Title: HADDEN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HADDEN v. STATE2002 WY 4142 P.3d 495Case Number: 00-336Decided: 03/15/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JOHN C. 
HADDEN, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Defender Aid Program; Elana Sears, Megan Overman, and James M. 
Meseck, Student Interns.  Argument 
by Ms. Overman and Mr. Meseck.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling and Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorneys 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Cooley.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, John 
Hadden (Hadden), was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and sentenced to a 
term of 15 to 20 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  He appeals that finding of guilt, 
claiming that the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress 
statements he made to police after he requested the assistance of an attorney, 
that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, and that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury on the subjects of "discrepancies in 
testimony" and "flight after committing a crime."

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.  However, we will also hold 
that after the publication of this opinion in the advance sheets of Pacific 
Reporter Third, the giving of a flight instruction in a criminal case will 
constitute reversible error, though the prosecution may still prove up and argue 
flight as a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred.

 

 

[¶3]      Hadden raises 
these issues:

 

I.          
Whether it was error for the trial court to not suppress Mr. Hadden's 
custodial statement to Detective Reekers when Mr. Hadden requested the 
assistance of counsel?

 

II.          
Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction of first degree 
sexual assault when the victim testified that Mr. Hadden did not resemble her 
attacker?

 

III.         
Whether the trial court erred when instructing the jury on witness 
credibility and flight when the instructions unduly focused the jury's attention 
on isolated facts?

 

The 
State rephrases those same issues in very similar terms.

 

 

[¶4]      At about 2:30 
a.m., on August 6, 1999, the victim of the instant crime burst into a 
convenience store located near the Outlaw Inn in Rock Springs.  The attendant at the convenience store 
recognized the victim as someone she had seen before and observed that she was 
"highly aggravated,1 upset, distraught," that she "was 
bloody and her eye was  was almost closed shut from swelling and her nose was 
bleeding," and that she reported that she had been beaten and raped.  The victim was taken to the hospital in 
Rock Springs.  There, she was able 
to describe some of the events that had occurred that night, including that she 
met a man at a bar in Rock Springs and had permitted him to drive her car to a 
location near the Outlaw Inn so that he could return to his semi-truck, as well 
as for what may have been intended to be a sexual liaison.  That man was later ascertained to be 
John Hadden.  When they arrived at 
the Outlaw Inn, Hadden attacked the victim and viciously beat and raped 
her.  Hadden then ran off into the 
night, leaving the victim prostrate, only partially clad, and severely bloodied 
in the back seat of her car.  Hadden 
had apparently also taken the keys to her car, or at least she did not have them 
when the attack was over.  The keys 
to the victim's car were never found.

 

[¶5]      The victim was 
able to make it to the convenience store and report the crime very shortly after 
it occurred.  She gave a description 
of the person who had beaten and raped her, but that description did not 
meaningfully resemble Hadden.  The 
victim was unable to identify Hadden in a photo lineup, and she tentatively 
identified a man in a photo lineup who was not Hadden.

 

[¶6]      A key piece of 
evidence was a baseball cap, which the person who raped the victim had left in 
her car.  At trial, the victim could 
not say that Hadden was the man who had beaten and raped her, though likewise 
she did not testify that he was not that man.  She was certain that the man who raped 
her was the man with whom she left the bar and that was the man who left a 
baseball cap in her car.

 

[¶7]      At the hospital 
in Rock Springs the victim was examined and her injuries catalogued.  Her face was badly beaten and she 
suffered other bruises.  Her blood 
alcohol concentration was .256, and she appeared to observers to be very 
intoxicated.  Her genital area was 
not injured and the emergency room physician conducting the examination, who had 
handled four to five hundred such examinations in his career, testified that the 
lack of genital injuries is very common, as most rapists are intent on gaining 
access to the woman's genitals, not injuring them.  No sperm was found in her vagina or 
rectum, and the emergency room physician testified that that also was not 
uncommon.  Based upon his 
experience, the physician viewed the victim's condition as constituting an 
extreme degree of physical injury and did not find it surprising that the 
victim's memory of the evening's events was impaired, given her injuries and the 
level of her intoxication.

 

[¶8]      The investigation 
immediately following this incident produced very little in the way of leads, 
with the exception of a black or dark navy blue baseball cap embossed with 
"Imperial Group Inc.," the name of a trucking company, and that company's 
logo.  The victim identified the hat 
as like the one worn by the man who attacked her.  That information eventually led to a 
trucking company in Florida, but because the records of that company indicated 
no trucks in Wyoming on the relevant date, that lead came to an 
end.

 

[¶9]      A break in the 
investigation developed when, on March 16, 2000, an agent for the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement received information that Amy Hadden, John 
Hadden's then estranged wife, had reported to local police the commission of a 
possible crime of rape that her husband had committed in Rock Springs, in August 
of 1999.  That report led law 
enforcement officers to Christopher Hobbs, who was the original source of Amy 
Hadden's information.  At this point 
in time, the Haddens were involved in getting a divorce and determining who 
would have custody of their six-year-old daughter.

 

[¶10]   Florida police interviewed Hobbs, 
and he related that Hadden had confessed to him that he had raped and beaten a 
woman in Rock Springs, on August 6, 1999.  
Hobbs also testified at Hadden's trial.  He related that when he was sixteen, he 
moved in with the Haddens because he had no other real home to which he could 
go.

 

[¶11]   Hobbs occasionally traveled with 
Hadden when he went on over-the-road trips, and one of those trips took them 
through Wyoming, where they stopped on August 5, 1999, for a planned overnight 
stay in Rock Springs.  While in Rock 
Springs, Hadden, Hobbs, and another truck driver attended a carnival, drank 
liquor, met some girls, and decided to go to a bar.  During these activities, Hadden was 
driving his truck.  Eventually, they 
did park that truck behind a bar, which was apparently the "Saddle Lite Bar," 
where Hadden met up with the victim.  
Hadden said he was going into the bar and told Hobbs to stay in the truck 
and sleep, which he did.  Three or 
four hours later, Hadden returned to the truck (which would have been between 
2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.), awoke Hobbs, and told him to get down from the sleeper 
compartment and into the passenger seat and act as a lookout.  Hobbs noticed that Hadden was covered in 
blood and was "very nervous, very scared, in a hurry and anxious to leave."  Hadden then told Hobbs that he had 
beaten and raped a woman; that he "was drunk and just snapped."  Hadden then hurriedly drove out of Rock 
Springs but stopped several miles down the road to clean up.  Hadden told Hobbs never to speak of the 
matter again or he would kill him.

 

[¶12]   Hobbs also conceded that, after 
returning to Florida, the Haddens separated and Hobbs's relationship with Amy 
Hadden blossomed into a sexual relationship (he was then 16, and she was about 
28).  Mrs. Hadden pumped him for 
information about her estranged husband, so he told her the story of the rape 
incident (by this time Hadden was living in Missouri with his new 
girlfriend).  There were some 
inconsistencies, or discrepancies, in Hobbs's stories (he was interviewed 
several times by several different law enforcement officers), but he offered an 
explanation for that in the form of crediting his return to Rock Springs to 
testify for refreshing his memory.  
His memory was also aided by some photographs that were taken while on 
the ill-fated trip, particularly with respect to the hat that Hadden was 
wearing.

 

[¶13]   Expert testimony was admitted at 
trial, which established that blood antigens foreign to the victim's body were 
found in both her vagina and anus.  
Those blood antigens were consistent with Hadden's blood type, though it 
is also common to over 40% of the general population.  Gas purchase records and telephone 
records placed Hadden in Wyoming at the time of the crime.

 

[¶14]   Based upon Hobbs's information, 
Hadden was arrested in Missouri and returned to Wyoming.  Shortly after his return to Wyoming, 
Rock Springs police detective Steve Reekers interviewed Hadden.  Hadden chose not to testify at trial, 
although he did make a statement to Detective Reekers while he was incarcerated 
in Sweetwater County, and that statement was related to the jury via the 
testimony of that police detective.  
Hadden related that he was in Rock Springs on August 5-6, 1999, and had 
attended a carnival with Hobbs and another truck driver.  At the carnival Hadden and his 
companions met up with a couple of girls and made arrangements to meet them at 
the Saddle Lite Bar.  He did meet 
the girls there, but they left soon after, and Hadden then had an encounter with 
the victim.  Hadden related that the 
victim "came on" to him and eventually asked him to leave the bar with her, 
which he agreed to do.  Outside in 
the parking lot the victim undid her pants, as well as Hadden's, and, as Hadden 
put it, she "run [sic] her hand down in my pants."  The two of them then got into the 
victim's car, with Hadden in the driver's seat, and began driving to what Hadden 
thought was her home.  However, 
according to Hadden, the victim was by this time passed-out drunk, and so he 
drove back to the Saddle Lite Bar where he had parked his truck.  Hadden then left the victim in her car 
and returned to his truck.  Hadden 
claimed that he did not have sex with the victim, though he conceded his pubic 
hair might be found in the victim's car because he and the victim had fondled 
each other.

 

[¶15]   Hadden told Hobbs about the woman 
passed out in her car, and Hobbs said he was going to go out and get in her car, 
drive off, and see how long it would take the victim to figure out that it was 
no longer Hadden who was with her.  
Hadden also related that Hobbs had been after him to "find him a woman," 
and later in his story added that Hobbs had been after him that very night to 
"find him a woman."  Hadden said he 
saw Hobbs drive off in the victim's car.  
Hadden then related that Hobbs returned to the truck about 30 minutes 
later and said that the victim had figured out that he was not Hadden and she 
kicked him out of her car, and he had to walk back to the truck.  Hadden said he looked at both the Flying 
J and the Outlaw Inn for a place to park his truck for the remainder of the 
night but because he could not find a place to park, he drove down the road 
about 20 miles to a rest area and stopped for the night.  Hadden claimed that the victim had asked 
him for his hat and he had given it to her.

 

[¶16]   Hadden went on to tell that Hobbs 
was now living with Hadden's ex-wife, and that they were both on drugs.  Hadden was trying to get custody of his 
daughter and was having them both watched for drugs.  He claimed that Hobbs said to him that 
he would see to it that Hadden never saw his daughter again.  Hadden explicitly asserted that it had 
to have been Hobbs who had assaulted the victim.  Hadden claimed that Hobbs knew that he 
had left his hat in the victim's car, so he was able to place Hadden in the 
victim's car.  Hadden believed that 
Hobbs did all this to get back at him because Hadden was "coming down hard" on 
his wife and Hobbs about drugs and trying to get custody of his daughter.  Hadden also thought that Hobbs believed 
that Hadden wanted to get back together with his wife and, therefore, he was 
trying to frame Hadden to prevent that from happening.  Hadden had also disciplined Hobbs for 
driving one of Hadden's cars at 100 miles per hour with Hadden's daughter in the 
car, and because Hobbs had spanked his daughter causing bruises and welts on the 
child.

