Title: Lorrain v. Ryan

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

LORRAIN_V_RYAN.92-238; 160 Vt. 202; 628 A.2d 543


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-238


 Derek & Patricia Lorrain                     Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 Kevin & Elaine Ryan                          November Term, 1992



 Alden T. Bryan, J.

 E. William Leckerling and Pamela J. Fitzgerald of Lisman & Lisman,
   Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

 Richard H. Wadhams, Jr., of Pierson, Wadhams, Quinn & Yates, Burlington,
   for defendants-appellees


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs Derek and Patricia Lorrain appeal the rulings
 of the Chittenden Superior Court on two post-judgment motions.  The trial
 court (1) denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of damages,
 in which plaintiffs argued that defendants failed to produce sufficient
 evidence for the jury to apportion damages and that the award of damages was
 grossly inadequate; and (2) granted defendants' motion for a judgment
 notwithstanding the verdict, in which defendants asserted that a damage
 award for loss of consortium was barred by the exclusivity provision of the
 worker's compensation statute.  We affirm the denial of plaintiffs' motion
 for a new trial and reverse the grant of defendants' motion for a judgment
 notwithstanding the verdict.
                                     I.
      Plaintiff Derek Lorrain was an employee of Derek Lorrain Carpet
 Installers, Inc., a business he owned and operated.  On July 16, 1985, while
 working at the home of defendants Kevin and Elaine Ryan, he carried a roll
 of vinyl down a flight of stairs leading off defendants' raised deck.  When
 one of the steps snapped, he fell and suffered an injury to his cervical
 spine.  Plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment, culminating in
 March 1991 in diskectomy and spinal fusion surgery.  Plaintiffs filed suit,
 alleging that defendants' negligence in maintaining their property was the
 cause of the accident and all of plaintiffs' injuries.  The suit included a
 claim for loss of consortium by Patricia Lorrain.
      The case was tried before a jury, and the medical testimony offered was
 extensive and conflicting.  Plaintiff's general physician and his orthopedic
 surgeon both testified that plaintiff's disabilities were due to the 1985
 accident, not a preexisting condition.  The general physician treated
 plaintiff for neck pains on the day of the accident and numerous times
 thereafter.  Although evidence was presented that plaintiff's condition was
 "much improved" and had "stabilized" in the months following the accident,
 plaintiff periodically returned for neck treatment.  The physician referred
 plaintiff to the orthopedic surgeon in October of 1990, attributing the
 complaints of neck pain to "a continuation of the July [1985] accident that
 was never resolved."  The surgeon testified that his treatment of plaintiff,
 including the 1991 surgery, stemmed from the 1985 accident.
      The general physician had also treated plaintiff several times for neck
 and arm pain in the six years preceding the accident, and twice referred
 plaintiff to specialists.  The first was to a neurologist, who confirmed the
 absence of nerve damage; the second was to a specialist in the cervical
 spine.  X-rays taken in spring of 1984 by an assistant to the cervical spine
 specialist revealed the presence of degenerative arthritis in plaintiff's
 neck, although several weeks later the assistant noted that plaintiff's
 range of motion was normal and the muscular strain was resolved.  The
 general physician noted that he had not seen plaintiff for any neck-related
 complaints for more than a year prior to the accident, and both he and the
 orthopedic surgeon testified that the degenerative condition shown in the x-
 rays did not necessarily indicate that plaintiff's neck problems would
 continue.
      The general physician testified that the medical bills plaintiff
 presented, totaling over $20,000, all resulted from the accident.
 Plaintiffs also presented an economist who testified that plaintiff will
 lose future earnings, the present value of which was $300,000.  Defendants
 disputed this figure.
      Defendants introduced the testimony of another orthopedic surgeon who
 examined plaintiff prior to and after the 1991 surgery, and reviewed
 plaintiff's medical records dating back to 1980.  Defendants' expert
 testified that plaintiff's disabilities were at least partially attributable
 to a preexisting degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine.  He stated
 that plaintiff's medical records established a natural progression of the
 degenerative condition, which only stops at death.  He also noted that
 plaintiff had suffered at least three minor injuries within approximately
 one year after the 1985 accident.  Defendants' expert testified that the
 1985 accident caused "an increase in symptoms" that subsequently subsided, a
 diagnosis supported by an August 1986 note from plaintiff's physical
 therapist stating that the neck injury had stabilized.  In the opinion of
 defendants' expert, most of the treatments, including the 1991 operation,
 were necessitated by the continued progression of the degenerative
 arthritis, not the subject accident.
      On February 19, 1992, the jury found that defendants' negligence
 proximately caused the 1985 accident and awarded damages in the amount of
 $8,610.33, including $2,298 for medical bills and $2,000 to Patricia Lorrain
 for loss of consortium.  Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
 verdict on the loss of consortium claim, contending that it was barred by 21
 V.S.A. { 622, the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation
 statute.  The trial court granted defendants' motion, striking the $2,000
 award, and denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of
 damages.
                                     II.
      Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in failing to grant them a
 new trial on the issue of damages for two reasons: defendants produced
 insufficient evidence for the jury to apportion damages, and the jury award
 was grossly inadequate.
                                     A.
      Plaintiffs' first argument relates to apportionment of damages between
 those caused by the accident and those attributable to other causes.  In its
 charge, the trial court instructed the jury on apportionment of damages in
 accordance with the principles set out in {{ 433A and 433B of the
 Restatement (Second) of Torts.  These principles apply "whenever two or more
 causes have combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and each has been
 a substantial factor in producing the harm."  Restatement (Second) of Torts
 { 433A comment a (1965). Consistent with these principles, the trial court
 charged the jury:
      A plaintiff's recovery for damages caused by a defendant's
      wrongful act may not be proportionately reduced because of a
      preexisting weakness or susceptibility to injury such as an
      arthritic condition or weakness caused by a previous injury.
      However, there are two exceptions to the general rule.  First,
      when a plaintiff is incapacitated or disabled prior to an
      accident, the defendant is liable only for the additional harm or
      aggravation that he caused.  The burden of proof is on the
      Defendants to prove the extent of the damages which were caused by
      the preexisting condition.  Second, when a plaintiff has a
      preexisting condition that would inevitably worsen, a defendant
      causing subsequent injury is entitled to have the plaintiff's
      damages discounted to reflect the proportion of damages that would
      have been suffered even in the absence of subsequent injury.
      Again, the burden of proof in such cases is on the defendant to
      prove the extent of the damages that the preexisting condition
      would inevitably have caused.

 Plaintiffs do not challenge the charge as inaccurate.  Instead, they assert
 that the jury apportioned damages by awarding them less than their full
 damages.  Plaintiffs argue that the court should not have allowed the jury
 to apportion damages because defendants did not produce sufficient medical
 evidence to support apportionment.
      Assuming plaintiffs are correct that there was insufficient evidence to
 apportion damages, they are not entitled to a new trial on damages for two
 reasons.  First, although they claim to challenge the sufficiency of the
 evidence to support the damage award, they really challenge the trial
 court's decision to charge that damages could be apportioned.  Plaintiffs,
 however, have failed to show that they objected to the charge below
 following its delivery. (FN1) See V.R.C.P. 51(b)(party may not assign error to
 an instruction unless an objection is made following the charge).  Failure
 to make an objection to the charge is a waiver that precludes raising the
 issue on appeal.  See O'Brien v. The Island Corp., 157 Vt. 135, 141, 596 A.2d 1295, 1298 (1991); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 137 Vt. 310, 311,