Title: People v. Patterson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
RONALD PATTERSON, Appellee. 
 
 
Docket No. 
115102 
 
 
Filed 
Rehearing denied 
 
October 17, 2014 
January 26, 2015 
 
 
Held 
(Note: 
This 
syllabus 
constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the court but 
has been prepared by the 
Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of 
the reader.) 
 
In a case in which a 15-year-old made a station-house confession and, 
after a transfer to criminal court, was convicted by a jury of three 
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the appellate court 
should not have found the confession involuntary and ordered a new 
trial where the totality of circumstances showed that, although the 
conduct of police may not have been exemplary, they made a 
reasonable attempt to notify a concerned adult as required by statute 
and the conduct of the detective assigned as a youth officer was not 
improper—challenge to constitutionality of automatic transfer statute 
rejected. 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Ellen 
Beth Mandeltort and the Hon. Thomas P. Fecarotta, Judges, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
Cause remanded. 
 
- 2 - 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, 
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, 
Annette Collins and Douglas P. Harvath, Assistant State’s Attorneys, 
of counsel), and Hannah J. McKinney, law student, for the People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, 
Deputy Defender, and Christopher Kopacz, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, 
and Molly McPartland and Brad Kaye, law students, for appellee. 
 
Scott F. Main and Julie L. Biehl, of Chicago, for amicus curiae 
Children & Family Justice Center et al. 
 
Joshua A. Tepfer, Molly Hall and Tara Thompson, of Chicago, and 
Molly Wyler, law student, for amicus curiae Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth et al. 
 
 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, and 
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Theis dissented, with opinion. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant was 15 years old when he was charged with three counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. Pursuant to the Illinois automatic transfer statute (705 ILCS 
405/5-130 (West 2008)), his case was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, 
where defendant was tried as an adult, convicted by a jury of all three counts, and sentenced 
to a total of 36 years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant’s 
convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the circuit court of Cook 
County had erred by admitting defendant’s confession. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573. The court 
also concluded that evidence of the victim’s sexual history was admissible on remand under 
the “constitutional necessity” exception to the state rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) 
(West 2008)). 
¶ 2 
 
Before this court, the State argues that the appellate court erred by excluding defendant’s 
confession and finding that evidence of the victim’s sexual past was admissible on remand. 
Defendant filed a cross-appeal, contending that his confession was also inadmissible because 
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the pretrial suppression hearing, an 
issue not reached by the appellate court. Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of 
 
- 3 - 
 
the automatic transfer provision (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008)) and asserts that his 
sentence was excessive. We reverse the appellate court’s exclusion of defendant’s confession 
and determination that evidence of the victim’s sexual history is admissible under an 
exception to the rape shield statute, reject his ineffective assistance claim, and uphold the 
constitutionality of the automatic transfer statute. Finally, we remand the cause to the 
appellate court for its initial consideration of defendant’s excessive-sentence claim. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
Defendant Ronald Patterson was a 15-year-old ward of the State of Illinois living in a 
residential treatment facility when he committed a violent sexual assault on a 25-year-old 
staff member, E.C. While E.C. was driving defendant home from a weekend family visit, he 
forced her to pull the facility van into a deserted parking lot off the highway, where the 
assault occurred. After the assault, the victim returned to the facility with defendant. Once 
defendant was secured in his unit, the victim immediately reported the attack, and the police 
were called. 
¶ 5 
 
Defendant was charged in Cook County circuit court with three counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. His case was automatically transferred to criminal court, and he was 
tried as an adult, as required by statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008)). On defense 
counsel’s motion, a fitness examination and hearing were held. At the hearing, both parties 
stipulated to the testimony of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Nishad Nadkarni. Dr. Nadkarni 
found that defendant understood the charges against him, the court proceedings, and the role 
of court personnel. Dr. Nadkarni concluded that defendant was sane when the offenses were 
committed and did not suffer from a mental impairment limiting his ability to appreciate the 
criminality of his actions or to understand his Miranda rights. Defendant was able to define 
each of those rights accurately and was able to assist his trial counsel and behave 
appropriately in court. The trial court subsequently found defendant fit to stand trial without 
medication. 
¶ 6 
 
Defendant next filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to the police, arguing 
that the police youth officer did not contact defendant’s legal guardian, the Illinois 
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), before he was interviewed and did not 
“affirmatively” protect his rights. The motion also claimed his statement was involuntary 
because he was a special education student with limited reading skills and comprehension 
who was not given his Miranda rights before questioning. The motion did not allege, and 
defense counsel expressly denied, “any type of coercion or duress” by the police. 
¶ 7 
 
At the suppression hearing, several witnesses testified, including the residential treatment 
facility director, Stephen Kehoe. Kehoe stated that he spoke to two or three police officers 
the night defendant was taken into custody at the facility at approximately 8:30 p.m. on 
Sunday, December 14, 2008. Kehoe could not remember whether any of the officers asked 
him for permission to speak to defendant, and he denied possessing sufficient authority to 
grant permission, asserting that DCFS alone retained that authority. Kehoe did recall, 
however, officers obtaining the name and phone number of defendant’s DCFS caseworker 
the night defendant was taken into custody. 
¶ 8 
 
Detective Joe Kaminski also testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he was 
the youth officer assigned to defendant’s case and knew defendant was a resident of the 
 
- 4 - 
 
treatment facility. After arriving at the police station on the night defendant was taken into 
custody, Detective Kaminski briefly spoke to E.C. before talking to defendant. Kaminski 
inquired about defendant’s grade in school but did not inquire about his participation in 
special education classes. Detective Kaminski stated he called both Kehoe and defendant’s 
caseworker shortly before 10 p.m. to notify them that defendant was at the Schaumburg 
police station and was going to be questioned about the assault. When they could not be 
reached, Kaminski left voicemail messages for them. Defendant’s caseworker did not return 
his call for two days. Nonetheless, Kaminski confirmed with another officer prior to the start 
of questioning that Kehoe had been notified that defendant had been taken to the police 
station and that Kehoe had given the police permission to speak to defendant. Detective 
Kaminski testified at trial that after defendant was questioned he again called Kehoe, who 
confirmed that the police had permission to speak with defendant as well as to search the 
facility’s van for evidence. 
¶ 9 
 
Kaminski described the role of a youth officer as advising defendant of his rights and 
ensuring his understanding, as well as answering defendant’s questions. Before the police 
interview, Detective Kaminski explained to defendant why he was at the station and read his 
Miranda rights to him from a preprinted form at about 10 p.m., asking defendant to explain 
each right in his own words. Defendant stated that he understood his rights and accurately 
described each of them. The officer had defendant read the form waiving his rights aloud, 
initial each sentence, and sign the form. The record does not indicate that defendant either 
asked to speak to another adult or made any other request prior to the start of questioning. 
¶ 10 
 
A second detective, John Atamian, then interviewed defendant for about 45 minutes 
about the alleged assault. Although Detective Kaminski remained in the room during 
questioning, he did not participate. After the interview was over and defendant’s statement 
was typed, it was read to defendant, who did not make any corrections. Defendant then read 
the statement aloud and signed it at 11:15 p.m. 
¶ 11 
 
Defendant’s account of the events differed significantly. According to him, after he had 
been at the Schaumburg Police Station for 30 to 45 minutes, the youth officer asked him if he 
needed anything and questioning began shortly thereafter. He claimed he did not receive any 
Miranda warnings until the interview was over and he had signed a typewritten statement. 
He also asserted he did not read the statement before signing it. During the suppression 
hearing, defendant did not claim that he had been threatened, mistreated, or coerced by the 
police, that he failed to understand the interrogation process, that he had asked to speak to 
another adult, or that he was a special education student with trouble reading and writing. 
¶ 12 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statement, finding both that the 
youth officer had fulfilled his duty and that it was reasonable for the police to notify the 
residential facility director of defendant’s arrest as he was a state ward and the facility “has 
been run under the supervision of [DCFS]. So it would be reasonable to assume that the 
director has some authority to act on behalf of DCFS. Particularly over people that are 
residents in his residence hall that he directs.” The judge also provided general remarks 
addressing his observations during the hearing, noting that it was “curious” that Kehoe’s 
counsel attempted, but was not permitted, to sit in the witness box with him and describing 
Kehoe’s inability to recall whether he gave the police permission to interview defendant as 
 
- 5 - 
 
“interesting.” In addition, the judge noted that Kehoe never denied giving his permission 
despite admitting that he had talked to three different officers that night. 
¶ 13 
 
The trial court expressly found Detective Kaminski’s testimony to be “very credible” and 
emphasized that he had not participated in defendant’s questioning, while rejecting as 
“ludicrous” defendant’s claim that he had not been read his Miranda rights until after he 
signed the written statement. The court concluded that defendant’s rights had been properly 
protected during questioning and that the police were not required to suspend their 
investigation until defendant’s caseworker was notified “because then they would be 
criticized for sitting on him for days.” In denying the suppression motion, the court found 
that defendant understood his rights when he signed the waiver form, and that, under “the 
totality of the circumstances,” his confession was voluntary. 
¶ 14 
 
The case proceeded to trial. The victim testified that defendant grabbed her arm and 
forced her to take the next exit off the highway as she was driving him back to the facility 
after his weekend family visit. At the time of the assault, defendant was 5 feet 10 inches and 
weighed between 250 and 300 pounds, while the victim was 5 feet 2 inches and weighed 115 
pounds. After taking the exit, defendant directed her to park in an empty lot in an industrial 
area and give him the keys to the van. She managed to retain the keys and reached inside her 
purse for her cell phone to call the facility for help, but defendant knocked the phone from 
her hand. Throughout the assault, defendant told the victim not to make him hurt her, and she 
testified that she feared for her life. She initially attempted to escape by opening the driver’s 
side door and stepping out of the van, but defendant grabbed her coat and followed her out of 
the vehicle. While returning the victim to the van, defendant pinned her against its sliding 
door, holding her by the front of her neck as he opened the sliding door and shoved her 
inside. She immediately tried to escape again, this time through the other sliding door, but 
defendant caught her by the foot and pulled her back. At some point, the victim’s global 
positioning system (GPS) was damaged, and the frayed cord fell onto the parking lot, where 
it was later found by police. 
¶ 15 
 
Once back inside the van, defendant told the victim to remove her clothing. When she 
refused, he forcibly removed her boots and jeans. He then ordered her to perform oral sex, 
pushing her head down while gripping her by the hair and the back of her neck. He grabbed 
the front of her neck and choked her until she opened her mouth. After 20 or 30 seconds, 
defendant briefly stopped before choking her again as he forced her to perform the act a 
second time. Next, defendant performed oral sex on the victim before engaging in vaginal 
intercourse for 30 or 45 seconds. Throughout this time, defendant appeared nervous and kept 
looking over his shoulder. 
¶ 16 
 
Shortly after that, he apologized and said he did not want to get in trouble. The victim 
promised she would not tell anyone what happened, and he allowed her to dress. They 
retrieved her cell phone as well as other items that had fallen out of her purse before she 
drove the van back to the residential facility, arriving at about 6:30 p.m. 
¶ 17 
 
On the way into the facility, they passed one of the victim’s co-workers, and, after 
defendant was secured behind locked doors, the victim ran back to her co-worker and 
collapsed, sobbing. The co-worker carried the victim to the supervisor’s office, and the police 
were called. The victim was taken back to the site of the assault before being examined at a 
 
- 6 - 
 
hospital. She reported experiencing pain in her genital area and finding it very difficult to get 
out of bed the next day. 
¶ 18 
 
The emergency room physician who performed the sexual assault examination testified 
for the State. He had treated about 100 sexual assault victims and was qualified as an expert 
in emergency medicine. In his medical report, he noted redness, abrasions, and a number of 
fresh bruises on the victim’s left thigh, wrist, elbow, and waist or hip. An external genital 
examination failed to reveal any injuries, a finding the physician explained was not unusual. 
An internal examination, however, revealed some cervical redness. The physician was unable 
to attribute the redness to a sexual assault. On cross-examination, the physician was unable to 
identify any specific source of the redness. 
¶ 19 
 
The parties stipulated that the forensic report stated, “No DNA of Ronald Patterson was 
found in the vaginal swab collected from [the victim].” During a subsequent sidebar, defense 
counsel requested permission to question the doctor about the presence of DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) from someone other than defendant, indicating that the victim “had 
recent intercourse, with someone else within 72 hours, knowing how far—that’s about how 
long sperm last.” Counsel did not make an offer of medical proof about how long cervical 
redness would have been present after consensual intercourse. The State objected to the 
questioning, arguing the additional questions would violate Illinois’s rape shield law, 
generally barring, in relevant part, any examination of the victim’s prior sexual history with 
persons other than the defendant. The State argued that the DNA found was from the victim’s 
boyfriend three days before the assault and did not provide a basis for granting defendant’s 
request. The trial court barred defendant from eliciting testimony about the victim’s prior 
activity to explain the redness because the physician “did not even trace it back to this 
incident” and “did not say it was the result of a rape.” After the sidebar, defense counsel did 
not make any additional inquiry about cervical redness or its potential persistence. 
¶ 20 
 
The investigating officers testified that the frayed cord to the victim’s GPS unit was 
discovered in the parking lot where the assault occurred, while the GPS charger was still 
inside the vehicle. In addition, the passenger side sun visor was torn from the ceiling and 
found on the driver’s side floor. The side of the van was dirty, with visible smudges and 
vague handprints outside the driver’s side door where defendant pinned the victim after she 
tried to escape. 
¶ 21 
 
Detective Kaminski testified at trial, recounting portions of his suppression hearing 
testimony and adding that he arrived at the residential facility around 9:15 p.m. and spoke to 
the victim before she went to the hospital. He asserted that, as a trained youth officer, his 
“responsibility was to first and foremost explain to [defendant] why he was at the 
Schaumburg Police Department. After we got past that, then it was to read him his Miranda 
warnings and to make sure that he understands what his Miranda warnings were.” He 
determined defendant’s age, that defendant had lived at the residential facility for three years, 
and that he was in ninth grade and could read. Detective Kaminski indicated it was not his 
“job to give advice” to defendant and that he “made a reasonable attempt” to contact 
defendant’s guardian before the interview began. 
¶ 22 
 
The officer who questioned defendant also testified at trial, stating that defendant, who 
was not handcuffed at the time, gave two conflicting accounts of the incident. In the first 
account, defendant claimed that the victim initiated the encounter, and he denied that 
 
- 7 - 
 
intercourse occurred. He also denied leaving the van while it was in the parking lot. When 
the officer said he would check for surveillance footage from the surrounding buildings, 
defendant’s demeanor changed suddenly. His shoulders slumped, he hung his head, and he 
disclosed that he had not been telling the truth. He then admitted committing the assault, 
stating he had not meant to hurt the victim but had gotten angry because he had not taken his 
medication. Defendant’s second statement was typed and read aloud before he signed it. The 
statement noted that defendant was not threatened, coerced, or promised anything in return, 
and his signature acknowledged that the statement was true, accurate, and voluntarily made 
and that he previously had an opportunity to review and edit it. 
¶ 23 
 
Defendant testified in his own defense and refuted the inculpatory statements in the 
confession. He asserted that the incident was consensual, without any struggle. He testified 
that the victim simply exited the highway and parked in the lot without any explanation 
before asking him to get into the backseat of the van. After he complied, she unzipped his 
pants and performed oral sex for a few minutes before telling him it was time to return to the 
facility. She told him that if he did not say anything, she would not either. They then returned 
to the front seats, and the victim drove back to the facility. Defendant returned to his room, 
and Director Kehoe and defendant’s therapist later came to get him from the dayroom and 
take him to the lobby, where the police were waiting. 
¶ 24 
 
Defendant also described his interrogation at the police station, reiterating that he was not 
given Miranda warnings until after the questioning. He denied knowing how the van or the 
GPS unit was damaged or how the victim was injured. He also asserted that the police lied 
about his confession. He maintained that he did not give the account memorialized in the 
statement and that he was instructed to sign before reading it or receiving any Miranda 
warnings. 
¶ 25 
 
To advance defendant’s consent defense, counsel questioned the victim’s credibility 
during closing argument, asking the jury to consider why the victim was “wearing elastic 
jeans that come down easily that might fall, and she doesn’t have any underwear on” while 
working with teenage boys. He also asserted that the source of the cervical redness was never 
established and emphasized the absence of any DNA from defendant to raise questions about 
the validity of the victim’s story. Finally, counsel argued that the validity of defendant’s 
confession was suspect because it was not videotaped and the police should have “wait[ed] 
until Monday to get his guardian.” 
¶ 26 
 
After deliberating almost nine hours over two days, the jury found defendant guilty on all 
three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and he moved for a new trial, contending 
that the police had not provided proper notice to his legal guardian. The trial court denied the 
motion because “the police did make reasonable efforts to find a guardian,” assigned a youth 
officer, and gave defendant “appropriate” Miranda warnings that he understood. 
¶ 27 
 
Defendant’s motion for a new trial also alleged that the court erroneously denied his 
request to ask about the victim’s sexual history to suggest an alternative explanation for the 
cervical redness. He contended that the additional questions were necessary because the jury 
may have assumed the redness was caused by defendant if they did not know her boyfriend’s 
DNA had been found. The State countered that defendant had extensively cross-examined 
the emergency room physician and had been allowed to present his theory of the case 
adequately. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. 
 
- 8 - 
 
¶ 28 
 
During sentencing, evidence was presented that defendant had been exposed to cocaine 
before birth and taken into DCFS custody as an infant before being adopted by another 
family member. He had a long history of aggressive and violent behavior toward both his 
family and others that resulted in several admissions to mental hospitals with widely varying 
diagnoses, including depression, intermittent explosive disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In 2006, his adoptive 
family voluntarily gave up custody to DCFS based on defendant’s aggression and mental 
health needs. 
¶ 29 
 
The State’s aggravating evidence included a victim impact statement and reports of 
defendant’s aggressive and violent behavior both toward residents and staff at the treatment 
facility and while he was in custody awaiting trial. Defendant offered mitigating letters and 
testimony requesting leniency due to his age, difficult childhood, and mental health issues. 
After considering all the relevant factors, as well as defendant’s potential for rehabilitation 
and the fact that he did not meet the statutory criteria for mental retardation, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to three consecutive 12-year prison terms. The court subsequently 
denied defendant’s motions for a new trial and to reconsider the sentence. 
¶ 30 
 
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court’s denials of his suppression motion and 
defense counsel’s request to introduce the victim’s sexual history were erroneous. He also 
claimed defense counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence of his mental 
impairment at the suppression hearing to establish the involuntary nature of his confession. 
Finally, defendant contended that his sentence was excessive. 
¶ 31 
 
The appellate court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded the cause for a new 
trial, finding that his confession should have been suppressed because defendant’s parents or 
another concerned adult had not been contacted before questioning and Detective Kaminski’s 
actions conflicted with his role as defendant’s youth officer. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, 
¶¶ 37-39 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). The court did not address 
defendant’s claim that his trial counsel had been ineffective, however, instead initially 
“tak[ing] into consideration Patterson’s severely limited intelligence and education” in its de 
novo review of the suppression issue. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, ¶ 35 (modified upon denial 
of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). The court also addressed the merits of defendant’s rape shield 
claim, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual 
history. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, ¶ 45 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). 
¶ 32 
 
The State filed a petition for rehearing, and the appellate court modified its opinion to 
eliminate any consideration of defendant’s “severely limited intelligence and education,” but 
it still did not directly rule on defendant’s ineffective assistance claim. 2012 IL App (1st) 
101573, ¶ 35 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). Applying a de novo 
standard of review, the appellate court again suppressed defendant’s typewritten confession 
as involuntary, based on the same rationale it used in its original opinion. 2012 IL App (1st) 
101573, ¶¶ 38-40 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). Based on this 
disposition, the court did not reach the merits of defendant’s excessive sentence claim. 
¶ 33 
 
This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 
2013). We also permitted amicus curiae briefs to be filed by the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth et al., and by the Children and Family Justice Center et al. Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
 
- 9 - 
 
 
¶ 34 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 35 
 
Before this court, the State’s appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the appellate court 
erred in suppressing defendant’s confession by concluding that: (a) a concerned adult was not 
contacted pursuant to section 5-405(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 
405/5-405(2) (West 2008)); and (b) the police youth officer improperly participated in 
defendant’s interview; and (2) whether the trial court properly applied the Illinois rape shield 
statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 2008)) in denying defendant’s request to introduce 
evidence of the victim’s sexual history. In his cross-appeal, defendant presents two additional 
issues: (1) whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not offering evidence 
of defendant’s diminished mental capacity during the suppression hearing; and (2) whether 
the mandatory transfer of certain minors from juvenile court to adult criminal court under the 
relevant portion of section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130 
(West 2008)) is constitutional under the due process clause, the eighth amendment, and the 
Illinois proportionate penalties clause, particularly in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for 
all juveniles), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (barring life without parole for 
juveniles in nonhomicide cases), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012) (barring mandatory life without parole for all juveniles). 
 
¶ 36 
 
 
 
 
A. Suppression of Defendant’s Confession 
¶ 37 
 
In its appeal, the State initially argues that the appellate court erred in holding 
defendant’s motion to suppress his confession should have been granted. The State 
specifically refutes two of the court’s findings: (1) the police did not make a sufficient effort 
to notify a concerned adult under section 5-405(2) (705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 2008)); 
and (2) the youth officer improperly participated in the investigation. In his cross-appeal, 
defendant asserts an alternative rationale for upholding the appellate court’s determination. 
He argues that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance at the hearing on the 
suppression motion. Although we review de novo the ultimate question of whether 
defendant’s confession was voluntary after examining the totality of the circumstances, we 
examine the trial court’s underlying factual findings deferentially, overturning them only if 
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50, 54 (2000). 
 
¶ 38 
 
 
 
 
1. The Statutory Notice Requirement 
¶ 39 
 
In examining whether the police complied with section 5-405(2), we look first to the 
relevant portion of the statutory language: 
 
“(2) A law enforcement officer who arrests a minor without a warrant under 
Section 5-401 shall, if the minor is not released, immediately make a reasonable 
attempt to notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor’s care or 
the person with whom the minor resides that the minor has been arrested and where 
the minor is being held ***.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 
2008). 
¶ 40 
 
The key to resolving the question in this case is the reasonableness of the Schaumburg 
police department’s actions before defendant was questioned. The appellate court concluded 
 
- 10 - 
 
that those actions did not constitute a “reasonable attempt” to contact a concerned adult, and 
defendant emphasizes that the presence of a “concerned adult” before or during the 
interrogation is an “important element” in determining the voluntariness of his confession 
(People v. Griffin, 327 Ill. App. 3d 538, 545 (2002)). 
¶ 41 
 
The parties agree that youth officer Kaminski called both the director of defendant’s 
residential facility, Stephen Kehoe, and defendant’s caseworker to notify them that defendant 
was at the Schaumburg station and was going to be questioned about the assault shortly 
before questioning began at 10 p.m. When they could not be reached, Kaminski left 
voicemail messages for each of them. The State notes that defendant’s caseworker did not 
return Detective Kaminski’s call for two days. The trial court acknowledged this fact as well, 
stating the police did not need to stop the investigation and “sit on the Defendant for days 
because then they would be criticized for sitting on him for days.” 
¶ 42 
 
In addition, Kaminski testified that he established with another officer prior to the start of 
questioning that Kehoe had previously been told where defendant was taken and had given 
the police permission to speak to defendant. Detective Kaminski further testified that, after 
defendant was questioned, he again called Kehoe, who confirmed that the police had 
permission to speak with defendant as well as to search the facility’s van for evidence. 
¶ 43 
 
In its evaluation of the witnesses, the trial court noted that Kehoe did not deny giving 
permission and admitted he had spoken to three police officers that night, although he was 
unable to recall giving his permission. The judge appeared somewhat skeptical of Kehoe’s 
lack of memory, describing the lapse as “interesting” and finding it “curious” that Kehoe’s 
counsel attempted, but was not permitted, to sit in the witness box with him during 
questioning. In contrast, the judge “believe[d] Officer Kaminski,” describing his testimony as 
“very credible.” Due to the inherent limitations in reviewing a cold transcript, we must give 
the trial court’s credibility findings considerable deference. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 
114-15 (2007). 
¶ 44 
 
While Detective Kaminski undoubtedly could have taken additional steps to notify a 
concerned adult, such as seeking out and calling the caseworker’s home phone number, none 
of those steps are required by the statute. 705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 2008). Statutory 
compliance is solely dependent on the police making a “reasonable attempt” at notification, 
not on perfect performance. In this instance, defendant was taken into custody at 
approximately 8:30 p.m. on a Sunday. Detective Kaminski testified that he attempted to 
comply with the notice requirement by placing telephone calls to both the director of 
defendant’s residential facility, Stephen Kehoe, and defendant’s caseworker before defendant 
was questioned. When he was unable to reach either party, Kaminski left phone messages. 
Kaminski was also informed by another officer prior to the start of questioning that Kehoe 
already granted permission to question defendant, and Kehoe did not dispute that he may 
have given permission. Although the statute does not require permission to interview a 
juvenile defendant, a grant of permission establishes that actual notice was given, fulfilling 
the statute. In addition, Detective Kaminski testified he personally spoke to Kehoe after 
defendant was questioned but before his statement was typed, reviewed with him, and signed. 
The trial judge found Detective Kaminski to be a “very credible” witness, and nothing in the 
record refutes that assessment. 
 
- 11 - 
 
¶ 45 
 
The reasonableness of the notification attempt by the police is also supported by the 
description of the persons subject to notification. Section 5-405(2) requires the police to 
make a reasonable attempt to notify “the parent or other person legally responsible for the 
minor’s care or the person with whom the minor resides.” 705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 
2008). 
¶ 46 
 
While DCFS was indisputably defendant’s legal guardian, the person or persons who 
were “legally responsible for [his] care” during the years he lived at the treatment facility is 
less clear. Defendant contends that Kehoe was not an appropriate adult to contact because he 
did not work for DCFS. We need not definitively answer that question here, however, 
because our inquiry is limited to determining whether the police made a reasonable attempt 
to notify a proper person. 
¶ 47 
 
As the director of the treatment facility where defendant had resided for three years, 
Kehoe was at least arguably “a person with whom defendant resided,” and bore some degree 
of responsibility for his care. Although defendant contends that Kehoe was more likely to be 
concerned for his injured staff member than for defendant, the plain language of the statute 
does not require that the individuals to be notified be concerned exclusively with the 
defendant’s well-being, instead simply listing broad categories of potentially concerned 
adults. 
¶ 48 
 
Defendant emphasizes the absence of a concerned adult is particularly relevant if the 
police have prevented an adult from talking to a juvenile, citing People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 
112362, ¶ 33. While we agree with that general statement, we disagree that it applies to the 
facts of this case. The record shows that Director Kehoe did not deny giving the police 
permission to speak with defendant, and the trial court appears to have been seriously 
troubled by his alleged lack of memory, particularly when he admitted he spoke with three 
police officers that night. Defendant does not cite any case law holding that a particular 
concerned adult was “prevented” from contacting a juvenile merely because another 
potentially concerned adult could not be contacted. The statute does not expressly require the 
police to attempt to contact every possible concerned adult, and in the absence of that 
legislative mandate, we decline to read that requirement into the statute. See People v. Lewis, 
223 Ill. 2d 393, 403 (2006). Accordingly, we are not convinced that the police “prevented” 
any adult from contacting defendant under the facts of this case. 
¶ 49 
 
Defendant also contends that finding the police attempts at notification to be reasonable 
would defeat the purpose of obtaining a concerned adult. As enacted, the statute does not 
mandate the presence of a concerned adult or, even more critically, that actual notice be 
provided before the start of questioning. Section 5-405(2) simply requires that the police 
make a reasonable attempt to provide notification. 705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 2008). This 
court may not add requirements to those already imposed by the plain language of the statute. 
Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d at 403. Therefore, based on our review of all the relevant facts, we 
conclude that the attempt here by police to provide proper notice, while arguably not 
exemplary, was sufficient to comport with the legislature’s statutory mandate. Accordingly, 
we reverse the appellate court’s contrary finding. 
 
