Title: Magin v. Solitude Homeowners, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BARBARA L. MAGIN, as a trustee of the Barbara L. Magin trust u/t/a dated June 30, 1995 v. SOLITUDE HOME OWNER'S INC., a Wyoming non-profit corporstion2011 WY 102Case Number: No. S-10-0166, S-10-0177Decided: 06/30/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
BARBARA 
L. MAGIN, 

as 
a trustee of the Barbara L. Magin trust u/t/a dated June 30, 1995,Appellant 
(Defendant),v.SOLITUDE HOMEOWNER'S INC., a Wyoming non-profit 
corporation,Appellee (Plaintiff).BARBARA L. 
MAGIN,

 as a trustee of the Barbara L. Magin 
trust u/t/a dated June 30, 1995,Appellant 
(Defendant),v.SOLITUDE HOMEOWNER'S, INC., a Wyoming non-profit 
corporation,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant in Case No. S-10-0166:

Gerard 
R. Bosch and Mark J. Longfield of Law Offices of Jerry Bosch, LLC, Wilson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Bosch.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee in Case No. S-10-0166:

Glenn 
M. Ford of Garland Ford & Potter, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court granted Solitude Homeowners, Inc. (Solitude) summary judgment on its 
claims that Barbara L. Magin had violated the subdivision's protective covenants 
by erecting screens, brush, log piles, and fencing.  The district court also awarded Solitude 
attorney fees.      

 
 
[¶2]      On appeal, Ms. 
Magin challenges the district court's refusal to disqualify Solitude's counsel 
for having a conflict of interest and its refusal to allow her additional time 
to respond to Solitude's summary judgment motion.  She also claims the district court erred 
by granting summary judgment to Solitude on the covenant violations and awarding 
Solitude attorney fees.     

 
 
[¶3]      We conclude that 
Solitude's counsel had a conflict of interest; however, the district court did 
not err by refusing to disqualify the firm because Ms. Magin's motion to 
disqualify was untimely.  The 
district court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Ms. Magin 
additional time to respond to Solitude's summary judgment motion and properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Solitude and ordered Ms. Magin to bring her 
property into compliance with the covenants.  We conclude, however, that the district 
court abused its discretion by ordering Ms. Magin to pay the attorney fees 
generated by her former firm because it failed to segregate the non-recoverable 
fees associated with clearing the conflict.  

 
 
[¶4]      We, therefore, 
affirm in part and reverse in part.  

            
 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Magin 
presents several issues, which we re-phrase:

 
 

1.            
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Magin's Motion to 
Disqualify Solitude's attorney under Rule 1.9 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law and for a hearing on the 
matter?

 
 

2.            
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Magin's motion to 
continue the summary judgment hearing and/or motion for extension of time to 
respond to Solitude's motion for summary judgment?

 
 

3.            
Did 
the district court err by granting summary judgment in favor of Solitude on the 
basis that Ms. Magin had violated the covenants?

 
 

4.            
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by awarding Solitude attorney 
fees?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶6]      In 1997, Ms. 
Magin purchased Lot 34 in the Solitude subdivision in Teton County, 
Wyoming.  Shortly after she 
purchased the property, the Solitude Site Committee informed her that 
pre-existing fences and a "bully" barn were in violation of the subdivision 
covenants.  She retained attorney 
Joseph Moore, and he contacted the individual from whom Ms. Magin had purchased 
the property seeking compensation or assistance with bringing the property into 
compliance with the covenants.  Mr. 
Moore also negotiated with the Solitude Site Committee to avoid litigation over 
the covenant violations.  Ms. Magin 
objected to Mr. Moore's bill and a proceeding before the Wyoming State Bar 
Committee for Resolution of Fee Disputes was commenced.  Mr. Moore apparently withdrew his bill 
before the committee issued a decision.    

 
 
[¶7]      On February 4, 
2008, Solitude filed a complaint against Ms. Magin alleging different violations 
of the covenants and seeking to recover the attorney fees it incurred in 
enforcing the covenants.  Solitude's 
original law firm withdrew and on September 5, 2008, attorney Glenn Ford entered 
an appearance on Solitude's behalf.  
Mr. Ford practiced in the same firm as Ms. Magin's original attorney, Mr. 
Moore.  Mr. Moore claimed that he 
contacted Ms. Magin's current attorney, Gerard Bosch, prior to Mr. Ford agreeing 
to represent Solitude and he and Mr. Bosch agreed there was no conflict of 
interest.  Mr. Bosch acknowledged 
they had talked, but stated that Ms. Magin verbally agreed to waive the conflict 
provided Mr. Moore did not participate in the litigation.  No written waiver of conflict was 
executed as required by Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at 
Law 1.9.  

