Title: State of Florida v. Charles Bradford

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
  
____________
No. SC96910
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
CHARLES BRADFORD,
Respondent.
[May 31, 2001]
CORRECTED OPINION
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Bradford v. State, 740 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999),
which expressly declares valid section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), a statute
criminalizing certain conduct related to solicitation when insurance benefits are
available.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons
set forth below, we quash the district court’s decision.  In so doing, we hold that
because the Legislature did not include fraudulent intent as an element of unlawful
insurance solicitation, the statute at issue unconstitutionally infringes upon the
1  Because we hold the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,
we decline to address Bradford’s argument that the statute is also void for vagueness.
2  The statewide effort was known as “Operation Chiro-Sweep.”
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protections afforded commercial speech by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.1  
FACTS
This case is one in a long line of cases in which the State charged several
chiropractors with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section
817.234(8).2  The specific facts relating to Mr. Bradford’s prosecution are as
follows.
Charles Bradford, a licensed chiropractor, was charged by information with
two counts of unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8). The
charges stemmed from Bradford’s business relationship with Prebeck Consultants,
Incorporated, a company engaged in the business of scheduling appointments with
chiropractors for persons involved in motor vehicle accidents. Specifically, in this
case, after obtaining a motor vehicle accident report, a Prebeck representative
telephonically solicited persons listed on an accident report for the purpose of
scheduling an initial examination with Bradford, and possible subsequent treatment,
if necessary, for injuries arising from the traffic accident.  Bradford examined the
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solicited individuals, determined that treatment was necessary, and later billed their
personal injury protection (PIP) insurance carrier for the services rendered.  During
the course of pretrial hearings, the State acknowledged and agreed that Bradford’s
conduct contained no element of fraudulent behavior, but explained that the statute
under which he was being prosecuted did not require proof of any element of
fraud.  Ultimately, after the trial court denied Bradford’s motion to dismiss, he
entered a plea of no contest to the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit
unlawful insurance  solicitation, specifically reserving his right to seek appellate
review of the issue concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute under
which he had been charged.  
While Bradford was seeking review of his conviction, other chiropractors
also charged with unlawful insurance solicitation were also appealing their
convictions.  The first of these cases to have an appellate decision was Barr v.
State, 731 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  The chiropractors in Barr challenged
the constitutionality of subsection (8) of the subject statute on several bases. 
Relevant to our consideration was the challenge presented under First Amendment
protection.  The district court, applying the test outlined by the United States
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), held:
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[T]he first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied, as the
solicitation made by Edelson and Barr was unlawful only because it
violated section 817.234(8), and not for any other reason. In addition,
the record reflects that the state satisfied the second prong by proving
that substantial state interests were involved. Specifically, in response
to the motions to dismiss, the state filed a 1975 Dade County Grand
Jury Report, which clarified that the statute was created in part to
combat both insurance fraud and a resulting increase in insurance
premiums borne ultimately by the public. This report also satisfied the
third prong of the test by showing that subsection (8) directly
advances the state's interest in preventing insurance fraud. As the
report suggests, there was a serious problem in the industry of
"runners" soliciting automobile accident victims with little or no
injuries to undergo unnecessary medical treatment so that they could
exhaust the victims' PIP benefits before the victims sued in tort for
damages. From an objective standpoint, we believe the statute's
prohibition against this type of solicitation provides a direct link to the
state's interest in preventing harm to such victims and the insurance
industry.
Finally, we hold the state satisfied the fourth prong of the test
by demonstrating that subsection (8) is narrowly drawn. The statute is
not a blanket ban on all solicitation of business by a chiropractor, but
rather, targets only those persons who solicit business for the sole
purpose of making motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims. Although
not the least restrictive means available to achieve the state's purpose,
we hold the ban on such solicitation is reasonably tailored to the
state's interest in preventing insurance fraud and raised premiums.  
Edelson and Barr's reliance on Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
764, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) and Innovative Database
Systems v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir.1993), as support for
their argument that the statute is not narrowly tailored, is misplaced.
The statutes in those cases placed total bans on the professional
solicitation at issue which were not sufficiently tailored in scope or
purpose. In contrast, section 817.234(8), by limiting its purpose to the
filing of motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims, is reasonably
tailored to fit the state's interests in preventing insurance fraud and
rising premiums.
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Barr, 731 So. 2d at 129. 
Shortly after the Barr decision was published, Bradford’s case was also
presented to the Fourth District.  See Bradford, 740 So. 2d at 569.  Based on its
analysis in Barr, the Fourth District again determined that the statute was
constitutional. See Bradford, 740 So. 2d at 570.  The district court, noting that it
was only writing to clarify why subsection (8) did not punish purely innocent
activity, concluded that “in enacting subsection (8) [the Legislature] intended to
punish only solicitations made for the sole purpose of defrauding that patient’s PIP
insurer.”  Id. at 571.  This reasoning was based on (1) the district court’s decision
to read subsection (1)(a), which criminalizes certain acts performed with the intent
to defraud, in pari materia with subsection (8), which was totally void of any
language as to intent to defraud; and (2) the Fourth District’s focus on the title of
section 817.234: “False and fraudulent insurance claims.”  Thus, the Fourth
District’s reasoning essentially inserted an element into the statute that did not
otherwise exist.
In late 1999, the Third District was presented with yet another of these cases
challenging the validity of section 817.234(8) on, inter alia, First Amendment
grounds.  See Hershkowitz v. State, 744 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  The
district court in Hershkowitz relied on the Fourth District’s decisions in Barr and
3 By the time Hansbrough was released, we had already accepted jurisdiction
in Bradford.  Noting that we had accepted review, the Fourth District certified the
questions at issue in this case as being of great public importance. The specific
questions certified were:
WHETHER 
SECTION 
817.234(8), 
FLORIDA
STATUTES, 
INCLUDES 
A 
REQUIREMENT 
OF
SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE INSURER.
and, if not
WHETHER 
THE 
STATUTE 
ADVANCES 
THE
GOVERNMENTAL 
INTEREST 
IN 
PREVENTING
INSURANCE 
FRAUD 
AND 
IS 
NOT 
MORE
EXTENSIVE THAN IS NECESSARY TO SERVE THAT
INTEREST.
Hansbrough, 757 So. 2d at 1283.  Hansbrough filed a motion to consolidate his case
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Bradford to conclude that the statute did not create a constitutionally  impermissible
burden on the right to commercial speech. See Hershkowitz, 744 So. 2d at 1270.
Approximately one year after announcing the Bradford decision, the Fourth
District again addressed the constitutionality of section 817.234(8).  See 
Hansbrough v. State, 757 So. 2d at 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 779 So.
2d 271 (Fla. 2000).  In that case, however, the court wrote:
[T]his court, in Bradford[], followed Barr, but, in order to satisfy the
third-prong of the Central Hudson four-prong test, interpreted section
817.234(8) as applying only where the defendant intends to defraud an
insurance carrier.  However, in Barr, we had previously ruled that
section 817.234(8) satisfied the state’s interest in preventing fraud. 
Accordingly, language in Bradford, interpreting section 817.234(8) as
requiring an intent to defraud in order to satisfy the third prong of the
Central Hudson test, was dicta and not controlling.[3]  
with Bradford.  That motion was denied because the briefing schedule in Hansbrough
would not have allowed all parties to submit their merits briefs in a timely manner for
oral argument. 
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Id. at 1283. 
During the pendency of the present case,  the First District departed from the
reasoning espoused by the Third and Fourth Districts and held that the statute is
unconstitutional.  See State v. Cronin, 774 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).  In
Cronin, the district court first determined that there was no support for the
conclusion that the Legislature intended to make fraudulent intent an element of the
statute at issue.  See id. at 874.  The court  further held that the statute  was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored, as required by the Central
Hudson test.  See id. at 876.
With that background in mind, we consider two issues.  First,  we must
determine whether intent to defraud is an element of the offense of unlawful
insurance solicitation, as specifically codified in section 817.234(8).  Second, if
fraud is not an element, we must then decide whether section 817.234(8) violates
the protections afforded by the First Amendment to commercial speech.   We
address each issue in turn. 
1.  Whether Intent to Defraud Is an 
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Element of Section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997).
A.  Plain Meaning
This Court has repeatedly held that “the plain meaning of statutory language
is the first consideration of statutory construction.”  Capers v. State, 678 So. 2d
330, 332 (Fla. 1996).  Section 817.234(8) states in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person . . . to solicit any business 
. . . for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims
or claims for personal injury protection benefits required
by s. 627.736.  Any person who violates the provisions
of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree 
. . . .  
Obviously, there is no mention of fraud as an element of the offense.  In fact, as
noted by Judge Stone in Hansbrough:
The statute in question, distilled to its most essential terms, provides
that it is unlawful for any “person . . . to solicit any business . . . for
the purpose of making . . . claims for personal injury protection
benefits . . . .”  § 817.234(8), Fla. Stat.  Subsection (8) does not
include the words “ with the intent to defraud.”  As it is not
ambiguous, we should assume the omission was intentional.  See
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). 
757 So. 2d at 1283 (Stone, J., concurring specially).  The same reasoning was
echoed by the First District Court of Appeal in its recent decision in Cronin where
the court noted that “section 817.234(8) clearly and unambiguously does not
include the requirement that the solicitation occur with the intent to defraud.”  See
4 When initially enacted, Florida’s no-fault insurance framework contained a
$1000 threshold which had to be exceeded prior to the filing of a tort claim to recover
intangible damages sustained in an automobile accident.  See ch. 71-252, § 8, Laws of
Fla.  In 1976, the Legislature eliminated this monetary requirement, and in its place
adopted a scheme which made recovery in tort dependent on the character of the
injury suffered by the accident victim.  See ch. 76-266, § 5, Laws of Fla.; see also §
627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). 
-9-
774 So. 2d at 874.  In our view, the plain language of the statute clearly and
unambiguously indicates that intent to defraud is simply not an element of the
offense as established by the Legislature.
To this end, we have held that “[w]here the language of the statute is plain
and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial interpretation.” T.R. v. State, 677
So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1996); see also  State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533,
540 (Fla. 1997); Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1992).  Because we
conclude that the language of this statute is facially clear and unambiguous, our
analysis need not proceed any further.  However, our conclusion here that intent to
defraud is not an element of the offense is similarly fully substantiated by this
statute’s legislative history and by canons of statutory construction.
B.  Legislative History
In an apparent response to concerns that unscrupulous doctors and lawyers
were inflating or outright falsifying personal injury claims in an effort to meet and
exceed the statutory monetary threshold amount,4 the Legislature enacted section
5 Attached to the legislative history of this chapter law is the Final Report of the
Grand Jury filed in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, on
August 11, 1975,  entitled “Investigation Into False Claims of Lawyers and Doctors”
(available at Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 70, Tallahassee, Fla.)
( hereinafter “1975 Report”). This report addresses “the practice of a small group of
lawyers, physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors and hospitals who work together to
inflate or outright falsify personal injury claims.”  1975 Report at 5.
6 Subsection (9) uses essentially the same language as subsection (8), except
that it specifically applies to attorneys. 
7  No mention of the 1975 Report is made within the legislative history of these
two subsections. 
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627.7375, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976).  See ch. 76-266, § 7, Laws of Fla.5 
Section 627.7375, when enacted, contained essentially that which is now found in
subsections (1) through (4) of section 817.234, all of which then included, and still
include, fraud as an element of the crime.  The following year, through the adoption
of chapter 77-468, section 36, Laws of Florida, subsections (8) and (9)6 were
added.7  Neither subsection (8) nor (9) contained any language pertaining to
fraudulent intent.  Moreover, the staff analysis for section 36, as it specifically
related to subsection (8), simply indicated that the statute was amended  to
“[p]rovide[] that acting as a runner is a third degree felony.”  Fla. S. Comm. on
Com., CS for SB 1181 (1977) Staff Analysis (June 7, 1977)(on file at Florida
Archives).  The staff analysis, albeit brief, clearly supports the conclusion that
intent to defraud has never been an element of subsection (8).  Instead, it is evident
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to us that subsection (8) solely seeks to curtail what has come to be known as
chasing business, irrespective of any intent to defraud. 
In 1978, subsections (8) and (9), both of which, at the time of enactment,
prohibited solicitation for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims, were
amended  to prohibit solicitation for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort
claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits.  See ch. 78-258, § 3, Laws
of Fla.  The Legislature, again having the opportunity to include intent to defraud as
an element, did not do so.  
The following year, the entire section (then-section 627.7375) was
renumbered as section 817.234.  See ch. 79-81, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Worthy of
notice, however, is that during the same year, the Legislature passed a reviser’s bill
to remove inconsistencies and redundancies and otherwise clarify statutes and
facilitate their correct interpretation.  See ch. 79-400, Laws of Fla.  While revising
then-section 627.7375, the Legislature permitted subsections (8) and (9) to remain
untouched. See ch. 79-400, § 240, Laws of Fla.  Subsections (8) and (9) have
remained, essentially, unchanged since 1979.  In our view, it is clear from the
preceding analysis that  the legislative history accompanying section 817.234(8)
also supports the conclusion that the Legislature, having had ample opportunity to
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do so, did not include fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful
insurance solicitation.
C.  Statutory Construction
Respondent Bradford initially asserts that section 817.234 is codified within a
chapter entitled “Fraudulent Practices” and is itself entitled “False and Fraudulent
Insurance Claims.”  Thus, Bradford presents the position that the title of section
817.234 evinces a strong indication that the Legislature intended fraud to be an
element of subsection (8).  In this respect, we have held:
The arrangement and classification of laws for purposes
of codification in the Florida Statutes is an administrative
function of the Joint Legislative Management Committee
of the Florida Legislature.  The classification of a law or a
part of a law in a particular title or chapter of Florida
Statutes is not determinative on the issue of legislative
intent, though it may be persuasive in certain
circumstances.  Where there is a question, established
principles of statutory construction must be utilized.   
State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1985)(citation omitted).  
Turning to well-settled principles of  statutory construction, this Court has
held that “[t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same
statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.”  See Mark Marks,
P.A., 698 So. 2d at 541; see also Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So. 2d 146,
152 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Rooney, 654 So. 2d 911, 914
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(Fla. 1995) (“[W]hen the legislature has used a term . . .  in one section of the
statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where
it has been excluded.”)).  In the present case, while intent to defraud is not
mentioned in subsection (8), it is specifically included as an element in subsections
(1), (2), (3), (4), and (7) of section 817.234.  Thus, this principle of statutory
construction lends further support to our determination that the Legislature
intentionally excluded fraud as an element of subsection (8).  It is evident that the
Legislature knew how to include intent to defraud as an element, and it could have
easily done so with respect to subsection (8) if it so wished. 
Respondent Bradford further urges us to consider another principle of
statutory construction which dictates that statutes dealing with the same subject
matter should be considered in pari materia in an effort to give effect to legislative
intent.  See, e.g., McGhee v. Volusia County, 679 So. 2d 729, 730 n.1 (Fla. 1996)
(“The doctrine of in pari materia requires the courts to construe related statutes
together so that they illuminate each other . . . . ”); Forsythe v. Longboat Key
Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) (“[A]ll parts of a
statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.”).  In this
respect, the district court below reasoned that “[w]hen reading subsection (8)
[which does not include fraud as an element] in pari materia with subsection (1)(a)
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[which does include fraud as an element], it becomes obvious that the Legislature in
enacting subsection (8) intended to punish only solicitations made for the sole
purpose of defrauding that patient’s PIP insurer.”  Bradford, 740 So. 2d at 571. 
We conclude that the district court’s reasoning that the concept of reading statutes
in pari materia necessarily incorporates the fraud requirement contained in
subsection (1) into subsection (8) is premised on a misguided interpretation of that
particular canon of statutory construction.  Simply, the concept of reading statutes
in pari materia does not require that elements from one subsection be carried over
and inserted into another subsection even if the statutes are related.  See
Hansbrough, 757 So. 2d at 1283-84 (“The fact that subsection (1)(a) of the statute
prohibits certain acts in connection with insurance claims if committed with intent
to defraud, as observed in Bradford, does not automatically lead to the conclusion
that all portions of the same statute require proof of specific intent to defraud.”)
(Stone, J., concurring specially). 
Thus, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statute does not indicate that
fraud is an element; the legislative history does indicate that there was ample
opportunity to include intent to defraud in subsection (8), yet the Legislature did
not do so; and lastly, but of no less importance, principles of statutory
construction lead to the conclusion that the Legislature was well aware of how to
8  Although amicus curiae Randolph Hansbrough suggests that the United States
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to abandon the Central Hudson framework
in favor of a more stringent test, this Court has noted that “in its 1999 term the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed its strong adherence to Central Hudson.”
Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar- Advertising Rules, 762 So. 2d 392
(Fla. 1999) (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S.
173 (1999)).
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incorporate the element of fraud into these subsections (as evidenced by 
subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7)), yet it declined to do so as related to
subsection (8). As a result, we conclude that the Legislature has not included
fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation.  
 2.  Whether Section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), 
Constitutes an Impermissible Restriction on Commercial Speech 
in Violation of the First Amendment.
Statutes or regulations which restrict commercial speech are analyzed under
the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).8 See
also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., U.S. 761 (1993); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985); see generally P. Cameron DeVore, Advertising and Commercial
Speech, (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course, Series
582, 1999).  Under the Central Hudson test, the State may regulate commercial
-16-
speech relating to unlawful activities, and commercial speech that is misleading. 
See 447 U.S. at 563-64.  Commercial speech which does not fall into either of
those categories, however, may still be regulated if the State meets its burden of
establishing the following three related requirements.  See id. at 564-66.  First, the
State must establish a substantial interest in support of the restriction on
commercial speech. See id.  Second, the State must also show that the restriction
directly and materially advances that substantial interest.  See id.  Finally, the State
must demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored.  See id.
At the outset, we must answer the threshold question of whether the
commercial speech being regulated by this case concerns unlawful activity or is
misleading.  In this case, it is clear to us, and the State readily concedes, that the
commercial speech regulated in this case does not relate to an unlawful activity and
is not misleading.  Thus, we must proceed to determine whether the State has
carried its burden of satisfying the three-prong test set forth by Central Hudson.
A.  Substantial State Interest
“Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit
us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other
suppositions.”  Went for It, 515 U.S. at 624 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768). 
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In the instant case, the State asserts the following interests in support of section
817.234(8):
(1)
The State has a substantial interest in protecting the public from
unnecessarily inflated insurance rates for personal injury
protection and liability insurance.
(2)
The State has a substantial interest in preventing fraud and
misrepresentation by professionals.
(3)
The State has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy of
its citizens involved in motor vehicle accidents.
(4)
The State has a substantial interest in promoting the ethical
standards of professionals, consistent with the laws of Florida,
who make claims for personal injury protection benefits and
motor vehicle tort claims related to the motor vehicle accidents
of its citizens.
Petitioner’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 26.  
It would be difficult for us to conclude that the above interests are not indeed
substantial.  The United States Supreme Court, in Edenfield, specifically concluded
that States have a substantial interest in the prevention of fraud and
misrepresentation.  See 507 U.S. at 768-69 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976)).  The
Court likewise concluded that States have a substantial interest in protecting the
privacy of their citizens, and has specifically approved that interest as it relates to
personal injury victims involved in automobile accidents.  See Went For It, 515
U.S. at 625.  Finally, the Court has also concluded that States have a substantial
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interest in promoting the ethical conduct of professionals who practice within their
boundaries. See id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975)); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
Accordingly, we determine that the State has satisfied its burden of setting forth
substantial interests in support of this restriction on commercial speech.
B.  Direct and Material Advancement of Substantial Interests
The Central Hudson test requires us to next determine whether the statute at
issue advances any one of the State’s asserted interests in a “direct and material
way.”  Went for It, 515 U.S. at 625 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 487 (1995)).  The United States Supreme Court has explained that the
State’s burden as to this prong
is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.
Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626 (quoting Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487); see also Zauderer
471 U.S. at 648-49.  The same Court has further explained: 
[W]e do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to
us accompanied by a surfeit of background information. Indeed, in
other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted litigants to justify
speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to
different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny,
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to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus and “simple
common sense.”
 
Went for It, 515 U.S. at 628 (citations omitted).   
In Edenfield, for instance, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants (“CPAs”),
reasoning that the Board of Accountancy had “present[ed] no studies that suggest
personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPA’s creates the dangers
of fraud [and] overreaching.”  507 U.S. at 771.  While the record contained a
somewhat skeletal and conclusory affidavit authored by a former chairman of the
board, the Court noted that “[t]he record [did] not disclose any anecdotal
evidence, either from Florida or another State, that validate[d] the Board’s
suppositions.”  Id.  Thus, the Court determined that nothing in the record
substantiated the State’s allegation of harm.
The evidence presented by the Board of Accountancy in Edenfield stands in
stark contrast to that which The Florida Bar presented in  Went For It, in support
of its prohibition on targeted mail soliciting personal injury or wrongful death clients
within thirty days of the accident.  The Florida Bar, in that case,  presented a 106-
page summary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation, which
contained statistical and anecdotal data supporting the Bar’s contention that Florida
9  See supra note 5.
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citizens viewed direct-mail solicitation immediately following accidents as an
intrusion on victims’ privacy that reflected poorly on the legal profession.  See
Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626.  Noting that the “anecdotal record mustered by the
Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and detail,”  id. at 627, the Court found that the
Bar’s restriction targeted a concrete, nonspeculative harm.  See id. at 629.   
As to this second prong of the Central Hudson test, the State correctly
contends that it is not required to establish that each of its asserted interests is or
will be directly advanced by section 817.234(8).  Rather, the State need only
establish that its restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances
one of its substantial interests.  See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 625 n.1.  The interest
which the State focused on throughout its briefs to this Court and its presentation
during oral argument was the prevention of insurance fraud.  As such, it relied on
the 1975 Report forming part of section 817.234's legislative history.9
This 1975 Report, entitled “Investigation Into False Claims of Lawyers and
Doctors,” began as follows:
The Grand Jury has heard testimony concerning the practice of a small
group of lawyers, physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors and hospitals
who work together to inflate or outright falsify personal injury claims.
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1975 Report at 5.  The 1975 Report chronicled a typical fraudulent insurance
scheme involving attorneys, doctors, hospitals and runners.  As the State asserts,
the Report
documented fraud in piercing Florida’s no-fault threshold.  The fraud,
or “harm feared,” was that persons with “little or no injuries” were
solicited for medical treatments that became the basis for making
claims of personal injury protection benefits, and when the medicals
exceeded that threshold, motor vehicle tort claims.  The effect was an
increase in both the number of recoveries and dollar value of
recoveries for pain and suffering in personal injury actions.  These
claims were paid by defendant insurance companies and passed on as
a cost of doing business to Florida citizens through unnecessary
insurance rate increases.
Petitioner’s Initial Brief at 28. 
The district court below relied on its earlier decision in Barr which noted:
As the report suggests, there was a serious problem in the industry of
“runners” soliciting automobile accident victims with little or no
injuries to undergo unnecessary medical treatment so that they could
exhaust the victims’ PIP benefits before the victim sued in tort for
damages.  From an objective standpoint, we believe the statute’s
prohibition against this type of solicitation provides a direct link to the
state’s interest in preventing harm to such victims and the insurance
industry.  
Barr, 731 So. 2d at 129.  The State has attempted to rely on a more recent grand
jury report which likewise focuses on the fraudulent framework detailed above. See
Second Interim Report of the Fifteenth Statewide Grand Jury:  Report on Insurance
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Fraud in Florida in the Area of Personal Injury Protection (on file with Clerk, Fla.
Sup. Ct.) (hereinafter “2000 Report”).  The 2000 Report makes similar
observations to those made by the 1975 Report; its import, however, is in the
documentation that these unscrupulous practices continue to take place. 
While these reports certainly indicate that the evil which the State seeks to
correct is unacceptable to all professions, real, and pervasive, section 817.234(8)
does not directly and materially advance the State’s goal of preventing insurance
fraud.  The statute criminalizes solicitation “for the purpose of making motor
vehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits.”  The State
maintains that “[c]ommon sense dictates that criminalizing a particular action deters
that action.” The State is correct.  The Legislature obviously hopes that the
criminalization of an activity will lead to its deterrence.  However,  United States
Supreme Court precedent requires that the restriction on commercial speech
directly and materially alleviate the evil (i.e., insurance fraud), see Went For It, 515
U.S. at 626 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71); that this subsection does not
accomplish.  
Section 817.234(8) does not directly and materially prohibit solicitation
which results in fraudulent tort and PIP benefits claims.  Rather, it prohibits all 
solicitation “for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for
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personal injury protection benefits,” irrespective of whether insurance fraud is
involved.  Thus, we conclude that the statute does not directly and materially
alleviate the problem of insurance fraud and actually condemns totally lawful
conduct. 
C.  Narrowly Tailored
Even if we were to conclude that the statute does directly and materially
alleviate the problem, section 817.234(8) would still violate First Amendment
parameters because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s articulated
interest–prevention of insurance fraud.  In reaching this determination, we
considered, as United States Supreme Court precedent requires, the relationship
between the State’s interests and the means by which it seeks to accomplish them. 
Our analysis is guided by the following pronouncement by the United States
Supreme Court:
What our decisions require . . . is a fit between the legislature’s ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interests served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.  Of course, we do not equate this test with the less rigorous
obstacles of rational basis review; in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417, n. 3 (1993), for example, we observed that
the existence of numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives
to the restriction on commercial speech . . . is certainly a relevant
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consideration in determining whether the fit between the ends and
means is reasonable.
Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632 (quotation marks omitted)(emphasis supplied); see 
also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
In this case, the State, relying on language from Barr, seeks to meet its
burden by maintaining that section 817.234(8):
[I]s not a blanket ban on all solicitation of business by a chiropractor,
but rather, targets only those persons who solicit business for the sole
purpose of making motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims. 
Although not the least restrictive means available to achieve the state’s
purpose, we hold the ban on solicitation is reasonably tailored to the
state’s interest of preventing insurance fraud and raised premiums. 
 
731 So. 2d at 129. More specifically, the State argues that:
A chiropractor could hire hundreds of telemarketers to solicit new
patients full time and not be in violation of Florida’s criminal statute,
so long as the chiropractors are not soliciting persons for the purpose
of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or claim for personal injury
protection benefits–the limited restriction imposed by the statute.  
Petitioner’s Initial Brief at 29.  While the statute, as drafted, may prevent or deter
fraud, its criminal net also captures legitimate and otherwise lawful conduct, the
State’s semantics notwithstanding.  As the First District’s opinion in Cronin points
out, “[e]very solicitation of business from an accident victim . . . has the potential
of being funded by the proceeds of a tort settlement or PIP claim.”  774 So. 2d at
-25-
876.   There is, however, absolutely nothing sinister about presenting  honest and
legitimate requests for compensation from a PIP carrier or filing a tort claim based
on damages sustained in an automobile accident.  Absent the element of fraud,
which we have already concluded is not part of this statute, this subsection
criminalizes conduct which is entirely lawful and within the protections voiced by
the United States Supreme Court.  This was aptly recognized by the First District in
Cronin:
The statute as written is far too broad in terms of the scope of
activities it can potentially reach. Proof of any advertisement for
chiropractic services which solicits business from automobile accident
victims would arguably be sufficient to get a prosecutor past a motion
for judgment of acquittal in a prosecution based on an alleged violation
of the statute, the theory being that the advertiser or solicitor obviously
intended to be paid for his or her services with the reference to the
accident being considered as evidence of an intent to access
recoverable tort claims, damages, or PIP benefits. The fact that a
prospective client may have had a legitimate need for chiropractic
services as a result of an automobile accident would be irrelevant given
that the statute contains no requirement that there be an intent to
defraud.
Id. at 875.  We agree with this reasoning and conclude that without fraud as an
element, the statute provides “only ineffective and remote support for the
government’s purpose.”  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
Although not specifically within the context of solicitation by chiropractors,
the United States Supreme Court, in a long list of decisions dating back to the late
-26-
1970s, has recognized the import of advertising professional services and has, with
few exceptions, invalidated regulations which unduly burden that form of
commercial speech.  One of these first cases was Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977), wherein the Court held that “advertising by attorneys
may not be subject to blanket suppression.”  Although the specific facts in Bates
concerned a newspaper advertisement relaying the availability and terms of routine
legal services, the Court has proceeded to expand and address other forms of
solicitation in later cases.  
For instance, in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)–a case involving 
restrictions on the terms used to describe an attorney’s practice; limits on mailing
lists for attorneys’ announcements; and restrictions on advertising the jurisdictions
in which an attorney is licensed to practice–the Court went as far as to hold:
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information . . . if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive. . . .  Although the potential
for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context of
advertising professional services, restrictions upon such advertising
may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the
deception.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Three years after the decision in  In re R.M.J was rendered, the Court
considered  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626.  In that case, the Court reversed in part an
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Ohio decision disciplining an attorney for recommending his services in a
newspaper advertisement that included legal advice.  See id. at 656.  Specifically,
the attorney had advertised his willingness to represent women who had suffered
injury from the use of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device.  See id.
at 629-30.  The Zauderer Court commented that a restriction which sought to
prevent litigation by prohibiting information to the public relating to potentially
legitimate claims would be unconstitutional.  See 471 U.S. 642-44.
Later, in Shapero, 486 U.S. at 466, the Court invalidated a regulation that
prohibited lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending
truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients who the lawyer knew faced a
particular legal problem.  In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court disapproved of
Shapero’s letter simply because it was directed to those who the attorney knew
would need his services, even though a mailing to the public at large would
necessarily include persons known to need Shapero’s services. See id. at 473.  
The Court concluded:
[T]he First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech
merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally
ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it
would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable.
Id. at 473-74.  The Court reasoned that the mere opportunity “for isolated abuses 
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or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial 
speech.” Id. at 476.
One of the most recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court
on professional solicitation of business is found in its decision in Edenfield, which
addressed Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation by CPAs.  The regulation was
invalidated primarily because the State could not satisfy Central Hudson’s
penultimate prong (i.e., the regulation must directly and materially advance a
substantial interest).  See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 773.  However, the Edenfield Court
added that in-person solicitation, which also included telephonic solicitation, by
nonlawyers could not be subject to a prophylactic ban.  See id. at 774-76.  The
Court’s conclusion was based on its reasoning that CPAs, unlike lawyers, are not
trained in the art of persuasion. See id.  In the present case, the statute at issue
prohibits “any person,” regardless of their persuasive abilities, to solicit for
purposes of filing a tort claim or PIP benefits.  Thus, it is much too broad to
comply with Central Hudson’s requirements and with the restrictions established by
United States Supreme Court precedent.  
The Supreme Court’s cases on professional advertising are unmistakably
clear that such form of commercial speech is heavily protected.  In fact, of the
Court’s leading cases which have addressed restrictions on advertising of
-29-
professional services, the Court has only upheld those restrictions on two
occasions.  First, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 449
(1978), the Court upheld a prophylactic rule banning all face-to-face solicitations by
lawyers.  In that case, the Court explained that “the potential for overreaching is
significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”  Id. at
465.  In Edenfield, as previously noted, the Court clarified that: 
Ohralik does not stand for the proposition that blanket bans on
personal solicitation by all types of professionals are unconstitutional
in all circumstances.  Because “the distinctions, historical and
functional, between profession, may require consideration of quite
different factors,” the constitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation
will depend upon the identity of the parties and the precise
circumstances of the solicitation.  Later cases have made this clear,
explaining that Ohralik’s holding was narrow and depended upon
certain “unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers.”  
507 U.S. at 774 (citation omitted)(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 773 n.25).  Thus, the Edenfield Court concluded that Ohralik made it clear
that “a preventative rule was justified only in situations ‘inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct.’ ”  Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
464). 
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Additionally, Ohralik only banned face-to-face solicitation, whereas section
817.234(8) does not make that distinction.  Instead, this statute bans all forms of
solicitation.  The First Amendment has not been interpreted to permit such a
prophylactic restriction on commercial speech as has been attempted in the subject
statute.  See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect.  Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”); see also
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (holding that advertising may be banned outright only
if it is actually or inherently misleading). 
The other leading case in which the Court upheld a restriction on solicitation
of professional services was Went For It, 515 U.S. at 618.  In that case,  the Court
determined that The Florida Bar’s prohibition on targeted mail soliciting personal
injury and wrongful death victims within thirty days of the accident passed
constitutional muster since the restriction was “narrow both in scope and in
duration.”  Id. at 635.  The restriction in this case, however, is far from being
narrow in scope or duration.  It prohibits solicitation–whether face-to-face,
telephonic or written–at all times, so long as the solicitation is done with the intent
to file a PIP or tort claim.  Although the State posits that this is a narrow restriction,
common sense indicates otherwise.  Under Florida law, virtually every owner or
10  See § 627.733, Fla. Stat. (2000). 
-31-
registrant of a motor vehicle must maintain PIP insurance.10  It is a safe assumption
that all Florida citizens, chiropractors included, are aware of this requirement.  It is
also a safe assumption that chiropractors–just as others who engage in a profession
or trade–who solicit patients or customers do so with the thought of being
compensated for their services.  In all likelihood, this compensation, or at least a
part thereof,  will come from PIP insurance benefit proceeds in those cases where
chiropractic services are rendered due to involvement in an automobile accident. 
Thus, almost every act of solicitation directed toward someone involved in a motor
vehicle accident would lead to prosecution under this section simply because
payment under such circumstances would usually flow from PIP benefits.  When
we consider that pursuant to this statute “any person” who contacts another, by
any means, may be charged with violating 817.234(8) if they do so intending to
recover payment, to which they are legitimately and lawfully entitled, from a PIP
carrier or through a tort claim, it is apparent that this statute is not narrowly tailored
and casts a net far beyond constitutional boundaries.
Although United States Supreme Court precedent affords abundant support
for our conclusion here that this statute violates the First Amendment, other courts
-32-
having had an opportunity to address similar statutes specifically directed toward
the conduct of chiropractors have also reached the same conclusion we reach
today.  For instance, in Bailey v. Morales, 190 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1999), the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a Texas statute which prohibited
chiropractors and professionals from soliciting potential clients if the solicitation
was in person or by telephone and if the individuals solicited were known to the
chiropractors to have a special need for chiropractic services, such as having been
in an accident or having a preexisting condition.  Similarly, in Silverman v. Walkup,
21 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780 (E.D. Tenn. 1998), a Tennessee federal court held that a
statute which proscribed both face-to-face and telephonic solicitation by
chiropractors and prohibited chiropractors from “accident” telemarketing violated
the chiropractors’ First Amendment rights, pursuant to the Central Hudson test. 
That court reasoned that a blanket ban on face-to-face as well as telephone
solicitation of accident victims is not narrowly tailored.  See id.
Moreover, given the nature of the inquiry in relation to this prong of the
constitutional  test, we must consider whether there are less restrictive measures
which the State may employ in an effort to curtail insurance fraud.  See, e.g., Went
For It, 515 U.S. at 632; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476. One very obvious less restrictive
manner with which to prevent insurance fraud would be to include “intent to
-33-
defraud” as an element of 817.234(8).  The Legislature could have easily done so,
yet it decided to not include such element in defining the prohibited conduct. 
Although it may be tempting to extricate this statute from the “constitutional
dustbin” by reading into it an element of fraud, as was attempted below, such a
reading cannot be sustained under applicable Florida law and such was not
intended by the Legislature.
It is also important to note that another factor which must be taken into
consideration is that this is a criminal statute and not simply a rule of professional
conduct.  That is, the statute does not merely regulate with the impending threat of
suspension or revocation of a professional license.  Instead, this statutory provision 
regulates with the potential threat of criminal sanction (i.e., third-degree felony). 
This is another consideration which supports the conclusion that  there are less
restrictive measures which may be employed by the State in preventing insurance
fraud.
CONCLUSION
We are compelled to note that our decision today is in no way to be
interpreted as promoting, or even condoning, the practice of chasing patients,
customers, or clients by a small group of those engaged in the business of
rendering either medical or therapeutic care or legal advice to those who have been
-34-
involved in an accident.  This practice has the potential of intruding upon those
whose lives have already been disrupted by involvement in an accident.  Even more
so, unscrupulous practices demean any profession–whether it be chiropractic,
medical, or legal–and perpetuate unfortunate stereotypes which adversely impact
those individuals who conscientiously seek to render their professional judgment
and services to those who are in need.  Nonetheless, based on our above analysis
and the decisions from the United States Supreme Court,  we simply cannot escape
the inevitable conclusion that this statute constitutes an impermissible encroachment
upon First Amendment commercial speech rights.  Accordingly, the district court’s
decision is quashed and the case is remanded with directions that Bradford’s
conviction be reversed.
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-2480 
(Broward County)
-35-
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Assistant Attorney
General, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Robert R. Wheeler,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Michael E. Dutko of Bogenschutz & Dutko, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent
Henry M. Coxe, III, and Aaron Metcalf of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans &
Coxe, Jacksonville, Florida; D. Gray Thomas and Wm. J. Sheppard of Sheppard,
White & Thomas, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Robert Stuart Willis of Willis &
Ferebee, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,
for Steven Warfield, Lakewood Chiropractic Clinic, d/b/a Warfield
Chiropractic Center, Mark E. Klempner, Casmar, Inc., and Craig J. 
Oswald, Amici Curiae
Robert A. Ader and Elizabeth B. Hitt of the Law Offices of Robert Ader, Miami,
Florida,
for Dr. Randolph Hansbrough, Amicus Curiae