Title: State ex rel. R. Bauer & Sons Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. R. BAUER & SONS ROOFING & SIDING, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. R. Bauer & Sons Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. 
(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 62.] 
Workers’ compensation — Violation of specific safety requirement — Claimants 
may amend their VSSR applications to clarify prior charges regardless of 
Industrial Commission deadlines or statutes of limitations — Industrial 
Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-09(F)(1), the catch-platform requirement, applies to gutter repair. 
(No. 95-2633 — Submitted August 19, 1998 — Decided December 2, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD06-865. 
 
Appellant, R. Bauer & Sons Roofing & Siding, Inc. (“Bauer”), seeks a writ 
of mandamus ordering appellee Industrial Commission to vacate its award of 
additional compensation to appellee Michael R. McClellan for Bauer’s alleged 
violations of specific safety requirements (“VSSR”).  The Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County denied the writ.  Bauer appeals as of right. 
 
On August 16, 1990, McClellan sustained an industrial injury while 
working for Bauer.  He fell approximately seventeen feet from a church roof as he 
attempted to remove the gutters, breaking his back and causing him to become 
paraplegic.  McClellan’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for “fracture 
of back, multiple injuries, closed head injury.” 
 
McClellan filed his VSSR application in September 1991, alleging Bauer’s 
violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1).  This rule requires catch 
platforms according to certain specifications on roofing projects, but allows the 
use of lifelines and safety belts “in lieu of” a catch platform.  McClellan’s 
application also referred to a “construction safety analysis” conducted by the 
 
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Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Division of Safety and Hygiene on the church 
roofing site several weeks before his accident.  The report advised Bauer that the 
site was not in compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) because the 
roof did not have a “catch platform or other equal safety guards.” 
 
A commission investigator looked into McClellan’s accident and filed his 
report in February 1992.  In November 1992, McClellan sent notice that he was 
amending his VSSR application to include a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-03(J)(1).  This rule requires personal protective equipment and specifies safety 
belts and lifelines for “all employees exposed to hazards of falling when the 
operation being performed is more than fifteen feet above ground.”  McClellan’s 
amendment concededly came long after the deadline in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
20(A)(1), which allows the filing of amendments over two years after the date of 
injury only where the amendment is filed within thirty days of the claimant’s 
receipt of the VSSR investigation report. 
 
The first time the commission heard the cause, it found a violation only of 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1): 
 
“On the date of injury, claimant was in the process of removing the gutter 
from a church roof.  Work on the roof itself had been completed one week to one 
month earlier.  Claimant was sitting or kneeling on the roof to reach down and 
work on the gutter, reportedly because the ground sloped and the work could not 
be done from a ladder.  The area of roof at which claimant was working was 
approximately 20 feet long and, because of the slope of the ground, the distance 
from the ground to the roof was 11 feet, 8 inches at one end and 17 feet, 5 inches 
at the other end * * *.  The undisputed affidavits of the claimant and of Tony Mills 
place claimant at or near the 17 foot, 5 inch location when claimant slipped and 
fell to the ground, causing the injuries of record. 
 
3
 
“On the initial application, claimant alleged a violation of [Ohio Adm.Code] 
4121:1-3-09, and specifically 4121:1-3-09(F)(1).  A reading of (F)(1) shows that 
that section makes reference to safety belts and a lifeline [as] being an acceptable 
alternative to the use of catch platforms.  By letter dated November 10, 1992, 
claimant’s counsel requested an amendment of the application to allege a violation 
of 4121:1-3-03(J)(1), the section dealing with safety belts, lifelines and lanyards.  
This requested amendment of the application is hereby allowed, as merely 
clarifying the previously stated claim, and * * * it [is] found that allowing this 
amendment does not unfairly prejudice the employer. 
 
“No violation of 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) is found.  The clear intent of the 
provisions in  4121:1-3-09 is to provide protection to employees who are 
performing work on the roof itself, as opposed to merely working from a roof, out 
of convenience, as was the case here. 
 
“A violation of 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) is found.  The proof establishes that 
claimant was performing an operation more than 15 feet from the ground when he 
fell and that safety belts and lanyards were not provided by the employer.  It is 
noteworthy that the Division of Safety and Hygiene had performed a safety survey 
for this employer, at this job site, on or about July 23, 1990, and one of the 
findings was that the roof was ‘not provided with a catch platform or other equal 
safety guards.’  While the employer was actually performing work ON the roof at 
the time of this safety survey, at the least this employer, reportedly in business for 
35 years, should have been put on notice that some type of safety precautions were 
[sic ] needed when work was being performed FROM the roof. 
 
“It is ordered therefore that an additional award of compensation be granted 
to the claimant in the amount of 35 per cent of the maximum weekly rate under the 
 
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rule of ‘STATE EX REL ENGLE V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,’ 142 Ohio 
St. 425 [27 O.O. 370, 52 N.E.2d 743].”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Both McClellan and Bauer moved for rehearing pursuant to Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-20(G)(1)(a) (rehearing warranted when motion presents “new 
and additional proof not previously considered and relevant to the [VSSR]).” 
McClellan cited his affidavit statement that “removal and replacement of the 
gutters attached to the roof [of the church] [were] an integral part of the entire 
roofing task.”  On rehearing, a hearing officer found that Bauer had violated Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1), as well as 4121:1-3-09(F)(1).  The hearing officer 
relied on the same reasoning for allowing McClellan’s amendment and finding a 
VSSR, adding that the construction safety analysis was “sufficient to put [Bauer] 
on notice of [a need for] roofing safety guards that go beyond a mere catch 
platform, i.e., lifebelts, lanyards, etc.”  And in determining Bauer’s violation of the 
catch-platform requirement, the hearing officer explained: 
 
“It is found that the employer violated Section 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) by failing 
to provide a catch platform for the roof from which the claimant fell.  * * * 
 
“The employer’s argument that the first word of the paragraph, ‘on,’ relates 
to a requirement that the work being performed must be on the roof itself (as 
opposed to sitting on the roof while removing the gutters), is not well taken.  
Grammatically analyzed, the [g]ist [of the] sentence reads: ‘On pitched roofs ... 
catch platforms shall be installed.’  This is differentiated [from] the next paragraph 
which reads: ‘On flat roofs ... a standard guardrail substantially fixed in place may 
be used.’  In both instances, the [word] ‘on’ relates to the type of guarding which 
should be used with each kind of roof, not the type [of] work being performed.  
Furthermore, the claimant states in his affidavit of June 16, 1993, that not only 
[were] the removal and repair of gutters a typical part of a roofing contract, but 
 
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that [they were] a particular part of the contract that the employer had with the 
church.  The employer has not provided any evidence to the contrary.  [Ellipsis 
sic.] 
 
“ * * * 
 
“It is therefore ordered that an additional award of compensation be granted 
to the claimant in the amount of 40 per cent of the maximum weekly rate under the 
rule of ‘STATE EX REL. ENGLE V.  INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,’ 142 Ohio 
St. 425 [27 O.O. 370, 52 N.E.2d 743].” 
 
Bauer requested the instant writ of mandamus in the court of appeals after 
its second request for rehearing was denied.  A referee found a violation of the 
catch-platform requirement, but not the safety-belt/lifeline requirement charged in 
McClellan’s amendment.  The referee concluded that the amendment was untimely 
because, even if it was a mere clarification under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
20(A)(1), the amendment was not filed as required within thirty days of receipt of 
the investigator’s report.  And while the referee indicated that the commission’s 
first decision to grant rehearing may have been error, he considered the 
commission’s original interpretation of the catch-platform requirement so 
“tortur[ed]” that a corrective writ of mandamus would have had to issue anyway.  
The referee thus recommended a writ ordering the commission to reassess Bauer’s 
forty-percent penalty based only on the catch-platform VSSR. 
 
On both parties’ objections, the court of appeals denied all relief, finding 
that Bauer violated both the catch-platform and the safety-belt/lifeline 
requirements.  While the court adopted the referee’s findings as to the request for 
rehearing and application of the catch-platform rule, it agreed with the 
commission’s allowance of McClellan’s amendment, concluding that the 
amendment deadline was merely advisory. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Dunlevey, Mahan & Furry, L.P.A., Gary W. Auman and D. Patrick Kasson, 
for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Gibson & Robbins-Penniman and Diane Burris, for appellee McClellan. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Three questions are presented for our review: (1) Did the 
commission abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment of McClellan’s VSSR 
application to allege a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1), the safety-
belt/lifeline requirement?  (2) Did the commission abuse its discretion in finding 
that Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1), the catch-platform requirement, applies to 
gutter repair? and (3) Did the commission abuse its discretion in granting 
rehearing based on McClellan’s affidavit?  For the following reasons, we hold that 
the commission properly allowed McClellan’s amendment and found a violation 
of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1).  We further hold that the commission did 
not abuse its discretion in interpreting Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1), but that 
the commission did abuse its discretion in granting rehearing to find a violation of 
this rule.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 
VSSR Application Amendment 
 
Bauer first argues that McClellan’s amendment was untimely under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-20(A)(1).  Paragraph (A) of this rule establishes a statute of 
limitations — two years from the claimant’s injury date — for filing VSSR 
applications.  State ex rel. Kirby v. S.G. Loewendick & Sons (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 433, 435-436, 596 N.E.2d 460, 462.  Paragraph (A)(1) provides the deadline 
for amending these applications, but allows only amendments that “merely clarify 
 
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a previously alleged violation” and do not “raise any unstated claim.”  For 
complying amendments, this paragraph provides: 
 
“Claimant or his representative may submit an amendment of his [VSSR] 
application * * * beyond the expiration of two years following the date of injury * 
* *.  Any such amendment must be submitted within thirty days of the receipt by 
the claimant or his counsel of the report of the investigation by the industrial 
commission into the alleged safety violation.  * * * Such amendment shall set forth 
all specific safety requirements omitted from the application made prior to the 
expiration of the two-year period which the claimant alleges were the cause of the 
injury * * *, but which were omitted by reason of mistake or incompleteness.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The commission’s rules are subject to the canons of statutory construction, 
State ex rel. Miller Plumbing Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 493, 496-
497, 37 O.O. 197, 199, 79 N.E.2d 553, 555, including the canon that words be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning.  State ex rel. Brilliant Elec. Sign Co. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 51, 54, 11 O.O.3d 214, 216, 386 N.E.2d 
1107, 1109.  Thus, Bauer points out that most dictionaries define “must” in terms 
of necessity or obligation.  See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 1492.  Bauer argues that the italicized sentence in Paragraph 
(A)(1) forbids amendments filed more than thirty days after claimant’s receipt of 
the commission’s VSSR report.  We would accept Bauer’s argument had we not 
already overridden the commission’s authority to refuse those amendments that 
merely clarify the original charges. 
 
Fueled by the principle that “technical rules of procedure should not be 
allowed to defeat an otherwise valid claim under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act,” State ex rel. Dillon v. Dayton Press, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, 6 
 
8
OBR 357, 360, 453 N.E.2d 566, 569, we have on at least three occasions clarified 
the underlying principles governing either the thirty-day amendment deadline in 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(A)(1) or a similar amendment deadline in former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-20(D).  In Dillon, a case under former Paragraph (D), we 
established a rule allowing claimants to clarify charges through amendment even 
after the two-year limitations period for filing a VSSR application had expired.  Id. 
at 299-300, 6 OBR at 361, 453 N.E.2d at 569-570.  We reasoned that amendments 
to VSSR applications should not be held to a more exacting standard than are 
amendments to an ordinary civil complaint, which, providing that the cause of 
action is not changed, may be amended after the statute of limitation expires.  Id. 
at 299, 6 OBR at 360-361, 453 N.E.2d at 569, quoting Kaiser v. Indus. Comm. 
(1940), 136 Ohio St. 440, 445-446, 17 O.O. 22, 24, 26 N.E.2d 449, 453. 
 
