Title: In re Murdock

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: November 27, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to
the Conduct of 

JEFFREY T. MURDOCK,

Accused.

(OSB 96-68; SC S43613)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Submitted on the record December 8, 1997.

	Jeffrey T. Murdock, pro se, filed the brief for the accused.

	Chris L. Mullman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is disbarred.

	*Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J. resigned March 31, 1998,
and did not participate in this decision.

		PER CURIAM

		The issue in this lawyer disciplinary case is
straightforward:  Should a lawyer who embezzles money from his or
her law firm be disbarred?  We hold that disbarment generally is
the appropriate sanction for such dishonesty.

		The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charges that the accused
violated Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules
(DR) 1-102(A)(2) and (3), which provide: 

		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 

		"* * * * * 

		"(2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law;

		"(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"

The Bar also charges that the accused violated ORS 9.527(1) and
(4), which provide:

		"The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or
reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper
proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court
that:

		"(1) The member has committed an act or carried on
a course of conduct of such nature that, if the member
were applying for admission to the bar, the application
should be denied;

		"* * * * * 

		"(4) The member is guilty of willful deceit or
misconduct in the legal profession[.]"

		The Bar's complaint alleged in part:

	"3.	"At all times material hereto, the Accused was
employed as an associate in the Lane County law firm of
Thorp, Purdy, Jewett, Urness & Wilkinson, P.C.
(hereinafter 'the firm').  As part of his duties with
the firm, the Accused provided contract indigent
criminal defense to the firm's clients through an
agreement with the State Court Administrator
(hereinafter 'SCA').  In addition, he provided certain
services to the firm's clients on a flat fee basis.

	"4.	"Between September 1993 and September 1995, and
while employed by the firm, the Accused diverted
payments from the SCA intended for payment for ongoing
indigent defense cases and converted those payments to
his own use without the firm's consent or knowledge. 
These payments totaled $6,917.78.  During this same
time, the Accused had flat fee clients of the firm pay
their fees directly to him without the firm's consent
or knowledge, and thereby converted the sum of
$2,525.00 to his own personal use.

	"5.	"During an investigation by the firm into the
SCA's failure to pay certain indigent defense accounts,
the Accused represented that these particular cases
were being handled by a local circuit court judge and
that the Accused was one of several lawyers who would
soon be reimbursed by court order.  This representation
was false, and the Accused knew it was false when he
made it."

		Pursuant to State Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 3.1, the
Bar also filed a petition for interim suspension during the
pendency of the proceedings on the above charges.  This court
appointed a special master to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the accused should be suspended temporarily.  The accused
personally appeared at the temporary suspension hearing and
represented himself. 

		At the BR 3.1 hearing, the accused stipulated that he
had violated all the disciplinary rules and statutes alleged by
the Bar.  After the hearing, the special master found facts in
accordance with the accused's stipulation.  The special master
concluded:

		"1.  By intentionally depriving the firm of fees
and retainers rightfully due the firm and appropriating
those funds for his own use, the Accused may have
committed the crime of Theft in the First Degree, a
Class C felony, as defined by ORS 164.055.

		"2.  The Accused had a fiduciary duty to act
honestly in his dealings with the firm and had an
obligation to give it all profits earned for the firm
while an employee of the firm.  His failure to do so
clearly was an act of dishonesty.

		"3.  Although the Accused is an alcoholic and was
addicted to drugs at the time that he converted the
funds as described above, the Accused was not laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his acts
or that what he was doing was wrong.  To the contrary,
at all times the Accused recognized the unlawful and
dishonest nature of his acts and consciously chose to
convert firm funds.

		"4.  At no time material to his complaint did the
Accused exhibit any inability to function that would
excuse his conduct."  (Emphasis in original.)

As to the question of interim suspension, the special master
concluded that the Bar had failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the accused's continued practice of law
during the pendency of the proceedings would, or was likely to,
result in substantial harm to any person or the public. 
Notwithstanding, after considering the special master's report,
this court found that the accused's continued practice of law was
likely to result in substantial harm to the public and,
accordingly, temporarily suspended him.  BR 3.1(e).

		At the hearing before the trial panel, the accused
stipulated that he had violated all the disciplinary rules and
statutes alleged by the Bar.  The trial panel accepted and
adopted the special master's findings of fact with the following
changes and additions:

		"(1) [The special master's] finding No. 11 [that
the accused made no effort to reimburse the converted
funds until his firm discovered his misconduct] is not
accepted.  Instead, we find that the repayment of a
part of the diverted funds to his employer caused the
accused's employer to confront him.

		"(2) When confronted, the accused initially denied
any alcohol or drug problems; but shortly thereafter he
acknowledged that he has a long-term addiction to
alcohol and drugs and that he embezzled money from his
employer.

		"(3) The accused was suspended by the Oregon
Supreme Court on March 1, 1997, and remains suspended
at this time.

		"(4) The accused voluntarily extended his
treatment program at Serenity Lane [a drug and alcohol
abuse treatment facility] because of his suspension.

		"(5) The accused continues to attend weekly group
therapy counseling sessions for approximately one and a
half hours.  He also occasionally receives one-on-one
counseling.  He expects this program to continue for at
least two more months.

		"(6) The money converted by the accused belonged
to his employer.

		"(7) No client was harmed by any of the improper
behavior which the accused committed."

The trial panel found:

	"Because of the evidence submitted at the Rule 3.1
hearing and the findings made by the Special Master,
the accused stipulated that he violated all of the
disciplinary rules and the statutes charged in the
bar's complaint.  Thus, the accused has agreed that he
committed an act or carried on a course of conduct of
such nature that, if he were applying for admission to
the bar, the application should be denied as provided
in ORS 9.527(1); that he is guilty of willful deceit or
misconduct in the legal profession as provided in ORS
9.527(4); that he committed a criminal act which
reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness to practice law as provided by DR 1-102(A)(2);
and that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation as provided in DR 1-102(A)(3)." 

The trial panel concluded:

	"[T]he accused should be suspended for a period of
three years commencing from the date a decision on this
matter is issued by the Supreme Court; and that he
should not thereafter be readmitted to the practice of
law in Oregon until he has been clean and sober for an
extended continuous period of time and is able to
demonstrate that there is in place a support system
designed to assist him in maintaining his sobriety."

		The trial panel reached that conclusion because of the
accused's history of drug and alcohol abuse and because of what
appeared to the trial panel to be a distinction that this court
had made in disciplinary cases involving lawyers who had stolen
money from someone other than a client or committed criminal acts
in which clients were not injured.  In reaching its conclusion
that something less than disbarment is appropriate here, the
trial panel relied on In re Stodd, 279 Or 565, 568 P2d 665 (1977)
and In re Warner W. Gregg, 252 Or 174, 446 P2d 123 (1968), and on
two stipulations for discipline.(1)

		Under ORS 9.536(2), and BR 10.1, this court is required
to review the trial panel's decision.  We review de novo.  ORS
9.536(3); BR 10.6.  We granted the Bar's motion to submit the
matter on the record without oral argument.  ORAP 11.25(3)(b). 
The Bar has the burden of establishing misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  In this case, the accused
stipulates that he violated DR 1-102(A)(2) and (3) and ORS
9.527(1) and (4).  Accordingly, we proceed to consider the
appropriate sanction for his admitted unethical conduct. 

I.  SANCTION

		The Bar recommends that the accused be disbarred.  The
accused filed a pro se brief in which he argues only that the
record does not support disbarment.  

		The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the
public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have
not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge
properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the
legal system, and the legal profession.  American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards), Standard 1.1; see In re Stauffer,
327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998) (same).  

		"Members of the public are entitled to be able to
trust lawyers to protect their property, liberty, and
their lives.  The community expects lawyers to exhibit
the highest standards of honesty and integrity, and
lawyers have a duty not to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, or interference with the
administration of justice."  ABA Standards at 5.

		In considering the appropriate sanction for the
violations found, this court refers to the ABA Standards and
Oregon case law.  In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 652, ___ P2d ___
(1998).  The court considers four factors: (1) the ethical duty
violated; (2) the accused's mental state at the time of the
misconduct; (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the
accused's misconduct; and (4) any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.  ABA Standard 3.0. 

	A.  Ethical duty violated

		A lawyer owes a duty to the public to maintain personal
integrity and to maintain the public trust.  ABA Standard 5.0. 
Here, the accused engaged in a course of conduct involving
dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation that reflects adversely
on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law.

		A lawyer owes a duty to his clients to preserve his
client's property.  ABA Standard 4.0.  The accused violated his
duties to his clients by converting to his own use the fees he
received, directly or indirectly, from those clients.  When those
fees were not received, the firm looked to the clients or, in the
case of its indigent clients, to the SCA for payment. 

		Although there is no explicit rule requiring lawyers to
be candid and fair with their partners or employers, such an
obligation is implicit in the prohibition of DR 1-102(A)(3)
against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
Moreover, such conduct is a violation of the duty of loyalty owed
by a lawyer to his or her firm based on their contractual or
agency relationship.  In re Smith, 315 Or 260, 266, 843 P2d 449
(1992).  The accused violated his duties to his law firm.  He was
compensated on a monthly salary.  The accused and the firm
understood that he would give the firm any flat fees that he
received in exchange for a monthly salary and that any checks
that he received from the SCA likewise would go to the firm. 
Notwithstanding, within a few months after the firm employed him,
the accused began to convert to his own use fees that he received
from clients and the SCA.  When the firm questioned the accused
about the SCA's apparent failure to pay certain indigent defense
accounts, he lied in an attempt to conceal his dishonesty. 
Later, he again lied to his firm when he made partial restitution
of the embezzled funds.  The accused's dishonesty and deceit is a
violation of his duty of loyalty to his firm based on their
contractual or agency relationship.  

		A lawyer owes a duty to the legal system not to engage
in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation to a court.  ABA Standard 6.1.  The accused 
violated his duty to the legal system, including his duty to the
court and the SCA.  The accused converted fees received from fee-paying clients and the SCA belonging to his firm, thus creating a
potential dispute between the firm, its clients, the court, and
the SCA over whether in fact those fees had been paid.  Moreover,
the accused represented to the firm that the delay in receiving
fees for services to indigent clients was the fault of the court. 
That was untrue, and the accused knew that the statement was
untrue when he made it. 

	B.  Mental state

		The ABA Standards recognize three mental states:
intent, knowledge, and negligence.  "Intent" is defined as "the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 7.  "Knowledge" is "the conscious
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct
but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result."  Ibid.  The admissions of the accused and the
findings and conclusions of the trial panel establish that the
accused acted intentionally in embezzling fees from his firm and
in misrepresenting the facts in an attempt to conceal his
dishonesty.

	C.  Extent of injury

		An injury need not be actual, but only potential, to
support the imposition of a sanction.  In re Williams, 314 Or
530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992).  The facts of this case show both
potential and actual injury.

		The accused's clients were injured by the accused's
dishonest course of conduct.  He embezzled $6,917.78 of indigent
defense fees and $2,525.00 of other fees due to the firm.  By
charging the firm's clients a flat fee and then converting a
portion of it to his own use, the accused set in motion a
potential conflict between those clients and his law firm.  When
clients inquired of the firm regarding the discrepancies, the
accused lied to his secretary, who innocently repeated those lies
to the clients.  The accused's law firm suffered actual financial
injury. 

		Before considering any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the ABA Standards provide that disbarment
generally is appropriate when a lawyer:  (1) knowingly deceives a
client with intent to benefit the lawyer or another and causes
serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client, ABA
Standard 4.61; (2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a
necessary element of which includes intentional interference with
the administration of justice, false swearing, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft, ABA Standard 5.11(a); (3) engages in
any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously, adversely reflects
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law, ABA Standard 5.11(b); or
(4) knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty
owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for
the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system, ABA Standard
7.1.

	D.  Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

		After a preliminary determination as to sanction has
been established, we consider any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in deciding what sanction to impose.  ABA Standard
9.1.  Aggravating circumstances present in this case are: (1)
dishonest or selfish motive, ABA Standard 9.22(b); (2) a pattern
of misconduct, ABA Standard 9.22(c); (3) multiple offenses, ABA
Standard 9.22(d); and (4) illegal conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(k). 
Mitigating circumstances present in this case are:  (1) absence
of a prior disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a); (2)
cooperative attitude with the disciplinary process, ABA Standard
9.32(e); and (3) remorse, ABA Standard 9.32(l). 

		The Bar disputes several circumstances that the accused
argues are mitigating.  The accused first disputes the special
master's finding No. 10:

		"At no time, up to the date of hearing, did the
Accused advise the SCA or the Lane County judiciary
that he had diverted SCA payments to his own use."  

		The accused points to no evidence in the record that
supports his version of the facts.  Contrary to the accused's
contention that a letter from the presiding judge referenced in
the special master's finding No. 17 supports his claim that he
had advised SCA or the court of his misconduct, we find that
letter to be silent on that issue.  However, the accused does not
dispute that, even if he had admitted wrongdoing to the SCA or to
the Lane County judiciary, or both, before the hearing, he did so
only after his firm detected his embezzlement.  The special
master's finding #10 was accepted and adopted by the trial panel;
we find that finding to be supported by clear and convincing
evidence in the record, and we accept it.

		The accused next disputes the special master's finding
No. 11:

		"Prior to the time that the firm discovered the
Accused's misconduct, he made no effort to reimburse
the firm for fees that he had converted to his own
use."

As noted, the trial panel rejected that finding, but it failed to
explain why it did so.  We agree with the special master's
finding, which is supported by the record.  Before the firm began
questioning the accused about his receivables, he never attempted
to reimburse the firm.  Even then, he attempted to cover up his
embezzlement by concocting a story that he was awaiting payment
from the trial court.  The accused began to repay the firm only
after the firm discovered his misconduct.  The accused admitted
that, when he tried to reimburse the firm with that money, which
he had borrowed from his parents, he deceived the firm as to the
source of the money.  Had the accused's firm not discovered his
embezzlement, nothing in the record suggests that he would have
stopped embezzling or would have reimbursed his firm.

		The accused's plea for leniency rests heavily on his
admitted long-term addiction to alcohol and illegal drugs.  Under
ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992), chemical dependency
including alcoholism or drug abuse may be a mitigating factor
when:  (1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is
"affected by a chemical dependency"; (2) the chemical dependency
caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the
chemical dependency is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained
period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery
arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely.  The Commentary to ABA Standard 9.32 (amended 1992)
states in part:

		"Issues of physical and mental disability or
chemical dependency offered as mitigating factors in
disciplinary proceedings require careful analysis. 
Direct causation between the disability or chemical
dependency and the offense must be established.  If the
offense is proven to be attributable solely to a
disability or chemical dependency, it should be given
the greatest weight.  If it is principally responsible
for the offense, it should be given very great weight;
and if it is a substantial contributing cause of the
offense, it should be given great weight.  In all other
cases in which the disability or chemical dependency is
considered as mitigating, it should be given little
weight.  A showing of rehabilitation from chemical
dependency may be considered but should not, in and of
itself, be a justification for a recommendation for
discipline less than that which would have been imposed
upon an attorney in similar circumstances where a
chemical dependency was not present."

		In this case, the accused presented no medical or other
expert testimony to the trial panel to support his claim that he
was "affected" by a chemical dependency in a way that should
influence the sanction here.  The accused states that he used
marijuana, mushrooms, LSD, and cocaine, but the record does not
show that he used any of those drugs regularly, that he used them
while embezzling the firm's fees or while lying to the firm to
cover up his crimes, or that he was "affected" by any of those
drugs.  The special master noted that the Serenity Lane records
were devoid of any history of LSD or cocaine use by the accused. 
Moreover, a counselor from Serenity Lane testified that, at all
times material to this proceeding, the accused was capable of
recognizing right from wrong.  

		Even if the accused was "affected" by a chemical
dependency at the time when he engaged in misconduct, he has not
demonstrated that his chemical dependence "caused" his
misconduct.  Nor has the accused produced persuasive evidence
that he has recovered from his claimed chemical dependency or
that his recovery, if any, has arrested his dishonesty and that a
recurrence of his misconduct is unlikely.

		The accused next argues that he should be given
consideration for his "interim rehabilitation by successful
participation in an intensive drug and alcohol treatment
program."  Rather than offering medical or other evidence of
recovery, he essentially argues that he should not be held
responsible for his unethical conduct.  We believe that it is
significant that the accused entered into the treatment program
at Serenity Lane only after his firm confronted him about his
dishonesty.  Accordingly, we reject the accused's plea of
mitigation based on ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992).(2)

		The accused disputes the special master's finding No.
9:

		"At all times material to this proceeding, the
Accused was able to distinguish between right and
wrong, and he made the conscious decision to convert
money that he knew belonged to his employer. The
Accused knew, during the time that he converted those
funds, that such conduct could result in his
disbarment."   

		The accused now claims, for the first time with the
filing of his appellate brief that, due to an unspecified
chemical addiction, he was unable to distinguish between right
and wrong, or that he unconsciously decided to embezzle, or that
even if he were capable of distinguishing right from wrong, he
was unable to control himself.  However, the accused testified at
the hearing before the special master:

		"Q:  Mr. Murdock, let me ask you this.  Did you,
at the time you took this money, did you know it was
wrong to take the money?

		"A:  Sure I did.  I knew it was wrong.  * * *  I'm
not here to minimize my responsibility.  I'm not here
to minimize my culpability.  Yeah, I would have been
caught, I knew that from day one.  I just didn't care." 

		The special master found that the accused was able to
distinguish between right and wrong, that he made a conscious
decision to covert his firm's money, and that he was aware that
such conduct could result in disbarment.  Moreover, the special
master's finding that the accused was able to do legal research,
appear in court, socialize with coworkers, and carry out the
daily work of a lawyer supports a conclusion that the accused was
aware that his course of conduct was dishonest and deceitful but,
nevertheless, persisted in it.  Those findings, which were
adopted by the trial panel, are supported by the record.  The
accused's own testimony makes it clear that he acted
intentionally in embezzling fees due his firm, in lying to cover
up his dishonesty, and that he knew that his course of conduct
was wrong.  We conclude that the accused was able to distinguish
between right and wrong during the relevant period.

		We conclude that the aggravating circumstances in this
case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

II.  OREGON CASE LAW

		The remaining consideration is this court's case law. 
We have found no Oregon case directly on point.  The trial panel
concluded that this court has distinguished between a lawyer who
steals from a client and a lawyer who steals from someone other
than a client.  The Bar argues, however, that the principle is
the same and that it should make no difference whether a lawyer
steals money from a client or from his law firm.  

		In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 348 P2d 774 (1960),
supports the Bar's view.  In that case, a lawyer had secreted
partnership funds over an eight-year period into his own account. 
He had caused false and fraudulent partnership income tax returns
to be filed.  The deceit was discovered when the lawyer's partner
had reason to suspect the withholding.  When confronted, the
accused admitted his deceit.  In rejecting the lawyers's argument
that he took no "client" funds, this court noted:

		"It is also urged that the accused has taken no
funds of any client.  He did not disclose taking his
partner's funds until called to account.  The long
practice of taking and secreting funds not his own
reflects directly on his right to be placed in a
position to handle other people's property.  If these
were the funds of a client there would be no hesitancy
in imposing the most severe sanction; particularly when
we consider the intent evidenced by the long course of
conduct.  The same violation of the fiduciary duty to
partnership funds is no less abhorrent.  Id. at 349
(emphasis added).

The court explained a lawyer's duty of absolute honesty, stating:

	"True, the rules of professional conduct may fill many
pages; the opinions interpreting some of the rules,
many volumes.  But in the more basic conduct he is
called upon to perform, any lawyer knows the simple
rules that he must cling to:  Simple straightforward
honesty and absolute good faith.  No less will suffice. 
Id. at 347.

The lawyer was disbarred.

		In In re O.H. Bengtson, 230 Or 369, 371, 370 P2d 239
(1962), this court stated that it uniformly had disbarred lawyers
guilty of embezzlement, "both when such defalcations resulted in
criminal conviction of a crime" and "when the defalcation did not
result in a criminal prosecution."  It is unclear in that case
whose money the lawyer embezzled.  The lawyer was disbarred.  		However, in In re Lewelling, 244 Or 282, 417 P2d 1019
(1966), and In re Sundstrom, 250 Or 404, 442 P2d 604 (1968), in
which the accused lawyers took clients' funds, the lawyers were
suspended, not disbarred.  In neither of those cases was the
misconduct as calculated and inexcusable as those in Bengtson. 
In Lewelling and Sundstrom, this court recognized that, if an
accused lawyer was rehabilitated from whatever condition brought
on his culpable conduct, the public would not be harmed by
permitting that lawyer again to practice law. 

		In Gregg, the lawyer stole $2,000 from an organization
of which he was the treasurer.  The lawyer argued that his
misconduct was the result of alcohol addiction.  This court
stated:

		"We conclude from the evidence that the accused
committed the defalcations because of his addiction to
alcohol.  However, he knew what he was doing when he
cashed at least some of the checks and before the
association officials questioned him he was aware that
he had committed defalcations.

		"The troublesome question is what form of
discipline the public interest requires for a lawyer
who admittedly stole $2,000 and whose conduct
apparently was caused by alcohol addiction which he has
at least for two years overcome.

		"We conclude the public interest requires that we
adhere to our past principle requiring disbarment of
attorneys guilty of embezzlement and order the accused
disbarred.  [Bengtson, 230 Or at 371].

		"It is true that the accused's conduct was caused
by alcohol; however, most embezzlements are caused by
pressures of some sort which the embezzler is unable to
withstand.  The bar and the court owe the public the
obligation of keeping out of the practice of law those
who cannot withstand these pressures."  Id. at 177-78.

		Thereafter, this court on reconsideration modified its
earlier opinion as follows:

		"If it appears likely that a disciplined attorney
may become rehabilitated within a few years and,
therefore, should be permitted to resume the practice
of law, suspension and not disbarment is the
appropriate discipline."  Id. at 179.

On reconsideration, the Gregg court did not address the issue of
whose money the lawyer stole.  Rather, the court focused only on
the lawyer's potential for rehabilitation.  The court did not
change its policy that disbarment is the proper sanction in
instances of planned, rational misconduct where the odds against
true rehabilitation are so great that the likelihood of
reinstatement in minimal.  Id. at 181.  Because the lawyer's
conduct after his misconduct persuaded the court that he was well
on the road to rehabilitation, the court changed the sanction to
a suspension for three years and thereafter, until the lawyer
affirmatively showed that he was rehabilitated and that his
resumption of the practice of law would not be detrimental to the
bar or the public.  Id.

		In Stodd, the accused lawyer converted the funds of a
nonprofit organization, of which he was the president. 
Apparently, he had returned most of the money before his
embezzlement was discovered, at which time he repaid the balance
with interest.  Id. at 567.  He had no prior disciplinary record. 
This court considered Gregg and concluded that Stodd's misconduct
was less serious than Gregg's:

		"Nothing less than the most scrupulous probity in
dealing with the funds of others is compatible with
admission to the practice of law.  This is a standard
that does not permit drawing a line between an
attorney's professional and his non-professional roles. 
Under the Disciplinary Review Board's recommendation,
the accused will have the burden, after a two-year
suspension, to demonstrate that he can be trusted with
this and other obligations of professional practice. 
We conclude that the board's recommendation is proper,
and we adopt it."  Id. at 567-68.

		In In re Pierson, 280 Or 513, 518, 571 P2d 907 (1977),
this court held that even a single conversion by a lawyer to his
own use of his client's funds will result in permanent
disbarment.  In Pierson, this court clearly signaled that,
notwithstanding some of this court's earlier disciplinary
decisions, the court would not look with leniency on a lawyer who
misused the funds of someone other than a client.  Id. at 517-18
n 1.  The lawyer was disbarred.

		In In re Holman, 297 Or 36, 62-63, 682 P2d 243 (1984),
the accused offered expert medical testimony that the drugs that
he had been taking caused an impairment so disabling that it
negated a culpable mental state.  This court stated:

	"In disciplinary proceedings this court makes its own
independent review of the evidence and, upon the basis
of the evidence and the entire record, must determine
where the truth lies.  If this court is convinced that
by reasons of his addiction this accused was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts, protection of
the public will only demand that he not be allowed to
practice until such time as his mental impairment can
be determined to be a thing of the past.  On the other
hand, if upon review of the entire record and the
evidence this court is convinced that the accused took
and commingled money at a time when he was able to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, he should be
disbarred."

The lawyer was reprimanded and placed on probation for more than
three years and thereafter "until such time as the accused can
persuade this court that the probation should be terminated." 
Id. at 69.

		In In re Laury, 300 Or 65, 76, 706 P2d 935 (1985), this
court noted:

		"Since the time of the Gregg, Lewelling, Sundstrom
and Stodd decisions, we have spoken to misappropriation
of clients' funds in no uncertain terms in In re
Pierson, 280 Or 513, 571 P2d 907 (1977), in which we
did disbar the lawyer.  In that opinion at footnote 1,
280 Or 517-18, we intimated that we believed the
sanction in Gregg and Stodd to be inadequate.  We went
on to state:

			"'We hold that a single conversion by a
lawyer to his own use of his client's funds
will result in permanent disbarment.'  280 Or
at 518.

	"Citations to cases earlier than Pierson for lenient
treatment of misappropriation of funds by lawyers is no
longer of any avail."  Id. at 76.

In Laury, the accused lawyer commingled and converted his
client's money to his own use.  The lawyer was disbarred.

		In In re Eads, 303 Or 111, 734 P2d 340 (1987), a lawyer
was addicted to alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the period
of the acts charged.  He argued that his addiction precluded him
from appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts and, therefore,
that he did not have the intent required to find that he had
misappropriated funds.  Alternatively, he asked the court to
impose a sanction with primary emphasis on rehabilitation.  Id.
at 121-22.  The accused offered substantial evidence that he had
embarked on a rehabilitation program and that he had been drug
free for several years.  This court concluded, however, that,
because of the gravity of the accused's misconduct, his drug or
alcohol dependency should not reduce the sanction.  The lawyer
was disbarred.

		In In re Benjamin, 312 Or 515, 823 P2d 413 (1991), a
lawyer failed to promptly pay money to clients, used clients'
money for personal expenses, neglected legal matters, and failed
to cooperate with the disciplinary process.  The lawyer was
disbarred.  See also In re Phelps, 306 Or 508, 520, 760 P2d 1331
(1988) (where an accused "steals funds from a client, the
sanction is disbarment," despite mitigating circumstances); In re
Jordan, 300 Or 430, 712 P2d 97 (1985) (multiple ethical
violations, including commingling and converting client's funds,
resulted in disbarment).  We also find support for our conclusion
in In re Biggs, 318 Or 295, 864 P2d 1310 (1993), Smith, and King.

		The accused admits:  that he violated the rules and
statutes as charged in the Bar's complaint; that, over a two-year
period, he embezzled more than $9,000 from his law firm for his
personal use; initially, he lied to his law firm in an
unsuccessful effort to conceal his dishonesty; he later lied to
his law firm about the source of $5,000 that he intended as a
partial repayment of the money that he had taken; at the time
that he embezzled the firm's money, he knew that it was unlawful
for him to do so; and he knew that his course of conduct could
lead to his disbarment. 

		The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that
the accused embarked on a course of conduct involving dishonesty
and deceit that reflects adversely on his fitness to practice
law.  This court often has stated that, generally, a lawyer who
converts a client's funds will be disbarred.  In this case, the
accused embezzled more than $9,000 from his law firm.  We
conclude that the sanction should be the same, i.e., disbarment
generally will follow embezzlement from a lawyer's law firm.  

		We have considered carefully the accused's plea for
leniency on the basis of his alleged alcoholism and chemical
dependency, and we reject it.  On these facts, the accused has
not presented evidence that would justify the imposition of any
sanction less than disbarment.  We conclude that the accused must
be disbarred.  

		The accused is disbarred.

1. 	A stipulation for discipline has no precedential value. 
Many facts and circumstances, most of which are not readily
discernable from the public record, motivate a lawyer and the Bar
to enter into a stipulation.  Moreover, a stipulated sanction
providing for a reprimand or suspension not to exceed six months
is not reviewed by this court unless the Bar or the accused seeks
review.  ORS 9.536; BR 10.1.

2. 	We are not saying that alcoholism or addiction never
may be mitigating factors.  Rather, we conclude that the accused
has not offered persuasive evidence to support his plea for
mitigation on those grounds.