Title: Moreau v. Fuller

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
THE HONORABLE STACEY W. MOREAU, JUDGE 
OF THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS  
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
v.  Record No. 062688 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 6, 2008 
WILLIAM H. FULLER, III,  
COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY  
OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider among other issues, whether a 
circuit court may issue a writ of mandamus directing a 
juvenile and domestic relations district court judge, who has 
taken a case involving criminal charges under advisement for 
deferred disposition, to immediately make a final disposition 
in the case. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
The Honorable Stacey W. Moreau (“Judge Moreau”), a judge 
of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court of the 
City of Danville presided over the case of Commonwealth v. 
Dareance Montae Skipwith, Case No. JA016152-01-00.  Skipwith, 
an adult, was charged with contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor, a misdemeanor under Code § 18.2-371.  Upon hearing 
the evidence in the case, Judge Moreau found the evidence 
sufficient to convict the defendant, however, upon request of 
the victim’s mother, she did not enter a judgment of 
conviction, and took the matter under advisement for final 
disposition at a later date.  The court stated it would “defer 
judgment given the facts and request of the victim’s mother.”  
Judge Moreau checked the box on the back of the warrant 
stating, “place accused on probation, §§ 4.1-305, 18.2-57.3, 
18.2-251 or 19.2-303.2.  Costs imposed on defendant.”  
However, there is no signature of the judge on this document.  
A separately prepared order which was signed stated: 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT: 
 
 
Sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
the charge.  The Court finds that it has the 
authority to take that matter under advisement 
per Powell v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 231 
(2001) and the dicta noted in the Danville 
Circuit Court opinion in the matter of 
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 Cir. 162 (12/3/2001), 
noting “(a)fter considering the authorities 
cited, this court is of the opinion that to the 
extent it has the authority to defer judgment, 
it is nevertheless inappropriate to do so in 
this case.” 
 
It IS ORDERED THAT: 
 
The Court finds that it is appropriate in this 
matter to defer judgment given the facts and 
request of the victim’s mother.  The matter is 
continued to 09/28/2006 at 8:00 a.m. 
 
Contemporaneous records of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court of the City of Danville indicated that if there 
were “no problems” then no appearance of the defendant or any 
witnesses would be required and the case would be dismissed.  
 
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These contemporaneous records were not in the form of an 
order. 
William H. Fuller, III, Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 
City of Danville (“Fuller”) objected to Judge Moreau’s 
continuance of the matter for deferred disposition and filed a 
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Danville.  The Petition requested that Judge Moreau be 
directed to render final judgment in the underlying Skipwith 
case and that she desist taking matters under advisement in 
the future. 
 
The Circuit Court of the City of Danville issued a writ 
of mandamus ordering Judge Moreau to “enter final judgment in 
the case of Commonwealth v. Dareance Montae Skipwith” and 
further held that: 
Deferred adjudication/disposition is only 
available to a trial court when a defendant is 
charged under a criminal statute that specifically 
authorizes such deferment wherein the judge can 
then dismiss the case. 
 
Section 18.2-371, contribution to the delinquency 
of a minor, does not specifically provide for 
deferred adjudication/disposition.  
 
A deferred adjudication/disposition of a violation 
of § 18.2-371, contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor, exceeds the scope of Virginia law.  
 
[Judge Moreau’s] finding of facts as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence was a discretionary 
function. However, nothing in this order prevents 
[Judge Moreau] from revisiting that discretionary 
finding.  But, once [Judge Moreau] has made a 
 
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finding as to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
then a determination as to the guilt or innocence 
of the accused is a ministerial and not a 
discretionary judicial function.  
 
Therefore, a writ of mandamus is appropriate to 
compel [Judge Moreau] to perform the ministerial 
act of making a final disposition of the case in 
Commonwealth v. Dareance Montae Skipwith. 
 
 
We granted Judge Moreau an appeal upon three assignments 
of error that challenge the propriety of mandamus to compel 
her to enter final judgment in the underlying case and include 
the following procedural claims: “There was no service of 
process on the criminal defendant, Skipwith[,]1 [t]he 
[p]etition for [m]andamus failed to allege that [p]etitioner 
had no other adequate remedy[,]2 [t]he Commonwealth’s Attorney 
lacked standing to bring the [p]etition for [m]andamus in his 
name, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney exceeded his authority 
to pursue a civil suit on behalf of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia.”  Further, Judge Moreau maintains that the trial 
                     
1 On brief, Judge Moreau argues that Skipwith was a 
necessary party and that failure to make him a party by 
serving him in the mandamus proceedings invalidated the 
granting of the writ.  There is some divergence between the 
expression of this contention in the assignment of error and 
in the brief, but in view of our disposition of the appeal on 
other grounds it is not necessary to consider whether the 
argument provided on brief impermissibly departs from the 
wording of this assignment of error under Rules 5:27 and 
5:17(c). 
2 A review of the record indicates that this assignment of 
error is factually inaccurate. Fuller did maintain in the 
trial court, in arguments made in a memorandum of law filed in 
support of his petition, that he had no other adequate remedy. 
 
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court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus because she “had 
authority to take the case under advisement and dismiss the 
charge.” 
II. Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
The issue whether Fuller has standing to file the 
petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the question of Judge 
Moreau’s authority to grant a “deferred sentence,” and the 
determination whether mandamus lies as an extraordinary remedy 
are all questions of law subject to de novo review upon 
appeal.  Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 
630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006). 
B.  Standing 
Judge Moreau contests Fuller’s authority as 
Commonwealth’s Attorney to pursue the civil remedy of 
mandamus.  The general requirements of standing have often 
been stated: 
 
The purpose of requiring standing is to make 
certain that a party who asserts a particular 
position has the legal right to do so and that his 
rights will be affected by the disposition of the 
case. Thus, a party claiming standing must 
demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy.  
 
Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 
(2001) (internal citations omitted).  Judge Moreau further 
argues that only the Attorney General of Virginia has the 
 
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authority to pursue this civil action. Recently, we have 
considered petitions brought by elected Commonwealth’s 
Attorneys seeking the issuance of special writs of prohibition 
or mandamus. In re: Robert F. Horan, Jr., 271 Va. 258, 634 
S.E.2d 675 (2006); In re: Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City 
of Roanoke, 265 Va. 313, 576 S.E.2d 458 (2003). The issue of 
standing or authority of the Commonwealth’s Attorney to bring 
such actions was not raised in either of those cases.  While 
it is clear that Commonwealth’s Attorneys are limited in the 
matters they may pursue, they are not entirely confined to 
criminal actions. As Fuller points out, the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney’s civil responsibilities include, among others,3 
                     
3 See, e.g., Code §§ 2.2-3126(A) (conflict of interest 
opinions); 3.1-249.70(B) (enjoining pesticide violations); 
3.1-616(2) (apple injunctions); 3.1-722.11(B) (farm produce 
injunctions); 6.1-2.27(C) (Consumer Real Estate Settlement 
Protection Act injunctions); 8.01-622.1(B) (enjoining assisted 
suicide); 8.01-637(A) (instituting actions in quo warranto); 
10.1-1320.1 (seeking fines and penalties for Air Pollution 
Control Board); 18.2-245(b) (enjoining continuing sales frauds 
in addition to any available criminal sanctions); 18.2-339 
(enjoining gambling); 18.2-371.2(D) (civil actions for sale of 
tobacco to minors); 18.2-384(1) (determining obscenity of 
books); 21-220 (enjoining pollution of tidal waters); 32.1-
125.2(B) (medical care facilities and services injunctions); 
40.1-49.6(A) (must represent the Commonwealth in civil matters 
involving enforcement of health and safety labor provisions); 
48-8 (prostitution injunctions); 54.1-2964(B) (enjoining 
violations of laws relating to the disclosure of interest in 
facilities and clinical laboratories); 54.1-3943 (attorney 
solicitation injunctions); 57-23 (appointment or removal of 
trustees of public cemeteries); 57-25 (condemnation of land to 
establish local cemeteries); 57-59(C) (charitable solicitation 
and terrorism injunctions); 58.1-339.10(D) (assisting the 
 
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enjoining common nuisances relating to alcohol, Code § 4.1-
335, and instituting seizures of property used in the sale and 
distribution of drugs, Code § 19.2-386.1. 
 
Clearly, the general delegation of authority to the 
Attorney General to handle civil matters on behalf of the 
Commonwealth contained in Code § 2.2-507 has been subject to 
exceptions.  We have considered such petitions in the recent 
past without objection by the parties or the Commonwealth and 
we now hold that at a minimum, the Commonwealth’s Attorney has 
standing to seek mandamus or prohibition in a matter involving 
an ongoing criminal prosecution. 
C.  Mandamus 
 
As we have recently stated: 
 
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be 
used ‘to compel performance of a purely 
ministerial duty, but it does not lie to compel 
the performance of a discretionary duty.’ ” 
Ancient Art Tattoo Studio, Ltd. v. City of 
Virginia Beach, 263 Va. 593, 597, 561 S.E.2d 690, 
692 (2002) (quoting Board of County Supervisors v. 
Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584, 221 S.E.2d 
534, 536 (1976)). “A ministerial act is ‘one which 
a person performs in a given state of facts and 
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of 
legal authority without regard to, or the exercise 
of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act 
being done.’ ” Richlands Medical Ass'n. v. 
                                                                
State Forester in collecting taxes); 58.1-3354 (correcting 
assessments); 59.1-68.4 (Home Solicitations Sales Act and 
deceptive trade practices injunctions); 62.1-194.1(B) 
(enjoining obstruction or contamination of waters); 62.1-
194.3(c) (enjoining obstruction or dumping in the Big Sandy 
River). 
 
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Commonwealth of Virginia, 230 Va. 384, 386, 337 
S.E.2d 737, 739 (1985) (quoting Dovel v. Bertram, 
184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370 (1945)). 
However, when the act to be performed involves the 
exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of 
the court or judge, it becomes a judicial act and 
mandamus will not lie. Dovel, 184 Va. at 22, 34 
S.E. at 370.  
 
In re: Commonwealth's Attorney, 265 Va. at 317-18, 576 S.E.2d 
at 461. 
 
As we explained in Page v. Clopton, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 
415 (1878): 
 
[Mandamus] may be appropriately used and is 
often used to compel courts to act where they 
refuse to act and ought to act, but not to direct 
and control the judicial discretion to be 
exercised in the performance of the act to be 
done; to compel courts to hear and decide where 
they have jurisdiction, but not to pre-determine 
the decision to be made; to require them to 
proceed to judgment, but not to fix and prescribe 
the judgment to be rendered. 
 
Id. at 418. 
The Constitution of Virginia declares fundamental powers 
in three branches of government:  “The chief executive power 
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Governor.”  Va. 
Const. art. V, § 1.  “The legislative power of the 
Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Delegates.”  Va. Const. 
art. IV, § 1.  “The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall 
be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of 
original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme 
 
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Court as the General Assembly may from time to time 
establish.”  Va. Const. art. VI, § 1.  The division of these 
fundamental powers is to be distinct:  “The legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and 
distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging 
to the others . . .”  Va. Const. art. III, § 1. 
At the heart of this declaration and separation of powers 
are roles that are uniquely allocated to the identified 
departments of government.  For example, the judiciary and the 
legislature may not assume a power of clemency or pardon which 
is a unique function of executive power.  The Governor and the 
judiciary may not assume the function of statutory enactment, 
a power unique to the legislative function.  And although the 
subject matter of the judiciary’s power may, in some ways be 
limited by legislative action, the essential function of the 
judiciary – the act of rendering judgment in matters properly 
before it – may not be abridged by either the executive or 
legislative branches.  
The judiciary’s inherent power derives from its existence 
as an institution entrusted with the function of rendering 
judgment.  To deny this function is to deny the very 
institution itself.  The court’s inherent power has been 
recognized to extend to matters “incident to the exercise of 
the judicial power which is vested” in it.  Button v. Day, 204 
 
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Va. 547, 553, 132 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1963) (citation omitted). 
See 2 A. E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
Virginia 718-20 (1974).  The United States Supreme Court 
addressed this fundamental power and observed that division of 
powers within the federal constitution “gives the Federal 
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to 
decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the 
Article III hierarchy – with an understanding, in short, that 
‘a judgment conclusively resolves the case’ because ‘a 
“judicial Power” is one to render dispositive judgments.’ ”  
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995). 
 
The case before us immediately presents definitional 
problems. Terms such as “deferred judgment,” “taking under 
advisement,” and “continuance for disposition” appear at times 
to be used interchangeably.  We must penetrate the confusion 
created by descriptive terms and address the underlying 
conduct to determine what is within the inherent authority of 
the judiciary and what may be beyond its boundaries. 
Upon hearing the evidence in the criminal proceeding at 
issue in this case, it was within the inherent authority of 
the court to “take the matter under advisement” or “continue 
the case for disposition” at a later date.  Such practices 
involve the essence of rendering judgment.  No one contends 
that the judge must immediately render judgment upon the 
 
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instant that the presentation of evidence has been concluded.
 
What may in a proper case be reasonably subject to 
challenge is whether the judge may decline to render judgment 
and continue the case with or without terms akin to probation 
status with the promise from the court of a particular 
disposition at a later date.4  However, the case before us does 
not present such questions. 
The purported disposition on the back of the warrant is 
not an order because it is not signed by the judge.  
Consequently, the order of the juvenile court that we must 
consider is the independently generated order that is signed 
by the judge.  This order finds that there is “sufficient 
evidence to convict the defendant of the charge” and “finds 
that it is appropriate in this matter to defer judgment given 
the facts and request of the victim’s mother.  This matter is 
continued to 09/28/2006 at 8:00 a.m.” 
We have repeatedly stated that a court speaks only 
through its written orders.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 103, 639 S.E.2d 174, 177 (2007).  
The underlying juvenile court order in this case has no terms 
                     
 
4 We note that while a case is pending, a court retains 
the power to continue bail requirements pursuant to statutory 
authority.  We need not determine whether such power is within 
the inherent power of the courts because the issue is not 
before us and there is express statutory authority that 
supports it. 
 
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or conditions and no provision of a future disposition.  It 
merely declares that the evidence is sufficient to convict the 
defendant and continues the matter to a date certain.  Nothing 
contained in the order is beyond the power of the court.5 
 
In the case before us, the trial court issued a Writ of 
Mandamus to Judge Moreau compelling her to “perform the 
ministerial act of making a final disposition of the case in 
Commonwealth v. Dareance Montae Skipwith.”  However, in 
reaching its decision, the trial court made the following 
holding as well: 
 
[Judge Moreau’s] finding of facts as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence was a discretionary 
function.  However, nothing in this order prevents 
[Judge Moreau] from revisiting that discretionary 
finding. But, once [Judge Moreau] has made a 
finding as to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
then a determination as to the guilt or innocence 
of the accused is a ministerial and not a 
discretionary judicial function. 
 
While we agree with the trial court that finding of facts as 
to the sufficiency of the evidence is a discretionary 
function, we disagree that a determination as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is a ministerial function.  “[A] 
judgment is a court's determination of the rights of the 
                     
5 To the extent that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
in Gibson v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 285, 649 S.E.2d 214 
(2007), is inconsistent with the holding of this case, it is 
expressly overruled.  See also Gibson v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 
176, 180-81, 662 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008) (this day decided). 
 
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parties upon matters submitted to it in a proceeding.”  In re: 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, 265 Va. at 319, 576 S.E.2d at 462. 
“The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the 
court.” Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 617, 139 S.E.2d 114, 
117 (1964).  The trial court recognized this broad 
discretionary function when it observed that “nothing in this 
order prevents [Judge Moreau] from revisiting that 
discretionary finding.” The very essence of adjudication and 
entry of judgment involves the discretionary power of the 
court. 
 
As previously noted herein, a court speaks only through 
its orders and the underlying order of the juvenile court 
merely finds the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant 
of the charges and continues the case to a date certain.  Such 
a disposition is within the discretionary authority of the 
court and as such is not subject to mandamus. 
III. Conclusion 
 
We hold that the act of rendering judgment is within the 
inherent power of the court and that the very essence of 
adjudication and entry of judgment by a judge involves 
discretionary power of the court. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court, vacate the writ of mandamus, and dismiss the 
petition. 
 
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                                           Judgment reversed, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  writ vacated, and 
petition dismissed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, concurring. 
 
I concur with the decision of the Court in this case, 
which properly limits its scope to issues presented by the 
record on appeal.  I write separately to stress that our 
decision in this case, as well as our decision in Gibson v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 176, 662 S.E.2d 54 (2008) (this day 
decided), necessarily leaves unresolved a significant issue 
concerning the inherent authority of the trial courts of this 
Commonwealth to defer rendering final judgments in criminal 
cases. 
 
Specifically, the issue we are unable to reach is whether 
a trial court, at the request of the accused and with the 
agreement of the Commonwealth, may in the exercise of inherent 
authority decline to render a judgment in a criminal case and 
continue the case to permit the accused to satisfy terms akin 
to probation with the understanding that the court will enter 
a particular disposition at a later date upon compliance by 
the accused with those terms.  It is a matter of common 
knowledge and practice of long standing in this Commonwealth 
that our trial courts have been entrusted to render justice in 
this manner in those exceptional cases that warrant this 
practice. 
 
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Surely, in time a case will come before this Court with 
the appropriate record to permit us to properly address this 
issue.  In the meantime, I am left only to observe that our 
trial courts’ inherent authority to render justice in a given 
case should extend in scope sufficient at least to permit this 
procedure to be used in appropriate cases and upon consent of 
the accused and the Commonwealth. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE AGEE 
join, concurring. 
 
 
I agree in all respects with the majority opinion and the 
Court’s decision in this case.  Nevertheless, I write 
separately to emphasize one point.  The record on appeal does 
not permit us to decide the question whether a trial court has 
the inherent authority, as opposed to the statutory authority 
in certain situations, see, e.g., Code §§ 16.1-278.8(A)(5); 
18.2-61(C); 18.2-67.1(C) and 18.2-251, to decline to render 
judgment in a criminal case and continue the case with or 
without probationary-type terms with the understanding or 
promise that the court will ultimately render a particular 
disposition after a specified period of time.  I stress this 
point because of my concern that, according to Justice Koontz’ 
concurring opinion, it is a common practice by the trial 
courts in this Commonwealth to dispose of criminal cases in 
 
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this manner when a defendant requests the court to do so and 
the Commonwealth agrees although the General Assembly has not 
authorized that type of disposition for the particular offense 
at issue. 
The concurrence also states that a trial court’s 
“inherent authority to render justice in a given case should 
extend in scope sufficient to permit this procedure to be used 
in appropriate cases and upon consent of the accused and the 
Commonwealth.”  But, this is the precise question that the 
Court does not answer today because it is not properly before 
us.  The Court’s inability to address this issue should not be 
viewed as a tacit approval of the practice. 
For this reason, I respectfully concur. 
 
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