Title: KELLEHER v STATE MONT AERONAUTI

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12206 I N T H E SUPRENE C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 HUGH R. KELLEHER, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - STATE O F MONTANA & M O N T A N A AERONAUTICS COMMISSION, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Victor H. F a l l , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete and Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Weymouth D. Symmes argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Geoffrey L. Brazier, Helena, Montana. For Respondent: Small, Cumins and Hatch, Helena, Montana. Floyd 0. Small argued, Helena, Montana. Submitted: June 16, 1972 M r , J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Co~xrt, This i s a personal injury action brought by the manager of the Helena City-County Airport against the s t a t e of Montana and the Montana Aeronautics Commission f o r damages r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r i e s received i n an airplane crash, A jury i n the d i s t r i c t court of the f i r s t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Lewis and Clark, returned a verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f in the amount of $245,000. Judgment was entered thereon, After denial of t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l , defendants appeal the f t n a l judgment, P l a i n t i f f was returning from a meeting a t Lewistown, Montana, which involved him i n h i s capacity a s city-county a i r p o r t manager, when a Cessna 185 single engine a i r c r a f t owned by the Montana Aeronautics Commission and piloted by Charles Lynch, Executive Secretary of the Montana Aeronautics Commission, crashed, P l a i n t i f f along with Henry Loble, general counsel f o r the Com- mission, was a passenger a t the i n v i t a t i o n of Lynch because the plane i n which p l a i n t i f f had flown t o Lewistown was not returning t o Helena. A l l three men had been i n attendance a t a meeting of the Northern Plains A i r Transportation Council i n Lewistown. For the purposes of t h i s appeal, defendants have assumed, i n l i g h t of the jury's v e r d i c t , t h a t the p i l o t Lynch was negli- gent i n the operation of the a i r c r a f t . It i s a l s o agreed t h a t p l a i n t i f f was covered by and received maximum workmen's com- pensation benefits , a s hereinafter s e t f o r t h i n our discussion of issue No. 1, Defendants r e l y on three issues i n support of t h e i r appeal: 1, That the court erred i n s t r i k i n g from defendants' amended answer i t s defense t h a t p l a i n t i f f was an employee of the s t a t e of Montana, to-wit, manager of the city-county a i r p o r t i n Lewis and Clark County. The city-county a i r p o r t carried workmen's compensation insurance and p l a i n t i f f was paid and accepted it, This was stipulated a t t r i a l and should have resulted i n dismissal of the action. 2. The verdict was so excessive so a s t o shock the con- science of an ordinarily prudent person. 3 , Numerous minor e r r o r s were committed during the course of the t r i a l which i n themselves would not be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e prejudicial e r r o r , but, when combined, would be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e prejudicial error. Defendants' issue No, 1 concerns t h e i r primary defense which they contend bars t h i s action under the ~orkmen's Compen- sation Act. They r e l y s p e c i f i c a l l y on section 92-204, R.C.M, 1947, of t h a t Act which provides i n pertienent p a r t : "Where both the employer and employee have elected t o come under t h i s a c t , the provisions of t h i s a c t s h a l l be exclusive, and such election s h a l l be held t o be a surrender by such employer and the servants, and employees of such employer and such employee, a s among themselves, of t h e i r r i g h t t o any other method, form o r kind of compensation, or determination thereof, o r t o any other compensation, or kind of determination thereof, o r cause of action, action a t law, s u i t i n equity, o r s t a t u t o r y o r common-law r i g h t o r remedy, o r proceeding whatever, f o r o r on account of any personal injury t o o r death'of such employee, except a s such r i g h t s may be hereinafter s p e c i f i c a l l y granted 9~ * *. Provided, t h a t whenever such employee s h a l l receive an injury while performing the duties of h i s employment and such injury o r i n j u r i e s , so received by such employee, a r e caused by the a c t o r omission of some persons o r corporations other than h i s employer, or