Title: People v. Cloutier

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed May 25, 2000.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, Robert Cloutier, appeals from a Cook County circuit court order 
dismissing his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Because 
petitioner was sentenced to death, this court has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)). For the 
reasons which follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted petitioner of the first 
degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of Alice Cogler. Details 
regarding the evidence presented at petitioner's trial and sentencing are set 
forth in the opinions disposing of petitioner's direct appeal, and will be 
referred to herein only as necessary to dispose of petitioner's instant appeal. 
On direct appeal, this court affirmed petitioner's convictions, but vacated his 
death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. People v. 
Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483 (1993). On remand, a jury again found defendant 
eligible for the death penalty, this time based on two separate aggravating 
factors: (1) the murder of Cogler occurred during the course of another felony 
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West 1994)), and (2) defendant had been convicted of 
murdering two or more individuals, in that, since the time of his initial 
sentencing, defendant had pled guilty to the unrelated first degree murder and 
aggravated criminal sexual assault of Cynthia Cooney (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 
1994)). Defendant was again sentenced to death. This court affirmed petitioner's 
sentence on direct appeal. People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141 
(1997).
Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. 
(West 1996)). The circuit court appointed counsel, who amended and supplemented 
the post-conviction petition. The circuit court granted the State's motion to 
dismiss the amended post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, and 
subsequently denied petitioner's motion to reconsider.
ANALYSIS
A proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is a collateral 
attack on a judgment of conviction. The principles of waiver and res 
judicata limit the scope of post-conviction review. People v. 
Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Consequently, the inquiry in a 
post-conviction petition is limited to allegations of constitutional violations 
that were not and could not have been raised previously. People v. 
Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 510 (1991). The petitioner is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction claim only if he has made a substantial 
showing, based on the record and supporting affidavits, that his constitutional 
rights were violated. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 537 (1995). 
In making that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and any 
accompanying affidavits are taken as true. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989). This court reviews the dismissal of a post-conviction 
petition de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89 
(1998).
Failure to Present Testimony of Victim's Coworker
Petitioner first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
interview or present the testimony of Brenda Grubisch, a coworker of Cogler and 
one of the last people to see her alive. At trial, Grubisch was called by the 
State and testified but was not called by the defense. Petitioner's theory at 
trial was that his sexual relations with Cogler just prior to her murder were 
consensual. Petitioner never denied murdering Cogler, but argued that he did not 
commit aggravated criminal sexual assault, and thus no such conviction could 
serve as the basis for his death penalty eligibility. The jury rejected this 
argument.
In an affidavit attached to the post-conviction petition, Grubisch states 
that on the night of Cogler's murder, she, Cogler and petitioner were at a bar 
where she and Cogler worked, and that she witnessed Cogler and petitioner acting 
like "a couple for the night." Grubisch further states that she saw petitioner 
and Cogler leave the bar together and return about an hour later, where they 
stayed until closing time. Petitioner argues that this information corroborates 
his version of the events that took place prior to Cogler's murder, namely, that 
the two engaged in consensual sex the first time they left the bar together, 
thereby supporting his defense that they engaged in consensual sex again after 
the bar closed, and that only after this consensual sex did petitioner murder 
Cogler. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
interview Grubisch or to call her as a witness. According to petitioner, had the 
jury heard the evidence presented in Grubisch's affidavit, there is a reasonable 
probability its verdict would have been different and he would not have been 
sentenced to death.
In order for petitioner to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, he must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient in that 
it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's 
deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different without counsel's errors. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); People v. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d 176 (1995). A reviewing court 
may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by finding that 
petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's representation without determining 
whether counsel's performance was deficient. People v. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 90 (1994).
In the instant case, even if defense counsel had contacted Grubisch prior to 
trial and elicited the statements contained in her affidavit, there is no 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial and sentencing would have 
been different. Evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly indicated that Cogler 
was sexually assaulted before petitioner strangled her, a finding upheld by this 
court in petitioner's direct appeal. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 506 (1993). Specifically, petitioner told police that he strangled Cogler 
with a fan belt while lying on top of her in the back seat of Cogler's car and 
that she did not put up a fight, facts supported by the gross disparity in size 
between petitioner and the victim. The fan belt was still around Cogler's neck 
when her body was found. Fresh bruises and abrasions, however, were found on 
Cogler's forehead, elbow, knees and thigh, suggesting the use of force. The 
headliner and visor in Cogler's car were torn, also indicating a struggle took 
place in the front seat of the car. Most damning, however, was the other-crimes 
evidence produced by the State at trial showing a common design or plan by 
petitioner to sexually assault and strangle several women in Cogler's car within 
the space of a few hours of Cogler's murder. The jury further heard evidence of 
petitioner's initial statement to police regarding the Cooney sexual assault and 
murder in which he also claimed to have engaged in consensual sexual intercourse 
before killing her. See Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d  at 500-06.
Furthermore, Grubisch's statements that petitioner and Cogler were acting 
like a couple for the night and that they left the bar together once earlier add 
nothing new to Grubisch's testimony for the State at trial that the two were on 
friendly terms before leaving the bar. Specifically, Grubisch testified that 
Cogler voluntarily left with petitioner at closing time and planned to drive him 
home. Nevertheless, the jury still found that petitioner sexually assaulted 
Cogler in her car. Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel's 
failure to bring forward Grubisch's additional testimony now contained in her 
affidavit.
Finally, petitioner suffered no prejudice during his sentencing hearing 
because he was found death-eligible on the independent basis of having murdered 
more than one person. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994). The outcome of 
petitioner's sentencing thus would have been no different even if the jury had 
found that petitioner did not commit Cogler's murder in the course of another 
felony.
State's Failure to Disclose Evidence
Petitioner next claims that the prosecution failed to disclose to defense 
counsel Grubisch's statements that petitioner and Cogler were acting like a 
couple for the night and left the bar together once before closing time. 
Petitioner argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose this favorable and 
material evidence denied him due process and a fair trial and sentencing hearing 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court required disclosure of 
evidence that is both favorable to the accused and " 'material either to 
guilt or to punishment.' " People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 539 
(1999), quoting Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct. 
at 1197. Under Brady and its progeny, favorable evidence is material, 
and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government 
" 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.' " Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 393, quoting United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). Materiality is demonstrated by showing that the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different 
light so as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 393, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995).
Taking petitioner's allegations that the prosecution failed to disclose 
Grubisch's statements as true, we find this evidence lacks the requisite 
materiality under Brady and its progeny. As explained above, the 
evidence of sexual assault presented at petitioner's trial was overwhelming. See 
Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d  at 500-06. We do not believe that, had the 
testimony contained in Grubisch's affidavit been disclosed to the defense, it is 
reasonably probable that the outcome of either the trial or the sentencing 
hearing would have been different. Nor do we believe this evidence could 
reasonably have put the entire case in such a different light so as to undermine 
the petitioner's conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The evidence 
allegedly withheld by the State is merely cumulative of that already presented 
at trial, namely, that petitioner and Cogler were on friendly terms and left the 
bar together at closing time the night of Cogler's murder. The State committed 
no Brady violation.
Use of Guilty Plea to Other Murder
Petitioner next challenges the use of his plea of guilty to the unrelated 
Cooney murder as a basis for finding him death-eligible in the instant case. 
First, petitioner argues that counsel in the Cooney case was ineffective for 
failing to inform him that his guilty plea could be used as a basis to sentence 
him to death in the instant case. Petitioner, however, may not raise a challenge 
to the conduct of his counsel in the Cooney case in this wholly separate 
proceeding. This court's review is limited to the proceedings which resulted in 
his convictions for crimes committed against Alice Cogler only. See 725 ILCS 
5/122-1(a) (West 1996).
Second, petitioner argues that defense counsel in the instant case was 
ineffective for failing to sufficiently investigate the circumstances 
surrounding his guilty plea in the Cooney case and for failing to properly 
defend him against the State's use of this guilty plea to find him 
death-eligible. Attorney Stephen Richards was assigned to defend petitioner at 
the eligibility phase of his resentencing. Richards was new to the case and had 
not previously represented petitioner in any other matters, although he states 
in his affidavit that he was aware petitioner had pleaded guilty to the Cooney 
murder. Upon learning that the State intended to use petitioner's guilty plea to 
the Cooney murder as an additional basis for finding him death-eligible, 
Richards filed motions in limine seeking to bar use of the plea on 
grounds of double jeopardy and the failure of the trial judge in the Cooney 
proceeding to admonish petitioner that his conviction could be used against him 
in another case. Petitioner argues that counsel should have conducted additional 
investigation of his guilty plea to the Cooney murder, which he claims would 
have revealed that his plea in that case was based on the ineffective assistance 
of counsel and was therefore uninformed and involuntary. The failure to conduct 
such an investigation and to file an objection on such grounds, petitioner 
claims, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to establish that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, 
petitioner must first show that counsel's actions fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  
at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. In assessing counsel's performance, the reviewing 
court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell into a 
wide range of reasonable representation, and the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy. People v. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d 103, 131 
(1984). In conducting an investigation, counsel has only a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision which makes 
particular investigations unnecessary, and the reasonableness of a decision to 
investigate is assessed by applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 
judgment. People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 149 (1995).
Under the forgoing standards, we do not believe counsel's representation of 
petitioner at his eligibility hearing fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Petitioner does not claim that Richards failed to conduct any 
investigation before defending him at the eligibility phase of his sentencing. 
Indeed, the motions in limine filed by Richards necessarily required 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea to the Cooney 
murder. It was not unreasonable for Richards to forgo additional investigation 
into why petitioner changed his plea from not guilty to guilty in the Cooney 
murder. See People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 324 (1997); 
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 150. The motions in limine filed by 
Richards seeking to bar use of the prior murder conviction, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, constituted a reasonable level of assistance.
Aggravation-Mitigation Hearing
Petitioner next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
during the aggravation-mitigation phase of his death penalty hearing because his 
attorneys failed to develop or present accurate mitigation evidence, and instead 
presented nonmitigating and erroneous evidence which actually caused him 
harm.
At sentencing, the defense presented evidence in mitigation attempting to 
show that petitioner's offenses were the result of his polysubstance abuse and 
antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders. Dr. Lawrence Heinrich, a 
psychologist, testified for the defense that he believed petitioner was 
suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he 
committed the Cogler and Cooney murders. The defense also presented testimony 
from Alvin Hill, a mitigation specialist employed by the Cook County public 
defender's office, who opined that petitioner committed the murders because he 
was "drugging." Petitioner contends, however, that a neuropsychological 
evaluation conducted after his sentencing hearing revealed that he suffers from 
an organic brain dysfunction. Petitioner further claims that subsequent 
post-conviction investigation revealed that petitioner's low birth weight and 
head trauma as a child could also account for his psychological dysfunctions and 
behavior problems, information which was not presented at the sentencing 
hearing. Petitioner claims that his criminal activity was not the result of drug 
abuse, as the jury heard at his sentencing, but rather was the product of a 
traumatic and violent childhood. According to petitioner, the failure by defense 
counsel to properly investigate and present this information in mitigation 
places the reliability of his death sentence in serious doubt. We disagree.
Defense counsel's performance at the penalty phase of a sentencing hearing is 
measured by the two-part standard of Strickland. Under 
Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and that, absent the errors, the judge 
"would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
Counsel's failure to order neuropsychological testing of petitioner prior to 
his sentencing was not unreasonable. Each of the three psychologists who 
examined petitioner concluded that he suffered from personality disorders. None 
of the experts found anything to indicate that petitioner suffered from an 
organic brain disorder, and there was nothing to indicate that further testing 
would be beneficial in any way. Counsel's decisions to investigate must be 
assessed in light of the information known at the time the decisions are made. 
In the instant case, defense counsel's decision not to investigate further into 
organic brain disorders, electing instead to present mitigation evidence of 
petitioner's personality disorders, was trial strategy and was not unreasonable 
under the circumstances.
We further find no error with regard to the allegedly inaccurate evidence 
presented in mitigation. In his post-conviction petition, petitioner relies on a 
report prepared by Marylynne Kaplan, a social worker, which cites scientific 
evidence allegedly showing that petitioner's criminal history was not the result 
of his "drugging," but rather was the product of his dysfunctional family 
history, a childhood plagued by violence and a mother who was emotionally 
distant and depressed. A review of the record, however, reveals that, while the 
primary theory advanced by the defense was that petitioner's actions were the 
product of his impaired judgment due to drug and alcohol abuse and personality 
disorders, the jury also heard testimony of petitioner's failure to find a place 
within his family, his rejection by his mother, his inability to relate to 
female members of his family including his four sisters, and his lack of a male 
role model while growing up. Alvin Hill also testified in mitigation regarding 
petitioner's drug use since the age of 12, his constant truancy throughout 
adolescence, his running away from home, his mother's abandonment of him, and 
his placement with juvenile authorities on several occasions. Given the extent 
of the testimony heard by the jury regarding petitioner's troubled childhood and 
family dysfunction, we believe that the additional information contained in 
Kaplan's report is merely cumulative of that already presented and would not 
have changed the outcome of petitioner's sentencing. Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from defense counsel's failure to 
present the information found in Kaplan's report at sentencing.
Petitioner further contends that defense counsel made a manifestly 
incompetent decision to present the dubious expert testimony of Dr. Heinrich at 
the aggravation-mitigation hearing. A review of the record, however, belies 
petitioner's claims that Dr. Heinrich, the defense expert, was ill-prepared and 
did not have adequate notice from which to prepare his mitigation evidence. Dr. 
Heinrich was first contacted by defense counsel in August 1994, several months 
prior to petitioner's resentencing hearing. Dr. Heinrich interviewed petitioner 
on two separate occasions and conducted several personality tests. In addition, 
Dr. Heinrich reviewed police reports, investigative reports and trial 
transcripts, as well as reports of psychological evaluations conducted by two 
previous experts, Dr. Schwarz and Dr. Cavanaugh. The record also reveals that 
petitioner himself was responsible for any lack of preparation by Dr. Heinrich 
because he specifically instructed Dr. Heinrich not to speak with his mother or 
with his four sisters because he did not want them involved in the instant 
proceedings.
Remaining Claims
Petitioner argues that Marijane Placek, lead counsel during the 
aggravation-mitigation phase of petitioner's sentencing hearing, may have been 
influenced in her defense by a fear of later claims of ineffectiveness and thus 
acted under a conflict of interest. Petitioner's claims, however, are 
unsupported by the record or by affidavits, and amount to no more than 
speculation. Thus, the trial court properly denied relief on this basis.
Petitioner also raises the following three arguments: that he was denied due 
process by the prosecution's use of his plea of guilty to the Cooney murder to 
find him death-eligible because, at the time he committed the Cogler murder, he 
could not have been found death-eligible under the multiple-murder aggravating 
factor; that the prosecution's use of certain victim impact evidence and 
argument relating to crimes other than the Cogler and Cooney murders denied him 
a fair sentencing hearing; and that the Illinois Pattern Instructions used at 
the sentencing hearing were unconstitutionally vague and confusing. Each of 
these arguments is waived however, because it could have been previously raised 
but was not. See People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 127 (1997).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County 
is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting 
Wednesday, November 29, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death entered 
in the circuit court of Cook County is to be carried out. Defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the 
warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority's assertion that Cloutier cannot raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this proceeding based on the advice 
he received from his attorney to plead guilty in the Cooney case. The 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, upon which my colleagues rely, provides that
Although the Cooney case involved a separate set of circumstances, it was 
inextricably linked to the present matter because it provided one of the 
predicates for Cloutier's eligibility for the death penalty. As such, it was 
part of the "proceedings" which resulted in the judgment challenged by Cloutier 
here. Accordingly, defense counsel's recommendation to plead guilty in the 
Cooney matter was a proper subject for Cloutier's post-conviction challenge to 
his death sentence in this case.
Having reached this conclusion, I nevertheless do not feel it necessary to 
resolve whether Cloutier's attorney did, in fact, provide ineffective 
assistance. Regardless of counsel's performance, Cloutier's sentence of death 
cannot be allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence 
and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the 
Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, 
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). 
Cloutier's sentence of death should therefore be vacated and he should be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 
1994).