Title: WJLA-TV v. Levin

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WJLA-TV, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 012050 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 7, 2002 
STEPHEN M. LEVIN, M.D. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider various issues arising out of a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action alleging common 
law defamation and the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s image 
for advertising purposes in violation of Code § 8.01-40(A).  
Much of the evidence adduced at trial was in conflict.  However, 
applying settled appellate principles, we review the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff-appellee, who prevailed in the trial 
court.  RF&P Railroad v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 251 Va. 
201, 208, 468 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996).  Additionally, we will 
recite the voluminous evidence in summary fashion, stating only 
the facts and proceedings relevant to appellants’ five 
assignments of error, which we will address seriatim.1  Majorana 
                     
1 The trial court record includes more than 3100 pages of 
pleadings and court documents, thirteen volumes of trial 
transcripts, several more volumes of deposition transcripts, and 
hundreds of pages of exhibits. 
 
v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 523, 539 S.E.2d 
426, 427 (2000). 
BACKGROUND 
In early 1997, Stephen M. Levin, M.D., an orthopedist whose 
professional office is located in Vienna, Virginia, was the 
subject of a hearing held by the Virginia Board of Medicine 
concerning complaints filed by a number of his female patients 
who asserted that certain treatment by him had been medically 
inappropriate.  The specific medical condition involved was 
“piriformis syndrome,” which may be defined generally as a 
condition in which the piriformis muscle in the buttock 
irritates the sciatic nerve causing pain in the buttock, lower 
back, and leg.  Dr. Levin’s treatment for piriformis syndrome 
involves intravaginal manipulation of the piriformis muscle. 
The Board of Medicine dismissed those complaints.  One of 
the complaining patients publicly criticized the Board’s 
decision and brought her complaints to the attention of the 
media defendants in the present case.  The media defendants’ 
actions in investigating Dr. Levin’s treatment for piriformis 
syndrome and in broadcasting reports concerning that 
investigation spawned the present litigation. 
On May 28, 1999, Dr. Levin filed a motion for judgment in 
the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against WJLA-TV, Allbritton 
Communications Company, Allbritton Groups, Inc., Perpetual 
 
2
Corporation, and against Candace Mays and Archie Kelly, two of 
WJLA-TV’s newsroom employees, individually (collectively, WJLA).  
WJLA-TV broadcasts on Channel 7 in the Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area, including Vienna, Virginia.  Relevant to this 
appeal, Dr. Levin alleged in count one of his motion for 
judgment, and again in a second amended motion for judgment, 
that WJLA defamed Dr. Levin in a news story aired as part of 
WJLA-TV’s 11:00 p.m. broadcast on November 18, 1997, and in 
advance advertisements and promotional announcements relating to 
that news story, by accusing him of sexually assaulting female 
patients and performing inappropriate medical procedures. 
The broadcast of the news story, which identified Dr. Levin 
by name and used his image, recounted the allegations of several 
of Dr. Levin’s female patients that they had been subjected to 
“inappropriate pelvic exams” during treatment by Dr. Levin for 
piriformis syndrome.  The broadcast recounted that despite the 
testimony of other female patients with similar complaints about 
his treatment of them, the Board of Medicine had closed the case 
against Dr. Levin for insufficient evidence.  The broadcast also 
recounted that one of Dr. Levin’s patients had filed a 
$1 million law suit against him as a result of his treatment of 
her.  The broadcast included the videotaped statements of Dr. 
Loren M. Fishman, who was described as having “literally 
[written] the book on piriformis syndrome,” and who was reported 
 
3
to have said that he had never heard of “vaginal manipulation” 
as a treatment for this syndrome.  Also included were assertions 
that leading experts from George Washington University Hospital 
and the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota had said that they 
had never heard of treating piriformis syndrome by “vaginal 
manipulation.”  Finally, the broadcast concluded with a 
statement that Dr. Levin “has denied doing anything wrong,” but 
that he “declined an on camera interview.” 
In promotional announcements preceding the broadcast, WJLA 
referred to its “undercover” investigation “expos[ing] the 
intimate violation of women at the hands of their doctor,” which 
amounted to “sexual assault,” and repeatedly referred to the 
unnamed subject of the news story as “the ‘Dirty Doc’ ” and “the 
X-Rated Doctor.”  Two of the televised promotional announcements 
featured Dr. Levin’s image, which Candace Mays had obtained 
without his permission by using a hidden videocamera while 
posing as a patient at his office. 
Dr. Levin alleged that he had suffered unspecified “general 
and special damages” as a result of the defamatory statements.  
He further alleged that WJLA had been negligent in making the 
defamatory statements and that they had done so with actual 
malice, either knowing that the statements were false or in 
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statements. 
 
4
In count five of the motion for judgment, Dr. Levin alleged 
that the use of his image without his consent in two of the 
televised promotional announcements constituted a 
misappropriation of his likeness for advertising or trade 
purposes in violation of Code § 8.01-40(A).  Dr. Levin alleged 
that as a result of this misappropriation he had suffered 
humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to his status and 
reputation. 
In a general ad damnum clause at the conclusion of the 
amended motion for judgment, Dr. Levin sought $30 million in 
compensatory damages.  He also sought $350,000 in punitive 
damages. 
WJLA filed an answer generally denying the allegations of 
Dr. Levin’s amended motion for judgment.  WJLA also raised 
various affirmative defenses, including assertions that the 
alleged defamatory statements were newsworthy and fair comment 
on a matter of public concern.  Additionally, WJLA asserted that 
their use of Dr. Levin’s image was not in violation of Code 
§ 8.01-40 because it was used to promote a newsworthy story and 
not for advertising. 
A jury trial was held in the trial court and extended over 
a period of three weeks.  The respective positions of the 
parties that developed from the evidence during the trial, and 
 
5
which they have continued to maintain in this appeal, can be 
summarized fairly as follows. 
Dr. Levin presented evidence that he had practiced 
orthopedic medicine for more than thirty years.  He established 
that diagnosing piriformis syndrome through intravaginal 
manipulation of the piriformis muscle is a recognized medical 
procedure.  He also established that he was regarded by some as 
an expert in the field of the diagnosis and treatment of 
piriformis syndrome, having diagnosed and treated thousands of 
patients for this condition, having written articles and given 
lectures on his treatment modality of this syndrome, and having 
received referrals from other doctors for his treatment of this 
syndrome.  Dr. Levin also presented evidence that his treatment 
modality is widely accepted in the medical community. 
Dr. Levin presented evidence that the complaints to the 
Board of Medicine were made by a small number of his patients 
who were included among those interviewed by WJLA for the news 
story.  He contended that the Board of Medicine had conducted a 
thorough investigation and had dismissed their complaints, fully 
exonerating him of any wrongdoing. 
Dr. Levin further established that approximately five 
months after the Board of Medicine had concluded its 
investigation, Candace Mays, a television news producer, was 
contacted by Jean Jessup, one of the patients whose complaint 
 
6
had been reviewed by the Board of Medicine.  Based on this 
contact, and despite having been informed by the Board of 
Medicine that Dr. Levin had been exonerated of any wrongdoing, 
Mays and Archie Kelly, a television news reporter, ultimately 
determined to make Dr. Levin the subject of an undercover 
investigation to be broadcast during the television ratings 
“sweeps” period in November 1997. 
At the conclusion of Dr. Levin’s case-in-chief, WJLA moved 
to strike his evidence regarding counts one and five of the 
motion for judgment and filed briefs in support of those 
motions.  The trial court denied both motions.  WJLA also filed 
a motion and supporting brief to bar any claim by Dr. Levin for 
damages to his incorporated medical practice.  The arguments 
made on these motions form the basis for much of the argument of 
the issues raised in this appeal and, accordingly, we will 
address them in more detail within our subsequent discussion of 
the individual assignments of error. 
WJLA presented, among other things, testimony from nine of 
Dr. Levin’s patients and a medical expert.  Each patient 
testified to her subjective belief that Dr. Levin’s treatment 
had been abusive and humiliating.  Some of the patients also 
testified that Dr. Levin had fondled their breasts on what they 
considered to be a pretext of performing exams for breast 
cancer. 
 
7
Dr. William C. Lauermann, an orthopedic surgeon, testified 
on behalf of WJLA that piriformis syndrome is a controversial 
diagnosis.  Dr. Lauermann further testified that in his opinion 
intravaginal manipulation of the piriformis muscle would not be 
a proper treatment modality for piriformis syndrome, which is 
generally treated with rest, physical therapy, and anti-
inflammatory drugs.  Dr. Lauermann also testified that 
performing breast exams was “completely out of the realm of 
orthopedics.” 
The jury returned its verdict in favor of Dr. Levin on 
counts one and five of the motion for judgment, awarding him 
$2 million damages for defamation and $575,000 for the 
unauthorized use of his image.2  WJLA filed a post-verdict 
“motions to strike Count Five . . . and for a new trial on Count 
One and Count Five.”  In a final judgment order dated June 22, 
2001, the trial court denied the post-verdict motions and 
entered judgment for Dr. Levin on the jury’s verdict.  In an 
order dated December 20, 2001, we awarded WJLA this appeal. 
                     
2 Prior to submitting the case to the jury, Dr. Levin 
withdrew his claim for punitive damages and no punitive damages 
were awarded to him. 
 
8
DISCUSSION 
Assignments of Error 
WJLA assigns five errors to the judgment of the trial 
court: 
1. 
The Trial Court erred by declining to hold that 
each of the six separate publications at issue 
are not actionable as a matter of law. 
 
2. 
The Trial Court erred by submitting to the jury a 
verdict form that permitted it to base its 
verdict on six separately allegedly defamatory 
publications collectively. 
 
3. 
The Trial Court erred by failing to strike Count 
5 or to set aside the verdict because the record 
does not support a cause of action for violation 
of Va. Code § 8.01-40(A). 
 
4. 
The Trial Court erred by failing to set aside or 
reduce the jury’s $2,000,000 defamation award of 
undifferentiated actual and presumed damages. 
 
5. 
The Trial Court erred by declining to instruct 
the jury that it could not award damages based on 
the decline in value of Dr. Levin’s incorporated 
medical practice. 
 
Whether the Publications were Defamatory 
In count one of his motion for judgment, Dr. Levin cited 
collectively the following statements made or published by WJLA 
as having defamed him: 
An advertisement in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area 
television supplement of the Washington Post that read: 
Q: When does a physical examination become a sexual 
assault?  A: When you go to the ‘Dirty Doc’. 
 
 
9
FIND OUT WHAT THIS ‘DOCTOR’ HAS DONE AND YOU’LL BE 
APPALLED.  FIND OUT HOW MANY WOMEN HE HAS DONE IT TO 
AND YOU’LL BE ASTONISHED.  THE DETAILS ON THE ‘DIRTY 
DOC’ IN A NEWS 7 SPECIAL REPORT 
 
TONIGHT 11:00 
 
An advertisement played on various radio stations in the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area that stated: 
A story so outrageous it almost defies description.  
There is a local doctor here who has a very, very 
peculiar method for treating his patients.  He calls 
it a cure.  The women who have received his treatment 
call it sexual assault.  What exactly does he do?  
When you find out, you’ll be outraged.  When you find 
out how many women he has done it to, you’ll be 
amazed.  Reminder: The X-rated doctor, tonight on News 
7 at 11:00. 
 
A promotional segment on WJLA featuring Dr. Levin’s image 
with an audio announcement that stated: 
“When does a doctor’s treatment become a sexual 
assault?  The story Tuesday at eleven.” 
 
Another similar segment featuring Dr. Levin’s image with an 
audio announcement that stated: 
“News 7 goes under cover to expose the intimate 
violation of women at the hands of their doctor.  
Don’t miss this special report Tuesday on News 7 at 
eleven.” 
 
Dr. Levin also asserted that various statements made during 
the broadcast of the news story on November 18, 1997, were 
defamatory.  Those statements included references to “vaginal 
manipulation,” “highly unusual pelvic examinations,” and 
“inappropriate pelvic exams.”  Dr. Levin asserted that these 
 
10
terms were intended to convey that his treatment modality for 
piriformis syndrome was not a medically recognized procedure and 
were intended to convey that he had sexually assaulted his 
patients. 
Dr. Levin also asserted that he was defamed by statements 
made to Dr. Fishman by Mays and Kelly that they were 
investigating an unnamed doctor who was “sexually approaching 
his female patients,” “digitally stimulating [his patients] in 
the vagina and causing pain to them,” and similar statements.  
It was subsequently established at trial that Dr. Levin 
contacted Dr. Fishman, after Dr. Fishman had spoken with Mays 
and Kelly, and provided him with details of his professional 
background and the procedure he performed on his patients with 
piriformis syndrome.  After receiving this information, Dr. 
Fishman contacted WJLA and retracted statements that he had made 
during the taped interview that he considered the unnamed 
doctor’s actions to be inappropriate.  Nonetheless, WJLA cited 
Dr. Fishman in its news story as confirming that the procedure 
was not medically appropriate. 
“Whether statements complained of in a defamation action 
fall within the type of speech which will support a state 
defamation action is a matter for the trial judge to determine 
as a matter of law” before the matter may be properly submitted 
 
11
to the jury.  Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 296, 497 
S.E.2d 136, 138 (1998). 
[A defamation] plaintiff must show that the alleged 
[defamation] was published “of or concerning” him.  He 
need not show that he was mentioned by name in the 
publication.  Instead, the plaintiff satisfies the ‘of 
or concerning’ test if he shows that the publication 
was intended to refer to him and would be so 
understood by persons reading [or hearing] it who knew 
him . . . .  But if the publication on its face does 
not show that it applies to the plaintiff, the 
publication is not actionable, unless the allegations 
and supporting contemporaneous facts connect the 
[defamatory] words to the plaintiff. 
 
The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 
(1985) (internal citations omitted). 
WJLA asserts in its first assignment of error that none of 
the publications in question are actionable in defamation as a 
matter of law and, accordingly, that the trial court erred by 
failing to strike count one of Dr. Levin’s motion for judgment 
at the conclusion of his case-in-chief.  Our consideration of 
this issue, however, is limited by the procedural posture in 
which it necessarily comes to us in this particular case.  At 
trial, without objection by WJLA, the trial court granted Dr. 
Levin’s requested instruction 27 which told the jury that it 
could return a verdict for Dr. Levin if he proved by the greater 
weight of the evidence that WJLA made “any one” of the 
statements in question.  Accordingly, WJLA has waived the issue 
whether all the publications are actionable and has limited our 
 
12
independent review of the record regarding this assignment of 
error to whether any one publication was actionable as a matter 
of law. 
As we have noted above, in the trial court the various 
alleged defamatory publications were collectively asserted and 
presented as one count of defamation.  While it is true, as WJLA 
points out, that each publication of a defamatory statement is a 
separate tort and, indeed, generally subsequent republications 
of such a statement are separate torts, Weaver v. Beneficial 
Finance Co., 199 Va. 196, 199, 98 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1957), a 
plaintiff is not required to bring a defamation action in that 
fashion.  Of course, a plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
damages for publications that are not actionable as a matter of 
law or that are not proven to be “of or concerning” him.  
However, we are of opinion that statements or publications by 
the same defendant regarding one specific subject or event and 
made over a relatively short period of time, some of which 
clearly identify the plaintiff and others which do not, may be 
considered together for the purpose of establishing that the 
plaintiff was the person “of or concerning” whom the alleged 
defamatory statements were made.  This is so even where the 
publication identifying the plaintiff is made subsequent to 
those that do not identify him.  See M.C. Dransfield, 
Annotation, What evidence is admissible to identify plaintiff as 
 
13
person defamed, 95 A.L.R.2d 227 § 4 (1964); see also Gelencser 
v. Orange County Publications, 498 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1986) (no error to permit plaintiff to include allegations 
that references from which he could be identified that appeared 
in subsequent news story concerning allegations of child abuse 
provided the context whereby he could be identified as the 
subject of two prior articles which used fictitious names). 
This principle is manifestly applicable to the undisputed 
facts of the present case.  The thrust of Dr. Levin’s claim of 
defamation was that WJLA’s publications collectively accused him 
of sexually assaulting some of his female patients under the 
guise of treating them for piriformis syndrome.  It is 
undisputed that all of WJLA’s publications concerned Dr. Levin’s 
treatment modality and were made within a relatively short 
period of time.  WJLA concedes that its televised promotional 
publications, which included Dr. Levin’s images, were “of or 
concerning” Dr. Levin.  That being the case, it cannot be said 
that the other publications, including the statements to Dr. 
Fishman, considered collectively were not as a matter of law “of 
or concerning” Dr. Levin. 
In The Gazette, we held, as a matter of state law, that 
[I]n an action brought by a private individual to 
recover actual, compensatory damages for a defamatory 
publication, the plaintiff may recover upon proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the publication was 
false, and that the defendant either knew it to be 
 
14
false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable 
grounds for such belief, or acted negligently in 
failing to ascertain the facts on which the 
publication was based . . . .  In addition, . . . such 
liability may be based upon negligence, whether or not 
the publication in question relates to a matter of 
public or general concern. 
 
229 Va. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25. 
 
We went on to say that “this negligence standard is 
expressly limited, however, to circumstances where the 
defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation 
apparent.”  Id., 325 S.E.2d at 725.  Whether a defamatory 
statement “makes substantial danger to reputation apparent” is a 
question of law to be resolved by the trial court.  Id.
As to each of the alleged defamatory publications, it is 
self-evident that when these statements are understood to apply 
to Dr. Levin, it is manifestly apparent that they posed a 
substantial danger to his reputation as a physician.  Moreover, 
in its brief in support of the motion to strike count one of the 
motion for judgment at the conclusion of Dr. Levin’s case-in-
chief, WJLA conceded that “[l]ooked at most favorably to [Dr. 
Levin] . . . there may be negligence.”3  For these reasons, the 
                     
3 During the trial, WJLA at times contended that Dr. Levin 
was a public figure and, thus, could prevail only upon a showing 
of actual malice.  WJLA has not expressly raised this contention 
on appeal.  Moreover, it is apparent on the record that Dr. 
Levin “did not occupy a position of ‘such persuasive power and 
influence’ [in society] that he could be deemed a public figure” 
for all purposes, Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 891-92, 275 
 
15
trial court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient 
evidence to submit to the jury the issue whether WJLA was 
negligent in making any of the six publications and, if so, for 
a determination of the actual damages Dr. Levin suffered as a 
result. 
WJLA asserts, however, that because Dr. Levin sought 
presumed as well as actual damages, the trial court was required 
to make the further determination whether there was evidence of 
actual malice before submitting the case to the jury.  See Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Shenandoah 
Publishing House v. Gunter, 245 Va. 320, 324, 427 S.E.2d 370, 
372 (1993).  WJLA contends that there was insufficient evidence 
of actual malice and, thus, the trial court erred in submitting 
each of the six instances of publication to the jury with 
instructions that presumed damages could be awarded. 
In the context of a claim of defamation, “actual malice,” 
often called New York Times malice in reference to the United 
Stated Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires that “the plaintiff show[] that 
                                                                  
S.E.2d 632, 637 (1981), nor would the fact that he was a subject 
of complaints to the Board of Medicine place him so 
significantly in the public eye as to make him a “public figure” 
except for the limited purpose of reporting on the specifics of 
the Board’s public proceedings.  Accordingly, in this case Dr. 
Levin is to be considered a private individual for purposes of 
his claims against WJLA. 
 
16
the defendant knew the publication to be false or evidenced 
reckless disregard for the truth.”  Great Coastal Express, Inc. 
v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 149, 334 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1985).  We 
agree with WJLA that where a private individual alleges 
defamation by a news-media defendant involving a matter of 
public concern, presumed damages cannot be awarded in the 
absence of actual malice.  Id.
In instructing the jury, the trial court directed that the 
jury should answer the following special interrogatory after 
reaching its verdict on the claim for defamation: 
 
If you found for Dr. Levin on the Defamation 
count against [WJLA], do you further find by clear and 
convincing evidence that [WJLA] knew the defamatory 
statements were false or made them so recklessly as to 
amount to a willful disregard for the truth, that is 
with a high degree of awareness that the statements 
probably were false? 
 
The jury responded in the affirmative.  Thus, although we 
conduct an “independent examination of the whole record” to 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a 
finding of actual malice, The Gazette, 229 Va. at 19, 325 S.E.2d 
at 727, we view the record in a light favorable to Dr. Levin, 
including the jury’s finding as demonstrated by its response to 
the special interrogatory, and we will affirm the trial court’s 
decision to submit that issue to the jury, unless it is plainly 
wrong or without support in the record.  See id.; Code § 8.01-
680. 
 
17
We need not recount all the evidence that would support the 
trial court’s decision to submit the question of actual malice 
to the jury and the jury’s affirmative finding.  Rather, we 
simply note that the jury could have based its finding of actual 
malice, for example, on WJLA’s use of Dr. Fishman’s statement 
that Dr. Levin’s treatment modality for piriformis syndrome was 
improper despite its knowledge that Dr. Fishman had retracted 
that statement.  The jury could also have found that in its 
promotional publications WJLA, directly or by implication, 
accused Dr. Levin of committing criminal sexual assaults while 
knowing that no criminal charges had been brought against him 
and having reason to know, based on the results of the Board of 
Medicine’s investigation, that such charges probably could not 
be sustained. 
In short, the question whether WJLA acted with actual 
malice was sufficiently at issue to warrant having the jury 
decide the matter.  The jury having found by special 
interrogatory that WJLA acted with actual malice, Dr. Levin was 
entitled to receive presumed as well as actual damages.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
submitting the issues of actual malice and presumed damages to 
the jury. 
Finally, WJLA asserts that the November 18, 1997 news story 
was not defamatory as a matter of law because the statements 
 
18
made therein were either not proven to be false or were 
statements of opinion not actionable as defamation.  WJLA 
contends that when the broadcast is viewed as a whole, it “does 
not accuse Levin of anything; rather, it raises legitimate 
questions about his conduct arising from charges made against 
him by his former patients.”  We disagree. 
Speech that does not contain a provably false factual 
connotation is sometimes referred to as “pure expressions of 
opinion,” and cannot normally form the basis of an action for 
defamation.  See, e.g., Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233, 
455 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1995); Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 
335 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1985).  However, the United States Supreme 
Court has specifically declined to hold that statements of 
opinion are categorically excluded as the basis for a common law 
defamation cause of action.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
497 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1990).  Moreover, factual statements made to 
support or justify an opinion can form the basis of an action 
for defamation.  Williams, 249 Va. at 233, 455 S.E.2d at 215; 
see also Swengler v. ITT Corp., 993 F.2d 1063, 1071 (4th Cir. 
1993).  Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact 
or of opinion is a question of law to be resolved by the trial 
court.  Chaves, 230 Va. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 102. 
As we have already noted in discussing whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of actual malice, 
 
19
statements made during the broadcast accused Dr. Levin of having 
committed criminal sexual assault.  Moreover, WJLA did not 
object to Dr. Levin’s jury instruction 34 providing, inter alia, 
that the statements attributed to WJLA were “understood to mean 
that Dr. Levin has committed the crime of sexually assaulting 
his patients and that Dr. Levin had intimately violated his 
patients.”  The news story also stated that Dr. Levin’s 
treatment modality for piriformis syndrome was not medically 
appropriate, and WJLA used statements by Dr. Fishman to support 
that assertion while knowing that Dr. Fishman had retracted 
those statements. 
In this context, the statements made by Dr. Levin’s former 
patients were arguably expressions of their own subjective 
opinions about the treatment they had received.  However, WJLA 
reported the allegations contained in these statements as fact.  
Indeed, it did so after having told its viewers to watch this 
broadcast to find out what the “Dirty Doc” had done to his 
patients and that his treatments were sexual assaults on his 
patients.  WJLA simply ignored or minimized competent data and 
opinions that contradicted the image of Dr. Levin that it 
conveyed to its viewing audience.  Therefore, this particular 
news story contained factual statements, which were verifiably 
false and can form the basis of a defamation action.  Thus, we 
hold that the trial court did not err in rejecting WJLA’s 
 
20
argument that the statements made in the news story were 
constitutionally protected opinion. 
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in failing to strike the evidence on count one of the motion for 
judgment. 
The Verdict Form 
Over WJLA’s objection, the case was submitted to the jury 
with a verdict form that did not require the jury to make a 
specific finding that each of the six publications was 
defamatory.  Rather, the verdict form permitted the jury to make 
a single general finding for Dr. Levin “on the Defamation count 
against [WJLA] and assess compensatory damages in the amount of 
$ _______.”  WJLA contends that this was error because the jury 
could have awarded damages for publications that it did not find 
to be defamatory. 
Under different circumstances, we well might agree with 
WJLA’s position on this issue.  This case, however, does not 
involve separate and distinct defamation claims based on 
separate and distinct publications or statements.  As we have 
explained above, the case was filed and tried on one count of 
defamation based collectively on publications and statements by 
the same defendant, its agents, and its employees and all 
regarding Dr. Levin’s treatment modality of piriformis syndrome.  
Additionally, WJLA agreed to instructions 26 and 27 which 
 
21
permitted the jury to return a verdict for Dr. Levin if “any” of 
the publications were made by WJLA and were defamatory.  Because 
the case was submitted to the jury in that fashion and our 
independent review of the record does not reveal that the use of 
a special verdict form would have altered the jury’s award of 
damages or the amount of those damages, we are of opinion that 
the use of the general verdict form was not reversible error in 
this particular case.4
Failure to Strike or Set Aside Verdict on Count Five 
WJLA contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
strike count five of the motion for judgment because Code 
§ 8.01-40 is not applicable to promotional announcements for 
news reports on matters of public concern.  Dr. Levin responds 
that WJLA has waived this issue because it submitted an 
instruction which stated that this “newsworthiness exception” 
would not apply to a use which was “willful, wanton, and 
reckless.”  We disagree with Dr. Levin. 
Initially, we reject Dr. Levin’s assertion of a waiver on 
this issue.  WJLA’s motion to strike count five, asserted at the 
                     
4 We also reject WJLA’s contention that because each 
publication could be considered a separate tort, the trial court 
was required to use a special verdict form.  WJLA again relies 
on Weaver, supra, to support this proposition, and, as we have 
already explained, Weaver is inapposite in this case because of 
the fashion in which the present case was submitted to the jury. 
 
 
22
close of Dr. Levin’s case-in-chief and reasserted at the close 
of all the evidence, was premised, in part, on the contention 
that there should be a “newsworthiness exception” to Code 
§ 8.01-40.  Responding to the motion to strike, Dr. Levin 
contended that such an exception would not apply in this case 
because the “promotional and so-called ‘news’ broadcasts were 
infected with substantial and material falsification.”  The 
trial court apparently concurred in this contention and denied 
WJLA’s motion to strike count five. 
Both parties proffered instructions on the application of 
Code § 8.01-40.  Dr. Levin’s proposed instruction did not 
address the “newsworthiness exception” and his proposed 
limitation, but merely stated the elements of misappropriation 
as defined by the statute.  WJLA objected to this instruction, 
and, while continuing to contest the applicability of Code 
§ 8.01-40 to the facts of this case, proffered an alternative 
instruction consistent with the position Dr. Levin had asserted 
in arguing against the motion to strike. 
Upon WJLA’s objection, the trial court initially took Dr. 
Levin’s proposed instruction under advisement.  When WJLA’s 
competing instruction was proffered, Dr. Levin at first 
objected, then agreed to its being given, but further stated 
that the trial court should also give his instruction.  The 
trial court indicated that both instructions would be given. 
 
23
Dr. Levin’s counsel then inquired whether the trial court 
had “rule[d] on the motion to strike” count five.  The trial 
court indicated that the motion to strike had been denied.  WJLA 
then objected to the granting of Dr. Levin’s instruction because 
it did not include the “newsworthiness exception,” which had 
been the basis of Dr. Levin’s argument against the motion to 
strike count five.  Despite having concurred in WJLA’s 
instruction, Dr. Levin insisted that the “[newsworthiness 
exception] is not the law.”  WJLA indicated to the trial court 
that its instruction included the elements of the statute given 
in Dr. Levin’s instruction.  The trial court agreed and reversed 
its decision to give Dr. Levin’s instruction. 
Normally, when a party proffers or agrees to an instruction 
which is contrary to a position previously argued during trial, 
the agreed instruction becomes the law of the case, and the 
party is deemed to have waived its previous objection.  See, 
e.g., T.L. Garden & Associates v. First Savings Bank of 
Virginia, 262 Va. 28, 31, 546 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2001).  However, 
when the record is clear that the party is not waiving its 
objection to the prior ruling, but merely proffering or agreeing 
to an instruction consistent with the trial court’s prior 
ruling, the previous objection will not be waived.  See, e.g., 
Wright v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 169-70, 427 
S.E.2d 724, 729 (1993); see also Code § 8.01-384. 
 
24
In the present case, Dr. Levin’s proffered instruction, to 
which WJLA objected, did not comport with his prior argument or 
the ruling of the trial court.  By contrast, WJLA’s instruction 
merely stated the law that the trial court had adopted in 
overruling WJLA’s motion to strike.  Moreover, it is clear from 
the post-verdict record that WJLA continued to assert in its 
motion to set aside the jury’s verdict that Code § 8.01-40 was 
not applicable on the facts of this case.  Accordingly, we hold 
that WJLA did not waive its objection to the trial court’s 
ruling denying the motion to strike count five.  The record 
establishes that WJLA was not inviting error by proffering the 
instruction, but was merely seeking to have the trial court’s 
position on the law, to which WJLA had previously objected, 
clearly stated to the jury.  Wright, 245 Va. at 170, 427 S.E.2d 
at 129. 
We now turn to the question whether the nonconsensual use 
of a person’s name or image by the news media to promote a news 
story about that person is a tortious unauthorized use under 
Code § 8.01-40.  Code § 8.01-40 is a statutory codification of 
one of the four common law torts of invasion of privacy.5  We 
                     
5 The common law torts of invasion of privacy are (1) 
unreasonable intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion, or 
solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of 
true, embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) 
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
 
25
discussed the application of Code § 8.01-40 in some detail in 
Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins.  There we stated 
that: 
 
Code § 8.01-40(A) provides that if a person’s 
“name, portrait, or picture” is used for “advertising 
purposes or for the purposes of trade” without written 
consent, the person may maintain a suit in equity to 
prevent the use, and may sue and recover damages for 
any injuries resulting from such use. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Use for “advertising purposes” and use “for the 
purposes of trade” are separate and distinct statutory 
concepts.  Claims based, as here, on the use of a name 
“for advertising purposes” have received a more 
liberal treatment by the courts than those based on 
use “for purposes of trade.”  The unauthorized use of 
a person’s name as an integral part of advertising 
matter “has almost uniformly been held actionable.”  
And, a name is used “for advertising purposes” when 
“it appears in a publication which, taken in its 
entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, 
an advertisement or solicitation for patronage of a 
particular product or service.” 
                                                                  
public eye; and (4) misappropriation of plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for commercial purposes.  William L. Prosser, The Law 
of Torts § 117 (4th ed. 1971).  By codifying only the last of 
these torts, the General Assembly has implicitly excluded the 
remaining three as actionable torts in Virginia.  See Falwell v. 
Penthouse, 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (W.D. Va. 1981).  
Accordingly, we agree with WJLA and the amici curiae that, to 
the extent that count five asserts a claim for false light 
publicity, it fails to state a proper cause of action.  Rather, 
in Virginia where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant made an unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name or 
image in a context that is false and would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, his remedy is to prove that the context 
was defamatory, and not that the use was a misappropriation.  
Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Law of Defamation, § 10:10 (2d ed. 
2000) (contrasting the elements of privacy torts and 
defamation). 
 
26
 
249 Va. 387, 394-95, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362 (1995) (citations 
omitted). 
We recognized in Town & Country Properties that Virginia is 
among the few states, including New York, that have limited the 
application of the common law privacy torts by statute.  We 
further recognized that under certain circumstances we may “look 
to New York courts for guidance” by considering the construction 
given by that state’s courts to the similar statutory right of 
privacy enacted by its legislature.  Id. at 394, 457 S.E.2d at 
362. 
In Messenger v. Gruner+Jahr Printing and Publishing, 727 
N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000), the New York Court of Appeals reiterated 
its long-standing position that the right of privacy does not 
extend “to reports of newsworthy events or matters of public 
interest.”  Id. at 552.  So long as there is a “real 
relationship between” the use of a person’s name or image and 
the report, and the report is not merely “an advertisement in 
disguise,” there is no misappropriation.  Id. at 554.  Applying 
this principle to the facts in Messenger, the New York Court of 
Appeals concluded that this was so even where a “false 
implication . . . might be reasonably drawn” from the use of the 
plaintiff’s name or image.  Id. 
 
27
Dr. Levin asserts that the promotional announcements were 
intended, in part, to entice the public to view the WJLA news 
broadcast in order to increase the station’s ratings during a 
critical “sweeps” period and, thus, potentially increase future 
advertising revenue.  While this may be so, it cannot reasonably 
be disputed that the principal purpose of WJLA’s announcements 
was to promote a report “of [a] newsworthy event[] or matter[] 
of public interest.”  It is a newsworthy event and a matter of 
public interest when a physician is accused by his patients of 
sexually assaulting them.  Accordingly, we hold that the use of 
Dr. Levin’s image in WJLA’s promotional announcements was not an 
unauthorized use prohibited under Code § 8.01-40, and the trial 
court erred in failing to strike count five.  For these reasons, 
we will reverse the judgment in favor of Dr. Levin and the award 
of $575,000 on count five and enter final judgment on that count 
for WJLA.6
Failure to Set Aside or Reduce Damages for Defamation 
We have already determined that the evidence was sufficient 
to support an award in favor of Dr. Levin for both actual and 
presumed damages resulting from WJLA’s defamatory statements.  
                     
6 Because we conclude that count five was improperly 
submitted to the jury, we do not address WJLA’s further 
contention that the damages awarded for count five were 
duplicative of the damages awarded for defamation. 
 
 
28
WJLA nonetheless contends that the amount of those damages was 
excessive, and that the trial court erred in failing to set 
aside or reduce that award.  The substance of WJLA’s argument on 
appeal is that the award of $2 million, which it contends is ten 
times larger than any prior award in a defamation action 
sustained by this Court, bears no reasonable relationship to the 
actual loss suffered by Dr. Levin.  Thus, it further contends 
that the trial court should have set aside the verdict and 
awarded WJLA a new trial or ordered a substantial remittitur.7  
Dr. Levin responds that he presented evidence of actual damages 
in excess of $900,000 and that the balance of the verdict 
represents adequate compensation for the injury to his 
reputation and the humiliation and mental anguish he suffered as 
a result of WJLA’s defamatory conduct.8
                     
7 In its post-trial brief, WJLA contended that an award of 
$50,000 would be appropriate. 
 
8 Some courts have noted that it is the injury to reputation 
which is the essence of a claim for defamation, citing not legal 
precedent, but Shakespeare’s Iago: 
 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,  
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.  
Who steals my purse steals trash;  
'Tis something, nothing;  
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;  
he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed.  
Othello, Act III, scene iii. 
 
29
With respect to claims of defamation, we have said that 
“[t]o ascertain what is a fair and reasonable compensation for 
such an injury, inflicted under the circumstances, is not easy.  
It has been repeatedly stated that there is no rule of law 
fixing the measure of damages, nor can it be reached by any 
process of computation.”  News Leader Co. v. Kocen, 173 Va. 95, 
103, 3 S.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1939); see also The Gazette, 229 Va. 
at 41, 325 S.E.2d at 740.  This being so, we must take special 
heed of the principle, applicable to any claim that a jury award 
is excessive, “ ‘that the verdict of the jury will not be set 
aside unless it is so grossly excessive (or inadequate) as to 
indicate that the jury in rendering it were actuated by 
prejudice, passion or corruption, or that they have been misled 
by some mistaken view of the merits of the case.’ ”  News Leader 
Co., 173 Va. at 103, 3 S.E.2d at 389 (quoting Kroger Grocery Co. 
v. Rosenbaum, 171 Va. 158, 164, 198 S.E. 461, 463 (1938)). 
Moreover, in such cases we accord the trial court a large 
measure of discretion regarding whether a verdict should be 
affirmed, set aside, or reduced “because it saw and heard the 
witnesses while we are confined to the printed record.”  
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 300, 362 
S.E.2d 32, 45 (1987).  “Unless the amount of the award is so 
                                                                  
See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12. 
 
30
excessive as to shock the conscience of the court . . . a 
verdict approved by the trial court will not be disturbed on 
appeal.”  The Gazette, 229 Va. at 41, 325 S.E.2d at 740. 
We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its 
refusal to set aside or remit a portion of the damages awarded 
for defamation in this case.  Dr. Levin’s evidence of actual 
damages, though criticized by WJLA in argument to the jury, was 
not rebutted.  Given that we have found the evidence supports 
the jury’s finding of actual malice, we cannot say that its 
award was the result of prejudice, passion, or some mistaken 
view of the merits of the case.  To the contrary, given the 
grave nature of the unfounded allegations made against Dr. Levin 
and the inevitable damage caused to his professional reputation, 
the jury’s award was not excessive.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the trial court did not err in upholding the award of $2 million 
for count one. 
Failure to Instruct Jury to Disregard Damages 
 Sustained by Dr. Levin’s Incorporated Medical Practice
 
WJLA contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant a portion of its instruction H directing the jury that it 
could not award damages based upon a diminution in the value of 
Dr. Levin’s incorporated medical practice.  Dr. Levin contends 
that WJLA waived its objection to the trial court’s failing to 
                                                                  
 
 
31
grant instruction H because WJLA agreed to his instruction 30, 
which permitted the jury to award damages for “any loss or 
injury to [Dr. Levin] in his medical practice.”  Although the 
argument in the record concerning these two instructions is 
quite confused, we will assume that instruction H was intended 
to direct the jury not to award damages for losses specific to 
the incorporated medical practice as a business that were 
separate and apart from the damages suffered by Dr. Levin in 
regard to his personal capacity to maintain a medical practice 
generally. 
WJLA relies upon Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Macione, 
230 Va. 137, 140, 334 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1985), for the principle 
that a defamation plaintiff cannot recover for losses sustained 
by a corporation he controls.  This is so because the 
corporation is a separate legal entity capable of seeking 
redress for the defamation in its own right.  Id.; see also 
Keepe v. Shell Oil Co., 220 Va. 587, 591, 260 S.E.2d 722, 724 
(1979). 
WJLA’s reliance on Landmark Communications is misplaced.  
In that case, the defamation plaintiff “showed no damages to 
himself, as opposed to those his corporation may have suffered” 
and did not seek presumed damages.  230 Va. at 140, 334 S.E.2d 
at 588-89.  Accordingly, in the absence of evidence that he 
 
32
personally suffered actual damages as a result of the 
defamation, the plaintiff was entitled to recover nothing. 
By contrast, in this case Dr. Levin presented ample 
evidence of the personal damages he suffered as a result of 
WJLA’s defamatory publications.  That evidence included expert 
testimony of the actual and potential future loss to Dr. Levin’s 
ability to earn a living in the practice of medicine.  Even if 
Dr. Levin chose to abandon his incorporated medical practice and 
seek employment elsewhere, the damage to his reputation caused 
by WJLA’s defamation would continue to impair his ability to 
earn a living through the practice of medicine.  Thus, that 
evidence did not relate to an injury that was exclusive to the 
incorporated medical practice. 
In the second amended motion for judgment, Dr. Levin 
neither alleged nor claimed damages specific to his incorporated 
medical practice.  The evidence presented with respect to that 
medical practice related to losses personal to Dr. Levin, and 
the jury was properly instructed that it could award damages for 
those personal losses.  The instruction requested by WJLA to 
have the jury disregard damages specific to the incorporated 
medical practice would have served only to confuse the jury.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to grant that instruction. 
 
33
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court in favor of Dr. Levin on count one, reverse the judgment 
in favor of Dr. Levin on count five, and enter final judgment. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
34