Title: Ivory v. Ivory

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CANDACE S. IVORY,   
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 342, 2012  
 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Family Court of the 
 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for  
v.  
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
DARREN S. IVORY 
§ 
File No. CN08-05175 
 
 
§ 
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
Pet. Nos. 10-29669, 12-03736 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 18, 2013 
Decided: July 11, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices.  
O R D E R 
On this 11th day of July 2013, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)  Respondent-below/Appellant Candace A. Ivory (“Wife”) appeals from 
an order of the Family Court which vacated the Final Decree of Divorce between 
Wife and Petitioner-below/Appellee Darren S. Ivory (“Husband”).  Wife raises two 
claims on appeal.  First, she claims that the Family Court’s sua sponte decision 
invalidating the parties’ decree of divorce was erroneous.  Second, she claims the 
Family Court lacked a basis for exercising in personam jurisdiction over Wife.  We 
remanded this case for a determination as to whether the parties could consent to in 
rem jurisdiction and reverse the order to vacate on those grounds.  The Family 
2 
 
Court found the parties could so consent.  We accordingly dismiss this appeal as 
moot.  
(2)  Husband and Wife married in Montana in 2006.  Husband served in the 
armed forces and Wife lived in Delaware while he was deployed.  Upon Husband’s 
return to the states, the parties resided in Delaware for a brief period before moving 
to Silver Spring, Maryland.  In 2008, Husband filed a Petition for Divorce in 
Delaware.  At the time of the Petition, Wife resided in Silver Spring.  Husband 
filed an Affidavit of Publication with the News Journal.  Husband attempted to 
serve Wife notice of divorce by notifying her by mail and publication.  He mailed 
one letter to Wife's Maryland address and another to the Philippines’ Embassy in 
Washington.  The embassy confirmed receipt, but the letter to Wife was returned 
for unclear reasons.  Wife failed to appear for any divorce proceedings and did not 
file any motions, requests, or reports.  The Family Court judge granted a Final 
Decree of Divorce on March 18, 2009, and later granted a default judgment against 
Wife relating to the division of marital property.  
(3)  In 2010, Husband filed a Rule to Show Cause petition (“RTSC-1”) 
seeking enforcement of the Default Order through attachment of wages.  The 
Family Court denied RTSC-1.  In 2011, Husband filed a second Rule to Show 
Cause petition (“RTSC-2”).  In 2012, Wife filed a Motion to Declare Void all in 
personam Orders and to Dismiss the both RTSCs.  The Family Court found that 
3 
 
Husband’s service of process was insufficient under the Delaware code, and 
therefore it lacked in personam jurisdiction and dismissed Husband’s petitions.1  
The Family Court also, sua sponte, found that the insufficient service of process 
meant it lacked in rem jurisdiction over the divorce and vacated the 2009 Final 
Decree of Divorce.2  This appeal followed. 
(4)  As the issue of in rem jurisdiction for the original divorce decree was 
never argued before the Family Court, we remanded for such argument and asked 
the Family Court to issue another order.  On remand, the Family Court stated: 
For the reasons set forth on the record, which includes an 
agreement of the parties as to the issue, the Court hereby 
determines that it does have “In Rem” jurisdiction over the 
divorce of these parties.”3 
Wife now argues her appeal should be dismissed as moot.  The Family Court’s 
finding on remand extinguishes the need for her first claim.   
(5)  This sole issue is now resolved by the Family Court’s disposition on 
remand.4  Though Husband makes an argument in his Answering Brief as to why 
                                          
 
1 Ivory v. Ivory, File No. CN08-05175, Pet. Nos. 10-39669 and 12-03736 at 10 (Del. Fam. Apr. 
20, 2012) (“Therefore, the Court must hold that Husband has not complied with the requirements 
of 12 Del. C. § 1508(b) and (d), and thus, has not established in personam jurisdiction over Wife 
for purposes of property distribution.”).  
2 Id. (“In rem jurisdiction applies only to the dissolution of the marriage, and although does not 
require minimal contact between the nonresident spouse and the state executing the divorce 
decree, it does require mailing and publication.  As discussed previously, the Court finds that 
mailing has not been accomplished in regards to Husband’s Divorce Petition.”).  
3 Ivory v. Ivory, File No. CN08-05175; Pet. No. 10-39669; 12-03736 (Del. Fam. Apr. 1, 2013) 
(civil disposition announced in court).  
4 Wife fashions this appeal as raising two claims.  Her second claim argues as to why the Family 
Court lacks in personam jurisdiction over her.  This claim does not seek affirmative relief, as the 
4 
 
the Family Court also erred in finding it lacked in personam jurisdiction over Wife, 
Husband never filed a cross-appeal.  “A cross-appeal is necessary if the appellee 
seeks affirmative relief from a portion of the judgment, i.e., enlarging the 
appellees' own rights or lessening the rights of an adversary.”5  Husband’s 
argument that the Family Court erred in finding it lacked in personam jurisdiction 
seeks affirmative relief.  The question is not properly before this Court.  
(7)  NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is 
DISMISSED as moot.   
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Family Court agreed with Wife on this point.  Accordingly, we do not consider this claim on 
appeal.  
5 Haley v. Town of Dewey Beach, 672 A.2d 55, 58 (Del. 1996) (citing United States v. American 
Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425 (1924).