Title: BACHMEIER v. HOFFMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BACHMEIER v. HOFFMAN2000 WY 611 P.3d 1236Case Number: 98-128, 98-129Decided: 03/29/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DELORES BACHMEIER, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), v.TIMOTHY HOFFMAN, individually and in his 
official capacity as SHERIFF OF PLATTE COUNTY, WYOMING; and THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF PLATTE, Appellees (Defendants). BERNARD 
MATTHEWS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v.TIMOTHY HOFFMAN, individually and 
in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF PLATTE COUNTY, WYOMING; and THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF PLATTE, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Platte County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Bruce S. Asay 
and Keith S. Burron of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, WY, 
representing appellants.Scott E. Ortiz of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, PC, Casper, WY, representing appellee Hoffman.Roger E. 
Shumate of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, WY, representing appellee 
Board of County Comm'rs.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] In these 
consolidated cases, we consider whether detention officers are law enforcement 
personnel exempt from the overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) under Section 7(k) of the Act, and review a summary 
judgment order finding that appellants, Platte County detention officers, had no 
reasonable expectation of being hired or promoted to the position of detention 
administrator. Because we find that detention officers can be exempted under 
Section 7(k) of the FLSA and have no reasonable expectation of being hired or 
promoted, we affirm the district court's Order on Summary 
Judgment.

ISSUES

[¶2] Appellants 
present these issues for our review:

I. Was the decision of 
the District Court contrary to federal law in that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
provides for over-time compensation.

II. Does the policy of 
Platte County establish the terms and conditions of employment, including 
over-time compensation, for the Appellants.

III. As the Sheriff of 
Platte County had restricted his discretion, did the Appellants have a property 
interest in the promotion to Administrator.

IV. Did the Sheriff 
violate the Appellants' liberty interest in employment.

V. Is Matthews' claim of 
gender discrimination an issue of fact for the jury.

[¶3] Appellee, 
the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Platte, rephrases the 
issues:

1. Should the 
appellants/plaintiffs' failure to properly designate the record to be relied on, 
which is a violation of Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.05(b), result in 
affirmance of the trial court's decision?

2. Did the 
appellants/plaintiffs have a contract of employment with Platte County which 
governed overtime compensation or did the Fair Labor Standards Act govern the 
overtime compensation of the county's Detention Officers?

3. Did the 
appellants/plaintiff have a protected property interest in a promotion to the 
position of Detention Administrator and do the appellants have an equal 
protection claim against the county as the result of the promotion decisions 
made by Sheriff Timothy Hoffman?

4. Did the 
appellants/plaintiffs properly state a cause of action for deprivation of 
liberty interest and did they produce any evidence to support that cause of 
action?

5. Did 
appellant/plaintiff Bernard Matthews produce any material facts in support of 
his claim for gender discrimination under Title VII?

[¶4] Appellee, 
Platte County Sheriff Timothy Hoffman, states the issues in this 
fashion:

1. Did the district court 
err in dismissing the Appellants' claim alleging deprivation of a protected 
property interest when another individual was hired to be the detention 
administrator?

2. Did the district court 
err in dismissing Appellants' claim that they were denied equal protection of 
the law?

3. Did the district court 
err in dismissing Appellants' claim alleging breach of 
contract?

4. Did the district court 
err in dismissing Appellants' claim that they were deprived of a liberty 
interest?

5. Did the district court 
err in dismissing Appellant Matthews' claim alleging gender based discrimination 
pursuant to Title VII?

6. Did the district court 
err in dismissing Appellants' claims alleging violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act regarding the payment of overtime compensation by Platte 
County?

FACTS

[¶5] Appellants 
are employed as detention officers at the Platte County Detention Facility in 
Wheatland, Wyoming. During the course of their employment, the position of 
Detention Facility Administrator became vacant, and both appellants applied for 
the position. After a fairly detailed interview process, neither appellant was 
promoted to the open position. The Platte County Sheriff subsequently hired 
another individual to fill the position in September of 1996. The sheriff's 
office does not have any policies providing detention officers tenure, rank, or 
any other right to be promoted or hired within the department. The sheriff has 
sole discretion to hire or appoint detention officers and the detention 
administrator.

[¶6] Both 
appellants were informed and had actual knowledge that they were working under a 
Section 7(k) exemption to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They 
understood this to mean that they must work 171 hours in a 28-day work period 
before receiving overtime compensation. Appellants kept track of their own 
28-day work period on their time cards and were charged with computing their 
overtime hours if they worked more than 171 hours per work 
period.

[¶7] Appellants 
filed these lawsuits in February of 1997, alleging breach of contract, breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and violations of due process, equal protection and liberty 
interests under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, appellant Matthews alleged 
sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
On March 12, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants 
on all claims. This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶8] Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kahrs v. 
Board of Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 
1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a 
disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which has been 
asserted by the parties. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995). We 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Jack v. Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995). We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the 
same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Adkins, 892 P.2d  at 
130. We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues 
of law. Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 406.

[¶9] The party 
moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case for a summary judgment. If the movant carries this burden, the party 
opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to 
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Thunder Hawk By 
and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992). 
General allegations and conclusory statements are not sufficient. Board of 
County Comm'rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 956 (Wyo. 1994).

I. Overtime Compensation 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act

[¶10] Appellants 
contend they are entitled to overtime compensation under the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Specifically, they contend they are 
entitled to comp time for hours accrued between 160 hours and 171 hours per 
28-day work period.1 We disagree.

[¶11] Although 
states and arms of the state may be immune from suit under the FLSA, states can 
waive their sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 
2258, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999). Wyoming has enacted a limited waiver of immunity 
for governmental entities manifested in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104 (Lexis 1999); Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶12] The FLSA 
states that an employee who works more than forty hours per week must receive 
overtime pay at the rate of one and one-half times the employee's normal 
compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Law enforcement employees' overtime 
compensation, however, is based on a longer work week, the length of which is 
determined by the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 207(k). FLSA grants authority to the 
Secretary of Labor to determine the scope of this exemption for all local and 
state employees. Id. § 213(a)(1); id. § 204(f). Department of Labor regulations 
are the primary source of guidance for determining the scope and extent of 
exemptions to the FLSA, and are entitled to judicial deference. Spradling v. 
City of Tulsa, 95 F.3d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996).

[¶13] The 
Department of Labor has promulgated what is known as the Section 7(k) exemption 
regulation, which provides:

(a) Section 7(k) of the 
Act provides a partial overtime pay exemption for fire protection and law 
enforcement personnel (including security personnel in correctional 
institutions) who are employed by public agencies on a work period basis. This 
section of the Act formerly permitted public agencies to pay overtime 
compensation to such employees in work periods of 28 consecutive days only after 
216 hours of work. As further set forth in § 553.230 of this part, the 216-hour 
standard has been replaced, pursuant to the study mandated by the statute, by 
212 hours for fire protection employees and 171 hours for law enforcement 
employees. In the case of such employees who have a work period of at least 7 
but less than 28 consecutive days, overtime compensation is required when the 
ratio of the number of hours worked to the number of days in the work period 
exceeds the ratio of 212 (or 171) hours to 28 days.

(b) As specified in §§ 
553.20 through 553.28 of subpart A, workers employed under section 7(k) may, 
under certain conditions, be compensated for overtime hours worked with 
compensatory time off rather than immediate overtime premium 
pay.

29 C.F.R. § 
553.201 (1998).

[¶14] The 
Department of Labor has defined the term law enforcement 
personnel:

(a) As used in sections 
7(k) and 13(b)(20) of the Act, the term "any employee . . . in law enforcement 
activities" refers to any employee (1) who is a uniformed or plainclothed member 
of a body of officers and subordinates who are empowered by State statute or 
local ordinance to enforce laws designed to maintain public peace and order and 
to protect both life and property from accidental or willful injury, and to 
prevent and detect crimes, (2) who has the power to arrest, and (3) who is 
presently undergoing or has undergone or will undergo on-the-job training and/or 
a course of instruction and study which typically includes physical training, 
self-defense, firearm proficiency, criminal and civil law principles, 
investigative and law enforcement techniques, community relations, medical aid 
and ethics.

[¶15] 29 C.F.R. 
§ 553.211(a) (1998). Prison guards and county jailers lacking the power of 
arrest would not appear to be covered by this definition, but security personnel 
in correctional institutions are expressly included within the definition of law 
enforcement personnel even though they do not meet the three-part test for law 
enforcement personnel. McBride v. Cox, 567 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ind. App. 1991); 29 
U.S.C. § 213(b)(20). The DOL regulations elaborate:

(f) The term "any 
employee in law enforcement activities" also includes, by express reference, 
"security personnel in correctional institutions." A correctional institution is 
any government facility maintained as part of a penal system for the 
incarceration or detention of persons suspected or convicted of having breached 
the peace or committed some other crime. Typically, such facilities include 
penitentiaries, prisons, prison farms, county, city and village jails, precinct 
house lockups and reformatories. Employees of correctional institutions who 
qualify as security personnel for purposes of the section 7(k) exemption are 
those who have responsibility for controlling and maintaining custody of inmates 
and of safeguarding them from other inmates or for supervising such functions, 
regardless of whether their duties are performed inside the correctional 
institution or outside the institution (as in the case of road gangs). These 
employees are considered to be engaged in law enforcement activities regardless 
of their rank (e.g., warden, assistant warden or guard) or of their status as 
"trainee," "probationary," or "permanent," and regardless of their assignment to 
duties incidental to the performance of their law enforcement activities, or to 
support activities of the type described in paragraph (g) of this section, 
whether or not such assignment is for training or familiarization purposes or 
for reasons of illness, injury or infirmity.

29 C.F.R. § 
553.211(f) (1998).

[¶16] Appellants 
are detention officers who attend to the inmates at the detention facility, 
including booking, transporting, and observing the inmates. Such detention 
officers clearly fit within the definition of "security personnel in 
correctional institutions." Because security personnel in correctional 
institutions are treated separately from other law enforcement personnel and 
are, by definition, eligible for 7(k) treatment, the fact that these particular 
detention officers lacked the power of arrest is immaterial. But, as appellants 
note, there is also a requirement that the employer keep certain records 
detailing the 7(k) exemption.

[¶17] The burden 
is on the employer to show it has adopted a § 207(k) exemption. Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S. Ct. 2223, 2229, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1974); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1992). The 
employer must prove the applicability of the exception by "clear and affirmative 
evidence." Birdwell, 970 F.2d  at 805 (citing Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984)). In order to maintain the exemption, the 
regulations require that the employer "maintain and preserve" certain records 
including (1) the number of hours of compensatory time earned in each work 
period, (2) the number of compensatory hours used in each work period, (3) the 
number of compensatory hours compensated in cash, and (4) any written 
understanding or agreement with respect to earning or using compensatory time. 
Where the agreement or understanding is not in writing, a record of its 
existence must be kept. 29 C.F.R. § 553.50(a)-(d). Also, the employer is 
required to "make some notation on the payroll records which shows the work 
period for each employee and which indicates the length of that period and its 
starting time." 29 C.F.R. § 553.51.

[¶18] The 
evidence pertaining to the issue of whether Platte County has adopted the 
exemption is essentially undisputed. Platte County generally requires its 
employees to work 40 hours per week. County offices are to be open from 8:00 
a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, "with the exception of all departments 
under the control of the Sheriff's Office and the Dispatch/Communications 
Department, who shall have adequate personnel on duty at all times." Thus, the 
County has recognized that employees of the sheriff's office may be subject to 
odd or unusual hours, and those employees are not subject to the 40-hour 
requirement applicable to other county employees. Time sheets prepared by 
appellants show the beginning point of the work period and its length, 28 days. 
When considered in conjunction with appellants' extrinsic admissions that they 
were orally informed of the 7(k) plan (and that comp time would be earned only 
after accruing 171 hours), these time sheets implicitly document the existence 
of a de facto 7(k) plan. The district court noted that the regulations do not 
specify how the existence of the plan should be documented, merely that it 
should be. We agree, and find no genuine issue of material fact present and 
conclude that Platte County has established the adoption of the 7(k) exemption 
for detention officers.

II. Failure to Promote CC 
Due Process and Equal Protection

[¶19] Appellants 
claim to have property and liberty interests in securing a promotion to the 
position of detention administrator. In Wyoming, there is no property interest 
in promotion where promotion depends on the discretion of the supervisor. City 
Council of Laramie v. Kreiling, 911 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Wyo. 1996). Where such 
discretion exists, the employee has only a unilateral expectation of promotion. 

[¶20] Wyoming 
sheriffs have discretionary authority to hire deputies and assistants. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-3-602 (Lexis 1999). Because the board of county commissioners 
cannot control the sheriff's appointments under his independent office, such 
appointments create no Fourteenth Amendment property interest under the 
personnel policies and practices of the board of county commissioners. Dickeson 
v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1439 (10th Cir. 1988). To have a property interest 
in a benefit, a person must enjoy a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Board 
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). The district court correctly found that the mere statement 
of minimum job qualifications is not such a substantive limitation on the 
sheriff's discretionary authority as to confer on appellants a constitutionally 
protected property interest in promotion.

