Title: University System v. Baltimore System

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

University System of Maryland, et al.v. The Baltimore Sun Company, et al.
No. 138, September Term, 2002
HEADNOTES: MARYLAND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT; CONTRACTS; THIRD
PARTY CONTRACTS; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Records evidencing a contract or agreement between  a State employee and a third
party, which  provides income to that employee and to which the State entity employing that
employee is not a party, when the subject of a Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA)
request, are subject to in camera review to determine whether they  are financial information
within the contemplation of § 10-617 (f) and, thus, not required to be disclosed. 
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
Case No. CAE02-06069 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 138
   
 September Term, 2002
                                                                            
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MARYLAND, et al.
v.
THE BALTIM ORE SUN COMPANY, et al.
                                                                            
Bell, C.J.
                               *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
               JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Harrell, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
                                                                            
Filed:   April 15, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1  Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references hereinafter are to these
provisions of the State Government Article.
2  Ms. Andrews reported that Coach Friedgen’s salary was originally $175,000 as
of November 30, 2000.  As of January 1, 2002, however, Coach Friedgen’s salary was
$183,920.
3Section 10-616, as relevant, provides:
“(a) In general. – Unless otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall deny
inspection of a public record, as provided in this section. 
. . .
“(i) Personnel Records. – (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, a
custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual,
This case concerns a request to the University of Maryland, College Park (“UMCP”)
for public records, made by The Baltimore Sun and Jon Morgan, one of its sports reporters
(collectively, the “appellees”)  pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (hereafter
“the MPIA”).  The MPIA is codified at Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum.
Supp.) §§10-611 et seq. of the State Government Article.1
I.
This case had its genesis when the appellees made a written MPIA request to the
Athletic Department of UMCP seeking  “copies of the original and revised employment
contracts for head football coach Ralph Friedgen. ... [and] any separate letters of
understanding, side letters or similar documents specifying incentives, bonuses, broadcast
agreements, athletic footwear contracts, and other matters concerning the terms and
conditions of [Coach Friedgen’s] employment and compensation.”  In response, University
Counsel disclosed that Coach Friedgen’s annual salary was $183,920,2 and denied the
remainder of the request, citing § 10-616(i)3 and § 10-617(f),4 which prohibit the disclosure
including an application, performance rating, or scholastic achievement
information
“(2) A custodian shall permit inspection by:
“(i) the person in interest; or
“(ii) an elected or appointed official who supervises the work of the
individual.”
. . .
4Section 10-617, as relevant, provides:
“(a) In general. – Unless otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall deny
inspection of a part of a public record, as provided in this section.
. . .
“(f) Financial information. – (1) This subsection does not apply to the salary of a
public employee.
“(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, a custodian shall deny
inspection of the part of a public record that contains information about the
finances of an individual, including assets, income, liabilities, net worth,
bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness.
“(3) A custodian shall permit inspection by the person in interest.”
2
of personnel and certain financial information.   
Dissatisfied with the UMCP’s response, the appellees retained counsel, who sought
reconsideration of UMCP’s decision to disclose only those documents related to Coach
Friedgen’s salary and to refuse disclosure of documents “describing other employment
related compensation due” him.   They argued  that UMCP’s reliance on §10-616(i) and §10-
617(f) was flawed because UMCP improperly and narrowly interpreted the term, “salary,”
and, at the same time, improperly construed the term, “personnel,” broadly, both
5The appellees relied on an opinion of the Attorney General, 83 Op. Att’y Gen. 192
(Md. 1998), available at 1998 Md. AG LEXIS 35 (Opinion No. 98-025, December 18,
1998), in which the term, “salary,” was given a broad construction, to include “records
that reflect the earnings of government officers and employees, whether those earnings
consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented by a bonus or performance award.” 
The Attorney General reasoned:
“In our opinion, the General Assembly enacted the ‘salary’ provisions of the
PIA to ensure that members of the public could find out how much public
employees earned. The term ‘salary’ should be construed to help achieve
this objective. Giving ‘salary’ too narrow a construction would allow
governments to secretly augment the earnings of public employees through
bonuses and performance awards, contrary to the General Assembly's goal
of holding a government publicly accountable for its compensation
decisions. Under the PIA, to borrow a phrase from an Ohio court, ‘the
public has an absolute right to ascertain the earnings of its servants.’ State
ex rel. Jones v. Myers, 581 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1991).”
Id. at 194. 
3
inconsistently with the “bias in favor of disclosure recognized by the courts.”5   
The UMCP was not persuaded and maintained its position.  Responding to the
appellees’ request for reconsideration, it wrote:
“Although we understand the MPIA’s general construction favoring disclosure
of public records, we remain constrained by its specific prohibitions.  With
respect to the Baltimore Sun’s request, the MPIA expressly requires us to deny
inspection of Coach Friedgen’s personnel records, as well as any part of a
record that contains information about his finances, including income.  (See
§§10-616(i) and 10-617(f) of the MPIA).  The only exception to these
requirements is limited to his “salary” as a State employee.  (See §§ 10-
611(g)(2) and 10-617(f)(1) of the MPIA).
“With respect to salary, we have concluded, in consultation with the Maryland
Attorney General’s Office, that the MPIA requires the disclosure of the total
amount of an employee’s State earnings.”
Nonetheless, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the threatened lawsuit, Coach Friedgen
6  The MPIA request relating to Coach Williams was significantly broader than that
pertaining to Coach Friedgen.  It sought:
“1.  All employment contracts and any revised contracts for
head basketball coach Gary Williams together with all
attachments and amendments to any contracts;
“2.  Any contract or other record describing the payment of
any incentive, bonuses, broadcast fees, athletic clothing or
footwear fees to Williams by the University or any third party;
“3.  Any report or other record of any athletically related
compensation received by Williams from any source outside
the University including but not limited to income, annuities,
sports camps, housing benefits, complimentary ticket sales,
television and/or radio fees, endorsements or consultation
contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or equipment
manufacturers; and
“4.  Any notices to the University or other record of any items
described in paragraphs 1-3 or approval of the same by the
University.”
