Title: Johnson v. Greenelsh

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 10/29/09 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ROBERT L. JOHNSON, as Cotrustee, etc., ) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S166747 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/6 B198228 
KATHRYN A. GREENELSH, as 
) 
Cotrustee, etc., 
) 
 
) 
San Luis Obispo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PR050017 
 
____________________________________)  
 
 
Here we conclude that a challenge to a surviving spouse‟s mental capacity 
to transfer trust assets and appoint a successor trustee did not violate the no contest 
clause in a family trust.  A proceeding contesting a settlor‟s mental competence to 
exercise rights under a trust does not amount to an attack on the trust itself, unless 
it seeks to thwart the estate plan established by the trust. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Spouses Walter and Florence Warren created the Warren Family Trust in 
1993.  Walter, Florence, and their children William Warren and Kathryn 
Greenelsh (Greenelsh) were named cotrustees.  Walter died in 1996.  The terms of 
the trust called for the creation of three subtrusts:  a survivor‟s trust, including 
Florence‟s interest in the community estate; a QTIP (qualified terminable interest 
property) trust, calculated to qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction 
and minimize estate taxes; and a residual trust consisting of the balance of the trust 
estate.  William Warrren and Greenelsh were remainder beneficiaries, as was 
Florence‟s son by a previous marriage, Robert Johnson. 
2 
 
 
William died on July 17, 2003, leaving Florence and Greenelsh as the 
cotrustees.  On July 22, 2003, Florence signed a document naming Johnson as her 
successor cotrustee.  The trust provides for such an appointment if a trustee 
“becomes unable or unwilling to act as Trustee.”  Johnson executed an 
“Acceptance of Appointment” on August 30, 2003.  On September 5, 2003, 
Florence signed a memorandum to the trustees declaring that she had exercised her 
right under the trust to withdraw all the property in the survivor‟s trust for 
distribution to herself.  The memorandum was also signed by one Forrest Warren 
as special trustee.1  On September 18, 2003, Florence executed a document by 
which she resigned as cotrustee and confirmed Johnson as her successor. 
 
The trust includes a no contest clause, barring any distribution to a 
beneficiary who “seeks to obtain in any proceeding in any court or before any 
arbitrator an adjudication that this Trust or any of its provisions is void, or seeks 
otherwise to void, nullify, [or] set aside this Trust or any of its provisions, . . . or to 
change provisions which are clearly and unambiguously expressed herein, . . . or 
through other means endeavors to secure or take any part of the Trust Estate in any 
manner other than as set forth herein.”  In January 2005, Greenelsh filed an 
application under Probate Code section 21320 to determine whether a proposed 
petition to compel arbitration would violate the no contest clause.2  Under the 
                                              
 
1  The trust requires the special trustee to approve withdrawals from the 
survivor‟s trust.  The record does not indicate how or when Forrest became a 
special trustee, or explain his family relationship. 
 
2  “If an instrument containing a no contest clause is or has become 
irrevocable, a beneficiary may apply to the court for a determination of whether a 
particular motion, petition, or other act by the beneficiary . . . would be a contest 
within the terms of the no contest clause.”  (Prob. Code, § 21320, subd. (a).)  
Further statutory references are to the Probate Code. 
 
We note that in 2008, the Legislature enacted a thoroughgoing revision of 
the statutory scheme governing no contest clauses.  Operative January 1, 2010, 
and applying to instruments that became irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
3 
 
arbitration clause in the trust, Greenelsh sought to resolve “various disputes . . . 
between petitioner and Robert Johnson regarding his erroneous claims of authority 
as a trustee or co-trustee of the Warren Family Trust.”  She also referred to 
“disputes as to whether or not Florence Warren made a withdrawal of trust assets 
to place them into her own personal ownership; cooperation in making decisions 
affecting the Warren Family Trust property; and other disputes . . . .”3 
 
In her reply to Johnson‟s opposition, Greenelsh made it clear that her 
challenge to his authority as cotrustee was based on Florence‟s alleged lack of 
capacity.  Greenelsh attached letters from two neurologists, one dated October 8, 
2001, opining that Florence “is incompetent to handle her own affairs at this 
time,” and one dated August 19, 2004, with an assessment of “[a]mnesic dementia, 
likely Alzheimer‟s disease, moderate in severity, in a pleasant, well-supported, 90-
year old female, with evolving neurobehavioral disorder including hallucinosis 
and generalized anxiety disorder.” 
 
The court denied Greenelsh‟s application without prejudice.  It noted that 
“[t]he petition relates to a mix of disputes that may or may not trigger the no 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
the new scheme generally limits the enforceability of no contest clauses to (1) 
direct contests brought without probable cause; (2) challenges to the transferor‟s 
ownership of property at the time of the transfer, if expressly included in the no 
contest clause; and (3) creditor‟s claims and actions based on them, if expressly 
included in the no contest clause.  The provisions of section 21320 are 
discontinued.  (Stats. 2008, ch. 174, § 2, adding § 21310 et seq.; see §§ 21311, 
subd. (a)(1)-(3), 21314; Recommendation on Revision of No Contest Clause 
Statute (Jan. 2008) 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (2007) p. 359; Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Mar. 24, 2008.) 
 
3  The trust‟s arbitration clause is a broad one, applicable to “[a]ny and all 
disputes” between trustees or beneficiaries, “concerning any property owned by 
any trust(s) or the operation of any trust created herein.”  The trust also authorizes 
the trustees to “commence or defend such litigation with respect to the Trust or 
any property of the Trust Estate as the Trustees may deem advisable.” 
4 
 
contest clause.  [¶]  A dispute concerning Florence Warren‟s capacity to withdraw 
funds from the survivor‟s trust and appoint Robert Johnson as a successor trustee 
could be identified as a direct contest . . . .  [¶]  In any subsequent petition, 
Petitioner should clearly identify all claims and relief that is sought so that the 
court can make an informed determination of whether the no contest provision is 
triggered.” 
 
Greenelsh filed a second section 21320 application in June 2006.  This 
time, she proposed to seek a declaratory judgment that she was sole trustee of the 
Warren Family Trust.  She attached a power of attorney signed by Florence in 
1995, naming Greenelsh and William Warren as successor attorneys-in-fact to her 
husband Walter, and a document entitled “Consent to Act as Co-Attorneys-in-Fact 
for Florence Warren” signed by Greenelsh and William on July 26, 2001.  
Greenelsh also relied on a trust provision stating that if a trustee is unable to 
participate in trust activities due to illness or disability, the other trustee or trustees 
“may act as Trustee and make any and all decisions regarding the Trust Estate as if 
he or she were the sole Trustee.”  Her proposed petition alleged that after 
Florence‟s incapacity and the deaths of Walter and William, Greenelsh was left as 
the sole trustee.  Johnson responded that the proposed petition violated the no 
contest clause by seeking to invalidate the provisions in the trust giving the 
surviving settlor the right to appoint a successor trustee. 
 
The court agreed with Johnson and denied Greenelsh‟s application.4  
Nevertheless, in November 2006 Greenelsh served a notice of arbitration on 
Johnson, alleging disputes over a range of matters including Johnson‟s status as 
successor trustee and Florence‟s transfer of trust property into her personal 
                                              
 
4  Johnson notes that Greenelsh failed to appeal from either of the trial 
court‟s rulings denying her section 21320 applications, but does not contend those 
rulings have any preclusive effect.  We express no view on that subject.  
5 
 
ownership.  Greenelsh claimed Florence lacked the capacity to take these steps.  
She also challenged various actions taken by Johnson with respect to trust 
property.  Furthermore, she contended he should have no rights as a trust 
beneficiary, apparently on the ground that he had filed court proceedings in 
violation of the no contest clause.  Johnson then sought to enforce the no contest 
clause against Greenelsh, arguing that she had violated the clause by initiating 
arbitration to set aside his appointment as cotrustee and Florence‟s withdrawal of 
survivor‟s trust assets.  Johnson‟s petition did not raise any other claims in the 
arbitration demand as grounds for enforcing the no contest clause. 
 
Greenelsh responded by withdrawing her notice of arbitration and arguing 
that Johnson‟s petition was therefore moot.  She also contended that in any event, 
the arbitration notice did not violate the no contest clause because the proposed 
arbitration was consistent with the provisions of the trust.  The trial court granted 
Johnson‟s petition. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “[t]he arbitration initiated by 
Greenelsh directly attacks provisions of the Trust in an attempt to change Walter 
and Florence‟s testamentary plan and, accordingly, directly contravenes the 
express language of the no contest clause.”  The court reasoned that Greenelsh had 
“sought to nullify the unambiguous right given to a settlor by the Trust agreement 
to appoint a successor trustee when he or she chooses, and to nullify the 
unambiguous right given to a surviving settlor to transfer assets in the survivor‟s 
trust from the Trust to the survivor individually.”  She had also, according to the 
court, sought to “ „secure or take‟ ” part of the trust estate in a manner contrary to 
the terms of the trust, as forbidden by the no contest clause. 
 
Greenelsh argued that her arbitration petition did not meet the statutory 
definition of a “direct contest” because it did not allege “the invalidity of an 
instrument.”  (§ 21300, subd. (b).)  Section 45 defines “instrument” as “a will, 
6 
 
trust, deed, or other writing that designates a beneficiary or makes a donative 
transfer of property.” 
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed.  It did not, however, explain how the 
statutory definition of “direct contest” was met.  Rather, it noted that a contest may 
also be indirect under section 21300, subdivision (c), and decided that “[e]ven if 
the documents appointing Johnson as trustee and withdrawing assets from the 
survivor‟s trust are not considered „instruments,‟ the arbitration initiated by 
Greenelsh necessarily includes a challenge to the provisions of the Trust 
agreement pertaining to those subjects.”  The court rejected Greenelsh‟s other 
arguments, including her claims that the arbitration demand merely sought to 
clarify ambiguous trust terms,5 was a challenge to the exercise of fiduciary power 
supported by public policy, and was consistent with the terms of the trust and her 
duties as a trustee. 
 
We granted Greenelsh‟s petition for review.  In this court, Greenelsh 
primarily contends that (1) her challenge to Florence‟s competency was not a 
“contest” under the statutory definition of “direct contest” or the case law 
governing indirect contests; and (2) her request for arbitration did not violate the 
no contest clause because it sought only to resolve ambiguities in the trust 
provisions.   We agree that the arbitration demand did not amount to a “contest,” 
and thus we need not address Greenelsh‟s other claims. 
 
Johnson not only renews the arguments that succeeded in the Court of 
Appeal, but also raises another justification for the trial court‟s ruling:  he asserts 
that the allegations in Greenelsh‟s arbitration demand seeking to disinherit him 
violated the no contest clause.  Johnson did not present this argument in the trial 
                                              
 
5  The no contest clause exempts “a petition made in good faith seeking an 
interpretation or construction of an ambiguous provision of this instrument.” 
7 
 
court or in his briefing before the Court of Appeal.  “[N]o reason appears why we 
should not apply the established rules that a party to an action may not, for the first 
time on appeal, change the theory of the cause of action [citations] and that issues 
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  
[Citations.]”  (Estate of Westerman (1968) 68 Cal.2d 267, 279, fn. omitted; see 
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12.) 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
There is no conflict or question of credibility in the relevant extrinsic 
evidence.  Accordingly, interpretation of the trust is a question of law for our 
independent review.  (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254 (Burch).)  
Although no contest clauses are enforceable and favored by the public policies of 
discouraging litigation and preserving the transferor‟s intent, they are nevertheless 
strictly construed and may not be extended beyond their plainly intended function.  
(Ibid.; §§ 21303, 21304.)  “ „Whether there has been a “contest” within the 
meaning of a particular no-contest clause depends upon the circumstances of the 
particular case and the language used.‟  [Citations.]”  (Burch, at pp. 254-255.) 
 
