Title: Ex parte Jarrod Taylor. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Jarrod Taylor v. State of Death Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:01/18/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1051315
_________________________
Ex parte Jarrod Taylor
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Jarrod Taylor
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-98-1328.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-0066)
BOLIN, Justice.
We granted certiorari review to determine whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals properly dismissed Jarrod Taylor's
1051315
2
appeal from the denial of his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
petition attacking his capital-murder conviction and death
sentence, because the notice of appeal was signed by a foreign
attorney who purportedly had not been admitted to practice law
in Alabama under the rules of the Alabama State Bar governing
admission of foreign attorneys pro hac vice. Taylor v. State
(No. CR-05-0066, May 10, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
Appl 2006)(table).
Taylor was indicted on four counts of capital murder.
Count one charged Taylor with intentionally causing the deaths
of Sherry Gaston, Bruce Gaston, and Steve Dyas, pursuant to
one scheme or course of conduct, see  § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala.
Code 1975.  Counts two, three, and four charged Taylor with
the capital offense of the murder of each of the three victims
during the course of a robbery, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2). The jury
found Taylor guilty of all four counts of capital murder. The
jury recommended, by a vote of 7 - 5, that Taylor be sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The
trial court overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Taylor to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
conviction and the sentence of death.  Taylor v. State, 808
1051315
3
So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).  This Court granted
Taylor's petition for certiorari review and subsequently
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Ex
parte Taylor, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001).  The United States
Supreme Court denied Taylor's petition for a writ of
certiorari.  Taylor v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 1086 (2002).
On July 31, 2002, Al Pennington, an Alabama attorney,
timely filed a petition pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
challenging certain aspects of Taylor's conviction and
sentence. According to the case-action summary, on August 30,
2002, Pennington submitted to the Alabama State Bar and to the
Mobile Circuit Court applications for admission to the Alabama
State Bar pro hac vice on behalf of New York attorneys Andrew
Tauber, Monica J. Stamm, John D. Totorella, Jennifer R.
Sandman, and Theodore V. Wells. The case-action summary
indicates that on September 9, 2002, the clerk of the circuit
court entered the following notation: "Admission to practice
under Rule VII of the rules governing admission to the Alabama
State Bar - Granted." On November 4, 2002, the State moved to
dismiss certain claims in Taylor's Rule 32 petition.
1051315
4
At a hearing regarding Taylor's Rule 32 petition on
February 28, 2003, the following exchange occurred between the
trial judge and Andrew Tauber, one of the New York attorneys:
"THE COURT: Okay.  The in forma pauperis
declaration, the Court is –- will show it's granted
and 
a 
free 
transcript 
is 
ordered 
of 
these
proceedings.
"MR. TAUBER: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
And I must confess now, my ignorance of Alabama
procedure, I don't know whether we need to formally
move to be appointed together, in conjunction with,
or separately from Mr. Pennington as counsel, I'm
just throwing myself on the Court with my ignorance.
"THE COURT: Well, it's my understanding that --
I mean, when you was -- the pro hac vice was
previously approved by this Court, you are co-
counsel with Mr. Pennington.
"MR. TAUBER: Okay. Very good.  I just want to
make sure we dot every 'i.'
"THE 
COURT: 
Now, 
grant[ed], 
I 
know 
Mr.
Pennington is not present and requested to be
excused, but I don't think, and the State can
correct me if I'm wrong, I don't think I can relieve
Mr. Pennington from the case, because we must still
have a licensed attorney from the State of Alabama.
"MR. TAUBER: I'm not asking that he be relieved,
I just wanted to make sure that we are in good
standing with this Court.
"THE COURT: Yes, sir.  Yes, sir.  All the
paperwork has been filed with the Alabama State Bar
and -- so we are procedurally in correct order as it
relates to your representation of the defendant in
these proceedings."
1051315
5
On May 5, 2003, Taylor filed an amended Rule 32 petition.
On October 23, 2003, the circuit court granted the State's
motion for dismissal of certain claims in Taylor's Rule 32
petition.  The other claims in Taylor's Rule 32 petition
remained pending.  On February 2, 2004, the State filed a
motion stating that two of Taylor's claims should not have
been dismissed based on the recently released case of Ex parte
Gardner, 898 So. 2d 690 (Ala. 2004).  On February 11, 2004,
the trial court held a hearing and set aside its previous
order dismissing the two claims based on Gardner and allowed
discovery on those two claims.   On July 28, 2005, the State
submitted to the trial court a proposed order stating that the
court's order of partial dismissal entered on October 23,
2003, completely disposed of Taylor's Rule 32 petition.  On
August 1, 2005, the trial court signed the State's proposed
order.
On September 9, 2005, Taylor timely filed a notice of
appeal with the trial court. The notice of appeal was signed
by New York attorney Theodore Wells and on behalf of Alabama
attorney Al Pennington.  The notice was sent to the Court of
Criminal Appeals. 
1051315
The Court of Criminal Appeals' clerk's office contacted
1
the Alabama State Bar regarding Attorney Wells's pro hac vice
status.  An appellate court, however, may not rely on facts
outside the record.
 
"'"[The record] is the sole, conclusive, and
unimpeachable  evidence of the proceedings in the
lower court.  If incomplete or incorrect, amendment
or 
correction 
must 
be 
sought 
by 
appropriate
proceedings rather than by impeachment on the
hearing in the appellate court. Accordingly, the
record cannot be impeached, changed, altered, or
varied on appeal by an ex parte unauthorized
certificate of the trial judge or of the clerk, nor
by statements of the briefs of counsel nor by
affidavits or other evidence or matters dehors the
6
On January 4, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered
the following order:
"After 
[Taylor 
v. 
State 
of 
Alabama] 
was
docketed, the circuit clerk filed an amended
transmittal of the notice of appeal wherein Attorney
Theodore V. Wells, Jr., was added as counsel for the
appellant. Because Attorney Wells is not an attorney
with a general license to practice law in the State
of Alabama, he was asked to furnish the clerk of
this Court proof of his admission by the trial court
to appear pro hac vice and to certify whether or not
that admission had been rescinded. Although Attorney
Wells's response was initially accepted as adequate,
a question has now arisen as to whether or not
Attorney Wells has ever been admitted to practice
before the trial court pro hac vice in compliance
with Rule VII of the Rules Governing Admission to
the Alabama State Bar.  Additionally, this Court has
conferred with the Alabama State Bar and was
informed that there is no order on file granting an
application by Attorney Wells for admission pro hac
vice.[1]
1051315
record."'"
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 278 Ala. 43, 48, 175
So. 2d 737, 741 (1965)(opinion on rehearing)(quoting Union
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 216 Ala. 527, 528-29, 113 So. 587,
587 (1927)); see also Ex parte Jett, [Ms. 1060281, July 20,
2007]     So. 2d       (Ala. 2007)(See, J., concurring
specially).
Both Taylor and the State filed proposed orders with
2
Judge Herman Y. Thomas.  On March 23, 2006, Judge Thomas
signed the proposed order submitted by the State finding that
Attorney Wells had not been admitted pro hac vice to represent
Taylor.
7
"Upon consideration of the above, the Court of
Criminal Appeals orders that Theodore V. Wells, Jr.,
shall be removed as counsel of record for the
appellant in the above cause until this Court
receives proof of his admission by the trial court
pursuant to Rule VII or until proper application is
made to this Court pursuant to that rule and he is
subsequently admitted by this Court." 
On January 5, 2006, the State moved the Court of Criminal
Appeals to dismiss Taylor's appeal on the ground that Attorney
Wells was not admitted pro hac vice in the Mobile Circuit
Court.  The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the
trial court for clarification as to whether Attorney Wells had
been granted pro hac vice status.   The Court of Criminal
2
Appeals' order provides, in pertinent part:
"The State has moved that we dismiss this appeal
because the notice of appeal was signed by an
attorney who had not been admitted to practice law
1051315
8
in Alabama.  Because of discrepancies in the record
we remanded this case to the circuit court for that
court to clarify whether attorney Theodore Wells, an
attorney licensed in the State of New York, had been
granted pro hac vice status to practice law in the
State of Alabama.  The circuit court has filed its
return with this Court.
"The circuit court's order on remand states:
"'On 
August 
1, 
2005, 
this 
Court
entered 
its 
final 
order 
summarily
dismissing 
Petitioner 
Jarrod 
Taylor's
corrected first amended Rule 32 petition.
On September 9, 2005, Jarrod Taylor,
through Foreign Attorney Theodore V. Wells,
Jr., filed his notice of appeal.
"'On March 9, 2006, the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals entered an order
remanding Taylor's case to this Court with
instructions "to clarify whether Wells's
request for pro hac vice status was granted
and, if so, when it was granted.  Due
return should be filed within 45 days from
the date of this order."  This Court now
enters this order on remand to comply with
the appellate court's directive.
"'Upon 
thorough 
consideration 
and
review of the record and the pleadings that
have been filed by Petitioner Taylor and
State of Alabama, this Court finds that it
did not admit Foreign Attorney Theodore V.
Wells, Jr., to represent Jarrod Taylor pro
hac vice in this matter.  So to answer the
Alabama 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals'
question, Foreign Attorney Theodore V.
Wells, Jr., was not admitted pro hac vice
to represent Jarrod Taylor during his Rule
32 proceedings in this Court.'
1051315
9
"(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Both 
parties 
have 
filed
responses to the circuit court's order on remand.
"In this case, the notice of appeal was signed
by one individual, Theodore Wells, an attorney who
had not been granted pro hac vice status –- an
attorney who was not ... admitted to practice law in
the State of Alabama.  The Alabama Supreme Court in
Black v. Baptist Medical Center, 575 So. 2d 1087,
1089 (Ala. 1991), held that any documents filed by
a foreign attorney who has not been granted pro hac
vice status are a nullity.  Accordingly, the notice
of appeal filed in this case is a legal nullity.
Because no effective notice of appeal was filed,
this case is due to be dismissed.  Rule 4, Ala. R.
App. P.
"Taylor's remedy, if any, is to file a petition
for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(f),
Ala. R. Crim. P., as amended effective June 1, 2005,
seeking an out-of-time appeal from the denial of his
Rule 32 petition.
"It is hereby ordered that this appeal is due to
be, and is hereby, dismissed."
Taylor filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
this Court.
Analysis
Rule 3(a), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a notice of
appeal shall be filed within the time allowed by Rule 4, Ala.
R. App. P.  Rule 3(c) sets the form and content of a notice of
appeal.  The notice of appeal, filed within the time period
prescribed by Rule 4, "shall specify the party or parties
1051315
10
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part
thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the
appeal is taken."  Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P.  Rule 3 is
intended to provide a uniform and simplified method for taking
an appeal and to ensure that effective notice of appeal is
given.  The opposing party should be notified that an appeal
has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case.
The only jurisdictional requirement for an appeal is the
timely filing of a notice of appeal.  Edmondson v. Blakey, 341
So. 2d 481 (Ala. 1976).   "Timely filing of the notice of
appeal is a jurisdictional act.  It is the only step in the
appellate process which is jurisdictional."  Committee
Comments to Rule 3, Ala. R. App. P.    
"The spirit of the [Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure] is recognized and restated to insure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
appellate proceeding on its merits.  The only
jurisdictional requirement rule in the entire rules
is the timely filing of the notice of appeal.
Nothing in the rules is designed to catch the unwary
on technicalities.  Jones v. Chaney & James Constr.
Co., [399 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1968)].  A simple
statement indicating what judgments the appellant
appeals from is all that is required."
Edmondson, 341 So. 2d at 484.
1051315
11
Rules 3(e), Ala. R. App. P., provides that each notice of
appeal be accompanied by a docketing statement.  The docketing
statements are Form 24 (an appeal to the Supreme Court), Form
25 (an appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals), or Form 26 (an
appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals), appended to the
Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Although no signature
is required on the notice of appeal under Rule 3(c), a
signature is required on the docketing statement, as set out
in Rule 3(e).  Rule 3(e) goes on to provide that if the notice
of appeal is not accompanied by a docketing statement, 
"the clerk shall accept the notice of appeal and
shall 
inform 
the 
person 
filing 
it 
of 
the
requirements of this rule, and the appellant, or, if
the appellant is represented by counsel, then the
appellant's attorney, shall promptly file a properly
completed docketing statement.  The clerk of the
trial court, when serving the notice of appeal as
specified in this rule, shall attach thereto a copy
of the docketing statement, if available.  If, on
the date the notice of appeal is served, the
docketing statement is not available, it shall be
served on those persons on whom the notice of appeal
was served as soon as it becomes available.  For the
failure to comply with the requirements of this
rule, the appellate court in which the appeal is
pending may make such orders as are just, including
an order staying the proceedings until the docketing
statement is filed or, after proper notice, an order
dismissing the appeal; and, in lieu of any orders
or, in addition to any orders, the court may treat
the failure to comply with the requirement of this
rule as contempt of court."   
1051315
12
As stated above, there is no requirement under Rule 3,
Ala. R. App. P., that the notice of appeal contain a
signature.  However, Rule 25A, Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"Every brief, motion, or other paper presented to an
appellate court for filing must be signed by at
least one attorney of record or, in a case in which
a party is proceeding pro se, by the party.  The
brief, motion, or other paper must include the
signer's address and telephone number. Unless a rule
or statute provides otherwise, a brief, motion, or
other paper need not be verified or accompanied by
an affidavit.
"The court shall strike an unsigned brief,
motion, or other paper unless the omission is
promptly corrected after it is called to the
attention of the attorney or party filing it.  The
signature requirement is to be interpreted broadly,
and the attorney of record may designate another
attorney to sign the brief, motion, or other paper
for him or her.  When a party is represented by more
than one counsel and counsel reside in different
locations, it is not necessary to incur the expense
of sending the brief, motion, or other paper from
one person to another for multiple signatures. If a
brief, 
motion, 
or 
other 
paper 
is 
filed
electronically, 
an electronic signature is an
original signature under this rule."
(Emphasis added.)
   In the present case, Taylor's notice of appeal specifies
that Taylor is appealing; it designates the trial court's
August 1, 2005, order as the order appealed from; and it names
the Court of Criminal Appeals as the court to which the appeal
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13
is taken.  The only defect complained of by the State and
relied upon by the Court of Criminal Appeals in dismissing
Taylor's appeal is that the notice of appeal was signed by a
foreign attorney who allegedly had not been admitted to
practice in Alabama pro hac vice.   
Before 2006, Rule VII of the Rules Governing Admission to
the Alabama State Bar required an out-of-state attorney
wishing to appear pro hac vice in a court in the State of
Alabama to file a verified application for admission to
practice in the court where the action was pending and to
serve a copy of that application with a filing fee in the
amount of $100 on the Alabama State Bar.  Rule VII(D).  Once
a copy of the application and the filing fee were submitted to
the State Bar, the Bar prepared a statement and submitted that
statement to the court in which the case was pending.  Rule
VII(D).  No pro hac vice application was granted before the
statement from the State Bar had been filed with the court.
Once this statement was received, the court held a hearing on
the application and issued an order granting or denying the
application.  Rule VII(D).
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Effective September 19, 2006, this Court amended Rule VII
regarding pro hac vice admissions of pro bono counsel in cases
involving indigent criminal defendants.  The 2006 amendments
omitted certain requirements for pro hac vice admissions of
pro bono counsel in an effort to facilitate the provision of
defense services to indigent defendants by foreign attorneys.
Committee Comments to Rule VII.  Rule VII(D) now provides that
applications by pro bono counsel no longer need be accompanied
by a filing fee and must be filed no later than the first
occasion on which the pro bono counsel files any pleading or
paper with the court or otherwise personally appears.  A
hearing is no longer required for applicants acting as pro
bono counsel, and no statement from the State Bar is required
for pro bono applicants, although a copy of the verified
application must still be filed with the State Bar. 
It appears that the trial court's record in the present
case supports Taylor's contention that the trial court had
granted Wells's pro hac vice application.  The case-action
summary indicates that Wells was admitted pro hac vice in
2002, and the trial court's statements at the hearing on
February 28, 2003, indicate that Wells and several members of
1051315
15
his firm had been so admitted.  Although the Court of Criminal
Appeals relied upon a 2006 statement prepared by the State and
signed by the trial court, this statement appears to be
incorrect.  Also, the Court of Criminal Appeals' statement
that the Alabama State Bar has no order on file granting an
application by Wells for admission pro hac vice conflicts with
the trial court's own docket sheet, because the trial court
cannot grant pro hac vice status until it receives a statement
from the Alabama State Bar.  Certainly, the State would have
objected in 2002 had the trial court failed to receive a
statement as then required under Rule VII(D) and the trial
court 
had 
nonetheless 
granted 
Wells's 
pro 
hac 
vice
application.
Even if we assume that Wells was not properly admitted to
practice pro hac vice in Taylor's case, our caselaw indicates
that a notice of appeal, even if technically deficient, is
valid if "the intention to appeal from a specific judgment may
be reasonably inferred from the text of the notice."
Edmondson, 341 So. 2d at 483. The defect on Taylor's notice –-
a signature of an attorney purportedly not admitted to
practice in Alabama –-  is not grounds for dismissal because
1051315
We 
likewise 
find 
no 
original-signature requirement 
in 
the
3
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure for a notice of appeal.
16
a signature is not a jurisdictional requirement for a notice
of appeal. 
In Dunning v. New England Life Insurance Co., 890 So. 2d
92 (Ala. 2003), this Court addressed the issue whether a
timely filed copy of an original notice of appeal was
acceptable even though the notice had been transmitted by a
facsimile machine.  We stated that the only jurisdictional
requirement for a notice of appeal is that the notice be
timely filed and that absent a showing that the alleged defect
in the notice of appeal prejudiced the adverse party, an
appeal will not be dismissed on the basis of the defect.  We
also stated that neither the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure nor the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure require
that a notice of appeal bear an original signature and held
that the timely filed copy of the original notice of appeal
was 
acceptable 
under 
the 
Alabama 
Rules 
of 
Appellate
Procedure.3
Relying on Dunning, supra, this Court in Ex parte
Barrows, 892 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2004), held that the filing in
1051315
17
the circuit court of the complaint previously filed in the
probate court with the word "probate" marked out and the word
"circuit" inserted in its place in the style and the filing of
the circuit court cover sheet constituted an adequate notice
of appeal from the probate court to the circuit court.  
In Ex parte Soule, 892 So. 2d 879 (Ala. 2004), the Court
of Criminal Appeals summarily dismissed an appeal from a Rule
32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition.  In the circuit court, the
Rule 32 petitioner filed a cover letter, which was in his own
handwriting and signed and dated, along with a notice-of-
appeal form from the circuit court.  The notice-of-appeal form
was not signed by the petitioner but was completed in the
petitioner's own handwriting.  We reversed the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the appeal, stating:
"This Court has stated that 'even where the
notice of appeal fails to comply with Rule 3(c),'
Ala. R. App. P., appeal can still lie if 'the
intention to appeal from a specific judgment may be
reasonably inferred from the text of the notice.'
Edmondson v. Blakey, 341 So. 2d 481, 483 (Ala.
1976).  The documents [the petitioner] filed are
sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction under
Rule 3.  The Court of Criminal Appeals could
reasonably infer from [the petitioner's] request to
the clerk in the cover letter to 'please file this
notice of appeal of Rule 32 to the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals' [the petitioner's] intent to
appeal.  That court could also ascertain from the
1051315
18
information the petitioner included on the notice-
of-appeal form and the cover letter the judgment
[the petitioner] was appealing, the date of the
judgment, the date of the filing, and the date of
[the petitioner's] conviction."
892 So. 2d at 881.
In McLin v. State, 840 So. 2d 937 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002),
the defendant sought postconviction relief from his first-
degree-burglary conviction.  The trial court denied the
petition.  The defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed the appeal without an opinion, on the
grounds that the defendant had failed to perfect his appeal
because the defendant filed only the docketing statement and
neither he nor his counsel had signed that form.  However, the
Court of Criminal Appeals granted McLin's application for
rehearing, holding that the notice of appeal was sufficient.
On rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion,
in which it stated:
"There is no express requirement in the Alabama
Rules of Appellate Procedure that a notice of appeal
filed in a criminal case be signed by the appealing
party or by his or her counsel.  Certainly Rules
3(a)(2) and 3(c) contain no such requirement.  Both
the rules  and the caselaw interpreting the rules
2
indicate that the only jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal to this Court is the timely filing of
the notice of appeal, and both state and federal
caselaw suggest that appellate rules should be
1051315
19
liberally construed so as not to 'catch the unwary
on technicalities.'  Edmondson [v. Blakey], 341 So.
2d [481,] 483 [(Ala. 1976)]. Based on the plain
language of Rule 3(c) and the caselaw cited above,
we hold that a notice of appeal does not have to be
signed by an appellant or by his or her attorney.
Jurisdiction vests with this Court when a notice of
appeal 
that 
substantially 
complies 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P., is
timely filed.
_______________
" Rule 2(a) provides that '[a]n appeal shall be
2
dismissed if the notice of appeal was not timely
filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate
court' (emphasis added), but Rule 2(a)(2) provides
that dismissal is discretionary with the appellate
court if an appellant fails to timely file a brief,
takes a frivolous appeal, fails to prosecute the
appeal, or fails to comply substantially with the
rules. The discretionary language of Rule 2(a)(2),
as opposed to the mandatory language and specific
reference to jurisdiction in Rule 2(a)(1), suggests
that any defect in a notice of appeal, other than
its timeliness, is not jurisdictional."
840 So. 2d at 941-42.
Our caselaw concerning defects in notices of appeal is
consistent with the caselaw of the United States Supreme
Court.  In Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether
"'when a party files a timely notice of appeal in district
court, ... the failure to sign the notice of appeal require[s]
the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal.'"  532 U.S. at
1051315
20
760. Becker, an inmate proceeding pro se, had timely filed his
notice of appeal, on which he had typewritten, but not signed,
his name. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit dismissed Becker's appeal on the ground that Becker's
failure to sign his notice of appeal was jurisdictional "and
therefore not curable outside the time allowed to file the
notice." 532 U.S. at 760. The Supreme Court held that Rule 11,
Fed. R. Civ. P., requires a signature on the notice of appeal.
However, the failure to sign a timely filed notice of appeal
was curable.  "[I]mperfections in noticing an appeal should
not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is
appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court."  532
U.S. at 767.  
Rule 3, Fed. R. App. P., is similar to Rule 3, Ala. R.
App. P.  In addressing the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Federal Practice and Procedure notes that "[t]he
signature and address of the appellant's attorney should [be
included], but failure to sign the notice should not defeat
the appeal."  Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999).  "The great hallmark of Rule
3, both in its language as amended over the years and in the
1051315
21
construction the courts have put upon it, is liberality.  The
rulemakers and the judges have wanted to be sure that a
possibly meritorious appeal is not denied its day in court
because the appellant -- or more often the appellant's lawyer
-- has left some i undotted or some t uncrossed."  Wright et
al., § 3949.6.
In the present case, any purported defect in having Wells
sign the notice of appeal is not grounds for the dismissal of
Taylor's appeal.  Taylor's notice of appeal notifies the
appellate court of the appeal and notifies opposing counsel
that he is taking an appeal.  Rule 25A, Ala. R. App. P.,
provides that an unsigned brief, motion, or other paper
presented to an appellate court for filing can be corrected.
Furthermore, the State has not shown any prejudice caused by
Wells's signature on the notice of appeal.  The State did not
even object to Wells's pro hac vice representation of Taylor
until 2005, even though Wells began representing Taylor in
2002.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals relies solely on Black v.
Baptist Medical Center, 575 So. 2d 1087 (Ala.  1991), in
dismissing Taylor's appeal.  In Black, an out-of-state
1051315
22
attorney, who was neither licensed to practice law in the
State of Alabama nor admitted pro hac vice, filed a complaint
against a hospital on behalf of a patient.  The trial court
concluded that the complaint was untimely filed, and this
Court agreed.  Although the attorney did submit, along with
the complaint, a motion to appear pro hac vice, that motion
was not accompanied by a letter of introduction and
recommendation to the circuit court from a member of the Board
of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar.  Nor did a member
of the board personally introduce and recommend the attorney
to the court.  Therefore, the motion did not comply with the
requirements of Rule VII.  Approximately two months after the
statute of limitations had run, an attorney who was licensed
to practice law in Alabama filed a notice of appearance on the
patient's behalf.  However, this Court held that this did not
cure the ineffective filing by the out-of-state attorney. 
Black is distinguishable from the present case because
Black involved a complaint, and, pursuant to Rule 11, Ala. R.
Civ. P., a complaint must be signed by at least one of the
party's attorneys of record, and the attorney's signature
means that the attorney has read the complaint, that to the
1051315
We note that although Rule 25A, Ala. R. App. P., provides
4
a remedy when a paper filed with an appellate court is not
signed, this is in contrast to Rule 11, Ala. R. Civ. P., which
provides that if a complaint is not signed or is signed with
an intent to defeat the rule, the complaint may be stricken as
though the complaint had never been served. 
23
best of his or her knowledge there are good grounds to support
it, and that it is not interposed for delay.   As stated
4
above, the only jurisdictional requirement of a notice of
appeal is its timely filing. The notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall
designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from;
and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.
Taylor's notice of appeal meets these requirements; the only
purported defect is that it is signed by Wells, who
purportedly was not admitted to practice pro hac vice.  We are
mindful that the rules governing authorization to practice law
are very important, as are the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provide that the rules "shall be construed so
as to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every appellate proceeding on its merits." Rule 1, Ala. R.
App. P.  To dismiss Taylor's appeal based on the peculiar
facts in this case would be to elevate form over substance.
1051315
24
Conclusion
The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in dismissing
Taylor's appeal on the ground that Wells, who signed the
notice of appeal, had not been granted pro hac vice status.
Accordingly, its judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.