Title: Robinson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GREGORY F. ROBINSON, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 10, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   Cr. I.D. 0710004286B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  November 18, 2009 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  December 8, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
James M. Stiller, Jr., Esquire, Schwartz & Schwartz, Dover, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
The defendant-appellant, Gregory F. Robinson (“Robinson”), appeals 
from a final judgment of conviction entered by the Superior Court.  
Robinson was found guilty of one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon 
by a Person Prohibited (“PDWPP”) under title 11, section 1448(a)(3) of the 
Delaware Code.  Robinson appeals on two grounds.  First, Robinson claims 
that the Superior Court erred by denying his right of self-representation 
under the Sixth Amendment, by excluding him from a sidebar conference.  
Second, Robinson claims that the Superior Court should have, sua sponte, 
acquitted him of PDWPP, because the State failed to prove that the steak 
knife found on Robinson was a “deadly weapon” as defined in title 11, 
section 222(5) of the Delaware Code. 
Facts 
 
 
On October 2, 2007, Dover Police Officer Christopher Bumgarner 
(“Bumgarner”) and Probation Officer Kevin McClure (“McClure”) 
conducted a home visit of a probationer at South Queen Street in Dover.  
During the visit, Bumgarner observed what he believed to be a drug 
transaction taking place between Robinson and two other men, in a parking 
lot across the street.  Bumgarner and McClure left the home they were 
visiting and crossed the street.   
 
3
When Robinson noticed the officers approaching, he began walking 
away from the parking lot.  Bumgarner ordered Robinson to stop and raise 
his hands in the air.  Robinson stopped, and as he raised his hands, 
Bumgarner saw him toss a plastic bag with a small white object to the 
ground.  McClure then proceeded to handcuff Robinson and asked Robinson 
whether he had on him anything that was going to poke, stick, or harm 
McClure during a pat down search.  Robinson answered that he had a knife 
on him.  McClure retrieved a steak knife with a 4-3/4 inches-long blade from 
Robinson’s front pants pocket.  Robinson was charged with PDWPP. 
 
Before trial, the Superior Court appointed Alexander Funk, Esquire, 
(“Funk”) to represent Robinson.  The Court later denied Robinson’s motion 
to appoint new counsel and informed Robinson that he would either be 
represented by Funk, or proceed pro se.  Robinson elected to proceed pro se 
and the Superior Court, after explaining to Robinson the meaning of self-
representation, appointed Funk as standby counsel.  The Superior Court 
ruled that Robinson would remain at counsel table throughout the trial, 
unless he chose to take the stand and testify.   
At trial, Robinson presented an opening statement and cross-examined 
the two witnesses for the prosecution.  He rested without presenting any 
 
4
witnesses for the defense.  Robinson also participated in the prayer 
conference and gave a closing argument.   
Robinson did not participate, however, in the one sidebar conference 
held during his trial, which occurred in response to Robinson’s cross-
examination of McClure.  During the cross-examination, Robinson asked 
McClure whether “the suspect [was] on probation?”  The prosecutor 
objected to the question, and asked the trial judge whether she and standby 
counsel could approach the bench.  The judge granted the prosecutor’s 
request.  Robinson did not ask to participate in the sidebar conference and 
did not object to the participation of standby counsel. 
A short sidebar conference ensued, in the presence of the jury, during 
which the trial judge, the prosecutor, and standby counsel, but not Robinson, 
discussed the content of Robinson’s question.1  After Robinson’s question 
was clarified, the prosecutor withdrew her objection.  The sidebar 
                                          
 
1 The transcript reflects the following discussion at sidebar: 
 
 
MS. BUSWELL: Did I just hear him say: Have I ever been on probation? 
 
THE COURT: I think that’s what he said. 
 
MS. BUSWELL: Is that what you heard him say? 
 
THE COURT: I’m having a hard time hearing. 
 
MR. FUNK: What I heard him say was: Was I the one that was on probation? 
 
MS. BUSWELL: Okay. 
MR. FUNK: That’s what I thought.  I thought he said: Was I the one that was on probation? 
 
MS. BUSWELL: Okay.  I will withdraw my objection. 
 
MR. FUNK: I can’t hear. 
 
THE COURT: Ask her. 
 
MS. BUSWELL: That’s okay.  I will just withdraw my objection. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Thank you.  
 
 
5
conference concluded, and the trial judge, announcing no ruling on the prior 
objection, asked Robinson whether he wanted to restate his question.  
Robinson’s cross-examination of McClure then continued. 
Robinson was found guilty of the offense and was declared an 
habitual offender pursuant to title 11, section 4214 of the Delaware Code.  
He was sentenced to eight years at Level V incarceration followed by six 
months at Level III.  This is Robinson’s direct appeal.            
Sidebar Conference 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of self-
representation in criminal proceedings is implicit in the Sixth Amendment.2  
That right is also made explicit in the Delaware Constitution.3  The 
defendant’s right to self-representation is either respected or denied.  The 
denial of this right is not subject to a harmless error analysis.4   
 
In Snowden v. State,5 this Court addressed the issue of whether 
excluding a pro se defendant from participating in sidebar conferences 
                                          
 
2 U.S. Const. amend VI; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1975) (“The Sixth 
Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it 
grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”); see also Snowden v. 
State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Del. 1996). 
3 Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard 
by himself or herself and his or her counsel. . . .”). 
4 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (“Since the right of self-
representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial 
outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ 
analysis.  The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”). 
5 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996). 
 
6
violates the right of self-representation.  Snowden, like Robinson, was 
ordered to remain at counsel table and was excluded from all sidebar 
conferences held during his trial, although his standby counsel participated.6  
We held that Snowden’s right of self-representation included the right to 
participate in sidebar conferences, for two reasons.  First, the right of self-
representation encompasses a pro se defendant’s “right to address ‘the court’ 
at ‘appropriate points in the trial’ on ‘any matter of importance,’” including 
sidebar conferences.7  Standby counsel’s participation, over defendant’s 
objection, erodes the defendant’s actual control over the case he chooses to 
present to the jury.8  Second, participation by standby counsel without the 
defendant’s consent might undermine the jury’s perception that the 
defendant is representing himself, thereby harming the defendant’s dignity 
and autonomy.9  In determining whether the defendant’s right of self-
representation has been respected, the primary focus is upon “‘whether the 
defendant had a fair chance to present his case [to the jury] in his own 
way.’”10  We concluded that because Snowden did not waive his right to 
                                          
 
6 Id. at 1020. 
7 Id. at 1021 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 174).  
8 Id.  A defendant can waive his right to represent himself at sidebar conferences.  Id. at 
1022 n.3.  
9 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d at 1021. 
10 Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177). 
 
7
represent himself at bench conferences (as reflected by the trial record), this 
right was violated.  Snowden was granted a new trial.11 
  
Robinson’s reliance on Snowden is misguided.  In this case, unlike in 
Snowden, Robinson’s right of self-representation was not violated when he 
did not participate in the sidebar conference.12  The record reflects that 
Robinson opposed any involvement of standby counsel during his trial, and 
refused any assistance from standby counsel.  Nevertheless, Robinson did 
not object to standby counsel’s participation in the sidebar conference.  
Robinson’s silence in the face of his standby counsel’s participation in the 
sidebar conference, which took place in the middle of his cross-examination 
of a witness, can only be deemed a consent.13  Robinson did not ask to 
participate in the sidebar conference, and accordingly, the trial judge did not 
rule that Robinson was excluded. 
It is also unlikely that the jury’s perception that Robinson was 
representing himself was harmed by his failure to participate in the sidebar 
conference.  The record reflects that Robinson actively managed his own 
                                          
 
11 Id. at 1022. 
12 Snowden v. State, 965 A.2d at 1020, 1022.  
 13 See People v. Rosen, 613 N.E.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. 1993) (“[T]o the extent standby 
counsel joined in the proceedings without defendant's protest, it may be presumed that 
defendant waived the opportunity to personally execute the particular function.”).  Cf. 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 182 (“A defendant like Wiggins, who vehemently 
objects at the beginning of trial to standby counsel's very presence in the courtroom, may 
express quite different views as the trial progresses.…  Wiggins objected vehemently to 
some of counsel's motions, but warmly embraced others.”). 
 
8
defense at trial, and that the sidebar conference was the only event in the 
jury’s presence in which standby counsel was actively involved.  At the 
conclusion of the sidebar conference, the prosecutrix withdrew her objection 
and Robinson continued his cross-examination of the witness.   
Further, this single occurrence could not have had any effect on 
Robinson’s presentation of his defense to the jury, because Robinson did not 
present any defense witnesses.  Instead, speaking in his own defense,  
Robinson conceded that he was carrying the steak knife, but argued that his 
action was defensible because he was using the knife as a work tool, not as a 
“deadly weapon.”14  As discussed below, Robinson’s purpose in carrying the 
knife is irrelevant and is not a defense to PDWPP.  Accordingly, the 
Superior Court did not violate Robinson’s right to represent himself, and 
Robinson’s failure to participate in the sidebar conference does not entitle 
him to a new trial. 
Steak Knife is a Deadly Weapon 
 
Robinson’s second argument on appeal is that the Superior Court 
erred in not acquitting him of the PDWPP charge, sua sponte, because the 
State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the steak knife was a 
                                          
 
14 Robinson elected not to testify.  This argument was presented, however, through 
Robinson’s cross-examination of McClure and in his opening and closing arguments.  
 
9
“deadly weapon.”  Because Robinson did not preserve this issue at trial, we 
review his claim on appeal for plain error.15   
At trial, Robinson was convicted of PDWPP under title 11, section 
1448(b) of the Delaware Code, which states: “[a]ny prohibited person as set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section who knowingly possesses, purchases, 
owns or controls a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm while so 
prohibited shall be guilty of possession of a deadly weapon or ammunition 
for a firearm by a person prohibited.”  On appeal, Robinson does not contest 
that the State properly proved he was a person prohibited, pursuant to title 
11, section 1448(a), nor does he contest that it proved he was actually in 
possession of a steak knife when he was handcuffed by McClure.  Instead, 
Robinson argues that the State failed to establish a necessary showing that 
this steak knife was “[u]sed, or attempted to be used, to cause death or 
serious physical injury,” in order for it to qualify as a “deadly weapon.”  
This argument is incorrect: to be convicted of PDWPP, Robinson did not 
have to use or attempt to use the steak knife, a per se deadly weapon, to 
cause death or serious physical injury.   
Robinson’s argument that the State was required to prove an 
additional element, involving his specific use of the steak knife, blurs the 
                                          
 
15 Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 23 (Del. 1991). 
 
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distinction between the statutory definitions of “dangerous instrument” and 
“deadly weapon” in the Delaware Code.  A dangerous instrument is defined 
in title 11, section 222(4) of the Delaware Code as “any instrument… which, 
under the circumstances in which it is used… is readily capable of causing 
death or serious physical injury….”  A deadly weapon is defined in title 11, 
section 222(5) of the Delaware Code as including, within a list of several 
other objects, “a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried 
in a closed position).”16   Section 222(5) states, in its entirety: 
“Deadly weapon” includes a firearm, as defined in paragraph 
(11) of this section, a bomb, a knife of any sort (other than an 
ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade 
knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, slingshot, 
razor, bicycle chain or ice pick or any dangerous instrument, as 
defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which is used, or 
attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury.  
For the purpose of this definition, an ordinary pocketknife shall 
be a folding knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in 
length.17 
 
The crux of Robinson’s argument on appeal is that the language, “which is 
used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury,” 
qualifies the entire list of objects in section 222(5), including “a knife of any 
sort,” rather than only dangerous instruments as defined in section 222(4).  
                                          
 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(5) (2007). 
17 Id. 
 
11
Robinson cites no authority in support of this grammatical parsing of the 
statutory language. 
A review of the legislative history of this section of the Delaware 
Code demonstrates that the “use” language is intended to apply only to 
objects that are defined as dangerous instruments under section 222(4), and 
not to the listed per se deadly weapons such as “a knife of any sort.”  When 
the Delaware Criminal Code was adopted in 1973, “a knife of any sort” was 
included within the list of deadly weapons.18  As the Commentary to the 
original Code noted, “the definition of ‘deadly weapon’ [in the Code] is 
more narrow than that given in present Delaware law.”19  Accordingly, in 
1992, the General Assembly amended the section of the Delaware Criminal 
Code defining deadly weapons, in order to expand the statutory definition.  
With this purpose in mind, the General Assembly newly added to the 
definition of deadly weapons any items that had previously been defined as 
dangerous instruments (and not ordinarily capable of being defined as 
“deadly weapons” under the statute), so long as such instruments were used 
in a manner which could cause death or serious physical injury. 
                                          
 
18 The original provision read “‘Deadly weapon’ includes any weapon from which a shot 
may be discharged, a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a 
closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, slingshot, 
razor, bicycle chain or ice pick.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(5) (1973). 
19 See Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary, § 222 (1973) (citing Wisniewski v. 
State, 138 A.2d 333 (Del. 1957)). 
 
12
In Taylor v. State,20 this Court held that the metal base of a fan, 
otherwise a dangerous instrument, constituted a deadly weapon for purposes 
of the PDWPP statute, based upon its particular use in that case.  This Court 
stated:  
In our view both the purpose and meaning of the 1992 
amendment to § 222(6) [prior numbering] are clear.  The 
General Assembly intended to add to the specific list of deadly 
weapons any item which had previously fallen within the 
designation of a dangerous instrument.  In doing so, the 
legislature imparted to such items a ‘use’ test which 
characterized those items as deadly weapons if, under the 
circumstances of their use, they had the potential for the 
infliction of death or serious physical injury.21 
 
It is therefore clear that the “use” language which the General Assembly 
added in 1992 was intended to apply as a limitation only to dangerous 
instruments as a newly-included type of deadly weapon, and not to all 
deadly weapons already enumerated in the statute.22 
The Superior Court correctly instructed the jury on the two statutory 
elements of the offense of PDWPP: “(1) the defendant knowingly possessed 
a deadly weapon at the time of the charged offense.  (2) the defendant was 
prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon because he had been convicted 
                                          
 
20 Taylor v. State, 679 A.2d 449 (Del. 1996). 
21 Id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
22 See Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18, 26-28 (Del. 1998) (explaining the history of 
legislative amendments of the definition of “deadly weapon” between the original 1973 
Delaware Criminal Code and the 1992 “use” language amendment). 
 
13
for the unlawful possession with intent to deliver a narcotic schedule – in 
this case, possession with intent to deliver/manufacture a narcotic Schedule I 
or II substance.”  As this Court recently stated, “possession of a deadly 
weapon by a person prohibited, without more, is the crux of a PDWPP 
charge.”23  Accordingly, the Superior Court’s failure to acquit Robinson of 
the PWDPP charge, sua sponte, was not plain error. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.  
 
                                          
 
23 Lecates v. State, 975 A.2d 799, 808 (Del. 2009).