Here, the Court of Appeal overstated the effect of Greenelsh‟s challenge to 
Florence‟s mental capacity.  Greenelsh did not propose to “void, nullify, [or] set 
aside [the] Trust or any of its provisions,” or to “change provisions which are 
clearly and unambiguously expressed,” as specified in the no contest clause.7  She 
                                              
 
6  Johnson‟s counsel informs us that in oral argument before the Court of 
Appeal, he urged the court to consider Greenelsh‟s attempt to disinherit his client 
as a ground for finding that the no contest clause was violated.  The court chose 
not to address this point, and it played no part in our grant of review.  
 
7  The clause provides, in relevant part:  “In the event that any beneficiary 
under this Trust or any amendments thereto . . . seeks to obtain in any proceeding 
in any court or before any arbitrator an adjudication that this Trust or any of its 
provisions is void, or seeks otherwise to void, nullify, [or] set aside this Trust or 
any of its provisions, including amendments hereto, or to change provisions which 
(footnote continued on next page) 
8 
 
sought no revision of trust terms, and made no claim that the trust did not 
authorize Florence to appoint a successor trustee or withdraw assets from the 
survivor‟s trust.  Greenelsh asserted only that Florence had become incompetent to 
perform those actions, so that the appointment and withdrawal in 2003 were 
ineffective.  The trust provisions governing appointment of trustees and 
withdrawal of assets would themselves remain unchanged and in full effect 
whether or not Greenelsh succeeded in her challenge.  Were Florence to be found 
incompetent, her powers of appointment and withdrawal could be exercised on her 
behalf by her legal representative or representatives.  Nothing in the no contest 
clause indicates it was intended to apply to proceedings to determine a settlor‟s 
mental capacity to exercise rights conferred by the trust document.  
 
 Moreover, Greenelsh correctly argues that her challenge was not directed 
at an “instrument” as contemplated by the statutory definition of “direct contest.”  
(§ 21300, subd. (b).)8  Neither the document appointing Johnson as successor 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
are clearly and unambiguously expressed herein, . . . or through other means 
endeavors to secure or take any part of the Trust Estate in any manner other than 
as set forth herein, then the right of that person to take any interest given to him or 
her by this Trust shall be determined as it would have been determined had such 
person predeceased the execution of the trust instrument without surviving issue.” 
 
8   “ „Direct contest‟ in an instrument or in this chapter means a pleading in 
a proceeding in any court alleging the invalidity of an instrument or one or more 
of its terms based on one or more of the following grounds:  [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Lack of 
capacity.”  (§ 21300, subd. (b).)  We are here concerned only with lack of mental 
capacity. 
 
At oral argument, Greenelsh raised an additional statutory argument.  She 
suggested that her arbitration demand was not a contest because it was not filed in 
“any court.”  (§ 21300, subd. (b); see also id., subds. (c) & (d).)  We decline to 
consider this belated claim, but note that under section 21300, subdivision (a), 
“ „[c]ontest‟ means any action identified in a „no contest clause‟ as a violation of 
the clause.”  Here, the trust‟s no contest clause refers to “any proceeding in any 
court or before any arbitrator.” 
9 
 
trustee nor the memorandum notifying the trustees of Florence‟s withdrawal of her 
assets was a “writing that designates a beneficiary or makes a donative transfer of 
property.”  (§ 45 [defining “instrument”].)  Absent any indication that the settlors 
intended the no contest clause to apply to such documents, there is no reason for a 
court to enlarge the scope of the clause.9 
 
