Title: Gallipo v. City of Rutland

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gallipo v. City of Rutland (2004-041); 178 Vt. 244; 882 A.2d 1177

2005 VT 83

[Filed 29-Jul-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 83

                                No. 2004-041

  Raymond Gallipo	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Rutland Superior Court

  City of Rutland	                         February Term, 2005

  Richard W. Norton, J.

  Andrew Jackson, Middlebury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Joseph A. Farnham and Kevin J. Coyle of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan,
    Burlington, for  Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.  

  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, J., and Grearson, D.J., Allen, C.J. (Ret.),
            and Gibson, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶   1.  DOOLEY, J.  Plaintiff, Raymond Gallipo, appeals a superior
  court order granting summary judgment to defendant, City of Rutland, on
  plaintiff's retaliatory discrimination claims, and defendant appeals the
  court's order dismissing its unjust enrichment counterclaim.  Plaintiff
  argues that the court erred in (1) accepting defendant's requests to admit
  as fact and denying plaintiff a renewed chance to respond; (2) admitting
  defendant's statement of undisputed facts in its summary judgment motion
  for plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 56(c)(2); and (3) determining
  that collateral estoppel applied to the workers' compensation proceedings. 
  Defendant argues that the trial court erred in precluding it from
  recovering temporary workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff.  We
  affirm both appeals.

       ¶   2.  The parties appear before this court for the sixth time.  See
  Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 173 Vt. 223, 225-26, 789 A.2d 942, 945 (2001)
  [hereinafter Gallipo V] (chronicling facts and procedural history of
  dispute).  They have been involved in litigation for over fifteen years
  surrounding plaintiff's claims of discrimination against his former
  employer, the City of Rutland, where he worked as a firefighter.  In 1995,
  a jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor, finding that the City
  discriminated against plaintiff by refusing to promote him because of his
  religious practices and a learning disability.  After this verdict,
  plaintiff continued to work for the City's fire department and in 1998
  began this action.

       ¶   3.  This litigation is best viewed in two phases.  The first
  began when plaintiff filed a complaint under the Vermont Fair Employment
  Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-496, (VFEPA) naming as defendants the City
  of Rutland and its fire chief, Gerald Lloyd, and claiming that, in response
  to his success in the previous trial, the City engaged in unlawful
  retaliatory employment practices.  Plaintiff alleged that these practices
  included subjecting him to heightened scrutiny, resentment, withholding of
  computer privileges and training, denial of funeral leave, videotaping him
  at a training class, denial of workers' compensation, denial of sick leave
  credits and constant criticism and shunning.  
   
       ¶   4.  Plaintiff particularly complained of an incident on September
  13, 1996, when a fire department trainer attempted to videotape a training
  session at which plaintiff was present.  Following a heated exchange with
  the person who was instructed to video the session, plaintiff left the
  training and did not return to work.  Plaintiff claims that he was being
  targeted by the taping and that the incident caused him great stress. 
  Defendant counters that the taping was routine, done for the benefit of
  those who could not attend, and not personally aimed at plaintiff.

       ¶   5.  Plaintiff never returned to work after the taping incident and
  on the day of the incident filed a workers' compensation claim alleging
  that he suffered anxiety and depression as a result of his treatment at the
  fire department.  He articulated four stressors that caused his mental
  injury: ongoing ridicule from fellow firefighters; use of profane language
  by other employees; lack of a computer password to perform his role as
  computer specialist; and the confrontation over the videotaping.  The
  Commissioner of Labor and Industry awarded interim benefits to plaintiff
  while his claim was pending.  Ultimately, the Commissioner denied this
  claim, concluding that "plaintiff had failed to prove that the mental
  injury he alleged was caused by work-related stresses from any of the four
  specified events."  Gallipo V, 173 Vt. at 226, 789 A.2d  at 945.

