Title: ACTION BAILBONDS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ACTION BAILBONDS v. STATE2002 WY 10349 P.3d 992Case Number: 00-335, 01-20Decided: 07/10/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

ACTION 
BAILBONDS FOR REMISSION OF A

JUDGMENT 
OF BOND FORFEITURE:

ACTION 
BAILBONDS, 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

v.

                                                                                                

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Petitioner) 
.

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

ACTION 
BAILBONDS FOR REMISSION OF A

JUDGMENT 
OF BOND FORFEITURE:

ACTION 
BAILBONDS, 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Petitioner) 
.

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

and 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Rick 
L. Koehmstedt of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. Koehmstedt. 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and P. Olen Snider, Jr., 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Snider.

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
VOIGT, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KITE, J., 
joined.

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

  

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      This is a 
consolidated appeal from the partial forfeiture of two surety bonds.1  We reverse, in part, and remand with 
directions, in part.  

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Action 
Bailbonds (Action), sets forth the following issues:

A.  Whether 
in Case No. 00-335 the district court erred when it forfeited a portion of the 
surety bond posted by appellant Action Bailbonds[.]

1.  Did 
the district court err by forfeiting a portion of the surety bond for violation 
of bond condition which was not related to court appearance, contrary to the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure?

2.  Did 
the district court err by forfeiting a portion of the surety bond for violation 
of bond condition which was not related to court appearance, contrary to the 
clear and unam­biguous language of the surety bond?

B.  Whether 
in Case No. 01-20 the district court abused its discretion by forfeiting a 
portion of the surety bond posted by appellant Action 
Bailbonds[.]

Appellee, 
State of Wyoming (State), enumerates the issues as 
follows:

1.  Has 
the appellant properly and lawfully invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this 
court?

2.  Did 
the district court patently abuse its discretion in partially granting the 
appellant's motions to set aside the bond 
forfei­tures?

FACTS

[¶3]      In the Daugherty 
case, Action posted a surety bond on behalf of Daugherty.  As a condi­tion of this bond, 
Daugherty was ordered to report to the Day Reporting Center of Casper, Inc.  However, Daugherty did not report to 
this facility as required.  Based on 
this failure, the State filed a motion to forfeit the surety bond, with the 
district court partially granting that motion.  Ultimately, an order was entered by the 
district court declaring a for­feiture of $500.00 of the surety bond 
posted.   

[¶4]      In the Moore 
case, Action also submitted a surety bond for Moore.  Moore then failed to appear at his 
sentencing hearing, and the district court entered an order forfeiting that 
surety bond.  Action filed a motion 
to set aside the surety bond forfeiture.  
Upon review, the district court partially granted that motion and set 
aside $1,500.00 of the $5,000.00 surety bond forfeiture.  Accordingly, the district court entered 
an order declaring a forfeiture of  
$3,500.00 of the surety bond posted.  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶5]      We recognized in 
the case of Northwest Bail Bonds v. State, 2002 WY 102, ¶6, __ P.3d __, 
¶6 (Wyo. 2002):

            
An appellate court will not interfere with a trial court's 
dis­cretionary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 
424 (Wyo. 1996).  This general rule applies to decisions 
on motions to set aside a bond forfeiture.  
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a remission is a discretionary one that 
will only be overturned on appeal for a patent abuse of discretion amounting to 
arbitrary and capricious action."  
Appli­cation of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d 1322, 1325 
(Wyo. 1983).  Assessing whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion involves determining whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support the district court's decision.  
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995).  One factor in that assessment is whether 
the district court's "conclusions [were] drawn from objective criteria."  Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 
257 (Wyo. 1988) (quot­ing Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  The burden is upon the appellant to show 
an abuse of discretion.  Blake v. 
State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997). 

DISCUSSION

Real 
Party In Interest

[¶6]      The State, for 
the first time on appeal, argues that Action is not a real party in interest 
and, as such, cannot lawfully invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction.  Specifically, the State proffers this 
argument contending that because Action purports to be acting in these 
consolidated appeals as an agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, it does 
not have appropriate standing before this court since Action, as solely a trade 
name, is not recognized as a legally cognizable person and does not have a 
sufficient stake in this litigation.  
Further, the State argues that an insurance agent may not commence or 
maintain an appeal on behalf of its insurance company principal.  Finally, the State argues that while 
either Amwest Surety Insurance Company or Jeanine Beagle2 may be real parties in interest, 
neither have appropri­ately filed a notice of appeal and are barred from now 
entering this matter.  We do not 
agree. 

[¶7]      Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure 17(a) states:

            
Real party in interest.Every 
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.  An executor, adminis­trator, 
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose 
name a contract has been made for the bene­fit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the 
party for whose benefit the action is brought . . . .  No action shall be dismissed on the 
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until 
a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same 
effect as if the action has been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest.     

[¶8]      It has also long 
been recognized that where an objection in the trial court that a party is not 
the real party in interest is not timely voiced, such delay constitutes a waiver 
of any objection on that ground.  
Gifford-Hill-Western, Inc. v. Anderson, 496 P.2d 501, 502 (Wyo. 
1972).   Moreover, it has also 
been recognized by this court that pursuant to W.R.C.P. 9 and 17 whether a 
plaintiff is a real party in interest should be submitted as an affirmative 
defense particularly considering the rights of ratification, joinder, or 
substitution provided in Rule 17 and cannot be presented for the first time on 
appeal.  Cockreham v. Wyoming 
Production Credit Ass'n, 743 P.2d 869, 873-74 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶9]      In addition, it 
is aptly pointed out by Action in its reply brief, that the State has accepted 
Action as a proper party to contract with as a surety on both bonds which are 
the subject of this consolidated matter and that Action was directly ordered by 
the court to forfeit partial amounts of the surety bonds involved.  Finally, both of the notices of appeal 
in these cases state clearly that Action is the party appealing these matters 
and that it posted both bonds involved.   Therefore, Action has a clear 
stake in the outcome of this action.  
Accord­ingly, we hold that the State has waived any objection 
concerning whether Action is a real party in interest in this matter. 

Daugherty 
Forfeiture Issues

[¶10]   Action contends that the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not allow for the forfeiture of bond for a 
violation of a bond condition which is not related to court 
appear­ance.  In particular, 
Action argues an internal conflict exists within the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure since Rule 46 mandatorily requires the forfeiture of a bond upon 
breach of any bond condition while Rule 46.4 provides for a bond forfeiture 
solely if a person fails to appear with any other violation of the conditions of 
bond allowing a court, in its discre­tion, to only revoke the bond.  As such, Action asserts it was improper 
for the district court to order a partial forfeiture of the surety bond posted 
on behalf of Daugherty on the basis that he failed to report to the Day 
Reporting Center of Casper, Inc. as required.  We agree.

[¶11]   Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure 
46(f) states as follows:

(f)  Forfeiture 
of bail.

(1)  Declaration.If 
there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court shall declare a forfeiture 
of the bail.

(2)  Setting 
Aside.The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in part, 
upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon 
execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the 
surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the 
forfeiture.

Further, W.R.Cr.P. 46.4 
provides:

Sanctions for failure to appear or for violation of 
release order.

(a)  Failure to appear.Whoever 
having been released under Rule 46 through 46.4 knowingly fails to appear before 
a court as required by the conditions of release, or fails to surrender for 
service of sentence pursuant to a court order may be punished for contempt.  It is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the 
person from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to 
the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to 
appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or surrendered as soon as such 
circumstances ceased to exist.

(b)  Declaration of forfeiture.If a 
person fails to appear before a court as required and the person executed an 
appearance bond, the judicial officer may regardless of whether the person has 
been charged with an offense under this rule, declare any prop­erty 
designated pursuant to 46.1 to be forfeited to the State of 
Wyoming.

(c)  Violation of release 
condition.A person who has been released under 46.1, 46.2 or Rule 46.3 and 
who has violated a condition of that release, is subject to a revocation of 
release and a prosecution for contempt of court. 

[¶12]   
Upon our review of the language found in the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, we conclude that two separate and distinct interpretations may be 
reached.  Under Rule 46, it is 
mandatory for a court to determine that bond is forfeited for any breach of the 
conditions of bond.  However, 
pursuant to Rule 46.4(b) and (c), a court may forfeit bond and/or revoke bond if 
a person fails to appear and is relegated, if it so desires, to only revoke bond 
if any other condition of bond is violated.   Accordingly, we find that 
inconsistency exists between these rules.   

[¶13]   
Recognizing this inconsistency, we hold that the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Proce­dure in effect at the time of this action must be construed 
to only allow a court to revoke bond upon violation of any condition of bond not 
related to appearance.  Indeed, we 
cannot support any other conclusion upon considering the applicable rules in 
pari materia and in an effort to apply their contrary provisions while at 
the same time attempting to construe them in harmony and not allow any part to 
be rendered superfluous or meaningless.

[¶14]   
This court has recently amended, effective September 1, 2001, W.R.Cr.P. 
46.4(b) to read as follows:

If a person fails to appear before a court as 
required, or fails to comply with any condition set by the court pursuant 
to Rule 46.1(c) and the person executed an appearance bond, the judicial 
officer may, regardless of whether the person has been charged with an offense 
under this rule, declare any property designated pursuant to 46.1 to be 
forfeited to the State of Wyoming.

(Emphasis added.)  This recent amendment to Rule 46.4(b) 
was made by this court to remedy the inconsistencies set forth 
above.

[¶15]   
Moreover, we find that our construction of the applicable rules involved 
produces a more equitable result as, prior to the amendment to Rule 46.4(b) 
mentioned above, sureties arguably may not have been adequately put on notice 
that forfeiture of a bond could result from the violation of any bond condition 
outside the requirement that a defendant appear before the court when so 
directed.  This result is also 
consistent with the long established legal adage that the law abhors a 
forfeiture.  Walker v. 
Graham, 706 P.2d 278, 281-82 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶16]   
Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion when 
it entered its order declaring a forfeiture of $500.00 of the surety bond posted 
since, under the law then in force, the district court could only revoke the 
bond posted with respect to the violation of Daugherty in not reporting to the 
Day Reporting Center of Casper, Inc. a condition of bond not related to 
appearance before the court.3    

Moore 
Forfeiture 
Issues 

[¶17]   Action contends that under the 
established law with respect to forfeiture of bonds, the district court abused 
its discretion when it refused to set aside the entire amount of the bond 
forfeiture ordered with respect to Moore.  
As we stated in the case of Northwest Bail Bonds, 
¶­8:

            
It is important to note the procedural context of a contested bond 
forfeiture.  W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(1) 
provides that "[i]f there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court 
shall declare a forfeiture of the bail."  (Emphasis added.)  Use of the word "shall" indicates that 
this decision is mandatory rather than dis­cretionary.  LePage v. State, Dep't of Health, 
2001 WY 26, ¶¶11, 12, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶¶11, 12 (Wyo. 2001).  The bail must be forfeited.  The discretion of the district court is 
exercised under W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(2):

The 
court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in part, upon such 
conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an 
appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surren­dered by the surety 
into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the 
forfeiture.

These 
rules being structured as they are, the issue comes to the district court not by 
way of a motion from the State to forfeit the bail, but by way of a motion from 
the appellant to set aside the forfeiture.  
The intent and effect of this structure is to place the burden on the 
surety to show why the forfeiture should be set aside.  State v. Martinez-Gonzales, 701 P.2d 8, 10 (Ariz.App. 1985); Bob 
Cole Bonding v. State, 13 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Ark. 2000); 
State v. Hedrick, 514 S.E.2d 397, 403 (W.Va. 1999).

[¶18]   
Having set forth the context of a bond forfeiture review, we must also 
look at the appli­cable criteria that must be considered and applied by a 
court when considering a motion from a surety to set aside forfeiture of a 
bond.  Again, we recognized in the 
case of North­west Bail Bonds, ¶9: 

            
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. [664 P.2d 1322 (Wyo. 
1983)] recited both general principles and specific factors that a judge should 
consider when faced with a motion to set aside a bail bond forfeiture.  The general principles 
include:

The 
purpose of a bail bond is not punitive.  
Its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant.  Nor can it be used "as a balm to soothe 
the disappoint­ment resulting from the inability to punish and 
rehabili­tate." . . . "Neither frustration nor its kinsman 
vindictive­ness should be of weight in tipping the scales by which the 
elements of the court's decision is weighed."

Application 
of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 
P.2d at 1325-26 (quot­ing United States v. 
Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1979)).  

[¶19]   We also for 
some time now have established that a court must consider and apply certain 
factors in such instances.  These 
factors were initially set forth in the case of Applica­tion of Allied 
Fidelity Ins. Co.   Specifically, the district court must 
consider:

1.  The 
willfulness of the defendant's breach of conditions; 

2.  The 
reasonable relationship between the forfeiture ordered  
and the cost and inconvenience to the government of regaining custody of 
the defendant; 

3.  The 
participation of the surety in apprehending the defendant; 

4.  The 
cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the  
government 
as a result of the defendant's breach; 

5.  The 
amount of delay caused by the defendant's default and  
the   stage   of   the   proceedings   at   the   time   of   the disap­pearance; 

6.  The 
public interest and necessity of effectuating the appear­ance of the 
defendant; and 

7.  Any 
explanation or mitigating factors presented by the 
defendant.

Application 
of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., at 
1325-26 (citing United States v. Castaldo, 
667 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 978, 
102 S. Ct. 2245, 72 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1982), and United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1979)). 

[¶20]   In reviewing whether an abuse of 
discretion has occurred, we  must 
make an in depth review of the record before us.  If the record is not adequate for us to 
make such a review, we may remand the matter back for further proceedings and 
the development of the bases used by the court for its determination.  Frankel v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Teton County, 2002 WY 13, ¶12, 39 P.3d 420, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002); Gillis v. F 
& A Enterprises, 813 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Wyo. 1991); Board of County 
Comm'rs of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 
411-14 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶21]   Our review of 
the record evidences no adequate bases for the ultimate conclusion made by the 
district court that Action should forfeit $3,500.00 of the bond posted on behalf 
of Moore.  While the record on 
appeal does reflect the court was apprised at hearing of the fact that Action 
took efforts to apprehend Moore and did ultimately return him to the court and a 
discussion was held during the hearing concerning the delay caused by Moore's 
breach, the public's interest and necessity of effectuating the appearance of 
Moore, and prof­fered explanation or mitigating factors presented as to why 
Moore failed to appear at the scheduled sentencing hearing, the record is 
unclear as to whether or not the court did or did not, in actuality, consider 
each of these factors in making its ultimate determination.  Further, while the court did recognize 
that it needed to consider the cost, inconvenience, and preju­dice suffered 
by the government as a result of Moore's breach, the court only recognized that 
the government was required to prepare and issue certain paperwork related to 
Moore's fail­ure to appear and that the government and the court were 
prepared to proceed with a sen­tencing hearing when originally 
scheduled.4   No other actual evidence was taken 
by the court concerning this factor, as the court concluded on its own that 
these facts were simply too difficult to determine with any precision. 

[¶22]   Review of the 
hearing transcript also does not make it clear if the district court 
consid­ered the willfulness of Moore's breach, the stage of the proceedings 
at the time of Moore's failure to appear,5 or the 
reasonable relationship between the forfeiture ordered and the cost and 
inconvenience to the government of regaining custody of the defendant.  We further note that review of the order 
entered by the district court setting aside a part of the forfeiture of the bond 
is of little assistance in our attempted determination as to the required and 
necessary bases of the court's ruling since it simply indicates that the 
district court had "considered the respective positions and arguments of the 
parties" and that Action had sur­rendered Moore into custody without the aid 
and assistance of law enforcement or any other agent of the State.  

[¶23]   Finally, comments made by the 
district court at the hearing may infer an intention to declare a substantial 
forfeiture as a lesson to bonding companies.  The court stated:

There's 
different ways I can look at this.  
I don't think I can be punitive.  
At the same time I think that a bond that's going to mean what it intends 
to mean, that is that there will be a loss of funds for a failure to appear, if 
it's going to have force and effect in assuring an appearance, it shouldn't 
always be set aside, allowed to be reinstated for the surrender of the 
Defen­dant back into Court.

In any 
event, I'm going to set aside $1,500 of the $5,000 amount.  I am going to require that the remaining 
$3,500 be paid to the Court within 14 days from today .

Certainly, while the court recognized that it could 
not be punitive or base its determination on frustration or vindictiveness as 
set forth in Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d at 
1325-26 (quoting United States v. Parr, 
594 F.2d at 444), a thorough basis for 
the ultimate conclusion must be explained to avoid any inference of the court's 
motivation.   

[¶24]   
Therefore, we remand this matter back to the district court for further 
proceedings and the express development of the facts which exist in this case as 
they relate to each of the factors set forth herein which must be considered 
when a motion to set aside a bond forfei­ture is at 
issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   We reverse the order of the 
district court in the Daugherty case calling for a forfeiture of the surety bond 
in the amount of $500, holding that the district court's only authority, given 
Daugherty's failure to report for drug testing, to be the revocation of the bond 
origi­nally issued.  Further, 
with respect to the order of the district court in the Moore case providing for 
the forfeiture of $3,500 of the surety bond, we remand such issues back to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

  
            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting, with which 
KITE, Justice, joins.

[¶26]   In Case No. 00-335, I respectfully 
dissent because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the versions of 
W.R.Cr.P. 46 and W.R.Cr.P. 46.4 in effect at the time of this action were 
inconsistent.  I believe the rules 
were compatible and clear enough to be enforced.  W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(1) stated that bail 
shall be forfeited if there is a breach of a bond condition.  W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(2) allowed for part or 
all of that forfeiture to be set aside.  
W.R.Cr.P. 46.4(a) added that a failure to appear may be punished as 
contempt of court.  W.R.Cr.P. 
46.4(b) said that the bond may be forfeited whether or not the defendant who 
failed to appear was charged with contempt.  And finally, W.R.Cr.P. 46.4(c) provided 
that, for violation of a condition of release, a defendant was subject both to 
prosecution for contempt and to revocation of release.  Consequently, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it declared a forfeiture of Daugherty's bail; in fact, 
it was mandated to do so by W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(1).  The district court then further 
appropriately exercised its discretion under W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(2) by setting aside 
$500.00 of the $1,000.00 forfeiture.

[¶27]   In Case No. 01-20, I respectfully 
dissent for the same reasons I dissented in Northwest Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
State, 2002 WY 102, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2002) (No. 01-56, published 
7/10/02).  The record is sufficient in this case, 
as it was in Northwest Bail Bonds, Inc., for this Court to determine that 
the district court adequately considered the factors from Application of 
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d 1322 (Wyo. 1983).  After a hearing at which Application 
of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. factors were discussed, the district court 
exercised its discretion by remitting $1,500.00 of the $5,000.00 bail 
forfeiture.  It is not for us to 
nitpick that decision.  I would not 
hold, as the majority appears to hold, that the record must reflect that the 
judge considered each and every Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. 
factor.  We said in 
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. that we would not overturn the 
district court's decision unless there had been "a patent abuse of discretion 
amounting to arbitrary and capricious action."  Id. at 1325.  I just cannot find such abuse in this 
case.  In addition, rather than 
characterizing the forfeiture in this case as an attempt to teach bonding 
companies a lesson, I would characterize it as an attempt to foster deterrence, 
which should be adopted by this Court as an acceptable consideration in bond 
forfeitures.  See Accredited Sur. 
& Cas. Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1983) and State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 
547, 514 S.E.2d 397, 407 (1999).

FOOTNOTES

   1Case No. 00-335 (Daugherty case) 
deals with those facts surrounding a surety bond issued on behalf of Raney Ray 
Daugherty while Case No. 01-20 (Moore case) is concerned with those 
circumstances surrounding a surety bond posted for Jimmie Dean 
Moore.

  2Ms. Beagle apparently operates 
Action Bail Bonds as either a sole proprietorship or under a fictitious 
name  while being personally 
registered as an agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company for fidelity and 
surety lines of insurance with the State of Wyoming Department of 
Insurance.  

  3We do not address any contract 
related arguments made by Action on appeal as our above holding renders any 
discussion on such issues moot.

   4Action in its reply brief at fn.6 
asserts that the district court holds criminal arraignments and sentencing 
hearings daily on Tuesday through Friday.  
Therefore, the government and court personnel would have been present in 
court regardless of Moore's appearance at the scheduled sentencing hearing.  While the record before us does not 
support these assertions, if this is in fact true, it must be taken into account 
by the court in making its determination as a part of the required factors noted 
above.  

   5See fn. 4.