Title: Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP958   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of Mary 
F.-R.: 
 
Milwaukee County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mary F.-R., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 63, 823 N.W.2d 841 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 26, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 3, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur. 
(Opinion filed.)     
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Hannah B. Schieber, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Hannah B. Schieber.   
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief by 
Kimberly R. Walker, Milwaukee County corporation counsel, and 
Colleen A. Foley, principal assistant corporation counsel, and 
oral argument by Colleen A. Foley. 
 
 
2013 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP958 
(L.C. No. 
2011ME4847) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of Mary 
F.-R.: 
 
 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mary F.-R., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 26, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 that affirmed the circuit 
court's order to involuntarily commit Mary F.-R. under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20 
(2011-12).2 
 
This 
case 
concerns 
the 
                                                 
1 Milwaukee Cnty. v. Mary F.-R., No. 2012AP958, unpublished 
slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012).   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
2
constitutionality of the jury trial provisions available to 
individuals subject to involuntary commitment for treatment 
under 
Chapter 
51. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11), 
such 
individuals may request a six-person jury for their involuntary 
commitment hearing and at least a 5/6 jury determination is 
required.  The specific question we address is whether the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection is violated when 
only a six-person jury with a 5/6 determination is available to 
those subject to involuntary commitment under Chapter 51 when 
compared to the 12-person jury and a requirement of unanimity 
for 
individuals 
subject 
to 
involuntary 
civil 
commitment 
proceedings as sexually violent persons under Chapter 980.  We 
also are presented with the question of whether Mary F.-R. 
forfeited her equal protection challenge by failing to make a 
contemporaneous 
objection 
at 
the 
time 
the 
circuit 
court 
empaneled the six-person jury at her commitment hearing.   
¶2 
On December 8, 2011, a jury of six found that 
Milwaukee County met its burden to involuntarily commit Mary F.-
R. for treatment for mental illness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  
The following day, the circuit court entered an order, which 
committed Mary F.-R. for a period no longer than six months.  
Mary F.-R. appeals that order, arguing that the six-person non-
unanimous jury available to her under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) 
violates equal protection.  In addition, Mary F.-R. argues that 
she did not forfeit her equal protection argument, even though 
she failed to raise a contemporaneous objection because she had 
already made multiple requests for a 12-person jury. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
3
¶3 
To reach Mary F.-R.'s equal protection challenge, we 
assume, without deciding, that she did not forfeit her right to 
challenge Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11).  We hold that the differences 
in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under 
§ 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 do not violate Mary F.-R.'s 
constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The legislature chose to allow for differing jury 
protections for initial commitments under § 51.20 and Chapter 
980 and these choices, reflected in the legislative enactments 
in question, are presumed constitutional.3  Mary F.-R. has not 
overcome 
this 
presumption 
and 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
the 
unconstitutionality 
of 
§ 51.20 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.  
Furthermore, considering that Mary F.-R's specific challenge 
relates to jury provisions, we find that rational basis review 
is appropriate.4  We hold that the different purposes of the 
provisions in question, the varied legislative schemes, and the 
range of liberty restrictions imposed on individuals subject to 
commitment under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, when compared to Chapter 
980, provide a rational basis for the legislative decision to 
provide a unanimous 12-person jury for initial Chapter 980 
commitments and a six-person jury with a 5/6 verdict for initial 
                                                 
3 State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 
N.W.2d 227. 
4 See ¶¶35-38, for our discussion of rational basis review, 
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in this case. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
4
commitments under § 51.20(11).  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
I. Background 
¶4 
The facts underlying Mary F.-R.'s initial commitment 
are not in dispute.  Police officers responded to Mary F.-R.'s 
apartment complex to address a call from a concerned neighbor.  
After investigating further, officers placed Mary F.-R. in 
emergency detention.  Following this detention, the treatment 
director of the Milwaukee County Mental Health division or his 
designee5 filed a supplemental statement to the emergency 
detention.6   
¶5 
After an individual is detained under  §§ 51.15 or 
51.20, a court must hold a hearing to determine "whether there 
is probable cause to believe the allegations" set forth in the 
petition for commitment.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(a).  On November 
30, 2011, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Court Commissioner 
Lindsey Grady presiding, held a hearing to determine whether 
Milwaukee County had probable cause to detain Mary F.-R.  On the 
same day, Mary F.-R. filed a handwritten request for a 12-person 
                                                 
5 The supplemental statement is unclear as to whether the 
treatment director or a designee signed the statement.  In any 
regard, the validity of the signed statement is not in question. 
6 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(b), the filing and notice of 
the treatment director or designee statement is treated as if 
Milwaukee County had filed a petition for involuntary commitment 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
5
jury.7  During the probable cause hearing, Mary F.-R. also orally 
requested a 12-person jury.8  Part way through the hearing, Mary 
F.-R. became unsatisfied with her attorney and fired her.  The 
circuit court commissioner suspended the probable cause hearing 
and scheduled a continuance to allow new counsel to be 
appointed.  Prior to the conclusion of the November 30, 2011, 
proceeding, the circuit court accepted Mary F.-R.'s demand to 
have a jury trial, but did not specifically address her demand 
to have a 12-person jury.  On December 2, 2011, the circuit 
court, the Honorable William W. Brash presiding, continued with 
the probable cause hearing.  At this hearing, Mary F.-R. 
requested a 12-person jury for her commitment trial.9  At the 
conclusion of this hearing, the circuit court found that 
Milwaukee County had met its burden to show that probable cause 
existed to believe the allegations asserted in the emergency 
detention and treatment director statement to commit Mary F.-R. 
                                                 
7 The handwritten request stated, "Please This is my Third 
12 Person Jury Trial Demand for any involuntary medication and 
any involuntary commitment here or elsewhere. . . . Two 12 
Person Jury Demands were put in yesterday.  One at 10am in PCS 
and 
one 
on 
this 
ward 
after 
arrival 
after 
12:30pm 
Sat. 
11/26/2011."  
8 Mary F.-R. stated, "[y]ou'll hear a different story about 
what happened on that ward, and five 12-person jury demands – - 
or six." 
9 Mary F.-R. stated, "I want a 12-person jury demand; and 
it's been in numerous times; and I have all the grievances and 
all the jury demands . . . I want that in the file . . . all my 
jury demands." 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
6
¶6 
Following a finding of probable cause, the next step 
in involuntary commitment proceedings under Chapter 51 is to 
hold a final hearing.  On December 8, 2011, the circuit court, 
the Honorable Victor Manian presiding, empaneled a six-person 
jury for Mary F.-R.'s final commitment hearing.  Neither Mary 
F.-R. nor her attorney objected to the six-person jury at this 
time.  Following the hearing, the jury unanimously found that 
Mary F.-R. met the requirements under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) 
for involuntary commitment.  Specifically, the jury found that 
Mary F.-R. was mentally ill, that she was a proper subject for 
treatment, and that she was a danger to herself and to others.  
The following day, December 9, 2011, the circuit court ordered 
Mary F.-R. be committed to the Milwaukee County Behavioral 
Health Division, a locked facility, for a period not to exceed 
six months.     
¶7 
Mary F.-R. appealed the circuit court's order.10  
Relevant to the issue before this court, Mary F.-R. challenged 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)11 on equal 
                                                 
10 As part of her appeal, Mary F.-R. challenged whether 
sufficient evidence existed for the jury to determine that she 
was a danger to herself or others.  That issue is not before 
this court.   
11 Section 51.20(11), in relevant part, provides: 
JURY TRIAL.  (a) If before involuntary commitment 
a jury is demanded by the individual against whom a 
petition has been filed under sub. (1) or by the 
individual's 
counsel 
if 
the 
individual 
does 
not 
object, the court shall direct that a jury of 6 people 
be selected to determine if the allegations specified 
in sub. (1) (a) or (ar) are true. . . . 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
7
protection grounds.  The court of appeals affirmed Mary F.-R.'s 
involuntary commitment.  It held that Mary F.-R. forfeited her 
equal 
protection 
argument 
by 
failing 
to 
argue 
its 
unconstitutionality at the circuit court and by failing to 
object, either by herself or through counsel, to the jury of six 
at the time of empanelment.   
¶8 Mary F.-R. raises two challenges before this court that 
relate only to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11).  
First, she argues that she did not forfeit her equal protection 
challenge when she failed to make a contemporaneous objection at 
the time the circuit court empaneled the six-person jury.  
Second, she argues that both § 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 are 
civil 
commitment 
statutes, 
and 
that 
the 
jury 
provisions 
available for initial commitment hearings for both should be the 
same.  Specifically, Mary F.-R. argues that § 51.20(11), on its 
face,12 violates her constitutional right to equal protection 
because § 51.20(11) does not require a 12-person jury and a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) No verdict shall be valid or received unless 
agreed to by at least 5 of the jurors. 
12 Mary F.-R, asserts that her equal protection argument is 
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11) and not an "as applied" challenge.  A facial 
challenge 
is 
defined 
as 
"[a] 
claim 
that 
a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional on its face — that is, that it always operates 
unconstitutionally."  Black's Law Dictionary 261 (9th ed. 2009).  
In contrast an "as applied" challenge is "a claim that a statute 
is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or in its 
application to a particular party."  Id.  Milwaukee County does 
not dispute Mary F.-R.'s classification of her challenge as a 
facial challenge. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
8
unanimous verdict like the applicable provisions under Chapter 
980.13 
II. Standard of Review 
¶9 
A statute's constitutionality is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, 
¶22, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929.  "Statutes are presumed to 
be 
constitutional, 
and 
a 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality must demonstrate that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 
328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227.   
III. Analysis 
A. Introduction 
¶10 The United States Constitution14 and the Wisconsin 
Constitution15 guarantee individuals equal protection under the 
                                                 
13 The relevant jury provisions for Chapter 980 initial 
commitments 
are 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.03(3) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.05(2).   
Section 980.03(3), in relevant part, provides: 
"The person who is the subject of the petition, the 
person's attorney, or the petitioner may request that a trial 
under s. 980.05 be to a jury. . . . A verdict of a jury under 
this chapter is not valid unless it is unanimous."   
The relevant portion of Section 980.05(2) provides:  
"The person who is the subject of the petition, the 
person's attorney, or the petitioner may request that a trial 
under this section be to a jury of 12." 
14 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides: 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
9
law.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  
Equal protection under our state constitution is generally 
interpreted in the same way as the equal protection clause found 
in the federal constitution.  State ex rel. Sonneborn v. 
Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965). 
¶11 As Mary F.-R.'s equal protection challenge requires a 
comparison of jury provisions in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) to jury 
provisions in Chapter 980, we will begin with a brief overview 
of the use of jury determinations in civil proceedings and 
specifically in civil commitment proceedings.  We will then 
proceed by giving a brief overview of involuntary commitment 
                                                                                                                                                             
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
15 "Art. I, Sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution is framed 
in language of a Declaration of Rights and reminiscent of the 
Declaration of Independence, and many times has been held to be 
substantially equivalent of the due-process and the equal-
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
14th 
Amendment 
to 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution."  State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 
43, 49, 132 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1965)(footnote omitted).  Article 
I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
"All people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed." 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
10
procedures under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and Chapter 980 before 
addressing Mary F.-R.'s specific arguments. 
¶12 The Wisconsin Constitution allows the legislature to 
provide for a specified number of jurors for a valid verdict, 
but not less than 5/6 thereof in civil cases.  Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 5 (amended 1922).16  The legislature has chosen to allow 
six-person juries in civil cases.  Wis. Stat. § 756.06(2)(b).  
An exception is provided for juries in Chapter 980 cases.  Id.  
In addition, the legislature has sanctioned the use of a non-
unanimous 5/6 jury verdict for all six-person juries permitted 
by Wis. Stat. § 756.06(2)(b).  See Wis. Stat. § 805.09.   
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 is a civil statute that 
governs involuntary commitments.  Wisconsin has a long history 
of utilizing juries in involuntary commitment cases.  Since 
1880, Wisconsin has allowed individuals subject to confinement 
for purposes of psychiatric treatment to have the option of a 
jury determination.  State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 
                                                 
16 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
The 
right 
of 
trial 
by 
jury 
shall 
remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law 
without regard to the amount in controversy; but a 
jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases 
in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, 
that the legislature may, from time to time, by 
statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, 
may be based on the votes of a specified number of the 
jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. 
 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
11
2d 148, 163, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973) (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).17   
B. Involuntary Commitments Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 governs involuntary commitments 
for treatment purposes.  This process commences with the filing 
of a petition for examination that requires a showing that an 
individual has a mental illness, a drug dependency, or is 
developmentally disabled.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.  In 
addition, the petitioner must show that the individual is a 
"proper subject for treatment."  Id.  Finally, the petition 
requires a showing that the individual is dangerous.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.  A showing that the individual is a danger to 
himself or herself or to others will meet the dangerousness 
requirement.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-b. 
¶15 Following the filing of a petition, the individual is 
appointed counsel through the Wisconsin State Public Defender's 
                                                 
17 The first reference to the use of juries in commitment 
proceedings appeared in Section 593 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
Wis. Stat. ch. 32, § 593 (1883 Supp.) (as amended by ch. 266, 
1880, sec 2, ch. 202, 1881, and sec. 1, ch. 35, 1883).  This 
Section stated "[t]he application . . . shall specify whether or 
not a trial by jury is desired by the applicant," but did not 
specify the number of jurors or whether the verdict was required 
to be unanimous.  Id.  The 1898 version of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, however, specified that "[i]f a jury trial be demanded 
by the person alleged to be insane or by any relative or friend 
acting on his behalf . . . the procedure shall be the same as in 
trials by jury in justices' courts."  Wis. Stat. ch. 32, § 585b 
(1898).  Juries, if requested, in justices' courts, also 
referred to as courts of justices of the peace, were comprised 
of "six men."  Wis. Stat. ch. 156, § 3639 (1898).  In addition, 
juries in justices' courts were required to reach a unanimous 
determination.  Wis. Stat. ch. 156, §§ 3652-53 (1898).  
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
12
Office.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3).  If an order of detention is 
issued, a hearing must be held to determine whether probable 
cause exists to believe the allegations asserted in the petition 
for commitment.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7).  In making a probable 
cause determination and all subsequent determinations, a court 
must consider alternative grounds for commitment, which include 
consideration 
of 
the 
least 
restrictive 
treatment 
method 
available to meet the needs of the individual.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1m); See also Wis. Stat. § 51.001.18  
¶16  If the court finds that probable cause exists, it 
schedules 
a 
final 
commitment 
hearing. 
 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 51.20(7)(c), (10)(c).  The court may choose to release the 
                                                 
18 The legislative policy statement found in Wis. Stat.  
§ 51.001 speaks to the purpose of involuntary commitments, 
budgetary concerns, and the preference to impose the least 
restrictive treatment option available that will meet an 
individual's needs.  Section 51.001 states:  
Legislative policy. (1) It is the policy of the state 
to assure the provision of a full range of treatment 
and rehabilitation services in the state for all 
mental disorders and developmental disabilities and 
for mental illness, alcoholism and other drug abuse. 
There shall be a unified system of prevention of such 
conditions and provision of services which will assure 
all people in need of care access to the least 
restrictive treatment alternative appropriate to their 
needs, and movement through all treatment components 
to assure continuity of care, within the limits of 
available state and federal funds and of county funds 
required to be appropriated to match state funds.  
(2) To protect personal liberties, no person who can 
be 
treated 
adequately 
outside 
of 
a 
hospital, 
institution 
or 
other 
inpatient 
facility 
may 
be 
involuntarily treated in such a facility. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
13
individual prior to the final hearing and may impose conditions 
for release.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(8)(a).  Alternatively, the 
court, considering the needs and condition of the individual, 
may order the individual to remain detained pending the final 
hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(8)(b). 
¶17 At least 48 hours prior to the final hearing, the 
individual or individual's attorney may request that the final 
hearing be before a jury of six.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a).  A 
valid jury verdict requires agreement from five of the six 
jurors.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(b). 
¶18 If a jury is requested and at least five of the six 
jurors agree that the petitioner has proved the requirements 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) by clear and convincing evidence, 
the court will order treatment for a period not to exceed six 
months.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(a)3., (e), (g)1.  Treatment may 
be on an outpatient or inpatient basis as directed by the court.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(a)3., (dm).  Individuals subject to 
involuntary commitment orders may appeal the court's order.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(15).   
¶19 If 
the 
court 
orders 
inpatient 
treatment, 
such 
treatment must be "in the least restrictive manner consistent 
with the requirements of the subject individual in accordance 
with a court order designating the maximum level of inpatient 
facility."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(c)2.  The county department 
providing treatment is also required to place the individual in 
the facility and program that is "least restrictive of the 
individual's personal liberty, consistent with the treatment 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
14
requirements of the individual."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(f).  
The county is also required to alter an individual's treatment 
plan as necessary to provide treatment continuously in the least 
restrictive setting possible.  Id. 
¶20 While the county may discharge an individual subject 
to inpatient treatment at any time, it may also petition the 
court to recommit an individual for an additional maximum time 
period of one year.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3., 2r., 1.  
Twenty-one days prior to the expiration of the initial six-month 
maximum commitment period, the court must file an evaluation of 
the 
individual 
along 
with 
a 
recommendation 
regarding 
recommitment.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)2r.  If recommitment is 
recommended, the court will proceed with a recommitment hearing.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. 
¶21 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(16), committed individuals 
may petition the court for reexamination and/or modification or 
cancellation of the court's commitment order.  If no hearing has 
been held within 120 days prior to filing, the court must grant 
a hearing to consider the individual's petition.  Wis. Stat.  
§ 51.20(16)(c).  Finally, an individual committed by court order 
for treatment of mental illness must be reevaluated within 30 
days 
of 
commitment, 
within 
three 
months 
of 
the 
initial 
reevaluation, and, at a minimum, every six months thereafter.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(17).  Mandatory evaluations ensure that the 
individual receives treatment in the least restrictive setting 
available to meet his or her needs.  See Id.             
C. Involuntary Commitments Under Chapter 980 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
15
¶22 Chapter 980 commitments are also civil proceedings.  
State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶41, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 
762.  However, we have found that Chapter 980 committees share 
many protections available to criminal defendants.  State v. 
Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 417, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).19  One of 
these protections is that the petitioner in a Chapter 980 
commitment has the burden to prove that an individual is a 
sexually violent person beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).  Another protection, granted by the 
legislature, is the ability of the individual subject to a 
Chapter 980 commitment to request a unanimous 12-person jury for 
his or her initial commitment hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3); 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(2).  
¶23 This court has summarized the legislative scheme for 
the involuntary commitment of sexually violent persons under 
Chapter 980.  See e.g., State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 297-301, 
541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  We are mindful, however, of the 
legislative changes made to Chapter 980 since our decision in 
                                                 
19 We recognize that our reasoning in Curiel was based, in 
part, on a now repealed subsection of Chapter 980.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(1m)(1995-96), repealed by 2005 Wis. Act 434.  
This subsection included the following language, "[a]t the trial 
to determine whether the person who is the subject of a petition 
under s. 980.02 is a sexually violent person, all rules of 
evidence in criminal actions apply. All constitutional rights 
available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are available 
to the person."  Id.  Even without the language from the now 
repealed Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), Chapter 980 continues to offer 
several protections similar to those allowed criminal defendants 
discussed herein.   
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
16
Post.20  Therefore, we will proceed by discussing the aspects of 
Chapter 980 most pertinent to Mary F.-R.'s equal protection 
challenge. 
¶24 The involuntary commitment of a sexually violent 
person commences with the filing of a petition alleging that the 
individual is sexually violent.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02.  A 
petition may be filed by the Wisconsin Department of Justice or, 
if the department does not file a petition, by the district 
attorney in the county where the individual was convicted of a 
sexually violent offense, where the individual will reside upon 
discharge, or where the individual is currently in custody.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(a)-(b); State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶43 
263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 ("[A] request from the agency 
with jurisdiction and a subsequent decision by the DOJ not to 
file are prerequisites to a district attorney's authority to 
file a Chapter 980 petition."). 
¶25   The individual subject to commitment under Chapter 
980, that person's attorney, or the petitioner may request that 
the commitment trial be to a 12-person jury.  Wis. Stat.  
§ 980.05(2).  The parties, however, may stipulate that the trial 
be to a jury of fewer than 12, and proceed accordingly with the 
court's approval.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(2m)(b)-(c).  The jury's 
verdict must be unanimous.  Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3). 
                                                 
20 Since our December 9, 1995, decision in Post, the 
Wisconsin Legislature has amended Chapter 980 on several 
occasions.  See 1997 Wis. Act 205, §§ 104-05; 2005 Wis. Act 344, 
§§ 633-35; 2005 Wis. Act 434, §§ 60-130. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
17
¶26  If a jury finds that the individual is a sexually 
violent person, the court must commit the person to the custody 
of the department of health services until the individual is no 
longer a sexually violent person.  Wis. Stat.  § 980.06.  The 
commitment order must specify that the person be placed in 
institutional care.  Id.  
¶27 Reexamination 
of 
the 
committed 
individual 
occurs 
within 12 months of initial confinement and again at least every 
12 months thereafter.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  At the earliest, 
an individual committed under Chapter 980 may petition the court 
for supervised release after 12 months of commitment.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08. 
¶28 The committed individual may petition the court for 
discharge at any time; however, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1) states: 
The court shall deny the petition . . . without a 
hearing unless the petition alleges facts from which 
the court or jury may conclude the person's condition 
has changed since the date of his or her initial 
commitment order so that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.   
Recently, in State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶¶3-5, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 
784 N.W.2d 513, we clarified the discharge petition process and 
explained that a circuit court must follow a two-step process 
outlined in Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1)-(2) when evaluating a Chapter 
980 committee's discharge petition.  If the discharge petition 
does not "allege[] facts from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude the petitioner is no longer a sexually violent 
person," then the discharge petition fails at step one.  Arends, 
325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30.  If sufficient facts exist within the 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
18
petition, the court then moves to step two, which requires a 
"limited review of the sufficiency of the evidence."  Id., ¶43.  
"If any facts support a finding in favor of the petitioner, the 
court must order a discharge hearing on the petition; if no such 
facts exist, the court must deny the petition."  Id.   
¶29 An individual subject to Chapter 980 commitment may 
request a jury of six for his or her discharge hearing.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.095(1)(a).  If a jury is requested, five or the six 
jurors must agree to discharge.  Wis. Stat. § 980.095(1)(c). 
D. Constitutional Challenge 
¶30 Mary 
F.-R. 
alleges 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11) 
violates 
her 
constitutional 
right 
to 
equal 
protection.  
Specifically 
she 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20 
cannot 
constitutionally provide lesser jury protections for initial 
commitment hearings than those afforded by Chapter 980 because 
the individuals affected are similarly situated, and both types 
of 
commitments 
promote 
similar 
governmental 
interests 
of 
protecting the public and treating the committed individual.  
However, as a preliminary matter, this court must first consider 
whether Mary F.-R. forfeited her constitutional challenge when 
she failed to make a contemporaneous objection at the time the 
circuit court empaneled the six-person jury.   
1. Forfeiture 
¶31 Mary F.-R. contends that she did not forfeit her 
ability to facially challenge Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) because 
under State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, ¶17, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 
N.W.2d 80, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
19
statute goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and 
"cannot be waived."21   
¶32 In State v. Bush, we addressed the procedural question 
of whether the defendant in that case forfeited his ability to 
bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 980 
when he failed to raise the constitutional issue in either of 
his appeals following his initial commitment.  Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 
90, ¶14.  In holding that the defendant did not forfeit his 
challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 980, we said "that 
while an 'as applied' challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute may be waived, a facial challenge is a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived."  Id., ¶17 (citing 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 
and State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n. 15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 
644 N.W.2d 891). 
¶33 Milwaukee County argues that Bush is inapplicable to 
this case since Mary F.-R. does not challenge the entirety of 
Chapter 51 or the essential purpose of the chapter as was the 
case in Bush. 
                                                 
21 While we used the term "waiver" in Bush instead of 
"forfeiture," we have since clarified the difference in meaning 
between the two terms.  "Although cases sometimes use the words 
'forfeiture' and 'waiver' interchangeably, the two words embody 
very different legal concepts.  'Whereas forfeiture is the 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'"  
State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).   
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
20
¶34 We decline the parties' invitation to address our 
holding in Bush.  Instead we reach the merits of Mary F.-R.'s 
equal protection challenge by assuming, without deciding, that 
she did not forfeit her challenge when she failed to make a 
contemporaneous 
objection 
at 
the 
time 
the 
circuit 
court 
empaneled the six-person jury.  We also note that Mary F.-R. 
made multiple requests for a 12-person jury prior to the 
empanelment of the six-person jury. 
2. Level of Judicial Scrutiny 
¶35 We next turn to the question of the appropriate level 
of scrutiny that should be used to evaluate Mary F.-R.'s claim.  
The United States Supreme Court has established two levels of 
judicial scrutiny that traditionally apply to equal protection 
challenges.22  See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).  "The general rule is that 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest."  Id. at 440.  This level of scrutiny 
is referred to as rational basis.  However, the other option, 
strict scrutiny, will apply "when a statute classifies by race, 
alienage, or national origin" or "when state laws impinge on 
personal rights protected by the Constitution."  Id.  Stated 
another way, "[e]qual protection requires strict scrutiny of a 
                                                 
22 A third level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, not 
discussed 
here 
typically 
applies 
to 
"discriminatory 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."  Clark v. Jeter, 
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
21
legislative 
classification 
only 
when 
the 
classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental 
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect 
class."  State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992)(citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 
(1976)).  In these circumstances, laws must be analyzed using 
strict scrutiny review and upheld only if narrowly tailored "to 
serve a compelling state interest."  City of Cleburn, 473 U.S. 
at 440.  
¶36 Mary F.-R. asks this court to apply strict scrutiny in 
evaluating her equal protection challenge because she asserts 
that her fundamental liberty interest is at issue.  She contends 
that the differences in the jury provisions in § 51.20 and 
Chapter 980 are not narrowly tailored to promote the government 
interests of protecting the public and treating the committed 
individual as required under strict scrutiny analysis.  In the 
alternative, if this court determines that rational basis review 
is appropriate, Mary F.-R. argues that the differences in the 
jury provisions for initial commitments under § 51.20(11) and 
Chapter 980 are not rationally related to the governmental 
interests they serve. 
¶37 Milwaukee County, however, argues that rational basis 
review rather than strict scrutiny should apply.  It argues that 
strict scrutiny analysis cannot apply, because Mary F.-R. does 
not belong to a suspect class, and because her challenge relates 
to jury provisions and not to her fundamental liberty interest.     
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
22
¶38 In 
evaluating 
prior 
challenges 
based 
on 
the 
differences found in Chapter 51 and Chapter 980, this court has 
generally refrained from deciding which level of scrutiny should 
apply.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 321.  However, we agree with 
Milwaukee County that rational basis analysis is the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny to apply to this case.  We disagree 
with Mary F.-R.'s contention that strict scrutiny applies due to 
her 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest. 
 
