Title: First Union National Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., et als

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On May 4, 2001, the predecessor in interest to First Union National Bank (First Union) provided a commercial loan to Marvin K. Hitchner, Jr. and Penn Salem Marina, Inc. (Penn Salem) in the amount of $750,000. The promissory note was secured in part by a first mortgage on Hitchner s commercial real property, a marina in Pennsville. The note required the borrower, beginning on July, 1, 2001, to pay interest at the rate of 13.5% per year through monthly installments of $9,737.39. The note also required payment of the entire remaining principal with all accrued unpaid interest on June 1, 2016. The mortgage and security agreement, referred to in the documents as the Security Instrument, was fully incorporated into the note by reference and secured performance of the obligations under the note. The instrument outlined the lender s rights and obligations in the event of a default, provided for legal fees incurred by First Union in enforcing the obligations under the note, and permitted the lender to recover judgment on the note either before, during, or after any proceedings for the enforcement of the Security Instrument. In late 2002, the Hitchner and Penn Salem defaulted on the note by failing to make their monthly payments. In January 2003, First Union filed a complaint on the note in the Law Division against Hitchner, Penn Salem and Hitchner, III, who is not a party to this appeal (Law Division Action), seeking the principal and interest accruing on and after November 8, 2002 to the date of the final judgment, post-judgment interest, attorneys fees, and costs. Hitchner and Penn Salem failed to answer the complaint and First Union moved for a default judgment. As part of that application, First Union filed the requisite certification, which set forth the amount of $833,835.03 as due and owing to First Union, together with interest to accrue thereon from August 3, 2003 at a rate of $269.02 per day. First Union also sought attorneys fees and costs of $11,944.69, for a combined total of $845,779.72. On August 8, 2003, the trial court in the Law Division Action entered a final judgment by default in the amount of $845,779.72. Penn Salem and Hitchner s motion to vacate the default judgment was denied and they did not appeal that decision. On February 4, 2003, less than a month after filing the Law Division Action, First Union also filed in the Chancery Division a separate mortgage foreclosure action against the same defendants (Foreclosure Action). In that action, First Union sought judgment in its favor, fixing the amount due on the note and mortgage, together with interest, post-judgment interest, late charges, advances, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. First Union also sought to have the property sold to satisfy the amount due. On November 10, 2003, the Chancery Division entered an order allowing Hitchner and Penn Salem to file a late answer and counterclaim. On February 24, 2004, the Chancery Division granted First Union s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter to the Foreclosure Unit for processing as an uncontested matter. On June 24, 2004, First Union moved for entry of final judgment and submitted a certification describing the amounts due and owing; however, the schedule annexed to this certification that summarized the same amounts referred to in the text of the certification contained higher numbers for most of the categories of damages. Defendants filed late objections to First Union s application, asserting that the amount sought in the Foreclosure Action of $1,043,085 was substantially higher than the final judgment of $845,779.72 previously entered on the note in the Law Division Action. Defendants argued that any final foreclosure judgment should be consistent with the judgment in the Law Division on the underlying debt. On January 13, 2005, a final judgment in foreclosure was entered in favor of First Union in the amount of $1,042,111.36. Penn Salem and Hitchner appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel limit the amount of the foreclosure judgment to the amount of the judgment on the note. The panel concluded that because the two actions are traditionally construed as separate actions, res judicata did not bar the higher amount in the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court granted Penn Salem s petition for certification. HELD: When there is an action on a note followed by an action to foreclose on the security, the trial court in the second action should be bound by the judgment entered in the first action to the extent the same categories of damages are claimed in the second as in the first. In this instance, issue preclusion requires that both judgments contain the same amounts for those categories of damages that cover the same period of time. 1. Financial institutions granting mortgage loans to businesses involving the financing of business or commercial properties are not required to first foreclose on a mortgage before seeking entry of a judgment on a note. When a bond and mortgage are used, the judgment in the foreclosure action is res judicata on a subsequent action on the bond. The Court in this case has occasion to decide whether the same determination applies when a note and mortgage, rather than a note and bond, are at issue. (Pp. 9-11) 2. Penn Salem s argument is one of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion rather than res judicata. Issue preclusion requires a similar but less demanding analysis than res judicata or claim preclusion. These doctrines serve important policy goals, including finality, prevention of needless litigation, avoidance of duplication, and reduction of the burden and expense of litigation. Thus, if an issue between the parties was fairly litigated and determined, it should not be relitigated. (Pp. 11-12) 3. In Hennessey v. Winslow Township, the Court outlined the five factors needed to foreclose relitigation of an issue. The first factor requires that the issues be identical. Here, there is a high degree of similarity between the two actions. The two complaints contained virtually the same categories of damages. The primary differences were that in the Foreclosure Action, First Union sought additional items of damages it did not seek in the Law Division Action the equitable remedy of a forced sale of the collateral and the legal remedies of default interest and prepayment penalties something First Union was authorized to do pursuant to the terms of the mortgage and note. For the purposes of issue preclusion, the damage issues are sufficiently similar to satisfy this factor, limited to only those categories of damages claimed in the Law Division Action. (Pp. 12-15) 4. The second and third factors, requiring that the issues actually be litigated and a final judgment be entered, were either given no weight or were satisfied. The fourth factor requires that the determination of the amount of damages be essential in the first action. Clearly the amount due on the note was essential to the entry of judgment in the Law Division Action. The fifth factor requiring privity of the parties has been met as it is there is no dispute that the parties are the same in both actions. Based on the Court s review of the above factors, the requirements for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied. Therefore, for identical time periods, issue preclusion requires that the amount claimed in each category of damages in the Law Division Action must be the same as the amount claimed in that same category of damages in the Foreclosure Action. (Pp. 15-17) 5. The application of issue preclusion does not prohibit a lender from recovering advances, interest, costs, attorneys fees, and the like that accrue after the date of the first judgment. Similarly, because the note and mortgage permitted the lender to claim different categories of damages, issue preclusion does not bar First Union s claim for a category of damages that was not sought in the Law Division Action. (Pp. 17-18) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO, and HOENS join in JUSTICE WALLACE S opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 11 September Term 2006 FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, as INDENTURE TRUSTEE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PENN SALEM MARINA, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and MARVIN HITCHNER, JR., MARVIN HITCHNER, III, FGS ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., and ABC CORP., a fictitious company, Defendants. Argued November 28, 2006 Decided May 10, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 383 N.J. Super. 562 (2006). Todd W. Heck argued the cause for appellant (Basile & Testa, attorneys). James B. Daniels argued the cause for respondent (Budd Larner, attorneys; Mr. Daniels, Donald P. Jacobs and Christopher P. Anton, on the letter in lieu of brief). JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether a lender in a foreclosure proceeding is entitled to recover a judgment that is inconsistent with and greater than the amount fixed in a prior Law Division action on the same indebtedness. The trial court answered the question in the affirmative and the Appellate Division affirmed. We hold that to the extent the note and mortgage provide for the same categories of damages, the amount determined in the first action is binding in the subsequent action. Except for amounts accruing after the first judgment and for different categories of damages, the amount of the judgment entered in each action should be identical. (B)Interest from October 1, 2002 to . . . 8/2/03 $ 82,096.02 (C)Late charges from October 2002 to . . . 8/2/03 $ 8,686.51 (D)Escrow Advances Taxes $ 6,042.31 (i) Hazard Insurance $ 9,658.87 (ii) Mortgage Insurance premiums $ (iii)Property preservation (repairs, inspections) $ Total amount due First Union this 02 day of Aug. 2003 $833,835.03 In addition, First Union sought attorneys fees and costs totaling $11,944.69, for a combined total of $845,779.72. On August 8, 2003, the trial court in the Law Division Action entered a final judgment by default against Hitchner and Penn Salem in the amount of $845,779.72, and on September 12, 2003, granted First Union s motion for summary judgment against Hitchner III for the same amount. A year later, on September 10, 2004, Hitchner and Penn Salem moved to vacate the judgment against them. The trial court denied the motion and no appeal was taken from that judgment. Meanwhile, less than a month after filing the Law Division Action, First Union commenced a separate mortgage foreclosure action against the same defendants on February 4, 2003, in the Chancery Division (Foreclosure Action). First Union sought judgment in its favor, fixing the amount due on the note and mortgage, together with interest, post-judgment interest, late charges, advances, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. In addition, First Union sought to have the property sold to satisfy the amount due. On November 10, 2003, the Chancery Division entered an order allowing Hitchner and Penn Salem to file a late answer and counterclaim, which defendants did. On February 24, 2004, the Chancery Division granted First Union s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter to the Foreclosure Unit for processing as an uncontested matter. On June 24, 2004, First Union moved for entry of final judgment in the Foreclosure Action. First Union submitted the certification of W. Jackson, in which Jackson certified that [t]here is currently due plaintiff under the Note the principal sum of $727,351.32, plus interest at the rate of 13.5% through January 22, 2004 in the amount of $138,186.75, plus default interest in the amount of $50,914.59, late fees in the sum of $11,607.73, escrow tax advances of $10,416.10, forced insurance in the amount of $3,177.00, property preservation of $5,089.50 and penalties of $36,367.57, plus other costs, as set forth in the Schedule annexed hereto. Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of $269.02. However, the schedule annexed to Jackson s certification summarizing those same amounts contained higher numbers for most of the categories. We set forth below the amounts claimed in the text of Jackson s certification and the amounts claimed in the schedule. Text Schedule Principal $ 727,351.32 $727,351.32 Interest from October 1, 2002 to January 22, 2004 ($367.65 p.d.) $ 138,186.75 $167,745.95 Default Interest $ 50,914.59 $ 58,541.19 Late charges from October 2002 to [unknown date] $ 11,607.73 $ 14,142.08 Escrow Advances/Taxes $ 10,416.10 $ 15,095.12 Hazard Insurance $ 3,177.00 $ 18,738.87 Mortgage Insurance premiums See footnote 3 $ $ Property preservation (repairs inspections) $ 5,089.50 $ 5,103.00 Prepayment & penalties $ 36,367.57 $ 36,367.57 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE FIRST UNION this [unknown date] $ 983,110.56 $1,043,085.10 __________________________________ Per diem from June 16, 2004 $ 269.02 $ 367.65 Defendants filed late objections to First Union s application, asserting that the amount sought in the Foreclosure Action of $1,043,085 was substantially higher than the final judgment previously entered on the note in the Law Division Action in the amount of $845,779.72. Defendants argued that any final foreclosure judgment should be consistent with the judgment in the Law Division on the underlying debt. The record fails to disclose that any action was taken on those objections. On January 13, 2005, a final judgment in foreclosure was entered in favor of First Union in the amount of $1,042,111.36, which was comprised of the following: Principal $ 727,351.32 Interest from 10/1/02 to 1/22/04 @ 13.5% $ 167,745.95 Default Interest $ 58,541.19 Late Charges $ 13,168.34 Real Estate Taxes $ 15,095.12 Forced Place Insurance $ 18,738.87 Property Preservation $ 5,103.00 Prepayment Penalties $ 36,367.57 ______________ Total $1,042,111.36 Thus, except for a minor adjustment in the late charges category, 4 the Chancery Division accepted the higher amounts included in the schedule attached to Jackson s certification. Defendants appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel limit the amount of the foreclosure judgment to the amount of the judgment on the note. First Union Nat l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 383 N.J. Super. 562, 569 (App. Div. 2006). The panel found that New Jersey jurisprudence treats a lawsuit to enforce the terms of a note as distinct from a mortgage foreclosure action because there are different remedies for each action. Id. at 571. The panel further rejected defendants contention that plaintiff waived its right to seek reimbursement for advances made under the mortgage in the Foreclosure Action because it was in a position to seek those same advances in the action on the note and did not. Id. at 572. Looking to the Security Instrument, the panel found that plaintiff always had the option to seek the additional charges under the note, which also afforded plaintiff the option of how and in what manner it was to collect the debt in the event of defendants default. Id. at 572-73. The panel concluded that because the two actions are traditionally construed as separate actions, res judicata did not bar the higher amount in the foreclosure action. Id. at 573-74. We granted Penn Salem s petition for certification. 187 N.J. 491 (2006). A. [Id. at 599 (quoting In Re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1994)) (citations omitted).] [Id. at 461-62 (quoting United States v. Athlone Indus. Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)) (citations omitted).] In deciding the similarity of issues for issue preclusion purposes, a court should consider whether there is substantial overlap of evidence or argument in the second proceeding; whether the evidence involves application of the same rule of law; whether discovery in the first proceeding could have encompassed discovery in the second; and whether the claims asserted in the two actions are closely related. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 27 comment c (1982); see also In re Estate of Dawson, supra, 136 N.J. at 21 (finding issues concerning similar stock distributions, but from different corporations, were not identical for issue preclusion purposes). Here, there is a high degree of similarity between the two actions. The act complained of, defendants failure to pay the note when due, is the same in both actions, and the same evidence is necessary to establish the failure to pay and the amount claimed due. Although the demand for relief is broader in the Foreclosure Action in that plaintiff also sought to foreclose on the property securing the underlying indebtedness, the other elements of relief are essentially the same. In the Law Division Action, plaintiff demanded recovery of the amount due on the note, additional interest until final judgment, and post-judgment interest in its complaint, and advances for taxes and insurance in its certification. Similarly, in the Foreclosure Action, plaintiff demanded that the court fix the amount due, require plaintiff be paid the amount due . . . as provided in the Note and Mortgage, together with interest, late charges, advances, attorneys[ ] fees, and costs of suit, and adjudge that the security be sold to satisfy the amount due to plaintiff. In sum, the two complaints contained virtually the same categories of damages. The primary differences were that in the Foreclosure Action, plaintiff sought additional items of damages it did not seek in the Law Division Action the equitable remedy of the forced sale of the collateral and the legal remedies of default interest and prepayment penalties - something plaintiff was authorized to do pursuant to the terms of the mortgage and note. We have emphasized that [t]o characterize the claims brought in the subsequent lawsuit as equitable, and those in the earlier action as legal in no way displaces the bar of res judicata. Culver, supra, 115 N.J. at 464 (citation omitted). That same admonition applies equally to issue preclusion. Thus, for purposes underlying issue preclusion, the damages issues are sufficiently similar to satisfy this factor. However, because the loan document did not require all categories of damages to be claimed at the same time, we limit this factor to only the categories of damages in fact claimed in the Law Division Action. The next two factors address whether the issues were actually litigated and whether a final judgment was entered. Although judgment was entered by default in the first action, defendants had ample opportunity to contest the complaint. Moreover, it is defendants who are seeking to apply issue preclusion, not plaintiff who obtained the default judgment. When defendants do not claim prejudice as a result of a default judgment, there is no justification to give weight to that factor. It is also obvious that a final judgment was entered in the Law Division Action. In short, we find that the factors requiring that the issues actually be litigated and a final judgment be entered were either given no weight or satisfied. The next requirement is that the determination of the amount of damages was essential in the first action. Clearly, the amount due on the note was essential to the entry of judgment in the Law Division Action. The note and mortgage incorporated each other s terms and provided for damages in addition to the principal and interest. To the extent plaintiff asserted a category of damages in the Law Division Action on the note, that category is deemed essential. Lastly, it is not disputed that the parties are the same in both actions. Thus, the privity requirement is met. Based on our review of the above factors, we conclude that the requirements for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied. Therefore, for identical time periods, issue preclusion requires that the amount claimed in each category of damages in the Law Division Action must be the same as the amount claimed in that same category of damages in the Foreclosure Action. To be sure, the remedies in the note and mortgage were cumulative. We agree with the observation by the Appellate Division that the documents provide plaintiff the option of how and in what manner it would seek to collect the debt in the event of default. First Union, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 573. That is, the agreement authorized plaintiff to claim different categories of damages in the note and in the mortgage, but did not require it. But, to the extent plaintiff sought a particular category of damages in the Law Division Action, such as per diem interest, the determination of that amount in the first action is binding in the subsequent action. Of course, that admonition does not pertain to any category of damages not asserted in the Law Division Action or damages that accrued after the date of the first judgment. In short, the application of issue preclusion does not prohibit a lender from recovering advances, interest, costs, attorneys fees, and the like that accrue after the date of the first judgment. Similarly, because the note and the mortgage permitted the lender to claim different categories of damages, issue preclusion does not bar plaintiff s claim for a category of damages that was not sought in the Law Division Action. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-11 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, as INDENTURE TRUSTEE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PENN SALEM MARINA, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and MARVIN HITCHNER, JR., MARVIN HITCHNER, III, FGS ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., and ABC CORP., a fictitious company, Defendants. DECIDED May 10, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace, Jr. CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY