Title: Mount Laurel Township v. Stanley

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). HELD: A property owner s use and enjoyment of the property is substantially affected within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c) when the condemnor s action directly, unequivocally and immediately stimulates an upward or downward fluctuation in value that is directly attributable to future condemnation. 1. It is undisputed that the increase in the value of the defendants property from the judgment of repose on December 3, 1997 until the filing of the complaint in condemnation on May 8, 2002 was caused by inflationary circumstances, and was not the result of any act by plaintiff. Applying the hierarchy of the earliest events set forth in N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, the earliest event that defines the proper date of valuation for condemnation was May 8, 2002, the date of the filing of the complaint in condemnation. N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(b). (pp. 9-10) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, ZAZZALI, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-103/ 104 September Term 2004 MOUNT LAUREL TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Petitioner, and SOUTHERN BURLINGTON COUNTY NAACP, CAMDEN COUNTY C.O.R.E, CAMDEN COUNTY NAACP, ETHEL LAWRENCE, THOMASINE LAWRENCE, CATHERINE STILL, MARY E. SMITH, SHIRLEY MORRIS, JACQUELINE CURTIS, GLADYS CLARK, BETTY WEAL, and ANGEL PEREZ, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs/Intervenors- Petitioners, v. RICHARD L. STANLEY AND LUCIA STANLEY, his wife, Defendants-Respondents. and HUDSON CITY SAVINGS BANK, and McCURDY & RISKIN, P.A., Defendants. Argued September 27, 2005 Decided November 21, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Kevin D. Walsh and Michael L. Mouber argued the cause for appellants Kevin D. Walsh, attorney for Southern Burlington County NAACP, Camden County C.O.R.E., Camden County NAACP, Ethel Lawrence, Thomasine Lawrence, Catherine Still, Mary E. Smith, Shirley Morris, Jacqueline Curtis, Gladys Clark, Betty Weal and Angel Perez and Michael L. Mouber, attorney for Mount Laurel Township; Mr. Walsh and Peter J. O'Connor, on the joint briefs). Wendy F. Klein argued the cause for respondents (Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard, attorneys; Thomas J. LaConte, of counsel; Ms Klein and Mr. LaConte, on the brief). PER CURIAM. Our State Constitution specifically provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, N.J. Const. art. I, 20. That limitation on governmental power mirrors the restrictions present in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution: [N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend V. The procedural protections required to implement those constitutional mandates are set forth in the Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50. Thus, if a public or private entity seeks to condemn private property for a public purpose under the power of eminent domain, Section 29 of the Act, N.J.S.A. 20:3-29, makes clear that the owner of the private property being condemned - the condemnee -- shall be entitled to compensation for the property and damages, if any, to any remaining property. . . . One of the key components in determining what constitutes just compensation in exchange for an eminent domain taking is the date of valuation of the private property subject to condemnation. Section 30 of the Act, N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, establishes four alternatives for determining the date at which just compensation for the condemned property is to be determined. Three describe readily and easily ascertainable events: (1) the date possession is taken by the condemnor, (2) the date of the filing of a condemnation complaint, or (3) the date of the filing of a declaration of blight or the expiration of the appeal period for removal of a designation of abandoned property. This appeal requires that we define and give context to the remaining alternative: the date on which action is taken by the condemnor which substantially affects the use and enjoyment of the property by the condemnee. . . . N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c). More narrowly, this appeal requires that we address what the Legislature meant by the term use and enjoyment in the context of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c). We hold that, consistent with Twp. of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 150 N.J. 111 (1997), the question whether a property owner s use and enjoyment have been substantially affect[ed] requires a determination as to what effect, if any, the actions of the condemnor, either directly or indirectly, had on the value of the property subject to condemnation. If the actions of the condemnor substantially affected the value of the condemnee s property and those actions precede any of the other triggering events listed in N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, then the date of those events shall be the date of valuation for just compensation purposes. [(emphasis supplied.)] Of these statutory alternatives, we must determine which applies, and thus which is the proper valuation date for the property subject to condemnation. Addressing the Stanleys claim that their continued use and enjoyment were not substantially affect[ed] by the December 3, 1997 judgment of repose, the trial court concluded that It is evident that a landowner will have some use and enjoyment of the property sought to be taken until possession is yielded to the condemning authority. However, some use and enjoyment of the property is inconsistent with unfettered ownership with all of its attendant rights to sell, rent, develop, subdivide or simply give the property away. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new valuation proceeding using instead the May 8, 2002 filing of the complaint in condemnation as the valuation date. The panel underscored that, under Nierenberg, one of the objectives of subsection (c) [of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30] is to protect the condemnee from a diminution in value resulting from the cloud of condemnation being placed on the property by a potential condemnor; another objective is to insulate the condemnor from the ravages of an inflationary spiral. Supra, 150 N.J. at 129 (quoting New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. Giant Realty Assoc., 143 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (Law Div. 1976)). Explaining the contours of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c) -- that the action [] taken by the condemnor [] substantially affect[] the use and enjoyment of the property by the condemnee -- the Appellate Division again relied on Nierenberg: A substantial effect upon the use and enjoyment of property is occasioned when the condemnor takes action which directly, unequivocally and immediately stimulates an upward or downward fluctuation in value and which is directly attributable to future condemnation. Id. at 129-30 (quoting New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. Giant Realty Assoc., supra, 143 N.J. Super. at 353). The Appellate Division noted that the emphasis in Nierenberg is not that the taking is certain, but rather whether the effect of that certainty causes an increase or decrease in the property s value such that just compensation requires valuation as of the date of that effect. The focus is on an action which directly, unequivocally and immediately stimulates an upward or downward fluctuation in value and which is directly attributable to future condemnation. Tp. of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, supra, 150 N.J. at 129-30 (quoting New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. Giant Realty Assoc., supra, 143 N.J. Super. at 353). It is only under those circumstances that subsection (c) represents just compensation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-103/104 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court MOUNT LAUREL TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Petitioner, and SOUTHERN BURLINGTON COUNTY NAACP, CAMDEN COUNTY C.O.R.E., CAMDEN COUNTY NAACP, ETHEL LAWRENCE, THOMASINE LAWRENCE, CATHERINE STILL, MARY E. SMITH, SHIRLEY MORRIS, JACQUELINE CURTIS, GLADYS CLARK, BETTY WEAL, and ANGEL PEREZ, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs/Intervenors-Petitioners, v. RICHARD L. STANLEY AND LUCIA STANLEY, his wife, Defendants-Respondents. and HUDSON CITY SAVINGS BANK, and McCURDY & RISKIN, P.A., Defendants. DECIDED November 21, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Per Curiam CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY