Title: Haderlie v. Sondgeroth

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Haderlie v. Sondgeroth1993 WY 155866 P.2d 703Case Number: 91-114Decided: 12/15/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
David 
L. HADERLIE and J.P. Robinson, d/b/a Jack Knife Ranch and Construction, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

James 
A. SONDGEROTH, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

 

R. 
Michael Mullikin (argued) of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for 
appellants.

Gerald 
R. Mason (argued) of Mason & Graham, and William H. Twichell (argued), 
Pinedale, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

Thomas, 
J., filed dissenting opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This was a suit 
by appellee James Sondgeroth to recover personal injury damages resulting from 
his automobile striking a horse that had earlier been struck and killed by 
appellant Haderlie near Bondurant, Wyoming. Two defendants, the owner of the 
horse and owner of the land where the horse was pastured, had settled prior to 
trial and were dismissed from the case. Each was on the verdict form and found 
to be 0 percent at fault. This appeal is from a judgment on the $375,000 jury 
verdict without credit for the sums paid by the defendants who settled before 
trial.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants raised 
the following issues which were presented to the court in the first oral 
argument:

1. 
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that David L. Haderlie had 
a legal duty to take reasonable steps to warn appellee and other motorists, or 
guard against the danger, of the horse obstructing the highway and in refusing 
appellants proposed Instructions Nos. 7 and 9.

2. 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence the prior 
pleadings and settlement agreements of appellee which admitted the fault of 
co-defendants Sleeping Indian Outfitters, Inc. and Paul Anselmi, which 
co-defendants had settled with appellee, as judicial admissions under Rule 801, 
W.R.E., and on the issue of damages.

3. 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the attorney for appellants 
to cross-examine the plaintiff with his prior pleadings and with the settlement 
agreements between appellants and co-defendants, Sleeping Indian Outfitters, 
Inc. and Paul Anselmi.

4. 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the attorney for appellants 
to advise the jury of the fact of the settlements and the terms thereof, which 
appellee had made with the former co-defendants, Sleeping Indian Outfitters, 
Inc. and Paul Anselmi, on the basis of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (1977), 
which requires the court, when requested, to inform the jury of the consequences 
of its verdict.

5. 
Whether the trial court erred in entering judgment for the full amount of the 
jury verdict without crediting appellants for the aggregate amount received by 
appellee from the settling co-defendants.

6. 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the "sudden emergency" 
instruction proffered by appellants.

7. 
Whether the verdict of the jury finding appellants one hundred percent (100%) at 
fault is supported by the evidence. [emphasis in original]

[¶4]      After argument, 
conference and discussion among the justices, it became apparent that the most 
significant and critical issue presented was whether the amounts paid appellee 
by the settling defendants should be credited upon the judgment against 
appellants Haderlie, et al. Therefore, on February 11, 1993, we ordered 
additional briefing and argument requiring that

each 
of the parties shall submit a brief addressing the applicability, if any, of the 
following: Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-108 (1988); Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 
1989); and, such other additional authorities as the parties may choose to 
present. Each party may submit a brief in reply 15 days thereafter. And it 
is,

     FURTHER ORDERED that 
this matter shall then be set for argument before the Court at its earliest 
convenience.

Order 
Directing Additional Briefing and Argument (Feb. 11, 
1993).

Facts

[¶5]      On the evening of 
October 29, 1987, appellant David Haderlie was driving a truck northbound on 
U.S. 191 near Bondurant, Wyoming. Appellant came upon a dark-colored horse in 
his lane of traffic. Before he could take evasive action, appellant struck and 
killed the horse. When appellant struck the horse, the hood of his vehicle flew 
up. He pulled to the side of the road and discovered that his truck was 
inoperable. Appellant shut the hood of his truck, turned on his flasher lights, 
walked to the horse, and discovered that it was dead. He began to walk toward 
some lights for help when he came upon another pickup truck coming down a side 
road towards the highway. He informed the group in that truck that he had hit a 
horse. Appellant and the group then drove to the highway to move the horse from 
the center of the road.

[¶6]      The group parked 
on the side of the road, and, while there, another vehicle was approaching where 
the horse lay. Appellant testified at trial that someone turned the flashers on 
in the group's pickup and flashed the headlights to warn the approaching 
vehicle. This testimony, however, was impeached on cross-examination and not 
corroborated by others in the group. The highway patrol officer testified that 
one minute and thirty seconds had passed between the time that appellant and the 
group in the truck had seen the vehicle approaching before it hit the 
horse.

[¶7]      Appellee James 
Sondgeroth was driving the approaching vehicle. He noticed a truck pulled over 
with just the yellow running lights on. Appellee testified that there were no 
flashing or blinking lights. Appellee passed the pickup, his vehicle struck the 
dead horse in the road, and he became "air-borne."

[¶8]      Appellee suffered 
severe injuries in the accident consisting of cervical spine fractures, a 
dislocation of vertebral bodies with nerve injury, and a severe concussion. 
Appellee brought suit against: appellant, the driver of the first vehicle; 
appellant's employer, J.P. Robinson, d/b/a Jack Knife Ranch and Construction 
(appellants); and Sleeping Indian Outfitters, the owner of the horse. Appellee 
later amended his complaint to join Paul Anselmi, the owner of the property 
where Sleeping Indian Outfitters pastured this horse. Sleeping Indian Outfitters 
and Paul Anselmi settled with appellee before trial and were dismissed from the 
suit.

[¶9]      Appellee 
proceeded to trial against appellants. After hearing the evidence, the jury 
returned its verdict finding fault as follows: appellee 0 percent, appellants 
David Haderlie and J.P. Robinson d/b/a Jack Knife Ranch and Construction 
(Haderlie) 100 percent, Paul Anselmi 0 percent, and Sleeping Indian Outfitters 0 
percent. The jury found that $375,000 was the amount of damages sustained by 
appellee and that appellants were liable for 100 percent of the 
damage.

[¶10]   Appellants challenge the judgment 
below on several grounds. Their initial primary focus on appeal was directed to 
whether or not appellants should have been allowed to introduce evidence of the 
settlements with other defendants that occurred prior to trial. Upon rebriefing 
and reargument, the primary focus of the appeal has shifted to the issue of 
credit upon the judgment for payments made by the settling defendants. The 
parties in their additional briefs filed pursuant to the court's order agreed 
that the issue presented was clearly stated in issue five above 
as:

Whether 
the trial court erred in entering judgment for the full amount of the jury 
verdict without crediting appellants for the aggregate amount received by 
appellee from the settling co-defendants.

This 
is the issue we discuss first.

Entry 
of Judgment without Settlement Credit

[¶11]   Appellants argue that the trial 
court erred in entering judgment for the amount of the verdict without first 
deducting the amount appellee received from Paul Anselmi and Sleeping Indian, 
the settling defendants.

[¶12]   In this case, prior to trial, 
appellee settled for the sums shown and dismissed his case 
against:

(a) 
Sleeping Indian Outfitter (horse owner) $195,000

(b) 
Paul Anselmi (pasture owner)    
     10,000

   ________ 

     Total agreed upon 
settlement       $205,000

Thereafter, 
the case was tried to a jury against appellant David Haderlie and his employer, 
the only defendants remaining, with the settling participants listed on the 
verdict form. The jury returned the following verdict:

(a) 
Sleeping Indian percentage of fault                   
0%

(b) 
Paul Anselmi percentage of fault                       
0%

(c) 
David Haderlie and J.P. Robinson, dba Jack Knife Ranch and Construction 
percentage of fault             
                                                            
100%

Total 
damages suffered by Sondgeroth                 
$375,0001

Thus 
the jury found that the settling defendants owed appellee nothing since they 
were 0 percent at fault. The settling defendants, in hindsight, paid more than 
this jury found they owed. Aside from the law (which is clear), the policy 
question presented is who should receive the benefit of the $205,000 paid by the 
settling parties. Should it be:

(a) 
Returned to Anselmi and Sleeping Indian? The parties' settlement agreement does 
not provide this result.

(b) 
Should that defendant, who took his chances on trial and who was found 100 
percent at fault, receive a $205,000 credit? If he does, he will only pay 45 
percent of the judgment rather than the 100 percent found due. If this is the 
result, tortfeasors will hold off settling to get credit for the payment of 
others. There will be little incentive to settle.

(c) 
Should it go to the injured plaintiff? He gambled that the settlement would be 
right - if [¶1.]          
it is less, he loses - if it is more, he gains.

 [¶13]  Prior to 1986, joint tortfeasors were 
jointly and severally liable for damages payable to an injured party. Thus, all 
parties liable were jointly obligated for the total damage and each party was 
individually obligated to pay the total damage. An injured party, not at fault, 
could recover his entire judgment (100 percent) from a five percent negligent 
party. With joint and several liability, there was the right of contribution 
among tortfeasors found in W.S. 1-1-110(b) (1977), which 
provided:

(b) 
The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more 
than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is 
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor 
is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire 
liability.

The 
five percent negligent party, having paid 100 percent of the judgment, then had 
a right of contribution under W.S. 1-1-110(b) and could recover from the 95 
percent negligent party the 95 percent of the judgment paid by the five percent 
party.

[¶14]   In 1986, the Wyoming legislature 
abolished joint and several liability by amending W.S. 1-1-109 to provide that a 
party at fault be required to pay for only his proportionate share of the fault 
- in the above example, five percent. At the same time, W.S. 1-1-110(b) 
providing for contribution among tortfeasors was repealed. Wyoming Statute 
1-1-109, as now amended, provides in pertinent part:

(d) 
Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total 
dollar amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him 
under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section. [emphasis 
added]

and 
§ 1-1-109(b)(i) and (ii) provides:

(b) 
The court may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) 
If a jury trial:

(A) 
Direct the jury to find separate verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a 
party; and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) 
If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party.

By 
repeal of W.S. 1-1-110(b), the legislature has clearly and unambiguously stated 
that appellants may not have help paying this judgment by way of contribution 
from other tortfeasors. If help in paying the judgment is not available by way 
of contribution, consistency would demand that such help be unavailable by way 
of a credit upon the judgment. Whether called contribution or credit, we speak 
of the same thing, i.e., someone else paying part of the 
judgment.

[¶15]   With the amendment of W.S. 
1-1-109(d), W.S. 1-1-110(b) providing for contribution was repealed and for good 
reason, for after joint and several liability was abolished, no tortfeasor would 
ever pay more than his proportionate share of a judgment. Thus, there would 
never be a need for contribution or for credit upon a judgment. Credit would not 
be given because the amount of judgment for which each defendant is liable is 
always limited by the percentage of fault assigned to that defendant. Therefore, 
as a matter of law, Haderlie can have no credit upon the judgment for sums paid 
by others because Haderlie, if and when he pays 100 percent of this judgment, 
will not pay more than the "percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him" 
by the jury in its verdict finding him 100 percent at 
fault.

[¶16]   The cases we cite to support our 
conclusion are the only cases that treat the situation existing after repeal of 
joint and several liability. These cases are the better reasoned and the 
developing majority in states like Wyoming that have abolished joint and several 
liability. Of necessity and as a matter of law, they differ substantially from 
states still retaining joint and several liability and contribution among 
tortfeasors. A recent Arizona case is nearly identical to this case. See Roland 
v. Bernstein, 171 Ariz. 96, 828 P.2d 1237 (App. 1991) (review denied May 5, 
1992). This Arizona court reaches a result identical to that reached by us. In 
Roland, the plaintiff sued a neurosurgeon, an anesthesiologist, and the 
hospital. The anesthesiologist and the hospital settled for $700,000 each. 
Roland, 828 P.2d  at 1238. The neurosurgeon and his professional corporation 
remained in the case for trial. The jury awarded $1,965,000 damages and 
apportioned fault as follows: neurosurgeon 47 percent; anesthesiologist 28 
percent; and the hospital 25 percent. Id. The trial court allowed the 
neurosurgeon to reduce the total judgment by the amount of the prior 
settlements. Thus, the trial court subtracted from $1,965,000 (the judgment) 
$1,400,000 (the settlement) and entered judgment for $565,000 instead of 
$923,550 (47 percent of the $1,965,000). The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. 
Id.

[¶17]   Roland was tried under a recent 
Arizona statute in which the Arizona legislature, as did the Wyoming 
legislature, abolished joint and several liability and limited recovery against 
any defendant to that percentage of the plaintiff's damages representing that 
defendant's degree of fault. Id., citing A.R.S. § 12-2506. The court stated that 
under the new statute, there is no contribution because "each defendant is 
liable only for the portion of the injury he caused, not the whole injury; no 
two are liable for the same injury." Roland, 828 P.2d  at 1239 (citing Kussman v. 
City and County of Denver, 706 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1985)). The rationale of the 
court of appeals is persuasive:

[W]e 
believe that it would be anomalous to give the benefit of an advantageous 
settlement, not to the plaintiff who negotiated it, but to the nonsettling 
tortfeasor. Had plaintiff made a disadvantageous settlement, she would have 
borne that consequence because her recovery against [the neurosurgeon] would 
have been limited to $923,550. At a minimum, symmetry requires that if the 
disadvantage of settlement is hers so ought the advantage be. Beyond that, we 
see no reason why a nonsettling tortfeasor ought to escape the liability that is 
his by reason of the faulty assessment of probabilities by a settling 
tortfeasor. Indeed, such a rule might well discourage settlement by the last 
tortfeasor on the reasoning that his exposure is limited to his degree of fault 
and even that might be reduced by reason of preexisting settlements. These 
considerations have led most courts considering this question to apply the rule 
we are adopting.

Roland, 
828 P.2d  at 1239.

[¶18]   We have acknowledged that guidance 
in interpreting the Wyoming legislation can be found in court decisions from 
states which have, like Wyoming, based their statute on Wisconsin's. Board of 
County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1190 (Wyo. 1981). Minnesota's 
comparative negligence statute was adopted from Wisconsin's. Id., see also 
Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190, 196 
(1976).

[¶19]   Minnesota faced a similar argument, 
that credit for settlements with other defendants should be given for the 
benefit of the nonsettling defendant. While Minnesota has adopted Wisconsin's 
basic comparative negligence scheme, it has not, as in Wyoming, abolished joint 
and several liability. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.02 (West Cum.Supp. 1991). Instead, 
Minnesota allows the use of a Pierringer release which allows a joint 
tortfeasor under joint and several liability to settle for his share "without 
fear that the nonsettling defendant will later have a contribution claim against 
him[.]" Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Minn. 
1980).

[¶20]   When settlement is pursuant to a 
Pierringer release, Minnesota has held that a nonsettling defendant is 
not entitled to credit the amount of settlement from settling defendants against 
the judgment he must pay. The situation is thus analogous to our case. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has said, "we believe it would be inequitable to allow 
defendant, the nonsettling party, to profit from a settlement agreement between 
plaintiff and third-party defendant." Shantz, 311 N.W.2d  at 156. The rationale 
followed by the Minnesota Supreme Court is relevant here. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court has said:

     In this case, the 
settling parties misgauged what the jury's verdict would be and O'Neill's Bar 
paid "too much" for its release. This observation, however, is as idle as most 
hindsight pronouncements. Judged as of the time the settlement was made, 
weighing the risks as then understood, the settlement amount was "just right." 
In accepting the settlement payment, the plaintiff accepted the likelihood of 
being under-compensated as well as being over-compensated. If the jury had 
determined the amount of the O'Neill's Bar fair share at more than O'Neill paid 
for its release, the Croatian Club, as the nonsettling defendant, would have 
been relieved of the obligation of making up the difference. * * * [I]f 
subsequent events sometimes result in a so-called "windfall" for plaintiff, that 
result is acceptable within the context of the law's strong policy to encourage 
settlement of disputes. * * * The nonsettling defendant, hoping the jury would 
provide a "windfall" which would work to its advantage, would also have a 
further reason for not settling its own liability 
exposure.

Rambaum 
v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn. 1989). See also Thurston v. 3K Kamper Ko., 
Inc., 482 A.2d 837, 842 (Me. 1984).

[¶21]   The policy choice is clear. 
Appellants are liable for 100 percent of the verdict. The jury said so. 
Appellants are asked to pay that amount, no more. Appellee's contractual 
settlements with others is not appellants' concern. Common sense, logic and 
justice tells us that if the injured party must suffer the loss that might 
result from settlement, he should benefit from the gain. This is the result 
mandated by law. It is the best result. We hold that entry of the judgment 
without credit for the payments of the settling parties was proper and in accord 
with the jury's verdict and Wyoming law.

Does 
W.S. 1-1-108 Provide Credit?

[¶22]   The singular question next 
presented results from an issue we raised and upon which we requested additional 
briefing and heard argument. It is, does W.S. 1-1-108 (1988) provide for a 
credit to a party upon a judgment for payments made by another in settlement of 
the claim of an injured person?

[¶23]   Section 1-1-108 provides as 
follows:

1-1-108. 
Voluntary partial payment of liability claims.

[¶24]   No voluntary partial 
payment of a claim based on alleged liability for injury or property 
damage shall be construed as an admission of fault or liability, or as a waiver 
or release of claim by the person receiving payment. Such payment is not 
admissible as evidence in any action for the purpose of determining the amount 
of any judgment, with respect to the parties to the occurrence from which the 
claim arose. Upon settlement of the claim, the parties may make any agreement 
they desire in respect to all voluntary partial payments. After entry of 
judgment, any such payment shall be treated as a credit and deducted from the 
amount of the judgment. If after partial voluntary payments are made it 
is determined by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction that the 
payor is liable for an amount less than the voluntary payments already made, 
the payor has no right of action for the recovery of amounts by which the 
voluntary payments exceed the final judgment. No voluntary partial 
payments shall be construed to reduce the amount of damages which may be pleaded 
and proved in a court proceeding between the parties. [emphasis 
added]

[¶25]   It is with some considerable 
reluctance that we undertake resolution of the right to credit under W.S. 
1-1-108, for perhaps it is no longer an issue presented to us by the parties. 
Appellants, who would benefit from a credit provided by W.S. 1-1-108, stated 
candidly in oral argument that they could not in good conscience argue that § 
1-1-108 provided credit upon the judgment for payment by Sleeping Indian and 
Anselmi and, in his brief, stated: "Appellants do not contend that Section 
1-1-108 of the Wyoming Statutes applies to the payments made by the settling 
defendants." Appellee also forcefully asserts that W.S. 1-1-108 does not provide 
credit to appellants upon the judgment for payments by Sleeping Indian and 
Anselmi. We could stop here, but failure to resolve the issue would be a 
disservice to citizens and the bar of Wyoming. 

[¶26]   Before W.S. 1-1-108 became an issue 
in this case, practitioners in the tort field generally accepted § 1-1-108 as 
providing a means for a potentially liable defendant or his insurance carrier to 
pay medical bills and other damages immediately after an injury and during 
recovery without the necessity of the injured party filing a legal action. The 
statute is beneficial to an injured party who can receive partial payments of 
medical bills, lost earnings and other loss promptly without using his own 
funds, borrowing, or facing bankruptcy for large medical expense he is unable to 
pay. It is beneficial to the potentially liable party who can aid the injured 
person during recovery, act reasonably, maintain good relations with the injured 
person, and perhaps settle the claim, avoiding the substantial cost and expense 
of litigation and trial. Thus, W.S. 1-1-108, when it uses the plural "parties," 
clearly refers only to the injured party and the "payor" settling party. There 
is not a reference or a hint of reference in the language of W.S. 1-1-108 that 
it also establishes rights of third parties who are not payors and have given 
nothing to the injured party. The statute then protects the party paying (payor) 
by providing a credit for all payments and prohibiting use of voluntary payment 
to establish liability. It protects the injured party in allowing litigation if 
settlement is not achieved.

[¶27]   Yet we must concede that the 
following language in the statute, "[a]fter entry of judgment, any such payment 
shall be treated as a credit and deducted from the amount of the judgment," 
taken out of context, can have two meanings. The credit might be available only 
to the party paying (payor), or credit "deducted from the amount of the 
judgment" may refer to any judgment against any other person. If we accept the 
claim of two possible interpretations, the statute is ambiguous, and we must 
proceed to ascertain the intent of the legislature in its enactment. Our rules 
of statutory interpretation and construction are well 
established.

In 
interpreting statutes, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must abide by the plain meaning of the statute. Adobe Oil & Gas Corporation 
v. Getter Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984). If a statute is ambiguous, 
however, we will resort to general principles of statutory construction in the 
effort to ascertain legislative intent. State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521 
(1984). A statute which is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning is 
ambiguous. McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985). In addition, we have 
said that "[s]tatutes should be given a reasonable, practical construction." 
State Board of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805, 
809 (1980). Further, "all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and 
every word, clause and sentence of it must be considered so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous," Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(1985), and a statute should not be construed to render any portion of it 
meaningless, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 766 
(1986), or in a manner producing absurd results, State v. Sodergren, 
supra.

Story 
v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶28]   First, W.S. 1-1-108 discloses an 
intent to encourage partial voluntary payments by potential tortfeasors to 
injured persons as a positive step toward settlement of the claim. The statute 
provides for protection of the parties' interests in that making partial 
payments and negotiations resulting in such partial payments (a) are not to be 
construed as an admission of fault; (b) are not admissible as evidence in any 
action for the purpose of determining the amount of any judgment; and (c) such 
payments are treated as credits if a larger judgment is entered. A strong public 
policy has always existed in Wyoming favoring settlement of litigation. Coulter, 
Inc. v. Allen, 624 P.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Wyo. 1981); Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam 
Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶29]   Next, the statute, in providing 
that partial payments are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of 
determining the amount of judgment, surely would refer to a judgment against the 
payor and evidences a legislative intent that credit only belongs to a defendant 
who makes the voluntary partial payment. Other defendants would have no need to 
be protected from the use of the voluntary payment in determining the amount of 
the judgment. Indeed other defendants might want to use evidence of such 
payments to shift liability and fault to codefendants.

[¶30]   The next clear indication of 
legislative intent that this statute applies only between a party paying and a 
party being paid is found in the language dealing with voluntary payments that 
are less than the amount of the judgment and voluntary payments which exceed the 
amount of the judgment. If the voluntary payments are less than the amount of 
the judgment, clearly it is the payor who is entitled to credit for his 
payments. And if the amount of the judgment is less than the voluntary payments, 
it is the payor who is clearly identified as having no right of credit or 
recovery back. Thus, W.S. 1-1-108 specifically states:

If 
after partial voluntary payments are made it is determined by final judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction that the payor is liable for an 
amount less than the voluntary payments already made, the payor 
has no right of action for the recovery of amounts by which the voluntary 
payments exceed the final judgment. [emphasis added]

The 
specific use of the term "payor" suggests that, throughout the statute, 
reference to parties is a reference to payors, i.e., parties paying, and refers 
to the amount of a judgment entered against a "payor." The "payor" under the 
statute must remain in the case for there to be a judgment against him, and it 
would be strange indeed if his voluntary payment was credited against the total 
judgment and not first against his portion thereof. Thus, the clear legislative 
intent is that the voluntary payments accrue only to the benefit or detriment of 
the payor of voluntary payments. The statute makes no mention of third parties 
who pay nothing as being either benefitted or harmed by the party paying and the 
injured party.

[¶31]   The statute specifically provides 
that the person who made the voluntary payments (payor) cannot recover the 
excess amount of the payments (surely a windfall to the injured party). It 
stretches credulity to even suggest that, in spite of a prohibition against 
getting back an overpayment of total damage, it would be proper for other 
defendants, who chose not to make any such payments, to be able to recover the 
same sum by means of a deduction "from the amount of the 
judgment."

[¶32]   The statute, when read in its 
entirety and in view of its purpose, demonstrates a clear legislative intent 
that credit for voluntary payments be made only against the amount of the 
judgment entered against a "payor."

Introduction 
of Pleadings or Settlement Agreements As "Judicial 
Admissions"

[¶33]   Objections to appellants' offer 
into evidence of the pleadings and settlement agreements of Anselmi and Sleeping 
Indian Outfitters were sustained. These documents were offered in an apparent 
attempt to establish negligence on the part of Anselmi and Sleeping Indian 
Outfitters. Appellants argue that the trial court should have admitted prior 
pleadings and settlement agreements as "judicial admissions." The admission of 
evidence at trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo. 1989); L.U. Sheep 
Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶34]   W.R.E. 408 
provides:

Evidence 
of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of 
the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require 
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias 
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. [emphasis 
added]

 Thus, 
under W.R.E. 408, evidence concerning settlements "is not admissible to prove 
liability." "Rule 408 is founded on public policy to encourage out of court 
settlements and is in the nature of a privilege." Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 624 P.2d  at 1202 (citing the Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 408). The 
"evidence of an offer to compromise is irrelevant since it may be motivated by a 
desire for peace, rather than any concession of weakness." Hursh Agency, Inc. v. 
Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d  at 36. See also McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 84 A.L.R.Fed. 259 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Advisory Committee Note to 
Fed.R.Evid. 408). The policy reasons for excluding settlement negotiations are 
so strong that courts have said "[g]enerally, statements regarding settlement 
negotiations are considered to be highly prejudicial and are typically 
sufficient grounds for a mistrial." Georgia Casualty and Sur. Co. v. White, 582 So. 2d 487, 494 (Ala. 1991). New trials are often granted where evidence of 
settlement was admitted. See McInnis, 765 F.2d  at 246.

[¶35]   Although W.R.E. 408 does 
allow evidence of settlement to be admitted if not offered to 
prove liability, this exception should be used sparingly, with due care. 
Weinstein's Evidence notes:

[c]are 
should be taken that an indiscriminate and mechanistic application of this 
"exception" to Rule 408 does not result in undermining the rule's public policy 
objective. The almost unavoidable impact of the disclosure of such evidence is 
that the jury will consider the offer or agreement as evidence of a concession 
of liability. * * * The trial judge should weigh the need for such evidence 
against the potentiality of discouraging future settlement 
negotiations.

2 
J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408[05] at 408-31 (1991). Because of the 
potential prejudice "when the issue is doubtful, the better practice is to 
exclude evidence of compromises or compromise offers." Bradbury v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987).

[¶36]   Appellants contend that the 
agreements should have been admitted for the jury to correctly apportion fault 
among the settling and nonsettling defendants. The admission would have been 
highly prejudicial. The settlement agreements are not evidence of negligence or 
fault, yet the jury could have interpreted the settlement agreements as an 
admission of fault of a party not at fault at all. Further, were we to approve 
the admission of these settlement agreements, there would be a very real risk 
that parties would be deterred from settling future cases because of a fear that 
their agreement would be received in evidence and become public knowledge, 
thereby compromising goals in settling, i.e., not admitting liability in 
exchange for peace and plaintiff not having liability established detrimental to 
the continuing case against nonsettling defendants. Thus, attempts at settlement 
would be chilled. Appellants fail to articulate an acceptable reason for 
admitting the settlement agreements other than proving liability which is 
impermissible under W.R.E. 408.

[¶37]   Next appellants contend that they 
should have been allowed to introduce appellee's original complaint and 
pleadings which contained the settling defendants as parties. Appellants argue 
that the pleadings constitute "judicial admissions" that Sleeping Indian 
Outfitters, Inc. and Paul Anselmi were at fault and should have been admitted 
under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(C). W.R.E. 801 relates to hearsay. W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(C) 
provides:

(d) 
Statements which are not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay 
if:

* 
* * * * *

(2) 
Admission by Party-Opponent. - The statement is offered against a party and is * 
* * (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning 
the subject[.]

[¶38]   Appellee alleged negligence on the 
part of Anselmi and Sleeping Indian Outfitters in the amended complaint. After 
settlement, the complaint was again amended to allege negligence only of 
appellants. Under W.R.C.P. 82 a party "may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency[.]" W.R.C.P. 
8(e)(2). Therefore, it was proper for appellee to include Sleeping Indian and 
Anselmi in the original complaint and later amend the complaint to eliminate 
claimed negligence on their part. Appellee took advantage of the liberal modern 
pleading rules and pled in the alternative.

[¶39]   Appellants cite Louisell and 
Mueller stating that "pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and responses to 
requests for admissions filed on behalf of a party in a civil action generally 
qualify as admissions by the party." 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, § 425, p. 
302 (1980 and 1992 Supp.). Although appellants quote Louisell and Mueller, they 
fail to recognize limitations placed upon the introduction of pleadings. 
W.R.C.P. 8 allows parties to plead hypothetically, inconsistently, and in the 
alternative. Therefore, when an inconsistency in pleading is present because of 
the liberal modern pleading rules, use of "the pleading as an evidential 
admission should be disallowed." Louisell and Mueller at p. 
306.

[¶40]   In a products liability case, the 
defendant attempted to introduce statements made by the plaintiff in his 
complaint as judicial admissions. Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
reliance on the pleadings was not proper because the pleadings "provide little 
real evidence of the liability of the settling defendants, [and] they provide no 
evidence upon which a jury could determine the percentage or extent of 
liability[.]" Whatley, 861 F.2d  at 839. This argument against admitting 
pleadings is especially applicable here because the trial court found that the 
pleadings were in the alternative, were not admissions, and had no probative 
value. Furthermore, the appellants' attempts to introduce the pleadings into 
evidence were in reality an attempt to allude to the settlement agreements which 
were inadmissible. The trial court properly refused admission of the settlement 
agreements and pleadings.

Use 
of Settlement Agreements For Impeachment in 
Cross-Examination

[¶41]   Appellants next claim that they 
should have been allowed to use the pleadings and the settlement agreements to 
cross-examine appellee. The trial court ruled that use of the settlement 
agreements in cross-examination of appellee was not permissible under W.R.E. 403 
because the risk of prejudice in introducing the settlement agreements 
outweighed their probative value. We leave evidentiary rulings to the discretion 
of the trial judge, reviewing only whether there has been a clear abuse of that 
discretion. Waggoner, 771 P.2d  at 1200. Appellants have not identified a clear 
abuse of discretion. The trial court properly served the policy behind both 
W.R.E. 408 and 403 by ruling that the settlement agreements were not available 
for impeachment during the cross-examination of appellee.

[¶42]   Appellants concede this issue in 
their reply brief. They admit they should not contest the trial court's decision 
to deny cross-examination of appellee with the settlement agreements because 
they are not appealing the damage award portion of the verdict. After this 
significant concession, however, appellants argue that "there were numerous 
other opportunities during the trial for cross-examination with respect to the 
pleadings." Appellants do not support this claim with examples in the record 
where such cross-examination would have been appropriate. They do not advance 
cogent argument but, rather, unsupported assertion. This court will not review 
incomplete assertions. Arguments must be reasoned, supported, and refer to the 
record. As we have said before "[t]his perfunctory argument does not rise to the 
level of cogent argument supported by pertinent authority, which we have stated 
many times is a requirement for consideration by this court." Weisbrod v. Ely, 
767 P.2d 171, 176 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 
1988)).

Advice 
to Jury Regarding Consequences of its Verdict Under Section 
109

[¶43]   Appellants claim that the trial 
court should have informed the jury of the facts surrounding the claim and 
settlement and the amount of the settlement with Anselmi and Sleeping Indian 
Outfitters to satisfy its obligation to inform the jury of "the consequences of 
its determination of the percentage of fault" as required by W.S. 
1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (1988).

[¶44]   The phrase in our statute which 
requires the judge to "[i]nform the jury of the consequences of its 
determination of the percentage of fault" is atypical. It is not found in states 
which have a similar comparative negligence statute. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
895.045 (West 1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-702 (1991); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 
23, § 13 (West 1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01 (West 1991); N.D. Cent. Code § 
9-10-07 (1987).

[¶45]   Wyoming Statute 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) 
provides:

The 
court may, and when requested by any party shall:

* 
* * * * *

Inform 
the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

[¶46]   The trial court gave the following 
instruction to the jury:

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7

The 
case must be determined on the basis of comparative fault of the parties 
involved in the occurrence. * * *

* 
* * * * *

It 
will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of fault, if any, of each 
of the parties involved in the occurrence. It also will be necessary for you to 
determine the amount of damages sustained [by] the 
plaintiff.

Your 
findings as to fault will affect the plaintiff's recovery. It is my duty to 
explain how that may occur.

First, 
should you determine that if the plaintiff's fault exceeds fifty percent, the 
plaintiff will not be entitled to recover any damages.

Second, 
the defendant's liability for damages is limited by the percentage of fault 
which you determine is attributable to him and he will only be liable to pay 
that percentage of the total damages.

In 
explaining the consequences of your verdict, the court has not 
meant to imply that any of the parties are at fault. That is for you to decide 
in conformity with these instructions. [emphasis added]

[¶47]   Appellants did not object to 
Instruction No. 7. W.R.C.P. 513 provided in 
part:

At 
the close of the evidence, or at such earlier time as the 
court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. A direction by 
the court that requests be filed prior to the close of the evidence shall not 
preclude any party from filing any subsequent request necessitated by the 
evidence and not reasonably anticipated by the party prior to the time of 
filing. Before the argument of the case to the jury is begun, the court shall 
give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be necessary and same shall 
be in writing, numbered and signed by the judge, and shall be taken by the jury 
when it retires. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make any such 
objection out of the hearing of the jury. [emphasis added]

The 
purpose of W.R.C.P. 51 is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to 
correct any potential error by requiring that objections be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1289 
(Wyo. 1985).

[¶48]   Appellants did present a motion 
before trial that the trial court instruct the jury concerning the settling 
defendants on the grounds that the jury was entitled to know the consequences of 
its determination as to the percentage of fault. Appellants' motion was not 
presented at the close of evidence, per W.R.C.P. 51, nor did appellants object 
to Instruction No. 7. The motion, therefore, did not satisfy the requirement of 
W.R.C.P. 51 and did not adequately make the trial court aware of a potential 
error in sufficient time to be corrected. The procedural problem with making the 
objection in the form of a motion preceding the instruction conference, rather 
than an objection at the instruction conference, is made obvious in this record. 
We are unable to locate a ruling on this particular motion. Perhaps the trial 
court considered this motion to be similar to one previously ruled on and 
therefore assumed it was implicitly denied. Appellants did not request a ruling 
from the trial court. They may have assumed it had been previously ruled upon as 
well. The loss of continuity in the handling of this motion makes clear that a 
motion for a jury instruction cannot take the place of presentation of an 
alternative instruction or an objection at the instruction 
conference.

[¶49]   Even if appellants had not failed 
procedurally in their opposition to Instruction No. 7, their argument would fail 
substantively. We hold that Instruction No. 7 was properly given and accurately 
informed the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault as required by W.S. 1-1-109(b)(i)(B).

[¶50]   Appellants' disagreement with the 
instruction centers on their interpretation of "consequences of its 
determination of the percentage of fault" in W.S. 1-1-109(b)(i)(B). Under 
appellants' interpretation, this phrase would encompass informing the jury of 
the fact and amount of settlement with other entities no longer parties to the 
litigation. This statutory language has been interpreted in practice as 
requiring only that the jury be told that if the plaintiff's percentage of 
negligence is more than 50 percent, the plaintiff will not recover and that a 
defendant who is liable will only pay in proportion to his percentage of fault. 
See Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 10.01A, 10.03A (1988). Instruction 
No. 7 is nearly identical to Instruction Nos. 10.01A and 10.03A of the Wyoming 
Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.

[¶51]   In Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1987), we held that the language allows the trial court to inform 
the jury of the consequences of its verdict by giving an instruction on the law 
of joint and several liability as affected by percentages of negligence. 
Coryell, 745 P.2d  at 886. In Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1987), 
we followed our previous Coryell interpretation of the phrase in Section 
114.

[¶52]   Harmon and Coryell were decided 
under the 1977 version of W.S. 1-1-109 and 1-1-114. Harmon, 745 P.2d  at 892. In 
1986 the legislature eliminated the doctrine of joint and several liability and 
substituted a provision that "each defendant is liable only to the extent of his 
percentage of fault as compared to all other actors whether or not parties to 
the action." Joint Liability - Repeal, 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
24.

[¶53]   In Harmon and Coryell we viewed 
this phrase as a part of the joint and several liability scheme about which the 
court should inform the jury. The same reasons for allowing the court to inform 
the jury of the effect of joint and several liability exist for informing the 
jury of the effect of a defendant's percentage of negligence under the amended 
comparative fault scheme.

[¶54]   The jury is to be informed of the 
consequences of its determination of the plaintiff's percentage of fault, 
defendant's and other actors' percentages of fault, only in the context of 
explaining that the court will reduce the amount of damages by the percentage of 
fault attributed to the plaintiff and that each defendant is liable only for the 
proportion of total damages determined by the percentage of fault attributed to 
that defendant. Informing the jury of those consequences is all that the phrase 
encompasses. In cases in which the jury will determine percentage of negligence 
of several persons, some parties and some not, care should be exercised to 
assure that the jury is not left with the impression that plaintiff has, has 
not, or will not recover from persons not parties to the case before them. This 
is in accord with W.R.E. 408. If a better public policy would be to inform the 
jury of more concerning settling defendants, then that ought to be accomplished 
by amendment to the Wyoming Rules of Evidence or by legislative enactment. 

Appellee's 
Remark in Closing Argument

[¶55]   In closing argument appellee 
argued:

no 
matter how much you find the damages to be, he will recover only the amount that 
you attribute to the Defendants. Amounts that you attribute to anybody else, to 
Crittenden or to Anselmi or to Sleeping Indian, he recovers none of 
that.

Appellants 
argue that this remark was prejudicial and, as a result, the jury did not 
accurately understand the consequences of its verdict. No objection was made to 
this argument at trial. This court has held "improper argument of counsel cannot 
be raised or urged for reversal in the absence of an objection." Coryell, 745 P.2d  at 886, quoting Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362, 364 (Wyo. 
1972).

[¶56]   The remark made by appellee at 
trial was an attempt to explain Instruction No. 7. However, appellee went beyond 
what was contained in Instruction No. 7 and arguably hinted that appellee can be 
compensated for his injuries only by appellants. It is true that he can recover 
compensation in this lawsuit only from appellants. It is not true that he cannot 
recover from others in another case or has not recovered compensation. This 
remark was improper, and appellee's counsel should not have made it. If counsel 
persists in this type of argument, the opposing party, upon timely objection, 
should be permitted to respond. However, there was no objection here and no 
effort by appellants to respond in argument. Also, appellants have not 
demonstrated that this single remark resulted in substantial prejudice to their 
case. The instructions given did accurately instruct the jury on the law. One 
sentence in a closing argument in all likelihood escaped the notice of the jury, 
and since they had the correct law in hand in the form of Instruction No. 7, 
there was no prejudice. We presume the jury followed the instructions and not a 
single sentence spoken in closing argument. In addition, Instruction No. 8 
required the jury to determine the percentage of fault attributable to Sleeping 
Indian or Paul Anselmi even though they did not appear or offer evidence. The 
settling defendants' names appeared on the verdict form. Appellants were 
afforded the opportunity to argue their negligence. Thus, there was no 
prejudicial error in the argument.

Jury 
Instructions

[¶57]   Appellants tendered the following 
proposed instructions in relevant part:

PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION NO. [7]

[T]he 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence:

1. 
That, following the time he struck the horse, Defendant David L. Haderlie 
breached a duty owed to Plaintiff and was, thereby, 
negligent;

2. 
That Defendant Haderlie, by his negligence, increased the risk of harm to which 
Plaintiff and other motorists were subject after he struck the 
horse;

3. 
That the negligence of Defendant David L. Haderlie was a proximate cause of 
injury and damage to the Plaintiff * * *.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. [9]

At 
the time and place of the accident, Plaintiff James Sondgeroth had a duty to 
operate his vehicle with ordinary care and to maintain a proper look out as that 
term is defined to you in other instructions.

At 
the time and place of the accident, after David L. Haderlie struck the horse, 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute, he had the following duty:

The 
driver of any vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident with any 
vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage to the 
other vehicle or other property shall immediately stop and shall immediately 
either locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or other property 
of his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving or 
shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on the vehicle or other 
property a written notice giving his name, address and the registration number 
of the vehicle he is driving. Every stop shall be made without obstructing 
traffic more than is necessary. David L. Haderlie had no duty to warn James 
Sondgeroth of the condition which existed on the highway following his 
non-negligent striking of the horse. However, if you find that David L. Haderlie 
attempted to come to the aid of James Sondgeroth and other motorists, he had 
only a duty to not increase the risk of harm to which James Sondgeroth and other 
motorists were subject following his striking of the 
horse.

[¶58]   The trial court refused both 
instructions. This court has consistently recognized that "a party is entitled 
to have a jury instruction upon its theory of the case but only if such theory 
is supported by competent evidence." Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 894 (Wyo. 
1989), quoting Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 
1987). We find that the evidence in this case did not support the theory under 
which appellants offered either instruction and they were thus properly refused 
by the trial court.

[¶59]   With proposed Instruction No. 7, 
appellants were attempting to instruct the jury on the standard of care owed by 
a volunteer who comes across a dangerous situation. Appellants cited Ellsworth 
Bros., Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1965). However, the circumstances in 
Ellsworth which invoked a volunteer standard of care were not present here. In 
Ellsworth, Crook saw the cattle on the road and was "herding them back to the 
owner's property[.]" Ellsworth, 406 P.2d  at 523. Crook moved the cattle as a 
volunteer and unlike Haderlie did not have a duty to do so because he was not 
involved in creating the danger. Therefore, we find that appellants' proposed 
Instruction No. 7 was properly refused.

[¶60]   Instruction No. 9 was based on the 
statutory duty of a driver in an accident as found in W.S. 31-5-1104 (1989). The 
trial court rejected proposed Instruction No. 9 stating "[t]he statutory section 
cited pertains to striking an unattended vehicle or property, and it relates to 
the driver's duty to the owner of that vehicle or property and does not relate 
to the duty [to] other motorists. It is inapplicable, for those reasons, and is 
not being given." The trial court's refusal of both proposed instructions was 
not error.

[¶61]   Appellants also contend that the 
trial court erred in refusing to give the following "sudden emergency" 
instruction which appellants offered:

Where 
a person finds himself or herself confronted with a sudden emergency, which was 
not brought on about his or her own negligence or want of care, such person has 
a legal right to do what appears to him or her at the time he or she should do, 
so long as he or she acts in a reasonable manner as any other person would have 
done under like or similar circumstances, to avoid an injury; and if he or she 
does so act, he or she will not be deemed to have been negligent even though it 
might afterwards be apparent that some other course of action would have been 
safer.

The 
trial court refused the instruction and reasoned that:

This 
Court does not deem that there has been any evidence of a sudden emergency. 
That's more applicable to a driver's suddenly finding someone in his own lane, 
or a spot of ice that he's onto, or something very immediate. In this case, 
there was an attenuation of approximately ten minutes of time from the time that 
Mr. Haderlie struck the horse until the Plaintiff struck the horse; and the 
Court does not deem that to be a sudden emergency.

The 
trial court's reasoning is logical and supported by this court's case law. See 
Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez, 508 P.2d 595, 601 (Wyo. 1973). Mr. Haderlie knew of 
the dangerous condition for a period of time, at least a minute and a half, 
before the second accident which negates any showing that an unknown or 
unforeseen condition arose unexpectedly. Holly Sugar, 508 P.2d  at 601. All three 
instructions were properly refused because they were not adequately supported by 
the evidence or the law, and the ruling of the trial court was 
correct.

Percentage 
of Fault was Supported by the Evidence

[¶62]   Appellants contend that the jury 
verdict finding appellants 100 percent at fault was not supported by the 
evidence. We begin our examination of their contention with our standard of 
review for fact findings of a jury:

We 
assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of 
consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable 
inference to the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it. In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to 
the jury the duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflicts therein and 
drawing its own inferences if more than one inference is 
permissible.

Woodbury 
v. Nichols, 797 P.2d 556, 558 (Wyo. 1990), quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co., 
Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Wyo. 1982). After a 
careful and thorough review of the record, we find that the jury's apportionment 
of fault was supported by substantial evidence. Appellants argue that, because 
of the evidence presented, the jury should have found at least some percentage 
of fault attributable to the settling defendants. Several facts in the record 
defeat this contention.

[¶63]   There was evidence to show that 
settling defendant Anselmi did not have notice that there was a defect in his 
fence because the horses had been successfully contained in that fence for the 
two weeks prior to the accident. In addition, there was evidence that when Paul 
Crittenden of Sleeping Indian, Inc. learned of the break in the fence the night 
of the accident, he repaired the fence that same evening.

[¶64]   The jury's determination that 
appellants were 100 percent at fault is supported by the record. In our review 
of appellant's testimony it is likely that the picture he painted of the events 
was not found credible by the jury. He explained one series of events in his 
deposition and a different version upon direct examination. Plaintiff's counsel 
seemed to be successful in impeaching appellant on the inconsistencies, thus 
making the jury doubt his credibility. In addition, there was evidence that one 
minute and thirty seconds passed from the time appellant saw appellee's 
headlights approaching before appellee hit the horse. The question of the 
proximate cause of the accident was before the jury. The jury most likely 
determined that there was sufficient time for appellant to have warned the 
oncoming vehicle, and had he warned him, the second accident would not have 
occurred. In sum, we find that the evidence in the record is sufficient to 
support the jury's assignments of percentage of fault in this 
case.

Conclusion

[¶65]   This jury's finding two settling 
defendants 0 percent at fault and the nonsettling defendant 100 percent at fault 
was supported by the evidence. Appellants are not entitled to credit for the 
settlement reached between the plaintiff and the settling defendants and 
therefore must pay the judgment as rendered. None of the errors alleged 
substantiated appellants' claim that they did not receive a fair trial. They had 
the opportunity to argue the fault of the settling defendants, and the jury 
nevertheless found otherwise. Appellants may not benefit from a settlement by 
the plaintiff with actors not parties in the case.

[¶66]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶67]   I must dissent from the majority 
opinion in this case. I am satisfied the intent of the Wyoming legislature is 
being frustrated rather than implemented. The assumption that the Wyoming 
legislature would abrogate joint and several liability to assure a joint 
tortfeasor never pays more than his pro rata share of damages and, at the same 
time, intend that an injured person should receive $205,000 more than the total 
damages as determined by the jury does not ring true for me. Consequently, I 
offer my thoughts with the hope they may be of some use to the legislature in 
correcting the inequities the majority has injected into our system of tort 
litigation by this decision. In addition, I am satisfied plain error is present 
with respect to the jury instructions, and the case should be reversed for that 
reason, as well as for the failure to implement legislative 
policy.

[¶68]   I identify the following areas of 
concern in this case: 

1. 
The failure of the majority to recognize plain error did occur in the jury 
instructions referring to parties, when the statute clearly requires reference 
to actors.

2. 
The failure to credit the amounts paid by the actors who settled against the 
determination of damages by the jury, thus approving a double recovery, which 
the legislature must have assumed it was foreclosing when it amended WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-1-109 in 1986 to abolish joint and several liability and at the same time 
did away with the statutes providing for contribution.

3. 
The failure of the majority to construe consistently WYO.R.EVID. 408 and WYO. 
STAT. § 1-1-108 by applying the rule to non-parties while limiting the 
application of the statute to parties.

4. 
The failure of the majority of the court to implement the legislative intent 
that a tortfeasor would not pay more than that person's percentage share of the 
damages as determined by the jury.

[¶69]   The major fallacy found in the 
majority opinion lies in this statement from of the slip 
opinion:

With 
the amendment of W.S. 1-1-109(d), W.S. 1-1-110(b) providing for contribution was 
repealed and for good reason, for after joint and several liability was 
abolished, no tortfeasor would ever pay more than his proportionate share of a 
judgment.

If 
the situation is analyzed in terms of damages rather than judgments, it is 
obvious that, in this instance, Haderlie or Sleeping Indian or Anselmi or, 
perhaps, all of them have paid more than a proportionate share of the damages. 
It is an evasion of the issue to contend that perhaps the total damages were 
more than $375,000 because we must rely on the determination of that figure by 
the jury.

[¶70]   In this case, the analysis is made 
substantially more difficult by plain error that occurred in the jury 
instructions. It must be remembered Sleeping Indian and Anselmi no longer were 
parties to the litigation after settlement was accomplished. Nevertheless, the 
jury was advised in Instruction No. 7 as follows:

[¶71]   The case must be determined on the 
basis of comparative fault of the parties involved in the 
occurrence.

* 
* * * * *

     It will be necessary 
for you to determine the percentage of fault, if any, of each of the parties 
involved in the occurrence. It also will be necessary for you to determine the 
amount of damages sustained [by] the plaintiff.

     Your findings as to 
fault will affect the plaintiff's recovery. It is my duty to explain how that 
may occur.

     First, should you 
determine that if the plaintiff's fault exceeds fifty percent, the plaintiff 
will not be entitled to recover any damages.

     Second, the 
defendant's liability for damages is limited by the percentage of fault which 
you determine is attributable to him and he will only be liable to pay that 
percentage of the total damages.

     In explaining the 
consequences of your verdict, the court has not meant to imply that any of the 
parties are at fault. That is for you to decide in conformity with these 
instructions. (Emphasis added.)

The 
word "parties" in the second and last paragraphs clearly refers only to 
Sondgeroth and Haderlie, the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. The jury was 
never told to determine the fault, if any, of any other "actor whether or 
not a party."

[¶72]   The correct treatment of these 
matters is set forth in WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988) as 
follows:

Comparative 
negligence.

     (a) Contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not 
more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person 
recovering.

(b) 
The court may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) 
If a jury trial: 

(A) 
Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount 
of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or 
not a party; and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

* 
* * * * *

     (d) Each defendant is 
liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount determined as  attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) 
or (ii) of this section.

The 
failure of the trial court to couch the instructions in the terms of the statute 
constitutes plain error in this instance and, for a correct result to be 
achieved, even under the majority analysis, a reversal is 
demanded.

[¶73]   Haderlie's persistent efforts to 
apprise the jury of the existence of these two "actors" should have been treated 
as a request to the court to give the directive to the jury to apportion fault 
among all "actors." Placing the horse owner and pasture owner on the verdict 
form with no explanation as to their being "actors," while at the same time 
instructing the jury to apportion liability only among the parties, structured 
an unacceptable result. This feature, alone, serves to distinguish this case 
from Roland v. Bernstein, 171 Ariz. 96, 828 P.2d 1237 (Ct.App. 1991), relied 
upon by the majority. It is obvious a correct instruction was provided to the 
jury in that case. Glossing over this significant deviation from the statutory 
mandate on the ground Haderlie failed to object to it evades the responsibility 
of this court to rationally develop the law. Even worse is the suggestion that 
it is a proper instruction in the face of glaring departures from statutory 
requirements.

[¶74]   Additionally, the fourth paragraph 
of the instruction quoted above, telling the jury that if Sondgeroth is 
determined to be over fifty percent at fault he cannot recover any 
damages, implies Sondgeroth will receive no remuneration at all, if he 
should not recover from Haderlie, because Haderlie is the only other "party" to 
the lawsuit. Adding insult to injury is Sondgeroth's attorney's remark in his 
closing argument "explaining" the trial court's instruction in paragraph 
four:

If 
you attribute 50 and a half percent of the fault to Jim [Sondgeroth], he's going 
to get nothing.

     The second thing is 
that no matter how much you find the damages to be, he will recover only the 
amount that you attribute to the Defendants. Amounts that you attribute to 
anybody else, to Crittenden or to Anselmi or to Sleeping Indian, he recovers 
none of that. He gets the percent times the damages that you attribute to 
the Defendants.

     So, if you put in 
there two percent, and you have $100,000 of damages, he will get $20,000, 
period, in the sum. You just need to be aware of the effect of your verdict, and 
I want you to know that. (Emphasis added.)

Even 
the majority states "care should be exercised to assure that the jury is not 
left with the impression that plaintiff has, has not, or will not recover from 
persons not parties to the case before them." At 716. Obviously, care was not 
taken in this regard. The result, in this case, was that the jury apportioned 0% 
fault to both Sleeping Indian and Paul Anselmi and 100% fault to 
Haderlie.

[¶75]   In light of this explanation of the 
impact of the erroneous instruction, the failure to credit the amounts paid by 
the settling actors becomes much more critical. The instructional error would be 
cured by such a credit.

[¶76]   The legislature now has departed 
from a rational and comprehensive statutory scheme, even though it was arbitrary 
and complex in some of its aspects. It has left us essentially with a 
legislative policy that:

     Each defendant is 
liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount determined as damages 
under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the percentage of the amount 
of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section.

WYO. 
STAT. § 1-1-109(d).

[¶77]   The product of the legislative 
adjustments has led this court to adopt a common law indemnity rule in part 
because the legislature did away with our earlier contribution statute. 
Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992). In this 
regard, it is noted California has held that the common-law equitable indemnity 
doctrine should be modified to permit, in appropriate cases, a right to partial 
indemnity under which liability among multiple tortfeasors may be apportioned on 
a comparative negligence basis. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978). 
Having invoked common law indemnity in Schneider, I am satisfied this court must 
develop a rational and comprehensive plan for the actors collectively to pay the 
total damages. I am satisfied our history and our precedent leads to the 
ineluctable conclusion that there is only one recovery for the damages to an 
injured person. The ceiling on that "pot of gold" is the damages awarded by the 
jury. The "pot of gold" can be no larger than that, in this instance, $375,000. 
The next task is to determine how those who are perceived to be responsible for 
a plaintiff's injuries must contribute to the payment of those 
damages.

[¶78]   In Schneider, we held, when one of 
those actors achieves a settlement with the plaintiff, even though the damages 
were not determined by a jury, that actor can seek to be indemnified by others 
perceived to be responsible. It is logical the same result should flow if the 
actor proceeds to a jury determination of those damages rather than agreeing 
with the plaintiff as to the amount. In this instance, we have a situation in 
which the others achieved a settlement with the plaintiff and, in accordance 
with Schneider, those settling actors would be entitled to seek indemnity from 
Haderlie and J.P. Robinson, d/b/a Jack Knife Ranch and Construction, for the 
amounts they had paid since the jury found them not at fault. The missing 
factor, of course, is an adjudication among the settling actor or actors and the 
other actors as to relative fault. I recognize the jury apparently addressed 
that question in this case, although the jury may have eliminated those who were 
not parties in the case. It is clear, however, that none of the actors, 
Haderlie, Robinson, Anselmi, or Sleeping Indian, are bound by that judgment, as 
among them, because Anselmi and Sleeping Indian were dismissed from the case 
upon settlement.

[¶79]   The majority completely ignores our 
decision in Schneider. In Schneider, this Court agreed with the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming that "indemnity is still available in 
Wyoming despite the repeal of contribution in 1986." Schneider, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 843 P.2d  at 570. We held that indemnity liability is to be allocated among 
the parties proportionately to their comparative degree of fault in negligence 
causes of action. Schneider.

[¶80]   From the perspective of this time 
and these cases, it would seem the legislature was too optimistic in its 
assumption that the responsibility of the several actors would be settled in one 
case by one verdict. It is obvious the legislature did not account for the 
creativity of experienced practitioners at the bar. Any anticipation that the 
several tortfeasors would agree to hang together is fallacious, and there is a 
compelling interest by the injured party to see to it that they hang 
separately.

[¶81]   While the possible combinations are 
myriad, it is clear from both this case and Schneider that it is possible for 
the parties to avoid having a jury arrive at the apportionment of fault with all 
parties present and defending their positions. In Schneider, the issue never got 
to a jury. In this case, the issue got to a jury, but Anselmi and Sleeping 
Indian were not present, and the debate before the jury essentially was only the 
fault of those who were present in the courtroom. It is easy to understand how a 
jury could find no fault on the part of those actors who were not even parties 
to a lawsuit. That is demonstrated by the effective, but inappropriate, argument 
of counsel for the plaintiff in this case, in which the jury was told, in 
substance, that Sondgeroth could not recover any portion of his damages from 
those actors who were not parties. This argument is simply an example of a 
potential for injustice which must be accounted for in developing rational and 
cohesive rules for the application of relative fault under our statute. 

[¶82]   In Schneider, we adopted 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1979) to justify our adoption of equitable 
indemnity. It would be consistent, in this case, to also adopt the RESTATEMENT 
rule for crediting the settlements against the judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 885, at 333 (1979) states:

Effect 
of Release of or Payment by or on Behalf of One of Several 
Tortfeasors

(1) 
A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by the 
injured person, does not discharge others liable for the same harm, unless it is 
agreed that it will discharge them.

(2) 
A covenant not to sue one tortfeasor or not to proceed further against him does 
not discharge any other tortfeasor liable for the same 
harm.

(3) 
A payment by any person made in compensation of a claim for a harm for which 
others are liable as tortfeasors diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors, 
at least to the extent of the payment made, whether or not the person making the 
payment is liable to the injured person and whether or not it is so agreed at 
the time of payment or the payment is made before or after judgment. 
(Emphasis added.)

This 
rule simply provides for a pro tanto credit of the settlement amounts against 
the verdict in entering judgment. We have been committed to the RESTATEMENT as a 
source of common law rules for a number of years. We need to remember that the 
several rules found in the RESTATEMENT are interwoven and designed to function 
together. Consequently, it seems appropriate in this situation to turn to the 
rule set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 
(1979).

[¶83]   Subsection (3) is further analyzed 
in Comments e. and f. as follows:

     e. Payments made by 
one of the tortfeasors on account of the tort either before or after judgment, 
diminish the claim of an injured person against all others responsible for the 
same harm. This is true although it was agreed between the payor and the injured 
person that the payment was to have no effect upon the claims against the other. 
If the payment is made as full satisfaction for a specified item of damage, the 
claim against the others is terminated with respect to that item. If it is 
agreed that the payment is to satisfy the payor's proportion of the total claim, 
the claim against the others is diminished in that proportion, if this is 
greater than the amount paid; if the proportion is less than the amount paid, 
the claim against the others is diminished by the amount paid, irrespective of 
the agreement.

     f. Payments made by 
one who is not himself liable as a joint tortfeasor will go to diminish the 
claim of the injured person against others responsible for the same harm if they 
are made in compensation of that claim, as distinguished from payments from 
collateral sources such as insurance, sick benefits, donated medical or nursing 
services, voluntary continuance of wages by an employer, and the like. These 
payments are commonly made by one who fears that he may be held liable as a 
tortfeasor and who turns out not to be. Less frequently they are made by a 
stranger, who wishes to compensate the plaintiff or to protect one tortfeasor 
against a possible judgment. The older rule was that the payments did not 
diminish the claim, which in effect allowed double compensation to the plaintiff 
on the basis of inconsistent positions taken toward different persons. This has 
now generally given way to the rule stated, that the claim is diminished if 
compensation was intended. This is consistent with the general holding as to 
accord and satisfaction of contracts. (On Subsection (3) in general, see § 
920A).

RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 885, at 335-36 (emphasis added).

[¶84]   The only area of debate which, in 
either case, assumes prior settlement credit differentiates pro tanto credit and 
pro rata credit. Pundzak, Inc. v. Cook, 500 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1993); Wadle v. 
Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1981). See T.J. Oliver, Annotation, Manner of 
Crediting One Tortfeasor with Amount Paid by Another for Release or Covenant Not 
to Sue, 94 A.L.R. 352 (1964). See also Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. UOP, 
Inc., 861 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1988). PROSSER agrees, stating: "[I]t is 
everywhere agreed that the amount received must be credited pro tanto against 
the amount to be collected." W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 48, at 331 (1984). The Reporter's Note to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 states with respect to subsection 
(3):

     Subsection (3): 
Payments made by the released tortfeasor in partial satisfaction of the 
plaintiff's claim must be credited to diminish pro tanto the amount of damages 
recoverable against others not released.

RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS APPENDIX § 885, at 164 (1982).

In 
this regard a number of additional cases are cited including Natrona Power Co. 
v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924).

[¶85]   A persuasive discussion of the 
general law is found in Glidden v. German, 360 N.W.2d 716 (Iowa 1984). That 
court first determined general comparative law concepts did not change 
principles of credit resulting from tortfeasor settlement and then determined 
that the historical Iowa rule of a pro tanto application against the verdict 
existed. The case is interesting because the Iowa legislature had enacted a pro 
rata credit provision, which was inapplicable to that particular case, in a 
section which otherwise was similar to our repealed WYO. STAT. § 1-1-113, but 
differing in a pro rata proviso rather than pro tanto as our repealed statute 
provided. Iowa had legislatively moved beyond the Uniform Joint Contribution Act 
to legislate the pro rata provision. Wyoming has nothing remaining in its 
statutory scheme that is comparable. By repeal of the statute we have returned 
to the common law long extant.

[¶86]   There are various methods that are 
invoked to arrive at a proper award when some, but not all, of the joint 
tortfeasors have settled, but precedent favors limiting the injured person to a 
net recovery by subtracting the amount of the settlement from the jury verdict. 
See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Comparative Fault: Calculation of Net Recovery 
By Applying Percentage of Plaintiff's Fault Before or After Subtracting Amount 
of Settlement by Less Than All Joint Tortfeasors, 71 A.L.R.4th 1108 (1989). 
According to one work specifically addressing the rules surrounding comparative 
negligence, there are four approaches that can be invoked with respect to the 
deduction of settlements from a jury's verdict. Each of the four approaches has 
been invoked by some jurisdiction. JOHN JAMES PALMER & STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 4.180 (rev. ed. 1974-1986). According to the 
authors, the first method is to reduce the judgment by the amount actually paid 
by the settlor; the second method is to reduce the judgment by the percentage 
share of fault of the settlor; the third method is to reduce the judgment by 
either the amount stipulated in the settlement agreement or the amount paid in 
consideration for the release, whichever is greater; and the fourth method is to 
reduce the judgment by a "reasonable" amount paid in settlement. The authors 
note that the first method is rarely used, but a respectable minority of 
jurisdictions that do invoke this method can be identified. These include 
Arizona (by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2503 to -2504 (1984)); Maine 
(Dongo v. Banks, 448 A.2d 885 (Maine 1982)); Massachusetts (Boston Edison Co. v. 
Tritsch, 370 Mass. 260, 346 N.E.2d 901 (1976)); Montana (Boyken v. Steele, 256 
Mont. 419, 847 P.2d 282 (1993)); and West Virginia (Biro v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., 
184 W. Va. 458, 400 S.E.2d 893 (1990)). The second method is to reduce the 
judgment by the percentage of fault, which is the method used under the 
comparative fault act. The third method is essentially in vogue in California 
and New York, and the fourth method is a relatively new approach which does not 
seem to be followed by courts, although apparently it has been invoked by the 
Washington legislature.

[¶87]   While perhaps either the first 
method or the third method would assist the resolution of our dilemma, the first 
method is exactly what WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 provides. The third method primarily 
is used where the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is in place, and 
our legislature specifically has repealed that statute. It should be noted that 
the New Mexico Court of Appeals has concluded the second method, also known as 
the proportionate fault rule, is the best system to adopt since the contribution 
statute no longer is in effect. Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 
(Ct.App. 1983).

[¶88]   Lost in the debate up to this point 
is WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 (1988), which provides:

Voluntary 
partial payment of liability claims.

No 
voluntary partial payment of a claim based on alleged liability for injury or 
property damage shall be construed as an admission of fault or liability, or as 
a waiver or release of claim by the person receiving payment. Such payment is 
not admissible as evidence in any action for the purpose of determining the 
amount of any judgment, with respect to the parties to the occurrence from which 
the claim arose. Upon settlement of the claim, the parties may make any 
agreement they desire in respect to all voluntary partial payments. After 
entry of judgment, any such payment shall be treated as a credit and deducted 
from the amount of the judgment. If after partial voluntary payments are 
made it is determined by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
that the payor is liable for an amount less than the voluntary payments already 
made, the payor has no right of action for the recovery of amounts by which the 
voluntary payments exceed the final judgment. No voluntary partial payments 
shall be construed to reduce the amount of damages which may be pleaded and 
proved in a court proceeding between the parties. (Emphasis 
added.)

I 
recognize that the invocation of this statute is awkward, since even the 
appellants eschew reliance upon it. I submit, however, that, in the context of 
the legislative tinkering with the concepts of contribution and joint and 
several liability, this language is clear and unambiguous. The statute should be 
dispositive in this case as to whether the amounts paid in settlement should be 
credited against the judgment. Certainly, the language of the statute supports 
the proposition that an injured plaintiff is entitled to only one 
recovery.

[¶89]   The majority argues Wyoming's 
statute on voluntary partial payment of liability claims applies only to 
"parties." However, they do concede the statute is ambiguous because the 
language, "[a]fter entry of judgment, any such payment shall be treated as a 
credit and deducted from the amount of the judgment," can be interpreted two 
ways. In this regard, the majority states:

The 
credit might be available only to the party paying (payor), or credit "deducted 
from the amount of the judgment" may refer to any judgment against any other 
person.

Op. 
at 711.

In 
finding that a non-settling defendant is not entitled to a credit from others' 
payments or prior settlements, the majority relies on "court decisions from 
states which have, like Wyoming, based their statute on Wisconsin's." Op. at 
709. In its holding, however, the majority relies primarily on three decisions 
from the Minnesota Supreme Court as controlling. Because Minnesota has not 
abolished joint and several liability as Wyoming has done, the majority's 
reliance on these cases is, at best, speculative and, at worst, artificial. The 
majority's reliance on Bernstein is also misplaced because, in that case, the 
jury apparently had enough information before it to apportion 28% and 25% fault, 
respectively, to two actors who settled before trial. Because of the 
instructional error, the same situation is not involved in this 
case.

[¶90]   I would opt for interpreting WYO. 
STAT. § 1-1-108 to allow any payments by any party or any other "actor" to be 
credited against a plaintiff's total damage award. This view comports with 
Wyoming's longstanding policy that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation from 
all wrongdoers, but with one satisfaction for his damages. See Day v. Smith, 46 
Wyo. 515, 30 P.2d 786 (1934); Natrona Power, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586; see also 
Kirby Bldg. Systems v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). 
Generally, the case law holds that an injured plaintiff is not entitled to a 
second recovery for payments already made in satisfaction of his total damages. 
Consequently, I would hold WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 requires payments made in 
partial satisfaction of a plaintiff's claim must be credited against any 
remaining liability to prevent double recovery. See also Sanders v. Cole 
Municipal Finance, 489 N.E.2d 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).

[¶91]   Moreover, in my opinion the 
majority's insistence on applying WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 solely to the "parties" 
is more appropriate when construing WYO.R.EVID. 408 in this case. At the very 
least, the statute and the rule should be construed consistently. If the statute 
is limited to parties to the action, the rule should be similarly limited. WYO. 
R.EVID. 408 provides:

     Evidence of (1) 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution.

The 
majority construes this rule to preclude evidence of settlements of both parties 
and non-parties from being presented to the jury unless one of the exceptions 
applies. However, McCORMICK takes an antithetical 
viewpoint:

The 
rule is available as an objection to one who made the offer and is a party 
to the suit in which the evidence is offered.

     To invoke the 
exclusionary rule, there must be an actual dispute, preferably some 
negotiations, and at least an apparent difference of view between the 
parties as to the validity or amount of the claim. (Emphasis 
added.)

McCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 266, at 194 (John W. Strong ed., 4th Practitioner's ed. 1992).1

As 
to the admissibility of settlements with third parties, McCORMICK 
states:

A 
settlement which is offered as proof of the liability of a third party, 
arising out of the transaction in suit, is not within the privilege since 
the evidence will not harm the parties to the compromise. (Emphasis 
added.)

MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 266 n. 24.

A 
New Jersey court, relying on the above language, had this to 
say:

The 
admission of this evidence [third-party settlement of Firestone] could not 
undermine the policy of encouraging settlements, because it was not offered 
against one of the parties to the settlement. * * * Stated another way, 
since Firestone was not a party to the lawsuit and hence could not be held 
liable, evidence of the settlement was not offered "to prove [Firestone's] 
liability for the loss" within the intent of Rule 52. See McCormick, supra 
[McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3 ed. 1984) § 274] at 813 n. 23 ("A settlement which is 
offered as proof of the liability of a third party, arising out of the 
transaction in suit, is not within the privilege since the evidence will not 
harm the parties to the compromise.") (Emphasis added.)

Wyatt 
By Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580, 526 A.2d 719, 722 (Ct.App. Div. 
1987).

[¶92]   The facts of our case justify the 
invocation of this rule. The horse owner and the pasture owner made their 
"deals" with plaintiff Sondgeroth prior to trial. Unlike an offer to compromise 
or settlement negotiations which did not culminate in a final settlement 
agreement prior to trial, these two settlements were entered into by "actors" 
"arising out of the transaction in suit" who agreed to pay a sum certain in 
damages to Sondgeroth. Despite disclaimers on the settlement agreements 
themselves, these settlements evidence some "liability" or responsibility for 
Sondgeroth's total damages, but only up to the amount offered and accepted by 
Sondgeroth.

[¶93]   The policy reason for excluding a 
settlement offer at trial is obvious: It is for the jury to determine liability 
and damages. This policy is not present when the damages owed by other "actors" 
will not be determined by the jury. The horse owner, the pasture owner, and 
Sondgeroth agreed among themselves what those damages would be and sealed it in 
a binding contract. At this point, there is no longer an inadmissible, 
speculative offer to settle which could mislead or prejudice the jury. Rather, 
this is evidence of a fait accompli which "will not harm the parties to the 
compromise." Accordingly, the existence of these two settlements should have 
been divulged to the jury because the "actors" who settled with Sondgeroth were 
not parties to the suit and, consequently, could not be held liable by the 
jury.

[¶94]   Even if I were to agree that the 
trial court properly excluded the settlements under WYO.R.EVID. 408, I would 
still find them admissible as an exception to the rule. The exception portion of 
the rule states:

This 
rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. (Emphasis added.)

WEBSTER'S 
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 1983) defines "such" as "of a kind 
or character to be indicated or suggested." Thus, because the list of exceptions 
is not exhaustive, I would hold that the existence of the settlement agreements 
should have been made known to the jury for it to correctly apportion fault 
among the settling "actors" and the "parties" to the lawsuit - or to state it 
another way - to prevent anything more than a full, 100% recovery by a 
successful plaintiff.

[¶95]   I fail to see how the jury's 
knowledge of these settlements could be prejudicial to the parties in the suit 
or how such knowledge could chill future attempts at settlement. In fact, in 
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978) (citing from Connar v. West 
Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 68 Wis.2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1975), the 
court apparently found that the remaining defendants in the lawsuit could be 
prejudiced without such evidence, when it stated:

     In almost every case 
the trial court should submit to the jury the fault of all parties, including 
the settling defendants, even though they have been dismissed from the lawsuit. 
If there is "evidence of conduct which, if believed by the jury, would 
constitute negligence [or fault] on the part of the person * * * inquired 
about," the fault or negligence of that party should be submitted to the 
jury.

See 
also Moser v. Wilhelm, 300 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1980).

[¶96]   In any event, I would find the jury 
was not properly informed of the consequences of its determination of the 
percentage of fault in this case as required by WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B); 
nor was the jury properly instructed as to its duty to determine the percentage 
of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party under section 
(b)(i)(A) of the statute. I would find this latter omission by the trial court, 
in tandem with the untoward remark by Sondgeroth's attorney in his closing 
argument, to be plain error requiring reversal and remand.

[¶97]   In 1986, the Wyoming legislature 
abolished joint and several liability by amending WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 to 
provide that:

(d) 
Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar 
amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under 
paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section. (Emphasis 
added.)

When 
requested by any party, the plain language of section (b)(i) of the statute 
commands the court to:

     (A) Direct the jury to 
find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the 
percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; 
and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault. (Emphasis added.)

Sections 
(b) and (d) of the amended statute are interrelated and, when read together, the 
logical inference is that the legislature wanted each responsible "actor," 
whether or not a plaintiff or defendant, to be apportioned a percentage of fault 
by the jury.

[¶98]   The legislature's repeal of joint 
and several liability came in response to the decision in Kirby, 704 P.2d 1266. 
Apparently, the legislature thought it was inequitable that two tortfeasors, who 
were found to be 55% negligent, would have to pay 95% of the plaintiff's 
damages. Thus, with comparative negligence, if a plaintiff cannot recover from 
one tortfeasor because he is bankrupt, for example, the plaintiff bears the loss 
and may obtain his damages only from the remaining tortfeasors, if any. In this 
case, the jury assessed 100% of the fault to defendant Haderlie while two other 
"actors" agreed before trial to pay $205,000 in damages. This $205,000 accounts 
for approximately 55% of the $375,000 total damage award. Yet, Haderlie is 
supposed to pay 100% amounting to the full $375,000 in damages, which includes 
the 55% payment ($205,000) ascribed and agreed to by others. Thus, as the 
verdict stands, Haderlie will have to pay 100% of the plaintiff's damages when 
two other tortfeasors are arguably 55% negligent. This result is deja vu from 
Kirby and, in my opinion, the same perversity the Wyoming legislature was trying 
to eliminate when it abolished joint and several liability in 1986. Also, after 
placing the burden of any non-recovery on the plaintiff by abolishing joint and 
several liability, it would be incongruous if the legislature impliedly 
authorized a plaintiff to recover 155% in damages at the same time. I cannot 
believe the legislature intended these anomalies.

[¶99]   The legislature's repeal of WYO. 
STAT. § 1-1-110(b), which provided a right of contribution among tortfeasors, 
clearly was perceived as consistent with the implementation of a system where 
each responsible party was to pay only his pro rata share of a plaintiff's total 
damages. Assuming the jury had the requisite knowledge of the other "actors" 
settlement agreements to be able to apportion some fault to them, application of 
indemnity liability, I believe, would have achieved a better result. It seems 
clear, from other jurisdictions which reduce the judgment by the percentage of 
fault of settling actors, that this knowledge is given to the jury in some form 
or the settling actors themselves participate in the trial where fault is 
apportioned.

[¶100] Because any fault of the settling "actors" was 
inadmissible at trial, because the jury was not instructed to consider the 
liability of other "actors" based on settlements totaling $205,000, and because 
the jury was led to believe Sondgeroth would recover nothing if not from 
Haderlie, the jury rationally - but inappropriately - attributed all the fault 
to Haderlie. In any event, someone is going to have to pay more than a 
proportionate share of the judgment of $375,000, which presumably compensates 
Sondgeroth completely for his injuries.

[¶101] If the rule of partial equitable indemnity from 
Schneider is applied correctly, it follows that Haderlie has an action to 
recover 55% or $205,000 from the settling actors that he would pay on their 
behalf. If the settling actors had to pay Haderlie back, then they would end up 
paying $410,000 (double the settlement payments) and should in turn be permitted 
to seek recoupment from Sondgeroth for $205,000. If Sondgeroth were required to 
pay the $205,000 to the settling actors, then all have paid the correct amount 
according to the jury verdict, and we have come full circle. Credit should have 
been given against the total judgment which would leave only one step, the 
seeking of common law indemnity from Sondgeroth if, in fact, Anselmi and 
Sleeping Indian were found not at fault in an action involving them as parties 
with Haderlie.

[¶102] I would hold the jury was not properly informed 
of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault in this case 
as required by WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B); nor was the jury properly 
instructed as to its duty to determine the percentage of fault attributable to 
each actor whether or not a party under subsection (b)(i)(A) of the 
statute. I would find this latter omission by the trial court, in tandem with 
the untoward remark by Sondgeroth's attorney in his closing argument, to be 
plain error requiring reversal and remand.

[¶103] In light of what I perceive is a clear, but 
frustrated, legislative policy, the legislature either should reinstate a 
statute providing for contribution and indemnity consistent with the policy 
advanced by abolishing joint and several liability or it should make clear that 
rules found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS are applicable in Wyoming. This 
would require the re-enactment of WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 to clearly provide for 
crediting of all amounts paid in settlement against any judgment. Hopefully, the 
legislature will correct the chaotic state of the law this court has structured. 
The sword of justice is double edged, and any rule that permits the sword to cut 
in only one direction is inappropriate because the thrust of the rule of law is 
dulled.

FOOTNOTES

1 Parenthetically, I must add that I am not convinced $375,000 was 
appellee's total damages. It was just the amount this jury would award against 
this lone defendant. Had there been three defendants against whom the jury could 
award damages, I am convinced the total verdict would be greater - and most 
experienced trial counsel will agree this is true.

2 Amended March 24, 1992.

3 Amended March 24, 1992.

 

FOOTNOTE 
for the Dissent

1 In a footnote, however, McCormick acknowledges that "[t]he cases in 
general do not display much concern as to the basis of the rule." McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 266 n. 2.