Title: PAHL v. PAHL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAHL v. PAHL2004 WY 4087 P.3d 1250Case Number: 03-72Decided: 04/14/2004
April Term, A.D. 2004

 

 

ANDREA 
M. PAHL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

TROY 
LEE PAHL,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
E. Miller of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, 
WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Kathryn 
J. Edelman of Edelman Law Office, Gillette, WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Andrea 
M. Pahl (Mother) appeals the district court's decision to award primary custody 
of the parties' child to Troy M. Pahl (Father).  Mother contends the district court 
failed to consider that she was the primary caregiver when making its custody 
determination and thus abused its discretion.  Mother further asserts the district 
court relied exclusively on the fact that she planned to take the child to 
Germany when it decided to award primary custody to Father.  Finding no abuse of discretion, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      Mother presents 
the following issue on appeal:

 

            
Did the trial court err as a matter of law when the court denied the 
"primary care giver" custody based solely on the fact that the "primary care 
giver" intended to return to her homeland in Germany?
 

Father 
rephrases the issue as:

 

            
Was the district court's award of custody to the father a reasonable 
choice under the circumstances, giving paramount consideration to the welfare 
and needs of the child and due consideration to the mother's primary caretaker 
role?
 

 

FACTS
 

[¶3]      
The parties were married while Father was stationed in Germany as a 
member of the United States Army.1  The couple moved from Germany to Fort 
Polk, Louisiana and then eventually to Wright, Wyoming in February of 1999.  Father is a United States citizen, and 
Mother is a citizen of Germany.  In 
September of 2000, the parties' only child was born.  The child has both German and U.S. 
citizenship. 

 

[¶4]      
Prior to the child's birth both parties worked full time, but after the 
birth Mother stayed home to care for the child.  Later, Mother took a part-time job.  At some point in time, Mother became 
unhappy living in Wright and sought to move.  The parties discussed moving to other 
towns around northeast Wyoming or perhaps Denver, Colorado, but the parties 
could not reach an agreement on the subject.  Eventually, in February of 2002, Mother 
stated that she wanted to remain married but that she wanted to return to 
Germany with the child.  This 
arrangement was unacceptable to Father, and he filed for divorce.  After Father filed the complaint, the 
parties continued to live in the marital home with relatively few problems.  The parties additionally shared time 
with the child in a fairly cooperative manner.
 

[¶5]      
The parties proceeded to a bench trial on November 18, 2002.  Each party testified and briefly 
presented witnesses and other evidence.  
The evidence mostly pertained to the parties' past interaction with the 
child and their current ability to care for the child.2  On December 16, 2002, the district court 
notified the parties of its ruling by way of a decision letter and asked the 
Father's attorney to prepare a decree based on that letter.  The decree was filed on January 23, 
2003, and, in conformance with the decision letter, granted primary custody of 
the parties' child to Father.  
Mother appeals.

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶6]      
We have addressed the standard of review in cases such as this numerous 
times.  
 

            
Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.  
Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997); Triggs v. 
Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996); Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 1995).  It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration.  Scherer, 931 P.2d  at 254; 
Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) and Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 
(Wyo. 1984).  The determination of 
the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle."  
Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36.
 

            
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 
1993)).  Our review entails 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's 
decision, and we afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while 
omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657; 
Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994).  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained.  Jones v. 
Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993).  
Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present "when a material factor 
deserving significant weight is ignored.'"  
Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993)).
 

Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).  
 

[¶7]      
We have additionally explained that "[j]udicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶9, 
76 P.3d 1250, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 1998)); see also Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157 ¶11, 79 P.3d 1188, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003).   

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      
Mother claims that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
consider that she was the child's primary caregiver, a material factor deserving 
significant weight.  Mother asserts 
that instead the district court inappropriately based its decision entirely on 
her intent to return to Germany.  
Father, on the other hand, contends that in addition to considering the 
mandatory factors, the court did consider that Mother was the primary caregiver 
for the child.  Father asserts that 
other factors weighed in his favor and thus the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.  We agree with 
Father.    
 

[¶9]      
We begin by once again noting that the district court's responsibility 
for fashioning family relationships through custody determinations encompasses 
one of the most difficult and demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.   "This life-altering decision is 
perhaps most exacting in cases such as this, where it is apparent that both 
parents love their children and are fit and competent to have custody." 
Id.  Beyond the emotional and 
family turmoil that attends custody disputes, adding to the district court's 
difficulty is that every case involving custody issues presents a different 
situation and set of facts.  
Consequently, there are no bright line rules to easily apply when making 
a custody decision.  Instead, every 
case requires a careful weighing of the relevant factors.  Id.  The district court must look to the 
unique family relationships of each case in order to reach a resolution that is 
in the best interests of the children in that particular family.  Id.; see also Martin v. 
Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo. 1990); Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43 ¶11, 
22 P.3d 861, 865 (Wyo. 2001); Stonham, ¶13.  The law, recognizing the different 
intricacies and circumstances of each case, affords the district court wide 
discretion when fashioning custody and visitation provisions.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
431.  
 

[¶10]   When 
exercising its wide discretion in this area, the ultimate goal for the district 
court is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each parent, with 
paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the 
children.  Stonham, ¶13 
(quoting Pace, 22 P.3d at 865).  
In making its custody determination the district court is charged with 
the following:  
 

(a)  In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a 
marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 
through 14-2-120, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the 
children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the 
children.  In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:
 

(i)  The quality of the relationship each child has with 
each parent;
 

(ii)  The ability of each parent to provide adequate care 
for each child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for 
each child's care by others as needed;
 

(iii)  The relative competency and fitness of each 
parent;
 

(iv)  Each parent's willingness to accept all 
responsibilities of parenting including a willingness to accept care for each 
child at specified times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;
 

(v)  How the parents and each child can best maintain and 
strengthen a relationship with each other;
 

(vi)  How the parents and each child interact and 
communicate with each other and how such interaction and communication may be 
improved;
 

(vii)  The ability and willingness of each parent to allow 
the other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights 
and responsibilities, including the right to privacy;
 

(viii)  Geographic distance between the parents' 
residences;
 

(ix)  The current physical and mental ability of each 
parent to care for each child;
 

(x)  Any other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant.  
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 (LexisNexis 2001).  Guided by these mandatory statutory 
factors and any other that the court deems relevant, the district court must 
fashion a custody award.  Depending 
on the case, different factors will present a greater need for emphasis.  Additionally "a process of this kind 
could readily swing the balance toward one party despite there being a material 
factor in favor of the other party."  
Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123 ¶22, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶22 (Wyo. 
2001).  The one constant however is 
that the resolution must be in the best interests of the children in that 
particular family.  Stonham, 
¶14.  We therefore must determine 
whether in this case the district court weighed the relevant factors to 
determine what was in the best interests of this child. 
 

[¶11]   When 
determining whether the district court weighed all the relevant factors, we must 
rely on the district court's articulation of the factors it considered and how 
those factors support its conclusions.  Reavis, 955 P.2d 431-32.  Because the district court is relying on 
its discretionary power, the district court should place on the record the 
circumstances and factors that were crucial to its determination, as well as its 
reasoning.  That way, counsel and 
the reviewing court will know and be in a position to evaluate the soundness of 
the district court's decision.  
Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶15, 45 P.3d 641, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002).  We have repeatedly implored 
trial courts to place such information on the record so that we may conduct a 
meaningful review.  We continue to 
strongly encourage and desire such findings.  Certainly such findings would have been 
enormously helpful in our review of this case because the decision letter 
provided a somewhat sparse explanation of the district court's reasoning.  
 

[¶12]   Nevertheless, 
unless requested, district courts are not required to make specific findings for 
each statutory factor if "consideration is reflected in the proceeding 
transcripts, by opinion letter, or as findings in the written order."  Id. at ¶16  (quoting Produit, ¶12).  Therefore, "consistent with 
Produit, we may look to the trial transcripts to determine whether the 
court's considerations are adequately set forth and comply with § 
20-2-201(a)."  Fergusson, 
¶17.  Several indications in the 
transcript, combined with the district court's statements in its decision 
letter, convince us that the necessary factors were considered and appropriately 
weighed.
 

[¶13]   Mother 
asserts that the district court failed to consider that she was the primary 
caregiver.  In its decision letter, 
the district court stated:  "Because 
of the father's employment, the mother became the primary caretaker of the 
child.  However, this case shows 
evidence of two good parents and primary custody with either parent is likely to 
create no issues of abuse or neglect. . . .  Both parties love and care for the 
child."  As can be seen, the 
district court was well aware of Mother's status as the primary caregiver.  However, Wyoming statute requires that 
the district court consider other factors in determining the best interest of 
the child.  
 

[¶14]   In Raymond 
v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 (Wyo. 1998), we acknowledged that the other 
factors can, in some circumstances, outweigh placing custody with the primary 
caregiver.  "Although the trial 
court considered the wife's role as a primary caregiver in determining what was 
in the best interests of the child, the other factors which were considered by 
the trial court ultimately weighed in the husband's favor; i.e., the husband's 
willingness to get help through counseling to improve his parenting abilities, 
the emotional stability he could offer the child, and the likelihood that he 
would promote an ongoing relationship between the child and the wife."  Id.  Thus, while primary caregiver status 
is a weighty consideration, it is not in all cases ultimately 
determinative.  Rather, the primary 
caregiver is another factor among the many that the district court 
considers.  Other factors may 
outweigh the primary caregiver status. 
 

[¶15]   Mother 
asserts that geographic distance was the only other factor considered by the 
district court.  The record and the 
district court's decision letter do reflect that geographic distance was of 
eminent concern, but the transcript shows that other factors were also 
present.  It generally appears that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(i), (ii), (iii) and (vi) weighed in neither 
party's favor.  Each parent had a 
good relationship with the child, and there was testimony that each parent could 
provide care to the child including arranging care for the child through 
others.  § 20-2-201(a)(i) and 
(ii).  It also appears that each 
parent was equally competent and fit to have custody of the child.  § 20-2-201(a)(iii).  It also seems that each parent 
interacted and communicated with the child equally well.  § 20-2-201(a)(vi). 
 

[¶16]   The 
transcript indicates that § 20-2-201(a)(iv) presented some element of 
consideration.  This subsection 
requires that the court consider each parent's willingness to accept all 
responsibilities of parenting including a willingness to relinquish care of the 
child to the other parent at specified times.  The evidence showed that Mother reduced 
the amount of time that the child was available to the Pahl family after Father 
filed the divorce action.  Also 
related through testimony was an incident where Father sought to take the child 
on a five-day camping trip with his family.  Mother would only consent to a three-day 
trip for the child.  When the child 
was not returned as Mother required, Mother drove to the Pahl family campsite 
and took the child from the family's camper refusing to wait until Father could 
return to the campsite before leaving. 
 

[¶17]   Sometime 
later Mother consented to a longer trip, but Mother stated that she only 
consented to a later longer trip because if she did not Father "probably would 
have insisted on his rights again."  
Mother further admitted that it was a source of irritation to her that 
Father insisted on his visitation rights.  
Mother also seemed to struggle with the idea of Father having lengthy 
visitation time.  Moreover, Mother 
felt that the child, only two years old, could understand and decide when and 
where he wanted to go when faced with a choice, and she therefore declined to 
arrange a specific visitation schedule pending the district court's 
decision.  These incidents combined 
to cause Father concern that Mother would not safeguard his relationship with 
the child.  On the other hand, 
Father appeared to respect the time Mother spent with the child.  Father also proposed that if he were 
given custody Mother could have visitation on any days that he worked in 
addition to her other visitation time.  
Based on this testimony the district court could reasonably conclude that 
Father would be more likely and willing to relinquish care of the child at 
specified times and could reasonably weigh this factor in Father's favor. 

 

[¶18]   It is also 
clear that the court considered how each parent could best maintain and 
strengthen a relationship with the child.  
§ 20-2-201(a)(v).  In its 
decision letter the court stated:
 

With the parties having moved to the United States and having 
conceived a child here, it seems to the court that the likelihood of each party 
having a bonded relationship with this child will be best served by awarding 
primary custody to the father.  For 
another thing, the mother is able to speak both German and English and father is 
unable to speak German.  This gives 
the mother the advantage in ease of exercising visitation as she speaks perfect 
English and can maneuver between Germany and the United States with ease while 
father would be handicapped in Germany.  
Another item is the ability of the mother to obtain employment in the 
United States and the near impossibility of the father to obtain employment in 
Germany.  Also, the father testified 
that the mother informed him that if he were to obtain primary custody, she 
would remain in the United States, but in another city, possibly Casper, in 
order to exercise visitation and to continue with the mother-child 
bond.
 

Mother proposed that if she were given custody the child would be 
returned to the United States for two in-person visits per year with 
Father.  Considering how much Father 
currently saw the child this was hardly routine visitation.  The district court could therefore 
reasonably conclude that each parent could best maintain and strengthen a 
relationship with the child if the child were in Father's primary 
custody.
 

[¶19]   Based on the 
transcript we can also see that the district court considered the ability and 
willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care without intrusion 
and respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities.  § 20-2-201(a)(vii).  While there was not a great deal of 
evidence on this point, the evidence that was presented showed that Mother 
demonstrated some inability to permit Father to provide care without her 
intrusion.  For example, testimony 
showed that Father knew and followed the child's bedtime routine.  Yet, when Father put the child to bed, 
Mother felt the need to get the child back up to again brush his teeth and wash 
his hands.  Mother insisted that the 
child be home by 7:00 when he was with Father and would call at that time or go 
pick up the child.  However, the 
7:00 curfew did not always apply when the child was with Mother.  Testimony also showed that when the 
child was on the aforementioned longer Pahl family trip, Mother insisted on 
calling the child twice a day.  The 
district court is in the best position to evaluate the witnesses and their 
demeanor when testifying; and we thus conclude that, based on the above 
evidence, the district court could reasonably find that this factor also weighed 
in Father's favor.
 

[¶20]   Finally, it 
is clear that geographic distance was at the heart of the district court's 
decision.  In its decision letter 
the district court stated:  "Since 
the court must decide this based upon the best interest of the child, I will 
find that the decision of the mother to return to Germany and to permanently 
place so much distance between the child and the father, is not in the best 
interest of the child."  There is no 
doubt that there is a great distance between Germany and Wright.  The round-trip airfare would be costly; 
the round trip lengthy.  These 
considerations are important because reasonable visitation for the noncustodial 
parent must be available.   
Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 614 (Wyo. 1999); Love v. Love, 
851 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 (Wyo. 1993).  
Additionally, the chances of both parents having a meaningful 
relationship with the child may rest on how often that parent can exercise 
visitation.
 

[¶21]   The recent 
Stonham case addressed similar international custody issues.  In Stonham, the mother, an 
Indonesian woman, was awarded sole custody of the couple's two children despite 
the fact that she intended to return to Indonesia following the divorce.  On appeal we held that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when making this custody award.  Stonham, ¶32.  In doing so, we in part reasoned that 
each case requires the trial court to carefully weigh the relevant factors while 
looking to the uniqueness of each situation.  ¶14.  The particular facts of Stonham 
showed that the mother was the primary caregiver for the children and planned to 
return to Indonesia following the divorce.  
Additionally weighing in the mother's favor as primary custodian was 
evidence that the mother was emotionally better equipped to care for the 
children and she had the support of a stable, supportive, and loving family in 
Indonesia.  Weighing against the 
father was the fact that he was unable to maintain stable and long-term 
relationships, and he had little or no respect for mother. ¶17.  The evidence also indicated that the 
father had stormy relationships with his own family, and he presented a moderate 
risk of verbal and emotional abuse to the child. ¶¶18,19.
 

[¶22]   While the 
international element of Stonham is similar to the case now before us, 
the other facts and circumstances are not.  
Stonham did show that we are willing to uphold a custody award 
where the primary custodian intends an international move, but the basic message 
from that case is similar to the message from all our cases involving custody 
issues: the district court must weigh all the relevant factors and 
make a custody determination in the best interests of that individual 
child.  Cases involving child 
custody when one party seeks to move abroad are, like all custody cases, fact 
sensitive.  Therefore, it would be 
foolish to attempt to define a bright line test for their determination.  Instead, we must decide whether the 
district court weighed all the relevant factors in each particular case. 

 

[¶23]   In the course 
of Stonham we also acknowledged that the international element of that 
case complicated the matter.  We 
then noted that we have not had a prior occasion to address such a case as that 
but noted that others had.  
Stonham, n.8 (citing Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, 
Court-Authorized Permanent or Temporary Removal of Child by Parent to Foreign 
Country, 30 A.L.R.4th 548 (1984 & 2002 Supp.) and M. David 
LeBrun, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Custody of Child to Parent Residing 
or Intending to Reside in Foreign Country, 20 A.L.R.4th 677 
(1983 & 2002 Supp)).  Those 
compiled cases "illustrate the competing benefits and limitations in awarding or 
denying custody to a foreign parent."  
Stonham, n.8.  Many of 
those cases present a compelling argument for awarding primary custody to the 
parent who will be remaining in the United States.  However, others show how a court can 
reasonably award custody to the moving parent.  "Despite the factual differences in 
these cases, there is one common analytical thread in virtually every case:  the best interest of the child is 
paramount in any award of custody and visitation, and the trial court has a 
large measure of discretion in making that award." Id.     

 

[¶24]   In Resor 
v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999) we also addressed the issue of a primary 
custodian who intended to move following the divorce.  We held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the mother custody even though she intended to 
move to Seattle, Washington.  We 
said that our decisions precluded the court from keeping the mother from giving 
up her plans to relocate with the children.  Id. at 150.  We further stated:  "It is unrealistic to assume that 
divorced parents will remain in the same location after dissolution of the 
marriage or to exert pressure on them to do so."  Id. at 151.  However, the differences between Germany 
and Seattle are significant.  
Importantly, the court is required to take geographic distance into 
consideration when making its initial custody determination.  "Geographical relocation does not make a 
parent who has cared for the children less capable of maintaining parental 
responsibilities and obligations."  
Id. at 152.  
Nevertheless, it does bear on the ability of both parents to enjoy a 
meaningful relationship with their child.  
In this instance, the child's move to Germany would significantly impact 
Father's right of visitation.  
Although Mother proposed two in-person visits per year, the proposal was 
that she pay for the child to return to the United States for the summer for 
visitation with Father.  However, 
Father would have to pay for the child's return to Germany and any other 
visitation Father desired in Germany. Mother admitted that Father did not have a 
lot of additional income to take other trips to Germany.  The district court could accordingly 
conclude that even if liberal visitation were awarded, given Father's inability 
to speak German and unlikelihood of finding a job in Germany, Father may not 
have been able to exercise regular visitation. 
 

[¶25]   Consequently, 
this factor weighed heavily in Father's favor, especially considering that 
Mother stated that she would not move to Germany if Father were granted primary 
custody.  We thus cannot conclude 
that the district court abused its discretion.  The district court weighed the relevant 
evidence and determined that primary custody with Father was in the child's best 
interests.  Although Mother was in 
fact the primary caregiver, the trial court was well within its discretion to 
decide that, on the whole, Mother's difficulty in relinquishing care to Father, 
trouble allowing Father to have time with the child without interference, and 
her planned move to Germany, combined with Father's stable work schedule, 
abilities, and willingness to share the child with Mother ultimately weighed in 
Father's favor. 
 

 

CONCLUSION
 

[¶26]   For the 
reasons noted above holding that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion, we affirm the district court's decision to award primary custody to 
Father in this case.  
 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Father 
testified that the parties were married on August 12, 1998, and Mother testified 
that they were married on August 16, 1997.  
In any event, the parties agree that they were married while Father was 
stationed in Germany.

 

2A 
more specific discussion of this evidence will be set out in the body of the 
opinion.