Title: People v. Mahaffey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85215-Agenda 3-March 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								REGINALD MAHAFFEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 13, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)), defendant, Reginald Mahaffey,
petitioned the circuit court of Cook County for post-conviction
relief. The trial court dismissed defendant's amended post-conviction petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant also filed a motion to vacate his convictions and
sentences pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1996)) alleging that new
evidence, outside the record, supported defendant's previous
assertions that his confession was a result of torture at the hands
of Chicago police officers assigned to Area 2 police headquarters.
The circuit court also dismissed this motion without an evidentiary
hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death for the
underlying murder convictions, he appeals directly to this court.
134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.


BACKGROUND


	This court has previously detailed the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on direct appeal. People v.
Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1 (1995). Therefore, we state here only those
facts which are necessary to the disposition of this appeal. On
September 2, 1983, defendant and his brother, Jerry Mahaffey,
were arrested by Chicago police officers for the August 29, 1983,
murders of Dean and Jo Ellen Pueschel and the attempted murder
of their 11-year-old son, Richard. On December 29, 1983, defense
counsel filed a "motion to suppress statements," claiming that
defendant's post-arrest statements and admissions to police were
"the direct result of either physical or mental coercion."
	Specifically, the motion alleged that at the time of defendant's
arrest, several police officers assigned to Area 2, including
Sergeant John Byrne and Detective John Yucaitis, induced
defendant into making a statement by telling him that "his brother
had already flipped on him, and if he didn't give a statement to the
police, he would go to the electric chair alone" and lose any
chance for leniency. In addition, the motion stated that the
arresting officers "did beat the defendant, causing injuries to the
defendant's ribs, and this beating was done to induce a statement."
	A hearing on defendant's suppression motion was conducted
in February 1984. The sole witness called by the State in its case
in chief was Irving Miller. Miller testified that, in his then capacity
as a felony review supervisor with the Cook County State's
Attorney's office, he met with defendant at Area 2 police
headquarters on the morning of September 2, 1983. According to
Miller, he spoke to defendant in an interview room at
approximately 9:30 a.m. and advised defendant of his Miranda
rights. After defendant indicated that he understood his rights,
defendant gave a statement implicating himself in the crimes
which occurred at the Pueschels' apartment. Miller testified that
this statement lasted approximately 20 minutes, and that Detective
Yucaitis was also present in the room during the time defendant
gave this statement. Miller then left the room, returned one-half
hour later, and again spoke with defendant for a short time.
According to Miller, Detective Yucaitis was present during this
conversation as well. Miller testified that he next saw defendant at
approximately 11:30 a.m. in a different, larger interview room at
Area 2, at which time defendant agreed to give a court-reported
statement with respect to his involvement in the crimes at the
Pueschel home. Miller stated that he initially spoke alone with
defendant for 15 minutes concerning the procedures for making a
court-reported statement, and also informed defendant of the
questions which Miller would ask defendant during the interview.
Miller testified that he also inquired of defendant concerning his
treatment by police, and that defendant made no statement to him
that he was beaten or threatened. Miller testified that, at the
conclusion of this brief meeting, Detective Yucaitis, Assistant
State's Attorney George Velich, and a court reporter arrived at the
interview room, and defendant gave his confession. Defendant
signed this court-reported statement between 3 and 4 p.m. the
same day. Miller testified that no one struck defendant in his
presence, used mental coercion, or threatened defendant with the
electric chair.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he was
arrested at his apartment at approximately 4:15 a.m. on the
morning of September 2, 1983. Defendant stated that when the
police arrived, he was lying on the floor of his bedroom. The
officers instructed him to get up and he was taken into the kitchen,
where he was asked his name. Defendant testified that when he
responded, one of the officers kicked him in his groin. Defendant
then fell to the floor and was kicked in his ribs and in the side of
his head. Defendant stated that he was struck three times by the
police in his apartment before he was taken outside. According to
defendant, the beating was administered by two plain-clothes
officers, one whom defendant described as having curly dark-brown hair, who was heavier in weight than defendant, and who
was between 5 feet 11 inches and 6 feet 2 inches in height.
Defendant testified that he did not clearly see the second officer
because when he was struck by the first officer, he fell face down.
However, defendant stated that the second officer was shorter than
the officer with curly brown hair, and weighed somewhat over 200
pounds.
	Defendant further testified that the officers tried to trip him as
he was going up the stairs from his basement apartment to the
sidewalk, and that the officers decided among themselves that
defendant would be transported to Area 2 by the detective with
curly brown hair who had beaten him in the apartment. Defendant
testified that he was placed in the back seat of the car, and two
detectives sat in the front seats, with the curly brown-haired
detective sitting on the passenger side. According to defendant,
during the ride to Area 2, this detective turned around and struck
him once in the forehead.
	Upon his arrival at Area 2 police headquarters, defendant
testified, he was placed in a small interview room, where he was
handcuffed to a ring in the wall. Defendant stated that, while he
was in that room, he was repeatedly hit by the same detective with
curly brown hair who had beaten him at his apartment and struck
him in the car. According to defendant, when the detective did not
like defendant's reply to his questions, he would strike defendant
in his mid-section with a flashlight, and hit defendant in his back
and across his shoulder blades. Defendant stated that a plastic bag
was also placed over his head and that the same detective "started
bumping the back of [defendant's] head against the concrete wall."
According to defendant, the detective with the curly brown hair
was the only officer who actually hit him at Area 2, although there
were other officers in the interview room at various times.
	Defendant testified that the only reason he made statements
to the police was because he was in fear for his safety. Defendant
stated that he was told by police that unless he confessed to the
murders, he would die. According to defendant, the officers also
told him what to say during his confession. Defendant stated that
he informed Assistant State's Attorney Miller about the beatings
during their first meeting, but that Miller left the room after telling
defendant that he was only there to take defendant's statement.
According to defendant, after Miller exited, the beatings began
once again.
	Defendant testified that he stated during his court-reported
confession that he was not beaten by police because he wanted to
avoid any further abuse. In addition, defendant testified that he
was in fear for his safety because the same detective with curly
dark-brown hair who had previously beaten him was also present
in the room, and that this same detective had previously told
defendant that Miller, in his role as a State's Attorney, could not
assure defendant's safety. According to defendant, after he gave
his court-reported statement, Miller requested that defendant read
it, and defendant replied that he was unable to read. Defendant
testified that Miller read him portions of the statement and
instructed defendant on how to correct misspellings in the text.
Thereafter, according to defendant, Miller told defendant to initial
and sign the statement. Defendant testified that the beatings ceased
once he gave the court-reported statement.
	Defendant further testified that after he gave his court-reported statement, a paramedic was called because he began
vomiting. Defendant stated that he told the paramedic that he had
a headache and pain in his ribs, but admitted that he did not tell the
paramedic that he had been kicked in the head or in the ribs.
	The next witness to testify on behalf of defendant was
Morriell Redmond. He stated that he had rented defendant a room
in his basement apartment and that he had opened the door to the
police on September 2, 1983. He testified that he did not see the
police hitting defendant because he was facing away from the
kitchen area, but he heard defendant "hollering" and "screaming."
He stated that defendant repeatedly said, "Don't hit me no more."
However, Redmond admitted that he never informed anyone about
what he overheard.
	The State called several witnesses in rebuttal. Detective
Charles Grunhard testified that he was one of several officers who
went to defendant's apartment on the morning of September 2.
Although Grunhard remained in the apartment's living-room area
with Morriell Redmond, he testified that he observed Sergeant
Byrne and Detective Yucaitis immediately proceed towards the
rear bedroom area of the apartment. Grunhard then observed
Yucaitis and Byrne bring defendant out of the bedroom and into
the apartment's kitchen area. Grunhard testified that he never
heard defendant yell or scream while in the apartment.
	Detective John Yucaitis testified that he and Sergeant Byrne
were the first of many police officers to enter defendant's
apartment on the morning of September 2. Yucaitis stated that he
and Sergeant Byrne were also the first two officers to enter
defendant's bedroom. Defendant was lying on the floor, and a
loaded .357 Magnum revolver was on a night stand near where
defendant was lying. According to Yucaitis, he gave defendant a
quick pat-down search, picked him up, and took defendant into the
apartment's kitchen area, where defendant was advised of his
Miranda rights. Yucaitis testified that defendant then began to
give a statement, implicating himself in the crimes at the Pueschel
residence. However, Yucaitis admitted that the report he filed in
connection with this case did not reflect that defendant made such
a statement at the apartment. Yucaitis testified that he remained
with defendant from the time defendant was brought into the
kitchen, and denied that he struck or kicked defendant in the
apartment.
	According to Detective Yucaitis, after exiting the apartment,
he placed defendant in the back seat of a police vehicle and was
alone in the car with defendant until he picked up his partner,
Detective Edmond Leracz, at another location. Thereafter, they all
proceeded to Area 2. Yucaitis testified that defendant confessed in
the car, but Yucaitis stated that he did not record this confession
in his report. Detective Yucaitis denied striking defendant while
he was in the vehicle.
	Detective Yucaitis further testified that when they arrived at
Area 2, he took defendant into interview room No. 1, and shackled
defendant's left wrist to the wall. Yucaitis testified that when he
was alone with defendant in this room, defendant again confessed
to the crimes. Yucaitis stated that Assistant State's Attorney Miller
then arrived. Yucaitis denied that he struck, kicked or hit
defendant at any time while defendant was at Area 2. Yucaitis also
denied placing a plastic bag over defendant's head, or instructing
defendant what to say in his confession. Yucaitis testified that he
was defendant's "baby-sitter" from the time defendant arrived at
Area 2 until defendant gave his court-reported statement. Yucaitis
stated that "[t]he majority of the time I was with him. If I wasn't
with him, he was alone." Detective Edmond Leracz also testified
on behalf of the State. Leracz initially observed defendant in the
back seat of a police vehicle when Leracz's partner, Detective
Yucaitis, picked him up from a location on Chicago's west side.
