Title: McMillan v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

314 S.W.2d 483 (1958) Woodrow McMILLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 4894. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 23, 1958. *484 George E. Pike, De Witt, Virgil Roach Moncrief and John W. Moncrief, Stuttgart, Peyton D. Moncrief, De Witt, for appellant. Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen, and Clyde Calliotte, Asst. Atty. Gen, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. Appellant, Woodrow McMillan, was charged with murder in the first degree, and upon trial, was convicted of second degree murder and given a sentence of twelve years. The killing occurred shortly after midnight, March 3, 1957, and McMillan pleaded self-defense. From such conviction, he brings this appeal. According to the evidence, Car] McCown and wife operated a cafe located near the court square in De Witt. McCown and appellant were in the cafe with others around 10 p. m, and McCown suggested that the group go to his home for a dice game. McMillan went along, and in the game lost what money he had, gave McCown a check for $10, and also lost that. After the game closed, the group returned to the cafe, and McCown parked his car at the back of the establishment. Subsequently, he went to his car, and McMillan later went and sat in the car with him. An argument ensued relative to the check which McMillan had given McCown, it being contended by appellant that the former had told him he would return the check. Appellant had in his possession a 22 calibre pistol. The parties subsequently got out of the car, and McCown started toward McMillan, either to strike him, or to get the gun. McCown knocked the first shot upward but McMillan continued to fire until the gun snapped. The magazine held nine cartridges, and it later developed all were fired except one. McCown ran into the street, and fell dead, being hit by three bullets. Numerous assignments of error are set forth in the motion for new trial, the first three questioning the sufficiency of the evidence. Proof on the part of the State showed that appellant went to his pickup truck and got the pistol before going to the "crap" game. On returning to the cafe, McMillan talked to different ones there, and then went out to McCown's car. According to the State's evidence, McMillan fired the first shot from the back seat of the automobile, and one Chester Edmondson testified as follows: The deceased's wife, Mildred McCown, testified: Charles Tiner, Chief of Police at De Witt, stated: Further testimony on the part of the State was to the effect that McCown was unarmed. The above enumerated testimony, if believed by the jury, was certainly sufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree murder. As stated in West v. State, 196 Ark. 763, 120 S.W.2d 26, 29: Numerous other cases denote the same holding. By assignment No. 4, appellant contends that it was error for the court to fail to sustain his objection to a statement made by the prosecuting attorney during the State's closing argument, and that such statement was inflammatory and prejudicial to him. The statement objected to was * * * if you turn him loose, then let him go out and kill someone else for a $10 worthless check * * *". Following this remark and an exchange of comment between the prosecutor and appellant's counsel, in which a derogatory remark, unconnected with the evidence, was made by defense counsel concerning the deceased, the court admonished the jury, stating: In Adams v. State, 176 Ark. 916, 5 S.W.2d 946, 956, this Court said: See also Tillman v. State, Ark, 307 S.W.2d 886. Several assignments of error deal with the court's refusal to sustain objections to the testimony of Russell McCollum, Coroner of Arkansas County. McCollum's testimony dealt with statements made to him by appellant a short time after the killing. We do not agree that this was error. As stated in Dearen v. State, 177 Ark. 448, 9 S.W.2d 30, 31: A long line of Arkansas cases hold likewise. According to the evidence, the statements made by appellant to McCollum were voluntarily made, and in fact, it is not contended otherwise, except that appellant testified he was nervous and upset at the time the questions were asked. Appellant objected to each question propounded to the coroner and answer given, contending that McCollum was actually conducting an inquest, and had not complied with the statute governing such hearings. It is specifically contended that the statute was not complied with in the following respects: no jury was summonsed as required by Sec. 42-302, Ark.Stats.(1947) Anno, and the testimony was not reduced to writing as required by Sec. 42-307. Let it first be said that the interrogation of appellant by the coroner does not reach the dignity of a formal hearing. According to appellant's own testimony, he was not sworn, and there was no semblance of a "hearing" as the word is commonly used. In other words, no inquest was held. There was no occasion for a hearing, since appellant freely admitted the killing. It is true that certain declarations against interest were made by appellant during the questioning, but, as stated, the evidence reflects these statements were voluntarily made. Appellant also contends that he was not warned that anything he might say could be used against him. While it is preferable that the accused be so advised, the failure to do so does not invalidate a confession. The situation here is analogous to the situation in the early case of Wilson v. United