Title: JACK DOLLARHIDE V. SCOTT BANCROFT, MURRAY SHATTUCK, and MICHAEL JOHNSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JACK DOLLARHIDE V. SCOTT BANCROFT, MURRAY SHATTUCK, and MICHAEL JOHNSON2010 WY 126239 P.3d 1168Case Number: S-10-0023Decided: 09/14/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

JACK 
DOLLARHIDE,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
SCOTT 
BANCROFT, MURRAY SHATTUCK, and MICHAEL JOHNSON,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Weston 
W. Reeves and Anna M. Reeves Olson of Park Street Law Office, Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Reeves 
Olson and Mr. Reeves.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Richard 
A. Mincer of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; John A. Sundahl of 
Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; L. Kathleen 
Chaney of Lambdin & Chaney, LLC, Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Ms. Chaney and Messrs. 
Mincer and Sundahl.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On August 3, 
2001, while employed as a carpenter by Bancroft Construction, Inc., in Teton 
County, Wyoming, Jack Dollarhide (Dollarhide) was injured when the raised wooden 
platform upon which he was standing crashed to the ground.  Dollarhide obtained benefits from the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation fund, but also filed a co-employee liability 
action against Scott Bancroft (Bancroft), the owner of the company, and Murray 
Shattuck (Shattuck), the company's general construction superintendent.  That action subsequently was consolidated 
with a similar action filed by Dollarhide against Michael Johnson (Johnson), the 
company's project superintendent.1

 
 
[¶2]      After 
considerable delay, the first trial resulted in a mistrial due to certain 
comments made by Dollarhide's counsel during opening statements.  The second trial resulted in a jury 
verdict in favor of Bancroft, Shattuck, and Johnson.  In this appeal, Dollarhide challenges 
the granting of the mistrial and assessment of costs resulting therefrom, and 
the denial of his motion for entry of default based upon a pretrial change in 
Johnson's testimony.  Finding no 
error, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion in granting Bancroft's motion for mistrial and assessing costs 
against Dollarhide?

 
 
            
2.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in denying Dollarhide's motion for entry of 
default?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]                  
            
"The court's ruling on a motion for mistrial . . . is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion."  Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 
(Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S. Ct. 59, 145 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1999); 
see also Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 
968 (Wyo. 1996).  "Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.'"  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)); see also Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 
(Wyo. 1999).

 
 
In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  If the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent 
a showing that some facet of the ruling is arbitrary or 
capricious.

 
 

Jordan 
v. Brackin, 
992 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 

Hannifan 
v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Cheyenne, 
2008 WY 65, ¶ 36, 185 P.3d 679, 693 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Terry v. Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 
2000)).  We also review the granting 
of costs as a sanction under the same standard.  Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Ass'n, 2002 
WY 94, ¶ 38, 48 P.3d 1072, 1085 (Wyo. 2002); Welch v. Hat Six Homes, 2002 WY 81, ¶ 
10, 47 P.3d 199, 202 (Wyo. 2002); Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 2001 WY 64, ¶ 6, 27 P.3d 695, 697 (Wyo. 2001).  Where egregious discovery abuse, or 
similar misconduct, has occurred, the discretion to impose sanctions may include 
the power to strike pleadings and to enter a default.  Stanley Shenker & Assocs. Inc. v. World 
Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc., 844 A.2d 964, 973 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1992); Combs v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 
1991).

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      On August 3, 
2001, Dollarhide was working for the company building a residence in Teton 
County.  At some point on that date, 
he and another employee got onto a wooden platform fitted with guardrails, which 
platformsometimes called a "man-basket"was then raised approximately twelve to 
fifteen feet in the air on the tines of a forklift so the men could attach two 
beams to the ceiling.  The 
man-basket came apart, and both men fell to the ground, with Dollarhide 
receiving serious injuries.  These 
basic facts are not in dispute.

 
 
[¶6]      Dollarhide sued 
Bancroft, the company's owner, and Shattuck, the company's general construction 
superintendent.  Later, that lawsuit 
was consolidated with his separate suit against Johnson, the project 
superintendent.  The gist of the 
cause of action against all three men was that they acted intentionally or in 
willful and wanton disregard of the known and obvious risks presented by 
elevating workers off the ground on a flimsy wooden platform.  This being the central issue of the 
case, the two focal questions became whether such was the company practice, and 
if so, what each man knew about the practice prior to the 
accident.

 
 
[¶7]      In their Answers 
to Dollarhide's Complaints, Bancroft, Shattuck, and Johnson generally denied the 
allegations, and specifically denied that Dollarhide was directed to use the 
man-basket.  More significantly, in 
support of a Motion for Summary Judgment, Bancroft and Shattuck relied upon 
their own affidavits, and Johnson's affidavit, to set forth, inter alia, the following 
"facts":

 
 
            
1.   Before work began on 
the day of the accident, Johnson instructed the workers to use scaffolding to 
install the beams, and the workers verbally acknowledged such 
instruction.

 
 
            
2.   Scaffolding was 
present at the job site for such purpose.

 
 
            
3.   During Johnson's 
temporary absence from the job site, the workers decided on their own to use the 
wooden man-basket.

 
 
            
4.   Neither Bancroft nor 
Shattuck was physically present at the job site on the date Dollarhide was 
injured, and neither man had any knowledge prior to the accident that company 
employees would use the wooden platform in the manner it was 
used.

 
 
            
5.   Neither Bancroft nor 
Shattuck were ever advised by any employee that a dangerous condition existed 
because employees were using the wooden platform in the manner it was 
used.

 
 
            
6.   In addition to the 
above statements, Johnson also specifically swore in his affidavit that the 
wooden platform was never intended to be used as it was being used when 
Dollarhide was injured, but was constructed for the sole purpose of transporting 
tools at the job site.

 
 
[¶8]      This version of 
events had one central theme:  it 
was not company policy or practice to use the wooden platform as a "man-basket," 
and Dollarhide was not authorized or instructed to use it in that manner.  The defendants perpetuated this theme in 
affidavits, depositions, and other discovery responses.  In support of his own Motion for Summary 
Judgment after he was brought in as a defendant, Johnson presented the same 
defense, and utilized many of the same discovery documents.  In his deposition taken in 2008, he 
repeated the statements he made in his 2005 affidavit; that is, he claimed that 
not only had he not instructed Dollarhide to use the wooden platform as a 
man-lift, he had never seen any company employees elevated in a wooden 
platform.

 
 
[¶9]      Without opining 
as to fault, we will simply say that the tortuous pretrial progress of this case 
is not a model to be followed.2  The incident occurred on August 3, 
2001.  The first Complaint was filed 
on August 29, 2003.  The discovery 
process, dispositive motions, changes in legal representation, a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute, and an appeal to this court caused considerable delay in 
getting to trial.3  See Dollarhide v. Bancroft, 2008 WY 113, 
193 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2008) (reversal of the dismissal).  Finally, the final pretrial conference 
was scheduled for April 20, 2009, and the trial was scheduled to begin on May 
18, 2009.

 
 
[¶10]   Just prior to the pretrial 
conference, the events that gave rise to the case in its present posture began 
to unfold.  Citing "professional 
considerations" and Rule 1.16(a)(1) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys at Law, the defendants' attorneys moved on April 16, 2009, to be 
allowed to withdraw from the case.4  That motion was granted, and several new 
lawyers appeared separately for the three defendants.  The trial was reset for August 10, 2009. 
 On May 26, 2009, Johnson's new 
counsel sent a "correction page" to all counsel and to the court reporter who 
had reported Johnson's deposition eleven months earlier.  Set out below is Johnson's original 
deposition testimony, along with the change made to each pertinent 
answer:

 
 
Q.    During the time that you 
worked for Bancroft Construction, did they  did you ever observe Bancroft use a 
wooden platform to raise workers up in the air to work?

 
 

A.    No.  [Changed 
to:  "Yes, workers used wooden 
platforms."]

 
 
Q.    Never?

 
 

A.    Never.  [Changed 
to:  "Bancroft Construction used 
wooden platforms on several occasions."]

 
 
Q.    Not on any of the jobs that 
you worked on?

 
 

A.    While I was there, no.  [Changed 
to:  "I did witness the usage 
[sic] 
of wooden 
platforms."]

 
 
Q.    Okay.  Did you ever see or observe any Bancroft 
employees be raised up by a forklift in a steel or metal basket to 
work?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  But never in a wooden or on a wooden 
platform or wooden pallet or anything like that?

 
 

A.    No.  [Changed 
to:  "Yes.  Wooden 
platform."]

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Sure.  Would it be fair to say that you never 
observed any Bancroft employees working aboveground from a forklift, unless they 
were in a metal basket?

 
 

A.    Correct.  [Changed 
to:  "Not correct.  Wooden platforms were used to work 
from."]

 
 
[¶11]   This dramatic change in Johnson's 
testimony concerning the primary issue of the case caused Johnson's deposition 
to be re-opened on June 22, 2009.  During the deposition, Johnson testified 
that, a few weeks before his original attorneys withdrew from the case, he had a 
conversation with them about changing his prior deposition testimony.  In addition, during a break in the 
deposition, Johnson's attorney presented to Dollarhide's attorney a packet of 
previously undisclosed photographs, some of which were taken at the job site in 
2001 by the project architect, and which show thewooden man-basket that had 
collapsed.  Johnson's original 
attorneys had received the photographs from the architect at approximately the 
same time that they discussed with Johnson changing his deposition 
testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   The jury trial began on August 10, 
2009.  That afternoon, in his 
opening statement to the jury, Dollarhide's counsel made the following comments 
following a lengthy statement about Bancroft Construction's use of wooden 
man-baskets and Johnson's change in testimony:

 
 

            
Let me tell you why this is so serious.  In 2005 Shattuck and Bancroft filed 
their statements and copies of their Depositions with Judge Guthrie and on the 
basis of their sworn testimony told her throw the case out, she 
didn't do it.  And in 2008 Michael Johnson with copies 
 filed a motion with copies of his affidavit, his answers to interrogatories, 
his 2008 deposition, depositions of Shattuck and Bancroft, all of which say 
[Dollarhide], it's your fault, you didn't do what we told you to do and asked 
Judge Guthrie to throw the case out, she 
didn't do it.

 
 

            
Michael Johnson retracted his testimony only after he learned that 
carpenters who worked on his crew were going to be willing to come forward and 
say that ain't so.  And the question 
I'm going to ask him, which he can think about tonight, if 
Judge Guthrie had thrown the case out saying the unanimous evidence is 
[Dollarhide] screwed up 
would you have told anybody, Mr. Johnson, that a ruling was based on your 
lie?  That's the question to which I 
want to get an answer in this case.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶13]   No defense attorney objected to 
these comments at the time they were made, but before defense opening statements 
began, Bancroft's counsel moved for a mistrial based, among other things, on the 
contention that these comments "suggested to the jury that you [Judge Guthrie] 
think that it's a good lawsuit and they should too."  The following morning, after allowing 
counsel to argue the matter, the district court granted the mistrial motion, 
concluding that the prejudice resulting from the statement could not be overcome 
with a curative instruction.  On 
August 24, 2009, Bancroft filed a Motion for Sanctions based upon the mistrial. 
 Bancroft sought $7,883.75 for 
expenses related to the aborted trial.  
On the following day, the district court entered an order taking the 
motion under advisement pending resetting and completion of the jury 
trial.

 
 
[¶14]   Stepping back in time a few days 
before the filing of the just-mentioned motion and order, we will now briefly 
describe the events that led to the second issue presently before this 
Court.  On August 17, 2009, less 
than a week after the mistrial was granted, Dollarhide filed a motion entitled 
"Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, for Order Requiring Supplementation of 
Defendants' Discovery Responses and for Remedial Measures Required by Wyoming 
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3."  In that motion, Dollarhide asked the 
district court to enter default against all three defendants as a sanction for 
their reliance upon Johnson's perjured testimony throughout the pretrial 
proceedings.  In the same order in 
which the district court took Bancroft's sanctions motion under advisement, the 
same was done with Dollarhide's motion.

 
 
[¶15]   The second trial began on August 
31, 2009, and on September 8, 2009, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendants.  That verdict is not the 
subject of this appeal.  Rather, in 
addition to the grant of a mistrial and the denial of a default, Dollarhide 
appeals the district court's resolution of the parties' motions for 
sanctions.  On November 13, 2009, 
the district court entered an order entitled "Re-Entry of Judgment, Award of 
Costs, and Order on Motions for Sanctions."  After consideration of the parties' 
conduct throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings, and consideration of the 
verdict, the district court ordered as follows:

 
 
1.    Dollarhide was to pay Teton 
County $2,235.45 for jury costs attributable to the 
mistrial.

 
 
2.    The defendants were to pay 
Dollarhide $450.78 for the costs of the trial continuance occasioned by the 
change in defense counsel.

 
 
3.    Dollarhide was ordered to pay 
Bancroft $2,844.47, Shattuck $778.18, and Johnson $3,537.42 as costs resulting 
from the defense verdict in the second trial.

 
 
4.    Dollarhide was awarded 
nothing as a result of Johnson's perjured testimony, and the defendants were 
awarded nothing as a result of the mistrial.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in granting Bancroft's motion for 
mistrial and assessingcosts against 
Dollarhide?

 
 
[¶16]   The gravamen of the mistrial 
motion, as well as the district court's rationale for granting the motion, was 
that Dollarhide's counsel had irrevocably tainted the jury by telling it, in 
effect, that Judge Guthrie had found Dollarhide to have a valid case against the 
defendants.  The reason that we must 
affirm the district court is that it is impossible to show that the mistrial 
decision was unreasonable or arbitrary or capricious under these 
circumstances.  While it is the law 
that "[g]ranting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be 
resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not 
be served by proceeding with trial[,]" it is also the law that "[t]he trial 
court is also in the best position to assess the prejudicial impact of such 
error."  Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 
1995); see also Martin v. State, 2007 
WY 2, ¶ 19, 149 P.3d 707, 712 (Wyo. 2007).  
We are in no position to second-guess the trial court's on-site, 
real-time assessment.5  Dollarhide argues that, "even if the 
statement was improper, it could have been cured by an instruction."  Obviously, we also are in no position to 
test the accuracy of that assumption.

 

[¶17]   Although 
not exactly the same, the facts of this case are similar to the facts in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. 
Resnick, 636 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1994), where the 
appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion where the 
plaintiff's counsel during opening statement told the jury that "the judge has 
already determined that [the defendant] didn't have [proof of delivery of a 
notice]."  Id. at 76.  In reversing, the appellate court 
concluded that

 
 
the 
remarks by [plaintiff's] counsel were such that an objection and instructions to 
disregard them could not cure the resulting prejudice.  The trial judge is the dominant figure 
responsible for the management, direction, and control of the proceedings.  In the adversary system, the jury looks 
to the trial judge for guidance.  A 
comment of this nature, made at the beginning of the proceedings, can have a 
marked tendency to influence a jury in its analysis of the issue.  We find the harm engendered by the 
comment made during opening statement is sufficiently pervasive and prejudicial 
to negate any curative value the judge's subsequent instructions might have 
had.

 
 

Id. 
at 77 (internal citations omitted).  
The same can be said of the case sub judice.

 
 

[¶18]   As 
mentioned above, we also review the award or denial of costs and sanctions after 
a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  
See supra ¶ 4.  In the instant case, the district court 
ordered Dollarhide to pay $2,235.45 to Teton County for the jury costs 
attributable to the mistrial, but it denied the defendants' request for costs 
and attorney's fees in the amount of $29,044.31, likewise attributable to the mistrial.  U.R.D.C. 503(b) provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
(b)  When a mistrial is 
caused by any party, the court may order that the party, or parties, reimburse 
the proper fund for fees and mileage paid to the witnesses, jurors and bailiffs 
for their attendance.

 
 
In 
other words, the district court clearly had the authority to order Dollarhide to 
pay the jury costs.  As to 
sanctions, Dollarhide certainly has no complaint that the district court did not 
also order him to pay the $29,044.31 sought by the defendants for his having 
caused the mistrial.  Under these 
circumstances, we would be hard-pressed to find the district court's assessment 
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.  As with the mistrial decision itself, 
the decision as to costs is a matter for the trial court's discretion.  We see no abuse of that discretion 
here.

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in denying Dollarhide's motion for entry 
of default?

 
 
[¶19]   After the mistrial brought an end 
to the first trial, and before the second trial started, Dollarhide filed a 
motion requesting, among other things, that the district court enter a default 
against the defendants on the issue of liability because of the last-minute 
change in Johnson's testimony.  The 
district court took the motion under advisement until after the second trial. 
 In its post-trial Re-Entry of 
Judgment, Award of Costs, and Order on Motions for Sanctions, the district court 
found that Johnson had admitted perjury and had changed his testimony, but that 
neither Bancroft nor Shattuck ever admitted perjury or changed his testimony. 
 In regard to the latter two 
defendants, the district court stated:

 
 
However, 
it is difficult for the Court to comprehend that the owner and general 
supervisor of a successful construction companywho had both been involved in 
the construction industry most of their adult liveswere so out of touch with 
the operations at their construction jobs that they were unaware that wooden 
platforms were being used to elevate workers.

 
 
The 
court then concluded that either Johnson alone, or in concert with the other 
defendants "perpetrated a fraud on the Court since 2005 with the false testimony 
that wooden platforms were not used as man-baskets on Bancroft construction 
sites."  In the end, the district 
court resolved its apparent indecision as to the culpability of Bancroft and 
Shattuck by sanctioning all three defendants for the "fraud on the Court."  The sanction was the denial to the 
defendants of their costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$29,044.31.

 
 
[¶20]   That brings us to the nub of 
Dollarhide's argumenthe contends that monetary sanctions are simply 
insufficient in the face of perjury, especially where that perjury lies at the 
heart of a "fraud on the court."  
Dollarhide cites Hazel-Atlas Glass 
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944) 
(overruled on other grounds by Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97 S. Ct. 31, 50 L. Ed. 21 (1976)), as 
being the first case to recognize what has come to be known as the "fraud on the 
court" doctrine.  In Hazel-Atlas, the lower court's denial of 
a post-trial motion for relief from judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court 
because tampering with the administration of justice cannot be tolerated.  Id. at 246, 64 S. Ct.  at 1001.6  It has been said that "fraud on the 
court" occurs "where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a 
party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to 
interfere with the judicial system's ability to impartially adjudicate a matter 
by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of 
the opposing party's claim or defense."  
Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989).

 
 
[¶21]   Many courts have recognized that 
courts possess the inherent authority to strike claims, or to strike answers, or 
to enter default, as sanctions for severe litigation abuse.  See, e.g., Campos v. Correction Officer 
Smith, 418 F. Supp. 2d 277, 279 (W.D. N.Y. 2006) (complaint dismissed where 
plaintiff knowingly presented a falsified exhibit); Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 
(S.D. Fla. 1995) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff fabricated evidence and 
committed perjury); Sun World, Inc. v. 
Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 389 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (default entered 
against defendants who submitted fraudulent documents and committed perjury); Aoude, 892 F.2d  at 1118 (claim dismissed 
where plaintiff attached a "bogus" agreement to the complaint); Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 1267, 
1279 (E.D. Ky. 1986) (answer and counterclaim stricken because defendant 
submitted backdated documents).  
Such severe sanctions should be available not just as punishment, but 
also as a deterrent to others from such conduct.  See Pearson v. First NH Mortg. Corp., 
200 F.3d 30, 42 n.7 (1st Cir. 1999); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 
(1976).

 
 

[¶22]   The 
phrase "inherent authority" in this context describes those powers that "are 
necessary to the exercise of all others."  
Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 
(1980).  This Court has said that 
"courts have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules and statutes that 
are absolutely necessary to the courts' ability to perform the functions for 
which they were created."  Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the 
Ninth Judicial Dist., 735 P.2d 709, 713 (Wyo. 1987).  Further,

 
 
[c]ourts 
are vested with very great and far-reaching power to control their business and 
proceedings and to enforce their orders and process in conducting the business 
of a court.  Courts must have these 
very great powers to ensure civility, orderly procedure, respect for the court 
as an institution and for its orders, and in the end an honest development of 
the facts of a controversy that will end in a just result.

 
 

Id. 
at 712.

 
 

[¶23]   Needless 
to say, of course, is the fact that possession of the inherent authority to do 
something does not equate to the requirement that such be done.  Whether a court chooses to impose a 
sanction as severe as dismissal or default is a matter left to that court's 
discretion, and our review of that decision, as stated above, is for abuse of 
that discretion.  In the instant 
case, there are several factors that incline us not to reverse the district 
court's decision not to default the defendants.  First, Johnson recanted his lies prior 
to trial and was re-deposed, and was cross-examined and impeached, allowing the 
trial to proceed with the jury having knowledge of, and basing its determination 
on, "the truth." Second, the complicity of Bancroft and Shattuck was surmised by 
the district court, but evidently not found by the jury, because the jury found 
in favor of the defendants.  And 
third, the district court did not ignore the alleged misconduct, imposing a 
sanction of $29,044.31.

 
 

[¶24]   Stated 
as a positive, the proper exercise of discretion means doing something that is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  
We do not reverse unless what was done by the district court was 
unreasonable.   Perhaps the most significant procedural 
fact of this case is the fact that the false testimony was disclaimed by Johnson 
prior to trial, thereby allowing Dollarhide to present to the jury not only his 
view of the truth, but the attemptadmitted at least by one of the defendantsto 
hide the truth.  The district court 
was satisfied that the change in testimony was sufficiently presented to the 
jury, and concluded that a default was not appropriate.  We do not find that to have been an 
abuse of the district court's discretion.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶25]   The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for a 
mistrial, in denying the motion to enter a default, or in its costs and 
sanctions orders.

 
 

[¶26]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides that the rights and 
remedies of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are exclusive in certain suits 
by employees against employers and co-employees, "unless the employees 
intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured 
employee."  This Court has equated 
the concept of "intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury" to the 
concept of "willful and wanton misconduct."  Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 
15, 67 P.3d 627, 632 (Wyo. 2003).  

2The 
Court notes that none of the parties' present counsel were involved in the early 
stages of the case.

3Bancroft 
and Shattuck filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 5, 2005, and after he 
was brought into the action, Johnson did the same on August 22, 2008.  The former was denied on February 27, 
2006, and the latter was denied on October 1, 2008.  More will later be said about these 
motions and orders.

4Rule 
1.16(a)(1) requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if "the 
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or 
other law[.]"

5In 
one sense, once a mistrial has been granted, that issue is moot because that 
jury has been released and another trial has taken place, meaning that "any 
determination made at this juncture by this Court would have no practical effect 
on that outcome."  State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 24, 88 P.3d 445, 454 (Wyo. 2004).  In such 
case, the only surviving issue may be the assessment of costs or sanctions. 

6Hartford-Empire 
had 
obtained a patent, and later won a patent infringement suit, by submitting a 
fraudulent trade journal to both the patent office and the court.  Id. at 240-41, 64 S. Ct.  at 
998-99.