Title: Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

No. 38	
December 21, 2023	
739
38
371 Or
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
2023
December 21, 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Inez GOLLERSRUD, 
an individual, and
David Gollersrud, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Relators,
v.
LPMC, LLC, 
dba Landmark Professional Mortgage,
an Oregon limited liability company,
Defendant-Adverse Party,
and
Tyler WESTBY, 
an individual et al.,
Defendants.
(CC 16CV36031) (SC S069796)
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted May 16, 2023.
C. Robert Steringer, Harrang Long P.C., Portland, 
argued the cause for plaintiffs-relators. Julian Marrs filed 
the briefs. Also on the briefs were C. Robert Steringer and 
Adina Matasaru.
William Gaar, Buckley Law P.C., Lake Oswego, argued 
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party. 
Also on the brief was Jillian Pollock.
Lisa T. Hunt, Law Office of Lisa T. Hunt, LLC, Lake 
Oswego, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial 
Lawyers Association.
______________
	
*  On petition for alternative writ of mandamus from an order of Marion 
County Circuit Court, Audrey J. Broyles, Judge.
740	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, 
Bushong, James, and Masih, Justices.**
JAMES, J.
A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.
______________
	
**  Baldwin, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argu­
ment, but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
741
	
JAMES, J.
	
This mandamus proceeding requires us to decide 
two issues: (1) whether email messages between a client 
and their attorney, sent from, and stored on, the client’s 
employer’s email system are “confidential communications” 
as defined in OEC 503(1)(b); and (2) if they are, whether an 
employee’s act of leaving employment and, in turn, leav­
ing those email messages on the employer’s email system 
constitutes a disclosure of communications and a waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege under OEC 511. As to the first 
issue regarding confidentiality under OEC 503(1)(b), based 
on the text, context, and legislative history, we conclude that 
communications between a client and an attorney, made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client, are presumptively confidential. The 
client’s mere use of an employer’s email system, without 
more, does not overcome that presumption of confidentiality. 
As to the second issue concerning waiver of privilege under 
OEC 511, we hold that, at least on this record, leaving the 
emails on the employers’ systems did not establish actual 
disclosure of communications - a necessary predicate to an 
OEC 511 waiver analysis. Although we do not foreclose the 
possibility that a party could make an evidentiary record 
demonstrating a lack of privilege under OEC 503(1)(b), or 
that such privilege had been waived through actual disclo­
sure under OEC 511, for email communications sent from 
and stored on an employer’s server, the record here is insuf­
ficient. Accordingly, a peremptory writ shall issue.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
We take the facts from the record in the underlying 
trial court proceedings. Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 361 Or 115, 117 n 1, 390 P3d 1031 (2017). Relators David 
Gollersrud and his mother, Inez Gollersrud, alleged fraud, 
among other claims, in a real estate investment relationship 
between plaintiffs and several defendants, including LPMC, 
LLC (LPMC). Because one of the other defendants was 
involved in an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, the parties 
agreed to informally abate the case pending the outcome of 
that proceeding. During that abatement period, they agreed 
to mediate and conduct informal, limited discovery.
742	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
	
LPMC issued subpoenas to three of Mr. Gollersrud’s 
former employers. In those subpoenas, LPMC sought to com­
pel production of all communications, from 2008 to the pres­
ent, between Mr. Gollersrud’s work email addresses and nine 
other email addresses, among them that of Ms. Gollersrud. 
Relators sought to quash LPMC’s subpoenas on the ground 
that some of the email messages between Mr. Gollersrud and 
Ms. Gollersrud included communications with their attor­
neys and were therefore protected under the attorney-client 
privilege, codified at OEC 503.1 They alternatively proposed 
that the scope of the subpoenas be limited or that the trial 
court order that their attorneys be permitted to screen priv­
ileged documents produced in response to the subpoenas.
	
In response, LPMC argued that the email messages 
were not covered by the attorney-client privilege because
(1) Mr. Gollersrud had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in email communications transmitted using his employ­
ers’ email systems; and (2) even if the email messages 
were privileged when transmitted, that privilege had been 
waived when Mr. Gollersrud failed to delete them from his 
employers’ email systems before severing his employment 
relationships.
	
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial 
court denied relators’ motion to quash the subpoenas. In a 
letter opinion, the trial court concluded that the email mes­
sages “between Mr. Gollersrud and [Ms.] Gollersrud to be 
recovered from the former employers’ servers are not privi­
leged.” The trial court concluded by requesting that LPMC 
prepare a proposed order.
	
Relators objected to LPMC’s proposed order and 
requested that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing on 
the attorney-client privilege issue or, in the alternative, clar­
ify its findings. In support of that objection, Mr. Gollersrud 
submitted a supplemental declaration that stated that (1) it 
was his “understanding that none of [his] three prior employ­
ers monitored the use of [his] computer or e-mail while [he] 
was employed with them”; (2) he had “received no notices 
	
1   Although relators initially opposed LPMC’s subpoenas on several addi­
tional grounds, they did not raise those issues in their mandamus petition, and 
we do not consider them here.
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
743
from any of [his] three prior employers that they were mon­
itoring [his] email use while [he] was employed with them”; 
(3) “[n]o third parties had a right of access to the comput­
ers or e-mail accounts [he] used while [he] was employed 
with [his] three prior employers”; and (4) his “computers and 
email accounts with [his] three prior employers were pro­
tected by passwords known only to [him].” Mr. Gollersrud’s 
supplemental declaration is the only evidence in the record 
regarding his former employers’ email policies.
	
Shortly after the objection was filed, the trial court 
action was stayed due to the bankruptcy of another defen­
dant. When the litigation resumed, the trial court issued a 
letter opinion advising that it would sign LPMC’s proposed 
order and denying relators’ request for clarification of its 
prior ruling. It is not clear from the record whether the trial 
court considered the material in Mr.  Gollersrud’s supple­
mental declaration.
	
Relators then petitioned this court for a writ of man­
damus. This court issued an alternative writ of mandamus 
directing the trial court to either vacate its order or show 
cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to 
vacate its order. As a result, the parties proceeded to argu­
ment in this court.
II. ANALYSIS
A.  Jurisdiction
	
Because this case comes to us on mandamus, we 
first consider whether this court has jurisdiction to issue 
the writ. The statutory requirements for mandamus juris­
diction are set out in ORS 34.110. First, the writ may be 
issued only to enforce “a known, clear legal right.” State v. 
Moore, 361 Or 205, 212, 390 P3d 1010 (2017). Second, the 
writ may be issued only if there is no “plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” ORS 
34.110. In most cases, direct appeal is a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy. See State ex rel Automotive Emporium v. 
Murchison, 289 Or 265, 268-69, 611 P2d 1169, reh’g den, 
289 Or 673, 616 P2d 496 (1980). However, when a discovery 
order erroneously requires disclosure of privileged commu­
nications, we have held that direct appeal is inadequate, 
744	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
because, once a privileged communication has been dis­
closed, the harm cannot be undone. Crimson Trace Corp. v. 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or 476, 485, 326 P3d 1181 
(2014); State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 497, 942 P2d 
261 (1997).
	
We conclude that the issues presented by this case 
fall squarely within our mandamus jurisdiction. A peremp­
tory writ of mandamus, if issued, would be used to enforce 
a legal right: namely, relators’ right not to produce privi­
leged communications. If the trial court’s ruling requiring 
the disclosure of Mr. Gollersrud’s email messages was erro­
neous because it did not correctly interpret OEC 503 and 
511, then an appeal would not be adequate to remedy the 
harm caused by the disclosure of those protected communi­
cations. Mandamus being an appropriate vehicle to address 
the issue here, we turn to the merits.
B.  Overview
	
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest and 
most broadly recognized evidentiary privileges. The priv­
ilege, codified at OEC 503,2 seeks to “ 
‘encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser­
vance of law and administration of justice.’ 
” Haas, 325 Or at 
500 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 389, 
101 S Ct 677, 66 L Ed 2d 584 (1981)). Although the attorney-
client privilege is expansive, it is not absolute; OEC 503 
establishes threshold requirements for the privilege, and 
OEC 511 allows for waiver of any evidentiary privilege, 
including the attorney-client privilege. Longo v. Premo, 355 
Or 525, 533, 326 P3d 1152 (2014).
	
OEC 503(2) provides, in part:
	
“A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to pre­
vent any other person from disclosing confidential commu­
nications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition 
of professional legal services to the client[.]”
	
2  The legislature amended OEC 503 in 2023. Or Laws 2023, ch  72, §  33. 
Because those amendments are not effective until January 1, 2024, and, in all 
events, are not material to our analysis, we cite the current version of the statute.
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
745
(Emphasis added.) That general rule is subject to numerous 
caveats, but, overall, assertions of the attorney-client privi­
lege in Oregon require (1) a communication between classes 
of persons described in OEC 503(2)(a) to (e); (2) that the com­
munication be made for the purpose of facilitating the ren­
dition of professional legal services to the client; and (3) that 
the communication be “confidential” within the meaning of 
OEC 503(1)(b), which defines a “confidential communica­
tion” to mean
“a communication not intended to be disclosed to third per­
sons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance 
of the rendition of professional legal services to the client 
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication.”
The parties agree that resolution of this case hinges on the 
meaning of confidentiality, and in particular, the interpreta­
tion of “not intended to be disclosed” as used in OEC 503(1)(b).
	
As such, the questions presented in this case are 
ones of statutory interpretation. The rules of evidence are 
adopted by the legislature and our construction of them 
follows our traditional method of statutory interpretation 
focusing on text, context, and legislative history. Crimson 
Trace Corp., 355 Or at 485; State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-
72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). “The principal source of legisla­
tive history for the 1981 Oregon Evidence Code is the 1981 
Conference Committee Commentary.” State v. Serrano, 346 
Or 311, 324, 210 P3d 892 (2009).
C.  The Burden of Proof to Establish a Confidential 
Communication
	
We begin with the predicate issue of which party 
bears the burden of proving that communications are—or 
are not—confidential. Generally, the burden is on the party 
asserting a privilege to establish that it applies. See Groff 
v. S.I.A.C., 246 Or 557, 565, 426 P2d 738 (1967) (regarding 
assertion of privilege as to disclosure and use of public assis­
tance records under ORS 411.320). Here, relators asserted 
the attorney-client privilege in their motion to quash, but 
the support for that assertion initially consisted solely of 
Mr. Gollersrud’s declaration, which stated, in relevant part:
746	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
“I cannot recall all of the email communications I have 
sent to, received from or which include my mother over the 
course of almost ten years. However, I expect many of these 
communications would involve:
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“Communications including privileged communications 
with attorneys in this case, related cases, and other unre­
lated family and business legal matters.”
	
After the court ruled, relators objected to its ruling 
and submitted Mr.  Gollersrud’s second declaration, which 
addressed his lack of knowledge of workplace email moni­
toring policies. No party here disputes that relators’ initial 
motion to quash was sufficient to meet the first and second 
prongs of invoking the attorney-client privilege—i.e., the 
existence of communications between a class of persons 
found in OEC 503(2)(a) to (e), and that the communications 
were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services. The sole issue is whether the 
communications were confidential, and who bore the burden 
on that question.
	
The core of OEC 503(1)(b)’s definition of a confi­
dential communication is a “communication not intended 
to be disclosed to third persons.” It is a phrase framed in 
the negative. We have interpreted similar wording, in the 
context of other privileges, to create a presumption of con­
fidentiality. In Serrano, this court determined that there 
can be a presumption of confidentiality when considering 
marital communications, and that that presumption can 
only be defeated if the “proponent of the evidence at issue 
establishes that * 
* 
* intent to disclose is apparent from the 
circumstances.” 346 Or at 330. To reach that conclusion, 
the Serrano court determined that, based on OEC 505(1)(a) 
Commentary (1981), the legislature intended for communi­
cations made during marriage to be presumed confidential 
under OEC 505. Id. at 324-26. The court further explained 
that, if the other requirements for the privilege are met, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the proffering party to rebut 
the presumption of privilege “by demonstrating that the 
communicating spouse did not intend the communication to 
be confidential.” Id. at 326.
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
747
	
We see no reason why the same presumption should 
not apply to OEC 503.3 Both evidentiary privileges use the 
phrase “not intended to be disclosed to” others in their defini­
tions for “confidential communication.” OEC 503(1)(b); OEC 
505(1)(a). In addition, the commentaries to both OEC 505 
and OEC 503 contain nearly identical provisions explain­
ing that the presence of intent to disclose must be apparent 
for the communications to not be confidential. OEC 503(1)(b) 
Commentary (1981) (“Unless an intent to disclose is appar­
ent, however, the attorney-client communication is confiden­
tial.”); OEC 505(1)(a) Commentary (1981) (“Unless intent to 
disclose is apparent, a communication between [spouses] is 
confidential.”). Further, both privileges share the underly­
ing goal of encouraging open communication between the 
persons in the protected relationships. See Serrano, 346 
Or at 325 n 6 (so stating). Although this court has not for­
mally adopted a presumption of confidentiality in attorney-
client privilege cases, it has previously found communica­
tions to be confidential when the parties merely state that 
they intended their communications to be confidential. See 
Crimson Trace Corp., 355 Or at 490-91 (determining that 
the relevant communications were confidential because the 
parties intended for them to be confidential).
	
We thus conclude that, in asserting the attorney-
client privilege, the burden is on the individual asserting the 
privilege to establish (1) communications between a class of 
persons found in OEC 503(2)(a) to (e), that (2) were made 
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services. When that is established, such communica­
tions are presumptively confidential. At that point, the bur­
den shifts to the proponent of the evidence to overcome the 
presumption of confidentiality. In this case, as discussed, 
no party is disputing that Mr. Gollersrud’s first declaration 
	
3  Although the Serrano court stated that reference to other evidentiary rules 
was “of limited value” in that case, 346 Or at 323, we do not find the same problem 
here. In Serrano, one of the issues concerned a unique feature of the marital com­
munications privilege: unlike many of the other privileges that are held by one per­
son (attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, and clergy-peni­
tent privileges), the spousal communication privilege is held by both spouses. Id. 
at 323-24. The Serrano court found the case law on the other privileges unhelp­
ful because it was tasked with deciding whether the “intent to disclose” inquiry 
focused on the communicating or the non-communicating spouse. Id. at 323-25.
748	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
was sufficient to establish points one and two. As such, that 
declaration was sufficient to entitle the Gollersruds to a pre­
sumption of confidentiality in any lawyer-client communi­
cations sent from, or stored upon, Mr. Gollersrud’s former 
employers’ servers. The burden to overcome that presump­
tion thus shifted to LPMC.
D.  Did LPMC defeat the presumption of confidentiality?
	
It is undisputed that the communications between 
Mr. Gollersrud and his attorney were sent on Mr. Gollersrud’s 
employers’ email systems. LPMC argues:
“When an employee chooses to use a third-party employer 
owned work computer and email systems to transmit and 
receive personal emails with the employee’s personal attor­
ney, the attorney-client privilege does not attach to the 
email communications. There is no legal prohibition that 
bars a private employer from searching, inspecting, or view­
ing emails transmitted or stored on the private employer’s 
email system. There is accordingly a risk that the employer 
will access an employee’s personal emails that were trans­
mitted through and saved to the employer’s email system. 
By choosing to use the employer’s email system to send, 
receive, or save personal emails, the employee assumes the 
risk of disclosure of the personal emails to the employer.”
In effect, LPMC argues that any time an email is sent from 
a system where third parties could potentially discover the 
contents, that establishes, per se, that such communications 
are not confidential. We decline to adopt LPMC’s per se 
approach for a number of reasons.
	
First, the commentary to OEC 503(1)(b) provides 
that, “[u]nless an intent to disclose is apparent, * 
* 
* the 
attorney-client communication is confidential.” OEC 503(1)(b) 

Commentary (1981). The commentary further notes that 
intent is to be “inferred from the circumstances, e.g., tak­
ing or failing to take precautions.” Id. The rule contem­
plates a circumstance-specific inquiry, not a one-size-fits-all 
approach.
	
Additionally, we have held that confidentiality 
is not defeated merely from the mere awareness of a risk 
of disclosure. For example, in Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin. 
Services, 370 Or 382, 401, 520 P3d 406 (2022), we rejected 
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
749
the plaintiff’s argument that “the completed request forms 
at issue * 
* 
* were not confidential at any point in time, 
because [the department] had warned state agencies that 
the forms could be subject to disclosure at some point in the 
future.” In doing so, we explained that “[c]onfidentiality as 
defined in OEC 503(1)(b) focuses on the client’s intent” and 
that there was “no evidence that the state agencies or [the 
department] intended to disclose the forms at any time. The 
state agencies were only warned that the forms might be 
disclosed in the future, which is not the same.” Id. at 401-02 
(emphases in original).
	
Requiring something more than just the possibility 
that a communication might be disclosed to overcome the pre­
sumption of confidentiality is in keeping with the animating 
purpose of the privilege. The legislature enacted the current 
version of the attorney-client privilege in 1981. See Or Laws 
1981, ch 892, § 32. OEC 503 is based on the federal analog, pro­
posed Rule 503 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Longo, 355 
Or at 534; see also OEC 503 Commentary (1981) (OEC 503 “is 
based on proposed Rule 503 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which was prescribed by the United States Supreme Court 
and submitted to Congress but not enacted.”). Notably, a pur­
pose of OEC 503 was to extend coverage “to areas in which 
current law [was] silent or unclear.” OEC 503 Commentary 
(1981). As the commentary states, “[i]n the past, substantial 
authority has allowed an eavesdropper to testify to over­
heard privileged conversations and has admitted intercepted 
privileged letters. The evolution of ever more sophisticated 
techniques of recording and interception calls for the aban­
donment of that position.” OEC 503(2) Commentary (1981). 
The legislature intended OEC 503 to be adaptive to chang­
ing times and changing modes of communication. OEC 503, 
is, accordingly, a rule grounded in practicalities and prag­
matism. OEC 503 was intended to govern how people real­
istically communicate. See, e.g., OEC 503(1)(b) Commentary 
(1981) (“The rule allows some disclosure beyond the immedi­
ate circle of lawyer and client and their representatives with­
out impairing confidentiality, as a practical matter.”).
	
LPMC’s proposed per se rule conflicts with the 
pragmatism of OEC 503 in that it ignores the practical 
750	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
realities of modern life, and it does not reflect how many 
Oregonians live and work. For many, a clear divide between 
work and nonwork does not exist. See Leora Eisenstadt, 
Data Analytics and the Erosion of the Work/Nonwork Divide, 
56 Am Bus LJ 445, 449 (2019). The United States Bureau 
of Labor Statistics shows that roughly a third of the work­
force—34 percent in 2022, worked remotely at least part of 
the week. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time 
Use Survey—2022 Results (2023), available at https://www.
bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf (accessed Dec 14, 2023). 
The common practice of telework has brought employer com­
puter systems and employer paid network access into the 
home, with an accompanying blurring of the lines between 
private and work communication, and the network infra­
structure supporting each. See Lawrence E. Rothstein, 
Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 
19 NY L Sch J Int’l & Compar L 379, 382 (2000). In short, for 
many Oregonians, personal and work business is increas­
ingly conducted from devices and accounts that are not 
clearly delineated.
	
LPMC argues that any practical concerns are easily 
solved by requiring a strict adherence to a divide between 
work and personal email:
“The employee can eliminate such risk and preserve the 
attorney-client privilege by taking reasonable precautions 
to protect communication from disclosure, such as using 
the employee’s personal email account on the employee’s 
personal computer, laptop, or phone, or communicating 
with the employee’s attorney by phone.”
LPMC’s argument, which, as noted, is grounded in a risk 
of possible disclosure, presupposes that personal email con­
tains no such risk. That assumption does not bear weight. 
“Though an employer may have a comparatively broad 
right to monitor the email messages flowing through its 
systems, they are not the only party with a qualified right 
to do so.” Anthony Biondo, Confidentiality and Attorney 
Client Privilege in the Internet Age: How to Handle Employer 
Monitoring of Employee Email, 90 St John’s L Rev 441, 443 
(2016). Most personal email is hosted by “free” email ser­
vice providers (Gmail, Yahoo! Mail, AOL Mail, etc.) who 
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
751
themselves reserve the right to monitor the contents. As 
an example, Google’s current terms of service provide that 
when a user sends or receives “content,” including emails, 
they provide Google with a “worldwide,” “non-exclusive,” and 
“royalty-free” license to “host, reproduce, distribute, com­
municate, and use”; “publish, publicly perform, or publicly 
display”; or “modify and create derivative works based on” 
that content. Google Terms of Service, http://policies.google.
com/terms?hl=en-US (accessed Dec 14, 2023). That reality of 
email communications, including personal hosted email, is 
another reason that a mere risk of disclosure cannot suffice, 
on its own, to overcome the presumption of confidentiality.
	
In contrast to LPMC’s per se approach, relators and 
amicus urge us to look to the framework adopted by the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York in In re Asia Global Crossing Ltd., 322 BR 247 
(Bankr SDNY 2005). There, the bankruptcy court held that, 
to determine an employee’s privacy expectations regarding 
computer files and email on an employer’s servers, a court 
should consider four factors:
“(1) does the [employer] maintain a policy banning personal 
or other objectionable use, (2) does the [employer] monitor 
the use of the employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third 
parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails, 
and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the 
employee aware, or the use and monitoring policies?”
322 BR at 257.
	
In Asia Global, the court highlighted the similar­
ities between the attorney-client privilege and the right to 
privacy, and it derived those factors from its right to pri­
vacy cases. Id. at 256-58. In that case, a bankruptcy trustee 
moved to compel production of email messages between 
employees and their outside counsel that were exchanged 
via the employer’s email system. Id. at 252-54. The trustee 
had argued that, because the employees communicated 
with outside counsel using the employer’s email system, the 
email messages were not protected by attorney-client priv­
ilege. Id. The court indicated that it presumed the email 
messages in question to be privileged and that the employ­
ees “subjectively intended that they be confidential.” Id. at 
752	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
258-59. Ultimately, after considering the four factors, the 
court concluded that the email messages were indeed privi­
leged, despite both the employer’s ability to access the email 
messages and the presence of an employer policy against 
personal email use, because the employer’s policy against 
such use was not communicated clearly to the employees. Id. 
at 259-61.4
	
We also observe that the cases that LPMC cites in 
support of its argument that this court should adopted a 
per se rule do not, themselves, announce a per se rule; they 
rather rely on the existence of company policies that would 
make an employee’s belief that the email messages were 
confidential unreasonable. See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. 
and Derivative Litig., 275 FRD 154, 158-59 (SDNY 2011) 
(concluding that email messages sent to and from the hus­
band’s work email address were not protected by the marital 
communications privilege where employees were regularly 
reminded that the email account was for business purposes 
only and email messages contained there were subject to 
disclosure); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F Supp 2d 
1083, 1108 (WD Wash 2011) (finding that the attorney-client 
privilege did not attach to employee’s email messages and 
communications created and sent or received on the employ­
er’s email systems and stored on the employer’s servers, 
where employee had been informed that employer reserved 
right to access and disclose any file or communication stored 
on the employee’s computer at any time).
	
We agree with relators and amicus that overcoming 
the presumption of confidentiality must come from a par­
ticular evidentiary showing. However, the Asia Global fac­
tors may not be fully encompassing of all the circumstances 
that a court properly might consider. Accordingly, we state 
the rule in more general terms: The burden to overcome 
the presumption of confidentiality falls to the proponent of 
the evidence allegedly barred by privilege. Overcoming the 
	
4  Asia Global’s approach is similar to that employed in some other jurisdic­
tions. For example, a California appellate court determined that the plaintiff-
employee’s email messages to her attorney using her business email account were 
not privileged in light of the employer’s policy against personal use of the business 
email account and the employee’s awareness of that policy. Holmes v. Petrovich 
Development Co., 191 Cal App 4th 1047, 1071, 119 Cal Rptr 3d 878 (2011).
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
753
presumption requires an evidentiary showing, one focused 
on the circumstances and context of the communications, 
that must establish more than a risk that privileged com­
munications “might be disclosed.” Chaimov, 370 Or at 402 
(emphasis in original).
	
Applying the above considerations to the facts before 
us, we conclude that LPMC failed to make an adequate evi­
dentiary showing to overcome the presumption of confidenti­
ality. The record here is essentially blank. LPMC submitted 
no evidence that Mr. Gollersrud was aware of any employer 
policies concerning personal use of company equipment or 
the monitoring of employee email. LPMC submitted no evi­
dence that Mr. Gollersrud’s prior employers had ever acted 
on any email monitoring policies, either in their treatment 
of him, or other employees. Indeed, LPMC submitted no evi­
dence that Mr. Gollersrud’s former employers even had such 
policies at all. Finally, LPMC submitted no evidence that, 
whether in accordance with a policy or not, email was, in 
fact, monitored by the companies. Whether such evidence 
would have been sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
privilege—a point we do not decide—the record here lacked 
even that showing and was insufficient to overcome a claim 
of OEC 503 privilege.
E.  Waiver of Privilege Under OEC 511
	
We now briefly address waiver of the attorney-
client privilege under OEC 511. LPMC asserts that, even 
if Mr. Gollersrud’s email messages were confidential com­
munications that the attorney-client privilege protects, he 
waived any privilege when he failed to delete those email 
messages from his previous employers’ servers upon sever­
ing his employment.
	
OEC 511 provides, in part:
	
“A person upon whom [OEC 503 to 514] confer a privi­
lege against disclosure of the confidential matter or com­
munication waives the privilege if the person * 
* 
* volun­
tarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant 
part of the matter or communication.”
	
Unlike confidential communication under OEC 
503(1)(b), which focuses on whether a communication was 
754	
Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC
“not intended to be disclosed,” OEC 511 waiver is centered 
around an actual disclosure, whether express or implied. See 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, 1 The New Wigmore: Evidentiary 
Privileges § 6.8, 894 (3d ed 2017) (explaining that waiver of 
the privilege, in contrast, occurs after initial intent attaches 
and the holder’s subsequent conduct manifests an intent to 
surrender the communication’s confidentiality via disclo­
sure). Accordingly, whether a communication was disclosed 
is first addressed as a factual inquiry by the trial court. 
OEC 104(1) (preliminary questions concerning, among other 
things, the existence of a privilege, shall be determined by 
the trial court); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 
314 Or 336, 342, 838 P2d 1069 (1992) (whether waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege occurred is a preliminary question 
of fact for the trial court under OEC 104). When a court 
orders disclosure, we look at the record in the light most 
favorable to disclosure, considering whether there was any 
evidence to support the factual finding. See State ex rel Ware 
v. Hieber, 267 Or 124, 127, 515 P2d 721 (1973). Whether a 
disclosure constitutes a waiver under OEC 511 is a question 
of law, reviewed for errors of law. Goldsborough, 314 Or at 
342.
	
In Goldsborough, we distinguished our previous 
decision in Bryant v. Dukehart, 106 Or 359, 210 P 454 (1923), 
by noting that, “[i]n Bryant, there was no showing that the 
party claiming the privilege had turned over the privileged 
material.” Goldsborough, 314 Or at 342. And as we explained 
in Haas, it is the showing of an actual disclosure that is the 
predicate for further OEC 511 analysis:
“[W]hen a holder of the lawyer-client privilege voluntarily 
has disclosed material covered by the privilege, two con­
siderations arise in determining whether a waiver has 
occurred: (1) whether the disclosure was ‘itself a privileged 
communication’ and, if not, (2) whether the disclosure was 
of a ‘significant part of the matter or communication.’ 
”
325 Or at 498 (quoting OEC 511). Finally, in Chaimov we 
noted that “the person must disclose part of the communica­
tion itself in order to effect a waiver.” 370 Or at 401.
	
We have already explained why email mes­
sages sent from an employer’s email system do not, per se, 
Cite as 371 Or 739 (2023)	
755
overcome the presumption of confidentiality. It follows that 
Mr. Gollersrud’s departure from employment did not, per se, 
establish voluntary disclosure. Nothing in this record estab­
lishes even actual disclosure—there is no evidence that 
Mr. Gollerrud’s former employers have ever read, reviewed, 
or learned the contents of the emails—let alone a voluntary 
disclosure on the part of Mr. Gollersrud. Without evidence 
of a voluntary disclosure, an OEC 511 analysis of waiver, on 
this record, is inapplicable.
	
In summary, we conclude that any email messages 
on Mr.  Gollersrud’s former employers’ servers containing 
communications between relators and their attorneys are 
confidential communications as defined in OEC 503(1)(b) 
and are therefore protected under OEC 503, the attorney-
client privilege. On this record, the confidentiality of those 
communications has not been overcome by a showing by 
LPMC. Similarly, this record is legally insufficient to estab­
lish an express or implied disclosure to a third party, as 
required under OEC 511.
	
A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.