Title: Commonwealth v. Horne

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12068 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CALVIN HORNE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2016. - January 10, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Relevancy and 
materiality. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 4, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Justin Florence for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  The 
Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, see Commonwealth v. 
2 
 
 
Horne, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2015), and we granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review.  The 
question before us is whether the admission in evidence of so-
called "negative profiling" testimony, suggesting that the 
defendant did not look like a "crack" cocaine addict, gave rise 
to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We conclude 
that it did.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  The defendant's arrest.  We recite the 
relevant facts the jury could have found.  In the early morning 
hours of September 14, 2012, the defendant was stopped by police 
on Colonial Avenue in the Dorchester section of Boston for 
traffic violations.  The automobile that the defendant was 
driving was registered to a woman named Denise Barton.2  The 
officer who conducted the stop, Boston police Sergeant Thomas 
Brooks, determined that the defendant's driver's license had 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted jointly by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the 
American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, the American Society 
of Addiction Medicine, and the National Association of Social 
Workers. 
 
 
2 The vehicle had been impounded in early August of 2012, 
when the vehicle's owner, Denise Barton, was arrested on charges 
of cocaine distribution.  She had given the defendant a power of 
attorney to have the vehicle removed from the impound lot so it 
would not continue to accrue charges.  Approximately two weeks 
before the events in question, the vehicle apparently was 
released from the impound lot to another individual, Robert 
Williams, who had a prior conviction of unlawful possession of a 
firearm.  The record does not disclose how or when the defendant 
ultimately came into possession of the vehicle. 
3 
 
 
been suspended.  When Brooks, joined by Boston police Officer 
Pele James, attempted to arrest him, the defendant forcefully 
resisted.  With the assistance of three additional officers, the 
defendant was subdued and placed under arrest. 
 
Thereafter, the arresting officers found nearby a clear 
plastic bag containing twenty-six individually wrapped "rocks" 
of crack cocaine, totaling 3.87 grams.  The defendant apparently 
had kept the bag in his boot, which came off during the melee.  
Later that night, Boston police Officer David Lanteigne 
conducted an inventory search of the motor vehicle.  He found 
two cellular telephones and eighty-three dollars in cash in the 
center console of the automobile, another cellular telephone on 
the driver's seat, and a gun in the trunk.  He did not find any 
drug paraphernalia. 
 
The defendant was charged with seven offenses as a result 
of the stop,3 including several gun-related charges and one count 
of possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with the intent 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h), as a subsequent offense, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (d); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h); two charges of assault and battery on a police 
officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D; resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, 
§ 32B; and possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with the 
intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), as a subsequent 
offense, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d).  After the 
verdicts, the defendant pleaded guilty to the subsequent offense 
charge of possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with the 
intent to distribute. 
4 
 
 
to distribute, as a subsequent offense.  The jury acquitted the 
defendant of the firearms-related charges and convicted him of 
the other charges. 
 
b.  Challenged expert testimony.  The Commonwealth notified 
defense counsel in advance of trial that a Boston police officer 
would testify as an expert to "several aspects of street-level 
narcotics activity including, but not limited to:  common 
practices and activities of street-level drug dealers, the 
appearance, packing, and value of street narcotics, [and] the 
vernacular of illegal narcotics users and dealers."  At trial, 
Sergeant Detective William Feeney, a supervisor in the Boston 
police drug control unit, testified in keeping with the notice.  
In addition, Feeney testified as follows: 
Q.:  "And through your experience in observing and 
encountering . . . drug users, what are some of the 
characteristics that you've observed in [drug users], 
physical characteristics?" 
 
A.:  "Well, depending upon what type of drug they are 
addicted to they have different characteristics." 
 
Q.:  "Thank you, I'm going to ask a more specific question, 
if someone were addicted to crack cocaine what are 
some of the physical characteristics of a crack 
cocaine addict?" 
 
A.:  "Somebody that's a crack cocaine user that's been 
using for a time, most times their physical appearance 
will be changed from what they probably looked like at 
one point, to be very --" 
 
 
At that point, the defendant's counsel requested a sidebar 
conference at which she stated that "this [line of questioning] 
5 
 
 
is getting a little wonky for lack of a better term, what people 
look like when they are addicted to crack."  Her "understanding 
from notice from the Commonwealth" was that "[the prosecutor] 
said [that Feeney] was going to testify to drug distribution[,] 
not what a drug addict looks like."  The judge asked if counsel 
had received notice that Feeney was going to testify to signs of 
drug abuse and, when the defendant's counsel replied essentially 
in the affirmative, the judge remarked that "it's sort of common 
knowledge that crack addicts are going to exhibit certain 
physical signs and behavior," and allowed the line of 
questioning to continue. 
 
The following exchange then took place: 
Q.:  "Sergeant Detective Feeney can you please describe for 
the members of the jury the crack addicts as you've 
observed them and in some cases arrested them, what 
are some of the physical characteristics that you've 
noted?" 
 
A.:  "Well, the majority of them you will notice them to be 
somewhat unkempt, very thin, physical appearances seem 
to be deteriorating, sometimes they'll have rotted 
teeth or worn down teeth from constantly grinding 
their teeth based on the addiction that results from 
the crack use." 
 
The prosecutor then elicited testimony from Feeney concerning 
how much crack cocaine he typically would find when searching a 
crack cocaine user, the commonly used instruments of drug 
dealers, and the manner in which drug dealers generally package 
cocaine.  Feeney also testified, upon looking at a photograph of 
6 
 
 
the crack cocaine in this case, that the cocaine "could be 
[packaged in] some ten dollar bags and . . . twenty dollar 
bags," suggesting an intent to distribute.  At the end of his 
direct examination, Feeney testified that the packaging and 
amount of crack cocaine found near the defendant's boot, coupled 
with the eighty-three dollars, was consistent with an intent to 
distribute. 
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized Feeney's 
testimony concerning the physical characteristics of crack 
cocaine addicts, stating: 
 
"How do you know he possessed [the crack cocaine] with 
the intent to distribute it, does he look like a drug 
addict?  You saw the pictures of him, drug addicts, 
particularly crack cocaine addicts are skinny, they are 
thin, they have rotted teeth, they are drawn out.  He's a 
big man, he's a big muscular man who gave it to Sergeant 
Brooks quite frankly and Officer [James], and they needed 
assistance to get him.  He is not a drug addict; he 
possessed it with the intent to distribute it." 
The jury convicted the defendant of possession of a class B 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute. 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that it 
was error to allow Feeney to testify as to the typical physical 
characteristics of crack cocaine addicts, maintaining that such 
testimony was inadmissible negative profiling evidence. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  The "admission of [expert 
testimony] is largely within the discretion of the trial judge 
and he [or she] will be reversed only where the admission 
7 
 
 
constitutes an abuse of discretion or error of law."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Mass. 199, 202 (1991).  Where, as 
here, the objection was not preserved,4 we review the defendant's 
claim to "determine whether any error . . . created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. 
Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 150 (2004).5 
 
b.  Admissibility of negative profiling evidence.  Twenty-
five years ago, we determined in Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 
719, 723 (1991), that profiling testimony is inadmissible.  In 
that case, we addressed whether there was error in the admission 
of an expert witness's testimony concerning the typical child 
                                                          
 
 
4 Counsel's statement that Feeney's testimony was "getting a 
little wonky" was not the functional equivalent of an objection, 
nor did her discussion at sidebar suggest that any incipient 
challenge would rest upon the impropriety of profiling evidence.  
Counsel instead seemed focused on whether proper notice of the 
testimony had been given.  Moreover, counsel did not object to 
the prosecutor's closing argument recounting the profiling 
evidence now at issue. 
 
5 The Commonwealth also argues that, in any event, the 
admission of the profiling evidence could not have caused a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because the 
defendant's trial counsel presented a defense of absence of 
evidence of possession rather than lack of intent to distribute.  
The record, however, indicates that, while trial counsel 
maintained that the defendant did not possess the drugs, she 
also challenged the Commonwealth's evidence that he intended to 
distribute narcotics.  She cross-examined Feeney on the type of 
activity he typically witnessed when surveilling and arresting 
drug dealers, and attempted to distinguish the defendant's 
circumstances.  She also argued in her closing that because the 
cellular telephones in the vehicle the defendant was driving 
were not ringing and the officers had not seen the defendant 
making stops, "[t]here is no evidence that [the defendant] was 
distributing drugs that night." 
8 
 
 
abuser.  Id.  The expert's so-called "child battering profile" 
consisted of his view of several typical characteristics 
associated with child abusers.  Id. at 722.  By introducing this 
evidence, the prosecutor intended to demonstrate that the 
defendant matched the profile.  We concluded that the expert's 
profiling testimony was both irrelevant and prejudicial to the 
defendant.  Id. at 723. 
 
