Title: MILISSA MCCLEMENTS V FORD MOTOR CO

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 26, 2005
MILISSA MCCLEMENTS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 126276 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to resolve two 
questions: (1) whether a common-law claim of negligent 
retention can be premised on sexual harassment in light of 
the remedies provided by the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 
37.2101 et seq.; and (2) whether an employer can be held 
liable under the CRA for sexual harassment against a non­
employee. 
The trial court granted summary disposition to 
defendant 
on 
both 
issues, 
ruling 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient notice to Ford to support the negligent 
retention theory, and that plaintiff could not pursue a 
claim under the CRA without demonstrating at least a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
“quasi-employment” relationship. 
The Court of Appeals 
affirmed with respect to the CRA claim, but reversed with 
respect to plaintiff’s negligent retention claim. 
We hold 
that: (1) a common-law claim for negligent retention cannot 
be premised upon workplace sexual harassment; and (2) 
because plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact that defendant affected or controlled the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, she 
cannot bring a claim against defendant under the CRA. 
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the trial 
court’s order of summary disposition in favor of defendant. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant Ford Motor Company hired AVI Food Systems to 
operate three cafeterias at its Wixom assembly plant. 
Plaintiff Milissa McClements was hired by AVI as a cashier 
at the Wixom plant in March 1998.1  Plaintiff testified that 
Daniel Bennett, then a superintendent in the predelivery 
department of the plant, had in November 19982 invited her 
1 Within a month, plaintiff filed a complaint with AVI
alleging that she was sexually harassed by a non-AVI 
contractor. 
After an investigation, AVI had the offending
nonemployee removed from its premises. 
2 The record is replete with confusion over when the
alleged incidents took place. 
In her complaint, plaintiff
alleged that the incidents with Bennett occurred in 
(continued…) 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
on “three or four” occasions to meet him at a local fast 
food restaurant. 
On each occasion, plaintiff rebuffed his 
invitation. 
According to plaintiff, Bennett “seemed very 
persistent, like he didn’t understand that I wasn’t 
interested.” 
Plaintiff acknowledged that, at this point, 
Bennett was polite, and there was no testimony that he used 
sexual or foul language. 
Bennett denies making any such 
invitations. 
Plaintiff described two additional encounters with 
Bennett that occurred during this same time period. During 
the first of these encounters, Bennett allegedly entered 
the cafeteria while it was closed, and approached plaintiff 
from behind. 
Plaintiff testified that “I was facing the 
opposite way. He came up and just grabbed me and turned me 
around and stuck his tongue in my mouth.”  After “a few 
days,” plaintiff allegedly had a second encounter with 
Bennett in the closed cafeteria. 
According to plaintiff, 
Bennett again grabbed her from behind, attempted to stick 
his tongue in her mouth, and stated, “Come on, I know you 
want it. 
Isn’t there somewhere we can go and have sex?” 
Plaintiff refused this advance, and Bennett left the 
(…continued)
September 1998. 
However, in her deposition, plaintiff
testified that the incident could have taken place in late
November, early December 1998, because she “seem[ed] to
remember it being Thanksgiving . . . .” 
3  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
cafeteria. 
Plaintiff allegedly reported the incidents to 
her union steward, but claims that she was advised that if 
she reported the incident to defendant, it would “turn 
around and stab you in the back and you [would] end up 
losing your job.” Plaintiff did not report the incident to 
either defendant or AVI until the instant lawsuit was 
filed. 
In 2000, plaintiff was approached by another Ford 
employee, Justine Maldonado,3 who claimed that she had also 
been sexually harassed by Bennett. Specifically, Maldonado 
claimed that in January or February 1998, Bennett exposed 
himself to her and demanded oral sex in the parking lot of 
the Wixom plant. Bennett also allegedly followed Maldonado 
in his car, got out after she had stopped at a floral shop, 
and reached into her car and tugged on her blouse. 
In 
late-October 1998, Maldonado told Joe Howard, her uncle and 
a production manager at Wixom, about the incidents.4  During 
“the last couple days” in October, Maldonado told David 
Ferris, a former Ford superintendent who was on temporary 
3 In a separate action by Maldonado, we directed oral
argument on whether to grant Maldonado’s application for
leave to appeal or take other peremptory action permitted
by MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 471 Mich
940 (2004). 
4 Howard testified that his conversation with Maldonado 
about the alleged harassment did not take place until
October 1999. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
assignment to her union, about the incidents. 
Maldonado 
testified that she spoke with Ferris just before undergoing 
knee surgery on November 2, 1998. 
Ferris testified that 
“two or three days” later, he confronted Bennett about 
Maldonado’s accusations. 
The next day, Ferris informed 
Jerome Rush, Wixom’s director of labor relations, about the 
alleged incidents of sexual harassment. 
Ferris testified 
that the conversation lasted a minute “at the most.” 
Rush 
allegedly told Ferris that he “need not be involved in 
these types of issues” and took no further action. 
Even after learning of the Maldonado incidents, 
plaintiff did not come forward with her allegations. 
However, 
plaintiff’s 
attitude 
changed 
after 
Maldonado 
informed her in August 2001 that Bennett had exposed 
himself to three teenage girls. 
In 1995, Bennett was 
convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure, for exposing 
himself to three teenage girls on I-275 while he was 
driving a company car. 
Defendant was aware of the 
incident, because the police determined Bennett’s identity 
by tracing the car through Ford.5 
5 Bennett’s conviction was expunged by the district
court 
in 
November 
2001. 
Before 
granting 
summary
disposition 
to 
defendant, 
the 
trial 
court 
granted
defendant’s 
motion 
to 
strike 
all 
references 
to 
the 
conviction from the complaint. 
5  
 
 
 
After learning about the indecent exposure arrest and 
conviction, 
plaintiff 
filed 
the 
instant 
lawsuit 
in 
September 2001. 
Plaintiff claimed that defendant: (1) 
negligently retained Bennett, whom it knew had a propensity 
to sexually harass women; and (2) breached its obligation 
under the CRA to prevent Bennett from sexually harassing 
her. 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
disposition. 
First, the trial court found that there was 
no evidence that defendant knew of Bennett’s propensity to 
sexually harass women in the workplace. 
Maldonado’s 
complaints to her uncle and friend were not sufficient to 
give defendant notice of Bennett’s sexually harassing 
behavior and the 1995 conviction alone is insufficient to 
establish that propensity. 
Thus, defendant could not be 
held liable under the negligent retention theory. 
Second, 
the trial court found that plaintiff as a nonemployee could 
not hold defendant liable under the CRA. 
However, even if 
defendant were potentially liable under the CRA, it could 
not be held liable under these circumstances, because its 
higher management was never made aware of the allegedly 
sexually harassing behavior. 
In an unpublished opinion, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Unpublished opinion per 
6  
 
 
 
 
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2004 
(Docket No. 243764). 
The Court of Appeals held that 
defendant’s knowledge of the indecent exposure arrest and 
Maldonado’s allegations created a genuine issue of material 
fact whether defendant “knew or should have known of 
Bennett’s 
sexually 
derogatory 
behavior 
toward 
female 
employees.” However, the Court of Appeals also applied the 
“economic reality test,” Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich 
App 9, 14; 627 NW2d 1 (2001), and held that defendant was 
not plaintiff’s employer. 
As a result, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that plaintiff could not maintain a CRA 
complaint against an entity that is not her employer. This 
Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal, 
as well as plaintiff’s application for leave to file a 
cross-appeal. 471 Mich 937 (2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for 
summary disposition. Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 
683 NW2d 611 (2004). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests 
the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim. 
Spiek v Dep’t 
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). 
Summary disposition is only permitted if the evidence, 
while viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
fails to establish a claim as a matter of law. Wilkinson v 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617 NW2d 305 (2000). We review de 
novo the questions whether the CRA displaces a common-law 
claim for negligent retention based upon sexual harassment 
in the workplace and whether an employer can be held liable 
under the CRA for sexual harassment against a nonemployee 
because they are questions of law. 
Morales v Auto-Owners 
Ins Co (After Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 
(2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The issue in this case is not whether Bennett has 
engaged in reprehensible conduct either inside or outside 
the workplace. 
Rather, the issues are: (1) whether 
defendant negligently retained Bennett as a supervisor as 
of the time Bennett allegedly sexually harassed plaintiff, 
despite the fact that it knew or should have known of his 
propensity to sexually harass women; and (2) whether 
defendant is responsible under the CRA for failing to 
prevent 
sexual 
harassment 
of 
plaintiff 
even 
though 
plaintiff was not a direct employee of defendant. 
A. NEGLIGENT RETENTION CLAIM 
Plaintiff’s first theory is that defendant negligently 
retained Bennett as a supervisor after learning of his 
propensity to sexually harass women. 
In general, an 
employer is not responsible for an intentional tort in the 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
workplace committed by its employee acting outside the 
scope of employment. 
Martin v Jones, 302 Mich 355, 358; 4 
NW2d 686 (1942). 
However, this Court has previously 
recognized an exception to this general rule of liability 
when the employer “‘knew or should have known of his 
employee’s 
propensities 
and 
criminal 
record 
before 
commission of an intentional tort by [that] employee 
. . . .’” 
Hersh v Kentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410, 
412; 189 NW2d 286 (1971) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff 
argues that defendant knew of Bennett’s “propensity” to 
engage in sexually harassing behavior because of: (1) 
Bennett’s 1995 indecent exposure conviction; and (2) 
Maldonado’s complaints to defendant’s supervisor (Howard) 
and 
labor 
relations 
representative 
(Rush) 
concerning 
Bennett’s harassment. 
Plaintiff concludes that defendant 
breached its duty of reasonable care by retaining Bennett 
despite its knowledge of his previous actions. 
The Court 
of Appeals held that whether defendant “knew or should have 
known” of Bennett’s propensities was a question of fact for 
the jury.6 
6 Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals improperly
allowed the jury to resolve the issue of whether defendant
had a duty towards plaintiff. We agree that whether a duty
exists to a particular plaintiff is a question for the
court. 
Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich
495, 500-501; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). 
An employer’s duty is
(continued…) 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
However, in those cases in which we have held that an 
employer can be held liable on the basis of its knowledge 
of an employee’s propensities, the underlying conduct 
comprised the common-law tort of assault. See Hersh, supra 
at 412; Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556, 563; 46 NW2d 382 
(1951). 
In the instant case, however, the entire premise 
for 
plaintiff’s 
negligent 
retention 
claim 
is 
the 
statutorily based tort of sexual harassment. 
Before 
passage of the CRA, Michigan did not provide a common-law 
remedy for workplace discrimination. 
Pompey v Gen Motors 
Corp, 385 Mich 537, 552; 189 NW2d 243 (1971). 
Plaintiff’s 
protections 
against 
being 
sexually 
harassed 
in 
the 
workplace are wholly creatures of statute. 
“‘Where a 
statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such 
remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a 
remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred 
(…continued)
to exercise reasonable care in selecting and retaining its
employees. 
However, it is the province of the jury to
determine whether an employer has breached that duty by
retaining the employee in question. 
In order for the jury
to determine whether an employer has breached this duty, it
must first determine whether the employer “knew or should
have known” that its employee had a propensity to engage in
the conduct that caused the injury to the plaintiff. 
The 
propensity at issue in the instant case is an alleged
propensity to sexually harass women. 
Because plaintiff’s
exclusive remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment is
the CRA, there is no question of fact for the jury and, 
therefore, summary disposition was appropriate. 
10  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
thereby and to that only.’” 
Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v 
Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997), 
quoting Lafayette Transfer & Storage Co v Pub Utilities 
Comm, 287 Mich 488, 491; 283 NW 659 (1939). Here, the CRA 
provides the right to be free from sexual harassment, MCL 
37.2103(i), and accords an aggrieved worker the remedy of 
“a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or 
damages, or both.” 
MCL 37.2801(1). 
Plaintiff’s remedy, 
then, for any act of sexual harassment is limited to those 
provided by the CRA. 
Accordingly, there is no common-law 
claim for negligent retention in the context of workplace 
sexual harassment.7 
Plaintiff invokes MCL 37.2803, which states that the 
CRA “shall not be construed to diminish the right of a 
person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies 
in the courts of this state.” 
However, contrary to the 
dissent’s theory, post at 7, this statutory language does 
not allow a worker to bring a CRA claim under the guise of 
7 We note defendant’s assertion that the Hersh rule is 
contrary to public policy concerning the rehabilitation of
first-time offenders. 
According to defendant, 
Hersh 
encourages employers to refuse to hire anyone who was ever
convicted of even a misdemeanor, for fear that they might
later be held liable for any conduct by the employee that
somehow 
could 
be 
linked, 
after 
the 
fact, 
to 
the 
circumstances of that crime. 
Because we hold that 
plaintiff’s negligent retention claim cannot be maintained,
there is no need at this time to reach defendant’s public
policy argument. 
11  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
a negligent retention claim. Rather, this provision simply 
allows a worker to bring suit under any legal theory that 
existed before the passage of the CRA. 
Thus, a worker 
would not be barred by the CRA from bringing a common-law 
negligent retention claim, as long as the premise for that 
claim is a tort that existed before passage of civil rights 
legislation.8 
Therefore, because the CRA provides the exclusive 
remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment, plaintiff 
has failed to establish a claim of negligent retention,9 and 
no inquiry into whether defendant possessed sufficient 
notice that Bennett was engaged in sexual harassment is 
necessary. 
B. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT CLAIM 
Plaintiff’s second theory is that defendant failed to 
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. MCL 37.2202(1) 
states in pertinent part: 
8 For example, if an employee had a history of 
committing simple assault, and the employer knew or should
have known of that history, then a third party who was
assaulted by the employee might be able to hold the 
employer liable under a negligent retention theory premised
on simple assault. 
9 Both the dissent and the concurrence/dissent argue
that plaintiff’s negligent retention claim “implicates
other torts such as assault and battery.” 
Post at 3. 
While that may be, plaintiff premised her claim on sexual
harassment, not assault or battery. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
An 
employer 
shall 
not 
do 
any 
of 
the 
following: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status. 
(b) 
Limit, 
segregate, 
or 
classify 
an 
employee or applicant for employment in a way
that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or
applicant 
of 
an 
employment 
opportunity, 
or 
otherwise adversely affects the status of an 
employee or applicant because of religion, race,
color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight,
or marital status. 
(c) 
Segregate, 
classify, 
or 
otherwise 
discriminate against a person on the basis of sex
with respect to a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, including, but not limited to, a
benefit plan or system. 
Discrimination 
based 
on 
sex 
includes 
sexual 
harassment. 
MCL 37.2103(i). 
The statute defines sexual 
harassment as follows: 
Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct or communication of a
sexual nature under the following conditions: 
(i) 
Submission 
to 
the 
conduct 
or 
communication is made a term or condition either 
explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment,
public 
accommodations 
or 
public 
services,
education, or housing. 
(ii) 
Submission to or rejection of the
conduct or communication by an individual is used
as 
a 
factor 
in 
decisions 
affecting 
the 
individual’s employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing. 
13  
 
 
 (iii) 
The conduct or communication has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering
with 
an 
individual’s 
employment, 
public
accommodations or public services, education, or
housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive 
employment, 
public 
accommodations,
public 
services, 
educational, 
or 
housing
environment. [MCL 37.2103(i).] 
Plaintiff 
claims 
that 
CRA 
forbids 
any 
entity 
classified as an employer from discriminating against any 
individual, including nonemployees. Therefore, because the 
actions 
of 
defendant’s 
employee 
allegedly 
created 
a 
sexually hostile work environment, defendant can be held 
liable under the CRA. Defendant, on the other hand, argues 
that an employer can only be held liable for discrimination 
against 
a 
nonemployee 
if 
some 
form 
of 
employment 
relationship exists between the parties. 
Both the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was 
required 
to 
prove 
at 
least 
a 
“quasi-employment 
relationship” before a claim under the CRA could be 
maintained. 
We conclude that, unless an individual can 
establish a genuine issue of material fact that an employer 
affected or controlled the terms, conditions, or privileges 
of his or her employment, a nonemployee may not bring a 
claim under the CRA. 
Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require 
us to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent 
as expressed by the language of its statutes. 
DiBenedetto 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). 
If the language is unambiguous, as is generally the case, 
Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459; 663 
NW2d 447 (2003), “we presume that the Legislature intended 
the 
meaning 
clearly 
expressed—no 
further 
judicial 
construction is required or permitted, and the statute must 
be enforced as written.” DiBenedetto, supra at 402. 
MCL 37.2201(a) defines an “employer” for purposes of 
the CRA as “a person who has 1 or more employees, and 
includes an agent of that person.” 
As recognized by 
plaintiff, the language of the statute does not otherwise 
narrow the scope of who may be considered an employer. 
Thus, MCL 37.2202 forbids any employer from engaging in 
acts of discrimination that are prohibited by the CRA. MCL 
37.2202 does not state that an employer is only forbidden 
from engaging in such acts against its own employees. 
Indeed, the CRA appears to clearly envision claims by 
nonemployees for the failure or refusal to hire or recruit, 
MCL 
37.2202(1)(a); 
the 
improper 
classification 
of 
applicants by a status prohibited under the CRA, MCL 
37.2202(1)(b); 
and 
the 
discrimination 
against 
former 
employees by operation of a benefit plan or system, MCL 
37.2202(1)(c). 
Accordingly, to limit the availability of 
relief under the CRA to those suits brought by an employee 
15  
 
 
against his or her employer is not consistent with the 
statute. 
However, the language of the statute is also clear in 
requiring some form of nexus or connection between the 
employer and the status of the nonemployee. 
MCL 37.2202 
forbids an employer from using a classification protected 
by the CRA: to “discriminate against an individual with 
respect to . . . a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment," MCL 37.2202(1)(a); to “deprive the . . . 
applicant of an employment opportunity,” MCL 37.2202(1)(b); 
or to “discriminate against a person . . . with respect to 
a term, condition, or privilege of employment,” MCL 
37.2202(1)(c). In other words, an employer is liable under 
the CRA when it utilizes a prohibited characteristic in 
order to adversely affect or control an individual’s 
employment or potential employment. 
Thus, the key to 
liability under the CRA is not simply the status of an 
individual 
as 
an 
“employee”; 
rather, 
liability 
is 
contingent upon the employer’s affecting or controlling 
that individual’s work status. 
Accordingly, an employer 
can be held liable under the CRA for discriminatory acts 
against a nonemployee if the nonemployee can demonstrate 
16  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that the employer affected or controlled the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of the nonemployee’s employment.10 
In Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462; 606 
NW2d 398 (1999), the Court of Appeals came to the same 
conclusion while interpreting similar language in the 
Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 
37.1202.11  In Chiles, an employee injured his back on the 
10 For example, a secretary who works for a temporary 
employment agency might not be an “employee” at the office
where she is sent to fill in.
 However, there is little
question that the employer at that office would dictate the
terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment with the
temporary employment agency, at least during the pendency
of her temporary employment. 
11 This provision of the PWDCRA is identical in all
relevant respects to the CRA. 
MCL 37.1202(1) states in
relevant part: 
Except as otherwise required by federal law,
an employer shall not: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or
promote an individual because of a disability or
genetic information that is unrelated to the 
individual’s ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position. 
(b) 
Discharge 
or 
otherwise 
discriminate 
against 
an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
compensation 
or 
the 
terms, 
conditions, 
or 
privileges of employment, because of a disability
or genetic information that is unrelated to the
individual’s ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position. 
(c) 
Limit, 
segregate, 
or 
classify 
an 
employee or applicant for employment in a way
which deprives or tends to deprive an individual
(continued…) 
17  
 
 
 
   
   
                                                 
 
  
job and filed for worker’s compensation benefits. After he 
was laid off, the employee brought suit under the PWDCRA. 
The “employer,” who laid off the plaintiff, argued that it 
was not liable under the PWDCRA because the employee was 
technically employed by a separate, though affiliated, 
company. The Court in Chiles noted that the PWDCRA 
addresses the conduct of an “employer” who takes 
adverse employment action against an “individual” 
because of a handicap that is unrelated to the
individual’s ability to perform the duties of a
particular 
job. 
MCL 
37.1202(1)(a); 
MSA 
3.550(202)(1)(a). 
The act does not limit the 
definition 
of 
“employer” 
to 
the 
plaintiff's
employer but, instead, simply defines it as a
“person who has 1 or more employees.” MCL 
37.1201(b); MSA 3.550(201)(b). [Chiles, supra at 
468 (emphasis supplied).][12] 
Thus, liability under the PWDCRA “does not require 
that an employment relationship exist,” but it does require 
that the employer defendant “have the authority to affect a 
plaintiff’s employment or potential employment.” 
Id. at 
468-469. 
However, the authority to affect a worker’s 
employment alone is not sufficient to impose liability upon 
(…continued)
of 
employment 
opportunities 
or 
otherwise 
adversely affects the status of an employee
because of a disability or genetic information
that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or 
position. 
12 The definition of an employer is essentially the
same under the CRA. MCL 37.2201(1)(a). 
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
an employer defendant.13
 Rather, in order to be liable 
under the PWDCRA, the employer defendant must also “take[] 
adverse employment action” against the worker plaintiff. 
Accordingly, under Chiles, the employer defendant must (1) 
have “the ability to affect adversely the terms and 
conditions of an individual’s employment or potential 
employment,” id. at 468; and (2) “take[] adverse employment 
action against an ‘individual’ because of a handicap that 
is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the 
duties of a particular job . . ., e.g., discriminatorily 
refusing to hire an applicant on account of a disability,” 
id. at 468, quoting MCL 37.1202(1)(a). In other words, the 
more precise articulation of the Chiles rule is that the 
employer defendant must, in fact, use such authority by 
“tak[ing] adverse employment action against an individual” 
in violation of the PWDCRA. 
Thus, to be liable under the 
PWDCRA, the employer defendant must actually affect or 
control 
the 
terms, 
conditions, 
or 
privileges 
of 
an 
individual’s employment. 
The Court of Appeals in Chiles 
determined that the employer defendant directly supervised 
13 
Thus, 
contrary 
to 
the 
concurrence\dissent’s 
position, the fact that plaintiff produced some evidence 
that defendant had the ability to “affect or control a
term, condition, or privilege of plaintiff’s employment,”
post at 2, is not sufficient to present a genuine issue of
material fact for the jury. 
19  
 
 
                                                 
the employee, controlled what tasks he worked at, and had 
the ability to fire or discipline the employee. 
Further, 
the employer defendant actually affected the plaintiff’s 
employment by laying him off. 
As a result, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the parties’ relationship fell 
within the scope of the PWDCRA and, therefore, the 
plaintiff could maintain an action under the PWDCRA. 
We hold that a worker is entitled to bring an action 
against a nonemployer defendant if the worker can establish 
that 
the 
defendant 
affected 
or 
controlled 
a 
term, 
condition, or privilege of the worker’s employment. In the 
instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish that 
defendant affected or controlled the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of her employment.14  Plaintiff was hired, paid, 
14 The dissent argues that, because defendant had the
authority to control Bennett and Bennett affected a 
condition of plaintiff’s employment, it follows that 
defendant itself “affect[ed] a condition of plaintiff’s
employment.” 
Post at 6. 
Based on this reasoning, an
employer would apparently always be liable for its agent’s
creation of a sexually hostile work environment. 
However,
we have held that such imposition of vicarious liability is
proper only in sexual discrimination cases in which the
employer’s agent has used his or her authority to alter the
terms and conditions of employment. 
Chambers v Trettco, 
Inc, 463 Mich 297, 310; 614 NW2d 910 (2000), citing 
Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 708­
709; 545 NW2d 596 (1996). 
We have declined to treat 
sexually hostile work environment cases in the same manner,
noting that “strict imposition of vicarious liability on an
employer ‘is illogical in a pure hostile environment 
setting’ 
because, 
generally, 
in 
such 
a 
case, 
‘the 
(continued…) 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
and subject to discipline by AVI. 
AVI placed plaintiff in 
the Wixom plant and had the sole authority to move her to 
different cafeterias or even to another plant. 
Plaintiff 
has failed to demonstrate that defendant affected or 
controlled 
whether 
she 
was 
hired, 
her 
benefits 
of 
employment, or where she was assigned to work. 
Further, 
although the cafeterias were located in the Wixom plant, 
they were operated solely by AVI, and were off-limits to 
defendant’s employees except during break-times. 
We conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine 
issue 
of 
material 
fact 
that 
defendant 
affected 
or 
controlled 
a 
term, 
condition, 
or 
privilege 
of 
her 
employment. 
Accordingly, plaintiff may not maintain a 
cause of action under the CRA against this defendant, and, 
again, 
no 
inquiry 
into 
whether 
defendant 
possessed 
sufficient notice that Bennett was engaged in sexual 
harassment is necessary. 
(…continued)
supervisor acts outside ‘the scope of actual or apparent
authority 
to 
hire, 
fire, 
discipline, 
or 
promote.’”
Chambers, supra at 311, quoting Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich
368, 396 n 46; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). 
We again decline to
strictly impose vicarious liability in sexually hostile
work environment cases, absent an awareness by the employer
of the offensive conduct. 
21  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact that defendant affected or 
controlled the terms, conditions, or privileges of her 
employment and, therefore, she cannot bring a claim against 
defendant under the CRA. 
Further, we conclude that a 
common-law claim for negligent retention cannot be premised 
upon workplace sexual harassment. 
Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals that plaintiff has 
failed to establish that she may bring a claim under the 
CRA against this defendant, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals that plaintiff has an actionable claim for 
negligent retention, and reinstate the trial court’s order 
of judgment in favor of defendant. 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MILISSA MCCLEMENTS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
No. 126276 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority’s holding that a worker may 
bring a claim against a nonemployer defendant under the 
Civil Rights Act1 if the worker can establish that the 
nonemployer defendant affected or controlled a term, 
condition, or privilege of the worker’s employment. 
Ante 
at 20. 
But I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that 
plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of material 
fact 
that 
defendant 
affected 
or 
controlled 
a 
term, 
condition, or privilege of plaintiff’s employment. 
As 
noted 
by 
the 
majority, 
when 
plaintiff 
reported 
the 
incidents to her union steward, she stated that she was 
advised that if she reported the incidents to defendant, 
defendant would “turn around and stab you in the back and 
1 MCL 37.2101 et seq. 
 
 
you [would] end up losing your job.” 
Ante at 4. 
While 
this statement standing alone would probably not be 
sufficient to establish that defendant did, in fact, affect 
or control a term, condition, or privilege of plaintiff’s 
employment, it does raise a question whether defendant had 
that ability. 
Therefore, I would allow the parties to 
present evidence on this issue and let the question go to 
the jury. 
I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that 
plaintiff may not pursue a common-law claim for negligent 
retention. 
As noted by the majority, MCL 37.2803 provides 
that “[t]his act shall not be construed to diminish the 
right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable 
remedies in the courts of this state.” 
As explained in 
Hersh v Kentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410, 412; 189 
NW2d 286 (1971), under the common-law claim of negligent 
retention, 
an 
employer 
may 
be 
held 
liable 
for 
an 
intentional tort committed by one of its employees if the 
employer “‘knew or should have known of his employee’s 
propensities and criminal record before commission of an 
intentional tort . . . .’” (Citation omitted.) 
The majority asserts that plaintiff may not pursue a 
common-law negligent retention claim because the claim is 
premised entirely on “the statutorily based tort of sexual 
2  
 
 
 
 
harassment.” 
Ante at 10 (emphasis deleted). 
I disagree. 
Plaintiff’s negligent retention claim is not premised 
solely 
on 
“the 
statutorily 
based 
tort 
of 
sexual 
harassment,” but also implicates other torts such as 
assault and battery. 
Therefore, I would allow plaintiff 
the opportunity to establish her negligent retention claim 
and let the jury determine whether she has successfully 
done so. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MILISSA MCCLEMENTS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126276 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I believe there is ample evidence for a jury to decide 
the issue of whether defendant had adequate notice that one 
of its supervisors, Daniel Bennett, had the propensity to 
sexually harass and assault women and was indeed doing so. 
Accordingly, 
because 
plaintiff 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence of notice, a jury should be allowed to determine 
plaintiff’s claims against defendant for sexual harassment 
under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., and 
negligent retention. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s decision dismissing all of plaintiff’s 
claims. 
I. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE  
OF BENNETT’S PROPENSITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT  
AND ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WAS INDEED SEXUALLY HARASSING AND  
ASSAULTING WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that defendant 
had adequate notice of Bennett’s propensity to sexually 
harass and assault women and the pervasiveness of the 
existing sexual harassment perpetrated by Bennett. Bennett 
was one of defendant’s supervisors. 
In 1995, defendant 
learned that Bennett had exposed himself to three teenage 
girls while driving one of defendant’s vehicles. 
Bennett 
was convicted of indecent exposure.1
 While the facts 
related to this conviction alone may not be enough to put 
defendant on notice, defendant received other information 
that Bennett was sexually harassing women. 
In late October 1998, Justine Maldonado, another of 
defendant’s employees, reported to a production manager 
that Bennett was sexually harassing her.2
 Maldonado also 
told another of defendant’s employees, David Ferris, about 
the 
sexual 
harassment. 
Ferris 
told 
Jerome 
Rush, 
defendant’s director of labor relations at defendant’s 
Wixom plant. 
Maldonado’s complaint was not the first complaint of 
this nature against Bennett. 
As detailed in Elezovic v 
Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 433, 442-444; 697 NW2d 851 
1 This conviction was later expunged. 
2 The production manager was also Maldonado’s uncle. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
(2005) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part; Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), defendant also had notice in October 1998 that Lula 
Elezovic had stated that Bennett sexually harassed her. 
This information was shared with the director of labor 
relations–the same director of labor relations who learned 
of Maldonado’s complaints. 
Further, other coworkers had 
also discussed sexual harassment involving Bennett with the 
director of labor relations.3 
An employer can only avoid liability if it adequately 
investigates a claim of sexual harassment and takes prompt 
and appropriate remedial action. 
Radtke v Everett, 442 
Mich 368, 396; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). 
Managers and the 
director of labor relations knew of claims that Bennett was 
sexually harassing women. 
These claims, along with 
knowledge that Bennett had exposed himself to three teenage 
girls, are sufficient evidence to allow a jury to determine 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant 
adequately investigated these claims and took appropriate 
3 Interestingly, in yet another case involving Bennett,
Perez v Ford Motor Co, unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued March 10, 2005 (Docket No.
249737), slip op at 3, the Court of Appeals notes,
“Defendant admits that the proper procedure for reporting a
sexual harassment claim was to report to the labor 
relations department or a UAW committeeperson.” 
(Emphasis
added.) 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
remedial action. 
See Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 
297, 312, 318-319; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). 
II. PLAINTIFF CAN BRING A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT UNDER THE 
CRA 
The CRA, in MCL 37.2201(a), defines “[e]mployer” as “a 
person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent 
of 
that 
person.” 
An 
employer 
is 
prohibited 
from 
discriminating against an individual by doing any of the 
following: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status. 
(b) 
Limit, 
segregate, 
or 
classify 
an 
employee or applicant for employment in a way
that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or
applicant 
of 
an 
employment 
opportunity, 
or 
otherwise adversely affects the status of an 
employee or applicant because of religion, race,
color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight,
or marital status. 
(c) 
Segregate, 
classify, 
or 
otherwise 
discriminate against a person on the basis of sex
with respect to a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, including, but not limited to, a
benefit plan or system. [MCL 37.2202(1).] 
“Discrimination 
because 
of 
sex 
includes 
sexual 
harassment.” MCL 37.2103(i). 
Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct or communication of a
sexual nature under the following conditions: 
4  
 
 
 
 
* * *  
(iii) The conduct or communication has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering
with 
an 
individual’s 
employment, 
public
accommodations or public services, education, or
housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive 
employment, 
public 
accommodations,
public 
services, 
educational, 
or 
housing
environment. [MCL 37.2103(i)(iii).] 
The majority acknowledges that the CRA allows for 
claims by nonemployees, but the majority states that 
“unless an individual can establish a genuine issue of 
material fact that an employer affected or controlled the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of his or her employment, 
a nonemployee may not bring a claim under the CRA.” 
Ante 
at 14. According to the majority, plaintiff cannot bring a 
claim against defendant because “[p]laintiff was hired, 
paid, and subject to discipline by AVI [Food Systems]. AVI 
placed plaintiff in the Wixom plant and had the sole 
authority to move her to different cafeterias or even to 
another plant.” Ante at 20-21. The majority’s application 
of the statute in this case ignores the specific language 
of the statute. 
MCL 37.2202(1)(a) states that an employer cannot 
“otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect 
to 
. 
. 
. 
a 
term, 
condition, 
or 
privilege 
of 
employment. . . .” 
Discrimination 
includes 
sexual 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
harassment. 
MCL 37.2103(i). 
Sexual harassment includes 
creating a sexually hostile or offensive work environment, 
MCL 37.2103(i)(iii), and this is exactly what defendant, 
through its supervisor Bennett, allegedly did to plaintiff. 
Defendant’s supervisor, Bennett, did not merely have 
the 
ability 
or 
authority 
to 
affect 
a 
condition 
of 
plaintiff’s 
employment, 
he 
allegedly 
did 
so 
because 
plaintiff alleged Bennett’s conduct created a sexually 
hostile 
work 
environment 
at 
plaintiff’s 
workplace. 
Notably, defendant was the only one who had the authority 
to control Bennett and, therefore, affect a condition of 
plaintiff’s 
employment. 
The 
CRA 
prohibits 
sexual 
harassment by an employer or an employer’s agent. 
Bennett 
was defendant’s agent when he allegedly sexually harassed 
plaintiff. 
Therefore, plaintiff can bring a claim against 
defendant for sexual harassment under the CRA.4 
III. PLAINTIFF CAN BRING A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR  
NEGLIGENT RETENTION  
MCL 37.2803 states that the CRA “shall not be 
construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or 
4 Contrary to the majority’s presentation of the 
dissent’s position, see ante at 20 n 14, defendant would be
liable only if it had notice and did not adequately
investigate the claim and take prompt and appropriate
remedial measures, just as in all other hostile work 
environment sexual harassment cases. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this 
state.” 
When a statute provides a remedy for enforcement 
of a common-law right, it is cumulative and not exclusive. 
Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537, 552-553; 189 NW2d 
243 (1971). 
The passage of the CRA did not abolish 
plaintiff’s right to bring a negligent retention claim 
against defendant. 
As stated by plaintiff’s counsel during oral argument, 
Bennett’s conduct, while indeed sexual harassment, was also 
“classic assault and battery, [a] common law tort.” 
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that Bennett posed a 
“known danger to women” and “sexually assaulted” plaintiff. 
Plaintiff’s claim that Bennett grabbed her and tried to put 
his tongue in her mouth, as well as Maldonado’s claims that 
Bennett assaulted her and exposed himself to her and 
Elezovic’s claims that Bennett assaulted her, certainly 
qualify as assaultive behavior. 
See, e.g., Radtke, supra 
at 395 (sexual assault can be sexual harassment that 
creates a hostile work environment). 
Plaintiff 
has 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
that 
defendant was aware of Bennett’s propensity to sexually 
harass and assault women and that defendant negligently 
retained Bennett in light of this information. See Hersh v 
Kentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410, 412, 415; 189 NW2d 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 (1971). 
Accordingly, I believe that plaintiff can 
present a claim for common-law negligent retention to a 
jury, and the jury should decide whether defendant acted 
reasonably. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I believe that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence 
that defendant had adequate notice of Bennett’s propensity 
to sexually harass and assault women and that Bennett was 
indeed doing so in the workplace. 
It is then a question 
for the jury whether defendant’s subsequent conduct was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, I would 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and 
allow plaintiff to proceed on her claim under the CRA. 
I 
would also affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
part and allow plaintiff to proceed on her claim for 
negligent retention. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
8