Title: State ex rel. Scherach v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Scherach v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5349.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5349 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHERACH v. LORAIN COUNTY  
BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Scherach v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5349.] 
Elections — Certification to fill vacancy in municipal office — Quasi-judicial 
hearing by county board of elections not required — R.C. 3513.31(I) and 
3501.39 — Writ of prohibition denied. 
(No. 2009-1685 — Submitted October 5, 2009 — Decided October 8, 2009.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a board of elections and its members from placing on the November 3, 
2009 general election ballot the name of a person as a candidate to fill the 
unexpired term of a city law director who had resigned.  Because the board of 
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elections did not exercise quasi-judicial authority in certifying the name to the 
election ballot, we deny the writ. 
Facts 
Vacancy and Selection of Candidate 
{¶ 2} Mark R. Provenza was elected as law director of the city of Lorain, 
Ohio, and served in that office beginning in January 2000.  Provenza was last 
elected to serve a term of office as law director from January 1, 2008, to 
December 31, 2011.  On March 31, 2009, however, Provenza resigned. 
{¶ 3} On April 30, 2009, the Central Committee of the Lorain County 
Democratic Party held a meeting at which it appointed intervening respondent, 
Patrick D. Riley, pursuant to R.C. 733.31, to the office of law director until a 
successor was elected and qualified by law.  The committee’s appointment of 
Riley and his acceptance of the appointment were documented on Secretary of 
State Form No. 291, which was entitled “Certification by Party Central 
Committee to Fill a Vacancy in County Office or City Office.”  Riley took office 
as interim law director on May 4, and the completed form was delivered to the 
board of elections and subsequently time-stamped on June 3. 
{¶ 4} At the April 30 meeting, the Lorain County Democratic Party 
Central Committee also appointed Riley as its candidate for the election to fill 
Provenza’s unexpired term of office as city law director.  The chairperson and the 
secretary of the committee signed Secretary of State Form No. 289, which is 
prescribed by the secretary of state for the certification of the selection of a 
candidate to fill a vacancy in a party nomination pursuant to R.C. 3513.31.  Riley 
signed the portion of the form for his acceptance of the nomination, and the 
director of respondent Lorain County Board of Elections notarized the completed 
form.  Both of the completed forms were then given to the director, who placed 
them in a manila file folder and accepted them in his official capacity on behalf of 
the board of elections. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
{¶ 5} The director of the board of elections brought the folder containing 
the forms to the board of elections the next day, and he initially placed the folder 
on his desk, where another board employee saw them and confirmed that the 
forms had been properly completed.  The director took the file with the completed 
forms and placed them on the desk of a board employee to continue processing 
them.  The completed Form No.  291 was further processed by the board sending 
a copy to the secretary of state on May 5 and the board time-stamping it on June 
3.  The completed Form No. 289, however, was subsequently determined to be 
missing from the board records.  Neither the original nor a copy of the form has 
been located.  The board of elections has no set protocol to time-stamp the forms 
containing party nominations for vacancies, and the majority of these documents 
have not been time-stamped in the past. 
{¶ 6} On August 17, 2009, the Central Committee of the Lorain County 
Republican Party selected relator, Michael J. Scherach, as its candidate for city 
law director.  The committee’s Form No. 289 certifying its selection of Scherach 
as its nominee for law director and noting his acceptance of the nomination was 
filed with the board of elections before 4:00 p.m. on August 19. 
August 27, 2009 Board of Elections Meeting 
{¶ 7} The board of elections scheduled a meeting for August 27 to 
certify candidates for the November 3, 2009 general election.  The board of 
elections issued a press release before the meeting in which it noted that it may 
exercise its discretion at the meeting “to conduct a hearing, take statements and or 
accept legal authority regarding the certification of Patrick D. Riley to the ballot 
as the Democratic candidate for Lorain City Law Director.” 
{¶ 8} At its August 27 meeting, the board heard testimony from several 
witnesses concerning the matter, and Scherach and Riley or their counsel 
questioned witnesses.  The board’s counsel noted, however, that the proceeding 
was not comparable to a trial.  Scherach submitted a memorandum in which he 
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claimed that the board of elections should not certify Riley to the ballot as the 
Democratic Party candidate for Lorain law director, because there was no 
“conclusive evidence” of the committee’s certification of Riley as its nominee.  
Riley submitted a memorandum supporting his certification as a candidate for law 
director. 
{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the meeting, the board of elections certified 
Riley to the November 3 general election ballot as a candidate for city law 
director. 
Protest 
{¶ 10} On August 31, Scherach filed a written protest with the board of 
elections contesting the board’s certification of Riley as a candidate for law 
director.  Scherach claimed that the purported committee certification of Riley as 
a candidate and Riley’s acceptance of the nomination did not comply with R.C. 
3513.31(I), because the form did not exist.  Scherach requested a hearing on his 
protest pursuant to R.C. 3501.38 and 3501.39 and submitted a memorandum in 
support of his protest. 
{¶ 11} At a special board meeting on September 8, the board of elections 
voted to file the protest but to take no action on it.  At the meeting, the board’s 
counsel stated his opinion that the protest proceeding was not available and that 
even if it were, Scherach lacked standing. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 12} On September 18, Scherach filed this expedited election action for 
a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the Lorain County Board of Elections 
and its members, from placing Riley’s name on the November 3 general election 
ballot as a party candidate for Lorain law director.  The board and its members 
filed an answer, Riley intervened as an additional respondent, and the parties filed 
evidence and briefs pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  We grant Scherach’s motion 
to amend his complaint. 
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{¶ 13} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition:  Quasi-Judicial Power 
{¶ 14} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Scherach must 
first establish that the board of elections and its members are about to exercise or 
have exercised judicial or quasi-judicial power.  State ex rel. Parrott v. Brunner, 
117 Ohio St.3d 175, 2008-Ohio-813, 882 N.E.2d 908, ¶ 6.  Not being judges, the 
board and its members have not exercised judicial power.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 15} For quasi-judicial authority, we have defined it as “ ‘the power to 
hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that require 
a hearing resembling a judicial trial.’  (Emphasis added.)”  State ex rel. Upper 
Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 
895 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908; see also State ex rel. Baldzicki v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893. 
{¶ 16} Scherach claimed in his memorandum supporting his protest that a 
hearing resembling a judicial trial was required upon his protest by R.C. 3501.39, 
which provides: 
{¶ 17} “(A) The secretary of state or a board of elections shall accept any 
petition described in section 3501.38 of the Revised Code unless one of the 
following occurs: 
{¶ 18} “* * * 
{¶ 19} “(2) A written protest against the petition or candidacy, naming 
specific objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made by the 
election officials with whom the protest is filed that the petition violates any 
requirement established by law.”  (Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 20} R.C. 3501.39(A)(2), however, applies solely to petitions described 
by R.C. 3501.38, which in turn refers to “[a]ll declarations of candidacy, 
nominating petitions, or other petitions presented to or filed with * * * a board of 
elections * * * for the purpose of being a candidate for any nomination or office.”  
By contrast, this case involves a person whose candidacy originated not by 
declaration of candidacy or nominating or other petition but by certification of a 
selection by an appropriate committee of a political party to fill the unexpired 
term of a person who had resigned.  See R.C. 3513.31(I).  The main cases cited by 
Scherach are inapposite because they involved persons filing declarations of 
candidacy or candidacy petitions.  Cf. State ex rel. Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, ¶ 10 
(write-in candidate for sheriff at primary election), citing State ex rel. Reese v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 
N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 17 (independent candidate for municipal court judge). 
{¶ 21} If the General Assembly had intended that the certification of a 
candidate for election to fill a vacancy caused by death or resignation under R.C. 
3513.31(I) be by a declaration of candidacy or a nominating petition for purposes 
of being subject to a protest under R.C. 3501.39(A)(2), it would have done so by 
appropriate language, as it has in certain other circumstances.  See, e.g., R.C. 
3513.253 (nominations of candidates for township officers to be by petition) and 
R.C. 3513.254 (nominations of candidates for boards of education to be by 
petition).  The General Assembly did not do so. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, there is no requirement under R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) for 
the board of elections to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing on the issue of whether 
Riley was properly certified under R.C. 3513.31(I).  The fact that Scherach filed a 
protest does not alter this conclusion.  “When no statute or other pertinent law 
requires the board of elections to conduct a hearing resembling a judicial trial, the 
board does not exercise quasi-judicial authority regardless of whether protests 
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have been filed.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, the mere fact that the board of elections actually held a 
hearing resembling a judicial trial before certifying Riley’s name as a candidate 
for city law director does not warrant a different conclusion.  The dispositive fact 
is that no statute or other law required the board to do so.  See State ex rel. 
Janosek v. Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2009-Ohio-
4692, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 1 (“Because no statute or other pertinent law required the 
agency to conduct a hearing resembling a judicial trial when it issued its notice to 
withhold income for spousal support, the agency did not exercise the judicial or 
quasi-judicial authority required for appellants to be entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 24} Therefore, the board of elections did not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial authority in certifying Riley’s name as a candidate for Lorain Law 
Director on the November 3 general election ballot.  
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Therefore, because Scherach has not established his entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition, we deny the writ.  Because this 
ground disposes of Scherach’s prohibition claim, we need not address the 
remaining requirements or claims.  See Wright, 120 Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-
5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 13.  We note that the unavailability of the extraordinary 
writ of prohibition did not leave Scherach without a remedy.  He could have 
raised his claim in a common pleas court action for a prohibitory injunction. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Michael J. Scherach, pro se. 
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Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerald A. Innes, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
 
Jeffries, Kube, Forrest & Monteleone Co., L.P.A., and David A. Forrest, 
for intervening respondent. 
______________________