Title: Graycor Construction Co. v. Pacific Theatres Exhibition Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13142 
 
GRAYCOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INC.  vs.  PACIFIC THEATRES 
EXHIBITION CORP. & others1 (and a consolidated case2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 6, 2021. - September 12, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Mechanic's Lien.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of 
inferior courts. 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 23 and November 9, 2020. 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by David A. Deakin, J., and a 
question of law was reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Alex W. Dockery (Peter D. Bilowz & Martin M. Fantozzi also 
present) for Podium Developer LLC & others. 
Christopher W. Costello for Graycor Construction, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
1 Podium Owner, LP; Podium Developer LLC; and Office Tower 
Owner, LP. 
 
2 Podium Owner, LP, & another vs. Graycor Construction 
Company Inc. 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  During the early months of the COVID-19 
pandemic, a contractor sought to establish a mechanic's lien, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 254, § 2, on land leased to a developer for 
whom the contractor had performed work but had not been paid.  
The contractor recorded a notice of contract in the registry of 
deeds, as required by G. L. c. 254, § 2, but the notice failed 
to name the actual owners of the property, who had leased it to 
the developer, and instead named the owner of another parcel.  
The contractor then filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
seeking to enforce the mechanic's lien, and also raising claims 
of breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and 
violations of G. L. c. 93A.  By the time that the contractor 
recorded a proper notice of contract, naming the actual owners, 
in the registry of deeds, and filed an amended complaint, the 
statutory deadline for making such a recording had elapsed. 
 
The property owners moved to dismiss the contractor's 
claims for quantum meruit, for unjust enrichment, and to enforce 
the mechanic's lien.  They also filed a complaint for summary 
discharge of the lien under G. L. c. 254, § 15A, arguing that 
the contractor had not timely recorded the notice of contract in 
the registry of deeds.  The contractor, in turn, filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint for discharge. 
 
At a consolidated hearing on the two motions, the 
contractor argued that four of this court's emergency orders, 
3 
 
issued on April 1, April 27, May 26, and June 24, 2020, which 
modified in-person court operations and, among other measures, 
tolled "all deadlines set forth in statutes" that expired 
between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, tolled the statutory 
deadline for recording a notice of contract in the registry of 
deeds under G. L. c. 254, § 2.  A Superior Court judge concluded 
that the deadline had been tolled; accordingly, he denied the 
owners' partial motion to dismiss and allowed the contractor's 
motion to dismiss the owners' complaint for discharge.  The 
judge also reported a question to the Appeals Court as to 
whether his decision was correct; we subsequently allowed the 
owners' application for direct appellate review.  Because the 
court's orders issued in the early months of the COVID-19 
pandemic, pursuant to our superintendence authority under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, concerned court operations only and did not apply 
to executive agencies such as the registry of deeds, the measure 
tolling statutory deadlines must be read as tolling only those 
statutory deadlines that pertained to cases pending in court or 
to be filed in court.  We therefore reverse the judge's order 
denying the owners' partial motion to dismiss the contractor's 
complaint and allowing the contractor's motion to dismiss the 
complaint for summary discharge. 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are undisputed.  In November of 
2018, Graycor Construction Company Inc. (Graycor) entered into 
4 
 
an agreement with Pacific Theatres Exhibition Corp. (Pacific) to 
serve as the general contractor for the construction of a cinema 
complex on land owned by Podium Owner, LP (Podium Owner), and 
leased by Podium Developer LLC (Podium Developer) (collectively, 
Podium entities).  The land on which the cinema was to be built 
was part of a mixed-use development consisting of several 
parcels owned by separate entities.  Graycor's contract with 
Pacific, however, incorrectly identified the parcel where 
Graycor was to perform its work as an abutting parcel owned by 
Office Tower Owner, LP (Office Tower Owner). 
 
