Title: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Las Vegas Review-Journal

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

436 Nev, Advance Opinion Ble
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE No. 78967
DEPARTMENT,

Appellant, FILED
vs.

LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, DEC 31 2020

 

Respondent. pp)

Appeal from a district court order, certified as final under
NRCP 54(b), granting in part a petition for a writ of mandamus regarding
disclosure of public records. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Joseph Hardy, Jr., Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Nicholas D. Crosby and Jacqueline V.
Nichols, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

MeLetchie Law and Margaret A. McLetchie and Alina M. Shell, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
In this appeal, we consider the scope of our recent opinion in
Clark County School District v. Las Vegas Review-Journal (CCSD), 134
Nev. 700, 429 P.3d 313 (2018). In CCSD, we adopted a burden-shifting test
to help courts determine whether information that implicates individual

privacy interests is subject to disclosure under the Nevada Public Records
0-46 4p

 
Act (NPRA). Id. at 708, 429 P.3d at 320. We held that when a government
agency first shows that disclosure implicates a nontrivial privacy interest,
the requester must then show that the information sought is likely to
further a significant public interest. Id. at 707-08, 429 P.3d at $20 (citing
Cameranesi v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 856 F.3d 626, 637 (9th Cir. 2017).

We decided CCSD in the context of a sensitive investigative
report, and certain language in that opinion could be read as limiting the
case's application to such reports. Today, we clarify that CCSD is not so
limited. Courts should apply the test adopted in CCSD whenever the
government asserts a nontrivial privacy interest. In the instant case,
appellant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) demonstrated
that its officers have a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments.
The district court erred in determining they did not. We therefore reverse
and remand for consideration of the second step of the CCSD test, that is,
whether disclosure of the unit assignments is likely to advance a significant
publie interest.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Las Vegas Review-Journal (Review-Journal) is
Nevada's largest newspaper. In order to fulfill its important function of
investigative journalism, the Review-Journal has frequently requested
government records, including records that the government has sought to
keep confidential. In early 2017, the Review-Journal was investigating
how Metro handles sex-trafficking cases. To that end, the Review-Journal
submitted an NPRA request for all of Metro's sex-trafficking case files,

'See, eg., Clark Cty. Coroner's Office v. Las Vegas Review-Journal
(Coroner's Office), 136 Nev. 44, 458 P.3d 1048 (2020); CCSD, 134 Nev. 700,
429 P.3d 313; Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134
Nev. 40, 412 P.3d 23 (2018); DR Partners v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 116 Nev.
616, 6 P.3d 465 (2000).

 

 
solicitation and trespass arrest reports, and officers’ names, badge
numbers, and unit assignments from 2014 through 2016?

Metro provided the Review-Journal with many of the requested
records, including all officers’ names and badge numbers. However, Metro
refused to disclose its officers’ unit assignments.

‘The Review-Journal petitioned the district court for a writ of
mandamus directing Metro to provide the requested records in their
entirety. Metro objected on numerous grounds. As relevant here, Metro
argued that it could not disclose officers’ unit assignments because such
information would reveal the identities of undercover officers. After a
hearing, the district court ordered discovery and meet-and-confer efforts by
the parties The Review-Journal subsequently narrowed its request to
include only patrol officer unit assignments, thereby excluding undercover

officers.5 Metro asserted, however, that disclosing any unit assignments—

*Thereafter, the Review-Journal also requested unit assignments
from 2017. The district court deferred ruling on this additional request and
itis not at issue in this appeal.

30n appeal, the Review-Journal argues that Metro waived any
objections to disclosure by failing to cite appropriate legal authority within
the five-day time limit set by NRS 239.0107(1Xq). Such arguments have
since been rejected by this court in Republican Attorneys General Ass'n v.
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't, 136 Nev. 28, 31-33, 458 P.3d 328, 331-
33 (2020), and Coroner's Office, 136 Nev. at 48-50, 458 P.3d at 1053-54,

‘Metro petitioned this court for emergency relief from the discovery
order. We denied the petition. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Kighth
Judicial Dist. Court, Docket No. 76848 (Order Denying Petition,
January 14, 2019).

The Review-Journal continued to request other records, such as
arrest reports. These records are not at issue in this appeal.

 

 
even those of patrol officers—would undermine officer safety and reveal

 

covert officers’ identities via the process of eliminatio

In support of its position, Metro provided declarations by
Joseph Lombardo, Sheriff of Clark County and Metro’s chief law
enforcement officer, and Steve Grammas, President of the Police Protective
Association. Both Lombardo and Grammas attested that disclosing patrol
officer unit assignments would compromise officer safety by revealing
where specific officers worked. Further, they attested that disclosing patrol
officer unit assignments could reveal names and locations of officers
assigned to covert operations.

After another hearing, the district court granted the Review-
Journal’s petition in part. In doing so, the court first applied the broad
balancing test set forth in Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 127 Nev. 873,
'880, 266 P.3d 623, 628 (2011). The district court concluded that Metro failed
to demonstrate that its interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighed the
strong presumption of public access. Specifically, the court reasoned that
Lombardo’s and Grammas’ declarations, even if believed, were too
speculative to satisfy Metro's burden. Next, the district court applied the
CCSD framework and determined that Metro's evidence did not show that
the requested records implicate any cognizable privacy interest because
Metro's officers are public employees who necessarily interact with the
public and the community. The court also determined that the declarations
were too speculative to show that disclosing unit assignments would reveal
the identities of undercover officers. Accordingly, the district court ordered

While the case was pending, this court decided CCSD. Metro
subsequently filed supplemental briefing, arguing that the officer safety
concerns which it has already raised were a privacy interest that CCSD
protected,

 

 
 

Metro to disclose patrol officer unit assignments from 2014 through 2016.
‘Metro now appeals.
DISCUSSION

Under the NPRA, government-generated records are
presumptively open to public inspection. Gibbons, 127 Nev. at 880, 266 P.3d
at 628. This presumption may be rebutted either by an explicit statutory
provision making a particular type of record confidential or, under Gibbons,
by a “broad balancing of the interests involved,” where the government
must prove that “its interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public’s
interest in access.” Id. In CCSD, this court adopted a different burden-
shifting test for nontrivial privacy claims asserted in response to public
records requests, in which any such privacy interest is weighed against the
requester’s demonstration of a significant public interest in disclosure. 134
Nev. at 708, 429 P.3d at 320.

Here, Metro argues that the district court erred by failing to
recognize that Metro's unit assignments implicate a nontrivial privacy
interest under CCSD. In response, the Review-Journal argues that the
CCSD test only applies to investigative reports. Further, in the Review-
Journal’s view, the district court's analysis should have ended when it
concluded, under Gibbons, that the interest in nondisclosure did not clearly
outweigh the public's right to access. Alternatively, the Review-Journal
argues that even if the CCSD test applies here, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that Metro failed to show the existence
of a nontrivial privacy interest.

Standard of review

“We review a district court’s grant or denial of a writ petition

for an abuse of discretion. However, we review the district court's

interpretation of caselaw and statutory language de novo.” Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep't v. Blackjack Bonding, 131 Nev. 80, 85, 343 P.3d 608, 612

(2015) (internal citation omitted). “Whether a legally recognized privacy
5

 
 

interest is present in a given case is a question of law,” Hill v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994), which we review de
novo, City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147,
1148 (2003).

Whether the CCSD test applies in this case concerns the
interpretation of the NPRA and our NPRA jurisprudence and, therefore, is
subject to our plenary review. See Blackjack Bonding, 131 Nev. at 85, 343,
P.3d at 612. Similarly, the district court’s determination that the officers
lacked a nontrivial privacy interest is a conclusion of law to which we owe
no deference. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 657; City of Reno, 119 Nev. at 58, 63
P.sd at 1148.7

The CCSD framework applies whenever a personal privacy interest may
warrant redaction

In CCSD, the Review-Journal requested records related to the
Clark County School District’s (CCSD’s) investigation of allegations of
sexual harassment and other inappropriate behavior. CCSD, 134 Nev. at
701, 429 P.3d at 315-16. CCSD provided an

 

al batch of responsive
documents, redacting not only the names of alleged victims, but also of
administrators, principals, supervisors, and schools. Id. at 701-02, 429 P.3d
at 316. While the Review-Journal agreed that victims’ names could be
redacted, it argued that CCSD's redactions “went too far.” Id. In the
ensuing litigation, CCSD took the position that it “complied with the
principles encouraging disclosure” and did not need to release additional

7We disagree with the Review-Journal's contention that the district
court's order involves fact-finding, which we should only review for an abuse
of discretion. The district court did not find that Lombardo’s and Grammas’
declarations were not credible as a factual matter. Rather, it determined
that, even accepting their averments as true, they failed to establish a
nontrivial privacy interest. Thus, the Review-Journal conflates the
threshold legal question of whether information implicates a nontrivial
privacy interest with the ultimate question of whether the information is
subject to disclosure.

 

6

 
information. Id, at 702, 429 P.3d at 316. The district court disagreed and
ordered CCSD to release all responsive documents, redacting only the
names of victims, students, or support staff. Id. at 702, 429 P.3d at 316-17.

On appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in part. First, we
affirmed “[t]hat part of the district court’s order requiring CCSD to disclose
the documents,” holding the district court did not abuse its discretion under
Gibbons’ broad balancing test. Id. at 706-07, 429 P.3d at 319. We explained
that ‘complete nondisclosure” was inappropriate where redaction would
address the relevant privacy concerns. Id. Turning to the appropriate scope
of those redactions, we recognized that Nevada law has “established
protection of personal privacy interests” and “protects personal privacy
interests from unrestrained disclosure under the NPRA.” Id. at 708, 429
P.3d at 320.

We then adopted a two-part burden-shifting test used by federal

  

courts to “facilitatel] a court’s balancing of nontrivial privacy interests
against public disclosure.” Id. (citing Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 637). Under
that test, the government must establish that disclosure would intrude on
a personal privacy interest that is nontrivial or that rises above the de
imis level. Id. at 707, 429 P.3d at 320. Upon such a showing, the burden
shifts to the requesting party to show that disclosure is likely to advance a
significant public interest. Id. at 707-08, 429 P.3d at 320.

  

Applying this test, we noted that the district court failed to
consider the privacy interests of “teachers or witnesses who may face stigma
or backlash for coming forward or being part of the investigation.” Id. at
709, 429 P.3d at 321. We therefore remanded for the district court to
consider those privacy interests. Id.

The Review-Journal urges this court to apply CCSD narrowly

and to limit its use to investigative reports. We disagree that CCSD should
be cabined to its particular facts in this way. As noted, the CCSD test is

 

 
grounded in Nevada's “established protection of personal privacy interests.”
Id, at 708, 429 P.3d at 320. Such interests arise in various contexts. For
instance, in Cameranesi, the court recognized that personnel and medical
files may be shielded from public disclosure to prevent an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. 856 F.3d at 637 (applying 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX6))

In CCSD, we observed that although the Cameranesi court
interpreted a federal statute, Nevada law similarly recognizes privacy
rights in ‘a laundry list of areas.” 134 Nev. at 708, 429 P.3d at 320.
Therefore, we conclude that it would be incongruous to restrict the CCSD
test to investigative reports. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court
has aptly stated, by “requirling] the person requesting the information to
establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure,” courts “give practical
meaning” to privacy interests. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v.
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). In sum, while CCSD addressed
investigative reports, it did not foreclose the application of the test we

 

adopted therein to other types of records containing private information.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by
applying the CCSD test to determine whether to disclose the unit
assignments, Consequently, the district court properly considered whether
‘Metro had demonstrated that the unit assignments implicated a nontrivial
personal privacy interest. However, we clarify that the district court was
not required to apply the Gibbons balancing test to the unit assignments.
Although both Gibbons and CCSD are balancing tests, CCSD supplies a
refined framework to analyze privacy claims. CCSD, 134 Nev. at 709, 429
P.3d at 321. In contrast, Gibbons applies to claims against disclosure that
are unrelated to personal privacy.
‘Metro demonstrated the existence of a nontrivial privacy interest

Having determined that the CCSD test applies to the privacy

claim asserted here, we now turn to whether Metro established that

 

 
 

 

disclosure of unit assignments implicated its officers’ nontrivial privacy
interests. To be “nontrivial,” the asserted privacy interest must be more
than de minimis, but is not required to be “substantial.” Cameranesi, 856
F.3d at 641-42 (emphasis in original).

Although this court has not previously had the occasion to
address the privacy interests asserted here, ample persuasive authority
shows that “[tJhe avoidance of harassment is a cognizable privacy interest.”
Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 639 (alteration in original) (quoting Forest Serv.
Emps. for Enutl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir.
2008). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the invasion
of privacy need not be a certainty or have occurred in the past to justify
nondisclosure. Civil Beat Law Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Inc. v. Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, 929 F.3d 1079, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2019). Like
these courts, we conclude that the government should not be forced to wait
for a serious harm from an unwarranted intrusion of personal privacy to
occur in order to justify nondisclosure.*

Courts have consistently shielded information about the
location and identities of government employees when disclosure could
subject those employees to harassment. Forest Service Employees is
structive, At issue there were the identities of federal employees who had
responded to a wildfire that killed two firefighters. 524 F.3d at 1022. The
Ninth Circuit explained that “individuals do not waive all privacy
interests ... simply by taking an oath of public office.” Id. at 1025
(alteration in original) (quoting Lissner v. U.S. Customs Serv., 241 F.3d

“Although the Review-Journal argues that, under Gibbons, Metro
‘cannot use hypothetical concerns to justify nondisclosure, we emphasize
that the CCSD test is distinct from the inquiry under Gibbons. Moreover,
the government would surely not meet its burden, even under CCSD, by
merely asserting a speculative or implausible harm. But real risks should
not be discounted as *hypothetical” merely because they have not
crystallized into actual harm.

9

 
 

1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001)). Further, “the employees possessed privacy
interests in avoiding the embarrassment, shame, stigma, and harassment
that would arise from their public association with the incident.” Id. at 1026
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, in Civil Beat Law Center, the Ninth Circuit held that
‘employees of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had a nontrivial privacy
interest in their names and contact information. 929 F.3d at 1092. There,
the requester sought information related to the inspection of a laboratory
that handled dangerous biological agents. Id. at 1090-91. Even though a
directory of the employees in the inspection agency was already publicly
available, the court held that the “additional location-specifie risk” from
releasing information regarding the laboratory inspection was sufficient “to
meet the low, ‘nontrivial’ privacy interest threshold.” Id. at 1092.

Law enforcement officers in particular have a privacy interest
in maintaining their anonymity and the confidentiality of their work
assignments where disclosure poses a risk of harassment, endangerment,
or similar harm. See, eg., Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188,
1198 (10th Cir. 2011); Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166
(3d Cir. 1995); Adionser v. Dep't of Justice, 811 F. Supp. 2d 284, 299 (D.D.C.
2011); Matter of Ruberti, Girvin & Ferlazzo v. N.Y. State Div. of State Police,
641 N.Y.S.24 411, 415 (App. Div. 1996).

Guided by the foregoing principles, we conclude that Metro's
officers have a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments.
Crucially, although the district court suggested otherwise, the officers did
not surrender their privacy interests by swearing an oath of public office.
Metro's evidence established the real possibility that disclosure of the unit
assignments could subject officers to harassment and retaliation.
Moreover, these risks were pronounced because the unit assignments reveal

the locations of officers. While we emphasize that location-specific

10

 
 

information about a public employee is not automatically confidential, it ean
heighten the risk of harassment and other harm and thereby establish a
nontrivial privacy interest.

The Review-Journal invites us to follow King County v.
Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), but that case is readily
distinguishable. There, the court held that there was no privacy interest in
the names of certain police officers that were “released on a regular basis.”
Id, at 318. It specifically rejected the argument that “public identification
could lead to harassment and danger in [the officers'| personal lives.” Id. at
317. However, the court noted the distinetion between names and
“employee identification numbers,” because release of the latter could lead
to “impermissible invasions of privacy.” Id. (quoting Tacoma Pub. Library
v, Woessner, 951 P.2d 357, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)

Here, in contrast, Metro has already released not only its
officers’ names, but also their badge numbers. Metro is only objecting to
disclosure of its officers’ unit assignments. That information is not released
on a regular basis and could lead to invasions of privacy even if the
disclosure of names alone would not. Therefore, we hold that the district
court erred in determining that Metro failed to establish that its officers
have a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments.

‘This determination does not end the inquiry. On remand, the
istrict court should consider whether the Review-Journal can meet its
burden under prong two of CCSD—that is, whether the information sought
is likely to advance a significant public interest.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the framework we adopted in CCSD is one of
general application and not limited to investigative reports. When the
government seeks to withhold specific information on the basis of a privacy
interest, the district court must first determine whether disclosure

implicates a nontrivial privacy interest. In doing so, the court should
u

 
consider the risks of harassment or other harm, though the government
need not prove that such harms are certain to occur. Here, because the
district court erred in determining that Metro's officers lack a nontrivial
privacy interest in their unit assignments, we reverse and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Stiglich

We concur:

 
  
 

Pickering,

Hardesty
ye

Parraguirre

Cadish