Title: State v. Stephen L. Jensen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3175 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Stephen L. Jensen,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 747, 603 N.W.2d 34 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 17, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief and oral argument by James L. Fullin, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter J. 
Dickey, Michael E. Smith, David Schultz and Ben Kempinen of the 
University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 
2000 WI 84 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3175-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Stephen L. Jensen,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is a challenge to a 
conviction for first-degree reckless injury in a "shaken baby" 
case.  The defendant, Stephen L. Jensen, does not deny that he 
vigorously shook his ten-week-old son, causing him to sustain 
severe and permanent disabilities.  Rather, he argues that he is 
only guilty of second-degree reckless injury because the State 
did not prove the "utter disregard for human life" element of 
first degree reckless injury.  Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1) (1993-94)1. 
¶2 
Jensen 
argues 
that 
in 
order 
to 
prove 
"utter 
disregard," the State must demonstrate his subjective awareness 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 version.    
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
2 
that shaking his son posed an extreme risk of death, and that it 
did not do so in this case.  Jensen also argues that the 
circumstances of this case, involving the excessive use of 
disciplinary force, are insufficiently aggravated to meet the 
definition of "utter disregard for human life."  Finally, Jensen 
argues that because he called 911 as soon as he realized his son 
was not breathing normally, he demonstrated enough regard for 
the child's life to preclude a finding of utter disregard.   
¶3 
Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
concluded that the test for determining utter disregard for 
human life is an objective test that focuses on what a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have known.  
Both lower courts found the evidence sufficient to show utter 
disregard for human life under the objective test.  We agree, 
and hold that the standard for utter disregard for human life is 
an objective one and that the State put in sufficient evidence 
to prove utter disregard in this case. 
¶4 
The undisputed facts are as follows.  C.D., the 
victim, is the non-marital son of the defendant and Darlene D.  
He was born September 14, 1996. Shortly after Darlene discovered 
she was pregnant, she called Jensen to tell him that he was the 
father.  Jensen wanted nothing to do with the child.  However, 
when Darlene called him again a few weeks after the baby's 
birth, Jensen expressed a tentative interest in assuming some of 
the responsibilities of fatherhood. 
¶5 
Jensen began seeing his son periodically, and Darlene 
taught him how to care for the child.  She told him that the 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
3 
baby was fragile and needed help holding his head up because his 
neck was weak.  Jensen cared for the baby without Darlene's 
supervision on several occasions, including at least one 
instance in which the baby stayed overnight at Jensen's 
apartment. 
¶6 
On November 22, 1996, the evening of the crime, C.D. 
was ten weeks old and weighed approximately 12 pounds.  Darlene 
left him at Jensen's apartment overnight.  At around 4:30 a.m. 
on November 23, the baby woke up and began to cry.  Jensen tried 
feeding him, but he refused the bottle and continued crying.  
Jensen testified that the crying was like a siren and was 
driving him "nuts" and making him angry.  Jensen testified that 
he lost his temper and began yelling at the baby.  He then 
grabbed the baby and shook him vigorously seven to 15 times.  
Jensen testified that he saw the baby's head repeatedly snap 
forward and hit his chest and then snap back, but he continued 
shaking him anyway.  Jensen stopped only when the baby suddenly 
stopped crying.  Jensen testified that he then noticed his son 
was having trouble breathing, waited about 30 seconds, and 
called 911.   
¶7 
Here is what he told the 911 operator: 
 
I just had an accident with my son.  He's just barely 
over 2 months old.  I was coming out for a nighttime 
changing and that, and I tripped over the phone cord. 
 We both went down.  I held him close to me.  He's 
breathing and that still, its just, I don't know, I'm 
not real sure that he's 100% okay. 
A police car and an ambulance were dispatched to Jensen's 
apartment.  Jensen told the same story to the police officer, 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
4 
and also remarked that he hoped the baby's neck had not been 
injured. 
¶8 
The baby was taken by ambulance to the hospital and 
barely survived the incident.  According to Dr. William Perloff, 
the treating physician, the baby was having difficulty breathing 
and had very low blood pressure when he arrived at the hospital. 
 Perloff discovered extensive bleeding behind the baby's eyes, 
and a CAT scan revealed severe cranial bleeding.  Dr. Perloff 
also noted that the baby's "soft spot" had become hard because 
of the extremely high pressure in his brain.  Dr. Perloff 
testified that the baby's injuries were similar in severity to 
those he might have incurred in a fall from a third-story 
window. 
¶9 
Jensen repeated his story about tripping over a 
telephone cord to Dr. Perloff, who recognized it as inconsistent 
with the severity of the baby's injuries.  In the doctor's view, 
the injuries were consistent with Shaken Infant Syndrome, a form 
of nonaccidental trauma.  While the baby was still in intensive 
care, Jensen fled to Florida, where he was apprehended several 
months later after a confidential informant turned him in.  C.D. 
suffered profound, permanent injuries as a result of the attack, 
and is now blind, retarded, unable to walk and requires constant 
care.   
¶10 Jensen was charged with first-degree reckless injury 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1).  He waived his right to a jury 
trial, and a bench trial was held in the Circuit Court for Dane 
County before the Honorable Patrick J. Fiedler.  The defense 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
5 
stipulated to much of the case, so that the only issue at trial 
was whether the defendant acted with "utter disregard for human 
life."2  The circuit court, after carefully considering a large 
body of case law, applied an objective test and concluded that 
any reasonable person would have recognized the danger of an 
adult male in his late twenties violently shaking a ten-week-old 
infant in a fit of anger.  Jensen was sentenced to 16 years in 
prison.   
¶11 Jensen appealed, arguing that the State was required 
to prove his subjective awareness that shaking his son posed an 
extreme risk of killing him in order to prove utter disregard 
for human life.  The court of appeals upheld the conviction, 
also applying an objective test.  State v. Jensen, No. 98-3175-
CR, unpublished slip op. at 5-6 (September 2, 1999).  The court 
concluded that it was not what Jensen knew, "but what a 
reasonable person in Jensen's position is presumed to have 
known" in determining the "utter disregard" element.  Id. at 7. 
 The court found the evidence sufficient to support the 
conviction under this objective test.  Id. at 8. 
¶12 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo.  State v. Bodoh, 226 
Wis. 2d 718, 724, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999).  Our objective is to 
discern the intent of the legislature by relying on the plain 
                     
2 The elements of first-degree reckless injury are 1) the 
defendant caused great bodily harm to another human being, 2) by 
criminally reckless conduct, and 3) under circumstances which 
show utter disregard for human life.  Wis JI—Criminal 1250; Wis. 
Stat. § 940.23(1).   
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
6 
language of the statute when possible and examining legislative 
history and statutory objectives if there is ambiguity.  Id. 
¶13 Jensen argues that the lower courts improperly applied 
an objective test to determine whether he acted with utter 
disregard for human life under Wis. Stat. § 940.23.  Jensen 
asserts that "utter disregard for human life" refers to a 
subjective, conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death, 
which the State has not proven here.   
¶14 We first turn to the language of the statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.23 provides: 
 
940.23 
Reckless 
injury. 
 
(1) 
First-degree 
reckless injury.  Whoever recklessly causes great 
bodily harm to another human being under circumstances 
which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of 
a Class C felony. 
(2) 
Second-degree 
reckless 
injury. 
 
Whoever 
recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human 
being is guilty of a Class D felony. 
 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.24 provides the definition of 
criminal recklessness, the required mental state for reckless 
injury under Wis. Stat. § 940.23: 
 
939.24 Criminal 
Recklessness. 
 (1) 
In 
this 
section, "criminal recklessness" means that the actor 
creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm to another human being and the 
actor is aware of that risk. 
(2) Except as provided in ss. 940.285, 940.29 and 
940.295, if criminal recklessness is an element of a 
crime in chs. 939 to 951, the recklessness is 
indicated by the term "reckless" or "recklessly."   
The accompanying Judicial Council Note explains that criminal 
recklessness requires both the creation of an objectively risky 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
7 
situation (risk of death or great bodily harm), and also the 
actor's subjective awareness of that risk.  Judicial Council 
Committee Note, 1988, § 939.24, Stats.   
¶16 Jensen contends that utter disregard is essentially a 
part of the subjective mental statethe mens reaof this crime, 
which must be proven on the basis of a subjective standard.  We 
disagree.  According to the plain language of the statute, 
criminal recklessness is the mens rea of this crime, possessing 
both subjective and objective components, as noted above.  
"Utter disregard for human life" is a separate element which, if 
the circumstances of the crime show it to be present, aggravates 
second-degree reckless injury to first-degree reckless injury. 
¶17 Although "utter disregard for human life" clearly has 
something to do with mental state, it is not a sub-part of the 
intent element of this crime, and, as such, need not be 
subjectively proven.  It can be (and often is) proven by 
evidence relating to the defendant's subjective state of mindby 
the defendant's statements, for example, before, during and 
after the crime.  But it can also be established by evidence of 
heightened risk, because of special vulnerabilities of the 
victim, for example, or evidence of a particularly obvious, 
potentially lethal danger.  However it is proven, the element of 
utter disregard for human life is measured objectively, on the 
basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position 
would have known.  If proven, the offender is considered more 
culpable because the conduct, according to the standards 
observed by the great mass of mankind, went beyond simple 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
8 
criminal recklessness to encompass something that, although 
falling short of an intentional crime, still deserves to be 
treated more seriously under the law and punished more severely. 
¶18 This interpretation of the "utter disregard" element 
is consistent with previous interpretations of the "depraved 
mind" element that it replaced.  Wisconsin's homicide statutes 
were revised by 1987 Wis. Act 399 as part of a project 
undertaken by the Wisconsin Judicial Council.  State v. Blair, 
164 Wis. 2d 64, 69, 473 N.W.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1991).  As part of 
the 
revision, 
the 
Judicial 
Council 
inserted 
the 
"utter 
disregard" element into first-degree reckless homicide, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.02, first-degree reckless injury, Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.23, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety, Wis. 
Stat. § 941.30.  1987 Wis. Act 399. 
¶19 The Judicial Council Committee Note to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02 explains that the "utter disregard" element was 
intended to codify prior judicial interpretations of "conduct 
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of life." Judicial Council 
Committee Note, 1988, § 940.02, Stats. (citing State v. Dolan, 
44 Wis. 2d 68, 170 N.W.2d 822 (1969); State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 
404, 210 N.W.2d 442 (1973)); see also Wis JI-Criminal 1250 
Comment 6 (jury instructions for first-degree reckless injury). 
 Wis JI-Criminal 1000 also explains that the "utter disregard" 
element was intended to "replace 'conduct evincing a depraved 
mind, regardless of human life' with terms that are more easily 
understood" but that "[n]o change in meaning of the basic 
concept was intended [emphasis added]."  
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
9 
¶20 The replacement of "depraved mind, regardless of human 
life" with "utter disregard for human life" in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.02, 940.23, and 941.30 was accomplished in the same 
statutory enactment.  When statutes are enacted together and 
concern the same subject matter, they are considered in pari 
materia and must be construed together and harmonized if 
possible.  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 325, 243 N.W.2d 
410 (1976). 
¶21 In Weso, the "depraved mind" element which "utter 
disregard" replaced was expressly held to be subject to an 
objective standard of proof.  Weso, 60 Wis. 2d at 411.  In Weso, 
the victim had attempted to start a fight with the defendant.  
Id. at 407.  Weso initially resisted, but then pulled out a 
pocketknife, swinging it at the victim and striking him in the 
face.  Id.  Weso then warned the victim to stop fighting or he 
would kill him.  Id.  In determining whether Weso "evinced a 
depraved mind," we stated:  
 
It is not necessary that the proof show a depraved 
mind in fact in the accused; it is sufficient that the 
conduct of the accused evinces or shows a state of 
mind which is generally considered by mankind to be a 
depraved mind. 
Id. at 411. (emphasis added).  Weso also made it clear that "the 
qualities of the act as imminently dangerous and evincing a 
depraved mind regardless of human life are to be found in the 
act itself and the circumstances of its commission."  Id. at 
409. 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
10
¶22 The court of appeals, relying on Weso, has already 
adopted and applied this objective standard in a case very 
similar to this one, State v. Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67, 598 
N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Edmunds, the defendant was 
convicted 
of 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.02, after a seven-month-old infant in her care died from 
"shaken baby syndrome."  Edmunds argued that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the "utter disregard" element because 
there was no proof that the defendant knew that shaking the baby 
would kill her.  Id. at 77. The court of appeals, citing Weso, 
applied 
an 
objective 
standard 
and 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant's conduct showed utter disregard for human life.  Id. 
at 77-78.  
¶23 Therefore, based upon the plain language of the 
statute, as well as the case law construing parallel predecessor 
statutes, the lower courts were correct to apply an objective 
standard to the evaluation of the "utter disregard for human 
life" element of this crime.  The answer to the next 
questionwhether the evidence was sufficient to convict based 
upon this objective standardis determined on the basis of a 
highly deferential test.  We may not reverse unless the evidence 
is so insufficient in probative value and force that as a matter 
of law, no reasonable factfinder could have determined guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 
493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  In applying this test, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction.  Id.  
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
11
¶24 In evaluating the proof of utter disregard for human 
life, the factfinder is to consider "all the factors relating to 
the 
conduct . . . includ[ing] 
. . . what 
the 
defendant 
was 
doing; why he was doing it; how dangerous the conduct was; how 
obvious the danger was and whether the conduct showed any regard 
for human life."  Wis JI—Criminal, 1250.  In Edmunds, the court 
of appeals put it this way: 
 
In conducting such an examination, we consider the type of 
act, its nature, why the perpetrator acted as he/she did, 
the extent of the victim's injuries and the degree of force 
that was required to cause those injuries.  We also 
consider 
the 
type 
of 
victim, 
the 
victim's 
age, 
vulnerability, 
fragility, 
and 
relationship 
to 
the 
perpetrator.  And finally, we consider whether the totality 
of the circumstances showed any regard for the victim's 
life. 
Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d at 77 (citation omitted). 
¶25 Here, 
the 
circuit 
court 
carefully 
evaluated the 
totality of the circumstances: the victim of the attack was a 
12-pound, ten-week-old baby, while the defendant was an adult 
male in his twenties; the defendant acted in a "fit of anger" 
over the baby's crying; the defendant vigorously shook the baby 
and watched his head snap forward and back repeatedly and still 
continued; the defendant did not stop until the baby stopped 
crying and started gasping for breath; the child suffered severe 
trauma, the equivalent of being dropped from a third-floor 
window, and sustained permanent brain damage and blindness.  The 
special vulnerability of the victim, the violence of the 
defendant's act, the great disparity in their respective sizes, 
the obviousness of the risk and the severity of the victim's 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
12
injuries all support the circuit court's finding of utter 
disregard 
for 
human 
life. 
 
Remember 
that 
the 
defendant 
stipulated to criminal recklessness, thereby conceding that his 
conduct created a substantial risk of death or great bodily 
harm, and that he was aware of the risk.  The evidence here was 
sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of the more 
aggravated form of the reckless injury offense.  
¶26 Jensen cites Seidler v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 456, 219 
N.W.2d 320 (1974), for the proposition that episodes of 
excessive use of disciplinary force ordinarily are not of such a 
character as to constitute utter disregard for human life.  
Seidler involved a babysitter who, angry that a two-year-old 
child in his care had soiled herself, threw her forcefully into 
a bedroom in the direction of the bed.  The child hit the bed's 
metal 
frame 
and 
suffered 
severe 
internal 
injuries 
that 
eventually 
led to 
her death. 
 This 
court 
reversed the 
defendant's conviction for second-degree "depraved mind" murder, 
finding insufficient evidence. 
¶27 Seidler focused on whether the defendant's conduct was 
"imminently dangerous," but also briefly addressed the "depraved 
mind" question.  The court determined that the defendant's 
conduct was not imminently dangerous and did not evince a 
depraved mind, given the distance between the door and the bed, 
the lack of evidence that the sitter had hurled the child 
directly into a particularly unyielding part of the bed, and the 
overall context of the crime.  Id. at 463-66.  The court 
catalogued a number of second-degree "depraved mind" murder 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
13
casesstabbings, shootings, bombingsand essentially concluded 
that the defendant's conduct was so significantly different in 
substance and degree as to warrant reversal.  Id.  
¶28 Seidler did not, of course, establish any different 
standard 
for 
proof 
for 
the 
"depraved 
mind" 
(now 
"utter 
disregard") element in the context of cases involving the use of 
excessive parental (or parental substitute) disciplinary force. 
 Nor did it establish a rule of law that these sorts of cases 
can never or even rarely be aggravated enough to meet the 
definition in the statute.  We see no reason to establish such a 
rule now.  In any event, it is difficult to characterize the 
violent shaking of a helpless, dependent, ten-week-old as 
"discipline."  We cannot realistically envision that a baby of 
this age can accomplish anything so offensive as to warrant the 
type of assault inflicted by the defendant. 
¶29 Certainly, a "shaken baby" reckless injury case is 
different from one arising out of a drive-by shooting, for 
example, or a bar fight, but we think prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, trial judges and juries can appropriately sort out 
and deal with such differences without categorical rules being 
laid down by appellate courts on sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges.  We do not reverse unless the evidence is so 
insufficient that no reasonable factfinder could convict beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and by this standard of review, the evidence 
here is sufficient to support the conviction.   
¶30 Finally, 
Jensen 
argues 
that 
his 
call 
to 
911 
demonstrates enough regard for his son's life to preclude a 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
14
finding of utter disregard, citing Wagner v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 
30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977), and Balistreri v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 
440, 265 N.W.2d 290 (1978).  Wagner and Balistreri are 
distinguishable, however, because both cases involved situations 
in which the defendant took measures to avoid injury before the 
fact.  In Wagner, 76 Wis. 2d at 33, the defendant was drag 
racing on a main downtown street when he hit and killed a 
pedestrian.  However, just before striking the pedestrian, 
Wagner swerved his car.  He was convicted of second-degree 
murder.  We reversed, concluding that the defendant's conduct 
did not evince a depraved mind because he took some measure to 
avoid striking the victim.  Id. at 47.   
¶31 In Balistreri, 83 Wis. 2d at 452, the defendant was 
involved in a high speed chase with police through the streets 
of downtown Milwaukee during rush hour.  During the course of 
the chase the defendant ran several red lights and traveled the 
wrong direction down one-way streets.  Id. at 452-53.  The chase 
ended when the defendant crashed into another car.  We concluded 
that Balistreri's conduct did not evince a depraved mind because 
of undisputed evidence that Balistreri turned on his headlights 
during the chase, swerved to avoid hitting a squad car, honked 
his horn and braked to avoid the collision.  Id. at 457.   
¶32 The defendants in both of these cases attempted, 
however ineffectively, to avoid inflicting the injury before or 
during the crime.  Here, Jensen's act in mitigationhis 911 
callcame after his assault upon his son was completed.  After-
the-fact regard for human life does not negate "utter disregard" 
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
15
otherwise established by the circumstances before and during the 
crime.  It may be considered by the factfinder as a part of the 
total factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a 
finding of utter disregard for human life.  
¶33 We hold, therefore, that the standard for evaluating 
proof of the "utter disregard for human life" element in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.23 is an objective or reasonable person standard, 
and that the evidence in this case was sufficient to meet that 
standard.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
  
No. 
98-3175-CR 
 
 
1