Title: Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 2001-
Ohio-1335] 
 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GAHANNA-JEFFERSON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
APPELLANT, v. ZAINO, TAX COMMR., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 231.] 
Taxation — Real property — Exemptions — Tax Commissioner has jurisdiction 
under R.C. 5715.27(E) to hear a complaint challenging the continued 
exemption of property located within a Community Reinvestment Area. 
(No. 00-983 — Submitted February 28, 2001 — Decided September 26, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 99-K-1562. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  R.C. 3735.65 et seq. allows cities and counties to grant tax 
exemptions for real property located within a designated Community 
Reinvestment Area (“CRA”).  This case asks whether the Tax Commissioner 
(“commissioner”) has jurisdiction under R.C. 5715.27(E) to hear a complaint 
challenging the continued exemption of certain property located in a CRA.  The 
Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) answered this question in the negative.  But 
because nothing in R.C. 3735.65 et seq. necessarily undermines the general 
authority granted to the commissioner under R.C. 5715.27(E), we reverse. 
I 
 
Appellee Duke Realty, L.P. (“Duke”) owns real property located within an 
area of Columbus, Ohio, designated as a CRA.  Appellant Board of Education of 
the Gahanna-Jefferson Local School District (“Gahanna-Jefferson”) filed a 
complaint with the commissioner under R.C. 5715.27(E), asserting that the 
property in question no longer qualified for an exemption granted under R.C. 
3735.65 et seq.  The commissioner dismissed the complaint for lack of 
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2 
jurisdiction, concluding that he lacked the statutory authority to participate in the 
process of exempting from taxation property located within a CRA. 
 
The BTA affirmed the commissioner’s decision, relying almost 
exclusively on its recent decision in Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Tracy (Apr. 14, 2000), B.T.A. Nos. 98-M-358 and 98-M-359, unreported.  
Although the BTA acknowledged that Gahanna-Jefferson “ ‘may have a remedy 
by appeal to a court of common pleas’ ” under R.C. 3735.70, it found “ ‘no 
reference within R.C. 3735.67 et seq. which directs the commissioner to 
administer the incentives permitted to CRA’s,’ ” quoting Vandalia-Butler.  
Accordingly, the BTA found that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear 
Gahanna-Jefferson’s complaint against the continued exemption of Duke’s 
property. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
II 
 
When reviewing an appeal from the BTA, we must ascertain whether the 
BTA’s decision is reasonable and lawful.  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Zaino (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783, 785.  Although we will 
generally not disturb the BTA’s determinations on the weight of evidence and 
credibility of witnesses, we will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is 
based on an incorrect legal conclusion.  See SFZ Transp., Inc. v. Limbach (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 602, 604, 613 N.E.2d 1037, 1039.  In this case, we must decide 
whether the BTA correctly interpreted R.C. 3735.65 et seq. as depriving the 
commissioner of jurisdiction over a complaint filed under R.C. 5715.27(E) that 
seeks revocation of a tax exemption for property in a CRA. 
R.C. 3735.65 et seq. 
 
In R.C. 3735.65 et seq., the General Assembly has instituted a property tax 
incentive program that promotes the construction and remodeling of commercial, 
industrial, and residential structures in CRAs.  Before property may be exempted 
January Term, 2001 
3 
from taxation under this program, the legislative authority of a municipality or 
county must adopt resolutions designating the boundaries of a CRA.  R.C. 
3735.66.1  The legislative authority must also designate a housing officer to 
administer the CRA program.  Id.  New or remodeled residential, commercial, or 
industrial property located within a CRA is eligible for a partial or total tax 
exemption.  Id. 
 
To obtain an exemption for new or remodeled property located in a CRA, 
the owner must file an application with the housing officer designated by the 
legislative authority.  R.C. 3735.67.  If the property is commercial or industrial, 
the legislative authority and the owner must also enter into a written agreement 
before new construction begins.  R.C. 3735.67(A) and 3735.671(A).  Unless 
certain conditions in R.C. 3735.671(A)(2) or (A)(3) apply, the school board must 
be notified of the exemption and, in the case of commercial or industrial property, 
must approve the written agreement between the legislative authority and the 
owner.  R.C. 3735.67(A) and 3735.671(A)(1).  After the housing officer has 
determined that all the requirements for an exemption have been met, he or she 
forwards the application to the county auditor with information regarding the 
percentage and duration of the exemption.  R.C. 3735.67(C). 
 
Besides the authority granted by R.C. 3735.67, the housing officer also 
has the power to revoke a CRA exemption after the first year if “the housing 
officer finds that the property has not been properly maintained or repaired due to 
the neglect of the owner.”  R.C. 3735.68.  In addition, if the property is 
commercial or industrial, the legislative authority of the county or municipality 
may revoke the exemption if it finds that (1) the owner “has materially failed to 
                                                          
 
1. 
The area designated as a CRA must be “one in which housing facilities or structures of 
historical significance are located and new housing construction and repair of existing facilities or 
structures are discouraged.”  R.C. 3735.65(B). 
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fulfill its obligations” under the written agreement entered into pursuant to section 
R.C. 3735.671 or (2) the owner violated R.C. 3735.671(E).2  Id. 
 
The CRA statutory scheme also contains an appeals process.  R.C. 
3735.70 allows “[a]ny person aggrieved under sections 3735.65 to 3735.69 of the 
Revised Code” to appeal to the CRA housing council, an administrative body 
appointed by local authorities under R.C. 3735.69.  R.C. 3735.70 also provides 
for further appeals “from a decision of the council to the court of common pleas 
of the county where the area is located.” 
R.C. 5715.27 
 
In contrast to R.C. 3735.65 et seq.’s specific applicability to tax 
exemptions for property in a CRA, R.C. 5715.27 is a general statute relating to the 
granting and revoking of exemptions from real property taxes.  The statute allows 
property owners to file applications for tax exemption with the commissioner, 
who must then notify the boards of education of these applications if requested to 
do so.  See R.C. 5715.27(A) and (B).  A board of education may then “file a 
statement with the commissioner * * * indicating its intent to submit evidence and 
participate in any hearing on the application.”  R.C. 5715.27(C).  The 
commissioner may not act on the application for exemption before the board of 
education’s deadline for submitting this statement unless certain statutory 
exceptions apply.  R.C. 5715.27(D). 
 
One of these exceptions in R.C. 5715.27(D) expressly refers to a CRA 
exemption statute.  At the property owner’s request, the commissioner may act 
upon an exemption application prior to the date specified in R.C. 5715.27(C) “in 
the case of exemptions authorized by section 725.02, 1728.10, 3735.67, 5709.41, 
                                                          
 
2. 
Under R.C. 3735.671(E), a person (or that person’s “successor or related member”) may 
not enter into any agreement with a legislative authority under R.C. 3735.671 if, within the last 
five years, that person (1) was a party to an agreement granting a CRA exemption and (2) 
discontinued operations at the structure to which the exemption applied prior to the expiration of 
the term of the R.C. 3735.671 agreement. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
5709.62, or 5709.63 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 5715.27(D).  
Thus, even though R.C. 3735.65 et seq. does not mention the commissioner, R.C. 
5715.27(D) contemplates some involvement by the commissioner in the process 
of exempting CRA property from taxation. 
 
R.C. 5715.27 also contemplates commissioner involvement in a decision 
to revoke a property tax exemption.  R.C. 5715.27(E) provides that “[a] complaint 
may also be filed with the commissioner by any person, board, or officer 
authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints with the 
county board of revision against the continued exception of any property.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 5715.27(F) empowers the commissioner to decide the 
issue and to certify his or her findings to the county auditor. 
Reconciling the Statutes 
 
There is no dispute that Gahanna-Jefferson is a “board” that is authorized 
by R.C. 5715.27(E) to file a complaint against the continued exemption of 
property.  And because R.C. 5715.27(E) allows a complaint to be filed against the 
continued exemption of any property, Gahanna-Jefferson argues that it may file a 
complaint under this provision against property within a CRA that is exempted 
under R.C. 3735.65 et seq.  Conversely, the appellees contend that R.C. 
5715.27(E) is inapplicable because R.C. 3735.65 et seq. provides specific and 
exclusive procedures for revoking an exemption previously granted to property 
within a CRA.  And because these specific provisions in R.C. 3735.65 et seq. 
make no mention of commissioner involvement, the appellees contend that R.C. 
5715.27(E) cannot grant jurisdiction to the commissioner over Gahanna-
Jefferson’s complaint. 
 
The relevant starting point for our analysis is R.C. 1.51, which states: 
 
“If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they 
shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.  If the conflict 
between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as 
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an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later 
adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” 
 
When two statutory provisions are alleged to be in conflict, R.C. 1.51 
requires us to construe them, where possible, to give effect to both.  Schindler 
Elevator Corp. v. Tracy (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 496, 499, 705 N.E.2d 672, 674.  
“Only where the conflict is deemed irreconcilable does R.C. 1.51 mandate that 
one provision shall prevail over the other.”  (Emphasis added.)  United Tel. Co. of 
Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129, 1131.  Our 
comparison of R.C. 3735.65 et seq. and 5715.27(E) fails to convince us that these 
statutes are irreconcilable. 
 
As noted above, R.C. 3735.68 explains the circumstances under which a 
housing officer or local legislative authority may revoke a CRA exemption.  The 
statute does not, however, contain a provision authorizing a board of education to 
commence proceedings seeking to revoke a CRA exemption.  The appellees view 
this omission as evidence of the General Assembly’s “clear intent” to have R.C. 
3735.68 act as the “exclusive means” for revoking tax exemptions previously 
granted to property in a CRA.  But it is just as likely that R.C. 5715.27(E) remains 
available to parties like Gahanna-Jefferson as a means to seek revocation of the 
CRA exemption.  The General Assembly did not expressly preclude all 
commissioner involvement in the CRA exemption revocation process, though it 
could have done so within R.C. 3735.68 or anywhere else within R.C. 3735.65 et 
seq. 
 
The lack of an explicit preclusion of commissioner involvement makes 
R.C. 3735.65 et seq.’s procedure for revoking CRA exemptions easily 
reconcilable with R.C. 5715.27(E).  On the one hand, we may give effect to R.C. 
3735.68’s enumeration of specific methods of revoking CRA exemptions.  That 
is, R.C. 3735.68 expressly allows housing officers and local legislative authorities 
to revoke CRA exemptions in the specific situations stated in the statute.  If the 
January Term, 2001 
7 
party seeking to revoke a CRA exemption is a housing officer or local legislative 
authority, R.C. 3735.68 is the appropriate statute governing the revocation.  On 
the other hand, R.C. 5715.27(E) provides a means for revoking a CRA 
exemption—via a complaint filed with the commissioner—for parties other than a 
housing officer or a local legislative authority.  By its express terms, R.C. 
5715.27(E) provides for commissioner jurisdiction over complaints filed by 
specified persons and entities against the continued exception of any property.  
This general grant of authority does not irreconcilably conflict with the specific 
scheme of R.C. 3735.65 et seq.  And without an irreconcilable conflict, R.C. 1.51 
requires us to give effect to both R.C. 5715.27(E) and 3735.65 et seq. 
 
The fact that R.C. 3735.70 provides an avenue for appeals relating to CRA 
exemptions does not undermine our reconciliation of R.C. 3735.65 et seq. with 
R.C. 5715.27(E).  Although R.C. 3735.70 allows an appeal to the housing council 
by “[a]ny person aggrieved,” it is not obvious that a party such as Gahanna-
Jefferson could invoke this provision.  Assuming that a school board qualifies as a 
“person aggrieved” within the meaning of R.C. 3735.70, the statute vests 
authority in the housing council only to “overrule any decision of a housing 
officer.” (Emphasis added.)  But if a housing officer simply takes no action to 
revoke a CRA exemption, there has been no formal “decision” from which to 
appeal.  Further, R.C. 3735.70’s language provides no vehicle by which anyone, 
let alone a school board, may challenge a legislative authority’s “decision” not to 
revoke a CRA exemption.  In light of these inherent limitations in the process 
outlined in R.C. 3735.70, we cannot conclude that this statute evidences a 
legislative intent to supersede the commissioner’s authority to entertain 
complaints filed under R.C. 5715.27(E). 
III 
 
Reading the relevant statutes together and giving effect to both R.C. 
5715.27(E) and 3735.65 et seq., we hold that the commissioner has jurisdiction 
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8 
over Gahanna-Jefferson’s complaint against the continued exemption of the 
property at issue.  The BTA’s decision to the contrary was unreasonable and 
unlawful.  We accordingly reverse the decision of the BTA and remand this cause 
to the commissioner for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  The majority today holds that as R.C. 
5715.27(E) can be reconciled with R.C. 3735.65 et seq., “R.C. 5715.27(E) 
remains available to parties like Gahanna-Jefferson as a means to seek revocation 
of the CRA exemption.”  I believe R.C. 5715.27(E) and R.C. 3735.65 et seq. are 
irreconcilable; therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
The relevant starting point for our inquiry is R.C. 1.51.  Pursuant to R.C. 
1.51: 
 
“If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they 
shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.  If the conflict 
between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as 
an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later 
adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” 
 
In Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 
Ohio St.3d 28, 567 N.E.2d 1018, we were presented with the issue of whether the 
Ohio Department of Agriculture had exclusive authority to regulate sanitary 
conditions of food establishments or whether local boards of health could also 
regulate in this area.  We compared the local and state sanitary regulations and 
determined that “[i]f the above comparisons, or others within these regulations, 
January Term, 2001 
9 
result in a determination that a conflict exists, the standards of construction found 
in R.C. 1.51 pertain.”  Id. at 37, 567 N.E.2d at 1027. 
 
Similarly, in Schindler Elevator Corp., we compared R.C. 5703.37, a 
general provision mandating service requirements for the Department of Taxation, 
with R.C. 5739.13, a special provision pertaining to the service of notices of sales 
tax assessments.  Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Tracy (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 496, 
499, 705 N.E.2d 672, 674.  After determining that there was a conflict between 
the two provisions, we noted that “ ‘[w]here there is no manifest legislative intent 
that a general provision of the Revised Code prevail over a special provision, the 
special provision takes precedence.’ ”  Id., 84 Ohio St.3d at 499, 705 N.E.2d at 
674, quoting State v. Frost (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 11 O.O.3d 294, 387 N.E.2d 
235, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
In Toledo Business & Professional Women’s Retirement Living, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Tax Appeals (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 255, 56 O.O.2d 153, 272 N.E.2d 359, the 
taxpayer sought a property tax exemption pursuant to a general statutory 
exemption for property operated exclusively for charitable purposes, i.e., homes 
for the aged operated by nonprofit corporations.  We denied the exemption, 
holding that the enactment of an intervening exemption specifically for homes for 
the aged limited us to applying specific criteria.  Specifically, we stated that the 
power to grant tax exceptions “is lodged exclusively in the General Assembly, 
and once it has chosen a specific subject for tax exemption, and defined the 
criteria, the function of the executive and judicial branches is limited to applying 
those criteria to a particular case, or to interpreting them if necessary.  Any other 
interpretation of Section 2 of Article X of our Constitution would constitute an 
usurpation of the power thereby granted in favor of, and co-sharing of that power 
by, those other branches.”  Id. at 258, 56 O.O.2d at 154, 272 N.E.2d at 361-362. 
 
