Title: Seabright Ins. v. US Airways

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 8/22/11 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SEABRIGHT INSURANCE COMPANY,  ) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
 S182508 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A123726 
US AIRWAYS, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
City and County of San Francisco
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CGC-06-458707 
 
 
) 
ANTHONY VERDON LUJAN, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Intervener and Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Generally, when employees of independent contractors are injured in the 
workplace, they cannot sue the party that hired the contractor to do the work.  
(Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette).)  Here, we consider 
whether the Privette rule applies when the party that hired the contractor (the 
hirer) failed to comply with workplace safety requirements concerning the precise 
subject matter of the contract, and the injury is alleged to have occurred as a 
consequence of that failure.  We hold that the Privette rule does apply in that 
circumstance. 
By hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the 
contractor any tort law duty it owes to the contractor’s employees to ensure the  
 
 
2 
 
safety of the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.  That implicit 
delegation includes any tort law duty the hirer owes to the contractor‘s employees 
to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory safety requirements.1  Such 
delegation does not include the tort law duty the hirer owes to its own employees 
to comply with the same safety requirements, but under the definition of 
―employer‖ that applies to California‘s workplace safety laws (see Lab. Code, 
§ 6304),2 the employees of an independent contractor are not considered to be the 
hirer‘s own employees. 
The Court of Appeal here erred in reversing the trial court, which had 
granted summary judgment for defendant. 
I. 
Defendant US Airways uses a conveyor to move luggage at San Francisco 
International Airport.  The airport is the actual owner of the conveyor, but US 
Airways uses it under a permit and has responsibility for its maintenance.  US 
Airways hired independent contractor Lloyd W. Aubry Co. to maintain and repair 
the conveyor; the airline neither directed nor had its employees participate in 
Aubry‘s work. 
The conveyor lacked certain safety guards required by applicable regulations.  
Anthony Verdon Lujan, who goes by the name Verdon, was inspecting the 
                                              
1  
Not present here is a situation in which the relevant statutes or regulations 
indicate an intent to limit the application of Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, or 
preclude delegation of the tort law duty, if any, that the hirer owes to the 
contractor‘s employees. 
2  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. 
 
3 
conveyor as an employee of Aubry, and his arm got caught in its moving parts.  
Plaintiff SeaBright Insurance Company, Aubry‘s workers‘ compensation insurer, 
paid Verdon benefits based on the injury and then sued defendant US Airways, 
claiming the airline caused Verdon‘s injury and seeking to recover what it paid in 
benefits.  Verdon intervened as a plaintiff in the action, alleging causes of action 
for negligence and premises liability. 
Defendant US Airways sought summary judgment based on Privette, supra, 
5 Cal.4th 689, and Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 
(Hooker).  In Hooker, we held that the hirer of an independent contractor can be 
liable for a workplace injury of the contractor‘s employee if the hirer retained 
control over the contractor‘s work and exercised that control in a way that 
―affirmatively contribute[d]‖ to the employee‘s workplace injury.  (Hooker, at 
p. 213.)  Defendant US Airways argued that it did not ―affirmatively contribute[]‖ 
to employee Verdon‘s injury. 
Insurer SeaBright and employee Verdon (plaintiffs) countered with a 
declaration by an accident reconstruction expert, who stated that the lack of safety 
guards at ―nip points‖ on the conveyor violated Cal-OSHA regulations (see § 6300 
et seq. [Cal. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1973 (Cal-OSHA)]; Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 8, §§ 3999, 4002 [regulations governing conveyor safety]) and that the 
safety guards would have prevented Verdon‘s injury. 
The trial court struck plaintiffs‘ declaration insofar as it discussed 
causation.3  It found no evidence that US Airways ―affirmatively contribute[d]‖ to 
                                              
3  
The sufficiency of plaintiffs‘ showing on causation might provide an 
alternative basis for upholding the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment for 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
4 
the accident (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 213) and granted summary judgment 
for defendant US Airways.  The Court of Appeal reversed. 
The Court of Appeal held that, under Cal-OSHA, defendant US Airways 
had a nondelegable duty to ensure that the conveyor had safety guards, and that 
the question whether the airline‘s failure to perform this duty ―affirmatively 
contribute[d]‖ to plaintiff‘s injury (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 213) remained a 
triable issue of fact, precluding summary judgment.  The court noted conflicting 
views among the Courts of Appeal as to how our holdings in Privette, supra, 
5 Cal.4th 689, and Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198, apply when the hirer of the 
independent contractor failed to comply with Cal-OSHA regulations, and the court 
followed a line of decisions holding that such omissions can expose the hirer to 
liability. 
To resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeal, we granted defendant US 
Airways‘s petition for review. 
II. 
Two questions govern the assignment of tort liability:  Did the defendant owe 
the plaintiff a duty of care?  If so, what standard of care applied?  (Lugtu v. 
California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 718; Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 546.)  A plaintiff can rely on statutory law to show that a 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care.  (See Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant US Airways.  (See conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, pp. 1-3.)  Like the 
Court of Appeal, we express no view on the question. 
 
5 
34 Cal.4th 915, 927 & fn. 8.)  Here, plaintiffs contend (1) that Cal-OSHA imposed 
on defendant US Airways a duty of care, (2) that this duty of care extended to 
hired contractor Aubry‘s employees, and (3) that defendant could not delegate the 
duty to Aubry.  Plaintiffs rely on a principle set forth in the Restatement Second of 
Torts:  ―One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to 
provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to 
liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by 
the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or 
precautions.‖  (Rest.2d Torts, § 424.) 
Defendant US Airways assumes that Cal-OSHA imposed on it a duty of care 
that extended to the employees of Aubry, an independent contractor, arguing that 
even if it had such a duty, our decisions, beginning with Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 
689, reflect a strong policy ―in favor of delegation of responsibility and assignment 
of liability‖ to independent contractors.  (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 659, 671 (Kinsman).) 
Whether Cal-OSHA imposes on an employer like US Airways a tort law 
duty of care that extends to the employees of other parties such as independent 
contractors is a question that remains unsettled.  In De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 
69 Cal.2d 217, 228–229 (De Cruz), this court answered the question in the 
affirmative, holding that an employer can be liable in tort to the employees of other 
parties for violations of Cal-OSHA and its regulations.  But the statutory basis of 
that 1968 holding was arguably undermined by significant changes in the law in 
1971 (see Stats. 1971, ch. 1751, §§ 2–3, pp. 3780–3781 [amending § 6304 and 
adding § 6304.5]) and in 1999 (see Stats. 1999, ch. 615, § 2, p. 4337 [amending 
§ 6304.5]). 
Under current law, a plaintiff may rely on Cal-OSHA requirements, in the 
same manner that it can rely on other statutes and regulations, in an attempt to 
 
6 
show that a defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care (§ 6304.5), but the law now 
defines ―employer‖ more narrowly than it did before 1971.  Before 1971, the 
Legislature‘s definition of the term ―employer‖ included ―every person having 
direction, management, control, or custody of any employment, place of 
employment, or any employee.‖  (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 6304, p. 306.)  This broad 
definition of employer was an underpinning of this court‘s 1968 holding in De Cruz, 
supra, 69 Cal.2d 217, that employers can be liable in tort to the employees of other 
parties for violations of workplace safety requirements.  (See id. at pp. 228–229.)  
Through a 1971 amendment to section 6304, the Legislature narrowed its previous 
broad definition of employer, leaving simply a cross-reference to section 3300.  
(See Stats. 1971, ch. 1751, § 2, p. 3780.)  As relevant here, section 3300 defines an 
employer as ―[e]very person . . . which has any natural person in service.‖  (§ 3300, 
subd. (c).)  The effect of these changes on our holding in De Cruz is uncertain, but 
we have never held under the present law that a specific Cal-OSHA requirement 
creates a duty of care to a party that is not the defendant‘s own employee. 
Here, however, as noted earlier (see p. 5, ante), US Airways assumes that 
Cal-OSHA imposed on it a tort law duty of care that extended to Aubry‘s 
employees, and it argues that it delegated any such duty to Aubry as part of its 
contract hiring Aubry to maintain and repair the conveyor.  Thus, the issue here 
turns on whether defendant US Airways could and did delegate to independent 
contractor Aubry any duty it owed to Aubry‘s employees to comply with the 
safety requirements of Cal-OSHA. 
In analyzing this issue, we first consider (in pt. II.A., post) our decisions, 
beginning with Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, that have addressed the liability of 
an independent contractor‘s hirer for workplace injuries to the contractor‘s 
employees.  Our decisions recognize a presumptive delegation of responsibility for 
workplace safety from the hirer to the independent contractor, and a concomitant 
 
7 
delegation of duty.  We next consider (in pt. II.B., post) the applicability of the 
nondelegable duties doctrine under which certain duties may not be delegated to an 
independent contractor.  We find that doctrine inapplicable here, and we therefore 
conclude that an independent contractor‘s hirer implicitly delegates to that 
contractor its tort law duty, if any, to provide the employees of that contractor a safe 
workplace.4 
A. 
Our 1993 decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, explained:  ―At common 
law, a person who hired an independent contractor generally was not liable to third 
parties for injuries caused by the contractor‘s negligence in performing the work.  
[Citations.]  Central to this rule of nonliability was the recognition that a person 
who hired an independent contractor had ‗ ―no right of control as to the mode of 
doing the work contracted for.‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 693.)  That was the common law rule, 
but ―[o]ver time, the courts . . . created so many exceptions to this general rule of 
                                              
4  
We are only discussing the delegation of any tort law duty the hirer might 
have.  The concurring opinion argues that the delegation-of-duty issue we decide 
here is ―at least partly a function of legislative intent,‖ because the hirer‘s tort law 
duty, if any, is one based on a statute.  (Conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, p. 4.)  
We see no indication, however, ―that the Legislature intended to bring about a 
sweeping enlargement of the tort liability of those hiring independent contractors 
by making them civilly liable for Cal-OSHA or other safety violations resulting in 
injuries to the contractors‘ employees.‖  (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 
Cal.App.4th 1267, 1280.)  We agree that US Airways‘s tort law duty, if any, to 
Aubry‘s employees is one derived by the courts from a statute.  Nevertheless, it 
remains a tort law duty, and whether it is delegable is a common law question.  
Here, the statute only comes into play by way of the common law doctrine that 
permits courts to use a statute to establish the existence of a tort law duty of care.  
(See, e.g., Elsner v. Uveges, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 927; Clinkscales v. Carver 
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 72, 75.) 
 
8 
nonliability that ‗ ― ‗the rule [came to be] primarily important as a preamble to the 
catalog of its exceptions.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Privette began limiting those exceptions. 
In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, a property owner hired a roofing company 
to install a new roof, and an employee of the roofing company was burned when 
attempting to carry a bucket of hot tar up a ladder.  At issue was the ―peculiar risk‖ 
exception to the general rule of nonliability.  The peculiar risk exception allows 
lawsuits against those who hire contractors, if the work is ―likely to create . . . a 
peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken . . . .‖  
(Rest.2d Torts, § 416.)  In this context, the phrase ―peculiar risk‖ is used to mean a 
risk that is particular to the situation, not a risk that is odd or weird.  (Privette, at 
p. 695.)  The peculiar risk doctrine ensured that ―a landowner who chose to 
undertake inherently dangerous activity on his land [c]ould not escape liability for 
injuries to others simply by hiring an independent contractor . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 694.)  
The rule ―fairly allocated [the risk of injury] to the person for whose benefit the 
job was undertaken,‖ thereby promoting workplace safety and ensuring 
compensation for ―innocent third parties‖ injured by such work.  (Ibid.) 
At first, the peculiar risk doctrine permitted only lawsuits by injured 
neighbors or innocent bystanders, not lawsuits by injured employees of the 
independent contractor hired to do the work.  Eventually, however, this court 
expanded the doctrine to include the latter type of suits.  (See Woolen v. Aerojet 
General Corp. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 407, 410–411 (Woolen); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 255 (Van Arsdale).) 
In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, we changed course and overruled Woolen, 
supra, 57 Cal.2d 407, and its progeny.  (Privette, supra, at p. 702, fn. 4.)  We noted 
that work-related injuries are compensable under our state‘s Workers‘ 
Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.).  (Privette, supra, at pp. 696–698.)  Moreover, 
that act affords ― ‗the exclusive remedy . . . for injury or death of an employee‘ ‖ 
 
9 
against an employer who obtains workers‘ compensation insurance coverage.  (Id. 
at p. 697.)  In light of that limitation on the independent contractor‘s liability to its 
injured employee, Privette concluded that it would be unfair to permit the injured 
employee to obtain full tort damages from the hirer of the independent contractor.  
That was especially so because (1) the hirer likely paid indirectly for the workers‘ 
compensation insurance as a component of the contract price (id. at pp. 698–699), 
(2) the hirer has no right to reimbursement from the contractor even if the latter 
was primarily at fault (id. at p. 701, citing § 3864), and (3) those workers who 
happen to work for an independent contractor should not enjoy a tort damages 
windfall that is unavailable to other workers (Privette, supra, at pp. 699–700).  We 
further noted that workers‘ compensation serves the same policies as the peculiar 
risk doctrine:  It ensures the availability of compensation to injured employees, 
spreads the risk created by a contractor‘s work to those who benefit from the 
work, and encourages workplace safety.  (Id. at p. 701.) 
We next discussed the peculiar risk doctrine in Toland v. Sunland Housing 
Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253 (Toland), in which we considered whether our 
holding in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, applied when the hirer of the 
independent contractor failed to specify as part of the contract that the contractor 
should take special precautions to avert the peculiar risk.  We noted that the hirer 
―has no obligation to specify the precautions an independent hired contractor 
should take for the safety of the contractor’s employees‖ and ―[a]bsent an 
obligation, there can be no liability in tort.‖  (Toland, supra, at p. 267, original 
italics.)  We also said that subjecting those who hire contractors to peculiar risk 
liability in such circumstances would negate their ―right to delegate to independent 
contractors the responsibility of ensuring the safety of their own workers.‖  (Id. at 
p. 269.)  Thus, in Toland, we recognized the principle of delegation of duty as a 
rationale for our decision. 
 
10 
In 2002, we further refined those principles in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
198, holding that an independent contractor‘s employee can sometimes recover in 
tort from the contractor‘s hirer if the hirer retained control of the contracted work 
and ― ‗fail[ed] to exercise his control with reasonable care . . . .‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 206, 
quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 414.)  We noted that our holding in Privette, supra, 
5 Cal.4th 689, was based on the principle that the hirer of an independent 
contractor generally has ― ‗ ― ‗no right of control as to the mode of doing the work 
contracted for . . . .‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Hooker, supra, at p. 213, italics omitted.)  We held in 
Hooker that the hirer cannot be liable ―merely because [it] retained the ability to 
exercise control over safety at the worksite,‖ but that it is fair to make the hirer 
liable if it ―exercised the control that was retained in a manner that affirmatively 
contributed to the injury of the contractor‘s employee.‖  (Id. at p. 210.) 
Thereafter, our 2005 decision in Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th 659, stressed the 
―framework of delegation‖ (id. at p. 671) to explain our holdings in Privette, supra, 
5 Cal.4th 689, Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th 253, and Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198.  
Those decisions, we observed, were grounded on a common law principle ―that 
when a hirer delegated a task to an independent contractor, it in effect delegated 
responsibility for performing that task safely, and assignment of liability to the 
contractor followed that delegation.‖  (Kinsman, supra, at p. 671.)  For ―policy 
reasons,‖ Kinsman noted, ―courts have severely limited the hirer‘s ability to 
delegate responsibility [to a contractor] and escape liability‖ to a bystander who is 
injured by the contractor‘s negligence.  (Ibid.)  But, Kinsman pointed out, if the 
injured party is the contractor‘s employee, and therefore entitled to workers‘ 
compensation benefits, those policy concerns do not apply.  Hence, Kinsman said, a 
hirer is presumed ―to delegate to an independent contractor the duty to provide the 
contractor‘s employees with a safe working environment.‖  (Ibid.) 
 
11 
Most recently, in Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
518, we again focused on delegation of duty as an important principle underlying 
Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, and its progeny.  Tverberg held that an independent 
contractor‘s hirer is not liable in tort even if the contractor himself, rather than the 
contractor‘s employee, is the one that is injured in the workplace.  (Tverberg, supra, 
at pp. 528–529.)  Although the contractor in Tverberg was not entitled to workers‘ 
compensation benefits, his claim against the hirer nevertheless failed because of the 
hirer‘s presumed delegation to the contractor of responsibility for workplace safety.  
(Id. at pp. 527–528.)  The independent contractor, Tverberg said, ―has authority to 
determine the manner in which inherently dangerous . . . work is to be performed, 
and thus assumes legal responsibility for carrying out the contracted work, including 
the taking of workplace safety precautions.‖  (Id. at p. 522.) 
The Privette line of decisions discussed above establishes that an 
independent contractor‘s hirer presumptively delegates to that contractor its tort 
law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor‘s employees.  At issue here 
is whether the hirer can be liable to the contractor‘s employees for workplace 
injuries allegedly resulting from the hirer‘s failure to comply with safety 
requirements of Cal-OSHA and its regulations.  That raises the question whether 
the tort law duty, if any, to comply with Cal-OSHA and its regulations for the 
benefit of an independent contractor‘s employees is nondelegable, an issue we 
discuss below. 
B. 
The nondelegable duties doctrine prevents a party that owes a duty to others 
from evading responsibility by claiming to have delegated that duty to an 
independent contractor hired to do the necessary work.  The doctrine applies when 
the duty preexists and does not arise from the contract with the independent 
contractor.  (See Eli v. Murphy (1952) 39 Cal.2d 598, 600; Knell v. Morris (1952) 
 
12 
39 Cal.2d 450, 456.)  In Maloney v. Rath (1968) 69 Cal.2d 442 (Maloney), for 
example, this court held that car owners cannot delegate their duty to ensure that 
their cars have working brakes.  Hence, an owner cannot avoid liability for an 
accident by arguing that the mechanic hired to inspect the brakes failed to discover 
the brake problem.  (Id. at pp. 446–447.) 
After our 2002 decision in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 (in which we 
allowed actions in tort against an independent contractor‘s hirer if the hirer retained 
control over the work and exercised that control negligently, thereby affirmatively 
contributing to the worker‘s injury), several Courts of Appeal have concluded that 
the hirer‘s statutory or regulatory duties constitute retained control if those duties 
are nondelegable.  The courts disagree, however, about the effect of a breach.  
Some courts — including the Court of Appeal here — have held that the breach of a 
nondelegable statutory or regulatory duty can, by itself, create a triable issue as to 
whether the hirer ―affirmatively contributed‖ (Hooker, at p. 210) to the injury of the 
independent contractor‘s employee.  (Padilla v. Pomona College (2008) 166 
Cal.App.4th 661, 672; Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 
137, 147; Barclay v. Jesse M. Lange Distributor, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 281, 
295, 301.)  Other courts have held that if the breach is merely an omission, that 
breach alone cannot qualify as the ―affirmative[] contribut[ion]‖ required for 
liability under Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 210.  (Madden v. Summit View, 
Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1279–1280; Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 
156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344, 1348.) 
These cases are inapposite here because we reject the premise that the tort 
law duty, if any, that a hirer owes under Cal-OSHA and its regulations to the 
employees of an independent contractor is nondelegable.  When in this case 
defendant US Airways hired independent contractor Aubry to maintain and repair 
the conveyor, US Airways presumptively delegated to Aubry any tort law duty of 
 
13 
care the airline had under Cal-OSHA and its regulations to ensure workplace 
safety for the benefit of Aubry‘s employees.  The delegation — which, as noted on 
page 11, ante, is implied as an incident of an independent contractor‘s hiring —
 included a duty to identify the absence of the safety guards required by Cal-
OSHA regulations and to take reasonable steps to address that hazard. 
As discussed earlier (pt. II.A., ante), Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, and its 
progeny recognize a presumption that an independent contractor‘s hirer delegates 
to that contractor the responsibility to perform the specified work safely.  The 
policy favoring ―delegation of responsibility and assignment of liability‖ is very 
―strong in this context‖ (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 671), and a hirer 
generally ―has no duty to act to protect the [contractor‘s] employee when the 
contractor fails in that task . . .‖ (id. at p. 674). 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal here held that defendant US Airways 
could not delegate to independent contractor Aubry the tort law duty, if any, the 
airline owed to Aubry‘s employees to ensure that the conveyor met Cal-OSHA 
safety standards.  The Court of Appeal quoted our comment — made in a decision 
some 25 years before Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 — that the category of 
nondelegable duties includes ―the duty of employers and suppliers to comply with 
the safety provisions of the Labor Code.‖  (Maloney, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 447.)  
Maloney, which did not involve workplace safety, based its nondelegable duty 
analysis on our then recent decision in Van Arsdale, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245, which 
did involve workplace safety. 
In Van Arsdale, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245, a city hired an independent contractor 
and expressly delegated to the contractor the responsibility for the safety of the 
contractor‘s workers.  This court held that the city ―had a nondelegable duty to 
exercise due care,‖ and it ―could not avoid [this] duty by hiring an independent 
 
14 
contractor.‖  (Id. at p. 255.)  Therefore, Van Arsdale concluded, an injured 
employee of the contractor could sue the city. 
In holding the city‘s tort law duty to be nondelegable, Van Arsdale relied 
on the peculiar risk doctrine.  (Van Arsdale, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 253–254.)  But 
as already discussed (see pp. 7–9, ante), our 1993 decision in Privette, supra, 
5 Cal.4th 689, rejected application of the peculiar risk doctrine in the context of 
tort actions by employees of independent contractors, and it overruled 
Van Arsdale.  (Privette, at pp. 696, 702, fn. 4.)  Therefore, Van Arsdale is no help to 
plaintiffs here, and neither is our statement in Maloney, supra, 69 Cal.2d at page 
447, which was based on Van Arsdale. 
In trying to fit this case within the nondelegable duties doctrine, the Court of 
Appeal here distinguished between those Cal-OSHA requirements that arise from 
the work performed by the independent contractor and those that predate the 
contractor‘s hiring and apply to the hirer ―by virtue of [its] role as property owner.‖  
In the view of the Court of Appeal, the latter requirements are nondelegable.  
Conversely, tort law duties that ―only exist because construction or other work is 
being performed‖ can be delegated to the contractor hired to do the work.  We 
acknowledge the distinction, but for the reasons given below, we conclude that the 
Court of Appeal did not apply the distinction correctly. 
Before hiring independent contractor Aubry, defendant US Airways owed 
its own employees a duty to provide a safe workplace.  We do not suggest that 
defendant could delegate that preexisting duty to Aubry (such that defendant could 
avoid liability if the conveyor had injured defendant’s own employee).  But under 
the definition of ―employer‖ that applies to California‘s workplace safety laws 
(see § 6304), the employees of an independent contractor like Aubry are not 
considered to be the hirer‘s own employees, and the issue here is whether 
defendant US Airways implicitly delegated to contractor Aubry the tort law duty, if 
 
15 
any, that it had to ensure workplace safety for Aubry’s employees.  The latter duty 
did not predate defendant‘s contract with Aubry; rather, it arose out of the contract.  
Any tort law duty US Airways owed to Aubry‘s employees only existed because of 
the work (maintenance and repair of the conveyor) that Aubry was performing for 
the airline, and therefore it did not fall within the nondelegable duties doctrine. 
The policy favoring delegation in this case is bolstered by the same factors 
we considered persuasive in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689.  (See pp. 8–9, ante.)  
Privette noted that the cost of workers‘ compensation insurance for an independent 
contractor‘s employees is presumably included in the contract price the hirer pays 
to the contractor, and therefore the hirer indirectly pays for that insurance.  (Privette, 
at p. 699.)  Privette further noted that workers‘ compensation guarantees 
compensation for injured workers, ―spreads the risk created by the performance of 
dangerous work to those who . . . benefit from such work,‖ and ―encourages 
industrial safety.‖  (Id. at p. 701.)  Also, in light of the limitation that the workers‘ 
compensation law places on the independent contractor‘s liability (shielding the 
latter from tort liability), it would be unfair to permit the injured employee to 
obtain full tort damages from the hirer of the independent contractor — damages 
that would be unavailable to employees who did not happen to work for a hired 
contractor.  This inequity would be even greater when, as is true here, the 
independent contractor had sole control over the means of performing the work.  
(See id. at pp. 698–700.)  In sum, we see no reason to limit our holding in Privette 
simply because the tort law duty, if any, that the hirer owes happens to be one 
based on a statute or regulation. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs here cannot recover in tort from defendant US 
Airways on a theory that employee Verdon‘s workplace injury resulted from 
defendant‘s breach of what plaintiffs describe as a nondelegable duty under Cal-
 