4
voluntarily agreed to provide additional information about his compensation.  Accordingly,
the UMCP disclosed the following additional information:
“Coach Friedgen receives a salary of $179,753 in 2001-2002.  Also, he has
earned the maximum amount of compensation for competitive achievement
(ACC Championship and BCS Bowl), automobile allowances, radio and
television appearances and apparel/endorsement compensation, which totals
$762,000.  The availability of student athlete academic achievement and
citizenship bonuses is evaluated subsequent to the completion of the fiscal
year.”
In the meantime and prior to receipt of the additional information voluntarily disclosed
by Coach Friedgen, the appellees made another MPIA request of the UMCP Athletic
Department,  this one seeking information with respect to the compensation and income of
UMCP’s head basketball coach, Gary Williams.6  The University responded to that request
5
as follows:
“Except for salary of a State employee, the MPIA requires State agencies to
deny access to personnel records and financial information of an individual,
including income.  See § 10-616(i) and § 10-617(f) of the MPIA.  Therefore,
University of Maryland legal counsel has advised Intercollegiate Athletics to
provide the following information in response to your request.
“Coach Gary Williams receives a regular salary of $202,991 in FY 2002.  To
date, he has also earned $540,400 for competitive achievement (ACC Regular
Season Championship and NCAA National Championship), automobile
allowance and radio, television and personal appearances.  The availability of
additional University compensation based upon student-athlete academic
achievement and NCAA compliance is evaluated at a later date.  His
apparel/endorsement compensation is received directly from the apparel
company.
“We must decline to provide you with copies of Coach Williams’ employment
contract and/or any other records in the University’s possession pertaining to
other income, which Coach Williams may receive directly from outside
sources (e.g., apparel/equipment endorsements, sports camps, consulting,
speaking engagements outside the scope of the contract, etc.)  Such documents
would constitute personnel records and/or contain personal financial
information other than the salary of a State employee, and their disclosure is
prohibited under § 10-616(i) and § 10-617(f) of the M PIA.”
Thus, UMCP reaffirmed its previously communicated interpretation of the MPIA and,
accordingly,  refused to disclose any information relating to Coach Williams’ non-University
related income.  Nor did it disclose a copy of Coach William’s University contract.
The appellees filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, naming as
defendants the University System of Maryland, Deborah A Yow, Ph.D, the athletic director
at UMCP, and David Haglund, the assistant director of Intercollegiate Athletics at UMCP
(collectively, the “appellants” or the “University”). The parties filed cross-motions for
7  The trial court’s order listed the records to be disclosed, as follows:
“a.  The original and revised employment contract for head
football coach Ralph Friedgen;
6
summary judgment, at the center of which was the question whether the University was
required to disclose, not only each coach’s total salary from the University, but, the
underlying contracts and agreements relating to each coach’s income.  The appellants  argued
that the plain language of the applicable sections of the MPIA statute requires state agencies
to deny disclosure of a state employee’s personnel and financial records, with a narrow
exception for salary derived from State funds.  The appellees, on the other hand, maintained
that the records sought were subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the MPIA
and that the appellant’s interpretation “accords broad secrecy to the terms of a state
employee’s compensation contrary to the MPIA’s mandate that the salary of public
employees should be a matter of public record.” 
The trial court found in favor of the appellees.  It reasoned: the legislature has directed
that the MPIA “shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection” of public records; the
term “salary” unambiguously is included in the definition of “public record” in § 10-
611(g)(2); the financial records exclusion contained in § 10-617(f) does not apply to the
salary of a public employee; and,  salary related documents are not personnel records within
the meaning of the statute.  Consequently, the trial court granted the appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and denied the appellants’ cross-motion.  Accordingly, the court ordered
that the records requested by the appellees be produced.7  The court instructed that, to the
“b.  Any separate letter of understanding, side letters or
similar documents specifying incentives, bonuses, broadcast
arrangements, athletic footwear contracts and other matters
concerning the terms and conditions of Coach Friedgen’s
employment and compensation;
“c.  All employment contracts and any revised contracts for
head basketball coach Gary Williams together with all
attachments and amendments to any contract;
“d.  Any contract or other record describing the payment of
any incentives, bonuses, broadcast fees, athletic clothing or
footwear to Williams by the University or any third party;
“e.  Any report or other record of any athletically related
compensation received by Coach Williams from any source
outside the University including but not limited to income,
annuities, sports camps, housing benefits, complimentary
ticket sales, television and/or radio fees, endorsements or
consultation contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or
equipment manufacturers; and
“f.  Any notice to the University of Maryland or other record
of any item described in paragraphs []b-d of this order or
approval of the same by the University.”
 The order required the disclosure to be made within thirty-one (31) days of the order.
7
extent that salary information and personnel records coexist in the same document, the
personnel information should be redacted before the records are delivered to the appellees.
The appellants moved to alter or amend the judgment, in an attempt to have any
references to payments to the coaches from third parties deleted from the court’s order.  They
argued, in that regard, that such payments did not constitute “salary” of a public employee
and pointed out that the appellees requested information only about payments to the coaches
“by the State University from public funds” and indicated that the records it sought did “not
reveal anything about the coaches’ personal finances other than how much taxpayer money
8  Prior to this Court’s grant of certiorari, the Court of Special Appeals entered an
order remanding the case to the trial court for compliance with Maryland Rule 2-601(a). 
Maryland Rule 2-601(a) provides:
“(a) Prompt entry — Separate document.  Each judgment
shall be set forth on a separate document.  Upon a verdict of a
jury or a decision by the court allowing recovery only of cost
or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk
shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless
the court orders otherwise.  Upon a verdict of a jury or a
decision by the court granting other relief, the court shall
promptly review the form of the judgment presented, and, if
approved, sign it, and the clerk shall forthwith enter the
judgment as approved and signed.  A judgment is effective
only when so set forth and when entered as provided in
section (b) of this Rule.  Unless the court orders otherwise,
entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending
determination of the amount of costs.”
The Court of Special Appeals “Ordered  that appeal shall not be affected by the
remand.”   By order dated April 16, 2003, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
entered an order pursuant to the remand and in accordance with the order of the Court of
Special Appeals.
