Title: Graves v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
ALPHONZO DORRELL GRAVES 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 160688 
JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
October 12, 2017 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
Joseph W. Milam, Judge 
 
 
The Circuit Court of the City of Danville convicted Alphonzo D. Graves of, among other 
crimes, using a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  On July 
6, 2007, the circuit court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment with two years suspended on 
this charge.  Graves challenges this sentence, arguing that the trial court sentenced him in excess 
of the statutory maximum.  We agree with his construction of the statute, as does the 
Commonwealth.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court insofar as it imposes 
a sentence exceeding the punishment authorized by the General Assembly in Code § 18.2-53.1, 
vacate the two year suspended sentence, and remand the case for entry of a new sentencing order 
in conformity with this opinion.1 
BACKGROUND 
 
Graves pled guilty to a number of charges in connection with a murder, including use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.  In February 2016, he filed a motion to vacate his 
sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  He objected to the imposition of a 
five-year prison sentence, arguing that it exceeded the statutory maximum and was, therefore, 
                     
1 Motions to vacate are civil matters and an appeal from a granted or denied motion to 
vacate lies to this Court.  Commonwealth v. Southerly, 262 Va. 294, 299-300, 551 S.E.2d 650, 
653 (2001). 
2 
 
void.  The trial court denied that motion, as well as a motion to reconsider.  This appeal 
followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo.  Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1 provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any 
pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon in a 
threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit 
murder . . . .  Violation of this section shall constitute a separate 
and distinct felony and any person found guilty thereof shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three 
years for a first conviction, and to a mandatory minimum term of 
five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the 
provisions of this section. Such punishment shall be separate and 
apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any 
punishment received for the commission of the primary felony. 
 
 
In Hines v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (2012), a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the three-year “mandatory minimum” sentence in 
Code § 18.2-53.1 constitutes both the mandatory minimum and the mandatory maximum.  Id. at 
575-80, 721 S.E.2d at 795-98.  Given the unique background of Code § 18.2-53.1, we agree with 
the Court of Appeals. 
 
I. 
ALTHOUGH CODE § 18.2-53.1 DOES NOT SPECIFY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE, CODE 
§18.2-14 AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ANSWER THE QUESTION OF WHAT 
CONSTITUTES A STATUTORY MAXIMUM UNDER THIS STATUTE. 
 
 
A. 
Code § 18.2-53.1 is an anomaly. 
 
The Virginia Code employs two methods to assign a punishment for a crime.  For many 
crimes, the offense is assigned a numbered “class” of felony or misdemeanor.  There are six 
3 
 
Classes of felonies and four Classes of misdemeanors, each of which provides a specifically 
defined punishment.  See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-11.  For example, Class 6 felonies are punished 
with “a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or . . . 
confinement in jail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or 
both.”  Code § 18.2-10(f); see, e.g., Code § 18.2-308.4 (unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance while “simultaneously with knowledge and intent possess[ing] any firearm . . . is a 
Class 6 felony.”).  Other crimes fall outside of this classification scheme.  For such unclassified 
crimes, the statute itself specifies the range of punishment.  See, e.g., Code § 18.2-95 (grand 
larceny is “punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not less than one nor 
more than twenty years.”). 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1 is anomalous because it neither assigns a particular Class of felony nor 
specifies a range of punishment within the text of the statute.  The Code contains a multitude of 
statutes criminalizing some aspect or another of the possession or use of a firearm, and, with the 
exception of Code § 18.2-53.1, all of them specify a Class of felony or misdemeanor.2  
                     
 
2 A non-exhaustive list of firearm offenses includes Code §§ 18.2-56.1 (reckless handling 
of a firearm, a Class 1 misdemeanor or a Class 6 felony); 18.2-56.2 (recklessly allowing access 
to firearms by children, a Class 3 or a Class 1 misdemeanor); 18.2-108.1 (receipt of stolen 
firearm, a Class 6 felony); 18.2-280 (willful discharge of a firearm in a public place, a Class 6 
felony or a Class 1 misdemeanor if no one is injured); 18.2-282 (brandishing a firearm, a Class 6 
felony); 18.2-285 (hunting with firearms while intoxicated, a Class 1 misdemeanor); 18.2-287.01 
(carrying a weapon in an air carrier airport terminal, a Class 1 misdemeanor); 18.2-308.1 
(possession of a firearm on school property, etc., a Class 6 felony); 18.2-308.1:2 (purchase, 
possession, or transportation of a firearm after having been declared incompetent or 
incapacitated, a Class 1 misdemeanor); 18.2-308.1:3 (possession of a firearm by a person 
involuntarily admitted to a facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment, a Class 1 
misdemeanor); 18.2-308.1:4 (purchase or transportation of a firearm by persons subject to certain 
court orders, a Class 1 misdemeanor; possession of a firearm by a person subject to a protective 
order in cases of family abuse, a Class 6 felony); 18.2-308.2 (possession or transportation of 
firearm by a convicted felon, a Class 6 felony); 18.2-308.2:01 (possession or transportation of a 
4 
 
Furthermore, the Code contains 42 statutes that impose a mandatory minimum punishment.  
Except for Code § 18.2-53.1, each of the other 41 statutes either assigns a class to the offense or 
specifically establishes a maximum punishment, thereby establishing a defined range.3 
 
 
 
 
                     
firearm by an alien who is illegally present, a Class 6 felony); 18.2-308.4 (possession of firearms 
while possessing illegal drugs, a Class 6 felony); 18.2-308.5 (manufacture, importation, or sale 
of a plastic firearm, a Class 5 felony); 18.2-308.7 (possession or transportation of a handgun or 
assault firearm for persons under age 18, a Class 1 misdemeanor). 
 
3 Code §§ 3.2-4212 (unlawful distribution of cigarettes); 4.1-305 (unlawful purchasing or 
possessing alcoholic beverages); 15.2-1812.2 (willful and malicious damage or defacement of 
public or private facilities); 16.1-253.2 (violation of provisions of protective orders); 18.2-36.1 
(certain conduct punishable as involuntary manslaughter); 18.2-36.2 (involuntary manslaughter; 
operating watercraft while under the influence); 18.2-46.3:3 (enhanced punishment for gang 
activity in gang-free zone); 18.2-51.1 (malicious bodily injury to law enforcement officers, etc.); 
18.2-57 (assault and battery); 18.2-60.4 (violation of protective orders); 18.2-61 (rape); 18.2-67.1 
(forcible sodomy); 18.2-67.2 (object sexual penetration); 18.2-121 (entering property of another 
for purpose of damaging it); 18.2-154 (shooting or throwing missiles at train, car, etc.); 
18.2-186.4 (use of person’s identity with intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass); 18.2-248 
(manufacturing or distributing, etc. a controlled substance); 18.2-248.01 (transporting controlled 
substances into the Commonwealth); 18.2-248.03 (manufacturing or distributing, etc. 
methamphetamine); 18.2-248.1 (distribution of marijuana); 18.2-248.5 (illegal stimulants and 
steroids); 18.2-255 (distribution of certain drugs to minors); 18.2-255.2 (sale or manufacture of 
drugs on or near certain properties); 18.2-266.1 (persons under 21 driving after illegally 
consuming alcohol); 18.2-270 (driving while intoxicated); 18.2-308.1 (possession of weapon on 
school property); 18.2-308.2 (possession or transportation of firearms by convicted felons); 
18.2-308.2:2(M) (purchasing a firearm for someone ineligible to purchase); 18.2-308.4 
(possession of firearms while in possession of certain substances); 18.2-374.1 (production, 
publication, etc. of child pornography); 18.2-374.1:1 (possession, reproduction, distribution, etc. 
of child pornography); 18.2-374.3 (use of communications systems to facilitate certain offenses 
involving children); 33.2-802 (dumping trash); 46.2-301 (driving while licenses suspended or 
revoked); 46.2-341.28 (driving commercial vehicle while intoxicated); 46.2-357 (operation of 
motor vehicle by habitual offender); 46.2-391 (driving with revoked license); 46.2-865.1 
(injuring or causing the death of another while street racing); 46.2-868 (reckless driving); 
46.2-1110 (driving over-height vehicle into tunnel or obstruction); 53.1-203 (felonies by 
prisoners). 
 
5 
 
 
 
B. 
Code § 18.2-14 specifies that punishment is determined by resorting to the  
 
 
statutory text.  
 
 
Code § 18.2-14 provides that  
Offenses defined in Title 18.2 and in other titles in the Code, for 
which punishment is prescribed without specification as to the 
class of the offense, shall be punished according to the punishment 
prescribed in the section or sections thus defining the offense. 
 
The command of Code § 18.2-14 is to look inwardly in interpreting Virginia sentencing 
provisions, to the text of the statute, rather than outwardly, to persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions. 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1 does not specify a class of offense.  According to the plain language of 
Code § 18.2-14, the crime should be punished “according to the punishment prescribed in the 
section or sections thus defining the offense.”  The punishment prescribed in Code § 18.2-53.1 is  
a minimum of five years.  The Court of Appeals put its finger on the interpretive dilemma when 
it noted that, on the one hand, “‘mandatory minimum’ suggests that the trial court has some 
discretion in imposing a sentence greater than the mandatory term of incarceration.”  Hines, 59 
Va. App. at 575, 721 S.E.2d at 796.  On the other hand, however, “application of Code § 18.2-14 
would seem to indicate that the trial court may impose only a three or five-year term of 
incarceration.”  Id. at 576, 721 S.E.2d at 796.  Given the ambiguity of the statute, we consult its 
legislative history to ascertain its meaning. 
 
C. 
Legislative history explains the anomalous language of Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1 does not specify a maximum sentence.  To fill this lacuna and resolve 
the conundrum of legislative intent, we examine its legislative history.  The predecessor statute 
to Code § 18.2-53.1 classified the offense as a Class 6 felony, and a second or subsequent 
6 
 
offense as a Class 5 felony.  1975 Acts chs. 1296, 1299-1300.  In 1976, the General Assembly 
substituted a fixed term of incarceration for the felony classifications, making the offense 
punishable by a one-year sentence for a first offense and three years for a second or subsequent 
offense.  1976 Acts ch. 430.  The General Assembly also specified that “the sentence prescribed 
for a violation of the provisions of this section shall not be suspended in whole or in part.”  Id.  
This change, we recognized, had the effect of displacing “the wide range of discretionary 
penalties originally authorized” with “[i]nflexible penalties” of specific duration.  Ansell v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 763, 250 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1979).  The General Assembly later 
increased the sentences, but retained their character as fixed terms of incarceration.  1982 Acts 
ch. 1225; 1993 Acts ch. 1207. 
 
In 2001, the General Assembly tasked the Virginia State Crime Commission “to study the 
organization of and inconsistencies in Title 18.2 of the Code.”  H.J. Res. 687, Va. Gen. Assem. 
(Reg. Sess. 2001).  The Crime Commission issued its report in 2004, proposing various 
recommendations and suggesting “amendments throughout the Virginia Code to use consistent 
language when describing mandatory minimum criminal sentences.”  Virginia State Crime 
Commission, Report to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia:  The Reorganization 
and Restructuring of Title 18.2, H. Doc. No. 15, at 5 (2004).  The report noted that “[t]he Code of 
Virginia currently has inconsistent language for the concept of a mandatory minimum 
punishment.”  The Code contained such variations as “minimum mandatory;” “mandatory 
minimum;” “minimum, mandatory;” “none of which may be suspended;” sentence “shall not be 
subject to suspension;” and, that the sentence “shall not be subject to suspension in whole or in 
7 
 
part.”  Id. at 37.  The Commission proposed the adoption of a definition for “mandatory 
minimum punishment” as well as amending existing statutes to adopt uniform language.  Id. 
 
Although the General Assembly did not adopt all of the recommendations contained in 
the Crime Commission’s report, it did follow through on its suggestion to adopt a definition of 
“mandatory minimum punishment” and to adopt uniform language throughout the Code.  2004 
Acts ch. 461, proposed as House Bill 1059.  The legislation was introduced by a member of the 
Crime Commission.  Other members of the Crime Commission also served as patrons of the bill.  
House Bill 1059 is attached as an exhibit to the Crime Commission’s 2004 report. 
 
The bill established a definition of “mandatory minimum punishment,” now codified at 
Code § 18.2-12.1, and replaced the disparate descriptions of mandatory minimum sentences with 
the language recommended by the Crime Commission.  For example, the General Assembly 
amended Code § 4.1-305, altering the language from “a fine of at least $500” to “a mandatory 
minimum fine of $500.”  2004 Acts ch. 461, at 1.  As another illustration, Code § 18.2-57 was 
changed in pertinent part from a term of incarceration, of which 30 days “shall not be suspended, 
in whole or in part” to read instead that the 30 days “shall be a mandatory minimum term of 
confinement.”  Id. at 3. 
 
The bill amended Code § 18.2-53.1 as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any 
pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon in a 
threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit 
murder, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual 
penetration as defined in § 18.2-67.2, robbery, carjacking, 
burglary, malicious wounding as defined in § 18.2-51, malicious 
bodily injury to a law-enforcement officer as defined in § 
18.2-51.1, aggravated malicious wounding as defined in § 
18.2-51.2, malicious wounding by mob as defined in § 18.2-41 or 
abduction. Violation of this section shall constitute a separate and 
8 
 
distinct felony and any person found guilty thereof shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three 
years for a first conviction, and for to a mandatory minimum term 
of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the 
provisions of this section. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the sentence prescribed for a violation of the provisions of this 
section shall not be suspended in whole or in part, nor shall anyone 
convicted hereunder be placed on probation. Such punishment 
shall be separate and apart from, and shall be made to run 
consecutively with, any punishment received for the commission 
of the primary felony. 
 
Id. at 674. 
 
 
This amendment and the insertion of the now standard language establishing a mandatory 
minimum sentence had the effect of displacing a fixed sentence without specifying a mandatory 
maximum.  The amendments to Code § 18.2-53.1, however, are entirely in keeping with the 
other changes in the bill.  The singular common thread throughout the entire bill is the adoption 
of a uniform style for prescribing mandatory minimum punishment.4  None of the changes to the 
other statutes increased a penalty for a crime.  This background reveals that the changes in House 
Bill 1059 were meant to clarify and make uniform the law concerning mandatory minimum 
sentences, not to effect substantive changes in the law. 
 
The fact that the General Assembly did not prepare a fiscal impact statement for the 2004 
amendments yields an additional clue that it did not intend to increase the punishment in Code § 
18.2-53.1.  As the Court of Appeals noted in Hines, Code § 30-19.1:4(A) required the 
Commission to “prepare a fiscal impact statement reflecting the operating costs attributable to 
and necessary appropriations for any bill which would result in a net increase in period of 
                     
 
4 The bill made other cosmetic changes, such as changing words for numbers, e.g., 
replacing “twenty” with “20” and updating “Immigration and Naturalization Service” to “United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services.”  Id. at 677, 681. 
9 
 
imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities.”  59 Va. App. at 578, 721 S.E.2d at 797.  An 
amendment that intended to increase a term of incarceration from a fixed mandatory term of 
three years to a potential term of life imprisonment would plainly result in a fiscal impact.  The 
bill, however, did not include a fiscal impact statement. 
 
Finally, one would expect the imposition of a potential maximum life sentence on so 
common an offense to generate a heated debate.  The bill passed the House and Senate Courts of 
Justice unanimously, passed the House on a block vote of 100 to 0 and the Senate on a 39-0 vote.  
This unanimity would be inexplicable unless the bill truly constituted a simple clarifying 
measure rather than a substantive change imposing a far heavier penalty for a common crime. 
 
We acknowledge that “[l]egislation is presumed to effect a change in the law unless there 
is clear indication that the General Assembly intended that the legislation declare or explain 
existing law.”  Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 420, 587 S.E.2d 584, 587 (2003).  Here, 
however, there is a clear indication that the legislation did not effect a change in the law with 
respect to Code § 18.2-53.1.  The legislation came at the suggestion of the Crime Commission 
with a stated purpose of using consistent terminology when imposing mandatory minimums.  
The language in the bill tracks the proposal by the Crime Commission.  None of the other 
statutes amended by House Bill 1059 were the subject of substantive changes.  It is therefore 
unlikely the General Assembly singled out Code § 18.2-53.1 for a change so drastic as an 
increase from a three-year fixed term to a possible maximum of life in prison.  When the General 
Assembly wishes to impose a life sentence, it knows how to make its intent manifest.5  Finally, 
                     
5 Statutes imposing life in prison can arise as Class 1 felonies, Class 2 felonies, or 
unclassified felonies for which a punishment of life in prison is specified within the text of the 
statute.  Class 1 felony: Code § 18.2-31 (capital murder). Class 2 felonies: Code §§ 18.2-32 (first 
10 
 
the absence of a fiscal impact statement and the unanimous passage of the bill constitute further 
indication that the General Assembly did not intend to enact a significant change to Code § 
18.2-53.1.  These circumstances, in combination, refute the ordinary presumption that the 
General Assembly intended a substantive change with its 2004 amendments to Code § 18.2-53.1.  
Instead, Code § 18.2-53.1 is best read to impose a fixed three-year term of confinement.  In other 
words, the three-year term is both the mandatory minimum and the mandatory maximum. 
 
D. 
Drawing a judicial inference of a legislative intent to impose life in prison is 
inapposite here and inconsistent with longstanding Virginia practice. 
    
 
Many courts have adopted a rule of construction under which courts will imply a 
legislative intent to impose a potential maximum life sentence when a statute is silent on a 
maximum term of imprisonment.  See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 
2004).  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted, “[l]eaving the 
determination of maximum sentences to the court is not uncommon” in the federal system, 
                     
degree murder); 18.2-32.2 (premeditated killing of the fetus of another); 18.2-46.5 (acts of 
terrorism where the base offense is punishable by a minimum of twenty years); 18.2-46.6 (use of 
a weapon with intent to commit terrorism); 18.2-48 (abduction with intent to extort money or for 
immoral purpose); 18.2-51.2 (aggravated malicious wounding); 18.2-89 (armed burglary); 
18.2-90 (armed statutory burglary); 18.2-91 (entering dwelling house with intent to commit 
felony); 18.2-92 (breaking and entering dwelling house to commit misdemeanor while armed 
with deadly weapon); 18.2-93 (armed bank robbery); 18.2-162 (destruction of public utility 
resulting in death of another due to radiation); 18.2-289 (use of machine gun for crime of 
violence); 18.2-300 (possession of sawed-off shotgun or rifle in perpetration of violent crime); 
18.2-481 (treason); 18.2-515 (racketeering – subsequent offense). Unclassified felonies 
punishable by life: Code §§ 18.2-58 (robbery); 18.2-58.1 (carjacking); 18.2-61 (rape); 18.2-67.1 
(forcible sodomy); 18.2-67.2 (object sexual penetration); 18.2-67.5:3 (violent felony sexual 
assault – subsequent); 18.2-77 (burning or destroying occupied dwelling house); 18.2-248 
(manufacture or distribution of Schedule I or II substance – subsequent; manufacture or 
distribution of certain specific types and quantities of narcotics; principal in a continuing 
criminal enterprise); 18.2-248.03 (manufacture or distribution of over 227 grams of substance 
with detectable methamphetamine); 18.2-248.1 (third or subsequent felony marijuana offense). 
 
11 
 
United States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1976), and courts have deduced from this 
practice Congressional intent to allow courts broad discretion in sentencing.  Id.  It appears that 
federal courts adopted this inference in interpreting the Lindbergh Act, which did not specify a 
maximum sentence.  See Bates v. Johnston, 111 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); Bailey v. United 
States, 74 F.2d 451, 452 (10th Cir. 1934).  Some courts look to legislative history in applying 
this principle, but more often than not federal courts apply this default principle without 
explanation or amplification.  Compare Walberg v. United States, 763 F.2d 143, 148-49 (2nd 
Cir. 1985) (“Since the legislative history of the Act reveals an intention to give judges maximum 
discretion and flexibility in sentencing, we read that the Act’s failure to provide an explicit 
maximum period . . . as implicitly authorizing the imposition of any period from the minimum 
specified in the statute to the life of the defendant.”) with United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 
709 (8th Cir. 2013) (Bright, J., concurring) (lamenting the “sparse explanation” that typically 
accompanies opinions applying this judicial inference).  A judicial inference that legislative 
silence on a maximum punishment means life does have the benefit of protecting a legislative 
enactment against a challenge that it is void for vagueness.  Jones, 540 F.2d at 468.  For states 
with indeterminate sentencing regimes like New Mexico, such an inference also fits in logically 
with the rehabilitative goals of indeterminate sentencing regimes.  See McCutcheon v. Cox, 377 
P.2d 683, 686 (N.M. 1962). 
 
We conclude that it would be inappropriate to resort to the “legislative silence means 
life” judicial inference in construing Code § 18.2-53.1.  First, we are persuaded for all the 
reasons set forth above that the legislature did not in this instance intend to adopt a maximum 
sentence of life in prison for a violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Second, although it may be 
12 
 
relatively common for Congress and some state legislatures to deliberately omit a statutory 
maximum, and, therefore, for courts to adopt an inference to address that situation, Virginia 
practice has been different.  Open-ended statutes that leave the determination of maximum 
sentences to the courts are not common in our Code.  In fact, aside from Code § 18.2-53.1, such 
statutes are unheard of in Virginia.  In addition, Virginia has not adopted an indeterminate 
sentencing regime.  For all of these reasons, we see no basis to invoke this judicial inference in 
construing Code § 18.2-53.1.  Thus, as the legislative history discussed above confirms, Code § 
18.2-53.1 is best read to impose a fixed three-year term of confinement.  The three-year term is 
both the mandatory minimum and the mandatory maximum. 
II. 
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS TO ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT. 
 
The defendant asks us to remand the case to the trial court for a resentencing on all of his 
convictions.  The Commonwealth disagrees, contending that there is no reason to remand when 
the only appropriate sentence is a fixed three-year term of incarceration.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth.  Ordinarily, “a criminal defendant . . . is entitled to a new sentencing hearing” 
where “a sentence [is] imposed in violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment.”  
Rawls, 278 Va. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549.  In this instance, a three-year fixed term of 
confinement is the only sentence available.  Therefore, a new sentencing hearing is unnecessary 
as to the defendant’s conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1.  In addition, there is no argument that 
the sentences for Graves’ other crimes were void ab initio.  Therefore, we see no reason in this 
collateral attack to invalidate them.6 
                     
 
6 We stated in Burrell v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 474, 480, 722 S.E.2d 272, 275 (2012) 
that the sentencing order itself was void.  But the statement in Burrell, that the order was void, as 
opposed to a particular sentence being void, was made in the context of an order sentencing a 
13 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will reverse the judgment below insofar as it imposes a sentence exceeding the 
punishment authorized by the General Assembly in Code § 18.2-53.1, vacate the two year 
suspended sentence, and remand the case for entry of a new sentencing order in conformity with 
this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                                                                                                              and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE KELSEY, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting. 
Code § 18.2-53.1 establishes a “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment.  The text of 
the statute, the majority concedes, “does not specify a maximum sentence.”  Ante at 5.  Viewing 
this omission as an “anomaly,” ante at 2, the majority fills what it considers a statutory “lacuna,” 
ante at 5, with a judicially implied maximum term — one exactly equal to the statute’s express 
minimum term.  In other words, the minimum is now the maximum.  Through the majority’s 
interpretive prism, “no less than” means “no more than” and “at least” means “at most.” 
I respectfully dissent. 
I.  MINIMUM MEANS MINIMUM 
 
In 2004, the General Assembly amended the felony-firearm statute.  “As a general rule, a 
presumption exists that a substantive change in law was intended by an amendment to an 
                     
defendant for a single crime.  In the context of that case, therefore, that statement was accurate.  
Here, Graves was sentenced for multiple crimes, and only one of his sentences was void ab 
initio.  Graves’ other sentences remain valid.  Therefore, this case is like Rawls, where we 
invalidated a specific sentence that was void ab initio, not the order in its entirety when it 
contained multiple sentences.  278 Va. at 221-22, 683 S.E.2d at 549. 
14 
 
existing statute.”  Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. 597, 602, 570 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) 
(citation omitted).  That presumption holds true here. 
The prior version of Code § 18.2-53.1 authorized a fixed “term of imprisonment” of three 
years for the first offense, or five years for subsequent offenses, which the sentencing court could 
not suspend in whole or in part.  2004 Acts ch. 461, at 674 (effective July 1, 2004).  The 2004 
amendment added the phrase “mandatory minimum” to qualify the “term of imprisonment.”  Id.  
The phrase “mandatory minimum” — when used in scores of other Virginia criminal statutes — 
means the minimum, non-suspendable portion of a sentence, the lowest point of a statutory 
sentencing range.1  In every instance where the legislature has chosen to equate the mandatory 
minimum sentence with the maximum statutory punishment, it has done so expressly.2 
                     
