Title: DeYoung/Thomas v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  July 6, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DENNIS MARTIN DEYOUNG,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
	Respondent on Review.
___________________________________
EDWARD ANDREW THOMAS,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
	Respondent on Review.
(CA A106889, A105130; SC S47467, S47322)

(Consolidated for Briefing, Argument, and Opinion)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 2, 2000.
	Daniel M. Carroll, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioners on review.  With him on the brief were
David E. Groom, State Public Defender, and Irene B. Taylor,
Deputy Public Defender.
	Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
	*On judicial review of orders of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 31, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		These two petitions, consolidated for briefing,
argument, and opinion, seek review of dismissals by the Court of
Appeals of petitions for judicial review of orders issued by the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (Board).  The
petitions challenge the dismissal orders of the Court of Appeals
only to the extent that they designate the Board as the
prevailing party on appeal and allow costs -- specifically, a
$100 prevailing party fee -- payable by petitioners.  Petitioners
argue that, under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals had no
authority to designate a prevailing party or to award costs.  We
conclude that the Court of Appeals had that authority and,
accordingly, affirm.
		Factually, the two cases differ only slightly. 
Petitioner DeYoung sought judicial review of a Board order that
denied him re-release after a parole violation and set a new
release date five years in the future.  The Board moved to
dismiss the petition on the ground that its order was a "decision
relating to a release date" and, therefore, was exempt from
judicial review.  See ORS 144.335(3) ("[B]oard's order is final
and is not subject to judicial review when the board makes any
decision relating to a release date"); Quintero v. Board of
Parole, 329 Or 319, 986 P2d 575 (1999) (affirming dismissal of
petition for judicial review of order denying re-release and
setting new release date).  The Court of Appeals granted the
motion, issuing a dismissal order  that designated the Board as
the prevailing party and allowed costs in the amount of $100 (as
a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190), payable by DeYoung.
		DeYoung moved for reconsideration of the award of costs
arguing, inter alia, that there was no statutory authority for
recovering costs from either party in a review of an order of the
Board.  The Court of Appeals denied the motion, stating in its
order that it had authority to award costs, including the
prevailing party fee provided in ORS 20.190(1), under ORS 20.120
and ORS 20.310, both set out post.  DeYoung then brought the
present petition for review.
		Petitioner Thomas's case also began when he sought
judicial review of a Board decision revoking post-prison
supervision and setting a new release date.  However, because the
Board's supervisory authority over him expired before the Court
of Appeals took any action, the Board moved to dismiss review as
moot.  The Court of Appeals granted the motion, issuing a
dismissal order that designated the Board as the prevailing
party, allowed costs payable by Thomas, and included a $100 money
judgment, again as a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190.   
		Thomas moved to recall the appellate judgment and
petitioned for reconsideration of that part of the dismissal
order that imposed costs.  The Court of Appeals denied the
motion, this time citing ORS 20.120 and ORS 20.190 as authority
for the award of costs and prevailing party fee.  Thomas then
sought review by this court, and we consolidated his petition
with that of DeYoung. 
		As noted, the Court of Appeals cited three statutes as
authority for its decision to impose costs on petitioners.  The
first, ORS 20.120, provides:
     "When the decision of an officer, tribunal, or
court of inferior jurisdiction is brought before a
court for review, such review shall, for all the
purposes of costs and disbursements, be deemed an
appeal to such court upon errors in law, and costs
therein shall be allowed and recovered accordingly."
The second, ORS 20.310, provides, in part: 
	"(1)  In any appeal to the Court of Appeals or
review by the Supreme Court, the court shall allow
costs and disbursements to the prevailing party, unless
a statute provides that in the particular case costs
and disbursements shall not be allowed to the
prevailing party or shall be allowed to some other
party, or unless the court directs otherwise. * * *
	"(2)  Costs and disbursements on appeal to the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court or on petition for
review by the Supreme Court are the filing or
appearance fee, the reasonable cost for any bond or
irrevocable letter of credit, the prevailing party fee
provided for under ORS 20.190, the printing, including
the abstract of record, required by rule of the court,
postage for the filing or service of items that are
required to be filed or served by law or court rule,
and the transcript of testimony or other proceedings,
when necessarily forming part of the record on appeal."
Finally, ORS 20.190 provides for a prevailing party fee to be
awarded in addition to other costs and disbursements:
	"(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (5)
of this section, a prevailing party in a civil action
or proceeding who has a right to recover costs and
disbursements in the following cases also has a right
to recover, as a part of the costs and disbursements,
the following additional amounts:
	"(a) In the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, on
an appeal, $100."
		Petitioners contend that the foregoing statutes do not
authorize cost awards in their cases.  They argue, first, that,
because their petitions for judicial review were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the Board was not a "prevailing party" for
purposes of ORS 20.310 and ORS 20.190.  Petitioners reason that,
if the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits
of their petitions, it also lacked authority to designate a
prevailing party or award costs.  
		In support of that reasoning, petitioners point to
general case law pertaining to how a court must respond when it
finds that it lacks jurisdiction over a case.  See, e.g.,
Oregonians for Health and Water v. Kitzhaber, 329 Or 339, 334,
986 P2d 1167 (1999) (dismissing petition for review raising issue
outside scope of statute the conferred limited direct review
authority on Supreme Court); Meyer v. Joseph, 295 Or 588, 668 P2d
1228 (1983) (dismissing certified appeal sua sponte on
discovering lack of jurisdiction).  Petitioners also rely on two
"prevailing party" cases, Berger Farms v. First Interstate Bank,
330 Or 16, 21-22, 995 P2d 1159 (2000), and Stelljes/Dumler v.
State Board of Parole, 307 Or 365, 769 P2d 177 (1989), which they
argue stand, respectively, for the following propositions:  (1) a
court may award costs only if it has jurisdiction to decide the
case or appeal on the merits; and (2) a court may award costs
only if a party actually prevails "on the merits."
		Petitioners misconstrue Berger Farms and
Stelljes/Dumler.  Those jurisdiction cases stand only for the
proposition that an appellate court must dismiss a case and must
refrain from making any decision on the merits when it lacks
jurisdiction.  They do not hold either that designating a
prevailing party is a decision on the merits or that such a
designation otherwise is precluded when an appeal or review is
dismissed.  Although both cases contain some statements,
discussed below, that superficially seem useful to petitioners,
it is clear, on closer inspection, that the actual holdings are
not on point.      
		Berger Farms involved a contract dispute.  The
contracts in question contained clauses to the effect that all
disputes arising out of the contracts would be resolved by
binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), 9 USC § 1 et seq.  One party to the contract filed an
action against the other in circuit court, alleging several
claims.  The defendant moved to stay the action pending
arbitration of the claims under the FAA.  The trial court denied
the motion, the defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately concluded that most of the claims were subject to
arbitration and that the action must be stayed with respect to
those claims.  The defendant then sought an award of attorney
fees on appeal under the attorney fees provisions of the
contracts, which provided for reasonable attorney fees and other
costs to the prevailing party "if any legal action, arbitration
or other proceeding is brought."  330 Or at 19.  Over the
plaintiffs' objection, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney fees
to the defendant.  
		On the plaintiffs' petition for review of the attorney
fees order, this court reversed.  The court noted, with respect
to the attorney fees that the defendant had incurred on the
claims that were held to be arbitrable, that the Court of Appeals
had decided that the trial court must stay proceedings on those
claims pending arbitration:
     "The effect of that decision was to halt the court
proceedings on the arbitrable claims, thereby
suspending the court's involvement in those claims.  It
follows that the Court of Appeals had no authority to
award attorney fees incurred on those claims, because
it already had determined that an arbitrator must
decide the underlying dispute.  Stated differently,
because the Court of Appeals was without authority to
decide the merits of the parties' underlying dispute on
the arbitrable claims, it likewise was without
authority to decide whether defendant was entitled to
attorney fees arising out of that dispute."
Id. at 21-22.  
