Title: State v. Williams

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

229 Kan. 646 (1981)
630 P.2d 694
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS L. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
No. 51,883

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion denying a rehearing filed June 17, 1981.
Russell Shultz, of Shultz, Fisher, Monnat & Shultz, of Wichita, for the appellant.
William P. Ronan, county attorney, Geary Gorup, former county attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, for the appellee.
OPINION DENYING A REHEARING
CRIMINAL LAW  Defendant's Conviction Reversed for Insufficient Evidence  Rehearing Requested by State Denied.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, C.J.:
The opinion of the court reversing the conviction of Douglas L. Williams was filed on February 28, 1981. State v. Williams, 229 Kan. 290, 623 P.2d 1334 (1981). Within the time allotted by Supreme Court Rule 7.06 (225 Kan. xlviii) the State filed a motion for rehearing. Thereafter, pursuant to an order of this court, the appellant filed a response to the motion for rehearing. Finding nothing upon consideration of the motion for rehearing and response thereto which warrants a reconsideration of the case, the motion for rehearing is denied.
It is not unique in the jurisprudence of this state to reverse convictions in criminal cases, homicide or otherwise, where the record does not contain sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. See State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. 469, 489, 441 P.2d 846 (1968), and cases cited therein. Recognizing, however, that such reversals are controversial and frequently misunderstood, we will state the applicable law in greater detail and seek to clarify the portion of the opinion concerning the absence of sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury.
The appellant was charged with aiding a felon, rape, aggravated burglary, felony murder, and premeditated murder. The trial court at the close of the State's evidence granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of aiding a felon. In the history of our law this offense was previously prosecuted by charging the perpetrator as an accessory after the fact. The jury found the appellant not guilty of rape. On Counts One (premeditated murder) and Two (felony murder) the trial court submitted one combined verdict form with four alternatives: (1) *647 Guilty of premeditated murder; (2) Guilty of murder while in the commission of a felony; (3) Guilty of premeditated murder and murder while in the commission of a felony; and (4) Not guilty. Of these alternatives the jury found the appellant guilty of only one  murder while in the commission of a felony. It also found the appellant guilty of aggravated burglary, which provided the underlying felony for the felony murder.
Of the instructions given to the jury, the following are pertinent to our analysis:
"No. 5
"1. That the defendant killed Kay L. Robinson;
"2. That such killing was done maliciously;
"3. That it was done willfully;
"1. That the defendant killed Kay L. Robinson;
"No. 6
*648 "No. 7
"2. That the defendant did so without authority;
....
"No. 11
In the original opinion we recited rules of law which guide the court in the determination of whether the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Those rules are repeated here:
Convictions based upon circumstantial evidence, as in the instant case, can present a special challenge to the appellate court. Juries are permitted to draw justifiable inferences from proven circumstances and established facts; but the appellate court must *649 determine whether findings based upon inferences are justifiable by applying additional rules of law.
In State v. Gobin, 216 Kan. 278, 531 P.2d 16 (1975), this court reversed a felony conviction of attempting to steal swine. The proof in that case was entirely circumstantial, and we recited applicable appellate rules including the following: "Presumptions and inferences may be drawn only from facts established and presumption may not rest upon presumption or inference on inference." 216 Kan. at 280; see State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. at 488; State v. Ragland, 170 Kan. 346, 351, 226 P.2d 251 (1951).
Black's Law Dictionary 917 (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines an inference as "[a] process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted." See Duncan v. Railway Co., 82 Kan. 230, 233, 108 Pac. 101 (1910) (where a discussion of inference and presumption is made). The presumption referred to is the permissive type, not the mandatory or conclusive presumption. See Stumbo, Presumptions  A View at Chaos, 3 Washburn L.J. 182, 190-91 (1964).
The rule which forbids the basing of an inference on an inference has received treatment and analysis in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 100. In Kansas, the rule has been cited most frequently in civil cases, but it is recognized as "doubly applicable in criminal cases." State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. at 488, and cases cited therein.
The rule is restated in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 (13th ed. 1972):
The rule against basing an inference on an inference has been discussed in more detail in Kansas civil cases. This court has said that what is meant by the rule forbidding the basing of one inference upon another inference is that an inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility. Virginia Surety Co. v. Schlegel, 200 Kan. 64, 434 P.2d 722 (1967). Permissible presumptions or inferences, as understood in the law of evidence, *650 must have substantial probative force as distinguished from surmise. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 219 Kan. 680, 689, 549 P.2d 1026 (1976). While reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts and conditions shown they cannot be drawn from facts or conditions merely imagined or assumed. Duncan v. Railway Co., 86 Kan. 112, 119 Pac. 356 (1911).
In the original opinion we recited allegations in the affidavits for the first and second search warrants designed to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. These allegations of fact do not present evidence this court can review on an appeal from a conviction which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial of the appellant fell short of the allegations in the affidavits in several material matters that were critical to establish the prosecution's theory of guilt in the case. Bits and pieces of circumstantial evidence supplied in the affidavits for search warrants, that tended to provide more than a mere suspicion that the appellant may have been involved in the commission of the crime, did not all materialize as evidence when the appellant was tried. Hair fibers alleged in the affidavits to have been found on or near the victim's body, which were capable of being identified and compared by a laboratory analysis, utterly failed to materialize to identify the appellant. Nothing on hair fibers found near the victim's body was presented at the trial of the appellant. The first search warrant affidavit stated that Dr. Crane, who performed the autopsy of the victim, detected an abrasion on the victim's left shoulder which was surmised to have been caused by a metal wrist band. The affidavit further alleged the appellant had been seen wearing a metal wrist watch band, and that Jordan had not been seen wearing a watch or identification bracelet. At the trial of the appellant, Dr. Crane testified about some superficial wounds to the outer skin on the top of the victim's shoulder, but there was absolutely no testimony in the record of the trial regarding the probable or suspected cause of these superficial wounds. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of trial which identifies the appellant as one who wore a metal wrist watch band. The first search warrant authorized the police to seize "[a]ll wrist watches and/or metal wrist bands" found among the possessions or in the apartment of Jordan and the appellant, Williams.
*651 In the affidavit for the first search warrant it was stated: "Four brands of cigarettes have been found in the apartment, three of which have filter tips. A fourth non-filtered tip cigarette was found in an ashtray in the living room which cannot be accounted for by the officers investigating the crime after speaking to the people who would normally have access to the apartment." At the trial of the appellant no evidence of a non-filtered tip cigarette was introduced and no evidence was introduced concerning any cigarette butts in an ashtray in the apartment.
In the affidavit for the first search warrant it is stated:
At the trial Bonnie Boone testified she saw the victim's white Satellite car come into the gravel parking lot and park in front of Bonnie Boone's apartment. She recognized the car as belonging to Kay L. Robinson because Kay had come to the apartment complex and parked in front of her apartment on four or five *652 previous occasions. She heard the car door close, she heard footsteps of one person going up the stairs to Mike Roger's apartment which was above hers, and the only other sound she heard from the upstairs area at that time was the door closing after she heard Kay Robinson's footsteps go upstairs. There is no testimony in the trial record concerning Bonnie Boone's ability to hear sounds (stereo, water running from the bathroom and other similar sounds as recited in the affidavit). Bonnie Boone testified she heard no other sounds after that. She testified that after she got in bed she "got back up to shut the window." At that time she said, "I saw a shadow walking by." (Emphasis added.) She described the shadow as "a person" walking north on the sidewalk in front of the apartments. She testified:
"A. No.
"A. No, I shut my window and turned on my fan.
"Q. And what did you do after that?
"A. Went back to bed.
....
"A. Nothing.
"A. After I went to bed I heard something.
"Q. Okay. What did you hear?
"A. I heard a thud.
"A. From upstairs.
"Q. The Mike Roger's Apartment?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And had you gone to sleep yet at this time?
"A. I was just getting ready to doze off.
"MR. GORUP: We withdraw the question, sir.
"Q. What did you do after you heard this thud?
"Q. Did you hear anything, any noises after that?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you see Kay Robinson at all that night?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you look at a clock?
"A. I can't remember.
"A. Yes."
The officer making the affidavit stated the shadow of a person described by Bonnie Boone in the affidavit fit the description of Jordan.
The evidence established there was no connecting door between the second floor apartments. An occupant of Jordan's apartment was required to exit downstairs to the front of the apartments at the street level and walk north past Bonnie Boone's bedroom window to enter the stairway to Mike Roger's apartment.
The State in its motion for rehearing asserts:
The foregoing assertion clearly indicates the State's theory of the case is based upon the assumption the sexual assault upon the victim and the murder must have been committed by no less than two separate male individuals. The unproved supposition of the State presented in its brief on appeal to this court is that because the decedent's body was found lying on her back with arms at her sides, with no defensive marks on the decedent's hands or arms, the perpetrator of the crime, Allen Jordan, must of necessity have had an accomplice with him at the time of the commission of the crime.
It is apparent from the facts which are beyond dispute that Kay L. Robinson was raped and murdered. The State completely ignores the possibility that Jordan, who had a speaking acquaintance with Mike Roger, may have been allowed to enter Roger's apartment so that no burglary was, in fact, perpetrated. Furthermore, it is entirely possible when threatened with a knife and threatened with rape that Kay L. Robinson, a high school student, was so frightened that she submitted without resistance. *654 Recognition of these possibilities is not to say this court on review is reweighing the evidence to determine the facts. It simply illustrates that the jury drew a questionable inference from all the evidence to find that two male individuals were responsible for the crime. From the circumstantial evidence at trial an inference that only one person committed the crime is just as consistent as an inference that two persons were involved.
Bear in mind, Bonnie Boone, whom the prosecuting attorney presented as a reliable witness, heard absolutely no sounds from the apartment above her, after she saw a shadow walk by when she closed her bedroom window, while she was in bed and still awake. According to the evidence presented at the trial, she was about to doze off when she heard a thud on the floor of the apartment above her about 11 o'clock p.m.
The jury, having made a finding by inference that two male individuals committed the crime, was then required to identify the second male individual.
There is no direct evidence that two individuals committed the crime, and there is no direct evidence as to whom the second individual, if any, may have been.
To identify the second male individual, other than Jordan, the jury was required to stack an impermissible inference on the first inference. The circumstantial evidence asserted by the State in its motion for rehearing to support its theory of guilt, which involves the stacking of inferences, is enumerated by the State as follows:
The State then argues in its motion for rehearing:
Most of the above numbered statements made by the State in its motion for rehearing are either inferences based upon inferences or conclusions drawn from those inferences. From the evidence presented at the trial the conclusion stated in enumerated item No. (8) above is unwarranted.
Eileen Burnau, a criminalist with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, primarily interested in the area of forensic serology, was presented by the State as its expert on the examination and identification of blood and other body fluids usually found in a stained or crusted form. She examined the sheets and the blue bedspread taken from the bed upon which the victim was found in Roger's apartment on the night of May 8, 1979. She testified:
On cross-examination Eileen Burnau testified in answer to questions:
"Q. So far as you know.
"A. Yes.
"A. That is correct.
"A. Yes "
On further cross-examination she testified:
"Q. So you don't claim to be a chemist?
"A. That is correct."
The nebulous character of the foregoing testimony established, among other things, that no tests were available to determine the age of seminal stains, and that tests made of seminal stains do not identify an individual.
In State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981), Eileen Burnau came up with a calculated blood analysis of 6/10ths of 1% of the population under the Multi-System polymorphic enzyme analysis to narrow the identification of the possible suspects in a murder case. There the court held any challenge to the reliability of the testing went to its weight, not its admissibility.
In the instant case Eileen Burnau's analysis narrowed the field of possible suspects to 32.8% of the male population based on her A-B-O blood grouping analysis, assuming the jury adopted the State's theory and did not find the credibility of her testimony shaken on cross-examination.
Mike Roger, in whose apartment the victim was found, testified that his wife had filed an action for divorce against him on April 19, 1979, which was only nineteen days prior to the victim's death. His testimony established that he had been having sexual relations with the victim. According to Roger the last time he had sex with Kay was on Sunday, May 6, 1979, in Oklahoma; the last time he had sex with Kay on the bed in the apartment was estimated about two weeks before her death; and the last time he had sex with Kay in the apartment was on April 30, 1979, in the front room. He further testified Kay would clean the apartment *658 and usually make the bed up. He said: "That is why she would come over while I was at work or after she got off work and clean the apartment." Roger related that on May 8, 1979, Kay was at his apartment in the afternoon and left for work at 3:15 p.m. He testified:
"A. Sunday, the Sunday before.
Mike Roger testified that the victim had a key to his apartment, also that he "had one and the landlord."
The landlord of Mike Roger, John Plummer, a prosecution witness, testified he gave a key to the apartment to Mike Roger and his wife and that he kept two keys for himself. He acknowledged that the key could have been duplicated.
Mike Roger testified he left the apartment for work at the Boeing Company in Wichita on May 8, 1979, at 3:45 p.m. His shift at Boeing began at 4:30 p.m. and ended at 1:00 a.m. He had regular employment at Boeing on the night shift. Roger said he tried to call Kay at his apartment at 11:00 p.m. on May 8, 1979, but no one answered the telephone.
Brenda Dryden, age eighteen, was a prosecution witness who described herself as a friend of Kay Robinson. Besides seeing Kay in school she socialized with her. Brenda worked at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant and saw Kay on the afternoon of May 8, 1979, when Kay invited her (Brenda) to come to Mike Roger's apartment that night. Brenda got off work a little after 10:00 p.m., but was tired and went home without calling Kay to tell her that she was not coming to Roger's apartment. Brenda testified on cross-examination:
"A. Yes, I have.
"A. That is essentially what she said, right."
While the State contends that Kay L. Robinson was the only *659 other individual shown to have "authorization to use the bedroom where the seminal stained bedspread was found," the evidence presented from prosecution witnesses was that two girls working at different restaurants, who were seniors in the Augusta High School and socialized together, were using Mike Roger's apartment at night while Roger was working on the night shift at Boeing.
On the foregoing evidence the State's attempt to zero in on a deposit of semen to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant, Douglas L. Williams, assisted Jordan as an accomplice inside the bedroom of Mike Roger's apartment, where the victim was raped and killed, requires the stacking of too many inferences to warrant approval by this court. On the record presented in this case, the State is required to rely on circumstances which are inferred or presumed from other circumstances. This fails to meet the burden of proof cast upon the State in a criminal prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State's attempt to bolster its case by elaborating on Jordan's ability to recruit an accomplice, other than the appellant, is likewise subject to the infirmity that the State relies on circumstances which are inferred or presumed from other circumstances.
Another bit of circumstantial evidence that warrants further attention is the empty package of Marlboro Light 100's found in the trash bag on the rear seat in the appellant's sister's car two days after the crime. This empty package was found to have a fingerprint of the appellant on it. No prints identifiable as the victim's were found on the empty package. This empty package was marked as an exhibit and bore a tag placed on it by the investigating officer which read: "Found in Jordan's trash."
In its motion for rehearing in this case the State charges the court on this matter with reweighing the evidence by its reference in the opinion to statements made by defense witnesses at the trial. The summary disposition of this bit of circumstantial evidence in the opinion was perhaps misleading. In substance, the court in reviewing the evidence simply determined the jury could not draw a justifiable inference from this circumstance to establish the appellant's participation in the crimes charged.
Evidence at the trial disclosed that Deanna Williams, an employee at the Derby self-service gas station in Augusta on the *660 night of May 8, 1979, sold a pack of cigarettes to Kay L. Robinson, whom she had known as a schoolmate. In her testimony at the trial she said it was "Some kind of Marlboros." When pressed to give the brand name she said: "It was either Marlboro Lights or Marlboro Light 100's. I don't know for sure." Randy Smith, a special agent for the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, interviewed Deanna Williams shortly after the homicide and was called to testify concerning the sale of cigarettes by Deanna Williams to Kay Robinson. Smith testified (without objection by defense counsel):
Assuming the jury found Kay L. Robinson purchased one package of Marlboro Light 100's on the night of May 8, 1979, on the way to Roger's apartment, the direct evidence discloses when the police examined her purse at the crime scene they found one partial package of Marlboro Light 100's containing nine cigarettes.
For the jury to make anything of the circumstance that an empty package of Marlboro Light 100's was found in Jordan's trash two days after the crime in the car of the appellant's sister (Jordan's live-in girl friend) bearing the appellant's fingerprint, it was required to draw an inference that Kay L. Robinson on the night of May 8, 1979, went to Roger's apartment with two packages of cigarettes that were Marlboro Light 100's in her purse. Assuming this to be a proper inference, then who took the second package? It was found in Jordan's trash. He was known to have been in Roger's apartment on the night in question. Did Jordan smoke the cigarettes and discard the empty package in the car to which both Jordan and the appellant had access? Did the appellant then pick up the empty package from somewhere in the car and put it in the trash bag on the rear seat? Did the appellant smoke a pack of Marlboro Light 100's procured from some other source, as indicated by possibilities in the court's opinion? Many other possibilities can be imagined. This is not to suggest the court is reweighing the evidence, but to emphasize that the jury *661 was required to draw a second inference based upon the first inference to find the appellant was in the apartment of Roger when the crime was committed and took a package of Marlboro Light 100's from the victim's purse. This is not a justifiable inference the jury can make from the circumstantial evidence. If the jury based its conviction on this circumstantial evidence, it was based upon pure speculation and conjecture, and the conviction cannot be upheld.
The State contends the intent of the appellant to commit the crime can be shown by the crime itself. From the transcript of the evidence there is no evidence upon which a jury could draw a justifiable inference that the appellant participated in any way in these crimes. Neither seminal stain nor any other evidence could be used to make identification, and the crime scene cannot be used to establish the intent of someone who is not shown to have been connected with the crime. Mere association with Jordan, the principal who actually committed these crimes, or mere presence of the appellant in the vicinity of the crime scene is insufficient to establish guilt of the appellant as an aider or abettor. What the law requires to show guilt of one who aids and abets is that the person knowingly associates with the unlawful venture and participates in a way which indicates that such person is furthering the success of the venture. State v. McDaniel & Owens, 228 Kan. 172, 612 P.2d 1231 (1980).
The State in its motion for rehearing charges the court with explaining away certain incriminating evidence by accepting defense testimony which the jury had the right to reject. On this point the State asserts what it describes as contradictory statements made by the appellant. The substance of the statements made by the appellant to the investigating officers before and after his arrest are stated in the court's opinion. The State argues the appellant in his second interview "provided authorities with information so important and obvious in a murder investigation (of which he was fully aware during his first interview) that nondisclosure of such information coupled with his affirmative statements to the contrary, clearly establish evidence of a guilty mind attempting to conceal the involvement of either Jordan or himself in these offenses."
At the trial the appellant testified:
"Q. Did he tell you why?
"A. He said he wanted to see if Mike had a joint.
"Q. Then what happened.
"A. The baby was crying in the bedroom.
"Q. The baby?
"A. Heather.
"Q. Continue.
"Q. Did he say anything at that time?
"A. No.
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you recall later being awakened?
"A. That is correct.
"Q. Doug, did you kill Kay Robinson?
"A. No sir, I didn't.
"MR. WATKINS: You may cross-examine.
"CROSS EXAMINATION
"BY MR. GORUP:
"A. That  Like I said, that is approximate.
"A. I recall something to that effect.
"A. No.
"Q. And you wouldn't  So that was the truth?
"A. Yes.
"A. Yes, but he just stated he was going next door.
"Q. He didn't say anything about the girl?
....
....
"A. Not at the time, no.
"Q. You knew it was important, didn't you?
"A. I had forgot all about it.
"A. Yes."
As heretofore stated the trial court at the close of the State's evidence granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of aiding a felon.
The trial court properly instructed the jury that it had the right to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each witness. Under the instruction the jury had the right to reject the testimony of any witness or the testimony of the appellant.
According to the appellant's testimony he was in his apartment for the entire period of time in question on the night of May 8, 1979. While the jury had the absolute right to reject the appellant's testimony, the jury had no authority by reason of its disbelief of the appellant's testimony to consider the converse of the appellant's testimony as affirmative evidence against him and base a conviction thereon. In other words, the jury could not find the appellant was in the apartment of Mike Roger assisting Jordan on the night in question, that he entered the apartment unlawfully with intent to rape, or that he participated in the crimes from testimony given by the appellant at the trial or from statements that he made prior to trial. The appellant made no admissions suggesting guilt on his part for any of the offenses with which he was charged. Under our theory of criminal jurisprudence in this *664 nation, the defendant is clothed with a presumption of innocence until he is proven to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the State.
Our review of the transcript in this case, which is the record of the trial as transcribed by the court reporter from notes taken at the trial recording the verbatim testimony of all witnesses and proceedings before the trial court, discloses the jury's verdict finding the appellant guilty of aggravated burglary and felony murder was based on pure speculation and conjecture. The State utterly failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is apparent the jury had difficulty with the evidence and the instructions. The jury acquitted the appellant of rape, yet it had to find under the court's instruction that the appellant entered the apartment of Mike Roger on the night in question without authority and with intent to commit rape to find him guilty of aggravated burglary. Logically, if the State's theory of guilt was adopted by the jury, the appellant was an accomplice assisting Jordan in the crimes of rape and felony murder, and under the instruction on aiding and abetting the jury would have found the appellant guilty of rape just as they did Jordan, the principal actor.
The appellant's conviction has been reversed by the court's opinion filed February 28, 1981. The lower court is directed to discharge the appellant forthwith.