Title: Moon v. McDonald Carano Wilson, LLP

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

126 Nev., Advance Opinion +47

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

JOON S. MOON; AND PATTERSON No. 51124
LABORATORIES, INC., A MICHIGAN

— FILED

MCDONALD, CARANO & WILSON, DEC 16 2010

LLP, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY Cea

PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM A.S.
Appeal from a district court order dismissing a legal

 

MAGRATH; AND JOHN J. LAXAGUE,
Respondents.

malpractice action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County;
Steven P. Elliott, Judge.
Affirmed.

Carl M. Hebert, Reno,
for Appellants.

Piscevich & Fenner and Margo Piscevich, Reno,
for Respondents.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.
In this appeal, we address the interaction of NRCP 16.1
mandatory pretrial discovery requirements with the Nevada Arbitration
Rules. Specifically, we determine whether cases not automatically

exempted from the court-annexed arbitration program by designation on

10-3847

 
i

 

the initial pleading, which are ultimately exempted from the program by
{the arbitration commissioner under the procedures outlined in NAR 5(A),
lare actually in the program during the time prior to their exemption and
are thus not subject to the requirements of NRCP 16.1 during this time
period. We conclude that cases are not actually in the court-annexed
arbitration program until they are assigned to an arbitrator, or ordered or
remanded into the program by the district court. As a result, such cases
that are awaiting exemption are not actually in the program during the
period prior to exemption, and thus, we hold that the deadlines and
requirements of NRCP 16.1 continue to apply during this time period.
BACKGROUND

On November 3, 2006, appellants Joon S. Moon and Patterson
Laboratories, Inc, filed their district court complaint against respondents
McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP; William A.S. Magrath; and John J.
Laxague. Respondents jointly filed their answer to the complaint on
JJanuary 10, 2007. On March 29, 2007, the arbitration commissioner
lentered an order exempting the case from the mandatory court-annexed
larbitration program on the basis that its probable jury award value
lexceeded the jurisdictional threshold set by rule.

On November 6, 2007, respondents moved to dismiss
Jappellants’ complaint, arguing, among other things, that appellants had
failed to comply with NRCP 16.1(e)(2), which authorizes the dismissal of a
complaint, without prejudice, as a sanction for failing to timely file a case
conference report, Appellants subsequently filed an individual case
conference report on November 21, 2007, and opposed the motion to
dismiss, claiming that they had timely complied with NRCP 16.1(0)(2). On
January 14, 2008, the district court entered an order granting
respondents’ motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

2

 
DISCUSSION

This court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a case for
failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for an abuse of
discretion. Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414, 168 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2007).
‘A district court's interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo.
Marquis & Aurbach v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1147, 1156, 146 P.3d 1130, 1136
(2006).

NAR 3(A) provides that any civil case commenced in the
district court that has a “probable jury award value not in excess of
'$50,000 per plaintiff, exclusive of interest and costs, . . . is] subject to the
[court-annexed arbitration] program,” unless it falls into one of the

 

enumerated categories excluded from the program by that rule! A party
‘claiming exemption under certain of the enumerated categories may be
jautomatically excluded from the program by expressly designating the
reason for exemption on the initial pleading filed in district court. NAR
[5(A). Cases not eli
be exempted if a request for exemption is granted by the arbitration

ble for automatic exclusion from the program ean only

 

lcommissioner or, if denied by the commissioner, by the district court after
Jan objection to the commissioner's ruling has been filed? NAR 6.

'See NAR 3(A) (delineating which cases are, and are not, eligible for
exemption from the court-annexed arbitration program).

8If a party whose case is eligible for automatic exclusion fails to
designate the basis for exemption on the initial pleading, then that case
can only avoid arbitration if it is exempted from the program by the
arbitration commissioner or the district court. NAR 6(A).

 

 
‘This appeal presents an important procedural issue of first
{impression with regard to those cases not automatically excluded from the
program by designation on the initial pleading, which are ultimately
exempted from the program by the arbitration commissioner or the
district court under the procedures outlined in NAR 5(A). In particular,
this case requires that we determine whether the deadlines and
requirements of NRCP 16.1, including NRCP 16.1(e)(2)'s deadline for filing
'a case conference report, apply and begin to run during the time prior to
the arbitration commissioner's or district court’s grant of the exemption
request.

Relevant to this determination, NRCP 16.1(b)(1) provides that
the parties to a case are required to hold an early case conference within
130 days after the filing of an answer by the first answering defendant,
/“[ulnless the case is in the court annexed arbitration program or short
rial program,” (Emphasis added.) Once a case conference has been held,
NRCP 16.1(c) requires that a case conference report be filed within 30
Jdays from when the conference was held. Failure to hold the case
conference within 180 days of the first appearance by a defendant, and file
the case conference report with 240 days of the first appearance by a
defendant, subjects the plaintiff to the possible dismissal of his or her
complaint as to that defendant pursuant to NRCP 16.1(e)(1) and (2),

8The parties may agree to extend the time for holding the early case
conference for up to 90 days by agreement and the district court may grant
2 continuance of up to 180 days for good cause shown. “Absent compelling
land extraordinary circumstances, neither the court nor the parties may
lextend the time to a day more than 180 days after an appearance is served
by the defendant in question.” NRCP 16.1(b)(1).

 

 
respectively. Also at play in evaluating the issue before us is NAR 4(C),
[which provides that the NRCP apply “[bjefore a case is submitted or
lordered to the program, and after a request for trial de novo is filed” and
that “once a case is accepted or remanded into the program, the
requirements of N.R.C.P. 16.1 do not apply."* In light of the language
contained in NRCP 16.1(b)(1) and NAR 4(C) providing that NRCP 16.1's
requirements do not apply during the time that a case is actually in the
program, whether NRCP 16.1's deadlines and requirements apply and
begin to run during the time prior to the grant of an exemption by the
arbitration commissioner or the district court for cases not automatically
lexcluded from the program that are ultimately exempted from the
[program by the grant of an exemption is dependent on a determination as
to when a case is actually in the court-annexed arbitration program.

In addressing this issue in the underlying proceedings, the
district court determined that appellants’ case, which was exempted from
ithe program by the arbitration commissioner on March 29, 2007, had
never been submitted, ordered, accepted, or remanded into the program.
[Based on this conclusion, that the case was never actually in the program,
the district court held that no suspension of NRCP 16.1's requirements
fhad occurred, and thus, effectively concluded that NRCP 16.1(e)(2)'s 240-
day period for filing a case conference report ran, without interruption,
from the starting date set forth in that rule, After concluding that

‘NAR 4(C) further provides that “[ajfter a case is submitted or
lordered to the program, and before a request for trial de novo is filed, or
juntil the case is removed from the program,” the Nevada Arbitration
Rules apply.

 

 

 
appellants had failed to timely file their case conference report within this
period, the district court exercised its discretion to dismiss their case,
Iwithout prejudice, under NRCP 16.1(@)(2). Because we agree with the
district court’s conclusions in this regard, we affirm its dismissal of
appellants’ case.®

Here, appellants’ complaint was not eligible for automatic
exemption, and thus, could only avoid arbitration if the arbitration
commissioner or district court exempted it from the program. NAR 5(A).
[Appellants maintain that, until they were exempted from the program, on
March 29, 2007, their case was considered to be in the program, and thus,
junder NRCP 16.1(b)(1) and NAR 4(C) they were not subject to the
requirements of NRCP 16.1, including NRCP 16.1(¢)(2)'s 240-day period
for filing a case conference report. We disagree.

As previously noted, NAR 4(C) provides that the NRCP apply
juntil a case is “submitted or ordered” into the program and that, except as

lotherwise stated in the rules, NRCP 16.1’s requirements do not apply once

In granting respondents’ motion to dismiss, the district court
incorrectly found that appellants had never filed a case conference report.
|Appellants, however, did file this document, but did so on November 21,
12007, after NRCP 16.1(¢)(2)'s 240-day deadline had expired. The district
court also errantly applied the version of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) applicable only
to family division and domestic relations proceedings, which calculates the
240-day period from the date the summons and complaint is served.
Because appellants’ November 21 filing was nonetheless untimely under
the correct version of NRCP 16.1(e)(2), which calculates the 240-day period
{from the date of the first appearance of a defendant, we nonetheless affirm
the district court's dismissal order. See Sengel v. IGT, 116 Nev. 565, 570,
2 P.3d 258, 261 (2000) (explaining that this court will affirm the district,
court's decision if it reaches the right result, even if for the wrong
reasons).

