Title: J.O. v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF RE and TE, minor children: JO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2011 WY 170Case Number: NO. S-11-0088Decided: 12/28/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
IN THE INTEREST OF RE 
and TE, minor children:
 
JO,
Appellant 
(Respondent),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,
Appellee 
(Petitioner).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County
The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Mervin W. 
Mecklenburg, Mecklenburg Attorney at Law, Yoder, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. 
Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jared S. Crecelius, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Crecelius.
 
Guardian 
Ad Litem:
Scott M. Powers, Law 
Office of Scott Powers, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
JO, challenges the juvenile court’s order directing the Department of Family 
Services (DFS) to pursue a termination of Appellant’s parental rights.  She contends there was insufficient 
evidence to support a change in the permanency goal for her children.  She also claims that DFS failed to 
provide a compelling reason for recommending termination of her parental 
rights.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Appellant raises the 
following issues:
 
1.    
Was the Department of 
Family Services required to provide a compelling reason for recommending a 
permanency plan of termination over relative guardianship under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-431(j)?
 
2.    
Did the trial court’s 
order that termination proceedings be filed against the Mother lack evidentiary 
support?
 
DFS presents the 
issues as follows:
 
1.    
Did the juvenile 
court comply with the relevant statutes in finding adoption and termination of 
Mother’s parental rights to be the proper permanency plan for the 
children?
 
2.    
Was there sufficient 
evidence to support the juvenile court’s order on permanency finding that 
adoption and termination of Mother’s parental rights were in the children’s best 
interests?
 
3.    
Does Mother have 
standing to raise the issue of Grandmother’s constitutional right to a familial 
relationship with the children?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellant is the 
mother of TE, born in 2007, and RE, born in 2009.  The children’s father was in prison at 
all times relevant to this action.  
His rights are not at issue in this appeal.  On May 6, 2009, when RE was 
approximately three months old, DFS received a report from medical personnel 
that RE had been diagnosed with “failure to thrive.”  When RE was released from the hospital, 
a social worker from DFS and a public health nurse visited Appellant’s home to 
discuss concerns about the children’s care and to schedule medical appointments 
to monitor RE’s health.  With regard 
to RE’s physical appearance during this visit, the social worker stated that “He 
did not look well.  He did not look 
healthy.  He was very, very 
thin.  You could see the veins 
throughout his body.  He just – It 
was almost like he was immobile.”  
An appointment with a primary care physician was arranged, and Appellant 
was informed that RE would need to be weighed at a public health clinic twice a 
week.
 
[¶4]        
Approximately one 
week after the initial consultation, the DFS social worker accompanied Appellant 
to RE’s doctor’s appointment, where RE was diagnosed with severe bronchitis and 
failure to thrive.  RE was directly 
admitted into the hospital.  While 
RE was in the hospital, the Torrington Police Department placed both children in 
protective custody with the children’s paternal great uncle and his wife (foster 
parents).
 
[¶5]        
The State filed a 
Petition for Neglect on May 20, 2009.  
Appellant admitted the allegations at a hearing held on June 2, and the 
juvenile court entered a decree finding that the children were neglected as 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xii) (LexisNexis 2007).1  The court ordered that the children 
remain in the legal custody of DFS for continued placement in foster care, and 
that DFS provide visitation opportunities for Appellant, which were to be 
“increased consistent with the well-being and goal of the children with the 
objective being reunification when that is in the children’s best interest.” 
 The court further ordered Appellant 
to “cooperate with the DFS in developing a Case Plan designed to insure the 
health, physical safety and emotional well-being of the minor children,” and 
ordered Appellant to comply with all the requirements of the case plan.  Finally, the court ordered that a 
multi-disciplinary team (MDT) be appointed to review the children’s personal and 
family history, and to provide recommendations for the care of the children, 
giving consideration “to the best interests of the child, the best interests of 
the family, the most appropriate and least restrictive case planning options and 
the costs of care.”
 
[¶6]        
Following issuance of 
the decree, DFS began working on a case plan with Appellant that identified a 
goal of reunification with her children.  
At the first MDT meeting, on July 9, 2009, it was noted that RE had 
gained weight, and that his health had improved significantly under the care of 
the foster parents.  Although 
Appellant’s physician stated that Appellant seemed to be benefiting from 
medication, he opined that reunification was not yet appropriate and indicated a 
possible diagnosis of psychosis.  At 
the end of the meeting, the MDT voted in favor of continuing legal custody with 
DFS and continuing physical custody with the foster parents.  The MDT also recommended that Appellant 
continue with parenting instruction and that she receive a psychological 
evaluation.
 
[¶7]        
Over the course of 
the next twelve months, DFS personnel experienced significant difficulty in 
procuring Appellant’s attendance at scheduled visitations and appointments, and 
in guiding Appellant’s participation during the visitations.  On July 19, 2010, an impromptu MDT 
meeting was held in response to an incident in which Appellant was arrested 
after a belligerent outburst during a visitation with her children.  Appellant’s progress as of the time of 
the meeting was summarized as follows:
 
            
[Appellant] has made no progress thus far and we are at 14 months. 
Interactions between [Appellant] and the kids are severely limited and her main 
focus still is with [TE] while [RE] fends for himself.  [Appellant] refuses any constructive 
criticism to try to help her improve her parenting, even when it comes to 
providing healthy snacks for the kids.  
DFS tried even approaching [Appellant’s] attorney so it wasn’t coming 
from DFS.  [Appellant] continues to 
make false allegations regarding the foster parents alleging bruising that is 
noted by a doctor as normal age appropriate bruising.  [Appellant] is inappropriate and rude to 
staff.  On July 2nd, [Appellant] had an inappropriate outburst at 
DFS that resulted in the Torrington PD being called and [Appellant] was 
arrested.  Visitations since then 
were moved to the Torrington PD due to safety concerns.
 
During the MDT 
meeting, Appellant’s attorney asserted that visitation was not in Appellant’s 
best interest and requested that visitation be stopped.  At the end of the meeting, the MDT was 
evenly divided between a recommendation to terminate Appellant’s parental rights 
and a recommendation to pursue a guardianship with the foster parents.  The children’s guardian ad litem 
abstained from voting because he was new to the case.  
 
[¶8]        
Approximately three 
months later, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(d) to determine which permanency plan was in the best 
interests of Appellant’s children.  Between the time of the final MDT meeting 
and the permanency hearing, Appellant had no visits with her children, although 
her parents continued to see the children.  
At the permanency hearing, the court heard testimony from three DFS 
social workers involved in Appellant’s case, as well as from two psychologists 
who had evaluated Appellant.  
Appellant did not testify at the hearing, but she conceded through 
counsel that she was “not able to reunify with her children at this time.”  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
juvenile court found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was 
appropriate.  The court summarized 
its findings as follows:
 
            
In looking at the track record in this case, the Court understands that 
[Appellant] claims for the last three months this [referring to the children’s 
visitations with Appellant’s parents] has worked out well, so why not leave it 
the way it is.
 
            
The track record here indicates that that’s not likely to continue.  In fact, after today’s hearing, I will 
suspect that it would begin again for her to undermine and disagree, and I heard 
the word “sabotage,” or disrupt the stability and permanency for these 
children.
 
            
So the Court finds it appropriate, or the court finds that the state has 
outlined [its] efforts for reunification, and they were exemplary.  The Court finds that the state 
considered options of kinship placement or some kind of guardianship or 
termination, and it explained well [its] reasons for selecting the goal of 
termination; and the Court finds that to be appropriate.
 
The court 
subsequently issued an order incorporating the findings set forth above and 
ordering that “the goal be changed from reunification to termination of the 
parental rights for the mother of the minor children.”  This appeal 
followed.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶9]        
We have had few 
occasions to review orders such as the one at issue here.  On those occasions where we did conduct 
such a review, we did not articulate a standard of review that would be 
applicable here.  For example, in HP 
v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982 (Wyo. 
2004), we reviewed a dispositional order requiring DFS to proceed with a 
permanency plan similar to the one adopted by the juvenile court in this 
case.  We applied a sufficiency of 
the evidence review: 
 
We 
understand Mother’s argument to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the juvenile court’s findings.  When reviewing a record for 
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of neglect, we: 
 
1.   Give considerable deference to the 
trial court’s determination because it has the advantage to judge the demeanor 
and intelligence of the witnesses;      2.   Examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to appellee and resolve all conflicts in evidence for 
appellee; 3.   
Assume as true the evidence in appellee’s favor, disregard entirely 
appellant’s evidence in conflict with appellee’s evidence, and give to 
appellee’s evidence every favorable inference that may fairly be drawn. 

 
Id., 
¶ 17, 93 P.3d  at 987 (quoting DH v. Wyo. 
Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 54, 79 P.3d 997, 1012 (Wyo. 2003)).2
 
[¶10]     
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-431(k) provides that “At a permanency hearing, the court shall determine 
whether the permanency plan is in the best interest of the child and whether the 
department of family services has made reasonable efforts to finalize the 
plan.  The court shall order the 
department of family services to take any additional steps necessary to 
effectuate the terms of the permanency plan.”  In cases where the trial court is 
required to make a determination that is in the “best interest of the child,” we 
have regularly applied an abuse of discretion standard of review.  This standard applies in adoption 
cases:
 
The district court 
has the power and discretion to grant an adoption without parental consent, 
provided all the statutory elements are satisfied. In the Matter of the Adoption of SMR, MVC v. 
MB, 982 P.2d 1246, 1248 
(Wyo. 1999). This Court reviews adoption decrees by applying the abuse of 
discretion standard. In the Matter of 
Adoption of TLC, TOC v. TND, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 863, 867-68 (Wyo. 
2002).      

TF 
v. Dep’t of Family Serv. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d 992, 998 (Wyo. 2005).  It also applies in child custody 
cases:  “We have stated before that 
'[c]ustody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.’”  Blakely v. Blakely, 2009 WY 127, ¶ 6, 218 P.3d 253, 254 (Wyo. 2009).  The fundamental goal in adoption and 
child custody cases is to arrive at a result that is in the best interests of 
the child.  Similarly, the “best 
interests of the children” are at the heart of the permanency decision in this 
case.  Accordingly, we will apply 
the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court’s 
decision.
 
[¶11]     
In determining 
whether there was an abuse of discretion, “our primary consideration is the 
reasonableness of the district court’s decision in light of the evidence 
presented.”  Blakely, ¶ 6, 218 P.3d  at 
254.
 
            
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Our review entails 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
district court’s decision. . . . Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present when a 
material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.
 
Id., ¶ 7, 218 P.3d  at 
255.  To the extent that our review 
addresses the proper application and interpretation of the Child Protection Act, 
our review is de novo.  DJM 
v. DM (In re SRB-M), 2009 WY 22, ¶ 8, 201 P.3d 1115, 1117 (Wyo. 
2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]     
In assessing whether 
the juvenile court abused its discretion in changing the permanency goal from 
reunification to termination and adoption,3 we must evaluate the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the court’s decision.  Blakely, ¶ 7, 218 P.3d  at 255.  In evaluating the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision 
against the preponderance of the evidence standard.  HP, ¶ 25, 93 P.3d  at 
989.
 
[¶13]     
Appellant contends 
that the court’s order was improper “because it was based upon [Appellant’s] 
predicted behavior, rather than upon current conditions.”  We find no support for Appellant’s 
argument.  As set forth below, the bulk of the testimony 
presented at the permanency hearing related to Appellant’s demonstrated 
inability to care for her children and her counterproductive participation in 
the original permanency plan of reunification.
 
[¶14]     
At the permanency 
hearing, the court heard testimony from three social workers involved in 
Appellant’s case.  Their testimony 
indicated that Appellant’s visits with her children were sporadic, and that 
Appellant failed to attend many scheduled medical appointments and visitations, 
despite numerous reminders by DFS staff.  
Initially, visitation was conducted in the children’s foster home, but 
was discontinued at that location due to Appellant’s failure to attend the 
visitations at the arranged times.  
Visitation then moved to DFS for a brief period, but was relocated to 
Appellant’s parents’ home in Torrington after Appellant moved into their home. 
 The visits were again relocated for 
a short time when Appellant moved in with a friend in Huntley, Wyoming.  In describing those visits, one of the 
social workers testified that “we did do some visitations out there; but the 
home was unclean; and it reeked, had a very, very strong odor of ca[t] urine and 
ammonia.  It was unbearable to be in 
there for 3 hours at a time.”  Soon 
after moving to Huntley, Appellant moved back in with her parents, and 
visitations were continued in Torrington.  
Although visitation at Appellant’s parents’ house “started out okay,” the 
quality of the visits deteriorated as a result of anger and frustration directed 
at DFS staff by Appellant and Appellant’s mother.  One of the social workers stated that 
“toward the end, it was constant turmoil, like there was always questioning 
about the case, people getting mad.  
[Appellant’s mother] would get mad if the visit didn’t go the way she 
wanted.”  When asked about the 
disruptions, the social worker testified about one particular instance in which 
Appellant had requested a visitation for her mother:
 
WITNESS:  [Appellant] got very upset because she 
requested a visitation for [her] mom.  
She requested a visitation with the children but had requested it for a 
short visit; so it didn’t give me enough time for arrangements with the foster 
parents; and she became angry and left the room and began making multiple phone 
calls and was swearing and cussing DFS around the kids, and using foul language, 
and I had to redirect her, that she needed to stop or the visit was going to be 
over.
 
The social worker 
further testified that visitation was then moved from Appellant’s parents’ home 
to DFS “[m]ainly because of this disruption, because it almost began to feel 
unsafe if a worker is there by themselves around just [Appellant] and her 
mother.”
 
[¶15]     
Another social worker 
testified about an outburst that occurred during a subsequent visitation at 
DFS.  On June 29, 2010, during a 
scheduled visitation, Appellant took pictures of bruises on TE and indicated 
that she wanted law enforcement to be called every time she found a bruise.  To assuage Appellant’s concern, DFS 
requested that the foster parents schedule a doctor’s appointment for TE for the 
following morning.  A visitation was 
scheduled at DFS immediately following the appointment.  When TE arrived at DFS several minutes 
late due to the doctor’s appointment, Appellant became upset.  The social worker testified that 
Appellant “began getting very frustrated and irritated, wanted to know where 
[TE] was. . . . She wanted to know where her daughter was, why she wasn’t 
informed of the appointment, began yelling; and I kept telling her that I wasn’t 
going to interfere with her visit at that time.  She needed to wait until after the visit 
and then we can discuss this; and if she continued on I was going to end the 
visit; and she continued to escalate and get angry and yell.”  Although Appellant’s other child, RE, 
was present at the visitation, the social worker stated that “Not once did 
[Appellant] even acknowledge that [RE] was there, even after I suggested that 
[RE] was here.”  Eventually, the 
social worker called law enforcement to respond to the situation, and Appellant 
was arrested at the DFS office.
 
[¶16]     
After the incident at 
DFS, visitation was moved to the police department due to concern for the safety 
of DFS staff and Appellant’s children.  
At the impromptu MDT meeting held in response to the incident, 
Appellant’s attorney informed DFS that it was not in Appellant’s best interest 
to continue having visitation with the children, and requested that it be 
stopped.  Consequently, Appellant 
had no visitation with her children for a period of almost three months prior to 
the juvenile court’s permanency hearing.
 
[¶17]     
Each of the social 
workers involved in Appellant’s case also testified that Appellant did not 
respond to parenting instruction, and that her inability to parent caused 
concerns for the children’s safety.  
The social worker who had the greatest amount of involvement with 
Appellant and her children testified as follows:
 
WITNESS:     [Appellant] showed poor 
parenting.  She required several 
reminders to feed the kids, to change diapers, to hold the kids when they would 
cry, especially [RE], lack of interaction with them.  She struggled at times to play with the 
children, even loving and nurturing, like giving hugs and kisses and attempting 
to bond with them, again, especially with [RE].
 
            
There were times that she struggled with supervising her kids.  There were times where I was constantly 
having to redirect [RE] when he was putting items into his mouth.  He would have items in his mouth that 
could cause choking, and if I wasn’t watching him, I don’t know what would have 
happened.
 
            
[TE] would leave the room sometimes without [Appellant] noticing until 
she would hear something in the other room.
 
            
She provided lack of response [to] the children.  She required constant redirection, 
relied a lot on others.  I noticed 
when there were others there, like if they were her sister or her mom was there, 
she seemed to rely on them for kind of picking up the 
slack.
 
            
We tried to role model and suggest to her some parenting; and the reason 
we tried to do the role [modeling] and so was more of us not telling her what to 
do, and trying to teach and show her; but she doesn’t respond to that. 

 
. . 
.
 
COUNSEL:  All right.  And when you said that you had to 
redirect often [Appellant’s] attention back to her children, where would her 
attention be?
 
WITNESS:  Sometimes it would be playing on her 
phone, texting on her phone or on the computer, watching TV, or just spacing 
out, not paying attention, saying she was sick, didn’t feel good, make off in 
the other room.
 
COUNSEL: Did you see 
any improvement when you attempted to model parenting behavior for 
[Appellant]?
 
WITNESS:  No, and in fact she did make the 
statement during a visit that she did not like when people told her what to do 
and that made her not want to do what they asked her to.
 
The same social 
worker also testified that Appellant had admitted letting her dog supervise her 
children, and had stated that “dogs were good baby-sitters.”  With regard to Appellant’s overall 
development of her parenting skills, the social worker testified that she 
reviewed the permanency plan with Appellant on several occasions due to her lack 
of progress: 
 
WITNESS:  . . . There was still a lot of parenting 
improvement that needed to be done.  
There was no stable home environment provided by her for the 
children.  She did not cooperate 
with the recommendations that were made.  
And she was not attending all of the visits, missing visits and ending 
visits or showing up late to them; and she was struggling with having consistent 
communication with me and just failing to comply with [the] overall 
plan.
 
The testimony 
concerning Appellant’s general failure to make progress towards the original 
permanency goal was corroborated by the other two social workers who provided 
assistance to Appellant during implementation of the permanency plan. 

 
[¶18]     
The court also heard 
testimony from a psychologist who met with Appellant on at least three 
occasions.  The psychologist 
determined that Appellant had “chronic psychiatric issues that . . . cause her 
to be extremely emotionally reactive and to distort reality and make poor 
judgments.”  When asked whether 
Appellant had the capacity to be a suitable parent, the psychologist stated that 
she had concluded that Appellant had “limited capacity at this time for assuming 
the roles of responsibility required for becoming a safe and effective parent.” 
 With regard to the factors that led 
to the conclusion that Appellant was unfit to parent, the psychologist testified 
as follows:
 
            
For instance, she, first of all, she had no capacity it seems or 
willingness to hold herself accountable for the neglect of the children that led 
to the social service intervention.  
She tended to blame other people or attribute those to things outside of 
her control; and she seemed to be – She was emotionally very defensive and 
hostile, which indicated that she was emotionally unstable.  She had difficulty maintaining an even 
mood, which [] also had a bearing on her capacity to exert concern and be 
appropriately calm.  She was very 
reactive.
 
            
Secondly, her reasoning was impaired.  She had a prominent paranoia in her 
thinking, and she tended to approach things other people said in a very paranoid 
way which then would affect her judgment and reasoning, leading to bad 
decisions.
 
            
She indicated that she was in many ways, you know, what appeared to be a 
good parent, but she tended to describe her children more as if they were her 
possessions rather than people, that people shouldn’t – They had no right to 
take her children, that sort of thing, rather than being concerned about their 
safety and well-being and whether she was capable of providing an appropriate 
environment for them.
 
            
Over time she tended to also – She would talk about her lifestyle, which 
was very chaotic and unstable.  She 
had a series of different relationships, and she also had – I am looking through 
my report that I am using that was dated November 9th.  She also had – She would make 
allegations that were untrue or rather crazy.
 
            
She claimed to have had a relationship with a police officer involved in 
the intervention, which turned out not to be true.
 
When asked whether 
Appellant could “become an adept parent somewhere down the line” with proper 
counseling and investment in her parenting skills, the psychologist responded 
that was not likely:
 
            
It was my impression that that would be unlikely, that although she can 
personally benefit from continued individual psychiatric therapy and medication 
management to stabilize her symptoms, you know, so that she could have a more 
stable lifestyle, it was my assessment that those interventions would be 
unlikely to be successful enough within a time frame that would be appropriate 
for her children to have to wait, if ever.
 
            
I assessed her to be very emotionally vulnerable, very vulnerable to 
sudden disruptions, and she, herself, had too many psychiatric symptoms that are 
complex that would be – could be sufficiently addressed, if they ever could be 
addressed, to a point that she can be responsible for young 
children.
 
            
Her prognosis with respect to those issues is very 
guarded.
 
[¶19]     
Another psychologist 
was called by Appellant during the hearing.  The second psychologist conducted a test 
of Appellant’s intelligence that indicated a reduced level of cognitive 
capacity.  When asked whether that 
would present parenting challenges, he responded as follows:  “It would.  Reduced levels of intellectual 
functioning are often accompanied with reduced judgment and reduced social 
understanding.  I believe it’s 
likely that some of [Appellant’s] – that a component of her difficulties 
relating to others and understanding others is probably due in part to her 
reduced intellectual functioning.”  Further, with regard to Appellant’s 
general parenting ability, he stated that “I do have concerns just based on my 
interview and testing with her, and because of her severe difficulties I would 
question whether she can provide adequate parenting independently to her 
children.” 
 
[¶20]     
Considering 
the testimony at the permanency hearing relating to (1) Appellant’s irregular 
attendance and lack of engagement at scheduled visitations with her children, 
(2) her inability to improve her parenting skills over fourteen months of 
sustained DFS assistance, and (3) mental health problems that were unlikely to 
resolve through medical intervention “within a time frame that would be 
appropriate for her children to have to wait, if ever,” we find sufficient 
evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that reunification with 
Appellant was not in the best interests of Appellant’s children. Further, 
Appellant chose not to testify at the permanency hearing, but conceded through 
counsel that she was “not able to reunify with her children at this time.”  Based upon the evidence, we cannot 
conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion.
 
[¶21]     
Appellant also claims 
that clear and convincing evidence was needed to support the juvenile court’s 
decision on permanency.4  She contends that the permanency order 
impinges on her parents’ fundamental rights in the child/grandparent 
relationship and that, because the rights of extended family members are not 
addressed in subsequent proceedings relating to termination of parental rights, 
the court’s determination at a permanency hearing must satisfy a higher 
evidentiary standard.  We 
disagree.
 
[¶22]     
The children’s 
relationship with their grandparents was a proper factor for the juvenile court 
to consider in determining the appropriate permanency goal for Appellant’s 
children.  However, there is nothing 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431 to indicate that this factor, or the rights of 
extended family members in general, required the court to apply a higher 
evidentiary standard at the permanency hearing.  As we previously determined in HP, ¶ 25, 93 P.3d  at 989, we review the 
juvenile court’s findings “under the preponderance of the evidence standard that 
is applicable to neglect proceedings.”  
Further, Appellant’s right to familial association does not demand 
application of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard because this is not 
an appeal from a termination of Appellant’s parental rights.  As the 
juvenile court correctly noted in its response to Appellant’s claim at the 
permanency hearing, “The Court is not called upon to make findings by clear and 
convincing evidence in this hearing.  This is not a termination of parental 
rights hearing.  It is a hearing to determine what is the appropriate 
permanency goal for the children in this case.”  Indeed, we have previously 
emphasized that a termination of parental rights proceeding is a civil action 
filed in district court, separate and distinct from other child protection 
proceedings held in juvenile court.  See HP, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d  at 
991; In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 373 n.5 (Wyo. 
1992).
 
[¶23]     
Appellant also 
ignores the fact that her parents are not parties to this action.  In TF 
v. Dep’t of Family Serv. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, ¶ 1, 120 P.3d 992, 996 (Wyo. 2005), the 
foster parents filed a petition to adopt the mother’s child, CF.  The mother objected to the adoption, and 
the grandfather petitioned the court for visitation.  Id.  The district court approved the 
foster parents’ petition to adopt CF and denied the grandfather’s request for 
visitation.  Id.  Both mother and grandfather appealed, but 
the grandfather subsequently dismissed his appeal.  Id.  The mother claimed that the district 
court’s decision rejecting the grandfather’s petition for visitation violated 
the grandfather’s right to familial association.  We held, however, that the mother did 
not have standing to assert a right of familial association on the grandfather’s 
behalf.  Id., ¶ 41, 120 P.3d  at 1005.  We stated that “Although Mother may be 
concerned about preserving a relationship between CF and her family, she does 
not have a personal interest in Grandfather’s petition for visitation.  Mother, therefore, does not have standing 
to claim that the district court erred by failing to grant Grandfather 
visitation with CF or to argue that Grandfather’s right to familial association 
was deprived by the district court’s order.”  Id.  Similarly, in this context, Appellant is 
not in a position to assert the grandparents’ right to familial association as a 
justification for the application of a higher evidentiary burden at the 
permanency hearing. 
 
[¶24]     
Finally, Appellant 
claims that the court improperly neglected specific sections of Wyoming’s Child 
Protection Act in issuing the permanency order.  First, relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-431(j), Appellant contends that the juvenile court’s decision should be 
overturned because DFS “failed to provide a compelling reason for recommending a 
permanency plan of termination over relative guardianship.”  The statute provides as 
follows:
 
(j) At the 
permanency hearing, the department of family services shall present to the court 
the efforts made to effectuate the permanency plan for the child, address the 
options for the child’s permanent placement, examine the reasons for excluding 
other permanency options and set forth the proposed plan to carry out the 
placement decision, including specific times for achieving the permanency plan. 
The department of family services shall 
provide the court a compelling reason for establishing a permanency plan other 
than reunification, adoption or legal 
guardianship.
 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
(emphasis added).  As indicated 
above, Appellant concedes that the permanency plan was changed to “termination 
and adoption.”  Under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-431(j), DFS is not required to provide a “compelling reason” for 
recommending a permanency plan of adoption over legal guardianship.  Rather, as the statute clearly 
indicates, DFS is required to provide a compelling reason for “establishing a 
permanency plan other than reunification, adoption 
or legal guardianship.”  Appellant’s 
arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
 
[¶25]     
Second, relying on 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(a)(ii), Appellant contends that the juvenile court 
was required to articulate specific findings of fact supporting its decision to 
change the permanency plan.  That 
section provides as follows:
 
§ 
14-3-429.  Decree where child adjudged neglected; dispositions; terms 
and conditions; legal custody.   

(a) In 
determining the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any 
child:
. . . 

 
(ii) If the 
court does not place the child in accordance with the recommendations of the 
predisposition report or multidisciplinary team, the court shall enter on the 
record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its decision to deviate 
from the recommended disposition.
 
(LexisNexis 
2009).  This statute, however, does 
not apply to a permanency hearing.  
Rather, the term “disposition,” as used in the statute, refers to the 
initial placement of a child following an adjudication of neglect and a 
disposition hearing.  Accordingly, 
as the statute governs the initial disposition phase of a neglect action, it has 
no application to the present case.  
Furthermore, the reasons for the court’s decision to discontinue the 
permanency plan of reunification with Appellant are clearly set forth in the 
record.
 
[¶26]     
Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-402(a)(xii) refers, in turn, to § 14-3-202(a)(vii), which defines neglect 
as follows:
 
(vii) “Neglect” 
means a failure or refusal by those responsible for the child’s welfare to 
provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical 
or any other care necessary for the child’s well being.
2See 
also 
LW v. State (In the Interest of 
JW), 2010 WY 28, 226 P.3d 873 (Wyo. 2010), where we 
did not explicitly set forth a standard of review.        

3Appellant asserts in 
her brief that the permanency plan was changed to “termination and 
adoption.”  The State 
agrees.
 
4Appellant contends 
that “clear and convincing” is the applicable standard of review in this 
case.  Our standard of review, 
however, refers to the degree of deference accorded to the trial court’s 
decision on appeal.  In contrast, 
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard refers to the burden of proof 
applicable in the trial court.