Title: Glover v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Matthew Glover v. State of Maryland, 
No. 67,  September Term 2001
[Criminal Law / Constitutional Law – Right to a Speedy Trial:   Held: Given that the
petitioner demonstrated no prejudice in the fourteen month delay in his trial, and given that
the delays resulted largely from the unavailability of judges and DNA discovery materials,
we do not find a constitutional violation of the petitioner’s speedy trial right under the four-
factor Barker analysis]. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 67
September Term, 2001
ROBERT MATTHEW GLOVER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
    Bell, C.J., Eldridge, and Harrell, JJ.,      
                     dissent
Filed:   March 6, 2002
We are required to determine whether the petitioner was denied his right to a speedy
trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  We hold that, given the circumstances of this case –
namely, that the delays resulted from unavailability of judges and attempts to acquire
complete DNA evidence, and the fact that the record does not establish prejudice –  the
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals, but on different grounds than those employed by the intermediate
appellate court.
I.   Facts and Legal Proceedings
This case arises from the death of Charles Scherer, whose body was discovered in a
vacant lot in Aberdeen, Maryland, on February 24, 1998.  A medical examiner subsequently
determined the cause of death to be blunt force injuries to the head and strangulation
resulting from a severe beating.  
The petitioner, Robert Matthew Glover, was arrested for the murder one year later,
on February 26, 1999, and was indicted for first degree murder on March 31, 1999.  Bail was
denied.  The petitioner remained confined for the entire pre-trial period, which ultimately
amounted to slightly more than fourteen months.  During these fourteen months, the
petitioner’s trial was postponed three times.  
Trial initially was scheduled for July 19, 1999, in the Circuit Court for Harford
County.  The State requested a postponement, however, on the ground that DNA test results
1
The DNA analysis compared DNA extracted from bloodstains on the victim’s jeans
pocket and a blood sample from the petitioner.  The precise date on which the samples were
collected is unclear from the record.  It appears, however, that a blood sample was taken from
the petitioner when the petitioner was brought to police headquarters for questioning, a few
months after the murder.
According to the State, the samples were sent to the Maryland State Police Crime
Laboratory sometime after the petitioner’s arraignment in late April or early May of 1999,
but on June 29, 1999, the samples had to be sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
crime laboratory for a more detailed analysis.  Two reports, dated July 7, 1999, and August
27, 1999, respectively, were generated from these tests and returned to the Harford County
Sheriff’s Office.  Neither test could exclude the petitioner as a possible source of the DNA
from the victim’s jeans pocket.
In his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, the petitioner contends that it was not
until on or about October 12, 1999, that the State provided the DNA reports; the laboratory
notes that generally accompany DNA test results were not provided until late December
1999.
2
The hearing on the motion for postponement in the Circuit Court for Harford County
occurred on July 14, 1999; the court verbally granted the State’s postponement request.
3
It appears that the difficulty in securing a judge resulted from, at least in part, the
retirement of one of the judges on the Circuit Court for Harford County, whose position
remained unfilled at the time the petitioner’s trials were scheduled. 
2
had not been received from the crime lab.1  The judge found the absence of the DNA test
results to be good cause for granting the postponement, but stated that “this motion [for
postponement] really is of no consequence or no meaning whatsoever, simply because you’re
not going to have a judge on the 19th [of July 1999] to hear this case in any event.”2  For these
reasons, the court granted the postponement and charged it to the State.
Trial was rescheduled for November 1, 1999, but on that date, the court granted
another postponement due to the unavailability of a judge and jurors.3  Finding that
administrative reasons were the bases for the postponement, the court charged neither party
4
The DNA test results and serology reports were provided to the petitioner; however,
the lab notes regarding testing procedures, etc., that generally accompany the test results,
were not provided to the petitioner, nor to the State, at the time the reports were received.
See also supra note 1.  At the suppression hearing, the State represented that, upon receiving
the notes from the crime lab, the State immediately hand-delivered a copy of the materials
to the petitioner on December 23, 1999.   
5
Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Section 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article provides, in pertinent part: 
(c)  Purposes. -- In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a
DNA profile is admissible to prove or disprove the identity of
any person, if the party seeking to introduce the evidence of a
DNA profile: 
(1)  Notifies in writing the other party or parties by mail
at least 45 days before any criminal proceeding; and 
(2)  Provides, if applicable and requested in writing, the
other party or parties at least 30 days before any criminal
proceeding with: 
(i) First generation film copy or suitable
reproductions of autoradiographs, dot blots, slot blots,
silver stained gels, test strips, control strips, and any
(continued...)
3
with the delay.  At the postponement hearing, petitioner’s counsel commented that her client,
the petitioner, was “unhappy about the postponement” but that she had explained to the
petitioner that, “there’s nothing that could be done.”
Trial was then rescheduled for January 13, 2000.  One week prior to the date of trial,
however, the petitioner moved to suppress the DNA evidence due to the fact that the State
did not provide the defense with the complete 4 DNA discovery materials until December 23,
1999, and thereby failed to comply with the requirement that DNA evidence be disclosed
thirty days prior to trial, pursuant to Maryland Code, Section 10-915(c)(2) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.5  The court ruled that suppression of the DNA test results would
5(...continued)
other results generated in the course of the analysis; 
(ii)  Copies of laboratory notes generated in
connection with the analysis, including chain of custody
documents, sizing and hybridization information,
statistical calculations, and worksheets; 
(iii)  Laboratory protocols and procedures utilized
in the analysis; 
(iv) The identification of each genetic locus
analyzed; and 
(v)  A statement setting forth the genotype data
and the profile frequencies for the databases utilized. 
(d) Prerequisites. -- If a party is unable to provide the
information required under subsection (c) of this section at least
30 days prior to the criminal proceedings, the court may grant a
continuance to permit such timely disclosures. 
6
The March 23, 2000, suppression hearing concerned two statements made by
petitioner at police headquarters on March 17 and 18, 1998.  The court suppressed these
statements because the State failed to establish the voluntariness of the defendant’s
statements by a preponderance of the evidence. 
4
be too extreme a remedy for the State’s failure to provide the petitioner with the complete
discovery materials thirty days prior to trial, and therefore, denied petitioner’s motion to
suppress.  A continuance was granted and charged to the State.  With respect to the
continuance, petitioner’s counsel voiced some concern over postponing the trial again, but
stated that because the suppression motion was denied, “the only other remedy is a
postponement, although the defense, Mr. Glover and I, don’t want the postponement, but
that’s the only other remedy we have.”   
The trial was reset for July 17, 2000.  The trial was rescheduled one more time when,
at a suppression hearing held on March 23, 2000,6 the petitioner’s counsel expressed concern
7
As will be discussed and applied in further detail, infra, the four factors in a speedy
trial determination are: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
(continued...)
5
over the length of the delay between trial dates. Counsel for petitioner indicated that the
delays were very significant as she stated:
“I have made this court aware that I do plan on filing a motion
to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, and I will have that in writing
and prepared ahead of trial, Your Honor, but I did want to voice
my concern at least today on our motions date that I believe that
the July 17th date is just too long of a delay between trial dates.”
The State’s Attorney also expressed concern about the delays, stating: 
“Your honor, the State shares in that concern also.  I was not a
party to the . . . conference that set the July 17th date . . . when I
got back to my office, I found out that date had been selected
and I, too, had great concern, as well as the victim’s family, as
to the necessity for having this case tried and brought to a
quicker conclusion, and  as I said to Mrs. Caruso [petitioner’s
counsel] earlier in our numerous conversations,  it was my
intention, and I believe she also agreed,  that we would see if we
could move that trial date up today.” 
Responding to these concerns, the court moved the trial date from July 17, 2000 to May 1,
2000.  
On April 19, 2000, the petitioner moved to dismiss his case for lack of a speedy trial
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.  On May 1, 2000, the Circuit Court, applying the four factor analysis
for speedy trial claims enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 101 (1972), granted the motion to dismiss and released the petitioner.7  The court
7(...continued)
defendant’s invocation of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117. 
8
To determine the final factor, courts must consider three elements: whether the pre-
trial incarceration was oppressive; whether the incarceration caused the defendant excessive
anxiety and concern; and whether the delay impaired the defense.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at
532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118
6
ruled that the inordinate length of the delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial and
thus required constitutional scrutiny under Barker.  Further recognizing that the petitioner
unquestionably had filed his demand for speedy trial on two separate occasions, the court
focused on the two remaining factors: the reason for delay and the prejudice to the defendant.
With respect to the reasons for the delay, the court found that: 
“the State has offered no explanation as to why, after having
obtained the defendant’s blood sample in April of 1998, the
DNA test results and reports were not completely available until
December 23rd of 1999.  The unavailability of [DNA test results]
resulted in failures of discovery and is the bottom-line reason for
the ultimate delay in this case.” 
The trial court dismissed the indictment, because it found that the State was responsible for
every postponement in this case and weighed the entire delay against the State and in favor
of the petitioner.  
Finally, with respect to whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay,8 the court
ruled that the pre-trial incarceration was oppressive and constituted actual prejudice.  The
court further inferred that the delayed indictment coupled with the delay in the trial of the
case impaired the defense.  Because the court found that the petitioner was deprived of his
7
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the petitioner’s indictment was dismissed.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-201, the State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
which, in an unreported opinion, reversed the Circuit Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s case.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the petitioner’s counsel “could have obtained
an earlier trial date, by complaining about the trial date that was scheduled and/or by putting
the State on notice that a motion to dismiss would be filed unless the trial was scheduled on
or before a particular date.”  The Court of Special Appeals emphasized that the petitioner did
not object when the January 13, 2000 trial date was rescheduled for July 17, 2000, and did
not complain about the newly scheduled trial date until March 23, 2000 (at which point the
trial was advanced to April 28, 2000).  The intermediate appellate court further stressed that
the petitioner did not assert his speedy trial issue until April 19, 2000 and, quoting RICHARD
P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, §42.3 at 527 (Michie 1983), stated, “[t]he request, ‘Try me today!’ is a far cry
from that other request, ‘Try me never, because you did not try me yesterday!’”  On these
grounds, the Court of Special Appeals found no violation of the speedy trial right and vacated
the Circuit Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s case.
The petitioner sought, and we issued, a writ of certiorari to determine whether the
Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating the Circuit Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s case.
See 365 Md. 472, 781 A.2d 778 (2001).  While we agree with the judgment of the
intermediate appellate court, we disagree with its reasoning.
8
II.   Standard of Review 
In reviewing the judgment on a motion to dismiss for violation of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial, we make our own independent constitutional analysis.  See State v.
Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415, 572 A.2d 544, 554-55, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 118,
112 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1990); see also Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102,1106
(2001)(stating that “when the issue is whether a constitutional right has been infringed, we
make our own independent constitutional appraisal”); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457, 682
A.2d 248, 253 (1996); Carrol v. State, 335 Md. 723, 736, 646 A.2d 376, 383 (1994).  We
perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand;
in so doing, we accept a lower court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  See Rowe
v. State, 363 Md. 424, 432, 769 A.2d 879, 883 (2001)(conducting a de novo review of a trial
court’s legal / constitutional conclusions with respect to a denial of a motion to suppress
under the Fourth Amendment, but stating that a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525
(2000)(maintaining that this Court does not engage in de novo fact-finding); State v. Ruben,
127 Md. App. 430, 438, 732 A.2d 1004, 1008, cert. denied, 356 Md. 496, 740 A.2d 613
(1999). 
III.   Discussion
The constitutional analysis to be applied in the speedy trial context was articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed.
9
The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states:  
“in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury . . . .”  MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS,
art. 21.
In addition to the constitutional guarantees, Section 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure
Article provides that unless good cause is shown, the trial may not be later than 180 days
after the defendant’s (or counsel’s) appearance before the court.  Specifically, Section 6-103
states: 
§ 6-103. Trial date 
(a) Requirements for setting date. -- 
(1) The date for trial of a criminal matter in the circuit court
shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: 
(i) the appearance of counsel; or 
(ii) the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit
court, as provided in the Maryland Rules. 
(2) The trial date may not be later than 180 days after the earlier
of those events. 
(b) Change of date. -- 
(1) For good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a
designee of the judge may grant a change of the trial date in a
circuit court: 
(i) on motion of a party; or 
(ii) on the initiative of the circuit court. 
(2) If a circuit court trial date is changed under paragraph (1) of
this subsection, any subsequent changes of the trial date may
only be made by the county administrative judge or that judge's
(continued...)
9
2d 101 (1972).  We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged
violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.9   See Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379, 388, 739 A.2d 71,
9(...continued)
designee for good cause shown. 
(c) Court rules. -- The Court of Appeals may adopt additional
rules to carry out this section. 
See Md. Code (2001), § 6-103 of the Crim. Pro. Art.
10
76 (1999)(affirming that this Court considers the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to be “very persuasive, although not necessarily
controlling” with respect to the proper application of Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights)(quoting Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 570, 386 A.2d 1206, 1213 (1978) and
Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 527, 350 A.2d 628, 632 (1976)); see also Bailey,  319 Md. at
409, 572 A.2d at 552; Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 264-65, 434 A.2d 574, 576 (1981); Jones
v. State, 279 Md. 1, 6, 367 A.2d 1, 5 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915, 97 S. Ct. 2177, 53
L. Ed. 2d 225 (1977); Erbe  v. State, 276 Md. 541, 546, 350 A.2d 640, 643 (1976).  
A post-indictment, pre-trial delay of sufficient length becomes presumptively
prejudicial and thereby triggers scrutiny under the Barker factors.  See Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 528 (1992).
Once such a delay is demonstrated, courts must balance the following four factors to
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred:  the length of the delay, the
reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, and the presence of
actual prejudice to the defendant.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d
at 117; accord Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S. Ct. at 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528.  Thus, the
11
length of delay is a “double enquiry” as it both triggers constitutional analysis and is a factor
in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.
See Doggett, 505 U.S. at  651, 112 S. Ct. at 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528. 
While the four factors are not exclusive, they provide a framework by which courts
and practitioners may determine and ensure the integrity of a constitutional right which has
often been described as amorphous, fluid, and unquantifiable, and which necessarily compels
courts to consider speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.  See Bailey, 319 Md. at 414-15, 572
A.2d at 554 (stating that because the speedy trial right is “amorphous and slippery . . . it is
impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied”); Brady v. State, 291
Md. at 266, 434 A.2d at 577 (discussing the difficulty with weighing the factors in the
balancing test and stating that “[d]espite this difficulty . . . it is the function of the court to
sift through the various factors, employ some reasoned analysis to determine which are more
important and which have greater impact, and reach a just determination as to which way the
scales tip”); Erbe, 276 Md. at 546, 350 A.2d at 643 (noting that a balancing test “necessarily
compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis”)(quoting Barker, 407 U.S.
at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-17).  Therefore, our independent constitutional
appraisal of the petitioner’s speedy trial claims begins most effectively with a factor-by-
factor approach. 
