Title: Payne v. Carroll

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
JANET L. PAYNE 
 
v.  Record No. 941600                         OPINION BY 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
TROY DREW CARROLL                          September 15, 1995 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 
 
Joshua L. Robinson, Judge-Designate 
 
 
In this plaintiff's appeal from a judgment entered in a tort 
action, we consider whether the credibility of a party-witness in 
a civil case may be impeached by disclosure of the name and 
nature of a felony conviction. 
 
The plaintiff, Janet L. Payne, a passenger in a pick-up 
truck driven by Paxton Payne, her husband, was injured in a 
collision between the truck and a vehicle operated by Troy 
Carroll.  The collision occurred at night in the left-hand 
northbound lane of Route 29.  Paxton Payne testified that, 
starting from a parked position on the eastern shoulder and 
observing no traffic in the rear-view and side-view mirrors, he 
had driven north "into the right-hand lane with the flashers on", 
that he "then turned the flashers off, turned [the] signal lights 
on and proceeded to go into the left-hand lane".  He explained 
that he was preparing to make a left turn onto Route 605 west 
and, thence, left to proceed south on Route 29. 
 
The Carroll vehicle was travelling north on Route 29 
approaching a hillcrest in the highway south of the intersection 
with Route 605 west.  Carroll testified that, when he topped the 
hillcrest, he "saw something was in the road", that he "swerved 
to the left", and, applying his brakes, "slid . . . maybe 50 
yards . . . and impacted with Mr. Payne's vehicle." 
 
The investigating officer testified that Carroll "had a 
strong odor of alcohol . . . [and] bloodshot glassy eyes, [was] 
unsteady on his feet and seemed to be very confused as far as his 
direction".  Carroll was placed under arrest "for driving under 
the influence."  As appears from the certificate of analysis 
admitted into evidence, Carroll's blood alcohol content two hours 
after the accident was 0.13, and Carroll acknowledged at trial 
that he had "pled guilty to DUI and confessed to giving false 
information at the scene". 
 
During the course of cross-examination of the plaintiff, 
counsel for the defendant posed questions suggesting she had 
changed certain testimony she had given in a pre-trial 
deposition. Counsel then asked the following question:  "Now, 
you, ma'am, have been convicted of a felony involving fraud, 
haven't you?"  Mrs. Payne replied, "Yes, sir."  The plaintiff's 
counsel objected, and the court considered the objection out of 
the presence of the jury.  Conceding that the defense had the 
right to reveal the fact of conviction, the plaintiff's counsel 
argued that the defense had no right to disclose "the nature of 
the felony."  Upon return to open court, the trial judge 
announced that "[t]he answer will stand." 
 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the 
plaintiff moved the court to set aside the verdict and grant a 
new trial.  The court ruled that "the defendant was entitled to 
show the fact and the nature of the conviction without going into 
the details" and that "while the Court may disagree as to the 
weight of the evidence, I think the Court has no alternative but 
to deny the motion to set aside the verdict". 
 
The issue framed in this appeal is one of first impression 
in this Court.  Until now, we have considered the question of 
disclosure of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes 
in criminal prosecutions and the question of limitations upon 
such disclosure.  Now, we consider those questions in the context 
of civil proceedings. 
 
Code § 19.2-269, part of the Criminal Procedure title of the 
Code, provides that "[a] person convicted of a felony or perjury 
shall not be incompetent to testify, but the fact of conviction 
may be shown in evidence to affect his credit."  Construing a 
predecessor of that statute, former Code § 19.1-265, to determine 
the permissible scope of cross-examination of the accused in a 
murder trial, we said that "the fact of conviction of a felony 
may be shown by the Commonwealth, but the name of the felony, 
other than perjury, and the details thereof may not be shown."  
Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 446, 185 S.E.2d 48, 51 
(1971). 
 
The rule established in Harmon has been applied to permit 
disclosure of the number and nature of felony convictions of a 
witness for the prosecution, Hummel v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 548, 
550, 231 S.E.2d 216, 217 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 
(1979); accord Johnson v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 525, 528, 298 
S.E.2d 99, 101 (1982), and of a witness called by the accused, 
Dammerau v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 285, 290, 349 S.E.2d 409, 
412 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Vecuso v. Commonwealth, 5 
Va. App. 59, 69 (1987).
1  But the rule in Harmon that forbids 
                     
    
1Disclosure of the number and nature of prior felony 
convictions of an accused-witness attenuates the presumption of 
innocence and creates a prejudicial impact upon the process of 
determining guilt, or penalty, or both.  That danger does not face 
disclosure of the name and nature of prior felony convictions for 
purposes of impeachment of a defendant in a criminal trial 
remains intact.  Joyner v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 290, 298-99, 
392 S.E.2d 822, 826-27 (1990). 
 
Payne argues on appeal, as in the court below, that the same 
limitations upon impeachment of an accused-witness in a criminal 
case should apply to a party-witness in a civil case.  We agree. 
 
The Harmon court recognized that "some prejudice rises" from 
disclosure of a defendant's felony conviction but concluded that 
"its probative value as to his credit outweighs the prejudicial 
effect."  Harmon at 446, 185 S.E.2d at 51.  Explaining the reason 
underlying the limitations upon disclosure, the Court said: 
 
Should the jury be permitted to know the name of the 
felony and the details thereof, it may mean more to 
them than the mere fact that the defendant is a person 
of doubtful veracity.  The danger of such prejudice is 
increased if the Commonwealth is permitted to show the 
nature of the crime of which he has been previously 
convicted.  Thus, so long as the defendant answers 
truthfully the inquiry as to a prior felony conviction, 
the name of the crime cannot be shown. 
 
Id. 
 
Here, when the members of the jury were permitted to know 
the nature of Payne's prior felony conviction, it could have 
meant more to them than the possibility that she was a witness of 
doubtful veracity.  Indeed, the jury could have concluded that a 
person convicted of criminal fraud was disposed to commit fraud 
in a civil case in which she was a party in interest and was, 
therefore, not only unworthy of belief but also morally 
undeserving of an award of damages. 
 
We are of opinion that the danger of prejudice flowing from 
                                                                  
other witnesses in a criminal trial. 
the disclosure in issue outweighed its probative value, that the 
trial court erred in ruling that "the defendant was entitled to 
show the . . . nature of the conviction" and that, as the trial 
court said, if the disclosure was improper, "it was not something 
that could amount to harmless error".
2  Paraphrasing the rule in 
Harmon defining the permissible scope of impeachment of an 
accused-witness in a criminal prosecution, we hold that, for 
purposes of impeachment, the fact of a prior conviction of a 
felony may be shown against a party-witness in a civil case, but 
that the name of the felony, other than perjury, and the details 
thereof may not be shown.  Applying that rule, we will reverse 
the judgment entered below and remand the case for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
    
2The cautionary jury instruction granted by the court was 
addressed solely to disclosure of the fact of conviction without 
mention of disclosure of the nature of the felony.