Title: State v. Bilodeau

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 92 
Docket: 
Ken-19-357 
Argued:  
June 9, 2020 
Decided: 
June 25, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW P. BILODEAU 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Andrew P. Bilodeau appeals from a judgment of conviction of 
manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1) (2020), entered by the trial court 
(Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) following a jury trial.  Bilodeau contends that the 
court erred in denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new 
trial.  We affirm the judgment.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the 
jury could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State 
v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶ 2, 179 A.3d 910.  On November 18, 2017, Bilodeau was 
fifty-five years old and licensed to drive in the State of Maine.  Bilodeau suffers 
from disabilities that affect his eyesight, impairing his depth-perception.  He 
 
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also suffers from cerebral palsy, which impairs his reaction time, especially in 
his lower extremities.  When he drove, Bilodeau used two feet to operate the 
pedals, placing his left foot on the brake pedal and wedging his right foot 
between the transmission tunnel and the gas pedal.  He primarily relied on 
steering—rather than braking or accelerating—to navigate around obstacles 
on the road.   
[¶3]  On the evening of November 18, 2017, at approximately 6:00 p.m., 
Bilodeau drove his car up Northern Avenue in Augusta.  Northern Avenue 
intersects with Kendall Street at the crest of a hill, and Kendall Street is crossed 
by a pedestrian crosswalk where it meets Northern Avenue.  As Bilodeau drove 
toward the intersection, the victim was crossing Kendall Street in the 
crosswalk.  It was dark outside.  The victim’s wife was walking several feet 
behind her husband.  
[¶4]  Bilodeau’s car struck the victim, who hit the windshield of the car 
and was propelled up and over the roof, landing in the street behind the car.  
Bilodeau continued on for a short distance, then pulled to the side of the road.  
When Bilodeau struck the victim, Bilodeau’s car was almost entirely in the 
oncoming lane of traffic and was traveling below the posted speed limit of 
 
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twenty-five miles per hour.  The victim was in the crosswalk when he was hit.  
EMTs transported the victim to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.   
[¶5]  In the minutes following the incident, Bilodeau gave three 
statements to police.  In each conversation, he told much the same story: he saw 
something or someone in the crosswalk, but did not trust his legs to brake in 
time.  Instead, he turned the wheel and continued forward, believing that he 
had time and room to maneuver around the obstacle.   
[¶6]  Bilodeau was indicted by a grand jury on March 23, 2018, and 
charged with one count of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).  He 
pleaded not guilty.  The court held a two-day jury trial on December 12 and 13, 
2018.  At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Bilodeau moved for a judgment 
of acquittal, M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(a), which the court denied.  On December 13, the 
jury found Bilodeau guilty.  Bilodeau subsequently renewed his motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(b), and filed a motion for a new trial, 
M.R.U. Crim. P. 33.  The trial court held a consolidated hearing on the motions 
and later entered an order denying both motions.  The trial court entered a 
judgment of conviction and sentenced Bilodeau to ten years’ imprisonment 
with all but one year suspended, and four years’ probation.  Bilodeau timely 
appealed the judgment of conviction.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2).   
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  On appeal Bilodeau raises two issues.  First, he contends that the 
trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.  M.R.U. 
Crim. P. 29(a)-(b).  Second, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a new trial based on allegedly improper arguments proffered by the 
State during its closing argument.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
the judgment.  
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[¶8]  Bilodeau contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion 
for a judgment of acquittal that he lodged at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, 
and by denying the motion when he renewed it post-trial.  Contrary to 
Bilodeau’s contentions, a jury could rationally have found each element of the 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by 
the State at trial, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying the motion.  
See State v. Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751. 
[¶9]  “A person is guilty of manslaughter if that person . . . [r]ecklessly, or 
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).  “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of 
the person’s conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that the 
 
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person’s conduct will cause such a result.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(A) (2020).  “A 
person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result of the person’s 
conduct when the person fails to be aware of a risk that the person’s conduct 
will cause such a result.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(4)(A) (2020).  The person’s failure 
to be aware of the risk or conscious disregard of the risk, “when viewed in light 
of the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances 
known to the person, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same 
situation.”  17-A M.R.S. § 35(3)(C), (4)(C) (2020).  
[¶10]  “On appeal, we review the denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to 
determine whether a jury could rationally have found each element of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751 
(quotation marks omitted)(alteration omitted); see also State v. Lowden, 2014 
ME 29, ¶ 13, 87 A.3d 694 (“We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal under the same standard as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence . . . .”).  “The jury may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented at trial.”  Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 19, 225 A.3d 751.  
 
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[¶11]  The facts of the case were largely undisputed at trial.  Bilodeau 
admitted that he was driving the car that struck the victim, and it is undisputed 
that the crash killed the victim.  However, Bilodeau contends that the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could rationally have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted recklessly or with criminal 
negligence, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
acquittal.  See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).   
[¶12]  Contrary to Bilodeau’s contentions, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, a jury could rationally have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Bilodeau acted recklessly or with criminal negligence.  
Bilodeau told law enforcement immediately after the accident that he saw 
someone or something in the crosswalk as he approached.  He confirmed this 
fact in his own trial testimony.  Bilodeau did not attempt to brake.  Instead, he 
piloted his car into the oncoming lane and through the crosswalk in an attempt 
to bypass the victim.  Testimony by an accident reconstructionist with the 
Maine State Police suggested that Bilodeau did not swerve in a last-ditch 
attempt to avoid the victim, but rather moved gradually into the oncoming lane.  
Bilodeau’s car entered the crosswalk straight-on, perpendicular to the path of 
 
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the crosswalk.  The jury could reasonably infer that braking was an alternative 
and appropriate reaction, given Bilodeau’s speed.  
[¶13]  These facts could reasonably support a conclusion that Bilodeau 
made a deliberate choice to try to avoid the victim by driving around him, even 
after he saw the victim in the crosswalk.  They do not suggest a panicked swerve 
made without time to stop the car.  On this record, a jury could rationally have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bilodeau either failed to be aware of the 
risk to the victim or consciously disregarded that risk, and that Bilodeau’s 
failure or disregard grossly deviated from the standard of conduct of a 
reasonable and prudent person.  See State v. Carisio, 552 A.2d 23, 24, 27 (Me. 
1988) (affirming conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver 
purposely ran a stop sign, believing she had sufficient time to avoid victim’s 
vehicle); State v. Gammon, 529 A.2d 813, 815-16 (Me. 1987) (affirming 
conviction for manslaughter where defendant driver saw victim’s car stopped 
in roadway 500 feet ahead but failed to slow below the speed limit before 
colliding); State v. Hanks, 397 A.2d 998, 1000 (Me. 1979) (affirming conviction 
for vehicular manslaughter where defendant’s car had mismatched and bald 
tires, causing it to leave lane of travel and strike oncoming car), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1985).  The trial court 
 
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did not err in denying Bilodeau’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close 
of the State’s case and again when he renewed the motion post-trial.   
B. 
Motion for New Trial 
 
[¶14]  Bilodeau also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial, arguing that statements made by the State 
during its closing argument regarding Bilodeau’s disabilities were improper 
and violated his Constitutional and statutory protections.  Contrary to 
Bilodeau’s arguments, the court did not err in concluding that he had failed to 
demonstrate that the State’s comments were improper.1   
[¶15]  “We review the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for 
an abuse of discretion and any findings underlying its decision for clear error.”  
State v. Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶ 44, 143 A.3d 800.  However, where the defendant 
argues that the State made improper comments during its closing argument, 
and the defendant did not object to those statements at trial, we review for 
obvious error.  State v. Robinson, 2016 ME 24, ¶ 25, 134 A.3d 828; see also State 
v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727 (articulating the obvious error 
                                         
1  Bilodeau raised the alleged impropriety of the State’s comments in his amended motion for a 
new trial.  However, in the trial court’s order, which addressed both Bilodeau’s motion for a new trial 
and renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court considered the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct in the context of its sufficiency analysis.  Bilodeau’s motions to the trial court and his 
arguments on appeal make clear that he was and is actually seeking a new trial—not a judgment of 
acquittal—based on the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.   
 
