Title: Commonwealth v. Veiovis

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12017 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CAIUS VEIOVIS. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     November 10, 2016. - July 19, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Photograph, Relevancy and materiality, 
Inflammatory evidence, Prior misconduct, Identity, State of 
mind, Motive.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument 
by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 6, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan (Christie L. Nader also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
David F. Capeless, District Attorney for the Berkshire 
District, for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury on three indictments charging murder in the first 
degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation for the grisly 
2 
killing of David Glasser, Edward Frampton, and Robert Chadwell.1  
The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the defendant 
participated in these killings with Adam Lee Hall and David 
Chalue to prevent Glasser from testifying against Hall in two 
criminal cases.  They kidnapped Frampton, who was Glasser's 
roommate, and Chadwell, who was Glasser's neighbor, simply 
because Frampton and Chadwell had the misfortune of being in 
Glasser's apartment when they entered to kidnap and later kill 
Glasser, and then killed Frampton and Chadwell to ensure their 
silence regarding the kidnapping and killing of Glasser.  After 
the three victims were killed, the defendant, Hall, and Chalue 
dismembered their bodies and placed the body parts in plastic 
bags, and Hall arranged for the burial of the plastic bags.2 
 
The defendant presents four primary claims on appeal:  (1) 
that the evidence of his knowing participation in these crimes 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions; 
(2) that the judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence 
of other acts the probative value of which was outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice; (3) that the judge abused his 
discretion in admitting in evidence a statement by the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was also found guilty on three indictments 
charging kidnapping and three indictments charging witness 
intimidation. 
 
2 Adam Lee Hall and David Chalue were found guilty of the 
three murders in separate trials that preceded the defendant's 
trial. 
3 
regarding the scars on his right arm; and (4) that the 
prosecutor presented facts in closing argument that were not 
supported by the evidence at trial.  We affirm the convictions 
and conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial, "we recite the evidence in 
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief . . . in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 
610, 611-612 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016).  We 
focus primarily on the evidence implicating the defendant in the 
joint venture, because the defendant does not dispute that there 
was abundant evidence that Hall and Chalue participated in the 
killings. 
 
The circumstances leading up to the killings began in July, 
2009, when Hall beat Glasser with a baseball bat because he 
believed that Glasser had stolen and sold motor vehicle parts 
that belonged to Hall.  While Glasser was being interviewed by a 
State police trooper two days later, Hall threatened Glasser in 
a telephone call.  The State police arrested Hall that day and 
recovered a baseball bat from Hall's vehicle. 
 
In July, 2010, while the charge against Hall of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon was pending, Hall 
concocted a scheme to discredit Glasser by framing him on a 
4 
false kidnapping charge.  As part of this scheme, a friend of 
Hall, Nicole Brooks, falsely reported to the police that Glasser 
kidnapped her and shot at her when she escaped; another friend 
of Hall, Scott Langdon, planted Brooks's wallet and a revolver 
in Glasser's truck, where they were found by police during a 
search of the truck.  The scheme resulted in Glasser's arrest, 
but the police soon exonerated Glasser and brought criminal 
charges against Hall and those who participated with him in the 
scheme. 
 
 The defendant began spending time with Hall and Chalue in 
the latter half of August, 2011.  Hall was a "sergeant [at] 
arms" in a local chapter of the Hells Angels motorcycle club and 
was described as an "enforcer."  The defendant was not a member 
of the Hells Angels, but there was evidence that he wanted to 
be.  He began to wear a vest with a Hells Angels insignia on the 
front and kept a Hells Angels sticker in his Jeep and apartment.  
Hall told a witness in the defendant's presence of the 
possibility that the defendant would get a motorcycle and become 
a prospective member of the Hells Angels.  The defendant's 
employer told the police that the defendant had wanted to 
establish credit because he wanted to buy a motorcycle and that 
"you cannot be in the Hells Angels without buying the 
motorcycle." 
5 
 
The time line of events before and after the killings is 
important in evaluating the weight of the evidence implicating 
the defendant as a participant in the killings.  On Friday, 
August 26, 2011, Hall picked up a friend, Katelyn Carmin, in the 
tan Buick vehicle3 he had purchased earlier that month; the 
defendant and Chalue were with him.  While driving around to 
various bars, Hall went into a tirade about a person he called 
"Drummer Dave,"4 who he said had robbed him and then "snitched" 
on him.  Hall said he was "going to kill that motherfucker."  
The defendant, along with Chalue, responded to Hall by assuring 
him that Hall will "get him."  Later that evening, they drove to 
the Hells Angels clubhouse in Lee, where they rode in an all-
terrain vehicle.  Hall told Carmin to be careful because he 
needed the defendant and Chalue for "a job." 
 
On Saturday, Hall was seen outside the building where the 
defendant's girl friend resided, talking to the defendant while 
sitting in the girl friend's pickup truck.  In the early 
                                                          
 
 
3 The Buick at other times during the trial was described as 
gold in color. 
 
4 Andrew Johnston, a childhood friend of Robert Chadwell, 
testified that people often referred to David Glasser by his 
nickname, "Drummer Dave." 
5 There was some confusion as to 
the color of the vehicle that was at Rose Dawson's residence at 
1:30 A.M.  Edwin Sutton, Rose's father described it as a Jeep 
Wrangler and testified that, although he was not sure, he 
thought it might have been yellow.  Ocean Sutton, one of Edwin's 
daughters, described it as a green Jeep Wrangler.  The 
defendant's Jeep is black. 
6 
afternoon, Hall, Chalue, and the defendant went to a party held 
by the Springfield chapter of the Hells Angels at a tavern in 
Springfield; Hall and the defendant left the party together 
early in the afternoon and returned at approximately 4:30 P.M.  
Hall, Chalue, and the defendant left the tavern together at 
approximately 6:30 P.M., and drove away in Hall's Buick.  Later 
that evening, Hall, Chalue, and the defendant were at the Hells 
Angels clubhouse in Lee; they left later to go to the 
defendant's house in Pittsfield.  Hall drove to the defendant's 
home in his own vehicle but first stopped at Steven Hinman's 
home in Lenox.  Hall showed Hinman a .45 semiautomatic pistol 
that he had in his vest, as well as a "dog food bag" that 
contained a .44 Magnum revolver, a sawed-off AR-15-type weapon, 
and a small revolver. 
 
The defendant and Chalue traveled to the defendant's home 
with two women, Allyson Scace and Kayla Sewall, in Sewall's 
vehicle after stopping at a liquor store.  When Hall arrived at 
the defendant's home, he pulled the firearms out of the dog food 
bag and asked the defendant where he kept brake cleaner and 
gloves.  The defendant directed him to a cabinet and went 
upstairs with Sewall.  While they were upstairs, Hall and Chalue 
disassembled and cleaned the firearms.  The defendant asked 
Sewall to stay, but she declined and left with Scace at 
7 
approximately 9 P.M., leaving Hall, Chalue, and the defendant 
alone in the apartment. 
 
The kidnapping of the three victims in Glasser's apartment 
in Pittsfield occurred shortly before midnight that Saturday or 
early Sunday morning.  Glasser's upstairs neighbor asked Glasser 
to move his truck at approximately 10:30 P.M. that Saturday, and 
saw the three victims (and a fourth man) in the kitchen of 
Glasser's apartment at that time.  The last telephone call made 
from Chadwell's cellular telephone was at 11:21 P.M.  Shortly 
after midnight, the upstairs neighbor heard banging from the 
front downstairs hallway, and heard the voices of Glasser and 
Frampton, as well as some unfamiliar voices.  Hall later told a 
friend, Rose Dawson, that, when they arrived at Glasser's 
apartment, one of the victims was using a computer and another 
was playing a video game. 
 
The defendant's girl friend had returned from a hiking trip 
on Friday night and was at her home on Saturday night.  She made 
a telephone call to the defendant's cellular telephone at 12:09 
A.M. on Sunday, but the defendant did not answer and she left a 
voicemail message.  She sent him a text message on his cellular 
telephone at 1:20 A.M., but received no reply.  She telephoned 
him again at 1:40 A.M., and again left a voicemail message after 
the call was not answered. 
8 
 
At approximately 1:30 A.M. on Sunday, Hall appeared at 
Dawson's home in Pittsfield.  He asked to borrow Dawson's 
cellular telephone, which she gave to him; he said he would be 
back soon.  He entered the passenger seat of a vehicle described 
as a Jeep Wrangler5 and left; the defendant owned a Jeep 
Wrangler. 
 
Hall was next seen at a convenience store in Pittsfield at 
approximately 5:30 A.M., where he purchased three candy bars and 
a pack of cigarettes.  Hall returned a few minutes later and 
purchased a pack of Black and Mild cigars.  The police seized 
the defendant's Jeep seven days later and subsequently searched 
it; they found a Black and Mild cigar wrapper inside.  On 
September 12, in a search of the defendant's apartment, to which 
he had recently moved, the police found four or five Black and 
Mild cigar wrappers in a duffle bag. 
 
The store clerk observed that Hall had mud on his shirt and 
that his boots and blue jeans were wet, as was the cash he 
handed over to pay for the items.  Tropical Storm Irene had 
reached western Massachusetts during the night, bringing heavy 
rain and high winds for much of the night and into the morning. 
                                                          
 
 
5 There was some confusion as to the color of the vehicle 
that was at Rose Dawson's residence at 1:30 A.M.  Edwin Sutton, 
Rose's father described it as a Jeep Wrangler and testified 
that, although he was not sure, he thought it might have been 
yellow.  Ocean Sutton, one of Edwin's daughters, described it as 
a green Jeep Wrangler.  The defendant's Jeep is black. 
9 
 
 Shortly thereafter, Hall returned to the Dawson residence 
and parked his Buick on the front lawn.  The defendant's Jeep 
arrived behind the Buick.  Hall walked from the Buick to the 
Jeep and left in the Jeep. 
 
At approximately 10:30 A.M., Hall returned to the Dawson 
residence with Chalue and the defendant in the defendant's Jeep, 
which Hall was driving.  Hall, who was wet and not wearing 
shoes, asked Dawson and her friend, Alexandra Ely, who was 
staying overnight with Dawson, to come to Hall's home to make 
breakfast.  Hall gave them money, which was soaking wet, and 
told them to buy breakfast food and bleach; he also told them to 
wash their hands after handling the money.  As Dawson and Ely 
drove to a supermarket in Hall's Buick, Hall telephoned Ely and 
told her to skip the bleach and not look in a bag in the 
vehicle.  They looked inside the bag and saw what looked like a 
"batting glove or golf glove." 
 
When they arrived at Hall's house, the defendant's Jeep was 
parked in front; Hall, Chalue, and the defendant were inside.  
Hall returned Dawson's cellular telephone to her and told her to 
delete her call log and tell no one that he had borrowed it.  
Chalue was in bed, and the defendant sat in a recliner 
"sleeping" and looking "tired."  Dawson and Ely left later in 
Hall's Buick to return home.  Hall, Chalue, and the defendant 
retrieved the Buick from Dawson's home later that day. 
10 
 
At approximately 2 P.M., Hall arrived at the home of David 
Casey in Canaan, New York, approximately eighteen miles from 
Pittsfield, in the Buick.  Hall said that he was having trouble 
with his vehicle and asked Casey if he knew anywhere nearby 
where he could park it overnight.  Casey called a friend, Alan 
Pavoni, who agreed to let Hall park the vehicle in Pavoni's 
driveway in Becket.  Hall then told Casey that he had killed 
Glasser, as well as "a fat guy" and a black man who were with 
Glasser.  He explained that he had held Glasser down and pulled 
the trigger, but the gun misfired.  As he tried to rechamber 
another round, Glasser ran into the woods.  "Davey" ran after 
him and shot him, but did not kill him.  "Davey" brought Glasser 
back to Hall, who then shot him.  Hall said the other two men 
were stabbed to death.  He said they thought the black man was 
dead and left him but, when they came back, they saw him sitting 
on a log, moaning.  Hall also said that they "chopped [the 
victims] up," and added that "one of the guys really enjoyed 
torturing and cutting them up."  Hall noted that it was "raining 
very hard" while this was happening. 
 
Hall asked if Casey was still working with an excavator at 
a property in Becket, and Casey said that he was.  Hall then 
asked if Casey would do him a favor; he wanted Casey to dig a 
hole to bury the bodies.  Hall added that, if Casey did this 
11 
favor for him, he would not harm Langdon.6  Hall wanted to go 
with him to dig the hole that day, but Casey said he would meet 
him there on Monday morning. 
 
Between 5 and 6 P.M., Hall drove his Buick to Pavoni's 
property and parked it there; another person was with him in the 
Buick.  A "Jeep-like vehicle" also arrived and picked up Hall. 
 
Hall, Chalue, and the defendant were seen late in the 
afternoon standing near the defendant's Jeep in the parking lot 
of the apartment building in Pittsfield where the defendant's 
girl friend resided. 
 
Casey met Hall as scheduled at approximately 8:30 A.M. on 
Monday at Pavoni's property.7  Hall was with a man he identified 
as "Davey," whom Hall assured Casey he could trust because the 
man was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and a person had to 
kill someone to become a member; Casey identified this man at 
trial as Chalue.  Hall opened the trunk of the Buick and said 
that it was "starting to smell."  Hall later drove the Buick to 
the property where Casey kept the excavator.  Casey used the 
excavator to dig a large hole, and Hall opened the trunk and 
                                                          
 
 
6 David Casey testified that Scott Langdon was living with 
and planned to marry Casey's sister.  Casey knew that Langdon 
was cooperating with the police regarding the pending charges 
against Hall. 
 
7 The defendant arrived for work as usual on Monday morning 
at the design firm where he was employed as a gardener. 
12 
dropped a number of plastic garbage bags, which Hall said 
contained body parts, into the hole. 
 
On Monday afternoon, Hall and Chalue brought the Buick to a 
salvage yard and sold it for scrap, where it was later placed in 
a crusher.  The interior carpets were coated with liquid, the 
back seat was mostly missing, and the carpet had been removed 
from the trunk.  On Sunday, September 4, Hall, Chalue, and the 
defendant drove past the salvage yard in the defendant's Jeep, 
and then drove back in the other direction, arguably for the 
purpose of checking to see that Hall's Buick had actually been 
crushed.  After they were stopped by police at a nearby gasoline 
station, the police seized and searched the Jeep, but found 
nothing of evidentiary value. 
 
On Friday, September 9, after Casey had revealed to police 
the location of the bodies, the police dug up the plastic bags 
containing the victims' body parts.  The autopsy of the body 
parts revealed that all of the victims had been shot and 
stabbed; their neck, arms, and legs had been removed, and two of 
the bodies had been cut through the torso.  Most of the 
dismemberment had been accomplished by chopping or hacking with 
a sharp instrument such as a butcher knife. 
 
On September 10, the defendant was arrested and brought to 
the Pittsfield police station.  At the station, a State police 
lieutenant told the defendant that he was protecting a "rat," 
13 
referring to Hall, because Hall had offered to cooperate with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the Hells Angels 
clubhouse in Lee a year earlier.  As the defendant was walking 
back to his cell, the defendant said to Chalue, "[Y]ou hear what 
they're saying about our partner?  They're saying he's a 
stoolie." 
 
On September 12, the police executed search warrants at two 
apartments in the same building in Pittsfield:  an apartment 
where the defendant lived and an apartment from which he had 
recently moved.  In the apartment where he lived, among other 
items that will be described later in this opinion, the police 
found a September 6 edition of a newspaper with an article 
describing the disappearance of the three victims, and an 
article dated September 8, describing the search for the missing 
men. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In reviewing 
a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, 
"after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. 
338, 343 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 
671, 677 (1979).  The defendant notes accurately that there was 
no percipient witness who testified to the defendant's 
14 
participation in the killing and dismemberment of the three 
victims, and no forensic evidence that linked him to the crimes.  
Circumstantial evidence, however, "alone may be sufficient to 
meet the burden of establishing guilt."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 
466 Mass. 707, 713, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014).  We 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient in this case to 
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
with the intent to kill, knowingly participated in the 
premeditated murder of the three victims.  See Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009). 
 
A reasonable jury could have found that the defendant was 
aware on the Friday before the killings that Hall planned to 
kill Glasser in order to silence him as a witness.  They also 
could find that the defendant had a motive to assist Hall in 
killing Glasser, because he wanted to be a member of the Hells 
Angels chapter where Hall served as sergeant at arms, and 
helping Hall in the killing would curry favor with Hall and 
cause Hall to believe him worthy of trust. 
 
On Saturday evening, shortly before the victims were 
kidnapped and killed, the defendant was with Hall and Chalue at 
the defendant's home when they disassembled and cleaned multiple 
firearms that Hall had just brought.  At approximately the time 
of the kidnappings and killings, the defendant failed to answer 
two telephone calls and a text message from his girl friend.  As 
15 
described by Hall in his conversation with Casey, Hall, Chalue, 
and a third assailant brought the victims to the woods in the 
heavy downpour of the tropical storm, killed them, and 
dismembered their bodies.8  It can reasonably be inferred that 
the dismemberment of the victims took a substantial period of 
time to accomplish and that it would have been bloody and messy 
work in a tropical storm.  It is therefore probative that Hall 
was a passenger in what reasonably could be inferred to be the 
defendant's Jeep at approximately 1:30 A.M., when Hall stopped 
at the Dawson residence.  It can also reasonably be inferred 
that Chalue and the defendant were still with Hall at 
approximately 5:30 A.M., because Hall purchased three candy bars 
at the convenience store and a brand of cigars smoked by the 
defendant.  This inference grows stronger when one considers 
that the defendant's Jeep followed Hall when he dropped the 
Buick off at the Dawson residence shortly after leaving the 
convenience store, and that Hall immediately left in the Jeep.  
Because nothing of evidentiary value was found in the Jeep, it 
can be inferred that the victims' dismembered bodies by this 
time were in the trunk of the Buick.  The defendant was still 
                                                          
 
 
8 Hall's statements to Casey were admissible for their truth 
against the defendant because they were made to induce Casey's 
cooperation in burying the bodies and therefore were made in the 
course of and in furtherance of the joint venture.  See 
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 522 (2016), and cases 
cited. 
16 
with Hall and Chalue when they returned to the Dawson residence 
at 10:30 A.M., with Hall now driving the defendant's Jeep, and 
continued with them to Hall's house later that morning in the 
Jeep, where the defendant appeared to be sleepy. 
 
There was credible evidence that a third person 
participated in the killings and dismemberments with Hall and 
Chalue, and that the defendant was the only third person with 
Hall and Chalue immediately before and immediately after the 
killings.  Moreover, Hall was seen in the defendant's Jeep at or 
around the time period when the bodies were likely being 
dismembered.  If the defendant had not participated in the 
killings, it is unlikely that he would have chosen to keep 
newspaper articles about the disappearance and the search for 
the victims in his apartment or that he would have referred to 
Hall in a conversation with Chalue as "our partner."  In light 
of this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the third person who 
participated in the killings and subsequent dismemberments. 
 
2.  Admission of photographs of items found in defendant's 
apartment.  The defendant argues that the judge abused his 
discretion in admitting photographs of items found during the 
search of the defendant's apartments because their probative 
value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  The 
defendant moved in limine to bar these items from evidence, but 
17 
the judge denied the motion.  The objected-to photographs show 
(1) anatomical drawings from a medical textbook with images of 
human dissections and amputation of body parts, some of which 
were presented as a collage hung on the wall; and (2) a machete, 
a cleaver, hatchets, various knives, and a baseball bat with 
spikes. 
 
The nature of so-called prior bad act (or other act) 
evidence under Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2017) is that it 
reflects badly on the character of the defendant and might show 
a propensity to commit the crime charged, which poses a risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  If it is offered solely for 
that purpose, it is not admissible.  But if it is offered for a 
purpose other than character or propensity, such as to establish 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or pattern of operation, the evidence is admissible 
where its probative value is not outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  See also Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 
Mass. 65, 79 (1986), S.C., 447 Mass. 635 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982) (prosecution 
may not introduce evidence that defendant previously misbehaved 
for purpose of showing his or her bad character or propensity to 
commit crime charged, but such evidence may be admissible if 
"relevant for some other purpose"); Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 
18 
Mass. 202, 206 (1985) (prior bad act admissible where it is not 
offered to demonstrate that defendant acted in conformity with 
his or her past actions but rather to "prove a relevant 
subsidiary fact").  See generally Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b).  We 
give great deference to a trial judge's exercise of discretion 
in deciding whether to admit a prior bad act, and we will 
reverse for an abuse of discretion only where the judge made "'a 
clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the 
decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range 
of reasonable alternatives."  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 
169, 185 n.27 (2014), quoting Picciotto v. Continental Cas. Co., 
512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 
Here, there were three relevant, noncharacter purposes to 
the admission of the amputation drawings and the collage of 
anatomical drawings.  First, their admission was probative of 
the identity of the defendant as the third man who participated 
in the killings.  A critical piece of evidence in this case was 
the statement made by Hall in furtherance of the joint venture 
that "one of the guys really enjoyed torturing and cutting [the 
victims] up."  Evidence that the defendant chose to put on his 
wall anatomical drawings showing the dissection of the human 
body and chose to possess drawings depicting the amputations of 
arms and legs tends to identify the defendant as the person who 
likely fit Hall's description of the third accomplice as someone 
19 
who enjoyed "cutting [the victims] up."  If Hall had said that 
the third person who participated in the killings was fascinated 
by medieval weapons, it would have been highly probative of 
identity if one of his friends had photographs of such weapons 
on his wall and a collection of such weapons on his mantel.  The 
collage and drawings in the defendant's apartment are no less 
probative of identity. 
 
Generally, we characterize other act evidence that is 
admissible to show identity as "modus operandi" evidence and 
allow its admission only where "the prior events and the 
circumstances of the crime charged have such similarities as to 
be meaningfully distinctive" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 417 Mass. 830, 836 (1994).  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 815, 555, cert. denied sub. nom 
Mooltrey v. Massachusetts, 555 U.S. 947 (2008); Commonwealth v. 
Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 743-746 (2008).  The theory underlying 
its admission is that the distinctive commonality between the 
prior or subsequent conduct and the charged act creates "a 
sufficient nexus to render the conduct relevant and probative" 
on the issue of identity (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 202 (2004).  We require a tight nexus 
because modus operandi evidence poses a high risk of unfair 
prejudice in that it allows the jury to learn about prior or 
subsequent bad acts of the defendant that are similar in nature 
20 
to the crime charged.  The commonalities among the crimes, 
therefore, need to be so distinctive that their probative value 
in identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime 
charged outweighs the substantial risk of unfair prejudice. 
   
We do not suggest that the anatomical drawings found in the 
defendant's apartment are admissible as modus operandi evidence.  
The method or location of the amputations shown in the drawings 
in the defendant's apartment are not so similar to the method or 
location of the actual dismemberment of the victims as to permit 
a finding that the drawings demonstrate the method of operation 
of the dismemberment.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 251 
(pornographic drawings found in defendant's jail cell not 
admissible as evidence of modus operandi "where the drawings had 
only a general similarity to the child pornography" found on 
public library computer he was charged with having possessed). 
 
Rather, the anatomical drawings are admissible as a 
different species of identity evidence:  evidence of 
idiosyncratic conduct by a defendant that, in light of the 
specific evidence in a case, tends to identify the defendant as 
the perpetrator of a crime.  Generally, the probative weight of 
such identity evidence need not be as great as modus operandi 
evidence because it does not involve the commission of similar 
crimes, and therefore poses less risk of unfair prejudice 
(although we do not minimize the risk of such prejudice arising 
21 
from the drawings in this case).  The probative weight of this 
type of identity evidence depends on its connection to the other 
evidence in the case that ties the idiosyncratic conduct to the 
identity of the perpetrator, as in our medieval weaponry 
example.9  Here, the anatomical drawings would not be admissible 
as identity evidence if Hall had not identified the third 
assailant as someone who enjoyed "cutting [the victims] up."  
The drawings have probative weight as to identity only because 
the drawings tend to identify the defendant as a person well 
known to Hall who appeared to have an unusual interest in the 
amputation and dissection of the human body. 
 
Apart from identity, a second relevant, noncharacter 
purpose for admitting the drawings is to show state of mind.  
One of the extraordinary features of these killings is the 
dismemberment of the victims, which appears to have had no 
                                                          
 
 
9 In dissent, Justice Lowy argues that our decision to admit 
the anatomical drawings is improper because "the connection 
between the defendant's other conduct and the charged conduct is 
squarely based on an impermissible propensity inference."  Post 
at    .  While the admission of any evidence that suggests the 
defendant's bad character risks inviting the jury to draw the 
improper inference that the defendant acted in conformity with 
his past conduct, the admission of the drawings in this case is 
not premised on such an improper inference.  Rather, the 
drawings invite the jury to conclude that the defendant matched 
Hall's description of the third participant in the crime.  While 
it would be improper to admit the drawings for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the defendant was predisposed to commit the 
crime, there is nothing improper about asking the jury to infer 
that the uncommon trait Hall attributed to the crime's third 
participant is also attributable to the defendant. 
22 
pragmatic purpose and which must have taken a considerable 
amount of time to complete, especially in the midst of a 
tropical storm.  The collage and drawings in the defendant's 
apartment are probative of the defendant's state of mind as a 
person fascinated by amputation and human dissection, and of an 
intent to seize the opportunity of these killings to engage in 
actual amputations and human dissection.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 739-740 (2014) (confrontations between 
defendant and victim three months prior to workplace shooting 
and between defendant and another employee were relevant to 
defendant's motive and state of mind). 
 
Third, the motive for the killings was to silence Glasser, 
who would have testified against Hall in two criminal cases, and 
to silence the other two victims, who would otherwise have been 
witnesses to Glasser's killing.  But these motives do not 
explain the victims' dismemberment.  We have admitted other act 
evidence where, without it, a crime may appear to be an 
inexplicable act of violence.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 
Mass. 65, 68 (1998); Drew, 397 Mass. at 78-79.  The defendant's 
apparent fascination with amputation and human dismemberment 
offers an explanation for what would otherwise be inexplicable. 
 
Where there were three relevant, noncharacter purposes for 
the admission of the anatomical drawings, the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in ruling that, "[i]n light of the other 
23 
evidence in the case, I do believe they have some probative 
value which outweighs the prejudicial effect."  In Commonwealth 
v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 443-444 (2009), we concluded that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion where the probative 
weight of the evidence was less compelling than it was here, and 
where the risk of unfair prejudice was equally significant.  
Where an apparently randomly chosen victim was murdered in a 
park by stabbing, strangulation, and blunt trauma, we found no 
abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence that the 
defendant "spoke to coworkers about serial killings, and that he 
often read books about murder and serial killings" (footnote 
omitted).  Id. at 441, 443.  We concluded that evidence of the 
defendant's fascination with murder "was relevant to the 
defendant's motive and state of mind and to explain what 
otherwise might be seen as an inexplicable act of violence."  
Id. at 443.  We reach a comparable conclusion as to the 
anatomical drawings in this case. 
 
Our analysis is different with respect to the admission of 
the photographs depicting the cutting objects found in the 
defendant's apartment.  "A weapon that could have been used in 
the course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's discretion, 
even without direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact 
used in the commission of the crime," because "[s]uch evidence 
is relevant for demonstrating that the defendant had the 'means 
24 
of committing the crime.'"  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 
116, 122 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 
744 (2000).  Based on the testimony of the medical examiner and 
forensic anthropologist, the machete, cleaver, hatchets, and 
various knives found in the defendant's apartment were 
consistent with the types of tools used to dismember the 
victims, and could have served as the means to accomplish the 
dismemberment.  Although they tested negative for blood at the 
time of the search of the defendant's apartment on September 12, 
approximately two weeks after the killings, and therefore were 
not seized for further testing, they could not reasonably be 
excluded as weapons that were used in the commission of the 
dismemberment.  Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in admitting the photographs of the 
machete, cleaver, hatchets, and knives. 
 
In contrast, the judge did abuse his discretion in 
admitting the spiked baseball bat, which had no probative value 
and posed a needless risk of unfair prejudice.  "Where a weapon 
definitively could not have been used in the commission of the 
crime, we have generally cautioned against admission of evidence 
related to it."  Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 122, citing Commonwealth 
v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 357-358 (1985).  Because there was no 
evidence that the baseball bat with spikes could have been used 
in the commission of the killings or the dismemberments, we 
25 
conclude that the judge erred in admitting the photograph 
depicting it.  We also conclude that, given the other admissible 
evidence depicting what was found in the search of the 
defendant's apartment, the error was not prejudicial.  
Commonwealth v. Graham, 431 Mass. 282, 288, cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 1020 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 
348, 353 (1994) (error not prejudicial "if we are sure that the 
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect"). 
 
We note that the defendant, although he unsuccessfully 
moved in limine to exclude this other act evidence and timely 
objected to its admission, did not seek a limiting instruction 
regarding the jury's consideration of this evidence, and the 
judge did not give one.  As a result, the jury were not told 
that this evidence may not be considered by them as evidence of 
the defendant's bad character or his propensity to commit the 
crimes charged.10  See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal 
Practice Jury Instructions §§ 7.7.2, 7.7.3 (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 2013).  Because there was no motion for a new trial, we do 
not know whether the absence of a request for a limiting 
instruction arose from a tactical choice by defense counsel not 
to focus the jury's attention on this evidence, or from an error 
                                                          
 
 
10 The judge did instruct the jury that the defendant's 
affiliation with the Hells Angels may not be considered as 
evidence of a bad character or a criminal personality. 
26 
of judgment by counsel.  Regardless, we review the absence of 
such a limiting instruction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
determine whether it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass. 
799, 809 (2002) (substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice standard applied to absence of limiting instruction in 
case of murder in first degree).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 48, 61 (2000). 
 
The jury are always free to consider evidence without 
limitation whenever a judge fails to give a limiting instruction 
under Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b), but we do not always conclude 
that the absence of such an instruction creates a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 290 (2011).  One factor in considering 
whether its absence produced a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice is whether the prosecutor in his or her 
closing argument misused the other act evidence to invite the 
jury to consider it as proof of the defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit the crime.  Cf. Commonwealth v. McCowen, 
458 Mass. 461, 479-480 (2010) (prior bad act evidence not 
mentioned in prosecutor's closing argument).  In Guy, 454 Mass. 
at 443-444, we noted that "[t]he prosecutor elicited the 
testimony and referred to it in his closing in a technical, 
analytical manner, without drama or undue emphasis that might 
27 
have released its potential for unfair prejudice."  The same 
could be said here; the prosecutor did not speak of this 
testimony in his closing argument, and alluded to it only when 
he argued that the murders were not just an attempt to keep 
three men from testifying in court "but of satisfying some 
retribution and intent to take apart humanity piece by 
piece. . . .  [T]he defendant, quote, really enjoyed torturing 
and cutting them up."  In short, the prosecutor alluded to this 
evidence for its relevant, noncharacter purposes.  Where those 
purposes were themselves compelling, the absence of a limiting 
instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
3.  Statement by defendant regarding scars on his right 
arm.  Hinman testified that, on an unspecified date, Hall 
brought the defendant to Hinman's property, and Hinman stared at 
the scars on the defendant's right arm.  Over objection, Hinman 
testified that the defendant told him, "See these scars[;] 
imagine what I can do to somebody else."  The defendant contends 
that the judge abused his discretion in determining that the 
probative weight of this statement outweighed the risk of unfair 
prejudice, and consequently admitting it in evidence. 
 
We recognize that this statement generally would be 
relevant only for the forbidden purpose of suggesting the 
defendant's violent character and his propensity to commit acts 
28 
of violence, and therefore would be inadmissible.  But in the 
unusual context of this case, it, like the collage of human 
dissections on the defendant's apartment wall, is relevant to 
identify the defendant as the third person participating in the 
killings who Hall described as someone who "really enjoyed 
torturing and cutting [the victims] up."  In essence, through 
this statement, the defendant was describing himself as someone 
who is capable of extraordinary acts of violence against other 
persons, which tends to identify him as someone who would enjoy 
torturing and dismembering other persons, and which therefore 
permits the inference that he is the third person referred to by 
Hall in speaking with Casey.  Where this statement is probative 
of the defendant's identification as the third assailant, we 
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
concluding that its probative weight outweighed the risk of 
unfair prejudice. 
 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor in closing argument "argued a number of 
points based on facts that do not appear in the record."  Where 
there was no objection to the closing argument, we review the 
record to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  We conclude that there was not. 
 
The defendant identifies four instances where the 
prosecutor allegedly argued facts not in evidence.  First, he 
29 
claims that there was no evidence supporting the prosecutor's 
statement that the three assailants had "the instruments in bags 
available for the dismemberment," which the prosecutor argued 
showed that the killings and dismemberments were planned.  The 
defendant is correct that no witness testified to this fact, but 
the prosecutor is entitled to argue that it was a fair inference 
that the assailants had the tools with them when they killed the 
victims, even though it was also possible that they retrieved 
the tools after the killings based on Hall's statement that they 
left the scene believing that the black man was dead and were 
surprised to find him still alive when they returned. 
 
Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly 
suggested that the cleaver found in the defendant's apartment 
was used to dismember the bodies.  The prosecutor properly noted 
that the three assailants had access to the types of tools that 
could have been used to dismember the victims, including the 
cleaver.  He also properly argued that the jury should not infer 
that the cleaver was not used in the killings because it did not 
test positive for blood, asking rhetorically, "Wouldn't you 
expect that [the cleaver] would test positive unless it was very 
carefully cleaned . . . ?"  Where a kitchen cleaver would 
routinely be used to cut meat, and therefore would be expected 
to have blood residue if not carefully cleaned, this was not an 
improper argument. 
30 
 
Third, the defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's 
suggestion to the jury that the defendant was the third 
assailant whom Hall said "really enjoyed torturing and cutting 
them up."  This was fair argument based on inferences from the 
evidence in the case. 
 
Finally, the defendant claims that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence by telling the jury that the defendant had "boasted 
to Steve Hinman that he had scarred himself."  This was a fair 
inference from the defendant's statement to Hinman in which he 
invited Hinman to imagine what he could do "to somebody else." 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As part of our 
plenary review of the case, we note that the judge, in defining 
reasonable doubt in his final jury instructions, told the jury 
that "the evidence must convince you of the defendant's guilt to 
a reasonable and moral certainty," but omitted the phrase from 
the reasonable doubt instruction in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 
Cush. 295, 320 (1850), that clarified the meaning of that 
phrase:  "a certainty that convinces and directs the 
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it."  Because the 
defendant did not object, we review to determine whether the 
judge's deviation created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 
204, 220 (2014). 
31 
 
"A constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction 
amounts to a structural error which defies analysis by harmless 
error standards."  Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 468 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341, 342 
(1995).  But "[t]he Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the 
government's burden of proof."  Russell, supra, quoting 
Pinckney, supra.  It suffices that the words used "impress[] 
upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near 
certitude of the guilt of the accused."  Russell, supra, quoting 
Pinckney, supra at 344.11 
 
The phrase "moral certainty" if used "in isolation, without 
further explanation, might amount to an erroneous instruction on 
reasonable doubt."  Pinckney, supra at 345, citing Commonwealth 
v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 571 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
1091 (1995).  But its use was not reversible error "where it was 
used with an additional instruction which impressed upon the 
factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near 
certitude of the guilt of the accused."  Pinckney, supra at 344, 
citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1994).  Although 
                                                          
 
 
11 In Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477-478 
(2015), we exercised "our inherent supervisory power to require 
a uniform instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
uses more modern language, but preserves the power, efficacy, 
and essence of the Webster charge."  The trial in this case 
resulted in verdicts in 2014, before the new instruction was 
mandated. 
32 
the phrase must be linked with "language that lends content to 
the phrase," Pinckney, supra at 345, "[w]e have never held that 
'moral certainty' must be immediately followed by content-
lending language, only that it must be linked with such 
language" (emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. LaBriola, 430 
Mass. 569, 573 (2000).  Additionally, we have said that use of 
the phrase "abiding conviction" in conjunction with the moral 
certainty language "does much to alleviate any concerns that the 
phrase 'moral certainty' might be misunderstood in the 
abstract."  Id. at 572-573, quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 21.  The 
judge's use of the phrase "abiding conviction" in conjunction 
with "moral certainty," coupled with his fidelity to the Webster 
instruction in every respect except for the noted omission, 
convinces us that the omission did not create a risk that the 
jury failed adequately to understand the reasonable doubt 
standard, and therefore did not create a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 
Mass. 553, 562 (1991) (no error where moral certainty language 
used as part of Webster charge). 
 
Having addressed this omission in the reasonable doubt 
instruction, we conclude that the verdicts of murder in the 
first degree are fully consonant with justice and we decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
33 
trial or to direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of 
guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  I agree 
with the court that the evidence was legally sufficient to 
support the defendant's convictions.  Because I disagree with 
the court's analysis of the admission of photographs of items 
found in the defendant's apartment, however, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Today, the court purports to announce a new brand of 
identity evidence, which involves the use of similar, but not 
distinctive, conduct of a defendant to infer that the defendant 
acted in conformity with that conduct on another occasion.  If 
this sounds like the language often used to describe the type of 
character inference that fact finders are roundly prohibited 
from making, that is because it is. 
 
The court sets forth three "relevant, noncharacter 
purposes" for which it holds the photographs were admissible:  
(1) identity, (2) state of mind, and (3) motive.  I address each 
in turn, and finally, I assess the prejudicial effect in this 
case. 
 
1.  Identity evidence.  I agree with the court that the 
posters hanging in the defendant's apartment were not 
sufficiently similar to the methods by which the victims' bodies 
were dismembered to qualify as modus operandi evidence.1  I also 
                                                          
 
1 When asked whether the dismemberment of the victims was 
consistent with the surgical illustrations, the Commonwealth's 
2 
agree that evidence may be admissible to prove a defendant's 
identity, absent such similarity, when the evidence is 
ultimately relevant because the evidence makes it more likely 
than it would be without the evidence that the defendant is the 
individual responsible for the crime.  This latter category of 
"identity" evidence, however, does not permit the use of the 
defendant's conduct "to prove [his] character in order to show 
that on a particular occasion [he] acted in accordance with the 
character."  Mass G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2017).  This rule 
limiting the use of a defendant's prior conduct applies without 
regard to the probative strength of the conduct. 
 
"One of the oldest principles of Anglo-American law is that 
a person 'should not be judged strenuously by reference to the 
awesome spectre of his past'" (citation omitted).  D.P. Leonard, 
The New Wigmore:  A Treatise on Evidence § 1.2, at 2 (2009) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expert said, "They do show amputation of limbs, so that portion 
is consistent.  I can't say if the exact location on the bone is 
consistent in some of them.  I can see at least one is 
inconsistent in terms of location.  Sometimes I just can't tell 
what part of the bone I'm looking at."  The prosecutor then 
asked whether the victims' limbs were dismembered at the site of 
the joint (as depicted in the illustrations), the witness 
responded, "They were chopped through sometimes near a joint but 
they were chopped through mostly right to the bone itself.  In 
terms of the vertebrae, a lot of the chopping was aimed between 
two bones, so both bones were damaged but they were separated 
where they normally separate."  Further, on cross-examination, 
defense counsel asked, "There's nothing in that diagram that's 
consistent with the multiple large chopping injuries which you 
just discussed, correct?"  The witness answered, "That's 
correct." 
3 
(Wigmore).  "For nearly two centuries, courts have excluded the 
evidence not because of its lack of probative value but 
primarily because of the dangers it is thought to present.  Most 
commonly cited is the danger of unfair prejudice."  Id. at 6.  
This prohibition on character evidence includes using a 
defendant's other, relevant conduct to prove his or her 
"propensity" to commit the charged crime.  Id. at 2-3.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b).  The danger of admitting such character 
evidence against the defendant is not that it is irrelevant.  
Rather, the danger is that the jury will overvalue the evidence.  
Wigmore, supra at 5-7. 
 
To say that other conduct is permissibly probative of 
"identity," rather than impermissibly probative of character, 
merely because a defendant's character makes him more likely to 
be guilty, is an exercise in circular logic that renders the 
prohibition on the character inference inert.  Thus, the court's 
reasoning today, at best, dilutes the stringent requirements for 
modus operandi evidence, or, at worst, eviscerates the rule 
prohibiting use of a defendant's other conduct to show his 
propensity to commit the crime charged. 
 
I would classify admissible evidence that is probative of 
identity into two categories:  (1) modus operandi, and (2) what 
I will call "identity-based evidence."  Unlike modus operandi, 
identity-based evidence does not require a high level of 
4 
distinctiveness shared between the defendant's other conduct and 
the charged conduct.2  Rather, such other conduct constitutes 
admissible identity-based evidence when introduced for a 
nonpropensity purpose, such as, motive, opportunity, knowledge, 
state of mind, or many other purposes, but the nonpropensity 
purpose is ultimately relevant to "identify" the defendant as 
the individual who committed the charged crime.  See P.C. 
Giannelli, Understanding Evidence 174-175 (4th ed. 2013) 
(Giannelli). 
 
The following example of identity-based evidence is 
illustrative.  If shortly before committing armed robbery, a 
defendant steals a particular weapon to commit the armed 
robbery, evidence that the defendant stole the weapon would be 
admissible to establish that he had the means or opportunity -- 
because he had the particular weapon used to commit the crime.  
See Giannelli, supra at 174.  That the defendant had the means 
to commit the crime is relevant to his "identity" as the 
perpetrator of the armed robbery.  See id.  The judge, however, 
must still balance the probative value of the theft of the 
weapon against the danger of undue prejudice that the jury will 
                                                          
 
 
2 As the court notes, ante at    , a similarity that is 
merely general is a reason to exclude evidence of other conduct.  
The danger that a jury will consider prior conduct as propensity 
evidence is at its apex when the prior conduct resembles the 
charged conduct, but is not sufficiently similar for purposes of 
modus operandi. 
5 
consider the theft as evidence of bad character.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 403.  Yet, there is minimal danger that a jury would 
impermissibly consider the theft as indicative of the 
defendant's propensity to commit armed robbery, i.e., that the 
defendant showed his bad character by stealing a firearm, and 
that it was more likely that he committed the crime due to this 
bad character.  Rather, the more probable and logical inference 
is that the evidence "identifies" the defendant as the 
individual who committed the crime because he possessed the 
weapon used in its commission.  The latter conclusion is not 
based on an impermissible propensity inference. 
 
In this case, the connection between the defendant's other 
conduct and the charged conduct is squarely based on an 
impermissible propensity inference.  The other conduct is 
hanging posters depicting medical amputations.  The charged 
conduct is chopping up three human beings.  The logical 
connection between the two is that the defendant acted in 
conformity with the character trait demonstrated by displaying 
images of amputation by brutally chopping up the victims on a 
subsequent occasion -- a stark contrast to the firearm example 
above, which involves no such impermissible character inference. 
 
The court conditions the admissibility of the drawings on 
Adam Lee Hall's statement that "one of the guys really enjoyed" 
chopping the victims up.  The court says that the anatomical 
6 
drawings are thus probative of identity in the same way that 
posters of medieval weapons would be admissible identity 
evidence if Hall had said one of the participants was fascinated 
by medieval weapons. 
 
The court's example is not analogous to the present case. 
Unlike the present case, the court's example does not implicate 
a propensity inference, because the medieval weapons referred to 
in the hypothetical example do not relate to the commission of 
the crime.  Thus, the example does not ask the jury to conclude 
that, because the defendant had posters of medieval weapons, he 
is the type of person who would participate in three brutal 
murders.  In the hypothetical example, Hall's statement serves 
only to identify a person who has an interest in medieval 
weapons.  The medieval weapons posters are relevant because they 
show an interest of the accused, and the hypothetical statement 
identifies an individual who has that interest as a participant 
in the crime.  The posters in no way suggest that the defendant 
acted in accordance with that interest in killing the victims. 
 
By contrast, in this case Hall stated that one of the 
participants enjoyed the act of torturing and chopping up 
people.  The anatomical drawings only corroborate this statement 
if one presumes that the defendant acted in accordance with his 
interest in anatomical dismemberment on a subsequent occasion by 
chopping up the victims in a manner that did not meaningfully 
7 
resemble the dissections depicted in the drawings.  Regardless 
of whether the defendant's display of the posters makes it more 
likely that he was the third participant than it would be 
without such evidence, this is the quintessential, impermissible 
propensity inference. 
 
2.  State of mind.  The court concludes that the fact that 
the dismemberment of the victims "appears to have had no 
pragmatic purpose and . . . must have taken a considerable 
amount of time to complete" was an indication of the defendant's 
state of mind.  Ante at    .  Even setting aside the evidence 
suggesting that there was in fact a pragmatic purpose for 
dismembering the bodies,3 this evidence still requires a jury to 
assume that an individual who is "fascinated by amputation and 
human dissection," demonstrated only by display of posters, 
would "seize the opportunity of these killings to engage in 
actual amputations and human dissection."  See ante at    . 
                                                          
 
 
3 The court concludes that the dismembered bodies were 
likely all placed in Hall's Buick.  Ante at    .  Further, after 
the killings, Rose Dawson and Alexandra Ely, who were not 
alleged participants in the killings, drove in the Buick to a 
supermarket.  They did not look in the trunk, but they also did 
not testify that they saw any blood or body parts in the cabin 
of the automobile.  Moreover, David Casey testified that he 
later observed Hall open the trunk of the Buick and drop a 
number of plastic garbage bags into the hole Casey had dug.  
Accordingly, chopping up the bodies may well have been a 
practical measure for purposes of transporting three bodies in 
the trunk of the vehicle, while still retaining the vehicle for 
limited use until the time it could be destroyed.  Whether the 
dismemberment of the bodies had any practical purpose was not an 
issue at trial and was not argued by the Commonwealth on appeal. 
8 
 
Under this rubric, the court's theoretical path of 
admissibility is "identity-based" evidence:  a person who is 
fascinated with amputation is more likely to engage in the act 
of physically dismembering people.  The court may be correct 
that displaying the posters is probative of the defendant's 
state of mind, which ultimately is relevant to identify him as 
the perpetrator of the crime.  But, we do not allow in evidence 
simply because it is relevant.  See Wigmore, supra at 5.  This 
theory still requires the quintessential prohibited inference, 
although labeled as "state of mind," in this application.  To be 
relevant to the defendant's state of mind, one must conclude 
that he acted in conformity with his other conduct of hanging 
the posters on a subsequent occasion by participating in the 
murders. 
 
The Commonwealth itself described the state of mind only as 
"depraved."  This is a thin veil.  It is difficult to imagine an 
interpretation of this argument that is not a bald assertion 
that the defendant's bad or "depraved" character makes him more 
likely to be guilty of murder.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 251-252 (2014) (jury prohibited from inferring that 
defendant's interest in child pornography meant he must have 
been person who accessed child pornography in library).  
Admitting the photographs as "state of mind" evidence where the 
photographs reflect only a general character trait of the 
9 
defendant eviscerates any distinction between evidence of a 
character trait and that of state of mind. 
 
The admission of this evidence was coupled with testimony 
from one witness that she observed "a lot of creepy shit 
everywhere" inside the defendant's apartment.  On this theory of 
admissibility, the Commonwealth does not attempt to factually or 
temporally tie this so-called "state of mind" evidence to the 
crime at issue.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 
78-79 (1986), S.C., 447 Mass. 635 (2006),  (defendant's 
participation in Satanic rituals relevant to prove involvement 
in ritualistic killings).  Accordingly, I would conclude that 
the posters were not admissible to prove the defendant's state 
of mind. 
 
3.  Motive.  The court concludes that the posters were 
independently probative of the defendant's "motive."  The court 
relies on cases in which we have allowed the Commonwealth to 
establish a "context for the killing" when it would otherwise 
appear to the jury as an "inexplicable act of violence" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 68 
(1998).  The circumstances of this case do not resemble those 
relied on by the court.  See, e.g., id. (Commonwealth allowed to 
introduce significant detail regarding defendant's relationship 
with victim and witnesses involved in drug business connected to 
murder); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269-270 (1982) 
10 
(Commonwealth permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's 
activities on day of murder because they were "inextricably 
intertwined with the description of events on the [day] of the 
killing").  See also Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 443 
(2009) (Commonwealth permitted to admit evidence of defendant's 
fascination with serial killings in absence of any other 
evidence of motive). 
 
The court relies primarily on Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444, 
which is not analogous.  In that case, the Commonwealth had 
significant physical evidence tying the defendant to the crime, 
but was faced with a peculiar situation of having no explanation 
for the jury as to why the defendant had committed the crime.4  
By contrast, Hall orchestrated David Glasser's death to prevent 
his testimony.  The other two victims were murdered to eliminate 
witnesses to Glasser's killing.  The defendant, as the 
Commonwealth argued at trial, was motivated to assist Hall 
because the defendant was aspiring to become a member of the 
Hells Angels motorcycle club.  The Commonwealth did not, and 
                                                          
 
 
4 There was also a greater quantum of evidence that the 
defendant in Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444 & n.3, had a significant 
fascination with serial killings, including a large number of 
books seized from his home (which were not themselves admitted 
in evidence, but were referenced) and testimony from his 
coworkers attesting to his ongoing fascination.  Here, the only 
evidence of the defendant's "fascination" was that he had placed 
posters on his wall, and the record suggests that the posters 
had not been displayed on the wall for a long period of time 
because the defendant was still in the process of moving his 
belongings from his previous residence into this residence. 
11 
does not on appeal, argue that the defendant was motivated to 
participate in the crime to seize the opportunity to dismember 
human beings, or that the dismemberment had no practical 
purpose. 
 
4.  Prejudicial effect.  For the reasons set forth above, I 
would conclude that the anatomical drawings were probative only 
of the defendant's character and were thus inadmissible.  
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to weigh the probative value 
against the danger of undue prejudice, since this evidence has 
no probative value other than propensity.  Instead, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the error created a "reasonable possibility 
that . . . might have contributed to the jury's verdict."  
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999).  The 
Commonwealth bears not only the burden to show the lack of 
error, but also the "risk of doubt when any exists" as to 
whether the error influenced the jury's verdict.  Id.  The 
Commonwealth does not even argue that the evidence, if 
erroneously admitted, was not prejudicial.  That may well end 
the inquiry, but there are five factors that I believe enhanced 
the danger of prejudice in this case. 
 
First, even if the evidence had been admissible, it should 
have been accompanied by a limiting instruction.  No limiting 
instruction was requested or given at trial, despite the 
palpable danger of undue prejudice of the evidence.  Without a 
12 
limiting instruction, the photographs were before the jury for 
all purposes, including as impermissible propensity evidence.  
This danger created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 252 
(illustrations too prejudicial to justify admission, even with 
limiting instruction). 
 
Second, in other cases, we have found that the failure to 
give a limiting instruction did not warrant reversal, when other 
circumstances mitigated the danger of unfair prejudice.  For 
example, in Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444 & n.3, in which we did not 
discuss a limiting instruction, we noted that the prosecutor 
utilized evidence of the defendant's interest in books about 
serial killings -- which were not admitted in evidence -- in a 
"technical, analytical manner, without drama or undue emphasis 
that might have released its potential for unfair prejudice."  
Further, the prosecution in that case had compelling physical 
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, reducing the 
probability that the jury would return a guilty verdict based on 
the defendant's macabre interest. 
 
This case is distinguishable from Guy.  Unlike the books in 
Guy, the posters themselves, depicting graphic images, were 
admitted in evidence.  Also, the prosecutor was not especially 
cautious in avoiding drama or character-related implications in 
his closing argument, to mitigate the danger of unfair 
13 
prejudice.  Rather, the prosecutor made a graphic emotional 
appeal to the jury, referring to the defendant's intent "not 
just . . . to keep three men from testifying in court but of 
satisfying some retribution and intent to take apart humanity 
piece by piece."  The court concludes that this statement, 
clearly referring to the horrendous nature of the dismemberment 
and not any pertinent evidentiary point, is comparably 
"technical and analytic."  I disagree. 
 
Third, although the prosecutor did not explicitly refer to 
the photographs in his closing argument, defense counsel quite 
understandably addressed the evidence in his closing argument 
three times, in an effort to dampen its prejudicial force. 
 
Fourth, the judge gave proper limiting instructions 
regarding the defendant's association with the Hells Angels and 
Hall's history with Glasser.  By informing the jury that there 
was specific evidence that they should not consider as evidence 
of bad character, the jury were left to infer that the remainder 
of the evidence could be considered as evidence of the 
defendant's bad character. 
 
Finally, the likelihood that the jury considered the 
evidence for a prohibited purpose was further enhanced by the 
entirely circumstantial nature of the case against the 
14 
defendant.5  As in Crayton, 470 Mass. at 250, the primary issue 
at trial was the defendant's identity.  Due to the lack of 
direct evidence and a limiting instruction, the jury were more 
apt to use the photographs as character evidence to infer the 
defendant's guilt.  Contrast Guy, 454 Mass. at 442-444, 447 
(evidence of defendant's interest in serial killings used to 
establish his identity as killer, but also deoxyribonucleic acid 
evidence matched defendant).  Even with the impermissible 
character evidence, the issues were difficult enough to resolve 
that the jury deliberated nearly five full days before reaching 
verdicts. 
 
I believe that the Commonwealth did not satisfy its burden 
to demonstrate that there was no "reasonable possibility" that 
the erroneous admission of these photographs contributed to the 
jury's verdicts.  Accordingly, I would have reversed the 
defendant's convictions and granted a new trial. 
                                                          
 
 
5 Of course, the Commonwealth is entitled to prove its case 
entirely by circumstantial evidence.  Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 
Mass. 707, 713, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014).