Title: SUNSHINE CUSTOM PAINTS & BODY, INC., a Wyoming corporation; CYCLONE DRILLING, INC., a Wyoming corporation; and M & J SERVICES, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. SOUTH DOUGLAS HIGHWAY WATER & SEWER DISTRICT, a governmental unit of the State of Wyoming; and THE CITY OF GILLETTE, WYOMING, a Municipal Corporation and City of the First Class

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SUNSHINE CUSTOM PAINTS & BODY, INC., a Wyoming corporation; CYCLONE DRILLING, INC., a Wyoming corporation; and M & J SERVICES, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. SOUTH DOUGLAS HIGHWAY WATER & SEWER DISTRICT, a governmental unit of the State of Wyoming; and THE CITY OF GILLETTE, WYOMING, a Municipal Corporation and City of the First Class2007 WY 206173 P.3d 398Case Number: S-07-0017Decided: 12/20/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

SUNSHINE 
CUSTOM PAINTS & BODY, INC., a Wyoming corporation; CYCLONE DRILLING, INC., a Wyoming corporation; and M & J SERVICES, INC., a 
Wyoming 
corporation,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.SOUTH DOUGLAS 
HIGHWAY WATER & SEWER DISTRICT, a governmental unit of the State of Wyoming; 
and THE CITY OF GILLETTE, WYOMING, a Municipal Corporation and City of the First 
Class,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Tad T. 
Daly and Matthew R. Sorenson of Daly Law Associates, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer 
District:

James L. 
Edwards of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock & Carpenter, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
AppelleeCity of 
Gillette:

Charles 
W. Anderson, Gillette City Attorney's Office; Judith Studer of Schwartz, Bon, 
Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming. 

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Sunshine Custom 
Paints & Body, Inc., Cyclone Drilling, Inc. (Cyclone), and M & J 
Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Landowners") appeal 
from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of South 
Douglas Highway Water & Sewer District (Sewer District) and the City of 
Gillette (the City) on their claim that the City did not have the right to 
construct a sewer trunk line beneath a road adjacent to their property.  Cyclone also appeals from the order 
granting the City summary judgment on its counterclaim for damages it suffered 
when Cyclone interrupted the sewer line construction project.  

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The Landowners 
present the following issues on appeal:

 
 

A.                 
Did 
the district court err in finding the language of the de[d]ication deed superior 
to the plain language of the plat?

 
 

B.                 
Did 
the district court err in finding the term "public use" granted subsurface 
rights as well as surface rights to the public?

 
 

C.                
Did 
the district court err in granting the defendantCity of Gillette's motion for summary 
judgment on its counterclaim?

 
 
The 
City and the Sewer District rephrase the issues as:

 
 

A.                 
Do 
appellants have standing to object to the public use of a roadway?  Specifically, can appellants claim a 
property interest in Mohan 
Road that was dedicated by deed to the public based 
upon a subdivision plat that does not cover that part of Mohan 
Road?

 
 

B.                 
Does 
the term "public use" permit a municipality to construct a sewer trunk line 
under the roadway surface?

 
 

C.                
Does 
taking the law into your own hands based on an unreasonable belief as to your 
property rights constitute a defense to the tort of intentional interference 
with a contract?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The Landowners 
own lots and maintain businesses in the Mohan Subdivision in Campbell County, Wyoming.  
Their lots abut Mohan 
Road.  
The Mohan Subdivision was created by the filing of a plat on March 1, 
1977.  The plat contained the 
following statement:

 
 

[T]he 
undersigned owners and proprietors . . . do hereby dedicate and convey to and 
for public use forever hereafter the streets as are laid out and designated on 
this plat, and do also preserve easements for the installation and maintenance 
of utilities and for irrigation and drainage facilities as are laid out and 
designated on this plat.

 
 

Mohan 
Road was 
depicted on the plat.  A few minutes 
later, the developer filed a dedication deed, which 
stated:

 
 
Grantor 
. . . hereby dedicates to the public as Grantee the following described real 
estate . . . hereby releasing and waiving all rights under and by virtue of the 
homestead exemption laws of the state, to wit [legal description omitted].  Subject to all reservation, easements 
and right of record.

  

The 
dedication deed pertained to the northern portion of Mohan Road.      

 
 
[¶5]      The City 
contracted with Western Municipal Construction of Wyoming, Inc. (Western) to 
construct a sewer trunk line to service several subdivisions. Western began 
construction of the line, which ran beneath Mohan Road, in December 2004.  The Landowners objected to the 
construction, claiming the City did not have the right to place the sewer line 
beneath the road.  They were also 
apparently dissatisfied with the City's efforts to keep the road accessible to 
their businesses during the construction.  
Unable to resolve their differences, Cyclone placed a large oil field 
pump house on Mohan 
Road in the path of the construction on February 24, 
2005, interrupting the work until March 2.   

