Title: Foote v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALLEN J. FOOTE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 578, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0710001779 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 14, 2010 
Decided: 
June 16, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 16th day of June 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On April 10, 2008, the defendant-appellant, Allen Foote 
(Foote), pled guilty to one count each of first degree assault and possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Foote to a total period of thirty-five years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving twenty years in prison for two 
years at Level IV work release.  This is Foote’s direct appeal. 
 
2 
(2) 
Foote's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Foote's counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Foote's attorney informed him of the provisions 
of Rule 26(c) and provided Foote with a copy of the motion to withdraw and 
the accompanying brief.  Foote also was informed of his right to supplement 
his attorney's presentation.  Foote has raised several issues for this Court's 
consideration.  The State has responded to Foote’s issues, as well as to the 
position taken by Foote's counsel, and has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
In response to his counsel’s motion to withdraw, Foote filed a 
letter asserting that the trial court improperly based its sentencing decision 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3 
on facts contained in the presentence investigation report that lacked the 
minimum indicia of reliability.  Foote also contends that his counsel never 
informed him that the five year minimum mandatory sentence that she 
argued for on his behalf was not guaranteed.  We address these claims in that 
order. 
(5) 
In reviewing a sentence such as Foote’s, which falls within the 
statutory limits, the Court will not find error of law or abuse of discretion 
unless it is clear from the record that the sentence has been imposed in 
reliance upon demonstrably false information or information lacking 
minimum indicia of reliability.2  Foote contends that the sentencing judge 
relied upon unsubstantiated allegations contained in the presentence report, 
which his attorney never shared with him.  Foote does not identify those 
unreliable allegations, however. 
(6) 
The sentencing judge, in fact, identified several aggravating 
factors that she considered relevant to her decision to impose more than the 
minimum mandatory sentence for each of Foote’s convictions.  Specifically, 
the sentencing judge noted the history of Foote’s domestic violence against 
the victim, Foote’s failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the offense, the 
lack of remorse he expressed to the presentence investigator, and Foote’s 
                                                 
2 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 790 (Del. 2003). 
 
4 
attempts to undermine the judicial system by preventing the victim from 
testifying against him.  Both the victim and her mother testified at the 
sentencing hearing about Foote’s history of domestic violence against the 
victim and his attempts to prevent her from “snitching.”  Given that, we find 
no support for Foote’s contentions that the judge sentenced him based on 
information lacking minimum indicia of reliability.  Moreover, to the extent 
Foote contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose the 
contents of the presentence investigation report to him, this Court will not 
consider that claim for the first time on appeal.3 
(7) 
Foote’s second argument on appeal is that his attorney assured 
him that he would be sentenced to the minimum mandatory term for each 
conviction.  He claims that he did not understand that he was not guaranteed 
to receive a sentence of only five years.  Foote’s claim, however, is flatly 
contradicted by the record.  The transcript of the guilty plea colloquy reflects 
Foote’s clear understanding that by pleading guilty to the two criminal 
offenses, he was facing a sentence that could range from a minimum of five 
years to a maximum of fifty years.  Foote expressly stated to the Superior 
Court that no one had promised him what his sentence would be and that, 
despite what the State might recommend as a sentence, he understood that 
                                                 
3 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985). 
 
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the judge ultimately would decide what the length of his sentence should be.  
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Foote is 
bound by these sworn statements.4   Consequently, we find no merit to his 
second argument on appeal. 
(8) 
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Foote’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Foote's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Foote could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                                 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).