Title: Commonwealth v. Bohigian

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12858 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHARLES F. BOHIGIAN. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 10, 2020. - November 13, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Constitutional 
Law, Blood test.  Due Process of Law, Blood alcohol test.  
Evidence, Blood alcohol test, Voluntariness of statement.  
Consent. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Westborough Division 
of the District Court Department on March 24, 2014. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Worcester Division of the 
District Court Department, the case was tried before Andrew M. 
D'Angelo, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Erin R. Opperman for the defendant. 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Jin-Ho King, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Charles Bohigian, was convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
(OUI), pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); operating a 
motor vehicle negligently so as to endanger, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); and OUI causing serious bodily injury, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2), in connection with an 
automobile accident.2  The defendant also was convicted of 
misleading an investigator pursuant to G. L. c. 268, § 13B, for 
statements he made at the scene.  He appealed from his 
convictions, and we subsequently granted his application for 
direct appellate review.  He argues that the evidence of his 
blood alcohol level was admitted improperly, as were the 
statements that formed the basis of the charge of misleading an 
investigator. 
 
We agree and conclude that the errors require that the 
defendant's convictions be vacated and the matter remanded to 
the District Court for a retrial.3 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts from the 
record.  At around midnight on March 23, 2014, Katrina McCarty 
                                                 
2 Count one, operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol (OUI), merged with count three, OUI causing 
serious bodily injury. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted jointly by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
 
lost control of her sport utility vehicle (SUV) as she traveled 
on a highway on-ramp, crashing into the guardrail of the ramp 
such that her SUV came to rest perpendicular to the roadway, 
blocking approximately two-thirds of it.  Soon thereafter, the 
defendant crashed into the stationary SUV, rotating it and 
causing it to hit McCarty, who had been standing on the side of 
the road next to her vehicle.  McCarty sustained serious 
injuries after being thrown into the path of the defendant's 
vehicle, and then being dragged underneath the vehicle for over 
200 feet as the defendant continued driving. 
When State police troopers arrived at the scene, they noted 
that the defendant had an injury to his forehead and was 
unsteady on his feet.  In addition, his eyes appeared glassy and 
bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he had a heavy smell of 
alcohol on his breath.  The defendant told the troopers that 
"another vehicle had come out of nowhere and run that lady 
over," and that the operator of that other vehicle told him to 
"keep his mouth shut." 
At the hospital, the treating nurse observed that the 
defendant exhibited symptoms of a concussion.  After the 
defendant refused to consent to a blood draw, one of the 
troopers who had responded to the scene applied for, and 
procured, a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from the 
4 
 
 
defendant as part of the trooper's investigation into whether 
the defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
Upon being presented with the signed warrant, the defendant 
repeated his objection to the blood draw.  Subsequently, the 
defendant's arms and legs were restrained by troopers as the 
nurse drew two vials of his blood at the direction of one of the 
troopers.  The blood was analyzed, and it was determined that 
the alcohol content was .135 percent at the time the blood was 
drawn.  A chemist determined that the defendant's blood alcohol 
level would have been between .16 and .26 at the time of the 
accident.4 
Discussion.  1.  Blood alcohol content evidence.  a.  
Statutory framework.  It is constitutional to draw a person's 
blood without consent as long as the law enforcement officer has 
procured a warrant or exigent circumstances make a warrant 
impracticable.  See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 
(2013), citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966); Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 383 Mass. 30, 32 (1981).  
However, the Legislature has created a statutory scheme 
specifically to address the testing of blood alcohol content 
                                                 
 
4 A blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or above is 
over the legal limit.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); G. L. 
c. 90, § 24L (1). 
5 
 
 
(BAC) in connection with prosecutions for OUI, including the 
drawing of blood. 
General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), works in tandem with 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  Section 24 (1) (e) requires that 
where a test of a defendant's breath or blood to determine 
alcohol content is made by or at the direction of a police 
officer, it must be done with the defendant's consent in order 
for the results to be admissible in a prosecution for OUI under 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a).5  Section 24 (1) (f) (1), known as the 
"implied consent" statute, provides that, by driving on public 
roads, all drivers give consent to submit to a BAC test if 
arrested for OUI.  However, the paragraph goes on to state that 
"[i]f the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or 
analysis . . . no such test or analysis shall be made."6  G. L. 
                                                 
5 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), states in pertinent 
part: 
 
"In any prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a), 
evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the 
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense . . . 
shall be admissible and deemed relevant to the 
determination of the question of whether such defendant was 
at such time under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
provided, however, that if such test or analysis was made 
by or at the direction of a police officer, it was made 
with the consent of the defendant . . . ." 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1), states in pertinent 
part: 
 
6 
 
 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  That is, the implied consent that 
attaches when a driver uses public roadways may be withdrawn, 
and without actual consent no test is to be done.  If the driver 
refuses the test, he or she is subject to losing his or her 
license for at least 180 days.7  Id.  Together the two 
subsections provide that, if an arrestee consents to a BAC test, 
the results are presumptively admissible at trial for a charge 
                                                 
"Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any way or in any 
place to which the public has right to access, or upon any 
way or in any place to which the public has access as 
invitees or licensees, shall be deemed to have consented to 
submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath or 
blood in the event that he is arrested for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor; provided, however, that no such person shall be 
deemed to have consented to a blood test unless such person 
has been brought for treatment to a medical facility 
licensed under the provisions of [G. L. c. 111, § 51]; and 
provided, further, that no person who is afflicted with 
hemophilia, diabetes or any other condition requiring the 
use of anticoagulants shall be deemed to have consented to 
a withdrawal of blood.  Such test shall be administered at 
the direction of a police officer, as defined in [G. L. 
c. 90C, § 1], having reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person arrested has been operating a motor vehicle upon 
such way or place while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.  If the person arrested refuses to submit to such 
test or analysis, after having been informed that his 
license or permit to operate motor vehicles or right to 
operate motor vehicles in the commonwealth shall be 
suspended for a period of at least 180 days and up to a 
lifetime loss, for such refusal, no such test or analysis 
shall be made and he shall have his license or right to 
operate suspended in accordance with this paragraph for a 
period of 180 days . . . ." 
 
 
7 Longer periods of revocation may apply depending upon the 
arrestee's driving record.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1). 
7 
 
 
of OUI under § 24 (1) (a).  If the arrestee does not consent, 
however, no test is performed, and the arrestee's license is 
suspended for at least six months. 
 
The defendant claims that because he was not afforded these 
statutory protections, the blood draw was unlawful and the BAC 
test results were inadmissible at trial.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the blood test results properly were admitted 
because obtaining a warrant for the blood is an alternative to 
obtaining consent and, thus, neither § 24 (1) (e) nor 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1) applies.  We agree with the defendant. 
 
The Commonwealth's suggested interpretation, endorsed by 
the dissent, ignores the plain statutory language that creates a 
blanket prohibition against blood draws without consent in the 
context of OUI prosecutions.  See Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 
Mass. 555, 557 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 
337, 347 (2010) ("[t]he meaning of a statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in language in which the act is framed, and 
if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms").  Both subsections require 
consent for OUI blood draws, and neither makes an exception for, 
or even mentions, warrants. 
8 
 
 
 
Pointing to two particular phrases in the provisions, the 
dissent asserts that we have misread the statutory language.8  
First, § 24 (1) (e) allows for the admission of BAC evidence in 
an OUI prosecution unless the test was performed without the 
consent of the defendant "at the direction of a police officer."  
The dissent concludes, as did the motion judge, that the BAC 
evidence was admissible because the defendant's blood was drawn 
pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge rather than "at the 
direction of a police officer."  Contrary to the view of the 
dissent, we believe that the limited protection provided by 
§ 24 (1) (e) was available to the defendant; however, in his 
case, it made no difference.  Section 24 (1) (e) applies only to 
prosecutions under § 24 (1) (a), which prohibits simple OUI.  
Had the defendant only been charged under § 24 (1) (a), he would 
have been able to argue that the BAC evidence was inadmissible 
because his blood was taken without his consent "at the 
                                                 
 
8 We note that although the dissent contends that our 
interpretation of § 24 (1) (e) and (1) (f) (1) is inconsistent 
with the plain language of the provisions, it is the dissent 
that seeks to read into the consent requirements of those 
provisions an exception for search warrants.  See Commonwealth 
v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 778 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 443 (2003) ("In interpreting a statute, 
'[w]e will not add words to a statute that the Legislature did 
not put there, either by inadvertent omission or by design'"). 
 
9 
 
 
direction of a police officer."9  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  
However, as the defendant additionally was charged with a 
violation of § 24L (OUI causing serious bodily injury), 
§ 24 (1) (e) had no bearing at all on the admissibility of the 
BAC evidence with regard to this more serious charge.10 
 
It is instead § 24 (1) (f) (1) that is operative here.11  
Quite apart from § 24 (1) (e), § 24 (1) (f) (1) flatly and 
                                                 
 
9 The Appeals Court long ago interpreted § 24 (1) (e) to 
apply not only to police officers but to State actors generally:  
"We read the statutory exclusion of evidence in G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (e), to be limited to a defendant's refusal to take 
tests to determine the alcohol level of his blood when requested 
by the police or other State actors -- in essence incorporating 
the State action requirement and protections of art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights" (emphasis added).  
Commonwealth v. Arruda, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (2008).  This 
makes sense, as the statutory and regulatory scheme 
distinguishes between blood tests performed for medical purposes 
and those conducted for investigatory purposes.  Id.  Here, 
there is no question that a judge or clerk-magistrate is a State 
actor and that the warrant was issued for investigatory 
purposes. 
 
 
Even if we were to adopt the dissent's interpretation of 
the statutory language, in applying it to the uncontested facts 
of this case, the blood draw indeed was performed "at the 
direction of a police officer."  The investigating officer made 
the decision to request, obtain, and execute the warrant.  It 
seems somewhat disingenuous to maintain that the blood draw was 
performed "at the direction of" the judge who signed the warrant 
rather than the police officer who sought the warrant and 
instructed that hospital personnel perform the draw. 
 
 
10 The same can be said for any defendant facing an OUI-
related prosecution that is more serious than simple OUI. 
 
 
11 Like § 24 (1) (e), § 24 (1) (f) (1) also contains the 
phrase "at the direction of a police officer"; however, the 
10 
 
 
unambiguously prohibits blood draws without consent for the 
purposes of analyzing BAC, regardless of who directs it.12  See 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1). 
The Appeals Court has analyzed the consent requirements of 
these subsections on multiple occasions and, as recently as last 
year, reiterated that "in this Commonwealth, a requirement of 
consent is imposed by statute even when, because there is 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, one is not imposed by 
the Federal Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Dennis, 96 Mass. 
App. Ct. 528, 532 (2019).  Decades prior to Dennis's 
                                                 
phrase is used in a different context.  In § 24 (1) (e), the 
phrase describes the conditions under which BAC evidence is 
admissible for OUI prosecutions under § 24 (1) (a).  In 
contrast, in § 24 (1) (f) (1), the phrase explains how the blood 
or breath test is to be performed, i.e., "[s]uch test shall be 
administered at the direction of a police officer, as defined in 
[G. L. c. 90C, § 1], having reasonable grounds to believe that 
the person arrested has been operating a motor vehicle upon such 
way or place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."  
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  In this case, because the 
defendant did not consent, no test should have been performed 
based on the plain language of the subsection.  See id. ("If the 
person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis . . . 
no such test or analysis shall be made . . ."). 
 
 
12 The dissent contends that the reference to "such test" 
within the phrase "no such test or analysis shall be made" 
narrowly refers to those tests made at the direction of an 
officer.  We disagree.  Instead, because the phrase "such test" 
is used earlier in the provision to refer to the type of test as 
initially described in the subsection, i.e., a "chemical test or 
analysis of his breath or blood," we interpret the second 
reference to "such test" similarly to refer back to the first 
mention of the test.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1). 
 
11 
 
 
publication, the Appeals Court concluded, correctly in our view, 
that although an individual in the defendant's position has no 
constitutional right to refuse a BAC or breathalyzer test, 
"[t]he right of refusal he does have stems from 
[§ 24 (1) (f) (1)], which requires that a test not be conducted 
without his consent" (emphasis added).13  Commonwealth v. 
Davidson, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 846, 848 (1989).  Thus, the Appeals 
Court has made clear that, although it may be constitutional to 
obtain a blood sample from an unwilling participant with a 
warrant and probable cause, here in the Commonwealth an 
involuntary blood draw is statutorily prohibited if it is sought 
for the purposes of an OUI investigation.  This court similarly 
has adopted this view.  See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 
1201, 1208 n.6 (1992), citing Davidson, supra at 849 (actual 
                                                 
13 Notably, § 24 (1) (f) (1), requiring actual consent for 
blood draws for the purposes of determining BAC, was passed one 
year after the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966), which established that 
blood draws performed without consent are constitutionally 
permissible with either a search warrant or an exigency 
exception.  As of 2013, Massachusetts was one of eighteen States 
that require consent for OUI-related blood draws.  See Missouri 
v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161-162 & nn.9 & 10 (2013) (collecting 
statutes).  In McNeely, the Supreme Court noted that "widespread 
state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide 
further support for [the Court's] recognition that compelled 
blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest."  Id. at 
162-163. 
 
12 
 
 
consent requirement in § 24 [1] [e] and [1] [f] [1] "reflects a 
legislative intent to avoid forced testing").14 
Following the Appeals Court's holding in Davidson, the 
Legislature amended § 24 (1) (e) and (1) (f) (1) on seven 
separate occasions, in 1994, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 
2012.  Each time, the language requiring consent -- i.e., 
"provided . . . that if such test was made by or at the 
direction of a police officer, it was made with the consent of 
the defendant" in § 24 (1) (e), and "[i]f the person arrested 
refuses to submit to such test or analysis . . . no such test or 
analysis shall be made" in § 24 (1) (f) (1) -- remained 
unchanged.  This is a strong indication that the Legislature 
approved of the court's statutory construction of these 
provisions.15  See Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 
                                                 
 
14 The dissent acknowledges the Appeals Court holdings of 
both Dennis and Davidson, referenced supra, but then states:  
"Neither Dennis nor any other appellate precedent expressly 
holds that the implied consent statute prohibits a neutral and 
detached magistrate from issuing a search warrant to obtain 
evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol test."  Post at note 5.  
This statement is nearly impossible to square with the 
conclusion reached by the Appeals Court, which we endorsed in 
1992.  See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1208 n.6 
(1992). 
 
 
15 We do not share the dissent's view that the Legislature's 
decision to amend the subsections without altering the language 
at issue after Davidson was decided is "of no interpretive 
significance."  Post at    . 
 
13 
 
 
(2007) (because we presume Legislature is aware of our prior 
decisions, "reenact[ment of] statutory language without material 
change" implies adoption of prior construction). 
It is well within the Legislature's authority to provide 
additional privacy protections over and above those granted by 
the Federal Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.16  See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) 
("States [may] choos[e] to protect privacy beyond the level that 
the Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] 
requires"); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 668 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  
There are valid reasons for doing so, including avoiding the 
confrontation that occurred during the blood draw conducted in 
this case.  See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 
2167 (2016), quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 
(1983) ("Although it is possible for a subject to be forcibly 
immobilized so that a sample may be drawn, many States prohibit 
drawing blood from a driver who resists since this practice 
helps 'to avoid violent confrontations'").  See also Rochin v. 
                                                 
 
16 We are mindful of the concern expressed by the dissent 
that our interpretation of these subsections may frustrate the 
over-all purpose of the statute to keep the roadways safe.  
However, our conclusion is based on the plain language of the 
statute, and as discussed infra, there are valid reasons for 
seeking to strike a balance between public safety and the right 
of a defendant not to be subjected to invasive procedures 
without his or her consent. 
14 
 
 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172 (1952) (due process violation 
where officers forced tube containing solution into defendant's 
stomach against his will, causing him to vomit; "the struggle to 
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible 
extraction of his stomach's contents -- this course of 
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound 
to offend even hardened sensibilities"). 
Requiring actual consent for blood draws is also a safety 
measure.  According to the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, blood draws involve a variety of risks to the 
patient, including "pain or bruising at the site of puncture, 
. . . fainting, nerve damage and haematoma."  U.V. Reid, World 
Health Organization, WHO Best Practices for Injections and 
Related Procedures Toolkit § 3.1 (Mar. 2010), https://www.ncbi 
.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK138496 [https://perma.cc/CR5N-YQWM].  
Risks to health care workers and those, like the police officers 
here who must restrain a patient during the procedure, include 
exposure to bloodborne pathogens, such as hepatitis B virus, 
hepatitis C virus, human immunodeficiency virus, syphilis, and 
malaria.  Id.  Health care workers and others participating in 
the procedure also must worry about "sharps injuries" caused 
during the use and disposal of the needle.  Id.  These risks are 
only amplified where the patient does not consent to the blood 
draw.  Notably, § 24 (1) (f) (1) specifically states that "no 
15 
 
 
person who is afflicted with hemophilia, diabetes or any other 
condition requiring the use of anticoagulants shall be deemed to 
have consented to a withdrawal of blood," no doubt in an effort 
to ensure that the health of such persons in not endangered by a 
blood draw. 
Finally, Massachusetts is not alone in having crafted such 
a statutory scheme.  In McNeely, the Supreme Court noted that "a 
majority of States either place significant restrictions on when 
police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect's 
refusal . . . or prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether."  
McNeely, 569 U.S. at 161 & n.9.  Courts in States with statutes 
nearly identical to ours similarly have interpreted them to bar 
blood draws absent consent, regardless of whether police have 
obtained a warrant. 
For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted the 
following language in the State's implied consent statute:  
"[i]f a person having been placed under arrest refuses upon the 
request of a law enforcement officer to submit to the tests, 
. . . none shall be given" (emphasis in original).  State v. 
DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I. 2000), quoting R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 31–27–2.1(b).  The court "conclude[d] that the language 
'none shall be given' is plain and unambiguous . . . , and that, 
upon such a refusal, a test shall not be given, with or without 
a warrant."  DiStefano, supra at 1163. 
16 
 
 
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed this issue in Pena v. 
State, 684 P.2d 864, 866 (Alaska 1984).  The Alaska statute at 
the time provided:  "If a person under arrest refuses the 
request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical 
test of his breath . . . a chemical test shall not be given."  
Id., quoting Alaska Stat. § 28.35.032.  The court stated:  "The 
statute clearly provides that after a driver refuses to submit 
to a chemical sobriety test the driver shall be penalized by 
[license suspension] but that no test shall be given."  Pena, 
supra at 867.  Therefore, the court held that the statute 
"preclude[s] chemical sobriety tests performed pursuant to 
search warrants."  Id. 
And the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted a statute that 
provided that "[i]f a person under arrest . . . refuses, upon 
the request of a law enforcement officer, to submit to a 
chemical test . . . , no test shall be given" (emphasis in 
original).  State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 317 (2005), quoting 
Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d).  The court held that the statute 
"clearly prohibits the giving of any chemical test once the 
suspect refuses to submit to the requested one.  It makes no 
provision for the police to then attempt to obtain a search 
warrant."  Collier, supra at 318. 
Thus, just as in DiStefano, Pena, and Collier, the plain 
language of our statutory scheme makes clear that testing shall 
17 
 
 
not be done absent consent, and that any nonconsensual testing 
done at the direction of the police is inadmissible.17 
b.  Application.  Here, it is clear that the blood draw was 
performed without the defendant's actual consent (and, in fact, 
against his will).  The defendant repeatedly objected to the 
blood draw, and in the end, several officers pinned him down and 
handcuffed him, while a nurse extracted his blood.  The blood 
draw thus was impermissible under § 24 (1) (f) (1), and 
consequently, the BAC test results were admitted improperly at 
trial.18  See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 700 (2010). 
                                                 
 
17 We note that the Legislatures in Rhode Island and Georgia 
subsequently amended their statutes to permit nonconsensual 
blood draws pursuant to a search warrant.  See R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 31–27–2.9(a), inserted by R.I. St. 2009, c. 09-210, § 2; 
McAllister v. State, 325 Ga. App. 583, 585 (2014), citing Ga. 
Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d.1).  Alaska enacted a new statute 
allowing for chemical testing absent consent if a defendant were 
arrested for OUI after an accident resulting in death or 
physical injury to another.  See Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864, 
867 (Alaska 1984), citing Alaska Stat. § 28.35.035. 
 
 
The dissent argues that the statutory amendments that were 
enacted following these State courts' interpretations of their 
respective implied consent statutes are proof that those courts 
incorrectly interpreted the statutes in the first place.  We 
take the opposite view.  Those courts based the interpretation 
of their respective statutes on the plain statutory language.  
The State Legislatures that subsequently amended the statutes 
did so because they were not satisfied with the consequences 
resulting from the enforcement of the statutes they enacted. 
 
18 As discussed supra, § 24 (1) (e) applies only to 
prosecutions under § 24 (1) (a), i.e., OUI.  Because the 
defendant additionally was charged under § 24L (OUI causing 
serious bodily injury), the defendant did not benefit from the 
limited protection of § 24 (1) (e). 
18 
 
 
As the defendant raised this issue by way of a motion in 
limine, we review for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Grady, 
474 Mass. 715, 718-719 (2016).  That is, "we must now determine 
whether the erroneous admission of that evidence was 'harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Tyree, 455 Mass. at 701-702, 
quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  The 
Commonwealth highlighted the blood draw and results during the 
trial and, in closing arguments, relied exclusively on the blood 
draw to prove that the defendant was under the influence.  The 
BAC results introduced by the Commonwealth provided the 
strongest proof that the defendant was intoxicated at the time 
of the accident.  Proof of intoxication was central to proving 
the defendant's guilt of both OUI causing serious bodily injury 
(§ 24L) and negligent operation (§ 24 [2] [a]).  See 
Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1022 (2019) ("evidence 
of an operator's intoxication is relevant to a charge of 
negligent operation").  We therefore cannot say that the tainted 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.19 
                                                 
19 In the alternative, the defendant argues that prior to 
his blood being drawn without consent, he was entitled to a 
hearing before a judge pursuant to Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 
831, 835-836 (1994).  In that case, the Commonwealth sought a 
sample of the defendant's blood to compare it to blood found at 
a crime scene.  Id. at 833.  Because consent is required for 
blood draws in connection with OUI investigations by statute, a 
Lavigne hearing would not be necessary in such cases.  Instead, 
as discussed supra, no blood draw shall take place. 
19 
 
 
2.  Voluntariness of statements.  The defendant was 
convicted of misleading an investigator pursuant to G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B, based on the statements he made to the responding 
officers at the accident scene suggesting that the driver who 
caused the accident had fled the scene.  He argues that the 
conviction should be vacated because, given the head injury he 
sustained in the accident, an inquiry into the voluntariness of 
his statements should have been made even without a request from 
trial counsel.  We review the claim for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 
290, 294-295 (2002). 
In order to use a defendant's statements against him or her 
at trial, they must have been made voluntarily.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 765 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 192 (1997).  "If the 
defendant does not raise the issue of voluntariness, the judge 
has a sua sponte obligation to conduct a voir dire only if the 
voluntariness of the statements is a live issue such that there 
is evidence of a substantial claim of involuntariness" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Brown, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 686 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 318 (2007) (for question 
of voluntariness to be considered live issue, "substantial 
evidence of involuntariness [must be] produced").  Further, a 
20 
 
 
judge must provide a humane practice instruction to the jury, 
i.e., that they must find that the defendant's statements were 
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before considering them.  
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 477 Mass. 69, 72 n.7 (2017). 
Given the relationship between the defendant's head 
injuries and his mental condition, the voluntariness of his 
statements was a live issue at trial.  Trial counsel discussed 
the head injuries that the defendant sustained in both the 
opening statement and closing argument, noting in the closing 
that the defendant "wasn't fine" when he responded to officers' 
questions at the accident scene.  Trial counsel questioned the 
responding officers as well as the treating nurse about the 
defendant's head wounds.  The nurse testified that the 
defendant, who had glass imbedded in his head from the accident, 
showed signs of having sustained a concussive head trauma, 
including repeating himself "quite often" and being lethargic. 
The judge erred by failing to make an independent 
determination regarding voluntariness and by failing to give a 
humane practice instruction to the jury.  Because the statements 
the defendant made were offered by the Commonwealth and formed 
the basis for the charge of misleading an investigator, the 
error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
We therefore vacate the defendant's conviction under G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B. 
21 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  In conclusion, we vacate the defendant's 
convictions of OUI causing serious bodily injury and misleading 
an investigator and remand the case to the trial court for 
proceedings consistent with this ruling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting, with whom Kafker, J., joins).  The 
court observes that "[t]he [blood test] results introduced by 
the Commonwealth provided the strongest proof that the defendant 
was intoxicated at the time of the accident."  Ante at    .  I 
agree.  Indeed, this was the Legislature's precise intent when 
it reframed the preexisting statutory scheme for controlling 
substance-impaired driving in objective terms of blood alcohol 
content.  See St. 1961, c. 340, and discussion infra.  Chemical 
analysis of blood alcohol content, although hardly foolproof, is 
not subject to testimonial infirmities such as failure of 
memory, misperception, ambiguity in communicating observations 
to the trier of fact, and lack of sincerity.  By placing new 
emphasis on collecting blood alcohol content evidence from 
suspected offenders, the Legislature both reduced exclusive 
reliance on witness perception and testimony to determine the 
extent of a defendant's intoxication and afforded protection to 
suspects whose symptoms of impairment were not a result of 
alcohol consumption.  Yet the court holds that the Legislature 
intended to exclude blood alcohol content evidence from a 
prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol (OUI) if police obtained it pursuant to a 
search warrant absent consent, because the provisions of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) and (f) (1) (subsections [e] and [f] [1]), 
require the defendant's consent to perform or admit the results 
2 
 
 
of any blood alcohol test made "at the direction of a police 
officer."  Ante at    . 
 
This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language 
and purpose of subsections (e) and (f) (1).  The ordinary 
meaning of the words composing these provisions confines their 
scope to blood alcohol tests performed "at the direction of a 
police officer."  See ante at note 5 (text of subsection [e]), 
and note 6 (text of subsection [f] [1]).  Properly construed, 
those provisions do not require consent for blood drawn pursuant 
to a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, 
upon a finding of probable cause.  The magistrate's decision to 
issue a warrant bears no relation to a suspected offender's 
consent, nor does it implicate the regulatory apparatus of 
implied consent or its effects on evidentiary admissibility. 
 
Moreover, the court's holding frustrates the overriding 
purpose of G. L. c. 90, § 24, to enhance the safety of the 
Commonwealth's roadways by deterring substance-impaired driving.  
See Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812-813 (2007) 
(public safety purpose of statutory scheme well established).  
Collection and use of blood alcohol content evidence is the 
statute's principal engine of enforcement:  The Legislature 
crafted subsections (e) and (f) (1) to fuel that engine by 
imposing an efficient, consent-based procedure for warrantless, 
police-directed testing.  The Legislature's consistent efforts 
3 
 
 
to encourage and to promote the collection of blood alcohol 
content evidence within constitutional bounds belies any 
suggestion of legislative intent to enable a defendant to 
prohibit an alternative, constitutionally compliant procedure by 
withholding his or her consent. 
This is especially true where prohibiting that alternative 
procedure would allow repeat offenders to shield themselves from 
conviction at a disturbing rate by declining to submit to 
forensic testing.1  See, e.g., Senate Committee on Post Audit and 
Oversight, Current Drunk Driving Deterrence, foreword (Oct. 
1987) (noting distressing fifty percent increase in breath test 
refusals over past year, depriving prosecutors of vital 
evidence).  Repeat offenders, due to their previous arrest, are 
typically aware of the inadmissibility of a refusal to take a 
breathalyzer test.  Thus, repeat offenders may avoid conviction, 
in part, because the prosecutor or judge cannot explain to the 
jury why there was no forensic evidence of blood alcohol content 
presented at trial.  The privilege against furnishing evidence 
                                                 
 
1 In a case where a defendant refuses to submit to a test 
establishing blood alcohol content, it is often difficult for 
the prosecution to carry its burden of proof on the element of 
impairment.  Only approximately thirty-one percent of all jury 
trials of OUI charges disposed of in the District Court and 
Boston Municipal Court Departments of the Trial Court over the 
past three calendar years (2017-2019) resulted in conviction.  
Harsh statutory penalties for subsequent convictions have little 
deterrent effect where the likelihood of conviction is 
significantly diminished upon refusing to submit to testing. 
4 
 
 
of one's own guilt under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights precludes the admission of evidence that a 
defendant refused a test given at the direction of the police.  
Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1211 (1992).  The 
confluence of these factors thus impedes the Legislature's 
consistent efforts both to promote the use of blood alcohol 
content evidence at trial to deter substance-impaired driving in 
general, and to ensure effective sanctions for repeat offenses 
in particular.  Because I discern neither a constitutional nor a 
statutory obstacle to admitting evidence of the defendant's 
blood alcohol content obtained pursuant to a search warrant 
issued upon probable cause, I respectfully dissent. 
1.  "Plain" meaning of statutory language.  "[T]he primary 
source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the 
language of the statute."  International Fid. Ins. Co. v. 
Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983).  The plain language of 
subsections (e) and (f) (1) neither prohibits a neutral and 
detached magistrate from issuing a search warrant to draw and 
test a defendant's blood to determine its alcohol content, nor 
forbids police from reasonably executing one.  See Plymouth 
Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 
605 (2019) ("Even clear statutory language is not read in 
isolation"). 
5 
 
 
a.  "[A]t the direction of a police officer."  The 
admissibility, consent, and refusal provisions of subsections 
(e) and (f) (1) each regulate only postarrest blood alcohol 
content tests made "at the direction of a police officer."  In 
denying this defendant's motion in limine to exclude the blood 
alcohol content evidence, the trial judge explained that a 
search pursuant to a "properly executed search warrant is not a 
search that requires the consent of the [defendant] or that is 
'made by or at the direction of a police officer.'"  I agree. 
 
This is not mere semantics.  The language of the search 
warrant issued by the magistrate in this case could not more 
plainly reflect that it is an order of the court, expressly 
directed to law enforcement: 
"I find that there is PROBABLE CAUSE to believe that the 
property described below . . . is evidence of a crime or is 
evidence of criminal activity.  YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
within a reasonable time . . . to search for the . . . 
blood of [the defendant] . . . which is . . . on the person 
or in the possession of [the defendant]." 
When a defendant's blood is drawn and tested pursuant to such a 
warrant, issued by order of "a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged [appropriate] by the officer engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" 
(citation omitted), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966), the defendant's consent is immaterial, see Commonwealth 
6 
 
 
v. Delaney, 442 Mass. 604, 611 (2004) ("suspect has no lawful 
option but to comply with the warrant"). 
 
"The Legislature's silence on [a] subject cannot be 
ignored," Commonwealth v. Nascimento, 479 Mass. 681, 684-685 
(2018), quoting Roberts v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 
438 Mass. 187, 193 (2002), and neither subsection (e) nor 
subsection (f) (1) proscribes or, as the court concedes, ante at    
, "even mentions" warrants.  The law affords suspected offenders 
a statutory means to check officers' discretion, dispensing with 
any opportunity for unwarranted State infringement of bodily 
security, as in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).  
Absent express prohibition of a magistrate's issuance of a 
search warrant for an arrestee's blood alcohol content, I 
decline to read one into the statutory silence.  In a closely 
related context, this court recently acknowledged the 
substantial difference between the summary action of an officer 
in the field and the officer's action following the deliberate 
decision of an impartial court, and then reasoned that this 
procedural discrepancy constituted a reasonable basis for the 
Legislature to impose distinct statutory consequences flowing 
from each.  See Nascimento, supra at 684 (declining to expand 
application of mandatory imprisonment provision where 
Legislature was silent, and differentiating between suspension 
for failing breath test effected by officer's summary 
7 
 
 
confiscation under G. L. c. 90, § 24 [f] [2], and suspension 
according to judicial determination following arraignment in 
open court under G. L. c. 90, § 24N).  Here, since a 
magistrate's "informed, detached and deliberate [probable cause] 
determination[]" to issue a warrant for a blood test, Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770, and the requirement that police execute it in a 
reasonable manner already each protect a defendant's individual 
interest against unreasonable government intrusions, including 
against intrusions upon bodily security, there was no need for 
the Legislature to create additional statutory limits on or 
otherwise acknowledge the default availability of traditional 
warrant procedure. 
 
The court nonetheless attempts to dismiss the limiting 
effect of the phrase "at the direction of a police officer" in 
subsection (e) by broadly construing "police officer" to 
encompass "any State actor," including a magistrate.2  Ante at 
                                                 
2 The court states that the dissent is "somewhat 
disingenuous to maintain that the blood draw was performed 'at 
the direction of' the judge who signed the warrant rather than 
the police officer who sought the warrant and instructed that 
hospital personnel perform the draw."  Ante at note 9.  To the 
contrary, the critical importance of this distinction is, in 
part, what inspired John Adams's authorship of art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and shaped the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See generally T.K. 
Clancy, The Framers' Intent:  John Adams, His Era, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 979 (2011) (discussing Adams's 
part in drafting art. 14 and its influence on Fourth Amendment, 
with particular attention to over-all goal of establishing 
8 
 
 
note 9, citing the Appeals Court rescript opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Arruda, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (2008).  That 
reasoning only makes sense in the context of the evidentiary 
admissibility of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood 
alcohol test under subsections (e) and (f) (1), since art. 12 
precludes any State actor from compelling a defendant to furnish 
testimonial evidence of his or her own guilt.  That 
constitutional concern is not implicated here, however, because 
the issue is the admissibility of the defendant's blood alcohol 
                                                 
objective criteria to justify governmental intrusion upon 
individuals' security).  Although colonial Massachusetts lacked 
organized police forces, its inhabitants were intimately 
familiar with the intrusive customs searches authorized by 
Parliament and the Crown.  See id. at 989-991.  In 1761, James 
Otis famously denounced the general warrants, or "Writs of 
Assistance," granted in furtherance of customs inspections as 
"the worst instrument of arbitrary power . . . that places the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."  J. 
Adams, Abstract of the Argument for and against the Writts of 
Assistance (circa Apr. 1761), in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams, 
at 140, 142 (L.K. Wroth & H.B. Zobel, eds., 1965).  The 
uncontrolled discretion afforded to customs officials under such 
writs was the chief complaint.  See Clancy, supra at 991-922.  
John Adams and the other founders thus recognized the importance 
of enshrining a right to be free from discretionary searches, 
and they understood that they could best protect liberty by 
establishing objective criteria to govern when a search should 
be legally authorized in a specific case, as "determin'd by 
adequate and proper judges" as opposed to "petty tyrants" 
(citations omitted).  Id. at 994.  While both a search "at the 
direction of the police" and a search authorized by a valid 
search warrant constitute State power, the former resembles the 
untrammeled discretion granted to searching customs officers, 
against which our constitutions protect, and the latter 
represents the preferred procedure to ensure that discretionary 
police actions do not trample individual security. 
9 
 
 
content, obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant, and not 
the defendant's refusal to submit to blood alcohol content 
testing.  Article 12 and its doctrinal tests are not implicated 
where real or physical evidence is concerned.3  See Commonwealth 
v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 783 (1982) (neither breathalyzer test 
nor field sobriety tests communicative to extent necessary to 
evoke art. 12 privilege). 
b.  "[No] such test . . . shall be made."  The court's 
conclusion that subsections (e) and (f) (1) "create[] a blanket 
prohibition against blood draws without consent in the context 
of OUI prosecutions," ante at    , hinges upon two critical 
errors.  The first is its inaccurate reading of "a test [made or 
administered] at the direction of a police officer," as it 
appears in subsections (e) and (f) (1), to encompass blood 
alcohol evidence collected pursuant to a warrant, discussed 
above.  The second is an overly broad construction of what 
                                                 
 
3 The court's citation to Commonwealth v. Arruda, 73 Mass. 
App. Ct. 901, 903 (2008), is not dispositive, since it involved 
admissibility of testimonial refusal evidence, not bodily 
fluids.  Although, in that context, it made some sense for the 
Appeals Court to interpret the subsection (e) provision 
excluding evidence that a defendant refused a test administered 
"at the direction of a police officer" to encompass a test at 
the direction of any State actor, that reading makes no sense 
here.  The concept of "State action" also applies to determining 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, but that doctrine is irrelevant here as well, 
since no Federal constitutional claims are at issue. 
10 
 
 
constitutes a "test or analysis" in the following provision of 
subsection (f) (1): 
"If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or 
analysis, after having been informed [that such refusal 
will result in license suspension of at least 180 days], no 
such test or analysis shall be made" (emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  In this portion of subsection 
(f) (1), "such test or analysis" means the breath or blood test 
"administered at the direction of a police officer" to which 
"[w]hoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way . . . 
shall be deemed to have consented to submit . . . in the event 
that he is arrested for [OUI]."4  Id.  Confined as they are to 
tests "at the direction of a police officer," the implied 
consent and refusal provisions in subsection (f) (1) simply have 
no application to the collection of blood alcohol content 
                                                 
 
4 The court's reading of "such test" as referring to any 
breath or blood test for purposes of determining blood alcohol 
content, rather than one specifically administered "at the 
direction of a police officer" is unworkable, both grammatically 
and substantively.  See ante at note 11.  A generally accepted 
rule of English syntax dictates that a demonstrative adjective 
generally refers to the nearest reasonable antecedent.  See A. 
Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 144-146 (2012) (discussing "last antecedent" canon of 
interpretation).  Here, "no such test . . . shall be made" 
refers back to "such test" as the arrestee "refuses to submit," 
which in turn refers to the test that "shall" be administered by 
a police officer.  More fundamentally, the only test 
contemplated by subsection (f) (1) is the one that "shall" be 
administered at police direction, because the very purpose of 
the implied consent law is to encourage cooperation with police 
requests to submit to testing.  It is the refusal to submit to 
that police request that triggers the license suspension and 
means no test is administered at police direction. 
11 
 
 
evidence pursuant to a warrant.  In other words, the court is 
correct when it observes that neither subsection (e) nor 
subsection (f) (1) "even mentions warrants."  Ante at    .  As 
such, the statute neither implies a driver's consent to a blood 
draw pursuant to a warrant nor affords any attendant possibility 
of refusal.  Neither is there any express prohibition of a 
magistrate issuing a warrant to draw and test blood of a person 
under arrest for OUI.  Indeed, no express exception is 
necessary, since obtaining a warrant is the default procedure 
for complying with the reasonableness requirement imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683 (2010) ("presumption 
against warrantless searches reflects the importance of the 
warrant requirement to our democratic society"). 
Moreover, since neither the statutory language nor prior 
appellate construction5 expressly precludes the use of warrant 
                                                 
 
5 The Appeals Court recently acknowledged that, "in this 
Commonwealth, a requirement of consent [to a warrantless blood 
draw] is imposed by statute even when . . . one is not imposed 
by the Federal Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Dennis, 96 Mass. 
App. Ct. 528, 532 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Davidson, 27 
Mass. App. Ct. 846, 848-849 (1989) (recognizing statutory 
"right" to refuse test precluding warrantless compulsion of test 
despite presence of probable cause and exigent circumstances).  
Neither Dennis nor any other appellate precedent expressly holds 
that the implied consent statute prohibits a neutral and 
12 
 
 
procedure to recover admissible evidence of a defendant's blood 
alcohol content, the Legislature's repeated amendment of 
subsections (e) and (f) (1) without change to their fundamental 
admissibility, consent, and refusal provisions is of no 
interpretive significance.  See ante at    , quoting Colturi, 
448 Mass. at 812.  See also Commonwealth v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 
224, 227 (2017) ("It is one thing to infer the Legislature's 
intent based on an implied awareness of our express holdings; it 
is quite another to infer it based on dictum in our opinions").6 
 
2.  Frustration of purpose.  The court's interpretation of 
subsections (e) and (f) (1) impermissibly frustrates the public 
                                                 
detached magistrate from issuing a search warrant to obtain 
evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol test. 
 
 
6 The same principle applies to the Appeals Court's aside in 
Davidson, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 849, postulating that at the time 
the Legislature added subsection (e) in 1961, "[t]he purpose of 
the provisions regarding actual consent (as opposed to the 
implied consent established by the first sentence of 
§ 24 [1] [f]) seems to have been to avoid forced testing -- 
i.e., testing by means of physical compulsion -- that was 
thought after Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), to be 
of dubious constitutional validity."  This court later restated 
that observation in a footnote.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
412 Mass. 1201, 1208 n.6 (1992) (responding to Senate's reported 
question regarding constitutionality of proposal to make refusal 
evidence admissible as additional inducement to submit to test).  
More fundamentally, intent to prevent police from physically 
compelling submission to testing in the absence of a warrant, 
and to deter the type of egregious, warrantless police abuse 
that occurred in Rochin, need not preclude use of reasonable 
force in police execution of a valid search warrant, issued upon 
a magistrate's finding of probable cause. 
13 
 
 
safety purpose of the larger statutory scheme laid out in G. L. 
c. 90, §§ 24-24X.  See Saccone v. State Ethics Comm'n, 395 Mass. 
326, 334 (1985) (where "literal import of any particular clause 
or section" is inconsistent with "the general meaning and object 
of the statute," court must interpret "according to the spirit 
of the act" [citation omitted]).  This court has held that the 
general purpose of that statutory scheme is to "protect the 
public from drivers whose judgment, alertness, and ability to 
respond promptly and effectively to unexpected emergencies are 
diminished because of the consumption of alcohol.'"7  Colturi, 
                                                 
 
7 The present case concerns precisely this type of impaired 
ability to respond to the unexpected -- here, the disabled 
vehicle of another substance-impaired motorist who had crashed 
her sport utility vehicle (SUV) into the guardrail of a highway 
onramp, coming to a stop in the middle of the ramp, almost 
perpendicular to the road.  In the expert opinion of the State 
trooper who performed the accident reconstruction analysis in 
this case, ninety-five percent of the population, traveling at 
the advisory speed limit of 30 miles per hour on the same road 
and at the same time of night (i) could have seen the stopped 
SUV from in excess of 200 feet away (and certainly no less than 
149 feet away), and (ii) reacted in time to brake and come to a 
complete stop within a distance of 142 feet, avoiding collision.  
The expert also opined that, alternatively, there was 8.75 feet 
of open road between the SUV and curb, and a further 6.50 feet 
from the curb to the guardrail, to allow a driver to maneuver 
around the disabled vehicle.  Unable to engage in the requisite 
type of split-second decision-making and action necessary to 
avoid collision, the impaired defendant instead initiated a 
chain of events that ended with the victim trapped beneath the 
defendant's car, which dragged the victim along the road beneath 
it for some 257 feet before dislodging her, alive but critically 
injured. 
14 
 
 
448 Mass. at 812-813, quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 
Mass. 169, 172-173 (1985). 
 
Since the 1906 enactment of its statutory predecessor, St. 
1906, c. 412, § 4 (mandating punishment for motor vehicle 
operation "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" by 
maximum fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for up to 
six months), the Legislature frequently has amended G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24, seeking to enhance the statute's public safety purpose 
through increasingly effective mechanisms to deter substance-
impaired driving.  See, e.g., St. 1909, c. 534, § 22 (doubling 
maximum fine for first offense; mandatory prison term of at 
least one year, not to exceed two years, upon conviction of 
second offense); St. 1913, c. 123, § 1 (increased punishment for 
first offense, to include imprisonment for at least two weeks 
but not to exceed two years, maximum fine of $200, or both); 
Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 250 Mass. 555, 558 (1925) (interpreting 
statute punishing driving "while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor" in accordance with plain language and 
"purpose . . . to regulate the use of motor vehicles on the 
public ways, in the interests of the public welfare"); St. 2003, 
c. 28, § 1 (adding new "per se" violation to G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 [1] [a] [1], operating motor vehicle "with a percentage, by 
weight, of alcohol in [the] blood of eight one-hundredths or 
greater," as alternative to operating "while under the influence 
15 
 
 
of intoxicating liquor"); Colturi, 448 Mass. at 813 ("It is 
beyond reasonable dispute that, in adding a per se violation to 
the OUI statute, the Legislature intended to strengthen the 
protections afforded the public from drivers who might be 
impaired by the consumption of alcohol").  Since 1961, many of 
these amendments have promoted the Legislature's intent to 
encourage OUI arrestees to take a blood alcohol test, to 
"provid[e] the most reliable form of evidence of intoxication 
for use in subsequent proceedings," and thereby assist the 
Commonwealth in carrying its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or otherwise exculpating the defendant.  Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979). 
In 1961, the Legislature first enacted a statutory 
presumption that a person was under the influence when his or 
her blood alcohol content exceeded a set limit.  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (e), inserted by St. 1961, c. 340.  That amendment 
yoked enforcement of G. L. c. 90, § 24, to an accurate 
determination of a defendant's blood alcohol content and to 
introducing that evidence to establish impairment at a criminal 
trial for OUI.  See id. (blood alcohol content as measured by 
chemical test "deemed relevant" to establishing "under the 
influence" element of offense).  Absent a defendant's consent, 
however, results of a blood alcohol test performed "by or at the 
direction of a police officer" were inadmissible.  Id.  In 1967, 
16 
 
 
the Legislature added subsection (f), incorporating a remedial 
sanction into the existing deterrence scheme by mandating an 
automatic ninety-day license suspension for any driver arrested 
for OUI who refused to take a breath test despite notice of the 
consequence.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f), inserted by St. 1967, 
c. 773.  The court's theory that the Legislature intended those 
amendments to create an absolute individual statutory right to 
refuse submission to a blood alcohol content test, ante at    , 
is not supported by the historical record.  There is no basis to 
suggest that any legislative concern to guard against potential 
police abuse or afford arrestees due process extended to tests 
conducted under the authority of a valid warrant. 
Contrary to the court's suggestion, ante at note 12, it is 
unlikely that the enactment of Massachusetts's implied consent 
law in December of 1967 had much, if any, connection to the June 
1966 release of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-771 (upholding warrantless blood test 
of unconscious driver performed by doctors at police request, 
due to exigent circumstances and probable cause).  The 
conventional wisdom attributes States' adoption of implied 
consent laws to "the intent of the statutory draftsmen to 
17 
 
 
obviate the element of physical coercion."8  Rosenberg, 
Compulsory Intoxication Tests:  A Suggestion for Massachusetts, 
50 Mass. L.Q. 145, 156 (1965).  See Bruns, Driving While 
Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel:  The Case Against Implied 
Consent, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 935, 941-942 (1980).  Yet both the 
timing and the content of the Massachusetts implied consent law 
more likely resulted from the influence of familiar, court-
approved formulations in widely adopted model statutes and 
powerful Federal financial incentives.  See Bruns, supra at 959 
(concluding that States' implied consent laws are "as much a 
result of historical snowballing as of a considered choice by 
legislatures"). 
Most of the language comprising Massachusetts's implied 
consent law had been operative in many other States' statutes 
for more than a decade before the 1967 Legislature added them to 
                                                 
 
8 Despite the express intent of the Supreme Court majority 
that its opinion in Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174, not implicate the 
"use of modern methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers 
and bringing them to book," Rochin does appear to have raised 
certain lingering doubts about the constitutionality of 
compelled testing, less due to the majority's opinion that 
police use of "force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity 
in securing evidence from a suspect" offended due process and 
rendered such evidence inadmissible, id., and rather more due to 
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion that "words taken from [a 
defendant's] lips, capsules taken from his stomach, blood taken 
from his veins are inadmissible provided they are taken from him 
without his consent" based upon the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
18 
 
 
G. L. c. 90, § 24.  In 1953, New York's Legislature enacted the 
nation's first implied consent statute.  See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. 
Law § 71-a, inserted by 1953 N.Y. Laws c. 854.  That enactment 
followed the recommendation of a joint legislative committee 
appointed to study "the apparent inability of our police and 
courts to effectively enforce laws forbidding driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating beverages."  Interim Report 
of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor 
Vehicle Problems:  Chemical Tests for Intoxication, N.Y. Leg. 
Doc. No. 25, at 9 (Jan. 1953) (Interim Report).  See Schutt v. 
Macduff, 205 Misc. 43, 46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (law responded to 
"urgent need" to promote "procurement of chemical tests for the 
purpose of definitely determining whether or not an accused 
driver was intoxicated to the extent of impairing his driving 
ability").  In its comprehensive report, the New York committee 
explained that, despite its own legal conclusion that compelled 
submission to testing would not violate any constitutional 
right, the proposed statute entirely avoided any question of a 
constitutional right to resist the test by providing "the 
accused . . . the choice of waiving his [constitutional right] -
- assuming such a right exists -- or losing the privilege to 
continue driving on our highways."  Interim Report, supra at 26. 
By February of 1957, it was clear that the United States 
Constitution posed no obstacle to "so slight an intrusion as is 
19 
 
 
involved in applying a blood test of the kind to which millions 
of Americans submit as a matter of course nearly every day."  
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).  Still, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
adopted the Uniform Chemical Tests for Intoxication Act, modeled 
on the New York language, as amended by 1954 N.Y. Laws c. 320, 
in July of that same year.  See Handbook of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
Proceedings of the Annual Conference, at 129, 216-229 (1957).  
"Thus [implied consent] legislation conceived to overcome a 
constitutional obstacle gained institutional momentum at the 
very time that the United States Supreme Court removed the 
obstacle."  State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 796 (1981).  This 
"institutional momentum" continued to build with the inclusion 
of the Uniform Chemical Tests for Intoxication Act as § 6-205.1 
of the 1962 Uniform Vehicle Code, which encouraged additional 
States' enactment of implied consent provisions,9 and ultimately 
                                                 
 
9 Some other State Legislatures, including those of Idaho, 
Kansas, and Utah, enacted their own implied consent statutes 
after the New York model even prior to the inception of the 
Uniform Chemical Tests for Intoxication Act in 1957.  See 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and Proceedings of the Annual Conference, at 218 
(1957).  Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
Minnesota joined their ranks by the time implied consent 
appeared as § 6-205.1 of the Uniform Vehicle Code, in 1962.  
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, 
Recent Developments in Chemical Test and Implied Consent Laws, 
20 
 
 
shaped Federal standards.  See, e.g., Report of the Legislative 
Research Council Relative to Massachusetts Implementation of the 
National Highway Safety Act of 1966 (Jan. 30, 1968), 1968 Senate 
Doc. No. 980, at 48 (Massachusetts Implementation of the 
National Highway Safety Act) (standard promulgated under Federal 
Highway Act of 1966 and requiring implied consent provision was 
"based on provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code"). 
Notably, Massachusetts lagged far behind most other States 
in its initial embrace of blood alcohol testing as evidence of a 
driver's level of intoxication,10 and trailed many others in its 
                                                 
at 7 (Apr. 24, 1963).  Before year end of 1963, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Minnesota, and Connecticut all followed suit.  See 
Comment, Implied Consent to a Chemical Test for Intoxication:  
Doubts about Section 6-205 of the Uniform Vehicle Code, 31 U. 
Chicago L. Rev. 603, 604 & n.11 (1964).  Throughout this period, 
State courts consistently rejected challenges to the 
constitutionality of these statutes.  Id. at 605 & n.13 (citing 
cases and early exception of Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 43, 46 
[N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954], prompting 1954 amendment of New York 
model, which withstood subsequent challenges once altered). 
 
 
10 As of 1952, the only other States, apart from 
Massachusetts, that had not yet recognized chemical testing to 
determine operator sobriety were Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, 
Kentucky, and Wyoming.  See Brooks, Chemical Tests for Driving 
Under the Influence, 37 Mass. L.Q. 10, 17 (1952).  Nearly 
another decade would pass until the Commonwealth amended G. L. 
c. 90, § 24, to add subsection (e), setting a blood alcohol 
content limit and accompanying presumption of "under the 
influence," and establishing the admissibility of breath or 
blood test results as evidence thereof.  St. 1961, c. 340.  In 
1952, the Legislature apparently remained wary as to the 
accuracy of the proposed scale correlating blood alcohol content 
with extent of intoxication, and the accuracy of tests to 
measure blood alcohol content.  See Brooks, supra. 
21 
 
 
later adoption of implied consent provisions.11  There can be 
little doubt as to why the bill that finally succeeded in making 
implied consent Commonwealth law was the one Governor John Volpe 
dispatched to the Legislature in March of 1967, see 1967 House 
J. 926, 928:  Massachusetts stood to lose the opportunity to 
access up to $7 million in new Federal highway funding along 
with ten percent of its present Federal highway aid, unless it 
complied with standards promulgated by the Secretary of 
Transportation under the Federal Highway Act of 1966.  See Pub. 
L. No. 89-564, Title I, § 101, inserting 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-404, 
80 Stat. 731 (Sept. 9, 1966).  By the time the Supreme Court 
decided Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, in June of 1966, the Federal 
legislative process that would culminate with President Lyndon 
Johnson signing the Federal Highway Act in September was already 
well under way, negating any suggestion that it was reactive to 
the Court's decision. 
                                                 
 
 
11 This was despite Governor John Volpe's efforts to 
implement license suspension measures to "correct" the evident 
"weakness" of the 1961 amendment providing for testing yet 
allowing "[d]rinking drivers . . .  to refuse with impunity to 
take [them]."  1966 House Doc. No. 3131, at 7.  The Legislature 
consigned the Governor's first such attempt, 1962 Senate Doc. 
No. 764, and many related, subsequent bills to languish in 
committee "study" over the next five years.  See, e.g., 1963 
House Doc. No. 2476; 1964 House Doc. No. 1125; 1964 House Doc. 
No. 1319; 1965 House Doc. No. 1127; 1965 House Doc. No. 1729; 
1965 Senate Doc. No. 839. 
22 
 
 
The Secretary of Transportation included a requirement for 
implied consent authority as part of Highway Safety Program 
Standard No. Eight, "Alcohol in Relation to Highway Safety," 
despite the Schmerber Court's recognition that where police 
obtained a warrant or satisfied the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant rule, the United States Constitution 
did not prevent compelled blood tests, so long as performed in a 
reasonable manner.12  See Massachusetts Implementation of the 
National Highway Safety Act, supra at 69; Bruns, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 
at 943-944.  Of course, absent refusal, the implied consent 
approach still provided a more efficient means of collecting 
evidence than compelled testing, but there could no longer be 
                                                 
 
12 In Schmerber, the Court reaffirmed its holding in 
Breithaupt (which predated the Court's extension of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule to bind the States) that a blood 
alcohol content test performed on an unconscious driver upon 
warrantless police request was constitutional, and its results 
were admissible at trial for OUI.  Notably, the Schmerber Court 
emphasized that, in that case, "the test was performed in a 
reasonable manner.  Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician 
in a hospital environment according to accepted medical 
practices."  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.  The ruling expressly 
did not extend to any test "made by other than medical personnel 
or in other than a medical environment," which "might be to 
invite an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and 
pain."  Id. at 772.  Moreover, the Schmerber Court explicitly 
recognized that "[i]t would be a different case if the police 
initiated . . . violence, . . . or responded to resistance with 
inappropriate force," and further acknowledged "[t]he integrity 
of an individual's person [as] a cherished value of our 
society."  Id. at 760 n.4, 772. 
23 
 
 
any doubt that consent was unnecessary for a blood test to pass 
constitutional muster. 
If the absence of blood testing from the implied consent 
provisions the Legislature enacted in 1967 indicates any 
continuing reservations about compelled testing, those 
reservations had disappeared by 1980, when the Legislature 
amended subsection (f) (1) such that refusing to consent to a 
blood test carried the same remedial license suspension 
consequences as refusing a breathalyzer test, enhancing the 
arrestee's incentives to submit to testing.  See Memorandum from 
Secretary of Public Safety to Governor's Assistant Legislative 
Secretary regarding House Bill No. 2046 (June 27, 1980) (on file 
at the Massachusetts Archives).  The 1980 amendment was enacted13 
in response to an emergency physicians' group report noting the 
typical absence of breath test equipment at hospitals, a lack of 
sanction for refusing a blood test, and no routine practice of 
testing blood alcohol content for medical purposes, which meant 
that injured drivers taken from a crash site to the hospital 
often were not tested.  Id. 
                                                 
 
13 The 1980 amendment, like many other amendments to the 
G. L. c. 90, § 24, scheme, was implemented with an emergency 
executive preamble, proclaiming its immediate effect in the 
public's interest "in order that the tests and analyses provided 
for may be used in determining the operation of motor vehicles 
by persons under the influence of intoxicating liquor."  Letter 
from the Governor to the Secretary of the Commonwealth (July 2, 
1980). 
24 
 
 
Subsequent amendments to G. L. c. 90, § 24, further 
enhanced incentives to submit to blood alcohol content tests, 
some specifically aiming to deter repeat offenders' refusal to 
submit to testing as a strategy to reduce the likelihood of 
conviction.  For example, a 1990 Senate committee report 
suggested, based upon "increasing evidence . . . [of] the 
importance that these [blood alcohol content] tests play in 
obtaining a drunk driving conviction, [that] the state should 
make every effort to have test results from every person 
arrested for drunk driving."  Report of the Senate Committee on 
Post Audit and Oversight Relative to Controlling the Drunk 
Driver:  The 1980s in Review, at 30 (Dec. 26, 1990), 1990 Senate 
Doc. No. 1900.  That report also recommended increasing the 
license suspension period for refusing to take a breath or blood 
test to be twice as strong as the sanction for taking the test 
and failing it, as well as increasing penalties for subsequent 
offenders' refusals.14  See Letter from the Governor to the 
                                                 
 
14 The affidavit submitted with the search warrant 
application in this case reported that a background check of the 
defendant revealed three prior arraignments on OUI charges, and 
one prior conviction.  His registry of motor vehicles history 
revealed multiple prior license suspensions for refusal to 
consent to testing.  If the conviction of OUI causing serious 
bodily injury were upheld, the defendant would face a ten-year 
license suspension in the event that he refused a blood alcohol 
test upon any subsequent arrest for OUI.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1) (penalty for refusal after having been 
convicted of violation of § 24L). 
25 
 
 
Senate and House (May 27, 2005), 2005 House Doc. No. 4099 
(transmitting draft legislation, later enacted as St. 2005, 
c. 122, and expressly stating intent to "increase the [license] 
suspension period for people who refuse the breathalyzer or 
field sobriety tests . . .  to create an increased incentive to 
submit to such tests as required by law"). 
The court raises a concern over of the dangers of blood 
draws, ante at    , highlighting language from the subsection 
regarding the lack of implied consent for hemophiliacs and 
diabetics.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  However, the 
statute anticipates such dangers by requiring that these blood 
tests be performed by medical professionals at a medical 
facility.  Id.  The police here provided the defendant with 
multiple opportunities to comply with the warrant, and officers 
handcuffed the defendant to the stretcher in an effort to 
prevent the type of harm presented by "sharps" that the majority 
raises.  Ante at    .  At the time of the blood draw, the nurse 
testified, the defendant cooperated with the procedure, and the 
nurse exercised care by following all standard procedures of the 
hospital, including the nurse's use of a vacuum system to reduce 
the "sharps" danger to the nurse.  Medical professionals 
typically identify a condition like hemophilia or diabetes in 
taking a patient's medical history, not to mention that persons 
26 
 
 
afflicted by those conditions often wear or carry specific 
identification. 
The court points out that "actual consent for blood draws 
is also a safety measure."  Ante at    .  And it is.  But for 
every hemophiliac, diabetic, or person on anticoagulant 
medication who is arrested for OUI, or for every medical worker 
who is injured by a sharp needle when blood is drawn -- 
contingencies that as a matter of course are addressed by the 
medical profession without incident -- immeasurably more danger 
results from permitting repeat OUI offenders to get behind the 
wheel.  If the concern is "safety measures," the best response 
is to provide jurors with the best evidence of sobriety, or lack 
thereof, so as to help deter repeat offenders from getting 
behind the wheel of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  By not 
precluding the use of warrants to collect blood alcohol content 
evidence from a defendant's blood, and consistently legislating 
to encourage arrestees to submit to blood alcohol content tests, 
I believe that this course is the one our Legislature intended 
to follow. 
Far from intending to grant defendants an absolute 
statutory right to deprive juries of the most probative evidence 
of driver impairment, the Legislature intended the provisions of 
subsections (e) and (f) (1) to facilitate, within the confines 
of the Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution, 
27 
 
 
the efficient collection of reliable evidence by encouraging 
defendants to consent to testing, and to facilitate justice by 
providing the trier of fact with the most probative evidence of 
guilt or innocence.  Common sense and the canons of statutory 
construction clearly demonstrate that the Legislature did not 
intend to prohibit the admissibility of blood alcohol content 
evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant based upon 
probable cause.15 
 
3.  Persuasive constructions in other jurisdictions.  Other 
States have enacted implied consent laws that include a 
directive that "no such test . . . shall be made," following a 
defendant's refusal, while remaining silent regarding tests 
performed pursuant to a warrant.  Appellate courts in those 
States have construed these cognate provisions to encompass only 
tests pursuant to warrantless officer requests.16  Notably, and 
                                                 
 
15 Proscribing the use of a warrant to obtain evidence of 
driver impairment "would be to place allegedly drunken drivers 
in an exalted class of criminal defendants, protected by the law 
from every means of obtaining the most important evidence 
against them."  Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864, 869 (Alaska 1984) 
(Compton, J., dissenting). 
 
 
16 I would join with those courts construing the "no such 
test" language so as not to exclude test results obtained 
pursuant to a valid warrant.  See, e.g., Britton v. State, 631 
So. 2d 1073, 1076-1077 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Metzner v. State, 
2015 Ark. 222, at 10; State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2003); Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616-617 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2002); State v. Stone, 229 W. Va. 271, 284 (2012).  See 
also Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 
28 
 
 
without coincidence, State appellate decisions interpreting 
similar "no test" language to prohibit police from obtaining 
blood alcohol content evidence under a warrant, including those 
cited ante at    , were subsequently superseded by statutory 
amendment:  These Legislatures' responsive amendments each carry 
a "for the avoidance of doubt" connotation suggesting that the 
court misconstrued the statute as initially written.  See State 
v. Evans, 378 P.3d 413, 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016) (quoting 
revised statute:  "Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
restrict searches or seizures under a warrant issued by a 
judicial officer, in addition to a test permitted under this 
section"); McAllister v. State, 754 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Ga. App. 
Ct. 2014) (noting similar legislative amendment); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 31–27–2.9(a), inserted by R.I. St. 2009, c. 210, § 2 
("Notwithstanding any provision of § 31-27-2.1, . . . a chemical 
test may be administered without the consent of that individual 
provided that the peace officer first obtains a search warrant 
authorizing administration of the chemical test").  See also 
State v. Stanley, 217 Ariz. 253, 257 (Ct. App. 2007) ("the 
legislature's amendments [including 'or pursuant to a search 
                                                 
(noting statutory silence on question and concluding that 
"provisions of the implied consent law do not act either 
individually or collectively to prevent a law enforcement 
officer from obtaining a blood sample pursuant to a search 
warrant"). 
29 
 
 
warrant'] were 'obviously . . . a response' to Collins v. 
Superior Court, [158 Ariz. 145 (1988)]"); State v. Garnenez, 
2015-NMCA-022, 344 P.3d 1054, 1058 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014), quoting 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (noting amendment that added 
"except when a municipal judge, magistrate or district judge 
issues a search warrant" after "none shall be administered"). 
4.  Conclusion.  It is now well established that the 
alcohol content of an individual's blood is not testimonial 
evidence, and its admission in evidence does not implicate self-
incrimination concerns.  See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764; 
Brennan, 386 Mass. at 783.  As the court acknowledges, obtaining 
or admitting such evidence, subject to a valid warrant, does not 
otherwise violate the United States Constitution or the 
Declaration of Rights.  See ante at    .  The admissibility, 
consent, and refusal provisions of subsections (e) and (f) (1) 
pose no roadblock either to the issuance and execution of a 
valid warrant to collect evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol 
content, or to admitting that probative evidence of impairment 
at trial.  The Legislature assuredly did not enact the implied 
consent statute to render inadmissible the result of a blood 
alcohol content obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued by 
a neutral and detached magistrate upon an informed finding of 
probable cause, and subject to the requirement of reasonable 
execution. 
30 
 
 
And why would they?  The Legislature has exercised its 
police power to regulate the use of motor vehicles and promote 
public safety for more than a century:  "No one has a right to 
use the streets . . . as he chooses, without regard to the 
safety of other persons who are rightly there."  Commonwealth v. 
Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 545 (1908).  When a person operates a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
that person endangers the lives and safety of every other driver 
and passenger on the road.  There is no reason why prosecutors 
should have to try OUI charges with both arms tied behind their 
backs, especially when the jury do not and cannot know the 
prosecutor's arms are thus bound by law.17  When "jurors find 
facts, not from a fair consideration of the evidence, but rather 
based upon bewilderment as to why no evidence of a breathalyzer 
                                                 
 
17 Where blood alcohol content evidence is absent, jury 
inquiries like, "Why would a [b]reathalyzer test be or not be 
administered?" are common.  Commonwealth v. Gibson, 82 Mass. 
App. Ct. 834, 835-836 (2012).  See Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 
Mass. 142, 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) (jury at 
defendant's first trial, which resulted in mistrial, asked, "Are 
we allowed to ask:  'Why there are no tests?' [e.g.,] 
Breathalyzer or blood test?"); Commonwealth v. Palka, 97 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1111 (2020) (trial judge gave instruction pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 197-201 [2001], 
after explaining, "Every time I don't give it, they ask it as a 
question"); Commonwealth v. Klegraefe, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 
(2020) (jury asked whether breathalyzer test was performed); 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (2020) (jury 
asked:  "Did he have a breath test?  Was it offered or 
refused?").  I predict that the court's interpretation of the 
implied consent statute to preclude an alternative legal means 
to obtain that evidence will only exacerbate this problem. 
31 
 
 
test was introduced," Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 151 
(2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting), and without explanation as to why 
they lack such evidence, the trial's truth-seeking function is 
impaired, and the rate of acquittals and recidivism 
proliferates. 
When it comes to evidence that the defendant refused to 
submit to testing under the implied consent law, the 
inadmissibility of that evidence is a price I embrace as the 
cost of our precious liberty and the sanctity of the right 
against self-incrimination.  But when the Commonwealth has 
obtained evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol content by 
constitutional means, pursuant to a validly issued and 
reasonably executed search warrant, there is no reason to 
exclude that evidence, especially in light of the Legislature's 
clear intent to promote its collection and use as the most 
efficient means of enforcing the laws and deterring substance-
impaired driving.  Contorting subsections (e) and (f) (1) 
otherwise unnecessarily endangers human life and provides 
unwarranted protection to dangerous repeat offenders.  I would 
uphold the trial judge's admission of the blood test results in 
evidence at the defendant's trial and affirm the defendant's 
conviction under G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2), for OUI causing serious 
bodily injury.