 

 

 

[¶17]   Our standard of review here is well 
established.  We 
review such an issue de novo.  We defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and the 
evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence 
and to assess the credibility of witnesses.  Lara v. State, 25 P.3d 507, 510 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶18]   Hadden gave a statement to a police 
detective on May 8, 2000, while in custody.  It clearly was not intended as a "confession," 
but in combination with other evidence, especially Hobbs's testimony, it was, 
perhaps, the most damning evidence against Hadden, both in terms of what it 
revealed and what it conveniently glossed over.  Hadden contends that his statement should have 
been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his right to 
counsel.  This 
issue was not raised in the trial court in the manner contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 
12.2

 

Rule 12.  Pleadings and motions before trial; defenses 
and objections.

 

            
(a)  Pleadings and motions.  Pleadings in criminal 
proceedings shall be the indictment, the information or the citation, and the 
pleas entered pursuant to Rule 11.  All other pleas, demurrers and motions to quash 
are abolished, and defenses and objections raised before trial which heretofore 
could have been raised by one or more of them shall be raised only by motion to 
dismiss or to grant appropriate relief, as provided in these rules.

            
(b)  Pretrial 
motions.  Any 
defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.  Motions may be 
written or oral at the discretion of the judge.  The following must be raised prior to 
trial:

(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the 
institution of the prosecution;

(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the 
indictment or information (other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense which objections shall be noticed by the court at 
any time during the pendency of the proceedings);

                        
(3) Motions to suppress evidence;

            
(4) Requests for discovery under Rule 16; or

            
(5) Request for a severance of charges or defendants under Rule 
14.

            
(c)  Mental illness or 
deficiency.  
If it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding by motion or upon the 
court's own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant 
has a mental illness or deficiency making the defendant unfit to proceed, all 
further proceedings shall be suspended and an examination ordered as required by 
W.S. 7-11-301, et seq.

            
(d)  Motion date.  Unless otherwise 
provided by local rule, the court may, at the time of the arraignment or as soon 
thereafter as practicable, set a time for the making of pretrial motions or 
requests and, if required, a later date of hearing.

            
(e)  Notice by state of intention to use 
evidence.

            
(1) At Discretion of State.  At the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is 
practicable, the state may give notice to the defendant of its intention to use 
specific evidence at trial in order to afford the defendant an opportunity to 
raise objections to such evidence prior to trial under subdivision (b)(3).

(2) At Request of Defendant.  At the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is 
practicable the defendant may, in order to afford an opportunity to move to 
suppress evidence under subdivision (b)(3), request notice of the state's 
intention to use (in its evidence in chief at trial) any evidence which the 
defendant may be entitled to discover under Rule 16, subject to any relevant 
limitations prescribed in Rule 16.

            
(f)  Ruling on 
motion.  A 
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court, for 
good cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the 
general issue or until after verdict, but no such determination shall be 
deferred if a party's right to appeal is adversely affected.  Where factual issues 
are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential 
findings on the record.

            
(g)  Effect of 
failure to raise defenses or objections, or to make requests.  Failure by a party to 
raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to 
trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to subdivision (d), or prior to any 
extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute waiver thereof, but the 
court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

            
(h)  Records.  A verbatim record 
shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing, including such findings of fact 
and conclusions of law as are made orally.

            
(i)  Effect of determination.  If the court grants 
the motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the 
indictment or information, it may also order that the defendant be continued in 
custody or that bail be continued for a specified time not to exceed 48 hours 
pending the filing of a new indictment or information.

            
(j)  Production of statements at 
suppression hearing.  Except as herein provided, Rule 26.2 shall 
apply at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence under subdivision 
(b)(3).  For 
purposes of this subdivision, a law enforcement officer shall be deemed a 
witness called by the state, and upon a claim of privilege the court shall 
excise the portion of the statement containing privileged matter.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶19]   The matter was first broached to the 
trial court3 for discussion in the form of an oral motion 
early on the second day of trial; indeed, the trial court expressed what might 
best be characterized as surprise at the development.  For this reason, the 
record does not contain the sorts of evidentiary materials that might be 
generated by a motion to suppress a statement, nor does it contain the more 
detailed oral and/or written findings that are created when such a motion is 
made, and therefore decided, before trial.  The record reflects this:

 

            
COURT:  
You know, I think the Defendant can raise it at any time [motion to 
suppress his statement].  I can yell at these two for not bringing it up 
sooner, and you know, I can scowl at them and chastise them, which I'm going to 
do, but I  I think as a constitutional right, the Defendant can bring it up at 
any time as a procedural matter, you know.  I wish these  the Defense attorneys would 
have brought it up earlier, but  but having heard that and I have never seen 
this, I never knew this was coming, but just from what you read, Mr. Harton, 
from the statement, certainly, I have to agree with the State, you know, that 
this was a voluntary waiver.

            
I think the Detective was  was correct in trying to find out what  what 
it was that Mr. Hadden wanted, because he seemed to be sending out somewhat of a 
mixed signal, but I think his waiver  he had his choice before him, and he made 
his choice, and there is nothing in what I heard you read where the officer 
misrepresented anything or tried to mislead him.  So your  your Motion to Suppress  is that 
what you called it?

            
MR. HARTON:  
Yes, sir,

            
COURT:  
is denied.

 

[¶20]   By its actions, the trial court 
determined that Hadden did not waive this issue through his failure to raise it 
in a timelier manner.  
However, we do not intend by the rendering of this opinion to establish 
that such a late motion cannot have the effect of waiving such an issue, even 
one of constitutional dimensions.  We have set out the information Hadden related 
during the rendition of his statement in our summary of the facts of this 
case.  Below, we 
set out the portion of the transcript of that statement which gives rise to the 
instant issue:

 

            
REEKERS:  Today's date is 5/8 of 00.  I'm Detective Steve 
Reekers of the Rock Springs Police Department.  With me is John 

            
HADDEN:  Hadden.

            
REEKERS:  Hadden and, uh, we're talking about the case  I want 
to ask him some questions here about case number 99-9454, reference an assault 
that took place in Rock Springs in the fall [sic] of 
'99 and before I do that I want to advise you of what your rights are.  And I've got in 
front of you a form, I'll just read it to you as you follow along.  Today  actually the 
place is the Rock Springs Police Department, that's where I'm from but you, you, 
you're aware of where you're at?  It's actually Green River, Wyoming?

            
HADDEN:  Right.

            
REEKERS:  Okay, in County Jail.  But before we ask you any questions you must 
understand your rights as in you have the right to remain silent, anything you 
say can be used against you in court, you have the right to talk to a lawyer for 
advice before we ask any questions and to have him with you during any 
questioning.  If 
you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning 
if you wish.  If 
you decide to answer any questions without a lawyer present, you will still have 
the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.  You understand these 
advisements?

(Hadden's response inaudible)

            
REEKERS:  Okay.  There's a little line behind each one.  If you wouldn't 
mind, just initial that you understand.

(Pause)

            
REEKERS:  Okay, now the next part is, is a waiver of 
rights.  I'm 
just asking you if you understand these rights and if you're willing to talk to 
me.  So here it 
says I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are 
and willing to make a statement of  statement and to answer questions.  I do not want a 
lawyer at this time.  
I understand and know what I am doing.  No promises or threats have been made to me 
and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.  What I want to do is 
question you about this assault and hear your side of the story is what I'm 
asking you.  But 
I'm going to do so with your advisement  the advisement of your rights.

            
HADDEN:  Right.

            
REEKERS:  Do you wish to waive these rights and give me a 
statement about what happened?  Your side  like Paul Harvey's, your  the 
rest of the story.  
Your side of the story.

            
HADDEN:  Um, I mean I do want a lawyer, yes.  But I mean, I do, I 
want to get this on the way.  You know, get 

            
REEKERS:  Mm hmm.

            
HADDEN:   you know, get this over with.  Because I didn't do 
what I'm being charged for.

            
REEKERS:  You didn't do what?

            
HADDEN:  I didn't do what I'm being charged for.

            
REEKERS:  You didn't do it  okay.  Well, what is your 
answer then?  
Would you like to talk to me about it?  Or you want to take your rights under 
advisement here?  
I can answer questions for you when, uh, at the same time.  But at this point in 
time it's open, uh, and your decision what you want to do.

            
HADDEN:  Will I still have the right to a lawyer?

            
REEKERS:  At any time that you want to.  As  you have the 
right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have 
him with you during questioning time and then if you  down at the bottom, if 
you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have 
the right to stop answering any questions.  So if, say, five minutes into this you decide 
that you won't answer any more questions, all you got to do is say you don't 
want to answer any more questions, you want a lawyer.  The choice is up to 
you. You're not on any medication or 

            
HADDEN:  No.

            
REEKERS:   anything like that?  No?  Okay.  This signing of the waiver, uh  just 
acknowledges that, that I gave it to you.

            
HADDEN:  Right.

            
REEKERS:  If you don't sign it I just put a note on there that 
you didn't sign it.  
But, uh, I would like to know what your decision is on this and we'll 
just go from there.

            
HADDEN:  How long will it take to get a lawyer?

            
REEKERS:  How long would it take?  Boy, that's 
different for every circumstance.  Um, probably in yours since you're not a 
resident from around here, um, I would imagine you're going to go for a court 
appointed?  
You're nodding your head yes.

            
HADDEN:  Yes.

            
REEKERS:  Okay.

            
HADDEN:  I'd like to, yeah.

            
REEKERS:  Okay, so  time is  arraignment, uh, you fill out 
papers to apply for the court appointed lawyer and then go from there.  And then it goes to 
the public defender's office and then they have several (inaudible) so, you 
know, we're not talking a day or two.  It takes a little bit of time to actually get 
a court appointed lawyer unless you, uh, wish to obtain one yourself by some 
type of financial aid or whatever you can get and find one here, on your 
own.

            
HADDEN:  Yeah.

            
REEKERS:  But I'm here to ask you if you want to give a 
statement about, uh, these allegations against you.  And first I want to 
advise you of what your rights are.  And you're asking good questions here on what 
to do.

            
HADDEN:  Cause I've always been told, you know, for any kind 
of trouble we'll have a lawyer before we answer any questions.

            
REEKERS:  Mm hmm.  And that's an individual choice.  And you're a person 
of sound mind, it appears, and you understand everything I'm telling you and you 
can read the English language and did you graduate from high school?

            
HADDEN:  No.

            
REEKERS:  No? what's your highest level.

            
HADDEN:  Eleventh grade.

            
REEKERS:  Eleventh Grade?  Okay, you ever get a GED?

            
(Hadden's response inaudible)

            
REEKERS:  Okay, yes?

            
HADDEN:  Yes.

            
REEKERS:  Okay, um . That's about the level, this 
understanding is, uh, pretty much high school or junior high level.  Where most adults 
can understand this.  
The choice is totally up to you.  Um, obviously I'm here for the interests of 
this investigation, I want to hear, hear your side of this, uh, allegation.  If, if you want to 
wait for a lawyer that's up to you, but that's a choice you gotta make here.

            
HADDEN:  Yeah I, I'll read a statement.

            
REEKERS:  Okay.  Uh, if you would, just go ahead and put an X 
here.  Just keep 
in mind, again, you can decide at any time during the questioning  you can 
change that mind.

 

[¶21]   At no time during the interview did 
Hadden ask for an attorney.  The entire interview appears to have lasted 
for less than one hour.  He now contends that the district court erred 
as a matter of law in finding that his exercise of his right to counsel was 
equivocal, and that the police were required to cease questioning Hadden, or at 
least attempt to clarify Hadden's equivocal exercise of the right to 
counsel.  Of 
course, the upshot of Hadden's claim is that his statements to the police should 
not have been admitted in evidence, and their admission in these circumstances 
requires reversal.

 

[¶22]   We hold that the district court was 
correct in ruling that Hadden's statements were admissible.  The United States 
Supreme Court recently held:

 

            
To recapitulate:  We held in Miranda 
that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial 
interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for such 
assistance.  We 
held in Edwards that if the suspect invokes the right 
to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning him until 
an attorney is present.  But we are unwilling to create a third layer 
of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer.  Unless the suspect 
actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.

 

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) 
(emphasis in original).

 

[¶23]   In Davis, the 
defendant was given Miranda warnings, and he then 
waived his right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney prior to 
questioning.  
During his interview,4 Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer."  Davis 
was told that he had a right to an attorney but then responded that he did not 
want an attorney.  
Later in the interview, he said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say 
anything else."  
At that point, the interview ceased.  Id., 512 U.S.  at 
454.  The 
Supreme Court's reasoning continued:

 

The Edwards rule  questioning must cease if the suspect 
asks for a lawyer  provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in 
the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the 
gathering of information.  But if we were to require questioning to cease 
if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and 
ease of application would be lost.  Police officers would be forced to make 
difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even 
though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess 
wrong.  We 
therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue 
questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.

 

Id., 512 U.S at 461 (emphasis in original).

 

[¶24]   The Supreme Court concluded its analysis 
stating that the courts below found that Davis's remark  "Maybe I should talk 
to a lawyer"  was not a request for counsel, and it found no reason to disturb 
that conclusion.  
Davis, 512 U.S at 462.  The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has applied that rule in similar circumstances.  United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 766 (10th Cir. 2000) (Zamora's statement that he "might want 
to talk to a lawyer" was ambiguous, as Zamora appeared to be thinking out loud, 
and questioning was not required to cease).

 

[¶25]   We adopt the rule espoused by Davis and Zamora.  In doing so, we have 
consulted with the views of our brethren in many jurisdictions and find them to 
be in agreement with the rule as well.  State v. Simmons, 
2000 MT 329 ¶¶ 19-24, 15 P.3d 408, ¶¶ 19-24 (Mont. 2000) (although defendant at 
first indicated he wanted an attorney, he then said, "I do not want an attorney 
present just for this part, no"  -- and answered questions asked of him); Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420, 428-29 (Nev. 2000) (During 
the course of his interview, Harte said, "Just out of curiosity, when do I get 
to talk to a lawyer?"; "I  they  they told me, you know, that they thought I 
should talk to a lawyer whatever"; "I don't wanna be  a bitch and say, you 
know, give my [sic] lawyer.  But I mean;" and, 
"What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context 
of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, 
those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions 
about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho 
App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of 
right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions 
being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 
9-10, 994 P.2d 61, ¶¶ 19-24 (Okla. 2000) ("I feel as though I should have an 
attorney," was equivocal response); State v. Kiriluk, 
1999 UT App 030 ¶¶ 7-8, 975 P.2d 469, ¶¶ 7-8 (Utah App. 1999), (defendant's 
response of "I don't," when asked if he had anything to say about evidence found 
in his apartment not unambiguous request for counsel or to remain silent); State v. Donesay, 959 P.2d 862, 871 (Kan. 1998) 
(adopting rule in context of right to remain silent); Braboy v. State, 745 A.2d 471, 477-79 (Md.App. 2000) ("I 
want a lawyer but I can't afford a lawyer," not an unambiguous exercise of right 
to counsel where defendant decided to talk after he was informed that a lawyer 
would be appointed for him if he could not afford one); Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1999) 
(Goodner equivocated about whether or not he should talk without a lawyer, but 
ultimately signed written waiver and talked); State v. 
Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72-74 (Iowa App. 1998) (defendant's statement, "Is my 
lawyer here?" not an unambiguous request for counsel); State v. Greybull, 1998 ND 102 ¶¶ 8-9, 14-21, 579 N.W.2d 161, ¶¶ 8-9, 14-21 (N.D. 1998) (defendant's statements, "You can't make me say 
nothing," "Do I have to get  a lawyer?" and "Do I need to get a lawyer?"  
ambiguous under Davis); Cothren v. State, 705 So. 2d 849, 851-55 (Ala.Crim.App. 
1997) ("I think I want to talk to an attorney before I answer that," ambiguous 
under circumstances of case); but see Billups v. State, 762 A.2d 609, 614-16 (Md.App. 2000) 
(defendant signed signature line on form which purported to waive his rights to 
remain silent and have counsel, but wrote "NO" by his signature  construed to 
be unequivocal exercise of right to remain silent and have an attorney).

 

[¶26]   The list of cases cited above is by no 
means exhaustive, and we concede that there are cases to the contrary.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 6 P.3d 58, 61-62 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2000) (Washington declined to adopt Davis rule); and State v. 
Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Hawai'i 1999) (according broader 
rights under Hawai'i Constitution).  However, we find the Davis decision and its progeny convincing, and we adopt 
that rule for Wyoming.

 

 

[¶27]   Hadden claims that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain his conviction, particularly in light of the victim's 
inability to identify him as her attacker, but also because of the inherent 
unreliability of Hobbs's testimony, as well as the extremely circumstantial 
nature of the other evidence that pointed to Hadden's guilt.  The benchmark for 
review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is whether the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is such as to permit a 
reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22 ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, ¶ 15 
(Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶28]   The victim was unable to identify 
Hadden, but her testimony did not eliminate him as the attacker.  Hobbs testified that 
Hadden told him he had raped a woman in Rock Springs on the night of August 6, 
1999, and that he returned to the truck they shared bloodied and in a hurry to 
get out of town.  
Hadden countered that testimony with a theory that Hobbs was telling lies 
in order to frame him.  
It was for the jury to decide Hobbs's credibility and whether he was 
capable of somehow making up a story such as that he told in considerable 
detail.  The 
circumstantial evidence, including the hat, fuel records, phone records, and 
body fluids, was, perhaps, somewhat ambivalent in terms of inculpating Hadden 
but could serve to point to guilt in light of Hobbs's testimony.  Finally, Hadden's 
statements to the police admitted most of the occurrence with the critical 
exception of the beating and the rape.  It is evident from the tape of that statement 
that Hadden's "story" had many of the ear-markings of a lie, and that, too, is 
apparently what the jury decided.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
for the jury to reach a verdict of guilty.

 

 

[¶29]   Jury instructions should inform the 
jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their 
findings with respect to the material facts; instructions should be written with 
the particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ 
from case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally 
correct; a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction; the 
test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of 
a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under 
which the crime can be found to have been committed.  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151 ¶ 9 
(Wyo. 2001); Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, ¶ 23 (Wyo. 2001); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶30]   First, Hadden contends that the trial 
court erred in giving an instruction on witness credibility.  Although the case of 
Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1991) is 
pertinent to our discussion, it is distinguishable in several respects.  Gentry contended 
that his conviction boiled down to whether the jury believed him or a police 
officer who alleged that Gentry confessed to him.  Id., at 1270.  The trial court did 
not permit Gentry himself to inform the jury that he had a prior felony 
conviction before he testified, but did allow the State to use the conviction as 
impeachment evidence against him.  Gentry contended that error violated his 
constitutional rights under the circumstances of his case because that matter 
was so critical to his credibility.  In that trial, this instruction was given to 
the jury:

 

You will decide which witnesses you believe and how much 
weight you give their testimony.  In deciding what you believe, you may consider 
anything about a witness which tends to prove or disprove truthfulness, 
including the following:

 

            
1.  His conduct, attitude, and manner while testifying;

 

            
2.  His physical and mental capacity to have heard or seen that 
about which he testifies;

 

            
3.  His ability to remember and to tell here in court what he 
has heard or seen;

 

            
4.  His reputation for honesty and truthfulness or for 
dishonesty and untruthfulness;

 

            
5.  Whether he has a bias or prejudice, an interest in the 
outcome of the trial, or any other motive for not telling the truth; and

 

            
6.  Whether the facts he related are inherently believable or 
unbelievable.

 

In evaluating witness credibility other facts are also 
important.

 

            
1.  You should consider statements by a witness that are either 
consistent or inconsistent with testimony given in court.

 

            
2.  If a witness admits to untruthfulness at some other time, 
you may consider that admission but you should take into account all the 
circumstances surrounding it; for instance, whether it was a sworn statement, 
whether it was made under pressure, whether it was self-serving and whether it 
was an important or merely a minor misstatement.

 

            
3.  If you conclude that a witness has willfully lied under 
oath about any material fact in this case you may distrust all of his 
testimony.  On 
the other hand, if you think it is reliable, considering all the other evidence, 
you may still believe it.  

 

Differences between one witnesses' [sic] testimony and that of others, does not necessarily 
mean someone is untruthful.  Two persons who witness an incident may see or 
hear it differently.  
In resolving differences in testimony, you should consider all the 
circumstances of the case whether the discrepancy concerns an important fact or 
a trivial one.  

 

You should not decide a fact based on the number of 
witnesses who testify about it.  The testimony of one witness you believe, 
considering all the circumstances of the case, is sufficient to prove any 
point.

 

We described that instruction in these terms:

 

In other words, a witness's credibility is a quilt of many 
patches:  
demeanor, forthrightness, apparent motives, internal consistency of 
testimony, external consistency of testimony when compared to other witnesses' 
testimony, and plausibility of the witness's testimony in relation to the jury's 
combined life experiences.  No one of these patches is a talisman for the 
jury; instead, it is in their interrelationship as perceived in the collective 
mind of the jurors that they have significance and effect.  Probably, the whole 
is larger than the individual parts.

 

Gentry, 806 P.2d  at 1273-74.

 

[¶31]   In this case, the district court gave 
the following instruction over Hadden's objection:

 

  
Discrepancies in a witness' testimony or between the testimonies of that 
of others, if there were any, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be 
discredited.  
Failure of recollection is a common experience; and innocent 
misrecollection is not uncommon.  It is a fact, also, that two persons 
witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it 
differently.  
Whether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a 
trivial detail should be considered in weighing its significance.

 

As a part of the introductory instructions, the trial court 
also informed the jury of its role with respect to the credibility of 
witnesses:

 

            
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, and of the 
weight to be given their testimony.  You should take into consideration their 
demeanor upon the witness stand, their apparent intelligence, their means of 
knowledge of the facts testified to, the interest, if any, which any witness may 
have in the outcome of this trial, the prejudice or motives, or feelings of 
revenge, if any, which have been shown by the evidence.  In so doing, you may 
take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case and give 
such weight as you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your 
experience and knowledge of human affairs.

 

            
If you believe from the evidence in this case that any witness swore 
falsely to any material fact in this case, then you are at liberty to disregard 
all or any part of the testimony of that witness, except insofar as the 
testimony has been corroborated by other and credible evidence, and the facts 
and circumstances proved during the trial.

 

            
In determining the weight to be given to an opinion expressed by a 
witness who did not testify as an expert, you should consider the credibility of 
the witness, the extent of the witness's opportunity to perceive the matters 
upon which the opinion is based and the reasons, if any, given for it.  You are not required 
to accept such an opinion but should give it the weight to which you find it 
entitled.

 

[¶32]   Hadden objected to this "discrepancy" 
instruction on the basis that it was covered by the other instructions.  He offered no 
alternative instruction because he did not want an alternative instruction; 
thus, the State's argument that we should not consider this issue because Hadden 
did not offer an alternative instruction is unavailing.  The State also 
contends that we must evaluate this contention of error under the plain error 
doctrine because Hadden did not object enough.  We disagree.  Hadden did object and for reasons that were 
sufficiently clear on the record that we must give this error plenary 
review.  In 
making its decision to give the instruction, the trial court said:

 

            
COURT:  
The Court intends to give Instruction No. 8.  As I told you in the 
informal instructions, the State had presented a three-page long instruction 
that had been given in Gentry.  I felt that it was 
much too repetitious, went over it into detail and was covered at least 
generally by the instructions you mentioned.  This is a  a very condensed version of 
that.  I think 
this will help the  the jury based on the testimony we've heard, both from the 
State's witnesses and Defense witnesses, and I think this is an accurate 
statement of the law and will assist the jury.

 

[¶33]   The district court would have made a 
sounder decision by either giving the full Gentry 
instruction or giving no instruction at all.  The State makes no cogent argument that the 
instruction is a proper instruction nor does it offer any pertinent authority in 
that regard.  
Our research efforts found no case law that would sustain the giving of 
the instruction.  
On its face, it appears to be an instruction given with pertinence 
primarily to the testimony of Christopher Hobbs, whose various renditions of 
what happened in Rock Springs varied in some of the more immaterial details (e.g., whether or not they were "bobtailing" in the 
tractor, i.e., driving around in the truck, without 
the trailer attached).  
It would have been better for the district court to refuse that 
instruction, and we hereby specifically disapprove of its use.  However, given the 
totality of the instructions, we can assign it no more than the status of 
harmless error.  
W.R.A.P. 9.04 and W.R.Cr.P. 52.

 

[¶34]   In addition, Hadden contends that the 
following instruction on the subject of "flight" was erroneously given to the 
jury over Hadden's objection:

 

            
Flight, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
defendant.  But 
it may be considered as a circumstance to be considered with other factors as 
tending to show a consciousness of guilt.

 

[¶35]   In Germany v. 
State, 999 P.2d 63, 69-70 (Wyo. 2000), we briefly discussed the use of a 
flight instruction in a wholly different context.  Here the issue arises, and the instruction was 
given, based upon Hobbs's testimony that on the night of the crime, Hadden 
returned to the truck and wanted to flee Rock Springs as quickly as possible, 
with Hobbs to act as a lookout.  In his statement to the police, Hadden 
contended that he left Rock Springs because he could find no suitable place to 
park his truck in Rock Springs so that he could rest for the night.  The following 
quotation from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1332 (1989 
and Supp. 2001) serves well to summarize the historical view of this aspect of 
criminal law:

 

            
In appropriate circumstances, the court may instruct the jury that they 
may draw an inference of guilt from accused's flight, considered in connection 
with all other evidence.

 

            
Such an instruction should be given only where there is evidence of 
flight immediately after the crime, and of accused's knowledge of the crime for 
which he was sought, and the links along the extended chain of inference from 
accused's behavior to actual guilt of the crime charged are unbroken, so that 
the flight has considerable probative value, and the court can draw a reasonable 
inference that accused fled because he is guilty.  Mere unexplained nonappearance at trial is 
insufficient evidence of flight.  An instruction is inappropriate in various 
circumstances.  
Moreover, it has also been held that it is reversible error for the court 
to charge a jury on flight, although the prosecution may still offer evidence of 
and argue flight.

 

            
However, it has been held that the charge may be given even where the 
flight alone is not sufficient to establish guilt, or the flight was not 
immediate, or there is no direct evidence that accused fled to avoid criminal 
charges, or the flight is not established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or 
accused ultimately surrendered.  Accused need not have left the jurisdiction or 
actively evaded the police.

 

            
The court should caution the jury that flight does not necessarily 
reflect consciousness of guilt, and that consciousness of guilt does not 
necessarily reflect guilt, but need not enumerate all possible innocent 
explanations for the flight offered by accused.

 

            
The court need not charge that failure to flee gives rise to an inference 
of innocence.  
Where accused has surrendered, the court need not charge that the 
surrender was voluntary, as this is a factual issue.

 

[¶36]   After many years of debate and 
characterizing a flight instruction as serving no real purpose, "as it is a 
particularization of the general charge on circumstantial evidence," the Supreme 
Court of Georgia prohibited the giving of such an instruction and propounded the 
rule that the giving of such an instruction is reversible error.  Renner v. State, 397 S.E.2d 683, 686 (Ga. 1990).

 

[¶37]   In Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions  
Criminal (4th ed. 2000), we find the following 
note where a suggested instruction on flight might otherwise appear:

 

3.03  Flight

 

Committee Note

 

   The Committee recommends that no 
instruction be given on this subject.

   Although evidence of flight is a proper 
subject of argument, its probative value is questionable.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); see also United State v. 
Jackson, 572 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1978).  The use of flight 
instructions has frequently been found to constitute error.  See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 39 
Ill.App.3d 502, 348 N.E.2d 854 (3d Dist. 1976) (Stouder, J., specially 
concurring) (collecting cases).  For these reasons, the Committee believes that 
a flight instruction should not be given.

 

[¶38]   In 1 Josephine R. Potuto, Steven A. 
Saltzburg, Harvey A. Perlman, Federal Criminal Jury Instructions, Part One, 
Chapter 3: Closing Instructions § 3.51, FLIGHT AND RELATED EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 
with 1993 Supp.) we find the following note:

 

            
No instruction is provided on flight evidence or the defendant's conduct 
after a crime.  
These instructions focus on a single aspect of circumstantial evidence 
and may unduly emphasize that aspect.  Arguments concerning the probative value of 
flight and the defendant's conduct should be left to the parties in their 
closing arguments to the jury.

 

[¶39]   We find that the instruction given in 
this case was consistent with the law as it existed at the time this case was in 
trial, and that it was not prejudicially erroneous, given the facts and 
circumstances of this case.  W.R.Cr.P. 52 and W.R.A.P. 9.04.  However, we agree 
with the sentiments expressed in the authorities cited above, and, to avoid 
future problems, we hold that hereafter (that is, cases tried after the date on 
which this opinion appears in the advance sheets of Pacific Reporter Third) the 
giving of a flight instruction to the jury, in a criminal case, shall be 
reversible error.  
In this instance, Hobbs testified to both Hadden's admission to 
committing the assault and rape and to Hadden's decision to "flee" Rock Springs 
late at night on the date of the crime.  However, the gravamen of Hobbs's testimony was 
to establish the commission of the crime itself, whereas the "flight" was 
peripheral to, and merely fleshed out, the entire story of that evening's events 
from Hobbs's perspective.  We are comfortable in concluding that, given 
these circumstances, to the extent it played a role in the jury's determination 
of guilt, the flight instruction was not prejudicial.

 

 

[¶40]   As set out more fully above, the trial 
court did not err in denying Hadden's motion to suppress the statement he made 
to the police, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Hadden's conviction, and 
the trial court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury.  However, as is also 
set out more fully above, the giving of a flight instruction after the date this 
case is published in the advance sheets of Pacific Reporter Third shall 
constitute reversible error.  The judgment and sentence of the district 
court are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1The 
witness may have intended the word to be "agitated," though the victim also 
expressed some "aggravation" to the witness, as the victim had knocked several 
times on the side door of the convenience store and her knocks went unanswered 
(the attendant testified that she heard the knocking but could not see anyone 
there).

  2W.R.Cr.P. 16(a) provides for the discovery of any 
statements made by a defendant.

  3We take 
note that the motion to suppress was renewed as a part of a motion for new 
trial, though that fact adds nothing of significance to our discussion and 
resolution of the issue.

  4It 
appears that Davis's interview was not tape-recorded, and the rendition of these 
facts relied on the testimony of Davis and the interviewing officers.  Here, the statement 
was tape-recorded, and, as this case makes evident, a tape recording can be as 
valuable to the State as it is to a defendant.  See Lara v. State, 25 P.3d 507, 511 (Wyo. 2001).