Title: Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 12, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVID LEE CAREY
and TANYA MARIA CAREY,
Husband and Wife,
Respondents on Review,
v.
LINCOLN LOAN CO.,
an Oregon corporation,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9706-04753; CA A117696; SC S53242)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the record November 14, 2006.
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., of Green & Markley, P.C., Portland, filed the brief for petitioner
on review.  With him on the brief was Steven E. Benson, Portland.
John M. Berman, Tigard, filed the brief for respondents on review.
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Salem, filed the brief for amicus curiae State of
Oregon.  With her on the brief was Hardy Myers, Attorney General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Walters,
Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Henry Kantor, Judge. 203 Or App 399, 125 P3d 814 (2005).
** Carson, J., retired December 31, 2006, and did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.  Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
Is the Court of Appeals lawfully constituted?  Defendant Lincoln Loan Co. argues
that it is not, because -- in defendant's view -- the provision of the Oregon Constitution that
purports to authorize the legislature to establish courts was improperly adopted in 1910.  It
therefore follows -- again, in defendant's view -- that, when the legislature created the Court of
Appeals by statute in 1969, it had no authority to do so.  For that reason, defendant asserts, the
Court of Appeals decision in this case, which reversed a trial court judgment in favor of
defendant, is invalid and must be vacated.  The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument
that that court was improperly established and ruled against defendant on the merits.  For the
reasons set out below, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I.  BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs David Carey and Tanya Carey purchased a house from defendant
pursuant to a land sale contract that included various provisions that made it difficult for
plaintiffs to sell the house to a third party.  Plaintiffs later brought this declaratory judgment
action, arguing that those provisions violated statutes applicable to loan agreements of that kind
and that a provision in plaintiffs' loan agreement with defendant that limited plaintiffs' ability to
prepay the contract was an impermissible restraint on alienation.   Plaintiffs asserted that those
contract provisions rendered the loan agreement unconscionable and unenforceable.   The trial
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed.  
Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 165 Or App 657, 998 P2d 724 (2000).   The Court of Appeals held
that defendant was entitled to judgment on some of the claims; however, it also concluded that
plaintiffs' claim that the contract provisions were unconscionable was not susceptible to summary
judgment.  Id. at 671.  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.  
On remand, the trial court determined that the provisions were not
unconscionable.  Plaintiffs appealed.  Defendant responded to that appeal by challenging the
Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Defendant argued that Article VII (Amended)
of the Oregon Constitution -- which provides, in part, that "[t]he judicial power of the state shall
be vested in one supreme court and such other courts as may from time to time be created by
law" (emphasis added) -- was improperly adopted by the voters in 1910.  Defendant based that
argument on several constitutional provisions that we describe below.  Without Article VII
(Amended) in place, defendant claimed, the legislature had lacked the authority to create the
Court of Appeals because Article VII (Original), which establishes the judicial power of the state,
did not grant the legislature that authority. (1)  Therefore, defendant argued, the Court of
Appeals was unconstitutionally established and lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider
plaintiffs' appeal.  
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, holding that, even if the
adoption of Article VII (Amended) were flawed, subsequent amendments to that article cured any
defect in the adoption of the provision authorizing the legislature to create new courts.  Carey v.
Lincoln Loan Co., 203 Or App 399, 407-15, 125 P3d 814 (2006).  The Court of Appeals then
proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs' appeal and held that some of the contractual provisions were
unconscionable.  We granted defendant's petition for review to consider defendant's challenge to
the constitutionality of the legislation that created the Court of Appeals.
II. DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO ARTICLE VII (AMENDED)
We first note that defendant raised the issue presented here in Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 340 Or 613, 136 P3d 1 (2006).  There, this court declined to reach the merits of
defendant's argument, because that action was a collateral attack on a judgment in a separate
action that had been litigated fully and in which defendant had participated without challenging
the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction.  Accordingly, this court concluded that defendant was barred
by claim preclusion from challenging the earlier judgment.  Id. at 630.  Here, however, we do
reach defendant's argument that the Court of Appeals was improperly established and, for the
reasons discussed below, reject it. (2)  
In Lincoln Loan, this court summarized the basis for defendant's challenge to the
validity of the Court of Appeals:
"[Defendant] asserts that the procedure by which the voters adopted  Article VII
(Amended) in 1910 suffered from three constitutional defects.  For that reason,
according to [defendant], Article VII (Amended) never became part of the Oregon
Constitution, and Article VII (Original) 'remains in full force and effect today.' 
Article VII (Original), section 1, provides, in part, that '[t]he Judicial power of the
State shall be vested in a Supr[e]me Court, Circuit[] Courts, and County Courts
* * *.'  That provision also refers to justices of the peace and to municipal courts. 
However, Article VII (Original) does not mention or provide for an intermediate
Court of Appeals and does not authorize the legislature to create a Court of
Appeals -- or, indeed, any court.  In contrast, Article VII (Amended), section 1,
provides, in part:
"'The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme
court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created
by law. * * * ' 
"'The legislature created the Court of Appeals in 1969.  Or Laws 1969, ch
198.  If Article VII (Amended), section 1, is a valid part of the Oregon
Constitution, then the legislature had the authority to create the Court of Appeals,
and [defendant's argument] fails.  If Article VII (Amended), section 1, is not a
valid part of the Oregon Constitution, then the legislature had no authority to
create the Court of Appeals, [and] the Court of Appeals had no authority to
reverse [the trial court judgment in defendant's favor].'"
340 Or at 616-17 (emphasis in original).
Defendant argues that the 1910 initiative petition that created Article VII
(Amended) was adopted unconstitutionally because it (1) encompassed more than one
constitutional amendment, but did not permit voters to vote separately on each amendment, in
violation of Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution; (2) was enacted without
compliance with the canvass and proclamation requirements of Article XVII, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution; and (3) failed to set forth the full text of the proposed constitutional
amendment, in violation of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution. 
III.  VALIDATION OF ARTICLE VII (AMENDED) BY SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
A. Post-1910 Amendments to Article VII (Amended)
Defendant's argument is directed at Article VII (Amended) as it was presented to
the voters in 1910. (3)   However, defendant first raised this issue in this case in 2004, when it
moved to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeals was improperly
established and therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider that appeal.  Article VII (Amended), as it
now appears in the Oregon Constitution, is not the same as it was when Article VII (Amended)
was adopted in 1910.  The article has been amended 10 times over the course of almost a
century; it has been construed in dozens of decisions issued by this court; and the legislature has
enacted many statutes based upon the authority conferred by that article.  This case thus is
different from Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49 (1998), and other recent cases
considering challenges to constitutional amendments based on alleged procedural irregularities in
their adoption.  Those cases all were filed relatively soon after the challenged amendments had
been approved by the voters and before the voters had made changes to the challenged
constitutional provisions or the legislature had enacted statutes based upon them.   As the Court
of Appeals noted in this case, "The issue before us is not whether [the] challenge would have
succeeded in 1910 but whether it will succeed today."  Carey, 203 Or App at 408.
Put differently, defendant's challenge to the validity of the Court of Appeals
depends not on whether the Court of Appeals would have been a validly created entity if it had
been established on the effective date of the 1910 constitutional amendment, but rather on
whether the Court of Appeals is a valid entity now. (4)  Accordingly, we first examine the
changes that the voters have made to Article VII (Amended) since 1910.  In doing so, we shall
assume, without deciding, that the initial adoption of Article VII (Amended) in 1910 was
defective in one or more of the particulars asserted by defendant.  We shall then consider whether
the post-1910 amendments, either because of the content of those changes themselves or with
respect to their effect on Article VII (Amended) as a whole, provide a valid constitutional basis
for the legislation creating the Court of Appeals.
As adopted in 1910, Article VII (Amended) consisted of sections 1 through
7. (5)  Section 1 provided, in part -- in words that have not been changed since 1910 -- "The
judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as from
time to time may be created by law."  That section also provided for the election of judges to six-year terms and prohibited judicial compensation from being reduced during a judge's term. 
Section 2 provided that the existing judicial system, except as expressly changed by the adoption
of Article VII (Amended), would remain as it had been and also granted the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings.  Section 3
contained a number of provisions respecting the conduct of trials and appeals from trial court
decisions, and section 4 dealt with terms and decisions of the Supreme Court.  Section 5
provided that a verdict in a civil case could be rendered by three-fourths of the jurors and also
established procedures for grand juries and for indictments.  Section 6 dealt with misconduct by
public officers, and section 7 prescribed the oath of office for judges of the Supreme Court.  
The people -- the source of Oregon's Constitution -- adopted Article VII
(Amended), by initiative petition, in 1910.  The people then made changes to that article on 10
separate occasions.  They amended different sections of Article VII (Amended); they repealed
and replaced other sections; and they added new sections, some of which they subsequently
amended. (6)  We turn to a discussion of those changes.
Article VII (Amended) was first amended in 1958.  Two years earlier, in State ex
rel Madden v. Crawford, 207 Or 76, 295 P2d 174 (1956), this court had considered the
constitutionality of a statute that authorized designating circuit court judges to sit temporarily as
members of this court to assist the court with its workload.  The court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it permitted circuit court judges to sit "as members" of the Supreme
Court, even though Article VII (Amended), section 1, required that members of the Supreme
Court be elected.  The 1957 legislature then submitted to the voters a new proposed section 2a to
Article VII (Amended) that authorized the legislature to empower this court to appoint retired
judges to sit as temporary members of this court, to appoint members of the bar to sit as
temporary members of inferior courts, and to assign judges of inferior courts to serve temporarily
outside the district for which they were elected.  Or Laws 1957, SJR 30.  The voters approved
that proposal in 1958.  
The 1957 Legislative Assembly also submitted to the voters a proposed
amendment to section 5 of Article VII (Amended) that authorized a person to waive indictment
by a grand jury and instead to be charged by an information filed by the district attorney.  Or
Laws 1957, SJR 23.  That proposal also was approved by the voters in 1958.  In 1974, the voters
repealed amended section 5 and replaced it with the current version.  That 1974 amendment
revised the procedures for convening a grand jury and specified when a district attorney could
charge a person by filing an information.  Or Laws 1973, SJR 1.
The voters again amended Article VII (Amended) in 1960, adopting a proposal
submitted by the legislature that required judges to retire at the end of the calendar year in which
the judge attained the age of 75.  Or Laws 1959, SJR 3.  That measure also authorized the
legislature by law to fix a lesser age for mandatory retirement (but not earlier than the end of the
calendar year in which the judge became 70); to provide for temporarily recalling retired judges
to active service; and to authorize or require the retirement of judges for disability or other cause
that rendered the judge incapable of performing judicial duties. 
The 1961 Legislative Assembly submitted to the voters and the voters in 1962
approved another addition to Article VII (Amended) -- section 2b -- which authorized the
legislature, when it enacted laws creating courts inferior to the Supreme Court or dealing with
court jurisdiction, to make such laws applicable to all judicial districts, to designated classes of
judicial districts, or to particular judicial districts.  Or Laws 1961, SJR 34. (7)  Although the
new section 2b itself did not purport to authorize the legislature to establish courts, it explicitly
referred to "laws creating courts inferior to the Supreme Court" and thus necessarily assumed that
the legislature already had the authority under Article VII (Amended), section 1, to enact laws
creating such courts.  
A provision authorizing the Supreme Court to remove a judge from office  for
misconduct was added to Article VII (Amended) as section 8 in 1968.  Or Laws 1967, SJR 9.  
That measure identified certain actions that could be grounds for removal, but, like many of the
other amendments to Article VII (Amended), it provided that the specific procedures would be
established by statute, by stating that removals would be "[i]n the manner provided by law * * *." 
Section 8 of Article VII (Amended) was further amended in 1976, with the addition of
suspension and censure as possible sanctions, in addition to removal from office, and with
changes in the grounds for discipline.  See Or Laws 1975, SJR 48 (setting out text of proposed
amendment to Article VII (Amended), section 8).  
The legislature proposed, and the people in 1972 approved, a new section 9 of
Article VII (Amended), authorizing legislation to permit juries consisting of less than 12 but not
less than 6 jurors.  Or Laws 1971, SJR 17.
In 1974, the people amended Article VII (Amended), section 3, to increase the
value in controversy that would entitle a party to a jury trial from $20 to $200.  Or Laws 1973,
HJR 71.  Section 3 was again amended in 1996 to increase the value in controversy requirement
to $750.  Or Laws 1995, HJR 47.
B. Effect of Post-1910 Amendments 
We now consider whether, assuming that the initial adoption of Article VII
(Amended) in 1910 was improper in one or more of the ways that defendant suggests, the
people's repeated votes on specific changes to that article demonstrate that they impliedly have
cured any such defect.  
We begin by considering cases from Oregon and other jurisdictions regarding the
circumstances in which subsequent laws have been held to ratify or validate earlier laws that
allegedly had been adopted improperly.  Oregon courts long have held that defects in laws can be
cured by subsequent legislative action, as long as the subsequent action does not impair vested
rights or the obligation of contract.  In Nottage v. City of Portland, 35 Or 539, 58 P 883 (1899),
for example, the issue was whether the city could collect a street assessment when the petition for
the improvement had not contained the names of one-half of the affected property owners, as
required by the city charter.  The city argued that the procedural defect in the assessment had
been cured by a legislative amendment to the city charter enacted after the assessment had been
made.  This court agreed with the city:
"It is true, the [later ordinance] does not, in language, purport to validate or
legalize irregularities in proceedings for the improvement of a street, but defects of
this character may be cured by implication * * *.  And when the legislature
authorized the city to bring an action against the property owners to recover the
amount of the assessments, notwithstanding any irregularity or defect in the
proceedings, it necessarily intended to and did render immaterial such defects, and
it can be no objection to the validity of the act that it does not used the words
'ratify,' 'confirm,' or 'validate.'"
