Title: Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAWL

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

+ 000

 

 

JON S. LOGAN WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a foreign corporation
authorized to’ do business in the State
of Hawai'i, Defendant -Appellee,

and

 

JOHN DOBS 1-50, Defendants.

 

No. 27190

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT couRT 2 - ©
(CIV. NO. 04-1-0178(2))

3

 

AUGUST 30, 2006

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

‘This appeal concerns the sole question whether an

employer -- in this case, defendant-appellee Home Depot U.S.A.,

Inc. (hereinafter, Home Depot] -- can legally terminate an

employee -- here, plaintiff-appellant Jon s. Logan Wright --
because of his prior criminal record, pursuant to Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 378-2.5 (Supp. 2002), relating to employers’

inquiries into criminal conviction records, quoted infra.

 
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Briefly stated, Wright was terminated from his employment with

jociate sales clerk in ite lumber department

 

Home Depot as an
at Kahului, Maui because of his prior conviction for use of a
controlled substance by the Mashoe Second Judicial Dietrict
court, Reno, Nevada. Wright brought @ wrongful discharge and
discrimination action against Home Depot, alleging primarily that
Home Depot's conduct violated HRS § 378-2 (Supp. 2005), quoted
infra. The Circuit court of the Second Circuit, the Honorable
Shackley F. Raffetto presiding, disagreed with Wright and granted
Home Depot's motion to dismiss, entering final judgment, pursuant
to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) (2004), on
February 28, 2005.

on appeal, Wright raises the following points of error.
First, Wright contends that the circuit court erred in applying
HRS § 378-3(23) (Supp. 1998) (authorizing employer to consider
individual's criminal record with regard to employment), quoted

Anfra, because subsection 3(13) was repealed and, thus, not in

 

* uncp mule 54 provides in relevant part:

(®) Judqsent upon miltiple claine or involving

multiple parties. When nore than one claim for relief Se
presented in an action... or when multiple parties are
Envolved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
fo ene or more but fewer than all of the claima of
‘ies only upon an express determination that there ie no
jon for delay and upon an express direction for the

     

5us
entry of judgnent. In the absence of such determination and
Girection, any form of decision». . which

 

Sdjudicates fewer ‘than all the clains or the righte and
Tiabilities of fewer than all the parts
terminate the action as to any of the c

  

(comps

 

in original.)

 
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effect at the time of hie employment or at the time of his
termination. Second, ERS § 378-2.5, concerning employers’
inquiries into conviction records, was likewise erroneously
velied upon by the court because the statute applies only to a
prospective employee or to one who was convicted of a criminal
charge during employment. In other words, Wright maintains that
HRS § 378-2.5 does not apply to an employee who had an existing
criminal record prior to employment. And, third, to the extent
that HRS § 378-2.5 ie applicable, Wright contends that his prior
conviction does not bear a “rational relationship" to his
employment as required by the subject statute, thereby rendering
the dismissal of his complaint inappropriate.?

For the reasons discussed herein, we vacate the circuit
court's February 28, 2005 final judgment and remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Backeround

Tt is undisputed that, prior to his employment with

Home Depot, Wright was convicted of using a controlled substance,

due., methamphetamine. On April 30, 1996, Wright pled guilty to

 

+ tm addition to his claim of violation of HRS § 378-2, Kright also
alleged that Hone Depot violated the fundamental public policies underlyi
fine # 376-2 and section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution, entitled "Due Proc
ind Byusl Protection." right, however, does not raise any point of error
Fegarding the circuit court's diamiseal of hie violation of public policy

Elling, “therefore, thie court need not address then. see Hawai'i Rules of
Kppeliate Procedure Rule (WRAP) Rule 26(b) (4) (200s) (*Pointe not presented

Swill be disregarded (1°).

   

 

 

 

 

 
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the drug charge before the Washoe Second Judicial District court
in Reno, Nevada (Case No. CR96-0577) and was sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of twelve to thirty-six monthe (hereinafter, the
1996 drug conviction]. The sentence was suepended, and he was
placed on probation not to exceed two years. On November 5,
1997, Wright was discharged from probation.

Approximately three and a half years later, Home Depot
hired Wright on or about April 21, 2001 as an associate sales
clerk in ite lumber department at Kahului, Maui. At the tine of
his hiring, Wright was tested for drugs; the results were
negative. The record does not indicate (nor do the parties
explain) whether the drug testing is part of Hone Depot's
standard employment process, i.e., whether hiring of a
prospective employee is conditioned upon a negative drug screen.
Moreover, neither the parties nor the record indicate whether
Home Depot conducted a criminal history record check prior to
employing Wright. Based on the facts of this case, it appears it
id not, and it also appears that Wright did not disclose the
existence of his 1996 drug conviction at the time he was hired.

In Septenber 2002, Wright applied for a promotion as
department supervisor. During the promotion review period,

Wright was tested twice for drugs; the results were negative.’

 

> Ae indicated gupra, the record does not indicate (nor do the partiet
explain) Whether this particular drug screening is part of Home Depot's
Standard practice when screening employees for promotion. Moreover, there is
Indication as to wiy Wright was tested evice

 

 
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Home Depot also initiated a background investigation on Wright in
connection with his application for the promotion. On November
22, 2002, Home Depot informed Wright, via a letter by its Human
Resources manager, that it had obtained a "Consumer Report” in
connection with Wright’s application for the supervisory
position. The letter indicated that,

(biased in part upon information contained in the Consumer

Report, (iue., Wright's prior drug conviction, Home Depot

twas] considering taking adverse action. Depending on the

Cizcunstances, adverse action could involve not offering you

The position, ‘termination of your employment, or sone other
action.

 

Bventually, Wright was terminated from his employment with Home
Depot, effective December 17, 2002, because of his “felony
conviction disposition 04-30-96, use of [a] controlled substance,
in violation of company policy.”
B. Brocedural History

on April 27, 2004, Wright filed a complaint for
wrongful discharge and discrimination against Home Depot.‘ Three
days later, on April 30, 2004, Wright filed an amended complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that Hone Depot’s conduct in terminating
his employment was discriminatory and in violation of HRS

§ 378-2. HRS § 378-2(1) provides in relevant part:

 

+ wright brought suit againgt Hone Depot subsequent to receiving a
sright-to-tue* notice trom the tavai'l Civil Rights Comission (HEH), welch,
purguast te HRS § 378-4 (Supp. 2008), “ahall have juriediction over the
Bubject of discriminatory practices made Uniawtsl by this part. Any
Snsividual claiaing to be Sggrieved by an alleged ullawfal” diacriinatory
practice nay file with the (HCRC] a complaint in accordance vith the procedure
Betablished under chapter 368." HRs f 568-12 (1993) provides in relevant part
Choc, {within ninety daye after receipe of a notice of right to sue, the
Slaplaiaant may Bring’ a civil action unser thie chapter-*

 

 

 

 

 
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(a) Begauge of race, sex, sexual orientation, age,
religion, color, ancestry, disability, marital
Statue, Or srsest and cout record:
(a) Bor any employer to refuse to hire or
HORAr of discharse trom

employ oF
smblomment. 9x otherise to discriminate
againat_amy_individual in compensation or
‘inlthe Terns “conditions. or privileses of
‘snplovmens (-1

(Bmphases added.) An “arrest and court record," in turn,

 

includes

anv_information about an individual having been questioned,
Spprehended, taken into custody oF detention, ‘held for
Envestigstion, tense, served 2 sumone,
arrested with of without a warrant, tried,

Dursuant to any law entorcenent or military ausnoriey
1 (1993) (emphases added). Wright also alleged that:

 

 

BRS § 378-
16. The said conviction . . . in 1996 for the use of
a controlled substance does not bear a xational xelationshio

othe duties and responeibéiities of the position he head

‘© Defendant Home DEPOT.

 

(amphasis added.)
on May 24, 2004, Home Depot moved to dismiss the

amended complaint, pursuant to ERCP Rule 12(b) (6), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Home Depot
essentially argued that its consideration of Wright's criminal
record was appropriate, under HRS §§ 378-2.5 and -3(13), because
it bore a rational relationship to his employment and that,
therefore, Wright’s termination was lawful. Section 378-2.5

provides:

meployer inguizes into conviction record. (a) Subject
to subsection (b), an employer may inguire about and
consider an individual's criminal conviction recor
Soncerning hiring, termination, or the terms, conditions, or

privileges of exployment; provided that the conviction
fesponsipilities of the position

 
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(b)_Inguiry into and consideration of conviction
records for prospective enployees shall take place only
after the prospective exployee has received a conditional
offer of employment which may be withdrawn if the
Prospective employee has 2 conviction record that bears a
Fational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of
the position,

c) Por purposes of thie section, “conviction” meane
fan adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that
the defendant committed « crime, not including fi
Sudsnente requirea to be confidential pursuant £0 section
Brives; provided that the period for waich the enployer may
examine the employee's conviction record shall not exceed
cen years,

 

 

 

