Title: State v. George R. Bollig

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
George R. Bollig,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  224 Wis. 2d 621, 593 N.W.2d 67 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 4, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 11, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Brady 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Thomas E. Knothe and Collins, Quillin & Knothe, Ltd., 
LaCrosse, and oral argument by Thomas E. Knothe. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 6 
  
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2196-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
George R. Bollig,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, George Bollig, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
affirming the circuit court’s denial of his motion to withdraw 
his plea.1  Bollig contends that his no contest plea to attempted 
sexual assault was unknowingly made because the circuit court 
failed to inform him of the registration requirement for sex 
offenders and failed to advise him of one of the essential 
elements of the offense. 
¶2 
He further asserts that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in concluding that the plea withdrawal 
                     
1 State v. Bollig, 224 Wis. 2d 621, 593 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 
1999) (affirming judgment and order of circuit court for Juneau 
County, John W. Brady, Judge). 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
2 
would substantially prejudice the State and that the court of 
appeals erred in assigning to the defendant the burden of 
proving lack of substantial prejudice.  Because we conclude that 
Bollig’s plea was knowingly and intelligently made, that the 
circuit court did not place on Bollig the burden of proving lack 
of substantial prejudice, and that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion, we affirm the court of appeals.  
¶3 
For the purposes of this appeal, the facts are 
undisputed. George Bollig was initially charged in a criminal 
complaint with one count of having sexual contact with a person 
under the age of thirteen in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) 
(1995-96).2  On the morning of the scheduled trial date, the 
State offered to amend the charge to attempted sexual contact 
with a child under the age of thirteen in violation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 939.32(1) and 948.02(1).  Bollig accepted the State’s 
offer and signed a plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form. 
¶4 
The court then engaged in a colloquy with Bollig, 
informing him of the implications of his no contest plea.  It 
outlined two elements of the offense: that Bollig attempted to 
have sexual contact with the victim and that the victim was 
under the age of thirteen.  However, the court failed to inform 
Bollig of the third element: that his actions must have been 
committed for the purpose of sexual gratification. 
                     
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 volumes. 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
3 
¶5 
The plea questionnaire listed all three elements of 
the offense.  The court inquired whether Bollig had read and 
understood the questionnaire after having reviewed it with his  
attorney.  In addition, the court asked Bollig’s attorney 
whether he was satisfied that Bollig was entering his plea 
knowingly and voluntarily.  All of these questions elicited 
affirmative responses.  Bollig then entered a no contest plea, 
and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing.  
¶6 
At the time the plea was entered, Bollig was not 
informed that he would be required to register as a convicted 
sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  This statute requires 
sex offenders to register with the Department of Corrections and 
provide their name, address, physical description, place of 
employment or school, and the offenses for which they were 
convicted.  Failure to register subjects the offender to both 
fine and imprisonment.  Wis. Stat.  § 301.45(6).  
¶7 
Prior to sentencing, Bollig filed a motion to withdraw 
his no contest plea on the basis that it was not entered 
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.  Bollig stated that he 
felt coerced on the day he made his plea, that he did not commit 
the crime with which he was charged, and that he had entered the 
plea agreement in order to spare the victim the trauma of 
testifying.  The circuit court denied Bollig’s motion to 
withdraw his plea and allowed his attorney to withdraw as 
counsel.   
¶8 
Upon the assignment of new counsel, Bollig filed 
another motion to withdraw his plea.  The court deferred action 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
4 
on the motion as a result of his request to dismiss his new 
attorney.  While awaiting the appointment of new counsel, Bollig 
filed a pro se motion, but the court took no action on that 
motion.  
¶9 
Bollig’s fourth motion to withdraw his plea, this time 
through a new attorney, stated that at the time he entered his 
plea, he was not advised that he would be required to register 
as a convicted sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1)(a), 
subjecting him to criminal charges if he did not comply with the 
requirement. Bollig argued that the registration requirement 
constituted punishment and that prior to accepting his plea, the 
court was required to advise him of this direct consequence of 
the plea.  The court disagreed and denied Bollig’s motion. 
¶10 Bollig was then sentenced to ten years imprisonment on 
the charge.  He subsequently appealed the denial of his fourth 
motion to withdraw his plea.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court’s decision to deny Bollig’s motion.  Although the 
court of appeals recognized that the circuit court had not 
properly informed Bollig of one of the essential elements of his 
offense, it concluded that the State had proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that Bollig was nevertheless aware of the 
nature of his offense.  
¶11 In addition, the court of appeals concluded that 
because 
registration 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 
did 
not 
constitute punishment, the circuit court was not required to 
advise Bollig of the requirement.  Finally, the court determined 
that 
even 
if 
Bollig’s 
lack 
of 
knowledge 
regarding 
the 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
5 
registration requirement presented a “fair and just” reason for 
plea withdrawal, he failed to demonstrate an absence of 
substantial prejudice to the State.  Thus, the court of appeals 
concluded that the circuit court properly denied the motion for 
plea withdrawal.  
¶12 Bollig presently raises four issues on review.  First, 
he contends that the circuit court’s failure to inform him of 
the registration requirement rendered his plea unknowing and 
unintelligent.  Next, he submits that the State bears the burden 
of proving substantial prejudice once a defendant has presented 
a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal.  Bollig further 
submits that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
concluding 
that 
the 
plea 
withdrawal 
would 
substantially 
prejudice the State.  Finally, Bollig contests the determination 
that he was aware of the nature of his offense notwithstanding 
the circuit court’s failure to discuss one of the essential 
elements of the offense during the plea colloquy.  
¶13 On appellate review, the issue of whether a plea was 
knowingly and intelligently entered presents a question of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140, 
569 N.W.2d 577 (1997). We will not upset the circuit court’s 
findings of historical or evidentiary facts unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  We review constitutional issues 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. Harvey, 139 Wis. 2d 
353, 382, 407 N.W.2d 235 (1987).   
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
6 
¶14 We must also determine whether the circuit court 
properly denied Bollig’s motion to withdraw his plea.  A circuit 
court’s 
discretion 
to 
allow 
a 
plea 
withdrawal 
prior 
to 
sentencing will be sustained unless the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
861, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  The remaining burden of proof issue 
presents a question of law that we review independently of the 
opinions of the circuit court and court of appeals.  Ranes v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Wis. 2d 49, 54, 60, 580 
N.W.2d 197 (1998). 
I. 
¶15 First we address whether the circuit court’s failure 
to inform Bollig of his requirement to register as a sex 
offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1)(a) rendered his plea 
unknowing and unintelligent.  It is well established that a 
guilty or no contest plea must be knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently entered.  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986).  Bollig’s plea must be withdrawn as a matter of right if 
the circuit court was required to inform him of the registration 
requirement and failed to do so.  Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 139. 
¶16 Courts 
are 
constitutionally 
required 
to 
notify 
defendants of the “direct consequences” of their pleas.  Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); State v. James, 176 
Wis. 2d 230, 238, 500 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993).  A direct 
consequence represents one that has a definite, immediate, and 
largely automatic effect on the range of defendant’s punishment. 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
7 
State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 579 
N.W.2d 698 (1998).  In contrast, defendants do not have a due 
process right to be informed of the collateral consequences of 
their pleas. Id.; State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 531, 401 
N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1987).  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 represents 
the statutory codification of the constitutional mandate that a 
plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and requires that a 
defendant be aware before entering a plea of the potential 
punishment upon conviction.  In essence, we must determine 
whether the registration requirement constitutes punishment. 
¶17 Whether sex offender registration is punishment, and 
hence a direct consequence of a plea, represents an issue of 
first impression in this state.  However, a number of other 
states have tackled this issue, some in the context of pleas and 
others in the context of ex post facto and double jeopardy 
analyses.  
¶18 Of the states that have addressed whether registration 
of sex offenders is punishment, all but one have answered in the 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
8 
negative.3   Despite variations in the classification of sex 
offenders, 
extent 
of 
public 
notification, 
exemption 
opportunities, period of mandatory registration, and the crimes 
to which registration is applicable, statutes in most states are 
                     
