Title: South Shore Homes Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

219 Kan. 744 (1976)
549 P.2d 1035
SOUTH SHORE HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC., A Corporation, Appellee,
v.
HOLLAND HOLIDAY'S, A Partnership of Lenexa, Kansas, Appellants.
No. 47,984

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 8, 1976.
Gary L. Lane, of Hackler, Londerholm, Speer, Vader & Austin, of Olathe, argued the cause, and Wilson E. Speer, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellants.
Stephen Jones, of Coffman, Jones & Hederstedt, of Lyndon, argued the cause, and Harry T. Coffman, and David Hederstedt, of the same firm, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRAGER, J.:
This is an action brought by the developer of a residential area to enforce certain restrictive covenants against the owners of property subject to such restrictions. The plaintiff-appellee is South Shore Homes Association, Inc., the developer of a platted residential subdivision near Lake Pomona in Osage county, *745 Kansas. The defendants-appellants are Holland Holiday's, a partnership of Lenexa, Kansas, the owners of two lots in the platted area. In the action plaintiff sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from placing mobile homes, campers, or tents upon their real property in the subdivision. After a hearing on the merits the district court issued an injunction permanently restraining the defendants from locating mobile campers and camping tents upon the lots owned by them, or permitting others to do so. The defendants, Holland Holiday's, have appealed to this court.
The facts in this case are not in dispute and were submitted to the court in the form of a stipulation of facts which provided as follows:
The Declaration of Restrictions, which was attached to and made a part of the stipulation of facts, provided in pertinent part as follows:
..............
"SECTION II. BILLBOARDS PROHIBITED:
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Following the filing of the stipulation of facts and the presentation of oral argument by counsel, the district court took the case under advisement. Thereafter the district court filed its Memorandum Decision granting injuctive relief in favor of the plaintiff. *750 The Memorandum Decision of the court in a clear and concise manner states the rationale of the court's decision as follows:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
On this appeal the defendants first contend that the trial court erred in construing the language of Section XI of the Declaration of Restrictions to prohibit occasional recreational camping. The defendants maintain in substance that utilizing a tent or camper for general camping purposes is not prohibited by the restrictions because such use is not a use or occupancy of the property as a residence. In support of its position the defendants direct our attention to certain rules of construction which are usually applied by courts in construing and enforcing restrictive covenants which limit the use of property. It would be helpful to review some of these principles of law in order to resolve the issues presented on this appeal.
Restrictive covenants have long been recognized in this state. *751 A person who takes land with notice of restrictions upon it will not in equity and good conscience be permitted to act in violation thereof. (Reeves v. Morris, 155 Kan. 231, 124 P.2d 488; Hecht v. Stephens, 204 Kan. 559, 464 P.2d 258.) Such restrictions will be enforced by injunction and in a proper case a mandatory injunction will lie for the removal of buildings and structures in breach of such restrictions. (N.P. Dodge Corp. v. Calderwood, 151 Kan. 978, 101 P.2d 883.) In Sporn v. Overholt, 175 Kan. 197, 262 P.2d 828, we held that restrictive covenants in deeds are to be construed in accordance with the intent and purpose of the grantors after examination of the entire instrument under consideration. In Sporn the court dealt with land on which a dwelling was being constructed and construed a clause in a deed requiring that the property be used for residence purposes only. In the opinion the court stated as follows:
In Sporn the court also defined the word "residence" in terms that are applicable to the instant case. That definition was as follows:
The granting of injunctive relief is, of course, equitable in nature and involves the exercise of judicial discretion. Whether injunctive relief will be granted to restrain the violation of a restrictive covenant is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court to be determined in light of all the facts and circumstances. Absent manifest abuse of that discretion, an appellate court will not interfere. (Hecht v. Stephens, supra.) In its memorandum decision the trial court points out that the basic issue in the case is whether the use made of their lots by the defendant owners violated the purpose of Section XI of the Declaration of Restrictions. To determine that question consideration should be given to the Declaration of Restrictions in its entirety. When the *752 various sections of the Declaration of Restrictions are considered as a whole, in our judgment their purpose is clear and unambiguous. At the outset it is stated that it is the desire of the development company that its land should be developed and used as an exclusive residential district. It is next declared that the restrictions are executed to the end that the development company and its future grantees may be protected and assured that the land developed will be used for residential purposes only. Following these general statements of intention Section I of the restrictions declares that none of the land may be used or occupied for other than private residential purposes. No flat or apartment houses, although intended for residential purposes may be erected thereon. Section II prohibits the erection of billboards without the consent of the development company. Section IV makes provisions for the release of the restrictions by a majority of the property owners after the expiration of a twenty year period or at successive five year periods thereafter. Section VI requires that every residence present an attractive frontage on the drive upon which said lot fronts. The desirability of enhancing the "aesthetic effect" of each property is emphasized. No owner of any lot shall allow any grass or weeds to obtain a height in excess of five inches from April through October of each year. No trash, litter, unsightly objects or debris shall be permitted to lie scattered about or upon any lot. Section IX provides for a minimum of 400 square feet of living area in any residence erected upon any lot. Section XIII prohibits erection of business buildings or the carrying on of any noxious or offensive activity upon the property. Section XV requires the approval of plans and specifications by the development company before the construction of any building upon the property. That section also provides that no building materials of any kind shall be placed or stored upon any lot until approved plans have been obtained and a date set for commencement of construction.
It is obvious from a reading of these various sections of the Declaration of Restrictions that the developer intended to maintain the area as an unusually nice and exclusive residential area subject to a variety of restrictions reasonably calculated to maintain its exclusive nature. In our judgment the trial court was correct in finding that there were no ambiguities in the language of Section XI of the Declaration of Restrictions and that the use of the lots by the defendant for general camping purposes violated *753 the restrictions therein contained. In arriving at this conclusion we have considered the cases from other jurisdictions cited by counsel for the defendants in their brief. (Builders, Inc. v. Hollar, 7 N.C. App. 14, 171 S.E.2d 60; Hullett v. Grayson, 265 N.C. 453, 144 S.E.2d 206; Harris v. Four Hills Development Corporation, 79 N.M. 370, 443 P.2d 863.) In our judgment each of those cases is distinguishable on its facts.
The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in ruling that there had not been a change in the character of the subdivision such as would justify the court in refusing to enforce Section XI of the Declaration of Restrictions. In support of their position counsel for the defendants argues that the apparent purpose for imposing restrictions was to develop a nice residential district with residences erected on each lot and that this purpose has been frustrated by the apparent lack of interest in lot owners in erecting residences. He points out that the restrictions became effective on January 1, 1964, and that only 26 lots out of 333 lots have residences erected upon them. Counsel is correct in his statement that covenants concerning the use of real estate will be enforced by equity only so long as they remain reasonable in the light of their purpose, taking into account changes in relevant conditions since the time they were made. (Landau v. City of Leawood, 214 Kan. 104, 519 P.2d 676.) Stated in another way, where there has been a change in the character and conditions of a neighborhood to such an extent as to neutralize the benefits of a restrictive covenant and destroy its purpose, a court of equity is justified in refusing to enforce the restriction. (Hecht v. Stephens, supra.) However, in Hecht it is also pointed out that the extent of change in a neighborhood which will justify refusal to enforce restrictive covenants has not given rise to any hard-and-fast rule. Each case must rest on the equities of the situation as it is presented. A basic principle woven as a thread throughout all the decisions is that to warrant refusal of equitable relief, the change in conditions must be so great or radical as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction and destroy its purpose. In the case before us the trial court found that the evidence does not sustain defendants' contention that there has been a change in the character of the subdivision such as would justify the court in refusing to enforce Section IX. On the stipulated facts we cannot say that as a matter of law there has been a change in the character and conditions of the subdivision to such an extent as to neutralize the benefits of *754 the restrictive covenant and to destroy its purpose. While it is possible to speculate that the economy has frustrated the development of the area, there is no indication that it will not be further developed in years to come and we find no compelling reasons to refuse to enforce the restrictive covenant on this basis.
The defendants' last point on this appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff's right to enforce the restrictions has been lost by laches, waiver, or by acquiescence in the violation of the restrictions by the defendants. The substance of defendants' position is that they have utilized their lots for recreational camping since acquiring an interest in the property in 1965, that the plaintiff has acquiesced in these activities for seven years, and having made no objection or complaint, it should not be permitted at this late date to enforce the restrictive covenants. It is true that the right to enforce a restrictive covenant may be lost by laches, waiver, or acquiescence. (Maurer v. J.C. Nichols Co., 207 Kan. 315, 485 P.2d 174; N.P. Dodge Corp. v. Calderwood, supra; Hecht v. Stephens, supra.) This rule, however, is not an absolute one. Mere acquiescence will not bar enforcement so long as a restriction remains of any value. Here there is no evidence to show that the defendants have changed their position or that it would be inequitable to enforce the restrictions. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence of general and continuous violations of the several restrictions such as would constitute acquiescence or waiver on the part of the plaintiff.
The judgment of the trial court granting injunctive relief is supported by the evidence and no abuse of its discretion has been shown. The judgment is affirmed.