Title: Alex Hammer v. Secretary of State

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2010 ME 109 Docket: Pen-10-582 Submitted On Briefs: October 27, 2010 Decided: October 28, 2010 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. Concurrence/ Dissent: ALEXANDER, J. ALEX HAMMER v. SECRETARY OF STATE GORMAN, J. [¶1] Alex Hammer appeals from a decision of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Murphy, J.) affirming a decision of the Secretary of State denying Hammer gubernatorial ballot access based on his failure to obtain a sufficient number of certified signatures pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 354 (2009). Hammer challenges the Secretary of State’s interpretation of section 354 to preclude the submission of nomination petitions by electronic means.1 We affirm the judgment. 1 Although, pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 356 (2009), there may be a colorable issue of the timeliness of Hammer’s appeals both to the Superior Court and to us, because the Secretary of State does not challenge the appeal on that basis, we reach the merits of Hammer’s contentions in these unique circumstances. 2 [¶2] Alex Hammer sought to be included on Maine’s November 2010 ballot as a non-party candidate for governor. He also sought to present the necessary petitions containing voter signatures through electronic means. The Secretary of State invalidated several hundred signatures on Hammer’s nomination petitions based on the Secretary’s interpretation of section 354 to require the presentation of original signatures, and therefore to preclude the submission of petitions for municipal certification by electronic means. We review directly the decision of the Secretary of State for “findings not supported by the evidence, errors of law, or abuse of discretion.” Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State, 2008 ME 124, ¶ 8, 954 A.2d 1054, 1058. [¶3] The Superior Court had the benefit of the administrative filings and briefing from Hammer and the Secretary.2 It issued a judgment containing a thorough review of Hammer’s contentions, along with a comprehensive and well-reasoned decision detailing the statutory interpretation leading to its conclusion that section 354 does require potential candidates to present the original nomination petitions, and thus bars them from presenting their petitions electronically. 2 Notwithstanding procedural assistance and explicit directions from the Clerk of the Law Court and the Attorney General’s Office, Hammer failed to file a brief in this Court in support of his appeal. 3 [¶4] Notwithstanding our direct review of the Secretary of State’s decision, we agree with the Superior Court’s determination that “the Secretary correctly interpreted the language of 21-A M.R.S. § 354 according to its plain language . . . .” Given the fact that the Superior Court issued a judgment addressing the factual and procedural background and a comprehensive analysis of the statutory interpretation required in this matter, we do not repeat that presentation herein. Rather, in this expedited proceeding, we append the judgment of the Superior Court. See Sephton v. FBI, 442 F.3d 27, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2006) (“When a lower court produces a comprehensive, well-reasoned decision, an appellate court should refrain from writing at length to no other end than to hear its own words resonate.” (quotation marks omitted)). The entry is: Judgment affirmed. ALEXANDER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. [¶5] The trial court’s opinion, adopted by the Court herein, thoroughly addresses the substantive issue in this case: whether our election laws allow receipt of electronic copies of nominating petitions in place of the actual signatures on paper copies. I concur in the Court’s observations on that issue. I write separately because we should not reach that issue. The law requires that appeals to us from 4 nominating petition decisions must be instituted within three days of the Superior Court’s decision. 21-A M.R.S. § 356(2)(E) (2009). Mr. Hammer’s appeal was filed well outside that time limit. The late appeal should be dismissed without reaching the merits. See M.R. App. P. 4(c); Landmark Realty v. Leasure, 2004 ME 85, ¶ 7 n.1, 853 A.2d 749, 750-51; Thomas v. BFC Marine/Bath Fuel Co., 2004 ME 27, ¶ 5, 843 A.2d 3, 5 (explaining that the Court never acquires jurisdiction of an appeal filed out of time). Alex Hammer did not file a brief. Attorneys for the Secretary of State: Janet T. Mills, Attorney General Phyllis Gardiner, Asst. Atty. Gen. Six State House Station Augusta, Maine 04333-0006 Penobscot County Superior Court docket number AP-2010-15 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY STATE OF MAINE ‘SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. ap-2010-15 ALEX HAMMER, Petitioner, v. DECISION & ORDER ON 80C APPEAL, OFFICE OF THE MAINE SECRETARY OF STATE Respondent. ‘The matter before the Court is an appel by the Petitioner, Alex Hammer, ‘pursuant fo $ M.R.S, §§ 11001-11008 und Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, from a decision by the Respondent, Mathew Dunlap, Secretary of State, and the Bureau of Corporations, Elections and Commissions (“Bureau”), declaring seventy of Hammer's non-party nomination petitions forthe November 2, 2010 General Election for the Office of Governor invalid on account of purported failures to meet the certification requirements of 21-A MRS. § 354. Asa consequence of the Division's decision, invalidating seventy ofthe pon-party nomination petitions, he petitioner failed to acquire the minimum number of signatures required—"at least 4,000 and not more than 6,000"— to ensure his placement on the November 2010 ballot asa independent candidate for the Office of Governor. 21-A M.RS. § 354(5)(A). Having reviewed the administrative record and the parties’ filings, the Court denies Petitioner Hammer's administrative eppeal BACKGROUND (On the record certified by the Secretary of State, the parties do not dispute the basic underlying facts giving rise to this administrative ation. Pursuant 10 correspondence from Mr. Hammer, the Seertary of State, him 100 of non-party petition forms. (Administrative Record at 24) (hereinafter R. at a the Bureau, delivered to ___)- Iman undated weiten reply, Hammer wrote back to Julie L. Flynn, Deputy Secretary of State, requesting both a copy ofthe 2010 Candidates Guide to Ballot Access and specific information regarding the contact information forthe municipal town clerks and registrars located throughout the State. (R. at 23.) On January 8, 2010, Hammer delivered an email directly to Secretary of State Mathew Dunlap requesting thatthe ‘Bureau send to him “additional allot signature forms.” (R. at 22.) Thereafter, Secretary Dunlap and Hammer engaged in an email exchange between January 8, 2010, and January 12, 2010. (R. at 22.) The substance of those emails demonstrates that Petitioner Hammer wanted addtional copies of the nom paty petitions while Secretary Dunlap consistently reiterated that Hammer could make photocopies ofthe petition already provided, and that prospective candidates were responsible for duplicating the non-party petition form at their own expense. (R. at 2223.) ‘After various communications with the Petitioner, (Rat 18), Deputy Secretary Flynn sent Hammer a letter explaining the petition process, and enclosed fifly additional ‘non-party petition along with the 2010 Candidate's Guide to Ballot Access. (R. at 19.) (On February 18, 2010, Hammer indicated « preference for delivering some of his non- party petitions to municipal town clerks and registrars by submitting photooopies of ‘them, (R. at 17), based on his realization that some of the petitions contained signatures from more than one municipality. Hammer thus anticipated that he might be unable to circulate the “origina!” copy of some ofthe non-party petitions to each and every local suniciplty for certification: was going to forward you copies of the multiple towns per ballot signature page (already covers hundred of signatures) and let you know that I plan to send the towns photocopies to certify (lor your advisement) because itis logistically to send same form to 15-20 or more towns (not enough time) and there is space on the back only for own [sic] town to certify number for each form as well. (R 17) Secretary Dunlap replied, “you ean only photocopy the blank originals; for verification, the clerks need the original forthe circulators oath, ec.” (Id) Subsequently, Hammer and Secretary Dunlap engaged in another email exchange, with the Secretary once again advising Hammer thatthe certification process required delivery cof each “original” petition tothe local municipal officer charged with cortfying signers, sa registered voter, in each particular municipality noted onthe form petition. (. at 16.) (On Apsil 1, 2010, Hammer sent an email message to Secretary Dunlap requesting dlvery of additonal non-paty petition after recognizing that certification of some of his petitions might pose a significant logistical problem because they contained signers from “15-20 or more towns.” (R. at 15.) Secretary Dunlap responded on April 2, 2010, informing Harmer that he would not euthorize the delivery of additional petitions and reiterated that Hammer was fre to make copes ofa blank petition inthe event he needed smore forms. (Rat 14)! ‘On May 10, 2010, Hammer initiated contact with Secretary Dunlap informing him that he intended to have “scanned” copics of some of the petitions made available to "throughout the nomination proces, the Seeretary alo adviced Harmer tthe could avold te logistical problems associated with menisipal etfistion srply by organising each aon-pary petition 10 include anes fom one municipality. (See Rat 10, 16, and 1819.) 