Title: Miller v. City of Birmingham et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 04/21/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151084
____________________
Laura Miller
v.
City of Birmingham et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-15-145)
PARKER, Justice.
Laura Miller appeals from a summary judgment entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") in favor of
the City of Birmingham ("the City"), Sandy Roberts, and Alice
1151084
Crutchfield 
(hereinafter referred 
to 
collectively 
as 
"the 
City
defendants").
I. Facts and Procedural History
Robert Jeffrey Miller, Mrs. Miller's husband, was
employed by the City as a firefighter.  Unum Life Insurance
Company of America ("Unum") issued a group life and accidental
death and dismemberment policy, identification number 293964
001, to the City on July 1, 2011 ("the policy").  The policy
provided life-insurance benefits to eligible employees of the
City.  The policy itself has not been submitted into evidence;
however, a summary of the benefits of the policy was submitted
by Mrs. Miller.  According to the summary of benefits, the
policy included different life-insurance benefits for active
employees and for retired employees.  Under the policy, as an
active employee, the City paid Mr. Miller's insurance premiums
and Mr. Miller was entitled to a life-insurance benefit of
$151,000, a result reached by multiplying his annual earnings
by 1.75.  However, if Mr. Miller were to become a retiree, he
would be required to pay his life-insurance premiums and would
be entitled to only a $50,000 life-insurance benefit.  The
summary of benefits also included the following provision:
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1151084
"What happens to your life insurance coverage if you become
disabled? Your life insurance coverage may be continued for a
specific time and your life insurance premium will be waived
if you qualify as described below."  The summary of benefits
specified that, in order to be eligible for a waiver of the
life-insurance premiums, the insured had to "be disabled
through your elimination period," which is nine months.  The
summary of benefits further stated:
"When will your life insurance premium waiver
begin?
"....
"Your life insurance premium waiver will begin
when we approve your claim, if the elimination
period has ended and you meet the following
conditions. Your Employer may continue premium
payments until Unum notifies your Employer of the
date your life insurance premium waiver begins.
"Your life insurance premium will be waived if
you meet these conditions:
"you are less than 60 and insured
under the plan.
"you 
become 
disabled 
and 
remain
disabled during the elimination period.
"you meet the notice and proof of
claim requirements for disability while
your life insurance is in effect or within
three months after it ends.
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"your claim is approved by Unum.
"After we approve your claim, Unum does not
require further premium payments for you while you
remain 
disabled 
according 
to 
the 
terms 
and
provisions of the plan.
"Your life insurance amount will not increase
while your life insurance premiums are being waived.
Your life insurance amount will reduce or cease at
any time it would reduce or cease if you had not
been disabled."
In May 2012, Mr. Miller was diagnosed with brain cancer
and soon became unable to perform the duties of his job.  Mrs.
Miller's affidavit states that when the Millers discovered
that Mr. Miller's condition was terminal, they "sought to
obtain 
information about 
[Mr. 
Miller's] 
life 
insurance 
benefit
and all other benefits that might be available."  The Millers
did not have a copy of the policy or the summary of benefits
at that time.  On March 28, 2013, the Millers and Ed Bluemly,
Mrs. Miller's brother-in-law, met with Sandy Roberts, the
assistant benefit administrator and the pension coordinator
for the Jefferson County Personnel Board, and Alice
Crutchfield, a personnel technician for the Jefferson County
Personnel Board, to learn about the benefits available to Mr.
Miller.  In her affidavit, Mrs. Miller states the following
concerning that meeting:
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1151084
"At that meeting, we were told that if [Mr. Miller]
could not return to work, he would have to 'retire.'
We wanted to know how we could keep his group life
insurance. 
We 
were 
told 
by 
[Roberts 
and
Crutchfield], without any hesitation, that the only
option we had was to convert the life insurance to
retiree life insurance. That meant that the life
insurance level of coverage at $151,000.00 would
drop to $50,000.00. We did not like this, but
[Roberts and Crutchfield] were very clear and firm
in their statements. They provided forms and
indicated to me and [Mr. Miller] that [Mr. Miller]
would have to sign the forms to convert the policy.
"[Mr. Miller] and I went over the forms and he
signed them before leaving the meeting. ... However,
[Roberts and Crutchfield] spoke very clearly as if
they knew what they were doing and as if they were
the authority on the subject for the City.
"I still wanted a copy of the policy or
certificate, as did my brother-in-law, Ed Bluemly,
and we both requested a copy of the policy. [Roberts
and Crutchfield] told us there was not a copy of the
policy or certificate. They could not obtain one,
nor could they tell us how to obtain one."1
Also concerning the March 28, 2013, meeting, Roberts's
affidavit states that she "did hear ... Crutchfield
referencing UNUM Life Insurance products and specifically
telling [the Millers] that their life insurance policy was
with Unum Insurance."  Roberts's affidavit also states that
she did not recall "any persons requesting a copy of an
1As discussed below, the circuit court struck some of the
quoted portions of Mrs. Miller's affidavit.
5
1151084
insurance plan from me during the meeting on or about March
28, 2013, nor do I recall any other person requesting an
insurance plan from me on behalf of the Millers at any time
after this meeting."  Nothing in Roberts's affidavit disputed
Mrs. Miller's and Bluemly's assertion that Roberts and
Crutchfield told the Millers that they had to convert Mr.
Miller's life insurance from active-employee to retiree life
insurance.  Crutchfield's affidavit states that, at the March
28, 
2013, 
meeting, 
Crutchfield "referenced Unum 
Life 
Insurance
beneficiary forms" and that no one "request[ed] a copy of a
life insurance policy."  Crutchfield's affidavit further
states that, after the March 28, 2013, meeting, she "never had
any discussions with [the Millers] concerning life insurance
benefits and/or life insurance policies" and that the Millers
never requested "any life insurance policy and/or certificate
of insurance."  Nothing in Crutchfield's affidavit disputed
Mrs. Miller's assertion that Roberts and Crutchfield told the
Millers that they had to convert Mr. Miller's life insurance
from active-employee to retiree life insurance.
After the meeting, the Millers continued to try to obtain
a copy of the policy.  To this end, the Millers asked several
6
1151084
of Mr. Miller's coworkers if they had a copy of the policy
and, if so, if they would share it with the Millers.  On April
11, 2014, a coworker of Mr. Miller's gave Mrs. Miller a copy
of "a supplemental group life policy" from Unum under which
Mr. Miller's coworker had coverage; it is undisputed that that
supplemental group life policy did not apply to Mr. Miller.
On May 5, 2014, Mr. Miller died.
In November 2014, Mrs. Miller's attorney sent the City a
letter requesting a copy of the policy.  On November 24, 2014,
Peggy Polk, director of the City's office of personnel, sent
Mrs. Miller's attorney a letter and a copy of the summary of
the benefits of the policy.  The subject line of Polk's letter
to Mrs. Miller's attorney stated: "Life Insurance Errors as to
Robert [M]iller (Deceased)."  Mrs. Miller's affidavit states
that the letter from Polk was not received until "early
December 2014."  Mrs. Miller's affidavit states that, upon
reviewing the summary of benefits, the Millers learned that
the policy included "a disability waiver of premium benefit." 
Mrs. Miller's affidavit further states: 
"It appears that [Mr. Miller] and I were
misinformed by Sandy Roberts and Alice Crutchfield
as to the existence of the disability waiver of
premium benefit. This benefit would have saved us
7
1151084
from having to pay for 'retiree life insurance' and
[Mr. Miller] should have instead been able to keep
the full policy benefit of $151,000.00, at no cost
to us, rather than just $50,000.00."
The City defendants do not dispute the accuracy of this
portion of Mrs. Miller's affidavit.
On January 16, 2015, Mrs. Miller filed a claim with the
City alleging that Roberts and Crutchfield had been negligent
in failing to inform the Millers "as to the existence of the
disability waiver 
of 
premium 
benefit" 
and 
requesting $101,000. 
In a letter to the City accompanying Mrs. Miller's claim, Mrs.
Miller's attorney stated that Mrs. Miller "does not contend
she will be damaged unless Unum refuses to undo or correct the
issues involved in this matter."  The letter also stated:
"We will be sending a copy of this also to Unum to
request and demand that they pay the full life
insurance proceeds which should have been paid, but
for the incorrect information being provided [by
Roberts and Crutchfield].  In any event, it appears
to be prudent to provide this claim notwithstanding. 
We will be working with Unum to accomplish this and
if this is not successful we will let the City of
Birmingham know."
Unum denied Mrs. Miller's request; Unum was under no
obligation to honor Mrs. Miller's request because Mr. Miller
had voluntarily converted his life insurance to "retiree life
insurance" and Unum acted accordingly.
8
1151084
On May 4, 2015, Mrs. Miller sued the City defendants,
alleging one claim of misrepresentation.  The complaint
alleged that the City defendants "made false representations
as to material facts as to the amount of life insurance Mr.
Miller was allowed to keep in place" and that "these
representations were reckless, wanton, grossly negligent,
and/or negligent."  The complaint further alleged that Mrs.
Miller "reasonably relied on these representations and had no
evidence that the representations were false until after
receiving a copy of the [policy] provided by [Polk] in
December of 2014."  Mrs. Miller requested, among other things,
damages in the amount of $101,000 "in lost life insurance
proceeds."
On January 20, 2016, the City defendants filed a motion
for a summary judgment.  The City defendants argued that they
were entitled to a summary judgment because (1) Mrs. Miller's
claim was barred both by the statute of limitations set forth
in § 6-2-38, Ala. Code 1975, and by § 11-47-23, Ala. Code
1975, the notice-of-claim statute for municipalities, (2) the
City is immune from Mrs. Miller's misrepresentation claim
under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, (3) Mrs. Miller failed to
9
1151084
add Unum, an allegedly indispensable party, which, the City
defendants argued, deprived the circuit court of subject-
matter jurisdiction, and (4) Unum is jointly liable with the
City defendants and, thus, required to be joined as a party
under § 11-47-191, Ala. Code 1975.
At some point thereafter, Mrs. Miller filed notices of
depositions of Roberts and Crutchfield.  On January 29, 2016,
the City defendants filed a "motion to quash" Mrs. Miller's
notices of depositions of Roberts and Crutchfield.  The sole
basis for the City defendants' motion to quash the depositions
was that Unum was an indispensable party under Rule 19.  The
City defendants also argued that Unum's absence from the
action 
deprived 
the 
circuit 
court 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction over Mrs. Miller's claim against them.  Mrs.
Miller filed a response to the City defendants' motion to
quash.
On February 27, 2016, Mrs. Miller filed a "motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability."  Mrs.
Miller argued that she had presented substantial evidence to
support each element of her misrepresentation claim and that
there was no genuine issue of material fact.  In support of
10
1151084
her summary-judgment motion, Mrs. Miller presented, among
other things, a copy of the summary of benefits and several
other documents concerning the policy, the affidavit of
Bluemly, and Mrs. Miller's own affidavit.
On March 4, 2016, the City defendants filed a motion to
strike certain exhibits to Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment
motion and references to those exhibits in the motion. 
Specifically, the City defendants argued that Mrs. Miller's
summary-judgment motion contained facts that were not
supported by specific references to Mrs. Miller's exhibits. 
The City defendants requested that the circuit court strike
the following portions of Mrs. Miller's brief in support of
her summary-judgment motion and the following evidence she
submitted in support of her summary-judgment motion: 
"(1) strike all unsupported allegations of [Mrs.
Miller's] Brief or instruct [Mrs. Miller] to
resubmit 
the 
brief 
in 
compliance 
with 
Rule
56(c)(1)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]; (2) exclude all UNUM
insurance documents constituting hearsay ([Mrs.
Miller's] Exhibit D & F)[2]; (3) exclude the Bluemly
Affidavit 
([Mrs. 
Miller's] 
Exhibit 
C) 
as
2In the heading pertaining to this particular argument,
the City defendants generally stated that the circuit court
"must exclude all Unum ... documents."  However, the City
defendants presented argument pertaining only to "Exhibit D &
F."  Accordingly, the City defendants limited their motion to
strike to those two exhibits.
11
1151084
impermissible hearsay; and (4) exclude all portions
of [Mrs.] Miller['s] Affidavit ([Mrs. Miller's]
Exhibit B) that are not based on personal knowledge
or admissible evidence."3
The 
City 
defendants identified 
the 
following 
specific 
portions
of Mrs. Miller's affidavit they sought to strike:
"I still wanted a copy of the policy or
certificate, as did my brother-in-law, Ed Bluemly,
and we both requested a copy of the policy. ...
"....
"... Finally, less than 30 days before Jeffrey
died, a fellow battalion friend of Jeffery’s named
Buddy logged into his computer and found a
supplemental group life policy .... [H]e claimed he
obtained a copy off his computer at work and then
e-mailed it to his wife and then his wife e-mailed
it to me. I am not saying that I was there when his
friend obtained a copy from the computer at work,
nor was I there when his wife, Sabrina, e-mailed the
document to me. ...
"I do not know too much about policies, but my
brother-in-law, Ed Bluemly, does and I let him look
it over. He assured me that his was not the correct
policy, as it did not have the correct terms and
information. ..."
On March 7, 2016, Mrs. Miller responded to the City
defendants' summary-judgment motion.  Mrs. Miller argued that
she had asserted her claim within the applicable statutory
3The City defendants did not move to strike the exhibit
Mrs. Miller identified as "Exhibit E."  This exhibit is the
copy of the summary of the benefits of the policy sent to Mrs.
Miller by Polk.
12
1151084
limitations period and that the City defendants were barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel from asserting that § 11-
47-23 barred her misrepresentation claim.  Mrs. Miller also
argued that Unum is not an indispensable party under Rule 19,
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Mrs. Miller attached to her response most of
the same exhibits that she had submitted in support of her
motion for a partial summary judgment.  Further, Mrs. Miller
presented a Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., affidavit of her
trial counsel explaining Mrs. Miller's need for the City to
respond to the entirety of her interrogatories and for the
need to depose Roberts and Crutchfield.
On March 8, 2016, the City defendants filed a reply to
Mrs. Miller's response to their motion for a summary judgment. 
On the same day, the City defendants also filed a motion to
strike portions of Mrs. Miller's response, for the same
reasons they had moved to strike portions of her summary-
judgment motion.  The City defendants requested that the same
portions of Mrs. Miller's affidavit be struck that they had
requested be stricken in their March 4, 2016, motion to
strike.
13
1151084
On March 31, 2016, Mrs. Miller filed the affidavit of
Jamie L. Langlois, an implementation consultant for Unum
Group, Unum's parent company, in support of her summary-
judgment motion.  On April 5, 2016, the City defendants filed 
a motion to strike Langlois's affidavit.  The City defendants
argued that Langlois's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and
was barred by the "best evidence rule."
On April 21, 2016, the City defendants filed a response
to Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment motion.  The 
City defendants
argued that Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment motion should be
denied for the following reasons:
"(1) [G]enuine issues of material fact exist[]; (2)
[Mrs. Miller's] claim[] against [the City defendants
is] barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the
City is immune to all claims arising from alleged
intentional and/or wanton conduct of its employees;
(4) 
[Mrs. 
Miller] 
failed 
to 
name 
all
indispensable/jointly liable parties to allow the
court to enter any final judgment in this matter;
and (5) Defendants, Crutchfield and Roberts, have
qualified immunity to the claim[] [as to which Mrs.
Miller] seeks summary judgment."
On April 22, 2016, Mrs. Miller filed a reply, arguing that
further discovery was necessary to develop the record. 
On June 6, 2016, the circuit court granted the City
defendants' summary-judgment motion and denied Mrs. Miller's
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summary-judgment motion.4  Contemporaneously, the circuit
court granted the City defendants' "motion to strike."  The
circuit court granted a singular motion to strike; it did not
specify which one of the City defendants' three pending
motions to strike it was granting.
On July 8, 2016, Mrs. Miller appealed.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review of a summary judgment is well
settled:
"'The standard of 
review applicable to 
a 
summary
judgment is the same as the standard for granting
the motion....' McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor
Flea Market, Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992).
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3),
Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact
4The parties agree on appeal that Mrs. Miller withdrew her
summary-judgment motion.  See Mrs. Miller's brief, at p. 6 n.
3, and the City defendants' brief, at p. 34.  The only thing
that the parties direct this Court's attention to in support
of this assertion is a statement in Mrs. Miller's reply to the
City defendants' response to Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment
motion that she had "agreed to withdraw her motion for [a]
summary judgment without prejudice."  However, nothing in the
record indicates that Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment motion
was ever actually withdrawn.  Mrs. Miller's summary-judgment
motion remained pending when the circuit court ruled upon it.
15
1151084
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. In determining whether the
movant has carried that burden, the court
is to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party. To defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
party must present "substantial evidence"
creating a genuine issue of material fact
-- "evidence of such weight and quality
that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
Ala. Code 1975, § 12–21–12; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough–Clean, Inc.,
639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994). Questions of law
are reviewed de novo. Alabama Republican Party v.
McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)."
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935
(Ala. 2006).
In arriving at its decision on the summary-judgment
motions, the circuit court also ruled on several discovery
matters.
"Our standard of review in matters involving
discovery is limited to determining whether the
trial court exceeded its discretion in making its
discovery decision. Rankin v. First Nat'l Bank of
Alabama, 437 So. 2d 503 (Ala. 1983). An appellate
court will not reverse the trial court's decision
regarding a discovery matter unless there is a clear
showing 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
exceeded 
its
16
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discretion. Ex parte McTier, 414 So. 2d 460 (Ala.
1982)."
Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1078 (Ala. 2009).
III. Discussion
Initially, we note that Mrs. Miller argues that the
circuit court exceeded its discretion in entering several
discovery orders.  We address some of her arguments insofar as
they relate to her arguments that the circuit court erred in
granting the City defendants' summary-judgment motion. 
However, our conclusion that the circuit court erred in
certain respects in granting the City defendants' summary-
judgment motion pretermits our discussion of the remainder of
Mrs. Miller's discovery arguments.
As set forth above, the City defendants asserted various
arguments in support of their summary-judgment motion. 
Specifically, the City defendants argued below that they were
entitled to a summary judgment based on the following grounds:
(1) Mrs. Miller failed to join Unum as an allegedly
indispensable party; (2) Mrs. Miller failed to join Unum as a
jointly liable party under § 11-47-191; (3) Mrs. Miller's
claim is barred under both § 11-47-23 and § 6-2-38; and (4)
the City is immune from liability under § 11-47-190.  The
17
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circuit court entered a general order granting the City
defendants' summary-judgment motion; it did not provide any
explanation.  Mrs. Miller argues that none of the arguments
asserted by the City defendants in support of their summary-
judgment motion provides a valid basis for the circuit court's
judgment.
A. Are the City defendants entitled to a summary judgment
because Mrs. Miller failed to join Unum as an indispensable
party?
Mrs. Miller argues that the City defendants' argument
that they are entitled to a summary judgment based on her
failure to add Unum as an indispensable party does not provide
a basis for the summary judgment in the City defendants'
favor.  Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., requires that the plaintiff
in an action join any indispensable parties if feasible:
"(a) Persons to Be Joined If Feasible. A person
who is subject to jurisdiction of the court shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any
of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
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1151084
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the
claimed interest. If the person has not been so
joined, the court shall order that the person be
made a party. If the person should join as a
plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects
to venue and joinder of that party would render the
venue of the action improper, that party shall be
dismissed from the action.
"(b) 
Determination 
by 
Court 
Whenever 
Joinder 
Not
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall 
determine 
whether 
in 
equity 
and 
good
conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might be prejudicial to the person
or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether
a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder."
This Court discussed the application of Rule 19 in
Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. University of Alabama
Health Services Foundation, P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013 (Ala. 2003):
"We have discussed the application of Rule 19 as
follows:
"'"Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides
for joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication. Its purposes include the
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promotion of judicial efficiency and the
final 
determination 
of 
litigation 
by
including all parties directly interested
in the controversy. Hooper v. Huey, 293
Ala. 63, 69, 300 So. 2d 100, 105 (1974),
overruled on other grounds, Bardin v.
Jones, 371 So. 2d 23 (Ala. 1979)."'
"Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 333, 336 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Byrd Cos. v. Smith, 591 So. 2d 844, 846
(Ala. 1991)).
"'Rule 19, [Ala.] R. Civ. P., provides
a two-step process for the trial court to
follow in determining whether a party is
necessary or indispensable. Ross v. Luton,
456 So. 2d 249, 256 (Ala. 1984), citing
Note, Rule 19 in Alabama, 33 Ala. L. Rev.
439, 446 (1982). First, the court must
determine whether the absentee is one who
should 
be 
joined 
if 
feasible 
under
subdivision (a). If the court determines
that the absentee should be joined but
cannot be made a party, the provisions of
(b) are used to determine whether an action
can proceed in the absence of such a
person. Loving v. Wilson, 494 So. 2d 68
(Ala. 1986); Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249
(Ala. 1984). It is the plaintiff's duty
under this rule to join as a party anyone
required to be joined. J.C. Jacobs Banking
Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834 (Ala.
1981).
"'"...."
"'We note that the interest to be
protected must be a legally protected
interest, not just a financial interest.
Ross, supra; see Realty Growth Investors v.
Commercial & Indus. Bank, 370 So. 2d 297
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 370
20
1151084
So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1979). There is no
prescribed formula for determining whether
a 
party 
is 
a 
necessary 
one 
or 
an
indispensable one. This question is to be
decided in the context of each particular
case. J.R. McClenney & Son v. Reimer, 435
So. 2d 50 (Ala. 1983), citing Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,
390 U.S. 102, 88 S. Ct. 733, 19 L. Ed. 2d
936 (1968).'
"Holland v. City of Alabaster, 566 So. 2d 224,
226-27 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis omitted). 'The absence
of a necessary and indispensable party necessitates
the dismissal of the cause without prejudice or a
reversal with directions to allow the cause to stand
over for amendment.' J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v.
Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834, 850-51 (Ala. 1981). See
also Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642
So. 2d 941, 945 (Ala. 1994) (Almon, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)."
881 So. 2d at 1021-22.
Initially, we note that it does not appear that the
circuit court granted the City defendants' summary-judgment
motion on this ground.  In granting the City defendants'
summary-judgment motion, the circuit court specifically
stated: "This case i[s] dismissed with prejudice."  (Emphasis
added.)  However, as immediately set forth above, this Court
has stated that "'[t]he absence of a necessary and
indispensable party necessitates the dismissal of the cause
without prejudice or a reversal with directions to allow the
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cause to stand over for amendment.' J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v.
Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834, 850-51 (Ala. 1981)."  Liberty
National, 881 So. 2d at 1022 (emphasis added).  Therefore,
because the circuit court "dismissed" Mrs. Miller's action
with prejudice, it appears that the circuit court did not find
this argument of the City defendants convincing and entered
the summary judgment based on an argument going to the actual
merits of the case.  Regardless, out of an abundance of
caution, we will address Mrs. Miller's argument that Unum is
not an indispensable party.
Further, we note that the City defendants argued that
Mrs. Miller's failure to join Unum as an indispensable party
deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The City defendants are incorrect.  In Campbell v. Taylor, 159
So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2014), this Court definitively stated that the
failure to join an indispensable party does not affect the
subject-matter jurisdiction of a court:
"This Court has long referred to a failure to
join a 'necessary' or 'indispensable' party as a
'jurisdictional defect.' See Gilbert v. Nicholson,
845 So. 2d 785, 790 (Ala. 2002) ('The absence of an
indispensable party is a jurisdictional defect that
renders the proceeding void.' (citing Davis v.
Burnette, 341 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1976))); Rogers v.
Smith, 287 Ala. 118, 123, 248 So. 2d 713, 717 (1971)
22
1151084
('[T]he absence of necessary or indispensable
parties ... is a jurisdictional defect....'). See
also J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d
834 (Ala. 1981); Johnston v. White–Spunner, 342 So.
2d 754, 759 (Ala. 1977); and Burnett v. Munoz, 853
So. 2d 963 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). But see Holland v.
City of Alabaster, 566 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1990)
(addressing the issue of the absence of an
indispensable party as one of error on the part of
the trial court). This is so, even after the
adoption in 1973 of Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., which
addresses the 'Joinder of Persons Needed for Just
Adjudication.' Indeed, Rule 19 wholly fails to speak
in terms of jurisdiction, and nothing in that rule
indicates that if the court fails to address the
necessity or indispensability of a particular party
or does address, and errs with regard to the
resolution of, Rule 19 concerns, any ensuing
judgment is void. See Adams v. Boyles, 610 So. 2d
1156, 1157 n. 1 (Ala. 1992) (reiterating 'that
failure to join even an indispensable party does not
automatically compel dismissal')."
