Title: DOMINIC LOWERY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. DOMINIC LOWERY V uyrrutr (~Vurf of '~rnf RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 2009-SC-000588-MR ON APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE NO. 09-CR-00093 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING rr -= at C7&c/l APPELLANT Appellant Dominic Lowery appeals to this Court from his convictions for first-degree possession of a controlled substance and first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO 1) . Finding no error, we affirm. On the evening of January 31, 2009, Appellant and his friend Tiffany Kerns drove to several houses in Newport, Kentucky, where, according to Kerns, Appellant sold crack cocaine . Appellant and Kerns then decided to drive to Grant County, where Kerns lived. Kerns testified that Appellant still had a small amount of cocaine left over from his sales. Kerns was driving with Appellant in the passenger seat when Officer Brandon Vance of the Newport Police Department passed Kerns's car at Sixth Street and Central in Newport. After noticing that the car had one headlight out and that the occupants were not wearing seatbelts, Officer Vance made a U-turn and activated. his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop . Kerns testified that, when Appellant realized the car was about to be pulled over, he took two bags of crack cocaine out of his pocket, gave them to ferns, and told her, "Don't pull over until you get it shoved up in you ." Kerns testified that, while driving, she inserted the cocaine into her vagina and concealed her crack pipe in the car. Officer Vance testified that Ferns continued to drive for longer than was typical before finally pulling over on the fourth Street bridge after several blocks . Ferns gave consent to a search of her car, and Appellant gave consent to a search of his person . Police discovered Kerns's crack pipe inside the car, and arrested her for possession of drug paraphernalia . Police also found $958 in -cash on Appellant, but did not find any illegal drugs . However, Appellant was arrested for giving a false name to a peace officer after giving his name as "Jimmy J . Jones, Jr .," apparently to avoid an outstanding warrant. . Officer Brady Buemi transported ferns to the jail, and informed her that, because of the nature of the charge against her, she would be subject to a strip search, and that she could face an additional charge for promoting contraband if she took illegal drugs into the jail. At that point, Ferns told Officer Buemi that she had crack cocaine concealed in her vagina . Officer Buemi handcuffed ferns in front, left her in his car, and walked away to allow Kerns to retrieve the cocaine . Officer Buemi then took possession of two small bags of crack cocaine, which were covered in menstrual blood. ferns told Officer Buemi that the cocaine belonged to Appellant, and she gave a written statement to that effect upon arriving at the jail. Appellant was charged with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, giving a false name to a peace officer, and PFO I . Prior to trial, Appellant pled guilty to giving a false name. ferns was ultimately convicted for her possession of cocaine, and she testified at Appellant's trial . During her testimony, the Commonwealth made it clear that Ferns had been offered nothing in exchange for her testimony. Officer Vance and Officer Buemi also testified for the Commonwealth, as well as a Kentucky State Police forensic chemist and a canine unit officer who had assisted with the search and arrest . In his defense, Appellant presented the testimony of his friend Charisma Spears, who stated that she had loaned Appellant the cash found in his pocket . The jury found Appellant not guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of first- degree possession of a controlled substance . The jury also found Appellant guilty of PFO I, and imposed a PFO-enhanced sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant therefore appeals to this Court as a matter of right- I Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict. Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991) . Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to reasonably find that he had possession of the crack cocaine . Appellant points to the concept of constructive possession, and argues that there was no evidence he had dominion or control over the cocaine found in Kerns's vagina . See Houston v . Commonwealth, 975 S.W .2d 925, 928 (Ky . 1998) ; Hargrave v . Commonwealth, 724 S.W .2d 202, 203 (Ky . 1986) . We need not address the issue of constructive possession, because there was sufficient evidence that Appellant had actual possession of the cocaine. KRS 218A. 14 15(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses" a number of listed substances, including cocaine. The Kentucky Penal Code definition of "possession"2 does not apply to drug offenses under KRS Chapter 218A, and this Court has thus defined "possess" with respect to drug offenses under its common meaning: "to have as property; own."3 Pate v. 2 KRS 500.080(14) . 3 "Possess" was not defined in the jury instructions in this case . Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Ky . 2004) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed . 2000)) (brackets omitted) . Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the testimony of Tiffany Kerns established that Appellant possessed cocaine for most of the night . Kerns testified that Appellant had crack cocaine in his pocket, and that he told Kerns to put it in her vagina just prior to the traffic stop . Although Appellant was acquitted of drug trafficking, Kerns testified that Appellant had been selling crack cocaine, and that he kept the remaining crack in his pocket . Based on this testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed that Appellant was the owner of the recovered cocaine. Appellant also argues that Kerns's version of events was "improbable and not worthy of belief." Therefore, Appellant argues, there was a "reasonable lingering doubt" as to his guilt. Kerns's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient for a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of possessing cocaine. Except for the question of the source of Appellant's cash, Kerns's version of events leading up to the traffic stop was undisputed. It was within the province of the jury to assess Kerns's credibility as a witness, and to decide whether to believe her testimony. Obviously, the jury found Kerns to be a credible witness. See Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 590, 598 (Ky. 2008) ; Fairrow v . Commonwealth, 175 S.W .3d 601, 609 (Ky. 2005) ("{Jjudgment as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are left exclusively to the jury.") ; Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S .W.3d 709, 730 (Ky . 2004) ("While Appellant strongly contests this witness's credibility, it is the prerogative of the jury to judge credibility.") ; Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 . There was no error in denying Appellant's motions for a directed verdict. Therefore, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court is affirmed . All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Shelly R . Fears Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601-1133 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Michael Louis Harned Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204