Title: Cardilli v. State

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 25 
Docket: 
Cum-23-329 
Argued: 
 March 5, 2024 
Decided: 
 April 11, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
MARK CARDILLI JR. 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
 
[¶1]  The State of Maine appeals from a judgment of the post-conviction 
court (Cumberland County, O’Neil, J.) granting Mark Cardilli Jr.’s petition for 
post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel; vacating his 
conviction for manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2023); and 
ordering a new trial.  The post-conviction court decided that Cardilli’s two trial 
attorneys failed to present an adequate argument that Cardilli acted in 
self-defense as provided in 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)(1) (2023): “A person is 
justified in using deadly force upon another person: When the person 
reasonably believes it necessary and reasonably believes such other person is: 
About to use unlawful, deadly force against the person or a 3rd person.”  
However, the trial court (Mills, J.), in acquitting Cardilli of intentional or 
 
2 
knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2023), and finding him guilty of 
manslaughter after a bench trial, expressly found that the State had proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that, if Cardilli actually believed that his use of 
deadly force was necessary under the circumstances, his belief was objectively 
unreasonable.  As a matter of law, that finding would have negated a 
self-defense argument under section 108(2)(A)(1).  Any inadequate advocacy 
by Cardilli’s trial counsel could not have had an adverse effect on his defense 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  We therefore 
vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for entry of a 
judgment denying Cardilli’s petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  We begin by summarizing (A) the historical facts found by the trial 
court in Cardilli’s criminal trial, (B) the proceedings on the murder charge in 
the trial court, (C) our appellate review of the judgment of conviction of 
manslaughter, and (D) the post-conviction proceedings now on appeal. 
A. 
Findings of the Trial Court in the Criminal Case 
 
[¶3]  Pertinent here, the trial court (Mills, J.) found the following facts, 
based largely on Cardilli’s testimony, which the court found mostly credible.  
See State v. Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, ¶¶ 2-9, 254 A.3d 415 (providing a detailed 
 
3 
summary of the facts).  On the night of March 15, 2019, Cardilli was called 
downstairs in the home where he lived with his parents and younger sister to 
discuss the presence of Isahak Muse—the twenty-two-year-old boyfriend of 
Cardilli’s seventeen-year-old sister.  Muse, who had been drinking throughout 
the day, was not supposed to be in the home due to bail conditions imposed on 
Cardilli’s sister.  After some discussion, Cardilli’s father agreed to let Muse stay 
until 1:00 a.m.  Muse did not leave at that time.  He pleaded to stay, but Cardilli’s 
parents insisted that he had to leave. 
 
[¶4]  Cardilli and his father escorted Muse to the kitchen door, which 
exited to a breezeway.  When Cardilli’s mother yelled that Cardilli’s sister had 
struck her, Muse pushed his way back into the house through Cardilli and his 
father, who were thrown back against the refrigerator and the kitchen table. 
 
[¶5]  Cardilli went to his apartment above the home’s garage to get his 
gun but then decided against getting the gun.  He returned and got Muse away 
from his father.  Cardilli’s sister began hitting Cardilli and his father.  Muse 
punched at Cardilli but missed.  Cardilli returned to his apartment, got his gun, 
and put it in his pocket.  When Cardilli returned, he told his father to get behind 
him. 
 
4 
 
[¶6]  Cardilli pulled out the gun and aimed it at Muse.  Cardilli did not call 
9-1-1 because he thought Muse would leave once he saw the gun.  Cardilli told 
Muse to leave.  Muse yelled for his phone to call for a ride.  Muse then moved 
toward Cardilli, punching Cardilli as Cardilli backed away into his sister’s room, 
where Cardilli’s father pushed Muse onto the sister’s bed.  Cardilli and Muse 
moved to the hall.  Muse punched Cardilli in the face four or five times. 
 
[¶7]  Cardilli knew that Muse had no gun.  He did not see Muse with a 
knife.  Muse did not try to grab Cardilli’s gun.  Regardless, Cardilli was 
concerned that if he dropped the gun, Muse would use it against Cardilli and his 
family.  Cardilli fired three shots when Muse was punching at him, and Muse 
died of internal and external bleeding after two bullets entered the back of his 
torso after he twisted away following the first shot. 
B. 
Original Trial Court Proceedings 
 
[¶8]  On April 5, 2019, the grand jury issued an indictment charging 
Cardilli with intentional or knowing murder.  The court held a jury-waived trial 
in December 2019.  At that trial, many witnesses testified, including Cardilli 
himself.  Cardilli testified that he knew Muse did not have a gun or knife but that 
he did believe Muse was about to use deadly force.  He testified, “The reason 
why I shot was I feared, not knowing how many more punches I could take, and 
 
5 
if I dropped the gun, lost the gun, Mr. Muse would take it and turn it on me and 
my family.” 
 
[¶9]  Cardilli, through his attorneys, raised self-defense as an issue both 
in his oral closing argument at the end of the trial and in his post-trial 
memorandum, filed in court on the day of the closing arguments. 
 
[¶10]  Orally, Cardilli’s lead attorney argued that Cardilli reasonably 
believed that his use of deadly force was necessary because “he didn’t know 
how many more punches he could take and that Mr. Muse may get that gun.”  
He argued that “it wasn’t just reasonable, again it was wise for Marky Cardilli 
to believe that his life was in danger because that guy wasn’t stopping for 
nothing.  He wasn’t listening to anything.  He wasn’t stopping for anything.  He 
was going to do whatever he wanted.  And Mark Cardilli’s belief, when he was 
in that corner, was more than reasonable.” 
[¶11]  Cardilli’s memorandum focused on the justification of self-defense 
under 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(B), which addresses defense against an intruder 
and provides, 
A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person: 
 
. . . . 
 
B. When the person reasonably believes: 
 
 
6 
(1) That such other person has entered or is 
attempting to enter a dwelling place or has 
surreptitiously remained within a dwelling place 
without a license or privilege to do so; and 
 
(2) That deadly force is necessary to prevent the 
infliction of bodily injury by such other person upon the 
person or a 3rd person present in the dwelling place. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Because this justification permits the use of deadly force if 
reasonably necessary “to prevent the infliction of bodily injury,” 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 108(2)(B)(2), Cardilli’s memorandum disclaimed reliance on the much more 
limited justification in section 108(2)(A)(1), which permits the use of deadly 
force only if it is reasonably necessary to prevent another person’s imminent 
use of deadly force.  See 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)(1) (“A person is justified in 
using deadly force upon another person: When the person reasonably believes 
it necessary and reasonably believes such other person is: About to use 
unlawful, deadly force against the person or a 3rd person.”).  Focusing on the 
evidence that Muse was punching Cardilli when Cardilli fired his gun, the 
memorandum argued that Cardilli did not “need to show that Mr. Muse was 
imminently going to use deadly force on [Cardilli].  This is not a self-defense 
case under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 108(2)(A) where the Court needs to determine 
whether Mr. Muse was going to inflict deadly force on any of the inhabitants of 
[the residence].”  Cardilli’s memorandum also raised a defense-of-premises 
 
7 
justification, see 17-A M.R.S. § 104 (2023), and argued that only if the court 
found unreasonable his belief that deadly force was necessary could it find him 
guilty of a lesser included offense based on “imperfect self-defense,” State v. 
Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 13 n.4, 38 A.3d 1278. 
 
[¶12]  The court entered a judgment on December 27, 2019.  The court 
found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardilli 
voluntarily aimed the gun at Muse’s chest and fired three times, knowing that 
it was practically certain that the conduct would cause Muse’s death.  See 
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A); 17-A M.R.S. § 35(2)(A) (2023).  Having determined 
that the State had proved the elements of murder, the court turned to Cardilli’s 
asserted justifications. 
 
[¶13]  Applying the law of self-defense that Cardilli’s memorandum had 
advanced, 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(B), the court found that the State had not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardilli “did not actually believe that 
his use of deadly force was necessary to prevent Isahak Muse from inflicting 
bodily injury upon defendant or a third person present in the dwelling.”  The 
court further found, however, that the State had proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that “if [Cardilli] did actually believe that his use of deadly force was 
necessary to prevent Isahak Muse from inflicting bodily injury upon [Cardilli] 
 
8 
or a third person present in the dwelling, his belief to that effect was objectively 
unreasonable.”  (Emphasis added.)  The court therefore found that Cardilli 
“[r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, cause[d] the death of another human 
being,” and was guilty of manslaughter.  17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A); see 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 35(3)(A), (4)(A); see also Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 13 n.4, 38 A.3d 1278. 
 
[¶14]  Before sentencing, Cardilli moved for the court to reconsider the 
verdict and for additional findings of fact.  See M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(c).  The court 
granted the motion for findings and incorporated additional findings into the 
judgment, but it denied the motion to reconsider the verdict.  Among the 
additional findings, the court found as follows: 
 
With regard to the need for deadly force, the court finds the 
video of Mark Cardilli, Sr. and defendant, recorded shortly after the 
shooting, shows both men in good condition.  Their injuries were 
minimal.  Some of their injuries were inflicted by [Cardilli’s sister].  
Mr. Muse had been drinking all day on March 15, 2019 and was 
impaired.  Deadly force was not required to prevent minimal bodily 
injury or to remove Mr. Muse from the house. 
 
 
Mark Cardilli, Sr. stated during the video that he thought 
defendant had an air soft gun, he did not think the gun was real, 
that was why he did not say anything, and he thought defendant 
was trying to scare Mr. Muse.  The court reasonably infers from 
Mark Cardilli, Sr.’s statements that if he had known the gun was 
real, he would have said something because such force was 
unnecessary. 
 
 
Further, defendant decided not to retrieve his gun during his 
first trip to his apartment during the interaction among Mr. Muse, 
 
9 
Mark Cardilli, Sr., and defendant.  Defendant returned from his 
apartment and after an additional punch, defendant returned to his 
room and got the gun.  Mr. Muse had no gun or knife and did not try 
to grab defendant’s gun.  Mr. Muse’s response to seeing the gun was 
to yell for his phone because, the court reasonably infers, he needed 
the phone to call for a ride.  Defendant introduced the only deadly 
force to the situation. 
 
(Emphasis added and citations omitted.) 
 
[¶15]  After holding a sentencing hearing, the court entered a judgment 
on August 31, 2020, sentencing Cardilli to eleven years in prison, with all but 
seven years and six months suspended and four years of probation. 
C. 
Appeal 
 
[¶16]  Cardilli appealed from the judgment of conviction of manslaughter, 
and we issued an opinion in June 2021.  See Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, 254 A.3d 415.  
Cardilli raised the issue of self-defense under section 108(2)(A)(1), Cardilli, 
2021 ME 31, ¶ 32, 254 A.3d 415, and we concluded that Cardilli had waived the 
issue in his written memorandum submitted in closing but went further to state 
as follows: 
 
Even if we were to assume that Cardilli’s section 108(2)(A) 
argument was not expressly waived, we find it unpersuasive.  The 
court’s findings regarding the level of “threat” posed by Muse 
preclude a finding that Cardilli held an objectively reasonable belief 
that Muse was about to use unlawful, deadly force against anyone 
in the household.  As mentioned above, the court explicitly found 
that Muse was not armed and that he did not at any time try to grab 
Cardilli’s gun.  The court specifically found that Muse’s response to 
 
10 
seeing the gun was to ask for his phone so he could call for a ride 
home.  Even if Cardilli had an actual belief that Muse was about to 
use deadly force by taking control of the gun that Cardilli brought 
into the chaos—a belief not asserted by Cardilli at trial—the court 
found that any such belief was objectively unreasonable.  The court 
aptly noted that “Muse had been drinking all day on March 15, 2019 
and was impaired.  Deadly force was not required to prevent 
minimal bodily injury or to remove . . . Muse from the house.” 
 
Id. ¶ 35.  We affirmed the judgment.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 35. 
D. 
Post-Conviction Review 
 
[¶17]  On April 1, 2022, Cardilli filed a petition for post-conviction review 
contending, among other things, that counsel had rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to argue consistently that Cardilli had acted in self-defense 
as the justification is defined in section 108(2)(A)(1).  See 15 M.R.S. § 2129 
(2023).  He asked “that the sentence be vacated, and a new trial be ordered.” 
 
[¶18]  The post-conviction court (O’Neil, J.) held an evidentiary hearing 
on April 13 and 14, 2023.  The court took judicial notice of the entire trial court 
record.  The court then heard testimony from Cardilli’s lead trial counsel, who 
thought that the justification of self-defense as provided by section 
108(2)(A)(1) was generated and disagreed with the trial judge’s findings and 
analysis as to the level of threat that the victim posed.  He admitted that his 
co-counsel had drafted the closing memorandum and that he had not reviewed 
it before closing arguments.  He testified that he did not realize until receiving 
 
11 
the Law Court’s opinion that the memorandum submitted by co-counsel had 
said that the case was not about section 108(2)(A). 
 
[¶19]  When asked if he had inquired of Cardilli during trial “whether he 
feared he would be killed by a punch,” counsel replied, “No.  I did—in his trial 
prep, I did repeatedly, and that’s why I didn’t ask him the question because of 
the answer I repeatedly got.”  Counsel testified, “[B]eing killed by a punch, the 
answer to that was repeatedly negative.”  He testified that Cardilli indicated that 
he feared being killed only if the victim took his gun. 
 
[¶20]  Cardilli’s co-counsel testified that she did not believe that a 
self-defense justification under section 108(2)(A)(1) was generated by the 
evidence because there was no evidence of the imminent use of deadly force by 
the victim.  Without evidence that the victim had special training in fighting, she 
could not see how Cardilli could prove that he had an objectively reasonable 
belief that deadly force was necessary and that the victim was about to use 
unlawful deadly force against him or someone else. 
 
[¶21]  The court also heard testimony from Cardilli’s mother regarding 
other grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel not at issue here, from Cardilli 
regarding his interactions with counsel, and from a law professor who opined 
that it was below the standard of an ordinary fallible attorney for lead counsel 
 
12 
not to have read the written arguments he was submitting to the court and for 
co-counsel to lack a shared, cohesive trial strategy.  Finally, Cardilli offered 
testimony from a former police officer and forensic behaviorist, Thomas Aveni, 
presented as an expert on the use of force.  The State, which had already moved 
to exclude Aveni as an expert, objected to his testimony at trial.  Instead of 
taking voir dire testimony, the court allowed Aveni to testify as an offer of proof, 
with the court ruling after the attorneys’ examination of Aveni on whether any 
of Aveni’s testimony would be admitted. 
 
[¶22]  Aveni testified that in his opinion Cardilli had made a rational 
decision when presented with an intoxicated, fearless man who was hitting him 
in the head, which can cause serious injury or death.  The court excluded the 
testimony as to the effect of blood-alcohol content on the victim, Cardilli’s state 
of mind, and any other evidence introducing facts that were not presented at 
the criminal trial.  The court admitted only testimony drawing the court’s 
attention to evidence in the trial record that could demonstrate that it was 
objectively reasonable for Cardilli to believe that the victim was about to use 
unlawful deadly force.1  After additional testimony from Cardilli’s lead trial 
counsel, the hearing ended. 
 
1  The State argues that the court erred in admitting any expert testimony from Aveni at the 
post-conviction hearing.  If the court had admitted the portion of Aveni’s testimony that contradicted 
 
13 
 
[¶23]  The post-conviction court entered a judgment on August 22, 2023, 
granting Cardilli’s petition for post-conviction relief, vacating the judgment of 
conviction, and remanding the matter for a new trial.  The court found that 
Cardilli’s two attorneys “did not have a cohesive trial strategy,” had opposing 
views about whether the self-defense justification set forth in section 
108(2)(A)(1) was generated, and did not communicate effectively. 
 
[¶24]  The court concluded that performance by counsel fell below the 
objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s failures “call into 
question the fairness and integrity of the trial court proceedings.”  The court 
reasoned that oral and written arguments can be influential and that, although 
the trial court made extensive findings, it did not address or analyze section 
108(2)(A)(1), which the post-conviction court determined was applicable due 
to Cardilli’s testimony that he did not know how many more punches he could 
take and that he was worried that if he dropped the gun, the victim would turn 
 
the trial court’s factual findings, we would agree, because that testimony would not be pertinent in 
determining whether the varied arguments of Cardilli’s co-counsel would have changed the outcome 
of the trial.  See M.R. Evid. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if such testimony 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” (emphasis 
added)); State v. Burbank, 2019 ME 37, ¶¶ 7-8, 204 A.3d 851.  The court did not abuse its discretion 
here, however, because the court admitted Aveni’s testimony only to the extent that it was pertinent 
to a fact in issue.  Specifically, the court admitted Aveni’s testimony identifying the portions of the 
trial record that could show that the inconsistent arguments of counsel may have affected the trial 
court’s finding that it was unreasonable for Cardilli to believe that his use of deadly force was 
necessary. 
 
14 
it on Cardilli or his family.  The court was concerned that the written argument 
of Cardilli’s trial counsel undermined Cardilli’s credibility by stating that 
section 108(2)(A) was not at issue, and it determined that this could have 
affected the trial court’s fact-finding. 
 
[¶25]  The post-conviction court concluded that our opinion that Cardilli 
could not prevail under section 108(2)(A) did not preclude a finding of 
ineffective assistance because “the issue is not whether the outcome of the case 
would have been different if trial counsel had argued 108(2)(A), but rather, 
whether the integrity of the proceedings, including the factfinding process, 
were affected by their failure to do so.” 
 
[¶26]  The State timely appealed from the post-conviction court’s 
judgment.  15 M.R.S. § 2131(2) (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 19(b). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶27]  The State argues that the court erred in finding and concluding that 
the ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in prejudice to Cardilli.  “The 
United States and Maine Constitutions guarantee that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to receive the effective assistance of an attorney.”  Gordon v. State, 2024 
ME 7, ¶ 11, 308 A.3d 228 (quotation marks omitted).  “To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that 
 
15 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and (2) that the errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶28]  The State does not challenge the finding, as to the first prong, that 
Cardilli’s attorneys’ inconsistency in raising section 108(2)(A)(1) as a 
justification amounted to performance below the standard of an ordinary 
fallible attorney.  See Gordon, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 12, 308 A.3d 228.  It challenges only 
the post-conviction court’s determination that the second prong of the test was 
met, arguing that Cardilli did not show prejudice resulting from the ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See id. ¶ 13.  According to the State, the post-conviction 
court improperly speculated about the effect of counsel’s performance on the 
trial court’s finding that Cardilli lacked an objectively reasonable belief that 
deadly force was necessary under the circumstances. 
 
[¶29]  In reviewing a post-conviction court’s decision on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we “review a post-conviction court’s legal conclusions 
de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”  Id. ¶ 14 (quotation marks 
omitted); see Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 12, 158 A.3d 512.  Because the 
analysis presents mixed questions of law and fact, we “apply the most 
appropriate standard of review for the issue raised depending on the extent to 
 
16 
which that issue is dominated by fact or by law.”  Gordon, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 14, 308 
A.3d 228 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶30]  “We apply a deferential standard of review to the findings of a 
post-conviction court, and we will not overturn a post-conviction court’s 
determination as to the effectiveness of trial counsel unless it is clearly 
erroneous and there is no competent evidence in the record to support it.”  
Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92, ¶ 16, 188 A.3d 871 (quotation marks omitted).  
“[T]he facts found regarding both the underlying trial and the post-conviction 
hearing are viewed in the light most favorable to the post-conviction court’s 
judgment.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶31]  In determining whether counsel’s error had an adverse effect, a 
court considers whether there was a “reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 19, 125 A.3d 
1163 (quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he proper test of a reasonable probability 
is different from an outcome-determinative standard, which is the quantitative 
inquiry that would require proof that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely 
than not altered the outcome in the case.”  Id. ¶ 20 (quotation marks omitted).  
 
17 
If the proceeding was unreliable and unfair, a court may grant post-conviction 
relief “even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence to have determined the outcome.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  In 
other words, “[a] conviction may be unreliable and not worthy of confidence 
. . . even without proof that a different outcome was more likely than not.”  Pratt 
v. State, 2023 ME 66, ¶ 29, 303 A.3d 661 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
question is whether “trial counsel’s performance undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the case and renders that outcome unreliable.”  Theriault, 2015 ME 
137, ¶ 19, 125 A.3d 1163. 
 
[¶32]  Here, the post-conviction court reasoned that the failure by 
counsel to argue self-defense under section 108(2)(A)(1) compromised the 
reliability of the conviction and undermined confidence in the judgment 
because the written argument disclaiming reliance on section 108(2)(A) might 
have affected the court’s findings about whether Cardilli held an objectively 
reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary.  See 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 108(2)(A)(1) (“A person is justified in using deadly force upon another 
person: When the person reasonably believes it necessary and reasonably 
believes such other person is: About to use unlawful, deadly force against the 
person or a 3rd person.”). 
 
18 
 
[¶33]  We must decide whether, given the findings of the trial court as to 
the level of threat that Muse posed and the findings of the post-conviction court 
as to the ineffective performance of counsel, the outcome is unreliable because 
there is a probability—sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—
that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  Theriault, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 19, 125 A.3d 1163 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
[¶34]  Although we do not require proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence that ineffective assistance of counsel more likely than not affected the 
outcome of the case, see Pratt, 2023 ME 66, ¶ 29, 303 A.3d 661; Theriault, 2015 
ME 137, ¶ 20, 125 A.3d 1163, a post-conviction petitioner must prove that the 
ineffectiveness had some adverse effect on the defense that undermines the 
reliability of the outcome, see Theriault, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 19, 125 A.3d 1163.  
Here, Cardilli asserts that the post-conviction court was correct that his 
counsel’s failure to press the section 108(2)(A)(1) justification in the 
memorandum had an adverse effect because the trial court could have 
concluded, if that argument had been pressed, that Cardilli’s actions were 
justified.  The trial court’s factual findings, however, leave no room for any 
argument that his use of deadly force against Muse was justified under either 
 
19 
the section 108(2)(B) justification that Cardilli’s memorandum argued or the 
section 108(2)(A)(1) justification that the post-conviction court determined 
should have been argued in the memorandum. 
[¶35]  To overcome the section 108(2)(B) justification, the State had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardilli’s belief that deadly force was 
necessary to prevent Muse from inflicting bodily injury was unreasonable.  
See Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, ¶¶ 21-23, 254 A.3d 415.  Even though Muse was in fact 
inflicting bodily injury on Cardilli, the trial court found that the State had met 
its burden.  The trial court made findings that Muse was not armed, asked for 
his phone to call for a ride home when he saw Cardilli’s gun, did not at any time 
try to grab the gun, was impaired from drinking all day, and had punched 
Cardilli several times, and that Cardilli was concerned that Muse might take 
control of the gun.  After making these and other findings, the trial court 
evaluated the justification that Cardilli’s memorandum argued, 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 108(2)(B), and concluded that if Cardilli actually believed that deadly force 
was necessary to prevent Muse from inflicting bodily injury on Cardilli or 
someone else, the belief was not objectively reasonable. 
[¶36]  To overcome the section 108(2)(A)(1) justification that the 
post-conviction court found should have been argued in the memorandum, the 
 
20 
State would have had a less burdensome task—to prove that if Cardilli believed 
that deadly force was necessary to prevent Muse from imminently using 
unlawful deadly force, the belief was unreasonable.  See Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, 
¶¶ 21-23, 35, 254 A.3d 415.  The court’s findings—particularly the additional 
finding that Cardilli “introduced the only deadly force to the situation” 
(emphasis added)—eliminate any possibility that a defense based on Cardilli’s 
belief that Muse was about to use deadly force could have succeeded.2 
[¶37]  If the trial court’s findings of fact even arguably left room for the 
legal argument that Cardilli says his counsel should have pursued, the omission 
of the argument in Cardilli’s memorandum might be said to have had an adverse 
effect on his defense.  Here, however, the legal argument is flatly incompatible 
with the court’s findings about what occurred.  The premise that counsel’s 
failure to advance a legal argument might have affected the court’s factual 
findings is itself doubtful.  It is the facts of a case that determine what legal 
arguments can be made; the legal arguments presented do not determine what 
the facts are.  The omission of a legal argument might result in the court not 
 
2  Deadly force is not “present in all fistfights” just “because a punch could cause a variety of serious 
harms.”  State v. Ricky G., 2000 ME 190, ¶ 5, 760 A.2d 1065.  We have rejected the premise that 
“anyone threatened with a punch would be justified in using deadly force to defend himself.”  Id.  
Moreover, when a person introduces a gun into a confrontation with a person who is unarmed, there 
is always a possibility that the other person will try to gain control of the gun.  The mere possibility 
does not support a belief that the other person is “about to use unlawful, deadly force” for purposes 
of section 108(2)(A)(1) and does not justify a shooting. 
 
21 
considering certain facts or reaching findings that would determine the 
applicability of a statutory justification, but that did not happen here.  The trial 
court actually reached the question of whether Muse had used or was about to 
use deadly force during the confrontation and decided that the only deadly 
force involved was Cardilli’s.  As we said in reviewing Cardilli’s direct appeal, 
the explicit findings of the trial court “regarding the level of ‘threat’ posed by 
Muse preclude a finding that Cardilli held an objectively reasonable belief that 
Muse was about to use unlawful, deadly force against anyone in the household.”  
Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, ¶ 35, 254 A.3d 415 (emphasis added). 
[¶38]  We discern no support in the record for a finding that Cardilli’s 
defense was prejudiced by his attorneys’ handling of the self-defense 
justification set forth in section 108(2)(A)(1).  Accordingly, we vacate the 
post-conviction court’s judgment and remand for the entry of a judgment 
denying Cardilli’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for entry of 
judgment 
denying 
the 
petition 
for 
post-conviction relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellant State of Maine 
 
Thomas F. Hallett, Esq. (orally), Hallett Whipple Weyrens, Portland, for appellee 
Mark Cardilli Jr. 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2022-1145 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY