Title: State v. Gerald J. Van Camp

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0600-CR and 96-1509-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Gerald J. Van Camp, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  207 Wis. 2d 641, 559 N.W.2d 924 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
October 23, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Eric J. Wahl 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert R. Henak and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gerald J. Van Camp,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
OCT 23, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The issues in this case are: 
(1) whether the State established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's no contest plea was voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently entered; and (2) whether the 
circuit court's prediction as to the probable outcome upon trial 
and 
its 
concern 
for 
the 
victim's 
feelings 
are 
relevant 
considerations in determining whether withdrawal of a no contest 
plea is required under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶2 
This is a review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals, State v. Van Camp, Nos. 96-0600-CR & 96-1509-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) which 
affirmed the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, Eric J. Wahl, 
Judge, denying Van Camp's motion for postconviction relief under 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
2
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1995-96).1  We reverse and remand the case 
to the trial court with the direction that Van Camp be permitted 
to withdraw his plea of no contest. 
¶3 
On September 7, 1994, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging one count of kidnapping as party to a crime 
against Gerald Van Camp, a man 62 years old, with a fourth-grade 
education, an IQ of 84, and no prior arrests.  The charge was 
based upon the claim that Van Camp and a friend drove to the 
Eau Claire home of Ronald Geurts and forced him to accompany 
them in Van Camp's automobile for approximately three hours of 
abuse, all under the mistaken belief that Geurts was seeing 
Van Camp's ex-girlfriend.   
¶4 
The State filed an information reflecting this charge 
and 
subsequently 
amended 
it 
adding 
one 
count 
of 
false 
imprisonment in violation of Wis. Stats. § 940.30.2  Van Camp 
initially pled not guilty to both charges, and the matter was 
set for a two-day trial to commence on April 18, 1995.  
¶5 
On the first day of trial, the State presented its 
entire case.  After the jury left for the day, the prosecutor 
presented to Van Camp's defense counsel, Attorney Owen R. 
Williams, an offer for a plea agreement.  Attorney Williams 
agreed to recommend the State's offer to his client. 
                     
1 All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1995-
96 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Wis. 
Stats. 
§ 940.30 
provides 
as 
follows: 
"Whoever 
intentionally confines or restrains another without the person's 
consent and with knowledge that he or she has no lawful 
authority to do so is guilty of a Class E felony."   
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
3
¶6 
The next morning counsel for both parties informed the 
court that they had reached an agreement.  Attorney Williams 
explained to the court that Van Camp had agreed to enter a plea 
of no contest to the false imprisonment count and that the State 
agreed to dismiss the kidnapping count.  Both parties agreed 
that the kidnapping charge would be read in for purposes of 
sentencing.   
¶7 
After a brief colloquy, during which the court 
determined that Van Camp in fact said he would plead no contest 
to false imprisonment, that no threats or promises were made, 
and that he understood that the court could impose "the maximum 
sentence," the court accepted Van Camp's plea.  After the 
prosecutor noted "some . . . reticence" on the part of Van Camp, 
the court also discussed the necessary elements and factual 
basis for the plea.   
¶8 
The court withheld sentence and placed Van Camp on 
probation for a period of three years, with the condition that 
he serve nine months jail time with Huber privileges for work 
and counseling. 
¶9 
By timely motion, Van Camp sought to withdraw his no 
contest plea on the grounds of manifest injustice and as a 
matter of right on the grounds that the plea was not freely, 
voluntarily and knowingly entered.  He also sought to withdraw 
that plea as the result of ineffective assistance of trial 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
4
counsel.3  Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court 
denied the motion.   
¶10 At the postconviction hearing, the prosecutor conceded 
that the plea colloquy was inadequate, and that Van Camp had 
made a prima facie case under State v. Bangert.  The State then 
called defendant's counsel, Attorney Williams, to testify in an 
attempt to show that Van Camp voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently entered his plea. 
¶11 Attorney Williams testified that Van Camp initially 
declined the State's offer, but that he eventually was able to 
overcome his client's reluctance to plead.  Attorney Williams 
testified 
that 
he 
did 
not 
recall 
discussing 
Van Camp's 
constitutional rights with Van Camp at the time of the plea, nor 
did he go through a guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form with Van Camp.  He claimed, however, to have gone 
through a litany of rights with Van Camp when they first met 
some seven months prior to the plea.  
¶12 The court stated in conclusory terms its belief that 
"Mr. Van Camp entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily" and 
that "the Bangert test was met."  The court explained that this 
did not constitute a finding that Van Camp knew any particular 
fact or right, but rather, that he generally knew what he was 
                     