In Rickenbacker, we explained that Toledo requires that “a property, to be 
exempt, must qualify under the criteria of the statute specifically applicable to that 
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property.”  Rickenbacker Port Auth. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 628, 631, 
597 N.E.2d 494, 496.  Rickenbacker involved a conflict between R.C. 4582.46, a 
specific exemption statute, and R.C. 5709.08 and 5709.121, two general 
exemption statutes.  Id. at 631, 597 N.E.2d at 496.  R.C. 4582.46 granted an 
exemption to property belonging to port authority facilities, provided that the 
property at issue was not leased for more than one year.  Rickenbacker had 
entered into a multiyear lease on the property at issue and argued that since the 
property was operated for a public purpose, it should be exempted under the 
general exemption statutes, R.C. 5709.08 and 5709.121.  Id. at 630-631, 597 
N.E.2d at 496. 
 
We held that “[i]f a port authority could exempt its property under a 
statute other than R.C. 4582.46, the one-year limitation contained therein would 
have no effect.”  Id., 64 Ohio St.3d at 632, 597 N.E.2d at 496.  Accordingly, we 
held that the specific statute, R.C. 4582.46, applied and that Rickenbacker did not 
qualify for an exemption pursuant to it, as Rickenbacker had failed to meet its 
criteria with respect to a lease of no more than one year.  Id. at 632, 597 N.E.2d at 
496-497. 
 
I believe that the instant case presents a conflict between R.C. 3735.65 et 
seq. and R.C. 5715.27.  Whereas housing officers and other local officials control 
exemption determinations under R.C. 3735.67, R.C. 5715.27 involves the Tax 
Commissioner in all phases of the exemption process.  R.C. 5715.27(A) allows 
property owners to file an application for exemption with the Tax Commissioner, 
while R.C. 5715.27(B) directs the Tax Commissioner to notify the board of 
education of applications for exemption if requested to do so.  The board of 
education may participate in the hearing by the Tax Commissioner upon request 
to the Tax Commissioner.  R.C. 5715.27(C) and (D).  Additionally, R.C. 
5715.27(E) and 5715.27(F) allow complaints against a continued exemption to be 
filed with the Tax Commissioner, who is empowered to consider such complaints 
January Term, 2001 
11 
and certify his or her findings to the auditor.  Finally, the Board of Tax Appeals 
hears appeals from decisions under R.C. 5715.27.  R.C. 5717.02. 
 
It is true that R.C. 5715.27 specifically refers to R.C. 3735.67.  R.C. 
5715.27(D) gives the Tax Commissioner the authority to “act upon an application 
at any time prior to that date upon receipt of a written waiver from each such 
board of education, or, in the case of exemptions authorized by section 725.02, 
1728.10, 3735.67, 5709.41, 5709.62, or 5709.63 of the Revised Code, upon the 
request of the property owner.”  (Emphasis added.)  However, the procedure for 
revocation of an exemption granted pursuant to R.C. 3735.65 et seq. 
conspicuously lacks any involvement on the part of the Tax Commissioner.  
While R.C. 5715.27(D) directs the Tax Commissioner to act upon a request for 
exemption by a property owner pursuant to R.C. 3735.67, there are no words in 
R.C. 3735.65 et seq. that authorize the Tax Commissioner to grant or revoke an 
exemption.  A review of the other statutes cited in R.C. 5715.27(D) reveals that 
although all provide for property tax exemption incentives, only R.C. 3735.65 et 
seq. provides a comprehensive procedure for the granting and revocation of 
exemptions.  In addition, R.C. 3735.70 gives an aggrieved party the right to 
appeal a decision of a housing officer to the court of common pleas of the county 
in which the subject property is located, rather than providing an avenue of review 
through the Tax Commissioner and ultimately the Board of Tax Appeals, as is 
authorized by R.C. 5715.27(E) and 5717.02.  Thus, a conflict regarding the 
authority of the Tax Commissioner exists between R.C. 3735.65 et seq. and R.C. 
5715.27. 
 
