Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicholson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. NICHOLSON. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicholson (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 275.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Original term of suspension served — During 
probationary period engaging in disruptive courtroom antics and making 
derogatory reference about female prosecuting attorney — Reinstatement to 
the practice of law. 
(No. 93-391 — Submitted April 16, 1997 — Decided November 19, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 92-41. 
 
On June 30, 1993, we suspended respondent, Thomas G. Nicholson of 
Bucyrus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0039741, from the practice of law in 
Ohio for six months, with the six-month suspension stayed, and directed that his 
conduct be monitored by the Crawford County Bar Association for a probationary 
period of one year.  Crawford Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nicholson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 
585, 613 N.E.2d 1025. 
 
On March 27, 1996, relator, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, filed a “Petition for the Revocation of Probation; 
Reinstatement of Stayed Suspension; and, Citation for Contempt” (“petition”) 
before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme 
Court (“board”). 
Procedural Posture of the Case 
 
The relator’s petition alleged that on July 23, 1993, the previous relator, 
Crawford County Bar Association, had appointed a monitor for respondent’s one-
year probationary period; that on July 13, 1994, respondent moved for a release 
from probation; and that the relator, appointed on September 22, 1994 as 
successor to the previous relator, recommended on May 11, 1995 that 
 
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respondent’s probation with monitoring be continued for one year.  The relator 
based its recommendation upon the fact that the terms of the original probation 
ordered in 1993 had not been complied with because the monitor appointed by the 
previous relator declined to accept the appointment, and that respondent knew 
throughout the original probationary period that he was not being monitored.  
Moreover, since there was no monitor during that period, there were no monthly 
monitoring reports on which to base an opinion regarding respondent’s progress.  
On June 22, 1995, we adopted relator’s recommendation that respondent’s 
probationary period be extended. 
 
On November 21, 1996, based on a certified report of a panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, we ordered that respondent’s 
probation be revoked and that his six-month suspension be reinstated. 
Factual Allegations of the Petition to Revoke Probation 
 
In its March 27, 1996 petition, the relator charged that while defending 
Larry Taylor, Sr. in a criminal trial in the common pleas court in September 1995, 
respondent was argumentative and contentious while cross-examining the 
prosecution’s witnesses; that respondent frequently argued about the court’s 
rulings, always attempting to have the “last word”; that respondent accused the 
judge of continually making an obscene gesture with his finger during 
respondent’s presentations and questioning; and that respondent was disrespectful 
to the court and opposing counsel.  Respondent reportedly said in court that he 
would not let his client, Taylor, “go down the tubes because * * * [respondent was 
not] a scared, whimpy [sic], little girl lawyer,” a comment immediately objected to 
by the female prosecuting attorney.  The judge questioned the jury and found that 
none of them believed he was making an obscene gesture.  The judge later 
removed respondent as defense counsel. 
 
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The relator charged that in January 1996, after appearing at a sentencing 
hearing defending William E. Ball, Jr. before the same judge and the same 
opposing prosecuting attorney, respondent wrote to the judge that the prosecuting 
attorney attempted to make him look “uninformed” in front of his client by 
offering a last-minute reduction of sentence.  Respondent further stated that the 
prosecuting attorney talked to respondent’s client without his permission.  The 
judge held a hearing and found that there was no ground for respondent’s 
accusations. 
 
The relator also charged that respondent continued to make rude, sexist, and 
insulting remarks to the prosecutor. 
Action by the Panel 
 
The respondent filed an answer to the relator’s petition, and a panel of the 
board held a hearing on May 7, 1996.  The panel found that the respondent had not 
met his probationary responsibilities.  The panel also found that respondent 
remains unwilling “to discharge his professional duty of zealous representation 
without resort to arrogant, discourteous, and disrespectful behavior directed at 
those he apparently perceives, and certainly treats, as enemies in battle. * * * 
[S]uch conduct on Respondent’s part [was] particularly reprehensible as directed 
against Judge Kimerline, who has, over an extended period of time * * *, 
repeatedly offered friendly guidance in an effort to help Respondent overcome his 
distorted view of the adversarial processes of law * * *.”  With respect to the 
allegations relating to respondent’s conduct towards the prosecuting attorney, the 
panel found that “[respondent’s] overall conduct toward [the prosecuting 
attorney], and many of his remarks and comments to and about her, [were] * * * 
unprofessional, discourteous, and highly inappropriate.” 
 
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The panel found as a mitigating factor that the previous relator had at first 
neglected and then abandoned its duties with respect to monitoring the respondent 
and thereby substantially contributed to the frustration over the initial disciplinary 
order.  “However, * * * Respondent’s conduct * * * occurred primarily after the 
substitution of Disciplinary Counsel as Relator.” 
 
The panel concluded that respondent was guilty of significant and 
continuing violations of the conditions of his probation.  The panel recommended 
that respondent’s probation be revoked and a six-month suspension be reinstated.  
Further, it recommended that respondent’s practice and professional career be 
monitored for an additional one-year period after the expiration of his suspension.  
Finally the panel recommended that three of the conditions for reinstatement 
should be (1) a public apology to the judge, (2) a public apology to the prosecuting 
attorney, and (3) the undertaking of appropriate counseling and/or education as 
approved by Disciplinary Counsel, to help respondent conduct himself in a 
professional manner both in and out of the courtroom. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown and Cynthia L. 
Roehl, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Thomas G. Nicholson, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Paragraph EC 7-36 of our Ethical Considerations provides 
that “[j]udicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly 
procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties.  Although a lawyer has the 
duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that 
offends the dignity and decorum of the proceedings.”  EC 7-37 provides, “In 
adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist 
 
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between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, 
attitude, and demeanor toward opposing lawyers.  A lawyer should not make 
unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel.  Haranguing and 
offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and 
have no proper place in our legal system.”  In short, as we recently said in Toledo 
Bar Assn. v. Batt (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 677 N.E.2d 349, 352, “We 
recognize that an attorney must zealously represent his client, but we also 
recognize that an attorney has a duty to be civil to opposing counsel and the 
court.” 
 
Whether particular conduct can be found to have been intended to disrupt a 
tribunal depends upon the setting and all the surrounding circumstances.  United 
States v. Lumumba (C.A.2, 1986), 794 F.2d 806.  The record in this case 
demonstrates clearly that respondent has violated the conditions of his probation.  
Respondent engaged in disruptive courtroom antics in the Taylor case.  While he 
claims that his comment about “a scared, whimpy [sic], little girl lawyer” was 
directed toward himself, his statement in the context of the situation was a clear 
derogatory reference to the female prosecuting attorney.  In the Bell sentencing 
matter, respondent had no basis whatever for his written accusations that the 
prosecutor had talked to his client without permission. 
 
We adopt the findings of the panel and its conclusion that respondent has 
violated his probation.  Since respondent’s six-month suspension was reinstated 
on November 21, 1996, respondent has now served the term of his original 
suspension.  Our primary concern is that in his future practice respondent maintain 
a respectful and civil attitude toward the court and opposing counsel.   We order 
that respondent be reinstated to the practice of law.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER,, J., not participating.