Title: Carson v. Com.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

421 S.E.2d 415 (1992)
James Patrick CARSON
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 911887.

Supreme Court of Virginia.
September 18, 1992.
*416 Roger Allan Inger, Warrenton, for appellant.
Thomas C. Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, STEPHENSON, WHITING, LACY and HASSELL, JJ., and POFF, Senior Justice.
COMPTON, Justice.
In March 1989, defendant James Patrick Carson was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary, and to a fine, upon conviction by the trial court, sitting without a jury, of possession of cocaine and marijuana, both with intent to distribute. Subsequently, a panel of the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the convictions. Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 497, 404 S.E.2d 919 (1991). Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and affirmed the convictions for the reasons stated in the panel opinion. Four judges, including the Chief Judge, dissented. Carson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 280, 410 S.E.2d 412 (1991).
We awarded the defendant this appeal to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred: in ruling that the approach of the motor vehicle in which the defendant was riding and the questioning by the police officer did not constitute an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; in ruling that the initial stop of the motor vehicle did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; in ruling that seizure of the contraband fell within the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; and, in ruling that the search of the trunk of the defendant's automobile was lawful as a search based on probable cause, not a search incident to an arrest.
We have considered these questions and, for the reasons articulated in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
HASSELL, J., with whom WHITING and LACY, JJ., join, dissents.
HASSELL, Justice, with whom WHITING and LACY, Justices, join, dissenting.
I dissent because the majority's opinion permits law enforcement officers to detain, unreasonably, any law-abiding citizen traveling in a vehicle anywhere in the Commonwealth merely because that citizen has stopped his or her vehicle to comply with a traffic-control device. Such a practice is unconstitutional and ought not be condoned.
The facts clearly establish that State Trooper Childers and other law enforcement officers assigned to the Special Investigations Division established a de facto road block to detain drivers and to conduct spot checks. Trooper Childers and certain other officers were assigned to a position at a toll booth on Interstate 95. They were looking for automobiles traveling from Florida which might have been used to transport illegal drugs. Trooper Childers, wearing his state police badge and a cap or a jacket which identified him as a state police officer, was standing on a toll booth structure. He described his responsibilities as follows:
When Trooper Childers observed Carson's car, the trooper had a "hunch" that *417 Carson's car had departed from Florida, even though Maryland license plates were affixed to the car. Carson testified:
In my opinion, Trooper Childers implemented a de facto road block when he randomly approached and detained cars at the toll booth where the cars were required to stop and pay a toll. When Trooper Childers approached Carson's car, a seizure occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a `seizure' ... even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 202, 380 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1989).
Furthermore, Code §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-817 required that Carson remain where he was stopped when he was approached and detained by Trooper Childers and, thus, Carson was not free to leave. Code § 46.2-104 states, in part:
Code § 46.2-817 states, in part:
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. at 202-03, 380 S.E.2d  at 658 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979)).
Here, Trooper Childers' own testimony unequivocally establishes that the state police had no plan to insure that Carson's reasonable expectation of privacy was not subject to arbitrary invasion solely at the officer's unfettered discretion. Rather, Childers' testimony demonstrates that his decision to seize Carson's car was based solely upon his (Childers') suspicion which clearly violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As the dissent stated in the Court of Appeals:
Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 497, 508, 404 S.E.2d 919, 925-26 (1991) (dissent), aff'd reh'g en banc, 13 Va.App. 280, 410 S.E.2d 412 (1991).
Finally, the majority permits the government to intrude upon privacy interests of citizens merely because a citizen happens to be in an automobile. I believe that we must be ever mindful of the admonition articulated by the Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse:
*419 440 U.S.  at 662-63, 99 S. Ct.  at 1400-01 (footnote omitted).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.