Title: State v. Rivas-Batres

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-1300 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 4 June 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Durham County 
No. 10 CRS 53879 
SAQUAN TREAY FACYSON 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 March 2012 by 
Judge H.W. Hight in Durham County Superior Court.  Heard in the 
Court of Appeals 11 March 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Philip A. Lehman, for the State. 
 
Sue Genrich Berry for defendant. 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge. 
 
 
Saquan 
Treay 
Facyson 
(“defendant”) 
appeals 
from 
the 
judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree 
murder.  Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
charge 
for 
insufficient 
evidence.  
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing 
him in the aggravated range because the evidence supporting the 
aggravating factor was the same evidence necessary to support an 
element of the underlying offense.  After careful review, we 
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conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion to 
dismiss.  Due to ambiguity in the verdict, however, we reverse 
the judgment and remand for a new sentencing hearing. 
Background 
On 19 April 2010, David Andrews was working at a restaurant 
in Durham, North Carolina when he borrowed a red Ford Fusion 
from his co-worker so that he could drive to buy some drugs.  
While borrowing the car, Andrews ran out of money to buy drugs 
and allowed other people to use the car in exchange for drugs.  
Andrews loaned the car to Demetrius Lloyd, Neiko Malloy, and 
defendant for two hours in exchange for a rock of crack cocaine.  
The men did not return the car to Andrews, but Andrews testified 
that he saw defendant driving the car later in the day.   
At approximately noon on 20 April 2010, Pebbles Kersey 
walked out of her Durham apartment to retrieve her mail.  
Jermaine Jackson was standing nearby in a recreational park.  As 
Kersey was walking to her mailbox, she saw a red car approaching 
with three men in the car.  In addition to the driver, the 
second occupant was in the front passenger seat, and the third 
was in the back seat; all three occupants were wearing red 
bandanas.  At that moment, Jackson yelled for Kersey to “get 
down,” and Kersey saw the man in the back seat shoot a gun into 
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the park.  Multiple shots were fired.  Jackson was struck in the 
face and died from his injuries.  
Dennis Diaz was driving by the park and witnessed the 
shooting.  While stopped at a red light, Diaz saw a sedan with 
three men, two of which were leaning out of the passenger side 
pointing guns in the direction of the park.  He saw Kersey drop 
to the ground and then immediately heard shots fired.  The car 
from which the shots were fired left the scene.  The police 
later recovered twelve bullet casings from the scene of the 
shooting.  Eight of the casings were from 9 millimeter bullets 
and four of the casings were from .380 bullets.  
At approximately 12:30 p.m. that day, the manager of an 
apartment complex, Rahjohn Baldwin, called the police to report 
a suspicious vehicle, a red Ford Fusion, parked in the parking 
lot of the apartment complex.  While Baldwin was on the phone 
with the police, he observed a gray sedan occupied by four 
individuals enter the parking lot.  Although Baldwin did not 
know the occupants, they were Lloyd, Malloy, defendant, and a 
man named Willie Jackson.  The men exited the gray sedan and 
walked toward the red Ford.  Baldwin told the men they had to 
leave, and they began walking away from the red Ford.   
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A resident of the apartment complex, Andre Jiggetts, 
testified that he saw one of the men standing at the passenger 
side of the red Ford wiping the car with a t-shirt or cloth.  
When Baldwin told the men to leave, the man then closed the car 
door and walked away.  Baldwin and Jiggetts then approached the 
red Ford to inspect the car and noticed a bullet casing resting 
on the windshield.    
 The police arrived on the scene and two of the men from 
the gray sedan fled on foot but were apprehended.  Baldwin 
noticed one of the men fleeing throw something as he fled, and 
the police later found the keys to the red Ford in a grassy area 
near the parking lot.  The remaining two men from the gray 
sedan, one of which was defendant, did not flee and were 
immediately detained by the police.  The police found a 9 
millimeter bullet casing resting on the windshield of the red 
Ford.  The State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) determined that 
the 9 millimeter casing found on the red Ford and the 9 
millimeter casings found at the scene of the shooting in which 
Jermaine Jackson was killed were all fired from the same gun.  
It was also determined that the four .380 casings found at the 
scene of the shooting were fired from the same weapon and that 
Jackson was killed by a .380 caliber bullet.   
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The SBI tested Lloyd, Malloy, defendant, and Jackson for 
gunshot residue.  There was no residue found on the hands of 
defendant, Lloyd, or Jackson.  However, particles characteristic 
of gunshot residue were found on the hands of Malloy.  Particles 
characteristic of gunshot residue were also found on all four of 
the men’s clothing, including one particle on defendant’s pants.  
Defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
murder 
and 
accessory after the fact to first-degree murder.  The jury found 
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.  With the verdict 
sheet, the trial court submitted the following interrogatory to 
the jury: 
Do you find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant joined 
with 
more 
than 
one 
other 
person 
in 
committing the offense for which you have 
unanimously found the [d]efendant guilty 
. . . and that the defendant was not charged 
with committing a conspiracy as to this 
offense?  
 
The jury answered this interrogatory in the affirmative.  The 
trial court based its finding of an aggravating factor for 
sentencing on this interrogatory.  Defendant was sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of 225 months to 279 months.  Defendant 
appeals. 
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Discussion 
I. Motion to Dismiss 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his  
motion to dismiss the charges against him as the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find that defendant acted alone or in concert with others to 
murder Jermaine Jackson.  We disagree. 
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss 
de novo.  State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 
33 (2007).  In doing so, we must determine “‘whether there is 
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the 
offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and 
(2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.’”  
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 
(quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 
(1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000).  
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  State 
v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).  When 
considering defendant’s motion to dismiss, “the trial court must 
consider 
all 
evidence 
admitted, 
whether 
competent 
or 
incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving 
-7- 
 
 
the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and 
resolving any contradictions in its favor.”  State v. Rose, 339 
N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 
U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).  “Circumstantial evidence 
may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even 
when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of 
innocence.”  State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 
433 (1988).  “The evidence need only give rise to a reasonable 
inference of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to 
the jury for a determination of defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id.   
“Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a 
human 
being 
with 
malice 
but 
without 
premeditation 
and 
deliberation.”  State v. Spicer, 50 N.C. App. 214, 221, 273 
S.E.2d 521, 527, appeal dismissed, 302 N.C. 401, 279 S.E.2d 356 
(1981).  “The intentional use of a deadly weapon as a weapon, 
when death proximately results from such use, gives rise to the 
presumptions that (1) the killing was unlawful, and (2) done 
with malice.”  Id.  
The trial court instructed the jury that it could find 
defendant guilty if the evidence established that defendant 
acted alone or with other individuals with a common plan or 
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purpose to murder Jackson.  “A defendant may be convicted of a 
crime under the theory of concerted action if he is present at 
the scene of the crime and the evidence is sufficient to show he 
is acting together with another who does the acts necessary to 
constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to 
commit the crime.”  State v. Giles, 83 N.C. App. 487, 490, 350 
S.E.2d 868, 870 (1986), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 460, 356 
S.E.2d 8 (1987).  
The evidence presented at trial established that defendant 
was present with two other individuals when the men borrowed the 
red Ford from David Andrews.  The three men did not return the 
red Ford to Andrews, and defendant was later seen driving the 
car.  Two witnesses to the shooting of Jackson testified that 
the men who fired the shots at Jackson were in a sedan, and one 
of the witnesses testified that the car was red.  The testimony 
of two additional witnesses established that the red Ford 
borrowed from Andrews was parked in an apartment complex parking 
lot shortly after the shooting.   
Defendant and the other two men who borrowed the red Ford 
returned to the car located in the parking lot.  One of those 
men was seen wiping either the interior or the exterior of the 
car with a cloth or t-shirt.  The keys to the red Ford were 
-9- 
 
 
found in the grass near the parking lot after one of the men 
fled from the scene and was seen throwing an object in the 
bushes.  A bullet casing consistent with the bullets found at 
the scene of the murder was found on the red Ford, and particles 
consistent with gunshot residue were found on all four of the 
individuals arrested at the red Ford, including one particle on 
defendant’s pants.  Thus, the State presented substantial 
circumstantial evidence of each element of second-degree murder 
in that defendant either acted alone or with others in the 
shooting and killing of Jermaine Jackson.  Defendant’s argument 
is overruled.      
II. Aggravating Factor 
 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
sentencing him in the aggravated range of sentences because the 
evidence supporting the aggravating factor was the same evidence 
necessary to support an element of the underlying offense.  We 
agree.   
“When a defendant assigns error to the sentence imposed by 
the trial court, our standard of review is ‘whether [the] 
sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and 
sentencing hearing.’”  State v. Deese, 127 N.C. App. 536, 540, 
491 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1997) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–
-10- 
 
 
1444(a1) (1996)).  “[A]ggravating factors must be submitted to a 
jury, which must determine whether the State has proven the 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Borges, 183 N.C. 
App. 240, 244, 644 S.E.2d 250, 253, disc. review denied, 361 
N.C. 570, 650 S.E.2d 816 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1126, 
169 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2008). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(b) (2012) provides in part 
that if aggravating factors are present, and the trial court 
finds that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, the 
trial court may depart from the presumptive range of sentences 
and impose a sentence in the aggravated range.  The statute 
provides that the following is an aggravating factor: “The 
defendant joined with more than one other person in committing 
the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy.”  
Id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(2).  However, the statute also provides 
that “[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense 
shall not be used to prove any factor in aggravation[.]” Id. § 
15A-1340.16(d). 
On the charge of second-degree murder, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
[I]f you find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that on or about the 
alleged date the [d]efendant, acting either 
by himself or acting together with other 
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persons, 
intentionally 
and 
with 
malice 
wounded Jermaine Anthony Jackson with a 
deadly weapon, thereby proximately causing 
his death, it would be your duty to return a 
verdict of guilty of second-degree murder.   
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
trial 
court 
also 
submitted 
an 
interrogatory to the jury which asked whether the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant joined with more than 
one other person in committing the crime and that defendant was 
not 
charged 
with 
conspiracy. 
 
The 
jury 
answered 
the 
interrogatory in the affirmative, and the trial court applied 
the aggravating factor to sentence defendant in the aggravated 
range of sentences.   
We note that defendant did not object at trial to this 
alleged error.  Generally, by failing to make a timely 
objection, a defendant waives his right to raise the alleged 
error on appeal.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2012).  Pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446, however, this Court has the 
discretion to review defendant’s argument despite his failure to 
preserve the issue for review.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1446(d), 
(d)(18) (2011) (providing that an alleged error may be reviewed 
despite the lack of objection before the trial court if the 
error alleged is that, “[t]he sentence imposed was unauthorized 
at the time imposed, exceeded the maximum authorized by law, was 
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illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law”).  
Accordingly, we address defendant’s argument.  
Defendant contends that the jury necessarily found him 
guilty of second-degree murder on the theory of acting in 
concert as there was no evidence of who fired the bullet that 
killed Jackson.  We do not agree.  The State presented 
sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that it was 
defendant’s actions alone that resulted in Jackson’s death, 
including the particle consistent with gunshot residue that was 
found on defendant’s clothing.  Therefore, it was possible for 
defendant to be convicted of second-degree murder without the 
necessity of the element of acting in concert.  However, as 
described above, the State also presented sufficient evidence to 
allow the jury to conclude that defendant acted with others in 
committing the crime.  Yet, the verdict sheet did not require 
the jury to indicate the theory on which it found defendant 
guilty.  We cannot speculate as to the basis of the jury’s 
verdict, and we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of defendant 
by assuming that the aggravated sentence imposed was based on 
the same evidence necessary to establish an element of the 
underlying offense.  See State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114, 
123, 347 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1986) (remanding for a new sentencing 
-13- 
 
 
hearing where the verdict sheet did not specify whether the jury 
found the defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping based on 
the theory that the victim was sexually assaulted or seriously 
injured, which precluded his conviction for kidnapping and 
sexual offense).1  Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment 
entered and remand for a new sentencing hearing without the use 
of the aggravating factor.   
Conclusion 
We find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.  But, we must reverse the judgment entered 
upon his conviction for second-degree murder and remand for a 
new sentencing hearing without the use of the aggravating 
factor.   
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur. 
                     
1 See also State v. Ford, 162 N.C. App. 722, 592 S.E.2d 294 (No. 
COA03-140) (2004) (unpublished) (concluding that because the 
defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and sexual 
assault and the jury verdict sheet did not specify whether the 
conviction for kidnapping was elevated to the first-degree based 
on the sexual assault of the victim, the verdict was ambiguous, 
and the ambiguity had to be resolved in the defendant’s favor to 
avoid a double punishment for the sexual assault), cert. denied, 
359 N.C. 412, 612 S.E.2d 631 (2005).