Title: City of Huetter v. Bradley W. Keene Election/voter registration

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35470-2008 
 
CITY OF HUETTER, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
BRADLEY W. KEENE and JENNIFER L. 
BROWN, 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Moscow, November 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No.  114 
 
Filed: November 24, 2010 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Kootenai County.  The Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is reversed. 
 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Alene, for appellant Keene. 
 
Wetzel, Wetzel & Holt, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment holding that pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-469 the 
positions of mayor and city councilman became vacant when the voter registrations of the 
occupants of those positions were cancelled after they had been sworn into office.  We reverse. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On November 6, 2007, Bradley Keene was elected mayor of the City of Huetter and 
Jennifer Brown was elected to the city council.  Their status as electors was challenged, and on 
December 27, 2007, the Kootenai County Elections Department sent them written inquiries by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, notifying them of the challenges.1 
                                                 
1 Idaho Code § 34-432(1) provides, “The county clerk shall mail a written inquiry to the challenged elector at his 
mailing address as indicated on his registration card.  Such inquiry shall state the nature of the challenge and provide 
a suitable form for reply.”  The statute does not require that the inquiry be sent by registered mail. 
 
2 
 
Mr. Keene did not receive the letter addressed to him.  He was not at home when the mail 
carrier attempted to deliver it, so the carrier left a notice stating that Mr. Keene had a certified 
letter that could be retrieved at the post office.  Due to his work schedule, he was unable to go to 
the post office when it was open to obtain and sign for the letter.  He testified that he did not ask 
one of his roommates to pick up the letter because Ms. Brown later told him it wasn’t pertinent, 
he did not need to do it right away, and in the worst-case scenario he could just reregister as a 
voter. 
 
Ms. Brown received and signed for her letter on January 8, 2008, and she telephoned the 
Elections Department to discuss the matter.  She was told that she had twenty days to respond or 
she would be dropped from the rolls of registered voters.  She asked if she could just reregister, 
and was told that she could, but she was not told that reregistering would satisfy the challenge. 
 
On January 9, 2008, Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown were sworn into office.  Their voter 
registrations were canceled on January 18, 2008, because they had not timely responded to the 
written inquiries, in person or in writing. 
 
When Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown arrived at a city council meeting on February 13, 2008, 
two council members refused to permit them to occupy their respective positions because their 
voter registrations had been cancelled.  The next day, Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown attempted to 
reregister as voters.  After a hearing, they were permitted to reregister on February 25, 2008. 
 
On March 19, 2008, the City filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Mr. 
Keene’s and Ms. Brown’s positions became vacant when their voter registrations were cancelled.  
The City also sought an injunction preventing them from representing that they are municipal 
officers.  The matter was tried to the district court, and on May 6, 2008, the court entered its 
decision holding that Idaho Code §§ 50-601 and 50-702, respectively, require mayors and 
councilmen to remain qualified during their terms; that pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-469, Mr. 
Keene’s and Ms. Brown’s positions became vacant when their voter registrations were cancelled; 
and that the City can fill those positions according to law.  The court entered judgment on May 
16, 2008, and Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown timely appealed.   
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Both Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown were duly elected to their respective positions.  They 
each took the required oath of office, and they received their certificates of election.  The City 
 
3 
has not challenged their elections or their right to take office.  Idaho Code § 50-601 requires that 
a mayor shall “remain[] a qualified elector during his term of office,” and Idaho Code § 50-702 
requires that a person elected to a city council shall “remain[] a qualified elector under the 
constitution and laws of the state of Idaho.”  It is undisputed that during the period from January 
18, 2008, until February 25, 2008, Mr. Keene and Ms. Brown were not qualified electors.  The 
district court held that when their voter registrations were cancelled on January 18, 2008, their 
positions became vacant pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-469.  The district court misconstrued the 
statute. 
 
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review.  
When construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole.”  Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 
128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 
Idaho Code § 50-469 provides, “If a person elected fails to qualify, a vacancy shall be 
declared to exist, which vacancy shall be filled by the mayor and the council.”  The district court 
construed the statute as stating that a vacancy exists if the person elected fails to remain 
qualified.  The court wrote as a conclusion of law, “A vacancy is created when a person elected 
fails to remain a qualified elector during his term of office.  I.C. § 50-469.”  (Emphasis added.)  
The court misconstrued the statute by adding the word “remain” to it.  Unlike Idaho Code §§ 50-
601 and 50-702, the word “remain” is not in Idaho Code § 50-469.  We cannot add by judicial 
interpretation words that are not found in the statute as written. 
 
In order to assume the office, the person must be elected and qualify.  The word “qualify” 
means doing whatever is required by law to assume the office to which the person was elected.  
That usually means taking the oath of office.  In some cases, it may also mean doing something 
else, such as posting a bond. 
 
In White v. Young, 88 Idaho 188, 397 P.2d 756 (1964), we stated what it means to 
“qualify.”  Crowley was elected as a probate judge on November 3, 1964, and on November 9th 
he took and filed the oath of office and filed the required bond.  He contended that he was at that 
point entitled to complete the incumbent’s term rather than waiting until the second Monday in 
January, when the incumbent’s term would expire.  The incumbent had been appointed to fill a 
vacancy, and a statute stated that he would hold the office until his successor was “elected and 
qualified.”  Another statute stated that those elected to county offices, which Crowley was, were 
 
4 
to take their oaths of office on the second Monday of January following their election.  We held 
that Crowley could not qualify for the office of probate judge until the second Monday in 
January because that was the date on which he was to take the oath of office.  We stated, 
“Pursuant to I.C. § 59-404, the oath for county elective officers, being required to be taken on the 
second Monday of January succeeding the general election, Mr. Crowley may not qualify for 
office until the second Monday of January, 1965.”  88 Idaho at 196, 397 P.2d at 761.  Likewise, 
in State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 606, 17 P.2d 343, 345 (1932) (emphasis added), we stated, 
“Under the facts appearing in the record, the probate judge, the committing magistrate, qualified 
for the office by taking the oath and furnishing bond . . . .” 
 
In Clark v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 (1917), Wonnacott was the incumbent 
county assessor.  At the next election, McFarland was elected county assessor, but he died 
shortly after the election and before his term of office would have commenced.  At the time of 
his death, he had not taken the oath of office and had not given the required bond.  Id. at 101, 
162 P. at 1075.  The county commissioners declared the position vacant and appointed Clark to 
be county assessor commencing on the date that McFarland would have taken office.  On that 
date, Clark demanded possession of the office, but Wonnacott refused to surrender it.  This Court 
held that Clark could not be appointed to the office because there was no vacancy. 
 
“There can be no appointment unless there is a vacancy; there can be no vacancy where 
there is an incumbent.”  Id. at 104, 162 P. at 1076.  There was in effect a statute providing that 
every person elected for a fixed term “shall hold office until his successor is elected . . . . and 
qualified.”  Id. at 102, 162 P. at 1075.  Thus, Wonnacott was entitled to hold the office until his 
successor was elected and qualified.  “[U]nder our statutes the person elected to an office does 
not become the incumbent of the office until he qualifies.”  Id. at 106, 162 P. at 1076.  We held 
“that if an officer under the law is entitled to hold his office until his successor is elected and 
qualified, that the election of the officer does not create a vacancy, but it requires his election 
and qualification coupled with the expiration of his predecessor’s term to create a vacancy.”  Id. 
at 104-05, 162 P. at 1076 (emphasis added). 
 
We held that Wonnacott remained the incumbent because McFarland had not qualified.  
“Had Mr. McFarland lived and failed to qualify there would have been no vacancy, under our 
statutes, because there was an incumbent to continue in the office, whose right it was to hold the 
office until his successor was not only duly elected, but also qualified.”  Id. at 105, 162 P. at 
 
5 
1076.  We concluded, “And since Mr. McFarland departed this life before he had qualified and 
before the expiration of his predecessor’s term, by no process of reasoning is it possible to 
consider him an incumbent of the office after his death.”  Id.  
 
We did not state that once McFarland died, he was no longer qualified.  Rather, we said 
that he died “before he had qualified.”  Qualifying was something he had yet to do.  It was taking 
the oath of office and filing the required bond.  The stipulated facts included “that at the time of 
his death he had not qualified as such assessor of Kootenai county, state of Idaho, and had not 
made or filed his official oath or given the bond required by law.”  Id. at 101, 162 P. at 1075. 
 
