Title: JAKE BRADSHAW v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAKE BRADSHAW v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION2006 WY 70135 P.3d 612Case Number: No. 05-156Decided: 06/05/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JAKE 
BRADSHAW,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DRIVERS' 
LICENSE DIVISION,                                         

Appellee 
(Respondent).       

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Mary 
Loos, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] 
Jake Bradshaw was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol and refused to submit to a breath test.  The Wyoming Department of Transportation 
(WYDOT) notified him his driver's license would be suspended.  Mr. Bradshaw requested a contested case 
hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  Based upon the evidence presented, the 
hearing officer upheld the suspension recommendation.  Mr. Bradshaw appealed to the district 
court, which affirmed the OAH decision.  
He now appeals to this Court, claiming the OAH decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.  We 
affirm.

  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Bradshaw 
presents the following issue for our review:

 
 
Was the 
decision of the hearing officer arbitrary and capricious?

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the decision of the hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence and 
whether it was arbitrary and capricious?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3] At 
approximately 9:15 p.m. on February 12, 2004, Deputy Dwight McGuire of the Uinta 
County Sheriff's Department was driving north on Highway 413 near Lyman, Wyoming 
when he observed a pickup truck in a snow bank approximately forty-five feet off 
the northwest side of the highway.  
Deputy McGuire turned his vehicle around and headed back to check the 
pickup which appeared to have run off the road.  As he stopped his vehicle, the driver of 
the pickup got out and walked toward him.  
Deputy McGuire recognized him as Jake Bradshaw.  

 
 
[¶4] As 
Mr. Bradshaw approached, Deputy McGuire noticed he walked with a staggering 
gait.  Deputy McGuire asked Mr. 
Bradshaw if he needed medical attention. Mr. Bradshaw indicated he was 
alright.  Deputy McGuire noticed a 
strong odor of alcohol on Mr. Bradshaw's breath and that his speech was 
slurred.  He asked Mr. Bradshaw if 
he had been drinking.  Mr. Bradshaw 
responded he had "had a few."  
Deputy McGuire asked how many was a few and Mr. Bradshaw said he drank 
four to five shots of whiskey and some beer.  Deputy McGuire asked if he had alcohol 
in his pickup truck and Mr. Bradshaw said he had a case and a half of beer in 
his truck, but had been drinking at a bar in Lyman.  He said he did not remember what time he 
started drinking, but had his last drink around 9:00 p.m. 

 
 
[¶5]  Deputy McGuire contacted dispatch and 
requested assistance.  He then asked 
Mr. Bradshaw if he would submit to field sobriety tests.  Mr. Bradshaw agreed and Deputy McGuire 
administered a series of tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk 
and turn, one leg stand, alphabet recitation and counting.  Deputy McGuire's report indicated Mr. 
Bradshaw was able to recite the alphabet as requested, but was unable to 
successfully complete the other tests. 

 
 
[¶6] 
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Hutchinson arrived on the scene as Deputy McGuire 
was conducting the field sobriety tests.  
Trooper Hutchinson re-administered the field tests and 
obtained the same results.  Deputy 
McGuire advised Mr. Bradshaw concerning Wyoming's implied consent law1 and Mr. Bradshaw stated he would 
take the breath test.  Upon arriving 
at the Lyman police station, however, Mr. Bradshaw refused the breath test.  As a result of Mr. Bradshaw's refusal, 
Deputy McGuire confiscated his driver's license and issued a notice of 
suspension and temporary driver's license, set to expire within thirty days 
unless Mr. Bradshaw pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol or requested a contested case hearing.   

 
 
[¶7]  On February 17, 2004, WYDOT notified Mr. 
Bradshaw it was recommending suspension of his driver's license for eighteen 
months2 in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2005) because of his refusal to submit to a breath 
test.  Mr. Bradshaw requested a 
contested case hearing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005).  As a result of his request, 
the suspension of his license was stayed pending the outcome of the hearing. 

 
 
[¶8] The 
OAH scheduled a contested case hearing for April 16, 2004.  Mr. Bradshaw appeared at the hearing 
with his attorney and presented evidence, including a video tape of law 
enforcement booking him into the UintaCountyDetentionCenter, intended to show he was not 
intoxicated.  WYDOT did not appear 
at the hearing but submitted its certified record containing documentation 
relating to Mr. Bradshaw, including Deputy McGuire's signed statement and 
report.  Several weeks after the 
hearing, Mr. Bradshaw submitted additional evidence in the form of an audio tape 
of Deputy McGuire's testimony in the related criminal case against Mr. 
Bradshaw.  He claimed the audio tape 
showed the deputy was not qualified to administer or score the field sobriety 
tests and the test results should not be considered by the hearing officer.  Upon consideration of all of the 
evidence, the hearing officer issued an order in which he concluded the 
preponderance of the evidence established the elements necessary to uphold an 
implied consent suspension.  

 
 
[¶9]  Mr. Bradshaw sought review of the 
administrative hearing officer's order in district court.  He claimed the order was arbitrary and 
capricious because it made no determination and set forth no findings of fact 
concerning probable cause and did not mention the audio and video tapes he 
submitted as evidence.  Concluding 
the administrative hearing officer's order was not arbitrary and capricious and 
his findings and conclusions adequately incorporated the element of probable 
cause, the district court affirmed.        

            

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
 [¶10]  This Court affords no special deference 
to district court decisions when it reviews matters initiated before an 
administrative agency; rather, we review the case as if it came directly from 
the administrative agency.  Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 4, 120 P.3d 176, 178 (Wyo. 2005).  The scope of our review is defined by 
Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2005), which provides as follows:

 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶11]  Where both parties present evidence at 
an administrative hearing, we review the entire record to determine if the 
agency findings are supported by substantial evidence. Bush, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d  at 179.  Substantial evidence in this context is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion.  Id.  Findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the record, we can 
conclude a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as adequate to support the 
agency findings.  Id.         

   

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Bradshaw contends the administrative 
hearing officer was required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103 (LexisNexis 2005) to 
determine whether Deputy McGuire had probable cause to believe he had been 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  
Because the hearing officer's order contains no findings or conclusions 
concerning probable cause, and does not even mention the audio and video tapes 
he submitted as evidence, Mr. Bradshaw contends it does not comply with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2005), which requires a concise and explicit 
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings of fact.  Without a concise and explicit statement 
of the underlying facts supporting a probable cause finding, he argues, this 
court cannot follow the agency's reasoning from its factual findings to its 
legal conclusions and the order must be set aside. 

 
 
[¶13]  In the event this Court concludes the 
findings are sufficient to support the order, Mr. Bradshaw argues the decision 
still must be reversed because Deputy McGuire did not have probable cause to 
make an arrest.  He claims the 
evidence presented showed only that he drove off the snow-covered highway at 
night and became stuck while talking on his cell phone; he walked with a 
staggered gait through ankle deep snow as he approached Deputy McGuire; his eyes 
were watering on a cold windy night; and he smelled of and admitted he had 
consumed alcohol.  Although Deputy 
McGuire testified he administered field sobriety tests, Mr. Bradshaw contends 
evidence of the tests was not admissible because Deputy McGuire's testimony in 
the related criminal case showed he was not qualified to administer and score 
the tests.  Mr. Bradshaw argues 
these facts, together with the complete lack of evidence that Deputy McGuire 
observed him driving erratically, his eyes were red or blood-shot, he had any 
difficulty responding to the deputy, or he slurred his words or staggered during 
the booking procedure compel reversal of the district court's order affirming 
the hearing officer's order.  

 
 
[¶14] We 
begin our discussion by addressing Mr. Bradshaw's claim that the hearing 
officer's order contains neither a finding of probable cause nor a sufficiently 
clear and explicit statement of the underlying facts to support a probable cause 
finding.  Section 16-3-110 sets 
forth an agency's duty to support its action with sufficient factual 
findings:

 
 
            
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be 
in writing or dictated into the record.  
The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.  Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the 
findings.

 
 
Addressing 
this provision, we have said:

 
 
A 
hearing officer is required to support his conclusions with adequate findings of 
fact.  A hearing officer has "the 
duty to make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the 
proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are 
based.  Unless that is done there is 
no rational basis for judicial review." Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo.1968).   In order for this Court to have a 
rational basis upon which to conduct a review:

 
 
All of 
the material evidence offered by the parties must be carefully weighed by the 
agency as the trier of the facts; conflicts in the evidence must be resolved, 
and the underlying or basic facts which prompt the ultimate conclusion on issues 
of fact drawn by the agency in sustaining the prima facie case made, or in 
rejecting it for the reason it has been satisfactorily met or rebutted by 
countervailing evidence, must be sufficiently set forth in the decision 
rendered.  Id. at 
557.

 
 

Bush, ¶ 9, 
120 P.3d  at 180 (some citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶15]  The order in Mr. Bradshaw's case 
contained the following findings of fact pertinent to the issue of probable 
cause:  Deputy McGuire observed Mr. 
Bradshaw's pickup truck stuck in a snow bank forty-five feet off the side of the 
highway; Deputy McGuire observed that Mr. Bradshaw walked with a staggering 
gait, slurred his words when he spoke and smelled of alcohol; Mr. Bradshaw 
admitted he had consumed four or five shots of whiskey and some beer; Mr. 
Bradshaw agreed to submit to field sobriety tests which were conducted first by 
Deputy McGuire and again by Trooper Hutchinson with the same results; after 
being advised of the implied consent law, Mr. Bradshaw refused to submit to a 
breath test.  In addition to these 
findings of fact, the order contained the following conclusion relevant to the 
issue of probable cause:  

 
 
For the 
reasons set forth, the Office concludes that [WYDOT] has established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, all elements necessary to uphold an implied 
consent suspension pursuant to W.S. 31-6-102(d) and 31-6-107. 

 
 
[¶16] 
The statutory provisions referenced by the hearing officer provide as 
follows:

 
 
 
 
§ 
31-6-102. Test to determine alcoholic or controlled substance content of blood; 
suspension of license.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 

(d)   If a 
person under arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a 
chemical test designated by the agency employing the peace officer . . . , none 
shall be given except in cases where serious bodily injury or death has 
resulted. The peace officer shall submit his signed statement to the department. 
The statement submitted by the officer shall contain:

(i) 
His 
probable cause to believe the arrested person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle:

(A)  On a public street or highway in this 
state;

(B) In 
violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving under the 
influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v); and

(ii)               
That the 
person refused to submit to the test upon the request of the peace officer. 

 
 
 
 
§ 
31-6-107.  Penalty for refusal to 
submit to chemical testing.

 
 

(a)   Upon 
receipt of the statement provided for under W.S. 31-6-102(d), the department, subject to review as provided in this 
act, shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle in this state as follows: * * *

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  The review referenced in 
the above provision is described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103 of the act in 
relevant part as follows:

 
 

(b)   The 
scope of a hearing for the purposes of this act shall cover the issues of 
whether a peace officer had probable cause to believe the arrested person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public 
street or highway in this state . . ., whether the person was placed under 
arrest, whether he refused to submit to a test upon request of the peace officer 
. . . and whether . . . he had been advised that his Wyoming driver's license or 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for the period provided 
by W.S. 31-6-107 if he refused to submit to a test     . . 
..

 
 
[¶17]  In accordance with these provisions, 
upon Mr. Bradshaw's refusal to submit to a breath test, Deputy McGuire submitted 
a signed statement containing his probable cause to believe Mr. Bradshaw was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on Highway 413 while 
under the influence of alcohol.  The 
statement included the fact that Mr. Bradshaw's pickup truck appeared to have 
run off the road and was stuck in a snow drift, he walked with a staggered gait, 
his speech was slurred, his breath smelled of alcohol and he admitted to having 
consumed several shots of whiskey and some beer, the last of which he said he 
consumed only fifteen minutes before Deputy McGuire came upon his stuck 
vehicle.  The statement of probable 
cause also included the fact that Mr. Bradshaw was able to successfully perform 
only one of five field sobriety tests conducted first by Deputy McGuire and then 
again by Trooper Hutchinson.  
Finally, the statement of probable cause included the fact that Mr. 
Bradshaw refused to submit to chemical testing.

 
 
[¶18]  We have said a license revocation 
proceeding is civil in nature and probable cause must be proven in such a 
proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence.  State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. 
Hull, 751 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1988).  A license suspension proceeding is 
likewise civil in nature and the same preponderance of the evidence standard 
applies.  Probable cause for a 
warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, a 
prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to believe that a 
crime has been or is being committed and the individual arrested is the 
perpetrator.  Smith v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Transp., 11 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
[¶19]  Although the order does not contain the 
words "probable cause," it does set forth findings of fact sufficient to 
establish that probable cause existed.  
From those facts, the hearing officer concluded the preponderance of the 
evidence demonstrated "all elements necessary" to uphold an implied consent 
suspension.  As reflected in the 
statutes quoted above, one of the elements necessary to uphold the implied 
consent suspension was that Deputy McGuire had probable cause to believe Mr. 
Bradshaw had been driving his vehicle under the influence of alcohol.  While it may be preferable for hearing 
officers to make a specific finding concerning the element of probable cause, we 
hold the hearing officer's findings and conclusions in this case were sufficient 
to allow review.  It is clear that 
one of the elements necessary to uphold an implied consent suspension is 
probable cause and the order sets forth sufficient factual findings to 
demonstrate probable cause.  His 
conclusion that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated "all elements 
necessary" to uphold the suspension incorporated the probable cause element. 
       

 
 
[¶20] 
Mr. Bradshaw argues next that the decision must be reversed because Deputy 
McGuire did not have probable cause to believe he was operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol.  
He contends evidence of the field sobriety tests was not admissible and 
the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause.  We begin with Mr. Bradshaw's claim that 
evidence of the field sobriety tests was not admissible. 

 
 
[¶21]  Citing Smith, 11 P.3d  at 935, and Griffin v. State, 2002 WY 82, ¶ 12, 47 P.3d 194, 197 (Wyo. 2002), Mr. Bradshaw asserts evidence concerning field 
sobriety tests is admissible only if the evidence establishes the tests were 
properly administered by a qualified person.  Contending Deputy McGuire was not 
qualified to administer the tests, Mr. Bradshaw points to the audio tape of the 
deputy's testimony during the motion hearing in the related criminal case in 
which he said he did not assign points to Mr. Bradshaw's performance on the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg stand tests and did not 
know how many points were required to fail the tests.  Other than Mr. Bradshaw's unsupported 
assertion that points are supposed to be assigned and some number of points 
determines a pass or fail, there is nothing in the record establishing the 
existence of or criteria for such a point system.  Even with such evidence, Mr. Bradshaw's 
claim would fail.  In Smith, 11 P.3d  at 936, faced with 
similar claimed deficiencies in the manner in which field sobriety tests were 
administered, we held such deficiencies go to the weight of the evidence and not 
its admissibility. 

 
 
[¶22]  Moreover, in Smith and Griffin we held 
evidence similar to that presented in Mr. Bradshaw's case was sufficient to 
establish the officers were qualified to administer the tests.  In Griffin, the officer 
testified he had three years of law enforcement experience; received additional 
certification; received training for the tests based on the NHSTA from the 
WyomingLawEnforcementAcademy; and received additional 
instruction from the Rawlins Police Department.  The officer's qualifications in Smith, 11 P.3d  at 936, were 
similar.  In both cases, the 
officers explained how the tests were supposed to be administered, how they were 
actually administered and how they determined the results. We held this 
testimony was sufficient to establish the officers were qualified to administer 
the field sobriety tests and evidence concerning the tests was properly 
admitted. 

 
 
[¶23]  In the present case, evidence was 
presented that Deputy McGuire had nearly five years experience in law 
enforcement, went through two days of training in the administration of field 
sobriety tests at the Wyoming Law Enforcement Academy two and one-half years 
before the incident with Mr. Bradshaw, received additional training 
approximately one and one-half years before and participated in additional 
instruction with fellow Uinta County deputies.  Evidence was also presented concerning 
how Deputy McGuire administered the field sobriety tests and determined the 
results.  Applying Smith and Griffin, this 
evidence was sufficient to show Deputy McGuire was qualified to administer the 
field tests.

 
 
[¶24] We 
turn to Mr. Bradshaw's claim the evidence was insufficient to establish probable 
cause.  The party challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence has the burden of demonstrating the agency's 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  Smith, 11 P.3d  at 937.     

 
 
Probable 
cause for a warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, a prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to 
believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the individual 
arrested is the perpetrator. As its name implies, probable cause involves 
probabilities.  These are factual, 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable, prudent people, 
not legal technicians, act. 

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶25] 
Deputy McGuire's determination that he had probable cause to believe Mr. 
Bradshaw was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated was based on his 
observation that the pickup appeared to have run off the road, Mr. Bradshaw's 
speech was slurred and he walked with a staggering gait, he smelled of alcohol, 
and he admitted he drank a considerable quantity of alcohol, the last of which 
he consumed just minutes before running his truck off the road.  In addition to these facts, Deputy 
McGuire administered field sobriety tests to Mr. Bradshaw with the following 
results: 

 
 
Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus:  Both eyes could not 
smoothly pursue the stimulus, had distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation and 
prior to the 45 degree angle of onset.

 
 
Walk and 
Turn:  Bradshaw stated he did not 
have any problems that would affect his balance.

 
 
Bradshaw 
was asked to place his left foot in front of his right foot and stand with his 
arms at his sides while receiving the instructions. Bradshaw was swaying while 
Deputy McGuire was demonstrating this maneuver. Bradshaw was then instructed to 
begin. Bradshaw failed to touch heel to toe on second step going out, and on 
steps 2 and 6 while returning to start point.

 
 
One Leg 
Stand:  Bradshaw was unable to keep 
his arms at his side, and unable to complete this test, by putting his foot down 
on the count of 18 and stating, "I can't do this." 

 
 
Deputy 
McGuire then asked Bradshaw what grade level he completed in order to do the 
next two tests which Deputy McGuire was to have Bradshaw perform. Bradshaw 
stated he completed the 12th grade. Deputy McGuire asked 
Bradshaw if could recite the English alphabet, Bradshaw said he 
could.

 
 
Deputy 
McGuire asked Bradshaw to say the alphabet starting with the letter D and stop 
at the letter M which Bradshaw did successfully.

 
 
Deputy 
McGuire then asked Bradshaw to count backward from 69 to 52. Bradshaw counted 60 
twice, and stopped at 54.

 
 
We 
conclude substantial evidence supported the hearing officer's conclusion that 
the preponderance of the evidence established all elements necessary to uphold 
an implied consent suspension, including the element of probable cause.       

 
 
[¶26]  Affirmed.

    

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2005)  
provides in relevant part as follows:

 
 

(a)     
If arrested 
for an offense as defined by W.S. 31-5-233 [driving or having control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor]:

(i) Any 
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a 
public street or highway in this state is deemed to have given consent, subject 
to the provisions of this act, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath 
or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or controlled 
substance content of his blood. . . .

* * 
*

(ii) For 
tests required under this act, the arrested person shall be advised 
that:

(A) His 
failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer 
shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense or 
eighteen (18) months for a second or subsequent offense . . . .

 
 

2Mr. 
Bradshaw's arrest on February 12, 2004, was his second offense for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol.