Title: JAY SCHIEFER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAY SCHIEFER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 108774 P.2d 133Case Number: 87-214Decided: 05/12/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAY SCHIEFER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellant Counsel, Public Defender Program, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Byrne, Asst. 
Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.*

* Retired June 29, 
1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Jay 
Schiefer, seeks review of a judgment and sentence of the district court which, 
in a trial to the court without a jury, found him guilty of forgery as provided 
in W.S. 6-3-602(a)(ii).

[¶2.]     We affirm the 
conviction but vacate the requirement that Schiefer reimburse the costs of his 
court-appointed counsel.

[¶3.]     The victim of this 
crime, Margaret Buchman, is an elderly woman in poor health who lived alone in a 
small apartment in Gillette, 
Wyoming. Schiefer lived across the 
street from Mrs. Buchman and, during a two-year period ending in September 1986, 
helped her by doing such things as cashing her social security checks, paying 
bills, shopping for groceries, doing laundry, and getting her medications. In 
September 1986, Mrs. Buchman's daughter moved in with her and she no longer 
required Schiefer's assistance. Mrs. Buchman's social security check had been 
delivered to a post office box belonging to Schiefer's mother. A change of 
address was effected by Mrs. Buchman after her daughter began living with her. 
Mrs. Buchman testified that, while Schiefer was helping her, he would bring her 
social security checks to her and she, being unable to read or write, signed her 
"X" and Schiefer cashed them at a local market. He then used the money to pay 
bills, buy groceries, and purchase her medications. While all this information 
is relevant to an understanding of the case, we note at this juncture that no 
problem ever arose with regard to the cashing of the social security checks. 
However, in addition to the social security checks, Mrs. Buchman received each 
year, in December, a sales tax refund check from the State of Wyoming. In 1985, this 
check was issued to her in the amount of $630. Mrs. Buchman gave Schiefer $300 
out of this check for repairs to the car he used in running the errands he did 
for her. Mrs. Buchman did not change the mailing address for delivery of this 
check and, in December 1986, it was delivered to the post office box to which 
Schiefer had access. Mrs. Buchman informed Schiefer that she did not want him to 
cash the 1986 refund check. She testified that she never authorized Schiefer to 
sign her "X" to the check; did not sign her "X" to it; and specifically told 
Schiefer that she needed all of the money from the check but would give him $50 
from it.

[¶4.]     There was evidence 
presented at trial establishing that Schiefer cashed the 1986 refund check at 
the market where he regularly had cashed Mrs. Buchman's other checks. The market 
required that the checks cashed by Schiefer have Mrs. Buchman's "X" on them and, 
in addition, that he sign as the individual who had cashed the checks. When Mrs. 
Buchman did not receive her 1986 refund check, she sought help from the police 
department. A Gillette police officer requested that Schiefer surrender the 
check. Schiefer provided the officer with $330, indicating that was the amount 
of the check he had cashed. The check itself was produced into evidence, and it 
was made out to Mrs. Buchman in the amount of $630 and had been cashed by 
Schiefer. Although Schiefer did not testify at trial, it was not disputed that 
he cashed the check.

[¶5.]     Schiefer raises three 
issues in this appeal:

1. He contends there was 
insufficient evidence of intent to commit fraud.

2. He asserts that his 
prior relationship with Mrs. Buchman made him her agent and this, combined with 
her acceptance of the $330 tendered her through the police officer, constitutes 
a ratification of the unauthorized signature negating the crime of 
forgery.

3. He contends the 
district court's assessment of reimbursement for court-appointed counsel is 
incorrect.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
OF INTENT

[¶6.]     We apply the same test 
to a challenge of sufficiency of evidence whether trial is to the court or to a 
jury. Washington v. State, 751 P.2d 384, 387 
(Wyo. 1988). 
Applying that test, we determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a 
reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to be drawn by the fact 
finder, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State. 
Id.

[¶7.]     In this case the 
district court made a specific finding that Schiefer "had the requisite intent 
to defraud by obtaining money which he was not entitled to by cashing the 
check." There is no question but that the crime of forgery has as one of its 
elements a specific intent, i.e., a "fraudulent intent." Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 676 (Wyo. 1982). Schiefer claims there was 
absolutely no evidence of intent to defraud and, on the contrary, the evidence 
showed that Schiefer told Mrs. Buchman that he had received the check, that he 
gave her $330 from the check, that Mrs. Buchman said she would give him $50 from 
the check, and that the previous year Mrs. Buchman had given Schiefer $300 from 
her refund check. Further Schiefer claims that

"there was only a 
misunderstanding of how much money [Schiefer] was entitled to for his services 
of cashing the check: the $300 that he received the year before, or the $50 that 
Mrs. Buchman said she was going to give him in 1986. This case is quite simply a 
contract dispute in which the State has decided to intervene and press 
charges."

[¶8.]     Initially, we must 
acknowledge that the evidence presented at trial does not support Schiefer's 
contention that this was merely a contract dispute. Schiefer's factual scenario 
is not supported by the record; but more importantly, it wholly ignores the test 
we apply in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence. When the evidence is viewed 
in a light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence to support 
the conclusion that Schiefer cashed the 1986 refund check without having 
authority to do so. Indeed, Schiefer cashed the check contrary to Mrs. Buchman's 
specific directions, and he did so with the intent of defrauding her of at least 
$300. We perceive Schiefer as really contending that there was no "direct" 
evidence of his intent. Specific intent to commit a crime may be shown by 
circumstantial evidence. Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 845 (Wyo. 1977). The mind of 
an alleged offender may be read from his acts, his conduct, his words and the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances of the case. To 
hold otherwise would create an impossible burden in a case requiring a finding 
of specific intent. Id. We hold that the evidence presented at 
trial was sufficient for the district court to draw an inference that Schiefer 
acted with the requisite specific intent to defraud Mrs. Buchman. See Grable, 
649 P.2d  at 676; State v. Grider, 74 Wyo. 88, 284 P.2d 400, 407 
(1955).

