Title: State v. Brown

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 111,166 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANTONIO M. BROWN, SR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Police are free to interview a suspect who is in custody after the suspect waives 
Miranda rights. But if a suspect invokes one or more of those rights, such as the right to 
counsel, an interview must end. A suspect is not subject to further questioning until 
counsel has been made available—unless the suspect initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with police. 
 
2. 
To determine whether a suspect waived a previously asserted right to counsel, a 
court must determine the suspect:  (a) initiated further discussion with police and (b) 
knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right.  
 
3. 
When challenged, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
statements made in a custodial interview were voluntary. Voluntariness is assessed by 
examining the totality of the circumstances, including:  (a) defendant's mental condition; 
(b) the manner and duration of the interview; (c) defendant's ability to communicate on 
request with the outside world; (d) defendant's age, intellect, and background; (e) the 
2 
 
 
 
officers' fairness in conducting the interview; and (f) defendant's fluency with the English 
language. Any one factor or a combination of factors may inevitably lead to a conclusion 
that under the totality of the circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the 
statements were not a free and voluntary act. 
 
4. 
Whether a suspect should be re-Mirandized after a waiver is a question of law an 
appellate court resolves by considering the totality of the circumstances. 
 
5. 
The 2013 amendments made in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d) and (e) eliminated 
lesser included offenses of felony murder and expressly provided for retroactive 
application to cases pending on appeal on and after its effective date. The amendment's 
retroactive application does not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 
6. 
There is no federal constitutional requirement that a jury be instructed on lesser 
included offenses not recognized as such by state law. 
 
7. 
Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which declares, "The right of 
trial by jury shall be inviolate," applies no further than to give the right of such trial upon 
issues of fact so tried at common law. 
 
8. 
A defendant has a right under Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
to have a jury determine his guilt of the charged crime in a felony prosecution. But 
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determining what further crimes upon which the jury should be instructed as lesser 
included offenses is a matter of law for the court. 
 
9. 
The elements constituting the crime of interference with law enforcement under 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) are:  (a) an identified law enforcement officer carrying 
out some official duty, (b) defendant knowingly and willfully obstructing or opposing the 
officer, and (c) defendant knew or should have known the person opposed was a law 
enforcement officer. 
 
10. 
Under the facts of this case, the jury's finding that the 14-month-old child abuse 
victim was particularly vulnerable because of age was a substantial and compelling 
reason to impose upward departure sentences for child abuse convictions. 
 
Appeal from Saline District Court; RENE S. YOUNG, judge. Opinion filed January 20, 2017. 
Affirmed. 
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defendant Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Ellen H. Mitchell, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was 
with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Antonio Brown was convicted of felony murder, two counts of child 
abuse, and one count of interference with a law enforcement officer. Brown argues his 
convictions must be reversed because (1) the district court admitted statements he gave to 
4 
 
 
 
police after he claimed he invoked his right to counsel and the statements were 
involuntary; (2) the district court failed to give lesser included offense instructions on the 
felony-murder charge; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of 
interference with a law enforcement officer. Brown further challenges the upward 
departure sentences imposed for the two child abuse convictions, arguing they were not 
justified by substantial and compelling reasons. We affirm.  
 
We hold Brown reinitiated his interview with police after his unsuccessful attempt 
to contact a lawyer and in doing so knowingly and intelligently waived his previously-
invoked right to counsel. Brown's subsequent inculpatory statements were freely and 
voluntarily given. 
 
We hold further that the district court properly refused to give lesser included 
offense instructions for the felony-murder charge. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402(d), (e) 
(no lesser included offenses of felony murder; provision retroactive to all pending cases); 
State v. Love, No. 112,611, this day decided (statutory elimination of lesser included 
offenses of felony murder does not violate due process or the right to jury trial as 
guaranteed by Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights); State v. Todd, 299 
Kan. 263, 277-79, 323 P.3d 829 (2014) (retroactive abolition of lesser included offenses 
does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause).  
 
We hold there was sufficient evidence to support Brown's conviction of 
interference with a law enforcement officer, based upon his failure to come out from 
hiding in a basement when instructed to do so by police. 
 
Finally, under the facts of this case, we hold there were substantial and compelling 
reasons to impose upward departure sentences for the child abuse convictions because a 
14-month-old victim was particularly vulnerable due to his age. 
5 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Beginning in late September 2011, Brown cared for 14-month-old Clayden 
Urbanek, while the child's mother, Brittney Betzold, was at work.  
 
On October 4, Brown called Betzold's workplace and asked to talk to her about 
Clayden. The person who took the call said Brown seemed panicked and emotional. 
When Betzold arrived home, she found Clayden in a bedroom. He was awake but could 
not move his legs or arms. Brown told her Clayden took a hard fall from the couch and 
got a concussion. When Betzold said she was going to call 911, Brown left the house. He 
later called Clayden's father and volunteered that he did not hit Clayden and would never 
harm him.  
 
When emergency personnel arrived, they found Clayden extremely pale with a 
distended abdomen, no pulse, and not breathing. Emergency room physicians transferred 
him to Wichita, where he underwent surgery for his abdominal injuries. He died shortly 
after the procedure. 
 
Due to the extensive injuries, police investigated and charged Brown with felony 
murder, two counts of child abuse, and one count of interference with a law enforcement 
officer. The first child abuse charge related to incidents alleged to have occurred between 
September 26 and October 3, 2011. The second for incidents alleged on October 4. 
Brown was tried and convicted of all charges.  
 
At a separate sentencing hearing, the jury found unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there were aggravating factors associated with the child abuse 
charges. The jury returned verdicts finding four aggravating factors for the first count and 
6 
 
 
 
three for the second. Based on those findings, the district court imposed departure 
sentences of double the presumptive sentences for each child abuse conviction. This is 
Brown's direct appeal. 
 
Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4) (life sentence 
imposed; defendant convicted of off-grid crime). 
 
BROWN'S STATEMENTS TO POLICE 
 
Brown argues inculpatory statements he made to police should have been 
suppressed because he claims:  (1) The officers violated his Miranda rights by failing to 
honor his request for counsel, (2) the statements were not voluntary, and (3) officers 
failed to read him the Miranda rights after every break in the questioning. The district 
court denied a motion to suppress prior to trial. We agree with the district court. 
 
Additional facts 
 
Police took Brown into custody around 7 p.m. on October 4, 2011. At about 8 
p.m., two investigators began a recorded interview. Brown read, initialed, and signed a 
form, confirming that he understood he had the right to remain silent, that his statements 
could be used against him in court, that he had a right to have an attorney present, and 
that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. While he was 
completing the form, Brown asked about the right to counsel.   
 
He said he had a lawyer in a prior case but did not know if that person was still his 
lawyer or if the lawyer should be present. Brown asked if he could call his roommate to 
have him get in touch with the lawyer to see if Brown needed to have an attorney present 
for the questioning. An investigator told Brown they would discuss that after finishing the 
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waiver form. Brown responded it did not matter because he would still talk to the 
officers. 
 
As the investigators were witnessing the form's execution, Brown again 
volunteered, "Actually it doesn't matter because I have nothing to hide." An investigator 
began to respond, "Well I want to clarify a couple of . . . ." 
 
The remainder of this sentence and any response appear to be edited from the 
video included with the appellate record because the video immediately jumps to the 
following exchange: 
 
"Brown:  I can't afford an attorney right now. 
 
"Investigator #1:  OK. 
 
"Brown:  Well I don't have the money in my pocket but my roommate, you 
know, he's been helping me, you know, on my last case. He was involved in it. 
But he helps me kind of financially, you know, to help with my lawyer. And he 
would, you know, we both have the same lawyer and that's the only reason I need 
to, you know, ask him. 
 
"Investigator #1:  I understand that. Can't really go through that route. What I 
could do is I can afford you the opportunity for a phone book and a phone to be 
able to call but going through your roommate is not going to happen.   
 
"Brown:  How about my fiancé?  
 
"Investigator #1:  That I can't do.   
 
"Brown:  That's fine. That's fine. Like I said I'm not worried about it.  
 
8 
 
 
 
"Investigator #1:  OK. But I can afford you the opportunity to you know call your 
attorney via the phone I have no problems with that. 
 
"Brown:  Like I said I don't know if he's still my attorney well because I took off 
on parole you know and I don't know if that drops the whole fuckin' case? I mean 
I don't know?  
 
"Investigator #2:  We can't answer that for you.   
 
"Brown:  I mean I don't know.  Do you mind if I call him? You guys can sit here 
and . . . . 
 
"Investigator #1:  Yeah, go right ahead.  
  
"Brown:  Like I said I don't have nothing to hide so it don't matter to me. So but  
. . . . 
 
"Investigator #1:  Yeah, go right ahead." 
 
Both investigators assisted Brown in locating the attorney's telephone number. 
Brown tried unsuccessfully to reach the attorney at two different numbers. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
 
"Investigator #1:  No answer? 
 
"Brown:  No [inaudible].   
 
"Investigator #1:  Well, um . . . . 
 
"Brown:  Um I understand what's going on. You know what I'm saying. I 
understand fully what's going on. 
 
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"Investigator #1:  Right. OK. 
 
"Brown:  You know I mean this . . . . 
 
"Investigator #2:  Our goal is to figure out the situation. 
 
"Brown:  Yeah. I'll—I'll—I'll talk . . . . 
 
"Investigator #1:  Without the presence of attorneys? 
 
"Brown:  Yes sir, yes sir, yes sir. Like I said I have nothing to hide, you know. 
  
"Investigator #1:  OK." 
 
The investigators proceeded to interview Brown until about 2 a.m., during which 
time he made incriminating statements. He admitted he was the only person watching 
Clayden during the day for the last week and a half. He conceded he had a bad temper, 
was strict, and a little mean. But he also said he would not hurt Clayden. He disclosed he 
had been upset with the child, but not to the point of hurting him, and sometimes grabbed 
him in a way that scared Betzold. He admitted spanking the child with a wooden paddle 
the Friday before the child died because he was not listening to Betzold, being 
"obnoxious," and getting into everything. He said he knew he had put bruises on 
Clayden's buttocks. 
 
Brown told investigators Clayden's fatal injuries happened when he fell off the 
couch and hit his head on the carpet. But he insisted he did not kill the child and denied 
hitting him on the head, face, or stomach. He said he did not know what happened to 
Clayden's stomach. Brown could not explain the injuries when confronted with the 
investigators' claim they could not have been caused by a fall. He admitted only he or 
Betzold could have killed the child and conceded the circumstances did not look good for 
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him, while maintaining he did not do it. At one point, Brown said his answers "probably 
seem[] like some bullshit." 
 
Brown also admitted he was aware of the bruises on Clayden's face, buttocks, and 
side. But he offered innocent explanations for some, e.g., the child fell and hit his head on 
a baby wipe container, or Brown squeezed his mouth to retrieve objects the child had put 
in it. Brown said he took a video of Clayden playing and tripping so Betzold could see he 
did not treat Clayden "like shit," but accidentally deleted it. He also made disparaging 
remarks about the child, e.g., he was an "obnoxious little guy" and acted like a "little 
asshole." 
 
