Title: Commonwealth v. Lessieur

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-10784 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHAWN LESSIEUR. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 10, 2015. - July 27, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior consistent statement, Impeachment of 
credibility, Corroborative evidence, Exculpatory.  Witness, 
Impeachment, Corroboration.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 8, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before S. Jane Haggerty, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on May 2, 2011, was heard by her. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Crystal Lee Lyons, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  On March 17, 1994, Mark Jones was shot twice in 
the head and died from his injuries.  In April, 2006, Nolyn 
Surprenant (Surprenant) implicated himself and the defendant in 
the murder.  Surprenant was indicted for murder two months 
later.  In March, 2007, Surprenant made an agreement with the 
2 
 
Commonwealth to testify against the defendant in exchange for a 
recommendation of five years in State prison on a manslaughter 
charge.  The defendant was subsequently indicted and, following 
a jury trial in the Superior Court, was convicted in October, 
2009, of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation and also of unlawful possession of a firearm.1  On 
May 2, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
which was denied.  The appeal from the denial of the motion was 
consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant 
challenges:  (1) the admission of multiple prior consistent 
statements; (2) the effectiveness of trial counsel in failing to 
object to the admission of certain evidence and failing to 
impeach a witness; (3) the prosecutor's closing argument; and 
(4) the viability of the conviction based on uncorroborated 
testimony and newly discovered evidence.  We affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial, and discern no basis to exercise our authority pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
                     
 
1 The judge imposed a mandatory sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole in State prison on the defendant's murder 
conviction and a concurrent sentence of from four to five years 
in State prison for the unlawful possession of a firearm 
conviction. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
based on the Commonwealth's case.  The defendant and Surprenant 
first met in 1989, when the defendant moved into the foster home 
where Surprenant, then fourteen years of age, lived.  The two 
became very close and Surprenant began selling drugs for the 
defendant two or three years later.  Surprenant dropped out of 
high school and moved out of the foster home and into the 
apartment that the defendant shared with his girl friend, Stacy 
Cruz.  The three spent a lot of time in the Chelmsford Street 
Projects in Lowell, and a group of people gathered at a house 
nearby, owned by Carol Ayotte, to sell, buy, and consume drugs. 
 
The defendant and Surprenant both knew the victim, although 
the victim was part of a different social group.  The victim had 
a reputation for violence and threatened to rob the defendant 
about two weeks before the murder.  The victim was murdered on 
March 17, 1994. 
 
Mark Beaulieu, then a resident of the University Heights 
apartment complex off Skyline Drive in Lowell, witnessed some of 
the events that occurred at the scene that evening.  He was 
outside of his apartment with his wife at about 6:55 P.M, 
clearing snow off their vehicle.  He noticed a vehicle parked 
with the engine running near the dumpster area of the complex 
and someone in the driver's seat.  He heard two gunshots fired a 
few seconds apart, which brought his attention back to the 
4 
 
dumpster area.  Beaulieu saw someone come out from the side of 
the building near the dumpster and get into the passenger seat 
of the vehicle.  He approximated that, based on the roof line of 
the vehicle, the passenger was "no taller than six feet" and had 
shorter hair, but was not able to describe any other details of 
the driver or passenger.  The vehicle then turned to leave the 
apartment complex. 
 
Beaulieu and his wife got into their vehicle and followed 
the departing vehicle.  He could not get a clear view of the 
license plate, but described the vehicle as "Toyotaish, . . . 
Japanese make older boxy."  Beaulieu eventually turned around 
and returned to the apartment to call the police. 
 
The victim was found in the early morning hours of March 
18, 1994, lying face up in the dumpster area of University 
Heights.  He was fully clothed, except that his penis was 
outside of his pants.  The first officers dispatched, at 7:16 
P.M. on March 17, did not find the victim's body because the 
area was very dark and covered in deep snow.  After a second 
dispatch, emergency medical technicians arrived shortly after 
midnight and located the victim.  The victim had been shot once 
on the left cheek and once on the back left side of his head 
near his neck.  Either shot would have killed him, and he likely 
died in seconds. 
5 
 
 
Police officers interviewed fifty to one hundred people 
during their investigation, but did not establish any concrete 
leads.  They did not talk to Surprenant during their initial 
investigation. 
 
Twelve years after the murder, in April, 2006, two police 
officers went to the house that Surprenant shared with his 
pregnant wife to talk to him.  The police officers asked 
Surprenant if he would come with them to talk, which he 
understood to be in regard to the death of the victim.  
Surprenant asked if he would be coming home that night, and the 
officers said that he would.  The officers drove him to Skyline 
Drive, where he described the victim's murder to them.  
Surprenant told the officers that on the evening of the murder, 
the defendant called Surprenant at the apartment they shared at 
about 6 P.M. and asked him to retrieve a gun from a reclining 
chair in the defendant's bedroom.  The defendant explained that 
the victim was with him at the Chelmsford Street Projects.  
Surprenant eventually found the gun and took it to Ayotte's 
house.  He drove the defendant's blue Toyota Corolla automobile. 
 
The defendant met Surprenant outside Ayotte's house.  The 
defendant explained to Surprenant that he and the victim would 
get into the vehicle with Surprenant and expounded, "I told [the 
6 
 
victim] I was going to take him to my dealers."2  The victim sat 
in the back seat of the vehicle and the defendant sat in the 
passenger seat.  The victim thought they were going to the 
defendant's drug dealer to rob him.  The defendant asked 
Surprenant to stop at a convenience store.  During this stop, 
Surprenant gave the defendant the gun while the victim was not 
looking. 
 
The three got back into the same seats in the vehicle and, 
following the defendant's directions, Surprenant drove to 
University Heights.  The defendant asked Surprenant to park next 
to the dumpster and got out of the vehicle, stating that he was 
going to "take a piss."  The victim said he would go with the 
defendant.  Surprenant stayed in the driver's seat and turned 
the vehicle's lights off; he left the engine running. 
 
The defendant and the victim walked toward the side of the 
building.  About three to four minutes later, Surprenant heard 
two gunshots fired about three to five seconds apart.  About 
thirty seconds later, the defendant came back to the car alone 
and Surprenant drove out of the apartment complex.  The 
                     
 
2 Stacy Cruz testified in response to the Commonwealth's 
subpoena.  She attempted to give the defendant an alibi on the 
night of the murder, saying that she did not think the defendant 
left Ayotte's house because he did not give her any drugs to 
sell and he always did so before leaving.  She said she left 
Ayotte's house the night of the murder with Surprenant and the 
defendant.  The jury apparently did not find her testimony 
credible. 
7 
 
defendant said that he "shot [the victim] while we was taking a 
piss while he had his dick in his hand."  The defendant said he 
shot the victim in the head and the face, but that he wanted to 
go back and make sure the victim was dead.  The two drove to 
their former foster home, where they stayed for approximately 
five minutes before Surprenant recommended that they go to the 
Tyngsboro bridge and dispose of the gun.  Surprenant parked near 
the bridge and the defendant walked up and threw the gun off the 
side.  Surprenant drove back to their apartment. 
 
Surprenant continued to sell drugs for the defendant until 
August, 1994, when Surprenant was arrested for selling cocaine.  
Although he and the defendant remained friends, the two never 
discussed the murder except for the first couple of weeks 
following the murder, when the defendant told Surprenant that he 
told a couple of people that he killed the victim.  Surprenant 
told his former girl friend, Kristin Tatro, about the murder in 
1996 or 1997, and told his brother, Jason, and a foster brother 
about the murder in 1999.  Jason told Surprenant never to tell 
anyone else about what had happened or else he would be "locked 
up for the case." 
 
In addition to the statement Surprenant made in the police 
cruiser, he made a video recorded statement that night at the 
Lowell police station.  He also led the police to the Tyngsboro 
bridge, where the two had disposed of the gun, and the police 
8 
 
then took him home.  The following month, a warrant issued for 
Surprenant's arrest, and Surprenant turned himself in.  
Surprenant's attorney negotiated a deal whereby Surprenant would 
testify against the defendant in exchange for five years in 
State prison on a manslaughter charge.  Surprenant remained in 
custody from May, 2006, through trial. 
 
The defense vigorously cross-examined Surprenant regarding 
recent contrivance, motive to lie, and bias, highlighting the 
terms of the deal that Surprenant made with the prosecution and 
suggesting that he contrived the testimony in an attempt to keep 
himself out of trouble.  Defense counsel also impeached 
Surprenant with inconsistencies in his testimony at trial, his 
testimony before the grand jury, his video recorded statement, 
and the police report written after Surprenant's statements on 
Skyline Drive and at the police station; a possible third-party 
culprit, "Minolo"; and memory issues, questioning Surprenant 
about his drug use at the time of the murder and a prior head 
injury.  In response to impeachment for recent contrivance, the 
Commonwealth presented Surprenant's prior consistent statements 
through the testimony of Tatro, Jason, and Sergeant Joseph 
9 
 
Murray, a police officer who conducted the April, 2006, 
interviews.3 
 
Tatro testified that she met Surprenant in 1993, had two 
children with him in 1995 and 1997, and that their relationship 
ended in 1998 or 1999.  She said that Surprenant told her about 
the murder sometime during their relationship.  He told her that 
he and the defendant picked up the victim because the victim had 
been talking about robbing the defendant, and that the defendant 
shot the victim.  Tatro testified that police had asked her 
about the murder in 2005, but that she lied and told the police 
that she had no information because she was afraid and loyal to 
Surprenant. 
 
Jason testified that Surprenant told him about the murder 
during the summer of 1999.  Jason was out on parole during that 
period, having been incarcerated in 1994.  Surprenant told Jason 
that he was in the vehicle when the defendant shot the victim in 
the back of the ear and in the head.  Surprenant also told Jason 
that he had an affair with Cruz in 1999, when she and the 
defendant were still in a relationship. 
                     
 
3 The Commonwealth also sought to introduce the videotape of 
the statement that Nolyn Surprenant (Surprenant) made at the 
police station.  Although the judge was inclined to allow the 
videotape, after vigorous objection by the defendant, she 
excluded the tape as being more prejudicial than probative.  She 
instead suggested that Sergeant Joseph Murray testify about the 
statement. 
10 
 
 
Sergeant Murray recounted Surprenant's prior statements 
during the interview on Skyline Drive and then at the police 
station.  He noted that there were no promises made to 
Surprenant before Surprenant started giving information about 
the crime.  Sergeant Murray said that police officers only told 
Surprenant that he would be going home that night after 
Surprenant agreed to get into the cruiser with them.  After 
Surprenant recounted the murder, he asked again if he was going 
home that night and the officers said that they would have to 
make a few telephone calls at the police station, but he was 
allowed to return home. 
 
The defense strategy was to show that Surprenant himself 
was the shooter or that he participated in the crime with a 
third party.  The defense called two witnesses, Jamie Simard and 
Stephen Andrade.4  Simard testified that Surprenant told him, in 
1996 or 1997, that he drove the victim and "Minolo"5 to Skyline 
Drive and that Minolo shot the victim.  Andrade testified that 
Surprenant threatened him, in 1995, because Andrade owed him 
money for drugs.  Surprenant told Andrade that he had "one body 
                     
 
4 Jamie Simard was incarcerated with the defendant in March, 
2009.  After seeing the defendant there, Simard decided to come 
forward with what he knew.  Stephen Andrade called the 
defendant's attorney approximately one month before trial to 
report what he knew. 
 
 
5 Simard described Minolo as a Hispanic male from the 
Chelmsford Street Projects, about 5'4" to 5'5" tall, and thin. 
11 
 
under his belt" and "You think I'm kidding?  You see [the 
victim], you see what happened to him."  Surprenant then showed 
him a gun. 
 
Discussion.  The primary issue at trial was whether the 
defendant was the person who committed the murder; the 
Commonwealth relied on Surprenant's testimony to tie the 
defendant to the murder.  In this appeal, the defendant does not 
contest the sufficiency of the evidence at trial but rather 
presents a series of arguments that attack the credibility of 
Surprenant's testimony.  Because the defendant's appeal from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial has been consolidated with 
his direct appeal, we review both pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 145 (2014), citing 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 145 (2013). 
 
1.  Prior consistent statements.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erred in allowing three witnesses to convey to the 
jury Surprenant's prior consistent statements that the defendant 
killed the victim.  As there was no objection to this testimony, 
we review the defendant's claim to determine whether the 
testimony was erroneously admitted, and if so, whether the error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 99 (1999).  We conclude 
that the admission of the statements was not error for the 
reasons explained below. 
12 
 
 
Prior consistent statements are "generally inadmissible to 
corroborate in-court testimony or a witness's credibility, but 
they are admissible when offered in response to a claim of bias, 
inducement, or recent contrivance."  Commonwealth v. Saarela, 
376 Mass. 720, 722 (1978), citing Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 
Mass. 23, 26-27 (1976).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613 (b) (2015).  
Prior consistent statements are only admissible to rebut the 
claims of recent contrivance but not to prove the truth of the 
statement challenged at trial.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 444 
Mass. 576, 582 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 
Mass. 382, 396 (1997).  "[T]he admission or exclusion of such 
testimony rests largely in the discretion of the trial [judge]."  
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 485 (1905).  The judge 
allowed the prior consistent statements because the defense 
raised a claim of recent contrivance, and she gave limiting 
instructions requested by the defense.6 
                     
 
6 Defense counsel requested that the judge instruct the jury 
that the testimony of Kristin Tatro and Jason Surprenant (Jason) 
was limited to the question of Surprenant's credibility.  The 
judge gave a more specific form of the requested limiting 
instruction prior to the testimony of these two witnesses.  
Additionally, in the final jury instructions, the judge 
instructed the jury that all prior consistent statements are 
"admitted into evidence solely on your consideration in 
evaluating the credibility issue of a witness and to rebut any 
suggestion that the trial testimony is a result of recent 
contrivance or fabrication."  Accordingly, the instructions 
satisfied the requirement in Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 
 
13 
 
 
The defendant first argues that the exception allowing 
prior consistent statements is not applicable in his case 
because the prior statements were not relevant to rebut a recent 
contrivance; instead, the statements were self-serving even 
before Surprenant made a deal with the Commonwealth.  We 
disagree. 
 
Years before the police spoke with Surprenant about the 
victim's death, he confessed to his girl friend and brother that 
he participated in the murder.  Further, he confessed to the 
police that he participated in the murder before he received any 
promises of leniency or negotiated a deal.  As Surprenant could 
be subject to criminal liability regardless of whether he or the 
defendant pulled the trigger, we cannot say that his confessions 
identifying the defendant as the shooter were self-serving.7  See 
Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 97 (2013) (discussing joint 
venture liability where participant knows joint venturer has 
weapon).  See also Rivera, 430 Mass. at 100 (rejecting 
defendant's argument that witness's confession to participation 
in murder before reaching deal with police was self-serving).  
                                                                  
91, 100 (1999) that the jury be given a limiting instruction on 
the defendant's request. 
 
 
7 Although the defendant maintains that Surprenant's story 
was fabricated, he acknowledges that the story "did not 
exonerate [Surprenant], and was instead a confession to first-
degree murder." 
14 
 
Defense counsel claimed recent contrivance through Surprenant's 
cross-examination.  He asked Surprenant whether anyone prevented 
him from giving a statement to police prior to being 
interviewed, and then in the next question asked whether it was 
correct that, "for your participation in the murder of [the 
victim], you're getting five years."  He also asked whether the 
officers promised not to arrest him the night of the initial 
statement.  Moreover, counsel claimed recent contrivance 
strenuously during closing, stating for example that 
Surprenant's "memory gets better as he keeps talking to the 
government and gains . . . information."  Given this context, 
the judge did not err in admitting the statements to rebut the 
defendant's claims of recent contrivance. 
 
