Title: Barber v. Gladden

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

215 Or. 129 (1958)
332 P.2d 641
BARBER
v.
GLADDEN

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on briefs September 17, 1958.
Affirmed December 3, 1958.
Petition for rehearing denied December 31, 1958.
*130 George R. Barber, in propria persona.
Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General for Oregon, and Peter S. Herman, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem, Attorneys for respondent.
AFFIRMED.
O'CONNELL, J.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding initiated by George R. Barber on November 5, 1957 against Clarence T. Gladden, Warden of the Oregon State Penitentiary. The plaintiff appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Marion County dismissing the action. The plaintiff was sentenced on November 20, 1953 for a term of 25 years in the State Penitentiary after a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary with explosives, in violation of ORS 164.260. He was represented by counsel at that time. No appeal was taken *131 from the judgment of conviction. On December 1955 the plaintiff commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in which he attacked the conviction on five grounds. He appealed from an order dismissing his action in that case. The order of dismissal was affirmed in Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 298 P2d 986, 309 P2d 192 (1957).
In the action which is now before us the plaintiff contends that his imprisonment was invalid on five grounds enumerated in his replication in the following order:
(1) The committing magistrate acted without legal authority for the reason that ORS 51.220 is void. This section provides as follows:
The plaintiff argues that ORS 51.220 violates the Oregon Constitution in that it is "an unlawful and unauthorized delegation of Legislative power" for the reason that it purports to create a district judgeship without election or appointment. He contends that since the section is void he was not legally committed by a magistrate and that therefore his conviction was void. He also contends that as a result of this alleged illegal procedure he was denied due process of law and equal protection of the laws under the Constitution of the United States.
(2) Oregon Laws 1949, Chapter 258 (which was applicable at the time plaintiff was prosecuted) was unconstitutional because the statute required the county court to prepare a jury list of "qualified jurors *132 in the county, as far as it may be able to ascertain the same from the latest tax roll and/or registration books of the county" and that this permitted "the systematic and intentional exclusion of a class of persons" by the county officials. He also charges that the method actually used in selecting the jurors who sat on the grand jury in his case was illegal and therefore he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
(3) The indictment under which he was convicted was fatally defective because it failed to allege the ownership of the building in which the crime was committed.
(4) The plaintiff's plea of guilty was the result of coercion and duress.
(5) The plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial court's action "in sentencing plaintiff on the basis of his [the judge's] recital that safecrackers once shot at his father."
The defendant demurred to allegations (1), (2), (3), and (5) contained in the plaintiff's replication on the ground that these allegations failed to set forth facts or grounds sufficient to entitle plaintiff to relief. The demurrer was sustained. Thereafter the defendant filed its answer to the remaining allegation, and after a hearing was held the court found that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made by the plaintiff. The court then entered an order dismissing the proceedings.
1-3. This is the second habeas corpus proceeding brought by the plaintiff to test the validity of his incarceration resulting from the judgment of conviction on November 20, 1953. There is nothing in the record to show that the issues presented on this appeal could not have been presented in the first habeas corpus proceeding brought by the plaintiff in December 1955. In fact some of the grounds urged as a basis for the *133 writ in the present case are essentially the same as those presented in the first petition. See Barber v. Gladden, supra.
ORS 34.710 provides, in part, as follows:
This statute is a legislative declaration that the principle of res judicata is applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. That principle precludes the relitigation not only of matters actually determined in a prior proceeding but also matters which could properly have been determined in such earlier proceeding. Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690, 277 P2d 767 (1954); Yuen Suey v. Fleshman, 65 Or 606, 133 P 803 (1913). Frequently res judicata is defined simply in terms of matters previously litigated as distinct from matters which could have been but were not litigated in the prior proceeding. See, for example, Black's Law Dictionary, page 1470. However, this manner of stating the principle is not regarded as a limitation upon the principle so as to exclude its operation in those situations in which the question was not raised in the prior proceeding but could have been raised and determined. And so also where a statute speaks only in terms of questions actually determined it may be construed more broadly to cover the principle of res judicata in its broader meaning. The Florida statute, FSA 79-10 which is similar to ORS 34.710 was so construed. Referring to the Florida statute, the court in Durley v. Mayo, 351 US 277, 283, said:
We interpret our own statute, ORS 34.710, to mean that a denial of the writ of habeas corpus is res judicata on a subsequent application for the writ, not only upon grounds which were alleged, but also upon grounds which could have been alleged in the prior habeas corpus proceeding.
