Title: Lasher v. Leslie-Lasher

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11954 
 
JEFFREY M. LASHER  vs.  TRICIA LESLIE-LASHER. 
 
 
March 22, 2016. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Divorce and Separation, Relief from judgment.  Practice, 
Civil, Relief from judgment. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Jeffrey M. Lasher, was divorced from the 
respondent, Tricia Leslie-Lasher, pursuant to a judgment of 
divorce nisi in 2014.  In March, 2015, he filed a motion for 
relief from judgment, pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b) 
(2) and (3), which was denied by a judge of the Probate and 
Family Court in May, 2015. 
 
 
The petitioner then filed a petition in the Appeals Court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., seeking review of 
that order.1  He alleged both that the respondent had been 
untruthful about her financial resources in the divorce 
proceedings and that the Probate and Family Court judge should 
have recused himself from ruling on the postjudgment motion.  A 
single justice of the Appeals Court initially remanded the case 
to the Probate and Family Court judge for clarification and 
findings regarding the status of the petitioner's recusal motion 
and the judge's ruling on it.  After the judge issued his 
                                                          
 
 
1 General Laws c. 231, § 118, first par., authorizes "[a] 
party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a trial court . . . 
[to] file . . . a petition in the appropriate appellate court 
seeking relief from such an order."  It is doubtful that the 
Probate and Family Court judge's order qualified as an 
interlocutory order. 
 
2 
 
findings,2 the single justice denied the petition and later 
denied a motion for reconsideration.  A second single justice of 
the Appeals Court struck the petitioner's notice of appeal.  See 
McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 189 (2008). 
 
 
The petitioner subsequently filed a substantially similar 
petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A 
single justice of this court denied the petition.  After 
allowing the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the single 
justice again denied the petition.  We affirm the judgment of 
the single justice of this court. 
 
 
It is incumbent on a party seeking exercise of this court's 
extraordinary power of general superintendence under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of 
alternative means of redress.  See Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 
1015, 1016 (2001); McGuiness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497 
(1995), and cases cited.  In this case, the petitioner failed to 
allege, much less demonstrate, that the Probate and Family Court 
judge's order denying relief from the divorce judgment could not 
adequately be addressed through the ordinary appellate process, 
in an appeal to a panel of the Appeals Court from the 
                                                          
 
 
2 According to the Probate and Family Court judge's 
findings, at a hearing on March 25, 2015, the judge informed the 
parties that he had received a Bible from the respondent with 
his name inscribed on it, and that this would be ground for a 
motion to recuse.  The petitioner filed such a motion.  Although 
the judge indicated that he could remain impartial, he allowed 
the motion: 
 
"based [on] the Court's belief that its impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.  After a recess, and upon further 
consideration, the Court informed the parties that although 
it had allowed the Motion to Recuse, it was still going to 
rule on . . . [the petitioner's] Motion to Reconsider and 
his Motion for Relief from Judgment, and that the recusal 
would take effect after the [judge] ruled on those 
[m]otions.  Neither party objected. . . . 
 
 
"The decision to rule on [the] Motions was made 
because the Court had already taken those matters under 
advisement, prior to recusal, and because the Court was 
very familiar with the parties and the substance of the 
Motions." 
 
3 
 
postjudgment order.3  See, e.g., Raheman v. Raheman, 59 Mass. 
App. Ct. 915, 917 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1013 (2004) 
(reviewing postjudgment ruling denying motion for relief from 
judgment); Rezendes v. Rezendes, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 438 (1999) 
(same).  For that reason, the single justice neither erred nor 
abused her discretion in denying the G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
Jeffrey M. Lasher, pro se. 
                                                          
 
 
3 It is not too late for the petitioner to pursue an appeal 
to a panel of the Appeals Court in accordance with the ordinary 
appellate process.  If a notice of appeal is filed with the 
Barnstable Division of the Probate and Family Court Department, 
see Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), as amended, 464 Mass. 1601 (2013), not 
later than May 5, 2016, "one year from the date of entry of the 
. . . order sought to be reviewed," Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), as 
amended, 378 Mass. 939 (1979), the petitioner may request the 
Appeals Court or a single justice of the Appeals Court to 
enlarge the time periods prescribed by the rules of appellate 
procedure.  See Commonwealth v. White, 429 Mass. 258, 263 
(1999).  See also Tisei v. Building Inspector of Marlborough, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379 (1975).  We express no view on the 
merits of the Probate and Family Court judge's order denying 
relief from judgment, or the judge's decision to not recuse 
himself from ruling on the motion.