The board argues that, notwithstanding these specific procedures granting 
jurisdiction to the housing officer designated by the legislative authority, the Tax 
Commissioner has concurrent jurisdiction to revoke exemptions under R.C. 
3735.67.  The board relies on State ex rel. Methodist Book Concern v. 
Guckenberger (1937), 133 Ohio St. 27, 9 O.O. 432, 10 N.E.2d 1001, and Society 
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of Precious Blood v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1948), 149 Ohio St. 62, 65, 36 O.O. 403, 
405, 77 N.E.2d 459, 461, which reaffirmed Methodist Book.  However, those 
cases involved the authority of the county auditor to strike property from the 
exempt list and are not relevant to determining the issue at bar.  For example, 
Methodist Book was an action in prohibition that held that although G.C. 5570-1 
gave the Tax Commission exclusive authority to declare property exempt, the 
county auditor had authority in any year thereafter to strike property from the 
exempt list precisely because the function performed by the auditor was 
ministerial and not quasi-judicial.  Methodist Book, 133 Ohio St. 27, 9 O.O. 432, 
10 N.E.2d 1001, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  In addition, the court 
found that an aggrieved party had the right to appeal to the Tax Commission 
pursuant to G.C. 5616.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  However, unlike the 
conspicuous lack of any mention of the Tax Commissioner in R.C. 3735.65 et 
seq., G.C. 5616 expressly permitted “[a]ny person, board or officer authorized by 
this act to file complaints with the county board of revision [to] complain to the 
Tax Commission of Ohio.”  Methodist Book, 133 Ohio St. at 28, 9 O.O. at 433, 10 
N.E.2d at 1001.  Society of Precious Blood merely reaffirmed Methodist Book in 
recognizing the authority of the auditor to reenter property on the taxable list.  
Society of Precious Blood, 149 Ohio St. at 65, 36 O.O. at 405, 77 N.E.2d at 461.  
Thus, neither Methodist Book nor Society of Precious Blood stands for the 
proposition that the auditor and Tax Commissioner have concurrent jurisdiction 
and are inapposite to this case. 
 
Appellant board also cites Fid. S. & L. Co. v. Strabala (May 1, 1986), 
Columbiana App. No. 84-C-36, unreported, 1986 WL 5284, for the proposition 
that the auditor and housing officer have concurrent jurisdiction to remove 
properties.  However, Fidelity does not stand for this proposition, holding only 
that the removal of property from the exempt list by the county auditor is a 
ministerial act required by R.C. 5713.08.  Thus, case law cited by the board is 
January Term, 2001 
13 
inapplicable to the issue at bar and does not persuade us that the General 
Assembly intended R.C. 5715.27 to prevail over R.C. 3735.65 et seq. 
 
In conclusion, I would find that R.C. 3735.65 et seq. provides detailed, 
specific procedures for the application, administration, and revocation of tax 
exemptions for property in a CRA.  Given the lack of manifest intent that the 
General Assembly meant R.C. 5715.27 to prevail and the clear intent of the 
General Assembly to have R.C. 3735.65 et seq. act as a self-contained program 
administered on a local level, I would conclude that R.C. 3735.65 et seq., the 
specific statutes, outline the exclusive procedure for the granting and revocation 
of exemptions.  Accordingly, I would agree with the Tax Commissioner that he 
lacks jurisdiction to consider a complaint against an exemption that is granted 
pursuant to R.C. 3735.65 et seq. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Board of Tax 
Appeals. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
 
Green & Hughes Co., L.P.A., and Martin J. Hughes III, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Phyllis J. Shambaugh, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Tax Commissioner. 
 
Thompson, Hine & Flory, L.L.P., and Peter D. Welin, for appellee Duke 
Realty, Inc. 
__________________