Title: State v. David G. Straszkowski

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP64-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
David G. Straszkowski, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Clark   
 
JUDGE: 
Jon M. Counsell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Philip J. Brehm, Janesville, and oral argument by Philip J. 
Brehm. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2006AP64-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF23) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David G. Straszkowski, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, David G. 
Straszkowski, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
order1 summarily affirming a judgment and order of the Circuit 
Court for Clark County, Jon M. Counsell, Judge.  Based upon the 
defendant's plea of guilty, the circuit court convicted the 
defendant of second-degree sexual assault of a child contrary to 
                                                 
1 State v. Straszkowski, No. 2006AP64-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006).   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (2003-04).2  The circuit court denied the 
defendant's post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea.    
¶2 
The issue on review is whether the circuit court erred 
in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  The 
defendant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea on the 
ground that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily.3  Specifically, the defendant contends that his 
plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was unaware that 
a charge dismissed but read in under a plea agreement is deemed 
admitted for purposes of sentencing the defendant on the charge 
to which the defendant pled guilty.4 
¶3 
We conclude that the record clearly demonstrates that 
neither the State, nor trial defense counsel, nor the circuit 
court referred to the read-in charges as admitted or deemed 
admitted for sentencing purposes or for any other purpose.  
Nowhere in the plea questionnaire, in the transcript of the plea 
hearing, or in the transcript of the sentencing hearing did the 
State, trial defense counsel, or the circuit court refer to the 
read-in charges as admitted or deemed admitted.  Rather, the 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 "When a guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, a defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea as a 
matter of right because such a plea violates fundamental due 
process."  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
716 N.W.2d 906 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
4 In the present case, the defendant does not assert that 
the plea was entered into involuntarily.  
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
3 
 
circuit court explicitly advised the defendant at sentencing 
(and repeated this explanation at the postconviction motion 
hearing) that it understood that the defendant was not admitting 
the read-in charge and that the circuit court would consider the 
read-in charge for purposes of sentencing the defendant on the 
charge to which the defendant pled guilty.  Because the circuit 
court did not consider the read-in charge to be admitted for 
sentencing purposes, we conclude that the defendant has failed 
to show that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily when he asserts that he was 
unaware that his agreement to have a sexual assault charge read 
in was an admission of the read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing.  
¶4 
The defendant further argues that under Wisconsin case 
law the circuit court arguably had an obligation to deem the 
read-in charge admitted by the defendant for sentencing purposes 
based on the defendant's agreement to have the charge read in, 
and that because the defendant was unaware of having made an 
admission to the read-in charge for sentencing purposes, he did 
not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to the charged 
sexual assault.  The defendant urges this court to impose an 
explicit duty on a circuit court to notify a defendant at the 
time the defendant enters a guilty plea that the defendant's 
agreement to read in a dismissed charge is deemed to be an 
admission of the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing.     
¶5 
Although the case law on read-in charges is neither 
consistent nor clear, a proper reading of the history of 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
4 
 
Wisconsin's read-in procedure demonstrates that it is not a 
critical component of a read-in charge that the defendant admit 
guilt of the charge (or that the defendant's agreement to read 
in the charge be deemed an admission of guilt) for purposes of 
sentencing.  In sum, no admission of guilt from a defendant for 
sentencing purposes is required (or should be deemed) for a 
read-in charge to be considered for sentencing purposes and to 
be dismissed.  To avoid confusion, prosecuting attorneys, 
defense counsel, and circuit courts should hereafter avoid (as 
they did in the instant case) the terminology "admit" or "deemed 
admitted" in referring to or explaining a defendant's agreement 
to read in a dismissed charge.  A circuit court should advise a 
defendant that it may consider read-in charges when imposing 
sentence but that the maximum penalty of the charged offense 
will not be increased; that a circuit court may require a 
defendant to pay restitution on any read-in charges; and that 
the State is prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in 
charge.      
¶6 
Although we hold that no admission of guilt from a 
defendant is required for a read-in offense to be dismissed and 
considered for sentencing purposes, this decision does not bar a 
circuit court from accepting a defendant's admission of guilt of 
a read-in charge.  This decision does not address what plea 
colloquy duties a circuit court might have with respect to such 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
5 
 
an admission, the issue the defendant raises.5  Our narrow 
holding is that an admission of guilt is not required by our 
read-in procedure and that the circuit court should avoid the 
terminology "admit" or "deemed admitted" in referring to or 
explaining a read-in charge for sentencing purposes except when 
a defendant does admit the read-in charge.   
¶7 
The present case does not involve an award for 
restitution.  Nothing in this opinion should be construed as 
expanding or restricting the circumstances in which restitution 
may be imposed.   
¶8 
For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying 
the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.   
I 
¶9 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the 
defendant's plea agreement and sentencing hearing.   
¶10 The State charged the defendant with two sexual 
assault offenses, one offense involving possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and two worthless check offenses.   
                                                 
5 The concurrence concludes that a defendant's agreement to 
read in a charge for consideration at sentencing may be deemed 
an admission of guilt of the read-in charge for sentencing 
purposes.  Concurring op., ¶1.  The concurrence also seems to 
conclude that the circuit court has no plea colloquy duties with 
respect to the defendant's deemed admission of guilt, although 
the concurrence opines that the "best practice" is for the 
circuit court to inform the defendant about the admission.  Id., 
¶15.     
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 The 
defendant 
stated 
on 
a 
completed 
"Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form that he intended to plead 
guilty 
to 
one 
sexual 
assault 
charge, 
the 
single 
drug 
paraphernalia charge, and one worthless check charge.  The 
completed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form also stated 
that the defendant's plea agreement would be set forth in 
circuit court as follows: "Remaining charges and cases to be 
dismissed; PSI [presentence investigation] jointly requested, 
and parties will be free to argue."        
¶12 On the completed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
form, a check mark was placed next to a statement that explained 
read-in charges as follows: Charges that are read in as part of 
the plea agreement may be considered by the circuit court when 
imposing sentencing but will not increase the maximum penalty; 
the defendant may have to pay restitution on any charges read 
in; and the State may not prosecute the defendant for any read-
in charges.  The statement checked on the completed Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form was as follows: 
 
I understand that if any charges are read-in as part 
of a plea agreement they have the following effects:  
 
 Sentencing —— although the judge may consider 
read-in charges when imposing sentence, the maximum 
penalty will not be increased. 
 
 Restitution 
—— 
I 
may 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
restitution on any read-in charges. 
 
 Future prosecution —— the State may not prosecute 
me for any read-in charges. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 At the hearing on the defendant's guilty plea, the 
prosecuting attorney stated in open court that the two charges 
to which the defendant did not plead guilty would be "dismissed 
and 
read 
in." 
 
Defense 
counsel 
then 
filed 
the 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form6 and informed the circuit 
court of the defendant's guilty pleas to the charges of sexual 
assault, possession of drug paraphernalia, and issuance of a 
worthless check.  Defense counsel stated that if the circuit 
court accepted the guilty pleas and found the defendant guilty 
of the three offenses, he understood that the State would move 
"to dismiss but [have the circuit court] consider for sentencing 
purposes" the remaining sexual assault and worthless check 
charges. 
¶14 Immediately after defense counsel made this statement, 
the circuit court engaged the defendant in a colloquy to 
"ascertain" the "promises [that] were made in connection with 
the defendant's anticipated plea . . . . "7 and questioned the 
                                                 
6 The form is Form CR-227 adopted by the Judicial Conference 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 971.025 and 758.18(1).  
7 "During the course of a plea hearing, the [circuit] court 
must address the defendant personally and . . . (2) Ascertain 
whether any promises . . . were made in connection with the 
defendant's anticipated plea . . . ."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶35 (citing State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 262, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986)). 
WIS JI——Criminal SM-32, which has been cited repeatedly 
with approval by this court and which this court has urged 
circuit courts to follow, states: "If there is a plea agreement, 
put it on the record and establish the defendant's understanding 
of the agreement."     
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
8 
 
defendant regarding the completed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights form signed by the defendant.  This colloquy began as 
follows after the statements of the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel describing the plea agreement and read-in 
charges: 
THE 
COURT: 
Mr. 
Straszkowski, 
is 
that 
your 
understanding of what is happening here today? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And your attorney has given me a plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form.  Have you 
reviewed that form? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And have you read through it? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you believe you understand its contents? 
DEFENDANT: Yes.  
THE COURT: It appears that you signed it on the second 
page.  Is that correct?   
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You did that earlier today? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any questions about the form or the 
recommendations being made here today? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: And the form says you haven't had any 
alcohol, medications, or drugs in the last 24 hours.  
Is that correct? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
9 
 
THE COURT: Anything else that would cause you to be 
confused or unclear as you are making these decisions 
today? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Did you need any more time to discuss this 
with your lawyer? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
¶15 Later during the plea hearing, the defendant pled 
guilty to the three charges in accordance with the plea 
agreement.  The circuit court convicted the defendant of the 
three charges to which the defendant pled guilty and stated that 
the remaining sexual offense charge and worthless check charge 
"are 
dismissed 
and 
read 
in 
for 
purposes 
of 
sentencing 
consideration and restitution if need be."8 
¶16 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that 
the defendant maintained his innocence of the dismissed but 
read-in sexual assault charge.  Defense counsel also asserted 
that he was confident he could have proven the defendant 
innocent of that charge had the matter gone to trial. 
¶17 The circuit court acknowledged that "[t]here is some 
denials [sic] with regard to the read-in" and that "there seems 
                                                 
8 Although both the dismissed sexual assault charge and the 
dismissed worthless check charge were read in for sentencing 
purposes, the defendant did not challenge the circuit court's 
read-in of the dismissed worthless check charge.  There is no 
evidence in the record that the circuit court considered the 
dismissed worthless check charge when sentencing the defendant. 
Before this court, the defendant similarly limits his 
challenge to the circuit court's read-in of the dismissed sexual 
assault charge. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
10 
 
to be some considerable dispute" over the charges pending in 
another county.  The circuit court never considered the read-in 
charge or the charges in another county9 "admitted" but 
considered these charges during sentencing as an indication that 
the defendant was placing himself in questionable situations 
involving underage girls.  
¶18 The circuit court explained that the read-in charge 
and the charges pending in the other county weighed in favor of 
confinement because the conduct underlying each charge was 
alleged to have occurred after the defendant had been made aware 
of the sexual offense charge to which the defendant had pled 
guilty.  The circuit court concluded that the read-in charge 
demonstrated that even after he had been made aware of the 
initial sexual assault charge, the defendant "continued to place 
himself in a questionable situation where those types of 
allegations could be made."   
¶19 The circuit court sentenced the defendant to five 
years' confinement and ten years' extended supervision on the 
sexual assault charge.  The circuit court also sentenced the 
defendant on the drug paraphernalia and worthless check charges 
but provided that the defendant would serve his sentence on 
those charges concurrently with his sentence on the sexual 
assault charge.  The presentence report recommended jail and 
                                                 
9 The record indicates that each of these charges was later 
dismissed.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
11 
 
probation.  Restitution was not claimed or awarded on the sexual 
assault offense.   
¶20 After sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his 
guilty pleas, arguing that he did not make those pleas knowingly 
and intelligently.  In his motion, the defendant stated that 
when he entered his pleas, he "was not aware of what it meant 
for a charge to be read-in" in that he "was unaware that 
pursuant to case law, a read-in offense is deemed admitted by 
[the] defendant."  The motion also stated that the defendant had 
consistently maintained that he was innocent of the dismissed 
sexual assault charge and that if he had known that the 
allegations underlying the charge were "going to be considered 
as true at the time of sentencing, [the defendant] would not 
have entered his pleas."   
¶21 At the postconviction hearing on the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea, the defendant's trial counsel 
agreed that he had never informed the defendant that the read-in 
charges "would be deemed admitted for purposes of sentencing" or 
that "the [circuit] court would . . . conclude [the defendant] 
committed" the alleged offense underlying the read-in charge.   
¶22 The defendant's trial counsel testified that he and 
the defendant had "spent quite a bit of time talking about the 
effect not only of the read-in charge, but also the fact that he 
was facing unrelated conduct in another county."  Counsel 
testified that he believed it doubtful that the defendant would 
have been convicted of the read-in sexual offense and that the 
defendant 
consistently 
denied 
the 
read-in 
charge. 
 
