Title: RYAN PATRICK HOPSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RYAN PATRICK HOPSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 32130 P.3d 494Case Number: 05-78Decided: 03/21/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RYAN 
PATRICK HOPSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Megan 
L. Hayes of Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General. 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and Waldrip, 
D.J.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found Ryan 
Hopson guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Hopson later pled guilty to being an 
habitual offender with two prior felony convictions.  He now appeals the judgment and sentence 
alleging that various errors occurred regarding his habitual offender 
charge.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Hopson presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
1.  Whether Hopson was denied his Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights when he proceeded to trial and testified in his own 
defense.

 
 
2.  Whether the district court erred when it 
denied Hopson's motion to dismiss the criminal charge as it had been alleged in 
the Information.

 
 
3.  Whether Hopson was deprived of his due 
process right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 29, 2003, 
Cheyenne police 
officers attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Hopson.  The warrant was issued in connection 
with a series of checks Hopson had forged in the Cheyenne area.  Hopson was staying with an acquaintance 
whose house was under surveillance by Cheyenne's special enforcement unit.  At some point, Hopson exited the house 
and noticed one of the officers nearby armed with an MP-5 service submachine 
gun.  The officer identified himself 
and called for Hopson to stop, but Hopson retreated into the house.1

 
 
[¶4]      Four officers 
entered the house in pursuit of Hopson.  
The officers searched the main floor and again identified themselves 
before entering the basement.  
Hopson hid in a side room with the door closed and armed himself with a 
modified shotgun2 while the officers searched the 
rest of the basement.  While the 
officers were searching a nearby room, Hopson fired a shot in the direction of 
the door.  The officers were 
verifying that none of them had accidentally discharged their weapon when Hopson 
fired another shot which splintered parts of the door and showered the officers 
with debris.  One of the officers 
suffered a lacerated lip, but they were otherwise unharmed.  The officers retreated to the main floor 
and radioed for additional backup.  
A two-hour standoff ensued before Hopson 
surrendered.

 
 
[¶5]      Hopson was 
charged in state court with felony forgery and, because he had been convicted in 
1997 of aggravated assault (a felony), Hopson was also charged with two felony 
counts in federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for 
possessing an unregistered firearm.  
After Hopson had been convicted of the forgery and the federal firearms 
charges, Hopson was charged in the instant case with one count of felony 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.  
The Information alleged that Hopson was also an habitual offender under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2003).3  The State sought an enhanced sentence 
based on three previous convictions  the 1997 aggravated assault conviction, 
the forgery conviction, and the federal firearms convictions.  If convicted of the aggravated assault 
and found to be an habitual criminal as charged in the Information, Hopson faced 
a mandatory life sentence.

 
 
[¶6]      Before trial, 
Hopson filed a Motion to Dismiss Habitual Criminal Status in which he sought to 
prevent the federal firearms convictions from being considered as a basis to 
enhance his sentence if the jury found him guilty of the aggravated 
assault.  Hopson claimed that the 
conviction did not, as a matter of law, arise out of a separate occurrence and 
therefore could not be considered in enhancing his sentence under § 
6-10-201.  The district court held a 
hearing on the issue and determined that the motion "require[d] resolution of a 
question of fact which must be determined by the jury in the second phase of the 
trial."

 
 
[¶7]      Hopson's trial 
began August 17, 2004.  Due to the 
nature of the habitual criminal charge, the proceedings were bifurcated, with 
the jury first to determine Hopson's guilt or innocence on the aggravated 
assault charge and then, if it found Hopson guilty, to determine Hopson's status 
as an habitual offender.  Four of 
the State's nine witnesses were the officers that served the arrest warrant on 
May 29, 2003.  Hopson testified in 
his own defense.  On the third day 
of trial, the jury began its deliberations and subsequently returned a guilty 
verdict on the aggravated assault charge.

 
 
[¶8]      The habitual 
offender phase of Hopson's trial began the next morning.  After opening statements, the prosecutor 
from Hopson's federal charges testified.  
Hopson successfully objected to portions of this testimony and sought a 
judgment of acquittal on the habitual criminal charge.  The district court found that, as a 
matter of law, the State had failed to prove that the federal conviction arose 
out of a separate occurrence and, therefore, dismissed the habitual offender 
charge insofar as it charged Hopson as an habitual offender with three prior 
felonies.  Hopson then pled guilty 
to an habitual offender status with two prior felonies.

 
 
[¶9]      A presentence 
investigation report was prepared and Hopson was sentenced December 13, 
2004.  Due to his habitual offender 
status, Hopson faced a sentence of imprisonment for ten to fifty years.  The State argued that thirty-five to 
fifty years' incarceration was an appropriate sentence based on Hopson's 
criminal history, "disregard for the . . . safety of the Cheyenne community," and 
the facts and circumstances of the instant case.  Hopson, his counsel, his mother, and his 
father asked the district court for some leniency.

 
 
[¶10]   In determining Hopson's sentence, 
the district court considered Hopson's status as an habitual criminal, the 
nature of his previous crimes  including the fact that one of the crimes was a 
violent crime  Hopson's age, his past conduct at boot camp, and his inability 
to complete probation successfully, as well as Hopson's family background and 
his good demeanor in court.  The 
district court also considered his "potential to do good and to be a productive 
member of society," as well as his "potential to do serious harm."  With regard to the aggravated assault, 
the district court noted that

 
 
            
[t]he incident itself is a very, very serious incident.  The Court sat through the testimony in 
that case, listened to the officers testify; again was truly struck by the 
courage that they displayed going down into very close quarters.  I can't even image what that's like to 
be on the other side of the door when the shotgun is fired in very close 
quarters.

 
 
            
And it is a miracle from the Court's perspective that no one was killed 
in that incident.  And if someone 
had been killed, it would have all been because of Mr. Hopson and Mr. Hopson's 
conduct.  And Mr. Hopson did not 
just shoot once.  As the Court 
recalls the evidence, Mr. Hopson shot twice.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
Given the serious nature of this incident; given the fact that Mr. Hopson 
was involved in a previous violent attack on another individual; given the fact 
that he is a felon that has had the opportunity of the probationary system, had 
the opportunity for drug treatment with regards to his problems and has chosen 
to ignore those and to not take advantage of those and they have been 
ineffective; given the fact that this incident involved law enforcement 
attempting to do their jobs and the risk of serious injury or death to those, 
the Court determines that the minimum ten-year period is not appropriate . . . 
.

 
 
The 
district court then sentenced Hopson to eighteen to thirty years' incarceration, 
to be served consecutively to the forgery and firearm sentences that he had 
already received.  Hopson now 
appeals from that judgment and sentence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Issue 
I

 
 
[¶11]   Hopson claims that the State 
violated his right to testify in his own defense when it attempted to use his 
trial testimony against him during the habitual offender phase of his 
trial.  He further argues that the 
State denied him due process and a fair trial because if he was convicted as an 
habitual offender with three prior felonies, he faced life imprisonment.  Hopson claims that he would have pled 
guilty to the aggravated assault charge and the habitual offender status with 
two prior felonies if the Information had not included the federal firearm 
offense that was later dismissed.  If he had pled guilty, Hopson argues, the 
district court would not have heard the officers' testimony and, therefore, he 
would have received a more lenient sentence.

 
 
[¶12]   As Hopson concedes in his reply 
brief, he did not raise this issue in the district court and our review is 
limited to plain error.

 
 
Once 
again, "[p]lain error will not be assigned unless: (1) the record clearly 
reflects the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to demonstrate 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is shown that a 
substantial right of the appellant was materially 
abridged."

 
 

Rutti 
v. State, 
2004 WY 133, ¶ 41, 100 P.3d 394, 410 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1990 (2005) 
(quoting Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 
1997)).  

