Title: ROBERT L. CUMMINGS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT L. CUMMINGS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 130218 P.3d 257Case Number: No. S-08-0218Decided: 10/23/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
ROBERT 
L. CUMMINGS,Petitioner,v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Respondent.

 
 
Petition 
for Writ of Review

from 
the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Julie 
Nye Tiedeken of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This case arises 
out of a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Mary North.  A Crook County Circuit Court jury found 
Petitioner Robert L. Cummings guilty of the traffic offense of improper passing 
for his role in the accident.  
Cummings was ordered to pay restitution, which included damages for 
wrongful death.  Cummings appealed 
the propriety of the wrongful death restitution award to the district 
court.  The district court vacated 
the award due, in part, to insufficient proof and remanded the matter to the 
circuit court for further fact-finding proceedings.  On remand, the circuit court again 
awarded restitution.  Another appeal 
ensued, wherein the district court upheld the order of restitution, but sua 
sponte reduced the amount awarded.  
Cummings then petitioned this Court for a Writ of Review, which we 
granted.  We vacate the challenged 
award and remand for entry of a new restitution order.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Cummings raises 
numerous issues challenging the legality of the restitution order.  We find, however, that the dispositive 
issue in this case is whether error occurred when the State was allowed a second 
opportunity to prove restitution after the district court determined the initial 
restitution claim was not adequately proven by credible evidence.1

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 6, 2004, 
Cummings was involved in a two-vehicle collision in which Mary North, a 
passenger in the vehicle driven by her husband, Larry North, was killed.  The State charged Cummings with 
misdemeanor vehicular homicide in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(a) 
(Lexis 2009)2 and the traffic offense of improper 
passing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-204 (Lexis 2009).3  Following a trial in the Crook County 
Circuit Court in January 2005, a jury acquitted Cummings of the vehicular 
homicide charge but convicted him on the improper passing charge.  At sentencing, the circuit court ordered 
Cummings to pay, in addition to a $200.00 fine and other fees, restitution to 
Mr. North in the amount of $317,743.00.  
Of that amount, $279,695.72 was intended to compensate Mr. North for the 
loss of Mrs. North's wages and benefits ("earnings") over the remainder of her 
projected life.  

 
 
[¶4]      Cummings appealed 
that portion of the restitution order which awarded lost earnings to Mr. 
North.4  The district court vacated the 
restitution order because (1) the evidence used by the circuit court "was 
insufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the loss," and (2) the 
circuit court failed to consider the comparative fault, if any, of the Wyoming 
Department of Transportation (WYDOT) in determining the amount to be paid by 
Cummings.  The district court 
remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination of the amount of 
restitution, if any, to be paid by Cummings. 

 
 
[¶5]      On remand, the 
circuit court conducted a new restitution hearing and entertained additional 
evidence.  Based on the evidence 
presented, the circuit court found no comparative fault on the part of WYDOT and 
concluded that Cummings' conduct was the sole cause of Mary North's death.  The circuit court also reconsidered the 
amount of restitution owing for the loss of Mary North's future earnings, and 
ultimately reduced the same from $279,695.72 to $143,777.32.  In total, the circuit court awarded 
$127,701.52 for lost wages and $16,075.80 for lost benefits.  A new Order and Judgment to that effect 
was entered on June 19, 2006.      

 
 
[¶6]      Cummings again 
appealed to the district court.  
Although the district court generally upheld the restitution order, it 
found that the circuit court had erroneously disregarded evidence relevant to 
the issue of lost wages.  The 
district court conducted its own calculation and reduced the amount of 
restitution attributable to lost wages to $96,249.03, resulting in a total award 
for lost earnings of $112,324.83.  
It remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter a 
new restitution order consistent with its decision.  Cummings filed the instant Petition for 
Writ of Review in this Court.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Our focus in 
resolving this case is on the initial appellate decision issued by the district 
court.  It determined the State had 
not produced adequate evidence to support the ordered amount of restitution for 
lost earnings.  The district court 
then remanded the case to the circuit court for a new determination of the 
amount of restitution to be charged against Cummings.

 
 
[¶8]      The law in 
Wyoming concerning restitution in criminal cases is clear cut.  The amount of restitution fixed by a 
sentencing court should be supported by evidence sufficient to afford a 
reasonable basis for estimating the victim's loss.  Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997).  The State bears 
the burden of presenting sufficient credible evidence at sentencing to sustain 
the restitution claim.  Hampton v. State, 2006 WY 103, ¶ 11, 141 P.3d 101, 105 (Wyo. 2006); Renfro v. 
State, 785 P.2d 491, 493 (Wyo. 1990).  
When the State fails in this burden, it is not allowed a second 
chance.  "[B]ecause of the double 
jeopardy implications, restitution orders overturned for failure of proof will 
not be remanded for the purpose of relitigating the restitution issue."  Crapo v. State, 2007 WY 194, ¶ 
19, 172 P.3d 393, 399 (Wyo. 2007).  See also Hite v. State, 2007 WY 
199, ¶ 15, 172 P.3d 737, 741 (Wyo. 2007); Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 
12, 78 P.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Wyo. 2003); Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646, 
648 (Wyo. 2000); Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 493-94. 

 
 
[¶9]      In light of this 
existing law, the initial remand by the district court in the instant case was 
erroneous.  The proceedings should 
have ended when the district court vacated the challenged portion of the 
restitution order pertaining to the lost earnings of Mary North.  The domino effect created by the 
continuation of restitution proceedings was unfortunately nothing more than a 
waste of judicial resources. 

 
 
[¶10]   We vacate the results of all 
proceedings occurring after the district court's initial appellate 
decision.  The case is remanded to 
the district court with directions to remand to the circuit court for entry of a 
new restitution order consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The State perfunctorily argues that Cummings is procedurally barred from 
challenging the restitution order.  
We disagree.  An order of 
restitution that exceeds the court's authority would be void, and a void order 
may be challenged at any time.  See Crapo v. State, 2007 WY 194, ¶ 10, 
172 P.3d 393, 396 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

2In pertinent part, § 6-2-106(a) states:

 
 
a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle . . . if he operates or drives 
a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner, and his conduct is the proximate 
cause of the death of another person.

 
 

3§ 31-5-204 provides:

 
 
No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway 
in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a 
sufficient distance ahead to permit the overtaking and passing to be completely 
made without interfering with the operation of any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken.  In every event the overtaking vehicle 
must return to an authorized lane of travel as soon as practicable and in the 
event the passing movement involves the use of a lane authorized for vehicles 
approaching from the opposite direction, before coming within two hundred (200) 
feet of any approaching vehicle. 

 
 

4The other aspects of the restitution order, totaling $38,047.28, were 
never contested in the district court, nor are they at issue in the instant 
matter before this Court.