Title: May v. Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

May v. Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center1993 WY 163866 P.2d 732Case Number: 92-179Decided: 12/29/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Marvin 
Lee MAY and Wilda Stevens, as Guardian of MKM, a minor,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

SOUTHEAST 
WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH CENTER; Ardith "Dardee" Ervin; and Frank Andrews; State of 
Wyoming, Department of Public Assistance, n/k/a Department of Family Services; 
Carol Matz; and Jan Stiles, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Ronald 
E. Triggs, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Peter 
K. Michael of Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee Frank 
Andrews.

Rebecca 
Lewis of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee Southeast Wyoming 
Mental Health Center and Ardith "Dardee" Ervin.

Karen 
A. Byrne, Cheyenne, for appellees Wyoming Dept. of Family Services; Carol 
Matz; Jan Stiles.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ., and BROWN, J. 
(Retired).

BROWN, 
Justice (Retired).

[¶1]      Appellants Marvin 
Lee May and the guardian of a minor filed this lawsuit against various state 
government agencies and certain individuals alleged to have been employed by 
these agencies. The essence of appellant May's complaint is that he was damaged 
by the state agencies and individuals (appellees) because they were negligent in 
reporting child abuse and testifying in a criminal prosecution against him. The 
gist of the guardian's complaint is that the individuals and state agencies were 
negligent in investigating and reporting child abuse involving the guardian's 
ward.

[¶2]      The district 
court disposed of the complaint by summary judgment or by dismissal for failure 
to state a cause of action.

[¶3]      Appellants state 
the issues to be:

1. 
Did the court err in the following orders and decisions:

A. 
Order Granting Defendant Frank Andrews' Motion for Summary Judgment dated 17 
July 1992.

B. 
Order Granting Defendants Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center's and Ardith 
"Dardee" Ervin's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 17 July 
1992.

C. 
Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims Against the State of Wyoming, Department of 
Public  Social Services (Now DFS), 
Carol Matz and Jan Stiles dated 24 March 1992.

D. 
Order on Motion of Defendant Frank Andrews to Dismiss Civil Rights Claims dated 
4 March 1992.

E. 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order to invade attorney/client 
privilege dated 28 May 1992.

2. 
Does bad faith remove the statutory governmental immunity of defendants Matz and 
Stiles?

3. 
Did the defendants owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs?

[¶4]      Appellants have 
not clearly identified the institutional or corporate parties that they intend 
to be included in this appeal. In the caption of appellants' brief and the 
issues specified, the State of Wyoming, Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services (DPASS) and Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center (Mental 
Health Center) are indicated as appellee parties. However, in their brief, 
appellants state, "The Plaintiffs appeal from the decision only insofar as it 
affects the individuals." We need not concern ourselves, however, about which 
parties, if any, appellants intended to drop from this 
appeal.

[¶5]      Reduced to its 
simplest terms, appellants complain that the motions for summary judgment and 
the motion to dismiss were decided adversely to them.

[¶6]      We 
affirm.

[¶7]      It appears that 
an understanding of this spectacle would be facilitated by identifying the 
principal players in the beginning.

CAST

MKM               
           
Issue of a dysfunctional marriage. 

Marvin 
Lee May         
Father of MKM. 

Dawn 
(May) Frantz    Mother of MKM. 

Wilda 
Stevens                       
Paternal Grandmother & Guardian of MKM. 

Doug 
Frantz               
Boyfriend/husband of Dawn May Frantz. 

Carol 
Matz                 
Social case worker, Laramie County DPASS 

Jan 
Stiles                   
Supervisor of Carol Matz, Laramie County DPASS 

Ardith 
"Dardee" Ervin           
Social Worker, Southeast Wyoming Mental Health 
Center

[¶8]      In addition to 
the cast, there were numerous entities and individuals that played some part in 
the tragedy about to be revealed.1 This list includes, but is not 
limited to, several Wyoming and Colorado courts, a mental health center, public 
assistance and social workers, lawyers, doctors and law enforcement personnel 
and facilities.

FACTS

[¶9]      Appellant Marvin 
Lee May and Dawn May (now Dawn Frantz) were divorced in December 1984. Dawn May 
voluntarily gave up custody of the couple's daughter, MKM, age sixteen months. 
Dawn states that she agreed that Lee May have custody of the child because Lee 
threatened that if she opposed it, he would reveal to Dawn's mother that Dawn's 
stepfather had sexually abused Dawn during her childhood. This revelation would 
have had dire consequences, according to Dawn.

[¶10]   Post-divorce proceedings resulted 
in Dawn May re-establishing visitation with her daughter MKM. In July 1986, 
Marvin Lee May reported to Mary Richard of the Mental Health Center that his 
daughter, MKM, had returned home from a visit with her mother exhibiting a 
cigarette burn on her hand. Mary Richard reported the burn to appellee Carol 
Matz, a social worker for DPASS, who investigated the burn incident. The mother, 
Dawn, told Matz that it was an accidental cigarette burn. Matz closed the file 
on September 11, 1986, with respect to the burn incident, concluding that the 
report of abuse was unsubstantiated.

[¶11]   At Carol Matz's interview of Dawn 
May on September 10, 1986, the latter reported that she was concerned that MKM 
showed signs of discomfort in the genital area during her bath. This discomfort 
had been noticed by Dawn during earlier weekend visitations. Dawn reported that 
MKM denied being touched inappropriately by an adult.

[¶12]   On September 18, 1986, Dawn May 
telephoned Carol Matz again about MKM's discomfort. She reported that during her 
latest visit, MKM did not want to be touched in the genital area and was evasive 
about whether someone had been touching her. Ms. Matz suggested that Dawn May 
take her daughter for an interview with Ms. Ardith "Dardee" Ervin (formerly 
Toland), at the Mental Health Center.

[¶13]   On Friday, September 26, 1986, Dawn 
May took MKM to the Mental Health Center for an interview with Ervin. At this 
interview, MKM told Ervin that her father had sexually abused her. MKM's 
description of the sexual abuse was limited by the experience and vocabulary of 
a three-year-old girl, but sufficiently graphic to prompt Ervin to report the 
results of her interview to Carol Matz. At this juncture, MKM was placed in 
emergency shelter care with a foster mother.

[¶14]   On Monday, September 29, 1986, MKM 
was again interviewed by Ervin at the request of Carol Matz. Ervin reported to 
DPASS and the sheriff's office that she suspected abuse by Marvin Lee May; she 
continued to see MKM in therapy sessions and give opinions to the State 
regarding the condition of MKM. Ervin testified in the criminal trial against 
Marvin Lee May at the request of Colorado authorities. MKM was seen by Cheyenne 
physician Wendy Palmer for a physical examination. The examination did not 
reveal physical evidence of penetration, but MKM repeated her allegations in Dr. 
Palmer's presence through play with anatomical dolls. Dr. Palmer reported she 
believed that MKM had been sexually abused by her father. Carol Matz drafted an 
abuse/neglect investigative summary which detailed the course of investigation 
up to September 29, 1986.

[¶15]   On September 29, 1986, a shelter 
care hearing was held before the district judge. MKM's foster placement was 
continued. MKM remained in that placement for several more days, until the next 
hearing held on October 10, 1986. The foster parent reported in a letter to 
DPASS that MKM was very distraught at being separated from her mother, and was 
afraid of both her father, Lee May, and her grandmother, Wilda 
Stevens.

[¶16]   On September 30, 1986, Marvin Lee 
May had his first supervised visit with his daughter at DPASS offices. Carol 
Matz intended to allow Mr. May to visit his daughter alone; however, MKM refused 
to go into the visiting room alone with her father. To accommodate Marvin Lee 
May's objection to Carol Matz being present during the visit, Dr. Frank Andrews, 
a Fort Collins psychologist, consented to be a neutral observer during the 
visit. Dr. Andrews was rewarded for his accommodation by being 
sued.

[¶17]   At the October 10, 1986 hearing, 
Dawn May was awarded temporary custody of MKM, and Dr. Andrews was appointed an 
evaluator by the court.

[¶18]   In the next few weeks after the 
October 10 hearing several of the players in this saga were administered most of 
the psychological and social tests known to man.2 In mid-October of 1986, the Laramie 
County Sheriff's Department communicated with Police Detective Richard Martin of 
Thornton, Colorado, regarding the sexual abuse allegations against Marvin Lee 
May. Detective Martin commenced an investigation which resulted in an 
Information being filed against Marvin Lee May in Adams County. The charge was 
aggravated incest and sexual assault on a child.3

[¶19]   In his capacity as court appointed 
evaluator, Dr. Andrews first interviewed Marvin Lee May and explained to him the 
purpose of the evaluation and answered questions. He also attended supervised 
visitation between Marvin Lee May and his daughter and administered some of the 
tests mentioned. In an interview MKM stated to Dr. Andrews, "Daddy had hurt her 
personal," and "Daddy was mean."

[¶20]   Dr. Andrews completed his 
evaluation in January 1987, and submitted his report to Carol Matz. He was never 
called to testify in the Laramie County, Wyoming, abuse/neglect case. Dr. 
Andrews never said at any time that he thought Marvin Lee May was guilty. 
Rather, in his report, he gave an opinion that Dawn May was the preferred 
custodial parent, and that MKM's outcry statements were inconsistent with 
coaching by Dawn May.

[¶21]   After submitting his report on 
January 20, 1987, Dr. Andrews had no involvement of any significance in the 
matter until April of 1988, when Marvin Lee May's criminal trial occurred in 
Adams County, Colorado. At this time, Dr. Andrews was subpoenaed as a witness 
for the prosecution. At the criminal trial in Adams County the jury found Marvin 
Lee May guilty of aggravated incest and sexual assault on a child. The 
conviction was overturned by the Colorado Court of Appeals on July 26, 1990, 
because the trial court failed to give a cautionary instruction. The prosecution 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court which 
was denied on April 8, 1991. Thereafter, the Adams County prosecutor's office 
declined to reprosecute Marvin Lee May, stating:

     After living with the 
defendant's mother [Marvin Lee May's mother, Wilda Stevens] during the pendency 
of the defendant's appeal, the victim is now recanting.

     Due to this 
recantation, the People are presently unable to prove this case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

[¶22]   On August 29, 1987, the district 
judge for Laramie County ordered that MKM be transferred from therapeutic foster 
case to Wilda Stevens, paternal grandmother. Dawn May Frantz, mother of MKM, 
appealed that custody decision to this court, which affirmed the district 
court's exercise of discretion. In the Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 
1990).4

[¶23]   On April 10, 1991, appellants filed 
a complaint in the District Court of Laramie County alleging, as nearly as we 
can determine, that appellees negligently investigated allegations that 
appellant Marvin Lee May sexually abused or had had sexual contact with his 
minor daughter MKM. Marvin Lee May further alleged that all individual appellees 
"deliberately or negligently ignored all exculpatory evidence and testified 
either inaccurately or untruthful, or both, in criminal proceedings in the state 
of Colorado." 

[¶24]   The original complaint alleged that 
the torts of institutional and corporate defendants include, but were not 
limited to, professional negligence, ordinary negligence, gross negligence, 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and outrage. An 
amended complaint was filed April 22, 1991, which alleged basically the same 
broad allegations against defendants but added that the actions of the 
institutional and corporate defendants and each of them constituted negligent 
hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, negligent instruction, 
negligent retention, and that they were additionally liable on the basis of 
respondeat superior. Appellants, in their complaint, shot-gunned a vague, 
unspecified "violation of constitutionally cognizable civil and/or 
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs."

[¶25]   Appellees responded to appellants' 
complaints by generally denying conclusory allegations set out in appellants' 
complaints and asserted one or more immunities from suit. The district court 
dismissed defendants DPASS, Carol Matz and Jan Stiles because of appellants' 
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. A summary judgment 
was granted in favor of the other appellees.

[¶26]   For several reasons we could 
justifiably affirm the district court's orders without addressing the merits of 
the case. In this instance, however, we prefer to decide this case on the merits 
rather than dismiss the appeal for technical reasons. The violation of appellate 
rules are noted, however. In this case, appellants merely state the issues to be 
that the court erred in granting summary judgments and motion to 
dismiss.

[¶27]   This court has stated countless 
times it will not consider issues alleging error which are not clearly defined, 
nor will issues be considered that are not supported by citation of proper 
authority or cogent argument. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 
1992); Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 641 (Wyo. 
1990); Newman v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 341 (Wyo. 1989). It is not the 
function of the court to frame an appellant's argument or draw issues for them. 
Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 577 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶28]   Appellants here have not framed the 
issues to be addressed, nor have they favored us with proper authority or cogent 
argument. Appellants' compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure 
is deficient in most respects.

FAILURE 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

[¶29]   The trial court dismissed this 
action against the State of Wyoming, DPASS, Carol Matz and Jan Stiles because 
the complaints failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be 
granted. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104(a) and (b) (1988) provide:

     (a) A governmental 
entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are 
granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 
through 1-39-112. Any immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a 
governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if 
the contract was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly 
executed. The claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims 
against governmental entities.

     (b) When liability is 
alleged against any public employee, if the governmental entity determines he 
was acting within the scope of his duty, whether or not alleged to have been 
committed maliciously or fraudulently, the governmental entity shall provide a 
defense at its expense.

[¶30]   There are exemptions to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act set out in Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-105, 1-39-107, and 
1-39-112. However, there is no exception from the Governmental Claims Act for 
social workers, nor do appellants claim that there is such an exception. Unless 
a claim falls within one of the statutory exceptions, it is barred. Sawyer v. 
City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1990). In Martinez v. City of 
Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 957 (Wyo. 1990), this court stated "any action against 
the State must be authorized by the legislature and that courts are without 
jurisdiction to proceed in any case that has not been so authorized." 

[¶31]   Governmental entities and their 
employees, while acting within the scope of their duties, are granted immunity 
from liability for any tort except those specifically waived within the 
Governmental Claims Act. Appellants do not contend nor argue that Matz and 
Stiles were not acting in the course of and within the scope of their 
duties.

[¶32]   Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-110 and § 
1-12-601 cited by appellants have no application to the facts in this case. The 
former statute specifies liability for certain health care providers. The latter 
statute speaks of burden of proof with respect to health care providers. Matz 
and Stiles are not health care providers within the contemplation of these 
statutes. In Troyer v. Dep't of Health & Social Services, 722 P.2d 158, 161 
(Wyo. 1986), this court defined a health care provider as "one who cures or 
prevents impairments of the normal state of the body."

[¶33]   Appellants rely heavily on Oyler v. 
State, 618 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1980). This case involved damages resulting from an 
offer of employment which never came to pass. Oyler has very little to do with 
the case before us. It was decided before the effective date of the Governmental 
Claims Act, and it did not have anything to do with the Child Protection 
Services Act or certain immunities that we refer to. Next, appellants allude to 
a civil rights claim under the Wyoming Constitution; however, they specifically 
waived a civil rights claim under federal law. With respect to suits or claims 
against the state, this court has stated:

     There are few, if any, 
precedents or rules that have been recognized longer or followed with greater 
fidelity than the rule that was set out in the case of Hjorth Royalty Company v. 
Trustees of University, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9 (1924), which held that Art. 1 § 
8, Wyoming Constitution, is not self-executing; that no suit can be maintained 
against the State until the legislature makes provision for such filing; and, 
that absent such consent, no suit or claim could be made against the State. * * 
* In addition to the fact that this rule is most clearly established by numerous 
Wyoming authorities, in states having a similar provision to the one in our 
constitution, it has been almost universally held that such provision, which 
empowers the legislature to authorize the bringing of suits against the State 
and providing the procedure therefor, is not self-executing and requires 
positive, definite legislative action. No suit can be maintained absent such 
consent set out clearly by statute.

Worthington 
v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 801 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶34]   These civil rights claims, based on 
the Wyoming Constitution, fail because of no implementing legislation. They 
might also fail for other reasons.

[¶35]   The trial court properly dismissed 
the action against the State of Wyoming, DPASS, Carol Matz and Jan Stiles 
because of failure to state a cause of action. The Governmental Claims Act 
grants immunity to these appellees, and appellants have not shown that appellees 
here come under any exception. Probably appellees Carol Matz and Jan Stiles also 
enjoy qualified immunity under the Child Protective Services Act. Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-209 (1986).

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS

[¶36]   As indicated in more detail earlier 
in reciting the facts of this case, Ardith "Dardee" Ervin (formerly Toland), was 
a social worker for Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center (Mental Health 
Center). In that capacity, she reported to DPASS and the sheriff's office that 
she suspected abuse of MKM by Marvin Lee May. Later, at the request of Colorado 
authorities, Ervin testified in a criminal trial against Marvin Lee 
May.

[¶37]   Dr. Andrews' first involvement in 
this case was when he accommodated DPASS and Carol Matz by sitting in on a visit 
by Marvin Lee May with his daughter, MKM. Thereafter, Dr. Andrews was appointed 
evaluator by the court. In that capacity, he made several interviews, conducted 
tests and made reports. Finally, he testified at a criminal trial against Marvin 
Lee May. Ervin and Andrews claim statutory immunity under Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-209. 
The district court agreed that these parties were immune, and we agree with the 
district court. 

A 
motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a 
prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue 
of material fact does exist. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 
(1986). We analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the 
record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all 
favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. Conclusory statements 
or mere opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's 
burden. Jones Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Wyo., 733 P.2d 258, 263 (1987).

Boehm 
v. Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶38]   The well-known standard of review 
for summary judgments has only minimal significance here. Rather, the summary 
judgments in this case can be upheld on the basis of immunity. Therefore, we 
need not search the record to see if there are disputed material facts, nor need 
we examine in detail the materials in support of summary judgment or in 
opposition.

[¶39]   The pertinent portion of the 
Wyoming Child Protective Services Act requires reporting of suspected child 
abuse:

     (a) Any person who 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child has been abused 
or neglected or who observes any child being subjected to conditions or 
circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, shall 
immediately report it to the child protective agency or local law enforcement 
agency or cause a report to be made.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-205 (1986) (emphasis added).

[¶40]   After a report has been made 
according to the requirement of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-205, the person or entity 
making the report has qualified immunity according to § 
14-3-209:

Any 
person, official, institution or agency participating in good faith in any act 
required or permitted by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 [Child Protective 
Services Act] is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability that might otherwise result by reason of the action. For the 
purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, the good faith of any 
person, official or institution participating in any act permitted or required 
by W.S. 14-3-215 shall be presumed.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶41]   Section 14-3-209 does not limit 
immunity to suits based only on the reporting. Rather, it provides immunity from 
any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result because of 
reporting. Immunity includes participation in legal proceedings, as well as the 
underlying determination of the abuse which then led to the reporting. It 
covers, in this case, all actions taken by Andrews, Ervin and the Mental Health 
Center. The reason for this blanket immunity is to protect children by 
encouraging reporting of suspected abuse so it can be investigated without the 
reporter fearing reprisal if the suspicions are later determined to be 
unfounded.

[¶42]   All fifty states have a statute 
similar to Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-209 which provides immunity for persons who report 
suspected abuse provided the reporting was done in good faith. Elmore v. Van 
Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Wyo. 1992). Case law from other jurisdictions 
indicate immunity statues are construed to include not only actions based on the 
actual reporting, but also suits founded on the alleged underlying malpractice 
or negligence that led to the belief that the child was being abused. See Maples 
v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1990); and Awkerman v. Tri-County 
Orthopedic, P.C., 373 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Mich. App. 1985).

[¶43]   In Elmore, the court clearly and 
concisely compared Wyoming's immunity statute with those of other states and 
explained the public policy and legislative intent in enacting Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-209. There, the court stated:

     All persons who report 
child abuse pursuant to the Wyoming reporting statute are "permissive eporters," 
because they do not face a criminal penalty if they fail to report child abuse. 
See W.S. 14-3-201 through -215 (1986). Looking to the legislative language and 
by comparing our statute to others, it is clear that the Wyoming legislature 
intended to provide qualified immunity, that is immunity for all who report 
child abuse in good faith. Therefore, should it appear that appellee reported 
this suspected child abuse in good faith, she will be entitled to qualified 
immunity under the statute.

     The reporting immunity 
statute contains two basic requirements. First, the report must be made pursuant 
to W.S. 14-3-205, which requires that a person immediately report abuse if they 
"kno[w] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe or suspect" that abuse has or is 
occurring, and second, that the report be acting in good faith. W.S. 14-3-209 
(1986); see also Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1990). Under 
Wyoming's statute, good faith is presumed. The statute provides a presumption 
that the report was made in good faith absent any contrary allegation or showing 
from appellants. W.S. 14-3-209.

This 
construction of the statute does not afford immunity for deliberately false 
accusations, yet still protects those who report in good faith. Were we to 
construe the statute in a different fashion, the result might be to chill 
legitimate reports of child abuse.

Elmore, 
844 P.2d  at 1083.

[¶44]   Under Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-209, the 
reporting by Ervin and Andrews is presumed to have been done in good faith. 
Appellants have presented no facts to rebut that presumption or to show that 
Ervin and Andrews did not act in good faith in this matter. There is no evidence 
of bad faith which would defeat the good faith presumption in this 
case.

[¶45]   At various times in this protracted 
case, appellants have urged DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social 
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989), in support of 
their case. In DeShaney, social services and several social workers were sued 
under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 for not intervening in a child abuse case. The federal 
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, decided against the 
petitioner. We learn from the case before us that social services are sued if 
they intervene in child abuse cases, and in DeShaney we learn that social 
services are sued if they do not intervene. DeShaney, 489 U.S.  at 195, 109 S. Ct. 
at 1002-03, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 158.

[¶46]   It appears that Ervin and Andrews 
also had witness immunity. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of witness immunity in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983), holding that parties and witnesses had immunity from 
liability due to their testimony in judicial proceedings. Those principles were 
expanded in Collins v. Walden, 613 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (N.D.Ga. 1985), to hold 
that witness immunity also protects statements made in depositions and 
affidavits.

[¶47]   It would not be illogical to expand 
this witness immunity to reports made to government agencies or 
quasi-governmental agencies when such reports become part of the basis for the 
criminal action or child protection actions. Appellee Andrews may also be 
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity after his appointment as evaluator by the 
court. With respect to some appellees, the statute of limitations may be a bar 
to an action under these circumstances. We will not decide the defenses of 
quasi-judicial immunity or the statute of limitations. We decide no more than 
necessary in this case.

[¶48]   Appellants' principal theory of the 
case against the institutional and corporate appellees DPASS and the Mental 
Health Center is respondeat superior. Because we have upheld the granting 
of summary judgment in favor of the individual appellees, the appeal against 
DPASS and the Mental Health Center must also fail.

[¶49]   Appellants allege negligent hiring, 
training, supervision, instruction and retention against the institutional and 
corporate appellees in their third amended complaint. We find these five 
allegations of negligence to be without merit. Appellants have not brought to 
our attention any evidence in support of these allegations. Any reference to 
such asserted acts of negligence are mere conclusions or opinions and are not 
sufficient to satisfy appellants' burden. Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 
710.

[¶50]   In order to counter the immunity 
provided for in Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-104 and 14-3-209, appellants have alleged bad 
faith. Appellants enumerate fifty-one numbered incidents or occurrences which 
they contend show negligence and bad faith. Some of these numbered allegations 
of bad faith contain more than one occurrence. Appellants essentially contend 
everything done by appellees and numerous things not done constitute bad faith 
and negligence. Appellants state, "Plaintiffs contend that the accumulated acts 
of defendants meet the test for bad faith." Some numbered occurrences have no 
references to the record; others refer us to some lengthy report, deposition or 
affidavit. It is not our responsibility to search the record and ferret out 
material to support allegations of appellants.

[¶51]   Appellants' contention of bad faith 
also fails because they do not cite any cases or make any logical argument to 
demonstrate why a particular act or non-act shows bad faith. This court has said 
that in the absence of authority cited by the one having the burden of proof, 
the court will assume that no authority was found. Nation v. State ex rel. 
Firefighters Local 279 I.A.F.F., 518 P.2d 931, 933 (Wyo. 1974). Appellants state 
in their brief that they have found no cases on the duty to investigate the 
facts of a charge of sexual abuse. In the absence of authority for appellants' 
contentions here, they cite four cases and text material regarding physicians 
and surgeons. This extraneous material has no application here. Appellants have 
not presented facts in an understandable way to rebut the presumption of good 
faith.

[¶52]   Appellants, at various and sundry 
places in their brief, allude to matters that are difficult to classify. These 
matters may be intended to be issues or perhaps grumblings in connection with 
other issues. For example, appellants complain that they were not able to obtain 
the entire DPASS file. They also say they were precluded from producing certain 
evidence, but they do not explain the preclusion. Appellants specify as issues: 
"Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order to invade attorney/client 
privilege," and "Did the defendants owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs?" These 
two issues are fleetingly addressed in connection with argument on other matters 
by appellants. In any case, there is no authority cited nor cogent argument made 
to support these so-called issues.

[¶53]   In summary, we uphold the trial 
court in its order of dismissal on the basis of the Governmental Claims Act and 
affirm the granting of summary judgments on the basis of the Child Protective 
Services Act.

[¶54]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We characterize this case as a tragedy because of the demands made on 
the courts, law enforcement, mental health, doctors, lawyers and public 
assistance - all of this supported by the taxpayer and all for 
naught.

2 Marvin Lee May, Dawn May and Doug Frantz were administered polygraph 
tests. Marvin Lee May's test was inconclusive while Dawn May and Doug Frantz 
passed their tests. Dr. Andrews conducted a family assessment/bonding 
evaluation/custody study. Dr. Andrews tested MKM with the Denver Developmental 
Test and tested Marvin Lee May with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI), Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) and the 
Multiphasic Sex Inventory (MSI). Eventually May was given a plythesmograph test. 
This test is so bizarre only inconclusive results could be 
expected.

3 Part of the time Marvin Lee May had custody of MKM he worked and lived 
in Colorado. The sexual abuse was alleged to have occurred in 
Colorado.

4 On March 9, 1989, the Laramie County District Attorney's Office filed 
criminal complaints against Doug Frantz for molesting MKM and against Dawn 
Frantz alleging that she was an accessory to molestation. Both complaints were 
dismissed because of insufficient evidence.