159 So. 3d at 9.  See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1611
(3d ed. 2001)("Because an objection to the failure to join a
person who should be regarded as indispensable under Rule
19(b) may be raised as late as on an appeal from a final
judgment or by the court on its own motion, the impression is
created that a failure to join is jurisdictional, since
ordinarily only jurisdictional defects are treated in this
fashion. Thus, it is not surprising that cases can be found
that speak of nonjoinder as ousting the court of jurisdiction.
23
1151084
Since the indispensable-party doctrine is equitable both in
its origin and nature, however, scholarly commentary as well
as the vast majority of courts reject this 'jurisdictional'
characterization." (footnotes omitted)).
Under Campbell, it is clear that the absence of an
indispensable party does not deprive the circuit court of
subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
"[A] 
circuit 
court's
subject-matter jurisdiction is derived from the Alabama
Constitution and the Alabama Code."  Campbell, 159 So. 3d at
10.  Here, the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction
over Mrs. Miller's tort claim against the City defendants
pursuant to § 12-11-30(a), Ala. Code 1975, which states, in
pertinent part: "The circuit court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the matter
in controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
exclusive of interest and costs ...."  Even assuming Unum is
an indispensable party, its inclusion in this action is not
what would provide the circuit court with subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.  Campbell, 159 So. 3d at 10. 
24
1151084
Rather, the circuit court already had jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to § 12-11-30.5
We now address Mrs. Miller's argument that Unum is not an
indispensable party.  Below, the City defendants argued that
Unum is an indispensable party to this action because Mrs.
Miller is seeking "lost life insurance proceeds" as damages. 
The City defendants argued that, under the policy, Unum is the
party obligated to pay Mrs. Miller any 
life-insurance benefits
to which she is entitled.  The City defendants argued that
Mrs. Miller's claim is actually one alleging breach of
contract, not misrepresentation, and that, as a party to the
policy, Unum is an indispensable party.
Mrs. Miller argues on appeal that the City defendants
have mischaracterized her claim.  Mrs. Miller argues that her
claim is not one alleging breach of contract against Unum, but
one alleging misrepresentation against the City defendants. 
Mrs. Miller specifically states that Unum has no contractual
5Although not essential to our ruling, we note that the
City defendants asserted this same argument as the sole basis
for their motion to quash, seeking to prohibit Mrs. Miller
from deposing Roberts and Crutchfield.  Because the failure to
join an indispensable party does not deprive a circuit court
of subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the circuit
court's granting of the City defendants's motion to quash was
in error.
25
1151084
obligation to pay her $151,000 in life-insurance benefits. 
This is so, Mrs. Miller argues, because the Millers acted on
the misrepresentation made by Roberts and Crutchfield and
converted Mr. Miller's insurance to retiree life insurance,
thereby diminishing the amount of life-insurance benefit to
which Mrs. Miller was contractually entitled from $151,000 to
$50,000.  Mrs. Miller is not alleging breach of contract.  In
fact, Mrs. Miller acknowledges that Unum paid her exactly what
was required under the policy.  See Mrs. Miller's brief, at p.
19.
Instead, Mrs. Miller's claim alleges misrepresentation
against the City defendants.  Mrs. Miller alleges that Roberts
and Crutchfield misrepresented to the Millers the terms of the
policy, which the Millers did not have a copy of and which the
City defendants did not aid the Millers in obtaining a copy of
even though requested to do so by Mrs. Miller.  The specific
misrepresentation alleged is that Roberts and Crutchfield
informed the Millers that their only option was to convert Mr.
Miller's life insurance from active-employee to retiree life
insurance, thereby decreasing the amount of life insurance
Mrs. Miller would be entitled to upon Mr. Miller's death from
26
1151084
$151,000 to $50,000.  Neither Roberts nor 
Crutchfield informed
the Millers of the "disability waiver of premium benefit" to
which Mr. Miller was allegedly entitled under the policy. 
That benefit would have allowed Mr. Miller to not convert his
life insurance to retiree life insurance and keep his active-
employee life insurance, thereby entitling Mrs. Miller to the
full $151,000 upon Mr. Miller's death.  Mrs. Miller alleges
that the Millers acted on the misrepresentation made by
Roberts and Crutchfield to Mrs. Miller's detriment.
We find Mrs. Miller's argument persuasive.  Mrs. Miller
is not asserting a breach-of-contract claim against Unum. 
Mrs. Miller is clearly asserting a misrepresentation claim
against the City defendants.  It is not alleged, nor is there
any evidence indicating, that Unum had anything to do with the
misrepresentation allegedly made by Roberts and Crutchfield. 
Accordingly, Unum is not an indispensable party to this
action.  Therefore, to the extent, if any, the circuit court
based its summary judgment in favor of the City defendants on
this argument of the City defendants, it erred.
B. Is Unum required to be joined as a party under § 11-47-191?
27
1151084
The City defendants argued below that Mrs. Miller was
required to join Unum as a party under § 11-47-191, which
states, in pertinent part:
"(a) The injured party, if he institutes a civil
action against the municipality for damages suffered
by him, shall also join such other person or persons
or corporation so liable as defendant or defendants
of the civil action, and no judgment shall be
entered against the city or town unless judgment is
entered against such other person or corporation so
liable for such injury ... and if a civil action be
brought against the city or town alone and it is
made to appear that any person or corporation ought
to be joined as a defendant in the action according
to the provisions in Section 11-47-190, the action
shall be dismissed ...."
The City defendants correctly note that Mrs. Miller has not
made any argument directly related to the application of § 11-
47-191.
However, although Mrs. Miller has not specifically
discussed the application of § 11-47-191, Mrs. Miller has
thoroughly argued and demonstrated that Unum has no potential
liability based on Mrs. Miller's misrepresentation claim.  As
discussed in the previous section, Mrs. Miller has alleged
that Roberts and Crutchfield made a misrepresentation to the
Millers that caused them to act to Mrs. Miller's detriment. 
Mrs. Miller has alleged that this is the sole cause of her
28
1151084
claimed damages.  Mrs. Miller has made no allegation that Unum
breached the policy or acted in a tortious manner.  Mrs.
Miller did request that Unum treat Mr. 
Miller's life-insurance
policy as that of an active employee rather than a retired
employee.  Unum refused Mrs. Miller's request; Mrs. Miller
acknowledges that Unum was under no contractual obligation to
honor her request.  There is no evidence indicating that Unum
is liable for Mrs. Miller's damages, if any.  Accordingly,
although Mrs. Miller did not cite § 11-47-191 in her original
brief before this Court, she has demonstrated that Unum has no
potential 
liability 
based 
on 
her 
sole 
claim 
of
misrepresentation.  
Therefore, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
insofar
as it based its summary judgment in favor of the City
defendants on this argument.
C. Is Mrs. Miller's misrepresentation claim barred under § 11-
47-23 or § 6-2-38?
Mrs. Miller addresses the City defendants' argument
asserted below that her misrepresentation claim is barred by
§ 11-47-23, which states: "All claims against the 
municipality
... shall be presented to the clerk for payment within two
years from the accrual of said claim or shall be barred.
29
1151084
Claims for damages growing out of torts shall be presented
within six months from the accrual thereof or shall be
barred."  (Emphasis added.)  Mrs. Miller also addresses the
City defendants' argument that her claim was barred by the
statute of limitations in § 6-2-38.  The determinative issue
is when Mrs. Miller's misrepresentation claim accrued.
Below, the City defendants argued that Mrs. Miller's
claim against them accrued on March 28, 2013, the day Roberts
and Crutchfield made the alleged misrepresentation complained
of by Mrs. Miller.  The City defendants argued that, under §
11-47-23, Mrs. Miller had to file her claim with the City
within six months of March 28, 2013.  Mrs. Miller did not do
so; she filed her claim with the City on January 16, 2015,
which is more than six months from March 28, 2013. 
Accordingly, the City defendants argued that Mrs. Miller's
action against the City defendants was barred by § 11-47-23. 
The City defendants also argued below that, pursuant to § 6-2-
38, Mrs. Miller was required to file her action against them
within two years of March 28, 2013.  Mrs. Miller did not file
her action against the City defendants until May 4, 2015, more
than two years from March 28, 2013.  Accordingly, the City
30
1151084
defendants argued that Mrs. Miller's action was barred under
§ 6-2-38.
Mrs. Miller argues on appeal that her misrepresentation
claim did not accrue on March 28, 2013, the day Roberts and
Crutchfield made the alleged misrepresentation that is the
basis of Mrs. Miller's claim against the City defendants. 
Instead, Mrs. Miller argues that her misrepresentation claim
did not accrue until she discovered that Roberts and
Crutchfield actually had made a misrepresentation.  Mrs.
Miller argues that she did not discover, and could not have
discovered, the misrepresentation until she received a 
copy of
the summary of the benefits of the policy from the City in
December 2014.  Mrs. Miller is correct.
In City of Mobile v. Cooks, 915 So. 2d 29, 33 (Ala.
2005), this Court set forth the following concerning when a
cause of action accrues under § 11-47-23:
"A cause of action accrues under § 11–47–23 when
an action can be maintained. Couch v. City of
Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144 (Ala. 1998); Hill v. City
of Huntsville, 590 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1991). This
Court has stated the following with regard to when
a cause of action accrues:
"'"The very basic and long settled
rule of construction of our courts is that
a statute of limitations begins to run in
31
1151084
favor of the party liable from the time the
cause of action 'accrues.' The cause of
action 'accrues' as soon as the party in
whose favor it arises is entitled to
maintain an action thereon."'"
(Quoting Ex parte Floyd, 796 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2001),
quoting in turn Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516,
518–19 (Ala. 1979).)
In Bryant Bank v. Talmage Kirkland & Co., 155 So. 3d 231,
235-37 (Ala. 2014), a case relied upon by Mrs. Miller, this
Court 
set 
forth 
the 
following 
concerning 
when 
a
misrepresentation claim accrues:
"A negligent misrepresentation constitutes legal
fraud. 
See 
§ 
6–5–101, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975
('Misrepresentations 
of 
a 
material 
fact 
made
willfully 
to 
deceive, 
or 
recklessly 
without
knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if
made by mistake and innocently and acted on by the
opposite 
party, 
constitute 
legal 
fraud.').
Therefore, negligent-misrepresentation claims are
subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which
begins running when the plaintiff discovers, or
should have discovered, the fact constituting the
fraud. See § 6–2–38(l) ('All actions for any injury
to the person or rights of another not arising from
contract and not specifically enumerated in this
section must be brought within two years.'); §
6–2–3, Ala. Code 1975 ('In actions seeking relief on
the ground of fraud where the statute has created a
bar, the claim must not be considered as having
accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party
of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he
must have two years within which to prosecute his
32
1151084
action.').[6]  In Auto–Owners Insurance Co. v.
Abston, 822 So. 2d 1187, 1194–95 (Ala. 2001), this
Court set forth the standard for evaluating when a
fraud claim accrues and, therefore, when the
statutory limitations period commences:
"'....
"'... For [fraud] cases ... § 6–2–3
does not "save" a plaintiff's fraud claim
so that the statutory limitations period
does not begin to run until that plaintiff
has some sort of actual knowledge of fraud.
Instead, under Foremost [Insurance Co. v.
Parham, 693 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1997)], the
limitations period begins to run when the
plaintiff was privy to facts which would
"provoke inquiry in the mind of a [person]
of reasonable prudence, and which, if
followed up, would have led to the
discovery of the fraud." Willcutt v. Union
Oil Co., 432 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Ala. 1983)
(quoting Johnson v. Shenandoah Life Ins.
Co., 291 Ala. 389, 397, 281 So. 2d 636
(1973)); see also Jefferson County Truck
Growers Ass'n v. Tanner, 341 So. 2d 485,
488 (Ala. 1977) ("Fraud is deemed to have
been discovered when it ought to have been
discovered. It is sufficient to begin the
running of the statute of limitations that
facts were known which would put a
reasonable mind on notice that facts to
support 
a 
claim 
of 
fraud 
might 
be
discovered upon inquiry.").'
"(Final emphasis added.)
6In the present case, the City defendants argue that Mrs.
Miller's claim is also subject to the six-month statute of
limitations for claims against a municipality set forth in §
11-47-23.
33
1151084
"The question of when a person of reasonable
prudence would have discovered the alleged fraud is
generally a question of fact within the purview of
a jury. As this Court stated in Jim Walter Homes,
Inc. v. Kendrick, 810 So. 2d 645, 650 (Ala. 2001):
"'"When a claim accrues, for
statute-of-limitations purposes,
is a question of law if the facts
are undisputed and the evidence
warrants 
but 
one 
conclusion.
However, when a disputed issue of
fact is raised, the determination
of the date of accrual of a cause
o f  
a c t i o n  
f o r
statute-of-limitations 
purposes
is a question of fact to be
submitted to and decided by a
jury."
"'Kindred v. Burlington Northern R.R., 742
So. 2d 155, 157 (Ala. 1999) (citations
omitted).
"'"A fraud action is subject
to 
a 
two-year 
statute 
of
limitations. Ala. Code 1975, §
6–2–38. However, the fraud claim
accrues only when the plaintiff
discovers the fraud or when the
plaintiff, acting as a reasonable
person, should have discovered
the fraud. Ala. Code 1975, §
6–2–3.... 'The question of when a
plaintiff should have discovered
fraud should be taken away from
the jury and decided as a matter
of law only in cases in which the
plaintiff actually knew of facts
that would have put a reasonable
person on notice of fraud.' Hicks
v. 
Globe 
Life 
& 
Accident
34
1151084
Insurance Co., 584 So. 2d 458,
463 
(Ala. 
1991)(emphasis 
in
original)."
"'Liberty 
Nat'l 
Life 
Ins. 
Co. 
v.
McAllister, 675 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (Ala.
1995)(some citations omitted).'"
In the present case, Mrs. Miller discovered the
misrepresentation allegedly made by Roberts and Crutchfield
when Mrs. Miller obtained a copy of the summary of benefits
and discovered that Roberts and Crutchfield had misinformed
the Millers about the benefits available to Mr. Miller under
the policy.  The City defendants have not offered any argument
indicating that Mrs. Miller could have discovered the
misrepresentation made by Roberts and Crutchfield without
knowing what the policy actually provided.  Instead, the City
defendants argue that Mrs. Miller "should have discovered any
alleged misrepresentation on March 28, 2013, when Roberts and
Crutchfield gave [the] Miller[s] documents identifying Unum
... as [Mr. Miller's] insurer."  The City defendants' brief,
at p. 47.  It is undisputed that Roberts and Crutchfield did
not provide the Millers with a copy of the policy at the March
28, 2013, meeting.  Apparently, the City defendants are
arguing that Mrs. Miller should have discovered the
35
1151084
misrepresentation on March 28, 2013, because Mrs. Miller
should have, immediately following the meeting with Roberts
and Crutchfield, contacted Unum to confirm the information
Roberts and Crutchfield had given the Millers about the
policy.
The City defendants have not presented any evidence
indicating that the Millers had any reason to doubt the
information Roberts and Crutchfield gave the Millers on March
28, 2013.  In fact, Roberts's affidavit states: "One of my
duties as a Pension Coordinator is to answer questions that
employees may have regarding pension benefits. The City of
Birmingham has authorized me, in my capacity as a Pension
Coordinator, to answer employee questions concerning pension
benefits."  
Similarly, 
Crutchfield's 
affidavit 
states: 
"One 
of
my duties as a Personnel Technician is to answer questions
that employees may have regarding employee life insurance
benefits. The City of Birmingham has authorized me, in my
capacity as a Personnel Technician, to answer employee
questions concerning life insurance benefits."  Roberts and
Crutchfield had the authority to answer the 
Millers' questions
about the policy.  There is evidence indicating that Roberts
36
1151084
and Crutchfield informed the Millers that Unum was the
insurer, but there is no evidence indicating that Roberts or
Crutchfield instructed the Millers to contact Unum if they had
any further questions regarding the benefits to which Mr.
Miller was entitled under the policy.
Mrs. Miller's affidavit indicates that she did request a
copy of the policy at the March 28, 2013, meeting.7  In their
affidavits, Roberts and Crutchfield state that no one
requested a copy of the policy at the meeting.  Viewing the
facts in a light most favorable to Mrs. Miller, the nonmovant,
we assume that Mrs. Miller did request a copy of the policy on
March 28, 2013.  Further, the facts indicate that the Millers
attempted to obtain a copy of the policy by requesting it from
some of Mr. Miller's coworkers.  There are no facts, however,
7We note that the City defendants filed a motion to strike
this portion of Mrs. Miller's affidavit as hearsay.  The City
defendants argued below that this portion of Mrs. Miller's
affidavit was not based on her personal knowledge.  As
explained above, it is unclear if the circuit court granted
the City defendants' motion to strike.  To the extent the
circuit court did grant this particular motion to strike filed
by the City defendants, it exceeded its discretion in doing
so.  Clearly, Mrs. Miller has personal knowledge of whether
she personally requested a copy of the policy at the March 28,
2013, meeting with Roberts and Crutchfield.  We also note that
the City defendants do not argue on appeal, as they did below,
that this portion of Mrs. Miller's affidavit is hearsay.  See
the City defendants' brief, at pp. 31-33.
37
1151084
indicating that the Millers ever requested a copy of the
policy from Unum directly.  The Millers finally obtained a
copy of the summary of the benefits of the policy in December
2014, at which time they learned that Roberts and Crutchfield
had misrepresented the terms of the policy.
"When a claim accrues, for statute-of-limitations
purposes, is a question of law if the facts are undisputed and
the evidence warrants but one conclusion."  Kindred v.
Burlington Northern R.R., 742 So. 2d 155, 157 (Ala. 1999)
(emphasis added).  Further, "[t]he question of when a
plaintiff should have discovered fraud should be taken away
from the jury and decided as a matter of law only in cases in
which the plaintiff actually knew of facts that would have put
a reasonable person on notice of fraud."  Hicks v. Globe Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 458, 463 (Ala. 1991).  The
facts concerning when Mrs. Miller's cause of action accrued
are, with the exception of one rather insignificant fact,
undisputed.  However, we cannot say that these undisputed
facts warrant but one conclusion.  There are no facts
indicating that Mrs. Miller actually knew of Roberts's and
Crutchfield's alleged misrepresentation until December 2014. 
