Title: Ford Motor Co. v. Favinger

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
v.  Record No. 062620  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 11, 2008 
WILLIAM K. FAVINGER 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this workers’ compensation claim for temporary 
partial disability benefits, the dispositive issue is 
whether an employee made a reasonable effort to market his 
residual work capacity.  Because the record contains no 
evidence that the employee did so, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia that affirmed 
an award of benefits. 
On September 11, 2002, while working for Ford Motor 
Company, William K. Favinger suffered an injury compensable 
under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), 
Code §§ 65.2-100 through 65.2-1310.  Favinger received 
compensation benefits for various periods and was 
eventually released to return to light duty work on May 12, 
2003.  Prior to his injury, Favinger performed work in a 
body shop that required lifting up to 25 pounds, but the 
light duty work involved less physical exertion and 
consisted of work in an office setting and some 
“containment work” in the body shop.  Since his return to 
 
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light duty work, Favinger has received his pre-injury 
hourly wage. 
On July 31, 2003, Favinger filed a change of condition 
application alleging entitlement to temporary partial 
disability benefits for the periods of May 12, 2003 through 
June 1, 2003 and June 10, 2003 through September 21, 2003.1  
Favinger claimed that he earned less performing light duty 
work than he had earned in his pre-injury job because of 
the loss of overtime work offered by Ford. 
A deputy commissioner denied Favinger’s claim for 
temporary partial disability benefits.  With respect to the 
issues before us, the deputy commissioner concluded 
Favinger did not show “that comparable workers in the body 
shop earned more overtime after May 12, 2003, than he was 
able to earn.”  The deputy commissioner also found that 
Favinger failed to carry his burden to “prove that he 
marketed his residual capacity and was unable, despite 
those efforts, to eliminate or mitigate his wage loss.” 
                     
1 Favinger included in his claim the period from May 
16, 2003 through May 25, 2003 when Ford experienced a 
temporary shut down and the period from June 30, 2003 to 
July 14, 2003 when Ford had its annual shut down. 
Favinger also sought temporary total disability 
benefits from June 2 through June 9, 2003.  Ford agreed 
that Favinger was entitled to the claimed compensation for 
that one time period. 
 
3
Favinger sought review of the deputy commissioner’s 
decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission 
(Commission).  The Commission awarded Favinger temporary 
partial disability benefits for various post-injury weeks 
in which his weekly wages were less than his pre-injury 
average weekly wages.  The Commission concluded that 
Favinger did not have “to prove that comparable employees 
continued to receive overtime opportunities . . . [because] 
they were free to pursue other employment opportunities if 
they became dissatisfied with less frequent overtime[; 
whereas, Favinger] was partially disabled as a result of a 
compensable work injury, and thus precluded from seeking 
employment comparable to his pre-injury position with other 
employers.” 
Ford appealed the Commission’s decision to the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia.  In an unpublished opinion, the 
Court of Appeals held that the Commission erred by failing 
to address whether Favinger had “adequately marketed his 
residual work capacity in order to recoup his lost 
overtime.”  Ford Motor Co. v. Favinger, Record No. 0112-05-
1, slip op. at 2 (October 11, 2005).  The Court of Appeals 
thus reversed the award of benefits and remanded the case 
to the Commission for determination of that question.  Id. 
 
4
On remand, the Commission noted that Favinger 
testified during the hearing before the deputy commissioner 
that he did not seek other employment during the periods 
when Ford did not offer him overtime.  The Commission, 
however, found that it was “unreasonable to expect 
[Favinger] to try to find additional employment over and 
above the [40] hours he was already working for the 
employer.  Such work would likely interfere with any 
overtime which might become available.”  Thus, the 
Commission concluded “that under the circumstances of this 
case, [Favinger] did not have a duty to market his residual 
capacity during times when the employer did not offer 
overtime to any of its employees.”  The Court of Appeals 
subsequently held that Ford’s appeal of the Commission’s 
decision was without merit.  Ford Motor Co. v. Favinger, 
Record No. 1254-06-1 (September 19, 2006). 
On appeal to this Court, Ford presents three 
assignments of error:  (1) the Court of Appeals erred by 
sustaining the Commission’s finding that Favinger 
established a causal link between his alleged wage loss and 
his work-related injury; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in 
upholding the Commission’s award of benefits because 
Favinger failed to market his residual work capacity; and 
(3) the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the 
 