The 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
12 
 
defendant's 
trial 
counsel 
further 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
explained to the defendant that although the defendant would not 
be convicted or sentenced separately for the dismissed but read-
in sexual assault charge, the circuit court "might consider that 
conduct when imposing sentence on the assault that he was 
pleading guilty to."  Defense trial counsel also stated that he 
believed at the time and "still believe[s] today that [the 
defendant] understood that the judge, although he wasn't 
convicting him of the other assault, he would certainly consider 
that assault when trying to decide what [the defendant] required 
for punishment and what the public required for protection."     
¶23 The defendant testified at the postconviction hearing 
that he did not understand that the circuit court would read in 
the dismissed sexual assault charge or that the circuit court 
could consider the charge for purposes of sentencing the 
defendant on the charge to which the defendant had pled guilty.  
The 
defendant 
acknowledged 
that 
he 
had 
discussed 
the 
significance of read-in charges with his trial counsel on at 
least two occasions.  The defendant also acknowledged that he 
heard it stated at the plea hearing that the dismissed sexual 
assault charge would be considered for sentencing purposes.  The 
defendant testified that upon hearing this statement he "thought 
they made a mistake," because his plea agreement said "nothing 
about [a] read-in."  The defendant further testified that at the 
plea hearing he asked his trial counsel, "[W]hy are they saying 
read-in?" and that his counsel replied that they "would talk 
about it later."   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
13 
 
¶24 Upon completion of the hearing on the defendant's plea 
withdrawal motion, the circuit court found the defendant's trial 
counsel's testimony to be credible and the defendant's testimony 
to be incredible.  The circuit court found that the defendant 
had understood at the time of his guilty plea that the dismissed 
sexual assault charge would be read in and that it could be 
considered at sentencing.     
¶25 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  The circuit court explained that it 
had not looked to the read-in charge or the charges pending in 
the other county "as things that definitively happened," but 
rather that the circuit court was "looking at those matters as 
[the defendant] continually placing himself in a situation where 
he is associating with underage persons sufficiently that they 
know who he is and for some reason would make these types of 
allegations against him."  The circuit court further asserted 
that it had looked at the read-in charge and the charges pending 
in the other county "in the same way."    
¶26 The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction and order denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  In so doing, the court of 
appeals applied its prior decision in State v. Lackershire, 2005 
WI App 265, 288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891, in which the court 
of appeals held that "[b]ecause read-ins do not increase the 
range of punishment, they are indirect consequences and their 
knowledge is not required for a defendant to enter a knowing, 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
14 
 
intelligent, or voluntary plea."10  Upon review of Lackershire, 
this court explicitly declared that it did "not adopt the court 
of appeals' determinations [in Lackershire, 288 Wis. 2d 609] 
that read-in charges are merely collateral consequences of a 
plea, and that therefore information about read-ins is not a 
prerequisite to entering a knowing and intelligent plea."11  The 
Lackershire court declined "to engage in further analysis 
regarding the circuit court's obligation to explain the nature 
of read-in offenses in a case where the record demonstrates that 
the dismissed charges were not treated as read-ins at either the 
plea or sentencing."12  This court's full discussion of the court 
of appeals' determinations in Lackershire is as follows:  
We do not adopt the court of appeals' determinations 
that 
read-in 
charges 
are 
merely 
"collateral 
consequences" 
of 
a 
plea, 
and 
that 
therefore 
information about read-ins "is not a prerequisite to 
entering 
a 
knowing 
and 
intelligent 
plea."  
Lackershire, 288 Wis. 2d 609, ¶15, 707 N.W.2d  891 
(citing State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶61, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477).  Those determinations 
appear to extend existing law.  See Austin v. State, 
49 Wis. 2d 727, 734, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (stating 
that "[a] plea agreement should always be made a 
matter of record whether it involves a recommendation 
of sentencing, a reduced charge, a nolle prosequi of 
charges or read ins with an agreement of immunity."); 
Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 77, 248 N.W.2d 425 
                                                 
10 State v. Lackershire, 2005 WI App 265, ¶15, 288 
Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891 (footnote omitted).   
11 State 
v. 
Lackershire, 
2007 
WI 
74, 
¶28 
n.8, 
301 
Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
12 Id. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
15 
 
(1977) (providing that "[t]he defendant should be 
advised by the trial court, on the record, of the 
effect of the read-ins. . . . ").  We decline to 
engage in further analysis regarding the circuit 
court's obligation to explain the nature of read-in 
offenses in a case where the record demonstrates that 
the dismissed charges were not treated as read-ins at 
either the plea or sentencing.13  
¶27 Before this court, the defendant does not dispute the 
circuit court's finding that the defendant understood at the 
time of his plea that the dismissed sexual assault charge would 
be read in and that the charge could be considered at 
sentencing.  The defendant instead limits his argument to the 
claim that he did not understand that the read-in charge was to 
be deemed admitted for sentencing purposes.    
II 
¶28 We turn first to the standard of review.  Because the 
defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing, he 
must show that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in manifest injustice.14   Manifest injustice may be shown 
when the defendant's guilty plea was not made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.15  
¶29 Whether a plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.16  Upon review, 
this court upholds the circuit court's findings of evidentiary 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
N.W.2d 836. 
15 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18. 
16 Lackershire, 301 Wis. 2d 418, ¶24. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
16 
 
or historical facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  
This 
court 
determines 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles regarding a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea 
to those evidentiary facts independently of the circuit court 
and 
court 
of 
appeals 
but 
benefiting 
from 
those 
courts' 
analyses.17   
III 
¶30 The defendant claims that he did not understand that 
by agreeing to have the sexual assault charge read in, he was 
admitting or would be deemed to have admitted the read-in charge 
for sentencing purposes.18  He asserts that his failure to 
understand that the read-in involved an admission for purposes 
of sentencing renders his guilty plea not knowing and not 
intelligent.   
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 We accept the defendant's assertion that he did not 
understand his agreement to have the sexual assault charge read 
in and considered for sentencing purposes to be an admission 
that he was guilty of the read-in charge.  Trial defense counsel 
acknowledged at the postconviction hearing that he did not 
explain the read-in agreement to the defendant as constituting 
an admission of guilt and further acknowledged that the 
defendant consistently denied that he was guilty of the read-in 
charge.  The record also shows that the defendant never made any 
statement, or agreed to any statement, suggesting that the read-
in charge was an offense that the defendant had actually 
committed.  Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing the defendant 
stated, through his counsel, that he was innocent of the read-in 
charge.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
17 
 
¶31 The defendant apparently contends that his plea was 
not entered knowingly and intelligently for the following 
reasons:  
(A) The defendant was unaware that the circuit court 
would deem the sexual assault charge dismissed but read in 
under the defendant's plea agreement to be admitted by the 
defendant for sentencing purposes;  
(B) The defendant did not admit guilt of the read-in 
charge but instead actively denied guilt of the read-in 
charge;  
(C) The circuit court was required to advise the 
defendant that the read-in charge was to be deemed admitted 
for sentencing purposes;  
(D) The circuit court was required under State v. 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d 246, 
270-72, 
389 
N.W.2d 12, 
to 
ascertain 
whether 
the 
defendant 
understood 
that 
by 
admitting guilt of the read-in charge he was waiving 
several constitutional rights with respect to that charge; 
and 
(E) Trial defense counsel failed to advise the 
defendant that when a charge is read in, the defendant is 
admitting guilt of the read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing or is deemed to have admitted guilt for purposes 
of sentencing, and therefore under a Nelson/Bentley19 
                                                 
19 State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶2, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 
N.W.2d 48; State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996); Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
18 
 
analysis the defendant has demonstrated that his guilty 
plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently regardless 
of whether the court's plea colloquy was defective. 
A 
¶32 The defendant's argument that his plea was not entered 
knowingly and intelligently because he was unaware that the 
circuit court would deem the read-in sexual assault charge to be 
admitted for sentencing purposes is unconvincing.  Nowhere did 
the circuit court conclude that the defendant admitted (or was 
deemed to have admitted) the sexual assault charge that was read 
in or that the defendant was guilty of the read-in sexual 
assault charge.   
¶33 The circuit court never deemed the read-in sexual 
assault charge to be admitted.  The record demonstrates that 
neither the State, nor trial defense counsel, nor the circuit 
court referred to the read-in charges as admitted or deemed 
admitted.  Nowhere in the plea questionnaire, in the transcript 
of the plea hearing, or in the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing did the State, defense counsel or the circuit court 
refer to the read-in charges as admitted or deemed admitted.   
¶34 The circuit court acknowledged that "[t]here is [sic] 
some denials with regard to the read-in" and that "there seems 
to be considerable dispute" over the charges pending in another 
county.  The circuit court explicitly advised the defendant at 
sentencing (and repeated this explanation at the postconviction 
hearing) that it understood that the defendant was not admitting 
the read-in charge.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
19 
 
¶35 The circuit court treated the read-in charge properly, 
not as an admitted crime but as an offense that may properly be 
considered for sentencing purposes.  
¶36 The circuit court treated the read-in charge in the 
same way as it treated the sexual assault charges pending 
against the defendant in another county and did not give the 
read-in charge more weight than it gave the pending charges in 
the other county.  It is well established that "[a] sentencing 
court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses" whether or 
not the defendant consents to having the charge read in.20    
¶37 The circuit court's consideration of the read-in 
charge when sentencing the defendant did not flow only from the 
parties' agreement to read in the sexual assault charge for 
sentencing purposes.  The circuit court treated the read-in in 
the same manner as it treated other pending charges or unproven 
offenses.   
¶38 Under the circumstances of the present case, the 
circuit court was not required to advise the defendant that the 
                                                 
20 State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶45, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341.   
See also State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 452 
N.W.2d 377 (1990) ("Evidence of unproven offenses involving the 
defendant may be considered by the court for" the purpose of 
"determining the character of the defendant and the need for his 
incarceration 
and 
rehabilitation."); 
Elias 
v. 
State, 
93 
Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980) ("[T]he trial court in 
imposing sentence for one crime can consider other unproven 
offenses, since those other offenses are evidence of a pattern 
of behavior which is an index of the defendant's character, a 
critical factor in sentencing.") (citations omitted).  
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
20 
 
read-in charge would be deemed admitted for purposes of 
sentencing.  The circuit court concluded not that the defendant 
was guilty of the read-in charge, but rather that the read-in 
charge and the charges pending in the other county demonstrated 
that even after he had been made aware of the initial sexual 
assault charge against him, the defendant "continued to place 
himself in a questionable situation where those types of 
allegations could be made."21 
                                                 
21 At the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, the circuit court again explained that it had not looked 
to the read-in charge or the charges pending in another county 
"as things that definitively happened," but that the court was 
rather "looking at those matters as [the defendant] continually 
placing himself in a situation where he is associating with 
underage persons sufficiently that they know who he is and for 
some reason would make these types of allegations against him." 
The defendant also argues that although the circuit court 
acknowledged that the defendant denied guilt of the read-in 
charge, the court identified this denial as a factor weighing in 
favor of more severe punishment.  The defendant appears to 
suggest 
a 
relationship 
between 
the 
circuit 
court's 
acknowledgment that "[t]here is some denials [sic] with regard 
to the read-in" and the court's immediately preceding discussion 
of the defendant's "blame-shifting issues."    
The record does not bear out the defendant's claim.  The 
transcript is clear that the circuit court did not adduce the 
defendant's protestation of innocence in regard to the read-in 
charge as an instance of blame-shifting.  In discussing the 
defendant's 
blame-shifting 
issues, 
the 
court 
cited 
the 
presentence investigation, which criticized the defendant for 
attempting to shift moral blame and responsibility to the victim 
of the sexual assault to which the defendant pled guilty.  The 
circuit court's discussion of blame-shifting very clearly 
regarded the defendant's failure to accept moral responsibility 
for the conduct that resulted in the defendant's conviction, not 
the defendant's failure to admit guilt to charges of which the 
defendant was not convicted. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
21 
 
¶39 Because the circuit court never treated the defendant 
as having admitted (or as having been deemed to have admitted) 
the read-in charge, the defendant's argument that his plea was 
not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he 
was unaware that the circuit court would deem the read-in sexual 
assault charge to be admitted for sentencing purposes is 
unconvincing. 
B 
¶40 The defendant is correct that he denied guilt of the 
read-in charge.  Indeed, the circuit court acknowledged that the 
defendant actively denied guilt of the read-in charge and did 
not admit the read-in charge for any purpose.  The circuit court 
never characterized the defendant as having admitted or as 
having been deemed to have admitted the read-in charge for any 
purpose.  Under these circumstances, the defendant's assertion 
that he denied guilt of the read-in charge is not a persuasive 
argument that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and 
intelligently. 
C 
¶41 The defendant appears to argue that the circuit court 
was required to advise him that the read-in charge was to be 
deemed admitted for sentencing purposes.  Two cases are relevant 
to this argument:  Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 77, 248 
N.W.2d 425 (1977); and State v. Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d 73, 510 
N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶42 In Garski, the defendant argued that "the trial court 
never informed him that it could order restitution as a 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
22 
 
condition 
of 
probation 
on . . . dismissed 
[read-in] 
charges . . . ."22  The Garski court nevertheless upheld the 
circuit court's order of restitution as a condition of probation 
on the dismissed read-in charges.  The Garski court concluded 
that the trial court had to inform the defendant of the 
statutory penalties for the charged offenses but that Garski had 
no authority for his argument that the trial court must inform 
him that restitution could be a condition of probation for the 
read-in offenses prior to accepting a guilty plea.23   
¶43 The Garski court "cautioned," however, that "when the 
plea agreement contemplates the non-prosecution of uncharged 
offenses, the details of the plea agreement should be made a 
matter of record"24 and that "[t]he defendant should be advised 
by the trial court, on the record, of the effect of the read-
ins, including that the judge may take these offenses into 
consideration when sentencing."25  The Garski court did not state 
whether this caution regarding how the trial court should advise 
a defendant about read-in charges was a recommendation of good 
practice or a requirement for a knowing, intelligent, and 
                                                 
22 Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 75, 248 N.W.2d 425 
(1977). 
23 Id. at 76. 
24 Id. at 77 (citing Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 
N.W.2d 56 (1971)). 
25 Garski, 75 Wis. 2d at 77. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
23 
 
voluntary plea.26  The Garski court also did not specifically 
require or caution a trial court to advise a defendant that a 
read-in involves or entails an admission of guilt to the read-in 
offense.   
¶44 In Cleaves, another restitution case, the court of 
appeals "suggest[ed]," but did not require, that trial courts 
"ask the defendant if there is an admission to the read-in 
charge for purposes of sentencing consideration."27  The Cleaves 
court of appeals stated that it "believe[d] that this is the 
better practice."28 
¶45 Cleaves makes clear that a trial court is not required 
to advise a defendant that a read-in charge is to be deemed 
admitted for sentencing purposes.  In light of Cleaves, the 
Garski court's ambiguous "caution" must be read as precatory, at 
least with respect to the circuit court's obligation to advise 
the defendant that a read-in charge is to be deemed admitted for 
sentencing purposes. 
                                                 
26 Id. at 73-74.  Garski's caution was based on a similar 
caution in Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 734, 183 N.W.2d 56 
(1971), which we discuss later.  Garski declared that in the 
absence of a statute allowing for restitution when a sentence of 
imprisonment 
is 
imposed, 
a 
trial 
court 
could 
not 
order 
restitution for the three offenses for which the trial court 
imposed a sentence of imprisonment but could, in imposing 
probation for the fourth charged offense, order restitution for 
a read-in offense as a condition of probation.   
27 Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d at 80 n.1, 510 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
28 Id. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
24 
 
¶46 Moreover, as we stated previously, the circuit court 
in the present case never considered the dismissed read-in 
charge or the sexual assault charges in another county to have 
been "admitted" by the defendant or to have been deemed admitted 
for sentencing or for any other purpose.  Even Garski's 
precatory 
caution 
and 
Cleaves's 
recommendation 
of 
better 
practice do not seem to apply to the present case, when the 
circuit court did not consider the dismissed read-in charge to 
have been admitted by the defendant or to have been deemed 
admitted. 
¶47 We conclude that the circuit court was not required in 
the instant case under either Garski or Cleaves to advise the 
defendant that the read-in charge was to be deemed admitted for 
sentencing purposes.  
D 
¶48 The defendant asserts that because he is deemed to 
have admitted a read-in offense when a read-in charge is 
involved in a plea agreement, the circuit court should have 
treated the admission to a read-in charge as equivalent to a 
guilty plea to the read-in charge and should have engaged in a 
plea colloquy for the guilty plea under State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977).  The defendant further 
asserts that the circuit court did not engage in such a colloquy 
in the present case; that the defendant therefore established a 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
25 
 
prima facie violation of Bangert; and that the State did not 
rebut the defendant's prima facie case.29 
¶49 Under Bangert, a circuit court accepting a guilty plea 
is required to address the defendant personally and to engage in 
a colloquy on numerous subjects.  Among other things, the court 
is required to establish the defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the crime, to ascertain whether a factual basis exists 
to support the guilty plea, and to inform the defendant of the 
constitutional rights that are waived by a plea and verify that 
the defendant understands he is giving up these rights.30 
¶50 The defendant argues that inasmuch as a read-in charge 
is deemed admitted for sentencing purposes, the circuit court 
was required to adhere to Bangert and to advise the defendant 
that he was waiving, in regard to the read-in charge, the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront one's accusers, and the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. 
¶51 We disagree with the defendant's Bangert argument in 
the present case.  Because the circuit court did not view the 
read-in charge as either having been admitted by the defendant 
or as having been deemed to have been admitted by the defendant 
for sentencing or for any other purpose, the defendant has no 
                                                 
29 Whether 
alleged 
deficiencies 
in 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
establish a violation of the circuit court's mandatory duties at 
a plea hearing is a question of law that we review independently 
of the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from 
those courts' analyses.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21.     
30 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
26 
 
basis to argue that the circuit court should have engaged in a 
full 
Bangert 
plea 
colloquy 
explaining 
the 
effect 
of 
an 
admission/guilty plea to the read-in charge.   
¶52 Rather, at sentencing the circuit court assessed the 
defendant's character using all the available information, 
including the read-in sexual assault charge and the sexual 
assault charges in the other county.  The sentencing court was 
not constrained in considering the read-in charge or the other 
charges by the Bangert rules of a plea colloquy or by the rules 
of evidence that govern evidence in the guilt phase of a 
criminal proceeding.31     
E 
¶53 Using a Nelson/Bentley analysis, the defendant argues 
that his guilty plea was not made knowingly and intelligently 
even assuming that the circuit court had no duty to inform him 
during the plea colloquy that the read-in sexual assault charge 
would be deemed admitted for sentencing purposes.  The defendant 
                                                 
31 Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶45 ("In Wisconsin, sentencing 
courts are obliged to acquire the full knowledge of the 
character and behavior pattern of the convicted defendant before 
imposing sentence.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); 
State v. Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, ¶53, 269 Wis. 2d 369, 674 
N.W.2d 647 
(explaining 
that 
there 
is 
a 
"well-recognized 
distinction between the fact-finder's function at the guilt 
stage, 
where 
the 
fact-finder 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
government has proved a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the sentencing judge's role, which is to assess the 
defendant's 
character 
using 
all 
available 
information, 
unconstrained by the rules of evidence that govern the guilt-
phase of a criminal proceeding.") (citation omitted); Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 911.01(4)(c) (providing that the rules of evidence are 
inapplicable to sentencing proceedings). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
27 
 
relies on the fact that his trial counsel acknowledged at the 
postconviction hearing that he did not inform the defendant that 
the defendant would be deemed to have admitted the read-in 
sexual assault charge.  The defendant argues that his lack of 
understanding regarding the "admission" aspect of the read-in 
procedure was vital to his ability to make a reasoned plea 
decision. 
¶54 The 
defendant's 
Nelson/Bentley 
argument 
rests 
primarily on the fallacy that the circuit court sentenced the 
defendant based on the defendant's conviction of two sexual 
offenses, the one to which he pled guilty and the one that was 
read in.  The record shows that the circuit court did no such 
thing, as we have explained previously.  The defendant's 
argument that he would have been better off setting the read-in 
charge for trial because he believed he would be acquitted makes 
little sense.  The defendant in the instant case was able to 
deny guilt of the read-in offense and was able to have the read-
in 
offense 
dismissed 
without 
the 
possibility 
of 
further 
prosecution.  The circuit court viewed the read-in sexual 
assault charge in the same way as it viewed the sexual assault 
offenses charged in the other county.  
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
28 
 
¶55 The defendant has not carried his burden to prove that 
factors extrinsic to the plea colloquy rendered his guilty plea 
unknowing and not intelligent.32     
¶56 We have considered the defendant's arguments that he 
did not understand that by agreeing to have the sexual assault 
charge read in, he was admitting or would be deemed to have 
admitted the read-in charge for sentencing purposes.  His 
assertion that his failure to understand that the read-in 
involved an admission for purposes of sentencing renders his 
guilty plea not knowing and not intelligent is not persuasive. 
We conclude that because the circuit court never considered the 
read-in charge admitted or deemed admitted for sentencing 
purposes on the charge to which the defendant pled guilty, the 
defendant has failed to show that his plea was not entered 
knowingly and intelligently. 
IV 
¶57 The defendant further argues that under Wisconsin case 
law the circuit court arguably had an obligation to consider the 
read-in charge as having been admitted by the defendant for 
sentencing purposes or having been deemed to have been admitted 
by the defendant for sentencing purposes, and that because the 
                                                 
32 In a Nelson/Bentley argument, a defendant's challenge to 
a guilty plea is based not on the inadequacies of the plea 
colloquy, but instead on factors extrinsic to the plea colloquy.  
At a non-Bangert postconviction hearing, the defendant has the 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his or her 
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶62-63. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
29 
 
defendant was unaware of having made an admission to the read-in 
charge for sentencing purposes, he did not knowingly and 
intelligently plead guilty to the charged sexual assault.  The 
defendant urges this court to impose an explicit duty on a 
circuit court to notify a defendant at the time the defendant 
enters a guilty plea that read-in charges are deemed admitted 
for purposes of sentencing.     
¶58 Although the case law on read-in charges33 is neither 
consistent nor clear, a proper reading of the history of 
Wisconsin's read-in procedure demonstrates that it is not a 
                                                 
33 We use the term "read-in charge" interchangeably with the 
terms "read-in offense" and "read-in crime."  Our decisions 
traditionally have referred both to "read-in charges" and "read-
in offenses" without drawing a distinction between these two 
terms.  See Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 
N.W.2d 23; State v. Martel, 2003 WI 70, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 664 
N.W.2d 69; Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 239 
Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692; State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 
606 
N.W.2d 155; 
In 
Interest 
of 
R.W.S., 
162 
Wis. 2d 862, 
471 
N.W.2d 16 
(1991); 
Austin 
v. 
State, 
49 
Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56.  Some decisions also use the term 
"read-in crime" without distinguishing this term from "read-in 
charge" or "read-in offense."  See Robinson, 239 Wis. 2d 595; 
Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767.      
The defendant's read-in agreement in the present case was 
phrased as an agreement to read in a "charge."  The defendant's 
Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form (Form CR-227, the 
standard form used in Wisconsin) refers to "read-in charges."  
At the plea hearing, defense counsel and the circuit court each 
used the term "charge" when discussing the read-in.      
The legislature has chosen to employ the term "read-in 
crime."  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b).  We do not interpret 
the legislature's use of the term "read-in crime" as a rejection 
of this court's case law using the terms "read-in charge" and 
"read-in offense" interchangeably with each other and with the 
legislature's term "read-in crime."    
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
30 
 
critical component of a read-in charge that the defendant admit 
guilt to a read-in charge (or be deemed to have admitted guilt 
to the read-in charge) for purposes of sentencing.  In sum, no 
admission of guilt from a defendant is required (or should be 
deemed) for a read-in charge to be considered for sentencing 
purposes and to be dismissed. 
¶59 We begin our examination of the history of read-in 
charges in this state with this court's first extensive 
description of Wisconsin's read-in procedure in Austin v. State, 
49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).   
¶60 In Austin, this court considered the validity of a 
plea agreement in which the district attorney agreed "not to 
prosecute uncharged offenses if the defendant would agree to a 
'read in' of these uncharged offenses and to allow the court to 
take such offenses into consideration in sentencing him on the 
charged offense."34  The court held the plea agreement valid. 
¶61 Because "the so-called 'read in' of uncharged crimes 
for the purpose of sentencing on the crime charged [was] 
somewhat unique to Wisconsin," the Austin court prefaced its 
analysis with "a brief review" of Wisconsin's read-in procedure, 
along with an accompanying (and intertwined) discussion of "the 
problems involved in the consolidation of multiple offenses and 
the problems involved in the application of the recidivist 
statute."35     
                                                 
34 Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 729, 183 N.W.2d 56 
(1971).   
35 Id.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
31 
 
¶62 Austin described the read-in procedure by referring to 
the defendant as admitting the uncharged offenses.  The Austin 
court explained that "[u]nder our read-in procedure, the 
defendant does not plead to any charges and therefore is not 
sentenced on any of the read-in charges but such admitted 
uncharged offenses are considered in sentencing him on the 
charged offense."36   
¶63 The Austin opinion does not explicitly state that such 
admission is an actual admission made by the defendant or, as 
some cases would later hold, an admission that the court simply 
assumes to be made as a matter of law based on the defendant's 
agreement to read in the charge for consideration at sentencing.  
The facts of Austin indicate, however, that the read-in 
procedure described in that opinion involved the defendant's 
actual admission of guilt.  In its brief in Austin, the State 
asserted that "defendant, represented by counsel, admitted his 
participation in an additional armed robbery occurring at a 
Clark Service Station in Milwaukee on the same date."   
¶64 Furthermore, Austin identified Pulaski v. State, 23 
Wis. 2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964), as a read-in case, and 
Pulaski involved an actual admission of guilt to uncharged 
offenses considered at Pulaski's sentencing hearing.  Austin 
stated that in Pulaski "this court was confronted with . . . a 
read in by a Milwaukee circuit court of 21 offenses committed in 
Milwaukee county, where the defendant was charged and convicted 
                                                 
36 Id. at 732 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
32 
 
on his plea of guilty to three charges of burglary . . . ."37  
The defendant in Pulaski actually admitted guilt to the 
uncharged 
offenses 
considered 
at 
his 
sentencing 
hearing.  
Pulaski pled guilty to three burglaries but "with the consent of 
the defense counsel and upon the assurances of the district 
attorney no warrants would be issued, [the court] took testimony 
of 
other 
burglaries 
in 
which 
the 
defendant 
had 
participated. . . . In all, testimony was taken on 24 burglaries 
admitted by the defendant."38   
¶65 Finally, Austin compared and contrasted Wisconsin's 
read-in procedure to a procedure described in the American Law 
Institute Model Penal Code under which "the defendant may admit 
in open court the commission of other [uncharged] felonies and 
ask that they be taken into account" at sentencing for a charged 
offense.39  The Austin court explained that the Model Penal Code 
                                                 
37 Id. at 730.   
38 Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 139-40, 126 N.W.2d 625 
(1964) (emphasis added). 
Pulaski's brief stated that the court demanded that Pulaski 
provide "full and open disclosure" involving the uncharged 
offenses in order to avoid facing "the maximum sentence in each 
case consecutively."  The State's brief in Pulaski further 
asserted that Pulaski had "admitted his involvement" in the 
uncharged burglaries to the police.     
39 Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 733 (emphasis added). 
According to the Austin court, the Model Penal Code 
provided as follows:  
When the defendant has asked that other crimes 
admitted in open court be taken into account when he 
is sentenced and the Court has not rejected such 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
33 
 
procedure was similar to Wisconsin's read-in procedure in that 
"the sentence [for the charged offense] bars the prosecution of 
such admitted [but uncharged] crime" and different from the 
Model Penal Code procedure in that the Code procedure "works 
like the Wisconsin repeater statute," permitting the trial court 
to "extend the term of the ordinary maximum penalty for the 
crime charged by taking into account the other offenses."40  The 
Austin court did not state whether Wisconsin's read-in procedure 
differed from (or was the same as) the Model Penal Code 
procedure in involving a defendant's actual admission of guilt 
to any uncharged crime read in for sentencing purposes.  
¶66 In sum, Austin appears to describe a read-in procedure 
as involving the defendant's actual admission of guilt to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
request, the sentence shall bar the prosecution or 
conviction of the defendant in this state for any such 
admitted crime. 
Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732 n.2 (quoting Model Penal Code, 
§ 7.05(4)) (emphasis added). 
Model Penal Code § 7.03(4) (1985) provides that a court may 
sentence a convicted felon to an extended term of imprisonment 
if it finds that the defendant "is a multiple offender whose 
criminality was so extensive that a sentence of imprisonment for 
an extended term is warranted."  Section 7.03(4) additionally 
provides that the court may not make such a finding unless 
certain conditions obtain, including the condition that "the 
defendant admits in open court the commission of one or more 
felonies and asks that they be taken into account when he is 
sentenced."   
Model Penal Code § 7.04(4) (1985) establishes a similar 
procedure for convicted misdemeanants. 
40 Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 733. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
34 
 
read-in charge.  The court "cautioned" in Austin that "when the 
plea agreement contemplates the nonprosecution of uncharged 
offenses the details of the plea agreement should be made a 
matter of the record."41 
¶67 Another early read-in case, State v. Gerard, 57 
Wis. 2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973), similarly describes the 
read-in procedure as involving the defendant's actual admission 
of guilt.  Gerard agreed to have 20 uncharged offenses read into 
the record and to allow the circuit court to take such offenses 
into consideration in sentencing him on two charged crimes.42  
The defendant made an actual admission, apparently to law 
enforcement officers, that he was guilty of these 20 uncharged 
crimes.43  The court was made aware of the defendant's admission 
and inquired as to the validity of the admission when the court 
read in the uncharged offenses.44  The Gerard court quoted an 
excerpt from the circuit court transcript reading in part as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Have the defendant walk forward.  Ronald 
Gerard, did you admit all those other said [read-in] 
offenses to the officers freely and voluntarily? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
                                                 
41 Id. at 734. 
42 State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d 611, 614, 205 N.W.2d 374 
(1973).   
43 Id. at 620. 
44 Id. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
35 
 
THE COURT: Were any threats or any promises made by 
anyone, any police officer or by any law enforcement 
officer or by anyone involved in this case in any 
manner, shape or form to get you to admit those 
offenses? 
THE DEFENDANT: No.  
THE COURT: Why did you admit them? 
THE DEFENDANT: Because I wanted to get everything off 
the books so I am not any more involved in anything.45 
¶68 Neither Austin nor Gerard stated that a defendant's 
admission is required under Wisconsin's read-in procedure.  
Although describing Wisconsin's read-in procedure as involving 
the defendant's admission of guilt, neither opinion addresses 
the question whether a circuit court would err in accepting a 
read-in agreement in the absence of the defendant's admission of 
guilt.  In other words, Austin and Gerard do not address the 
question whether a defendant's admission of guilt is a necessary 
component of the Wisconsin read-in procedure. 
¶69 In contrast to cases such as Austin and Gerard, some 
subsequent cases describe the defendant's admission of a read-in 
charge not as an actual admission of guilt but rather as an 
admission as a matter of law that the defendant makes simply by 
agreeing to read in a dismissed charge.  The first of these 
cases is State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 460 N.W.2d 819 
(Ct. App. 1990).  Szarkowitz addressed read-in offenses in order 
to apply Wisconsin's restitution statute and interpreted Austin 
in the course of interpreting the statute. 
                                                 
45 Id. at 620.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
36 
 
¶70 In 
Szarkowitz, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
rejected 
Szarkowitz's argument that the circuit court erred in ordering 
restitution to victims of crimes that were read in as part of 
Szarkowitz's plea agreement.46  In interpreting the restitution 
statute, the court of appeals concluded that the statute's 
provision that a circuit court may order the defendant to make 
restitution to "any victim of the crime" authorized the court to 
order restitution to "victims of any crimes to which the 
defendant admits as part of the read-in procedure as well as 
victims of the particular crime for which he is convicted."47  
 
¶71 In so holding, the court of appeals quoted, relied 
upon, and interpreted Austin's statement that "'[u]nder our 
read-in procedure, the defendant does not plead to any charges 
and therefore is not sentenced on any of the read-in charges but 
such admitted uncharged offenses are considered in sentencing 
him on the charged offense.'"48  The court of appeals construed 
this statement in Austin to mean that "when a defendant agrees 
to crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he makes an 
admission that he committed those crimes."49   
 
¶72 The Szarkowitz court of appeals did not explicitly 
state whether it was construing Austin to hold that "when a 
                                                 
46 State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 743, 460 N.W.2d 819 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
47 Id. at 746, 754. 
48 Id. at 753 (quoting Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732) (emphasis 
in Szarkowitz). 
49 Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
37 
 
defendant agrees to crimes being read in at the time of 
sentencing, he makes[, as part of that procedure, an actual] 
admission that he committed those crimes" or whether it was 
instead construing Austin to hold that "when a defendant agrees 
to crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he [is 
legally deemed to] make[] an admission that he committed those 
crimes [even in the absence of an actual admission]."  Both 
interpretations of Szarkowitz are permitted by the text of that 
opinion.     
¶73 The court of appeals adopted the latter interpretation 
of 
Szarkowitz 
in 
State 
v. 
Cleaves, 
181 
Wis. 2d 73, 
510 
N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1993).  In Cleaves (another case involving 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
Wisconsin's 
restitution 
statute), the defendant argued that his personal admission to a 
read-in offense was a condition precedent to the trial court's 
authority to order restitution for a victim of that read-in 
charge.  The court of appeals explained that Cleaves never 
voiced any objection to the read-in charges.  Relying on 
Szarkowitz and Austin, the court of appeals concluded that "[i]n 
the absence of any objection to . . . crimes being read in, the 
court may assume that the defendant admits them for purposes of 
being considered at sentencing."50  The court of appeals further 
concluded that because the defendant in Cleaves "did not object 
to the crimes being read in, he admitted them."51  
                                                 
50 Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d at 80 (emphasis added).   
51 Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
38 
 
 
¶74 Although holding that the circuit court "may" assume 
that the defendant admits of read-in charges for purposes of 
sentencing, the Cleaves court recommended that circuit courts 
instead expressly ask defendants whether there is an admission 
to the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing.  The Cleaves 
majority declared that "[t]o clarify the record . . . we suggest 
that trial courts in the future ask the defendant if there is an 
admission to the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing 
consideration.  We believe that this is the better practice."52    
 
¶75 Writing in concurrence in Cleaves, Judge Nettesheim 
endorsed and elaborated upon the majority's suggestion "that the 
trial court expressly obtain an admission from the defendant to 
a read-in charge."53  Judge Nettesheim explained that a read-in 
charge is usually accompanied by three conditions: (1) the 
defendant acknowledges responsibility for the uncharged or 
dismissed read-in charge; (2) the defendant agrees that the 
trial court may consider the read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing on the charges for which a defendant is convicted; 
and (3) the defendant accepts responsibility for restitution 
relating to the read-in charge.   
¶76 Judge Nettesheim suggested that a trial court engage 
in "a personal colloquy with the defendant under Bangert" to 
establish that the defendant understands these consequences of a 
read-in charge and to "additionally establish that the defendant 
                                                 
52 Id. at 80 n.1. 
53 Id. at 80 (Nettesheim, J., concurring). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
39 
 
understands and accepts all of these conditions, or any others 
which might apply."  This procedure, according to Judge 
Nettesheim, "can minimize the number of postconviction motions 
and appeals challenging a trial court's use of a read-in charge.  
And, even where such motion or appeal is brought, the judicial 
resolution of the issue will often be facilitated."54 
¶77 The opinions in Cleaves merely recommended that the 
trial courts ask defendants in the future whether they are 
admitting the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing.  
Cleaves did not require the trial courts to do so.  Cleaves also 
did not require circuit courts to assume that defendants have 
admitted guilt of read-in charges for purposes of sentencing, 
stating instead that courts "may" make such an assumption. 
¶78 Standing in contrast to cases such as Austin, Gerard, 
Szarkowitz, or Cleaves, all of which describe the read-in 
procedure as involving either an actual or a deemed admission of 
guilt, are cases describing the read-in procedure without making 
reference either to the defendant's actual admission of guilt or 
to a rule that the circuit court may deem the defendant's 
agreement to read in the charge to an admission that the 
defendant committed the read-in offense.   
¶79 Martinkoski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 237, 186 N.W.2d 302 
(1971), a case released in the same term as Austin, provides one 
such example.  Martinkoski "stipulated to the reading-in of" a 
                                                 
54 Id. at 80-81 (Nettesheim, J., concurring). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
40 
 
charge that the State agreed to dismiss without prejudice.55  
This court described Martinkoski as stipulating to the charge's 
"consideration in the imposition of a sentence in exchange for 
the agreement of the state not to prosecute that charge."56  The 
Martinkoski opinion does not state that Martinkoski admitted 
guilt of the read-in charge or that he was deemed as a matter of 
law to admit guilt of the charge.  Indeed Martinkoski initially 
pled not guilty to the charge dismissed and read in.57  Neither 
the briefs in Martinkoski nor the decision state that he 
admitted the read-in charge or that he was deemed to have 
admitted it as a matter of law.  
¶80 In Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 174 N.W.2d 521 
(1970), 
a 
case 
cited 
and 
quoted 
in 
Austin, 
the 
court 
distinguished a trial court's practice of considering other 
offenses for purposes of sentencing from the procedure of the 
state and the accused agreeing that the trial court may take 
uncharged offenses into consideration and that the prosecutor 
may not prosecute those offenses at a later time.  The Embry 
court described the latter procedure (the read-in procedure) 
without referring to the defendant as admitting guilt or as the 
defendant's 
agreement 
to 
the 
read-in 
as 
constituting 
an 
admission of guilt as a matter of law.  The Embry court instead 
                                                 
55 Martinkoski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 237, 248, 186 N.W.2d 302 
(1971). 
56 Martinkoski, 51 Wis. 2d at 248.   
57 See the State's brief in Martinkoski at App. 101-02. 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
41 
 
stated, as the court did in Martinkoski, only that a read-in 
offense is one that may be considered at sentencing and that the 
State is barred from prosecuting in the future.  The Embry 
opinion describes the read-in procedure as follows:  
[The read-in procedure is] a practice in this state, 
especially in Milwaukee, of charging a  multiple 
offender with two or more offenses for which the 
evidence is most conclusive and bringing the judge's 
attention to additional uncharged offenses prior to 
sentencing.  Upon agreement between the state and the 
accused, the judge may take these offenses into 
consideration 
and the prosecution agrees not to 
prosecute.  It is expected the uncharged crimes will 
influence the length of the sentence for the crime or 
crimes the defendant has been found guilty of or to 
which he has plead [sic] guilty.  The advantage of 
this technique to the accused is that he can clean his 
slate of several uncharged crimes with the safety of 
only receiving at the most the maximum sentence on the 
one or two crimes of which he is convicted.58 
¶81 After the read-in procedure developed in the Wisconsin 
courts, the legislature inserted a definition of read-in crimes 
into the Wisconsin Statutes.  In 1995, two years after the court 
of appeals mandated Cleaves (the latest of the decisions 
discussed above), a bill was introduced in the Wisconsin State 
Assembly that included a legislative definition of the phrase 
"read-in crime" for purposes of the criminal restitution 
statute.  The bill, 1995 Assembly Bill 467, would have defined a 
"read-in crime" as a crime to which the defendant actually 
admits guilt.  Section 3 of the bill provided in relevant part 
as follows: 
                                                 
58 Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 157-58, 174 N.W.2d 521 
(1970).   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
42 
 
973.20(1g) of the statutes is created to read: 
973.20(1g) In this section: 
. . . . 
(b) "Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged, 
that the defendant admits to having committed and that 
the court considers at the time of sentencing the 
defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted.59   
¶82 In a memorandum addressed to the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee Assembly, the Wisconsin Department of Justice objected 
to this proposed definition of "read-in crime" on the ground 
that it "would appear to require that the defendant personally 
and specifically admit to the read-in offense in order for it to 
be considered at sentencing for restitution."60  A transcription 
of the memorandum is attached as an Appendix hereto.  The 
Department of Justice argued that such a requirement "is 
inconsistent with the law on read-in offenses" and that under 
                                                 
59 1995 A.B. 467, § 3, LRB-0353/1 (emphasis added).    
The Legislative Reference Bureau analysis appearing on the 
bill's first page further stated that "[r]ead-in crimes are 
crimes that are not charged, but they are crimes that the 
defendant admits to and that the court considers when sentencing 
the defendant."   
The analysis also states that the bill was intended to 
codify the court of appeals' holding in Szarkowitz that courts 
may require a convicted criminal defendant to pay restitution to 
the victim of a read-in crime.  Analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, 1995 A.B. 467, LRB-0353/1.    
60 See Correspondence/Memorandum: Department of Justice, 
Aug. 11, 1995, in Bill Drafting File 1995 Wis. Act 141 
(available at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main 
St., Madison, Wis.). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
43 
 
the court of appeals' decisions in Szarkowitz and Cleaves, 
restitution was proper so long as the defendant agreed to the 
read-ins.  The Department of Justice memorandum supports a 
definition of "read-in charges" that allows dismissed read-in 
charges to be considered for restitution and that dispenses with 
the "admits" language so that a defendant's personal admission 
to the read-in charge is not required; the defendant need simply 
agree that the charge be read in. 
¶83 The Department of Justice memorandum proposed the 
following definition of "read-in crime" in the restitution 
statute: 
"Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged or 
which is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that 
the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
sentencing and that the court considers at the time of 
sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted. 
 (Emphasis in original.)   
¶84 The Assembly Judiciary Committee evidently found the 
Department 
of 
Justice 
memorandum 
to 
be 
persuasive 
and 
incorporated the Department's proposed language nearly verbatim 
into Assembly Amendment 1.61  The Amendment provided that a read-
in crime is a crime "that the defendant agrees to be considered 
by the court at the time of sentencing."62   
                                                 
61 Assembly 
Amendment 
1 
was 
offered 
by 
the 
Assembly 
Judiciary Committee.            
62 Assembly Amendment 1 to 1995 A.B. 467.   
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
44 
 
¶85 The language of Assembly Amendment 1 is the language 
ultimately enacted as the statutory definition of "read-in 
crime" in the restitution statute.  The statutory definition of 
"read-in crime," enacted by the legislature in 1995 Wisconsin 
Act 141 and now set forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b), makes 
no reference to any sort of admission, whether actual or deemed.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b) defines "read-in crime" as a 
crime "that the defendant agrees to be considered by the court 
at the time of sentencing."  The statutory definition of "read-
in" crime for purposes of restitution is as follows: 
"Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged or 
that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that 
the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
the time of sentencing and that the court considers at 
the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for 
which the defendant was convicted.  
¶86 Although not requiring that a defendant admit guilt to 
a read-in charge (or be deemed to have admitted guilt to the 
read-in charge) for purposes of sentencing, the statutory 
definition of "read-in crime" does not bar a circuit court from 
accepting a plea agreement involving the defendant's admission 
of guilt of a read-in charge.   
¶87 The statutory "read-in crime" definition appears in 
the criminal restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20, and is 
additionally 
incorporated 
by 
reference 
into 
the 
statute 
governing victim statements to be made before sentencing 
(§ 972.14(3)) and the statute governing sentencing restrictions 
on contact with victims of, or co-actors in, crimes (§ 972.049).  
These statutes, like § 973.20(1g)(b) defining "read-in crime," 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
45 
 
do not at any point refer to a "read-in crime" as a crime that 
the defendant admits or that the defendant is deemed to have 
admitted as a matter of law.   
¶88 Subsequent 
to 
Cleaves 
and 
to 
the 
legislature's 
enactment of a statutory definition for "read-in crime," this 
court has not necessarily been consistent in describing read-in 
offenses.   
¶89 For example, in State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶25, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, we cited Cleaves in support of the 
position that "[r]ead-ins constitute admissions by the defendant 
to those charges" (emphasis added).  In State v. Martel, 2003 WI 
70, ¶26, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 664 N.W.2d 69, we appear to have 
described read-ins as involving an actual admission, stating 
that Szarkowitz held for purposes of the restitution statute 
that read-in charges applied to crimes "admitted, dismissed, and 
read-in at sentencing for the crime of conviction" (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, in State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶27 
n.7, 734 N.W.2d 23, we cited Austin and stated that "[w]hen 
charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant admits to 
having committed the underlying crimes . . . " (emphasis added). 
¶90 In Robinson v. West Allis, 2000 WI 126, ¶42, 239 
Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692, the court stated that "[r]ead-in 
charges have historically served a limited function" and that 
although they have a preclusive effect of barring a State from 
future prosecution of the read-in charges, read-in charges "are 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
46 
 
not otherwise treated as adjudications of guilt."63  The Robinson 
court further stated that "[c]onsideration of read-in charges 
during sentencing is not tantamount to actual litigation of the 
underlying 
issues. 
 
The 
sentencing 
court 
performs 
no 
adjudication of the read-in charges . . . . "64   
¶91 In sum, the case law and the restitution statute 
suggest three different descriptions of the read-in procedure: 
(1) Austin's and Gerard's description of a procedure involving 
(though not necessarily requiring) the defendant's actual 
admission to the read-in charge for sentencing purposes; (2) the 
Cleaves (and perhaps Szarkowitz) rule that "[i]n the absence of 
any objections to . . . crimes being read in, the court may 
assume that the defendant admits them for purposes of being 
considered at sentencing";65 and (3) the statutory definition 
(and the description in cases such as Embry and Martinkoski) 
making no reference to an admission of the read-in crimes but 
describing only the effect of a read-in crime, namely that the 
read-in charge may be considered at sentencing and that the 
State is barred from future prosecution on the read-in charge.  
The State asserts, and our research appears to confirm, that 
Wisconsin would stand alone among the states should this court 
                                                 
63 The Robinson court quoted Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732: 
"Read-in offenses are not prior convictions and cannot be used 
under sec. 973.12, the repeater statute."  Robinson v. West 
Allis, 2000 WI 126, ¶42, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692. 
64 Robinson, 239 Wis. 2d 595, ¶43. 
65 Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d at 80.  
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
47 
 
conclude that a defendant must admit guilt or be deemed to admit 
guilt for purposes of sentencing when he agrees to a read-in 
charge. 
¶92 In reading Austin, the subsequent cases, and the 
criminal restitution statute defining a read-in charge, we 
conclude that Wisconsin's read-in procedure does not require a 
defendant to admit guilt of a read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing and does not require a circuit court to deem the 
defendant to admit as a matter of law to the read-in crime for 
purposes of sentencing.  A circuit court should not deem a 
defendant's agreement to have a charge read in for consideration 
at sentencing and dismissed on the merits to be an admission of 
guilt of the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing.  
¶93 Except when a defendant does in fact admit guilt of a 
read-in charge, stating that a defendant "admits guilt" of a 
read-in charge for purposes of sentencing is more likely to 
confuse than to guide the decisions made by a defendant or a 
sentencing court.  It is a better practice for prosecuting and 
defense counsel and circuit courts to omit any reference to a 
defendant admitting a read-in crime, except when the defendant 
does admit guilt, and simply to recognize that a defendant's 
agreement to read in a charge affects sentencing in the 
following manner: a circuit court may consider the read-in 
charge when imposing sentence but the maximum penalty of the 
charged offense will not be increased;66 a circuit court may 
                                                 
66 Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732 (cited with approval in 
Robinson, 239 Wis. 2d 595 ¶42). 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
48 
 
require a defendant to pay restitution on the read-in charges;67 
and a read-in has a preclusive effect in that the State is 
prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in charge.68  
¶94 To avoid any confusion, prosecuting attorneys, defense 
counsel, and circuit courts should hereafter avoid (as they did 
in the instant case) the terminology "admit" or "deemed 
admitted" in referring to or explaining a defendant's agreement 
to read in charges.  
¶95 We withdraw language in the case law that may be read 
as intimating that when a charge is read in a defendant must 
admit or is deemed to admit the read-in charge for sentencing 
purposes.       
* * * * 
¶96 We conclude that the record clearly demonstrates that 
neither the State, nor trial defense counsel, nor the circuit 
court referred to the read-in charges as admitted or deemed 
admitted for sentencing purposes or for any other purpose.  
Nowhere in the plea questionnaire, in the transcript of the plea 
hearing, or in the transcript of the sentencing hearing did the 
State, trial defense counsel, or the circuit court refer to the 
read-in charges as admitted or deemed admitted.  Rather, the 
circuit court explicitly advised the defendant at sentencing 
                                                 
67 Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g) &(1r) (cited in Robinson, 239 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶42). 
68 State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶25, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 
N.W.2d 155 (cited with approval in Robinson, 239 Wis. 2d 595 
¶42).  
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
49 
 
(and repeated this explanation at the postconviction motion 
hearing) that it understood that the defendant was not admitting 
the read-in charge and that the circuit court would consider the 
read-in charge for purposes of sentencing the defendant on the 
charge to which the defendant pled guilty.  Because the circuit 
court did not consider the read-in charge to have been admitted 
for sentencing purposes, we conclude that the defendant has 
failed to show that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily when he asserts that he was 
unaware that his agreement to have a sexual assault charge read 
in was an admission of the read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing.  
¶97 Although the case law on read-in charges is neither 
consistent nor clear, a proper reading of the history of 
Wisconsin's read-in procedure demonstrates that it is not a 
critical component of a read-in charge that the defendant admit 
guilt to a read-in charge (or that the defendant's agreement to 
read in the charge be deemed an admission of guilt) for purposes 
of sentencing.  In sum, no admission of guilt from a defendant 
for sentencing purposes is required (or should be deemed) for a 
read-in charge to be considered for sentencing purposes and to 
be dismissed.  To avoid confusion, prosecuting attorneys, 
defense counsel, and circuit courts should hereafter avoid (as 
they did in the instant case) the terminology "admit" or "deemed 
admitted" in referring to or explaining a defendant's agreement 
to read in charges.  A circuit court should advise a defendant 
that it may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence but 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
50 
 
that the maximum penalty of the charged offense will not be 
increased; that a circuit court may require a defendant to pay 
restitution on any read-in charges; and that the State is 
prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in charge.   
¶98 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying 
the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
1 
 
 
No. 
2006AP64-CR   
 
2 
 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶99 LOUIS 
B. 
BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I 
respectfully concur with the majority's mandate affirming the 
circuit court's order denying Straszkowski's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  However, I write separately because I disagree 
with the majority's ruling "withdraw[ing] language in the case 
law that may be read as intimating that when a charge is read in 
a defendant must admit or is deemed to admit the read-in charge 
for sentencing purposes."  Majority op., ¶95.  I also disagree 
with the majority's related admonitions that circuit courts 
"should not deem a defendant's agreement to have a charge read 
in for consideration at sentencing and dismissed on the merits 
to be an admission of guilt of the read-in charge for purposes 
of 
sentencing," 
and 
that 
"prosecuting 
attorneys, 
defense 
counsel, and circuit courts should hereafter avoid . . . the 
terminology 'admit' or 'deemed admitted' in referring to or 
explaining a defendant's agreement to read-in charges."  Id., 
¶¶91, 93.   
¶100 A 
defendant's 
admission 
or 
acknowledgement 
of 
wrongdoing is an essential part of the read-in process.  If a 
defendant who committed a crime has not acknowledged what he or 
she did wrong, why should the defendant benefit from having the 
charge dismissed with prejudice?  On the flip side, an innocent 
criminal 
defendant 
should 
not 
be 
held 
responsible 
and 
accountable for conduct that may have been committed by someone 
else. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
 
I 
¶101 Straszkowski's petition for review in this case 
presented a single issue:  whether the trial court erred in 
denying Straszkowski's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on his 
assertion his plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered 
due to his lack of knowledge regarding the effect of a read-in 
offense.  However, the majority has turned this case into a 
unilateral referendum on the propriety of acknowledging the role 
of admissions in read-in procedures, despite any party having 
raised such an issue.  This issue becomes the focus of the 
majority opinion, which ultimately undercuts the long-standing 
tradition of treating read-ins as admissions under Wisconsin 
law.  I respectfully but strongly disagree with the majority 
opinion's analysis and conclusion. 
A 
¶102 The read-in procedure at issue in this case, although 
unique to Wisconsin, is well-established within this state.  The 
read-in process provides a dual mechanism of, in some cases, 
helping make a victim whole through restitution to the extent 
reasonably possible, while in all cases providing the sentencing 
judge 
with 
helpful 
information 
about 
the 
defendant's 
rehabilitative needs.  See State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 422, 
561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  Agreeing to have one's crimes read in 
for such purposes is an alternative method of accepting 
responsibility for criminal conduct in lieu of punishment 
following a full adjudication of the crime.  See State v. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 753, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 
1990).  
¶103 A defendant's agreement to have his or her read-in 
crimes considered by a sentencing court is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(1r), which requires all sentencing courts to 
either order restitution or explain why no such order is issued.  
See State v. Borst, 181 Wis. 2d 118, 122, 510 N.W.2d 739 (1993);1 
State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶7, 234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 
147.  With every read-in case consequently beginning as a 
presumptive restitution case, a defendant's agreement to have 
his or her crimes considered for such purposes sends a message 
to the victim that the person who committed those crimes has 
acknowledged responsibility for his or her criminal conduct.  
¶104 Although it has been well established in Wisconsin 
that agreeing to have one's crimes considered by a sentencing 
court through a read-in procedure constitutes an admission to 
those charges, the read-in agreement is only the first step in 
the process.  The next step is that a sentencing court considers 
those uncharged crimes, along with other proven or unproven 
offenses, for limited sentencing purposes:  "[i]n determining 
the 
character 
of 
the 
defendant 
and 
the 
need 
for 
his 
incarceration 
and 
rehabilitation, the court must consider 
whether the crime is an isolated act or a pattern of conduct."  
State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990).  
                                                 
1 State v. Borst, 181 Wis. 2d 118, 122, 510 N.W.2d 739 
(1993), addresses the substantially identical language of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1)(1991-92), which was later renumbered as 
subsection (1r). 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
See also Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 729-30, 183 N.W.2d 56 
(1971)(citing Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 157, 174 N.W.2d 
521 (1970); Annot., Court's right, in imposing sentence, to hear 
evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by 
defendant, 96 A.L.R.2d 768 (1964)).  Because "[e]vidence of 
unproven offenses involving the defendant may be considered by 
the court for this purpose," McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 126, whether 
admitted 
to or not, the role of read-in agreements as 
constituting an admission to the charges is relatively minor at 
this point in the process. 
¶105 It is during the next step in every read-in process 
that admissions become significant.  In addition to being 
allowed to consider read-in charges for limited sentencing 
considerations, sentencing courts are also under a statutory 
mandate to consider restitution, either ordering the read-in 
defendant to pay restitution to the victim or explaining why 
such an order is not issued.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r).  
¶106 In recognition of the fact that the primary purpose of 
restitution is to compensate victims, not punish defendants, 
courts are required "to construe the restitution statute 
'broadly and liberally in order to allow victims to recover 
their losses as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct.'"  
State v. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 332, 602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 
1999)(citation omitted).  Although read-in crimes are not fully 
adjudicated, the plain text of Wisconsin's criminal restitution 
statute indicates that a defendant may be ordered to pay 
restitution for his or her read-in crimes which were "considered 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
at sentencing" where that acknowledged criminal conduct resulted 
in compensable injury to the victim.  See infra, ¶¶9-12 
(discussing Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a), (1g)(b), (1r)).  As 
such, it is at the point of a court's restitution deliberations 
that acknowledgement of that criminal conduct takes on a 
significant role, rendering admissions an integral part of the 
read-in and restitution process.  
B 
¶107 The majority focuses on the definition of "read-in 
crime"2 in our state's criminal restitution statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b), 
without 
addressing 
how 
that 
definition 
functions together with the substantive provisions of the 
statute.  By interpreting subsection (1g)(b)'s definition of 
"read-in 
crime" 
without 
reference 
to 
related 
statutory 
provisions 
describing the substantive function of read-in 
acknowledgments in the restitution process, the majority fails 
to heed the rule that "[w]hen construing a statutory provision, 
the entire section and related sections of the statute should be 
considered,"  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 416, and consequently misses 
much of the point of § 973.20. 
                                                 
2 The majority refers to "read-in crime," "read-in offense," 
and "read-in charge" interchangeably.  Majority op., ¶57 n.33.  
Such terminology does not fairly reflect the legislature's 
intent, in choosing the phrase "read-in crime," to clarify that 
the subject of a defendant's read-in agreement is not just a 
"charge" typed out on a form, but is the actual criminal conduct 
by that defendant which the defendant agrees to have considered 
for limited sentencing and restitution purposes.  See 1995 Wis. 
Act 141; Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b), (1g)(a), (5)(a). 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
¶108 There are many pertinent provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20, 
including 
those 
both 
immediately 
preceding 
and 
following subsection (1g)(b)'s read-in definition, that the 
majority fails to consider, and which illustrate the nature of a 
read-in acknowledgement as an admission.  For example, the 
subsection immediately preceding the read-in definition defines 
a "crime considered at sentencing" as "any crime for which the 
defendant 
was 
convicted 
and 
any 
read-in 
crime."  
§ 973.20(1g)(a)(emphasis added).  Subsection (1r) then provides 
the explicit link between read-ins and restitution, mandating 
that: 
[w]hen imposing sentence or ordering probation for any 
crime . . . the 
court, in addition to any other 
penalty authorized by law, shall order the defendant 
to make full or partial restitution under this section 
to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing 
[i.e., including read-in crimes.  See subsection 
(1g)(a)] . . . unless 
the 
court 
finds 
substantial 
reason not to do so and states the reason.  
(Emphasis added.)  The statute then proceeds to describe the 
procedural requirements for issuing restitution, including the 
mandatory consideration of such factors as the "amount of loss 
suffered by any victim as a result of a crime considered at 
sentencing."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)1. (emphasis added).  
Subsection (5)(a) further provides:  
(5) In any case, the restitution order may require 
that the defendant do one or more of the following: 
(a) Pay all special damages, but not general damages, 
substantiated by evidence in the record, which could 
be recovered in a civil action against the defendant 
for his or her conduct in the commission of a crime 
considered at sentencing. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶109 This 
description of a defendant's actions being 
acknowledged as his or her conduct in the commission of a crime 
by virtue of their having been considered at sentencing 
illustrates the nature of a read-in agreement as an admission.  
It is inconsistent with both common sense and the plain language 
of this statute to conclude, as the majority's approach 
requires, that a defendant's agreement to have a sentencing 
court consider "his or her" "conduct in the commission of a 
crime" does not necessarily include an implicit admission that 
such criminal conduct by the defendant actually existed.  The 
reason for this is clear; a criminal defendant should not be 
held responsible and accountable for conduct committed by 
someone else.  Such a ruling would have the practical effect of 
allowing the real criminals to remain free to perpetrate other 
offenses on the unwitting public. 
¶110 The role of deemed admissions may appear to be 
relatively insignificant in read-in cases such as this one where 
restitution was not ordered and an admission therefore was not 
required for the remaining sentencing considerations.  However, 
a defendant's admission is a pertinent part of the read-in 
process as long as Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r)'s restitution 
mandate, which applies to all read-in cases, remains pending in 
a case.  Before restitution may be ordered, § 973.20 requires 
that: 
a causal nexus must be established between the "crime 
considered at sentencing," Wis. Stat. § 973.20(2), and 
the disputed damage.  In proving causation, a victim 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
must show that the defendant's criminal activity was a 
"substantial factor" in causing damage. . . .   
As contemplated by the restitution statute, the 
"crime considered at sentencing" is defined in broad 
terms. . . .  The sentencing court should consider the 
defendant's "entire course of conduct."  
Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶¶9-10 (citations omitted)(emphasis 
added); see also State v. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201, ¶13, 287 
Wis. 2d 381, 704 N.W.2d 625 (describing substantial factor proof 
required for ordering restitution in various ways, including the 
description 
that 
"[p]ut 
another 
way, 
a 
causal 
link 
for 
restitution purposes is established when 'the defendant's 
criminal act set into motion events that resulted in the damage 
or injury").  There is no language in the restitution statute 
distinguishing read-in crimes from other "crimes considered at 
sentencing."  Either way, a nexus must be drawn between the 
victim's injury and what is consistently described as the 
defendant's criminal conduct.3  
¶111 Once Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b)'s definition of "read-
in crimes" is considered, not in isolation but together with 
this surrounding statutory language, a plain reading of § 973.20 
                                                 
3 These provisions answer any suggestion from the majority 
that a deemed admission may be too fictitious in nature to serve 
a proper foundation for restitution.  As these additional 
statutory provisions illustrate, the read-in agreement is only 
the first step in the process under Wis. Stat. § 973.20; 
subsequent steps require additional admissions or proof, e.g., 
of a nexus between the defendant's criminal conduct and the 
victim's injury, and of the restitution amount.  See also Garski 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977); State v. Gerard, 
57 Wis. 2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973).  Thus, for restitution 
purposes, a defendant's acknowledgement of his or her read-in 
crimes is only the first admission that may be required for a 
restitution order. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
in its full context clearly indicates that by agreeing to a 
read-in, a defendant agrees to have his or her criminal conduct 
considered at sentencing, not just to have some words, devoid of 
such context and meaning, read out loud by a court.  It is 
further clear that a defendant's agreement that his or her 
criminal conduct is to be considered must logically entail an 
implicit admission by the defendant that such criminal conduct 
by the defendant exists.   
¶112 Although the court of appeals correctly observed in 
State v. Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d 73, 80, 510 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 
1993), that sentencing courts are not mandated to obtain an 
express admission with every read in, the court suggested a 
preferred practice for purposes of clarifying the record:  "we 
suggest that trial courts in the future ask the defendant if 
there is an admission to the read-in charge for purposes of 
sentencing consideration."  Id. at n.1.   
¶113 I agree with the Cleaves court that the best practice 
is for such clarification to be obtained on the record, by 
either the defendant's attorney or by the court.  It is 
sufficient to clarify that the defendant has been informed that 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
his or her acknowledgment of read-in charges may be taken as an 
admission.4   
C 
¶114 The majority attempts to supplement its analysis with 
a reference to a Department of Justice Memorandum5 that describes 
the legislative intent underlying the 1995 amendments to Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20 incorporating read-in crimes into the criminal 
restitution 
process, 
including 
the 
new 
"read-in 
crime" 
definition in subsection (1g)(b).  However, while providing 
helpful guidance to Wisconsin's read-in and restitution laws, 
the Memorandum does not support the majority's conclusion.   
¶115 Rather, 
the 
Memorandum 
expressly 
describes 
the 
legislature's intent to codify Szarkowitz, which the Memorandum 
describes as affirming that "where a defendant agrees to the 
read-in offenses he is presumed to have admitted the charges."  
                                                 
4 Prior to the read-in proceeding, attorneys for read-in 
defendants have a mandate of ensuring that their clients 
understand the nature and consequences of the agreements they 
make in court.  The opening preamble of our Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SCR ch. 20, emphasizes the 
fundamental principle that a primary responsibility of an 
attorney is that of an advisor who must "provide[] a client with 
an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and 
obligations and explain[] their practical implications." SCR ch. 
20 Preamble at [2](2007).  See also SCR 20:1.4(b)("A lawyer 
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.").  Notably, Straszkowski does not allege a 
violation of these rules or ineffective assistance of counsel in 
this case. 
5 Drafting 
File, 
1995 
Wis. 
Act 
141, 
Correspondence/ 
Memorandum, Department of Justice, August 11, 1995 (hereinafter 
"DOJ Memorandum" or "Memorandum"), Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
DOJ Memorandum at 1-2 (citing Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753).  
Furthermore, the Memorandum not only concludes by recommending a 
specific definition of "read-in" crimes, but it also explains 
that the purpose of the proposed statutory amendments was to 
make restitution available for read-in crimes.6  DOJ Memorandum 
at 1-2.  The majority does not acknowledge any of this language 
from the Memorandum affirming the relationship between read-in 
admissions and restitution. 
¶116 The majority does describe the DOJ Memorandum as 
citing Szarkowitz and Cleaves as grounds for objecting to 
proposed legislative language that would have required a 
defendant 
to 
admit 
to 
a 
read-in 
offense 
personally 
and 
specifically.  Majority op., ¶82.  However, the majority fails 
to acknowledge that in rejecting Cleaves' personal admission 
suggestion as too confusing in light of the different types of 
read-in cases that require admissions to varying degrees (or not 
at all), the Memorandum expressly describes the legislature's 
intent to codify Szarkowitz.  Specifically, the Memorandum warns 
of the confusion arising from dual processes in which special 
efforts must be made to seek personal admissions in only 
restitution cases where personal admissions are required.  To 
ward off such confusion, the Memorandum recommends that rather 
than go to the extreme of either requiring a personal admission 
                                                 
