Title: Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
JESSICA CHAVEZ, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93658 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
CEDAR FAIR, LP,   
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY 
The Honorable A. Rex Gabbert, Judge  
 
Opinion issued November 12, 2014, and 
modified on the Court’s own motion December 23, 2014 
 
 
Twelve-year-old Jessica Chavez sustained injuries on a ride at Oceans of Fun 
Water Park and filed a suit for negligence against Cedar Fair, LP, which owns and 
operates Oceans of Fun.  Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of         
Ms. Chavez.  On appeal from that judgment, Cedar Fair claims the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that its liability should be assessed using the highest degree of care 
standard for negligence, rather than the ordinary degree of care standard.  Cedar Fair also 
claims the trial court erred when it refused to submit its proffered comparative fault 
instruction to the jury.  This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of 
appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  Because the trial court erred in instructing the jury to 
assess Cedar Fair’s negligence using the highest degree of care standard and should have, 
instead, submitted an instruction on ordinary care, the judgment is reversed and the cause 
remanded.   
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
In August 2000, twelve-year-old Jessica Chavez went to Oceans of Fun in Kansas 
City with relatives, including her aunt and her cousins.  The first and only ride             
Ms. Chavez rode that day was the Hurricane Falls raft ride. 
 
Hurricane Falls is a 680-foot-long water slide ride that has a 71-foot drop and 
twists and turns throughout.  During the ride, four to five passengers are seated cross-
legged in the bottom of a circular raft.  The raft descends down an open fiberglass flume, 
propelled only by a water flow of 8,000 gallons per minute.  There are no mechanical 
aspects to the ride other than the conveyor that takes the empty rafts from the splash pool 
at the bottom of the slide back to the loading platform at the top of the slide.  With the 
exception of the initial launch from the loading platform, ride attendants do not control 
the raft’s descent.  Rather, rafts descend variably based on the oscillation and rotation of 
the rafts, the contact the rafts make with the side or “splash” walls of the slide, and the 
contour of the layout of the ride.   
 
The raft’s only safety features are nylon webbing safety straps that run along 
portions of the top of the rafts.  Passengers are not buckled in because of the risk of 
drowning if a raft were to capsize.  Riders must be a minimum of 46 inches tall to ride on 
Hurricane Falls. Expectant mothers as well as guests with back, neck, muscular or 
skeletal issues are cautioned not to ride.  Signage placed along the staircase leading up to 
3 
 
the loading platform informs passengers to “hold on to straps at all times.”  Additional 
signage informs riders that the activity rating of Hurricane Falls is “[Diamond] 5 
Aggressive,”1 and lists the ride’s restrictions and rules, including that riders must “hold 
onto the straps at all times.”  Ride attendants also verbally instruct passengers before the 
ride begins to “hold on to the straps at all times.” 
 
When their turn came to ride, Ms. Chavez, her aunt, and two cousins were seated 
as instructed by a ride attendant, with Ms. Chavez seated directly across from one of her 
cousins.  As their raft rode up the splash wall on the final turn, Ms. Chavez’s mouth and 
her cousin’s head collided.  Due to the impact, Ms. Chavez’s braces were pushed up into 
her gums and her front tooth was knocked out.  These injuries subsequently required 
extensive dental work, including the removal of two more front teeth and the use of 
dentures.   
 
In 2005, Ms. Chavez filed a petition for damages claiming Cedar Fair failed to 
exercise the care required and was negligent in one or both of the following respects:        
(1) failing to provide friction devices reasonably sufficient to prevent a raft rider from 
colliding with another rider and (2) failing to adequately warn of the risk of harm from 
colliding with other raft riders.  The case proceeded to trial in 2012. 
 
