Title: State v. Jones

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2665 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Anthony Jones: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Anthony Jones, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 4, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Rhonda L. Lanford 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J., and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and an oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Amy C. Miller, assistant solicitor general, with whom on the 
brief were Brad D. Schimel, Attorney General, and Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Amy 
C. Miller. 
 
 
2018 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP2665   
(L.C. No. 
2013CI4) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Anthony Jones: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Anthony Jones, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, unauthored summary affirmance of the court of 
appeals, State v. Jones, No. 2015AP2665, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2017), affirming the Dane County circuit 
court's1 judgment finding Anthony Jones ("Jones") to be a 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Rhonda L. Lanford presided. 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
2 
 
"sexually violent person" under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(a) (2015-
16).2 
¶2 
On November 29, 1993, Jones was convicted of three 
counts of second-degree sexual assault, use of force, under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(2)(a), and was scheduled to be released from 
custody on August 15, 2013.  On August 9, 2013, the State filed 
a petition to commit Jones as a sexually violent person, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Prior to the commitment trial, 
Jones filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony pertaining 
to 
the 
Minnesota 
Sex 
Offender 
Screening 
Tool-Revised  
("MnSOST-R") and the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense 
Recidivism ("RRASOR"),3 which are actuarial instruments designed 
to measure an offender's risk of reoffending.  He argued that 
testimony as to the results produced by these instruments was 
not admissible under Wis. Stat. § 907.02 because it was not 
based on sufficient facts or data, was not the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and was not reliably applied to 
the facts of his case.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
finding that such testimony was admissible.  After a four-day 
trial, the jury found that Jones was "a sexually violent person, 
as alleged in the petition."  Jones appealed. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-
16 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 Jones also sought to exclude testimony pertaining to the 
Static Risk Assessment 99 ("Static-99"), but he does not renew 
his challenge to that testimony here. 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
3 
 
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed.  It held that the 
circuit court had not erroneously exercised its discretion in 
admitting the testimony because the circuit court applied the 
proper standard and found that the instruments were the product 
of sufficient facts or data, that the instruments were the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and that the 
instruments had been the subject of extensive review.  The court 
of appeals further noted that Jones' arguments went to weight, 
not 
admissibility, 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
he 
had 
had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
discredit 
the 
testimony 
through 
cross-
examination.  Jones petitioned for review. 
¶4 
We consider one issue on review:  whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) when it admitted expert testimony based on the 
results of the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR tests.  We conclude that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
because it evaluated the relevant facts under the proper 
standard and articulated a reasonable basis for its decision. 
¶5 
Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutory History 
¶6 
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Prior to 2011, § 907.02 read as follows: 
Testimony by experts.  If scientific, technical 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
4 
 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2009-10).  This was a liberal standard.  
Under this prior standard  
"questions of the weight and reliability of relevant 
evidence [were] matters for the trier of fact."  State 
v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶7, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 
N.W.2d 629. 
 
"[E]xpert 
testimony 
[was] 
generally 
admissible in the circuit court's discretion if the 
witness [was] qualified to testify and the testimony 
would help the trier of fact understand the evidence 
or determine a fact at issue."  State v. Kandutsch, 
2011 WI 78, ¶26, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865. 
Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, ¶174, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 
N.W.2d 816 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (alterations in original).  
"This was a 'low threshold.'"  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶7 
In 2011, the legislature amended the statute,4 which 
now reads as follows: 
Testimony 
by 
experts.  (1) 
If 
scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product 
of reliable principles and methods, and the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
(2)  Notwithstanding sub. (1), the testimony of 
an expert witness may not be admitted if the expert 
witness is 
entitled to receive any compensation 
contingent on the outcome of any claim or case with 
respect to which the testimony is being offered. 
                                                 
4 See 2011 Wis. Act 2, §§ 34m, 37. 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  These changes adopted the federal 
standard, which incorporates the analysis promulgated in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  See 
Seifert, 372 Wis. 2d 525, ¶6.5   
¶8 
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposed two requirements for 
the admission of expert testimony:  (1) that "[t]he subject of 
an expert's testimony must be 'scientific . . . knowledge'"; and 
(2) that "the evidence or testimony [must] assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue."  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-91.  In determining whether 
expert testimony meets this standard, the Court set forth a 
nonexclusive list of questions courts should consider when 
making these determinations: 
 whether the evidence can be (and has been) tested; 
 whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; 
 the known or potential rate of error; 
 the existence and maintenance of standards controlling 
the technique's operation; and 
                                                 
5 Although there was no majority opinion in Seifert v. 
Balink, 2017 WI 2, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816, a majority 
of the court agreed that the amendment of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 
adopted the federal Daubert standard.  See Seifert, 372 
Wis. 2d 525, 
¶6 
(lead 
opinion); 
id., 
¶169 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring); id., ¶¶193, 257 (Gableman, J., concurring, joined 
by 
Roggensack, 
C.J.); 
id., 
¶¶263 
n.3, 
296 
(Kelly, 
J., 
dissenting, joined by R. Grassl Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
6 
 
 the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community. 
Id. at 593-94.  The Court later held that Daubert's general 
principles were not limited to "scientific" knowledge, and that 
the analysis applies to all expert testimony.  Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999). 
 
B.  Factual and Procedural Background 
¶9 
As noted above, this case arises from Jones' three 
convictions for second-degree sexual assault on November 29, 
1993.  Jones was sentenced to 15 years probation for these 
convictions, but Jones' probation was revoked when he committed 
another sexual assault.  He was then sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment and was due to be released on August 15, 2013.   
¶10 Just before his release date, on August 9, 2013, the 
State filed a petition to commit Jones as a "sexually violent 
person."  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.02(1)(a), 980.01(7).  The State 
based its petition on the report of Anthony Jurek, Ph.D., which 
documented Jones' history of sexual and non-sexual arrests, 
charges, and convictions, his misconduct as an inmate, his 
probation 
violations, 
and 
his 
scores 
on 
four 
actuarial 
instruments: 
 On the RRASOR, Jones scored a 5, which corresponds to a 
49.8 percent rate of reconviction for sexual offenses 
within 5 years and a 55.3 percent rate within 10 years.  
 On MnSOST-R, Jones scored an 11, which corresponds to a 
30 percent rate of recidivism within 6 years.   
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
7 
 
 On the Static Risk Assessment 99 ("Static-99"), Jones 
scored a 9, which corresponds to a 39 percent rate of 
reconviction for sexual offenses over 5 years, a 45 
percent rate within 10 years, and a 52 percent rate 
within 15 years.   
 On the Static-99R, Jones scored an 8, which corresponds 
to a 45 percent rate of re-arrest and reconviction within 
5 years, and a 55.3 percent rate within 10 years.   
The State alleged that these scores "support [Dr. Jurek's] 
conclusion that [Jones] is 'more likely than not' to commit a 
sexually violent offense in the future."   
¶11 On August 23, 2013, the circuit court held a probable 
cause hearing, found "probable cause to believe that [Jones] is 
a sexually violent person within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7)," and ordered that Jones remain in custody pending 
the outcome of the commitment proceedings.   
 
1.  The Daubert hearing 
¶12 On June 17, 2014, Jones filed a motion to bar 
testimony pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  In general, he 
argued that expert testimony regarding any results of the 
MnSOST-R, the RRASOR, and the Static-99 should be excluded 
because they are not based on sufficient facts or data, they are 
not the product of reliable principles and methods, and they 
were not applied reliably to the facts of Jones' case.  
"Specifically, [Jones argued that] all three actuarial risk 
instruments have obsolete norms and fail to adequately take into 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
8 
 
account the correlation between age and recidivism risk."  He 
argued that the MnSOST-R is particularly flawed because it has 
not been published in an academic journal, was developed using 
inadequately small and unrepresentative samples (256 offenders), 
and excludes offenders known to have lower recidivism rates.  
Similarly, Jones argued that the RRASOR has not been published 
in an academic journal, was developed using inadequately small 
and unrepresentative samples (2,592 offenders), and its 10-year 
reconviction rate is just a factor of the 5-year reconviction 
rate, that is, it is not based on empirical data.   
¶13 On August 20, 2014, the State filed its response.  It 
noted that Jones did not appear to be challenging the use of 
actuarial instruments in general, or the qualifications of 
Dr. Jurek or the State's other expert, Bradley Allen, Ph.D.  The 
State then argued that the MnSOST-R, RRASOR, and Static-99  
have all been carefully researched, widely discussed 
and dissected in the professional literature.  They 
are the product of sophisticated, but hardly novel, 
statistical techniques for the analysis of large 
amounts of data.  Experts may disagree on the 
application, scoring, interpretation and weight to be 
given to the various actuarial instruments . . . but 
that is a different matter than claiming that the 
instruments themselves are not the product of reliable 
data, and principles.   
In this regard, the State observed that all of the experts——
Jones' included——rely on substantially the same risk assessment 
methodology, but give weight to different factors during that 
process.  It argued that "these differences are not a matter of 
admissibility," but rather that they are matters "best resolved 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
9 
 
through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary 
evidence."   
¶14 On August 25 and 26, 2014, the circuit court held a 
hearing on the motion.  At the hearing, Dr. Jurek and Dr. Allen 
testified for the State, and Richard Waller, Ph.D., testified 
for Jones. 
¶15 Dr. Jurek testified that his evaluations incorporate a 
review 
of 
records 
from 
the 
police, 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections, and probation officers, as well as a social 
history, substance abuse history, sexual history, and treatment 
history, along with the actuarial assessments.  He explained 
that 
"an 
actuarial 
assessment 
is 
the 
use 
of 
particular 
demographic variables that you can score a particular individual 
on, and then compare their score to individuals in a sample 
population who have a known rate of recidivism."  He also 
explained that all of the instruments have limitations, and, at 
best, have "moderate" predictive accuracy, but that evaluators 
incorporate the results from these instruments into their 
reports because "[u]sing the actuarials has been proven to be 
more accurate."  In this regard, Dr. Jurek noted that there is 
no one best instrument, that every instrument has limitations, 
and that which instrument to use is a matter of preference and a 
matter of how evaluators weigh the results in the process of 
their evaluation.  He then testified regarding each of the four 
actuarial instruments that he used in his evaluation of Jones.   
¶16 With regard to the MnSOST-R, Dr. Jurek testified that, 
although there is no definitive academic paper on the test, 12 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
10 
 
research inquiries have found it to have a positive relationship 
to sexual recidivism.  He also testified that the MnSOST-3——a 
more recent instrument published by the creators of the  
MnSOST-R——is not a replacement because its sample is made up of 
different kinds of offenders than were included in the sample 
for the MnSOST-R.  In this regard, he was aware of the criticism 
that the purposeful exclusion of offenders known to be low-risk 
(intrafamilial and non-contact offenders) resulted in a sample 
biased to overestimate risk, but testified that selective 
sampling can be useful if the goal is to homogenize the sample 
to improve predictive accuracy for a more specific population of 
people.  He was also aware of the criticism that the dichotomous 
way in which the MnSOST-R accounts for age6 is inadequate because 
it fails to account for the observed trend that the risk of 
recidivism continues to decline in a linear fashion as offenders 
age, but testified that accounting for age differently does not 
mean that the test inadequately accounts for age.  Ultimately, 
Dr. Jurek testified that the MnSOST-R is based on sufficient 
facts and data, and that it is the product of reliable 
principles and methods.   
¶17 With regard to the RRASOR, Dr. Jurek testified that, 
although the test was not originally published in a peer-
reviewed journal, he used it because it has an established 
                                                 
6 In applying the MnSOST-R, evaluators add a point to an 
offender's score if he or she is less than 30 years old and no 
points are added or subtracted if he or she is more than 30 
years old.   
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
11 
 
history of use, with approximately 35 studies demonstrating a 
positive relationship to sexual recidivism.  He was aware of the 
criticism that the sample had not been updated since 1997 (when 
it was first published), but testified that, even "if the 
general norms for sexual recidivism[] go down, [if] you're 
working in a [high-risk] population, the newer norms don't do 
you any good."  He was also aware of the criticism that the 10-
year recidivism rates are simply a multiplication factor of the 
5-year recidivism rates (i.e., are not based on empirical data), 
but disagreed that that was actually the case.  Additionally, 
the same criticism raised regarding age against the MnSOST-R was 
raised against the RRASOR, but, as he had testified regarding 
the MnSOST-R, Dr. Jurek testified that the dichotomous age7 
metric did not render the instrument ineffective.  Ultimately, 
Dr. Jurek testified that the RRASOR is based on sufficient facts 
and data, and that it is the product of reliable principles and 
methods.   
¶18 Dr. Allen also testified for the State.  He testified 
primarily with regard to the Static-99 and the Static-99R, which 
were the instruments he had relied on in conducting his 
evaluation of Jones.  He did, however, testify that he did not 
use the RRASOR because he believed it to be outdated, but that 
there was nothing unreliable about the data used to construct 
                                                 
7 In applying the RRASOR, evaluators add a point to an 
offender's score if he or she is less than 25 years old and no 
points are added or subtracted if he or she is more than 25 
years old.   
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
12 
 
it.  Specifically, on the issue of measuring the effect of age 
on the risk of recidivism, Dr. Allen testified that, "although 
age [] is definitely a factor to consider, we don't know why."  
He suggested that it could be because older offenders are 
underreported, or it could be related to declining health in 
older offenders.  He acknowledged that "[k]nowing why age and 
recidivism are correlated . . . is not needed to conclude that 
incorporating age can improve risk assessment measures," but 
testified that the fact that there is a debate about how to 
incorporate the age factor does not equate with unreliability or 
invalidity.  Ultimately, he concluded that responsible examiners 
may responsibly use different actuarial instruments and that it 
is "somewhat prudent to look at all the different assessments, 
and all the different factors and consider them for a particular 
individual."   
¶19 Dr. Waller testified for Jones and testified about all 
four tests.  He prefaced his testimony by noting that he had not 
himself evaluated Jones; rather, his testimony was based on the 
evaluations of Drs. Jurek and Allen, and his own expertise, 
given his approximately 30 years in the field.   
¶20 With regard to the MnSOST-R, Dr. Waller testified that 
it was not based on sufficient facts and data and was not based 
on reliable principles and methods because it had not been peer 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
13 
 
reviewed,8 the sample on which it is based is small, biased, and 
unrepresentative as applied to Jones, and no one has ever 
analyzed which of the 16 factors the MnSOST-R accounts for are 
actually related to recidivism.  In particular, the biased 
nature of the sample "virtually guarantees a high false positive 
rate over estimating the probability of recidivism."  
¶21 With regard to the RRASOR, Dr. Waller testified that 
it was not based on sufficient facts and data and was not based 
on reliable principles and methods because its dichotomous means 
of accounting for age is inadequate, its data set is many years 
old, and the 10-year rates are simply the 5-year rates 
multiplied by a factor of 1.5, which is a serious problem 
because actual empirical data indicates that the farther out you 
go the less likely offenders are to reoffend.   
¶22 Despite these criticisms, Dr. Waller acknowledged that 
not all offenders are alike, that different subgroups have 
different risks, and that the best way to determine the risk of 
recidivism is to compare the individual to a similar subgroup.  
Additionally, Dr. Waller acknowledged that actuarial assessment 
is a complex task, that there is more than one way to conduct an 
actuarial assessment, and that all actuarial instruments have 
                                                 
8 Dr. Waller defined "peer review[ed]" as "a method of 
judging the merits of a scientific article, and making a 
determination of whether it meets the standards of a journal."  
On cross-examination, however, he agreed that there is more than 
one way to peer review, including that "it can be peer-reviewed 
if it's given at a, say, conference, but it doesn't have the 
same weight." 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
14 
 
limits.  In this regard, he agreed with Dr. Jurek that the 
instruments all report error rates and, at best, have moderate 
predictive accuracy.   
¶23 After hearing brief closing arguments from counsel, 
the circuit court concluded that testimony as to the results 
from the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR was admissible.  In doing so, 
it explained the standard it was applying as follows: 
[Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02] was revised in 2011 
and tracks federal rule 702 also known as the Daubert 
standard . . . named after Daubert versus Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 1993.  It is axiomatic.  
The Court can look to federal cases interpreting 
[this] rule[.]  Because there is a dearth of case law, 
this Court will look primarily at federal law . . . . 
 
Judges may admit testimony resting on scientific, 
technical or otherwise specialized knowledge that will 
assist the trier of facts. . . . [R]ule 702 states 
that it does not condition admissibility on the State 
of the published literature and the complete and flaw 
free set of data, that a witness is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, and that expert may testify in the form of 
an opinion if the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data.  The testimony is principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and 
methods 
reliably 
to 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
case . . . . Daubert 
makes 
clear, 
[it 
does] 
not 
constitute a definitive checklist or test.  Daubert 
adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the 
facts of a particular case.   
The circuit court then concluded that: 
The evidence at the hearing through the witnesses 
show[s] that all of the tests and the testimony 
offered were the product of sufficient facts or data 
and 
the 
product 
of 
reliable 
[principles] 
and 
methods. . . . 
[W]hile publication in a journal is the most rigorous, 
it is not the only way to peer review.  The witnesses 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
15 
 
testified that these tests are routinely published [] 
both in journals and in published papers. . . . All of 
the instruments were subject of extensive review.  
They have been written about, and even criticized [in] 
the papers that [were] submitted. 
 
They have also been used in other cases, in other 
jurisdictions, and the Court was not able to find any 
cases where these tests were stricken based on 
admissibility or based on a Daubert challenge.  The 
tools have been debated, reviewed, and revised.  This 
is not junk science, which is what Daubert sought to 
reject.  These actuarial tools are widely used in 
predicting recidivism in sex offenders. . . . Both 
Dr. Jurek, 
and 
Dr. 
Allen 
testified 
that 
they . . . reviewed Mr. Jones' records and all the 
information they had and testified that this is the 
type of information reasonably relied upon by experts 
in their field. 
 
And there was no evidence suggesting or even 
challenging 
that 
they 
administered 
the 
test 
incorrectly 
or 
interpreted 
the 
actuarial 
data 
incorrectly.   
The circuit court additionally noted: 
[T]he State proceeds at its own peril if Mr. Jones, 
through cross-examination can convince a jury that 
Dr. Jurek 
and 
Dr. 
Allen's 
[testimony] 
is 
antiquated . . . . [But] Mr. Jones' criticisms of the 
actuarial tools are only that, criticisms, and cannot 
form the basis for this court to exclude this 
testimony. 
 
The weight to give this testimony is for the jury 
to decide.  This is a weight, not an admissibility 
analysis. . . . The 
Court 
is 
satisfied 
that 
this 
testimony presented meets all of the requirements for 
admissibility, and Mr. Jones' motion to exclude is 
denied.   
 
2.  Trial and appeal 
¶24 On September 29, 2014, Jones' trial for commitment as 
a sexually violent person under chapter 980 began.  At trial, 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
16 
 
three experts testified:  Dr. Jurek and Dr. Allen testified for 
the State, and Thomas Zander, Ph.D., testified for Jones.  
Dr. Jurek was "the only psychologist in this case to have used 
the RRASOR and [the] MnSOST-R to evaluate Mr. Jones' risk."  On 
October 2, 2014, the jury returned a special verdict finding 
that Jones was "a sexually violent person, as alleged in the 
petition."  Jones appealed.   
¶25 On appeal, Jones challenged his commitment on the 
basis that the circuit court's admission of testimony based on 
the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR was reversible error.  On April 10, 
2017, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
summarily 
affirmed. 
 
Jones, 
No. 2015AP2665.  The court of appeals held that the circuit 
court had not erroneously exercised its discretion because it 
considered the Daubert factors and found that the instruments 
were the product of sufficient facts and data, that the 
instruments were the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and that the instruments had been the subject of extensive 
review.  Id.  The court of appeals further noted that Jones' 
arguments 
went 
to 
weight, 
not 
admissibility, 
and 
that, 
therefore, he was able to discredit the testimony through cross-
examination.  Id.  Jones petitioned for review. 
¶26 On September 11, 2017, Jones' petition for review was 
granted. 
 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
17 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 "Questions regarding the admissibility of evidence are 
within the circuit court's discretion."  Nat'l Auto Truckstops, 
Inc. v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, ¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198. 
Where this court is asked to review such rulings, we 
look not to see if we agree with the circuit court's 
determination, but rather whether the trial court 
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted 
legal standards and in accordance with the facts of 
record.  A circuit court properly exercises its 
discretion when it considers the relevant facts, 
applies the correct law, and articulates a reasonable 
basis for its decision.   
Id. (citations omitted).  Whether the circuit court applied the 
correct law, however, requires us to interpret the statute.  
"The interpretation and application of a statute present 
questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 
193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  Thus, "this court decides whether the 
circuit court applied the proper legal standard under Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) . . . independently of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses."  Seifert, 
372 Wis. 2d 525, ¶89. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶28 We consider one issue on review:  whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) when it admitted expert testimony based on the 
results of the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR tests.  We conclude that 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
18 
 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
because it evaluated the relevant facts under the proper 
standard and articulated a reasonable basis for its decision. 
¶29 As noted above, the admissibility of expert testimony 
is governed by the recently amended Wis. Stat. § 907.02, which 
provides, in relevant part, as follows:  
Testimony 
by 
experts.  (1)  If 
scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product 
of reliable principles and methods, and the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1).  This statute requires that circuit 
courts 
make 
five 
determinations 
before 
admitting 
expert 
testimony:  (1) whether the scientific, technical, or other 
specialized 
knowledge 
will 
assist 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) 
whether the expert is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education; (3) whether the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (4) whether 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (5) whether the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
¶30 The first two determinations were also required under 
the pre-amendment statute.  And they were all that was required.  
As noted above, this was an easier standard to satisfy, because, 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
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as with relevance generally,9 the court's role was simply to 
determine whether the evidence made a fact of consequence more 
or less probable (although the evidence did also have to be 
introduced 
by 
a 
qualified 
witness). 
 
See 
Seifert, 
372 
Wis. 2d 525, ¶174 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (quoting State v. 
Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, ¶26, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865) 
("'Expert testimony was generally admissible in the circuit 
court's discretion if the witness was qualified to testify and 
the testimony would help the trier of fact understand the 
evidence 
or 
determine 
a 
fact 
at 
issue.'" 
(Alterations 
omitted.)). 
¶31 The court's role with regard to the admissibility of 
evidence is often described as that of a gatekeeper.  See, e.g., 
State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶40, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 
N.W.2d 629 (Ziegler, J., concurring) ("The judge, as gatekeeper, 
has the capacity to determine whether certain evidence is 
admissible."); see also State v. Wilson, 2015 WI 48, ¶99, 362 
Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52 (Ziegler J., concurring) ("The trial 
court remains the gatekeeper in determining what evidence is 
                                                 
9 Relevance is governed by Wis. Stat. § 904.01, which states 
as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Wis. Stat. § 904.01. 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
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admissible and why.").  In this role, courts seek to ensure that 
the evidence submitted to the factfinder is of the requisite 
quality.  The quality standards for admission of evidence vary 
based on the type of evidence at issue and the purpose for which 
it is offered.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 901.  These standards are 
prescribed 
by 
statute 
and 
represent 
the 
legislature's 
determination of a balance that ensures "that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.02.  In this regard, the admissibility of evidence is 
distinguished from the weight given to evidence that is 
admissible; the court's role is to admit evidence that meets the 
prescribed standards, which the factfinder then weighs to 
ascertain the truth.   
¶32 The heightened standard under the amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02 does not change this gatekeeping function.  It does, 
however, require more of the gatekeeper.  Instead of simply 
determining whether the evidence makes a fact of consequence 
more or less probable, courts must now also make a threshold 
determination as to whether the evidence is reliable enough to 
go to the factfinder.  The legislature has prescribed that 
courts do this by looking at whether the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, whether the testimony is the product 
of reliable principles and methods, and whether the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case.  As noted above, these requirements represent Wisconsin's 
adoption of the federal Daubert standard.  See supra ¶7.   
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
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¶33 In applying this standard, courts typically, although 
not exclusively, consider  
 whether the evidence can be (and has been) tested; 
 whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; 
 the known or potential rate of error; 
 the existence and maintenance of standards controlling 
the technique's operation; and 
 the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  Although this is a more burdensome 
standard, it is not exceedingly high; the court's "role [is to 
ensure] that the courtroom door remains closed to junk science."  
Seifert, 
372 
Wis. 2d 525, 
¶85. 
 
Moreover, 
although 
more 
burdensome, "trial courts [still] retain substantial discretion 
in deciding whether to admit expert testimony."  Id., ¶178 
(Ziegler, J., concurring) (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42).  
Thus, as with other admissibility determinations, we will not 
overturn a circuit court's admission of expert testimony unless 
the court failed to consider the relevant facts, failed to apply 
the proper standard, or failed to articulate a reasonable basis 
for its decision.   
¶34 Here, the circuit court considered the relevant facts, 
applied the proper standard, and articulated a reasonable basis 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
22 
 
for its decision.10  The circuit court identified the standard it 
was applying as under Wis. Stat. § 907.02 as "the Daubert 
standard . . . named 
after 
Daubert 
versus 
Merrell 
Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 
509 
U.S. 
579, 
1993." 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
transcript reveals that the circuit court actually applied this 
standard:  in reaching its conclusion, the circuit court found 
that, although the tests had not been published in peer-reviewed 
journals, "these tests are routinely published," "have been 
written about, and even criticized," "were subject of extensive 
review," and "are widely used in predicting recidivism in sex 
offenders."  These are among the factors that Daubert instructs 
courts to consider when evaluating whether expert testimony is 
admissible.  See supra ¶¶8, 33. 
¶35 These findings are also supported by the facts 
introduced at the Daubert hearing.  There was testimony that the 
MnSOST-R has been the subject of 12 research inquiries and that 
the RRASOR has been the subject of approximately 35 studies.  
The testimony also establishes that these tests have been 
criticized, particularly with regard to how they measure the 
effect of age on the risk of recidivism, and that, despite this 
                                                 
10 We note that, at the Daubert hearing, Jones did not 
dispute that Dr. Jurek was qualified or that Dr. Jurek had 
failed to apply his principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of Jones' case.  See supra ¶23 ("And there was no evidence 
suggesting or even challenging that they administered the test 
incorrectly or interpreted the actuarial data incorrectly.").  
Rather, Jones' challenge focused on whether the MnSOST-R and 
RRASOR were based on sufficient facts and data and reliable 
principles and methods. 
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
23 
 
criticism, responsible examiners may responsibly use different 
actuarial instruments where it is "somewhat prudent to look at 
all the different assessments, and all the different factors and 
consider them for a particular individual."   
¶36 Moreover, under Daubert these are the relevant facts a 
circuit court should consider.  See supra ¶¶8, 33.  The circuit 
court's findings therefore demonstrate that it considered the 
relevant facts, applied the proper standard, and articulated a 
reasonable basis for its decision.  Thus, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion when it admitted 
Dr. Jurek's testimony regarding the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR.  
Nat'l Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, ¶12.11 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 We consider one issue on review:  whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) when it admitted expert testimony based on the 
results of the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR tests.  We conclude that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
because it evaluated the relevant facts under the proper 
standard and articulated a reasonable basis for its decision. 
¶38 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
11 We emphasize that our decision is based on the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion.  Our opinion should not be read 
as endorsing the admissibility of these instruments in all 
cases.   
No. 
2015AP2665 
 
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By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP2665.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶39 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion but write separately out of concern that the 
majority author cites her own concurrences as authority for 
legal 
principles 
instead 
of 
citing 
precedential 
majority 
opinions.  The majority author cites to her past concurring 
opinions six times even though each citation could have been 
replaced with precedential authority.  The legal propositions 
for which she cites her concurrences in prior cases are not 
novel legal points.  I am concerned that allowing this practice 
to pass without notice will encourage future citations to past 
solo concurrences——creating majority opinions supported by one 
justice's separate writings instead of valid precedent. 
¶40 Although "concurring opinions have often exercised a 
greater effect on subsequent cases than the majority opinions 
that they accompany," where possible,1 we should cite to opinions 
that have binding precedential authority.  See Igor Kirman, 
Standing Apart to Be a Part:  The Precedential Value of Supreme 
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2084 (1995); 
see also Ives v. Coopertools, a Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc., 208 
Wis. 2d 55, 58, 559 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (per curiam) ("Our 
division on reasoning simply means that the analyses of the two 
concurrences have no precedential value." (citation omitted)); 
                                                 
1 I take no issue with using self-authored separate writings 
when, for example, no other authority exists for the proposition 
that a majority of the court has decided is a correct statement 
of the law.  That is not the situation here. 
No.  2015AP2665.rgb 
 
2 
 
State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714, 719, 546 
N.W.2d 140 (1996) (per curiam) (citing State v. Elam, 195 
Wis. 2d 683, 685, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) for the proposition that 
"[a] majority of justices must have agreed on a particular point 
for it to be considered the opinion of the court."). 
¶41 Here, the majority author's repeated citations to her 
past concurrences are unnecessary.  She could have replaced her 
concurrence citations in ¶¶6, 30 and 33 with citations to the 
precedential cases her concurrences quoted or cited.  
¶42 More problematically, the majority author could have 
replaced her concurrence citations in ¶31 with a citation to 
State v. Giese, 2014 WI App 92, ¶18, 356 Wis. 2d 796, 854 N.W.2d 
687 ("The court's gate-keeper function under the Daubert 
standard is to ensure that the expert's opinion is based on a 
reliable foundation and is relevant to the material issues." 
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 
n.7 (1993)))."  
¶43 Parlaying a justice's own concurrence into a majority 
opinion 
under 
these 
circumstances 
is 
not 
good 
practice.  
Reliance on the majority opinion author's own separate writings 
six times in an opinion that cites only four precedential cases 
raises concerns over the soundness and scholarship of this 
opinion.  
¶44 For these reasons, I concur. 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP2665.rgb 
 
 
 
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