Title: Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd.1993 WY 65851 P.2d 769Case Number: 91-210Decided: 04/28/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Terrence AMREIN, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

WYOMING LIVESTOCK BOARD; 
N.R. Swanson, Wyoming State Veterinarian;

 Ken J. Griggs, D.V.M.; and Richard 
Johnson, D.V.M., 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Terrence Amrein, 
pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Dennis Coll, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee 
Swanson.

Patrick T. 
Holscher, Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellees Griggs 
and Johnson.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J., 
Retired.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      There are two 
significant issues in this case arising out of the granting of motions to 
dismiss, filed pursuant to Wyo.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The first issue questions 
whether alleging a timely claim with specificity is essential to pleading the 
jurisdiction of the trial court in a claim asserted pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (Governmental Claims Act).1 The second issue questions whether 
the trial court, by considering a copy of a claim attached to a Motion to 
Dismiss filed by the State of Wyoming, converted motions to dismiss filed by 
individual defendants into motions for summary judgment, thus invoking the 
requirement that the plaintiff be afforded a ten-day notice of such conversion 
prior to hearing. We hold the plaintiff failed to allege the jurisdiction of the 
trial court to address the claim against the State of Wyoming, and the trial 
court's Order of Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc is affirmed insofar as it orders 
dismissal of the claim against the State of Wyoming. We also hold the appeal of 
the Order of Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc as to the individual defendants will be 
dismissed for failure to comply with the rules of this court relating to cogent 
argument and relevant authority, remarking for the edification of the bar that, 
if the issue were properly before the court, it is likely the motion to dismiss 
would be treated as converted into a motion for summary judgment. The Order of 
Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc is affirmed.

[¶2]      It is to be noted 
that Terrence Amrein (Amrein) appears in this case representing himself, and he 
presents the following statement of the issues in his Revised Brief of Appellant 
with Appendix:

I. The Ninth District 
Court erred in dismissing the case when Issues of Material Fact 
Existed.

II. The Ninth District 
Court Erred in Dismissing the case when all facts had not been examined and in 
effect gave Summary Judgment without proper inputs.

III. The Plaintiff's 
Constitutional Rights have been violated and Due Process denied the 
Plaintiff.

IV. The District Court's 
Findings and Conclusions were Erroneous in Several Respects.

In the Brief of 
Appellee Dr. Norm Swanson, DVM, the only issue stated is the 
following:

I. The lower court 
properly dismissed the Appellant's action for failure to timely file a claim 
pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

In the Brief of 
Appellees Kenneth J. Griggs, DVM and Richard Johnson, DVM, this statement of the 
issues appears:

I. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW

The issue for review 
concerning the appellees, Kenneth J. Griggs, DVM, and Richard Johnson, DVM, is 
whether the appellant filed this action within the time limit imposed by the 
applicable statute of limitations, W.S. § 1-3-107.

A sub issue exists as to 
whether the appellant has satisfied his burden of submitting a brief with cogent 
argument and pertinent authority.

[¶3]      Early in 1989, 
the State of Wyoming seized several horses and cows that were in Amrein's 
possession. The justification for that seizure was Amrein's treatment of the 
animals as reflected in Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 1992). This case 
focuses on only one of those animals, an Appaloosa stallion named Rainy Moon 
Zenith (alternatively called Hi Moon or High Moon). After the stallion was 
seized and placed in state care, the animal, which was diseased, was euthanised 
pursuant to an order of Dr. Swanson. The euthanisation occurred on April 15 or 
16, 1989. Dr. Griggs and Dr. Swanson were contract veterinarians for the State 
of Wyoming. They had treated the stallion and Dr. Johnson performed the 
euthanasia procedure.

[¶4]      Amrein presented 
an "itemized statement" dated April 17, 1991, in which he sought for the 
wrongful destruction of "Hi Moon" $500,000 compensation from the State 
Veterinarian and the Wyoming Livestock Board, apparently proceeding under the 
Governmental Claims Act. In this civil action, Amrein alleged there was a 
negligent diagnosis with respect to the stallion, and it was illegally 
destroyed. In his pro se complaint, Amrein alleged with respect to the filing of 
a claim under the Governmental Claims Act:

1) This court has 
jurisdiction and venue is proper under WS 1-3-117. 

2) Plaintiffs have made a 
claim under WS 1-39-113 but have not received a settlement offer to date, nor 
has the claim been rejected, but we have to file this case now or the statute of 
limitation will run, and I (we) expect the state to reject the 
claim.

