Title: City of Hutchinson v. HUTCHINSON, OFF. OF ST. EMP. SERV

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

213 Kan. 399 (1973)
517 P.2d 117
CITY OF HUTCHINSON, KANSAS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION OF HUTCHINSON, KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
THE HUTCHINSON, KANSAS OFFICE OF THE KANSAS STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND LAWRENCE M. FORNEY, Appellees.
No. 47,005

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 8, 1973.
Charles Hyter, of Hutchinson, argued the cause, and John A. Robinson, of Hutchinson, was on the brief for the appellant.
F. Duane Roberts, of Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellees.
David L. Ryan, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, attorney general, Charles S. Scott and Roger W. Lovett, both of Topeka, were with him on the brief for Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, American G.I. Forum and Kansas Human Relations Association, amicus curiae.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action by the City of Hutchinson for and on behalf of the Human Relations Commission of Hutchinson, Kansas, to require the Hutchinson, Kansas, office of the Kansas State Employment Service to furnish records in connection with an investigation.
The petition alleged:
Midland Credit Management, Inc.
Horn & Buckle Restaurant
Master Machine Tool, Inc. and
C-K, Inc.
*402 Thereupon the attorney for the defendants filed a motion which in material part reads:
On the 17th day of March 1972, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing in connection with the motion, and, after arguments, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. (Citing, City of Hutchinson v. Wagoner, 163 Kan. 735, 186 P.2d 243.) The reason assigned by the trial court for its ruling was that jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action is vested by statute and cannot ordinarily be conferred on a court by consent, waiver or estoppel. It also relied upon City of McPherson v. State Corporation Commission, 174 Kan. 407, 257 P.2d 123, for the proposition that the authority and jurisdiction of a court is fixed by statute and Article 3, Sec. 6, of the Kansas Constitution.
Appeal has been dulyAmong the exhibits introduced by the appellee at the hearing on the motion was Hutchinson Ordinance No. 6132; Rules of Procedure *403 of the Hutchinson Human Relations Commission; complaints filed by Mrs. Bobby VanBuren against Midland Credit Management, Inc., Valley Federal Savings and Loan Association, The Horn and Buckle Restaurant, Master Machine Tools, Inc., C-K, Inc., and Employment Service of Kansas. Also introduced in evidence was the regulation adopted by the State Labor Commissioner in connection with disclosure of information, Article IV, and a federal poster which prohibits discrimination by State Employment Service officers.
Appellees' Exhibit No. 9 is entitled:
"CITY OF HUTCHINSON: HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION
DOCKET No. 6-72
On the Complaint of Mrs. Bobby VanBuren
Complainant,
v.
Employment Service of Kansas
Respondent."
In her complaint Mrs. VanBuren among other things alleged:
It is readily apparent the appellant's action is against a state agency, The Kansas State Employment Service.
The Employment Security Law (K.S.A. 44-701, et seq., as amended) is complete within itself and provides its own procedures. (Shumaker v. Kansas State Labor Dept., 154 Kan. 418, 118 P.2d 550.)
The law is administered by the State Labor Commissioner. Actions brought by or against the agency involving employment service activities are brought in the name of the commissioner.
The State Labor Commissioner's duties and powers are described in K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 44-714 in these words:
K.S.A. 44-715 provides:
Under K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 44-717 (b) (1) actions for collection against employers shall be by civil action in the name of the "commissioner". The "commissioner" is defined to be the State Labor Commissioner in K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 44-703 (e).
The State Labor Commissioner's representation in court is covered by K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 44-720 in these words:
Service of process upon governmental agencies is specified in K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-304 (d) which provides in part:
Pursuant to the authority in 44-714, supra, the State Labor Commissioner adopted rules and regulations. Among them is K.A.R. 50-4-1 which places limitations upon the disclosure of information from the employment security division's files. The regulation begins with these words:
The regulation then continues to state that disclosure of information is authorized in certain cases, naming employment service functions, benefit claimants, unemployment compensation and similar agencies, public assistance agencies and no others. The regulation *405 authorizes general information but it does not include information indentifiable to individual applicants, employers, or employing establishments. The last paragraph of the regulation authorizes the giving of information to individuals, organizations, and agencies or for purposes other than those specified above, if such disclosure will not impede the operation of, and if not inconsistent with the purposes of, the public employment service program and is "authorized in writing in individual cases by the commissioner".
There is nothing in the record disclosing that the appellant complied with the foregoing regulation to procure the information and records sought by this action. On the contrary, the allegations of the petition  that Lawrence M. Forney refused to divulge information identifiable to individual applicants, employers, or employing establishments  admit compliance with the regulation by Mr. Forney.
In the petition filed by the appellant the State Labor Commissioner is not made a party to the action. An attempt is made in the petition to set up a purely local claim against a local official for the refusal to obey a city ordinance concerning the local official's state type activities.
Under the Kansas code of civil procedure Lawrence M. Forney, designated a defendant in this action, as an agent and employee of the employment security division, was merely acting in his official capacity in accordance with the Kansas Statutes and the agency regulations governing the performance of his duties. In this action Forney is not an indispensable party, nor is he a "contingently necessary" party under K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-219 (a).
Lawrence M. Forney, as a public officer, is not individually liable for the performance of duties involving discretion and judgment in the absence of malice, oppression in office or willful misconduct. (Hicks v. Davis, 100 Kan. 4, 163 Pac. 799; and Barten v. Turkey Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200 Kan. 489, 438 P.2d 732.)
In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Kronewitter, 199 Kan. 228, 428 P.2d 804 the court held:
From the allegations of the petition and on the state of the record *406 presented the State Labor Commissioner is an indispensable party to this action, and Lawrence M. Forney is not a necessary party. Failure to name the State Labor Commissioner as a party defendant and serve the attorney general or an assistant attorney general is fatal to the appellant's action. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction over the necessary parties to proceed in the matter.
Here the State Labor Commissioner made no entry of appearance. Counsel for the appellees raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process by motion as he was authorized to do by K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-212 (b). By his appearance for the named parties defendant's counsel did not waive any rights of the named defendants.
The old distinction between a general and special appearance was abolished by the new code of civil procedure (60-212 [b], supra, and Small v. Small, 195 Kan. 531, 538, 407 P.2d 491). In Haley v. Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 485 P.2d 1321, the court said:
In view of our disposition of the case it is unnecessary to discuss the matter of venue, which has not been briefed by the parties.
This court has long been committed to the rule that a judgment which is correct in result will not be disturbed on appeal even though the reasons given by the trial court for its rendition are erroneous. (Henks v. Panning, 175 Kan. 424, 264 P.2d 483; George v. Ayesh, 179 Kan. 324, 295 P.2d 660; and Leanderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita, 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1.)
As in Hutchinson Human Relations Commission v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308, 517 P.2d 158, the attorney general joined in the brief amicus curiae of the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American G.I. Forum and Kansas Human Relations Association urging the court to reverse the decision of the trial court.
For the reasons heretofore assigned the decision of the trial court dismissing the action on the motion of the appellees is correct in result. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.