Title: State v. Heath

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Nicholas Heath, No. 36, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Greene, 
J. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEEDINGS – OPENING STATEMENT – “OPENING 
THE DOOR” – APPROPRIATE REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
 
Although comments made in opening statement are not evidence, pursuant to the “opening 
the door” doctrine, the general principles involved in allowing a party “to meet fire with 
fire” are applicable to an opening statement in which improper comments are made.  The 
remedy to allow responsive evidence to be admitted is applicable provided the response is 
proportionate to the malady and not otherwise limited by law.   
 
A criminal defendant’s trial counsel who, during opening statement, called attention to 
Respondent’s purpose for being at a bar the night the underlying events took place triggered 
an analysis of the application of the “opening the door” doctrine.  The Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a previously redacted portion of 
Mr. Heath’s statement to the police, i.e., that Mr. Heath intended to sell “white” at Ottobar.  
The trial court first erred in admitting the statement because it was irrelevant to the issues 
in the case.  Second, the statement was a disproportionate response to the comment made 
in opening.  And third, even if the evidence was relevant, it should not have been admitted 
because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.   
 
The trial court committed an error of law and abused its discretion in allowing the 
unredacted statement into evidence and the error was not harmless.  Therefore, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the trial 
court’s ruling and remanded the case for a new trial. 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 36 
 
September Term, 2018 
 
______________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
v. 
NICHOLAS HEATH 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty  
Cathell, Dale R. (Senior Judge, Specially 
Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Greene, J. 
Barbera, C.J. and McDonald, J., dissent. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 28, 2019
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case Nos. 114296017 
 
    114296018  
Argued: January 3, 2019 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-06-28 13:50-04:00
In the present case, we consider whether a comment made by defense counsel in an 
opening statement invited the State to present, as evidence, a statement made by 
Respondent Nicholas Heath (“Mr. Heath”) indicating his intention to sell cocaine.  The 
State urges us to apply the opening the door doctrine to the facts of the present case, and 
hold that defense counsel, through her opening statement, opened the door to admitting, as 
evidence, Mr. Heath’s stated intention.  To resolve this issue we explore whether defense 
counsel’s remarks triggered the opening the door doctrine, and if so, whether the responsive 
evidence offered by the State was a proportional response.  For reasons we shall explain, 
we hold that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence and abused its discretion 
in weighing the proportionality of the contested portion of Mr. Heath’s statement.  The 
error in doing so was not harmless; thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Mr. Heath was charged with the murder of Tom Malenski (“Mr. Malenski”) and the 
attempted murder of Martin Clay (“Mr. Clay”).  The charges stemmed from an altercation 
that happened on September 25, 2014 at Ottobar, where Mr. Malenski and Mr. Clay were 
employed, in Baltimore City.  The undisputed facts are that on the evening of September 
25, 2014, Dustin Cunningham (“Mr. Cunningham”) directed inappropriate comments 
toward Erica Davis (“Ms. Davis”) and Ms. Davis’s unidentified friend.  Mr. Heath, in an 
attempt to quell any hostility between Mr. Cunningham and Ms. Davis, offered an apology 
to Ms. Davis and her friend on Mr. Cunningham’s behalf.  Ms. Davis did not accept the 
2 
 
apology.  She, instead, directed Mr. Heath to inform Mr. Cunningham that he needed to 
apologize himself for the comments that he had made. 
 
Eventually, after continued antagonism between the individuals, the bouncers 
removed Mr. Cunningham from the bar.  Both Mr. Clay and Mr. Malenski aided the 
bouncers in removing Mr. Cunningham.  Mr. Malenski was not working at Ottobar that 
night and Mr. Clay had gotten off of work at 11:00 p.m., but each were “hanging out” at 
Ottobar at the time of the altercation.  Mr. Cunningham claimed that, once outside, the 
bouncers attempted to beat him up, so he ran away.  Mr. Clay and Mr. Malenski ran down 
the street after Mr. Cunningham, but he successfully escaped.  Thereafter, Mr. Clay and 
Mr. Heath offered conflicting stories as to what happened. 
According to Mr. Clay, while he and Mr. Malenski were walking back to Ottobar, 
Mr. Heath came towards them with a knife.  At first, Mr. Clay thought that Mr. Heath had 
punched him in the face, but he ultimately realized that he had been cut.  Mr. Clay testified 
that, while Mr. Malenski was trying to “get in between” Mr. Clay and Mr. Heath, Mr. Heath 
slashed Mr. Malenski’s throat. 
Offering a different version of the events, Mr. Heath, in his recorded statement to 
the police, indicated that upon leaving Ottobar, he headed in the direction of where Mr. 
Cunningham had fled.  According to Mr. Heath, the men who had chased Mr. Cunningham, 
including Mr. Clay and Mr. Malenski, were walking back toward Ottobar.  The group of 
men approached Mr. Heath while he was trying to pass them.  Mr. Heath’s path was 
blocked, and the men began arguing with him.  Mr. Heath claimed that he saw Mr. 
Malenski pull out a knife.  Mr. Heath, in trying to defend himself from an attack, told the 
3 
 
men to back off.  He explained that Mr. Clay probably got cut in the face while Mr. Heath 
was defending himself against the attack.  Mr. Heath said that he intended to cut Mr. 
Malenski’s deltoid muscle and that would have prevented Mr. Malenski from raising his 
arms.  Mr. Heath stated that he was “merely trying to ‘disable’” Mr. Malenski.  
Unfortunately, according to Mr. Heath, Mr. Malenski lunged forward causing Mr. Heath 
to accidentally cut Mr. Malenski’s neck instead of his shoulder. 
Although Mr. Clay’s and Mr. Heath’s stories diverged, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Heath cut Mr. Clay’s face and Mr. Malenski’s throat.  Furthermore, it is uncontested that 
during the confrontation, Mr. Heath cut one of Mr. Malenski’s arteries, which resulted in 
his death.  Mr. Heath was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the first-degree 
murder of Mr. Malenski, the attempted first-degree murder of Mr. Clay, and other related 
charges.  The substantive issue at trial was whether Mr. Heath acted with criminal intent 
or in self-defense. 
Mr. Heath did not testify at trial, so his version of the events was established by way 
of a recorded statement that he gave to the police during an interview on September 27, 
2014.  Prior to trial, and without the trial court’s involvement, the parties entered into a 
stipulation and agreed to various redactions of Mr. Heath’s statement to police.1  The 
                                                          
 
1 The parties did not involve the court in their agreement, but their agreement was brought 
to the court’s attention.  The State explained to the court: 
Prior to the opening statements, Your Honor may recall that defense counsel 
and . . . myself, along with I believe the defendant, discussed some redactions 
from the defendant’s statement.  Much of those redactions related to the 
defendant’s statement in which he discussed selling drugs as his primary 
source of income.  State, again, agreed to those redactions prior to hearing 
[defense counsel]’s opening statement[.] 
4 
 
redacted portions of the statement related to Mr. Heath’s selling of drugs as his primary 
source of income.   
 
During her opening statement at trial, Mr. Heath’s counsel made the following 
comment about Mr. Heath’s purpose for going to Ottobar: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the young man that sits here [next to counsel] is 
Nicholas Heath.  And just as the State described to you in regards to [Mr. 
Malenski and Mr. Clay], he too loved music, liked to hang out, had friends, 
was busy doing tattoos, that’s one of his primary sources of income in 
order to pay a lawyer to get his wife from England to the United States.  That 
was his goal and that was his purpose to stop by the Ottobar that night.  
His friend, Dustin Cunningham says lots of people there have tattoos or had 
tattoos, this is a good source. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
The State did not object during defense counsel’s opening statement.  The State 
waited until its case-in-chief to respond to defense counsel’s remark in opening that Mr. 
Heath was at Ottobar to find clients for his tattoo business.2  Citing that remark, the State 
moved to unredact a portion of Mr. Heath’s statement to the police, in which he said that 
he went to Ottobar intending to sell “white.”3  Specifically, the State sought to unredact 
and admit into evidence the following portion of Mr. Heath’s statement: 
                                                          
 
 
2 The State did not promptly raise an objection to defense counsel’s opening remark.  After 
two of the State’s witnesses had testified, the State approached the bench and objected to 
defense counsel’s opening remark.  The trial judge did not immediately rule on the State’s 
motion.  At the end of the first day of trial, outside the presence of the jury, the judge heard 
arguments and ruled on the State’s motion. 
 
3 “White” is a street name for cocaine.  STREET NAMES AND NICKNAMES FOR COCAINE,  
https://luxury.rehabs.com/cocaine-addiction/street-names-and-nicknames/ 
[https://perma.cc/HM73-X6GW].  Cocaine has (continued . . .) 
 
5 
 
I mean look at nobody’s being violent man.  Nobody’s went in there starting 
trouble.  I went in there to sit down to sell a got damn bit of white that 
they, I’m just trying to make a fucking living.  And everybody around me is 
gotta act like an asshole.  That’s all I wanted to do.  You know am I wrong? 
Yeah.   
 
(Emphasis added).  The State argued that defense counsel’s remark, that Mr. Heath went 
to Ottobar for purposes related to his tattoo business, contradicted Mr. Heath’s statement 
to the police and opened the door to Mr. Heath’s “true” purpose for being at Ottobar, his 
intent to sell “white.”4  Defense counsel argued that opening statements are not evidence.  
Furthermore, according to defense counsel, regardless of the opening the door doctrine, the 
portion of the statement offered by the State was inadmissible bad acts evidence.  Defense 
counsel asserted that Mr. Heath’s statement was “highly prejudicial [with] no probative 
[value]” and therefore should not be admitted. 
The trial court weighed the probative value and prejudicial effect of the contested 
portion of Mr. Heath’s statement and reasoned that Mr. Heath’s explanation for “being 
present [at Ottobar] . . .” was probative of “the manner in which he is alleged to have 
conducted himself that evening.”  The trial judge expressed that he “would not have 
                                                          
 
(. . . continued) 
many nicknames, but “white” is one “of the more popular and enduring names used in the 
United States[.]”  Id.  The term “white” is derived from the drug’s appearance, as it is 
typically a fine, white, crystalline powder.  Id. 
 
4 Notably, Mr. Heath’s statement to the police does not indicate that he went to Ottobar for 
tattoo-related purposes.  Apparently, defense counsel obtained that information from Mr. 
Cunningham.  Defense counsel stated that she had “in [her] case notes that [Mr. 
Cunningham] had talked to [Mr. Heath] about people [at Ottobar] that may want tattoos.”  
She was “sp[eaking] out [sic] of information that [she] had received and honestly . . . didn’t 
even think about the drug-dealing part . . . because [Mr. Heath’s] profession . . . is 
tattooing.”    
6 
 
stricken that testimony, although some of the things which have been read, not everything 
would appear to be fully admissible even under the probative greater than prejudicial [sic] 
value of standard.”  Ultimately, the trial court “permit[ted] the State to unredact the 
testimony with regard to [Mr. Heath’s] statement as to why he was there that night with 
regard to certain business operations.” 
After the trial court’s ruling, defense counsel requested, and was granted, a 
continuing objection to references to Mr. Heath’s involvement in the “possession and 
distribution of controlled dangerous substances[.]”  Additionally, the prosecutor clarified 
that the trial judge’s ruling was limited to the portion of Mr. Heath’s statement in which he 
says that he went to Ottobar intending to sell “white,” and “that the rest of the references 
to [Mr. Heath] selling drugs is not probative[.]”  The trial judge said, “Right.”  He explained 
that other references to selling drugs in Mr. Heath’s statement to the police are “beyond 
the pale . . . it’s relevant only to that night and [Mr. Heath’s] presence at Ottobar.” 
Later in the trial, Mr. Heath’s statement to the police, including the portion in which 
he said that he went to Ottobar intending to sell “white,” was admitted into evidence over 
defense counsel’s objection.  A recording of Mr. Heath’s statement was played in open 
court for the jury.  Mr. Heath did not offer any evidence tending to establish that he visited 
Ottobar for reasons related to his tattoo business, or for any other reason.  Ultimately, the 
jury returned a verdict against Mr. Heath of guilty to involuntary manslaughter and second-
degree assault. 
Mr. Heath appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an 
unreported opinion, our intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling that 
7 
 
the door had been opened.  Heath v. State, No. 2736, Sept. Term 2015, 2018 WL 3085156, 
at *6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 21, 2018).  First, the intermediate appellate court held that 
Mr. Heath’s statement that he went to Ottobar to sell “white” constituted inadmissible bad 
acts evidence pursuant to Md. Rule 5-404.  Id. at *8-11.  Additionally, the court determined 
that Mr. Heath’s counsel did not open the door during her opening statement.  Id. at *13.  
Alternatively, the court reasoned that, “[a]ssuming arguendo that [Mr. Heath’s] counsel 
had ‘opened the door,’ the remedy – permitting the prior acts statement to come in – was 
not proportionate to the malady – impugning [Mr. Heath’s] character in the eyes of the 
jury.”  Id.  Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court’s error in 
allowing the statement into evidence was not harmless and therefore reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial.  Id. at *7. 
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari and we granted the petition.  
State v. Heath, 461 Md. 458, 193 A.3d 208 (2018).  We now review whether the trial court 
erred when it determined that defense counsel opened the door to admitting the defendant’s 
previously redacted statement based upon a comment made in her opening statement and, 
if so, whether admitting the defendant’s statement in response was legal error and an abuse 
of discretion.5 
                                                          
 
5 The questions posed in the State’s petition for writ of certiorari included: 
1. Does [the] introduction of evidence that opens the door to the admission 
of “other act” evidence operate to give the other act evidence “special 
relevance,” thereby relieving a party seeking to introduce other act 
evidence (in response to the door being opened) of the burden to establish 
“special relevance” under Maryland Rule 5-404 and State v. Faulkner, 
314 Md. 630 (1989)? 
(continued . . .) 
8 
 
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
 
As a preliminary matter, the parties ask us to define the standard for reviewing 
whether a party has opened the door to the admissibility of responsive evidence.  The State 
requests that we review this case as an application of the opening the door doctrine.  Mr. 
Heath, on the other hand, argues that the opening the door doctrine is not applicable here.  
In addition, the State asserts that we should reverse the Court of Special Appeals on the 
basis that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence Mr. 
Heath’s statement regarding his intent to sell “white” at Ottobar.  The State contends that 
the admission of Mr. Heath’s statement was a proportional response to defense counsel’s 
opening statement regarding Mr. Heath’s intent to find tattoo clients at Ottobar.  Mr. Heath 
                                                          
 
 
(. . . continued) 
2. Should an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s ruling that a party has 
“opened the door” to otherwise inadmissible evidence apply an abuse of 
discretion standard, and does that standard include a first-level fact-
finding by the trial court that is subject only to review for clear error? 
 
3. Applying the appropriate standard of review, did the Court of Special 
Appeals err first, by holding that counsel cannot open the door based upon 
comments made in an opening statement and second, by substituting its 
judgment for the trial court’s determination and making a factual finding  
about the intent and effect of Heath’s counsel’s comment in opening 
statement, and whether it opened the door to admission of Heath’s 
statement to police that he went to the bar where Malenski was murdered 
for the purpose of selling cocaine? 
 
4. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that admission of a 
lone comment in the defendant’s recorded statement that he planned to 
sell drugs was not harmless, where the State made no further mention of 
the statement at trial? 
9 
 
argues, however, that even if the door was opened, Md. Rule 5-404 prohibits the admission 
of the rebuttal evidence that the State offered.6   
We hold that the general principles of the opening the door doctrine that allow a 
party “to meet fire with fire” permitted the trial judge to consider whether to admit into 
evidence Mr. Heath’s statement that he intended to sell “white” at Ottobar.  The trial judge, 
however, failed to recognize that Mr. Heath’s intention to sell drugs at Ottobar injected 
into the case evidence on a collateral issue.  The introduction of a collateral issue and the 
evidence offered on that issue had nothing to do with the underlying criminal charges and 
exceeded one of the limitations to the introduction of responsive evidence under the 
“opening the door” doctrine.   
Another limitation under the “opening the door” doctrine is proportionality. Terry 
v. State, 332 Md. 329, 338, 631 A.2d 424, 428 (1993) (.“[T]he remedy must be 
proportionate to the malady.”).  The responsive evidence permitted by the trial judge was 
disproportionate because the jury would likely give more weight to a statement admitted 
into evidence than to a comment made in opening.  This disproportionality stems from the 
instructions given to the jury.  Specifically, the trial judge instructed the jury to make its 
decision based solely on the evidence admitted and not on what was said in opening 
statements.      
                                                          
 
6 This Court does not reach the issue of character evidence and whether the statement was 
inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-404.  The evidence was inadmissible on various other 
grounds, so we need not determine in this case whether a criminal defendant’s bad thoughts 
constitute a bad act, wrong or other crime under Md. Rule 5-404(b). 
10 
 
Regardless of whether the statement was a proportionate response, allowing the 
State to admit Mr. Heath’s statement into evidence was substantially more prejudicial than 
probative under Md. Rule 5-403 and should not have been received.  Clearly, the statement 
was unfairly prejudicial in that it associated Mr. Heath with drugs and likely undermined 
his credibility with the jury.  The jury had to evaluate Mr. Heath’s version of what occurred 
at Ottobar on the evening of September 25, 2014, and his theory of self-defense.   
Given the unfair prejudicial impact that Mr. Heath’s statement had on his credibility, 
and how that likely affected the jury’s perception of him, we cannot say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict was in no way influenced by the responsive 
evidence.  In admitting the evidence, the trial judge risked the jury finding Mr. Heath guilty 
based on the inference that Mr. Heath was “up to no good.”  Therefore, the statement’s 
admission at trial was not harmless error and Mr. Heath is entitled to a new trial.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for reviewing whether the opening the door doctrine yields to the 
admissibility of evidence offered at trial was thoroughly reviewed in this Court’s recent 
decision, State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 352-58, 205 A.3d 995, 1000-1004 (2019).  The 
framework for review is a familiar one.  See id.    Whether an opening the door doctrine 
analysis has been triggered is a matter of relevancy, which this Court reviews de novo.  Id. 
at 353, 205 A.3d at 1001.  A trial court does not have discretion to admit irrelevant 
evidence.  State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 724-25, 25 A.3d 144, 155 (2011) (“The de novo 
standard of review is applicable to the trial judge’s conclusion of law that the evidence at 
11 
 
issue is or is not of consequence to the determination of the action.”) (quoting Parker v. 
State, 408 Md. 428, 437, 970 A.2d 320, 325 (2009) (cleaned up).  
Whether responsive evidence was properly admitted into evidence is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 463 Md. at 358; 205 A.3d at 1004; Simms, 420 Md. at 
725, 25 A.3d at 156 (“whether the evidence is inadmissible because its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . is [] tested for abuse of [] discretion.”).  
Additionally, an error is harmless if a reviewing court can say, after an independent review 
of the record, that beyond a reasonable doubt, the error in no way influenced the verdict.  
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).  This Court has held that an 
“[a]buse of discretion exists where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 
the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles.”  
Robertson, 463 Md. at 364, 205 A.3d at 1007 (quoting Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 478, 
87 A.3d 1243, 1254 (2014)) (cleaned up).   
Relevance and the “Opening the Door” Doctrine 
Maryland Rule 5-401 provides the scope for the admission of evidence.  The starting 
point for determining the admissibility of evidence is whether it is relevant.  Relevant 
evidence is evidence having “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.”  Md. Rule 5-401 (2018).  The inverse of that rule, of course, is 
that "[i]rrelevant evidence is inadmissible.”  Simms, 420 Md. at 725, 25 A.3d at 156 
(citations omitted).  Maryland Rule 5-402 “makes it clear that the trial court does not have 
discretion to admit irrelevant evidence[.]”  Id. at 724-25, 25 A.3d at 155 (citation omitted).  
12 
 
Once the first hurdle of legal relevancy is satisfied, the next consideration is “whether the 
evidence is inadmissible because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, or other countervailing concerns as outlined in Maryland Rule 5-403.”  Id. at 
725, 25 A.3d at 156 (citation omitted).  Some evidence may be relevant but far too 
prejudicial to be admissible.  See Md. Rule 5-403 (requiring a weighing of unfair 
prejudicial danger versus the probative value).  
“Opening the Door” and Opening Statements 
 
An added layer to Maryland Rules 5-401 and 5-403 is the legal doctrine of “opening 
the door,” which expands the rule of relevancy.  The opening the door doctrine “authorizes 
admitting evidence which otherwise would have been irrelevant in order to respond to (1) 
admissible evidence which generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by 
the court over objection.”  Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 84-85, 629 A.2d 1239, 1243 (1993).  
For example, the doctrine provides a remedy where one party introduces evidence that was 
previously irrelevant, over objection, and in doing so, makes relevant an issue in the case.  
As a remedial tactic, “the trial court may rule that the first party has ‘opened the door’ to 
evidence offered as a fair response by the opposing party that previously would have been 
inadmissible because irrelevant, but has now become relevant.”  5 Lynn McLain, Maryland 
Evidence State and Federal, § 103:13(c)(i) at 82 (3rd ed. 2013).  Put another way, 
“‘opening the door’ is simply a way of saying: ‘My opponent has injected an issue into the 
case, and I ought to be able to introduce evidence on that issue.’”  Clark, 332 Md. at 85, 
629 A.2d at 1243. 
13 
 
Although the “opening the door” doctrine expands the rule of relevancy, the doctrine 
has its limitations.  The doctrine does not allow, for example, “injecting collateral issues 
into a case or introducing extrinsic evidence on collateral issues.” Id. at 87, 629 A.2d at 
1244.  A collateral issue is one that is immaterial to the issues in the case.  See Hardison v. 
State, 118 Md. App. 225, 239, 702 A.2d 444, 451 (1997) (defining a “non-collateral fact” 
as one that is material to the issues in the case); see also Gray v. State, 137 Md. App. 460, 
481-85, 769 A.2d 192, 204-06 (2001) (holding that testimony from a witness concerning 
her being raped was a collateral issue because the alleged rape existed only as an unproven 
allegation, testimony of the allegation was highly likely to lead the jury on a detour as to 
whether the rape had actually happened and would distract the jury).   
An additional limitation of the doctrine is consistent with Maryland Rule 5-403.  
That limitation excludes evidence if its probative value “is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”  Md. Rule 5-403; see also Clark, 332 Md. at 87, 629 A.2d 1244. 7 
 
We echo an oft-repeated and well-established principle: opening statements are not 
evidence.  See Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 33, 197 A.3d 1090, 1107 (2018) (citing Keller v. 
Serio, 437 Md. 277, 288, 85 A.3d 283, 289 (2014)).  In Ford, we highlighted several 
                                                          
 
7 Maryland Rule 5-403 was not codified at the time this Court decided Clark.  In Clark, 
this Court adopted the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as a limitation to the 
“opening the door” doctrine.  Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 87, 629 A.2d 1239, 1244 (1993).  
Several months after the filing of Clark, on December 15, 1993, this Court adopted Rule 
5-403, which is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 403.      
14 
 
definitions of an “opening statement.”  Id. at 32, 197 A.3d at 1106-07.  In summary, we 
explained the term as “a statement by counsel made at the beginning of a trial, before the 
presentation of evidence, in which counsel usually provides the fact-finder with an outline 
of the case, the evidence that is to be presented, and the arguments that are to be made.”  
Id. at 32-33, 197 A.3d at 1107.  We emphasized there that “an opening statement is not 
itself evidence, as it is given prior to the presentation of evidence, and often includes a 
preview of the evidence that counsel expects to present during trial.”  Id. at 33, 197 A.3d 
at 1107.  Previously, we have counseled that “[a]n opening statement should refer to facts 
that will be admissible in evidence.”  Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 337, 631 A.2d 424, 428 
(1993). 
  Nonetheless, pursuant to our case law, a comment in opening may “open the door” 
to evidence offered by the opposing party that previously would have been irrelevant, but 
has become relevant.  Id.; see also Little v. Schneider, 434 Md. 150, 161, 73 A.3d 1074, 
1080 (2013) (“the doctrine of ‘opening the door’ applies equally in opening statements, 
witness examination, and closing arguments.”); Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 226, 969 
A.2d 262, 275 (2009) (“It is equally well settled that the State’s case-in-chief may include 
‘rebuttal’ evidence to which the defense has ‘opened the door,’ . . . during opening 
statement[.]”).   
In Martin, v. State, we held that a statement made in opening can trigger the 
“opening the door” doctrine.  364 Md. 692, 708, 775 A.2d 385, 394 (2001).  However, we 
limited our examination to whether the responsive evidence was proportionate to defense 
counsel’s opening remark.  Id.  In that case, Dorian Martin (“Mr. Martin”), a former 
15 
 
Baltimore City police officer, was charged with theft and misconduct in office.  Id. at 695, 
775 A.2d at 386.  In opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that it was Mr. 
Martin’s “life-long desire to become a police officer,” that the police department was using 
Mr. Martin as a “‘sacrificial lamb’ for the Hispanic community” and that the department 
“‘abandoned’ him.” Id. at 705, 775 A.2d at 392.  The trial judge allowed the State to 
introduce evidence that Mr. Martin consulted with an attorney after he was accused of 
robbery and that, immediately after the consultation, he resigned from the police force.  Id. 
at 703, 775 A.2d at 391.  According to the trial judge, that evidence was relevant for 
purposes of rebutting defense counsel’s opening remarks.  Id. at 705, 775 A.2d at 392. 
On appeal from that ruling, we held that “[t]he State’s use of [Mr. Martin’s] 
consultation with an attorney to rebut defense counsel’s ‘abandonment’ assertion was not 
a proportionate response.”  Id. at 708, 775 A.2d at 394.  We noted that “[e]vidence of a 
criminal defendant’s consultation with an attorney is highly prejudicial, as it is likely to 
give rise to the improper inference that a defendant in a criminal case is, or at least believes 
himself to be guilty[,]” and concluded that “[t]he danger of unfair prejudice presented by 
the introduction of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative value, and it 
should not have been admitted.”  Id. at 708-09, 775 A.2d at 394-95.  
DISCUSSION 
In the present case, defense counsel, during her opening statement, presented a fact 
that triggered the opening the door analysis.  Defense counsel asserted that Mr. Heath 
sought to be reunited with his wife and that he was at Ottobar to find clients for his tattoo 
business to make money to pay for her transportation to the United States.  As such, the 
16 
 
trial court needed to decide whether the State could admit, as responsive evidence, a 
previously redacted portion of Mr. Heath’s statement to the police.  The State contended 
that Mr. Heath’s “true” reason for going to Ottobar was reflected in his statement to the 
police, which was to sell drugs.   
We conclude that the trial court committed a legal error when it admitted the 
prosecutor’s responsive, but legally irrelevant, evidence on a collateral issue.  In addition, 
the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to present evidence that 
was not a proportionate response to remarks made in defense counsel’s opening statement.  
Lastly, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that the probative value of 
the prosecutor’s responsive evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
any unfair prejudice.  
First, Mr. Heath’s intent to sell “white” at Ottobar was a collateral issue that should 
not have been injected into the case.  It was immaterial to the issues in the case, namely 
Mr. Heath’s culpability in the death of Mr. Malenski and the assault on Mr. Clay.  The 
dispositive question is whether the evidence used by the State was relevant to a fact or 
matter that is material to the issue in the case.  See Pearson v. State, 182 Md. 1, 14, 31 A.2d 
624, 629 (1943) (“Evidence of collateral facts . . . should be excluded, for the reason that 
such evidence tends to divert the minds of the jury from the real point in issue, and may 
arouse their prejudices.).  Here, Mr. Heath’s intent to sell cocaine at Ottobar had nothing 
to do with the underlying criminal charges, and thus exceeded the limitations of the opening 
the door doctrine. 
17 
 
Secondly, in permitting the State to respond to defense counsel’s opening remark, 
the trial judge was limited to providing a “remedy [that was] proportionate to the malady.”  
Terry, 332 Md. at 338, 631 A.2d at 428.   In Terry, defense counsel told the jury in opening 
statement that the defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and related charges because he was innocent.  Id. at 332, 631 A.2d at 
425.  The trial court permitted the State to respond to that statement by introducing 
evidence that the defendant had a previous conviction of possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, on the theory that the defendant may not have wanted to plead guilty because 
he faced “back up time” for violating his probation, and mandatory sentencing as a 
subsequent offender.  Id. at 332-33, 631 A.2d at 425-26. We explained that, in admitting 
evidence under the “open door” doctrine, “the remedy must be proportionate to the 
malady[,]” and held that evidence of the previous conviction should not have been admitted 
because the impact of that evidence was “fraught with [the] danger of improper prejudicial 
use by the jury.”  Id. at 338, 631 A.2d at 428. 
The responsive evidence admitted by the trial judge in the present case was a 
disproportionate response to the comment made in defense counsel’s opening statement 
because it did not properly counterbalance defense counsel’s inappropriate comment.  
Similar to Terry, in the present case, a comment made in opening was determined to be 
inappropriate because “[a]n opening statement should refer to facts that will be admissible 
in evidence.”  Id. at 337, 631 A.2d at 428.  Even if defense counsel’s comments were 
designed to gain the jury’s sympathy, the State’s responsive evidence failed to rebut that 
suggestion in a proportionate way.  Combating defense counsel’s remark with Mr. Heath’s 
18 
 
