Title: Towner v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Towner v. State1984 WY 87685 P.2d 45Case Number: 83-223Decided: 08/10/1984CHARLES TOWNER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES TOWNER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v. 

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, and Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, Appellate Counsel (argued), Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Charles 
Towner was convicted of four counts of concealing stolen goods in violation of § 
6-7-304, W.S. 1977.1

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant's trial began 
on February 7, 1983. A motion to sequester the witnesses was granted. The State 
presented several witnesses who testified to various burglaries, the items which 
were taken, and the value of those items. Police officers testified concerning 
the search of the Towner residence and interview of appellant. There is no 
dispute that the stolen items were found in appellant's living quarters in the 
basement of his parents' home.

[¶4.]     Appellant based his 
defense on lack of requisite knowledge that the items were stolen. One element 
necessary for conviction is that the person charged buy, receive or conceal 
stolen goods "knowing the same to have been stolen." § 6-7-304, supra. Appellant 
testified that his wife had brought the property into the residence; that he had 
believed her explanation that she was purchasing and had acquired the property 
lawfully. Appellant's wife was not available to be called as a witness at the 
trial. The defense then planned to call Mr. Towner, appellant's father, and 
Gloria Towner, appellant's sister, to testify that appellant's wife had made 
similar statements concerning her acquisition of the property to 
them.

[¶5.]     Appellant's attorney 
was informed by the court and the prosecuting attorney that Mr. Towner and 
Gloria Towner had been seen in the courtroom during appellant's testimony, 
thereby violating the sequestration order. The court excluded their testimony 
because of the violation. The defense, therefore, rested. Subsequently 
appellant's attorney learned from Mr. Towner and Gloria Towner that an agent of 
the district attorney's office had attempted to interview them; that they had 
been asked by the agent to enter the courtroom, and they did so because of this 
request. Appellant's attorney informed the court of the Towners' explanation of 
their being in the courtroom, protested the exclusion of their testimony, and 
asked that they be permitted to testify. The prosecution read a statement from 
the agent relating to a conversation he had with Mr. Towner shortly before Mr. 
Towner entered the courtroom. It is unclear from this statement whether or not 
the agent induced the witnesses to enter the courtroom. He may have; at the very 
least, that matter was in dispute.

[¶6.]     The court asked for an 
offer of proof as to what the testimony of these witnesses would be if permitted 
to testify. Appellant's counsel stated that Mr. Towner would testify that 
appellant's wife had told him that she was buying the property items found in 
appellant's living quarters, and that she was going to get the bill of sale and 
show it to him. He was also going to testify that appellant's wife had told him 
that she was getting the money to pay for the items from her parents. Gloria 
Towner was essentially going to testify to similar conversations. The court 
ruled that this testimony

"is not only of dubious 
relevance but is also cumulative to what the defendant has already testified to, 
and which no one has challenged"

and, therefore, 
affirmed his previous ruling excluding the testimony of the 
witnesses.

[¶7.]     The question presented 
to us is whether the trial court erred in excluding the defense witnesses' 
testimony due to their apparent violation of the sequestration order. Rule 615, 
W.R.E., provides for exclusion of witnesses.2 Under this rule, sequestration of 
witnesses is a matter of right for either party. The purpose is to prevent the 
tailoring of evidence to conform to prior testimony and to assist the parties in 
detecting falsehoods and testimony which is less than candid. 
United 
States v. Ell, 
718 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1983); Geders 
v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1976); 3 Louisell & Mueller § 370 (1979). Although Rule 615, W.R.E., 
does not provide for sanctions for violations of the rule, the most often 
invoked remedies are (1) to hold the witness in contempt; (2) to make the 
violation a subject for cross-examination and comment; and (3) to disallow the 
testimony altogether. 3 Louisell & Mueller § 371; 13 Land & Water L.Rev. 
909 (1978), "Article VI of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: 
Witnesses."

[¶8.]     The United States 
Supreme Court held in Holder v. United 
States, 150 U.S. 91, 14 S. Ct. 10, 37 L. Ed. 1010 
(1893):

"If a witness disobeys 
the order of withdrawal, while he may be proceeded against for contempt, and his 
testimony is open to comment to the jury by reason of his conduct, he is not 
thereby disqualified, and the weight of authority is that he cannot be excluded 
on that ground, merely, although the right to exclude under particular 
circumstances may be supported as within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." 14 S. Ct.  at 10.

 We have 
previously addressed this question in circumstances where the judge allowed 
witnesses to testify although they had been in the courtroom in violation of a 
sequestration order. We affirmed the allowance of that testimony, stating that 
permitting witnesses to testify was a matter addressed to the discretion of the 
court and that we would reverse only for gross abuse of that discretion. Whiteley v. State, Wyo., 418 P.2d 164 (1966); Pixley v. State, Wyo., 406 P.2d 662 
(1965). We have not, however, addressed the question of the propriety of 
excluding testimony because of a violation of a sequestration 
order.

[¶9.]     The general rule is 
that a party who does not know of nor procures the violation should not be 
deprived of essential testimony. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 70. However, when a party 
knows that a witness is violating the rule and allows the violation to continue, 
he may lose the right to present the witness or to object on those grounds. 23 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1013.

"A party should not be 
denied his witness because of misconduct which the party has not caused. 
`Refusal to permit a witness to testify in a criminal case on the ground that he 
had violated the order excluding witnesses is reversible error where neither the 
state nor the defendant was responsible for the violation of the order and did 
not know he was present.' Excluding testimony is not an appropriate remedy. 
Rather, the jury should be instructed on the credibility of the witness. If the 
order is willfully violated, the court may properly hold the witness in contempt 
of court." (Citations omitted.) State v. 
Wells, Mont., 658 P.2d 381 
(1983).

Exclusion of the 
witness' testimony is too grave a sanction where the violation was not 
intentional and was not procured by the connivance of the party or his counsel. 
A practical and sensitive accommodation between the defendant's right to present 
a defense and the trial court's need to control the proceedings must be 
maintained. Exclusion should be allowed only when it is necessary to preserve 
the integrity of the fact finding process. State v. Burdge, 295 Or. 1, 664 P.2d 1076 (1983).

[¶10.]  United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 
631, 14 A.L.R.3d 1 (7th Cir. 1962), held that exclusion of testimony was too 
harsh in situations where the witness did not willfully violate the 
sequestration order and there was no indiction that the witness was in court 
with

"`the consent, 
connivance, procurement or knowledge of the appellant or his counsel.' * * * 
[D]isqualification of the offending witness absent particular circumstances is 
too harsh a penalty on the innocent litigant." See also, United States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352 
(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 931, 99 S. Ct. 321, 58 L. Ed. 2d 325.

[¶11.]  Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 
(5th Cir. 1972), found error in excluding testimony because of a sequestration 
violation on grounds of Sixth Amendment rights and due process, stating that the 
defendant's right to obtain witnesses in his behalf was violated. Since neither 
the defendant nor his counsel was involved in the violation, there could not 
have been a waiver of a constitutional right which would render the exclusion 
proper. Testimony was considered properly excluded when the court found 
connivance of the government's counsel and prejudice to the defendant, United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315 
(11th Cir. 1983), and where a defendant violated the sequestration order by 
comparing testimony with another witness. United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154 
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 857, 95 S. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 2d 91.

[¶12.]  United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825 
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 972, 103 S. Ct. 305, 74 L. Ed. 2d 285, 
stated that most authorities agree that the "particular circumstances" of Holder v. United States, supra, 
sufficient for exclusion are indications that the witness violated the order 
with the consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge of the party seeking the 
testimony. This case held there was no abuse of discretion in excluding 
testimony because the witness stayed in the courtroom with the knowledge of the 
defendant and another witness gave 
substantially identical testimony. Excluding two witnesses for a violation was 
held not to deprive the defendant of his right to obtain witnesses in his behalf 
where three other witnesses testified to the same facts and the defendant and 
his counsel knew of their presence in the courtroom. Calloway v. Blackburn, 612 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 
1980).

[¶13.]  There was no evidence presented nor was 
it claimed that Mr. Towner and Gloria Towner entered the courtroom with the 
knowledge or consent of appellant or his counsel. The only allegations concerned 
the possible inducement of their presence by an agent for the county attorney's 
office. Therefore, we find that exclusion of their testimony as a sanction for 
violating the sequestration order was an abuse of 
discretion.

