Title: Sullivan v. Siegal

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

245 P.2d 860 (1952) 125 Colo. 544 SULLIVAN et al. v. SIEGAL. No. 16690. Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc. May 12, 1952. Rehearing Denied June 23, 1952. Max D. Melville, Edward E. Pringle, Thomas L. Ford, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Davis & Lutz, Creamer & Creamer, Denver, for defendant in error. Louis A. Hellerstein, Denver, amicus curiæ. ALTER, Justice. Thomas J. Sullivan and Marie E. Sullivan, plaintiffs in error, plaintiffs below, brought an action against S. I. Siegal, individually and doing business as Universal Investment Company, defendant in error, defendant below, to recover a judgment for $1,455.45 allegedly due them by reason of defendant collecting interest in excess of that allowable under the provisions of section 7, chapter 108, page 404, S.L.Colo. 1913. Upon trial to the court, on motion of defendant the action was dismissed and judgment entered accordingly, to review which plaintiffs bring the cause here by writ of error. It is alleged in the complaint that defendant is engaged in loaning money on security, and on December 1, 1949, plaintiffs borrowed and received from defendant the sum of $2,000, giving their note payable to defendant in the sum of $2,500, which note was payable at the rate of $80 or more per month until paid, with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent per annum. As security for the payment of said note, plaintiffs gave, and defendant received, deeds of trust. The note was paid in full on April 25, 1950, and defendant demanded, *861 and plaintiffs paid, as interest on the sum of $2,000 actually received by them, interest amounting to $579.08, which sum was $485.15 in excess of interest allowable under the provisions of chapter 108, page 400, S.L. Colo.1913, which, it is alleged, is now, and at all times mentioned in the complaint was, in full force and effect. It further is alleged that section 15, chapter 157, page 696, S.L.Colo.1935, which purportedly repealed chapter 108, S.L.Colo. 1913, is invalid and unconstitutional with respect to loans on security in sums in excess of $300; that said section 15 violates the provisions of section 21, Article V of the Constitution of the State of Colorado. Further it is alleged that under the provisions of section 7, chapter 108, S.L.Colo. 1913, plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the amount of the overcharge of interest from the person demanding and receiving the same, and that the action is brought within one year from the payment of the overcharge. Defendant's motion to dismiss was upon the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice and entered its findings, judgment and decree, the same being in part: As we view the specifications of points, two in number, they present but one question: Are the provisions of chapter 108, S.L.1913, still in full force and effect so far as the same pertain to loans in excess of $300? The title to the act, chapter 108, 1913 Session Laws of Colorado, reads: "An act to regulate the business of loaning money on security of any kind by persons, firms, and corporations other than national banks, or any banks or bankers operating under state charters or under state supervision, or building and loan associations." Section 5 of said chapter 108 provides: Section 7 of the chapter is as follows: We note that chapter 108, S.L.Colo.1913, was held to be constitutional in Cavanaugh v. People, 61 Colo. 292, 157 P. 200. A statute was enacted in 1917, S.L.'17, c. 93, p. 350, having to do with loans not exceeding $500 in amount, and we note that this statute was held void in Waddell v. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1273. We also note that the legislature enacted a statute, c. 159, p. 524, S.L.'19, having for its general subject the regulation of loans of $300 or less and expressly repealed chapter 108, Session Laws of Colorado 1913. The 1919 act, supra, we note was held to be unconstitutional in Gronert v. People, 95 Colo. 508, 37 P.2d 396. The 1917 act, supra, did not expressly repeal chapter 108, S.L. Colo.1913; however, by the provisions of section 20 of the 1919 act such an attempt was made. Both the 1917 act, supra, and the 1919 act, supra, having been held to be unconstitutional and therefore void, any attempt, either by express provision or by implication, to repeal chapter 108, S.L.Colo. 1913 failed. Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757. In Waddell v. Traylor, supra [99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1274], our court said: As we construe the opinion in Waddell v. Traylor, supra, is was there held that the plaintiff might proceed under the provisions of chapter 108, 1913 Session Laws of Colorado. We have examined the record in Waddell v. Traylor, supra, and it appears that the constitutionality of the 1935 act was not in issue. Under that decision, its constitutionality was not involved or even questioned; therefore, we conclude that chapter 108, Session Laws of Colorado 1913, was, and remained, in full force and effect unless it has been repealed or amended by chapter 157, 1935 Session Laws of Colorado. The title to the 1935 act, supra, reads: "An act relating to the making of loans or advancements of three hundred dollars or less; regulating the business of making such loans; providing for administration of this act and for penalties for the violation hereof and repealing all acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith." In said act we find that section 15 thereof reads: "That Chapter 108 of the Session Laws of 1913, and Chapter 93 of the Session Laws of 1917, and all other acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith be and are hereby repealed." By reference to the title, as well as the provisions of chapter 108, supra, it clearly appears that the legislature was limiting the interest that might be charged on loans with security to a certain, definite maximum rate, and without reference whatever to the amount of the loan made by those authorized by the act to engage in the business of making loans. It should be observed that the legislature in the title of chapter 157, Session Laws of 1935, limited its provisions to loans of $300 or less. Nevertheless, by section 15 thereof, it attempted to repeal a chapter which regulated interest rates on loans with security in any amount. It is here contended that the repealing clause in said chapter 157 is much broader than the title of the act, and, therefore, that the same is unconstitutional as violative of section 21, Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which provides, "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed." Our court, in an early opinion, In re Breene, 14 Colo. 401, 24 P. 3, made the following observation with reference to section 21, Article V of the Constitution of the State of Colorado: First, that it was mandatory; second that it should be liberally and reasonably interpreted in order to avert evils against which it was aimed and at the same time avoid unnecessarily obstructing legislation; thirdly, that it embraces two mandates, one thereof forbidding the union in the same legislative bills of separate and distinct subjects, and the other requiring that the subject treated in the bill should be clearly expressed in the title. With reference to these three requirements it was said: It is our duty to construe chapter 157, Session Laws of Colorado 1935, and chapter 108, Session Laws of Colorado 1913, so as to permit both acts to be effective and enforceable, if that can be done without violating any constitutional provision. We, therefore, find that section 15 of the 1935 act, being broader than the title thereof, does not effectuate a repeal of the 1913 act in so far as the same pertains to loans in excess of $300, and as to such loans the 1913 act is in full force and effect unless otherwise repealed by matters hereinafter discussed. Lest it be considered that we have overlooked our decision in Siebers v. Disque, 102 Colo. 39, 76 P.2d 1108, we call attention to the fact that there the constitutionality of the 1935 act, supra, was not questioned. As a matter of fact the plaintiff in that action admitted the repeal of the 1913 act by the 1935 act, supra, and in Dowd v. Labor Finance Corporation, 100 Colo. 512, 69 P.2d 305, we reversed a decision of the district court, and, by allowing a recovery on the note there involved, recognized that the provisions of the 1913 act were then in full force and effect. Counsel for defendants, in addition to their contention that the 1913 act is repealed by the 1919 and 1935 acts, supra, contend that the 1913 act having been omitted from the Compiled Laws of 1921 and the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, these omissions constitute a repeal of the 1913 act, and in support of this contention direct our attention to the decisions of many other courts, none of which we consider of importance or controlling in our determination of this cause. It would unduly prolong this opinion to quote the titles of acts authorizing the Revised Statutes of Colorado 1908, the Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921, and the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated. Any contention that an omission of any legislative act from either of these compilations results in a repeal of the statute is effectively answered by reference to the legislative act pertaining thereto. Section 10, chapter 159, '35 C.S.A., expressly provides that the Revised Statutes of Colorado 1908 "shall be prima facie evidence of the originals in all courts and tribunals of this state." We find that chapter 172, page 597, Session Laws of Colorado 1923, section 11, chapter 159, '35 C.S.A., provides that the Compiled Laws of 1921 "shall be prima facie evidence of the originals of the constitution and laws of Colorado in all courts and tribunals of this state." We find that chapter 91, section 6, Session Laws of Colorado 1935, being section 13, chapter 159, *865 '35 C.S.A., provides that the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated "shall be received in all courts and by all officers, boards and commissions of Colorado as prima facie evidence of the laws of the state of Colorado." It is idle to suppose that if the legislature, by authorizing the compilation or codification of either of these statutes, had intended to make them the basic and fundamental laws of the State of Colorado, thereby repealing all laws other than those contained in the compilation or codification, it would have found it necessary to enact statutes directly contrary thereto by a later specific act providing that these statutes should be considered as prima facie evidence only. We are in accord with the following: It is doubtful whether the legislature could lawfully delegate to any person or commission authority to make a compilation or codification of the statutes of the state, which, when completed, would give it the dignity of a basic and fundamental law without further legislative action. However, that question is not now before us, and we shall content ourselves with holding that the omission of the 1913 act, supra, from the Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921, and from the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, did not thereby effect a repeal of that act. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the views expressed herein.