Leracz testified that at that time, defendant's hands were cuffed
behind him, and that Leracz changed the handcuffs to the front.
Leracz then sat in the vehicle's passenger seat, and stated that at
no time did he strike defendant. Leracz testified that he had no
knowledge of whether defendant was struck prior to the time he
entered the vehicle. Leracz also testified that, during the ride to
Area 2, defendant confessed to the Pueschel murders, although
Leracz admitted that he did not record this confession in any of his
reports.
 	The State recalled Irving Miller, who testified that a Polaroid
photograph was taken of defendant on September 2, 1983 at
approximately 6:35 to 6:40 p.m. by a Chicago police department
evidence technician. Miller described the photograph as showing
defendant seated behind a table, fully dressed, and that no injury
to defendant was apparent. Also testifying with respect to
defendant's lack of injuries was Robert Muralles, an emergency
medical technician at Cook County jail. A medical history and
physical examination sheet prepared by Muralles on September 3,
1982, indicated that defendant exhibited no bruises, cuts, swelling
or abrasions.
	The State next called Sergeant John Byrne, and Detectives
William Kurschner, Raymond Benkowski, and Charles Grunhard,
who all testified that defendant was not physically abused in his
apartment on the morning of September 2.
	At the conclusion of the testimony, the circuit court denied
defendant's suppression motion. Specifically, the circuit judge
stated that his decision "boil[ed] down to a question of
credibility." The circuit court found that the testimony of the
police officers and former Assistant State's Attorney Miller was
far more credible than that of defendant and Morriell Redmond.
The court noted that all of the officers in the apartment testified
that at no time did they observe, or become aware of, any beatings
of defendant. The court also noted that Detectives Yucaitis and
Leracz testified that they did not strike defendant in the car on the
way to the police station.
	As to the alleged beatings at Area 2, the circuit court observed
that defendant testified that the officer who hit him in the kitchen
of his apartment and in the police car was the same officer who hit
him with a flashlight, put a bag over his head, and beat his head
against the wall in an interview room at Area 2 police
headquarters. The circuit court concluded that the evidence
showed that the only officer who had custody of defendant at Area
2 was Detective Yucaitis, and, therefore, the only person who
could have struck defendant was Yucaitis. Noting that Yucaitis
vehemently denied defendant's allegations, the circuit court judge
concluded that "Detective Yucaitis' testimony is far more credible
than the self-serving statements of the defendant in this regard,"
and found that "Detective Yucaitis did not beat the defendant at
any time while he was in the police station, did not hit him with a
flashlight, did not put a bag over his head and did not hit his head
against the wall." In support of this conclusion, the circuit court
also found it significant that former Assistant State's Attorney
Miller asked defendant outside the presence of officers, as well as
during defendant's court-reported statement, whether he had been
abused by the police and defendant replied that he had not. Finally,
the circuit court also noted in the course of its ruling that
defendant had never complained to anyone at the police station
about the torture, and that there was no physical evidence of
injury. The circuit court then ruled that the post-arrest statements
made by defendant were admissible during his trial.
	Defendant was tried by a jury in 1985 and was convicted of
the murders of Jo Ellen and Dean Pueschel, and of the attempted
murder of their son, Richard. Defendant was also found guilty of
several other felonies relating to the break-in at the Pueschel's
apartment. At a separate sentencing hearing, the jury determined
that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, and found that no
factors in mitigation were sufficient to preclude imposition of the
death sentence. Defendant was sentenced to death on the capital
offenses, and received terms of imprisonment for his noncapital
convictions. On direct appeal, this court reversed defendant's
convictions and sentences, and remanded the cause to the circuit
court for a new trial and sentencing hearing. People v. Mahaffey,
128 Ill. 2d 388, 409-12 (1989). This court determined that the
circuit court' failure to sever defendant's trial from that of his
codefendant brother, Jerry Mahaffey, constituted reversible error.
	On remand, defendant expressed his desire to represent
himself during all subsequent proceedings. The circuit court
conducted a fitness hearing, and found that defendant was fit to
stand trial. Thereafter, defendant formally waived his right to the
assistance of counsel for purposes of both the trial and the capital
sentencing hearing. The circuit court, however, appointed two
public defenders to act as defendant's "legal advisors" during the
proceedings to answer defendant's legal questions. Defendant's
second trial occurred in 1991, and, at the conclusion of the
proceedings, a jury again found defendant guilty of the murders of
Jo Ellen and Dean Pueschel, and of the attempted murder of
Richard Pueschel. The jury also convicted defendant of home
invasion, rape, armed robbery, aggravated battery to a child,
residential burglary, and theft (over $300). After a separate
sentencing hearing, the jury found that defendant was eligible for
the death penalty, and that there were no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death sentence. Defendant
was sentenced to death for the murder convictions, and received
an extended term of 60 years' imprisonment for the attempted
murder conviction of Richard Pueschel. The judge also imposed
consecutive 30-year sentences for home invasion, armed robbery,
and rape. Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on
direct appeal by this court. People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1
(1995). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Mahaffey v. Illinois,
516 U.S. 1002, 133 L. Ed. 2d 450, 116 S. Ct. 547 (1995).
	On June 30, 1995, post-conviction counsel filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, alleging that defendant's constitutional
rights were violated during his trial and on direct appeal. In 1996,
different post-conviction counsel filed a first, second, and third
supplemental petition for post-conviction relief. On September 17,
1997, the circuit court conducted a hearing to determine whether
defendant was fit for post-conviction proceedings. At the
conclusion of the proceedings, the court found defendant to be fit.
On that date, leave was granted to allow post-conviction counsel
to file an amended post-conviction petition.
	An amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed on
October 27, 1997. In this amended petition defendant, for the first
time during post-conviction proceedings, raised the claim that new
evidence supported his allegations that he had been subjected to
brutality by Chicago police officers, and that his confession had
been coerced. The petition stated that "[o]n May 9, 1997,
documents were made available for the first time that are critically
important to this case because they show nearly identical acts of
abuse, brutality, and falsification of evidence by the same officers
who investigated [defendant's] case." The petition references a
May 9, 1997, order entered by the United States district court in
the federal civil rights action of Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226
(N.D. Ill. 1997), wherein the court struck the confidential
designation of several documents produced by the City of Chicago
during discovery. Among the documents released from a
protective order was a report prepared by the Chicago police
department's Office of Professional Standards (OPS), which
surveyed alleged systematic abuse of suspects in custody at Area
2 police headquarters and which named several police officers
involved in cases of abuse, some of whom participated in
defendant's arrest and interrogation.
	Among other claims, defendant's amended post-conviction
petition alleged that the State violated defendant's rights to due
process and a fair trial by concealing evidence favorable to him
and material to his motion to suppress, in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
According to the amended petition, the prosecution withheld
information about prior allegations of police torture at Area 2
made by other suspects between 1982 and 1983. The petition also
alleged that "newly discovered evidence made available for the
first time in May, 1997, is critically important to this case because
it documents nearly identical acts of abuse, brutality, and
falsification of evidence by the same officers who investigated
[defendant's] case." Defendant contends that the evidence
allegedly withheld by the State in 1984, as well as the newly
discovered evidence, "would have been admissible as showing the
modus operandi" of officers assigned to Area 2, and would have
probably changed the outcome of the suppression hearing and trial.
	The amended petition also raised a related claim that
defendant was denied effective assistance of trial counsel at the
1984 suppression hearing because trial counsel "failed to
investigate and present evidence of complaints filed with the
Office of Professional Standards by other victims of Chicago
Police Officers involved in the arrest, search, and interrogation of
[defendant]." According to defendant, the evidence revealed by
such investigation, as well as the newly discovered evidence
described above, would have been admissible to establish a pattern
of abuse at Area 2 and to impeach the credibility of the testifying
officers, and would have changed the outcome of the suppression
motion and the trial.
	Defendant also contended in his amended petition that the
circuit court violated defendant's right to represent himself at the
sentencing stage of his second trial by appointing an assistant
public defender to serve as standby counsel. In addition, defendant
claimed that a court-ordered fitness examination prior to
sentencing deprived him of his right to remain silent.
	Post-conviction counsel also filed a petition to vacate
defendant's convictions and death sentence pursuant to section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
1996)). Relying totally upon exhibits attached to, or incorporated
by reference in, defendant's amended petition for post-conviction
relief, the motion alleged that newly discovered evidence, made
available for the first time on May 9, 1997, "documents nearly
identical acts of abuse, brutality, and falsification of evidence by
the same officers who investigated [defendant's] case *** [and]
would have been admissible as showing modus operandi."
Defendant contends that, had this evidence been available, the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
	On February 27, 1998, the circuit court granted the State's
motion to dismiss defendant's amended post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing, finding that defendant's claims had
been waived. The circuit court also dismissed defendant's section
2-1401 motion without an evidentiary hearing on the basis that it
was untimely. Defendant now appeals from the circuit court's
judgment. As part of this appeal, the Campaign to End the Death
Penalty was granted leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, in
support of defendant. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
ANALYSIS
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a
mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their
convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights
under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or
both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal from
the underlying judgment. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528
(1999). In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant
bears the burden of establishing a substantial deprivation of federal
or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the
judgment being challenged. People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1
(1995).
	Because a proceeding brought under the Act is a collateral
attack on a judgment of conviction, all issues actually decided on
direct appeal are res judicata, and all issues which could have
been raised in the original proceeding, but were not, are waived.
People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). The doctrines of
res judicata and waiver, however, will be relaxed in three
situations: where fundamental fairness so requires; where the
alleged waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate counsel;
or where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face
of the original appellate record. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371-72.
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of
right on a post-conviction petition. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 370-71. An evidentiary hearing is warranted only where the allegations
of the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the
trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing that a defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. For the purpose of
determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and any accompanying affidavits are
taken as true. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995). A
circuit court's determination regarding the sufficiency of the
allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are reviewed de
novo. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
 	Defendant first contends that his constitutional right to due
process of law and his right to a fair trial were violated when,
during the 1984 hearing on his motion to suppress, the State failed
to disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence as required by
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194
(1963). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecution must disclose evidence that is both favorable to the
accused and "material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady,
373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1197; People v.
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 485-86 (1996). Evidence is considered
"material" if there is "a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383
(1985); Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 486.
	According to defendant's amended post-conviction petition,
in February 1984 the "State knew that several of the Chicago
Police Officers intimately involved in this case" were "being
investigated by the FBI, Amnesty International, and the Chicago
Police Department Office of Professional Standards for their use
of abusive police tactics." In addition, defendant claims that, at the
time of his suppression hearing, the State withheld evidence
concerning a series of other prior alleged instances in which
officers assigned to Area 2 employed torture as a means of
eliciting confessions from other suspects.
	In support of his Brady claim, defendant specifically relies
upon three documents attached to his amended post-conviction
petition. First, defendant cites to a document filed in the federal
civil rights action of Wilson v. City of Chicago. This document,
entitled "plaintiff's proffer of other acts of beating torture and
electroshock by defendant Burge and other detectives," was filed
in mid-1989 and chronicles alleged acts of beatings and torture of
suspects by officers at Area 2, including some of the officers
involved in the arrest and interrogation of defendant. Second,
defendant relies upon the February 1993 complaint filed in the
federal civil rights action of Wiggins v. Burge. Similar to the
information contained in the "plaintiff's proffer" cited above, this
complaint details allegations of brutality and torture by suspects
against officers at Area 2, both before and after defendant's arrest
and interrogation. Finally, defendant relies upon the December 28,
1989, appellate court opinion in People v. Banks, 192 Ill. App. 3d
986 (1989) , wherein the court detailed allegations made by
several suspects that they had been tortured by Area 2 officers.
Defendant contends that, had the State disclosed the information
contained within the above documents, it would have been
admissible in establishing torture as the modus operandi of
officers assigned to Area 2, and also in undermining the credibility
of the testifying officers. Defendant concludes that the result of the
proceedings would have been different had this evidence been
admitted.
	In response, the State accurately contends that this argument
is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to raise this
issue on direct appeal. See Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371 However,
this court may review a post-conviction claim which has not been
properly preserved where fundamental fairness so requires.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 371-72; People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1,
20 (1995). Although "[t]he concept of fundamental fairness
escapes precise definition" (People v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400, 408
(1995)), it is "generally defined in terms of a 'cause and prejudice'
test." Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 15. "Cause" has been defined as "an
objective factor that impeded defense counsel's efforts to raise the
claim on direct review." Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 20. "Prejudice"
has been defined as "an error which so infected the entire trial that
the defendant's conviction violates due process." Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 20. Because we determine that no error occurred, defendant
is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of this test, and, therefore
cannot invoke the fundamental fairness exception.
	A review of the exhibits relied upon by defendant in his
amended post-conviction petition to support his claim that the
State violated the Brady rule reveals that these documents were
not in existence at the time of the 1984 suppression proceedings,
and therefore could not have been disclosed to defendant. In
addition, defendant has made no showing that the information
contained within the documents was available to the State at the
time of the suppression hearing. Defendant has failed to present
any evidence to support his claim that there was an "investigation"
of Area 2 officers by OPS or outside agencies prior to the February
1984 suppression hearing. Accordingly, defendant's argument is
unavailing that the State "knew" in early 1984 that Area 2 officers
were being "investigated" and failed to disclose this information.
Further, defendant has provided no evidence to support his claim
that in February 1984 the State was aware that there was a series
of prior alleged instances in which officers assigned to Area 2
employed torture as a means of eliciting confessions from other
suspects. To the contrary, the evidence presented by defendant in
support of his claims indicates that any apparent nexus between
alleged incidents of abuse of other suspects by Area 2 officers and
defendant's claims did not arise until several years after
defendant's suppression motion, and it was only at that later time
that investigations were initiated into interrogation practices at
Area 2. Therefore, defendant cannot properly claim that the State
violated the Brady rule by failing to disclose information that was
unavailable at the time of the suppression proceedings. See People
v. Haynes, Nos. 85180, 85181 cons., slip op. at 23 (July 6, 2000);
People v. Hinton, 302 Ill. App. 3d 614, 623 (1998). Under the
facts presented, we find that no Brady violation occurred and,
consequently, defendant suffered no prejudice. The circuit court
properly dismissed this claim.
	In his amended petition, defendant also makes the related
argument that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel
during the 1984 suppression hearing. To prevail on a claim
asserting that trial counsel was not effective, a defendant must first
establish that "counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984);
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 529. If a defendant establishes that defense
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, a defendant must then demonstrate that "there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 194 S. Ct.  at 2068; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. A
defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test before he
or she can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, if the ineffective assistance claim can be disposed of on
the ground that the defendant did not suffer prejudice, a court need
not determine whether counsel's performance was constitutionally
deficient. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997).
	In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant alleges
that his trial counsel "failed to investigate and present evidence of
complaints filed with the Office of Professional Standards by other
victims of Chicago Police Officers involved in the arrest, search,
and interrogation of [defendant]." Defendant also contends in his
amended petition that defense counsel "failed to gather and present
readily available evidence of systemic police abuse in other widely
reported cases involving the officers who handled the instant
investigation." In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant relies upon the same three documents cited in
support of his claims that the State violated the Brady rule.
According to defendant, had defense counsel discovered and
presented this evidence of "systemic police torture and abuse," it
not only would have been admissible in establishing that torture
was routinely employed by Area 2 officers to elicit confessions,
but also would have served to impeach the credibility of the
testifying officers. Defendant concludes that the introduction of
this evidence would have changed the outcome of the suppression
motion and the trial.
	In response, the State argues that this claim is procedurally
defaulted because defendant failed to present it on direct appeal.
However, as noted, the strict application of the waiver doctrine
may be relaxed where required by fundamental fairness, which is
analyzed in terms of "cause and prejudice." Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 20. Because defendant has failed to present evidence that his
trial counsel was ineffective, he is unable to satisfy the prejudice
prong of the fundamental fairness exception.
	As stated, the documents relied upon by defendant in support
of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective during the
February 1984 suppression proceedings are the same documents
defendant cited in support of his claim that the State violated the
Brady rule. As we held above with respect to defendant's
Brady claim, the documents relied upon by defendant were not in
existence at the time of the suppression hearing and, therefore,
could have been neither discovered nor presented by defense
counsel. In addition, defendant has provided no support for his
claim that counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of
complaints filed with OPS against the officers who arrested and
interrogated defendant. No evidence has been presented by
defendant that, prior to February 1984, complaints had been filed
with OPS against the officers involved in his case by other
suspects alleging abuse similar to that alleged by defendant.
Finally, defendant has failed to provide any support for his
assertion that, in February 1984, there was "readily available
evidence of systemic police abuse in other widely reported cases"
involving some of the officers who arrested and interrogated
defendant. Rather than supporting defendant's position,
defendant's own exhibits establish that such information was not
"readily available" until years after defendant's suppression
hearing, and it was only at that time that "systemic" abuse at Area
2 became "widely reported." Accordingly, under the facts
presented, we find that defendant has presented no evidence to
support his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Consequently, defendant suffered no prejudice, and he cannot
invoke the fundamental fairness exception. The circuit court
properly dismissed this claim.
	Defendant's amended petition also presents the broader claim
that new evidence supports his assertion that his confession was
coerced and involuntary, making its introduction at trial a violation
of his constitutional rights. See People v. King, No. 84261 (August
10, 2000). In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant
relies on material outside the trial record to argue that, had this
now-available information been before the circuit court at the time
of his suppression hearing, the circuit court would have suppressed
his confession. Defendant further asserts that, had his confession
been suppressed at trial, he "would probably have been acquitted."
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying him an
evidentiary hearing on this post-conviction claim.
	According to defendant's amended post-conviction petition,
"newly discovered evidence made available for the first time in
May, 1997, is critically important to this case because it
documents nearly identical acts of abuse, brutality, and
falsification of evidence by the same officers who investigated
[defendant's] case." The amended petition makes reference to a
May 9, 1997, order entered by the United States district court in
Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The
Wiggins order followed the settlement of a federal civil rights
action against the Chicago police department alleging torture of
suspects by police officers at Area 2. The order also struck the
confidential designation of several documents produced by the
City of Chicago during discovery. Citing the public interest in the
disclosure of these documents, the district court removed a
protective order from OPS investigative files, administrative
reviews, recommendations and findings in 11 alleged Area 2
police torture cases. The court also disclosed a report prepared by
the Chicago police department's office of professional standards
(OPS), which surveyed alleged systematic abuse of suspects in
custody at Area 2 police headquarters and which named several
police officers allegedly involved in cases of abuse, some of whom
participated in defendant's arrest and interrogation.
	Included among the documents attached as exhibits to
defendant's amended post-conviction petition are the OPS report,
as well as the findings and decision of the police board of the City
of Chicago with respect to Area 2. Specifically, the board
discharged Commander Jon Burge from the Chicago police force
after finding him guilty of physically abusing Andrew Wilson. We
parenthetically note that there is no evidence of record that Burge
was involved in any aspect of the arrest and questioning of
defendant at bar. We also note that Detective Yucaitis, the only
officer specifically implicated by defendant as abusing him, was
given a 15-month suspension for failing to stop or report the abuse
of Wilson by Burge, but was not found by the board to have
participated in any abuse. Also attached to the amended petition is
an unpublished state appellate court opinion in which the court
affirmed the police board's findings and decision. O'Hara v.
Police Board, Nos. 1-94-0999, 1-94-2462, 1-94-2475 cons.
(1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	The State counters that defendant's claim is barred by waiver,
as defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. We
disagree. Defendant's claim rests upon post-conviction disclosures
by the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department which
occurred after defendant's trial. As such, the information upon
which defendant relies is clearly outside the trial record upon
which this court's ruling on direct appeal was based. Because the
rules of procedural default are relaxed where the facts relating to
defendant's claim do not appear on the face of the record, the
merits of defendant's claim is properly considered. Haynes, slip
op. at 21; People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 437-38 (1998); People
v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 167 (1995).
	We find that the trial court properly dismissed defendant's
claim without an evidentiary hearing. In order for newly
discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, the evidence must be
"of such conclusive character that it will probably change the
result on retrial." People v. Patterson, No. 82711, slip op. at 20
(August 10, 2000); Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 449. We disagree with
defendant's assertion that the now-available evidence of other
alleged incidents of abuse and torture at Area 2 would alter the
result on retrial because it would corroborate his claim that his
confession was the result of police abuse. To the contrary, our
review of the record in this matter reveals that, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been
different had defendant's confession not been admitted into
evidence. Therefore, we conclude that defendant suffered no
prejudice as a result of the claimed error.
 	Apart from defendant's confession, the State presented
evidence at trial to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Richard Pueschel, who was 11 years old at the time of the
offenses and was 18 at the time of trial, provided an in-court
identification of defendant as one of two men he saw in the
apartment the night of the crimes, testifying that he was "99%
sure" that defendant was there. "99% sure" may not be sufficient
identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the crime,
particularly in a capital case. However, Richard Pueschel's
identification of defendant is corroborated by evidence that at the
time of his arrest, shortly after the murders were committed,
defendant was in possession of jewelry and weapons taken from
the Pueschel home at the time of the commission of the crimes.
Specifically, the jury heard evidence that numerous items of
personal property which were stolen from the Pueschel's residence
were found in defendant's apartment, including two dozen pieces
of jewelry identified as belonging to either Jo Ellen, Dean or
Richard Pueschel. The jury also heard evidence that, at the police
station following defendant's arrest, defendant removed a man's
ring from his hand and a watch from his back pocket, stating that
these items belonged with the other pieces of property that had
been seized from his apartment. The ring and watch were
identified at trial as also belonging to Dean Pueschel. In addition,
the loaded .357 Magnum revolver recovered from defendant's
night stand, as well as a shotgun recovered from defendant's
closet, were identified as belonging to the Pueschels. Under the
totality of the evidence, our review of this record convinces us that
in light of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's
guilt, confidence in the outcome of defendant's trial is not
undermined, even assuming the claimed error.
	We find the instant cause factually distinguishable from our
recent decision in People v. Patterson, No. 82711 (August 10,
2000), wherein the defendant presented a similar argument that
newly discovered evidence supported the theory that his
confession was the product of coercion by police officers assigned
to Area 2. In Patterson, the new evidence relied upon by the
defendant consisted of many of the same documents which are
attached to the amended post-conviction petition filed by
defendant in the instant cause. We concluded in Patterson that, in
light of this now-available evidence, an evidentiary hearing was
warranted on Patterson's allegations of police misconduct.
However, in Patterson, we noted that the evidence identifying the
defendant as the perpetrator of a double murder "consisted of (1)
the oft-changing testimony of a teenager whose cousin had been
a suspect in the crime; and (2) the testimony from the police
officers and assistant State's Attorneys concerning defendant's
confession." Patterson, slip op. at 18. Unlike in Patterson, where
the defendant's confession was the principal piece of evidence
supporting his convictions, in the matter at bar there is sufficient
evidence of defendant's guilt, apart from his confession.
	We also reject defendant's related argument that his petition
to vacate defendant's convictions and death sentence pursuant to
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1401 (West 1996)) was improperly dismissed by the circuit
court without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's section 2-1401
motion relies totally upon exhibits attached to, or incorporated by
reference in, defendant's amended post-conviction petition, and
raises the virtually identical "new evidence" claim as presented in
defendant's amended petition.
	A section 2-1401 petition for relief from a final judgment is
the forum in a criminal case in which to correct all errors of fact
occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to petitioner and
the court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known,
would have prevented its rendition. Haynes, slip op. at 16; People
v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 313-14 (1978). However, where a
section 2-1401 petition is filed more than two years after the
judgment was entered, it cannot be considered. 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(c) (West 1996); People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205
(1997). It is well established that the two-year limitation period
mandated by section 2-1401 must be adhered to in the absence of
a clear showing that the person seeking relief is under legal
disability or duress or the grounds for relief are fraudulently
concealed. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 210-11.
	 Defendant's section 2-1401 petition was filed in October
1997, more than six years after he was tried and convicted in 1991.
In his brief to this court, defendant merely makes passing reference
to this motion, and does not specifically argue that any of the
grounds for tolling the limitations period exist. Therefore, section
2-1401 is not available as a remedy. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 211.
In addition, even if defendant's section 2-1401 motion had been
timely presented, as stated above with respect to the identical
claim made in defendant's amended post-conviction petition,
defendant has failed to establish that the new evidence would have
changed the outcome of the proceedings. The circuit court
appropriately dismissed this motion.
 	Defendant's final argument in respect to his post-conviction
petition is that the circuit court erred in dismissing, without an
evidentiary hearing, defendant's claims that his constitutional
rights were violated during the sentencing phase of his trial. After
defendant was convicted, but before the start of the sentencing
phase of the proceedings, the circuit court readmonished defendant
concerning his right to be represented by counsel. The circuit court
reminded defendant that attorneys from the public defendant's
officer had been appointed as his "legal advisors," and that
defendant had the option of allowing them to represent him during
sentencing. Defendant initially indicated that he wished to
continue to represent himself during the sentencing proceedings.
However, defendant, in open court, then inquired of one of his
"legal advisors" whether counsel could "come up with some
evidence I can't come up with." Counsel replied: "[b]ecause the
defendant has asked me a question in open court, it is my feeling,
having a conversation with [defendant] in the lockup
approximately 20 minutes ago, that he does not comprehend what
is going on at this time. He's not fit for sentencing." The circuit
court then ordered that defendant be examined for fitness. A
psychiatric examination of defendant was performed by Dr. Robert
Reifman, who concluded that defendant was fit for sentencing.
Thereafter, the circuit court allowed defendant to waive his right
to counsel and to represent himself during the sentencing
proceedings. The State then presented Dr. Reifman at the second
stage of the sentencing hearing as a witness in aggravation. Dr.
Reifman testified that defendant had an antisocial personality
disorder, but that defendant was not suffering from a mental
disease.
	On direct appeal to this court, defendant argued that, pursuant
to Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981), he was entitled to receive Miranda warnings at the
outset of the psychiatric examination. Defendant contended that,
because no warnings were given, the State improperly introduced
evidence from Dr. Reifman's examination of defendant. We held
that defendant had waived this issue, and also determined that the
issue did not rise to the level of plain error. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 27. The evidence at the second stage of the defendant's
sentencing hearing was not closely balanced, as defendant
introduced no evidence in mitigation while the State, in contrast,
presented extensive evidence in aggravation. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 27. We also determined that the alleged error was not
substantial. We noted that Estelle had only limited application to
the facts presented here, and that the jury could have as likely
considered the content of Dr. Reifman's testimony in mitigation
as in aggravation. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 27-28.
	Defendant, urging us to "revisit the issue," now raises the
same argument in his post-conviction petition that he raised on
direct appeal that the court-ordered fitness examination prior to
sentencing deprived him of his right to remain silent because he
was examined by Dr. Reifman without first being given Miranda
warnings. The State contends that this issue is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata as a result of this court's decision on direct
appeal. We agree. In a post-conviction proceeding, determinations
of the reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res judicata
as to all issues actually decided. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371.
Defendant contends, however, that considerations of fundamental
fairness require that we relax the res judicata bar. We disagree. As
stated, fundamental fairness is usually analyzed in terms of "cause
and prejudice." See Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 20-21. Defendant has
failed to provide argument or facts sufficient to support the cause
and prejudice requirements of the fundamental fairness exception.
Defendant simply offers the bald assertion that fundamental
fairness overrides the res judicata doctrine. Accordingly, we
determine that defendant's claim is barred. See Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 15.
	In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant also raises
the related argument that he was denied his right to represent
himself at the sentencing stage of his trial, as guaranteed by
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 566,
95 S. Ct. 2525, 2527 (1975). According to defendant's brief, the
assistant public defendant who was acting as his "legal advisor"
and who requested that defendant be evaluated for fitness, was
actually representing "the trial court, not [defendant], who was
representing himself." Defendant argues that "in allowing standby
counsel to initiated [sic] an examination that boomeranged on
[defendant], the trial court violated [defendant's] right to represent
himself."
	The State responds that consideration of this claim is barred
by both res judicata and waiver. We agree. That portion of
defendant's claim which asserts that the examination
"boomeranged" on defendant is simply a recasting of the argument
rejected on direct appeal concerning the introduction of Dr.
Reifman's testimony at sentencing. A defendant cannot
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata and obtain post-conviction
relief simply by rephrasing issues previously addressed on direct
appeal. People v. Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100, 107-08 (1992). The
State also correctly contends that the remainder of the claim is
waived because defendant never argued on direct appeal that his
right to self-representation was violated during the sentencing
proceedings. See Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371. Defendant also
urges that we should ignore the procedural bar as to this portion of
his claim on the basis of fundamental fairness. See Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 20-21. Defendant, however, simply asserts that
fundamental fairness overrides waiver. We conclude that
defendant has failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice
requirements of the fundamental fairness exception. Therefore, we
determine that defendant's claim is barred. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at
15.


CONCLUSION


	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County dismissing defendant's amended
petition for post-conviction relief. We hereby direct the clerk of
this court to enter an order setting Thursday, January 11, 2001, as
the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court
of Cook County is to be carried out. The defendant shall be
executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West
1994)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the
mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden
of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution
where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Mahaffey's convictions should not be disturbed.
In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to
stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). Mahaffey's sentence of death should therefore be
vacated and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j). Because Mahaffey was found
guilty of murdering more than one victim, the term of his
imprisonment must be natural life. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
1005-8-1(a)(1)(c).