Title: Commonwealth v. Newton N.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12354 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NEWTON N., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     November 7, 2017. - February 5, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Probable Cause.  Insanity.  Mental 
Impairment.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child.  Practice, 
Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, 
Arraignment, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. 
Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. 
 
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk 
2 
 
District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  This case presents two important issues 
relevant to a Juvenile Court judge's consideration of a 
prearraignment motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint.  
First, we hold that a judge, in weighing whether the information 
contained within the "four corners" of the complaint application 
and related exhibits constitutes probable cause, may not 
consider whether a juvenile was criminally responsible for the 
charged offenses or whether the juvenile's mental impairment 
rendered the juvenile incapable of having the requisite criminal 
intent.  Second, we hold that, where a prosecutor exercises his 
or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency 
complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss 
the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal 
of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in 
the interests of justice.  Because the judge in this case 
dismissed the delinquency complaint before arraignment where the 
complaint was supported by probable cause and where the 
prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment, we vacate the 
dismissal and remand the case to the Juvenile Court.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the Suffolk district; the youth advocacy division 
of the Committee for Public Counsel Services; and the Mental 
Health Legal Advisors Committee, on behalf of the Center for 
3 
 
 
Background.  On May 25, 2016, a police officer applied for 
and obtained a delinquency complaint from a clerk-magistrate, 
charging the juvenile with breaking and entering into a building 
in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 16; breaking and entering into a 
vehicle in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 16; larceny over $250, in violation 
of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1); and disorderly conduct, in violation 
of G. L. c. 272, § 53.  The Commonwealth moved for arraignment 
and the juvenile moved prearraignment to dismiss the delinquency 
complaint.  The Juvenile Court judge, based on the documents 
that were submitted as part of the police officer's complaint 
application, allowed the juvenile's motion to dismiss and later 
issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
We summarize the judge's material findings.  On May 19, 
2016, at approximately 1:35 A.M., police officers were 
dispatched to a multiunit apartment complex in North Adams in 
response to a report that a young boy wearing an orange shirt 
and shorts was making noise and carrying a gun.  When the 
officers arrived on the scene, they found two long rifles on the 
ground near one of the apartments.  The officers later recovered 
a revolver in the area. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Public Representation, Massachusetts Advocates for Children, 
Strategies for Youth, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and the 
Center for Civil Rights Remedies. 
4 
 
 
Officer Ivan Cardeno spoke to the person who had reported 
the incident, who told him that she had observed a young male, 
approximately ten to twelve years old, enter two vehicles in the 
parking lot while carrying a long rifle.  She noted that she saw 
the boy holding the rifle up and repeatedly pulling the trigger, 
without aiming it. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Cardeno was informed that the 
boy had been located.  As Officer Cardeno approached the boy, 
who was wearing an orange T-shirt and shorts and whom he 
recognized as the juvenile, he heard the boy loudly cursing at 
the officers and attempting to pull away from them.  The 
juvenile continued this behavior as the officers escorted him 
home.  The boy sounded "deranged[,] making no sense at times." 
 
The juvenile's behavior and "deranged statements" continued 
after he arrived home.  He declared himself to be "Satan" and 
said "we have weapons" and "we are going to kill everyone."2  His 
mother informed the officers that he had experienced an outburst 
earlier that day in Albany, New York, to which the police had 
responded, but that nothing had been done then. 
 
Officer Cardeno determined that the juvenile was in need of 
a mental evaluation and called for an ambulance.  As the 
juvenile waited for the ambulance, he thrashed on the couch, hit 
himself on the head with closed fists, and rubbed his head with 
                                                          
 
 
2 His mother denied that they had any firearms in the home. 
5 
 
his fists "in a very hard manner."  When he was asked where he 
had found the weapons, he said he got them from the house "with 
the blue light" and agreed to show the officers the location of 
the house.  He walked with the officers to an apartment near 
where the police had first responded.  The officers knocked on 
the door and, after receiving no answer, noted that the door was 
unlocked and entered the apartment.  After opening the door, 
they saw a night light that displayed a "bluish light."  When 
the two occupants of the apartment were awakened, one of them 
informed the officers that he had two black powder rifles and a 
revolver in the home, but discovered that the weapons were 
missing when he brought Officer Cardeno to see them. 
 
When the juvenile was being transported by ambulance to the 
hospital, he began punching himself in the genitals with his 
closed fists and had to be placed in restraints.  The ambulance 
report indicated that the juvenile had an autism diagnosis and 
that he had not received his morning medication. 
 
In explaining her reasons for allowing the motion to 
dismiss all four charges contained in the delinquency complaint, 
the judge noted that each of the alleged offenses included an 
element of specific intent.  The judge concluded, "[b]ased on 
the totality of the evidence,"3 that there was not sufficient 
                                                          
 
 
3 The record appears to reflect that, at the motion to 
dismiss hearing, the juvenile's counsel provided the judge, 
6 
 
evidence as to the element of intent or the element of 
recklessness (for the charge of disorderly conduct) to support a 
finding of probable cause.  The judge determined, based on the 
juvenile's statements and actions, that the juvenile "was acting 
in a diminished, if not psychotic state, and therefore could not 
have possessed the requisite mental state." 
 
Apart from what the judge characterized as "the extensive 
evidence of [the juvenile's] deranged mental state," the judge 
further reasoned that the juvenile's age -- twelve years old at 
the time of the offense -- was a "relevant" consideration in 
determining probable cause.  She noted that "adolescent brains 
are not as developed as [the brains of] adults when it comes to 
controlling impulses, foreseeing consequences, and tempering 
emotions," and that the juvenile was unable to control "any of 
the three." 
 
The judge added: 
 
"It is not only in the best interest of [the juvenile] 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
without objection, with three exhibits that were not attached to 
the application:  (1) the medical record from the hospital the 
juvenile was admitted to from May 25, 2016, to June 2, 2016; (2) 
an undated psychological evaluation of the juvenile; and (3) a 
letter dated June 22, 2016, from the Department of Developmental 
Services informing the juvenile that his charges were preventing 
his placement at a supervised residential placement program.  In 
her findings of fact, however, the judge stated that she relied 
solely on the complaint application and the single exhibit 
attached to that application.  The Commonwealth does not contend 
that the judge reached beyond the "four corners" of the 
complaint application and its attached exhibit in formulating 
her findings of fact. 
7 
 
but in the interest of justice to dismiss these four 
charges prior to arraignment.  [The juvenile] is a child in 
need of aid.  He needs resources that will help him 
understand his mental health status and how to ensure 
stabilization moving forward.  What [the juvenile] does not 
need is the risk of a [court activity record information 
(CARI)] affecting access to necessary services or having 
any other impact on [the juvenile's] future needs." 
 
The Commonwealth appealed from the dismissal of the delinquency 
complaint, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Probable cause determination.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the judge erred in granting the 
juvenile's prearraignment motion to dismiss because the 
complaint application and its attached exhibit established 
probable cause that the juvenile had committed the four charged 
offenses.  Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the 
judge erred by concluding that, because of the juvenile's 
"diminished, if not psychotic state," and the juvenile's age, 
there was not probable cause regarding the intent required in 
any of the four offenses. 
 
"[A] motion to dismiss a complaint [for lack of probable 
cause] 'is decided from the four corners of the complaint 
application, without evidentiary hearing.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565 (2013), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Huggins, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111 (2013).  "To establish 
probable cause, the complaint application must set forth 
8 
 
'reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable or prudent person in believing that the defendant has 
committed the offense.'"  Humberto H., supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Roman, 414 Mass. 642, 643 (1993).  "The 
complaint application must include information to support 
probable cause as to each essential element of the 
offense."  Humberto H., supra at 565-566.  Probable cause 
requires "more than mere suspicion," id. at 565, 
quoting Roman, supra, but "considerably less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, so evidence that is insufficient to support a 
guilty verdict might be more than sufficient to establish 
probable cause."  Humberto H., supra.  See Commonwealth 
v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984), quoting K.B. Smith, 
Criminal Practice and Procedure § 104 (1983) ("Probable cause 
does not require the same type of specific evidence of each 
element of the offense as would be needed to support a 
conviction").  Because the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish probable cause is a question of law, we review the 
judge's probable cause determination de novo.  See  Humberto 
H., supra at 566. 
 
Here, there is abundant evidence contained in the complaint 
application and the attached exhibit to support a finding of 
probable cause that the juvenile committed the acts alleged in 
each of the charged offenses.  The judge's probable cause 
9 
 
finding, however, rested on her determination that the 
information within the four corners of the complaint application  
was insufficient to support a finding that the juvenile acted 
with the requisite intent because the juvenile was either not 
criminally responsible for his actions or was incapable of 
forming the requisite intent due to mental impairment.  We need 
not evaluate the weight of the information in the complaint 
application regarding criminal responsibility or the juvenile's 
capacity to form the requisite intent because questions of 
criminal responsibility and mental impairment are not relevant 
considerations in determining probable cause.  See Commonwealth 
v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 388 (1990). 
 
Criminal responsibility is not an element of an offense for 
which probable cause need be found.  Rather, lack of criminal 
responsibility is an affirmative defense in which the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the [juvenile] was criminally responsible" once the 
juvenile proffers "some evidence" at trial that, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the juvenile, "would permit a 
reasonable finder of fact to have a reasonable doubt whether the 
[juvenile] was criminally responsible at the time of the 
offense."  Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 811-812 
(2016).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A), as appearing in 
463 Mass. 1501 (2012) (if juvenile intends at trial to raise 
10 
 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility, juvenile must notify 
prosecutor in writing of such intention within time provided for 
filing of pretrial motions). 
 
Mental impairment, often characterized as diminished 
capacity, is not an affirmative defense.  See Commonwealth 
v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 45 n.7 (2005), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 729 n.5 (1998) (although "mental 
impairment" is often colloquially referred to as "diminished 
capacity," "[t]here is no 'diminished capacity' defense in this 
Commonwealth").  Rather, consideration of a juvenile's mental 
impairment "is merely an application of the ordinary rules of 
law pertaining to the requisite mental state for conviction of a 
particular crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30, 
34 (1974).  But, due to the complex nature of mental impairment, 
evidence of which is often presented at trial through expert 
testimony, we require defendants to provide the same notice 
regarding their intent to raise an issue of mental impairment at 
trial as we do their intent to raise a defense of criminal 
responsibility.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A) and 
Reporter's Notes (Revised, 2004), Massachusetts Rules of Court, 
at 186, 195 (Thomson Reuters 2016); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 
Mass. 822, 829 (2000) ("this court has implicitly recognized 
that the procedures set forth in [Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 
Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977),] and [Mass. R. Crim. P.] 
11 
 
14 [b] [2] [B] should be applied where the defendant raises an 
issue regarding his mental impairment"). 
 
The probable cause determination made by a judge or clerk-
magistrate based on the information in a complaint application 
is the same determination police officers must make in deciding 
whether to arrest.  We do not reasonably expect either a police 
officer or a judicial officer at this incipient stage of a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding to have the information 
necessary to engage in any meaningful assessment of possible 
mental impairments or lack of criminal responsibility.  Whether 
a juvenile's mental impairment renders him or her unable to form 
the requisite intent for a charged offense is an issue for 
trial, to be decided with the benefit of fair notice and perhaps 
expert testimony; it is not an issue that is appropriately part 
of the probable cause calculus.  Accordingly, the judge erred in 
finding no probable cause based on the juvenile's inability to 
form the requisite intent as a result of the juvenile's mental 
impairment. 
 
The judge also erred by considering the juvenile's age in 
determining his capacity to form the requisite intent.  A 
juvenile's age may be given due consideration when evaluating 
the weight to give an inference of consciousness of guilt from a 
juvenile's nervousness when stopped by the police.  
See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 632 (2015).  But the 
12 
 
judge treated the juvenile's age as if it were akin to some form 
of mental impairment arising from the limitations of the 
adolescent brain to control impulses, foresee consequences, and 
temper emotions.  Mental impairment -- regardless of whether it 
arises from an intellectual or psychological disorder, or from 
an immature, developing brain -- is simply not within the 
probable cause calculus. 
 
2.  Prearraignment dismissal based on best interests of the 
child and interests of justice.  The juvenile contends that, 
even if the complaint application were sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in dismissing the complaint prior to arraignment 
because she found that dismissal was both in the best interests 
of the child and in the interests of justice.  The juvenile 
contends that, in Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 576, we broadened 
the power of dismissal for Juvenile Court judges by permitting 
them to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment even where the 
judge finds probable cause to support the complaint, provided 
the judge finds that dismissal is in the best interests of the 
child and the interests of justice.  The juvenile misconstrues 
our holding in Humberto H.  We did not then, and do not now, 
grant a Juvenile Court judge the authority to dismiss a 
complaint before arraignment where the prosecutor moves for 
arraignment and where the complaint is supported by probable 
13 
 
cause. 
 
Our opinion in Humberto H. must be understood in light of 
its procedural context.  The Juvenile Court judge in that case 
had continued the juvenile's arraignment on the delinquency 
complaint alleging possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute "in order to determine whether the complaint was 
issued based on probable cause."  Id. at 564.  The Commonwealth 
filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking a single 
justice of this court to vacate the order of continuance.  Id.  
While the petition was pending, the juvenile filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause.  Id.  The 
single justice denied the Commonwealth's petition on the ground 
that the mere continuance of an arraignment is not the type of 
order that warrants extraordinary relief, but declared in dictum 
that, where the complaint had issued, the judge was "without 
power to decline to arraign him on the charge."  Id.  At the 
subsequent hearing on the motion to dismiss, the judge indicated 
that he believed he had no authority to decline to arraign the 
juvenile if the Commonwealth chose to proceed with the 
arraignment, but declared that he would dismiss the case 
immediately after arraignment.  Id.  After the prosecutor 
declared her intent to go forward with the arraignment, the 
judge, in keeping with the single justice's dictum, arraigned 
the juvenile, but then heard argument on the juvenile's motion 
14 
 
to dismiss and granted the motion, finding no probable cause 
that the juvenile possessed the marijuana with the intent to 
distribute.  Id.  The Commonwealth then appealed from the 
dismissal.  Id. 
 
We affirmed the judge's dismissal of the complaint for lack 
of probable cause, id. at 569, but went on to address the 
question whether a Juvenile Court judge has the authority to 
dismiss a complaint for lack of probable cause before 
arraignment.  Id. at 571-576.  We concluded that, where "a 
juvenile files a motion to dismiss a complaint before 
arraignment based on the absence of probable cause, and where a 
judge, after reviewing the 'four corners' of the complaint 
application, concludes that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the motion is meritorious, a judge does not abuse his 
discretion in deciding to hear and rule on that motion before 
arraignment to protect the child from the potential adverse 
consequences of a CARI record."  Id. at 575.  We noted that, 
"[a]fter arraignment, the juvenile's name and delinquency charge 
become part of the juvenile's permanent CARI record, and may not 
be expunged, even where the charge is immediately dismissed for 
lack of probable cause."  Id. at 572.  Mindful of the importance 
of "[p]rotecting a child from the stigma of being perceived to 
be a criminal and from the collateral consequences of a 
delinquency charge," we determined that the authority to rule on 
15 
 
a motion to dismiss before arraignment to spare a child from a 
CARI record where the complaint was without probable cause was 
within the discretion of a Juvenile Court judge to "protect the 
best interests of children consistent with the interests of 
justice."  Id. at 576.  We did not grant judges the authority to 
dismiss a delinquency complaint before arraignment where the 
complaint was supported by probable cause; nor were we asked to 
grant such authority.  Instead, we simply recognized that the 
best interests of children and the interests of justice are 
served by giving Juvenile Court judges the authority to dismiss 
a complaint before arraignment where the complaint is not 
supported by probable cause. 
 
Here, the juvenile asks that we grant Juvenile Court judges 
the authority to dismiss a delinquency complaint before 
arraignment that is supported by probable cause where the judge 
determines that dismissal before arraignment would serve the 
best interests of the child and the interests of justice.  We 
decline to grant Juvenile Court judges this authority. 
 
Generally, where a complaint is supported by probable 
cause, the decision to proceed with the prosecution rests in the 
broad and exclusive discretion of the prosecutor.  
See Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574 (2003).  
"Judicial review of decisions which are within the executive 
discretion of [a prosecutor] 'would constitute an intolerable 
16 
 
interference by the judiciary in the executive department of the 
government and would be in violation of art. 30 of the 
[Massachusetts] Declaration of Rights.'"4  Shepard v. Attorney 
Gen., 409 Mass. 398, 401 (1991), quoting Ames v. Attorney Gen., 
332 Mass. 246, 253 (1955).  See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 
Mass. 498, 500 (1991) (art. 30 instructs that judges may not 
"exercise[] discretionary decision-making power to decide 
whether a complaint, legally valid, should be pursued").  The 
Legislature may authorize judges to dismiss a valid complaint 
over a prosecutor's objection "without offending art. 30," as it 
has, for instance, in certain cases where defendants who are 
military veterans or active duty service members have 
successfully completed a pretrial diversion 
program.  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 780 (2017).  
But in the absence of such legislative authorization, a judge 
does not have the authority to dismiss a legally valid complaint 
that a prosecutor chooses to prosecute, whether that be a 
criminal complaint or a delinquency complaint.  See Victory 
                                                          
 
 
4 Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the 
separation of powers doctrine, provides: 
 
 
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them:  the executive shall never exercise 
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:  the 
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive 
powers, or either of them:  to the end it may be a government 
of laws and not of men." 
17 
 
Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 435 Mass. 
136, 143 (2001). 
 
We recognize that the Legislature has granted Juvenile 
Court judges considerable discretion regarding the disposition 
of a juvenile after an adjudication of delinquency.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 58; Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 631 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 808 
(2013) ("Juvenile Court judges have broad 'discretion . . . to 
render individualized dispositions consistent with the best 
interests of the child'").  Where allegations are proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the judge may adjudicate the child to be 
delinquent, or may continue the case without a finding and, with 
the consent of the child and at least one parent or guardian, 
place the child on probation.  G. L. c. 119, § 58.  
See Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012).  The 
judge may even place the case on file after a child is 
adjudicated delinquent on a complaint.  Id. at 463.  And, in all 
juvenile proceedings, the statutory provisions regarding 
delinquency, G. L. c. 119, §§ 52-63, "shall be liberally 
construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the 
children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as 
possible that which they should receive from their parents, and 
that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as 
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
18 
 
guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  But the Legislature has not 
authorized Juvenile Court judges to dismiss valid delinquency 
complaints before arraignment over the objection of a 
prosecutor, and we do not infer from the aspirational language 
of § 53 the legislative grant of such authority. 
 
Although a Juvenile Court judge is without authority to 
dismiss a complaint supported by probable cause before 
arraignment, we rely upon prosecutors to exercise their sound 
discretion in deciding whether to proceed with the arraignment 
of a juvenile, even where there is probable cause, and consider 
whether prosecution will serve the best interests of the child 
and the interests of justice.  See Carroll, petitioner, 453 
Mass. 1006, 1006 (2009) (district attorney's authority to nol 
pros criminal complaint may be exercised before 
arraignment); Manning v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 
372 Mass. 315, 318 (1977), quoting Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239 
Mass. 458, 489 (1921) (where finding of probable cause has been 
made, prosecutor has "[t]he authority vested in him by law to 
refuse on his own judgment alone to prosecute a complaint or 
indictment").  See generally Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor's interest in criminal prosecution "is 
not that [he or she] shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done"); Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, The 
Federal Prosecutor, Address at Second Annual Conference of 
19 
 
United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940) ("the citizen's safety 
lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who 
seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not 
factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility").  
Nowhere is the exercise of sound discretion more important than 
in cases involving juveniles with mental health challenges.5  In 
cases where a juvenile is eligible, prosecutors also have the 
option of considering diversion programs prior to arraignment as 
an alternative to prosecution.  We note that the vast majority 
of district attorneys have established such juvenile pretrial 
diversion programs.6 
                                                          
 
 
5 According to a 2006 nationally representative survey of 
over 7,000 incarcerated youth, the majority of juvenile 
offenders in residential facilities are diagnosed with at least 
one mental illness, and the prevalence of severe mental health 
illness among incarcerated youth (twenty-seven per cent) is two 
to four times higher than the national rate of all youth.  The 
survey demonstrated that the majority of juvenile residential 
facilities are ill prepared to adequately address the needs of 
youth in their custody.  See D. Gottesman & S.W. Schwarz, 
National Center for Children in Poverty, Juvenile Justice in the 
U.S.:  Facts for Policymakers, at 3, 4 (July, 2011), 
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1038.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/BP3U-SXGN]. 
 
 
6 As of 2015, ten of the eleven district attorneys in the 
Commonwealth indicated that their office used pretrial diversion 
programs for juvenile defendants in some capacity (informal or 
formal).  See E. Niedzwiecki, S. Irazola, C. Churchill, & M. 
Field, ICF International, Massachusetts Juvenile Diversion 
Assessment Study, at i (Jan., 2015), https://static1.squarespace 
.com/static/58ea378e414fb5fae5ba06c7/t/593709d2197aeac077e3f2f9/
1496779220634/MADiversion_FinalReport_2015+01+14-FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/WW2S-SRHV].  While most offices used diversion 
prior to arraignment, "four offices indicated that diversion may 
20 
 
 
In this case, although we vacate the dismissal of the 
delinquency complaint, the prosecutor needs to decide whether to 
proceed anew with the arraignment, and, as part of that 
discretionary decision, may consider all that has been learned 
about the juvenile since the hearing on the motion to dismiss. 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the order of dismissal of the 
delinquency complaint and remand the matter to the Juvenile 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
also occur during the pre-complaint stage in cases where youth 
are referred directly by law enforcement or a clerk[-]magistrate 
to the [district attorney's] office."  Id. at 23.  In February, 
2017, the district attorney for the Suffolk district launched 
the Juvenile Alternative Resolution pilot program, which screens 
"eligible juvenile offenders to determine their risk level and 
service needs in order to connect them with individually-
tailored support networks."  Juveniles who complete their 
diversion programs successfully "will see their cases resolved 
without convictions."  See Press Release, DA Conley Launches 
Juvenile Diversion Program with UMass Boston, Community Partners 
(Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/da-umass-
community-partners-join-forces-in-historic-juvenile-diversion-
program [https://perma.cc/6XEZ-SU8X].