Title: 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.,  No. 81,
September Term 2011
MOTION TO DISMISS–NON JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY–STANDING– The
Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) entered into by the City of Baltimore and the
Maryland Historical Trust in connection with the Market Center Urban Renewal Plan is a
private agreement between two entities.  It does not contemplate Petitioner as an intended
beneficiary.  Therefore, Petitioner, as a third party, does not possess standing to challenge
the alleged breach of a promise memorialized in the MOA. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-11-002775
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 81
September Term, 2011
120 WEST FAYETTE STREET, LLLP
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE, et al.
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially    
            Assigned)
Kenney, James A. (Retired, Specially 
               Assigned),
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., Harrell and Cathell, JJ., Dissent
Filed:   April 27, 2012
1 The five-block area that makes up the Superblock is bounded by Fayette Street,
Howard Street, Lexington Street, Clay Street, and Park Avenue.  
In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted the “Market Center Urban Renewal Plan”
(Urban Renewal Plan), to renew a portion of the westside of Baltimore City.  A five-block
area located in the westside renewal area, known as the “Superblock,”1 is part of the plan for
redevelopment and has been the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette,
LLLP (120 West Fayette) and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (City).  This appeal
marks the third time we are asked to address a legal issue generated by the ongoing dispute.
We held in 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 258,
964 A.2d 662, 664-65 (2009) (Superblock I), that 120 West Fayette had standing to challenge
the legality of the City’s entry into a Land Disposition Agreement (LDA) to sell to Lexington
Square Partners, LLC (Lexington Square) property in the Superblock.  Later, in 120 West
Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 992 A.2d 459 (2010) (Superblock
II), we held that the process for granting the negotiating rights and the resulting LDA were
not illegal under the City’s Charter and the Urban Renewal Plan, id. at 345, 992 A.2d at 481,
and the process did not involve an improper delegation of authority from a municipal
corporation to a non-profit corporation, id. at 354, 992 A.2d at 486.  We further held, as not
“sufficiently ripe to rise to the level of a justiciable controversy,” 120 West Fayette’s
allegation that in the immediate future the LDA would receive unlawful approval from the
Maryland Historical Trust (Trust) because the LDA contained design plans that conflicted
with the Urban Renewal Plan’s building height restrictions, id. at 359, 992 A.2d at 489.
The current iteration of the litigation focuses on a Memorandum of Agreement
-2-
(MOA) between the City and the Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in
connection with the Urban Renewal Plan.  In brief, the MOA requires the City to submit
Superblock redevelopment plans to the Trust for review and approval.  The Trust’s Director
and the State Historic Preservation Officer, J. Rodney Little, rejected the first four sets of
redevelopment plans submitted by the City.  On December 22, 2010, Mr. Little provided
conditional approval of the fifth set of plans.  The City, on December 30, 2010, agreed to
those conditions. 
Four months later, 120 West Fayette, Appellant here, filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City seeking a declaration of rights “interpreting the Memorandum of
Agreement in light of the facts of this case, and declaring the 12/22/10 letter from Rodney
Little to be ultra vires, ab initio.”  The City, the Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC),
Lexington Square, and the Trust, hereafter Appellees collectively, moved to dismiss the
complaint.  The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that 120 West Fayette
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it was neither a party to,
nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA.
We granted the petition of the City and the BDC, and issued a writ of certiorari to
consider whether 120 West Fayette can maintain an action that seeks a declaration
interpreting the terms of the MOA.  120 West Fayette, LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 422 Md.
356, 30 A.3d 196 (2011).  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
I.
 During its 2000 legislative session, the General Assembly appropriated $11.5 million
2  See Md. Code (2001, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 5A-325 of the State Finance and
Procurement Article (SFP) (requiring, inter alia, that a State unit, “[t]o the extent feasible,
. . . consult with the Trust to determine whether the project will adversely affect any property
listed in or eligible for listing in the Historic Register”; and, “[w]ithin 30 days after a State
unit notifies the Director [of the Trust] of a proposed capital project . . . , the Director shall
determine whether the project would adversely affect any property listed in or eligible to be
listed in the Historic Register”); SFP § 5A-326 (mandating, inter alia, that, “[i]f a historic
property is to be altered substantially or destroyed by State action or with financial assistance
from a State unit, the State unit shall cause timely steps to be taken to:  (1) make appropriate
investigations and records; (2) salvage appropriate objects and materials; and (3) deposit with
the Trust the results of the investigations, the records, and the recovered objects and
materials”).  
3  See Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
470f and 470h-2(a) (providing, in part, that the head of a federal agency having jurisdiction
over a proposed federal undertaking in a state must take into account the effect of the
undertaking on any building eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places
by, among other steps, consulting with the State Historic Preservation Officer on means to
consider adverse effects on historic properties). 
-3-
dollars to the Maryland Stadium Authority to rebuild the Hippodrome Performing Arts
Center, an historic theater centrally located within the westside development area.  See 2000
Md. Laws, ch. 204 § 1, DA03.60(2) (FY 2001 Budget Appropriation).  The appropriation
came with the condition that $1 million of the expenditure hinged on “the City of Baltimore
and the Maryland Historical Trust . . . reach[ing] [an] agreement on how to minimize the
demolition of structures which contribute to the Market Center National Register Historic
District.”  Id.
In addition to the requirements of the FY 2001 Budget Appropriation, Maryland law2
requires the Director of the Trust, and federal law3 requires the State Historic Preservation
Officer (SHPO), to determine whether proposed capital projects would adversely affect any
4  State law requires the Trust to appoint a Director who is responsible for determining
whether proposed state capital projects would adversely affect historical properties.  See SFP
§ 5A-316 & § 5A-325.  Federal law likewise requires the designation of a State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO), who assists federal agencies in determining whether proposed
federal capital projects would adversely affect historical properties.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2.
Because the duties of the two offices are so similar, Mr. Little has served as the State
Director of the Trust and federal SHPO, concurrently, for the past 32 years. 
-4-
property listed in or eligible to be listed in the Maryland Register of Historic Properties or
the National Register of Historic Places.  Typically in Maryland, a memorandum of
agreement constitutes an agreement between a governmental entity and the Trust that the
project may proceed on condition that certain stated steps are taken by the State or local
government to avoid, mitigate, or satisfactorily reduce any adverse effects on identified
historic properties.
On January 31, 2001, the City and the Trust entered into such an agreement,
memorialized in the MOA.  Then-Mayor Martin O’Malley signed the MOA on behalf of the
City, and Mr. Little, as Director of the Trust and with the authority to enter into such
agreements delegated to him by the Board of Directors of the Trust, signed the MOA on
behalf of the Trust.4
The MOA, characterizing as “the Project” the City’s undertaking to redevelop the
westside of downtown Baltimore, i.e., the Urban Renewal Plan, states that the Project “will
include significant rehabilitation of existing buildings as well as demolition and new
construction.”  Moreover, “in consultation with the Trust, the City acknowledges that the
Project may have adverse effects on properties within the Market Center Historic District,
-5-
which is listed in the Maryland Register of Historic Properties and the National Register of
Historic Places.”  The MOA further states that, “in accordance with [the relevant State law
provisions], the City and the Trust have consulted to determine means of avoiding, mitigating
or satisfactorily reducing the adverse effects of the Project on historic properties.”  The City
therefore “anticipates that the Project will require support and actions from various State and
Federal agencies which actions will necessitate conformance with the requirements of [State
and federal law].”
The MOA includes the agreement of the City and the Trust that “the Project will be
implemented in accordance with the following stipulations in order to take into account the
effects of the Project on historic properties.”  Among those stipulations is that the City “will
prepare a strategic plan for the Project” that designates “those contributing historic buildings
which the City and the Trust agree are worthy of preservation and those buildings which may
be demolished without further consultation between the City and the Trust.”  The MOA
further provides that “[t]he strategic plan will be submitted for the review and comment of
the [Market Center Project Area Committee], and the review and approval of the Trust,
which approval shall not be unreasonably delayed or withheld.”  Then, “[u]pon approval by
the Trust, the City will pursue amendment of the Urban Renewal Plan to incorporate the
approved strategic plan.”  The MOA details both the approval process by the Trust as well
as the City and the Trust’s respective obligations in connection thereto.  Finally, the MOA
provides:  “The execution of the MOA and the implementation of its terms evidences that the
City has afforded the Trust an opportunity to comment on the Project and its effects on
5  We have taken judicial notice  that the strategic plan contemplated by the MOA was
created in February 2001 and is available for review on the BDC’s website.  Urban Renewal
P
l
a
n
:
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
C
e
n
t
e
r
,
http://www.baltimoredevelopment.com/sites/default/files/downloads-resources/Market_C
enter_URP.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
6 Because this case is before us from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we assume the
truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint and “all inferences
that may reasonably be drawn from them.” Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d
200, 207 (2011) (quoting RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643,
994 A.2d 430, 433-34 (2010)).  All references herein to historical facts comply with this
standard.
7 120 West Fayette dedicates a substantial portion of its brief to the allegation that Mr.
Little granted the development plan conditional approval “[u]nder intense political pressure.”
Specifically, 120 West Fayette asserts that Mr. Little was “muscle[d]” into approving the
(continued...)
-6-
historic properties, and that the City and the Trust have taken into account the effects of the
Project on historic properties.”
The strategic plan contemplated by the MOA was developed in February 2001, within
days of the signing of the January 2001 MOA.5  Over the years that followed,6 Mr. Little, in
his capacity as Director of the Trust and as SHPO, and Jay Brodie, President of the BDC,
corresponded through a series of letters regarding plans submitted by the City for the
proposed Superblock development.  On October 29, 2010, Lexington Square, through the
City, submitted to the Trust, for its review pursuant to the MOA, a development plan for the
Superblock.  The development plan called for the complete demolition of nine buildings and
partial demolition of five buildings designated for preservation by the strategic plan.
By letter dated December 22, 2010, Mr. Little granted conditional approval of the
proposed development plan.7  In that letter, Mr. Little, noting that the development plan
7(...continued)
development plan at a December 16, 2010, meeting between City and State political
“heavyweights.”  We note the gravity of these allegations but do not delve into their specifics
here.  Whether such a meeting took place and Mr. Little was so “muscle[d]” does not bear
on the disposition of the legal issue before us.
-7-
contained “substantial adverse effects on historic resources,” intimated that the development
plan was approved because it was the product of Lexington Square’s “non-negotiable
business model for redevelopment of the Superblock,” and the proposed plan had
consistently enjoyed the City’s support as “the preferred retail strategy for [the Superblock].”
On December 30, 2010, the City and Lexington Square accepted the conditions stated in the
December 22, 2010 approval letter.  
