Title: Corkill v. Knowles

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Corkill v. Knowles1998 WY 34955 P.2d 438Case Number: 96-281Decided: 03/23/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Debora Eileen CORKILL, Petitioner,

v.

Clark Tyler KNOWLES, as 
Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, Deceased, 
Respondent.

 

Appeal from The District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

John C. Brooks 
of Brooks, Henley & Drell, P.C., Casper, for 
Petitioner.

Kathleen J. 
Doyle, Judith Studer and Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & 
Studer, LLC, Casper, for Respondent.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Debora Eileen 
Corkill (Corkill) petitions for interlocutory review of an order denying her 
motion to dismiss the wrongful death action brought against her by the personal 
representative for the estate of Lynn Rae Knowles. Corkill's motion to dismiss 
asserted that the action was time-barred pursuant to the applicable statute of 
limitations. The district court held that the "discovery rule" applies to 
Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act and the action was filed within the statutory time 
frame.

[¶2]      Determining that 
the Wrongful Death Act, when read as a whole, is ambiguous and could lead to an 
absurd result when applied to the unusual facts of this case, we hold that a 
personal representative may bring a wrongful death action within two years of 
the date on which the decedent is identified so the court may appoint a personal 
representative. Therefore, although we do not agree that the discovery rule 
applies to the limitation period found in the Wrongful Death Act, we affirm the 
district court's denial of the motion to dismiss on other 
grounds.

ISSUE

[¶3]      Petitioner 
Corkill presents the following issue in her brief:

Whether the 
"discovery rule"1 may toll the running of Wyoming's 
Wrongful Death Statute of Limitations for nearly sixteen 
years?

[¶4]      Clark Tyler 
Knowles (Knowles), the personal representative for the estate of Lynn Rae 
Knowles (the decedent), presents the issue for our review 
as:

Whether the 
statute of limitations under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act is tolled until a 
family member receives notice of the death, when the fact of death was not 
reasonably discoverable within a two-year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence?

FACTS

[¶5]      In the early 
morning hours of November 2, 1980, Corkill struck and killed Lynn Rae Knowles 
(the decedent) with her vehicle. Corkill fled the scene of the accident without 
rendering aid or reporting the incident to authorities. Investigators and police 
officers were able to locate Corkill because pieces of her vehicle's grill were 
left on the highway when she struck the decedent. Corkill was convicted of 
leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death. At the time of the 
accident, Corkill was intoxicated and unable to safely operate a motor 
vehicle.

[¶6]      Authorities were 
unable to identify the decedent after the accident. Her purse and wallet were 
missing, and she carried no identification. For the next fourteen years the 
decedent's family did not know what had happened to her. Her two children 
thought she had abandoned them. Knowles hired a private investigator to find his 
daughter, but to no avail. Fourteen years later, after making further inquiries, 
investigating dental records, and exhuming the body, authorities were finally 
able to identify the decedent and contact her family. On March 6, 1995, Knowles 
reviewed police photographs of the decedent's body, read a note found on her 
body, and identified the body as that of his daughter.

[¶7]      The decedent was 
a resident of Iowa City, Iowa, at the time she was killed in Wyoming. Knowles is 
the decedent's father and the qualified personal representative of the 
decedent's estate. Knowles, as the personal representative for the decedent, 
filed this wrongful death action on July 3, 1996, more than fifteen years after 
the decedent's death, but less than two years after her body was identified. In 
her answer and motion to dismiss, Corkill sought dismissal of the complaint, 
claiming the wrongful death action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation found in WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d).

[¶8]      Holding that the 
discovery rule applies to Wyoming's wrongful death statute, the district court 
denied Corkill's motion to dismiss because Knowles did not know or have reason 
to know he had a claim until less than two years before the case was filed. 
Corkill petitioned this Court for a writ of review, which we 
granted.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      Corkill has 
petitioned this Court for a writ of review pursuant to WYO. R.APP. P. 13. Rule 
13 permits appellate review of interlocutory orders involving a controlling 
question of law, the resolution of which may materially advance resolution of 
the litigation. WYO. R.APP. P. 13.02. The interlocutory order in the case at bar 
denied a motion to dismiss based on the district court's interpretation of 
Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and 
is reviewed de novo. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 1996). We review an order pertaining to a motion to dismiss 
accepting the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as true. See Stalkup v. 
State Dept. of Environmental Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 709 n. 3 (Wyo. 
1992).

DISCUSSION

The 
Arguments

[¶10]   In her motion to dismiss, Corkill 
asserted that the statute of limitation expired two years after the death of the 
decedent. A complaint filed after expiration of the statute of limitation is 
barred. Shubert v. Dexter, 891 P.2d 55, 56 (Wyo. 1995). The running of the 
statute of limitation is an affirmative defense which can be pled in a motion to 
dismiss under WYO. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See WYO. R. CIV. P. 8(c) and 12(b)(6); 
and In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 817 (Wyo. 1973). Corkill's 
memorandum of law supporting her motion to dismiss asserted that the discovery 
rule is not applied to wrongful death claims in the majority of jurisdictions 
where the language of the statute requires bringing of the action within a 
specified period of time after the decedent's death.

[¶11]   Knowles asks this Court to affirm 
the district court's determination that the discovery rule applies to Wyoming's 
wrongful death statute. Since Knowles did not discover the decedent's death 
until March 6, 1995, application of the discovery rule would toll the limitation 
period found in the Wrongful Death Act until that date. In support of his 
position, Knowles argues for liberal construction of the statute in support of 
its remedial purpose. He then directs us to discovery rule jurisprudence in 
Wyoming and to other jurisdictions' application of the discovery rule to 
wrongful death cases.

The Wrongful 
Death Act

[¶12]   Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act, found 
in WYO. STAT. §§ 1-38-101 and -102 (1997), provides:

§ 1-38-101. 
Actions for wrongful death which survive; proceedings against executor or 
administrator of person liable.

Whenever the 
death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if 
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not 
ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused 
under circumstances as amount in law to murder of the first or second degree or 
manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the 
executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate within the state 
of Wyoming, the Court may appoint an administrator upon 
application.

§ 1-38-102. 
Action to be brought by personal representative; recovery exempt from debts; 
measure and element of damages; limitation of action.

(a) Every such 
action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the 
deceased person.

(b) If the 
deceased left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of the deceased 
may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action 
brought under the provisions of this section.

(c) The court or 
jury, as the case may be, in every such action may award such damages, pecuniary 
and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just. Every person for whose benefit 
such action is brought may prove his respective damages, and the court or jury 
may award such person that amount of damages to which it considers such person 
entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society 
and comfort.

(d) Every such 
action shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the deceased 
person.

[¶13]   The purpose of the Wrongful Death 
Act, "commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act, was to prescribe limitations and a 
remedy for a cause of action which did not exist at common law, for at common 
law the cause of action died with the death of the claimant." Gengo v. Mardis, 
103 Neb. 164, 170 N.W. 841 (1919). Wyoming adopted the wrongful death act in 
1871. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 305, 3 P.2d 105, 106 (1931). 
The act was similar to Lord Campbell's Act and was almost an exact copy of West 
Virginia's wrongful death law. Id. "In the wrongful death statute, the Wyoming 
legislature has expressed a social policy that favors compensation to ameliorate 
the certain damage to relational interests resulting from the death of a family 
member." Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 
1175 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶14]   "The foundation of the action is 
the wrongful act of the defendant which resulted in death. No remedy existed at 
common law. The statute was intended to make a change." Coliseum Motor, 43 Wyo. 
at 307, 3 P.2d  at 107. Corkill asserts that the statute must be strictly 
construed because it is in derogation of the common law. However, "derogation" 
is defined as "[t]he partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a subsequent 
act which limits its scope or impairs its utility and force." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 399 (5th ed. 1979).

Wrongful death 
acts do not take away any common law right; they were designed to mend the 
fabric of the common law, not to weaken it. Remedial acts are not strictly 
construed although they do change a rule of the common law. Steggall v. Morris, 
363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577, 582 (1953). We must therefore apply the statutory 
language "with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative 
enactment." United Air Lines v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 377 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1964).

Howell v. 
Murphy, 844 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

[¶15]   The wrongful death act is remedial, 
in that it was intended to make a change, not to repeal or abolish a law or to 
limit its scope. Therefore, we will apply the statutory language with a view to 
promoting the remedial intent of the legislature when it enacted the law. See, 
e.g., Nulle, 797 P.2d  at 1175 (Wyoming legislature has expressed social policy 
favoring compensation to family members of decedent in wrongful death action); 
DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977) (wrongful death statute 
creates new cause of action for benefit of designated persons who have suffered 
the loss of a loved one); Coliseum Motor, 43 Wyo. at 307, 3 P.2d  at 107 (act was 
intended to give cause of action for benefit of relatives); Ashley v. Read 
Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D.Wyo. 1961) (action is brought to benefit 
those whom the state law ordains should share in the distribution of the 
decedent's estate); Miller v. Romero, 186 W. Va. 523, 413 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) 
(statute has a remedial, but not punitive, purpose).

The Limitation 
Period

[¶16]   Knowles argued, and the district 
court ruled, that the discovery rule applies to the limitation period found in 
WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d) (1997). We do not agree for two distinct reasons. 
First, the limitation period found in the wrongful death statute is a condition 
precedent, not a statute of limitation, and the discovery rule does not apply to 
conditions precedent. Second, the plain language of the statute does not lend 
itself to application of the discovery rule.

[¶17]   The right to sue for wrongful death 
is created purely by statute. The two year limitation upon the bringing of an 
action for wrongful death is an integral part of the statute itself, creating a 
condition precedent to the bringing of the action. Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 156 
W. Va. 861, 199 S.E.2d 50, 53-54 (1973) (citing Smith v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 
122 W. Va. 277, 8 S.E.2d 890 (1940)). Recognizing that we have referred to the 
time limitation in WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d) as a statute of limitation in 
previous cases, upon closer analysis we determine that those cases did not 
involve the issues before us in the case at bar, and therefore, in those cases 
this Court failed to analyze the terminology used to describe the limitation 
period. See, e.g. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 910 (Wyo. 1976) (time not 
tolled while defendant was out of state because service was possible through the 
secretary of state); Newcom v. Keever, 513 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Wyo. 1973) 
(interpretation advanced by appellant not supported by any cogent argument); 
Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901 (Wyo. 1963) (personal representative was not 
appointed within two year period of limitation and father was not the proper 
person to bring action unless he was appointed as personal 
representative).

[¶18]   Although we used the term "statute 
of limitation" in our previous cases when referring to the limitation period 
found in the wrongful death statute, it was used merely as a term of 
convenience, rather than in its conventional legal sense. The use of the term 
"statute of limitation" in our previous cases, without analysis, is not binding 
on our analysis here. Therefore, because the two-year limitation period found in 
the wrongful death statute is an integral part of the right created by the 
statute and does not contain a savings clause, we hold the limitation period 
found in the wrongful death statute, at WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(d), is a condition 
precedent, rather than a statute of limitation. 

[¶19]   The time period authorized by a 
condition precedent, absent a savings clause, cannot be extended by the 
exceptions usually allowed for general statutes of limitation (e.g., extending 
the time for appointment of an administrator or minority tolling periods or the 
discovery rule). See Miller, 413 S.E.2d  at 182 (discovery rule does not apply; 
however public policy requires extension of time limitation if defendant 
committed fraud or concealment of material facts surrounding the death); 
Annotation, Applicability to limitation prescribed by statute which creates 
cause of action for death of exceptions, express or implied, which attach to 
general statute of limitations, 8 A.L.R. 145, 151-54 (1920), and cases cited 
therein; 2 STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 
11:18 (3rd ed. 1992). Therefore, contrary to the district court's ruling, we 
hold that the discovery rule does not apply to Wyoming's Wrongful Death Act. 
Further, Knowles argues that other statutory tolling provisions, i.e., the minor 
tolling provision found at WYO. STAT. § 1-3-114, should be applied to the 
wrongful death statute. Again, because we hold the limitation period is a 
condition precedent, and not a statute of limitation, we hold the minor tolling 
provision is not applicable to the wrongful death statute.

