Title: People v. Smith

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed May 25, 
2000.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the 
court:
Defendant Earl Smith appeals his conviction for 
armed violence. For the following reasons, we reverse the conviction and remand 
for further proceedings.
At trial in the circuit court of Kankakee 
County, police officers testified that they executed a search warrant at 
defendant's apartment on June 22, 1994. As police approached the apartment 
building, they saw defendant drop a handgun out of the apartment window. The gun 
slid down the roof of the building's porch and onto the ground, where police 
recovered it. The gun was not loaded. In the living room of the apartment, 
police found 2.5 grams of cocaine behind a couch and 2.1 grams of cannabis on a 
coffee table. Defendant was found in the bedroom near a window, the screen of 
which had been pushed outward. No other persons were found in the apartment, and 
no ammunition was discovered.
At the close of the evidence, the court found 
defendant guilty of armed violence, unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession 
of cannabis. The court found defendant not guilty of an additional charge of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The court 
vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance because 
it served as the underlying felony for armed violence. See People v. 
Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 170 (1982) (holding that convictions for both 
armed violence and an underlying felony cannot stand where a single physical act 
is the basis for both charges). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent 
prison terms of nine years for armed violence, two years for unlawful possession 
of a weapon by a felon, and time served for unlawful possession of 
cannabis.
The appellate court affirmed, with one justice 
dissenting. No. 3-96-0335 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The 
majority held that defendant could be found guilty of armed violence despite the 
fact that he dropped the gun out the window before police entered the apartment. 
The majority also held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict 
defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the predicate felony 
for defendant's armed violence conviction. The dissent argued that defendant was 
not guilty of armed violence because he disposed of the unloaded gun as soon as 
he saw the police. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to 
appeal.
Defendant contends that the trial and appellate 
courts erred in finding that he committed the offense of armed violence. Because 
the facts are not in dispute, defendant's guilt is a question of law, which we 
review de novo. A person commits armed violence when, while armed with 
a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois law. 720 ILCS 
5/33A-2 (West 1992). A person is considered armed with a dangerous weapon when 
he or she carries on or about his person or is otherwise armed with a Category I 
or Category II weapon. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a) (West 1992). A handgun is a Category 
I weapon. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b) (West 1992).
In construing the meaning of the phrase 
"otherwise armed" as used in the armed violence statute, this court has 
emphasized that the statute's purpose is to deter felons from using dangerous 
weapons, thereby minimizing the deadly consequences which may result when a 
felony victim resists. People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 109 (1992). In 
Condon, we found that this deterrent purpose was not served and so 
reversed the defendant's armed violence conviction. As in the instant case, the 
police in Condon executed a search warrant to seize illegal drugs 
located in the defendant's residence. When police entered the residence, Condon 
was standing in the apartment with no weapon on or about his person. Although 
numerous guns were found elsewhere in the residence, we held that Condon's 
conviction for armed violence could not be sustained because he did not have 
" 'immediate access to' or 'timely control over' a weapon when the police 
entered." Condon, 148 Ill. 2d  at 110.
Conversely, in People v. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392 (1993), we affirmed the armed violence conviction of a defendant who 
was apprehended by police during a drug raid as he made a move toward his car, 
which contained two guns. In our opinion in Harre, we noted that at the 
time police confronted the defendant in Condon, Condon did not have the 
"intent and capability to maintain control and possession" of the weapons, while 
Harre clearly did. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d  at 399-401.
Applying these principles to the facts of the 
instant case, we conclude that defendant did not commit the offense of armed 
violence. Defendant did not have " 'immediate access to' or 'timely control 
over' a weapon when the police entered" (Condon, 148 Ill. 2d at 110), 
because he dropped the gun out of the window as soon as he became aware that 
police were approaching. For this same reason, defendant also did not have the 
"intent and capability to maintain control and possession" of the weapon, as 
this court has required. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d  at 399-401. Permitting an 
armed violence conviction to stand against a felon such as defendant, who 
exhibited no propensity to violence and dropped the unloaded gun out of the 
window as the police approached his apartment to search for drugs, would not 
serve, but rather would frustrate, the statute's purpose of deterring criminals 
from involving themselves and others in potentially deadly 
situations.
Defendant also contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
because the State did not prove that he was aware of the drugs found in his 
living room. This court has held, however, that the mere presence of illegal 
drugs on premises which are under the control of the defendant gives rise to an 
inference of knowledge and possession sufficient to sustain a conviction absent 
other factors which might create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. 
People v. Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d 306, 308-09 (1961). We believe that under 
the circumstances of the instant case, the trier of fact was entitled to rely on 
this inference in finding that defendant had knowledge and possession of the 
drugs.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. Defendant's conviction for armed violence is 
reversed, his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance is 
reinstated, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.
Appellate court judgment 
reversed in part
and affirmed in 
part;
circuit court judgment reversed 
in part
and affirmed in 
part;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
Although the majority correctly concludes that 
defendant's actions did not constitute armed violence, I believe that this case 
justifies a fuller consideration of the public policy concerns that inspired the 
armed violence statute.
Under the Criminal Code of 1961, a person 
commits armed violence when he is armed with a dangerous weapon and commits any 
felony under Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1992)). A person is considered 
"armed with a dangerous weapon" if he "carries on or about his person or is 
otherwise armed with a category I or category II weapon." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a) 
(West 1992). The two categories include various firearms, knives, and 
bludgeoning instruments. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b), (c) (West 1992).
The purpose of the armed violence statute is to 
deter felons from using weapons when they commit felonies. People v. 
Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 469 (1998); People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 109 (1992). The statute is aimed at the problem that arises when "[a] 
felon with a weapon at his or her disposal is forced to make a spontaneous and 
often instantaneous decision to kill without time to reflect on the use of such 
deadly force." Condon, 148 Ill. 2d  at 109. The legislature created the 
crime of armed violence to deter criminals from having a weapon at their 
disposal to allow them such a choice. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d  at 
109-10.
Illinois courts have continually determined 
that, because the purpose of the statute is to deter felons from making the bad 
decision of using a dangerous weapon while committing their felony, the felon 
must have timely control over or immediate access to that weapon. People v. 
Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392, 396 (1993); Condon, 148 Ill. 2d  at 110; 
People v. Orsby, 286 Ill. App. 3d 142, 149-50 (1996). The relationship 
between the defendant and the weapon is the most important consideration in 
determining whether the defendant is armed. People v. Hoyt, 180 Ill. 
App. 3d 863, 867 (1989); People v. King, 155 Ill. App. 3d 363, 370 
(1987). "Presence of the weapon, for purposes of the armed violence statute, 
denotes not only physical existence of the weapon, but characterizes the 
relationship between the weapon and the person." King, 155 Ill. App. 3d 
at 369.(1)
In this case, none of the dangers that 
inspired the armed violence statute are present. Defendant did not possess or 
have immediate access to a dangerous weapon when the police arrived. In fact, 
the police did not find a single weapon or round of ammunition in defendant's 
apartment. Consequently, defendant neither could have used deadly force nor 
given the impression that he might use deadly force. The worst that can be said 
is that, shortly before the police arrived, defendant momentarily held an 
unloaded gun for which no ammunition was readily available. More importantly, 
this case vindicates all of the public policy goals that inspired the 
armed violence statute. Defendant consciously chose not to be in 
possession of a dangerous weapon, thereby eliminating the possibility 
of a spontaneous and tragic decision to kill. Given these facts, it would be 
absurd to affirm defendant's conviction, as that decision would send the 
regrettable message that defendant would have been no worse off had he not only 
kept the gun but also loaded it.
In defining defendant's actions as armed 
violence, the State's argument defies the very purpose of the armed violence 
statute. It is clear that the legislature created the crime of armed violence so 
that, when a felon planned his felony, he would think twice about bringing a 
weapon and endangering anyone who might get in his way. The armed violence 
statute served its deterrent purpose in this case and, therefore, defendant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance. I do not agree, however, with the majority's separate 
conclusion that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty of armed 
violence. In my view, the evidence firmly establishes his commission of that 
offense as well.
A person commits armed violence when, while 
armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony under Illinois law. 720 
ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1992). A handgun, like the one in the defendant's possession 
moments before his arrest, qualifies as a dangerous weapon under the armed 
violence statute. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b) (West 1992).
The majority reverses the defendant's armed 
violence conviction, concluding that the defendant was not guilty of that 
offense because he disposed of his gun when he saw the police approach. In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority erroneously assumes that the 
determinative element here is whether the defendant was armed at the precise 
moment of his arrest. People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96 (1992), on which 
the majority relies, is fundamentally different from the present case. One 
question in Condon was whether the defendant's presence in a house 
containing numerous weapons could sustain a conviction for armed violence, and 
the court concluded that it could not. The defendant in that case was arrested, 
unarmed, by police in the kitchen of the residence, which was owned by the 
defendant's brother. A subsequent search turned up more than a dozen firearms 
throughout the house; none of the guns, however, were located in the kitchen, 
where the defendant was found. The predicate felonies for the defendant's armed 
violence charge alleged the delivery and possession of cocaine. This court noted 
that there was no evidence that the defendant used or displayed a gun during the 
delivery of the drug. The State argued, however, that the defendant's presence 
in the house, among the weapons, while committing the possessory offense was 
sufficient to establish the armed violence charge. This court rejected the 
State's contention:
A later decision, 
People v. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392 (1993), makes clear that a defendant 
may be guilty of armed violence even though he is not in actual physical 
possession of a weapon at the exact moment of his arrest. The defendant in 
Harre was arrested while he was standing next to the half-open window 
of an automobile, which held two guns on its front seat. This court found 
Condon distinguishable and concluded that the defendant was guilty of 
armed violence, predicated on an underlying drug offense. The court 
stated:
In the case at bar, 
the defendant threw away his weapon only after he became aware of the officers' 
approach. The evidence thus showed that the present defendant, unlike the 
defendant in Condon, had immediate access to or timely control over a 
weapon immediately before his arrest. Under these circumstances, the defendant's 
conviction for armed violence should be affirmed.
The majority further suggests, however, that a 
conviction for armed violence would be inconsistent with the defendant's 
peaceful abandonment of his gun. I do not agree. The defendant's decision to 
throw away the weapon may be considered in mitigation at sentencing; it does not 
alter the nature of his offense. The mere possession of a weapon at the time of 
the commission of the underlying offense is sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for armed violence, and a defendant may be guilty of armed violence even though 
he did not use the weapon. As this court explained in People v. Alejos, 
97 Ill. 2d 502, 508 (1983):
The same potential 
danger existed here, at least until the defendant decided to abandon his weapon. 
There was in this case the necessary convergence between the defendant's 
possession of a dangerous weapon and his commission of the predicate felony, and 
I would therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
defendant's conviction for armed violence.
JUSTICES FREEMAN and McMORROW join in this 
partial concurrence and partial dissent.
JUSTICE McMORROW, also concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
I join in Justice Miller's partial concurrence 
and partial dissent. I write separately to emphasize my disagreement with the 
majority's decision to overrule, sub silentio, People v. 
Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392 (1993). In Harre, police officers were 
positioned in a rural house situated at the end of a long, gated driveway, 
waiting for the defendant to arrive. Two officers saw a car approach and turn 
into the driveway. The car stopped at the closed gate, and the officers heard a 
car door open and close and the sound of the gate being opened. The car then 
proceeded up the lane slowly the rest of the way to the house. As the car 
approached the house, the officers observed the defendant riding on the 
passenger-side hood of the car. The defendant jumped down off the hood and took 
two steps towards the rear of the car until he was next to the half-opened 
window of the passenger-side door. An officer, with weapon drawn, then 
identified himself and instructed defendant to return to the hood of the car and 
place his hands there. At the same time another officer, also with weapon drawn, 
directed the driver to step out of the car. A .22-caliber pistol and .22-caliber 
rifle were recovered from the front seat of the car. A key recovered from the 
defendant's pants pocket opened the trunk, from which two garbage bags of 
cannabis were seized. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d  at 394-95.
This court in Harre determined that the 
defendant was guilty of armed violence. This result was based on two 
conclusions. First, the evidence showed that the defendant was "armed," for 
purposes of the armed violence statute, based on the police officers' lay 
opinion testimony that the weapons on the front seat of the car were within the 
defendant's immediate reach as the defendant stood next to the car door and 
partially opened car window. Second, and more important for the purposes of this 
case, the court determined that the defendant was guilty of armed violence 
because "the determination of whether a defendant is armed is not made at 
the moment of arrest." (Emphasis added.) Harre, 155 Ill. 2d  at 
401. As the court in Harre explained:
The majority errs, 
in the instant case, when it emphasizes the fact that the defendant was not 
armed at the time of his arrest. As Harre, which postdates 
Condon, makes absolutely clear, the only question that must be answered 
under the armed violence statute is whether the defendant was armed at the time 
of the commission of the felony. In the case at bar, the police officer's 
testimony that he saw the defendant throwing the gun out of the window clearly 
established that the defendant was armed during the commission of the possession 
offense. As in Harre, the defendant in this case had, "moments before 
his apprehension," been armed with a handgun and in possession of a controlled 
substance. The majority's decision is thus at odds with, and indeed overrules, 
Harre.
Although Harre clearly resolves the 
present case, one might still maintain, as the majority does, that on policy 
grounds a conviction for armed violence should not stand where the defendant has 
thrown the weapon away before the police make the arrest. I do not find this 
argument persuasive. The purpose of the armed violence statute is to reduce the 
risk of violence during the commission of felony offenses. The statute's purpose 
is not limited to deterring violence during an offender's arrest. Indeed, by 
focusing exclusively on the time of arrest, as the majority does, the majority 
concludes that it was acceptable, under the law, that defendant was armed and in 
felony possession of a controlled substance prior to his arrest. That result is 
obviously counter to the armed violence statute's purpose. For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.
JUSTICES MILLER and FREEMAN join in this partial 
concurrence and partial dissent.
1. 1Contrary to the majority's suggestion, these 
cases do not require an officer to observe the presence of the weapon in 
defendant's hand.