Title: PEASE v HANSEN v CARKULIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

4 ' No. 11901 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA VICTOR PEASE, et a l , , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, -vs - LAULETTE L. HANSEN, et a l . , Defendants and R.espondent9, -VS - T H E O D O R E CARKULIS, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Thomas H . Mahan argued, Helena, Montana, For Respondents: J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana . James R. Walsh, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Robert B. Gillan , Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: February 17, 1972 Decided : MAR 1 0 1972 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. O n March 16, 1970, p l a i n t i f f Victor Pease f i l e d a com- p l a i n t i n t h e d i s t r i c t court of the eighth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, seeking a judgment declaring section 71-302, R.C.M. 1947 ( E l i g i b i l i t y requirements f o r general r e l i e f ) , and Section 4561-2, Montana Department of Public Welfare Manual Volume I V (Policies and Procedures), unconstitutional, i n t h a t the r e s i - dency requirements f o r welfare e l i g i b i l i t y therein v i o l a t e the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con- s t i t u t i o n . Pease further sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the dura tiona 1 residency require- ments of the s t a t u t e and regulation. O n June 17, 1970, the d i s t r i c t court entered findings of f a c t , conclusions of law, order, judgment and decree, wherein it found t h a t , indeed, the residence requirements of t h e s t a t u t e and regulation were v i o l a t i v e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment of t h e United States Constitution and c i t e d Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L E d 2d 600. However, the d i s t r i c t court made a d i s t i n c t i o n between the e f f e c t of the s t a t u t e and regulation on the two defendant welfare agencies. It held t h e s t a t u t e and regulation were unconstitutional insofar a s they con- ditioned general r e l i e f assistance on a dura tionab residency re- quirement but t h a t the s t a t u t e and regulation were constitutiona 1 a s "a proper method of establishing t h e proportionate share of s o c i a l r e l i e f t o be provided by the individual counties." The d i s t r i c t court "perpetually enjoined" defendants from ''enforcing the one year residency requirement" contained i n t h e s t a t u t e and regulation but determined t h a t the s t a t u t e and regulation were permissible prohibitions on the payment of general r e l i e f from county poor funds and t h a t a l l applications received by the county, where the applicant had not s a t i s f i e d the one year residency requirement, were t o be forwarded t o the s t a t e depart- men t of public welfare f o r payment. The d i s t r i c t court's ruling was appealed t o t h i s Court and i n reversing t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Pease v. Hansen, 157 Mont. 99, 483 P.2d 720, 722, 28 St. Rep. 309,312: " W e cannot agree with the d i s t r i c t court t h a t Shapiro is controlling i n the s i t u a t i o n prevailing here because t h i s case does not involve any federally a s s i s t e d program. " Since t h i s Court reversed the d i s t r i c t court ruling the basis of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l question, we f e l t no necessity t o discuss the second issue presented---which agency, s t a t e o r county, should pay general r e l i e f f o r the i n i t i a l one year period. O n November 16, 1971, the United States Supreme Court reversed t h i s Court and s t a t e d i n Pease v. Hansen, U.S. 9 "Whether a welfare program is or is not federally funded is i r r e l e v a n t t o the constitutional principles enunciated i n Shapiro v. .Thompson, 394 U.S. 618." In view of the decision of t h e United States Supreme Court on the f i r s t issue, t h i s Court ordered a return r e m i t t i t u r s o t h a t a rehearing could be s e t a s t o the second issue---who s h a l l pay. Oral argument was heard on February 17, 1972, with n e i t h e r party submitting supplementary briefs. The issue before us now is clear: since neither t h e s t a t e nor the county can deny general r e l i e f assistance t o an applicant f o r f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y a durational residency require- ment, is t h e county obligated t o s a t i s f y such payment out of the county poor fund o r is the s t a t e obligated therefor? F i r s t , we determine which agency has t h e duty o r responsibility for providing general r e l i e f assistance. A r t i c l e X, Sec. 5 of the Montana Constitution provides: "The several counties of the s t a t e s h a l l provide a s may be prescribed by law f o r those inhabitants, who, by reason of age, infirmity o r misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and a i d of society. 11 It would appear t h a t the Montana Constitution places the burden of providing f o r the aged, inf&rm and unfortunate upon the counties. Nevertheless, the extent of t h a t burden is conditioned by the phrase "as may be prescribed by;dawl'. In S t a t e ex r e l . Wilson v. Weir, 106 Mont. 526, 533, 79 P.2d 305, t h i s Court said: "The words 'as may be prescribed by laq' a s used i n t h i s section, mean a s may be prescribed by Act of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. 11 In Jones v. Cooney, 81 Mont. 340, 344, 263 P. 429, the Court said: "As t h i s constitutional declaration is not s e l f - executing the measure of r e l i e f which may be furnished necessarily depends upon s t a t u t e s en- acted t o carry out the benevolent purpose expressed. " Defendant Cascade County Department of Public Welfare argues t h a t i n order f o r the county t o be obligated t o pay general r e l i e f assistance t o the new c l a s s of applicants created a s a r e s u l t of Pease, there must be specific s t a t u t o r y law s o directing. It further argues t h a t section 71-302, R.C.M. 1947, s p e c i f i c a l l y prohibits payment by the county t o applicants who have not re- sided i n t h e county for a t l e a s t one year and t h a t Pease does not prohibit t h i s limitation on county funds, a s long a s the applicant is paid by the s t a t e . It further argues t h a t section 71-309, R.C.M. 1947, commands payment only t o residents of the county and applicants who have not resided within t h e county f o r a one year period a r e not residents. This section is a prohibition on t h e ex- penditure of county funds, but it i n no way r e s t r i c t s payment by the s t a t e nor does it infringe upon the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of the individual applicant, since such applicant can be paid by the s t a t e . Another argument advanced by the county, although not documented, is t h a t Cascade County is already taxed t o the maximum (17 mills) and the anticipated increase i n applicants a s a r e s u l t of Pease w i l l place an additional burden on the county. Further, there is a d i s p a r i t y among the 56 counties of the s t a t e i n the amount of tax levy needed t o fund t h e i r particular welfare programs. Shapiro and Pease have created a new c l a s s of indigents, the t r a n s i e n t and migrant indigent heretofore not provided f o r by our s t a t u t e s . While the l e g i s la t u r e did a n t i c i p a t e and provide f o r transients traveling through t h e s t a t e who a r e injured and i n need of medical treatment and hospitalization (section 71-308, R. C.M. 1947), it understandably failed t o a n t i c i p a t e t h a t the United States Supreme Court would n u l l i f y a l l s t a t e welfare residency requirement s t a t u t e s , In s o doing t h a t Court created a g r e a t d i s - p a r i t y among the several counties i n regard t o tax l e v i e s t o support county general welfare programs. Defendant Montana S t a t e Department of Public Welfare argues that without statutory provision we must look t o A r t i c l e X, Sec. 5 of t h e Montana Constitution, thus putting the burden on the county. It argues t h a t Shapiro annulled a l l residency requirements, s t a t e and county. With t h i s argument we cannot agree. Rather, we hold the l e g i s l a t u r e can provide residency requirements f o r county residence, a s i t has, and where no provision^ has been made t o care f o r the t r a n s i e n t , migrant indigent the s t a t e must provide u n t i l such time a s t h e indigent has established residency i n a eounty,as provided by law. Residency is a matter controlled by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . The leg is la ture has provided guidelines f o r residency requirements i n a number of catagories, such a s : R.C.M. 1947, Section 11-710 - 714---Mayor,Alderman, requiranents 11-1814-------- Requirements, members of police force 21-134 -------- P l a i n t i f f i n divorce action 23-522 -------- Elections, rules f o r deter- mining voting and r e g i s t r a - t i o n 59-304 -------- Certain o f f i c e r s a t s e a t of government 59-306 -------- J u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s , r e s t r i c t i o n s on 59-304-308----- Public o f f i c e r s , r e s t r i c t i o n s 61-121 -------- Child, parent t o determine 71-209 -------- Requirements, s t a t e , county personnel 71-302 -------- Requirements f o r genera 1 r e l i e f 82-1306-------- Executive, residence 83-302 -------- Qualifications f o r c i t i z e n - ship 83-303 -------- Rules for determining 83-403 -------- Allegiance, how renounced 93-703 D i s t r i c t Judges 93-704 -------- Justices of Peace, where 93-2904 ------- Venue determined by residence 93-6601 ------- J u s t i c e courts, actions in. Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, speaking f o r the Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . Lewis and Clark County v. Board of Public Welfare, 141 Mont. 209, 211, 376 P.2d 1002, a case involving a dispute between the s t a t e and county welfare boards involving an injured transient female, said: "* * * t h e Board is empowered t o promulgate rules and regulations t o effectuate t h e policies of the Welfare Act (see R.C.M.1947, $ 71-2041, and ofttimes a r u l e of thumb, such a s the fourteen day regulation, may serve t h i s end. However, such a r u l e of thumb, while undoubtedly e f f e c t i v e i n the majority of cases, is simply unworkable i n c e r t a i n exceptional s i t u a t i o n s , t h i s being one of them. Here we have a wandering t h i r t e e n year old c h i l d incapable of establishing a residence i n Montana, R.C.M. 1947, $ 83-303, subd.6; she had no means of support and roamed from place t o place i n Helena f o r approximately one month. Would the Board say t h a t a non-resident t o u r i s t who spent more than fourteen days v i s i t i n g the parks i n Montana ceased t o be a transient when he had been i n t h i s s t a t e more than fourteen days? W e think not, nor do we think t h a t the g i r l i n t h i s case ceased t o be a t r a n s i e n t a f t e r the expiration of fourteen days. 1 1 Here, we have a somewhat s i m i l a r situation--an indigent who, u n t i l Shapiro, could not become a resident e l i g i b l e f o r wel- f a r e assistance u n t i l he had been a resident of Montana f o r a year. He was caught between claims of the S t a t e Welfare Board and the County Welfare Board t h a t the other was obligated for h i s assistance. He became a resident of Montana f o r general welfare purposes by action of t h e United States Supreme Court, but not of the county wherein he is located u n t i l a f t e r residing i n t h a t county f o r one year. In the meantime, h i s general welfare needs a r e t h e obligation of the s t a t e . The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. s s o c i a t e Justices Hon. Jack Shanstrom, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e Wesley M r . Justice Gene B . Daly took no part i n t h i s cause.