Title: Bryant v. Hornbuckle

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bryant v. Hornbuckle1986 WY 213728 P.2d 1132Case Number: 86-99Decided: 12/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
James Vernon BRYANT, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Brent HORNBUCKLE, 
Appellee (Defendant), Amoco Oil Company, a Maryland corporation, 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Robert C. 
Wilson, Casper, 
for appellant.

John E. Brooks 
and John I. Henley of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, and David E. Westling, 
(argued), Casper, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this personal injury 
action appellant James Bryant appeals from an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of appellee Brent Hornbuckle. The sole issue we must decide is whether the 
trial court correctly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed 
on the question of whether appellee's conduct constituted culpable negligence of 
a coemployee under § 27-12-103, W.S. 1977.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant's claim 
arises from injuries sustained while operating a water truck for Hornbuckle 
Contracting. At the time appellant's injuries occurred, Hornbuckle Contracting 
was engaged in a water hauling job for Amoco Production Company which involved 
the hauling of fresh water to Amoco's well site and hauling waste production 
water from the site. Waste production water normally contained some petroleum 
residues. Appellant drove and operated one of the trucks used to haul the water. 
The truck was equipped with a pressurized holding tank, air pump, hose, and a 
valve which could be placed in an open or shut position. If the valve was 
mistakenly left in the shut position in the wintertime, it could become frozen 
in that position. When this occurred, the truck operator could free the valve by 
applying heat with a butane torch. This procedure for thawing frozen valves was 
widely used in the water hauling industry, and it was a procedure that foreman 
Brent Hornbuckle instructed his truck operators to follow.

[¶4.]     When appellant showed 
up for work on January 20, 1982, he discovered that the valve on the truck that 
he was to operate that day was frozen shut. He proceeded to thaw the valve with 
a butane torch, as he had done some twenty times before without incident. But 
this time disaster struck. After applying heat for 20 or 30 minutes, appellant 
opened the valve and the fumes from the tank ignited. An instantaneous explosion 
occurred, hurling appellant to the ground and igniting his clothing. He rolled 
on the ground but in his panic rolled too quickly to put out the flames. Another 
driver ran to the scene, helped appellant to a snowy area, and jumped on him, 
smothering the fire with his body.

[¶5.]     As a result of the 
accident appellant sustained severe burns over his upper body, causing scarring 
and disfigurement and necessitating several skin grafting operations. He also 
suffered a dislocated shoulder. Appellant filed a worker's compensation claim 
from which he received $12,000 in temporary benefits, a $12,000 permanent 
disability award, and payment of medical expenses.

[¶6.]     Appellant has now filed 
suit against Brent Hornbuckle and Amoco, alleging that both parties were 
negligent in failing to adequately train and supervise him and failing to warn 
him of the dangers involved in the valve thawing procedure. In order to recover 
against Brent Hornbuckle and avoid the exclusive remedy provision of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act, appellant must demonstrate that Mr. Hornbuckle was a 
"culpably negligent" coemployee. Section 27-12-103, W.S. 
1977.

[¶7.]     A party seeking summary 
judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. O'Donnell 
v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278, 1281 (1985). 
The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate formal trials where only 
questions of law are involved and to pierce the formal allegations and reach the 
merits of a controversy where no material issue of fact is present. 
England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137 (1986). The standards we 
use in reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment are stated 
in England v. Simmons, 
supra:

"`When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same information. * * * Upon examination of a summary 
judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from 
the facts.'" (Citations omitted.) At 1141, quoting Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407, 410 
(1985).

[¶8.]     In support of his 
motion, Mr. Hornbuckle filed an affidavit in which he stated that the butane 
torch method for thawing frozen valves was standard in the water hauling 
industry. He also stated that during his experience with Hornbuckle Contracting 
he was aware of no other incidents like the one involving appellant and that he 
"certainly did not expect or anticipate such an 
occurrence."

[¶9.]     In resistance to the 
motion for summary judgment, appellant filed the affidavit of Ray Smith, the 
safety director for a local trucking company. In that affidavit Mr. Smith made 
the following statements:

"[I]t would be dangerous 
and hazardous to use a butane torch to thaw a frozen valve on a tank which had 
been used to haul water from a treator pit because of the possibility [of] crude 
oil residue in treator pit water.

"[T]he hazardous and 
dangerous nature of using a butane torch to thaw a frozen valve on a tank that 
has hauled anything other than fresh water has been widely known in the industry 
for a considerable length of time and has been a widely known fact during all of 
my working experience in the oil industry.

"There are several other 
methods which can be used to thaw a frozen valve other than using a butane torch 
* * *.

"Although a butane torch 
is commonly used to thaw frozen water valves on water tanks in the oil industry, 
it is nonetheless an unsafe and dangerous operation.

"In my opinion, it would 
be a reckless and dangerous procedure to allow the use or use a butane torch to 
thaw a frozen valve on a tank that has hauled anything other than fresh water 
without fully being aware of the dangerous and hazardous condition and possible 
consequences."

[¶10.]  Also appearing in the record is a portion 
of appellant's deposition which contains the following exchange between 
appellant and Mr. Hornbuckle's attorney:

"Q. And just to make sure 
I've got this right, you don't recall any conversations with either of the 
Hornbuckles or anybody else working for Hornbuckle about this accident that you 
specifically recall?

"A. I've talked to my 
brother about it, and he was working at the time for them.

"Q. What has he told you? 
Has he had conversations with the Hornbuckles that he told you 
about?

"A. He mentioned that 
after this happened - I don't know if it was Brent or Dick [appellee's father], 
but I think Brent had said, you know, `Gosh, we always wondered if something 
like that could happen. We didn't know.'"

Appellant's 
deposition also reveals the fact that appellee himself used the butane torch 
method for thawing frozen valves and that he personally demonstrated the 
technique for appellant when appellant first encountered a frozen water 
valve.

[¶11.]  Our review of the trial court's decision 
focuses on the concept of culpable negligence. Section 27-12-103(a) of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act provides:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required 
by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are culpably negligent * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

In order to 
recover against a coemployee under this section of the Worker's Compensation 
Act, a plaintiff must establish more than simple negligence; the coemployee's 
conduct must constitute "culpable" negligence. In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined 
the term "culpable negligence" as "willful and serious misconduct." We defined 
the term "willful" in this context as "`such as is done purposely, with 
knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard 
of consequences.'" Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 
206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943).

[¶12.]  The aggravating factor which 
distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the actor's state 
of mind. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 34 (5th ed. 1984). In order to prove 
that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that he 
acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. Id.State of mind, of course, may be difficult 
to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct 
has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow. Id.

[¶13.]  We agree with the trial court's 
determination that appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on 
the question of culpable negligence. In support of his summary judgment motion, 
Mr. Hornbuckle produced evidence which demonstrated that he was conforming to an 
industry standard, that he himself used the butane torch method for thawing 
frozen water valves, that he was aware of no incidents similar to the one 
involving plaintiff, and that he did not anticipate or expect such an 
occurrence. This evidence constituted a prima facie showing that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact. If unrefuted, it demonstrated that Mr. 
Hornbuckle did not act with a "culpable" or "willful" state of mind. The harmful 
consequences were unknown to him; the risk was not obvious; it was not highly 
probable that harm would follow. Consequently, the burden of establishing a 
genuine issue of material fact shifted to appellant. Harden v. Gregory Motors, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 283 (1985). 

[¶14.]  The affidavit of appellant's affiant, Mr. 
Smith, did not contain sufficient facts to meet this burden. Mr. Smith stated 
that the dangerous nature of the butane torch technique was "widely known in the 
industry" and that in his opinion the procedure was reckless. He also stated, 
however, that the procedure was commonly used. This evidence does not establish, 
directly or circumstantially, that Mr. Hornbuckle acted with the "quasi-intent" 
that is an essential element of culpably negligent 
conduct.

[¶15.]  Appellant produced no evidence showing 
that Mr. Hornbuckle actually knew that an explosion was highly probable or that 
a high probability of an explosion was obvious. Appellant testified in his 
deposition that Mr. Hornbuckle (or his father) said that he "didn't know" 
whether such an accident could occur. Neither appellant nor Mr. Smith recited 
any similar instances of explosions occurring from the use of a butane torch on 
a tank that had contained produced waste water. As far as we can tell from the 
record, such an occurrence had never happened before, not only at Hornbuckle 
Contracting but in the entire water hauling industry.

[¶16.]  We have observed that summary judgment is 
a drastic remedy which, as a general rule, is not appropriate in negligence 
actions. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, supra, 696 P.2d  at 1280. This case, 
however, is not an ordinary negligence case. When the issue is simple 
negligence, summary judgment is often inappropriate because the trier of fact 
must determine whether an actor's conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances. Culpable negligence, on the other hand, involves more than 
unreasonable conduct; it involves willfulness. When a party fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact on this element, summary judgment is 
appropriate.

[¶17.]  It has been said that when state of mind 
is at issue and especially when willfulness of an actor's conduct is questioned, 
courts should be reluctant to grant summary judgment because the actor's 
credibility is often a central issue in such cases. See Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2730 (1983). If the evidence 
presented, however, does not raise sufficient doubt of an affiant's credibility, 
a party's desire to test his statements by a jury will not preclude summary 
judgment. Id. at 237-238. Appellant has raised little, if any, doubt concerning 
Mr. Hornbuckle's credibility; and any doubt that might exist is refuted by the 
fact that Mr. Hornbuckle used the very same procedure for thawing frozen valves 
that appellant used when he was injured.

[¶18.]  Although appellee raised two additional 
issues on appeal, our decision on the question of culpable negligence makes it 
unnecessary for us to address those issues.

[¶19.]  The district court's order is 
affirmed.