Title: Com. v. Pomerantz

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

393 Pa. Superior Ct. 186 (1989) 573 A.2d 1149 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harold POMERANTZ, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted May 23, 1989. Filed August 3, 1989. Motion to Publish Opinion Granted April 23, 1990. *187 Nino Tinari, Philadelphia, for appellant. Donna G. Zucker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee. Before BECK, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ. JOHNSON, Judge: Harold Pomerantz appeals from an order denying his motion for return of property. We affirm in part and vacate in part. Pomerantz asks this court, on appeal, to consider the questions of (a) whether certain property constitutes derivative contraband, and if so, (b) whether such property need be returned as having been illegally seized. Since we are unable to determine that Pomerantz has established the necessary predicate to raise these questions, we decline to consider those issues and affirm the order denying return of the property. At the outset, we note that a motion for return of property pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 324 is entirely distinct from a procedure with respect to seized property (forfeiture) pursuant to Sections 28 and 29 of the Act of April 24, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64) known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780-128, 780-129 Rep.[1] The clear object of § 780-128, in a forfeiture proceeding, is to impose a penalty upon those who are significantly involved in criminal enterprises in violation of the drug act. Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 469, 362 A.2d 999, 1005 (1976). By contrast, a motion for return of property pursuant to Rule 324 is intended to return goods to a person aggrieved by a search and seizure based upon the right to lawful possession and the non-contraband status of the goods. Pa.R.Crim.P. 324. Rule 324 expressly provides: Under the rule, a party must, at a minimum, allege that he is entitled to lawful possession of the involved property. In the case before us, no evidence was submitted to the trial court that Pomerantz is entitled to lawful possession of the cash in dispute. On or about February 26, 1988, Pomerantz filed a motion for return of property requesting an order "directing that the certain property seized from his residence . . . be returned to him." In support of the motion, Pomerantz alleged in Paragraph 4: Although no written response to the motion is contained in the certified record, or noted in the docket entries, a handwritten notation to the file shows "5/25/88, Room 788, Comm. opposed. C-9/26/88 Room 788 hearing, By the Court, s/O'Keefe, J." A review of the entire hearing transcript from the Return of Property Hearing, September 26, 1988, 39 pages reveals that the averments contained in the motion were not offered *189 as evidence, nor was any testimony offered by Pomerantz on any of the factual allegations of the motion. The court, in its order denying the return of property, alludes to a Commonwealth's Petition for Forfeiture. No such petition has ever been filed, nor did the Commonwealth, at any time during the hearing, orally seek to proceed under 35 P.S. §§ 780-128. We will not consider a petition that has neither been filed nor been orally presented to the trial court. Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 114-16, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 385 Pa.Super. 236, 560 A.2d 781 (1989). To the extent that the order of November 23, 1988 purports to "grant" a petition for forfeiture, it is hereby vacated. Returning to the only matter properly before the hearing judge, namely the motion for return of property, we point out the confusion which resulted by virtue of the failure of the trial court to recognize the type of proceeding before him and to apply the appropriate burden of proof. On any motion for return of property, the moving party must first establish entitlement to lawful possession, Rule 324(a), before any obligation is placed upon the Commonwealth to prove that the property at issue is contraband. Rule 324(b). The Commonwealth did not have any burden to come forward at the outset since the proceeding did not involve a petition for forfeiture. We do not suggest that the two matters may not be heard together. See Matter of Kulbitsky, 112 Pa.Commw. 477, 480, 536 A.2d 458, 459-60 (1988) (answer and new matter to Rule 324 motion raised Commonwealth request for forfeiture). Where, as here, the only matter before the court is a motion for return of property, a necessary element which must be proven to warrant the granting of the motion is the right of the moving party to lawful possession. The Notes of Testimony of the hearing on the motion before the Honorable James D. McCrudden contain the following exchange between the court and counsel for both parties: Notes of Testimony, September 26, 1988, pages 4-8 (emphasis added). From this transcript it is apparent that the Commonwealth initially recognized the procedural distinction between return of property cases and forfeiture cases. It is also apparent that the hearing court readily conceded its unfamiliarity with the procedure. Sadly, the only evidence offered at the hearing was by Police Officer Matrisciano on the issue of whether the money seized would be determined *193 to be derivative contraband. There was no attempt to establish ownership or entitlement to lawful possession at any time during the hearing. Where the trial court is not provided with credible evidence as to ownership or entitlement, a motion for return of money should not be granted. Cf. Grossman v. Commissioner of Police, 318 Pa.Super. 584, 588, 465 A.2d 1007, 1009-10 (1983) (failure of movant to show he is the real owner of money seized). We conclude that Pomerantz has failed to sustain his burden, on a motion for return of property, that he is entitled to lawful possession, as required by Rule 324(a). We also conclude that the Commonwealth may not benefit from an order granting forfeiture where no petition for forfeiture has been presented to the court. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 298 Pa.Super. 272, 279 n. 2, 444 A.2d 1170, 1174 n. 2 (1982). We express no opinion as to whether the Commonwealth might prevail, were a petition for forfeiture pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-128 to be filed. Accordingly, that portion of the order of November 23, 1988 which denied return of the money is affirmed. That portion of the order purporting to grant relief to the Commonwealth on a nonexistent petition for forfeiture is vacated. Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. [1] Repealed and replaced by Section 4 of the Act of June 30, 1988 (P.L. 464, at 326-331, No. 79), 42 Pa.C.S., Chapter 68, §§ 6801, 6802.