Likewise, in State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 53, 
54, 23 OBR 127, 128, 491 N.E.2d 308, 310, we specifically held that the claimant 
could clarify his VSSR application under former Paragraph (D) “despite the 
running of the statute of limitations for such amendments.”  See, also, State ex rel. 
Kirby v. Loewendick, 64 Ohio St.3d at 435, 596 N.E.2d at 462 (confirming that 
“[r]egardless of whether the commission can refuse to consider an amended 
application filed more than thirty days after the claimant’s receipt of its 
investigation [under Paragraph (A)(1) ], it need not consider a violation that is 
raised for the first time after the [two-year] statute of limitations has expired”). 
 
And most recently, in State ex rel. Oliver v. Southeastern Erectors, Inc. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 26, 665 N.E.2d 1108, we implicitly found a claimant’s 
amendment to his VSSR application timely, even though he had filed it more than 
thirty days after his receipt of the commission’s investigation report.  See [State ex 
rel.] Oliver v. Southeastern Erectors (June 23, 1994), Franklin App. No. 
 
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93APD04-597, unreported.  The commission maintained in Oliver that the 
claimant’s amendment was untimely under Paragraph (A)(1), but we did not 
specifically dispose of this argument due to our finding that the claimant’s 
amendment charged a VSSR that either was similar to or referred to the VSSRs 
cited in his application.  We were satisfied that these references and similarities 
provided sufficient notice to the employer of the added VSSR.  Id. at 28-29, 665 
N.E.2d at 1111.  Inherent in this finding is the conclusion that the amendment 
“merely clarified” the previously alleged violations, without “rais[ing] any 
unstated claim,” within the meaning of Paragraph (A)(1). 
 
Accordingly, we hold, based on Dillon and its progeny, that claimants may 
amend their VSSR applications to clarify prior charges regardless of commission 
amendment deadlines or statutes of limitations.  We therefore reject Bauer’s 
argument that McClellan’s amendment is absolutely barred by the deadline in 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(A)(1). 
 
Bauer also argues that McClellan’s amendment alleges a previously 
unstated claim, not merely a clarification.  Bauer insists that the reference in Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) to the safety belts and lifelines as alternative safety 
measures is not enough to put an employer on notice of an additional VSSR under 
4121:1-3-03(J)(1).  Oliver, supra, specifically dispenses with this argument. 
 
In Oliver, the claimant also alleged in his application a violation of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1), among other rules, and later attempted to amend 
with a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1).  As mentioned, we found 
that the specific safety requirements cited in the application either referred or were 
conceptually similar to Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) and, therefore, that the 
amendment was permissible.  We concluded: 
 
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“[T]he omitted and cited provisions are sufficiently related so as to 
adequately apprise the parties of a potential violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-03(J)(1) as well.  Accordingly, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) should be 
treated as having been raised initially.”  Id., 76 Ohio St.3d at 28-29, 665 N.E.2d at 
1111. 
 
On this authority, we find McClellan’s amendment acceptable as a 
clarification under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(A)(1). 
Catch-Platform Requirement as Applying to Gutter Removal 
 
Bauer next argues that “roofing,” for the purpose of Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-09(F)(1), does not include gutter repair.  We reject this argument for the 
same reason the court of appeals did. 
 
Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-3 covers construction work, which is 
defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01(A): 
 
“Activities within the scope of this code, generally referred to herein as 
‘construction,’ include the demolition, dismantling, excavation, construction, 
erection, alteration, repair * * * of buildings and other structures. 
 
“This code covers construction activities of employees whose employer 
engages in such work as its principal business.  It also covers employees of other 
employers when the activities are performed in the course of new construction or 
substantial reconstruction of all or part of an existing structure, as well as 
substantial demolition or razing of an existing structure, but does not cover 
employees of such other employers when the activities are performed in the 
ordinary course of maintenance work.” 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09, titled “Roofing Devices,” provides with 
respect to pitched and flat roofs: 
 
“(F)(1)  Catch platforms for pitched roofs. 
 
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“On pitched roofs with a rise of four inches in twelve or greater, sixteen 
feet or more above ground, and not having a parapet of at least thirty inches in 
height, catch platforms shall be installed.  The platform shall extend two feet 
beyond the projection of the eaves and shall be provided with a standard guardrail 
substantially fixed in place.  Safety belts attached to a lifeline which is securely 
fastened to the structure may be used in lieu of a catch platform. 
 
“(2)  For flat roofs. 
 
“On flat roofs, not having a parapet of at least thirty inches in height, a 
standard guardrail substantially fixed in place may be used.  Safety belts attached 
to a lifeline which is securely fastened to the structure may be used in lieu of a 
standard guardrail.” 
 
Contrary to Bauer’s argument, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09 nowhere limits 
the scope of these provisions to actual roof-laying activity.  Cf.  State ex rel. 
Sorrells v. Mosier Tree Serv. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 341, 23 O.O.3d 312, 432 
N.E.2d 197 (former safety code chapter regulating electrical equipment limited 
scope of rules to electrical utility industry).  The rule instead refers to roofs of 
certain dimensions as “devices,” treating them just as it does the other roofing-
related “devices” for which it provides, i.e., buckets for handling hot tar, pitch or 
asphalt; felt-laying machines and mechanical moppers; roofing brackets; kettles 
and tankers; chicken ladders and crawling boards.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
09(C) through (H).  Absent such restriction, the scope of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
3-09 is limited to the construction activity defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
01(A). 
 
Thus, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09 operates to protect any construction 
employee who works with pitched roofs, flat roofs, or any other roofing device 
mentioned in the rule, and who is injured due to an employer’s failure to comply 
 
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with the duties imposed.  While doing construction work on a roof of the 
dimensions specified in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1), McClellan fell and 
was injured because the roof had no catch platform or other permissible safety 
measures.  Bauer is therefore susceptible to liability for this VSSR. 
Rehearing 
 
But Bauer alternately argues that even if Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) 
applied to McClellan’s injury, the commission still abused its discretion in 
granting rehearing of the initial order exonerating Bauer of this particular VSSR.  
We agree that Bauer cannot be held liable for violating this safety requirement. 
 
The court of appeals implied, by adopting the referee’s report, that 
McClellan’s affidavit did not constitute new and additional proof for the purpose 
of the rehearing standard in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(G)(1)(a).  See State ex rel. 
Lovell v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 250, 253, 658 N.E.2d 284, 287 
(commission did not abuse its discretion in denying rehearing based on claimant’s 
offer to testify in person, as compared to his already admitted deposition 
testimony).  However, the court did not find an abuse of discretion for that reason.  
The court instead declared the commission’s initial interpretation of the catch-
platform requirement an “obvious mistake of law” for which a writ of mandamus 
would have to issue anyway. 
 
This finding overlooks the real mistake of law that undermines the 
commission’s and court of appeals’ decisions in this cause — their combined 
failure to recognize that the catch-platform and the safety-belt/lifeline 
requirements 
are 
alternative safety measures and cannot be applied 
simultaneously.  Again, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1) provides for the use of 
lifelines and safety belts “in lieu of” a catch platform.  Therefore, by the express 
terms of this rule, and as acknowledged in the bureau’s construction safety 
 
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analysis, Bauer had no duty to provide both the specified safety belt/lifeline and a 
catch platform to protect McClellan.  Cf. State ex rel. Maghie & Savage, Inc. v. 
Nobel (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 328, 331, 691 N.E.2d 277, 279 (presence of 
equivalent means of protection may excuse compliance with specific safety 
requirement).  Accordingly, the commission cannot hold Bauer accountable for 
both violations at the same time or assess a combined VSSR penalty against 
Bauer. 
 
Having found that the commission abused its discretion only in granting 
rehearing and assessing a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-09(F)(1), we 
further find that the court of appeals erred in confirming that assessment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment to this extent and order 
that the commission redetermine Bauer’s VSSR penalty premised only upon the 
violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1). 
Judgment reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent.