Title: State ex rel. Twitchell v. Saferin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Twitchell v. Saferin, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3829.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3829 
THE STATE EX REL. TWITCHELL ET AL. v. 
SAFERIN ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Twitchell v. Saferin, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3829.] 
Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to place a 
proposed charter amendment on the ballot for the November 2018 ballot—
Relators failed to show that the board of elections abused its discretion in 
keeping the proposed amendment off the ballot—Writ denied. 
(No. 2018-1238—Submitted September 13, 2018—Decided September 21, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, Bryan Twitchell, Julian C. 
Mack, and Sean M. Nestor, seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Lucas 
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County Board of Elections1 to place a proposed charter amendment on the 
November 6, 2018 general-election ballot.  For the reasons set forth below, we deny 
the writ. 
Background 
{¶ 2} On August 6, 2018, Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor submitted part-
petitions in support of a proposed amendment to the Toledo City Charter entitled 
the Lake Erie Bill of Rights (“LEBOR”).  The LEBOR would declare that Lake 
Erie and the Lake Erie watershed “possess the right to exist, flourish, and naturally 
evolve” and that the citizens of Toledo have a right to a clean and healthy 
environment, including the Lake Erie ecosystem.  Section 2 would make it unlawful 
for a corporation or government to violate the rights secured by the LEBOR and 
declares that, within the city of Toledo, any corporate license or privilege that 
would violate these rights would be void.  Section 3 would make it a crime to violate 
the provisions of the LEBOR, would allow the city of Toledo, or any resident, to 
“enforce the rights and prohibitions of this law through an action brought in the 
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,” and would recognize the right of the Lake 
Erie ecosystem itself to enforce its rights in an action prosecuted by the city or any 
resident of the city.  Finally, Section 4 purports to nullify any state laws or agency 
rules that conflict with the provisions of the LEBOR. 
{¶ 3} The Lucas County Board of Elections verified a sufficient number of 
petition signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot.  However, on August 28, 
2018, the board voted 4-0 to refuse to place the charter amendment on the ballot on 
the ground that it contained provisions that are beyond the authority of the city to 
enact.  Specifically, the board followed the recommendation of its legal counsel to 
reject the petition on the grounds that (1) it creates a new cause of action and (2) it 
confers jurisdiction on the common pleas court to hear the new cause of action. 
                                                 
1 Individual members of the board, Dr. Bruce Saferin, Brenda Hill, Joshua Hughes, and David 
Karmol, in their official capacities, were also named as respondents. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 4} On August 30, Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor filed the present 
expedited election complaint.  The parties have filed briefs and evidence in 
accordance with the calendar for expedited election cases in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, 
and we have received two amicus briefs in support of respondents. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide that relief, and (3) the lack of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 
131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  To satisfy the first two 
requirements, a relator must show that the respondent engaged in fraud or corruption, 
abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  
State ex rel. Jacquemin v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 147 Ohio St.3d 467, 2016-
Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, ¶ 9.  Because there is no allegation of fraud or corruption 
in this case, Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor must show that the board abused its 
discretion or disregarded the law when it rejected the petition. 
{¶ 6} Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor have not shown that the elections board 
abused its discretion in keeping the LEBOR off the ballot.  The elections board 
relied on this court’s decision in State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 152 Ohio St.3d 244, 
2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 329, which held that elections boards are authorized “ 
‘to determine whether a ballot measure falls within the scope of the constitutional 
power of referendum or initiative,’ ” id. at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Youngstown v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 
1229, ¶ 9.  We do not find an abuse of discretion or disregard of the law in the 
election board’s reliance on Flak given that Flak also involved proposed 
amendments to a city charter.  “County boards of elections are of statutory creation, 
and the members thereof in the performance of their duties must comply with 
applicable statutory requirements.”  State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 
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185, 187, 134 N.E.2d 839 (1956).  It was not unreasonable for the elections board 
to look to Flak for guidance on its statutory duties. 
{¶ 7} Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor argue that the elections board should 
have relied on this court’s decision in State ex rel. Espen v. Wood Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-8223, ___ N.E.3d ___.  But that case did 
not result in a court majority.  Thus, the elections board did not improperly 
disregard Espen. 
{¶ 8} Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor also argue that the authority granted to 
elections boards in R.C. 3501.11(K)(2), adopted in 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 463 (“H.B. 
463”) is unconstitutional because it violates either the doctrine of separation of 
powers or the single-subject rule.  But as we have observed in other recent 
decisions, we need not reach these issues because we can decide this case under 
pre-H.B. 463 caselaw.  See Flak, 152 Ohio St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 
329, at ¶ 17; State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-____, 
333 N.E.3d ____ . 
{¶ 9} Because Twitchell, Mack, and Nestor have not demonstrated that the 
board of elections abused its discretion when it relied on Flak to deny the request to 
place the LEBOR charter amendments on the ballot, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’DONNELL and DEWINE, JJ. 
O’DONNELL, J., joins Justice Kennedy’s opinion and recognizes Justice 
Fischer’s position that portions of H.B. 463 are unconstitutional, but finds it 
unnecessary to reach that issue in this case. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2018 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 10} I concur with the per curiam opinion that the Lucas County Board of 
Elections did not abuse its discretion in refusing to place the charter amendment on 
the ballot and therefore relators, Bryan Twitchell, Julian C. Mack, and Sean M. 
Nestor, have failed to establish that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus.  I write 
separately to address the impropriety of reaching the issues raised by the opinion 
concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 11} “While there may be exceptions, it is not generally the proper role of 
this court to develop a party’s arguments.”  In re Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio 
St.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19.  Indeed, the opinion concurring 
in judgment only would not only rewrite significant constitutional provisions, it 
would sua sponte declare portions of the Toledo city charter to be in conflict with 
the Ohio Constitution, all without the slightest input from the parties.  We should 
adhere to this court’s long-standing policy not to address issues not raised by the 
parties.  Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2.  
We have recognized that “justice is far better served” when we have the benefit of 
the parties’ briefing and arguments before we make a final determination.  Id.; see 
also Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 144 Ohio St.3d 
188, 2015-Ohio-2343, 41 N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (critiquing 
the majority opinion’s reliance in that case on an issue that was not appealed to this 
court, that “the parties did not brief or argue,” and that was decided “without relying 
on experts or authoritative statements and without considering the unique needs” 
of the parties). 
{¶ 12} As recently as last week, this court denied a writ of mandamus by 
relying, in part, on State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 152 Ohio St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-
8109, 95 N.E.3d 329.  Today, the opinion concurring in judgment only—which is 
advanced by justices who concurred in the decision in Flak—sua sponte concludes 
that our prior decisions were in error.  But nothing has changed in the short time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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since Flak was announced; not the relevant statutes or constitutional provisions, not 
the parties’ arguments, and not the makeup of this court.  To so quickly abandon 
our prior case law without the benefit of briefing by the parties, as the opinion 
concurring in judgment only suggests that we do, would leave the law vulnerable 
to the whims of those sitting on the bench, rather than moored to the principled and 
disciplined approach that is the cornerstone of an independent judiciary. 
{¶ 13} That is not to say that this court should be so tied to precedent that it 
would reject an opportunity to correct an error.  But it is a frivolous use of judicial 
authority to sua sponte abandon our precedent, and act as both advocate and arbiter 
without the input of the parties, particularly in the context of expedited election 
cases, which involve such critical issues as the power reserved to the people by our 
state constitution to participate in their government. 
{¶ 14} Indeed, the opinion concurring in judgment only raises more 
questions than it answers in its effort to sua sponte alter the court’s jurisprudence 
in this line of election cases.  For example, it assumes that a proposed charter 
amendment initiated by the voters is not an “initiative” at all, that the voters’ power 
to amend a charter arises exclusively from Article XVIII, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of 
the Ohio Constitution, that Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution has no 
application to a proposed charter amendment initiated by the people, and that a 
board of elections’ duties are different when presented with a municipal-charter 
amendment than when it is presented with other voter-initiated efforts.  But this 
argument implicates many legal conclusions, including that Article XVIII is the 
exclusive provision under which charter amendments are governed.  And it requires 
interpreting the meaning of the term “initiative” to exclude voter-initiated efforts to 
amend a municipal charter.  Whether these conclusions are clear from the language 
of the relevant constitutional provisions is not a question before us nor one that the 
parties have briefed. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 15} Additionally, the opinion concurring in judgment only concludes 
that the Ohio Constitution requires the Toledo city council to approve an ordinance 
placing the initiated charter amendment on the ballot and that absent such an 
ordinance, relators’ complaint for a writ of mandamus against the board of elections 
is premature.  The opinion then goes so far as to conclude that the Toledo city 
charter is inconsistent with the Ohio Constitution.  But these arguments have not 
been presented to this court.  And the question whether the process of submitting a 
voter-initiated charter amendment to the electors arises exclusively under Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution has not been presented to this court nor briefed by 
the parties.  For example, Article XVIII, Section 9, requires a “legislative authority” 
(in this case, city council) to submit a qualifying initiative to the ballot, but it does 
not mandate how that is to be accomplished (by passage of an ordinance, 
certification by the clerk of a city council, or by another method). 
{¶ 16} It is the court’s role to act as an arbiter, not an advocate.  Here, the 
opinion concurring in judgment only exceeds the bounds of our judicial authority.  
We should treat such attempt with circumspection. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 17} I agree with the majority that relators, Bryan Twitchell, Julian C. 
Mack, and Sean M. Nestor, have failed to establish that they have a clear legal right 
to issuance of a writ of mandamus against the board of elections.  I write separately, 
however, to urge that we clear up the confusion created by our recent caselaw, 
which has begun treating a petition to amend a municipal charter pursuant to Article 
XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution as the equivalent of an initiative petition 
to enact an ordinance pursuant to Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution.  
However, the right of initiative is separate from the right of the people of a 
municipality to frame a form of government.  Until recently, we had recognized 
that Article XVIII, Section 9 sets forth the specific procedure for amending a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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municipal charter and requires a municipality’s legislative body to pass an 
ordinance placing a proposed charter amendment on the ballot when its proponents 
present a sufficient petition.  Because there is no evidence here that the Toledo city 
council passed such an ordinance, the Lucas County Board of Elections ultimately 
was correct in refusing to place the charter amendment on the ballot for the 
November 2018 election.  Therefore, I concur in the judgment denying the writ. 
Power of Initiative and Referendum 
{¶ 18} Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution, adopted in 1912, 
reserves to the people of a municipality the power of initiative and referendum: 
“The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each 
municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be 
authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised 
in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.”  Our caselaw construing this 
amendment has long held that a board of elections has authority to deny ballot 
access when an initiative petition “does not contain any question which a 
municipality is authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  State ex rel. 
Rhodes v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 12 Ohio St.2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967); 
accord State ex rel. Sensible Norwood v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 148 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696, ¶ 9; State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition 
v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 34; State ex rel. 
Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 168, 685 N.E.2d 224 
(1997). 
{¶ 19} In Sensible Norwood, the board of elections refused to place on the 
ballot a proposed municipal ordinance that would decriminalize marijuana and 
hashish in the city of Norwood.  We noted that a municipality has authority to define 
misdemeanor offenses but that the power to define and prescribe punishment for 
felonies is vested in the General Assembly.  Id. at ¶ 10.  And because the power to 
designate felonies is not a matter that municipalities are “authorized by law to 
January Term, 2018 
 
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control by legislative action,” Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution, the 
supporters of the proposed ordinance did not have the right to have the measure 
placed on the ballot.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 20} The power of a municipality or of the people of a municipality to 
adopt and amend a municipal charter, however, flows from a separate constitutional 
provision. 
Power to Adopt or Amend a Municipal Charter 
{¶ 21} Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution was also adopted 
in 1912.  It authorizes a municipality to “frame and adopt or amend” a charter form 
of government.  Section 9 of Article XVIII specifies the procedure for placing a 
proposed amendment to the charter on the ballot: 
 
Amendments to any charter framed and adopted as herein 
provided may be submitted to the electors of a municipality by a 
two-thirds vote of the legislative authority thereof, and upon 
petitions signed by ten per centum of the electors of the municipality 
setting forth any such proposed amendment, shall be submitted by 
such legislative authority.  The submission of proposed amendments 
to the electors shall be governed by the requirements of section 8 as 
to the submission of the question of choosing a charter commission 
* * *.  If any such amendment is approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon, it shall become a part of the charter of the 
municipality. 
 
In turn, Article XVIII, Section 8, states, “The legislative authority of any city or 
village may by a two-thirds vote of its members, and upon petition of ten per centum 
of the electors shall forthwith, provide by ordinance for the submission to the 
electors, of the question, ‘Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter.’ ” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 22} We have therefore explained that “ ‘Section 9 of Article XVIII, 
which incorporates the requirements of Section 8, allows, and on petition by ten 
percent of the electors, requires, the legislative authority of any city, e.g., city 
council, to “forthwith” authorize by ordinance an election on the charter 
amendment issue.’  (Emphasis sic.)”  State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter 
Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-
5302, 776 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Commt. for Charter Amendment 
Petition v. Avon, 81 Ohio St.3d 590, 592, 693 N.E.2d 205 (1998).  “The ‘manifest 
object’ of Section 9 of Article XVIII ‘is to provide the procedure for the submission 
of a charter amendment to electors’ and these ‘requirements are clear and complete, 
and are not to be added to or subtracted from.’ ” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting Billington v. 
Cotner, 25 Ohio St.2d 140, 146, 267 N.E.2d 410 (1971). 
{¶ 23} We have held that in placing a proposed amendment to a municipal 
charter on the ballot, “[the] board of elections has nothing but a ministerial role 
under the Constitution.”  State ex rel. Semik v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 67 
Ohio St.3d 334, 337, 617 N.E.2d 1120 (1993).  And “[s]ince the Constitution 
requires that the admission [sic, submission] of the charter amendment initiative be 
made by the legislature, it follows that the legislature need not make the submission 
unless satisfied of the sufficiency of the petitions and that all statutory requirements 
are fairly met.”  Morris v. Macedonia City Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 55, 641 
N.E.2d 1075 (1994).  “ ‘This function being reposed by the Constitution in the 
legislative branch of the government, it does not lie in the power of the people of 
the municipality to transfer it to an arm of the executive branch, viz. the board of 
elections.’ ”  Semik at 336, quoting State ex rel. Hinchcliffe v. Gibbons, 116 Ohio 
St. 390, 395, 156 N.E. 455 (1927).  For this reason, “the board cannot be granted 
decisive authority in this area.”  Id. at 337. 
{¶ 24} Our caselaw had been consistent on this point since we decided 
Hinchcliffe in 1927.  Recently, however, in reviewing mandamus actions involving 
January Term, 2018 
 
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ordinances to amend municipal charters, we began applying our caselaw construing 
the power of initiative and referendum as if Article II, Section 1f were the source 
of the authority to amend a municipal charter. 
{¶ 25} In State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 
Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, we addressed the board of 
elections’ authority to review an ordinance proposing a charter amendment, but we 
did not even mention Article XVIII, Sections 7, 8, and 9, or any of our prior caselaw 
construing those provisions.  We therefore did not recognize that the authority to 
amend a municipal charter arises from a constitutional provision separate from the 
right of initiative.  Even though an ordinance had instructed the board to place the 
charter amendment on the ballot, we relied on R.C. 3501.11(K) and held that the 
board had authority to review a charter-amendment petition and “determine 
whether a ballot measure falls within the scope of the constitutional power of 
referendum or initiative.”  Id. at ¶ 9.  However, our error did not affect the outcome 
of the case; we ordered the charter amendment on the ballot, explaining that “boards 
of elections do not have authority to sit as arbiters of the legality or constitutionality 
of a ballot measure’s substantive terms.  An unconstitutional amendment may be a 
proper item for referendum or initiative.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 26} We continued our error in State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 152 Ohio St.3d 
244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 329, in which we considered whether the 
Mahoning County Board of Elections had a clear legal duty to place two proposed 
charter amendments on the ballot.  The Youngstown city council had unanimously 
passed ordinances instructing the board to place the proposed amendments on the 
ballot, but the board refused to do so on the grounds that the amendments contained 
provisions that exceeded the scope of the city’s power to enact by initiative.  Id. at 
¶ 7.  In reviewing a mandamus action challenging that decision, we again relied on 
Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution without mentioning Article XVIII, 
Sections 7, 8, and 9.  The city had enacted ordinances placing charter amendments 
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on the ballot on authority of Article XVIII, Section 9, not Article II, Section 1f, but 
we held that under R.C. 3501.11(K)(1), the board had authority to review the 
sufficiency and validity of the charter-amendment petitions and determine whether 
the charter amendments fell within the scope of the power to initiate legislation.  
Flak at ¶ 11.  Then, we compounded the error by relying on Sensible Norwood, 148 
Ohio St.3d 176, 2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696—a case involving an initiative 
petition for a proposed municipal ordinance, not an ordinance proposing to amend 
a charter—and concluded that the board of elections properly rejected the petitions 
because the proposed charter amendments exceeded the municipality’s legislative 
power by purporting to create a cause of action.  Id. at ¶ 15-16. 
{¶ 27} We relied on our faulty reasoning in Flak in State ex rel. 
Khumprakob v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-
1602, ___ N.E.3d ___.  However, our discussion of Flak did not affect the outcome 
in Khumprakob, because we held that the board of elections abused its discretion 
in finding that the amendment exceeded the city of Youngstown’s legislative 
power.  We nonetheless assumed that a charter amendment involves the power to 
initiate legislation controlled by Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution 
rather than the power to amend a charter form of municipal government controlled 
by Article XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 28} The majority today apparently recognizes that our reasoning in Flak 
is flawed, because the majority does not actually apply that decision to this case but 
rather concludes that “[i]t was not unreasonable for the elections board to look to 
Flak for guidance on its statutory duties,” majority opinion at ¶ 6.  But the board of 
elections had nothing but a ministerial role in placing the proposed charter 
amendment on the ballot.  Semik, 67 Ohio St.3d at 337, 617 N.E.2d 1120.  It 
therefore had no discretion to exercise, and the reasonableness of its reliance on 
Flak is irrelevant.  And more fundamentally, we should not abdicate the judicial 
responsibility to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
L.Ed. 60 (1803), and permit the board of elections to decide ballot access by 
applying whichever of our conflicting lines of authority supports the desired result. 
{¶ 29} Here, the board of elections concluded that the proposed charter 
amendment exceeds the scope of the municipality’s legislative authority to enact 
through initiative pursuant to Article II, Section 1f.  But to reach that conclusion, 
the board had to ignore language on the petition citing “Constitution of Ohio, Art. 
XVIII, Section 9 and 14.”  The Ohio secretary of state used this language in Form 
6-B, the petition for submission of a proposed charter amendment.  (The secretary 
provides a separate Form 6-I for initiative petitions).  And the board of elections 
did not follow the secretary of state’s Ohio Ballot Questions and Issues Handbook 
10-6 
(2018), 
available at https://www.sos.state.oh.us/globalassets/elections 
/eoresources/general/questionsandissues.pdf (accessed Sept. 20, 2018), a guide for 
the boards of elections that states: 
 
The authority and procedure for approving an amendment to 
a municipal charter are found in Article XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  * * * 
An amendment to a charter may be submitted to the electors 
by one of the two following methods:  
i.  Two-thirds vote of the legislative authority of the 
municipality. 
ii.  A petition containing the full text of the proposed 
amendment and signed by 10 percent of the electors of the 
municipality.  The filing of a valid and sufficient petition requires 
the legislative authority to pass an ordinance ordering the board of 
elections to submit the amendment to the electors. 
The municipal legislative authority determines the 
sufficiency and validity of a petition to amend a charter.  The board 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of elections’ initial role in reviewing the petition is strictly 
ministerial; i.e., determining the sufficiency and validity of the 
signatures and reporting its findings to the legislative authority. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)   
{¶ 30} A charter amendment is not an exercise of the people’s power to 
initiate legislation—i.e., to enact an ordinance—but rather is the municipality’s 
authority to establish and amend its form of government through the action of the 
municipality’s legislative branch.  Accordingly, I would apply Article XVIII, 
Sections 7, 8, and 9, and caselaw construing those provisions in cases in which a 
city council enacts an ordinance ordering the placement of a proposed amendment 
to the municipality’s charter on a ballot and would not treat an ordinance ordering 
the placement of a proposed amendment on a ballot the same as an initiative petition 
seeking to enact an ordinance. 
{¶ 31} The concurring opinion asserts that this opinion “assumes that a 
proposed charter amendment initiated by the voters is not an ‘initiative’ at all, that 
the voters’ power to amend a charter arises exclusively from Article XVIII, 
Sections 7, 8 and 9, of the Ohio Constitution, that Article II, Section 1f, of the Ohio 
Constitution has no application to a proposed charter amendment initiated by the 
people, and that a board of elections’ duties are different when presented with a 
municipal-charter amendment than when it is presented with other voter-initiated 
efforts.”  Concurring opinion at ¶ 14.  Of course, had the framers intended for the 
people of a municipality to adopt and amend a municipal charter through the right 
of initiative reserved by Article II, Section 1f, there would be no reason to adopt 
procedures for amending a charter in Article XVIII, Sections 7, 8 and 9. 
{¶ 32} It is a general rule of constitutional interpretation that when a 
specific constitutional provision applies, it controls over a more general provision.  
State v. Anderson, 148 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-5791, 68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 26; 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
Sacramento Cty. v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 
(1998).  Article XVIII, Sections 7, 8, and 9 provide specific procedures for 
amending a charter, while Article II, Section 1f does not.  We should be hesitant to 
adopt an analysis that would allow a party to evade the procedure expressly 
provided by the Constitution for amending a municipal charter simply by 
characterizing the petition as seeking an initiative rather than a petition for a charter 
amendment. 
{¶ 33} The concurring opinion also asserts that “Article XVIII, Section 9 
requires a ‘legislative authority’ (in this case, city council) to submit a qualifying 
initiative to the ballot, but it does not mandate how that is to be accomplished (by 
passage of an ordinance, certification by the clerk of city council, or by another 
method).”  (Emphasis sic.)  Concurring opinion at ¶ 15.  That claim disregards the 
plain language of Article XVIII, Section 9, expressly incorporating Article XVIII, 
Section 8, and requiring the legislative authority of the municipality to “provide by 
ordinance” for the submission of the charter amendment to the people. 
{¶ 34} And it is peculiar that in writing to uphold the importance of stare 
decisis, the concurring opinion is so willing to abandon our caselaw recognizing 
that presentation of a sufficient petition requires the legislative authority of the 
municipality to pass an ordinance placing the charter amendment on the ballot.  See, 
e.g., Commt. for the Charter Amendment, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-5302, 776 
N.E.2d 1041, at ¶ 23; Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition, 81 Ohio St.3d at 
592, 693 N.E.2d 205; Semik, 67 Ohio St.3d at 337, 617 N.E.2d 1120; State ex rel. 
Blackwell v. Bachrach, 166 Ohio St. 301, 306, 143 N.E.2d 127 (1957).  In fact, our 
recent decision in State ex rel. Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition v. Maple 
Hts., 140 Ohio St.3d 334, 2014-Ohio-4097, 18 N.E.3d 426, granted a writ of 
mandamus to compel a city council to pass an ordinance placing a charter 
amendment on the ballot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 35} Last, I recognize that it would be helpful to order supplemental 
briefing on these questions, but the shortened timeline of an expedited election 
action make that impractical if not impossible—the deadline for preparing absentee 
ballots as required by federal law, 52 U.S.C. 20302, is imminent.  See R.C. 
3511.04(B).  In these circumstances, our prudential policy against addressing 
arguments not raised by the parties is not a barrier to addressing and remedying a 
clear mistake before it is repeated again.  The alternative is to stay silent and allow 
the board of elections to continue to deny ballot access based on this court’s 
erroneous statement of law.  In the words of Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, writing 
for the court in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 
381, 385, 662 N.E.2d 339 (1996), such an interpretation would not “foster[ ] the 
goal of providing citizens with access to the ballot, a foundation of our democracy.” 
{¶ 36} Despite the majority’s misapplication of Article II, Section 1f of the 
Ohio Constitution, here the board of elections properly refused to place the charter 
amendment on the ballot, because the Toledo city council had not passed an 
ordinance placing it on the ballot.  Rather, Toledo’s clerk of council submitted the 
petition—not an ordinance—directly to the board of elections.  This error resulted 
from the clerk’s attempt to comply with the Toledo City Charter, Chapter 1, Section 
5, which provides:   
 
Any amendment to this Charter may be submitted to the 
electors of the City for adoption by resolution of the Council, two-
thirds of the members thereof concurring, and shall be submitted 
when a petition is filed with the Clerk of the Council setting forth 
the proposed amendment and signed by not less than ten percent of 
the electors. * * * It shall be the duty of the Clerk to notify the 
election authorities of the adoption by the Council of a resolution 
for submission of a proposed amendment, or of his or her 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
determination that a sufficient petition for submission has been filed 
with him or her; and the Clerk shall request the election authorities 
to provide for an election as aforesaid. 
 
The charter calls for the council to pass a “resolution” to amend the charter on its 
own initiative.  However, when petitions are filed seeking an amendment, the 
charter requires the clerk to submit the amendment to the board of elections if the 
clerk finds the petitions to be sufficient—without council passing an ordinance 
instructing the board to place the charter amendment on the ballot.  The Toledo City 
Charter is therefore inconsistent with the procedure required by Article XVIII, 
Sections 8 and 9.  See Commt. for the Charter Amendment, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 
2002-Ohio-5302, 776 N.E.2d 1041, at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 37} Mandamus will not lie in this case, because until the Toledo City 
Council passes an ordinance, the board of elections has no duty to place the charter 
amendment on the ballot.  State ex rel. Beard v. Hardin, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-
Ohio-1286, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 34  (lead opinion).  “Because the council has not 
passed [an ordinance approving the placement of the amendment on the ballot], 
relators have no claim against the board of elections.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} Moreover, in contrast to the dissenting opinion’s argument that this 
court should address whether 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 463 (“H.B. 463”), which amended 
R.C. 3501.11 to require a board of elections to examine an initiative petition, 
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, the plain language of Article XVIII, 
Sections 8 and 9 of the Ohio Constitution is controlling, and there is no need to 
consider whether the amendments enacted by H.B. 463 apply. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} “[T]he public is not under the illusion that we are infallible.  [There 
is] little harm in admitting that we made a mistake * * *.”  Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 464, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
dissenting).  But recognizing an error in a prior decision is only the first step; sooner 
or later, we also have to rectify it.  As United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained,  
 
the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases, 
with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, 
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity.  The 
freshness of error not only deprives it of the respect to which long-
established practice is entitled, but also counsels that the opportunity 
of correction be seized at once, before state and federal laws and 
practices have been adjusted to embody it. 
 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  We therefore should overrule bad precedent at the 
earliest opportunity to avoid detrimental reliance on it.  This is especially true when 
the bad precedent resulted from inadvertence and runs counter to the plain language 
of the Ohio Constitution and almost a century of settled caselaw construing it. 
{¶ 40} This case brings us to that crossroads, because it is now apparent that 
there are two irreconcilable lines of case authority interpreting the Ohio 
Constitution’s procedure for amending a municipal city charter.  One line of 
authority dates from 1927 and holds that Article XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio 
Constitution governs the amendment of a municipal charter.  The second line of 
authority began in 2015 and applies caselaw construing Article II, Section 1f of the 
Ohio Constitution, pertaining to the right of initiative, as if that provision were the 
constitutional authority for amending a charter.  Rather than resolve the confusion 
in our law, the majority preserves it for another day. 
{¶ 41} Contrary to statements in our recent decisions, Article XVIII, 
Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution—and not Article II, Section 1f—sets forth the 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
specific procedure for amending a municipal charter and requires a municipality’s 
legislative body, upon submission of a sufficient petition, to pass an ordinance in 
order to place a proposed charter amendment on the ballot.  Because there is no 
evidence here that the Toledo city council passed such an ordinance, the Lucas 
County Board of Elections was ultimately correct in refusing to place the charter 
amendment on the ballot for the November 2018 election, and relators have failed 
to establish that they have a clear legal right to issuance of a writ of mandamus 
against the board of elections. 
{¶ 42} For these reasons, I concur in judgment only. 
O’DONNELL and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 43} I respectfully dissent and would hold that portions of 2016 Sub.H.B. 
No. 463 (“H.B. 463”) are unconstitutional for the reasons stated in my separate 
opinion in State ex rel. Khumprakob v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-1602, ___ N.E.3d ____, ¶ 42 (Fischer, J., concurring in 
judgment only). 
I. 
The Constitutionality of R.C. 3501.11(K) Is Ripe for Review 
{¶ 44} As I have previously discussed, I believe that R.C. 3501.11(K) 
contains language raising separation-of-powers concerns.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Bolzenius v. Preisse, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-3708, ___ N.E.3d ____, ¶ 24 
(Fischer, J., dissenting).  In the instant case, the parties directly argue the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3501.11(K)(1), and it is high time that this court addresses 
those arguments, which it has failed to do on multiple occasions.  See State ex rel. 
Flak v. Betras, 152 Ohio St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 329, ¶ 17 
(“Because the matter may be properly resolved under our pre–H.B. 463 caselaw, 
we leave consideration of the constitutionality of the new enactment for another 
day”); Bolzenius at ¶ 14 (“Because we have already found that the board had the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
authority to exclude the proposal from the ballot under our pre–H.B. 463 caselaw, 
we need not reach the constitutionality of H.B. 463 in this case”). 
II. 
The Court Could Interpret R.C. 3501.11(K) in a Manner that Does 
Not Violate the Separation-of-Powers Doctrine 
{¶ 45} In this case, relators, Bryan Twitchell, Julian C. Mack, and Sean M. 
Nestor, argue that the Board of Election’s action violates the separation-of-powers 
doctrine and that this court cannot allow the General Assembly to transfer a “take-
no-prisoners veto power” from the judicial branch to the executive branch. 
{¶ 46} “Courts must liberally construe statutes in order to avoid 
constitutional infirmities.”  State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 83 Ohio St.3d 551, 555, 
700 N.E.2d 1281 (1998), citing State ex rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn., 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 288, 690 N.E.2d 1273 (1998).  Theoretically, the 
court need not go so far as to find the statute unconstitutional.  It is possible that 
R.C. 3501.11(K) could be found constitutional by applying a nondeferential 
standard of review to those determinations made pursuant to the statute by the board 
of elections.  We already use a nondeferential standard in other areas of law when 
analyzing a purely legal question. 
{¶ 47} In a mandamus case such as this, we review an election official’s 
decision to exclude a ballot measure from the ballot for an abuse of discretion.  See 
State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d 361, 2015-Ohio-3749, 43 N.E.3d 
419; State ex rel. Coover v. Husted, 148 Ohio St.3d 332, 2016-Ohio-5794, 70 
N.E.3d 587.  In this case, the majority determines that the board of elections did not 
abuse its discretion when it rejected the ballot measure on the grounds that the 
proposed amendment to the city charter created a new cause of action and conferred 
jurisdiction on the common pleas court to hear that new cause of action.  We have 
long held, however, that we review questions of law de novo.  See In re J.V., 134 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 3. 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
{¶ 48} We have applied this de novo standard of review in cases in which 
we review legal determinations made by executive agencies.  For example, in cases 
in which we review decisions made by the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), we 
consider legal issues de novo.  Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 92, 2014-Ohio-1588, 9 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 10-11.  We 
“will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
conclusion.”  Gahanna-Jefferson Local Schools Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001).  In these and many similar cases, we have 
implicitly accepted that the BTA’s initial determination of a purely legal question 
does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
{¶ 49} I accordingly encourage the court to consider whether we should 
apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing a legal determination made by 
a board of elections pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(K). 
III. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 50} Thus, although I dissent in this case, I believe there may be common 
ground upon which this court can come to a consensus in the future regarding the 
constitutional issue that is presented, but left unresolved, in this case. 
_________________ 
Terry J. Lodge and Jensen Silvis, for relators. 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borell, 
Kevin A. Pituch, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
respondents. 
Chad A. Endsley, Leah F. Curtis, and Amy M. Milam, urging denial of the 
writ for amici curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Lucas County Farm Bureau. 
Barrett, Easterday, Cunningham & Eselgroth, L.L.P., David C. Barrett Jr., 
Carolyn Eselgroth, and Amanda Stacy Hartman, urging denial of the writ for amici 
curiae Ohio Soybean Association, Ohio Corn & Wheat Growers Association, Ohio 
Poultry Association, Ohio Cattlemen’s Association, Ohio Dairy Producers 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
Association, Ohio Pork Council, Ohio Sheep Improvement Association, and Ohio 
Agribusiness Association. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and L. Bradfield Hughes, urging 
denial of the writ for amici curiae Affiliated Construction Trades Ohio Foundation, 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Oil and Gas Association, Ohio Chemistry 
Technology Council, and American Petroleum Institute. 
_________________