At common law the principle of res judicata had no application to habeas corpus proceedings, and the decision on one writ was not a bar to a subsequent proceeding. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Section 55; Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or 283, 330, 251 P2d 87, 253 P2d 289. The explanation for the rule at common law is well stated in Salinger v. Loisel, 265 US 224, 230 (1924) as follows:
Probably no court today would accept the common-law rule in its pristine form. Cf, Ex Parte Reinhardt, 88 Mont 282, 292 P 582 (1930). However, the extent *135 to which the courts have qualified the common-law rule differs in the various jurisdictions. Since the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus resulting from the decision in Johnson v. Verbst, 304 US 458 (1937) both the courts and legislatures have sought measures to deal more effectively with the increasing number of petitions for the writ. There has been a noticeable tendency to adopt more stringent rules with respect to the filing of successive applications for the writ. Even prior to the expansion of the writ alluded to above, departures were made from the common-law rule excepting habeas corpus proceedings from the principle of res judicata. Thus in Salinger v. Loisel, supra, after noting the common-law rule, the court said:
A similar position has been taken by a number of state courts. See, e.g., Nicolay v. Kill, 161 Kan 667, 170 P2d 823 (1946); Fisher v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 195 Md 705, 71 A2d 871 (1950); Labelle v. Hancock, 99 NH 254, 108 A2d 545 (1954); State v. Ingenito, 16 NJ 36, 106 A2d 3 (1954). Some states have applied the rule that only issues actually determined in the prior proceeding are barred thereafter. Gusick v. Eyman, 81 Ariz 206, 303 P2d 531 (1956), *136 cert. den., 353 US 913 (1957); Guy v. Foster, 160 Tenn 285, 24 SW2d 897 (1930); Bravata v. Morhous, 273 App Div 929, 77 NYS2d 451 (1948); Du Fault v. Utecht, 220 Minn 431, 19 NW2d 706 (1945).
In still other states the principle of res judicata is applied in its broadest sense to habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Horowitz, 33 Cal2d 534, 203 P2d 513 (1949); Woodruff v. Balkon, 205 Ga 445, 53 SE2d 680 (1949); Tilghman v. McLeod (Okla Crim App), 306 P2d 732 (1957); De Simone v. Cavell, 185 Pa Super 131, 138 A2d 688 (1958). But c.f., Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 391 Pa 265, 137 A2d 468 (1958); McMahon v. Mead, 30 SD 515, 139 NW 122 (1912).
We believe that the principle of res judicata should be fully applicable to habeas corpus proceedings; we do not think that this position is inconsistent with ORS 34.710.
4, 5. If a petitioner establishes that the grounds asserted in his petition could not reasonably have been presented in the prior proceeding he will not be precluded from asserting them. The rule we recognize may be stated in the same terms as Section 8 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which has been recommended for adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Annual Conference Meeting in its 64th Year, Philadelphia, Pa., August, 1955). It provides as follows:
*137 The comment appended to this section explains its purpose:
The application of ORS 34.710 to plaintiff's petition in the present case precludes him from reasserting each of the five grounds upon which he bases his petition. If he can establish that any of these grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the prior petition the principle we have announced in this case does not preclude him from taking appropriate action to protect his rights.
The judgment is affirmed.
ROSSMAN, J., dissenting in part.
I concur in the holding of the majority that the order entered in plaintiff's first habeas corpus action (Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 298 P2d 986, 309 P2d 192) adjudicated, not only all grounds alleged by the plaintiff in his pleadings, but all other grounds which could have been averred, but I dissent from the concluding part of the opinion which declares:
Before the majority wrote that statement it declared:
*138 Obviously, if "the principle of res judicata" is "fully applicable" to habeas corpus proceedings, a petitioner must set forth in his petition all of his claims for relief and be deemed to have waived all others. If the majority view prevails, the doctrine of res judicata will become little more than a scarecrow. Our statutory enactment upon the subject (ORS 34.710), as I will presently show, is opposed to the majority position.
As the majority say:
The plaintiff makes no averment that he was unaware, in 1955, of anything which he alleges in his present action. The majority continue:
The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the conviction, held in the legal system of all civilized nations, that litigation must come to an end, and that when a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated the controversy its judgment must be deemed the termination of the controversy. As said in 30A Am Jur, Judgments, p 373, § 326:
The present case justifies the statement just quoted that, in the absence of the doctrine, litigation "would be endless." The plaintiff was sentenced November 20, 1953, upon his plea of guilty to an indictment which *139 charged him with the crime of burglary with explosives. December 22, 1955, he filed in the Circuit Court for Marion County his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As in the present proceeding, the petition named as defendant the warden of the penitentiary. When the case came on for a hearing, the circuit court ruled adversely to the plaintiff and from its order dismissing the proceeding he appealed. His notice of appeal to this court met with a motion to dismiss. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for an order waiving the payment by him of appeal fees and the statutory requirement for an appeal bond. In Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 298 P2d 986, this court denied the motion to dismiss, waived the requirement for payment of appeal fees and, yielding to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12, 76 SCt 585, held that the plaintiff need not file an appeal bond. The decision was rendered June 27, 1956. Subsequently the merits of plaintiff's habeas corpus proceeding were considered by this court and in a decision announced March 27, 1957, the order of the circuit court which dismissed the proceeding was affirmed. Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 55, 309 P2d 192. November 5, 1957, the plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court for Marion County the petition in the present proceeding. The circuit court ruled against him and from the resulting order of dismissal we have this appeal.
We see from the foregoing that the plaintiff has been before the circuit court three times: first, as the defendant in State v. Barber, charged by an indictment with the crime of burglary with explosives; second, as the plaintiff in the habeas corpus proceeding entitled Barber v. Gladden; and third, as the plaintiff in the second habeas corpus proceeding entitled Barber v. Gladden. He has also been before this court *140 three times: first, when his appeal in his first habeas corpus proceeding met with a motion to dismiss and he himself moved for relief from the payment of appeal fees and the requirement of an appeal bond; second, when the merits of his appeal came on for a hearing; and third, his appearance before this court in the present case.
Our statute, which imports finality to the adjudications made in habeas corpus proceedings, does not warrant the majority's holding that if the petitioner "can establish that any of these grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the prior petition" he may file another proceeding. Our statute (ORS 34.710) says:
If the word "question", which appears in the quoted statute, means only a specific ground set forth in the petition, the majority is right in its holding that the plaintiff may institute another post-conviction proceeding, but if the word "question" includes not only the specific grounds which were alleged in the first proceeding, but all others which were available, the outcome of the first case bars the maintenance of the second. Notwithstanding that the majority holds that the word "question" includes all grounds which could have been alleged, it nevertheless authorizes the institution of a third proceeding. I am satisfied that we must adopt the view that the word "question" includes, not only the grounds specifically set forth in the first proceeding, but all others that could have *141 been alleged. In fact, ORS 34.360 provides that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
ORS 34.310 requires that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall aver:
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff could have presented in his first proceeding all of the grounds which he possesses. The majority, it will be recalled, says: "If he can establish that any of these grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the prior petition" he may institute another proceeding. When the plaintiff was before the circuit court upon arraignment after indictment, he could have raised every ground mentioned in the majority opinion. In fact, that was the proper time to challenge the legality of the grand jury, the sufficiency of the indictment, the jurisdiction of the court or present any other ground for relief that he had. Again, when he filed his first habeas corpus action, he had every opportunity procedure affords to present to the court every ground that he had in mind. Our habeas corpus statute, which is unusually comprehensive, says:
Other sections of the act which I have quoted demand that the petition, in challenging the validity of his imprisonment, must set forth all of his grounds of *142 attack. He cannot withhold some and, upon meeting with defeat, file another proceeding in which he alleges some of his other grounds. Accordingly, it is clear that the plaintiff had every opportunity that liberal procedure affords to present, at the time of his arraignment or in his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the grounds which the majority says he may present upon a third application.
Possibly the majority may have in mind that the plaintiff was ignorant of something affecting his rights when he filed the first and present proceedings and of which he may wish to avail himself when he files the envisioned third proceeding. Bearing in mind that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding (Barber v. Gladden, supra), the following, taken from The Town of Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall 619, 19 L Ed 205, is pertinent to a proposal to employ ignorance as an excuse for an omission from a previous petition in habeas corpus:
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 US 351, holds:
In Columb v. Webster Manufacturing Co., 84 F 592, the cause of action arose out of the same transaction as the previous one, but the complaint alleged additional charges of negligence. The decision followed the holding in Town of Beloit v. Morgan, supra, and held that the outcome of the first action barred the maintenance of the second action.
I dissent from the part of the opinion previously mentioned.