Title: ROSS v GOLDEN STATE RODEO CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12554 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A KEITH W. ROSS individually and KEITH W. R O S S a s administrator of the Estate of Jeffery Wade Ross, a deceased minor child and representative and successor i n i n t e r e s t of Jeffrey Wade Ross, a deceased minor child, and Connie J. Ross, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, G O L D E N STATE RODEO C O M P A N Y , a Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Graybill, Graybill, Ostrem and Warner, Great F a l l s , Montana Harrison, Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana Jerome T. Loendorf argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Risken and ~ ' ~ e a r y , Helena, Montana Jack Risken argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: June 17, 1974 Decided: 4 2 5 1974 Pllr. .Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment f o r defendants entered on a jury verdict. P l a i n t i f f appeals following denial of motions f o r judgment notwithstandimg the verdict and new t r i a l . The case was t r i e d i n Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Gordon Bennett presiding. Because the issues on appeal a r e r a t h e r narrowly s t a t e d , t o understand our holding here it i s important t o discuss some of the preliminaries. The amended complaint named, i n t e r a l i a , individual county commissioners and individual members of the Lewis and Clark County Fair Commission. These persons were l a t e r dismissed a s defendants, After t h a t dismissal there remained a s defendants the County of Lewis and Clark, the Fair Board, Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co, and John Doe I-X. T w o of p l a i n t i f f ' s counts were abandoned before t r i a l , leaving t h i s s i t u a t i o n : P l a i n t i f f Keith W. Ross sued t o recover damages f o r the wrongful death of J e f f e r y Ross h i s infant son, which occurred on August 1, 1971, a t the Last Chance Stampede and F a i r a t Lewis and Clark County fairgrounds. There remained two counts of the complaint (1) the action of p l a i n t i f f individually f o r the wrongful death of h i s son and, (2) t h e action of p l a i n t i f f a s administrator of the e s t a t e of h i s deceased minor son under ~ o n t a n a ' s general sur- vival s t a t u t e . Following judgment and a f t e r appeal was taken against a l l defendants, additional and new counsel came i n t o the case f o r plain- t i f f . A t t h a t time, p l a i n t i f f dismissed the appeal a s t o Lewis and Clark County, Last Chance Stampede and F a i r Association, Inc., and John Doe I - X , expressing the i n t e n t t o appeal only a s t o one defendant, Golden State Rodeo Co. A n order was made, ex parte, permitting t h i s . The significance of t h e narrowing of the appeal w i l l appear herein- a f t e r . The rodeo a t which the death of the boy occurred took place a t the Lewis and Clark County fairgrounds. For a number of years t h e county has hired o r contracted with Golden State t o bring rodeo stock t o Helena and t o produce a rodeo known a s the Last Chance Stampede. F a c i l i t i e s f o r the show were erected and maintained by the county. Testimony was given t h a t such f a c i l i t i e s were excellent and b e t t e r than adequate. The county not only supplied the f a c i l i t i e s but supplied security personnel t o protect the spectators. O n t h e date of t h e accident p l a i n t i f f ' s family had come t o Helena t o attend the rodeo and had been on the grounds f o r some period of time prior t o the accident. A Brahma b u l l r i d i n g event was the l a s t event of the rodeo. P l a i n t i f f had purchased t i c k e t s which e n t i t l e d h i s family t o seats. Before the accident p l a i n t i f f I I l e f t h i s s e a t and was i n a r e s t r i c t e d area" f o r some time--approxi- mately an hour-- with h i s three year old son. The "restricted area" was an area around one of the arena gates. While there were no obstacles o r constructions t o physically r e s t r a i n anyone from approaching o r standing i n the area of the gate, there were repeated warnings by public announcement and o r a l warnings by uniformed security personnel, The gate was about s i x f e e t high, t h e same height a s t h e fence around the arena. The Brahma b u l l "Yellow ever" threw i t s r i d e r ; then t r o t t e d over t o t h e gate i n question and jumped on it, f e l l on over t o the other side and landed on the three year old boy. The boy died of h i s i n j u r i e s before he reached the hospital. The b u l l Yellow Fever was variously described a s a "good" r l b u l l , one of our "besf' b u l l s , a "good performer", a vicioust' b u l l . A n expert on Brahma b u l l s described them a s being the "most a c t i v e domestic animals". The issues on appeal a r e three: (1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t court erred i n not directing a verdict on the i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y ; (2) Error i n instructions; and (3) Whether the verdict i s supported by t h e facts. The main t h r u s t of appellant's appeal i s t h a t there existed under the f a c t s presented a s i t u a t i o n where defendant Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co. was negligent a s a matter of law, and thus the i s s u e should not have been submitted t o the jury. It i s important t o remember t h a t here we a r e concerned only with Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co. Golden State, under the evidence, was the show producer i n the arena only. It had no control over spectators, including p l a i n t i f f and h i s son. De- fendants who had control o f , and the r e s u l t a n t duty t o the spectators have, f o r reasons known only t o p l a i n t i f f , been dismissed from the appeal. Thus, we only look narrowly t o the proof a s it concerns Golden State. The only proof was t h a t Golden S t a t e furnished the b u l l ellow ow ever"; t h a t t h e b u l l was dangerous; and, t h a t he had been known t o jump fences. P l a i n t i f f , we believe, throughout the t r i a l and here, believed t h a t an owner of a vicious o r dangerous animal i s an insurer. In Hansen v. Brogan, 145 Mont. 224, 400 P.2d 265, where a t o u r i s t was gored by a buffalo, p l a i n t i f f had stopped a t a public r e s o r t owned by defendant. This r e s o r t had a c o r r a l containing animals. P l a i n t i f f stood near the fence and a buffalo charged i n t o it, injuring p l a i n t i f f . The jury found i n favor of p l a i n t i f f . The complaint alleged the defendant, i n keeping wild animals, was an insurer of p l a i n t i f f ' s safety and was s t r i c t l y l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s . The complaint a l s o alleged a general negligence theory and denied any negligence on p l a i n t i f f ' s part. Defendant alleged contributory negligence and assumption of r i s k . The t r i a l court ruled out a l l of defendant's proof on contributory negligence, assumption of r i s k , and knowledge of the vicious nature of the animal. The court granted a directed verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f on the issue of l i a b i l i t y ; a ruling requested of the t r i a l court i n the i n s t a n t case but which it correctly denied. In Hansen t h i s Court concluded t h a t the law of negligence was preferable and the t r i a l court was i n e r r o r i n limiting the evidence of defendant and directing a verdict on l i a b i l i t y i n favor of p l a i n t i f f . While Hansen established t h e law of negligence, it did not purport t o e s t a b l i s h the standard of care. However, Hansen did c i t e with approval 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, p. 839, that the : "* * degree of care which must be exercised i n the keeping of an animal w i l l depend upon its nature and w i l l obviously be higher i n the case of a t i g e r than z dog. I I In Thompson v. Yellowstone Livestock, 133 Mont. 403, 413, 324 P.2d 412, the Court quoted with approval from Potter v. Thompson, 74 Cal.App.2d 474, 477, 169 P.2d 40, where defendants were charged with negligence i n f a i l i n g t o provide a reasonably s a f e enclosure and adequate supervision of t h e customers. This Court said i n Thompson : "When the cow went on a rampage, instead ofcpening the gate f o r it t o escape, o r attempting t o other- I wise protect t h e spectators, the attendants got out of there a s quick a s possible.' The defendant Clint Thompson, admitted t h a t he was present on an occasion about a year and a h a l f before t h i s incident, and saw another cow escape from the enclosure by going over o r through the fence 'between the cables. t "At t h e condlusion of the t r i a l , the jury returned a verdict i n favor of the defendants, finding t h a t they I were 'not g u i l t y of negligence. A judgment was rendered accordingly. A motion f o r new t r i a l was granted on the specified ground of insufficiency of the evidence t o support the verdict. From t h a t order, an appeal- was taken. The appellate court s a i d [74 CaleApp.(2d) 474, 169 P.2d 421: "'The chief contention of the appellants i s t h a t the court abused i t s discretion i n granting a new t r i a l since the uncontradicted evidence c l e a r l y shows t h a t they were not g u i l t y of negligence, and t h a t they had no knowledge of the f a c t t h a t t h e cow i n question was nervous o r dangerous t o t h e spectators. "'1n determining whether the defendants were g u i l t y of negligence which proximately caused the i n j u r i e s complained o f , i t was the duty of the jurors, and t h e t r i a l judge upon the motion f o r new t r i a l , t o consider a l l of the proved f a c t s and circumstances surrounding the incident. The question t o be determined i s , what would a reasonably prudent person be required t o do, under such circumstances, f o r t h e protection of h i s invited customers. The f a c t t h a t the defendants did not actually know t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r cow i n question was fractious, nervous o r dangerous does not necessarily acquit them of negligence on t h a t score. They were expert auctioneers of c a t t l e , who had been i n t h a t business f o r several years. They had handled and sold hun- dreds of cows. W e must assume t h a t some of the animals were l i k e l y t o become fractious, i r r i t a b l e , nervous and dangerous. The defendants handled and sold c a t t l e which we assume had various temperaments, tendencies and natures. On a former occasion another fractious cow broke through the enclosure. It i s not unreasonable t o assume t h a t the defendants should have anticipated t h a t some of the cows would become uncontrollable and r e s t o r t t o dangerous be- havior when driven i n t o the small enclosure i n the presence of spectators. Since it was the duty of the defendants t o provide a reasonably s a f e enclosure, it i s a proper inquiry a s t o whether a fence 4 f e e t 8 inches high, with a sagging upper cable, i s reasonably safe f o r the protection of prospective customers who a r e seated adjacent thereto. The court might reasonably i n f e r t h a t t h e enclosure was unsafe, and t h a t defendants should have added another cable t o increase the height of the fence, o r a t l e a s t t h a t they should have tightened the sagging top cable. The court a l s o had a r i g h t t o assume it was the duty of the defendants t o provide attendants t o reasonably guard the c a t t l e i n the enclosure, and t h a t , instead of fleeing f o r t h e i r own safety when the cow went upon a rampage, they should have opened t h e gate t o permit the animal t o escape, o r otherwise r e s t r a i n it f o r the protection of the spectators. 11 ' These and other question were proper f o r the judge t o consider on the motion f o r new t r i a l . Certainly t h i s court may not hold a s a matter of law t h a t t h e judge abused h i s discretion i n granting a new t r i a l merely be- cause he disagreed with the jury regarding the defendants' exercise of ordinary care where there i s a serious c o n f l i c t of evidence upon t h a t subject, a s there was i n t h i s case. 11 1 The p l a i n t i f f , Marie Porter, was an invitee. She was a prospective purchaser of c a t t l e a t the auction s a l e which was being conducted by the defendants. It was defendants' duty t o exercise reasonable care t o maintain supervision and a reasonably safe enclosure and s e a t s f o r the customers.* * *"I In the foreoing quoted case the standard of care discussed was reasonable care t o maintain supervision and a reasonably s a f e enclo- sure and s e a t s f o r customers. Thompson involved a livestock auction r i n g where a customer was i n h i s s e a t and a cow jumped a fence landing on t h e customer. In the i n s t a n t case appellant c i t e s Thompson a s supporting the r e f u s a l of an instruction on ordinary care. However, the opinion i n Thompson shows t h a t t h e standard of care instruction refused was a s t o t h e knowledge of a propensity o r tendency of the cow. A s a matter of f a c t , Thompson used a reasonable o r ordinary standard of care. The judgment there was f o r p l a i n t i f f and we affirmed. Thompson i s somewhat similar t o the i n s t a n t case. Even though appellant here s t a t e s t h a t the animal i n Thompson causing the injury was not a vicious b u l l , but a simple cow, the r e s u l t i s the same. Here, the b u l l was not attacking but jumping, j u s t a s the fractious though simple cow did i n Thompson. Also, and even more s i g n i f i c a n t , i n the i n s t a n t case the owner of the animal is the only remaining defendant whereas i n Thompson t h e owner of the animal was not a defendant. Rather, there t h e Livestock Commission Co., who operated the s a l e s ring--like the county and f a i r board here-- was the de- fendant. In Thompson, i n discussing the motioncf defendant f o r nonsuit, t h i s Court said: I t It i s a general r u l e t h a t i n a motion f o r nonsuit, t h e evidence must be accepted and taken most favorably to p l a i n t i f f , and t h a t even doubtful in- f erences and deductions must be resolved favorably toward p l a i n t i f f . The evidence i n t h i s case a s introduced by p l a i n t i f f , c l e a r l y established t h a t he was present a s a business i n v i t e e and t h a t it was defendant's duty t o use ordinary care t o keep the premises i n a reasonably safe condition. This f a c t having been very strongly established, the judge properly overruled and denied defendant's motion f o r a nonsuit. I I I n the i n s t a n t case, the remaining prevailing party has the benefit of t h a t reasoning. A s heretofore pointed out the wlmtary dismissal of Lewis and Clark County and the F a i r Board, leaves only the duty of Golden State Rodeo Co. t o be comidered here. What f a i l u r e i n the exercise of any standard of care, reasonably o r otherwise, was proven here a s t o Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co. ? The jury found none. Appellant's second i s s u e regarding instructions quarrels with t h e t r i a l court giving an instruction on ordinary care of a reasonable and prudent person acting under t h e circumstances. Appellant urges t h a t a higher degree of care would be required than ordinary care. HOW- ever, again the significance of the volunary dismissal of t h e other defendants appears. With only Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co. t o consider, there was an absence of proof of any negligence a s a proximate cause so t h a t the giving of the instruction could not have been prejudicial. While we r u l e here t h a t no evidence of negligence was proven against t h e remaining defendant, we a r e not t o be understood t h a t an instruction on ordinary o r reasonable care would be s u f f i c i e n t had there been proof of any negligence as t o t h a t remaining defendant. W e a r e impressed with the discussion by t h e Utah Court i n T o m v. Days of '47, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 386, 401 P.2d 946, 948, where t h a t Court said: " ~ e f e n d a n t contends t h a t the court committed p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r because it unduly emphasized p l a i n t i f f ' s theory and p r a c t i c a l l y directed a verdict on the issue of negli- gence because it instructed the jury t h a t defendant had a duty t o construct a fence t h a t would be safe f o r the purpose f o r which i t was intended, t h a t is, t o Iteep the b u l l out of the bleachers, and t h a t it had a further duty t o use reasonable diligence t o inspect the fence t o see t h a t it was i n proper condiction t o f u l f i l l t h i s requirement, and t h a t i f it f a i l e d i n e i t h e r of these duties t h e defendant would be negligent. Then, a f t e r giving t h i s instruction the court unduly emphasized p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence by further instructing t h e jury t h a t i t must find whether defendant was negli- gent i n building the fence with the chain l i n k wire on the grandstand side of the posts, using the type of fastening it did and i n f a i l i n g t o have a r a i l o r tension wire o r other obstruction between the ground and the bottom of t h e fence. 11 It i s t o be noted t h a t the uncontradicted evidence was t o the e f f e c t t h a t the Brahma b u l l was trained t o be belligerent and i n i t s performance a t the rodeo was goaded t o be mean. For show purposes, the meaner the b u l l i s , the more spectacular i t i s considered t o be f o r the audience. It i s a l s o t o be noted t h a t t h e r e was no question a s t o how the fence was b u i l t o r the type of materials used i n the fence. The only controversy i n regard t o the fence was i t s adequacy f o r the purpose f o r which it was b u i l t , t h a t is, t o keep the performing ani- mals i n the arena and away from spectators. Both plain- t i f f and defendant resented the views of experts on t h i s I : problem. P l a i n t i f f s experts pointed out what they con- sidered i t s deficiencies and defendant's experts t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s b u i l t , t h e fence was a s good o r b e t t e r f o r the purpose intended than usually i s found i n other places where rodeos a r e held. The jury found the opinions of p l a i n t i f f ' s experts more convincing. I t It cannot be gainsaid t h a t t o be f r e e of negligence a higher degree of care i s required of a possessor f o r the containment of a known vicious o r dangerous animal than i n t h e case of an ordinary, domestic animal with l e s s known dangerous propensities. It i s r e a d i l y foreseeable t h a t a vicious animal i s highly dangerous t o persons with whom it might come i n contact, and, therefore, the possessor must use greater care t o f o r e s t a l l such contact. The c o u r t ' s instructions were consonant with t h i s greater duty of care but l e f t it t o the jury t o determine whether defendant had used such care i n the construction and in- spection of the fence so t h a t it was safe f o r the use f o r which it was intended. The g i s t of an action f o r i n j u r i e s against t h e possessor of a dangerous animal is t h e f a i l u r e t o use care commensurate with i t s known vicious tendencies t o keep the animal securely contained.The f a i l u r e t o use such c a ~ i s negligence, and i f such negligence i s the proximate cause of the i n j u r i e s sustained by the p l a i n t i f f , the possessor of the animal i s l i a b l e . The f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f did not pay f o r viewing the performance and may have been a mere licensee did not change defendant's l i a b i l i t y . Un- l i k e the r u l e s i n cases imposed on possessors of land f o r i n j u r i e s caused by the dangerous physical conditions of t h e lands, no d i s t i n c t i o n between business invitees and licensees a r e made a s t o l i a b i l i t y of t h e possessor of a dangerous domestic animal f o r i n j u r e s sustained by either. 1 l In the i n s t a n t case p l a i n t i f f offered an instruction from the Montana Jury Instruction Guide, No. 110.04, which reads: "ANIMALS-INJURY BY VICIOUS DOMESTIC ANIMAL. ".Jury Instruction No. 110.04 I 1 One who owns o r keeps an animal known by him t o be of vicious tendencies and dangerous t o people i s l i a b i l e t o a person injured by such animal, unless t h e injured party i s g u i l t y of negligence contri- buting d i r e c t l y t o t h e injury. The injured party i s g u i l t y of such negligence i f : I I (1) He has done something a reasonable person should have known was l i k e l y t o provoke an a t t a c k by the animal; o r "(2) H e knew of an unusual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the animal and did something which a reasonable person could reasonably expect t o provoke an a t t a c k by t h a t p a r t i c u l a r animal; o r I 1 (3) H e intentionally and unreasonably exposed himself t o injury, e i t h e r knowing the customary nature of t h a t kind of animal o r knowing the p a r t i c u l a r nature of the spec i f i c animal. I I That i n s t r u c t i o n would make t h e owner of the b u l l an insurer unless one of the three exceptions a s t o contributory negligence applied. The instruction was not applicable i n any event. Finding no e r r o r , the judgment i s affirmed. J u s t i c e (J W e Concur: ' %. "---~/Ho~.M.~ .Takes Sorte, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. Honorable M. James Sorte, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, specially concurring: I concur i n the r e s u l t . However, it seems t o m e t h a t defendant Golden S t a t e Rodeo Co. was t h e only defendant t h a t knew of t h e p a r t i c u l a r dangerous propensities of t h e b u l l "Yellow Fever". If t h i s question had been presented t o the jury there might have been a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent. The majority opinion seems t b conclude t h a t t h e dismissal of the F a i r Board and Lewis and Clark County, leaving the Golden S t a t e Rodeo C o b alone a s defendant, excluded a l l of the defendants who owed a duty t o the patrons a t the rodeo because it i s claimed the rodeo company had no control over the spectators. I disagree. I f t h e rodeo company's duty was arrived a t i n t h i s manner, it could exhibit i t s "bull" without any fence. I find no authority t o support the doctrine t h a t the manner i n which the known vicious b u l l approached the fence enclosure, through it o r over it, could characterize him l e g a l l y a s a "fractious" bull. I f e e l t h e owners and exhibitors of t h i s kind of animal have a duty and a r e held t o a higher degree of care than s e t f o r t h i n the majority opinion, regardless of the duty o r negli-