Title: State v. Malumphy

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

105 Ariz. 200 (1969) 461 P.2d 677 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Timothy MALUMPHY, Appellant. No. 1751. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. December 3, 1969. *201 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, Former Atty. Gen., Howard P. Leibow, Former Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Ross Lee, Public Defender, Vernon B. Croaff, Former Public Defender, Grant Laney, Former Deputy Public Defender, Lewis Roca Beauchamp & Linton, by John J. Flynn, James Moeller, Terry D. Oehler, Charles D. Roush, Phoenix, for appellant. UDALL, Chief Justice. Defendant Timothy Malumphy was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. We have reviewed the record of the trial and conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. At the time of the offense defendant was employed as a waiter at Laffite's restaurant in Scottsdale, Arizona. He testified that for some time he had contemplated suicide but lacked the courage to take his own life. He therefore decided to kill someone else so that he could be tried for murder and given the death penalty. His plans took form on the afternoon of April 15, 1966, when he purchased a 38-caliber revolver from a Phoenix pawnshop. At approximately 6:15 p.m. on the same day he walked into the employee's dining room at Laffite's. He told one employee he was going to quit, and spoke to others about employment in Colorado Springs. Robert Bartlebaugh allegedly made a sarcastic remark to defendant, and defendant pulled out the gun and shot him in the chest. Constantine Karabogius was in the main dining room, and upon hearing the shot he entered the employee's room. Defendant then shot Karabogius in the stomach, and when he fell face downward on the floor he shot him again in the back. Bartlebaugh lived four hours, but Karabogius was dead upon the arrival of officers on the scene. Defendant then walked from the restaurant and some hours later gave himself up to his brother, a Phoenix policeman. Defendant testified that he picked his two victims because "they didn't deserve to live." He further stated that his action in taking their lives was sanctioned by God, and that in God's sight he had done no wrong. He admitted that he knew he was breaking a law of society, and that society would condemn him for his action, but he felt that someone had to "stop" the two men from hurting others, and since his life was already ruined he was the one to do it. At his trial defendant raised the defense of insanity at his mother's request. He stated on the stand that he hoped the jury would find him guilty and sentence him to death. Further, he made a motion in this court, which we denied, to have his appeal dismissed. We granted him the opportunity to appear before us on his own behalf, and in that appearance he stated *202 that he felt he had been given a fair trial and an appropriate sentence. Despite his efforts we have undertaken a review of the record, and will discuss the merits of the arguments presented by assigned counsel. It is contended that the trial court erred in instructing on the M'Naghten rules as the test for criminal responsibility, rather than the test set forth in the Model Penal Code, § 4.01. We have considered the question of adopting a different test for criminal responsibility in this state on numerous occasions, and have consistently adhered to the M'Naghten rules. State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965). In Schantz we discussed § 4.01 of the Model Penal Code, and stated: We hold that the court properly instructed the jury as to the test for criminal responsibility. It is contended further that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's mental condition in determining whether defendant, in fact, entertained premeditation and deliberation. The instruction embodies the precept commonly referred to as the doctrine of "diminished responsibility." We rejected the doctrine in State v. Schantz, supra, after an extensive discussion of the subject. We likewise reject it in this case for the reasons set forth in Schantz. Further, it would have been a useless gesture to give the instruction in the instant case since it was defendant's own testimony that the murder was carefully conceived and carried out according to the preconceived plan. Neither of the psychiatrists who examined defendant, and testified at the trial, stated that defendant's mental condition prevented him from entertaining the requisite premeditation. The court refused to instruct the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter. A defendant is entitled to instructions on the lesser offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter if a reasonable interpretation of the evidence indicates that he could be guilty of these offenses. State v. Schroeder, 95 Ariz. 255, 389 P.2d 255 (1964). The facts here clearly point only to a conviction for first-degree murder. Further, as was stated in State v. Schroeder, supra, "When the sole defense to a charge of murder is an alibi, for example, or a plea of insanity, no instruction on included crimes is necessary." Defendant was examined by two psychiatrists who both testified at the trial. It is contended that one of the doctors was prejudiced in favor of the state since he regularly testified for the County of Maricopa at insanity hearings. No prejudice appears in the record, and we will not presume that it existed. State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798 (1956). Carlos Jiminez, an employee of Laffite's at the time of the shooting, was called by the state as a witness. On direct examination he gave an eye-witness account of the shooting and offered his opinion that defendant was normal and knew right from wrong. On cross-examination the following ensued: *203 It is contended that the court erred in not allowing the witness to answer the question as to whether defendant was normal when the shooting occurred. It is not clear from the record whether the court sustained the objection because it was presented in argumentative form or whether the court meant to keep the witness from rendering his opinion on defendant's mental condition. However, since the witness testified on direct examination that in his opinion defendant was normal and knew right from wrong, and since several other witnesses testified to the same effect, it is our opinion that any error that was made was harmless. State v. Eisenstein, 72 Ariz. 320, 235 P.2d 1011 (1951). It is contended that A.R.S. § 13-453, which prescribes the punishment for murder, is unconstitutional in that it authorized the imposition of the death penalty in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and §§ 4, 13, and 15 of Article II of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. We answered the question in State v. Boggs, 103 Ariz. 328, 441 P.2d 778 (1968), where we said: During voir dire of the jury a prospective juror was questioned as follows: It is submitted by assigned counsel that the juror was improperly excused under the holding in Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). We do not agree. In Witherspoon the United States Supreme Court stated: The juror in the instant case expressed more than conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty. She stated specifically that even if she felt the case warranted it she would be prevented from imposing death by her moral or religious beliefs. The following language from Witherspoon, supra, is clearly in point: The instant case comes within the above exclusionary language, and therefore the court did not err in excusing the juror for cause. Affirmed. STRUCKMEYER and HAYS, JJ., concur. *204 McFARLAND, Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion; however, because of the importance of the decision, I feel that it is desirable to express my views on the question relating to the sanity of the defendant as it affects the case, both at the time of the commission of the acts and since that date. This requires a supplemental statement of the facts of the case. Defendant Timothy Malumphy was charged with two counts of murder in the first degree. The first was the murder of one Constantine Karabogius, and the second the murder of one Robert Bartlebaugh. He was found guilty on both counts, and the jury fixed his punishment at death. At the trial he was defended by the Public Defender's Office, who filed this appeal from the conviction and sentence. The Public Defender's Office filed an able and exhaustive brief in behalf of defendant, which was signed by Vernon Croaff, Public Defender, and Grant Laney, Deputy Public Defender. Defendant filed a motion in personam to dismiss the appeal, and requested to be allowed to represent himself. His motion to dismiss the appeal was denied by this Court, and an order entered to appoint John J. Flynn as his attorney. The firm of Lewis Roca Beauchamp & Linton, by John J. Flynn (hereinafter referred to as Flynn), also filed an able and exhaustive supplemental brief in behalf of defendant and a reply brief to appellee's answering brief. On the 30th day of August 1968 defendant filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing to determine his mental ability to represent himself as his own counsel. Thereafter, on the 18th day of October, this Court made an order referring the question of defendant's mental competency to waive counsel and represent himself to the Superior Court of Maricopa County for determination. After hearings, the trial court answered in the affirmative. The defendant, in his oral presentation before this Court, stated that he believed the imposition of the death penalty was justified, and, in fact, demanded that it be swiftly carried out. A defendant representing himself in an appellate court may not testify, and can only present matters which he would be able to present if he were an attorney; and no defendant should be permitted to choose his punishment for a crime. The briefs of both the public defender and Flynn question the sufficiency of the instructions on insanity, it being contended that we should follow those recommended in the Model Penal Code. However, the objection to the instruction, which has been referred to as a test under the McNaghten rule as to sanity, is sufficiently broad to require an examination as to whether the instruction covers the law under the facts of the instant case. As pointed out by the majority, this Court has previously rejected other tests and approved the test under the McNaghten rule. State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521. In Schantz, supra, we held: For the first time we are confronted with the question should the court have instructed the jury as to whether the wrong referred to was a "moral wrong" or a "wrong against the law of the land," or both? This question requires a careful analysis of both the facts and the law relating to this subject. In Flynn's opening brief it was stated: I agree that the evidence without question shows that the defendant was mentally disturbed; hence, the question must be carefully considered as to whether the proper test was used to determine whether he was legally sane at the time of the commission of the crime. Did the defendant "know the nature and quality of his acts"? If he did, did he know that what he was doing was wrong wrong morally, usually referred to as under the laws of God, or wrong under the laws of man, or both? This requires an analysis of the evidence. Defendant's early life was a series of unfortunate events. His father was either dead at Malumphy's birth, or died when he was an infant. There were four brothers; one of whom is now dead; and one is a city policeman. His mother worked, and defendant lived with his grandmother. He and his grandmother had a very close relationship, but his grandmother turned him against his mother, telling him his mother had abandoned him when he needed her the most. He had polio at an early age, and the grandmother never disciplined him after that. In 1949, upon the death of the grandfather, he was placed in Girard College Orphanage in Philadelphia. His grandmother died in 1958, and he was brought home from school to the funeral. He evidenced no sorrow whatsoever at her death, laughed in the funeral home, and acted as though he were at a party. He went back to the orphanage, but was expelled, after which he came to Phoenix to live with his mother who had remarried. He enrolled in high school, but did not graduate. He thought he was entitled to have a car. He had earned some money, but because he was not permitted to buy a car he stole one for a joy ride, and was sent to Ft. Grant. After his discharge, he informed his mother that if she did not permit him to enlist in the Air Force he would quit school as soon as he was eighteen and enlist anyway. He was charged with fraudulent enlistment because he had not revealed his commitment to Ft. Grant. It was proven that he did not fraudulently leave this matter out, but omitted it because the officer had told him it was not necessary. While awaiting court martial he was restricted to the base; however, he left the base on several occasions without permission and was reported by one of the airmen. Because he felt he was unjustly treated he took a gun and went to this airman's room, and told him he would shoot him. He shot at him, but missed. He took the airman's roommate as a hostage and shot him in the knees to punish the man who had reported him. In this regard he testified: Because of this incident he was court-martialed and sentenced to Fort Leavenworth. There he stabbed a fellow prisoner, was given psychiatric examination, and discharged from the federal prison, as it seemed there could be no purpose served by his further confinement. His mother testified that he needed psychiatric treatment, but would not sign a complaint for his commitment to the State Hospital. He secured work at various jobs the last being at *206 Laffite's Restaurant in Scottsdale. It was there he became acquainted with the two victims. There was "bad blood between them" from the very beginning. According to his testimony he was mistreated. The number of his tables was cut down, thereby curbing his tips, and many times they would take the food he had ordered and give it to other customers and cause his customers to wait longer for their food. He would then get fewer tips, and he was having difficulty with his finances. On April 15, 1966, he purchased a gun. At approximately 6:15 p.m., he walked into the employees' dining room, told them he was going to quit, and spoke to the other employees about employment in Colorado Springs. After some words with the deceased Bartlebaugh he shot him, and then shot Karabogius when he came into the dining room. In his testimony setting forth his reasons for killing the two decedents in the instant case, he testified: A number of psychiatrists testified at the trial. Dr. Carl Breitner testified: Dr. Richard E.H. Duisberg, after testifying as to defendant's background, stated, when asked for a diagnosis: "Q You found evidence of paranoid symptoms of self-justification? I have not quoted from, nor discussed, the testimony of the experts at the hearing on the motion to determine whether the defendant was competent to represent himself before this Court, as it was only evidence for the purpose there introduced, but the testimony was much stronger there, in that two of the three experts stated that in their opinion he was not competent to represent himself. Their testimony went much further in regard to his mental ability to understand the nature and quality of the act than the expert testimony at the trial. This was true with regard to the testimony of one of the experts who also had testified at the trial. We must judge the case solely on the evidence that was before the court during the trial. We cannot consider evidence at that hearing nor statements made by the defendant himself before this Court in the course of argument. In determining whether the "M'Naghten rule" should be modified, we have rejected the criminal-responsibility test set forth in the Model Penal Code, the irresistable-impulse theory, and the diminished-responsibility test, State v. Schantz, even though England, which gave us the McNaghten rule, has changed in favor of the latter test. Homicide Act, 1957 (586 Eliz. 2, c. 11), § 2. We have for the first time a case in which the testimony shows that defendant believed that the act he was committing was right under the laws of God while admitting that he knew it was a violation of the "laws of society." It is also novel in that the defendant testified that not only did he feel it was his duty to kill the two decedents, but he also felt that his life was such that he would be better off dead, and that he did not have the nerve [guts] to take his own life, and it was one of his objectives in killing the men that he would then himself be executed. We must therefore determine the law as to the type of instruction necessary under such facts. For our present purposes we need not indulge in relating the background and history of McNaghten and the other alternate approaches since this has been done often and exhaustively throughout the United States and Great Britain. Reference to but several of the many excellent opinions will suffice. See Blocker v. United States, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 288 F.2d 853 [Judge Burger's concurring opinion], cert. denied 375 U.S. 923, 84 S. Ct. 269, 11 L. Ed. 2d 167; Harvey v. State (Miss.), 207 So. 2d 108; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. No question is raised here as to that part of the test relating to defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act. The issue is the definition of the term "wrong." The defendant admits that he knew his actions were legally wrong, but insists that they did not offend the law of God that these murders were not morally wrong. *209 Does McNaghten's rule allow for such a dichotomy of the term "wrong"? The biblical phrase "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" [Matt. 22:21] is of simple application until a person is placed in a situation where to render unto one does violence to the laws of the other. A person with a diseased mind, or suffering a delusion may find himself torn between what his pitiable condition leads him to believe, are two obligations. His mind compels him to follow his distorted view of his obligation to God. This is a conscious decision not an irresistible impulse but spawned by a diseased aberration of his mentality. Is he any the less insane because he is aware of the State law prohibiting his act? Even Blackstone had difficulty with this question of moral versus public responsibility. The poles of the involvement of moral law in the definition of "right from wrong" are best shown by two decisions from Kansas and Utah. In State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739, 747, the court stated: The cited case of Reg. v. Windle, supra (36 Cr.App.R. 85), decided prior to the Homicide Act, considered the definition of wrong as follows: But see Bergin v. Stack [1952], Austl. L.R. 810; R. v. Balaban [1954], S.Austl. S.R. 282. On the other hand the Utah court has held that an offender, to be considered legally responsible, must know that his act is both legally wrong and morally wrong. In State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319 P.2d 859, the Court approved a jury charge which required acquittal because of insanity if the jury found "that, when he fired the shot, he did not know it was wrong in the sense that such act was condemned by morals or law." The Court said: One of the leading cases written upon the subject of the meaning of the word "wrong" as used in the test was an opinion written by the able and learned Judge Cardozo, later Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945, L.R.A. 1916D, 519, reargument denied 216 N.Y. 762, 111 N.E. 1095. It should be interjected at this point that Judge Cardozo's decision on this point is supported by the language used at McNaghten's trial in the Central Criminal Court reported in IV Reports of State Trials (New Series) 847. The Solicitor General, in the McNaghten case, in his statement to the jury, recognized that there must be a violation of both the laws of God and man: Lord Chief Justice Tindal, presiding at the trial and later rendering his opinion to the House of Lords in McNaghten's case, included the following in his charge to the jury: This use of the term "wrong" casts doubt on the interpretation given McNaghten in R. v. Windle, supra. Judge Cardozo's opinion in Schmidt continues: Thus, Judge Cardozo walked a middle path between the doctrines expounded in Kirkham, supra, and Andrews, supra. In contrast to the complete rejection of moral wrong in the Kansas case and the double standard of wrong in the Utah case, Cardozo formulated a "blend" of both moral and legal wrong. In illustration, Judge Cardozo gives the following: In my opinion Cardozo's "middle-of-the-road" refinement of McNaghten's rule is the correct test rather than the strict application of "legal wrong only" in State v. Andrews, supra, and the liberal "either-or, legal or moral wrong" set forth in State v. Kirkham, supra. It is my belief that even where a defendant is aware that a particular act is a violation of the law, if he harbors a delusory belief, which is the product of mental disease of such magnitude that he believes that the act is not morally wrong, and that as a result of such mental disease he is unable to understand that it is wrong for him to violate the law prohibiting the act, then he is not criminally responsible. The evidence in the instant case does not show the defendant was unable to understand *213 it was wrong for him to kill the decedents. He was lucidly aware that his acts were wrong in that they violated the law. The testimony of the experts and of the defendant show that defendant thought that the acts he committed were not morally wrong; also that he was aware that the acts were a violation of the law. The question then in the instant case is not just whether he was aware that his acts were a violation of the law, but whether he harbored a delusionary belief which was a product of mental disease of such magnitude that he did not believe it was wrong to so violate the law. The evidence would have to show not just that he did not believe it was legally wrong, but that the belief was the result of such mental disease. The evidence in the instant case was not sufficient to justify such a finding. Therefore, it was not prejudicial error for the court to fail to distinguish between moral and legal wrong in its instruction defining the test to be applied for insanity. I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority. LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., concurs.