Title: Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund

State: south-carolina

Issuer: South Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

433 S.E.2d 846 (1993) GREENWOOD MILLS, INC., Respondent, v. SECOND INJURY FUND, Appellant. No. 23888. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard May 19, 1993. Decided July 6, 1993. Edgar W. Dickson, of Williams & Williams, Orangeburg, for appellant. William S. Davies, Jr., and Darryl D. Smalls, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, for respondent. CHANDLER, Justice: *847 The Second Injury Fund (Fund)[1] appeals Circuit Court's Order holding that the two-year statute of limitations for the filing of Worker's Compensation claims,[2] is inapplicable to claims of employers for reimbursement from the Fund. We affirm. Respondent, Greenwood Mills, Inc. (Employer),[3] employed Jackie Morris (Employee) in 1979, with knowledge of his preexisting pulmonary problems and shortness of breath. His last day of work was July 20, 1983. Six months later, in January, 1984, Employee filed for Worker's Compensation benefits, alleging an occupational disease, byssinosis, caused by the inhaling of cotton dust. On February 20, 1984, Employer filed a "Notice of Claim for Reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund." Employer settled the Worker's Compensation claim with Employee in May, 1986. In July, 1989, Employer filed a Form 54 application for reimbursement from the Fund. Fund denied the claim on the ground that it was barred by § 42-15-40, the two-year statute of limitations. The Single Commissioner and Full Commission, two Commissioners dissenting, agreed; Circuit Court reversed, finding § 42-15-40 inapplicable. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Cum. Supp.1992)[4] provides, in part: It is well established that "[i]n construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." First Baptist Church v. City of Mauldin, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 417 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1992); see also Merchant's Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund, 277 S.C. 604, 291 S.E.2d 667 (1982). Section 42-15-40, on its face, is inapplicable to claims by employers against the Second Injury Fund. The statute applies to claims for compensation, not reimbursement; it governs claims addressed to the Commission as opposed to those addressed to the Fund; it speaks to an employee's injury, not to an employer's notice of injury. Nothing in § 42-15-40 references claims against the Second Injury Fund. To the contrary, the only specific reference to claims against the Fund is set forth in § 42-9-400(f) (1976): We previously recognized that "the right of a claimant to secure reimbursement under the statute [§ 42-9-400(f) ] ... depends upon compliance with the terms and conditions imposed for recovery." Masonry Const. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 267 S.C. 277, 282, 227 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1976). Clearly, the governing statute for reimbursement of employers is § 42-9-400. Decisions and statutes from foreign jurisdictions cited by Fund are inapposite inasmuch as they involve claims by employees for additional compensation and not, as here, claims by employers for reimbursement. See generally Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 59.31(h) (Vol. 2); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Austin, 521 S.W.2d 783 (TN 1975); Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432, 267 A.2d 693 (1970). Circuit Court correctly held § 42-15-40 inapplicable. The judgment below is AFFIRMED. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] Fund was created by statute in 1972 to reimburse employers/carriers for Worker's Compensation benefits paid to employees resulting from second or subsequent injuries. Fund's purpose, in part, is to encourage employers to hire handicapped workers. See S.C.Code Ann. § 42-7-310 (1976); § 42-9-400 (1976); Masonry Const. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 267 S.C. 277, 227 S.E.2d 659 (1976). [2] S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Cum.Supp.1992). [3] Employer is a self-insured Worker's Compensation carrier. [4] This section was amended by 1990 Act No. 612, Part II § 15C, effective June 30, 1990. The amendments have no bearing on the present case.