Petitioners focus on the last sentence of the foregoing
paragraph as support for their theory that appellate courts are
without authority to decide entitlement to costs if those courts
have no authority to decide the merits of the underlying claim. 
However, we agree with the Board that Berger Farms is a case
concerned with the scope of mandatory arbitration and the FAA,
and that it does not purport to speak to the more general
question of what it means to prevail for purposes of the general
statutes that provide for costs and disbursements.  That fact is
made evident not only by the authorities that are cited in the
relevant part of the Berger Farms opinion -- all federal cases
pertaining to the scope of binding arbitration under the FAA --
but also by the fact that the opinion does not refer to any of
the statutes that ordinarily govern awards of costs and attorney
fees in this state. (1)  Ultimately, when Berger Farms is read in
its entirety, it becomes clear that its superficially favorable
wording does not sweep beyond the context of binding arbitration.
		There also is clear support in older case law from this
court for the Board's view that authority to dismiss an appeal
for lack of jurisdiction includes the authority to award costs,
particularly when, as in the present cases, the respondent has
moved for dismissal and the court has granted that motion.  In
Portland & O.C. Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 86 Or 206, 167 P 270 (1917),
for example, this court granted the respondent's motion to
dismiss an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, yet awarded costs
and disbursements under Lord's Oregon Laws section 565 (a
predecessor statute to ORS 20.190).  The appellant moved to
recall the mandate for costs, arguing that the court lacked
jurisdiction to award costs if it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the appeal.  The court rejected that argument:
     "In the very nature of things we had the power to
decide the motion [to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction], because, until a decision there could be
no authoritative adjudication.  Although the appeal
terminated in a decision that we lacked jurisdiction to
hear the cause on the merits[,] the very act of
deciding the motion [to dismiss] was equivalent to a
determination that we possessed the power to decide the
motion, and therefore * * * to dispose of the appeal. 
Granting the motion to dismiss made the respondent the
prevailing party on appeal and it was properly allowed
$15 costs and the necessary disbursements, as provided
by sections 565 and 566, [Lord's Oregon Laws]."
Id. at 209-10.  See also McCargar v. Moore, 88 Or 682, 687-88,
173 P 258 (1918) (whether motion to dismiss is oral or written,
appellee ordinarily is prevailing party and is entitled to costs
of appeal when appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). (2) 
Although Doyle and McCargar speak to much older versions of the
costs and disbursements statutes, they retain their logical force
and dispose of petitioners' theory about the effect of a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on a court's continuing
authority to award costs.
		Petitioners also suggest, in a related but more general
sense, that a decision "on the merits" is required to justify
awarding a prevailing party fee.  They rely on Stelljes/Dumler. 
However, we disagree with petitioners' reading of that case.  
		In Stelljes/Dumler, two petitioners, Dumler and
Stelljes, sought judicial review of orders by the Board of Parole
setting release dates. (3)  Immediately thereafter, and before the
Court of Appeals issued any decisions, the Board withdrew both
the challenged orders and issued new orders that essentially gave
the petitioners the relief that they sought from the Court of
Appeals.  Subsequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed Dumler's
petition, designating him as prevailing party and awarding him
costs, but denying his claim for a prevailing party fee under ORS
20.190.  For reasons that are unclear, Stelljes was permitted to
continue his review proceeding, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately affirmed the Board's new order and designated the
Board as the prevailing party.  However, when Stelljes petitioned
for costs and a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190, the Court
of Appeals awarded costs, but denied the request for a prevailing
party fee. 
		Dumler and Stelljes both sought review of the Court of
Appeals' orders to the extent that the orders denied their claims
for prevailing party fees.  Because the issue had not been raised
or briefed, this court expressly declined to consider the
seemingly obvious question whether the petitioners were entitled
to costs under the circumstances at all.  Stelljes/Dumler, 307 Or
at 369 n 8.  We noted only that ORS 183.497 generally controls
the award of costs in judicial reviews of administrative actions
and that ORS 183.482(6) provides for an award of costs in such
reviews if the agency withdraws an order before the date set for
hearing and modifies it in the petitioner's favor, but that
neither of those statutes was applicable to judicial review of
Board orders.  Id. at 368.    
		With respect to prevailing party fees provided under
ORS 20.190, this court concluded that the statute would not
support an award of prevailing party fees in Dumler's and
Stelljes' cases:
     "We conclude that in order to receive a prevailing
party fee in these cases, petitioners had to prevail on
the merits in the Court of Appeals.  They did not do
so.  The Court of Appeals dismissed Dumler's petition,
and Stelljes case was decided in favor of the Board. 
Petitioners may have benefitted from the Board's new
orders; however, any such benefit resulted from the
Board's action, not from any decision on the merits by
the Court of Appeals.  Thus they did not prevail on the
merits in the Court of Appeals and, therefore, are not
entitled to ORS 20.190 prevailing party fees."
Id. at 369 (emphasis in original).  Petitioners suggest that the
operative words in the foregoing quoted paragraph are "on the
merits."
		Petitioners are mistaken.  The operative words are "in
the Court of Appeals."  The party asserting entitlement to the
prevailing party fee must show, at a minimum, that the party's
victory happened in the Court of Appeals, rather than in some
other forum.  A victory in some other forum, even if achieved
only after invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
does not mean that a party has prevailed for purposes of the
award of a prevailing party fee.  See, e.g., ORAP 13.05(3) (party
qualifies as "prevailing" for purposes of allowance of costs --
including prevailing party fee -- "only if the court reverses or
substantially modifies the judgment or order from which the
appeal or judicial review was taken" (4) (emphasis added)).   
		In sum, we are persuaded that petitioners' arguments
pertaining to the Court of Appeals' authority to impose costs in
connection with the dismissal of their petitions for judicial
review are not well taken.  Although appellate courts may decline
to award costs to the prevailing party in cases of dismissal, for
reasons of fairness or otherwise, (5) a party nevertheless may be
said to have prevailed on appeal, for purposes of costs and
disbursements, by obtaining dismissal of the appeal or petition.  
		Petitioners next argue that the cost awards in their
cases were unauthorized because there is no specific statutory
authority in the statutes that govern judicial review of Board
orders for awarding costs to the prevailing party.  Petitioners
begin by noting (correctly) that costs and attorney fees are
controlled entirely by statute and are not recoverable in the
absence of a statute or contractual provision that authorizes
such an award.  See Compton v. Weyerhaeuser, 302 Or 366, 367, 730
P2d 540 (1986) (costs, like attorney fees, not recoverable in
absence of statute or contractual provision authorizing award). 
Petitioners then assert that we must interpret ORS 144.335, the
statute that governs judicial review of Board orders, as the
complete authority of appellate courts with respect to judicial
review of such orders.  Petitioners conclude that, because that
statute makes no mention of costs or disbursements, it follows
that no statute authorizes cost awards in any review of a Board
order, regardless of any general authority to award costs under
ORS chapter 20.   
		Petitioners have not identified anything persuasive in
ORS 144.335 itself or in this court's cases discussing costs and
disbursements that supports their view that authority to impose
costs on review of a Board order may derive only from a statute
that speaks specifically to that kind of proceeding. (6)

       		Petitioners argue that, even if the general cost award
provisions in ORS chapter 20 might have some theoretical
relevance in a review of a Board order, none of the provisions
cited by the Court of Appeals provides actual authority for
imposing costs and prevailing party fees in their cases.  Because
it is largely dispositive, we first consider petitioners'
arguments with respect to ORS 20.120.
		Petitioners argue that ORS 20.120 does not confer
affirmative authority to allow costs on judicial review, but,
instead, provides only that a party's right to recover costs on
judicial review shall be allowed in the same manner and to the
same extent as that party's right to recover costs in an appeal. 
Petitioners contend that, "[because] costs and disbursements may
only be awarded on appeal pursuant to express statutory
authority, any award of costs on judicial review must be
specifically authorized under the statutes governing that
review." 
		But, assuming that petitioners' initial premise, viz.,
that ORS 20.120 is not a source of substantive authority to award
costs, is correct, their conclusion logically does not follow. 
The traditional requirement that authority to award costs, on
appeal or otherwise, must be "express" cannot be so easily
transformed into petitioners' suggested requirement that such
authority must appear in the statutes governing the specific type
of judicial review in which the award is made.  
		Neither do petitioners adequately explain why ORS
20.310, which appears to confer express general authority to
award costs "in any appeal," is not relevant in this context.  It
is at least arguable that, because judicial reviews are to be
deemed appeals "for all the purposes of costs and disbursements,"
ORS 20.120, costs also are authorized in any judicial review,
unless some statute otherwise provides.  And, in any event, this
court previously has construed ORS 20.120 as authorizing by
itself cost awards on judicial review of an administrative
agency's order.  In Compton, 302 Or 366, the court ordered a
workers' compensation claimant who unsuccessfully challenged a
Workers' Compensation Board order in this court to pay that
board's costs.  The claimant sought reconsideration, arguing that
the court did not have authority to impose costs on a private
party seeking review of an administrative agency's order.  The
claimant relied on Shetterly, Irick & Shetterly v. Emp. Div., 302
Or 139, 143, 727 P2d 117 (1986), in which the court had
determined that a provision of the Administrative Procedures act
(APA), ORS 183.497, precluded allowing costs against a private
party when review of a state agency order occurs "as provided in"
the APA.  Compton, 302 Or at 367-68 (quoting ORS 183.497(2) and
Shetterly, 302 Or at 143.
		The Compton court noted, first, that judicial review of
decisions of the Workers' Compensation Board is governed by the
workers' compensation statutes, not the APA.  Compton, 302 Or at
368.  The court then stated:
     "Shetterly held effectively that ORS 183.497
superseded ORS 20.120 with regard to the cases within
the purview of ORS 183.497.  However, ORS 20.120 still
controls cases not subject to the APA costs limitation. 
Compton is such a case.
      "ORS 20.120, a version of which first appeared in
the General Laws of Oregon § 554, p 226 (Deady & Lane
1843-1872), provides the statutory authorization for
'costs or disbursements' on review of decisions of a
'tribunal.'  Before the APA costs provision existed,
the Court of Appeals relied on this statute to uphold
an award of costs by the circuit court in an appeal
from the Workers' Compensation Board.  Cunningham v.
State Compensation Department, 1 Or App 127, 459 P2d
892 (1969).  The later enactment of the APA cost
provision, which does not apply to review of workers'
compensation cases, does not change this."
Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
		Compton thus holds that ORS 20.120 is authority for
imposing costs and disbursements on judicial review of a 
administrative agency's order, except when review is "as provided
in" the APA.  Because judicial review of the Board orders in the
present case are not as provided in the APA, ORS 183.315(1) and
(5)(a), ORS 20.120 would appear to authorize an award of costs
upon review.
		Petitioners argue, however, that the holding in Compton
-- that ORS 20.120 authorizes cost awards in judicial reviews
that are not controlled by the APA -- is unsound and should not
be applied to the present controversy.  Petitioners suggest that
the Compton decision should be disregarded as an interpretation
of ORS 20.120, because Compton itself disregarded a prior
interpretation of ORS 20.120 by this court that was at odds with
the interpretation in Compton.  Petitioners refer to State ex rel
v. Estes, 34 Or 196, 55 P 25 (1898).
		We do not agree with petitioners that Estes construes
ORS 20.120 in a way that conflicts with the interpretation
announced in Compton.  In Estes, a physician whose license had
been revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners sought review of
the Board's order in the circuit court.  The circuit court
reversed the Board order, but denied the physician's motion for
costs.  This court affirmed the denial of costs.  The court noted
that the "general" statute providing for recovery of costs and
disbursements (presumably Hill's Annotated Laws section 549, the
predecessor to ORS 20.190) had no application, because that
statute applied only to appeals from the judgment of a court. 