At trial, conflicting testimony was given regarding how the collision happened and 
whether Ms. Chavez, or both or either of her cousins, voluntarily or involuntarily let go 
                                              
1 Oceans of Fun uses an internal grading scale of 1 to 5 to rate the aggressiveness or thrill 
level of its rides.  A ride rated as a “5” is considered to be the most aggressive, meaning 
that the ride could involve “high speeds,” “heights,” “aggressive and unexpected forces,” 
and “rapid directional changes.”  
4 
 
of the raft’s safety strap.  Both parties also presented expert testimony to address the 
adequacy of the ride’s safety features and measures taken by Cedar Fair to ensure 
passenger safety.  On her negligence claim, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
“[T]he term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in these instructions means the failure to 
use the highest degree of care.  The phrase ‘highest degree of care’ means that degree of 
care that a very careful person would use under the same or similar circumstances.”  
Cedar Fair objected to the instruction on the ground that it presented the incorrect 
standard of care, as ordinary care was the proper standard.  The trial court overruled 
Cedar Fair’s objection, and the highest degree of care instruction was submitted to the 
jury.   
In addition to objecting to the submitted instruction regarding the standard of care, 
Cedar Fair also proffered an instruction requiring the jury to determine Ms. Chavez’s 
percentage of fault, if any.  Cedar Fair argued there was sufficient evidence that           
Ms. Chavez voluntarily let go of the raft’s safety strap despite repeated warnings to “hold 
onto the straps at all times,” thereby negligently contributing to the cause of her injuries.  
The trial court refused to submit the comparative fault instruction to the jury because it 
found that strained inferences and conflicting testimony failed to sufficiently establish 
these facts. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Chavez in the amount of $225,000, and 
the trial court entered judgment accordingly.  Cedar Fair appeals.  On appeal, Cedar Fair 
asserts the trial court erred in submitting a jury instruction that defined “negligence” as 
5 
 
the failure to use the “highest degree of care.”  Instead, Cedar Fair argues that “ordinary 
care” is the proper negligence standard for operators of water slides and similar 
amusement activities.  Cedar Fair also claims the trial court erred in refusing to submit its 
proffered comparative fault instruction to the jury.  Cedar Fair argues that sufficient 
evidence exists that Ms. Chavez voluntarily and negligently let go of the raft’s safety 
straps despite repeated warnings to hold on, warranting the submission of the 
comparative fault instruction.    
Standard of Review 
 
The appropriate standard of care is a question of law.  Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. 
Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Mo. banc 2000).  Similarly, whether the jury was 
properly instructed is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Coomer v. Kansas City 
Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Mo. banc 2014).  This Court will only 
vacate a judgment on the basis of an instructional error if that error “materially affected 
the merits of the action.”  Id.  Accordingly, “the party challenging the instruction must 
show that the offending instruction misdirected, misled, or confused the jury, resulting in 
prejudice to the party challenging the instruction.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Negligence Degree of Care Standard for Amusement Rides 
 
In its first assertion of error, Cedar Fair claims that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury that it owed Ms. Chavez the “highest degree of care” as defined in 
MAI 11.03, rather than the “ordinary degree of care” as defined in MAI 11.05 or 11.07.  
Cedar Fair contends that the trial court’s submission of the “highest degree of care” was 
6 
 
contrary to this Court’s precedent in McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co..  59 S.W.2d 
693 (Mo. 1933).    
The common law ordinary negligence rule requires a defendant to exercise the 
degree of care of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances, 
now commonly referred to as the “ordinary degree of care.”  While the facts underlying 
each situation “may not alter the legal standard of care required to avoid an accident,” the 
underlying facts “often multiply the precautions that must be observed to comply with the 
standard[.]”  Fortner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 244 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo 1951).  In 
Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1029 (Mo. 1928), the ordinary 
duty of care is further defined as a duty created by the particular “nature of the object, 
and of its use by the plaintiff.”  In other words, ordinary care is a relative term; “it is a 
care commensurate with the particular conditions and circumstances involved in the 
given case.”  Id.  This Court has applied this degree of care to almost all negligence 
cases, reserving the higher degree of care to a very small number of well-defined 
activities.   
This Court in McCollum rejected the highest degree of care standard for 
amusement park operators and held that they owe only a duty of ordinary care to their 
patrons.  In McCollum, the plaintiff, a young girl, suffered a broken leg after catching it 
in an open handrail at the top of a waterslide owned and operated by the defendant, an 
amusement company.  59 S.W.2d at 694-95.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was 
liable for negligent construction, maintenance, and operation of the slide.  The trial court 
7 
 
ruled in the girl’s favor.  Id. at 694.  On appeal, the Court considered whether the verdict 
director was improper because it allowed the jury to find the defendant negligent if the 
jury found that plaintiff was injured from the condition of the slide as constructed.  Id.  
The degree of care submitted in the verdict director, defining negligence as “the duty of 
ordinary or reasonable care,” was not at issue.  In holding that the instruction was 
improper because it did not allow “reasonable minds [to] differ as to whether [the slide’s] 
condition showed or constituted negligence,” the Court noted the proffered duty of care 
was correct insofar as the instruction “very properly told the jury that defendants in 
operating for hire a place of public amusement owned the patrons the duty of using 
ordinary or reasonable care for their safety.”  Id. at 697. 
The statement in McCollum that the operator of a place of public amusement has a 
duty of ordinary care to its patrons was consistent with the Court’s prior holding in 
Berberet, a negligence action against the operator of an amusement park.  3 S.W.2d at 
1029.  In Berberet, the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence after the plaintiff 
stumbled over an unfastened board on the defendant’s boardwalk, injuring herself.  Id. at 
1028.  In discussing the appropriate duty of care, the Court stated that “[t]he rule in this 
state, and generally, is that the proprietor of a place of amusement owes to his patrons 
that duty which, under the particular circumstances, is ordinary care or reasonable care 
for their safety.”  Id at 1029.   
The application of the ordinary degree of care standard as first articulated in 
Berberet has been followed by this Court in other decisions pertaining to the liability of 
8 
 
both owners and operators of places of amusement.  For example, in Kungle v. Austin, 
380 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1964), in a negligence suit against the owners of an indoor 
trampoline center, the Court held “[t]he proper test of the defendant’s conduct as 
negligence was whether or not they exercised the care which a reasonable person would 
exercise under like circumstances.” Similarly, in Gold v. Heath, 392 S.W.2d 298, 302 
(Mo. 1965), in a negligence action stemming from an injury occurring on a merry-go-
round, this Court held, “[i]n Missouri the owner of a . . . place of public amusement must 
exercise ordinary or reasonable care for the safety of patrons.”  Additionally, this Court 
held that a swimming pool operator was “bound to use reasonable care” in Boll v. Spring 
Lake Park, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Mo. 1962), and that a baseball club owed a duty 
of ordinary care to a spectator in Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318, 
320 (Mo. 1942).   
Moreover, the court of appeals, consistent with the precedent of this Court, has 
held that ordinary care is appropriate for operators of amusement activities ranging from 
snow skiing to a mechanical punching game.  In Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 
388, 392 (Mo. App. 1999), a duty of ordinary care was applied to a ski park when skiers 
were injured due to falls during icy conditions.  The court of appeals held that the 
operator of a skating rink owed a duty of ordinary care in a negligence action by plaintiff 
who suffered injuries while skating in Schamel v. St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375, 
378 (Mo. App. 1959).  Finally, in Moordale v. Park Circuit & Realty Co., 58 S.W.2d 
9 
 
500, 501 (Mo. App. 1933), a duty of ordinary care was applied to a park operator in an 
action by a plaintiff who broke his arm playing a mechanical game.     
In contrast to the broadly applicable ordinary degree of care standard, the standard 
of a higher degree of care first arose in Missouri in 1866 in the narrow context of what is 
now known as “common carrier liability.”  Recognizing the danger of steam railroads, 
this Court held that those who “undertake to carry persons by the powerful and dangerous 
agent of steam” are held to “the greatest possible care and diligence.”  Sawyer v. 
Hannibal  St. J.R. Co., 37 Mo. 240, 260 (1866).  This Court would continue to apply this 
“common carrier” liability to other modes of transportation as they became available, 
including elevator operators, streetcars, railroads in addition to steam railroads, 
commercial airlines, and buses.  See, respectively, Goldsmith v. Holland Bldg. Co., 81 
S.W. 1112, 1114 (Mo. 1904); Gott v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 222 S.W. 827 (Mo. 1920); 
Nix v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 240 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Mo. 1951); Atcheson v. Braniff Int’l 
Airways, 327 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1959); McVey v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 336 S.W.2d 
524, 527 (Mo. 1960).   
Outside of the aforementioned common carriers, this Court has applied the highest 
degree of care standard to only a few other situations.  Specifically, the highest degree of 
care standard has only been applied to: (1) electric companies; (2) users of explosives;      
(3) users of firearms; and, (4) motor vehicle operators.  See, respectively, Burk v. 
Missouri Power & Light Co., 420 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Mo. 1967); Mooney v. Monark 
Gasoline & Oil Co., 298 S.W. 69, 78 (Mo. 1927); McLaughlin v. Marlatt, 246 S.W. 548, 
10 
 
553 (Mo. 1922); Jarrett v. Jones, 258 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Mo. banc 2008).  The public 
policy behind extending the “highest degree of care” standard beyond common carriers 
has remained the same:  At the time the highest degree was applied, the activities were 
considered to be either so inherently or extremely dangerous, with such a risk of 
widespread injury, that the law required heightened protection.  See Id.   
In determining the appropriate degree of care to be applied to amusement parks, 
this Court has never found that that the public policy underlying the use of the highest 
degree of care supports its application to amusement park operators.  While 
acknowledging this law, Ms. Chavez, nevertheless, asserts that the jury was properly 
instructed to impute the “highest degree of care” to Cedar Fair.  Ms. Chavez cites three 
decisions from the court of appeals that find the operator of an amusement park should be 
held to the highest degree of care.  Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. App. 
1951); Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. App. 1932); 
Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. App. 1931).  Ms. Chavez 
contends that these decisions best articulate the proper rule for the jury instructions in this 
case—that an operator of an amusement park should be held to the highest degree of care.  
Ms. Chavez argues that unlike McCollum, these cases draw a necessary distinction 
between owners of amusement parks, who only owe patrons an ordinary duty of care for 
the maintenance and construction of an amusement park’s premises, and operators of 
amusement parks, who owe patrons the highest degree of care in their operation of rides 
like Hurricane Falls.  See Gromowsky, 241 S.W.2d at 63; Cooper, 55 S.W.2d at 742; 
11 
 
Brown, 34 S.W.2d at 152.  Notably, only one of the cases Ms. Chavez relies upon was 
decided after this Court’s holding in McCollum.   
In Brown, a case decided two years before McCollum, the plaintiff was injured 
when the roller coaster gave a sudden and unexpected jerk.  34 S.W.2d at 151.  
Importantly, the proper degree of care owed by owners and operators of amusement parks 
was not directly at issue in Brown.  Nevertheless, in discussing whether the plaintiff 
could proceed under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, the court explained: 
There have been several cases before the higher courts of this country 
involving devices similar to the one in the case at bar and, while the courts 
have been slow in holding that the operator of such devices is technically a 
common carrier and that all the rules governing such carriers are applicable 
to him, they do hold that the rule in reference to the degree of care 
required of a common carrier applies to the operation of such devices[.]  
 
Id. 34 S.W.2d at 152 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  In so likening amusement 
park operators to common carriers, the Brown court articulated in dictum their support for 
applying the highest degree of care to amusement park operators. 
Similarly, in Cooper, decided shortly after Brown but before McCollum, a plaintiff 
suffered injuries to her vertebrae when her buttocks hit the seat of the defendant’s 
rollercoaster “with great force” during a ride.  55 S.W.2d at 739.  This time, unlike in 
Brown, the question directly before the court of appeals was the proper degree of care 
owed by an amusement park owner and operator to its patrons.  Id. at 742.  In Cooper, the 
court rejected the applicability of this Court’s holding in Berberet, grouping it with other 
12 
 
cases that “do not apply here.”2  Id.  Instead, the court found the roller coaster to be a 
quasi-common carrier similar to a scenic railway in an amusement park, citing 10 C.J. 
Carriers § 1035 (1917) as stating the “general rule” that “[t]he owner and operator of a 
scenic railway in an amusement park is subject, where he has accepted passengers on 
such railway for hire, to the liabilities of a carrier of passengers generally.”  With little 
additional analysis, the Cooper court affirmed the holding in Brown, stating that “the 
operators of such devices as the ‘Whirl Winn’ are required to use the highest degree of 
care for the safety of their passengers.”  Id.   
 
In Gromowsky, a wire cable suspending an airplane swing broke, causing a metal 
bar to strike and injure the plaintiff’s back.  Despite being decided well after McCollum, 
and in direct contradiction of this Court’s holding that an operator of a waterslide at an 
amusement park owed only the duty of ordinary care to its patrons, the court of appeals 
once again affirmed the holding in Brown that an amusement park operator owes a duty 
to operate its rides with the highest degree of care.  241 S.W.2d at 63.   The defendant in 
Gromowsky, like in each of the aforementioned cases, was an amusement park operator 
facing allegations that a plaintiff’s injuries were the result of negligence on behalf of the 
amusement park.  Id. at 62-63.  And, like in the present case and McCollum, the 
                                              
2 The court of appeals did not elaborate on its reasoning for disregarding Berberet.  
Cooper, 55 S.W.2d at 742.  Given, however, that the court of appeals focuses its 
reasoning on the role of the ride operator as a quasi-common carrier, who has “accepted 
passengers” in an “apparatus under the control and management of the operator,” one can 
reasonably infer that it dismissed Berberet for being factually and legally distinguishable, 
with the underlying claim in Berberet stemming from premises liability, not the negligent 
construction of an amusement park ride.  Id. 
13 
 
defendant in Gromowsky contended that the jury was erroneously instructed.  Id.  The 
defendant specifically contended that the instruction was “erroneous and misleading 
because it presents a shaded and colorful description of the degree of care; that it 
overemphasizes the defendant’s duty” by providing that “it was the duty of the 
defendants to manage and operate its said seaplane ride with the highest degree of a very 
prudent person engaged in like business, in view of all the facts and circumstance.”  Id. at 
62-63.   
Once again quoting Brown, the court determined that “the degree of care required 
of a common carrier applies to the operation of [amusement] devices.” Id. at 152 (internal 
quotations omitted).  Seemingly, confronted with an argument that the highest degree of 
care was not well-defined in the jury instruction, the court went on to articulate what the 
highest degree of care requires:  
“A high degree of care”; “the utmost degree of care of very prudent 
persons”; “the greatest possible care and diligence”; “great care”; “such 
care as a very prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances”; 
“the highest degree of care that can be reasonably expected of prudent, 
skillful and experienced persons”; “the highest degree of care practicable 
among prudent and skillful men in that business.”  
 
Gromowsky, 241 S.W.2d at 63. As with the cases before it, Gromowsky offered no 
reasoning to support its finding that the highest degree of care was proper in negligence 
actions against amusement parks. Likewise, the court offered neither mention nor 
analysis of this Court’s holding in McCollum, which clearly expressed an ordinary degree 
of care standard for those “operating for hire a place of public amusement.”  McCollum, 
59 S.W.2d at 697. 
14 
 
Ms. Chavez argues that the application of the higher degree of care to the present 
case is not only supported by the holding in Brown, Cooper, and Gromowsky but should 
be distinguished from McCollum and Berberet because the latter two cases are premises 
liability cases pertaining to the negligent construction of the premise against amusement 
park owners rather than the negligent operation of the amusement against its operators.  
This, however, misstates the plaintiff’s claims in McCollum, because the plaintiff alleged 
“the defendants constructed, maintained, and operated a device or sliding chute.”  
McCollum, 59 S.W.2d at 694.  Additionally, this Court, recognized no such in distinction 
in McCollum when it held that “defendants operating for hire a place of public 
amusement owed the patrons the duty of using ordinary or reasonable care for their 
safety[.]”  McCollum, 59 S.W.2d at 697 (emphasis added).  There, the plaintiff submitted 
a claim for negligence when she injured her leg in an attempt to slide down a waterslide, 
similar to Ms. Chavez’s injury to her mouth when sliding down Hurricane Falls.  Id. at 
695.  Moreover, Ms. Chavez’s attempt to distinguish McCollum as a “negligent 
construction” case, thereby arguing that its holding is inapplicable to her case, is unsound 
because Ms. Chavez herself claimed that the rafts on Hurricane Falls were negligently 
constructed due to their lack of “friction devices.” 
Not only is McCollum most similar to the case at hand—collectively in terms of 
the injurious event, the negligence claims asserted, and the issue raised on appeal—it is a 
decision of this Court and as such is controlling.  “It is the duty of all inferior courts . . . 
to follow the decision of the Supreme Court en banc.”  Smith v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 
15 
 
259 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Mo. banc 1953).  In addition, McCollum, decided by this Court 
after Brown and Cooper, effectively overruled those cases when it held that the duty of 
ordinary care is the proper duty owed by owners and operators of amusement parks to 
their patrons.  Consequently, in Gromowsky, when the court of appeals affirmed its prior 
ruling in Brown without recognizing McCollum, it improperly ruled contrary to this 
Court’s established precedent regarding the duty of care owed by operators of amusement 
parks.  
Applying the ordinary degree of care in the present case is in accordance with this 
Court’s precedent.  As previously discussed, Missouri has held defendants in a 
negligence action to the highest degree of care only in limited circumstances.  The 
application of the highest degree of care has remained reserved for either activities that 
are so inherently dangerous as to have the potential to cause widespread injury or for 
those that fall within a narrowly tailored group of common carriers.  This Court’s 
application of the ordinary duty of care is supported by the facts that Cedar Fair is not a 
common carrier and the ride is not inherently dangerous. 
In fact, Ms. Chavez does not assert that Cedar Fair is operating the Hurricane Falls 
raft ride as a “common carrier” under Missouri law.  For 80 years, Missouri has 
consistently defined common carrier as:  “anyone who holds himself out to the public as 
ready to undertake for hire or reward the transportation of goods [or passengers] from 
place to place . . . and so invites custom of the public.”  Balloons over the Rainbow, Inc. 
v. Dir. of Revenue, 427 S.W.3d 815, 826 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting State ex rel. Anderson 
16 
 
v. Witthaus, 102 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. banc 1937); see also Cook Tractor Co., Inc. v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 187 S.W.3d 870, 873-74 (Mo. banc 2006).  Indeed, Missouri courts have 
consistently refused to classify entities as “common carriers” unless they fall squarely 
within the traditional definition.  Id.   
This established definition of “common carrier” does not, as an overall rule, 
encompass an amusement park that operates attractions for the purpose of providing 
amusement to patrons.  Branson Scenic Railway v. Dir. of Revenue, 3 S.W.3d 788, 791-
92 (Mo. App 1999).3  This Court finds convincing the reasoning employed by the court 
of appeals in Branson, that when the primary business purpose of a ride is “for fun, as 
opposed to . . . getting the rider to a particular place, then the carrier is providing 
amusement rides.  It is not in the transportation business, even though its mode of 
amusement is mobile.”  Id. at 792.  In addition, Hurricane Falls specifically cannot fall 
under the common carrier definition, because it does not hold itself out to carry 
“everyone who asks,” but exercises discretion by excluding those who do not meet the 
height requirement of 46 inches.  See Balloons over the Rainbow, Inc., 427 S.W.3d at 
826-27 (holding that a hot air balloon operator was not a common carrier because it 
exercised discretion regarding which passengers to fly).   
                                              
3 The court in Branson Scenic Railways interpreted the term “common carrier” in 
construing a revenue statute, not in association with negligence liability.  3 S.W.3d at 
791-92.  Nevertheless, the accepted definition of a “common carrier” and its application 
has remained consistent across all areas of the law.  See e.g. State ex rel. Star Pub. Co. v. 
Associated. Press, 60 S.W. 91 (Mo. 1900) (contract law); State ex rel. Anderson, 102 
S.W.2d 99 (criminal law); Cook Tractor Co, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 870 (tax law, discussing 
dictionary definitions of “common carrier” and stating that Missouri case law is 
“consistent” with these dictionary definitions). 
17 
 
Likewise, Missouri case law does not support the extension of the duty to exercise 
the highest degree of care to amusement park operators under the rationale that they are 
“inherently dangerous” or otherwise so essential as to warrant an elevated degree of care.  
The public policy that resulted in the application of the highest degree of care to 
electricity, explosives, firearms, and motor vehicles is the same:  At some point, these 
essential activities were considered to be so inherently or extremely dangerous, with such 
a risk of widespread injury to the public, that the law required the public to be protected 
from even the slightest negligence.  For example, this Court applied the highest degree of 
care to an electric utility because “[e]lectricity is one of the most dangerous agencies ever 
discovered by human science[.]”  Geisman v. Missouri Edison Elec. Co., 73 S.W. 654, 
659 (Mo. 1903).  Similarly, the inherently dangerous qualities of firearms and explosives 
have also warranted the highest degree of care.  In Paisley v. Liebowits, 347 S.W.2d 178, 
183 (Mo. banc 1961), this Court noted the “highly dangerous” nature of explosives.  In 
McLaughlin, 246 S.W. at 553, this Court discussed the “dangers attendant upon the use of 
firearms.”  Finally, upon the widespread use of automobiles in the early 1900s, the 
legislature required automobile operators to exercise the highest degree of care, as it was 
a matter of concern that millions of motor vehicles would travel highways everyday 
posing a new and potentially deadly risk daily.  RSMo § 8523 (1909); see also Hay v. 
Ham, 364 S.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Mo. App. 1962).  
Unlike the danger posed by an electric utility during the early stages of its entry 
into American homes and businesses, the obvious threat posed by the operation of 
18 
 
firearms, or the risk associated with the operation of an automobile, amusement rides are 
not such new, dangerous, or essential technology that they justify the highest degree of 
care.  While there are, of course, dangers associated with riding amusement rides, the 
ordinary degree of care is sufficiently flexible to adequately protect amusement park 
patrons because “ordinary care is a relative term, and its exercise requires precautions 
commensurate with the dangers to be reasonably anticipated under the circumstances.”  
Fortner, 244 S.W.2d at 13.  Accordingly, this Court finds that the trial court erred in 
submitting a jury instruction with the “highest degree of care.”   
An erroneous instruction “that imposes upon a party a standard of care higher than 
that required by law is prejudicial, requiring a new trial.”  Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 158 
(citations omitted).  Cedar Fair was prejudiced by the submission of the verdict director 
imposing the highest degree of care and is entitled to have the judgment reversed and the 
cause remanded.   
Comparative Fault Instruction 
Cedar Fair also claims that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on    
Ms. Chavez’s comparative fault.  Cedar Fair proffered a jury instruction based on a 
modification of MAI 32.01(1) (1991 Revision), asking the jury to assess a percentage of 
fault to Ms. Chavez if it found she was negligent in failing to hold on to the raft pursuant 
to Cedar Fair’s instructions.  The circuit court refused to submit this instruction to the 
jury.  The circuit court indicated that the insufficiency of evidence was its basis for 
refusing to submit the instruction, referring to the “multiple inferences” upon which the 
19 
 
