Title: Acuity v. Kishan Bagadia

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1153 & 06AP1974 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Kishan Bagadia, UNIK Associates, LLC, Symantec 
Corporation and Quarterdeck Corporation, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 133 
Reported at: 302 Wis. 2d 228, 734 N.W.2d 464 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18,2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark S. Gempeler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Arthur P. Simpson, Michelle D. Johnson, and Simpson & Deardorff, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Symantec Corporation and 
Quarterdeck Corporation, there was a brief by John S. Skilton, 
Michelle M. Umberger, Eric G. Barber, and Heller Ehrman LLP, 
Madison, and Christopher F. Stoll and Heller Ehrman LLP, San 
Francisco, Calif., and oral argument by John S. Skilton. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Kishan Bagadia and UNIK 
Associates, LLC, a letter was filed by Steven P. Bogart and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Beth Ermatinger Hanan 
and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance. 
 
 
2008 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV798) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kishan Bagadia; UNIK Associates, LLC; Symantec 
Corporation; and Quarterdeck Corporation, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   A lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
(hereinafter "District Court of Oregon") that resulted in a 
judgment for $958,253.40 entered against two of the respondents, 
Kishan Bagadia and UNIK Associates (collectively, "UNIK"), and 
in favor of the two other respondents, Symantec Corporation and 
Quarterdeck Corporation (collectively, "Symantec"), precipitated 
the present action filed by UNIK's insurer, Acuity Mutual 
Insurance Company ("Acuity"), in the Waukesha County Circuit 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
2 
 
Court.1  Acuity sought a declaration that its insurance policy 
with UNIK does not cover the damages entered by the District 
Court of Oregon for an "advertising injury" Symantec alleges 
that it incurred as a result of UNIK's infringement of 
Symantec's copyrights and trademarks.  Alternatively, in the 
event the circuit court ultimately held that Acuity's policy 
does cover the damages, Acuity sought a declaration that the 
amount it owes UNIK is set off by the amount Symantec has 
allegedly recovered from another insurer. 
¶2 
The circuit court entered a final judgment against 
Acuity, directing Acuity to indemnify UNIK for the full 
$958,253.40, plus interest. 
¶3 
We review the decision by the court of appeals2 
affirming the circuit court's entry of final judgment against 
Acuity and in favor of UNIK and Symantec.  Two issues confront 
us:  (1) Whether, under Acuity's Commercial General Liability 
("CGL") insurance policy, UNIK engaged in "advertising activity" 
resulting in UNIK's infringement of Symantec's copyrights and 
trademarks, thereby obligating Acuity to indemnify UNIK.  (2) If 
so, whether the amount in which Acuity is obligated to indemnify 
UNIK may be offset by the amount Symantec purportedly has 
already received from another insurer.  We affirm.  We hold that 
Acuity is liable for the damages entered against UNIK, because 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark S. Gempeler presided. 
2 Acuity v. Bagadia, 2007 WI App 133, 302 Wis. 2d 228, 734 
N.W.2d 464. 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
3 
 
Acuity's policy assures coverage for the copyright and trademark 
infringement 
UNIK 
committed 
as 
a 
result 
of 
advertising 
Symantec's products.  However, we decline to consider whether 
Acuity is entitled to have the judgment amount offset by the 
amount Symantec has allegedly collected from another insurer 
because the record with respect to that issue is insufficiently 
developed for us to render a decision.    
I.  BACKGROUND3 
¶4 
In 2002, Symantec sought to put a halt to UNIK's 
unauthorized distribution and sale of Symantec software by 
filing a lawsuit in the District Court of Oregon alleging 
copyright 
and 
trademark 
infringement. 
 
Symantec 
creates, 
publishes and manufactures software that protects the security 
of personal computers.  It owns four copyrights at issue:  
Norton AntiVirus®, Norton Utilities®, Norton Ghost®, and Norton 
CleanSweep®.  It also owns six trademarks at issue:  Symantec®, 
Norton 
SystemWorks®, 
Norton 
AntiVirus®, 
Norton 
Utilities®, 
                                                 
3 The facts set forth are undisputed.  The portion of the 
"Background" section describing the litigation in the District 
Court of Oregon collects its facts from Symantec's complaint in 
that lawsuit, from exhibits contained in the record, from the 
district court's opinion granting summary judgment in Symantec's 
favor and from the district court's separate opinions awarding 
costs and fees.  The opinion granting summary judgment is 
apparently unpublished and unavailable, both in the reporters 
and the electronic databases.  The opinions awarding costs and 
fees are found in:  Symantec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., No. 02-
406-KI, 2005 WL 1334557 (D. Or. Jun. 2, 2005) and Symantec Corp. 
v. CD Micro, Inc., No. 04-227-KI, 2005 WL 1972563 (D. Or. 
Aug. 12, 2005) (consolidated cases). 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
4 
 
Norton Ghost®, and Norton CleanSweep®.4   UNIK Associates, which 
is insured by Acuity, is a Wisconsin-based software vendor whose 
business focuses primarily on purchasing computer software at 
discount prices and then selling that software to resellers.  
Symantec claimed in the federal suit that UNIK, among other 
actions, 
advertised, 
distributed, 
and 
sold 
Symantec's 
copyrighted and trademarked products without authorization.  
Symantec also alleged that UNIK's actions caused injury to 
Symantec, including consumer deception and confusion. 
¶5 
The District Court of Oregon issued summary judgment 
in 
Symantec's 
favor. 
 
It 
found 
that 
UNIK 
"advertised 
[Symantec's] SystemWorks®5 software through trade magazines, 
telephone marketing, direct mailings, and supplying samples to 
interested buyers."  Symantec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., No. 02-
406-KI, slip op. at 4 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2005). UNIK placed 
advertisements bearing Symantec's trademarked name in computer 
trade 
magazines. 
 
In 
addition, 
UNIK 
shipped 
samples 
of 
Symantec's SystemWorks® products to existing customers who 
requested them over the phone.  UNIK would ship a sample disk 
containing the SystemWorks® software in a plain, white paper 
sleeve without a retail box or a manual.  In accordance with the 
                                                 
4 More 
precisely, 
Quarterdeck 
owns 
the 
copyright 
and 
trademark on Norton CleanSweep®, while Symantec owns the 
copyrights and trademarks on the other products.   
5 The SystemWorks® software constitutes "suites" of six 
separate software products, including the trademarked Norton 
SystemWorks®, Norton AntiVirus®, Norton Utilities®, and Norton 
Ghost®.  
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
5 
 
customer's specifications, UNIK would mark the inner hub of the 
sample disk to indicate the SystemWorks® products contained 
within.  The customer would inspect the sample.  If the sample 
met the customer's approval, the customer would place a full 
order for the product with UNIK.  UNIK, in turn, would place the 
order with its supplier and, upon receipt, would ship the full 
order to its customer in the plain, white sleeves it used to 
ship the samples.  Symantec sold each of its SystemWorks® suites 
of software for more than $40, but UNIK sold them at prices 
ranging from $3.50 to $20.  UNIK sold 117,273 copies of 
Symantec's software between December 2000 and October 2003, 
generating approximately $845,672 in gross revenue.   
¶6 
The 
federal court concluded that UNIK's actions 
violated Symantec's copyrights and trademarks.  It ordered both 
an injunction and monetary damages.  The court enjoined UNIK 
from "[d]isseminating, promoting, selling, offering for sale, 
distributing, or using any unauthorized copies" of Symantec's 
copyrighted products.  Symantec, No. 02-406-KI, [Stipulated] 
Permanent Injunction, ¶1(a) (D. Or. May 3, 2005).  It further 
enjoined UNIK from "[p]rocuring, using (including use on web 
sites, on the Internet, and on any products distributed by 
UNIK), 
reproducing, 
counterfeiting, 
or 
copying 
any 
of 
[Symantec's] registered trademarks, or distributing any products 
bearing [Symantec's] trademarks."  Id. at ¶b.   
¶7 
The court also imposed monetary damages.  It awarded 
statutory damages of $60,000 for each of the six Symantec 
trademarks UNIK infringed and $15,000 for each of the four 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
6 
 
Symantec copyrights UNIK infringed.  Pursuant to federal 
statutes6 providing for election of damages, Symantec elected to 
recover 
the 
$360,000 
in 
statutory 
trademark 
infringement 
damages, but elected to forego the $60,000 in statutory 
copyright infringement damages in favor of collecting $272,226 
in actual copyright infringement damages.  The court also 
awarded Symantec costs and attorney's fees of $326,07.40, 
bringing the total judgment against UNIK to $958,253.40.  
¶8 
Meanwhile, as the federal lawsuit unfolded, Acuity 
filed a lawsuit in Waukesha County Circuit Court, seeking, via a 
motion for summary judgment, a declaration that it had no duty 
to defend UNIK in the Oregon action.  The court denied Acuity's 
motion and ordered Acuity to defend.  However, the District 
Court of Oregon entered final judgment against UNIK.  Acuity, 
Symantec and UNIK then filed cross motions for summary judgment 
with respect to the question of whether Acuity had a duty to 
indemnify UNIK for the federal court judgment.  The circuit 
court denied Acuity's motion and granted Symantec's and UNIK's 
respective motions.  In its final judgment, the court ordered 
Acuity 
to 
indemnify 
UNIK 
for 
the 
full 
$958,253.40 
plus 
prejudgment interest, despite Acuity's request that the award be 
                                                 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) for the available election of 
damages for trademark infringement.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) for 
the available election of damages for copyright infringement.    
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
7 
 
offset by the alleged $165,964.38 Symantec had already received 
from Continental Casualty Company.7  
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed.  Acuity v. Bagadia, 
2007 WI App 133, ¶1, 302 Wis. 2d 228, 734 N.W.2d 464.  It held 
that Acuity's insurance policy with UNIK covered Symantec's 
judgment with respect to both its copyright infringement and 
trademark infringement claims.  UNIK engaged in "advertising 
activity," as described in the policy, which resulted from its 
infringing Symantec's copyrights and trademarks.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals held that Acuity is obligated to indemnify 
UNIK for the full amount entered by the circuit court.  The 
court of appeals also denied Acuity's request to offset the 
award by the $165,964.38 Acuity alleges Symantec received from 
Continental, pointing out that the record is insufficient to 
allow it "to determine who owes what."  Id., ¶24. 
¶10 The court of appeals employed a three-step test to 
reach 
its 
conclusion 
that 
UNIK's 
activities 
resulted 
in 
"advertising injury" to Symantec, thereby obligating Acuity to 
indemnify UNIK.  Id., ¶6.  First, the court concluded that 
                                                 
7 Symantec 
opposed 
Acuity's 
request 
for 
an 
offset, 
contending that Continental Casualty Company's alleged payment 
was subject to a reservation of rights to contest coverage.   
Continental is not a party to this suit.  Symantec does not 
dispute that Continental paid it $165,964.38, as Acuity alleges.  
However, there is no proof in the record that the amount 
actually was paid.  In addition, there is no indication in the 
record 
whether 
there 
has 
been 
a 
final 
determination 
of 
Continental's legal obligations with respect to Symantec's 
award.  Finally, presumably a Continental insurance policy 
covering UNIK exists, but it is also absent from the record.   
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
8 
 
copyright infringement and trademark infringement constituted 
enumerated offenses under Acuity's policy——copyright by virtue 
of being expressly enumerated in the policy, and trademark by 
virtue of being encompassed within "title," which is expressly 
enumerated in the policy.  Id., ¶¶7, 17.  Second, the court 
concluded 
that 
UNIK advertised Symantec's copyrighted and 
trademarked products and names.  Id., ¶¶7, 9, 18.  Finally, the 
court concluded that there existed a causal nexus between UNIK's 
advertising and its infringement of Symantec's copyrights and 
trademarks.  Id., ¶¶13, 19, 22.  
¶11 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 We are called upon to review an entry of summary 
judgment that interpreted an insurance policy.  We review the 
interpretation 
of 
an 
insurance 
policy 
independently, 
but 
benefiting from the discussions of the court of appeals and the 
circuit court.  Nu Pak, Inc. v. Wine Specialties Int'l, Ltd., 
2002 WI App 92, ¶6, 253 Wis. 2d 825, 643 N.W.2d 848.  We also 
review a decision on summary judgment independently, using the 
same methodology as the circuit court.  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 
of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶15, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 660 
N.W.2d 666; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
9 
 
B. 
Policy Interpretation 
¶13 We interpret undefined words and phrases of an 
insurance policy as they would be understood by a reasonable 
insured.  Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶21, 
266 Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 166.  If the policy language is 
unambiguous, we interpret the policy in accordance with the 
plain meaning of its provisions.  See Garriguenc v. Love, 67 
Wis. 2d 130, 135, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975).  If, however, the 
language that is undefined in the policy is "susceptible to more 
than one reasonable construction when read in context," it is 
ambiguous.  Westphal, 266 Wis. 2d 569, ¶21.  When such policy 
language relates to coverage and is ambiguous, we interpret the 
policy in favor of the insured to afford coverage.  Cardinal v. 
Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 375, 382, 480 N.W.2d 1 
(1992). 
¶14 Acuity's CGL policy states that it "will pay" its 
insured sums it is legally obligated to pay as a result of 
advertising injury caused by the insured.  The policy further 
states that it provides coverage for "advertising injury" 
"caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising 
[the insured's] goods, products or services."  The policy 
defines "advertising injury" as an injury stemming from, among 
other things, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style 
of doing business" or "[i]nfringement of copyright, title or 
slogan."   
¶15 We examine the provisions more closely.  The policy 
provides in pertinent part: 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
10 
 
LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES COVERAGES 
1. 
Business Liability 
a. 
We will pay those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
. . . advertising injury to which this insurance 
applies.   
. . . . 
b. 
This insurance applies [to]: 
. . . . 
(b) Advertising injury caused by an offense 
committed in the course of advertising your goods, 
products or services; 
. . . . 
LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES DEFINITIONS 
1. 
"Advertising injury" means injury arising 
out of one or more of the following offenses: 
. . . . 
c. 
Misappropriation of advertising ideas or 
style of doing business; or 
d. 
Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.   
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶16 To determine whether these provisions obligate Acuity 
to indemnify UNIK, we must determine whether UNIK engaged in 
"advertising activity" resulting in an "advertising injury," as 
defined by Acuity's policy.  We employ a three-step test 
articulated in Fireman's Fund to do so:  (1) Does UNIK's conduct 
fit within an offense the policy enumerates?  (2)  Did UNIK 
engage in advertising activity?  (3) Is there a causal 
connection between UNIK's advertising activity and the damages?  
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
11 
 
See Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶26.  Because the circuit 
court's final judgment against Acuity required the insurer to 
indemnify UNIK for damages resulting from both its copyright 
infringement and its trademark infringement, we must pose all 
three questions with respect to both copyright and trademark. 
C. 
The Fireman's Fund Three-Step Test 
¶17 We first consider whether UNIK's conduct, related to 
both copyright infringement and trademark infringement, fits 
within an enumerated offense in Acuity's CGL policy.   
1. 
Enumerated offense 
a. 
copyright infringement 
¶18 Acuity concedes that copyright infringement is an 
enumerated offense within the policy.  Indeed, the policy is 
clear on its face that "advertising injury" means "infringement 
of 
copyright." 
 
UNIK 
infringed 
Symantec's 
copyrights 
by 
distributing sample disks containing Symantec's copyrighted 
SystemWorks® software without Symantec's authorization. 
b. 
trademark infringement 
¶19 The District Court of Oregon found that UNIK infringed 
Symantec's 
trademarks 
when 
it 
distributed, 
without 
authorization, disks containing computer software denoted by 
Symantec's trademarked names and when it used Symantec's 
trademarked names in print advertising.   
¶20 Symantec 
contends 
that 
trademark 
infringement 
is 
enumerated as an advertising injury either under the policy's 
"infringement 
of 
title" 
provision 
or 
under 
the 
policy's 
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
12 
 
business" provision.  First, it argues that the plain meaning of 
the word "title" encompasses trademarks and that numerous courts 
have so held.  Second, it contends that trademark infringement 
constitutes "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of 
doing business."   
¶21 Acuity 
responds 
that 
our 
case 
law 
has 
already 
suggested that trademark infringement does not fall within 
"infringement of title."  Acuity submits that this is the 
correct interpretation of the policy, because had the parties 
intended to ensure coverage for trademark infringement, they 
would have expressly included the word "trademark" in the 
policy. 
¶22 The insurance policy defines advertising injury in 
part as "infringement of . . . title."  "Title" is not a defined 
term in the policy; consequently, we give "title" its plain, 
ordinary meaning.  Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 
Wis. 2d 91, 97-98, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).  To do so, we consult 
dictionaries and the relevant case law that has addressed the 
issue of whether a trademark is included within the term, 
"title."  In addition, because the evolution of the standard CGL 
policy form is useful to our analysis, we observe revisions to 
that form as well.   
¶23 We first consult the dictionary definition of "title."  
"Title" has been defined as a "distinguishing name" or "a 
descriptive 
or 
distinctive 
appellation." 
 
Random 
House 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
13 
 
Unabridged Dictionary, 1989 (2d ed. 1993).8  Also instructive is 
that the most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary that 
contains a definition of "title," outside of the context of the 
ownership 
of 
property, 
refers 
the 
reader 
to 
the 
term 
"trademark."  Black's Law Dictionary, 1485 (6th ed. 1990).  
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
then 
defined 
"trademark" 
as 
"a 
distinctive mark of authenticity, through which the products of 
particular 
manufacturers 
or 
the 
vendible 
commodities 
of 
particular merchants may be distinguished from those of others."9  
Id. at 1493.  We observe that dictionaries use similar words to 
define "title" and "trademark":  a "title" is a "distinctive 
appellation," while a "trademark" is a "distinctive mark."10 
                                                 
8 The sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"title" as "[a] mark, style, or designation; a distinctive 
appellation."  Black's Law Dictionary, 1485 (6th ed. 1990).  
Perhaps recognizing that the term's common meaning is no longer 
appreciably distinct from its legal meaning, the two more recent 
editions of Black's Law Dictionary, the seventh and eighth 
editions, do not define "title" outside of its application to 
the ownership of property.   
9 The most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary provides 
a slightly different definition of the term "trademark": "A 
word, 
phrase, 
logo, or other graphic symbol used by a 
manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products 
from those of others.  Black's Law Dictionary, 1530 (8th ed. 
2004).   
10 The Western District of New York has concluded that 
"infringement 
of 
slogan" 
can 
also 
include 
trademark 
infringement.  J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. 
Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 559 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).  The 
court cited the definition of "slogan" found in a leading 
treatise: 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
14 
 
¶24 We also consider that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
has 
concluded 
that 
trademark 
infringement 
falls 
under 
"infringement of title."  W. Wis. Water, Inc. v. Quality 
Beverages of Wis., Inc., 2007 WI App 188, ¶¶27-28, 305 Wis. 2d 
217, 738 N.W.2d 114.  The court concluded that unauthorized use 
of a water supplier's logos on water delivery trucks, truck 
driver uniforms, and water bottle labels gave rise to a claim 
for trademark infringement under the policy's "infringement of 
title" provision.  Id., ¶¶4, 25, 27-28.  It explained that it is 
reasonable to interpret the phrase "infringement of title" as 
broad enough to embrace trademark infringement, in part because 
"infringement 
of 
title" 
is 
susceptible 
to 
multiple 
interpretations, and in such event, our courts construe the 
provision in favor of coverage.  Id., ¶28. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Section 7.5  Slogans as Marks. 
Neither in the common law nor [in] the Lanham Act 
is [there] any reason why a plurality of words cannot 
function as a mark to identify and distinguish goods 
or services.  A slogan or any other combination of 
words is capable of trademark significance, if used in 
such a way as to identify and distinguish the seller's 
goods or services from those of others. 
Under common law unfair competition principles, 
slogans have long been protected against use by others 
so as to be likely to confuse purchasers . . . .  [A] 
slogan might also incorporate a separate trademark, 
such that both the slogan and the mark will be 
protectable. 
Id. (quoting McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (2d ed. 
1984)). 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
15 
 
¶25 Western Wisconsin Water followed the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Hedeen & Cos., 
C.V., 280 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2002).  There, the insurer, Charter 
Oak, sought a declaratory judgment against the insureds that it 
had no duty to defend them against a claim for trademark 
infringement.  Id. at 735.  Under its CGL policy, which mirrored 
the policy at issue here in all relevant respects, Charter Oak 
argued that trademark infringement was not a covered offense 
under the policy because (1) the definition of "advertising 
injury" did not expressly refer to trademark infringement, and 
(2) the policy's specific inclusion of "copyright infringement" 
as 
an 
advertising 
injury 
demonstrated 
that 
trademark 
infringement could not be covered as an advertising injury.  Id. 
at 735-36.  The court rejected Charter Oak's arguments.  Id. at 
736.  Applying Wisconsin law, the court held that the trademark 
infringement claim fell within the policy's "infringement of 
title" provision.  Id.  It reasoned that "'infringement' means 
using someone else's words," while "'title' refers to names and 
related trademarks."  Id. 
¶26 Western 
Wisconsin 
Water 
deemed 
Charter 
Oak 
its 
"authoritative guide" for three reasons.  First, Charter Oak was 
decided six years after Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper National 
Insurance Co., 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), a case relied upon 
by the insurer that reached a conclusion contrary to Charter 
Oak's more recent conclusion.  W. Wis. Water, 305 Wis. 2d 217, 
¶27.  Second, Charter Oak applied Wisconsin law.  Id.  Finally, 
Charter Oak rejected the holding of two other federal circuit 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
16 
 
court 
cases 
that 
adopted 
Advance 
Watch's 
holding 
that 
"infringement of title" does not include trademark infringement.  
Id.  
¶27 Western Wisconsin Water and Charter Oak are in step 
with numerous courts addressing the issue of whether trademark 
infringement is included within "infringement of title."11   
¶28 In addition, of significant historical note, it has 
been observed that, prior to 1986, the standard Insurance 
Service Office CGL policy form "included 'unfair competition' as 
a covered class of advertising injuries, and [expressly] 
excluded injuries resulting from trademark, service mark and the 
trade name infringement."  Bay Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Travelers 
Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (S.D. Tex. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  However, in 1986, the Insurance Service 
Office, which publishes standard forms widely used in the 
property and casualty insurance industry, revised the form to 
replace "unfair competition" with the phrase "misappropriation 
of advertising ideas and style of doing business," while it also 
eliminated the trademark, service mark and trade name exclusion.  
Id.  The revision therefore implies that claims related to 
trademark infringement would be included within the revised CGL 
policy.  Id.; see also, Adolfo House Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Polymer 
Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Sentex 
Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 882 F. Supp. 930, 
944 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
17 
 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 
2001).  
¶29 Given the plain meaning of "title," the reasoning of 
Western Wisconsin Water and Charter Oak, and the evolution of 
the standard CGL policy form, we conclude that the "infringement 
of title" provision in Acuity's CGL policy encompasses claims of 
trademark infringement.  Symantec owns trademarks in each of the 
following:  Symantec®, Norton SystemWorks®, Norton AntiVirus®, 
Norton Utilities®, Norton Ghost®, and Norton CleanSweep®.  Each 
of these designations is either the title of a software program 
they name or the brand under which those programs are sold (in 
the case of Symantec®).  Accordingly, UNIK engaged in an 
enumerated offense when it infringed Symantec's trademarks. 
¶30 Acuity argues, however, that Fireman's Fund has 
already intimated that "infringement of title" does not include 
infringements of trademark.  In Fireman's Fund, we concluded 
that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for trade dress 
infringement under a policy that defined "advertising injury" to 
include "infringement of trademark, copyright, title or slogan."  
Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶¶25, 29-34 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, unlike the policy at issue here, the policy at 
issue 
in 
Fireman's 
Fund 
expressly 
included 
trademark 
infringement within the definition of "advertising injury."  
Id., ¶25.  We noted that the insurance company had recently 
added 
trademark 
infringement 
to 
its 
policy 
and 
thereby 
"broadened" the definition of advertising injury.  Id., ¶25 
n.23.  Acuity contends that Fireman's Fund supports the 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
18 
 
proposition that its policy cannot be construed to include 
infringement of trademark as an enumerated offense because the 
policy does not expressly list "trademark" among the advertising 
injuries. 
¶31 Acuity's argument misses the mark because the policy 
at issue in Fireman's Fund contained a different provision than 
the one presented here.  We did not address the question of 
whether an infringement of trademark may come within the term, 
"title."  While footnote 23 of the Fireman's Fund opinion refers 
to 
the policy's addition of the word "trademark" as a 
"broaden[ing]" 
of 
the definition of "advertising injury," 
nothing in the opinion suggests that an "infringement of title" 
provision excludes claims for infringement of trademark. 
¶32 Acuity 
further 
argues 
that 
there 
can 
exist 
no 
trademark infringement claims under its policy because, had the 
parties intended to ensure coverage for trademark infringement, 
they would have expressly included the word "trademark" in the 
"copyright, title or slogan" provision in the policy.  Acuity 
relies on Advance Watch as support.   
¶33 Advance Watch held that a policy provision defining 
"advertising injury" as "infringement of copyright, title or 
slogan" does 
not 
encompass trademark infringement claims.  
Advance Watch, 99 F.3d at 802-04.  The court reasoned that the 
term "advertising" was limited to verbal conduct and that the 
word "trademark" did not appear in the policy definition of 
"advertising injury."  Id. at 802-03.  
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
19 
 
¶34 Advance Watch is unpersuasive.  First, we discern no 
compelling reason to limit the term "advertising" to verbal 
conduct.  Indeed, both the "narrow" and "broad" definitions of 
advertising commonly recognized in case law encompass non-verbal 
conduct.  The cases recognize that "advertising" is narrowly 
defined 
as 
"widespread 
announcement 
or 
distribution 
of 
promotional materials" and broadly defined as "any oral, 
written, or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner 
in connection with the solicitation of business."  See, e.g., 
Fireman's 
Fund, 
261 
Wis. 2d 
4, 
¶43. 
 
These 
alternate 
definitions, by ascribing a definition to "advertising" that 
embraces more than verbal conduct, undermine Advance Watch's 
conclusion.12   
¶35 Second, as we have already discussed, the absence of 
the word "trademark" in a CGL policy does not foreclose the 
conclusion that trademark infringement is covered under the 
"advertising injury" provision in Acuity's policy.  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded in Charter Oak that trademark infringement is 
covered under a policy defining "advertising injury" as an 
"infringement of copyright, title or slogan."  Charter Oak, 280 
F.3d at 736.  Numerous courts have held likewise.13  We agree 
                                                 
12 Moreover, Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper National Insurance 
Co., 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), is an "anomaly."  Adolfo House 
Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 165 F. Supp. 
2d 1332, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  It has been roundly criticized 
by other courts as out of step with the prevailing view.  See 
id. 
13 See note 11, supra. 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
20 
 
with these courts that construing the word "title" to encompass 
trademark infringement claims is consonant both with the canons 
governing the interpretation of insurance policies and with the 
plain meaning of "title." 
¶36 In sum, we conclude that UNIK's infringement of 
Symantec's trademarks constitutes an enumerated offense under 
the "advertising injury" provision of Acuity's CGL policy.  
Symantec's 
trademark 
infringement 
claims 
fall 
within 
the 
"infringement of title" provision because UNIK infringed on the 
trademarked titles of Symantec's name and software.   
¶37 Because we conclude that trademark infringement is 
encompassed 
within 
"infringement 
of 
title," 
we 
need 
not 
consider, as Symantec invites us to do, whether it is also 
encompassed within the provision of the policy enumerating as an 
advertising injury "misappropriation of advertising ideas or 
style of doing business." 
2. 
Advertising activity 
¶38 We next consider whether UNIK engaged in advertising 
activity.  To do so, we must first address the following 
question:  What is the definition of advertising? 
¶39 As 
we 
have 
stated 
above, 
Wisconsin 
cases 
have 
identified 
both 
a 
broad 
and 
a 
narrow 
definition 
of 
"advertising."  However, we have not adopted either definition.  
See Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶¶42-44.  Acuity encourages 
us to adhere to the general definition of advertising we noted 
in Fireman's Fund:  "[g]enerally speaking, advertising refers to 
calling the public's attention to a product or business by 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
21 
 
proclaiming its qualities or advantages in order to increase 
sales or arouse a desire to buy or patronize."  Id., ¶42 (citing 
cases quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (New College ed. 1980) and Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary (4th ed. 1976)).  Acuity argues that 
the court of appeals unnecessarily created new law by adopting 
what is considered to be the "broad" definition of advertising.  
¶40 In contrast, Symantec argues that the court of 
appeals' adoption of the "broad" definition of "advertising" is 
fully consistent with our rules for interpreting insurance 
policy provisions.  Symantec points out that "advertising" is 
not defined within Acuity's policy, but it is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations.  Consequently, it asserts that the 
term is ambiguous.  Our cases hold, Symantec contends, that 
ambiguous policy terms must be construed in favor of coverage. 
¶41 As we have recounted, our case law recognizes the 
existence of a broad and a narrow definition of advertising.  
Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶43.  We are not limited to those 
definitions, however.  Nor are we limited to the general 
definition of advertising described in Fireman's Fund.  Our task 
is to give the term "advertising" within Acuity's policy its 
ordinary meaning, because it is a non-technical term not defined 
in the policy.  Id. at ¶42.  We are permitted to consider the 
definitions of "advertising" in dictionaries of common usage and 
in legal dictionaries to help us discern its meaning.  See Sch. 
Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 170 Wis. 2d 347, 367, 
488 N.W.2d 82 (1992).  
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
22 
 
¶42 We consider the various definitions of "advertising."  
Dictionaries of common usage define the term as "calling the 
public's attention to a product or business by proclaiming its 
qualities or advantages in order to increase sales or arouse a 
desire to buy or patronize."  Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶42 
(summarizing cases that quote The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language and Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary).  A standard narrow definition and a standard broad 
definition of "advertising" have evolved in the common law.  The 
standard narrow definition is:  "widespread announcement or 
distribution of promotional materials."  Id., ¶43.  The standard 
broad definition is:  "any oral, written, or graphic statement 
made by the seller in any manner in connection with the 
solicitation of business."  Id.  All of these definitions are 
different 
in 
some 
respects, 
yet 
all 
are 
reasonable 
interpretations of the term, "advertising."  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the term is susceptible to multiple reasonable 
interpretations and is therefore ambiguous.  When faced with a 
policy ambiguity in regard to coverage, we interpret the policy 
provision liberally in favor of affording coverage to the 
insured.  Cardinal, 166 Wis. 2d at 382.  Consequently, we will 
apply the broad definition to the facts before us.   
a. 
copyright infringement 
¶43 Acuity 
contends 
that 
UNIK 
did 
not 
engage 
in 
"advertising activity" with respect to Symantec's copyrights.  
It emphasizes that the District Court of Oregon focused on 
UNIK's sales, not its advertising, of Symantec software; that 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
23 
 
the district court did not reference advertising injury; and 
that only one sentence of the district court's decision mentions 
advertising at all.  Accordingly, Acuity argues that the 
district court gave no indication that any advertising activity 
bore upon its finding of liability for copyright infringement. 
¶44 Acuity further notes that the disks that UNIK shipped 
to existing customers were shipped in response to customer 
requests, and they were packaged in plain, white paper sleeves 
without retail boxes and without manuals.  It argues that such 
activity cannot be deemed "advertising" under any definition.   
¶45 We are not persuaded by Acuity's arguments.  First, 
the District Court of Oregon's summary judgment opinion belies 
Acuity's assertions that the court did not take account of 
UNIK's advertising activity in finding UNIK liable for copyright 
infringement.  The district court stated that UNIK "advertised 
[Symantec's] SystemWorks® software through trade magazines, 
telephone marketing, direct mailings, and supplying samples to 
interested buyers."  Symantec, No. 02-406-KI, slip op. at 4 
(emphasis added).  The reference to supplying samples to 
interested buyers directly implicates UNIK's activity infringing 
Symantec's copyright through advertising.  Accordingly, the 
district court did not account solely for UNIK's copyright 
infringement by the sales of copyrighted material, as Acuity 
contends. 
¶46 Second, 
contrary 
to 
Acuity's 
arguments, 
UNIK's 
activity in accepting sample orders from existing customers and 
then sending those customers samples in unmarked sleeves 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
24 
 
comports with the broad definition of advertising we adhere to 
in this context.  The following facts are undisputed:  (1) UNIK 
sent sample disks to customers; (2) if the customer approved of 
the sample, the customer placed an order for the disks; (3) 
within less than three years, UNIK sold over 117,000 disks 
containing Symantec's copyrights through this process.  We think 
it is abundantly clear that UNIK's practice of sending sample 
disks constitutes a "solicitation of business," as we define 
advertising here.  
b. 
trademark infringement 
¶47 Acuity argues that our review of whether UNIK engaged 
in advertising activity that infringed Symantec trademarks is 
limited to consultation of the District Court of Oregon's 
summary judgment decision.  Acuity contends that the district 
court's decision makes clear that none of UNIK's activities with 
respect to Symantec's trademark "proclaim[ed the] qualities or 
advantages [of the product] in order to increase sales or arouse 
a desire to buy or patronize," as Fireman's Fund described 
"advertising."  Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶42.  We 
disagree. 
¶48 First, in resolving the questions this case presents, 
we are not required to confine ourselves to the District Court 
of Oregon's opinion.  Our case law and Wisconsin Statutes evince 
a court analysis of summary judgment wherein we examine "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits."  See, e.g., id., ¶15; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
Moreover, in determining whether an insurer has a duty to 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
25 
 
indemnify, courts routinely consult the entire record.  See, 
e.g., Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Mittlestadt, 109 S.W.3d 784, 
787 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see also, Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Alan Curtis LLC, 519 F.3d 466 (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) 
(reh'ing and reh'ing en banc denied Apr. 18, 2008); Columbia 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, 239 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
¶49 Second, UNIK advertised Symantec's trademark.  The 
district court's finding that UNIK "advertised [Symantec's] 
SystemWorks® software through trade magazines" is undisputed.  
The magazine advertisements contained in the record show 
Symantec's trademarked name.14  UNIK's placing advertisements 
bearing Symantec's trademark constitutes a "graphic statement 
made by the seller in any manner in connection with the 
solicitation of business."  Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶43. 
3. 
Causal connection  
¶50 The third question is whether there is a causal 
connection between UNIK's advertising activity and Symantec's 
harm.  Id., ¶¶26, 46.  In Fireman's Fund, we explained that in 
order to constitute a causal connection between advertising and 
harm, the advertising need not be the sole cause of harm.  
Rather, the advertising must merely "contribute materially" to 
the harm.  Id., ¶¶52-53.  
¶51 Acuity 
argues 
that 
the 
"contribute 
materially" 
standard does not apply here.  It points out that we identified 
                                                 
14 We have attached the trade magazine advertisements as 
Appendix A to this opinion. 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
26 
 
such a standard in Fireman's Fund within the context of deciding 
whether an insurer had a duty to defend, not a duty to 
indemnify.  Id., ¶2.  Acuity contends that, because the duty to 
defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the "contribute 
materially" standard is an incorrect standard to apply.  Citing 
case law from other jurisdictions, Acuity asserts that an 
insurer shoulders the responsibility to indemnify only when the 
insured's activity and any resulting injury actually falls 
within the policy's coverage.  See, e.g., United Servs. Auto 
Ass'n v. Dare, 830 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).   
¶52 Acuity's argument is perplexing in that it does not 
refute the proposition that it is sufficient that advertising 
"contribute materially" to harm in order to establish a causal 
link between advertising and harm.  Although it is true that the 
duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, that is so 
because the duty to defend arises from allegations contained in 
the complaint, whereas the duty to indemnify is supported by 
fully developed facts.  See, e.g., Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis. 2d 
4, ¶¶19-20.  Accordingly, an insurer may be obligated to defend 
claims that it ultimately may not be obligated to indemnify.  
See id., ¶¶20-21.  We agree with Acuity, therefore, that the 
duty to defend is indeed broader than the duty to indemnify.  
However, that distinction is not relevant here because it has no 
bearing on the question of what suffices to establish a causal 
connection between advertising and injury. 
¶53 We conclude that the "contribute materially" standard 
is the proper one to apply.  Acuity marshals no authority that 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
27 
 
compels us to abandon the "contribute materially" standard in 
this context.  In addition, that standard is in accord with 
Wisconsin law establishing the threshold for assigning liability 
for damages.  See, e.g., Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 
2004 WI 148, ¶24, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1 ("In Wisconsin, 
the test for causation is whether the conduct at issue was a 
'substantial factor' in producing the plaintiff's injury."). 
a. 
copyright infringement 
¶54 In applying this standard, we conclude that UNIK's 
advertising activity contributed materially to its infringement 
of Symantec's copyrights.  The conclusion that UNIK made sales 
as a result of disseminating sample disks to customers is 
inescapable.  UNIK's business was to sell software to resellers.  
To garner sales, UNIK, without authorization, provided potential 
customers with disks containing Symantec's software products, 
which enabled the potential customer to try out Symantec's 
copyrighted software before deciding whether to buy.  In less 
than three years, UNIK sold 117,273 copies of Symantec's $40 
software for prices ranging from $3.50 to $20.  These sales 
generated $845,672 in gross revenue.   
¶55 Our conclusion that UNIK's advertising resulted in 
copyright injury is further supported by the District Court of 
Oregon's injunction.  The district court enjoined UNIK from 
"[d]isseminating, 
promoting, 
selling, 
offering 
for 
sale, 
distributing, 
or 
using" 
Symantec's 
copyrighted 
products.  
Symantec, No. 02-406-KI, [Stipulated] Permanent Injunction, 
¶1(a).  Federal courts are not permitted to grant an injunction, 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
28 
 
unless the party seeking it has suffered "irreparable injury."  
See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006).  Accordingly, we conclude that based on the record 
before us UNIK's advertising activity contributed materially to 
infringing 
Symantec's 
copyright, 
thereby 
causing 
Symantec 
damage. 
b. 
trademark infringement 
¶56 In its complaint filed with the District Court of 
Oregon, Symantec alleged that UNIK's advertising activity 
infringing on Symantec's trademarks likely caused consumer 
confusion.  Advertising activity can contribute materially to 
the trademark infringement if the advertising activity likely 
creates consumer confusion.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
¶57 The District Court of Oregon noted that customer 
confusion is a central element of trademark infringement and 
that UNIK did not contest that it used Symantec's trademarks in 
a manner that was likely to cause consumer confusion.  Symantec, 
No. 02-406-KI, slip op. at 14.  It concluded that UNIK violated 
Symantec's trademarks.  Id. at 15.   
¶58 Advertising likely materially contributed to consumer 
confusion.  As we have noted, the advertising resulted in the 
purchase 
of 
disks 
containing 
software 
bearing 
Symantec's 
trademarked titles.  Additionally, as we have already discussed 
above with respect to the copyright infringement, the District 
Court of Oregon's entry of an injunction against UNIK's 
"reproducing, counterfeiting, or copying . . . or distributing" 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
29 
 
Symantec's registered trademarks further evinces that UNIK's 
advertising 
contributed 
materially 
to 
Symantec's 
harm.  
Symantec, No. 02-406-KI, [Stipulated] Permanent Injunction, 
¶1(b).   
¶59 In sum, we answer all three Fireman's Fund questions 
in the affirmative.  First, copyright infringement and trademark 
infringement are enumerated offenses within Acuity's policy.  
Second, UNIK engaged in advertising activity with respect to 
both Symantec's copyrights and trademarks.  Finally, UNIK's 
advertising 
activity 
contributed 
materially 
to 
copyright 
infringement and trademark infringement.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Acuity is obligated to indemnify UNIK for the 
amount of damages the circuit court entered in its final 
judgment, $958,253.40 plus interest.   
¶60 We do not reach Acuity's argument that the judgment 
amount should be offset by the amount Symantec purportedly 
received from Continental Casualty Company.  The issue is 
insufficiently developed.  Continental is not a party to this 
suit.  Although Symantec does not dispute that Continental paid 
it $165,964.38, as Acuity alleges, there is no proof in the 
record that the amount actually was paid.  In addition, there is 
no indication in the record whether there has been a final 
determination of Continental's legal obligations with respect to 
Symantec's award.  Finally, presumably a Continental insurance 
policy covering UNIK exists, but it is also absent from the 
record.   
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
30 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶61 Two issues are presented in this review:  (1) Whether, 
under 
Acuity's 
CGL 
insurance 
policy, 
UNIK 
engaged 
in 
"advertising activity" resulting in UNIK's infringement of 
Symantec's copyrights and trademarks, thereby obligating Acuity 
to indemnify UNIK.  (2) If so, whether the amount in which 
Acuity is obligated to indemnify UNIK may be offset by the 
amount of payment Symantec purportedly has already received.  We 
affirm the court of appeals.  We hold that Acuity is liable for 
the damages entered against UNIK, because Acuity's policy 
assures coverage for the copyright and trademark infringement 
UNIK committed as a result of advertising Symantec's products.  
However, we decline to consider whether Acuity is entitled to 
have the judgment amount offset by the amount Symantec has 
allegedly collected from another insurer because the record with 
respect to that issue is insufficiently developed for us to 
render a decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
 
 
1 
 
APPENDIX A 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
 
 
2 
 
Nos. 2006AP1153 & 2006AP1974   
 
 
 
3