38
1151084
The City defendants argue, however, that Mrs. Miller should
have known of the alleged misrepresentation on March 28, 2013. 
However, the City defendants have presented no evidence
indicating that Unum would have provided Mrs. Miller with a
copy of the policy or, even if Unum were to have complied with
a request from Mrs. Miller for the policy, when Mrs. Miller
would have obtained a copy of the policy.
The question to be answered is whether facts existed
before December 2014 (when Mrs. Miller actually knew of the
alleged misrepresentation made by Roberts and Crutchfield)
that would have put a reasonable person on notice of fraud. 
Although the facts are not disputed, the facts do not warrant
only one conclusion.  This is a question for the jury to
decide.  Accordingly, the City defendants' argument that Mrs.
Miller's misrepresentation claim is barred under § 11-47-23
and/or § 6-2-38 does not present a valid basis for the summary
judgment in favor of the City defendants.  The summary
judgment is in error to the extent it is based upon this
ground.
D. Is the City entitled to immunity under § 11-47-190?
39
1151084
Lastly, Mrs. Miller argues that the City is not entitled
to immunity under § 11-47-190 from any liability arising from
her claim of misrepresentation.  Mrs. Miller argues that her
misrepresentation claim is "beyond the scope of 
immunity under
Ala. Code [1975,] § 11-47-190."  Mrs. Miller's brief, at p.
50.
Section 11-47-190 states, in pertinent part:
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for
injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or
corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or
suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or
unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee
of the municipality engaged in work therefor and
while acting in the line of his or her duty ...."
In interpreting § 11-47-190, this Court has stated:
"Section 11–47–190, Ala. 1975, provides that a
municipality is immune from tort liability 'unless
such injury or wrong was done or suffered through
the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some
agent, officer or employee of the municipality
engaged in work therefor and while acting in the
line of his or her duty.' This statute limits a
municipality's liability for the acts of its agents
to those acts that are negligent, careless, or
unskillful. 
Section 
11–47–190 
provides 
a
municipality immunity from liability for the acts of
its agents that are carried out in bad faith or with
malice. Borders [v. City of Huntsville], 875 So. 2d
[1168] at 1183 [(Ala. 2003)] (quoting Ex parte City
of Gadsden, 718 So. 2d 716, 721 (Ala. 1998))."
40
1151084
Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 910 (Ala. 2005).
See also Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, 779 So. 2d 1190, 1201
(Ala. 2000)("A municipality cannot be held liable for the
intentional torts of its employees. See Ala. Code 1975, §
11–47–190."); Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907, 909
(Ala. 1998) ("This Court has construed § 11–47–190 to exclude
liability for wanton misconduct.").
Mrs. Miller alleged in her complaint that the statements
made by Roberts and Crutchfield "were reckless, wanton,
grossly negligent, and/or negligent."  As part of her
misrepresentation claim, Mrs. Miller alleged that the City
defendants were wanton in their alleged misrepresentation to
the Millers.  In Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d
889, 892 (Ala. 1991), this Court stated:  "Section 11–47–190
limits the liability of municipalities to injuries suffered
through 'neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness.' Neighbors
v. City of Birmingham, 384 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 1980). To construe
this statute to include an action for wanton conduct would
expand the language of the statute beyond its plain meaning." 
(Emphasis added.)  Section 11-47-190 limits the City's
liability 
for 
claims 
arising 
from 
wanton 
misconduct. 
41
1151084
Therefore, the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of
the City was not in error insofar as it was based on the City
defendants' argument that the City is immune from liability
for Mrs. Miller's claim that the City defendants were wanton
in their alleged misrepresentation to the Millers.
This does not end our analysis, however, because Mrs.
Miller also alleged in her complaint that the City defendants
were 
negligent and 
reckless 
in 
their 
alleged 
misrepresentation
to the Millers.  Other than § 11-47-190, Mrs. Miller does not
cite any authority in her brief to support her argument.  It
is evident under the plain language of § 11-47-190 that the
City may be held liable for damages arising out of the
negligence of Roberts and Crutchfield.8  Therefore, we reverse
the summary judgment insofar as it held that the City could
not be held liable for damages arising out of Mrs. Miller's
claim that Roberts and Crutchfield made a negligent
misrepresentation to the Millers.
8We note that Mrs. Miller also alleged that the City
defendants were "grossly negligent."  In Town of Loxley v.
Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907, 909 (Ala. 1998), this Court stated
that "[t]he word 'gross,' when used in connection with the
word 
'negligence,' 
implies 
nothing 
more 
than 
simple
negligence. Stringer v. Alabama Midland R.R., 99 Ala. 397, 13
So. 75 (1893)."
42
1151084
However, Mrs. Miller has not cited any authority
indicating that a municipality is not immune from liability
arising from the reckless conduct of its agents.  In Jimmy Day
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala.
2007), this Court stated:
"Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that
arguments in an appellant's brief contain 'citations
to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
of the record relied on.' Further, 'it is well
settled 
that 
a 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of
authority in support of the arguments presented
provides this Court with a basis for disregarding
those arguments.' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005)(citing Ex
parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)).
This is so, because '"it is not the function of this
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and
address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by
sufficient authority or argument."' Butler v. Town
of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Dykes
v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994))."
Therefore, to the extent Mrs. Miller is arguing that the
circuit court erred in determining that the City is immune
from any liability arising out of her allegation that Roberts
and 
Crutchfield 
were 
reckless 
in 
their 
alleged
misrepresentation to the Millers, we decline to address this
issue.
43
1151084
In summary, to the extent the circuit court based its
summary judgment in favor of the City defendants on the City
defendants' argument that the City is entitled to immunity
under § 11-47-190, we affirm the summary judgment as to Mrs.
Miller's claim that Roberts and Crutchfield were wanton and
reckless in their alleged misrepresentation to the Millers,
and we reverse the summary judgment as to Mrs. Miller's claim
that Roberts and Crutchfield were negligent in their alleged
misrepresentation to the Millers.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
summary judgment in favor of the City insofar as the circuit
court based its summary judgment in favor of the City on the
City defendants' argument that the City is entitled to
immunity under § 11-47-190 from Mrs. Miller's claim alleging
wanton and reckless misrepresentation.  However, we reverse
the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the City
defendants in all other respects.  We remand this cause to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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