The Court of Appeal also reasoned that Greenelsh‟s arbitration demand 
qualified as an “indirect contest” under section 21300, subdivision (c) and case 
law.  We disagree.  The statutory definition of “indirect contest,” read literally, 
does not include challenges based on lack of capacity.  (§ 21300, subds. (b)(2) & 
(c). )10  In any event, under the statute and the applicable common law,11 an 
indirect contest is one that attacks the validity of an instrument by seeking relief 
inconsistent with its terms.  Greenelsh‟s claims did not conflict with any trust 
                                              
 
9  In a provision applicable only to instruments executed on or after January 
1, 2001, and thus not to the Warren Family Trust, the Legislature has specified 
that a “challenge to the validity of an instrument, contract, agreement, beneficiary 
designation, or other document, other than the instrument containing the no 
contest clause” does “not constitute a contest unless expressly identified in the no 
contest clause as a violation of the clause.”  (§ 21305, subd. (a)(3).) 
 
10  “ „Indirect contest‟ means a pleading in a proceeding in any court that 
indirectly challenges the validity of an instrument or one or more of its terms 
based on any other ground not contained in subdivision (b), and that does not 
contain any of those grounds.”  (§ 21300, subd. (c).)  Section 21300, subdivision 
(b)(2) includes the ground of “[l]ack of capacity.” 
 
The statutory definitions of “direct” and “indirect” contest were added to 
the Probate Code in 2002.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 1.)  Previously, the statute 
defined “contest” in terms that were also directed at an “instrument”:  “ „Contest‟ 
means an attack in a proceeding on an instrument or on a provision in an 
instrument.”  (Former § 21300, subd. (a); see Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 14, p. 972.16.) 
 
11  The Probate Code provisions governing no contest clauses are “not 
intended as a complete codification of the law,” and “[t]he common law governs 
enforcement of a no contest clause to the extent [the statutes do] not apply.”  
(§ 21301.) 
10 
 
provisions.  The authorities cited by the Court of Appeal, and relied on by 
Johnson, are inapposite. 
 
In Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th 246, a surviving spouse proposed to assert her 
community property rights in corporate stock, pension plan benefits, and life 
insurance policies that her husband had transferred to his family trust.  She also 
contemplated filing a separate action asserting her rights to the pension benefits 
under federal statute.  The trust made no accommodation for community property 
interests, and upon the husband‟s death divided the estate into six subtrusts, 
including a marital trust for the spouse.  (Id. at pp. 252, 255-256.)  This court held 
that the spouse‟s proposed complaints were designed to evade her husband‟s 
express intent to prevent her from taking under the trust while simultaneously 
asserting independent claims of ownership.  (Id. at p. 263.)    We rejected the 
spouse‟s claim that because her federal action sought no relief directly from the 
trust or the estate, it would not amount to a contest.  If successful, the action 
“would effectively nullify or thwart the provisions in the trust instrument that 
provide for the allocation of all assets placed in the trust estate to the various 
subsidiary trusts.”  (Id. at p. 261.) 
 
Here, by contrast, Greenelsh‟s claims thwarted no distributive scheme 
created by the trust.  They did not even indirectly challenge the validity of any 
trust provision allocating assets.  If Greenelsh were to establish that Florence was 
incompetent to appoint a successor trustee and withdraw assets, the estate plan set 
out in the trust would be protected, not thwarted.  Nor did Greenelsh assert an 
independent claim of ownership over trust assets, as did the spouse in Burch. 
 
In Genger v. Delsol (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1410, a surviving spouse 
proposed an action that, under various theories, challenged the validity of a 
corporate stock redemption agreement providing that shares held by a trust would 
be returned to the corporation in exchange for cancellation of the husband‟s debt 
11 
 
and transfer of the marital residence from corporate ownership to the trust estate, 
for distribution to the spouse.  (Id. at pp. 1417-1418.)  Relying on the former 
statutory definition of “contest” as “ „an attack in a proceeding on an instrument or 
on a provision in an instrument,‟ ” the spouse contended her challenge to the 
redemption agreement would not violate the trust‟s no contest clause.  (Id. at p. 
1420, & fn. 5, quoting former § 21300, subd. (a); see fn. 10, ante.) 
 
The court disagreed, relying on Burch for the proposition that “[a] „contest‟ 
is not confined to a direct attack on a will or trust instrument.”  (Genger v. Delsol, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420, original italics.)  The “complaint, if successful, 
would completely unravel the decedent‟s estate plan by setting aside the core of 
that plan, the corporate stock redemption agreement.”  (Id. at p. 1422.)  Thus, it 
would nullify key trust provisions and violate the no contest clause.  (Ibid.)  The 
Genger court also rejected the spouse‟s claim that she sought only to reform the 
redemption agreement to correct her husband‟s mistake regarding the value of the 
stock.  “[T]he trust instrument expressly calls for transfer of the stock out of the 
trust estate for redemption . . . while [the] proposed complaint seeks a contrary 
result.”  (Id. at p. 1423.) 
 
Here, as noted, the proposed challenge does not disrupt an estate plan or 
nullify any trust provision requiring the transfer of property.  Florence was 
authorized to withdraw property from the survivor‟s trust and to appoint a 
successor trustee, but the trust does not require those powers to be exercised in any 
particular way.  Johnson contends the no contest clause is meaningless if it does 
not apply to challenges to the documents by which a settlor actually exercises her 
rights under a trust.  However, the no contest clause remains effective against 
attempts to “void, nullify, [or] set aside [the] Trust or any of its provisions, . . . or 
to change provisions which are clearly and unambiguously expressed.”  (See fn. 7, 
ante.) 
12 
 
 
The Court of Appeal also reasoned that Greenelsh‟s challenge to the 
withdrawal of assets from the survivor‟s trust amounted to an “ „endeavor[] to 
secure or take [a] part of the Trust Estate in [a] manner other than as set forth 
herein,‟ ” under the terms of the no contest clause.  It is true that the ultimate result 
of a successful challenge to the withdrawal would be to preserve a large portion of 
the trust estate for possible future distribution to Greenelsh and the other 
beneficiaries.  However, they would take their shares in the manner set forth in the 
trust.  It would unduly extend the no contest clause beyond its intended reach to 
apply it to any action by a beneficiary seeking to restore property to the survivor‟s 
trust.  Surely, if Florence had withdrawn assets from the survivor‟s trust as a result 
of fraud, duress, or mistake, a beneficiary could pursue an action to recover that 
property after her incapacity or death without running afoul of the no contest 
clause.  No different reasoning applies to a challenge based on lack of capacity. 
 
Johnson relies on Estate of Friedman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 810 
(Friedman), in which a daughter‟s proposed complaint sought millions of dollars 
in compensatory and punitive damages from her mother‟s second husband, 
constructive trusts on estate assets obtained by him under two trusts and the 
mother‟s will, and an order restraining his exercise of a power of appointment 
under a marital trust.  The complaint alleged duress by the husband in the 
execution of the will and trusts.  (Id. at p. 817.)  The court held that the complaint 
would thwart the wishes expressed in the mother‟s will, which left the daughter 
$50,000, named the husband as remainder beneficiary of the marital trust, and 
included a no contest clause.  (Id. at p. 818.) 
 
The scope of the proposed complaint in Friedman far exceeded Greenelsh‟s 
challenge to Florence‟s capacity to appoint Johnson and withdraw assets from the 
survivor‟s trust.  Unlike Greenelsh‟s arbitration demand, the daughter‟s complaint 
in Friedman “squarely” contested the terms of the will, and was “designed to 
13 
 
frustrate th[e] testamentary plan” by securing a recovery that was plainly 
inconsistent with the terms of the will and the related trusts.  (Friedman, supra, 
100 Cal.App.3d at p. 818.)  Moreover, the daughter attempted to restrain the 
husband from exercising his power of appointment under the marital trust.  
Greenelsh did not seek to restrain Florence‟s powers under the trust, but only to 
determine whether she was mentally competent to exercise them herself. 
 
Scharlin v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 162 (Scharlin), is more on 
point.  There, a son (Joseph) sought to challenge the validity of an amendment to a 
survivor‟s trust depriving him of his share of the trust estate, based on duress or 
undue influence by his sister (Jacqueline) over their mother.  (Id. at pp. 165-166.)  
The relevant part of the Scharlin court‟s analysis came in response to Jacqueline‟s 
claim that the proposed petition violated no contest clauses in the original trust and 
the amendment, by attacking the surviving settlor‟s power to amend the trust and 
her power of appointment over survivor‟s trust assets.  Jacqueline argued that the 
power to amend was built into the structure of the estate plan, and that an 
unrestricted power of appointment was essential to preserve the marital deduction 
under federal estate tax law.  (Id. at pp. 169-170.)  The court was not persuaded. 
 
“What Jacqueline fails to recognize . . . is that Joseph‟s proposed challenge 
is not on the surviving settlors‟ power to amend or revoke the surviv[or‟s] trust.  
Rather it amounts to an attack on how the amendment occurred, namely, by the 
alleged exercise of duress or undue influence upon the settlor.  Joseph does not 
contend the surviving settlor lacked the right or power to amend.  Rather, he 
argues the surviving settlor did not in fact amend the trust, and any so-called 
amendment was the result of duress or undue influence, not the free will of the 
settlor.  Accordingly, we hold Joseph‟s proposed contest of the amendment . . . is 
14 
 
not a challenge to the power to amend the surviv[or‟s] trust or to the general 
power of appointment.”  (Scharlin, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)12 
 
Similarly, Greenelsh‟s proposed challenge here was directed not at the 
powers of appointment and withdrawal conferred by the trust provisions, but at 
whether Florence was mentally competent to exercise those powers.  There is 
merit in Greenelsh‟s claim that her challenge was consistent with her fiduciary 
obligations as a trustee.  (See §§ 16000, 16002, 16006; 13 Witkin, Summary of 
Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Trusts, § 63 et seq., p. 637 et seq.)  Certainly, under the 
case law reviewed above, a trustee who is also a beneficiary might violate a no 
contest clause by taking action to reverse a settlor‟s exercise of rights conferred by 
the trust, if the action would effectively nullify or alter the estate plan set out in the 
trust.  This, however, is not such a case.
                                              
 
12  Johnson attempts to distinguish Scharlin by noting that there, the 
original trust‟s no contest clause did not refer to amendments, whereas the no 
contest clause in the survivor‟s trust amendment did include challenges to 
amendments.  However, the Scharlin court considered this point only in response 
to Jacqueline‟s claim that Joseph would be barred from recovering under a 
separate decedent‟s trust if he failed to invalidate the survivor‟s trust amendment.  
The court reasoned that because the mother could not amend the original no 
contest clause insofar as it applied to the irrevocable decedent‟s trust, Jacqueline 
could not apply the no contest clause in the survivor‟s trust amendment to 
Joseph‟s rights under the decedent‟s trust.  (Scharlin, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
170-171.)  This aspect of the court‟s holding does not apply to the case before us. 
15 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
 We reverse the Court of Appeal‟s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Johnson v. Greenelsh 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/5/08 – 2d Dist., Div. 6 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S166747 
Date Filed: October 29, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Luis Obispo 
Judge: Martin J. Tangeman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sandra Waite and David P. Weilbacher for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
George ♦ Cyr, J. Keith George and Anne C. Cyr for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David P. Weilbacher 
1670 Noyes Road, Post Office Box 51 
Arroyo Grande, CA  93421 
(805) 481-8121 
 
J. Keith George 
George ♦ Cyr 
P.O. Box 6129 
Los Osos, CA  93412 
(805) 528-3394