Title: Supportive Solutions, LLC v. Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, Slip Opinion No. 2013-
Ohio-2410.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2410 
SUPPORTIVE SOLUTIONS, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. ELECTRONIC CLASSROOM OF 
TOMORROW, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of 
Tomorrow, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2410.] 
Judgments—Final, appealable orders—Political-subdivision immunity––Motion 
for leave to file amended answer to assert affirmative defense of political-
subdivision immunity—Denial of motion is final, appealable order—
Refusal to permit amendment to assert defense denies political subdivision 
benefit of alleged immunity—R.C. 2744.02(C). 
(No. 2012-0790—Submitted March 13, 2013—Decided June 12, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 95022 and 95287, 
2012-Ohio-1185. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider whether a trial court’s decision denying 
a defendant leave to assert the defense of political-subdivision immunity via an 
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amended answer is a final, appealable order.  We hold that it is because the denial 
of a political subdivision’s motion for leave to file an amended answer to assert 
the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity denies that political 
subdivision the benefit of the alleged immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C). 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} We gave a detailed history of this case in State ex rel. Electronic 
Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 30, 2011-Ohio-626, 950 N.E.2d 149 (“ECOT I”).  Here, we reiterate only 
those facts necessary to our discussion of the issue now on appeal. 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (“ECOT”), is an 
internet-based community school, established pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3314, and 
a “political subdivision” for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of 
R.C. Chapter 2744.  ECOT I at ¶ 2, 26-27; R.C. 2744.01(F).  ECOT and appellee, 
Supportive Solutions Training Academy, L.L.C. (“Supportive Solutions”), entered 
into a series of contracts for Supportive Solutions to supply supplemental 
educational services to eligible ECOT students during the 2007-2008 school year. 
{¶ 4} In March 2008, Supportive Solutions sued ECOT in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Supportive Solutions’ amended complaint 
asserted claims for breach of implied contract, misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud and fraud in the 
inducement, respondeat superior, and defamation.  ECOT filed an answer to 
Supportive Solutions’ amended complaint, as well as counterclaims for breach of 
contract, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.  ECOT did 
not raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity in its answer.  
Supportive Solutions subsequently filed a second amended complaint, adding 
Lucas County Educational Service Center as a defendant and adding a claim for 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
tortious interference with business relations.1  ECOT filed an answer to the 
second amended complaint, incorporating its earlier answer and counterclaims 
and denying all additional allegations, but, again, not raising political-subdivision 
immunity as an affirmative defense. 
{¶ 5} In January 2010, ECOT filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, arguing, in part, that it was entitled to political-subdivision immunity, 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, on many of Supportive Solutions’ claims.  ECOT 
also raised the issue of immunity in opposition to Supportive Solutions’ motion 
for summary judgment. Supportive Solutions responded that ECOT waived any 
immunity defense by not raising it in its answer.  ECOT then filed a motion for 
leave to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity as an 
affirmative defense. The trial court summarily denied ECOT’s motion for leave to 
amend its answer.  The court granted summary judgment to ECOT on Supportive 
Solutions’ claims of fraud and intentional misrepresentation, but denied ECOT 
summary judgment on the remaining claims. 
{¶ 6} ECOT immediately appealed the trial court’s denial of leave to file 
an amended answer.  Meanwhile, despite ECOT’s pending appeal, the trial court 
conducted a jury trial on Supportive Solutions’ remaining claims, and the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Supportive Solutions on claims of breach of express 
and implied contract and negligent misrepresentation.  The trial court entered 
judgment against ECOT on the jury verdict in the amount of $1,206,400, awarded 
prejudgment interest, and denied ECOT’s motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or for a new trial.  ECOT thereafter filed a second appeal—from the 
judgment on the jury verdict and the trial court’s denial of its posttrial motions.  
The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed ECOT’s first appeal on July 30, 
2010, for lack of a final, appealable order, but it subsequently reinstated that 
appeal and consolidated it with ECOT’s second appeal. 
                                                          
 
1 The trial court dismissed Lucas County Educational Service Center on immunity grounds.   
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{¶ 7} While its appeals were pending, ECOT filed an original action in 
this court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its 
judgment and for a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to vacate the 
allegedly invalid portion of its judgment and to stay execution of any surviving 
portion of the judgment without bond.  We held that, whether or not the denial of 
ECOT’s motion for leave to file an amended answer was a final, appealable order, 
ECOT’s first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a trial 
of any claim that might be subject to that defense.  ECOT I, 129 Ohio St.3d 30, 
2011-Ohio-626, 950 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 16.  Accordingly, we issued a writ of 
prohibition, which precluded the trial court from enforcing those portions of its 
judgment that were subject to ECOT’s appeal from the denial of its motion for 
leave to amend its answer, and a writ of mandamus, which ordered the trial court 
to vacate those portions of the judgment.  Id. at ¶ 31.  We also determined that 
ECOT was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to stay the 
surviving portion of its judgment without a bond.  Id. at ¶ 30-31. 
{¶ 8} Following our decision in ECOT I, the court of appeals dismissed 
ECOT’s consolidated appeals. Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic 
Classroom of Tomorrow, 8th Dist. Nos. 95022 and 95287, 2012-Ohio-1185. It 
held that it lacked jurisdiction over ECOT’s appeal from the judgments entered as 
a result of trial because this court ordered the trial court to vacate those 
judgments.  The court of appeals also addressed whether the denial of ECOT’s 
motion for leave to file an amended answer was a final, appealable order.  The 
court of appeals concluded that it was not, and the court dismissed ECOT’s appeal 
from that order for lack of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 9} This court accepted ECOT’s discretionary appeal to consider the 
following proposition of law: “Any order that denies the benefit of an alleged 
immunity to a political subdivision is immediately appealable pursuant to R.C. 
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5 
 
§2744.02(C), including the denial of a motion to amend the answer to include the 
defense.”  132 Ohio St.3d 1481, 2012-Ohio-3334, 971 N.E.2d 960. 
Analysis 
{¶ 10} An appellate court can review only final orders, and without a final 
order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction.  Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 
2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9, citing Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989).  Generally, an order denying 
leave to amend a pleading is not a final, appealable order.  See Trotwood v. S. 
Cent. Constr., L.L.C., 192 Ohio App.3d 69, 2011-Ohio-237, 947 N.E.2d 1291, 
¶ 54 (2d Dist.); Worthington v. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., 5th Dist. No. 
10 CA 40, 2010-Ohio-4541, ¶ 30-32. 
{¶ 11} R.C. Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, 
sets forth a comprehensive statutory scheme for the tort liability of political 
subdivisions and their employees.  It establishes a three-step analysis for 
determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability, starting with 
a broad rule that a political subdivision is generally not liable in damages.  Greene 
Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556-557, 733 N.E.2d 1141 
(2000); R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  The purpose of R.C. Chapter 2744 is to preserve 
political subdivisions’ fiscal integrity.  Wilson v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human 
Servs., 70 Ohio St.3d 450, 453, 639 N.E.2d 105 (1994).  Consistent with that 
purpose, early resolution of the immunity issue may save the parties the time, 
effort, and expense of a trial and appeal.  Hubbell at ¶ 25, quoting Burger v. 
Cleveland Hts., 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 199, 718 N.E.2d 912 (1999) (Lundberg 
Stratton, J., dissenting).  Accordingly, R.C. 2744.02(C) provides, “An order that 
denies a political subdivision * * * the benefit of an alleged immunity from 
liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final 
order.”  R.C. 2744.02(C) permits a political subdivision to appeal an order that 
denies it the benefit of an alleged immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, even when 
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the order makes no determination that there is no just cause for delay pursuant to 
Civ.R. 54(B).  Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 
909 N.E.2d 88, syllabus. 
{¶ 12} This court addressed the scope of R.C. 2744.02(C) in Hubbell, a 
homeowner’s suit against the city of Xenia, arising out of a sewage back-up.  The 
court of appeals dismissed the city’s appeal from the denial of its motion for 
summary judgment for lack of a final, appealable order, where the trial court 
found that questions of fact remained as to the city’s entitlement to political-
subdivision immunity.  It reasoned that an order denies the benefit of an alleged 
immunity only when it fully resolves the immunity issue.  This court disagreed 
with that reasoning and reversed.  Hubbell, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 
873 N.E.2d 878. 
{¶ 13} In 
accordance 
with 
established 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, we began our analysis in Hubbell by turning to the plain language 
of the statute to determine legislative intent.  We stated that the General 
Assembly’s use of the words “benefit” of an “alleged” immunity in R.C. 
