argues that the State violated § 971.23(1)(h).16  
This section provides: 
(1) What a district attorney must disclose to a 
defendant.  Upon demand, the district attorney shall, 
within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it within the possession, custody or 
control of the state: 
 . . . . 
(h) Any exculpatory evidence.   
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) (emphasis added).   
¶27 The 
parties 
dispute 
whether 
the 
phrase 
"any 
exculpatory 
evidence" 
merely 
codifies 
the 
constitutional 
requirements of Brady, or whether the phrase requires the State 
                                                 
16 Harris also contended at oral argument that the State 
violated Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e).  That section provides that 
a prosecutor must disclose "[a]ny relevant written or recorded 
statements of a witness named on a list under par. (d) . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e). 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) 
provides that the prosecutor must disclose "[a] list of all 
witnesses and their addresses whom the district attorney intends 
to call at trial."  We agree that the State may have been 
obligated under § 971.23(1)(e) to disclose B.M.M.'s recorded 
allegation that her grandfather assaulted her.  However, because 
this issue was not discussed in the parties' briefs and the 
record does not contain a copy of any witness list provided by 
the State, we decline to resolve this case on the basis of 
§ 971.23(1)(e).   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
25 
 
to disclose a broader set of information to the defendant.  
However, both parties agree that at a minimum, § 971.23(1)(h) 
requires that a prosecutor disclose the type of information 
required under Brady.  See Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d at 497 n.4.  In 
other words § 971.23(1)(h) requires, at a minimum, that the 
prosecutor disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused if 
nondisclosure of the evidence undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the judicial proceeding.    
¶28 Harris asserts that the undisclosed evidence was 
"favorable to the accused" because it was directly relevant to 
the credibility of B.M.M., as she could have projected her 
grandfather's assault onto him.  Harris notes that the alleged 
assaults by her grandfather occurred shortly before Harris is 
alleged to have assaulted B.M.M., and B.M.M. did not report the 
assaults by her grandfather until after she had reported being 
assaulted by Harris.  Harris argues this evidence would have 
created an inference that he was not guilty.  Also, Harris 
claims that the undisclosed allegation was relevant to the 
credibility and reliability of any expert witness the State 
would have called because it established a previous source for 
B.M.M.'s sexual knowledge and reactive behaviors.  According to 
Harris, because the evidence related to the credibility of the 
State's most influential witnesses, it was material, and 
therefore subject to disclosure.  The State primarily argues 
that the undisclosed information is not material because it 
would not have been admissible, as it does not meet the 
Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law.   
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
26 
 
¶29 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
"[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence 
affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule."  Giglio, 
405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 
(1959)).  The Court has stated that "[o]ur cases make clear that 
Brady's 
disclosure 
requirements extend 
to 
materials 
that, 
whatever their other characteristics, may be used to impeach a 
witness."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282 n.21.   
¶30 We agree with Harris that here, the undisclosed 
information is favorable to the accused because it casts doubt 
on the credibility of the State's primary witnesses and may have 
supported 
an 
inference 
that 
B.M.M. 
was 
projecting 
her 
grandfather's assaults onto Harris.  The United States Supreme 
Court has noted that "there are situations in which evidence is 
obviously of such substantial value to the defense that 
elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed . . . ."  Agurs, 
427 U.S. at 110.  Here, the undisclosed information is not 
directly exculpatory in the sense that DNA evidence might be 
because the fact that B.M.M. had alleged being previously 
sexually assaulted by her grandfather does not, in and of 
itself, tend to negate Harris's guilt regarding the separate 
assault that B.M.M. alleged he committed.  However, the evidence 
here constitutes impeachment information that could be used to 
challenge the credibility of witnesses whose credibility would 
have been determinative of Harris's guilt.  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 
154.  Thus, the undisclosed information constitutes exculpatory 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
27 
 
impeachment 
evidence 
because 
it 
is 
relevant 
to 
B.M.M.'s 
credibility and that of any expert the State may have called to 
provide evidence under State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 
N.W.2d 913 (1988), as it may have provided an alternate source 
for B.M.M.'s sexual knowledge and may have created the inference 
that 
B.M.M. 
projected 
the 
assaults 
perpetrated 
by 
her 
grandfather onto Harris.  Because this evidence could have 
undermined the credibility of the State's most influential 
witnesses, this is one of those situations in which fundamental 
fairness dictates that the evidence should have been disclosed.   
¶31 We also disagree with the State's argument that this 
evidence is not material because we determine that the State's 
nondisclosure of this evidence sufficiently undermines our 
confidence in the outcome of Harris's criminal proceeding.  
While the State argues at length that the undisclosed evidence 
is not material because it does not meet the Pulizzano test, we 
find this argument to be unpersuasive because the State never 
afforded Harris the opportunity to bring a Pulizzano motion in 
the first place.  We need not determine whether the five factor 
Pulizzano test would have been met in this case because even if 
the test would have been met, the circuit court would still have 
been obligated to balance Harris's right to present the evidence 
against the interest of the State in excluding it.  See State v. 
Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, ¶20, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 112; 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 653-54.  By failing to disclose 
B.M.M.'s 
prior 
allegation, 
the 
State 
denied 
Harris 
the 
opportunity to further investigate B.M.M.'s allegations and 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
28 
 
bring a Pulizzano motion.  As the resolution of any Pulizzano 
motion would have required the circuit court to balance the 
competing interests involved, the prosecutor here should have 
disclosed the evidence and let the circuit court determine its 
admissibility.  As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
"[b]ecause we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, 
and because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom 
be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the 
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of 
disclosure."  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.  Further, Wisconsin courts 
have recognized that "[i]mpeachment evidence casting doubt on a 
witness's credibility is material and subject to disclosure."  
DelReal, 225 Wis. 2d at 571.  See also Tucker v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 630, 641, 267 N.W.2d 630 (1978); Loveday v. State, 74 
Wis. 2d 503, 516, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).   
¶32 The State's argument is also contrary to the rationale 
utilized by the court of appeals in DelReal.  In DelReal, the 
court of appeals determined that the State failed to disclose 
Brady evidence when the State failed to inform the defendant 
that 
it 
had 
performed 
gunshot 
residue 
swabbing 
on 
the 
defendant's hands prior to trial.  DelReal, 225 Wis. 2d at 571.  
A postconviction investigation revealed that while the State had 
performed the swabbing, it had not tested the results.  Id. at 
569.   At the behest of the defendant, the tests were performed 
and the results came back negative.  Id.  In addressing whether 
this evidence was relevant and material, the court of appeals 
reasoned: 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
29 
 
[T]he State failed to turn over evidence of an 
exculpatory nature; i.e., the State failed to disclose 
that swabbing had in fact been performed, which would 
have provided DelReal the opportunity to have the 
swabs tested leading to a negative test result.  This 
was 
relevant, 
exculpatory 
evidence 
because 
the 
negative test result would have some weight and its 
tendency could have supplied a favorable inference of 
DelReal's innocence to the jury.   
Id. at 571 (emphasis added).  The court further noted that this 
evidence was relevant for impeachment purposes because it could 
have been used to attack the credibility of a police detective 
who testified that swabbing had not been performed.  Id. at 573, 
576.  The court held that "[i]n the interest of securing a fair 
trial, DelReal was entitled to challenge the reliability of the 
police investigation and to challenge the credibility of Gomez."  
Id. at 575.  Under the rationale set forth by the State in the 
present case, the defendant in DelReal would not have been 
entitled to the evidence that gunshot residue swabbing had been 
performed because the results had not been tested prior to 
trial.   
¶33 In the interests of a fair proceeding, Harris was 
entitled to the opportunity to bring a Pulizzano motion to 
challenge the reliability of the State's expert witness and 
challenge the credibility of the victim.  As the State failed to 
disclose B.M.M.'s allegation regarding her grandfather, Harris 
was never given the opportunity to make use of this exculpatory 
impeachment evidence.  By failing to disclose this evidence, the 
State denied him a fair judicial proceeding. 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
30 
 
¶34 We recognize that in the constitutional context, the 
Brady requirement of materiality is dependent upon whether the 
suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial and that no trial took place here.  However, as the 
Supreme Court stated when discussing how a reviewing court 
should evaluate a prosecutor's pretrial decision to not disclose 
evidence:   
The reviewing court should assess the possibility that 
such [prejudicial] effect might have occurred in light 
of the totality of the circumstances and with an 
awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a 
post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and 
the trial would have taken had the defense not been 
misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response.   
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683.  The State's argument requires us to 
reconstruct how a hypothetical trial would have proceeded and 
speculate as to how the jury would have viewed the evidence.  We 
decline to do so.  The circuit court accepted Harris's offer of 
proof that he pled guilty only because of the relative strength 
of the State's case and would not have pled guilty had this 
evidence been disclosed.  As Harris demonstrated that he would 
not have pled guilty but for the nondisclosure of this favorable 
evidence, we are satisfied that the nondisclosure of the 
evidence sufficiently undermines our confidence in the outcome 
of the proceeding.  As such, the State was under a statutory 
obligation to disclose B.M.M.'s allegation after Harris made a 
statutory demand for "any exculpatory evidence." 
¶35 The next issue we must address is one of timing.  The 
statute requires the State to disclose certain materials 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
31 
 
demanded by the defendant "within a reasonable time before 
trial."  Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1).  The statute itself does not 
define what is a "reasonable time before trial," and there are 
no cases that establish a per se rule for what is "reasonable" 
under the statute.  However, we note that immediate disclosure 
is not required under Brady.  See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 143-44 
(criticizing the district court for ordering prosecution to 
disclose all impeachment evidence immediately upon demand).  
What Brady does require is that the prosecution must disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant "in time for its effective 
use."  Id. at 144.  See also United States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 
563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where the 
defendant "had sufficient time to make use of the material 
disclosed"); United States v. Grintjes, 237 F.3d 876, 880 (7th 
Cir. 2001) ("Brady applies only where the allegedly exculpatory 
evidence was not disclosed in time for the defendant to make use 
of it.").   
¶36 In 
the 
constitutional 
context, 
this 
"timing" 
requirement 
dovetails 
with 
the 
Brady's 
"materiality" 
requirement.  Coppa, 267 F.3d at 142 (noting that "the 
prosecutor 
must 
disclose 
'material' . . . exculpatory 
and 
impeachment information no later than the point at which a 
reasonable probability will exist that the outcome would have 
been different if an earlier disclosure had been made").  
Therefore, "[Brady] demands only that the disclosure not come 
'"so late as to prevent the defendant from receiving a fair 
trial."'"  Grintjes, 237 F.3d at 880 (quoting United States v. 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
32 
 
Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1987)(quoting United States 
v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979))).17   
¶37 However, 
Brady's 
timing 
requirements 
cannot 
be 
completely incorporated into § 971.23(1) because the statute 
requires that evidence be disclosed "within a reasonable time 
before trial."  Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(emphasis added).  Brady, 
on the other hand, "does not require pretrial disclosure."  
Grintjes, 237 F.3d at 880 (citing United States v. Sweeney, 688 
F.2d 1131, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982)).  See also United States v. 
Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 2001)(same).  Thus, in 
regard to the timing of disclosure, § 971.23 is broader than the 
constitutional requirements of Brady.  While we cannot apply the 
Brady standard for determining when the timing requirement is 
satisfied, in light of statutory language that clearly requires 
pretrial disclosures, we do find Brady's initial formulation of 
the timing requirement to be useful.  We hold that in order for 
evidence to be disclosed "within a reasonable time before trial" 
for purposes of § 971.23, it must be disclosed within a 
sufficient time for its effective use.  Were it otherwise, the 
State could withhold all Brady evidence until the day of trial 
in the hope that the defendant would plead guilty under the 
false assumption that no such evidence existed.   
                                                 
17 But see State ex rel. Lynch v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 463, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978)("The State 
must therefore disclose such material as soon as the state 
recognizes its exculpatory character."). 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
33 
 
