Title: Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787.] 
 
 
PETERS, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. COLUMBUS STEEL CASTINGS CO., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 
 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787.] 
Wrongful death — Survival action — Arbitration — Survival action brought to 
recover for decedent’s own injuries before his or her death is independent 
from a wrongful-death action seeking damages for the injuries that the 
decedent’s beneficiaries suffer as a result of the death, even though the 
same nominal party prosecutes both actions — Decedent cannot bind his 
or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims. 
(No. 2006-0507 – Submitted February 28, 2007 – Decided September 20, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05-AP-308, 2006-Ohio-0382. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
A survival action brought to recover for a decedent’s own injuries before 
his or her death is independent from a wrongful-death action seeking 
damages for the injuries that the decedent’s beneficiaries suffer as a result 
of the death, even though the same nominal party prosecutes both actions. 
2. 
A decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-
death claims. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
I.  Introduction 
{¶1} 
This appeal presents the issue whether the personal representative 
of a decedent’s estate is required to arbitrate a wrongful-death claim when the 
decedent had agreed to arbitrate all claims against the alleged tortfeasor. 
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{¶2} 
In July 2003, William Peters (“Peters”) began working at appellant 
Columbus Steel Castings Company’s steel-forging plant.  This case centers on the 
employment agreement between Peters and the company, which included a 
Dispute Resolution Plan (“the plan”).  Peters signed an agreement to be bound by 
the plan, in which he indicated, “I understand and agree that mediation, and if 
unsuccessful, arbitration under the Dispute Resolution Plan will be my sole and 
exclusive remedies for any legal claims or disputes I may have against the 
Company regarding my employment.”  The plan stated that it applied to “the 
heirs, beneficiaries, successors, and assigns” of the employee. 
{¶3} 
On his eighth day of employment, Peters fell from a height of 
approximately 50 feet while attempting to reach a crane from a catwalk.  The fall 
proved fatal.  Thereafter, Alice Peters (Peters’s widow and the administrator of 
Peters’s estate) brought two causes of action against the company: a survival 
action for injuries Peters sustained prior to his death and a wrongful-death action 
for his beneficiaries’ damages arising from the death.  Both claims alleged that the 
company committed an employer intentional tort that led to Peters’s death. 
{¶4} 
The company moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the plan 
required the claims to be arbitrated.  The trial court determined that while a 
survival claim for Peters’s injuries could be resolved only pursuant to the plan, the 
wrongful-death claim could be brought in court.  Alice Peters subsequently 
dismissed the survival claim to proceed solely on the wrongful-death claim. 
{¶5} 
The company appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s holding.  In doing so, the court of appeals cited our decision in Thompson 
v. Wing (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 637 N.E.2d 917, for the proposition that 
wrongful-death claims are independent actions belonging to the decedent’s next 
of kin, and therefore an administrator’s actions in pursuing damages for injuries to 
the decedent do not release a defendant from liability for wrongful-death claims. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶6} 
We accepted the company’s discretionary appeal of this matter to 
clarify whether an individual may bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their 
wrongful-death claims by agreeing to arbitrate any claims that he or she may have 
against a particular defendant.  For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶7} 
The answer to this issue lies plainly in two longstanding general 
principles of law: (1) only signatories to an arbitration agreement are bound by its 
terms and (2) a survival action brought to recover for a decedent’s own injuries 
before his or her death is independent from a wrongful-death action seeking 
damages for the injuries that the decedent’s beneficiaries suffer as a result of the 
death, even though the same nominal party prosecutes both actions.  These 
principles are discussed in turn. 
{¶8} 
First, there is no dispute that “ ‘arbitration is a matter of contract 
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has 
not agreed so to submit.’ ”1  While arbitration is encouraged as a form of dispute 
resolution, the policy favoring arbitration does not trump the constitutional right 
to seek redress in court.  See id.; ABM Farms Inc. v. Woods (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
498, 500, 692 N.E.2d 574; see, also, Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  
Therefore, unless the company proves that Peters’s beneficiaries specifically 
agreed to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims, they should not be bound to do so. 
{¶9} 
The second principle, which concerns the separate nature of 
survival claims and wrongful-death claims, must be placed in its proper context.  
Although there is no common-law action for wrongful death, R.C. 2125.01 
establishes such a claim in Ohio.  Under this provision, “[w]hen the death of a 
                                                 
1.  Council of Smaller Ents. v. Gates, McDonald & Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 661, 665, 687 
N.E.2d 1352, quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 
U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled 
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not 
ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued * * * shall 
be liable to an action for damages.” 
{¶10} As opposed to a survival claim, through which a decedent’s estate 
may recover for the injuries suffered by the decedent before his death, a wrongful-
death claim belongs to the decedent’s beneficiaries.  Compare R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) 
with R.C. 2305.21.  “Except as provided in this division, a civil action for 
wrongful death shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of the 
decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the 
parents of the decedent * * * and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin 
of the decedent.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2125.02(A)(1).  In evaluating such a 
claim, the trier of fact may award damages for “the injury and loss resulting to the 
beneficiaries * * * by reason of the wrongful death.”  R.C. 2125.02(A)(2).  The 
personal representative is involved to prevent multiplicity of suits and facilitate 
distribution of any sums received from wrongful-death claims to the various 
beneficiaries.  See R.C. 2125.03. 
{¶11} Thus, when an individual is killed by the wrongful act of another, 
the personal representative of the decedent’s estate may bring a survival action for 
the decedent’s own injuries leading to his or her death as well as a wrongful-death 
action for the injuries suffered by the beneficiaries of the decedent as a result of 
the death.  Although they are pursued by the same nominal party, we have long 
recognized the separate nature of these claims in Ohio. 
{¶12} In 1908, we stated that survival actions and wrongful-death actions 
“are not the same,” even though they both relate to the defendant’s alleged 
negligence.  Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine (1908), 77 Ohio St. 395, 
414, 83 N.E. 601.  Thus, the fact that the representative of an estate fully litigates 
a survival action against a defendant does not prevent the representative from also 
January Term, 2007 
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bringing a wrongful-death action against the same defendant.  Id. at paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
{¶13} We expanded on this holding in subsequent decisions, such as 
Thompson.  There, the decedent had obtained a judgment in a medical-
malpractice action against a group of defendants during her life.  Thompson, 70 
Ohio St.3d at 178, 637 N.E.2d 917.  After her death, the personal representative of 
her estate brought a wrongful-death claim against the same defendants.  Id.  The 
defendants alleged that the wrongful-death action was barred by the judgment in 
favor of the decedent in the earlier case.  Id. 
{¶14} In our review, we noted that states generally view such claims in 
one of two different ways.  Id. at 180, 637 N.E.2d 917.  The majority of states 
treat wrongful-death actions as derivative of actions brought for the decedent’s 
own injuries, and thus a recovery by the decedent or the decedent’s estate 
extinguishes the beneficiaries’ right to bring a wrongful-death action.  Id.  
Conversely, a smaller number of states hold that the pursuit by a decedent or a 
decedent’s estate of personal injury claims does not affect subsequent wrongful-
death claims.  Id. 
{¶15} We reiterated in Thompson that the Ohio wrongful-death statute 
follows the minority position: “[T]he injured person cannot defeat the 
beneficiaries’ right to have a wrongful death action brought on their behalf 
because the action has not yet arisen during the injured person’s lifetime. Injured 
persons may release their own claims; they cannot, however, release claims that 
are not yet in existence and that accrue in favor of persons other than 
themselves.”  (Emphasis added.) Id. at 183, 637 N.E.2d 917. 
{¶16} However, we noted that wrongful-death claims share many of the 
same issues as survival claims asserted against the same defendant.  Id. at 184, 
637 N.E.2d 917.  Finding that the close relationships between the decedent and 
his beneficiaries created privity for such claims, we held that collateral estoppel 
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bars the beneficiaries in the wrongful-death action from relitigating issues 
resolved in the decedent’s previous action against that defendant.  Id. at 184, 637 
N.E.2d 917. 
{¶17} Given the statutory language and our precedents, it is clear that 
survival claims and wrongful-death claims are distinct claims that belong to 
separate individuals, even though they are generally brought by the same nominal 
party (the personal representative of the estate).  While we have allowed collateral 
estoppel to apply to such claims, given the deep similarity between the two and 
the privity between a decedent and his or her beneficiaries, there is no mistaking 
the independent nature of these actions. 
{¶18} When Peters signed the arbitration agreement, he agreed to 
arbitrate his claims against the company, whether brought during his life or after 
his death.  Thus, the provision in the agreement binding Peters’s heirs, 
beneficiaries, successors, and assigns applies to a survival action, which is the 
vessel used to pursue his claims after his death. 
{¶19} However, Peters could not restrict his beneficiaries to arbitration of 
their wrongful-death claims, because he held no right to those claims; they 
accrued independently to his beneficiaries for the injuries they personally suffered 
as a result of the death.  See Thompson, 70 Ohio St.3d at 182-183, 637 N.E.2d 
917.  Thus, a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their 
wrongful-death claims.  Id.  The beneficiaries can agree to arbitrate these claims 
themselves, but they are not required to do so.  Because Peters’s beneficiaries did 
not sign the plan or any other dispute-resolution agreement, they cannot be forced 
into arbitration. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶20} Although we have long favored arbitration and encourage it as a 
cost-effective proceeding that permits parties to achieve permanent resolution of 
their disputes in an expedient manner, it may not be imposed on the unwilling.  
January Term, 2007 
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Requiring Peters’s beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims without a 
signed arbitration agreement would be unconstitutional, inequitable, and in 
violation of nearly a century’s worth of established precedent.  As such, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Millisor & Nobil Co., L.P.A., Richard A. Millisor, R. Scot Harvey, and 
Terry E. Lardakis, for appellant. 
 
Rourke & Blumenthal, Michael J. Rourke, and Robert P. Miller; and 
Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., John Vail, Stephen B. Pershing, and 
Jesse R. Merriam, for appellee. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, and 
Bobbie S. Sprader, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce 
and Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Tate & Renner and Richard R. Renner, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
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