Brown had been in custody for about seven hours when the interview ended, 
although the interview itself lasted about six hours with three 15-35 minute breaks. 
Investigators provided Brown with water and coffee but no food because Brown said he 
had eaten earlier. They let Brown use the restroom. Investigators did not smell alcohol on 
Brown and said Brown did not fall asleep or nod off during questioning and appeared to 
understand the questions and answer them appropriately. Brown was 27 years old at the 
time and had been previously arrested numerous times. An investigator admitted he was 
unsure whether Brown graduated high school. Brown became emotional at times during 
the interview but never asked to stop the questioning. 
 
Brown moved to suppress the interview on the grounds he now raises on appeal. 
Following an evidentiary hearing and a review of the interview video, the district court 
addressed each basis asserted to support suppression and denied the motion. At trial, 
Brown preserved his arguments by timely objecting to his interview's audio recording. 
 
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Standard of review 
 
On review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, factual findings 
are reviewed for substantial competent evidence. Legal conclusions drawn from those 
facts are reviewed de novo. See State v. Cline, 295 Kan. 104, 113, 283 P.3d 194 (2012) 
(reviewing trial court's decision that interview statement was made freely, voluntarily, 
and intelligently); State v Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1038, 221 P.3d 525 (2009) (reviewing 
trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to invoke right to attorney for assistance in 
custodial interview). 
 
Alleged denial of right to counsel 
 
Police are free to interview a suspect who is in custody after the suspect waives 
Miranda rights. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. 
Ed. 2d 362 (1994). But if the suspect invokes one or more of those rights, such as the 
right to counsel, the interview must end. A suspect who has invoked the right to counsel 
is not subject to further questioning until counsel has been made available—unless the 
suspect initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 512 
U.S. at 458 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 
2d 378 [1981]); see also State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 946, 80 P.3d 1132 (2003). 
 
In their briefs, the parties appear to agree Brown invoked the right to counsel 
when he asked to call his lawyer. But at oral arguments, the State maintained Brown did 
not invoke the right to counsel. We do not believe this position has merit. Brown 
unequivocally expressed his desire for the assistance of counsel when he attempted to call 
an attorney from the interview room after receiving the Miranda warnings. See Abela v. 
Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (suspect invoked right to counsel by telling 
officers "maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William Evans," and showing 
12 
 
 
 
them the attorney's business card); United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 752 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (suspect invoked right to counsel by asking to call his attorney); United States 
v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (suspect invoked right to counsel when, upon 
being given opportunity to make a telephone call, suspect called information to get 
lawyer's number then called lawyer). 
 
The district court's ruling on this point is a little unclear because it noted Brown 
asked to contact an attorney who was representing him in another matter and found 
Brown "did not make an unequivocal request for counsel." To avoid mischaracterization, 
we quote the district court's ruling: 
 
"The court finds based upon the testimony of the officers and reviewing the 
videotape, that Mr. Brown was read his Miranda rights in the room prior to the interview. 
He was read those rights by [an investigator]. He then asked that the defendant read the 
first line of the Miranda rights form. And after he demonstrated [ ] that he could read, [an 
investigator] asked to read—read the remainder of that form and sign and initial, which 
the defendant did. 
 
"The defendant did ask to call a friend to see whether he needed an attorney or to 
get in contact with an attorney. That was not permitted by the officers. 
 
"The defendant did ask to contact Roger Struble who, apparently, represented 
him in another matter. And at that time the questioning stopped with the exception there 
was one question asking the defendant the name of his roommate. [The investigators] 
looked up Roger Struble's telephone number and that telephone number was provided to 
the defendant and the defendant was provided access to a telephone and the defendant 
was given the opportunity to attempt to contact Roger Struble who, apparently, was not 
available. He was then given the number—the 1-800 number to contact his attorney 
Roger Struble and, apparently, was unable to get in contact with Mr. Struble through a 1-
800 number. After not being able to contact Roger Struble, the defendant then reinitiated 
contact with the officers, and the videotape demonstrated that the decision to reinitiate 
13 
 
 
 
contact was defendant's decision. Neither officer pressured him, coerced him, or 
threatened him into speaking to them. And the defendant stated that he had nothing to 
hide, and the defendant began speaking to the officers. During the course of the entire 
interview the defendant at no additional time invoked his right to counsel or asked to 
terminate the interview. 
 
"And the court finds that the defendant did not make an unequivocal request for 
counsel. And that after he did initially indicate that he asked to speak with Roger Struble, 
he chose to reinitiate contact with law enforcement, so the court is going to find that the 
defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment Constitutional right to counsel." 
 
It is clear to us that, despite the mention of an unequivocal request for counsel, the 
district court ultimately viewed the circumstances correctly and focused on the real 
question—whether Brown reinitiated the questioning.  
 
To determine whether a suspect to whom a lawyer has not been made available 
has waived a previously-asserted right to counsel, a court must determine "whether the 
accused (1) initiated further discussions with police and (2) knowingly and intelligently 
waived the previously asserted right." Walker, 276 Kan. at 947; see Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983). The parties' arguments 
focus on the first prong of the test—whether Brown initiated the post-invocation 
conversation with the investigators. 
 
A suspect who previously invoked his right to counsel initiates further 
conversation about an investigation when his statements can be "fairly said to represent a 
desire . . . to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 
investigation." Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045. On the other hand, "inquiries or statements, 
by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial 
relationship, will not generally 'initiate' a conversation in the sense in which that word 
14 
 
 
 
was used in Edwards." 462 U.S. at 1045. Moreover, "a valid[, post-request] waiver 
cannot be established by showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation . . . ." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Whether a suspect's 
statement indicated a desire to reinitiate discussion turns on "both the content and 
context" of the statement when "viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer         
. . . ." United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 
As shown in the quoted interview extract, after Brown unsuccessfully attempted to 
contact Struble, he immediately indicated he understood "fully" his rights and the 
interview protocol, would talk without an attorney present, and had "nothing to hide." 
Viewing this in light of Brown's numerous declarations that it did not matter if he reached 
the attorney, we hold that Brown reinitiated the questioning and in doing so knowingly 
and intelligently waived the previously-asserted right to counsel.  
 
Voluntariness of the statements 
 
Brown next argues his statements must be suppressed because they were 
involuntary. The district court addressed each relevant factor associated with 
voluntariness and denied suppression. It stated, "after considering the totality of the 
circumstances, [the court] finds that the defendant's statements made—were freely and 
voluntarily made and the product of his own free will." 
 
When challenged, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
statements made in a custodial interview were voluntary. See State v. Betancourt, 301 
Kan. 282, 290, 342 P.3d 916 (2015). Voluntariness is assessed by examining the totality 
of the circumstances, including:  (1) defendant's mental condition; (2) the manner and 
duration of the interview; (3) defendant's ability to communicate on request with the 
outside world; (4) defendant's age, intellect and background; (5) the officers' fairness in 
15 
 
 
 
conducting the interview; and (6) defendant's fluency with the English language. "Any 
one factor or a combination of factors 'may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the 
totality of the circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not 
therefore a free and voluntary act.'" 301 Kan. at 290. 
 
There is little to support Brown's claim. The officers permitted him to 
communicate with the outside world by allowing him to call an attorney and helping him 
with that process. Though information on Brown's education is not in the record, he was 
27 years old at the time. He is fluent in English. He appeared on the interview recordings 
and to the officers to understand the questions asked and gave appropriate answers. He 
had prior experience with police, having been arrested a considerable number of times. 
There is no claim officers made any promises or threats. 
 
Brown focuses on three factors:  his own mental condition, the officers' fairness, 
and the interview's manner and duration. He argues the district court failed to give 
appropriate weight to the fact the officers asked emotionally charged questions and the 
interview's length. As to Brown's mental state and the officers' fairness, Brown argues he 
was "in tears" at times and "very emotional." He contends the officers appealed to his 
sentiments by using "emotionally charged questions" when accusing Brown of 
wrongdoing and lying; asking him if Clayden's father deserved an explanation about what 
happened; showing him pictures of the child; and telling him Clayden was dead and "not 
coming back." 
 
Showing the victim's photographs to a suspect "'is not inherently coercive police 
conduct.'" United States v. Sanchez, 614 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2010). Nor is urging a 
suspect to tell the truth. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 276, 173 P.3d 612 (2007). 
Importantly, Brown does not direct our attention to any caselaw supporting his argument 
16 
 
 
 
that the officers' actions were coercive or that his reaction renders his statements 
involuntary. 
 
In our 2007 Brown decision, defendant was charged with first-degree murder after 
a gang dispute and his conviction was supported by a confession. In determining whether 
the confession was voluntary, the court considered "emotional pressure" placed on 
defendant by asking him whether he wanted officers to tell his son he put a gang before 
him, and by telling him he was hurting his mother and his son by continuing to deny 
involvement. 285 Kan. at 275-76. The court construed the officers' statements as 
"basically asking [defendant] to tell the truth." 285 Kan. at 276. It explained the 
difference between permissible exhortations to tell the truth and coercive ones: 
 
"'"'"If [an extrajudicial confession] has been extorted by fear or induced by hope of profit, 
benefit, or amelioration, it will be excluded as involuntary. However, the advice or 
admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import either a threat or 
benefit, will not make a following confession incompetent."'" [Citations omitted.]' State 
v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 128, 977 P.2d 941 (1999)." 285 Kan. at 276. 
 
The Brown court concluded:  "The officers' statements regarding Brown's family 
were not an attempt to extort by fear; they were merely admonitions to be honest." 285 
Kan. at 276. 
 
As to emotional state, as challenged here, in United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 
503 (7th Cir. 1992), the suspect's crying during the interview was insufficient to 
demonstrate the confession was involuntary "absent a showing that her emotional distress 
was so profound as to impair her capacity for self-determination or understanding of what 
the police were seeking." No such display has been made in this case either. Brown's 
emotional outbursts constitute a small portion of the interview and do not depict Brown 
so distraught as to be incapable of understanding of the circumstances. 
17 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the interview's length, Brown was questioned for about six hours over 
the course of a seven-hour detention. This court has held a confession voluntary when the 
defendant's interview lasted just under five hours over the course of a 12-hour detention, 
during which time defendant was handcuffed to a table. See Brown, 285 Kan. at 273-74. 
And we have held a confession to be voluntary when defendant was in the interview 
room for almost 13 hours and subjected to questioning for about eight hours. State v. 
Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 597, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). 
 
We hold the officers' conduct, Brown's emotional state, and the length of the 
detention and questioning did not render Brown's confession involuntary. His statements 
to investigators were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. 
 
Renewed Miranda warnings 
 
Finally, Brown argues his statements should be suppressed because officers did 
not advise him of his Miranda rights after each break during the interview. He concedes 
this court has held this to be unnecessary. See State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 708, 207 
P.3d 208 (2009) ("[W]e have no trouble concluding as a matter of law that it was 
unnecessary to re-Mirandize [defendant] at the beginning of each portion of his 
interview.").   
 
Whether renewed Miranda warnings are necessary is a question of law this court 
answers by considering the totality of the circumstances. 288 Kan. at 706. One factor is 
"the time between the waiver and the statements sought to be suppressed." 288 Kan. at 
706-07. The Ransom court held two breaks—one 25 minutes long and another 45 minutes 
long—"did not put the later portions of the interview outside a reasonable time" from the 
initial Miranda warnings. 288 Kan. at 708. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited an 
18 
 
 
 
earlier case, which in turn observed that courts have permitted lengthy gaps of several 
hours, five hours, 11 ½ hours, and even an entire day between Miranda warnings and the 
challenged statements. See 288 Kan. at 707-08; State v. Mattox, 280 Kan. 473, 487-88, 
124 P.3d 6 (2005). But Brown argues because Miranda warnings serve such an important 
purpose, they should be given after every break as a matter of course. This court has 
rejected this argument: 
 
"'[O]nce the mandate of Miranda is complied with at the threshold of the interrogation by 
law enforcement officers, the warnings need not be repeated at the beginning of each 
successive interview. To adopt an automatic second warning system would be to add a 
perfunctory ritual to police procedures rather than provide the meaningful set of 
procedural safeguards envisioned by Miranda. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Boyle, 207 
Kan. 833, 841, 486 P.2d 849 (1971)." Mattox, 280 Kan. at 488. 
 
We hold that at no point between the initial Miranda warnings and the end of the 
interview did the length of time become unreasonable or otherwise make renewed 
warnings necessary. 
 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF FELONY MURDER 
 
Brown argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless and 
intentional second-degree murder as lesser included offenses of felony murder. The 
circumstances require additional explanation. 
 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1) and K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402(d) would have 
prohibited giving Brown's requested instruction because by statute there are no lesser 
degrees of felony murder, although those statutes were not in effect when Brown 
committed his crimes. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402(e) provides that the rule applies 
retroactively to matters pending when it was adopted—a class of cases to which Brown's 
19 
 
 
 
case belongs. He argues that the statutes should not control because:  (1) retroactive 
application of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402(d) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) the 
statutory elimination of lesser included offenses for felony murder violates due process; 
and (3) the statutes infringe on his right to a jury trial under Section 5 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. Our caselaw has already addressed these arguments.  
 
We rejected the Ex Post Facto claim in State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 278-79, 323 
P.3d 829 (2014). We continue to believe Todd correctly states the law and decline 
Brown's invitation to reverse it. See State v. Love, No. 112,611, this day decided. 
 
Brown's arguments that elimination of lesser included offenses for felony murder 
violates due process and the right to a jury trial under Section 5 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights also fail. We rejected identical challenges to the statutes in 
Love, slip op. at 26. Brown's federal due process claim fails because there is no federal 
constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on offenses not recognized by state 
law as lesser included offenses. Love, slip op. at 23; cf. Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 
99, 118 S. Ct. 1895, 141 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1988) (no constitutional error occurred when in 
prosecution for capital crime trial court did not instruct jury on a lesser crime that the 
state supreme court had previously held was not a lesser included offense of the charged 
crime under state law). And the state constitutional argument fails because Section 5 
secures a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine guilt of the charged 
offense, and it "'applies no further than to give the right of such trial upon issues of fact 
so tried at common law . . . .'" Love, slip op. at 25 (quoting Hasty v. Pierpoint, 146 Kan. 
517, 519, 72 P.2d 69 [1937]). The challenged statutes do not infringe upon these rights 
because determining what additional crimes upon which the jury should be instructed as 
lesser included offenses is a matter of law for the court outside the scope of the jury's role 
as a factfinder. Love, slip op. at 26-27. 
 
20 
 
 
 
Because these constitutional attacks on K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1) and 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402(d) fail, the instructions as given are deemed legally 
appropriate. Brown has failed to demonstrate any error with the jury instructions. See 
State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 162, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (instructional error occurs 
when a district court refuses to give requested instruction that is legally appropriate and 
factually supported). 
 
INTERFERENCE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
Brown next argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for 
interference with law enforcement because it did not demonstrate he substantially 
hindered the officers. 
 
Additional facts 
 
Brown spent the afternoon of October 4 at Ana Heberly's house. When police 
arrived looking for Brown, Heberly let them in and said Brown was in the basement. 
Heberly's sister told officers Brown was in the crawl space or hiding behind a wall. Three 
officers entered the house. At the top of the basement stairs, an officer called out that they 
were Salina police and ordered Brown out of the basement. 
 
When Brown did not emerge, officers went into the basement. They thought 
Brown was in an area not accessible to them, so one officer radioed for a K-9 unit, while 
another looked around. When an officer moved a piece of clothing, Brown announced he 
was there and would cooperate, and he emerged from behind a ledge. He was taken into 
custody. 
 
21 
 
 
 
To support the charge of interference with law enforcement, an officer testified 
they were in the basement a total of five to ten minutes. The K-9 unit never arrived. 
Another officer testified Brown's hiding slowed their effort to locate and arrest him. But 
the State did not claim the officers had a warrant to arrest Brown. Even though they 
commanded Brown to surrender, there was no evidence that they advised him they were 
there to arrest him, or that they were there on suspicion that Brown had committed any 
particular crime. See K.S.A. 22-2401(c)(1) (officer may arrest a person when the officer 
has probable cause to believe the person committed a felony). 
 
The district court instructed the jury that it had to find:  (1) The officers were 
"discharging official duty, namely investigating the abuse of a child and felony murder of 
[Clayden];" (2) Brown "knowingly obstructed, resisted, or opposed [the officers] in 
discharging that official duty;" (3) Brown's acts "substantially hindered or increased the 
burden of the officers in the performance of the officers' official duty;" and (4) Brown 
"knew or should have known [the officers] were law enforcement officers." 
 
Standard of review 
 
 
"'"When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations." State v. Lloyd, 
299 Kan. 620, 632, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014).' State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 874, 348 P.3d 
583 (2015)." State v. Brown, 303 Kan. 995, 1001, 368 P.3d 1101 (2016). 
 
22 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
"Interference with law enforcement is . . . knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing 
any person authorized by law to serve process in the service or execution or in the 
attempt to serve or execute any writ, warrant, process or order of a court, or in the 
discharge of any official duty." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3). 
 
The offense's elements are:  (1) an identified law enforcement officer carrying out 
some official duty; (2) "defendant knowingly and willfully obstructed or opposed [the] 
officer; and (3) "defendant knew or should have known the person he opposed was a law 
enforcement officer." State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353, 364-65, 690 P.2d 1353 (1984). The 
question is whether the evidence established that Brown "obstructed or opposed" the 
officers. 
 
"[W]hether there has been an obstruction of official duty must depend upon the 
particular facts of each case . . . ." 236 Kan. at 364. "'[T]o obstruct is to interpose 
obstacles or impediments, to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent, and 
this term does not necessarily imply the employment of direct force, or the exercise of 
direct means.'" State v. Lee, 242 Kan. 38, 40, 744 P.2d 845 (1987). While actual force is 
not necessary, "[t]here must . . . be some actual overt act of obstruction." Parker, 236 
Kan. at 360. The crime encompasses both physical acts and oral statements. 236 Kan. at 
363. 
 
 
"'The statute does not limit the offense to resistance alone. It includes also willful 
acts of obstruction or opposition, and to obstruct is to interpose obstacles or impediments, 
to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent, and this term does not 
necessarily imply the employment of direct force, or the exercise of direct means. It 
includes any passive, indirect or circuitous impediments to the service or execution of 
process; such as hindering or preventing an officer by not opening a door. It may be 
stated as a general rule that under statutes containing the words "obstruct, resist, or 
23 
 
 
 
oppose," or the single word "resist," the offense of resisting an officer can be committed 
without the employment of actual violence or direct force.'" 236 Kan. at 361 (quoting 
State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 270-71, 303 P.2d 155 [1956]). 
 
The defendant's act "must have substantially hindered or increased the burden of 
the officer in carrying out his official duty." 236 Kan. at 364.  
 
"The principal purpose of criminalizing conduct that resists and obstructs officers 
in the performance of their duty is to protect officers from physical harm . . . . The 
statutes de-escalate the potential for violence which exists whenever a police officer 
encounters an individual in the line of duty, and the concern is not limited to the officer's 
safety but extends to all parties involved, including the prospective arrestee." 67 C.J.S., 
Obstructing Justice § 25. 
 
Brown argues the State failed to put on evidence sufficient to demonstrate he 
substantially hindered the officers. He focuses solely on the fact that he remained hiding 
in the basement for only five to ten minutes before he surrendered himself to the officers. 
Brown relies entirely on State v. Everest, 45 Kan. App. 2d 923, 256 P.3d 890 (2011), for 
the proposition that "[s]ubstantial hindrance is more than a few minutes." 
 
In Everest, defendant gave a false name during a traffic stop, so dispatch personnel 
were unable to locate records associated with defendant. The Court of Appeals held there 
was insufficient evidence to support conviction because the defendant's identity was 
quickly established when the officer discovered an identification card, which was "before 
[the] misidentification caused any substantial burden to [the officer]." 45 Kan. App. 2d at 
930. The State distinguishes Everest on its facts, arguing that giving a false name is 
different from hiding and refusing to appear. We agree.  
 
24 
 
 
 
We have held a person could not be guilty of obstruction of official duty when she 
fled the crime scene and failed to turn herself in to police. See Lee, 242 Kan. 38, Syl. ¶ 2. 
In that situation, there was "no officer whose official duty [the person] could obstruct." 
See Lee, 242 Kan. at 42 (defendant's flight and failure to turn herself in occurred before 
she was under investigation or charged with a crime). And we have held a person could 
not be guilty of obstruction of official duty when she merely refused to assist an officer in 
the execution of process. See State v. Hatfield, 213 Kan. 832, 518 P.2d 389 (1974) 
(defendant, who was outside her home, did not comply with sheriff's request that she let 
him in to serve order of protective custody on child believed to be inside). 
 
But in this case the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State shows 
Brown was hiding in the basement from officers who identified themselves and ordered 
him to come out. His failure to do so created an immediate safety issue for both the 
officers and Brown. And the officers had to engage in additional actions to address the 
heightened security concerns. 
 
Given the limitations of our standard of review and the purpose underlying the 
interference with law enforcement statute, we hold under these circumstances a rational 
factfinder could have concluded Brown's failure to emerge from hiding when called by 
police substantially hindered the officers. The evidence supports the conviction. 
 
AGGRAVATED SENTENCES FOR CHILD ABUSE 
 
Brown next argues his upward departure sentences for child abuse were not 
supported by substantial and compelling reasons and that the aggravated sentencing 
statute is unconstitutionally vague. Because we conclude Clayden's vulnerability due to 
his young age was a substantial and compelling reason to impose departure sentences for 
these crimes, we affirm the sentences and need not reach Brown's vagueness claim.  
25 
 
 
 
 
Additional facts 
 
Prior to trial, the State moved for departure sentences on both child abuse counts:  
the October 4 child abuse (Count 2), and the child abuse occurring between September 26 
and October 3 (Count 4). During the penalty phase, both parties waived the opportunity 
to present additional evidence to the jury. 
 
As to Count 2, the district court instructed the jury that the State alleged three 
aggravating factors:  (1) Clayden was particularly vulnerable due to age; (2) the crime 
involved a fiduciary relationship between Brown and the child; and (3) Brown failed to 
render aid as Clayden's medical condition declined. With regard to Count 4, the trial 
court instructed that the State alleged the same three aggravating factors, and, 
additionally, that Count 4 involved excessive brutality in a manner not normally present 
in the offense. The jury found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt each factor 
associated with the respective counts. 
 
At sentencing, Brown opposed upward departure, arguing he was already facing a 
lengthy prison sentence. The district court explained its departure decision on both counts 
together, stating: 
 
"[T]he court finds that there are substantial and—substantial and compelling reasons for 
granting an upward durational departure based upon the following aggravating factors 
which were unanimously found by the jury to have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  The first is that Clayden Urbanek was particularly vulnerable due to his age or 
reduced physical or mental capacity which was known or should have been known to the 
defendant. The court notes Clayden was 14 months old at the time of his death and the 
time that these offenses were committed. Secondly, the defendant's conduct during the 
commission of the current offense manifested excessive brutality to Clayden in a manner 
26 
 
 
 
not normally present for that offense. The court notes that the medical testimony from the 
trial was that Clayden had bruises all over his body; he had been beaten so badly on the 
buttock that the tissue had died; and had he survived his injuries, he would have required 
skin grafting; and he had been struck so forcefully in his abdomen that he suffered 
extensive internal injuries that resulted in his death. Third, the offense involved a 
fiduciary relationship which existed between the defendant and Clayden Urbanek. The 
court finds that the defendant was providing child care for Clayden while Brittney 
Betzold worked at Tony's to support herself, Clayden, and the defendant. Fourth, the 
defendant failed to render aid to Clayden as his medical condition declined. As to this 
factor the court notes the defendant recognized that Clayden was extremely ill when he 
called Brittney to come home from work on the morning of his death, yet he did not seek 
medical attention for Clayden. After Brittney returned home, he convinced Brittney not to 
seek medical attention and EMS was not called until after Clayden had stopped breathing. 
And so the court does find these are substantial and compelling reasons to grant an 
upward durational departure in this case. And that relates to Counts 2 and 4." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
For Count 2, the court sentenced Brown to 120 months' imprisonment. This was 
double the aggravated grid-block sentence for Brown's criminal history score. For the 
Count 4, the court sentenced Brown to 68 months' imprisonment, which was double the 
aggravated grid-block sentence with no criminal history score applied. The court ran 
these sentences consecutive to each other and the sentences for felony murder and 
interference with a law enforcement officer. 
 
Standard of review 
 
A sentencing judge must impose the presumptive sentence in the applicable 
KSGA grid-box, "unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a 
departure sentence." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815(a). The standard of review for departure 
decisions depends on the issue presented. 
27 
 
 
 
 
When an issue is whether the record supports an articulated reason for departing, 
the court reviews for substantial competent evidence. When an issue is whether a "factor 
can 'ever, as a matter of law, be substantial and compelling in any case,'" review is 
unlimited. State v. Bird, 298 Kan. 393, 397-98, 312 P.3d 1265 (2013). The court also has 
unlimited review of whether "'the reasons, as a whole, [are] substantial and compelling 
reasons for departure in a given case.'" State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 739, 175 P.3d 832 
(2008). 
 
A departure sentence should be upheld when even one factor relied upon by the 
sentencing court is substantial and compelling. Moreover, the individual factors need not 
be sufficient on their own to justify departure, so long as the factors collectively 
constitute a substantial and compelling basis for departure. Bird, 298 Kan. at 398. 
 
Preservation 
 
Brown suggests there may be a preservation issue because he did not argue to the 
district court that there were not substantial and compelling reasons to depart, even 
though he argued departure was unwarranted. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) 
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41) (brief must contain reference to location in record where 
issue raised and ruled upon). The State did not respond to this. 
 
A departure sentence is subject to appeal. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6820(a). And 
given the State's failure to argue why Brown should be precluded from arguing on appeal 
that the departure sentences were not authorized, we will reach the merits. 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
Count 2:  October 4 child abuse 
 
When imposing the departure sentence for Count 2, the district court relied on four 
factors, even though the jury was only presented and found three. Excessive brutality was 
not an aggravating fact submitted to the jury, so it cannot be a proper basis for departure 
for the October 4 child abuse conviction. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815(b) ("[A]ny fact 
that would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a 
prior conviction, shall be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
But this error is harmless because the departure for this count is supported by another 
factor:  the child was particularly vulnerable due to his age. 
 
Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815(c)(2)(A), when determining whether 
substantial and compelling reasons for departure exist, a court may consider whether 
"[t]he victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or 
mental capacity which was known or should have been known to the offender." But 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815(c)(3) provides: 
 
"If a factual aspect of a crime is a statutory element of the crime or is used to 
subclassify the crime on the crime severity scale, that aspect of the current crime of 
conviction may be used as an aggravating or mitigating factor only if the criminal 
conduct constituting that aspect of the current crime of conviction is significantly 
different from the usual criminal conduct captured by the aspect of the crime." 
 
Brown argues we should not consider this factor as a sufficient justification for 
departure because age is an element of the child abuse offense. 
 
In State v. Salcido-Corral, 262 Kan. 392, 940 P.2d 11 (1997), on which Brown 
relies, the court vacated upward departure sentences imposed for convictions of 
aggravated indecent liberties and aggravated criminal sodomy—both of which require as 
29 
 
 
 
an element that the victim be under 14 years old. The departures were imposed based on 
the seven-year-old victim's young age. The Salcido-Corral court held because the 
victim's young age was an element of the crimes of conviction, the victim's vulnerability 
due to age was an improper aggravating factor without evidence the victim was any more 
vulnerable than any other child of her age would be. 262 Kan. at 415. 
 
We have not extended Salcido-Corral to other scenarios in which a child's age is 
both an element of the offense and a factor relied on to impose a departure, although it 
was mentioned in passing in another case. See State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 413, 23 P.3d 
801 (2001) ("We question, but need not decide, if the tender age of the children here 
qualifies as an aggravating factor for an upward departure, since age is an element of 
child abuse . . . ."). 
 
The State directs our attention to two cases that the Court of Appeals held the 
sentencing court did not err in imposing upward departure sentences based on the victims' 
vulnerability due to age. They are State v. Peterson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 354, 357, 964 P.2d 
695 (1998), and State v. Leonard, No. 104,646, 2011 WL 5833375, at *3 (Kan. App. 
2011) (unpublished opinion). But these are distinguishable because the victims' ages were 
not an element of the crimes for which the departure sentences were imposed. Peterson, 
25 Kan. App. 2d at 355 (robbery and aggravated burglary); Leonard, 2011 WL 5833375, 
at *1 (theft). 
 
The State also argues we should consider whether in some factual situations, the 
victim's age may be a factor for departure when compared to the age of others within the 
age range protected by the statute, but does not support this argument with any authority. 
Even so, the argument has merit under the circumstances because the 14-month-old 
victim was particularly vulnerable to abuse as compared to other child victims, whose 
30 
 
 
 
ages can range as high as 17 years old. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5602(a) (any child 
under the age of 18 years).  
 
In State v. Mohamed, 779 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. App. 2010), the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held a child abuse victim's infancy could be used as an aggravating factor under 
that state's similar aggravated sentencing scheme, even though the victim's age was also 
an element of the crime. The court explained: 
 
"The legislature has taken the victim's age into account to the extent that it 
recognizes the special vulnerability of those under the age of 18. But we hold that, given 
the broad spectrum of physical development captured in this 18-year time span, the 
legislature's recognition does not preclude consideration of the victim's infancy as an 
aggravating factor here. The age element in the statute does not account for the particular 
vulnerability of [the victim], an extremely young victim who, because of his early stage 
of development, is incapable of perceiving danger, fleeing or shielding himself from 
harm, seeking help, or reporting the abuse. Indeed, [the victim's] vulnerability is absolute. 
He is particularly vulnerable among the broad class of child victims who are covered by 
the statute." 779 N.W.2d at 98. 
 
We find this reasoning persuasive. Salcido-Corral suggests vulnerability due to 
age "'significantly different from the usual criminal conduct captured by the aspect of the 
crime'" turn solely on the victim's particular vulnerability as compared to others his or her 
own age. 262 Kan. at 414-15. We clarify this is not the case. We hold Clayden's 
vulnerability due to his age compared to others within the range of ages encompassed by 
the statute could be an aggravating factor here. 
 
This leads us to the next question as to whether vulnerability due to age was a 
substantial and compelling reason to impose a departure sentence. A reason for departure 
is "'substantial'" if it is "'real, not imagined, and of substance, not ephemeral.'" Bird, 298 
Kan. at 397. It is "'compelling'" if it '''forces the court, by the facts of the case, to abandon 
31 
 
 
 
the status quo and venture beyond the sentence that it would ordinarily impose.'" 298 
Kan. at 397. 
 
"'"Reasons which may in one case justify departure may not in all cases justify a 
departure." [State v. Grady ], 258 Kan. at 83[, 900 P.2d 227 (1995)]. Rather, we must 
evaluate the offense of conviction, the defendant's criminal history, and the departure 
reason stated, as well as the purposes and principles of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines. 
State v. Tiffany, 267 Kan. 495, 504-05, 986 P.2d 1064 (1999); Grady, 258 Kan. at 83.' 
[Citation omitted.]" Martin, 285 Kan. at 744. 
 
"Since one of the purposes of the sentencing guidelines is to ensure uniformity in 
sentencing, departures should only be allowed in extraordinary cases." State v. Eisele, 
262 Kan. 80, 90, 936 P.2d 742 (1997). 
 
The district court found the victim's particular vulnerability due to age supported 
departure because Clayden was only 14 months old at the time of the crime. We hold in 
this case this was a substantial and compelling reason to impose an aggravated sentence. 
 
Count 4:  Child abuse between September 26 and October 3 
 
As to Count 4, the district court imposed the upward departure based on four 
aggravating factors:  (1) Clayden's vulnerability due to age; (2) the presence of excessive 
brutality in a manner not normally present for the offense; (3) Brown's fiduciary 
relationship; and (4) Brown's failure to render aid. 
 
For the reasons set out above, Clayden's vulnerability was a substantial and 
compelling reason to justify departure on this count as well. And we note the excessive 
brutality of this crime would suffice independently as a reason to impose a departure 
sentence given that the extent of the child's injuries substantiate physical brutality well 
32 
 
 
 
beyond that minimally necessary to commit child abuse. See State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557, 
579, 908 P.2d 603 (1995). We hold there were substantial and compelling reasons to 
impose the aggravated sentence as to Count 4.  
 
Based on these holdings, which rest on statutorily enumerated aggravating factors, 
we need not address Brown's argument that permitting a sentencing court to rely on 
nonenumerated aggravating factors renders K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815 
unconstitutionally vague. "[A] party asserting vagueness 'cannot challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the statute may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court.'" State v. Williams, 
299 Kan. 911, 919, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (defendant lacked standing to challenge statute 
as unconstitutionally vague when his conduct clearly fell within statute); see also Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355 
(2010) ("We consider whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at issue, 
for '[a] [litigant] who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain 
of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'"); Hearn v. City of 
Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 639, 772 P.2d 758 (1989) ("One to whose conduct a 
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."). 
 
Affirmed.