Title: People v. Evans

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90072-Agenda 4-March 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
ROBERT LEE EVANS, JR., Appellant.
Opinion filed March 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Macon County, defendant,
Robert Lee Evans, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder. 720 ILCS
5/9-1 (West 2000). The same jury found defendant eligible for the death
penalty and further determined that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of that sentence. Subsequently, the
trial court sentenced defendant to death. Defendant's sentence was stayed
pending his direct appeal to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b);
720 ILCS 5/9-1(i) (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.

BACKGROUND
	On the evening of May 5, 1999, at approximately 11:30 p.m., 19-year-old Jerry Watson received a telephone call at his house in Decatur
while he was watching a movie with his sister, Crystal. After a brief
telephone conversation, Watson grabbed his car keys, told Crystal he was
going to "Little Robert Lee's" house, and left in his 1991 Chevrolet
Caprice. Watson never returned home. At 5:30 a.m. the following
morning, his car was found in an alley with the window down, the door
unlocked, and the dashboard damaged. At 6:15 p.m., Watson was found
dead with 20 separate stab wounds to his body. The stab wounds began
at the base of his skull and extended down the back of his body to his
buttocks.
	Defendant was questioned by the police about Watson's murder on
May 6, 1999. Defendant denied any involvement in the murder and told
the police that on May 5, 1999, between 11 p.m. and 11:45 p.m., he was
with his cousin at a local liquor store. Defendant told the police that he
was home in bed by 1 a.m., and that his younger brother, Marquis, was
also home when he went to bed. Defendant said that he last saw Watson
one month earlier. When the police confronted defendant with information
that people saw him with Watson one week before the murder, he
recanted his earlier statement and recalled that he had seen Watson one
week earlier and that he tried to contact Watson on May 5, 1999.
Defendant then added that in addition to the liquor store he stopped at his
Aunt Jackie's house on May 5, 1999, and that he called Carrie, Watson's
girlfriend, on the telephone from his aunt's house. He stated, however, that
he did not call Watson. Defendant denied killing Watson, and denied
having possession of any car stereo equipment.
	Defendant then changed his statement when he was informed by the
police that they had recovered hidden stereo equipment inside his house.
At that time, defendant replied to the police that he "wanted to tell the
truth." He stated that on the night of the murder, at 3 a.m., an individual
named Teddy came to his house, woke him up, and offered to sell him
stereo equipment. Defendant bought some of the equipment from Teddy
for $60. Defendant told the police that he kept the amplifier, but sold the
stereo deck to an unknown Caucasian male in his neighborhood. After the
police informed defendant that Teddy had an alibi, he asked if he would
be released if "he told the truth." Defendant ultimately implicated his 13-year-old brother, Marquis. Defendant claimed that his earlier statements
were lies to protect his brother who had committed the murder.
	At trial, the State claimed that defendant murdered Watson in order
to take his newly installed car stereo equipment. The State presented the
following evidence at trial. Several of Watson's family members and
friends testified that Watson and the defendant were together numerous
times, most recently in the weeks before the murder. On the evening of
May 5, 1999, Watson was riding around in his car with his sister, Crystal,
and three friends, Jason, Tim and Tara. Tara, Tim's sister, was dating
Jason. Several times throughout the evening, Jason's pager went off with
an unknown number. Later in the evening, the group stopped at Jason's
house. At Jason's house, Tara spoke to Jason's sister, Carrie, also
Watson's girlfriend. Carrie told Tara that defendant "had been calling" and
wanted to speak to Watson, she told Tara that each time defendant called
she called Jason's pager and left defendant's phone number. Carrie
testified about her telephone conversations with defendant on May 5,
1999. She stated that defendant asked if Watson was still driving his
Impala-she told defendant that Watson was driving a new car given to him
by his mother, a 1991 Chevrolet Caprice. Defendant also asked about the
stereo system in Watson's new car-she told defendant about Watson's
newly installed car stereo equipment. When Watson did not respond to
the pages, defendant called a final time and asked Carrie for Watson's
home telephone number.
	Tara informed Watson that defendant was looking for him, and
Watson did not reply. At 11 p.m., Watson returned home; he and Crystal
then watched a movie on television.
	Crystal testified that 15 minutes after she and Watson started to
watch the movie, the telephone rang. Watson answered and spoke to the
caller for three to four minutes. Crystal testified that when Watson hung up
the telephone, he grabbed his car keys from the table, but left his money
and identification, and indicated that he was going to "Little Robert Lee's"
house and would return shortly. At approximately 2 a.m., defendant had
not returned home and Crystal went to bed.
	At 5:40 a.m., on her way to work, Watson's mother observed
Watson's car parked in the alley behind their house. The driver's window
was down, the door was unlocked, and the stereo was missing from the
dashboard. She immediately called the police to report that he was
missing. The police responded to the scene and discovered that the
amplifier, the subwoofer box, the cross-over, the head unit of the stereo,
a CD sleeve, and an antenna adapter were missing from the car. Based
upon Watson's comment when he left the house, Crystal went to
defendant's house to ask him when he last saw Watson and if he knew
where they could find him. Defendant responded that he had not seen
Watson for several days.
	Approximately 12 hours later, at 6:15 p.m., the police discovered
Watson's body lying in a field two blocks from defendant's residence.
Defendant lived in his grandmother's house with his 13-year-old brother,
Marquis, his father, his father's girlfriend, his aunt, and his aunt's daughter.
The police searched the house with defendant's grandmother's consent.
During the search, the police discovered an amplifier under a bed,
subwoofers behind the water heater located in the attic crawl space, a
piece of speaker wire on the floor of the kitchen, a piece of speaker wire
outside the back door, and an empty knife sheath under the bed next to
the amplifier. At trial, several witnesses testified about the likeness of the
stereo equipment retrieved from defendant's home to that of Watson's
stereo system. For example, Watson's friend who helped install the car
stereo system testified that Watson's amplifier had a velcro strip attached
to the top and that one of the contacts had been broken off and that in its
place was a cord to complete the connection. The amplifier found in
defendant's home had a similar velcro strip across the top and the same
broken connection with a make-shift cord.
	The police also discovered a pile of wet clothing near the washing
machine in defendant's home. Specifically, the police recovered gray
sweat pants with blood on the knee. After testing the blood, Watson's
DNA profile could not be excluded from the DNA profile present in the
blood on the sweat pants. The police also recovered a soaking wet white
T-shirt with a bloodstain. The DNA profile gathered from the bloodstain
was consistent with Watson such that the profile would be expected to
occur in one in 230 Caucasians. Additionally, the police seized a pair of
white Reebok tennis shoes; the shoes were damp and smelled of bleach.
The shoes testified negative for the presence of blood. A forensic
pathologist for the State testified, however, that bleach degrades DNA.
Police also gathered a black sweatshirt, a pair of boxer shorts, a turquoise
T-shirt, and a second pair of boxer shorts. These items were wet and
located next to the washing machine. In the dryer, police discovered a pair
of black pants, a pair of socks and a pair of boxer shorts. The same
forensic pathologist testified that detergent and hot water can cause the
degradation of DNA.
	 Marquis testified for the State consistent with his statement to the
police on May 6, 1999. Marquis gave his statement to the police in the
presence of his father. Marquis stated that he did not know Watson, but
saw Watson around town. He testified that on May 5, 1999, he went to
bed at midnight. Defendant woke him up during the night and asked for his
help at the side door of the house. Marquis testified that defendant's
clothes were soaking wet from the falling rain outside, and that defendant
was wearing black pants, a black sweater and white Reebok tennis shoes.
Marquis followed defendant to the side door and discovered a stereo
system, including a speaker box, amplifier, CD player, and other items he
could not recall. Marquis helped defendant put the speaker box in the
attic, the amplifier in a bedroom, and the CD player on top of a table in
the den. While they moved the equipment, defendant told Marquis, "This
is what I stole from Jerry." Defendant did not give Marquis any further
details. Marquis further stated that defendant was wearing black pants
when he first came home, but that he changed his clothing and put on gray
sweat pants. Marquis further testified that he did not share clothing with
defendant.
	The State presented the testimony of Correctional Officer Ben
Swain. Officer Swain testified that after defendant was arrested on May
7, 1999, he escorted defendant to his cell. He stated that when he walked
defendant to his cell at 3 a.m., defendant made the unsolicited statements,
"I come up here a lot, and I'll be here for a long time," and "I stabbed that
guy." Officer Swain immediately reported defendant's statement to the
detectives in the police department.
	On May 7, 1999, following the report by Officer Swain, defendant
was questioned by Lieutenant Todd Walker of the Decatur police
department. Lieutenant Walker testified that defendant did not make any
admissions about the crime, but rather replied to his questions with the
statement that "he was going to hell" and that "he was going to take
everybody with him." Lieutenant Walker also testified that he observed a
small cut on the little finger of defendant's left hand.
	Ferlandis Scott, defendant's cousin, also testified for the State. At the
time of defendant's arrest, Scott was in the county jail for an unrelated
incident. He admitted that he had hoped to receive leniency in exchange
for his testimony, but that he had received no promises. Scott testified that
defendant admitted to him that he killed Watson. Specifically, he testified
that defendant told him he called Watson from his Aunt Jackie's house on
the night of the murder and asked Watson to meet him. He told Scott that
he and Watson rode around in Watson's car for a while before he told
Watson to give him the stereo equipment. Watson replied, "Why you
playing me like that? I never done anything wrong to you?" Defendant told
him that Watson tried to run, but that he chased him, and when Watson
turned and tried to grab him, he "took care of business." When defendant
stated that "he took care of business," he made stabbing motions to Scott.
Defendant also told him that he used his brother's knife to stab Watson,
then buried the knife, and finally took the stereo equipment home, where
he made Marquis help him hide it in the house. Scott testified that
defendant told him he washed the clothing he was wearing with bleach and
detergent to hide the bloodstains before he went to bed.
