Title: Rogers v. Watson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-391


Marcia M. Rogers, Herbert & Mary             Supreme Court
Taylor, Edwina Bard, Rudolph &
Dorothy Bondone, Brian & Janet               On Appeal from
Maroney, Michael & Mary Walsh,               Bennington Superior Court
et al.

     v.                                      May Term, 1989

Gerald E. & Kay F. Watson, State
of Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources, and Town of Bennington

     v.

Charles M. & Hazel L. Wilkinson


Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

Lon T. McClintock of Offices of Thomas H. Jacobs, Bennington, for
 plaintiffs-appellees

Timothy L. Taylor and William H. Meub of Kelley, Meub, Powers & English,
  Ltd., Rutland, for defendants-appellants Gerald and Kay Watson

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Mark J. Di Stefano, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee State of Vermont
   Agency of Natural Resources


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   This action began with a complaint by adjoining
landowners for an injunction requiring defendants, Gerald and Kay Watson, to
remove a mobile home they had placed on part of their land.  The complaint
alleged that the mobile home violated a restrictive covenant applicable to
defendants' land.  It also joined the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
seeking to require it to enforce certain subdivision regulations that were
allegedly violated by the presence of the mobile home.  The Agency cross-
claimed against defendants to enforce the regulations.  The trial court
found for the plaintiffs and the Agency and granted an injunction requiring
removal of the mobile home.  It also imposed a fine for violation of the
regulations.  Defendants appeal, and we affirm.
     In 1963, defendants purchased a lot in Bennington from Olaf and Edwina
Bard, the first division of a 200-acre parcel into a residential
development.  There are no restrictions in this deed.  Thereafter, the Bards
sold off other parcels, and each deed, except one to the Bards' son and
daughter-in-law, contained a covenant similar to the following:
           No mobile home, trailer, or other similar structure
          shall be placed or maintained on said premises without
          the prior approval in writing of the grantor herein or
          his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns.

In 1977, Edwina Bard (Mr. Bard having died) sold to Charles and Hazel
Wilkinson a lot adjacent to that owned by defendants.  The deed contained
the above restrictive covenant prohibiting the placement of a mobile home on
the land.  In 1981, defendants purchased part of this lot from the
Wilkinsons.  The deed did not mention the restrictive covenant.
     Because the Wilkinsons were subdividing their land, the transfer to
defendants required a permit from the Agency of Natural Resources unless
deferred because defendants waived development rights.  Defendants applied
for and received such a deferral after agreeing that they would not
construct or erect any structure, "the useful occupancy of which [would]
require the installation of plumbing and sewage treatment facilities" on the
lot without first obtaining a permit.  The deed contained this restriction.
     In October 1985, defendants decided to place a mobile home on the lot
they had acquired from the Wilkinsons.  Their son-in-law was afflicted with
a brain tumor, making it necessary for them to house him, their daughter,
and two infant grandchildren.  For this purpose, they purchased the mobile
home, poured a slab foundation, and began to construct the septic system
when they became aware that they might need a permit from the Agency.
Because of soil conditions, the Agency denied a permit for a septic system.
Nevertheless, defendants completed the sewage system but did not connect it
within the home.  Water was available from defendants' nearby house but was
not connected.  The mobile home does have heat and electricity.
Defendants' daughter and son-in-law use the mobile home as their home, but
they go to defendants' home for all living needs requiring water or sewage.
     Plaintiffs in the original action are neighboring landowners, at least
some of whom purchased land from the Bards after the sale from the Bards to
the Wilkinsons.  Edwina Bard was also a plaintiff.  She died while the
action was pending and was replaced by the executor of her estate.
     The trial court found that the restrictive covenant ran with the land,
applied to defendants, and could be enforced by plaintiffs.  It further
found that defendants' actions in placing the mobile home on the land
required a permit under the deferral language and the applicable Agency
regulation.  It found the Agency regulation to be valid.
     On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting
plaintiffs an injunction because there was no showing that either the
benefit or the burden of the restrictive covenant was intended to run with
the land.  As to the Agency, they argue that the placement of the mobile
home on the land without connecting the water and sewage does not require a
permit under Agency regulations.  Alternatively, they argue that if the
regulation is applicable, it is invalid because it is unconstitutionally
vague, is beyond the Agency's statutory authority and represents an
excessive delegation of legislative power.
     We begin with defendants' argument that it was improper to enforce the
restrictive covenant against them.  In order to enforce a restrictive
covenant against an owner other than the original covenantee, the covenant
must run with the land.  Chimney Hill Owners' Assoc., Inc. v. Antignani, 136
Vt. 446, 454,