Title: People v. Roberson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96159-Agenda 2-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. BRIAN 							
ROBERSON, Appellant. 
Opinion filed October 28, 2004.
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Brian Roberson, was convicted in the circuit court of
Du Page County and sentenced to four years' incarceration for
violating a bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10(a) (West 2000)). Following
his conviction, he filed a posttrial motion, arguing that he was entitled
to sentence credit for the time he was in custody awaiting trial on the
underlying burglary charge that the State dismissed. The circuit court
denied the motion, and defendant appealed. The appellate court
affirmed. 337 Ill. App. 3d 685. We granted defendant leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was arrested for burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West
2000)) and posted bond. Defendant failed to appear for a court date,
and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Approximately six
months later, defendant was arrested on the warrant in California and
extradited to Illinois. Approximately eight months later, defendant was
indicted for violating the terms of his bail bond. He posted bond on
the burglary charge and two days later he was taken into custody on
the violation-of-bail-bond charge.
	The case proceeded to a bench trial, where the State elected not
to prosecute the burglary charge. Defendant was later convicted of
violating his bail bond and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.
Defendant subsequently filed a posttrial motion, arguing, among other
things, that he was entitled to sentencing credit for the 267 days he
served in custody on the burglary offense, representing most of the
time he was incarcerated following his extradition from California and
just prior to his second arrest. The trial court denied the motion,
stating that defendant "was not in custody on the violation of [the] bail
bond charge." Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that pursuant
to section 5-8-7(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730
ILCS 5/5-8-7(c) (West 2000)), he should receive credit against his
violation-of-bail-bond sentence for the time he served in custody
awaiting a trial on the dismissed burglary charge. Section 5-8-7
provides:
			"(b) The offender shall be given credit *** for time spent
in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence
was imposed ***.
* * *
			(c) An offender arrested on one charge and prosecuted on
another charge for conduct which occurred prior to [the
offender's] arrest shall be given credit on the determinate
sentence or maximum term and the minimum term of
imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former
charge not credited against another sentence." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-7(b), (c) (West 2000).
	The appellate court affirmed, with Presiding Justice Hutchinson
dissenting. The appellate majority reasoned as follows:
			"This case hinges on the proper characterization of the
April 23, 2000, arrest of defendant in California. If the ***
arrest was an arrest for the burglary charge, section 5-8-7(c)
would clearly apply. However, the *** arrest was not for the
charge of burglary. As of April 23, 2000, defendant had
already been indicted for that burglary and arrested on that
charge on September 4, 1999. Rather, the bench warrant
commanding defendant's arrest, served on April 23, 2000,
was for failure to appear and was issued pursuant to section
110-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. [Citation.]
The bench warrant clearly commanded the arrest of
defendant for 'FAILURE TO APPEAR' and included ***
citation [to the bail bond violation statute] ***. As a result,
the conduct for which defendant was prosecuted (failing to
appear in court on October 25, 1999) did not occur prior to
defendant's September 4, 1999, arrest for burglary.
Therefore, we find that section 5-8-7(c) does not apply to
this case." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 687-88.
	In dissent, Presiding Justice Hutchinson found there was evidence
of manipulation by the State and that defendant was entitled to credit
for time spent in custody. According to Justice Hutchinson, the
warrant stated that the original violation was burglary. 337 Ill. App.
3d at 689 (Hutchinson, P.J., dissenting). Therefore, the California
arrest related back to the original charge of burglary, and section
5-8-7(c) should apply. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 690 (Hutchinson, P.J.,
dissenting). Justice Hutchinson further reasoned that the State
manipulated defendant's liberty by allowing him to remain in custody
for approximately eight months without bail before charging him with
violation of his bond. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 690 (Hutchinson, P.J.,
dissenting).
	Defendant sought leave to appeal, and this court allowed
defendant's petition. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. In the interim, defendant has
finished serving his sentence and mandatory supervised release for his
conviction. For this reason, the State moved to dismiss the appeal as
moot. We ordered that motion taken with the case, and for the
reasons that follow, we deny it.

ANALYSIS
	As a threshold matter, we observe that this case is moot, as
argued by the State, because defendant has been released from
custody. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003) (an appeal is
moot when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues no
longer exist). The mootness doctrine stems from the fear that parties
to a resolved dispute will lack the personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy sufficient to assure the adversarial relationship, " ' "which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult *** questions." ' " In re A Minor,
127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989), quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77 (1983), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204,
7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962). A case is moot if the
issues involved in the trial court have ceased to exist because
intervening events have made it impossible for the reviewing court to
grant effectual relief to the complaining party. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 255. In this case, we are unable to render any sort of effectual
relief to defendant because he has served his sentence and completed
his mandatory supervised release.
	Notwithstanding the general rule, a reviewing court may,
however, review an otherwise moot issue pursuant to the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2002). The factors a reviewing court will consider
when deciding whether to address a moot case under the public
interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question; (2) the
likelihood that the question will recur; and (3) the desirability of an
authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers.
In re Andera F., 208 Ill. 2d  at 156. This exception is to be construed
narrowly and requires a clear showing of each criterion. In re
Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).
	With these factors in mind, we choose to address the merits of
defendant's appeal. First, the question presented by this appeal is one
of a definitive public nature. The liberty interests of every person
subject to the application of section 5-8-7 of the Code are potentially
at stake. Second, the question has already reoccurred in People v.
Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d 163 (2004), leading the Second District
to a contrary holding, with Justice Hutchinson, writing this time for
the majority, adopting the rationale of her Roberson dissent.
Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 168-69. As a result, guidance is
needed by this court to resolve the conflict and to ensure public
officers will consistently apply section 5-8-7 in the future.
	Turning to the merits of defendant's argument, he maintains that
under the plain and ordinary meaning of section 5-8-7(c) he is entitled
to credit for time served on the burglary charge because he was
arrested for one charge, i.e., burglary, and prosecuted for another
charge, i.e., bond violation, that occurred before his second arrest.
The State counters that the appellate court correctly found
defendant's first arrest was for burglary, but his second arrest was for
failure to appear in court pursuant to section 110-3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-3 (West 2000)) and
therefore section 5-8-7(c) does not apply. In reply, defendant
contends that if his second arrest was for failure to appear, then he
was plainly entitled to credit under section 5-8-7(b). Defendant raises
this argument for the first time in his reply brief to this court and,
therefore, the State moved to strike defendant's reply brief and
maintains that this argument is waived. The substance of this issue
involves an issue of statutory construction subject to de novo review.
People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (2003).
	In relevant part, section 110-3 provides:
			"Upon failure to comply with any condition of a bail bond
*** the court having jurisdiction at the time of such failure
may, in addition to any other action provided by law, issue a
warrant for the arrest of the person at liberty on bail ***. The
contents of such a warrant shall be the same as required for
an arrest warrant issued upon complaint. When a defendant
is at liberty on bail *** on a felony charge and fails to appear
in court as directed, the court shall issue a warrant for the
arrest of such person. Such warrant shall be noted with a
directive to peace officers to arrest the person and hold such
person without bail and to deliver such person before the
court for further proceedings." 725 ILCS 5/110-3 (West
2000).
	As noted by the parties, the resolution of this case depends upon
the proper characterization of defendant's second arrest. The
Hernandez court dealt with an almost identical situation,
characterizing the second arrest as one for the underlying charge.
Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 170.
	In Henandez, the defendant was indicted for aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 2000)). He was arrested on
that charge and released on bail. After failing to appear, the
defendant's bond was revoked and he was later arrested for a second
time. As in the case at hand, the warrant authorizing the defendant's
second arrest noted the original violation of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. Approximately four months after the defendant's second
arrest, the State dismissed the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge
and charged the defendant with violating his bail bond.
	Following the defendant's conviction on that charge, he argued
that he was entitled to credit for the 122 days he was incarcerated
following his second arrest and prior to being charged with violation
of his bond. The trial court denied defendant's motion for sentencing
credit. On appeal, the appellate court held that the defendant was
entitled to the credit and directed the clerk of the court to enter a
modified mittimus reflecting an additional 122 days of credit for time
served. Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 171. The appellate court
reasoned as follows:
			"The offense underlying the issuance of the bench warrant
to arrest was aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The March
16, 1999, warrant for defendant's arrest was predicated on
his failure to appear in court on the sexual abuse charge. The
March 16, 1999, warrant did not formally charge defendant
with committing a crime; it was merely a procedural tool that
the trial court was statutorily required to utilize to effect
defendant's return so that he could face prosecution on the
sexual abuse charge." Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 170.
	The appellate court further stated that it appeared the State
"manipulated" the defendant's liberty when it permitted him to remain
in custody for 122 days without bail before charging him with
violating his bail bond. Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 170. According
to the appellate court, if the State had charged the defendant for
violating his bail bond when he was arrested, there would have been
no question that he would have been entitled to the credit for time
spent in custody under section 5-8-7(b) of the Code. Hernandez, 345
Ill. App. 3d at 170-71. Rather, the State held the defendant in custody
for 122 days before dismissing the underlying criminal sexual abuse
charge and formally charging him with violating his bail bond.
Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 171.
	Here, if defendant had been charged with failure to appear
contemporaneously with the execution of the second arrest warrant,
there is no question that he would have received credit under
subsection (b) for the time he served while awaiting trial. Instead, he
was not charged until approximately eight months later, prompting the
trial court to articulate that he was not "in custody" on the violation
of the bail bond charge during that time. Therefore, under the trial
court's finding, subsection (b) did not apply. According to the trial
and appellate courts, subsection (c) did not apply either because the
second arrest was solely for failure to appear. Thus, under the lower
courts' interpretations, while defendant was arrested for failure to
appear, he was not "in custody" for that charge during the eight
months he was incarcerated prior to the State electing not to
prosecute the burglary charge and finally opting to charge him with
the latter offense.
	We disagree with the trial court and appellate court's reasoning.
Defendant is correct that he was entitled to credit under section
5-8-7(b). Despite the trial court's pronouncement that defendant was
not "in custody" on the violation of the bail bond charge until he was
formally indicted for that offense, once a defendant is arrested for an
offense he or she is clearly "in custody" for that offense even before
he or she is formally charged. See Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 173-74 (Callum, J., specially concurring). In factual situations such as the
one found in the present case, the second arrest is for the bail bond
violation and, therefore, subsection (b), rather than subsection (c),
applies. See Hernandez, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 173-74 (Callum, J.,
specially concurring). Subsection (b) allows "credit *** for time spent
in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2000). Here, defendant was
arrested for the bail offense, detained, and ultimately convicted and
sentenced on that offense. Accordingly, he was entitled to credit for
time served under subsection (b).
	We acknowledge, as the State argues, that defendant did not raise
subsection (b) in his petition for leave to appeal but, instead, waited
until his reply brief to do so. However, a sentence in conflict with a
statutory guideline such as subsection (b) is void and may be
challenged at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).
Further, the failure to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal
does not present a jurisdictional bar but, rather, raises concerns of
administrative convenience. Dineen v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 248, 265 (1988). In this case, defendant has already served his
sentence and will not be granted any relief, regardless of how we
resolve this appeal. As previously noted, the issue presented in this
case is being addressed only to provide guidance under the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In this context, concerns
of administrative convenience must be set aside in order to address the
proper statutory provisions and to provide the most complete and
accurate guidance to our public officers.
	Because our decision that section 5-8-7(b) controls is dispositive
of this appeal, we need not and do not reach the parties' arguments
regarding section 5-8-7(c). We further deny the State's argument to
strike defendant's reply brief.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court,
affirming the circuit court, is reversed. While we cannot grant
defendant in this case any relief as he has already completed his prison
term and period of mandatory supervised release, in future cases,
other persons in defendant's position should receive credit for time
served while awaiting trial.

Reversed.