3 The court of appeals held that the defendant waived the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The court found that a 
no contest plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional 
defects and defenses, including claims of constitutional rights 
violations, and that the defendant failed to make a proper 
record to preserve this claim.  The defendant did not raise in 
his petition for review the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  This issue, therefore, is not considered in this 
opinion. See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6). 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
5
doing.  The trial judge stated, "That does not mean that he 
necessarily understood every nuance of what this all meant or 
that what exactly a read-in could do or how that would reflect, 
but overall, he entered it knowingly and voluntarily."   
¶13 The question of whether a defendant may withdraw a 
plea is ordinarily for the discretion of the trial court. See 
State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 559, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).  We 
will not disturb the trial court's decision unless it has 
erroneously exercised its discretion. See id.  When a defendant 
establishes a denial of a relevant constitutional right, 
however, withdrawal of the plea is a matter of right. See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283; State v. Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d 467, 
480, 334 N.W.2d 91 (1983).  The trial court reviewing the motion 
to withdraw in such instance has no discretion in the matter. 
See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283 (citing Rock, 92 Wis. 2d at 
559).  
¶14 A plea of no contest that is not voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently entered violates fundamental due 
process. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257 (citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). A plea may be involuntary 
either 
because 
the 
defendant 
does 
not 
have 
a 
complete 
understanding of the charge or because he or she does not 
understand the nature of the constitutional rights  he or she is 
waiving. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976).  
¶15 On appellate review, the issue of whether Van Camp's 
plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered is a 
question of constitutional fact. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
6
283; (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985)(holding that 
voluntariness of a confession is not an issue of fact, but is a 
legal question requiring independent factual determination)). We 
review constitutional questions independent of the conclusion of 
the lower courts. See id. at 283; see also State v. Kywanda F., 
200 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996).  We will not upset 
the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or historical facts 
unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 805.17(2). 
¶16 Applying this standard to the case at bar, and upon 
review of the entire record, we conclude that Van Camp did not 
enter his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 
¶17 Under the procedure this court established in Bangert, 
we employ a two-step process to determine whether a defendant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered a plea of no 
contest.  We must first determine (1) whether the defendant has 
made a prima facie showing that his plea was accepted without 
the trial court's conformance with Wis. Stat. §  971.08,4 and 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 971.08 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) 
Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows: 'If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
7
other mandatory duties imposed by this court, and (2) whether he 
has properly alleged that he in fact did not know or understand 
the information which should have been provided at the plea 
hearing. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  If the defendant 
meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the State, 
and we must determine whether the State has demonstrated by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered at the time 
the court accepts the plea, despite the inadequacy of the 
record. See id. 
¶18 To 
meet 
his 
initial 
burden 
under 
Bangert, 
the 
defendant must satisfy two threshold requirements.  First, he 
must make a prima facie showing that his plea was accepted 
without the trial court's conformance with Wis. Stat. § 971.08, 
or other mandatory duties imposed by this court. See Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Second, the defendant must properly allege 
that he in fact did not know or understand the information which 
should have been provided at the plea hearing. See id.  Van Camp 
met this burden.  
¶19 Both the State and the defendant agree that the plea 
colloquy was woefully inadequate.  The plea hearing transcript 
does not demonstrate a personal, voluntary waiver of Van Camp's 
constitutional rights, and it fails to show he knew or 
understood the potential punishment he faced by entering his 
plea.   
                                                                  
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law.' 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
8
¶20 The trial court failed to conform with the mandatory 
duties imposed by this court.  In Bangert we explained that "[a] 
person must know and understand that constitutional rights are 
waived by the plea in order for the plea to be voluntarily and 
intelligently made." Id. at 270 (citing Edwards v. State, 51 
Wis. 2d 231, 234, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971)).  Invoking our 
supervisory powers, we there held that when accepting a plea of 
no contest, a trial court is required to inform the defendant of 
his rights and to ascertain that the defendant understands he is 
waiving those rights.5  See id. at 271.  
¶21 Nothing in the plea hearing transcript establishes 
that the trial court fulfilled this express obligation.  The 
court did not mention defendant's constitutional rights during 
the plea colloquy.  Nor did the court ask the defendant whether 
he understood he was waiving his rights by entering his plea.  
The record shows that the court failed to follow the provisions 
set forth in Wis. JI—Criminal SM—32, Part V, Waiver of 
Constitutional Rights, and that the judge failed to ask defense 
counsel whether he informed defendant of his constitutional 
rights. 
                     
5 In Bangert, we required that at plea hearings state courts 
must follow the provisions set forth in Wis. JI—Criminal SM-32, 
Part V, Waiver of Constitutional Rights, or specifically refer 
to some portion of the record or communication between defense 
counsel and defendant which affirmatively exhibits defendant's 
knowledge of the constitutional rights he will be waiving.  We 
there stated that: "[t]he express duty to inform the defendant 
of the constitutional rights which he will be waiving, or to 
ascertain that the defendant possesses such knowledge, may be 
considered a seventh duty to be followed by the trial courts." 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 270-72, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) 
(citing Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 674, 170 N.W.2d 713 
(1969)).  
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
9
¶22 We also note that the court failed to abide by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08.  In pertinent part, Wis. Stat. § 971.08 provides 
that before a court accepts a plea of no contest, it shall 
"[a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea 
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the potential punishment if convicted." Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a) (emphasis added).   
¶23 Nothing in the plea hearing transcript establishes 
that Van Camp understood the range of punishments he faced.  The 
court did not provide such information in the plea colloquy or 
ask Van Camp's defense counsel whether he had explained it to 
the defendant.  Nor did the court refer to any part of the 
record or any other evidence showing defendant's knowledge of 
this information.  At the time of entry of his plea, Van Camp 
was entitled to know what could happen to him, including the 
maximum sentence he faced by pleading no contest. See Bartelt, 
112 Wis. 2d at 475; see also State v. Mohr, 201 Wis. 2d 693, 
700, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996).  By accepting Van Camp's 
plea without informing him of the potential punishment he faced, 
the court failed to conform with the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08. 
¶24 Having established that the trial court failed to 
inform him of the constitutional rights he would waive and of 
potential punishment he faced by entering his plea, the 
defendant made a prima facie showing that the court accepted the 
plea without conforming with the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and other mandatory duties imposed by this court.  
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
10 
¶25 After reviewing the record, we believe the State 
waived the issue of whether defendant sufficiently alleged that 
he in fact did not know or understand the information which 
should have been provided at the plea hearing.  Although it 
appears that the defendant never expressly alleged that he did 
not know or understand this information, the State conceded 
during the postconviction hearing that the defendant had made a 
prima facie showing under Bangert and that the burden had 
shifted to the State to show that the defendant had entered his 
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  The State 
failed to challenge the sufficiency of defendant's allegations 
before the trial court or in the briefs submitted to the court 
of appeals. 
¶26 This contention, advanced for the first time in briefs 
before this court, was waived by the State, and we decline to 
consider it.  As a general rule, this court will not address 
issues for the first time on appeal. See Perkins v. Peacock, 263 
Wis. 644, 650, 58 N.W.2d 536 (1953); see also State v. Brown, 96 
Wis. 2d 258, 291 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1980).  The reason for this 
general rule is to give trial courts the opportunity to correct 
errors, thus avoiding appeals. See Herkert v. Stauber, 106 
Wis. 2d 545, 560, 317 N.W.2d 834 (1982).  Had the State raised 
this issue below, the defendant would have had an opportunity to 
cure, and the trial court would have had the opportunity to 
consider, this claimed defect.  We are unpersuaded that justice 
would be served here by entertaining the State's arguments where 
the trial court was not afforded an opportunity to do so. See 
Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-4, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
11 
(1980); Binder v. Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 613, 618, 241 N.W.2d 613 
(1976). 
¶27 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant 
met his initial burden under Bangert.  This does not entitle 
Van Camp to withdraw his plea as a matter of right. See Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 282.  A postconviction review of all relevant 
evidence may reflect that the plea was constitutionally sound.  
The burden, however, shifts to the State to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that Van Camp entered his plea voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently, despite the inadequacy of the 
record at the time of the plea hearing. See id. at 274. 
¶28 Once the burden shifts, the State must show that the 
defendant 
in 
fact 
possessed 
the 
constitutionally required 
understanding and knowledge which the inadequate plea colloquy 
failed to afford him. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275.  Whether 
a plea is voluntary depends in part on whether the defendant 
both knows and understands the nature of the constitutional 
protections he is waiving. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; see also 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 259.  The State, therefore, must show 
that Van Camp possessed both the knowledge and the understanding 
of the relevant constitutional rights he was waiving by entering 
his plea of no contest.  We find that the State failed to make 
such a showing. 
¶29 To meet its burden, the State may utilize any evidence 
which substantiates that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
made.  The State may examine the defendant or defendant's 
counsel and may rely on the entire record to demonstrate that 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
12 
Van Camp knew and understood the constitutional rights he would 
be waiving. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75. 
¶30 At the postconviction hearing, the State chose to call 
just one witness, Van Camp's defense counsel, Attorney Williams. 
 Attorney 
Williams 
testified 
that 
he 
discussed 
the 
plea 
agreement with Van Camp on the evening after the first day of 
trial and on the morning before the second day of trial.  
Importantly, Attorney Williams also testified that he did not 
recall discussing Van Camp's constitutional rights at that time 
or going through a guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form with him: 
 
Q. 
All right.  Now, from whatever point [Van Camp] 
indicated a willingness to resolve the case by a plea, 
from that point forward did you have a chance to 
discuss with him in any way, shape or form any of the 
statutory or constitutional rights such a plea would 
require him to give up? 
 
A. 
I do not have specific memory of that.  It's my 
practice to go over that and say now look, keep in 
mind that these are the rights you're waiving.  I 
don't have specific memory of doing that. 
 
Q. 
So is it possible that you, in fact, did not do 
that with Mr. Van Camp? 
 
A. 
It is possible. 
 
¶31 Based 
upon 
his 
"invariable" 
practice, 
Attorney 
Williams claimed that at some time during representation he had 
gone through the "litany of rights" with Van Camp.  According to 
Attorney Williams's testimony, this most likely occurred when he 
first met with Van Camp on September 10, 1994, some seven months 
prior to the plea hearing. 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
13 
¶32 Attorney Williams's testimony does not establish that 
Van Camp, at the time he entered his plea, knew or understood 
that he was waiving certain constitutional rights.  A plea 
involves a simultaneous waiver of a variety of constitutional 
rights, including the right against self-incrimination, the 
right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's 
accusers. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; see also Edwards, 51 
Wis. 2d at 235.  Although a defendant need not specifically 
waive each right, the record or other evidence must show that he 
understood the rights he was waiving. See Edwards, 51 Wis. 2d at 
235-36; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 270. 
¶33 The record now before us is silent as to whether 
Van Camp understood that he was waiving his rights by entering 
his plea.  At the plea hearing, the court did not inquire from 
Van Camp whether he understood the rights he was waiving.  
Attorney Williams was not asked, nor did he state, whether he 
had advised Van Camp that he was waiving any rights.  Van Camp 
never completed a plea questionnaire or a waiver of rights form. 
  As we explained in Bangert, understanding must have knowledge 
as its antecedent, and knowledge, like understanding, cannot be 
inferred or assumed on a silent record. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 269 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 243).  We refuse to 
infer from this record that Van Camp made "an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment" of his rights, as due process 
requires. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 
(1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). 
¶34 The State argues that the fact that Attorney Williams 
read to Van Camp a litany of rights at their first meeting is 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
14 
sufficient to show that Van Camp both knew and understood the 
constitutional rights he was waiving at the plea hearing.  We 
find this argument unpersuasive.   
¶35 First, the constitutional inquiry whether a plea was 
entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently should not 
focus solely on a "ritualistic litany" of rights. See Henderson, 
426 U.S. at 644.  To accept Attorney Williams's litany of rights 
as sufficient, we would have to elevate procedural form over 
constitutional substance.  This we will not do. 
¶36 From our review of the record, we cannot determine 
whether this litany of rights was a complete list of Van Camp's 
rights, whether Attorney Williams explained each right to Van 
Camp, or whether Van Camp understood each right read to him.  
The record is limited to the testimony of Attorney Williams: 
 
Q. [Attorney Williams,] could you please relate to the 
Court what you include in that litany? 
 
A. 
Sure. 
 
[Defendants] 
have 
a 
presumption 
of 
innocence.  They have the right to remain silent 
throughout the entire prosecution.  They have a right 
to have an attorney represent them.  If they cannot 
afford one, they have a right to presumption of 
innocence.  Trial by jury of twelve.  Right to 
unanimous verdict of that.  Right to have their guilt 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Right to compel the 
attendance of witnesses by writ of subpoena.  That's – 
unanimous verdict, twelve, oh, they have the right to 
have their guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, 
in fact, there is a presumption of innocence that must 
be overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We agree with the defendant that this part of Williams's "mental 
checklist" is at best "a conclusory, incomplete, and confusing 
muddle which even those educated in the law would have a 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
15 
difficult time following."  It is not enough merely to inform 
the defendant or point to a portion of the transcript or other 
evidence which indicates that the defendant possesses some 
knowledge of his rights; the court must also ascertain the 
defendant's understanding of those rights. See Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 269.  We refuse to infer from Attorney Williams's 
testimony that Van Camp both knew and understood the rights he 
was waiving by entering his plea. 
¶37 Second, although the reviewing court may look to the 
record as a whole to show that the defendant understood the 
waiver 
of 
his 
constitutional 
rights, 
the 
defendant's 
understanding must be measured at the time the plea is entered. 
See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283 (citing Edwards, 51 Wis. 2d at 
235-36).  As we stated in Bartelt, the fact that a defendant was 
told 
sometime 
earlier 
of 
his 
rights 
is 
not 
necessarily 
determinative of whether he understood those rights at a later 
time. Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d at 474 n.2.  Accordingly, the fact 
that Attorney Williams read to Van Camp a litany of rights some 
seven months before the plea hearing does not show that at the 
plea hearing Van Camp understood or even remembered the rights 
he was waiving.  The operative time for determining whether a 
defendant understands the effects of a plea remains the plea 
hearing itself. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269. 
¶38 We do recognize that, when based on an adequate 
record, a defendant's past knowledge can support a voluntary and 
knowing plea.  A court, however, must consider the totality of 
the 
circumstances 
when 
making 
such 
a 
determination. 
See 
Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645; see also Brady v. United States, 397 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
16 
U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (concluding voluntariness of defendant's 
plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant 
circumstances surrounding it). 
¶39 In Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court found that a court may reasonably infer 
from the fact that a defendant was fully informed of his rights 
at one point that he was still aware of them nearly two years 
later. Id. at 37.  We agree with the Court's rationale in Parke, 
but we do not believe that such an inference is supported by the 
record before us. 
 ¶40 In Parke, a defendant charged as a persistent felony 
offender challenged the validity of two previous guilty pleas.  
The Court found that the defendant's knowledge of his rights in 
November 1979 permitted an inference that he remained aware of 
them 23 months later. Id. In its decision, the Court relied 
heavily on the government's evidence which showed that in the 
1979 plea proceeding the defendant completed a "Plea of Guilty" 
form stating that he understood the charges against him, the 
maximum punishment he faced, his constitutional rights, and that 
a guilty plea waived those rights. Id. at 24.  In addition, the 
Court noted that the defendant's counsel had verified his own 
signature on another part of the form indicating that he had 
fully explained defendant's rights to him. Id.  The court added 
that the defendant's testimony indicated that his sophistication 
regarding his legal rights had increased substantially after his 
first conviction. Id. at 25. 
¶41 The current record diverges significantly from that 
relied on in Parke.  At the time of the plea, Van Camp was a man 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
17 
62 years of age, with a fourth-grade education and an IQ of 84. 
 Van Camp had never before been in trouble with the law and had 
never completed a plea questionnaire or a waiver of rights form. 
 Unlike the defendant in Parke, Van Camp exhibited an unreliable 
memory and little sophistication regarding his legal rights.  As 
Attorney Williams testified at the July 21, 1995, sentencing 
hearing: 
 
 
I have seen what I believe to be a difficulty of 
Mr. Van Camp to understand certain concepts during the 
course of the representation . . . I've seen a 
deterioration of his memory which I don't believe to 
be selective or brought on . . . I think he and I 
discussed things and then I form certain opinions 
based on facts which he gives me, then these facts are 
not remembered by him at a later time . . . It may be 
the stress of the litigation which has caused this but 
quite frankly I think that the guy is slipping 
mentally. . . 
 
¶42 We agree that when supported by a sufficient record, a 
court may reasonably infer that a defendant is aware of his 
rights from the fact that he was fully informed at some previous 
time.  We do not believe, however, that the current record 
supports such an inference.   
¶43 Based on the foregoing, we find that the State failed 
to carry its burden under Bangert to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that Van Camp knew and understood the 
constitutional rights he waived by entering his plea. See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  We therefore conclude that Van 
Camp did not enter his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.  The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and remanded to the trial court with the direction that the 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
18 
court allow Van Camp to withdraw his plea of no contest as a 
matter of right. 
¶44 Since this conclusion disposes of the appeal now 
before us, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the 
record establishes that Van Camp had sufficient knowledge of the 
potential punishment he faced by entering his plea.  Nor do we 
find it necessary at this time to determine whether the 
information provided to Van Camp regarding the effect of having 
the kidnapping charge read in was necessary or sufficient for 
his plea to be constitutionally valid.    
¶45 To clarify the standard we established in Bangert, we 
do find it necessary to discuss the trial court's consideration 
of both the likely outcome of the case and the victim's feelings 
when determining whether Van Camp entered his plea voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently.  Neither factor is relevant to the 
analysis set out in Bangert or to the constitutional validity of 
a defendant's plea. 
¶46 The circuit court made clear from the beginning of the 
postconviction hearing that its belief that Van Camp had no 
viable defense to the false imprisonment charge was a major 
factor in denying Van Camp's motion to withdraw his plea.  The 
court stated:  "I believe before a withdrawal is a reasonable 
possibility, before withdrawal should be reasonably granted, 
rather there should be some indication that the ultimate outcome 
of the case will be affected."6 
                     
6 At the conclusion of the postconviction hearing, the trial 
judge, denying Van Camp's motion to withdraw his plea, also 
stated: 
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
19 
¶47 We find inappropriate the extent of the trial court's 
reliance on the likely outcome of the case.  It is not proper 
for a trial judge to weigh the convincing power of facts and 
evidence to be entered as sufficient to deny a motion to vacate 
the plea of guilty or no contest.  The perceived lack of a 
defense at trial is irrelevant to the question of whether a 
defendant must be permitted to withdraw a plea under Bangert.  
Rather, the sole focus in such motion is on whether the plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered.  See Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 257.  If not so entered, the defendant is 
absolutely entitled to withdraw the plea and go to trial:   
 
 
A defendant must ordinarily show a manifest 
injustice in order to be entitled to withdraw a guilty 
or no contest plea. . . . When a defendant establishes 
a 
denial 
of 
a 
relevant 
constitutional 
right, 
withdrawal of the plea is a matter of right.  The 
trial court reviewing the motion to withdraw has no 
discretion in the matter in such an instance. 
Id. at 283. 
¶48 Where, as here, the defendant has established a denial 
of his constitutional rights, the trial court should not 
consider whether the outcome of a case will likely change.  Such 
consideration is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor to be 
considered in a motion to withdraw a plea.  The potential 
outcome 
of 
evidence 
does 
not 
display 
the 
defendant's 
                                                                  
And as I indicated, I don't know if a jury would 
have convicted Mr. Van Camp of kidnapping. . . . But I 
believe the evidence on the false imprisonment was 
overwhelming and that these technical objections are 
just delaying the ultimate disposition of the case. 
 
And for those reasons I'm going to deny the 
motions.  And let the matters proceed as they should.  
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
20 
understanding or knowledge of his rights or the charges against 
him. In State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967), we 
made it clear that the probable outcome at trial is unrelated to 
the question whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw 
his or her guilty plea: "The test at this stage is not whether 
the defendant is guilty but whether he was fairly convicted." 
Id. at 386. 
¶49 For similar reasons we also find inappropriate the 
circuit court's consideration of the victim's feelings in 
determining whether to allow Van Camp to withdraw his plea.  In 
denying Van Camp's motion to withdraw his plea, the circuit 
court relied, in part, on its belief that to allow withdrawal 
would further punish the victim, Mr. Geurts.7  As explained 
above, the circuit court's sole focus should have been on 
whether 
Van 
Camp's 
plea 
was 
voluntarily, 
knowingly, 
and 
intelligently entered. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257.  The 
victim's situation, no matter how tragic, is irrelevant in 
determining 
whether 
a 
plea 
was 
constitutionally 
valid.  
Considering Mr. Geurts's feelings was an error of law. 
¶50 Under 
the 
proper 
legal 
standard 
established 
in 
Bangert, the circuit court had no discretion but to allow Van 
                     
7 Denying Van Camp's motion to withdraw his plea, the 
circuit judge stated: 
We've been delaying these penalties now well into what 
should be the second year. . . Mr. Geurts has been 
punished by all these delays . . . I do think that at 
some point the rights of others have to be looked at 
in the process of making legal decisions.  And I do 
think that Mr. Geurts's rights have not been fully 
taken care of in this matter because the man who 
tormented him, who terrorized him for a period of 
several hours . . . is still looking for more justice.  
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
21 
Camp to withdraw his plea as a matter of right.  The circuit 
court's focus on the eventual outcome of a trial, and its desire 
to avoid delay in imposing penalties, have led to increased 
costs, additional delays, and a needless use of judicial 
resources.  By importing improper considerations into the 
analysis mandated by this court in Bangert, the circuit court 
committed an error of law and erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  
¶51 The case is remanded to the trial court with the 
direction to grant Van Camp's motion to withdraw his plea.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.
Nos.  96-0600-CR & 96-1509-CR 
 
 
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