Title: Gann v. Keith

State: texas

Issuer: Texas Supreme Court

Document:

253 S.W.2d 413 (1952) GANN et al. v. KEITH et al. No. A-3711. Supreme Court of Texas. December 3, 1952. Rehearing Denied December 31, 1952. Murray & Murray, Floresville, Charles J. Lieck, San Antonio, for appellants. Carl Wright Johnson and Nat L. Hardy, San Antonio, for appellees. SHARP, Justice. The Court of Civil Appeals at San Antonio certifies to this Court certain questions hereinafter set out, and the certificate is accompanied by the entire record in the case, together with the briefs of the parties. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is reported in 249 S.W.2d 683, and contains a comprehensive statement of the facts and the reasons for its decision. In order to show the background of the questions certified, we quote from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals certain controlling facts, as follows: The Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion sets out certain findings of fact made by the trial judge, which will not be repeated here. We quote further from the opinion as follows: The evidence relied upon to show a violation of Article 6701d, § 121, is also set out in the opinion, which will not be repeated here. The Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion further said: "This holding effects no change in the disposition of this cause and the original order of affirmance will remain in effect." The certificate reads as follows: Petitioners, who reside in Wilson County, Texas, brought this suit in Wilson County against respondents Raymond Earl Mabra and Ben E. Keith; the said Mabra, who was an employee of and was driving the truck for Keith being a resident of Dallas County, Texas, and the said Ben E. Keith being a resident of Tarrant County, Texas. It was alleged that respondents violated Section 9-a of Article 827a, Vernon's Annotated Penal Code, and certain sections of Article 6701d, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. The action, in order to establish venue in Wilson County, was based upon *417 Section 9 of Article 1995, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Respondents are not being prosecuted for a criminal offense for which punishment is sought to be enforced against them. This is a civil suit for which damages are sought for a violation of Section 9-a of Article 827a of the Penal Code and certain sections of Article 6701d, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Petitioners contend that Section 138 of Article 6701d is void for uncertainty, and therefore did not repeal Section 9-a of Article 827a of the Penal Code. We answer Question No. 1, "Yes." This answer is based upon the ground that petitioners are interested in Section 138 of Article 6701d, although it may be declared invalid as a penal statute, because it may constitute a rule of civil conduct. For a discussion of the authorities bearing upon this question see Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Stevenson, Tex.Com. App., 29 S.W.2d 995; West Texas Coaches, Inc., v. Madi, Tex.Com.App., 26 S.W.2d 199. The courts recognize that one whose rights are affected by the operation of a statute may question its validity. City of Amarillo v. Tutor, Tex.Com.App., 267 S.W. 697; 9 Tex.Jur., p. 467, § 53; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 76, p. 164. In Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808, 812, this Court said: Section 5 of Article V of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., of this State provides that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction in all criminal cases of whatever grade, with certain exceptions which are not involved in this case. We answer Question No. 2 as follows: The Court of Criminal Appeals has not passed upon the validity of Section 138 of Article 6701d. Since respondents are not being prosecuted for a violation of the statute, and only civil liability is sought for failure to comply with some of its provisions, we will confine our construction of the statute under the latter standard. As a general rule, criminal statutes do not create civil liability, and since this Court has held that although a penal statute may be held void for lack of certainty, yet it has been held that it may constitute a rule of civil conduct. For this reason Section 138 of Article 6701d is not unconstitutional and void. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Stevenson, supra; West Texas Coaches, Inc., v. Madi, supra. We answer Question No. 3 as follows: Article 6701d is a very comprehensive law, and the act shows upon its face that it was intended as a comprehensive code for the regulation of traffic on highways, and was considered by the Legislature as both a civil and a criminal statute. The intent of the Legislature is clearly shown by Section 154, which reads: "This Act may be cited as the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways." The Act shows that it was intended to cover and regulate traffic in every respect on the highways of the State. The Legislature inserted in the Act the following: A portion of the repealing provisions applicable to this case reads as follows: The title or caption of this Act reads as follows: It is agreed that Section 138 of Article 6701d is inconsistent with and in conflict with Section 9-a of Article 827a, Vernon's Annotated Penal Code. Section 138 is only a part of Article 6701d, and does not contain the repealing provisions. Regardless of Section 138 of Article 6701d, Section 9-a of Article 827a is repealed by the above provisions of Article 6701d. In the case of Simmons v. Germany, Tex. Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 774, the Court of Civil Appeals held that Section 138 of Article 6701d was in conflict with Section 9-a of Article 827a, and therefore repealed Section 9-a of Article 827a. The Court of Civil Appeals in this case sustained that holding, and we agree that Section 9-a of Article 827a was repealed. 39 Tex.Jur., p. 131, § 68; 8 Tex.Jur.Sup., p. 806, §§ 67 and 68; 50 Amer.Jur., p. 525, § 516. We answer Question No. 4 as follows: Section 9-a of Article 827a was repealed by the Legislature by the enactment of Article 6701d, and therefore the repealed article cannot be used to establish venue in Wilson County. In reaching this conclusion it is not necessary to hold that Section 138 of Article 6701d was valid or invalid as a penal statute, but such conclusion rests upon the construction that such article constituted a rule of civil conduct.