Title: Ford v. Sewell

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

188 Kan. 767 (1961)
366 P.2d 285
FLOYD E. FORD and DORTHA A. FORD, his wife, Appellees,
v.
RAMEY SEWELL and JULIA R. SEWELL, his wife, Appellants.
No. 42,360

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 10, 1961.
Karl V. Shawver, Jr., of Paola, argued the cause, and Karl V. Shawver, of Paola, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Oliver D. Rinehart, of Paola, argued the cause, and William D. Bright, of Paola, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This action involves a dispute as to the boundary line between adjoining lands of the parties. Plaintiffs originally owned all the land in question. The defendants purchased from plaintiffs Lots 4, 5 and 6 and a triangular part of Lot 3, all in Block 4 of Angier's Addition to the City of Paola, Kansas. There were no *768 definite markings to determine the exact property line of the purchased part of Lot 3. The parties did make some measurements which were furnished to the scrivener who prepared the deed.
The plaintiffs brought this action by filing a petition in which, in the first cause of action set forth in such pleading, they alleged that the deed prepared by defendants' scrivener did not correctly or sufficiently express the agreement of the parties as to the boundary line; charged mutual mistake of the parties, or mistake on the part of plaintiffs and fraud on the part of defendants in the description of the part of Lot 3 to be conveyed, and set out what they contend to be the true description. As to the first cause of action the prayer of the petition asks that the deed be reformed to properly describe the premises, that the boundary line be permanently established, and that the court decree the true boundary line to be that described in the plaintiffs' petition.
In order to avoid possible misunderstanding it should be stated at this point that our failure to refer to the second and third causes of action contained in the petition is due to the fact, as counsel in oral argument finally concede, that the record here presented is limited to proceedings in the court below pertaining to the first cause of action only.
Pertinent portions of the defendants' answer assert that:
The defendants also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiff, Dortha A. Ford.
With issues joined as related the cause came on for trial by the court which, after hearing the evidence adduced by the parties and arguments by their respective counsel, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and then rendered judgment in which it established the boundary line about half way between the two lines for which the parties contend and overruled the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Thereupon defendants perfected the instant appeal.
At the outset, we are confronted with plaintiffs' contention that the motion for a new trial was filed before the rulings of the court upon which defendants' base their alleged error and that in the *769 absence of a motion for a new trial the alleged errors cannot be reviewed. This contention must be disposed of before the merits of the appeal can be considered.
Whether the motion for a new trial as filed covered the later rulings of the trial court need not be considered because there was no appeal taken from the order overruling the motion and it was not specified as error. Moreover, defendants have appealed from the judgment only and limit their specifications of error to charges that the trial court erred (1) in overruling their motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) in locating the involved boundary line; and (3) in rendering judgment for plaintiffs on their first cause of action.
We have repeatedly held that failure to appeal from an order overruling a motion for a new trial or failure to specify the order as error limits the review of this court to the question whether the pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment. Both subjects are thoroughly discussed and laid to rest in McCarty v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 176 Kan. 386, 271 P.2d 264, where it is said and held:
"and in the opinion p. 456 it is said:
This court has had the same questions before it in more recent decisions. See, e.g., Reger v. Sours, 181 Kan. 423, 424, 311 P.2d 996; Jeffers v. Jeffers, 181 Kan. 515, 518, 313 P.2d 233; Marshall v. Bailey, 183 Kan. 310, 312, 327 P.2d 1034; Shelton v. Simpson, 184 Kan. 270, 336 P.2d 159; Green v. State Highway Commission, 184 Kan. 525, 337 P.2d 657, and has carefully adhered to the rule as announced in the McCarty case, supra. See, also, Baker v. Maguire's Inc., 176 Kan. 579, 272 P.2d 739; State, ex rel., v. Miller, 177 Kan. 324, 279 P.2d 223; McIntyre v. Dickinson, 180 Kan. 710, 307 P.2d 1068.
The record will be examined for the purpose of determining whether the judgment is supported by the pleadings and the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We will first consider defendants' contention that the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been sustained as to the plaintiff Dortha A. Ford.
*771 On this question the court found:
The court, citing Robinson v. Mutchmore, 128 Kan. 419, 278 Pac. 18, as authority, made the following conclusion of law:
..............
The parties by joint effort shortly after the deed was made built a substantial ornamental fence at a line about midway between the points contended for by the parties. It was built of gas pipe set in concrete and painted white and left a gateway at both the north and the south ends of the fence. Each of the parties held possession of the land up to the ornamental fence.
Under the state of record we are not inclined to disturb the judgment of the court overruling the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants have set up as a defense a quiet title action in which Dortha A. Ford was named as one of the defendants. The answer alleges that the petition in the quiet title action described the property using the description as contended for by defendants in this action, and a decree quieting title was entered April 30, 1957. Plaintiffs replied alleging that the quiet title action was "filed for the purpose of clearing some discrepancies in the chain of title to the property and was not intended to be and was not an adjudication of the issues involved in this action."
In the opening statement of counsel for defendants the court inquired as to why Dortha A. Ford was made a party to the quiet title action and not Floyd E. Ford. Counsel answered: "The fact there was a difference in her signature." It would appear that if it was intended to settle the boundary dispute in the quiet title action the other tenant in common would have been made a party.
Ordinarily a quiet title action is brought to remove a cloud from the title, not to determine a boundary dispute. In the absence of the record in the quiet title action, particularly the pleadings and *772 the judgment, this court should not attempt to determine whether the boundary dispute was concluded by the judgment.
The question whether the pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment fixing the boundary along the line of the ornamental fence jointly constructed by the parties must be answered in the affirmative.
The court made findings of fact in part as follows:
..............
Finding number 6 is omitted because it was later stricken by the court and a definite description added as follows:
The trial court's conclusions of law on this issue are as follows:
In the face of the record presented we find no reasonable basis *774 for a contention that the judgment of the trial court is not supported by the pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore what has been heretofore stated and held requires an affirmance of such judgment.
It is so ordered.