¶38 The jury trial in Harris's case was set for August 6-
8, 2001.  He made his discovery demand on May 30, 2001, and pled 
guilty pursuant to the plea agreement on July 25, 2001.  Thus, 
at the time Harris entered into his plea agreement, there were 
approximately two weeks until trial.  As discussed previously, 
had B.M.M.'s allegations against her grandfather been disclosed, 
Harris would have brought a Pulizzano motion in order to admit 
the evidence.  Also, because this evidence would have been used 
not only to challenge B.M.M.'s credibility, but also to 
challenge the credibility and reliability of the State's Jensen 
experts, Harris would have been required to secure experts of 
his own.  Given the nature of Pulizzano evidence and the fact 
that the State was planning to call at least one expert witness 
to provide Jensen-type evidence, the State should have disclosed 
the suppressed evidence 
by 
at least 
this 
point in the 
proceedings in order for Harris to be able to effectively use 
it.  We are satisfied that by the time Harris pled guilty, the 
State should have disclosed B.M.M.'s statement in order to meet 
the statutory requirement that such evidence be disclosed within 
a reasonable time before trial.  Thus, although we concluded 
under Ruiz that the specific type of evidence here was not 
required to be disclosed prior to Harris's plea bargain as a 
constitutional matter, we nonetheless conclude that the State 
was under a statutory obligation to disclose this evidence 
because § 971.23 requires Brady evidence to be disclosed "within 
a reasonable time before trial."  
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
34 
 
¶39 Finally, we address whether the State's violation of 
§ 971.23(1)(h) entitles Harris to withdraw his plea.  In 
Hatcher, this court delineated four circumstances in which a 
criminal defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice:  1) if he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel; 2) if the plea was not entered 
or ratified by the defendant or his agent; 3) if the plea was 
involuntary because it was entered without knowledge of the 
charge or potential sentence; or 4) if the State breached the 
plea agreement.  Hatcher, 83 Wis. 2d at 564.  However, we noted 
that this list was not exhaustive and stated that a defendant 
may be able to withdraw a plea on the grounds of manifest 
injustice in similar circumstances.  Id.  We believe that the 
circumstances here are sufficiently similar to those delineated 
in Hatcher.  The common thread among the situations listed in 
Hatcher is that the defendant was deprived of a right guaranteed 
by the constitution, statute, or rule, and that deprivation 
induced the defendant to plead guilty.  Here, the State violated 
the discovery 
statute 
by 
withholding 
material 
exculpatory 
impeachment evidence that, if admitted, would have raised 
serious questions about the credibility of the victim and the 
reliability of the State's expert witnesses.  Aside from 
Harris's own version of events, this was the only existing 
material evidence that was "favorable to the accused."  The 
circuit court accepted Harris's postconviction offer of proof 
that he would not have pled guilty had this evidence been 
available to him.  This court has previously determined that a 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
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prosecutor's violation of discovery statute, if prejudicial to 
the defendant, entitles the defendant to a new trial.  DeLao, 
252 Wis. 2d 289, ¶59.  Here, the State's violation of the 
discovery statute prevented Harris from ever having a trial.  
Harris has demonstrated the State's discovery statute violation 
resulted in "'a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the 
plea.'"  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
N.W.2d 836 (quoting State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379, 534 
N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995)).  Under these circumstances, we 
believe it necessary to allow Harris to withdraw his guilty plea 
in order to prevent a manifest injustice.    
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 To summarize, we hold that the State did not violate 
Harris's right to due process because, pursuant to the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz, due process does not 
require the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment 
information before a defendant enters into a plea bargain.  
However, we determine that B.M.M.'s allegation against her 
grandfather is the type of information the State was required to 
disclose pursuant to § 971.23(1)(h) because it constitutes 
evidence favorable to the accused whose nondisclosure undermines 
our confidence in the judicial proceeding.  This information is 
favorable to the accused because it constitutes impeachment 
evidence that casts doubt on the credibility of the State's 
primary 
witnesses. 
 
The 
nondisclosure 
of 
this 
evidence 
undermines our confidence in the outcome of the judicial 
proceeding because Harris would not have pled guilty but for the 
No. 
02-2433-CR   
 
36 
 
nondisclosure of this evidence.  We further hold that in order 
to comply with the mandate in § 971.23(1) that such information 
must be turned over within a reasonable time before trial, the 
State was obligated to disclose this evidence at a point when 
Harris would have had sufficient time to make effective use of 
the information.  As Harris entered his plea bargain within two 
weeks prior to the date his trial was scheduled to commence, the 
State should have disclosed the suppressed evidence by at least 
this point in the proceedings in order for Harris to be able to 
effectively use it.  Given that 1) the evidence of B.M.M.'s 
allegation was the type of evidence required to be disclosed 
under § 971.23(1)(h); 2) the State did not disclose this 
evidence within a reasonable time before trial; and 3) Harris 
would not have pled guilty but for this nondisclosure, Harris 
has demonstrated that a withdrawal of his plea is necessary to 
avoid a manifest injustice.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶41 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
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¶42 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I write separately 
because I believe that the decision in United States v. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. 622 (2002), properly interpreted, is not limited to 
impeachment evidence, but rather extends to both material 
impeachment evidence and material exculpatory evidence.  While 
the majority of the discussion in Ruiz focused on impeachment 
evidence, the waiver contained in the plea agreement at issue in 
Ruiz contained not only a waiver of the right to impeachment 
evidence, but also a waiver of the right to evidence supporting 
any affirmative defense.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.  The majority 
in Ruiz specifically rejected the notion that due process 
requires information regarding an affirmative defense to be 
disclosed prior to plea bargaining.  Id. at 633.   
¶43 Exculpatory evidence includes evidence that tends to 
support an affirmative defense.  See United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 98-99 (1976)(Although the court ultimately concluded 
that the evidence in question, supporting a theory of self-
defense, was not material under its now-outdated definition of 
materiality, the Court never questioned the exculpatory nature 
of the evidence in question).  An affirmative defense is defined 
as "[a] defendant's assertion raising new facts and arguments 
that, if true, will defeat the . . . prosecutor's claim, even if 
all allegations in the complaint are true."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 430 (7th ed. 1999).  Thus, by definition, evidence 
supporting an affirmative defense is exculpatory because it 
No.  02-2433-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
tends "to establish a criminal defendant's innocence."  Id. at 
577.   
¶44 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly 
held that exculpatory 
evidence 
and 
impeachment 
evidence are to be treated the same for purposes of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 280-82 (1999).  In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
676 (1985), the Court stated that there is no substantive 
difference between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence 
for Brady purposes:  "This Court has rejected any such 
distinction 
between 
impeachment 
evidence 
and 
exculpatory 
evidence."  Thus, it logically follows that if due process does 
not require impeachment evidence to be disclosed prior to a plea 
agreement, then due process does not require exculpatory 
evidence to be disclosed prior to a plea agreement.   
¶45 The conclusion that due process does not require the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence prior to a plea bargain is 
also consistent with the very underpinnings of Brady.  The Court 
has previously recognized that because the purpose of the Brady 
rule is to ensure a fair trial, there is no violation unless the 
government's nondisclosure of the evidence resulted in an unfair 
trial.  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 ("[T]he prosecutor will not have 
violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his 
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial 
of the defendant's right to a fair trial."); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
678 ("[S]uppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional 
violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.").  
No.  02-2433-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
Indeed, in his concurrence in Ruiz, Justice Thomas aptly 
remarked:  "The principle supporting Brady was 'avoidance of an 
unfair trial to the accused.'  That concern is not implicated at 
the plea stage regardless."  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 634 (Thomas, J., 
concurring)(quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).  See also Matthew v. 
Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2000)("Because a Brady 
violation is defined in terms of the potential effects of 
undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's assessment of 
guilt, it follows that the failure of a prosecutor to disclose 
exculpatory information to an individual waiving his right to 
trial is not a constitutional violation.").18   
                                                 
18 The Seventh Circuit has noted, despite the holding in 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), that "it is highly 
likely that the Supreme Court would find a violation of the Due 
Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant government 
actors 
have 
knowledge 
of 
a 
criminal 
defendant's 
factual 
innocence but fail to disclose such information to a defendant 
before he enters into a guilty plea."  McCann v. Mangialardi, 
No.  02-2433-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
¶46 Because I would hold, pursuant to Ruiz, that due 
process does not require the disclosure of material impeachment 
information or material exculpatory information prior to plea 
bargaining, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003).  However, this statement does 
not diminish the significance of Ruiz's holding with respect to 
exculpatory evidence relating to affirmative defenses.  While 
evidence 
that 
actually 
establishes 
a 
defendant's 
factual 
innocence will necessarily be exculpatory, the converse is not 
true; not all exculpatory evidence actually establishes the 
factual innocence of the defendant.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
577 (7th ed. 1999) (defining exculpatory evidence as "[e]vidence 
tending to establish a criminal defendant's innocence")(emphasis 
added).  I further note that the case at bar does not implicate 
this statement from McCann because here the State did not 
withhold evidence that actually established Harris's innocence.  
 
No.  02-2433-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
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