Title: State v. Bates

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Bates, 110 Ohio St.3d 1230, 2006-Ohio-3667.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BATES, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Bates, 110 Ohio St.3d 1230, 2006-Ohio-3667.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2005-1515 — Submitted April 11, 2006 — Decided August 2, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 84654, 2005-Ohio-3411. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
{¶ 2} The court orders that the opinion of the court of appeals may not 
be cited as authority except by the parties inter se. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 3} I disagree with the majority’s decision to dismiss this cause as 
having been improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 4} Following an afternoon high-speed car chase, Sgt. Timothy 
Franczak pursued on foot a man who had rapidly exited the driver’s side of the 
car and escaped through a nearby fence.  The sergeant later described the man as a 
short, stocky black male between the ages of 18 and 20 and, despite having been a 
distance of 25 to 35 feet away from the man, stated that he clearly viewed the 
man’s face as the man had turned to escape through the fence.  During an 
inventory of the car, Sgt. Franczak found a cellular telephone and subsequently 
answered it when it rang.  The caller asked for “Maurice” before hanging up. 
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{¶ 5} The sergeant then searched the vehicle’s ownership information 
through the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (“LEADS”) database and 
called the owner of the car.  The owner told him that “Maurice” had had 
possession of her car for the past two days and gave to the sergeant “Maurice’s” 
full name, address, and date of birth.  Sgt. Franczak immediately entered that 
information into the LEADS database and obtained Maurice Bates’s Bureau of 
Motor Vehicles photograph.  Sgt. Franczak testified that his initial reaction to the 
photograph was “That’s the guy,” meaning that Bates was the man that he had 
chased that day. 
{¶ 6} When Bates voluntarily appeared at the police station five days 
later, the sergeant again indicated that Bates’s physical appearance merely 
confirmed what he already knew: that Bates was the individual who had run from 
him following the chase.  Based upon the department’s policy to seek direct 
indictment unless the crime involved a gun or violence, however, Sgt. Franczak 
did not immediately arrest Bates.  After the sergeant read Bates his Miranda 
rights, Bates told the sergeant that another man had actually been involved in the 
crime.  The sergeant then investigated the other individual and determined almost 
immediately that the other man bore no resemblance to the man that the sergeant 
had seen escaping through the fence. 
{¶ 7} At trial, the court allowed testimony concerning the eyewitness 
identification by Sgt. Franczak, along with other evidence.  Bates was convicted.  
The appellate court reversed Bates’s convictions and remanded for a new trial 
based entirely on its holding that the identification testimony offered by Sgt. 
Franczak had violated Bates’s due process rights because the testimony was based 
on an impermissibly suggestive identification process. 
{¶ 8} The admission of impermissibly suggestive identification evidence 
obtained by unnecessary measures violates a defendant’s constitutional due 
process rights in cases where the totality of the circumstances does not support the 
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3 
reliability of the identification.  See Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 
97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140.  Courts generally find the use of a single 
photograph for identification purposes impermissibly suggestive absent 
extraordinary circumstances.  See Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 
1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.  Even assuming that the procedure used in this case was 
suggestive,1 the suggestive nature of the identification goes only to the weight of 
the evidence, not to its admissibility.  State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 26-
27, 559 N.E.2d 464; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 
L.Ed.2d 140. 
{¶ 9} A court determines admissibility of identification testimony by 
considering whether the totality of the circumstances indicates reliability despite 
the suggestive nature of the photographic identification.  Jells, 53 Ohio St.3d at 
27, 559 N.E.2d 464.  Five factors establish reliability: (1) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the defendant at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of 
attention, (3) the accuracy of any prior description of the defendant given by the 
witness, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness as to the 
identification, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification.  
Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. 
{¶ 10} The record reflects that Sgt. Franczak had only a brief view of the 
perpetrator as he ran through a fence before subsequently discovering the single 
LEADS photograph of Bates through his investigation of circumstantial evidence.  
The appellate court first considered whether the identification procedure utilized 
in this case was impermissibly suggestive.  In deciding that issue, however, the 
appellate court improperly considered the reliability factors instead of analyzing 
                                          
 
1.  Though it is questionable whether the actual procedure was suggestive or just a product of 
good police work, the state does not challenge this portion of the analysis.  The suggestive aspect 
in this case appears to be the circumstantial evidence leading the sergeant to the LEADS 
photograph, not the consideration of a single LEADS photograph that was as likely to exonerate as 
to condemn the pictured individual. 
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the actual identification procedure.  While the appellate court may have 
determined correctly that the use of a single LEADS photograph for identification 
purposes was impermissibly suggestive, the court engaged in improper analysis to 
reach that conclusion. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court next decided that the sergeant’s out-of-court 
and in-court identification testimony was unreliable.  It relied heavily upon four 
factors: (1) the sergeant’s limited time to view the perpetrator, (2) his failure to 
immediately arrest Bates when Bates voluntarily appeared at the police station for 
questioning, (3) the failure of the sergeant to state that Bates’s twin brother 
resembled him in any way, and (4) the availability of a less suggestive and more 
reliable method of identification.  Only the first factor has any relevance to the 
five-pronged reliability analysis.  The appellate court’s reliance on the remaining 
factors and its analysis do nothing to address the actual issue before it:  whether, 
in the totality of the circumstances, the identification was sufficiently reliable. 
{¶ 12} The appellate court ignored the relevant reliability factors.  Instead, 
it applied an improper test, focusing myopically on whether the circumstantial 
evidence available to the sergeant “influence[d] [his] ultimate identification of 
Bates as the suspect-driver.”  Consideration of each erroneous fact relied upon by 
the appellate court demonstrates the court’s misplaced reliance. 
