Title: People v. Shellstrom

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97831-Agenda 7-November 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. DANIEL R. SHELLSTROM, Appellee.
Opinion filed July 21, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Daniel Shellstrom, was indicted in the circuit 
court of Du Page County on eight felony counts stemming from an incident that 
took place in Naperville on August 15, 1994. The indictment charged defendant 
with three counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 1994)), three 
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(1) (West 
1994)), and two counts of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 1994)). 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. Under the terms of this 
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of home invasion and two counts 
of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and the State nol-prossed the remaining 
counts. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 13 years' imprisonment for home 
invasion and 6 years' imprisonment for each of the two aggravated criminal 
sexual assault counts, with all three sentences to be served consecutively. 
Defendant moved for a reduction in his sentence, and the circuit court denied 
the motion. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant's 
convictions and sentence. People v. Shellstrom, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1114 
(1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Four years later, 
defendant filed, pro se, a document entitled "Motion to Reduce 
Sentence, Alternatively, Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Order Strict 
Compliance with Terms of Guilty Plea." The circuit court treated the pleading as 
a postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) and summarily dismissed it, finding 
that it was patently without merit. Defendant appealed from the circuit court's 
summary dismissal of his pleading, and the appellate court reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings. 345 Ill. App. 3d 175. We affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court, for different reasons, and we vacate the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand with instructions.

BACKGROUND
As the basis for his guilty plea, defendant stipulated to 
the following facts. On the evening of August 15, 1994, defendant was walking in 
a residential neighborhood in Naperville when he looked in the bedroom window of 
a home and saw a woman standing naked. Defendant climbed a trellis that led to 
the second-story bedroom window, cut the screen off the window, removed all of 
his clothing, and entered the home. Once inside, defendant found himself in the 
master bedroom. Defendant moved to the next room and crouched beside a bed where 
a four-year-old girl was sleeping. When the girl's 11-year-old sister entered 
the room, defendant approached her, pulled her shirt up over her face, laid her 
on her back, pulled her pants down, and sexually assaulted her. Defendant then 
led the girl downstairs and again assaulted her. He told the girl to open the 
front door for him, and, still naked, he left the residence.
During the hearing on defendant's guilty plea, the circuit 
court admonished defendant that each of the three counts to which he was 
pleading guilty was a Class X felony which carried a sentence of 6 to 30 years 
in prison. The court further admonished defendant that his sentences for these 
three counts would be served consecutively. The court added that defendant's 
sentences would be followed by a three-year period of mandatory supervised 
release (MSR). Defendant indicated that he understood these admonishments.
With regard to the two counts of aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, the court sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment on each 
of these counts. An additional sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was imposed 
for home invasion, bringing defendant's total sentence to 25 years, plus the 
three years of MSR. In June 1995 defendant moved for a reduction in his 
sentence, and the circuit court denied the motion. Defendant's convictions and 
sentence were affirmed on appeal. No. 2-95-0794 (unpublished order under Supreme 
Court Rule 23).
In May 2002 defendant, appearing pro se, filed a 
pleading entitled "Motion to Reduce Sentence, Alternatively, Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus to Order Strict Compliance with Terms of Guilty Plea." "Respondents" 
listed in the pleading were "DONALD N. SNYDER, Director of Illinois Department 
of Corrections," and the "PRISON REVIEW BOARD."
In the pleading, defendant alleged that (1) the circuit 
court never informed him of the three-year MSR period and (2) the judgment order 
made no mention of an MSR term. According to defendant, he only "recently 
learned from his place of confinement that[,] following his completion of the [j]udicially 
imposed sentence, he would have to serve a 3-year term of MSR." Defendant argued 
that the alleged failure to inform him of the MSR term resulted in a violation 
of his constitutional right to due process. Defendant argued in addition that 
the MSR term was imposed by the administrators of the prison where he was 
confined, not by the circuit court, and therefore violated the separation of 
powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1. In a 
related argument, defendant contended that the allegedly non-judicially-imposed 
MSR term was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Defendant also argued that, 
under the relevant statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 1994)), the MSR term was 
to run concurrently with the prison sentence, not consecutive 
to it. As relief, defendant asked that the judgment orders be amended to show 
that he was not required to serve the MSR term.