In the ensuing months, Graycor furnished labor, materials, 
and equipment for the cinema project.  Graycor ceased work on 
the project on March 4, 2020.  According to Graycor, Pacific has 
not paid Graycor $3,527,956.10 it is owed for this work.  On 
April 27, 2020, Graycor recorded a notice of contract in the 
Suffolk County registry of deeds, pursuant to G. L. c. 254, § 2, 
in order to perfect a mechanic's lien on the property.  Graycor 
also recorded a statement of account, setting forth the amount 
assertedly owed to Graycor by Pacific, pursuant to G. L. c. 254, 
§ 8.  Both the notice of contract and the statement of account 
incorrectly identified the property and named Office Tower Owner 
as the property owner.  Neither of the April 27, 2020 filings 
referenced the Podium entities.  On June 19, 2020, Graycor 
recorded an amended notice of contract and statement of account, 
5 
 
once again incorrectly identifying the property, naming Office 
Tower Owner as the property owner, and failing to name either of 
the Podium entities. 
 
Graycor filed a complaint in the Superior Court on July 23, 
2020 for breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, 
enforcement of the mechanic's lien, and violations of G. L. 
c. 93A.  The complaint named Pacific and Office Tower Owner as 
defendants, but did not name either Podium Owner or Podium 
Developer.  On September 9, 2020, Graycor recorded a second 
amended notice of contract and statement of account in the 
registry of deeds, this time correctly identifying the address 
of the property where Graycor had performed its work and naming 
the Podium entities for the first time.  Graycor subsequently 
filed an amended complaint in the Superior Court, which added 
the Podium entities as defendants. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss three counts of that 
complaint, including the claim to enforce the mechanic's lien, 
and the Podium entities also filed a separate complaint against 
Graycor, pursuant to G. L. c. 254, § 15A, seeking summary 
discharge of the purported lien on the ground that Graycor had 
not met the statutory deadline for recording a notice of 
contract in the registry of deeds, set forth in G. L. c. 254, 
§ 2.  Under the terms of the statute, the deadline for filing 
the notice of contract is ninety days after work was last 
6 
 
performed on the property.  Graycor moved to dismiss the 
complaint for discharge, arguing that the deadline had been 
tolled because the "Supreme Judicial Court extended statutory 
deadlines due to the COVID-19 pandemic." 
 
After a consolidated hearing on the two motions to dismiss, 
a Superior Court judge allowed Graycor's motion to dismiss the 
complaint for discharge and denied the defendants' motion to 
dismiss three counts of Graycor's complaint.  The motion judge 
concluded that the disputed orders regarding court operations 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the April 1 order,3 the April 27 
order,4 the May 26 order,5 and the June 24 order,6 tolled the 
 
 
3 See Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, 
No. OE-144 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/repealed-
sjc-order-regarding-court-operations-under-the-exigent-
circumstances-created-by-the/download [https://perma.cc/F5V5-
TPPB]. 
 
 
4 See Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under the 
Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) 
Pandemic, No. OE-144 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc 
/repealed-sjc-updated-order-regarding-court-operations-under-
the-exigent-circumstances-created/download [https://perma.cc 
/JPU4-KUG3]. 
 
 
5 See Second Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under 
the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) 
Pandemic, No. OE-144 (May 26, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc 
/repealed-sjc-second-updated-order-regarding-court-operations-
under-the-exigent-circumstances/download [https://perma.cc/UYT3-
U4KP]. 
 
 
6 See Third Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under 
the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) 
Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc 
7 
 
statutory deadline set forth in G. L. c. 254, § 2, and therefore 
that Graycor's recording of its notice of contract on September 
9, 2020, was timely.  The judge then reported his decision and 
the following question to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 64 (a): 
"Did the Supreme Judicial Court's Orders . . . entered on 
April 1, April 27, May 26, and June 24, 2020, . . . toll 
the statutory period for filing a Notice of Contract with 
the registry of deeds under G. L. c. 254, § 2?" 
 
After reporting the question, on motion by the Podium entities, 
the judge issued a "final judgment" to ensure that his decision 
would be ripe for review, and clarified the wording of his 
original order.  We allowed the defendants' application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Although a judge may report specific 
questions of law in connection with an interlocutory finding or 
order, the basic issue to be reported is the correctness of his 
[or her] finding or order.  Reported questions need not be 
answered in this circumstance except to the extent that it is 
necessary to do so in resolving the basic issue."  Commonwealth 
v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 333 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 493 n.5 (2000).  Here, the question before 
the court is the correctness of the judge's determination that 
 
/repealed-sjc-third-updated-order-regarding-court-operations-
under-the-exigent-circumstances/download [https://perma.cc/5K7R-
27AT]. 
8 
 
the orders at issue tolled filing deadlines in the registry of 
deeds, which underpins his decision on the parties' motions to 
dismiss.  We review such a legal question de novo.  See Edwards 
v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017), S.C., 488 Mass. 555 
(2021); Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 
(2011). 
 
