Title: IN THE INTEREST OF MN, S(e)N, S(h)N: LM V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF MN, S(e)N, S(h)N: LM V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2007 WY 189171 P.3d 1077Case Number: C-06-12Decided: 12/05/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF MN, S(e)N, 
S(h)N:LM,Appellant(Respondent),v.LARAMIE 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
Appellee(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dameione 
S. Cameron of Parsons Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Cameron.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Nancy D. Conrad, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Chatfield.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing, among other things, 
that no guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent her children.  
Finding that issue to be dispositive, we reverse and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      The Laramie 
County Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate the 
appellant's parental rights to her three children on March 1, 2006.  The petition was heard on June 7, 2006. 
 It is uncontested that no guardian 
ad litem was appointed to represent 
the children in the proceedings.  On 
July 26, 2006, the district court entered a document entitled Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the effect of which was to terminate the appellant's 
parental rights to her children.1

 
 
STATUTES

 
 
[¶3]      A petition to 
terminate parental rights must be brought pursuant to Wyoming's Termination of 
Parental Rights Act, which is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 requires in 
pertinent part as follows:

 
 
            
After the petition has been filed, the court shall appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the child unless the court finds the interests of the child 
will be represented adequately by the petitioner or another party to the action 
and are not adverse to that party. . . .

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      The question 
before the Court is purely one of statutory construction.  That is, does the language of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-312 give the district court any choice other than (1) to appoint a 
guardian ad litem for the children, 
or (2) to find that no guardian ad litem is required because the interests 
of the children will be represented by the petitioner or another party?  Our rules of statutory construction are 
well known:

 
 
            
This court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's 
intent. . . .  We begin by making an 
inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection. . . .  We give effect to every word, clause, 
and sentence and construe together all components of a statute in pari materia. . . .  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law. . . .  We review questions 
of law de novo without affording deference to the district court's 
decision.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 
52 (Wyo. 2001).  If a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 
17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 
(Wyo. 2000)).  Only when we find a 
statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of statutory 
construction.  Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d  at 506 
(quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 
P.3d at 347).  An ambiguous statute 
is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation.  Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864-65 
(Wyo. 
1992)).

 
 
            
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in 
light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. . . 
.

 
 
We are 
guided by the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal 
structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole.  In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo. 
2000) and Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1993)).  Each word of a statute is to be afforded 
meaning, with none rendered superfluous.  
Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 
1120 (Wyo. 2000).  Further, the 
meaning afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless 
another meaning is clearly intended.  
Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 
773 (Wyo. 
1991).  If the meaning of a word is 
unclear, it should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the statute's 
purpose.  Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 996 
(1943).

 
 

Union 
Pac. Res. Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 
WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶¶ 
9-10, 50 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶5]      In particular, we 
have repeatedly found the word "shall" in a statute to be mandatory.  Stutzman v. Office of Wyo. State Eng'r, 
2006 WY 30, ¶ 17, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006) ("Where the legislature uses the 
word shall,' this Court accepts the provision as mandatory and has no right to 
make the law contrary to what the legislature prescribed."); see also Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 
¶ 42, 86 P.3d 270, 288 (Wyo. 2004); and In re DCP, 2001 WY 77, ¶ 16, 30 P.3d 29, 
32 (Wyo. 2001).  "The choice of the 
word shall' intimates an absence of discretion . . . ."  In re LePage, 2001 WY 26, ¶ 12, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶6]      Application of 
these rules of construction leads us readily to the conclusion that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-312 is an unambiguous mandatory statute that does not allow the 
district court discretion not to appoint a guardian ad litem or not to make the appropriate 
record findings that no guardian ad 
litem is required.  Furthermore, 
the requirement that mandatory statutes be obeyed is most compelling in cases 
such as this, where fundamental parent/child relationships are at risk of 
severance.  MB v. Laramie County Dep't of Family 
Servs., 933 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Wyo. 1997) (termination of parental rights is 
directed toward a right that is fundamental and substantial); In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 513 (Wyo. 1982) (it is a fundamental right to have custody of one's minor 
child), overruled on other grounds by 
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 
(Wyo. 1998).  Although the very 
issue now before the Court was rendered moot by reversal on another issue, we 
clearly recognized in In re FM, 2007 
WY 128, ¶¶ 25-26, 163 P.3d 844, 850-51 (Wyo. 2007), that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-312 is mandatory, and that the district court has no discretion beyond the 
two statutory options.

 
 
[¶7]      We conclude by 
stating that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 leaves no room for an assumption that 
the Department of Family Services will adequately represent the interests of the 
child, or children, in a termination action.  In a parental rights termination action, 
there are many reasons why there might be a conflict between the Department and 
a child or, even more problematic, multiple children involved in the 
action.  Generally, the Department 
is not only a party, it is the party instituting the action.  In deciding whether to bring a 
termination action, the Department must consider not only the child(ren) and 
family, it must also broadly consider other concerns such as policy, pertinent 
statutes, and federal funding mandates.  
If any assumption is to be made, it should be that the complexity of the 
activities and operation of the Department creates the potential for numerous 
conflicts with the best interests of the involved child(ren).  This makes it even more important for 
the district court to make an express finding that the Department has no 
conflicts with the best interests of the involved child(ren) before allowing 
the Department to act as a substitute for a guardian ad litem.  Children have as fundamental a right to 
familial association as do parents.  
Strict adherence to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 guarantees that children's 
rights will be protected, and failure to abide by the statute is fundamental 
error requiring reversal.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-312 is an unambiguous mandatory statute that requires the district court in 
a parental rights termination action either to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the involved child 
or children, or to make a finding that no guardian ad litem is necessary because the 
petitioner or another party to the action will adequately represent the 
interests of the child or children, and the interests of the child or children 
are not adverse to that party.

 
 
[¶9]      Reversed and 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1U.R.D.C. 
401 requires orders to be entitled so as accurately to reflect their 
content.  The title "Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law" does not fairly indicate that it is actually an 
order terminating parental rights.