Title: Silverfine v. Town of Bakersfield

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-079


Len Silverfine                               Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Franklin Superior Court

Town of Bakersfield and                      January Term, 1990
Bell-Gates Lumber Company


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Douglas D. DeVries, Enosburg Falls, and Michael Rose, St. Albans (On the
  Brief), for plaintiff-appellant

David M. Yarnell and Jesse D. Bugbee of Kissane, Yarnell & Cronin, St.
  Albans, and Philip J. Fitzpatrick, Jeffersonville, for defendant-
  appellee Bell-Gates Lumber Company

Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, St. Albans, for defendant-appellee Town
  of Bakersfield

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Andrew W. MacLean, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee State of Vermont


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   Plaintiff landowner appeals from the dismissal of his suit,
which alleges that his civil rights were violated when defendant Town of
Bakersfield, pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute, granted
defendant Bell-Gates Lumber Co.'s petition to lay out a right-of-way across
his land in order to transport its lumber.  We affirm the dismissal of the
suit, but on grounds different from those relied on by the trial court.
     The parties stipulated to the facts.  During the spring of 1983,
pursuant to 19 V.S.A. { 325, (FN1) Bell-Gates petitioned the Town of Bakersfield
for permission to lay out a right-of-way to remove logs across plaintiff's
property.  The Town granted Bell-Gates's petition, provided that the company
pay plaintiff $100 for the estimated damage to his property, post a $1,500
bond to cover potential damages from runoff, and complete the logging
operation within two years.  In April of 1986, following two attempted suits
by plaintiff, (FN2) the Town gave Bell-Gates until April of 1987 to begin the
operation and another two years after that to complete it.  Bell-Gates began
work sometime between the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986 and completed
it sometime between March and August of 1988.
     In January of 1987 plaintiff brought this suit, claiming damages under
42 U.S.C. { 1983 for an unconstitutional taking of his property.  There are
four counts to the complaint:  (1) against Bell-Gates for appropriating the
right-of-way, plaintiff seeks ten thousand dollars in compensatory damages,
an injunction from using the right-of-way across his land, and a declaration
that { 325 is unconstitutional; (2) against the Town of Bakersfield for
granting Bell-Gates's petition, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of one
dollar and the same declaration; (3) against the State of Vermont for
enacting an unconstitutional statute, plaintiff requests unspecified
compensatory damages along with the same declaration.  The fourth count,
added later, states that the Declaratory Judgments Act, 12 V.S.A. {{ 4711-
4725, gives the court the authority to adjudicate the parties' rights vis-a-
vis { 325.  The trial court dismissed the case, concluding that the
temporary right-of-way across plaintiff's property did not constitute an
unconstitutional taking.
     On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants' actions pursuant to { 325
constitute an unlawful taking for private purposes in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Chapter I, Article 2 of the
Vermont Constitution.  Because no justiciable controversy exists, we do not
reach plaintiff's constitutional arguments.
     In order for this Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, the
litigants must show that the requested declaratory relief, if granted, would
make a practical difference in an actual controversy.  See Robtoy v. City of
St. Albans, 132 Vt. 503, 504,