Title: Blundon v. Town of Stamford

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 89-108
 
 
Robert Blundon                               Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Bennington Superior Court
 
Town of Stamford and                         February Term, 1990
Zoning Board of Adjustment
 
 
Silvio T. Valente, J.
 
John M. Ruggiero of Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall, Rutland, for
  plaintiff-appellee
 
J. Garvan Murtha and Gwendolyn W. Harris, Law Clerk (On the Brief),
  Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Defendants, Town of Stamford (town) and Town of Stamford
Zoning Board of Adjustment (board), appeal the decision of the superior
court reversing the board's decision that denied plaintiff, Robert Blundon,
a conditional use permit.  We reverse and reinstate the board's decision.
     The facts were stipulated by the parties as follows.  Plaintiff owns a
206 acre lot in Stamford, Vermont.  Under the town's zoning ordinance, the
property is located in the forest district.  The only access to plaintiff's
lot is through an easement of at least twenty feet in width over a right-of-
way known as Coal Kiln Road.  This road is not constructed to town
standards.  It passes through part of the Green Mountain National Forest and
three other lots and continues to a county road that does meet the town
standards.
     Plaintiff began constructing a camp on his property without obtaining a
zoning permit from the town, and on August 17, 1987, he received a notice of
violation of the town zoning ordinance.  The violation was described as the
construction of a structure in the forest zone without a sewage disposal
permit or a building permit.  On August 20, 1987, the town planning
commission granted plaintiff's request for a construction permit.  Under the
zoning ordinance, however, the building of a camp in the forest zone also
requires a conditional use permit from the zoning board.  The Board denied
such a permit on October 27, 1987 because it found that the access road
leading to plaintiff's property was not in compliance with { 6.2.1 of the
zoning ordinance.  That section deals with conditional use permits in the
forest district and provides in pertinent part that "[r]oads providing
access to lots in the forest district shall be constructed to town
standards."
     Plaintiff appealed the board's decision to the Bennington Superior
Court.  The lower court reversed the zoning board decision and ordered the
board to issue plaintiff a conditional use permit once he successfully
obtained a sewer permit.  The court recognized the ordinance provision on
which the board relied, but held that another provision governed.  That
provision, { 7.2.1 of the ordinance, is part of the "General Regulations" of
the zoning ordinance and states:
	  No land development may be permitted on lots which do
	not either have frontage on a public road or public
	waters or, with the approval of the Planning Commission,
	access to such road or waters by a permanent easement or
	right-of-way at least twenty feet in width.
	 
The court held that since plaintiff's proposal met the requirements of {
7.2.1, the town's legitimate concerns for access were satisfied and the
permit should issue.  Defendants appeal the lower court's grant of plain-
tiff's conditional use permit.
     There are three issues for our consideration:  (1) whether the trial
court correctly interpreted the town's zoning ordinance; (2) whether the
town's requirement that a forest district access road meet town standards is
valid; and (3) whether the denial of a conditional use permit would render
plaintiff's property unusable.  The town must prevail on each of these
questions if we are to reverse the decision of the lower court.
     In construing a zoning ordinance, we use the same rules that we use in
construing a statute.  See Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219,
223,