Title: Robinson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Robinson v. State, No. 74, September Term, 1998. 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY—CHARGING OF OFFENSES—The 1996 Legislature’s
enactment of new criminal assault statutes, Article 27, §§ 12, 12A, and 12A-1, abrogated the
common law crimes of assault and battery, effective October 1, 1996.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case # CT 96-2471X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 74
September Term, 1998
JOHN WILLIAM ROBINSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Chasanow and Cathell, JJ., Dissent.
Filed:  April 28, 1999
  Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references shall be to Maryland
1
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 27.
Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on June 3,
1997 of assault and battery.  We granted certiorari to answer the question whether “common
law assault and battery was a cognizable crime in Maryland after October 1, 1996,” the
effective date of statutory assault, 1996 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 632.  We shall hold that by
this statutory enactment the General Assembly repealed the common law crimes of assault
and battery.
I.
Petitioner, John W. Robinson, was charged by the Grand Jury for Prince George’s
County in a five count indictment with the offenses of child abuse, Count One, in violation
of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 27, § 35C;  third degree
1
sexual offense, Count Two, in violation of § 464B; fourth degree sexual offense, Count
Three, in violation of § 464C; second degree assault, Count Four, in violation of § 12A; and
assault and battery, Count Five, in violation of the Common Law.  In the charging document,
the State alleged that on or about September 7, 1996 through October 30, 1996, Petitioner
committed a sexual offense upon C.W., a seven year old female, and an assault and battery
upon her.  Petitioner was a good friend of C.W.’s father.  The two men routinely watched
football games together every Sunday afternoon during autumn at C.W.’s home.  
-2-
  While there appeared to be some confusion from her father’s testimony as to the
2
year of C.W.’s birth, a perusal of the entire record makes clear that her date of birth is
October 30, 1989.
  Anthony was a schoolmate of C.W.’s who testified at trial that sometime after
3
school started in 1996 but before C.W.’s birthday on October 30th, C.W. told him “about
something that happened to her” which he then related to his own mother.  Anthony’s mother
then testified that she related the incident to C.W.’s mother.  None of this testimony,
however, expressly identified Petitioner.  Only later did C.W. herself testify that she had
related the incident to Anthony, warning him, “Don’t go to sleep around [Petitioner], or he’ll
touch you in your private.”
C.W. testified that sometime before her birthday  during the fall of 1996, she had been
2
watching football on a Sunday afternoon with her father and Petitioner when Petitioner
“picked me up and carried me to my mother’s room and touched my private” by rubbing her
on the outside of her clothing.  The State attempted to establish with certainty the date of the
offense.  C.W. could only remember that the incident occurred on a Sunday, before her
birthday, while she was watching football.  At a bench conference, the State elaborated on
the date of the incident:
What we know is according to the indictment, the incident
occurred sometime between September 7th of 1996 and October
30th of 1996.  But C. can say it certainly happened before her
birthday on the 30th of October, and it didn’t come out during
the testimony, but she has said to me in the past that it came
after school.  That is why the September 7th date . . . and what
we do know is that at some point, she told Anthony[ ] that it had
3
occurred. 
At the conclusion of the State’s case, Petitioner moved for judgment of acquittal on
all counts.  His counsel argued the following:
-3-
  The indictment in this case was not duplicitous.  “Duplicity is the charging of
4
separate offenses in a single count.” 2 W.R. LAFAVE & J.H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 19.2(e), at 457 (1984).  “The general rule of the common law is that an indictment should
not charge the commission of two or more substantive offenses in the same count, and in the
event that it does so it is objectionable because of duplicity.”  Jackson v. State, 176 Md. 399,
401, 5 A.2d 282, 283 (1939) (citations omitted).  See also Kirsner v. State, 183 Md. 1, 5, 36
A.2d 538, 540 (1944); Weinstein v. State, 146 Md. 80, 83, 125 A. 889, 890 (1924); Mohler
v. State, 120 Md. 325, 327, 87 A. 671,671 (1913); State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 122, 26 A.
500, 500 (1893); Ayre v. State, 21 Md. App. 61, 64, 318 A.2d 828, 831 (1974).  The charges
against Petitioner about which defense counsel complained here—statutory second degree
assault and common law assault and battery—were not duplicitous as that term is commonly
understood in the law when applied to the charging of criminal offenses.  These two offenses
were charged in separate counts and were therefore not duplicitous.
“Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in more than one count.”  Brown v.
State, 311 Md. 426, 432 n. 5, 535 A.2d 485, 488 n. 5 (1988) (citing C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 142 (1982, 1987 SUPP.)).  See also LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra, § 19.2(e), at 457 (“A multiplicious indictment charges a single offense in
several counts.”).  Arguably, if the State’s contention that common law assault and battery
was a cognizable crime after the enactment of statutory assault were correct, the indictment
might be multiplicious.  The defense’s objection is thus more accurately characterized as
multiplicity, i.e., that the State charged Petitioner with commission of the same criminal act
in more than one count in the indictment.  To the extent Petitioner was seeking a judgment
of acquittal, or dismissal of the indictment, based upon such multiplicity, the court was
correct in not granting such a request.  See Brown, 311 Md. at 432 n. 5, 535 A.2d at 488 n.
5 (stating that multiplicity is considered pleading defect not fatal to indictment or information
(again, citing WRIGHT, supra, § 142) and noting that some courts have held objection to
(continued...)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, as to Counts 4 and 5 of
the indictment, which charges Mr. Robinson with second degree
assault, and Count 5, common law assault.
THE COURT:  Which is Count 5.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I respectfully submit that considering
the fact that --
THE COURT:  They’re one in the same.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  They are duplicitous.4
-4-
(...continued)
4
multiplicious indictment or information waived if not raised before trial).  See also LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra, § 19.2(e), at 458 (“Multiplicity does not require dismissal of the
indictment.”).
THE COURT:  I think we’ll rectify that.  [State’s Attorney],
does the State have a desire to not proceed as to Counts 4 and 5
at this point in time?
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  The second degree assault?  That’s
correct, Your Honor.  At this time -- Very well.  The State
would enter Count 4 as nolle prosequi.
THE COURT:  We’re just going forward as to assault and
battery a common law offense?
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  [Defense counsel], anything else?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, having indicated that the State
has nol-prossed Count 4, and being left with Count 5 --
THE COURT:  Do you care to address Counts 2 and 3?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I’ll get to that.  I am concerned as to
the allegations that the evidence has brought out that an alleged
battery may have occurred, but we’re still without specificity as
to what date it occurred.  Now, granted the allegation in the
indictment covers -- correction, September 7th through October
30th, but without that specificity, I don’t think that the Court
can allow this count to go to the jury, because the nol-prossed
Count 4, second degree assault, took effect October 1st.
Common law assault was still the rule of law from September
7th through September 30th.  Not knowing when the allegations
occurred, I think that we can’t allow the jury to speculate on that
battery count.
THE COURT:  Is it fair to say that you never raised the issue of
specificity until now?
-5-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Motion is denied as to Count 5.  Okay.  I’ll hear
you as to anything you want to say as to Counts 2 and 3.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I was about to finish as far as not
only specificity grounds, but as to sufficiency of the evidence as
far as the date is concerned.
  
THE COURT:  Thank you.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . [W]e would submit on Counts 2
and 3.
The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts one, two,
three and five.  The defense proceeded with its case, calling the defendant and Detective
Michael Olds as witnesses.  At the close of all of the evidence, the defense again moved for
judgment of acquittal on all counts.  After hearing argument from the State, the court asked
defense counsel, “Do you want to address Counts 2 and 3 and 5 by indicating anything other
than what you said already?”  Defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.  We’ll submit.”
The trial judge granted Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count one, child
abuse, but denied the motion with respect to all remaining counts, thus leaving Counts two,
three and five for the jury’s consideration.  The court instructed the jury that the time of the
acts relative to all three counts “concerned between the dates of September 7th, ‘96 and
October 30th, 1996.”
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the third degree sexual offense and the
fourth degree sexual offense.  The jury found Petitioner guilty of common law assault and
battery.  The court sentenced Petitioner to the Division of Correction for a period of ten
-6-
years, with two years suspended, and five years probation upon his release from
incarceration.
Robinson noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
court affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion, holding “that common law assault and
battery was and remains a cognizable crime in Maryland, except that from and after 1
October 1996 it is designated ‘second degree assault’ unless accompanied by certain
aggravating factors elevating the offense to a felony now designated as ‘first degree assault.’”
We granted Robinson’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether the Court of
Special Appeals erred in holding that common law assault and battery was a cognizable
crime in Maryland after October 1, 1996.
II.
In 1996, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Article 27, §§ 12, 12A and 12A-1,
effective October 1, 1996.  1996 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 632.  These statutes provide as
follows:
§ 12.  Definitions.
(a)  In general. — In this subheading the following words have
the meanings indicated.
(b) Assault. — Except as otherwise provided in this subheading,
“assault” means the offenses of assault, battery, and assault and
battery, which terms retain their judicially determined meanings.
(c)  Serious physical injury. — “Serious physical injury” means
physical injury which:
(1) Creates a substantial risk of death;
-7-
  We note at the outset of our analysis that “there is no single crime in our State
5
called ‘assault and battery.’”  State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510, 510 A.2d 253, 256 (1986).
Rather, common law assault and battery are two closely related but distinct offenses.  Ford
v. State, 330 Md. 682, 699, 625 A.2d 984, 992 (1993).  Throughout our analysis, we shall
refer to the “crimes”—rather than the singular crime—of “assault and battery” in recognition
of their being distinct offenses under the common law.
(2) Causes serious permanent or serious protracted disfigure-
ment;
(3) Causes serious permanent or serious protracted loss of the
function of any bodily member or organ; or
(4) Causes serious permanent or serious protracted impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ.
§ 12A.  Second degree assault.
(a)  General Prohibition. — A person may not commit an
assault.  
(b)  Violation; penalties.  — A person who violates this section
is guilty of the misdemeanor of assault in the second degree and
on conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $2,500 or
imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.
§ 12A-1.  First degree assault.
(a)  Serious physical injury; use of a firearm.  — (1)  A person
may not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical
injury to another.
(2)  A person may not commit an assault with a firearm . . . .
(b)  Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of
the felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is
subject to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
  
Petitioner contends that the 1996 Act abolished the common law crimes of assault and
battery.   Petitioner’s argument is that the Act accomplished three objectives.  It repealed
5
former §§ 12 and 12A of Article 27 that created and contained aggravated forms of assault;
it established a two-tiered structure that defines all assaults and batteries as either first or
-8-
  The common law crimes of assault and battery had no statutory penalty.  The
6
maximum term of imprisonment was ordinarily limited only by the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See Gerald v.
State, 299 Md. 138, 139, 472 A.2d 977, 978 (1984); Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 714, 421
A.2d 957, 958 (1980).  Accordingly, the maximum sentence for common law assault or
battery was limited by that which was considered reasonable and proportionate under the
circumstances of the case, both as to the offense and as to the offender.  See Thomas v. State,
333 Md. 84, 96, 634 A.2d 1, 7 (1993).  See also Epps v. State, 333 Md. 121, 126, 634 A.2d
20, 23 (1993).
second degree assault; and, it set out a statutory maximum penalty for the offenses.6
Petitioner argues that although the enacted statutes did not abolish the common law concept
underlying the crimes of assault and battery, the Legislature intended to establish a scheme
that accounted for every form of those crimes.  The State, on the other hand, argues that the
General Assembly did not intend to abolish the common law crimes of assault and battery
but rather, the purpose of the 1996 assault statutes was to prescribe a maximum penalty for
the crimes of assault and battery and to specifically repeal the common law crimes of
mayhem and maiming.
It is a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed to repeal the
common law “further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative
without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law.”  Lutz v.
State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934) (quoting 25 R. C. L. 1054).  Where a statute
and the common law are in conflict, or where a statute deals with an entire subject-matter,
the rule is otherwise, and the statute is generally construed as abrogating the common law
as to that subject.  Id., 172 A. at 356 (citing SUTHERLAND ON STAT. CONST. § 294; 12 C. J.
-9-
186); Watkins v. State, 42 Md. App. 349, 353-54, 400 A.2d 464, 467 (1979).  See also Irvine
v. Rare Feline Breeding Center, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“An
abrogation of the common law will be implied . . . where a statute is enacted which
undertakes to cover the entire subject treated and was clearly designed as a substitute for the
common law . . . .” (citation omitted), transfer denied, 698 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind. 1998)).
This brings us to the construction of the statutes in the present case.  It is a cardinal
rule of statutory construction to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  Jones v. State,
311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988).  To be sure, the language of the 1996 assault
statutes contain no specific words of repeal or abrogation, nor is there any conflict between
those statutes and the common law.  We have determined, however, that the statutes as
adopted represent the entire subject matter of the law of assault and battery in Maryland, and
as such, abrogate the common law on the subject.  The 1996 statutes are more than mere
penalty provisions for the common law offenses of assault and battery.  They created degrees
of assault unknown to the common law, and while retaining the common law elements of the
offenses of assault and battery and their judicially determined meanings, the statutes repealed
the statutory aggravated assaults and created new offenses.
Perhaps ironically, some of the best evidence that the 1996 assault statutes comprise
more than just penalty provisions for the common law offenses of assault and battery, and
that they actually abrogated those common law offenses, derives from the fact that the
statutes explicitly repealed and replaced the entire statutory scheme for aggravated assaults
then existent, i.e., Assault with Intent to Murder, Ravish or Rob, Assault—Third Person
-10-
Aiding One Being Assaulted, and Assault by Inmates, as well as the crime of Maiming.  See
1996 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 632, § 1, at 3616-17 and 3629; Maryland Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) Article 27, §§ 11E, 12, 12A, and 384-86.  The new statutes thus
subsumed all previous statutory assault provisions as well as the common law into a single
scheme and established a two-tiered regimen.
The dissent construes the 1996 assault statutes as merely establishing penalty
provisions for different forms of common law assault and battery.  Dissenting op.  at 1.  This
interpretation ignores the critical fact that the new statutory scheme now incorporates within
it all possible previous assault crimes—common law as well as statutory forms.  Prior to
October 1, 1996, if a person committed a criminal assault, that crime might have fallen under
one of the aggravated assault provisions alluded to above.  But not all criminal assaults
committed prior to October 1, 1996 fit within the statutory scheme existing at the time.
Those assaults that fell outside the statutory provisions could be prosecuted under the
common law.  The dichotomy between assaults that could fit within the statutory provisions,
and those that could not, ended, however, on October 1, 1996.  Whether an assault
committed prior to the new statutes’ effect fit within the former statutory scheme for
aggravated assaults, or fell under the common law for simpler offenses, the same assault
committed after September 30, 1996 cannot help but fit within one of the new statutory
provisions.  Any and all assaults, no matter how simple or aggravated, now fit within § 12A,
second degree assault, or § 12A-1, first degree assault.
-11-
  Drawing an analogy to murder and robbery, the dissent further maintains that “[t]he
7
statutes at issue were intended to replace previous penalty sections covering aggravated
assaults.”  Dissenting op. at 2 (emphasis added).  The dissent also states, “Where . . . the
legislature has taken a single common law crime and subdivided it, creating statutory
penalties for degrees of the crime, this Court has held that the common law crime is not
abrogated by the statutory penalties.”  Id. at 3.
The dissent is incorrect that the former aggravated assault statutes were merely
penalty provisions.  Also, the analogy to murder and robbery is inapposite.  The common law
does not include any offense known as “aggravated assault” or “aggravated battery.”  See
R.M. PERKINS & R.N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW Ch.2, §2, at 158 (3rd ed. 1982).  The now
repealed aggravated assault statutes were obviously more than mere penalty provisions: the
offenses were unknown to the common law and were created by the General Assembly.  See
Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 322, 593 A.2d 671, 676 (1991) (“[T]he aggravated assaults
. . . are creatures of statute.”).  Furthermore, if the dissent were correct that in the new
statutes the Legislature was simply assigning penalties and dividing the common law crimes
of assault and battery into degrees, then the result would be that the common law would be
replacing the statutory offenses of aggravated assaults.  There is no authority nor precedent
for this view.  The 1996 enactment expressly indicates that this Act repealed former §§ 12
and 12A of Article 27 and enacted new sections in lieu thereof.  See 1996 Laws of Maryland,
Ch. 632, §1, at 3616-17.  See also Editor’s note to current §§ 12 and 12A.  Unlike the murder
and robbery statutes analogized by the dissent, the 1996 assault statutes did not take a single
common law crime, subdivide it, and create statutory penalties.  On the contrary, the new
assault provisions expressly repealed all former statutory aggravated assault offenses, as well
as the crime of maiming, incorporated all forms of the crimes of assault and
battery—whether under the former statutes or the common law, and established a bifurcated
penalty scheme applicable to any and all possible assault offenses.  We therefore consider
our interpretation of the murder and robbery statutes inapposite to assault and are further
persuaded of the Legislature’s implicit intent to repeal the common law offenses of assault
and battery.
The 1996 assault statutes thus accomplished much more than simply “establishing the
penalties for different forms of common law assault and battery.”  Id.   By subsuming and
7
combining all statutory offenses of assault then existent as well as all common law forms of
assault and battery into a single and comprehensive statutory scheme, the 1996 assault
statutes represent the entire subject matter of assault crimes.  We therefore conclude that the
-12-
  The 1995 version was filed as House Bill 844 and cross-filed as Senate Bill 513 of
8
the 1995 General Assembly of Maryland. 
  The major revisions to the 1995 version consisted of the reduction in the number
9
of categories of offenses to two and the elimination of special classes of protected persons,
(continued...)
new assault statutes, effective October 1, 1996, abrogated the common law offenses of
assault and battery.
The legislative history of the 1996 assault statutes supports this conclusion.  The
1996 Judiciary Committee’s Bill Analysis of House Bill 749, cross-filed as Senate Bill 618,
which the General Assembly enacted as Chapter 632 of the 1996 Laws of Maryland,
recounts the origin of the legislation.  As background information, the report notes that
House Bill 749 was introduced at the behest of the Article 27 Revision Committee, a
committee formed in 1992 by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and
chaired by Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, Joseph F. Murphy.  1996 Judiciary
Committee, Bill Analysis, House Bill 749, at 2 (hereinafter, “1996 Jud. Comm. Bill Analysis,
HB 749”).  During the 1995 session, a bill to revise the assault laws was introduced at the
request of the Article 27 Committee, but the measure failed.   Id.  Following a hearing by the
8
Judiciary Committee and study by the Article 27 Committee during the legislative interim,
changes were made to simplify the 1995 version.  Id.  Hence, it is clear from the legislative
history of the 1996 assault statutes that this legislation originated during the General
Assembly’s 1995 session, underwent some revision, and then became law the following
year.9
-13-
(...continued)
9
such as police officers and prison guards.  See 1996 Judiciary Committee, Bill Analysis,
House Bill 749, at 2; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Senate Bill 618, at 2-3.
We view these revisions as having in no way altered the general purpose of the statutes or
overall intent of the Legislature in subsequently enacting the revised assault legislation.
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee’s Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 618
indicates that “[a]lthough Senate Bill 618 retains the common law meanings of [‘assault’ and
‘battery’], it is clear under the bill that the term ‘assault’ includes all aspects of the law on
assault and battery.”  1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis, Senate Bill
618, at 3.  In addition, this report states that “the Committee to Revise Article 27 felt that the
current law on crimes related to physical injury should be in one place in the Code, rather
than in several different places and in the common law.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See also
1996 Jud. Comm. Bill Analysis, HB 749, at 3; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee,
Floor Report, Senate Bill 618, at 3; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Floor
Report, House Bill 749, at 3.
In addition to enacting the current assault statutes, Chapter 632 of the 1996 Laws of
Maryland amended § 9-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a statute dealing
with the admission of testimony by the spouse of a person charged with a crime.  In a
Committee Note appended to this statute, the Committee to Revise Article 27 stated, “The
revision of the assault laws replaces the common law crime of assault and battery with the
statutory crimes of assault in the first or second degree.”  Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.
Vol., 1997 Supp.) § 9-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added);
-14-
  One of the chief simplifications of the 1995 version accomplished by the enacted
10
1996 version was that “[i]nstead of four degrees of assault (or the three degrees after
amendment in the Senate in the 1995 Session), the current bill only has two degrees.”  1996
Judiciary Committee, Bill Analysis, House Bill 749, at 2; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, Bill Analysis, Senate Bill 618, at 2; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, Floor Report, Senate Bill 618, at 3; 1996 Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, Floor Report, House Bill 749, at 3.
1996 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 632, § 1, at 3632.  While cognizant that “the Committee Notes
and catchlines contained in this Act are not law,” 1996 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 632, § 2, at
3633, we nonetheless find this statement persuasive evidence of the legislative intent to
abrogate common law assault and battery.
Moreover, as precursors a year earlier to House Bill 749 and Senate Bill 618, House
Bill 844 and Senate Bill 513 of the 1995 General Assembly very clearly expressed the same
general purposes relevant to our analysis here.  The Judiciary Committee’s Bill Analysis of
1995 House Bill 844 described those legislative purposes as follows:
This bill revises, both stylistically and substantively, the current
statutory laws governing assault [and] . . .
. . . reorganizes all laws dealing with assault into one coherent
statutory scheme.  The new offenses are categorized into four
degrees of assault patterned after the current statutory structure
for arson, sexual offenses and burglary.
*          *          *          *          *          *
Some of the current assault provisions are reflected in the new
crimes that are created in the bill. . . . However, other offenses
are repealed in their entirety and the substance is absorbed in
other sections. . . . Also, the common law crime of assault and
battery is replaced with the four new degrees of assault.[ ]
10
Id. at 1 (emphases added).  See also 1995 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill
Analysis, Senate Bill 513, at 1; 1995 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Floor Report,
-15-
Senate Bill 513, at 1. Our review of the legislative history of the 1996 assault statutes leads
us to conclude that the General Assembly clearly intended the statutes to encompass the
entire subject of assault and battery and to abrogate the common law on the subject.
This Court reached a similar conclusion when we considered the consolidated theft
statute as it related to the common law crime of larceny.  In West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 539
A.2d 231 (1988), we concluded that the common law crime of larceny was abrogated by the
enactment of the consolidated theft statute as it was “now subsumed in Maryland’s
consolidated theft statute, Md. Code . . . Article 27, Sections 340-344,  which merge[d] all
the formerly distinct larceny-like common law offenses, as well as the offense of receiving
stolen property, into a single crime of theft.”  Id. at 202-203 n.1, 539 A.2d at 233 n.1 (citing
Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987)).
In Watkins v. State, 42 Md. App. 349, 400 A.2d 464, the Court of Special Appeals
considered the question “whether the adoption of Article 27, Sec. 139, the statutory law of
escape, abrogated the common law offense of escape.”  Id. at 352, 400 A.2d at 466.  The
intermediate court held that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law, and the
appellant’s conviction on the common law offense of escape was a nullity.  Id. at 354-55,
400 A.2d at 467-68.  Judge Liss, writing for  the court, reasoned:
We find that the statute simplified the common law by
consolidating the three types of escape into one statute and
making all escape a felony.  The statute as adopted represented
the entire subject matter of the law of escape in Maryland and
thereby abrogated the common law of escape and its several
classifications as well as the distinction among various acts of
escape as misdemeanors or felonies.  We hold that the adoption
-16-
of the escape statute was, in effect, the equivalent of the wooden
stake in the heart of Dracula which made impossible the
resurrection of the common law by the declaration of the trial
judge that the escape statute was unconstitutional.
Id. at 354, 400 A.2d at 467.  Both the West court and the Watkins court were considering
statutes, regarding theft and escape, respectively, that lacked an express repeal of the
common law yet nevertheless held those statutes to abrogate the related common law
-17-
  The dissent relies heavily on Maryland’s murder and robbery statutes, Article 27,
11
§§ 407-413 and §§ 486 and 488, respectively, and the fact that this Court has interpreted
those statutes as not having abrogated the related common law crimes.  See Dissenting op.
at 3-6; Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 137-38, 482 A.2d 474, 481-82 (1984); West v. State,
312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988); and Grimes v. State, 290 Md. 236, 243, 429
A.2d 228, 231 (1981).  Contrary to the dissent’s claim that our decision today “has
effectively overruled the many cases holding that murder and robbery still are common law
crimes and retain their common law meaning,” Dissenting op. at 7, we find our interpretation
of the murder and robbery statutes wholly inapposite to the assault legislation, see supra note
7, and therefore neither intend nor imply any overruling of a single case interpreting those
statutes.
Unlike the 1996 assault statutes, the 1809 division of the single common law crime
of murder into first and second degrees under this State’s statutory law for purposes of
different punishments involved no revision of prior statutory law and hence those statutes
acted solely as penalty provisions.  See Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389-90, 330 A.2d
176, 180 (1974).  Moreover, none of the murder statutes proscribes any act per se nor does
any of the statutes add elements to the crime of murder that were unknown to the common
law.  Instead, each statute simply defines how different forms of murder shall be classified
or punished.  For instance, § 407 states in full, “All murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated
killing shall be murder in the first degree.”  Meanwhile, § 412(b) provides that persons
convicted of first degree murder, if at least eighteen years old and not mentally retarded at
the time of the murder, shall be punished by death, life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole, or life imprisonment.
Similarly, the original enactment of the robbery statutes, §§ 486 and 488, involved no
substantive revision or repeal of any prior statutory offenses but rather only established
different levels of punishment for the underlying common law offense.  See Whack v. State,
288 Md. 137, 140, 416 A.2d 265, 266 (1980).  Nor do the robbery statutes proscribe any act
per se or add any elements to the crime of robbery.  They merely state that persons convicted
of the crime of robbery or robbery with a deadly weapon are guilty of a felony and are
subject to certain penalties.
In stark contrast, the 1996 assault statutes, again, repealed and replaced prior statutory
law while incorporating the common law; added elements to the crime of assault that are
unknown to the common law; and expressly proscribed and set penalties for the commission
of various types of assault.  Finally, no succeeding amendment to the murder and robbery
statutes has ever abolished the statutory scheme in place out of a preference for an entirely
new and exhaustive scheme for the prosecution of such crimes, which is exactly the effect
(continued...)
offenses.   We in turn hold that the adoption of the assault statutes abrogated the common
11
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(...continued)
11
of the Legislature’s 1996 revamping of the crimes of assault.
law crimes of assault and battery as of October 1, 1996.
  
III.
Our inquiry does not end with the determination that as of October 1, 1996, the
common law crimes of assault and battery are no longer cognizable in this State.  The
petition for certiorari presented a second question for our review:  “Did the State fail to prove
that the alleged offense occurred at a time when common law assault and battery was a
cognizable crime in Maryland?”  Petitioner argues that a court lacks power to render a
verdict under a charging document which does not charge an offense within its jurisdiction
proscribed by the common law or by statute.  He points out that the only conviction in this
case was for common law assault and battery, under a charging document alleging that
Petitioner committed the charged crimes on or about September 7 through October 30, 1996.
Since the State entered a nolle prosequi to the statutory second degree assault charge, the
State was required to prove that Petitioner committed the crime before October 1, 1996,
when common law assault and battery were still cognizable in Maryland.  We agree. 
In this case, Count five of the indictment, charging common law assault and battery,
alleged that the offenses took place “on or about the 7th day of September, nineteen hundred
and ninety-six, through the 30th day of October, nineteen hundred and ninety-six.”  C.W.
testified that the incident took place before her birthday and the State informed the court that
-19-
  “Fundamental jurisdiction” means “the power residing in [a] court to determine
12
judicially a given action, controversy, or question presented to it for decision.”  Pulley v.
State, 287 Md. 406, 415, 412 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1980) (citations omitted).
C.W. had previously stated that the incident took place after she began school, thus placing
the event between September 7 and October 30, 1996.
“A claim that a charging document does not charge an offense may be raised at any
time.  Maryland Rule 4-252(c).” Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 74, 548 A.2d 832, 833 (1988).
As Chief Judge Murphy pointed out, writing for the Court in Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787,
490 A.2d 1277 (1985):
Manifestly, where no cognizable crime is charged, the court
lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction to render a
judgment of conviction, i.e., it is powerless in such
circumstances to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to
declare the punishment for an offense.
Id. at 792, 490 A.2d at 1279 (citations omitted).
The crimes of common law assault and battery existed through September 30, 1996.
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, we find that the
indictment charging Petitioner with common law assault and battery on or about September
7 through October 30, 1996 was legally adequate to charge an offence and that the circuit
court had fundamental jurisdiction  to hear the criminal charges pending against Petitioner.
12
See Powell v. State, 324 Md. 441, 446, 597 A.2d 479, 482 (1991).  The  crimes of common
law assault and battery were still cognizable between September 7 and September 30, 1996.
The indictment’s extended time frame from October 1 to October 30, 1996 did not defeat the
-20-
  See supra note 4.
13
trial court’s jurisdiction.  Rather, the expiration of the common law crimes on September 30,
1996 simply limited the time frame upon which Petitioner could be convicted of assault and
battery.  We therefore hold that the charging document properly charged an offense within
the jurisdiction of the trial court and one proscribed by the common law.
At trial, Petitioner did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction; instead, he requested the
trial judge to enter judgment in his favor on all counts.  A criminal defendant may move for
judgment of acquittal and when so doing, shall state with particularity all reasons why the
motion should be granted.  Maryland Rule 4-324.  Petitioner moved for judgment at the close
of the State’s case and again at the close of all the evidence.  Defense counsel argued to the
trial court three bases for granting the motion for judgment of acquittal: duplicity, lack of
specificity, and sufficiency of the evidence.  He was wrong on the first two grounds, but
partially correct on the third ground.  As we have indicated, the indictment was not
duplicitous:  no one count of the indictment charged more than one substantive offense.13
As to lack of specificity, the trial court essentially ruled that because defense counsel was
raising lack of specificity for the first time at the close of the State’s case, the issue had been
waived.  The trial court was correct.  Objections based on defects in the indictment, other
than that the indictment failed to show jurisdiction of the court or to charge an offense, must
be raised by motion before trial, or the objections are waived.  Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2);
see Rule 4-252(c) (A mandatory motion shall be filed within 30 days after the earlier of the
-21-
appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to
Rule 4-213(c), except when discovery discloses the basis for a motion, the motion may be
filed within five days after the discovery is furnished).  See also Campbell v. State, 325 Md.
488, 503, 601 A.2d 667, 674 (1992) (stating that defendant’s failure to file timely motion
attacking indictment as defective for omitting specifics of charge of “conspiracy to violate
controlled dangerous substances law” constituted waiver of such defects).  Petitioner’s
objections as to lack of specificity, as well as duplicity, raised for the first time after the trial
commenced, were therefore waived.
As to sufficiency of the evidence, the Court of Special Appeals treated Petitioner’s
central claim, that the State failed to prove that the offense upon which the jury convicted
him occurred at a time when common law assault and battery were cognizable crimes in
Maryland, as a “sufficiency of the evidence issue.”  The intermediate court summarized
Petitioner’s argument as follows: because the State could not pinpoint whether the act
occurred before the new statutes took effect, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
common law assault and battery. 
 The  State’s evidence as to the time of the incident consisted of C.W.’s testimony that
Robinson assaulted her sometime before her birthday on October 30th and Anthony’s
testimony that sometime between the beginning of the school year, September 7th, and
C.W.’s birthday, C.W. told him that “something happened” to her.  Petitioner testified that
he recalled an incident from one Sunday in “the end part of September.”  C.W. emerged from
the bedroom while her father was in the bathroom and asked Petitioner who had put her to
-22-
bed, to which Robinson responded, “Your father.”  According to Petitioner, C.W.’s father
returned from the bathroom and confirmed to C.W. that he was the one who had put her to
bed.  Based on this evidence, the jury could have concluded that Petitioner committed the
alleged assault on C.W. prior to October 1, 1996.  The evidence was therefore sufficient to
support Petitioner’s conviction of common law assault and battery until September 30, 1996.
See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479, 649 A.2d 336, 338 (1994) (Evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction on appeal if, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99
S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979))).
The real weakness of the State’s only remaining strand of its case against Petitioner
on the assault and battery charge lies not in any jurisdictional defect in the indictment or in
the sufficiency of the evidence as related to the time period from September 7th through
September 30th.  Rather, the remaining problem resides in trial error, in that the court
permitted the jury to speculate whether the criminal act occurred after or before October 1st.
If the jury convicted Petitioner of common law battery based upon conduct which occurred
after September 30, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of a crime which was no longer an
offense in Maryland.  Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction must be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial on the charge of common law assault and battery with respect only
to conduct committed prior to October 1, 1996.
-23-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
REVERSED. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AND
TO REMAND THE CASE FOR NEW
TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PRINCE 
GEORGE’S
COUNTY.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
-1-
The majority holds that “the adoption of the assault statutes abrogated the common
law crimes of assault and battery as of October 1, 1996.” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___,
___ (1999)(Majority Op. at 17).  I respectfully dissent.  
If the common law crimes of assault and battery are abrogated by the statutory
enactment of the three referenced assault statutes and if the common law crimes cease to
exist, then the effect is to freeze common law assault battery as it was at the time it went out
of existence and was replaced by the statutes.  The best indication that this is not what was
intended and the best indication that the assault statutes are merely penalty statutes
establishing the penalties for different forms of common law assault and battery can be found
in the published committee note by the committee that drafted the statutes.  It states:
“COMMITTEE NOTE (COMMITTEE TO REVISE ARTICLE 27)
Similar to the revision of the burglary law, the
Committee has chosen to retain the judicially determined
meanings of the terms ‘assault,’ ‘battery,’ and ‘assault and
battery.’  The meaning of these terms has been extensively
developed at common law and case law.  See e.g., Lamb v.
State, 93 Md.  App.  422 (1992).  Also, as with the burglary
revision, the Committee does not intend to ‘freeze’ the meanings
of these terms, but expects that they will continue to be clarified
when appropriate in future case law.”
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 12.  It seems clear that the intent was
to continue the common law crimes and the judicial development of assault and battery,
rather than repeal or abrogate the common law crimes and have all new development of
-2-
assault and battery a matter of statutory interpretation and ascertaining what the legislative
intent was at the time the common law was abrogated.
A further indication that the legislature did not intend to subdivide common law
assault and battery into two separate distinct statutory crimes, but instead intended to
establish two different penalties for common law assault and battery can be found in § 12A-
4(c), “Lesser included offense. — A charge of assault in the first degree also charges a
defendant with assault in the second degree.”  The whole statutory scheme is consistent with
enacting two penalties for all of the acts that constitute different forms of common law
assault and battery.  Every aspect of the legislation seems to contemplate continuation of the
common law offense as well as ongoing judicial development of that crime.  See, e.g., § 12A-
3 stating: “A person charged with an offense under this subheading is entitled to assert any
judicially recognized defense.”  The legislation under review is much more consistent with
maintaining common law assault and battery, but establishing two penalties; one for the more
aggravated degree and one for the lesser degree of the crime, and there is nothing to indicate
an intent to create two new crimes and abrogate the common law offense.
The statutes at issue were intended to replace previous penalty sections covering
aggravated assaults.  Our construction of the replaced statutes has some relevancy to the
construction of the new assault statutes.  In Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 201 A.2d 353
(1964), the defendant argued that his ten-year sentence for common law assault was unlawful
in view of the statutorily prescribed penalties for the statutory offenses of assault with intent
to murder (fifteen years) and assault with intent to maim (ten years).  This Court rejected that
-3-
contention, noting that the penal limits for statutory assaults did not imply a legislative policy
to limit the sentences for common law assault to not greater than those prescribed for
statutory assault.  Id. at 277.  The Court stated: “Statutes in derogation of the common law
are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature by creating statutory
assaults intended to make any alteration in the common law other than what has been
specified and plainly pronounced.”  Id.  See also Roberts v. Warden, 242 Md. 459, 460-61,
219 A.2d 254, 255, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876, 87 S.Ct. 156, 17 L.Ed.2d 104 (1966)(holding
that creation of statutory assaults was not intended to make any alteration in common law
other than what was specified and plainly pronounced).  Additionally, as will be discussed,
when construing similar statutes this Court has adopted a presumption that the legislature did
not intend to abrogate the common law crime.
ANALOGOUS STATUTES
Where, as in the instant case, the legislature has taken a common law crime and
subdivided it, creating statutory penalties for degrees of the crime, this Court has held that
the common law crime is not abrogated by the statutory penalties.  The primary examples
are our first and second degree murder statutes,  §§ 407-413.  What we said in Hardy v.
State, 301 Md. 124, 482 A.2d 474 (1984),  is equally applicable to the instant case, including
our prior discussion about the charging documents:
“In 1809, the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive
codification of various common-law offenses.   [Chapter] 139
of the Acts of 1809.   This legislation, modeled on a 1794
-4-
Pennsylvania statute, divided the crime of murder, as known at
common-law, into first and second degree murder.  See
Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 441, 444 A.2d 1034, 1036
(1982).   In a seminal decision interpreting this 1809 Maryland
law, our predecessors stated that this law did ‘not create a new
offense in distinguishing between murder of the first and second
degrees.  The design was to discriminate in awarding the
punishment[,]’ Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442, 451 (1855), not
to define new crimes.  Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 373 (1874).
Thus, from Weighorst to the present, we have consistently
maintained that the 1809 Act did not abolish the common-law
concept of murder, but merely divided it into degrees for
punishment purposes.  E.g., Campbell v. State, supra, 293 Md.
at 441, 444 A.2d 1034; State v. Ward, supra, 284 Md. at 205,
396 A.2d 1041; Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 268, 373 A.2d
262 (1977); Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389-90, 330 A.2d
176 (1974); Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 260, 146 A.2d 17
(1958); Davis v. State, supra, 39 Md. at 374; Weighorst v. State,
supra, 7 Md. at 451.  That one may be charged with
common-law murder in lieu of the shortened statutory form
prescribed in § 616 of Article 27 is well-settled.  State v. Ward,
supra, 284 Md. at 200-01, 369 A.2d 1041; Wood v. State, supra,
191 Md. at 667, 62 A.2d 576.  Equally well-settled is that one
may be convicted of first-degree murder under an indictment
charging common-law murder.  Our predecessors originally
noted this proposition in Davis v. State, supra:
‘When, therefore, a person is indicted for
murder, in the technical language of the common
law, he is charged with a crime, which in its
proper sense, includes all circumstances of
aggravation, and as all minor degrees are included
in the major, he is liable to be convicted of the
inferior, as well as of the higher grades of that
offense, and vice versa.’  
39 Md. at 374.
Based on these principles an indictment charging common-law
murder is sufficient to sustain a conviction for either first or
second-degree murder or manslaughter.   Evidence presented at
-5-
trial and the verdicts will determine the level of criminal
culpability and hence the punishment for the offense.  Our
research has not revealed any Maryland appellate decision that
has questioned the validity of these principles.”  (Footnote
omitted)
301 Md. at 137- 138, 482 A.2d at 481-82.  Similarly when the legislature established
penalties for robbery and robbery with a dangerous weapon by Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 27, § 486 and § 488, this Court in several cases held that robbery retains its
common law definition in Maryland, but that the penalties for armed and unarmed robbery
are fixed by statute.  See, e.g., Bowman v. State, 314 Md. 725, 729, 552 A.2d 1303, 1305
(1989); West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988).
In Grimes v. State, 290 Md. 236, 429 A.2d 228 (1981), we explained a primary
difference between creating two statutory degrees of the same common law offense by two
penalty statutes and creating two new statutory offenses, as well as the reason why the
former construction is preferred.  We said:
“The view that different statutory provisions may
constitute the same crime, although in different degrees, has
been taken by this Court with respect to certain common law
offenses.  Typically, this arises when the Legislature deals with
a single common law offense and, without changing the basic
common law elements of that offense, divides it for purposes of
punishment because of the presence or absence of aggravating
or mitigating factors.  Thus, murder was one offense at common
law, but, for purposes of punishment depending upon the
presence or absence of premeditation and deliberation, the
Legislature has classified it into two degrees.  Similarly, robbery
remains a single common law offense, but the Legislature, in
separate statutory sections (Art. 27, §§ 486 and 488) has
provided greater punishment if a dangerous or deadly weapon
is used.  However, with regard to such offenses, the greater
-6-
degree includes the lesser degree.  The lesser degree of the same
offense ‘must be treated as a lesser included offense,’ Sweetwine
v. State, 288 Md. 199, 201 n. 1, 421 A.2d 60, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1017, 101 S.Ct. 579, 66 L.Ed.2d 477 (1980), and cases
cited.  Because of the consistent holdings of this Court that §§
32 and 342 are mutually exclusive insofar as they encompass
storehouse breaking with larcenous intent, the two statutes could
not constitute different degrees of the same offense as this Court
has used that concept.  Moreover, neither  statute embodies a
common law offense.  Rather, the offenses embraced by the two
statutes are legislative creatures.”
Grimes, 290 Md. at 243-44, 429 A.2d at 231-32.  The same reasoning we applied when
construing the murder and armed robbery statutes ought to be applied to the analysis of the
assault statutes.
THE RATIONALE OF THE MAJORITY
The majority acknowledges that “[i]t is a generally accepted rule of law that statutes
are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared, and that a
statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take
away the common law.’  Lutz v. State, 167 Md.  12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934)(quoting 25
R. C. L. 1054).” ___ Md.  at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op.  at 8).  Why then does the
majority reject this principle and hold that the common law crimes of assault and battery are
abrogated by the statutes?  It states:
“To be sure, the language of the 1996 assault statutes contain no
specific words of repeal or abrogation, nor is there any conflict
between those statutes and the common law.  We have
determined, however, that the statutes as adopted represent the
entire subject matter of the law of assault and battery in
-7-
Maryland, and as such, abrogate the common law on the
subject.  The 1996 statutes are more than mere penalty
provisions for the common law offenses of assault and battery.
They created degrees of assault unknown to the common law,
and while retaining the common law elements of the offenses of
assault and battery and their judicially determined meanings, the
statutes repealed the statutory aggravated assaults and created
new offenses.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 9).  Whenever it creates penalties for
common law offenses, as in the assault statutes, as well as the murder and robbery statutes,
the legislature obviously does not intend to leave loopholes or gaps so every statute
establishing penalties for a common law offense is intended to cover “the entire subject
matter” of the common law offense.  In addition, every statutory scheme providing penalties
for a common law offense divides the offense into degrees “unknown to the common law.”
Neither of the reasons cited by the majority justify departing from the presumption that,
merely by establishing penalties for a common law offense such as murder and robbery, the
legislature did not intend to abrogate the common law crimes.  Indeed, if the reasoning in the
instant case is followed, the Court has effectively overruled the many cases holding that
murder and robbery still are common law crimes and retain their common law meaning.  
When the instant case was heard in the Court of Special Appeals, a three-judge panel
that included Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, the Chair of the committee that drafted the assault
legislation, held that the statutes at issue merely provided penalties for common law assault
and battery and did not abrogate the common law crimes.  Its unreported opinion stated in
part:
-8-
“[T]he language indicates a preference for retaining the
common law by stating ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subheading, “assault” means the offense of assault, battery, and
assault and battery, which terms retain their judicially
determined meanings.’ § 12(b)(emphasis added).  While the
language does not affirmatively retain the common law crime
per se, the statute clearly intends to retain and promote the
common law that had evolved up to the time the statute was
enacted.  Moreover, there is no conflict whatever between the
statutory definition of second degree assault and the common
law offenses of assault, assault and battery, and battery.  Unless
aggravated to the greater offense of first degree assault by the
use of a firearm or intent to cause serious physical injury, the
common law offenses are second degree assault, for which the
statute now provides a maximum penalty.
Reviewing the legislative history of this statute is also
instructive.  Although the records are scant, our review of the
bill file does not indicate an intent of the legislature to abolish
the common law offense of assault and battery.  For example,
1996 Md. Laws, Chap. 632, the precursor to the present statute,
states the act was drafted
‘[for] the purpose of revising and restating the
laws concerning crimes involving physical injury
and threatened physical injury; replacing
provisions of law on assault with intent to commit
certain offenses...; establishing the crimes of first
and second degree assault...; repealing crimes
related to mayhem and maiming; making stylistic,
conforming, and substantive changes to statutory
provisions that include references to assault-
related offenses; ... repealing an obsolete
reference; ... and generally relating to the law of
assault and crimes involving threatened and actual
physical harm.  (Emphasis added).’
Letters and summaries within the bill file recite much of the
same language.
-9-
What we find most persuasive is the legislature’s choice
of wording with regard to the effect of this bill.  For instance,
the above section states the act was to revise, restate, or replace
the common law and prior assault statutes laws, not to repeal or
abolish them.  It does specifically repeal, however, the common
law crimes of mayhem and maiming.  Had the legislature
intended on repealing the common law crime of assault in favor
of the sections 12, 12A, and 12A-1, it clearly could have done
so.
Notwithstanding the lack of apparent legislative intent to
repeal common law assault and battery, the statute actually
‘moves up’ certain types of assaults to felonies, thus increasing
the magnitude of the status of the crime and often the sentences
imposed for certain particularly egregious acts.  See Art. 27, §
12A.  The result is not a repeal or removal of the common law
crime; it reclassifies certain conduct and prescribes certain
penalties for it.  Therefore, the codification of this assault and
battery statute really is more of a punishment statute than one
attempting to supplant a common law crime.”  (Footnote
omitted).  
I agree with the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals and would, consistent with
our prior decisions construing similar statutes, hold that in enacting the assault statutes the
legislature intended to divide common law assault and battery into degrees and did not intend
to abrogate the common law crimes.  I would affirm Robinson’s conviction.
Judge Cathell has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this
dissenting opinion.