Title: Attorney Grievance v. Johnson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Chauncey Bayarculus Johnson 
AG No. 63, September Term 2018  
 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTION – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 
 
Respondent, Chauncey Bayarculus Johnson, violated several provisions of the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MARPC”), and the Maryland Rules when he failed to maintain an 
attorney trust account, failed to timely remit funds due to clients, failed to safeguard client 
funds, failed to maintain his trust obligations to clients, made misrepresentations to clients, 
and commingled funds. 
 
Mr. Johnson’s conduct violated the following rules of professional conduct: 1.1 
(Competence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); and 8.4 (Misconduct).  
Mr. Johnson’s conduct also violated the following Maryland Rules: 16-603 (Duty to 
Maintain Account); 16-604 (Trust Account—Required Deposits); 19-408 (Commingling 
of Funds); and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions).  This misconduct warrants an indefinite 
suspension with the right to reapply after one year, providing that Mr. Johnson completes 
a course emphasizing the responsible maintenance of an attorney trust account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE19-09143 
Argued: October 29, 2020 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG. No. 63 
 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF 
MARYLAND 
 
V. 
 
CHAUNCEY BAYARCULUS JOHNSON 
 
 
    Barbera, C.J., 
    McDonald 
    Watts 
    Hotten 
    Getty 
    Booth 
    Biran 
 
 
                
JJ. 
 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
Watts, J., dissents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Filed: March 16, 2021 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-06-10 08:22-04:00
 
 
“Do the dull things right so the 
extraordinary things will not be required 
too often.” 
 
George F. Will, Columnist – Describing 
the baseball philosophy of Baltimore 
Orioles manager Earl Weaver.1 
 
Earl Weaver, famous for managing the Baltimore Orioles during their glory days, is 
often quoted about stressing the fundamentals of playing baseball.  Much like in baseball, 
to properly maintain a law practice, a lawyer must execute basic fundamentals, some of 
which can, on a daily basis, be dull and monotonous.  Establishing and maintaining an 
attorney trust account requires devoting time and attention to minute details but is 
fundamental to complying with the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Maintaining strong communications with clients can be monotonous; supervising non-
attorney staff can be difficult; and executing other client matters can be dull, but failure to 
do so can result in violations and misconduct under the rules.  Weaver also said, “The key 
to winning baseball games is pitching, fundamentals, and three run homers.”2  However, 
for the Maryland attorney, it is all about the fundamentals. 
 
 
1 George F. Will, Dry Your Eyes, Child, Balt. Sun, Oct. 7, 1982, at A15.  Earl Weaver 
served as manager of the Baltimore Orioles for seventeen years (1968–82; 1985–86).  In 
describing Earl Weaver’s management style, George F. Will also stated that “the secret of 
Oriole magic is attention to detail.”  Id.       
 
2 
Baseball 
Almanac, 
Quotes 
from 
Earl 
Weaver, 
https://www.baseball-
almanac.com/quotes/quoweav.shtml [https://perma.cc/DX6A-DVFL].    
2 
 
 
Throughout the course of numerous personal injury representations, Respondent, 
Chauncey Bayarculus Johnson, repeatedly failed to recognize the fundamentals of 
operating a Maryland law practice.  Mr. Johnson operates a solo law practice in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland, known as the Law Offices of Chauncey B. Johnson.  Mr. 
Johnson transitioned from working as a schoolteacher to practicing law part-time in 2013, 
prior to becoming a full-time attorney shortly thereafter.  During this transition, Mr. 
Johnson first transgressed by failing to maintain his client’s settlement funds in an attorney 
trust account.  Shortly after Mr. Johnson opened an attorney trust account, he alleges that 
his nephew and non-attorney employee—Romeo Clarke—began misappropriating client 
funds from that account with the intent to commit theft.  The misappropriation of funds 
from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account set off a wide-ranging pattern of misconduct 
spanning twenty-one personal injury clients.  For the reasons discussed below, we shall 
indefinitely suspend Mr. Johnson from the practice of law, with the right to reapply after 
one year, providing that he completes a course emphasizing the responsible maintenance 
of an attorney trust account.    
BACKGROUND  
A. 
Procedural Context. 
 
On February 19, 2019, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting 
through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) with 
the Court of Appeals alleging that Chauncey Bayarculus Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”) had 
violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC” or “Rules”), 
3 
 
the Maryland Rules, and Maryland Code (1989, 2018 Repl. Vol.) Bus. Occ. & Prof. 
(“BOP”) § 10-306.3  See Md. Rule 19-721.   
 
The Petition concerned Mr. Johnson’s failure to deposit client funds into an attorney 
trust account, several instances of financial mismanagement after Mr. Johnson opened an 
attorney trust account, commingling of funds, failure to supervise a non-attorney 
employee’s handling of funds, failure to promptly remit funds due to clients, and 
misrepresentations to clients about their settlements.  Based on this conduct, the Petition 
alleged that Mr. Johnson violated the following Rules: 1.1 (Competence); 1.4 
(Communication); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Non-
Attorney Assistants); 5.54 (Unauthorized Practice of Law); and 8.4 (Misconduct).  The 
Petition also alleged violations of the following Maryland Rules: 16-603 (Duty to Maintain 
Account); 16-604 (Trust Account—Required Deposits); 16-607 and 19-408 (Commingling 
of Funds); and 16-609 and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions).5  Finally, the Petition alleged 
 
3 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and 
recodified without substantive changes in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules.  Since Mr. 
Johnson’s misconduct occurred both before and after the recodification of the MLRPC, he 
committed violations of the same rules of professional conduct under both the MLRPC and 
the MARPC.  For simplicity, and because there is no substantive difference in the two 
codifications of the rules, we shall use the shorter designations of the MLRPC, e.g., “Rule 
1.1.” 
  
4 Bar Counsel later withdrew its allegation that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 5.5. 
  
5 Bar Counsel charged Mr. Johnson with violating Maryland Rules 16-603 and 16-604 
based on conduct that occurred before July 1, 2016.  Effective July 1, 2016, Title 16, 
Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules were recodified, without subsequent change, in Title 
19, Chapter 400.  Rule 16-607 was recodified as Rule 19-408, and Rule 16-609 was 
 
4 
 
that Mr. Johnson violated § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of 
the Maryland Code.  See BOP § 10-306 (“A lawyer may not use trust money for any 
purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”). 
 
We designated the Honorable Leo E. Green, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County by Order dated March 6, 2019, to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommend 
conclusions of law.  See Md. Rule 19-722(a).  Mr. Johnson was personally served with 
process on May 16, 2019, and, on May 22, 2019, this Court entered an Order reassigning 
the case to be heard by the Honorable Wytonja L. Curry (the “hearing judge”).   
 
The evidentiary hearing spanned six days: December 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10, 2019.  
Three months after the hearing, on March 18, 2020, Mr. Johnson moved this Court to 
remand the case for the hearing judge to consider newly discovered evidence or 
alternatively to include newly discovered evidence in Mr. Johnson’s exceptions to the 
hearing judge’s finding of facts and conclusions of law.  We denied Mr. Johnson’s motion 
in an Order dated March 27, 2020.  The hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law were filed in this Court on March 23, 2020, and shortly thereafter, on March 31, 
2020, Mr. Johnson moved this Court to reconsider its March 27 Order denying his Motion 
for Leave to Remand.  We denied Mr. Johnson’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order 
dated April 9, 2020.  Mr. Johnson filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact 
 
recodified as Rule 19-410.  Because Mr. Johnson’s misconduct under Rules 16-607 and 
16-609 occurred both before and after July 1, 2016, Bar Counsel charged Mr. Johnson with 
violating both versions of the Rules.     
 
5 
 
and recommended conclusions of law on April 23, 2020, and this Court heard oral 
argument in this matter on October 29, 2020.   
B. 
Factual Findings. 
 
We begin by summarizing the hearing judge’s factual findings.  Mr. Johnson is 
originally from Liberia and immigrated to the United States in 1991.  He received degrees 
in engineering and biochemistry from the University of Maryland at College Park.  He also 
completed a teaching certificate in science and math, after which he spent several years 
working as a teacher.  Mr. Johnson then attended the University of Maryland School of 
Law and, after graduating, was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 20, 2001.   
Mr. Johnson did not immediately begin practicing law upon admission to the bar and 
continued working as a teacher for several years before practicing law part-time in 2013.  
Sometime between December 2014 and October 2015, Mr. Johnson began practicing law 
full-time.6  At all relevant times, Mr. Johnson maintained a law office—the Law Offices 
of Chauncey B. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson’s law practice first operated from his home address 
in Fort Washington, Maryland, and he later opened an office in National Harbor, Maryland.   
 
In this matter, the hearing judge first made factual findings involving Mr. Johnson’s 
failure to maintain an attorney trust account or IOLTA account between 2013 and October 
 
6 The hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are unclear as to when exactly 
Mr. Johnson began working as a full-time attorney.  The hearing judge first noted that, “by 
December 2014, [Mr. Johnson] was no longer working as a part[-]time attorney[.]”  
However, two sentences later, the hearing judge determined that “[Mr. Johnson] began the 
full-time practice of law in 2015.”  Mr. Johnson’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
indicates that he transitioned to the full-time practice of law sometime in the middle of 
2015.   
6 
 
2015.  Then, the hearing judge made factual findings regarding multiple instances of 
misconduct spanning twenty-one clients.  Lastly, the hearing judge made factual findings 
regarding witness testimony that Mr. Johnson misappropriated client funds.  Regarding 
mitigation, the hearing judge made findings about evidence and testimony that Mr. Johnson 
suffered from a Gastrointestinal Stromal Tumor (“GIST tumor”) when his misconduct 
occurred.7 
 
1. 
Mr. Johnson’s failure to maintain an attorney trust account or IOLTA 
account until October 2015.  
 
 
When Mr. Johnson began practicing law part-time in 2013, he did not maintain an 
attorney trust account or IOLTA account.  Mr. Johnson recognized this in a retainer 
agreement dated April 28, 2013, that provided: 
I am currently a part-time lawyer transitioning from the Montgomery County 
School System and averages very small monthly balances.  Therefore the 
undersigned does not intend to hold monies for you or any client.  Therefore 
all settlement check(s) will be jointly endorsed before a teller and the money 
deposited jointly and a check immediately issued to you (the client) “on the 
spot” representing your portion of the settlement as agreed by the parties.  
The date to be placed on your check will be determined by the client but the 
check must be deposited immediately, within a week but preferably sooner.  
All medical liens signed for by the undersigned less the person injury 
protection paid directly to the provider will be paid by the undersigned from 
any source of income available to the undersigned.  If you do not agree to 
this arrangement you are free at this point to hire another attorney or 
seek legal advice at this junction prior to signing! 
 
 
7 Dr. Ashraf Meelu testified that Mr. Johnson, while operating his law practice, was 
suffering from a GIST tumor that affected his ability to practice law.  Although the hearing 
judge did not opine on the effects of Mr. Johnson’s medical condition in her factual 
findings, she did weigh the parties’ testimony and evidence regarding Mr. Johnson’s 
medical condition in her consideration of mitigating factors.      
7 
 
(Emphasis and exclamation point in original.)  However, on February 26, 2014, and 
November 10, 2014, Mr. Johnson opened two Bank of America operating accounts 
(“Account #1945” and “Account #6070”) for his law practice that were not attorney trust 
accounts or IOLTA accounts.  Between April 25, 2014, and September 28, 2015, Mr. 
Johnson deposited $223,251 in personal injury settlement funds into Account #1945 for 
eighteen clients.  Additionally, on April 10, 2015, Mr. Johnson deposited $11,500 in 
settlement funds into Account #6070 for one client.  Mr. Johnson did not maintain an 
attorney trust account until October 5, 2015, when he opened an IOLTA attorney trust 
account at Bank of America.   
 
At all relevant times between 2013 and October 5, 2015, Mr. Johnson was required 
to receive informed consent from his clients before depositing client funds into an account 
other than an attorney trust account.8  The hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson’s April 
28, 2013, retainer agreement provided notice that he did not intend to hold client funds.  
But, in highlighting that Mr. Johnson’s December 2014 retainer agreement no longer 
contained similar language, the hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson had ceased providing 
such notice.9  Based on the language of Mr. Johnson’s December 2014 retainer agreement, 
the hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson failed to obtain his clients’ informed consent to 
deposit settlement funds into an operating account instead of an attorney trust account from 
 
8 See Rule 1.15. 
 
9 The hearing judge declined to make a finding that Mr. Johnson failed to obtain informed 
consent from clients before December 2014 because “[t]he retainer agreements for dates 
prior to December 2014 were not admitted into evidence.”   
 
8 
 
December 2014 through October 2015.10  We now turn to twenty-one client representations 
that primarily involve personal injury settlements arising from automobile accidents. 
 
2. 
Representation of Chrisha Robinson. 
 
Ms. Chrisha Robinson testified at the evidentiary hearing that she retained Mr. 
Johnson to represent her in a personal injury case arising from a 2014 motor vehicle 
accident.  During the representation, on November 23, 2015, United States Automobile 
Association (“USAA”) issued an $8,900 settlement check made payable to Ms. Robinson 
and Mr. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson endorsed and deposited Ms. Robinson’s settlement check 
on December 1, 2015, without notifying her of its arrival or obtaining her endorsement. 
 
Mr. Johnson failed to advise Ms. Robinson that he was in possession of her 
settlement funds until three months later on March 1, 2016.  Ms. Robinson testified that 
she had contacted Mr. Johnson five or six times between December 1, 2015, and March 1, 
2016, about the status of her settlement check.  Mr. Johnson did not advise Ms. Robinson 
that he had received her settlement check in December 2015—instead telling her that he 
had not received any funds and that he was working to secure the check from USAA.  After 
attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Robinson was $5,663.      
Yet, when Mr. Johnson remitted Ms. Robinson’s settlement funds in March 2016, he issued 
her a partial payment drawn on his attorney trust account for $4,508 and a settlement 
disbursement sheet.   
 
10 Mr. Johnson concedes that this conduct violated Rule 1.15(a). 
9 
 
 
Mr. Johnson failed to pay out his remaining $1,155 trust obligation for over a year.  
On or about November 21, 2017, he issued Ms. Robinson a $1,155.38 check drawn on his 
attorney trust account and a second settlement disbursement sheet.  While Mr. Johnson met 
his remaining trust obligation to Ms. Robinson when he paid out the second $1,155.38 
check, he misled Ms. Robinson about the origin of the funds.11  Ms. Robinson testified that, 
upon arriving at Mr. Johnson’s office, he explained that the check was a “refund” from a 
payment discrepancy between himself and Ms. Robinson’s physical therapist.  The hearing 
judge found that Mr. Johnson’s bank records indicate that he did not pay, or receive a 
refund from, any medical provider on behalf of Ms. Robinson.  The hearing judge 
accordingly determined that Mr. Johnson intentionally misled Ms. Robinson about the 
origin of the second settlement check, which was provided by Mr. Johnson in fulfillment 
of his outstanding trust obligation. 
 
Throughout Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Robinson, his attorney trust 
account balance frequently dropped below his $5,663 trust obligation.  On December 31, 
2015, Mr. Johnson’s month-end account balance for his attorney trust account was $1,900.  
On January 31, 2016, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account month-end balance was $100.  
As a result of a $30,000 settlement in a different case, unrelated to Ms. Robinson, Mr. 
Johnson’s February 29, 2016, month-end account balance was $20,082.  However, after 
Mr. Johnson’s first partial payment of $4,508 in March 2016, the month-end balance of his 
attorney trust account again dropped below his remaining $1,155 trust obligation in the 
 
11 Mr. Johnson disputes this fact.  See infra Discussion section (A). 
 
10 
 
following months: April 2016, June 2016, December 2016, April 2017, May 2017, June 
2017, July 2017, August 2017, and September 2017.12  Even so, Mr. Johnson withdrew his 
earned fee for Ms. Robinson’s client matter in March 2016.  The hearing judge therefore 
determined that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation and made 
misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson about her settlement. 
 
3.  Representation of Kevin Ross.  
 
Mr. Johnson represented Mr. Kevin Ross on a contingency fee basis beginning on 
January 22, 2015.  During the representation, the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund 
issued a $3,400 settlement check on November 30, 2015, made payable to Mr. Johnson 
and Mr. Ross.  However, on December 7, 2015, Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Ross’ 
settlement check into his attorney trust account without notifying Mr. Ross or obtaining his 
endorsement.    
 
Mr. Johnson failed to remit Mr. Ross’ settlement funds until August 15, 2016, over 
eight months after Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Ross’ settlement check.  On August 15, Mr. 
Johnson issued Mr. Ross a $3,500 check drawn on his attorney trust account.13   
 
12 The hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law does not indicate how many 
times Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance dropped below his trust obligation to 
Ms. Robinson between March 1, 2017, and November 21, 2017.  The hearing judge only 
provided findings as to Mr. Johnson’s month-end balances. 
 
13 Despite the parties’ agreed upon contingency fee, Mr. Johnson’s client file for Mr. Ross 
sheds light on why Mr. Johnson did not deduct his earned fee or costs from Mr. Ross’ 
settlement.  Mr. Johnson’s client file indicates that the “[c]lient needs money[,] entire check 
will be given to the client plus $100 extra dollars.  Client $311.65 cost will be forgiven as 
well.” 
 
11 
 
Because Mr. Johnson was not holding additional funds for Mr. Ross beyond his $3,400 
settlement, Mr. Johnson’s $100 overpayment created a client ledger balance of negative 
$100.  Moreover, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account month-end balance dropped below 
his $3,400 obligation in the following months: December 2015, January 2016, March 2016, 
April 2016, and June 2016.14 
 
4. 
Representation of Gina Byrd. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Gina Byrd, the Progressive Casualty 
Insurance Company (“Progressive”) issued a $7,500 settlement check on December 9, 
2015, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. Byrd.  Without notifying Ms. Byrd or 
obtaining her endorsement, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. Byrd’s settlement check into his 
attorney trust account on December 15, 2015.  After deducting attorney’s fees and costs, 
Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Byrd was $4,300.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. 
Byrd’s settlement funds until April 1, 2016, over three months after he deposited Ms. 
Byrd’s settlement check.  Yet, when Mr. Johnson paid out Ms. Byrd’s settlement funds, he 
only issued her a partial payment of $2,500. 
 
From December 15, 2015, to April 1, 2016, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account 
month-end balance dropped below his $4,300 trust obligation in three months: December 
2015, January 2016, and March 2016.  During the same time period, Mr. Johnson’s attorney 
trust account balance dropped below his trust obligation fourteen times.  Mr. Johnson failed 
 
14 The hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law also did not provide how 
many times that Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance dropped below his trust 
obligation to Mr. Ross.  The hearing judge only provided findings as to Mr. Johnson’s 
month-end balances.  
12 
 
to pay out his remaining $1,800 trust obligation until October 5, 2017, over one year after 
making his first settlement payment to Ms. Byrd.  The hearing judge accordingly 
determined that, between April 1, 2016, and October 5, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust 
account month-end balance dropped below his remaining $1,800 obligation.15  In April or 
May 2016, Mr. Johnson earned his fee, but he failed to withdraw those funds from his 
attorney trust account for over four months.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. 
Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation and, by not timely removing his earned fee, 
commingled funds. 
 
5. 
Representation of Clarence Weefur. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Clarence Weefur, the Government 
Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) issued a $30,000 settlement check on February 
22, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Weefur.  However, before Mr. Johnson 
deposited the $30,000 check into his attorney trust account, $19,800 was withdrawn from 
his attorney trust account in connection with Mr. Weefur’s client matter.  This transaction 
created a client ledger balance of negative $19,800.  Yet, on February 26, 2016, Mr. 
Johnson deposited Mr. Weefur’s settlement check into his attorney trust account without 
notifying Mr. Weefur or obtaining his endorsement.  After Mr. Johnson deposited the 
settlement check, several additional withdrawals were made in connection with Mr. 
 
15 The hearing judge did not state in which months, or how many times, Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust account balance dropped below his remaining $1,800 trust obligation to Ms. 
Byrd. 
13 
 
Weefur’s client matter, which caused a consistently negative client ledger balance between 
February 2016 and March 2018.  
 
On August 17, 2016, six months after Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Weefur’s GEICO 
settlement check, the Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company (“Allstate”) issued 
a $10,957.03 settlement check made payable to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Weefur.  On 
September 2, 2016, Mr. Johnson again deposited Mr. Weefur’s settlement check into his 
attorney trust account without notifying Mr. Weefur or obtaining his endorsement.  The 
hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation, after attorney’s fees and 
costs, was $20,000 to Mr. Weefur and $526.74 to the Revenue Administration Division of 
the Maryland Comptroller on Mr. Weefur’s behalf, for a total obligation of $20,526.74.  
Mr. Johnson remitted $20,000 to Mr. Weefur from his attorney trust account, but he did so 
by making five partial payments of: $5,000 on June 10, 2016; $2,500 on July 16, 2016; 
$2,500 on July 31, 2016; $5,000 on September 6, 2016; and $5,000 on September 20, 2016.  
Over two years after depositing Mr. Weefur’s first settlement check, on March 1, 2018, 
Mr. Johnson paid out $526.74 to the Revenue Administration Division.  Between February 
2016 and March 2018, the balance of Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account dropped below 
his trust obligation eighty-one times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson 
failed to maintain his trust obligation.  
 
6. 
Representation of Jennifer Heaven. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Jennifer Heaven, USAA issued a 
$7,500 settlement check on March 20, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and  
Ms. Heaven.  However, on April 6, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. Heaven’s settlement 
14 
 
check into his attorney trust account without notifying her or obtaining her endorsement.  
After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Heaven was $4,000.  
Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. Heaven’s settlement funds until June 1, 2016, almost two 
months after he deposited her settlement check.  Between April 6, 2016, and June 1, 2016, 
Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance dropped below his $4,000 trust obligation six 
times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust 
obligation. 
 
7. 
Representation of Itati Hernandez. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Itati Hernandez, Erie Insurance Group 
(“Erie Insurance”) issued a $9,000 settlement check on March 22, 2016, made payable to 
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Hernandez.  However, on March 24, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited 
Ms. Hernandez’s settlement check into his attorney trust account without notifying her or 
obtaining her endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation 
to Ms. Hernandez was $5,000.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. Hernandez’s settlement 
funds until August 23, 2016, almost five months after depositing Ms. Hernandez’s 
settlement check.  Between March 24, 2016, and August 23, 2016, Mr. Johnson’s attorney 
trust account balance dropped below his $5,000 trust obligation sixteen times.  
Additionally, Mr. Johnson failed to remove his earned fee from his attorney trust account 
until August 2016.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain 
his trust obligation and, by not timely removing his earned fee, commingled funds. 
 
8. 
Representation of Santos Hernandez. 
15 
 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Santos Hernandez, Erie Insurance 
issued a $8,500 settlement check on March 22, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and 
Mr. Hernandez.  However, on March 28, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Hernandez’s 
settlement check into his attorney trust account without notifying Mr. Hernandez or 
obtaining his endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation 
to Mr. Hernandez was $4,500.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Mr. Hernandez’s settlement 
funds until November 16, 2016, over seven months after Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. 
Hernandez’s settlement check.  Between March 28, 2016, and November 16, 2016, Mr. 
Johnson’s attorney trust account balance fell below his $4,500 trust obligation twenty-nine 
times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust 
obligation. 
 
9. 
Representation of Louise Price. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Louise Price, GEICO issued a $7,250 
settlement check on April 13, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. Price.  However, 
on April 18, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. Price’s settlement check into his attorney 
trust account without notifying her or obtaining her endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and 
costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Price was $5,250.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit 
Ms. Price’s settlement funds until August 16, 2016, over three months after depositing Ms. 
Price’s settlement check.  Between April 18, 2016, and August 16, 2016, Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust account balance fell below his $5,250 trust obligation thirteen times.  The 
hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation. 
 
10. 
Representation of Byme Taylor. 
16 
 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Byme Taylor, GEICO issued an $8,300 
settlement check on April 27, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Taylor.  
However, on May 3, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Taylor’s settlement check into his 
attorney trust account without notifying Mr. Taylor or obtaining his endorsement.  Mr. 
Johnson failed to remit Mr. Taylor’s settlement funds until January 10, 2017, over eight 
months after depositing Mr. Taylor’s settlement check.   
 
Mr. Johnson issued a $2,500 payment drawn on his attorney trust account to 
“Whosoever Will Christian Church” on Mr. Taylor’s behalf.  However, Mr. Johnson 
deducted as attorney’s fees a majority of Mr. Taylor’s settlement funds, earned by 
providing legal work on unrelated matters.  When Mr. Johnson made the payment, he was 
only holding $100 of Mr. Taylor’s funds in trust and the payment caused a client ledger 
balance of negative $2,400.  Between April 27, 2016, and January 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust account balance fell below his trust obligation nineteen times.  The hearing 
judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation to Mr. Taylor. 
 
11. 
Representation of Ajamu and Shelly Patterson. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Ajamu Patterson and Ms. Shelly 
Patterson, Progressive issued two separate $7,100 settlement checks on May 23, 2016.  Mr. 
Patterson’s check was made payable to himself and Mr. Johnson, while Ms. Patterson’s 
check was made payable to herself and Mr. Johnson.  Two days later, on May 25, 2016, 
Mr. Johnson deposited both checks into his attorney trust account without notifying the 
Pattersons or obtaining either clients’ endorsement.  Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation was 
17 
 
$7,900 to the Pattersons collectively, and $1,280 to Wilkins Chiropractic Center, which 
was one of the Pattersons’ medical providers.   
 
Mr. Johnson did not remit Ms. Patterson’s settlement funds until July 20, 2016, and 
Mr. Patterson’s funds until July 28, 2016.  Mr. Johnson waited over one year before 
remitting the funds due to Wilkins Chiropractic Center on August 25, 2017.  Between May 
25, 2016, and July 28, 2016, when Mr. Johnson paid out the Pattersons’ settlement funds, 
Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account dropped below his $7,900 trust obligation nine times.  
From May 25, 2016, until August 25, 2017, when Mr. Johnson paid out Wilkins 
Chiropractic Center, his attorney trust account balance fell below his remaining $1,280 
trust obligation twenty-five times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson 
failed to maintain his trust obligation to the Pattersons and Wilkins Chiropractic Center. 
 
12. 
Representation of Teressa Fultz. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Teressa Fultz, GEICO issued a $7,736 
settlement check on June 3, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. Fultz.  However, 
on June 10, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. Fultz’s settlement check into his attorney 
trust account without notifying her or obtaining her endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and 
costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Fultz was $5,736.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit 
Ms. Fultz’s settlement funds until August 16, 2016, and allowed his attorney trust account 
balance to fall below his $5,736 trust obligation nine times.  The hearing judge therefore 
found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation. 
 
13. 
Representation of Chardae Bell. 
18 
 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Chardae Bell, the State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company (“State Farm”) issued an $8,500 settlement check on August 4, 2016, 
made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. Bell.  However, on August 9, 2016, Mr. Johnson 
deposited Ms. Bell’s settlement check into his attorney trust account without notifying her 
or obtaining her endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust 
obligation to Ms. Bell was $5,243.12.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. Bell’s settlement 
funds until August 15, 2017, over one year after he deposited Ms. Bell’s settlement check.  
Between August 9, 2016, and August 15, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s trust account fell below his 
$5,243.12 trust obligation fifty-eight times.  The hearing judge therefore determined that 
Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation. 
 
14. 
Representation of Victoria McCollum. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Victoria McCollum, State Farm issued 
a $6,000 settlement check on August 4, 2016, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. 
McCollum.  On August 9, 2016, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. McCollum’s settlement check 
into his attorney trust account without notifying her or obtaining her endorsement.  After 
attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. McCollum was $4,000.  
Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. McCollum’s settlement funds until November 4, 2016, 
over two months after depositing her settlement check.  Between August 9, 2016, and 
November 4, 2016, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance fell below his $4,000 trust 
obligation nine times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to 
maintain his trust obligation. 
 
15. 
Representation of India Gooden. 
19 
 
 
Ms. India Gooden testified at the evidentiary hearing that she retained Mr. Johnson 
in 2016 to represent her in a personal injury case resulting from an automobile accident.16    
During the representation, State Farm issued a $6,200 settlement check on August 4, 2016, 
made payable to Mr. Johnson and Ms. Gooden.  However, Mr. Johnson deposited Ms. 
Gooden’s settlement check into his attorney trust account on August 9, 2016, without 
notifying her or obtaining her endorsement.   
 
After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Gooden was 
$3,727.62.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. Gooden’s settlement proceeds until January 
13, 2017, over five months after depositing Ms. Gooden’s settlement check.  However, 
when Mr. Johnson paid Ms. Gooden, he issued her a $2,000 partial payment drawn from 
Account #1945—an operating account that is not an attorney trust account.  Ms. Gooden 
testified that, between August 9, 2016, and January 13, 2017, when Mr. Johnson issued the 
$2,000 check, Mr. Johnson did not inform her that he had received her settlement funds.  
Instead, Ms. Gooden testified that she had asked about the status of her settlement funds 
five or six times and that Mr. Johnson maintained he was waiting for State Farm to issue 
the check.  The hearing judge accordingly found that Mr. Johnson misrepresented the 
amount of settlement proceeds that Ms. Gooden was entitled to receive on January 13, 
2017. 
 
The hearing judge also found that Mr. Johnson misrepresented the origin of a second 
payment made to Ms. Gooden in August 2017, after he advised her that State Farm had 
 
16 Ms. McCollum and Ms. Bell—also clients of Mr. Johnson—were passengers in Ms. 
Gooden’s vehicle when the accident occurred.  See supra Background sections B(13), (14).     
20 
 
paid out additional funds.  On or around August 15, 2017, Ms. Gooden visited Mr. 
Johnson’s office to receive her additional funds, but Mr. Johnson refused to issue the funds 
unless she signed and notarized an affidavit stating: “I, India Gooden, hereby affirmed [sic] 
under penalty of perjury that Mr. Johnson kept me updated and obtained approval about 
the entire case throughout 2016 and 2017.”  Mr. Johnson accompanied Ms. Gooden to a 
notary public to have her sign the affidavit, and upon returning to Mr. Johnson’s office, he 
issued her a $3,727.62 check drawn on his attorney trust account.   
 
However, after receiving Ms. Gooden’s affidavit and issuing her the $3,727.62 
check, Mr. Johnson requested that she deposit the check and return $2,000 in cash to him.  
Mr. Johnson presented Ms. Gooden with a settlement disbursement sheet to sign that did 
not mention the $2,000 payment made on January 13, 2017, or Mr. Johnson’s request that 
she return $2,000 in cash to him.  Ms. Gooden ultimately signed the settlement 
disbursement sheet but, after Mr. Johnson refused to provide additional documentation 
about his previous $2,000 payment to her, the parties got into a verbal altercation and a 
third-party called the police.  Ms. Gooden left Mr. Johnson’s office with the $3,727.62 
check and deposited it on August 16, 2017, without returning $2,000 in cash to Mr. 
Johnson.  Based on Mr. Johnson’s August 2017 encounter with Ms. Gooden, the hearing 
judge again found that he had made intentional misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden when he 
misled her about the origin of the $3,727.62 check. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Johnson testified that his nephew and non-attorney 
employee—Romeo Clarke—misappropriated Ms. Gooden’s settlement funds in the 
process of stealing client funds from Mr. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson first explained that Mr. 
21 
 
Clarke stole funds by depositing client settlement checks into Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust 
account without Mr. Johnson’s or the client’s knowledge.  According to Mr. Johnson, Mr. 
Clarke then transferred client funds from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account to Account 
#6070 and used a debit card associated with that account to steal funds.   
 
Mr. Johnson also testified about the circumstances surrounding Ms. Gooden’s 
$2,000 settlement payment on January 13, 2017.  Mr. Johnson maintained that Mr. Clarke 
was in a relationship with Ms. Gooden and used one of two blank checks left in the office 
by Mr. Johnson for emergency purposes to pay her without Mr. Johnson’s knowledge.  
Even so, the hearing judge declined to make a finding that the $2,000 check issued to Ms. 
Gooden from Account #1945 was a blank check that was left in Mr. Johnson’s office for 
emergency purposes and issued by Mr. Clarke.  The hearing judge therefore declined to 
make a finding that Mr. Clarke misappropriated Ms. Gooden’s settlement funds and that 
Mr. Clarke made the $2,000 payment to Ms. Gooden using a blank check left in Mr. 
Johnson’s office for emergency purposes.     
 
16. 
Representation of Emmett and Nyan Acquoi. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Emmett Acquoi and Ms. Nyan Acquoi, 
Allstate issued two separate $4,300 settlement checks on September 15, 2016.  Mr. 
Acquoi’s check was made payable to himself and Mr. Johnson, while Ms. Acquoi’s check 
was made payable to herself and Mr. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson deposited both settlement 
checks into his attorney trust account on September 29, 2016, without notifying the 
Acquois or obtaining either clients’ endorsement.  After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. 
Johnson’s total trust obligation to the Acquois was $4,200.  Mr. Johnson did not remit the 
22 
 
Acquois’ settlement funds until October 14, 2016, and the hearing judge determined that 
he did so using settlement proceeds received in connection with other client matters.  
Between September 29, 2016, and October 14, 2016, the balance of Mr. Johnson’s attorney 
trust account was $900.03.  Therefore, the hearing judge also determined that Mr. Johnson 
failed to maintain his trust obligation. 
 
17. 
Representation of Gustavo Sandoval. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Gustavo Sandoval, Erie Insurance 
issued a $3,000 settlement check on September 29, 2016, made payable to Mr. Sandoval 
and Mr. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson endorsed and deposited Mr. Sandoval’s settlement check 
on October 4, 2016, without notifying Mr. Sandoval or obtaining his endorsement.  After 
attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Mr. Sandoval was $1,857.41.  
Mr. Johnson failed to remit Mr. Sandoval’s settlement funds until August 25, 2017, more 
than ten months after Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Sandoval’s settlement check.  Between 
October 4, 2016, and August 25, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance 
dropped below his trust obligation twenty-five times.  The hearing judge therefore 
determined that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation. 
 
18. 
Representation of Aloysius Glover. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Aloysius Glover, USAA issued a 
$12,000 settlement check on October 19, 2016, made payable to Mr. Glover and Mr. 
Johnson.  Without notifying Mr. Glover or receiving his endorsement, Mr. Johnson 
23 
 
deposited Mr. Glover’s settlement check into his attorney trust account.17  After attorney’s 
fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Mr. Glover was $6,887.  Mr. Johnson did 
not remit Mr. Glover’s settlement funds until August 15, 2017, over nine months after Mr. 
Glover’s settlement check was issued by USAA.  Between October 28, 2016, and August 
15, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account balance fell below his trust obligation fifty 
times.  The hearing judge therefore found that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust 
obligation. 
 
19. 
Representation of Kelly Frosolone. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Ms. Kelly Frosolone, Progressive issued 
three separate settlement checks on April 5, 2017, totaling $10,000, for Ms. Frosolone and 
her two minor children.18  Mr. Johnson deposited all three settlement checks into his 
attorney trust account on April 13, 2017, without notifying Ms. Frosolone or obtaining her 
endorsement.  Ms. Frosolone’s $8,500 check was returned by Bank of America because of 
an ineffective endorsement on April 18, 2017.  Progressive re-issued the $8,500 check on 
April 25, 2017, and, on May 1, 2017, Mr. Johnson again deposited the check into his 
attorney trust account without obtaining Ms. Frosolone’s endorsement.  
 
After attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Johnson’s trust obligation to Ms. Frosolone and 
her children was $5,200.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit Ms. Frosolone’s settlement funds 
 
17 The record indicates that Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Glover’s settlement check into his 
attorney trust account on October 28, 2016. 
 
18 Ms. Frosolone’s settlement check was for $8,500 and her children’s checks were for 
$1,000 and $500 respectively. 
24 
 
until July 7, 2017, around three months after he received the three settlement checks.  The 
hearing judge found that, between April 13, 2017, and July 7, 2017, Mr. Johnson’s attorney 
trust account balance dropped below his $5,200 obligation eight times.  Moreover, the 
hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson withdrew $800 in “miscellaneous cost[s]” pertaining 
to Ms. Frosolone’s client matter and failed to remove those funds until July 7, 2017.  The 
hearing judge therefore determined that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his trust obligation 
and, by failing to remove costs associated with Ms. Frosolone’s client matter for three 
months, commingled funds. 
 
20. 
Representation of Edward Feustel. 
 
During Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Edward Feustel, Progressive issued a 
$6,000 settlement check on June 28, 2017, made payable to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Feustel.  
Mr. Johnson endorsed and deposited Mr. Feustel’s settlement check into his attorney trust 
account on July 3, 2017, without notifying Mr. Feustel or obtaining his endorsement.  Mr. 
Johnson testified at the evidentiary hearing that $4,000 of Mr. Feustel’s settlement funds 
belonged to him in repayment of a loan that he previously made to Mr. Feustel.  Although 
$4,000 of Mr. Feustel’s settlement funds belonged to Mr. Johnson, he deposited all of Mr. 
Feustel’s settlement funds into his attorney trust account.  Mr. Johnson testified that he 
deposited Mr. Feustel’s settlement check because he wanted to bring his attorney trust 
account into balance, however Mr. Johnson subsequently used these funds to pay out other 
clients.  The hearing judge therefore found that, by depositing Mr. Feustel’s funds into his 
attorney trust account and using those funds to pay out other clients, Mr. Johnson 
commingled funds.   
25 
 
 
In November 2017, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Feustel renegotiated the terms of their 
outstanding loan and Mr. Johnson issued Mr. Feustel a $2,590 settlement check.  Later, 
Mr. Feustel made four $1,000 payments to repay Mr. Johnson for the outstanding loan.  
The hearing judge also found that, as of July 3, 2017, Mr. Johnson had a $910 trust 
obligation to Adolph & Kalkstein Chiropractic.  Mr. Johnson failed to remit those funds 
until November 18, 2017, over four months after depositing Mr. Feustel’s settlement check.  
Throughout Mr. Johnson’s representation of Mr. Feustel, the hearing judge found that Mr. 
Johnson failed to manage his trust account, failed to provide competent representation, and 
failed to promptly remit funds to Mr. Feustel and Adolph & Kalkstein Chiropractic. 
 
21. 
Testimony Regarding Mr. Johnson’s Alleged Misappropriation of Funds. 
 
Finally, the hearing judge made factual findings about the parties’ testimony 
concerning the misappropriation of client funds from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account.  
Bar Counsel presented testimony from Ms. Robinson, Ms. Gooden, and Charles Miller, a 
Forensic Investigator and Certified Public Accountant for the Attorney Grievance 
Commission.19  Mr. Johnson, on the other hand, presented testimony from Jeffery Barsky 
and Robert Waller, both of whom are Certified Public Accountants who were accepted by 
the hearing judge as experts in accounting, forensic accounting, and fraud examination.  
Mr. Johnson also presented testimony from Dr. Ashraf Meelu, a medical doctor who was 
 
19 Mr. Miller was not presented as an expert witness, and his testimony generally concerned 
client transaction summaries based on Mr. Johnson’s Bank of America account documents, 
client ledgers, and client files. 
26 
 
accepted by the hearing judge as an expert witness in oncology.  Additionally, Mr. Johnson, 
and his wife, Ms. Andrea Johnson, testified at the evidentiary hearing.   
 
Based on Mr. Waller’s and Mr. Barsky’s testimony, the hearing judge first declined 
to make a finding that Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account would have been in balance 
but for Mr. Clarke’s alleged transfer of funds associated with Mr. Weefur’s client matter.  
Mr. Johnson conceded that funds were misappropriated from his attorney trust account in 
connection with Mr. Weefur’s client matter.  However, Mr. Johnson’s expert witness 
testimony shifted the blame entirely to Mr. Clarke and sought to discredit Mr. Miller’s 
testimony and client transaction summaries.  
 
Mr. Johnson’s expert witnesses testified that Mr. Johnson failed to maintain his 
client trust obligations because Mr. Clarke—acting alone and with the intent to steal client 
funds from Mr. Johnson—transferred $73,945.17 in fees and expenses from Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust account.  According to Mr. Johnson’s expert witnesses, Mr. Clarke’s alleged 
transfers were only associated with Mr. Weefur’s client matter.  Furthermore, Mr. 
Johnson’s expert witnesses testified that Mr. Clarke stole $57,456.56 by transferring client 
funds from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account to Account #6070 and using a debit card 
associated with that account to make purchases and withdrawals.  Mr. Johnson’s expert 
witnesses therefore concluded that, but for Mr. Clarke’s alleged actions, Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust account would not have been out of balance at any point in time.20   
 
20 Mr. Johnson’s expert witnesses also highlighted the remedial actions taken by Mr. 
Johnson after discovering the transfers, concluding that all of Mr. Johnson’s clients were 
paid in full and that Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account remained in balance from October 
2017 through March 2018. 
27 
 
 
Because Mr. Johnson maintained that his attorney trust account imbalances 
stemmed from transfers made in connection with Mr. Weefur’s client matter, Mr. Barsky 
also testified about Mr. Johnson’s specific trust obligations during Mr. Weefur’s 
representation.  Mr. Johnson represented Mr. Weefur on a contingency fee basis regarding 
his insurance settlements.  At the same time, Mr. Barsky testified that Mr. Johnson also 
agreed to negotiate Mr. Weefur’s medical debts on his behalf after those costs exceeded 
his insurance settlement proceeds.  Mr. Johnson charged $350 per hour for this work and 
Mr. Barsky testified that, by the time Mr. Johnson deposited Mr. Weefur’s $30,000 GEICO 
settlement check into his attorney trust account, Mr. Johnson’s contingency fee and earned 
hourly fee had exceeded $30,000.   
 
However, Mr. Johnson’s testimony did not confirm whom Mr. Weefur’s $30,000 
settlement check belonged to at the time Mr. Johnson deposited it into his attorney trust 
account or whether his ledger for Mr. Weefur’s client matter was accurate.  Contrary to 
Mr. Barsky’s testimony that Mr. Johnson had earned Mr. Weefur’s settlement funds, Mr. 
Johnson remitted $20,000 from his attorney trust account, and $4,000 from his operating 
account, to Mr. Weefur.  The hearing judge therefore found that, because Mr. Johnson did 
not sufficiently explain his accounting in Mr. Weefur’s client matter, or verify the 
information that Mr. Barsky’s expert testimony relied on, she could not make a finding that 
28 
 
Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account would have been in balance but for the transfers 
associated with Mr. Weefur’s client matter.21 
 
The hearing judge also declined to credit Mr. Waller’s testimony about Mr. Clarke’s 
alleged theft or make a finding that Mr. Miller’s testimony and summaries were unreliable.  
Mr. Waller testified about Mr. Clarke’s alleged theft of funds associated with Mr. Weefur’s 
client matter, and Mr. Johnson requested that the hearing judge credit Mr. Waller’s 
testimony based on his qualifications, use of corroborating documentary evidence, 
adherence to industry-standard methodology, and thorough analysis of Mr. Johnson’s 
client documents.  Mr. Johnson also requested that the hearing judge discredit Mr. Miller’s 
summaries and testimony as unreliable because Mr. Miller did not conduct a theft or 
shortfall analysis, did not review pertinent documents, and failed to interview witnesses.22  
The hearing judge declined to make these findings regarding Mr. Waller’s and Mr. Miller’s 
testimony. 
 
Next, the hearing judge determined that, although she declined to make a finding 
that Mr. Johnson participated in the misappropriation of funds, she did not find credible 
 
21 The hearing judge also highlighted that an addendum contract modifying Mr. Johnson’s 
original retainer agreement with Mr. Weefur was not signed until February 2016, two 
months after withdrawals started being made from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account 
that matched with his hourly rate. 
 
22 Mr. Johnson’s expert witnesses also testified that Mr. Miller’s calculations concerning 
Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account were incorrect and that Bar Counsel’s accounting 
evidence did not conform with AICPA methodology, Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (“GAAP”), or AICPA’s Statement of Financial Concepts Number 2, paragraph 
160.  
 
29 
 
Mr. Johnson’s testimony that he was unaware of the misappropriation.  Mr. Johnson 
testified that he personally settled his clients’ personal injury cases and knew when to 
expect each settlement check.  Moreover, Mr. Johnson endorsed several client settlement 
checks, and in Ms. Robinson’s and Ms. Gooden’s client matters, Mr. Johnson made 
affirmative misrepresentations about the arrival of their settlement checks.  Based on Mr. 
Johnson’s actions and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge declined 
to make a finding that Mr. Johnson was unaware of the misappropriation of funds from his 
attorney trust account.    
 
Lastly, despite Mr. Waller’s and Mr. Barsky’s testimony that Mr. Clarke’s theft 
caused Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account to remain out of balance, the hearing judge 
discredited Mr. Johnson’s testimony that both he and his wife were unaware of Mr. 
Clarke’s unauthorized withdrawals from Account #6070.  Mr. and Ms. Johnson both had 
access to the debit card associated with Account #6070, which Mr. Clarke allegedly used 
to steal funds, and Ms. Johnson testified that she had created journals to determine who 
made purchases and cash withdrawals from the account.  Moreover, by Mr. Johnson’s own 
admission and Mr. Barsky’s schedule of expenditures for Account #6070, Mr. Johnson 
spent $127,978.22 from Account #6070 between December 2015 and October 2016.  
Because Mr. and Ms. Johnson had control over Account #6070, used the debit card 
associated with the account, and maintained journals to track withdrawals from the 
account, the hearing judge declined to make a finding that Mr. Johnson was unaware of 
Mr. Clarke’s unauthorized transactions.  However, because Mr. Johnson, Ms. Johnson, and 
Mr. Clarke all had access to the debit card associated with Account #6070, the hearing 
30 
 
judge also declined to make a finding as to which person made the unauthorized 
transactions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 
judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law.  See Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 332 (2020) (citation omitted) (“[T]his 
Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact . . . .”); Md. Rule 19-
741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions 
of law.”).  This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a 
lawyer violated a rule of professional conduct.  See Md. Rule 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has 
the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by 
clear and convincing evidence.”).   
 
Either party may file “exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing 
judge[.]”  Md. Rule 19-728(b).  If a party excepts to the hearing judge’s findings, this Court 
“shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of 
proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).”  Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B).  “We may confine our review 
to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions, mindful though, that the hearing judge 
is afforded due regard to assess the credibility of witnesses.”  Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 332 
(citation omitted).  This Court will not disturb the hearing judge’s findings “where ‘there 
is any competent evidence to support the’ finding of fact.”  Id. (quoting Attorney Grievance 
31 
 
Comm’n v. Donnelly, 458 Md. 237, 276 (2018)).  Therefore, “[i]f the hearing judge’s 
factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are 
supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”  Id. at 
333 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419 (2009)).    
DISCUSSION 
 
Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact or 
conclusions of law.  Mr. Johnson notes several exceptions to both the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We shall address each in turn. 
A. 
Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact. 
 
  Mr. Johnson takes exception to five of the hearing judge’s factual findings: (1) that 
Mr. Johnson was not suffering from the effects of his GIST tumor when client funds were 
misappropriated from his attorney trust account; (2) that Mr. Miller’s testimony and 
summaries were admissible; (3) that Mr. Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. 
Robinson; (4) that Mr. Johnson did not pay out $2,500 in settlement proceeds to Mr. 
Taylor; and (5) that Mr. Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden. 
 
A hearing judge is given “a great deal of discretion in determining which evidence 
to rely upon.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 195 (2020) (citing 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 462 Md. 209, 230 (2018)).  Therefore, this Court 
“generally ‘defer[s] to the credibility findings of the hearing judge.’”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 181 (2014) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 722 (2014)).  We do so because “[t]he hearing judge is in the best 
position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, 
32 
 
as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 683–84 
(2002)); see also Woolery, 462 Md. at 230 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted) (“As far as what evidence a hearing judge must rely upon to reach his or her 
conclusions, we have said that the hearing judge may pick and choose what evidence to 
believe.”). 
 
Mr. Johnson first excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he was not 
suffering from symptoms of his GIST tumor when client funds were misappropriated from 
his attorney trust account.  However, the hearing judge was in the best position to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses presented at the evidentiary hearing when she found that 
Mr. Johnson “did not introduce any credible evidence establishing that he was experiencing 
any symptoms [of his GIST tumor]” between 2015 and 2017—when the misappropriation 
occurred.  Although Dr. Meelu testified about the effects of Mr. Johnson’s GIST tumor 
dating back to 2015, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson was not entitled to 
mitigation as a result of his diagnosis because he “never saw a specialist, was never 
hospitalized, and did not receive any blood transfusions” during this timeframe.  
 Mr. Johnson’s arguments that the hearing judge incorrectly focused on acute anemia, 
rather than chronic anemia, and ignored Dr. Meelu’s testimony regarding Mr. Johnson’s 
anemia both fail.  The hearing judge made no mention of “acute” anemia in her findings of 
fact or conclusions of law and credited Dr. Meelu’s testimony on cross-examination that 
Mr. Johnson “was not suffering from anemia as late as June 2016.” 
33 
 
 
 Therefore, the credibility determination made by the hearing judge—after 
considering the evidence and testimony from Dr. Meelu and Mr. Johnson—is one that this 
Court defers to absent clear error.  Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“Th[is] Court shall give due 
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”).   
We find no clear error.  “[T]he hearing judge was in the best position to evaluate the 
veracity of [Mr. Johnson’s] explanation regarding [his] alleged violation[s] of the [Rules]” 
when she found that Mr. Johnson “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he was suffering from a physical disability at the time of the misconduct.”  Miller, 467 Md. 
at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kepple, 
432 Md. 214, 226–27 (2013)).  We therefore overrule Mr. Johnson’s exception. 
 
Next, Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s decision to credit Mr. Miller’s 
summaries as reliable and contends that Mr. Miller should have been prohibited from 
introducing them at the evidentiary hearing.  Mr. Johnson primarily contends that Mr. 
Miller should not have been permitted to testify about his summaries at the evidentiary 
hearing because he was not designated as an expert witness, his summaries included expert 
analysis, and his summaries were not timely disclosed.  However, this Court addressed 
similar summaries presented by Mr. Miller in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sanderson, 
465 Md. 1, 37–38 (2019).  In Sanderson, this Court overruled Garland Sanderson’s 
exception to Mr. Miller’s testimony because: 
The activities which Mr. Miller engaged in do not require any particular 
expertise in a subject-matter.  Mr. Miller, in his role as investigator, reviewed 
the bank records obtained from Wells Fargo and placed some of this 
information, concerning Mr. Sanderson’s trust account, in tables detailing 
the transactions.  In this regard, Mr. Miller acted as a fact witness and merely 
34 
 
noted data from the financial records and recorded this information in tables 
for greater ease of access.  In his review, Mr. Miller offered no expertise, 
merely reiterated numbers from the records, and the subject-matter did not 
require a particular level of expertise.  Accordingly, Mr. Miller testified as a 
fact witness instead of an expert witness[.] 
 
Sanderson, 465 Md. at 38.   
 
We also find that Mr. Miller’s testimony here, which relied on summaries created 
from Mr. Johnson’s Bank of America records, client ledgers, and subpoenaed documents, 
was within the ken of a layperson witness.  See id. at 37–38 (citing Dorsey v. Nold, 362 
Md. 241, 257 (2001)) (“[W]e have held that individuals testify as expert witnesses where 
they opine in a particular matter on subjects which laypersons would typically be unable 
to grasp.”).  Mr. Miller’s summaries here do not require any particular expertise in a subject 
matter and, contrary to Mr. Johnson’s contentions, Mr. Miller testified as a fact witness.23  
We therefore overrule Mr. Johnson’s exception. 
 
Mr. Johnson also excepts to various findings concerning his representation of Ms. 
Robinson, Mr. Taylor, and Ms. Gooden.  Mr. Johnson first asks this Court to find erroneous 
the hearing judge’s determination that Mr. Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. 
Robinson about her settlement.  We decline to do so.  Mr. Johnson contends that the hearing 
judge erred in stating that the “bank records admitted in evidence do not demonstrate that 
[Mr. Johnson] paid any medical provider on behalf of Ms. Robinson or that he received a 
refund check from any provider[.]”  Mr. Johnson accordingly asks the Court to determine 
that he did not make misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson or misappropriate her funds.  But 
 
23 We also disagree that Mr. Miller’s summaries were not timely disclosed. 
 
35 
 
the evidence presented at the hearing supports the hearing judge’s factual finding that Mr. 
Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson about the status of her settlement 
funds.24   
 
Significantly, Mr. Johnson still made misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson when he 
told her that he was not in possession of her settlement funds between December 2015 and 
March 2016, and that his $1,115.38 payment to her was a “refund” from a payment 
discrepancy with her chiropractor.  Even if the hearing judge erred in finding that Mr. 
Johnson did not make a payment or payments to Ms. Robinson’s chiropractor—and we 
believe the hearing judge did not err based on the evidence presented at trial—there is no 
evidence that the $1,115.38 paid out to Ms. Robinson was returned to Mr. Johnson by the 
chiropractor as a “refund.”25  The hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Mr. 
Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson about her settlement.  We therefore 
overrule Mr. Johnson’s exception. 
 
Furthermore, Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s findings concerning Mr. 
Taylor’s settlement payment.  We agree that the hearing judge’s findings of fact and 
 
24 Mr. Johnson filed a Motion for Leave to Remand in this Court so that the hearing judge 
could consider newfound evidence purporting to show that Mr. Johnson did make a 
payment to Ms. Robinson’s chiropractor.  We denied Mr. Johnson’s motion and we decline 
to consider newfound evidence brought to this Court’s attention months after the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.  
 
25 In addition to Ms. Robinson’s testimony about Mr. Johnson’s $1,115.38 payment, the 
record indicates that the memo line of the check issued to Ms. Robinson was filled out 
“Refund.”  It is also worth noting that Mr. Johnson’s second payment of $1,115.38 on 
November 21, 2017, paid out $.38 more than the exact $1,155 balance of Mr. Johnson’s 
remaining trust obligation to Ms. Robinson. 
 
36 
 
conclusions of law may suggest that Mr. Johnson misappropriated $2,500 in settlement 
funds from Mr. Taylor.  While Mr. Johnson did create a client ledger imbalance by making 
a $2,500 payment to “Whosoever Will Christian Church” on Mr. Taylor’s behalf, it does 
not automatically follow that Mr. Johnson misappropriated those funds.  To the extent that 
the hearing judge’s findings concerning Mr. Taylor’s representation suggest that Mr. 
Johnson failed to pay out his trust obligation, we sustain Mr. Johnson’s exception. 
 
Lastly, Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Johnson made 
misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden about her settlement.  Mr. Johnson is correct in asserting 
that his two payments to Ms. Gooden totaled $5,727.62, which exceeded her share of the 
settlement.  Mr. Johnson also is correct that Bar Counsel did not meet its burden of proving 
that he made misrepresentations regarding the $2,000 check that was paid to Ms. Gooden 
on January 13, 2017.26  However, these have no bearing on other misrepresentations that 
Mr. Johnson made during Ms. Gooden’s representation.  Like in Ms. Robinson’s 
representation, Mr. Johnson made affirmative misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden that her 
settlement check had not been issued after he had already deposited the check.  Moreover, 
Mr. Johnson misrepresented to Ms. Gooden that State Farm had issued additional 
settlement funds and that she was required to sign an affidavit to receive those funds.   
 
26 The hearing judge discredited Mr. Johnson’s testimony “that the January 13, 2017[,] 
check issued to Ms. Gooden was a blank check that had been left for Mr. Clarke’s 
emergency purposes and improperly issued to Mr. Gooden by Mr. Clarke.”  However, Bar 
Counsel did not prove by clear and convincing evidence, nor does the record support, that 
Mr. Johnson knew that this check was issued to Ms. Gooden on January 13, 2017.   
37 
 
 
We therefore sustain Mr. Johnson’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he 
made misrepresentations in connection with the $2,000 check that was issued to Ms. 
Gooden.  Otherwise, however, the record supports the hearing judge’s finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Johnson made misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden during her 
representation.  We therefore overrule Mr. Johnson’s general exception that Mr. Johnson 
did not make misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden. 
B. 
Conclusions of Law. 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rules 1.1, 1.4, 1.15, 5.3, 
and 8.4.  The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Maryland Rules 16-
603, 16-604, 19-408, and 19-410.  Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing 
judge’s conclusions of law.  Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions that 
he violated Rules 1.15(a), and 5.3(c).  Based on an independent review of the record, we 
sustain Mr. Johnson’s exception as to Rule 5.3(c) and uphold the hearing judge’s remaining 
conclusions of law. 
 
1. 
Rule 1.1 (Competence).  
 
Rule 1.1 requires that an attorney “provide competent representation to a client.  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  “[A]n attorney ‘demonstrates 
incompetence, and therefore violates Rule [1.1], when he [or she] fails to properly maintain 
his [or her] client trust account.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 
735 (2020) (some alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 
457 Md. 159, 214 (2018)).  Additionally, an attorney’s “failure to maintain [client] funds 
38 
 
in a proper trust account demonstrates incompetence.”  Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 337 
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 296–97 (2005)). 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.1 by failing to 
promptly remit settlement funds due to clients and by making misrepresentations to Ms. 
Robinson and Ms. Gooden about the status of their settlement checks.  As evidenced by 
the hearing judge’s factual findings, Mr. Johnson failed to maintain client funds in an 
attorney trust account and, after opening an attorney trust account, exhibited an extensive 
pattern of mishandling client funds held in trust.  Mr. Johnson does not except to these 
conclusions of law.  Based on our independent review of the record, we agree that Mr. 
Johnson violated Rule 1.1 by failing to promptly remit funds due to clients, by making 
misrepresentations to clients about their settlements, and by exhibiting an extensive pattern 
of improperly handling client funds.   
 
2. 
Rule 1.4 (Communication). 
 
Rule 1.4 provides: 
(a) An attorney shall: 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-
301.0 (f) (1.0), is required by these Rules; 
 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects 
assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
 
39 
 
Under Rule 1.4, attorneys are required “to communicate with their clients and keep them 
reasonably informed of the status of their legal matters.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349 (2020).  Accordingly, an attorney’s failure to disburse funds due 
to clients and third-parties in a timely manner constitutes “a failure to keep [their] clients 
reasonably informed about the status of their cases in violation of Rule 1.4.”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 369 (2005).  
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (b) when 
he failed to keep Ms. Robinson reasonably informed about her case “to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit [her] to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”  After depositing Ms. Robinson’s settlement check, Mr. Johnson 
misrepresented to her that he was still waiting for the check to arrive.  Again, in November 
2017, Mr. Johnson misled Ms. Robinson by telling her that a second $1,155.38 settlement 
payment was a refund from a payment discrepancy between Mr. Johnson and Ms. 
Robinson’s chiropractor.  The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson’s explanation 
was untrue based on the evidence presented at the hearing.   
 
The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.4(a)(2), (3), and 
(b) when he failed to keep Ms. Gooden informed about her settlement.  Mr. Johnson misled 
Ms. Gooden about the status of her settlement, misled her by requiring her to sign and 
notarize an affidavit before issuing her funds, failed to respond to her reasonable requests 
for information, refused to provide her an accurate settlement disbursement sheet, and 
failed to explain her settlement “to the extent reasonably necessary to permit [her] to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation.”   
40 
 
 
Mr. Johnson does not except to these conclusions of law.  Based on our independent 
review of the record we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Johnson’s 
conduct violated Rule 1.4. 
 
3. 
Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property). 
 
Rule 1.15 provides in pertinent part:  
(a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an 
attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
attorney’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and 
records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that 
Chapter.  Other property shall be identified specifically as such and 
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be 
created and maintained.  Complete records of the account funds and of other 
property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of 
at least five years after the date the record was created. 
 
(b) An attorney may deposit the attorney’s own funds in a client trust account 
only as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b). 
 
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a 
different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that 
have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those 
funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses 
incurred. 
 
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person 
has an interest, an attorney shall promptly notify the client or third person.  
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, an attorney shall deliver promptly to the client or third person 
any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive 
and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full 
accounting regarding such property. 
 
41 
 
Put plainly, when an attorney receives a client’s settlement funds, “[s]uch funds are to be 
placed in an attorney trust account in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-404.”27  Smith-
Scott, 469 at 350 (alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Singh, 
464 Md. 645, 673 (2019)).  Therefore, “a violation of Rule 1.15 occurs when the attorney 
‘does not deposit trust funds into an attorney trust account and does not obtain the client’s 
informed consent to do otherwise.’”  Planta, 467 Md. at 352 (quoting Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 189–90 (2015)).  Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that the 
balance in an attorney trust account falls below the total amounts held in trust supports a 
prima facie finding of [a] violation of [Rule 1.15].”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bell, 
432 Md. 542, 552–53 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 472 (1996)).  
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to 
maintain client funds in an attorney trust account, by allowing his attorney trust account 
balance to fall below his trust obligations to clients, and by failing to safeguard settlement 
funds due to clients and third-parties.  Mr. Johnson failed to maintain an attorney trust 
 
27 Maryland Rule 19-404 provides:  
 
Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, 
received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client 
or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, 
unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in 
reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall 
be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution.  
This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm 
that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted 
directly to the client or third person. 
42 
 
account until October 5, 2015, and repeatedly allowed his attorney trust account balance to 
fall below his trust obligations thereafter.  In addition, Mr. Johnson failed to safeguard 
settlement funds for the following clients: Mr. and Ms. Acquoi, Ms. Bell, Ms. Byrd, Ms. 
Frosolone, Mr. Feustel, Ms. Fultz, Mr. Glover, Ms. Gooden, Ms. Heaven, Ms. Hernandez, 
Mr. Hernandez, Ms. McCollum, Mr. and Ms. Patterson, Ms. Price, Ms. Robinson, Mr. 
Ross, Mr. Sandoval, Mr. Taylor, and Mr. Weefur.  Mr. Johnson also failed to safeguard 
funds due to third-parties in Mr. Feustel’s, Mr. Weefur’s, and Mr. and Ms. Patterson’s 
client matters. 
 
Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 1.15(a) 
before December 2015 and contends that he adequately obtained informed consent to 
deposit his clients’ funds into an operating account other than an attorney trust account.  
However, the hearing judge correctly reviewed the retainer agreements admitted into 
evidence and determined that—although Mr. Johnson provided notice that he did not intend 
to hold client funds as early as April 28, 2013—his December 2014 retainer agreement no 
longer contained similar language.  The hearing judge declined to make a finding that Mr. 
Johnson failed to obtain informed consent prior to his December 2014 retainer agreement, 
and only found that he violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to obtain his clients’ informed 
consent between December 2014 and October 5, 2015—when he opened an attorney trust 
account.  
  
We are not convinced that Mr. Johnson’s December 2014 retainer agreement, and 
those thereafter, provided adequate notice for Mr. Johnson to obtain his clients’ informed 
consent to deposit their settlement funds into an operating account other than an attorney 
43 
 
trust account.  “Informed consent requires an attorney to give a client ‘any explanation 
reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other 
person’s options and alternatives.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 50–
51 (2018).  No such explanation was provided to clients after December 2014, therefore, 
the hearing judge’s determination that Mr. Johnson violated 1.15(a) was not clearly 
erroneous.   
 
The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.15(b) by failing 
to promptly remove earned attorney’s fees from his attorney trust account.  We have 
“consistently held that ‘an attorney’s failure to withdraw earned fees from his or her trust 
account in a timely manner results in an impermissible commingling of funds violative of 
[Rule 1.15(a).]’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 195 (2017) 
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Weiers, 440 Md. 292, 305 (2014)).  Mr. Johnson 
failed to timely remove his earned attorney’s fee in connection with the following client 
matters: Fran Delgado, Chauncey Johnson, Jr., Charles Johnson, Ms. Byrd, Ms. Frosolone, 
Ms. Heaven, Ms. Hernandez, Ms. Robinson, and Mr. Weefur.28  We therefore find that, 
although the hearing judge correctly found that Mr. Johnson’s repeated failure to promptly 
withdraw his earned fee in client matters violates Rule 1.15(b), his conduct also violates 
Rule 1.15(a).  
 
28 Mr. Johnson’s representations of Fran Delgado, Chauncey Johnson, Jr., and Charles 
Johnson were not outlined by the hearing judge in her findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
44 
 
 
Lastly, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated 1.15(d) by failing to 
promptly notify Ms. Robinson and Ms. Gooden about the status of their settlement funds 
and by failing to promptly remit funds due to clients.  Rule 1.15(d) “requires that an 
attorney, upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third party has an 
interest, promptly notify the client or third person and deliver promptly . . . any funds or 
other property to which they are entitled.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 443 Md. 
351, 373–74 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Mr. Johnson failed to promptly 
remit settlement funds to the following clients: Ms. Bell, Ms. Byrd, Mr. Feustel, Ms. 
Frosolone, Ms. Fultz, Mr. Glover, Ms. Gooden, Ms. Heaven, Ms. Hernandez, Mr. 
Hernandez, Mr. and Ms. Patterson, Ms. Price, Ms. Robinson, Mr. Ross, Mr. Sandoval, Mr. 
Taylor, and Mr. Weefur.  The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 
1.15(d) when he failed to promptly remit funds due to third-parties in Mr. and Ms. 
Patterson’s, Mr. Weefur’s, and Mr. Feustel’s client matters. 
 
Mr. Johnson does not object to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 
1.15(b), and (d).  We determined that Mr. Johnson’s failure to timely remove his earned 
fee from his attorney trust account was, as we have previously held, a violation of 1.15(a) 
as well as a violation of Rule 1.15(b).  Mr. Johnson takes exception to the hearing judge’s 
conclusion that he violated Rule 1.15(a) prior to December 2015, but we overrule his 
exception.  Accordingly, our independent review of the record confirms that clear and 
convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Johnson violated 
Rule 1.15(a), (b), and (d). 
   
45 
 
 
4. 
Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Non-Attorney Assistants). 
Rule 5.3 provides in pertinent part:  
With respect to a non-attorney employed or retained by or associated with an 
attorney:  
 
(a) a partner, and an attorney who individually or together with other 
attorneys possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the 
professional obligations of the attorney; 
 
(b) an attorney having direct supervisory authority over the non-attorney 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the attorney;  
 
(c) an attorney shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would 
be a violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct if 
engaged in by an attorney if: 
  
(1) the attorney orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 
ratifies the conduct involved; or  
(2) the attorney is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a 
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 
take reasonable remedial action[.] 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 5.3(c) because he ratified Mr. 
Clarke’s conduct, which included making unauthorized transfers from Mr. Johnson’s 
attorney trust to Account #6070 and using a debit card associated with that account to steal 
funds.   
 
Mr. Johnson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 5.3(c).  
Mr. Johnson contends that he did not know about Mr. Clarke’s misconduct at a time when 
it could have been mitigated and that he took immediate remedial action upon learning of 
46 
 
the misconduct.  While we defer to the hearing judge’s determination that Mr. Johnson 
knew or should have known about Mr. Clarke’s actions, the hearing judge failed to take 
Mr. Johnson’s remedial actions into account in concluding that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 
5.3(c).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, this Court addressed misconduct 
perpetrated by a non-attorney employee under of Rule 5.3(c) and explained that: 
Under [Rule] 5.3(c)(2), four elements must be present to impute an 
employee’s misconduct to an attorney: (1) misconduct by the employee that 
would violate the [MARPC] if done by the attorney; (2) partnership status or 
a direct supervisory relationship; (3) the attorney’s knowledge of the 
wrongdoing at a time when its consequences can be mitigated; and (4) the 
attorney’s failure to take reasonable remedial action. 
 
443 Md. at 380.  As is the case, we have “rarely found an attorney responsible for a non-
lawyer employee’s misconduct under [Rule 5.3(c)(2)].”  Id. at 379.   
 
The hearing judge did not explicitly analyze the four elements set out in Smith to 
determine that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 5.3(c).  We do so here.  Mr. Clarke’s alleged 
conduct would certainly violate the Rules if he was an attorney, and it is clear from the 
record that Mr. Johnson was Mr. Clarke’s direct supervisor.  Further, the hearing judge 
discredited Mr. Johnson’s testimony that he was unaware of Mr. Clarke’s actions because 
Mr. Johnson had control over Account #6070.  Mr. Johnson also continued to receive 
settlement checks and issue settlement funds to clients from his attorney trust account 
during Mr. Clarke’s alleged misappropriation.  It therefore follows that Mr. Johnson knew 
about, or should have known about, Mr. Clarke’s actions at a time in which he could have 
mitigated their consequences.  However, the hearing judge erred in failing to consider the 
remedial actions taken by Mr. Johnson to ensure that all of his clients were made whole.  
47 
 
The hearing judge’s failure to consider Mr. Johnson’s remedial actions forecloses this 
Court from imputing Mr. Clarke’s actions to Mr. Johnson. 
 
Therefore, based on an independent review of the record, we sustain Mr. Johnson’s 
exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 5.3(c). 
 
5. 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct). 
 
Rule 8.4 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:  
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or, 
do so through the acts of another; 
 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects; 
 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice[.]  
 
An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) when he or she violates other Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hensley, 467 Md. 669, 684 (2020); see also 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359, 395 (2009).  “Under Rule 8.4(c), ‘[i]t 
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 
1, 39 (2014) (alteration in original).  Rule 8.4(c) therefore encompasses a “broad universe 
of mis-behavior.”  Id.  When an attorney conceals material information from a client, that 
action constitutes a misrepresentation that violates Rule 8.4(c).  Attorney Grievance 
48 
 
Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 640 (2015) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 
426 Md. 298, 324 (2012)).   
 
“[C]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,” in violation of Rule 8.4(d), 
occurs when an attorney acts in a way that “reflects negatively on the legal profession and 
sets a bad example for the public at large[.]”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 
1, 22 (2007).  We have found that “an attorney violate[s] Rule 8.4(d) by failing to keep his 
[or her] client advised of the status of the representation . . . ‘which tends to bring the 
profession into disrepute.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 175 
(2010) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 111 (2006)).  
 
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4 in the following 
ways:  
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(a) by violating Rules 1.1 and 1.15.29 
  
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he misrepresented the amount of 
settlement proceeds that Ms. Gooden was entitled to receive on January 13, 
2017.30 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he misrepresented to Ms. Gooden 
why he was issuing her a second check for $3,727.62 in August 2017. 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he misrepresented to Ms. Gooden 
that he could not issue her the $3,727.62 settlement check in August 2017 
unless she signed and notarized an affidavit stating that Mr. Johnson had 
competently represented her. 
 
29 Mr. Johnson also violated Rule 8.4(a) by violating Rules 1.4, and 8.4(c) and (d).  
 
30 We sustained Mr. Johnson’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he made 
misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden regarding her $2,000 payment in January 2017.  This 
conclusion is therefore clearly erroneous.  Nonetheless, Mr. Johnson’s further 
misrepresentations to Ms. Gooden, and those made to other clients, satisfy us he violated 
Rule 8.4(c).  
49 
 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he misrepresented the status of Ms. 
Robinson’s settlement funds by telling her that he was still waiting for her 
settlement check to be issued after he had already deposited it. 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he misrepresented the status of Ms. 
Gooden’s settlement funds by telling her that he was still waiting for her 
settlement check to be issued after he had already deposited it. 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when he issued Ms. Robinson a $4,508 
settlement check and a settlement disbursement sheet despite his $5,663 trust 
obligation. 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) when, in November 2017, he 
misrepresented to Ms. Robinson that her chiropractor had issued a refund 
from a payment discrepancy between himself and the chiropractor. 
 
• Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(d) by failing to keep several clients, including 
Ms. Robinson and Ms. Gooden, advised of the status of their respective 
representations and by failing to diligently represent those clients’ interests. 
 
 
Mr. Johnson does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusions regarding Rule 8.4.  
Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. 
Johnson’s conduct violated Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d). 
 
6. 
Maryland Rule 16-603 (Duty to Maintain). 
 
Rule 16-603, which was in effect until July 1, 2016, requires that: 
An attorney or the attorney’s law firm shall maintain one or more attorney 
trust accounts for the deposit of funds received from any source for the 
intended benefit of clients or third persons.  The account or accounts shall be 
maintained in this State, in the District of Columbia, or in a state contiguous 
to this State, and shall be with an approved financial institution.  Unless an 
attorney maintains such an account, or is a member of or employed by a law 
firm that maintains such an account, an attorney may not receive and accept 
funds as an attorney from any source intended in whole or in part for the 
benefit of a client or third person. 
 
50 
 
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 16-603 when he failed to 
maintain an attorney trust account from December 2014 through October 5, 2015.  Mr. 
Johnson does not except to this conclusion.  Based on our independent review of the record, 
we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Johnson’s conduct violated Rule 16-603. 
 
7. 
Maryland Rule 16-604 (Trust Account—Required Deposits). 
 
Rule 16-604, which was in effect until July 1, 2016, requires that:  
Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, 
received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client 
or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, 
unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in 
reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall 
be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. 
This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm 
that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted 
directly to the client or third person. 
 
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 16-604 when he failed to 
deposit and maintain his clients’ settlement funds in an attorney trust account from 
December 2014 through October 5, 2015, when Mr. Johnson opened an IOLTA attorney 
trust account at Bank of America.  Mr. Johnson does not except to this conclusion.  Based 
on our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Johnson 
violated Rule 16-604. 
 
8. 
Maryland Rule 19-408 (Commingling of Funds). 
 
Rule 19-40831 provides in pertinent part: 
 
31 Rule 16-607 prior to July 1, 2016. 
 
51 
 
(a) General Prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney 
trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by 
Rule 19-404 or permitted to be so deposited by section (b) of this Rule.  
 
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 19-408 when he failed to 
promptly remove earned attorney’s fees from his attorney trust account in several client 
matters.  Mr. Johnson does not except to this conclusion.  Based on our independent review 
of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 19-408. 
 
9. 
Maryland Rule 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions). 
 
Rule 19-41032 provides in pertinent part:  
(a) Generally.  An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds 
required by the Rules in this Chapter to be deposited in an attorney trust 
account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing 
any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
(c) Negative Balance Prohibited.  No funds from an attorney trust account 
shall be disbursed if the disbursement would create a negative balance with 
regard to an individual client matter or all client matters in the aggregate. 
 
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 19-410 when he issued a 
$2,500 check to “Whosoever Will Christian Church” and created a negative client ledger 
balance for Mr. Taylor.  The hearing judge also determined that, three months later, in 
April 2017, Mr. Johnson again created a negative account balance in his attorney trust 
account.  Mr. Johnson does not except to this conclusion.  Based on our independent review 
of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Johnson violated Rule 19-410. 
 
 
32 Rule 16-609 prior to July 1, 2016. 
52 
 
SANCTION 
 
As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is not to 
simply punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging 
in misconduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 499 (2020) (citing 
Woolery, 456 Md. at 497–98).  “The public is protected when sanctions are ‘commensurate 
with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were 
committed.’”  Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 363 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 596 (2005)). 
 
Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Mr. Johnson for his numerous instances of 
financial mismanagement and deceitful conduct in connection with his personal injury 
client representations.  Mr. Johnson, instead, argues that a 30-day suspension is a more 
appropriate sanction because he was inexperienced in the practice of law, was suffering 
from symptoms associated with his GIST tumor, and was being taken advantage of by a 
non-attorney employee who was his relative. 
 
“In fashioning an appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary proceedings, ‘[w]e 
determine the appropriate sanction by considering the facts of the case, as well as balancing 
any aggravating or mitigating factors.’”  Sanderson, 465 Md. at 67 (quoting Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 337 (2013)).  Accordingly, our consideration 
of aggravating and mitigating facts “can be critical in the selection of an appropriate 
sanction.”  Yi, 470 Md. at 500.   
53 
 
 
This Court has also emphasized that “[a]ggravating factors[33] militate in favor of a 
more severe sanction[.]”  Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 364 (some alteration in original) (quoting 
Sanderson, 465 Md. at 67).  The existence of aggravating factors must be demonstrated by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 
642, 708 (2019).  The hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson’s dishonest or selfish motive 
in making misrepresentations to clients about their settlements was the sole aggravating 
factor. 
 
Mr. Johnson contends that the hearing judge erred in finding that he acted with a 
selfish or dishonest motive, however, the record belies Mr. Johnson’s argument.  Mr. 
Johnson primarily relies on the hearing judge’s declination to make a finding as to who 
misappropriated funds from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust account, which proports to show 
that Mr. Johnson did not act in a dishonest or deceitful manner towards his clients.  
 
33 Aggravating factors include:  
 
(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern 
of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [Rules]; (5) bad faith obstruction 
of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with 
the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) 
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices 
during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the 
misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial 
experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or 
rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including 
that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of 
repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 216 (2020) (quoting Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling & Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018)). 
 
54 
 
However, the hearing judge did not need to make such a finding to determine that Mr. 
Johnson acted selfishly and dishonestly in making misrepresentations to Ms. Robinson and 
Ms. Gooden about their settlements.  Mr. Johnson made these misrepresentations because 
he failed to adhere to fundamental standards in administering his law practice and 
maintaining his attorney trust account.   
 
Although Mr. Johnson may not have misappropriated funds on his own accord, he 
acted in a deceitful manner by selfishly lying to his clients to prolong the time in which he 
had to remit their settlement funds.  Mr. Johnson went one step further during Ms. 
Gooden’s representation and misrepresented to her that, to receive her settlement funds, 
she needed to sign and notarize a document essentially stating that Mr. Johnson provided 
competent representation.  Bar Counsel therefore proved the existence of a selfish and 
dishonest motive in accord with the standards of Maryland Rule 19-727(c). 
 
“Unlike aggravating factors, ‘the existence of mitigating factors[34] tends to lessen 
or reduce the sanction an attorney may face.’”  Smith-Scott, 469 Md. at 365 (quoting 
 
34 Mitigating factors include: 
 
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith 
efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) 
full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a cooperative attitude toward the 
attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) 
character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or 
chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there 
is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or 
mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused 
the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
 
55 
 
Sanderson, 465 Md. at 70).  If an attorney presents mitigating factors, they must prove 
them by a preponderance of the evidence.  Sanderson, 465 Md. at 70.  The hearing judge 
found that Mr. Johnson’s lack of prior attorney discipline was the sole mitigating factor.  
Mr. Johnson asserts that the hearing judge erred in failing to consider the following 
mitigating factors: (1) Mr. Johnson’s cooperation with Bar Counsel; (2) Mr. Johnson’s 
inexperience in the practice of law; (3) Mr. Johnson’s willingness to take responsibility for 
his actions and demonstrated remorse; (4) Mr. Johnson’s efforts to make restitution; (5) the 
absence of delay in the attorney grievance proceeding; (6) the remoteness of Mr. Johnson’s 
violations; (7) Mr. Johnson’s concession that he violated Rule 1.15(a); (8) that Mr. Johnson 
was previously investigated by the Attorney Grievance Commission and cleared of 
wrongdoing; and (9) Mr. Johnson’s good character and pro bono work.  
 
Mr. Johnson correctly asserts that the hearing judge should have considered his 
inexperience, cooperation with Bar Counsel, willingness to take responsibility, and efforts 
to make restitution.  The record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. 
Johnson was an inexperienced attorney who had just transitioned to the full-time practice 
of law when his transgressions occurred.  Moreover, the record indicates that Mr. Johnson 
was cooperative with Bar Counsel during its investigation, and Bar Counsel conceded at 
 
successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and 
the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the [MARPC]; and (14) unlikelihood 
of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maldonado, 463 Md. 11, 49 n.9 (2019) (quoting 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277–78 (2016)).   
56 
 
the evidentiary hearing that they never alleged that he was uncooperative.  We are satisfied 
that Mr. Johnson met his burden of demonstrating a cooperative attitude towards Bar 
Counsel’s investigation.   
 
We are also satisfied that Mr. Johnson met his burden of demonstrating a 
willingness to take responsibility for his actions and make restitution.  The record indicates 
that Mr. Johnson fired Mr. Clarke after he learned of his alleged actions, and no further 
mismanagement of Mr. Johnson’s trust account occurred thereafter.  Further, Mr. Johnson 
took responsibility for failing to maintain an attorney trust account when he conceded 
below that his conduct violated Rule 1.15(a).  Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Mr. 
Johnson proved by a preponderance of the evidence that all of his clients were paid 
restitution and made whole, even if that meant foregoing his earned fee.  The hearing judge 
did not make a finding that Mr. Johnson misappropriated client funds and each client, 
although often belatedly, received their owed settlement funds.  We therefore agree with 
Mr. Johnson that, in addition to his lack of disciplinary history, he is entitled to the above 
mitigating factors in our consideration of his sanction. 
 
Despite this, we disagree that Mr. Johnson’s GIST tumor was a mitigating factor.  
In Smith-Scott, we explained that, in cases involving misrepresentations and deceit: 
[W]e will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything 
less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health 
conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct 
and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her 
conduct in accordance with the law and with the [Rules of Professional 
Conduct.] 
 
57 
 
469 Md. at 366 (some alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413–14 (2001)).  As we explained earlier, we find no clear error 
in the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Johnson “did not introduce any credible evidence 
establishing that he was experiencing any symptoms [of his GIST tumor]” during the time 
that funds were being misappropriated from his attorney trust account.  We therefore find 
that Mr. Johnson did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his GIST tumor 
was a mitigating factor. 
 
“We have held that the sanction for misappropriation of client funds is disbarment 
absent compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction[.]”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 573 (2006) (quoting Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 
376).  However, “[i]n a case of misappropriated client funds, ‘where there is no finding of 
intentional misappropriation . . . and where the misconduct did not result in financial loss 
to any of the [attorney’s] clients, an indefinite suspension ordinarily is the appropriate 
sanction.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tun, 428 Md. 235, 247 (2012) (quoting 
Calhoun, 391 Md. at 572).  We have accordingly stated:  
Although ignorance does not excuse a violation of disciplinary rules, a 
finding with respect to the intent with which a violation was committed is 
relevant on the issue of the appropriate sanction.  This is consistent with the 
purpose of a disciplinary proceeding: to protect the public, as well as to 
promote general and specific deterrence. 
 
DiCicco, 369 Md. at 687 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 
435 (1997)). 
 
Here, although client funds were misappropriated from Mr. Johnson’s attorney trust 
account, the hearing judge declined to make a finding as to who misappropriated those 
58 
 
funds.  Nonetheless, based on the hearing judge’s findings, Mr. Johnson knew or should 
have known that funds were being misappropriated from his attorney trust account because 
he continued depositing client settlement checks into that account and issuing checks 
drawn on that account to clients.  While Mr. Johnson’s lack of intentional conduct suggests 
that our sanction should be in the realm of an indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, 
we must also consider Mr. Johnson’s other violations, including his misrepresentations to 
clients. 
 
As explained above, Mr. Johnson engaged in a dishonest and selfish manner by 
making misrepresentations to his clients.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, this 
Court quoted Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde in articulating how it generally 
views intentional dishonesty perpetrated by an attorney: 
Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we will not in the future 
attempt to distinguish between the degrees of intentional dishonesty based 
upon convictions, testimonials or other factors.  Unlike matters relating to 
competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely 
entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree 
as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. 
 
457 Md. at 223 (quoting 364 Md. at 418).  As is the case, dishonest conduct usually 
warrants disbarment.  Id.  Bar Counsel accordingly compares this case to Smith in asking 
us to disbar Mr. Johnson.  Id. at 177.  However, we do not find that Mr. Johnson’s conduct 
rises to the level of disbarment.       
 
Despite our general pronouncement that intentionally dishonest conduct calls for 
disbarment, we indefinitely suspended an attorney in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang 
despite “clearly dishonest and deceitful [conduct].”  461 Md. at 75.  We did so because, 
59 
 
although such conduct “usually results in disbarment,” the existence of “‘sufficient 
mitigation’ militated against disbarment.”  Id. (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Hecht, 459 Md. 133, 158 (2018)).  Although we disagree with Bar Counsel as to the 
appropriate sanction, we note that Mr. Johnson exhibited a pattern of egregious conduct.  
Thus, we also disagree with Mr. Johnson’s assertion that his misconduct, compared to cases 
like Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Singh or Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 
warrants a 30-day suspension.  464 Md. 645 (2019); 462 Md. 112 (2018).    
  
While we recognize the presence of an aggravating factor, we find that there is 
sufficient mitigation here that militates against disbarment.  The hearing judge found that 
Mr. Johnson has no prior disciplinary history, and we further determined that his 
inexperience, cooperation with Bar Counsel, and willingness to take responsibility are all 
mitigating factors.  Additionally, we determined that Mr. Johnson’s act of providing 
restitution serves as a mitigating factor because all of his clients were made whole.  Lastly, 
the record supports Mr. Johnson’s assertion that no further mismanagement of his law 
practice or attorney trust account occurred after he fired Mr. Clarke.   
 
In all, given Mr. Johnson’s violations, it is clear that his conduct failed to adhere to 
fundamental standards in administering his law practice and maintaining his attorney trust 
account.  However, upon our independent review, we conclude that an indefinite 
suspension with the right to reapply after one year is the proper sanction, providing that 
Mr. Johnson completes a course emphasizing the responsible maintenance of an attorney 
60 
 
trust account.  For these reasons, we indefinitely suspend Mr. Johnson from the practice of 
law with the right to reapply after one year.35  
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on our assessment of Mr. Johnson’s misconduct, the existence of an 
aggravating factor, and the existence of several mitigating factors, we disagree with Bar 
Counsel that Mr. Johnson should be disbarred.  However, we also disagree that Mr. 
Johnson’s preferred 30-day suspension adequately protects the public and deters future 
violations similar to those made by Mr. Johnson.  For the above reasons, we suspend Mr. 
Johnson from the practice of law indefinitely with the right to reapply after one year, 
providing that he completes a course emphasizing the proper maintenance of an attorney 
trust account.  The suspension shall begin 30 days after the date on which this opinion is 
filed. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND RULE 19-709, FOR  
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
 
35 Under Maryland Rule 19-709(a), the prevailing party in an attorney discipline matter is 
entitled to “reasonable and necessary” costs.  See Sperling & Sperling, 459 Md. at 285.  As 
the prevailing party, the Attorney Grievance Commission is entitled to costs.  However, 
Mr. Johnson contends that the costs awarded should be reduced by $6,505—the cost of 
three separate court reporter invoices—based on the costs he expended defending 
violations that were either dismissed or disproven.  We decline to reduce the amount of 
costs awarded because the items that Mr. Johnson seeks to exclude were “reasonable and 
necessary” to litigate the claims brought against him. 
61 
 
CHAUNCEY 
BAYARCULUS 
JOHNSON. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 63 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
CHAUNCEY BAYARCULUS JOHNSON 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 16, 2021  
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE19-09143 
 
Argued: October 29, 2020 
 
Respectfully, I dissent as to the sanction imposed in this case.  I would follow Bar 
Counsel’s recommendation and disbar Chauncey Bayarculus Johnson, Respondent.1  From 
my perspective, the sanction of an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for 
reinstatement after one year provided that Johnson complete a course emphasizing the 
responsible maintenance of an attorney trust account is not appropriate, given the numerous 
instances of intentional dishonest conduct and the lack of compelling extenuating 
circumstances justifying a sanction less than disbarment. 
Chief among other misconduct, Johnson violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rule of 
Professional 
Conduct 
(“MARPC”)2 
8.4(c) 
(Dishonesty, 
Fraud, 
Deceit, 
or 
Misrepresentation) with respect to client matters by making multiple misrepresentations to 
the clients.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 48-49.  With respect to one client, Johnson violated 
MARPC 8.4(c) by misrepresenting the amount of settlement proceeds that the client was 
entitled to receive, by misrepresenting to the client why he was issuing a second settlement 
check, by misrepresenting to the client that he could not issue the second settlement check 
unless the client signed and notarized an affidavit stating that he had competently 
represented the client, and by misrepresenting the status of the client’s settlement funds by 
telling the client that he was still waiting for the issuance of the settlement check when in 
 
1Johnson requests a thirty-day suspension.  
2As the Majority notes, effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the MARPC and recodified without 
substantive change in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 3 n.3.  Johnson’s 
misconduct occurred before and after recodification of the MLRPC.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 
3 n.3. Because there are no substantive differences between the MLRPC and MARPC, I 
refer to the MARPC.  
- 2 - 
fact he had already deposited the check.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 48-49.  Johnson violated 
MARPC 8.4(c) with respect to another client by misrepresenting the status of the client’s 
settlement funds by telling her that he was waiting for the settlement check to be issued 
when in actuality he had already deposited the check, by issuing a settlement check to the 
client in an amount less than what was owed to the client and preparing a settlement 
disbursement sheet that reflected the lower amount, and by misrepresenting to the client 
that her medical provider had issued a refund from a payment discrepancy between himself 
and the medical provider.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 48-49.  
In addition to the numerous violations of MARPC 8.4(c), Johnson violated multiple 
other MARPC and several Maryland Rules over a period of time, namely MARPC 1.1 
(Competence), 1.4(a)(2), (a)(3), and (b) (Communication), 1.15(a), (b), and (d) 
(Safekeeping Property), 8.4(d), and Maryland Rules 16-603 (Duty to Maintain), 16-604 
(Trust Account—Required Deposits), 19-408 (Commingling of Funds), and 19-410 
(Prohibited Transactions). Compounding the circumstances, Johnson’s misconduct is 
aggravated by a dishonest or selfish motive.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 53-54.  The majority 
opinion states:  
Although [] Johnson may not have misappropriated funds on his own 
accord, he acted in a deceitful manner by selfishly lying to his clients to 
prolong the time in which he had to remit their settlement funds.  [] Johnson 
went one step further during [one client]’s representation and misrepresented 
to her that, to receive her settlement funds, she needed to sign and notarize a 
document essentially stating that [] Johnson provided competent 
representation.  Bar Counsel therefore proved the existence of a selfish and 
dishonest motive in accord with the standards of Maryland Rule 19-727(c). 
 
Maj. Slip Op. at 54.   
- 3 - 
As to mitigating circumstances, the Majority concludes, and I agree, that Johnson’s 
misconduct is mitigated by the absence of prior attorney discipline, inexperience in the 
practice of law, a cooperative attitude towards Bar Counsel’s investigation, and a 
willingness to take responsibility for his actions and to make restitution.  See Maj. Slip Op. 
at 55-56.  I also agree with the Majority that Johnson did not prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence a mitigating factor in the form of his GIST tumor.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 56-
57.   
Even with the mitigating circumstances, with which I agree, it is clear that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.  This case involves an attorney “knew 
or should have known” that funds were being misappropriated from his attorney trust 
account given that he continued depositing client settlement checks into the account and 
issuing checks to clients drawn from the account.  Maj. Slip Op. at 58.  To cover up that 
misappropriation, Johnson misled his clients about the receipt of their settlement funds and 
attempted to play catch up by disbursing funds to clients much later than when he had 
deposited them.  
 At bottom, Johnson received settlement funds on behalf of his clients, did not tell 
his clients that he had received the funds, and actively misled (deceived) his clients by 
misrepresenting that he had not received the funds and by misrepresenting the amounts to 
which the clients were entitled.  And he did all of this with the dishonest or selfish motive 
to hide the reality of the misappropriation from his clients and prolong the time in which 
he had to remit their settlement funds.  That Johnson himself may not have misappropriated 
the funds or lacked the intent to do so does not negate or absolve him of engaging in 
- 4 - 
intentionally dishonest conduct, i.e., making numerous intentional misrepresentations to 
clients about their settlement funds over a protracted period of time to hide other 
misconduct.  There was no lack of intent with respect to the misrepresentations Johnson 
made to his clients, especially when he knew or should have known what was going on 
with his attorney trust account and misled his clients as a result. 
Because Johnson engaged in intentionally dishonest conduct by making multiple 
misrepresentations to clients—and had a dishonest or selfish motive in doing so— 
compelling extenuating circumstances are necessary to justify a sanction other than 
disbarment.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 228, 223 A.3d 976, 
1006 (2020).  The mitigating factors present in the case fall far short of circumstances that 
would constitute compelling extenuating circumstances.  Under this Court’s holding in 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 
485, 488 (2001), the lack of compelling extenuating circumstances alone is sufficient to 
warrant disbarment for intentional dishonest conduct.   
Johnson’s misconduct, though, includes not only numerous instances of intentional 
dishonest conduct in the form of misrepresentations (dishonesty), but also other forms of 
misconduct, including a lack of competence, the failure to properly communicate with 
clients, and the failure to properly maintain client funds and his attorney trust account.  
Disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case given that, in addition to Johnson’s 
multiple instances of intentional dishonest conduct, Johnson engaged in additional 
misconduct that violated numerous other MARPC and Maryland Rules with respect to 
multiple client matters over a long period of time.   
- 5 - 
In Vanderlinde, id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488, this Court announced: 
Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we will not in the 
future attempt to distinguish between degrees of intentional dishonesty based 
upon convictions, testimonials or other factors.  Unlike matters relating to 
competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely 
entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree 
as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.  
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s character. 
Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest 
conduct.  With our opinion today, we impress upon the members of the bar 
that the Court does not consider [certain prior] cases to be authority for an 
argument for leniency in attorney disciplinary matters involving intentionally 
dishonest conduct. 
 
We explained that only compelling extenuating circumstances would justify a sanction less 
than disbarment in cases of intentional dishonest conduct, stating: 
[We hold] that, in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, 
fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as 
“compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything less than the most serious 
and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any 
source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an 
attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with 
the law and with the M[A]RPC.  Only if the circumstances are that 
compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe 
sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, 
the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, 
whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise. 
 
Id. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485 (emphasis in original). 
As we stated recently in Miller, 467 Md. at 228, 223 A.3d at 1006, “disbarment is 
generally the appropriate sanction for intentionally dishonest conduct, unless an attorney 
can establish the existence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser 
sanction.”  (Cleaned up).  And, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cocco, 442 Md. 1, 13, 
109 A.3d 1176, 1183 (2015), this Court stated that “we have reached the conclusion that 
- 6 - 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for intentional misrepresentations, particularly when 
they cast disrepute upon the public perception of lawyers.”  (Citation omitted).  Examining 
Johnson’s misconduct, especially his various instances of intentionally dishonest conduct, 
demonstrates that, under Vanderlinde and its progeny, disbarment is warranted.  The 
premise underlying this Court’s holding in Vanderlinde is that we must protect the public 
from dishonesty and deter lawyers from engaging in intentional dishonesty of the type that 
Johnson engaged in. 
From my perspective, the sanction imposed in this case, and similar ones where 
there has been intentional dishonest conduct and disbarment was not deemed to be the 
appropriate sanction, demonstrates that there is a need for the Court to determine whether 
our holding in Vanderlinde concerning disbarment generally being the appropriate sanction 
for intentional dishonest conduct remains valid or whether the presence of mitigating 
factors that do not constitute compelling extenuating circumstances will be sufficient to 
conclude that disbarment is unwarranted.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Riely, 
471 Md. 458, 242 A.3d 206 (2020); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 191 
A.3d 474 (2018).  
   
If we wish to move away from the Vanderlinde standard and no longer require 
compelling extenuating circumstances to justify a sanction less than disbarment in cases 
involving intentional dishonest conduct, then, from my perspective, we should say so.  For 
the sake of clarity in our attorney grievance jurisprudence and providing guidance to Bar 
Counsel and the Bar at large, we should make known whether we intend to adhere to the 
principles set forth in Vanderlinde where there is intentional dishonest conduct or not, i.e., 
- 7 - 
whether Vanderlinde remains good law. 
For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/63a18agcn.pdf