Title: Byrd v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,189 
 
TYRON BYRD, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
In enacting K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) and directing a law enforcement officer 
to serve a notice of driver's license suspension by mailing a copy of the notice to the 
driver, the Kansas Legislature intended to give the officer the responsibility of ensuring 
that the notice was mailed. The legislature did not intend that the officer must physically 
perform the acts of addressing, stamping, and placing the envelope containing the notice 
in a receptacle for mail pickup.  
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 43 Kan. App. 2d 145, 221 P.3d 1168 (2010). 
Appeal from Atchison District Court; PHILIP C. LACEY, judge. Opinion filed October 26, 2012. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed 
and remanded. 
 
 
J. Brian Cox, senior litigation attorney, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of 
Revenue, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. 
 
 
Brian L. Leininger, of Leininger Law Offices, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Robert D. 
Campbell, of Campbell Law Office, P.A., of Atchison, was on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
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LUCKERT, J.:  K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) provides that where a driver's license 
is being suspended because an illegal blood-alcohol level has been established by a blood 
test, "the officer shall serve notice of such suspension in person or by another designated 
officer or by mailing the notice to the person at the address provided at the time of the 
test." (Emphasis added.) This driver's license suspension case involves the question of 
whether the phrase "mailing the notice" requires the officer who conducted the alcohol 
testing to personally deliver the notice of a driver's license suspension to the custody of a 
mail carrier or may instead follow his or her office's standard operating procedures for 
outgoing mail, as was done in this case, and thereby mail the notice.  
 
We hold that K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) imposes the responsibility to ensure 
mailing on the officer but does not require the officer to personally address, stamp, and 
place in a mailbox an envelope containing the notice. In this case, an Atchison County 
Sheriff's officer ensured mailing by following the sheriff's standard operating procedure 
for mailing the notice and, thus, fulfilled the statutory requirement. Because this 
conclusion is contrary to the decision of the district court, we reverse the district court 
and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that also reversed the district court, 
although we reach our holding through a different analysis than that of the Court of 
Appeals. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On April 17, 2008, the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) suspended Tyron 
Byrd's driving privileges after a blood test established he had a blood-alcohol 
concentration of .28 and an officer certified that Byrd had operated or attempted to 
operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated. An administrative hearing officer affirmed the 
suspension, and then Byrd filed a petition in district court seeking review of the 
administrative decision. One of the issues raised by Byrd was whether he was properly 
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served with a copy of the arresting officer's certification and notice of suspension form, 
commonly referred to as a DC-27 form, as required by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c).  
 
At a hearing before the district court, Deputy Bryan Clark of the Atchison County 
Sheriff's Office, the officer responsible for arresting Byrd for driving under the influence, 
indicated he initialed a portion of the DC-27 form that reads:  "A copy of this document 
which contains a Notice of Driver's License Suspension is being served . . . by mailing by 
first-class mail to the address shown above." Clark testified that after completing the 
form he followed "the sheriff's office mailing process." This process, as Clark explained 
it, required him to place the completed form and the accompanying file in the 
administrative assistant's box. The administrative assistant then printed the envelope, 
placed the appropriate postage on the envelope, and placed the envelope in the mailbox. 
Clark indicated that "she's able to print off the addresses on her computer. We don't have 
access to that. So she completes that." He also indicated he does not have access to the 
postage meter. He explained that when he certified that a copy of the DC-27 form "is 
being served" by mail he did so because "I mailed it by our mailing system."   
 
Melissa Hale, the administrative assistant responsible for mailing the DC-27 form, 
corroborated Clark's testimony about the procedures established in the sheriff's office for 
completing and mailing the form. She explained the procedure once she receives a 
completed DC-27 form from an officer, stating: 
 
"We make sure everything is completed on it. Usually the undersheriff or sheriff 
sometimes do this to make sure everything is completed. Then I copy the lab results—the 
first page of the lab results—and prepare the envelope and put them in the envelopes and 
print the papers and put the postage on them and then mail them."  
 
One copy is mailed to the driver, another to the KDR. 
 
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With regard to the present case, Hale could not specifically remember mailing the 
form to Byrd, but she stated that under the "standard operating procedure" of the 
department the form would have been mailed on March 5, 2008, the date of mailing as 
certified by Clark. There is no dispute that the DC-27 form was mailed to Byrd and that 
he received it.  
 
At the conclusion of the hearing before the district court, Byrd argued that Clark 
failed to properly serve the DC-27 form on him under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c) 
because Clark failed to mail the form himself as required by the statute. Because Clark 
failed to comply with the statute, Byrd argued that the KDR did not have jurisdiction to 
take action against his license. Thus, he asked the district court to reverse the KDR's 
decision to suspend his driving privileges.  
 
In response, the KDR argued that K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c) should not be 
strictly construed as requiring a law enforcement officer to actually place a DC-27 form 
in a mailbox. The KDR contended that as long as officers caused the form to be mailed 
through the use of administrative staff, the service-by-mail requirements of the statute are 
satisfied.  
 
The district court agreed with Byrd's strict reading of the statute and held that 
K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c) requires that the law enforcement officer directing 
administration of alcohol testing must actually place the DC-27 form in the mail. Because 
Clark failed to do this, the district court concluded the service-by-mail requirements of 
the statute were not satisfied and reversed the KDR's suspension of Byrd's driving 
privileges. 
 
The KDR appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
district court's conclusion that Clark failed to strictly comply with the statute because he 
did not personally place the notice in the mail. See Byrd v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 43 
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Kan. App. 2d 145, 148-49, 221 P.3d 1168 (2010). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court, concluding that Clark had accomplished the purpose of the 
statute and could be deemed to have mailed the DC-27 under the doctrine of substantial 
compliance. Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 154-55. 
 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted:  "There is no explicit 
language in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c) allowing an officer to satisfy the service by 
mail requirements by simply causing the DC-27 form to be mailed to the person." Byrd, 
43 Kan. App. 2d at 148. The court compared the language of K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-
1002(c) with K.S.A. 60-303(c)(2), which stated:   
 
"The sheriff, party, or party's attorney shall cause a copy of the process and 
petition or other document to be placed in a sealed envelope addressed to the person to be 
served in accordance with K.S.A. 60-304, and amendments thereto, with postage or other 
delivery fees prepaid, and the sealed envelope placed in the custody of the person or 
entity effecting delivery." Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 148-49.  
 
See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-303(c)(2) ("The sheriff, party, or party's attorney must give to 
the person or entity effecting delivery a copy of the process and petition or other 
document in a sealed envelope, with postage or other delivery fees prepaid, addressed to 
the person to be served in accordance with K.S.A. 60-304, and amendments thereto."). 
The court noted that K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c) does not allow an officer to simply 
cause the DC-27 form to be mailed and concluded this meant the officer must physically 
place the notice in the custody of the entity effecting delivery. Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 
148-49. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals adopted the KDR's alternative argument that it 
was enough that Clark substantially complied with the statute's service-by-mail 
requirement. Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 149 (quoting City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 233 
Kan. 159, 164, 660 P.2d 1368 [1983]) ("'substantial compliance' generally means 
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'"compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable 
objective of the statute"'"). In accepting the KDR's argument, the court rejected Byrd's 
argument that application of the substantial compliance doctrine was contrary to the 
holding in Anderson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 18 Kan. App. 2d 347, 355, 853 P.2d 69, 
rev. denied 253 Kan. 856 (1993). The court acknowledged that Byrd's argument was 
supported by Anderson but concluded that "the reasoning set forth by the court in 
Anderson is no longer valid given the subsequent amendment to K.S.A. 8-1001 et seq." 
Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 153. Specifically, the Byrd court cited an amendment that was 
effective just months after the Anderson decision, in which "the legislature added 
subsection (i) to K.S.A. 8-1001 . . . . L. 1993, ch. 275, sec. 1"; the Byrd court continued, 
noting:  "That subsection, now found at K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1001(v), states:  'This act is 
remedial law and shall be liberally construed to promote public health, safety and 
welfare.'" Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 153. The court reasoned that this provision allowed 
for the application of the substantial compliance doctrine to the service-by-mail 
requirement of K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1002(c). Therefore, the court concluded that "when 
determining whether service by mail has been achieved under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-
1002(c), technical irregularities may be overlooked if the essential purpose of the statute 
has been fulfilled under the facts of the case. [Citations omitted.]" Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d 
at 154. 
 
The Byrd court cited Anderson for its holding regarding the purpose of K.S.A. 
2007 Supp. 8-1002(c), which is "'to guarantee that a person whose license has been 
suspended is aware of his or her right to appeal.' 18 Kan. App. 2d at 355." Byrd, 43 Kan. 
App. 2d at 154. The Byrd court concluded: 
 
"This purpose was fulfilled under the facts of this case. Though Clark did not place the 
DC-27 form in the mail, he directed Hale to do so. Though Hale could not specifically 
remember mailing the form to Byrd, she obviously did so because:  (1) Byrd timely 
requested an administrative hearing; and (2) he introduced the DC-27 form he received in 
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the mail into evidence at trial before the district court. Simply stated, Hale's act of placing 
the DC-27 form in the mail was essentially no different than if Clark had placed the form 
in the mail himself. Byrd has not raised (nor can he raise) any argument to show how he 
was prejudiced by receiving a DC-27 form that was placed in the mail by Hale instead of 
Clark. Absent any showing of prejudice by Clark, his argument lacks merit. [Citation 
omitted.]" Byrd, 43 Kan. App. 2d at 154-55. 
 
Byrd filed a petition for review, which this court granted. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal under K.S.A. 20-3018(b).  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Our review of the Court of Appeals' decision presents a question of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited 
review. 143rd Street Investors v. Board of Johnson County Commr's, 292 Kan. 690, 698, 
259 P.3d 644 (2011). Well-known principles of statutory interpretation apply. The most 
fundamental of these rules is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be 
ascertained. 143rd Street Investors, 292 Kan. at 698. The first step in ascertaining 
legislative intent is to examine the statutory language, giving common words their 
ordinary meanings. State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009). If upon 
examination the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous, a court may use 
legislative history, canons of construction, or other background considerations to construe 
the legislature's intent. 143rd Street Investors, 292 Kan. at 698.  
 
 
In applying these rules to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c), which has the same 
language as the 2007 version, we first attempt to ascertain the legislature's intention by 
examining the statutory language—"the officer shall serve notice of such suspension in 
person or by another designated officer or by mailing the notice to the person at the 
address provided at the time of the test." In doing so, we must begin with the ordinary 
meaning of the verb "mail," which is: 
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"1. To deposit (a letter, package, etc.) with the U.S. Postal Service; to ensure that 
letter, package, etc. is properly addressed, stamped, and placed into a receptacle for mail 
pickup. 2. To deliver (a letter, package, etc.) to a private courier service that undertakes 
delivery to a third person, often within a specified time." Black's Law Dictionary 972 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 
 
The first alternative—to deposit the DC-27 form with the United States Postal 
Service—was applied by the district court and the Court of Appeals. Neither court 
considered the implications of the second alternative—"to ensure that a letter, package, 
etc. is properly addressed, stamped, and placed into a receptacle for mail pickup." 
(Emphasis added.) Yet, this use of the word is common in business and organizational 
settings, such as a sheriff's office or law firm, where a person depends on the business' or 
organization's mail system for the performance of the physical acts of addressing an 
envelope, affixing postage, and delivering an envelope to the United States Postal Service 
or another courier. While the person who authored the item being mailed does not 
perform the physical acts associated with the mailing, the person is responsible for the 
mailing—in other words, guarantees or ensures the mailing—by using the standard office 
procedures. In this sense, the word "mail" does not require that the person responsible for 
the mailing be the one who physically deposits the item into the custody of the entity 
responsible for delivery.  
 
 
In light of these variations in meaning, the legislature's use of the word "mailing" 
is ambiguous. The legislature did not provide further guidance by defining the term or 
using language like that found in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-303(c). Cf. K.S.A. 8-1433 
(defining "mail"; means to "deposit in United States mail properly addressed and with 
postage prepaid"); K.S.A. 31-150a(a) (incorporating K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-103 for 
definition of restricted mail); K.S.A. 43-166 (same); K.S.A. 58-30a15 (same); K.S.A. 
2011 Supp. 60-2803(a) (same).  
 
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Without specific guidance from the legislature that clarifies the ambiguity, we turn 
to legislative history, canons of construction, and other background considerations to 
ascertain legislative intent. Regarding legislative history, the parties have not cited and 
we have not found any information that assists in determining what the legislature 
intended. Turning to canons of construction, only one applies; that is the canon that 
requires a court to construe a statute in a reasonable manner. See Board of Miami County 
Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 322-23, 255 P.3d 1186 
(2011).  
 
 
As we consider a reasonable application of the potential definitions of "mail"—
one requiring the officer to physically place the DC-27 in the mail and the other requiring 
the officer to ensure that the DC-27 is properly addressed, stamped, and mailed—we 
conclude the legislature did not intend for a law enforcement officer to have to physically 
undertake the clerical tasks associated with mailing a notice. Rather, the legislature 
intended to place the responsibility on the certifying officer to ensure that the DC-27 is 
mailed. In order to fulfill that responsibility, there must be a process and procedure in 
place for the mailing of a DC-27 form, and the officer must take responsibility for 
ensuring that the process and procedure are followed.  
 
 
On the record in this case, there was uncontroverted evidence that there was a 
policy in place—a standard operating procedure—and assigned personnel to ensure that 
the mailing would occur. The evidence was also uncontroverted that the policy and 
process were followed. Clark mailed the DC-27 to Byrd by following this procedure. 
 
Because we apply this plain meaning to the verb "mail," we do not need to 
consider the effect of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(v) ("This act is remedial law and shall 
be liberally construed to promote public health, safety and welfare."). Nor do we need to 
consider the doctrine of substantial compliance, which unlike the Court of Appeals, we 
deem to be a separate doctrine from liberal construction of a statute. Instead, because 
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there is uncontroverted evidence that Clark ensured that the DC-27 form was mailed 
according to standard office policy and procedure, we determine that he mailed the DC-
27 form. Hence, although on different grounds, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision 
to reverse the district court. We remand to the district court for consideration of Byrd's 
appeal of his driver's license suspension.  
 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. 
Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.