 

 
la case has been “accepted or remanded into the program.” NAR 4(C).
‘This language clearly requires some affirmative action or event to take
place before a case is actually in the court-annexed arbitration program.
‘The Nevada Arbitration Rules do not, however, specifically spell out what
levents or actions must occur in order for a case to be placed into the
program. Accordingly, we take this opportunity to clarify that a case is
not actually in the court-annexed arbitration program until it is assigned
to an arbitrator under the procedures outlined in NAR 6 or it is ordered or
remanded into the program by the district court.) Thus, cases not
automatically exempted by the initial pleading, but which are ultimately
exempted from the program by the arbitrator or the district court under
the procedures outlined in NAR 5(A), are not actually in the program

during the time period prior to their being exempted from the prograi

 

Indeed, unless such cases are subsequently ordered or remanded into the

Examples of when a case may be ordered or remanded into the
program by the district court include when the parties agree to submit an
otherwise exempt case to the program with the district court’s approval in
accordance with NAR 3(B), and when the district court makes a final
determination that a request for exemption from the program should be
denied and remands the case into the program after an objection to the
arbitration commissioner's resolution of the issue is made under the
procedures outlined in NAR 5.

"We note that a different conclusion would be necessarily reached if
a case was actually assigned to an arbitrator or submitted or remanded
jinto the program by the district court and later exempted from the
program by the arbitration commissioner or district court.

 

 
om ee

 

program by the district court for some other reason, they are never
actually in the court-annexed arbitration program.

While appellants contend that such a conclusion is
inconsistent with NAR 5(A)'s requirement that parties whose cases are not
automatically excluded from the program utilizing the procedure set forth
in that rule must seek exemption from the program in order to avoid going
through the arbitration process and would, in fact, render NAR 5(A)
superfluous, we disagree with this assertion. Although cases not
automatically excluded from the program by designation on the initial
pleading are subject to the program from the moment the initial pleading
is filed and, if not exempted by the arbitration commissioner or district
court, will ultimately be submitted into the program, such cases are not
[actually in the program until they are assigned to an arbitrator or ordered
lor remanded into the program by order of the district court.

Contrary to appellants’ argument, this conclusion is wholly
consistent with NAR 5(A), which sets forth the procedure by which cases
‘not automatically excluded from the program by designation on the initial
pleading can avoid being placed into the program by making a request for
exemption, Indeed, to conclude that such cases are automatically in the
program until they are exempted by the arbitration commissioner or
district court would render NAR 4(C)’s language differentiating which sets
lof rules govern the procedures applicable to a case based on whether the

"This same conclusion applies to cases automatically excluded from
the program by designation on the initial pleading. Unless they are later
lordered or remanded into the program by the district court, such cases
never enter the court-annexed arbitration program.

 
ome

 

case has been submitted, ordered, accepted, or remanded into the program

mere surph

 

sage, and thus, such a conclusion must be rejected.” See
Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc,, 122 Nev. 409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022,
1028 (2006) (noting, in construing a statute, that when possible this court
will construe

 

statute so that no part of the statute is rendered nugatory
or becomes mere surplusage); see also Marquis & Aurbach v, Dist, Ct,, 122
Nev. 1147, 1157, 146 P.3d 1130, 1137 (2006) (applying rules of statutory
construction to the interpretation of a court rule); State ex rel. PSC v,
District Court, 94 Nev. 42, 44, 574 P.2d 272, 278 (1978) (implying that the
rules of statutory construction apply to the construction of Nevada's Rules

 

of Civil Procedure).

Although the dissent sees the matter differently, our
conclusion makes perfect sense in the overall context and design of the two
sets of rules, the NRCP and NAR. For cases in the arbitration program,
NAR 11 provides for an arbitration-sponsored early case conference
equivalent to the NRCP 16.1 conference, to occur “[w]ithin 30 days after
the appointment of the arbitrator.” Under NAR 6, the commissioner does
not assign an arbitrator, triggering the NAR 11 alternative to NRCP
16.1(b)(1)'s early case conference, until he or she decides any exemption
request. By design, the arbitration rules provide for exemption requests to
be filed (20 days after the defendant's answer, NAR 6(A)) and opposed

"See also NAR 3(D) (allowing parties to cases “submitted or ordered
to the program” to agree to be bound by the results of the arbitration);
NAR 4(F) (stating that “[olnce a case is submitted or ordered to the
program all parties subsequently joined in the action shall be parties to
the arbitration unless dismissed by the district judge to whom the case is
assigned”).

 

 
oo 1

 

(five days after the exemption request is served, NAR 5(B)) before the
NRCP 16.1(b)(1) early case conference requirements are triggered (80 days
after the defendant’
‘Thus, under the rules, arbitration

 

answer) should the matter stay in district court.

 

cemption requests are known and in
most instances determined, before NRCP 16.1(6)(1)'s 30-day time limit for
holding the early case conference runs.!° For cases that stay in district
court, the NRCP 16.1(b)(1) timetable controls. On the other hand, if the
case has been accepted into arbitration, NAR 11 applies. Further
confirming that the NRCP and NAR were written to work in tandem,
NRCP 16.1(b)(1) says that “parties to any case wherein a timely trial de
novo request has been filed subsequent to an arbitration, need not hold a
farther in person conference” (emphasis added). If the rules intended to
suspend NRCP 16.1(b)(1)'s obligations for cases with pending arbitration
exemption requests, it would have been simple to write them to say s0,
particularly since NRCP 16.1(b)(1) was specifically revised to deal with
arbitrations under the NAR, but they were not. Instead, they wore
written to be read together. Taken together, they confirm the importance
of a prompt, mandatory, early case conference to occur under NRCP
16.1(0)(1) and on its timetable, unless a case is in the arbitration program,
in which event NAR 11’s version of NRCP 16.1(b)(1) applies.

NRCP 16.1(b)(1) permits its 30-day time limit to be extended on
stipulation or by motion, which could be invoked if the exemption request
has been made, opposed, and remains undecided when the NRCP
16.1(b)(1) obligation would otherwise occur.

10

 
Finally, to the extent that appellants attempt to rely on our
decision in Morgan v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc,, 118 Nev. 315, 43 P.3d 1036
(2002), for the proposition that their case was in the program until it was
jexempted by the arbitration commissioner, we conclude that their reliance
jon this case is misplaced. In Morgan, which dealt with a case that
jactually went through the arbitration process because the complaint
jsought only monetary damages below the jurisdictional amount and then
[proceeded to trial de novo after arbitration was completed, this court held
that NRCP 41(e)'s five-year period for bringing a case to trial was not
tolled while cases are in the court-annexed arbitration program and
rejected an effort to resurrect the arbitration award and reduce that
Jaward to judgment. Id. In discussing these issues, the Morgan court
briefly addressed the court-annexed arbitration rules and procedures, a
Jdiscussion that appellants present as a purported conclusion that cases
/not automatically excluded from the program by the initial pleading that
jare ultimately exempted from the program are in the program until an
exemption is granted. The Morgan decision, however, contains no such
conclusion. In fact, in rejecting Morgan's effort to resurrect the arbitration
award, the court specifically noted that the court

 

annexed arbitration
[program “automatically diverts all civil cases that are not exempted from
the program into” the program. Id, at 322, 43 P.3d at 1040 (emphasis
added), This statement demonstrates that the Morgan court recognized
what we now hold in this opinion—that cases awaiting a ruling on a
request for exemption made under NAR 5(A) by the arbitration

commissioner or the district court are not actually in the program during

 

‘the time prior to being exempted from the program. Only when a case is

 

 
signed to an arbitrator or is ordered or remanded into the program by
the district court is the case actually in the program,

Applying this conclusion to the case at bar, because
appellants’ case was never assigned to an arbitrator or ordered or

remanded into the program, the case was not actually in the court-

 

annexed arbitration program during the time prior to the arbitration

‘commit

 

jioner’s decision exempting the case from the program. As a
result, the portions of NRCP 16.1(1)(b) and NAR 4(C) that exempt cases
that are in the program from NRCP 16.1’s deadlines and requirements
during the period that they are actually in the court-annexed arbitration
Program never applied to appellants’ complaint, and appellants were
therefore obligated to comply with NRCP 16.1(¢)(2)'s requirement that
they file a case conference report within 240 days of the first appearance
by a defendant.

Here, respondents first appeared in the action when their
answer was filed on January 10, 2007. Appellants, however, did not file
their case conference report until November 21, 2007, which was more
than 300 days after respondents first appeared in the action by filing their
answer to the complaint. As a result, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s dismissal of appellants’ complaint, without prejudice, based

on appellants’ failure to timely file their case conference report within

 

 
one

 

NRCP 16.1(e)(2)’s 240-day period, and we therefore affirm the district
‘court's dismissal order." Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 168 P.3d 1050

 

(2007).
Douglas
We concur:
Cu.
Parraguirre

J.
Sajt

4
|Gibbons
“oko. Lo.
Pickering

‘Because appellants’ sole argument on appeal is that they complied
‘with NRCP 16.1(e)(2)’s case conference report filing requirement and they
do not otherwise argue that the district court failed to consider or
improperly applied the factors for district court consideration in
evaluating motions to dismiss based on NRCP 16.1(¢)(2), we need not
consider whether the district court properly applied those factors in
dismissing the complaint.

13

 
oe

 

CHERRY, J., dissenting:

‘The majority adopts the position that during the period that a
Inewly filed case is awaiting exemption from the court-annexed arbitration
program, the case is subject to, but not actually in, the court-annexed
larbitration program. This conclusion makes little sense, and it creates a
situation in which a party is required to opt out of a program that the
party's case is supposedly not even in, Accordingly, I must dissent.

‘The stated purpose of the court-annexed arbitration program
and its associated rules “is to provide a simplified procedure for obtaining
{a prompt and equitable resolution of certain civil matters.” NAR 2(A). To
that end, NAR 5 plainly outlines an opt-out process in which a case is
Jdeemed to be in the court-annexed arbitration program until a party's
request to be released from the program is approved by the arbitration
lcommissioner or the district court.

While the majority seems to conclude that its approach to this
issue is necessary to harmonize NAR 5's exemption-procedure language
with the language contained in NAR 4(C) (setting forth which rules govern
{the procedures applicable to a case based on whether the case has been
“submitted or ordered to” or “accepted or remanded into” the program), 1

strongly disagree that such an approach is practicable or necessary.!

'Similar “submitted or ordered to” language also appears in NAR
'3(D) (allowing “[plarties to cases submitted or ordered to the program” to
agree to be bound by the results of the arbitration) and NAR 4(F) (stating
that “[olnce a case is submitted or ordered to the program all parties
[subsequently joined in the action shalll be parties to the arbitration unless
dismissed by the district judge to whom the case is assigned”).

 
It is well established that this court will interpret statutes in
harmony, so as to render no part of a statute mere surplusage. Albios v,
‘Horizon Communities, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 418, 182 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006).
Here, achieving a uniform construction is simply not possible. As the
majority points out, “{tJhe Nevada Arbitration Rules do not . .. specifically

ell out what events or actions must occur in order for a case to be placed
into the program.” Majority opinion ante at 7. Thus, by their own
admission, the majority seeks to salvage language that is neither
explained nor given effect by the rules. In so doing, the majority merely
losses over the readily apparent conflict between requiring that cases be
submitted, ordered, or remanded into the program in order to actually be
in tho program and the opt-out procedure embodied in NAR 5. As a
consequence, the majority allows this otherwise unexplained “submitted or
ordered to” or “accepted or remanded into” language to control the
resolution of this issue, despite the clear language of NAR 5 that plainly
anticipates the use of an opt-out approach for cases that are not
automatically exempted on the initial pleading.

Confusingly, the majority asserts that their conclusion
regarding when cases are deemed to be in or out of the arbitration
program somehow “makes perfect sense in the overall context and design”
of the NRCP and the NAR, based on the fact that NRCP 16.1(b)(1) sets
forth discovery conference deadlines for cases not in the program while
NAR 11 sets discovery conference deadlines for program cases. Majority
opinion ante at 9-10, A determination as to which rule—NRCP 16.1(6)(1)
or NAR 11—applies to a case, however, is predicated on whether a case is,
actually in the program at a particular time. Given that the purpose of

this opinion is to set forth when a case is or is not deemed to be in the

 

 
program, the fact that the NRCP and NAR set forth different discovery
conference deadlines based on whether a case is or is not in the program
provides no support for the majority's position regarding when cases are
actually in the program. Indeed, NRCP 16.1(b)(1) and NAR 11 would
likewise govern discovery conference deadlines for cases, depending on
whether they are or are not in the program, under the position I would
adopt—that a case is in the program until an exemption is granted. If the
exemption is denied, the case would remain in the program and the
deadlines set forth in NAR 11 would control. If a case is exempted from
the program, then the NRCP 16.1(b)(1) deadlines would begin to run from
the date of exemption,

‘This last point is the key difference between my view and the
tack taken by the majority. Under the majority's position, when a case
subject to the program is not automatically exempted, the plaintiff is
forced to juggle two sets of competing deadlines. Specifically, the plaintiff
‘must file his or her request for exemption within 20 days of the date the
defendant's answer is filed (NAR 5(A)), then wait out the 5-day opposition
period (NAR 5(B)) and however long it takes the arbitration commissioner
to resolve the exemption request. A party unhappy with the

 

‘commissioner's decision has an additional five days to object to that
decision (NAR 5(D)), after which the parties must wait for the district
court to finally resolve the issue. NAR 6(E). Meanwhile, a plaintiff who
has complied with each of these deadlines must watch the clock continue
to run on NRCP 16.1(b)(1)'s 30-day early case conference deadline. Given
the heavy case load burdening this state's district courts, it would be

extremely difficult for a plaintiff to have his or her exemption request

 

 
om

 

finally determined prior to the expiration of the initial 30-day NRCP
16.1(b)(1) period.

‘The end result of the majority's approach is that a plaintiff
}who complies with each of the exemption deadlines will, in most cases,
have to request an extension of the NRCP 16.1(b)(1) deadline in order to

 

comply with the requirements of that rule and avoid having his or her case
rule-booked out of the district court on procedural grounds. In stark
contrast, if cases subject to the arbitration program are deemed to be in
‘the program until an exemption is granted, the NRCP 16.1 deadlines
‘would not begin to run until the case is exempted and the plaintiff would
have the full 30-day window to comply with the requirements of NRCP
16.1(b)(1), which, in many cases, would obviate the need to seek an
extension of the NRCP 16.1(b)(1) period.

In light of these considerations, I would apply the plain
language of NAR 5's clearly explained opt-out process, rather than
attempt to breathe life into NAR 4(C)'s unexplained “submitted or ordered
to” or “accepted or remanded into” language. As a result, I would conclude
that appellants’ case was in the program until it was exempted on March
29, 2007, and that, as a result, considering NRCP 16.1(b)(1) and NAR
4(C), NRCP 16.1(6)(2)'s 240-day time period did not start to run until the
date of exemption—March 29, 2007. Using this approach, because
appellants filed a case conference report on November 21, 2007, which is
within the 240-day period, I would conclude that they complied with
NRCP 16.1(e)(2)'s requirements, so that dismissal on that basis was an
abuse of discretion. See Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414, 168 P.3d 1050,
1052 (2007) (setting forth this court’s standard of review for NRCP
16.1(e)(2) dismissals). Given the confusing and contradictory language

 
jused in the Nevada Arbitration Rules and this court's oft stated preference
{for deciding cases on the merits, see e.g. Hansen v. Universal Health
Servs., 112 Nev. 1245, 1247-48, 924 P.24 1845, 1346 (1996) (noting this
court's preference that cases be decided on the merits); Hotel Last Frontier
'v. Frontier Prop., 79 Nev. 150, 155, 380 P.2d 293, 295 (1963) (same), such
8 conclusion represents the only just and equitable resolution of this
matter.

Putting aside the merits of this particular case, in light of the
[confusing and contradictory language contained in the Nevada Arbitration
Rules at issue in this appeal, I believe that the majority misses the bigger
picture. Rather than correct the clear inconsistencies with the current
incarnation of these rules through the rule-amendment process, the
majority superficially attempts to harmonize rules that, in my view,
simply cannot be harmonized. This effort is unnecessary, as an
Jamendment to the rules would allow the court to address these issues in a
clear, logical, and consistent fashion, s0 as to provide appropriate guidance
to litigants and the district courts, rather than creating a makeshift
Jsolution that is inconsistent with the language and intent of one of the
very rules the majority seeks to interpret and apply. Unfortunately, the
/majority’s solution to dealing with the admittedly contradictory language
jin the Nevada Arbitration Rules merely adds confusion and complexity to

ithe process. Accordingly, I dissent.

Cherry