Title: Ex parte Floyd Casey. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Floyd Casey v. State of Alabama)(Baldwin Circuit Court: CC-11-589; Criminal Appeals : CR-12-0593). Writ Denied. No Opinion.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 03/28/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1130314
____________________
Ex parte Floyd Casey
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Floyd Casey
v.
State of Alabama)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CC-11-589;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-0593)
PARKER, Justice.
WRIT DENIED.  NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent. 
1130314
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Floyd Casey was convicted of murder made capital because
the killing of Edward McCrory occurred during the commission
of a burglary. See § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. Casey was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. Based on telephone calls to and from Casey shown on
McCrory's cellular telephone in the time frame of the murder,
a police investigator, pursuant to a warrant, 
searched 
Casey's
residence and found incriminating evidence. Two witnesses,
including an accomplice, also testified against Casey. 
Casey presents his petition for certiorari review under
Rule 39(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P., and asks this Court to
overrule a controlling Alabama Supreme Court case followed in
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Specifically,
he asks this court to overrule Ex parte Davis, 737 So. 2d 480
(Ala. 1999), and to return to the prior rule expressed in Ex
parte Gentry, 689 So. 2d 916 (1996). Both cases address the
circumstances under which a murder is made capital because it
occurred "during a burglary." First-degree burglary requires,
among other things, that the perpetrator "knowingly and
unlawfully enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with
2
1130314
intent to commit a crime therein ...." § 13A-7-5(a), Ala. Code
1975 (emphasis added).
In Davis, which overruled Gentry, this Court held that
"evidence of a struggle that gives rise to circumstantial
evidence of revocation of a license or privilege can be used
to show an unlawful remaining." 737 So. 2d at 483. Thus,
"evidence of a struggle can supply the necessary evidence of
an unlawful remaining." 737 So. 2d at 484. In Gentry, by
contrast, the Court was concerned not to make every crime
committed indoors automatically a burglary. The Court stated:
"There was no separate crime of burglary simply
because one could infer that she realized he was
attacking her and therefore may or must have
'revoked 
his 
privilege 
to 
remain.' 
It 
was,
therefore, error to instruct the jury that for
purposes of determining whether the defendant had
committed a burglary, 'the fact that the victim had
terminated the defendant's license or privilege to
be present in the victim's apartment can be inferred
from the circumstances that a struggle took place.'
This jury instruction had the effect of relieving
the State of its burden of presenting a prima facie
case of burglary."
 
Gentry, 689 So. 2d at 921. Justice Johnstone, commenting on
this issue in another case, stated:
"I know from my service in the Alabama House of
Representatives when that language originated that
the legislature intended for this new alternative to
reach only clandestine remaining -- that is hiding
3
1130314
inside the premises to await an opportune time to
commit the intended crime. Ex parte Gentry, 689 So.
2d 916 (Ala. 1996), respected this limitation. Davis
v. State, 737 So. 2d 480 (Ala. 1999), in overruling
Gentry and eliminating this limitation, exceeds the
intent of the legislature and violates the rule that
criminal statutes be strictly construed against the
State. 
The 
Davis 
rule 
will 
allow 
burglary
convictions of unruly guests in fact scenarios never
contemplated by the legislature as burglaries. We
should 
return 
to 
the 
faithful 
Gentry
interpretation."
Ex parte Freeman, 776 So. 2d 203, 205-06 (Ala. 2000)
(Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This Court's current interpretation is that if the murder
victim struggles with her killer in her residence, a burglary
has occurred, even if the killer entered the residence with
permission. This arguably strained interpretation of the
burglary statute violates "the fundamental rule that criminal
statutes are construed strictly against the State." Ex parte
Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237, 239 n.2 (Ala. 2000). In my view, Gentry
was properly decided and Justice Johnstone is correct in his
analysis in Freeman. Rather than continuing to follow the
Davis rule that evidence of a struggle satisfies the "remains
unlawfully" element of burglary, I believe we should return to
4
1130314
the Gentry rule that the burglary has to be proven as a
separate crime from the murder.1
For the reasons stated, I dissent from the denial of
Casey's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Murdock, J., concurs.
In response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
1
the Alabama Legislature redefined the death penalty to apply
only in certain aggravated circumstances. See Act No. 213,
Ala. Acts 1975. Prior to Furman, the jury in its discretion
determined whether the 
circumstances 
of a murder warranted the
death penalty. The perceived need to stretch the aggravating
factor of burglary to the breaking point reflects a desire, I
believe, to allow for the death penalty in circumstances that
do not clearly fit within that statutory aggravating factor.
5