Title: SNYDER v. LOVERCHECK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Snyder v. Lovercheck1999 WY 167992 P.2d 1079Case Number: 98-186, 98-203Decided: 12/13/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
LOREN 
SNYDER, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

RON LOVERCHECK, d/b/a 
BEAR MOUNTAIN LAND COMPANY; O.W. LOVERCHECK and MARGARET O. LOVERCHECK, husband 
and wife, Appellees (Defendants).

LOREN SNYDER, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

JEREMY HAYEK and ERA THE 
PROPERTY EXCHANGE INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeals from the District 
Court of Goshen County, The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, 
Judge.

Micheal K. 
Shoumaker, Sheridan, Wyoming; and James N. Wolfe, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
representing Appellant.

Nancy D. 
Freudenthal of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing Appellee 
Ron Lovercheck, d/b/a Bear Mountain Land Co.

John J. Maier of 
John J. Maier Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming, representing Appellees O. W. 
Lovercheck and Margaret O. Lovercheck.

Stephen N. 
Sherard of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, Wyoming, representing 
Appellees Jeremy Hayek and ERA The Property Exchange, 
Inc.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

TAYLOR, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Believing himself 
to have been shortchanged in the purchase of a wheat farm, appellant filed suit 
against the sellers, both real estate agents, and his agent's employer. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all of 
appellant's claims. The district court awarded costs to all defendants, and 
awarded attorney's fees to the sellers. Finding the district court's disposition 
on the motions for summary judgment to be correct, we affirm. However, we remand 
the award of attorney's fees and costs, and vacate the award of costs for 
Westlaw research.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Loren 
Snyder (Snyder), presents three issues for review that pertain to the Lovercheck 
appellees:

A. Did the 
district court err in granting summary judgment to the 
Loverchecks?

B. Did the 
district court err in granting attorney fees to O.W. Lovercheck and Margaret 
Lovercheck?

C. Did the 
district court err in granting costs to the Loverchecks?

The Lovercheck 
appellees (Ron, O.W., and Margaret Lovercheck) reorganize and rephrase the 
issues as:

1. Is there 
evidence that Ron Lovercheck, or O.W. and Margaret Lovercheck violated any 
provision of the contract to sell a wheat farm to Loren 
Snyder?

2. After 
disclaiming reliance on any representation of the Loverchecks to consummate a 
sale of the wheat farm, is Snyder barred from claiming justifiable reliance for 
an action based on negligent misrepresentation or fraudulent 
misrepresentation?

3. Did the 
district court err in awarding costs to the sellers and their agent, and fees to 
the sellers?

[¶3]      As to Jeremy 
Hayek (Hayek) and ERA The Property Exchange, Inc. (The Property Exchange), 
Snyder presents two issues for review:

1. Did Jeremy 
Hayek adequately discharge his obligation as a realtor to Loren 
Snyder?

2. Is Loren 
Snyder precluded from his claim against Mr. Hayek's malpractice by ratification 
and waiver?

Hayek and The 
Property Exchange respond simply with the question:

Did the district 
court err in granting the motion for summary judgment of Jeremy Hayek and ERA 
The Property Exchange, Inc. * * *?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      In the fall of 
1995, Snyder began searching for a suitable wheat farm. To facilitate his 
search, he contacted and employed Hayek, a real estate agent employed by The 
Property Exchange. Hayek contacted Ron Lovercheck of Bear Mountain Land Company 
(Ron) and discussed O.W. and Margaret Lovercheck's (the Loverchecks) farm in 
Goshen County. Hayek, Ron, and Snyder toured the farm on November 5, 1995. The 
crops were planted but not growing when they toured the farm. Ron did mention 
that there had been some problems with rye in the past, expressing his belief 
that the problem was minor. Snyder left the meeting with the understanding that 
the problem was confined to about 100 of the 1,960 acres.

[¶5]      The following 
day, Ron, through Hayek, informed Snyder that he had spoken with the former 
owner of the farm, Ray Headrick (Headrick). Headrick stated that the acreage in 
question had always produced more wheat then the county average. Headrick also 
showed Ron the areas where the rye problem was at its worst. Those areas 
comprised about 100 acres total, and Headrick said that those areas could grow 
as much as twenty to twenty-five percent rye. Snyder returned to view the 
property on ten to twelve occasions after the initial 
tour.

[¶6]      Eventually, 
Snyder made an offer on the property, and negotiations ensued. On February 16, 
1996, Snyder and the Loverchecks entered into a contract for sale of the farm. 
The contract, drafted by Hayek on Wyoming Real Estate Commission Forms, 
expressly provided that:

Purchaser is not 
relying upon any representations of the Seller or Seller's agents or sub-agents 
as to any condition which Purchaser deems to be material to Purchaser's decision 
to purchase this property[.]