8
they are paid from their public employment.”   The trial court denied that motion,  whereupon
the appellants timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior to any
proceedings on the merits in the intermediate appellate court,8 this Court, on its own
initiative, issued a writ of certiorari.  University System of Maryland v. The Baltimore Sun
Co., 374 Md. 81,  821 A.2d 369, (2003). 
III.
We recently considered the applicability of the MPIA in Hammen v. Baltimore
County Police Department, 373 Md. 440, 455-456, 818 A.2d 1125, 1134-36 (2003).  In that
9§ 10-613.  Inspection of public records.
(a) In general. – Except as otherwise provided by law, a custodian
shall permit a person or governmental unit to inspect any public record at
any reasonable time.
10Section  10-612,   General right to information, as relevant, provides:
“(a) General right to information. – All persons are entitled to have
access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts
of public officials and employees.
“(b) General construction. – To carry out the right set forth in
subsection (a) of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy
of a person in interest would result, this Part III of this subtitle shall be
construed in favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least
cost and least delay to the person or governmental unit that requests the
inspection.”
. . .
9
case, we commented that the MPIA requires that a “custodian shall permit a person. . . to
inspect any public record at any reasonable time” except as otherwise provided by law.  Id.,
citing § 10-613.9  We explained that the “provisions of the. . . Act reflect the legislative intent
that the citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public
information concerning the operation of their government.”  Id., quoting Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81, 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998) (emphasis in original).  Moreover,
we made clear that the MPIA “is to be construed in favor of disclosure.”  Id., citing §10-612
(b).10  See also, Fioretti v. Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 73, 716
A.2d 258, 262 (1998) (“<the provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative
intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public
information concerning the operation of their government.’”), quoting A.S. Abell Publishing
11“§ 10-615.  Required denials – In general.
“A custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a
public record if:
“(1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or
“(2) the inspection would be contrary to:
“(i) a State statute;
“(ii) a federal statute or a regulation that is issued
under the statute and has the force of law;
“(iii) the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals;
“(iv) an order of a court of record.
10
Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983) (the provisions of the statute
“must be liberally construed . . . in order to effectuate the Public Information Act’s broad
remedial purpose”);  Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771, 481 A.2d 221, 227
(1984); Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford County, 299 Md. 493, 506-507, 474 A.2d 880,
887 (1984).
To be sure, the parties do not dispute that the records sought by the appellees are
public records.  They dispute only whether those records fall within the category of
documents and/or information that the statute mandatorily instructs a custodian to deny,11 or
permit, inspection.  As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the differences in the
documents  requested by the appellees and how these documents came  to be public records.
Both Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams are employees of the University of Maryland,
College Park, a part of the University System of Maryland, an instrumentality of the State of
Maryland.  Consequently, both coaches are employees of the state of Maryland.  Both also
12 Section 10-611 (g) provides:
“(g) Public record. – (1) ‘Public record’ mean the original or any copy of
any documentary material that:
“(i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State
government or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or
instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business;
and
“(ii) is in any form, including:
1. a card;
2. a computerized record;
3. correspondence;
4. a drawing;
5. film or microfilm;
6. a form;
7. a map;
8. a photograph or photostat;
9. a recording;
10. a tape.
“(2) ‘Public record’ includes a document that list the salary of an employee
of a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision.
“(3) ‘Public record’ does not include a digital photographic image or
signature of an individual, or the actual stored data thereof, recorded by the Motor
Vehicle Administration.”
. . .
11
have entered into written agreements with the University, outlining  the terms and conditions,
including salary, of the employment arrangement.  These written agreements, and any
amendments thereto, similar to other government contracts, come under the definition of
“public record” as  § 10-611 (g)12 defines it, as they originated as documentary evidence in
the transaction of public business.   Indeed,  § 10-611(g) (2) is  clear, a public record
“includes a document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the
State government or of a political subdivision.”  Clearly, employment contracts on file with
13  The NCAA “is a voluntary association of about 1,200 colleges and universities,
athletic conferences and sports organization devoted to the sound administration of
intercollegiate athletics.”  NCAA Online, (July 25, 2002) available at
http://ncaa,org/about/what_is_the_ncaa.html. 
14Stipulation That NCAA Enforcement Provisions Apply.  Contractual agreements
or appointments between a coach and an institution shall include the stipulation that a
coach who is found in violation of NCAA regulations shall be subject to disciplinary or
corrective action as set forth in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedures.” 
15 Termination of Employment.  Contractual agreements or appointments between
a coach and an institution shall include the stipulation that the coach my be suspended for
a period of time, without pay, or that the coach’s employment may be terminated if the
coach is found to be involved in deliberate and serious violations of NCAA regulations.
16  Section 11.2.2 of the NCAA Bylaws reads:
“11.2.2 Athletically Related Income.  Contractual agreements, including
12
the University are public records.
The University is a member of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”).13  Pursuant to NCAA regulations, contractual agreements between a member
institution and its athletic coaches, and hence between UMCP and both coaches in this case,
must include an express stipulation that NCAA Enforcement Provisions shall apply to the
terms of the employment contract. § 11.2.1.14  Violations of these provisions by a coach, it
is further stipulated, can result in disciplinary or corrective action, including suspension
without pay and termination, for serious and deliberate violation of NCAA regulations. §
11.2.1.1.15  In addition, the NCAA bylaws, see §11.2.2, provides that an athletic coach must
report annually to the member institution the sources of his or her athletically related income
from third parties.16  To be sure, therefore, coaches may earn supplemental pay, § 11.01.7,17
letters of appointment, between a full-time or part-time athletic department staff
member (excluding secretarial or clerical personnel) and an institution shall
include a stipulation that the staff member is required to provide a written detailed
account annually to the chief executive officer for all athletically related income
and benefits from sources outside the institution.  In addition, the approval of all
athletically related income and benefits shall be consistent with the institution’s
policy related to outside income and benefits applicable to applicable to all full-
time or part-time employees.  Sources of such income shall include, but are not
limited to, the following: (Revised 1/10/92, 1/11/94, 1/10/95, 4/26/01 effective
8/1/01)
“(a) Income from annuities;
“(b) Sports camps;
“(c) Housing benefits (including preferential housing arrangements);
“(d) Country club memberships;
“(e) Complimentary ticket sales;
“(f) Television and radio programs; and
“(g) Endorsement or consultation contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or
equipment manufacturers.”
17  The term “supplemental pay” is defined by NCAA Bylaw §11.01.7 as “the
payment of cash over and above an athletic department staff member’s institutional salary
by an outside source for the purpose of increasing that staff member’s annual earnings
(See Bylaw 11.3.2.2).”   Bylaw 11.3.2.2, in turn, provides:
“11.3.2.2 Supplemental Pay.  An outside source is prohibited from paying
or regularly supplementing an athletic department staff member’s annual
salary and from arranging to supplement that salary for an unspecified
achievement.  This includes the donation of cash from outside sources to
the institution earmarked for the staff member’s salary or supplemental
income.  It would be permissible for an outside source to donate funds to
the institution to be used as determined by the institution, and it would be
permissible for the institution, at its sole discretion, to use such funds to pay
or supplement a staff member’s salary.”
13
see § 11.3.2.1 (“A staff member may earn income in addition to the institutional salary by
performing services for outside groups”); however,  the NCAA recognizes the institution’s
18Bylaw, § 11.3.1,  Control of Employment and Salaries, provides:
“The institution, as opposed to any outside source, shall remain in control of
determining who is to be its employee and the amount of salary the
employee is to receive within the restriction specified by NCAA
legislation.”
14
control of the coaches’ employment and salary, see § 11.3.1,18 by both limiting and
prohibiting the source of, and how, supplemental pay  may be earned.  Section § 11.3.2.2, for
example, prohibits  “[a]n outside source ... from paying or regularly supplementing an
athletic department staff member’s annual salary and from arranging to supplement that
salary for an unspecified achievement.”  Similarly, § 11.3.2.3 limits bonuses to “direct cash
payment[s] in recognition of a specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g., contribution
during career to the athletic department of the institution, winning a conference or national
championship, number of games or meets won during career/season), provided such a cash
supplement is in recognition of a specific achievement and is in conformance with
institutional policy.”  Additionally, “An institution’s coaching staff member may not promote
a noninstitutional camp or clinic by permitting the use of his or her quotations and/or pictures
in the camp or clinic brochure, unless that coaching staff member is employed by the camp.”
Bylaw § 11.3.2.6.
Consequently, pursuant to the NCAA reporting requirements with respect to the
ability of athletic coaches to earn outside income, the University has come into possession
of documents that contain references to contracts for remuneration, and other financial
arrangements, between the coaches and third parties.  These documents evidence, at least
15
purportedly, income in addition to both coaches’ state-provided salaries, i.e., in NCAA
parlance, “institutional salary,” see By-Law, § 11.01.7, that is derived from athletically
related sources outside of the University.  Again, the documents, as all parties agree, fall
within the definition of “public record” as defined in § 10-611 (g).
The interplay between the NCAA reporting requirements and the MPIA, as it relates
to state employees, is, as we have said, at the heart of the dispute sub judice.  Without the
NCAA reporting requirement, the University, potentially, would not be in possession of the
records the respondent seeks.  Or, if both coaches were employed by a private university in
Maryland, although subject to the same NCAA reporting requirements, the MPIA would not
be applicable and the appellees could not compel their disclosure, since the MPIA does not
apply to the business records of a private entity.  
Whether, in this case, the records in the possession of the University need be disclosed
depends solely upon the legislative intent in enacting the MPIA.   That is a question of
statutory construction, the principles of which are well settled.   Most recently, the principal
canons of statutory construction, and those relevant to the decision of the case sub judice,
were reviewed by this Court in Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md.76, 85-86, 839 A. 2d 727,
732-733 (2003):
“[T]he primary goal of [statutory construction is] to ‘ascertain and effectuate
the intention of the legislature.’ Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d
423, 429 (1995).   In order to discern legislative intent, we first examine the
words of the statute and if, giving them their plain and ordinary meaning,  the
statute is clear and unambiguous, we will end our inquiry. Comptroller of the
16
Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567, 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003).  As we have
recognized, however, ‘[a]n ambiguity may ... exist even when the words of the
statute are crystal clear. That occurs when its application in a given situation
is not clear.’ Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md. v. Md. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 371
Md. 221, 231, 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002).  Therefore, a statutory provision may
be ambiguous: ‘1) when it is intrinsically unclear; or 2) when its intrinsic
meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular object or
circumstance may be uncertain.’ Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648-49, 689
A.2d 610, 613 (1997).  Further, ‘when the statute to be interpreted is part of a
statutory scheme, . . . [we read it in context, together with the other statutes]
on the same subject, harmonizing them to the extent possible. . . .’ Mid-
Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Pub Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760
A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000).   We also ‘seek to avoid constructions that are
unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense,’ Frost v. State, 336 Md.
125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994), and we will presume that ‘the Legislature
“intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious
body of law,’” Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d
229, 234 (2003), quoting  State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143,
149 (1997) (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555
(1992)), so that ‘no part of the statute is rendered meaningless or nugatory.’
Id., (citing  Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 428 (2002));
see also Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24, 636 A.2d
448, 452 (1994). In our endeavor to harmonize the provisions of all of the
relevant statutes, this Court will prefer an interpretation that allows us to avoid
reaching a constitutional question. East Prince Frederick Corp. v. County
Board of Comm’rs, 320 Md. 178, 182, 577 A.2d 27, 29 (1990). Automobile
Trade Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 21, 437 A.2d 199, 202 (1981).”
See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Olaf A. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567-69, 826 A.2d at 469-70
(2003).
At the threshold, we point out that the MPIA does not require the carte blanche, and
unrestricted disclosure, of all public records.  To the contrary, it clearly requires the
custodian of public records, in some circumstances, to deny inspection of public records and
disclosure of specific information, e.g. §§ 10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f), and, in certain other
19Section 10-618, “Permissible denials,” as relevant, provides:
“(a) In general. – Unless otherwise provided by law, if a custodian
believes that inspection of a part of a public record by the applicant would
be contrary to the public interest, the custodian may deny inspection by the
applicant of that part, as provided in this section.
*     *     *     * 
“(f) Investigations. – (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, a
custodian may deny inspection of:
“(i) records of investigations conducted by the
Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, a city or county
attorney, a police department, or a sheriff;
“(ii) an investigatory file compiled for any other law
enforcement, judicial, correctional, or prosecution purpose; . . .
.  
(2) A custodian may deny inspection by a person in interest only
to the extent that the inspection would:
(i) interfere with a valid and proper law enforcement
proceeding;
(ii) deprive another person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication;
(iii) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(iv) disclose the identity of a confidential source;
(v) disclose an investigative technique or procedure;
(vi) prejudice an investigation; or
(vii) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.”
20Section 10-611 (e) defines “person in interest”as 
“(1) a person or governmental unit that is the subject of a public record or a
17
circumstances, where disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, § 10-618,19  gives
the custodian discretion to deny inspection of parts of a public records.   Moreover, the MPIA
recognizes that “an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest”20 is reason
designee of the person or governmental unit;  
“(2) if the person has a legal disability, the parent or legal representative of
the person; or  
“(3) as to requests for correction of certificates of death under § 5-310 (d)
(2) of the Health-General Article, the spouse, adult child, parent, adult
sibling, grandparent, or guardian of the person of the deceased at the time of
the deceased's death.”
Being the subject of the public records sought by the appellees, both Coach Friedgen and
Coach Williams are persons in interest.
18
to deny inspection of a public record.  See § 10-612 (b).  Read in its totality and in context,
it is clear that, in enacting the MPIA, the General Assembly was attempting to  balance the
right of the public to unfettered access to government records against the “unwarranted
invasion of the privacy of a person in interest,” see §10-612 (b), that unrestricted disclosure
would cause.  Clearly, it is the threat of, and protection against, an unwarranted invasion of
privacy that led to the exclusions found in §§10-616 and 10-617.  Nonetheless, the
Legislature has also instructed, and we have repeatedly affirmed, see Hammen supra, 373
Md. at 457, 818 A.2d at 1136;  Caffrey v. Dept of Liquor Control for Mont. Co. 370 Md.
272, 305, 805 A.2d 268, 287-288 (2002);  Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359
Md. 341, 343, 753 A.2d 1036, 1037 (2000);  Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Examiners,
351 Md. 66, 73, 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998); Kirwan supra, 352 Md. at 96-97, 741 A.2d at
207, that the MPIA is to be construed in favor of permitting inspection of public records.
19
Our case law interpreting the MPIA’s disclosure requirements is instructive.  For
example, in Hammen, a retired Baltimore County Police Officer, pursuant to an M PIA
request, sought to inspect surveillance tapes taken of his activities.  The videotapes were
taken by the county to be used in a separate administrative proceeding related to the re-
evaluation of the officer’s disability retirements benefits.  Denying the request to inspect the
videotape, the Baltimore County Office of Law opined that disclosure of the videotapes
would be contrary to the decision in Shenk v. Berger, 86 Md. App. 498, 587 A.2d 551
(1991).   In that case, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue of whether
surveillance videotapes of an injured party, taken by the opposing party after the alleged
injuries had occurred, were subject to Maryland’s discovery rules.  The intermediate
appellate court held that they were, provided that, prior to disclosure, the party having to
disclose is afforded the opportunity to depose the injured party.  Shenk, supra, 86 Md. App.
at 506-507, 587 A.2d at 556.  In Hammen, the defendant agreed to honor the MPIA  request,
if Hammen would agree to be deposed in a separate proceeding, which he agreed to do.
Nevertheless, we concluded that Shenk was not applicable because it involved “a private
personal injury civil action and did not involve statutorily guaranteed access to public records
by a ‘party in interest’” Hammen, supra, 373 Md. at 452, 818 A.2d at 1133.  We held that
“the rules of discovery applicable to circuit court proceedings are not, generally, applicable
20
in respect to MPIA proceedings,” id. at 453, 818 A. 2d at 1133, explaining that an MPIA
request “is an attempt to gain statutorily guaranteed access to ‘public information,’ not
private information.”  Id. at 457, 818 A.2d at 1135 (emphasis added).  Thus, absent some rule
of law to the contrary, whatever rights the appellees have to compel disclosure and,
conversely, whatever rights the appellants have to deny disclosure, are embodied within the
MPIA.
Prior to Hammen, this Court addressed the scope of the MPIA in two cases, Office
of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000) and Kirwan v.
The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998).   The MPIA request in Washington
Post sought disclosure of the  telephone records of the Governor of the State of Maryland for
“all phones in the Governor’s Mansion (Government House); his State House offices; all
phones in Shaw House (an annex office in Annapolis); all phones in the Washington and
Baltimore offices; all car phones and cellular phones used by the governor and anyone on his
staff.”  In addition, the Washington Post asked to review the scheduling and appointment
records of the Governor for a two-year period.  Asserting executive privilege, the Governor’s
Office, denied the request, choosing instead to disclose only the aggregate cost of the
telephone calls.  In addition, it  released the Governor’s public agenda, but  refused to release
the appointment and scheduling records, which, in its opinion, did not constitute public
21  One of the dissents in Office of the Governor v. Washington Post, 360 Md. 520,
565, 759 A.2d 249, 574 (2000), argued that the Maryland General Assembly was
precluded, by the doctrine of separation of powers, enumerated in the Maryland
Constitution, see Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, Article II, Section 17 of the
Maryland Constitution, from enacting laws compelling  the Governor’s office to disclose
the nonpublic activities, such as appointments and scheduling of private interviews, of the
Governor. 
21
records.  
We addressed, as a preliminary matter, whether the provisions of the MPIA applied
to the Governor’s office. Concluding that the statutory language “clearly encompassed. . .[the
Governor’s office] as a unit or instrumentality of the State government,” this Court
determined that records of the Governor’s office are subject to the right of inspection
guaranteed in the MPIA.21  We concluded that there was no statutory exclusion in the MPIA
for certain of the records sought by the Washington Post and, accordingly, required their
disclosure.  More important, however, to the case sub judice, was the determination that
phone records from the Governor’s Mansion, although technically property owned and paid
for by the State and in the possession of the Governor’s office, did not come within the
definition of “public record,” “in light of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her own home.”  360 Md. at 537, 759 A.2d at 258.  The Court explained:
“In light of the nature of Government House and the role of the Government
House Trust, the Governor and his family might not have the identical
22
expectation of privacy while living there as one has in his or her privately
owned home.  Nonetheless, we do not believe that the Governor and his family
must relinquish all normal expectations of privacy in their home simply
because, in accordance with constitutional and statutory provisions, their home
and furnishing, including telephone service, are supplied by the State.”
Washington Post, supra, 360 Md. at 537-38, 759 A.2d at 259.  Thus, the determination in
Washington Post, with respect to the Governor’s home telephone bills, turned on this Court’s
construction of those records as being in their nature private and, therefore, not being the
kinds of records that are encompassed within the definition of a “public record” intended by
the Legislature.  Id. at 538, 759 A.2d 259.
Also at issue in Kirwan v. Diamondback, supra, was the scope of an MPIA request
involving the records of parking citations issued by UMCP to student-athletes, and,
coincidentally, to the UMCP head basketball coach, Gary Williams.  The MPIA request,
made by the campus student-newspaper, was denied by the University, the custodian of the
parking citation records, on the basis that they were either personnel records exempt from
disclosure under § 10-616 (i) of the MPIA or, in the alternative, financial information exempt
from disclosure under § 10-617 (f) of the MPIA.  This Court rejected both rationales.   We
concluded, instead, that a citation for a parking violation is, in sum, “a charging document
accusing the recipient of a petty crime, and the monetary penalty imposed for a parking
23
violation is a fine rather than a debt.” 352 Md. at 87, 721 A.2d at 202.   As such, we stated,
such records did not constitute financial information as defined under the statute and,
moreover, “did not fit within the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘personnel
records.”’  Id. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200.  
We also were not persuaded by the University’s argument, pursuant to § 10-618
(permissive denials),  that disclosure of the records “is against the public interest.”  Id. at 87-
88, 721 A.2d at 202-03.  That argument was premised upon the, supposed, “chilling effect”
disclosure would have on the University’s obligation to self report NCAA violations.  The
Court concluded that the “public interest” argument did not fall clearly into categories
recognized in § 10-618's permissive denials.  Id.  
Finally, the University argued, citing §10-612, that disclosure of parking ticket records
would be “‘an unwarranted invasion of privacy’ because it would subject student-athletes and
their families ‘to extreme embarrassment and humiliation.’” 352 Md. at 88, 721 A.2d at 203.
In response, we stated
“When an adult commits or is formally charged with committing a criminal
offense, even a petty one, it is doubtful that any “invasion of privacy”
occasioned by an accurate newspaper report of the matter is “unwarranted.”
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that one might reasonably believe that such
disclosure is an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the Maryland Public
Information Act does not contain an exemption for particular cases whenever
24
the disclosure of a record might cause an “unwarranted invasion of privacy.”
Section 10-612 (b), previously quoted, related to the ‘General Construction’
of the Act.  It provides that the Act “shall be construed in favor’ of disclosure
“unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would
result.’  The statutory construction issues raised in the present case regarding
the Maryland Public Information Act concern the meaning of the terms
‘personnel records’ and ‘financial records.’  As explained in Part II A and II
B above, the records sought in the present case do not constitute personnel
records or financial information.  Furthermore, we do not believe that a
broader definition of these terms would be justified under the statutory
construction principles set forth in § 10-612 (b).”
Id. at 88-89, 712 A.2d. at 203.  
Our cases thus instruct  that, in a dispute relating to an MPIA request, a  party’s right
to deny or compel inspection of public records is grounded, almost, if not exclusively, within
the Act.   The express exemptions set out  in §§ 10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f), are intended to
address the reasonable expectation of privacy that a person in interest has in certain types of
records identified by the Legislature.
To be sure, the MPIA expressly requires the disclosure of a state-employee’s salary
as a matter of public record.  See § 10-611(g)(2) (defining a public record to include “a
document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State
government.”) and § 10-612.  The appellants, while acknowledging that a document
evidencing a state-employee’s salary is subject to MPIA’s disclosure requirements
25
(Petitioner’s Brief at 7), maintain that the employment contracts sought by the appellees are
either personnel records or financial information exempt under §§10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f).
(Petitioner’s Brief at 8).   With respect to the former, they reason: when § 10-616 (i) and §
10-617 (f) (1) are read together, it is clear that § 10-617 (f) (1) “does not trump the personnel
records exemption.”   They point out that the latter provision “refers to the ‘subsection,’
meaning § 10-617 (f).   It does not refer to § 10-616 (i),” which it easily could have done, had
that been what the Legislature intended.
The appellants also rely on 83 Op.  Att’y Gen. 192 (Md. 1998), available at 1998 Md.
AG LEXIS 35 (Opinion No. 98-025, December 18, 1998).   In that opinion, the Attorney
General, responding to an inquiry from the County Executive for Anne Arundel County
concerning “public access to records reflecting individual bonuses or performance awards
paid to merit system employees and appointed officials of Anne Arundel County,”concluded
that “the public is entitled to inspect records that reflect the earnings of government officers
and employees, whether those earnings consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented
by a bonus or performance award.”   Id.   He cautioned, however, that “[t]his conclusion does
not imply that the public has an entitlement to the documents establishing the basis for a
bonus or performance award[,] for example, performance evaluations. Underlying records
of this kind fall within the exemption for personnel records.”  Id. at 192  n.3.  The appellants
26
argue that the employment contract the University has with each coach is an underlying
record of the kind to which the Attorney General made reference and, therefore, comes
within the exemption for personnel records found in § 10-616 (i).  (Petitioner’s Brief at 11).
So viewing the contracts  for employment,  they disclosed the salary information that the
contracts authorized, but refused to disclose the contracts themselves.
The appellants’ argument with respect to § 10-617 (f) is premised on the financial
information concerning the coaches’ contractual and financial arrangements with, and thus
payments from, third parties, being personal financial information and not a part of the salary
the coaches receive from the State.    They note, in this regard, that, while “public record”
is broadly defined, the requirement of disclosure is tempered by whether the law provides
otherwise.    Section 10-617 (f) provides otherwise, they assert, by prohibiting “inspection
of the part of a public record that contains information about the finances of an individual,
including assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities,
or creditworthiness.”   Thus, the appellants submit:
“[T]he plain language of the MPIA requires only the disclosure of ‘salary’ and
expressly prohibits the disclosure of ‘income.’    Had the Legislature intended
that State agencies disclose private income of an individual ‘derived from any
university asset,’ it could have easily so provided.   But those words do not
appear in the statute. ...  The plain meaning of SG § 10-617 (f) (2) requires that
a custodian deny inspection of a public record that contains information about
[the] finances of an individual, including income.    There is no exception for
27
income ‘derived from any university asset.’”
(Citations omitted).    The need to give effect to the plain language of the statute is not
trumped, the appellants conclude, by the statutory direction to construe the MPIA in favor
of permitting inspection of a public record.    
This court is not persuaded by the appellants’ personnel records argument.   Moreover,
the MPIA clearly requires, as all of the parties agree, the disclosure of the “salary of an
employee of a unit or instrumentality of State government.” § 10-611 (g) (2).    That certainly
would include the dollar amount paid.    We believe that the requirement must include, in
addition, disclosure of any document evidencing the employment arrangement and how the
state-funded salary is earned.  
A public record includes documentary material, in any form, made , or received, by
a unit or instrumentality of State government in connection with the transaction of State
business.   A contract between the University and the coaches of their athletic teams entered
into after negotiations is the result of, and indeed, is, the transaction of State business. 
While it may not fall neatly into the definition of salary, a contract setting out the rights and
responsibilities of each party to it and the circumstances and conditions governing the
coaches’ entitlement to receive the salary is not only a document entered into, i.e. made by
28
and received by the University in connection with the transaction of public business, but it
certainly informs and gives context to “salary.”    Indeed, the purpose of the MPIA, see § 10-
612 (a) (“all persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of
government and the official acts of public officials and employees”), is better served when
the full context in which the salary is due or paid is known, i. e., fully disclosed.   That is
achieved only when the contract itself is disclosed.   Thus, it is clear that the employment
contracts evidencing the regular salaries paid to each coach by the University, and their
obligations and rights, are exactly the types of records to which the Legislature intended the
public to have access.  
We are not persuaded that the employment contracts are themselves the kinds of
underlying documents referred to by the Attorney General and argued by the appellants.
They may establish the basis for the salary, for they state the rights and obligations of the
coach in order to earn the contractual remuneration, but they are not in the nature of a
performance evaluation.   Thus, under the legislative policy favoring disclosure of public
records, we conclude that they do not fall within the exemption for personnel records found
in §10-616(i).  
Moreover, denial of inspection of the employment contracts would contribute to the
lack of public understanding of the amounts earned by Coach Friedgen and Williams as a
29
result of their public employment and would thwart the achievement of the goal of the MPIA.
We, therefore, hold that the employment contracts and any amendments thereto, side letters
or documents reflecting the total compensation and sums of monies paid directly by the
University to Coaches Friedgen and Williams must be disclosed.  The terms of the
employment contract are essential to an understanding of the salaries paid to the coaches,
especially in light of the various alternatives for compensation potentially available to the
coaches, supra note 8, in the form of car allowances, country club memberships,
complimentary ticket sales, use of state-owned resources for clinics and camps, etc.
Consequently, the trial court correctly ordered disclosure of the records evidencing payments
of state funds to Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams.   
We reach a different result, one contrary to that reached by the trial court, with respect
to records of financial arrangements between the coaches and third parties.  
There are, to be sure, benefits that flow from being the head football or basketball
coach at an institution like UMCP.  As with any employment opportunity, there are both
benefits and burdens.    Along with status and celebrity, these positions afford the individuals
holding them with a wide array of business and financial opportunities.  Often, these
opportunities result in financial remuneration from third parties over and above that called
for by, but nevertheless consistent with, the contract with the University.  As employees of
30
the State of Maryland, Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams share in the burden with the
thousands of other state employees whose employment terms and affairs are subject to the
inspection requirements of the MPIA.  To date, the MPIA does not provide an exception for
head coaches who work at schools with NCAA programs.
While it is true that the records evidencing these third party transactions are in the
appellants’ possession, we must also note that these records have come to be there only by
virtue of the regulations governing the relationship between the University and the NCAA.
Not only does the MPIA not require the University to collect these records, no Maryland
statute requires the Coaches to provide these documents.  Nonetheless, balancing the public’s
right of access to the affairs of government and the caution against unwarranted invasions
of privacy, articulated in §10-612, as manifested in the Legislature’s exemption of certain
financial information from disclosure pursuant to § 10-617 (f), we do not believe the records
of the private business affairs of Coaches Friedgen and Coach Williams,  including contracts
with third parties, unrelated to their public employment, are required to be disclosed.
 The situation may be different, however,  when the contract with the third party, and
the income flowing therefrom, are so connected with, and related to, the coach’s public
employment as to be, in effect, authorized by, and thus, a part of, the  University contract.
Although, as articulated above, the MPIA is to be construed so as to promote disclosure of
22That both coaches may profit, even handsomely, from these third party financial
arrangements, by virtue of their employments as head coaches at UMCP, must be
conceded, and, indeed may be a strong, even a persuasive argument for requiring the
disclosure of, not simply the salaries of state employees, but third party payments, as well,
however the mere existence of said compensation is not determinative of whether it is
properly disclosed under the MPIA.   
31
public documents,  the General Assembly simply,  and clearly, provided that a custodian deny
“the part of a public record that contains the finances of an individual, including assets,
income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or
creditworthiness.”  § 10-617 (f) (2).  Therefore, the decision whether it is appropriate to
disclose the third party contract under the  MPIA  is one that cannot be made in a vacuum.
Rather, to determine whether disclosure is appropriate, both the University contract and the
third party contract will have to be reviewed in tandem.   The University contract must be
reviewed to determine whether, arguably, it authorizes or contemplates the third party
contract or contracts similar thereto.  And the terms of the third party contract must be
reviewed in order to determine whether the income derived by that contract is closely
connected with, and related to, the coach’s employment with the University, to determine,
in other words, whether, but for the coach’s employment with the University, the third party
contract would not have been made, or many of its terms included.22  
The NCAA by-laws require that a coach must report annually to the member
32
institution the sources of his or her athletically related income from third parties, and thus,
make the third party contracts relating to athletically related income important when
discussing the University’s employment contract with the coaches.  
We have also pointed out that, under the circumstances where public employment and
remuneration, subject to the MPIA, and private employment and remuneration, not subject
to the MPIA, intersect, the ability to comply with the MPIA is dependent on reviewing the
contracts governing both in tandem.  An unwarranted disclosure of private financial
information can be avoided by the review being made by the trial court  in camera.   During
that in camera review,  the court must construe the MPIA as the Legislature enacted it, and
not  give it a forced or strained meaning.  See Kolzig, 375 Md. at 568-569, 826 A.2d at 469-
470; Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1246 (2001); Graves v. State, 364
Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001);  Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471, 667 A.2d
179, 183 (1995)  Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788, 791 (1979).
If the court determines that Coach Williams is receiving payments from companies
solely as a result of his position as coach at UMCP, and that the income is intimately
connected to his activities as coach of UMCP, then that income  is part of his compensation
and subject to disclosure.  Thus, for instance, if the third party contract requires that the
members of the  basketball  team wear that party’s shoes or clothing during UMCP basketball
23Coach Williams’ honors, for example, include:
•
Naismith National Coach of the Year Finalist, 1995, 1997, 2002 
•
National Coach of the Year, 2002 (Basketball America,
CBSSportsline.com)
•
Atlantic Coast Conference Coach of the Year, 2002
•
Victor Award, 2002 (National Academy of Sports Editors)
•
Winged Foot Award, 2002 (N.Y. Athletic Club)
•
Harry Litwack Eastern Coach of the Year Award, 2002 (Herb Good
Basketball Club of Philadelphia)
•
District Coach of the Year, 2002 (Basketball Times)
•
Seaboard Region Coach of the Year, 1997, 2002 (Basketball Times
& Eastern Basketball)
•
National Coach of the Year, 2001 (Playboy)
•
Atlantic Coast Conference Coach of the Year, 2000 (College Hoops
Illustrated)
•
Atlantic Coast Conference Coach of the Year, 1998 (ACC Athlete
Magazine)
•
U.S. Olympic Team Selection Committee, 1988
See University of Maryland Official Athletics Official Site, Coaches, available at
http://umterps.ocsn.com/sports/m-baskbl/mtt/williams_gary00.html (last visited
March 12, 2004).
33
games, the court may find that the financial benefit to the coach is directly related to the
coach’s status with the University and, therefore, order the contract pursuant to which it is
paid disclosed.  On the other hand, if after reviewing the contract terms, the court is
convinced that the payments the coach  is receiving from the third party company, although
prompted by his position as an NCAA coach, and the University’s coach in particular,23 are
not so connected with or related to his activities as coach of UMCP as to render the contract
proceeds a part of his official compensation, the contract is not subject to disclosure under
the MPIA.  
34
We conclude that the records evidencing contracts and agreements, to which the
University is not a party, providing income to the coaches and supplied by third parties, must
be viewed by the lower court, in camera, in order to determine whether they  are financial
information within the contemplation of § 10-617 (f) and, thus, are not required to be
disclosed pursuant to the MPIA. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
PRINCE 
GEORGE’S 
COUNTY
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS 
OPINION.
COSTS  TO BE PAID ONE HALF BY THE
APPELLANTS AND ONE HALF BY THE
APPELLEES.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 138
September Term, 2002
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF
MARYLAND, et al.
v.
THE BALTIMORE SUN 
COMPANY, et al.
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia, J.J.
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   April 15, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this
Court; after being recalled pursuant  to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion.
Although I agree with most of the Majority’s reasoning and conclusions, I respectfully
dissent with regard to the Majority’s reasoning that either coach’s income received from a
private contract with a third-party, outside of State government, can somehow be so “closely
connected,” “intimately connected,” or “related” to the coaches’ employment by the State as
to morph into a part of the salary paid by the State.  Maj. op. at 30-33.  The salary of a public
employee is paid by the State.  The MPIA simply and clearly distinguishes between salary
and income so that the privacy of the non-salary finances of an individual is protected against
an unwarranted invasion.  Balancing the public’s right of access to the affairs of government
against an individual’s right to privacy, articulated in § 10-612, as manifested in the
Legislature’s exemption of certain financial information from disclosure under § 10-617(f),
I conclude that the records of the private business affairs of Coach Friedgen and Coach
Williams categorically do not warrant disclosure, let alone in camera examination.
As is customary in matters of statutory interpretation, we begin by reminding
ourselves of the pertinent rules of interpretation.  “The goal with which we approach the
interpretation of a statute or ordinance is to determine the intention of the Legislature
enacting it.”  County Council of Prince George’s County, Maryland, Sitting as the District
Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416, 780 A.2d 1137, 1147 (2001) (citation omitted).  It is
well settled that 
the cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.  To this end,
we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the
words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly
understood meaning, we end our enquiry there also.  Where the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete
language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in that language, nor may it
construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its
application.  Moreover, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no
word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.
Id. (citations and formatting omitted)  The language of the MPIA statute is clear and
unambiguous.  The plain language clearly states that “salary” must be disclosed and the parts
of public records that contain financial information not relating to salary are excluded from
inspection. § 10-617(f)(1).  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1031
(10th ED. 1989) defines salary as “fixed compensation paid regularly for services.”  As
regards the finances of an individual, the General Assembly provided that a custodian deny
disclosure of “the part of the record that contains the finances of an individual, including
assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or
creditworthiness.” § 10-617(f)(2).
By enacting the MPIA, the Legislature expressly chose to exempt from disclosure
public records that contain information about the personal finances of an individual,
including income, that do not constitute salary paid by the State.  The information that the
University holds about the contracts between the coaches and third parties is financial
information about income from outside sources that is not part of the coaches’ salaries.
Moreover, those documents are collected by the University, not as part of any requirement
of State Law, but in obeisance to NCAA regulations.  The Legislature has not required the
inspection of public records that reflect all sources of a State employee’s income–it chose not
to do so.  I would conclude, therefore, that the records evidencing contracts and agreements
providing income to the University’s coaches supplied by third parties, and to which the
University is not a party, are financial information other than salary information under § 10-
617(f).  Thus, those documents and the information contained therein are not required to be
disclosed pursuant to the MPIA.