3 See Robinson v. State, 730 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1998)(registration and notification requirements collateral 
consequences and not punishment); Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 
1007, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (registration requirement a 
collateral consequence); State v. Young, 542 P.2d 20, 22 (Ariz. 
1975) (registration collateral effect of conviction); Collie v. 
State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(designation as sexual predator a collateral consequence); Ray 
v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 935 (Idaho 1999) (registration not a 
direct consequence); People v. Taylor, 561 N.E.2d 393, 394 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) (registration act not penal in nature); Spencer 
v. O’Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) 
(notification not punishment); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 
400 (Iowa 1997) (sex offender registration not punitive); State 
v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Kan. 1996) (sex offender 
registration act not punitive but regulatory); State v. Manning, 
532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (registration not 
punishment); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 534 (N.H. 1994) 
(no added punishment imposed by sex offender registration); Doe 
v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404-05 (N.J. 1995) (registration 
requirement not punitive but regulatory); State v. Burr, 598 
N.W.2d 147, 159 (N.D. 1999) (registration not punishment); State 
v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ohio 1998) (no punitive intent 
underlying registration statute); State v. Matthews, 978 P.2d 
423, 426 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (no retributive intent behind 
registration requirement); Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 702 A.2d 
565, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (registration provisions not 
intended to punish); Guzman v. State, 993 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. 
App. 1999) (registration a collateral consequence); Kitze v. 
Commonwealth, 
475 
S.E.2d 
830, 
832 
(Va. 
Ct. 
App. 
1996) 
(registration requirement not punishment); State v. Ward, 869 
P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1994) (registration requirement not 
punitive but regulatory); Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(Wyo. 1996) (registration not punishment).  But see People v. 
McClellan, 
862 
P.2d 
739, 
745 
(Cal. 
1993) 
(sex 
offender 
registration a direct consequence of plea).    
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
9 
remarkably similar.  That is because most state statutes have 
the same genesis and are versions of Megan’s Law.4   
¶19 Named after a young child raped and murdered by a 
convicted sex offender residing nearby, Megan’s Law was passed 
by the New Jersey legislature in 1994 with the intention of 
providing community and parent notification of convicted sex 
offenders residing within the community.  E.B. v. Verniero, 119 
F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997).  Presently all 50 states have 
some type of sex offender registration and notification laws in 
effect.  See Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 177 n.1 (D. Mass. 
1998).  
¶20 Courts 
that 
have 
determined 
that 
sex 
offender 
registration is not punitive have held that the underlying 
intent is public protection and safety.  See e.g., Doe v. 
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 372-73 (N.J. 1995); Commonwealth v. 
Gaffney, 702 A.2d 565, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  See also 
Licia A. Esposito, State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring 
Persons 
Previously 
Convicted 
of 
Crime 
to 
Register 
with 
Authorities, 
36 
A.L.R. 
5th 
161, 
173-74, 
193-95 
(1996).  
                     
4 In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 
which encourages states to enact sex offender registration and 
community notification laws in order to receive federal funding 
for crime prevention.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A).  The 
passage of the act came in the wake of the cases involving 
eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling and seven-year-old Megan Kanka. 
  In 1996, President Clinton signed a federal version of Megan’s 
Law, which added a mandatory notification provision to the 
existing registration requirements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d).  
     
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
10
Registration 
statutes 
assist 
law 
enforcement 
agencies 
in 
investigating and apprehending offenders in order to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of the local community and members 
of the state.  State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147, 153 (N.D. 1999); 
State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1994).  Courts have 
concluded that the remedial goal of protecting the public 
outweighs any punitive effect of registration, including any 
infringement on the rights of the offender.  See e.g., Ray v. 
State, 982 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Idaho 1999); People v. Taylor, 561 
N.E.2d 393, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  
¶21 Likewise, Wisconsin’s registration statute does not 
evince the intent to punish sex offenders, but rather reflects 
the intent to protect the public and assist law enforcement.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 175.45 (1993-94) originally governed sex 
offender registration.  The statute was substantially revised 
and renumbered to § 301.45 by 1995 Wisconsin Act 440.  The 
revised   § 301.45 requires a sex offender to register with the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) rather than the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), as previously required.    
¶22 The drafting file for 1995 Wisconsin Act 440 contains 
a proposal prepared by the Wisconsin DOC Sex Offender Community 
Notification workgroup.  This workgroup was formed in response 
to efforts by legislators to introduce community notification 
legislation based on a revision and expansion of the then 
existing registration statute.   The Executive Summary of 
Recommendations 
indicates 
that 
the 
intent 
underlying 
the 
legislation related to community protection.  Wisconsin DOC, Sex 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
11
Offender Community Notification i (1994).  In addition, a stated 
goal included the balancing of community protection with the 
offender’s community re-integration needs.  Id. at 1.   
¶23 Bollig argues that, irrespective of an intent to 
protect the public, registration and the subsequent public 
dissemination 
of 
information 
under 
§ 301.46 
constitute 
punishment, 
akin 
to 
traditional 
shaming 
punishments 
used 
throughout history to degrade those who have overstepped the 
boundaries imposed by law.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and 
Punishment in American History 36-38 (1993); Adam J. Hirsch, 
From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration 
in Early Massachusetts, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1225-26 (1982).  
Bollig 
maintains 
that 
since 
registration 
and 
release 
of 
information result in ostracism, humiliation, and retaliation, 
they constitute punishment.  
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.46, which grants access to the 
registration information provided under § 301.45, does not 
automatically grant the public carte blanche access to the 
information. 
 
Although 
access 
is 
more 
liberal 
for 
law 
enforcement agencies, release of information to members of the 
general public requires compliance with enumerated conditions 
and is limited to when “providing the information is necessary 
to protect the public.”5  This section does not allow for the 
                     
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 301.46(5), an individual may request  
sex offender information when the department or the police chief 
or sheriff determine that release of such information is 
necessary to protect the public and the individual: 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
12
indiscriminate 
publication 
of 
a 
sex 
offender’s 
vital 
information.  Rather, the selective release of information 
underscores 
that 
public 
protection, 
and 
not 
punishment, 
represents the core concern. 
¶25 The principles outlined in the DOC proposal indicate 
the desire to discourage acts of “vigilante-ism.”  Sex Offender 
Community Notification at 2.  The summary of recommendations 
also suggests “limited” access to the sex offender registry, 
discouraging the use of “mass media releases, distribution of 
door-to-door fliers, or any other method of notification that 
may be described as ‘intrusive’.”  Id. at ii.  
¶26 Although we recognize that sex offenders have suffered 
adverse consequences, including vandalism, loss of employment, 
and community harassment, the punitive or deterrent effects 
resulting from registration and the subsequent dissemination of 
information do not obviate the remedial and protective intent 
underlying those requirements.  State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 
30, 46-47, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996); State v. Dugan, 193 Wis. 2d 
610, 620-21, 534 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995).  See generally 
                                                                  
Submits a written request for the information in the form 
and 
manner 
prescribed 
by 
the 
department 
or 
local 
law 
enforcement. The department or local law enforcement may require 
that a person specifically state his or her purpose for 
requesting the information; 
Specifies by name the person about whom he or she is 
requesting the information; and 
Provides any other information that law enforcement deems 
necessary to determine accurately whether the person specified 
is registered under s. 301.45.   
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
13
Richard Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community 
Notification: Assessing the Impact in Wisconsin (1999) (study 
conducted by National Institute of Justice, on file at Marquette 
University Department of Social and Cultural Sciences).  Simply 
because registration can work a punitive effect, we are not 
convinced that such an effect overrides the primary and remedial 
goal underlying Wis. Stat. § 301.45 to protect the public.  
¶27 We 
determine 
that 
Wisconsin’s 
sex 
offender 
registration requirements do not constitute punishment.  Because 
the duty to register is not punishment, it does not represent a 
direct consequence of Bollig’s no contest plea.  Rather, it is a 
collateral consequence, and Bollig does not have a due process 
right to be informed of collateral consequences prior to 
entering his plea. 
II. 
¶28 Having determined that sex offender registration is 
not punishment, we next address whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the plea 
withdrawal would substantially prejudice the State.  The 
question of whether a defendant may withdraw his plea is left to 
the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Van Camp, 213 Wis. 
2d at 139.  However, a circuit court should freely allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution will be substantially 
prejudiced.  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 861; Cannedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 
582.   
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
14
¶29 Although 
“freely” 
does 
not 
mean 
“automatically,” 
Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 861, the exercise of discretion requires 
the court to take a liberal, rather than a rigid, view of the 
reasons given for plea withdrawal. Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 
121, 127-28, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973); State v. Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d 
284, 288, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989).  A fair and just 
reason contemplates “the mere showing of some adequate reason 
for defendant’s change of heart.”  Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 128.  
However, the reason must be something other than the desire to 
have a trial.  Cannedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583.     
¶30 In this case, the circuit court concluded that 
Bollig’s ignorance as to the registration requirement did not 
present a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal.  The court 
noted, however, that even if this ignorance did amount to a fair 
and just reason, prejudice to the State outweighed the reason 
for plea withdrawal.  
¶31 The State concedes that if Bollig was unaware of his 
requirement to register as a convicted sex offender, he 
presented a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal.  When 
viewed liberally, as required under the Libke standard, we 
conclude that Bollig’s lack of knowledge as to the consequences 
of his plea constituted a fair and just reason. Shanks, 152 Wis. 
2d at 290 (genuine misunderstanding of plea’s consequences fair 
and just reason for plea withdrawal). 
¶32 However, determining that Bollig offered a fair and 
just reason does not conclude our inquiry as to whether a plea 
withdrawal should have been granted.  We must still examine 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
15
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in concluding that the State would suffer substantial prejudice 
if Bollig were allowed to withdraw his plea. 
 ¶33 At the outset, we address the question of who should 
bear the burden of proof on the issue of substantial prejudice. 
 Bollig posits, and the State agrees, that the State should bear 
the burden of demonstrating substantial prejudice once a 
defendant 
has 
offered 
a 
fair and 
just reason 
for 
plea 
withdrawal.  
¶34 On no previous occasion has this court explicitly 
addressed the issue and assigned the burden of proof to the 
State in a similar situation.  We seize the opportunity to do so 
now and conclude that once the defendant presents a fair and 
just reason, the burden shifts to the State to show substantial 
prejudice so as to defeat the plea withdrawal.  
¶35 In reaching this conclusion, we look to the analyses 
of the federal courts that have addressed this issue.  We do so 
because our standard for plea withdrawal conforms to the 
standard articulated by the ABA Standards for Pleas of Guilty, 
Standard 14-2.1, and by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(e).6   
                     
6 In State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86, 151 N.W.2d 9 
(1967), 
this 
court 
adopted 
the 
legal 
standard 
for 
plea 
withdrawal set forth in the tentative draft of the American Bar 
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice.  
The draft provided that a court has discretion to grant a pre-
sentence plea withdrawal for any fair and just reason unless the 
state would be substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the 
plea. 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
16
¶36 Cases in the federal context establish that the State 
bears the burden to demonstrate that it will suffer substantial 
prejudice once the defendant has offered a fair and just reason 
for plea withdrawal.  See e.g., United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 
308, 313 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 
337, 338 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nahodil, 776 F. 
Supp. 991, 996 (M.D.Pa. 1991). 
¶37 The Commentary to Standard 14-2.1(a) of the ABA 
Standards for Pleas of Guilty also recognizes the shifting of 
the burden.  The Commentary states: “[a]ssuming that the 
defendant establishes a fair and just reason, the burden then 
shifts to the prosecution to show substantial prejudice if the 
defendant’s plea were to be withdrawn.”  Commentary to Standard 
14-2.1(a) at 14-54. 
¶38 We note that the court of appeals in this case 
erroneously cast the burden on Bollig to show that the State 
would not suffer substantial prejudice as a result of his plea 
                                                                  
This court applied the 1968 approved draft version to a 
pre-sentence plea withdrawal in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 
125-26, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973), and also acknowledged that 
Fed.R.Crim.P 32(d) was the “ancestor” of the ABA standards.  The 
Libke court then analyzed federal cases interpreting Rule 32(d) 
and the “fair and just” language.  Id. at 126-28. 
Rule 32(d) was amended in 1983 to incorporate the “fair and 
just” language and has been subsequently revised and changed to 
32(e).  Except for minor stylistic changes, subdivision (e) 
remains the same as subdivision (d).   
Likewise, the ABA standard has also been revised and 
essentially expresses the same sentiment as Rule 32(e).  See 
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas 
of Guilty, Standard 14-2.1(a) (2d ed. 1986 Supp.). 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
17
withdrawal.  State v. Bollig, 224 Wis. 2d 621, 639, 593 N.W.2d 
67 (Ct. App. 1999).   Affirming the decision to deny plea 
withdrawal, the court of appeals discussed the circuit court’s 
finding that Bollig failed to prove a lack of prejudice to the 
State.  Id.  However, the record does not indicate that the 
circuit court improperly assigned the burden or rendered its 
decision based on Bollig’s failure to demonstrate lack of 
substantial prejudice to the State.   
¶39 The circuit court made no reference to Bollig’s 
failure to satisfy this added burden of proof during the plea 
hearing.  Rather the court denied plea withdrawal by finding, 
based on the facts on record, that the State would suffer 
substantial prejudice.  Thus, the error was in the court of 
appeals’ assignment of the burden of proof and not in the 
circuit court’s interpretation of that burden.  We reiterate 
that once the defendant has presented a fair and just reason for 
plea withdrawal, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate 
substantial prejudice so as to defeat the plea withdrawal. 
¶40 Bollig contends that once the burden shifted to the 
State to show substantial prejudice, the State failed to satisfy 
its burden.  According to Bollig, the State offered no 
demonstrative evidence that it would suffer prejudice as a 
result of Bollig’s plea withdrawal, and thus the circuit court 
erred in finding prejudice based on its personal assumptions and 
inferences.     
¶41 In order to sustain a circuit court’s discretionary 
decision to deny a plea withdrawal, we must ensure that the 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
18
court’s determination was made upon the facts of the record and 
in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law.  State ex 
rel. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d at 635; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289.  
We will find an erroneous exercise of discretion if the court 
improperly relied upon irrelevant or immaterial factors.  Elias 
v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 282, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980).    
¶42 The record in this case reveals that the State raised 
the issue of prejudice during a scheduled plea hearing at which 
Bollig changed his mind and indicated that he instead wanted a 
trial.   The State noted on the record that Bollig was “just 
playing games with the system” and that his numerous dilatory 
tactics would adversely affect the child victim’s ability to 
recall her testimony and the events underlying the offense.  
¶43 In 
determining 
that 
there 
would 
be 
substantial 
prejudice to the State, the circuit court noted that further 
delay by granting Bollig’s plea withdrawal and allowing the case 
to go to trial would hamper the victim’s ability to recall 
pertinent events.  The court was familiar with the facts of this 
case and was aware of the record. 
¶44 The record reveals that the attempted sexual assault 
occurred in February 1996, when the victim was four and a half 
years old.  Initially scheduled to begin in February 1997, 
Bollig’s trial was taken off the trial calendar due to his 
intent to plead to the charge.  However, the subsequently 
scheduled plea hearing was also removed from the trial calendar 
because he indicated that he desired a trial instead.  Bollig 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
19
yet again changed his mind and finally entered a plea of no 
contest to the charge of attempted sexual assault in May 1997.   
¶45 Sentencing was delayed several months due to Bollig’s 
repeated dissatisfaction with his appointed attorneys.  On his 
fourth motion to withdraw his plea, the circuit court observed 
the numerous delays and noted that nearly two years had passed 
since the offense, which would adversely affect the child 
victim’s memory. 
¶46 In light of the facts of the record, as well as the 
recognition of the effects of protracted criminal proceedings on 
the victim’s memory, we determine that the circuit court 
properly concluded the State would suffer substantial prejudice 
as a result of Bollig’s plea withdrawal.  It was reasonable to 
consider the impact a plea withdrawal would have on the child 
victim, the State’s key witness.  Since the circuit court did 
not 
improperly 
rely 
upon 
personal 
assumptions 
or 
other 
irrelevant 
factors, 
it 
did 
not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion in denying Bollig’s motion to withdraw his plea. 
III. 
¶47 Finally, we address whether Bollig was aware of the 
elements of his offense so as to render his plea knowing and 
intelligent.  Due process requires that a plea be knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 140.  A 
plea violates due process unless the defendant has a full 
understanding of the nature of the charges against him.  Id.  
See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
20
¶48 This court in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d, 246, 274, 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), set forth a test to ascertain whether a 
defendant did not have an understanding of the charges against 
him, thus rendering his plea constitutionally infirm.  First, a 
defendant must show that the trial court failed to comply with 
the procedural requirements included in Wis. Stat. § 971.08.7  
Id.  Then, the defendant must properly allege that he did not 
understand or know the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing.  Id.   
¶49 Once the defendant has made a prima facie showing that 
his plea was accepted without compliance with the procedures set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and has also properly alleged that 
he did not understand or know the information that should have 
been provided at the plea hearing, the burden shifts to the 
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  Id.  See 
also State v. Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 830, 416 N.W.2d 
627 (Ct. App. 1987).  
                     
7 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 
971.08(1) 
incorporates 
the 
constitutional imperative that a plea be knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, stating in relevant part: 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it  shall do all of the following: 
 
(a)  Address the defendant personally and determine that 
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the 
nature of the charge and the potential punishment if 
convicted. 
(b)  Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant 
in fact committed the crime charged.  
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
21
¶50 The essential elements of a charge of attempted sexual 
contact with a child under the age of thirteen include that the 
defendant attempted: 1) to have sexual contact with the victim; 
2) the victim had not attained the age of thirteen at the time 
of the alleged contact; and 3) the alleged contact was for the 
purpose of defendant’s sexual gratification or the victim’s 
humiliation.  See Wis. JI-Criminal 2103.8  
¶51 The State concedes that the circuit court did not 
inform Bollig of one of the essential elements of his offense.  
Although the court notified Bollig of the first two elements, it 
failed to inform him that the offense must have been committed 
for the purpose of his sexual gratification.  Thus, Bollig has 
made a prima facie showing that his plea did not conform to the 
procedural standards set forth in Bangert.  He has also properly 
alleged that he did not understand or know the information that 
should have been provided at the plea hearing.       
¶52 Since Bollig has satisfied the first part of the 
Bangert test, the burden now shifts to the State to demonstrate 
by clear and convincing evidence that Bollig was aware of all 
three elements of his offense, despite the inadequacy of the 
plea colloquy.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Bollig contends 
that the court of appeals erred in determining that he was aware 
                     
8   Wisconsin JI-Criminal 2103 has subsequently been moved  
to 2102, which incorporates the definition of sexual contact 
found in 2101A.  Although the revised 2102 indicates only two 
elements of the charge, it incorporates by reference the 
definition of sexual contact, which includes the added sexual 
gratification element.   
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
22
of the nature of his offense by relying on the signed plea 
questionnaire, as well as his presence at a pre-trial hearing 
concerning evidence of prior sexual assaults.  We disagree with 
Bollig’s contention. 
¶53 The State may utilize the entire record to demonstrate 
Bollig’s knowledge of the nature of his offense and of the 
constitutional rights he was waiving.  Id. at 274-75.   The 
record in this case reflects that the circuit court inquired 
whether Bollig understood the implications of his no contest 
plea, including the constitutional rights he was waiving as a 
result.  The court also asked whether he had enough time to 
discuss the plea and the elements of the offense with his 
attorney.  Bollig responded affirmatively to each question.   
¶54 Paragraph Seven of the plea questionnaire contains a 
specific reference to the essential elements of the offense, 
including the element of sexual gratification.  Those elements 
are followed by Bollig’s signature at the end of the form.  When 
asked by the court whether he had reviewed and signed the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, and whether he 
understood the contents of the form, Bollig responded in the 
affirmative and expressed his acknowledgement of the elements 
contained in the plea questionnaire.  The information contained 
in the questionnaire may be used to demonstrate Bollig’s 
awareness of the nature of his offense.  State v. Brandt, 226 
Wis. 2d 610, 621, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999). 
¶55 Bollig’s presence at a pre-trial hearing concerning 
the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual assaults further 
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
23
demonstrates his awareness.  At that hearing, the State asserted 
that prior acts evidence was relevant to establish motive and 
intent, because Bollig had a history of assaulting young girls 
for the purpose of his sexual gratification.  Viewed together, 
the plea questionnaire and Bollig’s presence at the pre-trial 
hearing satisfied the State’s burden to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that Bollig was aware of the nature of his 
offense, despite the inadequacy of the plea colloquy. 
¶56 In summary, we determine that the circuit court’s 
failure to inform Bollig of his requirement to register as a sex 
offender did not render his plea unknowing and unintelligent.  
Since registration is not a direct consequence of Bollig’s plea, 
he did not have a due process right to be informed of the 
requirement prior to entering his plea.  
¶57 We further determine that the State bears the burden 
of proving substantial prejudice in order to defeat a plea 
withdrawal and that the circuit court did not improperly assign 
that burden to the defendant.  Additionally, the court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in finding that the plea 
withdrawal would substantially prejudice the State.  Finally, we 
conclude that despite the circuit court’s failure to advise 
Bollig of one of the essential elements, the State has 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he was 
nevertheless aware of the nature of his offense.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
98-2196-CR 
 
 
1