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standard in the context of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct).  Obvious error 
is that which is plain and likely to have affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights, while also likely affecting the outcome of the trial:  
If a defendant demonstrates on appeal that there was prosecutorial 
misconduct that went unaddressed by the court, we will consider 
whether the error is plain—that is, whether the error is so clear 
under existing law that the court and the prosecutor were required 
to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection. If 
there is error that is plain, we will then consider whether the 
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that the 
error affected her substantial rights, meaning that the error was 
sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. When a prosecutor’s statement is not sufficient to 
draw an objection, particularly when viewed in the overall context 
of the trial, that statement will rarely be found to have created a 
reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
 
Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727 (quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted).   
 
[¶16]  In his amended motion for a new trial, Bilodeau argued that the 
State improperly stated in its closing that Bilodeau “should not have been 
driving because of his physical disability.”  He further contended that “[i]t is 
inappropriate to argue that a disabled person should not be driving after the 
 
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government approves it [by granting the person a license].”2  Bilodeau did not 
cite any law to support these claims.  He renews these arguments on appeal, 
again failing to cite any law in support of his contentions.   
 
[¶17]  Contrary to Bilodeau’s arguments, neither the fact that the State of 
Maine issued him a driver’s license nor the fact that he was disabled serves as 
a defense to criminal liability.  The Maine Criminal Code does not provide any 
statutory defense to manslaughter related to a defendant’s physical disability 
or preclude the State from presenting evidence of that disability.  See 
17-A M.R.S. §§ 101-110, 203 (2020).  Nor does the Maine Human Rights Act or 
Maine Civil Rights Act limit the State’s ability to present relevant evidence of a 
defendant’s disability in a criminal prosecution.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4634, 
4681-4685 (2020).  Regulations promulgated by the Department of the 
Secretary of State set forth detailed processes by which the Department 
evaluates physical disabilities in the context of licensing drivers, but do not 
provide that a driver’s licensure constitutes a defense against reckless or 
criminally negligent operation.  See 29-250 C.M.R. ch. 3 (effective Dec. 31, 
2016).    
                                         
2  Bilodeau also moved for a new trial based on testimony from a State’s witness describing 
Bilodeau as exhibiting “no remorse” following the crash.  The trial court denied the motion as to this 
ground, and Bilodeau does not renew the argument on appeal.   
 
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[¶18]  Bilodeau has not demonstrated that the court erred in permitting 
the State to refer to Bilodeau’s disabilities in its closing argument.  See Fahnley, 
2015 ME 82, ¶ 35, 119 A.3d 727.  He has not identified any constitutional 
provisions, statutes, regulations, or case law to suggest that the State’s 
arguments were improper.  It was through Bilodeau’s own direct testimony 
that evidence of his disability was presented to the jury.  The State’s reference 
to that evidence in its closing argument was clearly relevant to an element of 
the charged crime and failed to generate any objection from Bilodeau.  In sum, 
Bilodeau cannot show that the trial court’s decision to allow the State to refer 
to his disability in its closing argument constituted error, much less obvious 
error.  Id. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶19]  The State presented evidence upon which a jury could rationally 
have found all elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the trial court did not obviously err in allowing the State to refer to Bilodeau’s 
disabilities in its closing argument.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Kevin P. Sullivan, Esq. (orally), Sullivan Law, P.C., Gardiner, for appellant 
Andrew P. Bilodeau 
 
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Frayla Tarpinian, Dep. Dist., Atty. 
(orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2018-508 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY