Title: Durdahl v. Bank of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Durdahl v. Bank of Casper1986 WY 99718 P.2d 23Case Number: 85-279Decided: 04/24/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lyle 
DURDAHL, Appellant (Defendant),

v. 

BANK 
OF CASPER, aWyoming 
banking corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

John I. Henley, 
of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, P.C., Casper, for appellant 
(defendant).

Kenneth R. 
Marken, of Marken & Anest, Casper, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Bank of Casper (Bank), the lender, in an amount 
of $54,535.29 for unpaid principal and accrued interest, plus accruing interest, 
$5,000.00 attorney's fees, and costs of $27.63, on a secured promissory note 
which was in default. Appellant, Lyle Durdahl, the borrower, claims that 
material factual issues exist which preclude summary 
judgment.

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     Appellant Durdahl 
framed the issues:

1. "The question of how 
much, if any, money is owed to the appellee is a material question of fact and 
precludes summary judgment for the appellee."

2. "A material question 
of fact exists as to whether or not the appellee acted in a commercially 
reasonable manner subsequent to the repossession of certain 
collateral."

3. "The court erred in 
granting $5,000.00 in attorney's fees for the appellee's collection 
efforts."

[¶4.]     Appellee Bank of 
Casper claims 
that:

1. "No genuine issue of 
material fact existed concerning appellee's prima facie 
case."

2. "Appellant's issues of 
fact in opposition are not material and/or admissible."

3. "The court did not err 
in making its award of attorney's fees to appellee."

[¶5.]     An additional problem 
arises from the denial by the trial court of the Durdahl motion to file an 
amended answer and counterclaim, determined by the court to be "moot by virtue 
of this [summary judgment] ruling."

[¶6.]     The facts in this case 
are of a nature best described as hard to believe. We state the facts that 
appear without conflict in the record on appeal, without any expectation of what 
a trial on the merits will adduce. Involved is a lending transaction to renovate 
a Greyhound bus for individual motorhome usage.

[¶7.]     As we said in a recent 
case, Fiedler v. Steger, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 773, 776 
(1986):

"This court, as did the 
trial court, takes the record as presented for the summary-judgment hearing, and 
cannot recreate the facts which may have been or do not 
appear."

I

Pleadings

[¶8.]     First, we review the 
pleadings which come to us on appeal from summary judgment, wherein the Bank 
filed a complaint on a promissory note, alleging failure to pay, default and a 
principal balance due of $42,506, plus accrued and accruing interest. (It may be 
that the total was $40,000 principal, plus $2,506 added interest, plus accruing 
interest from an unstated date, if the affidavits of the defendant are 
accurate.)

[¶9.]     By answer, Durdahl 
admitted the execution of the note, denied the default delinquency or amount 
due, and stated as affirmative defenses failure to state a claim, noncompliance 
with the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code, breach of the loan agreement, and 
repossession of security which had not been resold.

[¶10.]  The Bank moved for summary judgment, with 
attached affidavits, the first by an officer of the Bank, describing the note of 
$70,006 ($70,000 plus a title and filing fee of $6.00), due date of March 27, 
1984, failure to repay, with an unpaid principal balance of $42,506, plus 
accrued and accruing interest based upon the current floating rate, two per cent 
above the prime rate of interest charged by the bank, which interest equaled 
$11,334.94, as of September 17, 1985, and an accrual rate thereafter. Also filed 
was an affidavit signed by a Casper attorney in regard to attorney's fees, 
which, without enumeration of the work involved or other facts, 
stated:

"5. A reasonable 
attorney's fee in this case is therefore Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000).

"6. This fee is 
consistent with and based upon the criteria set forth in the American Bar 
Association Standards relative to attorney's fees."

[¶11.]  Durdahl filed a motion to file an amended 
answer and counterclaim, which amended answer more specifically contended for a 
set-off in a greater amount than was due on the note, and a counter-claim which 
alleged failure to advance funds as agreed, fraudulent charge to defendant's 
account, lender failure in a duty to insure the bus, repossession of security 
without disposition, conversion, loss of profit, destruction of collateral by 
act of the Bank, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

[¶12.]  Two affidavits, one signed by Durdahl and 
the second by Donald L. Hedges, were attached as a resistance to the motion for 
summary judgment and in support of the motion for leave to amend which will be 
described more specifically in the statement of facts.

[¶13.]  Based on this record, the district court 
granted summary judgment in the amount of $42,506 principal, accrued interest of 
$12,029.29 and accruing interest, and $5,000 attorney's fees. 
Further:

"That Defendant's `Motion 
to File Amended Answer and Counterclaim' is moot by virtue of this 
ruling."

[¶14.]  Durdahl then filed a motion to open 
judgment and for reconsideration and attached supplemental affidavits of Hedges 
and Durdahl. That motion was denied, and the Bank then proceeded in execution 
collection efforts, including garnishee notice and summons to attempt to 
garnishee Durdahl's wages. Each party filed a statement of proceedings which in 
significant detail are categorically in dispute, and the district court did not 
"review the respective `Statement of Proceedings' filed by the parties herein 
and approve an appropriate and accurate Statement for the Clerk of the District 
Court to include in the Record on Appeal." Consequently, from the standpoint of 
facts, we will consider the filed affidavits in the record as the only facts now 
available for appellate review.1

II

Facts Presented by 
Affidavits

[¶15.]  Since the affidavits are not factually in 
specific conflict, and the Bank did not choose to file responsive affidavits to 
the extended affidavits filed by Durdahl and Hedges, we have a case for decision 
with the following rather interesting facts.

[¶16.]  Durdahl approached the Bank of Casper 
with a proposal to borrow $70,000 to buy a Greyhound bus to convert through the 
services of Hedges into a motor home for resale. Signing a promissory note for 
$70,006, he gave an undetermined security interest (no one saw fit to attach a 
copy of any security documents to the affidavits or for filing in the record) in 
a Worthington 
engine, a gas compressor, and a Greyhound bus. We only know this by virtue of 
statements in the affidavits, and the fact that the promissory note and 
disclosure statement stated, "This note is further secured by Security Agreement 
dated 9/29/83, Worthington Engine, gas compressor, Greyhound Bus." The optional 
provision in the promissory note was not checked, which 
stated:

"____ I desire property 
damage insurance at a cost of $ ____, for a period of ____ 
months."

[¶17.]  Likewise, a sentence was not checked 
which stated:

"____ I do not desire 
property damage insurance from lender and will provide proof of coverage or 
property damage insurance to lender as required."

[¶18.]  Durdahl then entered into an agreement 
with Hedges to acquire and convert the bus into a motor home, and the Bank gave 
Hedges $30,000 to begin the project, as an advance on the Durdahl note. Hedges 
made a down payment of $10,000 on the bus from these funds, and moved the bus to 
his shop, where it was torn down and refurbishing 
commenced.

[¶19.]  At this stage of renovation, the Bank 
refused to advance any more money to Durdahl on his $70,000 note, thus delaying 
the renovation project for at least two weeks.

[¶20.]  For reasons then unexplained, the Bank 
approached Hedges and loaned him some money to finish the project, the amount 
thereof not being determinable from the present record. Thereafter, following 
exhaustion of the separate credit line of Hedges, the Bank then advanced Hedges 
another $10,000, and possibly, to make sense from the file, $12,500 which was 
charged to the Durdahl note and given directly to Hedges without either approval 
or knowledge of Durdahl.

[¶21.]  Hedges stated in his affidavit that when 
the Bank loaned him the money to finish the work on the bus the Bank required 
Hedges to "put the title to the bus in their name," and, after the bus was 
completed, Donn Dorsett of the Bank gave him permission to take it anywhere and 
attempt to sell it.

[¶22.]  With title (according to the record) in 
the Bank's name, and the bus then reconverted with a reasonable value of 
$125,000, and Hedges feeling that he had a buyer for the bus for $125,000 in the 
southern part of Wyoming, Hedges then stated that "the bus crashed when I 
stopped on Red Canyon to go to the bathroom, and it rolled down a hill and off 
the road."

[¶23.]  Lo and behold, from the factual 
statements in the record, we do not know what happened thereafter to the residue 
of the bus. It seems to have evaporated.2 Prior to the accident in which the 
bus presumably was totaled, the Bank received a notice that the insurance had or 
would expire, but did not notify Hedges of the expiration of the insurance 
policy, and consequently there was no insurance at the time the unit was 
totaled. The Bank then repossessed a compressor from Durdahl, which they placed 
in Hedges' yard for safekeeping and where it apparently still is, or was at the 
time of oral argument.

[¶24.]  A modest internal conflict in the Hedges 
affidavit does seem to exist:

"* * * [T]he Bank of 
Casper required 
that they be named as, and were in fact named as a loss payable insured on said 
bus,"

since as owner 
this would be unlikely.

[¶25.]  The Durdahl affidavit is generally 
consistent with the Hedges affidavit in further describing the loan transaction 
and that a gas compressor was repossessed by the Bank and not thereafter 
liquidated as a chattel security and credited to the secured indebtedness, and 
in further saying:

"* * * [P]rior to the 
events which occurred above, I had investigated the market for such motor homes 
and found an excellent market in Arizona. The motor home such as the one I was 
building were being bought and sold for $120,000 or more."

[¶26.]  Supplementary affidavits, also signed by 
Hedges and Durdahl, which were filed with the motion to open judgments, denied, 
for reasons that are factually unclear, a partnership relationship, and further 
by Hedges:

"That after the bus was 
complete, I permitted Mr. Durdahl to make suggestions on how the bus would be 
sold, but he did not have title to the bus and did not dictate to me how the bus 
should be marketed. Indeed, I remember one occasion when he wanted to take the 
bus to Arizona 
to market it, but I refused him this opportunity."

And by 
Durdahl:

"That if the Bank of 
Casper had complied with their agreement, Mr. Hedges would not have been in 
control of the bus and I would have marketed the bus much differently, including 
taking it to Arizona where the market for mobile homes is 
best."

[¶27.]  The district court found that there was 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact (which may be nearly true as to the 
record before us), and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law (which is certainly not true under the evidentiary status created by the 
filed affidavits).

[¶28.]  We determine that the district court's 
order of summary judgment prematurely terminated the litigation, observing that 
with the present status of the record, the Bank of Casper was not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, nor were all litigable factual issues at this 
juncture resolved by the filed documents. Wyoming Insurance Department v. Sierra 
Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1360 
(1979).

[¶29.]  At least four material issues of fact or 
questions of law arise. As a fifth concern, we would add the holding that the 
counterclaim issues were rendered moot by a judgment on the promissory note. 
Those issues would include the disposition by the Bank of the gas compressor 
owned by Durdahl and given as security, which raises legal questions; confusion 
regarding title to the bus, which in fairness to all parties raises a material 
factual question; what was the chargeable amount on the note; and whether the 
affidavit upon which the award of attorney's fees was based is legally 
sufficient.

III

Repossession of the 
Compressor

[¶30.]  A most troublesome question perceived by 
this court is, what occurs when a lending institution has repossessed security 
and then proceeds to sue on the note without completing the foreclosure 
process?

[¶31.]  The five principal remedies given to the 
secured party upon default by the debtor were explained in Eggeman v. Western 
National Bank, Wyo., 596 P.2d 318 (1979). The fifth remedy described in that 
opinion appears to be the remedy contemplated by the lender in this 
case:

"5. Take a judgment on 
the underlying obligation, and proceed under the judgment. * * * The procedure 
for this remedy is not set out in the Uniform Commercial Code, i.e., § 
34-21-101, et seq., W.S. 1977. The usual procedure for enforcement of judgments 
for money is set out in § 1-17-101, et seq., W.S. 1977. Usually the judgment is 
executed on by issuance of a writ of execution. The sheriff levies the writ upon 
the goods and chattels of the debtor, taking them actually or constructively 
into his possession. The various items levied upon are then identified and are 
subject to valuation and inspection. If necessary, the sheriff then holds an 
execution sale. Such procedure is anticipated by the Uniform Commercial Code [§ 
34-21-960(e), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985]." 596 P.2d  at 
322.

[¶32.]  We cannot find anything in Wyoming law which allows 
a creditor to repossess collateral and do nothing with it, then commence suit on 
the underlying obligation. It seems that the creditor can 
only:

[¶33.]  1. Repossess the collateral and sell it. 
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 2d, § 26-9, p. 1108 (1980); U.C.C. § 
9-504; § 34-21-963, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985; Farmers State Bank of Parkston 
v. Otten, 87 S.D. 161, 204 N.W.2d 178 (1973). See Stephens v. Sheridan Public 
Employees Federal Credit Union, Wyo., 594 P.2d 473 (1979), for notice 
requirements.

[¶34.]  2. Repossess the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debt (also known as strict foreclosure). White and Summers, 
supra, § 26-8, p. 1104; U.C.C. § 9-505(2); § 34-21-964(b), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985; and see Western National Bank of Casper v. 
Harrison, Wyo., 577 P.2d 635 (1978); 
or

[¶35.]  3. Obtain a judgment, then execute on the 
judgment, i.e., have the sheriff repossess the collateral. Eggeman v. Western 
National Bank, supra; White and Summers, supra, § 26-4, pp. 1090-1094; U.C.C. § 
9-501; § 34-21-960(e), W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985; § 1-17-301, et seq., W.S. 
1977.3

[¶36.]  The Bank in this case appears to have 
chosen alternative three. Yet, as pointed out in Eggeman v. Western National 
Bank, supra, and White and Summers, supra, § 26-4, p. 
1092:

"Generally, the creditor 
must first commence suit and obtain a judgment for the debt owed. After judgment 
the clerk of the court will, on request, issue a `writ of execution' (or the 
like). This writ recites that a judgment has been obtained and directs the 
sheriff or other appropriate officer to seize the property of the debtor and 
sell it to satisfy the judgment debt. With the writ in hand, the officer will 
levy against the debtor's property at his home or place of business (i.e., 
exercise dominion over it such that it is safely preserved for satisfaction of 
the debt). Finally, after giving public notice, the officer will sell the 
property at a public auction to the highest bidder and then turn proceeds 
necessary to satisfy the debt over to the creditor. The surplus, if any, goes to 
the debtor. An attractive alternative to levy is garnishment of the debtor's 
most liquid asset - his wages."

[¶37.]  The record on appeal includes the summary 
judgment order, garnishee notice and summons, which was served on Durdahl's 
employer, and the writ of execution against Durdahl's goods and chattels. 
Inclusion of these documents suggests that the Bank has chosen to use the 
procedure for executing on the judgment. However, the Bank repossessed Durdahl's 
collateral prior to commencing suit and obtaining judgment on the debt 
owed.

"* * * [A]t some point 
the secured creditor must choose which remedy he will utilize and pursue that 
route to fruition. In other words, a secured creditor may first attempt to 
enforce his rights by one method and if that proves unsuccessful follow another 
one, but he should not be permitted to harass the debtor by simultaneously 
pursuing two or more of the several avenues of attack open to him. Neither case 
law nor the language of 9-501 [§ 34-21-960, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1985] 
authorizes a `double-barreled' attack upon the debtor." White and Summers, 
supra, § 26-4, pp. 1093-1094.

[¶38.]  Appellant cites Farmers State Bank of 
Parkston v. Otten, supra, which is factually somewhat similar to appellant's 
predicament. This opinion quotes from Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 29 
Mich. App. 99, 
185 N.W.2d 47 (1970):

"* * * It would be unfair 
to allow a creditor to deprive the debtor of the possession and use of the 
collateral for an unreasonable length of time and not apply the asset or the 
proceeds from its sale toward liquidation of the debt. Moreover, it would be 
equally unfair to allow a creditor to take possession at all, if the creditor 
never intended to dispose of the security. For during the period that the debtor 
is deprived of possession he may have been able to make profitable use of the 
asset or may have gone to far greater lengths than the creditor to sell. Once a 
creditor has possession he must act in a commercially reasonable manner towards 
sale, lease, proposed retention where permissible, or other disposition. * * * 
If such disposition is not feasible, the asset must be returned, still subject, 
of course, to the creditor's security interest. To the extent the creditor's 
inaction results in injury to the debtor, the debtor has a right of recovery." 
204 N.W.2d  at 181.

[¶39.]  Some courts have held that the trier of fact must determine what length 
of time is reasonable before a creditor who has repossessed collateral is deemed 
to have retained the collateral in satisfaction of the underlying debt. Swanson 
v. May, 40 Wn. App. 148, 697 P.2d 1013, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 274 (1985); Service 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Sparks, 99 Wn. 199, 660 P.2d 760, 35 U.C.C.Rep. 
1371 (1983); Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 18 Wn. App. 569, 570 P.2d 702, 23 U.C.C.Rep. 247 (1977); Shultz v. Delaware Trust Co., 
Del.Super., 360 A.2d 576, 19 U.C.C.Rep. 1402 (1976). That the repossessed 
compressor was still in the constructive possession of the Bank at the time of 
oral argument in this case leads us to conclude that the trier of fact should 
have an opportunity to determine whether the Bank has by implication already 
elected to retain the compressor in satisfaction of the debt. Hinkle v. Rock 
Springs National Bank, 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976); § 34-21-964, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985 (U.C.C. § 9-505).

[¶40.]  Also, the Bank's right to obtain judgment 
on the promissory note while in possession of collateral with an appraised value 
which exceeds the debt on the note, is a serious question which renders 
inappropriate the Bank's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Section 
34-21-963(b), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985 (U.C.C. § 9-504).

[¶41.]  We decline to specifically state any 
determinative rule of law on the foreclosure alternatives since the record lacks 
sufficient definition to enable us to avoid a hypothetical assumption. Kimbley 
v. City of 
Green River, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 443 
(1982).

"* * * This court is 
primarily a court of review except in cases in which this court has original 
jurisdiction or where a constitutional question is legally certified to this 
court. It is not its function to determine the facts and the law in a case in 
the first instance." Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199, 339 P.2d 398, 
reh. denied 80 Wyo. 199, 342 P.2d 236 
(1959).

IV

Title to the 
Bus

[¶42.]  Who owned the bus at the time it was 
destroyed is, in our opinion, a genuine issue of material fact. The pleadings, 
affidavits and exhibits in the record certainly do not provide a necessarily 
believable answer. Neither the Bank's complaint nor its president's affidavit 
makes mention of the bus. The promissory note lists the bus as security. 
Durdahl's amended answer and counterclaim assert that the Bank repossessed the 
bus and had a duty to insure it. Hedges' affidavit states that the Bank made him 
put the title to the bus in the Bank's name, and that the Bank failed to inform 
Hedges that it had received notice that the insurance on the bus had or would 
expire. Durdahl's affidavit states that: "Mr. Hedges purchased the Greyhound bus 
and began refurbishing the same." Durdahl's Statement of Proceeding states that 
the Bank's attorney denied that the title to the Greyhound bus was held in the 
Bank's name. In the Bank's Statement of Proceedings it objects to the 
insinuation that the Bank conceded that the title to the bus was placed in its 
name. For the record now before us, no one produced a title. By remand, we will 
leave for trial any determination of the finite facts and whether the Bank had 
constructive possession through its direct relationship with Hedges. The 
affidavits at present juncture do not develop a controverted issue of 
fact.

[¶43.]  If the Bank did have title to the bus 
placed in its name, or even if the Bank constructively possessed the bus at the 
time it was destroyed, the question arises as to who should bear the loss. A 
reading of Wisconics Engineering, Inc. v. Fisher, Ind. App., 466 N.E.2d 745, 39 
U.C.C.Rep. 1151 (1984), informs us that:

"* * * [I]t has been held 
that where the secured party destroys the collateral while it is in his 
possession, Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., [Tex., 628 S.W.2d 769, 33 
U.C.C.Rep. 124 (1982)] * * * he will be found to have retained the collateral in 
complete satisfaction of the debt." 466 N.E.2d  at 764.

[¶44.]  Also, § 34-21-926, W.S. 1977, may have a 
bearing on the issue of who should bear the loss:

"(a) A secured party must 
use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in his 
possession. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(c) A secured party is 
liable for any loss caused by his failure to meet any obligation imposed by the 
preceding subsections but does not lose his security 
interest."

[¶45.]  Who owned the bus, and who should bear 
the loss of the bus are issues which merit factual determination and legal 
resolution. We will not now hypothetically assume what those conclusions should 
be.

V

Attorney's 
Fees

[¶46.]  The Bank submitted an affidavit from a 
practicing Casper attorney stating that the $5,000 
attorney's fee was reasonable. After citing his membership in the Bar and his 
experience in collection suits, the affiant stated:

"3. A reasonable and 
customary fee for collection work in cases in which a Promissory Note is 
involved is an amount between five and ten percent of the face amount of the 
note, particularly in cases where post-judgment collection efforts may be 
necessary.

"4. In the instant case, 
your Affiant understands the Defendant to owe a sum in excess of Fifty-Three 
Thousand Dollars ($53,000.00) plus accruing interest.

"5. A reasonable 
attorney's fee in this case is therefore Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00).

"6. This fee is 
consistent with and based upon the criteria set forth in the American Bar 
Association Standards relative to attorney's fees."

[¶47.]  This affidavit is quite similar to the 
one found to be insufficient in Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., Wyo., 531 P.2d 499, 503 (1975).4 We said in that 
case:

"* * * Unless and until 
there be some evidence in the record besides the customary fee, we see no basis 
for determination of the other important and necessary factors upon which the 
reasonableness of the fee should be based." 531 P.2d  at 
504.

[¶48.]  These important and necessary factors for 
determining the reasonableness of the fee include:

"* * * (1) the qualities 
of the advocate: his ability, training, education, experience, professional 
standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, 
intricacy, importance, the time and skill required, the responsibility imposed 
and the prominence and character of the parties when they affect the importance 
of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, 
time and attention given to the work; and (4) the result: whether the attorney 
was successful and what benefits were derived. [Citations.]" Schouweiler v. 
Yancey Company, Nev., 712 P.2d 786, 790 
(1985).

[¶49.]  Also see these factors organized in a 
different fashion in Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., supra; Anderson v. Meier, 
Wyo., 641 P.2d 187, 192 (1982); Downing v. 
Stiles, Wyo., 
635 P.2d 808 (1981).5 No comfort is afforded by 
appellee's citation of Anderson v. Meier, supra, since Harold Meier, 
the affiant, was the party who incurred the expenses and as a practicing 
attorney was knowledgeable about the work involved and the reasonableness of the 
amounts charged as his debt.

[¶50.]  The affiant for the Bank of Casper must 
revise his determination of a reasonable fee to reflect consideration of these 
other factors. A conclusory statement that the fee is "consistent with and based 
upon the criteria set forth in the American Bar Association Standards relative 
to attorney's fees" is insufficient. Claims for attorney's fees not satisfying 
the evidentiary requirements of Prairie Dog and Shanor v. A-Pac, Ltd., Wyo., 711 P.2d 420 (1986), can be expected to be summarily reversed upon 
appeal.