Sometime in January 2011, the Trust learned of Mr. Little’s conditional approval of
Lexington Square’s development plan.  Disagreeing with Mr. Little’s disposition of the
matter, the Trust voted to ask Mr. Little to rescind his approval.  When Mr. Little declined,
the Trust transmitted a letter to the Mayor of Baltimore to convey its “serious reservations”
about the development plan for the Superblock.  The Trust also contacted counsel in the
Office of the Attorney General for advice on the legal viability of challenging Mr. Little’s
approval.  Of relevance here, the Trust took no further action, legal or otherwise, to challenge
Mr. Little’s conditional approval.
The Complaint
On April 19, 2011, 120 West Fayette filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City challenging Mr. Little’s actions as ultra vires and illegal under the MOA and
8  The City, the BDC, and Lexington Square argued a failure by 120 West Fayette to
allege a justiciable controversy because:  (1) the action is barred by SFP § 5A-325(h); (2) 120
West Fayette is neither a party to nor an intended third-party beneficiary of the MOA that is
capable of enforcing its terms; (3) the Trust’s Executive Director, Mr. Little, acted within his
authority in approving the proposed Superblock development plan; and (4) the MOA
provides that, in the absence of Trust action within 30 days, the proposed development plan
is deemed automatically approved, thereby rendering moot any claim asserted by 120 West
Fayette. 
The Trust’s motion to dismiss included some of the arguments made by the other
defendants and further asserted that:  (1) the sovereign immunity of the Trust bars the
complaint; (2) the complaint presents a non-justiciable political question not amenable to
judicial resolution; and (3) judicial action to enforce the MOA is precluded by the dispute
resolution clause of the MOA. 
(continued...)
-8-
requesting declaratory relief.  The complaint names as defendants the City, the BDC,
Lexington Square, and, as a “necessary party,” the Trust.  The complaint alleges that
“interpretation of a contract–the MOA between the State and City–” reveals how the
approval process for demolition within the Superblock should have proceeded.  The
complaint further alleges that the approval process set forth in the MOA was violated when
Mr. Little “abdicat[ed] . . . the MOA’s contractual preservation mandate” by approving the
demolition of nine designated buildings and thereby prohibited the Trust from exercising its
proper role under the MOA by unilaterally approving the development plans.  The complaint
prayed the court to “interpret[] the Memorandum of Agreement in light of the facts of this
case, and declar[e] the 12/22/10 [acceptance] letter from Rodney Little to be ultra vires, ab
initio.”
Each Appellee—the City, the BDC, Lexington Square, and the Trust—filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint.  All Appellees argued, inter alia,8 that 120 West Fayette’s claim
8(...continued)
It is unnecessary for us to address, and so we do not address, any argument of
Appellees other than the argument accepted by the Circuit Court, that is, 120 West Fayette
failed to state a justiciable claim because it is, at most, an incidental beneficiary of the
agreement between the City and the Trust. 
9  The Circuit Court specifically noted that, “for the purposes of the present arguments,
(continued...)
-9-
should be dismissed because 120 West Fayette is neither a party to, nor an intended
beneficiary of, the private agreement memorialized in the MOA.  Appellees pointed out that
the MOA explicitly names the City and the Trust as parties to the agreement and does not
contain a term or promise for the particular benefit of 120 West Fayette.  Therefore,
Appellees argued, 120 West Fayette does not possess the requisite standing to file a suit
requesting a declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces the MOA’s approval
provisions.
120 West Fayette answered, arguing that its standing in the matter was beyond
challenge.  Citing our opinions in Superblock I and Superblock II, 120 West Fayette asserted
that its standing to request declaratory relief for ultra vires acts connected to the Superblock
was established in Superblock I and “perpetuated” by Superblock II. 
The motions to dismiss came on for a hearing before the Circuit Court, which granted
the motions and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.  The Circuit Court agreed with Appellees that “[120 West Fayette] ha[s] sued to
enforce an agreement, the MOA, which exists between [Appellees], and to which [120 West
Fayette is] not a party nor a beneficiary.”9  The court ruled that “this status does not establish
(...continued)
[120 West Fayette has] standing for the same reasons established by the Court of Appeals
in its decision in Superblock I.”  The court went on to rule that 120 West Fayette, in making
its claim as an incidental beneficiary of the MOA, “failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” 
As we shall discuss further, infra, we agree with the Circuit Court’s reasoning
concerning 120 West Fayette’s status and rights as an incidental beneficiary.  However, we
disagree with the Circuit Court that the principles laid out in Superblock I confer standing
upon 120 West Fayette to challenge the MOA. 
10 The City and the BDC presented two questions for review in their joint petition:
1. Whether an incidental third party beneficiary’s challenge to enforce a
contract presents a justiciable controversy?
(continued...)
-10-
a cause of action for [120 West Fayette] against [Appellees].”  Issuing a declaratory
judgment interpreting the MOA, explained the court, would be “issuing nothing more than
a purely advisory opinion as to [120 West Fayette] and [the City and the Trust].”
120 West Fayette noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before the case
could be decided by that court, the City and the BDC filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
this Court.  The City and the BDC also filed an unopposed motion to expedite appellate
review, citing the protracted litigation record between the parties in connection with
development of the Superblock and the threat of losing State and private capital investment
in the Superblock development project should the litigation continue into the 2012 calendar
year.  We granted both the petition,  120 West Fayette, 422 Md. at 356, 30 A.3d at 196, and
motion and consolidated into the one question below the two questions presented in the
petition:10
10(...continued)
2. Whether [120 West Fayette] has any basis to assert a private cause of action
challenging the Trust’s review and approval of the proposed Superblock
development under the MOA between the Trust and the City?
11  We review for legal correctness a circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, RRC
Northeast, 413 Md. at 644, 994 A.2d at 434, by reference, see supra n. 6, to all well-pleaded
facts and allegations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
-11-
Was the Circuit Court correct in dismissing 120 West Fayette’s complaint
requesting declaratory relief, which would interpret and enforce the terms of
an agreement between the Trust and the City?  
II.
120 West Fayette argues that the Circuit Court made a legal error in granting the
City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.11  Specifically, 120 West Fayette argues
that the Circuit Court erred in using principles of contract law to analyze its standing,
because, in the words of 120 West Fayette, the MOA is “much more than a simple agreement
between the City and a State agency.”  Instead, 120 West Fayette posits that our holdings in
Superblock I and Superblock II support its assertion that it has the requisite standing to
request declaratory relief interpreting the MOA, and, thereby, in its words, “give [the Trust]
the right to review and rule on demolition plans under the MOA.”  In essence, 120 West
Fayette argues that our prior opinions grant it the ability to sue the City, on the Trust’s
behalf, in order to return to the Trust a decision-making power granted by the MOA.  As we
have mentioned, the Circuit Court agreed with 120 West Fayette that those cases conferred
“standing”; nevertheless, the court ruled that 120 West Fayette failed to state a justiciable
claim because it is only an incidental beneficiary of the MOA between the City and the Trust.
-12-
120 West Fayette asserts that in Superblock I this Court granted 120 West Fayette
taxpayer standing, or alternatively, adjoining property owner standing, “to seek a declaratory
judgment” where “[a]ppellant . . . claimed unlawful and manipulative actions of the City and
BDC.”  120 West Fayette argues that it retains taxpayer standing in the instant case because
it pays City and State taxes and, like it did in Superblock I, challenges acts taken by
government officials that were illegal and ultra vires.  120 West Fayette further asserts that
it maintains its adjoining property owner standing because it remains situated next to the
development site and, like in Superblock I, the violation it alleges derives from a quasi-land
use decision.  In that regard, 120 West Fayette declares the MOA to be a land use decision
because it is “a unique land control device” that “provides an administrative body (The Trust)
[with] control [of] demolition in an historic area.” 
120 West Fayette also is of the view that we confirmed its standing in Superblock II
to seek declaratory relief in the form of an interpretation of the MOA.  120 West Fayette
alleged in the litigation that prompted our decision in Superblock II that “[defendants named
in the Superblock II complaint do] not intend to comply with the standards . . . in the MOA.”
413 Md. at 354, 992 A.2d at 487.  We held that the allegation did not give rise to a justiciable
controversy and therefore was unripe for adjudication.  Id. at 359, 992 A.2d at 489.  We
added the following footnote to that discussion: 
We affirm the dismissal of [the unripe claim in] 120 West Fayette’s amended
complaint without prejudice to 120 West Fayette’s right to reassert the claim
and seek appropriate relief when the alleged facts have developed to the point
that a violation is imminent or has occurred.  See Boyds [Civic Ass’n v.
Montgomery Cnty. Council], 309 Md. [683,] 692, 526 A.2d [598,] 602 [(1987)]
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(“The imminence and practical certainty of the act or event in issue, or the
intent, capacity, and power to perform, create justiciability as clearly as the
completed act or event, and is generally easily distinguishable from remote,
contingent, and uncertain events that may never happen and upon which it
would be improper to pass as operative facts.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).  
Id. at 358 n. 19, 992 A.2d at 489 n. 19.
120 West Fayette maintains that the above-quoted footnote (footnote 19) provides
implicit approval of 120 West Fayette’s standing to litigate the claim it raised in Superblock
II, once that claim became ripe for consideration.  120 West Fayette asserts, moreover, that
the claim it raises in the current declaratory judgment action is identical to the non-justiciable
claim raised in Superblock II.  As 120 West Fayette sees it, footnote 19 serves as an
“invitation” to litigate, on behalf of the Trust, the enforcement of a breached promise that
was memorialized in the MOA.
We disagree with both prongs of 120 West Fayette’s standing argument.  We consider
first the Superblock II-related contention.  To begin, the claim 120 West Fayette presents in
the current declaratory judgment action (i.e., that Director Little’s actions constituted an
illegal and ultra vires “abdication of the MOA’s contractual preservation mandate”) is not
the same as the claim at issue in Superblock II (i.e., that a private developer, Lexington
Square, does not intend to comply with the building height standards laid out in the MOA
and Urban Renewal Plan).  But even assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that the
claims here and in Superblock II are materially the same, our discussion of the MOA in
Superblock II did not address directly, either in footnote 19 or elsewhere in the opinion,
12 Specifically, 120 West Fayette asserted that the City illegally engaged in a public
works project outside of the bidding process provided in Art. VI § 11 of the City Charter, and
used a negotiating instrument (an “Exclusive Negotiating Privilege”) that was “a concept
foreign to the City Charter [and] City Code.”  Superblock I, 407 Md. 253, 268, 964 A.2d 662,
670 (2009). 
-14-
whether 120 West Fayette would have standing to litigate such a claim, even if ever it were
ripe for judicial review.  Much less does the footnote constitute a holding of this Court.  At
most, footnote 19 notes, by citation and an accompanying parenthetical, when the claim
raised in Superblock II might become justiciable.
We similarly reject  the contention that our opinion in Superblock I provides 120 West
Fayette grounds for legal standing in the instant case.  Superblock I is fundamentally
distinguishable from the case at bar.  In Superblock I, 120 West Fayette alleged that the City
and BDC “unlawfully violated . . . the City’s Charter and laws, to award the LDA [Land
Disposition Agreement] to a favored developer.”12  407 Md. at 260, 964 A.2d at 665
(emphasis added).  That allegation was necessary to our holding that 120 West Fayette
possessed taxpayer standing, or alternatively, adjoining property owner standing, in that
litigation.  See id. at 268, 964 A.2d at 670 (“In our view, the allegations contained in 120
West Fayette’s complaint are also sufficient to establish taxpayer standing . . . .  120 West
Fayette’s complaint specifically alleges that the LDA agreement is ‘in derogation of the
Charter and laws of the City.’”); see also id. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673 (“[W]e conclude that
the principles that confer standing upon an adjoining . . . property owner to seek judicial
review of land use decisions, logically extend to an adjoining . . . property owner that is
13 Our dissenting colleagues dispute this point, asserting that 120 West Fayette’s action
“is not merely based on the terms of the MOA; it is based on State law.”  ___ Md. ___, ___,
___ A.3d ___, ___ (dissent slip op. at 16).  According to the dissent, 120 West Fayette’s
complaint alleges a violation of SFP § 5A-326(a)(2), which commands a State unit’s
cooperation with the Trust to “ensure that no property listed in or eligible to be listed in the
Historic Register is inadvertently transferred, sold, demolished, destroyed, substantially
altered, or allowed to deteriorate significantly.”    ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___ (dissent
slip op. at 16-17).
There are two flaws in the dissent’s analysis.  First, and foremost, 120 West Fayette
(continued...)
-15-
challenging . . . illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement ordinances.”)
(emphasis added).
The complaint we consider in the present appeal does not allege a violation of City
law or the City Charter.  Instead, the complaint charges Dr. Little and the City with the
“abdication of the MOA’s contractual preservation mandate,” and explains that the
“interpretation of a contract–the MOA between the State and City–” controls how approval
for development plans should have proceeded.  (Emphasis added.)  Specifically, 120 West
Fayette’s complaint highlights, as the “gravamen” of the complaint, “[t]he illicit
circumvention of appropriate approval for demolition plans.”  Self-evidently, 120 West
Fayette explicitly recognizes the contractual nature of the MOA.
Moreover, the  process for “appropriate approval” set forth in the MOA  derives from
the agreement that the City and the Trust memorialized in the MOA, not from the City
Charter or its laws.  In essence, 120 West Fayette claimed a violation of a law in Superblock
I, but claims in the instant case the breach of a contractual provision.  The distinction renders
inapposite the holding of Superblock I,13 extending tax-payer and adjoining landowner
13(...continued)
is categorically barred from alleging a violation of § 5A-326(a)(2).  Section 5A-326(h)
explicitly prohibits private causes of action for a State unit’s non-compliance with the Trust’s
review, consultation and cooperation on historic preservation projects.  Second, 120 West
Fayette, seemingly aware of this statutory bar, did not file a complaint in the Circuit Court
asking for declaratory judgment defining State law.  120 West Fayette prayed for the relief
of an interpretation of the MOA, claiming only that provisions of the MOA had been
violated. 
14  None of the arguments advanced by Preservation Maryland, National Trust for
Historic Preservation and Baltimore Heritage, Inc. (Amici) in support of 120 West Fayette
persuades us to a different conclusion.  We already have rejected the argument, which Amici
repeat, that Superblock I and II provide the basis for 120 West Fayette’s standing.  We also
reject the suggestion that the very nature of the MOA at issue here entitles 120 West Fayette
to bring a declaratory judgment action in connection with it.
Amici cite to Master Royalties Corp. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 235 Md. 74, 92, 200
A.2d 652, 661 (1964), in making the broad assertion that “the lower court improperly ignored
well-established Maryland land-use law that gives expanded standing to property owners
confronted with harmful effects of redevelopment projects.”  We remain unpersuaded by this
assertion because, as we explain infra, the MOA before us is not a land use decision.  Unlike
the urban renewal ordinance at issue in Master Royalties, which “approve[d] a renewal plan
for Project I of the Mount Royal-Fremont Renewal Area,” 235 Md. 74, 82, 200 A.2d 652,
656, or the renewal ordinance at issue in Superblock I, the MOA between the City and the
Trust was not promulgated by a legislative or administrative body to bind the general public
in the development or use of real estate.  We therefore decline to apply “well-established
Maryland land-use law” to the question of whether a non-party to the MOA has standing to
litigate compliance with its terms.
Second, Amici assert that the MOA at issue is a close relative of MOAs entered into
pursuant to Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, which effectuate historical
preservation goals for federal capital projects.  This similarity, according to Amici, gives
“added weight” to federal authority interpreting Section 106 MOAs.  Consequently, Amici
cite to two Section 106 cases, Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) and Waterford
Citizens’ Ass’n v. Reilly, 970 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir. 1992), which Amici assert stand for the
proposition that private citizens possess standing to enforce the terms of an MOA drawn up
for historical preservation purposes.  Both cases are inapposite to the statutory issue we here
decide.
Of the two, only Tyler, the decision of the United States. Court of Appeals for the
(continued...)
-16-
standing to a party alleging a violation of an urban renewal ordinance.14  
14(...continued)
Ninth Circuit, deals squarely with the standing of a non-party, private citizen to enforce the
terms of an MOA governing historic preservation of a federal capital project.  In that case
private homeowners brought suit against the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development  and the City of San Francisco, among others, for the breach of an MOA
entered into pursuant to Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.  236 F.3d at
1128.   The defendant agency and city argued that the plaintiff homeowners could not bring
suit to enforce breached terms of the MOA “because they lack[ed] privity of contract and
[were] not intended beneficiaries of the MOA.”  Id. at 1134.  The Tyler court disagreed,
holding that the plaintiffs “[had] standing as third-party beneficiaries to the MOA.”  Id. at
1135.  The court based its holding on the fact that “Stipulation 5 of the MOA specifically
provide[d] that if a ‘member of the public’ makes a written complaint, ‘the City shall take
the objection into account and consult as needed with the objecting party.’”  Id. at 1134.
Thus, noted the court, though the plaintiffs were not signatories to the MOA, they were
contemplated as beneficiaries of the MOA’s terms because they were “specifically referenced
in Stipulation 5.”  Id. at 1135.
The reasoning of the Tyler court does not apply to the facts of the case at bar.  Unlike
the MOA in Tyler, the MOA in the present case does not provide for a public right of
comment. 
-17-
120 West Fayette also argues that it has standing as an adjoining landowner because
the MOA is a “unique land control device” that “provides an administrative body (The Trust)
[with] control [of] demolition in an historic area.”  The argument fails in its premise.  The
MOA is not a land control device—or, perhaps better stated, a “land use decision”—with
attendant principles extending standing to nearby aggrieved landowners.
Generally defined, a land use decision is a decision (typically an ordinance or
regulation) enacted or promulgated by a legislative or administrative body for the purpose
of directing the development of real estate.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 958 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “land use regulation” as “an ordinance or other legislative enactment governing the
development or use of real estate”).  Important for present purposes, our research discloses
-18-
not a single case of this Court approving the grant of tax-payer or adjacent landowner
standing to an individual or entity in any context other than a challenge to or pursuant to a
land use decision, as that term is generally understood.  Indeed, in every case of this Court
that we have found, the land use decision a party was seeking to challenge or enforce was
either an ordinance, variance, reclassification, or special exception provided by a local
zoning body, or a permit or license issued by an administrative agency.  See, e.g., Prince
George’s Cnty. v. Billings, 420 Md. 84, 97-98, 21 A.3d 1065,1072-73 (2011) (granting tax-
payer and adjoining landowner standing to residents who sought to challenge a departure
from design standard and special exception granted by the Prince George’s County Planning
Board and Zoning Hearing Examiner, respectively); Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269-70, 964
A.2d at 671 (granting tax-payer and adjoining landowner standing to a private corporation
that sought to challenge a violation of a Baltimore City Council urban renewal ordinance);
Sugarloaf Citizens’ Assoc. v. Dep’t of Env’t, 344 Md. 271, 298-99, 686 A.2d 605, 619 (1996)
(granting farm-owners adjoining landowner standing to challenge issuance of two permits
by the Department of the Environment authorizing construction of trash incinerators); Wier
v. Witney Land Co., 257 Md. 600, 614, 263 A.2d 833, 840 (1970) (granting landowners
adjoining landowner standing to challenge a reclassification and special exception granted
by the County Board of Appeals of Baltimore County); Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258
Md. 350, 355, 265 A.2d 885, 887 (1970) (granting landowner adjoining landowner standing
to challenge a City of Salisbury ordinance reclassifying land from industrial to residential);
The Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578, 584, 251 A.2d 1, 4 (1969) (granting
-19-
homeowners adjoining landowner standing to challenge a zoning reclassification granted by
the County Commissioners of Howard County); Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 651-52, 244
A.2d 879, 882-83 (1968) (granting homeowners adjoining landowner standing to challenge
a rezoning decision by the Montgomery County District Council); Bryniarski v. Montgomery
Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 146-47, 230 A.2d 289, 295-96 (1967) (granting
landowners adjoining landowner standing to challenge a special exception granted by the
Montgomery County Board of Appeals); Hertelendy v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals,
245 Md. 554, 564-65, 226 A.2d 672, 678-79 (1967) (reversing Circuit Court’s determination
that appellant was not an aggrieved party, for purposes of standing to challenge a variance
granted by the Montgomery County Board of Appeals); Windsor Hills Improvement Assoc.,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 394, 73 A.2d 531, 535 (1950) (denying standing
to an association seeking to challenge the Baltimore City Board of Municipal Zoning
Appeals’s grant of a building permit).
Previous opinions of the Court of Special Appeals generally follow the same pattern.
See, e.g., Ray v. Baltimore, 203 Md. App. 15, 40, 36 A.3d 521, 536 (2012) (denying
adjoining property owner standing to individuals challenging a Baltimore City Council
zoning ordinance that established a planned unit development); Handley v. Ocean Downs,
LLC, 151 Md. App. 615, 629, 827 A.2d 961, 969 (2003) (granting homeowners taxpayer
standing to challenge the City of Cambridge Board of Zoning Appeals’s grant of a special
use permit); Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller Media Co., 150 Md. App. 479, 507, 822
A.2d 478, 494 (2003) (denying standing to a non-taxpayer who challenged the grant of a
-20-
zoning variance by the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Willards); Comm. For
Responsible Dev. on 25th Street v. Mayor of Baltimore, 137 Md. App. 60, 89, 767 A.2d 906,
921-22 (2001) (denying the adjoining property owner standing to a resident challenging
issuance of a demolition and construction permit by Baltimore City Board of Municipal and
Zoning Appeals); Holland v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 113 Md. App. 274, 281-82, 687
A.2d 699, 703 (1996) (denying residents aggrieved status to challenge approval for a
residential subdivision by the Town of Hampstead Planning & Zoning Commission);
Cylburn Arboretum Assoc., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 106 Md. App. 183, 193, 664 A.2d
382, 387 (1995) (denying standing to an association challenging Baltimore City zoning
ordinance that permitted planned use development on a lot); Grooms v. Lavale Zoning Bd.,
27 Md. App. 266, 270-271, 340 A.2d 385, 389 (1975) (granting residents standing to
challenge resolution and order amending the zoning map enacted by the LaVale Zoning
Board); cf. Long Green Valley, Assoc. v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., ___ Md. App. ___, 2012 Md.
App. LEXIS 19, *80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Filed Feb. 14, 2012) (granting adjoining
landowner standing in a challenge brought pursuant to a Maryland Agricultural Land
Preservation Foundation easement that aimed to preserve agricultural character of land at
issue and restricted land from being used for commercial, industrial or residential purposes).
The MOA at issue in the present case is not an ordinance, variance or permit.
Furthermore, the MOA binds only two parties (as opposed to the general public).  The MOA
was not enacted by a legislative or administrative body.  And, most important, the MOA does
not direct the use or development of real estate in the Superblock.  The MOA, in short, is not
15 Under the enumeration of the Trust’s powers and duties codified at SFP § 5A-318,
the Trust may do the following:  (1) adopt regulations to carry out Title 5A, Subtitle 3; (2)
take legal action to enforce the subtitle; (3) adopt and use an official seal; (4) contract for
services; (5) apply for and accept loans; (6) provide financial assistance to a historic
preservation project; (7) acquire and hold real and personal property; (8) acquire securities
or other evidence of indebtedness; (9) acquire title to a historic property by conveyance or
foreclosure; (10) transfer or dispose of property held by the Trust; (11) make agreements and
contracts for the performance of Trust duties; (12) preserve, restore, rehabilitate, reconstruct,
protect, document, excavate, salvage, exhibit and interpret historic properties; (13) accept and
use gifts for any Trust purpose; (14) apply to Trust purposes any thing of value the Trust
receives; or (15) delegate any of its powers to the Director, or one of the trustees.  SFP § 5A-
318(b)(1)-(15).
Likewise, in accordance with its duties, the Trust must: (1) direct a statewide survey
of historic properties; (2) maintain an inventory and register of historic properties; (3)
research and document the significance of historic properties; (4) prepare and implement
statewide and regional historic preservation plans; (5) help subdivisions develop local
historic preservation plans; (6) carry out programs and activities to protect and preserve
historic properties; (7) preserve properties held by the Trust; (8) cooperate with various
governmental entities to ensure historic properties are considered at all levels of planning and
development; (9) review State unit programs that affect historic properties, and recommend
ways to improve their effectiveness; (10) administer financial and technical assistance
programs for historic preservation; (11) make recommendations on certification of historic
properties for tax credits; (12) provide public education and training relating to historic
(continued...)
-21-
a land use decision.
We also reject the argument of 120 West Fayette that the MOA vested the Trust with
authority to “control . . . demolition in an historic area,” thereby (as we understand the
argument) rendering the MOA a land use decision.  Title 5A, Subtitle 3 of the Maryland
Code (2001, 2009 Repl. Vol.), State Finance and Procurement Article (SFP) establishes the
Trust and sets forth its responsibilities.  120 West Fayette does not direct us to a provision
within that Subtitle that expressly empowers the Trust to direct the development of real
estate, and we can find none.15  It appears that the closest express connection the Trust has
(...continued)
preservation; (13) encourage public interest in historic preservation; (14) assist the State
Historic Preservation Officer in his or her responsibilities; (15) advise the Governor and
General Assembly on historic preservation; and (16) submit an annual report of its activities
to the Governor and General Assembly.  SFP § 5A-318(c)(1)-(16).
Based on this enumeration, we fail to see how the Trust may direct a State unit on the
development of real estate under that State unit’s control.  Even more so, we fail to see how
the Trust is entitled to direct a citizen of this State on the development of real estate within
the citizen’s control.  Under SFP § 5A-318(c)(8) & (9), the closest the Trust stands to the
locus of a land use decision itself is carrying out its duties of “cooperat[ion],” “review,” and
“recommend[ation].”  In short, the Trust does not and cannot on its own direct real estate
development.
16 Entitled “Protection and use of historic properties,” SFP § 5A-326 consists of eight
subsections that outline how the Trust may effectuate the protection and preservation of
historical properties.   Subsection (a) provides that a State unit must cooperate with the Trust
to identify historic properties under its control, ensure those historic properties are not
inadvertently transferred or destroyed, and use historic buildings to the extent possible before
acquiring new property.   § 5A-326(a).   Subsection (b) requires a State unit that transfers an
historic property to ensure that the transfer provides for the preservation of the property, “[i]f
it is prudent, practicable, and in the State’s best interest to do so.”  § 5A-326(b).   Subsection
(c) requires a State unit whose actions will result in the alteration or destruction of an historic
property to investigate the property, salvage appropriate objects and materials, and deposit
everything with the Trust.  § 5A-326(c).   Subsection (d), discussed above, requires a State
unit to give notice to and consult with the Trust when issuing a permit or license that will
affect an historic property.  § 5A-326(d).  Subsection (e) permits the State unit, after
consultation with the Trust, to put certain preservation conditions on any license it issues. 
§ 5A-326(e).  It also provides that the reasonableness of the conditions are appealable in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.  § 5A-326(e)(3).  Subsection (f) requires
the Trust to promulgate regulations for standards, guidelines and procedures to preserve
historic properties under State unit control, in order to minimize the need for Trust review.
§ 5A-326(f).  Subsection (g)  makes the subtitle applicable to any “undertaking” subject to
the National Historic Preservation Act.  § 5A-326(g).   And subsection (h) provides that,
“[f]ailure by a State unit to comply with this section does not create a private cause of action
under State law.” § 5A-326(h).
-22-
to land use decisions is in SFP § 5A-326.16  Even there, a State unit that “issues permits or
licenses” need only “cooperate” with the Trust by “giving notice to the Trust, on request, of
-23-
each application for a permit . . . [or] license,” and, “where appropriate[,] . . . consult[ing]
with the Trust before the State unit takes final action on the application.” SFP § 5A-326(d)(1)
& (2).   
Because the MOA is not a land use decision, 120 West Fayette cannot rely on the
principles that extend standing to an adjoining landowner in review of land use decisions.
120 West Fayette therefore is left only with principles of contract law to establish its
entitlement to press a claim for declaratory relief.  
As we have said, 120 West Fayette recognizes the contractual nature of the MOA.
Indeed, by its terms, the MOA is an agreement between the City and the Trust.  For the Trust,
the MOA establishes a procedure for Trust consultation and approval of development plans
with potential adverse effects on historic properties within the Superblock that is in
accordance with state and federal law.  For the City, the MOA fulfills a condition precedent
to receiving the General Assembly’s $1 million appropriation for redevelopment of the
Hippodrome Performing Arts Center, a key component of the westside Urban Renewal Plan.
Therefore, the Circuit Court properly applied principles of contract law to determine whether
120 West Fayette is entitled to seek the declaratory relief requested in the complaint. Under
those principles, 120 West Fayette may only ask for declaratory relief interpreting the MOA
if it can show that it was a party to, or an intended beneficiary of, the MOA.
At common law, only a party to a contract could bring suit to enforce the terms of a
contract.  Marlboro Shirt Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 569, 77 A.2d 776, 777
(1951).  The common law rule has expanded to permit “third-party beneficiaries” to bring
-24-
suit in order to enforce the terms of a contract.  Dickerson v. Longoria, 414 Md. 419, 452,
995 A.2d 721, 742 (2010).  “An individual is a third-party beneficiary to a contract if ‘the
contract was intended for his [or her] benefit’ and ‘it … clearly appear[s] that the parties
intended to recognize him [or her] as the primary party in interest and as privy to the
promise.’”  Id., 995 A.2d at 741 (quoting Shillman v. Hobstetter, 249 Md. 678, 687, 241 A.2d
570, 575 (1968)) (alterations in original).  It is not enough that the contract merely operates
to an individual’s benefit:  “An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no
right against the promisor or the promisee.”  Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 408
Md. 242, 261, 969 A.2d 284, 295 (2009) (citation omitted).
120 West Fayette is not a party to the MOA, and, indeed, it does not claim to be.  The
memorandum states explicitly: “This [agreement] is entered into . . . by and between the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . and the Maryland Historical Trust.”  Additionally,
120 West Fayette is not a third-party beneficiary of the MOA.  The promises and benefits set
forth in the MOA are directed solely to the City and the Trust.  Nowhere in the MOA is it
contemplated that 120 West Fayette is to receive a benefit.  120 West Fayette seems to
concede as much in its brief before this Court, explaining that it did not file its complaint in
order to obtain a favorable administrative decision; instead, “[120 West Fayette] asked the
nisi prius court to restore the Board’s opportunity, conferred by the MOA, to the rightful
decision maker, i.e., the Board of Trustees of [the Trust]. . . . The prime intent of the suit was
to give [the Trust] the right to review and rule on demolition plans under the MOA.”
(Emphasis added.) 
-25-
Neither does 120 West Fayette’s standing to challenge the City’s “allegedly illegal
avoidance of urban renewal and procurement ordinances,” Superblock I, 407 Md. at 272, 964
A.2d at 673, make it a donee or creditor beneficiary of the MOA.  And 120 West Fayette
does not claim a direct right to compensation from the MOA.  See Montana v. United States,
124 F.3d 1269, 1273 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When members of the public bring suit against
promisors who contract with the government to render a public service,” they “are considered
to be incidental beneficiaries unless they can show a direct right to compensation.”).  In
short, the parties to the MOA did not “intend[] to recognize” 120 West Fayette “as the
primary party in interest and as privy to the promise.”  Dickerson, 414 Md. at 452, 995 A.2d
at 741 (quoting Shillman, 249 Md. at 687, 241 A.2d at 575).
The Trust ultimately chose not to take any legal action in connection with this matter.
Whether 120 West Fayette is satisfied with the consequences of that decision is immaterial,
because 120 West Fayette’s satisfaction was not contemplated by the private agreement
memorialized in the MOA.  
We hold that 120 West Fayette, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, may not
file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which
it has no part.  The Circuit Court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 81
September Term, 2011
120 WEST FAYETTE STREET, LLLP
v. 
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
Kenney, James A. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
     
                 
  JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,
 which Harrell and Cathell, JJ., join.
Filed:   April 27, 2012
1 In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal program for the
development of the westside of downtown Baltimore known as the “Market Center Urban
Renewal Plan.”  Lexington Square Developers submitted to the Baltimore Development
Corporation (“BDC”) its plans for development, which were accepted and subsequently
The majority holds that a Memorandum of Agreement between the City and the
Maryland Historical Trust is a private agreement to which taxpayers are mere incidental
beneficiaries, and as a result, the appellant taxpayer suing to enforce the Agreement, lacks
standing to do so.  The majority, therefore, affirms the lower court’s motion to dismiss the
appellant’s action, citing a lack of a justiciable controversy.  In actuality, the appellant has
taxpayer standing, as it alleges a violation of State law by the City and the Maryland
Historical Trust through its alleged approval of a land use project.  Additionally, the
Memorandum of Agreement is a contract so inextricably bound with the land uses to be
developed that it creates land use standing and cannot be considered a purely private
contract.  For these reasons, I dissent.
I.
The appellant is 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP, a business entity and neighboring
landowner to the development site in dispute.  The appellees are  the City of Baltimore (“the
City”), the Baltimore Development Corporation (“BDC”), Lexington Square Developers,
LLC, d/b/a Lexington Square Partners (“the developers”), and the Maryland Historical Trust
(“MHT”).  The contract in question is a January 2001 Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”)
between the MHT and the City relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection
with the Baltimore City Market Center Urban Renewal Area (a land use redevelopment
project) commonly known as the “Superblock.”1  It was made necessary, as the majority
the City and developers entered into a Land Disposition Agreement (“LDA”), the subject
of controversy in 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 992 A.2d 459 (2010) (“Superblock II”).  “Under the LDA,
Lexington Square will receive upon closing a fee simple interest in all property conveyed
pursuant to the agreement[,]...contingent on several conditions, including...the MHT’s
approval of the project plan, and sufficient evidence that Lexington Square has financing
for the project.”  Id. at 320, 992 A.2d at 467.  Further, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, in its Memorandum of Opinion, recognized the significance of the MOA, stating, in
its summary of the current case, “It is agreed by all parties that the MOA is inextricably
bound with the Land Development Agreement and, therefore, is likewise bound to the
land uses to be developed within the Superblock.”  120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 24-C-11-002775, slip op. at 5.
The majority asserts that this particular case does not involve land use issues.
Urban Renewal, including its side agreements, are quintessentially land use issues.  The
history of urban renewal reflects that it has often been used to dispossess the relatively
powerless lower income residents in favor, ultimately, of a privileged few.  This case
actually involves what many believe to be the most onerous land use tool – urban
renewal.  The majority’s position that this case is not a case involving land use is simply
incorrect.
2 The MOA expressly provides, in § 4, titled Trust and Review Approval:
“The Trust will review and provide written comments within 30 days after
the receipt for all items the City submits for review pursuant to the terms of
this MOA.  If the Trust fails to approve, disapprove, or approve with
conditions any item within 30 days of receipt, the City may proceed with
the activity.”
2
acknowledges, 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, __
Md. __, __, __ A._d __, __ (2012) [slip op. at 3], as a result of the inclusion in the budget bill
of language conditioning the Maryland Stadium Authority’s receipt of $1 million in funds
on “the City of Baltimore and the Maryland Historic Trust... reach[ing] an agreement on how
to minimize the demolition of structures which contribute to the Market Center National
Register Historic District.”  See 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 204 § 1, DA03.60(2).  The MOA
requires the City to submit Superblock redevelopment plans to the MHT for approval.2  That
The State makes much of the MOA being a private agreement.  That emphasis
disregards, and at the least undermines, the undeniable fact that it is an agreement forced
by the General Assembly, see 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 204 § 1, DA03.60(2), and it is also a
means to carry out the provisions of, and the MHT’s duties under, the State and Finance
Procurement Article of the Maryland Code, as we discuss below.
3 Section 5A-325(h) states, in relevant part:
“(a) Duty to consult with Trust on State-financed capital projects. – (1) To
the extent feasible, a State unit that submits a request or is otherwise
responsible for a capital project shall consult with the Trust to determine
whether the project will adversely affect any property listed in or eligible
for listing in the Historic Register.”
*     *     *
“(d) Determination of adverse effect. – (1) Within 30 days after a State unit
notifies the Director of a proposed capital project under this section, the
Director shall determine whether the project would adversely affect any
property listed in or eligible to be listed in the Historic Register.
“(2) If the Director finds that the proposed capital project would
have a significant adverse effect on a listed or eligible property, the
Director and the State unit shall consult to determine whether a
practicable plan exists to avoid, mitigate, or satisfactorily reduce the
adverse effect.
“(3) If the Director and the State unit cannot agree on a plan, the
State unit shall submit to the Council a report of the consultations
and the findings and recommendations of the State unit.
“(4) Within 30 days after receiving the report, the Council shall
submit to the State unit comments:
“(i) accepting the adverse effect; or
“(ii) recommending practicable alternatives to avoid, mitigate,
or satisfactorily reduce the adverse effect.
“(5) The State unit may:
“(i) incorporate in the project the alternatives recommended
by the Council; or
“(ii) disagree with the comments of the Council.
3
MHT is the approval authority is appropriate given the issues and matters at stake and is, in
fact consistent with, and authorized by, the statutory authority granted to the MHT by the
General Assembly in Maryland Code (2001, 2009 Repl. Vol.) §§ 5A-325 (h)3 and 5A-326
“(6) If the State unit disagrees with the comments of the Council, the
State unit:
“(i) shall respond in writing to the Council, explaining why
the State unit refuses to adopt the measures included in the
comments of the Council; and
“(ii) may not proceed with the project for at least 10 working
days after responding.”
While subsection (d) specifically grants authority to the Trust’s “Director,” I note
that it limits this authority simply to the determination of “adverse effect”on historic
properties.  Further, with subsection (a) using the language “consult with the Trust,”this
Court should read the two subsections harmoniously together.  See Taxiera v. Malkus,
320 Md. 471, 481, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990) (“where two statutes purport to deal with
the same subject matter, they must be construed together as if they were not inconsistent
with one another.”) (internal citations omitted).
4 Section 5A-326 states, in relevant part:
“(a) In general. – In cooperation with the Trust and subject to available
resources, each State unit shall:
“(1) establish a program to identify, document, and nominate to the
Trust each property owned or controlled by the State unit that
appears to qualify for the Historic Register;
“(2) ensure that no property listed in or eligible to be listed in the
Historic Register is inadvertently transferred, sold, demolished,
destroyed, substantially altered, or allowed to deteriorate
significantly; and
“(3) use any available historic building under its control to the extent
prudent and practicable before acquiring, constructing, or leasing a building
to carry out its responsibilities.”
The majority, at 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, __ Md. __, __, __ A._d __, __ (2012) [slip op. at 21-23], asserts that the
appellant cites no “provision within that Subtitle that expressly empowers the Trust to
direct the development of real estate” and thus the MOA, which reflects State law, is not,
and fails to incorporate, a land use decision.  It then states that “SFP § 5A-326 consists of
eight subsections that outline how the Trust may effectuate the protection and
preservation of historic properties.”  Id. at __, n.16, __ A._d at __, n.16 [slip op. at 23]. 
In making these statements, the majority is simply wrong.  Section 5A-326 (a) is not an
optional provision; nowhere does it contain the word “may.”  As seen above, the
provision is mandatory.  Woodfield v. W. River Ass’n, 395 Md. 377, 388-89, 910 A.2d
4
(h)4 of the State Finance and Procurement Article and Section 110 of the National
452, 459 (2006) (“When a legislative body commands that something be done, using
words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ rather than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ we must assume, absent
some evidence to the contrary, that it was serious and that it meant for the thing to be
done in the manner it directed.”) (quoting Tucker v. State, 89 Md. App. 295, 297-98, 598
A.2d 479, 481 (1991)).  It states that a City, in cooperation with the Trust, “shall” ensure
that no property listed in the Historic Register is inadvertently demolished or destroyed. 
The Superblock is included in the National Register of Historic Places as part of the
Market Center Historic District.  The Trust’s agreement is required when property on that
registry is to be transferred, destroyed or altered.  That, it seems to me, is certainly the
authority to direct real estate decisions, when those decisions involve, as they do here, the
transferring, destruction, or alteration of historic properties.
5 Section 110 of the National Preservation Act of 1966, or 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2,
states, in relevant part:
“(a) Responsibilities of Federal agencies; program for identification,
evaluation, nomination, and protection.
“(1) The heads of all Federal agencies shall assume responsibility for
the preservation of historic properties which are owned or controlled
by such agency. Prior to acquiring, constructing, or leasing buildings
for purposes of carrying out agency responsibilities, each Federal
agency shall use, to the maximum extent feasible, historic properties
available to the agency, in accordance with Executive Order No.
13006, issued May 21, 1996 (61 Fed. Reg. 26071) [40 USCS § 3306
note]. Each agency shall undertake, consistent with the preservation
of such properties and the mission of the agency and the professional
standards established pursuant to section 101(g) [16 USCS §
470a(g)], any preservation, as may be necessary to carry out this
section.
*     *     *
“(c) Agency Preservation Officer; responsibilities; qualifications. The head
of each Federal agency shall, unless exempted under section 214 [16 USCS
§ 470v], designate a qualified official to be known as the agency’s
“preservation officer” who shall be responsible for coordinating that
agency’s activities under this Act [16 USCS §§ 470 et seq.]. Each
Preservation Officer may, in order to be considered qualified, satisfactorily
complete an appropriate training program established by the Secretary
under section 101(h) [16 USCS § 470a(h)].”
5
Preservation Act of 1966.5  These federal and state provisions relate to review of projects that
6 The majority, at 120 West Fayette, __ Md. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 2],
simply states that “Rodney Little[ ] rejected the first four sets of redevelopment plans by
the City[,]” but fails to specify that, in doing so, Little used language indicating that the
entire Trust made the decision, while he acted only as the official correspondent.
6
may adversely affect historic properties and the consultations that are required to be made
in order to avoid or mitigate adverse effects.
The first four redevelopment plans the City submitted to the MHT were rejected on
grounds that the developers failed to present a plan acceptable under the MOA, due to a
failure to retain enough historic properties.  In each instance, the rejection, not surprisingly,
was communicated by the Director of MHT, Rodney Little, but on behalf of the MHT.6  That
he was acting in a representative capacity is made clear by the language he used in those
rejection letters: “We are writing to provide our initial comments;” “the Trust cannot concur
in this plan;” “[w]e have determined that the [development plan] provided to the Trust...does
not meet the minimum requirements in the MOA and Strategic Plan,” etc.  In response to the
fifth set of development plans, submitted in December 2010, Little, acting without the
authorization of the MHT and, therefore, in an individual capacity, gave conditional approval
to redevelopment plans that were not appreciably different than the preceding rejected
submissions.  That this is true is obvious from the letter itself.  In it, consistently with the
prior letters, Little states “[w]e have reviewed this design for the redevelopment of
‘Superblock’ and assessed its effects on historic resources...[t]he current proposal will have
substantial adverse effects on historic resources.”  He then asserts “[t]he current conceptual
design (October 21, 2010) includes revisions and measures that will minimize or mitigate
7
some of these adverse effects[,]” concluding “[o]ur office has determined that the current
[Lexington Square Partners] proposal minimizes or mitigates the adverse effects of their
project on the historic district...[w]ithin these constraints, our office is prepared to approve
the proposed design with the following conditions....”
Rather than referring to “the Trust,” he uses the term, “our office,” substituting that
entity as the source of the conditional approval.  Of greater importance, unlike in the case of
the prior letters, where Little did not leave his personal contact information,  he ends the
letter,  “[I]f you have any questions concerning this determination, please contact me at (410)
514-7602 or rlittle@mdp.state.md.us.”   
The appellant, whose office building is located physically across the street from, and
overlooks, the Superblock, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City an action challenging
the proposed demolition in the Superblock, premised on Little’s approval of the development
plans.  Naming the appellees as defendants, it alleged, among other things, that the agents
of the governmental defendants that purported to approve demolition plans within an area
of the Superblock engaged in certain ultra vires acts.  The gravamen of the Complaint is that
the appellees were involved in an “illicit circumvention of appropriate approval for
demolition plans” of historically significant buildings in the Superblock.  More particularly,
the appellant proffered that the City “maneuvered to putatively gain an ultra vires, bogus
approval for development of the Superblock that spurns statutorily and contractually
mandated objectives of preservation in favor of the developer’s ‘non-negotiable business
model.’”  As the Circuit Court recognized in its Memorandum of Opinion, “the Plaintiffs
7 The majority makes much of the appellant’s request, in its original Complaint, for
a declaratory judgment interpreting how the approval process for demolition within
Superblock should have proceeded under the MOA.  See 120 West Fayette, __ Md. at __,
__ A._d at __ [slip op. at 2, 8, 21].  It also argues that the appellant did not ask for a
declaratory judgment defining State law.  Id. at __, n. 13, __ A._d at __, n.13 [slip op. at
16].  First, the MOA is an approval mechanism for historic property destruction in
connection with the development of the Superblock, the second largest redevelopment
project in the history of the State of Maryland; as I discuss in Part III, the MOA, because
of the decisions on which the City and the MHT must agree, is so inextricably tied to this
Urban Renewal Plan, and represents such an essential step to real estate development, that
it creates land use standing on its own.  Second, I do not agree that the appellant’s request
for declaratory relief was deficient.
The first line of the Complaint simply states that it sues the Defendants “for
declaratory relief” but does not specify to what regard.  Later, in paragraph 6, the
Complaint reads “This suit arises now because Mr. Brodie, for Baltimore City, has
maneuvered to putatively gain an ultra vires, bogus approval for development of
Superblock that spurns statutorily and contractually mandated objectives of preservation
in favor of the developer’s [business model].” (Emphasis added).  Later, in paragraph 13,
the Complaint avers that the developers “[were] awarded the land disposition agreement
to develop the Superblock in accord with, among other things, the MOA.  Indeed, the
land disposition agreement specifically requires adherence to the MOA.” (Emphasis
added).  Next, in paragraph 31, right before the appellant cited case law interpreting a
governmental employee’s authority, the Complaint reads “As pointed out by Preservation
Maryland...Mr Little’s ultra vires abdication from the Trust’s mission exceeded Mr.
8
assert that it is not the contract between the Defendants, per se, that the Plaintiffs seek to
enforce, but rather what Plaintiffs term was the ultra vires approval of the plans themselves
by the Executive Director of the Maryland Historical Trust.”   120 West Fayette Street, LLLP
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 24-C-11-002775, slip op. at 11.  In response
to the Defendants’ counter-assertion that the appellant’s lawsuit was based exclusively upon
the MOA, the appellant noted “that ‘Maryland Historical Trust places heavy reliance on
Sections 5A-325 and 5A-326 of the State Finance and Procurement Article...[although]
neither provision appear[s] on the face of the MOA.’”  Id. at 12.7
Little’s authority as an agent of the state agency, the Trust, and thus had no legal effect.” 
Finally, under the section entitled “Relief,” the Complaint states “Plaintiff prays that a
declaration of rights be entered...interpreting the Memorandum of Agreement in light of
the facts of this case, and declaring the 12/22/10 letter from Rodney Little to be ultra
vires, ab initio[.]” (Emphasis added).  
It is clear to me that the Complaint properly and consistently requested a
declaration that Little’s letter was ultra vires when considered in the context of the MOA,
the Budget Bill requiring it, the statutory basis for the MHT and applicable provisions of
the State Finance and Procurement Article.  The State statutes that are relevant to the
disposition of this case are clear and do not require “defining.”  Thus, I am at a loss as to
why the appellant needed to or should have sought to have them defined.   In focusing on
Little’s failure to comply with the MOA, the appellant emphasized the decisions the
MOA required the parties to it to make, so viewing the MOA as a land use document in
the sense that it encompassed land use decisions from which taxpayer standing may arise. 
The Circuit Court erred in its interpretation, and the majority mistakenly adopts this
erroneous interpretation, of the appellant’s Complaint.
9
The Complaint and exhibits detailed the rejection of the four demolition proposals
under the MOA because each proposal was not preservation protective.  The allegations that
the City and developers unlawfully circumscribed the MOA requirements were specified in
paragraphs 23 to 29 of the Complaint.  Read as a whole, they allege that BDC’s president,
M. J. Brodie, fearing another rejection of the plans of its chosen developer, gathered, without
any notice to the MHT’s Board of Trustees, “a meeting among senior representatives of the
State…, the City…and [the developer] to discuss this serious matter.”  At the gathering, these
“heavyweights” were arrayed against Little and one other Trust employee, according to the
allegations of the Complaint, for the purpose of placing  intense political pressure on Little
for the benefit of the developer.  As a result of the meeting, Little, without notice to the
Board, and under what he felt was enormous political pressure, issued his letter of
conditional and “reluctant acceptance.”
8 Section 5A-317 of the State Fin. & Proc. Art. of the Maryland Code states that
“[o]n request, the Board shall receive legal counsel and services from the Attorney
General to carry out the purposes of the Trust.”  The majority points out that the Trust
“ultimately chose not to take any legal action in connection with this matter.”  120 West
Fayette, __ Md. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 26].
Shortly after Director Little’s approval, on January 18, 2011, Preservation
Maryland, Maryland’s state-wide historic preservation advocacy organization, sent a
letter to Chairman of the MHT, as well as copies to the Mayor, Office of the Attorney
General, and several other parties, asserting that Little’s letter had no legal authority.  In
response, the Office of the Attorney General issued an advice of counsel letter stating
that, in its view, the Director was authorized to approve the development proposal.  First,
the letter incorrectly reasoned that the Director had direct authority for his actions based
on § 5A-325 (d)’s language, which in actuality only grants the Director the authority to
determine “adverse effect” of a development plan on historical properties, but not to
single-handedly approve the destruction of such properties; second, the letter incorrectly
reasoned that the Board delegated to the Director the authority to make the approval
10
The Board of MHT was not advised, by Little,  and did not learn of Little’s putative
approval of the redevelopment plans until a month or so later, when Preservation Maryland,
by letter, provided that  notification.  During the period following Little’s purported
approval, including that period before the Board of MHT received notification that Little had
given approval, the City, despite being aware that the December letter approving the
redevelopment plan was from Little and represented the position of his “office,” and not the
MHT, but acting on that “approval,” proceeded to accept the proposed demolition plan.
Following a meeting, the MHT Board conveyed its thoughts to the Mayor.  “[S]trongly
disagree[ing] with the Trust Director’s determination in this case” and reiterating what it had
said four times before, the MHT Board concluded, “that the current proposal does not
conform to the provisions or intent of the Memorandum of Agreement.”  It asked that the
Director’s December 22, 2010 letter of conditional approval be rescinded.8  That request was
based on the Board’s “acquiescing” to the Director’s past negotiations relating to the
MOA – negotiations which, of course, never amounted to an approval of any
development plan.  This assertion is clearly incorrect as evidenced by the MHT’s request
that the approval be rescinded.
Perhaps the MHT Board relied on this response when it chose not to retain the
Attorney General in an action against the Director or the City.  The record reflects that the
MHT Chairman, in response to the Director’s approval, requested that the Mayor rescind
the conditional approval, a request that was ultimately denied.
11
denied.  Indeed, the City, brushed aside the MHT Board’s complaint and disapproval.
The appellees all filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, which were heard before
the parties had a chance to engage in  discovery.   The trial court granted their motions,
dismissing the appellant’s Complaint on the grounds that it was neither in privity with, nor
a third party beneficiary of, the MOA, a private contract.
II.
In RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643-44, 994 A.2d 430, 433-
34 (2010), we stated:
Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and
allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and
permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the
allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be
granted...Upon appellate review, the trial court’s decision to grant such a
motion is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct.
(Internal citations omitted).
This Court is also aware that “a motion to dismiss ‘is rarely appropriate in a
declaratory judgment action.’”  120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council
12
of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 355, 992 A.2d 459, 487 (2010) (“Superblock II”) (citing
Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 466, 494 A.2d 934, 936 (1985)) (quoting Shapiro v. Bd.
of County Cmm’rs, 219 Md. 298, 302-03, 149 A.2d 396, 398-99 (1959)).  “When a
complaint fails to allege a justiciable controversy, however, a motion to dismiss is proper.”
Superblock II, 413 Md. at 356, 992 A.2d at 488.  See also Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 3-409(a)(1).  “To be justiciable the issue must present more than a mere difference of
opinion, and there must be more than a mere prayer for declaratory relief.”  Superblock II,
413 Md. at 356, 992 A.2d at 488 (citing Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 46, 464 A.2d 1076,
1078 (1983)).
This case, essentially, requires a determination of standing, which must be asserted
properly before this Court can address the merits of the allegations.  This Court has held, and
the majority recognizes, that standing exists in the case of urban renewal plans by virtue of
the land use decisions inevitably involved.  120 West Fayette, __ Md. at __, __ A._d at __
[slip op. at 15].  In 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
407 Md. 253, 272, 964 A.2d 662, 673 (2009) (Superblock I), we stated
“Because ‘land use . . . is at least one of the prime considerations with which
an urban renewal plan is reasonably sure to be concerned,’ Master Royalties
v. Balto. City, 235 Md. 74, 92, 200 A.2d 652, 661 (1964), we conclude that the
principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, confronting or neighboring
property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, logically extend
to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is challenging
a municipalities’ allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement
ordinances. Cf. Schweig v. City of St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. 1978)
(reasoning that since nearby property owners have standing to challenge
zoning ordinances, nearby property owners also had standing to challenge the
legality of a municipal redevelopment project since the owners could have
13
suffered harm if the project was mismanaged or not completed).”
See also Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 234, 738 A.2d 881,
885 (1999) (“Maryland has ‘gone rather far in sustaining the standing of taxpayers to
challenge…alleged illegal and ultra vires actions of public officials.’”) (citing Inlet
Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Ass’n, 313 Md. 413, 441, 545 A.2d 1296,
1310 (1988)) (quoting Thomas v. Howard County, 261 Md. 422, 432, 276 A.2d 49, 54
(1971)); Sugarloaf Citizens’ Assoc. v. Dep’t of Env’t, 344 Md. 271, 297, 686 A.2d 605, 618
(1996) (“In actions for judicial review of administrative land use decisions an
adjoining...property owner is deemed, prima facie...a person aggrieved.”).
The appellant clearly has met the requirements for asserting taxpayer standing in a
land use case.  Appellant is an adjacent landowner, a State and City taxpayer, and is
challenging both a State official’s and the City’s decision to approve redevelopment of
Superblock, and in the process, destroy several historical properties and forever alter the
landscape and tone of Baltimore, without proper approval from the MHT, as required by
State law.  The point of contention with the majority is whether there has been a claim that
City and State officials have acted outside of their governmental authority in making a land
use decision.  There has been.  The appellant, in its two-pronged Complaint, see supra note
7, alleges  that the City, a State unit, purported to circumvent its legal duty of cooperation
with the MHT and execute the Land Disposition Agreement (“LDA”), by way of Director
Little’s conditional approval, in violation of State laws pertaining to the MHT.  The majority
seems to believe that the appellant’s only claim is that Little acted in breach of the MOA.
9 Although the MOA reflects existing State law, it does not provide the exclusive
mechanism for providing oversight of urban renewal developments that impact and
implicate historical buildings and structures, and the MHT is not the only entity
empowered to conduct reviews of such developments and issue approvals.  Moreover, the
MOA, and its 30-day approval clause, is distinct from, and serves a different function
than, the state-mandated “30 day adverse effect” provision.  See Md. Code (2001, 2009
Repl. Vol.), State Fin. & Proc. Art. § 5A-325 (d).  The “Determination of adverse effect,”
as mandated by § 5A-325 (d) is not binding on the State unit, since ultimately, the State
unit can dispute the Trust’s findings with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
see id. § 5A-325 (d) (3), and then may disagree with the comments of the Council and
proceed with the project after submitting a written refusal.  See id. §§ 5A-325 (d) (5) -
(6).  Rather, it is the language of § 5A-326 (a), providing that the State unit, in
cooperation with the Trust, shall ensure that no historic property be inadvertently
destroyed, that binds the State.
14
In actuality, the appellant has validly asserted that Little acted ultra vires because his actions
violated not only the MOA, but provisions of the Maryland Code as well.  The majority
distinguishes the instant case from Superblock II, because, there, 120 West Fayette alleged
that the LDA, a land use instrument, violated City laws, whereas here, the MHT approval
process, a non-land use instrument, derives from the MOA and not from City law.  120 West
Fayette, __ Md. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 15].  This assertion is incorrect.
Pursuant to the MOA, it is the MHT’s duty to approve, disapprove, or conditionally
approve the City’s development plans for the Superblock within 30 days of their submission
for review.9  The MHT is “an instrumentality of the State...a body corporate,” see § 5A-310
(b), that is “charitable and...intended to benefit the residents of the State.”  § 5A-311 (b).  Its
governing body is a Board of Trustees of the Trust, consisting of 15 trustees, § 5A-313 (a)
(1), eight of whom constitute a quorum. § 5A-315 (a).  “The Board shall exercise the powers
and duties of the Trust,” § 5A-318 (a), although it may “delegate any of the powers of the
15
Trust to one or more trustees or the Director.” § 5A-318 (b) (15). The Director acts as the
chief administrative officer of the Trust, § 5A-316 (a) (2), performing his duties, however,
“[u]nder the direction of the Board” and as “the Board prescribes.”  § 5A-316 (e).  The 30-
day approval clause in the MOA derives from § 5A-326 (a) (2), which states that, “[i]n
cooperation with the Trust and subject to available resources, each State unit shall...ensure
that no property listed in or eligible to be listed in the Historic Register is inadvertently
transferred, sold, demolished, destroyed, substantially altered, or allowed to deteriorate
significantly[.]”  It is significant that it is the “Trust,” and not the Director, to whom the §
5A-326 (a) (2) responsibility, in cooperation with a State Unit, of safeguarding historic
properties is entrusted.  It is also significant that § 5A-326 (a) (2) is a provision that
authorizes the Trust, for the benefit of State residents, to protect historical properties by
preventing their sale, destruction or alteration.  These actions are land use decisions of an
administrative body and State unit, especially given the instant context.
The Director, as mandated by the State and Finance Procurement Article of the
Maryland Code, is not authorized to make decisions single-handedly about the destruction
of historic properties, as his authority stems only from power delegated to him by the Trust.
All decisions are required  to be made by the Trust, meaning, at minimum, a quorum of the
MHT Board members, and for the intended benefit of the State’s residents.  Here, the
appellant has alleged that BDC President Brodie and MHT Director Little exercised power
not delegated to them when they circumvented the MHT’s Board of Trustees review and
approval responsibility to enact a development plan that, due to its endorsement of the
16
destruction of multiple historic buildings, had previously been deemed insufficient, by the
MHT, to meet the MHT standards.  There is clear evidence, in the light most favorable to the
appellant, see RRC Northeast, 413 Md. at 643-44, 994 A.2d at 433-34, that Little was not
merely exercising powers delegated to him by the Trust, because the Trust almost
immediately expressed disapproval of his act and attempted to rescind his conditional
approval to halt the Urban Renewal Plan.  The appellant’s action is not merely based on the
terms of the MOA; it is based on State law, and therefore the appellant has properly asserted
its standing as a taxpayer.
The majority distinguishes the instant appeal from Superblock I, holding that, here,
120 West Fayette failed to state a justiciable claim because it is only claiming a breach to a
contractual provision to which it was not privy, whereas in Superblock I, 120 West Fayette
claimed a violation of the Baltimore City Charter or City laws.  120 West Fayette, __ Md.
at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 15].  I disagree.  Looking strictly at the Complaint, as this is
a standing issue, in the light most favorable to the appellant, see RRC Northeast, 413 Md. at
643-44, 994 A.2d at 433-34, there is a valid taxpayer challenge to the unlawful approval by
the City and State.  The majority also distinguishes the instant appeal from Superblock I, and
several other cases, because, here, there has been no violation of a land use ordinance, zoning
classification, development permit, etc.  Id. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 18].  I also
disagree with that conclusion, as this Court has never so strictly defined or limited the
definition of a land use decision.
In Superblock I, the appellant sued the City, alleging that it illegally entered into the
10 Superblock II was an appeal from the Circuit Court’s “grant of summary
judgment [to the City, the BDC, and the Lexington Square developers,] on 120 West
Fayette’s original complaint and that court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss Count
Two of 120 West Fayette’s amended complaint.”  413 Md. 309, 317, 992 A.2d 459, 464. 
120 West Fayette timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but this Court issued a
writ of certiorari on its own motion before the intermediate appellate court considered the
case, see 120 West Fayette v. Baltimore, 405 Md. 290, 950 A.2d 828 (2008), and stated:
“In sum, we hold that the LDA with Lexington Square is not subject to the
[City Charter’s] competitive bidding requirements because the LDA is not a
public work contract. The project is neither for public use nor publicly
17
LDA, a private land use contract, to sell the Superblock to Lexington Square Partners, LLC.
407 Md. 253, 258, 964 A.2d at 664.  120 West Fayette argued that the City, and its agent, the
BDC, unlawfully violated and manipulated the Request for Proposals process, in violation
of the City’s Charter and laws, to award the LDA to a favored developer.  That it was the
manner in which the LDA was awarded, and not the LDA terms themselves, that formed the
basis of the complaint, is significant.  Superblock I at 260, 964 A.2d at 665.  It also alleged
that the City unlawfully delegated urban renewal powers to the BDC by giving it the power
to choose developers while the City merely appeared to be the decision-maker.  Superblock
II, 413 Md. at 353, 992 A.2d at 486.  Again, it was the authority to hire developers that was
considered a land use decision, not the actual sale or transfer of real estate.  Accordingly, 120
West Fayette sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the City’s award of the LDA to
Lexington Square was illegal and ultra vires.  We agreed that 120 West Fayette had standing,
and we remanded the case so a declaratory judgment could be issued.  Id. at 273-74, 964
A.2d at 673-674.  As a result, in Superblock II, this Court considered the merits of that issue,
and ultimately held that the award of the LDA was not ultra vires.10  Through these holdings,
funded. We further hold that the LDA is not ultra vires because the process
through which the LDA was granted did not constitute an improper
delegation of the City’s discretionary authority as related to urban renewal
and redevelopment of the ‘Superblock.’ Finally, we hold that, because none
of the allegedly violative design plans for the ‘Superblock’ has been
finalized or approved, and none of the facts evidences the City’s intent to
adopt a proposal that violates the MOA or the Renewal Plan, 120 West
Fayette failed to allege facts sufficiently ripe to rise to level of a justiciable
controversy. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court;
dismissal of Count Two of 120 West Fayette’s amended complaint shall be
without prejudice.”
 Superblock II, 413 Md. at 358-59, 992 A.2d at 489.
18
it is clear that “land use decisions” include all preliminary decisions and approval
mechanisms and are not limited only to the actual land transfer devices.
Here, the MOA is a contract, albeit one mandated specifically, and enforced, by State
law, see 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 204 § 1, DA03.60(2), just as the LDA is a contract, which
contemplates and indeed prescribes  land use decisions, with regard to historical property,
to be made jointly by the MHT, an administrative body, and the City.  While the LDA
purported to sell properties directly to the developers, the MOA directly impacts any such
sale or disposition, as it must be complied with and, thus, it determines whether the
destruction, transfer or alteration  of certain historical properties by developers will be
approved or denied.  Further, as alleged in Superblock I, there is a claim that a public official,
Director Little, unlawfully usurped authority not delegated to him.  I am convinced that the
instant case is not  materially distinguishable from Superblock I.  To be sure, it does not
involve an ordinance, but neither did Superblock I; involved in both was the unlawful
11 Now codified as Md. Code (2001, 2009 Repl. Vol.), St. Fin. & Proc. Art., §§ 5A-
325 and 5A-326.
19
mechanism of awarding a private land use contract to developers as part of a larger urban
renewal scheme.
In Boitnott, we defined an urban renewal plan pursuant to Article 13, § 24 (b) of the
Baltimore City Code:
“(b) As used herein a Renewal Plan means a plan, as it exists from time to time
for the elimination, correction, or prevention of the development or the spread
of slums, blight or deterioration in an entire Renewal Area or a portion thereof.
When a plan is applicable to less than an entire Renewal Area, it shall include
a description of the boundaries of the area to which it applies.  The plan shall
include a land use map showing the proposed use of all land within the area to
which the plan is applicable, including the location, character, and extent of
the proposed public and private ownership...”
356 Md. At 229, 738 A. 2d at 882 (We held in Boitnott that the taxpayers had standing to
challenge, as unlawful, the enforcement of Ordinance 97-231, a zoning ordinance, as it
related to a pre-existing private agreement in connection with an urban renewal plan).
Here, the City, through its developers, was required to, and did, submit development
plans, to implement the Urban Renewal Plan, to the MHT for its approval as to the historical
properties.  The City recognized, as the MOA confirmed, that the urban renewal “Project
[would] require support and actions from various State and Federal agencies which actions
[would] necessitate conformance with the requirements of Article 83B, Sections 5-617 of and
5-618 of the Annotated Code of Maryland11...and Section 106 of the National Historic
12 Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, codified as 16 U.S.C.S. §§
470, is a congressional finding and declaration of policy that “it is... necessary and
appropriate for the Federal Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs
and activities, to give maximum encouragement to agencies and individuals undertaking
preservation by private means, and to assist State and local governments and the National
Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States to expand and accelerate their historic
preservation programs and activities.”
20
Preservation Act[.]”12  (Emphasis added).  To be sure, the petitioners in Boitnott challenged
an ordinance, not a contract; however, here, the appellant challenges not just performance
of the MOA by the City and the Trust, but, as a result of the failure of performance, the
unlawful execution of an approval, an administrative act, of the Urban Renewal Plan.  I see
no substantive difference between Boitnott and the instant case: Boitnott involved a land use
approval in the form of a legislative act, whereas this case involves a land use approval in the
form of an administrative act.  In either case, a justiciable controversy exists when a party
challenges acts of the City that are ultra vires.  As we put it in Boitnott:
In any event, “Maryland has ‘gone rather far in sustaining the standing of
taxpayers to challenge…alleged illegal and ultra vires actions of public
officials.’” Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Ass’n, 313
Md. 413, 441, 545 A.2d 1296, 1310 (1988), quoting Thomas v. Howard
County, 261 Md. 422, 432, 276 A.2d 49, 54 (1971). The taxpayer plaintiff
need not allege facts which necessarily lead to the conclusion that taxes will
be increased; rather, the question is whether the taxpayer “reasonably may
sustain a pecuniary loss or a tax increase … whether there has been a showing
of potential pecuniary damage.” Citizens Planning and Housing, 273 Md. 333,
344, 329 A.2d 681, 687 (1974). (citations omitted). See also Castle Farms
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Lexington Market Authority, 193 Md. 472, 67 A.2d 490
(1949).
Boitnott, 356 Md. at 234, 738 A.2d at 885.
21
While the majority cites a number of cases in attempting to show that our courts
generally allow taxpayer challenges to land use decisions only when ordinances, variances
or permits are involved, see 120 West Fayette, __ Md. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 18-
20], I am not convinced that an unlawful administrative approval fails the test of “land use
decision.”  The case Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc. v. Gudis and County Council of Montgomery
County, 319 Md. 558, 573 A.2d 1325 (1990), to which the majority does not cite, is
instructive.  In Gudis, four members of the Montgomery County Council, including the
respondent Michael Gudis, adopted a resolution approving a potential land site which the
County would purchase in order to operate a mass-burn facility in conjunction with PEPCO.
Id. at 562, 573 A.2d at 1327.  The petitioner association, taxpayers in Montgomery County,
asked the court to “void the action of the Council [and Gudis in his individual capacity] in
approving the Dickerson site and in adopting [the resolution,]” as Gudis owned shares of
PEPCO, and his approval was potentially ultra vires in violation of the ethics provisions of
Montgomery County Code, Chapter 19A.  Id. at 562-63, 573 A.2d at 1327-28.  We held that
there was taxpayer standing to assert this claim and void the action of the Council’s approval.
Id. at 566-67, 573 A.2d at 1330.  At that point, no ordinance had been passed; no permit
issued; and no zoning classification assigned.  We allowed the petitioner’s peremptory
challenge of what it believed was an illegal approval that would eventually lead to a major
land use decision.
Standing also is not defeated by the “no private cause of action” clauses inserted in
§§ 5A-325 and 5A-326 of the State Finance and Procurement Article.  In Baker v.
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Montgomery County, 201 Md. App. 642, 678-79, 30 A.3d 267, 289 (2011), the Court of
Special Appeals held there was no private cause of action implicit in § 21-809 of the
Transportation Article of the Maryland Code, as it would be inconsistent with the provision
in § 21-809, which details the manner in which to oppose a speeding citation under the
statute.  The court made sure to specify, however, that, had the petitioners alleged standing
as taxpayer plaintiffs, which they did not, the outcome would have been different, based on
the language of Boitnott.  Baker, 201 Md. App. at 679, n.27, 30 A.3d at 289, n. 27.  The lack
of a private cause of action contained in the statute did not negate taxpayer standing.
In Gudis, we reached the same conclusion.  Section 19A-22 (b) of the Montgomery
County Code, the ethics provision which Gudis was alleged to have  violated, contained a
“no private right of action” clause, which the Court of Special Appeals held barred the
petitioner’s lawsuit.  319 Md. At 566, 573 A.2d at 1330.  We disagreed:
Whether § 19A-22 (b) creates an implied or express private cause of action is
not critical to our decision and is a question we do not address.  A taxpayer or
other person specially damaged has standing: to seek to enjoin the
implementation of an unconstitutional statute, Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md.
466, 87 A. 413 (1913); “to restrain the action of a public official, which is
illegal or ultra vires, and may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s rights and
property,” Inlet Associates v. Assateaque House, 313 Md. 413, 441. 545 A.2d
1296, 1310 (1988); Citizens P & H Ass’n v. County Exec., 273 Md. 333, 339,
329 A.2d 681, 684 (1974); or to redress a public wrong, Becker v. Litty, 318
Md. 76, 91, 566 A.2d 1101, 1108 (1989)...At argument in the trial court on the
motion to dismiss...Sugarloaf said that it was asserting, among other things, a
common law right to seek enforcement of the county ethics law.  That is the
same sort of standing we upheld in Becker, supra.
Gudis, 319 Md. at 566-67, 573 A.2d at 1330. 
That Gudis involved the passage of a County Council Resolution intended to
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effectuate a development plan, while, here, no legislative action was involved, the City,
having purported to secure a required agency approval, signed a development contract, is of
no moment.  The State granted millions of taxpayer dollars to a group of public officials for
urban renewal.  The ensuing decisions, whether in the form of ordinances, city permits,
reclassification, state agency approvals, or contracts, so long as they were directly tied to
land use and could “injuriously affect the taxpayer's rights and property,” Gudis, 319 Md.
N558, 567, 573 A.2d 1325, 1330 (1990) (internal citations omitted), were land use decisions.
In Gudis, we did not specify exactly what type of ultra vires action by a public official a
taxpayer could sue to restrain; in fact, this Court has never drawn any strict lines.  Rather,
taxpayer standing protects taxpayers potentially affected by the adverse public decisions,
decisions that impact their homes and livelihoods, by granting taxpayers authority to
challenge acts of  public officials that are outside of their authority, even when another public
official, such as an Attorney General, is empowered to bring the lawsuit, but fails, for
whatever reason, to do so.  There is no requirement that land use decisions be in a certain
form.  What we have here is simply a new set of facts.  That the MHT is funded by taxpayers
and exists for the benefit of taxpayers is further evidence that its land use decisions should
remain freely challengeable by aggrieved parties.  The appellant has properly asserted that,
due to an unlawful approval of an urban renewal plan, Director Little acted ultra vires; and,
viewing the assertions in the light most favorable to the appellant, there is a justiciable
controversy as to his official actions, rendering the Circuit Court’s decision on the  motion
to dismiss erroneous.
13 To be clear, I concede that the MOA, standing alone and on its face, is not a land
use decision; rather, it is the required approval mechanism embedded in the MOA, and
the fact that the MOA is a required step to the execution of the LDA, that gives it its land
use properties.  The MOA cannot be viewed in isolation.
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III.
The majority states that the “MOA between the City and the Trust was not
promulgated by a legislative or administrative body to bind the general public in the
development or use of real estate,” 120 West Fayette, __ Md. at __, n. 13, __ A._d at __,
n.13, despite earlier asserting that the General Assembly, in passing its FY 2001 Budget
Appropriation, conditioned a $1 million development expenditure “on ‘the City of Baltimore
and the Maryland Historical Trust...reach[ing] [an] agreement on how to minimize the
demolition of structures which contribute to the Market Center National Register Historic
District.’”  Id. at __, __ A._d at __ [slip op. at 3] (citing 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 204 § 1,
DA03.60(2)).  The MOA was an integral part of an urban renewal funding bill passed by the
General Assembly, it appears, as an incentive for the parties to reach an agreement;13 after
all, § 5A-326 (a) (2) mandates that the State unit and the Trust cooperate to ensure that no
historic property be inadvertently destroyed.  If the parties could reach an agreement to
“purposely” demolish historic properties using the MOA, the provisions of the State Finance
and Procurement Article would be met.  The MOA, therefore, functions as a compliance tool
for § 5A-326; adhering to  the agreement would secure the City’s receipt of $1 million in
funding and would allow implementation of  the Urban Renewal Plan.  That it was violated
certainly created standing for a taxpayer to sue.  First, its violation, especially the one alleged
25
here, evidences a noncompliance with State law and potentially creates a public action that
was ultra vires.  Next, as agreed to by all parties, as an overarching matter, the LDA
specifically requires adherence to the MOA, and so a violation of the MOA would
functionally bar any transfer of property to the developers, thus making it an essential
approval device to the Urban Renewal Plan.  If the majority’s reasoning is correct, a City can
effectuate urban renewal through unlawful acts, yet preclude taxpayer claims simply by using
the guise of a “private contract.” Under that guise, it would make land use decisions, leaving
aggrieved citizens with no remedy.
The MOA provides the mechanism for approval of land use decisions, specifically,
decisions pertaining to whether to demolish several historic properties in Baltimore in
connection with the Superblock project.  By its terms, the land use decision authority given
to the City is required, in some instances, to be shared by the MHT in the exercise of its
authority under the State Finance and Procurement Article.  Had the MOA been freely and
independently entered into by the parties, rather than forced by the General Assembly as part
of an appropriations bill, the result may be as the majority posits.  Under these circumstances,
however, to hold that the MOA is a purely private contract free to be violated without regard
to the interests of taxpayers would render the General Assembly’s intervention in this project
a nullity and without effect.  Thus, here, violation of the MOA, essentially, is a violation of
State law and the failure of a condition precedent to the Urban Renewal Plan and the
development of the Superblock.
I do not agree that the MOA is not an agreement or document affecting land use.  It
26
is executed pursuant to a governmental direction, which implicates land use decisions and
funding critical to the development of the Superblock project.   Therefore, the contract exists
for the benefit of potentially affected taxpayers who may challenge in the event of a breach.
I dissent.
Judges Harrell and Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.