{¶ 13} First, Sgt. Franczak explained his failure to arrest Bates upon their 
first meeting: The department policy mandated direct indictment of any crime not 
involving a gun or violence.  The sergeant did recognize Bates at the initial 
meeting and stated that he intended to immediately present the evidence to the 
grand jury for indictment.  Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the 
failure to arrest immediately has nothing to do with the reliability of the 
sergeant’s identification testimony. 
{¶ 14} Second, the fact that the sergeant never stated that Bates’s twin 
brother resembled him is a red herring.  Despite popular perception, identical 
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twins may appear very different in person.  The record contains no evidence that 
the twins were difficult to tell apart or that they greatly resembled each other.  In 
fact, the defense introduced a photograph that included the twin brother, and Sgt. 
Franczak stated with certainty that none of the pictured individuals resembled the 
driver.  Without any further evidence, there is no reason for the appellate court to 
assume that the twins looked alike.  The jury was in a much better position to 
determine whether the twin brother resembled Bates so greatly that the sergeant 
should have “recognized” him in the photograph as the driver of the vehicle. 
{¶ 15} Finally, the fact that a less suggestive and more reliable method of 
identification might exist has no bearing on the reliability factors.  It only goes to 
whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.  The jury had 
all of the facts before it in order to determine whether the identification procedure 
tainted the sergeant’s identification.  The appellate court should have considered 
that in conjunction with the first part of the test and not with reliability. 
{¶ 16} When the actual reliability factors are applied to this case, the 
sergeant’s identification testimony takes on a different character.  Despite Sgt. 
Franczak’s limited time to view the perpetrator at the scene of the crime, he did 
have a clear view.  As a trained police officer, his degree of attention likely 
exceeded that of a person untrained in law enforcement.  See Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140.  He carefully 
observed the face of the driver as the driver was forced to take the time to get 
himself through a fence.  The sergeant’s general description of the suspect 
matched that of Bates, and he exhibited certainty in his identification.  Finally, 
only a matter of hours passed between the crime and Sgt. Franczak’s 
identification of Bates’s LEADS photograph.  Courts have regularly upheld the 
reliability of identification testimony even in light of the weakness of one of the 
factors.  Jells, 53 Ohio St.3d at 27, 559 N.E.2d 464; Brathwaite, supra; Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200-201, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401.  Despite Sgt. 
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Franczak’s limited opportunity to view the suspect, the totality of the 
circumstances indicates reliability. 
{¶ 17} The appellate court in this case used improper factors to determine 
whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, failed to 
consider the reliability factors laid out by Biggers, and, instead, overturned 
Bates’s conviction on the basis that a less suggestive procedure could have been 
used rather than properly analyzing the actual reliability of the sergeant’s 
identification in light of Biggers.  The issue of whether the suggestive procedure 
produced a mistaken result is a question for the jury relying on the evidence 
produced at trial.  See Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 
S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247.  I would hold that the Eighth District invaded the 
province of the jury by purporting to overturn a conviction based upon reliability 
when, in fact, the court considered only whether the identification was 
impermissibly suggestive. 
{¶ 18} Although the state and Bates argue only the reliability issue on 
appeal, a second issue should be addressed: Whether the improper admission of 
suggestive and unreliable identification testimony requires per se reversal.  Once 
the appellate court determined that the testimony was impermissibly suggestive, it 
stopped its analysis. 
{¶ 19} The United States Supreme Court has held that harmless-error 
analysis may apply to constitutional errors as long as those errors are not 
structural in nature.  Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 
L.Ed.2d 705; Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 306-310, 111 S.Ct. 
1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302.  “When reviewing the erroneous admission of * * * 
improperly admitted evidence, [the appellate court] simply reviews the remainder 
of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the 
[improperly admitted evidence] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 
310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 20} Many federal appellate courts and at least one state appellate court 
have applied harmless-error analysis in reviewing cases where a trial court 
erroneously admitted improperly suggestive and unreliable identification 
testimony.  See Carter v. Grams (C.A.7, 2006), 165 Fed.Appx. 480; United States 
v. Smith (C.A.3, 2005), 127 Fed. Appx. 608, 613; United States v. Concepcion 
(C.A.2, 1992), 983 F.2d 369, 379; Souza v. Howard (C.A.1, 1973), 488 F.2d 462, 
466; United States v. DeBose (C.A.6, 1970), 433 F.2d 916, 918; Johnson v. State 
(2000), 246 Ga.App. 239, 243, 539 S.E.2d 914.  Although this court has 
previously recognized that harmless error may apply to constitutional violations, 
see, e.g., State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, 
at ¶78, it has never explicitly extended this standard of review to the admission of 
impermissibly suggestive and unreliable identification testimony. 
{¶ 21} After determining that Sgt. Franczak’s identification testimony was 
unreliable, the appellate court merely assumed that the improper admission of this 
evidence demanded reversal of Bates’s convictions and a new trial.  No legal 
precedent supports the court’s per se reversal. 
{¶ 22} In considering whether constitutional error is harmless, a court 
should determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”  Conway, at ¶78, citing 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.  See, also, State v. 
Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 388, 721 N.E.2d 52.  The actual 
identification testimony by the sergeant in this case was only a small piece of 
evidence indicating Bates’s guilt.  Given the amount of circumstantial evidence 
supporting Bates’s conviction, I would find that any error in the admission of the 
testimony was harmless error. 
{¶ 23} Not only did the appellate court improperly vacate a conviction 
based upon the availability of less suggestive and reliable identification 
procedures and ignore the well-settled Biggers reliability factors, the court held 
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that the constitutional violation at issue in this case mandated per se reversal 
instead of applying harmless-error analysis. 
{¶ 24} I believe that the appellate court committed multiple errors and that 
the issues presented here should have been thoroughly addressed by this court.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Law Office of Timothy Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. Sweeney, for 
appellee. 
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