States, (which was originally tried in the Western District of Arkansas) found in 162 U.S. 613, 16 S. Ct. 895, 899, 40 L. Ed. 1090. There, Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, said: "In the case at bar, defendant was not put under oath, and made no objection to answering the questions propounded. The commissioner testified that the statement was made freely and voluntarily, and no evidence to the contrary was adduced. * * *" There was no error in admitting the testimony of the coroner. It is next contended the court erred in giving certain instructions and refusing to give others requested by appellant. We have examined all the instructions, offered, refused, and given, and we find no error committed by the court as against the objections made. Appellant's main argument for reversal is based upon remarks made by the trial court in the presence of the jury concerning certain evidence offered by appellant with reference to an infected or diseased ear, with which he allegedly was afflicted, and it is further contended that the court erred in refusing to permit several witnesses to testify relative to such physical condition. We will first discuss the latter contention. Five witnesses had previously testified regarding the condition of Mc-Millan's ear, and appellant offered in evidence a notice from the Veteran's Hospital to appellant, directing that McMillan report back for further examination. The court correctly excluded this exhibit, as it was not in proper form for introduction, and then announced: Appellant contends that this was error, but we do not agree. In Sheppard v. State, 120 Ark. 160, 179 S.W. 168, 170, Justice Kirby, speaking for the court, said: We think it was sufficiently established that appellant had been suffering with some sort of ear infection, and additional testimony upon the subject would have been entirely cumulative. We come now to a discussion of appellant's contention concerning the remarks by the court. The first witness offered by the defendant, John Varnadore, was asked the question: The court permitted the question, and subsequently in the examination, another question was asked relative to the ear.[1] Upon objection by the State, the court invited appellant's counsel to explain his theory. McMillan testified he had had trouble with his ear for a year or two before the killing, and that it had constantly bothered him; that he had received treatment for the ear condition from different doctors in De Witt, and had gone to the Veteran's Hospital in Little Rock, but had not been able to obtain relief. He testified his condition grew worse,[2] and the court remarked : "The Court: I don't think that would be competent, Mr. Moncrief." It would appear that counsel's contention was conveyed to the jury, but this, of course, did not constitute evidence. In several instances, questions relating to the ear were properly ruled inadmissible; for instance, Lem Burton was asked the question : "In going fishing and hunting with McMillan, was he more careful than you in dodging limbs and bushes?" Any answer, of course, by the witness, would have been pure opinion. We are of the view however, that competent evidence as to appellant's physical condition was proper and relevant. He was entitled to show his physical, as well as mental, condition at the time of the offense charged. As stated in Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141: Also, in Rector v. State, 11 Ala.App. 333, 66 So. 857, 862: Such a conclusion is logical, for it might well be that one physically incapacitated would hesitate far longer to precipitate an altercation than one who is sound in body; at least, the jury was entitled to take into consideration such fact during their deliberations, as relating to the possible aggressor. Since we consider such evidence competent, it definitely appears that the remarks of the Court amounted to comment upon the weight of the evidence. On two occasions, the Court, though admitting *490 the evidence, stated: "This is not a personal injury suit," and three times made remarks to the effect that the Court did not consider the evidence competent or relevant. It must be remembered that many jurors are serving for their first time, but, for that matter, even though they have served numerous times, the attitude, statements, and opinion of the court probably make a more indelible impression upon the mind of the juror than any other factor during a trial. To the jury, his word is the law. As stated by the late Justice Butler in Western Coal & Mining Company v. Kranc, 193 Ark. 426, 100 S.W.2d 676, 677: Likewise, as stated by the beloved Judge Battle, in Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147, 10 S.W. 228, 233: Clearly, the remarks of the court intimated that the evidence was of little, if any, value. While we recognize that no partiality or prejudice was intended by the remarks of the court, such remarks could have been damaging to appellant's plea of self-defense. Numerous other errors are alleged, but we find no merit in such allegations. Because of the error herein set out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. [1] Varnadore's testimony about the ear was as follows: "The ear drained and it would sometimes drain down on his shirt and he would have to keep putting cotton in his ear, and he would have to do that three or four times a day. * * * Yes, there seemed to be blood and pus." [2] McMillan's foster mother testified there was a discharge from his ear with "an awful odor" which she would help clean out.