Title: Andrew Richard Lukeheart v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC90507
____________
ANDREW LUKEHART,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 28, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Andrew Lukehart.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  We affirm the convictions of first-degree murder and aggravated child
abuse and the sentence of death.  However, we remand to the trial court for a
resentencing on the aggravated child abuse conviction and direct the trial court to
complete the sentencing guidelines scoresheet.
FACTS
The victim in this case, five-month-old Gabrielle Hanshaw, was killed by
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Lukehart, who lived in Jacksonville with Gabrielle's mother, Misty Rhue, along with
Rhue's other daughter, Ashley, and Rhue's father and uncle.  On February 25,
1996, Lukehart and Rhue spent Sunday afternoon running errands in Rhue's car
with the two children.  When the four returned to their house on Epson Lane, Rhue
took two-year-old Ashley, who had been ill, to her bedroom for a nap, and
Lukehart cared for Gabrielle, the baby, in another room.  At one point, Lukehart
entered the bedroom and took a clean diaper for the baby.  At approximately 5
p.m., Rhue heard her car starting in the driveway, looked out the window, and saw
Lukehart driving away in her white Oldsmobile.  Rhue searched the house for the
baby and did not find her.  Thirty minutes later, Lukehart called from a convenience
store and told Rhue to call the 911 emergency number because someone in a blue
Chevrolet Blazer had kidnapped the baby from the house.  After Rhue called 911,
Jacksonville Sheriff's Detectives Tim Reddish and Phil Kearney went to the Epson
Lane house.
Shortly thereafter, Lukehart appeared without shirt or shoes in the front yard
of the residence of a Florida Highway Patrol trooper in rural Clay County.  At
about that same time, the car that Lukehart had been driving was discovered about
a block away from the trooper's house.  The car was off the road and had been
abandoned with its engine running.  Law enforcement officers from the Clay
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County Sheriff's Office and the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office interviewed Lukehart
and searched in Clay County for the baby during the ensuing eighteen hours.  At
about noon on Monday, February 26, Lukehart told a lieutenant with the Clay
County Sheriff's Office that he had dropped the baby on her head and then shook
the baby and that the baby had died at Misty Rhue's residence.  Lukehart said that
when the baby died, he panicked, left Rhue's residence, and threw the baby in a
pond near Normandy Boulevard in Jacksonville.  Law enforcement officers
searched that area and found the baby's body in a pond.
On March 7, 1996, Lukehart was indicted on one count of first-degree
murder and one count of aggravated child abuse.  The trial was held February 26
and February 27, 1997.  During the trial, the State put into evidence the testimony
of law enforcement officers who were involved in the search for the baby and who
were with Lukehart during the evening of February 25 through the morning of
February 26, 1996.  The State also presented statements made by Lukehart.  The
State presented the testimony of the medical examiner, who testified that the baby's
body revealed bruises on her head and arm that occurred close to the time of death
and that prior to death the baby had received five blows to her head, two of which
created fractures.
Lukehart chose to testify in his defense at trial.  Before Lukehart testified, the
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trial court appropriately advised him that he had a right not to testify and that if he
did testify, he would be subject to cross-examination.  In his testimony, Lukehart
said that, while he was changing the baby's diaper on the floor at Rhue's residence,
the baby repeatedly pushed up on her elbows.  He forcefully and repeatedly pushed
her head and neck onto the floor "until the last time I did it she just stopped
moving, she was just completely still."  Lukehart testified to being six-feet one-inch
tall and weighing 225 pounds.  He stated that he used "quite a bit" of force to push
the baby down.  He testified that he tried mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, and when
the baby did not revive, he panicked and grabbed the baby and drove to a rural
area.  He said that when he stopped and was in the process of getting out of the
car, he accidentally hit the baby's head on the car door.  Lukehart testified that he
threw the baby into the pond where her body was found.  He admitted that he had
not told law enforcement officers the truth in his earlier accounts of the incident and
that, although he did not intend to kill the baby, he was responsible for her death. 
He said that he eventually told Lieutenant Jimm Redmond of the Clay County
Sheriff's Office that he was responsible for the baby's death and that he had
revealed the location of the baby's body because "I felt bad, I felt guilty."
The jury convicted Lukehart of first-degree murder and aggravated child
abuse as charged.  At the penalty phase, the State established that Lukehart had
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pleaded guilty to felony child abuse for injuring his former girlfriend’s baby and that
Lukehart was on probation for that prior felony conviction.  By a vote of nine to
three, the jury recommended death.  In its sentencing order, the trial court found
that the following three statutory aggravators had been established:  (1) that the
murder was committed during commission of the felony of aggravated child abuse;
(2) that the victim was under twelve years of age; and (3) that appellant had a prior
violent felony conviction and was on felony probation (two factors merged).  The
trial court also found and gave some weight to the statutory mitigators of
Lukehart’s age (twenty-two) and his substantially impaired capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.  The court found and gave some weight to the following nonstatutory
mitigators:  Lukehart's alcoholic and abusive father; Lukehart’s drug and alcohol
abuse; Lukehart’s being sexually abused and suicidal as a child; and Lukehart's
being employed.  Finding that aggravators outweighed mitigators, the court
sentenced Lukehart to death for the first-degree murder conviction and to fifteen
years’ imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction.
In this Court, Lukehart appeals his convictions and death sentence and raises
1Lukehart claims that:  (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress Lukehart's statements; (2)
the trial court erred by limiting cross-examination; (3) Lukehart's convictions of first-degree murder and
aggravated battery are invalid because of insufficient evidence of premeditation and the lack of a felony
independent of the homicide; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on justifiable or excusable
homicide; (5) Lukehart's death sentence is disproportionate; (6) the trial court erred in finding that the
murder in the course of a felony aggravator had been established; (7) the trial court erred in applying
the new aggravator of a crime committed while on felony probation; (8) the trial court erred in finding
both murder in the course of a felony and that the victim was under twelve as aggravators (improper
doubling); (9) the victim-under-twelve aggravator and the standard jury instruction on the aggravator
are unconstitutional; (10) the trial court erred in allowing a collateral crime (found to be a prior violent
felony) to be a feature of the penalty phase; (11) the prosecutor's closing argument comments during
the penalty phase were fundamental error; and (12) the trial court erred regarding the sentence for the
noncapital conviction and the restitution orders.
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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twelve claims.1
GUILT PHASE
Suppression Claim
Lukehart first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress his statements to law enforcement officers.  Specifically, he argues that
his statements were not voluntary because the officers (1) did not initially advise
him of his Miranda2 rights when he was handcuffed and waiting for detectives to
arrive; (2) denied him counsel and interrogated him after his unequivocal request for
a lawyer; and (3) coerced his statement regarding his role in the victim's death by
advising him repeatedly of his Miranda rights during the investigation, by showing
him a picture of the victim, and by referring to the need to find the baby's body in
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order to have a Christian burial.
Lukehart argues that all of his statements to law enforcement officers were
illegally obtained and thus should not have been allowed into evidence at trial.  He
contends that his exculpatory statements, which the State introduced through law
enforcement officers during its case-in-chief and which Lukehart recanted at trial,
were harmful because they portrayed Lukehart as a liar and were irrelevant to the
manner in which the baby died.  He maintains that introduction of his inculpatory
statements deprived him of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination.  Therefore, Lukehart asks this Court to grant him a new trial.
In his pretrial suppression motion, Lukehart moved to suppress the
statements made to law enforcement officers during the eighteen-hour period
beginning the early evening of February 25, 1996, when he walked out of the
wooded area in Clay County into the yard of the highway patrol trooper, and
ending with his arrest after he led law enforcement officers to the baby's body. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  The defense
renewed its objection at trial.
Suppression Hearing Testimony
At the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court heard
extensive testimony from the law enforcement officers and from Lukehart.  We find
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it necessary to set out that evidence in detail for an accurate understanding of the
flow of events during this eighteen-hour period between the death of the baby and
Lukehart's statement at about noon the following day that he had caused the baby's
death.
This evidence includes the testimony of Florida Highway Patrol Trooper
Richard Earl Davis, Jr., who at about 7 p.m. on February 25, 1996, was watching
television with his family in his home located in a sparsely populated area in rural
Clay County.  After hearing a helicopter flying over his house and seeing "the front
yard lit up," Trooper Davis called 911 and was told "there was a white male that
was in the woods, that they were looking for that possibly abducted a five month
old baby."  Trooper Davis went outside and almost immediately saw a white male
wearing only shorts and tennis shoes "in the ditch coming up toward my house."
That person, who was later identified as Lukehart, said something that
Trooper Davis believed was "I'm the one they're looking for."  Trooper Davis went
back into his house and obtained his gun belt and handcuffs.  Trooper Davis
returned outside five seconds later and saw the white male still standing with his
hands up and heard him repeat, "I am the one they are looking for."  Trooper Davis
told Lukehart to turn around, and he handcuffed Lukehart's hands.  Trooper Davis
testified that he did this "for officer safety also, you know, that he said they were
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looking for him, so that was basically it, I put them on for custody reasons."
Trooper Davis then "asked him where the baby was at."  Trooper Davis
testified that Lukehart "said he didn't know what the hell [Davis] was talking about,
[and to] read him his rights."  Trooper Davis did not read him his rights and asked
no more questions.  He communicated by telephone to law enforcement officers, "I
ha[ve] the guy."
Less than a minute after Trooper Davis placed handcuffs on Lukehart, Clay
County Sheriff's Deputy Jeff Gardner arrived in his marked patrol car and
transported Lukehart away from Trooper Davis's yard.  The total time that Lukehart
had been under the control of Trooper Davis was estimated by Trooper Davis to
be two minutes.
Deputy Gardner testified that around 6 p.m. on February 25, he was sent by
his dispatcher to Clay County Road 217 in reference to a vehicle accident.  When
he arrived at the vehicle scene, he "observed a vehicle approximately 50 feet off the
roadway in the woods.  It had gone between a telephone pole and the wire."  The
ignition of the car was still on, the lights on the dash were still on, and the car was
in drive.  He observed "a baby chair in the back seat on the passenger side and
some baby clothes on the floorboard."  Deputy Gardner informed his dispatcher of
the vehicle license number, and the dispatcher advised him that the vehicle had not
3Misty Rhue testified that Lukehart drove away from her house in her car, a white 1981
Oldsmobile.  This factual discrepancy is immaterial for purposes of this decision.
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been reported stolen.  The dispatcher then cross-referenced a telephone number for
the vehicle owner, and the dispatcher called this number.  The dispatcher advised
Deputy Gardner that officers from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office were at the
residence of the vehicle owner.
Deputy Gardner called the telephone number he had been given for the
vehicle owner and spoke with a person identified as being with the Jacksonville
Sheriff's Office.  That person told Gardner that the vehicle had been involved in an
apparent abduction and that the vehicle's owner was named Lukehart.3  That person
also told Deputy Gardner that "from what he knew somebody came in and took a
five [month] old infant . . . right out the door and got into a blue Chevrolet Blazer
and took off down the road, and [Lukehart] followed."
About five minutes later, Deputy Gardner was advised by his dispatcher that
the owner of the vehicle, Lukehart, was with Trooper Davis at Trooper Davis's
residence.  That residence was approximately a block from where Deputy Gardner
was waiting with the vehicle.  Deputy Gardner proceeded to Trooper Davis's
residence and arrived there about one minute later.  When Deputy Gardner drove
up to the house, he saw Trooper Davis standing with Lukehart in front of the
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house.  Deputy Gardner walked up to Lukehart and "asked him what was going
on."  Lukehart replied, "I don't want to speak to anybody until I see a lawyer." 
Lukehart then "looked over toward a tree there and said, ‘I just tried to kill
myself.’" Lukehart further stated that he had taken his shirt off, tied it to his neck
and also to a limb on the tree, and tried to jump out of the tree in order to hang
himself. Deputy Gardner testified that he had noticed a slight redness on Lukehart's
neck.
Deputy Gardner said he next asked Lukehart to accompany him back to the
place where the abandoned vehicle was found nearby.  Deputy Gardner testified
that he did not place Lukehart under arrest and he did not at that time have any
basis for arresting Lukehart.  Lukehart agreed to return to the abandoned vehicle.
As Deputy Gardner and Lukehart were traveling the quarter mile to the site of the
vehicle, Lukehart pointed to a tree and said, "[T]hat's where I just tried to hang
myself."  Deputy Gardner testified that, once they arrived at the site of the vehicle,
he kept Lukehart handcuffed for Lukehart's own protection because of the suicide
threat.  The two waited for Deputy Gardner's supervisor to arrive.  Deputy Gardner
testified that he did not interrogate or question Lukehart during this waiting period. 
Deputy Gardner said that, while they waited, Lukehart stood outside the patrol car,
leaned against the car, and smoked cigarettes that Deputy Gardner had obtained for
4The Baker Act, also known as the Florida Mental Health Act, provides in part that "a law
enforcement officer shall take a person who appears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination into
custody." § 394.463(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1995).
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him.  During the waiting period, Lukehart stated, "I wish she hadn't shit in her
diaper."  Lukehart also said, "[I]t's not going to look good on me now. . . .  I was
arrested for child abuse before but I didn't do it."
Deputy Gardner testified that Lukehart also said several times during this
period that he wanted to talk with detectives.  Detective Lavelle Goff of the
Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and Lieutenant Thomas Waugh of the Clay County
Sheriff's Office arrived within about an hour, and Deputy Gardner turned Lukehart
over to them.
When Deputy Gardner and Lukehart arrived at the place where Lukehart's
vehicle had been abandoned, Officer Richard G. Davis of the Jacksonville Sheriff's
Office was there with the vehicle.  Officer Davis testified that Lukehart was kept in
handcuffs because Lukehart said he had tried to commit suicide and that Officer
Davis was under the impression that Clay County law enforcement officers were
holding Lukehart under the Baker Act.4  Officer Davis testified that no one tried to
question Lukehart after he requested a lawyer.  Officer Davis said that Lukehart
said:  "I guess my girlfriend is going to be mad at me now." Lukehart also asked
several times "when was [he] going to get a chance to tell [his] side of the story." 
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Officer Davis said he responded to the statement that "we had some fellow
detectives coming out from Jacksonville to talk to him."
Detective Goff arrived at the scene where Lukehart and the vehicle were
waiting at about 8 p.m. on February 26, 1996.  At the time of this investigation,
Detective Goff had been with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office for twenty-six years
and had been a detective for sixteen years.  Detective Goff was told that Lukehart's
vehicle "had run off the road and was wrecked and that [Lukehart] was being
detained at that time."  Detective Goff was told that Lukehart had "told Trooper
Davis to read him his rights," that Lukehart had asked for a lawyer, and that
Lukehart had tried to hang himself with a T-shirt.  Detective Goff was then told by
another officer at the scene that Lukehart "wanted to talk to a detective."
Detective Goff testified that, after talking with other officers, he walked over
to the patrol car where Lukehart was sitting.  As to his conversation with Lukehart,
Detective Goff testified that he said:
I understand that you want to talk with a detective but I understand
also that you asked for a lawyer earlier.
And [Lukehart] said, yes, I did but . . . I asked for a lawyer
because I heard the officers talking about previous arrests.
And [Goff] said well, you know, do you want to talk to us
now?
And [Lukehart] said yes, he did.
So at that time [Goff] said well, before I talk to you because
you've asked for a lawyer I want to go through your constitutional
5The rights card, which was admitted into evidence, provides as follows:
YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
You have the following rights under the United States Constitution.
You do not have to make a statement or say anything.
Anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before you make
     a statement or before any questions are asked of you, and to have the lawyer
     with you during any questioning.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any
     questioning if you wish.
If you do answer questions, you have the right to stop answering questions at any
     time and consult with a lawyer.
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rights with you.  And at that time I advised him of his constitutional
rights.
Detective Goff said that he read to Lukehart his full Miranda rights card.5  During
this reading, Lukehart interrupted the reading and said, "I understand my rights,"
but Detective Goff said he continued to read the rights card word-for-word.
Lieutenant Waugh corroborated Detective Goff's testimony concerning his reading
of the Miranda rights card to Lukehart.
According to further testimony in the suppression hearing, Detective Tim
Reddish of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office received a call concerning the
abduction of the baby and responded first to the home of Misty Rhue on Epson
Lane at about 7 p.m. on February 25.  He questioned Rhue and her father at that
time.  Detective Reddish was advised at approximately 8:15 p.m. that Lukehart had
-15-
been located in Clay County.  He went to the scene where Lukehart and his vehicle
were located and arrived there about 9 p.m.  Detective Reddish testified that he
again administered Miranda rights to Lukehart even though he had been told that
Detective Goff had already done so "[b]ecause before I spoke to him I wanted to
be sure that he understood his rights as well."  Lukehart did not ask for a lawyer in
Detective Reddish's presence.  Detective Reddish stated that the questions he then
asked Lukehart pertained directly to the whereabouts of the baby.  Lukehart gave
him details about a person in a blue Chevrolet Blazer who had fled with the baby.
Detective Reddish transported Lukehart in Reddish's patrol car from the
Lukehart vehicle scene in Clay County to Misty Rhue's residence on Epson Lane in
Jacksonville.  From the Epson Lane house, Detective Reddish transported Lukehart
to the Jacksonville Police Memorial Building.  Rhue and her father also were taken
to the police building.  The three of them were separated for interviews.  Detective
Reddish testified that he removed the handcuffs from Lukehart inside the police
building.  Lukehart disputed that statement and said the handcuffs were not
removed until several hours after he arrived at the police building.
Detective Reddish testified that, prior to interviewing Lukehart at the police
building, he again read Lukehart the Miranda rights form.  In evidence is a
constitutional rights form signed by Lukehart showing the time as 3 a.m. on
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February 26, 1996.  Lukehart did not ask for a lawyer while he and Detective
Reddish were at the police building during the morning hours of February 26.
At about 6:45 a.m. on February 26, Detective Reddish and Lukehart left the
police building.  Lukehart had agreed to retrace the route where he said he had
followed the Chevrolet Blazer from the Epson Lane house to the place where his
vehicle had left the road in Clay County.  At that time, it is undisputed that Lukehart
was not handcuffed.  Detective Reddish and Lukehart first stopped at a Burger
King and ate breakfast.  They next stopped at a Wal-Mart store where Reddish
bought Lukehart some clothes because the clothes he had been given at the police
building did not fit him.  Detective Reddish testified that at that time he considered
Lukehart to be an eyewitness to an abduction.  The two traveled from Epson Lane
to the scene where the abandoned Lukehart vehicle was located.  The Clay County
Sheriff's Office had set up a command post as part of their efforts to search the
area for the missing baby.  Approximately twenty-five to thirty law enforcement
officers were involved.  The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office was also conducting an
ongoing aerial search for the baby.
At about 10:30 a.m. on February 26, Lieutenant Jimm Redmond of the Clay
County Sheriff's Office asked to speak to Lukehart.  At about that same time,
Detective Reddish was asked to coordinate the air search from the vantage point of
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the police helicopter because he had pieced together Lukehart's route on the
previous day.  Detective Reddish left in the helicopter, and Lieutenant Redmond
stayed with Lukehart.
Lieutenant Redmond had been with the Clay County Sheriff's Office for
fifteen years when he was notified about 5:45 a.m. on February 26 that the search
for the baby was being conducted in Clay County.  He first came into contact with
Lukehart at about 10:30 a.m. that same day.  At that time, Lieutenant Redmond was
the supervising lieutenant of the Crimes Against Persons Unit of the Clay County
Sheriff's Office.  He stated that he asked the Jacksonville Sheriff's detectives to
allow him to seek from Lukehart additional information to assist in locating the
baby or the person in the Chevrolet Blazer who was purported to have abducted
the baby.  Lieutenant Redmond had been told by his supervisor that Lukehart had
witnessed the abduction and had pursued the Blazer but had lost sight of it in Clay
County.
When Lieutenant Redmond first came into contact with Lukehart, Lukehart
was seated alone in Detective Reddish's patrol car.  He was not handcuffed.
Lieutenant Redmond entered Detective Reddish's vehicle and sat in the driver's
seat.  He told Lukehart that he understood that Lukehart had pursued a subject in a
blue Blazer who had abducted the baby from Jacksonville, that Lukehart had
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followed the Blazer into Clay County and had lost sight of it, and that Lukehart
subsequently had driven his car off the road.
During this discussion between Lieutenant Redmond and Lukehart, a
photograph of the baby was handed into the vehicle to Lieutenant Redmond.
Lieutenant Redmond looked at the photograph and then showed it to Lukehart,
who said, "[D]on't show me the picture."  Lieutenant Redmond asked him for a
reason and Lukehart "just said he didn't want to look at the picture."  Lukehart did
verify that the picture portrayed the baby.  Lieutenant Redmond then told Lukehart
that he did not believe Lukehart's story about the blue Blazer and that he believed
that if Lukehart continued with that story, he would be arrested for murder.  He
further told Lukehart that it was important to find the baby to get her out of the hot
sun, because the family needed closure, and because the baby should have "a
decent burial."
Lieutenant Redmond testified that he put the photograph in his breast pocket. 
Fifteen to twenty minutes later, Lukehart told Lieutenant Redmond that the blue
Blazer story was not true.  Lukehart said he wanted to tell Lieutenant Redmond the
circumstances of the baby's death, but before he did so he wanted to move from
the location where the two had been sitting in the patrol car.  Lieutenant Redmond
and Lukehart then relocated from Detective Reddish's vehicle to Lieutenant
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Redmond's vehicle, and Lieutenant Redmond drove to a cul de sac less than a
quarter of a mile away.  Lieutenant Redmond testified as to the statement Lukehart
gave as the two sat alone in the patrol car:
Briefly he said that he was changing the baby's diapers, that he
was cradling, holding the baby, and that the baby was squirming, he
dropped the baby on the baby's head.  He told me that he yanked the
baby up and he knew he hurt the baby when he did that.  Subsequent
to that, he shook the baby trying to revive the baby.  And said he
knew she was dead.
Lukehart then told Lieutenant Redmond the location of the baby's body, which was
not in Clay County.  Rather, the body was in a pond off Normandy Boulevard in
Jacksonville.  Lukehart directed Lieutenant Redmond and Detective Reddish to the
body.  After finding the baby's body, Lieutenant Redmond and Detective Reddish
asked Lukehart to sign another Miranda rights form, and Lukehart did so. Lukehart
then wrote out a four-page statement describing the events surrounding the baby's
death.
According to Lukehart's testimony at the suppression hearing, he was
handcuffed much longer than Detective Reddish indicated.  Lukehart said that he
did first tell Lieutenant Redmond the abduction story, but Lieutenant Redmond told
him that he needed to help the police find the baby so the baby could have a
Christian burial or, if she was alive, she could receive medical assistance in time to
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save her.  Lukehart said he was crying when Lieutenant Redmond waved the baby's
photograph in front of him.  Lukehart said that he requested a lawyer several times
but admitted that this was before Detective Goff read him the Miranda rights card. 
Lukehart admitted that he signed the rights form and made the checkmarks on the
rights form.
Legal Analysis of Suppression Claim
The first subissue within the suppression claim is whether Lukehart received
adequate Miranda warnings.  Lukehart argues that all of the statements he made
from the moment he first encountered Trooper Davis at approximately 8 p.m. on
the evening of the baby's disappearance through his statements that led to the
finding of the baby's body the following day should have been suppressed in
accord with the decisions of United States Supreme Court and this Court as to
Miranda protections against forced self-incrimination.  We do not agree.
Here, the trial court found that Lukehart was neither in custody nor being
interrogated during the period before he waived his Miranda rights.  As to custody,
it is undisputed that Lukehart was handcuffed for his own protection because he
told Trooper Davis that he had tried to kill himself during an early stage of the
investigation prior to his Miranda waivers.  In his written statement given to law
enforcement officers after his Miranda waivers, Lukehart wrote concerning the
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initial period he spent in the yard of Trooper Davis:  "I wandered into the yard of a
state trooper . . . and asked him to notify the police and let them know where I was. 
I even asked him  to restrain me."
As to interrogation, the evidence supports the trial court's findings that the
police considered Lukehart to be an eyewitness rather than a suspect before he
waived his Miranda rights in the presence of Detective Goff and Lieutenant Waugh. 
Evidence also supports the trial court's finding that Lukehart made only voluntary
statements during that time period.
Such voluntary statements to law enforcement officers do not "warrant a
presumption of compulsion."  Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1990)
(quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985)).  The Supreme Court held in
Elstad that "[a] subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who
has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove
the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement."  470 U.S. at 314. 
Here, law enforcement officers did administer Miranda warnings subsequent to
Lukehart's unwarned voluntary statements.
In Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1998), we recently reiterated our
often-made statement that a determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of
a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an
6Under Miranda, a person "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way . . . must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in a court of law" and that he has the right
to the presence of a lawyer.  384 U.S. at 478-79 (emphasis added).
-22-
examination of the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 150.  See also Traylor v.
State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992).  The trial court determined, based upon this
substantial evidentiary record, that Lukehart voluntarily made his statements after
validly waiving his Miranda rights.  This determination is supported by the record.
Law enforcement officers are  not required to state the Miranda6 procedural
safeguard against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution or article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution unless a
person is both in custody and being interrogated.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980); Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966.  In Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 585
(Fla. 1997), we recently stated:
We agree with the reasoning in [Alston v. Redman, 34 F. 3d
1237 (3rd Cir. 1994)] and find it entirely consistent with the underlying
premise of Miranda.  Miranda's safeguards were intended to protect
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by countering the
compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation.  "[T]he presence of
both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger
the Miranda right to counsel prophylactic . . . . [A]bsent one or the
other, Miranda is not implicated."  Alston, 34 F. 3d at 1243 (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78).
Sapp, 690 So. 2d at 585.
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Under the facts before the trial court in this case, the court could reasonably
have concluded that through the time of the arrival of Detective Goff no
interrogation of Lukehart had been undertaken.  Moreover, we agree with the trial
court that there is competent, substantial evidence to conclude that through that
point in time Lukehart was not "in custody" as to the abduction of the baby.
At the end of the suppression hearing, Lukehart's argument was based upon
his complaint that Lieutenant Redmond had not advised him of his rights after
Lukehart told Lieutenant Redmond that he would tell him the truth.  In rejecting this
claim, the trial court stated:
Goff gives his constitutional rights, which the defendant freely admits
he received and then ultimately – Reddish, I should say, gives him
some constitutional rights when he comes on the scene, he transports
him down to the Police Memorial Building, gives him some more
constitutional rights.  In the meantime, they are now signing rights.
So how many does he have to give before they stick? That's my
point, I mean, if he had never been given any rights, anything that he
said after he said I want a lawyer up to the time that he was given his
constitutional rights, anything that was obtained by – from the
defendant was something that he voluntarily gave, not that it was
solicited by way of a question by any officers.
. . . [W]hen does the constitutional rights – when do we have to
quit giving it to him?  He said on each occasion he signed at least one
form that he understood it all, so where is the point there that we don't
have to continue giving him rights?
We believe the trial court's conclusion is supported by the evidence, and that under
the totality of the circumstances, Lukehart's statements were obtained in a manner
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compatible with the requirements of the United States and Florida Constitutions.
Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1995).
In the second subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that the trial court
erred in admitting his statements into evidence because, although he had invoked
his right to counsel very early on the evening of February 25 by saying to Officer
Davis that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, police had interrogated him without
providing him with a lawyer.  Lukehart contends that the interrogation violated
principles set forth in Edwards v. Arizona,  451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Traylor, 596
So. 2d at 966, which hold that once a person in custody has requested a lawyer, all
interrogation must stop until that person has a lawyer present.  However, as set
forth in detail in the law enforcement officers' testimony in the suppression hearing,
the officers did not begin interrogating Lukehart until after Lukehart initiated the
conversations by repeatedly stating that he wanted to talk to detectives to "tell his
side of the story."  Even then, the questioning began only after Lukehart had waived
his Miranda rights.
As to the claim in this Court regarding Lukehart's request for a lawyer, we
rejected a similar argument recently in Jennings.  718 So. 2d at 150.  As noted
previously, Lukehart initiated the contact with Detective Goff by requesting the
opportunity to "tell his side of the story."  Detective Goff responded appropriately
-25-
by telling Lukehart that he understood that Lukehart had requested a lawyer
previously and that he would talk with him only after he read Lukehart his Miranda
rights.  In this situation, we find our statement in Jennings to be controlling:
In short, the totality of the circumstances establishes that even if
Jennings invoked his right to counsel, see State v. Owen, he voluntarily
initiated further contact with the police.  He gave the statements he
now seeks to suppress after voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waiving the Miranda rights.
Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 150 (citation omitted).
Likewise, in Traylor, we earlier held:
Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can
reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody
unless the lawyer is present, although the suspect is free to volunteer a
statement to police on his or her own initiative at any time on any
subject in the absence of counsel.
Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).  After talking with
Detective Goff, Lukehart volunteered statements to detectives and waived the right
to counsel three more times.  Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion
to suppress on Miranda right-to-counsel grounds.
As his third subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that law enforcement
officers coerced him to make his statements by using three illegal tactics.  First,
Lukehart contends that his statements were erroneously admitted because they had
been obtained after police read him his Miranda rights so many times that the very
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reading of the rights became a coercive action.  Lukehart cites Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), in which the Supreme Court held that when a
suspect in custody requests counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is
present and may not be reinitiated without counsel present, even if the accused has
consulted with his or her attorney.  Id. at 153.  The Court explained that the
purpose of its holding was to protect suspects from "persistent attempts by
officials to persuade him to waive his rights."  Id.  Here, the law enforcement
officers testified at the suppression hearing that they read Lukehart his Miranda
rights four times:  twice at the Clay County scene, once at the Police Memorial
Building, and once at the Duval County scene where Gabrielle's body was found.
Under the totality of these circumstances, we find that this repeated reading of
constitutional rights was an effort to provide the procedural safeguards at every
step of the investigation and not an attempt to persist in attempts to persuade
Lukehart to talk to the law enforcement officers.
Lukehart's own testimony does not support this argument on appeal.  In
contrast to the appellant in Minnick, Lukehart had voluntarily given police
information about the disappearance of the victim and repeatedly said to Officer
Davis that he wanted to tell his side of the story.  We find that no coercion
occurred in the administration of the Miranda warnings.
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Lukehart next alleges that Lieutenant Redmond used the so-called "Christian
burial technique" of interrogation, which this Court found in Roman v. State, 475
So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1985), to be "unquestionably a blatantly coercive and deceptive
ploy."  Id. at 1232.  Lieutenant Redmond testified at the suppression hearing that he
merely told Lukehart that law enforcement officers needed to find the baby's body
so that she could have a "decent" burial.  However, as in Roman and Hudson v.
State, 538 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1989), we consider the totality of the
circumstances and find that the reference to finding the body so that it could be
buried was insufficient to make an otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible.  In
this case, the evidence was in conflict as to whether the word "Christian" was used. 
There was no evidence that Lieutenant Redmond knew anything about Lukehart's
religious beliefs.  Moreover, we find that the use of this tactic, no matter how the
officer worded the burial comment, did not directly result in Lukehart's giving his
statement, and, thus, the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the
statements that Lukehart made subsequent to Lieutenant Redmond's burial
comment.
Finally, Lukehart argues that Lieutenant Redmond's showing him a
photograph of the baby was coercive in that it prompted Lukehart to become
emotional and then to confess.  Lieutenant Redmond testified that, as he sat in a
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patrol car with Lukehart, someone handed him a photograph to help to identify the
baby and Lukehart saw it.  In the suppression hearing, Lukehart testified that he did
not find the viewing of such a photograph for identification purposes to be unusual. 
Moreover, as with the burial comment, we find that the photograph did not directly
result in Lukehart's statement, which he had already agreed to give. Thus, we find
that this subissue of the suppression claim has no merit. Accordingly, we uphold
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress Lukehart's statements.
Other Guilt Phase Claims
In his second claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred by limiting
cross-examination of Deputy Gardner as to whether police had provided a lawyer
for Lukehart after his request for counsel.  Lukehart argues that the refusal of the
trial court to allow the cross-examination, which was intended to cast doubt upon
the voluntariness of Lukehart's statements to police, violated his rights of
confrontation, due process, and fair trial under the United States and Florida
Constitutions.  The relevant exchange during cross-examination of Deputy Gardner
was as follows:
Q
He also told you he wanted a lawyer, didn't he?
A
Yes, he did.
Q
Was one provided him by you?
[Prosecutor]:  Objection, that's not relevant to the trial.
That's already been determined by this Court.
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THE COURT:  Sustained.
While trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination based on concerns about interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant, Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1997), we believe
that, in this case, the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination because
Lukehart should have been allowed to inform the jury of his lack of counsel at that
point.  However, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the
totality of the evidence, which demonstrated that the statements were voluntarily
made and that Lukehart was without counsel at the time he was talking to Detective
Goff, Detective Reddish, and Lieutenant Redmond.
In his third claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal after the trial because (1) the evidence did not
prove premeditated murder, and (2) Lukehart's dual convictions violate double
jeopardy principles and thus the felony murder conviction cannot stand because it
is based on the underlying felony conviction for aggravated child abuse.
As to premeditation, the first subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that
no eyewitnesses saw the murder and that evidence of physical injuries to the baby
is insufficient, in view of the other evidence, to sustain the charge that the murder
was premeditated.  In support of his argument, he cites Kirkland v. State, 684 So.
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2d 732 (Fla. 1996), in which this Court held that the State did not prove
premeditation based on evidence of a severe neck wound caused by many slashes
with a knife.  Id. at 735.  The State counters that Lukehart's testimony that he knew
the baby was hurt because she cried after the first blow is evidence of
premeditation, citing Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1981), for the proposition
that premeditation "may occur a moment before the act."  Id. at 967.
A premeditated design to take the life of the person killed is an essential
element of premeditated murder.  Forehand v. State, 126 Fla. 464, 171 So. 241, 242
(Fla. 1936).  This Court has recently defined premeditation:
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill;
it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.  This
purpose to kill may be formed a moment before the act
but must also exist for a sufficient length of time to permit
reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and
the probable result of that act.
“Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such
matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of
adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the
manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and
manner of the wounds inflicted.”
Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943-44 (Fla. 1998) (citations omitted) (quoting
Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 1986), and Holton v. State, 573 So.
2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990)).
7Section 782.04, Florida Statutes (1995), defines first-degree felony murder in relevant part:
(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being:
. . . . 
2.  When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the
attempt to perpetrate, . . . . 
. . . . 
(h) Aggravated child abuse,
. . . .
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Here, Rhue, her father, and her uncle all testified that Lukehart had been an
affectionate father figure to the baby.  Although Lukehart gave various accounts of
what occurred with the baby and stated that he killed the baby, there was a lack of
evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that Lukehart ever intended
the baby's death.  Thus, we find that the State did not prove premeditated first-
degree murder.
However, although we have found that the evidence in this case does not
support premeditation, reversal is not warranted because there was an alternate
theory of guilt, first-degree felony murder, for which evidence was sufficient.  See
San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1468
(1999).  Here, the record indicates that the trial court instructed the jury that it could
return a guilty verdict for first-degree murder if it found that the prosecution had
proven either premeditated murder or first-degree felony murder.7  For a first-
degree felony murder conviction, the jury was instructed, pursuant to the Florida
8Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in relevant part:  "(1) Aggravated child
abuse is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who:  (a) commits aggravated battery on a
child."
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Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, that it was "not necessary for the
State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill." 
Rather, the court told the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the following felony murder elements:
One, Gabrielle Hanshaw is dead, two, that death occurred as a
consequence of and while Andrew Richard Lukehart was engaged in
the commission of aggravated child abuse, three, Andrew Richard
Lukehart was the person who actually killed Gabrielle Hanshaw.
As to "the commission of aggravated child abuse," the jury was instructed,
pursuant to the standard jury instructions, that it had to find Lukehart guilty of
battery by finding that Lukehart had "intentionally or knowingly" caused great
bodily harm to the child and that the child was under eighteen years of age.  In
addition to returning a general verdict of first-degree murder, based on either
premeditated or felony murder, the jury convicted Lukehart on a separate charge of
aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).8 The
Duval County grand jury indictment charged that the aggravated child abuse was
"by inflicting blunt trauma to the head of the [baby]."  The jury was instructed that,
in order to return a guilty verdict, it had to find that the State proved beyond a
9Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in relevant part:
(1)(a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
1.  Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement . . . .
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reasonable doubt that Lukehart committed an aggravated battery.9
Our review of the record supports the jury's finding that Lukehart is guilty of
aggravated child abuse.  According to Lukehart's own testimony, Lukehart was six-
feet one-inch tall and weighed 225 pounds at the time of the baby's death.  He
forcibly pushed the baby down on the floor.  The jury could have reasonably
concluded that Lukehart was frustrated by the baby's need for a clean diaper and
by the baby's movement as he tried to change her diaper.  The jury's verdict is also
supported by the medical examiner's testimony that the baby died of injuries caused
by blunt trauma from five blows to her head, two of which caused fractures, that
the baby had bruises on her hand and arm that occurred shortly before her death,
and that these injuries could have resulted only from the use of substantial force. 
The medical examiner explained that "if you use your fist it will be that force [equal
to the force of dropping a child from a height greater than four to five feet] that you
need to fracture the skull."  Thus, because of the felony murder conviction, we find
no error in the trial court's denial of Lukehart's motion for judgment of acquittal.
As to the second subissue within this claim, we find Lukehart's argument that
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double jeopardy principles prohibit the dual convictions of felony murder and
aggravated child abuse to be without merit.  Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes
(1995), which provides the test for determining double jeopardy violations, does
not prohibit a defendant from being separately convicted and sentenced for felony
murder and the qualifying felony.
This issue was recently addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal in
Green v. State, 680 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), in an opinion which we
approve. Judge Cope wrote for the court:
Simply put, defendant can be convicted of both felony murder
and the qualifying felony because the felony murder statute says so. 
The Florida Supreme Court recently so held in Boler v. State, 678 So.
2d 319, 322 (Fla. 1996) . . . .
680 So. 2d at 1068.  We further agree with Judge Cope's analysis set forth in
Footnote 2 of that opinion:
Finally, in aggravated child abuse cases there is ordinarily overt
physical violence which is directed towards a child.  By specifically
including the category of aggravated child abuse within the felony
murder statute, the legislature clearly contemplated that both charges
can be made where violence directed at the child results in the death of
the child.
680 So. 2d at 1069 n.2.
Our affirmance of the convictions for both felony murder and aggravated
child abuse is in accord with this Court's decision in Boler.  However, Lukehart
10The amendment provided in relevant part: "(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and
sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction."  Ch.
88-131, § 7 at 709, Laws. of Fla.
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argues that our decision in Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985), should
control.  In that decision, we held that we did not believe it proper to convict a
defendant for aggravated battery and simultaneously for homicide as a result of one
shotgun blast.  Id. at 177.  We stated that we did not believe that the Legislature
intended convictions on both charges.  Id.  Subsequent to Mills, the Legislature
amended section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes,10 and in State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d
613 (Fla. 1989), this Court recognized the effect of the amendment by stating: 
"Multiple punishment shall be imposed for separate offenses even if only one act is
involved."  Id. at 616.  The statutory amendment also led this Court to our
conclusion in Boler, which controls in this case.  Boler, 678 So. 2d at 322. See also
Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 364 n.2 (Fla. 1994); Valdes v. State, 626 So. 2d
1316, 1322 n.8 (Fla. 1993); Dingle v. State, 699 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997).  Therefore, we find no merit in this claim.
In his fourth claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
allow him to waive the jury instructions on the defense of justifiable and excusable
homicide.  Lukehart provides no relevant support in statute or caselaw for this
argument, and we find no merit in the claim. 
-36-
Accordingly, we affirm Lukehart's convictions.
PENALTY PHASE
Lukehart raises a total of eight claims concerning his death sentence.  We
turn first to claims six through nine, in which Lukehart challenges the trial court’s
instructions upon and finding of certain aggravating circumstances.  Following our
analysis of these arguments, we will discuss Lukehart’s fifth claim, in which he 
argues that his death sentence is not a proportional punishment, and his remaining
three claims.
In his sixth claim, Lukehart argues that the aggravator that the murder was
committed in the course of a felony cannot be based on a felony that constituted
the homicidal act because there was no felony separate from the instant homicide. 
Lukehart contends that the rationale of Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla.
1985), should be applied to this claim because aggravated child abuse is an
enumerated felony in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1995).  We do not agree. 
Mills is not applicable to this issue.  In Mills we resolved a different issue, which
was whether a conviction of first-degree murder and aggravated battery could both
stand when arising out of the same act.  In Mills, we vacated the conviction of
aggravated battery.  See State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985), approved,
Boler v. State, 678 So 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 1996).  Mills does not involve the same
11Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:  "No bill of
attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."  Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution
provides in relevant part:  "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed."
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issue we have here.  In Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1997), we specifically
rejected the instant claim as to the murder in the course of a felony aggravator. 
Thus, we find no merit in this claim.
In his seventh claim, Lukehart contends that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that it could weigh as an aggravating circumstance the fact that Lukehart
was on felony probation at the time of the instant crime and then the court erred in
finding this aggravator in the sentencing order.  He asserts that the finding of this
aggravator violates the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Florida
Constitutions.11  The instant murder was committed on February 25, 1996, and
Lukehart’s sentencing proceeding began on March 13, 1997.  At the time of this
crime, the first aggravator listed in Florida’s death penalty statute provided in
relevant part:
(5) Aggravating circumstances -- Aggravating circumstances
shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under
sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control.
§ 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).  At the time of the murder, the aggravator
provided in subsection (5)(a) did not apply to persons on probation.  See Ferguson
-38-
v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 636 (Fla. 1982); Bolender v. State, 422 So. 2d 833, 837
(Fla. 1982); Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492, 499 (Fla. 1980).  Thereafter, the
Legislature amended section 921.141(5)(a) to add "or on probation," ch. 96-290, §
5 Laws of Fla., and further revised subsection (5)(a) to specify "felony probation"
and previous felony conviction.  Ch. 96-302, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Pursuant to these
amendments, probationary status did not become a statutory aggravator until May
30, 1996.
Over defense objection the trial court instructed the jury that in deliberating
its sentencing recommendation it could consider as an aggravator the fact that
Lukehart was on felony probation.  In his sentencing order, the judge found felony
probation as one of three aggravating circumstances.
Lukehart contends in this appeal that the Legislature's amendment of section
921.141(5)(a) to add probation to the list of statutory aggravators was a substantive
change in the law, not a mere refinement of the law as this Court found the
"community control" aggravating circumstance to be in Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d
1234 (Fla. 1996).  In Trotter, this Court held that the trial court's use of the fact that
the murder was committed while the defendant was on community control did not
violate the defendant's ex post facto rights, even though the crime and sentencing
took place before the sentencing provision was amended to add the "community
-39-
control" aggravator.  Id. at 1237.  Lukehart points to our reasoning in Trotter, in
which we found that “[c]ustodial restraint has served in aggravation in Florida since
the ‘sentence of imprisonment’ circumstance was created, and enactment of
community control [as an aggravator] simply extended traditional custody to
include ‘custody in the community.’”  690 So. 2d at 1237.  Lukehart argues that
this holding carries the implicit conclusion that community control was from its
inception a form of custodial restraint within the meaning of the "under sentence of
imprisonment" aggravator.  As to probation, Lukehart argues that until May 30,
1996, the death penalty statute contained no mention of probation as an element of
the "under sentence of imprisonment aggravator" at section 921.141(5) and, in fact,
Florida case law specifically held that probation was not an aggravator.  Ferguson;
Bolender; Peek.  Thus, Lukehart argues that the finding of probation as an
aggravator in this case was an ex post facto violation in that it produced an
increased risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes.  See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997); Dugger v. Williams, 593 So. 2d
180 (Fla. 1991).
We agree.  We conclude that the Legislature, in amending section
921.141(5)(a) to include the phrase "or on probation," altered the substantive law
by adding an entirely new aggravator to be considered in determining whether to
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impose a death sentence.  See State v. Hootman, 709 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (Fla.
1998).  Therefore, application of the aggravator in this case was a violation of
Lukehart's ex post facto rights.  Accordingly, we hold that the instruction upon and
finding of probation as a statutory aggravator in this case was error on the part of
the trial court.  However, we find this error to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt in light of the fact that the jury was aware that Lukehart was on probation for
the child abuse conviction.  Admission of evidence of that fact was relevant in the
proof of the prior violent felony aggravator as a showing of the proximity in time of
the prior felony infant abuse to the killing of the infant in this case.  The error is
likewise harmless as to the trial court's weighing of the aggravators and mitigators
because the trial judge merged the probation aggravator with the prior violent felony
aggravator in his sentencing order.
In his eighth claim, Lukehart argues that the trial court committed the error of
improper doubling by finding separately the two aggravating circumstances that the
murder was committed by a person engaged in aggravated child abuse and that the
victim was under twelve years of age.  We agree with this contention.  Improper
doubling occurs when aggravating factors refer to the same aspect of the crime. 
See Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976).  Here, both of the
challenged aggravators were based upon the victim's status as a child, and we find
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that allowing the two to operate as separate aggravators does constitute the
sentencing error of improper doubling.  However, we find this error to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  While the treating of these aggravators as two
aggravators is error, the fact that the victim was under twelve years of age is
properly considered in weighing the aggravating factor that the murder occurred
while Lukehart was engaged in the commission of aggravated child abuse.  The fact
that the victim was a helpless infant increases the weight of that aggravator.
In his ninth claim, Lukehart argues that the "victim under 12 years of age"
aggravator is unconstitutional in that it is over-inclusive and is a strict liability
determinant of life or death.  We find this argument to be procedurally barred in
that Lukehart did not object at trial on constitutional grounds to the jury instruction
on this aggravator.  Even if this claim were not procedurally barred, we would reject
it in view of our determination in this case that the victim's age was not properly
found as a separate aggravator.
As to Lukehart’s fifth claim, that his death sentence is not proportional, we
find no merit in this claim.  The court found three aggravators:  that the murder
occurred during commission of the felony of aggravated child abuse; that the victim
was under twelve years of age; and that Lukehart had been convicted of a prior
violent felony, which the court combined with the aggravator of Lukehart’s felony
-42-
probation status at the time of the murder.  Because of the court’s merging of the
felony probation aggravator with the prior violent felony aggravator, our finding of
error as to the probation aggravator has no effect upon the proportionality analysis. 
Likewise, our finding of improper doubling of aggravators is irrelevant to assessing
proportionality because the fact that the victim was under twelve years of age is
included in the weighing of the felony murder aggravator, which stems from
Lukehart’s conviction of aggravated child abuse.  Thus, we analyze the
proportionality of Lukehart’s sentence based upon a finding of the two valid
aggravating circumstances of prior violent felony and felony murder based upon
aggravated child abuse, each of which bears heavy weight in our analysis.
In arguing his proportionality claim, Lukehart contends that most child
murder cases in which trial courts have imposed and we have affirmed death
sentences are based upon factual situations including either sexual battery or
findings of the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), neither of
which was present in this case.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055 (Fla.
1997); Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997).  However, we find that the
absence of the trial court's finding of sexual assault or HAC is not determinative in
this case. 
This case is significantly aggravated by the existence of the prior conviction
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for felony child abuse.  Lukehart had previously pled guilty to felony child abuse
for shaking his former girlfriend's eight-month-old daughter, Jillian French, so hard
that the infant sustained a closed head injury resulting in seizures and visual deficits. 
This occurred on April 14, 1994.  The murder for which Lukehart was convicted
was committed less than two years after the felony abuse of that infant.  In fact,
Lukehart was still on probation for that prior felony conviction for abusing eight-
month-old Jillian when Lukehart killed another girlfriend's infant daughter, the five-
month-old infant victim in this case, on February 25, 1996.  Thus, Lukehart's prior
felony aggravator is an exceptionally weighty aggravating factor under the
circumstances of the present case.  See Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 672 (Fla.
1997); Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1996).  In addition, the trial court
found and weighed the felony murder aggravator, which was that the murder
occurred while Lukehart was engaged in the commission of aggravated child abuse.
Lukehart also urges us to find his case similar to Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d
720 (Fla. 1989), in which we commuted a death sentence to life in prison in a case
involving the murder of a twenty-nine-month-old child by a caregiver who was the
live-in boyfriend of the child’s mother.  Id. at 723.  However, Smalley is
distinguished in that the trial court in Smalley found just one aggravating
circumstance, HAC, along with four statutory mitigating circumstances and three
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factors in nonstatutory mitigation.  Id. at 721.  In Smalley, unlike the instant case,
the appellant first tried cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the child he had injured
and then rushed her to a medical facility.  Id.   Here, Lukehart concedes that, rather
than seeking medical attention for the infant he had injured, Lukehart drove her to a
secluded pond and left her to die.
As to mitigation in sentencing Lukehart, the trial court found and gave "some
weight" to the two statutory mitigators of Lukehart’s age (twenty-two) and his
substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and "some weight" to each of the
following four nonstatutory mitigators:  Lukehart's alcoholic and abusive father; his
drug and alcohol abuse; his being sexually abused as a child; and his being
employed.  This mitigation is not as extensive as the mitigation the court found and
weighed in Smalley.
In Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990), we found a death sentence to
be proportional and stated that “[b]ecause death is a unique punishment, it is
necessary in each case to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review
to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other
capital cases.  It is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.”  Id. at 1064 (citation omitted).  After considering the
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totality of the circumstances and the mitigation in this case, we find Lukehart’s
death sentence to be proportionate.  This murder of a defenseless infant falls within
the category of the most aggravated and least mitigated of capital crimes. 
Accordingly, we find no lack of proportionality with other cases wherein we have
affirmed a sentence of death.
In his tenth claim, Lukehart argues that the trial court erred in allowing a
collateral crime to become a feature of the penalty phase.  This claim is
procedurally barred because, as Lukehart admits, he did not object
contemporaneously that the State's evidence concerning the collateral child abuse
conviction became a feature of the penalty phase.  We have considered the record,
and we reject Lukehart's claim that this evidence became an undue focus of the
sentencing proceeding.  During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented three
witnesses to establish the prior violent felony conviction and one witness to
establish the "under sentence of imprisonment/felony probation" aggravator.  These
witnesses testified in a straightforward manner as to the injuries inflicted on Jillian
French, the eight-month-old infant, and the related charge of felony child abuse
against Lukehart and his subsequent plea bargain and four-year probation.  None of
these witnesses were relatives of the infant, and three of the four were cross-
examined.  In Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla. 1995), this Court held that
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details of prior violent felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to
the victim are admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial to help determine
whether to impose a death sentence.  Id. at 72.  Thus, we find that this claim, if it
had been preserved for appellate review, would have no merit.
Likewise, Lukehart's eleventh claim, in which he contends that the
prosecutor's closing argument was inflammatory and unsupported, is procedurally
barred because it was not preserved by contemporaneous objection and motion for
mistrial.  Even if the claim were not barred, our review of the record reveals no
reversible error in the closing argument in which the prosecutor asked the jury to
hold Lukehart responsible for his actions despite his deprived background.  We
have permitted wide latitude in arguing to a jury.  See Breedlove v. State, 413 So.
2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982).  The prosecution may properly argue that the defense has failed
to establish a mitigating factor and may also argue that the jury should not be
swayed by sympathy.  See Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 47 (Fla. 1991).  Thus,
even if this claim were preserved, we would find it to be without merit.
We also address Lukehart's twelfth claim, in which he argues that the trial
court erred regarding a restitution order and its sentencing order for Lukehart's
noncapital conviction of aggravated child abuse.  In light of Lukehart's failure to
raise a contemporaneous objection, we find to be procedurally barred his claim that
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the trial court erred in its imposition of restitution.  See Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d
845, 855 (Fla. 1997).  Within this issue Lukehart also claims that the trial court erred
in failing to fill out a sentencing guidelines scoresheet in imposing Lukehart's
concurrent fifteen-year prison sentence on the aggravated child abuse conviction. 
We agree with Lukehart that the trial court was required to complete a guidelines
scoresheet for the noncapital offense.  Thus, we remand for a resentencing on the
aggravated child abuse conviction and direct the court to properly complete the
guidelines scoresheet.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm Lukehart's convictions and his death sentence for
first-degree murder.  We remand for a resentencing on Lukehart's aggravated child
abuse conviction.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part as to sentence with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I cannot agree that the approval of the death sentence here is consistent with
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our controlling case law.  As noted by the majority opinion, our proportionality
review requires a consideration of “the totality of the circumstances in a case”
along with a comparison of “other capital cases” in order to determine if this case
is among the most aggravated and least mitigated murder cases that merit the death
penalty.  See majority op. at 45 (citing Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.
1986)).  A review of the majority opinion reflects that it has erroneously focused
only on the first prong of this analysis.  Further, it appears that based solely upon
the fact that the victim in this case was a five-month-old child, the majority has
established a rule that death is automatically the appropriate penalty without regard
to the balance of aggravation and mitigation that is required.  In fact, the majority is
unable to cite a single similar case we have decided in support of the death sentence
imposed here.
The most telling distinction between this case and all the prior cases in which
we have approved the death penalty for a child’s death is the serious aggravation
that is not present here.  Even the majority acknowledges that Lukehart did not
intend to kill the child:
     Here, Rhue, her father, and her uncle all testified that
Lukehart had been an affectionate father figure to the
baby.  Although Lukehart gave various accounts of what
occurred with the baby and stated that he killed the baby,
there was a lack of evidence from which it could
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reasonably be concluded that Lukehart ever intended the
baby's death.  Thus, we find that the State did not prove
premeditated first-degree murder.
The vast majority of cases involving the death of a child where the death penalty
has been approved by this Court consistently involve acts of sexual abuse or sexual
battery, and in all such cases, the HAC aggravator was established and found by
the trial court.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1997) (finding death
sentence proportional for the murder of a two-year-old girl where the trial judge
found that the murder was HAC and was committed during the course of a sexual
battery); Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (upholding death
sentence for murder and sexual battery of eleven-year-old girl where murder was
HAC and was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a
sexual battery and no mitigation was found).  As noted, this case did not involve
sexual acts and the HAC aggravator was neither pursued nor found.  
The absence of the HAC aggravator in this case is, of course, critical.  Just
recently, this Court reaffirmed that HAC, along with CCP, “are two of the most
serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme, and while their
absence is not controlling, it is also not without some relevance to a proportionality
analysis.”  Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  
The valid aggravation in this case consists of the fact that the murder was
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committed in the course of committing aggravated child abuse and the previous
felony conviction.  This aggravation must be weighed and balanced against the
established mitigation.  In this case, the trial court found and gave some weight to
six mitigating factors  These six factors include two statutory mitigators and four
nonstatutory.  The statutory mitigators were: (1) defendant’s age (twenty-two)
supported by the expert’s testimony that the defendant’s maturity level was less
than his actual age; and (2) impairment of his capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct.  As nonstatutory mitigation, the trial judge found: (1) Lukehart’s
father was an alcoholic who physically abused him; (2) Lukehart suffered from
drug and alcohol abuse; (3) Lukehart was repeatedly sexually abused by his uncle;
and (4) Lukehart was gainfully employed at the time of the crime.  The trial court
gave some weight to all of this mitigation.  In addition and in support of some of
these factors, the expert testified that Lukehart suffers from an intermittent
explosive disorder and from post-traumatic stress disorder, and that he has a
personality disorder that can be described as being antisocial with destructive
behavior. 
A comparison with our prior cases makes it apparent that death is not the
appropriate penalty here.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 705 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998);
Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1989).  Smalley cannot be distinguished in
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any meaningful way from this case except that the circumstances of Smalley appear
to be even more egregious.  In Smalley, the defendant was the live-in boyfriend of
the twenty-eight-month-old victim’s mother.  While defendant was babysitting the
small child, the child began to cry and whine.  As a result, the defendant repeatedly
struck the child throughout the day.  He also dunked the child’s head into water,
and after she continued to cry, he banged her head in the carpeted floor several
times.  His attempt to resuscitate her failed.  Based on his actions, Smalley was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  In support of the death
penalty, the trial court found that the murder was HAC, but also found seven
mitigating circumstances.  On appeal, we upheld the HAC finding, but reversed the
death sentence, ruling that the balance of the HAC aggravator and the established
mitigation did not warrant imposition of the death penalty.  The facts of the current
murder were almost identical to those of Smalley.  Similarly, in Jones, this Court
vacated the defendant’s death sentence for the murder of a schoolboy where two
aggravators (murder committed during the course of a robbery and for pecuniary
gain) were merged and considered only as one and some nonstatutory mitigation
was established.  See id. at 1365.
The facts of this present case are also strikingly similar to several other child
victim cases where death was never imposed.  See Dingle v. State, 699 So. 2d 834
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(Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Green v. State, 680 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Freeze
v. State, 553 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).  In Freeze, for example, the eight-
month-old child victim’s mother was convicted of aggravated child abuse and first-
degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum
mandatory sentence of twenty-five years on the felony murder charge and a
concurrent sentence of fifteen years on the aggravated child abuse.  The abusive
conduct in the case consisted of the mother’s violent shaking and severe beating of
the child.  As in our case, there was evidence that the mother had severely shaken
and abused her child before, yet a death sentence was not imposed.  See id. at 754. 
Finally, this case is also similar to several cases dealing with child victim
murders where we vacated the trial judge’s death sentence imposed after the jury
had recommended a life sentence.  See, e.g., Reilly v. State, 601 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1992); Morris v. State, 557 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1990); Wasko v. State, 505 So. 2d 1314
(Fla. 1987).  In Reilly, the defendant was convicted of felony murder, sexual
battery, and aggravated child abuse for the killing of a five-year-old boy who had
gone fishing near a neighbor’s dock.  The autopsy revealed trauma and wounds to
his head and neck, and his throat had multiple lacerations.  The cause of death was
determined to be asphyxiation due to strangulation.  The jury recommended a life
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sentence by a vote of eight to four.  However, the trial judge overrode the jury’s
recommendation and sentenced the defendant to death for the murder.  In support
of the sentence, the trial judge issued a thirty-page sentencing order where he found
three aggravating factors and no mitigation.  The three aggravators were: (1)
previous conviction for a violent felony; (2) the homicide occurred during the
commission of a sexual battery and an aggravated child abuse; and (3) the homicide
was committed in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.  Notwithstanding, on
appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence and
held that the totality of the evidence presented at trial provided a reasonable basis
for the jury’s life sentence.  Similarly, in Wasko, we overturned the death penalty
imposed by the trial court for the murder of a ten-year-old girl after the jury had
recommended life even though three valid aggravators and only one factor in
mitigation were found.  Although these cases differ from Lukehart’s in that the jury
in both of these cases recommended a life sentence, the murders there were clearly
more aggravated and less mitigated than the murder here.
The bottom line is that our approval of the death sentence here is
dramatically inconsistent with our case law involving other child murders.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
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Hon. William Arthur Wilkes, Judge - Case No. 96-2645 CFA
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Chet Kaufman, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee