Title: TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict1990 WY 79795 P.2d 1204Case Number: 89-211Decided: 08/06/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
TZ LAND & CATTLE CO., 
A WYOMING CORPORATION; WIN CONDICT,

 A/K/A WINTHROP C. CONDICT;  AND ELSIE CONDICT, 

APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

ALDEN R. CONDICT, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Carbon County, Larry Lehman, J.

Sky D Phifer, 
Lander, for appellants.

Stephen H. 
Kline, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS and MACY, JJ., and RAPER and BROWN, Ret. 
JJ.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     In an action for 
trespass, appellee Alden R. Condict obtained judgment for compensatory and 
punitive damages against appellants.

[¶2.]     Appellants state the 
issues to be:

1) Did the District Court 
lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action in alleged trespass over 
1760 acres of the public domain State Lease lands and the Bureau of Land 
Management lands?

2) Did the District Court 
lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action in alleged trespass over 
2140 acres of the Appellants Win Condict and Elsie Condict's mortgaged 
property?

3) Did the District Court 
err in entertaining an action for alleged trespass over the State Lease 
lands?

4) Did the District Court 
err in granting the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on the question of 
liability?

5) Did the District Court 
err in denying the Appellants' Motion to Amend Their Counterclaim?

6) Did the District Court 
err in denying the Appellants' Motion for a New Trial?

7) Did the Honorable 
Larry Lehman err in presiding over this case over the strenuous objection of the 
Appellants?

[¶3.]     We affirm.

[¶4.]     The parties to this 
action have been in continual litigation since April 1982 and in a cold war 
years before that. Prior to April 1982, appellee and one or both of the 
individual appellants were joint owners of real and personal property and 
partners in a cattle ranching operation located in Carbon County, Wyoming. In 
April of 1982, appellee filed an action in the District Court for the Second 
Judicial District seeking to partition the real property and for an accounting. 
(Condict v. Condict, Civil Action No. 82C-219, Second Judicial District Court 
(Condict I)). In that case, the district court bifurcated the issues relating to 
partition and accounting.

[¶5.]     In June of 1985, the 
district court held a hearing regarding division of the real property of the 
parties. While that hearing was in progress, the parties agreed to a division of 
the real property and appellants Win and Elsie Condict were given the choice of 
which half of the ranch land they would take. The division was reflected in a 
judgment and decree dated June 20, 1985, and filed by the district court on June 
28, 1985. Win and Elsie Condict then transferred the property awarded to Win 
Condict by the judgment to a newly formed corporation, TZ Land & Cattle Co., 
of which they were the majority shareholders.

[¶6.]     The second half of the 
bifurcated action dealing with the accounting for personal assets of the 
ranching operation was heard in November of 1985 and the decision taken under 
advisement. In June of 1986, Win and Elsie Condict filed a motion in the 
partition action to have the land division set aside, alleging fraud and 
coercion, and they refiled similar motions in that action in 1987 and 1988. 
Their motions to have the land division set aside were denied. The case then 
"ebbed and flowed [mostly ebbed] in the backwaters of judicial administration"1 until a final judgment was entered 
January 12, 1989.2 An appeal was taken from that 
judgment. That appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on January 24, 1990. 
The case presently before the court, hereinafter referred to as Condict II, is a 
fallout from the decision in Condict I.

[¶7.]     In the spring of 1987, 
while awaiting a decision of the district court on the November 1985 trial and 
on their outstanding motions, appellants began to physically assert possession 
and control of property set over to Alden Condict in the 1985 judgment in 
Condict I. This property was commonly referred to as the Kennaday, Corpening and 
Reid places. This exercise of control initially included exerting control over 
road, ditches and buildings located on the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid 
properties. Employees of appellants entered these lands during 1987 and stayed 
through May of 1988. Finally, in August of 1987, appellants drove cattle with 
the TZ brand onto the lands to graze and pasture.

[¶8.]     This action, Condict 
II, was brought in September of 1987 alleging that the appellants' action 
constituted a trespass upon land owned by Alden Condict and to which he had the 
sole right of possession. Appellee sought compensatory and punitive damages as a 
result of appellants' actions. Appellants have never denied utilizing the 
property in 1987 and 1988; rather, they contended in the trial court and on 
appeal that their use of the land was not wrongful.

[¶9.]     Before 1982, the 
Condict brothers ran part of their cattle operation on lands leased from the 
Bureau of Land Management and on state and national forest leases. The leases 
were divided by the judgment of June 1985, with each of the parties assigned 
those leases contiguous with the lands awarded to them. All of the parties were 
required by the judgment to take the necessary steps to transfer the joint 
leases to the proper interest holder and to provide clear title of the deeded 
lands to the party awarded those lands by the judgment.

