Title: State v. Mickey

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 303A95
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TERRY WAYNE MICKEY
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by
Stanback, J., on 2 February 1995 in Superior Court, Randolph
County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to the
judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for twenty years for
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was allowed 1 July 1997. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Debra C.
Graves, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by
J. Michael Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 5 August 1992 for first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.  He
was tried capitally at the 7 November 1994 Criminal Session of
Superior Court, Randolph County, Judge A. Leon Stanback
presiding.  The jury found defendant guilty of both charges.  At
the conclusion of a separate capital sentencing proceeding, the
jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-
-2-
degree murder conviction.  The trial court sentenced defendant to
imprisonment for life for the murder conviction and imposed a
consecutive sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment on the
conspiracy conviction.
The State’s evidence tended to show inter alia that in
the early morning hours of 29 June 1992, defendant’s first
cousin, Chris Cook, entered defendant’s home, where he shot and
killed defendant’s wife, Melissa Cooper Mickey.  Defendant Terry
Mickey had hired and conspired with Cook to perform the killing
for $10,000.  Cook ultimately confessed to the murder and
implicated defendant.
Defendant and Melissa had been separated in 1985 or
1986 and later reconciled.  Defendant had lived with another
woman during their separation.  Defendant later met Cindi
Rinaldi, a co-worker at the post office, and began a relationship
with her.  Defendant told Rinaldi that he was planning to divorce
his wife but that an attorney had advised that he wait until his
bills were paid.
Defendant solicited Joe Ray to murder defendant’s wife
about eight months before she was killed.  Ray refused to
participate.  Defendant asked Ray if his nephew would kill
defendant’s wife, and Ray said no.  Defendant then asked Ray to
get a gun for him, which Ray did.
Defendant’s cousin, Chris Cook, was in the Marine Corps
stationed at Virginia Beach when defendant phoned to ask if he
knew of a way to raise $50,000.  At one point, Cook and defendant
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planned to rob a drug dealer to raise money, but they did not go
through with the plan.  
In 1990 or 1991, Cook learned that defendant was making
purchases and cash advances using credit cards he had stolen from
the mail while he was a postal employee.  Defendant sometimes
gave Cook cash advances drawn on the stolen credit cards. 
Defendant also gave Cook a video cassette recorder and, in June
1991, an engagement ring for Cook’s fiancée, paying for the
purchases of those items with the stolen credit cards.
Cook was discharged from the Marine Corps on
3 September 1991.  He broke up with his fiancée in January or
February 1992 and pawned the ring, which defendant later redeemed
from the pawn shop.  In June 1992, defendant offered Cook $5,000
to kill defendant’s wife Melissa.  Cook refused the offer. 
Defendant repeated his offer to Cook on 14 June 1992.  Defendant
reminded Cook of all the cash and gifts he had given him.  Cook
continued to refuse the offer and tried to avoid defendant. 
Defendant went to Cook’s house and promised to pay $5,000 before
the killing and $5,000 after defendant received $50,000 from an
insurance policy defendant had taken out on Melissa several
months earlier.  Cook finally agreed to defendant’s scheme to
kill Melissa.
Defendant and Cook met at defendant’s house on Sunday,
28 June 1992, to plan the murder.  Defendant’s children were at
the beach with Melissa’s parents, and he stated that he wanted
the killing done that night or the next morning.  Defendant met
Cook at about 2:45 a.m. and took him to defendant’s home. 
-4-
Defendant gave Cook a ski mask, surgical gloves, and a
.38-caliber revolver loaded with six rounds of ammunition. 
Defendant told Cook to wait thirty to forty-five minutes before
killing Melissa so defendant could establish an alibi.
Cook entered the house through a door left unlocked by
defendant by prior arrangement and found Melissa lying in bed. 
He shot Melissa in the right jaw.  She writhed her way to the far
side of the bed.  Cook went around the bed, where, firing through
a pillow to muffle the sound, he shot her in the back of the head
and through the back.  He ran from the house, removed the mask
and gloves, and hid the gun and mask under a pile of rocks.  Cook
then called his roommate for a ride home from a convenience
store, where he was seen by witnesses.  Cook told his roommate
that he had been at a construction site early that morning.  He
claimed that because they had run out of supplies, he was jogging
home when he fell and hurt himself.
When Cook arrived at his home, he washed his clothes
and contacted his employer, Tim Edwards, to establish an alibi. 
He wanted Edwards to say that he had been working at one of
Edwards’ job sites early that morning.  Thinking that Cook had
gotten into some minor trouble, Edwards agreed to the scheme. 
Edwards later disavowed Cook’s alibi when Edwards was questioned
by investigators and realized that Cook wanted an alibi for the
morning of the murder.
Melissa Mickey’s friends and co-workers at L&M Floor
Covering had become concerned that she had not come to work by
the time defendant phoned and asked for her at 10:00 to 10:30
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a.m.  Annette Owens went to defendant and Melissa’s home to look
for Melissa.  She found Melissa’s car in the garage but did not
find Melissa.  She discussed her concerns with her co-workers and
Garland Lawson, the store owner.  Lawson contacted the Lenoir
County Sheriff’s Department to have a deputy check the house. 
Lawson met Deputy Greer at the house, and they went through it
together.  They found Melissa’s body in a kneeling position on
the floor at the side of the bed, with one elbow lying on the
mattress.  Lawson and Deputy Greer left the house, called for
assistance, and waited outside.
Detective Sergeant Jeff Wilhoit arrived and helped
secure the murder scene.  Detective Don Andrews, the lead
investigator, went into the house and observed evidence in the
master bedroom.  Andrews ordered the seizure of evidence from the
master bedroom.  Officers seized evidence, including the
bloodstained mattress and box springs, bullets found on top of
several pornographic magazines, addressed to someone other than
defendant, and the magazines themselves.  The magazines and
bullets were found under the bed after the mattress and box
springs were removed.  Officers also seized a credit card issued
to someone not a member of the household which was lying on top
of a roll-top desk.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that when imposing a sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act in
excess of the presumptive sentence for his conspiracy conviction,
the trial court erroneously found the statutory aggravating
factor that defendant induced others to participate in the
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commission of the offense and erroneously failed to find the
statutory mitigating factor that defendant had no record of
criminal convictions.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4 (1988) (repealed
effective 1 October 1994).  The Fair Sentencing Act applied to
crimes committed before 1 October 1994; because the conspiracy in
question here took place prior to that date, defendant was
sentenced under this statute.  Under the Fair Sentencing Act,
“the sentencing judge must find and weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors before imposing a sentence greater than the
presumptive sentence set by the statute.”  State v. Flowers, ___
N.C. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 1997 WL 594841, at *22
(Sept. 26, 1997) (No. 553A94).  We address defendant’s two
arguments in support of this assignment of error in turn.
First, defendant argues that the trial court
erroneously found the statutory aggravator that defendant induced
Cook to participate in the offense.  He contends that the trial
court must have used the same evidence that the jury relied upon
in finding the agreement element of the crime of conspiracy when
the trial court later found the aggravating factor of inducement. 
Defendant contends that the only evidence supporting the
inducement aggravator was identical to the evidence supporting
the agreement element of the conspiracy.  More specifically,
defendant avers that evidence of his solicitation of Cook’s
participation was the only evidence supporting the jury’s finding
of the agreement element of the conspiracy charge and the only
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding the inducement
aggravator in sentencing.  We disagree.
-7-
A sentence is aggravated to account for a defendant’s
culpable conduct that goes beyond what was necessary to commit
the crime for which he is being sentenced.  State v. Thompson,
318 N.C. 395, 397-98, 348 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1986).  The evidence
used to establish an element of a crime cannot then be used to
prove an aggravating factor of the same crime.  State v. Hayes,
323 N.C. 306, 312, 372 S.E.2d 704, 707-08 (1988).  However,
evidence tending to show inducement and evidence tending to show
agreement are not necessarily one and the same.  State v. Wilson,
338 N.C. 244, 257, 449 S.E.2d 391, 399 (1994).  In this case, the
State introduced evidence in addition to that tending to prove
the agreement element of the conspiracy, which additional
evidence tended to prove inducement.  The State produced evidence
that defendant tried on several occasions to persuade Cook to
kill his wife.  Defendant offered to pay Cook.  He went to Cook’s
home to try to talk him into killing his wife.  He also reminded
Cook of past favors in an effort to make him feel guilty and
obligated.  This evidence supported the finding that defendant
induced Cook to enter the conspiracy and to kill Melissa.
Other evidence supported the jury’s finding of the
agreement element of the crime of conspiracy.  Independent
evidence tending to show agreement included evidence that
defendant agreed to drive Cook to defendant and Melissa’s house;
defendant brought a gun, mask, and gloves for Cook; and defendant
told Cook which door would be unlocked.  Also, agreement could be
inferred from the fact that Cook did in fact kill defendant’s
wife.  Therefore, the trial court did not need to rely on
-8-
evidence necessary to prove the crime when finding the inducement
aggravating factor.  The trial court properly found the
aggravating factor that defendant induced Cook to kill his wife.
Second, defendant argues in support of this assignment
of error that, in sentencing him for the conspiracy, the trial
court should have found the statutory mitigating factor that he
had no record of criminal convictions.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1340.4(a)(2)(a).  Defendant points out that in its capital
sentencing instructions to the jury, the trial court peremptorily
instructed the jury to find the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that defendant had no prior criminal convictions. 
Defendant reasons that because of this instruction in the capital
sentencing proceeding, the trial court was required to find the
same mitigator when sentencing him under the Fair Sentencing Act
for the felonious conspiracy.  We disagree. 
Under the Fair Sentencing Act, the trial court was
required to consider the statutorily enumerated mitigating
factors it found to exist.  Furthermore, the trial court “must
find a mitigating factor when the evidence is uncontradicted,
substantial, and manifestly credible.”  State v. Tucker, 329 N.C.
709, 725, 407 S.E.2d 805, 815 (1991).  The burden was on
defendant to produce such evidence and to prove the factor by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  However, the trial court
ordinarily is not required to find the same mitigating factors in
felony sentencing as were previously found by a jury in capital
sentencing.  Id.
-9-
In the instant case, defendant never produced any
evidence of the statutory mitigating factor that defendant had no
record of criminal convictions.  Instead, defendant asserts on
appeal that the finding of an analogous mitigator in the capital
sentencing proceeding constitutes evidence of the mitigator for
felony sentencing purposes.  We will not infer from an otherwise
silent record that defendant had no record of criminal
convictions.  See State v. House, 340 N.C. 187, 456 S.E.2d 292
(1995); State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968). 
Defendant failed to produce evidence supporting the mitigator.  
Therefore, the fact that the trial court failed to find a
mitigating factor in the felony sentencing proceeding under the
Fair Sentencing Act that is analogous to the mitigating
circumstance found by the jury in the capital sentencing
proceeding is not error.
There was error related to the mitigator in question
here, but it occurred in the trial court’s capital sentencing
instructions to the jury.  There, the trial court peremptorily
instructed the jury to find the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that defendant had no record of criminal
convictions.  However, during the capital sentencing proceeding,
the only support for that mitigating circumstance was defense
counsel’s assertion of it during the sentencing charge
conference; thus, no evidence was introduced in this regard.  In
State v. Thompson, we said that the State’s mere assertion that
an aggravating factor exists does not require the court to find
the factor in sentencing.  State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421,
-10-
424-25, 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983).  Here, defendant’s mere
assertion that a mitigating factor exists was not probative of
its existence.  State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 221, 306 S.E.2d
451, 456 (1983).  The trial court erred in peremptorily
instructing the jury at the capital sentencing proceeding to find
this mitigating circumstance in the absence of evidence to
support the finding.  However, this error operated in favor of
defendant in the capital sentencing proceeding and may well have
caused the jury to reach its recommendation of a life sentence
rather than the death penalty.  For this reason, the error does
not entitle defendant to a new sentencing hearing on the
conspiracy charge.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence some of the
items seized at the murder scene.  He contends that this evidence
was not a proper product of the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement.  Defendant argues that the seizure of a
credit card found on top of a desk just eight feet from the
victim’s body constituted an improper seizure not justified under
the plain view exception.  Defendant further argues that the
seizure of several pornographic magazines addressed to someone
other than defendant that were discovered under the bed after the
mattress and box springs were properly seized and on which two
bullets were found did not fall within the plain view exception. 
We disagree.
Initially, “‘[i]t must always be remembered that what
the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
-11-
unreasonable searches and seizures.’”  State v. Scott, 343 N.C.
313, 328, 471 S.E.2d 605, 614 (1996) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680 (1960)).  In
the present case, we examine a search initially permitted under
the exigent circumstances exception, the scope of which was
incrementally expanded to include seizures under the plain view
exception.
As explained by the United States Supreme Court, a
seizure is lawful under the plain view exception when the officer
was in a place where he had a right to be when the evidence was
discovered and when it is immediately apparent to the police that
the items observed constitute evidence of a crime, are
contraband, or are subject to seizure based upon probable cause. 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); see
State v. Church, 110 N.C. App. 569, 430 S.E.2d 462 (1993).  The
North Carolina General Assembly has imposed an additional
requirement, not mandated by the Constitution of the United
States, that the evidence discovered in plain view must be
discovered inadvertently.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-253 (1988).  See
generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112
(rejecting the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), which indicated that
discovery of evidence under the plain view exception must be
inadvertent).
In the present case, defendant has not challenged the
officers’ right to secure the murder scene or seize evidence
obviously related to the murder, such as the victim’s body and
-12-
the bloodstained mattress.  Defendant concedes that the
investigators were lawfully in the bedroom carrying out these
duties.  We conclude that when investigators were securing the
bedroom in which the murder victim was found, it would have been
immediately apparent to them that the items bearing names other
than the victim’s or defendant’s could be evidence of a crime, in
that they were likely to reveal the identity of the killer or a
material witness.
Defendant’s contention that Arizona v. Hicks controls
here and compels exclusion of the evidence is erroneous.  In
Hicks, officers lawfully entered the defendant’s apartment to
search for the shooter, additional victims, and weapons, after a
bullet was fired through the defendant’s floor, injuring a man
below.  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347,
353 (1987).  One of the officers noticed some expensive stereo
equipment in the defendant’s otherwise squalid apartment.  Id. 
Acting only on reasonable suspicion, the officer moved the
equipment to gain access to the serial numbers, recorded the
serial numbers, and reported them to headquarters.  Id. at 323-
24, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 353.  After being informed that the equipment
had been stolen in an armed robbery, he seized the equipment. 
Id.  The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that by
moving the equipment, the officer had conducted a new search
separate and apart from the search permitted by the exigent
circumstances exception for “the shooter, victims, and weapons
that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment.” 
Id. at 235, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 354.  The Court held that this new
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search was not supported by probable cause and that the evidence
it yielded must be suppressed.
In the present case, uncontroverted evidence indicated
that the officers were lawfully securing the scene of a homicide
and seizing evidence directly and obviously related thereto when
they inadvertently discovered additional evidence which, by its
nature and under the circumstances, was likely to lead to the
identity of the killer or a material witness.  The seizure of
such evidence under these circumstances was lawful under the
plain view exception.  Defendant’s assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next complains that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to exclude evidence of his prior
misconduct -- the theft and unlawful use of credit cards -- for
which he had not been charged.  Defendant argues that the
relevance of this evidence was questionable and that its value
was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.  We disagree.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401
(1983).  Evidence of defendant’s financial dealings with Chris
Cook was relevant to understanding the leverage he exerted
against Cook in inducing and conspiring with him to commit
murder.  Such evidence tending to show how defendant induced Cook
was relevant to a determination of guilt on both charges.  Here,
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the evidence tended to help the jury understand the friendship
between defendant and Cook and how defendant exploited their
friendship to induce Cook to commit murder.  Specifically, the
evidence tended to show that defendant used stolen credit cards
to obtain cash and goods which he gave Cook and that he later
reminded Cook of this fact to bring pressure upon him to agree to
the murder.  These mechanics of the conspiracy and murder were
facts of consequence to the determination of guilt.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently held that Rule
404(b) is a “general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one
exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is
to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to
commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.”  State v.
Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).  The
evidence in the instant case was properly admitted to prove more
than defendant’s propensity to commit an offense of the nature of
the crime charged.  Id.  A jury could reasonably find that
defendant’s use of stolen credit cards to give money and other
presents to Cook tended to establish one reason for Cook’s
eventual agreement to defendant’s request to murder the victim
and for Cook’s entering into the conspiracy with defendant.
Defendant also contends that the probative value of the
evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial nature and because it
was a needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  “Evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or needless
-15-
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403
(1983) (emphasis added).  The determination to exclude evidence
on these grounds is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.  State v. Wilson, 345 N.C. 119, 478 S.E.2d 507 (1996).  “A
trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a
showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and
could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”  State v.
Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 340 S.E.2d 55 (1986).  Defendant’s use of
stolen credit cards was important to understanding the nature of
the conspiracy and the later murder.  Therefore, we see no basis
for concluding that the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse
of discretion.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant’s last assignment of error is that the trial
court erred when it admitted into evidence, for purposes of
corroboration, a witness’ unsworn extrajudicial statement. 
Defendant objected to the admission of Joe Ray’s unsworn
statement to an investigating officer.  Defendant contends that
the statement was a prior inconsistent statement, until the
inconsistent portions were removed.  At trial, Ray testified that
he sold the murder weapon to defendant and that defendant had
solicited him to commit the murder.  Ray’s earlier statement to
investigators, with certain parts removed, was then admitted to
corroborate his trial testimony.  Defendant argues that the
portions of Ray’s statement which were removed were inconsistent
with his testimony and would have cast doubt on the credibility
of his testimony.  Defendant also argues that by admitting the
statement with the inconsistent portions removed, the trial court
-16-
denied him the impeachment value of the statement’s
inconsistencies with Ray’s sworn trial testimony.  He contends
that Ray’s credibility was thus improperly enhanced by a
sanitized version of his actual statement, when the full
statement actually contradicted Ray’s testimony at trial.
For evidence to be admissible as corroborative, it
“must tend to add weight or credibility to the witness’s
testimony.”  State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 192, 424 S.E.2d 120,
131 (1993).  That corroborative evidence contains new or
additional facts does not make it inadmissible.  Id.  However,
contradictory statements may not be admitted under the guise of
corroboration.  Id.
In the present case, most of the removed portions of
the statement which defendant contends were inconsistent with
Ray’s testimony would be more accurately characterized as “new or
additional facts.”  Most of the removed portions pertained to
matters about which Ray was not asked on the witness stand and
would have been more prejudicial to defendant than either Ray’s
trial testimony or Ray’s prior statement as introduced at trial. 
One removed statement, however, is arguably inconsistent with
Ray’s testimony.  At trial, Ray testified that he had never been
inside defendant’s house.  In his prior statement to the
investigating officer, he said that he once went to defendant’s
house and stood about three feet inside the living room door. 
This Court has stated that:
A trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary
point will be presumed to be correct unless
the complaining party can demonstrate that
-17-
the particular ruling was in fact incorrect. 
State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 273 S.E.2d 716
(1981).  Even if the complaining party can
show that the trial court erred in its
ruling, relief ordinarily will not be granted
absent a showing of prejudice.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1443(a) (1983).
State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 749, 370 S.E.2d 363, 373 (1988). 
However, if the erroneous evidentiary ruling violates a right of
the defendant guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States, the State has the burden of showing that the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b); see
State v. Swindler, 339 N.C. 469, 476, 450 S.E.2d 907, 912 (1994). 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence here was improperly admitted
and implicated a right of the defendant under the Constitution of
the United States, we nevertheless conclude that its value for
purposes of impeachment would have been negligible.  Therefore,
the admission of the statement into evidence, as redacted by the
trial court, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant
received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.