Title: Holland v. Sweeney

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 09/14/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
_________________________
1110035
_________________________
Ex parte Carson Sweeney
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Timmy Joe Holland
v.
Carson Sweeney)
(Geneva Circuit Court, CV-10-104)
PARKER, Justice.
Carson Sweeney petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Geneva Circuit Court to vacate its
1110035
2
order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe
Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by
jury in Holland's trespass action against him.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On November 24, 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that
Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by,
among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other
foliage, 
[and] 
soil"; 
"redirect[ing] water flow"; 
and
"install[ing] drainage apparatuses."  The complaint stated the
following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels,"
negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion.
On January 14, 2011, attorney Lee F. Knowles filed a
notice of appearance on Sweeney's behalf.  On February 21,
2011, Holland's attorney, Jeffrey D. Hatcher, sent a letter to
Knowles, stating, in relevant part, that "it does not appear
that you have filed an Answer in this cause. Please file an
Answer in this matter as soon as possible so that we can
resolve this matter without further delay."  
On March 23, 2011, Holland filed what he styled as a
"motion to set final hearing"; in that motion Holland stated,
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3
among other things, that "an answer to the Complaint has not
yet been filed."  The circuit court set the matter for a
nonjury trial on May 26, 2011. 
On April 26, 2011, Sweeney filed an answer and a counter-
complaint and asserted two claims -- breach of contract and
violation of the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, Ala.
Code 1975, § 12-19-270 et seq., for filing an action "without
substantial justification" -- and demanded "a trial by struck
jury on all issues."  On May 9, 2011, Holland filed a motion
to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint, including
the demand for a trial by jury, arguing that the answer and
counter-complaint were untimely filed.
On May 26, 2011, the circuit court entered an order that,
among other things, granted in part and denied in part
Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-
complaint.  In its order, the circuit court found that
Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in
a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial"
to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said
failure."  Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's
motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and
1110035
We note that in its order the circuit court cited no
1
authority in support of its disposition of Holland's motion to
strike.
4
counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the
interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the
merits is paramount."  However, the circuit court granted
Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's
demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived
his right to demand a trial by jury."   
1
On 
June 
9, 
2011, 
Sweeney 
filed 
a 
"motion 
for
reconsideration, 
modification, new hearing, or in 
the
alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order
striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court
denied.  Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of
mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order.
II. Standard of Review
"The standard of review applicable to a petition
for a writ of mandamus is well settled:
" ' " M a n d a m u s  
i s  
a n
extraordinary remedy and requires
a showing that there is: '(1) a
clear 
legal 
right 
in 
the
petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the
r e s p o n d e n t  
t o  
p e r f o r m ,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
1110035
5
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court.' Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.
2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989); Ex parte
Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891
(Ala. 1991); Ex parte Johnson,
638 So. 2d 772, 773 (Ala. 1994)."
Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371,
374 (Ala. 1996). See also Ex
parte Waites, 736 So. 2d 550, 553
(Ala. 1999).'
"Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)." 
Ex parte Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 68 So. 3d 782, 788 (Ala.
2011).  We also note that  
"[a] trial court 'should exercise its discretion
liberally in favor of granting a jury trial in the
absence of strong and compelling reasons to the
contrary.' Fuino v. Morrow, 427 So. 2d 710, 712
(Ala. Civ. App. 1983). The standard of review
applicable to a trial court's striking a party's
jury demand is whether the court's action clearly
exceeded the limits of its discretion. See Dorcal,
Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 398 So. 2d 665, 669 (Ala.
1981))."
Smith v. Smith, 6 So. 3d 534, 541 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
III. Discussion
Sweeney argues that, by granting Holland's motion insofar
as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury,
the circuit court "deprived [Sweeney] of one of the most basic
fundamental rights in American Law which should not, is not,
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6
and has never been left to the discretion of the Court."
Specifically, Sweeney argues that the circuit court's ruling
violated his right to a trial by jury as "guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as
by the Constitution of Alabama of 1901."  We agree.
"Alabama Const. 1901, Art. I, § 11, provides:
'[T]he 
right 
of 
trial 
by 
jury 
shall 
remain
inviolate.' See Ex parte Kurtts, 706 So. 2d 1184,
1185 (Ala. 1997) ('Section 11, Ala. Const. 1901,
makes 
trial 
by 
jury 
a 
fundamental 
right.').
Similarly, Rule 38(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
'The right of trial by jury as declared by the
Constitution of Alabama or as given by a statute of
this State shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate.' This right, however, is subject to
waiver. Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1199
(Ala. 1982) ('[N]o constitutional or statutory
provision prohibits a person from waiving his or her
right to trial by jury.')."
Ex parte L&D Transp., 70 So. 3d 322, 324 (Ala. 2011).
Furthermore, 
"this Court's mandate to preserve the right to a
trial by jury is clear when that right was available
at common law, Ex parte Jones, 447 So. 2d 709, 711
(Ala. 1984), if it has not been abridged by Federal
law, see Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 775 So.
2d 149, 150 (Ala. 2000) (stating that arbitration
clauses will be enforced in Alabama to the extent
required by Federal law), and has not been expressly
waived by contract, Gaylord Dep't Stores of Alabama,
Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981)
(adopting decisions from other jurisdictions holding
that the right to a jury trial may be waived by
contract)."
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7
Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 775 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis
added).
In this case, Sweeney demanded a trial by jury in his
consolidated answer and counter-complaint, which the circuit
court allowed despite finding that it was untimely filed.  It
is well settled that the circuit court is vested with broad
discretion in determining whether to allow an untimely filed
answer.  See Hair v. Moody, 9 Ala. 399, 400 (1846) ("[I]t is
the settled practice in this court, that the allowance of
pleadings out of time, is a matter of discretion with the
court, the exercise of which is not a subject of revision."
(quoted with approval in Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co. v.
City of Bessemer, 69 So. 3d 182, 187 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010))).
In this case, the circuit court's determination that Sweeney's
consolidated answer and counter-complaint would be allowed
despite the fact that it was untimely conforms to this Court's
"long-established 
and 
compelling 
policy 
objective 
of 
affording
litigants 
a 
trial 
on 
the 
merits 
whenever 
possible."
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585 So. 2d 822, 827
(Ala. 1991) (citing numerous cases).  
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8
However, having allowed Sweeney's consolidated answer and
counter-complaint to proceed for a determination of the case
on the merits, the circuit court had no basis to strike
Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury.  By allowing Sweeney's
consolidated answer and counter-complaint to proceed for a
determination on the merits of the case, the circuit court
effectively treated the answer as timely filed.  See Manatt v.
Union Pacific R.R., 122 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
that "'[b]ecause the district court has the power to allow a
longer time, ... the court, in its discretion, may permit the
filing of an answer that would be otherwise untimely'"
(quoting Gutting v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 710 F.2d 1309,
1312 (8th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added))); see also 8B Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Richard L. Marcus, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2257 (3d ed. 2010) ("[T]he court can,
in its discretion, permit what would otherwise be an untimely
answer." (emphasis added)).  Thus, there is no basis for
concluding, as Holland argues we should do, that Sweeney's
demand for a trial by jury, filed with his answer and counter-
complaint, was untimely.
1110035
According to Sweeney's counter-complaint, the "contract"
2
between the parties was an oral agreement whereby Sweeney
would remove kudzu from Holland's property.  Specifically,
Sweeney asserted in his counter-complaint that he "entered
into an agreement with [Holland] to provide a service,
specifically to clear a kudzu patch for the benefit of both
parties."   
Neither Holland nor Sweeney has alleged an equitable
3
claim in this case; each of the parties' respective claims
seeks only an award of monetary damages.  See City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999)
("'We have recognized the "general rule" that monetary relief
is legal.'" (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television,
9
Furthermore, nothing before us indicates that Sweeney
either waived his right to a trial by jury or that a trial by
jury is unavailable to him for any reason established by prior
precedent.  See Ex parte Cupps, supra (the right to trial by
jury is available to a litigant "when that right was available
at common law"; "if it has not been abridged by Federal law";
and if it "has not been expressly waived by contract");2
Alford v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 170 Ala. 178, 189, 54 So.
213, 216 (1910) ("[The right to trial by jury] has usually
been held not to apply to violations of municipal ordinances,
nor to minor offenses punishable summarily, as contempts, as
to which a jury trial was never known, or as to which, under
former usage, a jury trial was not required; nor as to equity
suits, except in certain specified cases.").3
1110035
Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998), quoting in turn Teamsters v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990))).
10
In sum, there was no basis on which the circuit court
could have properly concluded that Sweeney had waived or was
otherwise not entitled to a jury trial in this case.  Sweeney
has established that he has been deprived of his "fundamental,
constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial by jury," Reserve
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Crowell, 614 So. 2d 1005, 1010 (Ala. 1993)
(citing Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. I, § 11); therefore,
Sweeney's petition is due to be granted.  
IV. Conclusion
Sweeney has demonstrated a clear legal right to the
relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ,
directing the circuit court to vacate that part of its order
of May 26, 2011, granting Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's
demand for a trial by jury and to deny Holland's motion to
strike in its entirety.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs specially. 
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ., concur
in the result.
1110035
11
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I do not read the main opinion's quotation of certain
passages from this Court's opinion in Ex parte Cupps, 782
So. 2d 772 (Ala. 2000), as suggesting that a right to a trial
by jury may be deemed to have been waived only in the two
circumstances noted in the quoted passages of that opinion,
i.e., where federal law imposes the waiver or there is a
prelitigation contractual waiver.  In this regard, I note that
an in judicio waiver may occur expressly or as a result of a
failure of a party to make "a demand therefor in writing ...
not later than thirty (30) days after the service of the last
pleading directed to such issue."  Rule 38(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P.; see also Rule 38(d).  The answer the trial court allowed
to be filed in this case, and in which a jury demand appears,
was "the last pleading directed to [the] issue[s]" Carson
Sweeney seeks to have tried by a jury.