Title: State ex rel. Barley v. Dep't of Job & Family Servs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Barley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3329.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3329 
THE STATE EX REL. BARLEY, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND 
FAMILY SERVICES ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Barley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3329.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus reversed—R.C. 
124.11(D)—Fallback rights—Former employee entitled to be reinstated to 
previous classified position. 
(No. 2011-1724—Submitted June 5, 2012—Decided July 25, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 10AP-186, 2011-Ohio-4205. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying appellant, Chris Barley, 
a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Ohio Department of Job and Family 
Services (“ODJFS”) and its director, to reinstate Barley to his previous classified 
position of human-services hearing manager with ODJFS.  Because the court of 
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appeals erred in denying the requested extraordinary relief, we reverse the 
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Barley was hired by ODJFS in 1989 as a production-control 
technician in the classified civil service.  In 1990, he was promoted to the 
classified position of production scheduler.  In 1993, Barley graduated from law 
school, and ODJFS promoted him to the classified position of hearing officer.  In 
1995, Barley was promoted to the classified position of senior staff attorney. 
{¶ 3} In 1998, ODJFS promoted Barley to the classified position of 
human-services program administrator, which had a working title of bureau chief 
of state hearings.  The previous bureau chief had also served in the classified civil 
service.  Initially, the bureau of state hearings had only six employees, and the 
hearing supervisors and officers did not report to Barley but were instead 
supervised by the district directors of ODJFS’s five regional offices.  After a 
reorganization, however, the supervisors and officers were transferred to the 
bureau of state hearings and were under Barley’s supervision. 
{¶ 4} In that same year, ODJFS created a series of positions under the 
title human-services-hearings series, and the series was reviewed and approved by 
the Ohio Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”).  Both ODJFS and 
DAS determined that all the positions in this new series were classified positions.  
In 1999, ODJFS laterally transferred Barley to the classified position of human-
services hearing manager.  In 2001, after serving his probationary period in the 
position, Barley became a certified human-services hearing manager, a classified 
position. 
{¶ 5} In December 2004, following a reorganization in the ODJFS 
Office of Legal Services, Barley’s supervisor, then ODJFS chief legal counsel 
Robert L. Mullinax, assigned him the additional duties of managing the 
department’s administrative-appeal process, which had previously been managed 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
by the office of legal services.  Before these additional duties were assigned to 
Barley, he did not supervise the administrative-appeal hearing examiners and he 
was not the director’s designee for issuing administrative-appeal decisions.  
Barley was not given any promotion or increased compensation for assuming 
these new responsibilities in addition to his existing duties, and he was not 
informed that the assumption of these duties would move his human-services 
hearing-manager position from the classified service to the unclassified service. 
{¶ 6} In 2005, two anonymous letters sent to ODJFS alleged various 
violations of work policies by Barley, including misuse of a work computer and 
improper use of leave.  An investigation of the alleged violations disproved most 
of them, but substantiated two allegations concerning his use of leave and work 
time spent on personal matters.  The investigator determined that Barley had 
misused personal leave by using it to cover time off needed in relation to a drunk-
driving arrest.  His supervisor had approved his leave request, even though he 
knew what Barley was using it for, but neither he nor Barley knew that such a use 
violated state policy.  The investigator also determined that Barley had used state 
time to work on a coworker’s divorce. 
{¶ 7} In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Barley for ten work days for 
the violations of the code of conduct.  Before that time, Barley had never been 
disciplined as an ODJFS employee.  Barley appealed the suspension to the State 
Personnel Board of Review (“the SPBR”).  Upon his return from the suspension, 
ODJFS scheduled a meeting with him.  Before that meeting, Barley sent an e-mail 
to his supervisor in which he advised him that he would consider taking a 
different position in the department.  On March 6, 2006, after Barley refused to 
sign a last-chance agreement or, in the alternative, resign, ODJFS notified him 
that he was an unclassified employee and that it was removing him from his 
position.  According to Barley’s supervisor, Barley’s position was not placed in 
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the unclassified civil service until his removal.  Barley appealed his removal to 
the SPBR. 
{¶ 8} In Barley’s appeal from his suspension, an SPBR administrative 
law judge (“ALJ”) denied his request to present evidence necessary to determine 
the applicability of R.C. 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from 
classified positions to unclassified positions the right to resume the classified 
position held before the appointment to the unclassified position (“fallback 
rights”), holding that it was irrelevant to the appeal.  After conducting a hearing, 
the ALJ recommended that the SPBR find that Barley was an unclassified 
employee when he was suspended and dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
See R.C. 124.03 (the SPBR has jurisdiction to hear appeals brought by classified 
employees).  The ALJ limited the evidence to a consideration of Barley’s job 
duties for a period of 15 months before his suspension: 
 
 
Because case law has determined that an employee’s actual 
job duties are the determinative factor of whether an employee is 
classified or unclassified, the testimony and evidence presented at 
record hearing was confined to information furthering the evidence 
of [Barley’s] job duties over a period of approximately fifteen 
months prior to his suspension, September 2004 to December 
2005. 
 
{¶ 9} In concluding that Barley was an unclassified employee at the time 
of his suspension, the ALJ emphasized the duties assigned to Barley in 2004, i.e., 
managing the administrative-appeal process and issuing final administrative-
appeal decisions as the director’s designee.  The SPBR adopted the ALJ’s 
recommendation and dismissed Barley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  The 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the SPBR’s dismissal of 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
Barley’s appeal from his suspension, and on further appeal, the Franklin County 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court upholding the 
dismissal by rejecting Barley’s new argument that he suffered a due-process 
violation when he was placed in the unclassified service without any notice: 
 
Both SPBR and the court of common pleas have 
determined that [Barley] was correctly placed in the unclassified 
service due to the nature and scope of his authority and job duties.  
That conclusion is no longer challenged in this appeal.  If [Barley] 
is correctly placed in the unclassified service, [he] has not been 
deprived of a protected property interest that, under the due 
process analysis * * *, would trigger the right to a pre-deprivation 
hearing.  He can claim no deprivation from loss of his previous 
designation as classified, which did not reflect his actual status and 
could not control SPBR’s review of his right to appeal.  * * * 
SPBR correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed this 
appeal by an unclassified employee. 
 
Barley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-386, 2009-
Ohio-5019, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 10} An SPBR ALJ also recommended that Barley’s appeal from his 
removal be dismissed based on the prior finding in his appeal from his suspension 
that he was an unclassified employee.  The SPBR adopted the ALJ’s 
recommendation and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  The Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the SPBR’s dismissal of Barley’s 
appeal from his removal. 
{¶ 11} In a separate administrative proceeding, the Unemployment 
Compensation Review Commission determined that Barley had been discharged 
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from ODJFS without just cause, and it reversed the agency’s denial of Barley’s 
application for unemployment-compensation benefits.  In concluding that ODJFS 
had discharged him without just cause, the board of review noted that there was 
little proof provided and that there were “no further problems with [Barley’s] 
actions at the workplace after he served his suspension.”  An investigation by the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel resulted in its determination that there was 
insufficient credible evidence to suggest that Barley had engaged in ethical 
misconduct. 
{¶ 12} In March 2008, Barley requested that ODJFS recognize his 
fallback rights under R.C. 124.11(D).  Barley claimed that he had an unqualified 
right to be placed in his prior human-services hearing-manager position “minus 
the duties [he] accepted in December 2004, with back pay and benefits.”  ODJFS 
rejected his request. 
{¶ 13} In February 2010, following the resolution of his administrative 
appeals from the suspension and removal, Barley filed a complaint in the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its 
director to reinstate him to his fallback classified position of bureau chief of state 
hearings, i.e., the human-services hearing-manager position, without the 
additional responsibilities of managing the administrative-appeal process, and to 
pay him all back pay and lost benefits from the time he was unjustly removed 
from that position.  Appellees filed an answer, and the parties submitted evidence 
and briefs. 
{¶ 14} In August 2011, the court of appeals denied the writ.  The court of 
appeals determined that although Barley was in an unclassified position when he 
was suspended and removed from his employment with ODJFS, he had never 
been “appointed” to the unclassified position and thus had no right under R.C. 
124.11(D) to be reinstated to his previous classified position. 
{¶ 15} This cause is now before the court on Barley’s appeal as of right. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus Requirements—Lack of Adequate Remedy 
{¶ 16} To be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus, 
Barley had to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding 
clear legal duty on the part of ODJFS and its director to provide it, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. 
Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 17} Barley claims that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ 
because R.C. 124.11(D) conferred a right upon him to be reinstated to his 
classified position of human-services hearing manager, without the additional 
duties assigned to him in 2004 that changed the position from the classified to the 
unclassified civil service.  Because he had no right to appeal ODJFS’s denial of 
his statutory fallback rights, he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law, and the dispositive issues are whether he established a clear legal right to the 
classified position and a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the 
department and its director to reinstate him to that position.  See R.C. 124.03 and 
124.11(D); State ex rel. Glasstetter v. Rehab. Servs. Comm., 122 Ohio St.3d 432, 
2009-Ohio-3507, 912 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 16. 
Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty: 
R.C. 124.11(D) Appointment 
{¶ 18} The version of R.C. 124.11(D) that was in effect when the new 
duties concerning management of the department’s administrative-appeals 
process were assigned to Barley in 2004 provided:  
 
