Title: Longariello v. Windham SW Supervisory Union

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Longariello v. Windham Southwest Supervisory Union  (95-275); 165 Vt 573; 
679 A.2d 337

[Opinion Filed 31-May-1996]

                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-275

                             MARCH TERM, 1996


Steve J. Longariello                 }     APPEALED FROM:
				     }
				     }
     v.                              }     Windham Superior Court
				     }
Windham Southwest Supervisory Union  }
				     }     DOCKET NO. 262-6-94Wmcv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Steve Longariello sued his former employer, Windham
  Southwest Supervisory Union, alleging that the method by which he was paid
  violated 21 V.S.A. § 342 and resulted in the loss of unemployment
  compensation benefits, which were compensable by 21 V.S.A. § 347.  In
  response to defendant's motion to dismiss, the superior court held that the
  claim was barred by res judicata because the issues had been adjudicated
  and resolved adversely to plaintiff in his unemployment compensation
  appeal, which was affirmed by this Court.  See Longariello v. Department of
  Employment and Training, No. 92-642 (Vt. July 30, 1993) (unpublished);
  Longariello v. Department of Employment and Training, No. 94-017 (Vt. June
  24, 1994) (unpublished).  We reverse and remand.

       Plaintiff worked as an integration specialist for defendant school
  district from February 3, 1992 to June 20, 1992.(FN1)  For work during this
  period, plaintiff earned $12,262 and was offered two payment plans: (1) to
  receive his salary over the period from February 3 to the end of August; or
  (2) to receive his salary as in (1) for the months of February through May
  and then to receive in June as a lump sum the amounts that would have been
  paid in June, July and August.  Plaintiff chose the latter option and, as a
  result, received 47% of his total salary in June.  On the completion of his
  employment, plaintiff applied for unemployment compensation and was found
  ineligible because of the method by which he was paid.(FN2)  This denial was
  upheld by the Employment Security Board, and eventually, by this Court.

 


       It is undisputed that plaintiff would have been eligible for
  unemployment compensation had he received his wages in equal increments
  during the period he worked.  It is not clear from the sparse record what
  the effect of the former option above would have been on unemployment
  compensation eligibility.

       The superior court granted defendant's motion to dismiss because
  "[t]his case has been fully litigated and adjudicated, including appellate
  review by the Vermont Supreme Court."  Res judicata, also known as claim
  preclusion, applies if there is a final judgment in former litigation in
  which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or
  substantially identical to those before the court in this case.  See Berlin
  Convalescent Center v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56, 615 A.2d 141, 143 (1992). 
  It bars claims that were litigated and those which should have been raised
  in the prior litigation. See id, 615 A.2d  at 143-44.  The related doctrine
  of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue
  that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties
  resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary
  to the resolution of the action.  See id., 615 A.2d  at 144.

       Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies here.  Plaintiff
  could not have litigated in the administrative appeal system of the
  Department of Employment and Training the legality of defendant's wage
  payment scheme under 21 V.S.A. § 342.  Nor did plaintiff actually litigate
  this issue.  The fact that plaintiff now seeks damages measured in part by
  the loss of unemployment compensation benefits does not change the fact
  that he could not, and did not, litigate his current liability theory.

       In the alternative, defendant argues that the dismissal should be
  affirmed because the complaint does not allege facts that would entitle
  plaintiff to relief under 21 V.S.A. § 347, the remedy provision.  This
  argument was not considered by the superior court, and the record is
  inadequate to allow us to rule on it here.

       Plaintiff alleges liability under § 342(b), which provides in
  pertinent part:

       any person having employees in his service doing and transacting
       business within the state may . . . pay bi-weekly or semi-monthly
       in lawful money or checks, each of his employees, the wages
       earned by the employee to a day not more than six days prior to
       the date of payment.  If a collective bargaining agreement so
       provides, the payment may be made to a day not more than 13
       days prior to the date of payment.

  Without factual development in this case, we cannot determine whether this
  section has been violated.  We note, however, that the facts developed in
  the earlier proceeding, as placed before the court by defendant in
  connection with the motion to dismiss as set forth above, suggest a
  violation of this section because part of plaintiff's wages were held back
  to be paid at the end of his employment or in the months after the
  employment ended.

       Nevertheless, defendant argues there is no remedy for any violation of
  § 342 because plaintiff's wages have been paid.  Section 347 provides a
  forfeiture remedy for violation of § 342 but provides: "no action may be
  maintained under this section unless at the time the action is brought the
  wages remain unpaid or improperly paid,"  21 V.S.A. § 347.  Defendant's
  argument ignores the words "improperly paid" which plainly mean something
  beyond continuing failure to pay.(FN3)  Nothing in Lanphear v. Tognelli, 157
  Vt. 560, 563, 601 A.2d 1384, 1386

 

  (1991), a case holding that the remedies in § 347 are inapplicable for
  violations of minimum wage laws, suggests that § 347 cannot reach the
  adverse consequences of uncorrected payment delays.

       Plaintiff also appeals two protective orders issued by the court.  The
  first relates to discovery and was issued because the dismissal made
  plaintiff's discovery requests moot and this Court had ruled that the
  information was not discoverable.  We agree that the court could find that
  the requests involved "undue burden or expense" and acted within its
  discretion.  V.R.C.P. 26(c).

       The second protective order was issued in response to plaintiff's
  repetitive filings of motions to alter or amend the court's judgment and
  directed that future filings by plaintiff be accompanied by an attorney's
  affidavit that they comply with V.R.C.P. 11.  In light of our disposition,
  we strike this protective order.

       Reversed and remanded; protective order dated March 25, 1995 is
  stricken.



     BY THE COURT:



     _______________________________________
     Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

     _______________________________________
     Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Just





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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Because there has been no adjudication on the merits, the facts
  are derived from the earlier decisions in the unemployment compensation
  appeal as attached to defendant's motion to dismiss.


FN2.  21 V.S.A. § 1338(d)(2) requires that in addition to the wages
  paid in the highest calendar quarter of the employee's base period, the
  employee must be paid in the base period additional wages equal to 40% or
  more of that amount.  In this case, the base period is the year before
  plaintiff's application for benefits, see 21 V.S.A. §§ 1301(16)(A),
  1301(17)(B), and plaintiff earned no other wages during that year.  Since
  the amount paid in the first quarter of 1992 does not equal at least 40% of
  the amount earned in the second (and highest) quarter, the requirement of §
  1338(d)(2) was not met.  It would have been met if plaintiff had been paid
  in equal installments over the period of his employment.


FN3.  We do not decide how, if plaintiff establishes liability, the
  amount of the forfeiture would be calculated in this case.