In determining that the profiling evidence was irrelevant, 
we noted that a "criminal trial is by its very nature an 
individualized adjudication of a defendant's guilt or legal 
innocence."  Id.  "[T]he mere fact that a defendant fits the 
profile does not tend to prove that a particular defendant" 
committed a particular offense.  Id.  Additionally, the use of 
such evidence invites a jury to conclude that because an expert 
identifies an accused as fitting a particular profile, "it is 
more likely than not that [the accused] committed the crime" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 723-724.  In light of this, "[t]he 
use of criminal profiles as substantive evidence of guilt is 
inherently prejudicial to the defendant."  Id. at 723. 
 
The inadmissibility of profiling evidence consistently has 
been upheld in the intervening years.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 850 (1997) ("expert may not provide 
profiles or testify as to the typical attributes or 
characteristics of the perpetrators of child abuse"); 
9 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 735-737 (2016) 
(sex abuser profile inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Poitras, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. 691, 694 (2002) (admission of child abuser 
profile erroneous); Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. 
Ct. 496, 501-502 (1996) (prosecutor's remarks suggesting 
defendant sexually abused his children because he fit mold of 
abuser improper).6 
 
The Commonwealth's effort to distinguish the challenged 
evidence from that held inadmissible in Day and its progeny is 
unavailing.  At trial in this case, the Commonwealth attempted 
to prove that since the defendant did not match the physical 
characteristics of a drug addict, he must be a drug dealer.  On 
appeal, the Commonwealth maintains that this use of profiling 
evidence was permissible because it did not explicitly compare 
the defendant to the profile of a drug dealer.  Contrary to the 
Commonwealth's assertion, however, such so-called negative 
profiling evidence -- where the goal is to demonstrate that a 
person does not fit a particular profile -- falls squarely 
                                                          
 
 
6 We note that the general bar against profiling evidence 
does not apply to instances where a medical expert testifies to 
the typical physical symptoms present in victims of a particular 
crime.  See Commonwealth v. LeFave, 407 Mass. 927, 930-931 
(1990) (pediatric gynecologist's testimony concerning physical 
damage to genitalia common in sexually abused children 
admissible).  See also Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 
628-630 (1989) (expert testimony concerning general 
characteristics of abused child admissible). 
10 
 
 
within the scope of the profiling evidence we have long 
prohibited. 
 
The rationale for this was explained recently in Coates, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. at 735, where the Appeals Court concluded that a 
defendant's proffer of expert testimony showing that he did not 
match the profile of a sex abuser had been properly excluded at 
trial.7  The Appeals Court cogently observed that "[i]mplicit in 
the defendant's assertion that he [did] not match a criminal 
profile is the assumption that such a profile would be probative 
if introduced to prove that someone who matched the profile 
would be more likely to have committed the crimes."  Id. at 734.  
As the court noted, if the profile would be irrelevant to 
establish the defendant's guilt under Day, it also was 
irrelevant when introduced for any other purpose.  Id. at 734-
737.  As the mirror image of the prototypical profiling evidence 
dealt with in Day, such negative profiling evidence serves the 
same impermissible end.  It is an attempt to convince the jury 
to determine a defendant's guilt by comparing him or her to 
stereotypes rather than by individualized adjudication.  Such 
evidence is inadmissible. 
                                                          
 
 
7 In an unpublished memorandum and order, see Commonwealth 
v. Correa, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1122 (2009), a panel of the Appeals 
Court concluded that the Commonwealth's use of expert testimony 
"about the stereotypical cocaine addict" in order to establish 
that the defendant was a drug dealer, as here, was inadmissible 
because it constituted improper "profiling testimony." 
11 
 
 
 
Given the well-established proscription against the use of 
profiling evidence, the admission of Feeney's testimony 
concerning the physical characteristics of crack cocaine addicts 
was error.  Moreover, as we stated in Day, 409 Mass. at 723, the 
use of such evidence was "inherently prejudicial" to the 
defendant. 
 
c.  Materiality of the error.  An "error creates a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice unless we are 
persuaded that it did not 'materially influence[]' the guilty 
verdict" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 13 (1999).  In applying this standard, we analyze the 
potential impact of the error on the verdict, Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 299 (2002), and review the record to 
determine the strength of the Commonwealth's case, absent the 
improper evidence, Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 362 
(2003).  An error may be said to have materially influenced the 
verdict only if we are left with "a serious doubt [as to] 
whether the result of the trial might have been different had 
the error not been made" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002). 
 