case rested and testimony that was “different as to the different reasons.”  The court of 
appeals affirmed, explicitly citing an insufficiency of evidence because “there [was] 
simply no evidence to suggest Respondent either negligently or unreasonably let go of 
the straps.” 
Cedar Fair argues that this basis for rejecting the comparative fault instruction is 
erroneous as it requires Cedar Fair to prove Ms. Chavez’s subjective reason for her 
behavior even though negligence is an objective evaluation of conduct and there is 
substantial objective evidence that Ms. Chavez let go of the safety straps.  Cedar Fair 
contends that, because the evidence is sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable 
to Cedar Fair, Ms. Chavez’s damages were caused by her own negligence in letting go of 
the straps.  Cedar Fair argues that it was entitled to have a comparative fault instruction 
submitted to the jury.   
Cedar Fair correctly states the law that the standard for comparative fault for a 
child is an objective standard, which does not require evidence of the child’s subjective 
state of mind.  Nevertheless, because this Court has reversed the judgment against Cedar 
Fair for the submission of the erroneous verdict instruction that misstated the degree of 
care standard, the sufficiency of evidence to submit a comparative fault instruction must 
be determined based on consideration of the evidence presented in the new trial.  
Likewise, Cedar Fair will have an opportunity to submit a different comparative fault 
instruction during the retrial that can address Ms. Chavez’s challenge to the form of its 
20 
 
instruction.4  Therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to adjudicate the merits of Cedar 
Fair’s claim of error related to the circuit court’s refusal of its comparative fault 
instruction.    
Conclusion 
This Court finds that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Cedar Fair 
owed the highest degree of care to Ms. Chavez because the ordinary duty of care is the 
proper duty of care in a negligence action against an owner or operator of an amusement 
park.  Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Stith and 
Wilson, JJ., concur; Teitelman, J., 
dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Draper, J., concurs in opinion of  
Teitelman, J.  
 
                                              
4 Ms. Chavez correctly states that Cedar Fair failed to submit legally correct instructions 
when it failed to define “negligence” in terms of an “ordinarily careful girl or boy of the 
same age, capacity and experience,” as required by MAI 32.01(1) Notes on Use (1991 
Revision) and MAI 11.04. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
JESSICA CHAVEZ, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93658 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
CEDAR FAIR, LP,   
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
Dissenting Opinion 
I respectfully dissent from the holding that the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury that Cedar Fair’s liability should be assessed using the highest degree of care 
standard for negligence.  While Ms. Chavez freely chose to ride the Hurricane Falls water 
slide, it is also true that Cedar Fair invites its customers to ride the 680-foot-long slide 
and that the slide is under Cedar Fair’s complete control as the owner and operator of the 
slide.  Given Cedar Fair’s complete control and Ms. Chavez’s complete lack of control, 
Cedar Fair should be held to the highest standard of care. 
 
The principal opinion relies on McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 59 
S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1933), for the proposition that amusement park proprietors owe a duty 
of ordinary care.   McCollum does not stand for the proposition that ordinary care is the 
exclusive standard of care for amusement park proprietors.  To the contrary, just five 
years before McCollum was decided, this Court noted that, while  amusement park 
proprietors generally owe patrons a duty of ordinary care, the general rule yields to the 
specific activity at issue.  Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1029 
(Mo. 1928).   While ordinary care is the starting point, the appropriate standard of care in 
a particular case is “a care commensurate with the particular conditions and 
circumstances involved in the given case.”  Id.   
 
In this case, Ms. Chavez alleged that her injuries were caused by Cedar Fair’s 
negligent operation of the Hurricane Falls water slide and, further, that she was 
dependent on Cedar Fair for her safety because Cedar Fair controls the slide as both 
owner and operator.  Under these circumstances, I would hold, consistent with previous 
cases from Missouri and elsewhere, that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury 
that Cedar Fair had a duty to operate Hurricane Falls with the highest degree of care.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge  
 
                                              
1  The Missouri Court of Appeals applied the highest standard of care in the following 
amusement park cases: Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. App. 1951); Cooper v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. App. 1932); Brown v. Winnwood 
Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. App. 1931).  Likewise, other states have also required 
amusement park proprietors to abide by the highest standard of care.  See, .e.g. Gomez v. 
Superior Court, 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1136 (Cal. 2005); Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 
939 (Colo. 1964); Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 194 N.E. 911, 913 (Mass. 1935); 
Lausterer v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 100 Pa. Super. 33, 37 (Pa. 1930) (applying a “strict 
measure of duty”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
2