Title: STEELE v. NEEMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEELE v. NEEMAN2000 WY 1356 P.3d 649Case Number: 99-283Decided: 06/07/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MELODY ANN STEELE, 
Appellant (Plaintiff/Respondent), v.ROBERT BOYD NEEMAN, Appellee 
(Defendant/Petitioner).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, The Honorable Dan Price II, Judge. 

Representing 
Appellant: Philip White Jr., 
Laramie, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: Daniel B. Bailey of Lubnau, 
Hand, and Bailey, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Melodie Ann 
Steele (Mother) appeals the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court over 
an interstate child custody/visitation dispute. Mother argues that the Wyoming 
court no longer retained jurisdiction, or, at the least, that it should have 
declined to exercise its discretion and deferred jurisdiction in favor of the 
courts of the State of New York. In addition, Mother challenges the district 
court's modification of the terms of visitation. We reverse and 
remand.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mother 
presents these statements of the issues presented for 
review:

I. Considering that the 
child has lived in New York since 1990 and has not been in Wyoming since 1997, 
did the Wyoming district court in 1999 meet both of the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A(d), including the requirement that the Wyoming court still have 
jurisdiction under W.S. 20-5-104(a), so as to have continuing jurisdiction to 
make a child custody/visitation determination or 
modification?

II. If so, was it an 
abuse of discretion for the district court to exercise that jurisdiction instead 
of deferring to the courts of New York?

III. If the Wyoming court 
had jurisdiction and properly exercised it, did the district court properly find 
that it would be in the best interests of the child to fly unaccompanied for his 
visitations in Wyoming?

[¶3] Appellee 
Robert Boyd Neeman (Father) responds with the following statement of the 
issues:

A. Did the District Court 
abuse its discretion by extending continuing jurisdiction to modify its child 
custody orders?

B. Was the Appellant's 
Notice of Appeal timely filed?

C. Did the District Court 
abuse its discretion by ruling that the child should fly for visitation as an 
unaccompanied minor?

FACTS

[¶4] Mother and 
Father were married in Colorado on August 1, 1979. Exactly eleven years later, 
Mother filed for divorce in Campbell County, Wyoming. The marriage produced one 
child, born on May 22, 1989. Shortly after filing the action for divorce, Mother 
and child moved to New York State. Eventually, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement resolving issues relating to child custody, support, and 
visitation. The settlement agreement was incorporated into the Decree of 
Divorce, which was issued on June 7, 1991. For purposes of the current 
proceedings, the relevant portion of the Decree of Divorce granted Mother 
custody of the child in New York while providing for liberal visitation rights 
to Father including provisions for allowing the child to spend vacations in 
Wyoming.

[¶5] In what 
would become a pattern in the parties' relationship, Father filed a show cause 
motion in the Wyoming district court on October 3, 1991, claiming that Mother 
had breached the terms of the settlement agreement and the divorce decree 
regarding the terms of visitation. The parties resolved the dispute by entering 
into a stipulation on January 2, 1992. In response, the district court issued an 
Amended Decree of Divorce on January 6, 1992, adopting the terms of the 
stipulation.

[¶6] The dispute 
then moved to the courts of New York State. In August of 1994, Mother filed a 
motion to modify visitation in the family court of Chautauqua County, New York. 
Father appeared with counsel in the matter, apparently for the purpose of 
contesting the jurisdiction of the New York court. Nevertheless, the parties 
were able to reach an accommodation, which was memorialized in a settlement 
agreement. The agreement was subsequently accepted by the New York court and 
incorporated into an order issued on August 21, 1995. The same scenario was 
repeated in 1996 when Mother filed a show cause order in the New York family 
court, which resulted in an oral stipulation again modifying visitation. The New 
York court issued an order on August 1, 1996, encapsulating the new 
agreement.

[¶7] In the 
action which precipitated the events leading to this proceeding, Father filed a 
petition to modify child support in the Wyoming district court on February 19, 
1998. Mother countered with two motions, one filed in the Wyoming court and the 
other filed in New York. Mother's Wyoming motion sought dismissal of Father's 
action based on contentions that the courts of New York had assumed jurisdiction 
over support matters. The motion filed in New York by Mother sought to have that 
court modify the terms of child support and visitation. Subsequently, Father 
filed an amended petition in the Wyoming court, which added issues of child 
custody and visitation to those regarding support raised in the initial 
petition.

[¶8] Meanwhile, 
on June 23, 1998, the New York court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction 
over child support issues. New York, however, still claimed jurisdiction over 
the visitation issue. In a July 14, 1998, letter to the New York court, the 
Wyoming judge acknowledged that New York was the home state of the child but 
asserted that Wyoming had still retained jurisdiction. The New York court 
replied with a letter the very next day in which it reiterated its belief that 
New York was the home state of the child, giving it jurisdiction over custody 
and visitation issues. In a subsequent letter on July 15, 1998, the New York 
court also pointed out that it had already issued at least two orders on 
visitation and that the latest filing in New York on that subject preceded the 
Father's Wyoming filing. The record does not disclose any other communications 
between the two jurisdictions.

[¶9] The New 
York court issued a decision on February 17, 1999, ostensibly modifying 
visitation. The relevant part of that order required Father to accompany the 
child on flights to and from his visitations to Wyoming. Meanwhile, in an April 
1, 1999, order, the Wyoming district court found that it had continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over issues related to child custody and child support. A 
hearing was subsequently held on the merits of Father's petition. A decision 
letter was issued on June 28, 1999, modifying visitation. The Wyoming order 
conflicted with the New York order in that it allowed the minor child to travel 
by air to and from Wyoming unaccompanied. Mother now appeals to this Court, 
challenging the assertion of jurisdiction by the Wyoming court and its decision 
to allow the child to travel on his own.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

The resolution 
of this case depends on the interpretation of statutory 
language:

"We endeavor to interpret 
statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We begin by making `"an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection."' * * *"

* * * When the court 
determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must 
give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort to the 
rules of statutory construction. * * * If, on the other hand, the Court 
determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent.

State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997) 
(quoting State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 
1166 (Wyo. 1994) and Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Wyo. 
1995)).

Basin Electric Power 
Co-Op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999). In child custody proceedings, 
the determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction or to defer to the courts 
of another state is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 111 (Wyo. 1999).

DISCUSSION

[¶10] Initially, 
we must address a contention raised by Father that Mother's appeal was not 
timely filed. Father insists that the April 1, 1999, district court order which 
stated that IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court has 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to child support and 
child custody between these parties and their minor child, was a final, 
appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05 (LEXIS 1999). (Emphasis in original.) Since 
Mother did not file her notice of appeal until September 21, 1999, well outside 
the allowable 30-day time period, Father contends that the appeal should be 
dismissed pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03 (LEXIS 1999). Mother counters that the April 
1, 1999, decision was not a final, appealable order because it did not resolve 
all outstanding issues between the parties. Indeed, Mother notes that the very 
order cited by Father actually sets a hearing date on the substance of Father's 
motion to modify visitation.

[¶11] We agree 
with Mother. An appealable order is [a]n order affecting a substantial right in 
an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a 
judgment[.] W.R.A.P. 1.05(a). "[A] judgment or order which determines the merits 
of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is final and 
appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does those things. Public Service 
Commission v. Lower Valley Power, 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980). The resolution 
of the jurisdictional issue by the district court did not determine the merits 
of the controversy. This is self-evident from the fact that the very order cited 
by Father also sets the merits of the controversy - his petition to modify 
visitation - for hearing. Since that order did not determine the merits of the 
controversy and resolve all outstanding issues, it was not a final, appealable 
order under W.R.A.P. 1.05(a). The final, appealable order in this matter was the 
one issued by the district court fully disposing of Father's modification 
petition on the merits. Since Mother's notice of appeal was timely filed after 
the issuance of that order, Father's argument is without 
merit.

[¶12] The 
determinative issue in this case is one of jurisdiction. Whether a court has 
subject matter jurisdiction or not is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. 
Ritter, 989 P.2d  at 111. Since Father still resides in this state, Wyoming has 
retained jurisdiction as the original decree state. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 43 (Wyo. 1992). The district court's order exercising jurisdiction 
based on its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to child 
support and child custody between these parties and their minor child, clearly 
implies that this was the underlying rationale for the court's assertion of 
jurisdiction.

[¶13] However, 
it is also clear from the record that the courts of New York also had 
jurisdiction over this matter as the home state of the child. The Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) provides:

(c) A child custody or 
visitation determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the 
provisions of this section only if -

(1) such court has 
jurisdiction under the law of such State; and

(2) one of the following 
conditions is met:

(A) State (i) is the home 
State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) 
had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because 
of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a 
contestant continues to live in such State[.]

28 U.S.C.A. 
1738A(c)(2)(A) (West 1994 and 2000 Cum. Supp.). Both Wyoming and New York law 
parallel this provision. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-5-104(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999) 
(Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act) and N.Y. Domestic Relations Law 
75-d.1(a) (McKinney 1999). The term home state, as used in 1738A(c)(2)(A), means 
the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived 
with his parents, a parent or a person acting as parent, for at least six 
consecutive months, and . . . [p]eriods of temporary absence of any of such 
persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period[.] 28 U.S.C.A. 
1738A(b)(4) (West 1994 and 2000 Cum. Supp.); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
20-5-103(a)(v); and N.Y. Domestic Relations Law 75-c. 5. The test to determine a 
child's home state is mechanical in nature: If, at the time of the commencement 
of the proceedings, the child or a parent have lived in a state for six months, 
then that state has jurisdiction as the home state. The term at the time of 
commencement of the proceeding refers to the period immediately preceding the 
filing of the subject action. See Tufares v. Wright, 644 P.2d 522, 524-25 (N.M. 
1982) (Home state under the PKPA); Henricks and Henricks, 839 P.2d 766, 768 
(Or.App. 1992) (Home state under UCCJA); State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 125 & fn. 6 (Utah App. 1990) (Home state under UCCJA); and Mott for 
Rivazfar v. Rivazfar, 653 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1997), affirmed, 668 N.Y.S.2d 551. Here, it is clear that under any of the laws cited above, New York 
is the home state of the child: The child has lived continuously in that state 
since shortly after his birth in 1989.

This case, then, presents 
a situation of concurrent jurisdiction. The PKPA gives primacy to the original 
decree state. Marquiss, 837 P.2d  at 37-38. That primacy, however, is not 
absolute:

[¶14] Although 
it is clearly recognized that the PKPA amended the UCCJA by creating a decree 
forum state predominance, [Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122 (Ala.Civ.App. 
1982)], it should not be considered that for modification, Wyo.Stat. 20-5-107 is 
rendered completely ineffective. Of even more significance, Wyoming jurisdiction 
as the decree court in seeking to remain informed can elect to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. 20-5-108 in meeting the alternative 
condition of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (declination to exercise jurisdiction to 
modify or by yielding to the new home state to enforce).

[¶15] The courts 
have uniformly affirmed a trial court discretion to yield jurisdiction to a 
present home state, whether based on PKPA primacy decree jurisdiction, Murphy v. 
Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988), or UCCJA concurrent jurisdiction. Zellat v. 
Zellat, 351 Pa. Super. 623, 506 A.2d 946 (1986) (where Pennsylvania yielded to a 
mother's new home state in Tennessee). There is also authority that even with 
jurisdiction as the decree state, the court should, at least initially, yield to 
the present home state. Schlumpf v. Superior Court of Trinity County, 79 Cal. App. 3d 892, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1978). For a best interest consideration, see 
Clark v. Superior Court In and For Mendocino County, 73 Cal. App. 3d 298, 140 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977). A contrary result to find abuse of discretion results if 
the trial court decision was apparently based on jurisdiction instead of 
discretion. In re Marriage of McEvoy, 414 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa App. 1987); In re 
Marriage of Corrie, 648 P.2d 501.

[¶16] Marquiss, 
837 P.2d  at 43-44 (footnotes omitted). Thus, even in cases where Wyoming is the 
original decree state, when the issue of concurrent jurisdiction is raised, the 
court has the duty to make a determination whether to exercise its discretion 
and retain jurisdiction over the matter or to defer to the courts of the other 
state. If a court retains jurisdiction solely on the grounds that it issued the 
original decree, then it has abused its discretion: The existence of 
jurisdiction is not determinative of whether that jurisdiction should be 
exercised under the circumstances of a particular case.

[¶17] The only 
basis appearing in the record in support of the district court's exercise of 
jurisdiction is its statement that it has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
The import of that statement is that the district court exercised jurisdiction 
based solely on its status as the issuer of the original decree. This is 
insufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction in a situation where concurrent 
jurisdiction exists. Marquiss, 837 P.2d  at 44. The exercise of jurisdiction 
based solely on the court's status as the original decree jurisdiction is an 
abuse of discretion because the court has, in fact, failed to exercise any 
discretion. This constitutes reversible error.

[¶18] Upon 
remand, the district court should engage in the analysis set forth in Wyoming's 
UCCJA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-5-101 to -125 (LEXIS 1999). If a court determines that 
concurrent jurisdiction exists, a decision to exercise jurisdiction or not will 
be guided by the principles set forth in 20-5-108(c)1 and the purposes behind the UCCJA 
set forth at 20-5-1022. Ritter, 989 P.2d  at 112-13. The 
court shall make findings on the record consistent with the factors set forth in 
those two statutes. A failure to include the reasoning behind a decision whether 
to exercise jurisdiction or not is an abuse of discretion. If we review a 
district court's discretionary ruling without knowledge of the court's 
underlying rationale, then our conclusions as to the reasons behind the district 
court's decision are merely speculation. In order for any review of a 
discretionary ruling to be meaningful, we must know the underlying basis for the 
district court's action.

[¶19] 
Furthermore, the UCCJA provides guidance for those situations, such as exists 
here, where proceedings concerning the same child are pending in another 
jurisdiction. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-5-107(c)3. One of the central purposes of the 
UCCJA is to prevent the very result which obtained in this case: Two different 
custody orders relating to the same child issued concurrently by two separate 
jurisdictions. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-5-102(a). When a court of this state is 
confronted with the fact that a similar proceeding is pending in another 
jurisdiction, it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the other court 
in an attempt to ensure that the issues are litigated in the most appropriate 
forum. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-5-107 (c). We reiterate what we have previously 
stated:

Interstate jurisdictional 
cooperation should be a primary effort before any actual modification of the 
visitation decree or general custody change as a last answer is 
undertaken.

Marquiss, 837 P.2d  at 43. 
(citations and footnote omitted). We acknowledge that there may be instances 
where the attempts to communicate with the other court to resolve the matter may 
be ineffective, and that may very well have been the case here. However, the 
only evidence in the record is the correspondence between the Wyoming and New 
York courts, which only illuminates the nature of the dispute but does not 
inform us of what steps, if any, were taken to resolve it. Again, for there to 
be a meaningful review, we must know what actions the district court took to 
resolve the controversy in order to determine whether there was an abuse of 
discretion by the district court in its decision to modify the visitation decree 
without reaching a resolution with the other court. Therefore, in addition to 
the findings required above, a court shall also include findings and conclusions 
relating to the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts in those instances where 
a parallel proceeding is pending in the courts of another 
state.

CONCLUSION

[¶20] When the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction is raised in a child custody dispute, the 
district court should initially make a determination if the other state does in 
fact possess jurisdiction under the PKPA. If the other state can legitimately 
exercise jurisdiction over the children at issue, then the court should proceed 
to analyze the facts of the case in light of the provisions of the UCCJA; and, 
similarly, when another proceeding is pending in another state court, then the 
Wyoming court should communicate with it in an effort to determine which court 
would be the appropriate forum for resolution of the dispute. The findings and 
conclusions of the court should be placed on the record. Failure to adhere to 
this procedure constitutes an abuse of discretion.

[¶21] We reverse 
and remand this matter to the district court for resolution in accordance with 
this opinion.

Footnotes

1 
20-5-108. Court may decline to exercise 
jurisdiction.

. . 
. .

(c) 
In order to determine whether it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall 
consider whether it is in the interest of the child that another state assume 
jurisdiction and for this purpose may take into account the following factors, 
among others:

(i) 
Whether another state is or recently was the child's home 
state;

(ii) Whether another state has a closer connection with the child and his 
family or with the child and one (1) or more of the 
contestants;

(iii) Whether substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training and personal relationships is more readily 
available in another state;

(iv) Whether the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less 
appropriate; and

(v) 
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene 
any of the purposes stated in W.S. 20-5-102.

2 
20-5-102. Purpose.

(a) 
The general purposes of this act are:

(i) 
To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in 
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of 
children from state to state with harmful effects on their 
well-being;

(ii) To promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end 
that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case 
in the interest of the child;

(iii) To assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take 
place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the 
closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, 
protection, training and personal relationships is most readily available, and 
that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child 
and his family have a closer connection with another 
state;

(iv) To discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the 
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family 
relationships for the child;

(v) 
To deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to 
obtain custody awards:

(vi) To avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this 
state insofar as feasible;

(vii) To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states;

(viii) To promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms 
of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states 
concerned with the same child; and

(ix) To make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it.

(b) 
The provisions of this act shall be construed to promote the general purposes 
stated in this section.

3 
20-5-107. Exercise of jurisdiction by court in this state; proceedings in 
other states.

. . 
. .

(c) 
If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding 
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before this 
court assumed jurisdiction, the court shall stay the proceeding and communicate 
with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the 
issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information be 
exchanged in accordance with W.S. 20-5-120 through 20-5-123. If a court of this 
state has made a custody decree before being informed of a pending proceeding in 
a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of this fact. If 
the court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another state after 
this court assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to the 
end that the issues may be litigated in the most appropriate forum.