Title: Hemmings v. Pelham Wood

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Suzette Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Limited Liability Limited Partnership, et al., No. 56,
September Term, 2002.
[Tort Law – Landlord duty to prevent criminal activity within a leased premises; Held: A
landlord has a duty to repair a known dangerous or defective condition within the areas
under its control to prevent a foreseeable third party attack against a tenant within a
leased premises.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2002
SUZETTE HEMMINGS
 V.
 
PELHAM WOOD LIMITED
LIABILITY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Raker, Cathell and Harrell, JJ. dissent
Filed:   June 16, 2003
Suzette Hemmings petitioned this Court to review an order for summary judgment
entered in favor of Pelham Wood Limited Liability Limited Partnership and RLA
Management, L.L.P. (hereinafter the “Landlord”), the owner and manager, respectively, of
Pelham Wood Apartments (hereinafter “Pelham Wood”).  We granted Ms. Hemmings’
petition to decide whether a landlord has a duty to repair a known dangerous or defective
condition under its control to prevent a foreseeable third party criminal attack upon a tenant
within a leased apartment unit, and whether there is sufficient evidence of such condition to
make summary judgment inappropriate.  For the reasons explained below, we conclude that
the Circuit Court’s entry of summary judgment was in error.
I. Background
A. Facts
On November 25, 1997, Ms. Hemmings, with her husband, Howard Hemmings,
entered into an agreement with the Landlord to lease a two-bedroom apartment at Pelham
Wood, a multi-building apartment complex consisting of four hundred units in Baltimore
County.  The Hemmings’ lease provided in part:
LANDLORD AND TENANT AGREE:
17. That [the] Landlord has the right to enter the [apartment] at
any time by master key or by force, if necessary, to inspect the
Premises, to make repair/alterations in the [apartment] or
elsewhere on [the] Landlord’s property, to enforce any provision
of this Lease or to show the [apartment] to prospective future
tenants or purchasers without being liable to prosecution
therefore, or damages by reason thereof.
* * *
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22. That . . . [the] Landlord shall be responsible for repairs to the
[apartment], its equipment and appliances furnished by [the]
Landlord . . . .
* * *
LANDLORD AGREES:
35. That the [apartment] will be made available such that it will
not contain conditions that constitute, or if not properly
corrected would constitute, a fire hazard or a serious and
substantial threat to the life, health or safety of occupants.
* * *
TENANT AGREES:
45. That [the] Landlord shall not be liable for an injury, damage
or loss to person or property caused by other tenants or other
persons, or caused by theft, vandalism, fire, water, smoke,
explosions or other causes unless the same is exclusively due to
the omission, fault, negligence or other misconduct of [the]
Landlord.
* * *  
RULES AND REGULATIONS
TENANT WILL NOT :
* * * 
7.  Change the locks on the doors of the Premises or install
additional locks, door knockers, chairs or other fasteners without
the prior written permission of [the] Landlord
The Hemmings resided at 5 Lynfair Court, one of several apartment buildings at
Pelham Wood.  Their two-bedroom apartment unit, Apartment A-2, was located on the
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second floor of 5 Lynfair Court, just above the ground level apartment.  A sliding glass door
in the Hemmings’ apartment allowed access to a rear patio balcony overlooking a wooded
area.
In an attempt to deter criminal activity at Pelham Wood, the Landlord had
implemented several security devices.   Howard Gartner, the Landlord’s corporate designee,
stated that “[t]here is exterior lighting around the property [and that] each apartment has a
regular door lock on its front door as well as a dead bolt door lock.”  For the apartments with
patio doors, like the Hemmings’, the Landlord provided “what is commonly referred to as
a Charlie Bar,” a horizontally mounted bar securing the sliding glass door.  In addition, “[t]he
[apartment] windows ha[d] locks on them,” and there was “interior lighting in the [common
area] hallways.”  For the “terrace” or ground level apartments only, the Landlord also
provided alarm systems, which, once armed, generated a “strong and loud noise” when one
opens an apartment door. 
At approximately 1:17 a.m. on June 13, 1998, an unidentified intruder entered the
Hemmings’ apartment through the sliding glass door and, upon encountering Mr. Hemmings
in the apartment bedroom, shot him twice in the abdomen.  Mr. Hemmings died from gunshot
wounds later that morning at the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center.  
After the attack, the Baltimore County Police Department initiated an investigation.
1
The Baltimore County Police Department moved to quash Ms. Hemmings’ subpoena
for documents related to the investigation.  This motion was granted. The incident report,
therefore, provided the only available investigation information from the police. 
-4-
The police incident report of the investigation1 noted that the intruder, who was not known
to Mr. Hemmings, entered the apartment by forcing open the sliding glass door from the
patio. 
Patrick M. Gunning, a contractor whom the Landlord had hired to repair the sliding
glass door in the Hemmings’ apartment on June 22, 1998, noted that the “whole left side of
the [sliding glass door] frame [,the area of] the locking mechanism[,] . . . was totally
mutilated” and that the aluminum frame around the door was “mangled, twisted,” and
“destroyed.”  He also stated that the locking mechanism no longer functioned and that it
appeared irreparable, as if “somebody had taken a jackhammer and actually beat it to death.”
According to Mr. Gunning, the marks on the door and locking mechanism, which he believed
had been caused by an object, were on the exterior side of the door, and no marks appeared
on the interior portion of the door.  As for the middle portion of the sliding door, Mr.
Gunning recalled that “it was flexed outward as far as it could go without actually breaking
the glass.” 
Mr. Gunning also described the remains of a Charlie Bar on the sliding glass door he
repaired.  Mr. Gunning believed a Charlie Bar had been on the door “at one time” because
“the cradle that [the Charlie Bar] lays in” remained attached to the door at the time of his
repairs.  As for the bar itself, though, he found “nothing of a [Charlie] bar whatsoever.”  Mr.
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Gunning replaced the old “housing mechanism,” disposing of it and furnishing an entirely
new Charlie Bar for the door.
Several tenants of the apartment building where the Hemmings lived, 5 Lynfair Court,
recalled the state of the lighting around their building prior to the Hemmings incident.  One
indicated that there was “not a light fixture against the wall . . . outside of [her] apartment”
in the rear of 5 Lynfair Court.  Another who lived immediately below the Hemmings’
apartment at the time of the incident, described the lighting at the rear of the building as
follows: “Pitch dark.  You can’t see anything.  Even if I would look outside, I couldn’t
identify anyone in that area because it is really dark.” That tenant stated that the front of 5
Lynfair Court was well lit but that the back of the building was not equipped with a working
light and was “too dark.”  Still another tenant of 5 Lynfair Court recalled that the back of the
building had “always been dark” until the Landlord added additional lighting “[w]ay after”
the Hemmings incident.   
The Pelham Wood property manager at the time of the shooting, Marsha Sultan,
provided a description of the exterior lighting around 5 Lynfair Court.  She stated that there
is a light on the front “entrance door into the building,” a roof light facing the “side of the
building,” and a roof light “in the back of the building.”  Ms. Sultan was not sure whether
this exterior lighting was working “at the time Mr. Hemmings was shot.”
Mr. Gartner, the Landlord’s corporate designee, also declared that he could not tell
“one way or the other” whether the exterior lights of 5 Lynfair Court were functioning on
2
The police department’s list of reported calls indicates that an additional forty calls
were made to report burglaries occurring at Pelham Wood.
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June 13, 1998.  He was certain, however, that no lights were in place on the balcony of 5
Lynfair Court on that date.
The Police Department had filed crime reports for twenty nine burglaries or attempted
burglaries and two armed robberies that had occurred at Pelham Wood over the two-year
period preceding the incident involving Mr. Hemmings.2  One of the alleged armed robberies
took place inside an apartment unit; the other involved an assailant who, bearing a sub-
machine gun, approached the victim from the woods near an apartment building.  The crime
reports further indicated that, in five of the burglaries, the intruder had entered the apartment
through its sliding glass door.
A call report list, which the Police Department maintains to track telephone calls
requesting police service, listed several violent crimes that had occurred at Pelham Wood.
The listed crimes included kidnaping, rape, attempted rape, armed robbery, unarmed robbery,
and numerous incidents of first or second-degree assaults, one of which had occurred at 5
Lynfair Court.  The report list also included crimes against property such as theft and
burglary, and breaking and entering.  One report indicated that a theft had occurred at 5
Lynfair Court on November 8, 1996.  Another report indicated that, on October 3, 1996,
there had been a burglary of the same apartment that the Hemmings later had leased.  The
crime report form describing that burglary, the occurrence of which the downstairs tenants
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recalled, stated that the intruders entered the apartment through the “rear patio door” using
an “un[known] tool to gain entry [through the] patio.” 
In addition, the Landlord maintained files with tenant complaints about criminal
activity in and around the apartment complex.  During the period between July 1, 1995, and
June 30, 1998, Tenants had complained about various types of criminal activities:  armed
robbery, robbery, threats at gunpoint, theft within apartment units, vandalism, apartment
break-ins, burglaries and attempted burglaries, theft from a balcony, theft in common areas,
and drug use in common areas.  Furthermore, of these tenant complaints, four mentioned
burglaries, two complained of attempted burglaries, and one involved a robbery.
Other than the tenant complaints, the Landlord did not keep records of criminal
activity at Pelham Wood.  Nevertheless, Mr. Gartner stated that the Police Department, on
two occasions, requested the Landlord’s assistance in conducting surveillance for suspected
criminal activity.  Gartner also stated that, on “three or four [occasions] in 17 years,” he had
been present when police officers had stopped by the Pelham Wood rental office to report
incidents of crime that had occurred on the premises.  Additionally, about four or five times
per year, tenants had complained to the rental office about break-ins at Pelham Wood, and
the rental manager had informed Mr. Gartner of the complaints.  
Ms. Sultan stated that she “ha[sn’t] had that much knowledge of crime happening” at
Pelham Wood and never has contacted the Police Department concerning its records of crime
at Pelham Wood.  Neither has she reviewed any police reports of criminal activity on the
3
Ms. Hemmings amended her complaint twice, once on July 22, 1999, and again on
August 23, 1999.  These final allegations appear in Ms. Hemmings’ second amended
complaint. 
-8-
premises.
B. Procedural History
On June 14, 1999, Ms. Hemmings filed wrongful death and survival claims against
the Landlord in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  Among Ms. Hemmings’ allegations,
she stated that the Landlord “failed to exercise reasonable care in taking sufficient
precautions to prevent harm from occurring to [the Hemmings]” and “negligently allow[ed]
dangerous conditions to remain unaddressed at the Hemmings’ apartment.”3
After the parties conducted discovery, the Landlord and Ms. Hemmings filed cross
motions for summary judgment.  The Landlord posited that it “owed no duty to Mr. and Mrs.
Hemmings to protect them from the violent crime” because “[t]he murder took place in the
victim’s apartment rather than in the common area of the apartment building.”  The Landlord
contended, additionally, that it had “fulfilled all of the security measures that they voluntarily
undertook at the Hemmings’ apartment and the apartment complex.” In response, Ms.
Hemmings argued that the Landlord, as a matter of law, owed a “legal duty to provide
adequate security to prevent the criminal activity” by inter alia “provid[ing] adequate
exterior lighting” and by “adequately secur[ing] the Hemmingses’ apartment . . . .”  
The Circuit Court heard arguments on the motions on July 30, 2001 and, that same
day, decided that summary judgment in favor of the Landlord should be granted.  In the
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Circuit Court’s view, the Landlord acted within the standard of care by providing working
locks on the apartment doors.  The Circuit Court Judge explained his reasoning orally:
I mean, I can’t get by the first tier.  You say on one hand that the
intruder had to break in.  That obviously means the place was
secure and there were locks that properly worked and the door
was secured.  And if there was nothing wrong with it and he
didn’t break in, that means the tenant in this particular case
allowed the intruder in.  Under either theory, I don’t see where
there is any duty of the landlord to go any further than that.  I
think the Court of Special Appeals will have to sort it out.
Ms. Hemmings appealed to Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the summary
judgment, holding that “[f]rom the facts presented, a fact finder would be constrained to
conclude that there could be no showing that [the Landlord’s] failure to maintain the
common areas was the proximate cause of the fatal event.”  Hemmings v. Pelham Wood, 144
Md. App. 311, 323-24, 797 A.2d 851, 859 (2002).  Although the intermediate appellate court
recognized that the Landlord had a duty to provide reasonable security against criminal acts
in the common areas of the apartment complex, it refused to apply this duty to require
protection from criminal acts that occur within the leased premises.  Id. at 319 & n.6, 797
A.2d at 856 & n.6.
We granted Ms. Hemmings’ petition for a writ of certiorari, Hemmings v. Pelham
Wood, 370 Md. 268, 805 A.2d 265 (2002).  We combine and rephrase the questions in her
petition as follows:
Does a landlord have a duty to repair a known dangerous or
defective condition under its control to prevent a foreseeable
third party attack upon a tenant within the leased premises, and
4
Ms. Hemmings’ petition for writ of certiorari presented the following three questions:
1.
Does the mere fact that a tenant is murdered by an
unknown intruder within the demised premises after
breaking and entering preclude a landlord’s liability
under circumstances in which the landlord has retained
control over and assumed a duty to provide adequate
exterior lighting to deter crime, and the landlord’s failure
to provide such lighting in the common areas enhanced
the risk of criminal activity?
2.
Does the mere fact that a tenant is murdered within the
demised premises after a breaking and entering though
the sliding glass door of the apartment’s rear balcony
preclude a landlord’s liability under circumstances in
which the landlord voluntarily assumed a duty to provide
a “charlie bar” to prevent forcible entry and there is
evidence that the landlord failed to so provide?
3.
Whether a landlord, aware of an extensive criminal
history on the property, has a duty to provide tenants
adequate security for the premises irrespective of
whether the criminal activity at issue occurred inside the
common areas under circumstances in which there are
allegations that the landlord was negligent with respect
to the management of common areas under its control
and that the landlord’s mismanagement caused injury
within the leased premises?
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was there sufficient evidence of such condition to make
summary judgment inappropriate?4
We answer this question in the affirmative.
II. Standard of Review
This Court exercises plenary review over a trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment.  See Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359, 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002);
Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443, 795 A.2d 715, 720 (2002).
Nevertheless, “ordinarily we will not affirm the granting of a summary judgment for a reason
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not relied upon by the trial judge.”  Cheney v. Bell National Life Ins., 315 Md. 761, 764, 556
A.2d 1135, 1137 (1989); see Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d
1333, 1339-40 (1986); Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Ctr., 313 Md. 301, 314 n.5, 545
A.2d 658, 664 n.5 (1988). 
In reviewing an order for summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court
conformed to the requirements under Maryland Rule 2-501(e), which provides that “[t]he
court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor
judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Therefore, in reviewing the
Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment, we must first determine whether material facts
are in dispute.   Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154-55, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003).  If no
material facts are disputed, our inquiry becomes whether the Circuit Court “was legally
correct,” or, in other words, correctly determined that the Landlord was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.  Id. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933.  Furthermore, when reviewing a trial court’s
order for summary judgment, we construe the facts properly before the court as well as
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  Id. (citing Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000)). 
In Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 355-56, 744 A.2d 47, 53-54 (2000), we recently
discussed the role of summary judgment in determining matters that ordinarily are reserved
for the fact-finder, such as knowledge, intent, or motive:
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As was explained in Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md.1984), summary judgment
is generally not appropriate for issues concerning knowledge,
motive, or intent because “the facts concerning the defendant's
knowledge and conduct, and the circumstances in which they
existed, as well as any determinations of how they  relate to the
legal standard . . . are best left for resolution by the trier of fact
at trial.” Id. at 1213. See e.g. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc.
547 F.2d 1329, 1345 (7th Cir. 1977)(“Summary judgment
motions are  particularly inappropriate vehicles by which to
judge subjective considerations such as motive, intent, or
knowledge.”). See also, Staren v. American National Bank  and
Trust Company of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1257, 1261-62 (7th Cir.
1976); Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th
Cir. 1974); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218  (2d
Cir.1968), cert. denied, Manley v. Shoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906, 89
S. Ct.  1747, 23 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969).
III. Discussion
To succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove four well-established
elements: “‘(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2)
that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and
(4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.’”
Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933 (quoting Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County,
370 Md. 447, 486, 805 A.2d 372, 395 (2002) (quoting Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md.
544, 549, 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999) (quoting BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 43, 656 A.2d
307, 311 (1995)))).  Because whether one party owed a duty to another requires a legal
determination based on statutes, rules, principles, and precedents, it is ordinarily for the court
rather than the jury to decide.  Valentine, 353 Md. at 549, 727 A.2d at 949 (“[T]he existence
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of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court.”); see also W. Page Keeton,
et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 37, at 236 (5th ed., 1984) (“[W]hether the interest of the
plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the
defendant . . . . is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of
statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law . . . .”).  We have defined
duty as “‘an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a
particular standard of conduct toward another.’”  Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933-34
(quoting  Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 486, 805 A.2d at 395 (quoting Ashburn v. Anne
Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986))).
The resolution of the present matter turns on our evaluation of the first two
negligence elements:  duty and breach.  Ms. Hemmings argues that the Landlord’s duty
involves more than providing working locks on apartment doors, as the Circuit Court’s ruling
suggested.  Instead, she maintains, the Landlord must maintain the areas under its control to
prevent an attack upon a tenant within the apartment unit.  She claims that, among other
allegations, the Landlord controlled and failed to maintain the exterior lighting located within
the common areas  
The Landlord counters that it owed no duty to protect Mr. Hemmings from the
criminal act because “it had no control over any aspect of the break-in.”  For example,
according to the Landlord, it “did not have day-to-day control over the apartment’s locks,”
and “only the Hemmings could utilize the security devices provided to them to keep crime
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out of their home.”  The Landlord further contends that it did not breach any duty owed to
Mr. Hemmings because it had “no notice of any defect in, or inadequacy of, any security
measures that were in place” at the time of the Hemmings incident.
A.
When a landlord has leased property but has not parted control with a portion of it, we
have held that the landlord may be liable for a foreseeable injury caused by a known
dangerous or defective condition located within the part of the property over which the
landlord retained control.  As our discussion will highlight, the duty of a landlord in these
cases depends on the existence of three circumstances: (1) the landlord controlled the
dangerous or defective condition; (2) the landlord had knowledge or should have had
knowledge of the injury causing condition; and (3) the harm suffered was a foreseeable result
of that condition.
A landlord’s control over conditions on its premises always has been a critical factor
that we consider in determining landlord liability.  Judge Eldridge, speaking recently for the
majority of the Court in Matthews v. Amberwood Assoc., 351 Md. 544, 557, 719 A.2d 119,
125 (1998), described our traditional emphasis in premises liability cases addressing the
landlord’s control over the dangerous or defective condition:
[A] common thread running through many of our cases
involving circumstances in which landlords have been held
liable (i.e., common areas, pre-existing defective conditions in
the leased premises, a contract under which the landlord and
tenant agree that the landlord shall rectify a defective condition)
is the landlord’s ability to exercise a degree of control over the
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defective or dangerous condition and to take steps to prevent
injuries arising therefrom.
Conversely, when a landlord has turned over control of a leased premises to a tenant,
it ordinarily has no obligation to maintain the leased premises for the safety of the tenant.
See  Matthews, 351 Md. at 556-57, 719 A.2d at 125  (“The principal rationale for the general
rule that the landlord is not ordinarily liable for injuries caused by defects or dangerous
conditions in the leased premises is that the landlord ‘has parted with control.’”) (quoting
Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161 A. 172, 172 (1932)); Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell,
227 Md. 454, 457, 177 A.2d 263, 265 (1962) (“Mere ownership of land or buildings does not
render the owner liable for injuries sustained by tenants or invitees rightfully on the premises,
for the owner is not an insurer of such persons but owes them the duty only to exercise
ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe.”); Marshall, 162 Md. at 689, 161 A. at
172 (“The law is well settled that, when the owner has parted with his control [of a leased
premises], the tenant has the burden of the proper keeping of the premises, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary; and for any nuisance created by the tenant the landlord is not
responsible.”).
In Matthews, Judge Eldridge included “common areas” among the portions of a
landlord’s property over which it retains control.  This reference to “common areas” relates
to situations “where a landlord leases separate portions of a property to different tenants and
reserves under his control halls, stairways, and other portions of the property used in common
by all tenants.”  Elmar Gardens, Inc., 227 Md. at 457, 177 A.2d at 265 (citing Landay v.
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Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 150 A.2d 739 (1959)).  In such situations, we have required landlords to
“exercise ordinary care and diligence to maintain the [common areas] in a reasonably safe
condition.”  Langley Park Apartments v. Lund Adm’r, 234 Md. 402, 407, 199 A.2d 620, 623
(1964).  “This Court, thus, has sustained landlord liability for injuries that occur in common
areas within the landlord’s control where it can be shown that the landlord knew or had
reason to know the danger existed.”  Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 675, 714 A.2d 881,
885 (1998).
We have applied this duty of a landlord to cases in which a tenant’s injury has
occurred within the common areas.  For example, we have held that the landlord is liable for
dangerous or defective physical conditions within common areas when the landlord knew of
the condition.  See Langley Park Apts., 234 Md. at 409-10, 199 A.2d at 624.  In Langley Park
Apts., a tenant suffered injuries when she slipped and fell on an icy walkway in the common
areas of the landlord’s apartment complex. Id. at 403-04, 199 A.2d at 621. We held that: 
an accumulation of ice or snow upon the common approaches to
tenement houses or multi-family apartment buildings may result
in imposing on the landlord liability for injuries due to it,
provided he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, of the existence of a dangerous condition and
failed to act within a reasonable time thereafter to protect
against injury by reason of it.
Id. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624.  Explaining the rationale for this holding and focusing on the
landlord’s control over the premises and its knowledge of the dangerous condition, we
stressed that, between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord was in the better position to
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abate the danger posed by icy common walkways.  Id. at 408, 199 Md. at 623; see also
Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 433-36, 298 A.2d 27, 31-32 (1972)
(holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained by the dangerous condition of a clothes dryer
in the laundry room of an apartment complex); Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75,
81-82, 227 A.2d 226, 230-31 (1967) (reversing directed verdict in favor of landlord where
there was evidence that landlord had knowledge of the dangerous condition of the building’s
entranceway door but failed to take preventative steps to ensure the guest’s safety).
By virtue of its control over the common areas, a landlord must exercise reasonable
care to keep the tenant safe not only from known defective or dangerous physical conditions,
such as icy common walkways, but also from certain criminal acts committed within the
common areas.  Scott v, Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d, 548, 554.  In Scott, a tenant’s
surviving child claimed, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, that
the landlord had breached a duty “to protect [the tenant] from criminal acts of third parties
committed in common areas within their control.”  Id. at 161, 359 A.2d at 549-50.  The
District Court certified and we answered questions regarding various aspects of a landlord’s
duty where a tenant had been murdered by a third party in the common areas of an apartment
building.  In answering one certified question, we found that the landlord to tenant
relationship was not the sort of “special relationship” that gives rise to a “special duty” in
tort, such as that of the common carrier to passenger relationship.  Id. at 166-67, 359 A.2d
at 552-53.  We declined, therefore, to impose a “special duty . . . upon the landlord to protect
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[its] tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord’s premises.”  Id. at
166, 359 A.2d at 554.  Nevertheless, we recognized that general principles of negligence
require a landlord to “exercise reasonable care for the tenant’s safety” in the common areas.
Id. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.  
Another certified question in Scott concerned the duty where the landlord has
knowledge of criminal activity having taken place on the landlord’s premises.  Id. at 168, 359
A.2d at 552.  The landlord’s duty in that situation involves an affirmative obligation to
provide reasonable security measures, as we explained:  
If the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity
against persons or property in the common areas, he then has a
duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing
circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the
criminal activity.  We think this duty arises primarily from
criminal activities existing on the landlord’s premises, and not
from knowledge of general criminal activities in the
neighborhood.
Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.  For guidance in determining what criminal activity gives rise
to this duty, we stated: 
Since the landlord can affect the risk [of injury to its tenants]
only within [its] own premises, ordinarily only criminal acts
occurring on the landlord’s premises, and of which he knows or
should have known (and not those occurring generally in the
surrounding neighborhood) constitute relevant factors in
determining, in the particular circumstances, the reasonable
measures which a landlord is under a duty to take to keep the
premises safe. 
Id.  Knowledge is essential to establishing a landlord’s duty under Scott.  Once a landlord has
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knowledge or should have knowledge that criminal activity on the premises has created a
dangerous condition, the landlord must take reasonable measures to eliminate or, in other
words, correct the condition contributing to the criminal activity.
Besides control and knowledge 
of a dangerous or defective condition on the landlord’s
premises, our cases have found foreseeability of harm to be an important element in
establishing a landlord’s duty.  We stated in Matthews that, in determining whether a duty
exists “where the risk created is one of personal injury . . . the principal determination of duty
becomes foreseeability.”  Matthews, 351 Md. 561, 719 A.2d at 127 (quoting Jacques v. First
National Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d  756, 759-60 (1986).  In Brown,
we recognized that “foreseeability” was a prerequisite test for determining a landlord’s duty
to correct a dangerous condition caused by lead paint in a leased premises.  357 Md. at 362,
744 A.2d at 57.  To establish foreseeability, the plaintiff must present facts showing that a
person of ordinary intelligence, who is equipped with the knowledge of the dangerous
condition, should realize the danger posed by that condition.  Id.  The test for foreseeability
“encompasses what a person of ordinary prudence should realize, not what he or she actually
did know or realize.”  Id.  Stated differently, a particular harm is foreseeable if a person of
ordinary prudence should realize that the condition of which he or she has notice, enhances
the likelihood that the harm will occur.  
Applying this element of foreseeability requires examining the harm caused by the
criminal act against the tenant.  A landlord’s duty under Scott obligates the landlord to take
-20-
reasonable security measures to eliminate harm that is foreseeable, based on the nature of the
known criminal activity on the premises.  On the other hand, if the harm is not the sort of
harm that a landlord of ordinary intelligence would associate with that criminal activity, the
duty does not attach.  
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Special Appeals refused to apply our holding
in Scott, reasoning that Scott “is not controlling because the case sub judice involves an act
that occurred [not within a common area but] within the leased premises.” Hemmings, 144
Md. App. at 317 n.4, 797 A.2d at 855 n.4.  Ms. Hemmings urges this Court, however, that
Scott should apply to the instant case because we have held that a landlord may be liable
when a tenant suffers a foreseeable injury in the leased premises caused by a landlord’s
failure to use reasonable care for the tenant’s safety in the common areas.  We find Ms.
Hemmings’ argument persuasive.
As two of our cases illustrate, a landlord is not necessarily immune from liability
because a tenant’s injury occurs within a leased premises, rather than within common areas,
if an uncorrected defect in the common area adversely affects occupants of the leased
premises.  In 2310 Madison Ave., Inc., v. Allied Bedding Mfg., 209 Md. 399, 408-10, 121
A.2d 203, 209-10 (1956), we held a landlord responsible for damage to a tenant’s property
in a leased premises because the damage resulted from the known defective condition of a
water drainage system common to all tenants and under the landlord’s control.  We
underscored the landlord’s control and knowledge of the defective condition.  As to the
-21-
landlord’s control, we stated: “[The] draining apparatus or appliance was not part of the
demised premises in the occupation of the plaintiff.  It was something used for the benefit
of the whole building.”  Id. at 411, 121 A.2d at 210.  We also were convinced that “notice
[of the defect] was given in ample time to have the defect repaired before the last overflow,
which caused the injury to the [tenant’s] goods . . . .”  Id. at 412, 121 A.2d at 210.  Although
the tenant’s injury occurred in the leased premises, we applied the “rule of liability . . . in
which a landlord is responsible for injuries sustained by tenants through negligence in or
upon those parts or appurtenances of demised premises which remain under the charge and
control of the landlord.”  Id. at 411-12, 121 A.2d at 210.  
Kinnier v. Adams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 120 A. 838 (1923), which we relied upon in
2310 Madison Ave., is similarly applicable.  In Kinnier, a tenant’s property kept in the rented
basement and ground floor of the landlord’s building was damaged from water that leaked
from the floor above.  Id. at 306, 120 A. at 839.  The damaging water sprang from a burst
pipe over which the landlord exercised control.  Id. at 308-09, 120 A. at 840.
Notwithstanding that the harm occurred within the leased premises, we allowed the jury to
determine whether the water damage resulted from the landlord’s  failure to prevent
“‘injuries to a tenant . . . caused by the [landlord’s] neglect to remedy defects in, or by [its]
improper management of, appliances of which he retains control.’”  Id. at 307, 120 A. at 839
(quoting 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant § 91 at 641-46 (1910)).
Our holdings in 2310 Madison Ave. and Kinnier support the proposition that a
-22-
landlord’s duty to maintain safe common areas is not limited to preventing harm that occurs
only within the common areas.  Rather, negligent maintenance of or failure to correct a
known defect in areas under the control of the landlord may result in liability for injuries that
occur within the leased premises.  It follows, therefore, that the duty to use reasonable care
for the tenant’s safety within the common areas also may apply to injuries suffered from
criminal acts within the leased premises.  In other words, the fact that a criminal attack
occurred within a leased apartment unit does not preclude the application of the duties set
forth in Scott. 
The Landlord argues, nevertheless, that the decision of the Court of Special Appeals
comports with the law of other jurisdictions.  In support of this contention, it cites only one
case, Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc., 441 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1994).  In Cramer,
the court held that a landlord of an apartment complex had no duty to protect its tenant from
a murder within the leasehold that occurred following an apartment break-in.  Id. at 318-19.
Although the facts in Cramer virtually mirror those in the case sub judice, we cannot
reconcile the South Carolina court’s holding with the law in Maryland.  “Under South
Carolina law a landlord does not owe a duty to a tenant to provide security in and around a
leased premises to protect the tenant from criminal activity of third parties.”  Id. at 319.
South Carolina, consequently, would not permit a tenant to recover from a landlord for any
injury resulting from the criminal act of a third party, even if that attack occurred within
common areas and could have been prevented by reasonable security measures.  In Maryland,
5
To support its conclusion that the Landlord could not be held responsible for a
criminal attack to a tenant within the leased premises, the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals discussed several additional cases from other states.  Hemmings, 144 Md. App. at
319-23, 797 A.2d at 856-58.  These cases are, however, distinguishable.
The court first discussed Fields v. Moore, 953 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App. 1997). In that
case the court refused to hold the landlord liable for the injuries of a tenant who was sexually
assaulted in her rented house by another tenant who lived nearby on property also owned by
the landlord.  The court concentrated on the foreseeability of the crime.  It found that the
landlord could not have foreseen the assailant’s crime because it did not have knowledge that
the assailant previously had committed a violent crime.  The court in Fields, however, never
acknowledged any distinction between landlord liability for crimes committed within a leased
premises and crimes committed in common areas. 
The Court of Special Appeals also relied on two Michigan cases, Samson v. Saginaw
Prof’l Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975), and Williams v. City of Detroit, 339
N.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).  In Samson, the court resolved a controversy involving
a criminal attack in the common areas of a landlord’s multi-unit facility.  Id. at 849.  As the
court stated, though, it did not have to answer whether “the landlord retains any responsibility
for actions which occur within the confines of the [] leased premises.”  Id.  Only in dicta did
the court suggest that a landlord “would not retain any responsibility for such actions [in the
leased premises] except in the most unusual circumstances.”
In Williams, the Court of Appeals of Michigan did address a tenant injury that resulted
from a third party attack within a leased premises.  The court cited Samson and did not
impose liability on the landlord.  The distinction between Williams and the case before us is
that, in Williams, the tenant, by contract, expressly assumed the responsibility to provide
security within the leased premises Id. at 218; under the Hemmings’ lease, however, the
tenant had no express responsibility to provide its owns security.  See supra pages 2-3
(reciting relevant provisions of the Hemmings’ lease).
Finally, Maryland’s intermediate appellate court looked to a Missouri case that was
-23-
this is simply not the case.  Scott explicitly imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords, in
particular circumstances, to take reasonable security measures to prevent certain criminal
activity.  278 Md. at 167-69, 359 A.2d at 353-54.  Unlike under South Carolina law, the
failure to provide reasonable security in Maryland may result in landlord liability for injuries
caused by a third party’s criminal acts.  The Landlord’s reliance on Cramer is, therefore,
misplaced.5
decided on the pleadings.  Advance Rental Centers, Inc. v. Brown, 729 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).  In Advance Rental Centers, the court held that the plaintiff tenant failed to
allege  the necessary elements of a cause of action against the landlord for a theft from the
rented premises:
The petition does not allege any “special circumstances”
suggesting the defendants were in a superior position to be
aware of criminal acts and guard against them.  The petition
does not suggest the existence of prior similar crimes which
might have put the [landlords] on guard.  Neither is there any
allegation indicating that defendants had retained any control of
that portion of the premises from which the theft had occurred.
. . . We hold that in the absence of such allegations of special
circumstances, no cause of action is stated against a landlord for
a breach of duty to protect his tenant from criminal acts of third
parties.
Id. at 646.  The “special circumstances” required in Advance Rental Centers do not focus on
the place where the tenant injury occurred.  Rather, like under Maryland law, the central
inquiry involves whether the landlord controlled the condition that contributed to the criminal
activity.  Also like the cases in Maryland, Advance Rental Centers does not limit possible
landlord liability to crimes that occur outside the leased premises. 
-24-
Various of our sister states share our view that a landlord’s negligent maintenance of
a common area may lead to liability for criminal acts within a leasehold.  In Duncavage v.
Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), the court held that the representative of
a deceased tenant stated a cause of action by alleging that the landlord’s negligent
maintenance of common areas proximately caused the rape and murder of the tenant within
the apartment unit.  The Court of Appeals of Georgia came to a similar conclusion in Jackson
v. Post Properties, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 259, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).  There, the court held that
the tenant had presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine whether the
landlord, by inadequately maintaining the common areas, had breached its “duty to exercise
ordinary care to prevent [a] foreseeable third-party criminal attack[] upon [a] tenant[]”within
-25-
a leased apartment unit.  Id. at 261, 263; see also Guadagno v. Terrace Tenants Corp., 691
N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the landlord’s duty “to take minimal
precautions to protect tenants from . . . foreseeable criminal conduct” applied when common
areas were inadequately secured and the tenant’s apartment was burglarized); Czerwinski v.
Sunrise Point Condominium, 540 So.2d 199, 200-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(recognizing
that the landlord owed a duty to provide security against foreseeable criminal attack upon a
tenant in her leased apartment unit).
Having determined that Scott may apply to harm occurring within the leased premises
as well as within the common areas, it is useful, at this point, to summarize what is required
to establish a landlord’s duty to provide reasonable security measures.  A landlord has a legal
duty to take reasonable security measures within the common areas when: (1) the landlord
had knowledge or should have had knowledge of criminal activity having taken place on the
premises, and (2) a landlord of ordinary intelligence, based on the nature of the past criminal
activity, should have foreseen the harm suffered.
B.
Once a landlord takes reasonable security measures to eliminate conditions that
contribute to criminal activity on the premises, all of its duties with respect to those
measures have not been fulfilled necessarily.  Rather, a landlord has a continuing obligation
to properly carry out the security measures it provides.  See Scott, 278 Md. at 171, 359 A.2d
at 555.  In Scott, we recited the “elementary principle of tort law” that “even if no duty
-26-
existed to employ the particular level of security measures provided by [a landlord], improper
performance of such a voluntary act could in particular circumstances constitute a breach of
duty.”  Id.; see Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 155, 110 A.2d 683, 686 (1955) (“Where the
landlord undertakes to repair or improve the rented premises, whether or not he is bound by
covenant to repair, he must exercise reasonable care in making such repairs or improvements,
and he will be liable for any injuries sustained by the tenants as a result of his negligence, just
as he would be if he were obligated by a covenant in the lease to do the work.”).  
We believe that, to properly perform the security measures provided, the landlord has
a duty to maintain and regularly inspect the devices implemented to deter criminal activity.
That is, if the security devices that the landlord provides require regular maintenance or
inspection for them to properly function, the landlord must do what is reasonable to maintain
or inspect the devices.  This obligation is analogous to a landlord’s duty to “exercise ordinary
care and diligence to maintain [areas under its control] in a reasonably safe condition.”
Langley, 234 Md. at 407, 199 A.2d at 623.  See  W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton
on Torts § 63, at 440 (5th ed., 1984) (“[A landlord] is . . . under an affirmative obligation to
inspect and repair [common areas] for the protection of the lessee.”).
Other states also require landlords to maintain their security measures.  Walls v.
Oxford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1993) (recognizing that a landlord that
provides lighting as a security measure “for the exterior of an apartment building might be
held liable for failing to insure that the lighting functioned properly”); see, e.g., Sharp v.
-27-
W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 509 (Idaho 1990) (“A landlord, having voluntarily provided
a security system, is potentially subject to liability if the security system fails as a result of
the landlord’s negligence.”); Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 459 (Okla. 1987) (“[B]y
retaining control over aspects of the premises such as door and window locks or alarm
devices which directly relate to security, the landlord faces potential liability when the
circumstances are such that a reasonable man would realize that a failure to act would render
one relying on those actions susceptible to criminal acts.”); Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742,
747 (Pa. 1984) (stating that a tenant may expect that voluntarily provided “program [of
security] will be reasonably pursued and not fail due to its negligent exercise”). 
The facts of the present case show that the Landlord provided exterior lighting at
Pelham Wood as a security measure intended to deter criminal activity.  Thus, it had a duty
to adequately maintain that lighting.
IV. Conclusion
In the case before us, the Circuit Court ruled that the Landlord fulfilled any duty to
the Hemmings solely by providing a working lock on the patio door.  The ruling, which was
issued orally, stated:
I mean, I can’t get by the first tier.  You say on one hand that the
intruder had to break in.  That obviously means the place was
secure and there were locks that properly worked and the door
was secured.  And if there was nothing wrong with it and he
didn’t break in, that means the tenant in this particular case
allowed the intruder in.  Under either theory, I don’t see where
-28-
there is any duty of the landlord to go any further than that.  I
think the Court of Special Appeals will have to sort it out.
This analysis inaccurately described the Landlord’s duty and insufficiently contemplated the
relevant considerations for determining whether the Landlord owed a duty and, thereafter,
breached that duty.  We believe the appropriate analysis demands a closer examination of the
facts in the record to determine whether the Landlord breached its duty in this case.
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT W ITH THIS
OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
Dissenting Opinions follow:
-29-
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-00909
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2002
SUZETTE HEMMINGS
v.
PELHAM WOOD LIMITED LIABILITY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting opinion by Raker, J.,
in which Cathell and Harrell, JJ., join
 
Filed:    June 16, 2003
Raker, J., dissenting, joined by Cathell, J., and Harrell, J.
I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  See Hemmings v. Pelham Wood, 144 Md. App.
311, 797 A.2d 851 (2002).  The Court of Special Appeals held that the landlord did not owe
a duty to protect the tenant from criminal activity committed by third persons within the
premises demised to the tenant, an area in which the landlord was no longer able to exert
control.  I agree.
Plaintiff, Suzette Hemmings, brought a wrongful death and survival action alleging
lack of adequate security and lighting in and around the leased premises as the proximate
cause of her husband’s death.  In plaintiff’s second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged as
follows:
¶ 6.  Prior to June 13, 1998, complaints had been made notifying
the Defendants of criminal activity in and around the Pelham
Wood Apartments and of the vulnerability of specific buildings
which back up to a wooded area which is completely dark.
¶ 7.  Defendants were aware of the specific vulnerability of 5
Lynfair Court based on prior criminal incursions into that
building, several of which required the response of the
Baltimore County Police Department.
¶ 8.  Defendants were aware and/or had reason to be aware of
the criminal activity in and around Pelham Wood Apartments
and/or had reason to be aware of the dangerous conditions that
existed.
¶ 9.  Despite the Defendants’ knowledge of the criminal activity
and the dangerous conditions that existed in and around Pelham
Wood Apartments and, the Defendants’ ability to take steps to
ensure the safety of the premises and its tenants, the Defendants
1
The majority recognizes and iterates the proper test for summary judgment and that
the existence of duty in a negligence case is a question of law for the court.  Maj. op. at 12.
See also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger, 366 Md. 29, 114-15, 782 A.2d 807, 858-59 (2001)
(Raker, J., concurring).
-2-
did nothing to eliminate the danger or enhance the safety of its
tenants. 
On the wrongful death and survival claim filed by Ms. Hemmings against her landlord,
summary judgment in favor of the landlord was entered properly by the Circuit Court because
the plaintiff failed to establish sufficient evidence to state a cause of action in negligence.
There is no duty on the part of the landlord to provide security within the premises demised
to the tenant to protect the tenant from criminal violence perpetrated by third persons.1
Neither is there a duty on the part of the landlord to ensure the safety of the premises or its
tenants.
The majority concludes that “the facts of the present case show that the Landlord
provided exterior lighting at Pelham Wood as a security measure intended to deter criminal
activity.  Thus, it had a duty to adequately maintain that lighting.”  Maj. op. at 28.  Although
the majority refers to evidence from tenants that there was no light fixture outside the wall
of a particular apartment or that it was very dark outside, there is absolutely no evidence in
this record that the Landlord received a complaint or notice that the light was not functioning.
It is important to note at the outset that the adequacy of door locks, alarms or “charley bars”
is not at issue in this case.  The majority quotes in great detail provisions from the lease
related to locks on the doors within the leasehold and the charley bar on the sliding glass
2
The analysis and the result in this case might well be different if the basis for the
landlord’s liability was the landlord retaining control over aspects of the demised premises
and particularly the locks and any alarm devices.  It is important to note that ¶ 7 of the rules
and regulations of the lease restricting tenant from changing or installing additional locks on
the doors without the landlord’s written permission is not at issue in this case.  Where the
landlord insists on control over the decisions as to changing or maintaining locks or security
devices, and permission has been withheld or the tenant has given notice and the landlord has
not responded, the result may be different if injury occurs.
Many courts have recognized that “by retaining control over aspects of the premises
such as door and window locks or alarm devices which directly relate to security, the
landlord faces potential liability when the circumstances are such that a reasonable man
would realize that a failure to act would render one relying on those actions susceptible to
criminal acts.”  Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 459 (Okla. 1987).   The Oklahoma court
found that a complaint stated a cause of action for injury to a tenant which occurred within
the leased apartment where the landlord retained exclusive control over the door locks and
the tenant had reported the broken lock.  Id. at 458-59.  The court found that:
“These principles appear to form the foundation for the
landlord’s liability in other jurisdictions in cases involving
criminal acts within the rented premises.  The element of
foreseeability in these cases has been found from a history of
criminal activity in the apartment complex or building, or
strictly from the nature of the defect in the premises.” 
Id. at 459.  
-3-
door.  The record reflects no complaints from the plaintiff-tenant or her decedent spouse to
the landlord-defendant that the locks were inoperable or deficient or that the charley bar
needed repair or replacement.  See maj. op. at 2-6.  Apparently recognizing that there was
absolutely no notice of any problem with these security devices, the majority abandons, and
rightfully so, these devices as a basis for any duty on the landlord’s part to protect the tenant
from harm occurring within the apartment.2
3
Under the plaintiff’s theory and the majority’s reasoning, it is solely the lack of
“adequate” lighting which forms the basis for liability.  Following the majority’s reasoning,
the lack of adequate lighting could form the basis of liability in the first place, as well as
failure to adequately maintain existing lighting. 
-4-
The entire basis of the majority opinion rests upon inadequate lighting in the rear of
the apartment building.  The majority holds that because the landlord provided exterior
lighting at Pelham Wood as a security measure intended to deter criminal activity, it had a
duty to adequately maintain that lighting.  See maj. op. at 28.  From this duty to maintain
adequate lighting in the common area, the majority makes the unjustified leap in logic that
somehow the landlord is then responsible for violent criminal activity that occurred within
the demised premises and not within the common area.3  
It has long been the law in this State that there is no general duty to protect another
person from crime.  That rule applies to the ordinary relationship between landlord and
tenant, although a duty may exist under special circumstances.  See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md.
160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976) (holding that there is no special duty imposed upon the
landlord to protect his tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord’s
premises).  In the absence of statute or special relationship, there is no duty to protect another
from harm.  Id., 359 A.2d at 552.  The general rule is that the landlord’s duty to protect
tenants or other persons on the leased property from the criminal acts of third parties does
not arise unless there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm.  See Annot., Landlord
Liability–Criminal Acts, 43 A.L.R. 5th 207, 406-08, 436-39 (1996).  The commentators in
that annotation note as follows:
-5-
“The question whether a landlord is obligated to protect tenants
against criminal activities of third parties is a specific facet of the
more general issue as to whether a private person is under a duty
to protect another against criminal conduct.  As a general
principle, and in the absence of statutes or of special relationships
or circumstances . . . a private person has no duty to protect
another from a criminal assault or a willful act of violence of a
third person, but that the duty to protect another from criminal
attack may voluntarily be assumed by contract, and if it is, the law
will recognize and enforce such a duty . . . .
Traditionally, courts have found that the mere relation of
landlord and tenant falls within the general rule and does not
impose upon the landlord a duty to protect the tenant against
criminal activities of third parties, ordinarily reasoning that the
liability of a landlord for injuries or damages resulting from such
activities must be predicated either upon the breach of a
contractual or statutory obligation, or upon the foreseeability,
under the circumstances, of the criminal occurrence.”  
Id. at 241.
A landlord is not the insurer of the safety of persons within the demised premises, or
for that matter, in the common areas of the property.  The duty of the landlord is a duty of
reasonable care to protect against known or reasonably foreseeable risks.  A landlord is not
required to take precautions against criminal conduct committed by third persons which the
landlord has no reason to anticipate.  Nor is the landlord responsible for attacks that are not
caused by the landlord’s action or inaction.  In the instant case, it is clear that the landlord
did not owe plaintiff a duty to provide her with lighting that would inhibit or discourage
break-ins by third parties into her apartment.
The plaintiff and majority’s theory that there is potential liability arising from a breach
of duty by the landlord because the landlord either undertook to light the back area and failed
to maintain the lighting properly, or never undertook to light the back area and it should have
done so, is not persuasive.  Nor is the majority’s theory that the single light in the rear of the
apartment building was placed there by the landlord for security purposes.  The plaintiff has
not shown that the landlord did anything that could reasonably be considered as having
4
I joined the majority in Matthews, and still believe that case was decided properly.
If this case is the logical extension of Matthews, then I would join Judges Cathell and Harrell
to overrule Matthews.  (Judge Harrell was not a member of this Court when Matthews was
decided.)  In my view, the outcome in Matthews was controlled by the fact that the tenant
harbored a dangerous animal, known to the landlord, in violation of the lease agreement
between the landlord and the tenant and thus within the landlord’s ability to control the
activity within the demised premises.
-6-
voluntarily undertaken to provide protection from criminal activity by third parties within the
leased premises.  The one light in the rear of the building cannot be construed as a voluntary
undertaking to provide security within the apartments; a failure to provide lighting in the rear
of the complex cannot, and has not, been considered in this State as a basis to impose liability
for injuries occurring within the demised premises.  Even if the landlord did provide
illumination in the common area, “the furnishing of outside lighting is commonplace and
furnished by virtually every landlord to every tenant in a facility such as is involved here.
It cannot reasonably be regarded as the assumption of a duty to protect against criminal acts.”
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1365 (Ill. 1988).
The majority relies primarily on the cases of Matthews v. Amberwood, 351 Md. 544,
719 A.2d 119 (1998) and Scott, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548.4  Neither case supports the
holding that the landlord has a duty to protect the tenant from criminal activity within the
demised premises.
The majority relies on Scott, 278 Md. at 165, 359 A.2d at 552, as support for its
conclusion that a duty exists.  Scott is inapposite.  The intermediate appellate court, in the
present case, pointed out that Scott was inapposite to the plaintiff’s claim:
“We cite Scott v. Watson as it establishes the basic principles of
Maryland law with regard to the duty owed by a landlord in
protecting the safety of his or her tenant.  In Scott, however, the
Court of Appeals was presented with the issue of whether the
landlord of an urban apartment complex had a duty to protect
tenants from the criminal acts of third parties committed in
-7-
common areas within the landlord's control.  The Court
ultimately concluded that a duty would be imposed on the
landlord only if the landlord had knowledge of increased
criminal activity and if the premises were thereby rendered
unsafe.  Scott, however, is not controlling because the case sub
judice involves an act that occurred within the leased premises.
We deem this to be an overriding distinction.”
Hemmings, 144 Md. App. at 317 n.4, 797 A.2d at 855 n.4.
Scott involved the murder of a tenant in the common area, an underground parking
garage.  Under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 12-601 through § 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, and Maryland Rule 8-305, this Court considered “[w]hether a duty is imposed upon
the landlord to protect his tenants from criminal acts of third parties where he has knowledge
of increasing criminal activity on the premises, or in the immediate neighborhood.”  Scott,
278 Md. at 168, 359 A.2d at 553.  We said:
“The duty of the landlord to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of his tenants in common areas under his control is
sufficiently flexible to be applied to cases involving criminal
activity without making the landlord an insurer of his tenant’s
safety.  If the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal
activity against persons or property in the common areas, he
then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the
existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing
to the criminal activity.  We think this duty arises primarily from
criminal activities existing on the landlord’s premises, and not
from knowledge of general criminal activities in the
neighborhood.  Every person in society is subject to the risk of
personal injury or property damage from criminal activity, both
inside and outside his abode.  The risk obviously varies with the
time and locale.  Since the landlord can affect the risk only
within his own premises, ordinarily only criminal acts occurring
5
The majority restates and embraces Ms. Hemmings’ argument “that Scott should apply
to the instant case because we have held that a landlord may be liable when a tenant suffers
a foreseeable injury in the leased premises caused by a landlord’s failure to use reasonable
care for the tenant’s safety in the common areas.”  Maj. op. at 21.  Ms. Hemmings’ premise
is wrong.  Scott dealt with injury in the common area and Ms. Hemmings misstates the
holding.  
-8-
on the landlord’s premises, and of which he knows or should
have known (and not those occurring generally in the
surrounding neighborhood) constitute relevant factors in
determining, in the particular circumstances, the reasonable
measures which a landlord is under a duty to take to keep the
premises safe.”
Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554 (first and third emphases added).  Scott does not stand for the
proposition that the landlord is responsible for personal injury to a tenant as the result of
criminal activity that occurs within the premises under control of the tenant and outside of
the common areas.5
Matthews provides no support for the plaintiff.  In Matthews, a sixteen-month-old
child, the son of a social guest of the particular tenant, was killed by the host’s pit bull.  The
tenant’s lease provided that pets were prohibited on the premises.  We held that the pit bull
in question was an extremely dangerous condition within the tenant’s apartment and that the
landlord retained control over the presence of the dog in the leased premises by virtue of the
“no pet” clause in the lease.  Matthews, 351 Md. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125.  We said:
“We do not hold that a landlord’s retention in the lease of some
control over particular matters in the leased premises is,
standing alone, a sufficient basis to impose a duty upon the
landlord which is owed to a guest on the premises.  This Court
has employed a balancing test to determine whether a duty of
reasonable care should be imposed in particular circumstances.
-9-
‘[U]ltimately, the determination of whether a duty should be
imposed is made by weighing the various policy considerations
and reaching a conclusion that the plaintiff’s interests are, or are
not, entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant.’  In the instant case, the various policy considerations
that need to be weighed are the general understanding that a
tenant is primarily in control of the leased premises and the
sanctity of a tenant’s home, including her ability generally to do
as she sees fit within the privacy thereof, against the public
safety concerns of permitting that same tenant to harbor an
extremely dangerous animal that will foreseeably endanger
individuals inside and outside the walls of the leased premises,
the degree of control maintained by the landlord, the landlord’s
knowledge of the dangerous condition, and the landlord’s ability
to abate the condition.  We, like the majority of courts
addressing this issue [landlord’s liability for pit bull attacks] in
other states, believe that the balance should be struck on the side
of imposing a duty on the landlord which is owed to guests on
the premises.”
Id. at 565-66, 719 A.2d at 129 (Citations omitted).  
The only way the majority can reach their desired result is to cobble together the line
of cases in Maryland imposing a duty for liability for physical harm which occurred in the
common areas with the line of cases finding liability for demised premise damage resulting
from a cause originating in the common area.  See maj. op. at 23.  This is a novel theory,
unsupported by any authority or case law in the country.
Some courts have found that, based on a voluntary assumption theory, a landlord’s
duty arises from an express or implied promise to provide security.  See e.g., Phillips v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 431 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (Ill. 1982) (citing Nelson v. Union Wire
-10-
Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 774 (Ill. 1964)).  Section 324A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (1965) states as follows: 
“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.” 
