Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Carol J. Brown

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1678-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  Carol J. Brown, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Carol J. Brown, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BROWN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 18, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1678-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carol J. Brown, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Carol J. Brown, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 18, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, the Honorable Timothy L. Vocke, that Attorney 
Carol J. Brown receive a public reprimand, pay restitution, and 
bear the full costs of this proceeding.  No appeal has been 
filed so we review the referee's report and recommendation 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  A referee's findings of fact will not 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:   
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
2 
 
be overturned unless clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  We independently review the referee's legal 
conclusions.  Id.   
¶2 
We approve and adopt the referee's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  We agree that Attorney Brown's 
professional misconduct warrants a public reprimand, and we find 
it appropriate to require Attorney Brown to pay restitution and 
the costs of this disciplinary proceeding as set forth herein. 
¶3 
Attorney 
Brown 
(formerly 
known 
as 
Carol 
Brown 
Biermierer) was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 
1993.  She has not previously been disciplined.  During the 
events relevant to this proceeding, she practiced in Madison 
with the law firm Brown & La Counte, LLP ("the Firm"), 
specializing in legal matters affecting Native American tribes 
and their members.  
¶4 
The 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR) 
filed 
a 
disciplinary complaint against Attorney Brown on July 3, 2009, 
alleging seven counts of professional misconduct.  All of the 
allegations of misconduct relate to the Firm and Attorney 
Brown's representation of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
                                                                                                                                                             
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
3 
 
Michigan, a federally recognized Indian tribe ("the Tribe").  
Attorney Brown was lead counsel for the Firm's representation 
related to the Tribe.  Attorney Brown filed an answer to the 
OLR's complaint, but the parties then entered into a stipulation 
whereby Attorney Brown withdrew her answer and pled no contest 
to the allegations set forth in the complaint pursuant to 
SCR 22.14(2).  A hearing was held before the referee on March 4, 
2010.  The referee accepted the stipulation and issued his 
report and recommendation on March 15, 2010.  
¶5 
We begin our discussion by noting the referee observed 
that many "of the problems that Attorney Brown got into in this 
case were as a direct result of the contentiousness between 
various interests in the tribe and the instability of the tribal 
government." 
 
The 
referee 
explicitly 
considered 
this 
a 
mitigating factor.  While this does not excuse misconduct, it 
does inform our review of this proceeding.  The parties have 
stipulated to the facts set forth in the complaint, so we will 
merely summarize the complex factual basis underlying this 
proceeding.   
¶6 
In March 1998 the Firm entered into a written contract 
with the Tribe for legal services ("the Contract").  The 
Contract was signed by Attorney Brown on behalf of the Firm.  
The Contract stated the Firm agreed to represent the Tribe, and 
not the then-serving governing council, its members, or any 
particular persons within the Tribe.  The Tribe's constitution 
required the Tribe to submit the Contract to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs ("BIA") for approval.  BIA refused to approve the 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
4 
 
Contract, requesting inclusion of specific language relating to 
fees and costs to be billed by the Firm.  In March 1999 the Firm 
prepared and executed a revised contract which was provided to 
the Tribe.  The Tribe filed the revised Contract with BIA in 
August 1999.  However, a new governing council took control of 
the Tribe's government, and the Tribe then requested that BIA 
not approve the revised Contract.  The revised Contract was 
never approved by BIA. 
¶7 
At the time the Firm was retained by the Tribe, there 
was controversy within the Tribe as to whether all of the 
persons listed on the Tribe's membership rolls were proper 
members of the Tribe.  There also ensued a series of disputes 
about election results.  There was disagreement as to whether 
then-serving members of the Tribe's governing council ("the 
Chamberlain Council") and then-serving Chief Kevin Chamberlain 
were legitimately elected representatives of the Tribe.  Between 
1996 and 1999, the Tribe experienced a series of elections, 
election protests, and subsequent invalidation of election 
results by the Chamberlain Council.2  Between November 1997 and 
August 1999, the members of the Chamberlain Council continued to 
hold office as a "holdover" government, instead of turning over 
the reins of the Tribe's government to the persons elected in 
the invalidated elections. 
                                                 
2 One of the points of controversy within the Tribe was 
whether Philip Peters, Sr., who was elected Chief in at least 
one of the invalidated elections, and several other persons 
elected to serve on the council, were proper members of the 
Tribe. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Eventually, several tribal members filed suit in 
tribal court, Peters, Durfee v. Chamberlain, et al., Case No. 
98-CI-361.  The tribal court held that the Chamberlain Council 
had the power to void the election results, but ordered the 
Chamberlain Council to develop a plan to allow the Tribe to hold 
a valid election.  Following this decision, tribal members began 
actively seeking intervention from Kevin Gover ("Gover"), then-
Assistant 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Interior. 
 
Gover 
urged 
the 
Chamberlain Council to hold elections for a properly elected 
council.  Ultimately, the Chamberlain Council failed to hold 
elections in the time and manner required by Gover.  Gover then 
directed his subordinates to withdraw federal recognition of all 
but two members of the Chamberlain Council.  Gover recognized an 
"Interim Council" which included Interim Chief Peters and two 
persons who had served as members of the Chamberlain Council.  
The Interim Council took control of the government of the Tribe.  
¶9 
On August 11, 1999, Interim Chief Peters wrote to 
Attorney Brown and advised the Firm:  
As you no doubt know, a new Saginaw Tribal Council 
took office yesterday . . . . [Y]ou currently do not 
have a valid contract [with the Tribe], and you do not 
represent the Saginaw Tribal Council or the Saginaw 
Chippewa Tribe.  The Council has voted to rescind the 
former council's approval of your contract and its 
request for Bureau approval.  Therefore, effective as 
of this date you are to cease all work for the Saginaw 
Tribal Council and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe and 
cease holding yourself out as attorneys for either. 
¶10 In August 1999 the Firm, on behalf of Chamberlain and 
five of the other deposed Chamberlain Council members, filed an 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
6 
 
action in the Appellate Court of the Tribe, pursuant to its 
original jurisdiction, to attempt to block Gover's directive 
from taking effect and to restore the deposed Chamberlain 
Council members to power.  Chamberlain, et al. v. Peters, et 
al., Case No. 99-CI-771 (Appellate Court of the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe of Michigan). 
¶11 On August 16, 1999, the Firm filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, 
purporting 
to 
represent 
the 
Tribe, 
seeking 
a 
declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing Gover's 
decision from taking effect.  Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan v. Gover, et al., Case No. 99-CV-10327 (E.D. Mich.).3  
¶12 In October and November 1999 the Interim Council held 
"curative elections," resulting in the Interim Council members 
being elected in November 1999 to regular two-year terms.  
Despite several protests and legal challenges, the Interim 
Council allowed the certified election results to stand.  The 
newly elected council members (comprised of the same members as 
the Interim Council, including newly elected Chief Philip 
Peters, Sr., and two members of the former Chamberlain Council) 
took the oath of office on December 7, 1999 ("the Peters 
Council").  
                                                 
3 The Interim Council directed the Tribe's general counsel, 
Attorney Michael G. Phelan, to intervene in the suit, also in 
the name of the Tribe, in an effort to prevent an injunction 
from being issued.  On August 19, 1999, the district court 
denied the Tribe's request for a temporary restraining order.  
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
7 
 
¶13 On January 5, 2000, the Appellate Court of the Tribe 
held that Gover had no legal authority under tribal or federal 
law to intervene in the Tribe's dispute or to determine the 
Tribe's government.  Chamberlain, et al. v. Peters, et al., 27 
ILR 6085.  However, the Appellate Court denied the deposed 
Chamberlain Council members any relief based on that judgment, 
in part because of the deposed members' own illegal actions in 
holding over beyond their terms and in part because the Peters 
Council members had been validly elected in November 1999, took 
the oath of office in December 1999, and thereby formed the 
legitimate government of the Tribe under tribal law.  Id.  
¶14 On February 11, 2000, the federal district court 
dismissed the suit pending in that court (Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Gover, et al.), finding that the 
decision of Appellate Court of the Tribe in Chamberlain, et al. 
v. Peters, et al. deprived the district court of jurisdiction.  
¶15 The Firm, purporting to act on behalf of the Tribe but 
acting at the direction of some of the deposed Chamberlain 
Council members, filed a motion asking the district court to 
amend the dismissal order to allow the Firm to file a second 
amended complaint and brief, which the district court also 
denied.  The Firm then filed with the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals an appeal of the district court's dismissal of the 
action, again purporting to act on behalf of the Tribe.  On 
July 6, 2000, the appeal was dismissed by stipulation. 
¶16 Thus, between August 11, 1999, and December 7, 1999, 
the Firm represented the interests of some of the deposed 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
8 
 
Chamberlain Council members in actions contrary to the Interim 
Council's governance of the Tribe.  Between December 7, 1999, 
and July 6, 2000, the Firm represented the interests of some of 
the deposed Chamberlain Council members in actions contrary to 
the Peters Council's governance of the Tribe.  Ultimately, the 
referee concluded that: 
[B]y representing or causing or allowing her firm to 
represent the interests of some of the deposed members 
of the Chamberlain Council in Chamberlain, et al. v. 
Peters, et al., Case No. 99-CI-771 (Appellate Court of 
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan), in 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Gover, et 
al., Case No. 99-CV-10327 (E.D. Mich.), and in an 
appeal from the dismissal thereof in Case No. 00-1395 
(6th Cir.); [and] by representing or causing or 
allowing her firm to represent Gloria King in her 
efforts to cause the Secretary of the Interior to call 
an election regarding proposed amendments to the 
Tribe's constitution, including representing King in 
King v. Norton, et al., Case No. 00-CV-10006 (E.D. 
Mich.), and in related advocacy before BIA; and by 
engaging in the aforementioned courses of conduct when 
in each such case the representation was materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client (the 
Tribe), when in each such case the representation 
involved the same or a substantially related matter to 
the representation of the former client, and when in 
each such case written consent was not obtained from 
the former client to the representation, [Attorney] 
Brown violated former SCR 20:1.9(a).4 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.9(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not "represent another person in the same or 
substantially related matter in which that person's interests 
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client 
unless 
the 
former 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
9 
 
There is no evidence these factual findings are clearly 
erroneous, and we agree with this conclusion of law. 
¶17 On August 11, 1999, Interim Chief Peters sent a letter 
to Attorney Brown stating, "Please send us an immediate 
accounting of all of the work you have done on behalf of the 
Tribe 
and 
the 
Council, 
along 
with 
all 
related 
billing 
records . . . ."  The Firm did not respond until May 11, 2000.  
Moreover, the May 11 letter did not provide or include an 
accounting to the Tribe and only included billing statements for 
one and one-half months.  Chief Peters replied to this letter on 
July 21, 2000, stating:  
I have received and reviewed your May 11, 2000 letter 
responding to my letter of August 11, 1999 . . . . 
[Y]our May 11, 2000, letter does not respond to my 
request for a full accounting and a release of all 
billing materials.  You provided no accounting and 
provided only billing statements for July 1999 and 
August 1-10, 1999.  I am, therefore, again requesting 
that you provide the information and materials I 
requested last August including but not limited to the 
following: . . . A full accounting of all transactions 
into and from the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe's Client 
Trust 
Account 
with 
your 
firm; . . . . 
 
A 
full 
accounting of all payments made to the firm from the 
$150,000.00 paid to the firm on or about July 28, 2000 
purportedly 
to 
"replenish" 
the 
Saginaw 
Chippewa 
Tribe's Client Trust Account; . . .  The production of 
billing records for services purportedly rendered to 
the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe from the inception of your 
relationship with the Tribe to the present. 
¶18 Attorney Brown responded on July 28, 2000, enclosing 
copies of the Firm's statements for legal services to the Tribe 
from March 1998 through June 1999, as well as a copy of the 
Firm's "actual Trust Account ledger sheets," and "[f]or purposes 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
10 
 
of clarity . . . an Excel Worksheet of the ledger accounts."  
However, 
there 
were 
numerous 
accounting 
errors 
in 
this 
paperwork.  In Attorney Brown's July 28, 2000, letter to Chief 
Peters, the Firm misrepresented that the Tribe owed the Firm an 
additional $69,816.93.  In fact, the Firm owed monies to the 
Tribe.  The OLR's subsequent investigation determined that the 
office manager's calculations of the amounts received by the 
Firm from the Tribe, which were also included in the July 28, 
2000, letter, were not accurate because Attorney Brown recorded 
activity 
on 
the 
Firm's 
client 
ledgers 
and 
check 
stubs 
inaccurately and because whoever prepared the letter failed to 
accurately calculate the total funds due.  
¶19 The referee concluded, and we agree, that by failing, 
prior to July 28, 2000, to provide or to cause her firm to 
provide the Tribe with a full accounting of the advanced fees 
and costs delivered to the Firm by the Tribe prior to August 11, 
1999, when the Tribe had requested a full accounting in August 
1999 
and 
May 
2000, 
Attorney 
Brown 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(b).5 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.15(b) (effective through June 30, 2004) provided 
as follows: 
 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall  
promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall render a full accounting 
regarding such property. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
11 
 
¶20 The OLR investigation also disclosed trust account 
anomalies and other problems with accurate financial disclosure, 
as well.  On two occasions in 1999 Attorney Brown disbursed more 
funds than the Firm held in trust.  When she became aware of the 
negative trust account balance, she arranged to draw on the 
Firm's line of credit to deposit $59,674.48 of Firm funds in the 
trust 
account 
on 
August 
2, 
1999. 
 
She 
inaccurately 
misrepresented the disbursement of funds to the Firm on client 
ledgers for the Tribe as "repayments" of a loan or advance to 
the Tribe from the Firm.  She caused the Firm to commingle 
between $15,953.40 and $16,899.43 of Firm funds with client 
funds in the trust account.  The trust account records and 
Attorney Brown's July 28, 1999, letter show that as of July 29, 
1999, Attorney Brown believed the Tribe owed the Firm fees in 
excess of $42,749.85 and mistakenly believed the Firm had more 
than $42,749.85 of Tribe funds in the trust account.   
¶21 The referee concluded, and we agree, that by causing 
the Firm to use client funds held in trust to satisfy 
disbursements unrelated to the clients' matters and commingle at 
least $15,953.40 of Firm funds in the trust account for more 
than 
three 
months, 
Attorney 
Brown 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(a).6  In addition, by causing or participating with the 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:1.15(a) (effective through June 30, 2004) provided, 
in pertinent part:  Safekeeping property. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
12 
 
Firm 
to 
send 
trust account ledgers to the Tribe which 
misrepresented the Firm had made a loan to the Tribe and that 
several disbursements from the trust accounts to the Firm 
represented repayments of that loan, when the Firm had not made 
a loan to the Tribe, Attorney Brown violated SCR 20:8.4(c).7  By 
disbursing or causing the Firm to disburse $109,325.03 from the 
Firm's trust accounts prior to providing written notice of the 
intended disbursements to the Tribe, Attorney Brown violated 
SCR 20:8.4(f)8 via In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marine, 
82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).  
¶22 The OLR investigation revealed issues pertaining to 
billing and staffing, as well.  It is undisputed that Attorneys 
Brown and La Counte were the sole partners of the Firm.9  In 
August 1998 pursuant to a written contract, the Firm hired 
Arizona-based 
attorney 
Robert 
J. 
Lyttle 
("Lyttle") 
as 
a 
"contract attorney to assist [the Firm] in matters related to 
the Saginaw Chippewa Constitution Project."  Billing records and 
                                                                                                                                                             
a fiduciary capacity.  . . .  No funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably 
sufficient to pay or avoid imposition of account 
service charges, may be deposited in such an account. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers; . . . ." 
9 The Firm also employed three associate attorneys and a 
part-time law clerk. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
13 
 
the Firm's contract with Lyttle show the Firm paid Lyttle $90 
per hour for legal services he performed related to the Tribe 
and $55 per hour for his related travel time.  The Firm billed 
the Tribe $125 per hour for Lyttle's work and travel time.  
However, the Firm did not obtain the Tribe's written agreement 
to the markup or the arrangement with Lyttle.  The Tribe 
calculated that during the course of the Firm's representation 
of the Tribe, Lyttle billed the Firm a total of $106,040 
($69,696 for his services and $36,344 in related travel time).  
The Firm billed the Tribe a total of $179,400 for the same work 
and services.  The additional net to the Firm for Lyttle's work 
and travel time between approximately August 21, 1998, and 
August 10, 1999, was $73,360.  The division of the fees billed 
to the Tribe for Lyttle's work and travel time was not divided 
between the Firm and Lyttle based on the proportion of work 
performed by the Firm and Lyttle for such amounts.  The Firm 
charged a "markup" on the rate the Firm would pay contract 
attorneys compared to the rate at which the Firm billed the 
client for the contract attorney's services.  The Firm generally 
did not notify the clients of the differences in the rates the 
Firm paid to the contract attorney versus the rates billed to 
the clients for the work of contract attorneys.  
¶23 Ultimately, the referee concluded, and we agree, that 
by causing or allowing the Firm to charge the Tribe markups of 
$35 per hour on services provided and $70 per hour on travel 
time by Lyttle, when such markups were not proportionate to the 
services performed by Lyttle and where the Firm failed to 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
14 
 
disclose the compensation arrangement with Lyttle and failed to 
obtain the Tribe's written agreement to the markup or the fee 
arrangement 
with 
Lyttle, 
Attorney 
Brown 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.5(e).10   
¶24 In addition, Attorney La Counte's husband, Richard A. 
Monette ("Monette"), was an attorney licensed to practice law in 
North Dakota but not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  
Monette had an association with the Firm whereby he brought 
clients to the Firm and provided legal and consulting services 
to Firm attorneys and to Firm clients.  The Firm paid him a 
portion of the fees charged by the Firm for his services, and he 
was paid a percentage of all fees charged by the Firm for 
certain other cases he brought to the Firm.  Monette was not, 
however, an employee, associate, or partner of the Firm.  
Nonetheless, Monette held himself out as "of counsel" to the 
Firm 
on 
his 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
Law 
School 
online 
                                                 
10 Former SCR 20:1.5(e) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided: 
 
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in 
the same firm may be made only if: 
 
(1) the division is in proportion to the services 
performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with 
the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility 
for the representation; 
 
(2) the client is advised of and does not object 
to the participation of all the lawyers involved and 
is informed if the fee will increase as a result of 
their involvement; and 
 
(3) the total fee is reasonable. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
15 
 
information page and was described as "of counsel" in at least 
one brief filed in the Tribe's litigation.11  The referee found 
that Attorney Brown took no steps to clearly and accurately 
communicate 
to 
clients, 
prospective 
clients, 
courts, 
and 
agencies before which Monette appeared on behalf of the Firm, 
opposing counsel, or the general public that Monette was not an 
employee, associate, or partner of the Firm.  The referee 
concluded, and we agree, that by allowing Attorney Richard 
Monette to hold himself out as an employee, associate or partner 
of the Firm, Attorney Brown violated SCR 20:7.5(d)12 via 
SCR 20:8.4(a).13  
¶25 The OLR ascertained that the Tribe was entitled to 
restitution in the amount of $73,360 and split this restitution 
obligation between the Firm's two partners.14  The parties thus 
stipulated that Attorney Brown owes restitution in the principal 
                                                 
11 For example, on September 3, 1999, in the Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Gover, et al., litigation 
pending in federal court, the Firm filed a First Amended 
Complaint signed by Monette on behalf of the Firm.  This 
pleading failed to include any language clarifying Monette's 
relationship with the Firm, thereby holding him out as an 
employee, associate or partner of the Firm. 
12 SCR 20:7.5(d) provides, "Lawyers may state or imply that 
they practice in a partnership or other organization only when 
that is the fact." 
13 SCR 20:8.4(a) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to 
"violate 
or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 
so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . ." 
14 Attorney La Counte, in the form of a consensual public 
reprimand, agreed to a payment plan to pay $36,680. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
16 
 
amount of $36,680 to the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan. 
¶26 We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions 
of 
law 
with 
respect 
to 
each 
allegation 
of 
misconduct.  We agree the appropriate discipline to be imposed 
against Attorney Brown is a public reprimand, together with an 
order that Attorney Brown pay restitution in the principal 
amount of $36,680 to the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan and pay the costs of this proceeding.   
¶27 With respect to how restitution and costs should be 
paid, we are guided by the referee's insightful observations.  
He noted, "It's clear that, over the course of the last several 
years, what was once a thriving and lucrative legal business 
became defunct to the point where the two principals of [the 
Firm] have split; . . . ."  The referee noted Attorney La Counte 
obtained a full-time job with the Ho-Chunk Nation, leaving 
Attorney Brown with a business loan totaling approximately 
$40,000.  The referee accepted as practical, reasonable, and 
fair Attorney Brown's proposal with respect to payment of her 
restitution obligation.  We agree.  Consistent with the 
referee's recommendation, we direct Attorney Brown to pay $5,000 
toward restitution on March 4, 2011.  She will "pay that exact 
amount on each anniversary [i.e. March 4] until 2017."  On 
March 4, 2018, Attorney Brown will pay the remaining $1,680 plus 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
17 
 
half of the costs.15  On March 4, 2019, she will pay the 
remaining half of the costs.   
¶28 IT IS ORDERED that Carol J. Brown is publicly 
reprimanded as discipline for professional misconduct. 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Carol J. Brown pay 
restitution to the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan in 
the total sum of $36,680 on the payment schedule set forth in 
the body of this decision.  If the restitution payments are not 
made, and absent a showing of her inability to pay, Carol J. 
Brown's license to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended 
until further order of the court. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Carol J. Brown pay to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding on the 
payment schedule set forth in the body of this decision.  If 
costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent a 
showing of her inability to pay, Carol J. Brown's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order 
of the court. 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution is to be 
paid in full prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
                                                 
15 The costs in this matter are $6,727.75 as of March 31, 
2010. 
No. 
2009AP1678-D   
 
 
 
1