Title: Vaughn v. Commonwealth (order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 15th day of 
January, 2010. 
 
Michael Dwayne Vaughn,  
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
   against   Record No. 090856 
 
 
 
Court of Appeals No. 2564-07-3 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals but 
vacates its opinion in part. 
The defendant, Michael Dwayne Vaughn, was convicted and 
sentenced in the Circuit Court of Henry County for grand larceny in 
violation of Code § 18.2-95.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's judgment.  Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 643, 
653-54, 674 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2009).  Vaughn asserts that the Court 
of Appeals erred by upholding the circuit court's denial of his 
motion to suppress the evidence seized during a warrantless search 
of the curtilage of his dwelling, specifically the backyard, and 
also any evidence derived from that search.  Vaughn argues that the 
law enforcement officer who conducted the search was not lawfully 
in Vaughn's backyard because the officer proceeded beyond that area 
of the curtilage for which he had "implied consent" to enter.  See 
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 34-35, 639 S.E.2d 217, 222 
 
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(2007). 
In an assignment of cross-error, the Commonwealth contends that 
the "Court of Appeals erred in failing to find Vaughn's challenge to 
the officer's authority to enter the yard procedurally defaulted 
pursuant to Rule 5A:18."  The Commonwealth is correct. 
In Vaughn’s motion to suppress filed in the circuit court, he 
argued, inter alia, that the search of the property violated the 
Fourth Amendment because "[t]here were insufficient underlying facts 
and circumstances presented to the officers for there to have been 
probable cause to believe that there was evidence located at the 
property that was subject to seizure[, c]onfiscation of the 
allegedly stolen items cannot be justified under any 'plain view' 
doctrine where the discovery was anticipated[, and t]here were no 
exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the 
property."  While Vaughn did argue that the Fourth Amendment 
requirements for a warrantless search of a dwelling's curtilage, 
i.e., probable cause and exigent circumstances, see Robinson, 273 
Va. at 34, 639 S.E.2d at 221, were not met, Vaughn did not contest 
the lawfulness of the officer’s presence in his backyard where the 
stolen items were plainly in view, or cite any cases that dealt with 
the doctrine of implied consent. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred by addressing the implied 
consent doctrine and deciding whether the officer lawfully entered 
Vaughn's backyard.  See Rule 5A:18 ("No ruling of the trial court 
. . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the 
objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time 
 
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of the ruling."); see also Rule 5:25. 
The Court therefore vacates that portion of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion deciding whether the officer lawfully entered 
Vaughn's backyard under the implied consent doctrine.  The Court, 
however, affirms the Court of Appeals' judgment upholding Vaughn's 
conviction for grand larceny. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and shall 
be certified to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Circuit 
Court of Henry County. 
                                A Copy, 
                                  Teste: 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk