Title: Davis v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: October 5, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ROBBIE T. DAVIS,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A120534; SC S52803)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 9, 2006.
Rebecca A. Duncan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the brief was Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director,
Office of Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Legal Services Division.
Judy C. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Riggs,** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision are affirmed.
*Appeal from a Final Order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 200 Or App 366, 114 P3d 1138 (2005).
** Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
KISTLER, J.
ORS 144.228(1)(b) provides that the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision (board) shall give a prisoner who has
been sentenced as a dangerous offender a release date "if the
condition [that] made the prisoner dangerous is absent or in
remission." (1)  In this case, the board did not set a release
date for petitioner because it found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the condition that made him dangerous was not
absent or in remission.  Petitioner argues that due process
requires the board to set a release date unless it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the condition that made him
dangerous is still present.  The Court of Appeals held that due
process requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence
and affirmed the board's order.  Davis v. Board of Parole, 200 Or
App 366, 373, 114 P3d 1138 (2005).  We affirm the Court of
Appeals decision but for a different reason.
In 1991, petitioner entered the home of an 87-year-old
woman and raped her.  A jury convicted petitioner of first-degree
rape and first-degree burglary.  On the rape conviction, the
trial court sentenced petitioner as a dangerous offender, finding
that he suffered "from a severe personality disorder indicating a
propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life and
safety of others."  See ORS 161.725(1) (stating conditions for
dangerous offender sentences).  The trial court imposed a 30-year
sentence on the rape conviction and a consecutive six-month
sentence on the burglary conviction.
In 2002, the board held a parole consideration hearing
to decide whether to set a release date for petitioner.  At that
hearing, the board considered petitioner's testimony, a current
psychological evaluation of petitioner, and the history of
petitioner's behavior in prison.  The board found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the condition that made
petitioner dangerous (a severe personality disorder) was not
absent or in remission.  The board did not set a release date for
petitioner but instead scheduled another parole consideration
hearing for him.
After exhausting his administrative remedies,
petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the board's
order in the Court of Appeals.  Among other things, petitioner
argued that due process required the board to apply a clear-and-convincing standard of proof.  The board responded that the
standard of proof that it had applied -- proof by a preponderance
of the evidence -- was constitutionally sufficient.  The Court of
Appeals accepted the parties' invitation to reach the due process
issue and held that proof by a preponderance of the evidence was
all that due process required.  Davis, 200 Or App at 373.
On review, petitioner reiterates his argument that the
Due Process Clause requires the board to use a clear-and-convincing standard of proof.  In analyzing petitioner's
argument, we begin by briefly reviewing the procedures that the
board generally follows in setting release dates and the
different procedures that it follows in setting release dates for
persons sentenced as dangerous offenders. (2)  We then examine
the state-law premises underlying petitioner's constitutional
claim.  Finally, we explain why the statutes governing early
release for persons sentenced as dangerous offenders do not
present the federal constitutional issue that petitioner asks us
to decide.
ORS 144.120 directs the board to set an initial release
date for most prisoners admitted to the Department of
Corrections.  See Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 340 Or 361, 371,
133 P3d 910 (2006) (discussing initial release dates).  Other
statutes provide that, having set a release date, the board may
postpone a scheduled release date if it finds, for example, that
the prisoner has a "present severe emotional disturbance such as
to constitute a danger to the health or safety of the community." 
ORS 144.125(3).  Similarly, the board shall postpone a prisoner's
scheduled release date if it finds, after a hearing, that "the
prisoner engaged in serious misconduct during confinement."  ORS
144.125(2).  
The legislature has provided a different procedure and
different substantive rules for persons sentenced as dangerous
offenders.  When a person has been sentenced as a dangerous
offender, ORS 144.228(1)(a) directs the board to set a parole
consideration hearing, not an initial release date, for the
prisoner.  At the parole consideration hearing, the board decides
whether to set an initial release date.  ORS 144.228(1)(b).  Only
if the condition that made the prisoner dangerous is absent or in
remission does the statute direct the board to set a release
date.  Id.  If the condition is not absent or in remission, then
the statute directs the board to review the prisoner's condition
"at least once every two years until the condition is absent or
in remission."  Id. (3)
ORS 144.228(2) governs the way in which the board
conducts parole consideration hearings for persons sentenced as
dangerous offenders.  It states that, "[f]or the parole
consideration hearing, the board shall cause to be brought before
it and consider all information regarding such person."  ORS
144.228(2).  It specifically provides that the information that
the board "shall cause to be brought before it and consider" must
include two reports:  a recent psychiatric report on the prisoner
and a Department of Corrections report setting out, among other
things, the prisoner's conduct while confined, disciplinary
record, participation in any programs offered by the prison, and
the prisoner's attitude towards society, towards the sentencing
judge, and towards other participants in the criminal justice
system.  ORS 144.228(2).
With that background in mind, we turn to the state-law
premises that underlie petitioner's federal constitutional claim. 
Petitioner asserts -- and the board does not deny -- that the
board has the burden of persuasion to show that petitioner
continues to suffer from the condition that made him dangerous. 
Starting from that premise, petitioner argues that due process
requires the board to find by clear and convincing evidence that
the condition that made him dangerous is still present.  As we
explain, one difficulty with petitioner's due process argument is
that the state-law premises that underlie it are both
procedurally and substantively incorrect.
Procedurally, ORS 144.228(2) directs the board to
"cause to be brought before it and consider" certain information. 
That subsection does not impose a burden of persuasion on the
board.  Rather, it identifies who is responsible for ensuring
that certain evidence is before the board.  It also directs the
board to "consider" that evidence.  As the use of the verb
"consider" makes clear, the task that the legislature has
assigned to the board is to decide whether the evidence before it
satisfies the substantive standard that ORS 144.228(1)(b) states. 
ORS 144.228(2) does not make the board a party to the agency
proceeding or place any burden of persuasion on it.
Petitioner's argument suffers from a related but
separate problem:  It misperceives the substantive standard that
ORS 144.228(1)(b) directs the board to find.  ORS 144.228(1)(b)
does not provide that the board must set a release date for a
prisoner unless it finds that the prisoner still suffers from the
condition that made him or her dangerous, as petitioner argues. 
Rather, ORS 144.228(1)(b) provides that the board may not set a
release date for a prisoner unless the board finds that the
condition that made the prisoner dangerous is absent or in
remission.  Under the terms of that statute, if the board is not
persuaded that the condition that made the prisoner dangerous is
absent or in remission, then the board may not set a release date
and the prisoner must continue to serve the dangerous offender
sentence that the trial court imposed.  As a practical matter,
the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the prisoner.
Our examination of the state-law premises underlying
petitioner's constitutional claim reveals why this case does not
require us to reach the due process issue that petitioner urges
us to decide -- viz., whether due process requires the board to
find the facts by clear and convincing evidence.  Petitioner has
no interest in having the board use a clear-and-convincing
standard of proof (rather than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence) to determine whether the condition that made him
dangerous is absent or in remission.  Using a clear-and-convincing standard of proof to decide that issue would only
decrease the likelihood that the board would make the factual
finding that is a prerequisite to setting a release date under
ORS 144.228(1)(b). (4)
The board, for its part, has evinced no interest in
applying a higher standard of proof than proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.  In this case, the board applied a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in determining
whether to set a release date for petitioner and has argued that
no higher standard of proof is required.  If neither the board
nor petitioner has any interest in having the board apply a
clear-and-convincing standard of proof, then this case does not
require us to decide whether due process requires that standard
of proof.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 264-65, 666 P2d 1316
(1983) (counseling against reaching federal constitutional issues
unnecessarily). (5)  It follows that the board did not err in
using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and that the Court
of Appeals was correct in affirming the board's order, albeit for
different reasons from those on which the court relied.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision are affirmed.
1. Because petitioner committed his crimes in 1991, this
opinion refers to the 1989 version of all the statutes cited in
the opinion.  
2. As noted earlier, petitioner committed his crimes in
1991, and statutes in effect at that time govern our analysis
here.  In reviewing the board's procedures in setting release
dates, we refer to statutory provisions that have remained
substantially unchanged since 1991.
3. ORS 144.228(1)(b) provides:
"At the parole consideration hearing, the prisoner shall be
given a release date in accordance with the applicable range and
variation permitted if the condition [that] made the prisoner
dangerous is absent or in remission.  In the event that the
dangerous condition is found to be present, reviews will be
conducted at least once every two years until the condition is
absent or in remission, at which time release on parole shall be
ordered if the prisoner is otherwise eligible under the rules. 
In no event shall the prisoner be held beyond the maximum
sentence less good time credits imposed by the court."
4. To illustrate, suppose that the board was convinced by
a preponderance of the evidence (but not by clear and convincing
evidence) that the condition that made petitioner dangerous was
absent or in remission.  If the board were to use a clear-and-convincing standard of proof, as petitioner asks it to do, it
would not set a release date for petitioner under the terms of
ORS 144.228(1)(b).
5. It may be that other decisions that the board makes
regarding different types of sentences will present the federal
constitutional question that petitioner asks us to decide.  The
sentence at issue in this case does not do so, however.