Title: Hicks v. Greenville Lumber Co., Inc.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

387 So. 2d 94 (1980) John D. HICKS, Jr., and Dixie W. Hicks v. GREENVILLE LUMBER COMPANY, INC. No. 52078. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 13, 1980. Robertshaw & Merideth, Douglas J. Smith, Jr., Greenville, for appellants. Felts, Russell, Adams & Lueckenbach, Nathan P. Adams, Jr., Greenville, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and WALKER and BOWLING, JJ. ROBERTSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Appellants, John D. Hicks, Jr., and his wife, Dixie W. Hicks, appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Washington County, sustaining a general demurrer to their four-count declaration for damages against the Greenville Lumber Company, Inc. Appellants sought damages of $92,284.39 from the appellee for negligence in the construction of their home, breach of an express one-year warranty covering any defects in construction, breach of implied warranties of suitability and fitness, strict liability in tort, and the false filing of a materialman's lien against their property. The *95 house, the subject matter of this suit, was constructed by appellee and sold by it to Sharron Anne Shepherd, the title being transferred by general warranty deed dated October 20, 1975. The Hicks subsequently purchased this house from Mrs. Shepherd, who conveyed title to the Hicks by general warranty deed dated June 8, 1976. Appellee acted as broker in this transaction. Appellants' only assignment of error is that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to all counts of their first amended declaration. Negotiations for the purchase of this house were carried on in May and June of 1976 between the Hicks and a representative of Greenville Lumber Company. Among other things, appellants charged in their declaration: In Count IV, Plaintiffs charged: The trial court was correct in sustaining a demurrer to Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Declaration, but was in error in sustaining a demurrer to Count IV. The allegation about the residence being still covered by an express one-year warranty of appellee apparently was an oral representation by appellee's agent, because no copy of the sales contract or any writing of any kind was attached to the declaration. Since there were no allegations in the declaration charging fraud or mutual mistake, our ruling in Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Cohn, 217 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 1969), applies. In Cohn, we said: The trial court was correct in sustaining a demurrer to Count I of the declaration. In Count II, the plaintiffs charged: In the concurring opinion in Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974), a majority of this Court joining therein, it was said: Following up on the Oliver ruling, we said, in Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1978): The trial court was correct in sustaining a demurrer to Counts II and III of the declaration. Appellee contends that the trial court was correct in sustaining a demurrer to Count IV of the declaration because Count IV "shows on its face that the action for recovery is filed more than one year from the filing of any such alleged false notice and is, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations in this cause, same being Section 85-7-201 of Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated." MCA section 85-7-201 (1972), which has been brought forward unchanged in each successive code since 1930, provides: MCA section 85-7-197 (1972), also brought forward unchanged since 1930, provides in part: Appellee argues that its Notice of Materialman's Lien was filed in the "Notice of Construction Liens" book, in accordance with MCA section 85-7-133, and not in the lis pendens record, and, therefore, the notice to the owner required in section 85-7-197 does not apply. Besides being inconsistent in arguing that the one-year limitation provision of section 85-7-201 applies, but the reference to section *97 85-7-197 requiring notice to the property owner does not, the appellee's contention must fail for these additional reasons. Section 85-7-197 (laborers and materialmen may file evidence of claim) has come down unchanged since it was first enacted into law in Chapter 136, General Laws of 1928. It first appeared in the 1930 Code as section 2282, and in the 1942 Code as section 380. Likewise, section 85-7-201 has come down unchanged since it was first enacted into law in Chapter 136, General Laws of 1928. It appeared in the 1930 Code as section 2284 and in the 1942 Code as section 382. In the 1930 Code, sections 2282 and 2284 were included in Chapter 44, under the heading "Liens". Likewise, section 85-7-131 has come down virtually unchanged since its appearance as section 2258 in the 1930 Code and section 356 in the 1942 Code under the heading "Lien of laborers, materialmen, architects notice." It was not until 1964 that a "Notice of Construction Liens" book was provided for. The Mississippi Legislature in 1964 passed Senate Bill No. 1744 (Chapter 291, General Laws of 1964). The purpose was described in its title, which read: "AN ACT to amend Section 356, Mississippi Code of 1942, Recompiled, as amended, to extend labor and materialmen's lien to water well drillers." After section 356 of the 1942 Code, as amended, was repeated in its entirety in a long Section 1(a) of Senate Bill 1744, a short paragraph, Section 1(b) was added, as follows: That Section 1(b) is now MCA section 85-7-133, (1972). There is no merit in appellee's contention that the limitation of one year mentioned in section 85-7-201 applies, but that the mandatory notice to the property owner required by section 85-7-197 does not apply, merely because its notice of lien was listed in "Notice of Construction Liens" book rather than on the lis pendens docket. The plaintiffs charged in their declaration that the materialman's lien was filed July 28, 1977, without notice to them and came to their attention for the first time on or about May 25, 1979. They filed their suit shortly thereafter, on June 21, 1979. Not being barred by the one-year limitation on filing suit, contained in section 85-7-201, the declaration in Count IV stated a good cause of action, not subject to demurrer. Inasmuch as Count IV was good, the demurrer should not have been sustained to the declaration. Boler v. Mosby, 352 So. 2d 1320 (Miss. 1977). The order sustaining the general demurrer is, therefore, reversed, and this cause remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.