Title: Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
CHRISTOPHER GARDNER, as Public Defender, etc., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S246214 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E066330 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
CIVDS1610302 & ACRAS1600028 
 
 
March 28, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF 
SUPERIOR COURT  
S246214 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
With the help of court-appointed counsel, a criminal 
defendant facing misdemeanor charges filed a successful motion 
to suppress the prosecution’s evidence against her.  The 
prosecution appealed.  The question is whether the defendant is 
entitled to the help of appointed counsel in responding to the 
prosecution’s appeal of the suppression order.  Based on article 
I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we conclude the 
answer is yes.  
I. 
This case arises from the criminal prosecution of Ruth 
Zapata Lopez, who was charged by misdemeanor complaint with 
driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. 
(a)) and driving while having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 
percent or higher (id., § 23152, subd. (b)).  The complaint also 
alleged that Lopez had suffered a prior conviction for driving 
while having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher.  
The charges against Lopez are punishable by confinement in 
county jail.  (See id., § 23540, subd. (a) [minimum punishment 
for violating Veh. Code, § 23152 within 10 years of prior 
conviction under § 23152 is “imprisonment in the county jail for 
not less than 90 days nor more than one year” and a fine]; see 
also id., § 23542, subd. (a)(1)(B) [grant of probation requires 
confinement in county jail “[f]or at least 96 hours”].) 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
The petitioner in this case is the Public Defender of San 
Bernardino County, whom the superior court appointed to 
represent Lopez.1  (See Pen. Code, § 987, subd. (a); see also id., 
§ 987.2, subd. (i).)2  On behalf of Lopez, petitioner filed a motion 
under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress evidence collected 
during a warrantless traffic stop.  The court conducted a limited 
hearing on the motion, during which Lopez was assisted by a 
Spanish language interpreter.  Petitioner argued that the traffic 
stop leading to Lopez’s detention was invalid, rendering the 
subsequent search unlawful.  The court agreed and granted the 
motion to suppress.  The court then dismissed the underlying 
case under Penal Code section 1385.  (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. 
(a) [authorizing judge to dismiss action “in furtherance of 
justice”].) 
The prosecution appealed the suppression order to the 
appellate division of the superior court.  (See Pen. Code, 
                                        
1  
The San Bernardino Public Defender serving at the time, 
Phyllis K. Morris, has since been succeeded in office by 
Christopher Gardner, who has been substituted as a party. 
2  
Penal Code section 987, subdivision (a), provides:  “In a 
noncapital case, if the defendant appears for arraignment 
without counsel, he or she shall be informed by the court that it 
is his or her right to have counsel before being arraigned, and 
shall be asked if he or she desires the assistance of counsel.  If 
he or she desires and is unable to employ counsel the court shall 
assign counsel to defend him or her.” 
 
Penal Code section 987.2, subdivision (i), provides in 
relevant part:  “Counsel shall be appointed to represent, in a 
misdemeanor case, a person who desires but is unable to employ 
counsel, when it appears that the appointment is necessary to 
provide an adequate and effective defense for the defendant.” 
 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
§ 1538.5, subd. (j) [“If the property or evidence seized relates 
solely to a misdemeanor complaint, and the defendant made a 
motion for . . . the suppression of evidence in the superior court 
prior to trial, both the people and defendant shall have the right 
to appeal any decision of that court relating to that motion to 
the appellate division . . . .”].)  Questions promptly arose as to 
who, if anyone, would represent Lopez in responding to the 
appeal.  Petitioner took the view that the public defender’s office 
was no longer obligated to represent Lopez,3 and asked the 
appellate division to appoint new counsel to represent her.4  The 
appellate division refused.  Court clerks informed petitioner 
that, as the respondent in a misdemeanor appeal, Lopez was not 
eligible for appointment of appellate counsel.  In an e-mail to a 
member of the office, a clerk also wrote that, in the court’s view, 
the public defender “ ‘is still counsel’ ” for Lopez.  (Morris v. 
                                        
3  
Petitioner relied for this argument on Government Code 
section 27706, subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part:  
“The public defender . . . shall prosecute all appeals to a higher 
court or courts of any person who has been convicted, where, in 
the opinion of the public defender, the appeal will or might 
reasonably be expected to result in the reversal or modification 
of the judgment of conviction.”   
4  
To make the request, the public defender adapted a form 
entitled “Request for Court-Appointed Lawyer in Misdemeanor 
Appeal,” which indicated that it was “only for requesting that 
the court appoint a lawyer to represent a person appealing in a 
misdemeanor case.”  (Italics added, bold omitted.)  In the portion 
of the form calling for “Name of Appellant (the party who is 
filing this appeal),” the public defender crossed out “Appellant 
(the party who is filing this appeal)” and typed in “Appellee.”  
Where the form called for the name of “Appellant’s lawyer,” the 
public defender crossed out the word “Appellant’s” and typed in 
“Appellee’s.”   
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
Appellate Division of Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 636, 
654 (Morris).)  
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the 
appellate division.  The petition asked the court to direct the 
superior court “to appoint counsel for all indigent appellees in 
all misdemeanor criminal appeals,” as well as to issue a 
judgment declaring that the superior court “may not appoint the 
Public Defender to represent indigent appellees in misdemeanor 
criminal appeals, or declare the Public Defender to remain 
appointed in cases where the Public Defender previously 
represented an indigent appellee in the Superior Court.”  The 
appellate division summarily denied the petition.  Petitioner 
then sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which also 
issued a summary denial.  This court granted review and 
transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to 
issue an order to show cause.   
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal again denied 
the petition.  Without addressing whether the public defender 
remains appointed to represent Lopez, the Court of Appeal held 
that Lopez neither has the right to appointment of counsel 
under court rules nor a constitutional entitlement to be 
represented by counsel on appeal.  (Morris, supra, 17 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 644, 653.) 
The Court of Appeal explained that the appellate division 
had been correct as to court rules:  While the California Rules of 
Court provide for the appointment of appellate counsel for an 
indigent criminal defendant “convicted of a misdemeanor” (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.851(a)(1), (2)), the rules make no provision 
for the appointment of appellate counsel to represent a 
misdemeanor defendant who, like Lopez, has not yet been 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
convicted.  (Morris, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)  The court 
went on to consider whether, notwithstanding the limited scope 
of the court rules, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution require that Lopez be represented 
by counsel if she so chooses.  The court answered that question 
in the negative.  As an initial matter, the court concluded that 
the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel does not apply 
in appellate proceedings; the right to appellate counsel is 
instead governed by the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Morris, at p. 645.)  But 
in any event, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
alike, the right to counsel applies only when the defendant may 
lose his or her physical liberty as a direct consequence of the 
action.  (Morris, at pp. 646–647.)  Here, the court opined, that is 
not the case; even if no counsel is appointed for purposes of the 
appeal, Lopez faces no deprivation of “the right to be free from 
uncounseled imprisonment” “since she will be represented at 
trial even if the People prevail in the appellate division.”  (Id. at 
p. 647.) 
We granted review. 
II. 
Before turning to the merits, we address a threshold issue 
concerning the legal framework for our decision.  In their initial 
briefing before this court, the parties focused on the scope of the 
right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  That amendment, which is binding on the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, gives an indigent 
defendant facing incarceration the right to court-appointed 
counsel for his or her defense.  (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 
U.S. 335, 342–343 (Gideon).) 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
But in California courts, the federal Constitution is not the 
sole source of a criminal defendant’s right to representation.  
Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, too, 
guarantees a right to “the assistance of counsel for the 
defendant’s defense” in a “criminal cause.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 15.)  Much like its federal counterpart, article I, section 15 has 
been understood to confer a right to state-appointed counsel for 
indigent defendants.  (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 
288, 301 (Mills); In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 329–330 
(Johnson).)  But it has also been understood to extend more 
broadly than its federal counterpart, particularly in relation to 
misdemeanor cases like this one.  (Compare Alabama v. Shelton 
(2002) 535 U.S. 654, 661–662 (Shelton) [6th Amend. right to 
appointed counsel applies to misdemeanor cases resulting in 
imprisonment], with Mills, at p. 301 [Cal. Const. confers right 
to counsel in all misdemeanor cases, without regard to whether 
imprisonment is imposed].)  To implement the state 
constitutional guarantee, the Legislature has enacted several 
statutory provisions governing the appointment of counsel for 
defendants facing both felony and misdemeanor charges.  (See 
Pen. Code, §§ 686, 987, subd. (a), 987.2, subd. (i).) 
Because of its importance to full consideration of the issue 
before us, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs 
regarding the relevance of article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution.  We now conclude that article I, section 15 is 
dispositive of the question presented.  Our holding makes it 
unnecessary for us to decide whether the same result would 
obtain under the federal Constitution. 
 
 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
III. 
Under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, 
a defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel is not limited to 
trial, but instead extends to other, “critical” stages of the 
criminal process.  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 335, 465 (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler); People v. 
Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 97–99 (Bustamante).)  This 
rule, which was first articulated in cases interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment, recognizes that the right to the assistance of 
counsel is fashioned according to the need for such assistance, 
and this need may very well be greater during certain pre- and 
posttrial events than during the trial itself.  (Lafler v. Cooper 
(2012) 566 U.S. 156, 165 (Lafler); United States v. Wade (1967) 
388 U.S. 218, 224 (Wade).)   
For purposes of determining whether the right to counsel 
extends to a particular proceeding, we have described a critical 
stage as “one ‘in which the substantial rights of a defendant are 
at stake’ [citation], and ‘the presence of his counsel is necessary 
to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial’ [citation].”  
(Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 465.)  More 
broadly, critical stages can be understood as those events or 
proceedings in which the accused is brought in confrontation 
with the state, where potential substantial prejudice to the 
accused’s rights inheres in the confrontation, and where 
counsel’s assistance can help to avoid that prejudice.  (See 
Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 7 (Coleman); accord, e.g., 
Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008) 554 U.S. 191, 212, fn. 16.) 
Employing this rubric, courts have identified the following 
proceedings, among others, as critical stages to which the 
constitutional right to counsel attaches:  arraignments 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
(Hamilton v. Alabama (1961) 368 U.S. 52, 54); preliminary 
hearings (Coleman, supra, 399 U.S. at p. 10); postindictment 
lineups (Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 227); postindictment 
interrogations (Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 
206); plea negotiations (Missouri v. Frye (2012) 566 U.S. 134, 
143 (Frye), In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933–934); and 
sentencing (Lafler, supra, 566 U.S. at p. 165).  Relying solely on 
the state Constitution, this court has recognized a right to 
counsel in other proceedings as well.  (E.g., Bustamante, supra, 
30 Cal.3d at p. 102 [state right to counsel extends to 
preindictment lineups], disagreeing with Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 
406 U.S. 682, 690.)5 
Employing the same rubric here, we conclude that a 
pretrial prosecution appeal of a suppression order also qualifies 
as a critical stage of the prosecution at which the defendant has 
a right to appointed counsel as a matter of state constitutional 
law.  The suppression of evidence is generally a matter of vital 
importance in the course of a criminal prosecution.  As the high 
court has noted, “suppression hearings often are as important 
as the trial itself.  [Citations.]  In . . . many cases, the 
suppression hearing [is] the only trial . . . .”  (Waller v. Georgia 
(1984) 467 U.S. 39, 46–47.)  This case offers a vivid illustration 
of the point.  In the trial court, Lopez, with her counsel’s help, 
secured a favorable suppression ruling; in the absence of the 
suppressed evidence, the trial court concluded that the 
prosecution could not continue.  A reversal on appeal would both 
                                        
5  
Of course, not every stage of the criminal process will 
qualify as a critical one at which counsel’s assistance is required.  
(E.g., People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 247 [the defendant 
had no right under federal or state Constitution to have his 
counsel present during investigatory forensic testing].) 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
revive the prosecution’s case against Lopez and meaningfully 
increase the chances of conviction.  In other cases, a ruling on a 
suppression order may not be entirely dispositive of the 
outcome, but may nevertheless have a dramatic impact on the 
prosecution’s ability to meet its burden of proof at trial.  
Regardless of the scope of the suppression order in any given 
case, an appellate proceeding to determine whether the evidence 
will remain suppressed poses a clear and substantial risk of 
prejudice to the defendant’s position at trial.  (See People v. 
Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841 [law of the case doctrine binds 
trial courts to appellate courts’ legal rulings governing 
suppression motions].)  
The need for counsel in responding to such a state-
initiated appeal is equally clear and equally substantial.  On 
appeal, the defendant “ ‘face[s] an adversary proceeding that—
like a trial—is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson 
would be hopelessly forbidding.’ ”  (In re Olsen (1986) 176 
Cal.App.3d 386, 390, quoting Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 
387, 396.)  These rules are forbidding for any layperson, but all 
the more so for criminal defendants who may come to court with 
a wide range of educational backgrounds and linguistic and 
other abilities.  (See Halbert v. Michigan (2005) 545 U.S. 605, 
621 [“Navigating the appellate process without a lawyer’s 
assistance is a perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well 
beyond the competence of individuals . . . who have little 
education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments.”].)  
Indeed, in part for these very reasons, the high court has held 
that a criminal defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right 
to appointed counsel in his or her first appeal as of right.  (See 
Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353 (Douglas).)  For the 
same reasons, we conclude that a defendant like Lopez is 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
entitled to the assistance of counsel in responding to the 
prosecution’s appeal.  Just as a defendant is unlikely to fare well 
in filing and litigating a suppression motion without the help of 
a trained attorney, a defendant will almost certainly struggle to 
defend the trial court’s suppression ruling on appeal without the 
assistance of counsel “skilled in persuading a panel of appellate 
judges by means of a brief and perhaps oral argument.”  (U.S. ex 
rel. Thomas v. O’Leary (7th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 1011, 1014 
(O’Leary).)   
It is true, as respondent observes, that on appeal Lopez 
“will reap the benefit of standards of review and other 
procedural tools that are designed to protect the ruling the trial 
court has already made.”  But the effect of these “procedural 
tools” should not be overstated; there are limits to how much an 
appellate court can or should defer to a trial court’s conclusions.  
(See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High 
School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 [on appeal, a court defers 
to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported by 
substantial evidence, but reviews questions of law de novo].)  
Here, for example, we are concerned with a Fourth Amendment 
suppression ruling regarding evidence obtained without a 
warrant; in such cases, an appellate court independently applies 
the law to the trial court’s factual findings, determining de novo 
whether the findings support the trial court’s ruling.  (People v. 
Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123.)  The effect of standards of 
review and other procedural tools is, moreover, often open to 
reasoned debate; in our adversarial system of justice, we 
ordinarily depend on the litigants to lay out the terms of that 
debate.  For an indigent defendant who, like Lopez, has won the 
underlying ruling with counsel’s assistance, standards of review 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
are not an adequate substitute for continued assistance on 
appeal. 
Respondent raises two remaining arguments concerning 
the scope of Lopez’s right to counsel.  Both arguments are 
predicated on the federal Constitution rather than the 
California Constitution, which forms the basis of our judgment 
here.  For the sake of completeness, however, we address—and 
reject—both arguments. 
IV. 
First, respondent argues that the right to appointed 
counsel is a trial right, and therefore cannot confer a right to the 
appointment of counsel on appeal.  Respondent relies for this 
argument on Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth 
Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152 (Martinez), in which the high 
court considered whether the Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation6 entitles a convicted defendant to reject the help 
of state-appointed counsel in appealing his conviction.  The 
court answered no, reasoning:  “The Sixth Amendment identifies 
the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy in ‘all criminal 
prosecutions.’  They are presented strictly as rights that are 
available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself.  The 
Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal.  As we 
have recognized, ‘[t]he right of appeal, as we presently know it 
in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute.’  [Citation.]  It 
necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide 
any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.”  
(Martinez, at pp. 159–160.)  As this court has since noted, it 
follows that the Sixth Amendment does not provide any basis 
                                        
6 
See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
for finding a right to the appointment of counsel for purposes of 
appealing a conviction.  (See In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 
472–473 (Barnett), citing Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. 152; cf. 
Barnett, at pp. 472–473 [noting other authorities conferring 
right to counsel to bring first appeal as of right].)  Respondent 
argues the same rule applies here, and defeats any Sixth 
Amendment claim Lopez might have to the appointment of 
appellate counsel. 
Although we have never squarely addressed the question, 
we will assume Martinez applies equally to the state 
constitutional right to counsel under article I, section 15 of the 
California Constitution.  Respondent’s reliance on Martinez is 
unavailing all the same.  The sort of appeal we are concerned 
with here—a pretrial prosecution appeal of a suppression 
order—is clearly not the sort of appeal the Martinez court had 
in mind.  Martinez concerned a defendant’s postconviction 
appeal:  that is, an appeal that takes place after the prosecution 
is complete and charges against the defendant have been 
resolved.  In such an appeal, the defendant initiates the 
appellate proceeding and “assumes the burden of persuading a 
reviewing court that the conviction should be reversed.”  
(Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 154.)  The pretrial appeal of a 
suppression order, by contrast, occurs before charges are finally 
resolved and while criminal proceedings are still ongoing (or, as 
in this case, are suspended pending the appellate court’s 
decision whether the trial court’s ruling will be reversed and the 
charges against the defendant revived).  The appeal is not, of 
course, part of the criminal trial.  But neither are lineups (see 
Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 227; Bustamante, supra, 30 Cal.3d 
at p. 102) or plea negotiations (see Frye, supra, 566 U.S. at 
p. 143; In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 933–934).  The 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
constitutional right to counsel nevertheless extends to these 
confrontations by virtue of their potential to affect the ultimate 
resolution of the charges and the need for counsel’s advice in 
navigating them.  So, too, with a pretrial appeal of an order 
suppressing evidence. 
But even if we were to accept respondent’s limited view of 
the counsel clauses of the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 
15, it would go only to show that petitioner has invoked the 
wrong constitutional provision; it would do nothing to 
undermine the substantive conclusion that the California 
Constitution entitles Lopez to the assistance of counsel in 
responding to the prosecution’s appeal.  As already noted, the 
high court has also held that a criminal defendant has the right 
to counsel’s assistance in bringing his or her first appeal as of 
right, though that right is secured by the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than by 
the Sixth Amendment.  (See Douglas, supra, 372 U.S. 353; see 
also, e.g., Lafler, supra, 566 U.S. at p. 165 [noting rule that 
“defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal, even though that cannot in any way be characterized as 
part of the trial”]; Barnett, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 472–473 
[also citing state statutory authority for the appointment of 
counsel for defendants bringing criminal appeals].)  Appointed 
counsel, the high court has held, is necessary if the state-
conferred right of appeal is to be more than “a meaningless 
ritual.”  (Douglas, at p. 358.)7  Respondent has offered no reason 
                                        
7 
Martinez, by way of contrast, rejected the argument that 
the Fourteenth Amendment confers a right to dispense with the 
assistance of a state-appointed attorney on appeal, explaining 
that self-representation is not “a necessary component of a fair 
appellate proceeding.”  (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 161.)   
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
to believe our state Constitution would afford any lesser 
protection to indigent defendants pursuing such an appeal.   
The reasons for requiring state-appointed counsel for a 
first postconviction appeal as of right apply with equal force in 
the context of the prosecution’s pretrial appeal of the 
suppression order.  (Accord, O’Leary, supra, 856 F.2d at p. 1015 
[failing to appoint counsel for a defendant facing a pretrial 
prosecution 
appeal 
“would 
clash 
with 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”].)  Indeed, the reasons are 
arguably stronger.  A defendant appealing his or her conviction 
ordinarily needs counsel “not as a shield to protect him against 
being ‘haled into court’ by the State and stripped of his 
presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the 
prior determination of guilt.”  (Ross v. Moffitt (1974) 417 U.S. 
600, 610–611.)  Lopez, by contrast, seeks counsel as a shield, not 
a sword.  The prosecution has haled her into court, not the other 
way around, and it has done so while the presumption of 
innocence remains intact.  Lopez is entitled to the assistance of 
counsel to respond.8 
V. 
Respondent’s final constitutional argument relates to the 
nature of the charges Lopez faces.  While the United States 
Supreme Court has described the Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel as generally applicable in felony cases (see 
Gideon, supra, 372 U.S. at p. 339), it has not ruled so 
                                        
8  
This case, of course, concerns the right to appointed 
counsel for purposes of responding to a pretrial prosecution 
appeal of a favorable suppression ruling.  We express no opinion 
about a defendant’s right to appointed counsel for purposes of 
bringing a pretrial appeal of an adverse suppression ruling. 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
categorically in other cases.  In defining the scope of the federal 
right to counsel in nonfelony cases, the high court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence draws the line at cases involving 
“ ‘actual imprisonment.’ ”  (Shelton, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 662; 
Scott v. Illinois (1979) 440 U.S. 367, 373; see Argersinger v. 
Hamlin (1972) 407 U.S. 25, 33.)  Respondent argues, and the 
Court of Appeal agreed, that as a misdemeanor defendant, 
Lopez is not entitled to the assistance of counsel for purposes of 
responding to the prosecution’s pretrial appeal because she faces 
no immediate prospect of imprisonment as a result of the 
appellate division’s ruling.  If the prosecution prevails, the worst 
case scenario for Lopez is the case will return to trial court, 
where she will be represented by counsel at the trial and 
sentencing that determine her fate.  (Morris, supra, 17 
Cal.App.5th at p. 647.)   
Respondent’s argument is beside the point here, for 
reasons we noted at the outset of the discussion:  While the high 
court has drawn an “actual imprisonment” line in sketching the 
contours of a misdemeanor defendant’s right to appointed 
counsel, California (like many states) has not adopted the same 
approach.  (See p. 6, ante.)9  Many decades ago, this court 
                                        
9  
As the high court has acknowledged, California ranks 
among the many states that provide a right to appointed counsel 
that is more expansive than that afforded by the federal 
Constitution.  (Shelton, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 668–669 & fn. 8; 
Nichols v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 738, 748, fn. 12.) 
 
In 
invoking 
the 
“actual 
imprisonment” 
standard, 
respondent relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. 
Wong (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 151.  In that case, the defendant 
sought the assistance of counsel to appeal a misdemeanor traffic 
conviction that resulted only in a fine and a penalty totaling $65.  
 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
affirmed that the predecessor to the current version of article I, 
section 15 of the California Constitution, confers a right to 
counsel “in all felony and misdemeanor proceedings whether 
actual imprisonment is to follow or not.”  (Mills, supra, 10 Cal.3d 
at p. 301; see also In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 103; 
Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 527 [“It 
is settled beyond cavil in this state that under the California 
Constitution (art. I, [formerly] § 13) an indigent defendant in a 
criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor, of whatever degree or 
type, is entitled to representation by counsel.”].)10  We have put 
the point plainly:  the “actual imprisonment” standard “is not 
the law in California.  In this state, a person charged with a 
misdemeanor has a right to counsel regardless of whether a jail 
                                        
The court held that neither the federal nor the state 
Constitution conferred a right to appellate counsel under those 
circumstances.  The question here is meaningfully different; we 
are not concerned with the scope of a misdemeanor defendant’s 
right to the assistance of counsel to challenge a conviction 
resulting only in a small fine, but instead with a defendant’s 
right to counsel’s help in defending a favorable suppression 
ruling against the prosecution’s appellate challenge. 
10  
The provision at issue in Mills and Rodriguez was later 
renumbered and reworded as part of a comprehensive 
constitutional revision adopted by voters in 1974.  (Prop. 7, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974).)  The right to counsel and its companion 
rights were moved from article 13 to article 15 in the state 
Constitution, and they were reworded to apply in “a criminal 
cause” rather than in “criminal prosecutions, in any court 
whatever.”  (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision 
(1971) pt. 5, p. 24.)  The history is clear, however, that this 
revision was not intended to diminish the right to counsel.  (See 
Cal. Const. Revision Com. com. at p. 24 [commission 
recommends retaining the “significant criminal procedure 
provisions” contained in art. 1, former § 13, adding an express 
right to confront witnesses, and deleting obsolete provisions].)   
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
term actually is, or even could be, imposed.”  (Salas v. Cortez 
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 27, fn. 2.)  Consistent with that 
understanding, this court has read the statutes implementing 
the constitutional declaration to require that a misdemeanor 
defendant be informed of the right to counsel at arraignment 
and that a lawyer then be appointed if the defendant desires and 
is unable to employ counsel, regardless of whether a sentence of 
imprisonment may ultimately be imposed.  (Johnson, supra, 62 
Cal.2d at pp. 329–330; see Pen. Code, §§ 858, subd. (a), 987, 
subd. (a); see also Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
760, 766 [by statute, misdemeanor defendants entitled to 
counsel even though charged offenses are punishable only by a 
fine and not imprisonment].)  Respondent offers no reason to 
reconsider our understanding of the reach of the state counsel 
guarantee as extending to misdemeanor defendants like Lopez. 
VI. 
 
Having concluded that Lopez has a right to appointed 
counsel in the present appeal, the question remains whether the 
appellate division must appoint a new attorney to represent her, 
as petitioner had argued below, or whether the public defender 
continues 
to 
represent 
her 
pursuant 
to 
the 
original 
appointment.  The Court of Appeal did not resolve this issue 
because it ruled that Lopez did not have a right to appointed 
counsel.  We leave it to the Court of Appeal to resolve this issue 
in the first instance.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of  
 
 
GARDNER v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 17 Cal.App.5th 636 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S246214 
Date Filed: March 28, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Michael A. Knish, Annemarie G. Pace and Carlos M. Cabrera 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Phyllis K. Morris and Christopher Gardner, Public Defenders, and Stephan J. Willms, Deputy Public 
Defender, for Petitioner. 
 
Steven Harmon, Public Defender (Riverside) and Laura Arnold, Deputy Public Defender, for Law Offices 
of the Public Defender County of Riverside and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Brett J. Williamson and Ryan W. Rutledge for the Innocence Project, the California 
Innocence Project, the Project for the Innocent at Loyola Law School, the Northern California Innocence 
Project, the University of San Francisco Criminal & Juvenile Justice Clinic, the American University 
Washington College of Law Criminal Justice Clinic, Professor Lara Bazelon and Professor Jenny Roberts 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Robert L. Driessen for Respondent. 
 
No appearance for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephan J, Willms 
Deputy Public Defender 
8303 Haven Avenue, Third Floor 
Rancho Cucamonga, CA  91730 
(909) 476-2206 
 
Robert L. Driessen 
Superior Court of San Bernardino, Appellate Division 
8303 Haven Avenue 
Rancho Cucamonga, CA  91730 
(909) 708-8869