16 
OSHA regulations to provide safety guards on the conveyor.  Hence, the Court of 
Appeal erred in reversing the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment for defendant. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
JOHNSON, J.*
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I agree with the majority that defendant US Airways, Inc., is entitled to 
summary judgment.  I do not agree with the majority‘s reasoning.   
I 
We originally granted review to resolve a conflict between various 
divisions of the Court of Appeal concerning nondelegable duties.  Decisions of 
this court beginning with Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 
(Privette) generally prevent employees who are injured at work from suing the 
person who hired their employer,1 subject to certain exceptions.2  Under one of 
those exceptions, liability can still exist when the injury was caused by the hirer‘s 
breach of a nondelegable duty articulated in a safety statute or regulation.3  Courts 
                                              
1  
E.g., Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1238; and Toland 
v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 267.  
2  
E.g., Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 674-675 (hirer fails 
to warn of latent or concealed hazardous condition); McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219, 225 (hirer furnishes unsafe equipment); and Hooker v. 
Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 210-212 (hirer retains 
control and affirmatively contributes to injury).   
3  
E.g., Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 
147-149 (industry safety order for elevated billboards); and Barclay v. Jesse M. 
Lange Distributor, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 281, 296-298 (fire code provision 
concerning fire extinguishers).  
 
2 
 
have differed, however, on the question whether liability can be predicated simply 
on the hirer‘s passive omission to comply with a such a duty, or whether liability 
also requires a showing that the hirer made some additional, affirmative 
contribution to the injury.4  The former view is somewhat closer to strict liability, 
the latter less so.  It was to resolve this conflict that we granted review.   
The Court of Appeal, ostensibly taking the former view but arguably 
moving further in the direction of strict liability, concluded defendant‘s failure to 
comply with regulations requiring safety guards on conveyor belts (Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 8, §§ 3999, 4002) created a potential for liability justifying the case‘s 
submission to a jury, even though no admissible evidence showed how the 
accident had occurred.  Anthony Verdon, the injured employee, claimed not to 
know how his arm had become caught in the machine.  Immediately after the 
accident, Verdon‘s supervisor and coworker filed incident reports asserting that 
Verdon had violated safety rules by inserting his hand into the machinery to 
remove debris without first turning it off.  Later, however, the same employees 
signed declarations repudiating their reports, stating they had not witnessed the 
accident or discussed it with Verdon and had instead based their reports on ―a 
guess as to what may have caused the accident.‖  The superior court excluded for 
                                              
4  
Compare Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th 
137, 147 (passive omission suffices); and Barclay v. Jesse M. Lange Distributor, 
Inc., supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 281, 298 (same); with Madden v. Summit View, Inc. 
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1280 (other affirmative contribution required); 
Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1352 (same); and Park v. 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 595, 610 
(same).   
 
3 
 
lack of foundation the only other evidence concerning causation — an accident 
reconstruction expert‘s opinion that safety guards would have prevented the 
accident, based on supposed deposition testimony that turned out not to exist.  On 
this record, the superior court properly held that no evidence raised a triable issue 
of fact as to causation and thus granted summary judgment for defendant.  This 
ruling was correct no matter which of the competing rules one favors, because the 
hirer‘s failure to comply with a nondelegable duty, in order to create liability, must 
still be a proximate cause of the injury.  (E.g., Madden v. Summit View, Inc., 
supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1280-1281.)  This essential principle of tort law 
disposes of the case before us.   
II 
In concluding summary judgment for defendant was proper, the majority 
does not answer the specific question about nondelegable duties that prompted us 
to grant review.  Instead, addressing a different question and adopting a rule 
broader than any party has proposed, the majority holds that an employer‘s duties 
under the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (Cal-OSHA) 
(Lab. Code, § 6300 et seq.)5 and the regulations issued under its authority are 
delegable and, moreover, are presumptively delegated to independent contractors.  
In so holding, the majority treats Cal-OSHA statutes and regulations differently, 
and less deferentially, than other laws imposing safety obligations on actors 
subject to governmental oversight — a category of laws that has long been 
considered to impose nondelegable duties for purposes of tort law.  (See generally 
                                              
5  
All further citations to statutes are to the Labor Code, except as noted.   
 
4 
 
Maloney v. Rath (1968) 69 Cal.2d 442, 446-448.)  Given the factual record and the 
manner in which this case has been presented, I question whether it offers an 
appropriate occasion for such a holding.  Moreover, the holding may well be 
wrong for reasons the majority does not consider.   
Whether a person upon whom the Legislature has imposed the duty to 
maintain a safe workplace (§ 6400, subd. (a)) may delegate that duty ought to be at 
least partly a function of legislative intent.  Implicitly recognizing this, the 
majority attempts to claim for its holding — if not legislative authority — at least 
legislative neutrality.  ―Not present here,‖ the majority writes, ―is a situation in 
which the relevant statutes or regulations indicate an intent to limit the application 
of Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, or preclude delegation of the tort law duty, if 
any, that the hirer owes to the contractor‘s employees.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2, 
fn. 1.)   
To the contrary, nondelegability is the clear, unavoidable import of section 
6400, subdivision (b), which confirms that Cal-OSHA authorizes the DOSH to 
issue citations to employers at multiemployer worksites when an employee has 
been exposed to a hazard ―in violation of any requirement enforceable by the 
[DOSH],‖ ―regardless of whether their own employees were exposed to the 
hazard.‖  The list of employers who may be cited for hazards endangering the 
employees of other employers includes, among others, ―[t]he employer who 
actually created the hazard‖ (id., subd. (b)(2)) and ―[t]he employer who was 
responsible, by contract or through actual practice, for safety and health conditions 
on the worksite, which is the employer who had the authority for ensuring that the 
hazardous condition is corrected‖ (id., subd. (b)(3)).  While the most common 
multiemployer worksite is perhaps the construction site, the statute expressly 
covers ―both construction and nonconstruction‖ worksites.  (Id., subd. (b).)  That 
 
5 
 
the employer‘s duties under these circumstances extend to the employees of other 
employers is necessarily implicit in the statute, as no citation can logically issue 
unless a duty has been breached.  A contrary interpretation would defeat the 
statute‘s purpose.   
The statutory language addressing multiemployer worksites (§ 6400, subd. 
(b)) is part of the statute that articulates the fundamental duty of employers to 
provide a safe workplace (id., subd. (a)) and thus speaks at the same high level of 
authority.  The 1999 act that added this language to the Labor Code (Stats. 1999, 
ch. 615, § 4, pp. 4338-4339) also added the language already mentioned 
(§ 6304.5) making clear that Cal-OSHA statutes and regulations are admissible to 
prove negligence in tort actions (Stats. 1999, ch. 615, § 2, p. 4337) and deleted 
language that previously had barred the use of Cal-OSHA statutes and regulations 
in tort actions ―except as between an employee and his own employer‖ (former 
§ 6304.5, as added by Stats. 1971, ch. 1751, § 3, p. 3780, italics added; see Elsner 
v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 930-931 (Elsner)).  Considered together, the 
1999 amendments leave no doubt that the Legislature understood and intended 
that the employer‘s Cal-OSHA duties at multiemployer worksites would extend 
not just to the employer‘s own employees, but also to those of other employers.  
Based on the 1999 amendments, we unanimously concluded in Elsner that 
―plaintiffs may use Cal-OSHA provisions to show a duty or standard of care to the 
same extent as any other regulation or statute, whether the defendant is their 
employer or a third party.‖  (Elsner, at pp. 935-936, italics added.)   
Ignoring the 1999 multiemployer worksite statute (§ 6400, subd. (b)), the 
majority suggests the Legislature‘s intent to permit delegation of Cal-OSHA 
responsibilities can be inferred from an earlier statute defining an employer as 
―[e]very person . . . which has any natural person in service.‖  (§ 3300, subd. (c); 
 
6 
 
see § 6304 [referring to § 3300], as amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 1751, § 2, 
p. 3780.)  The definition will not bear the weight the majority would place upon it.  
The more recent enactment concerning multiemployer worksites operates not 
through the legal fiction that an employer employs a third party‘s employees (cf. 
maj. opn., at p. 2), but instead by expressly recognizing that employers in shared 
worksites owe duties to the employees of other employers.  For the same reason, it 
is of no consequence that judicial decisions relying on a former definition of 
employer to reach a similar conclusion (e.g., De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 69 Cal.2d 
217, 228-229; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 5) may have prompted the Legislature to 
adopt the present definition (§§ 3300, 6304).  The duties recognized in the 
multiemployer worksite statute (§ 6400, subd. (b)) do not in any way depend on 
the definition of employer.   
To observe that an employer subject to Cal-OSHA has violated a statutory 
or regulatory duty to an independent contractor‘s employee certainly does not 
suffice, without further analysis, to establish liability in tort for any injuries the 
employee may have suffered as a result.  But the duty’s existence is the essential 
starting point of the analysis.  As explained, Cal-OSHA duties play a role in 
negligence cases because of section 6304.5, which provides that ―[s]ections 452 
and 669 of the Evidence Code shall apply to this division and to occupational 
safety and health standards adopted under this division in the same manner as any 
other statute, ordinance, or regulation.‖  In other words, Cal-OSHA statutes and 
regulations are admissible to show negligence per se in tort actions (see Evid. 
Code, § 669; Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 915, at pp. 927-928, 935-936) and are 
subject for this purpose to judicial notice (see Evid. Code, § 452; Elsner, at 
p. 927).  Evidence Code section 669, which codifies the common law doctrine of 
negligence per se (Elsner, at p. 927), does not negate or repeal the doctrine of 
 
7 
 
nondelegable duties (California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health 
Services (1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 298).   
The plain language of Evidence Code section 669 applies without any 
difficulty when an employer‘s violation of a Cal-OSHA provision at a 
multiemployer worksite causes injury to another employer‘s employee.  More 
specifically, the employer violating the regulation has ―violated a statute . . . or 
regulation of a public entity,‖ the violation has ―proximately caused . . . injury to a 
person,‖ the injury has ―resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the 
statute . . . or regulation was designed to prevent,‖ and ―[t]he person suffering . . . 
the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . 
or regulation was adopted.‖  (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(1)-(4)).  Finally, at a 
multiemployer worksite, section 6400, subdivision (b), establishes that the injured 
employee ―was one of the class of persons for whose protection the . . . regulation 
was adopted‖ (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(4)).   
As the majority correctly observes (ante, at p. 2, fn. 1), the Legislature has 
not expressly addressed the interaction between Cal-OSHA and the rule of 
Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689.  But the Legislature has had no reason to do so 
because, until today, this court‘s decisions applying and extending that rule have 
concerned duties arising under the common law and not under Cal-OSHA.  What 
matters for present purposes is that the Legislature has determined that the Cal-
OSHA duties of employers at multiemployer worksites extend to the employees of 
other employers.  (§ 6400, subd. (b).)  I recognize that the Legislature‘s decision to 
place Cal-OSHA provisions on an equal footing with other statutes and regulations 
in the context of tort law (§ 6304.5) permits courts, at least in theory, to guide the 
use of such provisions in civil actions by applying applicable common law 
doctrines, insofar as those doctrines are consistent with the Legislature‘s intent in 
 
8 
 
creating the relevant duty.  In contrast, to apply a common law doctrine like 
Privette in tort actions to selectively negate one aspect of an employer‘s Cal-
OSHA duty (i.e., the employer‘s duty to other employers‘ employees), while 
enforcing other aspects of that duty (i.e., the employer‘s duty to its own 
employees; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 14), is plainly inconsistent with legislative 
intent.   
In summary, to the extent delegability is a function of legislative intent, the 
majority does not convince me the Legislature intended to treat duties created by 
Cal-OSHA statutes and rules, unlike other regulatory safety duties, as delegable 
and presumptively delegated whenever the person upon whom the Legislature has 
imposed such a duty hires an independent contractor.  A rule that threatens an 
erosive effect on workplace safety deserves a more solid grounding in legislative 
intent than a statutory definition of employer (§§ 3300, 6304; see maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 2, 5) that, as explained, is not the provision in which the Legislature has 
addressed the scope of employers‘ duties in multiemployer worksites (see § 6400, 
subd. (b)).  I thus do not join in the majority‘s analysis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Seabright Insurance Company v. U.S. Airways, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 183 Cal.App.4th 219 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S182508 
Date Filed: August 22, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Peter J. Busch 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
England Ponticello & St. Clair, Barry W. Ponticello, Renee C. St. Claire and Nadine D. Y. Adrian for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
The Arns Law Firm, Robert S. Arns, Jonathan E. Davis and Steven R. Weinmann for Consumer Attorneys 
of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Hodson & Mullin, Samuel C. Mullin; O‘Mara & Padilla and Michael D. Padilla for Intervener and 
Appellant. 
 
Dimalanta Clark, Lee W. Clark, Lisa A. Lenoci; Kenney & Markowitz, Stephan E. Kyle, Kymberly E. 
Speer and Elizabeth D. Rhodes for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Archer Norris, Gary Watt; and Nick Cammarota for The California Building Industry Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrod and Stephen E. Norris for Fillner Construction, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney and William A. Munoz for Air Transport Association of America, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Barry W. Ponticello 
England Ponticello & St. Clair 
701 B Street, Suite 1790 
San Diego, CA  92101-8104 
(619) 255-6450 
 
Michael D. Padilla 
O‘Mara & Padilla 
12770 High Bluff Drive, Suite 200 
San Diego, CA  92130 
(858) 481-5454 
 
Kymberly E. Speer 
Kenney & Markowitz 
255 California Street, Suite 1300 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 397-3100 
 
Gary A. Watt 
Archer Norris 
2033 North Main Street, Suite 800 
Walnut Creek, CA  94596-3759 
(925) 930-6600