Title: Eileen Heigle v. Jimmie D. Miller

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Eileen HEIGLE v. Jimmie D. MILLER

97-652                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 19, 1998


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when granted. -- Summary judgment
     should only be granted when it is clear that there are no
     genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the
     moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; where
     reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions they could
     draw from the facts presented, summary judgment should not be
     granted.

2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- movant's burden. -- The burden of
     sustaining a motion for summary judgment is the responsibility
     of the moving party; once the moving party has established a
     prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing
     party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence
     of a material issue of fact; the appellate court views the
     evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom
     the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences
     against the moving party.

3.   Negligence -- premises liability -- invitee and licensee distinguished. --
     An "invitee" is one induced to come onto property for the
     business benefit of the possessor; a "licensee" is one who
     goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the
     owner for one's own purposes and not for the mutual benefit of
     oneself and the owner.

4.   Negligence -- premises liability -- "invitee" category has not been
     expanded. -- The supreme court has declined to expand the
     "invitee" category beyond that of a public or business invitee
     to one whose presence is primarily social.

5.   Negligence -- premises liability -- appellant was licensee in appellee's
     home. -- The facts in the case demonstrated that appellant was
     a licensee in appellee's home: the primary purpose of
     appellant's presence on the occasion of her injury was social;
     she had been invited there for dinner and to spend the
     evening; that appellant had brought some food and cigarettes
     to appellee was merely incidental to her social purpose of
     visiting a friend; moreover, the fact that her social visit
     was emotionally beneficial to appellee did not alter the
     nature of the relationship between the two women or
     appellant's purpose for going to appellee's home.

6.   Negligence -- premises liability -- duty owed is question of law. -- The
     question of the duty owed by one person to another is always
     a question of law and never one for the jury.

7.   Negligence -- premises liability -- duty of care landowner owes licensee. -
     - A landowner owes a licensee the duty to refrain from
     injuring him or her through willful or wanton conduct; where,
     however, the landowner discovers that a licensee is in peril,
     he or she has a duty of ordinary care to avoid injury to the
     licensee; this duty takes the form of warning a licensee of
     hidden dangers if the licensee does not know or have reason to
     know of the conditions or risks involved.

8.   Negligence -- premises liability -- issue of disputed facts regarding
     appellee's duty to warn appellant of dangerous condition -- summary
     judgment inappropriate. -- Based upon testimony concerning
     appellee's bathroom, the supreme court concluded that there
     was an issue of disputed facts regarding whether appellee had
     a duty to warn appellant of the dangerous condition in the
     bathroom; a jury could have determined that the dangers
     associated with the recurring condition that made the bathroom
     floor unsafe were hidden or, at least, not easily recognized,
     especially given the darkness of the area at the time of the
     accident; summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

9.   Negligence -- "slip & fall" case -- requirements to prevail. -- Typical
     "slip and fall" cases occur in public places, which often
     occupy a great deal of space, and involve isolated incidents
     where anything could have been spilled or placed on the floor
     by anyone at anytime without the owner's knowledge; to prevail
     in a "slip and fall" case, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
     presence of the substance upon the premises was the result of
     the defendant's negligence, or (2) the substance had been on
     the floor for such a length of time that the defendant knew or
     reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use
     ordinary care to remove it.  

10.  Negligence -- premises liability -- "slip & fall" analysis not required --
     determination of duty to warn of hidden dangers required -- reversed and
     remanded. -- Where the presence of a foreign substance on the
     bathroom floor was not a one-time incident; where the facts
     presented showed that there was a recurring condition that
     frequently made the bathroom floor slick and unsafe; where
     appellee admittedly knew that her husband would urinate on the
     floor virtually every time he used the restroom and further
     knew that the floor was slick when a piece of carpet was not
     in place, the supreme court concluded that the particular
     facts of the case did not require an analysis under a
     traditional "slip and fall" theory of recovery; rather, the
     issue presented required a determination of the duty to warn
     of hidden dangers; accordingly, the court reversed the ruling
     of the trial court regarding the issue of whether appellee
     breached the duty owed to appellant as a licensee and remanded
     the matter.


     Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Pope, Ross, Dendy & Cazort, by: Brad A. Cazort; and John K.
Shamburger, for appellant.
     Snellgrove, Laser, Langley, Lovett & Culpepper, by: Todd
Williams, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     This is a premises liability case.  Appellant Eileen Heigle
appeals the judgment of the Cleburne County Circuit Court granting
summary judgment to Appellee Jimmie D. Miller.  On appeal,
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred (1) in finding that
Appellant was a licensee rather than an invitee in Appellee's home;
(2) in applying the wrong standard of care to her negligence claim;
and (3) in granting summary judgment when there were genuine issues
of material fact to be adjudicated.  Our jurisdiction of this
appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15), as it presents
questions involving the law of torts.  We find merit to
Appellant's second point, and we reverse.
     The undisputed facts are as follows.  Appellant had been
invited by Appellee to come over to Appellee's house for dinner and
to spend the night.  Appellee was essentially home bound, having to
take care of her eighty-year-old husband who suffered from
deteriorating health conditions, including incontinence and poor
eyesight.  As a result of his health problems, Appellee's husband
frequently urinated on the bathroom floor, in his attempts to
relieve himself.  On the night in question, Appellant was injured
when she slipped on Appellee's bathroom floor, which had been wet
with urine.  Appellee was asleep when the accident occurred. 
Appellee normally kept a piece of carpet on the bathroom floor to
help prevent the floor from being slick with urine when her husband
went to the rest room.  Periodically, the carpet was not in the
bathroom, as it was being cleaned and allowed to air out for
several days.  The carpet had been taken up a day or two prior to
the date that Appellant fell.  Appellant alleged in her complaint
that Appellee was negligent for failing to warn her of the slick
condition, despite Appellee's knowledge of it. 
     The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary
judgment, finding that Appellant was a licensee in Appellee's home
and that, as a result, the duty of care owed to Appellant was to
refrain from injuring her through willful or wanton conduct or to
warn of hidden dangers where the licensee does not know or has no
reason to know of the conditions or risks involved.  The trial
court analyzed the claim as a "slip and fall" case, ruling that
Appellant must prove either (1) that the presence of a substance
upon the premises was the result of Appellee's negligence, or (2)
that the substance was on the floor for such a length of time that
Appellee knew or should have known of its presence and failed to
use ordinary care to remove it.  The trial court found that, while
it was undisputed that the bathroom floor was wet, Appellant did
not present any proof that the liquid was negligently placed there
or allowed to remain there.  The trial court found further that
there was no evidence showing that anyone had fallen previously or
that Appellee had knowledge that the bathroom floor was wet prior
to Appellant's entering the room that night and falling. 
Additionally, the trial court determined that there was no proof of
a breach of a duty to warn Appellant of any hidden dangers. 
     Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that
there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Pugh
v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).  Where reasonable
minds could differ as to the conclusions they could draw from the
facts presented, summary judgment should not be granted.  Brunt v.
Food 4 Less, Inc., 318 Ark. 427,