Title: D'Allessandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12891 
 
LIZ D'ALLESSANDRO, trustee,1 & others2  vs.  LENNAR HINGHAM 
HOLDINGS, LLC, & others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2020. - November 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Condominiums, Common area.  Repose, Statute of.  Practice, 
Civil, Claim barred by statute of repose. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
Christopher Weld, Jr., for the defendants. 
 
Hugh J. Gorman, III, for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Edmund A. Allcock & Norman F. Orban for New England Chapter 
of Community Associations Institute. 
 
David J. Hatem & Jon C. Cowen for American Council of 
Engineering Companies of Massachusetts & another. 
                     
 
1 Of the Hewitts Landing Condominium Trust. 
 
 
2 Jane Freeman, Tod McGrath, Jay Driscoll, and Mike Nappi, 
as trustees of the Hewitts Landing Condominium Trust. 
 
 
3 Hewitts Landing Trustee, LLC; Lennar Northeast Properties, 
Inc., doing business as Lennar Northeast Urban; and Lennar 
Corporation. 
 
 
2 
 
Thomas O. Moriarty & Kimberly A. Bielan for Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another. 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this case, we answer a certified question 
posed by a judge in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts concerning the application of the six-
year statute of repose in G. L. c. 260, § 2B, to claims 
regarding alleged defects in the design and construction of the 
common and limited common areas of a multi-phase, multi-building 
condominium.  The question, as posed by the District Court 
judge, is the following: 
"Where the factual record supports the conclusion that a 
builder or developer was engaged in the continuous 
construction of a single condominium development comprising 
multiple buildings or phases, when does the six-year period 
for an action of tort relating to the construction of the 
condominium's common or limited common elements start 
running?" 
 
We respond to the certified question as follows:  Where a 
condominium development is comprised of multiple buildings, 
regardless of how many phases of the development there may be or 
how many buildings are within each phase, each building 
constitutes a discrete "improvement" for purposes of § 2B, such 
that the opening of each individual building to its intended 
use, or the substantial completion of the individual building 
and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner or 
owners, triggers the statute of repose under § 2B with respect 
to the common areas and the limited common areas of that 
 
 
3 
building.  In addition, where a particular improvement is 
integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings (or the 
condominium development as a whole), the statute of repose 
begins to run when that discrete improvement is substantially 
complete and open to its intended use.4 
Background.  In her decision denying the defendants' 
partial motion for summary judgment, the District Court judge 
recited the relevant facts from the summary judgment record.  We 
rely on her recitation of the facts, and on other undisputed 
facts in the record. 
The Hewitts Landing Condominium consists of 150 units, 
contained in twenty-eight buildings, built over the course of 
twenty-four "phases" between 2008 and 2015.5  From time to time 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Chapter of Community Associations Institute; Real Estate 
Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and the Abstract Club; 
and the American Council of Engineering Companies of 
Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Chapter of the American 
Institute of Architects. 
 
 
5 The condominium's master deed, recorded on June 25, 2010, 
states that the condominium "is planned to be developed as a 
phased condominium."  The first phase of the development is 
described as including three buildings, containing twelve units.  
The deed reserves the rights of the declarant to expand the 
condominium by the addition of "certain building(s) containing 
up to a total of 138 additional units in multiple phases," for a 
total of up to 150 units, within fifteen years of the recording 
of the master deed.  The deed further states that the declarant 
"shall have no obligation" to expand the condominium beyond the 
first phase. 
 
 
 
4 
during the course of construction, the project's architect 
submitted affidavits to the town of Hingham, swearing that 
individual units or buildings were "substantially complete" and 
ready for occupancy, and the town issued certificates of 
occupancy for the individual units or buildings. 
The plaintiffs, trustees of the Hewitts Landing Condominium 
Trust, commenced this action in the Superior Court on November 
3, 2017, seeking damages from the defendants6 for alleged design 
and construction defects to the common and limited common 
                     
 
6 The defendants include the developer of the condominium 
(Lennar Northeast Properties, Inc.); the contractor, 
construction manager, and condominium declarant (Lennar Hingham 
Holdings, LLC); the entity that served as trustee of the 
condominium trust from 2010 to 2015 (Hewitts Landing Trustee, 
LLC); and their parent company (Lennar Corporation). 
 
 
 
5 
elements of the condominium,7 among other claims.8  The complaint 
discussed four main aspects of the common areas in which defects 
were alleged:  "decks and columns," "roofing/flashing," 
"exterior walls/flashing/building envelope," and "irrigation 
system."  The complaint also stated, however, that "[the 
plaintiffs'] claims [were] not limited to those described 
[above]" and that the plaintiffs expressly reserved the right to 
amend the complaint to assert any additional claims as they were 
discovered. 
                     
 
7 "Ownership of a condominium unit is a hybrid form of 
interest in real estate, entitling the owner to both exclusive 
ownership and possession of his unit, . . . and . . . an 
undivided interest as tenant in common together with all the 
other unit owners in the common areas" (quotation, citation, and 
alteration omitted).  Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 262 
(2002).  See generally G. L. c. 183A, §§ 3-5.  Here, the 
condominium's master deed uses the statutorily defined term 
"common areas and facilities" interchangeably with the term 
"common elements."  See G. L. c. 183A, § 1.  For purposes of 
this opinion, we also treat the terms interchangeably.  As 
summarized by the Federal District Court judge, the common areas 
of the condominium here essentially include "all structural 
components and columns of the buildings, and all areas of the 
buildings and facilities (e.g., foundations, floor slabs, 
columns, beams, joints, all conduits, pipes, central services, 
etc.) with the exception of the unit interiors. . . .  The 
limited common areas are a type of common area that is 
designated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than 
all unit owners (e.g., a patio affixed to a unit)." 
 
 
8 The plaintiffs' claims include breach of condominium 
documents, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional 
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, 
breach of express and implied warranty, a claim entitled 
"piercing corporate veil/equitable remedy," and violation of 
G. L. c. 93A. 
 
 
6 
After removing the case to Federal court, the defendants 
sought partial summary judgment; they argued that the 
plaintiffs' claims were partially barred by the six-year statute 
of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B.9  More specifically, 
the defendants argued that § 2B barred all claims with respect 
to six of the condominium's twenty-eight buildings.10  The 
District Court judge denied the defendants' motion after 
concluding that only two of the plaintiffs' causes of action 
(negligence and implied warranty) were appropriate for 
consideration under § 2B, and, with respect to those, that all 
twenty-eight of the condominium's buildings should be treated as 
a single "improvement" for purposes of § 2B.  Subsequently, upon 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 260, § 2B, provides in relevant part: 
 
"Action of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency 
or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general 
administration of an improvement to real property . . . 
shall be commenced only within three years next after the 
cause of action accrues; provided, however, that in no 
event shall such actions be commenced more than six years 
after the earlier of the dates of:  (1) the opening of the 
improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the 
improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by 
the owner." 
 
 
10 For these six buildings, it is undisputed that the 
architect signed affidavits of substantial completion for each 
unit in the building more than six years before the commencement 
of this action.  And for five of the six buildings, the town 
issued certificates of occupancy for the buildings and all of 
their respective units more than six years before the 
commencement of this action. 
 
 
7 
the defendants' motion, the judge certified the question that is 
now before us.11 
Discussion.  As with any statutory provision, § 2B "must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  DiCarlo v. 
Suffolk Constr. Co., 473 Mass. 624, 628 (2016), quoting Galenski 
v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 309 (2015).  See G. L. c. 4, § 6, 
Third.  We begin, therefore, with the plain language of the 
statute. 
Under § 2B, the six-year statute of repose begins to run on 
the earlier of two dates:  "(1) the opening of the improvement 
to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the 
taking of possession for occupancy by the owner."  The 
plaintiffs focus their argument on the term "improvement."  They 
contend that the relevant improvement in this case is the entire 
condominium, based on such factors as the terms of the master 
deed, which creates a single legal entity; the pace and 
                     
 
11 The District Court judge certified the question to us 
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 
(1981). 
 
 
8 
continuity of construction; and the fact that the particular 
defendants in this case participated in the construction process 
from beginning to end.  Our analysis of the term "improvement" 
in the context of the statutory language as a whole leads us to 
a different conclusion. 
As we previously have noted, § 2B does not define the term 
"improvement," and the "legislative history of G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2B, does not indicate precisely what the Legislature meant the 
term to encompass."  Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 399 
Mass. 687, 696, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987), quoting 
Milligan v. Tibbetts Eng'g Corp., 391 Mass. 364, 366 (1984).  
Previously, we have found a dictionary definition of 
"improvement" instructive on the issue of whether particular 
work or conduct falls within the scope of the statute.  See 
Conley v. Scott Prods., Inc., 401 Mass. 645, 647 (1988), quoting 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1138 (1961) 
(defining "improvement" as "a permanent addition to or 
betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and 
that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed 
to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished 
from ordinary repairs"); Milligan, supra at 368 (same). 
The definition, however, has proved to be of limited 
utility in certain contexts.  See Dighton, 399 Mass. at 697 
(utility of Webster's definition was "doubtful" in context of 
 