The circuit court treated the pleading as a postconviction 
petition pursuant to the Act, and summarily dismissed it, finding that it was 
"patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2002). Defendant was 
not present and had no notice and no opportunity to respond to the circuit 
court's dismissal of his complaint.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred 
in treating his pleading as a postconviction petition and summarily dismissing 
it. Defendant conceded that his pleading, if construed as a motion to reduce 
sentence, would have been untimely. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). However, defendant 
noted that his pleading was titled, alternatively, as an action under the 
mandamus statute. Thus, defendant argued, his pleading should have been 
treated as a motion for mandamus relief. Defendant further asserted 
that there was no provision in the mandamus statute for summary 
dismissal. The appellate court agreed with defendant that there was no provision 
in the mandamus statute authorizing summary dismissal of a mandamus
complaint. According to the appellate court, the circuit court should have 
followed the procedure outlined in the mandamus statute, under which 
the nonmoving party is required to answer or otherwise plead, and the moving 
party may then respond. The appellate court held that "[t]he trial court 
committed reversible error when it failed to follow these statutory provisions 
and instead summarily dismissed defendant's complaint." 345 Ill. App. 3d at 177. 
The appellate court reversed and remanded.
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS
Before this court, defendant argues, as he did before the 
appellate court, that his pleading should have been treated as a mandamus
complaint and not as a postconviction petition. Defendant concedes that, 
where a pro se pleading is unlabeled, a trial court may 
properly recharacterize it as a postconviction petition. However, defendant 
emphasizes that his pleading in the case at bar "specifically invoked the 
mandamus statute and never referred to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act." 
According to defendant, where a pro se pleading is clearly labeled, it 
should not be recharacterized as a postconviction petition. To do so, defendant 
argues, deprives a pro se litigant of his choice of procedural vehicle. 
Quoting from Justice Scalia's partial concurrence in Castro v. United States, 
540 U.S. 375, 386, 157 L. Ed. 2d 778, 789, 124 S. Ct. 786, 794 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas, J.), 
defendant contends that the recharacterization of a clearly labeled pleading 
"essentially amounts to a 'paternalistic judicial exception to the principle of 
party self-determination.' " Defendant argues that, in the case at bar, his 
choice of the procedural vehicle of mandamus should have been 
respected. We disagree.
Under our precedent, it is well settled that, where a 
pro se pleading alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable 
under the Act, a trial court may treat the pleading as a postconviction 
petition. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 566 (2003); People 
ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484 (1973). Moreover, contrary to 
defendant's argument, such recharacterization is allowed even where the pro 
se pleading is clearly labeled. In Palmer we stated:
"It is apparent that the same lack of legal knowledge 
which causes a prisoner to draft an inadequate post-conviction petition might 
result in his selecting the wrong method of collaterally attacking his 
conviction. A salutary result, consistent with the intent of the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act as expressed in [People v.] Slaughter[, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968)], would be achieved if the circuit court, upon finding that a pro 
se petition, however labeled, and however inartfully drawn, 
alleged violations of the petitioner's rights cognizable in a post-conviction 
proceeding, would thereafter, for all purposes, treat it as such." (Emphasis 
added.) Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d  at 484.
See also Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 
201 Ill. 2d 95, 102 (2002) (it is a motion's substance, not its title, that 
determines the motion's character).
There are good reasons for allowing a circuit court to 
recharacterize in such circumstances. First, recharacterization enables the 
issues to be properly framed. Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d  at 484; see also 
Castro, 540 U.S.  at 381-82, 157 L. Ed. 2d  at 786-87, 124 S. Ct.  at 791-92 
(explaining that one reason for recharacterization is "to create a better 
correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion's claim and its 
underlying legal basis"). Second, recharacterization avoids the possible 
harshness of holding a pro se litigant to the letter of whatever label 
he happens to affix to his pleading, even when his claims are such that they 
could more appropriately be dealt with under a different heading. See 
Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d  at 102. As previously noted, defendant in the case 
at bar argues that a party's choice of procedural vehicle must be respected, 
even where the party is acting pro se. While we acknowledge the general 
principle that " 'the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he 
will rely upon' " (Castro, 540 U.S.  at 386, 157 L. Ed. 2d  at 789, 124 S. Ct.  at 794 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
joined by Thomas, J.), quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 
228 U.S. 22, 25, 57 L. Ed. 716, 717, 33 S. Ct. 410, 411 (1913)), we do not 
believe that this principle necessarily applies with full force in every 
situation involving a pro se litigant. As we noted in Palmer, 
a pro se litigant's lack of legal knowledge "might result in his 
selecting the wrong method of collaterally attacking his conviction." Palmer, 
53 Ill. 2d  at 484.
A third reason for sometimes recharacterizing a pro se
pleading as a postconviction petition is illustrated in the case before us. 
Because defendant's pleading was treated as a postconviction petition and 
dismissed pursuant to the Act, defendant was provided with appellate counsel to 
assist him in appealing the dismissal. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(2), 122-7 (West 2002); 
134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). Defendant would not have been eligible for such 
assistance from appointed counsel if his pleading had been treated as a 
mandamus complaint.
In conformity with our precedent, we reaffirm that, where 
a pro se pleading alleges a deprivation of rights cognizable in a 
postconviction proceeding, a trial court may treat the pleading as a 
postconviction petition,(1) even where the 
pleading is labeled differently. We reject the argument that a clearly labeled
pro se pleading must be treated in accordance with its label, 
regardless of the substance of the pleading. See Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d  at 102.
Defendant argues, in addition, that even if a clearly 
labeled pro se pleading may properly be treated as a postconviction 
petition, the circuit court erred in the case at bar because the 
recharacterization of defendant's pleading was done summarily, without giving 
defendant notice or an opportunity to respond. Defendant points for support to
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 157 L. Ed. 2d 778, 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003).
In Castro, similar to the case at bar, the Court 
addressed the propriety of a district court's recharacterization of a federal 
prisoner's pro se motion. The pleading was labeled by the prisoner as a 
Rule 33 (Fed. R. Crim. P. 33) motion for a new trial, but the district court 
treated it as a motion for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255 
and denied the pleading on the merits. As a result, when the prisoner 
subsequently filed what he called a §2255 motion, it was dismissed for failure 
to meet one of the requirements for filing a second or successive §2255 motion. 
The court of appeals affirmed, but urged district courts in the future to 
" 'warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them 
with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings.' " Castro, 540 U.S.  at 379, 157 L. Ed. 2d  at 785, 124 S. Ct.  at 790, quoting Castro v. 
United States, 290 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002).
The Supreme Court in Castro took the court of 
appeals' suggestion to heart. The Court noted that nine other circuit courts of 
appeals, including the Seventh Circuit, had recognized that, "by 
recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigant's filing 
that did not previously bear that label, [a] court may make it significantly 
more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion." Castro, 
540 U.S.  at 382, 157 L. Ed. 2d  at 787, 124 S. Ct.  at 792. These nine circuits 
placed limitations on such recharacterization, and the Supreme Court in 
Castro did likewise. Exercising its supervisory powers over the federal 
judiciary, the Court held:
"The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a 
pro se litigant's motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the 
district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to 
recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization 
means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on 
'second or successive' motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to 
withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he 
believes he has." Castro, 540 U.S.  at 383, 157 L. Ed. 2d  at 787, 124 S. Ct.  at 792.
With regard to the case before it, the Court in Castro
concluded that the prisoner's "Rule 33" motion could not be considered a 
first §2255 motion, and his subsequent "§2255" motion therefore was not a second 
or successive §2255 motion. The Court vacated the judgment of the court of 
appeals, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
In the case at bar, the State argues that Castro 
is inapposite. The State appears to contend that, while the restrictions imposed 
in Castro might be necessary to limit the recharacterization of federal 
pleadings as §2255 motions, the situation is different with regard to Illinois 
recharacterizations of pro se pleadings as petitions for postconviction 
relief. The State's rationale appears to be that any obstacles faced by Illinois 
litigants when filing successive postconviction petitions are not as great as 
those encountered by federal prisoners when filing successive §2255 motions. 
Under this rationale, a federal prisoner would have more at stake than would an 
Illinois litigant if a recharacterization summarily deprived him of his ability 
to file a successive pleading. Therefore, according to this rationale, the 
federal prisoner was more in need of limitations on recharacterization than was 
the Illinois litigant.
The State asserts:
"Although the Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the 
filing of only one petition, it also provides a 'safety valve' for the filing of 
subsequent petitions in unique circumstances. *** If a prisoner can 
demonstrate cause for his failure to raise a claim in his earlier 
post-conviction proceeding and prejudice resulting therefrom, a subsequent 
petition is permitted under the statute." (Emphasis added.)
We find this argument unpersuasive. In our view, the 
obstacles standing in the way of filing a successive postconviction petition are 
not easy to overcome. The cause-and-prejudice test to which the State refers is 
likely as difficult to meet as are the conditions required for filing a second 
or successive §2255 motion. The cause-and-prejudice test is, as the State 
acknowledges, codified in subsection (f) of section 122-1 of the Act. Subsection 
(f), which was added on January 1, 2004, states:
"Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this 
Article without leave of the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a 
petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his 
or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that 
failure. For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by 
identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a 
specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a 
prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his 
or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the 
resulting conviction or sentence violated due process." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) 
(West Supp. 2003).
Under the summary procedure urged by the State, a circuit 
court in Illinois could summarily recharacterize as a first postconviction 
petition a pro se litigant's pleading that was labeled differently. The 
litigant would not be given notice or an opportunity to respond. As a result, 
the pleading that was transformed into the litigant's first postconviction 
petition would present only those arguments that the litigant had chosen to 
include before realizing that he was, in effect, filing a postconviction 
petition. Any additional arguments that the litigant might have included in a 
first postconviction petition would be barred from successive petitions unless 
the litigant could demonstrate cause for failing to bring them and 
prejudice resulting from that failure.
We find this prospect as troubling as did the Supreme 
Court in Castro when faced with a similar circumstance regarding §2255 
motions. We agree with defendant in the case at bar that a pro se 
litigant such as defendant, who has labeled his pleading as a mandamus 
complaint or some other cognizable action other than a petition for 
postconviction relief, ought to be given notice before his pleading is 
recharacterized as a first postconviction petition.
Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we hold that, in 
the future, when a circuit court is recharacterizing as a first postconviction 
petition a pleading that a pro se litigant has labeled as a different 
action cognizable under Illinois law, the circuit court must (1) notify the 
pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) 
warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent 
postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive 
postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to 
withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the claims 
appropriate to a postconviction petition that the litigant believes he or she 
has. If the court fails to do so, the pleading cannot be considered to have 
become a postconviction petition for purposes of applying to later pleadings the 
Act's restrictions on successive postconviction petitions. As noted, we 
recognize that trial courts need not recharacterize a pro se pleading 
as a postconviction petition. However, we urge judges to consider recasting 
pleadings that warrant such treatment.
With regard to the case at bar, we conclude that, in view 
of the proceedings before us, defendant has already received parts 1 and 2 of 
this notice and admonishment. He is aware that the circuit court intended to 
recharacterize his pleading as a first postconviction petition, and he 
undoubtedly knows that, as such, his pleading/postconviction petition will be 
subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions. However, 
defendant has not received the third part of this admonishment: he has not been 
given an opportunity to withdraw his pleading or to amend it to include whatever 
additional postconviction claims he thinks fit. Accordingly, we vacate the 
circuit court's judgment summarily dismissing defendant's pleading entitled 
"Motion to Reduce Sentence, Alternatively, Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 
Order Strict Compliance with Terms of Guilty Plea," and we direct the circuit 
court, on remand, to provide defendant an opportunity to withdraw this pleading, 
or, in the alternative, to amend it to include whatever additional 
postconviction claims he believes he has.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the appellate court for 
different reasons. We vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the 
cause to the circuit court with instructions to afford defendant an opportunity 
to withdraw his pro se pleading, or, in the alternative, to amend it to 
include whatever additional postconviction claims he believes he has.



Appellate court judgment affirmed;
circuit court judgment vacated;
cause remanded with directions.
 
1.  We note that, while a trial court may treat a pro se 
pleading as a postconviction petition, there is no requirement that the 
court do so. A 1997 amendment to section 1221 of the Act added subsection (d), 
which provides:
"A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this 
Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this 
Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction 
or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is 
filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it 
could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article." 725 
ILCS 5/1221(d) (West 2002).
In other words, if a pro se pleading alleges 
constitutional deprivations that are cognizable under the Act, but, as in the 
case at bar, the pleading makes no mention of the Act, a trial court is under no 
obligation to treat the pleading as a postconviction petition. Nevertheless, as 
our appellate court has pointed out, this does not mean that a trial court is 
barred from treating a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition. 
"If the court need not do so, then, by the strongest of implications, it 
also may do so." (Emphases in original.) People v. Helgesen, 347 
Ill. App. 3d 672, 676 (2004).