Section (c) has been interpreted to mean that “[w]here the reliance of the other, or of the third
person, has induced him to forego other remedies or precautions against such a risk, the harm
results from the negligence as fully as if the actor had created the risk.”  See Pippin v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 399 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ill. 1979) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 324A cmt. e).  Without relying explicitly upon § 324A, the majority appears to find
a duty on the landlord’s part based upon the landlord having provided for outdoor lighting
in the common area and the failure to maintain the lighting.  See maj. op. at 28.
The question of whether a landlord’s provision of security measures can give rise to
liability for harm to tenants, within the demised premises, that results from a failure to
maintain those measures is one of first impression in the State.  Other states have addressed
the question, with varying results.  See, e.g., Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106-
07 (N.H. 1993) (“[A] landlord who undertakes, either gratuitously or by contract, to provide
-11-
security will thereafter have a duty to act with reasonable care.”); Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc.,
796 P.2d 506, 509 (Idaho 1990) (“A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system,
is potentially subject to liability if the security system fails as a result of the landlord's
negligence.”); Feld v. Merriam,  485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984) (“[A] landlord may . . . incur
a duty voluntarily or by specific agreement if to attract or keep tenants he provides a program
of security.”).  But see, e.g. Hall v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 913 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ark. 1996)
(holding that a landlord’s implementation of “modest, conscientious measures” such as safety
lighting, evening patrols, and communication with residents regarding suspicious activities,
“do not rise to such a level that [the landlord] assumed a duty to protect its tenants from
criminal attacks by third parties”).  
In several states where the duty to maintain security features external to the demised
premises gives rise to liability for harm to tenants, the duty imposed is limited to the extent
of the security measures undertaken.  See Walls, 633 A.2d at 107; Feld, 485 A.2d at 747 (“A
tenant may rely upon a program of protection only within the reasonable expectations of the
program.  He cannot expect that a landlord will defeat all the designs of felonry.  He can
expect, however, that the program will be reasonably pursued and not fail due to its negligent
exercise.”).  In Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001), the
Supreme Court of Minnesota noted:
“We are not inclined to establish a rule that would discourage
landlords from improving security.  Transforming a landlord’s
gratuitous provision of security measures into a duty to maintain
those measures and subjecting the landlord to liability for all
-12-
harm occasioned by a failure to maintain that security would
tend to discourage landlords from instituting security measures
for fear of being held liable for the actions of a criminal.  This
limitation on the extent of the duty to maintain security
measures leads us to conclude that any duty [the landlord] might
have had is not of the type to give rise to liability for Haynes’
death.”
Id. at 675.  
Courts have generally held, based on public policy, that it is not fair to impose upon
the landlord a duty to protect the tenant from criminal activity within the demised area.  See
Bartley v. Sweetser, 890 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ark. 1994); R. Schoshinski, American Law of
Landlord and Tenant, 217 (1980).  The reason for the rule has been stated as follows:
“‘Judicial reluctance to tamper with the common law concept of
the landlord-tenant relationship, the notion that the act of a third
person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another . . . ; the often times
difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts;
the vagueness of the standard which the landlord must meet; the
economic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and the
conflict with public policy allocating the duty of protecting
citizens from criminal acts to the government rather than the
private sector.’”
Id. (quoting Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).  Although this Court has been willing to consider changes to the common law,
recognizing that the law is not static, the other reasons set forth by Professor Schoshinski are
persuasive.  This view is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (1965),
which reads as follows:  
6
Were we to hold that the failure to maintain, or install the lighting subjects the
landlord to liability for all violent crime committed by a third party within the tenant’s
apartment and in a location beyond the control of the landlord, we would discourage the
landlord from initiating extra lighting for fear of being held liable for the actions of a
criminal.  
-13-
“The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or
crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting
therefrom, although the actor’s negligent conduct created a
situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to
commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood
that such a situation might be created, and that a third person
might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or
crime.”
Thus, foreseeability of a risk of harm is the primary basis for imposing a duty, but, the
question is not simply whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to
take measures to guard against it.  See Smith v. Dodge Plaza, 148 Md. App. 335, 346-55, 811
A.2d 881, 888-93 (2002).  Although the foreseeability of a plaintiff’s injury is important in
the determination of whether a duty exists, the imposition of a duty does not depend upon
foreseeability alone.  As Dean Prosser stated, “[I]t should be recognized that ‘duty’ is not
sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.”  Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 53 (5th ed. 1984).  Whether a duty exists depends on the relationship of
the parties, consideration of the likelihood of injury and nature of the risk, the public interest
in the proposed solution, the burden to guard against it, and the consequences of placing that
burden upon the defendant.6  See Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189
-14-
(1994); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627-28, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083
(1986).  Writing for the panel in Dodge Plaza, Judge Rodowsky applied the balancing
approach set out in Matthews, “under which the foreseeable risk is compared to a number of
factors, including ‘the landlord’s ability to abate the condition.’”  Dodge Plaza, 148 Md.
App. at 351, 811 A.2d at 891 (quoting Matthews, 351 Md. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129).
Whether the landlord retains responsibility for actions which occur within the leased
premises under other circumstances is not an issue before this Court.  Those circumstances
have yet to be defined.  See, e.g., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573
(Cal. 1986) (finding allegation of negligence sufficient based on condominium association’s
duty to provide exterior lighting, where tenant/victim made repeated requests to improve
lighting for security, installed additional lighting herself, and was ordered by the association
to remove her additional lighting).  What is clear to me, and is before this Court, is that the
failure to maintain adequate lighting in the common area does not make a murder within the
leased premises foreseeable.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected plaintiff’s arguments.
Judge Arrie Davis, writing for the panel, cogently reasoned as follows:
“‘The basic elements necessary for a cause of action in
negligence “are a duty or obligation which the defendant is
under to protect plaintiff from injury, a failure to discharge that
duty, and actual loss or injury to the plaintiff proximately
resulting from that failure.”’  Scott v. Watson,  278 Md. 160,
165, 359 A.2d 548 (1976)(quoting Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md.
663, 669, 267 A.2d 114 (1970)).  A landlord is obligated to use
reasonable and ordinary care to keep common areas safe.  Id.
Because a landlord is not an insurer of the safety of its tenants,
he or she is not ordinarily liable to a tenant or guest of a tenant
7
The duty to keep “the premises secure” in this context means the common areas, not
the demised premises.
-15-
for injuries from a hazardous condition in the leased premises
that comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession.
Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 161 A. 172 (1932).  This rule
also applies to criminal acts of third parties; ‘there is no special
duty imposed upon the landlord to protect his [or her] tenants
against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord’s
premises.’  Scott, 278 Md. at 166, 359 A.2d 548.  However,
when it can be illustrated that the landlord had knowledge of
increased criminal activity on the premises, a duty is imposed on
the landlord to undertake reasonable measures to keep the
premises secure.7  Id. at 165, 359 A.2d 548.”
Hemmings, 144 Md. App. at 317-18, 797 A.2d at 855.  The Court of Special Appeals
concluded: 
“From the facts presented, a fact finder would be constrained to
conclude that there could be no showing that appellees’ failure
to maintain the common areas was the proximate cause of the
fatal event.  Consequently, the grant of summary judgment was
proper.
Id. at 323-24, 797 A.2d at 859.  I agree with the Court of Special Appeals and would affirm.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  Judge Cathell and Judge Harrell have authorized
me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2002
Suzette Hemmings
v.
Pelham Wood Limited Liability Limited
Partnership, et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting opinion by Cathell, J.
in which Harrell, J. joins
Filed:   June 16, 2003
For the reasons stated in the dissents in Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Limited
Partnership, Inc., 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998), I also dissent in the present case.  The
majority, in my view, now makes a landlord an insurer against crime.  Judge Harrell
authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.