Title: State v. Harmon

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
§ 
Appellant/  
 
§ 
Cross-Appellee, 
 
§ Nos. 606 and 628, 2001 
§        Consolidated 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
MICHAEL HARMON,   
§ for New Castle County  
§ Cr.A. Nos. 01011158 and 
Appellee/ 
 
 
§ 0101006104 
Cross-Appellant. 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 29, 2002 
Decided: 
June 18, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices. 
 
Appeal from Superior Court.   Affirmed in Part.  Reversed in Part and 
Remanded. 
 
 
William M. Kelleher, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public 
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WALSH, Justice: 
 
 
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The State of Delaware initiated this appeal from a decision of the Superior Court 
that granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on two weapons offenses. 
 The State contends that the trial court misconstrued the definition of “deadly weapon” 
contained in 11 Del. C. § 222(5).  The defendant below, in turn, appeals his conviction 
for second degree assault.  We conclude that the Superior Court erred in granting the 
judgments of acquittal, but affirm the assault conviction. 
 
I. 
The appellant/defendant below, Michael Harmon (“Harmon”), was found guilty 
of second degree assault (as a lesser included offense of first degree assault), possession 
of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and possession of a deadly 
weapon by a person prohibited.  Following the jury’s guilty verdict, the Superior Court 
granted Harmon’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to both weapons offenses.  The 
State promptly filed a notice of appeal challenging the dismissal of the weapons 
convictions.  Harmon later appealed his conviction for second degree assault.  We 
ordered the two appeals consolidated.  
On January 8, 2001, Harmon and his roommate, Keith Dorsey, were involved in 
an altercation during which Harman stabbed Dorsey in the eye with a knife.  A third 
 
 
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roommate witnessed the immediate aftermath of the stabbing and took Dorsey to the 
hospital.  Dorsey suffered permanent damage to his eye.  Harmon was quickly arrested 
and charged with assault and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 
felony.  The State later learned that Harmon had been convicted of a felony in 1993 
and charged him with the additional offense of possession of a deadly weapon by a 
person prohibited.  
At Harmon’s trial on these charges, the State introduced a knife into evidence 
that the police found in a small refrigerator in Harmon’s bedroom.  There was no 
objection to the introduction of the knife, nor did the State explain why it was being 
introduced.  Later, the State conceded that the introduced knife was not the knife used 
to stab Dorsey, but was introduced because it was relevant to the possession of a deadly 
weapon by a person prohibited charge.  The introduced knife was a pocketknife, found 
in a closed position, with a metal blade measuring a little more than three inches in 
length.  At the close of the State’s case, Harmon moved for a judgment of acquittal on 
all counts, arguing that the introduction into evidence of a knife, not the stabbing knife, 
was unduly prejudicial.  The trial court refused to consider this motion, however, 
stating only that it was normal practice to wait until the close of all evidence to entertain 
such motions.  After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial court granted Harmon’s 
 
 
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motion on both weapons charges, finding that the introduced knife was an ordinary 
pocketknife, and therefore not a deadly weapon pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 222(5).  
 
II. 
Harmon contends that the introduction into evidence of a knife that was not the 
knife used in the stabbing was reversible error because the jury may have improperly 
inferred that possession of any knife indicates a disposition to use it.  Since Harmon did 
not object to the introduction of the knife, however, we review this claim for plain 
error. See Supr. Ct. R. 8; Flamer v. State, 794 A.2d 1160 (Del. 2002).  Harmon relies on 
this Court’s decision in Farmer v. State, in which we held that evidence that a defendant, 
charged with a weapons offense, had access to a weapon is probative only if that 
particular weapon is connected to the specific criminal act charged.  698 A.2d 946, 948-
49 (Del. 1997).  Harmon’s reliance on Farmer is misplaced.  Harmon’s defense at trial 
was self-defense, he admitted that he used a knife to stab Dorsey but argued that Dorsey 
had been the aggressor.  There was no question, therefore, that Harmon had access to, 
and used, a knife.  The prejudicial inference condemned in Farmer finds no application 
here because the use of a deadly weapon was conceded.  Moreover, the State argued that 
the introduced knife was relevant to count three, possession of a deadly weapon by a 
 
 
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person prohibited.*  Because the knife was introduced for an independent, proper 
purpose and any prejudice to Harmon was slight, this claim does not rise to the level of 
plain error and we affirm Harmon’s conviction for second degree assault.   
 
III. 
Harmon further argues that the trial court’s refusal to consider his motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case was error.  Harmon is correct that a 
trial court should consider and rule on a motion when properly made, but the error in 
this case was harmless.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 29; Walls v. Dept. of Corrections, 567 A.2d 
424 (Del. 1989).  Harmon would not have been entitled to a judgment of acquittal at 
the close of the State’s case because the evidence established a prima facie claim of 
assault, which, if not rebutted, would sustain a conviction.  See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 29. 
 
                                                 
*The State’s position at trial is somewhat at variance with the State’s concession at argument 
on appeal that it was reasonable to conclude that the “deadly weapon” referred to in Count III of the 
Indictment was not the knife used in the assault, but the knife introduced into evidence.  But, again, 
there was no objection to the introduction of the knife into evidence. 
 
 
 
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IV. 
As to the State’s appeal, Harmon argues that it was filed prior to his sentencing 
and is thus an impermissible interlocutory appeal.  On the contrary, the State has an 
absolute right to appeal the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on an 
alleged erroneous construction of a statute.  See 10 Del. C. § 9902(a).  That appeal must 
be filed “within thirty days from entry of the order appealed from.”  10 Del. C. § 9904.  
Here, the final order dismissing both weapons convictions was entered on November 6, 
2001, and the State filed a timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2001.  See State v. 
Cooley, 430 A.2d 789, 790 (Del. 1981).   
V. 
In its appeal, the State asserts that the Superior Court relied on an erroneous 
construction of 11 Del. C. § 222(5) in granting a judgment of acquittal on counts two 
and three, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony and 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited.  We agree.  The trial court held 
that, because the knife introduced into evidence had a blade measuring less than three 
inches, excluding the unsharpened base of the knife, it was not a “deadly weapon,” and 
counts two and three failed.  11 Del. C. § 222(5).  The trial court erred in two respects.  
First, section 222(5) defines a deadly weapon as, among other things, “a knife of any 
 
 
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sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position)” or any dangerous 
instrument “which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical 
injury.” 11 Del. C. § 222(5).  An “ordinary pocketknife” is further defined as “a folding 
knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in length.”  Id.  Here, there was unrebutted 
testimony that Harmon stabbed Dorsey in the eye with a knife. That knife, the stabbing 
knife, was obviously in an open position and used, or attempted to be used, to inflict 
serious physical injury.  It is, therefore, a deadly weapon within the meaning of the 
statute, regardless of the length of the blade.  Count two, possession of a deadly weapon 
during the commission of a felony, was thus proved and the jury’s verdict of guilt 
should be reinstated.     
 
VI. 
The Superior Court’s dismissal of count three, possession of a deadly weapon by 
a person prohibited, fails for a different reason.  The State proffered the knife 
introduced into evidence as the deadly weapon Harmon had possessed for purposes of 
count three.  The trial court dismissed count three because it found that the knife’s 
blade was less than three inches in length.  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
measured only the sharpened part of the blade and noted that the complete length of 
 
 
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the blade, from the handle to the tip, was a little more than three inches.  In our view, 
the “blade” of a knife should not depend upon how much of the knife is sharpened, but 
should encompass the entire length of the knife, excluding only the handle.  Although 
the knife introduced into evidence was found in a closed position, its blade was more 
than three inches in length from handle to tip, and it therefore qualified as a deadly 
weapon pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 222(5).  Accordingly, Harmon’s conviction for 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited should also be reinstated. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore affirmed as to Harmon’s 
conviction for second degree assault, reversed as to the trial court’s dismissal of 
Harmon’s convictions for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 
felony and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, and remanded for 
proceedings consistent herewith.