Title: Plumb v. Casey

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11519 
 
EVE PLUMB & others1  vs.  DEBORA A. CASEY, trustee.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 8, 2014. - September 8, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & 
Lenk, JJ.3 
 
 
Art.  Consignment. 
 
 
 
 
Certification 
of 
a 
question 
of 
law 
to 
the 
Supreme 
Judicial 
Court 
by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
Andrew Z. Schwartz (Joshua S. Pemstein with him) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Kathleen R. Cruickshank for the defendant. 
 
Steven 
B. 
Levine, 
Nicolas 
M. 
Dunn, 
William 
D. 
Currie, 
& 
Jessica 
T. 
Lu, 
for 
Arts 
& 
Business 
Council 
of 
Greater 
Boston 
& 
another, 
amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 Karen Hollingsworth, John Kuhn, Marjie Kuhn, Cynthia 
McCallister, William McCarthy, Elizabeth Mumford, Deborah 
Quinn-Munson, Anne Neely, John Schieffer, Kat Scott, Dylan Stark, 
Robert W. Stark, Jr., and Susan Sugar. 
 
2 Of the bankruptcy estates of Kenneth Wynne, III; Allyson 
Wynne; and Wynne Fine Art, Inc. 
 
3 Chief 
Justice 
Ireland 
participated 
in 
the 
deliberation 
on 
this 
case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The consignment of fine art is governed by G. L. 
c. 104A, which provides that, upon delivery of a work of fine art 
to 
a 
consignee, 
the 
consignor 
shall 
provide 
a 
written 
statement 
with 
specified information about the work.4  See G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b).  
A judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Massachusetts has certified the following question pursuant to 
S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981), concerning 
the effect of a consignor's failure to deliver a written statement 
as required by G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b): 
 
"Under Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 104A, the Massachusetts fine 
art consignment statute ('Chapter 104A'), must a consignor 
transmit a written 'statement of delivery' to a consignee as 
a necessary prerequisite to the formation of a 'consignment'; 
or, 
alternatively, 
under 
Chapter 
104A 
does 
a 
consignment 
arise 
upon 
the 
delivery 
by 
a 
consignor, 
and 
acceptance 
by 
a 
consignee, 
of a work of fine art for sale on consignment, regardless of 
whether a written 'statement of delivery' is sent by the 
consignor?" 
 
For the reasons we discuss, we answer, "No, a written statement of 
delivery is not a prerequisite for the formation of a consignment 
under G. L. c. 104A." 
 
Background.  We 
summarize 
certain 
undisputed 
facts 
in 
the 
order 
of certification and in the record before us.  Kenneth Wynne, III, 
and Allison Wynne (the Wynnes) owned and operated Wynne Fine Art, 
Inc. 
(Wynne 
Gallery), 
in 
Chatham.  Wynne 
Gallery 
accepted 
art 
works 
                                                          
 
4 We 
acknowledge 
the 
amicus 
brief 
of 
Arts 
& 
Business 
Council 
of 
Greater Boston and Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts of Massachusetts 
filed in support of the creditor artists. 
3 
 
that the creditor artists delivered to the gallery, and agreed to 
sell the art works and pay fifty per cent of the proceeds to the 
creditor 
artists.  In 
2013, 
the 
Wynnes 
filed 
for 
personal 
bankruptcy 
under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, and the 
appointed 
bankruptcy 
trustee 
of 
the 
bankruptcy 
estates 
moved 
to 
sell 
many of these art works.5 
 
Seeking to enjoin the sale, the creditor artists commenced an 
adversary proceeding against the bankruptcy trustee in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts.  The 
creditor artists sought a declaration that the art works are held 
in 
trust 
under 
the 
Massachusetts 
fine 
art 
consignment 
statute, 
G. L. 
c. 104A, and therefore are not the property of the bankruptcy 
estates.  The bankruptcy trustee filed a counterclaim seeking a 
declaration that G. L. c. 104A is inapplicable to the art works at 
issue because, when the creditor artists delivered their work to 
Wynne Gallery, they did not provide a written statement describing 
the art work as required by G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b).  The creditor 
artists 
argue 
that 
the 
delivery 
and 
acceptance 
of 
the 
art 
work 
alone 
sufficed to create a consignment relationship protected under the 
fine art consignment statute.  Acknowledging that the parties' 
opposing interpretations of G. L. c. 104A raise a dispositive 
                                                          
 
5 The bankruptcy trustee moved to sell approximately 130 
paintings; the creditor artists claim an interest in approximately 
eighty-five of these works. 
4 
 
question as to which there is no controlling precedent, the judge 
certified the above question to this court. 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 104A, § 2 (b), provides that: 
 
"A consignor who delivers a work of fine art hereunder 
shall, upon delivery of the work of fine art, furnish to the 
consignee a separate written statement of delivery of the work 
of fine art, which shall include at a minimum the following 
information:  (1) the artist's name and the name of the owner 
of the work of fine art; (2) the title, if any, of the work of 
fine 
art; 
(3) 
the 
medium 
and 
dimensions 
of 
the 
work 
of 
fine 
art; 
(4) 
the 
date 
of 
completion 
of 
the 
work 
of 
fine 
art; 
(5) 
the 
date 
of delivery of the work of fine art; and (6) the anticipated 
fair market value of the work of fine art." 
 
 
The bankruptcy trustee argues that the word "shall" in G. L. 
c. 104A, § 2 (b), should be interpreted as a mandatory obligation, 
see Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983), and, thus viewed, 
the delivery of a written statement by the consignor is required to 
effectuate a consignment under the fine art consignment statute.  
This argument is unavailing both in considering the language of the 
statute 
as 
a 
whole 
and 
when 
viewed 
in 
light 
of 
the 
legislative 
purpose 
underlying the 2006 statutory amendments that inserted this 
provision.  See St. 2006, c. 353, § 6. 
 
1.  Statutory language.  In interpreting the requirements 
necessary 
to 
effectuate 
a 
consignment 
under 
the 
fine 
art 
consignment 
statute, our objective is to discern the intent of the Legislature 
from the text of the statute.  See Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 
Mass. 249, 251 (1996), quoting Lehan v. North Main St. Garage, 312 
5 
 
Mass. 547, 550 (1942) ("The object of all statutory construction is 
to 
ascertain 
the 
true 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature 
from 
the 
words 
used").  
We consider the text of the statute "in connection with [its] 
development 
and 
history, 
and 
with 
the 
history 
of 
the 
times 
and 
prior 
legislation," Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 406 Mass. 
431, 443 (1990), and cases cited, in order to construe the statute 
as "a consistent and harmonious whole."  EMC Corp. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, 433 Mass. 568, 574 (2001), quoting State Tax Comm'n v. 
LaTouraine Coffee Co., 361 Mass. 773, 778 (1972). 
 
While G. L. c. 104A, § 1, defines the term "consignment" under 
the 
fine 
art 
consignment 
statute,6 G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (a), 
sets 
forth 
specific requirements regarding the establishment of such a 
consignment: 
 
"Notwithstanding any custom, practice or usage of the 
trade to the contrary, or any other language herein, whenever 
a consignor delivers . . . a work of fine art to a 
consignee . . . 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
exhibition 
or 
sale, 
or 
both, 
on a commission, fee or other basis of compensation, the 
delivery to and acceptance of the work of fine art by the 
consignee shall constitute a consignment, unless the delivery 
to the consignee is pursuant to an outright sale . . . ." 
 
                                                          
 
6 Under G. L. c. 104A, § 1, a "[c]onsignment" is 
"a 
delivery 
of 
a 
work 
of 
fine 
art 
under 
which 
no 
title 
to, 
estate in, or right to possession of, the work of fine art 
superior to that of the consignor shall vest in the consignee, 
notwithstanding 
the 
consignee's 
power 
or 
authority 
to 
transfer 
and 
convey 
to 
a 
third 
person 
all 
of 
the 
right, 
title 
and 
interest 
of the consignor in and to the work of fine art." 
6 
 
Thus, according to the plain statutory language, three elements are 
necessary 
to 
constitute 
a 
consignment 
of 
fine 
art7:  (i) delivery 
of 
a 
work 
of 
art 
by 
the 
consignor, 
and 
(ii) acceptance 
by 
the 
consignee, 
(iii) 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
exhibition 
or 
sale 
on 
commission.8  General 
Laws 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (a), 
states 
that, 
unless 
there 
is 
an 
outright 
sale 
of the art work, the occurrence of these three elements "shall 
constitute a consignment" "[n]otwithstanding . . . any other 
language herein."  That the consignor provide a written statement 
                                                          
 
7 "Fine art" is defined as: 
 
 
"[A] painting, photograph, sculpture, functional 
sculpture, hologram, wearable art, drawing, fiber-based work, 
ceramic-based work, metal work, conceptual-based art, 
glass-based work, an installation, a work that is created or 
displayed 
using 
computer, 
digital 
devices 
and/or 
new 
technology 
such as, but not limited to, digital prints, digital 
photographs, 
CD 
Roms, 
DVDs, 
cyberart, 
a 
web/internet-based 
art 
work, a performance-based art work and the results of the 
performance such as, but not limited to, film, video, DVDs, CD 
Roms, 
a 
sound 
work, 
an 
electronic-based 
work, 
a 
work 
of 
graphic 
art, including an etching, lithograph, off set print, silk 
screen/screen print, or work of graphic art of like nature, a 
work 
of 
calligraphy, 
an 
artist's 
book, 
or 
a 
work 
in 
mixed 
media 
including collage, assemblage or any combination of the 
foregoing art media." 
 
G. L. c. 104A, § 1. 
 
8 "Delivery" is defined in G. L. c. 104A, § 1, as "the process 
of physically transporting a work of fine art from a consignor to 
a consignee, whether done by the consignor personally, by a 
professional transportation service, or by the services of an agent 
or 
dealer 
who 
acts 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
consignor."  "Acceptance" 
is 
not 
defined in G. L. c. 104A. 
7 
 
of delivery is not among the prerequisites for establishment of a 
consignment under G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a). 
 
General 
Laws 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b), 
then 
sets 
forth 
the 
requirement 
of a writing upon delivery of a work of fine art.  See notes 6 and 
7, supra.  The bankruptcy trustee urges an interpretation of this 
provision that would make the delivery of a written statement an 
additional element necessary to effectuate a consignment.  This 
interpretation fails to give effect to the plain language of G. L. 
c. 104A, § 2 (a), stating that the delivery and acceptance of art 
work for the purpose of exhibition or sale on commission "shall 
constitute a consignment" "[n]otwithstanding . . . any other 
language 
herein," 
unless 
there 
is 
an 
outright 
sale.  If 
"shall" 
were 
interpreted in its mandatory sense in both G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a), 
and G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b), the provisions would be in conflict:  
under § 2 (a), a consignment could be effective without a written 
statement of delivery, and under § 2 (b), a consignment could not 
be effective without a written statement of delivery.  In light of 
this 
conflict, 
it 
cannot 
be 
the 
case 
that 
"shall" 
is 
intended 
in 
its 
mandatory sense in both G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a), and G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b).  "Seemingly contradictory provisions of a statute must be 
harmonized so that the enactment as a whole can effectuate the 
presumed 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature."  See Wilson 
v. 
Commissioner of 
Transitional Assistance, 441 Mass. 846, 853 (2004). 
8 
 
 
Resolution of this apparent conflict is found in the phrase, 
"[n]otwithstanding 
. . . 
any 
other 
language 
herein," 
in 
the 
opening 
sentence 
of 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (a), 
which 
provides 
a 
clear 
indication 
that the use of "shall" in G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a), is intended in 
a mandatory sense, whereas the use of "shall" in G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b), is intended in a directive sense.9  See Attorney Gen. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319 (2008), quoting Cisneros 
v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) ("The use of such a 
'notwithstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's intention 
that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override 
conflicting provisions of any other section").  "A statute should 
be construed so as to give effect to each word, and no word shall 
be regarded as surplusage."  Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 
407, 412 (2009).  To give meaning to all of the terms of G. L. 
c. 104A, § 2 (a), and to harmonize those terms with G. L. c. 104A, 
                                                          
 
9 Our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
language 
in 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (a), 
and G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b), is also supported by the principle that 
we "derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources 
presumably 
known 
to 
the 
statute's 
enactors, 
such 
as 
their 
use 
in 
other 
legal 
contexts 
and 
dictionary 
definitions."  Seideman 
v. 
Newton, 
452 
Mass. 
472, 
478 
(2008), 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Zone 
Brook, 
Inc., 
372 
Mass. 366, 369 (1972).  The definition of "consignment" in the 
Uniform 
Commercial 
Code, 
G. L. 
c. 106, 
and 
in 
legal 
dictionaries 
when 
G. L. c. 104A was enacted in 1978, see St. 1978, c. 286, and when 
it was amended in 2006, see St. 2006, c. 353, are in accord that a 
consignment is the delivery of goods to another for the purpose of 
selling the goods; none mentions a written statement of delivery as 
constituting 
a 
component 
of 
consignment.  See 
G. L. 
c. 106, 
§ 9-102 
(20); Black's Law Dictionary 380 (4th ed. 1957); Black's Law 
Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004). 
9 
 
§ 2 (b), we read G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b), as providing a directive 
standard of practice, and not as adding an additional mandatory 
element for effecting a consignment under G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a).  
See Wilson v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, supra 
(interpreting 
"shall" 
in 
directive 
sense 
where 
doing 
so 
was 
necessary 
to harmonize statutory provisions). 
 
2.  Legislative context and history.  Moreover, we interpret 
the word "shall" in G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b), in a directive sense, 
rather than in a mandatory sense, where doing so is necessary to 
effectuate the primary purpose of the statute.  See Wilson v. 
Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, supra; Boston v. Quincy 
Mkt. Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 312 Mass. 638, 646-647 (1942), 
quoting Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 276 
(1932) (term "shall" "is not of inflexible signification and not 
infrequently is construed as permissive or directory in order to 
effectuate 
a 
legislative 
purpose").  As 
discussed 
below, 
one 
of 
the 
legislative purposes for the enactment of G. L. c. 104A was to 
protect 
the 
interests 
of 
artists 
in 
their 
consigned 
works 
in 
the 
event 
that a consignee files for bankruptcy protection; this purpose 
supports the conclusion that the word "shall" in G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b), 
was 
intended 
in 
its 
directive 
rather 
in 
its 
mandatory 
sense. 
 
The fine art consignment statute was enacted in 1978, see 
St. 1978, c. 286, and was amended in 2006, see St. 2006, c. 353, at 
10 
 
which 
time 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b), 
was 
added.  See 
St. 2006, 
c. 353, 
§ 3.  In determining the intent of the Legislature in adopting the 
2006 
amendments, 
we 
consider 
"the 
cause 
of 
[the 
statute's] 
enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be 
accomplished."  Commonwealth 
v. 
Wade, 
467 
Mass. 
496, 
501 
(2014), 
quoting Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 28 (2013).  We look to 
the language of preexisting statutes because, "[w]hen amending a 
statute 
or 
enacting 
a 
new 
one, 
the 
Legislature 
is 
presumed 
to 
be 
aware 
of prior statutory language."  Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, supra 
at 412-413. 
 
The 2006 amendments to G. L. c. 104A were first introduced in 
January, 2005; the language of the proposed § 2 (a) was identical 
to 
that 
in 
the 
1978 
statute, 
and 
did 
not 
include 
the 
phrase 
"any 
other 
language herein" after the term "[n]otwithstanding."  Compare 2005 
Senate Doc. No. 1838 with G. L. c. 104A, as inserted by St. 1978, 
c. 286.  The Legislature did not adopt this version, but instead 
adopted 
a 
revised 
bill 
in 
March, 
2006, 
see 
2006 
Senate 
Doc. 
No. 
2461, 
which 
added 
both 
the 
provision 
in 
§ 2 (b) 
requiring 
that 
a 
consignor 
furnish a written statement of delivery, and the qualification that 
§ 2 (a) is to apply "[n]otwithstanding . . . any other language 
herein."10  These simultaneous revisions further indicate that the 
                                                          
 
10 The proposed § 2 (b) stated that a "consignee who accepts a 
work of fine art hereunder shall . . . furnish to the consignor a 
11 
 
Legislature did not intend a consignment under G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 2 (a), to be conditioned or altered by the provision requiring a 
written statement of delivery in G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b).  See 
Campatelli 
v. 
Chief 
Justice 
of 
Trial 
Court, 
468 
Mass. 
455, 
468 
(2014) 
(comparing 
versions 
of 
proposed 
legislation 
to 
ascertain 
legislative 
intent). 
 
The 2006 amendments to the fine art consignment statute were 
enacted in the wake of the insolvency of two large art galleries in 
Boston that generated wide-spread public concern about the 
difficulties 
faced 
by 
artists 
seeking 
to 
reclaim 
their 
art 
work.  See 
Ulrich & Jamieson, Muddled Waters:  An Addendum on Consignment of 
Fine 
Art 
Law 
in 
Massachusetts, 
37 
J. 
Arts 
Mgt., 
L. 
& 
Soc'y 
301, 
302-304 
(2008) (insolvent galleries' failure to keep records of consigned 
art 
work 
severely 
jeopardized 
ability 
of 
artists 
to 
reclaim 
art 
work 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
separate written statement of acceptance" (emphasis supplied).  
2005 Senate Doc. No. 1838.  The revised version of § 2 (b), which 
was the version that was adopted, stated that a "consignor who 
delivers a work of fine art hereunder shall . . . furnish to the 
consignee a separate written statement of delivery" (emphasis 
supplied).  2006 Senate Doc. No. 2461.  Placing the requirement to 
provide a written statement on the consignor rather than the 
consignee 
made 
sense 
in 
light 
of 
the 
recording 
system 
that 
the 
amended 
statute put in place.  See supra.  By adding the phrase 
"[n]otwithstanding . . . any other language herein" to § 2 (a) in 
2006 
Senate 
Doc. 
No. 
2461, 
the 
Legislature 
evidenced 
its 
intent 
that 
a consignor's failure to meet this requirement would not remove the 
consignment from the scope of the protections provided in G. L. 
c. 104A. 
12 
 
and funds from sales of art work).11  Viewed against this backdrop, 
and considered in conjunction with the other amendments to G. L. 
c. 104A 
enacted 
at 
that 
time, 
which 
also 
enhanced 
protections 
to 
the 
consignor,12 it is apparent that the directive of G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b), to provide a written statement of delivery was designed as 
                                                          
 
11 A newspaper article concerning the passage of the 2006 
amendment 
to 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
describes 
the 
extensive 
volunteer 
effort 
that 
was 
needed 
in 
2003, 
in 
the 
aftermath 
of 
the 
bankruptcy 
of 
Boston 
Corporate 
Art, 
to 
enjoin 
the 
sale 
of 
hundreds 
of 
consigned 
paintings, 
and to help artists retrieve their works from unorganized stacks of 
paintings held in a warehouse.  See Artists Hunt for their Works 
Rescued from Bankruptcy Firm, Boston Herald, Aug. 20, 2003, at 58.  
Following 
these 
events, 
"a 
working 
group 
convened, 
including 
members 
from Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts of Massachusetts (VLA), the 
Artists 
Foundation, 
and 
the 
Boston 
Art 
Dealers 
Association, 
to 
revise 
the 
statute. . . . 
[A 
Senator] 
took 
the 
revisions 
under 
advisement, 
and they were successfully enacted into law in November 2006."  
Ulrich 
& 
Jamison, 
Muddled 
Waters:  An 
Addendum 
on 
Consignment 
of 
Fine 
Art 
Law 
in 
Massachusetts, 
37 
J. 
Arts 
Mgt., 
L. 
& 
Soc'y 
301, 
302 
(2008). 
 
 
Upon 
passage 
of 
the 
bill 
by 
the 
Senate, 
and 
prior 
to 
being 
acted 
on by the Governor, Jim Grace, the executive director of VLA, who 
helped 
draft 
the 
amendments 
to 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
stated 
that 
"[t]he 
main 
purpose of this statute is to protect the artists," and that "a lot 
of artists were harmed" because their work was not returned or they 
did not receive appropriate payment after the closure of the Boston 
Corporate Art and Haley & Steele, Inc. galleries.  Tougher Rules on 
Fine Art Consignment Now up to Governor, State House News Service, 
Oct. 31, 2006.  See Adams v. Boston, 461 Mass. 602, 612 n.17 (2012) 
("We employ contemporaneous news accounts not as a source of 
legislative intent, but as a source of valuable context as to the 
public dialogue animating the statute's passage"). 
 
12 These 
amendments 
included 
a 
broader 
definition 
of 
"fine 
art"; 
a 
definition 
of 
"consignor" 
encompassing 
art 
collectors; 
provisions 
regulating the manner and timing of payments by consignee to 
consignor; and added confirmation that a trust relationship exists 
between 
a 
gallery 
and 
an 
artist.  Compare 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
as 
inserted 
by St. 1978, c. 286, with G. L. c. 104A, as amended by St. 2006, 
c. 353. 
13 
 
part of a recording system for consigned art work, and not as a 
prerequisite for a consignment.13 
 
General Laws c. 104A protects consignors' interests in their 
art 
work 
by 
providing 
that 
consigned 
works 
of 
art 
are 
not 
the 
property 
of the consignee, but are rather held in trust for the consignor.  
See G. L. c. 104A, § 4.  Like statutes in a number of other 
jurisdictions, G. L. c. 104A thereby "provide[s] a safe harbor for 
the 
artist 
against 
the 
claims 
of 
a 
dealer's 
creditors."  R. 
E. 
Lerner 
& 
J. 
Bresler, 
Art 
Law:  The 
Guide 
for 
Collectors, 
Investors, 
Dealers, 
and Artists 41 (3d ed. 2005).  See Jay, A Picture Imperfect:  The 
Rights of Art Consignor-Collectors When Their Art Dealer Files for 
Bankruptcy, 58 Duke L.J. 1859, 1875-1876 & n.111 (2009) (collecting 
statutes).  The bankruptcy trustee's interpretation of G. L. 
c. 104A 
would 
deny 
this 
safe 
harbor 
to 
consignors 
who 
fail 
to 
deliver 
                                                          
 
13 This interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
as 
initially 
enacted 
in 
1978.  See 
St. 1978, 
c. 286.  
Prior 
to 
the 
enactment 
of 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
the 
Uniform 
Commercial 
Code 
(UCC), G. L. c. 106, applied to the consignment of art work, and 
afforded minimal protection to consignors of art work in the event 
that 
a 
consignee 
sought 
bankruptcy 
protection.  See 
Ulrich, 
Muddled 
Waters:  Consignment of Fine Art Law in Massachusetts, 35 J. Arts 
Mgt., L. & Soc'y 121, 123-124 (2005).  Under the UCC, if a UCC 
financing statement is not filed upon consignment, then a consignor 
retains only an unsecured interest in the consigned item, see G. L. 
c. 106, § 9-319.  Commentators have noted that many artists do not 
file UCC financing statements due to the "handshake culture" of the 
fine art market.  See, e.g., Madigan, Orphaned Art Consignors:  
Confusion in the Courts and the UCC, 29 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 
753, 756-757 (2011); Jay, A Picture Imperfect:  The Rights of Art 
Consignor-Collectors 
when 
their 
Art 
Dealer 
Files 
for 
Bankruptcy, 
58 
Duke L.J. 1859, 1862-1863, 1890 (2009). 
14 
 
written 
statements; 
such 
an 
interpretation 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
Legislature's intent to enhance protections for artists' interest 
in their consigned works in both the original and amended versions 
of G. L. c. 104A.  Compare G. L. c. 104A, as inserted by St. 1978, 
c. 286, with G. L. c. 104A, as amended by St. 2006, c. 353. 
 
General Laws c. 104A, § 2 (c), requires a consignee to keep a 
copy 
of 
the 
consignor's 
written 
statement 
of 
delivery, 
make 
a 
record 
of 
sale 
if 
the 
art 
work 
is 
sold, 
and 
make 
records 
available 
for 
review 
upon request of the consignor.  General Laws c. 104A, § 4A (a), 
requires that a consignee maintain separate accounts for each 
consignor, 
and 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 4A (b), 
requires 
that 
payment 
be 
made 
to the consignor within ninety days of the sale of an art work.  
Failure to make payment within ninety days renders the consignee 
liable for payment of interest, costs, and attorney's fees, and 
failure to make payment within 180 days entitles the consignor also 
to seek treble damages.  See G. L. c. 104A, § 4A (b), (c).  In the 
event of a closure of the consignee's business, G. L. c. 104A, 
§ 4A (f), requires a consignee to notify consignors, return works 
within ninety days, and maintain all records for four years. 
 
The Legislature thus intended the requirement of a written 
statement of delivery in G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b), to facilitate a 
recording system that enhances protections for consignors of art 
work, 
and 
not 
to 
create 
a 
barrier 
to 
such 
protection.  The 
recording 
15 
 
system 
and 
its 
protections 
are 
impeded 
if 
a 
consignor 
does 
not 
provide 
the consignee with identifying information about the art work, and 
the 
name 
of 
the 
artist 
and 
the 
owner 
of 
the 
art 
work, 
and 
as 
required 
by 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 2 (b).  That 
the 
consignor 
generate 
the 
written 
description of the art work makes sense because the consignor will 
know the information that is required to be included in the record, 
such as the work's title, dimensions, medium, and completion date, 
and 
the 
consignor 
has 
a 
significant 
interest 
in 
the 
record 
being 
made.  
By 
delivering 
a 
written 
statement 
that 
is 
then 
kept 
on 
record 
by 
the 
consignee, the consignor reduces the risk that art work will be 
misidentified, become untraceable, or, in the worst case, be 
forfeited.14  See 
G. L. 
c. 104A, 
§ 4 (c) 
(consignor 
forfeits 
art 
work 
if in good faith consignee cannot locate consignor within one year 
after decision to return unsold work); G. L. c. 104A, § 4A (e) (if 
in 
good 
faith 
consignee 
cannot 
locate 
consignor, 
consignee 
shall 
not 
be liable for penalties for failure to make payment, and after four 
years from date of sale, consignor forfeits payment).  A consignor 
who 
does 
not 
furnish 
a 
written 
statement 
of 
delivery 
thus 
jeopardizes 
the consignor's own interest in the art work, but nevertheless 
effects a valid consignment under G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (a), so long 
                                                          
 
14 A consignor "is solely responsible for keeping his contact 
information current with the consignee," including name, mailing 
address, telephone number, facsimile transmission number, and 
electronic mail address.  G. L. c. 104A, § 4 (c). 
16 
 
as there is delivery of the art work and acceptance for the purpose 
of exhibition or sale on commission. 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported question, "No, a written 
statement of delivery is not a prerequisite for the formation of a 
consignment under G. L. c. 104A." 
 
The 
Reporter 
of 
Decisions 
is 
directed 
to 
furnish 
attested 
copies 
of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
as the answer to the question certified, and will also transmit a 
copy to each party.