While 
liberty 
is 
a 
fundamental right, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992), 
and involuntary civil commitment is a "significant deprivation 
of liberty," Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), Mary 
F.-R.'s challenge relates only to the jury procedures available 
for initial commitment hearings under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and not 
to the use of involuntary commitments in general.  Unlike a 
situation where protection for a fundamental liberty interest is 
interfered with impermissibly, having a six-person jury trial is 
not the "equivalent to having no jury trial at all."  State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶18, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  
There is no right to a 12-person jury in civil proceedings such 
as here.  Id., ¶¶17-19.  In addition, we are satisfied that Mary 
F.-R. does not belong to a suspect class.23  Since strict 
                                                 
23 Mary F.-R. makes no argument that she belongs to a 
suspect class.  The United States Supreme Court has explained 
that a "suspect class is one 'saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.'"  Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 
(1976)(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).  The Supreme Court has specifically found 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
23
scrutiny does not apply to this case, we evaluate Mary F.-R's 
equal protection argument using rational basis review.      
3. Equal Protection Analysis 
¶39 In response to Mary F.-R.'s equal protection argument, 
Milwaukee County does not dispute that § 51.20(11) and Chapter 
980 provide different jury provisions for initial commitments.  
Both parties also take the position that individuals subject to 
involuntary commitment under § 51.20 and Chapter 980 are 
similarly situated to some extent.  However, Milwaukee County 
notes the long-standing use of six-person juries in civil 
proceedings, and differentiates between the two groups by 
focusing on the difference in liberty restraint faced by each of 
the groups.  Milwaukee County asserts that these differences 
provide a rational basis for the different jury provisions at 
issue. 
¶40 We agree with Milwaukee County that the availability 
of a non-unanimous six-person jury in a § 51.20 commitment trial 
does not violate equal protection.  Chapter 980 committees are 
subject to increased liberty restraints when compared to Chapter 
51 committees. The legislature has imposed restraints in both 
situations for treatment purposes and for the purposes of 
protecting the public.  We hold that the legislative decision to 
allow the added protection of a 12-person unanimous jury in 
Chapter 980 commitment trials, but not in Chapter 51 commitment 
                                                                                                                                                             
that individuals facing discriminatory treatment based on race 
or national origin will be considered part of a suspect class.  
Id. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
24
trials, is rationally related to different treatment needs and 
differing levels of dangerousness that § 51.20 and Chapter 980 
seek 
to 
address, 
as 
well 
as 
stricter 
rules 
concerning 
confinement in Chapter 980. 
¶41 As the party challenging the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(11), Mary F.-R. has the burden to prove her equal 
protection violation beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Post, 197, 
Wis. 2d at 301. 
 It is well established under rational basis 
review that "[e]qual protection does not require that all 
persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a 
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which 
the classification is made."  See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 
107, 111 (1966).  "[T]he crucial question is whether there is an 
appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the 
differential treatment."  Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 
92, 
95 
(1972). 
 
Therefore, 
we 
first 
consider 
the 
governmental interests served through involuntary commitments 
under both § 51.20 and Chapter 980.   
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 serves three governmental 
interests, which are apparent from the statutory language.  
First, the statute serves to protect the public.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Second, it provides protection of the 
committed 
individual. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a, 
c.-e.  
Finally, it is concerned with providing treatment to the 
committed individual in the least restrictive treatment setting 
available, which meets the individual's needs.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)1; Wis. Stat. § 51.001.   
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
25
¶43 Chapter 
980 
furthers 
two 
governmental 
interests.  
Protection of the public and treatment for the committed 
individual are such interests.  See Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 302; 
Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶13.   
¶44 The 
pertinent 
question 
in 
our 
equal 
protection 
analysis is whether the differences in the jury protections 
offered under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 rationally 
relate to the governmental interests served by each of the 
legislative enactments.  We have previously commented that 
Chapter 
980 
committees 
present 
a 
"heightened 
level 
of 
dangerousness and . . . unique treatment needs," which "justify 
distinct 
legislative 
approaches 
to 
further 
the 
compelling 
governmental purpose of protection of the public."  Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 322-23.  These same considerations, treatment needs 
and protection of the public, provide a rational basis for the 
legislature to afford different jury protections to individuals 
subject to § 51.20 commitments when compared to Chapter 980.    
¶45 We recognize that individuals subject to commitments 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and Chapter 980 share some common 
characteristics and that, in general, both statutory chapters 
address somewhat similar governmental interests.  For example, 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and Chapter 980 share the goals of protection 
of the public and treatment of the individual.  In addition, on 
a broader scale, both chapters govern classes of individuals 
that the legislature has deemed in need of civil commitment. 
¶46 Aside from these similarities, however, significant 
differences exist between § 51.20 committees and Chapter 980 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
26
committees.  In addition, there are pronounced differences in 
the specific governmental purposes served by § 51.20 commitments 
when compared to Chapter 980 commitments.  These differences 
provide a rational basis for the legislature to provide a 12-
person unanimous jury option to Chapter 980 committees, and a 
six-person non-unanimous jury to individuals subject to § 51.20.   
¶47 As a general example of the differences between 
Chapters 51 and 980, the governmental interest of protecting the 
individual is present in Chapter 51 commitments, but not in 
Chapter 980. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.(requiring a 
dangerousness factor for commitment that may be met if the 
individual is a danger to himself or herself).  Specifically, 
and more importantly, additional differences between § 51.20 and 
Chapter 980 all relate to the lessened liberty restraint 
experienced by § 51.20 committees when compared to Chapter 980 
committees.  The increased liberty deprivation imposed on 
Chapter 
980 
committees 
addresses 
both 
the 
treatment 
and 
protection of the public purposes of these types of commitments.    
¶48 At every step of the involuntary commitment process, 
individuals subject to Chapter 980 are subject to greater 
liberty restrictions than individuals subject to Wis. Stat.  
§ 51.20.  For example, following the filing of a petition, 
individuals subject to Wis. Stat. § 51.20 commitments may remain 
in the community before a final determination is made.  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(2).  This is also the case following the probable 
cause hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(8)(a).  Individuals subject 
to commitment under Chapter 980, however, remain in prison 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
27
following the filing of a petition for commitment.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.015; Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m).  Furthermore, once an 
individual is found to be a sexually violent person, the 
commitment order must specify placement in institutional care.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  
¶49 There are also significant differences in the amount 
of time that an individual may be committed depending on whether 
commitment is ordered under Chapter 51 or Chapter 980.  Initial 
commitments under Chapter 51 are limited to a maximum time 
period of six months.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g).  Initial 
commitments under Chapter 980, however, can last indefinitely.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06.   
¶50 The legislative policy underlying Chapter 51 further 
illustrates a significant difference in purpose between § 51.20 
commitments and Chapter 980 commitments.  The legislative 
approach to Chapter 51 is to provide treatment to individuals in 
the least restrictive setting that is available to meet each 
individual's needs.  Wis. Stat. § 51.001(1).  This is reflected 
throughout § 51.20 and is especially apparent in the provisions 
that require periodic reevaluations of the committed person to 
ensure that the least restrictive treatment setting is being 
used.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(17).  However, Chapter 980 commitments 
are not subject to a similar goal of providing treatment in the 
least restrictive manner possible, and reevaluations may be done 
on a less frequent basis. See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (discussing 
reevaluation). 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
28
¶51 Another example of the increased liberty restraints 
placed on Chapter 980 committees is reflected in the types of 
treatment available to the two groups.  In line with a goal of 
providing the least restrictive treatment setting possible, 
initial § 51.20 commitments can occur on an outpatient basis, 
but Chapter 980 commitments cannot.  Compare Wis. Stat.  
§ 51.20(13)(a)3, (dm) with Wis. Stat.  § 980.06.  
¶52 Furthermore, rational basis review may be satisfied if 
"any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . . could provide a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
classification," 
F.C.C. 
v. 
Beach 
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  That the legislature 
actually based its decision on the stated facts is not required.  
Id. at 315.  Cost savings considerations provide an additional 
rational basis for why the legislature may have chosen to 
provide 
the 
option 
of 
a 
six-person 
jury 
in 
involuntary 
commitments under Chapter 51 instead of a 12-person jury.24         
                                                 