 
 
An appointing authority whose employees are paid directly 
by warrant of the auditor of state may appoint a person who holds 
a certified position in the classified service within the appointing 
authority's agency to a position in the unclassified service within 
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that agency. A person appointed pursuant to this division to a 
position in the unclassified service shall retain the right to resume 
the position and status held by the person in the classified service 
immediately prior to the person's appointment to the position in the 
unclassified service, regardless of the number of positions the 
person held in the unclassified service. Reinstatement to a position 
in the classified service shall be to a position substantially equal to 
that position in the classified service held previously, as certified 
by the director of administrative services. 
 
2000 Sub.S.B. No. 173, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9388, 9392-9393. 
{¶ 19} The court of appeals determined that ODJFS never “appointed” 
Barley to an unclassified position when it assigned him additional duties that 
changed his position from the classified service to the unclassified service. 
{¶ 20} “In interpreting R.C. 124.11(D), our paramount concern is 
legislative intent.”  State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 
262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 22.  To discern legislative intent, we 
“read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of 
grammar and common usage.”  State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 
409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11.  “In common usage, ‘appoint’ means 
‘to assign, designate, or set apart by authority,’ ‘position’ is defined as ‘the group 
of tasks and responsibilities making up the duties of an employee,’ and 
‘reinstatement’ means ‘the action of reinstating (as in a post or position formerly 
held but relinquished).’ ”  Glasstetter, 122 Ohio St.3d 432, 2009-Ohio-3507, 912 
N.E.2d 89, ¶ 19, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 105, 
1769, and 1915 (2002). 
{¶ 21} Moreover, “ ‘[w]ords * * * that have acquired a technical or 
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
construed accordingly.’ ”  Hoffman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 113 Ohio St.3d 
376, 2007-Ohio-2201, 865 N.E.2d 1259, ¶ 26, quoting R.C. 1.42.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 124-1-02(E) defines “appointment” as the “placement of an employee 
in a position,” and Ohio Adm.Code 124-1-02(S) defines “position” as “a group of 
duties intended to be performed by an employee.” 
{¶ 22} From these definitions, it is evident that a position’s status as 
classified or unclassified cannot be determined without considering the duties 
associated with the position.  This is consistent with our longstanding precedent 
that the job title or position classification used by the appointing authority is not 
dispositive on the issue whether a public employee is in the classified or 
unclassified service and that the true test requires an examination of the duties 
actually delegated to and performed by the employee.  In re Termination of Emp. 
of Pratt, 40 Ohio St.2d 107, 113-114, 321 N.E.2d 603 (1974); State ex rel. 
Emmons v. Lutz, 131 Ohio St. 466, 469, 3 N.E.2d 502 (1936) (“However, it must 
be clear that a mere title is not at all conclusive.  The true test is the duty actually 
delegated to and performed by an employee”); Yarosh v. Becane, 63 Ohio St.2d 5, 
406 N.E.2d 1355 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus (“The State Personnel 
Board of Review has jurisdiction over appeals from removals of public employees 
if it determines that such employees are in the classified service, regardless of 
how they have been designated by their appointing authorities”). 
{¶ 23} Therefore, when ODJFS assigned additional duties to Barley that 
changed his position from the classified service to the unclassified service, it 
appointed him to the unclassified position, regardless of whether his position title 
remained the same.  ODJFS placed its employee, Barley, in an unclassified 
position by assigning him duties that took the group of duties to be performed by 
him outside the classified service.  This finding is consistent with the SPBR’s and 
the court of common pleas’ determination in Barley’s administrative appeal from 
his suspension that he had been placed by ODJFS in the unclassified service.  See 
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Barley, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-386, 2009-Ohio-5019, ¶ 14; see also Glasstetter, 122 
Ohio St.3d 432, 2009-Ohio-3507, 912 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 20, where we affirmed a court 
of appeals’ rejection of a state employee’s mandamus claim based on R.C. 
124.11(D) because she “was never appointed to a position in the unclassified 
service.  That is, she was never assigned to a separate position with different job 
duties.  Instead, throughout her employment * * *, [she] remained in the same 
position * * * with the same job duties.”  (Emphases added.) 
{¶ 24} Barley’s isolated statement from a March 2008 letter to ODJFS 
reasserting his fallback rights that he “was never appointed to the unclassified 
civil service, and was always considered and treated as a classified employee” 
does not warrant a different conclusion because at the time the letter was written, 
his administrative appeals in which he had been arguing that he was improperly 
suspended and removed from his classified position remained pending.  In that 
limited context, as the court of appeals acknowledged, Barley’s statement was not 
a legally binding admission for purposes of his subsequent mandamus claim. 
{¶ 25} Moreover, a contrary conclusion upholding the court of appeals’ 
judgment would permit state employers desiring to remove classified employees 
without the just cause required by R.C. 124.34 to change the employees’ job 
classification to the unclassified service by adding new duties that are inconsistent 
with classified service, which would then both deprive the employees of the 
ability to contest any removal from state employment and simultaneously strip 
them of their R.C. 124.11(D) statutory right to fall back to their prior classified 
positions.  In effect, state employers could decide which employees would have 
fallback rights and which employees would not.  The General Assembly could not 
have intended such an unreasonable result.  State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 130 Ohio 
St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-5350, 957 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 25 (courts construe statutes and 
rules to avoid unreasonable or absurd results); State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
193, ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. Saltsman v. Burton, 154 Ohio St. 262, 268, 95 
N.E.2d 377 (1950) (“ ‘Statutes must be construed, if possible, to operate sensibly 
and not to accomplish foolish results’ ”). 
{¶ 26} Finally, this result is consistent with our duty to liberally construe 
the R.C. 124.11(D) fallback provision.  “R.C. 124.11(D) is a remedial provision 
that protects state employees when they move from classified positions, from 
which they may be terminated only for just cause, to unclassified, terminable-at-
will positions.  It provides appointing agencies * * * with a broader pool of 
experienced applicants for upper level, unclassified positions by offering civil-
service protection to those classified employees appointed to unclassified 
positions.”  Asti, 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 31; see 
also R.C. 1.11 (“Remedial laws * * * shall be liberally construed in order to 
promote their object”).  Adopting the court of appeals’ construction of this 
provision would permit employers to move employees in the classified service to 
the unclassified service by adding duties without the employees’ consent and 
would prevent the employees from challenging any subsequent removal from that 
position or from invoking the right to fall back to the classified-service position 
they held before the additional duties were forced upon them. 
{¶ 27} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in determining that Barley 
could not establish his entitlement to the R.C. 124.11(D) right to fall back to his 
previous classified position as human-services hearing manager because he was 
not appointed to an unclassified position when he was assigned the additional 
duties that took his position out of the classified civil service.  This result is 
dictated by the plain language of the applicable statutory and rule provisions, the 
manifest intent of the General Assembly in enacting R.C. 124.11(D), and our duty 
to liberally construe this important statutory right. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty: 
R.C. 124.11(D) Applicability 
{¶ 28} ODJFS argues that even if Barley can establish that the department 
appointed him to an unclassified position, he is still not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus, because he was appointed to the unclassified 
position in 1998, which, ODJFS argues, was before the law was amended to 
provide classified employees with fallback rights. 
{¶ 29} The court of appeals held that because Barley was never 
“appointed” to an unclassified position, “any arguments and objections relating to 
whether [he] held a classified position from 1998-2004 are moot.”  Yet the court 
of appeals went on to adopt its magistrate’s resolution of the remaining issues.  
The magistrate had determined that res judicata precluded Barley’s claim that his 
position had not changed to unclassified until he was assigned new duties by his 
boss in December 2004 because he either raised or could have raised that 
contention in his previous administrative appeals. 
{¶ 30} It is true that “[r]es judicata, whether claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion, applies to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings.”  State ex rel. 
Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio St.3d 526, 2009-Ohio-
1704, 905 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 29; State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger, 128 Ohio St.3d 
361, 2011-Ohio-759, 944 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 11.  But the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that Barley could have raised the issue of whether he was a classified 
employee in 1998 in his previous administrative appeals.  Those appeals were 
limited to the issue whether Barley was a classified employee when he was 
suspended and ultimately removed from his employment with ODJFS in 2005 and 
2006.  In fact, when Barley attempted to raise the issue of his fallback rights 
under R.C. 124.11(D) in his first administrative appeal, his attempt was rejected 
and the SPBR expressly limited the appeal to a consideration of his job duties 
from September 2004 to December 2005.  Barley’s classified status in 1998 was 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
irrelevant to his administrative appeals.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that res judicata barred Barley’s contention that he was entitled to 
fallback rights. 
{¶ 31} Moreover, the evidence establishes that Barley was a classified 
employee until the addition of duties related to managing the administrative-
appeal process in December 2004.  His position was consistently designated by 
both ODJFS and DAS as being in the classified service, and the SPBR, in its 
decision in Barley’s administrative appeal from his suspension, relied heavily on 
the duties assigned to him in December 2004 to determine that he was an 
unclassified employee at the time he was suspended in December 2005.  The 
affidavit evidence presented in the court of appeals—including the affidavit of 
Barley’s boss, then ODJFS chief legal counsel—supported this conclusion. 
{¶ 32} Therefore, the court of appeals further erred insofar as it 
determined that Barley was not entitled to fallback rights because he was not a 
classified employee when these rights became effective. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} Based on the foregoing, Barley has established that he is entitled to 
a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his 
previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially 
equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved 
his position into the unclassified service.  Because the court of appeals erred in 
holding otherwise, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to that court to 
grant the writ and to determine Barley’s remaining claims, e.g., back pay and lost 
benefits.  Asti, 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 35. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent and would adopt the reasoning of the court of 
appeals in denying the writ of mandamus.  The majority now holds that a 
classified public employee who is given additional duties so that his position is 
recharacterized as unclassified has fallback rights under R.C. 124.11(D).  The 
redesignation of status is not an appointment to a position as contemplated by the 
fallback statute. 
{¶ 35} The court of appeals determined that Barley had never been 
“appointed” to the unclassified position and thus had no right under R.C. 
124.11(D) to be reinstated to his previous classified position.  R.C. 124.11 was 
amended effective March 30, 1999, to include section (D), which provides:  
 
An appointing authority * * * may appoint a person who 
holds a certified position in the classified service within the 
appointing authority’s agency to a position in the unclassified 
service within that agency. A person appointed pursuant to this 
division to a position in the unclassified service shall retain the 
right to resume the position and status held by the person in the 
classified service immediately prior to the person’s appointment to 
the position in the unclassified service, regardless of the number of 
positions the person held in the unclassified service. 
 
(Emphases added.) 
{¶ 36} Thus the statute speaks of an appointment to a position.  Barley 
stated in his March 13, 2008 letter when he reasserted his fallback rights: 
 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
I am writing to re-assert my fallback rights, as provided by 
Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D).  Although I was never appointed to the 
unclassified civil service, and was always considered and treated as 
a classified employee, I was removed as an unclassified employee 
during the Taft administration on March 6, 2006. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 37} Barley himself recognizes that he was never appointed to an 
unclassified position.  I agree with the court of appeals’ determination that ODJFS 
never “appointed” Barley to an unclassified position when it assigned him 
additional duties that caused his position to be characterized as unclassified.  This 
view comports with our precedent construing R.C. 124.11:  State ex rel. 
Glasstetter v. Rehab. Servs. Comm., 122 Ohio St.3d 432, 2009-Ohio-3507, 912 
N.E.2d 89 (R.C. 124.11(D) did not apply, because employee was never appointed 
to an unclassified position, although she was redesignated as an unclassified 
employee); State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 
2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658 (employee was appointed to several 
unclassified positions and retained fallback rights). 
{¶ 38} I would affirm the determination of the court of appeals that Barley 
could not establish his entitlement to the R.C. 124.11(D) right to fall back to his 
previous classified position as human-services hearing manager because he was 
not appointed to an unclassified position when he was assigned the additional 
duties that took his position out of the classified civil service. 
__________________ 
 
Walter J. Gerhardstein Jr., for appellant. 
 
 
 
 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Joseph N. Rosenthal, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, and Brandon R. Gibbs, Assistant Attorney General, 
for appellee the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services. 
______________________