Title: FLANAGAN v CURRAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12527 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 A R T H U R S . FUNAGAN, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - MICHAEL CURRAN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hoyt, Bottomly and Gabriel, Great F a l l s , Montana John C . Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Smith, Emmons and B a i l l i e , Great F a l l s , Montana William T. B a i l l i e argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: March 22, 1974 Decided 'APR.1'1 1974. Filed: APR 17 1974 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Cascade County, t h e Hon. Paul G. Hatfield presiding, granting summary judgment t o t h e defendant. The p l a i n t i f f , Arthur S. Flanagan, was employed by de- fendant, Michael Curran, a s a ranch hand. While so employed he was run over by a t r a c t o r and suffered t h e i n j u r i e s complained of i n t h i s action. Viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o plain- t i f f t h e circumstances surrounding t h e accident a r e as follows: P l a i n t i f f was an "old time" ranch hand who had during most of h i s working l i f e been more involved with horses than t r a c t o r s o r o t h e r t h i n g s mechanical. He d i d , however, know how t o operate a t r a c t o r and had spent increasing amounts of time doing so over t h e l a s t f i v e years. A s a p a r t of h i s d u t i e s f o r defendant, p l a i n t i f f operated t h e t r a c t o r involved i n t h e accident. This use w a s on a d a i l y b a s i s f o r t h r e e weeks proceeding t h e accident. During t h i s period t h e p l a i n t i f f had d i f f i c u l t y s t a r t i n g t h e trac- t o r . Another employee showed him how t o start it by "jumping" t h e points of t h e solenoid with a p a i r of p l i e r s . P l a i n t i f f used t h i s method by standing by t h e s i d e of t h e t r a c t o r between t h e f r o n t and r e a r wheel. H e d i d t h i s during t h e e n t i r e period he used t h e t r a c t o r . The p l a i n t i f f informed t h e defendant's foreman, mechanic and other employees of the s t a r t e r d i f f i c u l t i e s . O n t h e day of t h e accident he parked t h e t r a c t o r with t h e i n t e n t i o n of not using it u n t i l t h e s t a r t e r deficiency was repaired. However, a "rusHtjok came up and p l a i n t i f f without checking t o s e e i f t h e t r a c t o r was i n gear jumped t h e points of t h e solenoid t o s t a r t it. The t r a c t o r was i n gear and when it s t a r t e d ran over p l a i n t i f f causing severe i n j u r i e s . O n January 1 0 , 1973, defendant's motion f o r summary judgment was heard arid t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d i c a t e d 'I * * * t h a t I t h i n k t h a t t h i s case i s one f o r summary judgment a s a matter of law * * *." However, because an appeal t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court was pending i n t h e case of Hammond v. Hager, 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52, 2 9 St.Rep. 945, involving t h e question of t h e a v a i l - a b i l i t y of t h e defenses of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence i n a g r i c u l t u r a l employment c a s e s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t stayed its proceedings u n t i l determination of t h e appeal by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court. O n April 2 , 1973, t h e Supreme Court dismissed t h e appeal f o r want of a s u b s t a n t i a l f e d e r a l question. Hammond v. Hager, U.S. S.Ct. , 36 L ed 2d 303. - 1 - This dismissal e f f e c t i v e l y affirmed our determination t h a t t h e defenses of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence were a v a i l a b l e . O n April 5, 1973, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered summary judgment f o r defendant. P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s two i s s u e s on t h i s appeal. (1) That t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d by granting defendant summary judgment with- o u t allowing t h e p l a i n t i f f an opportunity t o p r e s e n t arguments i n opposition t o t h e motion; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n deciding t h a t t h e r e was no m a t e r i a l f a c t u a l d i s p u t e and a s a matter of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent o r had assumed t h e r i s k of h i s employment. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., provides f o r a hearing on a motion f o r summary judgment a s a matter of r i g h t . I f i n f a c t t h e p l a i n - t i f f was denied t h e r i g h t t o be heard on t h e m e r i t s of t h e motion t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was i n e r r o r . I n t h i s c a s e it i s c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f had an opportunity t o be heard on t h e m e r i t s a t t h e hearing on January 1 0 , 1973. The t r a n s c r i p t of t h a t hearing does not i n d i c a t e t o what e x t e n t t h e m e r i t s were argued s i n c e a p a r t of t h e hearing was off t h e record. It is, however, r e c i t e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order s t a y i n g proceedings t h a t argument had been heard on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. From this it appears that plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard and in fact was heard on the merits of the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's second issue on this appeal is whether or not the district court erred in concluding that there was no material dispute of fact and as a matter of law plaintiff was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of his employ- ment. Preliminary to a detailed discussion it is necessary to recall the well established rules governing summary judgment. Summary judgment is not a proper tool for resolving disputed issues of fact and is accordingly improper whenever material factual matter is in dispute. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., Mustang v. Jos. Schlitz rew wing Co., Beverage Co., 1nc.L Mont . , 511 P.2d 1, 30 St.Rep. 565; Dunjo Land Co. v. Hested Stores Co., Mont . - - , 515 P.2d 961, 30 St.Rep. 939. Further, the burden of showing that there is no disputed issue of material fact is on the party seeking summary judgment. Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deac. Hosp., 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476; Stensvad v. Miners & Merchants Bank of Roundup, Mont . , 517 P.2d 715, 30 St.Rep. 1178; Rosen v. Midkif f , Mont. - , 519 P.2d 416, 31 St.Rep. 215. From our examination of the record herein, consisting of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and depositions, we conclude that the district court was correct in determining that the defendant had borne his burden and shown there was no material dispute of fact with regard to the defense of assumption of risk. The showing required to sustain the defense of assumption of risk is set out in D'Hooge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747, and states: " * * * four elements must be proven by the em- ployer in order to establish assumption of risk by the employee: (1) knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition; (2) appreciation of t h i s condition as dangerous; (3) a voluntary r e - maining o r continuing i n t h e f a c e of t h e known dangerous conditions; ( 4 ) i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g a s t h e usual and probable consequence of t h i s dangerous condition. * * *" Each of these elements is established by p l a i n t i f f ' s answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and by h i s deposition. P l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge of t h e s t a r t e r d e f e c t is baldly s t a t e d i n h i s answer t o defendant's interrogatory: " 4 . Did you know p r i o r t o October 31, 1967, t h a t t h e Ford d i e s e l had a d e f e c t i v e s t a r t i n g system * * * "ANSWER: Yes." P l a i n t i f f ' s deposition elaborates on t h i s answer and i n d i c a t e s t h a t he was aware of t h e s t a r t e r d e f e c t f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e weeks. Appreciation of t h e s t a r t e r condition a s dangerous i s less baldly s t a t e d but equally c l e a r . P l a i n t i f f had been operating t r a c t o r s f o r over 5 years. Further he had been operating t h e t r a c t o r involved i n t h e accident f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e weeks. H e had a l s o worked a s a truck d r i v e r . In h i s own words, " * * * p r i o r t o t h i s I d i d a l o t of trucking * * *". While it is a s s e r t e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was an "old time" ranch hand t h e r e i s nothing t o indi- c a t e t h a t he was of l e s s than normal i n t e l l i g e n c e . It seems c l e a r t h a t a person of normal i n t e l l i g e n c e who had operated various types of machinery would appreciate t h e f a c t t h a t standing d i r e c t l y i n f r o n t of t h e t i r e of a t r a c t o r while attempting t o s t a r t it was dangerous. This appreciation of r i s k can be d i r e c t l y i n f e r r e d from t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s statement i n response t o an interrogatory t h a t " * * * we advised them and t o l d them w e weren't going t o use it u n t i l it was fixed * * *." This response w a s r e i t e r a t e d i n p l a i n t i f f ' s deposition. The p l a i n t i f f ' s voluntary remaining i n t h e face of t h i s known danger is obvious. He objected t o t h e condition of t h e s t a r t e r but then proceeded t o again s t a r t t h e t r a c t o r by "jumping" t h e points of solenoid, thus consenting t o accept r i s k involved. The f i n a l element needed t o e s t a b l i s h t h e defense of assumption of r i s k , an i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from t h e known dangerous condition, is equally c l e a r . The r i s k of s t a r t i n g a vehicle while standing i n f r o n t of it i s t h a t it may run over t h e i n d i - vidual who does so. I n t h i s case t h e r i s k was r e a l i z e d when t h e t r a c t o r s t a r t e d and r o l l e d over t h e p l a i n t i f f - The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of r i s k a r e applicable t o cases of a g r i c u l t u r a l employment, Hammond v. Hager, supra. I f e i t h e r i s established it w i l l bar p l a i n t i f f ' s recovery, thus negating any i s s u e with regard t o de- fendant's negligence. Since a s heretofore indicated t h e defense of assumption of r i s k i s established by t h e undisputed f a c t s contained i n t h e record, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n grant- i n g summary judgment t o t h e defendant. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is affirmed. . / -,L,--I--,----L,U'--' ------------ J u s t i c e W e concur: d - - 1 , , - - , , - - - - - - - - . - b - , , - Ch'ef J u s t i c e C . ----fi ---- J u s t i c e s