Title: The Florida Bar v. Harold Silver

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-689
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR
Complainant,
vs.
HAROLD SILVER,
Respondent.
[June 21, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
The respondent, Harold Silver, has petitioned for review of the referee's
report regarding alleged ethical breaches and recommending a public reprimand. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
The Bar filed a complaint against Silver alleging that, in the handling and
disbursement of certain settlement proceeds, he violated Rules of Professional
Conduct 4-1.15 (safekeeping property) and 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty,
1.  Ramadan Hand Institute is a fictitious name of Medlink Management
Services, Inc.  
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fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  After a
hearing, the referee found as follows.
FACTS
Silver was retained on a contingency basis by Willie Pogue (Pogue)
concerning an injury Pogue received in a laundromat, Wash King.  Silver was also
retained by Pogue on other cases, including two family law matters that were
unrelated to the Wash King case.  Silver secured a lien against the proceeds from
the Wash King case for the hourly fees on the two family law cases.
Pogue received medical treatment from various medical providers for the
injuries he sustained at Wash King.  Silver sent several letters to one of these
medical providers, Ramadan Hand Institute (Ramadan),1 which stated that he
would protect the doctors' bills after attorney's fees and costs were paid.  In
several of these letters, Silver attached a medical assignment signed by Pogue that
authorized Silver to pay the medical facilities and doctors after payment of
attorney’s fees and costs.  One of the letters of protection to Ramadan from Silver
indicated that the hospital and doctor would be protected "so far as the money will
go, after attorney fees and costs are paid."
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On April 29, 1997, Silver received a check from Nationwide Insurance
Company for general liability coverage ("medpay") made payable to Pogue in the
amount of $3,937.58.  With Pogue's approval and consent, Silver took $1,312.53
as a contingent fee and $1,027.28 for costs in the Wash King case, and applied the
balance to attorney’s fees in one of the family law cases.  Silver did not notify any
of the medical providers upon receipt of the medpay funds, did not deliver any of
the medpay funds to the medical service providers, or otherwise protect the funds.
On September 10, 1998, Silver and Pogue signed a letter of protection
entitled "Letter of Protection/Lien for Medical Services" prepared by Ramadan. 
Before returning the document, Silver added some language to the document by
handwriting the words "and costs" after the words "attorney's fees" and typing an
additional condition to the end of the paragraph.
On May 11, 1999, Pogue settled his Wash King personal injury case for
$22,500.  In order to accept the settlement, Pogue indicated to Silver that he needed
to receive at least $6000 from the settlement.  Silver told Pogue that he would
reduce his legal fees and attempt to negotiate with the medical providers for a
reduction in their bills.
Due to the small settlement amount, Silver's office sent letters to most of 
Pogue's medical providers asking them to accept thirty cents per dollar in settlement
2.  The referee found that the Bar "failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [Silver] engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 4-8.4," and recommended that Silver be
found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4.  The Bar does not contest this finding.
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of outstanding medical debts.  One of these letters was sent to Dr. Osbourne "c/o
Ramadan."  Through Silver's inadvertence, a separate letter was not sent to
Ramadan.  Neither Dr. Osbourne nor Ramadan responded to the letter.  Silver
telephoned most of the medical providers that did not respond to his letter and was
able to negotiate the amount of those medical bills.  Silver, however, did not attempt
to contact or negotiate with Ramadan or Dr. Osbourne by telephone.
According to Silver's accounting of the settlement funds, Silver reduced his
fee to $6000, took $2,309.11 as costs, distributed $5,659.69 to medical providers,
distributed $2000 to Mrs. Pogue for all claims concerning her divorce from Pogue,
and distributed the balance, $6,331.20, to Pogue.  Silver sent two checks for $1500
each to Ramadan and Dr. Osbourne.  Ms. Emerson-Webb, chief financial officer
for Ramadan, initially refused the checks and demanded payment in full or an
accounting. 
Based on the above, the referee recommended that Silver be found guilty of
violating rule 4-1.15.2  In pertinent part, the referee elsewhere in the report makes
factual findings relevant to a violation of this provision:
3.  The referee stated that  "Silver does not acknowledge wrongful conduct
in this case, however, I do not place great weight on this factor as I believe Silver
thought he was behaving in the interest of his client."
4.  Rule 4-1.15(b) provides in full:
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Silver certainly did not notify Ramadan of the existence of the medpay
funds.  Neither did Ramadan receive notice of the settlement until the
funds were already distributed.  The failure to send Ramadan a letter
requesting a reduction in their bill may have been an office oversight,
but it is one for which Silver is ultimately responsible.  The evidence is
also clear that Silver did not negotiate with Ramadan and Dr. Osbourne
for an agreed reduction in their fees as he did with the other medical
providers, and the funds were distributed by Silver, with his client’s
acquiescence, without taking the matter to an independent third party
for review.   Silver argued that his contract with Pogue gave him a
superior lien to the funds.  While this may or may not be the case, it
was not for Silver to unilaterally make such a decision.  The matter
should have been placed before a court of competent jurisdiction for a
decision as to how the funds should be appropriately distributed.
As to discipline, the referee recommended that Silver be publicly
reprimanded.  In mitigation, the referee found: lack of a disciplinary record,  absence
of a dishonest or selfish motive, absence of fraud or intent to deceive, and  Silver's
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  In aggravation, the referee found: 
Silver's refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct3 and  Silver's
substantial experience in the practice of law (almost 28 years).
ANALYSIS
Under subdivision (b) of rule 4-1.15,4 Silver had a duty, upon receiving funds
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or
by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the
client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.
5.  Silver testified that he received the medpay check at his office and,
because it was made payable only to Pogue, he deposited it into his office account
rather than a trust account.  Although this appears to be a rule 4-1.15(a) violation
for commingling client funds, the Bar did not allege such a violation.  Also, the Bar
did not charge a violation in connection with Silver's taking a full contingency fee
on the medpay benefits.
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in Pogue's personal injury case, to promptly notify persons with an interest in such
funds.  Ramadan and Dr. Osbourne had an interest in the personal injury funds
based on the letters of protection.  Thus, whether Silver is guilty of violating rule 4-
1.15(b) depends on whether there is competent substantial evidence supporting the
referee's findings that Silver failed to notify Ramadan and Dr. Osbourne of the
medpay funds or that Silver failed to notify Ramadan of the settlement funds.  See
Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1988) (stating that where such
findings are adequately supported, "this Court is precluded from reweighing the
evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee").
At the hearing, Silver testified that he did not notify Ramadan or any other
health care provider that the medpay funds had been received.5  Thus, there is
6.  Silver admits this fact again in his review brief.  See Initial Brief of
Respondent at 3-4.  
7.  Silver admits this fact again in his review brief.  See Initial Brief of
Respondent at 6.  
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competent substantial evidence supporting the referee's finding that Silver did not
notify Ramadan or Dr. Osbourne of the medpay funds.6  Therefore, Silver is guilty
of violating rule 4-1.15(b) for failing to notify the medical providers of the medpay
funds. 
Although Silver argued at the hearing that the medpay funds were not his
because the check was made payable only to Pogue, Silver had letters of protection
and Pogue's medical assignment authorizing Silver to pay the medical providers after
payment of attorney's fees and costs.  Indeed, the very nature of medpay benefits is
to provide for payment of medical bills.  
Further, as to the settlement funds, Silver testified that his office sent a letter
to all the medical providers except Ramadan.7  Although Silver may not have
intentionally failed to notify Ramadan of the settlement funds, intent is not a
requirement under rule 4-1.15(b).  In addition, Silver made follow-up calls to all the
medical providers that did not respond to his letter except Ramadan and Dr.
Osbourne.   As such, Ramadan was not telephonically contacted to negotiate a
reduction in its bill.  Thus, there is competent substantial evidence supporting the
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referee's finding that Ramadan was never notified of the settlement funds until after
the funds had been distributed.  Therefore, this failure also constitutes a violation of
rule 4-1.15(b). 
As to discipline, generally speaking this Court "will not second-guess a
referee's recommended discipline as long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in
existing caselaw."  Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  In this
case, the referee recommended a public reprimand.  The Florida Standards For 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provides in Standard 7.3 that a ''Public Reprimand is
appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty
owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or
the legal system."  In light of the violation found, there is no basis for imposing a
lesser sanction.
What this Court stated in Florida Bar v. Wagner, 212 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla.
1968), over thirty years ago rings true today:
A lawyer who undertakes to assert and collect a personal injury claim
for a client ordinarily and necessarily deals with a number of persons
and agencies other than his client and the adverse party.  The attorney
does not prosecute his client's claim in a vacuum.  During the course of
investigating and preparing his client's case, the attorney must
necessarily seek out witnesses of various kinds.  In particular, his quest
for evidence ordinarily leads him to treating physicians, hospitals, drug
stores, and other persons and agencies who have rendered medical
services to his client.  He must necessarily confer with such parties and
8.  We do not find merit in any of the points raised by respondent attacking
the award of costs.  However, we note that although the referee awarded $4,053.06
in costs, this award included $210 in court clerk travel and expenses.  There is no
provision under rule 3-7.6(o)(1) for allowing for the court clerk's travel and
expenses as taxable costs.  Taxable costs are limited to those specified under the
rule.  See generally Florida Bar v. Chilton, 616 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 1993).
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in many cases he must call upon them for testimony or other evidence. 
In addition, the attorney is often required to enlist the aid of experts and
other witnesses who have not rendered such services to the client.  
The responsibilities of the attorney which arise as such
relationships are established, and which come into focus upon the
attorney's receipt of funds in settlement or payment of his client's
claim, are not entirely defined and limited by the law of contracts. 
Quite apart from any legal duty on his part, the attorney has a
professional duty to accomplish the disbursement of such funds in a
matter which accords a proper regard and respect for the rights and
legitimate expectations of his own creditors, as well as those of his
client.   
Wagner, 212 So. 2d at 773.
Accordingly, Harold Silver is hereby publicly reprimanded by publication of
this opinion. Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Harold Silver in the amount
of $3,843.06, for which sum let execution issue.8
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
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Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Division Director,
and Edward Iturralde, Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Complainant
Douglas W. Abruzzo, Gainesville, Florida,
for Respondent