The defendant next argues that allowing three witnesses to 
each recite Surprenant's prior consistent statements was 
improper bolstering of Surprenant's testimony and thus exceeded 
the bounds of the exception allowing admission of prior 
consistent statements.  Although the better practice is to 
scrupulously avoid improper bolstering, we discern no error in 
the circumstances of this case.  The defendant analogizes to the 
first complaint doctrine, under which the admissibility of 
witness testimony relaying out-of-court statements by a sexual 
assault complainant is limited to the "first" complaint.  
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 245 (2005), cert. denied, 
15 
 
546 U.S. 1216 (2006).  The first complaint doctrine permits the 
Commonwealth to introduce an out-of-court statement made by a 
victim after an alleged sexual assault for the purpose of 
corroborating the victim's own in-court testimony.  Id.  Prior 
to King, judges were encouraged, but not required, to restrict 
the number of complaint witnesses, id. at 232, citing 
Commonwealth v. Licata, 412 Mass. 654, 659-660 (1992); in King, 
we limited the statements allowable under the doctrine to only 
the first8 complaint, after taking into account "prejudicial 
'piling on' of such witnesses."  Id. at 245.  We reasoned that 
"[t]he testimony of multiple complaint witnesses likely serves 
no additional corroborative purpose, and may unfairly enhance a 
complainant's credibility . . . ."  Id. at 243. 
 
The defendant's analogy, while germane to the dangers of 
cumulative testimony, is not determinative in this case.  The 
first complaint doctrine allows admission of an out-of-court 
statement for corroboration alone without any inference of 
recent contrivance.9  See Mass. G. Evid. § 413 (a) (2015).  If an 
                     
 
8 In certain circumstances, a substitute witness may testify 
in place of the first complaint witness and the complainant may 
also testify as to the details of the first complaint.  
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 243-244, 245 & n.24 (2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006). 
 
 
9 The first complaint doctrine is also not determinative 
here, of course, because the doctrine is only applicable to a 
 
16 
 
out-of-court statement rebuts a claim of recent contrivance, 
however, it may be admitted in addition to testimony allowed 
under the first complaint doctrine.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 413 (b) (multiple complaints serving evidentiary purpose other 
than corroboration allowed if probative value outweighs 
prejudicial effect); Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 229 (2009) 
(if subsequent complaint evidence "does serve a purpose separate 
and apart from the first complaint doctrine, the judge may admit 
it 'after careful balancing of the testimony's probative and 
prejudicial value'").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 
395, 404 (2013) (claim of fabrication insufficient to allow 
admission of multiple complaints).  Consequently, multiple 
accounts of a prior consistent statement may be admitted even if 
the limitations prescribed by the first complaint doctrine 
applied here. 
 
We recognize the danger in admitting cumulative accounts of 
prior consistent statements because, as we previously stated, 
"corroborative evidence . . . can have, at most, only a very 
indirect bearing upon the credibility of the witness, while from 
its very nature it may be likely to influence the jury as 
substantive evidence of its own truthfulness."  Tucker, 189 
                                                                  
certain class of sexual assault cases not at issue.  King, supra 
at 247. 
17 
 
Mass. at 484.  Multiple accounts of the same evidence may, 
however, serve evidentiary purposes apart from corroborating the 
witness's testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 
287, 298-299 (2009) (multiple accounts of prior consistent 
statement admissible following claim that witness fabricated 
sexual abuse claim in order to obtain restraining order).  That 
is the case here, where the witnesses' testimony was relevant to 
rebut various claims of recent contrivance.  Surprenant's pre-
2006 statements to Tatro and Jason were relevant to rebut 
defense counsel's claim that the officers told Surprenant what 
to say when they questioned him in April, 2006, and that he was 
induced to fabricate his story by the "promises" that he would 
not be arrested and that he would return home the night of 
questioning.  In contrast, Sergeant Murray's testimony was 
relevant to rebut recent contrivance claims that derived from 
inconsistencies in various accounts of Surprenant's statements.  
In light of these circumstances, the judge did not err in 
allowing the various accounts.  See Rivera, 430 Mass. at 100. 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because we review 
the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we "determine whether there exists a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as required 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a 
defendant than is the general constitutional standard for 
18 
 
determining ineffective assistance of counsel."  Commonwealth v. 
Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 187 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  We "consider whether there was an 
error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id. 
 
The defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
(a) failing to object to the admission of Surprenant's prior 
consistent statements and evidence of Cruz's age when her 
relationship with the defendant began; and (b) failing to 
impeach Surprenant's testimony with bias evidence and with a 
prior conviction.  The defendant has failed to meet his burden 
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel on any of his claims.  
See Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 563 (2013). 
 
First, trial counsel did not err by failing to object to 
the asserted evidentiary errors because the pertinent evidence 
was properly admissible.  See Kebreau, 454 Mass. at 301.  The 
admissibility of the prior consistent statements is discussed 
above.  Further, there was no error in the admission of Cruz's 
age and therefore counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
exclude this evidence. 
 
The defendant raised his claim regarding Cruz's age in his 
motion for a new trial.  At trial, the prosecution introduced 
evidence that Cruz was fifteen years of age when her 
19 
 
relationship with the defendant, then twenty-one, began.  The 
defendant stated in his affidavit filed with his motion that the 
only reason that evidence of Cruz's age was admitted was to 
demonstrate a prior bad act because he would be seen as "child 
abuser" if the jurors heard the ages of both him and Cruz 
without knowing that "[they] had an eight year relationship and 
two children together."  The motion judge, who had been the 
trial judge, denied this claim after an evidentiary hearing.  
The judge noted that trial counsel could have masked this 
evidence through a motion in limine; however, the age gap would 
not have been completely eliminated because the Commonwealth was 
entitled to explore the depth of the relationship in order to 
demonstrate Cruz's bias.  Without deciding whether counsel's 
failure to file a motion in limine was an error, the judge 
concluded that any such error would not have influenced the 
jury. 
 
The judge properly resolved this issue against the 
defendant because Cruz's age was relevant, although perhaps not 
necessary, to demonstrate bias arising from her long-standing 
relationship with the defendant.  Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 
Mass. 672, 683 n.12 (2003).  Further, trial counsel may have had 
a strategic reason for not taking any action to exclude Cruz's 
20 
 
age.10  Cruz's age was used to demonstrate the length of the 
relationship for the jury.  Cruz testified at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial, in contrast, that the relationship ended 
after ten years, when the defendant was incarcerated on an 
unrelated charge.   Because the Commonwealth was entitled to 
demonstrate the length of the relationship, trial counsel may 
have strategically decided not to seek exclusion of Cruz's age 
in order to minimize the risk of information regarding the 
defendant's prior incarceration coming before the jury.  
Therefore, we are unable to say on the record that trial counsel 
did not have a strategic reason for not excluding Cruz's age.  
Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 (1994) 
(claims of ineffective assistance may only be resolved on direct 
appeal if "factual basis of the claim appears indisputably on 
the trial record"). 
 
Second, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
impeach Surprenant's testimony with bias evidence and with a 
prior conviction.  The defendant raised his claim regarding bias 
evidence in his motion for new trial.  Specifically, he argued 
                     
 
10 Trial counsel submitted an affidavit but did not testify 
at the hearing.  Although counsel acknowledged discussing the 
issue with the defendant before trial, he did not provide any 
reason, tactical or otherwise, for not taking any action to 
exclude the evidence. 
21 
 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach 
Surprenant's testimony with evidence of a short-term sexual 
affair between Surprenant and Cruz in 1998 or 1999 and a related 
conversation wherein Surprenant offered to kill the defendant 
for Cruz, while Cruz and the defendant were still in a 
relationship.  Trial counsel stated in an affidavit submitted 
with the defendant's motion for a new trial that he was aware of 
the affair but made no mention whether he was aware that 
Surprenant, during the course of the affair, had asked Cruz if 
she wanted him to kill the defendant.  He explained that he did 
not raise the subject of the prior affair because he was 
skeptical of the information. 
 
The judge denied the defendant's claim because trial 
counsel's presentation of this information would not have 
influenced the jury's verdict where evidence of the affair was 
already before the jury through Jason's testimony and where so 
many years elapsed between the time of the alleged threat and 
when Surprenant identified the defendant to police in connection 
with the murder.11  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his claim because evidence of the affair and threat 
                     
 
11 The judge analyzed this evidence under the portion of her 
decision discussing newly discovered evidence, but her 
conclusions regarding the effect of the evidence are applicable 
to the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 
22 
 
would have cast into doubt the inference that Surprenant was 
dominated by the defendant at the time of the murder, 
demonstrated bias, and provided an explanation for why 
Surprenant named the defendant as the "scapegoat" for the 
murder. 
 
We agree with the judge that the claimed errors would not 
likely have influenced the jury's conclusion.  Wright, 411 Mass. 
at 682.  As noted by the judge, the jury were aware of the 
evidence of the sexual affair through another witness.  Further, 
the alleged affair and threat occurred four to five years after 
the murder, and therefore the assertion that the evidence would 
undermine the theory that Surprenant was under the defendant's 
control at the time of the murder rings hollow.12 
 
The defendant also argues, for the first time, that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Surprenant with 
evidence of a prior assault and battery conviction.  A sidebar 
during trial demonstrates that trial counsel and the judge 
previously had discussed Surprenant's prior convictions; the 
                     
 
12 There is no evidence, outside of the defendant's self-
serving affidavit, that trial counsel knew of the threat before 
trial.  Even if trial counsel had been aware of the alleged 
threat, Cruz's affidavit stated that the threat followed on the 
heels of a fight between her and the defendant.  Without 
additional information, we can only speculate that trial counsel 
may have strategically decided not to raise the issue in order 
to prevent potential evidence of the defendant's aggressive 
behavior from being admitted. 
 
23 
 
defendant provided no information about the details of that 
conversation or any other information on which we could discern 
whether there was a strategic reason for not raising the prior 
conviction.13  Whether or not counsel had a strategic reason for 
not raising the prior conviction is not apparent on the record.  
Without additional information in this record, we cannot say 
that trial counsel's failure to raise the prior conviction was 
an error.  Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 562-563. 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Surprenant in his 
closing argument.  "Improper vouching can occur if an attorney 
expresses a personal belief in the credibility of a witness, or 
indicates that he or she has knowledge independent of the 
evidence before the jury."  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 
336, 352 (1998).  As there was no objection, we review the 
closing argument to determine whether there was improper 
prosecutorial vouching that created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 
181, 190 (2011), citing Wilson, supra at 354. 
                     
 
13 As evidence of this alleged prior conviction is not in 
the record, we assume for the purposes of this decision that 
Surprenant actually was convicted of assault and battery.  We 
also note that other prior conviction evidence was admitted 
through testimony that Surprenant was previously "caught selling 
cocaine." 
24 
 
 
The defendant takes issue with three portions of the 
prosecutor's closing argument:  (1) the prosecutor's statement 
that the district attorney "gets involved in" determining how 
Surprenant's story fit with facts that could be proved and that 
there was no "rush" because the murder occurred twelve years 
prior; (2) that after officers spoke to Surprenant, the ongoing 
investigation "f[e]ll into place.  And that led to a renewal and 
that led to this trial"; and (3) "Why would [Surprenant] -– how 
could [Surprenant] make up, create -– you saw him, he's not -– 
Okay?"  The defendant argues that the prosecutor, through these 
statements, improperly expressed his personal belief in 
Surprenant's story.  The defendant's argument is unavailing 
because the prosecutor was merely referring to the 
Commonwealth's need to review details of the murder, which 
corroborated Surprenant's statement, before bringing any 
charges; was highlighting the lack of concrete leads in the case 
prior to the interview with Surprenant in response to defense 
counsel's suggestion that Surprenant contrived his statement to 
minimize his punishment; and was acknowledging the questionable 
parts of Surprenant's statement that indicated that Surprenant 
did not create a fabricated story.  The prosecutor did not 
improperly vouch for Surprenant's testimony. 
 
4.  Other issues.  a.  Corroboration of participant 
testimony.  The defendant argues that the conviction, based on 
25 
 
Surprenant's uncorroborated testimony that the defendant 
committed the murder, violated his right to due process.  There 
is no requirement that a cooperating witness's testimony be 
corroborated unless the witness is immunized under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20E, a factor not at issue here.  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 439 
Mass. 362, 372 (2003).  In Thomas, supra at 372-373, we rejected 
a similar argument and noted that jury instructions and cross-
examination protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.  We 
discern no reason to revisit this rule.14  The judge gave jury 
instructions regarding Surprenant's credibility in light of his 
cooperation with the Commonwealth and Surprenant's testimony was 
the subject of vigorous cross-examination.  There was no 
violation of the defendant's due process rights. 
 
b.  Newly discovered evidence.  The defendant argues that 
newly discovered evidence, specifically proffered testimony from 
Ricardo Rivera and Rivera's former girl friend, Christine 
Mungovan, would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations and necessitates a new trial.  "A defendant 
                     
 
14 Moreover, evaluating the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), Surprenant's testimony 
about the defendant's involvement in the murder was 
corroborated.  Mark Beaulieu described the vehicle involved in 
the murder and the height of the shooter, both of which match 
the defendant's vehicle and the approximate height of the 
defendant.  Cruz and another friend from the Chelmsford Street 
Projects both testified that the defendant and the victim were 
together earlier in the evening of the murder. 
26 
 
seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
must establish both that the evidence is newly discovered and 
that it casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 458 Mass. 405, 415 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  The evidence 
"must be material and credible . . . [and] must carry a measure 
of strength in support of the defendant's position. . . .  Thus 
newly discovered evidence that is cumulative of evidence 
admitted at trial tends to carry less weight than new evidence 
that is different in kind."  Santiago, supra, quoting Grace, 
supra at 305-306.  Where "'the judge acting on the motion was 
also the trial judge' . . . and is in the best position to weigh 
the credibility of the proffered evidence and to determine its 
probable impact on a jury hearing it with all the other 
evidence," reversal of a motion for a new trial for abuse of 
discretion is particularly rare.  Santiago, supra at 414, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990). 
 
The judge resolved the claims under the second prong of the 
newly discovered evidence test, whether the evidence "casts real 
doubt on the justice of the conviction," Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 664 (2011), quoting Grace, supra at 
305, and whether "there is a substantial risk that the jury 
would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been 
admitted at trial."  Id., quoting Grace, supra at 306.  She 
27 
 
denied the motion after concluding that the jury would not have 
reached a different conclusion with Rivera and Mungovan's 
testimony.  Rivera submitted an affidavit and testified at an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, alleging that Surprenant told 
him, in 1999 or 2000, that Surprenant killed the victim.  
Mungovan also testified at the hearing, stating that Surprenant 
told her that "he already had a body under his waist or under 
his belt."  The judge did not credit either testimony, noting 
their eighteen year friendships with the defendant and failure 
to come forward previously with the information, even though 
Rivera attended parts of the trial.  Nothing in the record 
warrants disturbing the judge's conclusion.  The proffered 
testimony was largely cumulative; the defense presented two 
witnesses at trial who each relayed statements in which 
Surprenant implicated himself in the murder between 1995 and 
1997.15 
 
The defendant argues that the judge abused her discretion 
by basing her findings on her own credibility assessments 
instead of weighing the risk that the new evidence would have 
                     
 
15 The defendant also argues that proffered testimony that 
Surprenant had guns in his apartment, five years after the 
murder, would rebut the suggestion at trial that Surprenant was 
an innocent and under the control of the defendant.  This 
argument is unavailing because of the time lapse and because 
Surprenant testified that he was a drug dealer at the time of 
the murder. 
28 
 
influenced the jury's verdict.  This claim has no merit.  The 
judge properly relied on her knowledge of the trial in making 
her findings.  Moore, 408 Mass. at 127. 
 
Because the judge did not err in resolving this claim under 
the second prong of the newly discovered evidence test, we do 
not consider the first prong of the test, where "[t]he defendant 
has the burden of proving that reasonable pretrial diligence 
would not have uncovered the evidence."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 
306. 
 
5.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the entire record and see no reason to exercise our 
power to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.