Title: Commonwealth v. Bennefield

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12640 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD BENNEFIELD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 4, 2019. - May 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Waiver.  Practice, Criminal, Trial by jury, Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Marlborough Division 
of the District Court Department on March 18, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Michael L. Fabbri, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 26, 2017, was 
considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert B. Graham for the defendant. 
 
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant was tried before a jury in the 
District Court for cruelty to animals in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 77.  During the trial, one of the six jurors was 
excused from service for reasons unrelated to the case.  After 
2 
 
conducting a colloquy in which the judge informed the defendant 
of his right to a jury of six persons, the judge found that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived that right, and the 
trial continued with five jurors.  The defendant was 
subsequently convicted.  He unsuccessfully moved for a new 
trial, arguing that his waiver was invalid because it was not in 
writing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (b), 378 Mass. 888 
(1979) (rule 19 [b]).  We transferred the defendant's appeal to 
this court on our own motion and conclude that a written waiver 
is unnecessary as long as the trial judge ensures, by way of a 
colloquy, that the defendant's decision to so proceed is made 
knowingly and voluntarily.  We therefore affirm the denial of 
the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
Facts and prior proceedings.  The defendant was tried on 
one count of animal cruelty.  During the lunch break prior to 
the close of evidence, a juror asked to be excused because of a 
death in his family.  The trial judge granted the request, 
leaving a jury of five persons.  See G. L. c. 218, § 26A.  
Defense counsel then notified the judge that the defendant 
wished to go forward with a five-person jury.  The judge engaged 
in a colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the waiver of 
the full jury was knowing and voluntary.1  However, the waiver 
                     
 
1 The colloquy, in relevant part, was as follows: 
3 
 
                     
 
The judge:  "Tell me your name, please." 
 
The defendant:  "Richard Bennefield." 
 
The judge:  "And how old are you, sir?" 
 
The defendant:  "[Twenty]." 
 
The judge:  "How far did you go in school?" 
 
The defendant:  "This is -- this will be my last year of 
high school." 
 
The judge:  "Any drugs, alcohol, controlled substances over 
the past [twenty-four] hours?" 
 
The defendant:  "No." 
 
The judge:  "Any other medications?" 
 
The defendant:  "I take pills for my anxiety." 
 
The judge:  "Does that medication interfere in any way with 
your ability to speak with your lawyer or the Court -- " 
 
The defendant:  "No, sir." 
 
The judge: "-- to make decisions?" 
 
The defendant:  "No, sir." 
 
The judge:  "Or to understand what's going on in the 
Court?" 
 
The defendant:  "No." 
 
The judge:  "And you heard your lawyer say that he spoke to 
you briefly about the issue with the juror.  I 
unfortunately had to excuse one of the jurors.  You have an 
absolute right to have a trial by six persons in the 
district court.  You have a right to have that jury decide 
unanimously by six, at least six, whether you're guilty or 
innocent.  And you . . . can waive that right.  I can't go 
4 
 
                     
any lower than five.  The law does permit a jury of five if 
you agree to it.  Do you understand that?" 
 
. . . 
 
The defendant:  "Yes, Your Honor." 
 
The judge:  "Have you had enough time to speak to [your 
attorney] about the benefits of going forward with a jury 
of five, or you can exercise your right to ask the Court to 
declare a mistrial and impanel another jury, which could 
not be today." 
 
The defendant:  "Yes, I have." 
 
The judge:  "And it's my understanding you made a decision 
to proceed with five jurors." 
 
The defendant:  "Yes, sir." 
 
The judge:  "And do you need any more time to talk to [your 
attorney] about that issue?" 
 
The defendant:  "No." 
 
The judge:  "Are you certain you want to proceed with just 
five jurors?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yes, sir." 
 
The judge:  "And you do understand, sir, that . . . they 
still have to be unanimous in their decision either for not 
guilty or five for guilty?  And you want to voluntarily, 
willingly and knowingly give up your constitutional right 
to have a jury of six people decide this case and agree to 
go on with five?"   
 
The defendant:  "Yes, Your Honor." 
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "Okay. . . . You said you have anxiety.  Have 
you been diagnosed with anxiety?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yes." 
5 
 
was not in writing, and the Commonwealth never stated a position 
regarding the waiver. 
 
The defendant filed a notice of appeal, and then submitted 
an unopposed motion for a new trial.  The defendant's motion was 
denied without a hearing.  The defendant appealed from the 
denial of that motion, and the two appeals were consolidated.  
We transferred the case sua sponte for review. 
                     
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "Anything else other than anxiety?" 
 
The defendant:  "I have depression, bipolar, . . . 
posttraumatic stress." 
 
The judge:  "Do any of those diagnoses interfere with your 
ability to -- again, to understand what's going on in 
court, communicate with your lawyer in the court and make 
decisions?" 
 
The defendant:  "No, sir." 
 
The judge:  "You've decided you want . . . to proceed with 
five?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "Okay.  And [defense counsel], you had enough 
to time to speak to your client about going one way or 
another?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "Based on the colloquy that I've had with the 
defendant and the conversation with counsel, I find that 
you voluntarily, willingly and knowingly beyond a 
reasonable doubt has waived his right [sic] to a trial by 
six, and we'll proceed with five." 
 
6 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Waiver of right to full jury.  General 
Laws c. 234A, § 68, governs, among other things, the empanelment 
of jurors.  It states in pertinent part: 
"Nothing in this section shall prevent the court from 
rendering a valid judgment based upon a verdict rendered by 
fewer jurors than required under this section where all 
parties have by stipulation agreed to this procedure.  
Nothing in this section shall prevent the court from 
entering a valid judgment based upon a verdict rendered by 
fewer or more jurors than required under this section or 
based upon procedures other than that specified in this 
section where all parties have by stipulation agreed to 
such a number of jurors or to such procedures." 
 
Rule 19 (b), which is the procedural rule that addresses 
proceeding with less than a full complement of jurors, states in 
part: 
"If after jeopardy attaches there is at any time during the 
progress of a trial less than a full jury remaining, a 
defendant may waive his right to be tried by a full jury 
and request trial by the remaining jurors by signing a 
written waiver which shall be filed with the court." 
 
 
The Commonwealth contends that notwithstanding rule 19 (b), 
because a written waiver is not statutorily required in order to 
proceed with fewer than the specified number of jurors, as long 
as the defendant waives this right knowingly and willingly, an 
oral waiver is valid.  The defendant argues that his conviction 
should be reversed because the existing statute and rule should 
be read together to require both a stipulation by the parties 
pursuant to G. L. c. 234A, § 68, and a written waiver pursuant 
to rule 19 (b).  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
7 
 
A review of the procedure to waive the right to a trial by 
jury is instructive.  General Laws c. 263, § 6, provides:  "Any 
defendant in a criminal case other than a capital case, whether 
begun by indictment or upon complaint, may, if he shall so 
elect, . . . before a jury has been impanelled to try him . . . 
, waive his right to trial by jury by signing a written waiver 
thereof and filing the same with the clerk of the court."  See 
G. L. c. 218, § 26A ("Trial of criminal offenses in the Boston 
municipal court department and in the district court department 
shall be by a jury of six persons, unless the defendant files a 
written waiver and consent to be tried by the court without a 
jury").  The procedural rule corresponding to this statutory 
requirement, Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a), similarly calls for the 
waiver of the right to a jury trial to be in writing:  "A case 
in which the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury shall 
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing 
with the approval of the court and files the waiver with the 
clerk . . . ." 
We have recognized the requirement of a written jury waiver 
as a "legislative safeguard" designed "to create a moment of 
pause and reflection on the part of a defendant that is 
concomitant with signing one's name to a formal declaration 
relinquishing that right."  Commonwealth v. Osborne, 445 Mass 
776, 780 (2006).  Thus, the lack of a written waiver of a 
8 
 
criminal defendant's right to a jury trial had been held to 
render the conviction of that defendant invalid.  Id. at 781.  
See Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 933, 934-935 
(1997). 
The defendant reasons that we similarly should enforce 
strictly the procedural rule requiring a written waiver of the 
right to a full complement of jurors.  We disagree based on the 
legislative history of the statute and principles of statutory 
construction.  Prior to the adoption of the rules of criminal 
procedure, waiver of the right to be tried by a full jury was 
governed by former G. L. c. 234, § 26A, and was required to be 
in writing.2  The rule was intended to reflect existing practice, 
as provided in the statute.  See Reporter's Notes to Rule 19, 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 
1701 (LexisNexis 2018) (rule 19 in accord with G. L. c. 234, § 
26A).  However, in 1979, the Legislature repealed this statute 
                     
 
2 Prior to its repeal in 1979, G. L. c. 234, § 26A, stated 
in pertinent part:  "Any defendant in the superior court in a 
criminal case, including a capital case, after a jury has been 
impanelled may, in case one or more jurymen shall die or become 
otherwise unable to serve, so that there are less than twelve 
jurors remaining, waive his right to be tried by a full jury of 
twelve and request trial by the remaining members of the jury 
thus impanelled by signing a written waiver and request and 
filing the same with the clerk of the court, whereupon the trial 
shall continue accordingly, and in every such case the court 
shall have jurisdiction of such case with the remaining members 
of the jury and may render judgment thereon."  See Gallo v. 
Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 397, 399 (1961). 
9 
 
and amended G. L. c. 263, § 6, to require waiver of a jury trial 
altogether to be in writing.  See St. 1979, c. 344, §§ 9, 19.  
Three years later, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 234A, § 68, 
which now addresses waiver of a full complement of jurors and 
requires only that "all parties have by stipulation agreed to 
this procedure."  See St. 1982, c. 298, § 1. 
Here, the Legislature reasonably could have recognized that 
there is a difference between choosing between a jury trial and 
a bench trial, where a defendant must decide whether to be tried 
by members of the community or by a single judge, and choosing 
between a trial by a full complement of jurors and a trial by 
somewhat less than a full jury.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 
457 Mass. 24, 28 (2010) (in enacting G. L. c. 263, § 6, "[t]he 
Legislature reasonably could have decided that a written jury 
trial waiver is paramount in circumstances where . . . a judge, 
instead of a jury, is to determine a defendant's guilt").  
Moreover, "[w]here the Legislature has deleted . . . language, 
apparently purposefully, the current version of the statute 
cannot be interpreted to include the rejected requirement.  
Reading in language that the Legislature chose to remove . . . 
violates basic principles of statutory construction and 
impermissibly interferes with the legislative function."  AIDS 
Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 
303 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Porges, 460 Mass. 525, 530 
10 
 
(2011).  See Plumb v. Casey, 469 Mass. 593, 598 (2014), quoting 
Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412-413 (2009) 
("When amending a statute or enacting a new one, the Legislature 
is presumed to be aware of prior statutory language"). 
Thus, we conclude that a waiver of the right to be tried by 
a full complement of jurors need not be in writing, 
notwithstanding rule 19 (b), where the rule no longer reflects 
the statutory language.3  See Commonwealth v. Pamplona, 58 Mass. 
App. Ct. 239, 242-243 (2003) ("truncated" colloquy without 
written waiver sufficient for defendant to knowingly and 
voluntarily waive right to counsel at criminal trial). 
Importantly, although we conclude that a written waiver of 
this right is not required, the waiver nonetheless must be 
knowing and voluntary.  See, e.g., Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 
Mass. 504, 507 (1979) ("a conviction cannot stand which follows 
upon a jury waiver that is not freely and knowingly given").  
                     
3 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Dery, 452 
Mass. 823 (2008), is misplaced.  There, we stated that the 
written waiver requirement of the procedural rules in connection 
with being tried by fewer than the specified number of jurors 
served a similar purpose as the written waiver required to 
proceed with a jury-waived trial, noting that the written waiver 
requirement for the latter is an important safeguard for 
defendants.  See id. at 825.  However, we did so in the context 
of rejecting the Commonwealth's attempt to invoke Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 19 (b) to invalidate a trial in which the defendant was 
acquitted by fewer than six jurors without having executed a 
written waiver.  See id. at 824-825.  We did not confront then 
the issue before us today. 
11 
 
Accordingly, the trial judge must engage in a colloquy with the 
defendant to ensure that the waiver is, in fact, knowing and 
voluntary.  The Ciummei case set forth the principles that a 
colloquy concerning waiver of a jury trial should cover.4  Id. at 
509-510.  The same principle applies to cases where, as here, 
the defendant was waiving the right to a trial by the full 
complement of a jury.5 
A colloquy, which allows the judge to personally evaluate 
the defendant's state of mind and explain the nature of the jury 
trial right and the waiver, is in many ways more important than 
                     
 
4 "In the exchange, the judge will advise the defendant of 
his constitutional right to a jury trial, and will satisfy 
himself that any waiver by the defendant is made voluntarily and 
intelligently.  We do not intend to create a rigid pattern but 
note that, where a defendant needs a compendious reminder, the 
judge might state that the jury consists of members of the 
community, that the defendant may participate in their 
selection, that the verdict of the jury must be unanimous, that 
they decide guilt or innocence while the judge makes rulings of 
law in the course of the trial, instructs the jury on the law, 
and imposes sentence in case of guilt; and that, where a jury is 
waived, the judge alone decides guilt or innocence in accordance 
with the facts and the law.  The judge should make sure that the 
defendant has conferred with his counsel about the waiver, and 
that he has not been pressured or cajoled and is not intoxicated 
or otherwise rendered incapable of rational judgment."  Ciummei 
v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 504, 509-510 (1979). 
 
 
5 During the colloquy, the trial judge stated that he would 
not proceed with fewer than five jurors.  We agree generally 
with the proposition that courts disfavor trials by smaller 
juries, see generally Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239-244 
(1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); however, we are not aware of 
any applicable authority that prevents a defendant from 
consenting to trial by fewer than five jurors after jeopardy 
attaches. 
12 
 
a written waiver -- that is, although a colloquy can be 
sufficient without a written waiver, a written waiver can never 
be sufficient without a colloquy.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Pavao, 
423 Mass. 798, 802 (1996) (colloquy requirement in Ciummei case 
is "bright line rule").  To the extent that there are concerns 
about documenting the waiver, we conclude that a colloquy on the 
record will be sufficient. 
2.  Validity of defendant's waiver.  Here, when the juror 
was excused, it was defense counsel who indicated the desire to 
continue the trial with the five remaining jurors.  A thorough 
colloquy was conducted on the record, in which the judge 
inquired as to the defendant's education and medical history, 
the extent of the consultation with his attorney, and his 
understanding of the "absolute" and "constitutional" right being 
waived.  See note 1, supra.  There is no claim that the 
defendant did not understand the difference between being tried 
by five rather than six jurors, or that he did not have an 
adequate opportunity to consult with counsel.  After the 
colloquy, the judge found that the defendant's decision to go 
forward was made knowingly and voluntarily "beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  The defendant does not dispute this finding.6 
                     
 
6 The defendant contends that the trial was fatally flawed 
because there is no indication that the parties "by stipulation 
agreed" to go forward with fewer than the specified number of 
13 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the defendant's waiver of his right to a six-person jury was 
valid.  The denial of his motion for a new trial is therefore 
affirmed.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
jurors.  See G. L. c. 234A, § 68.  This argument is unavailing.  
A stipulation is an "agreement made by the attorneys engaged on 
opposite sides of a cause (especially if in writing), regulating 
any matter incidental to the proceedings or trial, which falls 
within their jurisdiction."  Black's Law Dictionary 1415 (6th 
ed. 1990).  There is no factual dispute as to the parties' 
agreement to proceed with five jurors.  However, the defendant 
argues that G. L. c. 234A, § 68, must be read to require more 
than a mere agreement, such as a writing or an oral accord on 
the record.  Although a stipulation may be in writing, it is 
clear from the above definition that it need not be.  Further, 
the fact that the trial went forward without objection 
demonstrates on the record the parties' apparent agreement to do 
so.  Further, we decline to "read into the statute a provision 
which the Legislature did not see fit to put there."  Chin v. 
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015), quoting Commissioner of 
Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the 
County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006). 
 
7 We ask this court's standing advisory committee on the 
rules of criminal procedure to propose an amendment to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 19 (b) consistent with this opinion.