Title: In re Starr

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  January 23, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

	In Re Complaint as to 
	the Conduct of

	DENI STARR,

										Accused.

(OSB 94-145; SC S41967)

		In Banc

		On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

		Argued and submitted April 29, 1997.

		Deni Starr, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the briefs in propria persona.

		Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,
Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for
the Oregon State Bar.

		PER CURIAM

		The accused is suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months commencing on the effective
date of this decision.

		Gillette, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and specially concurring in part, with Van Hoomissen
and Durham, JJ., joining.

		PER CURIAM

 		This is a lawyer discipline proceeding.  The Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleges that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), former DR 9-101(A) (1992) (failing to deposit
all funds of a client into a trust account), and former DR 9-101(B)(1) (1992) (failing promptly to notify a client of the
receipt of the client's funds).  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found the accused guilty of violating those
disciplinary rules and concluded that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction.

		Because of the extent of the sanction, this court must
review the trial panel's decision.  ORS 9.536(2); Rule of
Procedure (BR) 10.1.  This court reviews the trial panel's
decision de novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden
of establishing misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR
5.2.

		On de novo review, we conclude that the accused has
violated former DR 9-101(B)(1) and former DR 9-101(A), but that
the Bar has not met its burden of proof as to the charged
violations of DR 1-102(A)(3).  We further conclude that the
appropriate sanction in this case is a six-month suspension.

FINDINGS OF FACT

		The accused was admitted to the practice of law in
Oregon in 1983.  From 1983 to 1995, she practiced mainly in the
areas of domestic relations and personal injury, and mostly in a
solo practice.  In late 1994, the accused entered into a
stipulation for discipline, pursuant to which she was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of 18 months, beginning
January 1, 1995, for a series of disciplinary violations charged
in an earlier proceeding.  The accused was under that suspension
at the time of the hearing in this matter.

		We turn to the facts relating to the present charges. 
In early 1991, a shelter for battered women referred Charlotte
Olson to the accused for representation in connection with a
juvenile court proceeding concerning Olson's minor son.  Olson
paid the accused a $200 retainer under a written fee agreement to
pay $50 per hour, plus expenses.  Olson lost her job.  The court
then appointed the accused to represent Olson in the juvenile
court proceeding, but Olson remained responsible for paying the
accused for services performed before the appointment.  The
accused notified Olson by letter that she had incurred $258 in
fees for that matter.  Olson agreed to make payments of $50 per
month on the juvenile court matter.

		Olson had custody of her son.  During the pendency of
the juvenile proceeding, the child's father, Stephen Kilpper,
took the child for an approved visit.  He did not return the
child to Olson.  Instead, he left the state and filed for a
change of custody in Texas.

		Olson retained the accused to represent her in the
ensuing custody dispute.  Olson signed no written fee agreement,
but she orally agreed to pay the accused $80 per hour.  With
Olson's permission, the accused hired a lawyer in Texas to seek
dismissal of the custody proceeding there.  Kilpper left Texas
and moved to Florida.  Again with Olson's permission, the accused
hired an investigator to locate Kilpper, personally traveled to
Florida, and obtained an order requiring Kilpper to return the
child to Oregon.  Olson eventually regained custody of her son.

		By May 1992, the accused had billed Olson for $5,216.40
on the custody case.  On July 1, 1992, Texas counsel was owed
$540.62.

		The accused also represented Olson in connection with a
personal injury claim for assault against a boyfriend,
Christopher Clair.  On that matter, the accused represented Olson
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement calling for the accused to
be paid one-third of any amount collected if the case settled
after the institution of an action, but before trial.  The
accused filed an action on Olson's behalf and obtained a default
judgment against Clair for about $33,000.

		The accused sought to collect the Clair judgment.  As
part of that effort, she obtained a continuing writ of
garnishment against Clair's wages.

		By letter dated March 31, 1992, the accused, on behalf
of Olson, agreed to pay the Texas lawyer $100 per month beginning
in May 1992 and to pay at a faster rate if money were collected
on the Clair judgment.  Olson also agreed to apply a portion of
the money received from the Clair judgment against her
outstanding bill with the accused.

		As a result of the writ of garnishment, the accused
received five checks from Clair's employer.  Each check was made
payable to Olson, and the accused endorsed each one, "Deni Starr
for Charlotte Olson."  The following chart shows the date of each
check, the amount, the deposit date, and where the check was
deposited:
   Date of Check
Amount
Deposit Date