	Defendant presented several witnesses in support of his theory that
his brother, Marquis, committed the crime. First, defendant himself
testified. Defendant denied killing Watson. He testified that on the night of
May 5, 1999, he left his house to buy liquor and cigarettes. After making
his purchases, he stated, he went to his Aunt Jackie's house to call Carrie,
Watson's girlfriend. Defendant stated that he spoke to Carrie, but that she
told him it was too late to come over so instead he walked home.
According to defendant, he unsuccessfully attempted to buy marijuana on
his walk home, but made no other stops during his walk. Defendant stated
that he watched television for approximately one hour before Marquis
arrived home at 1 a.m. and beckoned him outside. Defendant followed
Marquis outside and saw an unfamiliar white Chevrolet Caprice parked
in front of the house. Initially, defendant criticized Marquis for bringing the
car home. At Marquis' request, he helped remove the stereo equipment
from the car and hide it inside the house. After hiding the equipment,
defendant noticed that Marquis was wearing his white Reebok tennis
shoes; defendant stated that he and Marquis had limited clothing and as
a result shared clothing and shoes. He asked Marquis to wash the shoes
because he wanted to wear them the next day. Marquis replied that he
would wash the shoes later, after he returned home. Marquis then left the
house and returned approximately one-half hour later without the car.
Defendant testified that the next morning Marquis admitted to him that he
had stabbed Watson.
	The State cross-examined defendant about his inconsistent
statements to the police before he implicated Marquis. Defendant
responded that the lies were to protect Marquis. The prosecutor further
cross-examined defendant about his statement to Officer Swain.
Defendant replied that Officer Swain misunderstood him. Defendant stated
that he did not tell Officer Swain "I stabbed a guy," but instead said,
"They're trying to say I stabbed a guy."
	Additionally, defendant's Aunt Jackie testified for the defense. Jackie
testified that defendant came to her house on May 5, 1999, at
approximately 8 or 9 p.m., but that she went to bed after he arrived and
did not know how long he stayed. A second aunt, Tammy Evans, also
testified for the defense. She testified that she lived with defendant, and,
as opposed to Marquis' earlier testimony, she testified that defendant and
Marquis shared clothing and shoes. She testified that she observed
defendant wearing dark jeans on May 5, 1999, but that her recollection
was limited because she had been drinking and went to bed at 8:30 p.m.
	John Britton, defendant's cousin who was also incarcerated for an
unrelated charge at the time of trial, testified that while he was in jail
Ferlandis Scott contacted him and suggested that they falsify a story about
defendant in order to receive leniency for their crimes. Britton stated that
Scott told him to read the newspapers in order to learn details about
Watson's murder and to repeat those details to the assistant State's
Attorney. Scott told him to tell the police that defendant stabbed a "white
guy for some money and the car and some music." The State impeached
Britton with his written statement to the police. In his written statement,
Britton detailed a conversation with defendant in the county jail where
defendant admitted to the crime and threatened to "kill his grandmother"
for helping the police in his case.
	Last, the defense presented the testimony of Jason Rhodes, a 28-year-old male who lived near the location where Watson's body was
discovered. Rhodes testified that on the night of the murder he heard a
woman screaming, "You killed him! You killed him!" and "I loved him! I
loved him!" Rhodes investigated the source of the screaming by jumping
over a fence where he observed a woman yelling and hitting a heavy-set
male in the chest. Rhodes indicated that the area of the fence he scaled
was the same area where Watson's body was later discovered. He
testified that during the fight he observed a parked van with a person in the
driver's seat. The woman led the man towards the van to leave when she
noticed that they were attracting attention. Rhodes described the man as
5 feet 10 inches tall, Caucasian, and weighing approximately 260 pounds.
	The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and returned
a verdict finding defendant death-eligible for murder in the course of
committing the felonies of robbery, burglary, or attempt robbery, or
attempt burglary. Following evidence in mitigation and aggravation, the
jury found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty. Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal followed.
134 Ill. R. 302.

ANALYSIS
	In his direct appeal, defendant raises seven issues: four guilt-phase
issues and three sentencing-phase issues.
	However, while this appeal was pending, former Governor George
Ryan commuted defendant's death sentence to natural life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. People
ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, No. 95663 (January 23, 2004). After
petitioner's sentence was commuted, this court issued an order retaining
jurisdiction. Although petitioner is now serving a life sentence, we continue
to have jurisdiction. In the interest of judicial economy, we choose to
dispose of this matter, rather than transfer it to the appellate court.
	Further, commutation removes the judicially imposed sentence and
replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed sentence. People ex rel.
Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566 (1913). An appellate issue is moot
when it is abstract or presents no controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An issue can become moot if circumstances
change during the pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court
from being able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002). Thus, the commutation rendered defendant's
sentencing-phase issues moot. For this reason, we address only
defendant's four guilt-phase issues in this appeal.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that the evidence was
circumstantial; that his evolving statements to the police and his allegedly
incriminating statements were simply a misunderstanding; that the
testimony against him was unreliable because the witnesses were
motivated to lie; and that the evidence showed someone else could have
committed the murder.
	When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not
the function of this court to retry the defendant. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 329-30 (2000). A reviewing court must determine whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1989).
That is, " ' "[o]nce a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged,
the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a
legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." ' " (Emphasis
in original.) People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1990), quoting People v.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d  at 330.
	First, defendant claims that the evidence raises reasonable doubt as
to his guilt because the evidence equally implicates his brother, Marquis,
in the murder. Evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction if the
evidence satisfies the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall,
194 Ill. 2d  at 330. It is not necessary that the trier of fact find beyond a
reasonable doubt as to each link on the chain of circumstances. Rather,
the trier of fact must find only that the evidence taken together supports a
finding of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Jones, 105 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (1985). Here, the evidence taken together
supports the jury's verdict.
	The State presented evidence that on the night of the murder,
defendant made repeated attempts to contact and locate Watson.
Defendant himself admitted that on the night of the murder he attempted
to contact Watson. The State also presented testimony that on the night
of the murder, Watson received a telephone call and that immediately after
hanging up the telephone, he grabbed his car keys and stated that he was
going to defendant's house. Next, the State offered evidence that Watson
was found with 20 separate stab wounds two city blocks from
defendant's home, and that within defendant's home the police retrieved
an amplifier, large stereo speakers, subwoofers, speaker wires, and an
empty knife sheath. During questioning after the murder, detectives
observed that defendant had a small cut on his left finger. Defendant had
no explanation for the cut at the time of the trial. Regarding the recovered
stereo items, witnesses identified some of the equipment as belonging to
Watson and other equipment which was identified as of the "same type"
previously installed in Watson's car the week before his murder. One
witness testified that during her conversation with defendant on the night
of the murder, defendant asked about Watson's car and his new car
stereo equipment.
	The State also entered into evidence several items of clothing and
shoes from defendant's home. Although defendant asserted that he shared
his clothing with Marquis, Marquis denied this fact, and the clothing
containing bloodstains was identified as belonging to defendant. Detectives
testified that some of the clothing recovered was wet and soaked with
bleach and detergent, while other clothing was found in the dryer having
been recently washed. A forensic scientist testified that some of this
clothing contained human blood. Tests indicated that the gray sweat pants
contained a mixture of DNA profiles and Watson's profile could not be
excluded, and that a white T-shirt contained a bloodstain with a DNA
profile consistent with Watson's DNA profile. Further, Marquis identified
the clothing offered into evidence as the clothing worn by defendant on the
night of the murder.
	In addition, the State presented defendant's evolving statements to
the police as evidence of his guilt. Particularly, defendant first told the
police that he last saw Watson one month earlier but, when presented with
conflicting information, admitted that he was with Watson one week
earlier. Further, defendant first stated that on the night of the murder he
went to the liquor store with his cousin and returned home 45 minutes
later, and went to bed at 1 a.m. Defendant, however, changed his
statement and told the police that he went with his cousin to his aunt's
house to use the telephone, and then returned home. When police
detectives presented defendant with the recovered stereo equipment
retrieved from his home, defendant implicated an individual named Teddy.
When the detectives informed defendant that Teddy had an alibi,
defendant changed his statement a fourth time. In his final statement,
defendant implicated Marquis.
	Defendant, however, argues that his evolving statements to the police
were his "initial clumsy attempts to protect his brother" and, therefore,
"easily explain the foolish fabrication[s]." Defendant argues that this
evidence cannot establish his guilt. When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the province of this court to substitute
its judgment for that of the jury on questions regarding the weight of the
evidence. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 43 (1997). It is the
function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to
determine the appropriate weight of the testimony, and to resolve conflicts
or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420,
444 (1995). Therefore, reversal is not warranted simply because the
defendant alleges " 'that a witness was not credible' " or that the jury
assigned too much weight to a particular piece of evidence. People v.
Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 250 (1998), quoting People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299 (1995). A jury is not obligated "to accept any possible
explanation compatible with the defendant's innocence and elevate it to
the status of reasonable doubt." People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 206
(1990); People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 211 (1998) ("speculation
that another person might have committed the offense does not necessarily
raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused").
	In this case, the jury was presented with conflicting testimony.
Defendant's explanation of the retrieved stereo equipment and his conduct
on the night of the murder were contradicted by Marquis' testimony.
Marquis testified that his brother woke him up on the night of the murder.
At defendant's request, Marquis helped defendant carry stereo equipment
into the house. Marquis testified that defendant admitted that he stole the
equipment from Watson, but did not mention that he murdered Watson.
Marquis also identified the clothing taken from the house by the police as
defendant's, and testified that the clothing was worn by defendant on the
night of the murder. It is the jury's function to resolve the conflicts in the
evidence, which they did, against defendant. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d  at 332
(the jury "is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from
the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with
innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt"), citing
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	For these same reasons, we also reject defendant's arguments that
his alleged statement to the detective that "he was going to hell" and "going
to take everyone with him" was a misunderstanding and too ambiguous to
indicate responsibility, and that his incriminating statement to Officer Swain
was a misunderstanding and insufficient evidence of guilt because it is
improbable and unreasonable to believe that he confessed to the murder.
	Last, we address defendant's argument that jailhouse informants are
unreliable witnesses because they are motivated to fabricate evidence
against others in return for leniency and, thus, their testimony cannot be the
basis for his conviction. As an initial matter, though Scott testified that he
had hoped to receive leniency for his pending felony and misdemeanor
charges in return for his testimony against defendant at trial, there is no
evidence in the record that his hopes were fulfilled. Nonetheless, regarding
defendant's allegations that Scott's testimony is unreliable evidence of his
guilt, it is well settled that the "credibility of a government informant, as
with any other witness, is a question for the jury." Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 210, citing United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (7th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.
1989); People v. Irby, 237 Ill. App. 3d 38, 58-59 (1992). Regarding the
use of informants our Supreme Court has stated, "The established
safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his
testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury." Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 387, 87 S. Ct. 408, 418 (1966).
	In the present case, the jury heard opposing accounts from two
jailhouse informants and the defendant himself. The jury heard the
testimony of jailhouse informant Britton. Britton testified that Scott
fabricated his testimony. Further, defendant himself testified that Scott
fabricated his testimony. Conversely, however, the State impeached
Britton and presented testimony and evidence corroborating Scott's
testimony. For example, on cross-examination of defendant the jury heard
defendant admit to having "a lot of conversations" with Scott in the county
jail. Defendant further admitted telling Scott that he called Watson on the
night of the murder. Consistent with Scott's testimony, defendant's
clothing contained bleach. Consistent with Scott's testimony, the blood-tainted and bleached clothing allegedly worn by defendant matched the
clothing described by Scott. Consistent with Scott's testimony, the victim
had multiple stab wounds. Further, consistent with Scott's testimony, the
recovered stereo equipment matched the stolen items described by Scott.
The jury heard defendant's claims that Scott gathered his detailed
knowledge about the clothing worn by defendant from the newspaper, and
that by luck Scott made up facts that happened to be accurate, such as the
presence of bleach on defendant's clothing. On the issue of Scott's
credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
	Additionally, we disagree with defendant's assertion that his
conviction was "based upon" Scott's testimony. Certainly, Scott's
testimony was relevant; however, absent his testimony there was certainly
substantial evidence to sustain defendant's conviction.
	For the aforementioned reasons, we cannot say that the evidence of
guilt was so improbable, unsatisfactory, or unreasonable that no rational
fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. Substitution of Judge
	Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for a substitution of judge. Defendant asserts that he was entitled to an
automatic order of substitution pursuant to section 114-5(a) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides:
			"(a) Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant
has been placed on the trial call of a judge the defendant may
move the court in writing for a substitution of that judge on the
ground that such judge is so prejudiced against him that he
cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the
court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to
another judge not named in the motion." 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a)
(West 2002).
	Under the statute, a motion for substitution must be granted if the
defendant satisfies five criteria: (1) the motion is timely filed; (2) the motion
names only one judge unless the defendant is charged with a Class X
felony; (3) the motion is made in writing; (4) the motion alleges that the
trial judge is prejudiced against the defendant such that the defendant
cannot receive a fair trial; and (5) the motion is made before any
substantive rulings in the case. People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481, 487-88 (1999). The instant case concerns the timeliness of defendant's motion
to substitute.
	As an initial matter, because section 114-5(a) involves defendant's
right to a fair trial, a right of a constitutional dimension, " 'the provisions of
the statute are to be construed liberally.' " McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d  at 488,
quoting People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 480 (1988). A liberal
construction of the statute, however, does not mean that a motion will be
considered to have been timely filed in all cases. The statute provides that
motions for substitution must be filed within 10 days after a cause has been
placed on the trial call of a judge. 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2002).
The commencement of this 10-day period, however, is not uniform. This
is true because the assignment of judges to a cause varies in Illinois. In
McDuffee, this court discussed the practice of judicial assignments:
			"In Illinois, there is no statute or supreme court rule which
requires that the assignment of judges be made in a formal,
written fashion. Indeed, in some judicial circuits, '[i]t is the
customary, if not the daily, practice for circuit judges and
associate judges to be assigned specific cases, or even
transferred to different counties by personal or oral telephone
assignments. [Citation.]' The procedures for assigning judges
vary from circuit court to circuit court, and the rules of a given
circuit court may not require formal judicial assignment orders in
all cases. [Citations.]" McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d  at 489-90.
	Because assignments are not uniform, courts examine timeliness using
the "charged with knowledge" test. Under this test, a motion is timely if it
is filed within 10 days of when a defendant could be "charged with
knowledge" that the judge has been assigned to his or her case.
McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d  at 490. This examination is case specific and
depends upon the record presented in each case. See McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d  at 490.
	Here, a review of the record shows that defendant's motion for
substitution was untimely and, therefore, properly denied. Defendant was
charged by information on May 11, 1999. Subsequently, the case was
assigned to Judge Greanias as a "felony A" assignment. On 12 separate
days, between June 1, 1999, and May 15, 2000, defendant appeared
before Judge Greanias in courtroom 3A. Subsequently, on January 6,
2000, defendant appeared before Judge Greanias in courtroom 3A to
discuss the matter of continuances. At that time, Judge Greanias urged
both sides to move the case along and set a special status date to monitor
trial readiness. Pursuant to the January 6, 2000, order, on February 10,
2000, the parties reappeared and defense counsel informed the court that
he required more time to prepare for trial. Judge Greanias responded:
			"I would like to pick a date for the trial even if it's in May,
and we can all work toward that and plan our absences and
things like that around it.
* * *
			*** Now, your attorneys have indicated that it will be-they
need until May to prepare for a trial.
			Shall we set this for the first day of the first week of the Jury
Term, May 15?"
	The parties agreed to the May 15 trial date, and the docket statement
notes: "Case is set for jury trial on May 15, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. in
courtroom 3A." On May 15, 2000, the parties appeared before Judge
Greanias and were informed by the court that the trial would commence
at 9:30 a.m. Defense counsel responded to Judge Greanias with a motion
for substitution of judge. Judge Greanias denied the motion:
			"We have two felony calenders, an A and a B. By
administrative orders that are entered in this court, the Felony A
Calendar is assigned to me. At the present time, those cases are
picked by computer. *** All of the cases that are on my
calender, I try, if possible. This Court takes care of all the pretrial
proceedings. It is true that, on the day of trial, we do multiple
booking of cases, and if this Court has more trials to commence
than one on a day, it will assign it to another judge, if a judge is
available."
	The case proceeded to trial, and after trial in his posttrial motion
defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
substitute Judge Greanias. Defense counsel argued that in Macon County
the parties are not apprised of who will preside over a case until the day
of trial. To support his position, defense counsel discussed Macon
County's two calendar system for felony trials, and referred to Judge
Greanias' order denying the motion as evidence that cases are not
assigned until the day of trial. Particularly, defense counsel claimed that the
possibility of reassignment due to administrative conflicts made it
impossible to know the trial judge until the day of trial; therefore, the 10-day period cannot begin until the day of trial. Judge Greanias denied the
motion, and in his written order provided:
			"On the first day of trial, May 15, 2000, defendant filed a
section 114-5(a) motion for substitution of judge naming Circuit
Judge John K. Greanias. The motion was denied on the basis
that it was untimely. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in
People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481 (1999), the test for
calculating the 10-day period set forth in section 114-5(a) does
not depend upon the existence of a formally executed assignment
order. The 10-day period commences with the date on which the
defendant could be 'charged with knowledge' that the judge at
issue had been assigned to the case.
			On January 6, 2000, the defendant and his attorney were
present for a hearing with Judge Greanias. The Court and
counsel discussed trial preparations, and the Court set the case
for a 'special status date' on February 10, 2000. The 'special
status date' was not a routine docket call. It is clear in the record
that the February 10 hearing was a trial call proceeding for final
scheduling by the judge and public defenders who were assigned
to participate in the trial of this capital case. The defendant was
present at the February 10 pretrial proceeding. He and his
attorneys actively participated in the final trial arrangements with
the [sic] Judge Greanias. At the February 10 pretrial proceeding
Judge Greanias stated: 'I would like to pick a date for the trial
even if it's May and we can all try to work toward that and plan
our absences and things like that around it.' It is evident that on
February 10 the defendant and his attorneys were aware that
Judge Greanias was the assigned judge, and that he was
reserving a special date on his calender for this capital case to
ensure that he would be available for the trial.
			The defendant's contention that he did not know that his
capital case had a trial judge assigned until the day of trial is
contrary to the record. The Court finds that as of February 10,
2000, the defendant is charged with knowledge that his case was
on the trial call of Judge Greanias."
	We agree. On February 10, 2000, Judge Greanias and counsel for
the State and defendant selected a date for trial to accommodate the
schedules of all those involved and to avoid potential scheduling conflicts.
Defendant had appeared before Judge Greanias on twelve separate times
before the cause was set for trial, and it is evident from the discussion that
occurred on February 10, 2000, that the matter was to be tried before
Judge Greanias. We reject defendant's assertion that in Macon County a
defendant charged with a felony is generally not apprised of a trial judge
until the day of trial. Circuit courts must assure timely trials, and with this
assurance comes obvious administrative concerns and constraints. Macon
County's two felony calendar system is an administrative system designed
to assure timely trials and to address inevitable instances of scheduling
conflicts. The mere possibility that a case may be assigned to another
judge because of a scheduling conflict does not mean that the case was
not assigned to the judge in the first instance. In this case, the record
demonstrates that on February 10, 2000, defendant was apprised that
Judge Greanias would preside over the trial. Defendant's motion for
substitution was not timely and, therefore, properly denied.

III. Strickland
	Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in two instances.
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
object to the admission of Officer Swain's testimony that defendant told
him, "I come up here a lot, and I'll be here for a long time. I stabbed that
guy." Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective because he
failed to object to the admission of Britton's statement, offered by the
State for impeachment purposes, that defendant said he would "kill his
grandmother" for helping the police. Defendant asserts that the statements
constituted evidence of other crimes, and that his counsel's failure to
object or move to redact the statements denied him a fair trial.
Alternatively, defendant argues that the assistant State's Attorney was
obligated to redact the statements.
	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant
must prove that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense in that absent counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 694,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064, 2068; People v. Evans,
186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). Under the first Strickland prong, defendant
must demonstrate that his attorney's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 201
(1988); see also People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92 (1984)
("Effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect
representation"). Regarding the second Strickland prong, a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome-or put another way, that
counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable
or fundamentally unfair. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). A
reasonable probability of a different result is not merely a possibility of a
different result. People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90, 106 (1993), quoting
People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 129-30 (1988). To prevail, a defendant
must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.
People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 487 (1996).
	Turning to defendant's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
generally the admission of other-crimes evidence to demonstrate a
defendant's propensity to commit crime is prohibited. People v. Nieves,
193 Ill. 2d 513, 529 (2000). However, it is not reversible error if
defendant is not prejudiced or denied a fair trial by the admission of the
evidence. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d  at 530. In Nieves, the assistant State's
Attorney read to the jury a portion of the defendant's court-reported
statement that included a reference to the defendant's participation in
"other incidents." Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the reference to "other incidents" lacked probative value and
constituted evidence of other crimes. We held that the admission was
improper, but that it did not warrant reversal. Specifically, we held: "[A]ny
prejudicial effect that may have been produced by this one isolated and
cryptic reference to defendant's criminal activity in New York was
overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt-most
notably, his own uncontested statement." Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d  at 530; see
also Towns, 157 Ill. 2d  at 106 (rejecting defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
introduction of the remarks, " 'I would go back to jail' " and " 'I can't go
back to jail' ").
	Similarly, the admission of defendant's isolated and cryptic statement
did not deny defendant a fair trial. The statement was brief and
nonspecific, and certainly overshadowed by extensive evidence of
defendant's guilt. Further, we find that defendant's claim does not satisfy
the performance prong under Strickland. Defense counsel's failure to
object to testimony may be a matter of sound trial strategy, and does not
necessarily establish deficient performance. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 478-79 (2003); see also People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 13
(1991) ("As a general rule, trial strategy encompasses decisions such as
what matters to object to and when to object"). At trial, defendant argued
that Officer Swain was mistaken and that defendant never made the
alleged statement to Officer Swain. It is highly possible that defense
counsel allowed the statement to pass without objecting to diffuse its
importance, rather than object and draw further attention to the statement.
This possibility seems more likely when considering that at trial defendant
maintained that the statement was fabricated. Therefore, because
defendant does not satisfy both Strickland requirements, his claim fails.
	Turning to defendant's second Strickland claim, defendant contends
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to a statement
read and submitted to the jury by the State. For impeachment purposes,
the State read defense witness Britton's written statement. In this
statement, Britton told the police of his discussion with defendant wherein
defendant said when he prevailed in this case he was "gonna kill his
grandmother" because she helped the police in the murder investigation.
Defendant argues that the admission of this statement permitted the jury
to conclude that he was guilty because he said he would kill his
grandmother.
	As an initial matter, the admission of testimony regarding defendant's
threats was not error and could have been considered by the jury as
evidence of defendant's guilt; therefore, counsel was not deficient for
failing to object. The statement was relevant to demonstrate defendant's
consciousness of guilt. See People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 108 (1990)
(testimony that defendant threatened to kill his co-conspirators was
relevant to show defendant's consciousness of guilt); People v. Turner,
128 Ill. 2d 540 (1989) (it was not plain error to admit testimony that
defendant told his cell mate he would kill anyone who interfered with his
escape); People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (1979) (evidence that
defendant attempted to kill a witness was relevant to show consciousness
of guilt). More importantly, however, we reject defendants claim of error
because Britton's statement was not entered substantively. The statement
was admitted for impeachment purposes, and the jury was properly
instructed of this purpose.

IV. Closing Arguments
	Last, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the assistant
State's Attorney's remarks during rebuttal argument. In rebuttal, the
prosecutor began with the following statement:
		"Now, the Defendant talks about tunnel vision. And you see
there's certain words, catch phrases, defense attorneys can draw
on when they address juries, and when O.J. Simpson had his
difficulties, we all know the magic words. 'Rush to judgment.'
And, then, for months afterwards, every attorney gets up and
tells the Jury, 'It's a rush to judgment.' Well O.J. is old. He's still
playing golf, and, now, you use 'tunnel vision.' "
	Defendant maintains that the clear implication from this argument is
that, like O.J. Simpson, defendant is guilty and, unlike O.J. Simpson,
defendant should not escape justice. Put another way, the acquittal of
defendant would be no different from the acquittal of O.J. Simpson.
Defendant further maintains that by this statement the prosecutor
compared defendant's attorney to the attorneys in the O.J. Simpson case
in order to suggest that defendant's attorney was trying to win unfairly.
Defendant maintains that this constitutes reversible prejudice because the
jury may have focused upon concerns raised following the O.J. Simpson
case, rather than the particular facts of his case. Particularly, defendant
asserts that the comments implied that the defendant's "smoke and mirror"
defense was illegitimate and that the jury should disregard this defense and
convict defendant to avoid the ridicule accompanying an acquittal.
	The State first argues that the issue is waived. Defendant's attorney
failed to object to these comments at trial and further failed to raise the
issue in his posttrial motion. Nonetheless, on the merits of the issue, the
State argues that while the reference to O.J. Simpson may have been
inappropriate, defendant overstates the impact that the statement may
have had on the jury. The State posits that the statement was not an attack
on defense counsel, but rather a response to defense counsel's theme
phrase during closing statements that the police and prosecution had
"tunnel vision" and failed to do a thorough investigation or investigate other
suspects. Therefore, according to the State, the statement in its proper
context did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
	Defendant concedes that he failed to properly preserve this issue for
appeal. He requests, however, that we consider the issue under the plain
error exception to the waiver rule. Courts of review may consider a
waived error under the plain error doctrine in two circumstances, where
the evidence is closely balanced and where the error is of such magnitude
that it denied the accused of a fair and impartial trial. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a);
People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1995). The accused is denied a fair
and impartial trial where the prejudice reveals a total breakdown in the
integrity of the judicial process. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17. We find that this
issue does not present an appropriate circumstance in which to relax the
waiver rule and consider the issue on its merits.
	As already discussed, the State presented a strong case. The State
presented witnesses who testified that defendant made repeated attempts
to contact Watson on the night of the murder, in addition to Watson's own
statement prior to his murder that he was going to meet defendant. The
State presented witnesses who testified that defendant made inculpatory
statements, and introduced evidence concerning defendant's continually
evolving statements to the police as he was confronted with evidence that
contradicted his statements. The State introduced evidence of the
Watson's stab wounds, and highlighted the unexplained cut on defendant's
finger observed the day after the murder. The State further introduced
evidence stolen from Watson's car and retrieved from defendant's home,
in addition to defendant's bloodstained clothing gathered from his home
that contained a DNA profile consistent with Watson's DNA profile. The
evidence, therefore, was not closely balanced.
	While the prosecutor's comments were ill-advised, they do not
constitute reversible error. Generally, prosecutors have wide latitude in the
content of their closing arguments. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d  at 346; People v.
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 48 (1998). Statements must be considered in the
context of the closing arguments as a whole (Macri, 185 Ill. 2d at 48),
and counsel may comment upon defense characterizations of the evidence
or case (People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 252 (1993)). Further, in the
context of rebuttal argument, "when defense counsel provokes a response,
the defendant cannot complain that the prosecutor's reply denied him a
fair trial." People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 445 (1993); see also Hall,
194 Ill. 2d  at 346 (prosecutors may respond when defense comments
clearly invite a response); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1996)
("Because the comments were invited, they cannot be relied upon as error
on appeal"); see also People v. Pearson, 52 Ill. 2d 260 (1972) (courts
must consider closing argument as a whole and should not focus on
selective phrases or remarks). A reviewing court will find reversible error
based upon improper comments during closing arguments only "if a
defendant can identify remarks of the prosecutor that were both improper
and so prejudicial that 'real justice [was] denied or that the verdict of the
jury may have resulted from the error.' " Jones, 156 Ill. 2d  at 247-48,
quoting People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533 (1983); see also Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 18.
	In this case, the prosecutor's remarks were not made to compare
defendant to O.J. Simpson, but were comments in response to defense
counsel's theme during closing argument. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 207 (Minn. 2002) (prosecutor's comparison to O.J.
Simpson did not warrant a new trial); Perdomo v. State, 829 So. 2d 280, 281 n.1 (Fla. App. 2002) (the prosecutor's ill-advised statements
concerning O.J. Simpson did not constitute reversible error); Shelling v.
State, 52 S.W.3d 213, 217-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (the
prosecutor's brief mention of the Simpson case as an example of a
circumstantial case did not affect the verdict or warrant reversal of the
conviction); State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 845-46 (La. 1999) (the
court deferring to the "good sense and fairmindedness of jurors" held that
the prosecutor's comparison of the defendant to O.J. Simpson "[getting]
away with murder" did not influence the verdict); State v. Thompson,
578 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Minn. 1998) (holding that "the evidence of guilt
is so overwhelming that a simple review of the facts substantiated by the
evidence spins out a web of guilt more persuasive than anything that could
be added through the prosecutor's inappropriate [statements concerning
O.J. Simpson]"); State v. Jones, 320 S.C. 555, 557-58, 466 S.E.2d 733, 754 (App. 1996) (the State's improper reference to O.J. Simpson
did not materially prejudice defendant such that a new trial was
warranted). Accordingly, waiver aside, the challenged remarks were not
so improper and so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the
verdict of the jury may have resulted from the alleged error.

CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction.
Affirmed.