Title: In re Kirby

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Kirby (2011-291)
 
2012 VT 72
 
[Filed 24-Aug-2012]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 72
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-291
 
JUNE TERM, 2012
 
In re Paul Kirby
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
  
 
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Civil Division
 
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DOCKET NO. S0450-08
  CnC
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
In 2006, Paul Kirby was charged with five counts of possessing child
pornography after a search of his computer revealed five different video
depictions of sexual conduct by a child or children.  Evidence suggested
that each video was downloaded independently and stored as a separate file on
petitioner's computer.  Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of
possession in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two counts. 
Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of four to fifteen
years.  
¶ 2.            
In 2008, Kirby, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief
(PCR), and amended the petition with the assistance of counsel in 2009.  The
petition contained two claims: (1) that petitioner received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to research, investigate, and
inform him of the possibility of asserting a challenge to the multiple charges
of possession that could have resulted in the five charges being reduced to
one; and (2) because counsel failed to advise him on this legal theory prior to
entering his plea agreement, petitioner's subsequent guilty pleas were not
entered knowingly and voluntarily.  Petitioner moved for summary judgment
on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The State opposed petitioner's
motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on both claims.  The superior
court granted the State's motion for summary judgment.  Petitioner
appeals.  We affirm.
¶ 3.            
Attorney Elizabeth Hibbits represented petitioner on the possession of
child pornography charges through his conviction and sentencing. 
Petitioner was charged under 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a), which states that "[n]o
person shall, with knowledge of the character and content, possess any
photograph, film or visual depiction, including any depiction which is stored
electronically, of sexual conduct by a child or of a clearly lewd exhibition of
a child's genitals or anus."  The PCR petition asserted that, but for
counsel's failure to advise him on or pursue a multiplicity challenge,
petitioner's sentence would have been at most five years, rather than four to
fifteen.  Accompanying this motion, petitioner submitted a statement of
uncontested material facts and an affidavit of expert opinion from an
experienced criminal defense attorney stating that petitioner had been denied
effective assistance of counsel.  The expert opined that petitioner's
attorney should have researched and pursued the claim that the multiple child
pornography counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to United States Constitution because "[a]ll five counts in this case arose
from a single alleged possession occurring on September 25, 2006 by Mr. Kirby
on his computer in his residence in Essex."  The affidavit acknowledged
that "in 2007 this area of the law was in a state of development and
uncertainty."*  With its motion for summary
judgment, the State submitted a statement of uncontested material facts with an
affidavit from Attorney Hibbits attesting that she researched the law and
discussed the multiplicity defense with petitioner.  Petitioner did not
submit countervailing evidence disputing counsel's account.
¶ 4.            
The trial court granted the State's cross-motion and ruled against
petitioner on both claims.  Relying on Attorney Hibbits's uncontested
assertion that she had "discussed and explored" whether the five videos could
support five separate criminal counts with petitioner, and on petitioner's
failure to file an opposition to the State's summary judgment motion, the court
held that petitioner did not show that counsel failed to inform him of this
possible defense or that he would have pled differently but for counsel's alleged
failure.  On appeal petitioner does not challenge the finding that
Attorney Hibbits researched and discussed the law with him, but argues that
counsel wrongly informed him that a multiplicity challenge was not a viable
defense, and that he entered his guilty pleas based on this misunderstanding
and, thus, his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily.  
¶ 5.            
On an appeal of summary judgment, this Court applies a de novo standard
of review.  In re Barrows, 2007 VT 9, ¶ 5, 181 Vt. 283, 917 A.2d 490.  Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of
material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
V.R.C.P. 56(a). 
¶ 6.            
In the present case, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
 To the trial court, petitioner claimed that he "did not understand that
there was (and is) an untested legal theory which had (has) the potential
defense to cause all five counts to be subsumed within one. That legal theory
was not even contemplated, let alone investigated, researched, and discussed
with him."  In light of the lower court's findings that counsel did in
fact research and discuss with petitioner a possible multiplicity challenge,
petitioner's argument on appeal has shifted.  Now, petitioner argues that
he did not understand that he had a viable multiplicity defense because counsel
told him such a defense was meritless.  Counsel's affidavit confirms that
she did not think the facts in petitioner's case supported such a challenge because
petitioner's possession of five separate and individual files formed the
evidentiary bases for five distinct counts of possession.  Based on her
understanding of the law, and the fact that "[t]here was no controlling legal
authority at that time standing for the proposition that the charges were
multiplicitous," she advised petitioner that she doubted the defense would be
supported by the evidence.  She further shared her assessment of "the
potential pitfalls of asking for a hearing where the video evidence might be
presented to the Court that would ultimately determine Mr. Kirby's sentence." 
¶ 7.            
Was counsel's opinion that a multiplicity defense would fail
flawed?  And, would any misunderstanding on the part of petitioner entitle
him to post-conviction relief?  On appeal petitioner does not raise his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to this Court.  Rather, he
contends that his pleas were based on a misunderstanding effectuated by
counsel.  As a result, though we do not address the adequacy of counsel's
representation as a separate claim, it is necessary to address whether
counsel's opinion on the viability of a multiplicity challenge was reasonable
before determining if her opinion undermined petitioner's understanding so as
to make his pleas involuntary.  
¶ 8.            
As noted, petitioner was charged with violating 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a),
which states that "[n]o person shall . . . possess any
photograph, film or visual depiction, including any depiction which is stored
electronically, of sexual conduct by a child or of a clearly lewd exhibition of
a child's genitals or anus."  Petitioner argues that under the language of
this statute, he should be charged with only one count of child pornography
possession, rather than five (i.e., one count for each separate image file of
pornography found on his computer).  Petitioner reasons that the word
"any" leaves the Legislature's intended unit of prosecution unclear because it
has both singular and plural meaning.  He argues that where there is statutory
ambiguity, the rule of lenity should be applied, effectively reducing his five
counts of possession to a single charge.  
¶ 9.            
Post-conviction relief is a limited remedy, intended to correct
fundamental errors in the judicial process.  In re Laws, 2007 VT
54, ¶ 9, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210; State v. Bristol, 159 Vt. 334, 337,
618 A.2d 1290, 1291-92 (1992); In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361, 438 A.2d 1106, 1110 (1981).  It is not designed to be a substitute for a
merit-based appeal, nor should it be a vehicle for the introduction of legal
arguments not raised below.  As such, whether a multiplicity challenge to
13 V.S.A. § 2827(a) would have been successful is not the issue in this
case.  Just as we are not permitted to judge an attorney's competence
based on whether a tactical decision was ultimately successful, we decline to
stand on hindsight and decide whether a given tactic would have been ultimately
successful had it been pursued.  In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 212,
647 A.2d 316, 319 (1994); In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 32, 460 A.2d 472,
477 (1983).  Thus we look only to whether counsel's decision not to raise
this challenge constitutes a fundamental error. 
¶ 10.        
In 2007, when counsel would have researched the potential for a
multiplicity challenge, the state of the law was in flux and, as the court
noted, "there was no controlling authority on whether, or under what
circumstances, 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a) supports multiple charges of possession of
child pornography."  Even petitioner's expert stated in his affidavit:
 "Suffice it to say that in 2007 this area of the law was in a state of
development and uncertainty."  Several states had already dismissed
multiplicity arguments in child pornography statutes and upheld separate charges
for each piece of child pornography found in a single seizure.  See,
e.g.,  Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 788 (Del. 2003) (holding thirty
counts of child pornography possession did not violate double jeopardy even
though State could not prove that images were obtained through multiple
downloads); State v. Multaler, 643 N.W.2d 437, 449 (Wis. 2002)
(upholding a conviction of twenty-eight counts of possession, one for each of
twenty-eight image files located on two computer disks); State v. Mather,
646 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Neb. 2002) (affirming that eighteen counts of visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child based on eighteen
separate and different photographs did not violate double jeopardy).  In Multaler
and Mather, the statutory language was very similar to the language in
13 V.S.A. § 2827(a) in that they also use the word "any" followed by the
singular form of a type of prohibited material.  Multaler, 643 N.W.2d  at 451; Mather, 646 N.W.2d  at 610-11.  Following these
states, the high courts of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania both released
decisions upholding multiple child pornography possession convictions in 2007.
 State v. Ravell, 922 A.2d 685, 688 (N.H. 2007) (holding that even
possession of a duplicate copy of an image can result in a separate charge); Commonwealth
v. Davidson; 938 A.2d 198, 219 (Pa. 2007) (concluding that legislature
intended for each image of child pornography to be a separate, independent
crime).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "of the other
jurisdictions that have considered similar challenges, a significant majority
have found that possession of each image of child pornography constitutes a
separate offense and does not implicate double jeopardy."  Id. 
¶ 11.        
This Court has previously recognized a strong presumption of
reasonableness in an attorney's performance.  Dunbar, 162 Vt. at
212, 647 A.2d  at 319.  We permit counsel "a great deal of discretion in
decisions regarding trial strategy, and even the failure of that strategy is
not the standard by which a reviewing court will measure a trial counsel's
competence."  Id.  Where counsel chooses not to pursue or
investigate a given legal theory, that decision "must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference
to counsel's judgments."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
691 (1984).  As noted, not only was there significant case law suggesting
a multiplicity challenge might not succeed, there was no controlling case law
to suggest that it would. 
¶ 12.        
In light of the case law that existed in 2007, it was reasonable for
counsel to doubt the merit of asserting a similar challenge to Vermont's
statute and to inform petitioner she thought this challenge was not
viable.  The mere fact that petitioner and his expert were able to find
some case law that may support a multiplicity challenge does not mean that
challenge would have succeeded, nor does it mean counsel was unreasonable to
believe it would not.  Counsel is entitled to "wide latitude" in her tactical
decisions, so long as they are reasonable.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
689.  "Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a
particular client in the same way."  Id.
¶ 13.        
Where the theory of law is untested or unsettled, counsel cannot be
faulted for failing to raise every possible defensethis is both an unduly
heavy and impractical burden.  See  State v. McMahon, 519 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) ("Counsel is not required to object [to]
and argue a point of law that is unsettled.  Although it might have been
ideal for counsel to so object . . . the fact is that he
was not deficient in failing to do so.").  This reasoning is consistent
with our past statements on the affirmative duties of defense counsel and with
the laws of malpractice.  In re Combs, 2011 VT 75, ¶ 12, __ Vt. __,
27 A.3d 318 (mem.) (upholding the trial court's finding that "petitioner made
the decision not to raise an insanity defense after advice from defense counsel
and defense counsel could not be faulted for a wrong decision"); Roberts v.
Chimileski, 2003 VT 10, ¶ 19, 175 Vt. 480, 820 A.2d 995 ("[T]he rule that
an attorney is not liable for an error of judgment on an unsettled proposition
of law is universally recognized." (quoting 3 R. Mallen et al., Legal
Malpractice § 18.1 at 2 (5th ed. 2000))); see also Strickland,
466 U.S.  at 691 ("[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's
failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as
unreasonable.").
¶ 14.        
Having established that it was not unreasonable for counsel to doubt the
viability of a multiplicity challenge, and to inform petitioner likewise, we
turn to whether petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily.
 A defendant waives important constitutional rights when he pleads guilty,
and thus such a plea must be the "voluntary expression of his own
choice."  In re Quinn, 174 Vt. 562, 563, 816 A.2d 425, 426-27
(2002) (mem.) (quotation omitted); see In re Raymond, 137 Vt. 171, 180,
400 A.2d 1004, 1009 (1979).  "It is well accepted that if a plea is
unfairly obtained through ignorance, fear or misunderstanding it is open to
collateral attack."  In re McGrail, 130 Vt. 492, 495, 296 A.2d 213,
215 (1972).  Where petitioner relied upon a material misunderstanding
resulting from misinformation provided by his attorney, he may be entitled to
post-conviction relief.  In re Moulton, 158 Vt. 580, 586, 613 A.2d 705, 709 (1992).  However, to make a valid claim on this ground, such a
misunderstanding may not be based solely on a petitioner's subjective
misunderstanding of the law or of counsel's statements.  In re Stevens,
144 Vt. 250, 255, 478 A.2d 212, 215 (1984).  Rather, it "must be based on
objective evidence which reasonably produced the misunderstanding."  Id.
¶ 15.        
Here, counsel advised petitioner that a multiplicity challenge would
likely fail.  Counsel's affidavit states that she believed "the State had
ample evidence to support five separate counts under the applicable Vermont
statute."  Petitioner's claim is therefore not based on a subjective
misunderstanding of counsel's advice.  He apparently accepted her opinion
and understood that he was facing five charges of possession when he agreed to
plead guilty to three charges.  Nor was counsel's opinion that a
multiplicity challenge would not succeed an objective misunderstanding of the
law, which she passed on to petitioner, and on which he based his plea. As
noted above, counsel was reasonable to doubt the merit of an untested
multiplicity challenge.  Counsel's advice, however unsatisfactory to
petitioner, did not misinform him.  
¶ 16.        
We hold that counsel's assessment of the viability of a multiplicity
challenge under 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a) was not unreasonable, and thus did not
create a material misunderstanding upon which petitioner based his guilty
pleas.  Petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily and
therefore he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
Affirmed. 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Beth Robinson, Associate
  Justice
 

*  The trial court did not consider
the affidavit accompanying petitioner's motion for summary judgment because it failed
to comply with Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) in that the statement
of uncontested facts did not refer specifically to the affidavit (although the
motion for summary judgment incorporated the affidavit and the statement of
facts).