2744.02(C) illustrates that the statute is not limited to orders that finally resolve 
the immunity question: “the plain language of R.C. 2744.02(C) does not require a 
final denial of immunity before the political subdivision has the right to an 
interlocutory appeal.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  Thus, even though it did not preclude the city 
from proving its entitlement to immunity later, we held that the trial court’s denial 
of summary judgment denied the city “the benefit of an alleged immunity” and 
was, therefore, a final order under R.C. 2744.02(C).  Id. at ¶ 27.  “When a trial 
court denies a motion in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks 
immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged 
immunity and is therefore a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).”  
Id. at syllabus.  Like the statute itself, Hubbell focuses on the effect of the trial 
court’s order on a party’s ability to claim immunity. 
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{¶ 14} Ohio courts of appeals, including the Eighth District, have applied 
the reasoning of Hubbell to hold that denials of motions for judgment on the 
pleadings and motions to dismiss based on political-subdivision immunity are 
final orders.  See, e.g., DiGiorgio v. Cleveland, 196 Ohio App.3d 575, 2011-Ohio-
5824, 964 N.E.2d 495 (8th Dist.). 
{¶ 15} Here, the court of appeals acknowledged Hubbell, but held that 
Hubbell’s “broad interpretation” of R.C. 2744.02(C) does not encompass motions 
for leave to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity.  2012-
Ohio-1185, at ¶ 15.  The court distinguished “dispositional-type motions, i.e., 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(C) motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, and Civ.R. 56 motions for summary judgment,” from other motions 
and reasoned that Hubbell was not intended to be read so broadly as to “open the 
door for political subdivisions to challenge all adverse rulings potentially 
affecting [an] immunity defense with an immediate appeal.”  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals held that the order denying ECOT leave to 
amend its answer did not deny the benefit of an alleged immunity because it 
“made no determination about immunity.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  That reasoning directly 
conflicts with our statement in Hubbell that R.C. 2744.02(C) is not limited to 
orders that determine the merits of a claimed immunity defense and our holding 
that a denial of summary judgment on immunity grounds is final under R.C. 
2744.02(C), even though it does not determine entitlement to immunity.  Justice 
Pfeifer, dissenting in Hubbell, expressed concern regarding that component of the 
majority opinion: “The key word in R.C. 2744.02(C) is ‘denies.’  Certainly, [the 
city] cannot claim that its assertion of immunity has been denied, that it has been 
foreclosed from further asserting and proving its alleged immunity at the trial 
level.”  Id. at ¶ 37 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  According to the Hubbell majority, 
however, an order may deny the benefit of an alleged immunity under R.C. 
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2744.02(C) even if it does not foreclose the political subdivision from asserting 
and proving immunity. 
{¶ 17} Unlike in Hubbell, the trial court’s denial of leave for ECOT to 
amend its complaint determines ECOT’s entitlement to immunity and precludes a 
finding of immunity in this case.  Statutory immunity, including political-
subdivision immunity, is an affirmative defense, and it is waived if not raised in a 
timely fashion.  Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist., 85 Ohio St.3d 95, 98, 706 
N.E.2d 1261 (1999).  In Turner, at 98, we stated that “as a matter of course, a 
properly pleaded answer should * * * include[] the statutory-immunity defense 
* * * because, in most cases, the [Political Subdivision Tort Liability] Act could 
provide a complete defense.”  We noted that the possibility of waiver makes it 
“extremely important and prudent” to plead all defenses as early as possible.  Id. 
at 99.  ECOT agrees that absent leave to amend its answer, it will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity defense.  Thus, the trial court’s ruling forecloses ECOT 
from enjoying the benefit of the alleged immunity. 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals justified its interpretation of Hubbell by 
referring to the waiver rule discussed in Turner: “We find that no caveat or niche 
has yet been carved out giving a political subdivision an exception to the waiver 
provision of the Civil Rules.”  2012-Ohio-1185, ¶ 18.  In Turner, we held that the 
trial court abused its discretion by granting the political-subdivision defendant 
leave to amend its answer and assert a statutory-immunity defense.  Therefore, we 
held, the defendant waived that defense.  We based our holding, however, on the 
merits of the motion for leave.  There, the defendant moved for leave to amend its 
answer on remand, after the reversal of summary judgment in its favor on another 
ground, almost three years after the commencement of the action, and without 
explanation for its failure to assert the affirmative defense sooner.  We noted that 
the defendant’s delay forced the plaintiffs to expend time and money to oppose 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
the defendant’s first motion for summary judgment in the trial court and on 
appeal, including a request for discretionary jurisdiction in this court.  Id. at 99. 
{¶ 19} There is no dispute that the waiver rule applies to a political 
subdivision, just as it applies to other defendants, or that a political subdivision 
waives its statutory–immunity defense, just like other affirmative defenses, if it 
does not timely assert it.  See Turner at 97-98.  Nothing in Turner, however, 
suggests that the doctrine of waiver precludes a trial court, in other circumstances, 
from granting leave to amend pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A).  Indeed, we stated in 
Turner that the defendant “should have attempted to amend its answer to include 
the immunity defense prior to its initial motion for summary judgment.”  Id. at 99.  
An affirmative defense is not deemed waived when the defendant raises the 
defense “by motion before pleading pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B), affirmatively in a 
responsive pleading under Civ.R. 8(C), or by amendment under Civ.R. 15.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 75 
Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 661 N.E.2d 187 (1996).  Were a defendant not entitled to avoid 
waiver by raising an affirmative defense in an amendment to the pleadings, there 
would have been no need in Turner to review the order allowing the amendment 
for an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 20} The court of appeals’ discussion of waiver relates, not to the 
question of R.C. 2744.02(C)’s applicability, but to the merits of ECOT’s motion 
for leave to amend its answer.  Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying ECOT’s motion for leave to file an amended answer is a distinct question 
from whether the trial court’s order denying that motion is immediately 
appealable.  The right to appeal under R.C. 2744.02(C) hinges on the effect of the 
trial court’s order, and rightly or wrongly decided, the trial court’s denial of leave 
had the effect of depriving ECOT of its alleged immunity defense. 
{¶ 21} In support of its holding, the court of appeals expressed concern 
that expanding Hubbell could lead to abuse by political subdivisions delaying the 
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assertion of a timely immunity defense.  2012-Ohio-1185, ¶ 16-17.  We have 
explicitly rejected the use of judicial policy preferences to override valid 
legislation, however.  Hubbell, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 
878, at ¶ 22.  Thus, neither our notions of public policy nor those of the appellate 
court establish a basis for a refusal to apply R.C. 2744.02(C) as written. 
{¶ 22} Although the issue is beyond the scope of its proposition of law, 
which concerns only the finality of the trial court’s denial of leave to amend its 
answer, ECOT urges this court to further hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying its motion for leave and that ECOT is entitled to immunity 
as a matter of law.  The court of appeals has not considered whether the denial of 
ECOT’s motion for leave to amend its answer amounts to an abuse of discretion, 
and neither the court of appeals nor the trial court has considered whether ECOT 
would be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of statutory immunity had 
it been permitted to raise that defense in an amended answer.  We decline to 
decide those issues before the lower courts have the opportunity to address them 
in the first instance. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} The trial court’s denial of ECOT’s motion for leave to file an 
amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision 
immunity precluded ECOT from enjoying the benefits of the alleged immunity.  
The court of appeals therefore possessed jurisdiction to determine ECOT’s appeal 
of that order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).  Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal 
of ECOT’s appeal from the denial of its motion for leave to file an amended 
answer, and we remand this matter to the court of appeals for resolution of 
ECOT’s appeal. 
Judgment reversed 
 and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals.  Interpreting R.C. 2744.02(C) to allow an immediate 
appeal of a trial court’s order denying a motion for leave to file an amended 
answer is, I believe, an unwarranted extension of Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878. 
{¶ 25} The Hubbell majority accepted the idea that an order denying the 
city of Xenia summary judgment on grounds of immunity was an appealable 
order, despite the fact that the order did not completely resolve the immunity 
question between the parties.  The Hubbell majority held that “[w]hen a trial court 
denies a motion in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity 
under R.C. Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity” 
and is therefore appealable under R.C. 2744.02(C).  Id. at syllabus.  In my view, 
to be a final appealable order under this statute, the order must be a final 
disposition of the immunity defense.  I believe Hubbell to have been wrongly 
decided, and at the very least, it should be confined to its facts. 
{¶ 26} In a well-reasoned opinion, this court unanimously held that the 
denial of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is not a final appealable order.  
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 108 Ohio St.3d 540, 2006-
Ohio-1713, 844 N.E.2d 1199.  So too here we should recognize that the court did 
not finally determine the issue of immunity adversely to a party, giving rise to an 
appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C).  In this case, the trial court simply did 
not grant leave to Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (“ECOT”) to file an 
amended answer.  There was no “denial” on the merits of an immunity defense.  
Therefore, R.C. 2744.02(C) does not apply. 
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{¶ 27} As the court of appeals recognized, political subdivisions are 
subject to the same civil rules as are other litigants.  Civ.R. 8(C) requires that in a 
responsive pleading, a party must “set forth affirmatively * * * any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense,” which includes the defense of 
political-subdivision immunity.  Here, the case commenced in March 2008, and 
ECOT filed answers to the amended complaint and the second amended 
complaint without asserting the affirmative defense of political-subdivision 
immunity.  A co-defendant raised the immunity defense in a motion to dismiss in 
January 2009.  See State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 129 Ohio St.3d 30, 2011-Ohio-626, 950 N.E.2d 
149, ¶ 5. But not until a year later did ECOT attempt to raise the immunity issue 
in a motion for partial summary judgment.  It was not until Supportive Solutions 
argued that ECOT had waived the immunity defense that ECOT attempted to 
obtain leave to file an amended answer. 
{¶ 28} Civ.R. 15(A) allows for amendment of pleadings by leave of court 
and provides that “[l]eave of court shall be freely given when justice so requires.”  
I would hold that ECOT waived its right to raise the immunity defense in this 
case, just as we held in a case in which the motion to amend the answer came 
after reversal of summary judgment on appeal, almost three years after the case 
was filed and four months before the trial.  Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist., 85 
Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99, 706 N.E.2d 1261 (1999). 
{¶ 29} A trial court's decision to grant or deny a party leave to amend a 
pleading is reviewed on the standard of abuse of discretion.  Wilmington Steel 
Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 573 N.E.2d 
622 (1991).  An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of 
judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.  Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
1140 (1983), citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 
(1980). 
{¶ 30} If the majority is correct that denial of leave to file an amended 
answer under these circumstances is immediately appealable, then the only issue 
is whether the trial court acted unconscionably in denying leave.  Furthermore, if 
ECOT was deprived of its defense, it was because of its own inactivity, not a 
denial by the court. 
{¶ 31} The majority states that R.C. 2744.02(C) focuses on the effect of 
the trial court’s order on a party’s ability to claim immunity.  If that is accurate, 
then potentially any adverse intermediate order is subject to interlocutory appeal 
in a case in which immunity may be claimed.  This matter has been in litigation 
for over five years and now is to be remanded to the court of appeals for a 
piecemeal review that will cause further delay and expense to both parties.  
Certainly this cannot be what the General Assembly intended. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Demer & Marniella, L.L.C., John A. Demer, and James A. Marniella; and 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellant. 
 
Davis & Young and Kurt D. Anderson, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
________________________