Title: Summers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM GREGORY 
SUMMERS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 161, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr.A. No. IK97-10-0448 thru 
§                              0454 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 26, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   October 10, 2002 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of October 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William Gregory Summers, filed an 
appeal from the Superior Court’s March 5, 2002 order denying his motion 
for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment 
of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
 
2
Summers’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and 
AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In January 1999, Summers was found guilty at a Superior Court 
bench trial of Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, and 
Misdemeanor Theft.  Thereafter, the State of Delaware filed a motion to 
have Summers declared an habitual offender.3  Following a hearing, the 
Superior Court granted the State’s motion and sentenced Summers to life 
imprisonment.   
 
(3) 
On direct appeal to this Court, Summers claimed that the 
Superior Court erred in sentencing him pursuant to the habitual offender 
statute, the statute was unconstitutionally disproportionate, and the sentence 
for misdemeanor theft was incorrect.  This Court affirmed as to Summers’ 
first two claims, but held that the separate sentence for misdemeanor theft 
was imposed in error and ordered that conviction and sentence be stricken.4  
The matter was then remanded to the Superior Court for correction of 
Summers’ sentence. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1The Superior Court adopted the commissioner’s January 28, 2002 report and 
recommendation.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 512(b). 
2SUPR. CT. R. 25(a). 
3DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(b). 
4Summers v. State, Del. Supr., No. 563, 1999, Walsh, J. (Sept. 15, 2000). 
 
3
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Summers claims that: a) his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress, conduct 
an adequate investigation and subpoena witnesses for trial; and b) the 
Superior Court erroneously determined that the claims made in his 
postconviction motion were procedurally barred.  To the extent Summers 
has not argued other claims that were raised in his postconviction motion, 
those claims are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed by this Court.5   
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Summers must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.6  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”7 
                                                          
 
5Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  Summers argued in the Superior 
Court that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his robbery 
conviction; the State permitted false testimony to be presented at trial; the State failed to 
produce any physical evidence of the crimes and failed to call the officer who took the 
statement from the victim to testify at trial; and his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by refusing to file the pretrial motions he requested and coercing him into 
entering a guilty plea. 
6Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
4
 
(6) 
Summers’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
without merit.  We have reviewed the trial transcript and there is no 
evidence that Summers’ counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness or that any alleged errors by his counsel 
prejudiced him.  
 
(7) 
Summers’ claim that the Superior Court erred by determining 
that his claims were procedurally barred is also without merit.  The Superior 
Court correctly determined that Summers’ ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims did not reflect a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or 
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction8 and, on 
that basis, found his claims to be procedurally barred.9 
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Summers’ opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
                                                          
 
8SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
9SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
 
5
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice