Title: In re Davenport

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: November 22, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re:  Complaint as to the Conduct of 
JOHN P. DAVENPORT,
Accused.

(OSB 97-138; SC S47245)

	On petition for reconsideration, filed July 18, 2002, of an
opinion filed June 27, 2002.*
	Marc D. Blackman, of Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland, filed
the petition for reconsideration for the accused. 
	No appearance contra.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	PER CURIAM
	The petition for reconsideration is allowed.  The former
opinion is modified and, as modified, is adhered to.
    *Review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board. 334 Or 298, 49 P3d 91 (2002).
    **De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
	PER CURIAM
		In In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 49 P3d 91 (2002), this
court held that, in addition to three other disciplinary rules,
the accused had violated Code of Professional Responsibility
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2) (criminal act that reflects
adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to
practice law).  As the basis for that violation, this court
concluded that the accused had violated 18 USC section 1623,
which provides that it is a crime for any person knowingly to
make a false, material declaration, under oath, in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court of the United States.  In
accordance with its conclusions respecting the accused's
violations, this court suspended the accused from the practice of
law for two years.   
		The accused timely petitioned this court for
reconsideration.  We allow his petition for reconsideration to
correct the court's discussion of materiality as it relates to 18
USC section 1623.  In all other respects, we adhere to the former
opinion, including the conclusions respecting the accused's
violations and the sanction.
		In defining the term "material" for purposes of 18 USC
section 1623, this court stated:
	"In the context of a deposition or similar 			examination, the Ninth Circuit generally has concluded 	that a false declaration is material under 18 USC 	section 1623 if a truthful answer 'is relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration' and the false 	declaration had a 'natural tendency to influence, or 	was capable of influencing,' the decision-making body to which it was addressed.  See U.S. v. Clark, 918 F2d 843, 846 (9th Cir 1990) (setting out that standard 	under 18 USC section 1621, for purposes of civil 		deposition), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Keys, 95 F3d 874 (9th Cir 1996); United States v. 	Rahman, Nos 91-10364, 91-10365, 91-10376, 91-10416,	1992, WL 363672 at *3 (9th Cir Dec 9 1992) (applying 	Clark to deposition for purposes of 18 USC section 1623)."	  
334 Or at 316.  In his petition for reconsideration, the accused
disputes the first part of that statement, that is, that an
answer must be "relevant to any subsidiary issue under
consideration" to be material.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In disputing that statement, the accused criticizes this court's
citation to Rahman, which is an unpublished decision, because
Ninth Circuit Local Rule 36-3 does not permit courts within that
circuit to cite unpublished dispositions.  In addition, the
accused argues that only the latter part of the court's statement
sets out the correct test for whether a false statement is
"material" under 18 USC section 1623:  A false statement is
"material" if it has "a natural tendency to influence, or was
capable of influencing, the decision-making body to which it was
addressed."  Id. (internal citations omitted); see United States
v. Gaudin, 515 US 506, 509, 115 S Ct 2310, 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995)
(so stating).
		Although Ninth Circuit Local Rule 36-3 is not binding
upon this court, we agree, as a matter of comity, to withdraw the
citation to Rahman.  We also agree that, to determine if a false
statement is "material" for purposes of 18 USC section 1623, the
proper inquiry focuses upon whether the false statement has "a
natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing,
the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was
addressed."  Gaudin, 515 US at 509 (internal citations omitted). 
That clarification, however, does not alter the court's
conclusion that the accused violated 18 USC section 1623, because
the court determined that the accused knowingly made false
statements that "were capable of influencing the decision-making
process[.]"  334 Or at 317.  Accordingly, we adhere to the
holding that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2).
		The petition for reconsideration is allowed.  The
former opinion is modified and, as modified, is adhered to.