Appearing 
initially for both the Wyoming Livestock Board and N.R. Swanson, Wyoming State 
Veterinarian, the Office of the Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
the ground a timely claim was not filed,2 and a copy of a claim presented by 
an attorney on behalf of Amrein was attached to the Motion to Dismiss. The 
letter, dated April 17, 1991, asserts that it is "a claim for the wrongful 
destruction of Hi Moon by that order of Dr. N.R. Swanson made on or about April 
15th or 16th, 1989." Amrein filed a Reply to Motion to Dismiss to which he 
attached various reports of tissue samples, which reflect that the tissue 
samples were received on April 20, 1989. After filing answers, both Dr. Griggs 
and Dr. Johnson filed motions to dismiss, raising the statute of limitations. 
They alleged the injury occurred no later than April 16, 1989, and the complaint 
was filed on April 22, 1991. Amrein also filed a Reply to Motions to Dismiss by 
Griggs, and Reply to Motions to Dismiss by Richard Johnson, to which he attached 
copies of a transcript of testimony in connection with the prior criminal 
proceeding in which there is testimony the stallion was euthanised on April 15, 
1989. The trial court disposed of the cases by granting the respective motions 
to dismiss, and it is from that resolution, ultimately made in an Order of 
Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc, that Amrein has taken this appeal.

[¶5]      We affirm the 
dismissal with respect to Dr. Swanson, but for a different reason from that 
urged in the trial court and in Dr. Swanson's brief. Our rule states we can 
consider the question of jurisdiction upon our own motion and that it is never 
waived. Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 
(Wyo. 1983), and cases cited therein. We said in Bell:

[W]e hold that the 
failure to file a claim under that statute [Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113] results in a 
district court having no jurisdiction over an action which is brought if the 
complaint fails to allege the filing of the claim pursuant to 
statute.

Bell, 662 P.2d  
at 415 (emphasis added). In this instance, Amrein alleged the filing of the 
claim, but we expand upon the rule articulated in Bell and now hold that, in 
order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must 
encompass a statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing 
of the claim within two years of the date of the "alleged act, error or 
omission" or, alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the 
"alleged act, error or omission." Since Amrein failed to make this allegation, 
the complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to allege the jurisdiction of 
the court with specificity. We recognize dismissal is within the discretion of 
the trial court, and it would generally be appropriate to enter that dismissal 
without prejudice. Boller v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 829 P.2d 260 (Wyo. 1992); 
Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 608 P.2d 1299 
(Wyo. 1980), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 
(1982); Breazeale v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1972). In this case, it appears 
from the file that it would be impossible for Amrein to present the requisite 
allegations and, consequently, we affirm the order of dismissal as to Dr. 
Swanson.

[¶6]      Turning then to 
the appeal as it involves Dr. Griggs and Dr. Johnson, we discern no 
jurisdictional problem with respect to the complaint against them. Instead, we 
rely upon our articulated rule that, in the absence of the citation of pertinent 
authority or cogent argument, we will not afford relief to an appellant. Wyo. 
R.App.P. 5.01 (1978) (now Wyo.R.App.P. 7.01 (1992)).3 While it is permissible under our 
system for litigants to represent themselves, such litigants do not receive any 
special benefit in the examination of papers that are presented to this court 
including briefs. Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988), and cases cited 
therein. We hold the Revised Brief of Appellant With Appendix is woefully 
lacking in either the presentation of pertinent authority or cogent argument. 
Consequently, we invoke our rule that we will not consider the issues that are 
presented and, for that reason, we affirm the district court.

[¶7]      We add simply as 
a caveat for the edification of the bar that it appears, in this instance, the 
trial court considered "matters outside the pleading" in arriving at a decision 
to dismiss the complaint. In our view, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
demand that the contemplation of a motion to dismiss focus only upon the 
allegations of the complaint and whether it states a claim. The specific 
relevant language of Wyo.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (emphasis added) is:

If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56.

It is from this 
premise that we could affirm the dismissal of the complaint as to Dr. Swanson. 
If, however, the trial court considers other materials, the result is the 
conversion of the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and the 
rules require, according to our cases, that the plaintiff receive a ten-day 
notice of the decision to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment so that appropriate responses can be made to the materials 
apart from the complaint. E.g., Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, Inc. 
v. First Sec. Bank, 835 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1992); Cranston v. Weston County Weed and 
Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1992); Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128 (Wyo. 
1990); Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986); Kirby Bldg. Systems v. 
Independence Partnership No. One, 634 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1981); Wyoming Ins. Dep't. 
v. Sierra Life Ins. Co., 599 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶8]      We hold that the 
trial court properly dismissed the complaint as to Dr. Swanson because of the 
failure of the complaint to allege jurisdiction with requisite specificity, and 
we refuse to consider the issues raised in the appeal with respect to Dr. 
Johnson and Dr. Griggs for the reasons set forth above.

[¶9]      The Order of 
Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc entered in the trial court is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶10]   This case provides a continuing 
examination of the campaign by certain state (including judicial) officials 
against Terrence Amrein. See Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶11]   In the present case, appellant, 
Terrence Amrein (Amrein), sued state veterinary officials who deliberately 
destroyed one of his animals suffering from an alleged incurable disease. At the 
same time, the State was prosecuting Amrein on various charges to which Justice 
of the Peace William W. Cramer originally sentenced Amrein to eight consecutive 
six-month sentences and a fine in the amount of $6,000, for a total confinement 
in county jail of four years. Amrein, 836 P.2d  at 863.

[¶12]   In this civil damage case, taken on 
appeal pro se, Amrein presents two issues: (1) improper grant of summary 
judgment by the trial court when issues of fact existed, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986); and (2) insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
destruction of his property in compliance with state law.

[¶13]   Appellees, as state officials, 
changed the scope of the appeal attacking the lack of proof of satisfaction of 
the statute of limitation for professional malpractice, Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107 
(1988), as well as the technical insufficiency of the pro se appellate 
brief.

[¶14]   This court's majority resolves the 
case on a basis not submitted by any of the litigants. It is from that 
adjudicatory readjustment and its failure to provide Amrein due process to 
litigate his "state taking" claim that I dissent. Implicit in my disagreement is 
that Amrein's liberty interests were tried in the criminal prosecution by a far 
from disinterested jury, but he has also been denied even that access in this 
property deprivation litigation.

[¶15]   The court reaches this stage by 
creating an entirely new obstacle in the mine field litigants must pass. It is 
now deemed jurisdictional, in the case of a claim against a state official under 
the state's general claims statutes, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-101 through § 1-39-120 
(1988 & Cum.Supp. 1992), to allege pleading a date of filing the claim. In 
other words, to be defensible from a motion to dismiss, it is not now sufficient 
to allege timely filing or filing, but the date of filing must now be alleged so 
that adjudicatory review can be pursued on a motion to dismiss 
premise.

[¶16]   It might be true, as the majority 
now finds as a fact, that it "would be impossible for Amrein to present the 
requisite allegations," but it might also be possible, within contested issues 
found in abundance in this case of human and animal tragedy, to find the 
opposite. In any event, appellate implementation of this new principle of 
pleading at this stage as a jurisdictional requirement denies, in my 
opinion, Amrein due process and access to the courts. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, 
due process; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8, open courts.

[¶17]   I am even less satisfied with the 
second segment of the majority opinion where, lacking a jurisdictional avenue 
for appellate disposition, the decision falls back into the pertinent authority 
and cogent argument disability for this pro se litigant.

[¶18]   Amrein contended that the 
litigation disposition was summary judgment. In view of the "evidence" in the 
record, I would agree. If this was a summary judgment conversion, W.R.C.P. 56, 
from a motion to dismiss, W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), I would also accept the pro se 
litigant's presentation as adequate to present his argument and contention 
regarding summary judgment disposition without the necessity to recite the 
multitude of Wyoming cases directed to a principle of non-trial of issues of 
fact in summary judgment. See, in recent review, Drake v. Winkler, 838 P.2d 1177 
(Wyo. 1992) and Stalkup v. State Dept. of Environmental Quality (DEQ), 838 P.2d 705 (Wyo. 1992). In general analysis, see also Cordova, 719 P.2d 625.

[¶19]   Consequently, I respectfully 
dissent and continue searching for a requirement for our courts to provide an 
avenue and access to justice without indispensably requiring participation by 
lawyers. Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1993). 

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 
to -120 (1988) (Supp. 1992).

2 Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113 
(Supp. 1992) provides, in pertinent part:

(a) 
No action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless 
the claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an 
itemized statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged 
act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more 
than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the 
claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) 
Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

The 
failure to file a timely claim under this statutory provision is an absolute bar 
to suit against the governmental entity. Duran v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1990); Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827 (Wyo. 1985); Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1983).

3 Our cases are legion in 
which we have stated that we need not consider errors asserted on appeal, but 
which are not supported by available authority or cogent argument. See, e.g., 
Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1990); 
Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988); Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 
1986); Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1981); Wyoming Timber Products Co. v. 
Crow, 500 P.2d 683 (Wyo. 1972); Nichols v. Pangarova, 443 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1968); 
and Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, 384 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1963).