admission regarding his intention to sell drugs was “tantamount to killing an ant with a pile 
driver.”  See id. at 339, 631 A.2d at 429.     
There is an inherent difference between the weight that a jury is instructed to give 
evidence and the weight that a jury is instructed to give a comment made in opening.    Here, 
the jurors were instructed to decide Mr. Heath’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence 
presented to them, and that opening statements were not evidence.8   Given the trial judge’s 
instructions, it is not unlikely that the jury gave greater weight to the responsive evidence 
offered by the State, which was disproportionate to the attempt by defense counsel to 
bolster her client’s reputation in her opening statement. 
Third, even if the responsive evidence were relevant, it was highly prejudicial when 
compared to the probative value that it offered.  The State conceivably offered evidence of 
Mr. Heath’s intent to sell drugs because an issue arose, due to defense counsel’s opening 
statement, as to Mr. Heath’s true purpose for going to Ottobar.  In response to a slight 
bolstering by defense counsel, the trial court permitted the State to attack the credibility of 
Mr. Heath by associating him with drugs.  An association with drugs is extremely 
prejudicial given the fact that Mr. Heath was not charged with a drug related offense. See 
Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339, 347, 23 A.3d 192, 196 (2011) (“Evidence is prejudicial 
                                                          
 
8 During the jury instructions, the trial judge gave the following instructions on evidence 
and opening statements: 
During your deliberations, you must decide this case based only on the 
evidence that you and your fellow jurors heard together in the courtroom.  . . 
.  Opening statements and closing arguments of lawyers are not evidence.  
They are intended only to help you to understand the evidence and to apply 
the law.  Therefore, if your memory of the evidence differs from anything 
the lawyers or I may say, you must rely on your own memory of the evidence. 
19 
 
when it tends to have some adverse effect . . . beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that 
justified its admission.”) (citation omitted).  The evidence offered by the State had the 
“adverse effect” of attacking Mr. Heath’s credibility and likely misled the jury to believe 
that Mr. Heath’s intent to engage in drug dealing played a role in the altercation.  As such, 
the probative value of Mr. Heath’s statement to the police was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice and should not have been admitted.  Md. Rule 5-403. 
Moreover, Mr. Heath’s credibility was at issue because of his claim of self-defense.  
The success of that claim depended upon the jury’s willingness to believe Mr. Heath’s 
version of the events.  Evidence that Mr. Heath went to Ottobar to sell drugs undermined 
not only his character but also his credibility.  See State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 
A.2d 870, 875-876 (1994) (noting that involvement in the manufacture or distribution of 
drugs is relevant to a person’s credibility and affects it in a negative way).  
Whether a Remedy is Proportionate 
We now examine what would have been a proportionate response to defense 
counsel’s remarks in opening statement.  The State did not object to defense counsel’s 
opening remarks when they were made and, instead, waited until its case-in-chief was well 
underway to seek recourse.  The State’s decision to forego a timely remedy – while, 
perhaps, a strategic decision – was not the proper way to remedy defense counsel’s malady.  
A proper response by the State in reaction to defense counsel’s opening remarks would 
have been to object and request that the trial judge strike the comments relating to Mr. 
Heath’s purpose for being at Ottobar and to admonish the jury to disregard the 
inappropriate portion of defense counsel’s opening remarks.  To strike the objectionable 
20 
 
portions of the opening statement would, indeed, have been a proportional response since 
counsel had a stipulation about facts that would be redacted from Mr. Heath’s pretrial 
statement to the police.   
Harmless Error 
In the present case, the court erred when it allowed the unredacted statement into 
evidence to combat an inappropriate comment made in opening.  Accordingly, reversal is 
required “unless the error did not influence the verdict.”  Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 234, 
166 A.3d 1044, 1052 (2017) (citation omitted).  Conversely, if there is a possibility that 
the error played a role in the jury’s verdict, the error is prejudicial and a reversal is 
mandated.  Id.  An error cannot be deemed harmless “unless a reviewing court, upon its 
own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]”  Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 
659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).  We must “be satisfied that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of – whether erroneously admitted or excluded – 
may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.”  Id.  
  
The State argues that because Mr. Heath admitted to engaging in a fight with Mr. 
Malenski and Mr. Clay, the second-degree assault conviction was likely inevitable.  
Therefore, according to the State, the comment that was admitted into evidence was 
harmless because Mr. Heath would have been convicted whether or not the statement was 
admitted into evidence.  Next, the State contends that the statement about planning to sell 
cocaine in Ottobar was harmless.  This is so, according to the State, because the prosecutor 
did not mention or refer to Mr. Heath’s selling of cocaine for the rest of the trial and did 
21 
 
not use the statement to characterize Mr. Heath as a drug dealer.  Finally, the State asserts 
that the jury may not have understood what “white” meant and, therefore, did not associate 
Mr. Heath with drugs in any way. 
The State’s contentions regarding harmless error fail on several accounts.  In our 
view, the association with the distribution of illicit drugs unfairly impeded Mr. Heath’s 
credibility with the jury.  Evidence that Mr. Heath intended to sell drugs unfairly gave the 
jury reason to disbelieve Mr. Heath’s claim of self-defense.  As a result, the jury may have 
convicted Mr. Heath solely because of his association with drugs and illicit activity.   
Next, to influence the verdict, only one juror would have needed to understand what 
the term “white” meant.  Given the context in which Mr. Heath used the word, we are not 
persuaded that no one on the jury understood that the term, as used here, referred to cocaine.  
Pursuant to our holding in Dorsey, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
was not influenced by the inflammatory evidence of Mr. Heath’s stated intention to sell 
“white” at Ottobar.  The error is therefore not harmless and a new trial for Mr. Heath is 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Defense counsel’s comment in her opening statement about what Mr. Heath 
intended to do at Ottobar was not evidence, but the comment triggered an analysis under 
the opening the door doctrine.  In applying the principles of the opening the door doctrine, 
the State’s responsive evidence was inadmissible because it injected into the case evidence 
on a collateral issue and was a disproportionate response to defense counsel’s opening 
remark.  Furthermore, even if the State’s responsive evidence was determined to be non-
22 
 
collateral/relevant, the probative value of Mr. Heath’s statement was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Md. Rule 5-403.  The trial judge’s errors 
were not harmless, given the unduly prejudicial impact on Mr. Heath’s credibility.  
Therefore, Mr. Heath is entitled to a new trial. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE 
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE 
PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 36 
 
September Term, 2018 
 
______________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
v. 
NICHOLAS HEATH 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty  
Cathell, Dale R. (Senior Judge,   
Specially Assigned), 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J. 
which Barbera, C.J., joins. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 28, 2019      
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case Nos. 114296017 
 
    114296018  
Argued: January 3, 2019 
 
 
 
As the Majority Opinion recounts, there was no dispute at trial that Nicholas Heath 
wielded the knife that fatally slashed Tom Malenski’s neck and that severely wounded 
Martin Clay outside Ottobar on the evening of September 25, 2014.  Rather, the issue at 
trial was how he had come to do so and with what intent.   
Mr. Heath elected not to testify at the trial.  His version of the incident was presented 
through a recording of his interview with police detectives that was introduced into 
evidence by the State.  One problem with that recorded interview, from Mr. Heath’s 
perspective, was that he had also made extensive admissions to the detectives that he was 
involved in selling illegal drugs.  With reference to the evening in question, Mr. Heath told 
the detectives that he had gone to Ottobar not to “start trouble” but rather to sell “a bit of 
white … to make a … living.”  Prior to the trial, the prosecution and the defense agreed 
that Mr. Heath’s admissions of drug dealing, including his purpose in being at Ottobar on 
the night of the incident, would be redacted from the recording that was to be played for 
the jury, as well as from the transcript of that recording.1   
In opening statement, however, defense counsel chose to take the whitewash of the 
recorded interview a bit further.  She told the jury that Mr. Heath had gone to Ottobar that 
                                                          
 
1 The unredacted version of the recorded interview does not appear in the record.  
However, when the trial court and counsel discussed the redaction of that recording, the 
prosecutor noted that the transcript of the unredacted recording contained “page after page 
after page” of Mr. Heath discussing his drug dealing activities and that the redactions 
eliminated Mr. Heath’s statements about drug dealing as “his primary source of income.”  
Neither defense counsel nor the court disputed those descriptions of the complete recording 
and the redactions. 
 
2 
 
night for the relatively benign purpose of promoting his tattoo business in order to raise 
money to bring his wife to the United States from Great Britain.2  The State argued that the 
defense had thereby opened the door to restoring Mr. Heath’s references to his drug dealing 
in the recorded statement that was to be played for the jury.  In response, the trial court 
adopted a measured approach.  The State was not permitted to restore all of Mr. Heath’s 
admissions of drug dealing to the recording and transcript, but only his statement as to why 
he had gone to Ottobar.  That statement comprises approximately nine seconds of an 
interview that lasted well over an hour and occupies less than two lines of the 39-page 
single-spaced transcript of the otherwise redacted recording. 
Having obtained that relief, the State did not exploit it.  The prosecutor did not direct 
the jury’s attention to Mr. Heath’s statement about selling a “bit of white” – or even present 
any evidence explaining that “white” was a reference to cocaine.  Nor did she mention the 
statement in closing argument.  The defense similarly made no mention of it during the 
remainder of the trial, although the defense dropped the pretense that Mr. Heath was 
present simply to promote his tattoo business in order to reunite with his wife.  No one 
explained to the jury what “white” meant. 
                                                          
 
2 Mr. Heath had indeed mentioned a tattoo business, as well as his wife, during the 
recorded interview, but that characterization of why he was at Ottobar that evening was 
misleading, as would be evident to anyone familiar with the unredacted recording.  
 
When the prosecutor pointed out that the defense opening statement had deviated in 
this regard from Mr. Heath’s recorded statement, defense counsel told the trial court that 
she expected Mr. Cunningham to testify that Mr. Heath was at Ottobar to solicit tattoo 
customers.  However, she did not attempt to elicit such testimony when Mr. Cunningham 
was on the stand. 
 
3 
 
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Heath of involuntary manslaughter of Mr. 
Malenski and second-degree assault of Mr. Clay.  It acquitted Mr. Heath of the more serious 
charges, including first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder.3 
 
The Majority Opinion holds that the manslaughter and assault convictions must be 
reversed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion when it restored Mr. Heath’s 
brief statement about why he was at Ottobar that night under the “open door” doctrine.   
 
I disagree with that conclusion for two reasons.  First, the trial court appropriately 
exercised its discretion when it allowed a targeted response after defense counsel “opened 
the door” as to Mr. Heath’s purpose in going to Ottobar.  Second, even if that lone and 
ambiguous reference to his drug dealing activity should also have been excised from the 
redacted recording, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The “Open Door” Doctrine 
Under the “open door” doctrine, once a party has opened the door, the opposing 
party is allowed, as a matter of fairness, to make a tailored response with evidence that, 
although otherwise inadmissible, has thereby become relevant.  See Little v. Schneider, 434 
Md. 150, 157 (2013); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368, 388-89 (2009).  As the Majority 
Opinion states, a trial court’s decision as to the extent of that response is assessed by an 
appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Majority slip op. at 11. 
                                                          
 
3 Mr. Heath was also acquitted of second-degree murder, second-degree attempted 
murder, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree assault, and carrying a dangerous weapon 
with intent to injure.  
 
 
4 
 
 
This Court has long held that the “open door” doctrine may be triggered by 
assertions made in an opening statement.  E.g., Little, 434 Md. at 161 (“the doctrine of 
‘opening the door’ applies equally in opening statements, witness examination, and closing 
arguments”); Mitchell, 408 Md. at 388 (same); Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 226 (2009) 
(“It is equally well settled that the State’s case-in-chief may include ‘rebuttal’ evidence to 
which the defense has ‘opened the door’ … during opening statement …”); Martin v. State, 
364 Md. 692, 708 (2001) (“[w]hile comments made in opening statements are not evidence 
…, the general principles [of the open door doctrine] are applicable”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
As the Majority Opinion apparently concedes, when defense counsel suggested that 
Mr. Heath was at Ottobar that night solely to advance his tattoo business to reunite with 
his wife, the defense triggered the “open door” doctrine.4  I agree.  However, the Majority 
Opinion further holds that the targeted response to that statement permitted by the trial 
court requires reversal of Mr. Heath’s convictions.  I disagree. 
 
Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion  
The abuse-of-discretion standard is extremely deferential to the trial court.  This 
Court recently reiterated that “abuse of discretion exists where no reasonable person would 
take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to guiding 
rules or principles.”  State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 364 (2019) (quotation marks, 
                                                          
 
4 See Majority slip op. at 15-16, 21.  The Majority Opinion thus disagrees with the 
Court of Special Appeals, which held that the open door doctrine was not triggered on the 
ground that opening statements are not evidence.  See Heath v. State, 2018 WL 3085156 
at *6. 
 
5 
 
brackets, and citation omitted); see also North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994) (to be 
an abuse of discretion, a ruling must be “well removed from any center mark … and beyond 
the fringe of what [is] minimally acceptable”).  Thus, a ruling reviewed under that standard 
“will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same 
ruling.”  Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 67 (2014).   
Here, other than a conclusory statement at the outset of its analysis, the Majority 
Opinion does not apply the abuse-of-discretion standard.  See Majority slip op. at 15-20.  
Rather, the Majority Opinion makes its own de novo assessment that the evidence should 
have been excluded on the ground that it was “highly prejudicial.”  Majority slip op. at 18.  
In other words, the Majority Opinion simply would have reached a different conclusion 
than the trial court.  
In my view, the trial court acted within its discretion when the defense raised the 
question as to why Mr. Heath went to Ottobar that evening.  The trial court allowed the 
State to un-redact two lines in a lengthy recorded statement in which Mr. Heath specifically 
spoke about why he was present at Ottobar.  The jury was not permitted to hear his many 
other statements to the detectives about his drug dealing activity.  Nor was any independent 
evidence of his drug dealing placed before the jury.5  In my view, it cannot be said that “no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” 
                                                          
 
5 This is in contrast to Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329 (1993), where the prosecution 
countered an “innocuous,” though improper, statement by defense counsel comparing the 
defendant to his former co-defendants by introducing independent evidence of the 
defendant’s prior drug conviction.  This Court held that the disproportionate response had 
“kill[ed] an ant with a pile driver.”  332 Md. at 339.  By contrast, in this case, the State did 
not respond with extraneous evidence of past drug dealing.  Rather, the responsive evidence 
 
6 
 
 
Whether Any Error was Harmless 
 
Even if the trial court ruling could be deemed an abuse of discretion, the error was 
harmless.  Under the doctrine of harmless error, an appellate court will not reverse a 
conviction if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.  
Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 43-44 (2018).   
There is no likelihood of such an effect in this case.  First, the two lines of the 
recorded statement admitted under the “open door” doctrine comprised approximately nine 
seconds of a recorded interview played for the jury that lasted well over an hour.  Neither 
party directed the jury’s attention to that brief moment, nor did either party elaborate on 
the meaning of “white” in that statement.  Given that expert testimony is generally required 
to explain the significance of such a term in a drug prosecution,6 it is quite likely that the 
term had no impact at all on the jury.  Nor were any witnesses called to testify about Mr. 
                                                          
 
consisted of Mr. Heath’s own statement as to why he was present at Ottobar on the night 
of the incident – a statement that contrasted with the picture that defense counsel was 
attempting to paint. 
 
6 See, e.g., Joelle A. Moreno, Strategies for Challenging Police Drug Jargon 
Testimony, 20 Crim. Just. 28-29 (2006) (noting that “federal courts unanimously agree that 
the jargon of the narcotics trade and the code that drug dealers often use are certainly 
beyond the ken of the average juror”); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 
1996) (“There is no more reason to expect unassisted jurors to understand drug dealers’ 
cryptic slang than antitrust theory or asbestosis”); Annotation, Admissibility of expert 
evidence concerning meaning of narcotics code language in federal prosecution for 
narcotics dealing – modern cases, 104 ALR Fed 230; Annotation, Necessity and 
Admissibility of Slang, Lingo, Jargon or Code Expert Testimony in State Cases, 35 ALR 
7th 6. 
 
 
7 
 
Heath’s drug dealing on that night or any other.7  An instructive comparison is Robertson, 
342 Md. at 363-64, where the Court held that the State’s response to defense testimony that 
opened the door was disproportionate because the State elicited evidence of the details of 
a prior incident unrelated to the crime charged.  Here, the prosecutor never once mentioned 
that Mr. Heath was a drug dealer when questioning witnesses or making her closing 
argument.  A stray mention by the defendant himself in an hour-plus recording was the 
only time “white” was ever mentioned before the jury. 
Second, as noted above, Mr. Heath was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and 
second-degree assault.  Involuntary manslaughter has no intent element, and second-degree 
assault requires only an intent to injure.  He was acquitted of other charges with stronger 
intent elements.  In his recorded interview with the detectives, Mr. Heath admitted to 
participating in the altercation (while admittedly being intoxicated), said that he had 
attempted to stab someone in the deltoid with a knife, and contended that he had 
accidentally slashed his victim in the throat.   
 
Mr. Heath’s only defense to the two charges of which he was convicted was that he 
had acted in self-defense.  Far from undermining that defense, his own statement that he 
had gone to Ottobar not to “start trouble,” but just to sell “white” in order “to make a … 
living” was perfectly consistent with that defense.  If it was error to admit the statement, it 
was harmless.   
                                                          
 
7 By contrast, Mr. Heath’s repeated assertions in the interview that the other parties 
to the altercation were high on drugs that night were more explicit and remained part of the 
recording played for the jury. 
 
8 
 
 
Chief Judge Barbera has advised that she joins this opinion.