Title: Commonwealth v. Tremblay

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12493 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RANDALL TREMBLAY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 10, 2018. - October 3, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Waiver of constitutional rights, Search and 
seizure.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Intoxication, Scientific test.  
Waiver.  Intoxication.  Search and Seizure, Clothing.  
Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Motion to suppress, Waiver, 
Property seized at time of arrest. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 10, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth 
W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
Applications for leave to prosecute interlocutory appeals 
were allowed by Hines, J., and Cordy, J., in the Supreme 
Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeals were 
consolidated and reported by them to the Appeals Court.  After 
review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
2 
 
 
 
Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant stands accused of murder in the 
first degree in connection with the beating death of a woman who 
had obtained a restraining order against him.  The Commonwealth 
appeals from an order suppressing both the statements that the 
defendant made during custodial interrogations and the forensic 
testing results obtained from his bloodstained clothing. 
 
The motion judge heard testimony from police witnesses and 
watched an audio-video recording of a second custodial 
interrogation, which took place soon after the police realized 
that they inadvertently had failed to record the defendant's 
first interrogation.  The judge concluded that the defendant was 
too intoxicated during both interviews to make a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary Miranda waiver.  Consequently, the 
judge determined that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant validly 
waived his Miranda rights at the unrecorded first interview.  
See Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 149 (2011). 
 
As to the suppression of the defendant's statements, the 
case calls upon us first to examine unsettled aspects of the 
standard of review to be applied to the judge's subsidiary 
findings, some of which were drawn from documentary evidence.  
We decline to adopt the Federal approach, which does not permit 
3 
 
 
a reviewing court to make an independent assessment of pertinent 
documentary evidence, and instead requires deference to all 
subsidiary fact findings that are not clearly erroneous.  See 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–575 (1985).  
We instead reaffirm the long-standing principle that an 
appellate court may independently review documentary evidence, 
but should accept subsidiary findings based partly or wholly on 
oral testimony, unless clearly erroneous.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 399 (2014).  In such circumstances, the 
case should be decided "upon the entire evidence," see Berry v. 
Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 57-58 (1939), giving "due weight" to the 
judge's subsidiary findings when required.  See Edwards v. 
Cockburn, 264 Mass. 112, 120–121 (1928). 
 
In the recording of the second interrogation, the judge saw 
a man then so intoxicated that his level of sobriety one hour or 
so earlier -- the pertinent time for assessing the validity of 
the Miranda waiver -- could only have been much worse.  The 
recording of the second interview thus formed part of the 
predicate for the judge's conclusion that the defendant had been 
too intoxicated at the beginning of the unrecorded first 
interview to give a valid waiver.  Our de novo review of that 
documentary evidence instead reveals that, for the duration of 
the recording of the second interview, the defendant appeared to 
be lucid, coherent, responsive, and in control of his mental 
4 
 
 
faculties.  Thus, the judge's findings regarding the defendant's 
condition during the second interview -- and, to the extent that 
they are premised on extrapolations from that interview, his 
findings concerning the defendant's capacity validly to waive 
his Miranda rights during the first interview -- are not 
supported by that evidence and cannot stand. 
Mindful that the judge also made findings relating to the 
defendant's condition that are based on oral testimony, and to 
which we must defer, the case on appeal is to be decided on the 
"entire evidence."  See Berry, 304 Mass. at 57-58.  We therefore 
must weigh our de novo review of the second interview along with 
the judge's assessment of the oral testimony.  Doing so presents 
unique challenges in these particular circumstances, where the 
findings focus largely on a comprehensive documentary record of 
the wrong time period.  We do not know the extent to which the 
recording of the second interview may have had an impact on the 
judge's other factual findings and credibility determinations, 
or what else the judge might have found if he shared our view of 
the recording.  Additionally, the judge failed to make factual 
findings or credibility determinations regarding certain 
material evidence.  We are thus not confident that the remaining 
findings as to the testamentary evidence that are entitled to 
deference allow for meaningful review of the entire evidence in 
this case. 
5 
 
 
This being so, it is the better part of wisdom to remand 
this case so that the judge can make findings and credibility 
determinations regarding all pertinent evidence in light of our 
de novo assessment of the recording of the second interview.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 438 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 338 (2007).  Depending 
on the findings made on remand as to the defendant's condition 
and level of sobriety at the pertinent time, and recognizing 
that intoxication alone does not preclude a valid waiver, 
Commonwealth v. Wolinski, 431 Mass. 228, 231 (2000), a remand 
will also afford the opportunity to clarify any such nexus, and 
allow the judge as well to determine the voluntariness of the 
statements. 
 
The situation is otherwise as to the suppressed forensic 
testing results.  The police lawfully seized the defendant's 
clothing incident to arrest, and thereafter did not need a 
separate warrant to test the clothing for the presence of human 
blood.  See Commonwealth v. Arzola, 470 Mass. 809, 816-817 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 792 (2016).  Accordingly, the 
order suppressing the results of the forensic testing of the 
defendant's clothing must be reversed. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Findings of fact.  The judge held an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress at 
which three officers testified and an audio-video recording of 
6 
 
 
the defendant's second interview was submitted.1  The judge did 
not make any explicit adverse credibility findings, but stated 
that he credited the officers' testimony "to the extent it [was] 
consistent with [his] explicit findings of fact."  The judge 
found as follows.  Shortly after 2 A.M. on November 18, 2014, 
Boston police received a 911 call stating that the victim had 
died at her apartment.  Her body was found, covered with a 
blanket, on a "very bloody" couch; her face was bruised and 
bloodied.  Two of the defendant's friends were in the apartment 
when the officers arrived, but the defendant was not present.  
One friend appeared to be intoxicated; the other, who did not, 
had telephoned 911. 
 
Sergeant Scott Yanovitch of the Boston police department 
requested a dispatch to all relevant units; the dispatch went 
out around 2:50 A.M.  Officer Shawn Roberts heard the dispatch 
                     
 
1 The remaining evidence presented consisted of the 
defendant's Miranda waiver form, a restraining order obtained by 
the victim against the defendant, a video recording of the wrong 
interrogation room, photographs of the crime scene, and a video 
recording of the defendant with his friend at a Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) station more than four hours 
before he was interrogated.  At the hearing, the witnesses also 
referenced video surveillance from a liquor store more than five 
hours before the defendant was interrogated, but that footage 
was not played or submitted.  The judge did not discuss these 
other pieces of evidence in his findings.  Although the record 
on appeal does not include the video recordings of the defendant 
with his friend at the MBTA station and the liquor store, these 
materials would not aid our analysis, because they were recorded 
four or five hours before the defendant's first interrogation. 
7 
 
 
and recognized the address because he had responded there to 
some previous complaints by the victim of domestic violence by 
the defendant.  Roberts used his mobile data terminal to perform 
a search of the prior police reports regarding that address, 
found the defendant's name, and checked his criminal record.  
Roberts discovered that an active restraining order was in place 
requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim's 
residence, and that there was an outstanding warrant to arrest 
the defendant for failing to register with the Sex Offender 
Registry Board.  Roberts also examined the defendant's booking 
photographs. 
 
Over the next hour or so, Yanovitch saw a man who was later 
identified as the defendant "hanging out" near the victim's 
apartment.  The first time, Yanovitch briefly stepped outside 
the victim's apartment to get some fresh air and saw the 
defendant walk past him, talking and mumbling to himself.  The 
second time, when Yanovitch escorted one of the defendant's 
friends outside the apartment to smoke a cigarette, the 
defendant approached and asked the friend for a cigarette.  
Around the same time, Roberts completed his research and 
contacted Yanovitch over the police radio to tell him what he 
had learned about the defendant.  Yanovitch asked Roberts to 
come to the scene to determine if the friend that he had 
escorted outside to smoke was the person Roberts had researched.  
8 
 
 
Roberts arrived, confirmed that the friend was not the same 
individual, and left. 
 
Back inside the apartment, Yanovitch heard the defendant, 
standing on the sidewalk, yelling loudly; he was yelling 
statements such as "What's going on in there?"; "I know what 
happened"; and "She was my friend."  Yanovitch went outside 
again.  The defendant approached him, asked, "What's going on in 
there?" and repeated, "She was my friend."  Yanovitch asked the 
defendant for his name, and the defendant responded, "What, are 
you going to run me?"  Yanovitch then asked Roberts to return to 
the scene to determine if the defendant was the person he had 
researched; by this time it was approximately 3:40 A.M. 
 
When Roberts returned and approached the defendant, Roberts 
smelled alcohol.  He identified the defendant and placed him 
under arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant.  The defendant 
stated that he had paperwork showing that the arrest warrant had 
been recalled, but the paperwork concerned a different warrant.  
Roberts read the defendant the Miranda rights; the defendant did 
not indicate whether he understood.  Roberts and another officer 
then drove the defendant to Boston police headquarters.  During 
the drive, the defendant repeatedly asked if he would be 
released because the warrant was a mistake; he said nothing 
about the victim. 
9 
 
 
 
Sergeant Detective Michael Stratton interviewed the 
defendant for approximately one hour, starting at around 
4:30 A.M., while Roberts observed.  Stratton told the defendant 
that they were being recorded, but, for the duration of the 
defendant's interview, the officers inadvertently recorded a 
different interrogation room.  Stratton read the defendant the 
Miranda rights from a preprinted form, and the defendant 
initialed the form and signed his name.2,3  The defendant then 
made statements implicating himself in the victim's death; the 
defendant said that he and the victim had gotten into an 
argument and that he had hit her in the head twelve to fifteen 
times.  The defendant said that he "got her good," and, "I think 
I killed her." 
 
The defendant also said that, when he woke up the next 
morning, the victim's body was cold and he thought she was dead.  
He stated that he then left the apartment and found his friend, 
                     
 
2 The defendant's waiver form states that his waiver was 
obtained at 5 A.M.  The judge credited the time stamp on the 
recording that was taken of the wrong interview room, however, 
which indicated that the first interview began at 4:30 A.M.  We 
defer to this finding, which also is consistent with the fact 
that the interview lasted for approximately one hour and was 
followed by a ten-minute cigarette break before the defendant 
was reinterviewed at 5:50 A.M. 
 
 
3 References to the "unrecorded" waiver denote the fact that 
the defendant's waiver process was not captured on an audio-
video recording, and are not meant to suggest that the defendant 
failed to sign a waiver form. 
10 
 
 
and they drank beer together before returning to the victim's 
apartment.  Once there, the defendant mopped puddles of blood 
from the floor and took out the trash.  He then drank more beer, 
finishing the last of the beer as his other friend telephoned 
911.  Throughout the interview, the defendant also repeatedly 
insisted that the warrant was a mistake and asked when he would 
be released. 
 
When he learned of the mistake in recording, Stratton asked 
the defendant if he would agree to a second interview; the 
defendant assented, but wanted a cigarette first.  During the 
ten-minute cigarette break, the defendant continued to ask when 
he would be released. 
 
Stratton interviewed the defendant a second time beginning 
at around 5:50 A.M.  This interview was audio-video recorded.  
The judge found that the defendant was "quite intoxicated" 
throughout the interview, and that Stratton knew this but did 
not attempt to discern the defendant's level of intoxication.  
The judge found that the defendant was "stumbling around and 
very unsteady on his feet" when he re-entered the interview 
room, and that he "sound[ed] drunk and seem[ed] to have trouble 
speaking clearly."  The defendant paid "very little attention 
while Stratton tried to review the Miranda form with him," and 
"reached across the table and started playing with Stratton's 
pen and papers."  The judge found that, at that point, the 
11 
 
 
defendant still did not realize that he had incriminated 
himself, as he was again arguing that the warrant was only a 
"straight warrant," a "mistake," and asking if he would be 
released.  The defendant also made statements such as, "She's 
dead because of me," and, "I did whack her."  The judge stated 
that, "[s]ince it is apparent that [the defendant] was quite 
intoxicated throughout the second police interrogation, the 
Court infers and therefore finds that he was even more drunk 
during the first interview." 
 
After the second interview, Stratton arrested the defendant 
for murder.  Stratton also seized all the defendant's clothing 
after he noticed apparent bloodstains on the defendant's shoes 
and socks.  The officers had not obtained a warrant to seize or 
test the clothing.  Every piece of clothing the defendant had 
been wearing tested positive for the presence of human blood. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, and 
violation of an abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7.  He 
moved to suppress all statements he had made to police and all 
evidence seized from him.  The judge allowed the motion to 
suppress in part.  He ordered suppressed all statements the 
defendant made once he had been transported to the police 
station, but found that suppression was not required for 
statements made before the defendant had been transported to the 
12 
 
 
police station.  The judge found that the Commonwealth had not 
met its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had validly waived his Miranda rights.  The judge 
also ordered that the results of forensic testing of the 
defendant's clothing be suppressed, because no warrant had been 
obtained to test the clothes; he denied the motion to suppress 
the clothing itself, on the ground that the seizure was 
permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
 
A single justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's 
petition for interlocutory review of the partial allowance of 
the motion to suppress.  The defendant's motion for leave to 
file a cross appeal of the partial denial of the motion to 
suppress also was allowed, and the appeals were consolidated and 
reported to the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court reversed the 
judge's partial allowance, Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. 295, 313 (2017), and this court then allowed the 
defendant's application for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "In general, in 
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the 
judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (quotation, citation, and alterations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340 (2012).  
13 
 
 
Massachusetts appellate courts have traditionally declined to 
defer to subsidiary findings based wholly on documentary 
evidence, however.  See, e.g., Berry, 304 Mass. at 57-58.  
Because the judge's subsidiary findings rested on both 
testimonial and documentary evidence, we must first settle the 
open question whether our long-standing practice of 
independently reviewing documentary evidence survives in light 
of more recent legal developments. 
 
i.  Origins.  Traditionally, "[g]reat weight is justly 
given to the conclusions on questions of fact of the justice who 
hears the case."  Chase v. Hubbard, 153 Mass. 91, 92 (1891).  
This is because the judge "has [had] an opportunity to observe 
the conduct of the witnesses, their fairness and intelligence, 
and can judge better than the full court possibly can of the 
degree of credibility to be given to their testimony."  Id.  If 
a judge's subsidiary findings are drawn from documentary 
evidence, however, we have reasoned that "the reason of the rule 
largely disappears."  Id.  Thus, for over a century, 
Massachusetts appellate courts have distinguished between 
findings drawn from testimonial evidence and those drawn from 
documentary evidence.  See Olivieri v. Atkinson, 168 Mass. 28, 
30 (1897); Chase, supra. 
 
Initially, this court held that, where the record consists 
entirely of documentary evidence, it is "proper to re-examine 
14 
 
 
the evidence, and determine if on the whole the judgment was 
right."  Olivieri, 168 Mass. at 30.  Later, this rule was 
expanded, such that, within a given case, subsidiary findings 
based on documentary evidence were not entitled to deference, 
but subsidiary findings "based wholly or partly upon oral 
testimony are not to be set aside unless plainly wrong."  Berry, 
304 Mass. at 57–58.  Even then, however, the case "is to be 
decided upon the entire evidence," giving "due weight" to the 
judge's subsidiary findings based on testimonial evidence.  
Edwards, 264 Mass. at 120–121. 
 
ii.  Rule 52 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The standard of review for subsidiary findings based 
on documentary evidence originated in civil cases, but such 
cases were later relied on in the criminal context as well.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004) 
(citing civil cases such as Berry, 304 Mass. at 57-58, for 
standard of review); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 
256–257 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (same).  Civil 
cases like Berry, supra, however, appear to conflict with 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996), 
which was adopted in 1974.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Gaston Snow 
& Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 525, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 
(1989) (recognizing, but not resolving, conflict between 
traditional standard of review for findings based on documentary 
15 
 
 
evidence and rule 52 [a]); Rapp v. Barry, 398 Mass. 1004, 1005 
n.3 (1986) (same).  We take this opportunity to resolve this 
apparent conflict, affecting the standard of review in both 
civil and criminal cases. 
 
Rule 52 (a) provides, in relevant part, "[f]indings of fact 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of 
the credibility of the witnesses."  It does not exempt findings 
drawn from documentary evidence.4 
 
The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure were "patterned 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."  Van Christo Advert., 
Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 414 (1998).  For this 
reason, "[i]n construing our rules, we follow the construction 
given to the Federal rules absent compelling reasons to the 
contrary or significant differences in content" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Id.  At the time that Mass. R. Civ. P. 
52 (a) was adopted, its language was identical to the cognate 
Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Chance 
                     
 
4 Nonetheless, in the four decades since the adoption of 
rule 52 (a), Massachusetts courts have continued the practice of 
reviewing de novo subsidiary findings based wholly on 
documentary evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 
Mass. 395, 399 (2014); Meschi v. Iverson, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 678, 
681 n.7 (2004); Guempel v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 
845, 848 (1981). 
16 
 
 
v. United States, 415 F.2d 330, 331 (5th Cir. 1969) (discussing 
prior wording of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52[a]). 
 
Since 1985, Federal courts have not independently reviewed 
documentary evidence, and instead have applied the "clearly 
erroneous" standard to all lower court findings.5  See Anderson, 
470 U.S. at 574–575.  See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 
145 (1986) (applying Anderson, supra, to all findings of fact by 
Federal District Courts in criminal cases, other than ultimate 
findings of guilt).  The United States Supreme Court did not 
provide this clarification, however, until more than ten years 
after Massachusetts adopted rule 52 (a).  Until then, in 
applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, Federal courts were split as to 
whether findings based purely on documentary evidence were 
entitled to deference.  See Advisory Committee Notes (1985) to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (collecting cases). 
                     
 
5 The United States Supreme Court held that the clearly 
erroneous standard should apply to all lower court findings, not 
just those involving credibility determinations, because trial 
judges have expertise in fact finding, and "[d]uplication of the 
trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely 
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination 
at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources."  Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–575 (1985).  
Additionally, "the parties to a case on appeal have already been 
forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading 
the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct 
one."  Id. at 575.  "[T]rial on the merits should be the main 
event . . . rather than a tryout on the road" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Id. 
17 
 
 
 
Furthermore, one month after the Supreme Court's decision 
in Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–575, the Federal rule was amended 
to reflect the clarification that the "clearly erroneous 
standard" applied even when findings were based on wholly 
documentary evidence.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (amended April 
29, 1985, effective August 1, 1985).  Thus, Rule 52(a)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now states, "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' 
credibility" (emphasis added).  Rule 52 (a) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure, by contrast, remains unchanged.  Since 
the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) with regard to documentary 
evidence was not clarified until after Massachusetts adopted 
rule 52 (a), and there is currently a "significant difference[] 
in content" between our rule and the Federal rule, we expressly 
decline to depart from the long-standing practice in 
Massachusetts of independently reviewing documentary evidence in 
favor of the Federal approach (citation omitted).  See Van 
Christo Advert., Inc., 426 Mass. at 414. 
We now affirm the principle that an appellate court may 
independently review documentary evidence, and that lower court 
18 
 
 
findings drawn from such evidence are not entitled to deference.6  
See Clarke, 461 Mass. at 340-341.  By contrast, findings drawn 
partly or wholly from testimonial evidence are accorded 
deference, and are not set aside unless clearly erroneous.7  Id.  
Accord Hoose, 467 Mass. at 399-400; Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).  
The case "is to be decided upon the entire evidence," however, 
giving "due weight" to the judge's findings that are entitled to 
deference.  Edwards, 264 Mass. at 120–121. 
While there is no direct counterpart in the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), we also 
defer to subsidiary factual findings in criminal cases unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leahy, 
445 Mass. 481, 485 (2005).  Thus, our pronouncement that the 
clearly erroneous standard set forth in Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) 
                     
 
6 This principle was articulated differently in Commonwealth 
v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004), which explained that we 
independently review evidence that is "reduced to a tangible 
form."  The discussion in that case was referring to documentary 
evidence, such as "transcripts of deposition testimony" or 
"photographs."  See id.  The case did not extend the rule 
regarding findings based on documentary evidence to include all 
forms of physical evidence. 
 
 
7 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.'"  See Building Inspector of 
Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977), quoting 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948). 
19 
 
 
does not apply to subsidiary findings based on documentary 
evidence extends to the criminal context as well. 
We emphasize, however, that this does not give appellate 
courts carte blanche with respect to fact finding.  "[A]s our 
long-standing jurisprudence makes plain, in no event is it 
proper for an appellate court to engage in what amounts to 
independent fact finding in order to reach a conclusion of law 
that is contrary to that of a motion judge who has seen and 
heard the witnesses, and made determinations regarding the 
weight and credibility of their testimony."  Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass. at 438, citing Clarke, 461 Mass. at 340–341, and cases 
cited. 
 
b.  Suppression of statements.  In order for a defendant's 
statements to be admissible at trial, the Commonwealth bears the 
"particularly heavy burden" of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant's Miranda waiver was valid.  See Hoyt, 461 
Mass. at 152, citing Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 920 
(1983).  A waiver is valid when it is made "voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently."  Hoyt, supra at 153.  This 
determination is based on the "totality of the circumstances, 
including the characteristics of the accused and the details of 
the interrogation."  Id.  "[T]he judge may consider, among other 
things, the defendant's age, education, intelligence, physical 
and mental stability, and experience with and in the criminal 
20 
 
 
justice system," Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 203 
(2005), as well as his "outward behavior,"8 Commonwealth v. 
Sarourt Nom, 426 Mass. 152, 159 (1997). 
 
The Commonwealth does not appear to have presented evidence 
concerning most of the aforementioned factors, such as age, 
education, or intelligence, nor did the judge address them.  The 
evidence primarily concerned the defendant's outward behavior 
and demeanor, particularly with regard to his intoxication.  The 
judge, in turn, concentrated his findings and conclusions on the 
defendant's level of intoxication, without establishing the 
nexus between the defendant's intoxication and his ability 
validly to waive his rights.  Expressly relying on the audio-
video recording, the judge concluded that the defendant was 
"quite intoxicated" during the second interview, and inferred 
that the defendant therefore must have been even more 
intoxicated during the first interview. 
 
i.  The recording.  As the recording is documentary 
evidence, the judge's findings drawn from it are not entitled to 
deference and we may review such evidence de novo.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 464 (2015) (recorded 
interrogation constitutes documentary evidence); Clarke, 461 
                     
 
8 The fact that the defendant's waiver was documented in 
writing is not dispositive; the validity of a waiver depends on 
the totality of the circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Magee, 
423 Mass. 381, 387 n.8 (1996). 
21 
 
 
Mass. at 341 (same); Hoyt, 461 Mass. at 148 (same).  We take a 
view quite different from what the motion judge did as to what 
the recording reveals about the defendant's condition. 
 
As the judge noted, at the beginning of the audio-video 
recording, the defendant was a bit unsteady on his feet when he 
was led into the interrogation room; this unsteadiness 
dissipated quickly, however.  For example, the defendant was 
able to stand and pantomime hitting the victim repeatedly, 
without any instability or stumbling.  He also spoke coherently; 
as he entered the interrogation room he was clearly arguing with 
the officers about the warrant for his arrest, and was insisting 
that it was a "straight warrant" rather than a "default." 
 
The recording also shows that the defendant was paying 
attention while Stratton reviewed the Miranda rights, and told 
Stratton he already knew what Stratton was going to say.  The 
defendant did not "play" with Stratton's pen and paper, as the 
judge found, but rather grabbed them while stating that he would 
sign the Miranda waiver form again.  He indicated that he 
understood each right and remembered his earlier waiver, stating 
"I understand everything. . . .  I initialed everything, I 
signed it, and I dated it."  When Stratton asked if the 
defendant understood that he had a right to remain silent, he 
exclaimed, "I'll tell you whatever you want!" 
22 
 
 
 
Throughout the recording, the defendant was very responsive 
to questions.  He was able to recall details of the incident, 
such as times, locations, and the specific bus he took, and even 
corrected a few of Stratton's statements.  His account of 
hitting the victim repeatedly in the head was consistent with 
his statements during the first interview, and he made some of 
the same incriminating statements.  When Stratton asked for the 
defendant's friend's last name, he declined to provide it.  The 
defendant also minimized his culpability, insisting that he only 
hit the victim in the face with an open hand, and that he had 
her permission to be in the apartment and had not stolen her 
keys. 
 
The defendant was cooperative and cordial throughout the 
interview, but when asked pointed questions about the victim, 
his demeanor would become more grave and reticent, and he made 
statements such as, "It shouldn't have happened," and "I fucked 
up."  Thus, although the defendant repeatedly asked when he 
would be released, and disputed the technicalities of the prior 
outstanding warrant, he also, contrary to the judge's findings, 
understood the gravity of the situation.  In addition, he 
understood that he had incriminated himself; regarding the 
victim's condition, he made statements such as, "You're not 
going to let me go now, are ya?"; "I'm going to jail, aren't 
I?"; and "Are you going to charge me with something?" 
23 
 
 
 
In sum, our de novo review of the audio-video recording 
reveals that, during the second interview, the defendant's 
demeanor was lucid, coherent, and responsive, and he appeared to 
be in control of his mental faculties.  Although intoxication 
"bears heavily on the validity of a Miranda waiver," and there 
is no dispute that the defendant drank at least some alcohol in 
the hours prior to his arrest and interrogation, intoxication is 
"insufficient alone to require a finding of involuntariness" 
(citation omitted).  See Wolinski, 431 Mass. at 231.  See also 
Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 303 Mass. 242, 246 (1939) 
("Liquor affects individuals in various ways," and "it is 
sometimes difficult to determine degrees of intoxication").  In 
this case, the recording demonstrates that the defendant's level 
of intoxication at that point did not appear to impede his 
capacity knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to waive his 
rights during the second interview. 
 
This conclusion, however, is not sufficient to resolve the 
matter.9  The recording captured the defendant's condition more 
                     
 
9 The Commonwealth contends that the defendant validly 
waived his rights before both interviews.  The recording instead 
demonstrates that at the start of the second interview, the 
defendant and the officers simply reviewed the waiver form he 
signed during the first interview.  In any event, even if the 
defendant had waived his rights at the start of the second 
interview, the Commonwealth would still be required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the first, unrecorded waiver was 
valid.  "In this Commonwealth, there is a presumption that a 
 
24 
 
 
than one hour after he had made the waiver, when the effects of 
his intoxication presumably had declined to an unknown extent. 
Unlike in Clarke, 461 Mass. at 337 n.1, 338-340, 343, and Novo, 
442 Mass. at 263, 267-268, where the audio-video recordings were 
dispositive, here the recording itself does not show the 
defendant's condition when he made the waiver and cannot be 
conclusive.  We must accordingly consider the recording in light 
of the "entire evidence," Berry, 304 Mass. at 57-58, to 
determine whether the Commonwealth met its heavy burden.  Hoyt, 
461 Mass. at 152. 
 
ii.  The entire evidence.  "It is the motion judge's 
responsibility to make credibility assessments, weigh the 
evidence, and make findings of fact; it remains the 
responsibility of an appellate court to evaluate whether those 
findings are clearly erroneous."  See Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
at 431 n.3.  In this regard, it is also the motion judge's 
                                                                  
statement made following the violation of a suspect's Miranda 
rights is tainted, and the prosecution must show more than the 
belated administration of Miranda warnings in order to dispel 
that taint" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Osachuk, 418 Mass. 229, 235 (1994).  "This presumption may be 
overcome by showing that either:  (1) after the illegally 
obtained statement, there was a break in the stream of events 
that sufficiently insulated the post-Miranda statement from the 
tainted one; or (2) the illegally obtained statement did not 
incriminate the defendant, or, as it is more colloquially put, 
the cat was not out of the bag."  Id.  Here, the second 
interview began ten to twenty minutes after the first interview 
ended; this is insufficient to constitute a "break in the stream 
of events."  See id. 
25 
 
 
responsibility to find adequate facts pertinent to the matter at 
hand; those facts "should be stated clearly, concisely and 
unequivocally, and be worded so that they are not susceptible of 
more than one interpretation."  Isaiah I., 448 Mass. at 339. 
Our ability fairly to assess the entirety of the evidence 
in this case is complicated by two factors.  First, we do not 
know the extent to which the recording had an impact on even 
those findings that did not expressly rely on it.  Second, the 
judge failed to address certain testimony plainly material to 
the issue before him, calling into question the adequacy of the 
facts found to support his conclusion as to the ultimate issue 
in this case, i.e., the defendant's capacity validly to waive 
his Miranda rights at the time of the first interview. 
As to the first complicating factor, to the extent the 
judge expressly relied on the recording of the second interview 
to make findings concerning the defendant's condition during the 
unrecorded first interview, these findings must be set aside in 
light of our independent assessment of the recording.  To the 
extent that the judge made findings about the defendant's 
condition that do not rest on the recording, they are drawn from 
oral testimony and are entitled to deference.  See Clarke, 461 
Mass. at 341.  We cannot know the extent to which the recording 
may have had an impact on these findings, however, and are 
unable to evaluate how, if at all, our de novo review of the 
26 
 
 
recording might alter the judge's view of the testamentary 
evidence.  Additionally, we cannot know whether the judge would 
have reached different credibility determinations had he shared 
our view of the defendant's condition at the second interview. 
As to the second complicating factor, our ability fairly to 
evaluate the entirety of the evidence is compromised by the 
inadequacy of the findings made as to certain material matters.  
For example, the judge credited police officer testimony that, 
at the crime scene, approximately one hour before the first 
interview, the defendant was talking and mumbling to himself 
repeatedly, and yelling statements loudly at the officers such 
as, "What's going on in there?"; "I know what happened"; and 
"She was my friend."  This testimony is not self-explanatory, 
however, and the judge made no further findings regarding what, 
if any, relationship this bore to the defendant's condition at 
the time of the first interview. 
 
Further, the judge did not address certain oral testimony 
by the same police witnesses that was plainly material to the 
ultimate issue in this case.  This would include their testimony 
that the defendant did not appear intoxicated at the crime 
scene, and that the defendant was cooperative, lucid, 
articulate, and even strategic in answering questions during the 
first interview.  In addition to not making any findings as to 
27 
 
 
this testimony, the judge also did not make any express 
credibility determinations as to these three police witnesses. 
The judge's prefatory statement that he credited the 
officers' testimony "to the extent it [was] consistent with 
[his] explicit findings of fact" does not relieve him of his 
obligation to make adequate findings.  Of course, motion judges 
need not make findings with respect to every piece of evidence 
in the record, irrespective of pertinence.  It is understandable 
that busy trial court judges will use brief, prefatory language 
as shorthand to indicate that they are aware that the record 
contains additional testimonial evidence, but find only certain 
portions of the testimony credible or relevant.10  See Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431 n.3.  While such prefatory language 
precludes supplementation of the findings by the reviewing 
court, it does not insulate such findings from being reviewed 
for their adequacy.  Id. 
Here, the portion of the officers' testimony that was 
omitted from the judge's findings was the only evidence directly 
                     
 
10 We are not unaware that the widespread use of such 
prefatory language also may have arisen in response to perceived 
appellate overreaching in the form of augmented or substituted 
fact finding, often to reach a different outcome from that 
reached by the trial court.  Such perceived overreaching may 
occur when the reviewing court supplements findings by relying 
upon apparently uncontroverted witness testimony of record that 
has not been otherwise specifically discredited by the trial 
court judge.  See Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 432. 
28 
 
 
addressing the defendant's condition during the unrecorded first 
interview.  As such, it warranted the judge's attention.  While 
the credibility of this testimony was for the motion judge alone 
to assess, the testimony should have been addressed, and not 
ignored.  This omission unnecessarily impairs our ability on the 
entire evidence to evaluate whether the judge's findings 
adequately support his ultimate conclusions of law. 
 
Nevertheless, appellate courts must not overstep our 
boundaries by substituting our view of the testamentary 
evidence, appearing in a cold transcript, for that of the motion 
judge who, as it were, "eyeballed" the witnesses when in a 
unique position to assess credibility.  See Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass. at 438, citing Clarke, 461 Mass. at 340–341, and cases 
cited.  Given this, we have little alternative but to remand the 
matter for further fact finding, despite the fact that remand is 
ordinarily disfavored; it comes at the expense of court and 
litigants' resources and time, and prolongs proceedings.  Here, 
however, remand is prudent to ensure that the judge will have an 
opportunity to make findings regarding all pertinent evidence in 
light of our assessment of the recording of the second 
interview.  It will also give the judge an opportunity to 
clarify the nexus, if any, between the defendant's intoxication 
and his capacity to make a valid waiver during the relevant 
period.  Cf. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 437 ("where the facts 
29 
 
 
as found are susceptible of more than one interpretation, and 
there is additional evidence in the record, neither implicitly 
credited nor discredited by the judge, remand may be 
appropriate" [quotation and citation omitted]); Isaiah I., 448 
Mass. at 338 (remand for further fact finding necessary where 
judge's findings omitted certain evidence and it was unclear 
whether omission was result of credibility determination or 
clear error). 
 
Because of the unusual circumstances here, including the 
factors complicating our ability fairly to assess the entire 
evidence, this case is the exception, not the rule.  Now, as 
before, what is needed from a trial court judge are credibility 
determinations as to pertinent matters, and concise, clear, and 
adequate findings of fact.  See Isaiah I., 448 Mass. at 339.  
This will allow a reviewing court to evaluate whether the 
findings are clearly erroneous and whether they support the 
judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law. 
 
c.  Voluntariness of statements.  Remand also is 
appropriate here because the judge made no separate findings 
concerning the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.  
"Due process requires a separate inquiry into the voluntariness 
of [a defendant's statement] apart from the validity of the 
Miranda waiver" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Morales, 
461 Mass. 765, 776 (2012).  This is necessary in order to ensure 
30 
 
 
that the statements were "free and voluntary" and "not the 
result of inquisitorial activity that had overborne his will."  
Id.  "Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, promises 
or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's 
age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience 
with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental 
condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency 
(whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the 
interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  On remand, the judge 
therefore should assess separately the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements. 
 
d.  Suppression of clothing and forensic testing.  "The 
Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and art. 14 
[of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] provide that every 
person has the right to be secure against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of his or her possessions" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 587 (2016).  
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively 
unreasonable, but may be justified if the Commonwealth can 
demonstrate that the search or seizure "falls within a narrow 
class of permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 588.  For instance, 
police may seize a defendant's clothing incident to arrest if 
31 
 
 
they have "probable cause to believe that the [clothing] was 
connected to the crime."  Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 
66 (1996).  "[P]robable cause requires a substantial basis for 
concluding that the items sought are related to the criminal 
activity under investigation" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110 (2009). 
 
In this case, the defendant's clothing was validly seized 
incident to his arrest.  The officers had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant even in the absence of his incriminating 
statements.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 119-
120 (1996) (because arrest was proper, police were permitted to 
seize as evidence clothing and shoes worn by defendant at time 
of arrest); Commonwealth v. Gliniewicz, 398 Mass. 744, 750 
(1986) ("Once a defendant has been arrested and is in custody, 
clothing that constitutes evidence may be taken from him"). 
Specifically, although the defendant initially was arrested 
at the crime scene pursuant to a warrant for failure to register 
as a sex offender, police also had probable cause at that time 
to arrest him for the victim's death.  That arrest took place 
after police observed him standing outside the apartment where 
the victim's body had been found, shouting that he knew the 
victim and knew what had happened to her.  The officers knew 
that the defendant had been involved in prior incidents of 
domestic violence involving the victim, at the same address, and 
32 
 
 
his proximity to the victim's apartment indicated that he was in 
violation of the abuse prevention order.  Since the officers 
could have arrested the defendant for murder at the crime scene, 
their later observation11 of apparent bloodstains on his socks 
and shoes provided a substantial basis to conclude that his 
clothing contained evidence of the victim's death.  See Robles, 
423 Mass. at 66-67 (defendant's coat properly seized incident to 
arrest where police observed bloodstains on it and defendant was 
wearing same clothes he had worn on night of murder). 
 
Once the defendant's clothing was properly seized, the 
officers did not need a separate warrant for forensic testing.  
We repeatedly have rejected such a requirement in the context of 
clothing.  See Robles, 423 Mass. at 65 n.8; Commonwealth v. 
Varney, 391 Mass. 34, 38–39 (1984).  While an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothes he or she is 
wearing, that expectation dissipates once the clothes are 
lawfully in the possession of the police.  See Arzola, 470 Mass. 
at 816-817.  At that point, clothing is more comparable to 
latent fingerprints.  Id.  In such cases, the "DNA analysis is 
not a search in the constitutional sense."  Id. at 820.  See 
Commonwealth v. Aviles, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 459, 463 (2003) 
                     
11 The officers first noticed the bloodstained clothing 
during the booking process after they had arrested the defendant 
for murder following the second interview. 
33 
 
 
("where the police have lawfully obtained evidence, it may be 
subjected to scientific testing"). 
 
The judge's reliance on Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 106 n.7, was 
misplaced.  That case concerned forensic analysis to search the 
contents of a computer that was seized pursuant to the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  It is 
inapposite here, particularly as the search of a computer can 
produce significantly more information than basic forensic 
testing of clothing.  See Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 
239 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018) ("Searches of 
the many files on electronic devices . . . must be done with 
special care and satisfy a more narrow and demanding standard 
than searches conducted in the physical world" [quotations and 
citation omitted]).  Compare Varney, 391 Mass. at 41 ("A white 
powder, unlike a film, is not a communicative medium.  A 
warrantless scientific examination by government agents of white 
powder lawfully obtained and plainly visible may confirm the 
fact that it is contraband . . . [but] does not, in our view, 
implicate any Fourth Amendment privacy interest").  Accordingly, 
the suppression of the results of forensic testing of the 
defendant's clothing is reversed. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  So much of the judge's order requiring 
suppression of the results of forensic testing of the 
defendant's clothing is reversed.  So much of the judge's order 
34 
 
 
requiring suppression of the defendant's statements is remanded 
for further factual findings, reconsideration of legal 
conclusions in light of the further findings, and other 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.