Title: William Pangman v.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0039-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against 
William Pangman, 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PANGMAN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 5, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Geske, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For William Pangman there were briefs and oral 
argument by William A. Pangman, Waukesha. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility there were briefs and oral argument by Richard P. 
Mozinski, Manitowoc. 
 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against WILLIAM A. PANGMAN, Attorney at 
Law. 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney’s 
license 
suspended. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is an appeal and cross-appeal from 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the referee 
concerning the conduct of Attorney William Pangman in the course 
of post-divorce proceedings in which he was a party and from the 
referee’s recommendation that the license of Attorney Pangman to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a minimum of six 
months as discipline for some of that conduct. Attorney Pangman 
appealed from the findings and conclusions that he engaged in 
professional misconduct by accusing a trial judge of having 
tampered with a court record by directing a court reporter to 
remove portions of the official transcript of a hearing and of 
otherwise intentionally interfering with his access to a 
complete hearing transcript for purposes of appeal and by making 
comments demeaning to the judicial system and engaging in 
disruptive conduct in a court proceeding. The Board of Attorneys 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
2 
Professional Responsibility (Board) cross-appealed from the 
referee’s conclusion that Attorney Pangman did not violate the 
attorney conduct rules by refusing to comply with several 
circuit court orders regarding the custody, placement and 
support 
of 
his 
children. 
By 
the 
remaining 
findings 
and 
conclusion, the referee determined that Attorney Pangman did not 
engage in professional misconduct by failing to make reasonable 
efforts to expedite the protracted litigation of the post-
divorce matters.  
¶2 
On the basis of the facts properly found by the 
referee and the conclusions based on those facts, we determine 
that Attorney Pangman made statements concerning the integrity 
of a trial judge that were found to be false with reckless 
disregard as to their truth or falsity, in violation of SCR 
20:8.2(a)1, when he accused the judge of having directed a court 
reporter to remove portions of an official hearing transcript 
and of otherwise obstructing the availability of a complete 
transcript, with the intention of “sanitizing” the record and 
interfering with Attorney Pangman’s announced intention to seek 
appellate relief. Attorney Pangman also engaged in conduct with 
the intention of disrupting the court, in violation of SCR 
                     
1 SCR 20:8.2 provides, in pertinent part: Judicial and legal 
officials  
(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer 
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or 
falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, 
adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate 
for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
3 
20:3.5(c),2 and by that conduct and his statements in connection 
with it he failed to maintain the respect due to courts of 
justice and judicial officers, as required by the Attorney’s 
Oath, SCR 40.15. As set forth in SCR 20:8.4(g),3 an attorney’s 
violation 
of 
the 
Attorney’s 
Oath 
constitutes 
professional 
misconduct.  
¶3 
As discipline for that professional misconduct, we 
suspend Attorney Pangman’s license to practice law for a period 
of 90 days, not the minimum six-month period recommended by the 
referee. In doing so, we recognize the aggravating factors 
identified 
by 
the 
referee 
that were 
the 
basis for his 
recommendation of discipline more severe than the 90-day license 
suspension the Board had suggested was appropriate, but, as 
explained below, we consider mitigating factors that have not 
been addressed previously. Those aggravating factors concerned 
Attorney Pangman’s demonstrated lack of respect for the judicial 
system and his outspoken contempt for it, as well as his 
                     
2 SCR 20:3.5 provides, in pertinent part: Impartiality and 
decorum of the tribunal 
A lawyer shall not:  
 . . .  
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.  
3 The referee’s conclusion in this respect was that Attorney 
Pangman’s violation of the Attorney’s Oath constituted a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(f), which establishes as professional 
misconduct a lawyer’s violation of a supreme court rule. As the 
Attorney’s Oath is set forth as a supreme court rule, the 
referee’s conclusion is correct, but the court’s determination 
is based on the more specific subsection of SCR 20:8.4.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
4 
deliberate refusal to abide by the obligations imposed upon him 
as a licensed member of the legal profession.  
¶4 
Attorney Pangman was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1983 and practices in Waukesha. He has not been the 
subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding. The referee in this 
proceeding, Timothy Vocke, reserve judge, made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law following an evidentiary hearing.  
¶5 
Over a period of several years, Attorney Pangman has 
been 
a 
party 
in 
what the 
referee 
described 
as “highly 
contentious and lengthy” post-divorce proceedings on the issues 
of custody, visitation, maintenance and child support. One of 
those proceedings was before Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Gary 
Gerlach from the fall of 1992 through the end of August, 1993. 
At a hearing before Judge Gerlach May 24, 1993, the judge issued 
an oral decision from the bench setting child support and asked 
his court reporter to reduce it to writing and send a copy to 
each of the parties. During that hearing but prior to announcing 
the decision, Judge Gerlach had admonished Attorney Pangman for 
what 
the 
judge 
considered 
inappropriate 
behavior 
in 
the 
courtroom. That admonishment did not appear in the written 
decision prepared by the reporter, as it was not part of the 
judge’s decision.  
¶6 
Three months later, on August 24, 1993, Attorney 
Pangman filed a motion asking Judge Gerlach to recuse himself. 
One of the five grounds set forth in that motion was Judge 
Gerlach’s alleged “tampering with the record.” In the motion, 
Attorney Pangman stated:  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
5 
Upon information and belief, Judge Gerlach directed 
the court reporter to remove portions of the official 
transcript of court proceedings and has otherwise 
obstructed the timely availability of a verbatim full 
transcript 
to 
purposely 
sanitize 
the 
record and 
frustrate [my] announced intentions to seek effective 
appellate relief.  
Attorney Pangman reiterated that allegation at the hearing on 
the recusal motion, and when Judge Gerlach asked him to state 
the factual basis for it, Attorney Pangman was unable to present 
any evidence to support his claim.  
¶7 
The referee found that Judge Gerlach had not directed 
the court reporter to remove portions of the official transcript 
of 
the 
proceeding, 
intentionally 
obstruct 
the 
timely 
availability of the verbatim full transcript purposely to 
sanitize 
the 
record, 
or 
intentionally 
frustrate 
Attorney 
Pangman’s announced intentions to seek appellate relief. What 
the judge did, the referee found, was direct his reporter to 
make a verbatim transcript of his decision of May 24, 1993. The 
referee found further that prior to filing the recusal motion, 
Attorney Pangman had not accused Judge Gerlach of having 
tampered with the record, although he had been provided a copy 
of the decision prepared by the reporter more than two months 
earlier. The referee found that Attorney Pangman’s public and 
written claims of wrongdoing by Judge Gerlach were false in 
their entirety and were motivated by his dissatisfaction with 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
6 
the judge’s rulings and his desire to have the judge remove 
himself from the case. Judge Gerlach did recuse himself.  
¶8 
Based on those facts, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Pangman violated SCR 20:8.2(a), which prohibits a 
lawyer from making a statement the lawyer knows to be false or 
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning 
the qualifications or integrity of a judge. However, it is 
unclear from the referee’s statement of the legal conclusion 
whether he concluded that Attorney Pangman violated the rule by 
knowingly making false statements about the judge’s integrity or 
by making statements with reckless disregard as to their truth 
or falsity.  
¶9 
From the referee’s factual findings and his discussion 
of the aggravating factors in his report, we conclude that 
Attorney Pangman violated SCR 20:8.2(a) by statements he made 
concerning Judge Gerlach with reckless disregard as to their 
truth or falsity. The referee made no finding that Attorney 
Pangman knew those statements were false when he made them, but 
he did find that when the judge asked him for the factual basis 
of 
his 
allegations 
of 
tampering 
with 
the 
record 
and 
intentionally interfering with his access to a transcript for 
purposes of appeal, Attorney Pangman was “unable to present any 
evidence to back up his claim.” Moreover, in listing the factors 
considered in aggravation of the severity of discipline to be 
imposed for Attorney Pangman’s misconduct, the referee included 
Attorney Pangman’s “reckless disregard for the truth, as 
demonstrated by his statements concerning Judge Gerlach.”  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
7 
¶10 Another aspect of Attorney Pangman’s conduct during 
the course of the post-divorce proceedings was his refusal to 
obey several orders the circuit court had issued concerning 
child custody, placement and support. In July, 1993, Judge 
Gerlach found Attorney Pangman in contempt of court for failing 
to comply with a child support order he had issued the preceding 
May in respect to arrearages and the current support obligation, 
and he sentenced Attorney Pangman to six months in the House of 
Correction, with work release privileges. On December 20, 1994, 
Judge Robert Landry found Attorney Pangman in contempt for 
failing to pay child support as ordered, for which he sentenced 
him to 10 days in the House of Correction, with work release 
privileges.  