Both an elected mayor and an elected council member are required to take the oath of 
office.  The mayor “shall take office at the time and in the manner provided for installation of 
councilmen,” Idaho Code § 50-601, and “the newly elected [councilmen] shall . . . subscribe to 
the oath of office, be presented certificates of election, [and] assume the duties of their position,” 
Idaho Code § 50-702.  “A certificate of election for each elected city official . . . shall be . . . 
presented to such officials at the time of subscribing to the oath of office.”  Idaho Code § 50-470. 
 
Idaho Code § 50-469 provides, “If a person elected fails to qualify, a vacancy shall be 
declared to exist, which vacancy shall be filled by the mayor and the council.”  Keene and 
Brown did not fail to qualify.  The stipulated facts were that they “were sworn into office at a 
regularly scheduled and noticed meeting of the Huetter City Council.”  Therefore, there was no 
vacancy.  Section 50-469 declares a vacancy only if “a person elected fails to qualify” in order to 
assume the office.  It does not apply to a person who was elected and qualified, and then later 
became ineligible to hold the office. 
 
There was a period of about five weeks when Keene and Brown were not eligible to hold 
office because they were not qualified electors.  Idaho Code §§ 50-601 & 50-702.  However, 
there is no statute providing that the failure to remain eligible for the office automatically creates 
a vacancy.  Idaho Code § 59-901 provides: 
 
Every civil office shall be vacant upon the happening of either of the 
following events at any time before the expiration of the term of such office, as 
follows: 
1.  The resignation of the incumbent. 
2.  His death. 
3.  His removal from office. 
4.  The decision of a competent tribunal declaring his office vacant. 
 
6 
5.  His ceasing to be a resident of the state, district or county in which the 
duties of his office are to be exercised, or for which he may have been 
elected. 
6.  A failure to elect at the proper election, there being no incumbent to 
continue in office until his successor is elected and qualified, nor other 
provisions relating thereto. 
7.  A forfeiture of office as provided by any law of the state. 
8.  Conviction of any infamous crime, or of any public offense involving 
the violation of his oath of office. 
9.  The acceptance of a commission to any military office, either in the 
militia of this state, or in the service of the United States, which requires 
the incumbent in the civil office to exercise his military duties out of the 
state for a period of not less than sixty (60) days. 
 
 
The judgment recited, “Vacancies are declared to exist in the Mayoral and one 
Councilperson position of the City of Huetter pursuant to I.C. §59-901(4) . . . .”  There is no 
factual basis for the district court to declare the vacancies in this case. 
 
We have not addressed the issue of city officials failing to remain eligible because of 
their voter registrations being cancelled for a period of time.  However, we have addressed a 
similar issue with respect to an elected official failing to maintain the required county residence.  
In State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 17 P.2d 343 (1932), a probate judge was required to reside 
and keep his office at the county seat and could not be absent from the state for more than twenty 
days.  The judge left the state for five weeks, and after returning presided over a preliminary 
hearing and issued a commitment requiring the defendant to answer in the district court, where 
he was convicted of forgery.  The defendant challenged his conviction based upon the contention 
that the probate judge had no authority to conduct the preliminary hearing and issue the 
commitment because he had forfeited his office by violating the residency statute.  We held that 
although an officer may abandon his office by permanently moving from the county in which he 
was required to reside, “a mere temporary removal, without intention to make a permanent 
change of residence, or surrender or abandon the office, or to cease to perform its duties, does 
not affect the tenure of the office.”  Id. at 609, 17 P.2d at 346. 
 
The same reasoning applies here.  The temporary failure of Keene and Brown to remain 
qualified electors did not constitute an abandonment of their offices.  They had reregistered as 
voters prior to this action being commenced.  The record fails to disclose any basis for declaring 
vacancies in their offices. 
 
7 
 
Keene seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-606.  That statute 
authorizes the award of damages in an action for usurpation of office.  Keene does not explain 
how that statute has any application to this case.  The City requests an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121.  Both statutes only provide for the awarding of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.  Because the City has not prevailed on this appeal, it is not 
entitled to attorney fees under either statute. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the district court.  We award appellants costs on appeal, but 
not attorney fees. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.