35 Or at 556-57 (emphasis added).  See also State ex rel. v. School District No. 23, 179 Or 441,
460-61, 172 P2d 655 (1946) (dismissing challenge to defective school consolidation order on
grounds of laches and stating that three elections -- one for school district directors, another
ratifying district's selection of school site, and a third approving the sale of bonds -- "were, in
effect, successive ratifications by the voters of the consolidation order").
Cases from other jurisdictions similarly hold that subsequent legislation can
validate constitutionally defective laws by implication.  In Wrought-Iron Range Co. v. Carver,
118 NC 328, 24 SE 352 (1896), the legislature had passed and the governor had signed a tax
statute, but the president of the senate and the speaker of the house had not signed the bill, as
required by the state constitution.  However, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
assessments made under the tax statute, because a statute that was properly enacted at the same
legislative session referred to the tax and treated it as effective.  Similarly, in Comm'rs of
Leavenworth Co. v. Higginbotham, 17 Kan 62 (1876), the president of the senate failed to sign an
1865 bill that otherwise was properly adopted.   Statutes passed in 1866 and 1867 treated the
1865 statute as valid, and the Kansas Supreme Court held that the subsequent statutes effectively
validated the defective 1865 statute.
In a more recent case, Beck v. Beck, 814 SW 2d 745 (Texas 1991), the Texas
courts had held that a statute authorizing certain prenuptial agreements was unconstitutional
under the Texas constitution in effect at the time that the statute was enacted.  In 1980, the
legislature proposed, and the people adopted, a constitutional amendment under which those
agreements would be valid.  Although the constitutional amendment did not refer to the earlier
statute or to existing agreements, the Texas Supreme Court held that, under the doctrine of
implied validation, the previously unconstitutional statute -- and actions authorized by that
statute -- were validated, to the extent that validation did not interfere with vested rights or
impair the obligation of contract.  See Beck, 814 SW 2d at 747 (describing "doctrine of implied
validation").
The cases discussed above involve the subsequent validation of defective statutes,
rather than defective constitutional provisions.  However, the same rationale applies to the
people's constitutional authority to amend that organic law, and we reach the same conclusion
here:  Irregularities in the people's adoption of a constitutional amendment may be cured by
subsequent constitutional amendments that the people enact that implicitly validate the earlier,
defective amendment. (8)  
We now consider the application of that principle to the unusual circumstances
here.  As discussed in detail above, since its adoption almost a century ago, the people have
amended, through 10 different votes, the original version of Article VII (Amended).  In adopting
those 10 amendments, the people (1) necessarily viewed each amendment as a valid exercise of
their authority to change the constitution, and (2) necessarily assumed that Article VII
(Amended) was a valid part of the constitution that could be the subject of amendment or repeal. 
Moreover, each of those amendments necessarily was approved with the intent of the people to
amend Article VII (Amended) as it had been presented to the voters in 1910 (or as amended by
post-1910 amendments).  The post-1910 amendments, of course, are of equal dignity as the 1910
amendment that adopted Article VII (Amended) and therefore could -- and did -- correct, modify,
and repeal parts of that earlier constitutional provision.  See In re Fadeley, 310 Or 548, 560, 802
P2d 31 (1990) (later-enacted constitutional provision was of equal dignity as earlier provisions
and therefore modified earlier provisions).  By properly adopting those amendments, the people
necessarily, if implicitly, validated the 1910 adoption of Article VII (Amended) and cured any
irregularities that might have accompanied its adoption. 
The people's assumption, in subsequently amending Article VII (Amended), of the
validity of that article is consistent with the treatment of that article in several of this court's
cases.  Although not addressing the specific issue presented here, those cases implicitly relied on
the validity of Article VII (Amended) and, particularly, the authority that that article conferred on
the legislature to create inferior courts.  In State v. Harvey, 117 Or 466, 242 P 440 (1926), for
example, this court rejected the defendant's claim that the court of domestic relations did not
have jurisdiction over his alleged crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  The court
began its opinion by quoting Article VII (Amended), section 1, providing for the creation of
courts by law, and held that the legislature had created the court of domestic relations by law and
that that court had jurisdiction over the defendant's case.  Similarly, in State ex rel Madden v.
Crawford, this court treated Article VII (Amended) as a valid part of the constitution and
explained that it had authorized the legislature to "create new and additional courts[,]" even
stating in dicta that the legislature "may provide for an intermediate court of appeals * * *."  207
Or at 83.  As this court stated even more bluntly 80 years ago, "That the whole judicial system
may be changed by the legislative power is taught in Section 2[] of Article VII [(Amended)]." 
LaGrande v. Municipal Court et al., 120 Or 109, 115, 251 P 308 (1926). (9)
For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the irregularities, if any, in the
adoption of Article VII (Amended) in 1910 have been cured by the implicit subsequent validation
of that article by the people. (10)  We therefore hold that Article VII (Amended) is now valid. 
It follows that the creation of the Court of Appeal in 1969, pursuant to the authority granted by
Article VII (Amended), section 1, was within the legislature's authority.  The Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeal in this case.  That court properly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal and proceeded to decide the merits of that appeal. (11)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
APPENDIX A
Article VII (Original) (as approved in 1857)
Section 1.  The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Suprume [sic] Court, Circuits
[sic] Courts, and County Courts, which shall be Courts of Record having general jurisdiction, to
be defined, limited, and regulated by law in accordance with this Constitution. — Justices of the
Peace may also be invested with limited Judicial powers, and Municipal Courts may be created
to administer the regulations of incorporated towns, and cities. —
Section 2.  The Supreme Court shall consist of Four Justices to be chosen in districts by the
electors thereof, who shall be citizens of the United States, and who shall have resided in the
State at least three years next preceding their election, and after their election to reside in their
respective districts: — The number of Justices, and Districts may be increased, but shall not
exceed five until the white population of the State shall amount to One Hundred Thousand, and
shall never exceed seven; and the boundaries of districts may be changed, but no Change of
Districts, shall have the effect to remove a Judge from office, or require him to change his
residence without his consent. —
Section 3.  The Judges first chosen under this Constitution shall allot among themselves, their
terms of office, so that the term of one of them shall expire in Two years, one in Four years, and
Two in Six years, and thereafter, one or more shall be chosen every Two years to serve for the
term of Six years. —
Section 4.  Every vacancy in the office of Judge of the Supreme Court shall be filled by
election for the remainder of the vacant term, unless it would expire at the next election, and until
so filled, or when it would so expire, the Governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment. —
Section 5.  The Judge who has the shortest term to serve, or the oldest of several having such
shortest term, and not holding by appointment shall be the Cheif [sic] Justice. —
Section 6.  The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction only to revise the final decisions of the
Circuit Courts, and every cause shall be tried, and every decision shall be made by those Judges
only, or a majority of them, who did not try the cause, or make the decision in the Circuit Court.
—
Section 7.  The terms of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by Law; but there shall be one
term at the seat of Government annually: —
And at the close of each term the Judges shall file with the Secretary of State, Concise written
Statements of the decisions made at that term. —
Section 8.  The Circuits [sic] Courts shall be held twice at least in each year in each County
organized for judicial purposes, by one of the Justices of the Supreme Court at times to be
appointed by law; and at such other times as may be appointed by the Judges severally in
pursuance of law.  —
Section 9.  All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this Constitution, or
by laws consistent therewith, exclusively in some other Court shall belong to the Circuit Courts,
and they shall have appellate jurisdiction, and supervisory control over the County Courts, and all
other inferior Courts, Officers, and tribunals. —
Section 10.  When the white population of the State shall amount to Two Hundred Thousand
the Legislative Assembly, may provide for the election of Supreme, and Circuit Judges, in
distinct classes, one of which classes shall consist of three Justices of the Supreme Court, who
shall not perform Circuit duty, and the other class shall consist of the necessary number of
Circuit Judges, who shall hold full terms without allotment, and who shall take the same oath as
the Supreme Judges. —
Section 11.  There shall be elected in each County for the term of Four years a County Judge,
who shall hold the County Court at times to be regulated by law. —
Section 12.  The County Court shall have the jurisdiction pertaining to Probate Courts, and
boards of County Commissioners, and such other powers, and duties, and such civil Jurisdiction,
not exceeding the amount or value of five hundred dollars, and such criminal jurisdiction not
extending to death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, as may be prescribed by law. — But the
Legislative Assembly may provide for the election of Two Commissioners to sit with the County
Judge whilst transacting County business, in any, or all of the Counties, or may provide a
seperate [sic] board for transacting such business. —
Section 13.  The County Judge may grant preliminary injuctions [sic], and such other writs as
the Legislative Assembly may authorize him to grant, returnable to the Circuit Court, or
otherwise as may be provided by law; and may hear, and decide questions arising upon habeas
corpus; provided such decision be not against the authority, or proceedings of a Court, or Judge
of equal, or higher jurisdiction. —
Section 14.  The Counties having less than ten thousand white inhabitants, shall be
reimbursed wholly or in part for the salary, and expenses of the County Court by fees,
percentage, & other equitable taxation, of the business done in said Court & in the office of the
County Clerk.
Section 15.  A County Clerk shall be elected in each County for the term of Two years, who
shall keep all the public records, books, and papers of the County; record conveyances, and
perform the duties of Clerk of the Circuit, and County Courts, and such other duties as may be
prescribed by law: — But whenever the number of voters in any County shall exceed Twelve
Hundred, the Legislative Assembly may authorize the election of one person as Clerk of the
Circuit Court, one person as Clerk of the County Court, and one person Recorder of
conveyances. —
Section 16.  A sheriff shall be elected in each County for the term of Two years, who shall be
the ministerial officer of the Circuit, and County Courts, and shall perform such other duties as
may be prescribed by law. —
Section 17.  There shall be elected by districts comprised of one, or more counties, a
sufficient number of prosecuting Attorneys, who shall be the law officers of the State, and of the
counties within their respective districts, and shall perform such duties pertaining to the
administration of Law, and general police as the Legislative Assembly may direct. —
Section 18.  The Legislative Assembly shall so provide that the most competent of the
permanent citizens of the county shall be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole number in
attendance at the Court, seven shall be chosen by lot as grand jurors, five of whom must concur
to find an indictment.  But the Legislative Assembly may modify or abolish grand juries.
Section 19.  Public Officers shall not be impeached, but incompetency, corruption,
malfeasance, or delinquency in office may be tried in the same manner as criminal offences [sic],
and Judgment may be given of dismissal from Office, and such further punishment as may have
been prescribed by law. —
Section 20.  The Govenor [sic] may remove from Office a Judge of the Supreme Court, or
Prosecuting Attorney upon the Joint resolution of the Legislative Assembly, in which Two Thirds
of the members elected to each house shall concur, for incompetency, Corruption, malfeasance,
or delinquency in office, or other sufficient cause stated in such resolution. —
Section 21.  Every judge of the Supreme Court before entering upon the duties of his office
shall take, subscribe, and transmit to the Secretary of State the following oath. — I
____________ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United
States, and the constitution of the State of Oregon, and that I will faithfully, and impartially
discharge the duties of a Judge of the Supreme, and Circuits [sic] Courts of said State according
to the best of my ability, and that I will not accept any other office, except Judicial offices during
the term for which I have been elected.
APPENDIX B
Article VII (Amended) (1910)
Section 1.  The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one supreme court and in
such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.  The judges of the Supreme and
other courts shall be elected by the legal voters of the State or of their respective districts for a
term of six years, and shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which
compensation shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected.
Section 2.  The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as
expressly changed by this amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise
provided by law.  But the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus proceedings. 
Section 3.  In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to
support the verdict.  Until otherwise provided by law, upon appeal of any case to the supreme
court, either party may have attached to the bill of exceptions the whole testimony, the
instructions of the court to the jury, and any other matter material to the decision of the appeal.  If
the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that
the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such
judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial; or if, in any
respect, the judgment appealed from should be changed, and the supreme court shall be of
opinion that it can determine what judgment should have been entered in the court below, it shall
direct such judgment to be entered in the same manner and with like effect as decrees are now
entered in equity cases on appeal to the supreme court; provided, that nothing in this section shall
be construed to authorize the supreme court to find the defendant in a criminal case guilty of an
offense for which a greater penalty is provided than that of which the accused was convicted in
the lower court.
Section 4.  The terms of the supreme court shall be appointed by law; but there shall be
one term at the seat of government annually.  At the close of each term the judges shall file with
the secretary of state concise written statements of the decisions made at that term.
Section 5.  In civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.  The legislative
assembly shall so provide that the most competent of the permanent citizens of the county shall
be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole number in attendance at the court, seven shall be
chosen by lot as grand jurors, five of whom must concur to find an indictment.  But provision
may be made by law for drawing and summoning the grand jurors from the regular jury list at any
time, separate from the panel of petit jurors, and for the sitting of the grand jury during vacation
as well as session of the court, as the judge may direct.  No person shall be charged in any circuit
court with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or made punishable by any of
the laws of this State, except upon indictment found by a grand jury; provided, however, that any
district attorney may file an amended indictment whenever an indictment has, by a ruling of the
court, been held to be defective in form.
Section 6.  Public officers shall not be impeached; but incompetency, corruption,
malfeasance or delinquency in office may be tried in the same manner as criminal offenses, and
judgment may be given of dismissal from office, and such further punishment as may have been
prescribed by law.
Section 7.  Every judge of the supreme court, before entering upon the duties of his
office, shall take and subscribe, and transmit to the secretary of state, the following oath:
"I, _________ _________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the state of Oregon, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of a judge of the Supreme Court of this State,
according to the best of my ability, and that I will not accept any other office, except judicial
offices, during the term for which I have been elected."
APPENDIX C
Article VII (Amended) (2005)
Section 1.  The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such
other courts as may from time to time be created by law. The judges of the supreme and other
courts shall be elected by the legal voters of the state or of their respective districts for a term of
six years, and shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which compensation
shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected.
Section 1a.  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1, Article VII (Amended) of this
Constitution, a judge of any court shall retire from judicial office at the end of the calendar year
in which he attains the age of 75 years. The Legislative Assembly or the people may by law:
(1) Fix a lesser age for mandatory retirement not earlier than the end of the calendar year in
which the judge attains the age of 70 years;
(2) Provide for recalling retired judges to temporary active service on the court from which
they are retired; and
(3) Authorize or require the retirement of judges for physical or mental disability or any other
cause rendering judges incapable of performing their judicial duties.
This section shall not affect the term to which any judge shall have been elected or appointed
prior to or at the time of approval and ratification of this section.
Section 2.  The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly
changed by this amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by
law. But the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus proceedings.
Section 2a.  The Legislative Assembly or the people may by law empower the Supreme Court
to:
(1) Appoint retired judges of the Supreme Court or judges of courts inferior to the Supreme
Court as temporary members of the Supreme Court.
(2) Appoint members of the bar as judges pro tempore of courts inferior to the Supreme
Court.
(3) Assign judges of courts inferior to the Supreme Court to serve temporarily outside the
district for which they were elected.
A judge or member of the bar so appointed or assigned shall while serving have all the
judicial powers and duties of a regularly elected judge of the court to which he is assigned or
appointed.
Section 2b. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 23, Article IV of this Constitution,
laws creating courts inferior to the Supreme Court or prescribing and defining the jurisdiction of
such courts or the manner in which such jurisdiction may be exercised, may be made applicable:
(1) To all judicial districts or other subdivisions of this state; or
(2) To designated classes of judicial districts or other subdivisions; or
(3) To particular judicial districts or other subdivisions.
Section 3. In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the
verdict. Until otherwise provided by law, upon appeal of any case to the supreme court, either
party may have attached to the bill of exceptions the whole testimony, the instructions of the
court to the jury, and any other matter material to the decision of the appeal. If the supreme court
shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the
court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be
affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial; or if, in any respect, the judgment
appealed from should be changed, and the supreme court shall be of opinion that it can determine
what judgment should have been entered in the court below, it shall direct such judgment to be
entered in the same manner and with like effect as decrees are now entered in equity cases on
appeal to the supreme court. Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize
the supreme court to find the defendant in a criminal case guilty of an offense for which a greater
penalty is provided than that of which the accused was convicted in the lower court.
Section 4. The terms of the supreme court shall be appointed by law; but there shall be one
term at the seat of government annually. At the close of each term the judges shall file with the
secretary of state concise written statements of the decisions made at that term.
Section 5.  (1) The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for:
(a) Selecting juries and qualifications of jurors;
(b) Drawing and summoning grand jurors from the regular jury list at any time, separate from
the panel of petit jurors;
(c) Empaneling more than one grand jury in a county; and
(d) The sitting of a grand jury during vacation as well as session of the court.
(2) A grand jury shall consist of seven jurors chosen by lot from the whole number of jurors
in attendance at the court, five of whom must concur to find an indictment.
(3) Except as provided in subsections (4) and (5) of this section, a person shall be charged in
a circuit court with the commission of any crime punishable as a felony only on indictment by a
grand jury.
(4) The district attorney may charge a person on an information filed in circuit court of a
crime punishable as a felony if the person appears before the judge of the circuit court and
knowingly waives indictment.
(5) The district attorney may charge a person on an information filed in circuit court if, after a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate, the person has been held to answer upon a showing of
probable cause that a crime punishable as a felony has been committed and that the person has
committed it, or if the person knowingly waives preliminary hearing.
(6) An information shall be substantially in the form provided by law for an indictment. The
district attorney may file an amended indictment or information whenever, by ruling of the court,
an indictment or information is held to be defective in form.
(7) In civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.
Section 6.  Public officers shall not be impeached; but incompetency, corruption, malfeasance
or delinquency in office may be tried in the same manner as criminal offenses, and judgment may
be given of dismissal from office, and such further punishment as may have been prescribed by
law.
Section 7.  Every judge of the supreme court, before entering upon the duties of his office,
shall take and subscribe, and transmit to the secretary of state, the following oath:
“I, ____________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution of the
United States, and the constitution of the State of Oregon, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of a judge of the supreme court of this state, according to the best
of my ability, and that I will not accept any other office, except judicial offices, during the term
for which I have been elected.”
Section 8.  (1) In the manner provided by law, and notwithstanding section 1 of this Article, a
judge of any court may be removed or suspended from his judicial office by the Supreme Court,
or censured by the Supreme Court, for:
(a) Conviction in a court of this or any other state, or of the United States, of a crime
punishable as a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude; or
(b) Wilful misconduct in a judicial office where such misconduct bears a demonstrable
relationship to the effective performance of judicial duties; or
(c) Wilful or persistent failure to perform judicial duties; or
(d) Generally incompetent performance of judicial duties; or
(e) Wilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be established by the Supreme
Court; or
(f) Habitual drunkenness or illegal use of narcotic or dangerous drugs.
(2) Notwithstanding section 6 of this Article, the methods provided in this section, section 1a
of this Article and in section 18, Article II of this Constitution, are the exclusive methods of the
removal, suspension, or censure of a judge.
Section 9.  Provision may be made by law for juries consisting of less than 12 but not less
than six jurors.
1. The text of Article VII (Original) of the Oregon Constitution, as adopted in 1857, is set
out in Appendix A.
2. We initially held defendant's petition for review in this case until deciding Lincoln Loan,
340 Or 613.  We then allowed the petition for review and requested the parties to brief the issue
of whether principles of judicial estoppel -- specifically, defendant's earlier appeal in this case to
the very Court of Appeals that defendant now claims was unconstitutionally established -- would
prevent us from considering the merits of defendant's challenge to Article VII (Amended).  The
parties promptly and capably briefed that issue.  Based on those briefs, we conclude that judicial
estoppel does not bar defendant's present challenge to the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' appeal.  Judicial estoppel generally does not prevent a party to a case from challenging
a court's subject matter jurisdiction, even after the party has invoked or consented to the
jurisdiction of the court.  See Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm., 281 US 470, 475, 50 S Ct 374, 74
L Ed 972 (1930) (so holding); Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or 589, 592, 392 P2d 768 (1964)
("Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties by consent, nor can the want of jurisdiction be
remedied by waiver, or by estoppel.").  In contrast to Lincoln Loan, where defendant brought an
action challenging a final judgment in a separate case, defendant's present challenge to the Court
of Appeals' validity comes in the same case in which defendant earlier had invoked the Court of
Appeals jurisdiction.  Principles of judicial estoppel and law of the case do not bar defendant
from raising its subject matter jurisdiction claim at this point.
3. In much of the following discussion, we draw on the Court of Appeals' thoughtful
opinion in this case.  Our analysis here is not identical to that of the Court of Appeals, but it is
consistent with that analysis.
4. Or, at least, whether the Court of Appeals was a valid entity when defendant raised this
challenge in 2004. 
5. The 1910 text of Article VII (Amended) is set out in Appendix B.
6. The current version of Article VII (Amended) is set out as Appendix C.
7. Section 2b responded to cases interpreting Article IV, section 23, of the Oregon
Constitution, which had construed that provision to prohibit the legislature from enacting laws
related to courts that identified counties by name on the ground that those laws were a prohibited
type of "special" or "local" law.  The Court of Appeals reviewed the origins of the 1962 addition
of section 2b in detail in Carey, 203 Or App at 408-12.
8. Subsequent validation may not be sufficient to cure an earlier defect if it would have the
effect of impairing a vested right, however.  See Smith v. Cameron et al, 123 Or 501, 507, 262 P
946 (1928) (statute could not be applied retroactively to validate plaintiff's eminent domain
action against defendant, because defendant already had a "vested right" in the property); Beck v.
Beck, 814 SW2d at 747 (retroactive validation of statute not permissible if it would "impair the
obligation of a contract or impair vested rights.").  Here, however, the 10 amendments to Article
VII (Amended) were adopted between 1958 and 1996.  Any "right" of defendant in the favorable
trial court judgment that it obtained in 2000 vested long after the voters had cured any defect in
the 1910 adoption of Article VII (Amended).  
9. At the time that this court decided LaGrande v. Municipal Court, Article VII (Amended),
section 2, provided, in part, that the "courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system * * * shall remain
as at present constituted unless otherwise provided by law." (Emphasis added.)
10. The Court of Appeals considered separately defendant's arguments that the 1910 adoption
of Article VII (Amended) violated the separate-vote requirement, the canvass and proclamation
requirement, and the full-text requirement, rejecting each one for reasons specific to the
particular challenge.  Carey, 203 Or App at 403-15.  Because we conclude that subsequent
amendments to Article VII (Amended) have validated that article, notwithstanding any
irregularities that may have accompanied its adoption, we need not consider whether defendant's
specific arguments respecting those defects would have been well-taken had they been advanced
in 1910. 
11. We allowed defendant's petition for review to consider its challenge to the Court of
Appeals' validity.  We decline to address defendant's challenge to the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the merits of plaintiffs' appeal.  See ORAP 9.20(2) (Supreme Court opinion need
not address each question raised in petition for review).