[¶20]   Finally, unlike other Wyoming 
statutes to which we have applied the discovery rule, this statute does not 
contain language which permits tolling of the statutory time limit until the 
elements of the cause of action are discovered. Those statutes of limitation to 
which the discovery rule applies either expressly adopt the application of the 
rule2 or state that the limitation period 
runs only after the cause of action accrues.3

[¶21]   In contrast, the language contained 
in WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1997) is similar to that of the Wyoming Wrongful Death 
Statute. Wyoming Statute § 1-3-111 requires a claim for injury caused by 
deficient improvements to real property to be brought within ten years of the 
substantial completion of the improvement. "Substantial completion" is defined 
in WYO. STAT. § 1-3-110, and, like death in the wrongful death statute, is a 
time certain. The discovery rule does not apply to WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111. See, 
e.g., Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 802 (Wyo. 1991). 
"Under statutes which specify that the action must be brought within a period 
after the time of death, the courts have repeatedly stated, implemented, and 
given effect to such statutory provisions." 2 SPEISER, supra § 11:12. Subsection 
(d) of WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102 clearly and unambiguously requires the wrongful 
death action to be commenced within two years from the death of the deceased 
person. It does not leave room for application of a discovery 
rule.

The Personal 
Representative Requirement

[¶22]   The unusual facts of this case 
prevent us from concluding our analysis at this point, however, because the 
wrongful death act contains a second condition precedent in subsection (a) of 
WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102. The statute requires every wrongful death action to be 
brought by and in the name of the decedent's personal representative, i.e., the 
executor or administrator of the decedent's estate.4 WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(a) (1997). 
Only a personal representative, appointed by the court, may bring an action for 
wrongful death. See Bircher, 378 P.2d  at 902; Ashley, 195 F. Supp.  at 728 ("The 
pertinent statutes of Wyoming make it crystal clear that only the personal 
representative of the decedent may bring an action for" a death caused by the 
wrongful action of another and that such action is brought to benefit those whom 
the state ordains should share in the distribution of the estate.). However, the 
court cannot appoint a personal representative until the identity of the 
decedent is known. Where the identity of the decedent is not known until after 
the two-year limitation period expires, as in the case at bar, it is not 
possible for a personal representative to bring an action before expiration of 
the limitation period. Unless the statute does not run until the decedent is 
identified, this is an absurd result.

[¶23]   Corkill directs our attention to 
Leo v. Hillman, 164 Vt. 94, 665 A.2d 572 (1995), the only case cited in the 
briefs which is factually similar to the case at hand in that it deals with 
similar statutory language and belated discovery of the decedent's death. In Leo 
the Vermont Supreme Court held that the wrongful death action was barred by the 
two-year limitation period (referred to in the case as a "statute of 
limitation") because the claim accrued from the date of death, not the discovery 
of the date of death. Id., 665 A.2d  at 575-76. While we agree with Leo's 
determination that death is a determinable fact, not subject to accrual and 
therefore not subject to the discovery rule, Leo did not address the inability 
to appoint a personal representative until the identity of the decedent is 
known.

[¶24]   The reason the Vermont court failed 
to address that issue becomes apparent upon a closer analysis of the facts in 
that case, which also distinguish it from the case at bar. In 1979, Leo-Coneys 
disappeared and was never seen alive again. Leo, 665 A.2d  at 574. Her former 
boyfriend, Malinosky, disappeared about three weeks later and was considered a 
principal suspect in her disappearance because he had threatened her with a gun 
just weeks earlier. Id. In 1980, the trustee for Leo-Coneys filed suit against 
Malinosky for, among other things, the "possible death of Judith Leo-Coneys." 
Id. The trustee entered into a release agreement with Malinosky's legal 
representative in 1981, discharging Malinosky from all future claims. Id. In 
1990, Malinosky was apprehended and led authorities to Leo-Coneys' body. In 
1992, the family members of Judith Leo-Coneys brought a wrongful death action 
against Hillman, who was Malinosky's psychologist, asserting Hillman knew 
Malinosky posed a serious threat to Leo-Coneys, but did nothing to protect her. 
Id.

[¶25]   Unlike Leo-Coneys' family, the 
Knowles' family did not know where she was or why she disappeared. They did not 
and could not reasonably assume that someone killed her. The court was able to 
appoint a personal representative for Leo-Coneys because her identity, as well 
as the circumstances surrounding her disappearance, were known. The Leo court 
simply did not need to address the inability to appoint a personal 
representative for an unknown decedent. Corkill's suggested interpretation of 
the statute when presented with the unusual facts of this case would lead to an 
absurd result. No personal representative could be appointed for Lynn Rae 
Knowles in Wyoming until she was identified. It would be absurd to require a 
personal representative to bring a wrongful death action within two years of the 
death of the decedent when the personal representative cannot be appointed until 
the decedent is identified.

[¶26]   "It is contrary to reason to 
ascribe to a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation, if capable of 
any other interpretation." DeHerrera, 565 P.2d  at 481. "A statute should be 
construed in such a fashion that one provision will not destroy another." Id. It 
is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act 
must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be 
construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. State of Wyoming, Dept. 
of Family Services v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Wyo. 1997). This Court must 
assume that the legislature did not intend futile things and that statutes 
should not be interpreted in a manner producing absurd results. 
Id.

[¶27]   Statutes should be construed in 
pari materia with other statutes to which they relate and courts should strive 
to give meaningful effect to the purpose of these statutes. It would thwart the 
legislative purpose of the wrongful death statute to construe it in such a 
manner as to allow a tortfeasor to reap the benefits of her destructive act 
while penalizing the relatives of the victim who had the misfortune of being 
left to die by her killer without any identification on her 
person.

[¶28]   For the foregoing reasons, we hold 
that the two-year limitation period found in Wyoming's wrongful death statute 
cannot commence to run until the identity of the deceased person is known, 
thereby permitting the appointment of a personal representative to bring the 
action. This is not to mean a party may delay appointment of a personal 
representative and thereby toll the limitation period. See Bircher v. Foster, 
378 P.2d 901 (Wyo. 1963). It means simply that, under the unusual facts of this 
case, where the identity of the decedent is not known and a personal 
representative cannot be appointed, the limitation period does not run until the 
decedent is identified.

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   The discovery rule does not apply 
to the wrongful death statute's limitation period. However, we uphold the 
district court's denial of Corkill's motion to dismiss because the statute also 
requires a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action, and the 
court cannot appoint a personal representative until the decedent's identity is 
known. Since the action was filed within two years after the decedent was 
identified, that action was not time barred.

Footnotes

1 Wyoming 
applies the discovery rule to tort claims. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 346 
(Wyo. 1979). The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows 
or has reason to know of the existence of that cause of action, that is when the 
injury or its cause becomes apparent. Id. n. 8 (citing Banner v. Town of Dayton, 
474 P.2d 300, 304-05 (Wyo. 1970); Town Council of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 
Wyo. 419, 424, 263 P. 703, 705 (1928)).

2 The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act provides its own limitation period, which expressly 
applies the "discovery rule" in WYO. STAT. § 1-39-113. Wyoming Statute § 1-3-106 
expressly provides that the cause of action for the taking of personal property 
accrues when the wrongdoer is discovered and the cause of action for fraud 
accrues when the fraud is discovered. A claim against a professional must be 
brought after the discovery of the alleged act, error or omission. WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-107 (1997).

3 Wyoming 
Statute § 1-3-102 provides that civil actions must be commenced within the 
periods described in Chapter 3 of the first title of our statutes (where our 
general statute of limitations is found) after the cause of action accrues, 
unless a different limitation period is prescribed by statute. WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-102 (1997). In Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), we applied the 
"discovery rule" to determine when a cause of action accrues under our 
limitation statutes. Wyoming Statutes § 1-3-103 (an action for loss of real 
property) and § 1-3-105 (all civil actions other than for recovery of real 
property) also provide that their limitation period starts after the cause of 
action accrues.

4 The 
pertinent definitions, found in Wyoming's Probate Code, provide that a personal 
representative includes an executor and administrator. WYO. STAT. § 
2-1-301(a)(xxviii) (1997). An executor is appointed by the court to administer 
the estate of a testate decedent, while an administrator is appointed by the 
court to administer the estate of an intestate decedent. WYO. STAT. § 
2-1-301(a)(i), (xv) (1997).

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶30]   I am contented with the result in 
this case as reached by the majority opinion. It indeed would be an anomaly for 
this Court to conclude that an action for wrongful death could be barred prior 
to the time that facts were available to secure the appointment in Wyoming of 
the personal representative, who must bring the action under the statute. In 
effect, the Court, while not articulating the proposition, has attached a 
condition to the two year period, which is that facts necessary to secure the 
appointment of the personal representative must be known before the two year 
statute begins to run.

[¶31]   I cannot agree with the rejection 
by the majority of the discovery rule as it applies to the two year period in 
the wrongful death statute. I do not agree that the limitation period found in 
the wrongful death statute is a condition precedent, and would not follow West 
Virginia law on that proposition. Instead, I believe that the limitation period 
in this statute correctly is identified as a statute of repose like WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-111, as the majority opinion at . While we have rejected the application of 
the discovery rule with respect to WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111, we may be confronted 
with different policy considerations with respect to wrongful death than we were 
in connection with damages to property.

[¶32]   I am convinced that, unless some 
exception, like that found in this case, other than the discovery rule is 
adopted in future cases, we may be confronted with a constitutional dilemma. The 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming precisely and succinctly provides in Art. 
1, Section 8:

All courts shall 
be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property 
shall have justice administered without sale, denial or 
delay.

We previously 
have spoken in a prophetic tone with respect to the constitutional struggles of 
other courts when confronted with a situation in which a remedy, which could be 
foreclosed by a statute of repose, is lost before the facts that support the 
remedy are known.

[¶33]   There is a second cluster of 
constitutionally disposed cases addressing statute of repose where there is the 
potential for the period for filing a claim to terminate before the incident of 
damage or loss has actually occurred. See, for example, Phillips v. ABC 
Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980); Carr v. Broward County, 541 So. 2d 92 
(Fla. 1989); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Klein v. 
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. 
Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 
1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); and Funk v. Wollin Silo 
& Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis.2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). Those cases have a 
logical relevance to this case, where premised on a constitutional right, to be 
able to assert a remedy before a statutory abnegation of the right occurs. 
Shessel, 316 S.E.2d 155; Neagle, 685 S.W.2d 11. Although we have no equivalent 
worker's compensation precedent which has been presented or found in our 
research, these cases appropriately direct attention to the same problem of 
exhaustion of the right to a remedy before the opportunity for its utilization 
may have occurred, Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), 
cert. denied 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S. Ct. 1029, 98 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1988), and sometimes 
before the incident of damage or loss has occurred, Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 
69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984). Although currently centered in the field of medical 
malpractice,1 Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 
33 Ohio St.3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987), the cases involve a broad array of 
statutes where a repose and not a limitation function is introduced as the 
boundary of time for action by the injured party.2 Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 
435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986); Kennedy 
v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d 419. Within this class of cases, there is the injured child segment. 
Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 
N.H. 687, 506 A.2d 310 (1986); Mominee, 503 N.E.2d 717; Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). There is also within some of the cases an analytical 
trend that has developed which avoids the determination of textural [sic] 
unconstitutionality in the statute of repose situation by denying application of 
the limitation until a reasonable time after the right might have been pursued 
following damage and known knowledge of injury. Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co., 144 Wis.2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988). This adaptation applies 
a condition to the statutory language that, despite its terms, if the incident 
of damage or discovery occurs after the expiration of the period provided, a 
reasonable time continues to exist for the claim to be made. Tucker v. Nichols, 
431 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. 1983); Kenyon, 688 P.2d  at 979, Cameron, J., concurring; 
Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984). See also Coffey, 506 A.2d 310.

[¶34]   The obvious philosophical and 
sociological concern that a right which actually exists as the result of the 
misconduct of a person may be lost before anything can be done to pursue 
attainment of a remedy has authored an obvious trend either in construction to 
achieve constitutionality or a determination of unconstitutionality in these 
statute of repose cases. Phillips, 611 P.2d 821; Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 
424 A.2d 825 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: 
Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 627, 644 (1985). A perspective of 
constitutionality which initially developed a number of years ago when statutes 
of repose first appeared in the construction and later products liability 
segments of the law has now developed a clear converse trend in recent result. 
See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 
Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 (1989) and most 
recent examples found in the Utah cases, Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989); and Sun 
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1989). In the Utah cases, the court held that the Utah architect's and 
builder's statute of repose establishing a seven year limitation was 
unconstitutional under the open court provision of the Utah Constitution. In 
analysis of the difference between a statute of limitation which provides a 
period of time after a right accrues to pursue action and a statute of repose 
which limits the time for a right of action even though the event may not have 
yet occurred from which the damage accrues, the Utah court in Horton and Sun 
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. pursues the national precedent. The critical 
concern manifested in the whole periphery of statute of repose cases are those 
circumstances where the time runs out before the opportunity to pursue relief 
occurs, Funk, 435 N.W.2d 244, either because the event of damage has not yet 
developed, Note, Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of 
Architects and Engineers for Negligence: A Potential Nightmare, 22 Tulsa L.J. 
85, 105 (1986), or discovery of the injury may not have occurred, Clark v. 
Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Carson, 424 A.2d 825; Berry By and 
Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). This problem 
is magnified in those cases where medical malpractice injuries to minor children 
are the subject matter of the litigation. Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 
Ohio St.3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983). See also Young v. Haines, 41 Cal. 3d 883, 
226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909 (1986). The same thesis is applied here to 
permit filing the claim after parentage has been 
established.

State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 765-66 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶35]   In the light of our specific 
constitutional language, I would eschew the specific rejection of the discovery 
rule encompassed in the majority opinion. We decide the case on a different and 
appropriate ground, an implied condition that the appointment of a personal 
representative must be possible before the two year period of limitations can be 
said to bar the wrongful death action. In effect, we declare the statute to be 
tolled during that period. I am convinced that there may be other appropriate 
situations in which to toll the statute. Yet the rejection of the discovery rule 
may be perceived by practitioners and the trial bench as foreclosing the tolling 
of the statute.

Footnotes

1 See Note, 
The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. Judicial 
Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 
(1989).

2 Statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitations are often confused. They are similar in that 
both prescribe the time period within which a plaintiff may commence his 
suit. The distinguishing feature between the two is the time at which the 
respective periods commence. Generally, in medical malpractice actions, if the 
plaintiff's cause of action accrues and the statutory period commences when the 
injury occurs or, as is most often the case, when the plaintiff is or should be 
aware that he has been injured, the statute is properly termed a statute of 
limitations. If the statutory period commences upon the occurrence of an event, 
regardless of when the injury occurs, at a time when the plaintiff may or may 
not be aware of any injury, the statute is properly termed a statute of repose. 
In the latter case the repose period commences upon the occurrence of an event, 
such as the negligent act or omission of the health care practitioner, but the 
injury caused by this act or omission may be latent and therefore not manifest 
itself until after the statutory period has elapsed. Consequently, the 
plaintiff's claim may be barred before he is or should be aware that he has been 
injured or has a claim. Note, supra n. 8, 34 Vill.L.Rev. at 400-01 (footnotes 
omitted). See Com. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865 
(1989) (differentiation noted when effecting governmental entities). See also 
McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability 
Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 579 (1981). Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 is not 
directly defined in designation to be a statute of repose case, although in 
terminology, the differentiation is recognized. "[T]he statute in question, * * 
*, is not a statute of limitations but is a grant of immunity from suit." Id. at 
831. Cases this court cited generally for precedential support include some of 
the more influential statute of repose decisions, including Overland Const. Co., 
Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. 
Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 
260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); 
and Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). 
Compare Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988), where that court 
determined the statute was a statute of limitation without the benefit of the 
discovery rule and was also unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution.