Title: Andrew Baugus et al. v. City of Florence, Alabama

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/09/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061151
_________________________
Andrew Baugus et al.
v.
City of Florence
Appeal from Lauderdale Circuit Court
(CV-03-30)
LYONS, Justice.
Andrew Baugus and 11 other individuals (hereinafter "the
landowners") who own real property adjacent to a landfill
operated by the City of Florence (hereinafter "the City") sued
the City, alleging nuisance, negligence, trespass, strict
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liability, and inverse condemnation.  The Lauderdale Circuit
Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City, and the
landowners appealed.  Because the summary judgment was not a
final judgment, we dismissed the appeal and remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.  Baugus v. City of
Florence, [Ms. 1051593, January 12, 2007] __ So. 2d __ (Ala.
2007).  The trial court then entered a summary judgment in
favor of the City on all claims, and the landowners again
appealed.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The landowners sought damages for nuisance, negligence,
trespass, and strict liability against the City, arising from
the City's operation of a landfill.  The landowners also
asserted an inverse-condemnation claim, alleging that the
City's placement and monitoring of methane-measuring pipes on
their properties constitutes a taking and/or damage to their
properties. 
The City opened the landfill sometime between 1969 and
1972.  The landfill is adjacent to 9 parcels of property
belonging to the 12 landowners.  Each landowner purchased his
or her respective property in or before 1993, and 8 of the 12
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landowners reside on their property.  The remaining four
landowners own the houses on their properties, but do not
reside there.  
The City contends that the landfill closed in 1987 or
1988 and that it has not operated as a landfill since that
time.  The landowners contend that the City never officially
closed all areas of the landfill and that it dumped waste at
the landfill as late as 2006.  A 1987 letter from the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") notes that the
City is in the process of closing the landfill.  Additionally,
a 1990 letter from ADEM confirms receipt of a December 29,
1989, letter from the City stating that the landfill had been
closed.
Since the closure of the landfill, the City has
maintained the site in what it describes as a "post-closure
care monitoring period."  The City keeps the site vegetated,
periodically mows the vegetation, and fills in depressions
created by subsidence.  For the purpose of filling such
depressions, the City has occasionally deposited "clean fill"
-- unregulated inorganic solid such as dirt or concrete -- on
the site.
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The decomposition of organic waste material in landfills
generates methane, and methane has been consistently detected
at the landfill and in the surrounding areas.  Methane is an
invisible gas that can become combustible if it reaches a
sufficient concentration and a source of ignition is present.
In 1982 ADEM informed the City that methane was migrating off
the landfill above allowable limits.  Again in 1984, ADEM
informed the City that methane was migrating toward the
landowners' properties.  The City began monitoring for methane
gas across from the landowners' properties in May 1987.  Since
at least 1991 the City has regularly measured methane levels
along the perimeter of the landfill and reported the
measurements to ADEM.  From 1992 to 1998 the City quarterly
reported monitoring results to ADEM.  Since 1998 the City has
monitored the perimeter of the landfill annually.  
After several landowners expressed concern to a City
councilman about the migration of methane in 1994, the City
retained an engineering firm to monitor the amount of methane
on the landowners' properties.  Of the 12 landowners, 11
consented to the monitoring; the 12th landowner has not
resided on her property since 1990.  In the summer of 1994,
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the engineering firm installed PVC pipes in each landowner's
yard to measure methane levels.  A 3/4-inch, 3-foot long PVC
pipe was inserted 2 to 2 1/2 feet in the ground at each corner
of the landowner's house.
Since September 1994, the engineering firm has taken a
monthly methane reading from the pipes and has produced a
monthly report of the level of methane detected on each
property.  By December 1994, a detectable amount of methane
was found on each property.  The eight landowners who have
resided on their property since 1995 have received copies of
some or all of the monthly monitoring reports for their
property.    
On March 19, 2002, pursuant to § 11-47-23, Ala. Code
1975, the landowners informed the City of their intent to sue
the City seeking damages for injuries caused by (1) the City's
operation of the landfill, (2) the migration of methane from
the landfill onto their properties, and (3) the monitoring of
methane levels on their properties.  The landowners then
brought a nuisance claim and an "unlawful-taking" claim
against the City on January 17, 2003.  The City moved to
dismiss or for a more definite statement.  On February 24,
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2003, the landowners filed an amended complaint, restating the
"unlawful-taking" claim as an inverse-condemnation claim.  
The City moved for a summary judgment, and the landowners
filed a second amended complaint on March 29, 2006, adding
claims of trespass, continuing trespass, strict liability, and
negligence.  The City moved to strike the second amended
complaint, but the trial court never ruled on its motion.  The
City never amended its motion for a summary judgment to
include the four additional claims the landowners asserted in
their second amended complaint.  After a hearing, the court
entered a summary judgment in favor of the City.    
The landowners appealed to this Court.  We held that the
judgment appealed from was not a final judgment because the
claims in the second amended complaint were never ruled upon,
and we dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.  Baugus, supra.
On January 22, 2007, the City filed an answer to the
second amended complaint and an amendment to its previous
summary-judgment motion.  After a hearing, the trial court
denied the City's motion to strike the landowners' second
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amended complaint and entered a summary judgment in favor of
the City on all the claims.  The landowners then appealed. 
II. Standard of Review
"The standard by which this Court will review a
motion for summary judgment is well established:
"'The principles of law applicable to
a motion for summary judgment are well
settled.  To grant such a motion, the trial
court must determine that the evidence does
not create a genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant
makes a prima facie showing that those two
conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to present "substantial
evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of
Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala. Code
1975.  Evidence is "substantial" if it is
of 
"such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
"'In our review of a summary judgment,
we apply the same standard as the trial
court.  Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462,
465 (Ala. 1997).  Our review is subject to
the caveat that we must review the record
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant.  Hanners v. Balfour
Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala.
1990).'"
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Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 832-33 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184
(Ala. 1999)).  
III. Analysis
A. Tort Claims
1. Strict-Liability Claim
The landowners contend that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of the City on their
strict-liability claim because, they argue, the migration of
methane placed the landowners within a "zone of danger ... in
immediate risk of physical harm" from the potential ignition
of a flammable gas.  The landowners' brief provides no legal
authority to support the argument that the operation of a
landfill and the risk of harm a landfill creates constitute an
ultra-hazardous activity.  "When a brief states general
propositions but fails to make specific application of those
propositions to the rulings assigned as error, it is waived
and will not be considered on appeal."  Welch v. Hill,  608
So. 2d 727, 728 (Ala. 1992) (citations omitted).  We therefore
do not deal further with the extent to which a strict-
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liability claim under the circumstances here presented might
escape the bar of limitations, and we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment as to that claim.
2. Statute of Limitations on Remaining Tort Claims
a.  The Relevant Time Period
The landowners' nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims
are based on the presence of methane and garbage on their
properties 
allegedly 
caused 
by 
the 
City's 
negligent
maintenance of the landfill.  The original complaint states
that "[t]he [City's] maintenance operation of the landfill and
the escapage [sic] of methane gas constitutes a continuing
nuisance."  Additionally the second amended complaint, which
added the negligence claim, states that "[t]he City knew, or
should have known, it was unlawfully maintaining waste
materials at the Landfill and in its vicinity, in a manner
that caused, and will continue to cause, the generation,
discharge migration and escape of potentially explosive
gases."  The landowners' trespass claims are based on (1) the
disposal of waste and landfill material on their properties as
recently as November 2005, and (2) the presence of landfill
gases, including methane, on their properties.  
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The City argues that the landowners' tort claims are
barred by two separate statutes of limitations because, it
says, the claims accrued, if at all, more than eight years
before the landowners notified the City of their claims.
First, the City argues that the nuisance and negligence claims
are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort
claims in § 6-2-38, Ala. Code 1975, and that the trespass
claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations in §
6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975.  The City further contends that all
the tort claims are barred by the municipal nonclaim statute,
§ 11-47-23, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that tort claims
seeking damages from a municipality must be presented to the
City "within six months from the accrual thereof or shall be
barred."  Applying this six-month limitation to the date on
which the landowners notified the City of their claims --
March 19, 2002 -- the City contends that all the landowners'
claims that accrued before September 19, 2001, are time-
barred.  
The City further argues that the tort claims based on the
presence of methane are time-barred because, it argues, the
claims accrued no later than 1994 when methane was detected on
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all the landowners' properties.  The City notes that under
Alabama law, a "'statute [of limitations] begins to run
whether or not the full amount of damages is apparent at the
time of the first legal injury.'"  Garrett v. Raytheon Co.,
368 So. 2d 516, 519 (Ala. 1979) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v.
Stuart-McCorkle, Inc., 291 Ala. 601, 608, 285 So. 2d 468, 473
(1973)).  Thus, the City contends that a new statute of
limitations did not begin to run when additional levels of
methane were detected later.  However, Garrett dealt with an
alleged wrongful act, toxic exposure, that was not ongoing
when the action commenced.  In this case, we deal with the
continuous and ongoing migration of methane from the landfill,
which the landowners assert does not continue solely because
of the previously completed activity of the City in depositing
waste, but because of the City's negligent maintenance of the
landfill site in the years after it had ceased to deposit
waste at the landfill.
Because it is undisputed that methane was detected by no
later than 1994 and it is further undisputed that methane
continues to be present on the landowners' property, the issue
as to the bar of limitations turns on whether the continuing
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emission of methane gas within the period on and after
September 19, 2001, constituted a violation of a legal duty
owed the landowners by the City.  If a duty exists, the claims
accruing after that date are actionable. 
b.  Existence of a Duty as of the Commencement of the Action
The landowners contend that the tort claims are not time-
barred because, they argue, the statute of limitations begins
to run anew each time methane gas migrates from the landfill
onto their properties.  See Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776
So. 2d 761 (Ala. 2000).  Because there is "well-settled law
that negligent design or construction of a drainage ditch is
considered to be a permanent condition that is not abatable,"
Byrd v. City of Citronelle, 937 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 2006),
the landowners emphasize that their tort claims arise from the
negligent maintenance of the landfill, not the negligent
construction or design of the landfill.  When a claim is based
on negligent maintenance, each occurrence or recurrence of the
injury constitutes a new cause of action.  City of Clanton v.
Johnson, 245 Ala. 470, 473, 17 So. 2d 669, 672 (1944).
In order to establish the prima facie elements of a
negligent-maintenance claim, the landowners must establish
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that the City had a legal duty to maintain the landfill after
the landfill was closed.  See Byrd, 937 So. 2d at 521.  The
landowners assert that the City has ongoing statutory,
regulatory, and common-law duties to maintain the landfill.
The City contends that the landowners have not presented any
evidence or legal authority indicating that the City has such
a duty.
The existence of a duty is a question of law for the
court to resolve.  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.
2d 834, 839 (Ala. 1999).  The entry of a summary judgment
indicates that the trial court concluded that the City does
not have a duty to maintain the landfill after its closure. 
To establish a regulatory duty to maintain the landfill,
the landowners rely on certain ADEM regulations in the Alabama
Administrative Code.  The landowners argue that a phrase from
Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
(Environmental 
Management), 
rule 
335-13-4-.16
(2005), which states that "[s]pecial attention shall be given
to control and monitoring of explosive gases," including
methane, establishes that the City has a duty to control and
monitor the landfill.  However, this rule, dealing with
requirements for obtaining a permit to operate a landfill,
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refers to "a landfill unit which accepts organic waste."
These requirements thus deal with an ongoing operation.  The
City obtained a permit to operate the landfill from ADEM and
then, as of December 1989, informed ADEM that it had closed
the landfill.  The landowners also argue that Ala. Admin. Code
(Environmental Management), rule 335-13-4-.20 (2005) requires
the City to control the methane gas migrating from the
landfill, but the rule requires the City only to monitor
methane levels postclosure, which the City has done.  We
conclude that the City has no regulatory duty to control the
methane migrating from the landfill after the landfill closed.
To obtain a permit to operate a landfill, a landfill
permittee must prepare and file an explosive-gas monitoring
plan, which includes a remedial plan for explosive-gas
releases.  Ala. Admin. Code (Environmental Management), rule
335-13-4-.16(2) (2005).  The landowners assert that under
ADEM's Minimum Requirements for an Explosive Gas Monitoring
Plan at Solid Waste Disposal Sites in the State of Alabama,
derived from §§ 22-27-3 and -7, Ala. Code 1975, the City has
a duty to control the migration of methane, notwithstanding
that the landfill has been closed.  The explosive-landfill-gas
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monitoring plan the City drafted, in compliance with the ADEM
regulation, in 1991, over one year after the date the City
contends that the landfill closed in December 1989, provides
that if a "dangerous level" of gas is measured "the City will
relocate citizens as is necessary to safe places (at City
expense), make contact with ADEM, and perform remedial
measures as are necessary to remove the threat."  The
monitoring plan further  states that the City will monitor the
site "at least twice yearly and more often if necessary due to
the proximity of the homes."  We conclude that the City
imposed a duty upon itself to monitor the amount of methane
generated from the landfill and to perform remedial measures
to remove the threat of a "dangerous level" of methane after
the landfill closed.
The landowners also assert that the City has an ongoing
common-law duty to maintain the landfill.  The landowners cite
Harris v. Town of Tarrant City, 221 Ala. 558, 560, 130 So. 83,
84-85 (1930), in which this Court held that after an
improvement to a drainage system is complete "the city is
responsible for the careless and negligent manner in which it
is maintained by it."  More recently, in Kennedy v. City of
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Montgomery, 423 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Ala. 1982) (citations
omitted), this Court held that "[o]nce the authority to
construct or maintain a drainage system is exercised, a duty
of care exists, and a municipality may be liable for damages
proximately caused by its negligence.  This reflects the
familiar tort principle that liability may arise from the
negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking."  
This Court has not previously considered whether a
municipality has a common-law duty to maintain a landfill
after its closure.  After considering all the evidence, we
hold that, under the facts of this case, a municipality has a
common-law duty to maintain a landfill it owns after the
closure of the landfill.  Maintaining a landfill includes (1)
maintaining the waste deposited that is not in a totally
dormant state and (2) controlling the methane gas generated by
the waste.  Although the landfill is "closed," the City
continues to own the property for a public purpose, a place to
store previously deposited waste materials.  It is undisputed
that the City is aware of the fact that previously deposited
waste materials at the site are not in a passive state but
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constantly continue to decompose, causing the emission of
methane every day. 
We conclude that the landowners' tort claims do not arise
from the installation of the landfill, but from the continuous
migration of methane onto their properties as a result of the
City's maintenance and ongoing operation of the landfill for
a public purpose subsequent to its closure.  The landowners'
tort claims of nuisance, negligence, and trespass accrue each
time the City's maintenance and ongoing operation of the
landfill causes methane to migrate onto the landowners'
property and, thus, those claims are not time-barred.  That
the City elected to deal with the problem caused by its
ongoing operation by merely monitoring the release of gas, as
opposed to more aggressive curative measures the landowners
allege could have been undertaken, does not, as a matter of
law, 
constitute 
a 
defense 
to 
the 
action 
under 
the
circumstances here presented.  However, any claims for damages
that accrued before September 19, 2001, six months before the
landowners informed the City of their intent to sue the City,
are barred by the municipal nonclaim statute, § 11-47-190.
We, therefore reverse the summary judgment as to the nuisance,
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negligence, and both trespass claims and remand the cause for
further proceedings.
B. Inverse-Condemnation Claim 
The landowners contend in their brief to this Court that
the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor
of the City on their inverse-condemnation claim because, they
say, they presented substantial evidence indicating that the
City (1) dumped garbage on the their properties, (2) continues
to allow methane to occupy their properties, and (3) installed
PVC pipes on their properties to monitor the methane.
However, the landowners' amended complaint alleges inverse
condemnation due only to the installation and periodic
monitoring of the PVC pipes.  The complaint states: 
"[T]he [City] has taken and/or damaged the property
of the [landowners] without resorting to the powers
of eminent domain in that the [City] has continually
entered upon the [landowners'] property and placed
devices upon [landowners'] property for the purposes
of measuring said methane gas as appropriated to the
[landowners'] property for such use."
We thus disregard any theory based on dispersal of garbage on
the landowners' properties. See Engel Mortgage Co. v. Triple
K Lumber Co.,  56 Ala. App. 337, 343, 321 So. 2d 679, 684
(Civ. App. 1975) ("Summary judgment must be granted or denied
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on the record which is before the trial court at the time the
motion is heard. A party cannot add new theories or advance
new issues in order to gain reversal of the ruling on the
motion for summary judgment.").
The City argues that the inverse-condemnation claim is
time-barred and that the landowners failed to establish
substantial evidence of the essential elements of an unlawful-
taking claim.  Specifically, the City argues that the
landowners failed to establish that the City's placement and
periodic monitoring of the PVC pipes on the landowners'
properties constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property
for public use.  Under Art. I, § 23, Alabama Constitution of
1901, 
and 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States
Constitution, a governmental entity is required to pay just
compensation to a property owner when his or her property has
been taken for public use.  Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I., § 23
("private property shall not be taken for, or applied to
public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor");
United States Const., amend. V ("nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation").
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The City's placement and periodic monitoring of the PVC
pipes on the landowners' properties is not an inverse
condemnation of the landowners' properties because the methane
monitoring is not performed for a public use, but for the
benefit of the landowners.  The City maintains other PVC pipes
on the perimeter of the landfill to measure levels of methane
migrating from the landfill, but it measures methane at the
landowners' houses for the benefit of the landowners.  All the
landowners who continue to reside on the properties testified
that they want the City to continue monitoring the methane.
Moreover, the installation and monitoring of the PVC
pipes does not constitute a taking of the landowners'
properties.  To be a taking for constitutional purposes, the
governmental action "must 'constitute an actual, permanent
invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and
not merely an injury to, the property.'"  Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982)
(citing Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149
(1924)).  Eleven of the 12 landowners consented to the
installation and monitoring of the PVC pipes, and, as noted
above, the landowners currently residing on the properties
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want the monitoring to continue.  The City's installation and
periodic monitoring of the pipes on the landowners' properties
does not amount to an unconstitutional taking.  Therefore, the
trial court properly entered the summary judgment for the City
on the landowners' inverse-condemnation claim.     
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the summary judgment as to the strict-liability
and inverse-condemnation claims.  We reverse the summary
judgment as to the nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims,
and we remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur with the main opinion in all respects, except as
to part III.A., as to which I concur only in the result.