the servants or employees of h i s employer, then'such employee, o r i n case of h i s death h i s h e i r s o r personal representatives, s h a l l , i n addition t o the r i g h t t o receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, have a r i g h t t o prosecute any cause of action he may have f o r damages against such 8, * , I ' persons o r corporations, causing such injury, " (Emphasis supplied) I n addition t o preserving the common-law r i g h t t o t h i r d party action t o employees, t h i s section a l s o gives t o the employer o r insurance c a r r i e r paying the compensation the r i g h t of limited subrogation and the additional r i g h t t o bring the t h i r d party action i f the employee f a i l s t o do so within s i x months of h i s injury. W e find no necessity t o c i t e cases t h a t i n t e r p r e t the I I intended meaning of the terms employer" and "employee" a s used and defined i n sections 92-410 and 92-411, R,C.M, 1947, of the ~orkmen's Compensation Act. It i s s u f f i c i e n t t o point out t h a t 11 t h e general accepted d e f i n i t i o n of the term employed'is a person i n service under any appointment or contract of h i r e , express o r implied, o r a l or written, and considered a s "actual" employment. I n addition t o the general c l a s s of employer and employee contemplated originally by the Workmen's Compensation Act, a s noted above, the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the various s t a t e s , including Montana, have by s t a t u t e extended coverage under workmen's compensation t o c e r t a i n specific classes of employees who a r e not I I actual employees" within the original d e f i n i t i o n discussed above, t h a t i s , they have no d i r e c t contract of employment, However, t h i s coverage i s usually extended t o protect the employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors or independent con- t r a c t o r s . A n equal basic purpose of the Act i s t o make the remedies provided exclusive under the Act and t o insulate the em- ployer, l i a b l e f o r compensation payment, immune from t h i r d party actions by the employee, Montana has done t h i s i n cases of statutory employers, some s t a t e s have n o t , Sections 92-438, 92-604, R.C.M. 1947. arson's workmen's Compensation Law, V. l A , Ch. 9, 9 49.11, pp, 855-858, explains the rationale of t h i s statutory extension of coverage: I 1 The purpose of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n was t o protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcon- t r a c t o r s by imposing ultimate l i a b i l i t y on the presumable responsible principal contractor, who has it within h i s power, i n choosing subcontractors, t o pass upon t h e i r responsibility and i n s i s t upon appropriate compensation protection f o r t h e i r workers. This being the rationale of the r u l e , i n the increasingly common s i t u a t i o n displaying a hierarchy of principal contractors upon subcon- t r a c t o r s upon sub-subcontractors, i f any employee of the lowest subcontractor on the totem pole i s injured, there i-s no p r a c t i c a l reason f o r rezching up the hierarchy any further than the f i r s t insured contractor. * * * he s t a t u t e a l s o aims t o f o r e s t a l l evasion of the a c t by those who might be tempted t o subdivide t h e i r regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping d i r e c t employment r e l a t i o n s with the workers and relegating them f o r compensation protection t o small contractors who f a i l t o carry (and, i f small enough, may not even be required t o carry) compen- sation insurance. l1 (Emphasis supplied). It i s important i n the analysis of t h i s problem t o recognize t h a t the r a t i o n a l e of the statutory employer-employee extension by the l e g i s l a t u r e i s f o r the benefit of the employee and t h a t such a benefit conferring a l i a b i l i t y on the employer i s co- e x i s t e n t with immunity from common-law l i a b i l i t y . In the i n s t a n t case it i s c l e a r t h a t Charles Lynch, the negligent p i l o t , was an a c t u a l employee of the s t a t e of Montana and i t s aeronautics commission under the accepted d e f i n i t i o n heretofore discussed. It i s equally c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f under a contract of employment with the city-county a i r p o r t i s not an "actual" employee of the s t a t e of Montana under the accepted definitions. It does not appear t h a t defendants contend p l a i n t i f f i s an "actual" employee the same a s the p i l o t ; but, i n a r a t h e r unusual multipronged approach, seem t o contend t h a t p l a i n t i f f f a l l s I I i n t o the position s f a statutory employee1; of the s t a t e of Montana o r the s t a t e i s a "statutory employer'bf p l a i n t i f f , although defendants never q u i t e get t o the terminology of statutory employer o r employee, Defendants seem t o contend "that the p l a i n t i f f , a s manager of the city-county a i r p o r t located near Helena, was a servant of an agency created by the S t a t e of Montana carrying out i t s governmental function. I I (Emphasis supplied), I n another statement defendants contend t h a t "the Cj-ty- County Airport Commission was a sub-division of the State of Montane, and as such, the State of Montana and i t s Montana Aero- nautics Commission were the actual employers of the p l a i n t i f f * * ; ? . " (Emphasi-s supplied), Even with the one isolated reference t o "actual" employment, the t o t a l i t y of defendants' language 11 does not seem t o urge a c t u a l employment" a s used i n the Act. There i s no law i-n t h i s s t a t e nor i s any c i t e d by defendants from other jurisdictions, t h a t creates statutory employment by *n a c t of the l e g i s l a t u r e establishing an agency o r commission, such a s an a i r p o r t commission, nor do the s t a t u t e s c i t e d giving the State Aeronautics Commission regulatory control over a i r p o r t operation, c r e a t e this legal. f i c t i o n , As discussed e a r l i e r , these creations must be found within the Act and the extinguishing of the common-law r i g h t s should be s t r i c t l y con- strued. Madison v. Pierce, 156 Mont, 209, 217, 478 P.2d 860. In f a c t , section 92-410, R.C.M. 1947, c i t e d by defendants I t and which defines employer", specifi-cally permits thc "state and each county, c i t y and county, c i t y school d i s t r i c t , i r r i g a - tion d i s t r i c t , a l l other d i s t r i c t s established by law and a l l public corporations and quasi-public corporations and public agencies therein * * *I1 t o be separate employers under the Act, Lacking statutory or case authority t o e s t a b l i s h an employee- employer relationship, defendant$ position cannot be sustained. Defendants' issue No. 2 questions the amount of the verdict contending t h a t such verdict was excessive and should be s e t aside, a new t r i a l granted, or a t the very l e a s t , the verdict should be substantially reduced. Defendants maintain p l a i n t i f f had preexisting d i s a b i l i t i e s which "prevented him from doing manual labor long before the a i r c r a f t accident with which we a r e concerned i n t h i s case". They a l s o argue p l a i n t i f f "has recovered from a l l the i n j u r i e s suffered by him except continuing discomfort of h i s back on occasions. 11 On reading the e n t i r e record, including the testimony of lcwo docfors, p l . a i n t i f f l s coemployees, and p l a i n t i f f , we find: P l a i n t i f f a t time of t r i a l was 44 years of age, married w i t h three children aged 22, 15 and 11. H e had a high school education and a l i f e expectancy of 28.67 years. More than 25 vears ago, a t approximately age 16, p l a i n t i f f f e l l down an -levator shaft and injured h i s r i g h t leg, From t h a t accident, he developed osteomyelitis i n the leg, had several surgical operations and was l e f t with "a f a i r amount of residuals i n the leg." The n e t e f f e c t of t h a t accident was a s t i f f knee, h i s r i g h t leg was shortened approximately one inch, and he walked with a limp. However, p r i o r t o t r i a l af t h i s action p l a i n t i f f had been f r e e of any symptoms of osteomyelitis f o r a period of more than 13 years and had no compl.aints concerning h i s leg throughout t h a t time. P l a i n t i f f ' s employment record reveals he s t a r t e d working f o r the c i t y of Helena a f t e r graduation from high school a s a general laborer a t various jobs including the water department, lighting department, and s t r e e t department. Such work consisted of pick and shovel work, laying cable, and handling heavy equip- ment, H e worked eight hours per day, s i x days per week and had no d i f f i c u l t y doing the work, Idhen p l a i n t i f f went t o work f o r the city-county a i r p o r t , he worked a s general maintenance man plowing runways, mowing weeds,and other things connected with the general maintenance, H e was promoted t o the position of manager of the city-county a i r p o r t which work was primarily administrative and management, although a t times before the accident involved here he assisted with maintenance work i n heavy rush periods. Following the accident, p l a i n t i f f was treated i n the hos- p i t a l by D r , Bossler who had been p l a i n t i f f ' s family doctor f o r t h i r t e e n years. p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s a s l i s t e d by D r . Bossler included: multiple bruises throughout h i s body; laceration over one eye; injury t o h i s r i g h t shoulder; some r i b fractures; sore l e f t ankle; injury t o h i s r i g h t knee; compression fracture of the transverse process of L4 and a f r a c t u r e of the spinous process of L4; bleeding from a cut on h i s head; f r a c t u r e of the bones about the face and l e f t zygomatic arch; and an injured finger. As a r e s u l t of the i n j u r i e s , p l a i n t i f f was placed i n a back brace whi-ch he continues t o wear most of the time; he has per- manent residuals of the back injury, finger injury, both legs; numbness t o the l e f t side of h i s head r e s u l t i n g from nerve injury t o the side of h i s head; and headaches. P l a i n t i f f regu- l a r l y receives treatment i n the form of painkillers. H i s condi- tion i s permanent and i s compounded by emotional trauma caused by the i n j u r i e s and the need f o r continued treatment t o a l l e v i a t e pain. D r . Trobough of Anaconda, the other examining physician, t e s t i f i e d t h a t the compression f r a c t u r e i s a disabling injury which cannot be relieved o r r e c t i f i e d by surgery. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d p l a i n t i f f had a permanent residual i n the form of weakness i n h i s shoulders, tiredness i n h i s arms, accompanied I 1 by a t i n g l i n g and numbness which i s j u s t a s t r a i n pattern of the shoulders. I think it was j u s t a s t r a i n pattern and the shoulders were strained. " D r . Trobough gave the following testimony a s t o the compression fracture: I t I think compression fracture of a vertebra causes considerable muscle spasm and ligamentous injury of the t i s s u e s around t h i s vertebra, plus there i s narrowing of the i n t e r v e r t e b r a l space and there could be some evidence of compression i n j u r i e s t o the nerves, plus generally a l o t of muscle spasm. Limitation of motton of the back i s a r e s u l t of these compression fractures, I t D r . Trobough a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t the old injury t o p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t leg had been d e f i n i t e l y aggravated by the plane accident and with reference t o the extent of p l a i n t i f f ' s d i s a b i l i t y he t e s t i f i e d : "MY d i s a b i l i t y r a t i n g w i l l be based mainly on the f r a c t u r e of h i s back. Anyway, I said now two years and three months a f t e r the accident the patient i s s t i l l having subjective complaints a s a r e s u l t of h i s i n j u r i e s on September 23, 1969, They a r e , i n m y opinion, of a permanent nature and he w i l l continue t o require medical a t t e n t i o n , care and medication. Any work t h a t involves the use of the back, especially i n the labor f i e l d o r anything t h a t causes even average manual labor, I f e e l he i s 100 percent t o t a l l y disabled. OR the basis of the above diagnosis, i n m y opinion, he has a 55 percent permanent d i s a b i l i t y , 11 P l a i n t i f f ' s coemployees, M r . Richard McCord and M r s . Dorothy Moe, t e s t i f i e d t h a t upon returning t o h i s job a f t e r the accident of September 23, 1969, p l a i n t i f f was not able t o perform any physical labor; t h a t he i s quite nervous and appears t o be suffering most of the time; he cannot s i t f o r very long; t h a t he i s short-tempered and frequently hreaks out i n a rash on h i s arms when he i s nervous; and, t h a t here a r e repeated tnstances of h i s being i n pain, Defendants have raised the issue of p l a i n t i f f ' s condition with emphasis on h i s preexisting i n a b i l i t y t o engage i n manual labor p r i o r t o t h i s accident a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s f a l l 25 years ago, Yet, defendants offered no evidence t o controvert p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence of years of manual labor following the fi.rst injury nor did they o f f e r evidence t o controvert h i s present condition. Defendants had p l a i n t i f f examined by an orthopedic surgeon, D r , Harris Hanson of Helena, but f a i l e d t o submit the r e s u l t s of t h a t examination of p l a i n t i f f t o the jury, As a r e s u l t , the record contains some claimed inconsi-stencies e l i c t e d on medical cross-examination of p l a i n t i f f ' s medical witnesses but such in- consistencies do not overcome p l a i n t i f f 's evidence t o a degree t h a t the jury did not have before i t substantial credible evi- dence upon which i t could render i t s v e r d i c t , I n addition t o preexisting d i s a b i l i t y , defendants base t h e i r argument o f excessive damages primarily on the contention t h a t a review of a1.l of the cases decided by t h i s Court does not reveal a jury verdict of t h i s s i z e . They argue t h a t t h i s Court over the years has been confronted with hundreds of personal injury cases with i n j u r i e s sllbs tanti-a l l y more severe than those suffered by p l a i n t i f f here, but there have been no verdicts t h i s large, Defendants c i t e t o t h i s Court f o r comparison of damage awards, Sheehan v. DeWitt, 150 Mont, 8 6 , 430 P,2d 652, which held a county attorney struck i n the face was not e n t i t l e d t o $1,500 because no treatment was required and it was not a serious injury; and Jewett v. Gleason, 104 Mont. 63, 65 P,2d 3, a - 1937 case where a $12,000 verdict on a back injury case was reduced by These arguments f a i l t o recognize t h e c r i t e r i a which governs the examination of damage awards by t h i s Court, This Court and the Federal Courts i n applying Montana law recently have spoken i n unison i n t h i s area with c l e a r and concise language, Smith v , Kenosha Auto Transport, 226 F,Supp, 771, 774, (D,C.Mcznt, 1964); Strong v, Williams, 154 Mont, 65, 71, 460 P. 2d 90; Sal-vail v. Great Northern Ry,, 156 Mont. 12, 31, 473 P,2d 549, In Smith, i n the contest of an $180,000 award, the Federal Court s t a t e d : 1 I The medical evidence i n t h i s respect i s largely un- contradicted, the only question raised by defendants being whether the condition was caused by the acci- dent or pre-existed the accident i n view of the diagnosis of a convulsive disorder i n the p l a i n t i f f a year preceding the accident. The f a c t remains t h a t a f t e r the previous diagnosis, the p l a i n t i f f recovered and performed well a s both a worker, and a husband and f a t h e r u n t i l h i s injury i n the accident, I n addition, there was positive medical testimony t o the e f f e c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s condi- t i o n a t the time of t r i a l resulted from the i n j u r i e s received i.n the accident and/or the aggravation of a previous condition, which i n i t s e l f was not disabling i n the l e a s t . There was a l s o medical testimony t h a t plain- t i f f ' s condition i s permanent and progressive. I I The Court i n answer t o the contention t h a t the award was ex- cessive, went on t o say: "The foregoing a l s o applies t o defendants' contention t h a t the verdict i s so excessive t h a t it must have resulted from passion and prejudice. It i s only when the amount of the verdict i s such a s t o shock the conscience of the court o r t o cause the court t o be- l i e v e it was the r e s u l t of sympathy, passion o r pre- judice, or t h a t the jury, i n fixing the amount of damages, was motivated by factors t h a t should not have been taken i n t o consideration, t h a t the court may s e t aside a verdict. [Citing cases] This r u l e announced so often i n federal courts i s a l s o the r u l e followed by the Montana Supreme Court. Sullivan v. City of Butte, 117 Mont, 215, 157 P.2d 479; Brown v. Columbia Amuse- ment Co,, 91 Mont, 174, 6 P,2d 874; McCartan v , Park Butte Theater Co., 103 Mont. 342, 62 P,2d 338; Thompson v. Yellowstone Livestock Commission, 133 Mont, L03, 324 P.2d 412, From the summary of the evidence and what has been said above, i t i s apparent t h a t the amount of the verdict does not shock the conscience of the court, and the court does not believe the amount of the verdict was influenced by passion o r prejudice, sympathy, or any other improper considerations. I l I n Strong, t h i s Court stated: I I I n personal injury actions there i s no fixed measuring s t i c k by which t o determine the amount of damages, other than the intelligence of the jury; t h a t the jury i s allowed a wide l a t i t u d e and unless it appears the amount awarded i s grossly out of proportion t o the injury a s t o shock the conscience, t h i s Court w i l l not s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of the jury, especially where, a s here, the t r i a l court has approved the verdict by denying the motion for a new t r i a l , " (Emphasis supplied), I n Salvail, the Court entered t h i s restatement: "It i s i d l e t o c i t e cases from t h i s or other jurisdic- t i o n s on awards by j u r i e s f o r c e r t a i n i n j u r i e s a s no two cases a r e a l i k e and each case turns on i t s own f a c t s . I n 1 1 A.L.R,3d there a r e 713 pages of cases f o r compari- son. "The amount t o be awarded a s damages i s properly l e f t t o the jury and t h i s Court rill not s u b s t i t u t e i t s - Judgment f o r t h a t of the jury p a r t i c u l a r l y where, a s here, the t r i a l court has approved the verdict b denying a new t r i a l . Strong v. Williams, 154 M o : t . 65 P.2d 90. It i s only where the amount awarded i s so gr , 460 -0s s l y out of proportion t b the injury a s t o shock the conscience t h a t t h i s Court w i l l intervene. In the i n s t a n t case the verdict of $125,000 i s not so grossly out of proportion t o the injury a s t o shock our conscience nor induce a b e l i e f t h a t i t was the product of passion o r prejudice, Thprn i c : n n t h i n ~ whatanbver i n the- record t o indicate A*.-&- A" ..---------- --- ---- - - assion or prejudice; on the contrary, there is a substan- !Fa1 - evidentiary - b a s i s .. justifying the amount of the award." (Emphasis supplied). Here, the jury has made i t s award f o r physical damages caused t o a 44 year old p l a i n t i f f with a l i f e expectancy of 28,67 years, H e must endure those i n j u r i e s f o r t h a t time, The t r i a l court has refused t o grant a new t r i a l . W e find nothing in the record t o indica.te the jury was motivated by f a c t o r s which should not have been taken i n t o consideration, such a s passion, prejudice o r sympathy, I n l i g h t of the times and the growing awareness within the l e g a l processes t h a t has attempted t o conform damage awards t o the extent of the i n j u r i e s sustained, the amount of the verdict does not shock the conscience of the Court and we find no e r r o r , Defendants1 issue No. 3 requires no extended discussion. They contend t h a t a s e r i e s of e r r o r s occurred during the t r i a l none of which, standing alone, would be s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l 7" J* t o authorize a new t r i a l , but the t o t a l i t y of which consituted manifest prejudice t o defendants, requiring a new t r i a l . The e r r o r s t o which defendants d i r e c t our a t t e n t i o n are: (1) Alleged speculative opinion evidence by expert witness Hamer t h a t the moist condition of the spark plugs found i n the wreckage of the a i r c r a f t several hours a f t e r the accident might have been caused by flooding resulting from a prolonged power-off g l i d e t o a lower a l t i t u d e and a subsequent application of the t h r o t t l e , (2) Testimony of expert witness Leaphart t h a t there were a l o t of places i n the v i c i n i t y of the crash s i t e where "you could touch down an airplane i n t h a t area and come out of it reasonably unscathed." (3) Undue concern by the t r i a l judge f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s physical condition and comfort while t e s t i f y i n g , Items (1) and (2) a r e irrelevant t o t h i s appeal i n any event, They r e f e r only t o the issue of the p i l o t ' s negligence, Defendants concede t h i s issue on appeal. This i s demonstrated 11 by the following statement i n t h e i r b r i e f : However, i n the l i g h t of t h e jury's v e r d i c t , we s h a l l assume f o r the purposes of t h i s b r i e f on appeal only t h a t [the p i l o t ] was negligent i n the operation of the a i r c r a f t , 1 I Item (3) likewise i s without merit, The t r i a l judge simply advised p l a i n t i f f t h a t i f he wanted t o stand up a t any time while t e s t i f y i n g t o do so, and t h a t i f he needed a recess t o say so. Defendants' attorney was similarly s o l i c i t o u s of p l a i n t i f f ' s physical condition i n l i k e manner, and raised no objection a t the t r i a l t o the judge's remarks, Under such circumstances the claim of prejudicial e r r o r upon appeal i s without substance. The judgment of the Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent. I shall not dwell at length on the matter but will observe that the Workmen's Compensation Act, in my v i m , forecloses an action by an employee of one state agency against another state agency. Both agencies involved here 8 r ~ creatures of the Legislature, both financed by public tax monies. Additionally, on issue No. 2, I c~ould grant a new trial because the damages awarded are excessive. Here we have an employee in a managerial position who has in fact returned to work and hns had a salary increase since his return. In his position he is fully able to do the job and a quarter of a million dollar judgment shocks my conscience. I would grant a new trial. ~ s s o c i 6 3 \ Justice.