We may assume that Feeney's testimony was inherently 
prejudicial to the defendant.  The impact of the testimony was 
magnified by the prosecutor's closing argument, in which the 
profiling testimony was presented as a key factor in 
12 
 
 
demonstrating that the defendant intended to distribute the 
cocaine.  The first thing the jury heard as to why the defendant 
did not possess the cocaine for personal use but intended to 
distribute it was that his physical appearance showed that he 
was not a drug addict.  The prosecutor stated, "How do you know 
he possessed [the cocaine] with the intent to distribute it, 
does he look like a drug addict?"  The prosecutor then continued 
to emphasize the profiling evidence, contrasting the defendant's 
size, strength, and physical appearance, with the "drawn out" 
appearance of a typical "skinny" crack cocaine addict with 
"rotted teeth." 
The deceptively intuitive appeal of this entreaty provided 
it with a "superficial plausibility . . . [that] masked its 
profound flaws."  Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 460 Mass. 781, 788 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 675, 
685 n.6 (2010) (Milkey, J., dissenting).  While the prosecutor 
went on to argue the impact of other items of evidence, the 
simplest and most direct evidence, from the standpoint of the 
jury, sat a few feet away from them at the defense table.  We 
think it unlikely that the profiling evidence was only of minor 
significance to the jury. 
The Commonwealth's remaining evidence, while clearly 
sufficient to support the conviction, was not overwhelming.  As 
proof that the defendant possessed the crack cocaine with the 
13 
 
 
intent to distribute it, there was also evidence of (1) eighty-
three dollars found in the central console of the vehicle that 
the defendant was driving; (2) three cellular telephones, two 
found in the central console of the vehicle and one found on the 
driver's seat; and (3) twenty-six individual packets of crack 
cocaine packaged in what Feeney testified could be ten- and 
twenty-dollar bags that had been found near the defendant's 
boot.  We consider each in turn. 
While large amounts of cash can be probative of an intent 
to distribute, eighty-three dollars in cash would at best give 
rise to a weak inference.  See Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 
Mass. 160, 166 (2014) (cash in amount of $312 not particularly 
large sum for purposes of demonstrating intent to distribute 
narcotics).  As to the cellular telephones, while a defendant's 
possession of multiple cellular telephones may be probative of 
an intent to distribute, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dancy, 75 
Mass. App. Ct. 175, 178 (2009), it is far from clear whether all 
three cellular telephones found in the vehicle belonged to the 
defendant.  The defendant contended at trial that two of the 
cellular telephones, both of which were located in the central 
console of the automobile, belonged to others.  The vehicle that 
the defendant was driving, owned by Barton, had apparently 
recently been driven by Williams.  See note 2, supra.  The 
14 
 
 
Commonwealth did not present any evidence demonstrating that the 
defendant used the cellular telephones.8 
The Commonwealth's strongest evidence concerns the crack 
cocaine found on the street and inferably belonging to the 
defendant.  The drugs were packaged in twenty-six individual 
bags, which Feeney testified could have had a street value of 
ten to twenty dollars each.  While the drugs packaged as they 
were could be probative of an intent to distribute, see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 391, 392-393 (1999) 
(possession of 2.04 grams of cocaine in eighteen "dime" sized 
bags probative of intent to distribute), the weight of the 
cocaine, 3.87 grams, is also consistent with personal use.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Roman, 414 Mass. 642, 646-647 (1993) 
(possession of 25.6 grams of cocaine, without more, not enough 
to prove distribution). 
The Commonwealth's admissible evidence, taken as a whole, 
was certainly sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. 
See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979) 
(sufficiency of evidence determined based on whether evidence in 
light most favorable to Commonwealth supports conviction).  
Nonetheless, the case against the defendant on the drug charge 
                                                          
 
 
8 We also are mindful that the jury acquitted the defendant 
of the firearms-related charges despite the presence of a gun in 
the trunk of the vehicle that he was driving.  This suggests 
that the jury did not accept the Commonwealth's argument that 
all of the items in the vehicle belonged to the defendant. 
15 
 
 
was not overwhelming.  See Commonwealth v. Little, 453 
Mass. 766, 775 (2009) (where prosecution's case not 
overwhelming, error gave rise to substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice).  Given this, along with the inherently prejudicial 
impact of the error, magnified by the use of long-proscribed 
profiling evidence in the Commonwealth's closing, we are left 
with "a serious doubt [as to] whether the result of the trial 
might have been different had the error not been made" (citation 
omitted).  Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is vacated and set aside.  
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.