1 See Code §§ 3.2-4212(D), 4.1-305(C), 15.2-1812.2(A), 16.1-253.2(A), 18.2-36.1(B), 
18.2-36.2(B), 18.2-46.3:3, 18.2-51.1, 18.2-57, 18.2-60.4(A), 18.2-61(B)(1), 18.2-67.1(B)(1), 
18.2-67.2(B)(1), 18.2-121, 18.2-154, 18.2-186.4, 18.2-248(C), 18.2-248.01, 18.2-248.03, 
18.2-248.1(d), 18.2-248.5(A), 18.2-255(A), 18.2-255.2(B), 18.2-266.1(B), 18.2-270, 
18.2-308.2:2(M)-(N), 18.2-308.4(B),18.2-374.1(C1)-(C2), 18.2-374.1:1(C), 18.2-374.3(C)-(D), 
33.2-802(C), 46.2-301(C), 46.2-341.28, 46.2-357(B)(1)-(2), 46.2-391(D)(1)-(2), 46.2-
865.1(A)(2), 46.2-868(C), 53.1-203. 
2 See Code §§ 18.2-61(B)(2) (requiring a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment when 
an adult offender rapes a child under 13 even though the crime of rape carries a general 
punishment range of 5 years’ imprisonment to life), 18.2-67.1(B)(2) (requiring a mandatory 
minimum of life imprisonment when an adult offender forcibly sodomizes a child under 13 even 
though the crime of forcible sodomy carries a general punishment range of 5 years’ 
imprisonment to life), 18.2-67.2(B)(2) (requiring a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment for 
object sexual penetration by an adult offender of a child under 13 even though the crime of 
object sexual penetration carries a general punishment range of 5 years’ imprisonment to life), 
18.2-308.1(C) (requiring a 5-year mandatory minimum for possessing a firearm on school 
property, a crime punished as a Class 6 felony that carries a general punishment range of up to 5 
years’ imprisonment), 18.2-308.2(A) (requiring a 5-year mandatory minimum for possessing a 
firearm after a conviction for a violent felony, a crime punished as a Class 6 felony that carries a 
general punishment range of up to 5 years’ imprisonment), 18.2-308.4(C) (requiring a 5-year 
mandatory minimum for possessing a firearm while possessing certain drugs with the intent to 
distribute, a crime punished as a Class 6 felony that carries a general punishment range of up to 5 
years’ imprisonment), 46.2-1110 (requiring a mandatory minimum fine of $1,000, or $2,500 for 
a subsequent offense, for attempting to drive through a tunnel in violation of height or weight 
15 
 
The Virginia tradition has always been to ask “not what the legislature intended to enact, 
but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.  We must determine the legislative intent by 
what the statute says and not by what we think it should have said.”  Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 
338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406-07 (1963).3  I thus would not inquire as to “what the legislature 
meant” but instead “ask only what the statute means.”  Tvardek v. Powhatan Vill. Homeowners 
Ass’n, 291 Va. 269, 277 n.7, 784 S.E.2d 280, 284 n.7 (2016) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899)). 
Following this tradition, “[i]t is our duty to interpret the statute as written and when this 
is done our responsibility ceases.”  City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfield, 177 Va. 212, 221, 13 S.E.2d 
323, 326 (1941); see also Continental Baking Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 202 Va. 798, 805, 
120 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1961).  Because we “can only administer the law as it is written,” Coalter 
v. Bargamin, 99 Va. 65, 71, 37 S.E. 779, 781 (1901), the interpretative principle that precedes all 
                     
limitations, a crime that carries the specific punishment of a $1,000 fine, or $2,500 for a 
subsequent offense). 
3 See also United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 91 U.S. 72, 85 (1875) (“Courts cannot supply 
omissions in legislation, nor afford relief because they are supposed to exist.”); United States v. 
Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 387 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[I]t cannot be pretended that the natural sense 
of words is to be disregarded, because that which they import might have been better, or more 
directly expressed.”); Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation 
of the Laws § 26, at 45 (2d ed. 1911) (“If the language of the statute is plain and free from 
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively 
presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey. . . .  [e]ven though the 
court should be convinced that some other meaning was really intended by the law-making 
power . . . .”); 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 401, at 
384 (1833) (“Where the words are plain and clear, and the sense distinct and perfect arising on 
them, there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation.  It is only, 
where there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources, that interpretation has its 
proper office.”); J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 237, at 313-14 (1891) 
(“‘We are not at liberty to imagine an intent and bind the letter of the act to that intent . . . .’  
Even when a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and intended something not 
expressed by the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain 
meaning of language which is free from ambiguity.” (citation omitted)). 
16 
 
others is that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there,” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006) (citation omitted).  We thus “presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words 
it used when it enacted the relevant statute,” Tvardek, 291 Va. at 277, 784 S.E.2d at 284 (citation 
omitted), and give each word of a statute its “ordinary and plain meaning, considering the 
context in which it is used,” Hilton v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 293, 299, 797 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 
(2017) (citation omitted).  The ordinary and plain meaning of the word “minimum” is minimum, 
not maximum. 
Seeking to rebut the presumption that the 2004 amendment changed the law by replacing 
a fixed term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the majority 
correctly points out that Code § 18.2-53.1 does not state a maximum term of imprisonment either 
by specifically stating an upper limit or by incorporating a maximum term from the classification 
of felonies found in Code § 18.2-10.  The majority finds this omission anomalous because, read 
literally, Code § 18.2-53.1 authorizes a potential sentence of life imprisonment.  This anomaly, 
the majority reasons, empowers us to blue-pencil the 2004 amendment so that the minimum 
sentence equals the maximum sentence.  For several reasons, I am unwilling to do so. 
 
To begin, what the majority views as a legal anomaly has been settled law in federal and 
state courts for many years.  It is not at all anomalous for a legislature to enact a mandatory 
minimum sentence and “decline to state a maximum.”  United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 
120 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Ex parte Robinson, 474 So. 2d 685, 686 (Ala. 1985) (“Our research 
reveals many statutes, both federal and state, which fix a minimum penalty for an offense but 
which fail to prescribe a maximum penalty.”).  When legislatures impose only a “minimum 
sentence,” they “leav[e] it within the power of the court to fix the maximum sentences.”  Turner, 
17 
 
389 F.3d at 120 (quoting Binkley v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 848, 849 (10th Cir. 1948)).  In short, these 
statutes impose “a mandatory minimum sentence, not a mandatory maximum sentence.”  United 
States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1988).  One court has described this principle as “so 
self-evident as to not need explanation.”  Turner, 389 F.3d at 120. 
In such cases, American courts uniformly hold that “in the absence of a statutory 
maximum penalty, the maximum penalty when a term of not less than a certain number of years 
is provided, means that the maximum is life imprisonment.”  United States v. Sias, 227 F.3d 244, 
247 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Ex parte Robinson, 474 So. 2d at 686.  This conclusion merely 
reflects the “sensible rule of statutory construction whereby the absence of a specified maximum 
simply means that the maximum is life imprisonment.”  Turner, 389 F.3d at 120.  The mandatory 
minimum provision, after all, “is designed to serve as the floor, not the ceiling” for criminal 
sentences.  Sias, 227 F.3d at 247; see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987); Ex parte Robinson, 474 
So. 2d at 686; State v. Turnbow, 466 P.2d 100, 101 (N.M. 1970); State v. Sisneros, 464 P.2d 924, 
925 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970). 
A multitude of courts recognize that the minimum-means-minimum principle applies to 
felony-firearm statutes no less than any other criminal statute.  See Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-63 (2013) (holding that any fact which increases the 
“mandatory minimum” sentence under the federal firearm statute must be alleged in the 
indictment while observing that “the maximum of life marks the outer boundary” of the 
sentencing range under that federal firearm statute and noting that, although the trial court could 
originally have imposed a sentence above the mandatory minimum, an indictment for the 
additional act is still necessary to subject a defendant to a higher mandatory minimum); Custis v. 
18 
 
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994) (“The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 . . . raises the 
penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum of 10 years in prison to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole if the 
defendant ‘has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.’” 
(alteration and citation omitted)).4 
With the exception of the divided Court of Appeals panel opinion in Hines v. 
Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (2012), the majority cites no cases suggesting 
that the phrase “mandatory minimum” also means the statutory maximum, and I am unaware of 
any such cases.  Nor am I persuaded by the majority’s cursory dismissal of this unbroken line of 
federal and state cases on the ipse dixit that the statutes and sentencing regimes at issue in those 
cases have little in common with those at issue here.  See ante at 10-12.  Because the legal issue 
is the same — whether “minimum” means minimum, not maximum — they have everything in 
                     
4 See also United States v. Ortiz-García, 665 F.3d 279, 284-85 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 
768, 772 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott v. 
United States, 562 U.S. 8, 13, 24-28 (2010); United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 
2007); United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1139 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811-12 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 642-43 (9th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Avery, 295 
F.3d 1158, 1170 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 147 (4th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Harrison, 272 F.3d 220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pounds, 230 
F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Sias, 227 F.3d at 246-47; United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by United States 
v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 662 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v. Tisdale, 921 
F.2d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1990), 
superseded on other grounds, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 cmt. n.2 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 1992); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1989), 
superseded on other grounds, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 cmt. n.2; United 
States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1988); Jackson, 835 F.2d at 1197; Thomas v. 
United States, 602 A.2d 647, 651-52 (D.C. 1992); State v. Norton, 949 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997); State v. Fulks, 173 S.E. 888, 889 (W. Va. 1934). 
19 
 
common.  Neither Graves nor the majority, therefore, can shoulder the burden of rebutting the 
presumption that the 2004 amendment effected a “substantive change in law,” Bruhn, 264 Va. at 
602, 570 S.E.2d at 869 (citation omitted), by replacing a fixed term of imprisonment with a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. 
II.  THE USE & MISUSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Conceding that the text of the statute does not establish a maximum term of 
imprisonment, the majority infers from the statute’s legislative history that the omission is a 
forgivable oversight on the General Assembly’s part.  See ante at 5-10.  I have two responses.  
First, that inference does not stem from a proper use of legislative history; second, it is a tenuous 
and speculative inference at best. 
A. 
As to the first point, I agree that legislative history has a place in statutory interpretation.  
I also believe, however, that it should be kept in its place.  See generally 2A Norman J. Singer & 
Shambie Singer, Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48:1, at 551-54 (7th ed. rev. 
2014).  A textually clear statute needs no judicial construction of any kind, whether based upon 
legislative history or otherwise.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 29 (2012) (noting that even “cases approving the use of legislative 
history . . . disapprove of it when the enacted text is unambiguous” (emphasis in original)). 
Virginia courts turn to a statute’s legislative history only when the statutory text is 
ambiguous — that is, when there are multiple, equally reasonable, ways to interpret the 
command or prohibition.  As we have previously emphasized: 
Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more 
than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously. . . .  
If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for 
construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the 
20 
 
enactment will be given it.  When an enactment is clear and 
unequivocal, general rules for construction of statutes of doubtful 
meaning do not apply.  Therefore, when the language of an 
enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and 
extrinsic facts is not permitted because we take the words as 
written to determine their meaning.  And, when an enactment is 
unambiguous, extrinsic legislative history may not be used to 
create an ambiguity, and then remove it, where none otherwise 
exists. 
 
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citations omitted). 
This point has been a mainstay of our jurisprudence.  See Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 
362, 370, 492 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, . . . resort to . . . legislative 
history . . . is impermissible.”); Carter v. City of Norfolk, 206 Va. 872, 876, 147 S.E.2d 139, 142 
(1966) (“The language of the act being unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to legislative 
history . . . .”); City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 269, 136 S.E.2d 817, 825 
(1964) (“[T]he plain meaning of a statute cannot be affected by resort to its legislative history.”); 
Commonwealth v. Rose, 160 Va. 177, 181, 168 S.E. 356, 357 (1933) (noting that “[t]he history of 
legislative dealings” is “interesting but has no value except in doubtful cases”); Shenandoah 
Lime Co. v. Governor of Va., 115 Va. 865, 870, 80 S.E. 753, 754 (1914) (“[T]he motives, 
purposes or intention of the legislature have no existence in law where its enactment is plain and 
unambiguous on its face, except as those motives may be disclosed on the face of the act 
itself.”).5 
                     
5 See also NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The 
text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”); Milner v. Department of the 
Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572-74 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe 
that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.  We will not take the 
opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language. . . .  
Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create 
it.”); Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (“Legislative 
history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.”); Burlington N. R.R. v. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (finding the legislative history “inconclusive 
21 
 
 
The majority vaults the ambiguity hurdle by focusing not on Code § 18.2-53.1, the statute 
we must interpret, but on Code § 18.2-14.  See ante at 5.  That general statute states that 
sentencing courts must punish unclassified felonies “according to the punishment prescribed in 
the section or sections thus defining the offense.”  Code § 18.2-14.  This correct but circular 
observation, however, adds nothing to the analysis.  Code § 18.2-53.1 enacts an unclassified 
felony.  So, under Code § 18.2-14, we look solely to Code § 18.2-53.1 (rather than the 
classifications in Code § 18.2-10) to determine the sentence to be imposed.  But this conclusion 
tells us nothing about what Code § 18.2-53.1 means by imposing a “mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment,” and it certainly does not tell us that “minimum” also means “maximum.”  Code 
§ 18.2-14 thus begs, but does not answer, the question before us. 
Along the same lines, I see no interpretative relevance to Code § 18.2-12.1, which merely 
states what we already know:  A sentencing court cannot suspend the mandatory minimum terms 
of imprisonment in Code § 18.2-53.1 either “in full or in part.”  Code § 18.2-12.1.  A sentencing 
court can, and often does, suspend a sentence above the minimum.  If the definition of 
“mandatory minimum” in Code § 18.2-12.1 proves that the expression “mandatory minimum” 
also means “mandatory maximum,” that definition would be in conflict with a myriad of statutes 
imposing a non-suspendable “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment while simultaneously 
                     
and irrelevant” because “[l]egislative history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose 
obscured by ambiguity, but ‘in the absence of a “clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary,” the language of the statute itself “must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive,”’” and 
“[i]n the present case, the language of [the statute] plainly declares the congressional purpose” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (“Having concluded that 
the provisions of [the statute] are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort to 
the legislative history of the Act.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) 
(“[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative 
intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from . . . reports 
accompanying their introduction, or from any extraneous source.”). 
22 
 
authorizing a suspendable maximum term.  See supra note 1. 
Legislative history should never be a basis for judicially amending a statute to supply a 
term that a court believes the legislature left out, regardless of how obvious the oversight or how 
clear the legislative history.  See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496-97 (1997) (declining 
to rely on the “Reviser’s Note,” which stated that the amendments to the statute “[were] without 
change of substance,” because the “indication” that those “who prepared the legislation either 
overlooked or chose to say nothing” about removing a term from 3 of 13 consolidated statutes 
“does nothing to muddy the ostensibly unambiguous provision of the statute as enacted by 
Congress” and because “[i]n any event, the revisers’ assumption that the consolidation made no 
substantive change was simply wrong” (citations omitted)); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 256-60 
(noting that “[t]he new text is the law” and that the changed language governs “even when the 
legislative history consisting of the codifiers’ report expresses the intent to make no change”). 
The majority’s reasoning, however, effectively amends Code § 18.2-53.1.  Declaring the 
omission of a maximum term “anomalous,” ante at 3, 5, the majority digs into the statute’s 
legislative history and supplies the missing statutory term.  The phrase “mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment,” Code § 18.2-53.1, is not truly being interpreted.  Instead, the majority 
has judicially edited the phrase to add a new term so that, for all practical purposes, the statutory 
phrase now reads “mandatory minimum ˄ and maximum ˄ term of imprisonment.”  I do not 
believe that legislative history, even when understood with confidence, gives courts the power to 
amend statutes.  “Courts are not at liberty to speculate upon the intentions of the legislature 
where the words are clear, and to construe an act upon their own notions of what ought to have 
been enacted.”  Sutherland, supra note 3, §§ 235-36, at 311-12. 
23 
 
B. 
I am also unconvinced by the majority’s understanding of the legislative history 
surrounding the 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1.  Nothing in the recommendations of the 
Virginia State Crime Commission suggests that the phrase “mandatory minimum,” standing 
alone, also includes a maximum.  See Virginia State Crime Comm’n, The Reorganization and 
Restructuring of Title 18.2, House Doc. No. 15, at 5 (2004).  If anything, the legislative history 
shows just the opposite of what the majority assumes.  During the 2004 session, the General 
Assembly defeated two bills that would have amended Code § 18.2-53.1 but left intact the prior 
language mandating fixed terms of imprisonment.  See H.B. 377, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 
2004); H.B. 1053, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 2004).  Taking a different approach, the General 
Assembly replaced the fixed terms of the pre-2004 version of Code § 18.2-53.1 with new 
“mandatory minimum” terms of imprisonment.  2004 Acts ch. 461, at 674. 
The majority also turns to the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission’s failure to 
prepare a fiscal impact statement to accompany the 2004 amendment as an “additional clue” 
supporting its argument that the phrase “mandatory minimum” in the 2004 amendment also 
includes the maximum sentence.  See ante at 8-9 (citing Code § 30-19.1:4(A)).  This argument, it 
seems to me, is the weakest of all.  Probably for this reason, neither party made it at oral 
argument or on brief.  I think the reason why neither party made this argument is because the 
interpretative “clue,” ante at 8, is really nothing more than a speculative guess. 
Truth be told, none of us can explain the absence of a fiscal impact statement for the 2004 
amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1.  The Criminal Sentencing Commission may have simply 
misread the proposed amendment and, as a consequence, neglected to prepare a fiscal impact 
statement.  Perhaps those charged with scoring the fiscal impact relied upon the State Crime 
24 
 
Commission Report and did not realize that the recommendations in the report addressed only 19 
of the mandatory minimum statutes needing amendment and conspicuously omitted any mention 
of Code § 18.2-53.1.  See Virginia State Crime Comm’n, supra, at 37-38.  Maybe this specific 
funding issue got lost in the General Assembly’s decision in 2004 to build two new state prisons 
at a cost of over $140 million.  See 2004 Acts ch. 4, at 493 (Spec. Sess. I) (effective July 1, 
2004).  A year later, in 2005, the General Assembly authorized the Department of Corrections to 
“develop a plan” to “finance, construct and operate additional correctional facilities.”  2005 Acts 
ch. 951, at 2281-82 (effective May 4, 2005).  I do not know what to make of these budgeting and 
appropriation decisions.  But I do know what not to make of them.  Whatever their plausible 
explanations, none persuade me to interpret “minimum” in Code § 18.2-53.1 to mean anything 
other than minimum. 
III.  STATUTORY ABSURDITIES 
I do not deny that textualism has its limits.  We should not adopt a literal reading of a 
statute when such an interpretation “would result in a manifest absurdity.”  Butler v. Fairfax Cty. 
Sch. Bd., 291 Va. 32, 37, 780 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2015) (citation omitted).6  That said, “the anti-
absurdity principle — understood in its legal sense — serves only as an interpretative brake on 
irrational literalism.  This fail-safe applies in situations in which a purely literal reading forces 
the statutory text into an ‘internally inconsistent’ conflict or renders the statute ‘otherwise 
incapable of operation.’”  Tvardek, 291 Va. at 280, 784 S.E.2d at 285-86 (quoting Butler, 291 
Va. at 37, 780 S.E.2d at 280). 
                     
6 The majority never invokes the anti-absurdity principle, at least by name.  Instead, it 
accomplishes the same result by deeming the statute “anomalous.”  See ante at 2 (“Code § 18.2-
53.1 is an anomaly.”); ante at 3 (“Code § 18.2-53.1 is anomalous . . . .”); ante at 5 (“Legislative 
history explains the anomalous language of Code § 18.2-53.1.”). 
25 
 
A literal interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1 — one that interprets “minimum” to mean 
minimum, not maximum — cannot be dismissed as a manifest absurdity.  No court has ever 
suggested as much.  To be sure, every case in the nation of which I am aware that has addressed 
this issue (except the divided Court of Appeals panel in Hines) has held that minimum means 
minimum, not maximum.  See supra at 16-19 & n.4.  Nor can we say that a life sentence would 
never under any conceivable circumstances be appropriate under this statute.  The “mandatory 
minimum” term of Code § 18.2-53.1 applies to various felons, including murderers and rapists 
who use firearms to kill, maim, or torture their victims.  I see no manifest absurdity in imposing 
life imprisonment upon a recidivist murderer or rapist who uses a firearm to accomplish his 
crime.  Imposing such a sentence is not absurd simply because the murderer or rapist also 
deserves an equal punishment for the underlying predicate felony.7 
As for the conjectural possibility that a judge could impose a life sentence upon an 
undeserving criminal, I am content to rely on the good judgment of our trial judges to avoid such 
immoderate results.  The fact that life sentences are “rarely, if ever, imposed” in felony-firearm 
cases, United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), 
demonstrates that this trust is well placed. 
IV.  HINES & THE COMMONWEALTH’S CONCESSION 
When this issue arose in Hines, the Commonwealth conceded that, “while perhaps not 
what the General Assembly intended for violators of Code § 18.2-53.1, . . . . [I]t appears that the 
only sentence available for a first conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1 is three years in prison.”  
                     
7 Consider the counter-absurdity of capping the sentence of a murderer or rapist who uses 
a firearm in committing his crime at three years’ imprisonment (under the majority’s 
interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1) while capping the sentence of a defendant convicted of 
possessing of a drug with intent to distribute who merely possesses a firearm, without using it, at 
five years, see Code § 18.2-308.4(C). 
26 
 
Appellee’s Br. at 14-15, Hines, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (Record No. 0228-11-2) 
(emphasis omitted).  The Commonwealth’s brief in Hines, however, admitted that “Hines, in 
essence, is asking this Court to rewrite the sentencing portion of § 18.2-53.1 by effectively 
ignoring the term ‘minimum’ in the present statute.”  Id. at 13 (emphases added).  “Had the 
General Assembly intended the ‘mandatory minimum’ sentence of three years to be both the 
minimum and maximum term of imprisonment . . . , it simply would have left the three year 
sentence to be ‘mandatory’ instead of amending the statute in 2004 to add the term ‘minimum.’”  
Id. 
The Commonwealth in Hines also pointed out that the Court of Appeals, in an 
unpublished opinion regarding another statute, held that “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning of ‘mandatory minimum fine of $1,000’ is that the trial court or jury has the discretion 
to impose a pecuniary punishment greater than $1,000, and nothing in the statute supports a 
different conclusion.”  Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Neria v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 3088-07-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 136, at *10 (Mar. 24, 2009) (Elder, J.) (unpublished), 
aff’d, Record No. 090813, 2010 Va. LEXIS 300, at *1-4 (Feb. 19, 2010) (unpublished)). 
Despite these observations, the Commonwealth nevertheless encouraged the Court of 
Appeals panel to accept Hines’s invitation to “rewrite” the statute, “effectively ignoring” its plain 
language.  Id. at 13.  Having convinced 2 of 15 active and senior judges on the Court of Appeals 
that this approach was consistent with Virginia law, the Commonwealth now relies on Hines as 
settling the matter for all time.  For two reasons, I am unwilling to accept either the 
Commonwealth’s concession or the split decision in Hines as persuasive. 
First, “an ‘issue which is a question of law is not subject to a concession binding on this 
Court.’”  Virginia Marine Res. Comm’n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371, 389, 757 S.E.2d 1, 10 
27 
 
(2014) (alterations and citation omitted).  “An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question 
of law which we review de novo.”  Manu v. GEICO Cas. Co., 293 Va. 371, 378, 798 S.E.2d 598, 
602 (2017) (alteration and citation omitted).  I consider it a given that, when exercising this 
review, a Virginia court should reject any litigant’s invitation to rewrite a statute in an admitted 
effort to ignore its plain language. 
Second, the Commonwealth’s position in Hines prevented that case from being appealed 
to this Court from the Court of Appeals.  After the Commonwealth conceded the issue, there was 
no aggrieved litigant to appeal the case to our Court or, for that matter, to file a petition for 
rehearing en banc with the Court of Appeals.  This truncated appellate review, based upon an 
ambivalent concession and resulting in a split panel decision that was never tested by any further 
rehearing or appeal, leads me to one conclusion:  Any persuasive precedential value that Hines 
might have is, at best, inconclusive.  We thus should do in this case what appellate courts are 
designed to do — review de novo a lower court decision on a pure question of law.  If we were 
to apply the winnowing fork of de novo review to this case, Hines would never make it to the 
threshing floor. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The plain wording of Code § 18.2-53.1 establishes a mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment — not a mandatory maximum.  Because the statute sets no upper limit to the 
potential term of imprisonment, there is no statutory limit.  In this case, therefore, the trial court 
did not err by imposing a five-year sentence, with two years suspended, for Graves’s violation of 
Code § 18.2-53.1.