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Commission’s award of benefits that was based on Favinger’s 
post-injury actual weekly wages instead of his post-injury 
average weekly wages.  The second issue is dispositive of 
this appeal. 
With regard to Favinger’s marketing of his residual 
work capacity, Ford argues that, since Favinger’s wage loss 
claim is based on the reduced amount of overtime that he 
worked after his injury, he must show that he sought work 
in addition to his normal 40-hour work week and could not 
find such employment because of his work-related injury.  
Ford challenges the Commission’s conclusion that it was 
unreasonable to require Favinger to find work in excess of 
40 hours and contends that there is no evidence to support 
the Commission’s finding that part-time work might conflict 
with Favinger’s duties at Ford.  Ford acknowledges that, if 
Favinger had demonstrated that he tried to find additional 
work and that such work conflicted with his job at Ford, he 
would have satisfied his burden to market his residual work 
capacity. 
In response, Favinger argues that his acceptance of a 
light duty job procured by Ford and his willingness to work 
overtime when offered by Ford demonstrates that he marketed 
his residual capacity to work more than 40 hours per week.  
He also contends that it would be unreasonable to expect 
 
6
him to work part-time for another employer because the 
hourly rate of pay would be significantly lower than the 
rate he earned working overtime at Ford.  And, if he 
accepted such a position, he would not be available to work 
overtime when Ford offered it to him.  In short, Favinger 
contends that he “marketed himself by simply being 
available, upon a moment’s notice, to work overtime” at 
Ford. 
An award by the Commission is conclusive and binding 
as to all questions of fact.  Code § 65.2-706(A); Bass v. 
City of Richmond Police Dep’t, 258 Va. 103, 114, 515 S.E.2d 
557, 563 (1999); Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 
192, 467 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1996).  The determination as to 
whether an employee seeking temporary partial disability 
benefits has made a reasonable effort to market his 
residual work capacity falls within the Commission’s fact-
finding, and if the Commission’s factual conclusion on that 
question is supported by credible evidence, it will not be 
disturbed on appeal.  Wall Street Deli, Inc. v. O’Brien, 32 
Va. App. 217, 220-21, 527 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2000).  The 
Commission’s factual findings, however, are “‘conclusive 
and binding’ only to the extent that they are ‘predicated 
upon evidence introduced or appearing in the proceedings.’”  
Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Gabriel, 272 Va. 659, 664, 636 
 
7
S.E.2d 408, 411 (2006) (quoting Vanzant v. Southern Bending 
Co., 143 Va. 244, 246, 129 S.E. 268, 268 (1925)).  If the 
Commission’s findings of fact are not based on credible 
evidence, “its findings are not binding and the question 
presented becomes one of law.”  Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Robertson, 218 Va. 1051, 1053, 243 S.E.2d 234, 
235 (1978) (citing Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 207, 123 
S.E.2d 393, 395 (1962)); accord Gabriel, 272 Va. at 664, 
636 S.E.2d at 411; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Summers, 
183 Va. 428, 431, 32 S.E.2d 673, 674 (1945). 
Pursuant to Code § 65.2-502(A), an employer is 
required to pay to an employee with partial incapacity for 
work resulting from an injury “a weekly compensation equal 
to 66 2/3 percent of the difference between his average 
weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages 
which he is able to earn thereafter.”  A partially disabled 
employee who refuses “employment procured for him suitable 
to his capacity” loses entitlement to certain benefits 
“during the continuance of such refusal, unless in the 
opinion of the Commission such refusal was justified.”2  
                     
2 We have stated that the legislative intent behind 
former Code § 65.1-63 (now Code § 65.2-510) is “to 
encourage injured employees to seek selective employment 
rather than to remain unemployed unless the employer finds 
such employment for them.”  Big D Quality Homebuilders v. 
Hamilton, 228 Va. 378, 382, 322 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1984). 
 
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Code § 65.2-510; see Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority v. Harrison, 228 Va. 598, 601, 324 S.E.2d 654, 
656 (1985). 
In a claim for temporary partial disability, the 
employee “[has] the burden of proving that he [has] made a 
reasonable effort to procure suitable work but [is] unable 
to market his remaining work capacity.”  Harrison, 228 Va. 
at 601, 324 S.E.2d at 656; see also White v. Redman Corp., 
41 Va. App. 287, 292, 584 S.E.2d 462, 464 (2003) (“A 
partially incapacitated employee . . . is not entitled to 
temporary total disability benefits unless he has made a 
reasonable effort to market his remaining capacity for 
work.”); Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 15 Va. App. 29, 
42, 422 S.E.2d 165, 171 (1992) (“A claimant still has the 
burden of proving his entitlement to benefits, and to do 
that ‘he [has] the burden of proving that he [has] made a 
reasonable effort to procure suitable work but was unable 
to market his remaining work capacity.’ ”) (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted); Manis Constr. Co. v. 
Arellano, 13 Va. App. 292, 294, 411 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1991) 
(“As a condition to benefits under the Virginia Workers’ 
Compensation Act . . . , a partially disabled employee must 
make a reasonable effort to market his remaining work 
capacity.”); National Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 8 Va. App. 
 
9
267, 270, 380 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1989) (“[A claimant] who seeks 
compensation of the wage differential between his new and 
his old jobs[] has the burden of proving that he has made a 
reasonable effort to market his full remaining work 
capacity.”). 
There are no fixed guidelines for determining what 
constitutes a “reasonable effort” by an employee to market 
residual work capacity.  Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 
v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 467, 359 S.E.2d 98, 102 (1987).  
An employee must “exercise reasonable diligence in seeking 
employment” and the reasonableness of an employee’s effort 
will be determined on a case by case basis, taking into 
account “all of the facts and surrounding circumstances.”  
Id.  Some of the criteria, however, that should be 
considered include: 
(1) the nature and extent of [the] employee’s 
disability; (2) the employee’s training, age, 
experience, and education; (3) the nature and 
extent of [the] employee’s job search; (4) the 
employee’s intent in conducting his job search; 
(5) the availability of jobs in the area suitable 
for the employee, considering his disability; and 
(6) any other matter affecting [the] employee’s 
capacity to find suitable employment. 
 
National Linen Service, 8 Va. App. at 272, 380 S.E.2d at 34 
(footnotes omitted); accord Metropolitan Washington 
Airports Auth. v. Lusby, 41 Va. App. 300, 317, 585 S.E.2d 
318, 326 (2003); Wall Street Deli, 32 Va. App. at 220, 527 
 
10
S.E.2d at 453.  In sum, an employee “must present ‘some 
evidence that he [has] engaged in a good faith effort to 
obtain work within the tolerance of his physical condition’ 
and has failed to find a job, either due to his injury or 
because no such work was available in the community.”  
National Linen Service, 8 Va. App. at 271, 380 S.E.2d at 34 
(quoting Dunkin Donuts of America, Inc. v. Watson, 366 A.2d 
1121, 1126 (Me. 1976) (emphasis added)). 
Favinger, however, did not make a reasonable effort to 
market his residual work capacity; in fact, he made no 
effort.  When testifying before the deputy commissioner, 
Favinger was asked: “When you were losing that overtime did 
you seek any other employment to pick up that overtime?”  
Favinger responded: “No, sir.” 
Despite this testimony, the Commission concluded that 
it was “unreasonable to expect” Favinger to market his 
residual capacity beyond his 40-hour work week at Ford and 
that, if he did so, such overtime work “would likely 
interfere with any overtime which might become available” 
at Ford.3  The Commission’s conclusion, however, is not 
                     
3 The two cases cited by the Commission to support its 
conclusion, Carr v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 25 Va. 
App. 306, 487 S.E.2d 878 (1997), and Consolidated Stores 
Corp. v. Graham, 25 Va. App. 133, 486 S.E.2d 576 (1997), 
did not address the issue of an employee’s responsibility 
 
11
supported by any evidence that Favinger actually attempted 
to market his residual work capacity and that available 
jobs within his capacity would have interfered with his 
duties at Ford, including his ability to accept overtime 
work when offered by Ford. 
Before his injury, Favinger routinely worked 50-hour 
weeks at Ford, and he now claims a wage loss for the 
overtime that he did not receive during certain weeks while 
performing his light duty job.  The fact that he accepted 
the light duty job and was willing to work overtime when 
Ford offered it did not negate the requirement that he make 
a reasonable effort to market his residual work capacity, 
i.e., the additional 10 hours of overtime.4  In the absence 
of a reasonable effort to market his residual work 
capacity, Favinger is not entitled to temporary partial 
disability benefits for his alleged loss of overtime 
earnings.  See Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Agee, 201 Va. 678, 
681, 112 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1960) (employee was not entitled 
to benefits because he “never applied for work elsewhere 
either before or after he learned that he had silicosis, 
and there [was] no proof that he could not have marketed 
                                                             
to make a reasonable effort to market residual work 
capacity. 
 
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his remaining capacity for work”); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. 
Barbour, 201 Va. 682, 684, 112 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1960) 
(reversing Commission’s award of benefits because there was 
no proof either that the employee made “a reasonable effort 
to procure work” or that he was unable to market his 
residual capacity); see also Island Creek Coal Co. v. 
Fletcher, 201 Va. 645, 648, 112 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1960) 
(employee was awarded compensation because he demonstrated 
that “he was willing to accept other employment and did 
make an effort to work outside the mine but was unable to 
perform that work”). 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Commission’s 
award of temporary partial disability benefits to Favinger 
was not “predicated upon evidence introduced or appearing 
in the proceeding.”  Vanzant, 143 Va. at 246, 129 S.E. at 
268.  We will, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals and enter final judgment here in favor of Ford. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                             
4 Favinger’s argument concerning the wage differential 
if he accepted overtime work with an employer other than 
Ford is not supported by any evidence in the record.