Title: Hernandez v. Boston Market, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BEATRIZ HERNANDEZ, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ No. 79, 2005     
 
Employee-Appellant Below, § 
 
Appellant, 
 
§ Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
 
§ the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
 
§ New Castle County 
 
 
 
§ 
BOSTON MARKET, INC., 
 
§ C. A. No. 04-05-009  
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Employer-Appellee Below, § 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 15, 2005 
 
 
Decided: 
June 29, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 29th day of June 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
The claimant-below appellant, Beatriz Hernandez (“Hernandez”), 
appeals from a Superior Court order affirming an Industrial Accident Board 
(“IAB”) order denying her motion for additional compensation due.  Hernandez 
argues that the IAB’s determination that her medical expenses were not 
“reasonable and necessary” was not supported by substantial evidence.  Because 
the Board’s decision is supported by the record, as the Superior Court found, we 
affirm. 
 
2
 
2. 
Hernandez was injured in two compensable accidents while employed 
by Boston Market, Inc.  She received wage compensation for partial permanent 
impairment to her cervical spine and lower back.  In October 2003, Hernandez 
filed a petition for additional compensation, for the chiropractic treatment she 
received between August 2001 and June 2002. 
 
3. 
At the hearing on her petition, Hernandez presented the testimony of 
her chiropractor, Dr. Brian McDonald, who testified that he treated Hernandez 
from January 2001 through June 2002.  Hernandez and Dr. McDonald both 
testified that Hernandez’s symptoms were alleviated by the treatment.  Hernandez 
stopped seeing Dr. McDonald in June 2002 after Dr. McDonald told Hernandez 
she had reached a “plateau,” and that additional chiropractic therapy would provide 
no further benefit to her. 
 
4. 
Dr. Jeffrey Meyers, who testified on behalf of Boston Market, 
examined Hernandez on four occasions following Hernandez’s accident.  Initially, 
Meyers determined that chiropractic treatment would be beneficial to Hernandez.  
Dr. Meyers next examined Hernandez in June 2001, at which time he concluded 
that Hernandez had reached a plateau, and that she would not experience any 
significant improvement with further chiropractic treatment.  In August 2001, on 
the basis of Dr. Meyers’ opinion, Boston Market stopped paying for Hernandez’s 
 
3
chiropractic visits.  Despite that, Hernandez continued to see Dr. McDonald until 
June 2002.  
 
5. 
After hearing the evidence, the IAB rejected Hernandez’s petition for 
reimbursement for the costs of her chiropractic treatment.  The IAB determined 
that the medical expenses were not “reasonable” or “necessary,” and, therefore, 
were not compensable under the worker’s compensation statute.1  The Superior 
Court affirmed the IAB.2  Hernandez appeals from that decision. 
 
6. 
The IAB determined that Hernandez was not entitled to compensation 
under 19 Del C. § 2322(a), which requires an employer to pay any “necessary” and 
“reasonable” medical expenses that are related to an employee’s work injury.  The 
Superior Court affirmed.  This Court reviews to determine whether the IAB’s 
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.3  Substantial evidence 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
                                          
 
1 19 Del. C. § 2301, et. seq. 
 
2 Hernandez v. Boston Market, Inc., C.A. No. 04A-05-009, 2005 WL 181655 (Del. Super. Jan. 
26, 2005). 
 
3 Scheers v. Indep. Newspapers, 832 A.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Del. 2003).  On appeal from a 
decision of an administrative agency, this Court must determine whether the agency’s ruling is 
supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.  Stoltz Management v. Consumer 
Affairs Board, 616 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. 1992).  Where there is a review of an administrative 
decision by both an intermediate and a higher appellate court and the intermediate court received 
no evidence other than that presented to the administrative agency, the high court directly 
examines the decision of the agency.  Id (citing Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 
1985)). 
 
 
4
support a conclusion.4  This Court will not determine questions of credibility or 
make independent factual findings or conclusions.5   
 
7. 
On appeal, Hernandez does not appear to dispute the IAB’s finding that 
after June 2001 the chiropractic treatment she received provided no further 
improvement in her condition.  Instead, she argues that the treatment was 
“necessary and reasonable” because it offered palliative relief from her symptoms.  
Although Dr. Meyers acknowledged that Hernandez might have obtained some 
temporary palliative relief from additional chiropractic visits, he opined that 
Hernandez could have obtained the same relief by using over-the-counter pain 
relievers and a heat pad.  Dr. Meyers’ opinion was consistent with Hernandez’s 
actual experience: after discontinuing chiropractic treatment in June 2002, she 
obtained temporary relief by using anti-inflammatory medication.  The IAB 
concluded that the chiropractic treatment beyond June 2001 was not “reasonable 
and necessary” based on Dr. Meyers’ testimony that after June 2001, Hernandez 
could have obtained the same palliative relief through at-home remedies. 
 
8. 
The IAB is free to accept one expert’s opinion over another,6 and this 
Court does not second-guess such credibility determinations.  Because the IAB’s 
                                          
 
4 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 
 
5 Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Del. 1988). 
 
6 DiSabatino Bros., Inc. v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. 1982) (citing General Motors v. 
Veasey, 371 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Del. 1977)). 
 
5
decision was supported by substantial evidence, namely Dr. Meyers’ opinion and 
his observations of Hernandez, the order of the Superior Court affirming the IAB is 
free from error. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         Justice