A.
The Length of Delay
While no specific duration of delay constitutes a per se delay of constitutional
12
dimension, Barker, 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S. Ct. at 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 113 (finding no basis
for quantifying a specific length at which the speedy trial right might be violated), we have
employed the proposition that a pre-trial delay greater than one year and fourteen days was
“presumptively prejudicial” on several occasions.  See Divver, 356 Md. at 389-90, 739 A.2d
at 76-77 (1999); Brady,  291 Md. at 265, 434 A.2d at 576 (fourteen-month delay gives rise
to a prima facie speedy trial claim); Jones, 279 Md. at 6, 367 A.2d at 5; Epps v. State, 276
Md. 96, 111, 345 A.2d 62, 72 (1975); see also Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 686, 414 A.2d
1266, 1272 (1980)(noting that the State conceded that an eight-month, twenty-day delay
might be of constitutional dimension).
As emphasized by the Supreme Court, the delay that can be tolerated is dependent, at
least to some degree, on the crime for which the defendant has been indicted.  See Barker,
407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117 (stating that “the delay that can be
tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than a serious, complex conspiracy
charge”).  Unlike the circumstances presented in Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379, 739 A.2d 71
(1999), where we found the delay of twelve months and sixteen days to be “of uniquely
inordinate length for a relatively run-of-the-mill District Court case [for driving under the
influence of alcohol],” id. at 390, 739 A.2d at 77, the delay in the case sub judice, while
somewhat unnecessary, was not an inordinate delay for a murder case involving complex
DNA evidence. 
While the nature of the charges do not validate automatically a specified duration of
13
delay in trial, see Bailey, 319 Md. at 411, 572 A.2d at 553 (finding that drug possession and
distribution charges, in and of themselves, do not justify a two-year delay), courts must be
cognizant of both the degree of complexity associated with a particular charge and the
potential impact an adverse verdict would have on the accused.  In a murder case, for
example, society has an interest in an expeditious trial, see id. at 395-96, 572 A.2d at 545
(discussing generally the societal interest in providing a speedy trial),  but society also has
an interest in ensuring that sentences of life imprisonment or death are rendered upon the
most exact verdicts possible.  DNA evidence may provide that exactness, and to the extent
that the delay is not inordinate, society may weigh the precision which DNA evidence
potentially provides more heavily than proceeding with a murder trial without such evidence
in the name of expediency.  
The fourteen-month delay certainly requires constitutional scrutiny.  It is not so
overwhelming, however, as to potentially override the other factors.  The length of delay, in
and of itself, is not a weighty factor, see Erbe, 276 Md. at 547, 350 A.2d at 644 (stating that
the length of “delay is the least conclusive of the four factors identified in Barker”)(quoting
United States v. Brown, 354 F.Supp.1000, 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1973), but rather the duration of
the delay is closely correlated to the other factors, such as the reasonableness of the State’s
explanation for the delay, the likelihood that the delay may cause the defendant to more
pronouncedly assert his speedy trial right, and the presumption that a longer delay may cause
the defendant greater harm.  “The length of delay . . . appears to be significant principally as
14
it affects the legitimacy of the reasons for delay and the likelihood it had prejudicial effects.”
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 n.12, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1574 n.12, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26, 38 n.12
(1970)(Brennan, J., concurring).  
B.
The Reasons for the Delay
In Bailey, supra, we subscribed to the continuum pronounced by the Supreme Court
in Barker with respect to the reasons for a pre-trial delay:
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government
assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should
be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted
heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less
heavily but nevertheless should considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify
appropriate delay.   
Bailey, 319 Md. at 412, 572 A.2d at 553 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192,
33 L. Ed. 2d at 117).  
Pursuant to this continuum, we will analyze the delays that occurred during the  post-
indictment, pre-trial period of the petitioner’s case.  The first postponement, requested by the
State, resulted from dual factors: the unavailability of a judge and the fact that the DNA test
results had not yet returned from the crime lab.  The first factor - the unavailability of a judge
- is clearly a neutral reason.  While the State will be held accountable for this factor, see
Divver, 356 Md. at 391, 739 A.2d at 78; Jones, 279 Md. at 12, 367 A.2d at 8-9; Smith, 276
15
Md. at 531, 350 A.2d at 634-35, it will not weigh heavily against the State.  The second
factor - the unavailability of the DNA test results - is a valid justification in these
circumstances.  DNA evidence is highly technical, often requiring courts to allow more time
for completion of the tests and review, by both parties, of the results.  This is not to say,
however, that we will permit the State to act in a lackadaisical fashion.  On the contrary, just
as the State “has a duty to coordinate the efforts of its various criminal divisions in
attempting to locate a defendant,” Brady, 291 Md. at 267, 434 A.2d at 577, so does the State
have a duty to coordinate the various criminal divisions, including those responsible for
laboratory analysis, necessary to bring a defendant to trial.  This duty includes, of course,
ensuring that critical discovery materials, such as DNA evidence, are properly monitored and
accounted for, and not simply collecting dust in state or federal crime labs.  In regard to the
State’s initial request for postponement, we find no evidence that the State failed to act in a
diligent manner and therefore, we conclude that these grounds for the postponement were
both neutral and justified.
We digress momentarily to observe that other jurisdictions similarly have accepted
some delay in order to ensure the most accurate judgment scientifically possible, specifically
with respect to DNA evidence.  See State v. Stroud, 459 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1990) (holding
that a delay to obtain DNA testing meets the good cause standard when the reason for delay
was outside the state's control, the DNA evidence was essential to the State's case, and the
defendant failed to prove that he would suffer legally recognizable prejudice by the delay);
16
Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 51 (Miss. 1998)(explaining that the delay of 247 days was not
excessive for a capital murder case particularly because the defendant “was in a position to
benefit from the DNA evidence if it exculpated him from being prosecuted for . . .  murder”);
State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert. denied, 157 N.J.
543, 724 A.2d 803 (1998)(finding that the delays in the defendant's trial due to “the complex
issues relating to the admissibility of DNA evidence and defendant's protracted efforts to
obtain his own DNA experts” were “legitimate and substantial reasons for the delay in
defendant's trial”); State v. Rojo, 971 P.2d 829, 843 (N.M. 1998)(refusing to weigh heavily
against the State a delay in processing DNA samples because allowing additional time for
processing DNA evidence could increase the likelihood of an accurate result or exculpate the
defendant).  Thus, while minor delays in obtaining DNA evidence will not be weighed
heavily against the State, nor against a defendant seeking his or her own DNA analysis,
delays likely will not be tolerated upon clear demonstrations of a failure to monitor or
aggressively pursue the attainment of these results.  
The second postponement in the petitioner’s case occurred because, again, the Circuit
Court was unable to provide both judge and jury for the petitioner’s trial.  While it is
somewhat disturbing that a case would be scheduled twice without a judge available, this
basis for the postponement can only be deemed neutral. 
The third postponement, while requested by the petitioner, was in fact a result of the
State’s failure to comply with the discovery guidelines for DNA evidence.  Granted, the
17
DNA test results, themselves, were submitted to the petitioner well within the thirty-day
requirement of Section 10-915, but the notes from the crime lab pertaining to the testing
procedures and methodology were not delivered to the petitioner until approximately twenty
days prior to trial (and approximately ten days prior to the scheduled motions’ hearing).  It
is unclear from the record whether the State’s failure to produce the complete DNA reports
pursuant to discovery obligations rises to a level of negligence; it is clear, however, that the
State failed to be aggressive in securing the materials necessary for its and the petitioner’s
thorough review.  While we understand that the scientific intensity of DNA evidence may
entail slightly more time for acquisition than that which normally would be deemed
acceptable, we do not understand and cannot accept the State’s failure to monitor the division
responsible for producing this critical evidence.  DNA evidence has the potential, depending
on the factual circumstances, to be completely exculpatory or virtually inculpatory.  As such,
the State is obligated to ensure that all materials necessary to an evaluation of the validity of
the DNA test results are available to the defense as well as the State.  Because the State failed
to provide these results in a timely fashion, the petitioner and his counsel were left with no
choice but to agree to another postponement.  
Despite our admonition for the State’s lack of diligence when the case was postponed
for the third time, the delays in petitioner’s case, as a whole, stem largely from neutral
reasons.  In addition, the State appears to have been as concerned with the delays as the
petitioner and there is not the slightest implication that the State failed to act in good faith.
10
The petitioner filed a demand for speedy trial in the District Court on March 3, 1999.
When the case proceeded to the Circuit Court, he filed the demand in Circuit Court on March
25, 1999.  
18
C.
The Assertion(s) of the Right to a Speedy Trial
Often the strength and timeliness of a defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right
indicate whether the delay has been lengthy and whether the defendant begins to experience
prejudice from that delay.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. 2192-93, 33 L. Ed. 2d
at 117-18; Bailey, 319 Md. at 409, 572 A.2d at 552.  The petitioner in the case sub judice
twice asserted his right to a speedy trial.  He first demanded a speedy trial in March of 1999,
only two months after his indictment.10  Then, one year later on April 19, 2000, the petitioner
moved to dismiss his case for violation of his speedy trial right.  The petitioner, without
question, satisfies this factor. 
The Court of Special Appeals relied largely upon the circumstances surrounding the
third postponement to support its conclusion that the petitioner failed to aggressively assert
his speedy trial right.  Because the petitioner failed, according to the Court of Special
Appeals, to adequately assert the right, the cause of the delay was deemed more attributable
to the petitioner rather than the State.  While we agree that, upon learning that the third
postponement resulted in a six-month delay (January 13, 1999 to July 19, 1999), the
petitioner could have, and probably should have, immediately asserted his right to a speedy
trial, we must disagree with the excessive weight the Court of Special Appeals places on this
facet of the case.  The vigorousness and timeliness of the assertion of the speedy trial right
19
is a consideration.  It cannot be deemed, however, in and of itself, the cause for the delay;
nor can it be the determining factor in whether a constitutional violation occurred.  This
marks our departure from the decision of the intermediate appellate court, and in fact, is the
basis upon which we opine today. 
D.
Prejudice to the Defendant
In analyzing the fourth factor, actual prejudice to the defendant, we are, in essence,
considering the harms against which the speedy trial right seeks to protect: (i) oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; (ii) anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) impairment of the
accused’s defense.  See Bailey, 319 Md. at 416-17, 572 A.2d at 555-56 (quoting Barker, 407
U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118).
While the pre-trial incarceration was of constitutional dimension requiring scrutiny
under the Barker factors, we do not believe that it was inordinate or unduly oppressive given
the factual circumstances of this case.  Specifically, the petitioner’s trial was delayed as a
result of a quest, by both parties, for complete and accurate DNA evidence and
administrative delays resulting from the unavailability of judges. 
With respect to the second element, we have recognized that emotional stress from
a prolonged delay “can be presumed to result . . . from uncertainties in the prospect of facing
public trial or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is presently
serving – uncertainties that a prompt trial removes.” Jones, 270 Md. at 17, 367 A.2d at 12
(quoting Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263, 37 L. Ed. 2d 56,
20
61 (1973)).  Those intangible personal factors “should prevail if the only countervailing
considerations offered by the State are those connected with crowded dockets and
prosecutorial case loads.” Divver, 356 Md. at 393, 739 A.2d at 78-79 (quoting Barker, 407
U.S. at 537, 92 S. Ct. at 2195, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 121)(White, J., concurring)).  Actual prejudice
requires more than an assertion that the accused has been living in a state of constant anxiety
due to the pre-trial delay.  Some indicia, more than a naked assertion, is needed to support
the dismissal of an indictment for prejudice.  Bailey, 319 Md. at 417, 572 A.2d at 555-56.
In the case sub judice, petitioner’s counsel alleged that “[o]bviously,  [Glover’s] very anxious
and concerned about [the time he’s been incarcerated] . . . he [lost] house and home, and .
. . [is] distanced from family . . . .”  Certainly these intangible factors are troublesome for any
accused who is incarcerated for a lengthy duration prior to trial.  These factors only prevail,
however, if the State’s sole basis for the postponements was crowded dockets.  Because the
attainment of the DNA materials was a justifiable reason, at least initially, for the
postponement, we will not weigh these factors heavily for the petitioner.
Of the three elements, the most serious is the potential that a delay will impair the
ability to present an adequate defense and thus skew the fairness of the entire adversarial
system.   A delay in trial can result in the impairment of one’s defense due to both tangible
factors, such as the unavailability of witnesses or loss or destruction of records, and
intangible factors, including fading memories about the incident in question and a decrease
in the likelihood that exculpatory witnesses can be found.  
11
The period of time relevant to speedy trial analysis begins with the date of arrest or
filing of indictment, in this case, February 26, 1999,  see Divver, 356 Md. at 388-89, 739
A.2d at 76, and not the date of the offense (February 24, 1998).
12
The petitioner challenged the pre-indictment delay on due process grounds.  To
prevail, the petitioner was required to establish both (1) actual prejudice, and (2) that the
delay was purposefully made by the State to gain a tactical advantage over the accused.  See
Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 645, 774 A.2d 1136, 1156 (2001).  The trial court did not rule
on the petitioner’s pre-indictment delay motion.  The issue of pre-indictment delay is not
before this Court.  
21
The trial court inferred an impairment of petitioner’s defense because of the time
period that elapsed between the date of the offense, the indictment, and the date of trial.11 
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the petitioner alluded to missing witnesses and
faded memories, but this argument was made largely with respect to the pre-indictment delay,
which is not an issue presently before us.12  We cannot find any evidence on the record that
indicates that the petitioner’s defense was impaired as a result of the delay, and we are
unwilling to presume or infer that such an impairment existed when, as we stated earlier, the
delay was not excessive or inordinate.  As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-322, 92 S. Ct. 455, 464, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468, 479 (1971),
Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair
memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of
witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend
himself.  But this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself
sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper
context. Possible prejudice is inherent in any delay, however
short; it may also weaken the Government's case. 
(emphasis added).  To the extent that the trial judge found prejudice, we believe his findings
of fact were clearly erroneous.  
22
IV.   Conclusion
Balancing the four factors is undoubtedly a sensitive task, completely dependent on
the specific facts presented by each unique case.  In carrying out this difficult task, we are
mindful that our task is to ensure that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial has not been
violated; we are also mindful, however, that delay is often the result of efforts to ensure the
highest quality of fairness during a trial.  The fairness of a trial is particularly sensitive in
cases in which DNA evidence may play a critical role in determining the guilt or innocence
of an accused murderer.  The acquisition or availability of DNA evidence does not mean that
a defendant’s speedy trial rights have diminished import.  On the contrary, and with respect
to the case at hand, we wish to emphasize that the State was not as aggressive in its pursuit
of the DNA evidence, both the test results and the supporting documents, as we believe is
required under statute, see Md. Code, §10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
(outlining the requirement that DNA evidence be presented at least thirty days prior to trial),
and under the universally accepted duty of the State to bring the defendant to trial.  See
Bailey, 319 Md. at 395, 572 A.2d at 545.   Nevertheless, we do not believe that the delay
unduly prejudiced the defendant.  
The peculiar circumstances of this case, namely the attempts to acquire complete
DNA evidence, coupled with the fact that no evidence on the record established prejudice,
leads us to our conclusion that the petitioner’s speedy trial right was not violated.  Therefore,
while we disagree with the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, we affirm the ultimate
23
judgment. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE PETITIONER.
24
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 67
September Term, 2001
__________________________________
ROBERT MATTHEW GLOVER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________
Bell, C.J
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
                                                                    
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J., in 
which Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., join
                                                                    
Filed:   March 6, 2002
1In Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed. 2d 528 (1992), the
Supreme Court said:
Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, official
negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the middle
ground.  While not compelling relief in every case where bad-
faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused
cannot demonstrate exactly how it prejudiced him.
505 U.S. at 656-7, 92 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed. at 531.
I respectfully dissent in this fact-bound case.  The trial judge’s dismissal of the
indictment was legally correct, in my view.  Contrary to the conclusions offered in the
Majority’s analysis, the record does not reflect that the delays occasioned by the DNA testing
process and transmittal of the results and related documentation to the defense was due, as
the Majority hints, to the inherent complexities of DNA testing (Maj. slip op. at 15).   Also,
the Majority is mistaken in its claim that the record is devoid of evidence that the State was
other than diligent (Id.).  Rather, the delay of concededly constitutional dimension in this case
was caused by what may be described as avoidable benign neglect and institutional snafus
on the part of the State and its units.1
The victim was discovered by law enforcement authorities on 24 February 1998.  The
State, therefore, had early access to samples of the victim’s blood and the jeans he was
wearing when discovered, from which jeans a bloodstain on a pocket was discovered much
later that became a critical focus of the DNA analysis.  Unfortunately, and for reasons that
2The prosecutor explained to the court at a 14 July 1999 hearing on the State’s initial
postponement request that the bloodstain on the pocket was discovered while “going through
the evidence for a closer look.” 
3The prosecutor who argued the postponement request also mentioned he had only been
“recently . . . assigned to the matter,” taking over for an earlier assigned prosecutor.
2
go unexplained on this record, the pocket bloodstain evidence went undiscovered by the
authorities until sometime in late April - early May 1999.2  The authorities had obtained a
blood sample from Petitioner in May or June 1998; however, Petitioner was not arrested until
26 February 1999, over a year after the victim’s body was discovered, and was not indicted
until 31 March 1999.
The record is obscure as to when the samples were forwarded, and to which laboratory
initially, for DNA testing.  The State’s written trial postponement request, filed on 2 July
1999, stated as grounds for a postponement, inter alia, “scientific evidence (D.N.A. testing
results) not back from F.B.I. Crime Lab . . . .”  At the 14 July 1999 hearing on this
postponement request, the prosecutor represented to the court that he was informed by a
person from the Maryland State Police’s Crime Laboratory on 30 June 1999 “that the sample
had to be sent on to the FBI crime lab for more detailed analysis and would not be ready for
trial on” 19 July 1999.3  He explained further that the State Police had “just recently”
received the jeans pocket bloodstain and, “they were having a hard time pulling off and
matching on the preliminary type testing they do, so it had to be sent to the FBI crime lab.”
Finally, the prosecutor maintained that the State Police crime laboratory was not able to
perform the “level of analysis” required.
4A copy of the letter was filed with the court on 2 August 1999.
5The report is dated 7 July 1999, but does not contain any clear indication when and from
whom the samples were received initially, whether the samples had been routed initially to
the FBI, or when the test was conducted.  It could be inferred from the file number (#F98-
130), however, that a file on the matter was opened in 1998.
6See Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 744-45 n.6, 679 A.2d 1106, 1117 n.6 (1996), for a
technical explanation of the PCR and RFLP testing processes.
3
The record, however, does not reveal that any of the samples ever were sent to the FBI
for testing.  Rather, it appears that the Maryland State Police crime lab performed both of the
DNA tests in this case.  In a letter, dated 30 July 1999,4 from the prosecutor to Petitioner’s
attorney transmitting the Maryland State Police Crime Laboratory Division’s lab report5
results of a Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test on the samples, the State notes that it was
still awaiting results of testing from the Trace Unit of that division.  A second round of DNA
test results, also apparently from tests conducted by the State Police crime lab, was relayed
to Petitioner’s counsel by the prosecutor in a letter dated 8 October 1999.  This second State
Police crime lab report, dated 27 August 1999, contained results apparently obtained via the
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) process,6 although that process was not
mentioned as such in the report.  Thus, it appears prima facie that the State Police crime lab
indeed was capable of performing the more sophisticated RFLP test, the suggestions to the
contrary in the State’s initial postponement justification notwithstanding.  We also are left
to wonder on this record what role, if any, the FBI crime lab may have played in the matter,
other than the mere invocation of its name to interject some verisimilitude into the State’s
4
justification for the initial postponement.
Petitioner, on 23 August 1999 at the latest, asked for the testing notes from the State
Police crime lab regarding any DNA testing.  The prosecutor supplied the chemist’s notes
from the PCR testing, but, at a 20 December 1999 court hearing, claimed that crime lab
personnel advised him that no notes were taken relative to the RFLP test.  Petitioner’s
counsel registered surprise that no notes existed for the more sophisticated RFLP test in light
of the facts that notes were made on the less sophisticated PCR test and the results of the
RFLP test depicted as “uninterpretable” 3 of the 6 genetic markers obtained from the DNA
profile of the jeans pocket bloodstain when compared to Petitioner’s DNA profile from his
blood sample.
Two days after the 20 December 1999 hearing, the prosecutor forwarded to
Petitioner’s counsel copies of the chemist’s notes from the second DNA test that was the
subject of the 27 August 1999 report.  As the prosecutor explained to the court at a 6 January
2000 hearing on Petitioner’s Motion To Suppress the DNA evidence, the confusion over
whether notes existed for the presumed RFLP test was occasioned by: (1) different chemists
conducting the PCR and RFLP tests; (2) both chemists leaving State employment in
September 1999; (3)  the next assigned contact person at the State Police crime lab
responsible for the case could not find the notes from the second test (which were in a file
at the lab); and, (4) it took the involvement of the lab supervisor and others to search and
locate the notes.  Essentially, the prosecutor chalked-up the delay to unintentional internal
5
confusion at the crime lab caused by imprecision in the transfer of responsibilities.
The upshot of this was another postponement on 6 January 2000 of the 13 January
2000 trial date.  Although the court denied Petitioner’s suppression motion as to the DNA
evidence, it later granted his motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, concluding that
“the State has offered no explanation as to why . . . the DNA test results and reports were not
completely available until December 23rd of 1999.  Th[at] unavailability of this material
resulted in failures of discovery is the bottomline reason for the ultimate delay in this case.
In the final analysis, the State is responsible for each and every postponement of this case.”
This is what the record of this case reveals.  As is patently clear, the delays attributable
to the obtention of samples and  DNA testing were laid at the feet of the State.  The delays
were not occasioned by the complexity of testing.  Therefore, it is of concern to me that the
Majority, in its analysis of the Barker v. Wingo considerations, glosses over and misstates
what the record shows and, instead, leads the analysis down a theoretical primrose path that
bears no relevance to the facts and permissible inferences present in this case.  In its
examination of the Barker  “reasons for delay” factor, the Majority reasons that “DNA
evidence is highly technical, often requiring courts to allow more time for completion of the
tests and review, by both parties of the results.”  (Maj. slip op. at 15).  It then acknowledges,
however, the “State [has] a duty to coordinate the various criminal divisions, including those
responsible for laboratory analysis, necessary to bring a defendant to trial.  This duty
includes, of course, ensuring that critical discovery materials, such as DNA evidence, are
7The Majority, later in its analysis of the reasons for delay, chastises the State for its “failure
to comply with discovery guidelines for DNA evidence,” but only with regard to locating and
delivering to Petitioner the chemist’s notes from the second round of DNA tests (Maj. slip
op. at 16-17).  Just as briefly, however, the Majority excuses the gravamen of its
“admonition” because, in its view, “the delays in petitioner’s case, as a whole, stem largely
from neutral reasons.”  (Id. at 17).  Fundamentally, it is that last generalization with which
the trial judge and I disagree.
6
properly monitored and accounted for, and not simply collecting dust in State or federal
crime labs.  In regard to the State’s initial request for postponement, we find no evidence that
the State failed to act in a diligent manner and therefore, we conclude that these grounds for
the postponement were both neutral and justified.”  (Id.).
Except for its inability to find “evidence” in the record “that the State failed to act in
a diligent manner” 7 and its erroneous conclusion that the “grounds for the [initial]
postponement were both neutral and justified,” I accept the Majority’s generalizations about
societal expectations and the scientific complexities of DNA testing.  Where I part company,
however, is that this record reveals no evidence that the State acted diligently, but rather
much evidence and inferences to the contrary.  It is this state of the evidence, which was
before the trial court, that leads me to conclude the trial judge was correct.