Title: State v. Melvin

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-39 
No. 486PA19 
Filed 16 April 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
JAMELL CHA MELVIN and JAVEAL AARON BAKER 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA18-843, 2019 WL 6134204 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2019), finding no error in part and vacating and remanding in part 
judgments entered on 4 August 2017 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Superior Court, 
Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 February 2021.  
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Benjamin O. Zellinger, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Sarah Holladay for defendant-appellant Jamell Cha Melvin. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In the summer of 2015, armed robbers stole nearly half a million dollars from 
Raleigh’s Walnut Creek Amphitheater. The narrow question in this appeal is whether 
one of the defendants in this case, Jamell Cha Melvin, properly preserved for 
appellate review his claim that he should not have been tried jointly with another 
defendant because the two had antagonistic defenses at trial. Three defendants, Mr. 
Melvin, Javeal Aaron Baker, and Kianna Baker, were tried together as co-defendants 
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
for their involvement in the crime after their motions for separate trials were denied. 
Following their convictions, Mr. Melvin and Mr. Javeal Baker appealed to the Court 
of Appeals, arguing that the trial court should have granted their motions for 
severance. The Court of Appeals concluded that their claims had not been properly 
preserved for appeal because the grounds for severance argued at the beginning of 
the trial were not the same as the grounds relied upon by defendants on appeal. 
However, the Court of Appeals erroneously analyzed the case as one involving 
severance of offenses rather than severance of defendants. Mr. Melvin sought and 
was allowed discretionary review by this Court. We reverse and remand to the Court 
of Appeals for consideration on the merits of Mr. Melvin’s claim for severance of 
defendants.1  
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
At trial, the State presented evidence that three armed men entered the 
                                            
1 The Court of Appeals also considered arguments from Mr. Baker and Mr. Melvin 
that (1) the trial court erred when, in response to a jury request for available information on 
Crime Stopper tips, the trial court failed to repeat a limiting instruction regarding 
anonymous tips; and (2) the trial committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could 
find Mr. Baker and Mr. Melvin guilty on six separate counts of robbery. State v. Melvin, No. 
COA18-843, 2019 WL 6134204, at *5–7 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished). It 
rejected these arguments. Id. The Court of Appeals also rejected Mr. Baker’s argument that 
the record did not contain any evidence that Mr. Baker had constructive possession of money 
found in a storage unit and rejected Mr. Melvin’s argument that cumulative error warranted 
a new trial and his argument that the trial court erred when it entered a judgment for 
restitution. Id. at *7–9. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in 
entering a civil judgment for attorneys’ fees against Mr. Melvin because the trial court failed 
to provide Mr. Melvin with an opportunity to be heard. Id. at *9. Our decision leaves 
undisturbed these portions of the Court of Appeals decision. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Walnut Creek Amphitheater in Raleigh, North Carolina, on 13 July 2015. The men 
were wearing dark clothing, except for one who was wearing a tan coat, and all three 
men had their faces concealed. The assailants corralled five employees in one or two 
offices, holding them all at gunpoint and threatening to shoot them. After forcing one 
of the employees, a supervisor, to call the general manager, the men compelled the 
general manager to open the safe. Two of the armed men then began packing money 
into bags while the third moved some of the employees into a walk-in freezer. The 
men stole approximately $497,000 and then fled the scene. The State alleged that Mr. 
Melvin was the driver of a car that transported the three men who robbed the 
amphitheater.  
¶ 3 
 
On 8 June 2017, the State filed motions (1) to join for trial the offenses of six 
counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, and five counts of second degree kidnapping 
against each of four defendants (Mr. Melvin, Mr. Baker, Shymale Robertson, and 
Adjani Bryant); and (2) to join for trial six defendants (Mr. Melvin, Mr. Javeal Baker, 
Shymale Robertson, Adjani Bryant, Ms. Kianna Baker, and Lorenzo McNeil) on the 
theory that the offenses charged against each defendant were all part of a common 
scheme or plan. The motion for joinder of offenses and the motion for joinder of 
defendants were included in the same document for each defendant, titled “Motion 
and Order for Joinder.” The record contains a subsequent motion by the State, made 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
28 June 2017, that sought to join all of the same defendants with the exception of 
Adjani Bryant, who testified against Mr. Melvin and Mr. Baker at trial.  
¶ 4 
 
At a hearing to consider the State’s motions for joinder, the defendants made 
various arguments about why they should be tried separately. Counsel for Mr. 
Robertson argued, in part, that Mr. Robertson’s case should be severed because he 
intended to call a witness named Chicago Smith who would provide information, in 
the form of a statement from Mr. Melvin, that was potentially exculpatory for Mr. 
Robertson and potentially incriminating for Mr. Baker and Mr. Melvin. Mr. 
Robertson’s counsel also argued that much of the evidence expected to be presented 
in the case did not pertain to Mr. Robertson, that he intended to elicit information 
from one of the State’s witnesses that would likely be prejudicial to the other 
defendants and to Mr. Melvin in particular, that the other defendants (and Mr. 
Melvin particularly) were more culpable than Mr. Robertson, and that Mr. Robertson 
might be convicted on the basis of his association with the other defendants rather 
than on the basis of his guilt.  
¶ 5 
 
Mr. Baker’s counsel asked for Mr. Baker’s trial to be severed from Mr. 
Robertson’s trial because of Mr. Robertson’s plan to call Chicago Smith, arguing that 
if they were tried jointly, he would be unable to cross-examine Mr. Melvin, a co-
defendant who was the source of Chicago Smith’s information. However, Mr. Baker’s 
counsel suggested that the problem could be solved if Mr. Baker’s and Mr. Melvin’s 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
trials were severed from each other. Mr. Baker’s counsel also requested severance 
from Ms. Kianna Baker (Mr. Baker’s mother) and Mr. Melvin (Ms. Baker’s partner), 
on the basis that he might be convicted based on the conduct of Ms. Baker and Mr. 
Melvin. Mr. Baker’s counsel argued that the dearth of direct evidence related to his 
client and the more substantial evidence forecast to be presented against Mr. Melvin 
and Ms. Kianna Baker made it more likely that he might be convicted as a result of 
his relationship to Mr. Melvin and Ms. Baker.  
¶ 6 
 
Mr. Melvin’s counsel argued that Mr. Robertson’s trial should be severed 
because Chicago Smith’s testimony, expected to be elicited by Mr. Robertson, was 
likely to conflict with the State’s evidence presented through the testimony of Adjani 
Bryant. On his own motion to sever, Mr. Melvin’s counsel argued that, because the 
State alleged that Mr. Melvin was the driver rather than one of the three armed men 
who robbed the amphitheater, Mr. Melvin should be tried separately to avoid 
confusing the jury.  
¶ 7 
 
Ms. Kianna Baker’s counsel argued that she should be tried separately because 
(1) Ms. Baker was charged as an accessory after the fact rather than a principal, and 
(2) Ms. Baker was likely to be convicted on the basis of her associations rather than 
on the evidence. Mr. McNeil’s counsel did not make any arguments as to joinder in 
anticipation that Mr. McNeil’s case would be resolved before the trial began. 
¶ 8 
 
After taking the motions under advisement, the trial court ultimately granted 
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the State’s motion to join the defendants and offenses for trial as to Mr. Baker, Mr. 
Melvin, Ms. Kianna Baker, and Mr. McNeil. As to Mr. Robertson, the trial court 
denied the State’s motion to join him as a defendant for trial, but granted the State’s 
motion to join his charged offenses. The joint trial of Mr. Melvin, Ms. Kianna Baker, 
and Mr. Javeal Baker began on 10 July 2017.  
¶ 9 
 
During the joint trial, Mr. Melvin moved to sever defendants an additional five 
times. First, Mr. Melvin asked to be heard following direct examination testimony by 
Kelly Ann Kinney, a detective with the Raleigh Police Department. Mr. Melvin 
argued that the detective had testified to statements made by Ms. Baker to Detective 
Kinney indicating that Mr. Melvin sold marijuana and had purchased two vehicles. 
Mr. Melvin argued that he had “wanted to sever for these particular reasons” and 
renewed his motion to sever the defendants, which was denied. Second, Mr. Melvin 
renewed his objection to joinder of defendants, without further explanation, at the 
close of the State’s evidence. Third, Mr. Melvin renewed his objection to joinder of 
defendants, again without further argument, at the close of all evidence.  
¶ 10 
 
Mr. Melvin’s final two objections to joinder of the defendants came after the 
parties’ closing arguments. The first of the two objections, Mr. Melvin’s fifth overall 
objection to the defendants’ joinder, came at the end of the jury’s first day of 
deliberations. After the trial court dismissed the jury for the evening, the trial court 
asked whether there were any additional objections from counsel regarding 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
instructions that had been provided. Mr. Melvin’s counsel stated, “Nothing as to that. 
I did want to revisit a matter and renew my objection to the joinder of this matter 
based on [Mr. Baker’s counsel’s] comments in his closing arguments.” The trial court 
denied the motion. The following day, the jury returned its verdicts. The day after 
that, before the trial court conducted sentencing, Mr. Melvin’s counsel asked to be 
heard and explained that his objection after the closing argument from Mr. Baker’s 
counsel was because Mr. Melvin “not only had to contest [the State] but had to contest 
[Mr. Baker].” In the view of Mr. Melvin’s counsel, this was in violation of Mr. Melvin’s 
rights under the United States and North Carolina constitutions.  
¶ 11 
 
During his closing argument, Mr. Baker’s counsel had argued to the jury that 
Mr. Melvin had committed the actual robbery, stating: 
The Walnut Creek Amphitheater was robbed. Those six 
victims were robbed. Those six victims were then 
kidnapped in the sense of being put in a cooler or left in the 
cash room. The question is who did that? And the defense 
that we’ve been trying to present to you through the 
questions is that it wasn’t Javeal Baker, but it was Adjani 
Bryant, who you know did go into this robbery, and it was 
Jamell Melvin, and it was Lorenzo [McNeil].  
Mr. Baker’s counsel then emphasized that “the evidence that [he’d] tried to present” 
through his questions was that the robbery “was committed by Adjani Bryant, by 
Jamell Melvin, and by Lorenzo [McNeil].”2 Mr. Baker’s counsel went on to assert that 
                                            
2 A review of the trial transcript reveals the efforts of Mr. Baker’s trial counsel in this 
regard. For example, Mr. Baker’s counsel used cross-examination to elicit information 
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Mr. Melvin (rather than Mr. Baker) had been in the building committing the robbery, 
arguing that Mr. Melvin matched the physical description of one of the robbers and 
that Mr. Melvin was more closely associated with the other suspects in the case.  
¶ 12 
 
At the trial’s conclusion, Mr. Melvin and Mr. Baker were each convicted of six 
counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, five counts of second-degree kidnapping, 
and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.3 The trial 
court entered judgment, and they both appealed their judgments to the Court of 
Appeals.  
¶ 13 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Melvin and Mr. Baker primarily argued 
that the trial court should have severed their cases and tried them separately. State 
v. Melvin, No. COA18-843, 2019 WL 6134204, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2019) 
(unpublished). They asserted that they had put on antagonistic defenses at trial. Id. 
at *2. The Court of Appeals did not address the merits of this argument, holding 
instead that it was unpreserved because neither Mr. Melvin nor Mr. Baker had 
argued before trial that they planned to present antagonistic defenses. Id. at *2–5. 
                                            
regarding a violent assault by Mr. Melvin; ties between Mr. Melvin and Adjani Bryant (who 
admitted involvement in the robbery); and Mr. Melvin’s history of working at the 
amphitheater, contrasting the lack of a similar history on Mr. Baker’s part. It was also Mr. 
Baker’s counsel who elicited testimony regarding Mr. Melvin’s height, which he later argued 
was evidence that Mr. Melvin and not Mr. Baker had entered the amphitheater to commit 
the robbery. While these examples are not every instance of Mr. Baker’s counsel referring to 
Mr. Melvin, they indicate that the alleged conflict did not first appear during closing 
arguments. 
3 Ms. Kianna Baker, who was not a party to the appeal below, was convicted of 
accessory after the fact of robbery with a dangerous weapon.  
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
After rejecting most of the defendants’ other arguments as being without merit, the 
Court of Appeals found no error in the judgments of conviction but vacated and 
remanded the civil judgment of attorneys’ fees against Mr. Melvin. Id. at *9. Mr. 
Melvin sought discretionary review in this Court, asking that we review that portion 
of the Court of Appeals decision which addressed his objection to the joinder of his 
trial with that of Mr. Baker. We allowed the petition on 26 February 2020.  
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 14 
 
“This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to determine whether 
it contains any errors of law.” State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 244 (2020) (quoting State 
v. Melton, 371 N.C. 750, 756 (2018)). As to the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion 
for joinder, consolidating the trials of defendants alleged to be responsible for the 
same behavior is preferred as a matter of public policy. State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 
564 (2004) (citing State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 586 (1979)). Therefore, “[a] trial 
court’s ruling on a motion for joinder is reviewed for abuse of discretion in light of the 
circumstances of the case, and the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
showing that the joinder caused the defendant to be deprived of a fair trial.” Id. (citing 
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 399 (2000)); see also State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 281–
82 (1976). We will reverse a trial court for abuse of discretion “only upon a showing 
that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason” or where the ruling “was so 
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
312 N.C. 770, 777 (1985). However, such an abuse of discretion is established when 
the trial court makes an error of law. Da Silva v. WakeMed, 375 N.C. 1, 5 n.2 (2020) 
(citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)); State v. Rhodes, 366 N.C. 532, 
536 (2013); accord Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 732 (1952) (stating that “a 
matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . is not reviewable on 
appeal” absent “a palpable abuse of such discretion” or “some imputed error of law or 
legal inference” (first quoting Johnston v. Johnston, 213 N.C. 255, 257 (1938); then 
quoting Hughes v. Oliver, 228 N.C. 680, 685 (1948); then quoting Johnston, 213 N.C. 
at 257)). 
III. 
Severance of Defendants for Trial 
¶ 15 
 
The Court of Appeals erred by considering only the pretrial motions for 
severance. Instead, it should have considered each of the motions made by Mr. 
Melvin’s counsel and decided on the merits whether the trial court was required to 
sever the defendants’ trials.  
¶ 16 
 
Section 15A-927 of the General Statutes governs objections to the joinder of 
defendants for trial. The statute provides that a trial court “must deny a joinder for 
trial or grant a severance of defendants whenever” (1) the trial court finds before trial 
that severance is necessary to protect a defendant’s speedy trial right or to promote 
a fair determination of guilt or innocence, or (2) the trial court finds during trial that 
severance is “necessary to achieve a fair determination” of guilt or innocence. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c)(2) (2019). If during trial, the motion to sever must be made by 
the severing defendant or by the prosecutor with the severing defendant’s consent. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c)(2)(b). Thus, the statute contemplates that defendants may 
object to joinder or move for severance both “before trial” and “during trial.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 15A-927(c)(2). Further, the statute does not limit such objections or motions to the 
period of time before trial or before the close of the State’s evidence. See id. Instead, 
the trial court “must deny a joinder for trial or grant a severance of defendants 
whenever . . . it is found necessary to achieve a fair determination of the guilt or 
innocence of [the severing] defendant.” Id. Defendants may preserve for appellate 
review, then, a claim for severance of defendants by objecting to joinder or moving for 
severance of defendants at any point during the trial. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 346 
N.C. 221, 231–32 (1997) (considering the merits of a defendant’s argument that the 
trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the defendant’s case for trial based in 
part on evidence presented during a co-defendant’s case-in-chief); State v. Workman, 
344 N.C. 482, 492–96 (1996) (considering the merits of a defendant’s argument that 
the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the defendant’s case for trial based 
only on occurrences after the State rested its case-in-chief). There is no part of the 
statute which would support a conclusion to the contrary. 
¶ 17 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Melvin’s argument for severance was 
not preserved and stated that “[t]o preserve an argument concerning joinder or 
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
severance for appellate review, the defendant must assert that specific argument to 
the trial court before trial or, if the ground for severance arises only after the trial 
begins, immediately after that ground becomes apparent.” Melvin, 2019 WL 6134204, 
at *2 (citing State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 79 (2003)). This is true as to severance of 
offenses. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(a)(1) (“A defendant’s motion for severance of offenses 
must be made before trial as provided in G.S. 15A-952, except as provided in G.S. 
15A-953, and except that a motion for severance may be made before or at the close 
of the State’s evidence if based upon a ground not previously known.”); accord 
Walters, 357 N.C. at 79 (“Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(a), a defendant must make 
a motion for severance of offenses before trial unless the basis for the motion is a 
ground not previously known. Under such a situation, the defendant may move for 
severance during trial but no later than the close of the State’s evidence.”). However, 
the statute contains no similar requirement for the timing of a motion for severance 
of defendants. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-927.  
¶ 18 
 
Indeed, this Court has previously addressed the merits of an argument for 
severance of defendants against a similar procedural backdrop. In State v. Pickens, 
335 N.C. 717 (1994), the two co-defendants “filed motions to sever prior to trial” which 
were denied. Id. at 724. Both defendants renewed their motions throughout the trial 
and were denied. Id. In that decision, we gave no indication that we were limiting our 
analysis to the arguments made prior to trial. Instead, we considered the “numerous 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
evidentiary rulings” identified by the co-defendants “which they contend[ed] resulted 
in the denial of a fair trial for each of them.” Id.; see also Nelson, 298 N.C. at 586–87 
(considering testimony of co-defendants, which necessarily occurred after the close of 
the State’s evidence, to determine whether motions of severance of defendants were 
properly denied). In the decision below, the Court of Appeals relied on two of our prior 
decisions to conclude that the arguments of Mr. Melvin and Mr. Baker were 
unpreserved. See Melvin, 2019 WL 6134204, at *2 (citing Walters, 357 N.C. at 79); Id. 
at *4 (citing State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 127 (1981)). However, both of those decisions 
pertained to severance of offenses rather than severance of defendants. See Walters, 
357 N.C. at 79 (considering preservation of the defendant’s argument that the trial 
court erred by consolidating “the murders and related charges regarding” multiple 
victims); Silva, 304 N.C. at 126 (considering preservation of the defendant’s argument 
that the trial court erred by consolidating charges of robbery, larceny, and 
conspiracy).  
¶ 19 
 
On these facts, where Mr. Melvin objected to joinder prior to trial, moved to 
sever during trial when he perceived that testimony relating a co-defendant’s 
statements prejudiced him, renewed the motion to sever at the close of the State’s 
evidence and at the close of all evidence, and again moved to sever on the basis of a 
co-defendant arguing during closing that Mr. Melvin was guilty, we hold that Mr. 
Melvin sufficiently preserved for appellate review his motion to sever his trial from 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that of his co-defendants on the basis of antagonistic defenses. The Court of Appeals 
erred by applying the preservation standard for severance of offenses rather than the 
standard applicable to severance of defendants and erroneously limited its 
consideration to only Mr. Melvin’s pretrial arguments for severance. As a result, we 
reverse the Court of Appeals decision holding that Mr. Melvin did not adequately 
preserve his argument and remand to that court for consideration of Mr. Melvin’s 
claim on the merits. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER concurring in result only. 
¶ 20 
 
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong statute 
when it analyzed this case.  Rather than applying N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c)–severance 
of defendants–the Court of Appeals applied N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(a)(1)–(2)–severance 
of offenses.  However, I concur in result only because this case should simply be 
remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c) and to analyze 
preservation under the appropriate statute, rather than this Court making the 
determination in the first instance.  
¶ 21 
 
Instead, the majority has issued an opinion concerning preservation which 
could be misinterpreted as removing Rule 10’s requirement for specific grounds in 
cases involving joinder or severance of defendants.  Given the plain language of Rule 
10, the majority could not have intended for an objection to joinder on Bruton grounds 
to preserve an antagonistic defenses argument on appeal.  It is more likely that the 
majority intended to convey that defendant’s objection prior to sentencing preserved 
for appellate review his antagonistic defenses argument. 
¶ 22 
 
“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have 
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific 
grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were 
not apparent from the context.”  N.C. R. App. P. 10(a).  Defendant’s sole motion to 
sever based on antagonistic defenses was his sixth objection to joinder, made after 
the jury verdict and prior to sentencing.  A misreading of the majority opinion could 
 
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Berger, J., concurring 
 
 
 
allow defendants to argue one ground for severance at trial but still preserve wholly 
unrelated arguments for appeal.  This would undermine the purpose of requiring a 
party to state the specific grounds for a motion or an objection and obtain a ruling 
from the trial court.   
¶ 23 
 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c) sets forth specific grounds for severance of defendants: 
when (1) “a defendant objects to joinder of charges against two or more defendants 
for trial because of an out-of-court statement of a codefendant makes reference to him 
but is not admissible against him,” (2) “if before trial it is found necessary to protect 
a defendant’s right to a speedy trial,” or (3) either before or during trial, it is found 
necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more 
defendants.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c)(1)–(3) (2019).  The issue of antagonistic 
defenses is one of several circumstances in which severance may be related to 
promoting a fair determination of guilt or innocence, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-
927(c)(2).  See State v. Pickens, 335 N.C. 717, 725, 440 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1994) (“The 
test [for antagonistic defenses] is whether the conflict in defendants’ respective 
positions at trial is of such a nature that, considering all of the other evidence in the 
case, defendants were denied a fair trial.” (cleaned up)).   
¶ 24 
 
Here, defendant only raised the specific ground of antagonistic defenses in his 
sixth objection to joinder.  Defendant’s other objections either concerned Bruton 
issues or were simply renewals of prior objections.  As such, defendant’s five earlier 
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Berger, J., concurring 
 
 
 
objections did not preserve the issue of antagonistic defenses for appellate review.  
See State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 477, 272 S.E.2d 84, 89 (1980) (“A specific objection, 
if overruled, will be effective only to the extent of the grounds specified.”).   
¶ 25 
 
During the pre-trial hearing, defendant first objected to joinder, arguing that 
there was a Bruton issue with potential witness Chicago Smith.  During trial, 
defendant renewed his motion to sever based on Bruton because of a statement that 
defendant was a drug dealer.  Counsel for defendant stated that he was renewing his 
motion to sever “for these particular reasons.”  Defendant’s next two objections, made 
at the close of the State’s evidence and the close of all of the evidence, were renewals 
of his prior objections.  None of these objections mentioned antagonistic defenses, and 
there was no argument made by defendant related to antagonistic defenses.   
¶ 26 
 
After closing arguments, defendant’s counsel again attempted to sever; this 
time based on comments counsel for co-defendant Baker made during closing 
arguments.  However, defense counsel stated that he was “renew[ing his] objection to 
the joinder of this matter.”  Defendant failed to direct the court to the specific 
comments made by Baker’s counsel during closing arguments to which he was 
objecting, and he never objected based on antagonistic defenses.   
¶ 27 
 
Following the entry of the jury’s verdicts, defense counsel finally articulated 
an objection related to antagonistic defenses.  Defense counsel stated:  
during the course of the trial, I renewed my objection to the 
court joining these defendants for trial. I just want to make 
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Berger, J., concurring 
 
 
 
sure that it’s on the record as to why. As you recall, Mr. 
Wilkinson gave a closing, and my client, Mr. Melvin, not 
only had to contest Mr. Waller but had to contest Mr. 
Wilkinson, and I think that’s a violation of his 
constitutional rights, both under North Carolina and the 
U.S. Constitution. So I want to put that on the record.   
¶ 28 
 
This was the only time defendant argued for severance based on the possibility 
of antagonistic defenses and a fair determination of guilt or innocence.   
¶ 29 
 
 The majority holds that: 
where [defendant] objected to joinder prior to trial, moved 
to sever during trial when he perceived that testimony 
relating a co-defendant’s statements prejudiced him, 
renewed the motion to sever at the close of the State’s 
evidence and at the close of all evidence, and again moved 
to sever on the basis of a co-defendant arguing during 
closing that [defendant] was guilty, we hold that 
[defendant] sufficiently preserved for appellate review his 
motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants on 
the basis of antagonistic defenses.  
This could be read as holding that defendant’s sixth objection preserved his 
antagonistic defense argument.  Or, the majority opinion could be viewed, contrary 
to Rule 10, as permitting a defendant to object to joinder on one ground, but 
nevertheless preserve a different issue for our review.1  The majority’s approach, 
however, overlooks the fact that defendant abandoned many of his joinder arguments.  
See N.C. Rule App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are 
                                            
1 Such a procedure would be equivalent to allowing an argument that a particular 
statement is not a present sense impression under Rule 803(1) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Evidence to then preserve for appellate review every potential hearsay objection that 
could have been made by a party.   
STATE V. MELVIN 
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Berger, J., concurring 
 
 
 
deemed abandoned.”).  It seems incongruent to find preservation where a party has 
abandoned the issue on appeal.   
¶ 30 
 
While I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals opinion was 
premised on the wrong statute, this matter should be remanded for the Court of 
Appeals to apply N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c) and review preservation of defendant’s 
antagonistic defenses argument under that section. 
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BARRINGER join in this concurring 
opinion.