[¶21] Appellants 
also contend that their liberty interests were impaired when they were harassed 
about their complaints of inadequate working conditions. If the Government 
imposes on an employee a stigma or disability that forecloses his freedom to 
take advantage of other employment opportunities, a liberty interest may be 
implicated. Sipes v. United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1422 (10th Cir. 1984). 
However, for an employee to make a successful claim of liberty deprivation, he 
must show that his employer's actions resulted in the publication of information 
which was false and stigmatizing. Sipes, 744 F.2d  at 1421. Appellants have not 
alleged any publication of false or stigmatizing information. We find this claim 
devoid of merit.

[¶22] Appellant 
Matthews also claims that his constitutional right to liberty was impaired 
without due process because the sheriff somehow interfered with Bernard 
Matthews' right to associate with his son, Deputy Sheriff John Matthews, by not 
promoting him. Appellant alleges that the sheriff refused to promote Matthews 
because the sheriff did not like Matthews' son. However, appellant produced no 
evidence that he has been precluded from any type of familial association with 
his son. There is no constitutional right to nepotism in Wyoming. Regardless, 
appellant has not even alleged that he could spend more time with his son if he 
were hired as detention administrator. The district court properly granted 
summary judgment on this claim.

[¶23] Appellants 
vaguely contend they were somehow denied equal protection under the law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because the sheriff discriminated against 
them by hiring a third person. In the absence of any issues involving a suspect 
class or a fundamental right (which could trigger strict scrutiny analysis), to 
prevail on this claim, appellants must show that the sheriff treated similarly 
situated people differently, and that such disparate treatment was not 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. See Kautza v. City of 
Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 1991); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1982). The sheriff could only hire one 
detention administrator. He hired the candidate he felt best qualified. We find 
that this disparate treatment was rationally related to the legitimate 
governmental objectives of properly running the detention facility (as required 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603 (Lexis 1999)) and preserving the peace in Platte 
County (as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-606 (Lexis 
1999)).

III. Gender 
Discrimination

[¶24] Appellant 
Bernard Matthews contends that the sheriff unlawfully discriminated against him 
on the basis of his gender in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by 
hiring a woman, Julie Minear, as detention administrator rather than Mr. 
Matthews. Under Title VII, a plaintiff who has received a "right to sue" letter 
from the EEOC must first make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, 
thus creating a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746-47, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 
(1993). In the case at bar, the district court assumed that appellant Matthews 
met this requirement. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. If 
the employer meets that burden of production, the presumption created by the 
prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case. St. Mary's Honor Center, 
509 U.S.  at 511, 113 S. Ct.  at 2749. Once the employer meets its burden of 
production by offering a legitimate rationale in support of its decision, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the employer's proffered reasons 
were pretextual. The plaintiff must present specific facts significantly 
probative to support an inference that the employer's proffered justifications 
were simply a pretext for discrimination. Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing 
either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that 
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Cone v. Longmont 
United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1994).

[¶25] The record 
shows that the sheriff chose not to hire Matthews because he would not be well 
suited to the job of detention administrator. In a confidential process, 
Matthews' interviewers found him to be "intolerant," "closed-minded," "rigid," 
and "autocratic." Appellant Matthews has offered no evidence of pretext 
countering these legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring him. The 
only evidence he offers in response to his employer's preferred explanation was 
an allegation that an employee of the sheriff's department made a comment 
regarding a woman's breast size. However, appellant has provided no evidence 
that the remark was related to the hiring decisions in this case. Without a 
showing of a nexus between the alleged discriminatory statement and the 
employer's decision, an inference of bias cannot be supported. Cone, 14 F.3d  at 
531.

IV. Breach of 
Contract

[¶26] Finally, 
appellants apparently contend that they had contractual rights to overtime 
compensation and to promotion but point to no contract language specifically 
applicable to detention officers that would entitle them to such rights or that 
would give them a reasonable expectation of being hired or promoted. Therefore, 
we will not further discuss these claims.

CONCLUSION

[¶27] There is 
no competent evidence to sustain any genuine issue of material fact. The 
district court properly granted summary judgment for the 
appellees.

[¶28] 
Affirmed.

1 The record indicates 
that appellants do receive comp time for hours worked over 171 hours per 28-day 
period, as required by the FLSA. The only issue is whether they should receive 
overtime compensation or comp time for hours between 160 and 
171.