6 The Memorandum concludes:  "DOJ should support the 
proposed bill with the suggested changes.  First, allowing for 
dismissed read-in charges to be considered for restitution.  
Second, to change the 'admits' language to reflect that a 
personal admission is not required, as opposed to simply 
agreeing that the charges be read-in."  DOJ Memorandum at 2. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
12 
 
in every case or ignoring the need for admissions entirely, the 
restitution legislation be drafted to change "the 'admits' 
language to reflect that a personal admission is not required, 
as opposed to simply agreeing that the charges be read-in."  DOJ 
Memorandum at 2 (emphasis added).  Thus, to establish a standard 
practice appropriate for various scenarios, the Memorandum 
proposes the solution eventually enacted by the legislature:  
the adoption of statutory language comparable to but less 
stringent than actual personal admission requirements, i.e., 
statutory language defining a read-in crime in part as a "crime" 
that the defendant "agrees to" for limited purposes, thereby 
codifying Szarkowitz's deemed admission approach to read-in 
crimes.  Id. at 1-2. 
¶117 The legislature, following the DOJ's recommendations, 
similarly embraced the concept of deemed admissions, as evident 
in the text of the amended statutory language read in its full 
context.  By including within the definition of "read-in crime" 
the agreement of a defendant to have his or her uncharged or 
dismissed crimes considered for limited sentencing purposes, 
this 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b) 
complements 
subsection (5)(a), which describes the restitution paid by 
defendants as corresponding with "his or her conduct in the 
commission of a crime."  As previously discussed, a defendant's 
agreement to have the court consider "his or her [criminal] 
conduct" under Wis. Stat. § 973.20, read as a whole, logically 
entails a defendant's acknowledgement of the existence of his or 
her criminal conduct.  In this manner, the statutory language 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
13 
 
suggested by the Memorandum and embraced by our legislature 
preserves the important role assumed admissions generally play 
in restitution cases, while alleviating the need for separate 
personal admissions in every case. 
¶118 To the extent the majority recognizes that the 
legislature adopted the DOJ Memorandum, the majority should 
defer to the legislature's intent to codify Szarkowitz by 
spelling out the relationship between read-in crimes and 
restitution and by describing the read-in agreements in terms of 
implicit, not express, admissions.  The majority does not do so.  
Rather, the majority contends that because the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b)'s definition of "read-in crime" does not 
use the word "admission," then reading that statute together 
with Austin and "the subsequent cases" leads to the conclusion 
that Wisconsin's read-in procedure neither requires admissions, 
nor even allows a circuit court to deem such an admission from a 
defendant's agreement to have read-in charges considered at 
sentencing.  Majority op., ¶¶91-92.   
¶119 Not only does the majority's approach to the read-in 
process fail to take into account pertinent statutory and case 
law authority related to the relationships among read-ins, 
restitution, and admissions, but it also fails to recognize the 
actual problem which the DOJ and legislature intended to remedy 
through the new statutory "read-in crime" definition.  The DOJ 
Memorandum exhibits no substantive concerns with the concept of 
deemed admissions, but rather addresses the procedural problems 
related to inconsistent applications of admission requirements 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
14 
 
in read-in cases due to a diminished need for admissions in 
cases where restitution is not ordered.  The Memorandum resolves 
the procedural problem created by the variation among types of 
read-in cases 
and 
corresponding admission requirements by 
implementing a standard definition of read-in crimes as crimes 
acknowledged 
for 
sentencing 
consideration 
purposes 
without 
requiring more explicit admissions in every read-in case. 
D 
¶120 The majority describes Austin as the first Wisconsin 
case extensively describing read-in procedures.  Majority op., 
¶59.  Austin describes a growing number of appeals addressing 
the read-in procedure, and proceeds to engage in what it 
describes as a "review" of those cases.  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 
729.  Austin singles out one such case from the previous year 
describing the read-in procedure; in that case, Austin stated, 
"we explained the read-in procedures as follows:" 
[The read-in procedure is] a practice in this state, 
especially 
in 
Milwaukee, of charging a multiple 
offender with two or more offenses for which the 
evidence is most conclusive and bringing the judge's 
attention to additional uncharged offenses prior to 
sentencing.  Upon agreement between the state and the 
accused, the judge may take these offenses into 
consideration 
and the prosecution agrees not to 
prosecute.  It is expected the uncharged crimes will 
influence the length of the sentence for the crime or 
crimes the defendant has been found guilty of or to 
which he has plead guilty.  The advantage of this 
technique to the accused is that he can clean his 
slate of several uncharged crimes with the safety of 
only receiving at the most the maximum sentence on the 
one or two crimes of which he is convicted. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
15 
 
Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 730 (quoting Embry, 46 Wis. 2d at 157-58).  
The read-in process was similarly described in a 1969 case in 
which this court explained that a defendant may expressly agree  
to allow the judge to consider unproven offenses so 
that, should the state later attempt to prosecute him, 
he could successfully assert the defense of double 
jeopardy. . . .  
[U]nder 
this 
agreement 
[a 
judge 
cannot], under any circumstances, sentence him for the 
proven crimes to a term longer than that permitted by 
statute. 
State v. Smith, 45 Wis. 2d 39, 42, 172 N.W.2d 18 (1969).   
¶121 Austin also identifies Wisconsin's read-in procedure 
as akin to the long-standing English practice of "taking into 
account" uncharged offenses at the request of the accused, while 
not issuing a conviction for such (read-in) offenses.  Austin, 
49 Wis. 2d at 732 (citation omitted).  See also United States v. 
Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 170 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1974).  Austin's 
acknowledgement of the English procedure as akin to Wisconsin's 
is significant because the older English procedure to which our 
state's 
read-in 
roots 
can 
be 
traced 
describes 
pleas 
alternatively as "admissions" and as "asking for offenses to be 
taken into consideration," with these two phrases being used 
synonymously.  See Haygood, 502 F.2d at 170 & n.10 (citation 
omitted).  
¶122 The majority then misidentifies the 1990 court of 
appeals Szarkowitz decision as the turning point at which 
Wisconsin courts began recognizing read-in acknowledgements as 
deemed admissions.  See majority op., ¶69.  The recognition that 
a read-in agreement is in and of itself a type of presumptive 
admission did not originate with Szarkowitz's holding that "when 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
16 
 
a defendant agrees to crimes being read in at the time of 
sentencing, he makes an admission that he committed those 
crimes."  Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753.  Szarkowitz explains 
that this distinct procedure of allowing courts to consider 
offenses 
without 
charges 
being 
brought 
"has 
long 
been 
recognized," particularly "where the defendant's guilt of such 
other offenses was admitted or was not denied."  Id. at 753-54 & 
n.3 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).   
¶123 This court also explained the role that admissions 
play in read-in restitution cases in Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
62, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977).  In that case, this court contrasted 
an older restitution statute which had required defendants 
either to have been convicted or to have "freely admit[ted]" 
their wrongs before restitution could apply with the new 
restitution 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1), 
under 
which 
requirements 
were 
relaxed, 
allowing 
restitution 
where 
"reasonable and appropriate."  Id. at 71.  Garski further cited 
State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973), which 
explains that it is only in cases where the face of the record 
does not already establish the amount of losses caused by the 
defendant's criminal acts that the defendant's personal and 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
17 
 
explicit admission pertaining to the amount of restitution is 
also required.  Garski, 75 Wis. 2d at 71.7  
¶124 In 
addition, 
the 
cases 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20 illustrate that it is because a defendant pays 
restitution for those injuries arising from "his or her conduct 
in the commission of a crime" that some sort of acknowledgement 
of those crimes must usually be made prior to restitution.8  
Perhaps being overly focused on the case before it which does 
not involve a restitution order,9 the majority suffers from a bad 
case of tunnel vision which prevents it from seeing the 
important role admissions generally play in read-in cases as a 
result of statutorily required restitution considerations.   
¶125 Furthermore, 
the 
majority 
relies 
on 
an 
alleged 
conflict between Austin and other cases to justify curtailing 
the role of admissions in the read-in process.  Majority op., 
¶¶88-92.  However, the majority's perception of such a conflict 
                                                 
7 Thus, admissions play a dual role in read-in cases, which 
(1) must always establish general grounds for restitution in the 
form of a defendant's acknowledgment of the sentencing court's 
consideration of his or her criminal conduct (i.e., the criminal 
conduct the defendant engaged in), which courts may deem to be 
the equivalent of an admission for sentencing and restitution 
purposes; and (2) only in some cases, for example where the 
record alone does not clearly establish the restitution amount, 
require a more express personal admission of the grounds for 
and/or amount of restitution.   
8 See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a); State v. Johnson, 2005 WI 
App 201, ¶13, 287 Wis. 2d 381, 704 N.W.2d 625; State v. Canady, 
2000 WI App 87, ¶9, 234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147.   
9 This would not be a problem if the majority's decision 
focused on the narrow issues presented by this case, rather than 
issuing a sweeping ruling that affects all read-in cases, and 
most detrimentally affecting those involving restitution orders. 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
18 
 
appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Austin as 
generally requiring explicit personal admissions from read-in 
defendants, unlike other cases which recognize that admissions 
may be deemed through the read-in acknowledgement.  
¶126 Contrary to the majority's suggestions, Austin does 
not contain any language either requiring a personal admission 
or precluding deemed admissions.  Rather, Austin describes read-
in charges synonymously with "admitted" charges, explaining that 
under our read-in procedures, a defendant "does not plead to any 
charges and therefore is not sentenced on any of the read-in 
charges but such admitted uncharged offenses are considered in 
sentencing him on the charged offense."  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 
732 (emphasis added).  In Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753, which 
interpreted and applied Austin, the court of appeals similarly 
observed that "'[i]n Wisconsin, when a defendant agrees to 
crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he makes an 
admission that he committed those crimes."   
¶127 In Cleaves, the court of appeals interpreted these 
passages from Austin and Szarkowitz as indicating that a read-in 
constitutes an admission:  "when a defendant agrees to the read-
in, he or she admits that the crimes occurred."  Cleaves, 181 
Wis. 2d at 78 (emphasis added).  Consequently, the court 
concluded, because the defendant in that case "did not object to 
the crimes being read in, he admitted them."  Id. at 79.  
¶128 Cleaves further explains that this process of deeming 
admissions from read-in agreements is a natural extension of 
deeming restitution amounts from a defendant's failure to object 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
19 
 
to them.  Cleaves highlights the following passage from 
Szarkowitz which explains the parallels between a court's 
ability to assume that read-in crimes not objected to are 
admitted, 
and 
its 
corresponding 
ability 
to 
assume 
that 
restitution amounts not objected to are similarly admitted: 
The use of the word "stipulate" in sec. 973.20(13)(c) 
does not imply a requirement of a formal written 
stipulation, signed by the defendant, as to the amount 
of restitution claimed.  We hold that, in the absence 
of any objection to amounts claimed on a court-ordered 
restitution 
summary 
accompanying 
a 
presentence 
investigation, where a defendant has been given notice 
of the contents of that report and summary, the trial 
court is entitled to proceed on the understanding that 
the claimed amount is not in dispute, and so order 
restitution under sec. 973.20(13)(c). 
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 749.  As Cleaves explains, "the same 
reasoning applies" to deemed assumptions through read-in, in 
which, "[i]n the absence of any objection to the crimes being 
read in, the court may assume that the defendant admits them for 
purposes of being considered at sentencing."  Cleaves, 181 Wis. 
2d at 80.   
¶129 These cases clearly describe the parallel relationship 
between admissions and objections at the initial read-in stage 
and at the restitution hearing stage, with a failure to object 
to either read-in crimes or restitution amounts potentially 
sufficing as a deemed admission of the crime, in the one case, 
or the restitution amount in the other.  However, the majority 
maintains that, contrary to the interpretation of Cleaves' (and 
the DOJ's) description of Austin, Austin describes the read-in 
process as requiring that a defendant must make an additional 
express admission during the read-in process, beyond merely 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
20 
 
agreeing to have the read-in crimes considered.  Majority op., 
¶66.  
¶130 The majority does acknowledge that Austin leaves open 
the 
possibility 
that, 
as 
cases 
interpreting 
Austin 
have 
explained, a defendant's admission may be deemed from the 
defendant's agreement to have the read-in charges considered.  
Majority op., ¶72.  However, the majority also rejects that 
interpretation, concluding that Austin's description of read-in 
agreements in terms of admissions must have been referring only 
to express, not assumed, admissions because Austin, a decision 
cited by Austin (Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 
625 (1964)), and another read-in case we have discussed (Gerard, 
57 Wis. 2d 611) contained procedural histories mentioning actual 
admissions by defendants.  Majority op., ¶¶63-67, 91-92.  
Therefore, the majority appears to conclude, Austin's holding 
must have been only as broad as the facts of that particular 
case; Austin's general description of read-in procedures could 
not have been so inclusive as to allow admissions to be 
encompassed 
implicitly 
through 
the 
read-in 
acknowledgement 
itself in other cases.  See majority op., ¶¶63-67, 91-92. 
¶131 In its description of Austin as describing actual, not 
deemed, admissions, the majority also focuses on a passage in 
Szarkowitz describing Austin as holding that "when a defendant 
agrees to crimes being read in at the time of sentencing, he 
makes an admission that he committed those crimes."  Majority 
op., ¶71 (quoting Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753).  The majority 
offers that this sentence is not clear on its face but can 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
21 
 
potentially be interpreted as referring either to an implicit or 
an express admission.  Majority op., ¶72.  
¶132 This passage from Szarkowitz, as well as the original 
language in Austin, is much more clear than the majority 
contends and does not require the type of separate express 
admission the majority describes.  First, the DOJ Memorandum, as 
previously described, explicitly explains that it was the 
legislature's intent to codify Szarkowitz's holding, which the 
Memorandum describes in part as clarifying that "where a 
defendant agrees to the read-in offenses he is presumed to have 
admitted 
the 
charges." 
 
DOJ 
Memorandum 
at 
1-2 
(citing 
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753).   
¶133 Second, the language in Szarkowitz is clear on its 
face.  The statement that when a defendant agrees to read-in "he 
makes an admission" is purely descriptive, not proscriptive, 
language.  If it had the proscriptive meaning urged by the 
majority, i.e., describing what a defendant must do during the 
read-in process as opposed to describing a read-in agreement as 
itself being an admission, Szarkowitz would have stated that 
when a defendant agrees to have charges read-in, he must also 
make an explicit admission of guilt.  
¶134 Szarkowitz simply does not contain such language.  
After identifying the legislative intent of Assembly Bill 467 as 
the codification of Szarkowitz, the DOJ Memorandum aptly 
explains: 
As stated in Szarkowitz, "When a defendant agrees to 
the crimes being read in at sentencing, he makes an 
admission 
that 
he 
committed 
those 
crimes."  
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753.  The question is only 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
22 
 
whether the defendant agreed to the crimes being read-
in.  Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753.  Thus, where a 
defendant agrees to the read-in offenses he is 
presumed to have admitted the charges. 
DOJ Memorandum at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
¶135 Similarly, 
nothing 
in 
Austin 
contradicts 
the 
complementary holdings of later cases such as Cleaves, Garski, 
or Szarkowitz, which illustrate that in read-in cases, a court 
may deem a defendant to have admitted his or her crimes when the 
defendant agrees to have those read-in crimes considered for 
limited sentencing and restitution purposes.  The majority's 
interpretation of Austin might be more persuasive if the 
majority were correct that Austin was this court's first 
decision extensively describing Wisconsin's read-in procedure, 
and if Austin also specified that it was setting forth a read-in 
procedure which requires an personal admission separate from the 
agreement 
to 
have 
one's 
read-in 
crimes 
considered 
by 
a 
sentencing court.  However, Austin contains neither the first 
description of Wisconsin's read-in procedure nor any language 
requiring an additional explicit admission of guilt beyond the 
agreement to have one's crimes read-in and considered.  
¶136 Nor should Austin be read as implicitly requiring such 
explicit admissions merely because the background facts of 
Austin happened to include an actual admission.  Austin itself 
explicitly states that "[u]nder our read-in procedure, the 
defendant does not plead to any charges," and describes the 
read-in procedure by quoting Embry, which does not describe a 
personal admission requirement.  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 732, 729-
30 (quoting Embry, 46 Wis. 2d at 157). 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
23 
 
¶137 Consequently, the existence of an actual admission in 
the background facts of any given case does not translate to a 
rule requiring that all read-in cases involve such an actual 
admission.  The only reasonable reading of Austin is to continue 
reading it exactly as Wisconsin courts have read it over the 
years:  as establishing that by agreeing to a sentencing court's 
consideration of read-in crimes, a defendant may be assumed to 
be admitting to those crimes.  
¶138 The majority acknowledges that recent cases have 
described the read-in procedure as involving either deemed or 
actual admissions.  See majority op., ¶89 (citing State v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶27 n.7, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 
23; State v. Martel, 2003 WI 70, ¶26, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 664 
N.W.2d 69; State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶25, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 
N.W.2d 155).  However, the majority's subsequent description of 
these cases as being in conflict with each other, to the point 
of calling into question the entire practice of deeming 
admissions from read-in agreements, is unfortunately overstated. 
¶139 Rather, each of these three cases describes read-ins 
as admissions.  Floyd explicitly describes read-ins in such 
terms, as the majority acknowledges by quoting Floyd's language 
that "read-ins constitute admissions by the defendant to those 
charges."  Majority op., ¶89 (quoting Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 
¶25).  As the majority further acknowledges, Lackershire 
similarly states that "[w]hen charges are read in during 
sentencing, the defendant admits to having committed the 
underlying crimes."  Id. (quoting language in Lackershire, 301 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d 418, ¶27 n.7, which is nearly identical to Szarkowitz's 
deemed admission language).  See supra, ¶¶35-38 (discussing 
language in Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d at 753, that "when a 
defendant agrees to crimes being read in at the time of 
sentencing, he makes an admission that he committed those 
crimes").  Even Martel, in a passage omitted from the majority 
opinion, similarly describes Austin as holding that "offenses 
that are dismissed and read in are admitted by the defendant for 
purposes of consideration at sentencing on the crimes or crimes 
for which the defendant is convicted."  Martel, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 
¶21 (emphasis added).  
¶140 In another attempt to identify conflict among read-in 
cases, the majority cites Robinson v. West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 
¶42, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692, and describes that case as 
holding 
that 
read-ins 
"are 
not 
otherwise 
treated 
as 
adjudications of guilt."  Majority op., ¶90.  Robinson, however, 
is not inconsistent with the other read-in cases.  Adjudication 
of guilt is not the same thing as a voluntary admission of one's 
criminal conduct for read-in purposes.   
¶141 The majority ultimately concludes that the role of 
admissions in read-in cases is too confusing to allow courts and 
attorneys to even mention admission in reference to read-in 
procedures.  However, while claiming such an irreconcilable 
conflict exists, the majority has failed to point to a single 
case that holds that personal admissions are expressly required; 
that holds that read-in agreements are not deemed admissions; or 
that in any way implies that no type of admission, either 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
25 
 
express or implicit, is required in the read-in process, as the 
majority concludes. 
¶142 It may be true that not every read-in case discusses 
read-in admissions in exactly the same way, largely because of 
the varying degree to which restitution may or may not be 
considered in a given case.  For example, Cleaves and Szarkowitz 
both 
involved 
actual 
restitution 
orders, 
making 
it 
more 
necessary for the decisions in those cases to spell out the 
exact nature of the admission required as a prerequisite in such 
cases.  In cases such as Austin, in contrast, where restitution 
was not at issue, the role of admissions was not as pertinent.  
In those cases, it was not therefore necessary to spell out with 
as much specificity.  
¶143 What 
is 
consistently described in our statutes, 
legislative history and case law, however, is that in all read-
in cases, admissions are to some degree a part of the process.  
Furthermore, those cases and statutory provisions addressing 
restitution specifically make it clear that by acknowledging 
that one's criminal conduct may be considered for read-in 
purposes, as required for restitution, a read-in defendant is 
admitting that such criminal conduct exists.   
¶144 Consequently, I am not troubled by some decisions 
discussing the role of deemed read-in admissions more explicitly 
than others, considering the fact that not all cases involve 
restitution orders.  I also accept without any trouble our 
legislature's chosen accommodation of such variety through a 
path that grants sentencing courts the flexibility necessary to 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
26 
 
accommodate 
different 
types 
of 
read-in 
cases 
with 
correspondingly different degrees of admission requirements for 
restitution purposes.  
¶145 The majority, on the other hand, seems surprisingly 
troubled by the variation among cases, which overwhelmingly 
apply the same broad principles to different sets of facts, as 
is standard in any area of the law.  The majority does not 
recognize that any variation in read-in cases is largely one of 
emphasis and different factual backgrounds; the cases are 
consistent in their recognition of read-in acknowledgements as 
admissions of one's criminal conduct, as described by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20.   
¶146 By instead focusing on isolated cases and statutory 
language read out of their full context, the majority appears to 
have missed the critical role that criminal accountability and 
acceptance of responsibility play in the history of the read-in 
procedure.  Our state did not establish read-in procedures for 
the purpose of creating just another negotiation chip and 
bargaining tool for case settlement.  To the contrary, our 
legislature has explicitly described read-in as part of the 
restitution process, and consequently, a method of allowing 
defendants to compensate victims for acknowledged criminal 
conduct without having those crimes fully adjudicated.  See 
especially 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(a) 
(specifying 
that 
restitution orders may require a defendant to pay special 
damages that could be recovered in a civil action "against the 
defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of a crime 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
27 
 
considered at sentencing")(emphasis added).  This is not just an 
important 
principle 
for 
general 
purposes 
of 
ensuring 
constitutional justice, but it is a policy the legislature 
explicitly 
endorsed, 
and 
which 
therefore 
should 
not 
be 
undermined by this court. 
II 
¶147 I have set forth the reasons why I disagree with the 
majority's analysis.  I now return to the reason I concur:  I 
agree with the majority's conclusion that Straszkowski has 
failed to demonstrate any manifest injustice resulting from the 
circuit court's refusal to let him withdraw his plea.  
¶148 Straszkowski argues that under either a Bangert or a 
Nelson/Bentley 
analysis, 
his 
plea 
was 
not 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently entered because the circuit court failed to notify 
him of the effects of the read-in offense during the plea 
bargain.  See also majority op., ¶30; State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 
2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 
270-72, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 
195 
N.W.2d 
629 
(1972). 
 
In 
support 
of 
this 
argument, 
Straszkowski primarily cites what he describes as the circuit 
court's failure to notify him that the read-in sexual offense 
was deemed admitted for purposes of sentencing.   
¶149 However, the circuit court expressly ruled that it was 
not deeming the read-in offense an admission or awarding 
restitution.  In addition, informing a defendant that admissions 
may be deemed is not informing a defendant of an "effect," but 
is rather a description of a general precondition for granting 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
28 
 
restitution.  The actual effects of agreeing to read-in charges 
were clearly explained and consented to, as evidenced by the 
plea 
questionnaire 
and 
waiver 
of 
rights 
form 
signed 
by 
Straszkowski, indicating that he understood "that if any charges 
are read-in as part of a plea agreement they have the following 
effects," followed by an accurate description of the ways in 
which read-in charges may affect sentencing, restitution and 
future prosecution.  Furthermore, as the State correctly points 
out, "[i]t is simply not credible that Straszkowski knew that 
the court could take his conduct in committing the read-in 
sexual assault into consideration at sentencing, in other words 
assume his guilt for that offense, [while at the same time did 
not know] that agreeing to a read-in involved an admission of 
guilt for that offense."  
¶150 This case parallels Garski with respect to the issue 
of whether the circuit courts in each case failed to inform 
defendants about the effect of their read-ins.  In this case, 
Straszkowski argues that the circuit court erred in not 
informing him it could deem his read-in charges admitted at 
sentencing.  In Garski, the defendant had similarly argued that 
the trial court never informed him that it could order 
restitution.  See Garski, 75 Wis. 2d at 75.  Citing Austin, this 
court in Garski did recommend that courts advise defendants of 
the effect of read-ins, "including that the judge may take these 
offenses into consideration when sentencing," but this court 
also concluded that the information given to the defendant had 
been sufficient, there being no additional requirement that 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
29 
 
courts explain to offenders prior to accepting pleas that 
restitution may be imposed.  Id. at 76-77.   
¶151 In this case, Straszkowski received more information 
about the effects of read-ins than the defendant in Garski, even 
conceding he was told that he could be ordered to pay 
restitution for the read-in crime.  If under Garski we concluded 
that less information was adequate, the information given to 
Straszkowski in this case, which described the effects of read-
in in the context of restitution, was adequate as well.   
¶152 As such, any error in this case was harmless.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), we will not reverse the judgment of a 
circuit court unless an examination of the record reveals that 
the error was not harmless, but had affected the defendant's 
substantial rights.  We determine whether there has been 
harmless error by looking at the totality of the circumstances.  
State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 745 N.W.2d 
397.  We have previously applied the harmless error test to 
review denied requests to withdraw guilty pleas, explaining that 
in such cases, the standard is whether the alleged error 
"sufficiently undermines the court's confidence in the outcome 
of the judicial proceeding."  See id., ¶42 (citing State v. 
Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶¶27, 30-31, 33, 34, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 
N.W.2d 737).  
III 
¶153 In sum, I concur with the majority's affirmation of 
the circuit court's order denying Straszkowski's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, due to Straszkowski's failure to 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
30 
 
establish any prejudicial error or manifest justice resulting 
from the circuit court's denial of his plea withdrawal request.  
However, I strongly disagree with the majority's statement and 
related analysis that circuit courts "should not deem a 
defendant's agreement to have a charge read in for consideration 
at sentencing and dismissed on the merits to be an admission of 
guilt of the read-in charge for purposes of sentencing," and 
that "prosecuting attorneys, defense counsel, and circuit courts 
should hereafter avoid . . . the terminology 'admit' or 'deemed 
admitted' in referring to or explaining a defendant's agreement 
to read-in charges."  Majority op., ¶¶92, 94.  
¶154 I also respectfully but strongly disagree with the 
majority's ruling that "withdraw[s] language in the case law 
that may be read as intimating that when a charge is read in a 
defendant must admit or is deemed to admit the read-in charge 
for sentencing purposes."  Majority op., ¶95.  The history of 
Wisconsin read-in law reflects a consistent recognition by all 
three branches of our state government——represented by our 
courts, the legislature, and the Department of Justice, who have 
all weighed in on this issue——that an agreement to have one's 
crimes read in may be interpreted as an admission of those 
crimes.  It is unclear how the majority's opinion will affect 
our state's longstanding traditions and precedents related to 
read-in procedures.  In the end, however, we remain constrained 
by the legislative mandates of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 which clearly 
describe restitution in terms of a defendant's payment for his 
or her criminal conduct, which the defendant necessarily 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
31 
 
acknowledges by virtue of agreeing to the sentencing court's 
consideration of his or her crimes.  A defendant, quite simply, 
cannot agree that his or her conduct in the commission of a 
crime may be considered without clearly implying (and thereby 
implicitly admitting) that such conduct existed in the first 
place.  The majority, unfortunately, insists on such a semantic 
distinction, contrary to Wisconsin's statutory and case law to 
date.  
¶155 We should not send the message to victims that those 
who injured them can pay off their crimes monetarily without 
ever acknowledging responsibility for their actions.  It would 
be anathema to our system of justice and truth-seeking to 
eliminate the requirement that a person either be proven guilty 
or acknowledge one's criminal conduct before paying a victim 
restitution for that crime. 
¶156 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶157 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2006AP64-CR.lbb 
 
1