[¶10.]  The dispute in Condict II is over parcels 
of land awarded to Alden R. Condict by the June 1985 decree commonly referred to 
as the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid properties. For reasons that do not appear 
in the record here, before the land division in 1985, Win and Elsie Condict 
claimed an undivided 7/12 interest in those lands. In the early 1980's, Win and 
Elsie Condict obtained a loan from the Wyoming Farm Loan Board secured by the 
7/12 interest in the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid properties. In 1985, in the 
partition action, Win and Elsie Condict agreed that Alden would receive those 
properties in the land division. Since the parcels of land were part of the 
properties solely awarded to Alden Condict in the 1985 judgment, it was required 
that Win and Elsie Condict take the steps necessary to remove the mortgage from 
those properties and to have it placed on properties awarded to Win Condict by 
the 1985 judgment. This was never done.

[¶11.]  At trial in Condict II, the court granted 
appellee's motion for a partial summary judgment on liability. In a jury trial, 
appellee received a verdict for compensatory and punitive damages.

[¶12.]  The issues stated by appellants and their 
arguments overlap and some duplicate others. Furthermore, appellants' argument 
does not track the stated issue and is not supported by case law or cogent 
argument.3

I

[¶13.]  In Issues 1 and 3, appellants question 
the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain an action for trespass on 
state leases and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) leased land. The state lease 
was originally entered into between the State of Wyoming and the Condict ranches 
when the ranch was run jointly. The lease was a ten year lease most recently 
signed jointly by the parties in 1977. Since the lease was contiguous to 
lands awarded to Alden Condict in the 1985 decree (Kennaday, Corpening and 
Reid), the decree provided that the lease be assigned to Alden Condict. The 
lease, along with the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid properties, was utilized by 
Alden Condict from June of 1985 through the spring of 1987. 

[¶14.]  In 1987 the lease came up for renewal. 
Win and Elsie Condict hastened to sign an application for renewal of that lease. 
Alden Condict objected to appellants' application for lease of this land when it 
first came to his attention. He initially refused to sign the lease as long as 
Win and Elsie Condict were allowed to co-sign it. Alden Condict did not sign the 
lease until the spring of 1989 after the State of Wyoming threatened to place 
the lease up for public bid unless he signed it.

[¶15.]  Appellants contend that their application 
for renewal of this lease allowed them to utilize the state lease land contrary 
to the judgment of June 1985. The appellants' apparent argument is that since 
Alden Condict signed the lease a year after the trespasses by appellants ended, 
knowing that Win and Elsie Condict had previously signed it, he somehow condoned 
trespass on those lands. Appellants also allege that an officer of the State 
Land Board told them that they had a right to use the mortgaged and leased 
property.

[¶16.]  Appellee's complaint included an 
allegation of trespass on the state leases awarded to him by the 1985 judgment 
and decree. Pleadings, motions and affidavits thereafter did not deal with the 
issue of trespass on the state lands. After filing the complaint, appellee chose 
not to address the state lease issue. The sworn testimony presented in support 
of appellee's motion for summary judgment and at trial alleged trespass over the 
deeded lands commonly referred to as the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid places. 
Appellants raised the issue of trespass over a state lease lying contingent to 
the Kennaday property just before trial on damages and it became the main thrust 
of their arguments to the jury. The issue is a phantom issue - one created and 
argued by the appellants and has only a peripheral relationship to the case 
actually tried.

[¶17.]  Wyoming statutes cited by appellants do 
not relate to issues here. W.S. 11-34-130 and W.S. 36-9-116 cited by appellants 
make it a criminal misdemeanor to trespass upon lands owned by the Board or 
mortgaged to the Board. These statutes do not relate to civil trespass of leased 
lands and do not state that only the State of Wyoming has a right to pursue a 
trespass action against any trespasser upon lands owned by the Board. W.S. 
36-9-117 and W.S. 36-10-102, also cited by appellants, do not pertain to civil 
trespass over leased lands.

[¶18.]  Despite the fact that the issue raised in 
this argument by appellants is not one that was raised before the trial court or 
jury by appellee, the evidence introduced by appellants on this issue did show 
that a trespass was committed by the appellants on the state lease contingent to 
the Kennaday property awarded to appellee by the 1985 decree.

[¶19.]  An action for trespass is an action for 
injury to a possessory right. The state lands in question are the subject of the 
lease that was required to be assigned by Win and Elsie Condict to Alden Condict 
by the judgment of June 1985. Appellee had a greater right of possession to 
those lands created by the 1985 judgment, and if he had so chosen, he could have 
asserted a trespass over these lands. Noble & Carmody v. Hudson, 20 Wyo. 
227, 122 P. 901 (1912); Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191, 201 P. 1012 
(1921). The district court, being a court of general jurisdiction, had original 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 10.

[¶20.]  The problems resulting in the Condict II 
lawsuit stem from appellants' refusal to recognize and give effect to the 
judgment and decree of the district court - a judgment and decree to which they 
stipulated and assisted in its preparation.

[¶21.]  Appellants are reminded that an order, 
judgment or decree of the district court governs the conduct of parties until 
such instrument is modified, vacated or reversed by the Supreme Court. No action 
rendering the judgment and decree a nullity ever took place.

II

[¶22.]  In Issue 2, appellants contend that they 
were mortgagors in a mortgage on the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid properties. 
They apparently took the position that their status as mortgagors rendered their 
entry and use of the properties lawful. They took this novel position 
notwithstanding the court's judgment and decree of June 1985 awarding this land 
to appellee. The judgment and decree further directed that appellants remove and 
transfer the mortgage from the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid lands to other lands 
owned by them. So far as we know, appellants made no effort to effect such 
removal. Appellants cannot "boot strap" their status as mortgagors to a 
possessory right. Issue 2 is a spurious issue and does not merit further 
analysis to support our determination.

III

[¶23.]  In Issue 4, appellants attack the 
propriety of the trial court's granting a partial summary judgment on the 
question of liability. Appellants summarize their argument that the summary 
judgment was improper by stating:

a) the June 20, 1989 
Judgment and Decree in Condict v. Condict, supra, [Condict I, Docket No. 89-51] 
was interlocutory in nature, and not a final decree;

b) the signed lease 
agreement by the parties negated, as a matter of law, any supposed validity or 
finality of the June 20, 1985 Judgment and Decree in Condict v. Condict, 
supra.

c) the continued 
existence of a valid mortgage on the Kennaday, Corpening and Reid properties in 
question remained in the names of the Appellants Win and Elsie Condict and had 
to be paid. This necessitated their use of the lands to generate the necessary 
income to make the required payments to the State of Wyoming.

d) as stated in Argument 
I above, without having the State of Wyoming and the federal government as 
parties to this action, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this 
action.

[¶24.]  In Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987), we said:

     A motion for summary 
judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the 
motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
does exist. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (1986). We 
analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. Conclusory statements or mere 
opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's burden. Jones 
Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Wyo., 733 P.2d 258, 263 
(1987).

[¶25.]  Evidence opposing a summary judgment that 
is conclusory or speculative is insufficient to demonstrate that a material fact 
exists, and the trial court has no duty to anticipate possible proof. Nelson v. 
Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶26.]  The pleadings, admissions, affidavits, 
and sworn testimony on record at the time the motion for partial summary 
judgment was granted made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of 
law.

[¶27.]  Appellants never at any time throughout 
the trial sought to deny the admissions requested of them by appellee. Pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 36, admissions not denied within thirty days are deemed admitted. 
Based on their failure to deny the requests for admissions, the district court 
was required to find the appellants: (1) admitted that appellee was the sole 
owner and permittee of the properties in question; (2) stipulated to the land 
division in the partition action; (3) occupied and possessed part of the 
property set over to appellee by the June 1985 judgment and decree; (4) placed 
an employee on the property; (5) continued to maintain cattle on the property; 
(6) constructed roads and culverts on the property; (7) told individuals 
intending to hay for appellee that they would not be allowed to enter the 
property during the 1987 haying season; and (8) refused to remove themselves 
from the property. The January 20, 1985 affidavit of appellee and all of the 
pleadings and other numerous affidavits by all of the parties on file on the 
date that the motion for partial summary judgment was granted clearly indicate 
that no material issues of fact were in dispute and that partial summary 
judgment was appropriate.

[¶28.]  Numerous affidavits and other pleadings 
were filed by appellants. It is most difficult to determine whether these 
voluminous instruments were filed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary 
judgment or otherwise. Most of the statements made appear to have nothing to do 
with the issues in this case. Appellant Elsie Condict, for example, filed a 
153-paragraph affidavit. In paragraph 146 she states:

     That Judge Lehman 
chose to condon[e] to the fact that the PROBATE OF W.C. CONDICT, the Father had 
not been closed when he died in 1955 in violation of W.S. (1977) § 2-7-813 as NO 
FINAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WAS EVER ISSUED[.]

This statement 
is not atypical of the rantings contained in appellants' affidavits.

[¶29.]  The 153-paragraph affidavit is totally 
devoted to an attack on the June 20, 1985 partition judgement and decree and a 
personal vituperative assault on District Judge Lehman. Appellants state that 
the partition judgment and decree of June 1985 was interlocutory in nature - the 
inference being that they were not bound by this judgment and were free to act 
contrary to its provisions. Appellants cite no law to support this strange 
notion nor do they present any cogent argument.

[¶30.]  Judicial administration would be in 
disarray if parties were free to choose which orders of the court they would 
obey and which they would flout. The June 1985 partition judgment and decree, 
though interlocutory, governed the rights and duties of the parties. It was in 
full force and effect unless modified, vacated or reversed on appeal. Nothing 
ever happened to relieve appellants of their duty to obey the judgment and 
decree. As mentioned earlier, appellants' appeal to the Supreme Court on the 
partition action and accounting was dismissed.

[¶31.]  After appellee made a prima facie showing 
that summary judgment should be granted, appellants totally failed to meet their 
burden to demonstrate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed.

IV

[¶32.]  In Issue 5, appellants contend that the 
trial court abused its discretion in not allowing them to amend their 
counterclaim. In Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 166 (Wyo. 1988), this court held 
that "[t]he allowance or disallowance of an amended complaint is within the 
sound discretion of the district court and can be reversed on appeal only when 
an abuse of discretion is perceived."

If the underlying facts 
or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, 
he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the 
absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or 
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by 
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."

Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962).

[¶33.]  The principal basis for appellants' 
argument that they should have been allowed to amend their counterclaim is that 
they "recently discovered [a] State Lease signed by all the parties." Appellants 
have not demonstrated how this "recently discovered" document would affect the 
remaining issues to be tried before a jury or how an amendment would give rise 
to a viable new issue to be tried before a jury. The proposed amendment seems to 
be yet another attempt to attack the June 1985 partition judgment and decree and 
place before the jury an issue already decided by the district court in the 
liability phase of this case.

[¶34.]  In the order denying appellants' motion 
to amend, the court left open the affirmative defense involving the lease. At 
trial the court was liberal in admitting evidence and allowed testimony by 
appellants' witnesses on most of the issues raised by appellants in their 
motions to amend. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the action taken by the 
court in its ruling on appellants' motion to amend the pleadings.

V

[¶35.]  In Issue 6, appellants contend that the 
court erred in not granting a motion for a new trial. They address: "(1) 
irregularities in the proceedings of the trial court, (2) excessive damages not 
sustained by sufficient evidence, and (3) a fundamental error of 
law."

[¶36.]  Appellants assert that appellee's counsel 
caused to be placed into the list of exhibits for review by the jury one that 
had not been admitted into evidence and that he threatened a witness. These 
claims of impropriety were made a month after the verdict but were not supported 
by testimony from the supposedly threatened witness or the jurors. In any case, 
the allegations of impropriety were rebutted by affidavits of counsel for 
appellee, the court reporter and the witness who was supposed to have been 
threatened.

[¶37.]  Appellants assert that damages awarded 
appellee were excessive; however, they do not point out deficiencies in 
appellee's proof but rather complain in general terms and conclude that both 
compensatory and punitive damages were excessive.

[¶38.]  At least four witnesses testified about 
compensatory damages on such matters as loss of hay and pasture and that 
appellee was unable to increase his cattle herd because of these losses. If the 
jury believed and accepted appellee's evidence on damages, which it apparently 
did, the damages awarded by the jury were not in excess of the proofs made. On 
the issue of punitive damages, appellants stipulated the amount of their net 
worth. Considering appellants' net worth and their continuous disregard of the 
partition judgment and decree, the punitive damage award does not shock our 
conscience.

[¶39.]  Appellants direct our attention to Cates 
v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 920 (Wyo. 1983):

When the verdict of the 
jury, at first blush, appears outrageous, grossly excessive, or to be the result 
of passion, prejudice, mistake, or improper motive, so as to be obviously 
disproportionate to the injury shown, then it is the duty of the court to modify 
the verdict.

We do not 
perceive any of the reasons stated in Cates for a modification of the 
verdict.

[¶40.]  Appellants argue that damages were 
exacerbated by evidence of and comment on a nolo contendere plea entered by 
appellant Win Condict for an assault and battery charge. Appellants objected to 
this testimony on the basis of materiality and relevance. On appeal, however, 
appellants contend that the testimony was inflammatory, but they say nothing 
about relevance. Appellants did not propose any curative instructions for the 
court. It is well established that an objection to testimony must be made on 
proper grounds or it may be rightfully overruled by the court, Valerio v. State, 
429 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1967), and that issues which have not been properly raised 
below will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. Banks v. Crowner, 694 P.2d 101 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶41.]  Furthermore, appellants have failed to 
show that they suffered any prejudice by the admission of the testimony. 
Assuming the reference to the nolo contendere plea to be improper, the error was 
harmless. For it to be regarded as harmful and reversible there must be a 
reasonable probability that in the absence of error the verdict may have been 
more favorable to the defendant. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1988). 
The fact that error might exist does not create a presumption of prejudice. 
Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880 
(Wyo. 1987). Appellants have failed to show that the outcome would likely have 
been different had this issue not been raised, especially considering the weight 
of the evidence in appellee's favor and other evidence of violence which was not 
objected to.

[¶42.]  The fundamental error of law alluded to 
by appellants in this issue apparently has reference to the state lease awarded 
to appellee in the June 1985 judgment and decree. We have addressed that matter 
several times in this opinion and have about wrung it dry. Suffice it to say, 
that judgement and decree was binding on appellants and they flouted it to their 
peril.

[¶43.]  In their brief on the issue of a new 
trial, appellants scatter-gun into their argument: failure of appellee to 
mitigate damages, denial of rebuttal testimony, and the allegation that punitive 
damages would serve no purpose. These three complaints are not supported by 
cogent argument or case law and do not demonstrate reasons to grant a new trial. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new 
trial.

VI

[¶44.]  On March 20, 1989, appellants filed a 
motion for disqualification for cause against District Judge Larry Lehman. This 
motion is provided for under W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2). Judge Lehman denied the 
motion, and appellants raise that denial as their final issue on appeal.4

[¶45.]  This motion was made after Judge Lehman 
had rendered his decision in Condict I. This case has been referred to 
frequently in this opinion and involved substantially the same parties as this 
case. Appellants state that in Condict I, Judge Lehman exhibited partisanship 
and bias. These conclusions are the only stated reasons why Judge Lehman should 
be disqualified. The law requires a greater showing on the part of appellants in 
order for Judge Lehman to properly recuse himself. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986); Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Sugden, 694 P.2d 110 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶46.]  Construing the words "bias" and 
"prejudice" as used in W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2), this court said: "Prejudice involves 
a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or 
examination. Bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person 
over another. The `bias' which is a ground for disqualification of a judge must 
be personal." Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶47.]  The court has also said: "Such conditions 
must exist which reflect prejudgment of the case by the judge or a leaning of 
his mind in favor of one party to the extent that his decision in the matter is 
based on grounds other than the evidence placed before him." Pote v. State, 733 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶48.]  Appellants produced no evidence that 
Judge Lehman formed an opinion about this lawsuit without sufficient knowledge; 
that Judge Lehman had a personal bias for or against any of the parties to this 
action; or that his decision was based on grounds other than the evidence placed 
before him. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed from unfavorable rulings in 
the past. Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 625. That Judge Lehman found against the 
appellants in Condict I is not evidence of bias or prejudice under the 
definition given those terms by this court.

[¶49.]  Finally, we have said:

     Without a valid reason 
for recusal, a judge has a duty not to recuse himself.

     "Recusal and 
reassignment is not a matter to be lightly undertaken by a district judge. 
While, in proper cases, we have a duty to recuse ourselves, in cases such as the 
one before us, we have concomitant obligation not to recuse ourselves; absent a 
valid reason for recusal, there remains what has sometimes been termed a `duty 
to sit'. [Citations.]" Simonson v. General Motors Corporation, U.S.D.C.Pa., 425 F. Supp. 574, 578 (1976).

Cline, 600 P.2d  
at 729.

[¶50.]  During the course of a few years a 
district judge likely decides one or more cases against every lawyer in the 
district. If an adverse decision in an earlier case demonstrated bias and 
prejudice by the trial judge, he could be disqualified on most cases and be out 
of business. This issue of prejudice and bias is spurious, and the motion to 
disqualify was properly overruled.

[¶51.]  Appellants devoted most of their efforts 
in attempting to retry Condict I and have only given cursory attention to the 
real issues in this case.

[¶52.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Per Justice Robert R. 
Rose in Whitefoot v. Hanover Insurance Company, 561 P.2d 717, 719 
(1977).

2 Four district judges 
were involved in various phases of Condict I. Judge Lehman, the judge who signed 
the order dated January 12, 1989, became involved in the case in 
1988.

3 Sky D Phifer, 
appellants' counsel at oral argument, came into this case late. He was not 
involved in the pleadings, affidavits or trials, nor did he prepare the 
appellate briefs.

4 Appellants exercised 
their peremptory disqualification against Judge Robert A. Hill on October 13, 
1987. Two other district judges had some involvement in this case before it was 
assigned to Judge Lehman.