Title: Jeffrey Young v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Patricia Caress McMath 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No.   49S02-0905-CR-252 
 
 
JEFFREY YOUNG, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant Below), 
 
 v. 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G23-0706-FB-105813 
The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Master Commissioner 
________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0709-CR-829 
_________________________________ 
 
May 28, 2009 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
Resolution of this appeal is determined by our holding today in Meredith v. State, ___ 
N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2009), that it is legally insufficient to display a paper temporary license plate 
inside the rear window of a motor vehicle.  For this reason, we affirm the conviction of the 
defendant, Jeffrey Young, for Possession of Cocaine, rejecting his claim of improper admission 
of evidence resulting from an unlawful traffic stop.   
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
May 28 2009, 4:21 pm
2 
 
One night in June 2007, Officer Greg Milburn stopped a vehicle because he could not see 
its license plate.  As he approached the vehicle, he saw a paper temporary plate taped to the 
inside of the rear window.  The vehicle's temporary vehicle plate was not found to be invalid, but 
after receiving the defendant driver's identification, Officer Milburn learned the defendant's 
license was suspended and that he had a prior conviction of driving while suspended, and he 
therefore arrested the defendant.  While searching the defendant's vehicle in preparation for 
impoundment, Officer Milburn found cocaine.  At a bench trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
the evidence obtained after the officer learned that the defendant's license plate was valid.  The 
trial court took the motion under advisement and allowed the State to introduce evidence pending 
the court's ruling.  After the close of evidence, the trial court denied Young's motion to suppress 
and found him guilty of possessing cocaine.  The defendant appealed, claiming that the traffic 
stop violated the search and seizure clauses of both the federal and Indiana constitutions.  The 
Court of Appeals reversed.  Young v. State, 886 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  We granted 
transfer.   
 
The defendant's constitutional claims rely upon his assertion that his vehicle was licensed 
and properly displaying the temporary license plate and thus the officer's traffic stop should have 
concluded as soon as the information on the plate was visible to the officer as he approached the 
rear of the vehicle.  The officer's further investigation, according to the defendant, was devoid of 
reasonable suspicion and therefore subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure.   
 
In Meredith, we conclude that statutory requirements for the illumination and mounting 
of license plates on the rear of a vehicle apply to all license plates, whether temporary or 
permanent, and uphold as proper a traffic stop resulting from the improper display of a 
temporary license plate in the back window of a vehicle.   ___ N.E.2d at ___.  Upon the authority 
of Meredith, we find that because the defendant's temporary license plate was not illuminated 
and not mounted on the rear of the vehicle but rather was displayed inside the rear window, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.  We thus reject Young's claim that his 
conviction is based on erroneously admitted evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search 
or seizure.   
 
3 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.   
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.  Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.   
 
 
1 
 
Rucker, J., dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Meredith v. 
State, No. 89S04-0808-CR-430, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. May 28, 2009) (Rucker, J., dissenting).