Title: Attorney Grievance v. Kalarestaghi

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ali Mansouri Kalarestaghi, AG No. 48, 
September Term, 2021.  Opinion by Hotten, J. 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – SUSPENSION 
 
Respondent, Ali Mansouri Kalarestaghi, violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b) (Communication) (1.4), 19-301.7 (Conﬂict of 
Interest – General Rule) (1.7), 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific 
Rules) (1.8), 19-301.9(a) (Duties to Former Clients) (1.9), 19-301.16(a)(1) (Declining or 
Terminating Representation) (1.16), and 19-308.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct) (8.4).  These 
violations stemmed from Respondent’s conflict of interest in the representation of two 
clients; putting the parties in direct conflict during representation; failing to recognize and 
advise clients of the conflict of interest; failing to attempt to obtain the clients’ informed 
consent, confirmed in writing, to continue with the representation; entering into a business 
transaction with a client without advising the client, in writing, of the desirability of seeking 
advice of independent counsel and without giving the client a reasonable opportunity to do 
so; representing a client against a former client without obtaining written, informed consent 
from the former client; and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
 
Considering the nature of the misconduct and the various aggravating and mitigating 
factors present, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that a sixty-day suspension,  
stayed in favor of a six-month probationary period with the conditions that Respondent 
adhere to the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and complete a 
continuing legal education course on conflicts of interest or general ethics, is the 
appropriate sanction.
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. C-03-CV-21-004062 
Argued: November 3, 2022 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND* 
 
AG No. 48  
 
September Term, 2021 
 
__________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
v. 
ALI MANSOURI KALARESTAGHI  
__________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
Fader, C.J., Booth, and Gould, JJ., concur 
and dissent. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 14, 2023 
 
 
 
*During the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court 
of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials 
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this 
document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2023-03-14 
08:51-04:00
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel 
(“Petitioner”), filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the 
“Petition”) against Ali Mansouri Kalarestaghi (“Respondent”) pursuant to Md. Rule 19-
721.1  Specifically, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating the following Maryland 
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”):2 
1. Rule 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b) (Communication) (1.4); 
2. Rule 19-301.7 (Conﬂict of Interest – General Rule) (1.7);  
3. Rule 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules) (1.8);  
4. Rule 19-301.9(a) (Duties to Former Clients) (1.9);  
5. Rule 19-301.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation) (1.16); and  
6. Rule 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct) (8.4). 
Pursuant to Md. Rule 19-722(a),3 we referred the matter to the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County and designated the Honorable Wendy S. Epstein (the “hearing judge”) 
 
 
1 Maryland Rule 19-721(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: “Upon approval or 
direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Commission, shall file a 
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the [Supreme Court of Maryland].” 
 
2 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were 
renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and recodified in Title 19 
of the Maryland Rules without substantive changes.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 
472 Md. 491, 503 n.3, 247 A.3d 767, 774 n.3 (2021).  “For simplicity, and because there 
is no substantive difference in the two codifications of the rules, we shall use the [longer] 
designations of the [MARPC], e.g., ‘[Rule 19-301.1].’”  Id., 247 A.3d at 774 n.3. 
 
3 Maryland Rule 19-722(a) provides, in pertinent part: “Upon the filing of a Petition 
for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the [Supreme Court of Maryland] may enter an order 
designating (1) a judge of any circuit court to hear the action, and (2) the clerk responsible 
for maintaining the record.” 
 
 
2 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing and provide findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
After a two-day hearing on April 27 and 28, 2022, the hearing judge found clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent violated the applicable MARPC as alleged in the 
Petition.  Respondent filed numerous exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law.  This Court heard oral arguments on November 3, 2022. 
For the reasons outlined below, we suspend Respondent from the practice of law for 
sixty days, but with the execution of that disposition stayed for a six-month period of 
probation, subject to the conditions that: (1) Respondent adhere to the MARPC and (2) 
complete a continuing legal education course (“CLE”) on conflicts of interest or general 
ethics. 
HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT 
We summarize and, where indicated, quote the hearing judge’s findings of fact that 
have been established by clear and convincing evidence.   
Background 
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar in December 2007.  At all relevant 
times, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in Catonsville, Maryland.  
Respondent “focuses his practice on real estate and business law.”  As the hearing judge 
found: 
In 2012, Respondent, his father, Mehdi Kalarestaghi (hereafter “Mr. 
Kalarestaghi”), and his brother, Hossain Kalarestaghi, formed an entity 
named MAH Mountain, LLC (“MAH Mountain”), a family business created 
with the intention of purchasing one or two properties to redevelop them.  
The Respondent is a 30% owner of MAH Mountain.  In 2012, MAH 
Mountain purchased a two-story multi-unit commercial retail property 
located at 6567 Baltimore National Pike, Catonsville, Maryland (the 
 
 
3 
“Baltimore National Pike [P]roperty”) with the purpose of leasing retail 
space to commercial tenants. 
 
Respondent does not have a “specific role” or title at MAH Mountain, but testified 
that his position was akin to that of an attorney.  In his capacity as an attorney for MAH 
Mountain, “Respondent drafted and negotiated leases for the temporary tenants who were 
in the property after they purchased it and then for any subsequent tenants when the 
renovations were completed.” 
Representation of Catonsville Eye  
Peepers Family Eye Care (“Peepers”) is an optometry practice owned and operated 
by Dr. Norman Fine and Dr. Erick Gray.  Dr. Gray “focuses on the administrative aspects 
of the business[]” while Dr. Fine “focuses on patient care.”  Dr. Gray expanded Peepers’ 
practice by opening roughly eight stores, including Catonsville Eye Associates, LLC 
(“Catonsville Eye”).  In this capacity, Dr. Gray has experience with commercial leases but 
always used his own attorney to review each lease. 
In February 2012, Catonsville Eye leased a commercial space on Rolling Road in 
Catonsville (“Rolling Road”).  The lease was originally set to expire in September 2017; 
however, Catonsville Eye executed an addendum extending the lease to December 2017.  
In 2016, Drs. Gray and Fine sought to relocate Catonsville Eye.  In December 2016, Drs. 
Gray and Fine saw an advertisement for available commercial rental space at the Baltimore 
National Pike Property, which, at the time, was under construction.  Dr. Gray subsequently 
called the number listed on the advertisement and spoke with Mr. Kalarestaghi. 
 
 
4 
Respondent, Dr. Gray, Dr. Fine, and Mr. Kalarestaghi met in December 2016 “to 
discuss the possibility of Catonsville Eye leasing space from MAH Mountain.”  
Respondent introduced himself as Mr. Kalarestaghi’s son and attorney but neglected to 
inform Drs. Gray and Fine that he owned a thirty-percent interest in MAH Mountain.  
During the meeting, Drs. Gray and Fine informed Respondent and Mr. Kalarestaghi about 
their current lease at the Rolling Road location: 
[A]lthough they were interested in the Baltimore National Pike [P]roperty, 
their Rolling Road lease ran through December 2017 and they could not 
afford to pay rent at two locations at the same time.  Not having to pay two 
rents was of great importance to Dr. Gray. 
 
Mr. Kalarestaghi “offered to have the Respondent review the Rolling Road lease to 
determine whether the lease could be terminated before December 31, 2017[,] without 
liability.”  Catonsville Eye thereafter provided Respondent a copy of its Rolling Road lease 
and amendment for review.  Dr. Gray hoped to break the lease, suggesting to Respondent 
that “Catonsville Eye could [] let the landlord keep its security deposit and then walk away 
from the lease.” 
Respondent and Dr. Gray continued their conversations and negotiations over email.  
Respondent and Dr. Gray exchanged five emails on December 6, 2016, “confirming that a 
discussion, or some discussions, took place . . . about leasing a space at the Baltimore 
National Pike [P]roperty, and confirming the in-person meeting[.]”  The first email from 
Respondent to Dr. Gray, provided: 
Hello Erick! 
 
It was great to meet you today.  We tried to get into the terms you mentioned 
during our meeting.  Here is what we are proposing: 
 
 
5 
 
-4 months of security deposit in lieu of personal guarantee subject to review 
of tenant’s financials 
-5 year lease with two 5 year options to renew 
-4% annual increases 
-$4,250/month NNN 
-Tenant Space B as marked on the attached floor-plan. 
-Lease and rental commencement date-February 1 
-Signage: Tenant sign on storefront above space, one sign on the side of the 
building, and space on pylon. 
-Brokers: none 
 
Our practice is to have a $1,000 non-refundable deposit once we reach an 
agreement on terms.  That deposit gets applied toward the security deposit.  
Once we have that, we prepare a lease.  
 
Please let me know if you have any questions! 
Ali 
 
The fifth and final email exchanged on December 6, from Dr. Gray to Respondent, 
read as follows: 
When do you truly expect to get your U and O[?]  My lead time on cabinetry 
is 4 months[.]  Assuming I had my attorney review the lease.  And we both 
acted quickly.  Realistically a final lease would be signed mid January.  
Architecturally plans will take some time even if I absorbed the risk of 
expense based on good faith . . . I too do believe your location represents a 
much better location.  I appreciate the quality of appearance and the small 
business retail compassion.  Obviously and fairly I’m looking for rent 
commencement within 15 days of opening, understanding I’m giving by 
paying architect fees to expedite my opening.  I will make a business decision 
by Monday at the latest assuming your agreeable to the timing.  Thanks 
Erick[.] 
 
On December 17, 2016, Respondent emailed Drs. Fine and Gray about the Rolling 
Road lease and amendment: 
Hello Gentlemen!  
 
I have read over the two attached documents (the lease dated February 28, 
2012 and First Amendment dated September 21, 2012).  From my 
 
 
6 
understanding, the lease term started March 1, 2012 and went for 5 years and 
6 months.  Although the amendment specifies what the rent will be from 
January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017, I did not see anything that extended 
the term.  
 
Therefore, it would be our position (this is legal advice, it is subject to 
attorney-client privilege, I cannot even share this review with my father, 
although you can) that you are obligated to stay at the Rolling [R]oad 
location through August 31, 2017.  Although the amendment is specifying 
what your rent would be after that date, I do not see an agreement or provision 
anywhere that extends the original term from August 31, 2017 to December 
31, 2017.  
 
According to Section 21.01 of the lease, it is my understanding that you have 
placed a security deposit of $9,520.00 with the Landlord.  If the base monthly 
rent in 2017 will be $5,518.14, the security deposit would cover less than two 
months of rent (most of July and all of August of 2017).  
 
The problem with your idea however (of applying your security deposit to 
the last two months) is that doing so without an agreement in place (an 
agreement with your current landlord) would put you in violation of the lease 
terms.  The best way to address this would be for us to send a letter to the 
Landlord putting them on the defensive and offering a compromise or 
settlement (namely, ideally, an early termination, and an agreement to apply 
the security deposit to the remaining rent).  
 
In my very experienced legal opinion, the Landlord has ZERO basis for 
claiming that your lease ends December 31, 2017.  Unless there is a 
document that I have not been provided, your lease ends August 31, 2017.  
 
Please let me know if you have any questions.  
Thank you both! 
 
(Emphasis added).  By email dated December 18, Dr. Fine asked Respondent whether 
Respondent could get Catonsville Eye “out of [their] lease, perhaps June or [J]uly, so we 
can move into your building or make some kind of concession to ease the pain of double 
rent[.]”  On December 19, Respondent replied: 
Hello Gentlemen!  
 
 
 
7 
To answer your question, I do believe that we could negotiate a settlement 
with the landlord to hand over the property before the end of your term, 
hopefully June or July as you mentioned. 
 
But to protect you and show our willingness to work with you, here is our 
proposal:  
 
1-$4,250/mo net rent  
2-February 1st start date  
3-Four Months Free (February, March, April, and May).  Rent starts June 1.  
4-Four months security deposit as discussed 
5-Up to $5,000 in free legal services through my office to negotiate a 
settlement with the landlord, or defend a suit by the Rolling Road landlord.  
6-Any period where you have an out of pocket rental obligation at Rolling 
Road, you will receive a 20% reduced rate at the new location. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions! 
 
(Emphasis added).  Dr. Gray responded the next day: 
[C]learly our mutual goal is to have only 1 landlord.  I agree with your legal 
position that the later dated lease ends [A]ugust of 2017.  I believe that 1 
month security deposit was applied as separate from the 2 months deposit 
paid with signing of the second lease[,] however [I] may be mistaken.  
[W]hile sitting at [P]anera[] [I] believe 4 months security was reduced to 3!  
My partner Norman and I will sign and hand you the $1000 deposit based 
not only on your updated and modified proposal[,] but included in is your 
success in negotiating our way out of our current lease.  I know that you 
know that in order for us to open in time we must finalize our deal quickly.  
I am absolutely appreciative of your efforts in getting this business deal 
done[.]  And we look forward to a long term relationship.  Thank you for 
your personal desire to have us as a tenant in your beautifully crafted 
building. 
 
(Emphasis added).  On December 20, Respondent emailed Drs. Gray and Fine the 
following: 
Understood.  Three months security deposit is correct.  I believe you and my 
father were talking about that as Dr. Fine and I were talking about something 
else.  I believe getting you out of your lease should be do-able.  My father is 
willing to waive rent as long as you have an out of pocket rental obligation, 
assuming you give me free rein and your full cooperation in using every 
 
 
8 
possible argument to disturb and disrupt the landlord (from a legal 
standpoint) in an effort to motivating him to release you from your lease.  
Now, with that, if we get that Landlord to release you from the lease as of 
April 30th for example, rent would start for the new space as of May 1, 2017.  
I think that is fair and hope you agree.  We are rolling the dice and betting on 
the fact that we can get a settlement negotiated with the landlord.  Obviously, 
we do not want and cannot have 7 months of free rent.  And on that note, the 
five year term would start as of the first month that rent is paid.   
 
$1,000 non-refundable deposit gets applied toward the three month security 
deposit and I will have a lease to you within 36 hours of that for you and any 
other parties to review.  Obviously, I have a conflict of interest in reviewing 
the new lease for you! 
 
You are welcome to leave a check at the Catonsville location and we will 
have one of us pick it up, or we can meet to do so.  Please let me know if you 
have any questions. 
 
Thank you both!  
Ali 
 
(Emphasis added).  Later that evening, Dr. Fine emailed Respondent the following 
questions: 
Ali, a few questions:  
[W]hat is the yearly rental increase?[] 
[C]ommon area maintenance?[] 
[R]eal estate taxes?  
How much time do you think it will take to negotiate our getting out of the 
lease?   
I assume this will all be covered in the lease agreement. 
 
On December 21, Dr. Fine texted Respondent to meet “for a brief meeting to wrap 
[this] up.”  The same morning, Dr. Gray emailed Respondent to “define disturb and disrupt.  
[A]nd if you are unable to break our lease what then?”  Respondent replied: 
Good Morning Gentlemen- 
 
 
 
9 
Dr. Fine texted mentioning a meeting this afternoon.  I think that is a good 
idea.  We are available anytime after 2pm.  Answers to the questions either 
of you have mentioned thus far:  
 
1) Define disturb and disrupt- I have to look into it further, but I believe that 
we may have grounds to argue that your landlord has not lived up to their 
lease obligations.  By disturb and disrupt, I mean that I want to put the 
landlord in a position that the issues raised by Peepers (through their 
attorney) become so taxing to respond to that is simply easier and wiser 
financially and from a business standpoint to simply allow Peepers to leave.  
 
2) What if Ali is unable to break the Rolling Road Lease?  If Peepers has 
cooperated fully (for example, agree to proceed with filing preliminary 
litigation if needed), and I am still unable to negotiate a settlement with the 
landlord, we will provide free rent for your new space during the time that 
you have out of pocket rent.  I hope that shows you that not only are we doing 
all we can (including a nearly blank check for free rent, but also free legal 
services), but also it should be a reflection of my confidence in our ability to 
negotiate a resolution with the landlord.  We are partners in that side of the 
deal as well and if we succeed, we succeed together.  If we fail, we fail 
together.  We are putting substantial skin in the game.  
 
Again, I have mentioned “out of pocket” rent a few times.  Allow me to be 
very clear so we don’t have any coded secrecy.  Your lease goes through the 
end of August.  You have 2-3 months of security deposit on file with the 
landlord.  Dr. Gray has always calculated his financial obligation to the 
current landlord by measuring the end of the lease term (previously believed 
to be 12/31/17, now agreed to be 8/31/17) and then deducted the security 
deposit.  As I have mentioned before, it is not my legal advice to apply your 
security deposit unilaterally (without an agreement in place) to the last few 
months rent because you would be in violation of the lease.  However, for 
purposes of our discussion and calculations, we are applying your existing 
security deposit held by your current landlord, to the end of your lease.  This 
would have been easier to explain in person, hopefully it makes sense here 
in written form.  
 
* * * 
  
6) How much time do you think it will take to negotiate our getting out of 
the lease?  I would want to move very quickly.  I cannot control the Rolling 
Road landlord, but my estimate and goal would be to have a settlement in 
place with them in February.   
 
 
 
10 
I think meeting this afternoon would be a good idea in order to clarify any of 
these items, etc.  I just received Dr. Fine’s email confirming 2pm at Panera 
in Catonsville.  I look forward to it!  
 
-Ali 
 
The hearing judge determined that, at this juncture, “Dr. Gray understood there were 
issues between Catonsville Eye and their existing landlord.  Respondent understood that 
he was offering legal advice and legal representation to Catonsville Eye to resolve those 
issues.  Both parties understood that Respondent would be the attorney handling the 
negotiations.”  “On December 23, 2016, Dr. Fine, on behalf of Catonsville Eye, wrote the 
Respondent’s law office a check for $1,000.00 for reading the [Rolling Road] lease, an 
amount that MAH Mountain later credited towards Catonsville Eye’s security deposit for 
the 6567 Baltimore National Pike [P]roperty.” 
On January 10, 2017, Respondent emailed Drs. Fine and Gray a draft lease 
agreement for the Baltimore National Pike Property: 
Hello Gentlemen! 
 
You are wonderful for being so patient.  Please do not let this massive delay 
be an indicator of our interest or eagerness in moving forward.  The delay 
was solely my fault.  My father was out of the country and we had a few 
inspectors drag us through the ringer this week.  (not regarding quality of 
construction, regarding annoyances like the path of the sewer line). 
 
I am attaching the draft of the lease.  As I mentioned, it would be a conflict 
of interest for me to provide a legal opinion regarding this lease, however 
I have a provision in the lease confirming that my office will provide up 
to $5,000 in legal services to terminate your existing lease.  As I mentioned 
before, that is a very high cap to provide reassurance.  I anticipate it will take 
far less time.   
 
 
 
11 
Thank you again for your patience.  Please forward this to your attorney 
and welcome them to reach out with any questions, proposed changes, 
etc. 
 
-Ali 
 
The hearing judge found “no indication as to whether or not Dr. Gray had his 
attorney review the lease.” 
The January 10, 2017[,] draft (“January 10 Draft”) of the five-year lease 
started on February 1, 2017, with a 3% yearly increase.  Under “Rent 
Commencement Date,” the lease provided:  
 
The Landlord, at Landlord’s expense, will engage the services of Law 
Offices of Ali K., LLC (within this paragraph only, referred to as “Attorney”) 
to represent the Tenant with respect to the termination of Tenant’s existing 
lease on Rolling Road.  Landlord will pay up to $5,000.00 in legal fees 
towards Tenant’s termination of their existing lease at Rolling Road.  If 
Tenant has cooperated fully with Attorney (for example, agree to proceed 
with filing preliminary litigation if needed), and Attorney is still unable to 
negotiate a settlement with the Tenant’s landlord at Rolling Road, Landlord 
will provide free rent for Tenant’s Premises during the time that Tenant has 
out of pocket rent.  The Parties agree that out of pocket rent refers to net rent 
owed to prior landlord and Tenant’s security deposit with their Rolling Road 
landlord (understood to be equal to 2-3 months of rent) will be applied toward 
the net rent figure. 
 
Between February and March of 2017, Drs. Fine and Gray and Respondent emailed 
about the floor plans and architectural drawings for the proposed Catonsville location.  On 
March 24, 2017, Respondent emailed Dr. Gray the revised lease agreement (the “March 24 
Lease”).  The March 24 Lease commenced on April 1, 2017, for a period of five years, 
with a three percent yearly rent increase.  “The March 24 lease had the same ‘Rent 
Commencement Date’ clause as the January 10 [D]raft, except that the Respondent added: 
‘In no event will the Rent Commencement Date be later than August 1, 2017.’”  Dr. Gray 
 
 
12 
testified that he was not prepared to sign the March 24 Lease because “[w]e hadn’t 
negotiated a lease.  I didn’t retain or have my lawyer review it to respond to it.” 
According to the hearing judge, Respondent’s and Dr. Gray’s testimony differed as 
to the events that occurred on or around April 3 and 4, 2017.  “Respondent testified that on 
April 3, 2017[,] at 4:26 p.m., he received a text from his father advising of a meeting he 
just had with Dr. Gray.”  He explained: 
The doctor was here he said if we have the paper lease ready by tomorrow at 
12 he be here and sign it the way it is and give us the check only thing in 
there we have to add that we will put a bathroom before he opens and he will 
pay us $5[,]000.00.   
 
Respondent continued, “explaining the circumstances of the texts exchanged with his 
father[:]” 
As I recall, I was in my office.  My father called and said Dr. Gray and I are 
here.  We are signing this lease and we just signed this lease, but now we see 
that this doesn’t have the language about the bathroom in it.  And maybe one 
or two other things that they were concerned with . . . .  So my father said, 
yeah, make those changes, I will come by, grab it and will bring it back here 
and Dr. Gray will sign it.  I’m paraphrasing.  I don’t remember exactly what 
was said.  That is the overall message that I believe was exchanged. 
 
So on April 4th, I kind of come up for air, so to speak, and I texted my father 
at 1:02 and said, I just finished work.  What happened with the doctor, 
knowing that he had been meeting with him at noon, according to the last 
message that I had on the topic.  And at 1:03 my father said, “I’m waiting for 
him.”  At 1:04 I said, “should I print this or what?”  I guess meaning a lease 
agreement. . . . At 1:05 he said, “yes, just add in there we put bathroom after 
OP and doctor will pay five thousand for that.”  At 1:05 I said, “all right.”  
He at 1:18 said, “he is here.  He signed.  His copy you send him.”  At 1:21 I 
said call me when he is gone.”  1:23 he responded “Okay[.]”  1:27 I said, 
“lease starts May 1st? Any free rent?” and that was the last text that we had 
until April 7th. 
 
That is how I recall it.  I think that they were meeting and I think that they 
signed a lease and then I think that they were discussing and said, hey, we 
 
 
13 
got the language about the bathroom.  This is all conjecture.  I wasn’t there.  
This is how I received it as I sat in my office because I saw a text that said 
he was here; he signed.  Because the text messages, as they are in isolation, 
don’t tell the whole story.  
 
So I believe I received a phone call and I believe that the nature of that call 
was, hey, we just signed the lease but we see that the bathroom is not in here 
and whatever; we need to make some changes.  So when I started to make 
changes, I saw that there are some other things that generally we update.  So 
by March 24th to April 4th we were now into a new month.  So I wanted to 
make sure that any of the dates reflected their agreement, et cetera.  
 
So my point of contact was just my father and he was the one that was 
speaking with Dr. Gray.  I had no communications with Dr. Gray on that date 
or, you know, in the days leading up to it, certainly not about lease terms.  
And I believe, as I recall it, my father came to my office.  I think he made the 
call.  He said, yeah, we need to make these changes.  I said okay, I will start 
making them.  And then as I’m doing it, I had another question or two.  I sent 
him a text message.  Never received an answer because as I recall it, at that 
point he is driving to my office, that half mile or so.  Dr. Gray was not with 
him.  He comes, he picks it up and he takes it back and they execute it. 
 
Mr. Kalarestaghi also advised Respondent that the free rent and up to $5,000 in free 
legal services were “no longer part of the deal.”  Therefore, “[t]he Respondent revised the 
March 24 [L]ease agreement as instructed by Mr. Kalarestaghi.” 
 
On the other hand, Dr. Gray testified that, “[b]etween March 24 and April 4, 2017, 
. . . Mr. Kalarestaghi called him ‘multiple times’ and spoke to him ‘frequently,’ telling Dr. 
Gray that the bank was exerting ‘enormous pressure’ on him to obtain money.”  
Specifically, per Dr. Gray’s testimony, the hearing judge recognized that:  
Mr. Kalarestaghi was “frantic,” and “pled” with Dr. Gray to bring a check 
for a lease deposit.  Dr. Gray considered Mr. Kalarestaghi his friend, so he 
agreed.  He wrote a check for $21,500.00, comprising four months’ security 
deposit and first month’s rent, drove to Mr. Kalarestaghi’s office, and handed 
him the check.  Mr. Kalarestaghi informed Dr. Gray that he needed Dr. Gray 
to sign the lease agreement.  Dr. Gray told Mr. Kalarestaghi that he was not 
prepared to sign the lease agreement and did not have a copy of the lease 
 
 
14 
with him.  Mr. Kalarestaghi appealed to their friendship and promised Dr. 
Gray that he would make any requested changes.  In reliance on Mr. 
Kalarestaghi[’s] assertions, the Respondent’s repeated assurances that MAH 
Mountain would waive or reduce rent during the time that Catonsville Eye 
owed rent to Klein Enterprise, and the Respondent’s legal advice that the 
Rolling Road lease, by its terms, ended on August 31, 2017, Dr. Gray agreed 
to sign the lease agreement. 
 
Dr. Gray signed the March 24 Lease on April 4, which commenced on April 1, 2017 
(the “April 4 Lease”).  After the April 4 Lease was signed, Dr. Gray and Mr. Kalarestaghi 
noticed the lease did not include “an agreed-upon provision providing for the addition of a 
bathroom to the premises” and required “a rent commencement date of April 1, 2017.”  As 
a result, Mr. Kalarestaghi asked Respondent to update the lease.  
The hearing judge noticed that “[t]he April 4, 2017 [L]ease . . . differed from the 
March 24 [L]ease in three significant ways[:]” (1) Respondent removed the provision 
providing for free rent and $5,000 in free legal services from the Rent Commencement 
Date paragraph;4 (2) “Respondent changed the rent commencement date from April 1 to 
May 1, 2017[;]” and (3) “the Respondent added a ‘Restroom’ clause giving Catonsville 
Eye the option to request that MAH Mountain build a bathroom in the unit in exchange for 
$5,000.00.” 
The hearing judge also noted discrepancies in Respondent’s and Dr. Gray’s 
testimony regarding the lease signing.  Respondent initially claimed he was not present at 
 
4 The hearing judge, however, did not find this exclusion to be “dispositive of the 
issue of whether there was an attorney/client relationship between Catonsville Eye, and Dr. 
Gray and Dr. Fine.”  According to the hearing judge, deletion of this clause “did not 
terminate or negate the attorney/client relationship.” 
 
 
 
15 
the lease signing, but later testified he was present and merely “was mixing different 
experiences.”  Dr. Gray, on the other hand, testified that Respondent was present for the 
lease signing, and that, “after the Respondent ‘started to turn the pages’ of the lease 
agreement, he watched as Mr. Kalarestaghi ‘grabbed ahold’ of the lease, ‘flipped it to the 
signature pages,’ and folded it vertically to expose the signature lines.”5  Upon 
consideration of the testimony, communications, and lease drafts, the hearing judge found 
Dr. Gray’s testimony to be “more credible.”  Ultimately, the hearing judge concluded that 
“an attorney/client relationship existed between the Respondent and Catonsville Eye from 
December 2016 through April 2017[.]” 
On June 5, 2017, MAH Mountain obtained a use and occupancy permit for the 
Baltimore National Pike Property.  Thereafter, “Drs. Fine and Gray began . . . designing 
and building out the infrastructure for an optometry practice and [eventually] moved 
Catonsville Eye from Rolling Road to the Baltimore National Pike [P]roperty[.]” 
“In August 2017, Dr. Gray received an invoice from MAH Mountain seeking rent 
payments for May through August 2017.”  Dr. Gray initially thought the invoice was a 
mistake and contacted Mr. Kalarestaghi to clarify.  Mr. Kalarestaghi’s response was “if 
you don’t owe it, don’t worry about it.”  “After some discussion between Dr. Gray and Mr. 
Kalarestaghi, Dr. Gray believed the two verbally agreed that Catonsville Eye would start 
paying rent in November 2017.”  On September 24, 2017, Dr. Gray emailed Respondent 
 
5 The hearing judge also questioned Dr. Gray’s supposed “coerc[ion] into signing 
the lease without being able to read it[]” because Dr. Gray “is an experienced businessman 
and has signed numerous leases.” 
 
 
16 
that his “[a]ttorney is Steve Fedder I will send you his contact info.  Any questions will 
now be a legal matter.”  Based on Dr. Gray’s and Mr. Kalarestaghi’s discussion, 
“Catonsville Eye made its first rent payment to MAH Mountain in November 2017.”  Mr. 
Fedder advised Dr. Gray to include a restrictive endorsement with Catonsville Eye’s 
December rent check, “requiring, as a condition of tender, that MAH Mountain modify the 
lease agreement to reflect a rent commencement date of November 1, 2017.”  Dr. Gray 
testified that MAH Mountain did not agree to the restrictive endorsement. 
Procedural History 
On December 6, 2017, MAH Mountain, represented by Respondent, sued 
Catonsville Eye in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, “seeking rent for 
the period July 1 through December 31, 2017[,] totaling $28,588.08 and late charges in the 
amount of $1,429.40.”  “On December 19, 2017, . . . Catonsville Eye . . . moved to 
disqualify the Respondent as counsel for MAH Mountain, alleging a conflict of interest 
due to his prior representation of Catonsville Eye.”  Respondent opposed the motion, 
claiming that “whatever prior representation may have occurred, it bears no relationship to 
this matter.”  The District Court granted Catonsville Eye’s motion, recognizing the 
potential conflict of interest.  The court postponed trial to January 2018 “to allow [MAH 
Mountain] to obtain substitute counsel[.]” 
 
Trial commenced on January 9, 2018.  During trial, “Catonsville Eye argued that 
the court should not enforce the terms of the lease agreement because there was fraud in 
its inducement.”  The court held that it “lacked jurisdiction to consider the fraud claim and, 
 
 
17 
based on the [April 4 Lease], entered judgment in the amount of $34,782.16 in favor of 
MAH Mountain[.]”  Catonsville Eye appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 
On January 16, 2018, Catonsville Eye sued MAH Mountain in circuit court, alleging 
fraud and legal malpractice against Respondent.  Catonsville Eye sought a declaratory 
judgment affirming that “the Rent Commencement Date of the [April 2017 Lease] . . . be 
November 1, 2017[.]”  The circuit court consolidated the cases on June 14, 2018. 
The circuit court conducted a two-day trial on August 14 and 15, 2019.  On 
September 20, the circuit court vacated the District Court’s judgment, granting Catonsville 
Eye’s request for declaratory relief.  The circuit court ordered the April 4 Lease to “reflect 
a rent commencement date of August 1, 2017, and that rent payments shall commence as 
of November 1, 2017[.]”  The court, however, dismissed the legal malpractice claim.  On 
November 18, 2019, MAH Mountain timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland.6 
On January 29, 2021, the Appellate Court of Maryland, in an unreported opinion, 
held that the circuit court “erred in reforming the lease when issuing a declaratory 
judgment[;]” however, the circuit court properly held that Respondent “did not commit 
legal malpractice chiefly because the proof was inadequate.”  The intermediate court 
vacated and remanded to the circuit court to “reassess the proof presented only on the fraud 
count[.]” 
 
6 During the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
to the Appellate Court of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
 
 
18 
On November 12, 2021, the circuit court, upon remand, concluded that Catonsville 
Eye “proved all five elements of fraud[,]” and that it “repudiated the Lease at issue.”  The 
court ultimately awarded judgment for Catonsville Eye in the amount of $18,000, 
“representing the security deposit that was paid.” 
During the litigation, Catonsville Eye filed a complaint against Respondent with 
Petitioner.  On December 6, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant action with this Court.  This 
Court referred the matter to the hearing judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing and provide 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.   
HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b), 19-301.7, 19-301.8(a), 19-301.9(a), 19-
301.16(a)(1), and 19-308.4(a), (c) and (d).   
Petitioner filed no exceptions.  Respondent filed numerous exceptions, which we 
address in turn.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“In attorney discipline proceedings, ‘this Court has original and complete 
jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.’”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n 
v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 658, 271 A.3d 792, 807 (2022) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n 
v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253, 950 A.2d 798, 806 (2008)).  We generally accept the 
hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id., 271 A.3d at 807 
(citation omitted).  Since Respondent filed exceptions, Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B) 
provides: 
 
 
19 
[This Court] shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved 
by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).  Th[is] Court 
may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions.  
Th[is] Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to 
assess the credibility of witnesses.   
 
“This Court shall not disturb the hearing judge’s findings where there is any 
competent evidence to support the finding of fact.”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 658, 271 A.3d at 
808 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “We assess the hearing judge’s legal 
conclusions under a de novo standard of review.”  Id., 271 A.3d at 808 (citations omitted).  
“If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn 
from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be 
overruled.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419, 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 
(2009).  “We have ‘the ultimate authority to decide whether a lawyer has violated the 
professional rules.’”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 659, 271 A.3d at 808 (quoting Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260, 1267 (2001)) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
DISCUSSION 
Exceptions 
 
Maryland Rule 19-728(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “each party may file (1) 
exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge, (2) recommendations 
concerning the appropriate disposition under Rule 19-740 (c), and (3) a statement of costs 
to which the party may be entitled under Rule 19-709.”  We first address Respondent’s 
exceptions to the findings of fact. 
 
 
 
20 
Exceptions to Findings of Fact 
Exception One 
First, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Catonsville Eye 
executed an addendum extending its lease to December 31, 2017.  Respondent maintains 
that “[n]o court has ever found that the lease addendum, by its terms, extended the lease to 
December 31, 2017.”  Respondent claims that while “[t]he parties to it may have treated 
the addendum as having extended the lease,” his review revealed that the “only logical 
inference” for the expiration of the lease was sometime “in the third quarter of 2017, like 
August/September 2017.” 
We disagree.  The hearing judge’s finding was supported by the exhibits submitted 
and testimony.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16, 85 A.3d 117, 125 
(2014) (citation omitted); see also Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B) (“The Court shall give due 
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”).  In 
Catonsville Eye’s complaint, they alleged that Respondent committed malpractice by 
advising Catonsville Eye that their Rolling Road landlord had “ZERO basis” for claiming 
that the lease ended in December 2017.  To the contrary, Catonsville Eye alleged that “[n]ot 
only did the landlord have a basis for a claim that the lease term was extending to December 
31, 2017, but more than likely would have prevailed in such a lawsuit.”  At the April 27 
hearing, Dr. Gray testified that, by the terms of the Rolling Road lease and amendment, the 
lease expired in “December of 2017.”  Therefore, we conclude that the hearing judge’s 
finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 
 
21 
Exception Two 
Second, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Drs. Gray and Fine 
were unaware of Respondent’s interest in MAH Mountain; rather, Respondent maintains 
that the parties’ communications illustrate an “express acknowledgement of Respondent’s 
interest in MAH Mountain.”  Respondent examples several email exchanges between the 
parties, highlighting language (e.g., “[o]ur practice[,]” “we[,]” and “your building”) that 
Respondent believes reflects “actual knowledge” on behalf of Catonsville Eye of 
Respondent’s interest in MAH Mountain.  Respondent also testified that he previously 
discussed “MAH Mountain and . . . who was involved[]” with Dr. Gray.  The hearing judge 
concluded that Respondent failed to advise Catonsville Eye that he had an ownership 
interest in MAH Mountain at any time prior to the execution to the April 4 Lease.  There 
is no evidence in the record to support Respondent’s assertion that Drs. Gray and Fine 
expressly knew of Respondent’s interest in MAH Mountain.  In fact, Dr. Gray testified to 
the contrary: 
Q. And were you aware at the time of the meeting that Ali Kalarestaghi was 
an attorney? 
 
A. I think he introduced himself as his father’s attorney. 
 
Q. Okay.  And were you aware that Ali Kalarestaghi represented MAH 
Mountain or did you think it was his father personally that he represented? 
 
A. I thought it was his father who he represented. 
 
The evidence advanced by Respondent does not suggest, and we do not accept, that 
Drs. Gray and Fine had actual knowledge of Respondent’s interest in MAH Mountain.  We, 
therefore, overrule this exception. 
 
 
22 
Exception Three 
Third, Respondent excepts to the finding that Catonsville Eye provided Respondent 
a copy of their existing lease after the first meeting “to see if they could break their lease.”  
Rather, Respondent argues that Catonsville Eye advised him before their initial meeting 
that Catonsville Eye’s existing lease expired in September.  At the April 27 hearing, Dr. 
Gray testified to the events at the first Panera Bread meeting: 
A. Well, [Dr. Fine and I] were adamant about the fact that we were not in a 
financial condition to pay rent at two locations at the same time.  And so 
that we could not afford to enter into it under those terms.  And that was 
the primary event. 
 
Q. Did you advise the Kalarestaghis of the day that you believe that your 
earlier lease – 
 
A. We told them we were obligated through December of 2017. 
 
Q. Okay. And do you recall what their reaction was to that? 
 
A. They said they would look into that, that they would look into that date at 
that time.  They offered us -- again, if I remember right, a reduction in 
rent if there was an overlap.  They were looking for ways to make 
concessions. 
 
* * * 
 
Q. Okay.  And why did [Respondent] review these documents? 
 
A. It was said that his father was offering up [Respondent’s] Legal Services 
for up to five thousand dollars to evaluate the Rolling Road lease for the 
purpose of seeing if it had an early termination. 
 
Q. Okay.  When you say it was said, who said that to you, if you recall? 
 
A. I believe [Respondent] said it. 
 
Q. Do you recall when [Respondent] said that? 
 
 
 
23 
A. Within a day or two of that meeting, if not -- I think within a day or two 
of that meeting. 
 
The first Panera Bread meeting occurred on December 6, 2016.  Respondent 
emailed Drs. Fine and Gray his “legal advice” regarding Catonsville Eye’s current lease 
and addendum on December 17.  The hearing judge evaluated the evidence and weighed 
Dr. Gray’s testimony.  “The hearing judge is in the best position to make these types of 
credibility evaluations and we cannot find that the hearing judge was clearly erroneous.”  
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Maldonado, 463 Md. 11, 36, 203 A.3d 841, 855 (2019) 
(citations omitted).  We, therefore, will not overrule the hearing judge’s finding. 
Exception Four 
Respondent next excepts to the finding that he offered to review the Rolling Road 
Lease and “determine whether Catonsville Eye could terminate the lease” in exchange for 
$5,000.  Respondent asserts that he never offered his legal services in exchange for money, 
and that the $5,000 “had nothing to do with the review of the Rolling Road lease.”  The 
record demonstrates otherwise.  On December 19, 2016, Respondent emailed Drs. Gray 
and Fine, offering, amongst other things, “[u]p to $5,000 in free legal services through my 
office to negotiate a settlement with the landlord, or defend a suit by the Rolling Road 
landlord.”  On January 10, 2017, Respondent reconfirmed that “I have a provision in the 
lease confirming that my office will provide up to $5,000 in legal services to terminate 
your existing lease.”  The Rent Commencement Date clause in the January 10 Draft also 
included this exchange:  
The Landlord, at Landlord’s expense, will engage the services of Law 
Offices of Ali K., LLC . . . to represent the Tenant with respect to the 
 
 
24 
termination of Tenant’s existing lease on Rolling Road.  Landlord will pay 
up to $5,000.00 in legal fees towards Tenant’s termination of their existing 
lease at Rolling Road. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Dr. Gray further testified that, after the first Panera Bread meeting, 
Respondent’s father “offer[ed] up [Respondent’s] Legal Services for up to five thousand 
dollars to evaluate the Rolling Road lease for the purpose of seeing if it had an early 
termination.”  Dr. Gray understood this to mean that Respondent “was representing 
[Catonsville Eye] with regard to [their] Rolling Road location and lease.”  The hearing 
judge’s finding regarding Respondent’s exchange of services for $5,000 was well 
supported by the record.  Accordingly, we overrule the exception. 
Exception Five 
 
Fifth, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent 
understood that he was offering legal advice and legal representation to Catonsville Eye to 
resolve those issues.  Both parties understood that Respondent would be the attorney 
handling the negotiations.”  Respondent maintains there is “no testimony or documentary 
evidence supporting such ﬁndings.” 
We disagree.  The Rent Commencement Date clause in the January 10 Draft stated 
that “[t]he Landlord . . . will engage the services of [Respondent] . . . to represent the 
Tenant with respect to the termination of Tenant’s existing lease on Rolling Road.”  
(Emphasis added).  The March 24 Lease similarly included the provision that Respondent 
“would provide representation for Catonsville Eye on the early termination issue[.]”  
(Emphasis added).  As the hearing judge noted, the emails between Respondent and 
Catonsville Eye, wherein the parties discussed strategy, support the conclusion that 
 
 
25 
Respondent understood he represented Catonsville Eye in the Rolling Road lease 
termination negotiations.  This finding is supported by material evidence in the record.  
Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. 
Exception Six 
 
Sixth, Respondent excepts to the finding that Dr. Gray paid Respondent $1,000 to 
review the Rolling Road lease.  Respondent claims the $1,000 was for “MAH [Mountain] 
to prepare a proposed lease.”  At the April 27 hearing, Dr. Gray testified that he “had paid 
a thousand dollars up front for reading the lease.  I had four months security deposit and 
first month lease less the thousand dollars.”  (Emphasis added).  Respondent provided 
Catonsville Eye with his “legal advice” regarding the Rolling Road lease on December 17, 
2016.  Less than a week later, Catonsville Eye provided Respondent—not MAH 
Mountain—with a check for $1,000.  Respondent provided Catonsville Eye the first draft 
lease on January 10, 2017.  There is material evidence to support a finding that Catonsville 
Eye wrote Respondent a $1,000 check to review the Rolling Road lease, which was later 
credited towards their security deposit for the Baltimore National Pike Property lease.  We, 
therefore, overrule this exception.   
Exception Seven 
 
Respondent further excepts to the finding that Catonsville Eye signed the Baltimore 
National Pike Property lease because: (1) Respondent made “repeated assurances” that 
MAH Mountain would “waive or reduce rent during the time that Catonsville Eye owed 
rent to” the Rolling Road landlord and (2) Respondent advised that the Rolling Road lease 
ended in August or September 2017.  Respondent claims he “made no such assurances.”  
 
 
26 
Instead, Respondent notes that Catonsville Eye “did not execute and agree” to those 
“previous offers[,]” but “agreed to lease for a completely different unit with . . . 
significantly different material terms.”  As to the latter, Respondent maintains he told 
Catonsville Eye “an early termination was not certain and Dr. Gray . . . understood . . . it 
required negotiations.”  Respondent uses various email communications to illustrate his 
contention, such as the December 19 email, wherein Respondent stated, “I do believe that 
we could negotiate a settlement with the landlord[,]” and the December 20 email, wherein 
Respondent stated that “[w]e are rolling the dice and betting on the fact that we can get a 
settlement negotiated with the landlord.” 
The hearing judge reviewed the evidence and testimony and found that Catonsville 
Eye signed the Baltimore National Pike Property lease in reliance on Respondent’s 
assertion.  Respondent emailed Catonsville Eye on December 17 that its “Landlord has 
ZERO basis for claiming that [their] lease ends December 31, 2017.”  Dr. Gray relied upon 
Respondent’s legal opinion, testifying that he understood that to mean Respondent was “a 
hundred percent sure that we didn’t have an extension past August.”  On December 20, 
Respondent emailed Catonsville Eye that his father was “willing to waive rent as long as 
you have an out of pocket rental obligation, assuming you give me free rein and your full 
cooperation in using every possible argument to disturb and disrupt the landlord . . . to 
release you from your lease.”  The testimony and exhibits support the hearing judge’s 
finding.  We, therefore, cannot say the finding was clearly erroneous. 
 
 
 
 
27 
Exception Eight 
 
Eighth, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the March 24 Lease 
“did not contain an agreed-upon provision providing for the addition of a bathroom to the 
premises.”  Respondent argues this finding was “based solely on Respondent’s speculation 
at trial[.]”  The hearing judge found Respondent’s testimony to be credible on this issue.  
The record does not contain evidence contradicting Respondent’s own testimony.  See Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 197, 223 A.3d 976, 988 (2020).  As such, the 
hearing judge correctly found that the March 24 Lease did not contain the provision 
providing for the addition of a bathroom.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 
667, 706–07, 215 A.3d 242, 265 (2019).  We, therefore, overrule this exception. 
Exception Nine 
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the March 24 Lease had 
a start date of April 1, 2017, and that Respondent updated the lease.  Instead, Respondent 
claims the March 24 Lease had a commencement date “of no later than August 1, 2017[,] 
based upon conditions of rent abatement[,]” and the April 4 Lease had a rent 
commencement date of May 1, 2017. 
As to the latter, we agree.  The April 4 Lease had a commencement date of May 1, 
2017.  However, we disagree as to the commencement date of the March 24 Lease.  While 
the March 24 Lease contained a contingency based on the Rolling Road lease termination, 
the lease defines the commencement date as April 1, 2017.  Dr. Gray also testified that the 
commencement date for the March 24 Lease was April 1, 2017.  Respondent’s own 
testimony also confirms the hearing judge’s findings: 
 
 
28 
Q. I believe you also testified . . . that the previous lease, at least the March 
24 version . . . didn’t have a rent commencement date of May 1st, 2017, 
is that correct? 
 
A. I don’t remember what the March 24th rent commencement date was. 
 
Q. All right.  So let’s go to the previous exhibit, Exhibit Number 4 [the March 
24 Lease].  And I guess it would be Page 21. 
 
A. Uh-hum. 
 
Q. All right.  That was the commencement date of April 1st, 2017? 
 
A. Correct. 
 
Q. And then turning back to page 49, the commencement date on [the April 
4 Lease] has been changed to May 1st, 2017? 
 
A. Yes, because as of the time of this draft, the commencement date was no 
longer possible because April 1st had passed three days ago. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Based upon the testimony and facts described above, the hearing 
judge’s finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Therefore, Respondent’s 
exception is overruled. 
Exception Ten 
 
Tenth, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the April 4 Lease 
differed from the March 24 Lease in three “significant” ways: (1) removal of the Rent 
Commencement Date clause providing for $5,000 in legal services and potential “free rent” 
contingent on the Rolling Road lease, (2) the changed commencement date from April 1, 
2017, to May 1, 2017, and (3) the addition of a “Restroom” clause providing Catonsville 
Eye the option to request MAH Mountain build a bathroom in unit for $5,000.  Respondent 
asserts that the April 4 Lease and the March 24 Lease differed in two additional respects: 
 
 
29 
(4) an entirely “different space—the preferable end unit, not the middle unit[]” and (5) 
“greater options of lease renewal[.]” 
 
The hearing judge noted, per Respondent’s December 6, 2016, email, that the parties 
originally negotiated for the middle unit, also known as “Space B” or “Unit 102[,]” of the 
Baltimore National Pike Property.  The hearing judge also considered the unit’s 
desirability, stating that “[t]he March 24 lease, like the January 10 draft, was for the middle 
space, a less desirable space[.]”  The hearing judge identified that the March 24 Lease and 
the April 4 Lease “erroneously identif[ied] ‘suite 102,’ a middle unit, as the unit to be 
occupied by Catonsville Eye, but at some point during the negotiations it was agreed that 
Catonsville Eye would occupy the end unit.”  It is clear that the hearing judge was aware 
of the unit change in the lease.  This Court defers to the hearing judge to determine what 
constituted a “significant” change in the leases.  Kane, 465 Md. at 679 n.6, 215 A.3d at 249 
n.6 (citation omitted) (providing the hearing judge “significant deference in . . . picking 
and choosing from the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Singh, 464 Md. 645, 662 n.15, 212 A.3d 888, 899 
n.15 (2019) (citation omitted).  We, therefore, will not overrule the hearing judge’s finding 
that the April 4 Lease “significant[ly]” differed from the March 24 Lease in three ways.  
Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
Exception Eleven 
 
Next, Respondent excepts to the finding that there was no indication that Dr. Gray 
“was willing to pay substantially more rent . . . in exchange for leasing an end space.”  
Respondent argues that Dr. Gray “pa[id] the exact same amount in rent for the end space[]” 
 
 
30 
as he would have for the middle space.  We find no merit in Respondent’s claim.  The 
hearing judge did not find that the April 4 Lease rent price increased.  Dr. Gray testified to 
this finding: 
Q. And do you recall expressing any preference to the Kalarestaghis about 
which of those two units, the end unit or the middle unit, you would prefer 
to occupy? 
 
A. I don’t remember if it was at that time, but at some point I said it was 
agreed to that the end unit had more visibility, but for me, the benefit to 
the mid-unit was it had a bathroom and as long as I had signage on both 
walls I was okay with either one. 
 
Q. As you are discussing it in 2016, would you have been willing to pay 
substantially more rent to occupy the end unit versus the middle unit?  
 
A. No. 
 
(Emphasis added).  We have no reason to regard this finding as clearly erroneous based on 
our review of the record.  We, therefore, overrule Respondent’s exception. 
Exception Twelve 
 
Twelfth, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Dr. Gray was not 
prepared to sign the April 4 Lease because “there were no negotiations however he was 
willing to pay MAH Mountain $4,500 out of friendship, without signing anything.”  
Instead, Respondent alleges that “Dr. Gray intended on April 4 to go and sign a lease 
and present a check.”  We disagree.  While Dr. Gray alleged in his complaint to Petitioner 
that he “intended on April 4 to go and sign a lease and present a check[,]” he also testified 
as follows:  
Q. Did you go to [Mehdi’s] office that day intending to sign a lease? 
 
A. No. 
 
 
31 
Q. Why not? 
 
A. Because it hadn’t been reviewed. 
 
Q. Hadn’t been reviewed? 
 
A. By an attorney. 
 
Q. Okay.  And what changed your mind? 
 
A. [Mehdi] and I had a friendship and he was desperate and promised me 
over and over again he would not cheat me, he would make any changes that 
needed to be made and that he needed it.  He needed it so badly because he 
was in -- he just needed it.  And I was uncomfortable with it.  I expressed my 
discomfort with it.  He continued pleading with me to do it.  Even when 
[Respondent] showed up with the leases, I made point of letting -- saying it 
again, to which [Respondent] responded that I’m willing to make any and all 
changes my father tells me to make. 
 
* * * 
 
Q. And why was it that with all [your business] experience you signed a lease 
without having an attorney review it? 
 
A. We were friends and I thought him to be honorable.  
 
(Emphasis added).  The court recognized the conflicting testimony and questioned “the 
credibility of Dr. Gray’s testimony, that he was coerced into signing the lease without being 
allowed to read it.”  The hearing judge noted Dr. Gray’s business experience with 
“numerous leases[]” and that he had an attorney.  However, “[a]fter considering all of the 
testimony and reviewing the emails and leases, the [c]ourt [found] Dr. Gray’s testimony . 
. . to be more credible.”  In deference to the hearing judge, we determine that this finding 
was supported by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, overrule this exception.7 
 
7 The dissent asserts that we “relax[] the clear and convincing standard by sustaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
 
32 
Exception Thirteen 
 
Respondent further excepts to the finding that an attorney-client relationship existed 
between Catonsville Eye and Respondent.  Respondent relies on three emails to support 
the conclusion that “Dr. Gray could not have reasonably believed that the Respondent 
represented Catonsville Eye with regard to the Rolling Road lease.”  The December 17 and 
 
(. . . continued) 
the hearing judge’s findings so long as there was some testimony from Dr. Gray that could 
be interpreted as supporting the findings.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kalarestaghi, No. 
48 Sept. Term, 2021, slip op. at 9 (Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
“[T]o satisfy this exacting standard,” the dissent observes, “the testimony must be capable 
of being found credible ‘when considered in connection with all the facts and 
circumstances in evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 
56, 79, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000)). 
 
As this Court has stated on countless occasions, “[w]e accept the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we defer to the hearing judge’s 
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 
194, 233, 185 A.3d 76, 98 (2018) (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 
351, 368, 952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008)).  “We do so because ‘[t]he hearing judge is in the best 
position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, 
as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.’”  Johnson, 472 Md. at 
527, 247 A.3d at 789 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 181, 105 
A.3d 533, 560 (2014)).  “Indeed, [a]s far as what evidence a hearing judge must rely upon 
to reach his or her conclusions, we have said that the hearing judge may pick and choose 
what evidence to believe.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 333, 230 
A.3d 30, 60 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “This Court will not 
disturb the hearing judge’s findings where there is any competent evidence to support the 
finding of fact.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Moawad, 475 Md. 424, 458, 257 A.3d 611, 
631 (2021) (citation omitted); McDonald, 437 Md. at 16, 85 A.3d at 125 (“A hearing 
judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous [i]f there is any competent material evidence 
to support [it].”  (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Again, we find no clear 
error here or “misplaced deference to the hearing judge.”  Kalarestaghi, slip op. at 10 
(Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The hearing judge, after considering 
the testimony and reviewing the record, found Dr. Gray to be credible.  This determination 
was not “too grave of an inferential step[.]”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ucheomumu, 450 
Md. 675, 696, 150 A.3d 825, 837 (2016).  The hearing judge’s credibility determinations 
are within her discretion; accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
 
 
33 
December 21 emails, Respondent claims, reveal that he merely “offered his opinion and 
proposal as to how Catonsville Eye might negotiate with its landlord an early exit from its 
current space[.]”  Despite knowing that negotiations with their Rolling Road landlord 
would be necessary, Respondent maintains that Drs. Gray and Fine “did nothing”—they 
“did not execute agreements with MAH [Mountain] to pursue the effort . . . [nor] retain[ed] 
Respondent to do so.”  Respondent further excepts to the finding that he “would have 
continued to represent [Catonsville Eye] in the future, on that issue, as speciﬁed in the Rent 
Commencement Date clause” as speculative and “contrary” to the language in the April 4 
Lease.  We disagree.  During Dr. Gray’s testimony, he indicated several times that he 
believed Respondent represented them with regard to the Rolling Road lease and would 
continue to do so throughout lease negotiations.  The hearing judge, “[a]fter considering 
all of the testimony and reviewing the emails and leases,” credited Dr. Gray’s testimony.  
Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
Exception Fourteen 
 
Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that his emails reflect that 
he engaged in numerous “detailed strategy discussions with Drs. Fine and Gray about the 
methods he would use to achieve an early termination of the Rolling Road Lease.”  
Respondent maintains these emails were not “detailed strategy discussions[;]” rather, they 
“offered his opinion . . . as to how Catonsville Eye might negotiate . . . an early exit[.]”  
Respondent is correct that the record contains emails from him to Catonsville Eye, 
concerning termination of the Rolling Road lease.  Nevertheless, the record also supports 
the hearing judge’s description of those emails as “strategy discussions.”  For example, in 
 
 
34 
the December 17 email, Respondent states that “[t]he best way to address this would be for 
us to send a letter to the Landlord putting them on the defensive and offering a compromise 
or settlement[.]”  (Emphasis added).  We, therefore, overrule this exception. 
Exception Fifteen 
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he never terminated his 
representation of Catonsville Eye because he “never represented Catonsville Eye.”  
Respondent argues Catonsville Eye did not “manifest an intent that the Respondent provide 
[them] legal services.”  We are unconvinced.  As previously discussed, there was clear and 
convincing evidence to support the hearing judge’s finding that Catonsville Eye reasonably 
believed that Respondent represented them.  The hearing judge’s credibility determinations 
are within her discretion and, accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception.  Hodes, 
441 Md. at 182, 105 A.3d at 560. 
Exception Sixteen 
 
Finally, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, during the District 
Court proceeding, the court recognized that the circumstances raised a conflict-of-interest 
issue, leading the District Court to postpone trial “to allow MAH Mountain to obtain 
substitute counsel and avoid the possibility of [a conflict] occurring.”  Respondent asserts 
this “incomplete reference . . . was not before the [h]earing [j]udge for its truth or for fact 
ﬁnding purpose[s]” and “should be stricken as exceeding the scope[.]”  Specifically, 
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Exhibits 11 through 17 were narrowly admitted to 
support witnesses’ testimony and “not for the truth of any of the factual findings[.]”  
However, Respondent fails to recognize that, in making this finding, the hearing judge 
 
 
35 
relied upon Exhibits 8 through 10—not Exhibits 11 through 17—to provide procedural 
background.  Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
Conclusions of Law 
 
Having concluded that the hearing judge’s findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous, we now turn to address the hearing judge’s sustained violations.  The hearing 
judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b), 19-301.7, 19-
301.8(a), 19-301.9(a), 19-301.16(a)(1), and 19-308.4(a), (c) and (d).  Respondent excepts 
to all the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Based on our independent review of the 
record, we uphold the hearing judge’s legal conclusions, except for the 19-308.4(c) 
violation. 
MARPC 19-301.4. Communication (1.4) 
 
MARPC 19-301.4 provides in relevant part: 
(a) An attorney shall: 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect 
to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required by these Rules; 
 
* * * 
 
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
 
 
A lawyer violates MARPC 19-301.4 “when the attorney fails to communicate 
crucial information about the status of the case [to the client].”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n 
v. White, 480 Md. 319, 370, 280 A.3d 722, 751 (2022) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  MARPC 19-301.4(b) “requires an attorney to 
communicate with a client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
 
 
36 
informed decisions.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Framm, 449 Md. 620, 650, 144 A.3d 
827, 845 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and 
(b) by failing to communicate and explain to Catonsville Eye his conflict of interest in 
concurrently representing Catonsville Eye for the termination of their Rolling Road lease 
and MAH Mountain for the negotiation of the Baltimore National Pike Property lease.  
While Respondent advised Drs. Fine and Gray that he could not review the Baltimore 
National Pike Property lease with them, the hearing judge recognized that Respondent 
“drafted all versions of the lease.”  As previously discussed, the hearing judge noted that 
Respondent failed to inform Catonsville Eye that he had a thirty-percent ownership interest 
in MAH Mountain prior to the execution of the April 4 Lease.  Ultimately, the hearing 
judge determined that, because Respondent failed to “disclose the conflicts, or potential for 
conflict, or explain the effects that the conflict could have on his representation, Drs. Fine 
and Gray could not[:]” (1) consent to Respondent’s continued representation of Catonsville 
Eye or (2) “make informed decisions about whether to allow the Respondent to pursue 
early termination of their Rolling Road lease on their behalf while they were entering into 
a new lease agreement with MAH Mountain.”  Respondent excepts to this conclusion by 
stating that Petitioner failed to establish the violation by clear and convincing evidence. 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b).  The hearing judge noted that 
Respondent did not explain the existence or appearance of a conflict of interest between 
Catonsville Eye or MAH Mountain.  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s 
 
 
37 
failure to adequately explain the conflict deprived Catonsville Eye of the ability to make 
informed decisions.  See Framm, 449 Md. at 649, 144 A.3d at 844.  By failing to inform 
Drs. Gray and Fine of a potential conflict, Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) 
and (b).  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 267, 107 A.3d 1159, 
1169 (2015) (“We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent clearly violated [MARPC 
19-301.4](a)(1) by failing to explain the potential conflict of interest when he undertook 
joint representation[.]”).  Other than one conclusory sentence, Respondent offers no basis 
for asserting that this conclusion was not proven by clear and convincing evidence.  We, 
therefore, sustain the hearing judge’s conclusion. 
MARPC 19-301.7. Conﬂict of Interest – General Rule (1.7) 
MARPC 19-301.7 provides: 
(a) Except as provided in section (b) . . . an attorney shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a conflict of interest.  A conflict of 
interest exists if: 
 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; 
or 
 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another 
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
attorney. 
 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under section (a) . 
. . an attorney may represent a client if: 
 
(1) the attorney reasonably believes that the attorney will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
 
 
 
38 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the attorney in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
The hearing judge determined that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.7 by 
concurrently representing Catonsville Eye in the termination of their Rolling Road lease 
and in the negotiation of the Baltimore National Pike Property lease with MAH Mountain.  
According to the hearing judge, this representation “created a significant risk that the 
representation of one client would be materially limited by his responsibilities to another 
client.”  In fact, the hearing judge found that Respondent’s concurrent representation put 
the parties “in direct conflict with each other[.]”  Respondent, as a partial owner in MAH 
Mountain, had a “personal interest” in the outcome of the lease negotiations.  Therefore, 
Respondent’s “‘loyalties were divided’” between MAH Mountain and Catonsville Eye in 
violation of MARPC 19-301.7(a)(2).  As evidenced by Respondent’s emails, the hearing 
judge noted that he was clearly “aware of the potential for a conflict of interest,” yet 
Respondent “failed to obtain Catonsville Eye’s informed consent in writing as required by 
[MARPC 19-301.7](b).” 
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion, maintaining that he did not 
“violate conflict of interest rules” because “Catonsville Eye was a prospective client who 
never formed an attorney-client relationship with Respondent[.]”  Respondent further 
alleges that Petitioner failed to identify: “(1) how Respondent’s representation . . . was 
directly adverse . . . , (2) what was the significant risk,” and (3) how the representation of 
one client was materially limited by his representation to the other.  To Respondent, the 
 
 
39 
representation could not be considered “adverse” because Catonsville Eye and MAH 
Mountain had the same goal—to sign a lease for the Baltimore National Pike Property.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we overrule Respondent’s exception.   
This Court has previously explained that: 
An attorney-client relationship is formed when: (1) a person manifests to a 
lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the 
person; and . . . (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably 
relies on the lawyer to provide [legal] services. 
 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 727, 93 A.3d 262, 280–81 (2014) 
(citation omitted).  In Hodes, we further described the “parameters” of the attorney-client 
relationship: 
The facts and circumstances of each particular case are critical in determining 
whether an attorney-client relationship exists.  A key factor that courts look 
to is whether the purported “client” sought legal advice.  Certainly, an 
attorney-client relationship still can be found even though the attorney 
renders services or advice that is not strictly legal in character.  Moreover, a 
personal relationship or close friendship with a purported “client” does not 
preclude a court from finding that an attorney-client relationship exists.  Our 
cases make clear that an explicit agreement or payment arrangement is not a 
prerequisite to the formation of an attorney-client relationship. 
 
441 Md. at 170, 105 A.3d at 553–54 (internal citations omitted); see also Framm, 449 Md. 
at 655, 144 A.3d at 848 (“We have explained that the formation of an attorney-client 
relationship ‘does not require an explicit agreement,’ but rather may arise from the conduct 
of the parties.” (citation omitted)). 
There were two components to the attorney-client relationship found by the hearing 
judge: (1) reviewing the Rolling Road lease and rendering a legal opinion on its termination 
date; and (2) representing Catonsville Eye in negotiations with the Rolling Road landlord 
 
 
40 
to achieve an early termination of that lease.  The evidence clearly and convincingly 
establishes the first component.  It is less clear whether the evidence clearly and 
convincingly establishes the second. 
On January 10, 2017, Respondent emailed Drs. Fine and Gray the January 10 Draft 
for the Baltimore National Pike Property:  
I am attaching the draft of the lease.  As I mentioned, it would be a conflict 
of interest for me to provide a legal opinion regarding this lease, however 
I have a provision in the lease confirming that my office will provide up 
to $5,000 in legal services to terminate your existing lease.  As I mentioned 
before, that is a very high cap to provide reassurance.  I anticipate it will take 
far less time.   
 
Thank you again for your patience.  Please forward this to your attorney 
and welcome them to reach out with any questions, proposed changes, 
etc. 
 
The January 10 Draft provided in part: 
 
The Landlord, at Landlord’s expense, will engage the services of Law 
Offices of Ali K., LLC (within this paragraph only, referred to as “Attorney”) 
to represent the Tenant with respect to the termination of Tenant’s existing 
lease on Rolling Road.  Landlord will pay up to $5,000.00 [i]n legal fees 
towards Tenant’s termination of their existing lease at Rolling Road.  If 
Tenant has cooperated fully with Attorney (for example, agree to proceed 
with filing preliminary litigation if needed), and Attorney is still unable to 
negotiate a settlement with the Tenant’s landlord at Rolling Road, Landlord 
will provide free rent for Tenant’s Premises during the time that Tenant has 
out of pocket rent.   
 
(Emphasis added).  On January 16, Dr. Gray emailed Respondent that he would “be 
unavailable for [the] next 2 weeks.”  On February 6, Dr. Gray advised Respondent that he 
would “be focusing on Catonsville tomorrow . . . [w]e will absolutely have clarity by the 
end of tomorrow.”  The next day, Dr. Gray emailed Respondent that he “[s]poke with Dr[.] 
 
 
41 
Fine who is trying to rationalize the cost of relocating.  My suggestion is to meet and 
discuss our concerns.  We are available mid morning this Thursday[, February 9].  Would 
you like to meet around 1100 at Pan[era]??”  Respondent replied that “Thursday, 11am at 
Panera sounds great.  I confirmed that my father is free then as well.  We look forward to 
sitting down with you gentlemen.  We’d be happy to discuss anything of concern!”  On 
February 8, Dr. Gray informed Respondent that: 
Dr[.] Fine has voted not to relocate to your site for the valid reason of age.  
Norman believes he will not benefit quick enough to justify the build out 
expense.  I can’t argue his perspective[.]  Therefore I can only thank you both 
for your professionalism and kind manner in our negotiations.  If you have 
any other suggestions we are willing recipients.  Thank you both. 
 
Despite this email, Dr. Gray still went to the meeting at Panera as scheduled and 
negotiations continued.  If, at this juncture, Catonsville Eye did not expect for Respondent 
to take any steps to secure an early termination of the Rolling Road lease, then one must 
ask why Dr. Gray still scheduled and attended the February 9 Panera meeting.  When 
questioned about the February 8 email, Dr. Gray testified as follows: 
Q. Did you have any conversations about leasing 6567 with [Mehdi] 
Kalarestaghi following this e-mail? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Do you recall -- what do you recall was the substance of that location? 
 
A. Just that if he could think of any other way, that I was still interested. 
 
Q. And when you say any other way, what do you mean by that? 
 
A. If he had any other suggestions. Brainstorm and come up with an 
alternative suggestion. 
 
 
 
42 
* * * 
 
Q. Okay.  And you reference acknowledging terminating your existing 
Catonsville lease? 
 
A. I’m sorry? 
 
Q. You reference acknowledgement of termination of your Catonsville lease.  
Do you see that in the e-mail? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Was it still your understanding at this point that [Respondent] was 
representing you in negotiations with your Rolling Road landlord? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Again, when questioned by Respondent’s counsel, Dr. Gray testified 
as follows: 
Q. And you didn’t consider [Respondent] to be your lawyer in terms of any 
negotiation on this new lease with MAH Mountain? 
 
A. Only with regard to Rolling Road. 
 
(Emphasis added).  He continued: 
 
Q. So when [the January 10 Draft] was presented to you with this language, 
there was an issue that was addressed as to what the terms would be if 
[Respondent] attempted to negotiate but was unsuccessful, right? 
 
A. It is a strange word.  I was under the assumption that he was negotiating. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Even though the February 8 email indicated that Catonsville Eye was 
no longer interested, “negotiations restart[ed] . . . the next day.”  Dr. Gray further testified 
that his expectation of representation continued through the April 4 Lease signing: 
 
 
43 
Q. Okay.  Was it still your understanding at this point that [Respondent] 
intended to negotiate an early end to your Rolling Road lease? 
 
A. That is what we believed, that he was negotiating an early end. 
 
Q. Okay.  Did [Respondent] say anything about your Rolling Road lease 
negotiations during this meeting in April 4? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. Did [Respondent] ever specifically say to you that he would not be 
representing you for purposes of those lease negotiations? 
 
A. Yes, he said he was not representing us with regard to 6567. 
 
Q. Okay.  Let me rephrase the question.  Did [Respondent] ever explicitly 
tell you he would not be representing you as to the lease negotiations with 
the Rolling Road landlord? 
 
A. No, he never said that. 
 
(Emphasis added).   
Based upon the communications between Respondent and Drs. Gray and Fine, “it 
was reasonable for the hearing judge to presume the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship, thereby triggering Respondent’s obligations to advise accordingly[.]”  Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. White, 448 Md. 33, 54, 136 A.3d 819, 831 (2016).  “The hearing 
judge’s determination as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed between the 
[R]espondent and [client] will not be overturned by us unless the [P]etitioner demonstrates 
that the [hearing] judge’s finding was clearly erroneous.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Shoup, 410 Md. 462, 490, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (2009) (citations omitted).  This is especially 
true if “[t]here is ample evidence in the record to support the hearing judge’s conclusion.”  
Id., 979 A.2d at 136.  The purported client’s “testimony is a key factor in a court’s attorney-
 
 
44 
client inquiry.”  Id., 979 A.2d at 136 (footnote omitted) (recognizing that the potential 
client “never intended for the [R]espondent to provide her with legal services[]”).   
Based on Dr. Gray’s testimony, it is clear that Catonsville Eye did expect and 
reasonably believe Respondent to take further action to secure an early termination of that 
lease.  The testimony and record reveals that there was still an attorney-client relationship 
between Respondent and Catonsville Eye after the February 8 email.  See id. at 490, 979 
A.2d at 136.  Dr. Gray’s testimony was a “key factor in [the] court’s attorney-client 
inquiry.”  Id., 979 A.2d at 136 (footnote omitted).  The “clearly erroneous standard” is met 
where the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by “any competent material 
evidence.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 286, 218 A.3d 757, 766 
(2019); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Wemple, 479 Md. 167, 191, 277 A.3d 427, 441 (2022).  
As we explained in Hodes:  
[T]he term “clear and convincing” evidence means that the witnesses to a 
fact must be found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have 
testified are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly 
and in due order, so as to enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear 
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 
Whether evidence is clear and convincing requires weighing, comparing, 
testing, and judging its worth when considered in connection with all the 
facts and circumstances in evidence. 
 
 
441 Md. at 169 n.15, 105 A.3d at 553 n.15 (citations omitted).  It was enough for the 
hearing judge to rely on Dr. Gray’s testimony to establish this fact.   
Furthermore, Respondent “never expressed, in writing or otherwise,” a “lack of 
consent” to assist Catonsville Eye; rather, his actions—including acceptance of the $1,000 
check to review the Rolling Road lease and continued strategy discussions on how to 
 
 
45 
terminate the Rolling Road lease—evidenced his intent to provide legal services to 
Catonsville Eye.  See Agbaje, 438 Md. at 729, 93 A.3d at 281.  Respondent was required 
to “dispel” Catonsville Eye’s “reasonable expectation of legal representation[,]” but the 
record reveals that “Respondent took no such action.”  See id., 93 A.3d at 281.  Upon 
consideration of the testimony, communications, and lease drafts, the hearing judge found 
Dr. Gray’s testimony to be credible.  Therefore, we cannot say the hearing judge was 
clearly erroneous.  Shoup, 410 Md. at 490, 979 A.2d at 136 (citations omitted). 
Assuming, arguendo, Catonsville Eye was a prospective client as to the second 
component.  In this scenario, Respondent still violates MARPC 19-301.7.  Respondent 
violated MARPC 19-301.7 by virtue of his ownership interest in MAH Mountain and 
representation of MAH Mountain in negotiating a new lease with Catonsville Eye while 
concurrently reviewing the Rolling Road lease for Catonsville Eye and opining on its 
termination date.  Dr. Gray testified that Respondent never disclosed this conflict upon 
rendering his December 17 “legal advice[:]” 
Q. And did you also know at this time that [Respondent] had an ownership 
or a financial interest in MAH Mountain? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. Okay.  And looking at the section that says “this is legal advice, it is 
subject to attorney-client privilege, I cannot even share this review with my 
father, although you can.”  When you read that, did you believe that 
[Respondent] was providing you with legal advice? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
 
 
46 
Q. And were you -- did he advise at this time of any conflict of interest that 
he may have had in providing you legal advice about your Rolling Road 
lease? 
 
A. No. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Following the December 20 email, Dr. Gray testified as follows: 
Q. And [Respondent] states in the next -- a couple sentences down, 
“obviously I have a conflict of interest in reviewing the new lease for you.”  
Do you see that? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And did you understand that to mean that he couldn’t provide you legal 
advise about the Rolling Road lease? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. What did you understand that to mean? 
 
A. That he represented his father with regard to the 6567 lease location. 
 
Q. Okay. And [Respondent] did not at this time explain to you any possible 
conflicts that could arise from providing you legal advice as to the Rolling 
Road lease but then separately representing his father as to your negotiations 
regarding 6567? 
 
A. No. 
 
(Emphasis added).   
 
We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent’s representation of Catonsville 
Eye created a conflict of interest because Catonsville Eye and MAH Mountain were in a 
directly adverse relationship during lease negotiations.  Respondent’s failure to adequately 
explain the conflict deprived Catonsville Eye of the ability to make informed decisions.  
Framm, 449 Md. at 649, 144 A.3d at 844.  The alleged “alignment” of  MAH Mountain’s 
 
 
47 
and Catonsville Eye’s business interests created a conflict.  It was “immaterial” that the 
parties had the same goal.  Framm, 449 Md. at 655, 144 A.3d at 848 (“We do not subscribe 
to the contention that Mr. Griggs was a mere ‘incidental beneficiary’ because his and Mr. 
Wilson’s interests were in fact aligned.”).  “[C]oncomitant with the rule 
against conflicts of interest is the duty of loyalty.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 
462 Md. 209, 238, 198 A.3d 835, 852 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Respondent owed a duty to Catonsville Eye to provide unbiased and objective advice.  
Therefore, when Respondent told Dr. Gray there was “ZERO basis” for the Rolling Road 
landlord to claim that the lease terminated on December 31, one cannot help but wonder 
whether Respondent would have projected such certitude if he did not have a personal and 
professional interest in having Dr. Gray believe that the lease terminated on August 31.  
For the reasons stated above, we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent 
violated MARPC 19-301.7.  We, therefore, overrule the exception. 
MARPC 19-301.8. Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules (1.8) 
MARPC 19-301.8 provides in relevant part: 
(a) An attorney shall not enter into a business transaction with a client unless: 
 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the attorney acquires the interest are 
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; 
 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given 
a reasonable opportunity to seek independent legal advice on the 
transaction; and 
 
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the 
essential terms of the transaction and the attorney’s role in the 
 
 
48 
transaction, including whether the attorney is representing the client in 
the transaction. 
 
The hearing judge determined that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.8(a) when 
he, “as part-owner of MAH Mountain, [] entered into a lease agreement with his client 
Catonsville Eye.”  Specifically, Respondent failed to: (1) “advise Catonsville Eye . . . of 
the desirability of seeking independent advice related to the March 24 [L]ease[,]” (2) “give 
Dr. Gray a reasonable opportunity to seek independent advice prior to signing the April 4 
[L]ease,”8 and (3) “obtain Catonsville Eye’s informed consent, in a writing signed by 
Catonsville Eye, to the essential terms of the transaction and the Respondent’s role in the 
transaction[.]” 
Respondent again excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion because he believes 
“Catonsville Eye was a prospective client.”  As we just explained, Catonsville Eye was not 
a prospective client.  Given our conclusion above that the record contains clear and 
convincing evidence that an attorney-client relationship existed between Respondent and 
Catonsville Eye, we agree with the hearing judge, for the reasons stated above, that 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.8(a). 
MARPC 19-301.9. Duties to Former Clients (1.9) 
 
MARPC 19-301.9 provides in relevant part: 
(a) An attorney who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the 
 
8 The hearing judge found that, “[h]ad Dr. Gray reviewed the [April 4 Lease] with 
his own attorney, he would have discovered the Rent Commencement Date clause had been 
eliminated.” 
 
 
49 
interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
The Comment to MARPC 19-301.9 reads, in relevant part: 
[2] . . . The underlying question is whether the attorney was so involved in 
the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a 
changing of sides in the matter in question.   
 
[3] Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they 
involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a 
substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have 
been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the 
client’s position in the subsequent matter. 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.9(a) “when 
he filed a lawsuit on behalf of MAH Mountain against his former client, Catonsville Eye, 
to enforce the terms of the April 4 [L]ease agreement without obtaining written, informed 
consent from Catonsville Eye.”  Respondent again excepts to the hearing judge’s 
conclusion because “Catonsville Eye was a prospective client.”  We reaffirm that 
Catonsville Eye was not a prospective client, and agree with the hearing judge, for the 
reasons stated below, that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.9(a). 
The hearing judge determined that Respondent “understood the confidential nature 
of his legal relationship with Catonsville Eye” based on his December 17 email, where he 
stated, “this is legal advice, it is subject to attorney-client privilege, I cannot even share 
this review with my father[.]”  Yet, Respondent, simultaneously represented MAH 
Mountain against Catonsville Eye.  Furthermore, the hearing judge determined that 
“Catonsville Eye and MAH Mountain’s interests were ‘materially adverse’ when MAH 
Mountain sued Catonsville Eye for failure to pay rent.”  The hearing judge cited to the 
 
 
50 
District Court’s unease regarding Respondent’s potential conflict of interest, whereby the 
District Court postponed trial “to allow [MAH Mountain] to obtain substitute counsel[.]”  
Lastly, “Respondent was required to obtain written, informed consent from Catonsville 
Eye before representing MAH Mountain in the litigation[.]” 
It is clear that the hearing judge observed the relevant considerations in the record 
and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to support a violation of 
MARPC 19-301.9.  We, therefore, agree that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.9(a) 
when he sued Catonsville Eye, on behalf of MAH Mountain, in a substantially related 
matter without Catonsville Eye’s written, informed consent.  See Woolery, 462 Md. at 239–
40, 198 A.3d at 853; see also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Powers, 454 Md. 79, 104, 164 
A.3d 138, 152–53 (2017). 
MARPC 19-301.16. Declining or Terminating Representation (1.16) 
MARPC 19-301.16(a) provides, in relevant part, that “an attorney shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the 
representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland 
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law[.]” 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.16(a)(1) 
“when he undertook the representation of MAH Mountain in the [D]istrict [C]ourt for the 
failure to pay rent case against Catonsville Eye” in violation of MARPC 19-301.7 and 19-
301.8.  Respondent excepts to this finding by merely stating that Petitioner failed to 
establish the violation by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 
51 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.16(a)(1).  MARPC 19-301.16 requires “[a]ttorneys 
[to] withdraw from representation of a client once their interests become ‘untenably at odds 
with [their] client[s’].’”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 392, 108 A.3d 
394, 409 (2015) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 173, 994 
A.2d 928, 943 (2010)).  As previously stated, Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.9(a) 
when he sued Catonsville Eye on behalf of MAH Mountain.  Catonsville Eye and MAH 
Mountain’s interests were materially adverse.   
In this case, Respondent’s representation, without withdrawal, of MAH Mountain, 
despite the conflict of interest in violation of MARPC 19-301.7 and MARPC 19-301.8, as 
the hearing judge concluded, constitutes a violation of MARPC 19-301.16(a)(1).  See Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Neverdon, 473 Md. 631, 686, 251 A.3d 1157, 1190 (2021).  Other 
than a conclusory sentence, Respondent offers no basis for concluding that these findings 
are clearly erroneous.  As such, the hearing judge’s determination is supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
MARPC 19-308.4. Misconduct (8.4) 
MARPC 19-308.4 provides in relevant part: 
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 
so through the acts of another; 
 
* * * 
 
 
 
52 
(c) engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; [or] 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] 
 
The hearing judge determined that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c) 
and (d).  The hearing judge determined that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(c) 
when “he assisted his father with the [April 4 Lease and] . . . [when] he knew or should 
have known [] that Dr. Gray was not aware of the change in lease terms.”  To the hearing 
judge, Respondent knew that the Rent Commencement Clause was “critical” to Drs. Gray 
and Fine, but “unilateral[ly] change[d]” the lease agreement in MAH Mountain’s favor.  
The hearing judge considered Respondent’s failure to inform Catonsville Eye about the 
lease change “self-serving.”  The hearing judge further determined that all of Respondent’s 
conduct herein also constitutes a violation of MARPC 19-308.4(d).  Respondent again 
excepts to this finding by merely stating that Petitioner failed to establish the violation by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
We have generally held that MARPC 19-308.4(c) “encompasses a broad universe 
of misbehavior.”  White, 480 Md. at 381, 280 A.3d at 758 (finding an 8.4(c) violation where 
Respondent “knowing[ly] and intentional[ly] misrepresent[ed]” information to the courts 
and bar counsel during a disciplinary investigation) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  “Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of 
a lawyer.”  Agbaje, 438 Md. at 715, 93 A.3d at 273 (finding an 8.4(c) violation where 
Respondent persistently displayed a “pattern of dishonesty and deceit toward his client[.]”) 
(citations omitted).  A MARPC 19-308.4(c) violation “turns on whether [Respondent’s] 
 
 
53 
conceded misrepresentations were made intentionally.  Resolution of that question is 
largely a matter of credibility.  We defer to the hearing judge’s determination in that 
respect, particularly when it comes to assessing an attorney’s state of mind as to an intent 
to deceive.”  Framm, 449 Md. at 663, 144 A.3d at 852 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Notably, the hearing judge never concluded that Respondent’s actions 
were intentional.  The record did not reveal intentional dishonesty or a “pattern of 
dishonesty and deceit” on behalf of Respondent towards Catonsville Eye.  Agbaje, 438 Md. 
at 715, 93 A.3d at 273 (citations omitted); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 
482, 501, 270 A.3d 917, 928 (2022) (finding an 8.4(c) violation where an attorney made 
knowingly and intentionally false statements to bar counsel).  In fact, the hearing judge 
determined that “Petitioner did not meet their burden of proving the Respondent acted in 
an intentionally dishonest manner[.]”  Therefore, we sustain Respondent’s exception and 
do not find a violation of MARPC 19-308.4(c). 
“It is professional misconduct for an attorney to[] . . . (d) engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”  MARPC 19-308.4(d).  A lawyer generally 
violates MARPC 19-308.4(d) “‘where the lawyer’s conduct would negatively impact the 
perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.’”  Collins, 477 
Md. at 510, 270 A.3d at 934 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 645, 
180 A.3d 134, 155 (2018)).  “When an attorney proves untrustworthy . . . the 
trustworthiness of every member of the Bar is susceptible to being called into question, 
thereby diminishing the public’s confidence in the legal profession.”  Agbaje, 438 Md. at 
733, 93 A.3d at 284 (citations omitted).  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s 
 
 
54 
underlying conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  We agree.  
“Respondent, among other professional misconduct, engaged in representation that created 
a conflict of interest . . . [and] Respondent’s conduct erodes the public’s confidence in the 
legal profession and is prejudicial to the administration of justice” in violation of MARPC 
19-308.4(d).  Framm, 449 Md. at 664, 144 A.3d at 853 (citation omitted); see also 
Neverdon, 473 Md. at 703, 251 A.3d at 1200 (holding that an attorney’s failure to advise 
clients of a conflict of interest or attempt to obtain the client’s informed consent to continue 
representation constituted a violation of 8.4(d)).  “Although we [] conclude[] that 
[Respondent] did not engage in intentional dishonesty, nonetheless, [Respondent] engaged 
in a variety of misconduct that the public would not expect from a member of the legal 
profession[.]”  Neverdon, 473 Md. at 703, 251 A.3d at 1200.  This Court, therefore, 
concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated MARPC 19-
308.4(d). 
“It is professional misconduct for an attorney to[] violate or attempt to violate the 
[MARPC] . . . .”  MARPC 19-308.4(a).  As discussed above, Respondent violated MARPC 
19-301.4(a)(1) and (b), 19-301.7, 19-301.8(a), 19-301.9(a), 19-301.16(a)(1), and 19-
308.4(d).  Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent thereby violated MARPC 19-308.4(a).   
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS 
“During an attorney grievance matter, the circuit court may consider the existence 
of aggravating and mitigating factors.”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 656, 271 A.3d at 806.  We 
 
 
55 
now address the conclusions of the hearing judge regarding the existence of aggravating 
and mitigating factors. 
Aggravating Factors 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shuler, this Court articulated twelve 
aggravating factors to consider in an attorney disciplinary proceeding: 
(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern 
of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the M[A]RPC; (5) bad faith 
obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court [ ]; (6) submission 
of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the 
attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the 
misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial 
experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or 
rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including 
that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of 
repetition of the misconduct. 
 
443 Md. 494, 506–07, 117 A.3d 38, 46 (2015) (alterations in original omitted).  Petitioner 
has the burden of proving aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence.  Md. Rule 
19-727(c).   
Petitioner alleged the existence of two aggravating factors: (1) dishonest or selfish 
motive and (2) substantial experience in the practice of law.  The hearing judge found clear 
and convincing evidence to establish each of the alleged aggravating factors.  Respondent, 
as a partial owner of MAH Mountain, exhibited a selfish motive by pursuing MAH 
Mountain’s interest, “and therefore his own . . . to the detriment of his client, Catonsville 
Eye.”  The hearing judge also noted Respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of 
law since he was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2007.  These determinations are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 
56 
Mitigating Factors 
This Court “always consider[s]” mitigating factors “in deciding a disposition in an 
Attorney Grievance case.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 401, 19 
A.3d 431, 449 (2011).  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Allenbaugh, this Court 
provided a list of potential mitigating factors:  
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith 
efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) 
full and free disclosure to [Bar Counsel] or a cooperative attitude toward the 
attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) 
character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or 
chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there 
is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or 
mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused 
the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and 
the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the M[A]RPC; and (14) unlikelihood 
of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
450 Md. 250, 277–78, 148 A.3d 300, 316–17 (2016) (quoting Shuler, 443 Md. at 506–07, 
117 A.3d at 46).  Respondent has the burden of proving mitigating factors by a 
preponderance of evidence.  Md. Rule 19-727(c).   
The hearing judge found that Respondent established the following mitigating 
factors by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board 
or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (2) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; 
(3) a good reputation in the legal community; and (4) the imposition of other penalties or 
sanctions. 
 
 
57 
Respondent was “fully cooperative with the Commission throughout the 
disciplinary process.”  Prior to these proceedings, Respondent had no attorney disciplinary 
matters brought against him.  Respondent was a member of the Maryland State Bar 
Association and the Baltimore County Bar Association.  He is currently a member of the 
Howard County Bar Association, having previously served as President and currently 
serving on its Board of Directors.  And, as the hearing judge found, Respondent “has a 
reputation for hones[ty] and integrity in the legal community.”  Respondent volunteers his 
time with the Howard County Bar Association, whereby he established a “lawyer referral 
program” to “better serve” the county’s citizens.  Therefore, we likewise conclude that 
Respondent has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating factors found 
by the hearing judge. 
SANCTION 
We now consider the appropriate sanction to impose on Respondent for his 
violations of MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b) (Communication) (1.4), 19-301.7 (Conﬂict 
of Interest – General Rule) (1.7), 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific 
Rules) (1.8), 19-301.9(a) (Duties to Former Clients) (1.9), 19-301.16(a)(1) (Declining or 
Terminating Representation) (1.16), and 19-308.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct) (8.4). 
“It is well-established that the purpose of sanctions in attorney disciplinary 
proceedings is not to punish the attorney.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Keating, 471 Md. 
614, 651, 243 A.3d 520, 543 (2020) (citation omitted).  In determining an appropriate 
sanction, “[w]e are motivated by our obligation to protect members of the public from 
attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unfit for the practice of law.”  Id., 243 A.3d 
 
 
58 
at 543; Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 741, 236 A.3d 603, 629 (2020) 
(quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kaufman, 466 Md. 404, 428, 220 A.3d 316, 330 
(2019)); see also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 
713 (2005) (noting that a sanction seeks to “protect the public, to deter other lawyers from 
engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the 
integrity of the legal profession” (citation omitted)).  “[T]he appropriate sanction for [] 
violation[s] of the [MARPC] depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, 
including consideration of any mitigating factors [and aggravating factors].”  Zuckerman, 
386 Md. at 375, 872 A.2d at 713 (citations omitted).  “[W]e impose a sanction that is 
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they 
were committed.”  Id., 872 A.2d at 713 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
Petitioner recommends indefinite suspension with the right to petition for 
reinstatement in six months.  Petitioner asserts this sanction is consistent with prior cases 
involving misconduct that “did not involve any intentional dishonesty or . . . selfish 
motive,” including Attorney Grievance Commission v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 107 A.3d 
1159 (2015), and Keating, 471 Md. 614, 243 A.3d 520.  On the other hand, Respondent 
asks that, should this Court find a violation, we impose, at most, a reprimand.  Respondent 
argues that Olszewski and Keating “bear no resemblance to the facts in this case before this 
Court.” 
In Olszewski, the attorney violated rules relating to competence, diligence, 
communication, conflict of interest, bar admission and disciplinary matters, declining or 
terminating representation, fees, safekeeping property, and misconduct arising out of two 
 
 
59 
separate client complaints.  Olszewski, 441 Md. at 266–70, 107 A.3d at 1169–71.  This 
Court indefinitely suspended the attorney with the right to apply for reinstatement after six 
months due to the attorney’s severe “neglect and inattention” to his clients.  Id. at 274–75, 
107 A.3d at 1174.   
In Keating, we indefinitely suspended, with the right to apply for reinstalment after 
six months, an attorney who violated MARPC 19-303.3(a)(1), 19-308.4(a), (b), (c), and 
(d).  471 Md. at 648–50, 653, 243 A.3d at 541–42, 544.  The attorney submitted a client’s 
will for probate despite knowing that the will was not signed by at least two present 
witnesses as required by law.  Id. at 636, 243 A.3d at 534.  The attorney falsely represented 
that she witnessed the will when she had signed the will a month after the client’s death.  
Id. at 628, 636–37, 243 A.3d at 529, 534.  We concluded that the attorney made knowingly 
false statements to the court by submitting the will without the legally required number of 
witnesses, and that the attorney’s act of perjury and false submission constituted 
misconduct.  Id. at 650, 243 A.3d at 542.  Despite this, we did not “impose disbarment 
because of Respondent’s genuine attempt to further the client’s wishes, absence of prior 
discipline[,] and high moral character.”  Id. at 653, 243 A.3d at 544.  Rather, we determined 
that an indefinite suspension with a six-month reapplication period appropriately 
“balance[d] the mitigating factors present [] with the serious violation of dishonesty before 
a tribunal.”  Id. at 654, 243 A.3d at 545.   
We agree with Respondent that Olszewski and Keating are distinguishable based on 
the severity of the misconduct reflected in those cases.  Unlike Keating, Respondent was 
not dishonest towards the tribunal.  Id. at 649, 243 A.3d at 41–42.  And, unlike Olszewski, 
 
 
60 
Respondent did not neglect Catonsville Eye or improperly withhold their funds.  Olszewski, 
441 Md. at 274–75, 107 A.3d at 1174.  Respondent’s violations are not as severe.   
On the other hand, this Court has held that a ninety-day suspension is appropriate 
where Respondent does not “act with dishonest, deceitful, or fraudulent intent, lacks a prior 
disciplinary record, . . . and was cooperative with Bar Counsel throughout the 
investigation[.]”  Ugwuonye, 405 Md. at 367, 373, 375, 952 A.2d at 235, 240 (finding a 
violation of MARPC 19-301.1, 19-301.3, 19-301.4, 19-301.5, 19-301.15, 19-301.16(d), 
and 19-308.4(d) where the attorney “[took] a meritless case, charg[ed] a fee that grossly 
outweighed the work accomplished, and [engaged in] the overall lack of communication” 
with the client).  We also consider whether “actual harm” was done to the client.  See Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 721, 4 A.3d 957, 972 (2010) (noting that, unlike 
Mr. Edib, the attorney in Ugwuonye caused actual harm when the attorney “took retainer 
fees from clients, but never pursued their cases[]”); see also Singh, 464 Md. at 681, 212 
A.3d at 909 (implementing a sixty-day suspension for an attorney who violated MARPC 
19-301.3, 19-301.4, 19-301.7, 19-301.8, 19-301.15, 19-404, 19-308.1, and 19-308.4, but 
did not cause client significant harm).  This Court has also issued a sixty-day suspension 
for an attorney who, among other violations, “inadequately communicated with clients, had 
a conflict of interest in obtaining a release of liability from his client, and committed 
misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Butler, 426 Md. 522, 527, 44 A.3d 1022, 1025 (2012). 
It follows that a sixty-day suspension stayed, followed by a six-month probationary 
period with conditions, is the appropriate discipline here.  With respect to aggravating 
 
 
61 
factors, the hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence of two: (1) selfish motive 
and (2) substantial experience in the practice of law.  The record does not support the notion 
that Respondent harbored intentionally dishonest or deceitful motives in his representation 
of Catonsville Eye.  In fact, the hearing judge determined that “Petitioner did not meet their 
burden of proving the Respondent acted in an intentionally dishonest manner[.]”  The 
hearing judge even determined that Respondent “was sincere in his testimony” and “did 
not believe there was a conflict of interest.” 
The hearing judge found at least four mitigating factors, including: (1) full and free 
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (2) the absence 
of a prior disciplinary record; (3) a good reputation in the legal community; and (4) the 
imposition of other penalties or sanctions.  Despite the violations enumerated above, the 
mitigating factors weigh in Respondent’s favor.   
We reiterate that “our primary goal is to protect the public and deter future 
misconduct.”  Singh, 464 Md. at 681, 212 A.3d at 910 (citation omitted).  We conclude that 
a sixty-day suspension stayed, in favor of six months’ probation with conditions, is 
sufficient to deter Respondent from violating the MARPC.  See id., 212 A.3d at 910 
(citation omitted).  This “message can be sent without sidelining for an indefinite period 
an attorney who has no other record of discipline . . . .”  Id. at 681–82, 212 A.3d at 910.  
Therefore, in light of all the circumstances present in this case, including the aggravating 
and mitigating factors, we conclude that a sixty-day suspension stayed in favor of a six-
month probationary period with conditions is the appropriate sanction.  The conditions of 
 
 
62 
Respondent’s probation require him to: (1) adhere to the MARPC and (2) complete a CLE 
on conflicts of interest or general ethics. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, we impose on Respondent a sixty-day suspension, 
but with the execution of that disposition stayed for a six-month period of probation, 
subject to the conditions that Respondent adhere to the MARPC and complete a CLE on 
conflicts of interest or general ethics for his violations of MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b), 
19-301.7, 19-301.8(a), 19-301.9(a), 19-301.16(a)(1), and 19-308.4(a) and (d). 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR 
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
ALI 
MANSOURI KALARESTAGHI. 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. C-03-CV-21-004062 
Argued: November 3, 2022 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND* 
 
 
 
AG No. 48 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
ALI MANSOURI KALARESTAGHI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
        
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Gould, 
J., which Fader, C.J. and Booth, J. join 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed:  March 14, 2023 
 
* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 
amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Maryland.  
The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
 
 
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the Majority’s disposition of 
this case.   
This disciplinary action springs from a commercial landlord-tenant dispute among 
sophisticated businessmen in which the fundamental personal and business loyalties of all 
players were known to all.  That includes the personal and business loyalties of 
Respondent.  On one side of the business transaction we have an entity called MAH 
Mountain, LLC (“MAH”), which owned a commercial retail property in Catonsville, 
Maryland on Baltimore National Pike (the “MAH Property”).  MAH was owned by 
Respondent, Respondent’s father Mehdi Kalarestaghi (“Mehdi”), and Respondent’s 
brother.  Respondent was also MAH’s attorney. 
On the other side of the business transaction was Catonsville Eye Associates, LLC 
(“Catonsville Eye”).  Catonsville Eye was owned by Dr. Erick Gray and Dr. Norman Fine.  
Catonsville Eye was in the optometry business with multiple locations, one of which was 
in a commercial retail space in Catonsville on Rolling Road.  Dr. Gray was primarily in 
charge of the administrative aspects of the business, with substantial experience signing 
leases and opening stores.   
The business transaction at the core of this matter was a lease agreement made in 
April 2017, pursuant to which Catonsville Eye leased space at the MAH Property.  In 
December 2016, with Catonsville Eye’s lease at the Rolling Road location set to expire 
sometime within the next year, Dr. Gray began looking at possibilities for relocating the 
store, and, to that end, identified the MAH Property as a potential new location.  In 
connection with that possibility, Dr. Gray communicated in person and in emails with both 
 
2 
 
Mehdi and Respondent.  Those discussions began in December 2016 and continued 
sporadically through the beginning of April 2017, culminating in a fully executed lease 
agreement in April 2017.   
Before the new space at the MAH Property was ready for occupancy, Dr. Gray 
received from MAH a bill for rent due for the months of May through August 2017.  The 
parties’ subsequent disagreement over that invoice prompted Respondent, on MAH’s 
behalf, to file a failure to pay rent action in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore 
County, which, in turn, prompted Catonsville Eye to sue MAH, Mehdi, and Respondent in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  Dr. Gray also filed a complaint with the Attorney 
Grievance Commission against Respondent. 
The charges against Respondent stem from his involvement in MAH’s efforts to 
secure Catonsville Eye as a new tenant.  At Dr. Gray’s request, Respondent reviewed and 
gave his opinion on the termination date of the Rolling Road lease.  Respondent also 
offered that if Catonsville Eye were to enter into a lease with MAH, he would provide legal 
services, at MAH’s expense, to help negotiate an early termination of the Rolling Road 
lease to mitigate Catonsville Eye’s liability for paying rent simultaneously at two locations.   
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent had an attorney-client relationship with 
Catonsville Eye in connection with reviewing the Rolling Road lease to render an opinion 
on its termination date and to negotiate an early termination of that lease, and the Majority 
overrules Respondent’s exceptions as to those findings.  The hearing judge also concluded 
that by virtue of his undisclosed ownership interest in MAH and his simultaneous 
representation of MAH in lease negotiations with Catonsville Eye, Respondent had a 
 
3 
 
conflict of interest that he failed to adequately disclose and for which he failed to secure 
waivers.  On that basis, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Maryland 
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a)(1) and (b) (Rule 19-301.4(a)(1) and (b)), 
1.7 (Rule 19-301.7), 1.8(a) (Rule 19-301.8(a)), 1.9 (a) (Rule 19-301.9(a)), 1.16(a) (Rule 
19-301.16(a)), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Rule 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d)).1  The Majority 
upholds each of these conclusions except with respect to the Rule 8.4(c) violation. 
 
I write separately to explain where I agree and where I part ways with the Majority’s 
analysis.  The fault-line between our respective views is in how we define the contours and 
scope of the attorney-client relationship between Respondent and Catonsville Eye.  The 
Majority has deferred to the hearing judge’s conclusion that the relationship included both 
the review of the Rolling Road lease and an undertaking to secure an early termination of 
that lease.  In my view, however, the attorney-client relationship existed only for the 
former: to review the Rolling Road lease and opine on its termination date.  That 
representation was limited in time and scope and was completed no later than January 2017.   
That being the case, I concur in part and dissent in part.  I concur with the Majority 
that violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.7 were established by clear and convincing evidence, but 
not for the reasons found by the hearing judge.  I also concur that sufficient evidence 
 
1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules, 
were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, 
Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules.  For ease of reference and comparison with our prior 
opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering 
of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22) and as identified in the paragraph to 
which this footnote is appended.  
 
4 
 
establishes violations of Rules 1.9, 1.16, and 8.4(a) and (d).  I explain my rationale in the 
concurrence section below.2 
But I disagree with the Majority that Respondent violated Rule 1.8(a).  The hearing 
judge found a violation of this rule based on the lease executed on April 4, 2017.  However, 
by that time, Catonsville Eye was a former client, not a current one.  Therefore, Respondent 
did not enter into a business transaction with a current client as proscribed by this Rule.  I 
would sustain Respondent’s exception to this conclusion. 
CONCURRENCE 
Rules 1.4 and 1.7  
The evidence before the hearing judge supported findings that Respondent’s 
simultaneous representation of both parties for a discrete period at the inception of the 
business discussion created a conflict of interest that was not adequately disclosed and 
waived.  Specifically, in December 2016, Respondent offered to review the Rolling Road 
lease for Catonsville Eye and provide an opinion on its termination date.  Drs. Gray and 
Fine furnished the lease to Respondent for that purpose, and Respondent undertook that 
review and opined that the lease terminated on August 31, 2017.  An attorney-client 
relationship existed for that discrete and limited representation.  But that representation 
ended no later than January 2017. 
During that limited and brief representation, Respondent was the attorney for MAH 
in lease negotiations with Catonsville Eye.  Respondent also owned a membership interest 
 
 
2 I concur with the Majority’s sanction as well. 
 
5 
 
in MAH, which the hearing judge found was not disclosed to Drs. Gray and Fine.  
Respondent did not perceive a conflict of interest at that time because the business interests 
of his two clients—MAH and Catonsville Eye—appeared to be aligned.  That is, both 
MAH and Catonsville Eye were interested in the latter becoming a tenant of the former. 
Respondent’s analysis of the Rolling Road lease termination provisions was undertaken in 
furtherance of both parties’ mutual objective. 
MAH and Respondent knew that Drs. Gray and Fine wanted to avoid 
simultaneously paying rent for two spaces.  In December 2016, Dr. Gray forecasted that if 
they signed a lease in January for MAH’s space, the new space would be ready for 
occupancy sometime in May or June 2017.  If the Rolling Road lease ran through December 
31, 2017, Catonsville Eye would have been facing the prospect of paying double rent for 
six months.  A lease termination date of August 31 would save four months of double rent, 
making a lease with MAH more financially palatable.  In December 2016, therefore, it was 
in both sides’ interests for the lease to terminate on August 31 instead of December 31. 
Usually, determining a lease termination date is not a tricky task.  One simply looks 
at the lease to see when, under its plain terms, the tenancy ends.  But Respondent identified 
what he perceived to be an ambiguity based on the lease termination and rent payment 
provisions, from which an argument could be made that the lease terminated on August 31.  
The alignment of business interests notwithstanding, when Respondent agreed to that 
limited representation, he had a duty to provide objective and unbiased advice to 
Catonsville Eye.  When Respondent advised Drs. Gray and Fine—with a measure of 
certainty one usually does not see when a sophisticated attorney such as Respondent 
 
6 
 
advises clients on their rights under ambiguous contract provisions—that the lease 
terminated on August 31, Respondent was providing the answer that best served his 
personal interests as well as those of his clients.  He was giving the answer everyone at that 
time wanted to hear. 
Respondent had a duty to explain to Catonsville Eye that MAH had an interest in 
the outcome of his analysis of the Rolling Road lease, that he had personal, financial, and 
fiduciary ties to MAH, and that therefore, the objectivity of his review and analysis of the 
Rolling Road lease could, albeit unintentionally, be compromised.  Upon such advice, 
Catonsville Eye could have made an informed decision on whether to sign a written conflict 
of interest waiver as required by Rule 1.7 and thereby engage Respondent for the lease 
review notwithstanding the potential conflict of interest.  On this limited basis, I concur 
that Respondent violated Rules 1.4 and 1.7, and consequently, Rule 8.4(a) and (d) as well. 
Rules 1.9 and 1.16 
In December 2017, when Respondent filed the failure to pay rent action against 
Catonsville Eye, Catonsville Eye was Respondent’s former client.  Rule 1.9 governs an 
attorney’s ability to represent one client in a matter adverse to a former client: 
 An attorney who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing  
 
Thus, the issue here is whether the failure to pay rent action that Respondent filed 
on behalf of MAH was “substantially related” to Respondent’s prior engagement to review 
the Rolling Road lease and opine on its termination date.  Comment [3] to Rule 1.9 explains 
 
7 
 
that “[m]atters are ‘substantially related’ for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would 
materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.”  There is no evidence in 
the record, and the hearing judge cites none, that Respondent acquired any confidential 
information in his limited representation of Catonsville Eye, let alone confidential 
information that he either used or could have used to MAH’s advantage in the subsequent 
litigation.  However, because Respondent’s review of the Rolling Road lease was, in fact, 
intertwined with (and undertaken in furtherance of) MAH’s lease negotiations with 
Catonsville Eye, one could plausibly conclude that the two matters involve the same 
transaction.  Although I do not believe this to be the case, I cannot say that the record 
evidence is insufficient to justify such a conclusion.  I therefore reluctantly concur with the 
Majority as to its disposition of the charges under Rules 1.9 and 1.16.3 
DISSENT 
 
I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence 
established that Respondent was engaged by Catonsville Eye to negotiate or seek by other 
means an early termination of the Rolling Road lease.  Therefore, to the extent the Majority 
 
 
3 Under the circumstances of this case, Respondent’s violation of Rule 1.9 also 
constitutes a violation of 1.16, which prohibits an attorney from undertaking a 
representation in violation of another Rule.  Also, these violations support the violations 
found under Rule 8.4(a) and (d). 
   
 
8 
 
relies on the existence of an attorney-client relationship in that respect to establish 
violations of Rules 1.4, 1.7, 1.84 and 8.4(a) and (d), I dissent.   
Petitioner had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between Respondent and Catonsville Eye.  As stated 
before, the hearing judge found such a relationship in two respects: (1) review of the 
Rolling Road lease and rendering a legal opinion on its termination date; and 
(2) representation of Catonsville Eye in negotiations with the Rolling Road landlord to 
achieve an early termination of that lease.  The hearing judge also concluded that the 
attorney-client relationship lasted from December 2016 to April 2017.  However, the 
evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish an attorney-client relationship with 
respect to securing an early termination of the Rolling Road lease. 
“An attorney-client relationship is formed when . . .  a person manifests to a lawyer 
the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person . . . and . . . the 
lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide [legal] services.”  Att'y 
Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 727 (2014).   Petitioner failed to 
adduce any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that Catonsville Eye 
manifested an intention for Respondent to proceed with efforts to secure an early lease 
termination.  Nor is there any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that 
 
4 The hearing judge found a violation of this rule based on the lease executed on 
April 4, 2017.  However, by that time, Catonsville Eye was a former client, not a current 
one.  Therefore, Respondent did not enter into a business transaction with a client.  I would 
sustain Respondent’s exception to this conclusion. 
 
9 
 
Respondent said or did anything to cause Catonsville Eye to believe that he would proceed 
with such efforts in the absence of a signed lease with MAH.   
In elaborating on the clear and convincing evidence standard, we have previously 
stated that 
the term “clear and convincing” evidence means that the witnesses to a fact 
must be found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have testified 
are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due 
order, so as to enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear conviction, 
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Whether evidence 
is clear and convincing requires weighing, comparing, testing, and judging 
its worth when considered in connection with all the facts and circumstances 
in evidence. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 79 (2000) (quoting 
Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320 (1980)).  In my view, the Majority relaxes the clear and 
convincing standard by sustaining the hearing judge’s findings so long as there was some 
testimony from Dr. Gray that could be interpreted as supporting the findings.  But to satisfy 
this exacting standard, the testimony must be capable of being found credible “when 
considered in connection with all the facts and circumstances in evidence.”  That is 
particularly so in this context, where the underlying dispute concerned an arms-length 
business transaction in which sophisticated businessmen knew how to protect their interests 
through contracts.   In other words, self-serving or vague testimony that cuts against basic 
common business sense and other undisputed evidence does not satisfy the clear and 
convincing standard.   
 
A prime example of the Majority’s relaxed application of the clear and convincing 
standard is its treatment of Exception Twelve, in which Respondent excepts to the finding 
 
10 
 
that Dr. Gray was not prepared to sign the April 4 lease when he went to Mehdi’s office.  
Dr. Gray, however, contradicted himself on this point.  In Dr. Gray’s complaint to the 
Commission that instigated these proceedings, he alleged that he “intended on April 4 to 
go and sign a lease and present a check.”  At the hearing, however, he testified that he did 
not intend to sign a lease when he went to MAH’s office on April 4, but only signed the 
lease and tendered the security deposit check out of deference to his friendship with Mehdi.  
The hearing judge recognized the contradiction in Dr. Gray’s account and expressly 
questioned his credibility on this point.  In doing so, the hearing judge observed that Dr. 
Gray “is an experienced businessman and has signed numerous leases.”  Yet, 
notwithstanding the doubts about his credibility, the hearing judge made findings aligned 
with Dr. Gray’s testimony regarding the circumstances behind the April 4 lease signing.  
And even though there was no other evidentiary support for those findings, the Majority 
sustains them out of a misplaced deference to the hearing judge.  In my view, if a factfinder 
determines that certain testimony lacks credibility, then such testimony cannot support a 
factual finding under the clear and convincing standard.  Mooney, 359 Md. at 79 
(explaining that clear and convincing means “a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the 
truth of the precise facts in issue”) (quoting Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302).   
An exacting examination of the evidence is required when the clear and convincing 
standard is applied.  That means that the communications among the parties must be 
evaluated in the specific business context in which they occurred.   The business context 
in December 2016 when Dr. Gray first contacted MAH, was very different than the context 
in April 2017, when he signed the lease with MAH.  In December 2016, the business 
 
11 
 
decision facing Catonsville Eye was whether to renew its existing lease on Rolling Road 
or relocate to new space.  Moving the location of a business—particularly an optometry 
practice that requires the removal and/or installation of inventory, medical supplies, and 
equipment—entails numerous moving parts.  Sequencing the events necessary to 
accomplish a move that minimizes business interruption and the risk of simultaneously 
paying rent to two landlords is challenging to any business, and that challenge was foremost 
in the minds of Drs. Gray and Fine.  As such, as the parties’ December 2016 emails show, 
the doctors’ business objective was to align, as closely as possible, the termination of their 
Rolling Road lease with the commencement of their obligation to pay rent at the MAH 
location.  And if they were going to make the move, Drs. Gray and Fine wanted MAH to 
absorb the risk if those dates could not be aligned. 
 
The termination date of the Rolling Road lease was only one variable in their risk 
equation.  The other variables included the timing of (i) signing a lease for MAH’s space, 
(ii) the delivery of that space to Catonsville Eye for a build-out, and (iii) the completion of 
the build-out and opening of the new location.  The December 2016 emails reflect that the 
parties, including specifically Dr. Gray, were negotiating under the premise that the MAH 
lease would be signed in mid-January, that the build-out would take approximately four 
months, that the new space would be ready to open in May or June, and that the Rolling 
Road lease would terminate at the end of August.5  Thus, at that point in time, the parties 
 
 
5  Regarding the lengthy build-out process, Dr. Gray wrote in a December 6, 2016 
as follows: 
 
 
 
12 
 
contemplated the possibility of several months during which Catonsville Eye may have 
been subject to paying rent for both locations.  It was also in that context that Respondent 
offered his services to negotiate an early termination of the Rolling Road lease and that 
MAH offered to pay up to $5,000 in fees for such services.   All of these discussions took 
place in December 2016, and every statement made by Respondent or Dr. Gray about 
securing an early lease termination was expressly linked and conditioned upon Catonsville 
Eye executing a new lease with MAH.   
Respondent explained in December 2016 that his strategy to negotiate an early 
termination of the Rolling Road lease would be to “disturb and disrupt” the landlord.  When 
asked by his client what that meant, Respondent explained that it meant “put[ting] the 
landlord in a position that the issues raised by [Catonsville Eye] (through their attorney) 
 
When do you truly expect to get your [use and occupancy permit.]  My lead 
time on cabinetry is 4 months[.]  Assuming I had my attorney review the 
lease.  And we both acted quickly.  Realistically a final lease would be signed 
mid January.  Architecturally plans will take some time even if I absorbed 
the risk of expense based on good faith . . . .  Construction for my space 
realistically begins February 1 and takes approximately 40 days.  Except for 
the cabinets !!  With blueprints in hand cabinet fabrication and installation 
won’t be until May.  I am as of last week remodeling [G]ambrills.  The 
approved cab design was signed off for December 1.  Installation is 
anticipated in April.  Optometric frame displays are unique and with only a 
few suppliers I was told by the owner my job represents order number 180.  
I too do believe your location represents a much better location.  I appreciate 
the quality of appearance and the small business retail compassion.  
Obviously and fairly I’m looking for rent commencement within 15 days of 
opening, understanding I’m giving by paying architect fees to expedite my 
opening.  I will make a business decision by Monday at the latest assuming 
your agreeable to the timing.  Thanks Erick 
 
  
 
13 
 
become so taxing to respond to that [it] is simply easier and wiser financially and from a 
business standpoint to simply allow [Catonsville Eye] to leave.”  Drs. Gray and Fine had 
made no final decision to relocate to MAH’s property at any time in December, January, 
February, or March. There is no evidence that Dr. Gray expected, let alone reasonably 
expected, Respondent to engage in such tactics before a lease with MAH was finalized and 
signed.  The very notion that Dr. Gray—a sophisticated businessman—would burn his 
bridges with his current landlord before making the business decision to relocate is 
irrational.   
 
In fact, on February 8, 2017, Dr. Gray informed Respondent that he and Dr. Fine 
decided not to relocate: 
Dr. Fine has voted not to relocate to your site for the valid reason of age.  
Norman believes he will not benefit quick enough to justify the build out 
expense.  I can’t argue his perspective.  Therefore I can only thank you both 
for your professionalism and kind manner in our negotiations.  If you have 
any other suggestions we are willing recipients.  Thank you both.  Erick. 
 
Based on this email, there can be no question that, as of that snapshot in time, 
Catonsville Eye did not expect any further opinions from Respondent as to the Rolling 
Road lease termination date or for Respondent to take any steps to secure an early 
termination of that lease.  And even though Dr. Gray subsequently resumed discussions 
with Mehdi, there is no evidence that, at any time after February 8, Dr. Gray had any 
expectation that Respondent would provide any legal services, let alone that Respondent 
 
14 
 
would attempt to secure an early termination of the Rolling Road lease, in the absence of a 
finalized deal with MAH.6   
At most, after Dr. Gray’s talks with Mehdi resumed, Dr. Gray had an expectation 
that if Catonsville Eye signed a lease with MAH, and if the timing of the opening of the 
new location was such that an early termination of the Rolling Road lease would be 
appropriate or necessary, Respondent stood ready and willing to represent Catonsville Eye 
in that effort, at MAH’s expense (capped at $5,000).  In other words, there was never 
anything more than the potential for an attorney-client relationship between Respondent 
and Catonsville Eye with respect to securing an early termination of the Rolling Road lease. 
The March 24, 2017 proposed lease forwarded by Respondent does not change this 
analysis.  The clause discussing the $5,000 of legal services to negotiate an early 
termination of the Rolling Road lease was merely an offer to provide legal services in the 
 
6 Relying on select excerpts of Dr. Gray’s testimony, the Majority contends that 
after February 8, “it is clear that Catonsville Eye did expect and reasonably believe 
Respondent to take further action to secure an early termination of that lease.”  Slip op. at 
42.  In my view, although one could possibly interpret his testimony to suggest that he 
expected Respondent to negotiate the termination of the Rolling Road lease, neither the 
questions nor his responses were sufficiently precise to satisfy the clear and convincing 
standard that he had such an expectation in the absence of a lease with MAH.  The questions 
and his responses related to email exchanges that clearly linked Respondent’s agreement 
to negotiate an early termination of the Rolling Road lease to execution of a lease between 
MAH and Catonsville Eye.  Thus, Dr. Gray’s testimony should be viewed in that light.  As 
I read the entirety of his testimony, Dr. Gray merely conveyed that from his perspective as 
a businessman, if Catonsville Eye was going to sign a lease with MAH, Respondent would 
be his lawyer to negotiate an early termination of the Rolling Road lease.   At no time did 
Dr. Gray testify that he wanted or expected Respondent to begin such efforts in the absence 
of a lease with MAH, and for the reasons explained above, any such expectation would 
have been unreasonable in any event.   
 
 
15 
 
context of a new lease with MAH.  There is no evidence that Catonsville Eye ever accepted 
that offer or authorized Respondent to proceed with such negotiations in the absence of a 
signed lease.  Nor is there any evidence that Respondent ever indicated his consent to 
undertaking such a representation in the absence of a lease with MAH.  And, although the 
hearing judge made a factual finding that Dr. Gray signed the March 24 version of the 
lease, that finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.7   
As noted above, business discussions must be understood in their proper context.  
By the time Dr. Gray signed the lease with MAH on April 4, the business context had 
changed for Catonsville Eye.  In December 2016, Dr. Gray’s business concern was that the 
new space would be ready up to five months before his existing lease terminated, leaving 
Catonsville Eye exposed to double rent during that time.  So Dr. Gray welcomed 
Respondent’s legal opinion that the existing lease terminated on August 31 (as opposed to 
December 31), and if Respondent could secure a termination prior to August 31 by 
“disturbing and disrupting” the landlord, even better.    
 
7 The hearing judge erroneously found that “[b]oth Petitioner and Respondent agree 
that on April 4 Dr. Gray signed the March 24 lease agreement which contained the Rent 
Commencement Date clause and commenced on April 1, 2017.”  The record evidence, 
however, includes no version of the March 24 lease that contains the parties’ signatures.  
Further, on cross-examination, Dr. Gray acknowledged that he did not sign the March 24 
lease, and Respondent testified that he did not know if the parties signed that version.  And 
finally, Dr. Gray could not recall any contact with Respondent between March 24 and April 
4.  Accordingly, there is no clear and convincing evidence that the March 24 version of the 
lease was ever signed by Dr. Gray.  Nor is there any evidence that, after receiving the 
March 24 lease, Dr. Gray manifested an intent for Respondent to proceed with the task of 
securing an early termination of the Rolling Road lease.  See Agbaje, 438 Md. at 727.   
 
16 
 
But by April, 2017, the timing considerations had changed.  Dr. Gray testified that 
the build-out of the new space was anticipated to take six to 12 weeks, and the fabrication 
of the cabinetry could take three to four months.  When Dr. Gray signed the lease in April, 
he knew he could not begin the build-out until MAH obtained the use and occupancy 
permit, which MAH did not then have, and would not have until June 5.  The hearing judge 
found that Dr. Gray started the build-out after June 5, which meant that Dr. Gray 
understood that the new space would not be ready by August 31.  Thus, when he signed 
the lease with MAH, there would have been no business purpose in terminating the Rolling 
Road lease prior to August 31.  Indeed, if Dr. Gray genuinely trusted Respondent’s legal 
opinion that the lease ended on August 31, he would have been more concerned about 
extending the lease, not prematurely terminating it.  Viewed in that light, it is not surprising 
that the evidentiary record lacks any evidence of any communication, at any time, from Dr. 
Gray to Respondent inquiring about the status of Respondent’s negotiations with the 
Rolling Road landlord.8   
Because clear and convincing evidence does not establish that Respondent was 
retained by Catonsville Eye to secure an early termination of the Rolling Road lease, rule 
violations predicated on that erroneous finding were likewise not established.  Thus, to the 
 
 
8 That’s not to say that paying double rent was no longer a business concern for Dr. 
Gray.  Clearly it was, as it would be for any reasonable businessperson.  But at that point, 
the business remedy to abate that risk would not have come from an early termination of 
the Rolling Road lease, but rather from rent concessions from MAH.  That is, Catonsville 
Eye’s business interest at that time was to continue operating out of the Rolling Road 
location until the new space was ready.  There is no evidence that after April 4, 2017, 
Respondent’s services for negotiating an early termination of the Rolling Road lease were 
either needed or contemplated. 
 
17 
 
extent the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rules 1.4, 1.7, and 1.8 based 
on the existence of an attorney-client relationship in that respect, I would sustain 
Respondent’s exceptions.  
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part to the 
Majority’s opinion.  Chief Justice Fader and Justice Booth authorize me to state that they 
join in this opinion.