Title: Williams v. Joynes

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices  
 
 
LEO WILLIAMS 
 
v.   Record No. 080751 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
June 4, 2009 
LOUIS N. JOYNES, II, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge 
 
In this legal malpractice action, we consider whether the 
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
defendant attorneys.  The circuit court held that the 
plaintiff’s failure to file a personal injury action in a 
foreign jurisdiction was a superseding event, which severed the 
link of proximate causation between the defendants’ failure to 
timely file a personal injury action in Virginia and the 
plaintiff’s loss of his personal injury claim. 
 
In October 2003, Leo Williams retained Louis N. Joynes, II 
and David S. Dildy of The Joynes & Gaidies Law Group, P.C. 
(collectively, Joynes) to represent him regarding a personal 
injury claim.  The claim was based on a May 12, 2003 automobile 
accident involving Williams and two other drivers, Alan D. 
Brown, a Virginia resident, and Patrick Kiker, a Maryland 
resident.  The collision occurred while Williams’ vehicle was 
stopped in traffic in Fairfax County.  A truck driven by Kiker 
and owned by Millstone Enterprises, Inc. (Millstone) hit the 
rear of Brown’s vehicle, which in turn struck Williams’ vehicle 
from behind. 
 
As a result of the impact, Williams sustained injuries to 
his neck and spine, including a herniated vertebral disc that 
required surgery.  Williams alleged that due to the injuries he 
sustained in the accident, he incurred more than $100,000 in 
medical expenses, was unable to work for 16 months, and lost 
more than $200,000 in income and benefits. 
 
On June 1, 2005, Joynes filed a motion for judgment on 
Williams’ behalf against Brown, Kiker, and Millstone in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  Two months later, 
Joynes notified Williams that the lawsuit had not been timely 
filed within the two-year statute of limitations governing 
personal injury actions in Virginia.  Joynes advised Williams 
that although his Virginia action was time-barred, Williams 
still might be able to file an action against Kiker and 
Millstone in Maryland, based on that state’s three-year statute 
of limitations. 
 
Joynes conceded, however, that because Brown was a Virginia 
resident, Brown would not be subject to suit in Maryland.  
Joynes further advised Williams that he may have a malpractice 
claim against Joynes, and that Williams should consider hiring 
other counsel to explore this possibility. 
 
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In January 2006, Williams filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Portsmouth alleging legal malpractice 
against Joynes.  Williams alleged that “[b]ut for the neglect 
and careless actions” of Joynes in failing to file a timely 
Virginia action, Williams would have recovered damages against 
Brown, Kiker, and Millstone. 
 
Williams further alleged that he filed the legal 
malpractice action after having spent “countless hours” over a 
period of several months trying to engage a Maryland attorney to 
pursue the personal injury claim in that state.  Williams 
asserted that most of the Maryland attorneys he consulted 
advised him that “there were too many problems with bringing the 
case in Maryland.”  Williams asserted that these “problems” 
included the increased expense of litigating in a foreign 
jurisdiction, the unavailability in Maryland of “necessary” 
witnesses who were Virginia residents, and the unique challenges 
posed in trying a case with one of two primary tortfeasors 
absent from the courtroom.  Williams maintained that he acted on 
this advice when he decided not to file a legal action in 
Maryland. 
 
In response, Joynes filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Joynes asserted that Williams’ independent decision not to file 
a Maryland lawsuit severed any causal link between Joynes’ 
negligence and the loss of Williams’ personal injury action.   
 
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After conducting a hearing on the summary judgment motion, 
the circuit court issued a letter opinion holding that Joynes 
was entitled to partial summary judgment.  The circuit court 
observed that Williams had conceded that he could have filed a 
timely action against Kiker and Millstone in Maryland.  The 
circuit court reasoned that because Williams still had a viable 
cause of action in Maryland after Joynes’ negligent failure to 
file a timely action in Virginia, Williams’ decision not to file 
suit in Maryland was “an intervening act that sever[ed] any 
connection between the negligent act of the defendants and the 
loss claimed by [Williams].”  The circuit court concluded that, 
therefore, Williams’ own inaction was the superseding cause of 
the loss of his personal injury claim.   
 
The circuit court additionally held, however, that Williams 
was entitled to recover from Joynes the expenses Williams 
incurred in seeking legal advice in Maryland as a direct result 
of Joynes’ negligence.  The circuit court awarded judgment for 
Williams in the amount of $423.76, for the expenses Williams 
incurred in his attempt to obtain an attorney to litigate an 
action in Maryland.  Williams appealed from the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
 
On appeal, Williams argues that even if he could have filed 
a timely action in Maryland, his abandonment of that right was 
not a superseding cause of his damages.  Williams contends that 
 
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the circuit court wrongly assumed that a Maryland lawsuit would 
have been the qualitative equivalent of the time-barred Virginia 
action, and ignored the fact that one of the two primary 
tortfeasors was not subject to suit in Maryland.  Williams 
maintains that based on these errors, the circuit court 
incorrectly decided the issue of superseding causation.  
Williams also argues that the question whether he should have 
filed a lawsuit in Maryland presented a jury question that 
properly related to mitigation of damages, not to proximate 
causation. 
 
In response, Joynes observes that there was a time period 
after Joynes’ negligent failure to timely file the Virginia 
action during which Williams had a viable claim in Maryland 
against Kiker and Millstone.  Joynes argues that, therefore, 
Joynes’ failure to timely file the Virginia action was not a 
proximate cause of Williams’ loss of the right to bring a 
personal injury action.  Thus, Joynes contends, the circuit 
court properly held that Williams’ own inaction was a 
superseding cause of Williams’ injury that relieved Joynes of 
liability for Williams’ loss of the personal injury action.  
Joynes additionally contends that it would be “impermissibly 
speculative” to ask a jury to consider the “qualitative[]” 
differences between the time-barred Virginia litigation and a 
 
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hypothetical Maryland lawsuit.  We disagree with Joynes’ 
analysis. 
 
In deciding whether the circuit court erred in awarding 
partial summary judgment to Joynes, certain general principles 
govern our inquiry.  A cause of action for legal malpractice has 
three separate elements: 1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship creating a duty; 2) a breach of that duty by the 
attorney; and 3) damages that were proximately caused by the 
attorney’s breach of duty.  Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 501, 
593 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2004); Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & 
Kelly, P.C., 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2002); 
Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 766, 232 S.E.2d 
774, 776 (1977).  A plaintiff in a legal malpractice action 
bears the burden of proving all three elements.  See Campbell v. 
Bettius, 244 Va. 347, 352, 421 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1992); Duvall, 
Blackburn, Hale & Downey v. Siddiqui, 243 Va. 494, 497, 416 
S.E.2d 448, 450 (1992). 
 
A legal malpractice action usually involves a “case within 
the case,” in which the plaintiff must present evidence that 
would have been presented in the underlying action.  Whitley v. 
Chamouris, 265 Va. 9, 11, 574 S.E.2d 251, 252-53 (2003).  There 
must be sufficient evidence of a breach of duty and of proximate 
causation and damages to convince the trier of fact in the 
malpractice case that, in the absence of the attorney’s alleged 
 
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negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying 
action.  Id. at 11, 574 S.E.2d at 252-53; Campbell, 244 Va. at 
352, 421 S.E.2d at 436. 
 
We have stated that a “proximate cause” is an act or 
omission that, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by a 
superseding cause, produces a particular event and without which 
that event would not have occurred.  Williams v. Le, 276 Va. 
161, 167, 662 S.E.2d 73, 77 (2008); Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 
122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996); Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 
519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970).  An event may have more 
than one proximate cause and, under certain circumstances, a 
proximate cause may also be a superseding cause that severs the 
link of proximate causation between the initial negligent act 
and the resulting harm, thereby relieving the initial tortfeasor 
of liability.  Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 662 S.E.2d at 77; 
Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128-29, 465 S.E.2d at 799; Coleman v. 
Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147 
(1980). 
 
A superseding cause occurs only when an intervening act so 
entirely supplants the operation of the initial tortfeasor’s 
negligence that the intervening act alone, without any 
contributing negligence by the initial tortfeasor in the 
slightest degree, causes the injury.  Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 
662 S.E.2d at 77; Atkinson v. Scheer, 256 Va. 448, 454, 508 
 
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S.E.2d 68, 72 (1998); Jenkins, 251 Va. at 129, 465 S.E.2d at 
799; Coleman, 221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147.  Therefore, a 
superseding cause is a new cause of a plaintiff’s injury, 
becoming the only proximate cause of that injury.  Atkinson, 256 
Va. at 454, 508 S.E.2d at 72; Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128-29, 465 
S.E.2d at 799; Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 510-11, 151 
S.E.2d 339, 345 (1966).  An intervening act will never be deemed 
a superseding cause if the intervening act was set in motion by 
the initial tortfeasor’s negligence.  Philip Morris Inc. v. 
Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 397, 368 S.E.2d 268, 277 (1988); Coleman, 
221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147; Jefferson Hospital, Inc. v. 
Van Lear, 186 Va. 74, 81, 41 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1947). 
 
In the present case, the circuit court held that Williams’ 
failure to file a lawsuit in Maryland was a superseding cause 
“that sever[ed] any connection between the negligent act of 
[Joynes] and the loss claimed by [Williams].”  Thus, in deciding 
this issue by summary judgment, the circuit court concluded as a 
matter of law that Williams’ failure to initiate litigation in 
Maryland became the sole proximate cause of his lost personal 
injury claim, relieving Joynes of any liability for Joynes’ 
failure to timely file the Virginia lawsuit. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the circuit court 
misapplied the principle of superseding cause in two distinct 
respects.  First, the circuit court’s analysis did not account 
 
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for the fact that Joynes’ own negligent failure to file a 
Virginia action set in motion the need for Williams to consider 
filing a Maryland lawsuit.  As a matter of law, this fact alone 
defeated Joynes’ assertion that Williams’ failure to file a 
Maryland lawsuit was a superseding cause that relieved Joynes of 
liability for Williams’ loss of his personal injury action.  See 
Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 662 S.E.2d at 77; Philip Morris Inc., 
235 Va. at 397, 368 S.E.2d at 277; Jefferson Hospital, Inc., 186 
Va. at 81, 41 S.E.2d at 444. 
 
Second, the circuit court’s analysis failed to consider the 
undisputed fact that Brown, one of the two primary tortfeasors 
in the underlying accident, was not subject to suit in Maryland.  
Having lost forever the right to bring a personal injury action 
against Brown because of Joynes’ negligence, Williams’ decision 
regarding Maryland litigation could not have severed completely 
the link of proximate causation between Joynes’ negligence and 
Williams’ loss of his personal injury claim against Brown.  
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting 
partial summary judgment to Joynes because, as a matter of law, 
Williams’ failure to file a Maryland lawsuit was not a 
superseding event severing the link of proximate causation 
between Joynes’ negligence and the resulting harm suffered by 
Williams.  See Atkinson, 256 Va. at 454, 508 S.E. 2d at 72; 
 
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Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128-29, 465 S.E.2d at 799; Maroulis, 207 Va. 
at 510-11, 151 S.E.2d at 345. 
 
Finally, we observe that the circuit court’s award of 
partial summary judgment was based solely on the issue of 
superseding causation and did not address other issues of 
proximate causation or the question of mitigation of damages.  
Therefore, although our holding here removes the issue of 
superseding causation from the case, all other issues, including 
the question whether Williams’ failure to initiate a Maryland 
action permits a defense that he failed to mitigate his damages, 
remain issues for resolution at trial of this case.  
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment, including its award of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Joynes, and will remand the case for trial on the 
merits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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