As the motion judge observed, the parties agree that the 
notice of contract Graycor recorded in April of 2020 was 
defective due to its misidentification of the property where the 
work was performed and its misidentification of the property 
owners.  The parties also agree that, if this court's orders 
tolled the deadline for recording a notice of contract in the 
registry of deeds, Graycor's notice of contract recorded in 
September of 2020 was timely and was sufficient to establish an 
enforceable lien. 
 
Graycor contends that the April 1, April 27, May 26, and 
June 24, 2020 orders, issued pursuant to this court's 
superintendence authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, tolled 
recording deadlines in the registry of deeds, because the 
registry of deeds is sufficiently entwined with the judicial 
system to be subject to this court's superintendence power.  The 
defendants argue that the orders did not toll recording 
deadlines, because this court's superintendence authority 
applies only to courts of inferior jurisdiction, not executive 
9 
 
agencies such as the registry of deeds. 
 
a.  Mechanic's lien statute.  A mechanic's lien secures a 
"debt due to a person who performs labor or supplies material 
for the improvement of real estate by an agreement or with the 
express or implied consent of the owner."  Hammill-McCormick 
Assocs., Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 399 Mass. 541, 542 
(1987).  "The primary purpose of the lien is to provide security 
to contractors, subcontractors, laborers, and suppliers for the 
value of their services and goods provided . . . ."  Id. at 542-
543. 
 
The mechanic's lien statute, G. L. c. 254, sets forth 
procedures for creating and enforcing mechanic's liens.  To 
prevail on a complaint for enforcement of a mechanic's lien, an 
individual or entity first must execute a written contract with 
the property owner, "or with any person acting for, on behalf 
of, or with the consent of such owner" for the work to be 
performed, and subsequently must record a notice of the contract 
in the registry of deeds in the county where the property is 
located.  G. L. c. 254, § 2.  The notice of contract must be 
recorded by the statutory deadline defined in G. L. c. 254, § 2; 
a determination of the applicable deadline is dependent upon 
whether either party has filed a notice of substantial 
completion asserting that the "work under the written contract 
is sufficiently complete so that it can be occupied or utilized 
10 
 
for its intended use," see G. L. c. 254, § 2A, and whether the 
owner has filed a notice of termination of the contract, see 
G. L. c. 254, § 2B.  The deadline for recording the notice of 
contract is "the earliest of:  (i) sixty days after filing or 
recording of the notice of substantial completion . . . ; or 
(ii) ninety days after filing or recording of the notice of 
termination . . . ; or (iii) ninety days after [the contractor] 
or any person by, through or under him last performed or 
furnished labor or materials or both labor and materials."  
G. L. c. 254, § 2. 
 
"[A]lthough there is no express articulation in the statute 
concerning the precise moment at which a lien under [G. L. 
c. 254, § 2,] comes into being," this court has understood the 
recording of the notice of contract in the registry of deeds as 
the act that creates the lien.  Tremont Tower Condominium, LLC 
v. George H.H. Macomber Co., 436 Mass. 677, 683 (2002).  "The 
enforcement of the lien," however, "requires further steps, 
which must also be performed within time frames established by 
the statute."  Id. at 680.  General Laws c. 254, § 8, provides 
that a contractor must record in the registry of deeds a 
statement of account, setting forth "the amount due or to become 
due him [or her]."  The deadline for filing the statement of 
account is the "earliest of:  (i) ninety days after the filing 
or recording of the notice of substantial completion . . . ; 
11 
 
(ii) [120] days after the filing or recording of the notice of 
termination . . . ; or (iii) [120] days after the last day a 
person, entitled to enforce a lien under [G. L. c. 254, § 2,] or 
anyone claiming by, through or under him [or her], performed or 
furnished labor or material or both labor and materials or 
furnished rental equipment, appliances or tools."  G. L. c. 254, 
§ 8.  If the contractor does not file the statement of account 
in the applicable time frame, the lien is "dissolved."  See id. 
 
Within ninety days after filing the statement of account, a 
contractor must commence a civil action to enforce the lien in 
the Superior Court for the county where the property is located.  
See G. L. c. 254, §§ 5, 11.  The contractor then has thirty days 
after filing the civil action to record an attested copy of the 
complaint in the registry of deeds.  See G. L. c. 254, § 5.  
Failure to meet either of these deadlines also results in the 
lien being "dissolved."  See G. L. c. 254, §§ 5, 11. 
 
b.  The COVID-19 orders.  In the early months of the COVID-
19 pandemic, pursuant to our "superintendence and rule making 
authority," G. L. c. 211, § 3, this court issued a series of 
orders "with respect to court proceedings, new filings, and 
trials, designed to 'protect the public health by reducing the 
risk of exposure to the virus and slowing the spread of the 
disease.'"  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 433, S.C., 484 Mass. 
12 
 
1029 (2020).  The title of each order contained the words, 
"Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic."  
The orders addressed the same topics and contained essentially 
similar language, although the applicable dates set forth in the 
orders changed with each order. 
 
The opening paragraph of the April 1 order provided: 
"In light of the ongoing and urgent public health concerns 
regarding the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, pursuant to its superintendence and rule 
making authority, issues the following ORDER to continue to 
reduce the number of people coming to Massachusetts State 
courthouses." 
 
In the April 27 order, the opening paragraph similarly explained 
the purpose of the order: 
"To safeguard the health and safety of the public and court 
personnel during the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic while 
continuing to conduct court business, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, pursuant to its superintendence and rule making 
authority, issues the following ORDER." 
 
The May 26 and June 24 orders contained a similar statement, 
while also noting the effort of "continuing to increase the 
business being conducted by the courts." 
 
Among other measures, the orders required all court filings 
and proceedings to be handled virtually rather than in person, 
with a limited exception for "emergency matters that [could not] 
be resolved virtually"; continued all jury and bench trials set 
to commence between March 13, 2020, and September 4, 2020; 
13 
 
precluded any new grand jury empanelment; required court staff 
to conduct court business, such as accepting filings and 
pleadings and conducting hearings, virtually; and tolled all 
civil statutes of limitations.  See April 1 order, supra at 
¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 10, 11; April 27 order, supra at ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 10, 11; 
May 26 order, supra at ¶¶ 3, 6, 8, 11, 12; June 24 order, supra 
at ¶¶ 3, 6, 9, 12, 13.  In addition, the May 26 order provided 
that 
"[u]nless otherwise ordered by the applicable appellate 
court, court department, or judge(s) presiding over the 
court case, all deadlines set forth in statutes or court 
rules, standing orders, tracking orders, or guidelines that 
expired or will expire at any time from March 17, 2020, 
through June 30, 2020, are tolled until July 1, 2020." 
 
May 26 order, supra at ¶ 13.7 
 
Graycor argues that the "plain language of the COVID 
[o]rders clearly indicates [this court's] intent for the 
[o]rders to be read broadly."  According to Graycor, the orders 
"unambiguously" tolled "all deadlines set forth in statutes"; as 
the deadline for recording a notice of contract is contained in 
 
 
7 We recite the specific language in the tolling provision 
in the May 26 order, as that provision applies to deadlines that 
expired before June 30, 2020, while the earlier orders contained 
a similar provision, but only covered deadlines expiring before 
May 4, 2020, and June 1, 2020, respectively.  Absent any 
tolling, Graycor's deadline for filing a notice of contract was 
June 2, 2020.  The June 24 order, supra at ¶ 14, stated that 
such deadlines would "not be tolled any further unless there is 
a new surge in COVID-19 cases in the Commonwealth and the SJC 
determines that a new or extended period of tolling is needed." 
14 
 
a statute, Graycor maintains that it was tolled by these orders. 
 
"In interpreting rules and orders adopted by this court, we 
rely upon basic principles of statutory construction."  Shaw's 
Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 341 (2021) (Shaw's 
Supermkts.).  "Thus, we begin with the plain language of the 
order."  Id.  We do not read any particular provision in 
isolation but, rather, examine its meaning in the context of the 
order as a whole.  See Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019). 
 
The opening paragraphs of the orders clearly stated that 
they were issued pursuant to our supervisory authority under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, to oversee "the administration of all courts 
of inferior jurisdiction."  Our supervisory authority includes 
the power to issue "orders, directions and rules" for "the 
improvement of the administration of [lower] courts, and the 
securing of their proper and efficient administration."  G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  At the time that the orders were issued, the 
Governor had declared a state of emergency due to the global 
COVID-19 pandemic.8  He also had issued a number of public health 
directives, including the closing, on March 23, 2020, of in-
person operations at all businesses and organizations that did 
 
 
8 See Office of the Governor, Declaration of a State of 
Emergency to Respond to COVID-19 (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www 
.mass.gov/news/declaration-of-a-state-of-emergency-to-respond-
to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/WZ5M-7LMZ]. 
15 
 
not provide "essential services," and prohibiting "[g]atherings 
of more than 10 people . . . in any confined indoor or outdoor 
space."9  Although these restrictions did not apply to the 
judiciary,10 this court responded to the risks associated with 
the COVID-19 pandemic by severely limiting those who could be 
physically present in court houses, in order to "safeguard the 
health and safety of the public and court personnel."  See, 
e.g., April 27 order.11 
 
The topics of the court's four orders were narrow in scope.  
The orders required almost all pleadings and other documents to 
 
9 See Office of the Governor, Order Assuring Continued 
Operation of Essential Services in the Commonwealth, Closing 
Certain Workplaces, and Prohibiting Gatherings of More Than 10 
People, COVID-19 Order No. 13 (Mar. 23, 2020) (COVID-19 Order 
No. 13). 
 
 
10 See COVID-19 Order No. 13, supra (stating that closure 
provisions "shall not apply to any municipal legislative body or 
to the General Court or to the Judiciary"). 
 
 
11 At the time of the court's April 1 and April 27 orders, 
the Governor's closure of all but essential services remained in 
effect, while at the time of the court's May 26 and June 24 
orders, the Governor had instituted two phases of his four-phase 
reopening plan, which allowed specific types of businesses to 
reopen, with limited capacity, beginning on May 18, 2020.  See 
Office of the Governor, Order Clarifying the Progression of the 
Commonwealth's Phased Workplace Re-Opening Plan and Authorizing 
Certain Re-Opening Preparations at Phase II Workplaces, COVID-19 
Order No. 35 (June 1, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/order-
preparing-for-phase-ii-reopening/download [https://perma.cc 
/PNA5-4MZK]; Office of the Governor, Order Implementing a Phased 
Reopening of Workplaces and Imposing Workplace Safety Measures 
to Address COVID-19, COVID-19 Order No. 33 (May 18, 2020), 
https://www.mass.gov/doc/may-18-2020-re-opening-massachusetts-
order/download [https://perma.cc/9Y72-6TNY]. 
16 
 
be filed electronically, required proceedings in nonemergency 
matters to be conducted virtually, and severely limited the 
individuals who could enter a court house for purposes of 
emergency, in-person proceedings.  See April 1 order, supra at 
¶¶ 2, 4, 5; April 27 order, supra at ¶¶ 2, 4, 5; May 26 order, 
supra at ¶¶ 3, 6, 7; June 24 order, supra at ¶¶ 3, 4-6.12  
Additionally, all jury trials that had been set to commence 
between March 13, 2020, and September 4, 2020, were continued 
until September 8, 2020, at the earliest, and no new grand jury 
empanelment was allowed until at least September 8, 2020.  See 
April 1 order, supra at ¶¶ 6, 10; April 27 order, supra at ¶¶ 6, 
10; May 26 order, supra at ¶¶ 8, 11; June 24 order, supra at 
¶¶ 9, 12. 
 
Consistent with their provisions, the titles of the orders 
emphasized that their focus was limited to "court operations 
under the exigent circumstances created by the COVID-19 
(coronavirus) pandemic."  Although a title does not control the 
meaning of the words of the order, it can be a helpful tool in 
ascertaining the intent of the order's drafters.  See Herman v. 
Admit One Ticket Agency LLC, 454 Mass. 611, 618 (2009).  Here, 
the titles introduced and framed the purpose and extent of the 
orders themselves; they informed the reader that the orders 
 
 
12 See notes 3-6, supra. 
17 
 
altered the manner in which court business was to be conducted 
in response to public health concerns brought on by the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
Given the narrow focus of the orders on court operations, 
it is clear that the provision in each order that tolled 
statutory deadlines was designed to encompass only those 
statutory deadlines that affect court operations, i.e., 
deadlines in cases pending in court or to be filed in a court.  
As we explained in Shaw's Supermkts., 488 Mass. at 342, our 
tolling of civil statutes of limitations was a reasonable 
response to "ongoing State and local restrictions imposed to 
combat the spread of COVID-19, and the effect of such 
restrictions on the ability of attorneys and litigants to 
prepare civil claims."  Read as a coherent whole, the paragraphs 
tolling civil statutes of limitation, and the paragraphs tolling 
deadlines "set forth in statutes or court rules, standing 
orders, tracking orders, or guidelines," provided relief to 
parties and attorneys at the beginning stages of litigation, and 
those already involved in ongoing proceedings; taken together, 
the two paragraphs tolled deadlines within which to initiate an 
action in court and deadlines for subsequent actions required in 
pending cases.13  See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 
 
 
13 For instance, G. L. c. 239, § 5 (a), provides that a 
party seeking to appeal from a judgment on a summary process 
18 
 
810 (2013) (in interpreting statutory language, "we look to the 
language of the entire statute, not just a single sentence, and 
attempt to interpret all of its terms harmoniously to effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
Graycor's understanding of the provisions tolling "all 
deadlines set forth in statutes" as applicable to matters other 
than filings in court requires reading the words "all deadlines 
set forth in statutes" in isolation.  It is inconsistent with 
 
action for possession of land has "[ten] days after the entry of 
the judgment" within which to file an appeal.  The court's 
tolling orders would have tolled that filing deadline in any 
given case if the deadline fell between March 17, 2020, and June 
30, 2020.  Similarly, G. L. c. 231, § 118A, provides that "[a] 
party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a trial court 
justice . . . issued . . . in response to a request for 
equitable relief may file within [ten] days of the entry of the 
order, a petition in the appropriate appellate division seeking 
relief from the order."  The court's tolling orders would have 
tolled this filing deadline as well, if the deadline fell 
between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, in any particular 
case. 
 
 
By contrast, the provisions in the orders that tolled civil 
statutes of limitations applied to deadlines to initiate legal 
actions or to obtain judicial review of orders issued by 
administrative bodies.  For instance, G. L. c. 175I, § 19, 
provides that a person may obtain judicial review of an order of 
the Commissioner of Insurance, if the person is subject to the 
order or harmed by a violation of the insurance regulations set 
forth in G. L. c. 175I, "by filing in the supreme judicial 
court, within twenty days from the date of the service of such 
order or report, a written petition requesting that the order or 
report of the commissioner be set aside."  This court's orders 
would have tolled this deadline, under the provision tolling 
"[a]ll civil statutes of limitations." 
19 
 
the limited reach of the orders at issue, as evidenced by their 
stated purposes, the statute under which they were issued, their 
titles, and the narrow range of subjects they covered.  In 
issuing the orders, we did not purport to supervise executive 
agencies such as the registry of deeds.  Rather, we provided 
guidance to lower courts as to how to conduct court operations 
safely amid the ongoing public health crisis, so that the courts 
remained accessible to the public, while abiding by public 
health restrictions to protect litigants, attorneys, and court 
employees.  The orders correspondingly tolled only those 
statutory deadlines that pertained to court proceedings. 
 
While an entity seeking to perfect a mechanic's lien might 
eventually turn to the courts to enforce that lien, perfecting 
the lien itself merely requires filing a notice of contract in 
the registry of deeds -- an executive agency charged with the 
keeping of land records.14  Consequently, the deadline for 
recording a notice of contract in the registry of deeds does not 
fall within the category of statutory deadlines tolled by the 
court's April 1, April 27, May 26, and June 24 orders. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The Superior Court judge's order denying 
the defendants' partial motion to dismiss Graycor's complaint, 
and allowing Graycor's motion to dismiss the Podium entities' 
 
 
14 See G. L. c. 36, §§ 1, 12. 
20 
 
complaint for discharge, is reversed.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.