[¶14.]  The State contends, however, that even if 
the exclusion of the witnesses for violation of the sequestration order was 
improper, the ruling should still be upheld on the grounds that the testimony 
was cumulative and irrelevant. Rule 403, W.R.E., states:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." (Emphasis added.)

We have stated 
that the trial court's discretion in ruling on evidence will not be overturned 
except for clear abuse. Buhrle v. 
State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 (1981). However, Rule 403 
is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly since it allows the 
court to exclude evidence which is concededly relevant and probative. Its major 
function is to exclude scant or cumulative evidence which may be unfairly 
prejudicial, confusing, or needlessly cumulative. United 
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 
1982). It has been held error to exclude evidence which is corroborative of the 
defendant's testimony. People v. 
Linder, 5 Cal. 3d 342, 96 Cal. Rptr. 26, 486 P.2d 1226 (1971). If there were 
no independent corroborative evidence on the points that the defendant testified 
to other than the excluded testimony, it is improperly excluded. State v. Conklin, 79 Wn.2d 805, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971).

[¶15.]  United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 
(5th Cir. 1981), held that it was error to deny the defendant his right to call 
witnesses in circumstances where the exclusion resulted from noncompliance with 
a discovery order even though the judge also ruled that the evidence was 
cumulative. Another court refused to allow defendant to call witnesses who would 
corroborate his testimony that he lacked the necessary intent, stating that the 
evidence was hearsay. On appeal there was a reversal, the court holding that 
even if the testimony were cumulative, it should not be excluded if introduced 
to corroborate the defendant's own statement because,

"[t]o deny defendant the 
right to present any independent corroborative testimony on a material issue 
must be considered prejudicial error. Such testimony is `cumulative' to the 
extent that the defendant testifies to the same facts or events. However, `[w]e 
know of no rule that prohibits a person on trial for a criminal offense from 
introducing cumulative testimony upon any fact material to the case, within 
reasonable limits, and it is manifest that [such testimony should not be 
prohibited when it] is sought to be introduced to corroborate his own statement, 
which, by reason of his interest in the result of the trial, may be, and often 
is, looked upon by the jury with some degree of suspicion.' [Citations.]" 
(Emphasis omitted.) People v. Green, 
38 Colo. 
App. 165, 553 P.2d 839 (1976).

2 Louisell & 
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 128 states that:

"Not all evidence which 
is entirely duplicative is therefore cumulative and excludable. Evidence may 
vary in degree of persuasiveness, and when an item of proof which is offered on 
a point is very different in character or persuasive impact from an item of 
proof previously received, the former cannot be considered merely `cumulative' 
of the latter."

[¶16.]  Appellant's case is different from one 
where many witnesses could testify to the same facts and the trial court limits 
the witnesses to a few. Appellant testified in his own behalf. With the 
exclusion of the testimony of his father and his sister, there was no other 
testimony to the fact that appellant's wife had allegedly brought the items into 
the house and explained their presence. Appellant's knowledge of the stolen 
property was necessary for a conviction. The excluded testimony was relevant to 
a material element and corroborative of appellant's 
testimony.

[¶17.]  The State contends that "the prosecution 
never challenged the existence or veracity of these statements" made to 
appellant by his wife. The prosecuting attorney, however, did not admit or 
stipulate to this fact; and, in closing arguments, he stated that appellant had 
told several different stories concerning the stolen items when he 
said:

"* * * However, we think 
there is a clear showing on actual knowledge that those items were stolen. It is 
an element of the crime. You cannot find the Defendant guilty unless he knew 
those items were stolen, and you will just have to determine his credibility and 
the simple fact that he told two different stories to law enforcement and a 
different story to you today, which goes a long way towards circumstantial 
evidence that there was guilty knowledge, he would have told one consistent 
story. We have a harder question, that he tells two different stories and tells 
you a different story, and you add that to the fact of all of these suspicious 
circumstances, how the wheeling and dealing was going on, and he told you 
obvious that she had this money."

[¶18.]  It is possible that the jury believed 
appellant had fabricated his testimony after he was charged. When appellant's 
case went to the jury, his testimony denying knowledge that the goods were 
stolen was uncorroborated. It stood alone against the State's total case and all 
of its witnesses. It is possible that the jury may have believed Mr. Towner or 
Gloria Towner irrespective of their close relationship with appellant. This 
corroborative evidence, when added to appellant's testimony, may or may not have 
been of sufficient weight to tip the scales in his favor. We do not know what 
the jury might have decided. We do know that defendant had the right to present 
this testimony and these witnesses that would tend to corroborate his testimony 
and would refute a material element of the crime charged. Therefore, we reverse 
and remand this case for a new trial or such further proceedings as are not 
inconsistent with this opinion.

1 Section 6-7-304, W.S. 
1977, as it appeared at the time of this offense, provided in 
part:

"Whoever buys, receives, 
conceals or aids in the concealment of anything of value, which has been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense, knowing the same to have been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense * * *." (Now § 6-3-403, W.S. 
1977)

2 Rule 615, W.R.E., 
provides:

"At the request of a 
party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the 
testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This 
rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) 
an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as 
its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a 
party to be essential to the presentation of his cause."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom BROWN, 
Justice, joins.

[¶19.]  The majority opinion concludes that the 
sanction for violation of the sequestration order in this case (disallowing the 
testimony of the two witnesses) was too severe. While not saying so, such 
opinion implies that the trial court should have allowed the testimony with 
comment to the jury by the court that the witnesses had violated the 
sequestration order.

[¶20.]  I believe the analysis should go beyond 
this point, and I believe the analysis by the trial court did so. The trial 
court held the testimony to be

"* * * not only of 
dubious relevance but is also cumulative to what the Defendant has already 
testified to, and to which no one has challenged. * * *"

Thus, the court 
considered allowing the testimony accompanied by the cautionary comment of the 
court, and then it considered such testimony in light of Rule 403, W.R.E. That 
rule provides:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

I believe the 
court acted in this matter within the discretion afforded to it by Rule 403, 
W.R.E. Within the scope of this rule we have said that admission of evidence is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion will not be 
disturbed absent a clear abuse of it. Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1979); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 101 
(1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). And 
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386, 392 (1979); Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374, 1380 
(1981).

[¶21.]  Applying the rule to this case, we must 
ascertain (1) the probative value of the evidence, and (2) the consideration of 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Then, we must weigh the first 
determination against the second to conclude whether or not there was a clear 
abuse of the trial court's discretion.

[¶22.]  If the trial court had admitted the 
evidence under the conditions set forth in the majority opinion, the jury would 
have had to be advised that the credibility of the testimony of appellant's 
father and of his sister should be considered in view of the fact that they were 
in the courtroom at the time appellant testified in violation of the direct 
order of the court that they be then excluded, and that the potential existed 
for them to have tailored their testimony to conform with the testimony of 
appellant. The jury would then have heard them testify that appellant's wife 
told them that she had purchased the property in question, appellant having 
already told the jury that his wife had told him the same thing. The stolen 
property consisted of a commercial microwave oven taken from the Casper Hilton 
Inn; a stereo, television and microwave oven taken from the Lundine residence; a 
toolbox, calculator, and resin taken from Moltec; drill bits taken from Triangle 
Sales and Service, Inc.; and an auger taken from Michaels Fence. Appellant 
testified that these items found in his bedroom were obtained by his wife who 
said she purchased them from her cousin's friend. The probative value of 
testimony by appellant's father and sister to the effect that appellant's wife 
had told them she purchased this random assortment of personal property from her 
cousin's friend would not only be weakened by the relationship between appellant 
and the two witnesses but also by the court's comment relative to their 
violation of the sequestration order.

[¶23.]  Against this "probative value" of the 
testimony of the two witnesses, the trial court had to weigh the desirability 
for not presenting cumulative evidence.1 In doing so, the court found the 
latter to outweigh the former.

[¶24.]  The question on appeal is not whether the 
decision of the trial court was that which we would have made. We are not to 
weigh the factors ourselves. Our determination is whether or not the trial 
court's decision was a clear abuse of discretion.

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶25.]  I do not believe the trial court acted in 
a manner which clearly exceeded the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances; which clearly was other than in a reasonable 
manner; or which was clearly an error 
of law committed under the circumstances.

[¶26.]  Not finding a clear abuse of discretion 
in excluding the testimony of the two sequestered witnesses, I would 
affirm.

1 Cumulative evidence is 
"additional or corroborative evidence to the same point." Black's Law Dictionary 
(5th ed. 1979), p. 343.