Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parker, 104 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004-Ohio-6236.] 
 
 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION  v. PARKER. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parker, 104 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004-Ohio-6236.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Neglect of an 
entrusted legal matter — Failing to carry out contract for professional 
employment — Failing to account for client’s funds — Failing to pay 
client funds to which client is entitled — Failing to cooperate in 
disciplinary investigation. 
(No. 2003-2169 — Submitted March 15, 2004 — Decided December 8, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-41. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Arlynn A. Parker of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0029312, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980.  
On June 17, 2002, relator, Dayton Bar Association, charged respondent with 
various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Efforts to serve 
respondent with the complaint at her last known address failed, and the complaint 
was served on the Clerk of the Supreme Court pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B).  
Respondent did not answer, and relator moved for default pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(F). 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
appointed a master commissioner to consider the motion for default and adopted 
the master commissioner’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendation.  As to the first count of the complaint, an investigator’s affidavit 
substantiated that respondent had represented a client for whom respondent failed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
to correct a bankruptcy petition.  This client filed a grievance concerning 
respondent’s neglect.  Relator’s investigator attempted to interview respondent, 
but respondent did not return the investigator’s telephone call.  The board 
concluded from this evidence that respondent had violated DR 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
(requiring an attorney to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation). 
{¶ 3} As to the second count, an investigator’s affidavit substantiated 
that respondent changed a date on a second client’s bankruptcy petition, “acted 
unprofessionally in meeting in public places to transact legal business,” and failed 
to carry out a contract of employment for professional services.  The board found 
that respondent had thereby violated DR l-102(A)(4) (barring conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(2) 
(requiring an attorney to carry out contracts for professional employment).  
Because respondent did not respond to the investigator’s three letters of inquiry 
and telephone call, the board also found a second violation of Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G). 
{¶ 4} As to the third count, an investigator’s affidavit substantiated that 
respondent failed to “maintain communication” with a third client.  The board 
found that respondent had thereby violated DR 6-101(A)(3). 
{¶ 5} As to the fourth count, an investigator’s affidavit substantiated that 
respondent promised but failed to place in escrow a portion of a fourth client’s 
settlement fees that the client needed in order to pay outstanding medical bills.  
And when the investigator attempted to interview respondent about this client’s 
grievance, respondent told the investigator that she was not then prepared to 
discuss the matter.  Respondent never did answer the investigator’s inquiries.  The 
board found that respondent had thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 6-101(A)(3), 
7-101(A)(2), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring an attorney to account for client’s funds), and 
January Term, 2004 
3 
9-102(B)(4) (requiring an attorney to pay client funds to which client is entitled), 
and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
{¶ 6} Upon review, we agree that respondent committed the foregoing 
misconduct.  In addition to the violations cited in this opinion, however, the board 
also found five more disciplinary violations relative to the first count in the 
complaint, two more violations relative to the second count, five more relative to 
the third count, two more relative to the fourth count, and three more relative to a 
fifth count.  Although these additional violations were charged in the complaint, 
relator did not cite them in its motion for default or substantiate them with proof.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) (charges shall be supported in default motion by 
“sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence”).  We therefore reject 
these findings pursuant to our independent review and final authority in 
disciplinary cases.  See Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 
708 N.E.2d 193, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 7} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board found 
no evidence of the mitigating factors listed in Section 10(B)(2) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Complaints and Procedure Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  The board 
found the following aggravating circumstances: a pattern of misconduct, multiple 
offenses, lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge 
wrongfulness of conduct, harm to vulnerable clients, and failure to make 
restitution.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), (e), (g), (h), and (i).  The board 
recommended, in accordance with the sanction recommended by the master 
commissioner, that respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law 
{¶ 8} Having found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 6-
101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G), 
we agree that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction.  “ ‘Neglect of 
legal matters and a failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
* * warrant an indefinite suspension from the practice of law in Ohio.’ ”  
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Judge (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 331, 332, 763 N.E.2d 114, 
quoting Akron Bar Assn. v. Snyder (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 211, 212, 718 N.E.2d 
1271. 
{¶ 9} Accordingly, respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents with opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 10} I respectfully dissent.  I believe that there is insufficient evidence 
to support the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  Therefore, I would return 
this cause to the board for further proceedings. 
{¶ 11} The board’s findings of fact in this case are based on the 
allegations in the complaint and the affidavits of the bar association’s investigator.  
Although the affidavits are sworn statements, they contain summary, conclusory 
assessments of misconduct based solely on conversations with the four grievants 
and are not based upon personal knowledge.  Such affidavits are not sufficient 
evidence to sustain a motion for default judgment under Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(F)(1)(b).  Northwestern Ohio Bar Assn. v. Lauber, 104 Ohio St.3d 121, 
2004-Ohio-6237, 818 N.E.2d 687. 
{¶ 12} We addressed similar concerns in Lauber.  The respondent in that 
case was the subject of a six-count complaint charging him with various 
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He was served with but 
January Term, 2004 
5 
failed to respond to the complaint filed by the Northwestern Ohio Bar 
Association. 
{¶ 13} The bar association sought a default judgment.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended that Lauber be 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for rule violations based upon six 
counts of misconduct.  The board’s findings were based solely upon an 
investigator’s sworn statement.  We rejected the summary, conclusory affidavit 
because it lacked “sufficient weight or probative force to constitute the ‘[s]worn 
or certified documentary prima facie evidence’ that Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) 
requires to sustain a motion for default.”  Lauber, 104 Ohio St.3d 121, 2004-
Ohio-6237, 818 N.E.2d 687, ¶3, citing Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 327, 331, 708 N.E.2d 193.  We remanded Lauber for further 
proceedings to “includ[e] the submission and consideration of evidence that 
directly establishes the charges of respondent’s misconduct.”  Id. at ¶4. 
{¶ 14} I see little distinction between Lauber and the present case.  Both 
cases involved a defaulting respondent.  In both cases, the relator’s evidence 
consisted entirely of an investigator’s affidavit or affidavits containing hearsay 
and conclusory statements.  It is inconsistent for us to remand Lauber for further 
proceedings to develop the record, while summarily accepting the board’s 
findings in Parker that are based upon the same type of evidence.  I believe that 
we should also remand Parker and require the board to support its findings by 
sworn or certified documentary evidence. 
{¶ 15} I am also troubled by the majority’s rejection of the board’s 
findings of 17 other rule violations attributed to Parker though not cited by relator 
in its motion for default or substantiated with proof.  It is inconsistent to agree to 
some charges of misconduct based upon an insufficient affidavit while rejecting 
other rule violations as unsubstantiated.  I believe that it is confusing for the board 
and frustrating for the aggrieved complainants for these charges to be summarily 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
dismissed for lack of proof.  Clients who file grievances expect the disciplinary 
process to be properly followed and completed.  In addition, these dismissed 
charges could become relevant in a future disciplinary action as part of a 
continuing pattern of misconduct or as justification to enhance a penalty. 
{¶ 16} I do not agree with the sanction of an indefinite suspension under 
these circumstances.  Therefore, as we did in Lauber, I would remand this cause 
for further proceedings. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas M. Kollin, for relator. 
_________________________