Title: ADOPTION OF BIERY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12617 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 I N T H E M A T T E R O F THE ADOPTION O F DWAYNE BIERY, A MINOR CHILD Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Kelly and Carr, Miles City, Montana Patrick J. Kelly argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent : William F. Meisburger, County Attorney, argued, Forsyth, Montana Submitted: April 23, 1974 Decided : Filed: Jna 8 ,974 M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by the natural mother of a minor child from an order of the d i s t r i c t court of Rosebud county declaring that her minor child remain i n the custody of and be adopted by the petitioners. The mother, Mayleen (Biery) Anderson, and Criss Harold Biery were married on December 4, 1966. Todd Dwayne Biery was born as lawful issue of said marriage. The father and mother were divorced bn September 4, 1968. Under the terms of the divorce decree, the father was awarded custody of the minor child with reasonable visitation rights i n the mother. On February 25, 1969, the mother sought to have the decree of divorce modified to enable her to have the custody of said child. That petition was denied and custody remained with the father. The father maintained custody of the child in the home of h i s sister and brother-in-law, Katherine Berdahl and Benny 0. Berdahl, the petitioners and respondents herein, u n t i l the accidental death of the father, Criss Harold Biery, on February 20, 1973. A week l a t e r the respondents petitioned the d i s t r i c t court of Rosebud County for temporary custody of the minor child and further petitioned the court f o r adoption. A n order to show cause why custody should not be granted to the petitioners was issued to the mother, Mayleen (Biery) Anderson. Subsequently a hearing thereon was held on March 5, 1973, and on April 23, 1973, a trial w a s had on the respondent's petition to adopt. The d i s t r i c t court ordered both petitioners' and the natural mother's homes to be investigated by the welfare depart- ment. Both homes were found suitable by the welfare department and notice of t h i s was made i n the court's findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w . The d i s t r i c t court also made findings of fact: "VI. That Respondent, although denied custody of t h i s child on two occasions by t h i s Court, has subsequT t l y married; lives i n Grand Forks, North Dakota; desires to obtain custody of said child; has a suitable home for the raising of the child; and i s joined i n her request by her present husband. "VIII. That Respondent has t e s t i f i e d that her l i f e style has changed; that she now i s mature enough to r a i s e the child; that such testimony i s supported by an expert witness and i s i n no way contradicted by evidence produced by Petitioners. said child has benefited from the stable which he has been living i n one-half years. I' and conclusions of law: "VII. That it would be for the best interests of the child, Todd Dwayne Biery, to remain i n the custody of, and be adopted by the petitioners. I 1 The d i s t r i c t court directed that a f i n a l decree of adoption be entered which w a s done on September 4, 1973. The mottper now appeals from the order of the d i s t r i c t I court granting ipermanent custody and adoption to petitioners. T w o issues are presented for review: (1) Did the d i s t r i c t court abuse i t s discretion i n awarding permanent custody to respondents? (2) Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n granting respondents' petition to adopt? Directing our attention to the f i r s t issue, w e note that t h i s Court has consistently looked to the best interests of the child i n determining custody . McCullough v. McCullough, 159 Mont. 419, 498 P.2d 1189; Simon v. Simon, 154 Mont. 193, 461 P.2d 851; Haynes v. Fillner, 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802. In awarding the custody of a minor, section 91-4515(1) speci- fically provides that the court is to be guided: "By what appears to be for the best interests of the child i n respect to i t s temporal and its mental and moral welfare * * *." The parent's right to the custody of her minor child i s not an absolute one, even though it be conceded that she i s a f i t and proper person. In a l l such cases the crucial factor i s the child's welfare, both material and psychological, con- sidering i n particular the t i e s of affection the child has formed and the consequences of breaking those ties. It i s apparent that the d i s t r i c t court took into consideration the fact that the child had lived with the petitioners the past four and one-half years, and that he had adapted to those sur- roundings. To remove the child from familiar surroundings might cause emotional disorientation in addition to that already caused by the death of his father. It i s clear from the record that the relationship between petitioners and the child i s extremely close. For these reasons the d i s t r i c t court concluded that it would be i n the childt s best interests to remain with petitioners. What i s , or what i s not i n the best interests of the child depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The responsibility of deciding custody i s a delicate one which is lodged with the d i s t r i c t court. The judge hearing o r a l testimony in such a controversy has a superior advantage in determining the same, and h i s decision ought not to be disturbed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. McCullough v. McCullough, : - t 159 Mont. -bq 498 P. 2d 1189 ; Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632. W e find substantial credible evidence supporting the decision here and accordingly no abuse of discretion i n awarding custody to petitioners. Thus w e affirm that part of the d i s t r i c t court's order. The second issue presented for review presents a more difficult problem. The laws of Montana relating to the adoption of a minor child are found i n section 61-201, e t seq., R.C.M. 1947. O f particular importance to t h i s issue is section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, requiring consent of a natural parent of a child sought to be adopted unless one of the exceptions set forth i n this statute i s met. The exceptions excusing consent are set out with particularity: "An adoption of a child may be decreed when there have been f i l e d written consents to adoption executed by : "(1) Both parents, i f living, or the surviving parent, of a legitimate child; provided, that consent shall not be required from a father o r mother , I f (a) adjudged guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction of physical cruelty toward said child; or, "(b) adjudged to be a habitual drunkard; or, " (c) who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect toward the child; or, "(d) who has, i n the s t a t e of Montana, or i n any other state of the United States, willfully abandoned such child; or "(e) who has caused the child to be maintained by any public or private children's institution, charitable agency, or any licensed adoption agency, or the s t a t e department of public welfare of the s t a t e of Montana for a period of one (1) year without contributing to the support of said child during said period, i f able; or, "(f) i f it i s proven to the satisfaction of the court that said father or mother, i f able, has not contributed to the support of said child during a period of one (1) year before the f i l i n g - - - - of a petition for adoption; or (an adoption of a child may be decreed when there have been filed written consents to adoption executed by). "(2) The mother, alone, i f the child i s illegitimate; o r "(3) The legal guardian of the person of the child i f both parents are dead or i f the rights of the parents have been terminated by judicial proceedings and such guardian has authority by order of the court appointing him to consent to the adoption; or " ( 4 ) The executive head of an agency i f the child has been relinquished for adoption to such agency or i f the rights of the parents have been judicially terminated, o r i f both parents are dead, and custody of the child has been legally vested i n such agency with authority to consent to adoption of the child; or , "(5) Any person having legal custody of a child by court order i f the parental rights of the parents have been judicially terminated, but i n such case the court having jurisdiction of the custody of the child must consent to adoption, and a certified copy of i t s order shall be attached to the petition. "The consents required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be acknowledged before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments, or witnessed by a representative of the s t a t e department of public welfare o r of an agency o r witnessed by a representative of the court." (Emphasis added. ) Petitioners concede that the d i s t r i c t court made no finding that Mayleen Anderson, the surviving parent came within any of the exceptions cited i n the statute. Nor did she consent to the adoption. They contend, however, that there i s testimony that the only support received for the child came from h i s father and from the respondents, thus coming under the exception of subsection ( l ) ( f ) of section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947. They argue that several jurisdictions have decided cases which indicate that the parents' consent to adoption i s not required where they have failed to contribute to the support of the child, during a period of one year before the f i l i n g of a petition for adoption, regardless of whether there was a court order compelling them to do so. Adoption of a Minor, 357 Mass. 490, 258 N.E.2d 567; In r e Adoption of Sargent, 57 Ohio Op.2d 135, 272 N.E.2d 206. While the best interests of the child are of utmost concern i n both custody and adoption cases we have required s t r i c t compliance with section 61-205, R O C .M. 1947, because of the harshness of permanently terminating parental rights. Although there i s testimony i n the record that the child w a s supported during the preceeding four year period by the father and petitioners, there i s no evidence that the mother was - able and failed to give support during t h i s same period. Subsection (1) (f) of section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, requires that it be proven: "* * * to the satisfaction of the court that said father o r mother, i f able, has not contributed to the support of said child during a period of one (1) year before the f i l i n g of a petition for adoption * * *.I1 (Emphasis added.) This the petitioners failed to do. Nor did the d i s t r i c t court make any findings to support petitioners argument. Absent a finding bringing the mother within one of the exceptions, consent i s required. For these reasons w e affirm the custody award, but vacate the adoption order without prejudice. T Justice