VI

Balance Due on the 
Note

[¶51.]  On the record now before us, we have the 
following reflected as existent facts. The note was $70,000; after $30,000 was 
advanced, the Bank declined to make additional advances, and then advanced funds 
on a separate obligation of Hedges until his credit was exhausted. Thereafter, 
it made a further advance to Hedges, and charged the amount to the note of 
Durdahl. We can assume separate facts, which might encompass estoppel, waiver, 
concurrence, nonconcurrence, unauthorized advance, and so forth, each of which, 
under applicable rules of law, might determine the liability for any additional 
amount advanced after the original $30,000. The present record certainly does 
not demonstrate that the additional $10,000 (or $12,500) was properly chargeable 
as a note debt to Durdahl. Since this case came to us from an order sustaining 
the motion for summary judgment, we will not now presuppose either what the 
facts may be on trial, or what the appropriate rule might be when the facts are 
determined.

[¶52.]  We have discussed the requirements for 
entry of summary judgment innumerable times, and however those standards may be 
stated cannot find the required burden of the plaintiff to have been met by the 
present evidentiary status of this case. Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 (1986). See excellent 
discussion in Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 
574 P.2d 751 (1978).

VII

Motion for Leave to 
Amend

[¶53.]  To avoid a further appeal before 
completion of a trial wherein all facts are determined, comment will be made 
about the motion for leave to amend. Reference is made for direction to Rule 13, 
W.R.C.P., compulsory counterclaim, and Rule 15(a), W.R.C.P., "leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." It is consequently anticipated that any 
appropriate amendments will be resolved in advance, for a complete resolution of 
the issues at one trial.

[¶54.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 In accord with the rule 
for consideration on appeal of summary judgment, this court will review the 
evidence as originally received and considered by the trial court. Fiedler v. 
Steger, supra.

2 We have cause to wonder 
whether some sheepherder at the bottom of RedCanyon is now utilizing the bus as a way 
station. Of interest, but not of record, is the geographical fact that 
RedCanyon, in the vicinity of Lander, Wyoming, encompasses an 
irregular, sloped drop of more than a thousand feet. It is a substantial and 
scenic canyon, and a convenient road access to the bottom of the canyon area 
does exist. A vehicle, if not held up in going down, would be severely dented in 
reaching the bottom. However, it would still have value, and would normally be 
retrieved. Depending upon where a vehicle might go off into the RedCanyon, if still there it could probably 
be seen by casual examination from the overlook at the 
top.

3 The three alternatives 
of the creditor which we name here are listed in Eggeman v. Western National 
Bank, supra, as alternative remedies four and five. Alternative remedies one 
through three from the Eggeman opinion do not apply in this 
case.

4 We quote from Greenough 
v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., supra, the description of the affidavit which was 
submitted in that case:

"* * * [A]fter the 
recitation of his membership in the Bar and experience, [the affiant attorney] 
sets out the following:

"`That in Affiant's 
experience the normal attorney's fee awarded by the courts in mortgage 
foreclosure actions is 10 percent of the principal and interest due 
thereon.

"`That in Affiant's 
opinion 10 percent of the principal and interest in the present action or the 
sum of $47,737.33 is a reasonable attorney's fee.'" 531 P.2d  at 
503.

5 This court has adopted 
the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility, as amended 
by the American Bar Association and Wyoming State Bar, as the ethical standards 
relating to the practice of law in this state. The code includes factors "to be 
considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee." They 
are:

"(1) The time and labor 
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;

"(2) The likelihood, if 
apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;

"(3) The fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar legal services;

"(4) The amount involved 
and the results obtained;

"(5) The time limitations 
imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

"(6) The nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client;

"(7) The experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services;

"(8) Whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent." Rule 20, Amended Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming Providing for the Organization and 
Government of the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of 
Wyoming, DR 
2-106(B).

This court in 
Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., supra, was encouraged to require a 
claimant to introduce evidence of all the above factors, but declined that 
invitation, saying:

"We view this section [of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility] as helpful and pertinent to the problem 
of the determination of a reasonable attorney's fee but do not adopt this as a 
rule of evidence for such determination." 531 P.2d  at 504.

See also DeWitt 
v. Balben, Wyo., ___ P.2d ___ 

Nos. 85-127 and 
85-128 (decided April 23, 1986).