Title: MARK A DORR V. THE WYOMING BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARK A DORR V. THE WYOMING BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS2006 WY 144143 P.3d 943Case Number: 06-12Decided: 11/09/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
MARK A. 
DORR,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
WYOMING 
BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Greg L. 
Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.  

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Kennard 
F. Nelson, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Douglas W. Weaver, Special 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Weaver.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      After an 
extensive contested case hearing, the Wyoming Board of Certified Public 
Accountants' (the Board) concluded Mark A. Dorr had violated the terms of a 
settlement agreement which resolved a former disciplinary action.  The Board also found him in violation of 
certain provisions of the Wyoming Certified Public Accountant's Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-3-101 et. seq. (LEXIS 1999).  
Consequently, the Board suspended Mr. Dorr's certificate to practice 
public accounting in Wyoming.  
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the Board's decision is 
supported by substantial evidence, is not arbitrary or capricious, and is 
otherwise in accordance with law.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Dorr phrases 
his appellate issue as:

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the district court erred when it adopted the reasoning set forth in the brief of 
respondent the Wyoming Board of Certified Public Accountants and affirmed the 
Wyoming Board of Certified Public Accountants' December 16, 2004, Board Decision Suspending Certificate and 
Permits to Practice.

 
 
The 
Board poses the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.      
Is the 
Wyoming Board of Certified Public Accountants' decision suspending Dorr's 
certificate and permits to practice supported by substantial evidence and 
according to law?

 
 

2.      
Did Dorr 
violate W.S. § 33-3-121[(a)(ii)]?

 
 

3.      
Was 
pre-issuance review defined, and was a pre-issuance [review] 
done?

 
 

4.      
Did Dorr 
receive a fair hearing?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶4]      Some of the 
underlying facts of this case are set forth in Dorr v. Wyoming Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 
2001 WY 37, 21 P.3d 735 (Wyo. 2001) (Dorr 
I).  The Board filed a 
disciplinary complaint against Mr. Dorr in 1999.  Dorr I, ¶ 3, 21 P.3d  at 737.  The parties resolved their dispute by 
entering into a settlement agreement, which stated in pertinent 
part:

 
 
13.  As of the date of this agreement, Dorr 
agrees to limit the scope of his practice to exclude all audits.  Prior to re-entry into audit practice, 
Dorr agrees to petition the Board for approval and agrees to a review of a post 
agreement audit engagement by a firm approved by the Board's 
representative.  This review is to 
demonstrate to the Board [that] Dorr is competent to perform audits.  The scope of the review is to be a 
"pre-issuance" review, the requirements of which are less in scope and magnitude 
than a peer review.  Dorr further 
agrees to reimburse the Board for the costs associated with this review.  Should Dorr re-enter the audit practice, 
he further agrees to undergo peer review in compliance with the Board Rules and 
Regulations.

 
 
14.  Dorr shall fully comply with the 
Certified Public Accountant's Act of 1975, and the Board's administrative rules 
and regulations.  Specifically, Dorr 
shall fully comply with Wyo. Stat. § 33-3-119.

 
 
15.  Dorr agrees that the Board shall retain 
continuing jurisdiction over him to take further action as may be necessary to 
conclude this matter.

 
 
            
16.  Dorr agrees that in the 
event he fails to comply with all terms of this agreement, and after notice and 
the opportunity to be heard, he will voluntarily surrender to the Board all 
permits and certificates held by him for a one (1) year suspension for 
discipline.  Dorr may petition and 
appear before the Board to show cause as to why his certificates and permits 
should be reinstated after the one (1) year suspension has been served.            

            

In Dorr I, the Board suspended Mr. Dorr's 
license to practice public accounting after finding he had violated the terms of 
the settlement agreement and various statutes.  Dorr I, ¶ 7, 21 P.3d  at 738-41.  We vacated the Board's decision because 
it was not supported by the record.  
Dorr I, ¶ 21, 21 P.3d  at 
745.  

 
 
[¶5]      On July 9, 2002, 
a Board committee filed another complaint against Mr. Dorr, alleging new 
violations of the settlement agreement and the laws and regulations pertaining 
to certified public accountants.  In 
particular, the committee claimed Mr. Dorr had violated the settlement agreement 
by engaging in audit practice in 2000 and 2001 when he participated in audits of 
the financial records of the Sixth Judicial District Child Support Authority 
(CSA).  The committee also asserted 
his actions violated the Wyoming Certified Public Accountant's Act because they 
were dishonest and reflected adversely on his fitness to practice public 
accounting.  

 
 
[¶6]      In September 
2002, Mr. Dorr filed a declaratory judgment action and a motion for a stay, 
asking the district court to halt the administrative proceeding.  The district court dismissed the 
declaratory judgment action because Mr. Dorr had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies.  In 
November 2003 and January 2004, a hearing examiner and a Board adjudicatory 
panel held a six-day contested case hearing on the disciplinary complaint.  During the hearing, Mr. Dorr's attorney 
learned there were many documents in the committee's possession which had not 
been provided to him in discovery.  
The hearing officer ordered the committee to produce all non-privileged 
documents to Mr. Dorr after the hearing and ruled the evidence would remain open 
until the discovery matters were resolved. The hearing officer performed an 
in-camera review of the documents the committee claimed were privileged and 
ordered some of them to be produced to Mr. Dorr.     

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Dorr 
identified 112 additional exhibits for admission into evidence.  The hearing officer denied admission of 
111 of the proposed exhibits on the basis they were irrelevant, immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108 (LexisNexis 2005) and/or 
they had been available to Mr. Dorr prior to the 
hearing and his request for admission was, therefore, untimely.  The hearing officer closed the evidence 
and ordered the parties to submit written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.    

 
 
[¶8]      The Board 
submitted its proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision, but 
Mr. Dorr apparently elected not to submit his proposed findings, conclusions and 
decision.  Instead, he filed motions 
in the district court to compel, renew his earlier declaratory relief action and 
stay the agency proceedings.  Before 
Mr. Dorr's motions were heard by the district court, the Board issued its 
decision suspending Mr. Dorr's privilege to practice public accounting in 
Wyoming.  Mr. Dorr filed a petition for review 
with the district court.  The 
district court affirmed the Board's decision, and Mr. Dorr filed a notice of 
appeal with this Court.1

  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
¶9] This case involves a disciplinary action under the 
provisions of Wyoming's Certified Public Accountant's Act. 
Sections 33-3-101 through 33-3-132.  
The act directs that proceedings before the Board are to be conducted in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act (§§ 16-3-101, et. 
seq.).  Section 33-3-123.  The Wyoming Administrative Procedures 
Act sets forth the scope of appellate review for 
agency decisions:

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

Section 
16-3-114(c).

 
 
[¶10]   
We review an administrative decision as if it came directly from the 
agency and do not defer to the district court's ruling.  Veile v. Bryant, 2004 WY 107, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 787, 792 (Wyo. 2004).  An 
agency's "conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be 
affirmed only if truly in accordance with law."  Hermosillo v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 175, ¶ 6, 58 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2002).  See also, Penny v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Mental Health 
Professions Licensing Bd., 2005 WY 117, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 152, 160 (Wyo. 
2005).  We examine the entire record 
to determine if the agency's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence.  See, RT Communications, Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 920 (Wyo. 2000), Laramie County Bd. of 
Equalization v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 
1996).  So long as the 
agency's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency.  RT Communications, 11 P.3d  at 920.  We define substantial evidence as being 
more than a scintilla of evidence.  
Id.  
It is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions.  Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   "Even if the Board's factual 
findings are found to be supported by sufficient evidence, the ultimate agency 
decision may be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons."  Billings v. Wyo. Bd. of Outfitters and Prof'l Guides, 
2004 WY 42, ¶ 8, 88 P.3d 455, 462 (Wyo. 2004).  We "examine the conflicting evidence to 
determine if the Board could have reasonably made its findings and order upon 
all of the evidence before it."  
Id.  The arbitrary and capricious review is 
intended to be a "safety net" to catch other improper agency actions.  Penny, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d  at 160.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Although Mr. Dorr presents a single 
issue on appeal, his argument is multi-faceted and requires the resolution of a 
number of legal issues.  In general, 
Mr. Dorr argues the record does not support the Board's conclusions he violated 
the terms of the settlement agreement, the Wyoming Certified Public Accountant's 
Act, or the Board's rules and regulations.  
He also asserts the language of the settlement agreement, the procedures 
followed in the contested case hearings, and the Board's ultimate decision 
violated his due process rights.  

 
 
[¶13]   In addressing Mr. Dorr's arguments, 
we are cognizant that disciplinary actions before licensing boards are subject 
to a more exacting level of proof than typical administrative actions.  In Dorr I, we stated:

 
 
A 
disciplinary proceeding before a licensing board is an adversary proceeding 
where the burden is on the complaining party to present its case in a proper 
manner and to state with precision the charges against the licensee. Devous v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo.1993).  Those 
charges must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.; Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939-40 
(Wyo. 2000).  We have defined clear 
and convincing evidence to be the "kind of proof which would persuade a trier of 
fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable."  Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 291 
(Wyo. 1989) 
(quoting MacGuire v. Harriscope 
Broadcasting Company, 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo.1980)).

 
 

Dorr I, 
¶ 8, 21 P.3d  at 741. 

 

A.                 
Did 
Mr. Dorr Violate the Settlement Agreement by Participating in the 2000 and 2001 
CSA Audits?

 
 

[¶14]   In Paragraph 13 of the settlement 
agreement, Mr. Dorr agreed to 
"limit the scope of his practice to exclude all audits," and to petition the 
Board for approval prior to re-entry into "audit practice."  The committee 
asserted he had violated the terms of the settlement agreement by participating 
in the 2000 and 2001 CSA audits without obtaining the Board's permission.  The Board agreed with the committee's 
contentions and concluded Mr. Dorr had violated the terms of the settlement 
agreement.  The Board issued the 
following pertinent findings of fact:

 
 

6.                  
By 
letter of April 28, 2000, Mr. Dorr petitioned the Board "to begin audit work for 
the sole purpose of a pre-issuance' review."  He indicated that he had no audit 
clients nor had he approached any potential audit clients at the time of that 
request.  But, would do so only if 
such permission was granted by the Board.  
Mr. Dorr mentioned that the Sixth Judicial District Child Support 
Authority (hereinafter "CSA") would be a likely potential client. 

 
 

7.                  
By 
letter dated May 8, 2000, the Board denied Mr. Dorr's request to reenter the 
audit practice at that time.

 
 

8.                  
On July 
10, 2000, the CSA requested Mr. Dorr and his firm CPA Network submit a proposal 
to perform its fiscal year 2000 financial and compliance audit (hereinafter 
"2000 CSA audit").

 
 

9.                  
On July 
21, 2000, Mr. Dorr and CPA Network responded to the CSA request for proposal by 
stating that:

 
 
. . . We 
will be happy to perform the same services as we have in the 
past.

 
 
As you 
requested, below is the fee to complete the audit of your financial statements 
for the year ending June 30, 2000.  
This fee is based on the assumption that your records will be available 
for examination in the August through October time frame.

 
 
         
The purpose of the engagement would be to audit the Authority's financial 
statements for the year ending June 30, 2000 and evaluate the fairness of 
presentation of the statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles.  

 
 

10.             
On July 
26, 2000, the CSA accepted Mr. Dorr's and CPA Network's proposal to audit its 
financial statements for the year ending June 30, 2000.  The CSA letter also stated, "Thank you 
for your commitment to continue providing audit services for our 
agency."

 
 

11.             
The 
record is replete with evidence that Mr. Dorr and CPA Network performed audit 
practice for CSA during 2000, including:

 
 
(a)  Carol Kinney, Executive Director for 
CSA, testified that she recalled Mr. Dorr being on-site working on the CSA audit 
and asking questions of her concerning it.

 
 
(b)  The CSA represented to Wyoming Family 
Services on September 22, 2000, that CPA Network was conducting its audit of 
financial statements and that forms were to be sent to CPA 
Network.

 
 
(c)  Julie Ann Pierce testified that she was 
Mr. Dorr's/CPA Network's employee; that Mr. Dorr supervised the 2000 CSA audit; 
and that he was the ultimate decision-maker for the 2000 CSA 
audit;

 
 
(d)  CPA Network billed CSA for audit 
services, from October 17 through November 13, 2000, including planning, field 
work, review and research, performed by Ms. Pierce;

 
 
(e)  Ms. Pierce by letter of December 6, 2000 
to Dennis Oberhelman, asserts that CPA [N]etwork has performed the 2000 CSA 
audit by compiling data and drafting the audit report.  

 
 
(f)  Payment for the 2000 CSA audit was 
provided to CPA Network; and

 
 
(g)  Mr. Dorr and Ms. Pierce presented the 
2000 CSA audit at the January 17, 2001, CSA Board Meeting, which was billed by 
Mr. Dorr.

 
 

12.             
During 
the time that services were performed in association with the 2000 CSA audit, 
neither Mr. Dorr nor CPA Network were authorized by the Board to perform or 
re-enter the audit practice, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement or Board 
Order.

 
 
13.       On June 20, 2001, the 
CSA requested Mr. Dorr and his firm CPA Network submit a proposal to perform its 
fiscal year 2001 financial and compliance audit (hereinafter "2001 CSA 
audit").

 
 
14.       On July 6, 2001, Mr. 
Dorr and CPA Network responded to the CSA request for proposal by stating that 
they would perform the audit for the year ending June 30, 2001.  

 
 
15. 
      On August 
3, 2001, the CSA informed Mr. Dorr and CPA Network of its acceptance of the 
proposal to audit its financial statements for the 2001 CSA 
audit.

 
 

16.             
Both 
on July 6 and August 17, 2001, Mr. Dorr performed audit planning for the 2001 
CSA audit, which time he billed as services.

 
 

17.             
By 
letter of October 5, 2001, Mr. Dorr requested that CSA provide him with 
schedules, workpapers and items needed to perform the 2001 CSA 
audit.

 
 

18.             
By 
letter of November 5, 2001, Mr. Dorr petitioned the Board for its approval to 
allow him to reenter the audit practice and for approval of Dennis Oberhelman to 
perform the pre-issuance review, required by the 
Agreement.

 
 

19.             
The 
Board approved Mr. Dorr's request on November 8, 2001, to reenter the audit 
practice and begin performing the 2001 CSA audit.  However, the Board was still considering 
the approval of a pre-issuance reviewer.

 
 

20.             
On 
or about November 14, 2001, Mr. Dorr/CPA Network employed John Rummel to perform 
field work for the 2001 CSA audit.  
That work was performed through December 10, 2001.

 
 

21.             
From 
the time period of November 14 to 30, 2001, Mr. Rummel and Mr. Dorr 
substantially completed the required field work for the 2001 CSA 
audit.

 
 

22.             
On 
November 20, 2001, the Board denied Mr. Dorr's proposed pre-issuance reviewer, 
Mr. Oberhelman[,] and invited him to select another pre-issuance 
reviewer.

 
 

23.             
Mr. 
Dorr withdrew his petition to the Board seeking approval to reenter the audit 
practice on December 13, 2001.  That 
request to withdraw was accepted by the Board on December 19, 
2001.

 
 

24.             
Even 
after Mr. Dorr requested to withdraw his petition to the Board seeking to 
reenter the audit practice, he continued to perform audit practice steps by 
completing and signing Control Risk Assessment and Inherent Risk Assessment 
Forms.  

 
 
25.       By letter 
of December 31, 2001, Mr. Dorr and CPA Network informed CSA that he was 
"assigning" all rights to perform the 2001 CSA audit, to Dennis Oberhelman.  This was the first time that CSA was 
informed that Mr. Dorr and CPA Network had licensing problems related to audit 
practice with the Board.

 
 
26.       The CPA 
Network billed CSA for services performed on the 2001 CSA audit, in the amount 
of $1,675.00 on November 20, 2001.

 
 
27.       The CSA 
paid CPA Network for services performed on the 2001 CSA audit. 

 
 
28.       On January 
16, 2002, Mr. Dorr appeared in person to deliver the 2001 CSA audit 
report/opinion to the CSA Board.  
Mr. Dorr also explained why he eventually "assigned" the audit to Mr. 
Oberhelman.

 
 
29.       Even though 
Mr. Oberhelman signed both the 2000 and 2001 CSA audit reports/opinions, his 
only other involvement included very limited supervision and 
review.

 
 
30.       Mr. Dorr's 
primary contention that neither CPA Network nor he were engaged in auditing or 
audit practice, as prohibited by the Settlement Agreement, in relation to both 
the 2000 and 2001 CSA audits, was that he did not sign the audit 
reports/opinions.  [Mr. Dorr 
contended] that Mr. Oberhelman solely and totally performed both CSA audits, 
exclusively based upon his  signing 
the audit reports/opinions.  

 
 
31.       Several 
CPAs, called as witnesses by both the Board Committee and Mr. Dorr, presented 
opinion testimony at the hearing concerning what is included in audit 
practice.  David Kreycik, James 
Hearne, Ronny Farmer, Mike Nelson and Don Gruenler collectively provided that 
the following activities are considered auditing and auditing 
practice:

 
 

a.      
Planning 
audit procedures;

 
 

b.      
Performing 
and supervising field work;

 
 

c.      
Reviewing 
field work;

 
 

d.      
Examining 
financial statements; 

 
 

e.      
Examining 
client accounts;

 
 
f.    Investigating and weighing 
evidence;

 
 
g.   Determining accuracy of 
entries;

 
 
h.   Reviewing and examining 
vouchers;

 
 
i.    Verifying that financial 
statements are fairly stated;

 
 
j.    Reviewing confirmations for 
accuracy and ensuring that they are returned to the 
auditors;

 
 
k.   Determining that selected 
transactions are accurately accounted for; and/or

 
 
l.    Delivering and discussing 
audit report/opinion with client.

 
 
32.       Gerald 
Marburger, Mr. Oberhel[man] and Mr. Farmer, all CPAs, testified that responding 
to a request for proposal for audit services and receiving notification that the 
client has accepted a submitted proposal is audit 
practice.

 
 
33.       Mike 
Nelson, CPA, an expert presented by Mr. Dorr, testified that his own firm of 
Chadwick, Steinkircher, Davis & Co., is engaged in audit practice when they 
perform audit procedures, even though they do not sign the final audit 
report/opinion.  That testimony 
directly refutes Mr. Dorr's contention that neither CPA Network nor he engaged 
in audit practice related to both the 2000 and 2001 CSA audits, because he did 
not sign the reports/opinions.

 
 
34.       Mr. Nelson 
further testified that audit practice encompasses more than simply signing an 
audit report/opinion.  He provided 
that audit practice includes:

 
 
a.         
Accepting a client to conduct an audit; 

 
 
b.         
Planning the audit;

 
 
c.         
Supervising audit field work;

 
 
d.         
Reviewing audit field work; 

 
 
e.         
Examining financial statements;

 
 
f.          
Examining accounts; 

 
 
g.         
Comparing vouchers; and

 
 
h.         
Reviewing and sending confirmations.

 
 
35.       Ronny 
Farmer, CPA, opined that Mr. Dorr and CPA Network were engaged in the audit 
practice related to the June 30, 2000 and/or June 30, 2001, CSA audits 
by:

 
 
a.         
Agreeing to provide audit service to CSA;

 
 
b.         
Supervising Ms. Pierce during the field work;

 
 
c.         
Requesting items from CSA to perform the audits;

 
 
d.         
Sending confirmations indicating that CPA Network was CSA['s] auditor; 

 
 
e.         
Drafting financial statements and audit report/opinion; 
and

 
 
f.          
Receiving payment from CSA for performing audit 
procedures[.]

 
 
36.       Mr. 
Oberhelman, a witness called by Mr. Dorr,2 opined that completing and signing 
Control Risk Assessment and Inherent Risk Assessment Forms, as done by Mr. 
Dorr[,] was audit practice.  He also 
testified that CSA was Mr. Dorr's only audit client.

 
 
37.       Mr. Dorr 
himself testified that completing Control Risk Assessment and Inherent Risk 
Assessment Forms, as was done for CSA[,] is auditing and a step in audit 
practice.  

 
 
[¶15]   In its decision, the Board stated: 
"The definitive issue presented is whether or not Mr. Dorr and CPA Network 
violated the Settlement Agreement by reentering the audit practice without first 
petitioning the Board and failing to obtain its prior approval to do so."  The Board answered its question in the 
affirmative and ruled Mr. Dorr and CPA Network had violated the terms of the 
settlement agreement by performing audits for CSA in 2000 and 2001 without 
properly obtaining Board approval.  
The Board's conclusions of law pertaining to the settlement agreement 
stated: 

 
 

14.             
Based 
upon the documentary evidence, lay testimony and expert opinions presented at 
the hearing in this matter as set forth in the Findings of Fact, above, and 
based upon Standards adopted by the Board, the Board concludes that the actions 
of Mr. Dorr and the CPA Network, LLC, performed, engaged in, conducted, 
constituted and entered audit practice, related to both the June 30, 2000 and/or 
June 30, 2001, Sixth Judicial District Child Support Authority 
audits.

 
 

15.             
The 
Board further concludes that the actions of engaging in and performing audit 
practice was in violation of the April 21, 1999, Settlement Agreement and 
Stipulation, Provision 13.  The 
violation is that Mr. Dorr and the CPA Network, LLC, failed to petition the 
Board for approval to reenter the audit practice prior to performing audit 
procedures and entering and engaging in audit practice for the June 30, 2000 
and/or June 30, 2001, Sixth Judicial District Child Support Authority 
audits.

 
 
* 
* *

 
 
18. 
      Mr. Dorr 
and the CPA Network, LLC, further agreed in the Settlement Agreement and were 
ordered in the Order Accepting Settlement Agreement, that in the event he fails 
to comply with all terms of the Settlement Agreement, and after notice and the 
opportunity to be heard, he will voluntarily surrender to the Board all permits 
and certificates held by him for a one (1) year suspension for discipline. 

 
 
19. 
      Because Mr. 
Dorr and the CPA Network, LLC have violated the Settlement Agreement and/or the 
Board's Order Accepting Settlement Agreement, they are required to serve a one 
(1) year disciplinary suspension of all permits and 
certificates.

 
 

[¶16]   Mr. Dorr argues the Board's 
decision is premised upon an incorrect finding that both he and CPA Network were 
prohibited, by the terms of the settlement agreement, from performing audits. 
When 
interpreting settlement agreements, we use our typical standard for interpreting 
contracts.  Mueller v. Zimmer, 2005 WY 156, ¶ 18, 
124 P.3d 340, 350 (Wyo. 2005); Exxon 
Corp.  v. Bd. of CountyComm'rs, SubletteCounty, 987 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1999).  

 
 
Our 
basic purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the 
intention and understanding of the parties.  If the contract is in writing and the 
language is clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be secured from the words 
of the contract.  And the contract 
as a whole should be considered, with each part being read in light of all other 
parts.  

 
 

Carlson 
v. Water Unlimited, Inc., 822 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Wyo. 1991), quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of 
Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 1980).  See also, Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 
1106 (Wyo. 
1996).  The plain meaning of 
contractual language is the meaning reasonable persons would ascribe to the 
language at the time and place of its use.  
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 23, 126 P.3d 909, 919 (Wyo. 2006).   Interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a matter of law.  Stevens v. Elk Run Homeowners' Ass'n, 
2004 WY 63, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 1162, 165-66 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶17]The 
settlement agreement listed the parties to the agreement as the Board and "Mark 
A. Dorr (Dorr), certified public accountant, d/b/a Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 
L.L.C., The CPA Network."  At all 
times relevant to this controversy, CPA Network was wholly owned by Mr. 
Dorr.  Under Wyoming law, public 
accountants are issued "certificates" to practice and public accounting firms 
are issued "permits" to practice.  
See, §§ 33-3-109 and 
33-3-118.  The settlement agreement 
referred to Mr. Dorr's certificates and CPA Network's permits.    

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Dorr claims that, despite the 
fact he was the sole owner of CPA Network, the business entity was not 
restricted in its ability to conduct audits by the terms of the settlement 
agreement.  Instead, he argues, the 
restriction applied only to him, personally.  He bases this argument on the language 
of Paragraph 13 which refers to Mr. Dorr as an individual in describing the 
restriction.  Looking at the plain 
language of the entire settlement agreement, within the context of Wyoming law, it is clear 
the restriction applied to Mr. Dorr and CPA Network, at least to the extent it 
was a business entity owned exclusively by him.  A reasonable person would interpret the 
settlement agreement and its attendant provisions to apply to both Mr. Dorr and 
his wholly owned accounting firm, CPA Network.  In support of his position, Mr. Dorr 
points to the testimony of other accountants at the hearing suggesting it would 
be improper to limit one accountant's practice because of another accountant's 
disciplinary problems.  Under other 
circumstances, such as if one partner in a firm is disciplined but another is 
not, that argument might be stronger.  
However, in this case, that argument rings hollow.  

 
 
[¶19]   The record contains ample evidence 
demonstrating Mr. Dorr, personally, participated in the 2000 CSA audit even 
though the Board had denied his petition to reenter audit practice.  A CPA Network clerical employee signed a 
letter for Mr. Dorr responding to CSA's request for a proposal to perform its 
audit for fiscal year 2000.  
Although Mr. Dorr argued Julie Pierce, another accountant working for CPA 
Network, conducted the 2000 CSA audit procedures on behalf of the firm, her 
testimony did not substantiate his position.  Ms. Pierce testified she was not 
qualified to sign off on audits and Mr. Dorr was her supervisor and the ultimate 
decision maker on the audit.  In 
addition, Carol Kinney, who began working as CSA's executive director in 
November 2000, while the audit was being conducted, testified Mr. Dorr and Ms. 
Pierce traveled to CSA's office to conduct the fieldwork.3   She stated Mr. Dorr directed the 
work on-site and asked her specific questions about CSA files.  The final audit report contained Mr. 
Oberhelman's signature; however, Ms. Kinney testified he did not appear at the 
CSA board meeting to present the report.  
Mr. Dorr and a female (presumably Ms. Pierce) appeared by telephone to 
present the 2000 audit.  Mr. Dorr's 
presence at the meeting was confirmed by CSA's board minutes.  The record, obviously, contains 
substantial evidence to sustain the Board's conclusion that the committee 
proved, by clear and convincing evidence, Mr. Dorr personally participated in 
the 2000 CSA audit.

 
 
[¶20]   On July 6, 2001, Mr. Dorr and CPA 
Network responded to CSA's request for a proposal to perform its audit for 
fiscal year 2001, and CSA accepted the proposal on August 3, 2001.  Mr. Dorr's billing statements showed he 
spent time planning the 2001 CSA audit on July 6 and August 17, 2001.  On October 5, 2001, a CPA Network 
employee signed a letter on behalf of Mr. Dorr, requesting CSA to provide 
schedules, work papers and other documents necessary to perform the audit.  On November 6, 2001, Mr. Dorr finally 
filed a petition with the Board for approval to perform an audit for CSA.  However, as outlined above, by the time 
the Board approved his re-entry into audit practice on November 8, 2001, he had 
already engaged the audit and performed activities associated with it.4  

 
 
[¶21]   Because Mr. Dorr still had to 
successfully complete a pre-issuance review before he could fully reenter audit 
practice and issue the 2001 audit report to CSA, he proposed Mr. Oberhelman 
conduct the pre-issuance review.  On 
November 20, 2001, the Board informed Mr. Dorr that Mr. Oberhelman would not be 
an acceptable pre-issuance reviewer because he had participated in the CSA 
audits in 1999 and 2000 and asked Mr. Dorr to select a different reviewer.  Instead of proceeding with the 
pre-issuance review process, Mr. Dorr sent a letter to the Board dated December 
13, 2001, revoking his request to be reinstated to audit practice.  The Board accepted his request to 
withdraw his petition on December 19, 2001.    

 
 
[¶22]   Nevertheless, Mr. Dorr continued to 
perform work on the CSA audit by completing and initialing a control risk 
assessment on December 20, 2001, and an inherent risk assessment on December 21, 
2001.  On December 31, 2001, he 
informed CSA he had assigned the audit to Mr. Oberhelman.  Mr. Oberhelman signed the audit 
report.  As in prior years, Mr. Dorr 
participated in the CSA board meeting at which the audit report was presented, 
although this time Mr. Oberhelman attended the meeting as well.  CPA Network submitted a bill to CSA for 
work performed on the 2001 audit, and received payment for its services.  Without question, there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the Board's conclusion the committee proved, 
by clear and convincing evidence, Mr. Dorr participated in the 2001 CSA audit 
during times when he did not have Board approval to do so.  

 
 

[¶23]   Mr. Dorr also claimed he was not 
engaged in "audit practice" because he did not sign the audit reports.  Instead, he maintained Mr. Oberhelman 
was CSA's auditor because he signed the reports for the 2000 and 2001 
audits.  The plain language of the 
settlement agreement stated Mr. Dorr agreed to "limit 
the scope of his practice to exclude all audits" and, prior to reentering "audit 
practice," he would comply with certain requirements, including petitioning the 
Board for approval.    

 
 
[¶24]   The plain meaning of the word 
"audit" is:  "An examination of 
records or financial accounts to check their accuracy."  American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000).  The 
term "audit" can also be used to refer to the final report of an audit.  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (2002).  By referring 
to "all audits" and "audit practice," the parties obviously agreed to the 
broader definition of "audit," including the process of examining records and 
financial accounts to check their accuracy.  Applying this meaning to the settlement 
agreement, it is clear Mr. Dorr was restricted from performing any aspect of an 
audit unless he first complied with the requirements of the settlement 
agreement.  Considering the broad 
definition of audit, it would border on nonsensical to interpret the restriction 
on "all audits" or "audit practice" in the settlement agreement as only 
prohibiting Mr. Dorr from signing an audit report. 

 
 
[¶25]   Although it does not seem necessary 
to consider extrinsic evidence5 of the meaning of audit under these 
circumstances, the parties presented considerable testimony about the meaning of 
the terms "audit" and "audit practice."  
As outlined in detail in the Board's findings of fact, several certified 
public accountants testified there are numerous aspects of an audit,6 including, without limitation:  engaging an audit client; hiring, 
training and supervising staff for the audit; planning the audit procedures; 
informing the client of what documents the auditor needs to examine; performing, 
supervising, and/or reviewing fieldwork; examining and verifying financial 
statements and accounts; investigating and weighing evidence produced during the 
audit; determining the accuracy of accounting entries; reviewing vouchers; 
sending out and reviewing confirmations from third parties; preparing and 
signing risk assessment forms; signing the audit report; and delivering the 
audit report or opinion to the client.  
Mr. Dorr admitted at the hearing that many of those activities were part 
of auditing and audit practice.       

 
 
[¶26]   Mr. Dorr successfully elicited 
testimony from various certified public accountants indicating that signing the 
audit report is the culmination of the audit process and it would be difficult 
for an accountant to have a successful audit practice without having the ability 
to sign an audit report.  From that 
testimony, he argues he did not engage in auditing or an audit practice because 
he did not sign the CSA audit reports.  
He conveniently ignores the evidence that CPA Network procured audit 
work, performed certain aspects of the audit and then had Mr. Oberhelman sign 
the report.  The evidence is clear 
Mr. Dorr's wholly owned accounting firm, CPA Network, received payment for those 
services from CSA.  Consequently, 
Mr. Dorr was able to sustain an audit practice without signing an audit 
report.  The Board's conclusion that 
the activities engaged in by Mr. Dorr amounted to auditing and audit practice in 
violation of the settlement agreement is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 

B.                 
Did 
Mr. Dorr Violate the Wyoming Certified Public Accountant's 
Act?

 
 

[¶27]  Mr. Dorr also claims the Board erred by 
finding him in violation of certain provisions of the Wyoming statutes 
pertaining to certified public accountants.  To the extent this appeal requires 
statutory interpretation, we apply the following standard:  

 
 
We first 
decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  A "statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability."  A "statute is ambiguous only if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations."  

 
 

Powder 
River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 
WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  State ex rel. Dep' t. of Revenue v. Buggy 
Bath Unlimited, 
Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶ 16, 18 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 2001).             

 
 

Diamond 
B Services v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2005).  See also, Dorr I, ¶ 9, 21 P.3d  at 741.  "If the language selected by the 
legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language establishes the rule of 
law. . . .'"  Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005) quoting Buggy Bath, ¶ 16, 18 P.3d  at 1187.  We give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence in the statute and construe them in pari materia.  Id.  

 
 

1.      
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-3-121(a)(ii).

 
 
[¶28]   In its July 9, 2002, complaint 
against Mr. Dorr, the committee alleged Mr. Dorr was dishonest in the practice 
of public accounting, in violation of § 33-3-121(a)(ii).  That statutory provision 
stated:

 
 
(a) 
After notice and hearing, the board may revoke, or may suspend for a period not 
to exceed two (2) years, any certificate issued under this act or may revoke, 
suspend, or refuse to renew any permit issued under this act or may censure the 
holder of a permit for any of the following causes:

 
 
* 
* *

            
(ii) Dishonesty, fraud or gross negligence in the practice of public 
accounting;

            

Id. 
  The Board concluded Mr. Dorr 
violated § 33-3-121(a)(ii):

 
 

21.             
The 
Board further concludes that the actions of engaging in and performing audit 
practice by Mr. Dorr and the CPA Network, while a violation of the Settlement 
Agreement and/or the Board's Order Accepting Settlement Agreement, is also a 
violation of Wyo. Stat. § 33-3-121(a)(ii), dishonesty in the practice of 
accounting.  Mr. Dorr and the CPA 
Network were dishonest in performing, engaging in, conducting and entering audit 
practice, related to the June 30, 2000 and/or June 30, 2001, Sixth Judicial 
District Child Support Authority audits, without informing the Board or seeking 
prior approval therefor.

 
 

22.             
The 
Board further concludes that the actions of engaging in and performing audit 
practice by Mr. Dorr and the CPA Network, is also a violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
33-3-121(a)(ii).  Mr. Dorr and the 
CPA Network were dishonest in performing, engaging in, conducting and entering 
audit practice, related to the June 30, 2000, Sixth Judicial District Child 
Support Authority audit, without informing the CSA that such practice was 
prohibited by the Board.

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Dorr argues the Board erred by 
ruling he was dishonest when he participated in the 2000 CSA audit without 
informing CSA he was prohibited from performing audits.  He claims we held in Dorr I he was not required to inform a 
potential client about his license restriction and, in any event, the record 
clearly shows CSA was aware of his licensing problems.  He relies on the following excerpt from 
Dorr I to support his position that 
he was not required to inform CSA about his license 
restriction:

 
 
The 
Board concluded that Dorr's failure to inform the Beef Council of the 
restriction placed on his ability to conduct audits by the Settlement Agreement 
amounted to dishonesty in the practice of public accounting.  The Board's finding is insufficient to 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of dishonesty.  Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, 
Dorr was prohibited from conducting audits.  That prohibition was not, however, 
absolute:  the Settlement Agreement 
provided for Dorr's re-entry to audit practice dependent on his compliance with 
the terms imposed under the Agreement.  
The Beef Council contacted Dorr about performing an audit, and Dorr 
immediately filed a request with the Board to conduct the audit and to initiate 
the pre-issuance review required by the Settlement Agreement.  This is exactly what the Settlement 
Agreement required Dorr to do.  
Nowhere in that Agreement is there a requirement that Dorr inform the 
prospective audit client that his license was restricted.   There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Dorr owed some duty to disclose his license status to the Beef 
Council.  Perhaps he should have, 
but the Board has not directed us to any statute, rule, or accounting practice 
that required him to do so under the circumstances of this case.  Without reference to some standard, a 
practitioner would have no notice that their conduct is prohibited.  Since Dorr complied with the letter of 
the Settlement Agreement, we conclude that the Board has failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that Dorr committed dishonesty in the practice of 
public accounting.

 
 

Dorr 
I, ¶ 
17, 21 P.3d  at 744 (footnote omitted).  
Mr. Dorr claims "[t]he Board is engaging in exactly the same behavior in 
the present action that this Court found unlawful in the 2001 Dorr decision."    

 
 
[¶30]   An important distinction exists 
between Mr. Dorr's actions in Dorr I 
and his actions in the 2000 CSA audit.  
In Dorr I, he did not inform 
the Wyoming Beef Council his license was restricted; however, once he was 
contacted by the potential client to perform an audit, he immediately initiated 
the process to gain the Board's approval.  
Dorr I, ¶ 17, 21 P.3d  at 
744.  In this case, Mr. Dorr 
affirmatively involved himself and his solely-owned firm in an audit after the 
Board had expressly denied his request for permission to perform 
audits.

 
 
[¶31]   Mr. Dorr also claims, even though 
he was not required to inform CSA about his audit restriction, the CSA board was 
aware of his licensing issues.  He 
argues "as early as the end of 1999" he notified the CSA board of why Mr. 
Oberhelman "had to be involved in the audit, and that if the Board would not 
permit [Mr. Dorr] to re-enter audit practice at that time, Mr. Oberhelman would 
complete and sign the audit for CSA."  
Mr. Dorr refers to testimony and evidence about his assignment of the 
1999 audit to Mr. Oberhelman for completion as establishing the CSA board was 
aware of the restriction on his ability to conduct audits.  Mr. Dorr testified he had an "on-going" 
conversation with CSA about his difficulties with the Board.    

 
 
[¶32]   While he claimed CSA was aware he 
was not permitted to perform audits and Julie Pierce did the work for CPA 
Network on the 2000 CSA audit, CSA's executive director recalled Mr. Dorr 
working on the audit and she considered him to be CSA's auditor in 2000.  This evidence is consistent with the 
Board's finding Mr. Dorr did not inform CSA of his audit restriction in general 
or specifically about the Board's denial of his request to reenter audit 
practice in 2000.   

 
 
[¶33]   As the fact finder, the Board was 
charged with resolving issues of witness credibility and weighing the 
evidence.  See KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 
116, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 145, 150 (Wyo. 2005).  
We have "repeatedly declared a lack of willingness to substitute [our] 
opinion as to the weight or credibility of the evidence for that of the 
administrative agency which acted as the trier of fact."  Story v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 
721 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Wyo. 1986) (citation omitted).  This is true even in professional 
license cases where the complaining authority has the burden of proving its 
contentions by clear and convincing evidence.  As we stated in Story, where the State Board of Medical 
Examiners revoked the appellant's license to practice medicine in Wyoming, "[w]e will not 
displace an agency's findings between two fairly conflicting points of view, 
even though the court might have made a different decision had the matter been 
before the court initially."  
Id. at 
1017.  So long as there is 
substantial evidence to support the agency's conclusion that the allegations 
were proven by clear and convincing evidence and the decision is not arbitrary, 
capricious and is otherwise in accordance with the law, we will not overturn the 
agency's decision.  Id.  As outlined above, although there is 
conflicting evidence in the record on this issue, we conclude substantial 
evidence supports the Board's finding Mr. Dorr withheld information about his 
license status from CSA when he engaged and participated in the 2000 audit.   

 
 
[¶34]   Moreover, even if we were to accept 
Mr. Dorr's argument about informing CSA about his licensing issues, we could not 
automatically conclude the Board was incorrect in concluding Mr. Dorr was 
"dishonest" in the practice of public accounting.  In Paragraph 21 of its Conclusions of 
Law, the Board stated Mr. Dorr and CPA Network violated § 33-3-121(a)(ii) 
because he was "dishonest in performing, engaging in, conducting and entering 
audit practice . . . without informing the Board or seeking prior approval 
therefor."  Violation of the 
settlement agreement, alone, probably does not amount to dishonesty in the 
practice of public accounting.  
However, more was at play here than a mere violation of the settlement 
agreement.  While Mr. Dorr attempted 
to legitimize his activity by involving Ms. Pierce and Mr. Oberhelman in the 
process, Ms. Pierce testified it was her understanding that CPA Network's 
association with Mr. Oberhelman was "a way to get around the agreement" with the 
Board.     

 
 
[¶35]   The record supports the Board's 
conclusion that, unlike in the Beef Council situation, Mr. Dorr did not follow 
the appropriate procedure to gain Board approval before he performed work on the 
2000 CSA audit and he expressly ignored the Board's denial of his request to 
reenter audit practice.  Although 
Mr. Dorr presented evidence to the contrary, the record contains the "kind of 
proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is 
highly probable." MacGuire v. Harriscope 
Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980).  See also, Billings, ¶ 9, 88 P.3d  at 462-63.  Thus, the record supports the Board's 
conclusion that Mr. Dorr violated § 33-3-121(a)(ii) by engaging in "dishonesty . 
. . in the practice of public accounting."  

            

2. 
        
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-3-121(a)(iv)?

 
 
[¶36]   The committee alleged Mr. Dorr 
violated § 33-3-121(a)(iv), which states:

 
 
(a) 
After notice and hearing, the board may revoke, or may suspend for a period not 
to exceed two (2) years, any certificate issued under this act or may revoke, 
suspend, or refuse to renew any permit issued under this act or may censure the 
holder of a permit for any of the following causes:

 
 
* 
* * 

 
 
            
(iv) Violation of a rule of professional conduct promulgated by the board 
under the authority granted by this act;

            
  

The 
Board's conclusions on this allegation were:

 
 

23.             
The 
Board further concludes that the actions of engaging in and performing audit 
practice by Mr. Dorr and the CPA Network, is also a violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
33-3-121(a)(iv).  Mr. Dorr and the 
CPA Network have violated Board Rule Chapter 6, Section 5(a), by performing, 
engaging in, conducting and entering audit practice, related to the June 30, 
2000 and/or June 30, 2001, Sixth Judicial District Child Support Authority 
audits, without authority to do so, without informing the Board or CSA of such 
actions and/or  by violating 
Settlement Agreement and/or the Board's Order Accepting Settlement Agreement. 
Those acts either separately or collectively adversely reflect upon Mr. Dorr's 
and the CPA Network's fitness to engage in public 
accounting.

 
 
The 
Board's decision quotes the relevant part of Chapter 6, Section 5(a) of its 
Rules as follows:

 
 
Rule 
401Discreditable Acts.  A holder 
shall not commit any act that reflects adversely on his fitness to engage in the 
practice of public accounting.

 
 
[¶37]   Mr. Dorr's sole basis for 
contesting the Board's conclusion he committed acts which reflect adversely on 
his fitness to practice public accounting is he complied with "the letter of 
the" 1999 settlement agreement.  We 
have already concluded he violated the terms of the settlement agreement.  Thus, we can summarily reject this 
argument.  

 
 
            
C.        Were 
Mr. Dorr's Due Process Rights Violated?

 
 
[¶38]   Mr. Dorr claims he was denied a 
fair hearing and his due process rights were violated because: a) the Board and 
the committee's investigator were biased; and b) the committee "withheld 
thousands of documents" until the hearing officer ordered them to be produced 
and the hearing officer refused Mr. Dorr's request to admit additional documents 
into evidence in the contested case proceeding.   

 
 
[¶39]   We consider first Mr. Dorr's claim 
that his due process rights were violated because the Board was biased.  He argues two of the Board members had 
formed unfavorable opinions of him when they participated as decision makers in 
his former disciplinary hearing and one Board member was biased because, while 
acting as Board Chairman, he appointed James Hearne to investigate the 
allegations against Mr. Dorr and to act as Board representative on the 
settlement agreement.  He also 
claims Investigator Hearne was potentially biased and had a conflict of interest 
because he was a competitor of Mr. Dorr's and stood to gain if Mr. Dorr was 
prohibited from engaging in audit practice in Wyoming.     

 
 

[¶40]   Mr. Dorr relies upon our decisions 
in Devous v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. 
Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 417 (Wyo. 1993) and Ririe v. Bd. of Trustees of School Dist. No. 
One, Crook County, Wyoming, 674 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1983) as support for his argument.  We held 
Dr. Devous' right to a fair and impartial hearing was violated when a biased 
physician sat on the panel deciding his case.  Devous, 845 P.2d  at 417-18.  We concluded the other physician was 
biased because he and Dr. Devous had both practiced medicine in SweetwaterCounty in the 1980s and the other 
physician had appeared before the Board on a prior occasion and expressed his 
opinion that Dr. Devous was guilty of a felony.  Id. 
at 418.  We concluded, under the 
circumstances of that case, the other physician's assertion he could objectively 
weigh the evidence was insufficient to eliminate the potential for bias.  Id.  

 
 
[¶41]   This Court explained the concept of 
bias among members of the tribunal in agency actions, as 
follows:

 
 
We 
said in Fallon, 441 P.2d  at 329, "we 
also start, of course, with the presumption that members of the board 'are 
assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging 
a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.' "   We summarized our perception of 
our responsibility with respect to the contention of bias and prejudice on the 
part of the board members when we quoted the following 
language:

 
 
      The Act 
authorizes the Board to enter an order upon a complaint alleging unfair labor 
practices, only after a "hearing."   
This must mean a trial by a tribunal free from bias and prejudice and 
imbued with the desire to accord to the parties equal consideration.  There is perhaps no more important right 
to which litigants are entitled than that they be given such a trial.  Its impairment, ipso facto, brings the 
court, and administrative bodies as well, into public disrepute, and destroys 
the esteem and confidence which they have enjoyed so generally.  Time and experience have demonstrated 
that the public, as well as litigants, will tolerate the honest mistakes of 
those who pass judgment, but not the biased acts of those who would deprive 
litigants of a fair and impartial trial.  
Foremost among the responsibilities imposed upon a reviewing court, is to 
make sure that this foundation of our Judicial system be not 
undermined.

 
 

Fallon, 
441 P.2d 322, 329 (citing Inland Steel 
Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 109 F.2d 9, 20 (7th 
Cir.1940)).

 
 

Devous, 
845 P.2d  
at 417.  See also, Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 938 
(Wyo. 2000) (holding "[d]ue process requires that an agency provide a fair trial 
without the appearance of bias or prejudice"). 

 
 
[¶42]   In Ririe, we discussed the statutory and 
constitutional safeguards which ensure a party receives a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal.  Mr. Ririe claimed his due process rights 
were violated because the same school board members, who had voted to accept the 
superintendent's recommendation his contract be terminated, also sat as the 
decision makers at the contested case hearing.  We said:

 
 
Pursuant 
to statutory and constitutional mandates such [contested case] hearings are to 
be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.  Section 16-3-112(a) of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act specifies in part:

 
 
" 
* * * * The functions of all those presiding in contested cases shall be 
conducted in an impartial manner."

            

            
Constitutional concepts of due process which require a fair hearing 
before an impartial tribunal have been held to apply to administrative agencies 
which adjudicate as well as to courts.  
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 
1698, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1973);  Fallon v. WyomingState 
Board of Medical Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322, 327 
(1968).

 
 

Ririe, 
674 P.2d  at 220-21.  We continued the 
analysis by quoting the United States Supreme Court:

 
 
            
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative 
functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative 
adjudication * * * * must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in 
those serving as adjudicators;  and 
it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same 
individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice 
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 
implemented.  421 U.S.  at 47, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1464.

 
 
* 
* * The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative 
procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members 
at a later adversary hearing.  
Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators "are assumed to 
be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a 
particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."   United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 
61 S. Ct. 999, 1004, 85 L. Ed. 1429 (1941).  
421 U.S.  at 55, 95 S. Ct.  at 
1468.

 
 

Ririe, 
674 P.2d  at 221 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975)).  We noted the Supreme Court's discussion 
of analogous situations:

 
 
It 
is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the 
results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints 
instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing 
hearings.  This mode of procedure 
does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due 
process of law.  We should also 
remember that it is not contrary to due process to allow judges and 
administrators who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to 
confront and decide the same questions a second time around.  See [F.T.C. v.] Cement Institute, 333 
U.S. [683] at 702-703, 68 S.Ct. [793] 
at 804 [92 L.Ed. 1009;  N.L.R.B. v.] Donnelly Garment Co., 330 
U.S. [219] at 236-237, 67 S.Ct. [756] 
at 765 [91 L. Ed. 854]."            

            

Ririe, 
674 P.2d  at 222, quoting Withrow, 421 U.S.  at 56-57.      

 
 
[¶43]   The Devous and Ririe decisions do not support Mr. 
Dorr's position in this case.  Devous is distinguishable because the 
disputed board member had actually appeared before the board in a prior 
proceeding and expressed a decidedly negative opinion about Dr. Devous.  Here, two of the Board members had 
simply considered an earlier alleged violation.  This case is, therefore, more like the 
situations discussed in Ririe.  The fact a decision maker 
participated in an earlier action involving the same circumstances does not 
automatically disqualify him from acting in a subsequent adjudicatory 
action.  Ririe, 675 P.2d  at 221-22.  Instead, the decision maker is presumed 
to act with honesty and integrity and the adverse party must demonstrate 
otherwise to mandate disqualification.  
Moreover, under the rationale of Devous, Ririe and Withrow, the fact one of the Board 
members had appointed Mr. Hearne to investigate allegations against Mr. Dorr 
would not, automatically, disqualify him from sitting on the adjudicatory 
body.  Mr. Dorr implies the Board 
members were biased against him and investigative and adjudicatory functions of 
the Board were improperly combined in this case, but he does not identify any 
specific evidence to overcome the presumption the Board members acted with 
honesty and integrity in making their decision.

 
 
[¶44]   Mr. Dorr had the opportunity to 
elicit specific facts about potential biases and conflicts of interest when he 
questioned the Board and the hearing examiner in voir dire.7  He apparently did not uncover anything 
of concern to him because, after questioning the Board members and the hearing 
examiner, Mr. Dorr's attorney stated:

 
 
MR. 
GODDARD [Mr. Dorr's attorney]:        All 
right.  Well I asked you [hearing 
examiner] to recuse yourself.  You 
refused.  You're here.  And so if you're telling me you'll be 
fair, that's all I can ask.

 
 
HEARING 
OFFICER HIBBLER:      
Okay.  Anything further?  Any further 
questions?

 
 
MR. 
GODDARD:       
No.

 
 
HEARING 
OFFICER HIBBLER:      
Mr. Weaver [Committee's attorney], any further 
questions?

 
 
            
MR. WEAVER:          
No, Your Honor.  I'm assuming 
he passed the Board?

 
 
            
MR. GODDARD:       
Right.

 
 
            
MR. WEAVER:          
And the hearing officer?

 
 
            
MR. GODDARD:       
Right.

 
 
[¶45]   In Ririe, we commended the hearing examiner 
for allowing the attorneys to voir 
dire the school board to investigate concerns about bias and prejudice.  Ririe, 674 P.2d  at 223.  We recognized the voir dire process as being a "valuable 
means of discovering individual prejudices--perhaps hidden to all, including the 
holder--and of emphasizing to the board the importance of conducting a fair and 
impartial hearing."  Id.  
In this case, Mr. Dorr's attorney passed the Board for cause after 
conducting voir dire.  In criminal cases where the stakes are 
arguably higher, we have said, "[g]enerally, when a defendant passes a jury 
panel for cause, he waives his claim to reversible error."  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 372 
(Wyo. 2000) (citation omitted).  The 
same rationale applies here.  By 
passing the Board for cause, Mr. Dorr waived any claim his hearing was not fair 
because the Board members were biased.  
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to overcome the presumption 
the Board members were impartial.

 
 
[¶46]   With regard to Mr. Dorr's claim 
Investigator Hearne was "potentially biased and had a conflict of interest," we 
again note this situation is different than Devous.  In that case, one of the decision 
makers was a competitor of the doctor's.  
Here, one of the committee's witnesses was a competitor of Mr. 
Dorr's.  Mr. Hearne testified at the 
hearing and was cross-examined by Mr. Dorr's attorney.  Mr. Hearne was specifically questioned 
about being Mr. Dorr's competitor.  
The Board was, therefore, aware of those circumstances and could take 
them into account in making its determinations about Mr. Hearne's 
credibility.  See generally, Voss v. Albany County Comm'rs, 2003 WY 
94, ¶ 19, 74 P.3d 714, 720 (Wyo. 2003) (indicating opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses helped ensure due process rights were protected in administrative 
action); Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 
939 P.2d 252, 256 (Wyo. 1997) (indicating opportunity to cross examine 
witness at the contested case hearing helped protect claimant's due process 
rights even though witness's deposition testimony, which was not in the case 
file, was considered by hearing examiner).  
The record does not support Mr. Dorr's claim he was denied a fair hearing 
because the Board and/or the committee's investigator were biased against 
him.    

 
 
[¶47]   We turn, next, to Mr. Dorr's claim 
his due process rights were violated "when [the committee] withheld thousands of 
documents until Hearing Examiner Hibbler ordered it to produce those documents 
to [him], and subsequently was denied a fair hearing when only 1 of [his] 
additionally proposed 112 exhibits was accepted as evidence in the contested 
case hearing."  Before the contested 
case hearing, Mr. Dorr served his request for production of documents upon the 
committee.  The relevant portion of 
the request sought production of:  
"[t]he investigative report and any and all associated documents 
regarding Mark A. Dorr."  In 
response to Mr. Dorr's request for production of documents, the committee 
provided materials from its investigative file to Mr. Dorr prior to the November 
hearing.    

 
 
[¶48]   It became apparent during the 
hearing there were documents in the committee's possession which were not 
provided to Mr. Dorr in discovery.  
Consequently, the hearing examiner ordered the committee to produce all 
non-privileged information to Mr. Dorr after the hearing and ruled the evidence 
would remain open.  The hearing 
officer reviewed in-camera all of the documents the committee claimed were 
privileged and ordered the committee to produce some of those documents to Mr. 
Dorr.    

 
 
[¶49]   On June 9, 2004, Mr. Dorr filed a 
supplemental disclosure statement, requesting permission to present a 
significant amount of additional evidence to the Board, including additional 
exhibits and testimony.8  The hearing examiner held a hearing on 
Mr. Dorr's request and the committee's response.  In his order, the hearing examiner 
stated Mr. Dorr had requested admission of 112 additional exhibits into evidence 
and to be allowed to present an additional two weeks of testimony.  The hearing examiner admitted one of the 
proposed exhibits but refused other offered exhibits because they were 
irrelevant, immaterial, and/or unduly repetitive.  The hearing officer also denied 
admission of some of the proposed exhibits because they were available to Mr. 
Dorr prior to the hearing and his request was, therefore, untimely.  Further, the hearing examiner denied Mr. 
Dorr's request to present additional witness testimony:

 
 
            
Mr. Dorr proposes to present an additional two weeks of unspecific 
testimony elicited from several witnesses, all who have already provided 
extensive testimony both on direct and cross-examination or were originally 
identified by Mr. Dorr, but not called.  
Based upon the denial of all but one additional proposed exhibit, there 
is no need for further testimony in this matter . . . . 

 
 
[¶50]   The hearing officer then closed the 
evidentiary record and directed the parties to submit written proposed findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and orders by November 5, 2004.  The committee submitted its proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Mr. Dorr, apparently, did not comply with the hearing officer's order 
but, instead, filed motions in the district court to compel exhibits and 
witnesses, renew his complaint for declaratory relief and stay the proceeding 
before the Board.  Prior to the 
district court's rulings on Mr. Dorr's motions, the Board entered its decision 
suspending Mr. Dorr's certificate and permits to practice.  

 
 
[¶51]   Mr. Dorr claims his due process 
rights were violated by the committee's failure to produce all of the documents 
prior to the hearing.  He ignores, 
however, the hearing examiner's efforts to resolve the discovery dispute.  The hearing examiner attempted to cure 
any prejudice to Mr. Dorr by directing the committee to disclose all 
non-privileged information pertaining to him and leaving the evidentiary record 
open.  As we have stated in the 
criminal context, a defendant generally is not denied a fair trial as a result 
of the prosecution's discovery violations when the district court takes remedial 
actions to cure the violation.  See e.g., Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 655-656 
(Wyo. 
1986).  Mr. Dorr does not explain 
how the hearing examiner's efforts failed to cure any prejudice he suffered as a 
result of the committee's failure to produce the documents in the first 
place.  Consequently, we do not find 
any constitutional violations as a result of the committee's discovery 
failures.    

 
 
[¶52]   Mr. Dorr also asserts the hearing 
examiner violated his due process rights by refusing to allow admission of 111 
of his 112 proposed additional exhibits.  
The hearing examiner relied upon § 16-3-108(a), in refusing many of the 
additional exhibits.   That 
statute states, in pertinent part:

 
 
In 
contested cases irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be 
excluded and no sanction shall be imposed or order issued except upon 
consideration of the whole record or such portion thereof as may be cited by any 
party and unless supported by the type of evidence commonly relied upon by 
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their serious affairs.   

 
 
Section 
16-3-108(a).  In accordance with the 
statutory language, the hearing examiner denied admission of many of the 
exhibits because they were irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.  Id.  See also, Story, 721 P.2d  at 1019.  Mr. Dorr does not explain on appeal how 
the hearing officer's rulings pursuant to § 16-3-108(a) were incorrect.  The hearing officer also denied 
admission of some of Mr. Dorr's proposed exhibits because he had access to the 
documents before the hearing, and his request for admission, therefore, was 
untimely.  Again, he does not 
explain how the hearing examiner erred in reaching that conclusion.  We refuse to consider arguments or 
complaints of error which are not supported by cogent argument and citation to 
pertinent authority.  Holloway v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 2005 WY 144, ¶ 
16, 122 P.3d 959, 963 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶53]   We feel compelled to comment on Mr. 
Dorr's general contention that he did not receive a fair hearing because of the 
discovery issues.  As we outlined in 
detail above, the hearing examiner ordered the committee to provide Mr. Dorr 
with full disclosure of all non-privileged documents in its possession, reviewed 
all of the documents the committee claimed were privileged, and ordered 
production of some of those documents.  
In addition, he delayed the final decision in this case for several 
months in order to give Mr. Dorr a full opportunity to review all of the 
documents and present his argument for admission of additional exhibits.  The hearing officer took great pains to 
ensure Mr. Dorr received a fair hearing, and we are not directed to any evidence 
or authority that suggests otherwise.

   

D.        Was the Pre-issuance Review Process 
Contained in the Settlement Agreement Appropriate and Was it 
Followed?

 
 
[¶54]   Mr. Dorr presents a couple of 
different arguments pertaining to the pre-issuance review process.  He argues Mr. Oberhelman performed a 
pre-issuance review in 1999, and the Board should have accepted it.  He also claims he was denied due process 
because the settlement agreement did not define the term "pre-issuance" 
review.    

 
 
[¶55]   The Board's decision did not rely 
upon any findings about whether or not the pre-issuance review process had been 
followed.  Instead, the Board 
addressed the pre-issuance review issue by simply stating:

 
 
5. 
        
There was extensive evidence presented in this matter concerning the 
definition and scope of "pre-issuance" review, as set forth in Provision 13 of 
the Settlement Agreement.  However, 
that is not an issue that requires determination in this matter.  The definitive issue presented is 
whether or not Mr. Dorr and CPA Network violated the Settlement Agreement by 
reentering the audit practice without first petitioning the Board and failing to 
obtain its prior approval to do so.  
Specifically, did Mr. Dorr and CPA Network perform, engage in, conduct, 
enter or provide audit practice, related to either or both the June 30, 2000 
and/or June 30, 2001, Sixth Judicial District Child Support Authority audits? 

 
 

[¶56]   As we explained above, Paragraph 13 
of the settlement agreement required 
Mr. Dorr to petition the Board for approval before he reentered audit 
practice.  The pre-issuance review 
process came into play only after he obtained the Board's approval to reenter 
audit practice.  The Board's 
decision focused on Mr. Dorr's failure to obtain the Board's approval prior to 
reentering audit practice.  Thus, we 
agree with the Board's reasoning that Mr. Dorr's concerns about the pre-issuance 
process do not require determination in this case.

 
 
[¶57]   Furthermore, we reject Mr. Dorr's 
claim the settlement agreement denied his right to due process because the term 
"pre-issuance review" was ambiguous.  
Mr. Dorr entered into the settlement agreement voluntarily and with the 
advice of legal counsel.  He agreed 
to the terms of the agreement in "settlement of a bona fide dispute.'"  Mueller, ¶ 18, 124 P.3d  at 350-51, 
quoting Parsley  v. Wyo. Auto. Co., 395 P.2d 291, 295 
(Wyo. 
1964).  A settlement or compromise 
is "an agreement between two or more persons who, to avoid a lawsuit, amicably 
settle their differences on such terms 
as they can agree on.'"  Id., quoting Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449, 456 n. 3 (Wyo. 1975) which quoted 15A C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 1 at 170 
(emphasis added).  His claim, at 
this late date, that the settlement agreement's terms violate his due process 
rights is unpersuasive.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶58]   In accordance with our standard of 
review, we have reviewed thousands of pages of transcript and documents from the 
contested case proceeding.  We 
conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's 
conclusions that the committee proved, by clear and convincing evidence, Mr. 
Dorr violated the terms of the settlement agreement when he failed to obtain 
Board approval prior to re-entering audit practice and violated the Wyoming 
Certified Public Accountants Act.  
Furthermore, after reviewing the entire record, including the conflicting 
evidence, we hold the Board "could have reasonably made its findings and order 
upon all of the evidence before it."  
Billings, ¶ 8, 88 P.3d  at 462.  Therefore, the Board's 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious.  
Finally, we conclude Mr. Dorr's due process rights were not violated by 
the procedures employed by the Board and hearing officer at his licensing 
hearing.

 
 
[¶59]   Affirmed.      

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
declaratory judgment action is not before us in this 
appeal.

 
 

2Mr. 
Oberhelman was called as a witness by the Board.    

 
 

3One of the 
certified public accountants who testified at the hearing defined "fieldwork" as 
"the portion of the audit that's performed at the client's  or the entity's 
place of business, wherever their records are maintained."  

 
 

4Mr. Dorr 
indicated he believed he had the Board's oral permission to begin the CSA 2001 
audit prior to November 8, 2001.  He 
testified about a conversation between his attorney and the Board's attorney 
prior to submission of his petition to reenter audit practice in November 2001. 
 The record contains a letter, dated 
October 12, 2001, from the Board's attorney to Mr. Dorr's attorney, confirming a 
telephone conversation about the procedure for Mr. Dorr to reenter audit 
practice.  The letter does not, 
however, indicate Mr. Dorr had been granted oral permission to proceed with the 
audit.  Mr. Dorr's argument that he 
had obtained oral permission to begin the 2001 CSA audit was not accepted by the 
Board, and Mr. Dorr has not convinced us the Board was mistaken in that 
regard.

  

5Extrinsic 
evidence of the meaning of a contractual term at the time and place of execution 
of the agreement is admissible even if the contract language is not 
ambiguous.  See Mullinnix, ¶¶ 22-28, 126 P.3d  at 
919-22.  Evidence of a specialized 
definition of a term may be presented to determine the plain meaning of 
contractual language.  Id.

 

6It appears 
at least some of the certified public accountants' testimony was directed at 
complying with the expert testimony requirements set out in Billings I and Devous.  We encountered an analogous 
situation in Penny, when we 
considered whether Mr. Penny had engaged in "clinical social work" without a 
license and concluded expert testimony was not necessary.  Penny, ¶¶ 31-33, 120 P.3d  at 
170-71.  The parties in this case 
apparently proceeded as if expert testimony was necessary. Consequently, the 
specific issue of whether expert testimony was required in order to establish 
whether Mr. Dorr violated the "audit" and/or "audit practice" terms of the 
settlement agreement is not presented to us.

 

7Mr. Dorr 
does not specifically argue on appeal that the hearing examiner was biased or 
partial.

  

8Mr. 
Dorr also filed a motion to dismiss on that same day, claiming he had been 
denied a fair hearing.  The Board 
denied Mr. Dorr's motion to dismiss.