¶11 Judge Landry again found Attorney Pangman in contempt 
January 25, 1995 for failing to comply with a placement order 
Judge Gerlach had issued giving physical placement of two of the 
Pangman children to their mother. Judge Landry then suspended 
placement of Attorney Pangman’s children with him until further 
order and sentenced him to 30 days in the House of Correction. 
At the end of August, 1995, Attorney Pangman refused to return 
his daughter to her mother as required by court order, and on 
September 25, 1995, the court ordered him to return the child 
immediately. When he did not do so, an order issued on behalf of 
Judge Landry directing the sheriff to enforce the placement 
order.  
¶12 Shortly thereafter, the chief judge of the judicial 
administrative district issued an order on behalf on Judge 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
8 
Landry suspending placement of the children with Attorney 
Pangman. Five days later, Judge Landry signed a contempt order 
resulting from the September 25, 1995 hearing. At the end of 
October, 1995, Attorney Pangman wrote the sheriff that he was 
concerned he would be obstructed when attempting to pick up his 
children on November 1 and asserted that Judge Landry’s October 
23, 1995 order superseded the chief judge’s earlier order 
suspending placement of his children with him.  
¶13 After the chief judge subsequently issued an amended 
order for clarification and directing law enforcement agencies 
to take necessary steps to enforce the prior court orders, 
Attorney Pangman’s former spouse, with the assistance of the 
sheriff, 
attempted 
unsuccessfully 
to 
collect 
two 
of 
the 
children. Attorney Pangman then sought a writ of habeas corpus 
in circuit court and, when it was denied, asked the Court of 
Appeals for the same relief. That court declined to issue the 
writ, referred the matter to the circuit court, and upheld all 
of Judge Gerlach’s prior placement orders.  
¶14 The 
referee 
found 
that 
while 
Attorney 
Pangman 
deliberately disobeyed several placement orders issued by Judge 
Gerlach and Judge Landry, it was clear that he took every 
possible action consistent with openly disobeying those orders 
in the belief that they were not valid. For example, Attorney 
Pangman made it clear on the record in several circuit court 
proceedings that he did not agree with the orders, took seven 
appeals from those orders, brought a petition for a supervisory 
writ, two petitions for review, and four state and one federal 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
9 
habeas 
corpus 
proceedings. 
In 
one 
of 
the 
habeas 
corpus 
petitions, he contended that the orders were “invalid” and 
“illegal” and thus “have no force.” In addition to making a 
record in circuit court that he was not abiding by the orders 
because he believed they were not valid, Attorney Pangman was 
found in contempt some six times and spent more than six months 
in jail rather than obey those orders.  
¶15 The referee found that Attorney Pangman’s refusal to 
obey the court orders was open and obvious and that he made it 
clear that he believed they were illegal and void and that he 
was not going to obey them. Consequently, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Pangman did not violate the attorney professional 
conduct rule that prohibits a lawyer from knowingly disobeying 
an obligation under the rules of a court, SCR 20:3.4(c),4 for he 
came within that rule’s specific exception “for an open refusal 
based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”  
¶16 Addressing a third aspect of his conduct in the post-
divorce proceedings, the Board alleged that Attorney Pangman 
failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite that litigation, 
                     
4 SCR 20:3.4 provides, in pertinent part: Fairness to 
opposing party and counsel 
A lawyer shall not:  
 . . .  
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 
no valid obligation exists;  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
10
as required by SCR 20:3.2.5 The proceedings generated 1200 pages 
of transcript, several orders to show cause -– three by Attorney 
Pangman, six by his former spouse -- and numerous motions and 
petitions -– 27 by Attorney Pangman, 15 by his former spouse. In 
addition, Attorney Pangman filed seven appeals, one supervisory 
writ petition, two petitions for review, and five habeas corpus 
petitions. 
The 
referee 
found 
that 
there 
had 
been 
no 
determination by any judge or judicial officer that anything 
Attorney Pangman did in the course of representing himself in 
the proceedings violated the frivolous action or frivolous 
appeal statutes.  
¶17 The referee found no clear and convincing evidence 
that Attorney Pangman’s conduct of the litigation violated SCR 
20:3.2 for the reason that he was representing himself, not a 
client, in the proceedings. Accordingly, there was no violation 
of the rule’s requirement to make reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation “consistent with the interests of the client.” The 
referee found no violation for the additional reason that 
Attorney Pangman was entitled to challenge the actions of the 
court and court officials he felt were erroneous by filing 
appeals, petitions for review, motions, and habeas corpus 
petitions. Moreover, the referee found no sufficient credible 
evidence 
that 
Attorney 
Pangman’s 
intent 
in 
making 
those 
                     
5 SCR 20:3.2 provides, Expediting litigation 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
make 
reasonable 
efforts 
to 
expedite 
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
11
challenges was merely to delay the outcome of the proceeding or 
obtain some financial advantage. The Board did not appeal from 
the referee’s findings and conclusion in respect to this claim 
of professional misconduct it had alleged.  
¶18 The remaining allegations of professional misconduct 
concerned Attorney Pangman’s conduct in the courtroom during the 
post-divorce proceedings. In that respect, the referee found 
that at the May 24, 1993 hearing, Judge Gerlach admonished 
Attorney Pangman for his gesturing and “emoting,” which the 
judge found distracting to himself and to the court reporter. At 
the August 30, 1993 hearing, Attorney Pangman deliberately 
antagonized Judge Gerlach by statements such as asking him, “Are 
you 
perturbed 
now?” 
In 
addition, 
the 
referee 
found 
the 
assertions Attorney Pangman set forth in his recusal motion 
before Judge Gerlach and his statement to the judge when arguing 
that motion clearly to have been intended to antagonize the 
judge to the point where he would voluntarily remove himself 
from the case in order not to have to deal with Attorney 
Pangman.  
¶19 The referee also found that in his appearance before 
Judge Landry on January 30, 1995, Attorney Pangman deliberately 
engaged in conduct intended to disrupt the proceeding. He 
constantly argued with and interrupted the judge as he was 
trying to announce his decision on the record. At one point, 
Judge Landry summoned the bailiff to stand next to Attorney 
Pangman at counsel’s table “and push [him] down into [his] seat, 
and if necessary, escort [him] out” so that the proceeding could 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
12
continue and, in the judge’s words, “to ensure that proper 
decorum would be maintained in view of the amazing behavior of 
Mr. Pangman.” The judge stated, “[I]t was impossible to proceed 
for several minutes while Mr. Pangman was haranguing the court.” 
During the proceeding, Attorney Pangman asserted that the judge 
was “unable to rule properly as an impartial and detached 
magistrate in this matter,” adding, “I can tell the Court is 
just itching to pull the trigger on me  . . .  .” The referee 
found that Attorney Pangman further attempted to antagonize 
Judge Landry by filing a motion for recusal in which he charged 
the judge with, among other things, dishonesty, issuing unlawful 
decrees in unlawful ways, bias, prejudice, judicial misconduct, 
antagonism, and gender bias. The referee found that by this 
conduct, Attorney Pangman showed a definite lack of respect to 
the court and that when it appeared things were not going well 
for him, he engaged in “bullying and intimidation tactics.”  
¶20 On the basis of that conduct in the proceeding before 
Judge Landry on January 30, 1995, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Pangman violated SCR 20:3.5(c) and the portion of the 
Attorney’s Oath, SCR 40.15, requiring an attorney to “maintain 
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.” The 
referee also concluded that Attorney Pangman’s statements in his 
recusal motion before Judge Landry constituted a gross violation 
of the Attorney’s Oath.  
¶21 In 
determining 
the 
discipline 
to 
recommend 
for 
Attorney Pangman’s professional misconduct established in this 
proceeding, the referee took into consideration factors in 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
13
mitigation and in aggravation of the seriousness of the 
misconduct and the appropriate disciplinary response to it. In 
mitigation, the referee noted that Attorney Pangman has not been 
disciplined previously for misconduct and that he is, in the 
referee’s words, “an extremely competent advocate who is fully 
capable of conducting himself in a professional manner, if he 
chooses to do so.” As aggravating factors the referee listed the 
following: Attorney Pangman’s total lack of respect for the 
judicial system, for which he has shown outspoken contempt; his 
reckless disregard for the truth; his deliberate refusal to 
abide by any general rules of fair play or specific rules 
governing the legal system if he determines it to be to his 
benefit to do so; his repeatedly demonstrated lack of concern 
for the rights and reputations of others and the obligations 
imposed upon him as a licensed member of the legal profession; 
his grandiose vision of himself; his inability to admit that 
what he is doing or saying is wrong or inappropriate, regardless 
of the evidence.  
¶22 Assessing Attorney Pangman’s misconduct in light of 
those mitigating and aggravating factors, the referee determined 
that it would be inappropriate to recommend as discipline for it 
a license suspension for a period of less than six months, for 
under the court’s rules, Attorney Pangman could have his license 
reinstated following such a suspension merely by filing with the 
Board an affidavit showing full compliance with all the terms 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
14
and conditions of the order of suspension. SCR 22.28(2).6 
Accordingly, the referee rejected the Board’s position that a 
90-day 
license 
suspension 
would 
be 
an 
appropriate 
recommendation.  
¶23 Instead, 
the referee 
recommended 
that 
the 
court 
suspend Attorney Pangman’s license for at least six months, in 
order that reinstatement require an order of this court and 
Attorney Pangman’s showing that he has complied with a number of 
conditions, including that he understands the standards imposed 
upon lawyers and that he will act in conformity with those 
standards. SCR 22.28(3) to (6).7 In making that recommendation, 
                     
6 SCR 22.28 provides, in pertinent part: Reinstatement. 
 . . .  
(2) An attorney’s license suspended for misconduct or 
medical incapacity for less than 6 months is automatically 
reinstated upon the attorney’s filing with the administrator an 
affidavit showing full compliance with all the terms and 
conditions of the order of suspension.   
7 SCR 22.28 provides, in pertinent part: Reinstatement. 
 . . .  
(3) An attorney whose license is revoked or suspended for 6 
months or more for misconduct or medical incapacity shall not 
resume practice until the license is reinstated by order of the 
supreme court. A petition for reinstatement may be filed at any 
time commencing, in the case of a license suspension, 3 months 
prior to the expiration of the suspension period or, in the case 
of a license revocation, 5 years after the effective date of 
revocation. A petition for reinstatement shall be filed with the 
court and a copy shall be filed with the administrator.  
(4) The petition for reinstatement shall show that:  
(a) The petitioner desires to have the petitioner’s license 
reinstated.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
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(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during the period 
of suspension or revocation.  
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the 
order and 
will continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until the 
petitioner’s license is reinstated.  
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and learning 
in the law, including a list of specific activities pursued.  
(e) The petitioner’s conduct since the suspension or 
revocation has been exemplary and above reproach.  
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar and will act in conformity with the standards.  
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal 
profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in 
matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an 
officer of the courts.  
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the requirements 
of SCR 22.26.  
(i) The petitioner indicates the proposed use of the 
license if reinstated.  
(j) The petitioner has fully described all business 
activities during the period of suspension or revocation.  
(k) The petitioner has made restitution or settled all 
claims from persons injured or harmed by petitioner’s misconduct 
or, if the restitution is not complete, petitioner’s explanation 
of the failure or inability to do so.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
16
the 
referee 
noted 
Attorney 
Pangman’s 
assertion 
in 
the 
disciplinary proceeding that if the court disciplines him, he is 
not going to change.  
¶24 Before addressing the issues presented in the appeal 
and cross-appeal, we consider the referee’s findings of fact and 
conclusion of law in respect to Attorney Pangman’s conduct of 
the lengthy post-divorce proceedings. Neither party challenged 
the referee’s findings of fact in that regard, and we adopt 
those findings. We determine that the referee properly concluded 
that the actions Attorney Pangman took in the post-divorce 
                                                                  
(5) The administrator shall investigate the eligibility of 
the 
petitioner 
for 
reinstatement 
and 
file 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation with the board. At least 30 days prior to the 
hearing on the petition before a professional responsibility 
committee, the administrator shall publish a notice in a 
newspaper of general circulation in any county in which the 
petitioner 
maintained 
an 
office 
prior 
to 
suspension 
or 
revocation and in the county of the petitioner’s residence 
during 
the 
suspension 
or 
revocation 
and 
in 
an 
official 
publication of the state bar.  
The notice shall contain a brief statement of the nature 
and date of suspension or revocation, the matters required to be 
proved for reinstatement and the date on which a hearing on the 
petition will be held before a professional responsibility 
committee. In the case of a license suspension, the hearing 
shall not be held prior to the expiration of the period of 
suspension.  
(6) The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating by clear 
and convincing evidence that the petitioner has the moral 
character 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
this 
state 
and 
that 
the 
petitioner’s resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest. 
The petitioner shall also demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence full compliance with the terms of the order of 
suspension or revocation and the requirements of SCR 22.26.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
17
litigation did not constitute a failure to make reasonable 
efforts to expedite the matter, as required by SCR 20:3.2. 
First, Attorney Pangman was representing himself in those 
proceedings and, consequently, his obligation under the rule to 
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation was in respect to 
the interests of his client, that is, himself. Second, it was 
the referee’s determination, one which neither party has 
challenged, that there was insufficient credible evidence that 
Attorney Pangman’s pursuit of legal recourse during that 
litigation was anything more than a series of challenges to 
actions by the court that he believed were erroneous and should 
be reviewed.  
¶25 We turn then to the first issue presented in this 
appeal, namely, whether the referee properly concluded that 
Attorney Pangman violated SCR 20:8.2 by making statements he 
knew to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or 
falsity regarding Judge Gerlach’s actions and motivations in 
respect to the court reporter’s transcription of the judge’s 
decision 
from 
the 
bench. 
As 
previously 
stated, 
we 
have 
determined that the relevant portion of the rule as applied here 
is not the “known to be false” element but the “reckless 
disregard of truth or falsity.” Contrary to Attorney Pangman’s 
assertion in this appeal that he had a reasonable factual basis 
for accusing Judge Gerlach of having altered the transcript of 
the 
hearing, 
the 
record 
contains 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
establish that he did not.  
No. 96-0039-D 
 
18
¶26 It was Attorney Pangman’s contention in the course of 
the disciplinary proceeding and in the instant appeal that the 
judge had ordered the court reporter to omit from the transcript 
of the proceeding the judge’s admonition to him regarding his 
gesturing and the judge’s harsh criticism of a letter Attorney 
Pangman had written to his former spouse regarding child 
support. As the referee found, however, it was not a transcript 
of the proceeding that the judge had directed the court reporter 
to prepare but a written transcription of the decision the judge 
had delivered from the bench. The document Attorney Pangman 
accused the judge of having tampered with, with the intention of 
“sanitizing” it, is titled “Memorandum Decision and Order from 
the Bench.” Moreover, the transcript of the entire proceeding 
demonstrates that the point at which the judge admonished and 
criticized Attorney Pangman preceded the judge’s statement of 
his 
decision, 
occurring 
near 
the 
end 
of 
the 
parties’ 
presentations prior to that decision.  
¶27 Further, Attorney Pangman did nothing to bring the 
claimed omission to the attention of either the court or the 
reporter during the two months he had a copy of the memorandum 
decision prior to filing the recusal motion in which he accused 
the judge of intentionally having tampered with the record to 
interfere with his appellate rights. He made no objection to the 
memorandum decision when he appeared before Judge Gerlach in 
late July, 1993, almost a month before filing his recusal 
motion. During that proceeding, the judge brought to the 
attention of the parties three typographical errors that had 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
19
appeared in the memorandum decision and stated the corrections 
he was directing be made. Attorney Pangman made no objection, 
either to the proposed corrections or to what he later would 
claim was the judge’s intentional tampering with the record. 
Also, the referee made the undisputed finding that when Judge 
Gerlach asked Attorney Pangman for the factual basis of his 
accusations at the hearing on the recusal motion, Attorney 
Pangman was unable to present any evidence to support them.  
¶28 In light of the time Attorney Pangman had the copy of 
the memorandum decision prior to filing his recusal motion, his 
contention on appeal that his accusations against the judge 
occurred in what he termed “the context of a hurriedly prepared 
pro se Motion for Recusal,” and were for that reason somehow 
excusable, 
is 
disingenuous. 
Similarly 
meritless 
is 
his 
contention 
that 
his 
accusations 
were 
ameliorated 
by 
his 
statement in the recusal motion that they were made “on 
information and belief.”  
¶29 The 
referee’s 
other 
conclusion 
regarding 
his 
professional misconduct from which Attorney Pangman has appealed 
concerns his conduct before Judge Landry and the statements he 
made about that judge in his recusal motion. The facts 
underlying 
the referee’s 
conclusion 
that Attorney Pangman 
violated SCR 20:3.5(c) by conduct intended to disrupt the court 
and also violated that portion of the Attorney’s Oath requiring 
an attorney licensed by this court to maintain the respect due 
to courts and judicial officers are a matter of record in the 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
20
proceeding before Judge Landry and are not disputed. We 
determine that the conclusion was proper.  
¶30 We reject Attorney Pangman’s attempt to minimize the 
seriousness of that conduct by asserting that it occurred only 
after the proceeding before Judge Landry had reached what he 
termed an “objectionable” stage –- after Judge Landry refused to 
grant his request for an adjournment to obtain counsel to 
represent him -- and by contending that it had been prompted by 
surrounding circumstances, such as the fact that he was told at 
the outset of the hearing that he would be jailed for contempt 
previously committed. We also reject his characterization of his 
statements to the judge as “merely criticism” or “possibly 
disrespectful.”  
¶31 Turning to the Board’s cross-appeal from the referee’s 
conclusion that Attorney Pangman did not violate SCR 20:3.4(c) 
by knowingly disobeying several court orders regarding child 
support and placement, we determine that the referee properly 
reached that conclusion based on the facts of record. We agree 
with 
the 
referee’s 
determination 
that 
Attorney 
Pangman’s 
disobedience of the orders came within the exception stated in 
the rule, that is, that it constituted an open refusal based on 
an assertion that no valid obligation to obey those orders 
existed.  
¶32 The Board contended that there is clear, satisfactory 
and convincing evidence in the record to establish that the 
stated 
exception 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
Attorney 
Pangman’s 
disobedience of the court orders for the reason that he did not 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
21
contest openly the validity of his obligation to comply with the 
orders until the time of hearing on orders to show cause for 
contempt. The Board asserted that during what it considers the 
relevant period of time, Attorney Pangman did not inform the 
court, opposing counsel, or the guardian ad litem that he 
considered the orders invalid or otherwise insufficient to 
establish a valid obligation on his part to obey them.  
¶33 The Board also argued that Attorney Pangman’s actions 
in respect to those orders were inconsistent. While he refused 
to obey them when it suited his purposes, at times he sought to 
have those same orders enforced when that enforcement would be 
to his benefit. For example, on one occasion, he brought a 
motion for remedial contempt against his former spouse in which 
he asked the court to enforce a placement order that he himself 
had refused to obey. The Board took the position that Attorney 
Pangman’s contradictory actions in respect to the orders belie 
his contention that he openly had asserted that they created no 
valid obligation.  
¶34 Contrary to the Board’s contentions, it was not 
necessary that Attorney Pangman make “one clearly worded, 
unequivocal statement” to the court or to the parties in 
litigation that he was refusing to obey the orders because they 
did not constitute valid obligations imposed on him. Under the 
circumstances, including the fact that he was acting in the dual 
role of attorney and litigant, the actions Attorney Pangman took 
to obtain relief from those orders and his repeatedly having 
been held in contempt and incarcerated for his disobedience of 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
22
them are sufficient to bring his conduct within the stated 
exception to the rule prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly 
disobeying an obligation under the rules of a court.  
¶35 On the issue of discipline to be imposed for Attorney 
Pangman’s professional misconduct that has been established in 
this proceeding, we have noted that the referee’s recommendation 
of a six-month license suspension is based in large part on the 
referee’s consideration of aggravating factors, particularly 
Attorney Pangman’s lack of respect for the court system, his 
refusal to abide by general rules of fair play or specific rules 
governing the legal system when it suits him, his lack of 
concern for the rights and reputations of others, and his 
disregard of the obligations imposed upon him as a person 
licensed to practice law. While the record in this proceeding 
contains ample evidence of Attorney Pangman’s attitude that the 
referee found sufficiently objectionable to warrant a license 
suspension of a duration that would require a showing of a 
proper understanding of and commitment to the standards imposed 
on lawyers, the referee acknowledged that Attorney Pangman 
demonstrated in the disciplinary proceeding that he has the 
ability to conform his conduct to the standards expected of 
attorneys and at the same time be a zealous and effective 
advocate. The referee reported, “Not once during three days of 
hearings did [Attorney Pangman] conduct himself in other than an 
exemplary manner.”  
¶36 This court had the opportunity to observe Attorney 
Pangman during his oral argument in this appeal. There, he 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
23
argued matters of principle without exceeding the bounds of 
proper professional demeanor. We are satisfied that Attorney 
Pangman has the ability to abide by and conform to the rules the 
court imposes on those it licenses to represent others in our 
legal system, and we expect that he will do so in the future. In 
the event he chooses not to, the court’s attorney disciplinary 
process provides a ready remedy. Accordingly, we determine that 
the appropriate discipline to impose for Attorney Pangman’s 
professional misconduct is a 90-day license suspension.  
¶37 The final matter presented in this proceeding is the 
assessment of costs. The referee recommended that the costs be 
assessed against Attorney Pangman, and Attorney Pangman objected 
to the full assessment of costs as set forth in the Board’s 
supplemental statement of costs. That objection was based on the 
following grounds. First, Attorney Pangman asserted, the Board 
did not prevail on the majority of the claims of professional 
misconduct presented in this proceeding, and presumably most of 
the Board’s work for which it incurred costs was directed to 
those claims. He argued further that the claims on which the 
Board did prevail concerned his conduct at court proceedings 
that was documented in large part by transcripts, and thus they 
did not require the amount of work the Board expended in 
addressing that matter. Attorney Pangman next contended that the 
Board brought the proceeding in bad faith and solely for the 
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring him. He contended 
that the misconduct allegations were frivolous and that the 
Board and its counsel should have known that they had no 
No. 96-0039-D 
 
24
reasonable basis. Finally, Attorney Pangman argued that the 
items of costs sought to be assessed against him are not 
available under the Rules of Civil Procedure and that he is 
entitled to a meaningful hearing at which the Board would have 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
the 
applicability, 
relevance, 
and 
reasonableness of the costs it incurred.  
¶38 None of the objections asserted by Attorney Pangman 
has merit. Consequently, we require Attorney Pangman to pay the 
costs incurred by the Board in this proceeding as set forth in 
its supplemental statement.  
¶39 IT IS ORDERED that the license of William A. Pangman 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90 
days, commencing April 20, 1998.  
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, William A. Pangman pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing to this court of his inability to 
pay the costs within that time, the license of William A. 
Pangman to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended 
until further order of the court.  
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that William A. Pangman comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.  
¶42 JANINE P. GESKE, J., did not participate.  
 
 
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