(Bold emphasis in original.) (Underscored emphasis added.) HRS
§ 378-3 (13) provided that
Nothing in this part shall be dened to:

a3)" Prohibit or preclude an employer from

a othe aut os

brosbective or continued employment.
(Emphasis added.)*
Home Depot specifically argued that,

[elven ££ every fact in (Wright's) complaint is
aesuned'to be true, it is clear that [Wright's] drog
Conviction has a moderate, fair, or reasonable relation to
Geployment at a hone inprovenent retailer with substantial
Soncern for the safety of ice customers and employees, for
{te enployee culture, for its goodwill and reputation, and
for ite interest in maintaining an honest environment «

 

Home Depot urged the circuit court to apply by analogy the
minimum rationality teat of the fourteenth amendnent’s equal
protection clause, which “requires the widest discretion to the
judgment of the employer, to the facts of this case.

on July 13, 2004, Wright filed a memorandum in

opposition to Home Depot’s motion to dismiss, arguing that he

 

+ ne more fully dincussed infra, subsection 3(13) was repealed,
effective June 30, 1998,
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wat tested for droge on three (2) separate occasions and
Found to be negative snd clean. it would appear, therefore,
that in the epirit of che non-diacriminatory law that
(wright) has been vehabilicated and deserves @ chance to
work. All of this will be proven at the tine of trial

‘The allegation that{,| effective December 17, 2002,
(wright] ‘vas terminated because of his conviction for vs
a controlled substance “in violation of company policy
“nich is not supportes by affidavit, is disputed, and the
Company policy is ctherwiee, voich will be shown at the tine
of the trial, only after discovery.

 

 

of

 

 

Wright further asserted that:

‘mere 18 no ambiguity to § 278-2.5(a), which provides
that [,] “subject to subsection (b), ah employer may inguire
‘about and consider an individual's criminal conviction
Fecord concerning hiring, termination or the terms,
Conditions or privileges of employment, provided that the
conviction record bears a rational relationship to the
Geties and responsibilities of the position." A resort to
Jegisiative history Je not relevant and should not be
considered. It only adds to the confusion

 

Weight maintained that, “[i]f the [c]ourt should grant the
ImJotion, it would lead to an absurd result. Section 378-2 . .
would be meaningless, and not enforceable.”

on July 16, 2004, Home Depot filed its reply to
Weight’s opposition, pointing out, inter alia, that Wright has
“completely ignore{d] the legal issue," i,e,, whether his 1996
drug conviction is rationally related to the duties and
responsibilities of his employment. Home Depot further reminded

the circuit court

 

As construed under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Srational relationship standard results in a strong
preaunpelon in favor of constitutionality, On a Rule
TPB) (6) potion to dismiss a claim under the Equal

Ehat presumption will resulr in diemi
‘the [p)iaintiff alleges facts sufficient to overcome
the’ presumption

(citation omitted.) At the hearing on the motion on July 21,

 

      

2004, Hone Depot reasserted its position that Wright’s prior
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conviction wae rationally related to the duties and
responsibilities of his employment. In response, Wright's

counsel argued that:

  

Silegetion in the complaint. And all it has todo is give
Rotice to the defendant, Ia thie c%
Teceived notice thet they're being charged or complaine:
Sgeinet because of the conviction record and the discharge
on account of it.

ie feel that there’s evidence thet should be adduced
at the trial to» for thea to substantiate. 1 think ve
Would be able to show that che policy of Hose Depot is not
What they purport ie to Be.

  

 

 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated that,
wafter reviewing the menorand[a], I’m persuaded by [Home Depot's]
argument that there is a rationale [sic] relationship between the

offense that [Wright] was convicted of [and his employment]

 

20 I'm going to grant the motion." On July 28, 2004, the circuit
court issued its written order granting Home Depot’s motion to

dismiss, Final judgment was entered on August 2, 2004.

 

on September 1, 2004, Wright filed his notice of
appeal. However, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction on February 4, 2005, inasmuch as the August 2, 2004

final judgment “d[id] not state that judgment is entered as to

 

[all) causes of action[.]* Consequently, on February 28, 2005,
the circuit court entered a second final judgment in favor of
Home Depot as to all counts in the amended complaint. On March

23, 2005, Wright timely appealed.

 
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I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A rion nis

A circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is
reviewed de novo. Bremner v, City & County of Honolulu, 96
Hawai'i 134, 138, 28 P.3d 350, 354, reconsideration denied,
(app.), cart, denied, 96 Hawai'i 346, 31 P.3d 203 (2001).

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
"s beyond doubt that the plaintit® cen
prove no set of faces in support of his or her claim that
Would entitle him or her to relief. we mist therefore view
Soplaineitf’s complaint in a light most favorable to him or
her in order to determine whether the allegations conteined

 

 

    

cirevit court

Gismissing [al complaint . . - out consideration is strictly
Ginited tothe allegations of ‘che complaint. and we must
a ‘aliegations to be true

cats xs, 103 Hawai'i 275, 280-61, 61 F.3d 1190,
1195-96 (2003) (citations omitted) (brackets and ellipsis in
original) (emphases added); gee also Aames Funding Com. v.
Mores, 107 Hawai'i 95, 98, 110 P.3d 1042, 1045, reconsideration
granted in part and denied in part, 107 Hawai'i 348, 113 P.3d 799
(2005) (*[Rleview of a motion to dismiss is based on the contents
of the complaint, the allegations of which we accept as true and
construe in the light most favorable to the plaintifé.”

(internal quotation marke, citation, and ellipsis omitted.)).
‘Statutory Interpretation

“The standard of review for statutory construction is

 

well-established, The interpretation of a statute is a question
of law which this court reviews de nove." Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
co. vs Dennison, 108 Hawai'i 380, 384, 120 P.34 1115, 1119 (2005)

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(quoting Labrador v, Liberty Mut, Group, 103 Hawai'i 206, 211, 81
P.3d 386, 391 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 80

doing, this court mist adhere to the well-established rule of
statutory construction that the “foremost obligation is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,
which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in
the statute itself.” Grav v. Admin. Dir, of Court, 84 Hawai'i
136, 148, 931 P.2d $80, $90 (1997) (citations omitted) .
IIT. DISCUSSION

As previously indicated, Wright essentially raises
three arguments on appeal, to wit, that: (1) HRS § 378-3(13)
does not apply because it was no longer in effect at the time of
his employment or at the time of his termination, which he raises
for the first time on appeal; (2) HRS § 378-2.5 does not apply to
convictions that occurred prior to an individual's employment;
and, (3) assuming that HRS § 378-2.5 does apply, his prior drug
conviction is not rationally related to the duties and
responsibilities of his employment. Each of Wright’s contentions
are addressed in turn below.
A, HRS § 378-3(23)

‘The Promulgation and Repeal of HRS § 378-3(13)

   

In 198, the legislature e:

 

ntially declared that an
employer's refusal to hire, bar, or discharge an employee based
upon race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color,

ancestry, disability, marital status, or arrest and court record

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constituted an unlawful discriminatory practice. See HRS

2. At the same time, the legislature provided certain

  

$37

exceptions to the foregoing declaration that were codified in ERS
§§ 378-3(1) through -3(10). 1981 Haw. Sess. L. Act 94, pt. of

7; see also Ross v, Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai:

Ltd., 76 Hawai'i 454, 458, 69 P.2d 1037, 1043 (1994) (holding

§ 2 at 185:

 

that termination of employment based upon any of the reasons set
forth in section 378-2 is violation of the statute, unless the
termination falls within one of exceptions set forth in HRS
§ 378-3)

Since 1981, three new exceptions have been added to ERS
§ 378-3, one of which is subsection 378-3(13) at issue in this
case. See 1994 Haw. Sess. L. Act 88, § 2 at 199-200 (adding ERS
§ 378-3(21)); 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 365, § 2 at 1147-48 (adding
HRS § 378-3(12)); and 1998 Haw. Sees. L. Act 175, § 2 at 651-52
(adding HRS § 378-3(13)). Tt is important to note that the
legislature established a sunset date of June 30, 1999 in Act

365, stating specifically that:

 

act 365] shall take effect upon ite
provided that.

 

1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 365, § 4 at 1149 (emphases added).
In 1998, Representative Joseph M. Souki introduced
House Bill No. 3526 to abolish the prohibition againet employment
discrimination based on an arrest and court record. See Hee.
Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 276-98, in 1998 House Journal, at 95, 1140;

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ee

Hee. stand. Comm, Rep. No. 673-98, in 1998 House Journal, at
3300-01. Ultimately, however, the bill modified HRS § 278-2 by
enacting a new section, HRS § 378-2.5, quoted gupra. See 1998
Haw. Sess. L. Act 175, § 1 at 651. In addition, Act 175 amended
HRS § 376-3 to include subsection -3(13), quoted supra. In light
of the sunset provision contained in section 4 of Act 365, HRS

§ 378-3 resorted to its pre-Act 365 version (i.e, eleven versus
thirteen exceptions) on June 30, 1998, and, thus, both HRS

g§ 376-3(12) and -3(13) were effectively repealed as of that
date. See 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 365, § 4 at 1149. HRS § 378-
2.5, nonetheless, remains in full force and effect.‘

Whether Weight’s Contention Should be Noticed as
Plain Error

 

As previously indicated, Wright contends for the first

parently relied on [HRS

 

time on appeal that the circuit court
§ 378-3(23),] which ie wrong" because subsection (13) was not in
existence at the time of his employment or at the time of his

termination inasmuch as said subsection was repealed after June

 

«tq 2003 and 2004 (after Wright had been terminated), HRS § 378-2-5
was anended to: (i) clarify that the conviction record “shall not exceed the
fuss cacent ten years, excluding periods of incarceration" (emphasis added)
ToS SORE an euployee with “an opportunity to present documentary evidence”
{2 biSneerate thet the period of incarceration wae less than what is shown on
the conviction record, and (3) preclude its application to those employers
Wtho“sre expressly permitted to inquire into an individual's er:

for eoployment, purposes pursuant to any federal or state lav{,)
Sihel"Er May ce ite political branches and agencies, the departeent of
fGacation, the judiciary, and armed security services. 2003 Hay. Set
Sev pa2 at 1ee787; 2004 Maw. Seas. L. Act 79, § 5 at 331-32.

 

 

 

 

     

 

 

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30, 1999.” Wright, therefore, urges this court to “notice a

nted, pertaining to [the] interpretation of

  

plain error not pre
the statute which is of great import.”

HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) mandates opening briefe to contain,

inter alia:

A concise statement of the points of error set forth
in separately numeres paragraphe. Each point ahail state:
(A) "the alleged error committed by the court or agency; (1d)
here in'che record the alleges error occurred, ane (1ii)

 

manner in Teaede Eo the
‘Sttention of the curr or ageney

io) not presen: ce wi
Soure. notice =
‘presetied:

(Emphases added.) It follows that “failure to raise or properly
reserve: issues at the trial level would be deened waived.” Enoka

Mu. AIG Hawai‘i Ins, Co., 109 Hawai'i 537, $46, 128 P.3d 650, 859

(2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see alec

in_xe_Tax Anpeal_of Subway Real Estate Corp, v. Dir, of Taxation,

State of Hawai‘, 110 Hawai'i 25, 30, 129 P.3d 528, 533 (2006)

(vas a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at
trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on
appeal") (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, “an appellate court should only reverse a

judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the

appellant in the trial court." Honda v, Bd. of Tre, of the
Employees’ Ret, Sys., 108 Hawai'i 212, 232, 118 P.3d 1155, 1175

* ae stated earlier, wright wae exployed from April 23, 2001 to
December ‘17, 2002.

 

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Se

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration
denied, 108 Hawai'i 338, 120 P.3d 237 (2005).

However, notwithstanding the foregoing, we have also
stated that “the rule is not inflexible and that an appellate
court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice so
requires’ and when a question of “great public import” is
involved. Id. (quoting Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9, 514 P.2d
568, 570 (1973)) (other citations omitted). Here, Wright

proffers no reason -- other than his conclusory statement that

 

the interpretation of HRS § 378-3(13) is of “great public import
<+ for this court to exercise its discretion in examining the
issue. Wright's failure to provide any rationale for this court
to review his contention is sufficient basis for this court to
decline to do so. See 1 of a1 ,
110 Hawai'i at 30, 129 P.3d at 533 (declining to consider the new
legal issue inasmuch as the cross-appellant did not provide any
reason for this court to address it). However, even assuming
that Weight had provided sufficient grounds to warrant a review
by this court, his argunent would nevertheless fail. Although

Home Depot’s moving papers did, in fact, make reference to both

 

HRS § 378-2.5(a) and 378-3(13), ite entire argument was focused
on the principle that Wright's criminal record bore a rational
relationship to hie employment, which principle is stated in both

statutory provisions. The circuit court did not specifically

 

state the statutory number upon which its ruling was based, but

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found that “there is a rational() relationship between the
offense that [Wright] was convicted of [and his employment.]*
‘Thus, inasmuch as HRS § 378-2.5(a) is still a valid statute and
even if the circuit court had relied upon both etatutory
provisions, its reliance on the repealed subsection was harmless.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we decline to
invoke plain error under these circumstances.
B. HRS § 378-2.5

With respect to HRS § 378-2.5, Wright argues that:
(1) the subject statute does not apply to him because it applies
solely to prospective employees; and (2) his conduct involving
Grugs did not occur on the property of Home Depot or during his
employment with Home Depot. Lastly, Wright contends that hie
prior conviction bears no rational relaticnship to the duties and
responsibilities of his employment. To the contrary, Home Depot
maintains that: (1) the express terms of the statute do not
prohibit consideration of a current employee's conviction that
occurred prior to his employment with the employer; and
(2) Wright's prior conviction was rationally related to his
duties and responsibilities at Home Depot. Consequently, Home

ed the

 

Depot submits that the circuit court correctly dismi
amended complaint in light of the fact that Wright did not plead
facts showing that there was no rational relationship between hie

1996 drug conviction and hie employment.

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ee

1. Whether HRS § 376-2.5 Applies to Both Prospective
and Current Employees

Wright appears to argue that, because HRS § 378-2.5(a)
contains the phrase “subject to subsection (b)* and subsection
(b) concerns prospective enployees, the subject statute applies
only to prospective employees. Wright, therefore, maintains that

the eubject statute prohibits an employer from considering a

 

current employee's criminal conviction that occurred prior to his
‘employment with the employer. Home Depot, on the other hand,

insists that the express terms of HRS § 378-2.5 do not preclude

 

ite consideration of @ current employee's prior criminal record.
preliminarily, we acknowledge the well-established

principle that

 

legislative enactments are presumptively valid a
fnterpretea in such a manner as to give then effect.
the wtarting point in statutory construction is to determine
Ehe legislative intent from the language of the statute
{teelf. Indeed, absent any constitutional obstacles in
applying the law,

 

this court's chief duty is to ascertain and give
‘to the legislature's intention to the
fullest degree, which ie obtained primarily from
nguage contained in the statute itself.
een a lav ie enacted, a presi
the words in the statute expre
the legistature,

 

   

   

 

  

 
 

Construction vould produce an absurd ©
soneerYe clearly inconsistent with the purposes
And policies of the act, this court may not
fejece generally unambiguous language if
Construction can be legitimately found which
SEIT Give force to and preserve all the words of
the seatute.

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Morgan v. Elanning Dep't, County of Kauai, 104 Hawai" 173, 185,

86 P.3d 982, 994 (2004) (citations, internal quotation marke, and

brackets omitted) (ellipsis in original).

 

‘As previously quoted, HRS § 378-2.5 provides:

Oo

Subiect to subsection (bl._an emplover may
Anquixe_about_and consider an andividual’s erisinal

femme, cet ‘oF privil agree

fhe duties and responsibilities of the position
(b) | inguixy into and consideration of conviction

he prost ee had receiv ional

which may be withdrawn if the
Prospective employee has 2 conviction record that bears a
Fational relationship co the duties and responsibilities of
the position.

(c) For purposes of this section, *conviction” neane
fan adjudication by a court of competent Jurisdiction that
the 'defensant comittes 4 crime, not including fine!
judgnente required to be confidential pursuant to eection

Solves; provides that the period for which the coplover nay
sxanine the emplovee’s conviction record shall not excead
enveare

(emphases added.) By its plain terms, subsection (a) permits an

 

 

 

employer to “inquire about and consider an individual's criminal
conviction record” in the context of “hiring, termination, or the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” as long as “the
conviction record bears a rational relationship to the duties and
responsibilities of the position.” By limiting the
aforementioned provision to only prospective employees, as Wright
suggests, the phrase “termination, or the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” would be rendered superfluous. See in
ze City & County of Honolulu Corp. Counsel, 54 Haw. 356, 373, 507
P.2d 169, 178 (1973) (applying the “cardinal rule of statutory

construction that a statute ought upon the whole be so

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SSS
constructed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or

word shail be superfluous, void, or insignificant’ (emphases
added)). 1 other words, termination or other privileges of
employment are triggered only after an employee begins
employment. Thus, based on a plain reading of the statute, it is
clear that subsection (a) applies to both prospective and current
employees

With reepect to the prefatory phrase contained in
subsection (a), ise., *[s]ubject to subsection (b),* it is well-
established that the term ‘subject tof may mean “Limited by,"
subordinate to,” or ‘regulated by." State Sav. & loan Ass‘n wv.
Kauaian Dev. Co., 62 Haw. 188, 198, 613 P.24 1315, 1321 (1980)
(citation omitted). In the context of HRS § 378-2.5, the term
seubject to" modifies consideration of conviction records for
vhiring" inasmuch as the “hiring” phrase undoubtedly applies to
only prospective employees. Stated differently, HRS § 278-2.5(a)
permits an employer to “inguire about and consider an
individual's conviction record concerning hiring," provided that
such inguiry and consideration “shall take place only after the
prospective employee has received a conditional offer of

2.5(b). However, in either situation --

  

employment.” HRS § 37

that is, current or prospective employees,-- the employer may

 

only examine conviction records for a period that “shall not

exceed ten years." HRS § 378-2.5(c). Thus, contrary to Wright’s

 

assertion, consideration of a “conviction record" is not

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restricted to an employee's conviction that occurs during hie
employment with the employer.
‘The foregoing conclusion is further supported by

legislative history, in which the legislature expressly indicated

 

that it intended HRS § 378-2.5 to apply to both current and
prospective employees. See Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3282, in
1998 Senate Journal, at 1331; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2959, in
1998 Senate Journal, at 1206 (“The purpose of this bill . . . is
to allow employers to consider a criminal conviction record of
prospective or current employees without violating Hawaii's
employment practices laws.” (Bnphasie added.)); Sen. Conf. Com.
Rep. No. 79, in 1998 Senate Journal, at 776 (“The purpose of this
bill . . . is to provide employers with qualified immunity for
Aisclosure and consequences of such disclosure for truthful,
fair, and unbiased information about a current or former
employee's job performance." (Emphasis added.)); Hse. stand.
Comm. Rep. No. 673-98, in 1998 House Journal, at 1300-01 (*the
purpose of this bill is to repeal the prohibition against
employment discrimination based upon arrest and court record[,]*
by, amongst other things, adding a new definition of “arrest
record" that “providles] an exception to the prohibition against

unlawful discriminatory practices in employment on the basic of

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oo
an applicant's or current employee's record of criminal

conviction[.]" (Emphasis added.) .*

 

+ wright argues that a review of the legislative history indicates that
the legisleture die not intend to expand the reach of the statute £0 both
hicens and prospective employees. In support, wright relies on the floor
SUEReus by senator Brien Kanno in the 1998 legislative session, with regards
Eovthe enactment of HRS § 376-2.5:

 

ke. President, agreement on this measure was reached
approxinutely one hour before the deadline. Because of the
{Etencss of the hour, the language in the measure is,
[nscvertently, inconsistent. We wanted to state for the
Record that the intent of the Legislature ie to allow
Eeployers to have access to conviction records where there
{era rational relationship between the duties and the

 

 

deouStion wise be had soreed tg, isch ie not-expllcit in
he =a zr cn
is forse

 

$hieo wanted to clarity that ve nave had discussions

 

with poth the Senate Judiciary chairs and with the Senate
ses: Ee fog. and tt was aso

PSEEca chat the Houre_dusiciary chair also agrees with us

on this provision, and che intent is not to allow for

ry oo eh es

comment by Senator Kanno in 1998 Senate Journal, at 647-48 (emphases added) .
fouever, ‘we are not persuaded chat Senator Kanno’s remarks embodied the
Gatene, The United states Supreme Court has held that:

    

Im surveying legislative history[,) we have repeatedly
stated that the authoritative source for finding the

    
 

 

Iegislature’s intent Lies in the Comittee neports on the
Bill, which represent the conaidered and collective
Understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
eudying prop fon

 

one. a east nen

. 46.0.8. 70, 76 (1964) (brackets, internal quotation
GarclavUlsrione ositted) (enphaais added); see also Reanett v. Yoshina,
Se P supp. 22 1139, 1250 (D. Haw. 2000) (vTo the extent that legislative
Blatory may be considered, it is the official connittee reports that provide
the suchoritative expression of legislative intent. ‘Stray coments by
{RE Glaual legislators, not otherwise supported by statutory language oF
SGeniecee reperte, cannot be attributed to the full body that voted on the
Soi (cisbing incre Helly, e841 F.26 908, 912 9.3 (stm Cir. 1968)), aff'd.
Bisipoa‘fos7 (ath Cir, 2001). Aw diecuased supra, the committee reports
(continued.

 

 

 

 

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Accordingly, we believe that HRS § 378-2.5 ie not
Limited in application solely to prospective employees; rather,
the statute applies to both current and prospective employees
Nevertheless, the issue remains whether Wright has sufficiently
alleged that his drug conviction was not rationally related to
his duties and responsibilities as an associate sales clerk in
Home Depot's lunber department, as required under HRS
§ 378-2.5(a), to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a clain.

2. Whether Wright Has Sufficiently Alleged that his
Conviction Record Does Not Bear a Rational Relationship

to his Employment
As previously mentioned, HRS § 378-2.5(a) establishes
as a matter of law that an employer, inter alia, need not hire,
or may terminate, an employee with a conviction (that is less
than ten years old), “provided that the conviction record bears a

ational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the
is added). Although

 

position.” HRS § 378-2.5(a) (emphs
“rational relationship" ie not defined in the statute, the plain

is found in the words

 

and obvious meaning of the phr

 

"(continued
specifically indleate that HRS § 378-2.5 applied to both current and
Prospective employees, which Senator Kanno's renarks, in fact, acknowledge.
Kichoogh the senator's remarks indicate that "there is a commitment to go back
dni fis this meaeure next session,” the legislature dié not revisit HRS
S'a76-2.5 in the 1999 legislative session. The legislature, however, aid
Sevieit ps $.378-2-5 in the 2003 and 2004 sessions, gee supra note 6, and,
Aithough the legislature anended the statute each session, those amendments
Gis'noe include “fixings the statute as indicated in Senator Kanno's remarks
Recordingly, the express terme of the statute continue to permit consideration
Bf'a curfent employee's conviction that occurred prior to his employment with
the exployer.

 

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themselves, i.€., under HRS § 378-2.5(a), the relationship

between the conviction and the employment mist be rational.
In this case and as previously indicated, Wright
asserted two counts against Home Depot: (1) a violation of HRS
§ 378-2; and (2) violations of public policies, which are not
before this court on appeal, see supa note 2. With respect to
his section 378-2 claim, Wright specifically alleged in his

complaint that:

7. on or about April 23, 2002, (Home Depot) hires
tweigne! te work in. [ose Depot] as an associate sales clerk
inthe lunber Gepartment. [wright] vas tested for drugs at
the beginning of his enpioysent by (Mone Depot], and the
Eesults were negative.

8.""on or about Septesber 2002, [Wright] was up for
prosotion as department supervisor, at viich tine (he) was
Rested twice for druge; the resulta were negative, clean.

9c On April. 30, 2996, Wright] was convicted for the
use of controlled substance, upen pleading guilty, in the
Washoe Second Judicial District court, Reno, Nevada, .
[ie sentenced to prison 12-36 nosths, ‘which was suspended,
nd placed on probation not to exceed two (2) years.

Special conaitione were chat he pay an administrative fee of
$85.00 and chemical fee of $60-00; chat on Novenber 5, 1997,
{weight] was honorably discharged. from probation.

0. ""the work performance of (Wright) at [Howe Depot)
wae goodi.)

iz! “on Decenber 27, 2002, [Wright’s] employment with

Ione Bepot] wes terminated because of (hie) conviction for
use of controlled substance in 1396.

 

 

 

 

ie! “tirright's) conviction... in 1996 for the use
of controlled eubstance does not bear a rational
Seiseicaship te bie duties and responsibilities of the
position he held at (Hove Depot].

Taking the allegations as true and viewing the complaint in the
Light most favorable to Wright, as the nonnoving party, Aames

Funding Corp. 107 Hawai'i at 98, 110 P.3d at 1045, we conclude
that, at this stage in the litigation, Wright has sufficiently

alleged a claim against Home Depot for violation of HRS § 378-2

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However, whether, on an ongoing basis, Wright will be able to
demonstrate that his prior conviction does not bear a rational
relationship to his employment is an issue within the province of
the trier of fact and not a proper issue to be determined by this
court as a matter of law on 2 motion to dismiss. Me, therefore,
hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing Wright's
complaint.”
IV. concuus

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's

February 28, 2005 final judoment and remand thie case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs: 4 b

Meyer M. Ueoka (of

Ueoke,& ueoka) for ii Ph Lorinacor

plaineiff-appellant
Jeffrey S. Harris and Peat Cauda On

Jan Muranaka Boivin (of
Torkildson, Katz, Fonseca, Oooo
Moore & Hetherington),

for defendant-appel lant Gere ~

 

* at the circuit court and on appeal, Howe Depot erroneously equa!
the phrase "rational relationship’ in MRS 378-2.5 with the rational
relationship or rational basis test as applied in the context of
constitutional equal protection analysis. Such standard 1s not applicable
here where the Claim e based upon a violation of a statute, jer, HRS ¢ 376
2. "As discussed gupra, the statute at ieaue in this case does nok define che
Phrase "rational relationship’; accordingly, we resort to "the ordinary

 

 

 

 

Reaning of .. . terms not statutorily defined."
Gollection Agency, 96 Hawaii 408, 424, 32 P-ad $2, 68 (2000) (elation and

therefore,” reject Hone Depot’
ih the context of equal

 

Internal quotation marke omitted) . We
arguments grounded upon the rational basin te
protection.

 

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