Title: THOMPSON v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SUBLETTE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMPSON v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SUBLETTE2001 WY 10834 P.3d 278Case Number: 99-328Decided: 11/08/2001

October Term, A.D. 2001

 
STUART 
THOMPSON and MARY

THOMPSON, 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF THE 
COUNTY OF SUBLETTE, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Gerald 
R. Mason of Mason & Graham, P.C., Pinedale, WY.  Argument by Mr. Mason. 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Dale 
Aronson, Sublette County Attorney, Pinedale, WY.  Argument by Mr. Aronson. 

 

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and  
KITE, JJ.

 

             
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a district court order enjoining the Thompsons from using their land for 
activities associated with a log home business and a ski enterprise on the 
ground that those activities violated Sublette County zoning regulations.  We affirm the district court 
order.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The parties raise 
the following issues:

 

I.  Whether the trial 
court erred in finding that the appellants failed to establish estoppel as a 
defense.

 

II.  Whether the trial 
court erred in finding that the appellants failed to establish laches as a 
defense.

 

III.  Whether the trial 
court erred in finding that activities of appellants relating to White Pine are 
not authorized within an agricultural district (A-1) zone.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The Thompsons own 
a parcel of land located in Sublette County which is zoned A-1 
agricultural.  Pursuant to the 
county zoning regulations, the authorized uses of the land rele­vant to this 
case include general agricultural uses and outdoor recreation facilities for 
hunting, fishing, horseback riding, hiking, or winter sports uses incidental to 
the principal agricultural use.

 

[¶4]      The Thompsons use 
the land in part for ranching.  
Beginning in 1991 and, they allege, in reliance on statements made to 
them by the county zoning administrator and a former county commissioner, the 
Thompsons began remodeling and new construction of buildings on the property for 
use in connection with two businesses in which they were involved, Logcrafters, 
a log home building venture, and White Pine, a ski area.  Although the main activities of both 
businesses take place off the premises, the Thompson property was used for 
storage, maintenance of equipment, administrative offices, and design work in 
connection with the businesses. 

 

[¶5]      Over the years, 
neighbors periodically complained about the increase in local traffic, dust, 
noise, use of heavy equipment, and decline in property value which allegedly 
resulted from the activities on the Thompson property.  Finally, in September of 1998, the Board 
of County Commissioners of Sublette County filed a complaint for injunctive 
relief in district court alleging that the activities on the Thompson property 
associated with Logcrafters and White Pine violated county zoning 
regulations.  After a bench trial on 
August 23, 1999, the court held that the activities were not authorized within 
an agricultural zone and entered an order granting a permanent injunction.  The Thompsons timely appealed from the 
district court's order. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      Laches is a form 
of equitable estoppel.  Goshen 
Irr. Dist. v. State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 949 (Wyo. 1996); Squaw 
Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 1991).  These claims, therefore, are subject to 
the same standard of review.

 

[¶7]      Whether laches 
or, by analogy, equitable estoppel is available as a defense is a ques­tion 
addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.  Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 
775 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Wyo. 1989).  
Our review of the Thompsons' first two claims, there­fore, must focus 
upon whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in finding that 
equitable estoppel and laches were not defenses to the county commissioners' 
claim for injunctive relief.  
Id.  Under the abuse 
of discretion standard, we determine whether the trial court could reasonably 
conclude as it did and whether any part of its ruling was arbitrary or 
capricious.  Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶8]      The Thompsons' 
third claim, that the district court erred in finding that the White Pine 
activities are not authorized in an agricultural district (A-1) zone, involves 
an applica­tion of the law to the facts.

 

Where 
the determination to be reviewed presents a mixed ques­tion of law and fact, 
i.e., a conclusion reached through application of legal precepts to the 
historical and narrative events of a particular case, the reviewing court will 
defer to the agency's findings of basic fact but will correct misapplications of 
the law to those facts.  If the 
agency has not invoked and applied the correct rule of law, we correct 
it.

 

Rodgers 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1997) (cita­tion omitted).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Estoppel

 

[¶9]      In their first 
claim for relief, the Thompsons allege that the board of county 
commission­ers should be estopped from seeking to enjoin the activities on 
their land because of the actions of its own representatives.  Specifically, the Thompsons allege that 
they pur­chased the land in question and made the improvements necessary for 
the operations of Logcrafters in reliance on statements made to them by a former 
commissioner and the county zoning administrator.  

 

[¶10]   Prior to purchasing the land at 
issue here, the Thompsons owned a ten-acre parcel north of Cora in Sublette 
County where they conducted operations associated with Logcrafters.  When they sought a variance from the 
county to allow them to build a storage facility on the ten-acre parcel, they 
allege they were told there would be no problem with their operations if they 
owned a larger parcel of land zoned A-1 closer to town.  The Thompsons allege that they purchased 
the property now at issue in reliance on that assur­ance.  They further allege that, before making 
the improvements necessary for Logcrafters' operations on the new property, they 
spoke with the county zoning administrator and received assurances that, because 
the land was zoned A-1 agricultural, no special permits were necessary.  Based on the assurances of the zoning 
administrator, the Thompsons made improvements costing them $170,000.  They claim that they were induced by the 
assurances of the county officials to believe their operations were permissible, 
they relied on the assur­ances to their detriment, and the board of county 
commissioners should now be estopped from enforcing the zoning regulations. 

 

[¶11]   We have said that equitable 
estoppel should not be invoked against a government or public agency functioning 
in its governmental capacity, except in rare and unusual circum­stances, and 
may not be invoked where it would serve to defeat the effective operation of a 
policy adopted to protect the public.  
Sare v. Sheridan County Bd. of County Com'rs, 784 P.2d 593, 595 
(Wyo. 1989); Big Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Com'n, 715 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1986).  In order to invoke the doctrine against 
a govern­ment or public agency functioning in its official capacity, there 
must be a showing of affirmative misconduct.  In re General Adjudication of All 
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 90 (Wyo. 
1988), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 1040,  109 S. Ct. 863, judgment aff'd, 
492 U.S. 406, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).  
Affirmative misconduct exists where a person, by his acts, 
representations, or admissions, intentionally or through culpable negligence 
induces another to believe that certain facts exist and the other person 
rightfully relies and acts on such belief and will be prejudiced if the former 
is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.  Id. at 89.  

 

[¶12]   Equitable estoppel does not apply 
to governmental or sovereign functions, especially where it would defeat the 
public interest.  Wells v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 3 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 2000); 
State Highway Com'n v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Ass'n, 784 P.2d 588, 592 (Wyo. 1989).  The 
state, and likewise the county, may not be estopped for the unauthorized acts or 
errors of its officers and employees.  
Wells, 3 P.3d  at 867.  
In Wyoming, the recognized exception to this rule is that a governmental 
agency may be estopped for the unintentional, misleading statements of its 
representative when the agency is functioning in a proprietary capacity.  Id. 

 

[¶13]   Here, there is no assertion that 
the board of county commissioners was functioning in a proprietary capacity, and 
the recognized exception does not apply.  
Therefore, absent a showing by the Thompsons of rare and exceptional 
circumstances justifying the application of equitable estoppel, the claim must 
fail.  

 

[¶14]   The Thompsons argue that unusual 
circumstances do exist justifying the application of equitable estoppel.  They claim that county officials induced 
them to change their position to their detriment by encouraging them in 1991 to 
purchase a larger parcel of land zoned A-1 and representing that, if they did 
so, they could continue their log home operations.  They claim that county officials further 
induced them to change their position to their detriment by assuring them that 
they could build their buildings, make other improvements, and conduct 
operations on the new parcel without permits.  They claim that they relied on the 
statements of county officials when they invested $170,000 in making the 
improvements and county officials knew about the investment.  Under these "unusual circumstances," the 
Thompsons claim, the county should be estopped from taking the position nearly 
eight years later that the operations are in violation of county zoning 
resolutions.

 

[¶15]   From our review of the record, we 
are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the 
Thompsons' equitable estoppel claim.  
This is particularly true in light of the longstanding rules that members 
of boards of county commissioners cannot act to bind the county except through 
official proceedings, and persons dealing with public entities are charged with 
ascertaining that the person with whom they are dealing possesses the legal 
authority to bind the entity.  
Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking & Excavating, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trustees, School Dist. No. 25, Freemont County, 681 P.2d 1326, 1329-30 (Wyo. 
1984); George W. Condon Co. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Natrona County, 56 Wyo. 
38, 103 P.2d 401, 403 (1940).  The 
Thompsons were charged with ascertaining that neither the county zoning 
administrator nor a single, individual member of the board of county 
commissioners had any authority to bind the board and an official proceeding 
before the board of county commis­sioners as a whole was required to 
determine what they could and could not do on their property.  From the record before us, there is no 
indication the Thompsons made any effort to ascertain what authority individual 
county representatives had, nor is there any evidence of any official proceeding 
before the board of county commissioners as a whole.  We hold that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in rejecting the Thompsons' equitable estoppel 
claim.

 

Laches

 

[¶16]   The Thompsons assert that the board 
of county commissioners' claim for injunctive relief should be barred by 
laches.  Specifically, they assert 
that the board of county commis­sioners stood by for eight years while they 
expended considerable sums of money improving their property and it should not 
now be allowed to enjoin the business at their expense. 

 

[¶17]   Laches is defined as such delay in 
enforcing one's rights that it works to the disadvan­tage of another.  Big Piney Oil & Gas Co., 715 P.2d  at 561.  A claim of laches is 
comprised of two elementsinexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or 
disadvantage to the defendants or others.  
Moncrief, 775 P.2d  at 1025.  
Governments and their agencies generally are not barred by laches when 
enforcing a public or governmental right.  
Big Piney Oil & Gas Co., 715 P.2d  at 
561.

 

[¶18]   From the record before us, we are 
unable to find an abuse of discretion in the district court's order granting the 
injunction.  Neither the doctrine of 
estoppel nor the doctrine of laches prevents the board of county commissioners 
from fulfilling its duty to enforce the local zoning resolutions.     

 

White 
Pine Activities

 

[¶19]   The Thompsons claim that the 
district court erred in finding the activities relating to White Pine are not 
authorized within an agricultural district (A-1) zone.  The Thompsons cite the language of the 
applicable zoning regulations which allows outdoor recreational facilities for 
winter sports incidental to agricultural use.  Arguing that we are required to give 
this lan­guage the least restrictive interpretation, the Thompsons claim 
that the activities relating to White Pine which occur on their property involve 
winter sports incidental to agricultural use.

 

[¶20]   The Sublette County zoning 
regulations provide in relevant part as follows:

 

Section 
3.  Authorized Uses.  The following uses shall be authorized 
in the various zoning districts, provided that they conform to the applicable 
development standards and conform to the applicable goals, policies and 
guidelines of the Sublette County Comprehensive Plan:

 

. . .

 

b.         
In the Agricultural District (A-1)

 

(1)  General agricultural 
uses;

 

. . .

 

(3)  Outdoor recreation 
facilities for hunting, fishing, horseback riding, hiking or winter sports uses 
incidental to the principal agricultural use[.]

 

[¶21]   The Thompsons claim that the White 
Pine operations which occur on their property are permissible under section 
3.b.(3) of these regulations as "winter sports uses incidental to the principal 
agricultural use."  The district 
court rejected this argument on the basis of its findings that the principal use 
of the Thompson property is not agricultural and, therefore, the White Pine 
operations were not incidental to the principal agricultural use as required by 
the regulations.  The district court 
reached this conclusion based upon the evidence presented that the Thompsons 
purchased the property in question because of its value to Logcrafters, the log 
home building enterprise, rather than for its value as a ranch and that 
Logcrafters, rather than the ranching operation, produces the majority of the 
income on the property.  

 

[¶22]   In reaching its findings, the 
district court relied on cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have 
attempted to define "incidental use" as the term is commonly used in zoning 
regulations.  In Lawrence v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of North Branford, 264 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1969), 
the court defined "incidental use" as a use which is not the primary use of the 
property but rather one which is subordinate and minor in significance as 
com­pared to the primary use.  
The court also said that, to constitute an incidental use, the use must 
be attendant or concomitant to the primary use.  The court suggested that the following 
factors be considered in determining whether a use is incidental: the size of 
the lot in ques­tion, the nature of the primary use, the use made of 
adjacent lots by neighbors, and the economic structure of the area. 

 

[¶23]   Applying these factors to the 
evidence before it, the district court concluded that the primary use of the 
Thompson property was not agricultural but was for operations associated with 
Logcrafters and, therefore, the White Pine operations were not incidental to a 
primary agricultural use as required by the regulations.   From the record before us, we 
cannot say that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion and holding 
that the White Pine activities are not authorized under the 
regulations.

 

[¶24]   Affirmed.