 
 
[¶13]   Even assuming that the record 
clearly reflects the incidents alleged as error, we fail to see how Hopson's 
right to testify in his own defense was infringed.  Hopson argues that the district court 
clearly violated our holding in Montez v. 
State, 670 P.2d 694 (Wyo. 1983).  In Montez, 670 P.2d  at 697-98, we held that 
a defendant who testifies in his own defense during the guilt phase of his trial 
may be impeached regarding his prior felonies; however, the same information 
cannot then be used substantively during the habitual offender phase to prove 
his habitual offender status.  We 
said that doing so would create an impermissible conflict between the 
defendant's right to testify in his own defense and his right to have the 
prosecution prove each element of his habitual offender charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.

            

[¶14]   However, Hopson's reliance on Montez is misplaced.  To the extent Hopson's testimony was 
used during the habitual offender phase of the trial, it was used to argue that 
the federal firearms convictions arose out of a separate occurrence and should 
be considered by the jury in determining his status as an habitual 
offender.  The argument was made 
outside of the jury's presence and was offered as a response to Hopson's 
W.R.Cr.P. 29(a) motion for acquittal on the habitual offender charge.  Hopson's belief that his rights were 
violated inexplicably ignores the fact that the district court ruled in his 
favor and reduced his habitual offender status to two prior felonies.  In other words, Hopson won the very 
argument he now brings before us on appeal and any error was corrected 
below.

 
 
[¶15]   Hopson next argues that his rights 
to due process and a fair trial were violated because he was given "no 
meaningful alternative" other than proceeding to trial.  We assume Hopson's argument follows this 
logic:  (1) Hopson faced an 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charge and a possible sentence 
enhancement as an habitual criminal with three prior felonies; (2) if convicted 
of both the aggravated assault and the habitual criminal status as contained in 
the Information, he faced a mandatory life sentence; (3) had he been charged as 
an habitual offender with only two prior felonies and convicted, he faced a 
sentence of ten to fifty years' incarceration; (4) had he been charged as an 
habitual offender with two prior felonies, he would have pled guilty to the 
aggravated assault and the habitual offender sentence enhancement; (5) because 
he was charged with three prior felonies, he proceeded to trial hoping to be 
found innocent and avoid a mandatory life sentence; and (6) because he elected 
to go to trial, the judge heard testimony from the officers at whom Hopson fired 
the shotgun, which testimony the district court relied on in imposing a "severe" 
sentence.4

 
 
[¶16]   We first note that Hopson was fully 
informed of his constitutional rights prior to trial and has not presented any 
argument that the guilt phase of his trial was procedurally flawed.  However, even if we were to assume for 
purposes of this appeal that some error occurred, Hopson has still failed to 
prove prejudice under the plain error test.  Hopson's sole claim of prejudice is that 
his sentence was increased due to the trial testimony of the officers "that 
graphically depicted for the sentencing court the violent nature of the May 29, 
2003 incident."

 
 
[¶17]   We have said that "[i]t is 
generally recognized that sentence imposition involves consideration of two 
broad categories: (1) the crime and its circumstances, and (2) the character of 
the criminal.'"  Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d 267, 274 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Wright 
v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Wyo. 1983)).  The testimony that Hopson claims was 
prejudicial to him clearly falls within the first category.  Hopson's argument, therefore, would 
require us to hold that he was prejudiced when the district court in the instant 
case knew of and considered the circumstances of Hopson's crime.  We are unwilling to adopt this bizarre 
reasoning.  The sentencing court 
necessarily considered the officers' testimony, which testimony was uncontested 
and clearly relevant to determining the nature of the crime and its 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶18]   Moreover, if Hopson's case had not 
proceeded to trial, the district court inevitably would have been informed of 
the circumstances surrounding the crime through the presentence investigation 
report, Hopson's factual basis for his guilty plea, and the officers' testimony 
at sentencing in the form of victim impact statements.5  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-102(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 
2005).  Because the district court 
would have been informed of the nature and circumstances of the crime, there can 
be no prejudice that resulted from the officers' trial testimony.  We also note that Hopson's conclusion 
that his sentence would have been more favorable absent the officers' testimony 
is purely speculative and ignores the fact that the sentencing court considered 
a variety of factors in determining the sentence and merely mentioned that "the 
serious nature of the incident" was one consideration in reaching its ultimate 
decision.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, Hopson's argument ignores 
the fact that the bifurcated trial process allows a defendant to contest his 
status as an habitual offender independent of the adjudication of his guilt for 
the substantive offense.  If Hopson 
believed himself innocent of the habitual offender charge as contained in the 
Information, he could have  and did  contest that charge during the habitual 
offender phase of his trial.  His 
choice to exercise or forego his right to trial during the guilt phase was 
independent of his choice to contest his habitual offender 
status.

 
 
[¶20]   For the foregoing reasons, we find 
that Hopson has not proven that he was prejudiced and, therefore, has failed to 
demonstrate plain error.

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
[¶21]   Hopson next argues that the 
district court's denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the habitual offender 
charge was in error.  Hopson couched 
his pretrial motion both in terms of a motion to dismiss the habitual offender 
charge as contained in the Information and as a motion to suppress the federal 
firearms convictions should his trial reach the habitual offender phase.  When reviewing such motions, we give 
deference to the district court's findings of fact if they are not clearly 
erroneous and we review any conclusions of law de novo.  Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 8, 117 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Wyo. 2005); Lindsay v. 
State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶22]   On August 3, 2004, Hopson filed a 
pretrial motion seeking a reduction in his habitual offender charge from three 
to two prior felonies.  Hopson 
argued that his federal firearm possession felony should be removed from the 
Information because it did not arise out of a "separate occurrence" as a matter 
of law.  The district court held a 
hearing on the motion and determined that Hopson's argument needed factual 
development at the habitual offender phase of the trial.  Hopson claims that the district court 
erred in so holding and, as a result, he proceeded to trial instead of pleading 
guilty.  Hopson then claims, as he 
did in his first argument, that he was prejudiced because the district court 
heard and relied on the trial testimony of the police officers when it sentenced 
him to imprisonment for eighteen to thirty years.  According to Hopson, had the district 
court dismissed the third felony from his habitual offender charge, he would 
have pled guilty and the district court would not have sentenced him as harshly 
because it would not have heard the officers' testimony.

 
 

[¶23]   In order for relief to be granted 
on appeal, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04 require that any error in the 
proceedings below be harmful to the appellant.  When reviewing whether an error was 
harmless, our focus is on whether an appellant's substantial rights were 
affected.  W.R.A.P. 9.04.  "To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play.'"  Condra v. 
State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 
WY 20, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
[¶24]   Again, even if we assume for 
purposes of this appeal that some error occurred when the district court denied 
Hopson's pretrial motion, such error would necessarily be harmless.  Hopson ignores the fact that the 
information the officers testified to at trial would have been available to the 
district court at sentencing through the presentence investigation report, 
victim impact statements, and Hopson's own factual basis for his guilty 
plea.  Moreover, we cannot say that 
considering the admissible and undisputed testimony of victims is a circumstance 
that manifests inherent unfairness and injustice.  Therefore, if any error was committed 
when the district court denied Hopson's pretrial motion, such error was 
harmless.  And beyond that, Hopson 
has not shown that, as a matter of law, the district court was wrong in 
determining that there were factual issues to be resolved by the jury.6

 
 
Issue 
III

 
 
[¶25]   In his final argument, Hopson 
claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the habitual offender phase 
of his trial and at sentencing.  We 
have said that

 
 
[w]hether 
such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 
52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected the 
accused's "substantial rights."  . . 
.  "Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Earll [v. State, 2001 WY 66,] ¶ 9, [29 P.3d 787, 789 (Wyo. 2001)].

 
 

Williams 
v. State, 
2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶26]   Hopson claims that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred in the following situations: (1) the prosecutor argued 
"undocumented allegations" during sentencing, which allegations indicated that 
Hopson had traded drugs for the gun he used in the shooting; (2) the prosecutor 
offered to produce new witnesses at sentencing who would testify that Hopson had 
traded drugs for the gun; (3) the prosecutor attempted to use hearsay evidence 
and Hopson's own testimony to prove the firearm possession conviction during the 
habitual criminal phase of the trial; and (4) the prosecutor improperly charged 
Hopson as an habitual offender with three prior felonies.  Hopson's only claim of prejudice from 
these incidents is that "[t]here is a reasonable possibility that, in the 
absence of the misconduct that forced this case to trial when no credible, 
admissible or relevant evidence existed to support a third, independent felony 
conviction, the sentence imposed by the trial court might have been more 
favorable to Mr. Hopson."

 
 
[¶27]   Insofar as Hopson claims the same 
prejudice as he does in his previous arguments, we may assume for purposes of 
this appeal that if misconduct occurred, no prejudice resulted.  To the extent his first two arguments 
deal with alleged misconduct at sentencing  long after Hopson was "forced" to 
go to trial  additional comments are necessary. 

 
 
[¶28]   The State made the following 
comments at sentencing:

 
 
[W]e 
frankly know by an undercover investigation that [Hopson] was dealing in 
methamphetamine, it's the only way he could support [his methamphetamine habit], 
which then gets us to the acquisition of the firearm that led to the federal 
charge.

 
 
            
State's evidence as indicated in motion hearings would be that he 
acquired that firearm in exchange for meth at least before this 
incident.

 
 
Hopson's 
counsel objected to the argument and noted that the only evidence presented to 
the jury was that the shotgun used in the shooting "was in the room when he got 
there." In response to that objection, the prosecutor responded that "if the 
Court has any questions, we would be more than happy to bring the witnesses 
in."  Ultimately, the district court 
ruled in favor of Hopson and stated that it would not consider where and how 
Hopson obtained the shotgun.

 
 
[¶29]   Hopson now claims that 

 
 
[e]ven 
though the trial court disregarded this information in imposing sentence, the 
prosecutor's repeated assertions that undocumented allegations could support the 
habitual criminal charge reveals his fundamentally misguided belief that he 
possessed credible, admissible or relevant evidence to support this charge, a 
belief that informed and drove his misconduct throughout these criminal 
proceedings.

 
 
Regardless 
of what the prosecutor may or may not have believed when charging Hopson as an 
habitual offender, Hopson still bears the burden of proving that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged error.  Deloge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1233, 1239 (Wyo. 2002); 
Williams, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d  at 254.  In the instant case, the district court 
specifically disregarded the State's comments and Hopson's argument must 
fail.  See Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117-18 
(Wyo. 
1993).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   Even assuming, for purposes of this 
appeal, that the alleged errors actually occurred in the proceedings below, 
Hopson has failed to show that he was prejudiced by those errors.  Hopson's belief that his sentence would 
have been more lenient is purely speculative, ignores the district court's duty 
to consider the crime and its circumstances, and disregards the fact that the 
testimony would have come before the district court at sentencing even if Hopson 
had pled guilty to the aggravated assault charge.

 
 
[¶31]   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Hopson 
claimed that, at that time, he did not know the man with the gun was a police 
officer.  However, the officer 
testified that he identified himself as a member of the Cheyenne Police 
Department and had his badge conspicuously placed on his 
belt.

 
 

2The 
barrel had been sawed off and the stock ground down to a pistol-like 
grip.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-10-201 reads:  

 
 
(a)     A person is an habitual 
criminal if:

(i)    He is convicted of a violent 
felony; and

(ii)   He has been convicted of a felony 
on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and tried which arose out 
of separate occurrences in this state or elsewhere.

(b)     An habitual criminal 
shall be punished by imprisonment for:

(i)    Not less than ten (10) years 
nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) previous 
convictions;

(ii)   Life, if he has three (3) or more 
previous convictions.

 
 

4Hopson, 
however, recognizes that his sentence fell within the permissible statutory 
range.

 
 

5The 
presentence investigation report in this case summarized the officers' testimony 
and indicated that "All three victims would like to be notified of the 
Defendant's date of sentencing.  
(One or all of the Police Officers will be making a victim impact 
statement before the Court.)"

 
 

6This 
argument is somewhat ironic.  
Usually, criminal appellants argue the oppositethat factual issues exist 
that should have gone to the jury.