Title: Amerigas Propane, Inc. v. Bing

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Amerigas Propane, Inc. v. Bing1994 WY 65875 P.2d 1276Case Number: 93-166Decided: 06/15/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
AMERIGAS 
PROPANE, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Charles 
A. BING and Ovella P. Bing,

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dan 
B. Riggs of Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, and Fred R. Silvester of Silvester 
& Conroy, Salt Lake City.

Representing 
Appellees:

Joel 
M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, for 
appellees.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Amerigas Propane, Inc. appeals from the district court's order which denied 
Amerigas's motion for a satisfaction of judgment or relief from the 
judgment.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      Amerigas presents 
the following issues on appeal:

Whether 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to credit Amerigas for a 
voluntary payment made pursuant to a stipulation and plaintiffs' receipt of 
payment?

Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to credit Amerigas' voluntary payment pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-108?

Whether 
the jury verdict form and jury instructions that charged the jury to compensate 
plaintiffs for their total damages is the law of the case as it relates to the 
measure of plaintiffs' damages?

[¶4]      On December 24, 
1990, an explosion occurred at Amerigas's retail propane delivery business which 
was located in Riverton, Wyoming. Appellees Charles Bing and Ovella Bing owned a 
motel which was situated directly east of the propane facility. The explosion 
damaged their motel.

[¶5]      The Bings filed a 
complaint in the district court in November 1991 against Amerigas. In April 
1992, Amerigas voluntarily paid $70,000 to the Bings and entered into a 
stipulation with them which provided: 

1. 
Amerigas Propane, Inc., will tender a check in the amount of Seventy Thousand 
and No Dollars ($70,000.00) payable to the order of Charles A. and Ovella P. 
Bing and their attorney, Joel M. Vincent. A receipt will be given for the 
payment.

2. 
The fact and the amount of the payment referenced in paragraph one above may be 
used as evidence at trial by either party if the payment is relevant to any 
damage claim pursued by the plaintiffs.[1]

3. 
Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) will be deducted from any judgment awarded 
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant in this 
case.

The 
Bings and their attorney signed a receipt for the $70,000 payment which 
acknowledged that they had received the check and "that the SEVENTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS represent[ed] payment for a portion of the damages claimed by [the 
Bings]." They also "acknowledged and agreed that SEVENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($70,000.00) [would] be deducted from any judgment awarded to the 
[Bings]."

[¶6]      Before the trial, 
the parties stipulated that Amerigas's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
explosion. The trial on the merits commenced on March 15, 1993. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bings in 
the amount of $259,329. On April 22, 1993, the district court entered a judgment 
in favor of the Bings for $263,085.96, and neither party objected. The 
$263,085.96 judgment included the $259,329 verdict plus the Bings' costs as 
agreed upon by the parties.

[¶7]      Amerigas tendered 
a check in the amount of $193,879.46 to the Bings and requested that the Bings 
sign a receipt for the check. The receipt indicated that the $193,879.46 
represented the amount of the judgment, less the $70,000 payment, plus the 
interest which had accrued since the date the judgment was entered. Amerigas 
also requested that the Bings enter a satisfaction of judgment. The Bings 
accepted the check and filed a partial satisfaction of judgment. They refused to 
sign the receipt or to execute a full satisfaction of judgment because they 
contended that they were entitled to receive payment of an additional $70,000 on 
the principal of the judgment.

[¶8]      Amerigas filed a 
motion with the district court for a satisfaction of judgment or relief from the 
judgment. After holding a hearing, the district court denied Amerigas's motion. 
Amerigas appealed to this Court.

[¶9]      Both parties 
agree that Amerigas was entitled to receive a credit for the $70,000 payment 
which it made to the Bings prior to the trial. Amerigas contends that, pursuant 
to the stipulation, the $70,000 payment should have been deducted from the 
amount of the final judgment entered by the district court. The Bings, on the 
other hand, argue that the jury took the $70,000 payment into account in 
reaching its verdict and that the Bings were entitled to collect the full amount 
of the judgment.

[¶10]   The district court instructed the 
jury to determine the amount of damages, if any, which the Bings had incurred as 
a result of Amerigas's negligence:

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 3

Defendant 
Amerigas Propane admits it is responsible for any damage suffered by plaintiffs 
(Charles and Ovella Bing) as a direct and proximate result of the explosion of 
December 24, 1990. The only questions remaining for your determination 
are:

(1) 
What damages, if any, were suffered by Charles and Ovella Bing as a result of 
the explosion; and

(2) 
What amount of money will reasonably compensate the Bings for those 
damages.

Such 
an admission of responsibility should in no way prejudice you either for or 
against the defendant, nor influence you in any way in determining the issue of 
damages submitted to you.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

The 
objective of a damage award is to compensate plaintiffs for proven losses caused 
by the negligent conduct of the defendant. The damage award should be designed 
to compensate the plaintiffs in full measure for the total harm to them, which 
was proximately caused by the propane explosion.

The 
verdict form asked the jury to answer the following question: "What is the total 
amount of damages incurred by the [Bings] as a result of the explosion that 
occurred on December 24, 1990?"

[¶11]   The Bings assert that the jury 
learned of the $70,000 payment through the Bings' opening statement, some 
testimony, and their closing argument. They contend that the jury took the 
payment into account in arriving at the verdict.2 We disagree.

[¶12]   The instructions, when they are 
read together, direct the jury to calculate the total amount of damages which 
the Bings suffered as a direct and proximate result of Amerigas's negligence. 
See Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 700 (Wyo. 1993) ("Instructions must 
be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should 
not be singled out and considered in isolation"). The district court did not 
instruct the jury to take the $70,000 payment into account while it was 
determining the Bings' damages.

[¶13]   The Bings did not object to the 
instructions, nor did they offer any instructions which would have informed the 
jury how to address the $70,000 payment. "The instructions given the jury, 
without objection, became the law of the case." Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 535 (Wyo. 1993). See also TG v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, Sheridan (In re CH), 783 P.2d 155, 160 (Wyo. 1989), and 
W.R.C.P. 51. "`We assume that juries follow their instructions and understand 
them.'" City of Cheyenne v. Simpson, 787 P.2d 580, 581 (Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1295 n. 17 (Wyo. 1985)). 
See also DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 187 (Wyo. 1986). We, therefore, 
assume that the jury followed its instructions and calculated the total amount 
of damages suffered by the Bings even though it was aware that the $70,000 
payment had been made.

[¶14]   The plain and unambiguous language 
of the stipulation provided that the $70,000 payment must be deducted from the 
amount of any judgment which was awarded in favor of the Bings and against 
Amerigas. Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 739 (Wyo. 1993) (the intention of 
the parties to a written agreement is determined by reviewing the words of the 
agreement, provided that the language is clear and unambiguous). The stipulation 
was consistent with the provision of WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 (1988) which states: 
"After entry of judgment, any such [voluntary partial] payment [of a claim which 
is made on the basis of alleged liability for injury or property damage] shall 
be treated as a credit and deducted from the amount of the judgment." See 
generally Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 710-12 (Wyo. 1993) 
(explaining the purpose of § 1-1-108). The $193,879.46 payment which was made by 
Amerigas to the Bings after the judgment had been entered together with the 
earlier $70,000 payment fully satisfied the judgment.3 The Bings were under a duty to 
release the satisfied judgment. WYO. STAT. § 1-16-308(a) (Supp. 1993). As a 
matter of law, the district court erred by denying Amerigas's motion for a 
satisfaction of judgment.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded with 
directions that a full satisfaction of judgment be entered in favor of 
Amerigas.

Footnotes

1 Under the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 1-1-108 (1988), a voluntary partial 
payment of a claim which is made on the basis of alleged liability for an injury 
or property damage "is not admissible as evidence in any action for the purpose 
of determining the amount of any judgment, with respect to the parties to the 
occurrence from which the claim arose." The parties do not dispute the admission 
of the evidence of the prior payment. We do not, therefore, determine the legal 
relationship between the voluntary agreement to allow admission of that evidence 
and § 1-1-108.

2 The Bings contend that they spoke with several jurors who told them that 
the jury had taken the payment into account. They also assert that one of the 
jurors was in possession of a handwritten note showing the jury's calculations. 
We refuse to use these statements to impeach the jury's verdict. The statements 
are completely unsubstantiated on the record. In Elite Cleaners and Tailors, 
Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784, 787 (Wyo. 1973), we refused to allow jurors' 
affidavits to be admitted to impeach the verdict. Here, the evidence is much 
less credible.

3 The parties did not present any argument disputing the amount of 
post-judgment interest tendered by Amerigas.