The court then noted that the statute specifically governing
review of orders of the Board of Medical Examiners expressly
prohibited awards of costs against the Board.  Finally, the court
concluded that "the act in question having made no provision for
the recovery of costs in case the action of the board be
reversed, defendant is not entitled to recovery from the relators
as in an ordinary action:  Hill's Ann. Laws § 564, 565."  34 Or
at 213 (emphasis added).  Estes does not construe Hill's
Annotated Laws section 565 (which now appears at ORS 20.120).  If
it suggests anything about that statute, it is that the statute
authorized costs awards in "ordinary" judicial reviews under that
statute, but that the review at issue was an exception to that
statute and a different statute specifically prohibited cost
awards against the Board of Medical Examiners.  That suggestion
is not inconsistent with the interpretation of ORS 20.120 offered
in Compton.      
		For the foregoing reasons, we reject petitioners'
argument that there is no statutory authority for an award of
costs and disbursements to the Board if the Board prevails on
judicial review of one of its orders.  We need not consider
petitioners' arguments that neither ORS 20.310, ORS 20.015, nor
any other provisions mentioned in the Court of Appeals' orders
authorize cost awards.  According to the interpretation announced
in Compton, ORS 20.120 authorizes cost awards to the prevailing
party in any judicial review that the APA does not govern (a
category that includes the present cases as they were considered
in the Court of Appeals). (7)
		Petitioners' final argument specifically pertains to
the prevailing party fee provided under ORS 20.190.  Under ORS
20.190, that fee is available in a "civil action or proceeding." 
Petitioners argue that judicial review of an order of the Board
is a criminal proceeding and, therefore, is not a civil action or
proceeding within the meaning of ORS 20.190.  In that regard,
petitioners note that the term "criminal" "pertains to or is
connected with the law of crimes, or the administration of penal
justice," Black's Law Dictionary, 372 (6th ed 1990), a category
that arguably includes Board decisions that subject a party to
continued incarceration for a crime.  Petitioners also rely on
the definition of "civil judicial proceeding" that appears in a
separate statute, ORS 182.090(3):  "As used in this section,
'civil judicial proceeding' means any proceeding, other than a
criminal proceeding as defined in ORS 131.005(7), conducted
before a court of this state."  "Criminal proceeding," under ORS
131.005(7) means "any proceeding which constitutes part of a
criminal action or occurs in court in connection with a
prospective, pending or completed criminal action."  Petitioners
contend that, under the foregoing definition, judicial review of
Board orders are criminal proceedings, because such review takes
place in a court (in their case, the Court of Appeals) and is "in
connection with a * * * completed criminal action," i.e., the
administration of penal sanctions.
		We are not persuaded.  We note, first, that ORS
182.090(3) specifically pertains to costs and expenses in a
particular circumstance -- when a state agency is a party to
litigation and the court finds against the agency and also finds
that the agency acted "without reasonable basis in fact or law." 
The statute has a limited scope.  It is not context for purposes
of determining the meaning of the term "civil action or
proceeding" in ORS 20.190.  Moreover, and even if ORS 182.090(2)
were relevant, the judicial reviews in this case are not reviews
"in connection with" a "completed criminal action."  "Criminal
action" is defined for purposes of ORS 131.005(7) (the statute
cross-referenced in ORS 182.090(2)) as an "action at law by means
of which a person is accused of the commission of a violation,
misdemeanor or felony."  ORS 131.005(6).  That definition does
not sweep so broadly as to include, as petitioners suggest, all
proceedings that pertain to the administration of penal
sanctions.  Put differently, petitioners' status as prisoners or
parolees may be the result of a criminal action that is
completed, but administrative proceedings respecting that status,
and judicial review of those administrative proceedings, are so
far removed from the criminal actions that they cannot be said to
be "connected with" them.   
		For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by petitioners'
arguments that focus on the meaning of the term "criminal."  It
may be that the term "criminal" broadly pertains to anything that
is connected with crime or the administration of penal justice,
but that is not dispositive here.  The statute at issue, ORS
20.190, refers to any "civil action or proceeding" (emphasis
added), and the terms that logically correspond, "criminal
actions" and "criminal proceedings," (8) are more limited in scope
than the adjective "criminal."  A "criminal action" is a
	"[p]roceeding by which [a] person charged with a crime
is brought to trial and either found not guilty or
guilty and sentenced.  An action, suit, or cause
instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal
laws."
Black's Law Dictionary at 372.  A "criminal proceeding" is a
proceeding
	"instituted and conducted for the purpose either of
preventing the commission of crime, or for fixing the
guilt of a crime already committed and punishing the
offender."
Id. at 374.
		Neither of the foregoing definitions describe judicial
review of an order of the Board.  Although any judicial review of
a Board order necessarily arises because there once was a
criminal action, such review is not a criminal action or
proceeding itself.  It is a civil proceeding and, as such, is
within the scope of the prevailing party fee statute, ORS
20.190. (9)
		In summary, we have considered each of petitioners'
arguments that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority in
awarding costs (i.e., a prevailing party fee) to the Board when
it dismissed their petitions for judicial review.  None of those
arguments is well taken.  The statutes authorize such awards; the
Court of Appeals did not err.
		The orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.	



1. 	Berger Farms discussed ORS 20.015 and ORS 20.096(5) in
regard to the claims that the court determined were
nonarbitrable.  With respect to those claims, however, there was
no question that the Court of Appeals had authority to decide
entitlement to attorney fees. 

2. 	Lord's Oregon Laws section 565 is a predecessor statute
to ORS 20.190.  At the time that Portland & O.C. Ry. Co. and
McCargar were decided, Lord's Oregon Laws section 565, provided:  
	"Costs, when allowed to either party, are as
follows: 
	"1.  In the supreme court, on an appeal to the
prevailing party, fifteen dollars * * *."  

3. 	Stelljes/Dumler was decided before the legislature
enacted ORS 144.335(3), making Board orders that relate to a
release date unreviewable.

4. 	Petitioners also suggest that their position is
supported by U-Cart Concrete v. Farmers Ins., 290 Or 151, 619 P2d
882 (1980), which they interpret as holding that, when a court
neither affirms nor reverses a judgment, no party has prevailed
for purposes of awarding costs.  However, U-Cart Concrete does
not announce that proposition, but addresses only the narrow
question whether, in the Supreme Court, a respondent on review
may recover costs upon denial of a petition for review. 

5. 	See ORS 20.310(1) (court shall allow costs and
disbursements to the prevailing party in any appeal, unless
statute provides otherwise or "unless the court directs
otherwise").

6. 	Petitioners cite In re King, 165 Or 103, 115, 105 P2d
870 (1940), for the proposition that the right to recover costs
must be found within the statute prescribing the procedure for
judicial review.  However, in that case, the court held that a
general catchall cost statute did not apply to the particular
proceeding at issue (review of findings and recommendations of
the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar).  The case does
not hold that the specific statute that governs judicial review
of an agency's orders is the exclusive source of authority for
costs and disbursements in such proceedings.
7. 	Petitioners also have argued, in a related vein, that
the Court of Appeals was without authority to award prevailing
party fees against them under ORS 20.190 because that statute
conditions entitlement to prevailing party fees upon the party
otherwise having a right to recover costs and disbursements, and
no statute in fact authorizes costs and disbursements.  Our
conclusion, under Compton, that cost awards are authorized in any
judicial review not "as provided in" the APA, undermines that
argument.  

8. 	Black's defines "civil action" generally as "[a]ll
types of actions other than criminal proceedings."  Black's Law
Dictionary at 245.

9. 	Petitioners also argue that parole review is a criminal
proceeding under the analysis set out in Brown v. Multnomah
County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977).  However, Brown,
which deals primarily with determining whether a procedure is
criminal for purposes of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, has no bearing on the question here, viz., what the
legislature that enacted ORS 20.190 intended by the term "civil
action or proceeding."