24 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), supports our 
conclusion that cost savings considerations provide a rational 
basis for the differences in jury size and jury unanimity at 
issue today.  In that case, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld Louisiana's three tiered criminal jury structure, which 
imposed 
different 
sized 
juries 
and 
varying 
unanimity 
requirements based on the seriousness of the charged offense.  
Id. at 363-64. Specifically, "Louisiana has permitted less 
serious crimes to be tried by five jurors with unanimous 
verdicts, more serious crimes have required the assent of nine 
of 12 jurors, and for the most serious crimes a unanimous 
verdict of 12 jurors is stipulated."  Id. at 364.  The Court 
held that the Louisiana legislature's decision to require 
different jury sizes and varied unanimity requirements was 
rationally related to cost savings efforts aimed at the criminal 
justice system; therefore, the legislative scheme did not 
violate equal protection.  Id. at 363-64.     
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
29
¶53 Mary 
F.-R. 
asserts 
that 
individuals 
subject 
to 
commitment under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and Chapter 980 are 
similarly situated.  This assertion is undoubtedly based on our 
prior holdings in Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 319-20, and Stovall, 59 
Wis. 2d at 159-60. 
¶54 In Post, we stated that "persons committed under 
chapters 51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of an 
equal protection comparison."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 318-19.  We 
based our decision in Post on Stovall in which we found the 
scope, 
purpose, 
and 
required 
judicial 
determination 
under 
Chapter 51 and Chapter 975, the now repealed Sex Crimes Act, to 
be similar.  Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d at 164.  These similarities led 
us to conclude that there existed no rational basis for the 
legislature to allow jury determinations for initial commitments 
and recommitments under Chapter 51, but not under Chapter 975.  
Id. at 168.  
¶55 In light of our holding today, our prior discussion of 
whether individuals subject to involuntary commitment under 
Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 are similarly situated merits 
revisiting.  First, it is necessary to consider that in 
concluding that individuals subject to involuntary commitment 
under Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 are similarly situated, Post 
relied on analysis that compared Chapter 51 to Chapter 975.  
Second, Post did not specifically compare the purposes of 
§ 51.20 and Chapter 980.  Third, and most importantly, in 
concluding that Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 committees were 
similarly situated, Post did not consider the narrow question of 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
30
specific 
jury 
provisions 
before 
us 
today 
to 
reach 
its 
conclusion.  Finally, both Post and Stovall engage in what might 
appear to be a tiered approach to equal protection analysis.  We 
have purposely declined, in our decision today, to utilize a 
tiered equal protection analysis, in which a threshold question 
of whether parties are similarly situated must be answered first 
before reaching the question of equal protection.  "[W]hen 
properly understood and applied, 'similarly situated' is another 
way of stating the fundamental values of the Equal Protection 
Clause."  Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 581, 615 (2011).   
¶56 Our decision today is in line with our previous 
determinations in equal protection cases involving Chapters 51 
and 980. On prior occasions, this court has considered several 
challenges that involved claimed equal protection violations in 
Chapter 980 when compared to Chapter 51.  In almost all cases, 
we have found that no equal protection violation occurred due to 
the state's compelling interest to protect the public through 
Chapter 980 commitments.  For example, in Post, we found that in 
all but one of the equal protection challenges, "[t]he state's 
compelling interest in protecting the public provides the 
necessary justification for the differential treatment of the 
class of sexually violent persons."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 321. 
¶57 In 
Post, 
we 
did, 
however, 
find 
that 
an 
equal 
protection violation existed because Chapter 980 did not allow a 
committed individual the right to request a jury at his or her 
discharge hearing.  Id. at 328-29.  In contrast, Chapter 51 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
31
allowed the committed individual to request a six-person jury.  
Id. at 329.  In doing so, we stressed the important role that a 
jury plays and its "'critical function of introducing into the 
process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the 
community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify 
the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment.'"  Id. 
at 328 (quoting Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 509).     
¶58  In addition, we have previously held that a rational 
basis exists for other differences between Chapter 980 and 
Chapter 51. See State v. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶33, 262 Wis. 2d 
354, 665 N.W.2d 124 (holding that the differences between the 
chapters relating to the level of confidentiality afforded to 
each type of proceedings does not violate equal protection); 
West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶96 (holding that the legislative 
decision to place the burden of proof on the committed 
individual seeking supervised release under Chapter 980 was 
justified due to the different degrees of dangerousness that 
each chapter seeks to address).     
¶59 In line with these prior decisions, we hold that the 
differences between Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 are such that the 
legislature's decision to allow a six-person jury with a 5/6 
determination under Wis. Stat.  § 51.20(11) and a 12-person 
unanimous determination under Chapter 980 is rationally related 
to the differences in liberty restraint that the two groups 
face.  We are not faced with the same situation that we 
previously addressed in Post, where Chapter 980 did not allow 
for a jury determination at the discharge stage, or in Stovall 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
32
where Chapter 975 failed to provide the option of a jury 
determination at either the initial commitment hearing or at 
recommitment hearings.  Here, both Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 
provide individuals with the option of a jury at their initial 
commitment hearings.  We continue to recognize the importance of 
allowing jury determinations in involuntary commitment cases and 
note that § 51.20(11) provides the same jury provisions that are 
typical in other civil proceedings.  
¶60 In sum, we find that although the governmental 
purposes of § 51.20 and Chapter 980 as well as the individuals 
subject to these civil involuntary commitment statutes share 
some overlapping goals and characteristics, Mary F.-R. has 
failed 
to 
prove 
the 
unconstitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 51.20(11) beyond a reasonable doubt.  The differences in the 
jury provisions available to those committed under Wis. Stat.  
§ 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 are rationally related to the 
difference in treatment needs and level of dangerousness 
presented by each group, as well as stricter rules concerning 
confinement in Chapter 980 commitments.  The legislature has 
addressed 
these 
differences 
by 
imposing 
greater 
liberty 
restrictions on individuals subject to Chapter 980 commitments.  
The added protection of a 12-person unanimous jury is rationally 
related to such increased liberty restrictions imposed on 
Chapter 980 committees when compared to the lesser liberty 
deprivation experienced by individuals committed under Chapter 
51. 
IV. Conclusion 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
33
¶61 To reach Mary F.-R.'s equal protection challenge, we 
assume, without deciding, that she did not forfeit her right to 
challenge Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11).  We hold that the differences 
in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under  
§ 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 do not violate Mary F.-R.'s 
constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The legislature chose to allow for differing jury 
protections for initial commitments under § 51.20 and Chapter 
980 and these choices, reflected in the legislative enactments 
in question, are presumed constitutional.25  Mary F.-R. has not 
overcome 
this 
presumption 
and 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
the 
unconstitutionality 
of 
§ 51.20 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.  
Furthermore, considering that Mary F.-R's specific challenge 
relates to jury provisions, we find that rational basis review 
is appropriate.  We hold that the different purposes of the 
provisions in question, the varied legislative schemes, and the 
range of liberty restrictions imposed on individuals subject to 
commitment under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, when compared to Chapter 
980, provide a rational basis for the legislative decision to 
provide a unanimous 12-person jury for initial Chapter 980 
commitments and a six-person jury with a 5/6 verdict for initial 
commitments under § 51.20(11).  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
                                                 
25 State v. McGuire, 328 Wis. 2d 289, ¶25. 
No.  2012AP958 
 
 
34
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2012AP958.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.1  I write briefly regarding the impact of 
                                                 
1 The court has declared that deprivations of liberty in 
Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 proceedings require at least some 
jury protection on equal protection grounds.  State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).   
Although I agree that case law supports a holding that a 
six-person non-unanimous jury did not violate Mary F.-R.'s equal 
protection rights, I am troubled by the due process implications 
of the case and whether unanimity and the size of the jury are 
essential attributes of the right to jury trial.  These issues 
were not briefed.  
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection."  Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  The Court has held that a non-
unanimous six-person jury violates the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by a jury in criminal cases.  See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 
U.S. 130, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979);  Ballew v. Georgia, 435 
U.S. 223, 98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978) (holding that a unanimous five-
person jury was an unconstitutional deprivation of a jury trial 
in a criminal case).   
Similarly, our court has held that in criminal trials, the 
Wisconsin Constitution requires a 12-person jury.  State v. 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998). 
Although both Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 commitment 
hearings are civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings, at 
common law a civil trial afforded parties a 12-person jury.  See 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 238 ("[R]ight to a trial by jury 
guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is the right to a jury 
of 12 persons as recognized by the common law as it existed at 
the time the constitution was adopted . . . .") (citing Norval 
v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, 20-23 (1853)); see generally Richard S. 
Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of 
Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1993) (describing 
the voluminous historical evidence that the common law in 
England and the United States viewed a jury as being composed of 
twelve).   
No.  2012AP958.ssa 
 
2 
 
State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80, on 
waiver, forfeiture, and subject matter jurisdiction.   
¶63 The court held in Bush that "a facial challenge is a 
matter of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived."  
283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶17 (emphasis added).   
¶64 After Bush, we clarified the difference between the 
concepts of "forfeiture" and "waiver."  These concepts had 
become confused in our jurisprudence.  In State v. Ndina, 2009 
WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, we distinguished between 
rights that receive a "forfeiture" standard and rights that 
receive a "waiver" standard:  
[S]ome rights are forfeited when they are not claimed 
at trial; a mere failure to object constitutes a 
forfeiture of the right on appellate review. . . . In 
contrast, some rights are not lost by a counsel's or a 
litigant's mere failure to register an objection at 
trial.  These rights are so important to a fair trial 
that courts have stated that the right is not lost 
unless the defendant knowingly relinquishes the right. 
Id., ¶¶30-31. 
¶65 Because Bush predated Ndina, we are left to ask (1) 
whether 
Bush 
referred 
to 
a 
facial 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute as a right subject to a waiver 
standard or a forfeiture standard; and (2) whether Mary F.-R.'s 
                                                                                                                                                             
I am concerned that a non-unanimous six-person jury in 
civil commitments constituting a significant deprivation of 
liberty may be a violation of due process and a violation of a 
right to jury trial.  Lines must be drawn somewhere on the size 
of the jury and the number of jurors required to agree on a 
verdict in a case of significant deprivation of liberty, if the 
substance of the jury trial right is to be preserved.     
No.  2012AP958.ssa 
 
3 
 
facial equal protection challenge to the jury statute is subject 
to a waiver standard or a forfeiture standard.  The court leaves 
both questions unanswered in the instant case.2   
¶66 It is also unclear whether Mary F.-R.'s facial 
challenge to a six-person non-unanimous jury attacked the 
circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction or its competence or 
neither.  Bush plainly asserts that "a facial challenge is a 
matter of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived."  
But as this court noted in Bush, "the jurisprudence concerning 
subject matter jurisdiction and a circuit court's competence to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction is murky at best."3  
This 
question 
about 
facial 
challenges, 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, and competence is also left for another day. 
¶67 Is the size and the unanimity of the jury a procedural 
matter or a substantive one?  This court has declared that trial 
by jury is a substantive right, stating that "[t]he legislature 
may 
modify 
old 
procedures, 
or 
create 
new 
ones, 
if 
the 
substantive right to jury trial is preserved."4  The United 
States Supreme Court and this court have linked the number of 
jurors and jury unanimity directly to the substantive right of 
                                                 
2 Although Mary F.-R. did not make a contemporaneous 
objection 
when 
a 
six-person 
jury 
was 
selected, 
she 
had 
previously asked several times for a 12-person jury.  It is 
therefore arguable that she neither waived nor forfeited her 
objection to a six-person jury.  
3 Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶16. 
4 State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 523, 
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).   
No.  2012AP958.ssa 
 
4 
 
trial by jury, rather than viewing them as mere procedural 
features.5     
¶68 For the stated reasons, I concur.
                                                 
5 See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S. Ct. 1623 
(1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978); 
State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998). 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
1 
 
¶69 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion and I agree with the majority that the 
court of appeals should be affirmed.  I write separately 
because, unlike the majority, I would address, as did the court 
of appeals, whether Mary F.-R. forfeited her constitutional 
challenge by failing to raise a timely objection in the circuit 
court.  I conclude that Mary F.-R. did indeed forfeit her 
challenge by not raising it or preserving it at the circuit 
court. 
¶70 Mary F.-R. argues that her facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) cannot be forfeited.  
The majority declines to address this issue by "assuming, 
without deciding" that the challenge was not forfeited.  See 
majority op. ¶34.  The majority then proceeds to address the 
merits of Mary F.-R.'s constitutional arguments. 
¶71 "A statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality." 
State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90; 
State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
"To overcome that presumption, a party challenging a statute's 
constitutionality 
bears 
a 
heavy 
burden." 
 
Smith, 
323 
Wis. 2d 377, 
¶8; 
State 
v. 
Cole, 
2003 
WI 
112, 
¶11, 
264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  The burden of proof is the highest 
in the law, as the challenging party must "'prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Smith, 
323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶8 (quoting Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11). "This 
court has repeatedly held that it 'indulges every presumption to 
sustain the law if at all possible, and if any doubt exists 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
2 
 
about a statute's constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt 
in favor of constitutionality.'" Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11 
(internal citation omitted).  I join the majority opinion which 
discusses Mary F.-R.'s failure to meet this heavy burden. 
¶72 "Normally this court will not address a constitutional 
issue if the case can be disposed of on other grounds."  State 
v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637 (citing 
Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 
N.W.2d 177 
(1984); 
see 
also 
Kollasch 
v. 
Adamany, 
104 
Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981).  We at least in part 
granted the petition for review on the question of whether a 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute can be 
forfeited.  The issue was briefed and argued.  I conclude that 
we should address the question. 
¶73 Mary 
F.-R. 
attended 
the 
entire 
trial 
and 
was 
represented by able counsel.  While she initially made a 12-
person jury demand, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) calls for a civil 6-
person jury.  The circuit court impaneled a 6-person jury 
pursuant to the statute.  No objection was made at the circuit 
court to that 6-person jury.  The jury did not decide the matter 
in Mary F.-R.'s favor.  She would now like to have a new trial 
with a 12-person jury. 
¶74 Generally, the party who wishes to raise an issue on 
appeal needs to first raise the issue before the circuit court.  
State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, ¶5, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 N.W.2d 691 
("As a general rule, issues not raised in the circuit court will 
not be considered for the first time on appeal."). "It is a 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
3 
 
fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must be 
preserved at the circuit court.  Issues that are not preserved 
at the circuit court, even alleged constitutional errors, 
generally will not be considered on appeal."  State v. Huebner, 
2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (holding that a 
defendant forfeited his right to challenge the six-person jury 
in his misdemeanor trial by failing to object at the circuit 
court level); State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997)(holding that a defendant had forfeited his 
right to challenge the admissibility of evidence against him by 
failing to object at the circuit court level).  "Raising issues 
at the trial court level allows the trial court to correct or 
avoid the alleged error in the first place, eliminating the need 
for appeal.  It also gives both parties and the trial judge 
notice of the issue and a fair opportunity to address the 
objection." Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12; Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 
609.  Here, Mary F.-R. failed to raise her objection with the 
circuit court, and so the forfeiture rule1 would dispose of the 
case without subjecting Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) to constitutional 
scrutiny. 
¶75 Mary F.-R. argues that State v. Bush stands for the 
proposition that she did not forfeit her challenge. 2005 WI 103, 
283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80.  In Bush this court held that the 
                                                 
1 As the majority points out, State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, 
283 
Wis. 2d 
90, 
699 
N.W.2d 
80, 
predates 
this 
court's 
clarification of the usage of forfeiture and waiver.  See 
majority op., ¶31 n.21; State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  The usage in Bush is properly 
expressed using the term "forfeiture." 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
4 
 
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute could not be 
forfeited because at its heart it effects the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court to hear the case in the first 
instance:  
[W]hile 
an 
'as 
applied' 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute may be waived, a facial 
challenge is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction 
and 
cannot 
be 
waived. 
 
The 
logic 
behind 
this 
conclusion is entirely consistent with Article VII, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Article VII, 
Section 8 states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
by law,' circuit courts have original jurisdiction 'in 
all matters civil and criminal.'  If a statute is 
unconstitutional on its face, any action premised upon 
that statute fails to present any civil or criminal 
matter in the first instance. 
283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶17 (internal citations omitted). 
¶76 Mary F.-R. takes this language from Bush to mean that 
it is impossible to forfeit a facial challenge to a statute.  
However, Bush does not stand for the proposition that every 
facial challenge to any one procedural statute necessarily 
impacts the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.  In fact, 
Bush challenged the constitutionality of the entirety of Chapter 
980, 
not 
just 
a 
procedural 
provision 
of 
that 
chapter.  
Specifically, Bush argued that the State lacked the authority to 
commit him in the first instance under Chapter 980 as a 
"sexually violent person."  By contrast, Mary F.-R.'s challenge 
is not that she cannot be committed under Chapter 51.  Rather, 
she argues that she was entitled to a jury of 12 instead of a 
jury of six and that she had no duty to object at the circuit 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
5 
 
court level.2  Her challenge, however, is to a procedural 
provision of Chapter 51, not to substantive statutes controlling 
commitment under Chapter 51 as a whole. 
¶77 I write separately because Mary F.-R. has forfeited 
the right to challenge her six-person jury.  Unlike Bush, even 
if Mary F.-R. were to prevail and the jury provision were held 
to be unconstitutional, Milwaukee County would not be barred 
from pursuing her commitment.  Instead, the county would be 
required to retry her commitment, contrary to statute, with a 
then 12-person jury.  Fundamentally, Mary F.-R. never objected 
to the six-person jury until appeal.  I conclude that Mary F.-
R.'s failure to object to a six-person jury at the circuit court 
level 
was 
a 
forfeiture 
of 
her 
right 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11). 
¶78 For the foregoing reasons I concur. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that, in each of the cases cited by Mary 
F.-R., the constitutional challenges were first raised in the 
circuit court.  See, e.g., Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶11; State v. 
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶2, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; 
State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 418, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 
1997); State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis. 2d 528, 530, 
280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No.  2012AP958.akz 
 
1