Title: Ex parte Dwayne Atkinson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Clarence Heard and Janice Heard v. APV North America, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

1051437 Rel 06/29/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051437
_________________________
Ex parte Dwayne Atkinson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Clarence Heard and Janice Heard
v.
APV North America, Inc., et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-04-7027)
PARKER, Justice.
I. Background
Clarence Heard claims he was injured on November 23,
2002, in an accident involving a positive flow continuous
fermenter manufactured by APV North America, Inc. ("the APV
1051437
2
tank"), while he was employed by Ventura Foods, L.L.C.  On
November 22, 2004, Heard and his wife, Janice, sued APV North
America and others, including several fictitiously named
defendants, claiming that Clarence's injury was caused by the
negligence of the defendants in designing, manufacturing, and
installing the APV tank.
On February 15, 2006, the Heards filed an amended
complaint, substituting Dwayne Atkinson for one of the
fictitiously named defendants, claiming that Atkinson was one
of the employees or supervisors at Ventura Foods who had
negligently installed the APV tank.  Atkinson filed a motion
asking the trial court to dismiss him as a defendant because,
he says, the statute of limitations on the Heards' claim had
expired before the Heards named him as a defendant.  The trial
court denied Atkinson's motion to dismiss, and  Atkinson
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to dismiss him as a defendant.
II. Standard of Review
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that requires the showing of: (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty on the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
1051437
3
invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte
McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala. 1998)."
Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 1000, 1002
(Ala. 2000).  Furthermore, this Court has held that a petition
for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate vehicle by which to
challenge the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss or
a motion for a summary judgment based on a statute-of-
limitations defense when "the undisputed evidence shows that
the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying
the fictitiously named defendant as the party the plaintiff
intended to sue."  Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala.
1999).  See also Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916
So. 2d 594 (Ala. 2005).
III. Analysis
The Heards filed their complaint on November 22, 2004,
one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired.
Atkinson was not listed as a defendant at that time; rather,
they 
listed 
several 
fictitiously named defendants and
Atkinson was substituted for one of those fictitiously named
defendants on February 15, 2006, well after the expiration of
the two-year statute of limitations.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
1051437
4
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that in order
to invoke the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h), that is,
in order for the amended complaint with the defendant's true
name to relate back to the original complaint with the
fictitious name, the plaintiff must establish  (1) that the
plaintiff was ignorant of the identity of the fictitiously
named party, in the sense of having no knowledge at the time
the complaint was filed that the party subsequently named was
in fact the party intended to be sued, Columbia Engineering
International, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d 955 (Ala. 1983); and
(2) that the plaintiff used due diligence to discover the
defendant's 
true 
identity 
before 
filing 
the 
original
complaint, Fulmer v. Clark Equipment Co., 654 So. 2d 45 (Ala.
1995).
Atkinson argues that Clarence Heard knew his identity and
his involvement with the installation of the APV tank before
the Heards filed their original complaint.  He cites the
1051437
5
following in the deposition given by Clarence Heard on
December 6, 2005:
"Q. Was the tank already installed when you moved to
     the 79th Street facility?
"A.  Yes.
     "Q.  Was the piping already hooked up to it?
 
"A.  No.
"Q.  Were there people that were working on the
[APV] tank when you went there, when you moved to
that facility?
"A.  Yes.
"Q.  Do you know who they were?
"A.  I know Dwayne, Dwayne Atkinson.  He was over it.
"Q.  All right.  Now I'm going to have to ask you to
spell Dwayne's last name if you can for me.
"A.  I can't spell it.
"Q.  Can you pronounce it for me again?
"A.  Dwayne Atkinson.
"Q.  Atkinson?
"A.  Yeah, I think that's it.
"Q.  Does Dwayne still work at Ventura [Foods]?
"A.  Yes.
"Q.  In what department does he work?
1051437
6
"A.  He works in engineering.
"Q.  Was he super -- let me start over.  From your
observations, did it appear that Dewayne Atkinson
was supervising the installation of the [APV] tank?
"A.  Yes, he was.
"....
"Q.  For how many days or weeks did you observe
Dwayne Atkinson and these contractors working on the
[APV] tank and connecting pipes to it?
"A.  I can't recall.
"Q.  Okay.  What did you see them do with respect to
the [APV] tank?
"A.  I just saw them hanging pipes, that's all."
Atkinson argues that Heard's answers in this deposition
establish that Heard knew Atkinson's true identity long before
the Heards filed their original complaint and that, even if
there is doubt as to whether he knew Atkinson's exact name at
that time, he knew enough about Atkinson that with due
diligence he could have determined Atkinson's true identity.
The Heards argue that Clarence Heard did not know
Atkinson. 
 
They 
note 
that 
in 
Clarence's 
answers 
to
interrogatories filed on October 19, 2005, he identified
Dwayne Atkinson as "Dewayne Adkins."  They also cite testimony
of other employees of Ventura Foods who stated that they did
1051437
7
not know Atkinson.  This, however, does not demonstrate the
ignorance 
of 
the 
defendant's 
identity 
that 
Columbia
Engineering and other cases require.  Even if it did establish
ignorance, it falls far short of establishing that the Heards
could not have learned Atkinson's true name with due
diligence, as Fulmer requires.  Certainly, if they knew that
someone with a name similar to "Dewayne Adkins" worked as a
supervisor for Ventura Foods, with due diligence they could
have learned  Atkinson's true identity.
The Heards also argue that Atkinson has failed to
demonstrate that he has suffered any prejudice from their
failure to name him as a party in the earlier complaint,
because, according to the Heards, he was aware of his
participation in the events underlying their action.  However,
the cases cited by the Heards do not support their position.
In  Denney v. Serio, 446 So. 2d 7 (Ala. 1984), Denney was
allowed to amend her pleading by substituting Serio as a
defendant for one of the fictitiously named defendants even
though the statute of limitations had expired, because the
defendant had suffered no substantial prejudice resulting from
her failure to name him in the original complaint.  However,
1051437
8
Denney had clearly established that she had no knowledge of
Serio's identity at the time she filed her complaint.
Likewise, in Wallace v. Doege, 484 So. 2d 404 (Ala. 1986),
Doege was allowed to name Wallace as a defendant in place of
the fictitiously named party even though the statute of
limitations had expired; however, like Denney, Doege had
established that she had no knowledge of Wallace's identity
when she filed her original complaint.  In each of these
cases, the question of the prejudicial effect on the named
defendant arises only after the plaintiff shows ignorance of
the defendant's identity at the time of filing the original
complaint.  Even if the plaintiff can establish this lack of
knowledge, however, the court will not allow the substitution
if the plaintiff has inordinately delayed in amending the
complaint and if the defendant is prejudiced by the
plaintiff's delay.  In this case, the Heards have failed to
establish that they were ignorant of Atkinson's identity, and
they have failed to establish that they could not have learned
his identity through due diligence before they filed their
original complaint.  Therefore, we do not reach the issue of
1051437
9
any prejudice to Atkinson caused by allowing the Heards to
amend their complaint to add him as a named defendant.
IV. Conclusion
Atkinson has established that the Heards were not
ignorant of his identify when they filed their original
complaint.  Therefore, the Heards' amended complaint does not
relate back to their original complaint; it is therefore time-
barred as it relates to Atkinson.  
Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion in
denying Atkinson's motion to dismiss.  This Court therefore
grants Atkinson's petition for the writ of mandamus and
directs the trial court to dismiss Atkinson as a defendant in
this case.
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith,
Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.