Title: Robert L. Tanksley v. Prosoft Automation, Inc., et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:6/01/2007 Tanksley v. ProSoft
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1050099
____________________
Robert L. Tanksley
v.
ProSoft Automation, Inc., et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-03-976)
PER CURIAM.
Robert L. Tanksley, the plaintiff below, appeals from
summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants, Rockwell
Automation, 
Inc. 
("Rockwell"), 
Danieli 
Corporation
("Danieli"), ProSoft Automation, Inc. ("ProSoft Automation"),
and PROSOFT, Inc. (collectively "the defendants"), in this
1050099
2
action seeking damages for injuries sustained in an industrial
accident.  We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Tanksley worked as a welder at a steel mill operated by
United States Steel Corporation ("U.S. Steel") and located in
Jefferson County.  The facility used a "pickle line" system to
treat steel.  In a pickle line, a continuous strip of flat
steel passes through various equipment and is treated with an
acid rinse.  The steel strip is threaded through several
"pinch" rollers that push the strip through the machinery.
The "No. 4" pickle line at the U.S. Steel facility was
designed by Wean Incorporated ("Wean") and had been installed
at the U.S. Steel facility in the 1960s.  Wean ultimately
filed a petition in bankruptcy, and Danieli purchased Wean.
At some point in the mid-1990s, PROSOFT, Inc., contracted to
upgrade the drive and control systems on the No. 4 pickle
line.  A control panel manufactured by Rockwell and carrying
the Allen-Bradley Company brand was installed on the No. 4
pickle line during the upgrade.
On August 3, 2002, Tanksley and several co-employees were
working to repair the No. 4 pickle line.  Apparently, the
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3
steel strip being processed on the line broke and had to be
rethreaded through the equipment and welded back together. 
To gain access to the pickle line to rethread the steel strip,
an overhead crane was used to remove certain equipment that
rested above the line, including a hot-air dryer cover.  After
the steel strip was repaired and in place, Tanksley and his
co-employees began to replace the hot-air dryer cover.  In
doing so, Tanksley stood directly on the steel strip to guide
the dryer cover into place as the crane lowered it.  As
Tanksley stood there, another employee at a control station
activated the line in an attempt to "jog" or move the strip.
When the strip moved, Tanksley's legs were pulled in between
two rollers; the resulting injuries required the amputation of
his right leg below the knee and the toes of his left foot.
On February 18, 2003, Tanksley sued the defendants,
seeking damages for his injuries.  Tanksley amended his
complaint three times, ultimately alleging that the defendants
were 
liable 
under 
the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's
Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD") for alleged defects in the No. 4
pickle line.  Tanksley also sued various co-employees, but
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4
those claims were later settled and are not at issue in this
appeal. 
On May 20, 2005, Rockwell filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  Tanksley filed materials in opposition to the
motion on July 11, 2005.  The remaining defendants filed their
own individual motions several days later.  On August 31,
2005, the trial court entered summary judgments for both
Rockwell and Danieli.  On September 16, 2005, Tanksley filed
an affidavit by his expert witness in opposition to the
"defendants[']" motions for summary judgment.  Subsequently,
the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of both
PROSOFT, Inc., and ProSoft Automation.  Tanksley appeals.
Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment by the following standard:
"'"In reviewing the disposition of a
motion for summary judgment, we utilize the
same standard as that of the trial court in
determining whether the evidence before the
court made out a genuine issue of material
fact" and whether the movant was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Bussey v.
John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala.
1988); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the
movant makes a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact,
the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
present substantial evidence creating such
an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of
1050099
5
Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 1989). Evidence is "substantial" if
it is of "such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 906
(Ala. 1999). When the basis of a summary-judgment
motion is a failure of the nonmovant's evidence, the
movant's burden, however, is limited to informing
the court of the basis of its motion--that is, the
moving party must indicate where the nonmoving
party's case suffers an evidentiary failure. See
General Motors, 769 So. 2d at 909 (adopting Justice
Houston's special concurrence in Berner v. Caldwell,
543 So. 2d 686, 691 (Ala. 1989), in which he
discussed 
the 
burden 
shift 
attendant 
to
summary-judgment motions); and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (stating that 'a party seeking
summary 
judgment 
always 
bears 
the 
initial
responsibility of informing the [trial] court of the
basis of its motion'). The moving party must support
its motion with sufficient evidence only if that
party has the burden of proof at trial. General
Motors, 769 So. 2d at 909."
Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So. 2d 75, 79-80 (Ala.
2001).  Additionally, we "accept the tendencies of the
evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and must
resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving
party."  Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 54 (Ala. 2003).
Discussion
1050099
6
The elements of an AEMLD claim are as follows:
"'"To establish liability, a plaintiff must
show:
"'"(1) he suffered injury or
damage[] 
to 
himself 
or 
his
property by one who sells a
product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the
plaintiff as the ultimate user or
consumer, if
"'"(a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such a
product, and
"'"(b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the
condition 
in 
which 
it 
[was]
sold."'
"Yamaha Motor Co. v. Thornton, 579 So. 2d 619, 621
(Ala. 1991) (quoting Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc.,
335 So. 2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976))."
Kirk v. Garrett Ford Tractor, Inc., 650 So. 2d 865, 866 (Ala.
1994).
On appeal, Tanksley alleges generally that the defendants
failed to meet their initial burden on summary judgment to
establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact.
Therefore, he argues, the burden did not shift to him to
create such an issue.  Tanksley further contends that, even if
the defendants did shift the burden, he introduced substantial
1050099
7
evidence of several defects in the machinery on the No. 4
pickle line: (1) there was no "delayed start" mechanism or
audible warning system that would activate before the line
began to move; (2) the pickle line lacked guards to protect
workers from accidental contact with pinch points; and (3)
there were no platforms to provide a safe area for workers to
stand while they were working on the line.  As discussed
below, we affirm the summary judgments as to each of the
defendants.
A. The Claims Against Rockwell
Tanksley alleged in count four of his complaint that he
was entitled to recover under the AEMLD against "Allen-Bradley
Company," because it provided no pinch-point guards on the
pickle line and no means "of locking out" the pickle line
during periods of maintenance, and because it failed to warn
Tanksley "of the danger of performing maintenance on the
energized Pickle Line under such conditions ...."  Count five
of the complaint alleges that Rockwell is the "successor in
liability" to Allen-Bradley Company and is liable under the
AEMLD for failing to provide a "means of locking out the
Pickle Line during periods of maintenance and failing to warn
1050099
8
[Tanksley] of the danger of performing maintenance on the
energized Pickle Line under such conditions ...."  Because
Tanksley alleges that Rockwell is the successor in liability
to "Allen-Bradley Company," we construe both counts four and
five as alleging causes of action against Rockwell, even
though count five does not contain the allegation that
Rockwell is liable for failure to provide pinch-point guards.
The record reveals that Rockwell either manufactured or
designed an Allen-Bradley brand control panel that was used on
the pickle line and that this is the only Rockwell product
involved in this case.  Rockwell contended in its summary-
judgment motion that the control panel was equipped with a
button that would have de-energized the pickle line, thus
preventing the movement of the line, and that there were other
lockout devices available to turn off the pickle line.
Rockwell further argued that Tanksley could produce no
testimony identifying any specific defect in the panel or
explaining what was wrong with any product designed or
manufactured by Rockwell and that Tanksley's own expert
testified that he found no defect in the panel.  
1050099
Although the "pickle section on/off" feature is referred
1
to in the record as a "button," it appears actually to be a
knob that is pushed or pulled into position.
9
In support of its motion for a summary judgment, Rockwell
submitted deposition testimony of U.S. Steel employees who
described the operation of the control panel, which was
located approximately 15 to 20 feet from the area where the
accident occurred.  The control panel was also equipped with
a "pickle section stop" button that, when pressed, would stop
the line if it was moving, but would not prevent the line from
being restarted.  The control panel was also equipped with a
button labeled "pickle section on/off."   The button, when
1
activated, would "de-energize" the pickle line, and a light on
the button would illuminate to indicate that the line was de-
energized.  The button would have to be moved again to re-
energize the line; when the line was re-energized the light
would turn off.  The line could not be restarted until the
"pickle section on/off" button had been deactivated to re-
energize the line.  Once the line was re-energized, it would
be restarted by controls in a control room; simply re-
energizing the line alone would not cause the pickle line to
move.  Rockwell asserted that the "pickle section on/off"
1050099
Tanksley appears to state in his brief that, even with
2
the lockout devices that existed in this case, the accident
would not have been prevented: "There are three other places
at which the line can be locked out than the panel near where
the plaintiff was injured ... [A]ll the buttons failed to
prevent this accident...."  Tanksley's brief at 31-32.
10
button was an adequate means to render the pickle line safe
while maintenance was being performed on the line. 
Additionally, Rockwell presented testimony indicating
that there were three other "lockout" switches that would have
prevented the pickle line from moving had they been activated.
Tanksley acknowledges that "[a]t the time of the plaintiff's
accident, there were several lockout devices available[:] at
the bliss mill, the trimmer, and the motor control room, to
lock out the movement of the pickle line."  Tanksley's brief
at 18.2
Rockwell also argued that Tanksley's own experts could
not testify that the control panel was defective.  Rockwell
submitted a portion of the deposition testimony of Dr. B.J.
Stephens, Tanksley's expert witness.  Dr. Stephens stated that
he offered no opinion as to whether the Allen-Bradley control
panel was defective, and he testified that, to the best of his
knowledge, on the day of the accident the control panel
operated as designed.  Dr. Stephens affirmed that he had "no
1050099
The parties do not provide a definition of what would
3
constitute a "lockout."  Apparently, a "lockout" is a switch
that deactivates the line and accepts a portable lock so that
individual workers can ensure that no one else uses the
switch.  Tanksley testified in a deposition that he was given
such a lock, but that it was lost in a house fire. 
11
criticisms" of any Allen-Bradley control panels.  He further
stated that the "pickle section on/off" button was an adequate
means to de-energize the line, although it would not qualify
as a "lockout."   He testified that if the "pickle section
3
on/off" button had been activated and had de-energized the
line, the accident would not have happened.   
In an AEMLD action, "the plaintiff must affirmatively
show that the product was sold with a defect or in a defective
condition."  Jordan v. General Motors Corp., 581 So. 2d 835,
836-37 (Ala. 1991).  "Without evidence to support the
conclusion that the product was defective and/or unreasonably
dangerous when it left the hands of the seller, the burden is
not sustained."  Jordan, 581 So. 2d at 837.  "Proof of an
accident and injury is not in itself sufficient to establish
liability under the AEMLD; a defect in the product must be
affirmatively shown."  Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642
So. 2d 411, 415 (Ala. 1994).
1050099
Tanksley's brief on appeal does not present a specific
4
argument as to whether Rockwell failed to shift the burden of
proof on his failure-to-warn claim.  Thus, we do not consider
that issue on appeal.  Additionally, the arguments in the
record and on appeal revolve around whether Rockwell was
liable for a defect in the control panel or for otherwise
12
Rockwell argued that Tanksley could produce no evidence
indicating that the control panel was defective.  "When the
basis of a summary-judgment motion is a failure of the
nonmovant's evidence, the movant's burden ... is limited to
informing the court of the basis of its motion--that is, the
moving party must indicate where the nonmoving party's case
suffers an evidentiary failure."  Rector, 820 So. 2d at 80.
We hold that Rockwell presented sufficient evidence to inform
the trial court of an evidentiary failure in Tanksley's case,
namely, that Tanksley's own expert witness could not identify
a defect in the Allen-Bradley control panel.  Additionally,
Rockwell presented substantial evidence indicating that there
were numerous means to both lockout or de-energize the pickle
line while the line was undergoing maintenance, but that none
of those means were used on the day of Tanksley's accident.
Therefore, the burden shifted to Tanksley to present
substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material
fact.4
1050099
failing to provide a lockout device; the parties make no issue
of whether Rockwell is liable for failing to install pinch-
point guards.
13
Tanksley filed a memorandum in opposition to Rockwell's
summary-judgment motion on July 11, 2005.  The memorandum
asserted that the No. 4 pickle line was defective because it
failed to incorporate a "delayed start" mechanism.  The
memorandum did not address an alleged failure by Rockwell to
install lockouts or pinch-point guards.  In support of the
opposition, Tanksley attached a document prepared by Dr.
Stephens titled "preliminary report."  The preliminary report
asserted that the pickle line, in general, was defective and
unreasonably hazardous because the hot-air dryer had no
warnings to instruct workers about "pinch points" between the
moving steel strip and the dryer rollers, because there were
no guards to protect workers from accidental contact with
pinch points, and because there were no platforms to provide
workers with safe locations in which to work on the pickle
line.  The preliminary report further stated: 
"It is common design practice to incorporate devices
that would prevent equipment from being energized
while maintenance is being performed.  It is also
common practice to incorporate a delayed start for
equipment capable of being remotely started or for
equipment that is controlled by an operator who does
1050099
14
not have a full and clear view of the entire
machine.  During this delay, a klaxon, bell, or
other warning device is sounded to warn workers of
the impending start or movement of the equipment.
No such warning device was incorporated into the #4
pickle line."  
The preliminary report does not discuss whether the Allen-
Bradley control panel was defective.
Tanksley also included in his opposition to Rockwell's
summary-judgment motion one page of a document titled "Safety
Standard for Conveyors and Related Equipment" published by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (hereinafter "the
ANSI standards").  Additionally, Tanksley included several
pages of the transcript of Dr. Stephens's deposition in which
he was asked about his mention of "the common practice to
incorporate a delayed start" mechanism for remotely operated
equipment.  Dr. Stephens testified that he did not know if
such a delayed-start mechanism was in use with the pickle
line.  Tanksley states in his memorandum in opposition to
Rockwell's 
summary-judgment 
motion 
that 
the 
defendants 
"chose"
not to "explore" his claim on this issue.  Finally, Tanksley
included with the opposition an affidavit of Stephan Moore, a
former U.S. Steel employee, who stated that there was no
delayed-start 
mechanism installed on the pickle line.
1050099
Tanksley also filed on July 11, 2005, a motion under Rule
5
56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., to continue the hearing on Rockwell's
summary-judgment motion so that additional discovery could
take place.  The motion asserted that Tanksley needed
documents from U.S. Steel, ProSoft Automation, and PROSOFT,
Inc., and that Tanksley needed to depose Stephen Young, a
former employee of PROSOFT, Inc.  The Rule 56(f) motion was
supported by an affidavit of one of Tanksley's counsel.
Tanksley does not argue in his initial brief that he had
insufficient time in which to conduct discovery; however, in
his reply brief, Tanksley states that he filed two Rule 56(f)
motions and that the trial court "ignored" them.  It is
unclear from the record how the trial court ruled on the July
11 motion; however, Tanksley states in his second motion,
which is a motion to continue the hearing on the motion for a
summary judgment and is not supported by an affidavit, that
the trial court granted the July 11 motion on July 15, 2005.
15
Instead, employees would rely on an announcement over a
public-address system indicating that the pickle line was
about to start moving.5
On July 14, 2005, Rockwell filed a motion to strike
Tanksley's opposition as untimely filed and to strike the
preliminary report because, Rockwell argued, it was unsworn,
unauthenticated, and inadmissible hearsay.  On appeal,
Rockwell continues to argue that the preliminary report was
due to be stricken and that it cannot be considered in
opposition to its summary-judgment motion.  On appeal,
Tanksley does not address whether the preliminary report was
due to be stricken.  Instead, he notes only that because the
1050099
16
trial court did not rule on Rockwell's motion to strike
Tanksley's opposition, this Court assumes that the trial court
considered the materials he filed in opposition.  See Hannah
v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 850 (Ala.
2002).
Documents submitted in support of or in opposition to a
summary-judgment motion are generally required to be certified
or otherwise authenticated; if they are not, they constitute
inadmissible hearsay and are not considered on summary
judgment.  Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d
1291, 1299 (Ala. 1991); Carter v. Cantrell Mach. Co., 662 So.
2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1995) (plurality opinion) ("Documents
submitted as exhibits to affidavits or otherwise must be
admissible in evidence either as sworn or certified copies.");
Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So. 2d 341, 343-44 (Ala.
1993) ("Evidence submitted by a nonmovant in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must be in a form admissible in
evidence; ... documents must be admissible in evidence as
either sworn or certified copies.").  See also Rule 59(e),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, the party opposing the documents
must generally object to the admissibility of nonconforming
1050099
First, it is unclear whether this issue was raised in the
6
trial court, because Tanksley's opposition to Rockwell's
motion for a summary judgment--the only legal argument
presented to the trial court by Tanksley that is found in the
record--does not contend that there is a conflict in the
evidence regarding this issue.
17
documents and move to strike them.  Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v.
Cato, [Ms. 1050048, April 13, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala.
2007).
Rockwell moved the trial court to strike the preliminary
report, and it argues on appeal that the report cannot be
considered.  Because the preliminary report is not sworn, not
certified, and does not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ.
P., we will not consider it in our de novo review.
Tanksley argues on appeal that there are disputed
questions of fact regarding the buttons on the Allen-Bradley
control panel.   Tanksley contends that there is a "dispute in
6
the evidence" regarding whether the "control button" would de-
energize the pickle line.  He notes that the defendants
asserted that the "control button" would de-energize the line
and that the line could not be started until the button was
moved a second time and the pickle line was then started from
the control room.  Tanksley argues that his witness, Moore,
testified that "[h]itting the stop button would not have
1050099
18
stopped the line from starting up again." (Emphasis added.)
Tanksley then implies that there is a dispute as to how the
"control button" works.  We disagree. 
Tanksley is conflating testimony regarding two different
buttons on the control panel, the "pickle section stop" button
and the "pickle section on/off" button, into a single,
nonexistent "control button."  It is apparent from the record
that Moore was referring to the "pickle section stop" button
when he said that the "stop button" would not prevent the line
from restarting.  Rockwell does not contend that the "pickle
section stop" button prevents the line from moving or would
have prevented the accident if it had been used; instead,
there is uncontroverted evidence that the "pickle section
on/off" button would illuminate when activated and de-energize
the line.  The line could not be restarted until the "pickle
section on/off" button was de-activated, and then the line
could be restarted only in the control room.  Even Tanksley's
own expert, Dr. Stephens, stated that the "pickle section
on/off" button was an adequate means to de-energize the line,
and that if the "pickle section on/off" button had been
1050099
19
activated and the line de-energized, the accident would not
have happened.
Tanksley also alleges on appeal that there exists
substantial evidence of several defects in the pickle line,
specifically, there was no "delayed start" mechanism or
audible warning system before the line began to move and there
were no platforms to provide a safe area for employees to
perform maintenance on the line.  First, the claims against
Rockwell, as set out in the complaint, allege only that
Rockwell was liable for failure to provide a means of locking
the line.  There is no allegation in the complaint that
Rockwell was liable for failing to use delayed-start
technology or failing to provide safe work platforms.  In any
event, without Dr. Stephens's preliminary report, there was no
evidence at the time the trial court granted Rockwell's
summary-judgment motion regarding the need for delayed-start
technology.  Additionally, the remaining evidence submitted in
opposition 
to 
the 
summary-judgment 
motion--the 
ANSI 
standards,
portions of the transcript of Dr. Stephens's deposition, and
the affidavit of Stephan Moore--do not create a genuine issue
of material fact as to the claims alleged in the complaint and
1050099
Danieli also contended that it was not liable because the
7
pickle-line equipment was designed and manufactured by Wean
20
addressed in Rockwell's motion.  None of the ANSI standards,
the transcript pages of Dr. Stephens's deposition, or Moore's
affidavit provides substantial evidence indicating that any
Rockwell product was defective as alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, although Tanksley attempts to argue that testimony
found in an affidavit by Dr. Stephens filed in the trial court
on September 16, 2005, creates an issue of fact, that
affidavit was filed after the trial court granted Rockwell's
summary-judgment motion.  Therefore, Tanksley failed to
present substantial evidence as to any genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims against Rockwell, and
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rockwell is due
to be affirmed.  
B. The Claims Against Danieli
In its motion for a summary judgment, Danieli contended,
among other things, that the No. 4 pickle line had been
substantially modified since it was designed and installed in
the 1960s, and that these alterations actually caused
Tanksley's injuries, thus relieving Danieli from any liability
under the AEMLD.   
7
1050099
before Danieli purchased Wean, that Tanksley could not prove
that a safer alternative design was feasible in this case, and
that Tanksley had been contributorily negligent.  Because of
our disposition of Tanksley's claims, we need not discuss
these issues.  
21
"An essential element of an AEMLD claim is proof
that the product reached the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was
sold. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d
1018, 1027 (Ala. 1993); see also Clarke Indus., Inc.
v. Home Indem. Co., 591 So. 2d 458, 462 (Ala. 1991).
However, the mere fact that a product has been
altered or modified does not necessarily relieve the
manufacturer or seller of liability. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., supra; see also Johnson v. Niagara Machine &
Tool Works, 555 So. 2d 88, 91 (Ala. 1989). A
manufacturer or seller remains liable if the
alteration or modification did not in fact cause the
injury, or if the alteration or modification was
reasonably 
foreseeable to the manufacturer or
seller. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra; see also
Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 475 So. 2d 472, 476 (Ala.
1985), and Clarke Indus., 591 So. 2d at 462."
Hannah, 840 So. 2d at 855.
In Williamson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1261 (Ala.
1993), a child was injured when he put his finger into a hole
found on an automatic chicken feeder manufactured by C.T.B.,
Inc.  The child's mother sued C.T.B. under the AEMLD, alleging
that the chicken feeder was not reasonably safe for its
intended use and that C.T.B. failed to warn of the
unreasonably dangerous condition of the feeder.
1050099
22
The evidence in the record demonstrated that the hole
into which the child put his finger had been drilled into the
chicken feeder by its owner, Smith, to increase the feed
output and that the feeder, as designed by C.T.B., did not
have that hole.  Therefore, this Court held:
"We note that 'the mere fact that a product has
been modified by the buyer subsequent to the sale
does 
not 
always 
relieve 
a 
manufacturer 
of
liability.'  Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool
Works, 555 So. 2d 88, 91 (Ala. 1989). However, the
plaintiff must show that 'the injury was not caused
by the change.' Id. (quoting Industrial Chemical &
Fiberglass Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 475
So. 2d 472 (Ala. 1985)). The record in this case
clearly shows that [the child] was injured when he
stuck his finger into a hole drilled by Smith. [The
child's 
mother] 
failed to produce substantial
evidence in order to defeat C.T.B.'s properly
supported motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we
affirm the summary judgment as to C.T.B."  
626 So. 2d at 1264.
Danieli presented substantial evidence that the No. 4
pickle line had been substantially altered since it was
originally designed and installed by Wean and that those
alterations caused Tanksley's injury.  Specifically, Danieli
produced the affidavit of Richard K. Lordo, who stated that he
had 40 years' experience as an engineer and designer in steel-
mill machinery design.  Lordo testified that he was familiar
1050099
23
with the design of the No. 4 pickle line, that it had been
materially altered from its original design, and that those
alterations created circumstances unforeseen by the original
design:
"The line at issue has been materially altered.
Specifically, the hot air drier as originally sold
and installed had been so materially altered that it
no longer met the original design and function
expectations. A lid or cap has been fabricated to go
on top of the hot air drier in a manner that
materially alters the design of the hot air drier,
compromises 
its 
efficiency 
and 
efficacy 
and
materially changes the utilization anticipated by
the manufacturer. As originally designed, there was
no hot air drier lid for the #4 pickle line.
Therefore, there could never be any circumstance in
which a worker would be expected to stand on this
line in front of the in-running rollers or nips.
"... Further, there was no reason for the
designer or manufacturer to expect that any worker
would place himself on the strip of steel at or
upstream of the hot air drier.... 
"There is no known effective means to guard the
rollers where the plaintiff was injured but they are
effectively guarded by other means of protection
including but not limited to signs directing workers
never to stand on the strip of steel, electrical
devices able completely to de-energize the line so
that the accident couldn't occur, and by the
positioning where the strip of steel and the
in-rolling rollers or nips are away from any
anticipated area of use by any worker. Otherwise,
due to the need for the steel to move in an
unimpeded fashion from the hot air drier to the
rollers, there is no known effective, efficient way
to 
safely 
install 
any 
guard 
that 
would 
not
1050099
24
compromise the effect of the machinery and the roll
of steel.
"....
"This equipment when sold as original equipment
was not defective, and there was no known reason to
have had any additional guarding in place at the
place of the plaintiff's accident. Also, no known
feasible alternative guarding is available to guard
the in-rolling rollers where the plaintiff was
injured.  There was no foreseeable reason that a
worker would ever be in this position as there was
nothing about the hot air drier that required any
lid, cap or shield as originally designed."
(Emphasis added.)
The record reveals that Tanksley submitted no response
directed to Danieli's motion for a summary judgment.  We find
nothing in the materials submitted to the trial court before
it granted Danieli's summary-judgment motion that provided
substantial evidence indicating that Tanksley's injury was not
caused by the alterations to the No. 4 pickle line made after
it was installed at the U.S. Steel facility.  Williamson, 626
So. 2d at 1264.  Additionally, Tanksley does not address this
issue on appeal.  Therefore, Tanksley has failed to show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the trial
court did not err in entering the summary judgment for
Danieli.  
1050099
Tanksley does not argue that the trial court erred in
8
entering a summary judgment against the ProSoft defendants on
the failure-to-warn claim.  Therefore, there is no need to
address that issue on appeal.  However, we note that the
ProSoft defendants presented substantial evidence indicating:
(1) that they had no duty to Tanksley because U.S. Steel was
a sophisticated user of pickle lines, (2) that Tanksley and
U.S. Steel already knew of the danger an energized line
presented when employees were working on it, and (3) that even
if the ProSoft defendants had warned Tanksley and U.S. Steel,
the warning would not have been heeded because numerous safety
procedures were ignored while the No. 4 pickle line was being
repaired.
25
C. The Claims Against PROSOFT, Inc., and ProSoft Automation
Tanksley alleged in count one of his final amended
complaint that he was entitled to recover "pursuant to the
Alabama Manufacturer's Extended Liability Doctrine" against
PROSOFT, Inc., because it failed to provide pinch-point guards
or a means of locking out the No. 4 pickle line while
maintenance was being performed on the line and failed to warn
Tanksley of the danger of performing maintenance on the pickle
line while it was energized.  Count two of the complaint
alleged that Tanksley was entitled to recover against ProSoft
Automation under the AEMLD "as the successor in liability of
[PROSOFT], Inc."  Both PROSOFT, Inc., and ProSoft Automation
(collectively "the ProSoft defendants") filed motions for a
summary judgment.    
8
1050099
Additionally, Tanksley alleged in count three of the
final amended complaint that he was entitled to recover
against 
ProSoft 
Automation 
because 
it 
"negligently, 
recklessly
or intentionally maintained, modified or repaired" a welding
machine operated by Tanksley.  Tanksley does not allege on
appeal that the trial court erred in entering the summary
judgment in favor of ProSoft Automation on this count;
therefore, we likewise do not address that count on appeal.
ProSoft Automation was incorporated in October 1997. Its
9
relationship to PROSOFT, Inc., an existing corporation when
ProSoft Automation was incorporated, is unclear.
26
On appeal, Tanksley argues that the ProSoft defendants
failed to present substantial evidence indicating that there
was no genuine issue of material fact and thus did not shift
the burden to him to produce substantial evidence creating
such an issue.  We disagree.  
The ProSoft defendants presented an affidavit of Stephen
Young, the former part owner of PROSOFT, Inc., and founder,
part owner, and former president of ProSoft Automation.9
Young stated that PROSOFT, Inc., had contracted with U.S.
Steel to perform upgrade work on the drive and control systems
of the pickle line in the 1990s; ProSoft Automation was later
contracted to perform certain mechanical work on the line.
Neither company, Young asserted, played a role in installing
the rolls that created the pinch point or in installing the
air dryer where Tanksley was injured, neither company was
1050099
27
involved in designing or installing any guards, and neither
company was involved in analyzing whether any guards were
necessary.  The ProSoft defendants also presented portions of
Dr. Stephens's deposition in which he agreed that there were
"practical problems" in placing guards in the front of steel-
coil rollers because the guards would deny access when
rethreading the steel coils and would thus have to be removed
for the rethreading process.
We hold that the ProSoft defendants presented substantial
evidence indicating that they were not the manufacturer or
seller of the portion of the No. 4 pickle line that lacked
pinch-point guards.  Additionally, Dr. Stephens's testimony
presents substantial evidence indicating that the addition of
pinch-point guards was not practical and would not have
prevented Tanksley's injuries because the guards would have
had to have been removed to perform the work Tanksley was
performing.  See Yarbrough v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 So. 2d
478, 482 (Ala. 1993) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
a defendant manufacturer in an AEMLD case because the "there
was no evidence to show that the utility of an alternative
1050099
We also note that Lordo's affidavit, although filed by
10
Danieli, was also before the trial court when it was
considering the summary-judgment motions filed by the ProSoft
defendants, and he stated in that affidavit that there was no
effective means to guard the rollers: "There is no known
effective means to guard the rollers where the plaintiff was
injured."
28
design outweighed the utility of the design actually used").10
Therefore, the burden shifted to Tanksley to produce
substantial evidence of the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact on his claim that the ProSoft defendants were
liable for failing to provide pinch-point guards.
The ProSoft defendants also produced substantial evidence
in the form of depositions and affidavits from U.S. Steel
employees indicating that the No. 4 pickle line was equipped
with several devices capable of preventing the line from
moving--including lockouts at the "bliss mill" and the trimmer
and the "pickle section on/off" button on the Allen-Bradley
control panel.  The employees further testified that these
devices would have prevented the movement of the pickle line
had they been used.  This evidence, like the evidence produced
by 
Rockwell 
discussed 
above, 
is 
substantial 
evidence
indicating that the pickle line was not defective for failure
1050099
The ProSoft defendants both moved to strike the
11
affidavit, and it does not appear that the trial court ruled
on the motion to strike.  However, given our disposition of
this issue, we see no need to address whether the motion
should have been granted.  
29
to provide a means of locking out the pickle line during
periods of maintenance on the line.
It appears from the record that Tanksley filed no
memorandum in response to the ProSoft defendants' motions for
a summary judgment.  Instead, on September 16, 2005, Tanksley
filed an affidavit by Dr. Stephens.  In this affidavit, Dr.
Stephens testified that it was feasible to construct the
pickle line with delayed-start technology that would warn
nearby workers that the line was about to move.11
Dr. Stephen's affidavit is not substantial evidence
indicating that the ProSoft defendants were liable for failing
to provide pinch-point guards, and it does not provide
substantial evidence indicating that the pickle line was
defective for failing to provide a means of locking out the
pickle line while maintenance was being performed on the line.
In short, Dr. Stephens's affidavit does not create a genuine
issue of fact as to any of the claims found in Tanksley's
complaint and addressed in the ProSoft defendants' motions for
1050099
In his reply brief, Tanksley also appears to claim that
12
he alleged a negligence claim against Rockwell that was
separate from his AEMLD claim.  Specifically, Tanksley cites
the "facts" portion of the first amended complaint, which
states 
generally 
that 
"[t]he 
Defendants 
negligently, 
wantonly,
or willfully" failed to equip the No. 4 pickle line with
warnings and readily available devices that would have
prevented the line from operating "during periods of
maintenance," that they tortiously continued to allow the
pickle line to operate in this manner, and that they failed to
inspect the pickle line for defects.  A substantially similar
statement appears in the "facts" portion of the final amended
complaint.  Tanksley fails to explain whether this statement
should be considered a cause of action different than the
causes of action asserted in the individual counts found in
the "causes of action" section of his final amended complaint.
30
a summary judgment.  Instead, it addresses only the failure to
use delayed-start technology, a new theory of liability and an
alleged defect not asserted in complaint and raised for the
first time in response to the motions for a summary judgment.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering the summary
judgments for the ProSoft defendants.
Finally, Tanksley, citing Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 365
So. 2d 305 (Ala. 1978), and Hannah, supra, argues that the all
the defendants owed an independent duty to Tanksley to
recommend to U.S. Steel the installation of delayed-start
technology, pinch-point guards, and safe work platforms.
However, it appears that this issue is raised for the first
time on appeal; therefore, it is not preserved for review.12
1050099
However, Tanksley appears to merge this purported negligence
cause of action with his allegation that the defendants owed
Tanksley an independent duty under Plant and Hannah to suggest
safety features, a claim that was not argued in the trial
court and that was not supported by expert testimony.
31
See RLI Ins. Co. v. MLK Ave. Redev. Corp., 925 So. 2d 914, 918
(Ala. 2005) (holding that an argument by the appellant was
waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal).
In any event, unlike the plaintiffs in Plant and Hannah,
Tanksley presented no evidence indicating that such a duty
arose in this case.  See Plant, 365 So. 2d  at 306-07 (noting
that the plaintiff presented expert testimony that in failing
to suggest safety guards on a conveyor system, the defendants
failed meet the standards of conduct imposed on licensed
engineers); Hannah, 840 So. 2d at 857-58 (holding that the
plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact by
presenting expert testimony that a defendant should have
noticed the lack of a safety feature and suggested that it be
corrected).
Conclusion
The summary judgments are affirmed.  
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.