3 the municipal town clerks end registrars through an internet filesharing program. (R. at 13.) Dring this exchange, Secretary Dunlap repeated thatthe various town registrars, consistent with 21-A MARS. § 354, could only certify signers if presented withthe “original” copies of the non-party petitions. (2d) Despite the Secretary Dunlap's warning that the own registrars were not permitted, by statute, to accept “copies” ofthe non-party petitions, and were therefore anemic to propery certify the signers, Hammer delivered & May 15, 2010, email to various town registrars requesting them to download electronically scanned copies of certain non-party petitions from an internet file sharing « network in order to certify those voter signatures that appeared to be onthe respective town voting rolls. (R. at 5, 12.) Included inthe email, Hammer provided a “key” to each petition so thatthe various registrars and town clerks could locate those petitions that contained signatures of voters purportedly residing and registered to vote in each respective municipality /d) In the email correspondence that followed, the Belfast City Clerk, Roberta Fogg, after consulting with Deputy Secretary Flynn, advised the town clerks and municipal officers copied onthe eml to refrain from certifying signatures using Hammer's proposed method of “delivery” until the Seeretary of State's office had an opportunity to engage the Office ofthe Attorney General for guidance. (R. at 11.) On May 18, 2010, Deputy Secretary Flynn dlivered a letter to Hammer indicating thatthe Secretary of State would not permit the various municipal authorities to accept for certification any petitions provided by Hammer in “scanned” or other facsimile format, (R at 10.) Deputy Secretary Flynn also circulated a Memorandum to all municipal town ‘lerks and registrars urging them not to accept Hammer's proposed method for centtying signetures and advised that they could only accepUcertfy those “original copies of petitions containing signatures.” (R. at 9:) On Monday, May 24, 2010, Hammer delivered an email message to the town clerks arguing that election laws permitted copies of the ‘non-party petitions to be provided for cetfieaton. (Rat 7.) (On May 25, 2010, Hammer delivered the Secretary of State's office 175 properly certified petitions, 10 petitions with “copies” of cerifications by municipal registrars, and 70 petitions without proper certifications by any ofthe municipal registrars. (See R. at 3- 5.) On May 27, 2010, Director of Elections, Melissa Packard, delivered a leter to Hammer indicating that 3,209 signatures contained in 185 ofthe non-prty petitions were properly certified and submitted, but thatthe Secretary could not accept as “valid” the signatures contained on 70 petitions because they did not contain the proper certification ‘from local municipal officials. (R. at 1.) The Secretary therefore determined that ‘Hammer had failed to obtain the 4000 certified petition signatures necessary lo ensure a place on the November 2010 ballot for Governor. See 21-A M.RS. § 354(5)(A). ‘After receiving Deputy Fiynn’s letter, Hammer appealed the Sccretary's decision by filing MR, Civ, P, 80C complaint with the Penobscot County Superior Court on Sune 28, 2010. The State filed the administrative record on August 2, 2010. On September 10, 2010, some two days after Lfamnmer had submitted his brief, the Court was finally slerted to existence ofthis administrative appeal.” Realizing the sensitivity of this litigation and its proximity to the upcoming November 2010 election, the Court held a conference cal with the parties on September 15, 2010, in which the parties were advised that the litigation would be expedited. The Court ordered the State to file its bret by no 2 The Penobscot County Superior Court Cle issund a standard Scheduling Order that would hve had he ‘wing inhi cas continue wel into October, later than September 22, 2010, The State filed its brief on that day, and the Petitioner filed his response on that date as wel. STANDARD OF REVIEW ‘The Court's review of Pettioner’s administrative appeal is confined by a deferential standard, Agency rulings may only be reversed or modified on MR. Civ. P. ‘80C appeal upon a finding thatthe administrative ruling is: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 2) in excess of the statutory authority of the ‘agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by bias or by error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence onthe whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of disretion. S MRS. § 11007(4)(C\(1)-(6); see also Seider v. Board of Examiners of Examiners of Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, 8, 695 A.2d 532, 4555 ("The standard of review [on M.R. Civ. P. 80C appeal] is limited to whether the governmental agency] abused its discretion, committed an eror of law, or made findings ‘not supported by substantial evidence inthe record) intemal quotation mark omitted) (citation omitted), Long-established rules of statutory construction obligate this Court to construe Maine statutes through the lens of giving “effect o intent of the Legislature.” Knutson». Sec'y of State, 2008 ME 124, $9, 954 A.24 1054, 1058 (quoting Arsenault ¥ Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 111, $11, 905 A.2d 285, 287-88). The Court first endeavors “Yo effectuate the plain language of the statue.” J. Where, however, the language of the statute is ambiguous, the Court “will defer tothe Secretary's interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable.” Id DISCUSSION The issue before the Cour in this M.R. Civ. P. 80C aetion concerns whether the Sceretary of State erred as a matter of law by instructing Hammer that he could submit only “original” copies of the non-party petition forms to town clerks and registrar, both preventing municipal authorities from certifying signatures contained in those petitions delivered by electronic means and culminating inthe Bureau's rejection of 70 petitions. (See R. at 1, 5.) The statutory procedures outlined in 21-A M.RS. §§ 351-57 provide the ‘non-party candidate attempting to run for public office with a detailed framework for ‘obtaining a positon on the clection ballot. See id. ‘The requirements for that process are outlined in § 354(7). ‘The Secretary argues that the statute effectuating the petition certification process is unambiguous, and explicitly requires the candidate to deliver “original” copies of the ‘non-party petitions tothe various municipal officals responsible for certifying voter signatures. The Court ugrees with the State's postion. ‘The Legislature has decided that a “(a nomination petition shall be on the form provided by the Secretary of State.” 21-A MRS. § 3542 Once the Secretary distributes the petition form(s), the reepient candidate andor his agents are left to circulate the petitions by gathering name and residence of registered voters, id. § 354(4), and the personal signature of each voter signing the petition “in such a manner as to satisfy the sogistrar of his municipality that he is a registered voter,” id. §354(3). After collecting > re eno dispute hat the Secretary delivered 180 nonparty pts to Hammer, enough o collect 16950 certified signatres, 750 more tan Vamnmer would ned, othe Secretary would wtimaely accept, ‘declaring Hammer's nomination forthe Office of Governor, See 21-A M.RLS. §384(S)(C). As noted in the ‘Cout'srectaton ofthe Set, Sereary Dunlap and Deputy Serer Flynn repeats tod lame that, he coud rerente the form peti provided by making photocopies of them inthe event heran ou of foes (Rat 16,19, 2, and23) ‘the minimum number (but not exceeding the maximum number) of signatures needed for the particular offic, all petitions are required to be “verified and certified” according to ‘procedure contained in § 354(7)(A)(C), the language critical to resolving the instant dispute, ‘Scetion 354(7)/A) requires the circulator to swear an oath “verifying that each of the signatures was made in his presence,” Knuson v. Secretary of State, 2008 ME 124, {FH10-13, 954 A.2d 1054, 1058-59, and Section 354(7)(B){C) prescribes the certification method assumed by the individual town clerks and registrars: B. Petitions must be delivered to the registrar, or clerk at the request or upon the absence of the registrar, for certification by 5 pam. on May 25th in the election year in which the petitions are to be used, except that petitions for 1 slate of candidates for the office of presidential elector ust be delivered for cetfication by 5 pam. on August 8th in the election year in which the petitions are to be used. C. The registrar, or clerk at the request or upon the absence of the registrar, ofeach municipality concerned shall certify which names on a petition appear in the central voter registration system as registered votes in that municipality and may not certify any names that do not satisfy subsection 3, 21-A MRS. § 354(7(B)-(C) (emphasis added). Given the explicit procedural design of the non-perty nomination process—from § 354(3)'s requirement thatthe voter “must personally sign the petition” on the “form provided by the Secretary of State” to § '354(7)(B)s requirement thatthe “{pletitions must be delivered tothe registrar or clerk” and § 354(7(C)'s restriction that a town clerk or egistrac “may not certify any names that do not satisfy subsection 3°—the statute plainly indicates tha the candidate secking 1 non-party nomination deliver the “origina! petition, complete with the “original” signatures of the voters signing the petition, to each town clerk or registrar responsible for certifying signatures in thir municipality Particularly relevant is Section 354(7)(C)'s requirement tha town clerk “may not catty names tht donot satisfy subsceton 3." This section presupposes thatthe voter's original signature appear onthe petition delivered; otherwise, the owm clerk may have no discernable method of distinguishing the circulators writing from that of the signing voter? Even ifthe plain language of §354(7)(B) were found to be ambiguous, the Court finds the Secretary's interpretation ofthe statute to be reasonable, and therefore, entitled to deference, See, ¢.g, Knutson, 2008 ME 124, | 13, 954 A.24 at 1059 (deferring to the Secretary's interpretation of “presence” in the context of requiring circulator to directly ‘observe a voter signature ona petition before the circulator can properly fulfill the obligation of his oath). Three considerations support this conclusion, Firs, asthe Seerctary argues, “all methods of delivery are not equivalent.” (Sec'y Br. at 10, Petitioner Hammer suggests that the term “delivered” contained in § 354(7)(B) includes all possible methods of delivery, whether in hand, by mal, by facsimile, ot by “scanned” clectronic transmission, (Id; see Per.’s Br. at2; Rat 7.) Petitioner Hammer realized relatively early in the petition process—at least by February 18, 2010—that he might not be able to deliver the “original” copy of some ofthe petitions, especially those containing voter signatures from "15-20 or more towns,” (R. at 13, 17;s0e also R. at 5.) to each municipality charged with certifying signatures by May * petitioner Hamme also suggests that he 70 ptton contsining th signatures fom voters registred in isparategooraphe locations, (Rt) could be delivered and ered by one municipal own clerk or "egievar given each municipality's “sapacly to certify names ftom throughout he state.” (R. st 13.) This ‘proposed cerication meted clearly conrad plain tnguage of21-A MRS §388(7\(C) and does not ‘onsite «ground upon which Manimer might be ented to reli in the MAR. Civ. P. OC action nom before the Court See id (“The regia, or lk athe request or upon the absence ofthe res. of cch ‘manip concerned shall arty which names ona pthion appear i the central voter eegsvaton ‘ste a epittered voters i that muniipaiy..) (phasis ded), > Subsections 354(3)44) permite citeulaoro “prin dhe voters name” andlor “wrt or prin the voter's residence dross and the muneipaly of reparation.” li ° 25, 2010. To that end, on May 15,2010, Hammer delivered an email correspondence to various town clerks outlining an alternative system of “delivery” by which the municipal clerks could * download and extract PDF” versions of the petitions from Hammer's ‘website; viow them using Adobe Reader; verify those voters’ signatures appearing on lity; complete the scanned version of the registrar's certification for each petition reviewed; and email the ceach petition purported to be registered in each respective munici scanned version of the certification back tothe Petitioner. (R. at 12.) However, in the ‘Coun's view, Section 354(7)(B) contemplates a transfer of physical documents, and not clectronie delivery of over 70 nom-party petitions nine days before the petitions were, by statute, required to bein the hands of own clerks and registrars, See Blacks Law Dictionary 494 (9th ed. 2009).° Second, when the petition certification process is compared to other statutory ms allowing “copies” of official forms to be used, accepted, delivered, or provi distributed in the election process, the Legislature has made those exceptions clear in the election statute, See, e.g, 21-A MRS. § 737-A(7) (requiring the Secretary to make photocopies of the disputed ballots in the event ofan election recount; id. § 852(5) (mandating the warden at cach polling place, atthe close of Election day, “to run an additional copy of the tally tape to provide tothe clerk with the tally sheets and the return of the votes cast’); id § 711(1)-(2) (requiring the municipal clerk to prepare election returns by making “an attested copy” of the returns “and immediately send them to the Secretary of State"); Id. § 753-A(3) (permitting a voter applying for an absentee ballot to § Notonly would elctonic delivery contravene th plan nyuage of § 354(7(B), requiring hat “orignal” petition be delivered tothe town cle t woud alo inevitably cause town clerks and registrars to Iaborously plow through ech “scanned” pation, o "key" provided for each petition, leit hose ‘voters parprtelly residing and regintered ovo th paticular municipality. This sem to be precisely the ype of eal § 354 designe, a asin arto prevent, 10 make a written request “by mail, in person, or by facsimile”). Even where the stare ‘permits electronic delivery ofclection-related documents, those situations are limited and precisely defined. See 21-A MRS. § 753-(A)6) (allowing municipal clerks the option of scoepting absentee ballots by e-mail provided the clerk follows certain procedures, specified inthe provision; id. § 783(5), enacted by P.L. 2008, ¢, $63, § 9 (eff. March 29, 2010) (authorizing “electronic receipt of an image of voted absentee ballots transmitted by email or fax from uniformed service voters or overseas voters”). The existence of these statutory provisions demonstrates that ifthe Legislature intended or contemplated that non-party petitions could be delivered to municipal town clerks and registrars in clectronic, facsimile or other “copy” format, it would have clearly provided for these alternatives in § 354(7)(B), The Court cannot therefore say that the Legislature intended to permit delivery of non-party petitions in the manner proposed by the Petitioner in this case.” Finally, if there was any doubt as to whether the § 354(7)(B) requires delivery of the “original petition,” the intent of the Legislature i readily ascertained by the provision in the Maine Constitution from which § 354(7) is ultimately derived: "written petition’ means one or more petitions written or printed, or partly written and partly printed, with the ‘original signatures of the petitioners attached, verified xs to the authenticity of the signatures by the oath of the circulator that all of the signatures to the petition were 7 The Court ins the Secrary’s interpretation reasonable forthe adlonl reson that allowing potential candidates to deliver “copies” ofthe peltins coud increase the potetia for ferged signature and ‘therwise mask material lteaton ox ption.”(See'y Ba 13; Rat 13.) Further, electron {Tonsmtal ofthe documents unde the cvcmstancea proposed by Hammer—on an unsecure, private ‘weble—pous a substan risk of compromising the security municpal computer sysiems. (Sey Brat 16). The explicit story framework of Maines section satu lend credence tthe Secretary's view thut“if the state could be ead to allow riers to cerity pation bsed ona review of an eleconie Image ofthe ptiton the Secretary ..wouldesublsh accu, public weit for that purpose." (I) In ‘concloing this, Court doesnot mean fo impugn Mr. Hammer's rebliy or otherwise suggest ha he was motivated o deliver fraudulently obtained sgnaies un ‘made inthe presence ofthe circulator and that tothe best of the circulators knowledge and beliof each signature isthe signature of the person whose name it purports to be, and accompanied by the certificate of the official authorized by Jaw to maintain the voting list or to certify signatures on petitions for voters on the voting list of the city, town or plantation in which the petitioners reside that their names appear on the voting list of the city, town or plantation of ‘the official as qualified to vote for Governor. Arsenault v, Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 111,11 n5, 905 A.2d 1054, 1058 n.$ (quoting ME. CONST. art. IV, pt 3, § 20). The Law Court previously held that Maine's election. Jaws are written in “painstaking detail” and the Secretary of State, despite its obligation to provide oversight of election processes, cannot usurp the proper function of the Legislature to set election “policy” by enacting election laws consistent with the Maine Constitution, See Knutson, 2008 ME 124, $27, 954 A.2d at 1062 (“Although the Secretary's policy decision, attempting to save petitions in certain cireurstances, may not be unreasonable, its the Legislature that weighs the competing considerations and sets the policy.”) (emphasis in original); Arsenault, 2006 ME 111, 23, 905 A.2d at 289- 90 (noting thatthe Secretary is without the power to “fashion a limitation that does not ‘exist in the statutes"). On the facts of this ease, the Secretary of State has not engaged in the type of policy-making that would appear to controvert ME. CONST. art. 1V, pt. 3, §2 ‘or the sttute modeled after it, 21-A MRS. § 354(7)(B). Given the forgoing analysis, the Court need not reach the Secretary's additional argument that granting Hammer’s requested relief at this point would “disrupt the ‘lection process and potentially disenfranchise Maine voters.” (Sce"y Br. at 16.) The ‘Court here finds thatthe Secretary correctly interpreted the language of 21-A MRS. § R 354 according to its plain language; and alternatively, determines thatthe Secretary's interpretation ofthe petition cenificaton provision tobe reasonable. ‘Because the Petitioner could submit enough certifications to tally only 3209 registered voter, he fll short of accomplishing the 4000 properly certified signatures necessary to casure his place on the November 2010 ballot for the Office of Governor. The entry is: 1. Petitioner's MR. Civ. P. 80C appeal is DENIED. 2. -Atthe direction ofthe Cour, this Order shall be incorporated ino the docket by reference. M.R. Civ. P. 75) a4 Date: September", 2010 ‘M. Michaela Murphy Justice, Superior Court