Title: State ex rel. Tracy v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Tracy v. Indus. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 477, 2009-Ohio-1386.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. TRACY, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO; 
AUTOZONE, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Tracy v. Indus. Comm., 
 121 Ohio St.3d 477, 2009-Ohio-1386.] 
Workers’ compensation — Abuse of discretion by the Industrial Commission — 
Court of appeals judgment reversing commission’s denial of benefits is 
affirmed. 
(No. 2007-2376 — Submitted February 17, 2009 — Decided April 2, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 07AP-88, 2007-Ohio-5792. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} AutoZone, Inc. appeals from a judgment issuing a writ of 
mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to grant appellee Mary J. 
Tracy’s request for temporary total disability compensation. At issue is the effect 
of a nonindustrial February 2006 incident on the chain of causation between 
Tracy’s previous industrial injury and her post-February disability. Specifically, 
we must determine whether the commission abused its discretion in declaring that 
the February 2006 occurrence was a new injury rather than simply an 
exacerbation of a previous industrial injury. 
{¶ 2} Tracy’s industrial injury occurred on January 30, 2004, and her 
claim was allowed for “left shoulder strain; C6-7 herniated nucleus pulposus; C5-
6 disc protrusion.”  In late 2005, she was declared to be at maximum medical 
improvement for those conditions. 
{¶ 3} On January 18, 2006, a visit to her attending physician, Dr. Paul D. 
Mumma, prompted these observations:   
January Term, 2009 
2 
{¶ 4} “The patient has persistent and chronic neck pain.  There is 
chronically decreased motion.  She has problems with reaching overhead and 
heavy lifting. 
{¶ 5} “* * * 
{¶ 6} “ASSESSMENT: 1) Cervical disk disease secondary to acute 
herniated nucleus pulposus, job related. 2) We will be arranging vocational rehab 
and I have given the patient some restrictions on her employment.  She is not to 
be doing any heavy lifting.  I would prefer she have a driving job where she does 
not have to load or unload heavy objects and she should be climbing, reaching 
down and using upper extremities occasionally, but not repetitively.” 
{¶ 7} On February 6, 2006, Tracy reported to her doctor in considerable 
physical distress.  The doctor’s notes reveal the following:  
{¶ 8} “HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:  The patient comes in after 
reinjuring her neck last Thursday while pushing back with her neck against the 
headrest of her car.  This was sudden.  She felt an articulation in her cervical 
spine and has had severe occipital and cervical pain syndrome ever since.  This 
has developed into severe headaches and has become disabling. 
{¶ 9} “She is obviously in pain.  She does not flex her cervical spine 
well.  She has no arm symptoms.  Denies any evidence of radiculopathy or cord 
symptoms. 
{¶ 10} “* * *   
{¶ 11} “ASSESSMENT AND PLAN: 1) Lower cervical spine injury 
associated with an acutely herniated nucleus pulposus in the past.  I believe she 
has reinjured her neck.  I am not sure if another MRI will be necessary or not 
unless we fail to see any improvement.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} The symptoms did not abate, and after consultation with a surgeon, 
it was confirmed that surgery would be required.  That surgery was performed on 
April 25, 2006. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
{¶ 13} Tracy sought temporary total disability compensation for periods 
surrounding her surgery.  AutoZone objected, claiming that the incident on 
February 6, 2006, constituted a new, intervening injury unrelated to Tracy’s 
employment.  In response, Tracy secured two letters from Dr. Mumma.  The first, 
dated June 10, 2006, stated: 
{¶ 14} “On 01/30/2004, Ms. Tracey [sic] injured her neck while pulling 
on a skid at work.  She suffered the immediate onset of neck pain radiating into 
her left arm and crescendoing over the subsequent several days.  Since that time 
MRI scanning has clearly demonstrated a herniated cervical nucleus pulposus. 
{¶ 15} “* * * 
{¶ 16} “Ms. Tracey [sic] did exacerbate her preexisting injury while 
repositioning herself in her car on 02/06/2006. 
{¶ 17} “At that time she felt an increase in pain in her arm and her neck 
hurt more than usual for a while. 
 
{¶ 18} “Ms. Tracy had a preexisting work-related herniated nucleus 
pulposus at C5-6 and C6-7 documented by MRI scanning prior to her mild 
exacerbation of this same injury on 02/06/2006.  It was preexisting and mere 
active pushing on the headrest would not have caused a herniated nucleus 
pulposus to appear somewhere else. * * * 
{¶ 19} “There is also compelling evidence that Ms. Tracy is feeling much 
better.  Her arm pain has all but disappeared and her neck pain is much improved 
following surgery. 
{¶ 20} “Therefore, I am of the opinion that Ms. Tracy’s original injury of 
01/30/2004 was the proximate and sole cause of the neck pain, arm pain, and 
MRI findings of herniated nucleus pulposus of C5-6 and C6-7.  It is also my 
opinion that her surgery was medically necessary and performed only as a 
consequence of her injury.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2009 
4 
{¶ 21} Dr. Mumma’s letter of September 6, 2006, reiterated those 
conclusions: 
{¶ 22} “Prior to her surgery this patient had stable physical findings until 
02/06/06 when she suffered a positional injury that evidently exacerbated her 
work-related injury.    
{¶ 23} “* * * Prior to her exacerbation of injury Ms. Tracy manifested no 
neurologic symptoms that would have required surgical intervention and was 
therefore managed conservatively.  This does not ameliorate the fact that she had 
a work-related injury or was suffering significant pain.  This also does not abolish 
the fact that she has significant cervical spasm, tenderness, and decreased range of 
motion.  Until her postural injury on February 6th, Ms. Tracy had no impending 
paralysis or loss of function of either upper extremity and was experiencing no 
spinal cord symptoms.  She would still have all the other manifestations of 
cervical disk injury including muscle spasm, tension headaches, shoulder pain, 
thoracic spine pain, and decreased cervical range of motion which are all well 
documented.  
{¶ 24} “It is my opinion that Ms. Tracy suffers from a progressively 
herniated nucleus pulposus of C6-7 that ultimately required surgery. 
{¶ 25} “It is also my opinion that Ms. Tracy’s work absences from the 
date of injury until post surgery were all necessary and resulted solely from her 
work-related injury. 
{¶ 26} “It is my opinion that Ms. Tracy’s chronic occipital cervical 
headaches are due to muscle spasm and traction as a consequence of her work-
related injury to her cervical spine and subsequent surgical intervention.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 27} A district hearing officer granted Tracy’s temporary total disability 
compensation request, but a staff hearing officer reversed: 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 28} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the injured worker sustained 
an intervening injury on 02/02/2006 when she was pushing back on the headrest 
of the seat in her car and re-injured her neck.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that 
this intervening injury was what caused the injured worker to develop severe 
tension headaches, to require an updated cervical MRI, and eventually surgery at 
C6-7 on 04/25/2006.  The Staff Hearing Officer relies on the office note of Dr. 
Mumma (02/06/2006) in this regard, the new MRI (02/15/2006) which was 
immediately obtained, which shows a significant change in the disc herniation of 
C6-7, and the fact that the injured worker necessitated surgery after this incident, 
which was performed on 04/05/2006 when prior to the incident there was no 
recommendation for surgery, in making this finding.” 
{¶ 29} Further appeal was denied. 
{¶ 30} Tracy filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
denying her temporary total disability compensation.  The court of appeals 
agreed.  It held that the staff hearing officer had inappropriately relied on isolated 
words in the February 6, 2006 Mumma report and the February 15, 2006 MRI 
report, having taken that language out of context.  The court stressed that there 
was no medical evidence attributing Tracy’s condition to anything other than the 
industrial injury.  State ex rel. Tracy v. Indus. Comm., Franklin App. No. 07AP-
88, 2007-Ohio-5792, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 31} The court granted the writ, and AutoZone has appealed that 
decision to this court. 
{¶ 32} The staff hearing officer denied Tracy’s motion based on Dr. 
Mumma’s February 6, 2006 office note and the February 15, 2006 MRI report. 
We must determine whether those documents are evidence supporting the order 
denying the temporary total disability.  The court of appeals held that they were 
not, and we affirm that judgment. 
January Term, 2009 
6 
{¶ 33} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating 
evidentiary weight and credibility, and it may draw inferences from that evidence.  
State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 172, 31 OBR 
369, 509 N.E.2d 946;  State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 
2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 34.  In this case, the staff hearing officer 
appeared to infer that a new injury occurred based on Dr. Mumma’s February 6, 
2006 reference to a “reinjured” neck. We find this to be an impermissible 
inference because Dr. Mumma has consistently and repeatedly attributed Tracy’s 
symptoms after the February 2006 incident to her industrial injury and has never 
suggested that a new injury occurred. 
{¶ 34} Dr. Mumma’s April 10, 2006 office note stated that Tracy’s 
current symptoms arose from “her work-related injury.” His June and September 
2006 letters were more emphatic.  He consistently referred to the February 
incident as an exacerbation of the original injury and numerous times attributed 
her condition thereafter to the industrial injury.  Every express statement on the 
issue of causation related it to the industrial injury.  Dr. Mumma’s one-time 
description of Tracy’s neck as “reinjured” cannot, therefore, sustain the 
conclusion that Tracy’s post-February symptomatology was unrelated to her 
original industrial injury. 
{¶ 35} The staff hearing officer’s reliance on the February 15, 2006 MRI 
is also tenuous.  First, the MRI listed only medical test results and offered no 
opinion on causation.  Second, the staff hearing officer mischaracterized the 
report by stating that it showed a “significant” change in Tracy’s disc condition 
from that reported in the 2004 MRI.  But the later MRI revealed only a 
“persistence” of the 2004 MRI findings, with “some” progression of a disc 
herniation that “slightly” impinged on the spinal cord.  There was no reference to 
any “significant” change. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
{¶ 36} AutoZone persists, arguing that because Tracy’s condition was 
worse after February 2006 than it had ever been, the February 2006 incident 
necessarily was a new injury.  This assertion is untrue.  An exacerbation, by 
definition, is a worsening of the condition.  That this worsening was particularly 
severe does not change that. 
{¶ 37} AutoZone finally claims that this cause of action is premature 
because the issue of additional allowance of Tracy’s headaches is pending before 
the common pleas court.  This assertion is not persuasive.  Tracy’s surgery was 
prompted by a series of symptoms arising from the February 2006 incident, not 
just the headaches for which she now seeks formal recognition.  The allowance or 
disallowance of occipital headaches is not necessarily determinative of the causal 
relationship between the original industrial injury and the benefits at issue here. 
{¶ 38} The evidence cited by the staff hearing officer does not support the 
denial of Tracy’s motion.  The court of appeals correctly ruled that the 
commission abused its discretion, and its judgment is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and John C. Albert, for appellant. 
Larrimer & Larrimer and Thomas L. Reitz, for appellee. 
______________________