This language 
mirrors the language in a statement of condition of the property completed by 
the Loverchecks at Snyder's request. The contract also contained an "as is" 
clause, a merger clause, a liberal inspection clause, and a specific objection 
procedure. Snyder stated in his deposition that he read parts of the contract, 
but not the above-quoted language.

[¶7]      The purchase 
price for the farm was $526,500.00, and the parties closed on May 10, 1996. 
According to Snyder, when the crops came up the rye problem was not minor, but 
rather he estimates that there is rye on 1,800 acres, over a third of which was 
100% infected. The affidavit of Snyder's expert stated that the extensive rye 
problem decreased the value of the farm to only 
$392,000.00.

[¶8]      Snyder filed suit 
alleging that the Loverchecks breached the contract for sale, that Ron and the 
Loverchecks negligently and fraudulently misrepresented the extent of the rye 
problem, that Ron's fraudulent misrepresentations entitled Snyder to punitive 
damages, and that Hayek and The Property Exchange breached their duty to delete 
and/or explain the waiver language quoted above. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of all appellees. The district court awarded the 
Loverchecks $12,811.09 in attorney's fees and $819.90 in costs, and awarded 
$8,746.12 in costs to Ron. This timely appeal followed.

III. STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW

A. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS

[¶9]      We will uphold a 
summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 
56(c).

"We review a 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials and following the same standards. We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties.'"

40 North Corp. 
v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Raymond v. Steen, 882 P.2d 852, 856 (Wyo. 1994); Kilmer v. Citicorp Mortg. Inc., 860 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 
1993); and Wagner v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Laramie, 784 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 
1989)).

[¶10]   We have held that summary judgment 
is appropriate in cases involving contracts when the language of the agreement 
is plain and unequivocal. 40 North Corp., 964 P.2d  at 426; Flying J, Inc. v. 
Booth, 773 P.2d 144, 148 (Wyo. 1989). The interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a question of law and, for that reason, summary judgment is 
appropriate with respect to disputes relating to unambiguous contracts. 40 North 
Corp., 964 P.2d  at 426; Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 
1994). 

B. ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS

[¶11]   We review an award of attorney's 
fees and costs under an abuse of discretion standard. Johnston v. Stephenson, 
938 P.2d 861, 862 (Wyo. 1997) (attorney's fees); Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 93 (Wyo. 1990) (costs). "A court abuses its discretion only when it acts in 
a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances." Johnston, 
938 P.2d  at 862. "The burden is placed upon the party who is attacking the trial 
court's ruling to establish an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is 
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did." 
Id.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT LOVERCHECK APPELLEES

[¶12]   The district court found that 
neither Ron nor the Loverchecks had breached the contract, and that the punitive 
damages claim fell with the underlying claims. Snyder makes no argument to this 
Court that such determinations were erroneous; rather, he relies solely on the 
contention that the Loverchecks, through Ron, negligently and fraudulently 
represented to Snyder that the rye problem was minor and manageable. The 
Loverchecks respond that the disclaimer clause in the contract for sale 
precludes Snyder from asserting such claims. The district court considered the 
common elements of both causes of action,1 and held that Snyder could not 
assert reliance upon the representations of either Ron or the Loverchecks. We, 
however, find the two causes of action sufficiently distinguishable to merit 
independent analysis.

1. FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATION

[¶13]   The effect of merger and disclaimer 
clauses on pre-contractual misrepresentations poses significant questions of 
public policy. There are two prevailing views on the subject. One school of 
thought focuses on the sanctity of the right to contract, and holds that a party 
is bound by a specific disclaimer even if the contract was fraudulently 
obtained. The other school of thought latches on to the age-old proposition that 
fraud vitiates all contracts, and holds that a party to a contract is not bound 
by a disclaimer if it was fraudulently obtained. Wyoming subscribes to the 
latter view.

[¶14]   The Loverchecks ask us to adopt the 
reasoning of Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (1959), where the New York Court of Appeals considered "whether 
the plaintiff can possibly establish from the facts alleged in the complaint * * 
* reliance upon the misrepresentations * * *." In Danann Realty Corp., the 
contract provided:

"The Purchaser 
has examined the premises agreed to be sold and is familiar with the physical 
condition thereof. The Seller has not made and does not make any representations 
as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation or any other 
matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid premises, except as herein 
specifically set forth, and the Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledges that no 
such representations have been made, and the Purchaser further acknowledges that 
it has inspected the premises and agrees to take the premises `as is' * * *. It 
is understood and agreed that all understandings and agreements heretofore had 
between the parties hereto are merged in this contract, which alone fully and 
completely expresses their agreement, and that the same is entered into after 
full investigation, neither party relying upon any statement or representation, 
not embodied in this contract, made by the other. The Purchaser has inspected 
the buildings standing on said premises and is thoroughly acquainted with their 
condition."

Danann Realty 
Corp., 157 N.E.2d  at 598 (emphasis in original). That court recognized a 
difference between a general merger clause and a specific disclaimer of 
reliance, noting that general merger clauses do not preclude a claim of fraud in 
the inducement. The New York Court of Appeals went on to 
say:

Here, however, 
plaintiff has in the plainest language announced and stipulated that it is not 
relying on any representations as to the very matter as to which it now claims 
it was defrauded. Such a specific disclaimer destroys the allegations in 
plaintiff's complaint that the agreement was executed in reliance upon these 
contrary oral representations * * *.

and,

If the language 
here used is not sufficient to estop a party from claiming that he entered the 
contract because of fraudulent representations, then no language can accomplish 
that purpose. To hold otherwise would be to say that it is impossible for two 
businessmen dealing at arm's length to agree that the buyer is not buying in 
reliance on any representations of the seller as to a particular 
fact.

Danann Realty 
Corp., 157 N.E.2d  at 599, 600.

[¶15]   Danann Realty Corp. has been 
followed by other courts, but has been limited in its applicability to 
situations where the disclaimer is specifically tailored. In LaFazia v. Howe, 
575 A.2d 182, 186 (R.I. 1990), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island applied the 
reasoning of Danann Realty Corp. to a disclaimer specifically denying reliance 
upon the seller's representations as to the profitability of the business being 
sold. However, in Travers v. Spidell, 682 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I. 1996) (per 
curiam), the court found that a merger-and-disclaimer clause was insufficient to 
invoke the rule where it did not specifically discuss the location or boundaries 
of the well in issue. Another path of evolution has been to dilute Danann Realty 
Corp. into a balancing test where the disclaimer is a factor to be considered in 
determining reliance. See Flakus v. Schug, 213 Neb. 491, 329 N.W.2d 859, 863 
(1983), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Nielson v. Adams, 223 Neb. 262, 388 N.W.2d 840 (1986).

[¶16]   Although not cited by the parties, 
we found that this issue is not unprecedented in Wyoming, and we choose to 
follow our long-established rule. Our decision to do so is not solely based on 
consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis, but also our finding that the 
rule in Wyoming more appropriately balances the competing interests of justice 
and freedom of contract.

[¶17]   In Baylies v. Vanden Boom, 40 Wyo. 
411, 278 P. 551, 552 (1929), the parties negotiated an exchange of a hotel in 
Kansas City, Missouri for a ranch in Uinta County. The parties entered into a 
agreement which provided:

"In the telegram 
of acceptance of proposition of the exchange of properties said telegram 
mentioned certain representations made by Bert L. Cook, Henry J. Vanden Boom, 
having no way of knowing whether to concur in his agents' representations, said 
representations are herewith set out, and constitute the only representations 
made."

Baylies, 278 P. 
at 553-54. The memorandum went on to list several representations, and was 
signed by both parties. Id. at 554. After taking over management of the hotel, 
Baylies discovered that several of the representations made to him, and not 
contained within the agreement, were untrue. Id. at 552. Baylies sued to rescind 
the contract, and Vanden Boom asserted that Baylies was precluded from asserting 
reliance upon any representations not contained within the memorandum. Id. at 
551-52.

[¶18]   We considered the rule analogous to 
Danann Realty Corp. that was in use at the time in several jurisdictions, and 
exemplified by Massachusetts cases.

"The 
Massachusetts cases emphasize the desirability of certainty in the contractual 
relations of those who have made a definite agreement, and if they say that they 
contract without regard to prior representations and that prior utterances have 
not been an inducement to their consent, any occasional damage to the individual 
caused by antecedent fraud is thought to be outweighed by the advantage of 
certainty and freedom from attacks, which would in the majority of cases be 
unfounded where such provisions were in the agreement."

Baylies, 278 P. 
at 555 (quoting Arnold v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., 20 F.2d 364 (2nd 
Cir. 1927)). We found, however, that competing considerations outweighed any 
interest in certainty. "`A perpetrator of fraud cannot close the lips of his 
innocent victim by getting him blindly to agree in advance not to complain 
against it.'" Baylies, 278 P.  at 556 (quoting Webster v. Palm Beach Ocean Realty 
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 15, 139 A. 457 (1927)). We held that Baylies was not precluded 
from proving that he relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentations 
notwithstanding the fact that he had signed the memorandum. Baylies, 278 P.  at 
557.

[¶19]   The Massachusetts Supreme Court has 
subsequently adopted the rule to which we subscribe, and has succinctly stated 
the policy behind the rule:

In the realm of 
fact it is entirely possible for a party knowingly to agree that no 
representations have been made to him, while at the same time believing and 
relying upon representations which in fact have been made and in fact are false 
but for which he would not have made the agreement. To deny this possibility is 
to ignore the frequent instances in everyday experience where parties accept, 
often without critical examination, and act upon agreements containing somewhere 
within their four corners exculpatory clauses in one form or another, but where 
they do so, nevertheless, in reliance upon the honesty of supposed friends, the 
plausible and disarming statements of salesmen, or the customary course of 
business. To refuse relief would result in opening the door to a multitude of 
frauds and in thwarting the general policy of the law.

Bates v. 
Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (1941).

[¶20]   Moreover, such a rule comports with 
the well-established exceptions to the parol evidence rule. That rule dictates 
that when the meaning of a contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not 
admitted to contradict the plain meaning of the terms used by the parties. Union 
Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 220 (Wyo. 1994). We depart 
from the parol evidence rule only if parol evidence is used to establish a 
separate and distinct contract, a condition precedent, fraud, mistake or 
repudiation. Applied Genetics Intern., Inc. v. First Affiliated Securities, 
Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 1990); Restatement of Contracts (Second) 
214 (1981).

[¶21]   Therefore, we decline to adopt the 
reasoning of Danann Realty Corp., and hold that Snyder is not precluded from 
asserting a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation by either the merger or 
disclaimer clauses. While the district court's decision on this issue was 
incorrect, it is well established that a district court judgment may be affirmed 
on any proper legal grounds supported by the record. Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶22]   "A plaintiff who alleges fraud must 
do so clearly and distinctly, and fraud will not be imputed to any party when 
the facts and circumstances out of which it is alleged to arise are consistent 
with honesty and purity of intention." Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 
1985). Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and will 
never be presumed. Id.

[¶23]   In the present case, Snyder 
presented no evidence to the district court consistent with fraud. Ron expressed 
his belief about the extent of the rye problem, and immediately sought a more 
informed opinion. No accusation has been made that Headrick's appraisal of the 
rye problem was based on anything other than his observations or was 
intentionally misleading. No one prevented Snyder from inspecting the land, and, 
in fact, he visited the land at least ten times before he agreed to the 
purchase. The facts of this case do not even approach the elevated burden of 
proof necessary to establish a claim of fraud. Summary judgment was properly 
granted on this issue. 

2. NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION

[¶24]   As noted above, the district court 
held that the presence of the disclaimer precluded Snyder from asserting 
reliance upon the negligent misrepresentations of the Loverchecks through Ron. 
We do not reach the merits of this issue, as we address the initial question 
posed by inclusion of a claim for negligent misrepresentation, which is whether 
a plaintiff may bring an action which arises out of a contract and call it a 
tort action, thereby rendering his own statement in the contract null and 
void.

[¶25]   We have never addressed the exact 
issue presented, and, therefore, we must look to other jurisdictions for 
guidance. Again, there are two predominant views on the subject. One view is 
that the contractual relationship controls, and parties are not permitted to 
assert actions in tort in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they agreed upon. 
The second view assumes that an action in tort is permissible, and that the 
parol evidence rule does not apply, and, therefore, the action may be 
maintained. We find the former to be the better rule.

[¶26]   In Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. 
v. Data General Corp., 101 N.M. 798, 689 P.2d 1269 (1984), the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico considered a contract with provisions similar to those present in 
this case. There, the buyer of goods brought an action against the seller for 
negligent misrepresentation made prior to the formation of the contract and an 
action for breach of express warranties. The contract included an integration 
clause and a provision disclaiming all prior representations and all warranties, 
express or implied, not contained therein. Id. at 1270-71. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court found that the buyer's claim of negligent misrepresentation was 
"nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the operation of the Commercial Code 
and to allow the contract to be rewritten under the guise of an alleged action 
in tort." Id. at 1271.

[¶27]   The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
expanded upon the reasoning articulated in Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. in 
Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984). We quote at 
length from this well-reasoned and persuasive opinion.

The very notion 
of contract is the consensual formation of relationships with bargained-for 
duties. An essential corollary of the concept of bargained-for duties is 
bargained-for liabilities for failure to perform them. Important to the vitality 
of contract is the capacity voluntarily to define the consequences of the breach 
of a duty before assuming the duty.

[¶28]   This case is illustrative. The 
effect of confusing the concept of contractual duties, which are voluntarily 
bargained for, with the concept of tort duties, which are largely imposed by 
law, would be to nullify a substantial part of what the parties expressly 
bargained for limited liability. Unless such bargains are against public policy 
(covered either by prohibitory statutes or well-defined, judge-made rules such 
as unconscionability), there is no reason in fact or in law to undermine them. 
Indeed, it would be an unwarranted judicial intrusion into the marketplace. No 
reason appears to support such a radical shift from bargained-for duties and 
liabilities to the imposition of duties and liabilities that were expressly 
negated by the parties themselves when they decided to abandon their status as 
legal strangers and define their relationship by contract. Tort law proceeds 
from a long historical evolution of externally imposed duties and liabilities. 
Contract law proceeds from an even longer historical evolution of bargained - 
for duties and liabilities. The careless and unnecessary blanket confusion of 
tort and contract would undermine the carefully evolved utility of 
both.

[¶29]   In tort, the legislatures and the 
courts have set the parameters of social policy and imposed them on individual 
members of society without their consent. The social policy in the field of 
contract has been left to the parties themselves to determine, with judicial and 
legislative intervention tolerated only in the most extreme cases. Where there 
has been intervention, it has been by the application of well established 
contract doctrines, most of which focus on threats to the integrity of the 
bargaining process itself such as fraud or extreme imbalance in bargaining 
power. 

[¶30]   Further, it should not matter 
whether the breach of a bargained-for duty arises from inattention, a 
disagreement over the existence of the duty, a dispute over the nature of the 
duty, an inability to perform the duty, or a simple unwillingness to perform the 
duty. The parties by contract (or in the absence of an express provision, by 
implied rules evolved under contract analysis) have themselves defined the 
consequences of the breach. In the marketplace of contract, a breach is a breach 
is a breach unless the parties choose to specify 
otherwise.

Isler, 749 F.2d  
at 23-24.

[¶31]   The Supreme Court of Kansas 
endorsed the reasoning of Isler in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Suburban Ford, 237 
Kan. 195, 699 P.2d 992, 998 (Kan.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 
(1985).

Suburban Ford 
[699 P.2d 992] stands for the proposition that a contract action cannot become a 
tort action by simply saying so. It stands for the proposition that when 
parties' difficulties arise directly from a contractual relationship, the 
resulting litigation concerning those difficulties is one in contract no matter 
what words the plaintiff may wish to use in describing it.

Beeson v. 
Erickson, 22 Kan. App. 2d 452, 917 P.2d 901, 907 (1996).

[¶32]   Those cases which do not subscribe 
to the above reasoning have structured the issue as whether the parol evidence 
rule bars admission of the prior representations in the face of merger and 
disclaimer clauses. In the leading case of Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 
154 Ariz. 495, 744 P.2d 22 (1987), the Arizona Court of Appeals found two bases 
for its decision to allow the claim for negligent misrepresentation to proceed. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals said that the parol evidence rule does not apply, 
because fraud is a recognized exception to the rule, and there is no difference 
in the result that obtains from either a fraudulent or a negligent 
misrepresentation. Id. at 26. The Formento court went on to say that the parol 
evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law, and, therefore, has no 
application to the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Id. The cases that have 
followed Formento have tended to adopt the latter reasoning. See Keller v. A.O. 
Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Colo. 1991); Gilliland v. 
Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580-81 (1990); and Stamp v. 
Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.App. 1990).2

[¶33]   We cannot agree with the first 
rationale espoused in Formento. While there is practically no difference in the 
harm that can result from either fraud or negligence, there are numerous 
examples in the law where a specific state of mind is a necessary predicate to a 
cause of action. Fraud and negligence embody two different states of mind, one 
of which has long been viewed as sufficiently egregious to warrant the 
intermingling of tort and contract principles via the parol evidence rule. We 
see no reason to extend that well-recognized rule beyond its historical 
boundaries.

[¶34]   The second rationale is even more 
difficult to accept. The reasoning of the court is that the parol evidence rule 
does not apply because it is a rule of contract law which cannot be infused into 
a tort cause of action. The difficulty with such reasoning is that it ignores 
the fact that a tort cause of action is being infused into a contractual 
relationship. Strict adherence to the principle of separation would actually 
lead to the opposite result in Formento.

[¶35]   While we recognize that the fields 
of tort and contract law are not completely divisible, we follow the rationale 
of those courts who find the contractual relationship controlling. Thus, the 
remaining determination is whether the merger and disclaimer clauses in the 
contract completely encompass all of the rights, duties, and liabilities of the 
parties with respect to the prior representations. We conclude that they do. 

[¶36]   It is well established in Wyoming 
that when parties reduce a contract to writing, they must abide by its plainly 
stated terms. Patel v. Harless, 926 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1996). Courts are not 
free to rewrite contracts under the guise of interpretation where the 
contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous. Klutznick v. Thulin, 814 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 1991). "Accordingly, in private disputes, a court must enforce 
the contract as drafted by the parties and may not relieve a contracting party 
from anticipated or actual difficulties undertaken pursuant to the contract, 
unless the contract is voidable on grounds such as mistake, fraud or 
unconscionability." Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, 226 Conn. 748, 628 A.2d 1298, 
1302 (1993) (citing 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 154, 159, and vol. 2, § 
208 (1981)). Moreover, "[o]ne who signs a contract generally cannot avoid it on 
the ground that he did not attend to its terms, or did not read it, or that he 
took someone's word as to what it contained." First State Bank of Wheatland v. 
American Nat. Bank, 808 P.2d 804, 806 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶37]   The contract clearly and 
unambiguously states that Snyder is not relying on any representations made by 
Ron or the Loverchecks. This clause validly allocates the risk of loss resulting 
from Snyder's reliance on the Lovercheck's representations. See Gibson v. 
Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 699 A.2d 68, 71 (1997) (considering a similar clause). 
The parties were free to contract for whatever terms they wished, and they chose 
to allocate the risk of loss to Snyder. Snyder's claim that he did not read or 
understand the terms to which he was agreeing falls on deaf ears. Under the 
circumstances, we are aware of no duty that the law would impose upon the 
Loverchecks either to ensure that Snyder's representation of non-reliance was 
genuine or to protect Snyder from poorly allocating the risk of loss. Summary 
judgment was appropriate as Snyder is barred from asserting a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation.

B. SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT BB HAYEK AND THE PROPERTY EXCHANGE

[¶38]   Snyder contends that Hayek's 
failure to advise him of the presence of and failure to strike the disclaimer 
clause in the contract constitutes an actionable breach of duty. Hayek maintains 
that Snyder waived the breach of duty by signing the contract. In support of 
this contention, Hayek refers us to two cases wherein a real estate broker 
obviously breached his duty to his client, but was relieved of responsibility 
for his error by the client's act of signing the contract.

[¶39]   In Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461, 
462 (Utah 1984), the seller instructed his broker to include in the contract a 
"subject to" clause which would make the sale contingent on the seller's 
locating a new residence. The broker, however, inserted a clause that made the 
buyer's possession subject to the seller's relocation. Id. The seller sued the 
broker alleging a breach of the principal-agent relationship, and requested that 
the broker indemnify the seller for damages awarded to the buyers. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that the broker had breached his duty to the seller, 
but found that:

The language of 
the "subject to" clause in the earnest money agreement was known to the seller 
prior to presentation to the buyer. The seller read the agreement, and in 
particular the pertinent clause, before signing it; he knew the words used; and 
had an opportunity to raise any question concerning the language in the earnest 
money agreement with his real estate agent. The language at issue was 
nontechnical and readily understandable, and there is no hint of 
misrepresentation, fraud, or sharp dealing by the real estate agent in this case 
and none was pleaded.

When a principal 
sees an act done by his agent and the act is not subject to misunderstanding by 
a reasonable person, the law does not permit the principal to ignore what is 
obvious, even if it be contrary to his instructions. When an agent exceeds his 
express authority, which must be assumed in this case because it is here on 
summary judgment, ratification by the principal releases the agent from 
liability in damages.

Kidd, 688 P.2d  
at 462.

[¶40]   Barta v. Kindschuh, 246 Neb. 208, 
518 N.W.2d 98, 100 (1994) arose from a failure to accurately reflect the 
condition of the roof in a "Property Disclosure Information" form. The sellers 
assumed that their broker made the necessary changes to the document when he was 
informed of the true condition of the roof. Id. at 99. The broker, in his 
defense, stated that he gave the form to the sellers to read and left the 
decision to sign it up to them. Id. at 99-100. The Nebraska Supreme Court quoted 
and followed the reasoning of Kidd, and held that the sellers acquiesced in and 
ratified the acts of the agent when they read and signed the unmodified form. 
Id. at 101-02.

[¶41]   We find these decisions, while well 
founded in the law of agency, to be incompatible with duties inherent in the 
relationship of broker and client. In Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981), 
we outlined the nature of this relationship. We said:

Realtors, just 
like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold themselves 
out as professionals; it is their job to know their profession. People rely on 
and trust them. Failure to comply with either the accepted standards in the 
field or the standards society is willing to recognize as acceptable, is 
actionable.

Hagar, 638 P.2d  
at 138. In Hagar, we stated that the accepted standards in the real estate field 
are provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 33-28-111 (Michie 1977). Hagar, 638 P.2d  at 137. 
The applicable provision of that statute provides that, "[f]ailing to advise the 
buyer and seller of all terms of the proposed sale at the time an offer is 
presented including estimated discounts and closing costs" is a breach of the 
broker's duty to his client. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 33-28-111(a)(x) (Michie Repl. 
1987). The terms of a proposed sale include not only those contained in the 
initial offer, but also those added by the broker in the contract for sale, even 
if they are part of the boiler plate language of a form 
contract.

[¶42]   It is inconceivable to this Court 
that a broker can escape liability for failing to advise his client of the 
consequences of signing a document by allowing the client to sign the very 
document that the broker failed to explain. The circularity of such a rule is 
readily apparent, and provides no protection for the unsophisticated and unwary 
consumer who places his trust in his paid agent. The better rule, and the one 
which we find to be consistent with the standard of care imposed upon brokers in 
Wyoming, was well stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Prall v. Gooden, 226 
Or. 554, 360 P.2d 759, 762 (1961):

It also must be 
kept in mind that a real estate broker stands in a fiduciary relationship with 
his customer or client and is thus bound to protect his clients' interests. He 
must, therefore, make a full, fair and understandable explanation to the client 
before having him sign any contracts, particularly when those contracts are with 
the broker himself. * * *

The broker 
should make his explanation commensurate with the education and understanding of 
the people he is dealing with, and if he is unable to give competent advice he 
should allow them to obtain it elsewhere.

Thus, a broker's 
statutory duty to advise his client of the terms of the proposed contract is 
fulfilled when an explanation commensurate with the client's sophistication has 
been made.

[¶43]   Whether a sufficient explanation 
has been made is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the 
surrounding circumstances. Ordinarily, we would remand a case such as this to 
the district court to make the required factual determination; however, the 
undisputed facts in this case are such that no genuine question of material fact 
could be raised. Snyder is not the typical first-time home buyer who might 
benefit from a detailed explanation of all the terms contained in a contract for 
sale. Snyder fancies himself a sophisticated purchaser. He has bought, sold, and 
traded various parcels of real estate several times in the past. He was 
negotiating the purchase of a 1,960 acre farm for $526,500.00. He was savvy 
enough to require that the sellers prepare a statement of condition of property. 
That statement provided that the "Sellers [made] no other representations of any 
kind relating to said property." Snyder read the document, and expressed neither 
concern nor confusion about the language. Hayek was justified in believing that 
a similar provision in the contract was understandable and acceptable to Snyder. 
Snyder has presented no evidence which would tend to prove that Hayek did not 
fulfill his duty to explain the terms of the contract. The district court's 
disposition on the motion for summary judgment was, therefore, 
appropriate.

C. ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS BB THE LOVERCHECKS

1. ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

[¶44]   The rule in Wyoming is that 
attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of specific statutory 
authority, unless there is a contract providing for them. Sheneman v. Division 
of Workers' Safety and Compensation Internal Hearing Unit, Dept. of Employment, 
State of Wyo., 962 P.2d 874, 875 (Wyo. 1998); Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Sav. 
Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo. 1998). The contract for sale at issue here 
provided:

In the event 
that any party shall become in default or breach of any of the terms of this 
Contract, such defaulting or breaching party shall pay all reasonable attorney's 
fees and other expenses which the nonbreaching or nondefaulting party may incur 
in enforcing this Contract with or without suit.

[¶45]   Snyder contends that the clause 
mandates that a party be found in default or breach before attorney's fees can 
be awarded. Snyder claims that since the district court did not specifically 
find that he had breached the contract, the condition precedent to an award of 
attorney's fees has not occurred, and the award was improper. The Loverchecks 
assert that there is no such condition precedent, and any attorney's fees 
incurred in enforcing the contract are properly awarded, if reasonable. We find 
that the provision plainly provides that one party to the contract breach the 
agreement before an award of attorney's fees is properly 
granted.

[¶46]   Here, the district court made no 
finding that Snyder breached the contract. While we have said that in the 
absence of special findings of fact, a district court judgment carries with it 
every finding of fact which is supported by the evidence, Bishop v. Bishop, 944 P.2d 425, 428 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 
335 (Wyo. 1987)), and a judgment will be affirmed on any legal ground appearing 
in the record, Bird, 948 P.2d  at 892, there is no evidence in the record on 
appeal which would support a finding that Snyder did not fulfill his obligation 
to pay for the farm. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for a 
determination whether Snyder breached the contract for 
sale.

2. 
COSTS

[¶47]   Snyder contends that the district 
court erred when it awarded all of the costs claimed by the Loverchecks, because 
it did not follow the dictates of U.R.D.C. 501. He questions the propriety of 
awards of expert fees, deposition costs, photographs, and Westlaw research. The 
Loverchecks respond by asserting that they are proper under the rule, and even 
if they are not, the contract for sale provides for the payment of "all * * * 
other expenses * * *."

[¶48]   Costs are purely statutory, as they 
did not exist at common law. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1373 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting Roberts Construction Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1183 (Wyo. 
1976)). However, this is true only in the absence of an agreement concerning 
costs between the parties. Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 28 Ill.Dec. 500, 390 N.E.2d 859, 865 (1979); Luppold v. Lewis, 172 Mont. 280, 563 P.2d 538, 545 
(1977); Washington Asphalt Co. v. Boyd, 63 Wn.2d 690, 388 P.2d 965, 969 (1964); 
20 C.J.S. Costs 4 at 12 (1990). Parties to an agreement are free to bargain for 
payment of costs, just as they can bargain for payment of attorney's fees. The 
parties' agreement to an allocation of costs is not subject to the provisions of 
U.R.D.C. 501.

[¶49]   The contract provided for the 
payment of "all * * * other expenses * * *."3 The district court awarded all of 
the expenses claimed by the Loverchecks in accordance with the agreement, and no 
argument has been made to this Court that these expenses were unreasonable. The 
costs, like the award of attorney's fees, however, cannot be awarded absent 
breach or default by Snyder, and, therefore, we remand this issue to the 
district court as well.

[¶50]   One element of the costs claimed 
can be finally resolved by this decision. The Loverchecks included $96.60 in 
Westlaw research in their inventory of costs. We conclude that computer research 
expenditures are included within attorney's fees and are not taxable as 
costs.

6 J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice, 54.77[8] (2d ed. 1986) states that "[c]omputer 
research is generally treated as a lawyer's cost and not taxable as ordinary 
costs[.]" * * * Similarly, 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs 61 (1995) states that "[t]he 
expense of computer-aided research is also a component of attorney's fees, and 
like any other legal research such expense cannot be taxed as [an] item of cost 
in addition to the attorney's fees award." * * * These conclusions are confirmed 
by the Annotation on the Recoverability of Cost of Computerized Legal Research 
Under 28 USCS 1920 or Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 
A.L.R.Fed. 168 (1986).

Bjornen v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 81 Haw. 105, 912 P.2d 602, 604 
(1996).

[¶51]   We vacate the award of costs for 
the Westlaw research, as that cost should have been included in the claim for 
attorney's fees. Since the research fee was not included in the original proof 
of attorney's fees, it cannot now be added to the attorney's fees already 
claimed. Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 537 (Wyo. 1995).

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶52]   Summary judgment was properly 
granted as to all claims; however, the findings necessary to an award of 
attorney's fees and costs were not made. By this decision, the balance of rights 
between sellers, buyers, and broker is maintained. Buyers may assert claims if 
they have been defrauded in their purchase; however, simple negligence will not 
relieve a buyer from a poor bargain. Brokers, entrusted with great 
responsibility to protect their client's interests, must explain the contracts 
they present in a manner commensurate with the sophistication of their clients. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed on the motions for 
summary judgment, and we remand to the district court for a determination on the 
issue of Snyder's breach of the contract. The award of $96.60 for Westlaw 
research is vacated.

Footnotes

1 The 
elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are: false information supplied 
in the course of one's business for the guidance of others in their business; 
failure to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or relating the information; 
and pecuniary loss resulting from justifiable reliance thereon. Richey v. 
Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1995); Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 
1985); Restatement of Torts (Second) 552 at 126-27 
(1977).

The 
elements of a claim for fraud are: "a false representation made by the defendant 
which is relied upon by the plaintiff to his damage, the asserted false 
representation must be made to induce action, and the plaintiff must reasonably 
believe the representation to be true." Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 
437.

2 We note 
that these cases have not been particularly well received by commentators. See 
Elizabeth Cumming, Note, Balancing the Buyer's Right to Recover for 
Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller's Ability to Disclaim Express 
Warranties, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1189 (1992) and Jared M. Levin, Note, A Proposed 
Penalty Default Rule Governing a Seller's Ability to Disclaim Liability for 
Precontractual Misrepresentations, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 399 
(1997).

3 Neither 
party attempts to distinguish the term "expense" from the term "cost," and, 
therefore, we treat the terms as synonymous for purposes of this 
opinion.