       ¶   6.  During discovery, defendants deposed plaintiff on January 19,
  1999 and thereafter served requests for admission on March 1, 1999. 
  V.R.C.P. 36.  Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment on March
  3, 1999.  Although plaintiff responded to the summary judgment motion, he
  never submitted answers to the requests to admit.  The superior court
  granted summary judgment on April 19, 2000, concluding that the Fire Chief
  was immune from suit and that the workers' compensation action exclusivity
  clause prevented plaintiff from bringing his employment discrimination
  action.  Plaintiff appealed, and we affirmed the first ground and reversed
  the second.  Gallipo V, 173 Vt. at 239, 789 A.2d  at 954.  As a result of
  our decision, fire chief, Gerald Lloyd, was dismissed as a defendant, and
  the action proceeded solely against the City.  This ended the first phase
  of the litigation.
   
       ¶   7.  The second phase commenced with the remand to the superior
  court.  Plaintiff sought successfully to amend his complaint to allege that
  he was terminated by defendant as part of its retaliatory actions against
  him.  The motion to amend was ultimately granted in October 2002. 
  Meanwhile, defendant filed three motions for summary judgment as follows:
  (1) the first alleged that based on the undisputed facts-particularly those
  shown by defendant's requests to admit in phase one of the litigation and
  its statement of undisputed facts in support of its summary judgment
  motion-defendant was entitled to judgment as matter of law on plaintiff's
  discrimination claims; (2) the second alleged, as discussed below,
  plaintiff's claims were barred by the preclusive effect of the Commissioner
  of Labor and Industry's decision; and (3) the third sought reimbursement
  for temporary workers' compensation benefits the City paid to plaintiff. 

       ¶   8.  Defendant's issue preclusion argument was based on the fact
  that on July 12, 2000, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry denied
  plaintiff's workers' compensation claim because she found that none of the
  alleged stressors created stress greater than that for other employees. 
  Following the Commissioner's decision, defendant counterclaimed against
  plaintiff seeking reimbursement of temporary workers' compensation benefits
  paid to plaintiff under an interim order requiring the City to pay benefits
  while plaintiff's claim was pending.  Defendant argued that reimbursement
  was appropriate under a theory of unjust enrichment and moved for summary
  judgment, the third motion described above, for the return of $67,413 plus
  interest in August 2002.
   
       ¶   9.  In response to defendant's first summary judgment motion,
  plaintiff relied upon a statement of contested facts filed in 1999 and
  attached new affidavits, and an "additional statement of contested material
  facts" based upon the affidavits.  He also requested permission to submit
  untimely answers to the March 1, 1999 requests to admit.  The court denied
  plaintiff's request to allow a renewed chance to respond and further held
  that plaintiff had failed to file a proper statement of disputed material
  facts as required by Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2).  Because of the
  civil rule violation, the court deemed defendant's statement of undisputed
  material facts as admitted.  It did not, however, grant summary judgment on
  this record alone, instead the court combined this first motion with the
  second one.

       ¶   10.  The court's decision on the second summary judgment motion
  parallels its decision on the first.  Again, it held that plaintiff had
  failed to comply with Rule 56(c)(2) when he filed new material in response
  to the motion and held, as a result, that defendant's statement of
  undisputed facts was deemed admitted.  It also ruled that the Commissioner
  of Labor and Industry's decision on plaintiff's claim for workers'
  compensation preclusively established the same facts.  

       ¶   11.  Combining the undisputed facts established by plaintiff's
  admissions, and those submitted in support of the two motions, the court
  held that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of
  plaintiff's claims.  Specifically, the court held that since "plaintiff did
  not suffer a compensable stress-related injury arising out of the course of
  his employment and that his perceived mistreatment was subjective,"
  plaintiff's discrimination claim could not go forward.

       ¶   12.  The court denied the third summary judgment motion, under
  which defendant sought return of the amounts paid as temporary workers'
  compensation benefits based on a theory of unjust enrichment.  The court
  concluded that, even if defendant's claim could be maintained on a theory
  of unjust enrichment, the facts did not support application of the theory
  because defendant failed to file medical evidence in opposition to
  plaintiff's supported motion for interim benefits.  Thus, the court
  reasoned that defendant slept on its rights, and plaintiff was not unjustly
  enriched.  This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
   
                                     I.

       ¶   13.  We first address plaintiff's argument that the court erred in
  granting defendant summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim.  On
  appeal, we review summary judgment de novo and use the same standard as the
  trial court.  Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Agency of Transp., 174 Vt.
  341, 344,