Title: Whittet v. Whittet

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 156 
Docket: 
Kno-17-9 
Submitted  
On Briefs: June 29, 2017 
Decided: 
July 13, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ROWLAND S. WHITTET 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL C. WHITTET 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Rowland S. Whittet appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Knox County, Stokes, J.) granting a permanent injunction and authorizing, 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 66, a special master to proceed with the sale of a 
parcel of real estate located in Rockport.  Our review in this appeal is limited 
to the court’s orders of December 15 and 22, 2016, and Daniel C. Whittet’s 
motion, filed in this appeal, for sanctions.1   
[¶2]  Because Rowland (1) has failed to provide transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings or a substitute to allow for adequate appellate review, 
(2) mounts untimely challenges to earlier decisions of the trial court not at 
                                         
1  On June 1, 2017, Daniel moved for sanctions against Rowland, submitting an affidavit detailing 
attorney fees expended in this appeal.  See M.R. App. P. 13(f).  We ordered that the motion for 
sanctions would be considered with the merits of the appeal. 
 
2 
issue in this appeal, and (3) has made no argument as to why the court erred 
in issuing the December 2016 orders, we affirm the judgment.  See Springer v. 
Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶¶ 7-8, 984 A.2d 828 (stating that where there is an 
inadequate record to review, we are “bound to accept the court’s factual 
findings and to assume that they are supported by sufficient competent 
evidence in the record”); Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ¶ 9 n.6, 
759 A.2d 205 (“The failure to mention an issue in the brief or at argument is 
construed as either an abandonment or a failure to preserve that issue.”). 
[¶3]  Pursuant to M.R. App. P. 13(f), we may award costs, expenses, or 
attorney fees as a sanction for appeals that are “frivolous, contumacious, or 
instituted primarily for the purpose of delay.”  “Sanctions are appropriate in 
egregious cases,” namely when a party seeks relief “with no reasonable 
likelihood of prevailing,” thereby increasing litigation costs and wasting time 
and resources.  Estate of Dineen, 2006 ME 108, ¶ 8, 904 A.2d 417 (quotation 
marks omitted).  “To support a finding of frivolousness, some degree of fault is 
required, but the fault need not be a wicked or subjectively reckless state of 
mind; rather, an individual must, at the very least, be culpably careless to 
commit a violation.”  Lincoln v. Burbank, 2016 ME 138, ¶ 46, 147 A.3d 1165 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
3 
[¶4]  Rowland’s opposition to the motion for sanctions, filed one day 
late, contains arguments and unsupported allegations with little apparent 
relevance to either the motion for sanctions or the merits of the appeal.  In a 
2013 judgment, the trial court proposed several contingent dispositions of the 
real estate to sensibly resolve this protracted dispute between the parties.  
Despite a number of court decisions to the contrary, including a 2016 finding 
of contempt,2 Rowland continues to maintain that he has complied with the 
2013 judgment and is entitled to full, unencumbered ownership of the 
disputed property.  His subjective belief is belied by the numerous decisions 
that have rejected the same meritless claims and arguments that he continues 
to make in this appeal3—claims and arguments that have effectively delayed 
enforcement of the 2013 judgment and wasted time and resources.  See 
Lincoln, 2016 ME 138, ¶ 46 & n.8, 147 A.3d 1165; Harriman v. Border Tr. Co., 
2004 ME 28, ¶¶ 6-7, 842 A.2d 1266 (sanctioning party for pursuing 
duplicative and vexatious litigation for the purposes of harassment and delay).  
We accordingly impose a sanction of attorney fees and treble costs.  See M.R. 
                                         
2  None of those decisions was timely appealed and therefore none is properly before us. 
3  This is Rowland’s fourth appeal involving this property; two of those appeals were dismissed 
in part for his failure to comply with the rules, to provide an adequate record for appellate review, 
or to properly present cognizable legal arguments.  See Whittet v. Whittet, Mem-14-113 
(August 5, 2014); Ribeck v. Whittet, Mem-14-48 (March 11, 2014) (dismissing the appeal on the 
ground that Rowland did “not even marginally comply with the requirements of M.R. App. P. 8”). 
 
4 
App. P. 13(f).  Daniel C. Whittet will be awarded attorney fees in the amount of 
$4,517.00 and treble costs in the amount of $216.24 for a total award of 
$4,733.24. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  Daniel C. Whittet’s motion 
for sanctions is granted.  He is hereby awarded 
attorney fees and treble costs in the amount of 
$4,733.24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rowland S. Whittet, appellant pro se 
 
Jamie F. Levenseler, Esq., and Edward M. Collins, Esq., Hanscom, Collins & Hall, 
P.A., Rockland, for appellee Daniel C. Whittet 
 
 
Knox County Superior Court docket numbers RE-2011-26 and -27 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY