Title: Commonwealth v. Barreto

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12699 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ONAXIS BARRETO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 6, 2019. - December 23, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion.  Search and 
Seizure, Motor vehicle, Reasonable suspicion.  Evidence, 
Anonymous statement, Corroborative evidence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 28, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth W. 
Salinger, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by 
him. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Eduardo Masferrer for the defendant. 
 
Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorney (Kathleen 
Celio, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Onaxis Barreto, was charged with 
trafficking in cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b), 
following a search of his motor vehicle.  The defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle, contending 
that the search took place after an unlawful exit order.  A 
judge in the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion 
following an evidentiary hearing, and the defendant filed an 
interlocutory appeal.  The Appeals Court reversed the denial in 
Commonwealth v. Barreto, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 337 (2018).  We 
granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
As did the Appeals Court, we conclude that based on the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the exit order 
that precipitated the search of the vehicle was unjustified.  We 
therefore reverse the order of the motion judge denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
Background.  The motion judge made the following factual 
findings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015).  Police received a tip from an undisclosed source that a 
green Volvo station wagon containing a "large" amount of 
narcotics would be located near a particular intersection in the 
3 
 
 
Roxbury neighborhood of Boston.1  As a result, police set up 
surveillance near the intersection indicated by the tipster.  
Soon thereafter, officers observed a green Volvo station wagon 
approach the intersection, turn left without signaling, and park 
approximately fifty feet away. 
 
The defendant, the vehicle's driver and sole occupant, 
leaned down and appeared to reach toward the floor of the 
passenger side of the vehicle.  An unidentified pedestrian 
approached the vehicle from a nearby apartment building.  When 
the pedestrian reached the driver's window, the two men appeared 
to speak.  The pedestrian then leaned toward the vehicle and 
moved his arms "in a manner consistent with the two men 
exchanging something"; however, officers did not observe the 
hands of the two men come together.  The interaction lasted 
about thirty seconds, after which the pedestrian returned to the 
apartment building.  Police did not observe anything in the 
pedestrian's hands at any time during or after the interaction. 
 
The defendant resumed driving for a short distance until 
officers signaled for him to stop.  At this point, at least four 
officers and three police vehicles had arrived.  When engaged by 
two of the officers, the defendant avoided making eye contact.  
                     
1 As discussed in detail infra, no further information was 
provided during the hearing regarding the reliability or 
veracity of the tipster. 
4 
 
 
Officers observed that the defendant was breathing heavily and 
looking in his rear and side view mirrors at the officers and 
vehicles behind him. 
 
An officer issued an exit order to the defendant.  As the 
defendant got out of his vehicle, the officer saw what appeared 
to be a roll of United States currency inside a clear plastic 
bag in the storage compartment of the driver's side door.  A 
subsequent patfrisk revealed no weapons or contraband.  Officers 
then searched the interior of the vehicle, and a drug-sniffing 
dog alerted for narcotics on the front passenger's seat.  Police 
towed the vehicle to a police station, where a search of a box 
hidden inside the front passenger's seat revealed a "large 
amount" of cocaine inside plastic bags and several large stacks 
of cash. 
Discussion.  Because the search of the defendant's vehicle 
was a direct result of observations police made after stopping 
his vehicle and issuing an exit order, we must examine the 
constitutionality of both the stop and the exit order.  See Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (1963); Commonwealth 
v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 701-702, 706 (2019). 
1.  The stop.  Police may effect a motor vehicle stop based 
on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or based on an 
observed civil infraction of the traffic laws.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 872 (2018); Commonwealth 
5 
 
 
v. Alvarado, 423 Mass. 266, 268 (1996).  The Commonwealth 
maintains that the informant's tip, together with the 
observations police made of the defendant's interactions with an 
unknown pedestrian, provided reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant had engaged in a drug transaction, thereby justifying 
the stop.  We are not convinced by the Commonwealth's argument 
on this point; however, as discussed infra, we conclude that the 
stop was authorized based on police observation of a motor 
vehicle infraction committed by the defendant. 
a.  The tip.  Although the Commonwealth contends that the 
information provided by the tipster is properly part of the 
reasonable suspicion calculus, this was not the position the 
Commonwealth took at the motion hearing.  At that time, the 
prosecutor indicated that the Commonwealth would use the tip 
only for "context" to "explain why the police were there."2 
                     
2 At the beginning of the hearing on the defendant's motion 
to suppress, the prosecutor stated that she would not seek to 
"establish Aguilar-Spinelli" with the unidentified source's tip.  
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).  Rather, the tip would "explain why 
the police were there," and the prosecutor indicated that she 
would object to any questions regarding the source of the tip. 
 
 
Following up, the motion judge sought to confirm the 
prosecutor's position by asking whether "the Commonwealth will 
not be attempting in any way to rely" on the tip to justify the 
stop, exit order, or search.  The prosecutor responded that the 
tip "provides context and stuff can be corroborated," that the 
tip "does not provide any sort of basis on its own for . . . any 
legal justification," and reiterated that she would object to 
questioning on the tip's source. 
6 
 
 
To be sure, it is common for the Commonwealth to withhold 
details about a confidential police informant who has provided a 
tip in order to ensure that the identity of the tipster is not 
revealed inadvertently.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Madigan, 449 
Mass. 702, 705-706 (2007).  However, withholding information can 
affect the reasonable suspicion analysis depending upon the 
amount and type of information withheld.  See Commonwealth v. 
Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515 (2007); Alvarado, 423 Mass. at 274; 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 18-19 (1990). 
Here, the Commonwealth presented no information at all 
regarding the basis of knowledge or the reliability of the 
confidential informant.  In fact, the prosecutor represented 
that the Commonwealth would use the tip solely for "context," 
would object to any questions regarding the "source" of the tip, 
and would not seek to "establish Aguilar-Spinelli" with the tip.  
See Costa, 448 Mass. at 515 & n.9 (articulating "Aguilar-
Spinelli" test).  For this reason, the defendant did not 
challenge the reliability of the tip,3 and the motion judge did 
                     
 
 
Defense counsel indicated that he understood that the 
prosecution would use the tip "for context only," and that the 
tip would not be used "under Aguilar-Spinelli to [support] the 
stop or search."  Defense counsel further agreed not to cross-
examine any of the Commonwealth's witnesses on the informant's 
identity or the details of the tip. 
 
3 Had the Commonwealth made clear that it would seek to use 
the tip to support the legality of the stop, exit order, and 
7 
 
 
not consider it in analyzing the justification for the stop, 
exit order, and search.  Accordingly, we similarly do not 
consider the tip in the reasonable suspicion analysis on appeal.4 
b.  The defendant's interaction with the unidentified 
pedestrian.  The Commonwealth also points to police observations 
of the defendant interacting with an unidentified pedestrian as 
providing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, thus, 
justification for the stop.  As mentioned supra, "[a] police 
officer may stop a vehicle in order to conduct a threshold 
inquiry if [the officer] has a reasonable suspicion that the 
occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit 
a crime."  Commonwealth v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984), and 
cases cited.  However, "[the officer's] suspicion must be based 
                     
search, the defendant would have been entitled to cross-examine 
the testifying officers in an attempt to assess the informant's 
basis of knowledge and reliability.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 308 (1992). 
 
 
4 At the end of the motion hearing, the prosecutor stated 
that the tip "could be corroborated," but that "in and of 
itself, [the tip] couldn't have provided any justification."  To 
the extent that these statements could be understood to mean 
that the Commonwealth intended to demonstrate the informant's 
reliability and basis of knowledge through independent police 
corroboration of the tip's details, see Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990), this position would be inconsistent 
with the prosecutor's earlier representations.  It also would 
have been materially unfair to use the tip to support the stop 
and search on this basis, especially because defense counsel 
relied on the prosecutor's previous representations in not 
cross-examining the Commonwealth's witnesses on the credibility 
of the tip. 
8 
 
 
on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom.  A hunch will not suffice."  Id. 
The motion judge found that the police made the following 
observations: 
"[The defendant] had stopped his vehicle on a public 
street; a second man immediately left the nearest building 
and walked to the driver's door of [the defendant's] 
vehicle[;] as the second man approached [the defendant] 
leaned down to his right as if he were reaching toward the 
floor by the front passenger seat; [the defendant] sat back 
up and interacted for no more than thirty seconds with the 
second man, who stood immediately outside the driver's door 
of [the defendant's] vehicle; during this interaction the 
second man leaned toward the [vehicle] as if he were 
reaching into the vehicle; and after no more than [thirty] 
seconds [the defendant] drove off and the second man walked 
back into the residential building he had emerged from a 
moment earlier." 
 
We note that, although the motion judge did not consider the 
confidential informant's tip in his analysis of the propriety of 
the stop, he nevertheless concluded that the police observations 
provided reasonable suspicion that the defendant had sold 
illegal narcotics to the pedestrian.  We disagree. 
In this case, neither the defendant nor the pedestrian was 
known to the officers conducting surveillance.  In addition, the 
area in which the men met was not known for drug activity.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Stewart, 469 Mass. 257, 261 (2014) 
(reasonable suspicion for stop where defendant with prior drug 
arrest was observed huddled with others briefly at site known 
for drug use); Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. 1010, 1011-1012 
9 
 
 
(2011) (reasonable suspicion for stop after individual made call 
on public telephone used frequently for drug transactions and 
driver arrived shortly thereafter to pick up individual, 
traveled around block, and then dropped individual off). 
We also note that, although the pedestrian faced the 
defendant and moved one or both of his arms in a manner 
consistent with an exchange, the officers did not observe an 
object change hands and did not observe anything in the 
pedestrian's hands either before or after meeting the defendant.5  
As the Appeals Court rightly pointed out, the observed movements 
were just as consistent with any number of innocent activities, 
such as briefly greeting an acquaintance or asking for 
directions after looking at a map, as they were with an illegal 
drug transaction.  Barreto, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 343-344.  See 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 44-45 (2005) (no 
reasonable suspicion for stop where individual in "high drug 
area" left bar, approached defendant, handed "an item" to 
defendant, and then returned to bar as defendant appeared to 
count money); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 477 
                     
5 Although we have not adopted a per se rule that requires 
officers to be able to identify whether anything is exchanged in 
order to have reasonable suspicion to believe that a drug 
transaction has taken place, see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 469 
Mass. 257, 263 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 
703, 711 (1998), such an observation would be important in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, see Kennedy, supra. 
10 
 
 
(1981) (no reasonable suspicion for stop where pedestrian passed 
what officer believed to be money through defendant's vehicle 
window and "something" was returned to pedestrian from inside 
vehicle).  In short, the observations made, without more, were 
insufficient for a stop on suspicion of criminal activity. 
c.  The motor vehicle infraction.  Although reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity did not exist for the stop of the 
defendant's vehicle, the stop was nevertheless within the bounds 
of the law.  Prior to pulling the defendant over, police 
observed the defendant make a left turn without using the 
vehicle's directional signal.  As police may effect a stop after 
observing a motor vehicle infraction regardless of the officer's 
underlying motivation, the stop here was valid.6  See Buckley, 
478 Mass. at 873; G. L. c. 90, § 14B (failure to signal prior to 
turning).  Having determined that the stop was lawful, we turn 
to an analysis of the exit order that followed. 
2.  The exit order.  An exit order is not constitutionally 
justified based solely on a traffic violation.  See Commonwealth 
v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016).  Thus, to be lawful, the 
                     
6 "An appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on grounds 
different from those relied on by the motion judge if the 
correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the 
record and the findings."  Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 
Mass. 99, 102 (1997). 
11 
 
 
exit order can only be justified based on events or observations 
made by the officers after they stopped the defendant's vehicle. 
Where a vehicle has been stopped for an observed traffic 
violation, an exit order issued to a driver or passenger of the 
vehicle is justified if (1) police are warranted in the belief 
that the safety of the officers or others is threatened; (2) 
police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; or (3) 
police are conducting a search of the vehicle on other grounds.  
See Amado, 474 Mass. at 151-152.  As nothing in the facts found 
by the motion judge indicates that independent grounds for a 
search of the vehicle existed at the time of the stop, we look 
at whether the exit order was issued properly based on safety 
concerns or on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity once 
police stopped the defendant.  Upon review, we conclude that 
there was no valid basis for the exit order. 
a.  Safety concerns.  In determining whether an exit order 
was justified based upon safety concerns, "we ask whether a 
reasonably prudent [person] in the [officer's] position would be 
warranted in the belief that the safety of the police or that of 
other persons was in danger" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 661 (1999).  In 
reviewing the facts, we conclude that the answer to that 
question is "no." 
12 
 
 
When the defendant was pulled over, police observed that he 
was breathing heavily, he avoided making eye contact when 
answering questions, and he appeared nervous.  He also looked in 
his rear view and side view mirrors at the several police 
officers and vehicles that had arrived.  At the same time, the 
defendant responded to the officers' questions,7 complied with 
all requests, and made no movements consistent with reaching for 
a weapon after he was stopped.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 76 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 
(2006) (exit order justified where defendant failed to produce 
identification, occupants of vehicle outnumbered officer, and 
defendant was visibly nervous); Commonwealth v. Stampley, 437 
Mass. 323, 326-328 (2002) (exit order justified where occupants 
outnumbered officer and defendant in rear seat repeatedly 
reached beneath seat). 
                     
7 Before issuing the exit order, an officer asked the 
defendant in English to state his date of birth; the defendant 
responded with a year.  When the officer asked for a full date 
of birth, the defendant stated that he did not understand 
English.  In closing at the motion to suppress hearing, the 
Commonwealth argued that the fact that the defendant initially 
answered questions in English before stating that he did not 
understand English supported the officers' reasonable suspicion 
and safety concerns.  We note that the defendant's behavior was 
consistent with an individual who is not fluent in English 
attempting to cooperate with the police.  The fact that the 
defendant attempted but was unable to answer fully police 
questioning due to a language barrier did not, absent more, 
contribute to safety concerns or suspicion of criminal activity. 
13 
 
 
Although "it does not take much for a police officer to 
establish a reasonable basis to justify an exit order or search 
based on safety concerns," Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, the mere 
fact that an officer observes a driver's "nervousness and 
fidgeting," without more, does not warrant a belief that the 
safety of the officers or others is threatened, id. at 668-669.  
Indeed, many would likely be nervous in response to being 
stopped and approached by multiple police vehicles and officers. 
The exit order was not justifiable on the basis that police 
reasonably believed the defendant posed a safety threat.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 534 (2009) 
("nervous or anxious behavior in combination with factors that 
add nothing to the equation will not support a reasonable 
suspicion that an officer's safety may be compromised"); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 184-185 (1999) 
(exit order improper where based solely on observation that 
defendant "appeared extremely 'nervous'"). 
b.  Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Just as  
police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct 
prior to stopping the defendant, we similarly conclude that the 
defendant's behavior after the stop did not provide the 
requisite suspicion of unlawful activity to justify an exit 
order on that basis.  See Amado, 474 Mass. at 151-152.  The only 
additional information that police had after executing the stop 
14 
 
 
that they did not have prior to the stop was the fact that the 
defendant appeared to be nervous and avoided eye contact while 
conversing with police.  "It is common, and not necessarily 
indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a 
mundane encounter with police . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
459 Mass. 459, 468 (2011).  Given that police did not have 
reasonable suspicion prior to the stop, the sole additional fact 
that the defendant appeared nervous after the stop cannot create 
reasonable suspicion.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 
153, 161 (1997) ("Adding up eight innocuous observations -- 
eight zeros -- does not produce a sum of suspicion that 
justifies . . . an order of persons out of their car . . ."). 
Conclusion.  Because the exit order was not lawfully 
issued, the evidence obtained from the subsequent search should 
have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  Tavares, 
482 Mass. at 701-702, 706, citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486-488.  
The order denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of the searches of his vehicle is reversed.  
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.