Title: Lower v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lower v. State1990 WY 10786 P.2d 346Case Number: 89-53Decided: 01/31/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN LOWER, 

PETITIONER 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, 

RESPONDENT 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Timothy J. Judson, J.

M. David 
Lindsey, Asst. Public Defender, Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Charles B. Mead, Jr., Student Intern, argued, for 
respondent.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]            
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant John Lower pleaded guilty to a 
single count of delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1014(d)(xiii). Although the trial court initially 
suspended execution of a one to three year sentence and placed appellant on 
probation, the original sentence was soon reinstated following revocation 
proceedings. Lower now appeals, alleging he was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process and his arraignment, 
and during the subsequent probation revocation hearing. In addition, he asserts 
that the trial court's failure to credit the reinstated sentence with the time 
successfully served on probation deprived him of due process and the equal 
protection of the law.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3]      On February 16, 
1988, an informant working for the Gillette Police Department purchased three 
ounces of marijuana from appellant with $400 in marked bills while two 
detectives, monitoring transmissions from a body wire worn by the informant, 
recorded the transaction. Appellant was charged with the unlawful delivery of a 
controlled substance. In exchange for his guilty plea to that offense, the 
county prosecutor offered to dismiss a charge of aiding and abetting in the 
delivery of a controlled substance. The document, filed on July 20, 1988, 
evidencing appellant's consent to that agreement, expressly stated that it did 
not extend to sentencing matters.

[¶4]      At his 
arraignment, on August 1, 1988 the trial court carefully explained the charges 
against appellant and the maximum penalties carried by those charges. The court 
advised appellant of the constitutional protections available to him and 
detailed those he would surrender should he plead guilty. Additionally, the 
court questioned appellant and was advised, in turn, that he was satisfied with 
the representation received from appointed counsel and that no coercion and no 
promises other than those contained in the plea agreement had induced him to 
submit his plea. The court then informed appellant it was not bound to accept 
the plea agreement, explaining further that sentencing, even under the terms of 
the agreement, was a matter committed entirely to the court's discretion. 
Notwithstanding such advice, appellant expressed his desire to enter a plea 
under the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the court approved the agreement 
and, after examining the factual basis for appellant's guilty plea, accepted his 
plea.

[¶5]      A sentence of one 
to three years in the state penitentiary was imposed and suspended, and 
appellant was ordered to serve 45 days in the Campbell County Detention Center 
followed by three years on probation. As a condition of probation, however, the 
trial court required appellant to avoid associating with anyone using controlled 
substances and prohibited him from using such substances himself. To assure his 
compliance with these conditions, appellant was additionally required to undergo 
treatment for substance abuse at the Wyoming Regional Counselling Center and to 
submit to periodic urine testing requested by his probation officer. 
Unfortunately these safeguards were to little avail, for within a month of his 
release from the county jail appellant had repeatedly breached the terms of his 
probation. Affidavits of his probation officer, filed in support of a revocation 
motion, indicated the presence of cannabinoid in appellant's urine on three 
separate occasions during November of 1988. Contemporaneously, appellant 
admitted his continued drug use and his continued association with known drug 
users to his probation officer.

[¶6]      A revocation 
hearing was held on January 9, 1989. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial 
court explained the nature of the proceedings to appellant, advising him of the 
maximum penalty it could impose for his probation violations. The court reviewed 
the constitutional rights available to him during the hearing and the effect of 
any admissions he might make on the later exercise of those rights. The court 
also determined appellant was satisfied with the representation of appointed 
counsel. Despite the court's comments, appellant nevertheless confessed to the 
alleged probation violations and recounted a detailed factual basis for his 
admissions. On the basis of that confession, the court revoked his probation and 
ordered him to serve one to three years in the state penitentiary, with credit 
given for the 45 days already served.

I

[¶7]            
Appellant asserts, as his first claim of error, that his appointed 
counsel ineffectively represented him during plea negotiations and during the 
arraignment at which he entered his guilty plea. We have recently held that, 
where a defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may challenge his subsequent 
conviction on appeal only with respect to matters which affect the voluntariness 
of his plea or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Zanetti v. 
State, 783 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Wyo. 1989). When a guilty plea has been entered 
upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea may depend on the 
extent to which that advice comports with the constitutional guarantee to the 
effective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th 
Cir. 1988). Such is clearly the substance of appellant's claim in the present 
case.

[¶8]            
Appellant argues that counsel knew he needed the confinement of inpatient 
treatment to successfully combat his alleged addiction to marijuana and that his 
consent to any proposed plea agreement, and the prospect for his successfully 
completing any probationary program, was contingent upon his procuring such 
treatment. Appellant also contends he signed the plea agreement, which was 
subsequently approved by the district court, solely on the assurances of counsel 
that the agreement guaranteed his enrollment in an inpatient substance abuse 
program. He now lays the blame for his continued cannabis consumption, and 
therefore his probation revocation, upon the failure of the court-ordered 
treatment program to adequately restrict his access to the illicit drugs. He 
asserts that he had informed his attorney of the foreseeability of this result 
and concludes that, had he known counsel's advice was faulty, he would have 
chosen to face a trial on the charges. Thus, appellant has challenged the 
voluntariness of his plea through his claim that counsel both failed to procure 
the desired treatment as part of the plea bargain and failed to inform him that 
such was the case.

[¶9]      To warrant 
reversal on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must 
demonstrate some deficiency in the representation received from his attorney. 
Counsel must have failed, in light of all circumstances existing at the time of 
the challenged act or omission, to employ such judgment or to render such 
assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney under 
like circumstances. In addition, appellant must demonstrate that counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of his case. He must demonstrate the existence 
of a reasonable probability that, absent that deficiency, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so 
serious as to undermine this court's confidence that the outcome was fair. Laing 
v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Wyo. 1987); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 
(Wyo. 1987); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145-47 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶10]   When an attorney has allegedly 
misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a guilty plea, a 
determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and forego the 
defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client. That determination 
involves two interrelated questions: whether, in the absence of counsel's error, 
the recommendation of a reasonably competent attorney concerning the plea would 
differ from that given; and whether, absent the error, the outcome of a trial 
would have been more advantageous to the client than the result of his plea. 
Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59-60, 106 S. Ct.  at 370-71. The defendant may also establish 
the necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances indicating that, in deciding 
whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special emphasis on the challenged 
aspect of his attorney's advice. He must suggest to the reviewing court a 
plausible reason why, had his representation been as he claims it should have 
been, he would have chosen to forsake the benefits of his plea agreement for the 
risks of trial. Id.; see also Worthen, 842 F.2d  at 1184.

[¶11]   The defendant cannot, however, be 
said to have been prejudiced by advice which is merely misleading if the trial 
court, prior to taking his plea, has corrected any misunderstanding engendered 
by that advice. Id. We have held in this regard that, although promises 
allegedly made during the course of plea negotiations later remained 
unfulfilled, a defendant's guilty plea is not thereby rendered involuntary where 
the trial court thoroughly discussed the plea agreement with him, informed him 
it was not bound by the terms of the agreement, and explained the ramifications 
of his guilty plea according to the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 15. Percival v. 
State, 745 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Wyo. 1987); Hanson v. State, 590 P.2d 832, 835 
(Wyo. 1979).

[¶12]            
Appellant in the present case has failed to demonstrate that he has been 
prejudiced by the acts or omissions of appointed counsel. The record indicates 
he faced two charges, potentially exposing him to twenty years of imprisonment. 
It also reveals upon the charge to which he entered his plea, the State had 
accumulated a considerable amount of inculpatory evidence. Against this 
background, appellant offers nothing to convince us that, had he proceeded to 
trial, he would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence or 
probation with more favorable terms. Neither does he suggest a plausible reason 
why the omission of a single provision from his plea agreement would cause him 
to proceed to trial, forsaking the benefits of a plea bargain which, except for 
that omission, apparently satisfied him. Inpatient treatment for substance abuse 
was guaranteed by neither course. It is particularly difficult, in light of the 
record of his arraignment proceedings, to imagine how appellant may have been 
prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to truthfully inform him that such a 
guarantee did not exist. The trial court detailed the provisions of the plea 
agreement appellant had signed, determined that no other promises had been made 
to him, and clearly told appellant that it was not bound to accept any plea 
agreement. The court, then, fully and completely advised him of the effects of 
his prospective guilty plea. Appellant's plea was entered voluntarily, and the 
trial court's acceptance of that plea is, therefore, 
affirmed.

II

[¶13]            
Appellant also claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
at his probation revocation hearing by counsel's failure to prepare him for the 
hearing. He contends that counsel failed to explain the grounds upon which 
revocation was sought and his right to remain silent. He asserts that, had he 
been properly represented, he would not have answered questions posed by the 
trial court in such a manner as to admit and provide proof of his numerous 
probation violations. Asserting that the State could not otherwise have 
established those violations, appellant concludes that counsel's deficiencies 
have thereby prejudiced him. Upon review of the record, however, in light of the 
standards articulated in the preceding discussion, we reach a contrary 
conclusion. Even if we were convinced that counsel behaved as inappropriately as 
claimed, appellant was not prejudiced.

[¶14]   The State sought to revoke his 
probation on the basis of urine samples taken from appellant and the affidavits 
of his probation officer, all of which indicated appellant had used marijuana 
three times during November of 1988. Those facts and the consequences of 
revocation were explained to him at the hearing. The court also explained the 
constitutional rights afforded to him during the proceeding, including his right 
to remain silent, and informed him of the evidentiary effect of any admissions 
he might make. The court then determined that appellant was satisfied with the 
representation received from appointed counsel. Notwithstanding these 
precautions, appellant admitted violating the conditions of his probation and 
detailed the circumstances surrounding those violations.

[¶15]   As was the case in our discussion 
of his arraignment, the evidence potentially available against appellant 
militated against a finding that the outcome of this hearing would have differed 
in the absence of attorney error. We also note that the conduct of the trial 
court has, in both instances, served to cure the asserted failings of counsel. 
Appellant has again claimed to have been misinformed or ill-informed by counsel, 
and again the trial court has supplied him with the correct information. As in 
the earlier proceeding, that information was sufficient to permit him an 
intelligent and voluntary choice, equal to that which would have been afforded 
had counsel performed to appellant's expectations. Consequently, he suffered no 
prejudice, and the revocation of his probation is 
affirmed.

III

[¶16]            
Appellant's third and final claim of error consists of a rather vague and 
misguided due process and equal protection challenge to the reimposition of his 
original sentence following probation revocation. He claims, in this regard, 
that the trial court was constitutionally required to grant him credit against 
that sentence for the time successfully served on probation. He is clearly 
mistaken.

[¶17]            
Sentencing decisions, including the revocation of probation and 
imposition of sentence, are matters left almost entirely to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Such decisions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
court has clearly abused that discretion. McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931, 932 
(Wyo. 1989); Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 680 (Wyo. 1988). "[N]o requirement 
exists, either constitutionally or statutorily, that a court must take into 
account time served on probation following a probation revocation." McFarlane, 
781 P.2d  at 932; see also United States v. Shead, 568 F.2d 678, 681 n. 1, 683 
(10th Cir. 1978); Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795, 796-97 (10th Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000, 84 S. Ct. 1936, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1051 (1964). 
Appellant has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion.

[¶18]   The actions of the trial court are 
affirmed in all respects.