Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 120 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2525-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, 
Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
       Complainant-Respondent, 
       
       v. 
 
Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GOROKHOVSKY    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 30, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, pro se.  
 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief 
filed by Matthew Price, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee.       
 
 
2012 WI 120 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2525-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, Attorney at 
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 30, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky has 
appealed from the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law entered after a public hearing following the filing of the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) complaint on October 15, 
2010.  The OLR alleged, and the referee concluded, that Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
had 
committed 
the 
following 
eight 
acts 
of 
professional misconduct: 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
2 
 
Count 
1:  Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
failed 
to 
provide 
competent representation to a client in violation of 
SCR 20:1.11 by advising a client that the client's chosen 
litigation strategy would be unlikely to succeed despite 
having never spoken to the client, reviewed the trial 
transcripts, or reviewed an important piece of trial 
evidence.   
Count 2:  Attorney Gorokhovsky failed to consult with 
his client and abide by the client's decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation in violation of former 
SCR 20:1.2(a)2 
by 
filing 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
for 
sentence modification without any prior input from his 
client. 
Count 3:  Attorney Gorokhovsky failed to keep his 
client reasonably informed and promptly comply with his 
client's reasonable requests for information, failed to 
communicate with his client in any way for almost a month 
after the representation began, by which time he had 
accumulated over $1,800 in attorney fees, and failed to 
communicate with his client in any way during a two-month 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 states, "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
2 Former SCR 20:1.2(a), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provided, in relevant part, "A lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, . . . and 
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are 
to be pursued." 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
3 
 
period preceding a scheduled hearing date in violation of 
former SCR 20:1.4(a)3 and current SCR 20:1.4(a)(3)4. 
Count 4:  Attorney Gorokhovsky accepted compensation 
for legal services from someone other than his client 
without obtaining the client's prior consent in violation 
of former SCR 20:1.8(f)(1).5 
Count 
5:  Attorney 
Gorokhovsky's 
compensation 
arrangement interfered with his independent professional 
judgment 
and 
with 
the 
client-lawyer 
relationship 
in 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(f)(2),6 in that Attorney Gorokhovsky 
informed the client that the party paying for his legal 
services could not afford to pay him to pursue the legal 
strategy that the client preferred, and that he was 
disinclined to schedule a telephone conference with the 
client——even though he had not yet spoken with the client——
                                                 
3 Former SCR 20:1.4(a), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provided: "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information." 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) states a lawyer shall "keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; . . . ." 
5 Former SCR 20:1.8(f)(1), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provided, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
"A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
accept 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client 
unless: 
 
(1) 
the 
client 
consents 
after 
consultation, . . . ." 
6 SCR 20:1.8(f)(2) provides, "A lawyer shall not accept 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: . . . (2) there is no interference with the 
lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the 
client-lawyer relationship; . . . ."   
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
4 
 
because the party paying for his legal services was having 
difficulty paying for those services. 
Count 6:  Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
violated 
SCR 20:1.8(f)(3)7 and former SCR 20:1.6(a)8 and current 
SCR 20:1.6(a)9 by discussing the client's case with the 
party paying for Attorney Gorokhovsky's legal services 
without the client's consent, and by allowing the party 
paying for Attorney Gorokhovsky's legal services to make 
decisions about the representation on the client's behalf. 
Count 7:  Attorney Gorokhovsky violated SCR 20:8.4(c)10 
and SCR 22.03(6)11 by dating a letter to the client on a 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.8(f)(3) states "A lawyer shall not accept 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: . . . (3) information relating to representation 
of a client is protected as required by SCR 20:1.6." 
8 Former SCR 20:1.6(a), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
provided, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
"A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
reveal 
information relating to representation of a client unless the 
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that 
are 
impliedly 
authorized 
in 
order 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
representation, . . . ." 
9 SCR 20:1.6(a) provides, in relevant part, "A lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation, . . . ." 
10 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
11 SCR 22.03(6) provides as follows: 
 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
5 
 
date when information contained in the letter establishes 
that it could not have been written until at least 13 days 
later, and by submitting a copy of this back-dated letter 
to the OLR during the course of its investigation.   
Count 8:  Attorney Gorokhovsky charged an unreasonable 
fee in violation of former SCR 20:1.5(a)12 and current 
                                                                                                                                                             
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
12 Former SCR 20:1.5(a), in effect prior to July 1, 2007, 
stated: 
 
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.  The factors 
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of 
a fee include the following:  
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;   
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
6 
 
SCR 20:1.5(a)13 by charging over $8,000 in attorney fees to 
pursue a postconviction motion that had not been authorized 
by the client, including over $1,800 in attorney fees prior 
to communicating with the client in any way; by submitting 
various duplicative and excessive charges; and by charging 
approximately $400 in fees for pursuing his fees.     
¶2 
The 
referee 
appointed 
to 
this 
matter, 
Attorney 
Christine Harris Taylor, determined that Attorney Gorokhovsky 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.5(a) states: 
 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses.  The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;   
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
7 
 
had committed the misconduct alleged in all eight counts.  The 
referee recommended 
that Attorney Gorokhovsky be publicly 
reprimanded and ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding, 
which totaled $14,396.78 as of August 1, 2012. 
¶3 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
and 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
recommendation regarding discipline.  Accordingly, this court 
concludes that Attorney Gorokhovsky's misconduct requires a 
public reprimand.  We further agree with the referee that 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
shall 
bear 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶4 
Attorney Gorokhovsky was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2002 and practices in Glendale, Wisconsin.  In 2009 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
was 
privately 
reprimanded 
for:  
(1) charging an unreasonable fee; (2) trust account violations; 
(3) failing to refund to his clients any portion of an advance 
fee; and (4) failing to provide accurate information to the OLR 
during an investigation.   
¶5 
The eight counts in this disciplinary proceeding 
concern Attorney Gorokhovsky's representation of F.B.  We 
provide the following summary of Attorney Gorokhovsky's course 
of conduct, drawn from the facts alleged by the OLR and found by 
the referee. 
¶6 
F.B. faced multiple criminal charges, including the 
false imprisonment and battery of his former girlfriend, D.B.  
After D.B. failed to appear as a witness at trial, the State 
dismissed the false imprisonment and battery charges, but 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
8 
 
pressed forward on misdemeanor and felony bail jumping charges 
arising from F.B.'s contact with D.B. in violation of certain 
no-contact orders.   
¶7 
A jury convicted F.B. on the bail jumping charges.  
The circuit court sentenced F.B. to jail and prison terms with 
extended 
supervision.  His sentences collectively carried 
several conditions, including an order that F.B. have no contact 
with D.B. without court approval during the period of extended 
supervision. 
¶8 
Despite the fact that F.B. never authorized Attorney 
Gorokhovsky to discuss his case with D.B. or anyone else, D.B. 
and Attorney Gorokhovsky repeatedly discussed F.B.'s case.  Over 
the course of several months, D.B. paid Attorney Gorokhovsky 
over $2,000 in legal fees to prepare and file a postconviction 
motion for sentence modification on F.B.'s behalf.   
¶9 
Before 
filing 
the 
sentence 
modification 
motion, 
Attorney Gorokhovsky wrote F.B. to say that he had been retained 
by D.B. and that he intended to file a motion for sentence 
modification.  F.B. wrote back stating that he disagreed with 
this approach, that D.B. had falsely accused him of criminal 
behavior, and that he wanted to challenge his conviction on 
various grounds, including ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Attorney Gorokhovsky responded with a letter stating 
that D.B. had retained him to file a sentence modification 
motion, and that challenging F.B.'s convictions as F.B. proposed 
would cost more than D.B. could afford and would be unlikely to 
succeed.  Attorney Gorokhovsky rendered this opinion about the 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
9 
 
likelihood of success of a challenge to F.B.'s convictions 
without obtaining and reviewing trial transcripts, or reviewing 
a videotape that had been an important piece of evidence at 
trial, or speaking with F.B.   
¶10 Attorney Gorokhovsky filed the sentence modification 
motion despite the fact that F.B. had not authorized him to do 
so.  The circuit court denied the motion.   
¶11 Attorney Gorokhovsky billed over $8,000 in attorney 
fees to pursue the postconviction motion that F.B. had never 
authorized.  He billed over $1,800 in attorney fees prior to 
communicating with F.B. in any fashion.  He billed approximately 
$400 for phone calls with D.B. regarding "billing issues" or 
other attempts to collect his legal fees.  He submitted various 
duplicative and excessive charges. 
¶12 The OLR alleged that by virtue of this conduct, 
Attorney Gorokhovsky committed the eight counts of misconduct 
set forth above.  Attorney Gorokhovsky denied any misconduct.   
¶13 Following a two-and-one-half-day hearing, the referee 
determined that the OLR had proven misconduct in all eight 
counts charged.  As for sanctions, the referee recommended that 
Attorney Gorokhovsky should be publicly reprimanded and should 
be assessed the entire costs of the disciplinary proceeding, 
which total $14,396.78 as of August 1, 2012.  The OLR did not 
request, and the referee did not recommend, any restitution 
award. 
¶14 Attorney Gorokhovsky appeals.  He challenges the 
referee's findings as incomplete and challenges each of the 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
10 
 
referee's conclusions of misconduct as incorrect.  He also 
appeals from the referee's recommendation that he should be 
publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding.  We consider Attorney Gorokhovsky's 
arguments in turn.     
¶15 Attorney Gorokhovsky first argues that the referee's 
findings of fact are incomplete in that the referee did not make 
findings summarizing the testimony that a certain witness gave 
at the disciplinary hearing.  Attorney Gorokhovsky appears to 
argue that the testimony of this witness was highly relevant in 
that it purportedly supported his decision to pursue a sentence 
modification motion without F.B.'s consent and justified his 
lack of communication with F.B.   
¶16 The referee obviously disagreed with this argument and 
we do also.  Nothing in this witness's testimony at the 
disciplinary hearing legitimizes Attorney Gorokhovsky's decision 
to pursue a litigation strategy contrary to his client's express 
wishes, with little in the way of lawyer-client communication.  
The referee's failure to make findings of fact summarizing the 
particular testimony at issue was harmless. 
¶17 Attorney Gorokhovsky next argues that the referee 
incorrectly granted a motion in limine filed by the OLR on the 
first morning of the disciplinary hearing.  The motion sought to 
exclude 
evidence 
of 
supposed 
off-the-record, 
in-chambers 
statements 
made 
by 
a 
circuit 
court 
judge——whom 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky did not name as a disciplinary hearing witness——
during F.B.'s criminal proceedings.  
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
11 
 
¶18 We 
reject 
this 
argument. 
 
Although 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky criticizes the motion in limine as having been filed 
untimely, he does not identify any specific deadline set by the 
referee for motions in limine, nor does he satisfactorily 
demonstrate any prejudice from the timing of the motion.  Any 
prejudice to Attorney Gorokhovsky from the granting of the 
motion in limine was self-inflicted by his failure to arrange 
for his desired witness's presence at the disciplinary hearing.  
Moreover, Attorney Gorokhovsky does not argue that the referee's 
grant 
of 
the 
motion 
in 
limine 
on 
hearsay 
grounds 
was 
substantively incorrect. 
¶19 Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
next 
argues 
that 
his 
representation of F.B. was proven to be competent by virtue of 
the fact that a different lawyer, an assistant state public 
defender, eventually filed a motion making the ineffective 
assistance claim that D.B. had wanted Attorney Gorokhovsky to 
pursue, and the circuit court denied this motion.   
¶20 We reject this argument.  Simply because F.B.'s 
preferred litigation strategy did not succeed does not mean that 
Attorney Gorokhovsky acted with the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to provide 
competent representation.  By rendering legal advice without 
speaking to his client, reading trial transcripts or reviewing 
key evidence, Attorney Gorokhovsky failed to provide competent 
representation. 
¶21 Attorney Gorokhovsky next attempts to persuade us that 
F.B. was to blame for the lack of lawyer-client communication, 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
12 
 
and that additional such communication was unnecessary given his 
familiarity with F.B.'s case.   
¶22 We reject this argument.  Attorney Gorokhovsky's 
argument does not alter the established facts that: (1) Attorney 
Gorokhovsky never consulted with F.B. before filing the sentence 
modification motion, and (2) Attorney Gorokhovsky never sought 
to withdraw the motion after learning of F.B.'s disapproval of 
the motion.  By any measure, these are troublesome failures in 
lawyer-client communication. 
¶23 Attorney Gorokhovsky next claims that his acceptance 
of compensation for legal services from D.B.——a non-client——did 
not constitute misconduct because he reasonably assumed that 
F.B. had authorized him to receive compensation from D.B., and 
because there was no proof that this payment arrangement 
interfered with his professional judgment.   
¶24 We reject this argument.  The record shows that 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
never 
obtained 
F.B.'s 
consent 
after 
consultation regarding the payment arrangement with D.B., as our 
rules 
require. 
 
The 
record 
further 
shows 
that 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky declined to perform certain work on F.B.'s behalf 
because 
D.B. 
was 
having 
difficulty 
paying 
for 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky's legal services.  These facts demonstrate the 
inappropriateness of the payment arrangement.     
¶25 Attorney Gorokhovsky next attempts to persuade us that 
his discussions with D.B. about F.B.'s case without F.B.'s 
consent, 
and 
his 
decision 
to 
follow 
D.B.'s 
strategic 
instructions rather than F.B.'s strategic instructions, did not 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
13 
 
amount to misconduct.  Attorney Gorokhovsky claims that he 
reasonably assumed that F.B. wanted D.B. to oversee his case.   
¶26 We reject this argument as unsupported by the record.  
The established facts show that Attorney Gorokhovsky was 
careless with his client's confidences and instructions, and 
such conduct is clearly unethical.   
¶27 Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
next 
takes 
issue 
with 
the 
referee's determinations that he had back-dated one of his 
letters to F.B. to make it appear as though he had sent F.B. 
certain case materials on an earlier date, and that he had 
misled the OLR by submitting a copy of this back-dated letter to 
the OLR during the course of its investigation.  Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
claims 
that 
his 
actions 
were 
not 
willfully 
misleading.   
¶28 We reject this argument.  The referee's determinations 
are fact-intensive and involve an implicit evaluation of 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky's 
credibility. 
 
Because 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky has not shown that the referee's findings with 
regard to the letter in question were clearly erroneous, we 
affirm the conclusion of misconduct on this count. 
¶29 Finally, Attorney Gorokhovsky challenges the referee's 
conclusion that he charged an unreasonable fee by, among other 
things, charging over $8,000 in attorney fees to pursue a 
postconviction motion that had not been authorized by F.B., 
submitting 
various 
duplicative and excessive charges, and 
charging approximately $400 in fees for pursuing his fees.  He 
claims that his fees were authorized by a representation 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
14 
 
agreement that D.B. never signed, and that there was no proof 
that his charges were unreasonable.   
¶30 We reject this argument.  The referee's findings with 
respect to the fees charged by Attorney Gorokhovsky are not 
clearly erroneous.  Further, we agree that these facts support 
the subsequent conclusion of law that Attorney Gorokhovsky's 
billing practices were unethical. 
¶31 In sum, after our review of the record in this matter, 
we conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous.  We agree with the referee's legal conclusion that 
Attorney Gorokhovsky's conduct as alleged in Counts 1 through 8 
of the complaint amounted to violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  We therefore adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.   
¶32 We appreciate that we may not have addressed each and 
every one of the arguments presented by Attorney Gorokhovsky 
challenging the referee's findings and conclusions.  To the 
extent we have not, such arguments are deemed denied.  See 
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 
801, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (appellate court need not discuss 
arguments 
unless 
they 
have 
"sufficient 
merit 
to 
warrant 
individual attention"). 
¶33 Turning to the question of the appropriate discipline, 
the OLR requested, and the referee recommended, that a public 
reprimand be issued as discipline for Attorney Gorokhovsky's 
misconduct.  Attorney Gorokhovsky argues that a public reprimand 
is excessive discipline in view of the facts of this matter.  He 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
15 
 
explains that whatever errors he may have committed were caused 
by an overzealous, good faith desire to help F.B. for which he 
should not be unduly punished.  He also claims that his conduct 
should be excused as a necessary part of his learning curve as a 
lawyer.  He argues that a private reprimand would be an 
appropriate sanction. 
¶34 We disagree.  Attorney Gorokhovsky has been licensed 
for a decade and has been privately disciplined once before.  
The ethical rules that Attorney Gorokhovsky violated are not 
difficult ones to grasp, and his violations of those rules were 
obvious. 
 
He 
ought 
to 
have 
known 
better. 
 
Under 
the 
circumstances, a public reprimand is a modest sanction.  We also 
remind 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
that 
the 
court 
may 
impose 
progressively severe sanctions when an attorney engages in a 
pattern of misconduct. 
¶35 Finally, there is the matter of restitution and costs.  
As to restitution, we note that there appears to be a disconnect 
between the OLR's disinterest in pursing restitution (it seeks 
none) and its charging decision.  In Count 4 the OLR alleged, 
the referee concluded, and this court has agreed that Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
committed 
professional 
misconduct 
by 
accepting 
compensation for legal services from someone other than his 
client 
without 
obtaining 
the 
client's 
prior 
consent, 
in 
violation of former SCR 20:1.8(f)(1).  Thus, it is a legal fact 
that every penny Attorney Gorokhovsky received from D.B. was 
ethically misbegotten.  It would seem that a lawyer whose 
collection of fees is itself a violation of the ethics code 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
16 
 
should be made to disgorge those fees through a restitution 
award.  However, because restitution has not been sought nor 
briefed, this court will not address the subject further. 
¶36 As 
to 
costs, 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky 
requests 
an 
undefined reduction in the amount of costs awardable to the OLR, 
which 
total 
$14,396.78 
as 
of 
August 1, 
2012. 
 
Attorney 
Gorokhovsky challenges the OLR's costs on several grounds.  He 
states, with no explanation, that the amount of attorney fees 
requested by the OLR is excessive.  He also argues that a 
dermatological condition and certain personal matters impact his 
ability to work and, we assume, his ability to pay costs.   
¶37 We believe that these claims are not sufficiently 
unique or compelling as to constitute the sort of extraordinary 
circumstances necessary to relieve Attorney Gorokhovsky from 
having to pay the full costs of this matter.  See SCR 22.24(1m) 
(supreme court's general policy upon a finding of misconduct is 
to impose all costs upon the respondent attorney).   Attorney 
Gorokhovsky's 
allegations 
of 
financial 
hardship 
are 
an 
appropriate consideration for establishment of a payment plan 
with the OLR; assigning greater significance to them at this 
point would be premature.   
¶38 IT IS ORDERED that Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky shall pay to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.   
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
17 
 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
No. 
2010AP2525-D   
 
 
 
1