Title: State v. Mutter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Mutter, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2928.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-2928 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MUTTER, APPELLANT.  (TWO CASES.) 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Mutter, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2928.] 
Criminal law—Double Jeopardy—Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution—Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution—Indictment for 
ethnic intimidation violated double-jeopardy clauses where defendants had 
previously been convicted of aggravated menacing and charges arose from 
the same incident. 
(Nos. 2016-0440 and 2016-0441—Submitted February 28, 2016—Decided  
May 24, 2017.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, 
Nos. 15CA3690 and 15CA3691, 2016-Ohio-512. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J. 
I.  Introduction 
{¶ 1} In these discretionary appeals, which we consolidated for oral 
argument and now consolidate for decision, we consider whether the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to grant the motions 
of appellants, Melvin Mutter and Buddy Mutter (“the Mutters”), to dismiss an 
indictment that charged them with ethnic intimidation.  The Mutters filed their 
motions to dismiss because they had already been convicted in Portsmouth 
Municipal Court for aggravated menacing, which is the predicate offense for the 
charges of ethnic intimidation that were brought against them in the dismissed 
indictment. 
{¶ 2} The double-jeopardy protections of the United States Constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment, which are applicable to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit multiple 
prosecutions for the same offense.  Relying on the analyses in Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), we conclude that in this case, 
aggravated menacing is a lesser included offense of ethnic intimidation, as charged 
in the indictment.  Therefore, we hold that for double-jeopardy purposes, the 
Mutters’ aggravated-menacing convictions are the same offenses as those charged 
in the dismissed indictment.  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
II.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} The Mutters were originally charged with offenses in the Portsmouth 
Municipal Court regarding an incident that occurred on October 17, 2014.  On 
October 20, 2014, Melvin Mutter was charged with ethnic intimidation, a felony of 
the fifth degree, in Portsmouth Municipal Court case No. CRA 1401576, and he 
was also charged with the offense of aggravated menacing in Portsmouth Municipal 
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Court case No. CRB 1401577.  The records of the Portsmouth Municipal Court 
show that the case in which Melvin Mutter had been charged with felony ethnic 
intimidation was dismissed without prejudice.  A new charge of menacing by 
stalking, case No. CRB 1401599, was filed.  On October 29, 2014, Melvin Mutter 
pleaded no contest to both the aggravated-menacing charge in case No. CRB 
1401577 and the menacing-by-stalking charge in case No. CRB 1401599.  The 
common pleas court made a finding of fact that it was the intent of the state of Ohio 
and Melvin Mutter that Mutter plead to a charge of menacing by stalking as a 
reduction of the charge of ethnic intimidation that had been brought in the dismissed 
case, No. CRA 1401576. 
{¶ 4} On October 20, 2014, Buddy Mutter was also charged with felony 
ethnic intimidation in the Portsmouth Municipal Court, in case No. CRB 1401578, 
and with aggravated menacing, in case No. CRB 1401579.  The records of the 
Portsmouth Municipal Court reflect that the ethnic-intimidation charge in case No. 
CRB 1401578 was reduced to a charge of menacing by stalking and that on October 
23, 2014, Buddy Mutter pleaded no contest to that charge and to the charge of 
aggravated menacing in case No. CRB 1401579. 
{¶ 5} After their no-contest pleas, Melvin Mutter was sentenced to 180 days 
in jail, with 150 days suspended, placed on probation, and fined and Buddy Mutter 
was sentenced to 180 days in jail, with the entire sentence suspended, and placed 
on probation. 
{¶ 6} On November 4, 2014, a Scioto County grand jury indicted the 
Mutters for ethnic intimidation, a felony of the fifth degree.  In the indictment, the 
state alleged that the Mutters violated R.C. 2903.21, the aggravated-menacing 
statute, “by reason of race, color, religion, or natural origin of another person.”  The 
trial court determined that the charges against the Mutters in the indictment arose 
from the same incident that had occurred on October 17, 2014, in Scioto County 
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and that had given rise to the misdemeanor charges of aggravated menacing to 
which the Mutters had already pleaded guilty. 
{¶ 7} The Mutters filed motions to dismiss the indictment, alleging 
violations of the Ohio and United States Constitutions’ Double Jeopardy Clauses.  
On February 6, 2015, the trial court held a joint hearing on the motions.  On 
February 20, 2015, the trial court issued a judgment entry dismissing the indictment 
against the Mutters. 
{¶ 8} The state appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the November 4 
indictment.  In reversing the trial court’s judgment, the Fourth District concluded, 
“The dispositive issue here is whether the menacing by stalking offenses, which the 
ethnic intimidation charges were reduced to in the municipal court, constitute lesser 
included offenses of the ethnic intimidation charges of the indictments.”  2016-
Ohio-512, ¶ 26.  The court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s factual 
determination that the Mutters’ convictions for aggravated menacing and 
indictments for ethnic intimidation arose from the same incident was not supported 
by any evidence in the record or the municipal court’s publicly accessible docket.  
Id. at ¶ 29.  However, at oral argument before this court, the state conceded and the 
Mutters agreed that the misdemeanor convictions and indictment for ethnic 
intimidation arose from the same incident. 
{¶ 9} We accepted two propositions of law from the Mutters for review:      
 
Second prosecutions are barred when they require 
relitigation of factual issues already resolved by a previous 
prosecution.  Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States 
Constitution; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 
* * * 
An appellate court may not shift the burdens established by 
App.R. 9 and App.R. 12(A) in Ohio’s Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
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Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Section 16, 
Article I, Ohio Constitution. 
 
See 146 Ohio St.3d 1414, 2016-Ohio-3390, 51 N.E.3d 659. 
{¶ 10} The Mutters assert that the United States and Ohio constitutions 
protect against successive prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses and 
that the aggravated-menacing offenses they were convicted of in municipal court 
are lesser included offenses of the ethnic intimidation charged in the indictment.  
The Mutters also argue that their negotiated pleas of no contest to charges of 
aggravated menacing and menacing by stalking are dispositive of this case because 
they reasonably believed that their pleas in Portsmouth Municipal Court would 
forbid further prosecutions for any greater offense related to the same factual 
scenario.  Finally, the Mutters argue that the appellate court improperly shifted the 
burden to them to provide evidence in the appellate record. 
{¶ 11} The state counters that the Portsmouth Municipal Court lacked 
jurisdiction.  As a result, the state contends, the judgments entered by the 
Portsmouth Municipal Court amending Buddy Mutter’s felony charge to a 
misdemeanor are void and jeopardy never attached.  Additionally, the state argues, 
under Blockburger, ethnic intimidation and aggravated menacing contain separate 
and distinct elements and these offenses are separate offenses under a double-
jeopardy successive-prosecution analysis. 
{¶ 12} Because our double-jeopardy analysis is dispositive, we do not 
address the Mutters’ second proposition of law. 
 
III.  Law and Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶ 13} Appellate courts review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an 
indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy, because it is a pure question of law. 
See State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 16, 
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citing Castlebrook, Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd. Partnership, 78 Ohio App.3d 
340, 346, 604 N.E.2d 808 (2d Dist.1992). 
B. Constitutional Protections against Double Jeopardy Prohibit a Second 
Prosecution for the Same Offense 
{¶ 14} “Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the double jeopardy 
guarantee serves ‘a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit.’ ”  
State v. Liberatore, 4 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 445 N.E.2d 1116 (1983), quoting United 
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).  The 
question in this case is whether the state would violate that guarantee if it 
prosecuted the Mutters on ethnic-intimidation charges under R.C. 2927.12 after 
their convictions for the predicate misdemeanor offense of aggravated menacing. 
{¶ 15} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  Through the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, this protection applies to individuals prosecuted 
by the state of Ohio.  State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 
N.E.2d 149, ¶ 10, citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 786, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 
L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).  The Ohio Constitution provides, “No person shall be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense.”  Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.  The 
protections afforded by the Ohio and United States Constitutions’ Double Jeopardy 
Clauses are coextensive.  State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 
780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7, citing State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 
435 (1996).  The Double Jeopardy Clauses protect against three abuses: (1) “a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,” (2) “a second prosecution 
for the same offense after conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same 
offense.”  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 
656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).  Here, we are concerned with the protection against 
a second prosecution after a conviction. 
{¶ 16} At the outset, we note that the fact that the Mutters were prosecuted 
in municipal court by the city of Portsmouth while the indictment that was filed in 
common pleas court was brought in the name of the state of Ohio does not affect 
the claim of double jeopardy.  State v. Zima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807, 
806 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 17, citing State v. Best, 42 Ohio St.2d 530, 533, 330 N.E.2d 421 
(1975).  “[T]he state and the city are parts of a single sovereignty, and double 
jeopardy stands as a bar to a prosecution by one, after an accused has been in 
jeopardy for the same offense in a prosecution by the other.”  Best at 533, citing 
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). 
{¶ 17} This court has relied on the Blockburger test to determine whether 
two prosecutions involve the same offense.  “In determining whether an accused is 
being successively prosecuted for the ‘same offense,’ the court in Best adopted the 
so-called ‘same elements’ test articulated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 * * *.”  Zima at ¶ 18; see also State 
v. Delfino, 22 Ohio St.3d 270, 273, 490 N.E.2d 884 (1986).  The Blockburger test 
applies “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions” and requires the reviewing court to evaluate the elements of 
each statutory provision to determine “whether each provision requires proof of a 
fact which the other does not.”  Blockburger at 304.  “ ‘This test focuses upon the 
elements of the two statutory provisions, not upon the evidence proffered in a given 
case.’ ”  Zima at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 259, 400 N.E.2d 
897 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Crago, 53 Ohio St.3d 243, 559 
N.E.2d 1353 (1990), syllabus.  The United States Supreme Court has summarized 
the Blockburger test as an inquiry that asks “whether each offense contains an 
element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double 
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jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.”  United States v. 
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, (1993). 
{¶ 18} We recognize that there are exceptions to the Blockburger rule.  See, 
e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); Garrett 
v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); and 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). 
However, the parties did not raise any of these exceptions, and they are inapplicable 
here. 
{¶ 19} As charged in the indictments in this case, the offense of ethnic 
intimidation as defined by R.C. 2927.12 contained two elements: first, that the 
Mutters committed the predicate offense of aggravated menacing in violation of 
R.C. 2903.21 and second, that they committed that offense by reason of the race, 
color, religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons.  The 
offense of ethnic intimidation contains an element that the offense of aggravated 
menacing does not, i.e., the racial or ethnic motivation, but aggravated menacing 
does not contain any elements that do not also fall within the elements of ethnic 
intimidation as charged in this case. 
{¶ 20} Ethnic intimidation can be committed by violating, with the requisite 
racial or ethnic animus, R.C. 2903.21 (aggravated menacing), 2903.22 (menacing), 
2909.06 (criminal damaging or endangering), 2909.07 (criminal mischief), or 
2917.21(A)(3), (4), or (5) (telecommunications harassment).  In this case, the state 
indicted the Mutters alleging only one predicate offense—aggravated menacing in 
violation of R.C. 2903.21—in the ethnic-intimidation charge.  Aggravated 
menacing therefore serves as one of the two elements of the ethnic-intimidation 
charges that were brought against the Mutters.  But the aggravated menacing 
charges that the Mutters were previously convicted of did not contain any additional 
elements that are not also included in the charges of ethnic intimidation that arose 
from the same facts.  We reach this conclusion because the state conceded at oral 
January Term, 2017 
 
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argument that the aggravated-menacing charges and ethnic-intimidation charges 
arose out of the same incident.  Without the benefit of the state’s concession, the 
court of appeals concluded that there was no evidence in the record to support the 
conclusion that the aggravated-menacing charges and ethnic-intimidation charges 
arose out of the same incident.  2016-Ohio-512, ¶ 29.  Here, aggravated menacing 
does not require proof of a fact that is not required to prove ethnic intimidation.  See 
Blockburger at 304.  Therefore, in this case, according to the Blockburger test, 
ethnic intimidation and aggravated menacing are the “same offenses” for double-
jeopardy purposes.  Id. 
{¶ 21} The United States Supreme Court applied the Blockburger test when 
the state of Ohio attempted to prosecute a defendant for the greater offense of auto 
theft after the defendant had pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of 
joyriding.  See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187.  In Brown, 
the court concluded that “[w]hatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment 
forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser 
included offense.”  Id. at 169.  This court has also recognized, relying on Brown, 
that a conviction for a lesser included offense bars prosecution for a greater offense.  
“[D]ouble-jeopardy principles barred the state from pursuing the grand theft 
charges because the trial court’s finding of guilt on the lesser-included offenses 
operated as an acquittal of the greater offenses.”  State v. Edmondson, 92 Ohio St.3d 
393, 395, 750 N.E.2d 587 (2001), citing Brown at 161. 
{¶ 22} The facts in the case at bar closely mirror the facts in Brown.  Like 
the defendant in Brown, the Mutters were first prosecuted for a misdemeanor 
offense that was a lesser included offense of the felony for which they were 
eventually indicted.  See Brown at 167.  The Brown court, relying on Blockburger, 
determined that the lesser included offense of “joyriding requires no proof beyond 
that which is required for conviction of the greater auto theft.  The greater offense 
is therefore by definition the ‘same’ for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser 
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offense included in it.”  Id. at 168.  Therefore, a misdemeanor conviction for a lesser 
included offense bars the state from indicting the same defendant for a felony that 
by definition included the misdemeanor offense within it as a lesser included 
offense, arising from the same facts.  In the same way, the offense of aggravated 
menacing is included within the offense of ethnic intimidation, as charged here, so 
just as joyriding and auto theft were the same offense under Ohio law, aggravated 
menacing and ethnic intimidation are the same offense under Ohio law.  Here, both 
Mutters were convicted of aggravated menacing, which is a lesser included offense 
of ethnic intimidation, so based on the principles in Brown and Blockburger, a 
further prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States 
and Ohio Constitutions. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} The double-jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment, 
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 10 
of the Ohio Constitution prohibit multiple prosecutions for the same offense.  
Relying on the analysis in Blockburger and Brown, we conclude that in this case, 
aggravated menacing is a lesser included offense of ethnic intimidation as charged 
in the indictments.  Therefore, we find that the Mutters’ aggravated-menacing 
convictions are the same offenses as those charged in the indictments brought 
against them in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas.  Consequently, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’DONNELL, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay S. Willis, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, Assistant State 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. 
Walton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien. 
_________________