Title: Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Complaint of Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-609.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-609 
IN RE COMPLAINT OF WILKES v. OHIO EDISON COMPANY; WILKES, 
APPELLANTS; PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Complaint of Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-609.] 
Public utilities—Easements—Dispute between utility and owners of property 
subject to easement over owners’ alleged interference with utility’s 
easement properly filed in common pleas court—Owners’ complaint 
before Public Utilities Commission seeking order forcing utility to remove 
transmission line properly dismissed—Commission may not adjudicate 
controversies involving property rights. 
(No. 2011-0737—Submitted November 16, 2011—Decided February 22, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 09-682-EL-CSS. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} Thomas and Derrell Wilkes appeal the Public Utilities 
Commission’s order dismissing their complaint against Ohio Edison Company for 
lack of jurisdiction.  We affirm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In 1949, Ohio Edison purchased an easement in Boardman, Ohio, 
for the purpose of building and maintaining an electric transmission line.  Today, 
a 69,000-volt electric transmission line runs over the property.  In 1977, Thomas 
and Derrell Wilkes purchased a portion of the property subject to the easement, 
and in 1993, they built an above-ground swimming pool and a storage shed in the 
area of the easement. 
{¶ 3} Ohio Edison discovered the structures 15 years later.  It informed 
the couple that the pool and shed presented safety issues and asked them to 
“relocate or remove” the structures.  The Wilkeses retained an attorney, who 
informed Ohio Edison that he would “have each and every employee of Ohio 
Edison who trespass or attempt to trespass on Mr. and Mrs. Wilkes’ property 
arrested and charged with all felony criminal statutes presently enacted in the 
State of Ohio.” Ohio Edison responded by filing a complaint in the court of 
common pleas to enforce the easement, asking the court to order the Wilkeses to 
remove their structures. 
{¶ 4} The Wilkeses filed their own complaint a few months later, not 
with a court, but with the commission.  They asked the commission to order the 
company to move its transmission line. 
{¶ 5} Ohio Edison filed a motion to dismiss the Wilkeses’ complaint, 
asserting lack of jurisdiction.  The commission granted the motion.  It found that 
the technical issue—that the proximity of the pool and shed to the transmission 
lines violates the National Electrical Safety Code—was undisputed.  What was 
disputed was “the remedy that should be applied to bring about compliance with 
the [code],” that is, which structure must give way, the pool and shed or the 
transmission line.  But that dispute involved a legal question of “competing 
property rights” and thus belonged before the courts. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 6} The Wilkeses have appealed; Ohio Edison has intervened as 
appellee. 
II.  Discussion 
{¶ 7} The Wilkeses present three propositions of law on appeal. 
{¶ 8} In the first, they argue that the commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over a claim for “service-related issues” that “calls for the 
interpretation and enforcement of the National Electrical Safety Code.”  However, 
the Wilkeses have not stated such a claim. 
{¶ 9} As a general matter, the commission “does not possess judicial 
power and may not adjudicate controversies between parties as to property 
rights.”  Dayton Communications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.2d 302, 
303–304, 414 N.E.2d 1051 (1980); New Bremen v. Pub. Util. Comm., 103 Ohio 
St. 23, 30-31, 132 N.E. 162 (1921).  But it does possess exclusive jurisdiction 
over certain types of claims, set forth in R.C. 4905.26.  Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 
122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524, 910 N.E.2d 1009, ¶ 8–9.  A claim is within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission if (1) the commission’s 
administrative expertise is required to resolve the issue in dispute and (2) the act 
complained of is a practice normally authorized by the utility.  Id. at ¶ 11–12. 
{¶ 10} The Wilkeses have not shown that the commission’s expertise is 
required to resolve the disputed issue.  Their only jurisdictional theory is that this 
case requires the commission to interpret the National Electrical Safety Code.  
Yet, the Wilkeses offer no explanation of how the code applies to this case—
indeed, they do not cite even a single page or section of it.  This lack of 
explanation and citation of authority suffices as a basis for rejecting their 
argument.  See, e.g., In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 
271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 14 (failure to “cite a single legal 
authority” or “present an argument that a legal authority applies on these facts and 
was violated * * * alone is grounds to reject [a] claim”); Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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v. Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 921 N.E.2d 1038, 
¶ 39 (“unsupported legal conclusions” do not establish error). 
{¶ 11} We decline to accept the first proposition of law. 
{¶ 12} In their second proposition of law, the Wilkeses argue that the 
commission had “independent” jurisdiction over their claims because the claims 
were based upon the statutes governing the commission and the commission’s 
own rules.  It is true that in a given case, the commission and the courts may each 
have jurisdiction that is independent of the other.  When a case has both 
regulatory and legal issues, the commission would have jurisdiction over the 
former by virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction, while a court may adjudicate the 
latter by virtue of its general jurisdiction.  Corrigan, 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-
Ohio-2524, 910 N.E.2d 1009. See also State ex rel. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002-Ohio-5312, 776 N.E.2d 92, 
¶ 18-21, 32.  But the Wilkeses have not demonstrated that an “independent” 
regulatory claim exists for the commission to resolve.  They assert that their 
claims are independent from those raised in the common pleas court because their 
claims are based upon two large collections of laws: “the PUCO statutes (O.R.C. 
4905.01 et seq.) and Ohio Administrative Code (Ohio Admin. Code 4901, et 
seq.).”  This is not a meaningful assertion of a regulatory claim—to cite 
everything is to cite nothing. 
{¶ 13} As for their argument that “collateral attacks are permissible in the 
PUCO,” it is based on a misreading of precedent.  (Emphasis deleted.)  The case 
they depend on, W. Res. Transit Auth. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 39 Ohio St.2d 16, 313 
N.E.2d 811 (1974), held merely that the commission could revisit its own orders, 
not the orders of a court.  Id. at 18; see Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, 
L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 129 Ohio St.3d 485, 2011-Ohio-4189, 954 N.E.2d 
104, ¶ 41.  W. Res. did not address, much less alter, the jurisdictional balance 
between the commission and the courts, and the case is irrelevant here. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 14} We decline to accept the second proposition of law. 
{¶ 15} The Wilkeses’ last proposition—that the commission erred by 
dismissing their “claim for unfair and discriminatory treatment”—is forfeited.  
The Wilkeses did not raise this argument in their application for rehearing before 
the commission, and we are jurisdictionally barred from considering such claims.  
R.C. 4903.10. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 16} For these reasons, the Wilkeses have not demonstrated that the 
commission erred in dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  We 
affirm. 
Order affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Brett M. Mancino, for appellants. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William L. Wright and Thomas 
G. Lindgren, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
Jones Day, David A. Kutik, and Douglas R. Cole, for intervening appellee 
Ohio Edison Company. 
______________________