Title: Shaw v. Smith

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shaw v. Smith1998 WY 124964 P.2d 428Case Number: 97-236Decided: 09/28/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Laurie J. SHAW, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Crayton SMITH; and Smith, 
Gosnell, Nicholson & Associates, a California corporation, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, Guthrie, J.

 

Jane A. Villemez 
and Bruce T. Moats, Cheyenne, for 
Appellant(Plaintiff).

Larry L. 
Jorgenson and Jessica Rutzick of Jorgenson Law Offices, Jackson; and William I. 
Goldstein, Encino, CA, for Appellee Crayton Smith.

Robert E. 
Schroth, Jackson; and S. Shane Sagheb, Encino, CA, for Appellee Smith, 
Gosnell, Nicholson & Associates.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Laurie 
J. Shaw (Shaw), accepted employment with a California corporation, Smith, 
Gosnell, Nicholson & Associates (SGN), at the request of its president and 
major shareholder, Crayton Smith (Smith). Several years later, Shaw began a 
live-in relationship with Smith that lasted for over nine years. When Shaw was 
removed from Smith's household and later terminated from her job, she filed 
claims against Smith for breach of express and implied contract and unjust 
enrichment, and a claim against SGN for wrongful termination. The district court 
dismissed SGN, ruling the corporation was not subject to personal jurisdiction, 
and later granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on Shaw's remaining 
claims.

[¶2]      Since Shaw 
presented a prima facie case showing that SGN's contacts with Wyoming were 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction, and finding evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding Shaw's claims against Smith, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Shaw presents the 
following issues for review:

1. Whether 
evidence of a cohabiting couple's agreement to share in the financial growth of 
their ten-year association and their conduct in maintaining a stable, mutually 
beneficial, family relationship requires a jury decision on the ultimate issues 
of the creation of an express contract or an implied 
contract.

2. Whether 
evidence of the parties' agreement to share equally in the control, direction 
and pecuniary outcome of their rental property enterprise requires a jury 
decision on the ultimate issue of the creation of a partnership or joint 
venture.

3. Whether one 
cohabitor is entitled to recover the reasonable value of her services to the 
other cohabitor, when she provides such services, in part, in exchange for his 
commitment to share equally in the financial growth of their 
association.

4. Whether 
Wyoming recognizes a claim for just and equitable division of property earned 
during a long, stable, non-marital, family relationship.

5. Whether a 
California corporation subjects itself to the personal jurisdiction of Wyoming 
courts by establishing an office in Wyoming, employing workers in Wyoming, and 
transacting business in Wyoming.

[¶4]      Appellee, Smith, 
states the issues as follows:

1. To create an 
express contract, Wyoming law requires, inter alia, (1) consideration and (2) a 
meeting of the minds. Is there a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
formation of an express contract between the parties where the terms of the 
contract are vague and unclear, and the evidence fails to show that the 
consideration for the contract was bargained for by both 
parties?

2. For an 
implied contract to exist proof of the intention of the parties is essential. Is 
there a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the formation of an 
implied contract between parties where the conduct of one party does not show an 
intention to enter into a contractual relationship?

3. Is Appellant 
entitled to recover the value of household services rendered during the period 
of the parties' cohabiting relationship where there is no contract between the 
parties and where the evidence does not reflect that Appellee had reason to know 
that Appellant expected additional compensation for such 
services?

4. A partnership 
or joint venture is formed where the parties (1) have an equal right of control 
over the venture and (2) agree to share in both the profits and losses of the 
business endeavor. Is there a genuine issue of fact with regard to the formation 
of a joint venture where Appellant did not have the right to transfer or convey 
the investment properties and where Appellant admits that the parties did not 
agree that they would share in the profits and the losses associated with the 
investment properties?

5. Should the 
property acquired by one party during the period of a cohabiting relationship be 
treated as marital property upon dissolution of the 
relationship?

Appellee, SGN, 
presents one issue:

Whether a 
corporate officer/shareholder who telecommutes from the forum state may subject 
a foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction, particularly when the 
plaintiff's claim arises from the telecommuter's individual activities, as 
opposed to his corporate activities.

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Pursuant to our 
standard of review, we present the facts in the light most favorable to Shaw. In 
1979, Smith offered Shaw a job as an independent contractor for the Jackson, 
Wyoming office of his talent agency, SGN's predecessor. Shaw worked for Smith 
until 1984, when he moved the operations back to California. During 1984 and 
1985, Smith repeatedly asked Shaw to move to California and work with him at 
SGN. Shaw contends she agreed after Smith told her he wanted to be equal 
partners in both business and in life.

[¶6]      Shaw moved to 
California and received compensation from SGN of $500.00 per week, $150.00 per 
week in expense money, use of a company car, credit card, telephone card, a 
pension plan, and health insurance. Initially, Shaw resided in Smith's home but 
did not share his bedroom. Between six months and a year later, their growing 
personal relationship resulted in a modification of the sleeping arrangements. 
After moving into Smith's bedroom, the couple lived as a family and Shaw assumed 
a primary role in raising Smith's two children. Throughout their relationship, 
Smith insisted Shaw's care of him and the children was one of her essential 
functions.

[¶7]      Smith provided 
financial resources for the household and repeatedly promised to "take better 
care of [Shaw] than anyone else could." Thus, Shaw's wages from SGN were not 
contributed to household expenses, but were retained for her personal needs and 
gifts for Smith, his children, and her family. In 1989, the couple returned to 
Jackson where Shaw continued to work for SGN in an office located in their home. 
In addition to her job at SGN and her household responsibilities, Shaw helped in 
the care and showing of Smith's prize Arabian horses. She also assisted Smith in 
the purchase and management of rental properties in Wyoming, California, and 
Arizona, with ownership of the properties held in the C. Crayton Smith Living 
Trust (the Living Trust). Shaw contributed her own funds to the purchase of only 
one of the properties. When her interest was later purchased by Smith at a 
profit to her, she invested the profit independently.

[¶8]      At some point in 
1990, Shaw expressed to Smith her concern that his repeated promises of 
financial security were not sufficient protection. Smith responded by modifying 
the revocable Living Trust and creating the Charles Crayton Smith Irrevocable 
Trust # 2 (Trust # 2). Trust # 2 provided that in the event of Smith's death, 
Shaw would receive a distribution of income conditioned on the age of the 
children and the amount of time they resided with her. The Living Trust, which 
held the majority of Smith's assets, was amended to provide that if his children 
and all their descendants were deceased at the time of Smith's death, the trust 
would be terminated and seventy-five percent of the balance distributed to Shaw. 
The Living Trust was restated to name Shaw and two other persons as co-trustees 
in the event Smith was disabled, and Shaw was given a power of attorney to 
deposit assets or funds into the Living Trust.1

[¶9]      Shaw contends 
that Smith explained he had changed the trust documents so that she was now an 
equal partner in his life and that half of everything was hers. She did not read 
the documents, relying on Smith's representations that they were voluminous, 
complicated, and could only be understood by a lawyer. Instead, Smith drew Shaw 
a diagram that she alleges showed her to have a fifty percent interest in the 
Living Trust. She also maintains Smith reassured her that she was now 
financially protected as if they were married.

[¶10]   Smith does not dispute that, at 
some point, he told Shaw "something to [the] effect" that these arrangements 
were "just the same as marriage as far as her financial protection." Shaw 
contends, based on her belief that the trust documents had memorialized Smith's 
oral agreement to make her his partner in life and his assurances that she was 
entitled to half of the property, she continued to assist his business efforts, 
maintain his household, and care for the children.

[¶11]   In November 1994, the relationship 
came to an abrupt end. Smith told Shaw he "needed space" and requested she stay 
with a friend in Santa Fe, New Mexico for a few weeks. He suggested she pack as 
if she were going on vacation for a month, drove her to Santa Fe, rented an 
apartment and furniture, and left. Shaw later learned that Smith hired a new 
assistant in Wyoming shortly after he left her in New Mexico. She continued to 
receive her check from SGN until April 27, 1995, but was not allowed to return 
to the office in Jackson. She never received official notification of 
termination.

[¶12]   Shaw filed her complaint against 
Smith and SGN on November 27, 1995. SGN responded with a motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. After a hearing and review of the legal briefs 
and affidavits submitted by the parties, the district court 
held:

Defendant SGN's 
Motion to Quash Service of Summons and to Dismiss is based on the three prong 
Amoco test (Amoco Production Company v. EM Nominee Partnership, Co., 886 P.2d 265, Wyo. 1994). The Court agrees that SGN did not purposely avail itself of the 
privilege of doing business in Wyoming, SGN's activities are separate from 
Plaintiff's claims and SGN has only incidental and ancillary contact with the 
State of Wyoming not sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
SGN.

[¶13]   Smith's motion for summary judgment 
was heard approximately one year later. In its order granting the motion, the 
full text containing the district court's reasoning is as 
follows:

If there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the ultimate facts are uncontroverted 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. The ultimate facts in this case are 
uncontroverted. The Court finds Plaintiff and Defendant never entered into a 
contract either express or implied. There was no partnership agreement between 
the parties. Ms. Shaw took care of Defendant's family without expecting 
compensation. Nothing in the record shows that Defendant had any reason to 
believe Plaintiff expected additional renumeration [sic]. There was no evidence 
presented which shows the Plaintiff's distress rose to the level of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by the Defendant.2 There are no genuine issues as to 
material facts. As a matter of law the Defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment.

Following the 
issuance of both orders, Shaw filed this timely appeal.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   Shaw claims the district court 
erred in dismissing her claims against SGN for lack of personal jurisdiction. A 
recent iteration of the applicable standard of review is found in O'Bryan v. 
McDonald, 952 P.2d 636, 638 (Wyo. 1998), where we stated:

The question of 
in personam jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact that, if disputed, 
must be resolved before a matter can proceed. Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of 
Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 676 A.2d 172, 178 (1996). The district court has 
considerable leeway in deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. PanAmerican Mineral Svcs., Inc. v. KLS Enviro Resources, 
Inc., 916 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo. 1996). The court may determine the matter on the 
basis of pleadings and other materials called to its attention; it may require 
discovery; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. The procedural path the 
district court chooses to follow determines the plaintiff's burden of proof and 
the standard to be applied on appeal.

[¶15]   When the underlying facts are 
undisputed, the existence of personal jurisdiction is a matter of law. Eddy v. 
Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610, 612 (Wyo. 1989). If the district court's determination is 
made without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must show only a prima facie 
case to defeat the motion to dismiss. Robinson v. U-Haul Intern., Inc., 929 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting PanAmerican Mineral Services, Inc. v. KLS Enviro 
Resources, Inc., 916 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo. 1996)); Amoco Production Co. v. EM 
Nominee Partnership Co., 886 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 1994). The district court must 
view the allegations in the pleadings and documentary evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, resolving all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party. Pelchat v. Sterilite Corp., 931 F. Supp. 939, 943 
(D.N.H. 1996); Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 
1997).

[¶16]   When material factual allegations 
regarding jurisdiction in the affidavits cannot be harmonized, the district 
court should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue of jurisdiction. 
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503, 507-08 (1983); 
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1989); Neways, Inc., 
950 P.2d  at 422. Once an evidentiary hearing is held, however, we will defer to 
the district court's findings of fact and the plaintiff will succeed upon 
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is subject to 
jurisdiction. Goodwin v. Hall, 957 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Wyo. 1998); O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 638; Robinson, 929 P.2d  at 1238; PanAmerican Mineral Services, Inc., 916 P.2d  at 989. No matter the procedural course charted, however, the ultimate 
question of whether personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised is a 
question of law to be reviewed de novo. O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 
638.

[¶17]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341 
(Wyo. 1997). A material fact is one which, if proven, would establish or refute 
one of the essential elements of an asserted claim or defense. Id. We review the 
record from a viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
allowing that party all reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the 
record. Id.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION

[¶18]   The exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant is statutorily authorized on any basis consistent 
with the Wyoming and United States Constitutions. Wyo. Stat. § 5-1-107(a) 
(1997). Due process requires that the defendant have " 'minimum contacts' " with 
the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend " 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Amoco Production 
Co., 886 P.2d  at 267 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office 
of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 
158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)). In determining the limits of personal jurisdiction 
based on a single act, we apply the three-part test articulated in First Wyoming 
Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. Trans Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 
1221 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, Eighteenth 
J.D., 189 Colo. 145, 538 P.2d 425, 426 (1975) and State ex rel. White Lumber 
Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571, 574 (1968)):3

" 'First, the 
defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the 
forum state or of causing important consequences in that state. Second, the 
cause of action must arise from the consequences in the forum state of the 
defendant's activities. Finally, the activities of the defendant or the 
consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with 
the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant 
reasonable.' "

[¶19]   SGN argues that it would be unfair 
to require it to defend an action in Wyoming because its only connection with 
this state is the fact that one of its officers owns a residence here. Its 
motion for dismissal rested solely on the affidavit of Smith, as president of 
SGN, that alleges SGN's only business office was in California; it is not 
registered to do business in Wyoming; it does not have a resident agent in 
Wyoming; and it does not own property nor possess any assets in Wyoming. 
Regarding Shaw's employment with SGN, Smith's affidavit asserted she 
"periodically" answered the telephone and typed letters that "sometimes 
happened" to be SGN related. She was paid about $500.00 per week gross, "as a 
matter of convenience and as an accommodation to Shaw to allow her to have 
spending money and health insurance coverage while she was living with [Smith]." 
Thus, SGN contends any contact it may have with Wyoming is predicated solely on 
Smith and Shaw's personal choice to live here. SGN further maintains Shaw's 
claims against SGN are merely ancillary to her personal dispute with 
Smith.

[¶20]   In response, Shaw submitted her own 
affidavit that alleged SGN maintained an active, fully-equipped office in 
Jackson in the residence she shared with Smith from 1989 through 1995; SGN 
provided a California telephone number that rang directly in the Wyoming office 
and licensed two company vehicles in Wyoming; Shaw performed secretarial and 
office management duties from the Wyoming office for which she received a weekly 
paycheck in Wyoming; and that SGN hired another employee to replace her when she 
was removed from the premises.

[¶21]   Thus, the parties' affidavits 
contain contradictory statements as to whether SGN maintained an office in 
Wyoming, and whether Shaw's residency in Wyoming was solely a personal choice or 
whether it was also connected to her work for SGN. In the absence of an 
evidentiary hearing on these factual disputes, Shaw's allegations that SGN 
maintained an office in Wyoming in which she carried out her duties as an 
employee, and the subsequent hiring of another employee in Wyoming, clearly 
present a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over SGN is 
appropriate.

[¶22]   The benchmark for determining if 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether 
defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant 
should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there. O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 
639; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). SGN's business contacts with Wyoming, as alleged by Shaw, 
were sufficient to meet the first prong of the jurisdictional inquiry. It is 
also patent that Shaw's claim of wrongful termination is a direct consequence of 
SGN's decision to maintain an employee in Wyoming. Thus, Shaw met the second 
part of her showing that in personam jurisdiction over SGN is 
proper.

[¶23]   Finally, "jurisdiction is proper * 
* * where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself 
that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum state." Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S.  at 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174. It is plainly foreseeable that a personal 
assistant required to live in a specific location would seek her home forum in 
order to litigate the merits of her employment claims. It is equally reasonable 
for the forum state to exercise its jurisdiction over that 
defendant.

[¶24]   At the time the jurisdictional 
issues were determined, SGN argued the office in Jackson was a "home office" for 
Smith while he telecommuted with the office in California, and Shaw's presence 
in Wyoming was merely a unilateral activity. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958) (unilateral activity cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with forum state); Riverside & Dan River 
Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194-95, 35 S. Ct. 579, 59 L. Ed. 910 (1915) 
(residence of corporate officer, alone, insufficient to show minimum contacts); 
and Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans Western Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 923 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (use of interstate communications, alone, insufficient to show 
minimum contacts). The heart of the jurisdictional question here, however, is 
whether an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate that SGN made a decision to 
establish sufficient contacts with Wyoming by maintaining an office and/or 
employees within this state.

[¶25]   Had an evidentiary hearing been 
held, the district court may have had the benefit of the matters discussed in 
Smith's deposition testimony, submitted in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, where he acknowledged that Shaw was hired by SGN to act as his 
personal assistant and that she was told her duties as his assistant required 
her full-time presence in the residence and the office. It is undisputed that 
when Smith removed Shaw from the residence, he refused her access to the home 
office and hired a replacement employee.

[¶26]   Although SGN may not have had any 
contacts with Wyoming "but for" Smith's choice to live in Wyoming, it is clear 
that SGN's business decision to maintain an assistant in this same state renders 
SGN's contacts with Wyoming voluntary and not merely fortuitous. As to SGN's 
contention that Shaw's claims arise not from her employment, but only from the 
demise of a personal relationship, we cannot say as a matter of law that Smith's 
actions relating to the termination of Shaw and the hiring of another employee 
were unconnected to his position as SGN's president and Shaw's immediate 
supervisor. SGN voluntarily chose to employ Smith's paramour as his assistant 
and to maintain her employment, under Smith's supervision, in Wyoming. SGN 
cannot now disavow any connection with Smith's mode of personnel 
administration.

[¶27]   We, therefore, reverse the district 
court's dismissal of SGN from this lawsuit and remand for an evidentiary hearing 
in which SGN will have the opportunity to "present a compelling case that the 
presence of some other considerations would make the exercise of jurisdiction 
unreasonable." Amoco Production Co., 886 P.2d  at 267.

B. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

1. CONTRACT 
CLAIMS

[¶28]   Shaw alleges several claims based 
on contract theory. She claims Smith breached an express oral contract that he 
would provide financial security and share the benefits accruing during their 
relationship in exchange for her efforts in managing and maintaining a home, 
raising his children, and assisting in his business endeavors. In the 
alternative, Shaw claims Smith breached an implied contract encompassing the 
same terms. Shaw also alleges breach of an express or implied agreement to enter 
into a joint venture or partnership in the rental 
properties.

[¶29]   It is well settled that a 
cohabiting couple can enter into binding contracts as long as the agreement 
complies with Wyoming's law of contracts. Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 
1158 (Wyo. 1982); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981). The basic 
elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration. Frost Const. 
Co. v. Lobo, Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998). Whether a contract has been 
formed, the exact terms of the contract, and whether there was a breach of those 
terms are questions of fact. Id.; Wyoming Realty Co. v. Cook, 872 P.2d 551, 
554-55 (Wyo. 1994); Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 247 
(Wyo. 1992) (quoting Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 
1988)). Interpretation of the terms of an oral contract becomes a question of 
law only when they are shown without any conflict in the evidence. Wilder v. 
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994). An implied 
contract may be created by the parties' conduct, " 'but the conduct from which 
that inference is drawn must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the 
parties expressed a mutual manifestation of an intent to enter into an 
agreement.' " Lavoie, 840 P.2d  at 248 (quoting Continental Ins. v. Page 
Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641, 651 (Wyo. 1989)). These factual questions may be 
resolved by summary judgment only if reasonable minds could not differ. Lavoie, 
840 P.2d  at 248 (quoting Continental Ins., 783 P.2d at 
651).

[¶30]   Smith challenges the existence of 
several elements of Shaw's contractual claims. Initially, Smith contends there 
was no evidence of bargained-for consideration for his promise to take care of 
Shaw, pointing to Shaw's admission that she never specifically promised anything 
in return for Smith's changes to his estate plan, nor did she specifically state 
she would leave Smith if the trust documents were not amended. While these facts 
may raise questions for a jury, the combination of oral promises and the conduct 
of the parties during the relationship is sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment in Smith's favor.

[¶31]   Smith denies he promised Shaw they 
would be "business" partners, but concedes he told Shaw they would be partners 
in life, that he "would take care of her," and that he encouraged her to remain 
in the home attending to his family, household, and business needs. Smith also 
acknowledges there were conversations regarding Shaw's financial expectations 
and concerns that were the impetus for the amendments to his Living Trust and 
the creation of Trust # 2. Although Smith insists that his promises to provide 
financial support were limited solely to the duration of their relationship, 
this is a question for a jury. Affording Shaw every reasonable inference from 
the record evidence, a jury could reasonably determine that Smith and Shaw 
bargained for his promise to provide financial protection and make her a partner 
in life in exchange for Shaw's efforts on behalf of Smith's family and business 
interests.

[¶32]   There is also evidence that the 
terms of the alleged contract were adequately certain and definite to find a 
"meeting of the minds." Raymond v. Steen, 882 P.2d 852, 856 (Wyo. 1994); Lavoie, 
840 P.2d  at 248. Shaw testified Smith told her they were "equal" partners in the 
relationship and that "half of everything" was hers. This, with the oral 
promises Smith admits he made, are sufficiently definite to present the issue to 
a jury.

[¶33]   Smith next argues that there can be 
no implied contract because the conduct of the parties does not demonstrate a 
mutual intent to share the financial benefits accruing during the relationship, 
nor the intent to equally control the investment properties. Smith points to the 
lack of jointly owned property, the absence of joint bank accounts and tax 
returns, the fact that Shaw retained the income from her job for her personal 
needs, and the fact that no partnership or joint venture tax returns were filed 
for the investment properties. We agree that failure to combine the parties' 
finances or to jointly file business tax returns may be considered as evidence 
refuting Shaw's claims. These facts, however, do not negate the existence of an 
agreement as a matter of law. Supplying services in lieu of finances may be 
sufficient consideration for either Shaw's claims of an agreement to share or as 
her contribution to the business venture. Resource Technology Corp. v. Fisher 
Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 978 (Wyo. 1996) (joint venture); Western Nat. Bank 
of Lovell v. Moncur, 624 P.2d 765, 767 (Wyo. 1981) (partnership); Carroll v. 
Lee, 148 Ariz. 10, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (1986) (contract to share 
assets).

[¶34]   Smith also claims that Shaw could 
not have equal control of the rental business necessary to imply the existence 
of a joint venture or partnership because Shaw was not a full trustee of the 
Living Trust. He further alleges that because Shaw admitted they had never 
directly discussed sharing the losses of the rental business, there can be no 
joint venture or business partnership. Shaw, however, did present evidence that 
tended to show the couple jointly managed funds. This includes Shaw's position 
as signatory to a master account into which she deposited rental payments and 
from which she paid household bills and upkeep on the rental properties, and her 
power of attorney to place money or assets in the Living Trust. Shaw also 
submitted an application for a Wyoming lodging license, registered in the 
partnership name of Smith & Shaw, allegedly with Smith's approval. Shaw 
further claims she assisted in the decision making regarding the purchase of the 
rental properties, as well as managing the day-to-day operations of the rental 
business. The fact that the couple agreed to share a home may imply that the 
losses, as well as the profits, would be equally born by both 
parties.

[¶35]   Smith disputes many of Shaw's 
factual allegations, and it is clear the resolution of this controversy rests 
largely on the credibility of the parties; a matter particularly suited for a 
jury. Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1996). Affording all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Shaw, we find a reasonable jury could reach differing 
conclusions regarding the control of the enterprise or the understanding as to 
whether the couple would share both losses and profits. We, therefore, leave to 
a jury the determination of whether the parties' conduct is sufficient to show a 
mutual assent to an agreement and, if so, the terms of that 
agreement.

2. QUANTUM 
MERUIT/UNJUST ENRICHMENT

[¶36]   To succeed on a claim for unjust 
enrichment, a plaintiff must prove (1) valuable services were provided to the 
defendant; (2) which were used and enjoyed by the defendant; (3) under 
circumstances which reasonably notified the defendant that the plaintiff 
expected payment; and (4) without payment the defendant would be unjustly 
enriched. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Zitterkopf v. 
Bradbury, 783 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 1989)). Smith contends this case is 
factually similar to Adkins, where we held that the plaintiff could not recover 
on a claim of quantum meruit because she provided her services gratuitously and, 
therefore, the defendant estate did not receive reasonable notification that 
payment was expected. Adkins, 892 P.2d  at 132. In this case, however, the 
disputed facts provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reach more than one 
conclusion regarding Shaw's motivation for her efforts on behalf of Smith. Smith 
acknowledges he promised her some benefit at the commencement of their liaison, 
and there is ample evidence that her expectations of financial benefit were the 
subject of several conversations leading to the amendment and creation of 
various trust documents. Thus, it becomes a question of fact whether she 
provided services solely out of love or with the expectation of financial 
compensation.

[¶37]   Smith also maintains Shaw cannot 
show that he was unjustly enriched because Shaw was paid for her assistance in 
his business endeavors through her SGN paychecks, pension, and other benefits, 
and her household services were compensated through the provision of her living 
accommodations. On the other hand, Shaw contends that the many household, 
social, and business services she provided for almost ten years were not 
sufficiently compensated merely by the provision of a home and food. As Shaw 
described the situation, after the trust documents were executed, "I worked 
myself crazy for him because I believed that half of everything was 
mine."

[¶38]   The record contains conflicting 
evidence regarding whether services provided by Shaw in relation to Smith's 
separate business activities were part of her job duties for SGN, or separate 
services performed to advance the alleged partnership between Shaw and Smith. 
Similarly, the extent of her efforts is contested. We, therefore, must leave to 
the trier of fact whether Shaw received adequate compensation for her efforts 
spanning the ten years of the couple's relationship.