 
 
 
- 12 - 
 
¶ 50 
 
 
 
 
2. The Role of the Youth Officer 
¶ 51 
 
As an additional basis for reversing the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his 
confession, the appellate court concluded that youth officer Kaminski improperly 
participated in the criminal investigation and “did not even fulfill the most basic of a youth 
officer’s tasks.” 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, ¶ 38 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 
2012). Before this court, defendant points to Kaminski’s allegedly improper acts of talking to 
the victim upon his arrival at the police station and working with the questioning officer by 
helping to type defendant’s statement, reading it to defendant, and obtaining his signature. 
Defendant analogizes these actions to those of the youth officer in Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, 
¶¶ 50-51, who actively worked against the defendant’s interests, completely abandoning his 
protective role by actively questioning the defendant about his involvement in the alleged 
offenses. 
¶ 52 
 
We concluded in Murdock that the juvenile officer “was not merely *** standing by 
while another officer took the lead in interviewing defendant; rather, [he] was the lead 
interviewer. *** [He] could not act as a juvenile officer or concerned adult while at the same 
time compiling evidence against defendant.” Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 51. 
¶ 53 
 
In contrast, Detective Kaminski was “merely a juvenile officer standing by while another 
officer took the lead in interviewing defendant” (Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 51). Although 
Kaminski was present during the interview, defendant does not allege that he asked any 
questions. Moreover, Detective Kaminski fulfilled the fundamental duties of a youth officer 
noted in Murdock, such as inquiring whether defendant needed anything, ensuring that he 
was treated properly while in custody, reading defendant his Miranda rights (Murdock, 2012 
IL 112362, ¶ 49), as well as ascertaining that he understood those rights by asking him to 
explain each one individually. Although defendant testified that he was not read his rights 
until after he signed a statement that had been fabricated by the police, the trial court found 
those allegations to be “ludicrous” and Kaminski’s contradictory account to be “very 
credible.” Defense counsel also specifically denied at the suppression hearing any allegation 
of coercion or duress by the police. 
¶ 54 
 
Even though Kaminski briefly spoke to the victim when he arrived at the police station, 
the record does not show what information he obtained at that time, and defendant does not 
establish how that conversation adversely affected his performance as a youth officer that 
night. Our review of the record also fails to reveal any connection between Kaminski’s 
conversation and possible prejudice to defendant. Nor did Kaminski’s ministerial acts of 
helping the investigating officer type up the statement and reading it aloud to defendant 
clearly breach the proper role of a youth officer. In fact, to ensure defendant’s understanding 
of the contents of the statement, Kaminski took the additional step of having him read it 
aloud before signing it. 
¶ 55 
 
As we explained in Murdock, “[w]hile the presence of a juvenile officer is a significant 
factor in the totality of the circumstances argument, there is no requirement that a juvenile 
officer be present when a minor is questioned, and the absence of a juvenile officer will not 
make a juvenile’s statements per se involuntary.” Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 52. Notably, 
despite the youth officer’s complete abandonment of his duties, we ultimately concluded that 
the juvenile’s statements were made voluntarily and upheld their admission at trial. Murdock, 
2012 IL 112362, ¶ 55. 
 
- 13 - 
 
¶ 56 
 
Here, Detective Kaminski’s actions did not remotely approach the complete 
abandonment of his role as a youth officer. If the complete absence of a youth officer and the 
active, adverse participation of a purported youth officer in the questioning of a juvenile are 
not sufficient to mandate a finding that a statement is involuntary, then Kaminski’s 
involvement does not either. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that the appellate 
court properly concluded that his statement was involuntary based on Kaminski’s improper 
participation in the investigation. 
 
¶ 57 
 
 
 
 
3. The Totality of the Circumstances 
¶ 58 
 
Next, we must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine de novo whether 
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his statement was erroneous. In 
making that determination, we recognize that taking a juvenile confession requires great care 
to ensure it did not result from mere juvenile ignorance or emotion. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50, 
54-55. Relevant factors to consider include the minor’s age, mental capacity, education, 
physical condition, the legality and length of the interview, and physical or mental abuse by 
the police, as well as the presence of a concerned adult and any attempts by the police to 
prevent or frustrate that contact. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55. 
¶ 59 
 
Defendant argues that the appellate court correctly determined that his statement was 
involuntary due to the coercive atmosphere created by this combination of factors: (1) the 
absence of a concerned adult during questioning; (2) the insufficiency of police attempts to 
contact a concerned adult; (3) youth officer Kaminski’s participation in the investigation; (4) 
defendant’s youth and minimal criminal justice system experience; (5) the officers’ use of 
trickery during questioning; and (6) the time when questioning was conducted. 
¶ 60 
 
In its modified decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the first three factors cited 
by defendant. Having previously found that the police did not violate the notice provision in 
section 5-405(2) and that Kaminski’s conduct was not improper; however, we need not 
further examine those separate factors. Supra ¶¶ 48, 53-54. As for the fourth factor, 
defendant’s youth and limited prior contact with the police, defendant alleged in his motion 
to suppress that he was “a special education student with limited reading comprehension and 
comprehension skills” but offered no supporting evidence at the motion hearing. The absence 
of that evidence serves as the basis for defendant’s additional claim that trial counsel 
provided him with ineffective assistance, a question we will address later. For our present 
purpose of reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, 
however, we consider only the evidence actually adduced at the suppression hearing. 
¶ 61 
 
We also note that defendant specifically disavowed at that hearing any police coercion or 
duress and does not allege any physical abuse or overt promises by police during questioning 
before this court. Thus, we examine only the remaining factors at issue in this case: (1) 
defendant’s age; (2) his limited experience with the criminal justice system; (3) any possible 
police deception; and (4) the time, legality, and duration of the questioning. See G.O., 191 Ill. 
2d at 54-55. 
¶ 62 
 
Addressing the first two factors together, the record shows that defendant was 15 years 
old and in ninth grade when he was questioned by police. Although defendant had received a 
“station adjustment” from police when he was 11, he had no other contact with the criminal 
justice system. Based on his prior experience, defendant posits that the failure to tell him that 
 
- 14 - 
 
he was facing adult charges likely caused him to believe he would be allowed to go home if 
he cooperated by signing the confession. Defendant has never claimed, however, that the 
police promised him anything in exchange for his confession. Moreover, after viewing 
defendant’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial court found him to be sufficiently 
mature to be capable of making a valid statement, describing him as: 
“a very astute young man. He is not in my opinion someone who does not understand 
things, his testimony, and his demeanor while testifying and so forth. I guess for lack 
of a better explanation from a judge’s point of view is he looks and acts much, much 
older than his age. That’s not saying that his mental state is older, but I don’t see any 
reason in the record that or even outside the record that I saw after consideration of 
everything that I have heard to suppress this statement.” 
The trial judge had the distinct advantage of watching defendant testify, and his description 
of defendant’s apparent maturity is not belied by our review of the record. Accordingly, we 
defer to the trial court’s assessment. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 114-15. 
¶ 63 
 
Moreover, we have upheld the admission of statements obtained without the benefit of a 
concerned adult from defendants considerably younger and less experienced than defendant. 
In G.O., the defendant was just 13 years old when he was adjudicated delinquent of first 
degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, and aggravated battery 
with a firearm. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 40. The police contacted his mother, and, although she did 
not contact him prior to questioning, they did not frustrate any attempt to speak with him. 
G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 56. Despite his young age, we upheld the admission of his confession 
after reviewing the totality of circumstances that are nearly identical to those in this case. We 
weighed the defendant’s youthfulness, lack of prior contact with law enforcement, and the 
absence of a concerned adult against the absence of any request to speak to an adult or 
evidence that the police frustrated any attempts at outside contact, the validity of the 
detention, the giving and understanding of the defendant’s Miranda rights, his intelligence, 
the short duration of the questioning, the absence of handcuffs, the opportunities given to the 
minor for food, drink, and access to the bathroom, and the lack of any physical coercion, 
threats, or promises by the police. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 56. 
¶ 64 
 
Defendant is also older than the minor in People v. Morgan, who was only 14 years of 
age when he was charged with the murders of his grandfather and grandmother, charges that 
ultimately resulted in a prison sentence of 75 years. People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 410 
(2001). The defendant had been an average student prior to being expelled from a private 
school for misconduct, although he had twice been hospitalized for over a month with 
diagnoses of attention deficit disorder and depression and had been prescribed 
antidepressants. Although he was handcuffed when initially taken into custody, the defendant 
was not restrained during questioning, nor was he threatened, coerced, or promised anything 
by police. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 437-39. 
¶ 65 
 
This court was troubled most by the police department’s complete failure to attempt to 
contact a concerned adult, or even a youth officer, prior to questioning, but we noted that the 
police did not actively prevent or frustrate contact and the defendant did not ask to speak to 
an adult. We also expressly recognized that a juvenile’s confession should not be suppressed 
merely because he was denied an opportunity to confer with a concerned adult. Morgan, 197 
Ill. 2d at 439-40 (citing G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55). 
 
- 15 - 
 
¶ 66 
 
The defendant in Morgan was offered food, drink, and bathroom access and was held in 
custody for less than six hours. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 436, 439. He was read his Miranda 
rights before being subjected to two interviews of approximately 30 minutes each. Although 
the defendant claimed he did not understand those rights and felt he had no choice but to 
answer the officer’s questions, the record showed that he affirmatively declined to answer 
one question. Consequently, we agreed with the trial court’s factual finding that the 
defendant understood his rights and that his will had not been overborne when he confessed 
to the murders. Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
suppress his custodial statements. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 441. 
¶ 67 
 
Finally, as in Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 44, the instant defendant was “on the older 
end of the juvenile scale.” In Murdock, the defendant was 16 years old when he was tried as 
an adult and convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. 
Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 3. The evidence established that the defendant received poor 
grades and had completed only one semester at an alternative high school before trial. On 
appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement as 
involuntary. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 28. 
¶ 68 
 
We concluded that the youth officer actively worked against the defendant’s interests and 
that no other concerned adult was available to him prior to and during questioning. Murdock, 
2012 IL 112362, ¶¶ 50-51. Nonetheless, after examining the totality of the circumstances, we 
affirmed the trial court’s determination that his confession was voluntary and admissible. In 
reaching that conclusion, we looked at the defendant’s lack of prior police contact, his 
demeanor and degree of understanding during questioning, his physical condition, his 
opportunities for food, drink, and bathroom use, and the absence of any coercion, physical or 
mental abuse, or promises or trickery by the police. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 55. 
¶ 69 
 
Notably, the length of the defendant’s detention and interview in Murdock were both 
considerably longer than those of defendant in this case. Murdock was detained for six to 
seven hours and questioned for three hours, with the interview concluding before “the very 
early morning hours.” Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 47. Here, defendant was taken into 
custody at 8:30 p.m., and signed his statement at 11:15 p.m., after just 45 minutes of 
questioning. 
¶ 70 
 
Our decisions in G.O., Morgan, and Murdock are highly instructive in this case, and we 
are not persuaded by defendant’s attempts to distinguish Murdock and G.O. on their facts. He 
contends that Murdock is distinguishable because there it was “clear” that the juvenile’s 
grandfather, who was at the police station, never requested to speak with him and the police 
officer testified contact would have been permitted if a request had been made. Here, the 
police allegedly questioned defendant “with full knowledge that no concerned adult would 
even know” he had been taken into custody, contributing to the coercive atmosphere present 
during questioning. 
¶ 71 
 
We reject defendant’s argument for two reasons. First, Detective Kaminski testified that 
he was informed prior to the start of questioning that Director Kehoe had already given 
permission for the interview, and the trial court found his testimony to be highly credible. 
Thus, Kaminski would have reasonably believed a concerned adult had been notified and 
chose not to speak with defendant before questioning. Under those circumstances, the police 
could not have leveraged any possible advantage from withholding notice to a concerned 
 
- 16 - 
 
adult during questioning. Second, defendant’s argument is logically inconsistent. The 
coercive effect of the lack of contact between a minor defendant and a concerned adult prior 
to questioning is the same regardless of whether it resulted from the failure of a concerned 
adult who was actually present at the police station to request contact, as in Murdock, or a 
lack of notice to any concerned adult at all, as defendant alleges here. Under either set of 
circumstances, the juvenile would still be subject to questioning without the benefit of a 
concerned adult’s experience and insight. 
¶ 72 
 
Defendant also attempts to distinguish Murdock because in that case the court had the 
advantage of a videotape of the defendant’s confession. That videotape contradicted his 
claims at his suppression hearing that the police promised he could go home if he confessed 
and that he was tired and scared. Here, defendant’s confession was not videotaped. When 
asked about the absence of a video recording in this case, the interviewing officer testified 
that the police department’s policy was to videotape statements only in homicide cases. 
While the trial court’s review of the parties’ demeanor and the actual conversation that took 
place in Murdock was undoubtedly a factor in determining whether his confession was 
voluntary, no mandate to record defendant’s statement in this case existed, and we decline to 
impose one judicially. We conclude the absence of a video record here is a neutral factor that 
cannot support defendant’s claim that his statement was involuntary. 
¶ 73 
 
Defendant also asserts that G.O. is distinguishable from this case for a similar reason. He 
maintains that here the police prevented him from speaking to a concerned adult by starting 
the interview only minutes after leaving messages for Director Kehoe and defendant’s 
caseworker. We reject this argument for the same reasons we rejected defendant’s similar 
contention about Murdock. Supra ¶ 71. Furthermore, we have already held that the police 
complied with their statutory duty of notification. Supra ¶ 48. Having fulfilled that duty, the 
police were under no obligation to delay the start of defendant’s interview. 
¶ 74 
 
Next, defendant attempts to distinguish G.O. because the juvenile in that case performed 
well in school while this defendant’s motion to suppress alleged that he was “a special 
education student with limited reading comprehension and comprehension skills.” No 
evidence of defendant’s allegedly deficient reading and comprehension skills was offered, 
however, at the motion hearing. In addition, we defer, as we must under this record, to the 
trial court’s conclusion that defendant understood his rights and possessed sufficient maturity 
and intellectual ability to make a valid statement. 
¶ 75 
 
Indeed, the record shows he was astute enough to tell the police initially that the victim 
had instigated the single act of consensual oral sex that he admitted took place. This 
deliberate attempt to avoid culpability belies any claim that he was confused by the 
questioning, intimidated by the authority figures, or unable to understand the serious nature 
and consequences of the interview process. 
¶ 76 
 
Defendant next argues that, unlike in G.O., the police tricked and deceived him during 
questioning. While deception is not per se unlawful, it can contribute to the coerciveness of 
the interrogation and weigh against a finding of voluntariness. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55. 
Defendant asserts that his confession was made immediately after Detective Atamian told 
him the police would check video surveillance footage from businesses in the vicinity of the 
assault for discrepancies in his story even though the officer did not know at that time 
 
- 17 - 
 
whether any footage was available. He adds that even if the officer’s statements were 
technically true, they amounted to trickery designed to induce him to confess. 
¶ 77 
 
Defendant does not dispute that the examining officer never said incriminating footage 
had actually been recovered, and the police looked later, unsuccessfully, for surveillance 
cameras in the area. While the mere prospect that video footage revealing inaccuracies in his 
statement could be recovered likely influenced defendant’s decision to renounce his initial 
story, that result is consistent with the underlying purpose of any interrogation, i.e., to elicit 
the truth. The officer’s statement accurately informed defendant of what the police would be 
doing to verify his account. Therefore, we decline defendant’s invitation to deem the 
interviewing officer’s utterly truthful statement to be “trickery.” Overall, we conclude that 
the factual distinctions defendant alleges exist between this case and G.O. are insignificant. 
¶ 78 
 
The appellate court, however, relied on defendant’s youth and inexperience, as well as its 
view that the police did not do enough to contact a concerned adult and that Detective 
Kaminski’s actions conflicted with his role as a youth officer, to conclude that the trial court 
erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because it was involuntary. After 
considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s confession, as well as 
our prior decisions in G.O., Morgan, and Murdock that upheld the admissibility of statements 
under substantially similar conditions, we hold the appellate court erroneously reversed the 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his statement. 
 
¶ 79 
 
 
 
 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶ 80 
 
As an alternative basis to uphold the appellate court’s finding that the trial court erred in 
denying his suppression motion, defendant argues in his cross-appeal that his trial counsel 
failed to provide him with effective legal assistance. He contends that by not offering 
evidence of his diminished mental capacity at the suppression hearing to support the bare 
claim in his motion to suppress that he was “a special education student with limited reading 
comprehension and comprehension skills,” counsel violated defendant’s right to effective 
assistance. He asserts that counsel’s knowledge of his limited intellectual functioning and 
longstanding mental health issues was demonstrated by counsel’s request for a pretrial fitness 
hearing and subsequent review of the examining psychiatrist’s report. 
¶ 81 
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong 
Strickland test, demonstrating that: (1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable 
compared to prevailing professional standards; and (2) there is a “ ‘reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Satisfying the prejudice prong necessitates a showing of actual 
prejudice, not simply speculation that defendant may have been prejudiced. People v. Bew, 
228 Ill. 2d 122, 128-29 (2008). Furthermore, a “reasonable probability” is defined as a 
showing sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, rendering the result unreliable or 
fundamentally unfair. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). When reviewing a ruling 
on a motion to suppress, overcoming the prejudice prong requires the defendant to show a 
reasonable probability both that: (1) the suppression motion would have been granted; and 
(2) the trial outcome would have been different if the evidence had been suppressed. Bew, 
228 Ill. 2d at 128-29. Because we may properly resolve claims of ineffective assistance after 
 
- 18 - 
 
examining only the prejudice prong (People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17), we begin here 
by examining defendant’s allegations of prejudice. 
¶ 82 
 
Defendant claims that his lengthy mental health history and limited intellectual capacity 
made him more susceptible to subtle police intimidation and coercion and that the evidence 
of his mental functioning would have weighed heavily in his favor in evaluating the 
voluntariness of his confession. If that evidence had been offered during the suppression 
hearing, defendant asserts that the outcome would have been different and his motion would 
have been granted, establishing prejudice. 
¶ 83 
 
Even if we accept defendant’s contention that the trial court would have suppressed his 
statement in light of the additional evidence, he has still failed to demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the entire trial would have changed, resulting in his acquittal. 
See Bew, 228 Ill. 2d at 128-29 (requiring a reasonable probability of different outcomes at 
both the suppression hearing and the trial). Disregarding any evidence related to defendant’s 
statement, the trial evidence consists predominantly of the conflicting accounts offered by 
defendant and the victim, along with physical evidence of her injuries and the damage to her 
GPS and the treatment facility’s van. At its core, the 25-year-old victim testified that she was 
assigned by her employer to pick defendant up in the van and return him to the center after a 
weekend visit with his family. After starting back to the facility with defendant, she 
described being frightened and physically overwhelmed by the much larger defendant, who 
forced her to exit the highway and park the van in a vacant parking lot. Although she 
repeatedly tried to escape, defendant was able to grab and restrain her, sometimes choking 
her into compliance. She was forcibly subjected to two brief nonconsensual oral sex acts, as 
well as to nonconsensual sexual intercourse, that lasted between 30 and 45 seconds. At the 
end of the assault, defendant apologized and said he had not intended to hurt her. After 
stating she would not tell anyone what had happened, she was allowed to drive the van back 
to the residential treatment facility. Once defendant was locked inside his unit, she 
immediately reported the assault to a co-worker, collapsing and sobbing, and the police were 
called. 
¶ 84 
 
Photographs taken several hours after the incident and testimony from the police officer 
who initially interviewed the victim and the treating emergency room physician confirmed 
that she was visibly upset and exhibited fresh bruises on her left thigh, wrist, elbow, and 
waist or hip. The police officer also recalled seeing a red mark on the side of her neck that 
did not photograph well several hours after the attack. In addition, a large area of dirt on the 
driver’s side of the van was smeared and a smudged handprint was discovered near the 
sliding door, consistent with the victim’s story that defendant caught her by her coat hood 
after she escaped from the van and pushed her against its side before shoving her inside 
again. Also consistent with E.C.’s account, her frayed GPS cord was found in the parking lot 
where the assault took place. Finally, the van’s visor was recovered from the floor of the 
vehicle, ripped from its hinge, consistent with a struggle. 
¶ 85 
 
For his part, defendant’s testimony differed in nearly every respect. He stated that before 
this incident he had recognized the victim as a facility staff member and that she had taken 
him to a movie he had earned as a behavioral reward a few days before the incident. On the 
day of the assault, he claimed it was E.C. who chose to exit the highway and park in the 
vacant lot. She then asked defendant to get into the backseat of the van, and she exited the 
 
- 19 - 
 
vehicle merely to get into the backseat with him. She unzipped defendant’s pants and 
proceeded to perform oral sex for three or four minutes before saying it was time to return to 
the facility and telling him she would not say anything about the events if he did not. He 
denied engaging in any other sexual activity with her. He then returned to the front seat 
through the middle aisle of the van while the victim exited the vehicle and re-entered through 
the driver’s side door. At some point, she mentioned to defendant that it was her birthday. 
After returning to the treatment facility, defendant relaxed in the dayroom until he was 
escorted to the lobby by his therapist and Director Kehoe, where he was handcuffed and 
taken into custody before being driven to the police station. Defendant expressly denied the 
details of the assault related in the victim’s testimony. 
¶ 86 
 
On cross-examination, defendant indicated E.C. made up the allegations. He denied ever 
getting out of the van or struggling with her while parked in the vacant lot. He had no 
explanation for the multiple fresh bruises on the victim’s body within hours of the assault or 
the damage to the van and the GPS. 
¶ 87 
 
Although credibility is generally a question for the trier of fact (People v. Wheeler, 226 
Ill. 2d 92, 114-15 (2007)), here the physical evidence strongly corroborated E.C.’s testimony. 
The details of her account were entirely consistent with the physical evidence of a violent 
assault, while defendant’s account could not be reconciled with that evidence. Given the 
overwhelming evidence corroborating the victim’s testimony and weighing against 
defendant’s account, we are not persuaded that it is reasonably probable that a jury would 
have acquitted defendant even in the absence of any reference to his confession at trial. The 
reasonably probable impact of counsel’s alleged error is not sufficient to undermine our 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and we reject his claim that defense counsel provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance. See Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17 (noting that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may be decided on the Strickland prejudice prong alone). 
Because the appellate court erred in holding defendant’s motion to suppress his statement 
should have been granted, we reverse that portion of its judgment and affirm the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion. 
 
¶ 88 
 
 
 
 
C. Constitutionality of the Mandatory Transfer Statute 
¶ 89 
 
In his cross-appeal, defendant argues that the mandatory transfer provision of the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008)), automatically transferring 
certain minors from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the adult criminal court, is 
constitutionally invalid. More specifically, he contends that the automatic transfer statute, 
either alone or in conjunction with Illinois’s mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme (730 
ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(ii) (West 2008)) and “Truth in Sentencing” rules requiring him to serve at 
least 85% of his sentence (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2008)), is unconstitutional. 
These provisions purportedly do not take into account the inherent differences between 
juveniles and adults, including juveniles’ reduced culpability and greater ability to change. 
Therefore, defendant argues that the provisions are fatally “flawed,” violating the federal and 
state due process clauses (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2), the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment of the federal constitution (U.S. 
 
- 20 - 
 
Const., amend. VIII), and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). 
¶ 90 
 
Constitutional challenges carry the heavy burden of successfully rebutting the strong 
judicial presumption that statutes are constitutional. In addition, courts have a duty to uphold 
the constitutionality of a statute whenever reasonably possible, resolving any doubts in favor 
of its validity. We review the constitutionality of any statute de novo. People v. Dabbs, 239 
Ill. 2d 277, 291 (2010). 
¶ 91 
 
Here, the automatic transfer statute requires juveniles who are at least 15 years old and 
charged with one of the enumerated crimes to be prosecuted in adult criminal court rather 
than in juvenile court. The specified crimes are first degree murder, aggravated battery with a 
firearm, when the minor has personally discharged the firearm, armed robbery committed 
with a firearm, aggravated vehicular hijacking committed with a firearm, and aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008). Because defendant was 15 years 
old when he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault, the provision required him 
to be automatically transferred to criminal court for trial and, if convicted, sentenced as an 
adult. 
 
¶ 92 
 
 
 
 
1. The Due Process Claim 
¶ 93 
 
We first address defendant’s due process claim. As both parties recognize, this court 
rejected a similar claim challenging the predecessor to section 5-130 in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 
2d 395 (1984). In that consolidated case, the three defendants were each 16 years old when 
the offenses were committed, and they were automatically transferred to criminal court under 
the statute. The trial court in each case found the transfer statute unconstitutional, and on 
direct appeal to this court, the defendants argued it violated both procedural and substantive 
due process. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 402. 
¶ 94 
 
In rejecting that claim, this court distinguished Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 
(1966), where the United States Supreme Court invalidated a District of Columbia statute 
allowing minors to be tried as adults, potentially exposing some of them to the death penalty 
or life imprisonment, if the trial court determined that juvenile court jurisdiction should be 
waived after a “full investigation.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 547. The Court held that due process 
was violated because the statute did not provide sufficient guidance in deciding when waiver 
was proper, permitting potentially arbitrary rulings, and because the statute did not provide 
juveniles with a hearing before that determination was made. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561-62. We 
concluded in J.S. that Illinois’s automatic transfer statute did not suffer from the same failing 
because it required all 15- and 16-year-olds charged with the listed offenses to be transferred 
to criminal court, thus eliminating the potential for the use of unguided discretion in the 
juvenile court that was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 
405. Applying a similar rationale in People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 236 (1991), we also 
rejected a juvenile defendant’s due process challenge to the “gang-transfer” provisions of the 
transfer statute. 
¶ 95 
 
Furthermore, this court again upheld the automatic transfer statute against a due process 
challenge in People v. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (1988). In that case, the juvenile defendant’s 
challenge was based on the legislature’s 1985 statutory amendment of the transfer provision, 
adding unlawful use of weapons on school grounds to the list of eligible offenses. M.A., 124 
 
- 21 - 
 
Ill. 2d at 138. We concluded that the legislature did not act irrationally or arbitrarily or 
contravene the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 in amending the statute and upheld 
the constitutional validity of the amended statute. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d at 145-46. 
¶ 96 
 
Here, however, defendant asserts that J.S. is no longer valid law in light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s subsequent rulings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012). Defendant argues that this court’s reliance on the absence of any statutory 
judicial discretion in J.S. to uphold the transfer statute supports his allegation of a due 
process violation in this case because those Supreme Court decisions emphasized a need to 
recognize the unique characteristics of youthful offenders that is inconsistent with an 
automatic transfer. 
¶ 97 
 
As previously discussed, in J.S., the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to support his 
due process argument by distinguishing the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in Kent. 
J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 404-05. In contrast, here defendant is attempting to support his due process 
argument by relying on the Supreme Court’s eighth amendment analysis in Roper, Graham, 
and Miller. Defendant’s constitutional argument is crafted from incongruous components. 
Although both the Supreme Court and defendant have emphasized the distinctive nature of 
juveniles, the applicable constitutional standards differ considerably between due process and 
eighth amendment analyses. A ruling on a specific flavor of constitutional claim may not 
justify a similar ruling brought pursuant to another constitutional provision. See People v. 
Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 45 (finding the juvenile defendant’s sentence violated the eighth 
amendment but declining to consider his state due process and proportionate penalties 
challenges). In other words, a constitutional challenge raised under one theory cannot be 
supported by decisional law based purely on another provision. United States v. Lanier, 520 
U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s eighth amendment case law to support his procedural and substantive due process 
claims. 
¶ 98 
 
Moreover, this court has recently had the opportunity to examine the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s analyses in Roper, Graham, and Miller in a due process challenge raised by 
the defendant in Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 30. As in this case, the defendant in Davis relied 
heavily on the “special status” of juveniles acknowledged by the Supreme Court. As we 
noted, however, this court recognized the special characteristics and vulnerabilities of 
juvenile offenders several years earlier, substantially anticipating the Supreme Court’s view 
in our extensive discussion in People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002) (hereinafter, Leon 
Miller). Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 45. We concluded in Davis that res judicata precluded our 
reconsideration of whether due process was violated by the imposition of a natural life 
sentence on the 14-year-old defendant even in the aftermath of Roper, Graham, and Miller, 
and we find no more persuasive basis here to reconsider our decision to uphold the transfer 
statute in the face of a due process challenge in J.S. 
 
¶ 99 
 
 
 
 2. The Eighth Amendment and Proportionate Penalties Claims 
¶ 100 
 
Defendant more properly relies on the decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller to support 
his constitutional challenge to the Illinois automatic transfer statute under the federal cruel 
and unusual punishment clause (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and our state proportionate 
 
- 22 - 
 
penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). He contends that those decisions require a 
finding that the transfer statute, either alone or in conjunction with Illinois’s mandatory 
consecutive sentencing scheme (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(ii) (West 2008)) and “Truth in 
Sentencing” rules (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2008) (requiring defendant to serve 85% 
of his sentence)), are fatally flawed because they do not take juveniles’ distinctive 
characteristics into account. Defendant asserts that the challenged statutes fail to recognize 
modern scientific research showing that youths are different from adults in three ways. 
Research shows that juveniles differ from adults because they are: (1) more impulsive; (2) 
more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressure; and (3) possess a less well 
formed character, making their actions less indicative of irreversible depravity. Miller, 567 
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. In recognition of those findings, the Supreme Court has 
concluded that juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Defendant argues that, therefore, the 
Supreme Court has extended two death penalty case rules to juveniles in non-capital cases: 
(1) categorically disallowing application of the same harsh sentencing standards as adults 
because they are inconsistent with evolving standards of decency; and (2) requiring 
individualized sentences for juveniles because “death is different” and so are minors. Miller, 
567 U.S. at ___, ___, ___, ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2463-64, 2467, 2470, 2475. 
¶ 101 
 
We begin our review by examining the relevant constitutional language. The eighth 
amendment protects defendants against cruel and unusual punishment, while the Illinois 
proportionate penalties clause similarly bars the imposition of unreasonable sentences, 
stating that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the 
offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship” (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, § 11). Under the definition of the plain language used, neither clause applies 
unless a punishment or penalty has been imposed. 
¶ 102 
 
To support his claim that the transfer statute is covered by the eighth amendment and the 
proportionate penalties clause because it is punitive rather than procedural, defendant 
analogizes to ex post facto cases where transfer statutes have been deemed to be inherently 
punitive because they ultimately resulted in the imposition of harsher sentences on juveniles. 
United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 1987). We are not persuaded by 
defendant’s line of reasoning. 
¶ 103 
 
Just as due process cases cannot be resolved based solely on eighth amendment analyses, 
neither can eighth amendment issues be disposed of based solely on the rationale and 
standards applied in ex post facto cases. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272 n.7 (explaining that a 
constitutional attack based on one provision cannot be supported by decisions relying strictly 
on another provision). Defendant’s challenge is raised pursuant to the eighth amendment and 
Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause. It does not implicate ex post facto law, and, in any 
event, this court is not bound by decisions cited by defendant (People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 
107821, ¶ 32). 
¶ 104 
 
We also reject defendant’s assertion that the transfer statute effectively functions as a 
sentencing statute, particularly when applied with mandatory consecutive sentencing and 
“truth in sentencing” provisions. As this court has repeatedly explained, access to juvenile 
courts is not a constitutional right because the Illinois juvenile justice system is a creature of 
legislation. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d at 141; J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 402. Whether a defendant is tried in 
 
- 23 - 
 
juvenile or criminal court is purely a matter of procedure. City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 
Ill. 2d 456, 486 (2004) (Freeman, J., dissenting); P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 222. Even if we accept 
the assertion that a juvenile who is convicted in criminal court is always subject to a lengthier 
sentencing range and harsher prison conditions than if he had been adjudicated in juvenile 
court, defendant cites nothing that can convert a purely procedural statute into a punitive one. 
¶ 105 
 
This court has previously concluded that the purpose of the transfer statute is to protect 
the public from the most common violent crimes, not to punish a defendant. In enacting the 
automatic transfer statute, the legislature has reasonably deemed criminal court to be the 
proper trial setting for a limited group of older juveniles charged with at least one of five 
serious named felonies. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 403-04. Because we decline to second-guess the 
validity of the legislature’s judgment (P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 233), defendant has not convinced 
us to disregard our long held view that the transfer statute is purely procedural and now 
construe it to be punitive. As we stated in M.A., 124 Ill. 2d at 146, “The differences in 
treatment created by the statute in question is not in the penalty provided for different 
offenses.” The mere possibility that a defendant may receive a potentially harsher sentence if 
he is convicted in criminal court logically cannot change the underlying nature of a statute 
delineating the legislature’s determination that criminal court is the most appropriate trial 
setting in his case. We reject the connection between the transfer statute and the imposition 
of harsher punishment alleged by defendant as simply too attenuated to be persuasive. 
¶ 106 
 
Therefore, in the absence of actual punishment imposed by the transfer statute, 
defendant’s eighth amendment challenge cannot stand. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 671 n.40 (1977). Because the Illinois proportionate penalties clause is co-extensive with 
the eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause (In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 
510, 518 (2006)), we also reject defendant’s challenge under our state constitution. 
¶ 107 
 
Finally, defendant suggests that, at a minimum, the combination of the transfer statute 
and the applicable sentencing provisions is unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide 
offenders because they are “categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. Because defendant did not kill or 
intend to kill, he claims he has a “twice diminished moral culpability” and does not deserve 
the most severe punishments. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. Defendant asserts that youthfulness 
must be considered whenever “a harsh adult sentence” is given to a minor because juveniles’ 
distinctive traits are not crime-specific, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In 
support, defendant also cites Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 340-41, where this court found the 
imposition of a mandatory life sentence on a 15-year-old convicted of two counts of first 
degree murder based on accountability after an automatic transfer to adult court 
unconstitutional because the youth’s age and personal culpability were never considered. 
¶ 108 
 
Here, defendant was sentenced to 12 years in prison on each of three counts of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault. The sentences were required to be served consecutively 
(730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(ii) (West 2008)), and defendant was statutorily mandated to serve at 
least 85% of his total prison term (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2008)), or 30 years, 7 
months. Although lengthy, that term is not comparable to either the death penalty or “ ‘the 
second most severe penalty permitted by law,’ ” life in prison without parole (Graham, 560 
U.S. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.))). 
 
- 24 - 
 
The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished the latter sentences from any others, noting 
both the uniqueness of the “ ‘severity and irrevocability’ ” of the death penalty and the 
“characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences” besides life 
without parole. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) 
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). The Supreme Court has also instructed 
that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted 
of a nonhomicide crime,” but only to give those offenders “some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” expressly leaving the 
specific mechanism and means to each state. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Most recently, in 
Miller the Court reiterated the Graham rationale and emphasized the “unprecedented” nature 
of the Court’s expansion of its categorical ban to the imposition of life without parole for 
juveniles in nonhomicide cases. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
¶ 109 
 
Similarly, this court has unanimously declined to expand the narrow rule in Graham to 
all juveniles sentenced to life without parole for homicides. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 
¶¶ 48-49. Although defendant relies on Leon Miller, that decision is inapposite. There, we 
described the minor defendant as “the least culpable offender imaginable,” having been 
convicted of two murders solely on the theory of accountability. Nonetheless, he was subject 
to mandatory life in prison with no possibility of parole. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. In 
our ruling, we focused on the particular harshness and obvious lack of proportionality of that 
sentence in light of the unique facts of the case. We expressly: 
“agree[d] with defendant that a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no 
possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not 
accurately represent defendant’s personal culpability such that it shocks the moral 
sense of the community. This moral sense is particularly true, as in the case before us, 
where a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the 
incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never handled a gun, is 
subject to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole—the same sentence 
applicable to the actual shooter.” Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. 
Nonetheless, we refrained from barring the imposition of a life sentence on any juvenile 
offender, denying any implication “that a sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile 
offender convicted under a theory of accountability is never appropriate.” As we explained, 
“[i]t is certainly possible to contemplate a situation where a juvenile offender actively 
participated in the planning of a crime resulting in the death of two or more individuals, such 
that a sentence of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.” 
Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. 
¶ 110 
 
Accordingly, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have closely limited 
the application of the rationale expressed in Roper, Graham, and Miller, invoking it only in 
the context of the most severe of all criminal penalties. A prison term totalling 36 years for a 
juvenile who personally committed three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault does 
not fall into that category. We decline defendant’s invitation to extend the Supreme Court’s 
eighth amendment rationale to the facts of this case. 
¶ 111 
 
We do, however, share the concern expressed in both the Supreme Court’s recent case 
law and the dissent in this case over the absence of any judicial discretion in Illinois’s 
automatic transfer provision. While modern research has recognized the effect that the 
 
- 25 - 
 
unique qualities and characteristics of youth may have on juveniles’ judgment and actions 
(see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; infra ¶ 156), the automatic transfer provision does not. 
Indeed, the mandatory nature of that statute denies this reality. Accordingly, we strongly urge 
the General Assembly to review the automatic transfer provision based on the current 
scientific and sociological evidence indicating a need for the exercise of judicial discretion in 
determining the appropriate setting for the proceedings in these juvenile cases. 
 
¶ 112 
 
 
 
 
D. The Illinois Rape Shield Law 
¶ 113 
 
After reversing defendant’s convictions and remanding the cause for a new trial, the 
appellate court considered whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s request to 
introduce evidence of the victim’s sexual history under an exception to the Illinois rape 
shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7 (West 2008)). Following the rationale in People v. Anthony 
Roy W., 324 Ill. App. 3d 181 (2001), the court held that the exclusion of evidence that the 
victim had engaged in sexual intercourse with someone other than defendant in the days prior 
to the assault was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Consequently, the court directed the 
trial court to admit the evidence on retrial. 2012 IL App (1st) 101573, ¶ 49 (modified upon 
denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). 
¶ 114 
 
In examining evidentiary rulings, we apply a deferential standard of review, considering 
only whether they were an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. To establish an abuse of 
discretion, defendant must persuade us that the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence 
was “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable man would take the view 
adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 
395, 401 (2004). We have previously noted the “absolute” nature of the rape shield bar, 
subject only to two narrow statutory exceptions for “evidence concerning the past sexual 
conduct of the alleged victim [or corroborating witness] *** with the accused” and evidence 
that is “constitutionally required to be admitted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santos, 
211 Ill. 2d at 401. See also 725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 2008). 
¶ 115 
 
Here, the State’s argument against admission of the evidence relies on the similarities 
between this case and Santos, while defendant claims that this case more closely resembles 
Anthony. We find neither case to be dispositive here because both are factually 
distinguishable. 
¶ 116 
 
The true core of defendant’s argument is based on dicta in People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 
159, 185 (1990), stating that one “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” potentially satisfying the 
constitutional requirement exception to the rape shield statute is an offer of evidence 
providing an alternative explanation for the victim’s observed injuries. Here, the injury at 
issue was noted by the victim’s examining physician, who testified that she had “some” 
cervical redness that was “consistent with sexual intercourse.” In a sidebar, defense counsel 
requested permission “to go into whether or not sperm was found in [the victim’s] vagina, 
which would otherwise be protected by the rape shield, but [defendant] has a constitutional 
right, I think, to bring out that evidence when there’s an inference that she had recent sexual 
intercourse and he’s denying that he had sexual intercourse with her, and she had sexual 
intercourse, apparently, with someone else within 72 hours, knowing how far—that’s about 
how long sperm lasts.” 
 
- 26 - 
 
¶ 117 
 
In ruling on the request, the trial judge noted that the physician testified to the presence of 
some redness but “did not say it was the result of a rape. He did not even trace it back to this 
incident.” The trial court added that “[i]t would be different *** if we were in a situation if 
he said he found some injury that was consistent with forced sexual act within the last few 
hours. Then we’d be in a different ballpark, so I think based on how he’s described it and 
how he described the significance or insignificance of that finding to this jury. Respectfully 
your request is denied.” The appellate court, however, reversed that ruling and permitted 
defendant, “on retrial, if the State introduces any evidence of [the victim’s] physical 
condition to show that she had intercourse within a day or two of the medical examination.” 
2012 IL App (1st) 101573, ¶ 49 (modified upon denial of rehearing Sept. 26, 2012). 
¶ 118 
 
Before this court, the State argues that defendant failed to provide adequate support for 
his request to admit the evidence under the rape shield exception to create an appealable 
issue (People v. Maxwell, 2011 IL App (4th) 100434, ¶¶ 76-87; People v. Grant, 232 Ill. App. 
3d 93, 103-05 (1992)). We agree in light of the important purpose underlying the rape shield 
statute, namely “to prevent the defendant from harassing and humiliating the prosecutrix at 
trial with evidence of *** specific acts of sexual conduct with persons other than the 
defendant” (Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 180). To preserve a claim on appeal, a party is required 
to make “considerably detailed and specific” offers of proof after a denial of a request to 
admit evidence if the substance of the witness’s answer is unclear. See People v. Peeples, 155 
Ill. 2d 422, 457 (1993). 
¶ 119 
 
Here, the only support offered for defense counsel’s proffered evidence was his 
speculation that the victim’s cervical inflammation occurred three days before the assault 
because sperm could persist for 72 hours. No medical testimony was offered to back up 
counsel’s bare assertion, and counsel did not take the opportunity to ask the examining 
physician, or any other expert, questions about the general persistence of cervical 
inflammation that could have provided a sufficiently detailed offer of proof. 
¶ 120 
 
Although defendant asserts the futility of asking additional questions because the 
examining physician had already testified that he could not tell when the injury occurred, our 
review of the record contradicts defendant’s position. On cross-examination, the examining 
physician was asked, “You don’t know exactly when [the cervical inflammation] occurred; is 
that correct, sir?” The physician responded, “I don’t know when that occurred.” Contrary to 
defendant’s contention, the physician’s response did not establish that he had a medical 
opinion on whether the redness could have persisted for three days. The question asked only 
if the witness could tell “exactly when” the inflammation occurred. 
¶ 121 
 
This distinction was not lost on defense counsel, who later used the inconclusive nature 
of the physician’s testimony to establish his theory of the case during closing arguments. 
Defense counsel asserted that the cervical redness: 
“could be caused by anything. It could be a rash. I don’t know. The doctor says 
there’s a redness in the cervix, and it could be caused by consensual or nonconsensual 
sex. Consensual or nonconsensual sex, when? The doctor didn’t say. Within the last 
three hours, within the last ten hours, the last three days, the last four days? How does 
that prove he had sex with her? It doesn’t. It’s meaningless.” 
¶ 122 
 
During his closing argument, counsel also noted the absence of any DNA from 
defendant, arguing “the greatest meaning of anything in this case is no DNA. Don’t let them 
 
- 27 - 
 
kid you about that. They can find DNA from saliva on a chicken bone that’s six months old 
after you chew on it. There’s no DNA in this case. And according to them, he’s all over her. 
He’s all over her. She can’t move.” After reviewing the testimony elicited from the witnesses 
and defense counsel’s closing argument, we conclude that, as in Sandoval, the trial court’s 
exclusion of the evidence of the victim’s sexual history did not prevent defendant from 
presenting the jury with his theory of the case. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 181.  
¶ 123 
 
Before this court, defendant also argues that the medical sources cited in the State’s brief 
indicate cervical inflammation could, in fact, last three days. It was, however, defense 
counsel’s burden to provide a sufficiently detailed offer of proof at trial, not months or years 
later on appeal. See People v. Canulli, 341 Ill. App. 3d 361, 367-68 (2003) (stating that 
appellate review is limited to the record on appeal). When reviewing an evidentiary ruling for 
an abuse of discretion, common sense dictates that we evaluate the exercise of that discretion 
in light of the evidence actually before the trial judge. Without a sufficient offer of proof, the 
trial court could not have known if any witness would have testified that the victim’s cervical 
redness could have persisted for three days or the possible underlying basis for that opinion. 
Because defendant did not provide a sufficient offer of proof, defendant’s claim that the trial 
court erred in denying his evidentiary request is not subject to review. See Peeples, 155 Ill. 
2d at 457-58 (explaining courts’ inability to review appeal when an offer of proof is not 
“considerably detailed and specific,” leaving the substance and basis of the witness’s 
testimony unclear). Therefore, we reject the portion of the appellate court opinion instructing 
the trial court to admit on remand the evidence requested by defendant. 
 
 
¶ 124 
 
 
 
 
E. The Excessive Sentence Claim 
¶ 125 
 
Lastly, because this court declined to grant defendant relief from his convictions or 
sentence on another basis, he asks that this cause be remanded to the appellate court for 
initial consideration of his excessive-sentence claim. The appellate court did not reach that 
issue in its prior judgment, and we agree with defendant that it should decide that question on 
remand from this court. 
 
¶ 126 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 127 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the police made a reasonable attempt to contact a 
concerned adult on behalf of the juvenile defendant, as required by section 5-405(2) of the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 2008)), the youth officer’s 
conduct was not improper, and the trial court did not err by admitting defendant’s inculpatory 
statement. We also conclude that defendant failed to establish the prejudice necessary to 
show that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance during the hearing on the motion to 
suppress defendant’s statement. We reject defendant’s constitutional challenges to Illinois’s 
mandatory juvenile transfer provision (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008)). Finally, we 
determine that, contrary to dicta in the appellate court judgment, the trial court properly 
applied the Illinois rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 2008)) to deny 
defendant’s request to introduce evidence of the victim’s sexual history. Accordingly, we 
reverse the appellate court judgment. We remand the cause to the appellate court for 
 
- 28 - 
 
consideration of defendant’s claim that his sentence is excessive. 
 
¶ 128 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 129 
 
Cause remanded. 
 
¶ 130 
 
JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting: 
¶ 131 
 
I join my colleagues in parts II.A., II.B., II.C.1, II.D., and II.E. of the majority opinion. I 
do not join them in part II.C.2. I believe that the excluded jurisdiction provision, or automatic 
transfer statute, of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2008)) 
violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) 
and article I, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). 
¶ 132 
 
The eighth amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (see 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam)), forbids “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” Article I, section 11 requires, “All penalties shall be determined both according 
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The first part of our constitutional clause is related 
to its federal counterpart (see People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 455-56 (1995); People v. 
Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40), and both concern punishment or penalties. According to the 
majority, the plain language of those clauses essentially decides this case. The majority 
asserts that because “neither clause applies unless a punishment or penalty has been 
imposed” (supra ¶ 101), and “the purpose of the transfer statute is to protect the public from 
the most common violent crimes, not to punish” (supra ¶ 105), the defendant’s eighth 
amendment challenge fails. The majority’s approach is ostensibly based upon a brief 
statement in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 404 (1984), where the court sketched, and 
accepted as reasonable, the State’s offer of a possible rationale for the statute. The majority’s 
approach also tracks that of the appellate court in a string of recent cases. See, e.g., People v. 
Jackson, 2012 IL App (1st) 100398, ¶ 24 (“The automatic transfer provision does not dictate 
any form of punishment as that term is used throughout criminal statutes.”); People v. Salas, 
2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68. 
¶ 133 
 
In my view, that approach is overly simplistic, and elevates form over substance. The 
automatic transfer statute may indeed protect the public, but it does so by mandatorily 
placing juveniles in criminal court based only on their offenses, and thereby exposing them 
to vastly higher adult sentences and, in effect, punishing them. “[T]he true impact and 
frequently articulated goal of transfer proceedings” is “to subject the juvenile offender to the 
harsher sentencing scheme only available in the adult justice system.” Jenny E. Carroll, 
Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Apprendi, 
Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 Hastings L.J. 175, 180-81 (2009); see People v. 
P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 231 (1991) (asserting that the purpose of the “gang transfer” provision 
of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is decreasing the level of gang violence “by increasing the 
likelihood of criminal prosecution and sentencing”). 
¶ 134 
 
“ ‘Adult time for adult crimes’ became the rallying cry for politicians across the country, 
leading to changes in the law in almost every jurisdiction between 1992 and 1999. These 
laws extended adult court jurisdiction over youths by lowering the age requirement for adult 
court prosecution, expanding the range of offenses which could subject a juvenile to adult 
 
- 29 - 
 
prosecution, and shifting the decision over who remains in juvenile court and who goes to the 
criminal court from judges to prosecutors or legislators.” Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, 
Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 257, 
265 (2007). 
¶ 135 
 
At the leading edge of that wave of such laws, our original automatic transfer statute, and 
the precursor to section 5-130, was enacted in 1982. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982, ch. 37, 
¶ 702-7(6)(a) (recodified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, ¶ 805-4(6)(a)). There were spirited 
debates in both houses of the General Assembly. These debates are highly relevant in 
divining the purpose behind the statute. See People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1991). 
They leave little doubt that legislators—both supporters of the bill and supporters of the 
amendments—considered the statute to be punitive. 
¶ 136 
 
In the Senate, Senator Dawn Clark Netsch offered an amendment to the bill that 
ultimately became the automatic transfer statute. Senator Netsch’s amendment did not 
disagree with “the basic premise that there are a number of juveniles who are violent 
offenders, and who ought not to be subjected, if you will, to the juvenile court system but 
ought to be a part of the regular criminal court system.” 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 
Proceedings, May 26, 1982, at 34. Instead, the amendment would have substituted automatic 
transfers for certain violent felonies with automatic hearings before juvenile court judges, 
who would exercise discretion in deciding where a juvenile would be tried. Id. She stated, 
“[P]hilosophically, it seems to me that there ought to be some review by the presiding 
juvenile judge and that is what this amendment is intended to offer as an option.” Id. at 35. 
¶ 137 
 
Senator Bowers, speaking against an amendment, suggested, “if you want to call them 
juveniles, and if you want to pretend they’re juveniles, that’s fine, but under today’s society 
and today’s societal acts that these people are committing, I don’t think they ought to be 
treated that way.” Id. at 38. Senator Collins, speaking for an amendment, stated, “I, for one, 
do not want to coddle criminals … hardened criminals, and I do realize the necessity for us to 
try and do something about *** those youths who get away under disguise of being youth, 
and who commit[ ] serious and hideous crime.” Id. at 40. Also in support of an amendment, 
Senator DeAngelis talked about perceptions: “In this particular instance, with the way the bill 
is right now, it’s perceived that this is going to offer greater punishment to the juvenile[s] 
because they have committed a more severe crime.” Id. at 43. And Senator Netsch, in 
closing, insisted that the amendment was not “soft-on-crime.” Id. at 44. 
¶ 138 
 
The debate in the House of Representatives was longer and, at times, more emotional. 
Representative Getty offered an amendment similar to Senator Netsch’s amendment, which 
would have created a rebuttable presumption in favor of transfer, but would also have given 
juvenile court judges some discretion over transfer decisions. 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House 
Proceedings, June 23, 1982, at 138. 
¶ 139 
 
Representative Daniels, speaking against an amendment to the bill, offered an example: 
“ ‘If a fifteen-year-old is convicted of murder under the Juvenile Act, the max 
sentence he can get is a period of six years, and with good time off, he’ll serve three 
years’ time for a murder—three years’ time. *** I recall a conversation that I had 
with [then-Cook County State’s Attorney] Rich[ard] Daley last year, *** and he said 
to me, *** “crime sure is a real problem in this country today, but the crime that I fear 
 
- 30 - 
 
the most is the crime that’s being committed today by the juveniles ***”.’ ” Id. at 
142-43. 
¶ 140 
 
Representative Johnson had similar thoughts: 
“ ‘[J]uvenile justice, juvenile crime, is an absolute joke in Illinois and around the 
country. *** The purpose of this Bill *** is to say to the people of Illinois, and we 
hope the same example is followed nation-wide, that the victims of a juvenile rapist, 
armed robber or murderer are just as victimized as if the fortuitous situation 
[occurred] where the perpetrator of the crime was eighteen years of age. It’s an 
absolute necessity that we have a mandatory transfer. *** [O]nce charged, a rapist, an 
armed robber, a murderer and so forth, ought to be charged as an adult and tried as an 
adult, and handled, except for incarceration purposes, through the adult criminal 
justice system ***.’ ” Id. at 144-45. 
¶ 141 
 
Representative Kosinski, speaking against an amendment, had “ ‘little sympathy for some 
juveniles today, who through sophistication of the media *** and the education of their 
peers—are hiding behind the realities of our law. I think it’s abominable that we permit this 
to occur, and on that basis, I feel we should have an extremely strong Bill’ ” with automatic 
transfers, and not automatic hearings. Id. at 145. Representative Stearney, also speaking 
against an amendment, was more stark in his comments: 
“ ‘A young person, a 15 or 16 year old *** values no life whatsoever; he’ll take my 
life simply to get a few dollars. That is the person that we must take off the streets. If 
we’re going to have a semblance of organized society in the large metropolitan areas 
of this state, we’ve got to remove the juvenile offender, that person that is committing 
serious crimes ***.’ ” Id. at 148-49. 
¶ 142 
 
Representative Bullock echoed that theme, which he called a “law and order issue,” 
stating: 
“ ‘I’m going to vote to take kids like that off the street before they hurt my kid and 
someone’s else’s kid. And I think that if a kid, 15 year old, takes a shotgun and goes 
out and robs someone, that he ought to be treated the same way we treat an adult; and 
that’s to put him in jail, throw the key away, and we won’t have to worry about that 
menace any more.’ ” Id. at 150-51. 
¶ 143 
 
Representative Ewell also touched upon that, but in the context of prison space: 
“ ‘In fact, if you have to triple the space, you’ll triple the space in order to eliminate 
this heinous crime. *** Murder, rape, armed robbery, and deviate sexual assault are 
indeed acts that ought to be transferred automatically, so the message would go, not 
to the people who are dead and not to the victims, but to the people who commit these 
heinous offenses.’ ” Id. at 153-54. 
¶ 144 
 
And Representative Bowman, speaking for a fiscal note on the bill, noted that the 
proponents of the bill asserted that it would send many more juveniles into the criminal 
justice system: “ ‘They are the ones who are suggesting this is going to keep more criminals 
off the street.’ ” Id. at 162. 
¶ 145 
 
In the final debate on the bill, Representative Frederick mentioned that Representative 
Getty’s amendment would have “ ‘allowed a modicum of individualization, rather than carte 
blanche transfer of all juveniles involved in very serious crime.’ ” But she insisted that all 
House members still “ ‘want to see juveniles who commit serious adult crimes such as 
 
- 31 - 
 
murder and rape *** brought to justice.’ ” 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 24, 
1982, at 70. 
¶ 146 
 
Representative Bullock spoke in favor of the bill: 
“ ‘[W]hat we’re talking about in this legislation is providing once and for all a clear 
statement of intent and a clear statement of principle to the victims of crime, not only 
in Cook County, but in the State of Illinois. *** And what we say in effect is that 
those individuals who are street-wise juveniles should be given the same type of 
consideration before a bar of justice, of an adult who is street-wise and happens not to 
be a juvenile. *** We are not going to allow *** street-wise juveniles to enter into 
these acts and not be punished accordingly.’ ” Id. at 71-72. 
¶ 147 
 
Representative Reilly agreed, focusing on the main point of the bill—automatic transfer: 
“ ‘A kid, fifteen, sixteen years old who’s committed a murder, who’s committed a rape, 
who’s committed a very serious crime, is not a kid in the sense that we ought to be concerned 
about that.’ ” Id. at 73. 
¶ 148 
 
Representative Currie summarized the intent of the bill’s sponsors, who were “ ‘selling 
this as a measure that will get tough on juvenile crime.’ ” Id. at 74. And Representative 
Henry explained his vote like this: 
“ ‘I’m amazed at those who are against this Bill. I would like to know how many 
youngsters in their districts are committing murder, raping *** senior citizens, 
robbing the poor, and *** dealing dope in their communities. I would just like to 
know, because I’m sick and tired of bleeding hearts telling me, and telling some of 
my friends what we can and we cannot support. I would like to take some of those 
juveniles, those tough juveniles, and transport them all to their districts and let them 
deal with them.’ ” Id. at 79. 
¶ 149 
 
Even after its initial enactment, the punitive focus of the automatic transfer statute 
remained unchanged. In the debates surrounding the bill that later became Public Act 91-15, 
which added aggravated battery with a firearm on or around school property to the list of 
enumerated offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, the House sponsor, 
Representative Schmitz, agreed with Representative Turner that its purpose was to obtain 
“very meaningful” and “strict” prosecution—essentially, to “get tough on crime” and 
juveniles who use or bring guns to school. 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 4, 
1999, at 13-14. Representative Turner even queried why anyone “ ‘would not be totally 
supportive of transferring these kinds of cases to the adult court where they can be reckoned 
with on a harsh basis because they should be dealt with on a harsh basis.’ ” Id. at 14. Further, 
a bill like the one that became Public Act 98-61, which left all automatic transfers in place, 
“ ‘is not, in fact, soft on crime.’ ” 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 16, 2013, 
at 48 (statements of Representative Currie). 
¶ 150 
 
These euphemisms indisputably mean punishment, and, in the minds of the legislators on 
either side of the proverbial aisle, so do automatic transfers. Other courts have recognized 
this for years. Defendant relies upon United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 
1987). There, a 15-year-old juvenile was charged with three murders on a Marine base. At 
the time of the offenses, the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act did not allow the government 
to prosecute minors as adults. Congress then amended the statute to provide for transfers. The 
 
- 32 - 
 
federal district court determined that the amended statute could be applied retroactively 
because it was a procedural change in the law. 
¶ 151 
 
The federal circuit court disagreed, holding that the amended statute could not be applied 
retroactively because it plainly imposed greater, more burdensome, and more onerous 
punishment by exposing the juvenile to a much more severe sentence. Id. at 470. The court 
explained: 
“The 1984 amendment is ‘procedural’ only in the most superficial, formal sense, in 
that it authorizes the government to move to ‘transfer’ the juvenile to the district court 
for trial as an adult. Such a ‘transfer’ is no mere change in venue ***; it is instead a 
means by which to impose on certain juveniles the harsher sentences applicable to 
adults. The significance of the ‘transfer’ is not that the transferred defendant must 
appear in a different court, the district court, and defend himself according to the 
procedural rules of the district court instead of those of a juvenile court. Rather, its 
significance is that the transferred defendant is suddenly subject to much more severe 
punishment. Only by closing one’s eyes to the actual effect of the transfer can one 
label this radical increase in the applicable punishment a procedural change.” Id. at 
471. 
¶ 152 
 
Accord Helton v. Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1045 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that “it is 
indisputable that [the defendant’s] punishment was increased as a result of the waiver of 
juvenile court jurisdiction”); Saucedo v. Superior Court, 946 P.2d 908, 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1997). 
¶ 153 
 
The majority rejects defendant’s line of reasoning, but not on its merits. The majority has 
chosen to remain blind to the true effect of automatic transfers on the grounds that that effect 
was observed in ex post facto clause cases. But the holdings in those cases are not so easily 
cabined, and their reasoning is persuasive. The key is not whether the defendant here has 
raised an ex post facto clause challenge to the automatic transfer statute, but whether that 
provision is punitive. In my view, it is. 
¶ 154 
 
That conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. What makes the automatic transfer 
statute unconstitutional is not that it is punishment, but that it runs afoul of “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality op.). Here is where Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012), enter our conversation. Those cases have incrementally led to a general rule that 
“youth matters,” so statutes with mandatory sentencing consequences for juveniles that fail to 
account for their diminished culpability and individual characteristics are constitutionally 
infirm. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. That rule, I believe, dictates the proper outcome of 
this case. 
¶ 155 
 
In Roper, the Supreme Court considered whether the eighth amendment prohibited 
capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder. The Court stated that the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause, like other expansive language of the constitution, “must be 
interpreted according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent.” Roper, 543 
U.S. at 560. To do so, the Court reiterated that it must refer to “ ‘the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so 
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” Id. at 561 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01). 
 
- 33 - 
 
According to the Court, the beginning point of the analysis is “a review of objective indicia 
of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures” regarding the 
challenged punishment, followed by an exercise of independent judgment as to whether that 
punishment is indeed disproportionate. Id. at 564. 
¶ 156 
 
The Supreme Court determined that there was a national consensus against capital 
sentences for juveniles, shown by the fact that 30 states prohibited the juvenile death penalty, 
and the other 20 states practiced it infrequently. Id. at 564-67. The Court then turned to the 
other part of its analysis: its own judgment about the proportionality of capital sentences for 
juveniles. Capital sentences should be reserved for those offenders whose extreme culpability 
warrants such a sanction (id. at 568), but “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 
18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among 
the worst offenders” (id. at 569). 
“First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies *** tend to 
confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are 
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the 
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.’ Johnson [v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)]; see also Eddings [v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)] (‘Even the normal 16-year-old customarily 
lacks the maturity of an adult’). It has been noted that ‘adolescents are 
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.’ Arnett, 
Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental 
Rev. 339 (1992). *** 
 
The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. Eddings, [455 
U.S.] at 115 (‘[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of 
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage’). This is explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have 
less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment. See 
Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. 
Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003) *** (‘[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom 
that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting’). 
 
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed 
as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. 
See generally E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968).” Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569-70. 
¶ 157 
 
According to the Court, these differences militate against any conclusion that juveniles 
fall among the worst offenders, and their “diminished culpability” means the penological 
justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—apply to them with less 
force. Id. at 570-71. As for retribution, the Court noted that if most adult murderers are not 
culpable enough to receive capital sentences, juvenile murderers certainly are not: 
“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity.” Id. at 571. As for deterrence, the Court noted that it remains unclear whether the 
 
- 34 - 
 
death penalty factors into the calculus of juvenile murders: “[T]he absence of evidence of 
deterrent effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles 
less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” 
Id. 
¶ 158 
 
In Graham, the Court considered whether the eighth amendment prohibited 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. The Court 
stated that its eighth amendment jurisprudence could be broken into two groups: cases 
involving specific challenges to term-of-years sentences, and cases involving general 
challenges to the propriety of certain sentences for certain offenders. Graham, 560 U.S. at 
59. The second group has typically concerned the death penalty. Id. at 60. In that context, the 
Court has outlawed capital sentences for defendants guilty of nonhomicide offenses, as well 
as for defendants who fall into certain categories, including juveniles. Id. at 61 (citing Roper, 
543 U.S. 551). The analysis used in the cases adopting categorical bans on capital sentences 
has two steps: The Court initially considers objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
expressed in legislation across the country regarding such sentences, then it exercises its own 
independent judgment about the constitutionality of such sentences. Id. 
¶ 159 
 
The Court found only a mild consensus against life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles guilty of nonhomicide offenses, but noted that it faced a similar situation more than 
20 years earlier in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality op.), where it 
concluded that capital sentences for juveniles under age 16 violated the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause. Graham, 560 U.S. at 66. There, and relevant to the case before us, a 
plurality of the Court stated that the fact that many states considered juveniles between ages 
15 and 18 old enough to be tried in criminal court did not mean those states had made a 
judgment about what sentences those juveniles should receive. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 
U.S. at 826 n.24). The Court stated: 
“Many States have chosen to move away from juvenile court systems and to allow 
juveniles to be transferred to, or charged directly in, adult court under certain 
circumstances. Once in adult court, a juvenile offender may receive the same sentence 
as would be given to an adult offender, including a life without parole sentence. But 
the fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without parole possible for 
some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many States 
intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences. 
 
*** [T]he statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole does 
not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express, and full 
legislative consideration.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 66-67. 
¶ 160 
 
The Court then turned to its own task of interpreting the eighth amendment. That task 
requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders in light of their crimes and 
characteristics, the severity of the sentence, and the sentence’s relation to “legitimate 
penological goals,” including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 
67, 71. The Court returned to Roper, and reiterated that juveniles have less culpability than 
adults: they generally display a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, making them more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures. Id. 
at 68 (discussing Roper). Juveniles should not be absolved of their transgressions, but they 
 
- 35 - 
 
are not as morally reprehensible, and, consequently, not as deserving of the most severe 
punishments. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835). The Court emphasized: 
“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain 
involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. [Citations.] 
Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely 
to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults. 
Roper, 543 U.S., at 570. It remains true that ‘[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.’ Ibid.” Id. 
The Court also observed that a life-without-parole sentence is the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law. Id. at 69. 
¶ 161 
 
Turning to penological goals, the Court stated that retribution could not support 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles: The case for retribution is just not as strong with 
a minor as with an adult. Id. at 71 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571). The Court further stated 
that deterrence could not support such a sentence because juveniles are less likely to consider 
possible punishment when making decisions due to their impulsiveness and impetuosity. Id. 
at 72. Regarding incapacitation, the Court stated, “To justify life without parole on the 
assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society requires the 
sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles 
make that judgment questionable.” Id. at 72-73. Stated differently, “ ‘incorrigibility is 
inconsistent with youth.’ ” Id. at 73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 
378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)). Finally, the Court stated that rehabilitation cannot justify a 
life-without-parole sentence because the penalty “forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal.” Id. at 74. Such a judgment is not appropriate in light of juveniles’ capacity for change. 
Id. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and 
self-recognition of human worth and potential. Id. at 79. The Court concluded that an 
offender’s age is relevant to the eighth amendment, and “criminal procedure laws that fail to 
take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Id. at 76. 
¶ 162 
 
In Miller, the Court considered whether the eighth amendment prohibited mandatory 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles who commit murder. The Court began by 
examining two lines of precedent: the categorical ban cases like Roper and Graham, and 
capital cases where the Court has required the sentence to consider the characteristics of the 
defendant and the circumstances of the offense before imposing the death penalty. According 
to the Court, Roper and Graham establish that “children are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Those cases 
relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, juveniles lack of maturity 
and a developed sense of responsibility. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569). Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences, so they lack the 
ability to extricate themselves from crime-producing settings. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
Third, juveniles lack well formed and fixed characters, and their actions are not indicative of 
irretrievable depravity. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Those were not only supported by 
common sense, but also by social science. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. The Court noted that 
“none of what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental 
 
- 36 - 
 
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific. *** So Graham’s reasoning 
implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar 
relates only to nonhomicide offenses.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In short, “youth 
matters” in determining the appropriateness of a life-without-parole sentence. Id. at ___, 132 
S. Ct. at 2465. 
¶ 163 
 
The Court stated that the mandatory penalty schemes there prevented the sentencer from 
taking account of these central considerations: 
“By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same 
life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws prohibit a sentencing 
authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment 
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham’s (and also 
Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on 
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” Id. at ___, 132 
S. Ct. at 2466. 
¶ 164 
 
The Court concluded that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate 
the eighth amendment (id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469), but insisted that its holding, while 
flowing from its holdings in Roper and Graham, was not a categorical bar like those imposed 
there (id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471). Instead, the Court mandated only that the sentencer 
consider an offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing such a penalty. 
Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. By treating every juvenile as an adult, the sentencer “misses 
too much,” including the juvenile’s chronological age and immaturity, his family and home 
environment, and his degree of participation in the offense, as well as the fact that he might 
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for his own incompetencies—“for 
example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors *** or his incapacity to 
assist his own attorneys.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
¶ 165 
 
The Court rejected the states’ arguments that a national consensus in favor of mandatory 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles exists. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. As it did in 
Graham, the Court downplayed the fact that a majority of states allow such sentences. Id. at 
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. “[S]imply counting them would present a distorted view,” because 
most of those states do not have separate penalty provisions for juveniles tried in criminal 
court and impose penalties regardless of age. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. And the presence 
of discretion in some states’ transfer statutes does not make the consensus stronger because 
many states use mandatory transfer systems: 
“Of the 29 relevant jurisdictions, about half place at least some juvenile homicide 
offenders in adult court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer 
to juvenile court. Moreover, several States at times lodge this decision exclusively in 
the hands of prosecutors, again with no statutory mechanism for judicial reevaluation. 
And those prosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent regarding standards, 
protocols, or appropriate considerations for decisionmaking.” (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2474. 
Notably, the Court cited, not approvingly, section 5-130 as one of the automatic transfer 
statutes. See id. at ___ n.15, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.15. 
¶ 166 
 
In those three cases, the Court outlined the proper analysis for reviewing the 
constitutionality of the automatic transfer statute under the cruel and unusual punishment 
 
- 37 - 
 
clause and the proportionate penalties clause. First, the court must consider objective indicia 
of society’s standards, as expressed in legislation across the country regarding automatic 
transfers. Second, the court must exercise its own independent judgment and consider the 
culpability of juveniles subject to that provision, the severity of their sentences due to that 
provision, and the legitimate penological goals behind that provision—that is, how well it 
serves the state’s interest in the four goals that the Supreme Court has recognized as 
legitimate: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 71 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality op.)). 
¶ 167 
 
On the first point, society’s standards have changed since 1982, when the General 
Assembly first passed the automatic transfer statute. As the Supreme Court stated in Miller, 
Illinois is now one of only 14 states with statutes that fail to provide juveniles with an 
opportunity to seek transfer back to juvenile court, a fact of which the Supreme Court is 
aware. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ n.15, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.15.1 Additionally, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures has observed legislative initiatives between 2001 and 2011 
that “reflect the trend in states to treat and rehabilitate youth in the juvenile justice system 
instead of sending them to the more punitive-oriented adult system.” Sarah A. Brown, Nat’l 
Conf. of St. Legislatures, Trends in Juvenile Justice State Legislation: 2001-2011 5 (2012), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf. See Neelum Arya, 
Campaign for Youth Just., State Trends: Legislative Victories From 2005 to 2010 Removing 
Youth From the Adult Criminal Justice System 33 (2011), available at http://www.campaign 
foryouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf (documenting a trend in 10 
states to change transfer laws); see also People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 53 
(“we see a nationwide trend developing to treat juvenile offenders differently than adult 
offenders”).2 
¶ 168 
 
On the second point, an exercise of our independent judgment must be informed by 
Roper, Graham, and Miller. Regarding culpability, every statement that the Court made 
about juveniles, their psychological traits, and their developmental paths applies with as 
much force in this case as those. Juveniles, like the defendant, are less culpable than adults. 
Compared to adults, they lack maturity and a developed sense of responsibility. See Roper, 
543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
Compared to adults, they are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures 
from family and peers, and have little control over their own environments. See Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. And 
compared to adults, their characters are not well formed, their traits are less fixed, and their 
behavior is less indicative of irretrievable depravity or irreparable corruption. Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
                                                 
 
1As amici inform us, that number shrinks further in cases involving offenses that correspond with 
aggravated criminal sexual assault in Illinois because only ten of those states allow automatic transfers 
for such offenses. 
 
2That trend has reached Illinois. A bill to repeal section 5-130 is currently pending in the Illinois 
House of Representatives. See 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 4538, 2013 Sess. The bill, introduced 
by Representative Nekritz and co-sponsored by seven other legislators, was approved by the House 
Judiciary Committee in March, and has been re-referred to the House Rules Committee. Clearly, some 
members of the General Assembly see the need for change. 
 
- 38 - 
 
¶ 169 
 
Those decisions rely not only upon common sense, but also social science. Studies have 
shown differences in adult and juvenile minds. The transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and 
inability to assess consequences that mark the latter both lessen juveniles’ moral culpability 
and enhance their prospects for reform. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; 
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65. 
¶ 170 
 
Regarding sentence severity, Roper, Graham, and Miller are not “crime-specific” (Miller, 
567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465), but neither are they sentence-specific. Juveniles are less 
deserving of harsh punishments (see Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 
567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464), particularly when those punishments are mandatory, and 
the legislature has robbed the sentencer of the ability to consider a juvenile’s individual 
characteristics in assessing whether such a punishment is proportionate to the offense. Id. at 
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (“Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike 
teach that in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats 
every child as an adult.”). That is what the automatic transfer statute does. The constitutional 
infirmity with the statute is not that it exposes juveniles to adult sentences, but that it operates 
automatically for those juveniles charged with certain offenses. 
¶ 171 
 
I am not suggesting that a categorical ban on all transfers is required. Just as there are 
conceivable cases in which a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile is appropriate (see 
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469), there are cases in which criminal court is the 
proper venue and a sentence under the Unified Code of Corrections is clearly appropriate. 
But, after Miller, that determination should be made on an individual basis. In his dissent in 
People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶¶ 98-99 (Appleton, J., dissenting), appeal 
allowed, No. 116402 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013), Justice Appleton aptly commented: 
“While there are juvenile offenders who may, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, be eligible for adult prosecution, an automatic transfer provision based 
on age and offense alone, without consideration of the wide variance in the maturity, 
sophistication, intelligence, and social adjustment of any particular juvenile offender, 
cannot pass constitutional muster. *** 
 
To be sure, our legislature recognized the increase in violent, homicidal crime 
committed by juvenile offenders and sought to address that problem. I believe it is the 
blanket transfer based on age that is the flaw in the legislature’s response. Such 
decisions are better made on the circumstances of the offender as well as the offense. 
In that sense, we should look to both the crime and the nature of the criminal.” 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶ 172 
 
Additionally, I recognize that the sentences available for the felonies enumerated under 
the automatic transfer statute are not as serious as those addressed by the Supreme Court, at 
least pursuant to our decision in People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 (holding that Miller applies 
retroactively). But we should still consider the fact that, if convicted as adults, juveniles are 
much more likely not only to receive heavier sentences than they would have in juvenile 
court, but also to receive sentences subject to enhancements and other rules. This defendant 
is a good example. As a 15-year-old, he was convicted on three counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault, sentenced to three mandatory consecutive 12-year terms for a total 
term of 36 years’ imprisonment, and, under truth-in-sentencing rules, must serve 85% of that 
term, or 30.6 years. He will be eligible for release after his 45th birthday, and the prospects 
 
- 39 - 
 
of him becoming a useful member of society will be greatly diminished. See also People v. 
Jenkins, 2013 IL App (1st) 103006-U, appeal allowed, No. 115979 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013) 
(involving an automatic transfer for murder and a 45-year sentence due to a mandatory 
firearm add-on and truth-in-sentencing rules); Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, appeal 
allowed, No. 116402 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013) (involving an automatic transfer for murder based 
on accountability, and a 30-year sentence with no good-time credit due to truth-in-sentencing 
rules); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (holding that lengthy term-of-years 
sentences are sufficient to trigger “Miller-type protections”); State v. Lyle, No. 11-1339, 2014 
WL 3537026 (Iowa Sept. 30, 2014) (holding that mandatory minimum sentences for 
juveniles tried in criminal court violate the state constitution’s provision against cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
¶ 173 
 
As for the four legitimate penological goals, Graham again is instructive. The case for 
retribution is not as strong for juveniles. Additionally, as early as 1996, one commentator had 
already criticized the inability of Illinois’s transfer provisions to isolate serious offenders, as 
well as the ineffectiveness of those provisions in sanctioning offenders. Elizabeth E. Clarke, 
A Case for Reinventing Juvenile Transfer, 47 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 3, 4 (Nov. 1996). Back then, 
automatic transfer provisions resulted in criminal court proceedings against minors “who are, 
more often than not, determined not to be dangerous enough to warrant imposition of a 
prison term.” Id. at 19. The statistics have remained largely the same, so that now “[t]he 
majority of cases automatically transferred end up convicted for lesser offenses, offenses that 
could not have triggered transfer.” See Automatic Adult Prosecution of Children in Cook 
County, Illinois. 2010-2012 (Juv. Just. Initiative, Evanston, Ill.), Apr. 2014, at 3, available at 
http://jjustice.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Automatic-Adult-Prosecution-of-Children-i
n-Cook-County-IL.pdf (hereinafter Automatic Adult Prosecution). 
¶ 174 
 
Similarly, the case for deterrence is not as strong for juveniles. As early as 1993, this 
court’s own Special Commission on the Administration of Justice (the Solovy Commission) 
reported that an increasing number of juveniles were transferred to criminal court in the first 
ten years of the automatic transfer regime without a corresponding deterrent effect, but with a 
corresponding negative impact on minority children. See Ill. S. Ct. Special Comm’n on the 
Admin. of Justice, Final Report Part II (December 1993). The Solovy Commission even 
recommended that the General Assembly consider a “waiver back” provision and an 
elimination of mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles in automatic transfer cases. Id. 
And those conclusions have only gained support. See Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles 
as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, Juv. Offenders & Victims Nat’l 
Rep. Series (Off. of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 26, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (“the weight of the evidence suggests that 
state transfer laws have little or no tendency to deter would-be juvenile criminals”); Richard 
E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, Juv. Just. Bull. 
(Off. of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, D.C.), June 2010, at 4, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf (“the bulk of the empirical evidence 
suggests that transfer laws, as currently implemented, probably have little general deterrent 
effect on would-be juvenile offenders”). 
¶ 175 
 
Regarding incapacitation, incarcerating all juveniles charged with felonies enumerated in 
the transfer statute for lengthy adult sentences is little more than a judgment that they will 
remain a danger for that entire period, and are essentially incorrigible. Further, the 
 
- 40 - 
 
rehabilitative services available in juvenile detention are at least as helpful as those in the 
adult prison system. A 2007 study by the federal Center for Disease Control shows that 
transfer policies generally have had a counter-rehabilitative effect, resulting in increased rates 
of recidivism, particularly for violent crime, among juveniles sent to adult court as opposed 
to those kept in juvenile court. See Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the 
Transfer of Youth From the Juvenile System to the Adult Justice System, Morbidity & 
Mortality Wkly. Rep. (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 30, 
2007, at 9, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5609.pdf (“To the extent that 
transfer policies are implemented to reduce violent or other criminal behavior, available 
evidence indicates that they do more harm than good.”); see also Automatic Adult 
Prosecution, at 3 (“More than 30 years’ of studies have consistently demonstrated that 
categorical treatment of children as adults prevents rehabilitation and positive development, 
fails to protect public safety, and yields profound racial, ethnic and geographic disparities.”). 
¶ 176 
 
The majority concludes that the eighth amendment does not apply. The majority is 
wrong. Criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all 
are flawed. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 76.3 Like the laws involved in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, section 5-130 is mandatory and inflexible. Every juvenile who commits one of the 
enumerated offenses is treated like every adult who commits the same offenses. Transfers are 
automatic, and the statute contains no mechanism by which a judge can consider 
characteristics of juveniles before transferring them to criminal court, where, if convicted, 
they face stiffer adult penalties, enhancements, and other rules to extend their time in prison. 
To comport with federal and state constitutions, transfer proceedings must take into account 
how children are different and how those differences may counsel against sending them to 
criminal court. Here, a judge should have been allowed to consider the defendant’s 
intelligence, his psychological and developmental issues, his family history and status as a 
ward of the State, as well as any other characteristics that would have aided in making such a 
determination. 
¶ 177 
 
Our state, home of the country’s first juvenile court and once a leader in juvenile justice 
reform, should not be a place where we boast of locking up juveniles and throwing away the 
key. Illinois should be a place where youth matters, and we work to tailor punishment to fit 
the offense and the offender, as required by our federal and state constitutions. For juveniles, 
that starts with abolishing automatic transfers. 
¶ 178 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
 
3The majority cites City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill. 2d 456, 486 (2004) for the proposition that 
“[w]hether a defendant is tried in juvenile or criminal court is purely a matter of procedure.” Supra ¶ 104. But, 
that proposition comes from Justice Freeman’s dissent. More importantly, the majority ignores the breadth of the 
Court’s statement in Graham. If, as the majority indicates, transfer statutes are criminal procedure laws, and if 
criminal procedure laws that fail to consider a defendants’ youth are flawed, then, logically, section 5-130, which 
operates automatically and gives judges no discretion to factor a juvenile’s age into the transfer decision, is 
flawed.