Title: Ex Parte Alapati

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

826 So. 2d 792 (2002)
Ex parte Subba R. ALAPATI, M.D.
(In re Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville d/b/a Huntsville Hospital v. Subba R. Alapati, M.D.)
1001881.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 1, 2002.
*793 Bill G. Hall and D. Milburn Gross, Jr., of Ables, Baxter, Parker & Hall, P.C., Huntsville, for petitioner.
Sandra Parker Hoffpauir of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for respondent.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Dr. Subba R. Alapati, the defendant in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge E. Dwight Faye, Jr., to vacate his March 27, 2001, protective order. That order provides that the plaintiff, the HealthCare Authority of the City of Huntsville doing business as Huntsville Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "the Hospital"), is not required to answer interrogatories or to produce documents relating to agreements it has entered into with physicians other than Dr. Alapati under its medical staff development assistance program. The petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.
On November 15, 2000, the Hospital sued Dr. Alapati, alleging that he had failed to make payments in accordance with the terms of a loan agreement originally executed by the parties on January 9, 1991, through the hospital's medical staff development assistance program. The Hospital sought a judgment against Dr. Alapati in the amount of $10,920.42, representing the alleged unpaid balance on the loan, plus interest. On January 11, 2001, Dr. Alapati filed an answer denying the allegations of the Hospital's complaint and pleading the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations, waiver, illegality of contract, laches, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dr. Alapati sought discovery under Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., filing interrogatories and a request for production. On March 9, 2001, Dr. Alapati filed a motion to compel, seeking an order from the trial court requiring the Hospital to respond to his discovery requests. On March 13, 2001, the trial court granted Dr. Alapati's motion to compel, allowing the Hospital 14 days to respond.
On March 14, 2001, the Hospital filed a motion for a protective order and a request for a hearing; that motion stated, in pertinent part:
On March 23, 2001, Dr. Alapati filed a motion in opposition to the Hospital's motion for protective order; that motion stated, in pertinent part:
On March 27, 2001, the trial court entered an order that stated:
*796 On April 2, 2001, Dr. Alapati filed an amended answer, adding the following affirmative defense:
On April 3, 2001, Dr. Alapati filed a motion requesting that the trial court reconsider its grant of the Hospital's motion for a protective order. That motion for reconsideration was denied on April 5, 2001. Dr. Alapati thereafter petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals to enter a writ of mandamus; that court denied the petition on July 10, 2001, without an opinion. Ex parte Alapati, (No. 2000790, July 10, 2001) ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (table).
This Court's standard of review of a petition for writ of mandamus is well settled.
Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala.1998). Furthermore, we have stated:
Ex parte L.S.B., 800 So. 2d 574, 578 (Ala. 2001).
Dr. Alapati argues that the petition for the writ of mandamus is due to be granted because, he says, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Hospital's motion for a protective order. Specifically, he argues (1) that the material he requested was relevant and authorized under Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., and (2) that the Hospital did not comply with the provisions of Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., in seeking the protective order.
Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part:
Dr. Alapati asserts that the information he seeks is relevant because, he says, it relates to his defense that the agreement between the Hospital and him is illegal as enforced. Specifically, he claims that the Hospital has not sought to enforce similar agreements it has with other physicians if those physicians refer sufficient numbers of patients to the Hospital. Relying on these allegations, he says that the Hospital chooses not to enforce certain agreements based upon the amount of referrals by physicians who are parties to those agreements, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. He further cites in support of his argument Polk County v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451 (E.D.Tex.1992), in which a federal district court found a physician recruitment agreement illegal under 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn and under Texas law. Dr. Alapati also cites, as he did to the trial court, several cases to the effect that an illegal contract is not enforceable in Alabama. See Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855 (Ala.1984), Thompson v. Wiik, Reimer & Sweet, 391 So. 2d 1016 (Ala.1980); Ellis v. Batson, 177 Ala. 313, 58 So. 193 (1912).
It is not necessary for us to address these assertions because they do not affect whether the agreement entered into between Dr. Alapati and the Hospital is illegal on its face or as enforced.[1] As Dr. *798 Alapati states in his brief, this Court has defined relevant information as information "relating to the subject matter of the action and having a reasonable possibility that the information sought will lead to other evidence that will be admissible; to be relevant, information need not itself be competent as evidence at trial." Ex parte Thomas, 628 So. 2d 483, 485 (Ala.1993).
We agree with the trial court that the information Dr. Alapati seeks is not calculated to lead to the discovery of information that is relevant to the subject matter of this actionthe agreement entered into between him and the Hospital. Specifically, we are provided with no authority, and we are aware of none, that would support the legal conclusion that the Hospital's violation of federal law in regard to its agreements with other physicians is relevant to whether the particular contract between Dr. Alapati and the Hospital is illegal on its face or as enforced.[2]
Because we conclude that Dr. Alapati has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion, see Ex parte L.S.B., supra, it necessarily follows that he does not have a clear legal right to an order by the trial court vacating its March 27, 2001, protective order. See Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra. Therefore, the petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  We do note that the federal district court in Peters considered only the agreement before it in determining that that agreement violated federal law and was unenforceable under Texas law. The court made no statement in regard to whether other agreements that that hospital had entered into with other physicians were discoverable or were in any way relevant to the court's consideration of the agreement before it.
[2]  Further, in regard to Dr. Alapati's argument that the Hospital did not meet the requirements of Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., by failing to include in its motion for a protective order a statement that the Hospital's counsel had attempted to resolve this discovery dispute with Dr. Alapati's counsel, we note that this procedural defect alone does not support the issuance of the writ of mandamus. In Ex parte Compass Bank, 686 So. 2d 1135, 1137-38 (Ala.1996), this Court stated that "Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., recognizes that the right to discovery is not unlimited, and the trial court has broad powers to prevent its abuse by any party." In light of the trial court's broad discretion concerning matters of discovery, we defer to the trial court's perception of the facts and procedural posture of the parties in concluding that the absence of strict compliance with Rule 26(c) concerning the parties' attempts to resolve the discovery dispute, does not give rise to a clear legal right to have the protective order vacated. Our conclusion in this regard is also supported by the discussion in the Committee Comments to the August 1, 1992, Amendment to Rule 26(c). Those comments state that amending Rule 26(c) to include this requirement was done "hop[ing] that most discovery disputes will be resolved between counsel without resort to provisions regarding protective orders."