3. PUBLIC 
POLICY

[¶39]   Smith further urges this court to 
find that a claim based on household services rendered during cohabitation is 
against public policy. Citing Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), 
Smith maintains Shaw may not claim reimbursement for household services under 
implied contract or under a theory of quantum meruit.4 In Willis, we held that a woman who 
knowingly and voluntarily cohabits with a man cannot recover on an implied 
contract for services rendered him during the relationship. Id. at 681-82. It is 
clear our later decisions in Kinnison, 627 P.2d  at 595-96 and Bereman, 645 P.2d  
at 1158 implicitly overruled Willis, and we now take the opportunity to 
expressly reject the reasoning therein.

[¶40]   Those courts which have held that 
implied contract or quantum meruit will not be enforced for "household" 
services, but will be enforced for commercial services, are based on the 
proposition that to allow recovery would effectively revive common law marriage. 
See Carnes v. Sheldon, 109 Mich. App. 204, 311 N.W.2d 747, 750-51 (1981) and 
Moors v. Hall, 143 A.D.2d 336, 532 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (1988). We now join the 
majority of jurisdictions that reject this argument. See Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (Ind. App. 1980); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Mo. 
App. 1987); Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553, 563 (1983); and 
Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis.2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 
(1987).

[¶41]   We have long rejected the validity 
of claims based solely on the fact that the parties cohabited for an extended 
period of time precisely because we do not recognize common law marriage. 
Kinnison, 627 P.2d  at 595; In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 502 
(1943). Despite Shaw's urging, we do not abandon that stance here. We will not, 
however, reject a claim based on well-established principles of contract or 
equity solely because the parties have cohabited. Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 
333, 521 A.2d 142, 145 (1987).

[¶42]   We are not persuaded by Smith's 
prediction that if Shaw's claims are recognized, "it will impose the obligations 
and responsibilities associated with marriage" and "will open the floodgates for 
* * * cohabiting parties" to seek a court's determination of "the precise set of 
facts necessary" to find an implied contract to equitably divide property. We 
note that the theories of implied contract and quantum meruit have been 
available to cohabiting parties in Wyoming since 1980, and numerous courts have 
recognized the existence of an implied contract between cohabiting parties. To 
date, we are aware of no jurisdictions submerged in the deluge predicted by 
Smith. If, in fact, the application of contractual principles associated with an 
implied contract will impose unwanted obligations on cohabiting parties, we can 
only suggest that the parties refrain from conduct that implies the acceptance 
of such obligations or that the parties clearly identify the limits of their 
oral promises.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶43]   Disputed issues of fact require an 
evidentiary hearing regarding Wyoming's exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
over SGN to determine Shaw's claim of wrongful termination. Considering the 
facts as alleged by Shaw to be true, she presented a prima facie case that 
jurisdiction is appropriate. We, therefore, reverse the district court's order 
dismissing SGN, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional 
issue.

[¶44]   Viewing the record in the light 
most favorable to Shaw, and affording her every reasonable inference to be drawn 
therefrom, we find disputed issues of material fact regarding the formation and 
terms of an alleged contract with Smith to share in the financial benefits 
accruing during their relationship and the existence of a partnership or joint 
venture. Genuine issues of material fact also exist regarding whether Smith was 
given reasonable notification that Shaw expected additional compensation for her 
services and whether, without such compensation, Smith would be unjustly 
enriched. The district court's order granting summary judgment is hereby 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 The Living 
Trust also references a "Marital Trust created under this agreement," but the 
full text of the Living Trust has not been disclosed, including the portions 
addressing the Marital Trust, even though the full document was the subject of a 
discovery request. Without access to the text of the "Marital Trust," we do not 
know if this document would be relevant or create a material issue of fact. This 
alone raises serious doubts as to the absence of material issues of fact in this 
case.

2 Shaw 
abandoned her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on 
appeal.

3 Shaw does 
not allege "continuous and systematic" contact by SGN with the State of 
Wyoming.

4 We do not 
see any limitation in this holding to only household services, but rather find 
the court's reasoning to be based on the assumption that all services provided 
by a wife to her husband are gratuitous. The clear dissonance between the 1935 
Willis assumptions and our later holdings regarding the ability of cohabiting 
parties to enter into a valid contract compels the final rejection of the Willis 
rationale.