Title: Taylor v. Johnston

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

224 S.E.2d 567 (1976) 289 N.C. 690 J. T. TAYLOR, Jr., Petitioner, v. R. G. JOHNSTON et al. No. 26. Supreme Court of North Carolina. May 14, 1976. *571 Henderson, Baxter & Davidson by David S. Henderson, New Bern, and Taylor & *572 Marquardt by Nelson W. Taylor, III, Morehead City, for petitioner-appellant. Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. Roy A. Giles, Jr., Raleigh, for respondents-appellees. BRANCH, Justice. Petitioner proceeds under Chapter 43 of the General Statutes which is generally referred to as "the Torrens Law." Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 43, anyone in peaceable possession of land in this State who claims an estate of inheritance therein may prosecute a special proceeding against all the world to establish his title thereto, to determine all adverse claims and to have the title registered. G.S. 43-6. When the Commission filed its answer, the allegations of the petition were controverted as to the lands lying north of Mouse Harbor Canal and the provisions of G.S. 43-11 were activated. Paper Co. v. Cedar Works, 239 N.C. 627, 80 S.E.2d 665. The pertinent portions of G.S. 43-11 provide: Any decree entered by the examiner must be "approved by the judge of the superior court, who shall review the whole proceeding and have power to require any reformation of the process, pleadings, decrees or entries." G.S. 43-12. In Paper Co. v. Cedar Works, supra, Justice Ervin, speaking for the Court, concisely stated the law and rules governing contested hearings in a Torrens proceeding. We quote from that case: If there be a hiatus or break in petitioner's chain of title, there can be no *574 benefit from earlier conveyances. State v. Brooks, 279 N.C. 45, 181 S.E.2d 553; Sledge v. Miller, 249 N.C. 447, 106 S.E.2d 868; Norman v. Williams, 241 N.C. 732, 86 S.E.2d 593; Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E.2d 142. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's chain of title was first severed by the document purporting to be the will of John Gray Blount. The record shows this document to actually be the report of commissioners appointed by the Beaufort Court of Equity to divide the lands of John Gray Blount, deceased. The commissioners returned their report to the Fall Term Session of the Beaufort Court of Equity and by their report allotted to Thomas H. Blount that portion of the lands of John Gray Blount known as the "Pamlico and Porpose (sic) Marshes," being Grant 602. In its decree of confirmation the court ordered that the parties "execute to each other deeds for their respective shares." Petitioner introduced no evidence tending to show compliance by the parties or that the court ever entered any order of attachment to enforce its decree. In Volume 68 C.J.S. Partition § 164, page 274, it is stated: See also 59 Am.Jur.2d, Partition, § 88, at 845. The United States Supreme Court considered a proceeding in equity to divide real estate in the case of Gay v. Parpart, 106 U.S. 679, 27 L. Ed. 256, 1 S. Ct. 456. There the Court, inter alia, stated: Under the common law, a decree in partition did not transfer or change legal title to any of the property. The partition could be effected only by exchange of deeds between the parties pursuant to the court's decree. 59 Am.Jur.2d Partition, § 88; Gay v. Parpart, supra. In Proctor v. Ferebee, 36 N.C. 143, this Court considered a decree allotting land and there stated: Petitioner, relying on Bank v. Leverette, 187 N.C. 743, 123 S.E. 68, first contends that the powers of a court of law and a court of equity are equal with respect to judgments and decrees affecting title to realty. We disagree. In Leverette, this Court held that once the possessory rights of a cotenant were defined by judgment or decree, a writ of possession or a writ of *575 assistance would issue to put them into possession of the portion that was rightfully theirs. We find no intimation in Leverette that a decree from a court of equity ordering the cotenants to exchange deeds had the same effect as a judgment at law finally determining the respective rights of the parties. Petitioner further argues that even if legal title did not vest in Thomas H. Blount upon the confirmation of the commissioners' report, the enactment of G.S. 1-227, 1-228 as reported in Session Laws of 1850 remedied this break in the chain of title. (Session Laws 1850, c. 107, s. 2, 4.) The Court of Appeals, holding that the date of confirmation rather than the date of recording determined the applicable law, noted that the decree was confirmed prior to the enactment of G.S. 1-227. Also the Court of Appeals decided that G.S. 1-227 does not have retroactive effect. We need not explore the reasoning of the Court of Appeals since it is apparent that by their very terms the statutes are not here applicable. At the time of its enactment in 1850, G.S. 1-227 provided: In Morris v. White, 96 N.C. 91, 2 S.E. 254, this Court held that there must be strict conformity to the provisions of G.S. 1-227 in order for a decree to operate as a conveyance. The Court held that the mere fact that the court below intended for the decree to transfer title was immaterial unless the court declared that the decree "shall be regarded as a deed of conveyance." Here, the court did not declare in the order then made or in any order made in the progress of the cause that the effect of its order was to transfer title to the subject property as directed by the court. Neither does the record show any conveyance made pursuant to the decree of the Beaufort Court of Equity. Thus the legal title to the property in controversy never vested in Thomas Blount pursuant to the 1835 proceeding. The subsequent conveyances by the sheriff's deed to William B. Rodman and the heirs of William B. Rodman to petitioner could not convey an estate of greater dignity than was vested in Thomas Blount upon the death of John Gray Blount. In an action to try title where it is denied that petitioners own any interest in the land, petitioners' action cannot be dismissed if their evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that they own some interest in the land entitling them to the present right of possession and petitioners are not required to establish the exact interest claimed in their pleadings. Skipper v. Yow, 249 N.C. 49, 105 S.E.2d 205. This record discloses that John Gray Blount died intestate and that Thomas Blount, by the laws of intestate succession, was entitled to a one-fifth undivided interest in the lands of John Gray Blount. Thus, if petitioner proves a chain of title from Thomas Blount into himself according to any one of the recognized methods of proving title, he would be entitled to a one-fifth undivided interest in the lands in controversy. The appellee contends, however, that the sheriff's deed to William B. Rodman also created a break in petitioner's chain of title since the petitioner failed to establish the existence of the judgment upon which the execution was purportedly issued or to establish that, except by evidence of the recitals contained in the sheriff's deed, there *576 was a live execution in the hands of the sheriff. The sheriff's deed recited entry of judgment against Thomas Blount and that execution was thereupon issued to the Sheriff of Beaufort County to sell the lands described as Grant 602 to satisfy said judgment. It further recited due advertisement of the land and sale to William B. Rodman as the last and highest bidder at the sheriff's sale. Our Court has considered the effect of recitals of fact in various types of deeds. In Sledge v. Miller, supra, plaintiff sought to establish title by a connected chain of title from the State. One of the links in his chain of title was a deed from Grady and others as receivers of Beaufort County Lumber Company. Holding that this deed constituted a fatal break in the chain of title, this Court, speaking through Justice Rodman, stated: We have also held that in a tax foreclosure action, the failure to introduce the intermediate decree and final judgment created a hiatus in the title when the parties relied on the commissioners' deed as a link in the chain of title. Kelly v. Kelly, 241 N.C. 146, 84 S.E.2d 809. The plaintiff in Board of Education v. Gallop, 227 N.C. 599, 44 S.E.2d 44, relied on a sheriff's deed as a link in his chain of title. Defendant contended the deed was invalid because it was not supported by a live execution. Plaintiff introduced an undated purported execution which contained no notation by the sheriff as to when it was received or served. Neither was entry of return on the judgment docket shown. The sheriff's deed, however, recited that it was executed pursuant to a live execution. This Court held that such recital was secondary evidence and therefore inadmissible into evidence until plaintiff proved loss or destruction of the original. In Walston v. Applewhite & Co., 237 N.C. 419, 75 S.E.2d 138, Justice Denny, later Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, reaffirmed the rule stated in Board of Education v. Gallop, supra, with the following language: The Sheriff's deed to William B. Rodman was admitted without objection, and should therefore have been considered for whatever probative value it contained. Reeves v. Hill, 272 N.C. 352, 158 S.E.2d 529; Freeman v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 113, 159 S.E.2d 327. *577 Although not strongly argued by the parties to this proceeding, we deem it necessary to consider the effect of the ancient document rule upon the recitals contained in the sheriff's deed. A hearsay exception in favor of recitals in ancient deeds is expressly recognized in North Carolina. Skipper v. Yow, supra; Sears v. Braswell, 197 N.C. 515, 149 S.E. 846; 1 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence § 152 at 509 (Brandis Rev., 1973). If the recitals are competent evidence in the case sub judice, the sheriff's deed is a valid link in plaintiff's chain of title. An ancient document is one which bears a date of thirty years or more before the date it is offered into evidence. Such document requires no further authentication when produced from proper and natural custody free from suspicious circumstances, indicative of fraud or invalidity. Spears v. Randolph, 241 N.C. 659, 86 S.E.2d 263; 2 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence § 196 at 121 (Brandis Rev.1973). In this connection, we note that it is no longer necessary to fortify an ancient document with evidence of possession or occupation in order to successfully offer it as a muniment of title. Nicholson v. Lumber Co., 156 N.C. 59, 72 S.E. 86. In Harding v. Cheek, 48 N.C. 135, the plaintiff relied on a sheriff's deed executed in 1775 which recited the existence of executions upon which the sale was founded. The action was instituted in 1855. Defendant contended that there was no proof of the existence of a judgment or that the sheriff levied upon and sold the land. The Court, without mentioning that the recital was a part of an ancient deed, held that the recitals in the deed were prima facie evidence of the facts set forth. However, this Court, in the case of Rollins v. Henry, 78 N.C. 342, interestingly enough, in an opinion by Justice Rodman, clarified the holding in Harding v. Cheek, with this language: In Sledge v. Elliott, 116 N.C. 712, 21 S.E. 797, administrators were licensed to sell certain lands in the year 1865. Plaintiff, seeking a recovery of a portion of these lands, relied on a deed authorized by this court order. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff and, inter alia, stated: For other cases recognizing the efficacy of recitals in ancient documents to prove muniment of title see Skipper v. Yow, supra; Sears v. Braswell, 197 N.C. 515, 149 S.E. 846, and Thompson v. Buchanan, 195 N.C. 155, 141 S.E. 580. At the time of the institution of this action, the document or public record was 121 years old and was produced from proper custody without any intimation of fraud or invalidity. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the general rule requiring proof of underlying documents must yield to the ancient document rule. We hold that the recitals in the sheriff's deed were prima facie evidence that the *578 sale was made pursuant to a live execution in the sheriff's hands. We are cognizant of the trial judge's finding that petitioner's evidence failed to establish whether William B. Rodman died testate or intestate. This finding does not comport with the well-established rule in this jurisdiction that there is a presumption that a decedent dies intestate. Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374, 121 S.E.2d 726; see 2 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence § 250 (Brandis Rev.1973). Here respondent offered no evidence to rebut this presumption. Neither is the finding that petitioner failed to show that William B. Rodman was seized of the lands at his death compatible with our rule that when a party proves a chain of title from the State into himself by mesne conveyances, he has made out a prima facie title to the interest proven in the lands described in the petition. Paper Co. v. Taylor, 196 N.C. 55, 144 S.E. 523; Paper Co. v. Cedar Works, supra; Skipper v. Yow, supra. We now consider respondent's contention that the land in controversy vested in it by virtue of seven years adverse possession under color of title. Assuming, arguendo, that the Commission has proved color of title it is, nevertheless, our opinion that the respondent has failed to show adverse possession for seven years. In Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 74 S.E. 347, Justice Walker succinctly defined adverse possession as follows: The only evidence of adverse possession offered by respondent prior to the year 1963 consisted of signs placed on the property beginning about the year 1956 which read: "Wildlife Game Management Area." During a subsequent period there were signs which read: "North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission Wildlife Management Area Boundary." The case of Berry v. Cedar Works, 184 N.C. 187, 113 S.E. 772, is very persuasive authority in support of petitioner's contention that the posting of signs indicating the area to be a wildlife management area was not sufficient to constitute adverse possession. In that case this Court, in an opinion by Justice Adams, stated: Here there was nothing on the signs posted which indicated a claim of ownership by respondent. One who observed the signs placed on the contested area could well assume that the Wildlife Commission was conducting studies or experiments thereon, or that it was leasing the property, or as the respondent admits, that the area was not posted but was for public use. The signs, unlike those in Berry v. Cedar Works, supra, did not suggest that one who came upon the property was a trespasser. We, therefore, hold that the posting of the signs by respondent for the required period of time is not such possession as would mature title in it. This proceeding was instituted on 15 July 1969, thus whether the improvements by the respondent consisting of dikes, impoundments, pumping stations, sheds and other structures were of such adverse nature as would mature title in respondent is not relevant to this contention since the improvements were not commenced seven years before action was instituted by petitioner. Petitioner argues that the Real Property Marketable Title Act cures any technical defects in his record of title so as to vest a fee simple title in him as sole owner of the lands in controversy. We do not agree. G.S. 47B-1, in part, provides: G.S. 47B-3 provides that such marketable record did not affect or extinguish the following rights: In June 1963, the Commission began construction of impoundments on the land sub judice. Twelve miles of dikes were constructed which created four water-control impoundments and the Commission also erected pumping stations, equipment sheds and other structures on the land. Respondent had employees who regularly maintained the improvements. In our opinion, this record discloses that the Commission was in actual and open *580 possession of the lands in controversy prior to the time that this action was instituted and that said respondent still retains such possession. Under these circumstances, the Marketable Title Act does not extinguish respondent's rights in the land in controversy. Neither does the act affect the provisions of G.S. 146-79 which, in part, provides: In State v. Brooks, 279 N.C. 45, 181 S.E.2d 553, this Court considered the effect of G.S. 146-79. In an opinion by Chief Justice Bobbitt, this Court declared that the presumption vested title in the State and noted: "If G.S. 146-79 were interpreted otherwise, title to the subject land would be in limbo. Presumably this statutory provision was enacted to avoid such an undesirable and chaotic result." We hold that: (1) the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission is the owner in fee simple of a four-fifths undivided interest in that portion of Grant No. 602 described in the petition which lies north of Mouse Harbor Canal; (2) subject to record stipulations and conveyances heretofore made by him, the petitioner, J. T. Taylor, Jr., is the owner of a one-fifth undivided interest in that portion of Grant No. 602 described in the petition which lies north of Mouse Harbor Canal. This cause is remanded to the North Carolina Court of Appeals with direction that it remand the cause to the Superior Court of Pamlico County with order that judgment be entered in accord with this opinion. Reversed in part and remanded.