Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-610.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-610 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. CARR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-610.] 
Attorney misconduct—Charging a clearly excessive fee—Six-month suspension 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2011-0803—Submitted August 8, 2011—Decided February 22, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-047. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Akron Bar Association, filed a complaint against 
respondent, Jeffrey A. Carr, Attorney Registration No. 0081745, for violating the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(2) and (b) 
(requiring that an attorney reasonably consult with the client about how the 
client’s objectives are to be achieved and that he explain the matter to the client so 
that the client can make informed decisions), 1.5(a) (prohibiting an attorney from 
charging or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 1.5(b) (requiring an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
attorney to communicate the nature and scope of the representation to the client 
and the rate of the fee, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation), and 8.4(a), (c), (d), and (h) (prohibiting 
conduct that violates the Rules of Professional Conduct, conduct involving 
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The 
panel’s findings, which were adopted by the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline, were that Carr had charged a clearly excessive fee in 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) but that the other charges had not been proved.  
The panel recommended a six-month suspension, all stayed on five conditions.  
The board adopted the panel’s recommendation, and we concur. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 2} After a career in school construction and construction arbitration, 
Carr became licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania in 2003 and in Ohio in 
2007.  At the time of the hearing in this matter, Carr was employed as a college 
instructor and his bar registration status was—and it remains—inactive. 
{¶ 3} This case arises from Carr’s representation of Silas Pearson, who 
had purchased a home in Akron and who asserted that he had been misled into 
making the purchase by the representation that the annual property taxes on the 
home would be lower than they turned out to be.  Engaged to represent Pearson in 
December 2008, Carr charged $240 per hour for his efforts over a ten-month 
period to prosecute a lawsuit against Coldwell Banker Hunter Realty (“Coldwell 
Banker”) and the real-estate agent involved in the purchase.  The record contains 
monthly invoices for December 2008 through September 2009 (there is no 
invoice for August 2009).  The invoices for work through July totaled $13,944 for 
58.1 hours of work, and Carr had received $6,750 in payments from Pearson over 
that period. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
{¶ 4} At a mediation conference in September, the case was settled for 
$7,500.  On the invoice for September 2009, the final invoice, Carr billed for 4.0 
hours for the mediation and 0.4 hours for “dismissal,” for a total of $1,056 in 
additional fees related to the mediation and settlement.  The invoice then brought 
forward the previous balance of $7,194, for a new balance of $8,250.  Next, Carr 
allowed a $1,000 fee reduction, which brought the balance to $7,250.  Finally, 
Carr offset the $7,250 balance against the $7,500 settlement proceeds and 
indicated that Pearson would receive $250. 
{¶ 5} The settlement check was made out to Carr.  Carr sent a check for 
$250 to Pearson and retained $7,250 for payment of his fees.  Thus, Pearson paid 
$14,000 in fees and received a $250 check, reflecting 3.3 percent of the settlement 
proceeds. 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
{¶ 6} Based on its investigation of a grievance filed by Pearson, relator 
filed its complaint against Carr with the board on June 14, 2010, and the case was 
heard before a panel on December 15, 2010.  At the hearing, Carr testified, as did 
Pearson.  In addition, the deposition of attorney R. Scott Haley was admitted into 
evidence as expert testimony on the subject of the reasonableness of the fees 
charged.  Pearson’s wife, who had written the checks to Carr to pay the attorney 
fees and who was the primary contact between Pearson and Carr, was deceased at 
the time of the hearing. 
{¶ 7} Conflicting testimony was offered concerning the initial meeting 
between Carr and the Pearsons.  Carr testified that he had met with the couple at 
the Akron Bar Association headquarters in late November 2008.  By contrast, 
Pearson testified that he had met with Carr on three occasions, but never at the 
bar-association headquarters. 
{¶ 8} Carr testified regarding the invoices he had sent to Pearson, which 
set forth the time he had spent on Pearson’s case in hour and tenth-of-an-hour 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
increments.  For December 2008, Carr billed 12.8 hours, consisting of 4.9 hours 
for drafting and filing the complaint, 4.2 hours for drafting interrogatories, and 3.7 
hours for case strategy and research.  The invoice totaled $3,072 for the hours, 
plus $250 for the filing fee for the complaint.  Carr testified that the December 
invoice included a review of documents supplied by the Pearsons, a conversation 
with a real-estate agent concerning real-estate law, review of documents at the 
county fiscal office to determine the property taxes charged, and online research 
on the Ohio Association of Realtors website regarding the liability of Coldwell 
Banker as opposed to the individual agent.  Carr testified that he had kept track of 
his time for invoicing purposes by writing on his desk-pad calendar and that he 
had torn off and discarded the calendar’s monthly page at the end of each month.  
Thus, he could not produce documentation to substantiate the time he had 
indicated on the invoices.  Carr also had no evidence of the fruits of the time spent 
on research. 
{¶ 9} Carr stated that he had met with Pearson’s wife on three occasions 
after the initial meeting in November 2008, once in February, once in March, and 
once in April 2009.  He claimed that the March and April meetings had been at a 
McDonald’s restaurant.  Carr explained that because Pearson was ill, he was not 
at the meetings.  Pearson testified that during the relevant period, he spent 
weekdays in Wilmington, where he was employed.  Pearson had contracted spinal 
meningitis and spent six months in a nursing facility beginning in April 2008.  
Pearson testified that his wife did not drive, so he would have had to have taken 
her to meetings with Carr, and he never took her to a meeting with Carr at 
McDonald’s. 
{¶ 10} Carr testified that he had prepared and sent a fee agreement to 
Pearson but it had never been sent back and he had not retained a copy for 
himself.  Pearson testified that he had never received a fee agreement. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
{¶ 11} With respect to the settlement money, Carr claims that he 
explained to the Pearsons that they owed more than the $7,500 settlement amount 
in fees but that he would accept the proceeds as full satisfaction.  Pearson asserts 
that he did not know that any of the $7,500 would go toward fees. 
{¶ 12} Relator elicited the testimony of R. Scott Haley, an Akron 
attorney, as an expert on real-estate litigation and associated legal fees.  A 
deposition of Haley was offered as evidence at the hearing, and Carr stipulated to 
its admission as evidence.  Haley testified that the property tax on any particular 
parcel is readily available to any member of the public either at the Summit 
County Fiscal Office or online.  Thus, Carr could not reasonably charge for much 
time to research that information. 
{¶ 13} Haley testified that the time Carr charged for drafting and filing the 
complaint, 4.9 hours, was unreasonably high for the complaint that was filed.  
Haley opined that the complaint does not even properly plead a claim of fraud, 
because it does not contain specific facts, as required by the Civil Rules.  
Moreover, the fraud claim was intrinsically weak because the taxes on the 
property were a matter of public record, so Pearson could have checked what they 
were before purchasing the property. 
{¶ 14} When asked about specific increments of time that Carr had billed 
for legal research and case strategy—he billed a total of 12.1 hours over three 
months—Haley stated that it would be typical for an attorney to print out cases 
and make notations for such extensive research and he found no such print-outs or 
notes in reviewing Carr’s file.  As for interrogatories, Haley testified that 4.2 
hours was a reasonable amount of time for Carr to have spent drafting the original 
set of interrogatories, but with regard to the 2.8 hours billed for preparation of a 
second set of interrogatories, Haley stated that that amount of time was both 
excessive and unreasonable.  Haley based that opinion on the fact that the second 
set of interrogatories contained only one question. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 15} Haley verified that there were no depositions held in the 
underlying case and opined that billing 13.1 hours for preparing for depositions 
was unreasonable.  Overall, Haley opined that the amount billed, given the 
inherent weakness of the case and the $7,500 settlement, was clearly excessive. 
Disposition 
{¶ 16} The panel found that Carr had charged a clearly excessive fee in 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a).  As mitigating factors, the panel found that Carr 
has no prior disciplinary record and that he fully and freely cooperated in the 
prosecution of this matter.  Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  As aggravating factors, the 
panel found that Pearson was a vulnerable client and had suffered harm as a result 
of Carr’s misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h).  Additionally, the panel 
found that Carr’s misconduct was driven by a selfish motive and that his failure to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct along with failure to make 
restitution were also aggravating factors.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (g), and 
(i).  The panel recommended as a sanction that Carr be suspended from the 
practice of law for six months, with the entire six-month suspension stayed on 
five conditions: first, that Carr commit no further misconduct; second, that he 
complete at least six hours of continuing legal education; third, that he submit to 
the monitoring of his practice by an attorney designated by relator during the 
entire term of the six-month suspension; fourth, that he make restitution to 
Pearson in the amount of $7,250; and fifth, that he pay the costs associated with 
this matter.  Because Carr’s registration status is currently inactive, the panel 
recommended that the stayed suspension take effect upon his being restored to 
active status but that restitution be made and costs be paid prior to his being 
restored to active status.  The board agreed with the panel’s findings and 
recommended sanction, and we adopt both. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 17} A six-month stayed suspension falls within the range of sanctions 
that we have imposed in connection with the charging of excessive fees.  In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009-Ohio-5960, 918 N.E.2d 
992, a public reprimand was issued to a relatively inexperienced attorney who 
when disbursing payments from an insurance company to his clients, deducted a 
contingency fee from the payment despite the fact that the controlling law 
prohibited the collection of contingency fees from such payments.  In deducting 
the fee, the attorney acted under the order of his boss.  Because the respondent 
had been acting under a senior lawyer’s directions, had no prior disciplinary 
record, and had cooperated in the disciplinary process, we found a public 
reprimand to be the appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 18} In the absence of that type of mitigation, we have imposed a six-
month suspension stayed on conditions on attorneys who have charged a clearly 
excessive fee.  See Toledo Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 121 Ohio St.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-
777, 903 N.E.2d 306; Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Character-Floyd (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 306, 699 N.E.2d 922. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Carr is suspended from the practice of law for six 
months, with the entire six-month suspension stayed on five conditions: first, that 
Carr commit no further misconduct; second, that he complete at least six hours of 
continuing legal education; third, that he submit to monitoring of his practice by 
an attorney designated by relator during the entire term of the six-month 
suspension; fourth, that he make restitution to Pearson in the amount of $7,250; 
and fifth, that he pay the costs associated with this matter.  Because Carr’s 
registration status is currently inactive, the stayed suspension shall take effect 
upon his being restored to active status, but he must make restitution and pay the 
costs associated with this matter before being restored to active status. 
{¶ 20} Costs are taxed to Carr. 
Judgment accordingly. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Milton C. Rankins and Vincent J. Alfera, for relator. 
 
Jeffrey A. Carr, pro se. 
______________________