Title: Ex parte Randell L. Dickson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Randell L. Dickson v. Emily Vandiver Dickson)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/26/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1061286
_________________________
Ex parte Randell L. Dickson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Randell L. Dickson
v. 
Emily Vandiver Dickson)
(Madison Circuit Court, DR-04-1522;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050945)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Randell L. Dickson ("the husband") petitioned this Court
for a writ of certiorari after the Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed, without an opinion, a divorce judgment that, among
other things, awarded Emily Vandiver Dickson ("the wife")
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alimony in gross in an amount substantially exceeding the
value of the husband's present estate.  Dickson v. Dickson
(No. 2050945, May 25, 2007), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2007) (table).  We granted certiorari review to determine
whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with Ex
parte Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 55, 299 So. 2d 743, 750 (1974), and
Zinnerman v. Zinnerman, 803 So. 2d 569, 574 (Ala. Civ. App.
2001).
Facts
The parties met in 2000 and were married in 2001; both
parties were 52 years old at the time of the marriage.  The
parties separated approximately three years later, in 2004;
they divorced in 2006.  There were no children from this
marriage, but each party has adult children from a previous
marriage. 
When the parties met in 2000, the husband was struggling
financially.  He had a real-estate and construction business
that was losing money because the houses he built were not
selling.  The husband had borrowed substantial sums from his
business partner to cover the costs incurred in connection
with the unsold houses.  In February 2000, the husband signed
a note to his business partner in the amount of $140,000,
which was secured by an assignment of the husband's interest
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in Dickson Realty, Inc., Security Boys Properties, L.L.C., and
Monrovia Farms Development, Inc.  By 2006, the husband owed
his business partner an additional $113,036 in unsecured debt.
In August 2000, the husband sold his residence because he
could no longer afford the mortgage payments, and he moved in
with the wife.  At that time, the husband agreed to share
expenses with the wife "fifty-fifty."  In December 2000, the
husband executed a line-of-credit promissory note in favor of
the wife, which provided that the husband would repay the wife
for his share of certain expenses plus interest.  Attached to
the note was a ledger on which the parties periodically
entered debits (e.g., the husband's share of household
expenses and certain major purchases) and credits.  The
husband testified that he did not intend for the line-of-
credit arrangement to continue after the parties married, but
the wife continued to enter debits and credits on the ledger
until the parties separated in 2004. 
The parties disagree on the amount owed on the line-of-
credit note at the time of the trial.  The wife testified that
the husband owed her $ 137,775.  The husband testified that he
owed the wife approximately $22,000 after attributing to him
a credit for substantial tax savings resulting from the
parties' joint use of the husband's prior years' tax losses.
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The trial court did not make an express finding as to the
1
amount owed under the line-of-credit note, but it awarded the
wife alimony in gross in the exact amount she claimed the
husband owed her, and it referred to the note in the paragraph
explaining its reasons for the award of alimony in gross. 
4
It appears that the trial court agreed with the wife's
contention as to the amount owed; there is evidence in the
record to support the wife's contention.  
1
By 2004, the parties were having disagreements over money
and over the conduct of the wife's adult son, who had moved
into the marital residence and later moved out.  In July 2004,
the husband moved out of the marital residence after the wife
told him that she would allow her adult son to move back into
the marital residence.  Shortly thereafter, the husband
purchased a house without making any down payment. 
In October 2004, the husband filed the present action,
seeking a divorce and an equitable distribution of the
parties' assets.  The wife filed an answer and a counterclaim,
seeking a divorce and an equitable distribution of assets.
Neither party requested periodic alimony or support.  In
October 2005, the wife filed an amendment to her counterclaim,
seeking enforcement of the line-of-credit note.  Approximately
one week later, the husband filed a petition for bankruptcy,
listing as creditors the wife, his business partner, certain
credit-card creditors, and others.  The husband's bankruptcy
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The record does not disclose the resolution of the
2
negotiation concerning payment for the husband's nonexempt
property.
5
petition sought, among other things, the discharge of the debt
arising out of the line-of-credit note.  In the bankruptcy
proceeding, the wife objected to the discharge of the
husband's debt to her.  It appears that, at the time of trial
in this case, the bankruptcy proceeding concerning the line-
of-credit note had not been resolved. 
The evidence in the record discloses that the husband's
separate estate, at the time of the trial, was approximately
$22,000, including (1) personal property worth approximately
$12,000, which was subject to a demand by the husband's
bankruptcy trustee that the husband pay $10,000 in lieu of
forfeiture of his nonexempt personal property (which the
husband valued at $9,150);  (2) the house the husband
2
purchased after he moved out of the marital residence, in
which he had an equity of approximately $300; (3) a savings
account at AmSouth Bank, with an approximate value of $10,000;
(4) AmSouth Bank stock valued at approximately $4,400; and
(5) a 401(k) retirement account at AmSouth Bank (see
discussion below), with a value of approximately $16,000.  The
husband's vehicles, furniture, and similar items were leased
or financed, and he had little or no equity in them.
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The record does not contain any evidence of the value, if
any, of the husband's interest in his three businesses.  The
husband testified that he had assigned his interests in those
businesses to secure the $140,000 note to his business partner
and that he had no equity interest in those businesses.
Following the parties' separation and before trial in
June 2006, the husband began working for AmSouth Bank, with a
base salary of $67,000.  The husband received an incentive
bonus of approximately $12,000 for 2004 and an incentive bonus
in excess of $30,000 for 2005.  There is evidence in the
record indicating that the husband's base salary for 2006 was
projected to be approximately the same as it was in 2004 and
2005.
During the marriage, the wife had been employed as a
civil-service engineer with the United States Army, earning
approximately $138,000 in 2004.  Shortly before the trial, the
wife voluntarily retired from her employment; she gave no
reason for retiring other than the fact that she "had the
number of years and the age factor."  There is evidence in the
record that the wife was receiving a pension of more than
$6,000 per month before taxes.  There does not appear to be
any impediment to the wife's seeking employment in the private
sector. 
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In July 2006, after a trial at which ore tenus evidence
was presented, the trial court rendered a judgment divorcing
the parties and awarding the wife (1) all of her separate
property, all the parties' jointly owned property, and certain
of the husband's separate property (including but not limited
to all the husband's savings account at AmSouth Bank and half
of the husband's AmSouth Bank stock), (2) alimony in gross in
the amount of $137,775, less the amount received by the wife
from the husband's savings account (approximately $10,000),
payable in monthly installments of $1,000, and (3) the sum of
$16,266.40, for her attorney fees.  The divorce judgment did
not award periodic alimony to either party.
Analysis
It is well settled that "'"[p]roperty divisions are not
required to be equal, but must be equitable in light of the
evidence, and the determination as to what is equitable rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court."'"  Ex parte
Durbin, 818 So. 2d 404, 408 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Morgan v.
Morgan, 686 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), quoting in
turn Duckett v. Duckett, 669 So. 2d 195, 197 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995)).  An appellate court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court or reweigh the evidence.  Ex parte
Foley, 864 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Ala. 2003). 
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A fortiori, if the additional $16,266.40 awarded the wife
3
by the trial court for attorney fees is considered part of the
alimony-in-gross award (which is the way the trial court
considered it), the resulting total of $154,041.40 would
exceed by that much more the value of the husband's estate as
8
Citing Ex parte Hager and Zinnerman, the husband contends
that the trial court's property division was in error because
the amount of alimony in gross awarded the wife by the trial
court greatly exceeded the value of the husband's present
estate, i.e., the husband's estate as it existed at the time
of the judgment.  The husband correctly argues in his brief to
this Court that an award of alimony in gross must be made
based on the value of the marital estate and the parties'
separate estates and not on the anticipated future earnings of
the payor.  He argues that the trial court failed to apply
this principle in the present case.  We agree.
  
In its order, the trial court found that the husband's
current income and other current circumstances give him the
financial ability to pay alimony-in-gross installments of
$1,000 per month, going forward.  We do not discern, however,
from the trial court's judgment a finding that the amount of
the husband's estate, as it existed at the time the judgment
of divorce was entered, was sufficiently large to justify the
$137,775 alimony-in-gross award, as entered by the trial
court.   Consistent with the discussion of the evidence as set
3
1061286
it existed at that time.
In general, an award of alimony in gross "must satisfy
4
two [other] requirements, (1) the time of payment and the
amount must be certain, and (2) the right to alimony must be
vested."  Cheek v. Cheek, 500 So. 2d 17, 18 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986).  Those two requirements do not appear to be at issue in
this case.
9
forth above, our review of the record leads us to conclude
that the record does not contain substantial evidence
supporting such a factual finding.  To the contrary, it is
clear that the alimony-in-gross award made by the trial court
substantially exceeded any value that could be drawn from the
evidence regarding the husband's estate at the time of the
divorce.
In Hager, this Court defined alimony in gross and
periodic alimony as follows:
"'Alimony in gross' is the present value of the
wife's inchoate marital rights -- dower, homestead,
quarantine, and distributive share.  It is payable
out of the husband's present estate as it exists at
the time of divorce.  Borton v. Borton, [230 Ala.
630, 162 So. 529 (1935).] On the other hand,
'periodic alimony' is an allowance for the future
support of the wife payable from the current
earnings of the husband." 
293 Ala. at 55, 299 So. 2d at 750 (emphasis added).   The
4
Hager Court also stated that the award at issue "was intended
to be, as denominated, 'alimony in gross,' a property
settlement award, compensating the wife only for the loss of
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her rights in the husband's estate."  293 Ala. at 55, 299 So.
2d at 751 (emphasis added).  See also Daniel v. Daniel, 841
So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (alimony in gross is
a form of property settlement and must be payable out of the
present estate of the payor at the time of the divorce).
In Zinnerman, 803 So. 2d at 574, the Court of Civil
Appeals reversed a judgment awarding alimony in gross because,
"at the time of the divorce [the husband's] estate was
insufficient to satisfy the award of alimony in gross."  The
court stated: 
"'"'Alimony in gross' is the present value of the
wife's inchoate marital rights -- dower, homestead,
quarantine, and distributive share.  It is payable
out of the husband's present estate as it exists at
the time of divorce."'  Murphy v. Murphy, 624 So. 2d
620, 622 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), quoting Hager v.
Hager 293 Ala. 47, 299 So. 2d 743 (1974) (emphasis
added [in Zinnerman])." 
803 So. 2d at 574.  See also Johnson v. Johnson, 840 So. 2d
909, 912 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (alimony in gross "'"is payable
out of the husband's present estate as it exists at the time
of the divorce...."'" (quoting Hager, 293 Ala. at 55, 299 So.
2d at 750) (emphasis added in Johnson)); Epps v. Epps, 218
Ala. 667, 669, 120 So. 150, 151 (1929) (allowance of $100 per
month was considered to be periodic alimony because it was
"equivalent to [the wife's] share in quite a considerable
estate.  The husband had no such estate.").
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The wife contends that Boykin v. Boykin, 628 So. 2d 949,
952 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), creates a "bankruptcy exception" to
the Hager principle and thus supports the award of alimony in
gross in this case.  That contention fails.  It is true that
the ex-husband in Boykin, in making a general argument that
the alimony-in-gross award was excessive, contended that he
had filed for bankruptcy before the parties separated.
Contrary to the manner in which the wife suggests that a
"bankruptcy exception" should operate in the present case, the
ex-husband in Boykin was attempting to use the fact of his
bankruptcy as a factor in support of reducing the property
award in that case.
Furthermore, the fact of the ex-husband's bankruptcy
played no apparent role in the Court of Civil Appeals'
analysis of the ex–husband's position.  628 So. 2d at 952.
The Boykin court affirmed the alimony-in-gross award in that
case based on its application of the general principle that
divisions of property must be equitable.  Id.  We therefore
see in Boykin no "bankruptcy exception" to the principle that
an award of alimony in gross, as part of the division of the
parties' property, must be made out of the present estate of
the payor at the time of the divorce.
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The wife also contends that, under Mahaffey v. Mahaffey,
806 So. 2d 1286, 1291 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), the appellate
courts are allowed to "relabel" the award of alimony in gross
in order to do equity.  The wife does not specify, however,
how the alimony-in-gross award should be relabeled.  Moreover,
Mahaffey does not support the wife's contention.  
In Mahaffey, the judgment ordered the husband to pay, as
alimony in gross, one-half of any liability the wife might
incur as a result of a pending lawsuit relating to a real-
estate sale.  The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the
designation of that obligation as "alimony in gross" was
improper because the time and amount of the payment were not
certain.  The court noted that "the substance of an award, and
not its title, governs the determination of the kind of award
it is."  806 So. 2d at 1291.  The court concluded that the
provision regarding the potential liability was a part of the
property division and that the designation of the potential
liability as "alimony in gross" was harmless.  
In the present case, however, the trial court's error is
not harmless and could not be saved by relabeling.  Whether
denominated as part of the general property division or, more
specifically, as alimony in gross, the award is improper
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because it exceeded the value of the husband's estate at the
time of the divorce.
Based on the facts before us, it appears that the trial
court erred by awarding the wife alimony in gross in an amount
far exceeding the value of the husband's estate at the time of
the divorce.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand
the cause for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.