Title: JAMES CREEL and BRENDA CREEL v. L & L INC., A Wyoming Corporation, LEW LEPORE and MIKE LEPORE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES CREEL and BRENDA CREEL v. L & L INC., A Wyoming Corporation, LEW LEPORE and MIKE LEPORE2012 WY 124287 P.3d 729Case Number: S-11-0138Decided: 09/14/2012
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
JAMES 
CREEL and BRENDA CREEL,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.L 
& L, INC., A Wyoming Corporation, LEW LEPORE and MIKE 
LEPORE,Appellees(Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Thomas Campbell, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Richard Gage of 
Richard Gage, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Grant R. Curry and 
Monty L. Barnett of White & Steele, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Denver, 
Colorado.  Argument by Mr. Barnett.
 
Before GOLDEN, and 
VOIGT, JJ., and SULLINS, BROOKS, and TYLER, DJJ.
 
GOLDEN, J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; TYLER, D.J., files a dissenting opinion, in 
which SULLINS, D.J., joins.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      
James Creel and Brenda Creel (collectively the Creels) attended the 2006 
Wyoming Open Golf Tournament (Wyoming Open) as spectators.  
During the tournament, James Creel (Mr. Creel) was struck by a golf ball 
and suffered a head injury.  The Creels thereafter filed an 
action for damages against several parties, including the golfer who hit the 
ball, a tournament official, and the operators of the golf course and tournament 
– L & L, Inc. and its owners Lew Lepore and 
Mike Lepore (collectively L & L).  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants except the 
golfer, concluding that getting hit by a golf ball is an inherent risk of golf 
and that the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act thus barred the Creels’ 
action.  The Creels appeal the summary judgment entered in 
favor of L & L.  We reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
The Creels present the following issues on appeal:
 
1.         
Does the “Recreation[] Safety Act,” Wyoming Statute § 1-1-121 through § 
1-1-123, shield a provider of a recreational opportunity from liability when the 
provider fails to provide a safe environment for that recreational 
opportunity?
 
2.         
Does the “Recreation[] Safety Act,” Wyoming Statute § 1-1-121 through § 
1-1-123, shield a provider of a recreational opportunity from liability when the 
negligence of the provider increases the dangers to spectators at that 
recreational opportunity?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
In reviewing a summary judgment, we set forth the underlying facts 
consistent with our standard of review, which requires that we proceed as 
follows: 
 
We 
treat the summary judgment movant’s motion as though it has been 
presented originally to us. We use the same materials in the record that was 
before the district court. Using the materials in the record, we examine them 
from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party opposing the 
motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the materials. 
 
Bangs v. 
Schroth, 2009 WY 20, ¶ 20, 
201 P.3d 442, 452 (Wyo. 2009) (citations omitted).
 
[¶4]      
On July 7, 2006, the Creels attended the 2006 Wyoming Open at the 
Cheyenne Airport Golf Course in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  They 
walked the course following their son, Josh Creel, who was competing in the 
event.  Josh Creel’s foursome included fellow golfer Brandon 
Donahue, and his caddy was Haley Hartman.  The spectators 
following Josh Creel, besides his parents, included Hadley Berry and Sue 
Blythe.  When Josh Creel reached the putting green of Hole #1, 
they and others watched him from the front-right side of the green.  
Hole #1 is straight, roughly 320 to 330 yards long, and the right side of 
its fairway is lined with scattered trees and bushes.  

 
[¶5]      
While the Creels and others watched their son putt, the next group of 
competitors prepared to tee off from the tee box of Hole #1.  
That group included Brett Veesart (Mr. Veesart), a 
professional golfer.  Those on the tee box of Hole #1, 
including Mr. Veesart, could see the golfers still on the putting green 
of Hole #1.   Mr. Veesart and 
the others in his group testified that the spectators following the Creel 
foursome ahead of them were not visible from the tee box of Hole #1, while Josh 
Creel and another golfer in his foursome testified that the spectators were 
standing in a location that was visible from the tee box.  

 
[¶6]      
Kathy Irvine (Ms. Irvine) was a volunteer “starter” at Hole 
#1.  She was appointed by and performing at the direction of L 
& L, which operates the course and sponsored the tournament.  
At the time of the 2006 Wyoming Open, Ms. Irvine had worked as a starter 
at the tournament for approximately twenty-four years.  

 
[¶7]      
Mr. Veesart was designated as the first player off the tee 
box, and Ms. Irvine instructed him to commence play.  
Mr. Veesart responded that he felt he should wait because he 
was concerned that he could hit the green with his initial drive.  
He testified:
 
Q.        
And do you remember the starter that day?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
Do you remember a discussion that you had with her?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
And do you remember discussing with her the fact that there were people 
on the green?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
And do you remember discussing with her the fact that you felt as though 
you could hit that green with your drive?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
And what was her response to you?
 
A.        
That the wind was swirling and that they were behind and we needed to get 
going.
 
Q.        
And how did you interpret that?
 
A.        
That she was basically saying you need – that we need to get 
going.
 
Q.        
That she was instructing you to hit?
 
A.        
Mm-hum.
 
Q.        
Regardless of whether or not people were on the green?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
Did she dispute the possibility that you could hit that green – 

 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
-- on your drive?  Did you tell her that you could hit 
that green with your drive?
 
A.        
I told her that I could knock it on that green.
 
Q.        
And she said everybody thinks that?
 
A.        
I don’t know if those were her exact words, but along those 
lines.
 
Q.        
But she, nonetheless, instructed you to hit?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
Were you reluctant to do that?
 
A.        
I told her I cannot hit.
 
Q.        
And she said hit anyway?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
[¶8]      
Mr. Veesart proceeded as Ms. Irvine directed and teed off 
Hole #1.  Mr. Veesart pushed his tee shot to the 
right of the green but did not yell “fore.”  The tee shot 
struck Mr. Creel on the side of his head, and he fell to the ground.  
Josh Creel then ran down the fairway alerting the Veesart 
foursome that his father had been hit and calling for an ambulance.  
Mr. Vessart went to Mr. Creel’s side and said, “I’m so 
sorry.  She made me hit.”   He also 
told the Creels that he would have been disqualified had he not hit the 
ball.  We shall provide pertinent additional facts in our 
discussion below.
 
[¶9]      
In March of 2009, the Creels filed a complaint that named 
Mr. Veesart as the sole defendant.  The complaint 
alleged that Mr. Veesart negligently caused the ball to be struck 
and negligently failed to warn the golfers and spectators within range of the 
incoming golf ball.  Subsequently, the Creels amended the 
complaint to add Ms. Irvine and L & L as defendants.  The 
amended complaint alleged negligence on the part of Ms. Irvine for directing 
Mr. Veesart to hit his drive and for failing to warn the golfers and 
spectators, and negligence by L & L for failing to adequately train Ms. 
Irvine.  In January of 2010, the complaint was amended a 
second time, and the second amended complaint added Lew Lepore and 
Mike Lepore as individual defendants, with it being asserted that 
they were engaged in the management and supervision of the golf 
tournament.  
 
[¶10]   
L & L moved for summary judgment on the ground that getting hit by a 
golf ball is an inherent risk of playing or being a spectator at a golf 
tournament and that the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act thus barred the Creels’ 
claims.  Ms. Irvine separately moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that, as a voluntary starter at the Wyoming Open, she did not owe the 
Creels any legal duty of care.  Finally, 
Mr. Veesart moved for summary judgment on the ground that he had no 
duty either to protect participants and spectators from the inherent risks of 
golf or to warn such individuals of those inherent risks.  

 
[¶11]   
In opposition to the summary judgment motion of L & L, the Creels 
argued:  (a)  there were genuine issues of 
material fact concerning whether the golf tournament was being negligently run 
by failing to properly mark safe observation areas for the tournament 
spectators; (b) the injuries sustained by Mr. Creel were not the result of 
inherent risks to the game of golf, rendering the Recreation Safety Act 
inapplicable; and (c)  Mr. Creel was a spectator at the 
tournament and not a participant as contemplated by the Recreation Safety 
Act.  In response to Kathy Irvine’s motion for summary 
judgment, the Creels responded:  (a) Ms. Irvine owed a duty of 
care to the Creels both in her individual capacity, as well as in her capacity 
as an agent for L & L; and (b) material issues of fact were in dispute 
concerning the existence of the agency relationship as well as whether a legal 
duty existed.  Finally, responding to the motion for summary 
judgment of Mr. Veesart, the Creels asserted that the Recreation Safety 
Act should not bar the pending claims against him because the Act does not 
immunize a participant from acting recklessly and negligently during the course 
of play.  
 
[¶12]   
The district court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants 
except Mr. Veesart.  In granting summary judgment the 
court found, in part:  
 
The main crux of both 
the primary assumption of risk doctrine and the WRSA is the absence 
of a duty to protect from risks inherent in a sporting 
activity.  This Court finds the WRSA to be in 
essence a legislative adoption of the common law principle.  
See Hal[p]ern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562 
(Wyo. 1995) (suggesting that the WRSA embodies the principle of 
primary assumption of risk, which limits duty, rather than secondary assumption 
of risk, which is an affirmative defense to breach of duty and was abolished in 
Wyoming by the comparative negligence statute, W.S. § 
1-1-109).
 
            
The WRSA removes a duty to protect from inherent risks of a 
sport, but it does not bar recovery for all risks.  Walters 
v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (D. 
Wyo. 1992). Relating to the primary assumption of risk doctrine, several 
jurisdictions note that there is a duty to not increase the inherent risks of a 
sport.  See e.g. Cotty v. Town of 
Southampton, 64 A.D.3d 251, 254 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2009); 
Levinson v. Owens, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1534, 1543 
(Cal.App.3 Dist. 2009); Yoneda v. Tom, 
133 P.3d 796, 810 (Hawaii 2006).  Similarly, duty 
is not limited wholesale against intentional or reckless conduct.  
See Shinn v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 589 
(Cal. 2007) (discussing that Ohio, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Texas, and Hawaii 
have all applied reckless disregard or intentional conduct standards to golf, 
and adopting a similar rule in California); Yoneda, 
supra at 380-81.  These standards appear to be in 
accords with the WRSA, at least to the extent that an affirmative act 
that increases risk, is reckless or is an intentional tort is not necessarily 
“intrinsic to” or “an integral part of” most 
sports.  W.S. § 1-1-122(a)(i).
 
            
Turning to the facts of this case, it is important to note that the 2006 
Wyoming Open was not a large professional tournament which drew an enormous 
number of spectators like one might see during a televised PGA 
event.  The record suggests that spectators generally came to 
observe a golfer with whom they had a personal relationship.  
Mr. Creel came to observe his son, and Veesart’s father was 
similarly following him.  It does not appear that any crowd 
control measures were taken under these circumstances, but rather spectators 
were free to travel the course at their own leisure.  This 
case is not akin to others which have involved questions of whether crowd 
control measures increased the risks of being hit.  See 
Duffy, supra; Baker, supra.  
Instead, spectators traveled the course with their respective golfer, and 
the risks which they faced were essentially the same faced by the 
competitors.
 
            
Mr. Creel was well aware of these risks.  He is a 
member of the Cheyenne Country Club and plays golf regularly with his 
wife.  Sometimes he plays as a part of his job and he often 
plays in tournaments himself.
 
            
The Creels’ central argument is that Irvine induced Veesart 
into hitting the ball when it was not safe to do so, and that 
the Lepores were negligent in not adequately training Irvine in her 
duties as a starter. . . .
 
            
While the Lepores and Irvine may have had an obligation to 
not increase the inherent risks present on the golf course, the Plaintiffs must 
live with the downside of this duty.  By stepping on the golf 
course, Mr. Creel assumed the risk that a ball might fly where a golfer did not 
intend, and that he could be the unfortunate victim of such an 
occurrence.  Indeed, there is ample authority that the risk of 
being hit by an errant shot is inherent in the game of golf.  
See e.g. Sanchez v. Candia Woods Golf Links, --- A.3d 
---, 2010 WL 4781478, *2-3 (N.H. 2010); Anand v. 
Kapoor, 61 A.D.3d 787, 790-91, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2009); Shin, 165 P.3d  at 587; 
Yoneda, 133 P.3d  at 808.  
The Lepores and Irvine had the same degree of control over 
the direction of Veesart’s ball as they did the weather on the day 
of the tournament.  It goes without saying that there is never 
a duty to control the uncontrollable.
 
* * * *
 
            
The Court must admit that if Irvine did have the ability to 
influence Vessart into hitting an unsafe shot, and that if such 
influence could be shown to have increased the inherent risk that spectators 
would be hit, then perhaps genuine issues of fact suitable for trial might 
exist.  However, every person who is familiar with the rules 
of golf whose testimony is present in the record agrees that the golfer has the 
ultimate responsibility of determining when he or she can safely 
hit.  Veesart is an assistant golf professional at 
the White Mountain Country Club in Rock Springs, Wyoming, where he has worked 
since 2005.  He has been an apprentice PGA professional since 
the spring of 2006.  There is no doubt that he knows the rules 
of the game well.  While he testified he feared being 
penalized if he did not comply with Irvine’s alleged orders, he also admitted 
that he knew at the time he could have sought the assistance of a rules official 
to settle any dispute.  In the end, there is simply no 
evidence that suggests Irvine had any authority or ability to 
direct Veesart to hit a dangerous shot.
 
* * * * 
 
            
Ultimately, reasonable minds cannot differ that getting hit by an 
off-line or errant golf shot is an inherent risk of playing and watching 
golf.  Mr. Creel assumed the risk of such an 
occurrence.  Neither Irvine, the Lepores 
and/or L&L had a duty to eliminate, alter or control that 
risk.  As a result, summary judgment based on the undisputed 
facts is appropriate.
 
[¶13]   
Shortly after the district court entered its order granting summary 
judgment to L & L and Ms. Irvine, the court entered an order denying 
Mr. Veesart’s summary judgment motion.  The court 
denied Mr. Veesart’s motion on the ground that a participant in a 
sport or recreational opportunity owes a duty to not increase the risks inherent 
in the activity and questions of fact remained as to whether 
Mr. Veesart’s conduct had increased the inherent risk to Mr. 
Creel.  The denial of Mr. Veesart’s summary 
judgment motion was not an appealable order and is therefore not before this 
Court.  The summary judgment in favor of Ms. Irvine in her 
individual capacity is likewise not before this Court as the Creels settled and 
dismissed those claims against Ms. Irvine.  
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶14]   
Motions 
for summary judgment come before the 
trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
 
[t]he judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
Redco Const. 
v. Profile Properties, LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 21, 
271 P.3d 408, 414 (Wyo. 2012) 
(quoting Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, ¶ 3, 
246 P.3d 286, 288 (Wyo. 2011)). We review a grant of summary 
judgment following a well-established procedure: 
 
We review a summary 
judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and 
following the same standards. [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 
992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 1999)]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 
964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998). We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Id. A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense asserted by the parties. Id. If the moving party presents 
supporting summary judgment materials demonstrating no genuine issue of material 
fact exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving party to present 
appropriate supporting materials posing a genuine issue of a material fact for 
trial. Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 
1999); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 
887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). We review a grant of summary judgment 
deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district 
court’s ruling. Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d  at 
156; Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).
 
Lindsey v. 
Harriet, 2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 
255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Inherent Risk Analysis under the Wyoming Recreation Safety 
Act
 
[¶15]   
The Wyoming Recreation Safety Act bars actions against the provider of a 
sport or recreational opportunity for any injury caused by a risk that is 
inherent to that activity.  The Act provides, in pertinent 
part:
 
(a)       
Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity 
assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether 
those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all 
damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results 
from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.
 
(b)       
A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to 
eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or 
recreational opportunity.
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶16]   
On appeal, the Creels do not dispute that golf is a sport covered by the 
Recreation Safety Act, that L & L is a “provider” under the Act, or that the 
Creels are covered by the Act as persons taking part in a sport or recreational 
opportunity.  The Creels instead contest the district court’s 
conclusion that there is no disputed issue of material fact as to whether it was 
an inherent risk of golf that caused Mr. Creel’s head injury.   

 
[¶17]   
The Act defines inherent risk to mean “those dangers or conditions which 
are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or 
recreational opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).  What constitutes an 
“inherent risk” in a given set of circumstances is a variable that the Wyoming 
Legislature included in the statute by design.  Muller v. 
Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, 2006 WY 100, ¶ 13, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 
(Wyo. 2006).  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted 
the term “inherent risk,” as used in the Wyoming Act, to mean the 
following:
 
What is 
inherent to a sport or activity, however, is far from self-evident. In 
Sapone, we defined “inherent” under the Wyoming Safety Act 
as either “'those risks which are essential characteristics of a sport and those 
which participants desire to confront,’ or they are undesirable risks which are 
simply a collateral part of the recreation 
activity.”  Sapone [v. Grand 
Targhee, Inc.], 308 F.3d [1096,] 1103 [(10th Cir. 2002)] 
(citation omitted). We have further defined a risk that is not inherent as “a 
risk that was atypical, uncharacteristic, [and] not intrinsic to the 
recreational activity. . . .” Id. at 
1104. 
Although equine activities are among those the Wyoming legislature clearly meant 
to protect, and although horseback riding indubitably involves inherent risks, 
we have concluded, following the Wyoming Supreme Court, that not all risks of 
horseback riding are inherent risks. Cooperman v. 
David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 (Wyo. 
1995). 
Some risks may occur from the choices a recreation provider makes on 
behalf of the participant and from the conditions in which the recreational 
opportunity is provided. Thus, atypical or uncharacteristic risks can arise even 
in those specific sports the Wyoming legislature clearly intended to exempt from 
liability for inherent risks.
 
Dunbar v. Jackson 
Hole Mtn. Resort Corp., 
392 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
 
[¶18]   
“[T]he 'intent behind the Recreation Safety 
Act was not to preclude parties from suing for a provider’s negligence, it was 
merely to stop people from suing providers for those risks that were inherent to 
a sport.’”  Carden v. Kelly, 
175 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1328 (D. Wyo. 2001) (quoting Madsen v. 
Wyoming River Trips, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (D. Wyo. 
1999)); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(c) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Actions 
based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, injury or death is not 
the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be 
preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.”).  Because of 
this distinction, courts interpreting and applying the Wyoming Recreation Safety 
Act have repeatedly cautioned against evaluating whether a risk is inherent to 
an activity without considering the specific facts surrounding the claimed 
injury.  See Dunbar, 392 F.3d  at 
1149; Carden, 175 F. Supp. 2d  at 1328; 
Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 
2000); Madsen, 31 F. Supp. 2d  at 1328; Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 
(Wyo.1995).  
“When attempting to determine whether a risk is inherent to a sport, we 
cannot look at the risk in a vacuum, apart from the factual setting to which the 
[participant] was exposed.  And, we must evaluate the risk at 
the greatest level of specificity permitted by the factual record.”  
Cooperman, 214 F.3d  at 1167 (citing Madsen, 
31 F.Supp.2d at 1328).  The Tenth Circuit in 
Cooperman went on to explain:  
 
In 
determining whether a certain risk is inherent to a sport, we are taken to the 
level of specificity that the facts support. While at some level all sports have 
inherent risks, as we add in the facts of a specific risk encountered the risk 
may or may not be inherent. 
 “Thus, the duty question is best resolved by framing the 
question correctly.” Madsen, 
31 F. Supp. 2d  at 1328.
 
Cooperman, 
214 F.3d  at 1167 (footnote omitted).
 
[¶19]   
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dunbar illustrates the level of 
specificity required in determining whether an injury was caused by an inherent 
risk of a sport or recreational activity.  In that case, 
Dunbar, an intermediate-level skier, left an intermediate ski run and entered a 
terrain park set up with jumps and other challenging features.  
Dunbar, 392 F.3d  at 1146-47.  Dunbar 
entered the terrain park with her companions to see whether it was something she 
would like to ski, but upon examination she determined it was beyond her skill 
level and attempted to exit the park via a designated catwalk.  
Id. at 1147.  While following the catwalk, 
Dunbar fell twelve feet into a “half-pipe” and suffered serious 
injuries.  Id.  Dunbar then filed an 
action against the ski area, and the district court granted the defendant 
summary judgment on the ground that Dunbar’s injuries were caused by an inherent 
risk of her decision to enter the terrain park.  Id. at 
1150.  The Tenth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact 
existed as to the inherent risk question and reversed, explaining:
 
            
As a preliminary matter, what sport or activity 
characterizes Camie Dunbar’s behavior is a matter of considerable 
dispute. Most generally, she was engaged in alpine skiing – a sport clearly 
covered by the Safety Act. If we were to analyze the risk at this level of 
generality, then it would certainly appear that falling twelve feet into a 
trench in the middle of an intermediate ski-run would decidedly not 
constitute an inherent risk of alpine skiing. Such a level of generality, 
however, is not appropriate. To determine what risk is inherent to Dunbar’s 
activity, we must go beyond a broad characterization and inquire into the 
specific circumstances of both her actions and those of the recreation 
provider.
 
* * * 
*
 
. . . 
It does not necessarily follow, as the district court finds, that having entered 
the terrain park, Dunbar also chose to confront all the features and conditions 
present within it. Although the district court emphasized the choices and 
conduct of the plaintiff in determining what risks she assumed, the court makes 
no distinction between the risks that are inherent to her actual choices – to 
ski into the terrain park area, but not to “take” any of the features – and 
risks that are inherent to choices one would make when actually intending to ski 
over the specific features.
 
      
Indeed, a reasonable person who entered the general area of the terrain 
park would stop first to view the features and decide whether or not to attempt 
to maneuver over or through any of them. In fact, Jackson Hole’s warning signs, 
the presence of which figure prominently in this dispute, direct skiers and 
snowboarders to “please observe terrain features, their risks, and their degree 
of difficulty before using.” That is precisely what Ms. Dunbar did. She chose to 
enter the area of the terrain park – if not the terrain park itself – but 
specifically chose not to “use” or “take” any of the terrain park features after 
doing exactly what Jackson Hole’s signs advised her to do: “observe . . . before 
using.” Presumably, Jackson Hole does not wish to claim that it operates like 
the Hotel California – where you can check in any time you like but you can 
never leave. Accordingly, it was error for the district court to conclude that 
having followed Jackson Hole’s instructions, having assessed the risks and 
decided not to use the terrain features, that there is no material issue of fact 
concerning whether a skier could leave without accruing those very risks. Having 
“entered” the terrain park, Dunbar did not “use” the terrain park as a terrain 
park – viz., she did not attempt to jump the table top jump nor did she attempt 
to do stunts in the snowboard half-pipe. She attempted to exit the terrain park 
without “taking” any of the features, and followed instructions from a Jackson 
Hole employee on how to exit the park. Given the specific factual setting of 
this case, what risks are associated with Dunbar’s actual choices and what duty 
Jackson Hole owed her are properly questions for the jury.
 
            
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it found that 
the risk of falling twelve feet into a snowboard half-pipe was an inherent risk 
of Dunbar’s alpine skiing when she had stopped and observed double diamond 
terrain features and had chosen not to “take” those features. When, as is here, 
genuine issues of material fact exist, it is properly a question for the jury to 
determine whether dangers that are “characteristic of” or “intrinsic to” or “an 
integral part” of the sport of alpine skiing evaluated under the specific 
factual circumstances of this case include those encountered by Dunbar in skiing 
from the main intermediate run to the tram car and from the tram car along the 
catwalk. 
 
Dunbar, 
392 F.3d  at 1149, 1151-52.
 
[¶20]   
The level of factual specificity required to establish an inherent risk 
will often but not always preclude summary judgment on the duty 
question.  For example, in Cooperman, the Tenth Circuit 
demanded greater specificity in defining the inherent risk but nonetheless 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.  In 
Cooperman, the plaintiff, Cooperman, went on a guided horseback ride and 
fell off his horse and suffered injuries when his saddle slipped.  
Cooperman, 214 F.3d  at 1164.  
Cooperman sued the guide, and the district court granted the guide 
summary judgment after finding that a slipping saddle is an inherent risk of 
horseback riding.  Id. In upholding the summary 
judgment, the court explained:
 
The 
Coopermans’ own expert testified that saddles slip for a variety of 
reasons including: stretching leather, the tensing or relaxing of a horse, the 
horse losing weight from sweat, the compression of certain types of saddle pads 
and loosening of the cinch due to the movement of the horse, or the rider 
failing to ride straight in the saddle. The expert further stated that a 
slipping saddle is always a possibility when horseback riding; that this was not 
the first time a saddle had slipped and it would not be the last. This evidence 
clearly indicates that a slipping saddle is an undesirable risk which is simply 
a collateral part of horseback riding. Cf. Hansen-Stamp, [Recreational 
Injuries and] Inherent Risks, [33 Land & Water L. Rev. 249] at 271 [1998]. 
Thus, a slipping saddle, with no other facts provided, is an inherent risk of 
horseback riding.
 
      
This case, however, presents facts which take us to a greater degree of 
specificity than simply stating that the saddle slipped. Thus we must take the 
analysis one step further. The Coopermans presented evidence that 
after Dr. Cooperman fell off the horse, his saddle was hanging loosely under the 
belly of the horse. One of WRT’s employees testified that “if the 
saddle just fell off and was hanging loosely under the belly, then obviously the 
saddle wasn’t tightened enough.” For purposes of summary judgment, then, 
the issue is whether a slipping saddle that is loosely cinched is an inherent 
risk of horseback riding.
 
      
As discussed above, it is inherent that a saddle will slip, and the 
plaintiffs’ expert testified that saddles will slip for a variety of reasons. 
The expert also testified that although there are dangers in cinching the saddle 
too loosely, there are also dangers in cinching the saddle too tightly. For 
example, if a saddle is cinched too tightly the expert testified that the horse 
may roll, which could also obviously result in injury to the rider. Thus, 
because cinching a saddle is done by hand, and not with scientific precision, a 
provider must make a judgment call as to how tight or loose to cinch the saddle. 
This imprecision in the cinching of the saddle is “characteristic” or “typical” 
of and therefore “inherent in” the sport of horseback riding. It is an 
undesirable risk which is simply a collateral part of the sport. When the 
cinching of a saddle can be too tight or too loose, and the cinching is not done 
with scientific precision, it is inherent in the sport that the provider at 
times will cinch too loosely or too tightly. Thus, the testimony 
of WRT’s employee that a saddle hanging underneath a horse would be 
evidence that the saddle was not cinched tightly enough does not take us outside 
the realm of inherent risk. It does not explain why the saddle was not cinched 
tightly enough.
 
      
As part of the Coopermans’ burden of showing that WRT 
owed Dr. Cooperman a duty of care, the Coopermans must provide some 
evidence to explain why the saddle fell, which explanation is not inherent to 
the sport. The Wyoming Legislature expressly stated in the Safety Act that a 
recreational provider has no duty to “eliminate, alter or control the inherent 
risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity.” Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-123(b). 
Thus, stating only that the cinch was not tight enough does not show that the 
risk was no longer inherent to the sport. The Coopermans have the 
burden of presenting some evidence on summary judgment that would raise a 
question of fact that the loosely cinched saddle was caused, not by an inherent 
risk, but rather by a risk that was atypical, uncharacteristic, not intrinsic 
to, and thus not inherent in, the recreational activity of horseback riding. 
The Coopermans have not met this burden.
 
            
Because under Wyoming law the question of what is an inherent risk is 
normally a question of fact for the jury, we do not attempt to set the 
parameters here as to what factual proof would take the risk of a slipping 
saddle outside the realm of an inherent risk. We can only say that presenting 
testimony that the saddle was not cinched tightly enough is not sufficient. As a 
result, this court agrees that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 
would preclude summary judgment.
 
Cooperman, 
214 F.3d  
at 1168-69 (emphasis added).
 
[¶21]   
Just as the trial court must scrutinize with great care the facts brought 
forward by the parties on a summary judgment motion, so too must this Court on 
appellate review of the summary judgment.  Our standard of 
review directs that we use the same designated “fact” materials, those 
designated by the parties, as did the district court, and our review is de 
novo.  It is as if the motion were filed in our Court, and we 
must consider it accordingly.  Thus, this Court has adhered to 
the prescribed careful attention to factual detail in considering whether 
summary judgment is appropriate on the question of inherent risk:
 
Our 
general answer to the question is that if such a motion is filed, the trial 
court must scrutinize the facts brought forward by the parties with great care. 
If the court can say that, given that evidence, this is an “inherent risk” and 
reasonable minds cannot differ about that, then summary judgment is appropriate. 
If the risk is an inherent one, then the provider has no duty to eliminate, 
alter, or control it. On the other hand, if reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether or not the risk was one inherent to the recreational activity, then 
summary judgment is not appropriate and the answer to the question must be 
assigned to the jury (or other fact finder).
 
Jackson Hole Mtn. 
Resort Corp. v. Rohrman, 2006 WY 156, ¶ 3, 
150 P.3d 167, 168 (Wyo. 2006); see also Beckwith v. 
Weber, 2012 WY 62, ¶ 35, 277 P.3d 713, 722 (Wyo. 2012) (whether particular risk is inherent in activity “is 
generally one for the jury to decide” and can be made as matter of law “only 
when the case involves undisputed facts and when reasonable persons could only 
conclude that an injury or death was caused by an inherent risk”).  

 
[¶22]   
The question we must answer in this case then is whether, upon our 
scrutinizing with great care the facts brought forward by the parties, the only 
conclusion reasonable minds could reach is that the Creels’ injuries were caused 
by an inherent risk of golf.
 
 
B.        
Application of Inherent Risk Analysis to Creel 
Injuries
 
[¶23]   
The Creels do not contest, and the evidence appears largely undisputed, 
that getting hit by a golf ball is, generally stated, an inherent risk of 
playing golf or being a spectator at a golf tournament.  This 
statement of the inherent risk is of limited usefulness, however, because it is 
abstract and presents the question in a vacuum without consideration of the 
specific facts of the case.  Just as the court analyses we 
discussed above required looking beyond generally-stated risks, such as falling 
from a horse or falling in a half-pipe while skiing, we must in this case look 
beyond the generalized risk of getting hit with a golf ball.  

 
[¶24]   
Under our required inherent risk analysis, the question we must answer is 
whether L & L did anything to increase the risk that Mr. Creel would be hit 
by a golf ball.  That is, did the conduct of L & L’s 
agent, Kathy Irvine, increase the risk beyond what everyone agrees would 
normally be an inherent risk.  It is when the question is 
framed with this specificity that we find genuine issues of material fact that 
preclude summary judgment. 
 
[¶25]   
The Creels argue that L & L’s negligence and not an inherent risk of 
golf caused their injuries because: 1) L & L did not provide a safe area 
from which spectators could observe the competition; and 2) L & L’s agent, 
Kathy Irvine, directed a player to hit a ball into players and 
spectators.  We reject the Creel’s first argument with respect 
to providing a safe area for spectator safety.  As noted 
above, the evidence is undisputed that getting hit by a golf ball is generally 
an inherent risk of participating in a golf event, either as a player or a 
spectator.  As such, L & L, in accordance with the 
Recreation Safety Act, had no duty to “eliminate, alter or control” that 
risk.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(b).  
We thus conclude as a matter of law that L & L had no obligation to 
provide a designated safe area for spectators to prevent them from being hit by 
a golf ball.  
 
[¶26]   
That said, as the district court likewise recognized, L & L did have 
a duty to not increase the inherent risks of the sport.  
See Dunbar, 392 F.3d  at 1149 (recognizing 
distinction between inherent risks and risks that “occur from the choices a recreation provider makes on 
behalf of the participant and from the conditions in which the recreational 
opportunity is provided”); see also Cotty v. Town 
of Southampton, 64 A.D.3d 251, 254, 880 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (defendant’s conduct may not unreasonably 
increase risk); Levinson v. Owens, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1534, 1543, 
98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 779, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing 
defendant’s duty to use due care not to increase sport’s inherent 
risks); Yoneda v. Tom, 133 P.3d 796, 810 
(Hawaii 2006) (golf course owner “has a duty to use due care not to increase the 
risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport”).  
Where we find disputed issues of material fact in this regard is in the 
question whether Kathy Irvine’s actions increased the risk that Mr. Creel would 
be struck by a golf ball.
 
[¶27]   
Framed in the light most favorable to the Creels, and with the required 
factual specificity, the question is whether Ms. Irvine increased the risk that 
Mr. Creel would be struck by a golf ball by instructing Mr. Veesart 
to tee off when: 1) Mr. Veesart expressed concern that he could hit 
the green where he could see that the group ahead was still present; and 2) Ms. 
Irvine knew or should have known that there were spectators in the area of the 
Hole #1’s green.  The facts relevant to this inquiry are: 1) 
Ms. Irvine’s directions to Mr. Veesart and, more particularly, what 
the two of them said to each other; 2) Ms. Irvine’s authority and ability to 
influence Mr. Veesart’s actions; 3) the ability of Ms. Irvine and 
Mr. Veesart to see the spectators near the green of Hole No. 1; and 
4) Ms. Irvine’s knowledge that there were spectators near the green of Hole No. 
1.  We find each of these facts, and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from them, to be in dispute.
 
1.         
Statements of Ms. Irvine and Mr. Veesart
 
[¶28]   
As set forth earlier in this opinion, Mr. Veesart testified 
that he told Ms. Irvine that he did not want to tee off Hole #1 because he felt 
he could hit the hole’s green, where the group ahead of them was still 
present.  According to Mr. Veesart, Ms. Irvine 
dismissed his concerns and told him he had to hit because the tournament was 
running behind schedule.  
 
[¶29]   
In reviewing the record, this Court has found no evidence from Ms. Irvine 
detailing her account of the conversation she had with Mr. 
Veesart.  In its decision letter, the district court 
noted:
 
            
Irvine remembers the events somewhat differently.  
According to her, she asked if anybody could drive the green and was told 
by several of the golfers in Veesart’s group that they 
could.  However, she remembers being told that if one of the 
players did manage to reach the green, the ball would probably land short and 
then roll to it.  As a result, they waited until the group in 
front of them, which included Josh Creel, was safely on the green before 
hitting.
 
[¶30]   
We assume that the evidence of Ms. Irvine’s recollection was properly 
before the district court and simply did not make it into the record on 
appeal.  In any event, the evidence does not resolve the 
factual question of what Ms. Irvine and Mr. Veesart discussed before 
he took his tee shot off Hole #1.  The evidence serves only to 
highlight that there remains a disputed issue of material fact as to the 
conversation between Ms. Irvine and Mr. Veesart.
 
2.         
Ms. Irvine’s Authority and Ability to 
Influence Mr. Veesart’s Actions
 
[¶31]   
L & L argues, and the district court agreed, that there was no 
disputed issue of material fact concerning Ms. Irvine’s authority and ability to 
influence Mr. Veesart’s conduct because it was undisputed that the 
golfer always makes the final decision when to hit the golf ball.  
We disagree that the evidence on which L & L and the district court 
relied resolves this genuine question of material fact.
 
[¶32]   
The record is replete with non-expert opinion testimony that a golfer is 
responsible for making the final decision when to take his or her 
shot.  For example, Michael Northern, one of the professional 
golfers in Mr. Veesart’s group, testified:
 
A.        
You know, as the starter, she designates the tee times.
 
Q.        
Right.
 
A.        
You know, so, I mean she’s trying to follow a tee sheet, tee time 
structure.
 
Q.        
Right.
 
A.        
To where once it’s that time, then she designates, “Okay, guys, you know, 
it’s time to play.”  I feel that it’s still the golfer’s 
responsibility that if he can hit the ball into some people, that you don’t do 
that.  You wait until they clear out to where – because every 
golfer hits a ball a different distance, and each golfer knows that distance 
that they hit.  So to me it’s up to the golfer to wait to make 
sure that the people – you know, it’s clear to actually play.
 
[¶33]   
This evidence does not, however, answer the question of the extent to 
which Ms. Irvine had the ability and authority to influence and did influence 
Mr. Veesart’s decision to tee off.  The evidence 
in the record concerning Ms. Irvine’s authority and influence 
included:
 
--Mr. Veesart’s 
own testimony that Ms. Irvine did influence his decision when to take his 
shot;
 
--Michael Lepore’s 
testimony that Ms. Irvine is a starter during tournaments and during everyday 
play and that the scorecard used by the golf course during everyday play, 
although not during tournaments, contains a statement of the rule that “[t]he 
pro or starter shall have absolute control of play on the course;” 
and  
 
--Mr. Creel’s 
testimony concerning his observations of Ms. Irvine’s demeanor when starting his 
son, Josh Creel:
 
A.        
We – we walked with my son Josh, who was playing.  And 
he started on number 10, played the back nine first.  As we 
walked up to the number 1 tee box, Haley Hartman, who was caddying for him, set 
his clubs down, and Josh started to walk inside.  
 
            
At that point Kathy Irvine grabbed him by the arm and said, Where do you 
think you’re going?  Josh said, I have to go to the 
bathroom.  And she said, We’re behind.  You 
need to get up here and hit.
 
            
Which angered me that she would physically grab a 16-year-old boy and – 
and talk to him like that.  So Josh hit.  I 
told Josh, Go ahead and go to the bathroom, which he did.
 
[¶34]   
Adhering to our standard of review, which requires that we consider the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record, we conclude that a genuine question of material 
fact remains regarding the question of Ms. Irvine’s ability and authority to 
influence Mr. Veesart’s decision to take a shot and thus increase 
the inherent risk at issue.  See Bangs, ¶ 20, 
201 P.3d  at 452.  In addition to 
Mr. Veesart’s testimony that Ms. Irvine did influence his decision, 
the record supports a number of inferences concerning Ms. Irvine’s authority, 
exercise of that authority and demeanor in exercising that 
authority.  For example, a jury may fairly infer from the 
scorecard’s advisement of the starter’s “absolute control” that Ms. Irvine’s 
demeanor and approach to directing golfers would be consistent with that 
advisement.  Likewise, a jury may infer from Ms. Irvine’s 
handling of Josh Creel that she was quite controlling or adamant in her 
directions to the golfers. 
 
[¶35]   
We do not mean to suggest that these are the only reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from the record, but they are examples of reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn from the record that we must consider when reviewing 
summary judgment.  The evidence on which L & L relied to 
support its motion for summary judgment did not address 
Mr. Veesart’s testimony or the possible reasonable inferences that 
may be fairly drawn from the record.  L & L’s evidence was 
instead opinion evidence that, to the extent it was relevant and admissible, was 
directed to fault apportionment between L & L and Mr. Veesart, not to 
the impact of Ms. Irvine’s conduct on the inherent risk to Mr. Creel of getting 
hit by a golf ball.  Based on the evidence in the record, and 
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, we conclude that 
a genuine question of material fact remains regarding the question of Ms. 
Irvine’s ability and authority to influence Mr. Veesart’s decision 
to take a shot and thus increase the inherent risk at issue.
 
3.         
Ability of Ms. Irvine and Mr. Veesart to See 
Spectators
 
[¶36]   
We also find genuine questions of material fact exist regarding the 
ability of Mr. Veesart and Ms. Irvine to see the spectators, such as 
the Creels, that were standing to the right of Hole #1’s green when 
Mr. Veesart teed off.  Mr. Veesart and 
the other players in his group testified that they could not see the spectators 
because their view was obstructed by trees and bushes.  On the 
other hand, a number of witnesses testified that the spectators would have been 
visible from Hole #1’s tee box, including Brandon Donahue, a player in the Creel 
foursome, Josh Creel, Josh Creel’s caddy, Haley Hartman, and Sue Blyth and 
Hadley Berry, spectators standing next to Mr. Creel when he was 
struck.
 
[¶37]   
Brandon Donahue testified:
 
Q.        
Okay.  And from where Mr. Creel, the plaintiff, was hit 
to the tee box, is that a situation where view would be a factor as far as 
knowing where the spectators are, or were they –
 
A.        
No, I don’t believe so.  I think that they’d be – that 
they would be pretty clearly in view.
 
Q.        
Okay.  And why is that?
 
A.        
I guess because of the pretty direct nature of the hole.  
You know, again, it’s a pretty straight hole.  These 
trees here are pretty – you know, I mean, they’re big, but they’re kind of tall 
off the ground.  These are a little bit shorter but bushy, but 
they weren’t, I don’t believe, hiding behind them.  I mean, 
they were near them, but these trees are not far off this green.  
And so standing near them doesn’t get them really out of the way of the 
hole.
 
Q.        
Would that change your opinion if they were, say, over in here 
(indicating)?
 
A.        
You know, not really.  Because these trees are, you 
know – again, it’s been a couple of years since I’ve been there, but these trees 
at this time as I recall are – are pretty, I don’t know if the word is 
stout.  I mean, they’re pretty full.  You 
can’t really get inside of these here like you can perhaps under some other 
tree.  You can’t really get inside of these bushes.
Q.        
Okay.  But you don’t know for sure whether or not the 
people on the tee box could see them or not?
 
A.        
No, I don’t know that for sure, no.
 
[¶38]   
Josh Creel testified:
 
Q.        
. . . In your opinion, do you think that your parents and 
the Hultgrens could have stood in a safer place than where they were 
located?
 
A.        
Where they were standing was visible from the tee box.  
I don’t think that it was an unsafe place by any means.  
You usually don’t tee off when people are on the green with a club that 
you know can get there.  But I didn’t think they were in any 
harm standing there.
 
Q.        
You’re not aware of whether or not the people on the tee box could 
actually see your parents, correct?
 
A.        
Maybe they couldn’t.  I’ve played that hole a ton of 
times, and you can see right where they were standing.
 
Q.        
So you would disagree with the two other golfers that have previously 
testified that they couldn’t see your parents?
 
A.        
Was it the guy who hit the ball?
 
Q.        
It was the two other golfers.
 
A.        
If they were standing off the tee box to the right, possibly 
not.  But if you’re hitting that tee shot on number one in the 
Wyoming Open, you can see where my parents were standing.  

 
Q.        
But you don’t know for sure because you weren’t on the tee box yourself, 
correct?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
[¶39]   
Haley Hartman, Josh Creel’s caddy, testified that the spectators 
following their group were not standing in the bushes.  By 
affidavit, Sue Blyth attested to the following:
2.         
While standing beside the green on Hole #1, I was standing near James 
Creel, his wife Brenda Creel and others.  While the golfers in 
that foursome were “putting out” on the green, James Creel was struck by a golf 
ball driven from the tee box on Hole #1.
 
3.         
While we were standing beside the green and at the time Mr. Creel was 
struck by the ball, I was able to see the Hole #1 tee box and the golfers on the 
tee box.
 
[¶40]   
Hadley Berry attested similarly, by affidavit, to the 
following:
 
1.         
On July 7, 2006, I was watching my friend Josh Creel compete in the 
Wyoming Open Golf Tournament at the Airport Golf Course in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.
 
2.         
While I was standing beside the green on Hole #1, with Mr. Creel and 
others, Josh Creel was “putting out” on the green.  While Josh 
was putting, his father was struck by a golf ball driven from the tee box on 
Hole #1.
 
3.         
Mr. Creel was standing immediately to my right.  The 
ball flew over my head and struck Mr. Creel in the head.  Once 
I realized what had happened, I turned toward the tee box and saw the golfers on 
the tee box and started running toward them.
 
[¶41]   
These witnesses testified as to what they believed was visible, based 
either on their particular vantage point or on their experience teeing off Hole 
#1 and being familiar with its layout on that same day.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Creels, we cannot 
reject the testimony simply because the witnesses cannot testify to what 
Mr. Veesart or Ms. Irvine actually saw.  No 
witness can ever stand in the shoes of another witness and testify as to what 
that witness saw.  Nonetheless, a witness can provide relevant 
testimony, including conclusions, inferences or opinions, based on their own 
actual observations.  See W.R.E. 701; 
Tucker v. State, 2010 WY 162, ¶ 18, 245 P.3d 301, 306 (Wyo. 
2010) (witness may testify to inferences or opinion “rationally based on his 
perception”).  
 
[¶42]   
A number of reasonable inferences can be fairly drawn from the testimony 
of Brandon Donahue, Josh Creel and Sue Blyth.  From the 
viewpoint most favorable to the Creels, a jury might infer that the two other 
golfers in Mr. Veesart’s group were unable to see as clearly as 
Mr. Veesart could from his vantage point; that the spectators were 
visible to Mr. Veesart and the other players, but 
Mr. Veesart and the other golfers did not notice them because they 
were preoccupied or distracted by their play or the play on the green; or that 
Mr. Veesart’s testimony was not credible.  Again, 
we do not mean to suggest that these are the only inferences or that they are 
the inferences a jury, or even this Court, would draw from this 
testimony.  But they are reasonable inferences that the record 
supports and, given this evidence, we must conclude that whether the spectators 
were visible from the tee box is a disputed issue of material fact.  

 
4.         
Ms. Irvine’s Knowledge of Spectators Near the Hole #1 
Green
 
[¶43]   
Ms. Irvine testified that when she started the Josh Creel foursome she 
saw a group of spectators walking the course with his foursome and that she 
recognized some of the spectators following his group.  From 
this evidence, and the evidence described above concerning the visibility of the 
spectators from the tee box, a jury could infer that Ms. Irvine knew or should 
have known that there were spectators near the green of Hole #1.  
We thus conclude that questions of material fact exist as to whether Ms. 
Irvine knew or should have known that there were spectators near that 
green.
 
[¶44]   
  Based on the conflicting evidence and the reasonable 
inferences that can be fairly drawn from the record, we find genuine questions 
of material fact exist and the jury must resolve the duty question.  
That is, the jury must determine whether L & L’s agent, Kathy Irvine, 
increased the risk that James Creel would be struck by a golf ball, beyond the 
risk inherent in the sport, when she instructed Mr. Veesart to tee 
off when golfers and spectators were on and around the green and 
Mr. Veesart expressed concern that he could hit the group ahead of 
him.  
 
[¶45]   
One final observation we must make is that we cannot determine, based on 
the record before us, and assuming the facts were resolved in Creels’ favor, 
whether the resulting scenario is one that increased the risk of getting hit 
beyond the sport’s inherent risk.  For example, in 
Cooperman, the Tenth Circuit found that the loose saddle that caused the 
plaintiff to fall was a result of human error in the cinching of the 
saddle.  The court went further, though, and found that such 
errors in judgment were an inherent risk in the cinching of saddles, and it 
affirmed judgment for the defendant.  Cooperman, 
214 F.3d  at 1169.  Similarly in this case, 
the question may be asked whether errors in judgment caused by trying to 
maintain the pace of play in a tournament are an inherent risk of the 
activity.  Based on the record before us, we simply do not 
know the answer to that question.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶46]   
Based on the conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences that can 
be fairly drawn from the record, we find genuine questions of material fact 
exist and the jury must resolve whether L & L increased the risk that James 
Creel would be struck by a golf ball, beyond the risk inherent in the sport, 
when L & L’s agent instructed a player to tee off when golfers and 
spectators were on and around the green and the player expressed concern that he 
could hit the group ahead of him.  We thus reverse the entry 
of summary judgment and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.
 
TYLER, 
District Judge, dissenting, in which SULLINS, District 
Judge, joins.
[¶47]   
We would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
to Appellees as a matter of law, since there are no genuine issues 
of material fact in dispute.
 
Summary Judgment 
Standard of Review
 
[¶48]   
This Court’s standard of review for an award of summary judgment is 
well-known.  We must “examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the non-movant party and that party receives the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record.”  Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., Inc., 2004 
WY 97, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d 484, 490 (Wyo. 2004).  

            

[¶49]   
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists 
and if the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Franks, ¶ 9, 
96 P.3d  at 490; Ware v. Converse Cty. Sch. Dist. 
No. 2, 789 P.2d 872, 874 (Wyo. 1990).  A 
genuine issue of material fact is a fact which, if proven, “would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of a cause of action or 
defense which has been asserted by the 
parties.”  Roitz v. Kidman, 
913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996); see also Franks, ¶ 9, 
96 P.3d  at 490.  “Material fact” has been defined 
as a fact falling into any one of the following categories:  

 
[A fact] having legal 
significance which would . . . control the legal relations of the parties; one 
upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part; one on 
which the controversy may be determined; one which will affect the outcome of 
the case depending on its resolution; or, one which constitutes a part of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defense.  

 
Reno Livestock Corp. 
v. Sun Oil Co., 
638 P.2d 147, 151 (Wyo. 1981) (citing Johnson v. 
Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Wyo. 1975)).
 
[¶50]   
A motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on 
the movant to make a prima facie showing that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a 
matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  
Until the movant has made a prima facie showing that 
genuine issues of material fact do not exist, the non-movant party has no 
obligation to come forward to counter the motion with materials beyond the 
pleadings.  Rino v. Mead, 2002 WY 
144, ¶ 23, 55 P.3d 13, 20 (Wyo. 2002).  Once a 
prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the 
motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
does exist.  Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987).  The party opposing 
a motion for summary judgment “must affirmatively set forth material facts in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, . . . [and] cannot rely only on his 
allegations and pleadings.”  Hyatt v. Big Horn Sch. Dist. 
No. 4, 636 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1981).  
“Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient . . . to 
satisfy an opposing party’s burden.” Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 
710.  The whole purpose of summary judgment would be defeated 
if a case could be forced to trial by a mere assertion that an issue 
exists.  England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 
1141 (Wyo. 1986).
 
Discussion
 
[¶51]   
Pertinent provisions of the Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-121 through § 1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2011), provide: 
 
§ 1-1-122. 
Definitions.
 
(a) 
      As used in this act: 
 
(i) 
        “Inherent risk” with 
regard to any sport or recreational opportunity means those dangers or 
conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any 
sport or recreational opportunity;
 
(ii) 
       “Provider” means any person or 
governmental entity which for profit or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport or 
recreational opportunity.  This act does not apply to a cause 
of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational 
equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the 
sport or recreational opportunity; 
 
(iii) 
      “Sport or recreational opportunity” 
means commonly understood sporting activities including baseball, softball, 
football, soccer, basketball, swimming, hockey, dude 
ranching, nordic or alpine skiing and other alpine sports, 
snowboarding, mountain climbing, outdoor education programs, river floating, 
hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding and any other equine 
activity, snowmobiling and similar recreational opportunities and includes the 
use of private lands for vehicle parking and land access related to the sport or 
recreational opportunity[.] 
* * * *
 
§ 1-1-123. Assumption 
of risk.
 
(a) 
      Any person who takes part in any 
sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is 
legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other 
persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or 
recreational opportunity.
 
(b) 
      A provider of any sport or 
recreational opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter or control the 
inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity. 

 
(c) 
       Actions based upon negligence 
of the provider wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an 
inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved 
pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.
 
* * * *
            

[¶52]   
The following facts germane to this appeal are not disputed:
 
1.         
At all relevant times, Appellees were “providers” of a “sport 
or recreational opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(ii), (iii).
 
2.         
Being struck by a golf ball on a golf course during play at a 
professional golf tournament is an “inherent risk” assumed by a participant of a 
“sport or recreational opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i), (iii).
 
3.         
At all relevant times, as a spectator present on a golf course during a 
professional golf tournament, Appellant James Creel assumed the “inherent risk” 
of being struck by a golf ball.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i), (iii) and § 1-1-123(a).
 
4.         Appellees 
were not required “to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks” to 
Appellant James Creel of being struck by a golf ball while he was a spectator 
physically present on a golf course during play at a professional golf 
tournament.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i), (iii) and 
§ 1-1-123(b).
 
5.         
The record is devoid of any acts or omissions by Appellees 
creating or causing a “non-inherent risk” of injury to Appellant James 
Creel.
 
[¶53]   
Within this appeal, Appellants do not steadfastly dispute whether being 
hit by a golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport of golf.  
Instead, they focus on the alleged negligent acts of Appellees, 
and argue that the act of directing the golfer to proceed to hit his drive on 
the first hole is not an act that is inherent to the game.  In 
support of this position, Appellants rely upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(c) 
alone, and assert that such provision supports an exception applicable to the 
case at hand.  Such an argument is flawed.  

 
[¶54]   
If the language of the Recreation Safety Act is clear and unambiguous, 
then we should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words without 
resorting to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011); Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Soles 
v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo. 1991)).  The 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(c) is clear and unambiguous.  
The proper interpretation is one that focuses upon whether the risk is 
“inherent” to the “sport or recreational opportunity” – not the nature of the 
conduct (i.e., whether the conduct is negligent).  
State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 351 (Wyo. 1974) 
(“[L]egislative intent governs and that 'intent must be ascertained by 
reading it [the statute] according to the natural import of the language used 
without resorting to subtle and forced construction.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting State ex rel. Murane v. Jack, 52 Wyo. 173, 
70 P.2d 888, 892 (1937)).   Accordingly, the 
negligence exception under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(c) applies solely to 
“non-inherent risks.”  
 
[¶55]   
Inasmuch as the uncontroverted fact that being struck by a golf ball on a 
golf course during play at a professional golf tournament is an “inherent risk” 
assumed by a participant of a “sport or recreational opportunity,” the 
negligence exception in subsection (c) does not apply.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i), (iii) and § 1-1-123(c).  To 
decide otherwise would effectively render the core purpose of the Recreation 
Safety Act a nullity.
 
[¶56]   
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment made a sufficient prima 
facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary 
judgment should be granted as a matter of law under the Recreation Safety 
Act.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  The 
burden then shifted to Appellants to present specific facts showing that a 
genuine issue of material fact does exist.  Moreover, 
Appellants “cannot rely only on [their] allegations and pleadings.”  
Hyatt, 636 P.2d  at 530; see also England, 
728 P.2d  at 1141.  
 
[¶57]   
Appellants failed to present specific material facts to the district 
court showing that any “damage [or] injury [was] not the result of an inherent 
risk of the sport or recreational opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-123(c).  Therefore, as to the claims asserted by 
Appellants against Appellees, no genuine issues of material fact exist 
which “would have the effect of establishing . . . an essential element of a 
cause of action.”  Roitz, 
913 P.2d  at 432; see also Franks, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d  at 
490; Reno Livestock Corp., 638 P.2d  at 151; Johnson, 
542 P.2d at 871-72; W.R.C.P. 56(c).  

 
[¶58]   
Pursuant to the Recreation Safety Act as a matter of 
law, Appellees should be deemed immune from any and all liability 
arising from Appellants’ claims against them.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-1-123(a), (b). 
 
Conclusion
 
[¶59]   
In this appeal, strictly involving Appellants’ claims against 
Appellees, we would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees as a matter of law under the immunity afforded 
them by the Recreation Safety Act, since there exist no genuine issues of 
material fact to be determined.