 
 
[¶8]      Over a year 
later, on September 29, 2009, Mr. Moore attended a hearing on pending motions 
with Mr. Ford.  On October 9, 2009, 
Ms. Magin filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Ford from acting as Solitude's 
counsel because he had a conflict of interest.  Ms. Magin submitted various materials 
and asked for another judge or magistrate to review them in camera because they were privileged 
and she was apparently concerned that the presiding judge's consideration of the 
underlying covenant violation issue may be tainted by the materials.  On November 19, 2009, the district court 
denied the motion to disqualify and the motion for in camera review without holding a 
hearing and without offering an explanation for its rulings.  Ms. Magin filed a motion for 
reconsideration the following day.  
On December 18, 2009, the matter was assigned to another district court 
judge as a result of the retirement of the first judge.  On February 22, 2010, the newly 
appointed judge set all pending matters for a hearing on April 1, 2010.    

 
 
[¶9]      At that hearing, 
the district court denied Ms. Magin's motion for reconsideration of the denial 
of her request for disqualification, again without holding an evidentiary 
hearing but indicating he presumed that the previous judge had reviewed the in camera materials.  The court also denied Ms. Magin's motion 
to continue the summary judgment hearing and her request for additional time to 
respond to the summary judgment motion and considered the case on the 
merits.  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Solitude, concluding that Ms. Magin had violated 
the covenants and Solitude was entitled to attorney fees.  Solitude filed its motion for attorney 
fees, and the district court awarded all of the fees sought by Solitude.  Ms. Magin appealed from the order 
denying her motion for disqualification, the order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Solitude and the order granting Solitude attorney fees.   

   

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

A.   Disqualification/Conflict 
of Interest

 
 
[¶10]   A district court's ruling on a 
motion to disqualify for a conflict of interest is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 350 
(Wyo. 1988).  Ms. Magin's motion was 
based upon Rule 1.9(a):

  

            
(a) 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless 
the former client makes an informed decision to waive the conflict, confirmed in writing signed 
by the client.

 
 
Although 
Mr. Ford did not formerly represent Ms. Magin, another member of his firm, Mr. 
Moore, did.  Rule of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys at Law 1.10(a) imputes a conflict of interest to all 
members of a law firm:

 
 

            
(a) 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so 
by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of 
the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially 
limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the 
firm.

 

Thus, 
Mr. Ford was disqualified from representing Solitude to the same extent as Mr. 
Moore.

 
 
[¶11]   In Simpson Performance Prods., Inc., v. Robert 
W. Horn, P.C., 2004 WY 69, ¶ 16, 92 P.3d 283, 287 (Wyo. 2004), we identified 
four elements which must be proven to establish a Rule 1.9 
violation:

 
 
First, 
there must have been a valid attorney-client relationship between the attorney 
and the former client . . . . Second, the interests of the present and former 
clients must be materially adverse . . . .  Third, the former client must not have 
consented, in an informed manner, to the new representation . . . . Finally, the 
current matter and the former matter must be the same or substantially 
related.

 
 

Sullivan 
County Regional Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 
141 N.H. 479, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (1996).

            

[¶12]   Solitude concedes that all of the 
elements of the test are met in this case, with the exception of the last 
element.  It contends that the 
current matter is not the same as or substantially related to the former 
matter.  Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 
discusses the definition of "substantially related":

 
 
[3]  Matters are "substantially related" for 
purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or 
if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information 
as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would 
materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. . . . [For 
example,] a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing 
environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from 
representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis 
of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on 
the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the 
completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. . . . 
Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete 
by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining 
whether two representations are substantially related.  . . . A former client is not required to 
reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish 
a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the 
subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be 
based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and 
information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing 
such services.

 
 
[¶13]   
As the comment makes clear, the determination of whether the current 
and former matters are substantially related is inherently factual.  In light of the factual nature of the 
issue, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated the following with regard 
to the necessity of an evidentiary hearing:

 
 
If 
the moving party makes a non-frivolous allegation that he has had an 
attorney-client relationship in a substantially related matter, a district court must 
investigate the allegation further through an evidentiary hearing before denying 
a motion to disqualify.  Failure to 
do so constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

  

United 
States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 681-82 (10th Cir. 2006), citing 
United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005).  See also, Simpson, ¶ 20, 92 P.3d  at 288 
(indicating that the determination of whether a conflict of interest exists 
requires a "fact-intensive analysis").  

 
 
[¶14]   Solitude argued that the present 
matter was not substantially related to Mr. Moore's prior representation of Ms. 
Magin.  It insisted that Mr. Moore's 
representation of Ms. Magin involved a dispute with the seller of the property 
over covenant violations and was resolved years ago, while the current matter 
involves different violations of the covenants and was brought by the 
homeowners' association.  All of 
that is true.  However, the 
materials submitted by Ms. Magin establish that the genesis of the first dispute 
was a claim by Solitude and her neighbors that certain structures and fences 
constructed on her property by her predecessor violated the covenants.1  Ms. Magin's submissions showed that Mr. 
Moore advised her with regard to interpretation of some of the same covenants at 
issue here and negotiated with Solitude with regard to the covenant 
violations.  

 
 
[¶15]   Ms. Magin certainly presented a 
non-frivolous allegation that the matters were substantially related.  As such, the district court was 
obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  The court's failure to do so amounted to 
an abuse of discretion.  See LaVallee, 439 F.3d  at 681-82.  Although we would normally remand to the 
district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the 
current and former matters were substantially related, the record contains 
sufficient information for us to make a determination.  In any event, a remand is unnecessary 
because, as explained infra, the 
motion to disqualify was untimely. 

 
 
[¶16]   The interest served by Rule 1.9 is 
the protection of the confidentiality of the client's information.   "[P]reservation of a client's 
confidences has been described as the bedrock principle of the Anglo-American 
legal system.'"  Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶ 50, 42 P.3d 1013, 1028 (Wyo. 2002), quoting Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice, Adverse 
Representation § 17.3 Ethical Considerations (5th ed. 2000), which quoted In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 283 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1991).  In Carlson, 751 P.2d  at 348, we stated that 
"the communication of confidential information is presumed once a showing is 
made that the matter in which an attorney formerly provided representation is 
substantially related to matters in the pending action."  We adopted a broad test for determining 
whether a substantial relationship exists between the two matters.  "If the two matters have common facts, 
the attorney is in a position to receive confidential information which possibly 
could be used to the detriment of the former client in the later 
proceeding."  Id. at 349 (citation omitted).  

 
 
[¶17]   
Carlson is an example of where disqualification was required.  There, Carl Carlson and his mother 
retained attorney A.B. to draft a lease agreement which apparently gave Mr. 
Carlson the option to purchase property belonging to his mother after her death 
in return for his leasing the property and making improvements upon it.  Id. at 345-46.  Citizens National Bank & Trust Co. 
had loaned Ms. Carlson money and urged her to sell the property to pay off the 
loan.  She advised Mr. Carlson she 
was terminating the lease and selling the property, and Mr. Carlson retained 
another attorney, E.F., to file suit against Ms. Carlson and the bank, alleging 
conspiracy to interfere with the contractual relationship between the Carlsons 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at 346.  A.B. appeared and answered on behalf of 
Citizens.  Id.   On appeal, this Court held that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Carlson's motion to 
disqualify A.B. from acting as Citizens' attorney.  We ruled that A.B.'s prior 
representation of Mr. Carlson and later representation of Citizens were 
substantially related because they both concerned the "existence, content and 
effect" of the lease agreement between Mr. Carlson and his mother.  Id. at 349-50.  

 
 
[¶18]   Solitude attempts to distinguish Carlson from the present case by stating 
that Mr. Moore did not draft the agreement at issue, i.e. the covenants, and the 
earlier dispute was between Ms. Magin and the seller.  As we stated above, the documents 
submitted by Ms. Magin showed that, while the earlier dispute involved the 
seller, it started with assertions by Solitude and Ms. Magin's neighbors that 
her property was in violation of the covenants.    

 
 
[¶19]   The present proceeding involves 
conditions which Ms. Magin herself created several years after the first matter 
was resolved.  Nevertheless, the 
interpretation and application of the covenants were directly at issue in both 
proceedings.  Mr. Moore provided 
advice to Ms. Magin about the covenants which went beyond the violations alleged 
at that time including specific advice on how to vote on proposed amendments to 
the covenants, some of which are directly at issue in this case.  The circumstances here are similar to 
the example provided in Rule 1.9, Comment 3, where an attorney who represented 
"a client in securing environmental permits to build 
a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to 
oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental 
considerations."  Despite the 
passage of time between the two proceedings, they involved common facts 
including the interpretation and application of the covenants.  The matters were, therefore, 
substantially related and Mr. Moore, Mr. Ford and their firm were prohibited, 
under Rule 1.9, from representing Solitude against Ms. Magin.  

 
 
[¶20]   
Our inquiry does not, however, end with the conclusion that a 
conflict of interest existed.  Solitude argues that Ms. Magin 
surrendered her right to disqualify Mr. Ford because she did not file a motion 
to disqualify within a reasonable time after she discovered the conflict.  The district court did not state its 
reasons for denying Ms. Magin's motion to disqualify; thus, it may have 
determined that the motion was untimely.  
In any event, we can affirm a district court's ruling on any basis 
appearing in the record.  See, e.g., Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82, 89 (Wyo. 
1986).   

 
 
[¶21]   If the client does not file a 
motion to disqualify within a reasonable time, she is deemed to have waived her 
objection to the conflict.  Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87-88 (9th Cir. 
1983). See also, Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food 
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th 
Cir. 1978); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 
518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); J. Burman, Conflicts of Interest in Wyoming, 35 
Land & Water L. Rev. 79, 100 (2000).  
Because of the potential for use of a late motion to disqualify as a 
technique of harassment, courts particularly frown upon clients waiting until 
significant work has been performed in a case to request disqualification.  See id.  

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Ford entered his appearance on 
September 5, 2008; Ms. Magin did not file her motion to disqualify until over a 
year later, on October 9, 2009.  Ms. 
Magin's attorney, Mr. Bosch, explained the delay by stating that when Mr. Moore 
contacted him before Mr. Ford entered his appearance and asked for a waiver of 
conflict, Ms. Magin verbally agreed to waive the conflict provided Mr. Moore did 
not participate in the current matter.  
Shortly after Mr. Moore attended the September 29, 2009, hearing 
allegedly in violation of the verbal agreement, Ms. Magin filed her motion to 
disqualify.    

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Moore offered a different 
explanation.  He filed an affidavit 
in which he stated that he had not sought a waiver of conflict because no 
conflict existed.  Arguing on appeal 
that Ms. Magin's motion was untimely, Mr. Ford asserts that because her attorney 
initially consented to Mr. Ford's representation of Solitude,2 she should not be allowed to seek 
disqualification at this late date.   

 
 
[¶24]   As we concluded above, a conflict 
did exist and Mr. Ford and Mr. Moore were obligated to obtain a waiver from Ms. 
Magin.  Rule 1.9(a) does not allow 
verbal waivers of conflicts and specifically requires that "the former client make[] an informed decision to waive the 
conflict, confirmed in writing 
signed by the client."  See, e.g., Boldridge v. State, 215 P.3d 585, 593 
(Kan. 2009) (indicating that unless there are special circumstances, such as a 
waiver made on the record after informed consent, a verbal waiver will not 
satisfy the written waiver requirement).  
An obvious purpose of the rule requiring a written waiver is to have the 
parameters of the parties' waiver agreement formalized to prevent precisely this 
type of dispute from arising later.  
Therefore, Ms. Magin's verbal waiver was not effective under Rule 1.9(a) 
to waive the conflict of interest.  

 
 
[¶25]   Ms. Magin was aware of Mr. Ford's 
conflict of interest when he entered his appearance on behalf of Solitude and 
she did not effectively waive the conflict.  Consequently, she had an obligation to 
demand Mr. Ford's disqualification in a timely manner.  She did not file her motion for 
disqualification until over a year after Mr. Ford began representing 
Solitude.  During that time, the 
parties performed significant work on the case, including conducting discovery, 
locating expert witnesses and filing dispositive motions.  An order by the district court requiring 
Mr. Ford to withdraw at that late date would have wasted judicial resources and 
prejudiced Solitude by requiring it to find new counsel costing additional time 
and money and unnecessarily delaying resolution of the matter.  See, e.g., Central Milk, 573 F.2d  at 992 (holding 
"[a] motion to disqualify should be made with reasonable promptness after a 
party discovers the facts which lead to the motion"); Redd, 518 F.2d  at 315 (holding motion to 
disqualify should be filed as soon as conflict becomes known to "avoid the very 
kind of disorder which resulted" from the delay); Trust Corp. of Montana, 701 F.2d  at 87 
("It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an 
attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest 
but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to have waived 
that right.").  We conclude, 
therefore, that Ms. Magin surrendered her right to request the disqualification 
of Mr. Ford because she delayed in filing her motion and the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion or refusing to reconsider its 
denial. 

 
 
 
 

B.   Continuance/Discovery 
 Summary Judgment

 
 
[¶26]   In two related issues, Ms. Magin 
challenges the district court's refusal to grant her motion to continue the 
summary judgment hearing and her motion for additional time to conduct 
discovery.  The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a 
motion for continuance and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing 
court will not disturb its ruling.  
Abraham v. Great Western 
Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

To 
find an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny 
appellant due process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual 
prejudice and a violation of his rights. Upon review we look at the peculiar 
circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the 
time of the request. Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, ¶ 7 
(Wyo. 2003).

 
 

Id.  See also, 
Jacobson v. Cobbs, 2007 WY 99, ¶ 10, 
160 P.3d 654, 657 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶27]   Solitude filed its motion for 
summary judgment in August 2009.  
Ms. Magin filed motions for extension of time to respond to the summary 
judgment motion in August and September 2009, citing Solitude's failure to 
comply with her discovery requests.  
At the hearing on September 29, 2009, the district court ordered Solitude 
to produce the documents requested by Ms. Magin and make its board members and 
experts available for depositions.  
Solitude produced documents to Ms. Magin in October 2009.    

 
 
[¶28]   The record contains no evidence 
that Ms. Magin made any effort to depose the Solitude board members and experts 
following the district court's ruling that she was entitled to do so.  If she did and was refused by Solitude, 
Ms. Magin filed no motion to compel.  
Additionally, after Solitude produced the documents in October 2009, the 
record contains no evidence that Ms. Magin requested additional information or 
used the documents produced to prepare a response to Solitude's motion for 
summary judgment.    

 
 
[¶29]   On February 22, 2010, the district 
court sua sponte set a hearing on all 
pending motions for April 1, 2010.  
Ms Magin still took no action to prepare a response to the summary 
judgment motion and on March 26, 2010, filed a motion to continue the hearing on 
Solitude's summary judgment motion.  
The district court denied the motion to continue on March 30, 2010.  On the day of the hearing, Ms. Magin 
filed a memorandum requesting additional time to respond to Solitude's summary 
judgment motion under W.R.C.P. 56(f), citing among other reasons, the need to 
depose several witnesses.  The 
district court denied the request and granted summary judgment on the merits in 
favor of Solitude.     

 
 
[¶30]   Ms. Magin claims the district court 
should have continued the hearing and allowed her additional time to conduct 
discovery because it had not ruled on her motion for reconsideration of the 
disqualification motion and had not established discovery deadlines after 
ordering Solitude to comply with her discovery requests at the September 29, 
2009, hearing.  Although a district court has the power to reconsider its 
pre-judgment rulings, see, e.g., Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1096-97 (Wyo. 2009) (order granting petition for writ of review), Ms. 
Magin provides no authority that a motion for reconsideration of a pre-judgment 
ruling relieves litigants of their responsibility to respond timely to a summary 
judgment motion. 

 
 

[¶31]   In addition, the fact that a 
district court has not set deadlines for discovery or filing responses to 
dispositive motions does not mean the parties can allow a matter to 
languish.  Wyoming 
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and (c) set forth the time for responding to 
motions when the district court has not set other deadlines and a means for 
seeking an order from the district court establishing different deadlines.  Rule 6(c)(1) states:  

 
 
Unless 
these rules or an order of the court establish time limitations other than those 
contained herein, all motions, . . . together with supporting affidavits, if 
any, shall be served at least 10 days before the hearing on the motion. . . . 
[U]nless the court by order permits service at some other time, a party affected 
by the motion may serve a response, 
together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on 
the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is 
earlier.  Unless the court by 
order permits service at some other time, the moving party may serve a reply, if 
any, at least one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after 
service of the response, whichever is earlier. Unless the court otherwise 
orders, any party may serve supplemental memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at 
least one day prior to the hearing on the motion.

 

See 
also, 
Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 
2008 WY 40, ¶ 15, 180 P.3d 895, 900 (Wyo. 2008).  Ms. Magin's claim that the summary 
judgment hearing should have been continued because the district court had not 
set specific deadlines ignores the requirements of the rules of civil procedure. 
 If Ms. Magin wanted different 
deadlines set, she should have filed a motion asking for them.3  In addition, nearly six weeks passed 
between the February 22, 2010, order setting the summary judgment hearing and 
the actual hearing on April 1, 2010, during which Ms. Magin could have prepared 
a response to Solitude's summary judgment motion.  

 
 
[¶32]   Ms. Magin also claimed she was 
entitled to additional time to conduct discovery under W.R.C.P. 56(f):  

 
 
Should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just.

 
 
In 
Jacobson, ¶¶ 11-15, 160 P.3d  at 
657-58, we agreed with the district court that a litigant cannot use Rule 56(f) 
to excuse his failure to move forward with discovery, etc. and forestall summary 
judgment when he has had ample time to conduct discovery and respond to a 
summary judgment motion.  Ruling 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jacobson's 
motion for enlargement of time to respond to Cobb's summary judgment motion, we 
distinguished Abraham.  In that case, we held that the district court abused 
its discretion by refusing to continue the summary judgment hearing when the 
discovery deadline had not expired and the defendant had not been given adequate 
time to respond to the summary judgment motion.  Id., ¶ 19, 101 P.3d  at 455. 

 
 
[¶33]   The present case is more similar to 
Jacobson than to Abraham.  Ms. Magin did not establish that she 
had insufficient time to obtain the necessary discovery or that she had a valid 
reason for being unable to present facts essential to her position.  She had over six months from the time 
the district court granted her discovery requests until the summary judgment 
hearing was held.  Even after the 
denial of her motion for disqualification, she had four months to prepare.  Ms. Magin simply ignored her obligations 
to move forward with discovery and present a response to Solitude's summary 
judgment motion.  

 
 
[¶34]   In denying Ms. Magin's request for 
a continuance and granting Solitude's motion for summary judgment, the district 
court specifically stated that it was relying on the principles set forth in 
W.R.C.P.  1:

 
 
These 
rules govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all 
actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature and in all special statutory 
proceedings except as provided in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The 
district court acted well within its discretion and consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the rules.  
Considering the extended procedural history in this case, we conclude the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a 
continuance or refusing Ms. Magin additional time to respond to the summary 
judgment motion under Rule 56(f).  

 
 
 
 

C.   
 Summary Judgment 
Rulings

 
 
[¶35]   Summary judgments are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c), which states in pertinent part:

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We 
review a summary judgment de novo, 
using the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. 
 "We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record." Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. No. 6, 
2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, 637-38 (Wyo. 2002), quoting Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., 
Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo.1991).  
See also, Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital West Nat'l 
Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 5, 231 P.3d 869, 870-71 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
[¶36]   The respective obligations of 
summary judgment opponents were described in Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo. 2006), quoting 
Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo. 
2006):

 
 
The 
party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Id. 
We have explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
as follows:

 
 
After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact. The opposing party must affirmatively 
set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings . . ., and 
conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing 
party's burden.

 
 

See 
also, 
Fayard v. Design Committee of the 
Homestead Subdivision, 2010 WY 51, ¶ 21, 230 P.3d 299, 305 (Wyo. 
2010). 

 
 
[¶37]   
The district court granted Solitude summary judgment on the issue of 
the validity of the covenants.4  Solitude's summary judgment documents 
included copies of the Solitude subdivision covenants stamped with the county 
clerk's recording information and Ms. Magin's deed showing her lot as being part 
of the subdivision.  Those documents 
established a prima facie case that the covenants encumbered Ms. Magin's 
property.   She did not present 
any evidence or affidavits in response to Solitude's summary judgment motion to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the covenants.  Moreover, in an earlier motion for 
partial summary judgment, Ms. Magin cited to the original covenants without any 
suggestion that they were not valid.  
She stated that the determination of whether the conditions on her 
property violated the covenants was "simply a legal interpretation of the 
contract between the parties."  We 
conclude, therefore, that Solitude established the validity of the covenants as 
a matter of law and summary judgment was appropriate on that issue.  

 
 
[¶38]   The district court also ruled that 
Solitude was entitled to summary judgment on its claims that the conditions on 
Ms. Magin's property violated the covenants.  The covenants require that all fences 
must meet certain conditions and be approved by the Site Committee and state 
that nuisances are prohibited and no trash or rubbish "shall be collected, 
placed or permitted to remain on any lot[.]"  Solitude  presented the affidavit of the chairman 
of the Solitude Site Committee and board member, Dan Clancy, in which he averred 
that he had reviewed evidence of the conditions on Ms. Magin's property and the 
Site Committee records and concluded that she had erected fences or screens on 
her property that were not approved by the Site Committee.  Solitude also presented an affidavit 
from William Collins, a consultant in land development regulations and use 
restrictions.  He stated that he 
inspected Ms. Magin's property on June 10, 2009, took photographs of the 
conditions upon the property and reviewed the covenant documents.  He concluded there were "numerous items 
of fencing and screening" on Ms. Magin's property that did not comply with the 
covenants.  He also stated: 

 
 
I 
. . . observed numerous instances of brush having been collected and stacked in 
rows on several locations on the property.  
The Covenants prohibited trash, rubbish or other unsightly items to be 
collected, placed or permitted to remain on the property.  Such stacks of brush are, in my opinion, 
a violation of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions.    

 
 
Mr. 
Collins' photographs of the conditions on Ms. Magin's property were attached to 
his affidavit and report.    

 
 
[¶39]   Solitude's submissions established 
a prima facie case that the conditions on Ms. Magin's property violated the 
covenants.  Ms. Magin filed no 
substantive response to Solitude's motion for summary judgment, and, thus, 
failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact regarding the violations of 
the covenants.  The district court 
properly granted Solitude's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and ruled 
that Ms. Magin must bring her property into compliance with the covenants.     

 
 
 
 

D.   Award of 
Attorney Fees

 
 
[¶40]   The district court awarded attorney 
fees to Solitude, which included fees paid to both firms that represented it in 
the present matter against Ms. Magin.   An award of attorney fees will not 
be disturbed unless the district court abused its discretion.  City of Gillette v. Hladky Constr., Inc., 
2008 WY 134, ¶ 109, 196 P.3d 184, 212 (Wyo. 2008).  In determining whether the district 
court abused its discretion, "the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did."  Id.  
    

 
 
[¶41]   Wyoming follows the American rule 
regarding recovery of attorney fees, meaning that each party is generally 
responsible for its own attorney fees.  
Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 
998 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 2000).   
Nevertheless, a prevailing party may be reimbursed for its attorney fees 
under a contractual or statutory provision which allows for fee shifting.  Id.  
The award in this case was based upon an amendment to the Solitude 
covenants which stated:

 
 
Any 
lot owner who violates these Covenants further agrees to pay all costs incurred 
by the Association, Site Committee or any lot owner in enforcing these 
Covenants, including a reasonable attorney's fee whether or not suit is actually 
filed.

 
 
[¶42]   In the order granting summary 
judgment, the district court ruled that Ms. Magin's property was "subject to" 
all of the covenants, including the attorney fees provision.  Ms. Magin argues vigorously that there 
was an issue of material fact as to whether the attorney fees provision was 
properly adopted.   However, 
all of the material she submitted in an attempt to create an issue of fact was 
filed late and in a form that failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 
56(e) to set forth specific facts.5  

 
 
[¶43]   Even if we consider the merits of 
Ms. Magin's argument, she did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the validity of the attorney fees provision.  As we stated earlier, Solitude 
established its prima facie case by filing copies of the covenants and the 
amendments stamped with the county clerk's recording information.  The amended covenant which provided for 
attorney fees stated that it was adopted in accordance with the covenant 
procedures, which required passage by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
lot owners.  Ms. Magin presents a 
convoluted argument that the attorney fees amendment could not be approved by a 
vote of two-thirds of the lot owners because there was insufficient proof that a 
prior 2006 amendment to the covenants which reduced the percentage of 
affirmative votes required for amendment from three-quarters to two-thirds was 
properly adopted.     

 
 
[¶44]   As part of her request for 
additional time to respond to Solitude's summary judgment motion, Ms. Magin 
claimed that she served requests for admissions on Solitude in September 2008 
and those requests were never answered and were, therefore, deemed admitted.6  The requests 
stated:

 
 
REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:  Admit that 
Plaintiffs do not pos[s]ess the original ballots to support the March, 2006 
First Amendment to Paragraph 32 of the Solitude Homeowners Association 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, by the affirmative vote of seventy-five 
(75%) of the then current members of the Solitude Homeowners Association.  

 
 
REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:   Admit 
that Plaintiff is relying solely on a vote tally of the March, 2006 First 
Amendment to Paragraph 32 of the Solitude Homeowners Association Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions to assert that the First Amendment [was] approved by 
the required majority.

 
 
REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:  Admit that the 
July, 2007, Third Amendment to the Solitude Homeowners Association Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions regarding Paragraph 34 was approved by a vote of 78 
"yes" ballots.  

 
 
According 
to Ms. Magin, if the 2006 amendment to the covenants was not properly adopted 
allowing amendment to the covenants by a two-thirds vote rather than the 
three-quarters required by the original covenants, the 2007 attorney fees 
provision could not be passed by an affirmative vote of less than three-quarters 
of the lots owners and seventy-eight affirmative votes did not fulfill that 
requirement.  She claims that 
Solitude's admission it did not have the ballots to demonstrate the 2006 
amendment had passed raised an issue of fact as to the validity of the 
amendment.  

 
 
[¶45]   Assuming for the sake of argument 
that the requests were deemed admitted, they are insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the validity of the attorney fees provision.   Ms. Magin presented no authority 
or legal argument that the failure to maintain the consents would invalidate the 
2006 amendment or any evidence to refute the statement in the recorded document 
that the amendment was properly adopted.  
Furthermore, although Ms. Magin claims that the seventy-eight affirmative 
votes received for the attorney fees amendment were insufficient to meet the 
three-quarters required for passage under the original covenants, she does not 
direct us to any documents in the record to support her calculation.  Thus, without further factual 
development the admissions do not create a material issue of fact as to the 
validity of the attorney fees amendment.  
Ms. Magin ostensibly admitted this deficiency in her proof when she 
stated in her brief:  "The 
deposition of board members as well as properly answered interrogatories and 
request[s] would have provided [her] with admissible information that would 
 refute that these amendments were 
valid."  Given our prior holding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her additional 
time for discovery, we conclude the district court properly ruled as a matter of 
law that Solitude was entitled to recover its attorney fees for enforcing the 
covenants.    

 
 
[¶46]   We turn now to the substance of the 
attorney fees award.  The attorney 
fees provision only allowed Solitude to recover fees for enforcing the 
covenants.  Attorney fees associated 
with clearing the conflict of interest were not "incurred . . . in enforcing" 
the covenants.  Segregation of fees 
allowed by the contract from those that are not is required, if possible.  See, e.g., Cline, 998 P.2d  at 952; Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 
2002 WY 173, ¶ 33, 58 P.3d 322, 330 (Wyo. 2002).  "Implicit in this directive is the 
requirement that a party must show segregation is impossible before he may 
recover for claims for which there is no authorization [for] fee shifting."  Jensen, ¶ 33, 58 P.3d  at 330.  When segregation is possible but is not 
done, the entire fee award is subject to reversal.  Id.; Cline, 998 P.2d  at 952.  

 
 
[¶47]   Solitude filed its motion 
requesting fees of over $47,000 and included copies of the attorney time 
sheets.  Mr. Ford's very first time 
entry addressed the conflict of interest: "conference with Joe and Scott 
regarding prior representation."  Later entries include: "Review Motion to 
Disqualify MM&G conference with JFM regarding same;" "Draft response to 
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Counsel;" "Draft affidavit of Joseph F. Moore; 
revise response to Motion to Disqualify;" "Conference with JFM; revise JFM 
affidavit."  Thus, the record shows 
that fees beyond those authorized by the covenants were included in the request 
and were allowed by the district court in the attorney fees award.    

 

[¶48]   Under these circumstances, 
segregation was obviously possible and, yet, was not done.  In fact, Mr. Ford agreed at oral 
argument that Solitude was not entitled to recover the fees associated with 
clearing the conflict.  The district 
court improperly approved Solitude's attorney fees request without requiring 
segregation and thereby abused its discretion.  Because segregation was possible but was 
not done, we reverse the award for all fees generated by Mr. Ford's law 
firm.  

 
 
[¶49]   There are also equitable reasons to 
deny Solitude's request that Ms. Magin reimburse it for Mr. Ford's attorney 
fees.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) 
(LexisNexis 2009) states that the court may award attorney fees "in its 
discretion."  Forfeiture of attorney 
fees is recognized as one of the remedies for violating Rule 1.9's prohibition 
against conflicts of interest.  Simpson, ¶ 17, 92 P.3d  at 287.  See also, Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-38 
(Tex. 1999); State ex rel. Special 
Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court v. Shapiro, 665 N.W.2d 615, 625-26 (Neb. 2003); Butler v. 
Walker, 932 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  This Court stated in Combs v. Walters, 518 P.2d 1254, 1255 
(Wyo. 1974) (per curiam) that, although a valid contractual provision for 
recovery of attorney fees is "as much an obligation of the contract as any part 
of it," attorney fees may be properly disallowed "altogether on the basis that 
such recovery would be inequitable."  
See also, Graves v. Burch, 26 Wyo. 192, 181 P. 354 (Wyo. 1919).  It is hard to imagine a circumstance 
where this principle would apply with greater force than here.  Solitude requested that Ms. Magin pay 
the fees generated by an attorney who had an obvious conflict of interest.  It would certainly be inequitable to 
require her to pay Mr. Ford's fees under these circumstances.  

 
 
[¶50]   These reasons justify denial of 
Solitude's motion to the extent that it requested reimbursement of fees 
generated by Mr. Ford and his firm.  
The same rationale does not, however, apply to the award of fees for the 
work done by the first law firm that represented Solitude.  The first firm's portion of the attorney 
fees award included $14,647.50 in fees and $120 in costs.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by awarding Solitude fees for the first firm, and that portion of the 
award is affirmed.  The remainder of 
the award which was attributable to Mr. Ford's firm is reversed.   

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶51]   This case is an example of how 
resolution of a simple dispute can become unduly complicated, expensive and 
delayed by the attorneys' conduct.  
The record on appeal discloses endless and unseemly jousting between the 
attorneys about virtually every aspect of the case.  Discovery requests that should have been 
responded to quickly were unnecessarily opposed by both sides for every little 
reason imaginable.  It took over two 
years to reach summary judgment, even though there was no real dispute about the 
facts of the alleged covenant violations, because of the constant bickering 
between the attorneys.  We can only 
imagine the frustration experienced by the district court, including the two 
different judges who sat on this case.  
The district court aptly commented on the attorneys' conduct when it 
granted Solitude's motion for summary judgment:

 
 
All 
right, you just cannot read this file and,  
. . . I guess there's some advantage to having a new judge at some point 
and some disadvantage, but you just can't read this file without . . . having 
some degree of regret that things can deteriorate . . . to this sort of 
level.  It's a very sad, sad set of 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶52]   Like the district court, we have 
been frustrated and dismayed by the state of the record and the attitude 
reflected in the parties' briefs and arguments.  While it may be that there are issues or 
arguments that we did not fully address in this decision, the fault lies with 
counsel.  We have attempted to 
distill the issues down to those that are determinative.

 
 
[¶53]   Judge O'Brien's concurring opinion 
in Hatch v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 930 P.2d 382, 398 (Wyo. 1997) offers some perceptive 
observations on this type of behavior by attorneys, though his comments were 
made in the context of a jury trial:    

 
 
      This case calls to mind the story of the senior attorney 
advising a new associate: "When you have compelling facts, pound on those facts. 
When the law is agreeable to your position, pound on the law. When you have 
neither favorable facts nor law, pound the table." It is less amusing than 
unsettling. 

. 
. . .

When 
counsel intentionally drive an otherwise routine case to the margins by 
infecting the trial with personal issues or by purposefully seeking to 
supercharge emotions, alert observers quickly recognize that the object is not 
justice, but victory. The ethical obligation to zealously serve client interests 
is tempered by the opposing, but no less imposing, obligation to act within the 
limits of the law--not merely the letter, but also the spirit, of the law. Any 
failure to appropriately and consistently measure duty to clients against duty 
to the profession perpetuates the "hired gun" image some lawyers cultivate and 
we all must live with. Worse, it sustains a popularly held conception that our 
professional ethic accepts the notions that success justifies, and occasionally 
necessitates, excessive zeal and that the cost of victory is irrelevant. . . . 
When a case is measured, not by the merit of the cause, the quality of the 
evidence, or the logic of the arguments, but by the level of invective, 
something is amiss. A trial [and other court proceedings] then becomes an ordeal 
which is neither dignified nor appropriate and, predictably, the result reflects 
the performance; the process is demeaned, as are the 
participants.

 
 
[¶54]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We have 
reviewed the materials submitted in 
camera by Ms. Magin.  In an 
effort to preserve the confidentiality of the information contained in those 
materials, we are limiting our discussion to matters which were also disclosed 
in Ms. Magin's district court pleadings and/or appellate brief.  We note, however, 
that the in camera materials contain 
additional evidence and reinforce our conclusion that the matters were 
substantially related.  

 
 
  2This statement 
contradicts, to some extent, Mr. Moore's averment that he had not asked for a 
waiver because no conflict of interest existed.

 
 

3At the September 29, 2009, hearing the district court generally stated 
various time periods for discovery in terms of the number of days each party 
should have to comply and/or respond, without establishing any particular 
deadlines.  Although the judge 
directed Mr. Ford to prepare an order, the record does not contain an order 
memorializing the district court's ruling or setting any deadlines.   

 
 

4Ms. Magin specifically challenged the validity of the attorney fees 
amendment to the covenants.   
We will address that issue, infra. 
 

 
 

5As part of her response to Solitude's  attorney fees motion, Ms. Magin filed 
seven CDs including electronic copies of the voluminous documents produced by 
Solitude in discovery.   She 
also filed an affidavit from a professional community association manager 
stating that Solitude did not follow the proper procedures in governing the 
homeowners association or conducting the amendment approval process.  She does not, however, discuss these 
documents on appeal or explain how specific documents support her position that 
the attorney fee amendment was not properly adopted. 

 
 

6Solitude denied being served with the requests for admission and objected 
to the admissions being raised for the first time at the summary judgment 
hearing, well over a year after the requests were purportedly served.