Title: State v. Rogers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: MAY 4, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
DAYTON LEROY ROGERS,
Appellant.
(CC 88-355, 88-356, 88-357, 88-358, 88-359, 88-360; SC S41392)
On automatic and direct review of the sentence of death
imposed by the Clackamas County Circuit Court.
Argued and submitted January 8, 1999.
Diane L. Alessi, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  With her on the briefs was Sally L. Avera,
Public Defender, Salem.
Janet Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent.  With her on the briefs were Theodore R.
Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor
General, and David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General. 
Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed a
supplemental brief for respondent.  
Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*
DURHAM, J.
The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DURHAM, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment that imposed a sentence of
death following his conviction on 13 counts of aggravated murder. 
The judgment is subject to automatic review in this court. 
Former ORS 163.150(1)(g), repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, §
1. (1)  For the reasons that follow, we vacate the sentence of death
and remand this case to the circuit court for further penalty-phase proceedings.
Over a period of time in 1987, police discovered the bodies
of seven women in the Mollala Forest.  The State Medical Examiner
determined that each of the women had been stabbed or cut with a
sharp object.  When the bodies were discovered, defendant was in
police custody as a suspect in the killing of another woman,
Smith.  Smith had died from multiple stab wounds.  Smith and the
seven women buried in the Mollala Forest were prostitutes.  The
facts surrounding the Mollala Forest killings shared other
similarities with those surrounding the Smith killing.  During
the investigation of the Molalla Forest killings, defendant was
convicted of aggravated murder for killing Smith, but he was not
sentenced to death.
In May 1989, defendant was found guilty of 13 counts of
aggravated murder arising out of six of the Molalla Forest
killings. (2)  In June 1989, the court sentenced defendant to death. 
On automatic review, this court vacated the death sentence and
remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase
proceeding that would include the so-called "fourth question," as
explained in State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93 (1990).  State
v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 836 P2d 1308 (1992).  In May 1994, after a
new penalty-phase proceeding before a jury (the remand
proceeding), the trial court again sentenced defendant to death.
AVAILABILITY OF THE "TRUE-LIFE" SENTENCING OPTION

During the remand proceeding, the trial court refused to
permit the jury, under ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) (quoted below),
to consider the option of sentencing defendant to life in prison
without the possibility of parole and to permit defendant to
waive any objection, under the ex post facto provisions of the
state and federal constitutions, to the jury's consideration of
that option. (3)  Defendant assigns error to that refusal.
When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985)
provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder:  death or
life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).  After the
first penalty-phase proceeding, the legislature added a third
option:  life in prison with no possibility of parole (true
life).  During the remand proceeding, defendant submitted a
"motion to accept defendant's waiver of ex post facto issue and
to submit life without parole option to jury with appropriate
instructions."  The state opposed the motion, and the trial court
refused to allow the jury to consider the true-life option.
Defendant argues that that refusal was erroneous for several
reasons, including that criminal defendants may waive any ex post
facto challenge.  This court addressed a similar issue in State
v. McDonnell, 329 Or 375, 987 P2d 486 (1999).  In McDonnell, the
defendant did not object, on an ex post facto ground or
otherwise, to the retroactive application of the true-life
sentencing option in his remand proceeding and filed a waiver of
any ex post facto objection.  The trial court nevertheless
refused to apply ORS 163.150(5) (1993), which was in effect at
the time of the remand proceeding, and instructed the jury only
about the two sentencing options that were in effect when the
defendant committed his crime.  The defendant was sentenced to
death.  On review, this court concluded that the trial court
erred in refusing to apply ORS 163.150(5) (1993), reasoning that
the defendant was entitled to, and did, waive the constitutional
protection against ex post facto laws by failing to assert a
timely objection or to claim that a post-offense sentencing
statute is an ex post facto law.  329 Or at 390, 392.
Defendant argues, as did the defendant in McDonnell, that he
was entitled to have ORS 163.150(5) (1993) applied in his remand
proceeding.  This case, however, presents several variations on
McDonnell.  First, in this case, the state argues that the
legislature did not intend ORS 163.150(5) (1993) to apply in this
situation, because, according to the state, defendant's "trial[]
commenc[ed]" before July 19, 1989.  ORS 163.150(4) (1993). 
Second, in this case, unlike in McDonnell, the state objected to
defendant's waiver of his ex post facto objections to the
application to his remand proceeding of ORS 163.150(5) (1993). 
Third, the state contends that defendant's written motion to
accept his waiver of his ex post facto objection was inadequate. 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that those arguments do not
require a different result than in McDonnell.
The state first argues that the true-life option should not
apply to defendant because, although the legislature intended
that ORS 163.150 (1993) would apply retroactively, the
legislature, in ORS 163.150(4) (1993), limited that retroactive
application to remand proceedings in which the trial had
commenced on or after July 19, 1989.  The state argues that a
"trial commences," for purposes of ORS 163.150(4) (1993), at the
beginning of the first guilt-phase proceeding and, because
defendant's first guilt-phase proceeding began in March 1989, the
trial court had no authority to apply the true-life option to
defendant. 
Defendant responds that ORS 163.150(4) (1993) does not
control here.  Defendant contends that this court remanded his
case for a new penalty-phase proceeding and that ORS 163.150(5)
(1993) governs that remand proceeding.  ORS 163.150(5)(a)(B)
(1993) directs that all three sentencing options be available to
the jury in remand proceedings.  ORS 163.150(5)(e) (1993)
provides that "[t]he provisions of this section * * * shall apply
to any defendant sentenced to death after December 6, 1984." 
According to defendant, ORS 163.150(5) (1993) evinces a
legislative intention that defendants who are sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984, have all three sentencing options
available if their cases are remanded for new penalty-phase
proceedings.  Defendant further contends that, even if the
effective date provision in ORS 163.150(4) (1993) applies here --
meaning that the legislature intended the true-life option to be
available to only those defendants whose trials commenced after
July 29, 1989 -- a "trial commences" not only at the beginning of
the first guilt-phase proceeding, but also at the beginning of a
new penalty-phase proceeding after remand.  According to
defendant, because his penalty-phase proceeding after remand
began in March 1994, he is among those persons to whom the court
may apply the true-life option.
As this court explained in McDonnell, before assessing
whether a defendant may or did waive an ex post facto objection
to the application of a post-offense statute, we must ascertain
whether the legislature intended to adopt retrospective
legislation that applies to the situation at hand.  329 Or at
382-83.  In McDonnell, this court concluded that the legislature
intended that all three sentencing options be available in remand
proceedings in which a defendant had been sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984.  Id. at 383.  In essence, the state
contends that that conclusion was incorrect because, instead of
looking to the effective date in ORS 163.150(5)(e) (1993), the
court should have looked to the effective date in ORS 163.150(4)
(1993), an argument that the defendant in McDonnell did not
raise.  Which provision governs is a question of statutory
interpretation to which the methodology summarized in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993), applies. 
The relevant parts of ORS 163.150 (1993) provide:
"(1)(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder, the court * * * shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(c), life
imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), or death.  
* * *
"(b) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the following
issues to the jury:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence.
"* * * * *
"(f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on
each issue considered under paragraph (b) of this
subsection, the trial judge shall sentence the
defendant to death.
"* * * * *
"(2)(a) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall * * * instruct the jury
that if it reaches a negative finding on any issue
under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the trial
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
without the possibility of release or parole, as
described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), unless 10 or more
members of the jury further find that there are
sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life
imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as
described in ORS 163.105(1)(c).
"* * * * *
"(4) * * * Subsection (2) of this section shall
apply only to trials commencing on or after July 19,
1989.
"(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this
section, the following shall apply:
"(a) If a reviewing court finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, the court may set
aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the
trial court.  * * *  Upon remand and at the election of
the state, the trial court shall * * *:
"* * * * *
"(B) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose
of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine
if the defendant should be sentenced to:
"(i) Death;
"(ii) Imprisonment for life without the
possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(b); or
"(iii) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(c).
"* * * * *
"(d) The new sentencing proceeding shall be
governed by the provisions of subsections (1) and (2)
of this section. * * * 
"(e) The provisions of this section are procedural
and shall apply to any defendant sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984."
(Emphasis added.) 
The state argues that the statute that provides the
application date here is ORS 163.150(4) (1993), which directs
retroactive application to "trials commencing on or after July
19, 1989."  The state contends that ORS 163.150(5) (1993) applies
when a reviewing court finds prejudicial error in the sentencing
proceeding only and remands the case to the trial court, as
provided in ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993).  ORS 163.150(5)(d) (1993)
directs that "[t]he new sentencing proceeding shall be governed
by the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section." 
According to the state, the legislature has expressed in ORS
163.150(5)(d) (1993) an intention that ORS 163.150(2) (1993)
shall apply to remand proceedings.  However, under ORS 163.150(4)
(1993), ORS 163.150(2) (1993) applies "only to trials commencing
on or after July 19, 1989."  The state concludes that, because
the application date of ORS 163.150(2) (1993) is July 19, 1989,
and because ORS 163.150(2) (1993) applies to remand proceedings
under ORS 163.150(5) (1993), the application date of ORS
163.150(5) (1993) also must be July 19, 1989.
That reasoning is unpersuasive.  Although the
legislature has expressed an intention that ORS 163.150(2) (1993)
apply to remand proceedings, it did not express that intention
regarding ORS 163.150(4) (1993).  The legislature incorporated
the July 19, 1989, application date in ORS 163.150(4) (1993), not
in ORS 163.150(2) (1993).  The legislature provided a specific
application date for ORS 163.150(5) (1993) within that section. 
We may not insert what the legislature has omitted or omit what
it has inserted.  ORS 174.010; PGE, 317 Or at 611.  The state's
proposed construction would require both the insertion into ORS
163.150(5)(d) (1993) of a requirement that the new sentencing
proceeding be governed by ORS 163.150(4) (1993) and the omission
from ORS 163.150(5) (1993) of the application date that expressly
applies to that section.  By its terms, ORS 163.150(5)(e) (1993)
makes the remand procedure in ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) --
including all three sentencing options -- applicable to "any
defendant sentenced to death after December 6, 1984." (4) 
Unquestionably, defendant's case met that requirement because, at
the time of the remand proceeding in 1994, the court had
sentenced defendant to death after December 6, 1984.  We
conclude, in accordance with our reasoning in McDonnell, 329 Or
at 385, that the legislature intended that ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993) would apply to the remand proceeding in this case.  
In McDonnell, this court held that the defendant's
decision not to invoke the protection of the ex post facto
clauses constituted a waiver of those constitutional protections
and that his arguments to the trial court and his written waiver
indicated that his decision not to invoke his constitutional
protection against ex post facto laws was an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.  329 Or at 389, 392.  Similarly
here, defendant intentionally decided not to invoke the
protection of the ex post facto clauses.  That decision
constituted a waiver of the protection afforded by those clauses. 
That the state objected to defendant's waiver in this
case, whereas, in McDonnell, it did not, makes no difference to
the result.  As this court observed in McDonnell, the "claim
[that application of ORS 163.150(5) (1993) violated the
prohibition against ex post facto laws] was defendant's to
assert, and he did not do so."  329 Or at 390.  Any objection by
the state to defendant's waiver of the protection of the ex post
facto clauses has no effect.  Because defendant did not invoke
those constitutional protections in this case, he waived those
protections.
The state also suggests that defendant's waiver was
inadequate because, in his motion to accept his waiver, he did
not mention that he was waiving the right to raise ex post facto
challenges in post-conviction or federal habeas corpus
proceedings or that he waived any challenge to the procedure that
could lead to the imposition of a true-life sentence.
To be effective, a defendant's waiver of the protection
of a pertinent statute or constitutional provision need not
follow a set formula:
"'A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.'  State v.
Meyrick, [313 Or 125, 132, 831 P2d 666 (1992)]. 
Although a waiver must be intentional, there is no
particular formula for determining whether a waiver has
occurred.  'Whether there has been an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege will depend upon the particular circumstances
of each case * * *.'  Ibid."
State v. Hunter, 316 Or 192, 201, 850 P2d 366 (1993).  In this
case, defendant sufficiently indicated that he intentionally was
relinquishing his known right to protection against ex post facto
laws both in his written motion and in his arguments to the trial
court during the hearing on that motion.  We conclude that
defendant waived his protection against ex post facto laws by
choosing not to object to the application of ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993) in the remand proceeding.  The trial court erred in
refusing to accept defendant's waiver.
The trial court's decision not to apply ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand proceeding was not harmless
error.  A properly instructed jury might have returned a verdict
supporting a sentence other than death.  As a consequence, we
must vacate the sentence of death and remand the case for further
proceedings.  See McDonnell, 329 Or at 392 (reaching same
conclusion).
We turn to several other issues raised in defendant's
appeal that are likely to recur on remand.  See, e.g., State v.
Smith, 310 Or 1, 22, 791 P2d 836 (1990) (following that
methodology).
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
In his second assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in limiting an unsworn statement that
defendant desired to address to the court and the jury at the end
of the penalty-phase proceeding.  Before the remand proceeding,
defendant moved for permission to make an unsworn statement to
the jury after closing arguments.  The state moved to require
defendant to submit a copy of his proposed statement to the court
so that the court could review the statement for relevancy before
defendant delivered it to the jury.  Defendant responded that any 
"prior restraint" of his "allocution" was improper.  In
particular, defendant contended that, under the "fourth question"
in capital cases, the scope of permissible allocution is broad,
and so it was unlikely that defendant's statement could stray
into irrelevant topics.
  After hearing arguments, the trial court ruled:
"Well, my view is that the defendant's entitled to
a statement. * * * [M]y concern is that by providing
that opportunity after the conclusion of the evidence
in the case and prior to the argument that there needs
to be some submission to the Court about the contents
of his statement.  I think that provides a way that
there is a structure, that I can satisfy myself won't
result in error that would cause a mistrial and this
process [to] have to be * * * repeated. * * *
"* * * * *
"Well, as I indicated, there would be a right of
allocution.  That would be exercised prior to the
arguments of the case.  There would be a submission in
writing to the Court of the proposed statement.  I
think that provides the Court with a safeguard on the
relevancy and other matters.  And I agree that it's a
broad scope here but I think we need to know what's
going to be submitted, particularly given the stage of
the proceeding that it is made. * * *"
After the close of evidence, defendant submitted to the
trial court the following proposed statement:
"Ladies & Gentlemen of the Jury --
"What I have done [and] caused clearly overshadows
anything I can say here today.  In no way do I nor can
I justify a thing.  It's true that there was a lot of
abuse in my raising, but I don't blame my parents for
what I've done and caused as an adult.  There is never
a day that I don't struggle within the very depths of
my heart and soul over the horrible things I've done. 
Because of what I have done, I have literally sentenced
the hearts of those family members to a lifetime of
precious loss and grief.  I have clearly proven to all
[and] myself that I don't belong in the free community
and never do.
"Besides the task before you in this case, I am
currently serving a life sentence with a 30 year
minimum from the previous Smith trial.  And your Honor,
at this time I respectfully appeal to you that should
this jury spare my life, I ask that I be sentenced to
consecutive life sentences."
The trial court struck the last paragraph in its entirety, but
allowed defendant to read the remainder of his statement to the
jury. 
Defendant now argues that the trial court erred in
three ways:  (1) by requiring him to submit his proposed
statement for the court's review; (2) by requiring him to read a
statement to the jury instead of allowing him to speak
extemporaneously; and (3) by editing his statement.  Defendant
contends that those limitations violated his rights under Article
I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (5)  We
first consider defendant's arguments under the Oregon
Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 53, 913
P2d 308 (1996) (court considers state constitutional claims
before federal constitutional claims); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or
260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (the court must resolve all
questions of state law before reaching federal constitutional
arguments).
Defendant argues that Article I, section 11, provides
criminal defendants with the right to make unsworn statements to
the jury and that the sole permissible limitation on the content
of that "allocution" is relevancy.  He relies on DeAngelo v.
Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 757 P2d 1355 (1988).  Defendant further
observes that the scope of relevancy in capital cases is
particularly broad because, under the "fourth question," juries
may consider, "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character * * * that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."  State v. Stevens, 319 Or
573, 583, 879 P2d 162 (1994) (citation omitted; emphasis
omitted).  Thus, according to defendant, a defendant in a capital
case is entitled "to speak to the jury in an unrestricted fashion
because it is difficult to determine exactly what that jury would
consider 'mitigating' in deciding a sentence of life or death." 
Defendant contends that, because nothing in his proposed
statement was irrelevant, the trial court erred in striking the
last paragraph.  Defendant further argues that his extemporaneous
feelings and thoughts constitute an aspect of his "character"
from which the jury could have inferred that his life should have
been spared and, accordingly, that the trial court erred in
requiring him to read from a prepared statement.
The state first responds that the trial court satisfied
the constitutional right to be heard by affording the opportunity
for defendant to take the stand and offer sworn testimony subject
to cross-examination.  In giving defendant the opportunity to
make an unsworn statement to the jury, the state argues, the
trial court gave him more than the constitution requires and
cannot be faulted for not giving him much more.
Defendant replies that the state conceded in the trial
court that capital defendants have the right to make unsworn
statements during the penalty phase and, accordingly, cannot
assert a contrary position on appeal.  The state denies making
that concession and asserts that it conceded only that criminal
defendants have a right of "allocution," which includes the right
to take the stand and offer sworn testimony.  The state submits
that it might have acquiesced before the trial court to the view
that an unsworn statement was permissible, but, according to the
state, that position is distinguishable from conceding that
defendant had a right to make an unsworn statement.  The state
contends that its position in the trial court is not inconsistent
with its present argument.  Furthermore, the state argues that,
even if it did concede that capital defendants have the right to
make unsworn statements to the jury, this court nevertheless may
consider the state's challenge to that proposition in determining
whether the trial court correctly limited defendant's statement,
albeit for a reason that the trial court might not have
considered.
We agree with the state that we can reach its present
argument that criminal defendants have no right to make unsworn
statements.  When a trial court makes a ruling, we will affirm
that ruling on appeal, even if the trial court's legal reasoning
for the ruling was erroneous, if another legally correct reason
and, to the extent necessary, the record developed in the trial
court support the ruling.  See, e.g., State v. Montez, 324 Or
343, 361, 927 P2d 64 (1996) (applying proposition); Tarwater v.
Cupp, 304 Or 639, 644 n 5, 748 P2d 125 (1988) (on appeal, party
seeking affirmance may change its argument and claim that lower
court was right for the wrong reason).The "right for the wrong
reason" principle establishes that appellate courts may examine
legal arguments not relied on by a trial court to determine if
those arguments provide a basis for affirmance.  To conclude
otherwise could result in reversal of a correct action of a trial
court, which would warp the law and waste judicial resources. 
This court, quoting the Supreme Court of the United States, has
stated:
"[W]e do not disturb the settled rule that, in
reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be
affirmed if the result is correct 'although the lower
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong
reason.' * * *  The reason for this rule is obvious. 
It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower
court to reinstate a decision which it had already made
but which the appellate court concluded should properly
be based on another ground within the power of the
appellate court to formulate."
State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611, 629 n 12, 853 P2d 256 (1993)
(citation omitted). 
Furthermore, we find no support in the record for
defendant's argument that the state conceded below that defendant
had a right to make an unsworn statement.  It appears that the
state did not object in the trial court to allowing defendant to
make an unsworn statement to the jury.  However, defendant does
not cite, and we cannot find, any concession by the state that
defendant had a right to make an unsworn statement.
Accordingly, we turn to the question whether defendant
had a right to make an unsworn statement to the jury, apart from
any right to take the stand and testify under oath.  That
question requires us to construe Article I, section 11, an
original provision of the Oregon Constitution.  This court has
determined that "the right * * * to be heard by himself" in
Article I, section 11, encompasses the right of all criminal
defendants to allocution, which "refers to a convicted
defendant's opportunity to speak before sentencing[.]"  DeAngelo,
306 Or at 94, 93 n 1.  According to the state, however, DeAngelo
leaves open the question of the form that allocution may take. 
The state is correct that DeAngelo does not resolve that issue
directly. (6)  Accordingly, we consider the specific wording of
Article I, section 11, the historical circumstances that led to
its creation, and the case law surrounding it.  See Priest v.
Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (setting out
methodology).  Our goal is "to understand the wording in the
light of the way [the] wording would have been understood and
used by those who created the provision," Vannatta v. Keisling,
324 Or 514, 530, 931 P2d 770 (1997), and to apply faithfully the
principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern
circumstances as those circumstances arise.  See, e.g., State v.
Delgado, 298 Or 395, 400-03, 692 P2d 610 (1984) (applying the
principle embodied in the "right to bear arms" to weapons
analogous to those in existence in 1857).
Article I, section 11, provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
In particular, in this case, we are concerned with what the
framers of the Oregon Constitution meant when they provided that
a criminal defendant has "the right to be heard by himself."  The
Oregon Constitution establishes that right in conjunction with
the right to be heard by counsel.  That suggests that the framers
intended that the content of that right be similar to the right
to be heard by counsel, i.e., that a criminal defendant has the
right to represent himself.  Accordingly, the wording of Article
I, section 11, supports defendant's view that he may present
argument without taking the stand, similar to the way in which
his counsel may make an unsworn closing statement to the
factfinder.
We turn to the historical circumstances that led to the
creation of Article I, section 11, and to the case law
surrounding it.  In this case, we address history and case law
together, as our prior cases have explicated that history. 
Nothing in the reported history of the adoption of the Oregon
Constitution sheds any light on the question of how the framers
understood the right to be heard.  Reports from the proceedings
leading to the adoption of the Oregon Constitution are collected
in Charles Henry Carey, ed., The Oregon Constitution and
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857
(1926).  Insofar as the reports reflect, the wording at issue
here was not discussed during the public deliberations of the
constitutional convention.  However, consideration of the
historical legal context is illustrative. 
In his special concurrence in State v. Douglas, 292 Or
516, 527-38, 641 P2d 561 (1982), Justice Lent provided a detailed
history of the evolution of the right to be heard.  He observed
that the relevant wording of Article I, section 11, was copied
from the Indiana Constitution of 1851, which, in turn, was drawn
from the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Kentucky.  Id. at 527.  When those states adopted their
constitutions, the right to be heard did not include the right to
testify, because courts considered defendants in criminal trials
to be incompetent to testify due to bias.  Id. at 527-28.  As
indicated above, the available historical resources describing
the adoption of the Oregon Constitution do not indicate that the
framers had a view of the "right to be heard" different from the
view that generally prevailed in 1859.  On the contrary, the Bill
of Rights in the Indiana Constitution was described during the
Oregon constitutional convention as being "gold refined" and as
"assert[ing] the civil rights of the citizens as ascertained in
those 70 years of progress [since the United States Constitution
was adopted]."  Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 at 101-02.
At common law, criminal defendants, like all parties,
were disabled from testifying under the reasoning that self-interest was likely to undermine their veracity.  Douglas, 292 Or
at 528-31 (Lent, J., specially concurring); see also Christopher
D. Jaime, Sword and Shield:  An Analysis of Criminal Defendants'
Right To Be Heard Under Article I, Section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, 28 Willamette L Rev 127, 129 (1991) (so stating). 
However, under the common-law system, courts allowed defendants
to speak in their own defense, including presenting their own
version of the facts, although they could not testify under oath. 
Douglas, 292 Or at 528-30 (Lent, J., specially concurring);
Jaime, 28 Willamette L Rev at 129-30.  Defendants also could
examine and impeach witnesses and make legal arguments.  Douglas,
292 Or at 530 (Lent, J., specially concurring); Jaime, 28
Willamette L Rev at 130.  In addition, after a jury had returned
a verdict of guilty against a defendant, courts would inquire
whether the defendant knew of any reason why the court should not
pronounce judgment.  The courts allowed criminal defendants to
make a responsive statement and labeled this process
"allocution."  Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo L Rev 115, 115
(1944).
That was the state of the law when the early state
constitutions, upon which the Oregon Constitution was based, were
adopted.  Justice Lent opined that it was that common-law right
to make unsworn statements that mid-nineteenth century Americans
also had in mind when they included in their constitutions a
right to be heard.  Douglas, 292 Or at 532 (Lent, J., specially 
concurring).  Justice Lent believed, and we agree, that the
framers of the Oregon Constitution intended to incorporate into
Article I, section 11, the contemporaneous understanding of the
right of one criminally accused to be heard "by himself."  Id.  As noted above, that contemporaneous understanding
developed in a legal context in which a criminal defendant had no
right to serve as a witness for or against oneself.  See Revised
Statutes of the Territory of Oregon, ch IV, title 1, §§ 3-4
(1854) (although court cannot prevent proffered witness from
giving evidence by reason of witness's interest in action, that
protection does not apply to a party to the action); Latshaw v.
Territory of Oregon, 1 Or 141, 145-46 (1854) (where several
defendants are indicted together, one cannot be a witness for the
others).  Because the constitutional right to be heard could not
have encompassed, at the time of adoption, a right to make a
sworn statement, that right must have entailed the right to make
an unsworn statement.
The wording of Article I, section 11, and the
prevailing understanding in 1859 that criminal defendants were
disabled from testifying support the conclusion that the "right
to be heard," at the time of the adoption of the Oregon
Constitution, referred to a right to make an unsworn statement.
We next consider the parameters of that right,
particularly with respect to the ways in which defendant contends
that the trial court erred in constraining his right to be heard. 
Defendant challenges both procedural and substantive restrictions
imposed by the trial court.  We first address the procedural
restrictions, viz., the trial court's requirements that defendant
read from a prepared statement and submit the statement to the
trial court in advance for review.
It is well established that a trial court generally
possesses broad discretion to control the proceedings before it. 
See, e.g., ORS 1.010 (every court has power to regulate
proceedings before it and to control, in furtherance of justice,
conduct of persons connected with judicial proceedings); OEC
611(1) (court shall exercise reasonable control over presentation
of evidence); Still v. Benton, 251 Or 463, 473, 445 P2d 492
(1968) (trial court has discretion and power to control progress
of trial, including scope of recross examination);  State v.
Barnett, 251 Or 234, 237, 445 P2d 124 (1968) (scope of voir dire
examination within trial court's discretionary power to conduct
trial efficiently and expeditiously).  For example, this court
has concluded that trial courts have discretion to control
arguments by counsel.   R.J. Frank Realty, Inc. v. Heuvel, 284 Or
301, 306, 586 P2d 1123 (1978); see also Biegler v. Kirby, 281 Or
423, 426-27, 574 P2d 1127 (1978) (determination of how to allot
argument between two attorneys arguing on behalf of one party is
within discretion of trial court); Amick v. Watson, 280 Or 641,
645, 572 P2d 317 (1977) ("[T]he trial court is in the best
position to evaluate the effect upon the jury of claimed
prejudice because of an attorney's argument.  Usually, these
matters are left largely to the discretion of the trial court * *
*.").  Similarly, the trial court has the authority to exercise
reasonable discretion regarding allocution by a defendant to
ensure that the trial is orderly and expeditious.  Furthermore,
especially in the case of statements by a defendant not made in
response to questioning under oath, the trial court has a
legitimate concern with assuring that the defendant does not make
irrelevant or prejudicial statements.  That concern, in fact, was
the basis of the decision of the trial court in this case to
require defendant to submit a written statement for the court's
review and to read only that statement to the jury.
A trial court's authority to exercise reasonable
discretion to ensure that the trial is orderly and expeditious
does not evaporate when the parties assert their constitutional
rights during trial.  See, e.g., State v. Langley, 314 Or 247,
257-60, 839 P2d 692 (1992) (rulings that implicated defendant's
rights to counsel and to fair trial reviewed for abuse of
discretion); State v. Engeman, 245 Or 209, 211, 420 P2d 389
(1966) (ruling that implicated defendant's right to fair trial
reviewed for abuse of discretion).  Rather, a trial court is
obliged to accommodate the exercise of all pertinent
constitutional and statutory rights by all parties within the
context of an orderly and expeditious trial.  See State v.
Burdge, 295 Or 1, 14, 664 P2d 1076 (1983) (proposition that
disqualification of testimony is too grave a sanction for
unintentional violation of exclusion order represents "a
practical and sensitive accommodation between a criminal
defendant's right to present witnesses in his behalf and the
court's need to control the trial proceedings"); Still, 251 Or at 
474 ("Cross-examination is a matter of right, but the bounds of
proper cross-examination are necessarily within the sound
discretion of the trial judge, and this is particularly so when
applied to recross-examination.  It must be clear that counsel
cannot be permitted to prolong the course of trial by continually
returning to matters already considered or as to which he has
been given ample opportunity to examine; otherwise, there would
be no orderly procedure, and nothing but confusion.") (citation
omitted).  Nothing in the text of Article I, section 11, suggests
that the framers intended that a defendant's right to be heard
"by himself" should override the court's authority and
responsibility to conduct the trial as an orderly and expeditious
proceeding.  The historical circumstances and case law
surrounding Article I, section 11, support that reading.  See
Douglas, 252 Or at 533, 533 n 17 (Lent, J., specially concurring)
(from the colonial era on, a defendant's right to present a
defense has been subject to some restrictions, e.g., relevancy).
We conclude that, by requiring defendant to read from a
prepared statement and to submit the statement in advance for
review, the trial court acted within its discretion to ensure
orderly and expeditious proceedings and to avert error. 
Defendant makes no convincing showing that those procedural
restrictions prevented him from exercising fully his
constitutional right to be heard.  Therefore, as to those
restrictions, we find no violation of defendant's right to be
heard under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.
Defendant next contends that those restrictions
violated his rights under the United States Constitution, first
pointing to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendant submits that, in Green v. United States, 365 US 301, 81
S Ct 653, 5 L Ed 2d 670 (1961), the Supreme Court recognized the
"persuasiveness of a defendant speaking in his own words."  He
further argues that, under Medina v. California, 505 US 437, 112
S Ct 2572, 120 L Ed 2d 353 (1992), the denial of a defendant's
opportunity to speak in an unedited, extemporaneous fashion
"'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,'" 
505 US at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197, 201-02,
97 S Ct 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977)), and, therefore, that the
trial court's procedural restrictions violated his right to due
process.  Defendant further contends that those restrictions
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment because, as
explained in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US 1, 106 S Ct 1669,
90 L Ed 2d 1 (1986), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 102 S
Ct 869, 71 L Ed 2d 1 (1982), a trial court must allow a capital
jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, including
aspects of a defendant's character.  According to defendant, his
extemporaneous, unedited thoughts are an aspect of his character,
and, therefore, requiring him to read a preapproved written
statement violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
The state responds that defendant has not shown that he
could not have presented the same aspects of his character by
taking the stand and testifying.  The state contends that,
because defendant chose not to pursue that available course, the
court should not permit him to argue that he was prevented from
presenting all relevant aspects of his character.  The state
further argues that there is no basis for defendant's federal
constitutional arguments, because the United States Supreme Court
has concluded that there is no federal constitutional right to
allocution.  The state relies for that argument on McGautha v.
California, 402 US 183, 91 S Ct 1454, 28 L Ed 2d 711 (1971), and
Hill v. United States, 368 US 424, 82 S Ct 468, 7 L Ed 2d 417
(1962).
We have reviewed the cases cited by the state and other
cases, and it appears to us that the Supreme Court has not
resolved definitively the questions of whether and to what extent
the right of allocution may have a basis in the United States
Constitution.  Even if the United States Constitution requires an
opportunity for allocution, however, we hold that that right was
not violated in this case.
First, any due process interest served by allocution,
as described by the Supreme Court, was satisfied here.  The jury
had the opportunity to hear defendant's arguments and evidence in
the sound of his own voice.  See McGautha, 402 US at 220 (ritual
of allocution assures that a defendant will not be sentenced to
death in silence).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained
that constitutional rights are not absolute, but "'may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process.'"  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44,
55, 107 S Ct 2704, 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987) (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 US 284, 295, 93 S Ct 1038, 35 L Ed 2d 297
(1973)).  See also United States v. Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308,
118 S Ct 1261, 140 L Ed 2d 413 (1998) ("A defendant's right to
present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject
to reasonable restrictions. * * * [S]tate and federal rulemakers
have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules
excluding evidence from criminal trials.  Such rules do not
abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they
are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve.") (internal quotation marks omitted; footnote
omitted).
The trial court in this case imposed reasonable
procedural limits on defendant's allocution based on its
legitimate concerns about the criminal trial process.  The trial
court wanted to ensure that defendant's allocution would not
introduce error at the end of a lengthy trial.  The restrictions
imposed were proportionate to accomplishing the objective of
minimizing the risk of error.  By requiring defendant to read
from a prepared statement and to submit that statement in advance
for the court's review, the trial court did not violate
defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Second, the court's action did not infringe any Eighth
Amendment interest that allocution implicates.  In Skipper, 476
US 1, and Eddings, 455 US 104, the Court held that the exclusion
of particular evidence violated the defendants' right not to have
the death penalty imposed without "individualized consideration
of mitigating factors" required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.  Eddings, 455 US at 105 (citation omitted). 
Defendant contends that his "extemporaneous, unedited thoughts"
are an aspect of his character such that the trial court was
required to allow him to speak in an extemporaneous and unedited
fashion.  However, defendant does not explain what aspect of his
character was excluded by the court's ruling that:  (1) could
bear on mitigation; and (2) defendant would have communicated to
the jury had the court allowed him to speak free of any
restraints.  Nor does defendant demonstrate that any such aspect
of his character was not communicated adequately by other means. 
We reject defendant's Eighth Amendment arguments without further
discussion.  We conclude that the procedural restrictions imposed
on defendant's allocution did not violate his rights under the
Fourteenth or Eighth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
We turn to defendant's argument that the trial court
erred in restricting the substance of his unsworn statement by
deleting the last paragraph, which read:
"Besides the task before you in this case, I am
currently serving a life sentence with a 30 year
minimum from the previous Smith trial.  And your Honor,
at this time I respectfully appeal to you that should
this jury spare my life, I ask that I be sentenced to
consecutive life sentences."
According to defendant, allocution traditionally includes the
right to discuss mitigating factors, and, because it is difficult
to tell what a jury would consider mitigating, a defendant must
be allowed to speak in an "unrestricted fashion."
The state responds that the trial court correctly
struck those two sentences.  The state contends that the second
stricken sentence contained information that was inappropriate
for allocution in two related ways:  First, the state contends
that the topic of consecutive sentencing was "a matter over which
the jury has no say," and hence was outside the scope of proper
allocution to the jury.  Second, the state notes that the second
sentence was addressed to the judge, who would control any
consecutive sentencing decision, not to the jury, to whom
defendant had asked to address his allocution. 
When the Oregon Constitution was adopted, the
permissible scope of a criminal defendant's unsworn pre-sentencing statement included legal reasons why the court should
not impose a potential sentence, general pleas for leniency,
mitigating factors, and requests for pardon.  Joseph Chitty, 1
The Criminal Law, 699 (4th ed 1841); Fred Cohen, Sentencing,
Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal:  The View from Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 Tex L Rev 1, 9-10 (1968); see also Jaime, 28 Willamette
L Rev at 132 (discussing trial in Virginia colony in 1766 in
which a defendant exercised his allocution to persuade the court
to accept his self-recommended sentence).  This court has
explained that allocution provides an opportunity for a defendant
to convince the sentencing authority to impose no more than the
minimum sentence and also allows the defendant to address other
matters pertaining to the sentence.  Huddleston, 324 Or at 612. 
As this court stated in DeAngelo:
"The right to speak at a sentencing hearing should
logically include the right to make any statements
relevant to existing sentencing and parole practices. 
* * * Oregon's * * * approach to incarcerating
individuals requires the sentencing judge to be fully
informed of the defendant's criminal history, the crime
severity, and aggravating and mitigating matters * * *. 
[A] prime reason for allowing such a right is to
provide the defendant an opportunity to plead for
mitigation of the sentence. * * * [A] defendant should
be able to state any reason why he or she feels
sentence should not be pronounced and, in addition to
presenting mitigating evidence, be given an opportunity
to make any relevant personal comments to the court. 
This includes, but is not limited to, statements of
remorse, apology, chagrin, or plans and hopes for the
future.  Some defendants might even wish to plead for
maximum punishment in an attempt to achieve some
purported good."
306 Or at 95-96 (emphasis added).
Generally, of course, it is the court, not the jury,
that resolves all sentencing issues.  See, e.g., ORS 137.010(1)
(statutes defining offenses impose duty upon court to pass
sentence in accordance with ORS chapter 137); ORS 137.120 (court
shall impose sentence on persons convicted of felonies); ORS
161.615 (court shall fix the term of imprisonment for
misdemeanors); ORS 161.725 (court may extend period of
confinement of dangerous offenders).  In capital cases, however,
the legislature has dictated that both the court and the jury
shall play significant roles in sentencing proceedings.  See ORS
163.150 (setting out procedures for sentencing in capital cases). 
In this case, as distinguished from DeAngelo, we address for the
first time the parameters of allocution in the context of a
capital sentencing proceeding, in which both jury and court play
a role.  See ORS 163.150(1)(b) (in capital sentencing proceeding,
jury must resolve four issues); ORS 163.150(1)(f), (2)(b)
(depending on how jury resolves those four issues, court must
impose a specified sentence). 
We agree with the state that, in all cases, including
capital cases, whether sentences are to be served consecutively
or concurrently is a matter for the court, not for the jury.  See
ORS 137.123 (establishing criteria under which court may order
sentences to run consecutively).  This court has held that a
trial court properly may refuse to allow a capital defendant's
counsel to argue to the jury that the court could impose
consecutive life sentences if the jury returned multiple life
sentence verdicts.  State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 628, 912 P2d
364 (1996).  This court reasoned that, to allow such an argument, 
"would * * * open[] a Pandora's box involving all sorts
of evidence and arguments about the possibilities of
what the trial court might do, what the Parole Board
might do, what the Governor might do, what might happen
if defendant escaped, and so forth.  A trial court has
the authority to prevent the parties from arguing about
matters outside the record and to prevent jury
confusion and speculation about matters over which the
jury has no say."
Id. at 628.  The proposed statement in this case, however, is
distinguishable and, as we explain below, when viewed in context,
was relevant to issues that Oregon law required the jury, as well
as the judge, to decide.
The pertinent sentences in defendant's statement were
preceded by defendant's acknowledgment that "I have clearly
proven to all [and] myself that I don't belong in the free
community and never do."  He then sought to inform the jury that
he already was serving a sentence with a 30-year minimum.  The
state concedes that the subject of the first stricken sentence --
that defendant already was serving a 30-year prison term for his
conviction in "the Smith trial" -- was within the record.  One of
the state's witnesses had testified that defendant already was
serving a 30-year prison term, and the trial court had alluded to
that prison term in the jury instructions, stating that any life
sentence in this case "would commence on the completion of the
life sentence currently being served by the defendant."  The
state's sole objection to the statement is that for defendant
himself to mention his prison term in the Smith case after a
prosecution witness already had mentioned it "could only have
appeared to be self-serving."
We reject the state's argument.  By referring to the
prison term that he already was serving, defendant was attempting
to obtain a less onerous sentence in this case.  A primary
traditional purpose for allocution is to allow a criminal
defendant to plead for leniency or to establish mitigation.  The
fact that such a purpose is, by definition, "self-serving," may
be accurate descriptively, but the label "self-serving" is not a
useful analytical tool.  By informing the jury that he already
would be in prison for many years, defendant was attempting to
communicate a relevant mitigating consideration, viz., the fact
that he already was separated from the community for his conduct,
and would continue to be for at least 30 years.
Two characteristics of the second stricken sentence
satisfy us that that sentence also was within the proper scope of
allocution.  First, it invited the judge to impose consecutive
life sentences but conditioned that request on the jury's
acceptance of defendant's plea that it spare his life.  Defendant
sought to express that statement to the judge, but also in the
jury's presence and for its benefit.  The question whether a
defendant might qualify for any sentence less than death is one
that ORS 163.150(5) requires the jury to decide.  By making the
statement in question, defendant sought to demonstrate to the
jury that a facet of his character -- his willingness to accept
lifetime imprisonment -- should induce them to decline to
sentence him to death.
Second, the second stricken sentence invited the trial
judge to hold defendant to his word before the jury.  By stating
his condition before both the jury and the judge, defendant knew
that he later would be unable to argue credibly against
consecutive life sentences if the jury spared his life.
ORS 163.150(5) assigns unique roles to the jury and the
judge, in that it makes both a part of the sentencing process. 
Thus, while defendant's second stricken sentence ordinarily would
be pertinent to only the traditional sentencer, the judge, it had
pertinence here to the jury, because under Oregon's death-penalty
sentencing scheme, the jury is a participant in the sentencing
decision.  We conclude that both excluded sentences fell within
the proper scope of allocution and that the court violated
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, in striking
them from defendant's proposed unsworn statement.
TESTIMONY OF DR. BLAKELY

During the remand proceeding, defendant called as an
expert witness Dr. Blakely, a neuropsychologist.  The state
objected to Blakely's testimony on the ground that, because he
was not a neurologist, Blakely was not qualified to testify about
possible causes of a frontal lobe dysfunction that he had
detected in defendant's brain.  The trial court sustained the
objection.  Defendant asserts that Blakely's education and
experience qualified him to testify about possible causes of
defendant's frontal lobe dysfunction and, accordingly, that the
ruling was erroneous.  As discussed below, we determine that we
must review this assignment of error for errors of law.  Applying
that standard, we conclude that the court should have allowed
Blakely to testify about the possible causes of defendant's
frontal lobe dysfunction.
Blakely testified at length about an
electroencephalogram (EEG), or record of brain waves, obtained
during tests that Blakely had administered to defendant and about
the results of that test.  Blakely described the procedure itself
and the meaning of different parts of the EEG.  He testified that
he had analyzed defendant's EEG and that it exhibited a
characteristic pattern indicating frontal lobe dysfunction. 
Defendant then began to question Blakely about possible causes of
frontal lobe dysfunction.  The state objected, arguing that,
because Blakely was not a neurologist, he was not qualified to
render an opinion about possible causes of defendant's
encephalographic profile.  The trial court allowed defendant to
make an offer of proof as to Blakely's qualifications.  Among
other things, Blakely explained that he and other
neuropsychologists routinely render opinions interpreting
clinical data and arriving at conclusions about possible
etiologies to explain the data. 
The trial court sustained the state's objection,
stating, "[I]t seems to me that Dr. Blakely is able to testify as
to his findings.  To indicate a cause, I think is beyond his
expertise."  On appeal, defendant argues that Blakely was
qualified, under OEC 702, (7) to testify about possible causes of
frontal lobe dysfunction and that, accordingly, the trial court
erred in sustaining the state's objection on the basis that
Blakely was not so qualified.
We first consider our standard of review.  Defendant
argues that the ruling in this case should be reviewed for errors
of law, relying on several cases in which he contends that this
court reviewed similar rulings for errors of law:  Mayor v.
Dowsett, 240 Or 196, 400 P2d 234 (1965); State v. Stringer, 292
Or 388, 639 P2d 1264 (1982); Barrett v. Coast Range Plywood, 294
Or 641, 661 P2d 926 (1983); Dyer v. R.E. Christiansen Trucking,
Inc., 318 Or 391, 868 P2d 1325 (1994).  The state argues that the
ruling should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, relying on
cases in which it contends that this court applied that standard: 
Myers v. Cessna Aircraft, 275 Or 501, 553 P2d 355 (1976);
Stringer, 292 Or 388; State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 808 P2d 1002
(1991).  Both parties are partially correct, because the
determination whether an expert witness is qualified to testify
may involve both the application of legal rules and the exercise
of a trial court's discretion.  We conclude that we review the
particular ruling at issue here for errors of law.  We reach that
conclusion because an examination of our previous cases shows
that, although we have not stated it in so many words, our
practice has been to review similar assignments of error for
errors of law. 
This court previously has explained that, with respect
to many evidentiary decisions, trial courts possess broad
discretion, as long as they exercise discretion within the range
of legally permissible decisions.  Put another way, if the
application of a legal rule governing the admissibility of
evidence allows for several legally correct outcomes, a trial
court may exercise discretion to choose among those outcomes.
For example, in Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or 247,
486 P2d 553 (1971), the plaintiff assigned error to the trial
court's refusal to allow her expert witness, an architect, to
testify.  This court examined in depth the proper standard of
review, explaining, 
"Generally, when appellate courts speak of the
discretion of a trial judge, they refer to an exclusive
power of free decision not revisable or reviewable by
an appellate tribunal in the absence of abuse. * * * 
"However, this cannot be the meaning of the term
'discretion' when a judge is faced with a decision
whether to admit certain testimony of an expert after
he has been deemed qualified.  At this point, he must
apply certain principles of law to his decision and he
is not free of revision or review.  In the case at bar,
it was not singularly a matter of discretion but a
question of law calling for an application of a rule of
law to a particular set of facts.  The true meaning of
'discretion,' when applied to the exclusion or
admission of testimony from an expert witness, would be
the power to make a choice from two or more legally
valid solutions if supported by the facts. * * * 
"* * * * *
"The decision of the trial judge is legally valid
so long as that decision is based on the proper
application of a rule of law to the facts involved."
Id. at 256-58. 
Similarly, in State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d
1133 (1999), this court explained that some evidentiary rulings
contain both legal and discretionary determinations:
"[W]e must determine the appropriate standard of review
for trial court determinations of relevance under OEC
401 -- a question that previously has not been
addressed expressly by this court.  In considering that
question, we note the distinction between the
determination of relevance under OEC 401 and the
question of admissibility under OEC 403.  A decision to
exclude evidence under OEC 403 is reserved to the trial
court's discretion. * * * That is so because
application of OEC 403 may allow for more than one
legally correct outcome. * * * For example, in some
cases, the record may support either the admission or
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence under OEC
403, and neither result legally would be incorrect. * * * 
"Relevance determinations under OEC 401, by
contrast, can yield only one correct answer; evidence
either is relevant or it is not.  Under OEC 401, if
evidence logically is relevant, a trial court has no
discretion to label it as irrelevant. * * *
Accordingly, we conclude that we must review
determinations of relevance for errors of law." 
(Citations omitted.)  See also, e.g., State v. Hubbard, 297 Or
789, 794 n 2, 688 P2d 1311 (1984) (term "discretion" should
indicate discretion to make decision from among available choices
and should not be buzzword for appellate abdication);  Stringer,
292 Or at 394 (if answer to question whether expert testimony
will assist jury reasonably could be decided either way, trial
court has latitude in admitting evidence).
From the foregoing, we glean several principles. 
First, in the context of evidentiary rulings, "discretion," as
this court has used that term, refers to the authority of a trial
court to choose among several legally correct outcomes.  If there
is only one legally correct outcome, "discretion" is an
inapplicable concept.  It follows that we first must review
evidentiary rulings without deference to determine whether proper
principles of law were applied correctly.  Next, and also without
deference, we must determine whether application of those
principles leads to only one correct outcome.  If there is only
one legally correct outcome, and the trial court arrived at that
outcome, it did not err; conversely, if the trial court arrived
at a different outcome, it did err.  Only if we determine that
application of the correct legal principles leads to more than
one correct outcome do we continue to review whether the trial
court abused its discretion in choosing an outcome. (8)  If the
trial court's decision was within the range of legally correct
discretionary choices and produced a permissible, legally correct
outcome, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Accordingly, appellate review of rulings on the admissibility of
evidence may involve the application of several standards of
review, depending on the particular ruling and assignment of
error at issue.
With those general principles in mind, we turn to the
evidentiary ruling at issue, viz., that Blakely was not qualified
"by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" to
testify about possible causes of frontal lobe dysfunction.  OEC
702. (9)  We first determine the proper law to apply to that ruling. 
We have addressed similar questions in several previous cases.
In State Highway Com. v. Arnold et al, 218 Or 43, 60,
341 P2d 1089 (1959), a condemnation action, the plaintiff sought
to introduce expert witness testimony about the value of the
property.  Holbrook, the proposed expert witness, testified about
his education and experience, which included substantial
appraisal experience and, in particular, experience appraising
cinder cones, the type of property at issue.  Id. at 60-63.  The
trial court concluded that Holbrook was not qualified as an
expert:
"'Oh, I don't believe this man is
qualified to testify as an expert.  He knows
nothing of the lands of Klamath County or in
this vicinity.  The fact he sold a piece of
property or he appraised a piece of property
for the petroleum company down here in the
City of Klamath Falls sometime ago, that
certainly isn't qualification.  Whatever he
knows as to the intricate makeup of these
cinders he got from the State of Oregon, it
is hearsay evidence as far as he is
concerned.  He can testify as an ordinary
witness but not as an expert.'
"'* * * * *
"'I don't think he has qualified as a
mineral expert any place by this testimony. 
I don't think he has ever tried to qualify
himself as a mineral expert.  In this
locality he has examined or he has appraised
a piece of property for the General Petroleum
Company.'" 
Id. at 63-64.
This court "consider[ed] the test for determining
whether a witness qualifies as an expert for the purpose of
testifying as to the value of property."  Id. at 64.  The court
arrived at the following principle to be applied to the
determination whether an expert is qualified to testify about
appraisal:  "[T]here is such 'generalized knowledge' [of
valuation processes or appraisal methods] and * * * it is to be
weighed in determining whether the witness qualifies as an
expert."  Id. at 65.  The court then reviewed the evidence of
Holbrook's education and experience in light of the particular
testimony sought, concluding:
"We are of the opinion that Mr. Holbrook should
have been permitted to testify as an expert and that
the trial court's refusal to permit him to do so
constitutes reversible error.  The trial judge stated
that the witness had not 'qualified as a mineral
expert.'  It was not necessary for him to do so.  He
was called to give testimony with respect to the value
of the condemned property.  To establish such value it
was not necessary that he have scientific knowledge of
the minerals which were being taken."
Id. at 64.  Similarly, in Brown et ux v. Eakins, 220 Or 122, 348
P2d 1116 (1960), the court examined the training and experience
of the witness in light of the testimony sought.  See id. at 124-25 (concluding that "[t]he evidence amply qualifies [the witness]
to give an opinion on the cause of fires generally and the cause
of this particular fire").
In Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., Inc., 262 Or 293, 498
P2d 766 (1972), the defendants contended that the trial court had
erred by allowing the plaintiffs' expert witness, a chemical
engineer, to testify about whether the plaintiffs' electric
blanket could have caused a fire.  This court stated:
"We gather from the questions asked Dr. Anderson by
defendants' counsel in aid of objecting to his
qualifications that at the time of trial they did not
feel he was qualified as an expert because he had no
specific experience in the manufacture of electric
blankets. * * *  Defendants' objection to his
qualification was:
"'Well, I would on the basis of the
man's testimony now object to his answering
the question on what caused this blanket or
whatever the problem was with the blanket in
glowing and so forth, on the ground I don't
think he qualified from the electrical
standpoint and I think he so indicated.'"
Id. at 304-05.  This court reviewed the witness's education and
experience and then stated:
"Even though the witness was a chemical engineer and
not an electrical engineer, he had sufficient training,
study, background, and experience to qualify as an
expert witness.  He does not necessarily have to be an
expert in the specific item under question in a
products liability case.  Whether he is the best expert
witness on the specific subject or what credibility
will be given to the witness's testimony are matters
that go to the weight of his testimony and not to his
qualification."
Id. at 305.  This court held that the trial court did not err in
allowing the witness to testify as an expert.  Id. at 306.  See
also Dyer, 318 Or at 398-99 (examining expert's qualification to
testify about point of impact); Barrett, 294 Or at 649 (examining
experts' qualification to testify about psychological condition);
Myers, 275 Or at 519-21 (observing "[n]o expert is competent to
express an opinion on every subject"; examining expert's
qualification to testify about cause of airplane crash); Meyer v.
Harvey Aluminum, 263 Or 487, 489, 501 P2d 795 (1972) ("The
capacity [to testify] is in every case a relative one, i.e.,
relative to the topic about which the person is asked to make his
statement."; examining expert's qualification to testify about
cause of damage to fruit) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Those cases demonstrate that this court reviews without
deference for errors of law whether a trial court properly
applied OEC 702 to decide whether an expert is qualified to give
testimony relative to a particular topic, because that
determination is a question of the application of law.  Once that
threshold is satisfied, it is for the factfinder to ascribe the
proper weight to an expert's testimony.
 In this case, the basis for the trial court's ruling
was that, because Blakely lacked a medical degree, he was not
qualified to testify about the possible causes of defendant's
frontal lobe dysfunction. (10)  This court previously has addressed
whether a particular degree or field of practice is a necessary
prerequisite to testimony about a particular topic.
For example, this court has held that a trial court
should not have excluded the testimony of medical doctors about a
psychological diagnosis known as functional overlay on the
grounds that the witnesses were not psychologists.  Barrett, 294
Or at 649.  Similarly, in Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Or 377,
449 P2d 426 (1969), this court held that the trial court erred in
refusing to admit testimony from a clinical psychologist that the
plaintiff's head injury had caused his emotional disturbance on
the ground that the witness was not a medical doctor.  As this
court observed in Sandow, "a properly-qualified clinical
psychologist is competent to testify concerning a person's mental
and emotional condition despite his not having medical training." 
Id. at 384.  A medical degree is not a necessary predicate to
finding an expert witness qualified to testify about medical
knowledge, assuming that witness otherwise is qualified to do so. 
It follows that, in this case, Blakely's lack of a medical degree
similarly should not have been the determinative factor in the
decision whether to admit his testimony. 
Proper application of OEC 702 requires assessment of
the particular qualifications of each witness.  We do not assume
a disqualification from the lack of a particular educational or
professional degree.  Accordingly, and similar to our analysis in
Sandow, 252 Or at 384, if Blakely was "a properly qualified
clinical psychologist," it was error not to permit him to testify
about the possible causes of defendant's frontal lobe
dysfunction.  All that remains is to review Blakely's testimony
about his qualifications to determine if he was in fact a
"properly qualified clinical psychologist."
The record demonstrates that Blakely had special
training and knowledge relating to, and thus was qualified to
testify about, the possible causes of frontal lobe dysfunction. 
Blakely testified that he holds a Ph.D. in physiological
psychology, has done post-doctoral work in neuroscience,
including neuropathology, and has taken advanced workshops
including several at Harvard Medical School.  He has taught
neuroanatomy at the University of California, among other places,
and has written a treatise on neuroanatomy.  He has worked in the
field of electroencephalography for more than 20 years,
specializing in electroencephalographic measurement and
interpretation, and also performs neuropsychological evaluation. 
He belongs to several professional organizations, including the
International Neuropsychological Association.  He has published
several papers, including a monograph on the neuropsychological
basis of crime, and articles in peer-reviewed journals.  Members
of his field routinely render interpretive conclusions, and
Blakely has rendered opinions and conclusions based on his data
in the past, including as part of civil and criminal proceedings. 
That combination of education and experience demonstrated that
Blakely had the requisite knowledge to testify helpfully about
the possible causes of defendant's frontal lobe dysfunction.  The
trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred in
refusing to permit the jury to consider the option under ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) of sentencing defendant to life in prison
without the possibility of parole and to permit defendant to
waive an ex post facto objection to the jury's consideration of
that option.  That error requires this court to vacate the
sentence of death and to remand the case for further proceedings. 
We also conclude that the trial court erred in striking the last
paragraph from the statement that defendant proposed to convey to
the jury.  Finally, we conclude that the court erred in
determining that Blakely was not qualified to testify about the
possible causes of the frontal lobe dysfunction presented by
defendant's encephalographic profile. 
We have examined defendant's other assignments of
error.  Those assignments either are not well taken or raise
issues that are unlikely to recur on remand.  We decline to
address those assignments in greater detail. 
The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  

1. Judgments of conviction and sentences of death are now
subject to automatic review in this court pursuant to ORS
138.012(1).  The parties do not argue that that statutory change
affects the analysis or disposition of this case.

2. Defendant was charged in a separate indictment for each
victim.  In each indictment, he was charged with one count of
aggravated murder in the course of torturing the victim, ORS
163.095(1)(e), and aggravated felony murder in the course of
kidnapping, ORS 163.095(2)(d); ORS 163.115(1)(b)(E) and (F).  In
one indictment, defendant was charged with a third count of
aggravated murder for murder in the course of sexual abuse.  ORS
163.095(2)(d); ORS 163.115(1)(b)(H).

3.  Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  "No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed * * *."  Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution provides, in part:  "No State shall * * * pass any  
* * * ex post facto Law * * *."  For a discussion of the history
of the Oregon ex post facto clause, see State v. Cookman, 324 Or
19, 25-31, 920 P2d 1086 (1996).

4. Our rationale obviates the need to address the parties'
arguments about the meaning of the words "trials commencing" in
ORS 163.150(4) (1993).

5. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
The Eighth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson v. California, 370 US 660, 667,
82 S Ct 1417, 8 L Ed 2d 758 (1962).  The Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides, in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]"
6. The parameters of the right of allocution in Oregon is
an open question.  In State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 124, 806 P2d
92 (1991), this court stated that "Article I, section 11, grants
two distinct, not overlapping, rights:  the defendant's right to
make a statement and to testify, and the defendant's right to be
represented by counsel."  (Emphasis added.)  The issue in that
case was whether Article I, section 11, entitled defendants to
"hybrid representation," i.e., whether defendants were entitled
to perform the same duties as their lawyers.  This court held
that the right to be heard did not include the right to hybrid
representation.  Id.  Because this court in Stevens was not
concerned directly with whether Article I, section 11,
encompassed the right to make an unsworn statement, any assertion
on that point is dictum.
Nor does State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597,
932 P2d 1145 (1997), resolve the issue.  In that case, this court
considered a facial challenge to ORS 137.700, adopted by the
people as Measure 11 in 1994.  This court concluded, among other
things, that Measure 11 did not violate Article I, section 11. 
Id. at 611-12.  Although the court discussed features of the
right of allocution, it did not at that time address whether the
Oregon Constitution allows a right to be heard that is distinct
from the right to take the stand and testify.  Similarly, State
v. Sally, 41 Or 366, 70 P 396 (1902), is not dispositive.  In
that case, this court concluded that, if the common-law right of
allocution applied to minor felonies -- then a holding that the
court declined to make -- the trial court had complied
substantially with that right in that case.  Id. at 370-71.

7. OEC 702 provides:
"If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise."
8. To say that a trial court necessarily abuses its
discretion if it applies the wrong principle of law or
incorrectly applies the correct rule of law leads to the same
result.  However, the formulation that we have set out is more
straightforward and correctly distinguishes that we do not defer
to trial courts' legal determinations.  To say that an appellate
court should review the legal aspects of an evidentiary ruling
for abuse of discretion and that a trial court abuses its
discretion if it makes a legal error unnecessarily complicates a
simple principle, i.e., that appellate courts review questions of
law anew without deference to the decisions of trial courts.

9. We are not asked, in this case, to review the factual
predicates for Blakely's qualification, e.g., whether he in fact
was a licensed psychologist.  Trial courts determine such facts
as preliminary matters under OEC 104(1), and this court reviews
the record to determine whether any evidence supports the trial
court's ruling.  See OEC 104(1) Commentary (1981) ("This
subsection assigns to the trial judge the responsibility for
making certain preliminary determinations regarding
qualifications * * *.  Is the alleged expert a qualified
physician? * * * To the extent that these preliminary inquiries
are factual, the judge will necessarily * * * act as a trier of
fact."); John Henry Wigmore, II Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 561 at 756 (Chadbourn rev 1979) ("[T]he trial court must be
left to determine, absolutely and without review, the fact of
possession of the required qualification by a particular
witness.") (emphasis omitted); e.g., Highway Com. v. Parker et
al, 225 Or 143, 162-63, 357 P2d 548 (1960) (court has gone far in
direction of assigning completely to trial court's discretion
ruling on would-be experts' qualifications).

10. Although the trial court stated, in making its ruling,
that Blakely was unqualified to testify as to "a cause" (emphasis
added), we observe that defense counsel reiterated that he had
sought Blakely's testimony only about the range of possible
causes for the type of encephalographic profile presented by
defendant.