 
9 
"decid[ing] which actors were intended to be comprehended by 
§ 2B").  Such is the case here.  It is undisputed, and rightly 
so, that the development of the condominium and its component 
parts constitutes "the design, planning, construction or general 
administration of an improvement to real property" within the 
meaning of the statute.  G. L. c. 260, § 2B.  See Aldrich v. ADD 
Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 220-221 (2002) (applying § 2B's statute of 
repose to claim for damages for negligent design of 
condominium).12  Rather, here, the question is whether the 
statute of repose was triggered only once (when the entire 
condominium satisfied the statutory requirements of being 
[1] open to use, or [2] substantially complete and taken for 
occupancy by the owner); or whether the statute was triggered 
multiple times, as each individual building (or other relevant 
component) of the project met those statutory requirements.  
Ultimately, we conclude that the latter approach adheres most 
closely to the statutory language and the underlying legislative 
intent. 
                     
 
12 The statutory definition of "condominium" in G. L. 
c. 183A, § 1, also supports this conclusion: 
 
"'Condominium,' the land or the lessee's interest in any 
lease of such land which is submitted to the provisions of 
this chapter, the building or buildings, all other 
improvements and structures thereon, and all easements, 
rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, which have been 
submitted to the provisions of this chapter" (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
 
10 
We view as significant that the applicable language 
defining the triggering events for the statute of repose in § 2B 
was added by amendment in 1984, displacing prior language that 
described the triggering event as "the performance or furnishing 
of such design, planning, construction or general 
administration."  See St. 1984, c. 484, § 53.  By amending the 
statute in this manner, the Legislature evinced an intent to 
shift the focus away from such factors as when, and by whom, the 
particular work was performed, and instead to predicate the 
analysis on two independent factors:  (1) whether the 
improvement is open to use; or (2) whether the improvement is 
substantially complete and the owner has taken possession for 
occupancy. 
The defendants contend that the statute of repose was 
triggered as each building in the development was opened to use, 
relying principally on the certificates of occupancy issued by 
the town.  Cf. Aldrich, 437 Mass. at 221-222 (§ 2B's statute of 
repose did not bar suit by condominium trust where action was 
commenced within six years of date of certificate of acceptance 
and occupancy, designated date of substantial completion, and 
date individual units had begun to be occupied).13  Although the 
                     
 
13 The defendants here also rely on the affidavits of 
substantial completion.  While such affidavits are relevant to 
the inquiry, the affidavits in this case do not, in and of 
 
 
11 
plaintiffs do not dispute that the issuance of a certificate of 
occupancy can signify that a building is open to use for 
purposes of § 2B, they argue that, in the context of a multi-
phase, multi-building condominium such as this, the relevant 
event is the issuance of the certificate of occupancy for the 
last building in the last phase of the development.14 
Ultimately, we conclude that the plaintiffs' interpretation 
would stray too far from the statutory language and the 
legislative intent behind it, and we hold that, under the 
circumstances here, the issuance of a certificate (or 
certificates) of occupancy for each individual building (or for 
all the units in a building) triggered the statute of repose for 
the common elements and limited common elements pertaining to 
that building.  We further hold that where a particular 
improvement is integral to and intended to serve multiple 
buildings within a single phase, or buildings across multiple 
                     
themselves, satisfy either the first prong (open to use) or the 
second prong (substantially complete and taken for occupancy by 
owner) of § 2B's statute of repose.  See Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 
437 Mass. 213, 220-221 (2002) (relying on date of substantial 
completion along with issuance of certificate of occupancy and 
actual occupancy by owners). 
 
 
14 We note that at the outset of the condominium development 
here, the total number of phases and buildings was 
indeterminate.  The master deed contemplated the construction of 
additional buildings beyond the first phase, but only committed 
the developer to completing the first phase. 
 
 
12 
phases, or even the condominium development as a whole, the 
statute of repose begins to run when that discrete improvement 
is substantially complete and open to its intended use.15 
As we have discussed in prior cases, "the Legislature's 
primary objective in enacting § 2B was to limit the liability of 
architects, engineers, contractors, and others involved in the 
design, planning, construction, or general administration of an 
improvement to real property in the wake of case law abolishing 
the long-standing rule that once an architect or builder had 
completed his work and it had been accepted by the owner, absent 
privity with the owner, liability was cut off as a matter of 
law."  Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 529, 
533-534 (2019), citing Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 480 
Mass. 349, 353 (2018).  "Otherwise, those engaged in the design 
and construction of real property may have to mount a defense 
when architectural plans may have been discarded, copies of 
building codes in force at the time of construction may no 
                     
 
15 See State v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 436 (2015) 
(under New Jersey law, statute of repose as to high temperature 
hot water system intended to serve multi-building facility was 
not triggered until system had been connected to every building 
it was intended to serve).  Because the parties did not brief 
this issue, we do not draw any conclusion as to whether such an 
improvement is at issue in this case.  Nor do we address other 
potential scenarios in which work on a building or improvement 
for which the statute of repose has yet to expire exacerbates a 
latent defect in a building or improvement as to which the 
statute of repose already has expired. 
 
 
13 
longer be in existence, [or] persons individually involved in 
the construction project may be deceased or may not be located."  
Stearns, supra at 534, quoting Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 
709-710 (1982).  "[L]imiting the duration of liability in this 
way serves a legitimate public purpose, even though it may 
abolish a plaintiff's cause of action without providing any 
alternative remedy."  Stearns, supra, citing Bridgwood, supra. 
Further, we have held that "[i]n establishing the six-year 
limit, the Legislature struck what it considered to be a 
reasonable balance between the public's right to a remedy and 
the need to place an outer limit on the tort liability of those 
involved in construction."  Klein, 386 Mass. at 710.  
Accordingly, we have consistently enforced § 2B's statute of 
repose, as we have other statutes of repose, "according to [its] 
plain terms, despite the hardship [it] may impose on 
plaintiffs," and we have held that "[u]nlike statutes of 
limitation, statutes of repose [such as that contained in § 2B] 
cannot be 'tolled' for any reason" (citation omitted).  
Bridgwood, 480 Mass. at 353. 
If we were to adopt the plaintiffs' view of the statute of 
repose in this case, it would contravene legislative intent by 
exposing the defendants in this action to liability with respect 
to discrete improvements (here, the common elements and limited 
common elements of certain individual buildings) that were 
 
 
14 
indisputably open to use more than six years before the 
commencement of this action. 
We recognize that this may present some difficulty for 
plaintiffs (including the plaintiffs in this case) where the 
developer retains control of the association of unit owners of a 
condominium for a period of time after some or all of the 
condominium's buildings are open to use or substantially 
complete and occupied.  See Trustees of the Cambridge Point 
Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, 478 Mass. 697, 703-
704 (2018), citing Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 265 
(2002) (noting that organization of unit owners has "exclusive" 
right to seek remedy for defects to common areas and that 
"developers are not likely to agree to sue themselves").16 
This concern, however, is appropriately addressed to the 
Legislature.  See Stearns, 481 Mass. at 537, quoting Joslyn v. 
Chang, 445 Mass. 344, 352 (2005) ("No exceptions ought to be 
made [to a statute of repose], unless they are found therein; 
                     
 
16 Although it is not a perfect substitute for a direct 
suit, prior to gaining control over the association, the unit 
owners have standing to file a derivative suit to enforce the 
rights of the association.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 23.1, 365 Mass. 
768 (1974); Cigal v. Leader Dev. Corp. 408 Mass. 212, 218 & n.10 
(1990).  In addition, once control over the association passes 
from the developer to the unit owners, the association could -- 
and in this case, did -- bring a claim against the developer-
controlled entities that formerly maintained control of the 
association for breach of fiduciary duty.  See Cigal, supra 
at 219. 
 
 
15 
and if there are any inconveniences or hardships growing out of 
such a construction, it is for the [L]egislature, which is fully 
competent for that purpose, and not for the court, to apply the 
proper remedy"). 
Conclusion.  We answer the certified question as follows:  
Where a condominium development is comprised of multiple 
buildings, regardless of how many phases of the development 
there may be or how many buildings are within each phase, each 
building constitutes a discrete "improvement" for purposes of 
G. L. c. 260, § 2B, such that the opening of each individual 
building to its intended use, or the substantial completion of 
the individual building and the taking of possession for 
occupancy by the owner or owners, triggers the statute of repose 
under § 2B with respect to the common areas and limited common 
areas of that building.  In addition, where a particular 
improvement is integral to and intended to serve multiple 
buildings (or the condominium development as a whole), the 
statute of repose begins to run when that discrete improvement 
is substantially complete and open to its intended use. 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
 
 
16 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and also 
will transmit a copy to each party.