 
 
[¶6]      On March 14, 
2005, the Landowners filed a complaint in the district court articulating 
several causes of action against the City and the Sewer District.  The City counterclaimed for the damages 
it suffered as a result of Cyclone's actions on February 24.  The City and Sewer District filed motions 
to dismiss and the Landowners filed a motion for a partial summary 
judgment.  The district court 
converted the City's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Sewer District.  The district court also granted a 
summary judgment in favor of the City on its counterclaim.  The Landowners appealed.    

  

DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶7]      We are asked to 
review two summary judgment rulings in favor of the appellees.  Summary judgment motions are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[¶8]      This Court 
reviews summary judgment rulings de 
novo, using the same materials and following the same standards as the 
district court.  The record is 
reviewed from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Cook v. 
Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006); 
Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo. 1996).  

 
 
[¶9]      The summary 
judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case with admissible 
evidence; once this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the opposing party to 
present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. 
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987); 
Gennings v. First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo. 
1982).

 
 
A.        Status of Mohan Road        

[¶10]   Several of the issues the parties 
raise pertain to the Landowners' property rights in Mohan Road.  Because the issues are related, we will 
consider them together, starting with the basic rules pertaining to public use 
conveyances.  Property may be 
dedicated to the public and dedication may be accomplished directly by deed or 
by recording a plat.  City of Evanston v. Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1985).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-104 (LexisNexis 
2007) articulates the effect of recording a plat:

 
 
            
The acknowledgment and recording of such plat, is equivalent to a deed in 
fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart 
for streets, or other public use, or is thereon dedicated to charitable, 
religious or educational purposes.

 
 
[¶11]   The Landowners maintain that the 
plat and dedication deed covered the same property and, because the plat was 
filed first, the deed is subject to the reservations included in the plat, 
including a utility easement.  They 
claim these circumstances raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
grantor's intent.  The record 
includes an affidavit signed by Don Oakley, a professional land surveyor.  Mr. Oakley reviewed the dedication deed 
and the plat and stated that the northern part of Mohan Road was 
conveyed to the public in the dedication deed and was not included in the legal 
description of the Mohan Subdivision created by the plat. The map attached to 
his affidavit indicates the southern part of the road was within the subdivision 
and, consequently, dedicated to the public in the plat. Mr. Oakley also 
stated:  "The area which was 
disturbed by the excavation for the sewer line which is the subject of 
Plaintiffs' complaint is located in the area described in the Dedication Deed . 
. . ."  Mr. Oakley's affidavit was 
not disputed and, therefore, conclusively established that the properties 
described in the dedication deed and the plat did not overlap.  Consequently, the Landowners' argument 
that the plat takes precedence over the dedication deed misses the point because 
the two documents pertain to different properties.   

 
 
[¶12]   The City and Sewer District claim 
the Landowners do not have standing to contest the appellees' use of the portion 
of Mohan 
Road adjacent to the Landowners' businesses because 
it was unequivocally conveyed to the public by the dedication deed.  In Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsley, 
660 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1983), this Court considered a case with 
facts similar to the case at bar.  
Ruby installed a water line in the right of way of a roadway easement 
dedicated to the public in a subdivision plat.  The appellees owned property in the 
subdivision adjacent to the roadway and sued Ruby for trespass.  Id. at 378-79.  This Court held that the entire right of 
way had been dedicated to the public and, "[t]his being so, the appellees as 
owners of lots in the subdivision only have a right to the use of the [roadway] 
for ingress and egress to their property; they have no possessory interest in 
that area sufficient to provide the underpinning for an action in 
trespass."  Id. at 381.

 [¶13]  In Owsley v. Robinson, 2003 WY 33, ¶ 16, 65 P.3d 374, 378 (Wyo. 2003), we stated:

 
 
[I]f the 
easements were set aside for public use, the public authority would hold title 
to the easements in trust for the public's benefit and the [individual 
landowners] would have no individual possessory interest in the easements and 
thus no standing to contest [another's] use of [the] [e]asement.     

 
 
[¶14]   According to Mr. Oakley's 
affidavit, the area disturbed by the sewer line was in the northerly portion of 
Mohan 
Road which was covered by the dedication deed.  Under the teachings of Ruby Drilling and Owsley, since the northern portion of 
the road was unequivocally dedicated to the public in the dedication deed, the 
Landowners would not have a possessory interest in it and, therefore, no 
standing to contest the City's use of the roadway for a sewer line.   

 

[¶15]   Our ruling that the Landowners 
whose property abuts the northerly portion of Mohan Road do not have standing would seem 
to be dispositive.  However, the 
record indicates the owner of Lot 9 may have a 
cognizable claim because its land does not abut the portion of Mohan Road covered 
by the dedication deed, but instead abuts the southern portion of the road which 
was dedicated in the subdivision plat.  
The map attached to Mr. Oakley's affidavit shows that Lot 9 is not adjacent to the portion of Mohan Road that was 
dedicated by the deed.  An affidavit 
filed by Mark Lenti stated that he was the controlling shareholder of M & J 
Services, Inc. and that company owns Lot 6 and a percentage of Lot 9.  The 
sewer line apparently continued down Mohan Road in the area covered by the 
plat.  Because the section of 
Mohan 
Road adjacent to Lot 
9 was dedicated in the plat rather than by the dedication deed, and M & J 
Services claimed the subdivision had an exclusive utility easement pursuant to 
dedication language in the plat, it has standing to contest the City's use of 
the roadway.   We will, therefore, address the effect of 
the plat on this case. 

 
 
[¶16]   In the subdivision plat, the owner 
dedicated "to and for public use 
forever hereafter the streets as are laid out and designated on this plat, and 
do also preserve easements for the installation and maintenance of utilities and 
for irrigation and drainage facilities as are laid out and designated on this 
plat."  The Landowners argue 
this dedication only gave the public the right to use the road for ingress and 
egress.  They claim the plat 
language indicates the grantor intended to reserve utility easements for the 
subdivision and the City did not have the right to install the sewer line 
beneath the platted portion of Mohan Road.   

 
 
[¶17]   When streets are dedicated to the 
public without restriction, the dedication "embraces every reasonable method of 
travel over, under and along the right of way."  Box L Corp. v. TetonCounty, 2004 WY 75, ¶ 17, 92 P.3d 811, 
817 (Wyo. 2004).  In Robinson, we stated that the dedication 
of streets includes the surface and "so much of the subsurface as is necessary 
for street construction and municipal services."  Robinson, 702 P.2d  at 1289.   

 
 
[¶18]   The Landowners would have us 
interpret the plat as reserving to the subdivision owners the exclusive right to 
use the road area for utilities.  
The plain language of the dedication does not support their 
interpretation.  The plat dedicates 
the street area to the public.  When 
such a dedication is made without restriction, it includes the right to use the 
subsurface for the provision of municipal services, including utilities.  The plat "preserved" easements for 
utilities, etc.  Use of the term 
"preserve" is somewhat unusual.  
Typically, if a grantor intends to keep some property interest when 
conveying the property, he "reserves" that interest.  We need not, however, concern ourselves 
with the precise meaning of the "preserve" language because even if we interpret 
the dedication as reserving a utility easement to the subdivision, it does not 
preclude the public from using the street area for utilities.  When an easement "does not clearly 
indicate it is exclusive to the dominant owner, the owner of the servient estate 
retains the right to use the easement area."  Owsley, ¶ 14, 65 P.3d  at 377.  The plat does not state that the right 
to use the property for utilities, etc. was exclusive to the subdivision.  Thus, even if the subdivision reserved a 
utility easement, it was not exclusive and the City would have the right to 
install utilities pursuant to the street dedication so long as it did not 
interfere with the subdivision's use of the easement.  

 
 
[¶19]   The district court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the City and Sewer District on the Landowners' 
claim that the City improperly used Mohan Road for installation of the sewer 
line.  

 
 
B.        Intentional 
Interference with Contract

 
 
[¶20]   The City asserted a counterclaim 
for intentional interference with a contract against the Landowners for delaying 
the construction of the sewer line by placing a pump house in the path of the 
construction.  A representative of 
Cyclone averred that it placed the pump house and the other plaintiffs were not 
involved.  The district court ruled 
that Cyclone, alone, was responsible for the construction delay and granted the 
City's motion for summary judgment for the extra amount it paid Western because 
of the delay.    

 
 
[¶21]   This Court has adopted the 
definition of the tort of intentional interference with a contract set out in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 (1979):

 
 
"One 
who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
(except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or 
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the 
failure of the third person to perform the contract.'"  Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 
1111 (Wyo. 1987), quoting Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 813-814 (Wyo. 1986).  

 
 

First 
Wyoming Bank, Casper, v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 
1988).  See also, Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶ 71, 75 P.3d 640, 662-63 (Wyo. 2003).  The elements of a claim of intentional 
interference with a contract are:  
(1) the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party; 
(2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant's intentional 
and improper interference with the contract which induced or caused a breach; 
and (4) resulting damages.  Mudge, 748 P.2d  at 715.  
See also, Gore v. Sherard, 2002 WY 114, ¶ 12, 50 P.3d 705, 710 (Wyo. 
2002); Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. 
Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1062 (1986); Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, 717 P.2d  at 813-814.

 
 
[¶22]   On appeal, Cyclone claims that the 
evidence was contested on the third element of the tort and, consequently, 
summary judgment was not warranted.  
In particular, it argues that its action was justified and proper because 
it was seeking to protect its asserted property interest in Mohan Road.  Cyclone maintains that summary judgment 
was improper because genuine questions of material fact existed concerning the 
reasonableness of its action and the district court should have analyzed the 
factors identified in § 766 in determining whether its actions were improper or 
justified.  Those factors are: 

 
 
(a) the 
nature of the actor's conduct,

 
 
(b) the 
actor's motive,

 
 
(c) the 
interests of the other with which the actor's conduct 
interferes,

 
 
(d) the 
interests sought to be advanced by the actor,

 
 
(e) the 
social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interests of the other,

 
 
(f) the 
proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference 
and

 
 
(g) the 
relations between the parties.   

 
 

Toltec, 717 P.2d  at 814; Mudge, 748 P.2d 716-17.

 
 
[¶23]   This Court recognizes Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 773 (1979), which states that "one who interferes with a 
contract by asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not liable for tortious 
interference with contractual relations."  
Mudge, 748 P.2d  at 717.   See also, Toltec, 717 P.2d  at 814.   Section 773 states:  

 
 
One who, 
by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or 
threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, 
intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter 
into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere 
improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes that his interest may 
otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or 
transaction.          

            

[¶24]   The district court found that the 
City had demonstrated that there was no disputed issues of fact as to Cyclone's 
interference and it was improper as a matter of law: 

 
 
Cyclone's 
placement of the pump house to stop construction of the trunk line was 
improper.  Cyclone took the law into 
its own hands and exercised vigilante justice.  Other appropriate actions were available 
to Cyclone to exercise or enforce its rights.  Wyoming law provides avenues to protect one's 
rights.  It doesn't matter that 
Cyclone's motive was to force the City and Western to comply with prior 
agreements.  It doesn't matter that 
Cyclone believed it was protecting its economic interest.  Cyclone's actions were 
inappropriate.  Cyclone's actions 
interfered with and negatively impacted other parties' interests.  

 
 
Placing 
a large piece of oil field equipment in front of the construction site and 
blocking construction equipment was not the appropriate action for Cyclone to 
take, no matter its reasoning.  
Wyoming 
does not condone vigilante justice.  
Cyclone's actions were improper as a matter of law. 

 
 
The 
district court continued:

 
 
Comment 
a to § 773 clarifies the rule.  It 
states:  "The rule is of narrow 
scope and protects the actor only when (1) he has a legally protected interest, 
and (2) in good faith asserts or threatens to protect it, and (3) the threat is 
to protect it by appropriate means."  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773, cmt. a.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Cyclone's 
ownership interest in Mohan 
Road was a legally protected interest.  Cyclone had justification to protect its 
interest.  But protection of that 
interest must be by "appropriate means."  
Placing a pump house in front of the construction site and equipment in 
order to stop the construction is not appropriate means.  Other appropriate options were available 
to Cyclone.  Cyclone was not 
justified in the way it attempted to protect its interest in Mohan 
Road.

  

[¶25]   The district court's ruling is 
supported by the record.  It is 
undisputed that Cyclone placed the pump house on Mohan Road in order 
to delay the sewer line construction.  
There was no showing that Cyclone had the legal right to place a piece of 
equipment on the road.  Even if 
Cyclone's asserted property interest in the road was legitimate, it did not have 
a right to block the construction by placing a piece of equipment in the 
road.  

 
 
[¶26]   Moreover, Cyclone stated in its 
response to the City's interrogatories that:

 
 
            
The placement was only done with the intent of persuading the City of 
Gillette and its 
contractor to fulfill previous commitments about keeping Mohan Road open to 
Highway 59 so as not to interfere with individual businesses located on 
Mohan 
Road.

 
 
            
[Cyclone] was willing to move the equipment once the City and/or 
contractor fulfilled commitments made in meetings of November and December 2004 
to keep the road clean and open to Highway 59.

 
 
 Thus, Cyclone admitted that it placed the 
equipment in the road to force the City to comply with its promise to keep the 
road open during the construction.  
This motivation had nothing to do with Cyclone's asserted property 
interest in the road.  Thus, the 
undisputed facts showed that Cyclone's action was improper and a weighing of the 
factors set out in Toltec and § 766 
was not required.  The district 
court properly held, as a matter of law, Cyclone's interference with the City's 
contract with Western was improper. 

 
 
[¶27]   Affirmed.