Title: King v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 JERMAINE KING, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
 STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 626, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 0805039623 (S) 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  January 22, 2019 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:     March 21, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s 
motion to affirm,1 and the record below, we conclude that Superior Court order, 
dated December 6, 2018, summarily dismissing the appellant’s second motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 should be affirmed.  
The Superior Court did not err in concluding that the motion was procedurally barred 
and did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61(d)(2).  As to the appellant’s contention that the Superior Court should have 
                                                 
1 On January 31, 2019, the appellant filed a motion for leave to respond to the motion to affirm. 
Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), a response to a motion to affirm is not permitted unless requested 
by the Court. The Court did not request a response to the motion to affirm and finds no reason to 
request a response after considering the appellant’s motion. 
2 
 
considered his claims under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), his habitual 
offender sentence is not illegal under the United Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States2 as the appellant contends.3 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave to respond 
to the motion to affirm is DENIED.  The motion to affirm is GRANTED, and the 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                                 
2 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding that portion of Armed Career Criminal Act providing for 
enhanced sentence for someone with three previous convictions for a “violent felony” was 
unconstitutionally vague because “violent felony” was defined, in part, as involving “conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). 
3 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 2016 WL 2929109, at *2 (Del. May 16, 2016) (“Because the language 
at issue in Johnson does not appear in Delaware’s habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214, this 
Court has held that the holding of Johnson does not apply under Delaware law.”); Priest v. State, 
2015 WL 7424860, at *1 (Del. Nov. 20, 2015) (rejecting defendant’s reliance on Johnson to argue 
that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), not the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act).