RATIFICATION

[¶9.]     Schiefer contends that 
Mrs. Buchman ratified his forgery of her signature by accepting $330 from him, 
and therefore he is guilty of petty larceny rather than forgery. To sustain this 
contention, he relies upon the Uniform Commercial Code which provides that: "Any 
unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this article." W.S. 
34-21-341(b). The comments pertaining to this code provision state that it 
neither affects the criminal law nor does it relieve a signer of criminal 
liability. 6 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-404:1, 
p. 142 (3rd ed. 1984). Schiefer also cites the cases Rowray v. Casper Mut. 
Building & Loan Ass'n, 48 Wyo. 290, 45 P.2d 7 (1935) and People v. Bendit, 111 Cal. 274, 43 P. 901 (1896), in support of this 
argument, but we are unable to perceive any application of these cases to the 
issues raised here. We hold the evidence was sufficient to support the 
conviction of forgery.

REIMBURSEMENT FOR 
SERVICES OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL

[¶10.]  Schiefer asserts that the district court 
improperly required him to reimburse the State of Wyoming and the County of Campbell for the services of his 
court-appointed counsel as a part of his sentence. In Schiefer's sentence, the 
district court directed that he reimburse $1500 for his court-appointed counsel 
and, further, the district court reserved the right to make an additional 
assessment for attorney's fees at the conclusion of any appeal. We agree that 
the entire assessment is improper. The assessment was made pursuant to W.S. 
7-6-106(d) which had an effective date of May 22, 1987. That statute provides 
that where probation is granted, as it was in this case, "the court shall order 
the needy person * * * to repay the state for expenses and services provided by 
appointed attorneys pursuant to the state public defender's standard fee 
schedule." Schiefer committed his crime and was found guilty prior to the 
effective date of W.S. 7-6-106(d). There was no similar provision in the 
statutes in existence at the time Schiefer committed his crime. See Public 
Defender Act, §§ 7-1-107 through 122, W.S. 1977 (currently W.S. 7-6-102 through 
114). 

[¶11.]  We have recently held in a similar 
context that an increase in the potential sentence for a crime, which becomes 
effective after commission of the criminal act, is a substantive detriment in 
violation of the ex post facto prohibition of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, 
§ 35, and the United 
States Constitution, Art. 1, § 10. Loomer v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989). The statutory provision at issue 
here is a substantive detriment; therefore the district court could not require 
Schiefer to make reimbursement for the costs of court-appointed counsel. 
Although our disposition of this issue also precludes the district court from 
reserving the right to assess additional attorney fees for an appeal, such issue 
may likely arise again, and so we address it briefly. The statutes make no 
provision for assessment of attorney fees by the district court upon conclusion 
of the appeal. Such assessment cannot be made before or after the effective date 
of W.S. 7-6-106(d). Paragraph 6 of the sentence is 
vacated.

[¶12.]  The judgment and sentence of the district 
court is affirmed except as modified.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶13.]  As originally assigned to write this 
opinion, I specially concur in affirming the conviction of the crime of forgery. 
The place where I specifically differ from the majority as now written is in 
regard to features of assessed punishment.

I. GUILT 
ISSUES

[¶14.]  Before reaching the fine and penalty 
questions resulting from the sentence, I would further discuss my perception of 
the ratification defense by special concurrence. This defense was strongly 
presented by appellant, Jay Schiefer (Schiefer), to deny crime 
commission.

[¶15.]  By this argument, Schiefer attacks proof 
of the fraudulent intent required for conviction. The defense is factually based 
upon the acceptance by Mrs. Margaret Buchman (Buchman) of a portion of the check 
proceeds delivered by Schiefer.

[¶16.]  My address to the subject considers that 
ratification is not an issue, whether justified by W.S. 34-21-341 (U.C.C. § 
3-404) or not, since ratification is not a defense to the fraudulent intent 
element of forgery. For a general discussion of ratification, see Annotation, 
What Constitutes Ratification of Unauthorized Signature Under UCC § 3-404, 93 
A.L.R.3d 967 (1979).

[¶17.]  Schiefer's reliance on the U.C.C. and 
Rowray v. Casper Mut. Building & Loan Ass'n, 48 Wyo. 290, 45 P.2d 7 
(1935) as dispositive of this ratification-defense issue is misplaced. While 
this court did say in Rowray, 45 P.2d  at 12-13, "a signature written in a 
party's absence may be adopted even when forged," that case is clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar. Rowray involved a civil action and 
questioned the effect of the formal acknowledgment of a mortgage and promissory 
note which allegedly bore the wife's forged name. Additionally, Rowray, 45 P.2d  
at 13 distinguished the terms ratification and adoption - "accurately speaking a 
ratification is an adoption and more." In context, that case is not precedent 
for ratification to be used as a defense to criminal 
forgery.

[¶18.]  Furthermore, the crime of forgery, 
although requiring a fraudulent intent, does not require that anyone actually be 
defrauded. 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.7(j)(5) 
(1986); R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law ch. 4, § 8 (3d ed. 1982); M. 
Wingersky, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes (Clark & Marshall) §§ 12.32 and 
12.33 (6th ed. 1958); 2 W. Burdick, The Law of Crime § 663 (1946). See also, 
Miller v. State, 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987), restitution is not necessarily a 
defense to obtaining property by false pretenses because the crime is complete 
upon the transfer. Since the criminality is assessed upon one's mental condition 
at the time of the act, restitution and ratification are inappropriate defenses; 
simply, any after-thoughts that appellant may later develop are irrelevant to 
the earlier occurrence of the crime.1 See Miller, 732 P.2d 1054.

II. TERMS OF THE 
SENTENCE

[¶19.]  I find two basic problems with the 
complex sentence entered in this case.

1. A fundamental finance 
related punishment is presented for a convicted defendant without demonstrated 
funds or earning capacity; and

2. The Wyoming statutes on 
restitution, cost repayment, and fines have been amended substantially since the 
date of offense and may have been considered for the sentence 
entered.

[¶20.]  After the bench trial where Schiefer was 
found guilty of forgery, he was sentenced to a penitentiary term of not less 
than fifteen months nor more than thirty months, fined $1000, assessed the $25 
victim's surcharge, and then with the confinement sentence suspended, placed on 
probation for a period of three years with conditions which 
included:

5. Make restitution to 
the victim of this crime pursuant to Wyoming Statute 7-13-109 and the Court 
specially finds the amount of pecuniary damages to each victim of the 
defendant's criminal activities as follows: Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to 
be paid to Margaret Buchman for which execution may issue.

6. Reimburse the State of 
Wyoming and the County of Campbell for the services of 
court-appointed counsel according to the schedule established. The Court 
determines the reasonable value of the legal services provided to be One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). The Court reserves the right to 
assess additional attorney's fees at the conclusion of any appeal of this 
case.

7. Make regular periodic 
payments until the fine, restitution and attorney fees are fully 
paid:

a. Payments shall be as 
established or revised by a probation officer based upon the ability to pay but 
not less than One Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($125.00) per month. (If the 
defendant is unable thru reasonable diligence to make the minimum payment 
required he may petition the Court for hearing on that 
issue).

* * * * * 
*

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 7-13-303 and Wyoming Statute § 7-13-702 et. 
seq., the defendant shall perform work as an additional condition of probation. 
The work shall be performed whenever the defendant fails to make the minimum 
payments required for fines, costs or attorney fees and regardless of payment 
history, and may be required by the probation officer when work is available and 
performance of the work would not interfere with the defendant's employment. The 
work shall be performed under the supervision of the Campbell County Sheriff and 
credit for the work shall be granted at the statutory rate, first against the 
fines, then against attorney fees and costs. The defendant may pay off his fines 
and attorney's fees by working at a rate of Four Dollars ($4.00) per hour but 
must pay his restitution in cash.

and

[I]n the event of a 
revocation of probation no credit will be given for time successfully served on 
probation.

 

[¶21.]  This dissent is confined to question 
provisions as stated in the sentence where ability to pay has neither been found 
nor demonstrated. Obviously, constitutional limitations of equal protection 
and due process and on imprisonment for debt must superintend upon any validity 
analysis.

[¶22.]  In first juncture, although in agreement 
with the majority in denial of attorney's fee assessments, I reach that result 
and consider the other questions about the general monetary terms of the 
sentence provisions with a more detailed analysis.

[¶23.]  The dates of the offense and subsequent 
proceedings become important because of the many changes which took place in the 
criminal sentencing statutes during the time frame of this case.2 New sentencing statutes more 
recently enacted3 to be even more restrictive and 
punitive cannot be applied to Schiefer. W.S. 8-1-107 reflects the legislative 
codification of this view and provides:

If a statute is repealed 
or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect pending actions, 
prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal. If the repeal or amendment 
relates to the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or 
proceedings, unless so expressed, nor shall any repeal or amendment affect 
causes of action, prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the 
amendment or repeal, unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or 
repealing act.

Since the most 
current legislature is silent in the pertinent amending and repealing 
provisions, the changes cannot affect Schiefer's sentencing if enacted since the 
crime occurred. Further, the legislature, in the savings clause of the 1982 
Wyoming Criminal Code, expressed the intent that the laws applicable to criminal 
prosecutions are the ones in effect on the date when the crime occurred. See 
W.S. 6-1-101 (June 1983 Replacement). Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 
(Wyo. 1984). 
Consequently, we need not explore the constitutional doubts about ex-post facto 
enactments prohibited by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 35.

A. Analysis

[¶24.]  Although the only aspect of the sentence 
challenged by Schiefer in his brief was the assessment of attorney's fees, the 
propriety of assessing the $1000 fine, $300 restitution, and $25 surcharge for 
victim's compensation against him as 
terms of probation contravening the imprisonment for debt constitutional 
prohibition lacking any demonstration of ability to pay were raised in oral 
argument.

Imprisonment for debt is 
usually thought of as a barbarous custom which declined continuously as 
civilization and Christianity advanced and which was totally done away with long 
ago. The facts, however, are otherwise.

Ford, 
Imprisonment For Debt, 25 Mich.L. Rev. 24, 24 (1926).

[¶25.]  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5 provides that "[n]o 
person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud."4 While the instant case did involve 
forgery which has a fraudulent intent element, fraud is distinguishable from 
intent to defraud and is not an element of forgery. Century Federal Sav. and 
Loan Ass'n of Long Island v. Roudebush, 618 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Milton v. United States, 
71 App.D.C. 394, 110 F.2d 556, 561 (1940); People v. Rising, 207 N.Y. 195, 198, 
100 N.E. 694 (1912). Therefore, we must address whether Schiefer's sentence 
constitutes imprisonment for debt under the Wyoming constitutional restraint.5 

[¶26.]  W.S. 7-11-515 (Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 147, § 
2)6 did allow a defendant to be 
committed to jail until the fine and costs are paid, and W.S. 7-13-109 (1986 
Cum.Supp.)7 provided for restitution as part of 
the penal sentence. Further, the legislature allowed the assessment of a 
victim's compensation surcharge in W.S. 1-40-119 (1986 Cum. Supp.)8, and the taxing of attorney's fees 
was permitted in W.S. 7-1-110 (1977).9 Consequently, with the monetary 
aspects of the sentence imposed, an analysis is required whether these statutes 
were constitutionally applied to Schiefer.

[¶27.]  The United States Supreme Court in a 
trilogy10 of cases has been faced with the 
conflict of an indigent defendant and constitutionally allowable sentencing.11 The first chapter of this law was 
developed in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 
(1970), which found, under the Equal Protection Clause, that a sentence was 
unconstitutional which extended the maximum confinement when a defendant had not 
satisfied the monetary provisions of his sentence. The second case is Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971), where the court 
determined that it was improper to imprison a defendant solely because of his 
indigence when the offenses which precipitated the fines were municipal in 
nature and were punishable by fines only. The third and most recent case of 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983) has the most application to Schiefer because both situations involve 
fines and restitution as conditions of probation. In Bearden, 103 S. Ct.  at 2070, 
the court held "if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the 
appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a 
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it," although leaving open 
the avenue that one, whether indigent or not, could be imprisoned for willfully 
refusing or neglecting to pay a fine or costs.

[¶28.]  Simply because Schiefer's probation has 
not been revoked, does not validate the conditions of probation placed upon him. 
"The fact that incarceration was imposed after a period of probation rather than 
immediately upon conviction is not constitutionally significant, where the only 
ground for the imprisonment is the inability to pay." State v. Crawford, 54 
Ohio App.2d 
86, 375 N.E.2d 69, 70 (1977). One can only be found to be in violation of a 
condition of probation that requires money payments if the person is in a 
reasonable financial position to make the payments. Hamrick v. State, 519 So. 2d 81, 82 (Fla.App. 1988); Mack v. State, 440 So. 2d 602 (Fla.App. 1983); Smith v. 
State, 373 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla.App. 1979); Jones v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158, 1159-60 
(Fla.App. 1978).

[¶29.]  Factually, this record discloses no 
evidence that Schiefer willfully or intentionally failed or refused to pay or 
gain employment to pay the monetary assessment as would be required under 
Bearden, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221.12 Furthermore, there is no actual 
evidence of his present employment opportunities and it is clear that he has no 
assets or estate for payment reliance (nor even a mother to assist). Wyoming has long held 
there must be an ability to pay found before monetary assessments can be a 
constitutional part of the criminal sentence. SeeState v. 
Posey, 77 Wyo. 
258,314 P.2d 833, 837 (1957), where we held:

Just debts should be paid 
and the law is adequate to compel their payment where there is an ability to pay, but 
the criminal law is not a process to be subserved for that purpose. Imprisonment 
for debt is no longer a part of our law. [Emphasis added.]

[¶30.]  Granted, this court previously has held a 
fine is not a debt. In re MacDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18 (1893). However, in the 
ninety-five years that have passed since that decision, I have seen the fallacy 
in that view as applied to the reality faced by the indigent criminal defendant. 
Consequently, that case has no present validity today under decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court considering penal assessment of fines, restitution, 
surcharge,13 and attorney's fees where ability 
to pay is not demonstrated.14

[¶31.]  A surcharge on the criminal penalty which 
funds crime victim's compensation is a form of punishment for the offense and is 
a fine. State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874, 880 (Fla. 1978). Thus, any assessment of a 
surcharge for a victim's compensation fund must occur only after the trial court 
has found the indigent defendant has the ability to pay. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla. 1984). For an analysis of the present 
W.S. 1-40-119 and its relationship to the constitutional prohibition on 
imprisoning for debt, see the dissenting opinion in Blakeman v. State, 753 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 
1988). See also Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988). For an overview of the victim's compensation 
system pertaining to Wyoming, see specifically, Comment, Victim 
Compensation and Restitution: Legislative Alternatives, XX Land & Water 
L.Rev. 681 (1985) and Annotation, Statutes Providing for Governmental 
Compensation for Victims of Crime, 20 A.L.R.4th 63 (1983).15 

[¶32.]  The record is clear that there was no 
finding of ability to pay with regard to any of the monetary assessments 
charged, and I find error in the trial court's assessing the fine, restitution, 
surcharge, and attorney's fees after expressly finding Schiefer to be 
indigent.16 This action affected a 
circumvention of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5 by using the form of imposition of 
probationary conditions in the criminal arena to require Schiefer to repay a 
civil debt after expressly determining that he was without such an ability 
which, as a manipulation of form over substance, cannot be condoned. See Ex 
Parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P.2d 734, 737 (1948) followed by Trombley v. 
Justice's Court, 31 Cal. 2d 868, 199 P.2d 5 (1948).

[¶33.]  The application of restitution and cost 
repayment statutes without a judicial finding of ability to pay are statutes 
designed as debt collecting devices masquerading as penal laws and contravene 
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. See Turner v. 
State ex rel. Gruver, 168 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla.App. 1964) (citing 16 C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 204(4) (1984)).

When a court imposes a 
fine known to be beyond the ability of the defendant to pay, it has, 
effectively, imposed a sentence of imprisonment after determining that the 
policy considerations called for a financial sanction. The fine may thus become 
a guise for imprisoning the poor whenever the sentencing judge believes that the 
maximum term provided by statute is not sufficiently severe. A defendant should 
not be sentenced to imprisonment simply because he cannot pay a fine at the time 
of the judgment. The severity of the punishment should be measured by its 
corrective value rather than by reason of the defendant's 
wealth.

Note, 
Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the 
Constitution, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 611, 621-22 (1969) (footnote omitted). See Godwin 
v. Godwin, 268 Ark. 364, 596 S.W.2d 695, 697 
(1980) for the recognition of the importance of the judicial finding of ability 
to pay to avoid violation of the Arkansas prohibition against imprisoning for 
debt. Cf. Hicks on Behalf of Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721, in considering application of either criminal or 
civil contempt payment obligations.

[¶34.]  The latitude provided by the trial court 
for Schiefer to "work off" his debt still does not constitutionally save the 
sentence since "[t]he opportunity to move for a substitution of community 
service after costs have already been 
assessed is not equivalent to notice of and an opportunity to object to such 
costs prior to their assessment." Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis 
added).

[¶35.]  Additionally, the record provides no 
evidence that a realistic job opportunity existed in the sheriff's office for a 
one hand man. This was not a work sentence pursuant to W.S. 7-13-303(b) (1986 
Cum.Supp.); this was a monetary assessment as restitution pursuant to W.S. 
7-13-109 (1986 Cum. Supp.), which converted into probation revocation when 
Schiefer was without funds and lacked a demonstrated future 
expectancy.

B. Appellate Attorney's 
Fees

[¶36.]  The trial court also erred in reserving 
the right to assess additional attorney's fees. The trial court exceeded its 
jurisdiction since only this tribunal may assess appellate attorney's fees. 
Dewitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854 (Wyo. 1986).

"Should the procedure 
[whereby the supreme court awards appellate attorney fees] be considered 
exclusive? We think it should. Public policy and the public interest require 
such a holding. In the first place, appeals to the supreme court are from a 
judgment or `final order' of the district court. Except for the performance of 
further duties assigned to him under the rules or statutes, the jurisdiction of 
the trial judge should end with the entry of the final judgment or order 
appealed from.

* * * * * 
*

"There is good reason for the supreme court 
rather than the district court to pass upon the need for ordering payment of an 
attorney's fee in an appeal, and the supreme court is in a better position to 
say what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable and proper fee for legal 
service in that court."

Id. at 866 (quoting Rubeling 
v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 285-86 (Wyo. 1965)) (emphasis in 
original).

[¶37.]  As the Kansas Court of Appeals in Olsen 
v. Olsen, 7 Kan. App. 2d 472, 643 P.2d 1153, 1155-56 
(1982) aptly put it:

For a trial court to 
render an informed decision on the matter, it would have to study the appellate 
briefs, perhaps have a transcript of the oral arguments made before the 
appellate court, and study the appellate court's opinion or memorandum to decide 
whether the court rested its decision on any of the parties' arguments. The 
trial court would be asked to do what the appellate court is already in the 
position to do at the end of the appeal. The trial court's decision would then, 
of course, be subject to appeal, bringing the matter back full circle. Also, the 
procedure suggested by defendant would put the trial court in the tenuous 
position of deciding whether an appeal from one of its own decisions was 
meritless or frivolous.

The trial court 
was putting a penalty on Schiefer's right to appeal which cannot be 
constitutionally approved. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶38.]  Although in the proper case constituting 
appropriate penal sanctions and system cost repayment obligations, fines, 
restitution, costs, and attorney's fees, as an implement in the criminal 
proceeding, are impacted similarly with due process and equal protection 
constraints where denied justice or resulting imprisonment for debt results from 
poverty.17 As the author in a 1969 analysis 
recognized at a time predating more recent due process application of the United 
States Supreme Court:

Yet I hope to make clear 
that in many instances their purposes could be more soundly and satisfyingly 
understood as vindication of a state's duty to protect against certain hazards 
which are endemic in an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty to 
avoid complicity in unequal treatment.

Michelman, 
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
Harv.L.Rev. 7, 9 (1969) (emphasis in original).

[¶39.]  Undeniably, legislatively consecrated 
fines, restitution, costs, or attorney's fees payment provisions in criminal 
sentences constitute imprisonment for debt to the impecunious where the affluent 
can pay and depart without similarly denied liberty interest. Furthermore, 
neither the legislature nor the judiciary can repeal the economic law that 
ability to collect is confined by the debtor's capacity to pay. See Blakeman, 
753 P.2d 1045 and Whitehead v. State, 511 N.E.2d 284 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 761, 98 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1988). There seems to be something invidiously 
included in recent probation and deferred sentence legislation that escape from 
immediate incarceration is available only to charged defendants who have money 
or immediate employment opportunity. The constitutionally required ability to 
pay must be found in order to impose 
monetary conditions of probation or sentencing so that individuals of different 
economic classes truly have an opportunity to stand on equal footing before the 
courts of this country.18 Comment, Equal Protection and the 
Use of Fines as Penalties For Criminal Offenses, 1966 U.Ill.L.F. 460 (1966); 
Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and The Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days", 57 
Calif.L.Rev. 778 (1969). Wyoming cannot "`impos[e] a fine as a sentence 
and then automatically conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the 
defendant is indigent * * *.'" Bearden, 461 U.S.  at 667, 103 S. Ct.  at 2070, 76 L. Ed. 2d  at 229 
(quoting from Tate, 401 U.S.  at 398, 91 S.Ct. at 
670-71).

[¶40.]  This court has previously recognized that 
it can modify by vacating or striking a part of a divisible sentence which is 
improper or illegal, and affirming the balance. Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 
1250 (Wyo. 1987); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 
1979). Finding error with the imposition of the fine, restitution, costs, 
surcharge, and assessment of trial court attorney's fees imposed as conditions 
of probation without an ability to pay demonstrated in the record, as well as 
error in the reservation of assessing appellate attorney's fees as being beyond 
the trial court's jurisdiction, I would affirm the judgment and modify the 
sentence to strike out the conditions of probation requiring reimbursement for 
attorney's fees, the reservation of attorney's fees, the restitution, the fine, 
costs, and the surcharge. State ex rel. Williams v. Blackburn, 484 So. 2d 665 
(La. 1986); State v. Garrett, 484 So. 2d 662 
(La. 1986); State v. Harris, 510 So. 2d 434 
(La. App. 
1987). With deletion of the monetary aspects of this sentence, the additional 
provision imposing work as a probationary condition for debt repayment should 
also be vacated.

[¶41.]  Consequently, I concur in affirming the 
conviction and substantively dissent in the majority's affirmation of the 
improper provisions contained in the sentence.

FOOTNOTES

1 This was a difficult 
case for the trial court to try and was conducted with great care and patience 
by the trial judge. Buchman could neither read nor write and had a very severe 
speech impediment at the time of trial. Irene McClure, daughter of Buchman and 
as principal antagonist, could neither read nor write and was on probation from 
a felony conviction. Mama Kate, mother of Schiefer, who was involved, was 
deceased by trial date. Schiefer did not testify. Another daughter of Buchman, 
who lived in Gillette but had not seen her mother for a year, testified for the 
defense as a subpoenaed witness. Examination of Buchman was conducted at her 
home and all participants (except to a singularly lesser degree the court 
reporter) had difficulty in understanding her because of the confining speech 
defect. The defense that Mama Kate and her son kept the money so the daughter 
would not steal it floundered on admissibility from hearsay problems. The death 
of Mama Kate before trial, the election of Schiefer not to testify, and the lack 
of relevance of the "safe keeping" motive for the funds which were retained by 
Schiefer, were sufficient evidence for the court to find a forgery 
conviction.

2 The date of the offense 
was December 3, 1986. The trial was held May 6, 1987, and the judgment was filed 
May 15, 1987. The sentencing hearing occurred on July 24, 1987 with the formal 
sentence being entered August 11, 1987.

3 The changes 
include:

1. Fine: Schiefer was 
sentenced under W.S. 7-11-515 found in Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 147, § 2 (1985); 
effective July 1, 1986, which has been amended and renumbered in 1987 to W.S. 
7-11-504 [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 4 (1987); effective May 22, 
1987].

2. Restitution: W.S. 
7-13-109 (1986 Cum. Supp.) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 27, § 1 (1984); effective June 
5, 1984] and W.S. 6-10-110 (1986 Cum.Supp.) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 72, § 1 (1985); 
effective May 23, 1985] were in effect at the date of the offense. However, the 
legislature in 1987 amended and renumbered much of the restitution sections 
which can now be found in Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 (1987), effective May 22, 
1987. Specifically, W.S. 7-13-109 (1986 Cum.Supp.) pertaining to the 
determination of restitution owed by a defendant correlates with W.S. 7-9-103. 
W.S. 6-10-110 (1986 Cum.Supp.) was also amended in 1987, but only to reflect the 
renumbering of the restitution statutes.

3. Surcharge: The 
victim's compensation statute in effect at the time of the offense was W.S. 
1-40-119 (1986 Cum.Supp.) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 213, § 1 (1985); effective May 
23, 1985], which provided for the $25 surcharge. In 1987, the legislature 
substantially revamped this statute and raised the surcharge monetary amount to 
$50. W.S. 1-40-119 [Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 154, § 1 (1987); effective May 22, 
1987].

4. Attorney's Fees and 
Costs: The provisions allowing the assessment of attorney's fees and costs to a 
non-needy person were W.S. 7-1-110 (1977) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 170, § 1 (1977); 
effective July 1, 1978] and W.S. 7-1-112 (1977) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 170, § 1 
(1977); effective July 1, 1978]. These statutes were modified, expanded, and 
renumbered to be W.S. 7-6-104 and 7-6-106 in 1987 [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 
and ch. 176, § 1 (1987); effective May 22, 1987]. Moreover, W.S. 7-1-114 (1977) 
[Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 170, § 1 (1977); effective July 1, 1978], which permitted 
the recovery of the expenditure for attorney's fees, became W.S. 7-6-108 [Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 and ch. 176, § 1 (1987); effective May 22, 
1987].

5. Work as a Condition of 
Probation: Imposed under W.S. 7-13-303 (1986 Cum.Supp.) [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 68, 
§ 1 (1984); effective June 5, 1984], which was amended and renumbered in 1987 to 
become W.S. 7-13-304 [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 (1987); effective May 22, 
1987]. Additionally, the statutes governing the restrictions on work at the time 
of the offense were W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704 (1986 Cum.Supp.) [Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 68, § 1 (1984); effective June 5, 1984], which were amended and became 
W.S. 7-16-101 through 7-16-104 [Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 (1987); effective 
May 22, 1987].

4 SeeState v. 
Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Wyo. 1982) for a case discussing imprisonment 
for debt and the worthless check statute.

An exception for fraud is 
an integral part of many state constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment 
for debt. Provisions identical to Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5 can be found in: Ariz. 
Const. art. II, § 18; Fla. Const. art. 1, § 10; Idaho Const. art. 2, § 
15; Kan. 
Const. B. of R. § 16; N.C. Const. art. I, § 28; and S.C. Const. art. I, § 19. 
For states that disallow imprisonment for debt unless there is "a strong 
presumption of fraud," see Colo. Const. art. II, § 12; Ill. Const. art. 1, § 14; 
Ky. Const. B. of R. § 18; Mont. Const. art. II, § 
27; N.D. Const. D. of R. § 15; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 16; and R.I. Const. D. of 
R. § 11. Confinement of imprisonment for debt provisions to civil actions occur 
in some states such as Ark.D. of R. § 16; Iowa, B. of R. § 19; Neb.B. of R. § 20; and 
Ohio Const. 
art. I, § 15. While there are many variations of the same theme among the 
states, fraud is an exemption from imprisonment for debt provisions in Ind. 
Const. art. 1, § 22 and N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 13. Minnesota allows 
imprisonment for debt if the person was "charged with fraud in contracting said 
debt," Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11. Nevada excepts out libel and slander in 
addition to fraud, Nev. Const. art. 1, § 14, whereas Michigan exempts cases of 
breach of trust plus fraud, Mich. Const. art. I, § 21. Oregon mandates that 
imprisonment for debt is prohibited except in cases of fraud or "absconding 
debtors," Or. Const. art. I, § 12, and Utah in 
Utah Const. 
art. I, § 17 and Washington in Wash. Const. art. 1, § 16, limit the 
permissible scope of imprisonment for debt to cases of absconding 
debtors.

5 For the extensive 
sources of analysis of imprisonment for debt under the United States 
Constitution through the Equal Protection and/or Due Process clauses, see 
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
Harv.L.Rev. 7 (1969); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 205 (1964); Rogge, A Technique For Change, 11 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 481 
(1964); Freedman, Imprisonment For Debt, II Temp.L.Q. 330 (1928); Ford, supra, 
25 Mich.L. Rev. 24; Comment, Imprisonment For Debt And The Constitution, 1970 L. 
& Soc.Ord. [Ariz.St. L.J.] 659 (1970) (offering an overview of imprisonment 
for civil debt); Comment, Jail Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Criminal 
Defendant: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 Tenn.L.Rev. 74 (1967); 
Comment, Equal Protection and the Use of Fines as Penalties For Criminal 
Offenses, 1966 U.Ill.L.F. 460 (1966); Comment, Constitutional Law: Imprisonment 
For Debt, 4 Calif.L.Rev. 331 (1916); Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and The Poor: 
"Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days" 57 Calif.L.Rev. 778 (1969); Note, Imprisonment 
for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the Constitution, 
22 Vand.L.Rev. 611 (1969); Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 435 (1967); Note, The Equal Protection 
Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64 Mich.L.Rev. 
938 (1966); Note, Criminal Costs Assessment in Missouri - Without Rhyme or Reason, 1962 
Wn.U.L.Q. 76 (1962); Note, Present Status of Execution Against The Body of the 
Judgment Debtor, 42 Iowa L.Rev. 306 (1957); Note, Fines and Fining 
- An Evaluation, 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1013 (1953); Note, Limitations on State 
Legislation Imposed by Constitutional Guaranties Against Imprisonment for Debt, 
41 Harv.L.Rev. 786 (1928); Note, Imprisonment For Debt, 3 Calif.L.Rev. 137 
(1914); Recent Case, Equal Protection - An Indigent Cannot Be Imprisoned For His 
Inability To Pay A Fine, 75 Dick.L.Rev. 528 (1971); and Recent Decision, 
Constitutional Law - Imprisonment for Debt - Imprisonment for Fraud 
Distinguished, 35 Va.L. Rev. 113 (1949).

More infrequently, courts 
have analyzed the imprisonment for debt issue that occurs with an indigent 
criminal defendant under the U.S. Const. amend. VIII proscription against cruel 
and unusual punishment and excessive fines. See Grimes v. Miller, 429 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (N.C.), aff'd 434 U.S. 978, 98 S. Ct. 600, 54 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1977); 
Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57, 60 n. 7 (D.Conn. 1974); and People v. 
Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N YS.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686 
(1966).

6 W.S. 7-11-515 
(Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 147 § 2) provided:

If a defendant sentenced 
to pay a fine or costs defaults in payment, the court may order the defendant to 
show cause why he should not be committed to jail. If the court finds that the 
defendant's default is willful or is due to a failure on defendant's part to 
make a good faith effort to obtain the funds required for payment, the court may 
order him committed until the fine or costs, or a specified part thereof, is 
paid. The defendant shall be given a credit for each day of imprisonment at the 
rate provided by W.S. 6-10-105, and may earn additional credits against his fine 
or costs for work performed as provided by W.S. 7-13-701 through 
7-13-704.

7 W.S. 7-13-109 (1986 
Cum.Supp) provided in part:

(b) At the time of 
sentencing a defendant for any misdemeanor or felony conviction, if the court 
desires to require restitution, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as 
restitution owed to each victim for pecuniary damages resulting from the 
defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its determination as a special 
finding in the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, W.S. 
6-10-110 (1986 Cum.Supp.) provided:

In addition to any other 
punishment prescribed by law the court may, upon conviction for any misdemeanor 
or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to each victim as prescribed 
under W.S. 7-13-109.

8 W.S. 1-40-119 (1986 
Cum.Supp.) provided in part:

(a) In addition to any 
fine or other penalty prescribed by law, a defendant who pleads guilty to or is 
convicted of the following criminal offenses shall be assessed a surcharge as 
provided by this subsection:

(i) For any felony 
offense, a surcharge of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

9 W.S. 7-1-110 (1977) 
provided in part:

(a) A needy person who is 
being detained by a law enforcement officer, or who is under formal charge of 
having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, 
is entitled:

(i) To be represented by 
an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so 
entitled; and

(ii) To be provided with 
the necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation 
and other preparation).

(b) The attorney, 
services and facilities, and court costs shall be provided at public expense to 
the extent that the person, at the time the court determines need, is unable to 
provide for their payment.

Moreover, part 
of W.S. 7-1-112 (1977) supplied the criteria of determination of a needy 
person:

(a) The determination of 
whether a person covered by W.S. 7-9.20 [§ 7-1-110] is a needy person shall be 
deferred until his first appearance in court or in a suit for payment or 
reimbursement under W.S. 7-9.24 [§ 7-1-114], whichever occurs earlier. 
Thereafter, the court concerned shall determine, with respect to each 
proceeding, whether he is a needy person.

(b) In determining 
whether a person is a needy person and in determining the extent of his 
inability to pay, the court concerned shall consider such factors as income, 
property owned, outstanding obligations and the number and ages of his 
dependents. Release on bail does not necessarily prevent him from being a needy 
person. In each case, the person, subject to the penalties for perjury, shall 
certify in writing or by other record such material factors relating to his 
ability to pay as the court prescribes.

(c) To the extent that a 
person covered by W.S. 7-9.20 [§ 7-1-110] is able to provide for an attorney, 
the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs, 
the court may order him to provide for their payment.

Further, W.S. 
7-1-114 (1977) provided for recovery of payment:

(a) The attorney general 
may, by suit within six (6) years after the date the services were rendered, on 
behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from 
each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit under this 
act:

(i) To which he was not 
entitled;

(ii) With respect to 
which he was not a needy person when he received it; or

(iii) With respect to 
which he has failed to make the certification required by W.S. 7-9.22(b) [§ 
7-1-112(b)].

(b) Amount recovered 
under this section shall be paid into the state general 
fund.

10 An early United States 
Supreme Court case of Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 
727, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1877) upheld the constitutionality of the imposition of a 
fine and then imprisonment of individuals who failed to pay. However, this 
trilogy apparently was sparked because by the early 
1970's,

[a]lthough there were no 
comprehensive statistics, evidence obtained from varied sources indicated that 
the number of * * * [inability to pay a fine] persons incarcerated was amazingly 
large - one widely cited estimate placing the figure at between 40% and 60% of 
all inmates in county jails. This led to the "conservative estimate" that on any 
day nearly 28,000 persons would be in jail in the United States 
because they had failed to pay a fine.

Choper, 
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional 
Rights, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 117-18 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted).

11 For cases that have held 
it improper to revoke an indigent's probation for failure to pay fines as being 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, see 
Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999 (1970); and State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971). The Supreme Court of Hawaii, although relying on both the 
United 
States and Hawaiian Equal Protection Clauses, 
summarized the situation:

Equal justice is clearly 
lacking where an indigent like [appellant] suffers imprisonment solely because 
of a financial inability to pay for liberty while his more prosperous 
counterpart avoids confinement.

State v. 
Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P.2d 191, 192 (1971).

12 Although Schiefer had 
lost his left hand in 1969 and was thereafter able to work on drilling rigs, the 
record indicates that by 1982, when roughneck employment declined with oil boom 
demise, that a change by reduction of number of workers on the drilling rigs 
made him essentially unemployable in that industry.

13 Although the term 
"costs" was utilized in part of the sentence, the term obviously refers to the 
victim's compensation surcharge. The term "costs" read in the context of the 
entire sentencing document was not meant to encompass the term "costs" in its 
generic sense, because no specific finding of an amount of costs attributable to 
Schiefer's conduct was ever made. Cf. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 
1989), which discusses the more generic concept and assessment of costs after a 
specific monetary amount was found to be owing.

14 Schiefer challenges the 
trial court assessment against him of $1500 for the trial level constitutionally 
required court-appointed attorney. This issue was disposed of in Burke v. State, 
746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 1987), where the same statute, W.S. 
7-1-112 (1977), concerning the assessment of attorney's fees was questioned. We 
held that it was improper to require reimbursement since this liability 
"constituted a civil debt." Burke, 746 P.2d  at 860. Since no finding was made of 
Schiefer's ability to provide funds toward this reimbursement or that he was not 
a needy person, the trial court attorney's fee assessments falls into the same 
category as the fine, restitution, and surcharge; simply, a monetary penalty 
burdened on an impoverished criminal defendant who lacks resources or earnings 
to pay.

15 Also of interest on this 
topic, see: McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in 
America, 8 Urb.Law. 346 (1976); 
Lamborn, The Propriety of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 446 (1973); Comment, Rehabilitation of the Victims of Crime: An 
Overview, 21 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 317 (1973); and Note, Victim Restitution in the 
Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 931 (1984). For 
discussions of both views of a possible constitutional amendment in this area, 
see: Dolliver, Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment: A Bad Idea Whose Time 
Should Not Come, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 87 (1987); Eikenberry, Victims of 
Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 29 (1987); Joutsen, Listening To 
The Victim: The Victim's Role in European Criminal Justice Systems, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 95 (1987); 
Kelly, Victims, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 69 (1987); Kilpatrick and Otto, 
Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation In Criminal Proceedings for Victims: 
Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 7 (1987); 
Lamborn, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The Proposals For 
a Constitutional Amendment, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 125 (1987); Spencer, A Crime 
Victim's Views on a Constitutional Amendment for Victims, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 1 (1987); and 
Young, A Constitutional Amendment For Victims of Crime: The Victims' 
Perspective, 34 Wayne L.Rev. 51 (1987).

16

I understand 
that you may not be in a position to make these payments because you don't have 
a job and any source of income. The restitution, of course, has to be made in 
cash.

17

An indigent person 
charged with felony is entitled to equal protection under the law which includes 
the right to representation by counsel and while he may be civilly liable for 
the repayment of the money expended for counsel, such debt is a civil debt and 
in no sense part of the costs of prosecution included in the penalty of the 
statute defining the criminal act under which he is 
charged.

Ex Parte Wilson, 
183 N.E.2d 625, 626 (Ohio App. 1962).

As Justice Black in 
Griffin v. 
People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 589-90, 
100 L. Ed. 891, reh'g denied 351 U.S. 958, 76 S. Ct. 844, 100 L. Ed. 1480 (1956) eloquently espoused:

Providing equal justice 
for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have 
never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at least 
in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Charta: "To no one 
will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice. . . . No 
free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or 
anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." These pledges were 
unquestionably steps toward a fairer and more nearly equal application of 
criminal justice. In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due 
process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which 
allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of 
persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our 
entire judicial system - all people charged with crime must, so far as the law 
is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American 
court." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S. Ct. 472, 479, 84 L. Ed. 716. [Footnote omitted.]

18            
"As we look back upon the 
absurdity, impolicy, and cruelty of imprisonment for debt, we wonder what 
influences had stupefied the conscience and intelligence of mankind that laws so 
atrocious were so long endured." Freedman, supra n. 5, II Temp.L.Q. at 365 
(quoting from Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and 
America 359 (1894)).