Title: Sax Enterprises v. HOTEL EMP. UNION LOCAL NO. 255

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

80 So. 2d 602 (1955)
SAX ENTERPRISES, Inc., Petitioner,
v.
HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL NO. 255 (A.F. of L.) and Albert H. Berlin, Clarence L. Smith and Henry Mischel, as Business Agents and Officers thereof, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division A.
May 27, 1955.
Sibley & Davis, Miami Beach, and Weldon G. Starry, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
*603 Warren, Klein & Moore, Miami Beach, Gramling & Gramling, Miami, and J.W. Brown, Cincinnati, Ohio, for respondents.
HOBSON, Justice.
Petitioner is the owner of one of the popular hotels of Miami Beach, the Saxony. Respondents comprise Hotel Employees Union Local No. 255 (A.F. of L.), its business agents and officers. Petitioner filed a complaint wherein it prayed that respondents be enjoined from picketing its hotel on account of violence and that the picketing was done for an unlawful purpose. On application for temporary injunction, evidence was taken, at the conclusion of which temporary injunction was denied. As to the contentions that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose, the chancellor specifically recognized that to be the main issue in the case but refused to adjudicate it because no answer had been filed or issue made on that point. Said the chancellor, that point should be decided at final hearing after answer. His order was conditioned on expediting the cause on account of its effect on the parties. From this order, we are confronted with an appeal by certiorari.
The point for determination is whether or not the chancellor committed error in entering said order.
At the outset, it is pertinent to relate that while this case was heard in conjunction with similar cases against the Roney Plaza, the Monte Carlo, the Sans Souci, the Sherry Frontenac, the Sorrento and the Algiers Hotels, the order involved here applies only to the Saxony Hotel. We have examined the record carefully and we find insufficient showing to reverse the chancellor on the question of whether or not picketing the Saxony Hotel was accompanied by violence. His order was "without prejudice to reapply for an injunction on the grounds of excessive conduct or violence, if such appears to be justified by future acts" and warranted by the evidence.
Whether or not the picketing was being done for a lawful purpose presents a more difficult question. Petitioner contends that it was entitled to an injunction because its complaint was sworn to and not challenged by motion to dismiss, answer or affidavit denying the facts relied on. Anderson v. Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 159 So. 782; Kellerman v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127; First National Bank of Gainesville v. Massey, 132 Fla. 113, 182 So. 187; Taylor v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 307; Seaboard Oil Company v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 128 So. 821; Treasure, Inc., v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union, Fla. 1954, 72 So. 2d 670, and Osceola Groves, Inc., v. Wiley, Fla. 1955, 78 So. 2d 700, are offered to support this contention.
We must agree with petitioner's contention because in a situation such as is presented by the record in this case, when the point is raised, the chancellor is duty bound to determine on an application for a temporary restraining order whether the picketing was for a lawful purpose. The allegations of the sworn complaint together with the evidence introduced at the hearing upon the application for a temporary restraining order, at which hearing all parties hereto were represented, are sufficient under our opinion in Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod, Fla. 1952, 61 So. 2d 753, the cases cited therein, and Treasure, Inc., v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union, supra, Fla., 72 So. 2d 670, to establish the fact that the picketing which is being carried on was and is for an unlawful purpose.
Without doubt a labor organization has the right to engage in peaceful picketing of an employer's premises when predicated upon the refusal of the employer to recognize and negotiate with the union as the representative of such employer's employees. In order for such picketing to be lawful, the union must establish that the employees have chosen it as their representative, Treasure, Inc., v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union, supra, and the labor organization must also inform the employer of the object to *604 be accomplished by the picketing and afford to the employer a fair opportunity to engage in negotiations. See North East Texas Motor Lines, Inc., v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W.2d 795.
With no evidence to the contrary, the chancellor had no alternative other than to accept as true the sworn allegations of the complaint. Pertinent among these allegations are the following:
Since, according to the allegations of the sworn complaint, the placards carried by the pickets contained false information, it cannot be said that they conveyed "information concerning the facts of a labor dispute". (Italics supplied.) It is therefore obvious that the purpose of the picketing is unlawful. As we said in the case of Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, supra [61 So.2d 755]:
It is clear, therefore, that the real purpose of the picketing was to force the employees of the Saxony Hotel to designate the union or the individual respondents as their bargaining agent, and to coerce said hotel owners through economic sanctions to sign contracts with the union and to use said contracts as a basis to compel the employees of the hotels to become members of the respondent union.
Certiorari is granted as to that part of the chancellor's order which deferred a ruling upon the question whether or not the picketing was being carried on for an unlawful purpose, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to enter a temporary restraining order.
It is so ordered.
DREW, C.J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.