Title: Johnson v. Delta-Democrat Pub. Co.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

531 So. 2d 811 (1988) Sarah H. JOHNSON v. DELTA-DEMOCRAT PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation, and Ken Cazalas. No. 57948. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 5, 1988. Fred C. DeLong, Jr., Roy D. Campbell, Jr., Campbell, DeLong, Hagwood, Wade & Stuart, Greenville, for appellant. Luther T. Munford, Ross F. Bass, Jr., Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, Jackson, Philip Mansour, Sr., Mansour & Mansour, Stan Perkins, Greenville, John C. Henegan, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ. GRIFFIN, Justice, for the Court: This is a libel action brought against a newspaper, The Delta Democrat-Times (DD-T), and its editorial columnist, Ken Cazalas. The appellant, Mrs. Sarah H. Johnson, the only black person of seven who comprise the City Council of Greenville, filed a complaint based on libel and actionable words, § 95-1-1, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), against The Delta Democrat-Times (DD-T) and its editor. She sought $450,000 in actual damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. The basis of the complaint is a column by Mr. Cazalas: "A high brand of hypocrisy down at City Hall," which was published on November 24, 1985, in the editorial page column. The column criticizes the city council for holding closed meetings and refusing to release annexation records. The column is reprinted below: Discovery was conducted simultaneously for this case and for another suit filed February 3, 1986. In the second suit the appellee, Delta Democrat-Times sued the City of Greenville and its council members for alleged willful and knowing violations of the Public Records Act of 1983, § 25-61-15, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1986), based on a refusal to release records showing costs incurred in an annexation suit. Discovery included depositions, document production and interrogatories. Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment. The appellant filed a response, along with affidavits from herself and two others in the community construing the editorial column. The affiants said they read the subject column as well as previously *813 published articles specifically concerning the appellant. In granting the summary judgment, the circuit court found there was no genuine issue of material fact, the column was one of opinion and commentary of publicly known facts and is privileged, that no defamatory remarks toward the appellant were made, and the actionable word statute, § 95-1-1, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), did not apply. This appeal followed. The appellant's numerous assignments of error may be reduced to a single proposition: Did the trial court err in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment? To address this issue, we must determine if the appellant has established a cause of action for defamation. To create liability for defamation, there must be: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 (1977). In this case we are asked to review the editorial commentary in a state newspaper. In so doing, we reacknowledge the Fair Comment Doctrine; however, we do not ourselves profess to be bon vivants of editorial commentary. To establish defamation in the case of a public official or figure, we look to federal standards of review which, due to the constitutional issues concerning free speech under the First Amendment, have preempted state and local standards. In cases involving a public figure liability may not be imposed for otherwise actionable libel unless the statements were The Sullivan standard has been adopted and repeatedly enforced by this Court. Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984); Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 695 (Miss. 1983); Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453, 458-59 (Miss. 1967). In Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 696 (Miss. 1983), we cited New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, and said concerning defamation actions: 434 So. 2d 687, 696 (Miss. 1983). We have held there are two restrictions on an action for defamation which must be strictly enforced. First, the words used must have clearly been directed toward the plaintiff and, second, the defamation must be clear and unmistakable from the words themselves and not the products of innuendo, speculation or conjecture. Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984). The thrust of the appellant's libel claim is that Mr. Cazalas' statement that she "won't talk to reporters anymore" is false and implies she is up to something under-handed, immoral or illegal. The appellant also asserts that the appellees' use of collective statements in the column (such as "council members," "these politicians," "the City Fathers," "a handful of politicians," "Public Servants?," "obdurate orangutans," etc.) and plural pronouns ("they," "them," etc.) to refer to the city governing body as a whole are not reasonable. She claims that a reasonable inference is they refer to her individually and is in part a racial slur. The appellant claims the references in the November 24, 1985, column are clearly directed toward her even though her name is not specifically cited, because the column refers to a quote she made to a DD-T reporter which was published in the same newspaper two days earlier. In the earlier article, entitled "Lease Difficulties Keep *814 North Terminal Vacant," the appellant refused to comment concerning an allegation of conflict of interest involving a lease by the Greenville Port Commission to a company presided over by the Port Commission Chairman. In response to the reporter's question, the appellant said: In the affidavits introduced by the appellant, the affiants state they read the November 24 column and understood the appellant to be the subject of specific insulting and defamatory references. Upon further examination of the affidavits, we find the affiants also state they had knowledge of facts apart from the subject column upon which to base their interpretation. One affiant states that his conclusions were based on a prior reading of the November 22 article where a specific quote from the appellant was presented. The affidavits, ironically, support a position contrary to that which the appellant has sought to establish. In short, they indicate an isolated reading of the November 24 column would not specifically direct the reader to the appellant individually. In Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967), we cited Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Pub. Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171 (1957), observing a clear and succinct adoption of the Fair Comment Doctrine. Foster at 455. In quoting from Edmonds, supra, we said: Foster, at 456. It has been recognized by this Court, and others that name calling and verbal abuse are to be taken as statements of opinion, not fact, and therefore will not give rise to an action for libel. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir.1984); Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir.1966). The United States Supreme Court has held editorial opinion is "entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection." FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-76, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3115, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 289 (1984). In Ferguson v. Watkins, supra, we held: We noted in Ferguson that caustic commentary is simply not actionable libel. Ferguson at 276. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black said concerning our right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment: Justice Black wrote in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964): We have upheld summary judgments dismissing libel claims on several occasions. Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So. 2d 595 (1988); Chatham v. Gulf Publishing Co., 502 So. 2d 647, 650 (Miss. 1987); Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Miss. 1986); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 77, 81 (Miss. 1986). In each case this Court compared "true" facts to the published facts and found no defamation. In a similar case, Lizak v. Associated Indem. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.Miss. 1985), the court granted summary judgment and rejected affidavits purporting to construe an alleged libelous article. The United States Supreme Court has held a public figure plaintiff may resist summary judgment only by showing clear and convincing evidence of constitutional malice in response to the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Upon examining the subject column we conclude it is one of opinion which is protected by the First Amendment and common law. The focus of the editorial is the City Council of Greenville, not the appellant. This is evident from the author's use of collective statements and plural pronouns. If the article is read all unto itself, nothing is stated which would defame the appellant individually. Readers ordinarily would expect the author's use of metaphorical language. In Fulton, supra, we said: 498 So. 2d at 1217. The only evidence the appellant introduced to oppose the appellee's motion for summary judgment were the three affidavits. We have concluded these affidavits fail to support the appellant's proposition that the references made in the November 24 editorial column by Mr. Cazalas are directed toward her individually or are defamatory. No clear and convincing evidence of actual malice has been presented. We affirm the summary order below. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents.