Title: State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1348.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1348 
THE STATE EX REL. METZ, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. GTC, INC., 
APPELLEE; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1348.] 
Workers’ compensation—Permanent total disability—Speculation that there was 
a possible conflict in a medical report does not meet requisite legal basis 
for mandamus relief—Court of appeals’ judgment granting limited writ 
reversed—Writ denied. 
(No. 2013-0509—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided April 9, 2015.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 12AP-56, 2013-Ohio-461. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant and cross-appellee, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a limited 
writ of mandamus that ordered the commission to clarify the opinion of Karl V. 
Metz, M.D., or to obtain additional medical evidence.  The commission relied on 
Dr. Metz’s opinion to deny the application of appellee and cross-appellant, Joseph 
Metz (“claimant”), for permanent-total-disability compensation. 
{¶ 2} We find that the court of appeals abused its discretion when it 
granted the limited writ, because its decision was based on speculation that there 
was a possible conflict in Dr. Metz’s report between the finding that the claimant 
was unable to perform repetitive lifting and the finding that he was capable of 
performing sedentary employment.  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals, and we deny the writ. 
{¶ 3} The claimant was injured at work on May 13, 2005, and has not 
worked since that day.  His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for the 
following conditions:  sprain of the neck and thoracic region, sprain or strain of 
the left trapezius muscle, left C6-7 herniated disc and protrusion, supraspinatus 
tendonopathy of the left shoulder, acromioclavicular joint hypertrophy on the left, 
impingement of the left shoulder, and recurrent major depressive disorder. 
{¶ 4} In August 2007, the claimant applied for permanent-total-disability 
benefits.  The commission denied his application.  On February 15, 2011, the 
claimant filed a second application supported by letters from his treating 
physician and a report from a psychologist.  He was then 45 years old. 
{¶ 5} In response, the commission submitted a report from Dr. Metz (the 
doctor is not related to the claimant), who examined the claimant and concluded 
that his medical conditions had reached maximum medical improvement.  Dr. 
Metz completed a physical-strength rating form on which he checked that the 
claimant was capable of sedentary work, defined on the form as the following: 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Sedentary work means exerting up to ten pounds of force 
occasionally (occasionally: activity or condition exists up to one-
third of the time) and/or a negligible amount of force frequently 
(frequently: activity or condition exists from one-third to two-
thirds of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull or otherwise move 
objects.  Sedentary work involves sitting most of the time, but may 
involve walking or standing for brief periods of time.  Jobs are 
sedentary if walking and standing are required only occasionally 
and all other sedentary criteria are met. 
 
Dr. Metz further stated that it was his opinion, “within reasonable medical 
probability, that Mr. Metz is capable of returning to work in a sedentary capacity.  
He is unable to drive a truck, perform repetitive lifting, carrying, or bending 
activities.” 
{¶ 6} The commission also submitted a report from Steven B. Van Auken, 
Ph.D., who examined the claimant for purposes of his allowed psychological 
condition.  Dr. Van Auken concluded that the claimant’s depression had reached 
maximum medical improvement and that he was capable of working, although his 
“work-injury-related 
depressive 
symptoms—including 
diminishments 
in 
concentration, energy level, stress tolerance, and social tolerance—would limit 
him to work environments that offered no more than moderate demands in terms 
of deadline pressures, productivity requirements, the need for frequent decision-
making and frequency of contact with the general public.” 
{¶ 7} A staff hearing officer denied permanent total disability based on the 
reports from Dr. Metz and Dr. Van Auken.  The order stated: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Dr. Karl V. Metz * * * indicated that the [claimant’s] 
condition has reached maximum medical improvement and that he 
can not return to his former position of employment, but is capable 
of performing sedentary work which means exerting up to 10 
pounds of force frequent to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise 
move objects. * * * 
Dr. Steven Van Auken, Ph.D. * * * also indicates that the 
[claimant’s] psychiatric condition has reached maximum medical 
improvement, and that he can not return to his former position of 
employment, but would be able to return to some sustained 
remunerative employment that would offer him no more than 
moderate demands in terms of deadline pressure, and productivity 
requirements due to his diminished concentration, energy, and 
stress tolerance.  * * * 
* * *  
Therefore, based upon the limited physical restrictions 
indicated by Dr. Metz, M.D. and Dr. Van Auken, Ph.D. who 
indicate that the [claimant] can perform sedentary work in a non-
stressful, non-demanding work environment, noting [his] young 
age and 11th grade education, the staff hearing officer finds on a 
whole that the [claimant] is not permanently and totally disabled 
and not precluded from all sustained remunerative employment. 
   
{¶ 8} The claimant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that 
the commission abused its discretion because it failed to consider the additional 
restrictions placed on him in the reports of Dr. Metz and Dr. Van Auken.  The 
case was referred to a magistrate, who determined that the commission had 
considered Dr. Van Auken’s restrictions but had not mentioned Dr. Metz’s 
January Term, 2015 
 
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restrictions that the claimant refrain from repetitive lifting, carrying, or bending 
activities. Nevertheless, the magistrate concluded that Dr. Metz’s restrictions “are 
compatible with sedentary employment and do not rise to the level which would 
require the commission to provide additional analysis.”  2013-Ohio-461, ¶ 40.  
The magistrate concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion when 
it relied on the reports of Drs. Metz and Van Auken. 
{¶ 9} The claimant filed objections to the magistrate’s report.  A divided 
court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s conclusions of law regarding Dr. Van 
Auken’s opinion but concluded that the staff hearing officer did not address the 
“possible tension” between Dr. Metz’s restriction on repetitive lifting and the 
definition of sedentary work.  Id. at ¶ 9.  The court stated:  
 
Dr. Metz reported Joseph Metz medically unable to perform 
repetitive lifting.  On its face, the restrictions could be construed to 
bar sedentary employment involving lifting up to ten pounds of 
force, either occasionally or frequently.  That restriction means Dr. 
Metz has reported conflicting opinions. 
 
Id.  The court issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to 
clarify Dr. Metz’s opinion or to obtain additional medical evidence. 
{¶ 10} This matter is before the court on the direct appeal of the 
commission and on the claimant’s cross-appeal. 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to an extraordinary writ of mandamus, a relator must 
show that he or she has a clear legal right to the relief requested and that the 
commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief.  State ex rel. Pressley v. 
Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph nine of the 
syllabus.  A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists when the relator shows 
that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order that is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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supported by any evidence in the record.  State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 
Ohio St.3d 76, 497 N.E.2d 70 (1986). 
{¶ 12} The commission argues that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that there was a “possible tension” in Dr. Metz’s report that “could be 
construed” to bar sedentary employment.  The commission maintains that Dr. 
Metz’s medical report was not inherently inconsistent, the restrictions imposed in 
that report did not conflict with the definition of sedentary work, and it had 
considered all the evidence before it, including the restrictions imposed by Dr. 
Metz. 
{¶ 13} The claimant, citing State ex rel. Seitaridis v. Indus. Comm., 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-494, 2011-Ohio-3593, argues that the commission was 
required to make certain that the specific restrictions imposed by Dr. Metz did not 
contradict his conclusion that the claimant was able to perform sedentary work.  
The claimant maintains that the court properly remanded the case to the 
commission for clarification. 
{¶ 14} In any order granting or denying benefits requested by a claimant, 
the commission must specifically state the evidence that it relied upon and briefly 
explain the reasoning for its decision.  State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio 
St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245 (1991), syllabus.  The commission is not required to 
list all the evidence that it considered in its order, but only that which it relied 
upon to reach its conclusion.  State ex rel. Buttolph v. Gen. Motors Corp, Terex 
Div., 79 Ohio St.3d 73, 77, 679 N.E.2d 702 (1997).  “Therefore, because the 
commission does not have to list the evidence considered, the presumption of 
regularity that attaches to commission proceedings * * * gives rise to a second 
presumption—that the commission indeed considered all the evidence before it.”  
State ex rel. Lovell v. Indus. Comm., 74 Ohio St.3d 250, 252, 658 N.E.2d 284 
(1996). 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 15} A physician’s report that identifies an injured worker’s capacity for 
sedentary work without identifying additional physical restrictions may constitute 
evidence on which the commission may rely.  State ex rel. O’Brien v. Cincinnati, 
Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-825, 2008-Ohio-2841, ¶ 9.  However, if the 
physician has imposed specific restrictions in the body of the report, the 
commission must consider whether any physical limitations the doctor listed 
correspond with the worker’s ability to perform at the level indicated by the 
doctor.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 16} Seitaridis is distinguishable from the case before us.  In Seitaridis, 
the commission relied on a medical report in which the doctor stated that the 
claimant could engage in light work with “ ‘restrictions limited with use of right 
upper extremity.’ ”  2011-Ohio-3593, at ¶ 6.  The court of appeals determined that 
this phrase was ambiguous and vague.  Id. at ¶ 15.  The court ordered the 
commission to clarify whether the restrictions were consistent with the doctor’s 
conclusion that the claimant was capable of performing light or sedentary work.  
Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 17} In this case, the commission’s hearing officer explicitly stated that 
his decision was “based upon the limited physical restrictions indicated by Dr. 
Metz.”  This statement indicates that the hearing officer considered the 
restrictions identified by Dr. Metz and found them compatible with sedentary 
employment.  It was within the commission’s discretion to determine that Dr. 
Metz’s report was not inherently inconsistent. 
{¶ 18} We find that the restriction against repetitive lifting did not conflict 
with the definition of sedentary work in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a)—
“exerting up to ten pounds of force occasionally * * * and/or a negligible amount 
of force frequently * * * to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects.”  See 
State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-418, 2014-
Ohio-1742, ¶ 14 (a doctor’s order restricting an injured worker from engaging in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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repetitive activities need not mean that the worker cannot otherwise perform 
sedentary work).  And the claimant here provided no contrary evidence to 
overcome the presumption that the commission considered all the evidence before 
it. 
{¶ 19} Finally, the appellate court’s speculation that there was a possible 
conflict within Dr. Metz’s report that could be construed to bar sedentary 
employment does not meet the requisite legal basis for mandamus relief.  The 
court did not identify any clear inconsistency between Dr. Metz’s report and the 
definition of sedentary work to justify its issuing a limited writ. 
{¶ 20} We are mindful that a reviewing court must not micromanage the 
commission’s business.  State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 
584, 679 N.E.2d 300 (1997). Our review of a commission order in mandamus is 
not de novo, and courts must defer to the commission's expertise in evaluating 
disability, not substitute their judgment for the commission’s. State ex rel. Pass v. 
C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055 (1996).  So long 
as the order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, even evidence 
that might be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order will 
not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.  Mobley at 584. 
{¶ 21} The claimant’s cross-appeal alleges that the court of appeals failed 
to address whether the psychological restrictions imposed in the medical report of 
Dr. Van Auken prevented the claimant from performing any work.  The 
claimant’s argument lacks merit.  The court of appeals determined that the 
commission’s order had specifically noted that Dr. Van Auken restricted the 
claimant to employment with “ ‘no more than moderate demands in terms of 
deadline pressure, and productivity requirements due to his diminished 
concentration, energy, and stress tolerance.’ ”  2013-Ohio-461, ¶ 35.  The court 
then concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion when it relied 
on the report of Dr. Van Auken. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 22} Because the claimant did not meet his burden in seeking a writ of 
mandamus, the court of appeals abused its discretion in issuing a limited writ.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
___________________ 
Green, Haines, Sgmabati Co., L.P.A., Ronald E. Slipski, Shawn D. Scharf, 
and Charles W. Oldfield, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant and cross-appellee.    
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