Title: Copeland v. Todd

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ. 
 
LUCRETIA PUTNAM COPELAND 
 
v.  Record No. 100929 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   September 16, 2011 
LESLIE TODD 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Rockingham County and dismissed the petition for adoption filed 
by Lucretia Putnam Copeland ("Copeland").  
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On April 11, 2003, Leslie Renee Todd ("Todd") gave birth to 
a female child who is the subject of this petition for adoption.  
At the time, Todd was incarcerated at Rockingham County Regional 
Jail for felony shoplifting and contempt of court.  The name of 
the child's father does not appear on the birth certificate, and 
his identity is unknown.  Todd's relatives were not prepared to 
take her newborn baby, and Todd agreed that Linda Guenther 
("Guenther"), who worked as a minister to inmates at the jail, 
and Guenther's friend, Copeland, would take temporary custody of 
the child until Todd was released from incarceration. 
On July 21, 2003, the Rockingham County Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court (the "J&DR court") entered an 
order granting Guenther and Copeland "legal and physical 
custody, subject to [Todd's] visitation at the discretion of 
 
2 
. . . Guenther and . . . Copeland."  Guenther and Copeland took 
the baby to visit Todd while she was incarcerated, usually on a 
weekly basis.  Although Guenther and Copeland both cared for the 
baby during the first year, Copeland eventually became the 
baby's primary physical custodian. 
After Todd was released in September 2003, Copeland, 
Guenther, and Todd all agreed that Todd could not take care of 
the child due to her housing and financial situation.  However, 
both Guenther and Copeland encouraged Todd to spend time with 
the child, and they facilitated visits by providing 
transportation for Todd.  Todd saw the child frequently through 
April 2005.  During this period, the child lived exclusively 
with Copeland.  Todd never offered financial support nor asked 
that the child be returned to her. 
Beginning in April 2005, Todd's contact with the child 
began to wane. Between that time and June 2006, Todd only had 
contact with the child three times through two telephone calls 
and one chance encounter at a department store parking lot.  
Between July 2006 and July 2007, Todd neither contacted nor 
visited the child. 
On June 21, 2007, Copeland met Todd at a local church and 
asked Todd for her consent to adopt the child.  At that meeting, 
Todd refused Copeland's request, and she asked to see the child.  
 
3 
Copeland agreed, and Todd visited with the child for 
approximately thirty minutes at Copeland's home. 
After that visit, Todd asked that she be allowed to visit 
the child more frequently.  However, Copeland, upon the advice 
of an attorney, refused further visitation.  In response, Todd 
sought and received court-ordered visitation with the child from 
the J&DR court.  The J&DR court appointed the Center for 
Marriage and Family Counseling (the "CMFC"), a private, 
non-profit counseling agency, to help set up a visitation plan 
for Todd and the child. 
On November 26, 2007, Copeland filed a petition in the 
circuit court to adopt the child "without the consent of [Todd] 
pursuant to [Code §] 63.2-1202(H)."  In January 2008, Todd 
completed orientation with the CMFC and began supervised visits 
with the child.  Todd visited the child on every occasion 
allowed by the court order.  Counselors at the CMFC monitored 
these visits and reported that Todd and the child "interact[ed] 
in a positive manner," and that "Todd has the knowledge, skills 
and ability to maintain and nurture an appropriate relationship 
with [the child]."  Throughout these visits, the child was 
unaware that Todd was her birth mother.  In a report dated March 
20, 2008, the CMFC recommended that "Todd have the opportunity 
to have unrestricted visits with [the child] at her home and 
without Ms. Copeland's presence."  The CMFC further opined that 
 
4 
"[f]rom a developmental perspective, it would be detrimental 
. . . to terminate a mother/daughter relationship at this 
point."  On April 24, 2008, the J&DR court issued an order 
mandating continued weekly visitations between Todd and the 
child at the CMFC, and ordered that "[d]isclosure of identity of 
birth mother shall not occur [with]out the consent of present 
custodians and birth mother." 
At the hearing regarding Copeland's petition for adoption, 
the circuit court heard testimony from several witnesses, 
including Guenther, Copeland, and Todd.  Todd testified that she 
was not seeking immediate custody and that "[her] goal is not to 
take [the child] from [Copeland]."  Todd testified that Copeland 
has "done a phenomenal job raising [the child]" and stated that 
it would probably be "traumatic" to move the child from 
Copeland's home.  However, Todd stated that she does 
"eventually" want custody, but that "right now [her] plan is not 
to rip [the child] from [Copeland]." 
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the circuit court 
granted Copeland's petition for adoption, holding that Todd 
failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six 
months prior to the filing of the petition as provided in Code 
§ 63.2-1202(H) and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld 
her consent contrary to the child's best interests as provided 
in Code §§ 63.2-1203 and -1205.   
 
5 
Code § 63.2-1202(H) states that an adoption may proceed 
without a birth parent's consent when the prospective adoptive 
parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
biological parent "without just cause, has neither visited nor 
contacted the child for a period of six months prior to the 
filing of the petition for adoption."  In interpreting this six 
month time period, the circuit court stated that Todd's contact 
with the child on June 21, 2007 "is solely, effectively the 
result of [Copeland] approaching her on the issue of adoption," 
and "the evidence shows that if [Copeland] hadn't instituted 
these adoption conversations this status quo could have 
continued for years."  Therefore, the circuit court held "that 
as a matter of fact that [Copeland] has established by clear and 
convincing evidence that [Todd] . . . without just cause has 
neither visited nor contacted this child for a period of six 
months prior to the filing of the petition for adoption," with 
"[t]he said six month period being contained in the period of 
June 10th, 2006, until June the 20th, 2007."  Accordingly, the 
circuit court held that under Code § 63.2-1202(H), Todd's 
consent to the adoption "is not necessary."  Alternatively, if 
the six month period of abandonment was not met under Code 
§ 63.2-1202(H), the circuit court held that Todd withheld her 
consent for the adoption contrary to the child's best interests 
under Code §§ 63.2-1203 and -1205. 
 
6 
Code § 63.2-1203 states that if, 
after consideration of the evidence, the circuit court 
finds that the valid consent of any person or agency whose 
consent is required is withheld contrary to the best 
interests of the child as set forth in Code § 63.2-1205, or 
is unobtainable, the circuit court may grant the petition 
without such consent. 
 
When "determining whether the valid consent of any person 
whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best 
interests of the child," a circuit court 
shall consider all relevant factors, including 
the birth parent(s)' efforts to obtain or 
maintain legal and physical custody of the child; 
whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing 
and able to assume full custody of the child; 
whether the birth parent(s)' efforts to assert 
parental rights were thwarted by other people; 
the birth parent(s)' ability to care for the 
child; the age of the child; the quality of any 
previous relationship between the birth parent(s) 
and the child and between the birth parent(s) and 
any other minor children; the duration and 
suitability of the child's present custodial 
environment; and the effect of a change of 
physical custody on the child. 
 
Code § 63.2-1205. 
In support of its determination that Todd withheld her 
consent contrary to the child's best interests, the circuit 
court addressed each of the eight factors set forth in Code 
§ 63.2-1205.  The circuit court held that: (1) Todd's efforts to 
obtain legal and physical custody of the child were "minimal and 
after the first two years almost nonexistent;" (2) Todd was not 
able financially or otherwise to assume full custody; (3) there 
 
7 
was no effort by any other individuals to thwart Todd's 
assertion of parental rights; (4) Todd was not able to care for 
the child because of "her financial situation, her financial 
dependence[, and] her inability to legally operate a motor 
vehicle even five years post-release from incarceration;" (5) 
the child, at the age of five, has only known her home to be 
with Copeland and needs finality in a stable home life; (6) 
Todd's relationship with the child was poor, as she "in effect 
abandoned this child" and "simply failed to assume her duties as 
a parent" upon her release from jail; (7) the child's present 
custodial home with Copeland is "safe and secure from a duration 
standpoint it covers almost all of the child's life;" and (8) 
considering the long periods of abandonment by Todd, a change of 
physical custody from Copeland to Todd would "expose[] this 
child to substantial risk."  Accordingly, the circuit court held 
that, "considering the factors set forth in [Code § 63.2-1205, 
Todd's] consent is withheld contrary to the best interest of the 
child." 
 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court and held that "the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires prospective adoptive parents 
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both that the entry 
of an adoption order over the objection of a nonconsenting 
parent is in the best interest of the child and that a 
 
8 
continuing relationship with the birth parent would be 
detrimental to the child's welfare."  Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. 
App. 773, 778, 689 S.E.2d 784, 787 (2010) (emphasis in 
original).   
 
The panel held that "the detriment to the child standard 
exists independent of the Virginia Code to protect the parental 
rights of biological parents – rights that the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution."  Id. at 789, 689 
S.E.2d at 792.  Therefore, "a trial court must make a detriment 
to the child determination, regardless of the language of the 
relevant statute, before entering an adoption order, in order to 
protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a nonconsenting 
biological parent."  Id. at 790, 689 S.E.2d at 792.  
Additionally, after finding that the General Assembly did not 
intend to abandon the "detriment to the child standard" through 
its 2006 amendment to Code § 63.2-1205, the panel concluded that 
the circuit court erred in granting Copeland's petition for 
adoption because it did not consider whether a continuing 
relationship between Todd and the child would be detrimental to 
the child's welfare.  Id. at 792, 689 S.E.2d at 793.  
Additionally, the Court of Appeals panel determined that the 
trial court erred in its interpretation of Code § 63.2-1202 (H) 
because "the plain language of [the statute] refers to the six 
 
9 
months immediately preceding the filing of the adoption 
petition."  Id. 
Copeland's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, and 
she timely filed her notice of appeal to this Court.  We awarded 
her an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Virginia Code 
§ 63.2-1202(H) so that, after the birth mother had 
abandoned her child for over a year, a single 30-minute 
visit with the child within six months of the petition for 
adoption – occurring only because the mother's consent to 
adoption was sought – was sufficient to defeat the 
statute's application. 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in reading the "detriment to the 
child" requirement – specifically removed from the statute 
by the General Assembly – back into the statute in direct 
contravention of the legislature's intent. 
 
We also granted Todd's two assignments of cross-error: 
 
1. The Court of Appeals erred by declining to consider Todd's 
claim that Code §§ 63-1203 and 1205 are unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds.  
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred by declining to consider whether 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial proved 
that [the child's] adoption was in [its] best interest. 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
The rules of statutory construction govern our analysis 
here.  "Principal among these rules is that we determine, and 
adhere to, the intent of the legislature reflected in or by the 
statute being construed."  Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. 
 
10 
Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 156, 500 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1998)(citation 
omitted).   
Where the words used in the statute are not 
sufficiently explicit, we may determine the 
intent of the legislature "from the occasion and 
necessity of the statute being passed [or 
amended]; from a comparison of its several parts 
and of other acts in pari materia; and sometimes 
from extraneous circumstances which may throw 
light on the subject."  
 
Id. (quoting Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 691, 77 S.E. 
470, 471 (1913)). 
 
Additionally, “constitutional arguments are questions of 
law that [this Court reviews] de novo.”  Shivaee v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2005).  
"[W]hen, as here, the constitutionality of a statute is 
challenged, our determination of legislative intent is guided by 
the recognition that 'all actions of the General Assembly are 
presumed to be constitutional.' "  Caldwell, 256 Va. at 157, 500 
S.E.2d at 816-17 (1998) (quoting Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 
Va. 49, 52, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990)).  Although "a 
presumption normally arises that a change in law was intended 
when new provisions are added to prior legislation by an 
amendatory act" or "existing rights" are "withdraw[n] from [an] 
act," Boyd v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 16, 20, 215 S.E.2d 915, 918 
(1975), we have a duty to construe statutes subject to a 
constitutional challenge in a manner that "avoid[s] any conflict 
 
11 
with the Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229, 
682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009) (citations omitted). 
B. Birth Parent Consent under Code § 63.2-1202(H) 
 
Code § 63.2-1202(H) states that an adoption may proceed 
without a birth parent's consent when the prospective adoptive 
parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
biological parent has failed, without just cause, to visit or 
contact the child "for a period of six months prior to the 
filing of the petition for adoption."  Here, Todd visited the 
child on June 21, 2007, within the six month period prior to 
Copeland's petition for adoption filed on November 26, 2007. 
 
In support of its holding that Todd's consent to the 
adoption was not necessary under Code § 63.2-1202(H), the 
circuit court stated that "it would be an unreasonable 
interpretation of that statute to find that the mere fact that 
the potential adoptive mother had the decency to call [Todd] 
somehow or another undo[es] or cancel[s] out the abandonment."  
Accordingly, the circuit court held that the applicable six 
month period for purposes of Code § 63.2-1202(H) was "the period 
of June 10th, 2006, until June the 20th, 2007," and because Todd 
did not contact or visit the child during this period, her 
consent was not required to grant Copeland's petition for 
adoption. 
 
12 
 
The Court of Appeals did not err in reversing this ruling 
of the circuit court.  The Court of Appeals held that the phrase 
"prior to" in Code § 63.2-1202(H) "refers to the six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition."  
Todd, 55 Va. App. at 792-93, 689 S.E.2d at 794.  "The phrase 
'prior to' may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear."  United 
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (holding that a 
statutory deadline of "prior to December 31" to mean "on or 
before December 30," the date immediately preceding the date 
certain). 
 
Copeland urges this Court to interpret Code § 63.2-1202(H) 
to require meaningful or significant visitation or contact to 
satisfy the terms of the statute.  However, this interpretation 
goes beyond the plain meaning of the statute and would require 
courts to evaluate the quality and value of time spent between a 
birth parent and child.  We refuse to adopt such an 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 82, 695 
S.E.2d 173, 176 (2010) (courts are bound by the plain meaning of 
language appearing in unambiguous statutes); Gilliam v. McGrady, 
279 Va. 703, 709, 691 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2010) ("It is not the 
function of the courts to add to or to amend clear statutory 
language."). 
C.  The "Best Interests of the Child" in Adoption Cases 
 
13 
 
Alternatively, the circuit court granted Copeland's 
petition for adoption under Code § 63.2-1205 because Todd 
withheld her consent "contrary to the best interest of the 
child."  Although the Code of Virginia has long provided a 
procedure by which a court may enter an adoption order in the 
absence of the birth parents' consent, we consistently have 
interpreted those statutes to balance the best interests of the 
child in question and the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
biological parents. 
 
Before 1995, the applicable adoption statute governing the 
parental consent requirement for adoptions provided in pertinent 
part that: "If after hearing evidence the court finds that the 
valid consent of any person or agency whose consent is 
hereinabove required is withheld contrary to the best interests 
of the child . . . the court may grant the petition without such 
consent."  Former Code § 63.1-225(E) (Supp. 1994).  However, 
this statute lacked a standard to determine when consent is 
withheld contrary to the best interests of the child.   
 
In the absence of such a standard, we developed the 
"detriment to the child" standard in order to balance the 
child's best interests with the constitutional rights of the 
biological parents.  In Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 397-99, 
192 S.E.2d 794, 797-98 (1972), we held that to conclude that a 
birth parent's consent is withheld contrary to the best 
 
14 
interests of the child, it is insufficient simply to prove that 
the best interests of the child would be promoted by the 
adoption.  If this were the case, the consent requirement would 
be rendered meaningless, and "the effect would have been to 
permit a court to dispense with consent in all cases in which it 
found that adoption would promote the best interests of the 
child."  Id. at 398, 192 S.E.2d at 798.  Therefore, we held that 
to hold that a birth parent's consent is being withheld contrary 
to the best interests of the child, "it must be shown that 
continuance of the relationship between the [birth parent and 
child] would be detrimental to the child's welfare."  Id. at 
399, 192 S.E.2d at 798 (emphasis added).   
 
In 1995, the General Assembly codified the detriment to the 
child standard when it enacted former Code § 63.1-225.1.  See 
1995 Acts chs. 772, 826.  From 1995 to 2006, that statute and 
its successors required courts to consider not only the child's 
best interests, but also whether the continuing relationship 
between the biological parent and the child would be 
"detrimental to the child": 
 
In determining whether the valid consent of 
any person whose consent is required is withheld 
contrary to the best interests of the child, or 
is unobtainable, the court shall consider whether 
the failure to grant the petition for adoption 
would be detrimental to the child.  In 
determining whether the failure to grant the 
petition would be detrimental to the child, the 
court shall consider all relevant factors, 
 
15 
including the birth parent(s)' efforts to obtain 
or maintain legal and physical custody of the 
child, whether the birth parent(s)' efforts to 
assert parental rights were thwarted by other 
people, the birth parent(s)' ability to care for 
the child, the age of the child, the quality of 
any previous relationship between the birth 
parent(s) and the child and between the birth 
parent(s) and any other minor children, the 
duration and suitability of the child's present 
custodial environment and the effect of a change 
of physical custody on the child. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).* 
 
Most recently, after establishing a joint subcommittee to 
study Virginia's adoption laws, see S.J. Res. 331, Va. Gen. 
Assem. (Reg. Sess. 2005), the General Assembly amended Code 
§ 63.2-1205 to remove the language requiring a finding of 
detriment to the child to permit adoption without parental 
consent.  See 2006 Acts chs. 825, 848 (effective July 1, 2006).  
As applicable to the present proceedings, this statute focuses 
on the "best interests of the child," stating: 
 
In determining whether the valid consent of 
any person whose consent is required is withheld 
contrary to the best interests of the child, or 
is unobtainable, the circuit court . . . shall 
consider whether granting the petition pending 
before it would be in the best interest of the 
child.  The circuit court . . . shall consider 
all relevant factors, including the birth 
parent(s)' efforts to obtain or maintain legal 
and physical custody of the child; whether the 
                     
 
* In 2000, the General Assembly repealed former Code § 63.1-
225.1 and recodified it as former Code § 63.1-219.13.  See 2000 
Acts ch. 830.  Then, in 2002, the General Assembly repealed 
former Code § 63.1-219.13 and recodified it as Code § 63.2-1205.  
See 2002 Acts ch. 747. 
 
16 
birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to 
assume full custody of the child; whether the 
birth parent(s)' efforts to assert parental 
rights were thwarted by other people; the birth 
parent(s)' ability to care for the child; the age 
of the child; the quality of any previous 
relationship between the birth parent(s) and the 
child and between the birth parent(s) and any 
other minor children; the duration and 
suitability of the child's present custodial 
environment; and the effect of a change of 
physical custody on the child. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, although the General Assembly retained the 
factors previously required to determine whether the failure to 
grant the petition for adoption would be detrimental to the 
child, they are now factors relevant to determining whether 
consent is withheld contrary to the "best interests" of the 
child."  Id.   
D.  The Constitutionality of Code § 63.2-1205 
 
Copeland assigns error to the Court of Appeals' holding 
that "the trial court's application of Code §§ 63.2-1203 and -
1205 violated Todd's due process rights because it failed to 
make the necessary finding under Virginia law that a continuing 
relationship with her child would be detrimental to the child's 
welfare."  Todd, 55 Va. App. at 796, 689 S.E.2d at 795.  
Additionally, Todd's assignment of cross-error requires us to 
consider whether the same statutes violate her Equal Protection 
rights.  Therefore, we must determine whether, after the 2006 
 
17 
amendments, Virginia's adoption statutes pass constitutional 
muster. 
1. Due Process 
 
The phrase "best interests of the child" is most commonly 
used in the context of custody disputes between natural parents.  
Code § 20-124.2(B) provides that "[i]n determining custody, the 
court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of 
the child," and Code § 20-124.3 delineates ten factors to be 
weighed in assessing the best interests of children in custody 
and visitation matters.  In this context, a court weighs these 
factors to determine what custody or visitation arrangement 
would best promote the child's interests.  In these cases, "the 
best interests of the child are paramount and form the lodestar 
for the guidance of the court in determining the dispute."  
Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99, 340 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1986) 
(quoting Walker v. Brooks, 203 Va. 417, 421, 124 S.E.2d 195, 198 
(1962)).   
 
However, the meaning of "the best interests of the child" 
is different in the context of adoptions, and must be read in 
light of the biological parent's due process rights in her 
relationship to her child.  Therefore, although Code § 63.2-1205 
uses the same phrase as our custody statutes, its definition is 
much more demanding.  
 
18 
 
We consistently have held that to grant a petition for 
adoption over a birth parent's objection, there must be more 
than a mere finding that the adoption would promote the child's 
best interests.  Malpass, 213 Va. at 398-99, 192 S.E.2d at 798-
99.  Our rationale is clear: if a mere finding of promotion is 
all that is required to determine that the birth parent's 
consent is withheld contrary to the child's best interests, a 
court effectively could divest a natural parent of all rights 
and obligations with respect to the child simply by finding that 
placement in the prospective adoptive home is more suitable to 
the child than placement with the birth parent.  Id. at 398, 192 
S.E.2d at 798.  We further have explained: 
While in both adoption and custody cases the 
primary consideration is the welfare and best 
interest of the child, it does not necessarily 
follow that the natural bond between parent and 
child should be ignored or lightly severed. On 
the contrary, this bond should be accorded great 
weight. We should apply neither the fitness test 
nor the best interest test to the exclusion of 
the other. We must determine whether the 
consequences of harm to the child of allowing the 
parent-child relationship to continue are more 
severe than the consequences of its termination. 
 
Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 747, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1981). 
 
The United States Supreme Court also has emphasized that 
the Constitution requires more than a showing of the best 
interests of the child to terminate parental rights.  The 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the relationship 
 
19 
between a parent and child is constitutionally protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).  "The liberty interest at 
issue in this case – the interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest 
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."  
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  Therefore, 
adoption cases invoke significant substantive and procedural 
safeguards to protect the biological parent's due process 
rights.  See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965).  
When, as here, the biological parent protests the adoption, the 
involuntary termination of her parental rights makes these 
safeguards all the more critical. 
In Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, the Supreme Court explained, 
[w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be 
offended [if] a State were to attempt to force the breakup 
of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and 
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for 
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the 
children's best interest. 
 
(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has held that "the Due Process Clause does not 
permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents 
to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge 
believes a 'better' decision could be made."  Troxel, 530 U.S. 
at 67, 72-73 (holding that a Washington state statute 
 
20 
authorizing nonparental visitation whenever "visitation may 
serve the best interest of the child" unconstitutionally 
infringed on "the fundamental right of parents to make 
childrearing decisions"). 
 
It is clear that the Constitution requires more than a mere 
showing of the child's best interests to terminate parental 
rights.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly determined 
that "there must be more than a mere finding that granting an 
adoption over the parent's objection would be in the child's 
best interests."  Todd, 55 Va. App. at 785, 689 S.E.2d at 790. 
 
However, the Court of Appeals misapplied that determination 
when it held that the circuit court violated Todd's due process 
rights.  Virginia's statutory scheme for adoption, including 
Code §§ 63.2-1205 and -1208, defines the best interests of the 
child in terms that require more expansive analysis than when 
the contest is between two biological parents. 
 
Inclusion of the precise language of "detriment" is not 
necessary for these statutes to pass constitutional muster.  The 
phrase "detriment to the child" is no term of art or requisite 
mantra.  Rather, for these statutes to pass constitutional due 
process scrutiny, they must provide for consideration of 
parental fitness and detriment to the child.  The Virginia 
statutory scheme does so. 
 
21 
 
The eight factors in Code § 63.2-1205, including "whether 
the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume 
full custody of the child" and "the birth parent(s)' ability to 
care for the child," focus on both the parent and child and 
therefore compel a court to consider whether a parent's 
unfitness would be harmful to the child's welfare.  (Emphasis 
added.)  Additionally, Code § 63.2-1208, which sets forth 
procedures by which a court may order a child-placing agency to 
conduct an investigation into the adoption and report its 
findings to the court, also includes considerations that go 
beyond a mere best interest of the child inquiry.  Code § 63.2-
1208(A).  The statute mandates that the investigation include 
inquiries as to  
(i) whether the petitioner is financially able[,] 
morally suitable, in satisfactory physical and 
mental health and a proper person to care for and 
to train the child; (ii) what the physical and 
mental condition of the child is; (iii) why the 
parents, if living, desire to be relieved of the 
responsibility for the custody, care, and 
maintenance of the child, and what their attitude 
is toward the proposed adoption; (iv) whether the 
parents have abandoned the child or are morally 
unfit to have custody over him; (v) the 
circumstances under which the child came to live, 
and is living, in the physical custody of the 
petitioner; (vi) whether the child is a suitable 
child for adoption by the petitioner; (vii) what 
fees have been paid by the petitioners or on 
their behalf to persons or agencies that have 
assisted them in obtaining the child; and (viii) 
whether the requirements of subsections E and F 
have been met.  
 
 
22 
Code § 63.2-1208(D) (emphasis added).  Additionally, the report 
must include "the relevant physical and mental history of the 
birth parents."  Code § 63.2-1208(E).  The statutes require a 
court to consider the parents' ability to care for the child, 
their potential moral unfitness or abandonment, and any 
"relevant physical and mental history."  Id. 
 
Therefore, we hold that the Virginia Code's adoption 
statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny because they 
encompass far more than mere consideration of the child's best 
interests as defined in cases involving a contest between 
natural parents.  Here, the circuit court explicitly and 
comprehensively considered each factor enumerated in Code 
§ 63.2-1205.  In conducting this analysis, the court considered 
Todd's fitness and ability to care for the child, and ultimately 
concluded that "considering the factors set forth in [Code 
§ 63.2-1205, Todd's] consent is withheld contrary to the best 
interest of the child."  The court's determination went beyond 
whether the adoption by Copeland would be in the child's best 
interest by finding in Todd "some showing of unfitness," 
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, and implicitly recognizing that 
"continuance of the relationship between [Todd and the child] 
would be detrimental to the child's welfare."  Malpass, 213 Va. 
at 399, 192 S.E.2d at 798.  Therefore, the circuit court gave 
adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights under the 
 
23 
Fourteenth Amendment, and it did not err in granting Copeland's 
petition for adoption. 
2. Equal Protection 
 
Todd also challenges the constitutionality of Code §§ 63.2-
1203 and -1205 on equal protection grounds.  She argues that her 
equal protection rights were violated "because an adoption 
initiated by a private party under [Code § 63.2-1205] does not 
receive the same protections for the child or its natural 
parents as an adoption initiated by the Virginia Department of 
Social Services under Code § 16.1-283."  We reject Todd's 
argument. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids any state to deny a person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.  We have held that "[t]his 
proscription guarantees that classes or persons will be given 
the same protection as like classes or persons. It does not 
require similar treatment of persons not similarly situated."  
Carter v. Carter, 232 Va. 166, 170, 349 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1986).   
 
In this case, Todd is not similarly situated to a parent 
involved in an adoption under Code § 16.1-283, where children 
are in the custody of the state and parental rights are in 
jeopardy of being terminated under Virginia's foster care 
statutes.  Unlike the foster care context, here the government 
did not remove the child from Todd's custody.  Rather, by 
 
24 
entering into the entrustment agreement with Guenther and 
Copeland, Todd voluntarily relinquished custody of the child.  
Therefore, Todd is not similarly situated to a person whose 
parental rights are involuntarily terminated by the state under 
Code § 16.1-283.  
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Finally, Todd maintains that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the factual findings necessary under the Virginia 
statutory scheme.  Upon review of the record, we are satisfied 
that the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of the 
circuit court in granting the petition for adoption pursuant to 
Code §§ 63.2-1200 et seq. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's 
consent to the adoption was not necessary under Code § 63.2-
1202(H).  However, the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment 
that the circuit court violated Todd's due process rights under 
Code §§ 63.2-1203 and -1205.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and reverse the 
judgment in part, and reinstate the final decree of adoption 
entered by the circuit court on March 18, 2009. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and final judgment.