Title: State v. Thomas

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Patrick Joseph Thomas a/k/a Patrick Joseph Patrick, No. 33, 
September Term, 2018, Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
CRIMINAL 
LAW 
– 
INVOLUNTARY 
MANSLAUGHTER 
– 
GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE – MALUM IN SE CRIMINAL OFFENSE: An act can be the basis of 
a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter charge, regardless of whether it is a malum in 
se or malum prohibitum offense.  Under an unlawful act involuntary manslaughter theory 
involving a malum in se offense, a court presumes that the unlawful act is conducted with 
a culpable mens rea.  Inversely, when the State proceeds under a gross negligence 
involuntary manslaughter theory, it must demonstrate the grossly negligent mens rea 
beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the character of the offense.  The Court 
declined to opine whether the distribution of heroin is a malum in se or malum prohibitum 
offense.  
 
CRIMINAL 
LAW 
– 
INVOLUNTARY 
MANSLAUGHTER 
– 
GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE – MENS REA – DISTRIBUTION OF HEROIN: Grossly negligent 
conduct must amount to a “wanton and reckless disregard for human life.”  State v. 
Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 499 (1994) (citation omitted).  In essence, this means that the 
individual’s conduct must be a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent 
person, occur without regard to the rights of others, and be “likely at any moment to bring 
harm to another,” Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 533 (1957) (citation omitted).  The 
underlying act of distribution of heroin is “inherently dangerous,” in and of itself.  
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 980 (Mass. 1990) (citation omitted).  The 
circumstances surrounding this particular sale of heroin—including that the victim was 
desperate for heroin, the victim was a “young boy,” the distributor had substantial 
experience with heroin, and the distributor neglected to take any mitigating measures—
vault it into the grossly negligent category.  Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the trial 
court to hold that the distributor was grossly negligent.  
 
CRIMINAL 
LAW 
– 
INVOLUNTARY 
MANSLAUGHTER 
– 
GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE – PROXIMATE CAUSATION – DISTRIBUTION OF HEROIN: “A 
causal connection between . . . gross negligence and death must exist to support a 
conviction . . . .”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499 (citation omitted).  This includes both actual 
and legal cause.  Maryland cases have reviewed actual cause in involuntary manslaughter 
cases like Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341 (1960), and Goldring v. State, 103 Md. App. 728 
(1995).  Here, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that, but for the 
four bags of heroin, the victim would not have overdosed.  Additionally, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the victim would ingest the heroin provided by the dealer.  Thus, ingestion 
of the heroin was the proximate cause of the victim’s death.  
 
 
Circuit Court for Worcester County 
Case No.: 23-K-16-000038 
Argued: November 29, 2018 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 33 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
PATRICK JOSEPH THOMAS A/K/A 
PATRICK JOSEPH PATRICK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D.,  
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
Greene, Hotten and Getty, JJ., dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: June 24, 2019 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-06-24 13:41-04:00
The past twenty years have seen a dramatic increase in heroin use, abuse, and 
accessibility.1  Unsurprisingly, Maryland has experienced a correlating spike in heroin and 
opioid-related deaths.2  Our State, and Marylanders alike, seek tools to combat this 
epidemic.  We are asked to consider under what circumstances the dangers of heroin would 
justify holding a dealer liable for involuntary manslaughter for supplying the means by 
which his customer fatally overdoses.  The issue is fraught.  The perception of an epidemic 
cannot solely dictate its legally recognized danger.  As our role requires, we address the 
issue in the specific context of this sale of heroin to determine where the act falls on the 
continuum of culpability.  
The question presented is at once straightforward and weighty: whether the evidence 
in the trial court was sufficient to sustain Patrick Joseph Thomas’ (“Thomas”) conviction 
for involuntary manslaughter.3  We resolve this case in favor of Petitioner, holding that 
                                              
1 Heroin Trafficking in the United States, Cong. Research Serv. 1–3 (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44599.pdf [archived at https://perma.cc/YP3D-PWES].  
 
2 Overdose Data and Reports, Md. Dep’t of Health, Behavioral Health Admin., 
https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/Pages/Data-and-
Reports.aspx [archived at https://perma.cc/Y6JN-VXR2].   
 
3 We have rephrased and consolidated the questions presented for clarity.  The issues 
as granted are as follows:  
 
1) As a matter of first impression, may a seller of heroin be 
convicted of a murder-related offense where the buyer of the 
heroin dies after ingesting it?  
 
2) Did CSA assume facts not in evidence and otherwise usurp 
the role of the fact-finder when it held that, as a matter of law, 
the State presented insufficient evidence of gross negligence 
2 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Thomas of gross negligence involuntary 
manslaughter.  
BACKGROUND 
The State charged Thomas with three counts: distribution of heroin, reckless 
endangerment, and involuntary manslaughter.  Thomas entered, what we have termed 
before, a “hybrid plea,” wherein the parties “agree to the ultimate facts,” while 
“maintain[ing] the ability to argue legal issues, as well as sufficiency.”  Bishop v. State, 
417 Md. 1, 22 (2010).  “The State’s proffer may not contain disputes of material fact, 
because the judge cannot resolve credibility issues on a mere proffer.”  Id. at 24.  These 
agreed factual findings were read into the record by the State’s Attorney and are quoted at 
length below.  
As an initial matter, Thomas objects to the State’s citation of “at least ten journal 
articles, newspaper reports, and internet websites” to support its argument, because, he 
asserts, we are confined to the record “as presented to the lower court.”  Moreover, Thomas 
states that he “does not agree to the facts identified by the State” in its brief, particularly 
considering that they are not placed in the context of the time in which this incident 
occurred, 2015.  
We agree with Thomas that newspaper articles—excepting those referenced in the 
agreed statement of facts—play no role in consideration of this case.  Still, this Court is 
able to take judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” and “capable of 
                                              
and 
causation 
to 
sustain 
Respondent’s 
manslaughter 
conviction? 
3 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned.”  Maryland Rule 5-201(b).  We may take such notice on request or sua 
sponte, see id. 5-201(c), regarding a range of reliable scientific and historical data.  See, 
e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 445 (1993) (Surgeon General’s Reports issued by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 139–40 
(1988) (reports issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as other 
academic publications); Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md. App. 484, 499 (1984) (life 
expectancy tables).  
Agreed Findings of Fact4 
[O]n June 26th of 2015, at approximately 3:19 in the 
morning, Worcester Central received a 911 call from Tammy 
Colleen Matrey [(“Tammy”)], who resides . . . [in] Ocean 
Pines, Worcester County, Maryland.  Tammy advised that she 
had located her son, Colton Lee Matrey [(“Colton”)], locked in 
her bathroom.  Colton was unresponsive, had no pulse and was 
not breathing.  Tammy would testify that she had previously 
seen Colton earlier that day, alive and well, and had found him 
at this particular time of evening or early morning hours of the 
26th of June unresponsive.   
 
At 3:27 in the morning Ocean Pines Emergency 
Medical Services and Ocean Pines Police Officer Kerrigan 
arrived at the residence and located Colton seated on the toilet 
in the bathroom with his head propped on the vanity top.  They 
pronounced Colton deceased.  Because of the scene, it was 
determined that Colton died of a probable heroin overdose.  
And, therefore, the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement 
Team was contacted and asked to respond to conduct a criminal 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding Colton’s death.  
 
                                              
4 For ease of reading, name substitutions and quotation marks have been inserted 
without brackets or any other indication.  All other alterations to the agreed statement of 
facts are set off by brackets.  Asterisks denote the removal of paragraphs.  
4 
At approximately 4:30 in the morning, Detective Jeff 
Johns [(“Johns”)] of the Ocean City Police Department, 
assigned to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement 
Team, arrived at the residence.  Without objection, Johns 
would have been offered and accepted as an expert in the 
valuation and identification of controlled dangerous substances 
[(“CDS”)], the common practices of users and dealers of 
[CDS] and [CDS] investigations generally.   
 
Johns arrived at the residence, went into the bathroom 
of the residence, observed Colton, determined that Colton’s 
body had not been moved. . . .  
 
Johns located one white wax paper bag inside of 
Colton’s right hand.  There were three additional identical 
white wax paper bags on the ground directly beneath Colton 
between the toilet and the vanity.  Each one of these bags was 
stamped [“banshee”] in blue, with a blue-colored emblem.  
Those packages contained trace amounts of suspected 
contraband [and] are what Johns knows is commonly used to 
contain heroin.  
* * *  
[State’s exhibits] reflect the photograph of Colton’s 
right hand which contained the one empty package of banshee 
and the other photograph depicts what was found in Colton’s 
pants pocket, which was a syringe.  
* * *  
Colton’s bedroom was searched with the consent of his 
mother.  And located in Colton’s bedroom were four additional 
hypodermic syringes, a spoon and a Q-tip inside of a folded 
pair of Colton’s jeans in the closet.  These were identified by 
Johns as heroin paraphernalia.  There was also a prescription 
pill bottle with the label torn off that contained six 50-
milligram tramadol pills, which is a Schedule IV [CDS].  It was 
determined that Colton did not have a prescription for the 
tramadol pills and possibly had taken these pills, unknowingly, 
from his mother.  
* * *  
Johns spoke with the individuals who were present in 
the residence at the time [of Colton’s death].  In addition to 
Tammy, . . . there was also James Godino [(“Godino”)], who 
5 
was the boyfriend of Tammy, and Carissa Koons [(“Koons”)], 
who was the girlfriend of Colton.   
 
It was determined . . . by interrogating or questioning 
those three individuals that Colton had been abusing heroin for 
approximately four[-]and[-]a[-]half years.  He resided in 
Pennsylvania up until February of 2015, when he moved to 
Ocean Pines, Maryland to live with his mother. . . .  
 
Koons had been in a relationship with Colton for four 
years.  She advised that Colton had always had a heroin 
addiction.  Approximately two[-]and[-]a[-]half years ago 
Colton had overdosed after being released from a halfway 
house where he had become clean of opiates.  Narcan, or 
naloxone, was administered, and he had survived that 
overdose.  However, Koons advised that he continued to abuse 
heroin after that overdose.   
 
In February of 2015[,] Colton moved out of the 
Pennsylvania area and into his mother’s home in an attempt to 
isolate himself from the lifestyle of heroin abuse in 
Pennsylvania. . . .  
 
[O]n June 25th[,] Colton had asked his mother to 
borrow her debit card.  Tammy allowed Colton to have her 
debit card so that he could rent a couple of movies.  
 
After his death, she checked her bank transactions.  She 
observed that Colton had rented two movies and then withdrew 
$40 in U.S. currency.  This $40 in U.S. currency was 
withdrawn at 11:59 in the evening on the 25th of June . . . .  
 
On June 25th of 2015[,] at approximately 11:50[,] 
Koons woke up from her sleep and observed that Colton had 
her car keys. . . . He then left the residence. . . .  
 
Approximately five minutes after Colton left the 
residence, Koons called Colton.  He did not answer.  She woke 
up at approximately [1:00] in the morning, noticed that Colton 
was not in the bedroom with her and called him again.  He did 
not answer, and she fell back asleep.   
 
6 
At approximately 3:10 to 3:15 in the morning[,] Koons 
woke up again.  Colton was still not back in the bedroom.  She 
then checked the bathroom and noticed that the door was 
locked, looked under the door crack and observed Colton’s 
shoes.  She then woke up Colton’s mother, Tammy, and 
Godino.  Godino removed the door hinges, at which time they 
were able to locate Colton’s body in the bathroom.  He was 
checked for a pulse.  It was determined that he was not 
breathing and that’s when 911 had been called.  
 
Johns, as part of the investigation, seized Colton’s black 
in color cellular telephone. . . . Tammy granted Johns 
permission to search the contents of the phone in an attempt to 
identify Colton’s supplier of heroin. . . .  
 
Later in the day[,] Tammy contacted Johns and advised 
that she had found a piece of paper inside Colton’s wallet that 
had two names and phone numbers written down. . . .  
 
The names and numbers written down on this piece of 
paper was [sic] the name Pat, with the number . . . , and also 
the name G – G . . . and his number . . . .   
 
Johns, utilizing the LInX Law Enforcement database, 
input the number that corresponded with the name of Pat.  The 
database 
search 
identified 
Patrick 
Joseph 
Thomas 
[(“Thomas”)], with a date of birth of 8/16/56, a 58—at the 
time—year old white male as the owner of the phone.  
* * *  
[Koons] indicated [to Johns] that when she woke up at 
approximately 11:50 on June 25th of 2015, and Colton was still 
in the house, she heard Colton complaining that Pat was not 
answering the phone.  This was right before Colton left the 
residence in Koon’s car.  There was no real familiarity with 
Pat.  Koons had never met Pat.  
* * *  
A physical examination of Colton’s phone . . . shows 
that an individual by the name of Pat was saved as one of his 
contacts.  And the phone number . . . corresponded with the 
number found in Colton’s wallet.  
 
7 
Johns then looked through the . . . call log on Colton’s 
phone and observed the following: On June 25, 2015, starting 
at 11:45 in the evening, [23:45] hours, Colton called Thomas 
27 times . . . between 11:45 and 12:07 a.m.  All of those call 
durations, except for the last one, were zero seconds, indicating 
no answer, no contact.  That last call was 27 seconds long, 
indicating contact.   
 
Additionally, there were text messages sent from 
Colton’s cellular telephone sent to the number associated with 
Thomas.  Those text messages were sent on June 25, 2015, at 
[23:46] hours, which stated, “I got $30, man, call me, please.”  
June 25, 2015, at [23:48] hours, “Call me.”  June 25, 2015, 
[23:48], “I’ll come to you.”  June 26, 2015, at two minutes past 
midnight, . . . “I’m here, I need 4.” . . . June 26, 2015, at 
[00:05] hours, “Yo, I’m here.”   
 
Johns would testify, based on his training, knowledge, 
and experience . . . that these were outgoing cell phone calls 
and text messages reaching out to Thomas, inquiring about 
purchasing five5 [sic] bags of heroin during those several 
minutes. . . .  
 
[F]rom Colton’s last communication until the time he’s 
pronounced dead, the only person he attempted to 
communicate with was Thomas.  
 
Based on that information, a search and seizure warrant 
was authored by Johns.  And on July 2nd of 2015, a search and 
seizure warrant was executed on the person of Thomas and [his 
residence.]  
* * *  
Johns located a total of 60 individual white wax paper 
bags.  These bags were stamped [“banshee”] in blue, with a 
blue emblem.  These bags were identical in appearance to the 
bags recovered from Colton from the date that he expired.  
These bags were on a table that was directly next to the chair 
where Thomas was seated during the warrant execution.  
 
                                              
5 All other information in the agreed statement of facts and the parties’ briefs 
suggests that this number should be “four.”  Thus, we presume this statement was in error.  
8 
Each of these bags contained a light brown powdery 
substance that was suspected heroin. . . . [E]ight bags were 
loose on the table, and there were another 52 bags that were 
packaged in four bundles.  
* * *  
There were several hundred empty . . . wax paper bags[] 
on the floor directly next to the chair where Thomas was 
seated and on the table next to Thomas. . . . Johns noticed a 
combination of the following: . . . wax paper bag[s] stamped 
“banshee” in blue with a blue emblem[;] . . . white wax paper 
bags stamped “banshee” in blue with no emblem[;] . . . white 
wax paper bags stamped “New York” in black with a black 
mask emblem[;] . . . blue wax paper bags stamped “Gucci” in 
red with a red emblem[;] . . . [and] blue wax paper bags 
stamped “slam” . . . in red with no emblem.  
* * *  
Also seized from Thomas was an LG brand cellular 
telephone that was on the table next to where he was seated.  
* * *  
[Johns examined Thomas’ phone.]  [A] screen shot of 
the LG phone . . . identified as Thomas’ identif[ied] an 
individual 
logged . . . as 
a 
contact. 
 
The 
name 
is 
“Colton”. . . . [The number] corresponds with Colton’s cellular 
telephone.  
* * *  
Toll records show that the cellular telephone that was in 
Thomas’ possession received 28 incoming phone calls from 
Colton’s phone number, starting as [23:45] hours, or 11:45, on 
the evening of June 25th of 2015, and continued through seven 
minutes after midnight on June 26th of 2015. . . .  
 
Johns would testify that the inconsistency, meaning 
there was 27 versus 28 [calls], would be that one of those calls 
would have been deleted by Colton accidentally.  
* * *  
The 60 bags recovered from Thomas’ residence 
[were] . . . submitted . . . for testing and analysis. . . . [T]hat 
report reflects that the gross weight was 13.10 grams. . . . Five 
specimens were analyzed separately, resulting in the 
conclusion that those items contained the substance of heroin, 
a Schedule I [CDS].  
9 
* * *  
[H]ad this matter gone to trial, . . . the State would have 
introduced the postmortem examination of the Office of the 
Chief Medical Examiner. . . . [The] autopsy [was] performed 
by [Theodore M. King, M.D. (“King”)]. . . . [T]he toxicology 
report and findings [stated:]  
 
“This 23-year-old white male, Colton Lee Matrey, died 
of alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) intoxication.  The 
manner of death could not be determined.  Autopsy detected 
increased levels of alcohol and a drug (free morphine) in the 
heart blood of the deceased and also showed evidence of heart 
disease and injuries to the head, neck, back, upper extremities 
and lower extremities.  The additional finding in the prostate 
gland was incidental to the man’s death.  The deceased had 
been consuming alcoholic beverages and heroin (a drug) a [sic] 
prior to death.  Post mortem testing for additional drugs was 
negative.”  
* * *  
During Johns’ testimony, . . . inquiry would have been 
made regarding the general public awareness regarding the 
dangers of heroin.  It would be his testimony that Worcester 
County, this particular region, and the State of Maryland has 
been consumed with heroin overdoses, some resulting in 
deaths, and that these overdoses have resulted in an acute 
awareness of the dangers of heroin.  Simply put, he would say, 
heroin kills, and everyone knows it.  
* * *  
He would also testify that even . . . outside of the drug 
use or abuse realm, it is still commonly known.  He would 
testify that one local paper is currently running a weekly series 
of articles regarding the dangers of heroin use . . . .  He would 
testify that the community itself has come together and formed 
groups in order to address the opioid and heroin problems 
facing this particular community.6  It would be his 
                                              
6 “Heroin is an opioid drug made from morphine, a natural substance taken from the 
seed pod of the various opium poppy plants . . . .”  Heroin, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse (June 
2018), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/heroin 
[archived 
at 
https://perma.cc/L2AK-S7NT].  The term “opioid” is an umbrella term including all 
“prescription medications used to treat pain such as morphine, codeine, methadone, 
oxycodone, hydrocodone, fentanyl, hydromorphone, and buprenorphine, as well as illegal 
10 
testimony . . . that anyone in Thomas’ situation would 
understand the dangers of heroin, and its propensity to harm 
physically, if not kill, individuals who are ingesting it.  
 
Following Thomas’ arrest, he was transported to the 
Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. . . . Corporal Wells 
[(“Wells”)] and [other officers] . . . met with Thomas at the 
sheriff’s office in the processing room.  Wells advised Thomas 
of his Miranda rights . . . . [T]here is no argument as to the 
voluntariness of [Thomas’] statement. 
* * *  
Wells asked Thomas, “How many bags of heroin do you 
use a day?”  Thomas replied, “About 12.”  Wells asked 
Thomas, “How many bags do you use in a single shot?”  
Thomas replied, “Four.”   
 
Wells advised Thomas that investigators were aware 
that he was travelling to Delaware to get his supply of heroin.  
Wells asked Thomas, “How often do you go to Delaware to get 
heroin?”  Thomas replied, “Every two to three days.”  Wells 
asked Thomas, “How many bundles do you get at a time?”  
Thomas replied, “Five.”  Wells asked Thomas, “How 
much . . . did you pay today for the five bundles?”  Thomas 
replied, “Three hundred dollars.”  
 
A bundle . . . would be testified by Johns as 
[being] . . . anywhere from ten to thirteen . . . individual bags 
of heroin.  They are rubber-banded together and sold as a 
bundle. . . .  
 
Wells asked Thomas, “When did you last go to 
Delaware to get heroin?”  Thomas replied, “Today.” . . . Wells 
asked Thomas, “How much do you sell a bag of heroin for?”  
Thomas replied, “Ten to fifteen dollars.”  Wells asked Thomas, 
“So out of the five bundles you got today, how many bags 
would you normally sell?”  Thomas replied, “About 30.”  
 
                                              
drugs such as heroin and illicit potent opioids such as fentanyl analogs (e.g., carfentanil).”  
Opioid Overdose Prevention Toolkit, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin. 1 
(June 
2018), 
https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma18-4742.pdf 
[archived 
at 
https://perma.cc/R3CZ-YZJZ].   
11 
Wells asked Thomas, “What is the best heroin out there 
now?”  Thomas replied, “Banshee.”  Wells asked Thomas, 
“How long have you been selling the banshee bags?”  Thomas 
replied, “A month or a month and a half.”   
 
Wells advised Thomas, “We saw you sell some heroin 
to a boy named Colton, or something like that, the other week.”  
Thomas replied, “Yeah, you mean Colt.”  Wells asked Thomas, 
“What do you know about Colt?”  Thomas replied, “He is a 
young boy.  He told me he did some prison time in 
Pennsylvania.”  Wells asked Thomas, “How many times have 
you sold heroin to Colt?”  Thomas advised, “A few times.”  
 
Wells told Thomas, “When we saw you sell to Colt, it 
was like midnight.  Do you remember that?”  Thomas replied, 
“Yeah, it was late.”  Wells asked Thomas, “Is that what time 
you normally meet with Colt?”  Thomas replied, “No, that was 
weird.  I usually met him earlier.”  Wells asked Thomas, “So 
that was the only time you sold heroin to Colt at around 
midnight?”  Thomas replied, “Yeah.”  Wells advised Thomas, 
“Do you remember how many bags you sold him?”  Thomas 
replied, “Four.”   
* * *  
Wells asked Thomas, “Where did you meet with Colt 
on this night?”  Thomas replied, “I can’t remember where I met 
him.  It could have been the Food Lion parking lot.  No, I think 
I met him on the street in Ocean Pines.”  Wells asked Thomas, 
“Was Colt driving a car?”  Thomas replied, “No, he was 
walking.”  Wells asked Thomas, “What kind of bag did you 
sell Colt?”  Thomas replied, “Banshee bags.”   
 
Wells then showed Thomas a photograph taken of 
Colton.  This photograph depicted Colton deceased in the 
bathroom of Colton’s mother’s house.  Wells asked Thomas, 
“Is this the person you know as Colt?”  Thomas looked at the 
photograph and replied, “Yeah, that’s him.”  
 
Thomas has a puzzled look on his face.  Thomas asked 
Wells, “Is he dead in that picture?”  Wells replied, “Yes. This 
picture was . . . taken just hours after [Colton] met with you 
and bought heroin.”  Thomas replied, “He couldn’t have 
overdosed off what I sold him.  I only sold him four bags.”  
12 
 
Wells then showed Thomas a picture of four banshee 
bags of heroin that were recovered from the bathroom that 
Colton was found deceased in.  Wells asked Thomas, “You 
mean these four bags?”  Thomas’ eyes opened widely.  
* * *  
Wells asked Thomas, “Do you know how old Colt 
was?”  Thomas replied, “I think he was like 19.”[7]  Wells and 
Thomas sat quietly for a moment.  Wells asked Thomas, “What 
do you think?”  Thomas said, “I feel bad.”  Detective Trader 
[(“Trader”)] advised Thomas, “You got to live with this on 
your conscience.”  Thomas replied, “I know.” . . .  
  
Trader then began walking Thomas to a holding 
cell. . . . Thomas stated to Trader that he felt bad about Colt’s 
death.  Trader advised, “Who wouldn’t?”  And Thomas 
replied, “Someone without a conscience.”  
* * *  
By agreement, if this case were to go to trial, Thomas 
would testify . . . and his testimony would include the fact that 
he personally had used the same product, the banshee heroin, 
[prior to Colton’s use,] and had not overdosed and, obviously, 
had not died from his use of it.  
 
Procedural Posture 
The trial court found Thomas guilty of distribution of heroin, reckless 
endangerment, and involuntary manslaughter.  The State presented two possible theories 
for an involuntary manslaughter conviction: unlawful act manslaughter and gross 
negligence manslaughter.  The court determined that Thomas could be convicted under 
either theory.  Specifically, the judge concluded that Thomas was grossly negligent because 
the testimony would have shown that “it is well known that, in fact, the use of heroin can 
cause death,” and Thomas’ statement to police demonstrated that he was so aware.  
                                              
7 In fact, Colton Matrey was 23 at the time of his death.  
13 
Alternatively, the judge stated that he reached the same result under an unlawful act 
analysis.   
Thomas appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Special Appeals, 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his involuntary manslaughter 
conviction.  Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App. 527, 531 (2018).  The intermediate appellate 
court first held that the State failed to establish causation sufficient to convict Thomas of 
unlawful act manslaughter.  Id. at 535–36.  The State does not challenge this determination 
and we do not review it.  Addressing gross negligence manslaughter, the Court concluded 
that “the State failed to carry its burden of proof in two regards.”  Id. at 536.  First, it held 
that, though there might be evidence of negligence, there was not sufficient evidence of 
gross negligence.  See id. at 537.  Additionally, the intermediate appellate court held that 
the defendant must be the “but for” cause of the victim’s death, but “the causal chain was 
broken.”  Id.  The State appeals to this Court.  
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
The trial court convicted Thomas of manslaughter under both an unlawful act and 
gross negligence theory.  It is our task only to review that court’s determination for whether 
there was sufficient evidence in the record to support it.  While it is typically cautioned that 
we must not “undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial 
of the case,” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478 (1994), there was no “trial” in the present 
case in the traditional sense.  Rather, this case proceeded on an agreed statement of facts.  
So, like the trial court, we accept the parties’ agreed “ultimate facts” and “simply appl[y] 
14 
the law to the facts agreed upon[.]”  Taylor v. State, 388 Md. 385, 396–97 (2005) (citation 
omitted).  We ask only “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)).  
Gross Negligence Involuntary Manslaughter 
In Maryland, involuntary manslaughter is a common law felony, though 
punishments are doled out in accordance with Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), 
§ 2-207(a) of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”).  Involuntary manslaughter is the 
unintentional killing of a human being, irrespective of malice.  See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 
499.  There are generally thought to be three varieties of involuntary manslaughter: (1) 
unlawful act manslaughter—“doing some unlawful act endangering life but which does not 
amount to a felony”; (2) gross negligence manslaughter—“negligently doing some act 
lawful in itself”; and (3) “the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  For the latter two categories of involuntary manslaughter, “the negligence [must] 
be criminally culpable”—i.e., grossly negligent.  Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 200 
(1971).  The present case involves only the second variety: gross negligence involuntary 
manslaughter.  
The State must also demonstrate a “causal connection between such gross 
negligence and death . . . to support a conviction, although it is not essential that the 
ultimate harm which resulted was foreseen or intended.”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499 (citation 
omitted).  This includes actual, but-for causation and legal causation.  The legal cause 
15 
analysis “turns largely upon the foreseeability of the consequence” of the defendant’s acts 
or omissions and whether “the ultimate harm is one which a reasonable man would foresee 
as being reasonably related to the acts of the defendant.”  Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 
352–53 (1960) (citation omitted).   
The State has made clear that its “sole argument before this Court is that the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Thomas of grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter.”  
Consequently, we do not review the Court of Special Appeals’ determination regarding 
unlawful act involuntary manslaughter.  Instead, we focus only upon whether the evidence 
introduced in the trial court was sufficient to convict Thomas of gross negligence 
involuntary manslaughter—in other words, to vault Thomas’ conduct over the theoretical 
bar separating ordinary negligence from criminal gross negligence.  
The Gross Negligence Standard 
As Judge Charles Moylan, a venerated scholar of Maryland criminal law, explained, 
“[f]rom the beginning, the Maryland caselaw describing the ‘gross negligence’ necessary 
to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter equated ‘gross negligence’ with a 
‘wanton or reckless disregard for human life.’”  Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide 
Law § 12.4, at 226 (2018); see also Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499 (citation omitted).  There is 
no obvious or empirical definition of “wanton and reckless disregard for human life,” but 
our cases have attempted to describe the “feel” of it.  See Pagotto v. State, 127 Md. App. 
271, 280 n.2 (1999), aff’d, 361 Md. 528 (2000) (“As a practical matter, jurors and judges 
alike are frequently able to ‘sense’ or to ‘feel’ the difference between depraved-heart 
murder and gross-negligence manslaughter,” as opposed to define it).   
16 
In general, the “gross negligence” mens rea is established by asking “whether the 
accused’s conduct, ‘under the circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the consequences 
which might ensue and indifference to the rights of others . . . .’”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 
(citation omitted).  The defendant must commit an act “so heedless and incautious as 
necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton . . . .”  Id. (citation omitted).  The act must 
“manifest[] such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful 
and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of indifference 
to the consequences.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Moreover, the defendant, or an ordinarily 
prudent person under similar circumstances, should be conscious of this risk.  See id.  See 
also Dishman v. State, 352 Md. 279, 299 (1998); Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, 
Criminal Law 107 (3d ed. 1982).  Still, these definitions, while somewhat descriptive, are 
of limited practical use.  
It is difficult to draw an exact line dividing gross negligence from the lower ordinary 
negligence standard, or from the higher depraved-heart standard.  Although, as recognized 
by Judge Moylan, these mentes reae exist one-after-the-other on a continuum of 
culpability.  See Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law § 12.3, at 225.  The definitional 
difficulty lies in the fact that culpability, by its nature, is dependent on the observable forces 
at play in a given scenario.  Our courts have discussed gross negligence involuntary 
manslaughter in four main contexts: automobiles, police officers, failure to perform a duty, 
and weapons.  None of these provide a perfect analogue for heroin distribution, but, 
together, they create a helpful tableau depicting how we assess a defendant’s level of 
negligence.  We review the most impactful of these cases below.  
17 
In 1941, the General Assembly enacted a law specifically defining “manslaughter 
by vehicle” as causing the death of another by “driving, operating, or controlling a 
vehicle . . . in a grossly negligent manner.”  CR § 2-209(b).  Although this statute preempts 
any prosecution for such conduct as common law gross negligence manslaughter, see State 
v. DiGennaro, 415 Md. 551, 565 (2010), we have stated that it involves precisely the same 
“common law concept and meaning of gross negligence,” Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 
588 (1954) (citation omitted).  Thus, these cases are still relevant here.  
Duren v. State may provide a useful low-water mark for successful manslaughter 
by vehicle prosecutions.  The defendant, driving in a “heavily congested residential and 
business area” of Baltimore City, drove his car at 7:00 p.m. on a Sunday in December at a 
speed of at least 60 miles per hour, approximately 30 miles per hour over the speed limit.  
Id. at 588–89.  Ultimately, he struck a pedestrian who had entered the street between two 
parked cars, hurling him onto the trunk of a nearby car and killing him.  See id. at 589.  The 
Court found it significant that the car hit the victim with such force even after the defendant 
had apparently attempted to brake, leaving skid marks for 72–89 feet.  See id.  
Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of 
manslaughter by vehicle, the Court reasoned it was “plain that the environment in which 
speed is indulged must determine whether it does or does not show gross negligence at a 
given time.”  Id. at 591.  What must be observed is “a lessening of the control of the vehicle 
to the point where such lack of effective control is likely at any moment to bring harm to 
another.”  Id. at 592.  Here, the Court could not say the trial court was “clearly wrong” 
when it found the defendant’s speed, in the context of his environment, amounted to gross 
18 
negligence, or “a disregard of the consequences which might ensue and indifference to the 
rights of others, and so was a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.”  Id. at 590.  
Duren was not an outlier.  In State v. Kramer, 318 Md. 576, 586–89 (1990), we 
again found evidence sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter by automobile 
when a driver in a rural area, passing in a no-pass zone going at least 75 miles per hour, hit 
an oncoming vehicle—all the while talking and joking with his passengers.8  We summed 
up the holding as follows: 
[T]he jury, weighing the speed in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances, could, again in the words of Duren, have found 
“such a lack of control, whether by reason of speed or 
otherwise, in a place and at a time when there [was] constant 
potentiality of injury as a result . . . .”  In addition to speed and 
lack of control, the factor of lack of attention was present.  In 
his brief, Kramer concedes that it could be inferred from the 
evidence that Kramer “failed to keep a proper lookout and thus 
came upon the Lee vehicle so suddenly that he had to swerve 
to avoid it.”  Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient for the 
jury to find on Kramer’s part a wanton and reckless disregard 
of the rights and lives of others and so a state of mind 
amounting to criminal indifference to consequences. 
 
Id. at 592–93. 
In a similar case with a divergent outcome, Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 530 
(1957), the Court reviewed a scenario in which a passenger was ejected from the 
defendant’s car and killed.  The defendant, driving in a non-residential portion of Baltimore 
City at 1:50 a.m., hit a curb, side-swiped a pole, and ended up in a plot of grass.  See id. at 
                                              
8 The conviction for manslaughter by automobile was reversed only because of the 
prejudicial joinder of that charge with an insurance violation charge.  See State v. Kramer, 
318 Md. 576, 593 (1990).  
19 
529–30.  A witness testified that the defendant’s car was going 60 miles per hour, but her 
testimony was severely undercut during cross-examination, and the defendant testified he 
was traveling at 35 miles per hour.  See id. at 530.  He had consumed two beers and officers 
smelled alcohol on his breath but did not believe that he was intoxicated.  See id.  
The central issue was “whether or not, in the circumstances existing at the time and 
place of the accident, the defendant was operating the automobile at such an excessive rate 
of speed as to constitute gross negligence within the meaning of [the statute].”  Id. at 531.  
The Court focused, again, on “whether, by reason of the speed in the environment, there 
was a lessening of the control of the vehicle to the point where such lack of effective control 
is likely at any moment to bring harm to another.”  Id. at 532–33 (citation omitted).  
Contrasting the case with Duren, the Court looked to environmental factors like the type 
of road traveled, the time of day, the traffic, the density and character of the neighborhood, 
and any safety precautions or warnings disregarded.  See id. at 533.  Based on these factors, 
it determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant was 
grossly negligent.  See id. at 534.   
These cases turn on whether, as judged by a holistic view of the risk factors at play, 
the defendant’s conduct was “likely at any moment to bring harm to another.”  While any 
one factor alone might not be enough to constitute gross negligence, the convergence of 
multiple factors creates an unacceptable threat of harm to others—with an emphasis on the 
one most likely to kill: speed—making an inference of wanton and reckless disregard for 
human life permissible.  Compare Goldring v. State, 103 Md. App. 728, 734 (1995) 
(“[T]here was ample evidence to support a rational finding that appellant’s decision to 
20 
compete in a drag race on Sunny Side Road constituted grossly negligent conduct.”), with 
Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 49, 56–58 (1954) (where the driver consumed alcohol and drove 
a truck with brakes in need of repair, there was no gross negligence without evidence of 
speeding).  See also Plummer v. State, 118 Md. App. 244, 267 (1997) (noting the absence 
of alcohol or speed in overturning a manslaughter by vehicle conviction).   
Common law gross negligence involuntary manslaughter also appears in cases 
involving negligent police officer conduct resulting in death.  Importantly, such cases are 
evaluated under a heightened “reasonable police officer under the circumstances” standard, 
rather than a reasonably prudent person standard.  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 487.  Still, they 
provide further guidance concerning the line between ordinary and gross negligence.  
In State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, two officers responded to a report of the 
stabbing of a man with a broken bottle.  One of the men involved in the stabbing, “Budd,” 
was reported to have fled the scene in a car driven by Rebecca Garnett (“Garnett”).  See id.  
The officers pursued the car and discovered it parked at a townhouse complex, with Budd 
and Garnett standing outside the vehicle.  See id. at 480.  Officer Albrecht yelled to the 
suspects, removed a shotgun fitted with a bandolier from his police cruiser, “racked” the 
gun, and “leveled” it at Garnett.  Id. at 481.  Albrecht, with his finger on the trigger, testified 
that he “intended to swing the shotgun to the left” to aim it at another party, but the gun 
discharged, striking Garnett, who fell to the ground dead.  Id. at 481–82.  Albrecht, who 
claimed not to realize the gun discharged, continued yelling “I told you not to move” and 
racked a second round.  Id. at 482.  Albrecht testified that he did not believe that Garnett 
posed a danger to him or others, another officer at the scene stated that Garnett had done 
21 
nothing to warrant the shotgun being leveled at her, and an expert testified that officers are 
trained to keep their finger on the trigger guard, never the trigger.  See id. at 504.  Albrecht’s 
conviction for grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter was upheld.   
State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 533 (2000), similarly dealt with an officer-involved 
shooting resulting in the death of an individual, but, this time, the Court affirmed the 
intermediate appellate court’s reversal of the officer’s conviction.  The Court identified 
five factors distinguishing Pagotto from Albrecht: (1) Albrecht drew a shotgun, racked it, 
and fitted it with a bandolier making it unbalanced; (2) Albrecht purposefully brought his 
gun to bear on the victim; (3) Albrecht placed his finger on the trigger of the gun, which is 
nearly universally prohibited; (4) Albrecht had ascertained that the victim was not armed 
and did not present a threat; and (5) several adults and children were behind Garnett when 
Albrecht shot her.  See id. at 554–55.  
These distinguishing factors are not unlike those provided in Duren and Johnson, 
above.  Though not phrased this way in the opinions, Albrecht’s conduct created a situation 
“likely at any moment to bring harm to another,” whereas Pagotto’s conduct—as judged 
by a reasonable officer standard—was not as unwarranted, unsafe, or likely to cause injury 
or death.  These environmental risk factors “elevated Albrecht’s behavior from ordinary 
civil negligence to gross criminal negligence.”  Id. at 554.  
Finally, Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196 (1971), provides perhaps the easiest 
comparison to the present case as it is a pure question of gross negligence involuntary 
manslaughter.  In this case, a 16-year-old boy took his father’s gun with him to a school 
dance.  See id. at 197.  Unfamiliar with the operation of the weapon, the boy and his friends 
22 
went to the bathroom to look at the gun and drink liquor.  See id.  Knowing there was one 
bullet in the chamber, the boy pointed the gun at his friend, who slapped the gun from the 
boy’s hand.  See id. at 199.  The gun hit the floor, discharged, and struck and killed another 
boy.  See id.  The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the circumstances “plainly” 
demonstrated “a grossly negligent act dangerous to life . . . .”  Id. at 202.  Moreover, the 
friend’s “reaction when the gun was pointed in his direction was wholly predictable,” and 
therefore not an independent supervening cause.  Id.   
Significantly, in each of the above-enumerated cases, there is no scientific test or 
quantifiable probability of death that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross 
negligence.  Rather, the inherent dangerousness of the act engaged in, as judged by a 
reasonable person—or reasonable officer—is combined with environmental risk factors, 
which, together, make the particular activity more or less “likely at any moment to bring 
harm to another.”  Johnson, 213 Md. at 533.  For example, while bringing a gun to a school 
dance might be negligent, the additional facts that the individual had little experience with 
weapons, was drinking, and pointed it jokingly at another surmount the gross negligence 
bar.  This objective reading of the conduct and circumstances determines whether an act is 
grossly negligent and creates a permissible inference of wanton and reckless disregard for 
human life.  
Another analogue useful in defining the requisite conduct required for gross 
negligence involuntary manslaughter is the crime of depraved-heart murder.  We again turn 
to Judge Moylan, who noted that “gross negligence manslaughter is the junior varsity 
manifestation of depraved-heart murder.”  Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law § 12.1, at 223.  
23 
The actus reus—the killing—is identical, and the mens rea—the negligence—differs only 
as a matter of degree.  Again, there is no “precise line” between the two offenses.  Dishman 
v. State, 352 Md. 279, 299 (1998).  Yet, it suffices to say that gross negligence 
manslaughter “involve[s] quantitatively less culpability in the first instance” than does 
depraved-heart murder.  Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law § 12.2, at 224.  In other words, 
it is “simply a little less wanton and a little less depraved . . . .”  Id.  
The Maryland Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions distinguish the two offenses, 
describing second-degree depraved-heart murder as involving one whose conduct amounts 
to “extreme disregard” and a “very high degree of risk” to human life.  § 4:17.8, at 699 
(2018).  The pattern instructions describe gross negligence involuntary manslaughter as 
consisting of “reckless disregard” and a “high degree of risk” to human life.  Id. § 4:17.9, 
at 704.  Although the difference between “extreme” versus “reckless” disregard, and “very 
high” versus “high” risk, may seem amorphous, the circumstances in which the distinctions 
are relevant work to give them shape.  See Alston v. State, 339 Md. 306, 320–21 (1995) 
(defendant was liable for depraved-heart murder where he “engage[d] in urban warfare” in 
a residential neighborhood, resulting in the death of bystanders); In re: Eric F., 116 Md. 
App. 509, 521 (1997) (defendant could be convicted of depraved-heart murder where he 
“plac[ed] [the victim] outside in the cold, dragg[ed] her to the woods, and [left] her there 
in an unconscious state” to die).  
In sum, when determining whether an individual has acted with the requisite grossly 
negligent mens rea to be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the State must 
demonstrate wanton and reckless disregard for human life.  This requires a gross departure 
24 
from the conduct of an “ordinarily careful and prudent person” and a disregard or 
indifference to the rights of others.  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (citation omitted).  It also 
involves an assessment of whether an activity is more or less “likely at any moment to 
bring harm to another,” Johnson, 213 Md. at 532–33, as determined by weighing the 
inherent dangerousness of the act and environmental risk factors.  This weighing must 
amount to a “high degree of risk to human life”—falling somewhere between the 
unreasonable risk of ordinary negligence and the very high degree of risk necessary for 
depraved-heart murder.  See Dishman, 352 Md. at 299 (citation omitted).  We review 
whether Thomas’ conduct crosses this bar, infra.  
Thomas’ Involuntary Manslaughter Conviction 
The matter of whether distribution of heroin can be the basis of a gross negligence 
involuntary manslaughter conviction is one of first impression in Maryland.  To address it, 
we rely on the principles enumerated above, as well as relevant out-of-state case law, to 
determine whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to permit the trier of fact to 
conclude that Thomas was grossly negligent and that his conduct caused Colton’s death.  
But first, we address Thomas’ curious contention that a conviction for gross negligence 
manslaughter cannot be premised upon the commission of a malum in se criminal act.  
(i) Gross Negligence Manslaughter and Malum in Se Offenses 
Thomas proposes that Maryland should not recognize gross negligence 
manslaughter when the defendant is accused of committing a malum in se offense,9 as 
                                              
9 Malum in se is defined as a “crime or an act that is inherently immoral, such as 
murder, arson, or rape.”  Malum in Se, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
25 
opposed to a malum prohibitum offense.10  Distribution of heroin, says Thomas, is a malum 
in se offense and, consequently, may only be tried under the unlawful act theory of 
manslaughter.  Thomas contends that allowing malum in se crimes to be charged as gross 
negligence manslaughter “hybridizes” the two involuntary manslaughter crimes, making 
them easier to prove.  In other words, Thomas argues that charging malum in se crimes as 
gross negligence manslaughter allows the State to take advantage of the less stringent 
causation showing of gross negligence manslaughter, while benefiting from the higher 
culpability presumed in a malum in se offense.  
The State disagrees, providing that “whether distribution of heroin is a malum in se 
or malum prohibitum only matters if the State is proceeding on the unlawful act variety of 
involuntary manslaughter,” which it is not.  Whenever a party is charged with gross 
negligence manslaughter, according to the State, the prosecution must prove that the act 
was grossly negligent, regardless of whether the crime at issue is malum in se or malum 
prohibitum.  Moreover, the State characterizes Thomas’ argument as “nonsensical,” 
maintaining that it allows some perpetrators to escape criminal liability when they commit 
a malum in se offense in a grossly negligent manner—the gross negligence manslaughter 
mens rea—but death does not occur in the commission of, or escape from, the crime—a 
causation requirement for unlawful act manslaughter.  
                                              
10 Malum prohibitum is defined as an “act that is a crime merely because it is 
prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.”  Malum 
Prohibitum, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
26 
We agree with the State.  First, we think Thomas is too eager to rely on lines that 
our cases have yet to clearly draw.  In Schlossman v. State, 105 Md. App. 277, 289–91 
(1995), overruled in part and on other grounds by Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 298 n.10 
(1999), the Court of Special Appeals concluded that malum in se offenses are sufficient, in 
themselves, to establish the mens rea for an unlawful act manslaughter charge.  But, 
significantly, it did not decide whether an act “dangerous to life” would suffice for the 
charge, regardless of whether it was malum in se or malum prohibitum.  See id.; Moylan, 
Criminal Homicide Law § 11.5, at 215.  Thus, Thomas overstates the matter when he insists 
that malum in se offenses are the only kind that could ever suffice for an unlawful act 
involuntary manslaughter charge.  See generally Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law § 11.5, 
at 213–15.  
Moreover, even if there was such a distinct line, it would only keep malum 
prohibitum offenses from being charged under unlawful act manslaughter, and not the 
reverse.  In Schlossman, the intermediate appellate court stated that “homicide resulting 
from the perpetration of a malum in se unlawful act not amounting to a felony is 
manslaughter, regardless of whether the unlawful act was ‘dangerous to life.’”  105 Md. 
App. at 288.  Thus, the intermediate appellate court reasserted the underlying rationale for 
the unlawful act-gross negligence manslaughter distinction—the State is relieved from the 
burden of demonstrating the higher level of culpability for unlawful act manslaughter due 
to the seriousness of the underlying offense.  The inverse of this concept is also true.  When 
the State seeks to proceed under a gross negligence manslaughter theory, it must 
demonstrate the higher level of culpability, irrespective of whether the underlying offense 
27 
is malum in se or malum prohibitum.  Consequently, the State does not benefit from any 
presumption in this circumstance—notwithstanding whether distribution of heroin is 
malum in se or malum prohibitum—and must prove the grossly negligent mens rea beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
(ii) Gross Negligence Mens Rea 
The State next argues that the Court of Special Appeals “usurped the role of the trier 
of fact and relied on unsupported assumptions” when it determined there was sufficient 
evidence of negligence, but not gross negligence.  The State particularly takes issue with 
the intermediate appellate court’s statement that drug dealers have “no rational interest” in 
making drug use more dangerous, as it believes this is “not supported by the record or 
reality.”  Specifically, the State points to the following facts to show sufficient evidence 
for the conviction: Thomas had no way of knowing the purity of the heroin he sold; the 
circumstances surrounding the timing of the sale; Thomas knew Colton was a “young boy”; 
Thomas knew that Colton was an addict who recently came to Maryland after a stay in 
prison; and Thomas knew that Colton was “desperate” for heroin and, “by inference,” that 
he would likely consume all four bags.  Thomas asserts that the evidence in this case cannot 
support his conviction under a gross negligence theory because it does “not show the 
requisite wanton disregard for human life necessary to constitute gross negligence.”  He 
states that, “absent proof that the accused or someone in his or her situation should know 
that amount of the substance is probably fatal,” the evidence is insufficient to establish 
gross negligence.  
28 
We have already discussed the general principles of gross negligence in Maryland, 
but, before this case, Maryland appellate courts have never been asked to apply them to the 
distribution of drugs.  Our search for law on this issue in other states has revealed only a 
few relevant decisions.  While some states have reviewed this matter based on a theory of 
common law manslaughter, others have avoided such a ruling due to supervening 
legislation addressing drug distribution resulting in death.  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
3-102(e) (West 2019); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.04(A), 2925.02(A)(3) (West 2019); 
Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a) (West 2018).  See also Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 
§ 15.4(e), at 1058–59 (6th ed. 2017).  We review some relevant cases below to further 
investigate the line between ordinary negligence and criminal gross negligence in the 
context of the distribution of intoxicating substances.  
In Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973 (Mass. 1990), the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts faced a set of facts similar to those presented here.  There, the 
victim purchased three bags of a highly potent heroin, keeping one bag for herself.  See id. 
at 975.  The defendant-dealer warned the victim not to “do a whole” bag because of the 
risk of an overdose.  Id. at 974.  Still, the victim returned home, injected herself, and died 
from a lethal combination of heroin and alcohol.  See id. at 975.  Based on these facts, the 
Court determined that the evidence was sufficient to support an indictment for the 
Massachusetts equivalent of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter—an “unlawful 
homicide unintentionally caused by wanton or reckless conduct.”  Id. at 979.  The Court 
starkly characterized the dangers of heroin distribution, stating that “the consumption of 
heroin in unknown strength is dangerous to human life, and the administering of such a 
29 
drug is inherently dangerous and does carry a high probability that death will occur.”  Id. 
at 980 (quoting People v. Cruciani, 70 Misc. 2d 528, 536 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1972)).11  
More recently, a North Carolina court determined that a circumstance in which a 
dealer sells a person methadone, who then fatally overdoses, after the dealer, himself, 
“nearly died the month before from an overdose,” could support a finding of reckless 
conduct for involuntary manslaughter.12  State v. Barnes, 741 S.E.2d 457, 465 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2013).13  Together, these cases display an approach to gross negligence manslaughter 
similar to the one used in Maryland—evaluating the dangers inherent in the defendant’s 
underlying conduct in the context of attendant circumstances. 
Certainly, some courts have reviewed particular factual scenarios and concluded 
that heroin distribution did not amount to gross negligence, but many cases are inapt, either 
                                              
11 In Massachusetts, a defendant can move to dismiss criminal indictments, prior to 
trial, based on his contention that “the indictments were not supported by sufficient 
evidence.”  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 82 N.E.3d 403, 413 (Mass. 2017).  No such procedure 
exists in Maryland.  
 
12 But see State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 30–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (defendant did 
not “conscious[ly] disregard . . . a risk of death to another” and could not be convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter because the State failed to adequately demonstrate the existence 
of any additional aggravating factors beyond the provision of the heroin and the Court was 
unwilling to “create a per se involuntary manslaughter rule”).  
 
13 Some Prohibition Era cases involving the furnishing and consumption of tainted 
alcohol also provide an interesting analogue.  See, e.g., People v. Pavlic, 199 N.W. 373, 
374 (Mich. 1924) (“If the liquor which the defendant furnished . . . was dangerous for use 
as a beverage, if it was of greater potency than ordinary whisky, or if it contained poisonous 
ingredients, . . . the defendant having distilled it himself would be charged with a 
knowledge of its dangerous character, and would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”); 
Thiede v. State, 182 N.W. 570, 573–74 (Neb. 1921) (jury question on involuntary 
manslaughter was warranted where defendant distilled the liquor himself and there was 
evidence he knew it was “extremely powerful”). 
30 
because the standard for criminal gross negligence requires the State to demonstrate a 
higher “probability of harm” than the one borne out by our cases, see, e.g., State v. Miller, 
874 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“[C]riminal liability will not attach to conduct 
increasing the probability of the risk of harm unless the conduct made the proscribed harm 
‘more likely than not’ to occur.”); Lofthouse v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 
2000) (there must be “a substantial risk that the amount of cocaine and heroin ingested by 
Buford would result in his death” and the fact that the amount ingested “could be fatal” 
was not enough); or involve murder charges requiring a higher level of culpability than 
gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, see, e.g., Heacock v. Commonwealth, 323 
S.E.2d 90, 93 (Va. 1984) (cocaine dealer charged with second-degree felony murder); 
Napier v. State, 357 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. 1978) (heroin dealer charged with first-degree 
murder); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714, 715 (Pa. 1973) (heroin procurer 
charged with murder in the second degree).  
As we reflect upon Maryland gross negligence manslaughter law generally, we 
discern that the Maryland appellate courts have upheld convictions—for drag racing, 
speeding in a highly congested area, speeding and passing in a no-pass zone, driving after 
repeatedly “nodding off,”14 mishandling guns without intent to kill—when the conduct 
measured by the wanton and reckless standard posed no obviously greater risk than the one 
Thomas disregarded in distributing heroin to Colton.  In none of these circumstances was 
                                              
14 See Skidmore v. State, 166 Md. App. 82, 89 (2005) (“Because Skidmore continued 
to drive after he was aware that he had nodded off ‘a few times,’ a rational trier of fact 
could conclude that he continued to drive in reckless disregard of the risk to human life, 
and that his conduct constituted gross negligence.”).  
31 
the defendant’s conduct proclaimed “probably fatal,” the standard that Thomas urges us to 
adopt.  Rather, their conduct posed a “high risk to human life”—or was “likely at any 
moment to bring harm to another.”  Johnson, 213 Md. at 533 (citation omitted).   
Still, we agree with Thomas that a per se rule providing that all heroin distribution 
resulting in death constitutes gross negligence involuntary manslaughter is unwise and not 
in keeping with our precedent.  Instead, we must consider the inherent dangerousness of 
distributing heroin with the attendant environmental risk factors presented by each case.  
See also People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 218 (Colo. 2000) (“[I]n order to determine whether 
a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that the harm will occur 
and the magnitude of potential harm . . . .”).  Moreover, the defendant, or an ordinarily 
prudent person under similar circumstances, should be conscious of this risk.  See Albrecht, 
336 Md. at 500 (citation omitted).  
It is undisputed that Thomas was knowingly engaged in the unregulated selling of a 
CDS with no known medical benefit15—an addictive16 and useless poison—to customers 
in a region suffering from an epidemic of heroin and opioid abuse and deaths.  The agreed 
facts provide that Thomas was surprised that Colton fatally overdosed from four bags of 
Banshee heroin.  Assuredly, he may have felt pangs of conscience.  But these facts do not 
                                              
15 Heroin is classified as a Schedule I drug, unlike most other opiates, which are 
listed on Schedule II.  See 21 U.S.C. § 812.  Schedule I drugs have “a high potential for 
abuse” and “no currently accepted medical uses in treatment.”  Id. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(B).  
 
16 Heroin Research Report, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse (June 2018), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/heroin/overview (“Heroin is a 
highly addictive opioid drug, and its use has repercussions that extend far beyond the 
individual user.”) [archived at https://perma.cc/4NXZ-369P].  
32 
overcome the risk and inherent dangerousness of the underlying activity.  Indeed, 
according to the agreed statement of facts, “anyone in Thomas’ situation would understand 
the dangers of heroin, and its propensity to harm physically, if not kill, individuals who are 
ingesting it.”   
The agreed facts also include a description of what Detective Johns, testifying as an 
expert in CDS investigations, would say at a trial—that Worcester County “has been 
consumed with heroin overdoses, some resulting in deaths, and that these overdoses have 
resulted in an acute awareness of the dangers of heroin.”  In his words, “heroin kills, and 
everyone knows it.”  His proffered testimony is consistent with data collected by the State 
of Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene regarding fatal overdoses from 
heroin and other opioids.  In 2015, the year Colton died, there were 1,259 deaths from 
alcohol and drugs in Maryland—86% of these were opioid-related.  See Drug- and 
Alcohol-Related Intoxication Deaths in Maryland, 2015, Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene 1, 5 (Sept. 2016), https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/ 
Documents/2015%20Annual%20Report_revised.pdf [archived at https://perma.cc/48X6-
DHKJ].  In this State, fatal overdoses from heroin rose dramatically between 2011 and 
2015, from 247 to 748 overdoses, vastly exceeding the number of deaths caused by any 
other drug, including fentanyl.17  See id. at fig.6.  In 2015, the rural counties of the Eastern 
                                              
17 In collecting this data, Maryland has recognized that some deaths are caused by 
two or more toxic substances, and that data allocating deaths by each potentially fatal drug, 
if all combined, may overstate the number of deaths.  See Drug- and Alcohol-Related 
Intoxication Deaths in Maryland, 2015, Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene 3 (Sept. 
2016), https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/Documents/2015%
20Annual%20Report_revised.pdf [archived at https://perma.cc/48X6-DHKJ].  
33 
Shore suffered 51 heroin-related deaths, including 11 deaths in Worcester County and 13 
deaths in neighboring Wicomico.  See id. at fig.8.  
It is also fair to infer that Thomas subjectively knew an overdose was possible based 
on his statement that Colton “couldn’t have overdosed off [the amount] I sold him.”  It is 
enough that Thomas knew about the overdose risks of heroin.  That he knew about the risk 
but wrongly estimated the amount of heroin sufficient to kill his customer does not remove 
his conduct from the reckless and wanton category.  Again, involuntary manslaughter does 
not involve an intent to kill, but only a reckless disregard of another person’s life.  When 
some quantity of heroin will kill, but variable circumstances render that quantity 
unpredictable, a person takes a large risk in distributing any amount above an exceedingly 
de minimis threshold.  
Considering the agreed statement of facts, reinforced by Maryland governmental 
data pertaining to 2015, we are asked to decide a legal question regarding Thomas’ 
culpability.  A major component of that question relates to the degree of increased risk we 
attribute to the heroin, itself—or how “wanton or reckless” the distribution of heroin is 
exclusive of other factors.  After much consideration of precedent in Maryland and 
elsewhere, we reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
which stated that “the consumption of heroin in unknown strength is dangerous to human 
life, and the administering of such a drug is inherently dangerous . . . .”  Catalina, 556 
N.E.2d at 980 (citation omitted).  We do so with the caveat, as indicated earlier, that 
distribution, alone, does not always amount to gross negligence.  This caveat is unavailing 
34 
to Thomas, however, because this is not a case involving the “mere act of distributing 
heroin,” as Thomas portrays it.  
A reasonable person in Thomas’ place would have understood that Colton was 
desperate for heroin and would have realized that increased the risk of the transaction.  The 
facts state that Colton had been abusing heroin for approximately four-and-a-half years, 
and Thomas knew he was a “young boy” who had been in prison in Pennsylvania sometime 
in the past.  On the night of his fatal overdose, Colton called Thomas 27 or 28 times 
between 11:45 p.m. and 12:07 a.m.—more than one call per minute—until Thomas finally 
answered.  Colton also sent multiple text messages to Thomas in that same timeframe, 
imploring him to “call me, please” and stating that he would “come to [Thomas]” to get 
the heroin.  Moreover, Thomas recognized that it was “unusual” for him to meet Colton at 
midnight and that he “usually met him earlier.”  All of these facts support the inference 
that Colton was desperately in need of heroin and might well ingest the entire four bags of 
heroin immediately.  
It is also relevant to distinguish the systematic and sustained heroin distributor from 
the infrequent or inexperienced provider.  The agreed statement of facts reveals a 
substantial amount about Thomas’ heroin distribution practices.  Thomas resupplies his 
heroin stock “every two to three days,” when he travels to Delaware to purchase five 
bundles (50–65 total bags of heroin) for $300.  Thomas is a heroin abuser, himself; 
presumably consumes between 24 to 36 bags of each resupply; and sells the remainder for 
$10–$15 per bag, an amount which consistently nets him a profit.  At the time of his arrest, 
Thomas possessed 13.10 grams (60 bags) of heroin.  From all this, it is evident that Colton 
35 
was not Thomas’ only client and that Thomas consistently distributed heroin to a 
substantial network of associates.  Thus, we can infer that Thomas was aware of the risk to 
life posed by consistent heroin abuse, cognizant of its ill-effects, and, yet, continued to sell 
the drug notwithstanding its danger.  See Hall, 999 P.2d at 220 (“In addition to the actor’s 
knowledge and experience, a court may infer the actor’s subjective awareness of a risk 
from what a reasonable person would have understood under the circumstances.”); Murray 
v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 357 (Wyo. 1993) (“A reasonable jury could infer from Appellant’s 
extensive experience with weapons that he was aware of, but consciously disregarded, the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim could be injured by a ricocheting bullet.”).   
The agreed facts state that Thomas sold Colton heroin only “a few times” and knew 
him to be a “young boy.”  They also inform us that Thomas had only been selling Banshee 
heroin for about a month.  Under interrogation by police, Thomas admitted that he typically 
used 12 bags of heroin per day and four bags in a single shot.  Thomas attempts to use these 
factual details as a defense, stating that he used the same amount of Banshee heroin as 
Colton and never overdosed from it.  Yet, this information is as much a sword as a shield.  
Based on his own admissions, Thomas should have reasonably concluded that Colton was 
also likely to use all four bags in one shot—as Thomas himself does—a fact he implicitly 
recognized when he stated that “he couldn’t have overdosed off what I sold him” because 
it was only four bags.  Thomas sold Colton four bags of heroin, likely to be used at once, 
without knowing anything about the composition of the heroin he sold, about what other 
substances Colton was taking or might have used that day, or about Colton’s tolerance 
given his age and recent incarceration.  To knowingly distribute a dangerous, and 
36 
sometimes lethal, substance without such information qualifies as “a gross departure from 
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same 
circumstances,” Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (citation omitted).  Failure to obtain this 
information represents an “indifference to [the] consequences” that may result.  Id.  
We are not persuaded by Thomas’ defense that the State failed to prove that the four 
bags constituted a lethal dose.  The consequences of ingesting heroin are unpredictable and 
what constitutes a lethal dose varies based on the circumstances.18  When dealing with 
street heroin, what is lethal will depend not only on the health of the particular individual 
and his tolerance for heroin, but on what other toxic substances are mixed with the heroin, 
as well as what other substances the individual has ingested.  The specifics as to the cause 
of Colton’s death are revealed by the Medical Examiner’s report and discussed in detail in 
the following section.  
To review, we consider whether Thomas’ conduct amounted to a “wanton and 
reckless disregard for human life,” Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (citation omitted)—a gross 
departure from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person, without regard to the 
consequences or the rights of others, and likely to bring harm at any moment.  Thomas sold 
heroin to a desperate young man, knowing that the consumption of heroin could be deadly.  
He had extensive experience with heroin—distributing it widely, in a manner sure to net a 
                                              
18 Information Sheet on Opioid Overdose, World Health Org. (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/information-sheet/en/ (“Risk factors for overdoses 
with prescribed opioids include a history of substance use disorders, high prescribed dosage 
(over 100mg of morphine or equivalent daily), male gender, older age, multiple 
prescriptions including benzodiazepines, mental health conditions and lower 
socioeconomic status.”) [archived at https://perma.cc/PBD4-CKDB].  
37 
profit, and with such frequency that he travelled across state lines two to three times a week 
to procure it—and was knowledgeable of its dangers.  Yet, he either willfully failed to 
obtain the necessary information to help reduce the risks of his behavior, or he was 
indifferent to mitigating these risks.  Either way, his conduct posed a high degree of risk to 
those with whom he interacted.  Whether Thomas’ motivation was to create a steady source 
of income, to feed his own addiction, or something more sinister, is of no moment, as intent 
to kill is not an element of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.   
Nor do we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ rationale that requisite intent 
for involuntary manslaughter cannot be found because we should infer that a drug dealer 
wishes for his customers to remain alive, so he can sell them more heroin.  The intention 
required for manslaughter must “amount[] to a disregard of the consequences which might 
ensue and indifference to the rights of others . . . .”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500 (citation 
omitted).  This criminal disregard of consequences can well co-exist with a desire to make 
a profit with more drug sales.  Thus, we hold that that the record contained sufficient 
evidence of gross negligence to support a conviction for gross negligence manslaughter 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(iii) Actual and Legal Causation 
Finally, the State disagrees with the Court of Special Appeals’ determination that 
the “causal chain” has been broken and argues that it incorrectly applied the same causation 
analysis to both unlawful act and gross negligence manslaughter.  It contends that the 
intermediate appellate court’s view of causation is too narrow and inconsistent with 
Maryland precedent.  Specifically, the State urges that Thomas is the “but for” cause of 
38 
Colton’s death—selling him four bags of heroin when he was “clearly desperate to get 
high”—and that Colton’s death “was neither remote nor unforeseeable.”  Moreover, the 
State maintains, the defendant’s act need not be the “sole reason” for the harm, and it is not 
material that Colton “injected himself or that Thomas did not adulterate the heroin.”  
Thomas does not appear to contest the State’s argument.  Rather, he asserts that the 
State failed to show causation “as to the unlawful act modality,” rather than gross 
negligence manslaughter.19  Still, we review this element to provide clarity to our decision.  
“A causal connection between . . . gross negligence and death must exist to support 
a conviction . . . .”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499 (citation omitted).  See also Craig v. State, 
220 Md. 590, 597 (1959) (negligence “must be the proximate cause of death”); Duren, 203 
Md. at 593 (“Necessarily, the criminal negligence must have produced the death if the 
accused is to be guilty of manslaughter.”); Blackwell v. State, 34 Md. App. 547, 557 (1977) 
(there must “be some reasonable connection between the act or omission and the death that 
ensued”) (citation omitted); Mills, 13 Md. App. at 200.  Thus, for a charge of gross 
negligence involuntary manslaughter, the defendant’s gross negligence must be the 
proximate cause of the victim’s death—meaning the (1) actual, but-for cause and (2) legal 
cause.20  See Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 442–43 (1979); LaFave, Criminal Law 
                                              
19 When questioned at oral argument, Thomas’ counsel again stated that he 
“challenged causation as the [sic] unlawful act” and that he had “not raised an argument as 
to gross negligence causation.”  Rather, counsel asserted that it was the State’s “burden to 
show error in [the Court of Special Appeals’] analysis.”  
  
20 The dissent applies incorrect causation principles to the present case.  The gross 
negligence involuntary manslaughter causation standard is different from the unlawful act 
manslaughter causation standard.  Compare Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 597 (1959) 
39 
§ 6.4(a), at 437 (“It is required, for criminal liability, that the conduct of the defendant be 
both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the ‘legal’ cause (often called ‘proximate’ cause) of the 
result.”).  
“In the usual [criminal] case there is no difficulty in showing the necessary causal 
connection between conduct and result,” LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.4(a), at 438, and, 
hence, it is atypical for our courts to discuss actual cause at length.  Yet, this case presents 
some factual nuances worthy of addressing.  “The concept of actual cause ‘is not a 
metaphysical one but an ordinary, matter-of-fact inquiry into the existence . . . of a causal 
relation as laypeople would view it.’”  Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) 
(citation omitted).  For conduct to be the actual cause of some result, “it is almost always 
sufficient that the result would not have happened in the absence of the conduct”—or “but 
                                              
(grossly negligent act “must be the proximate cause of death” for gross negligence 
involuntary manslaughter), with Schlossman v. State, 105 Md. App. 277, 284 (1995) (death 
must occur “in the course of committing a crime or even a civil wrong” for unlawful act 
involuntary manslaughter) (citation omitted).  The dissent correctly notes that unlawful act 
manslaughter is the “junior varsity manifestation” of felony murder, and, thus, “its rationale 
parallels that of the felony murder doctrine in every regard.”  Charles E. Moylan, Jr., 
Criminal Homicide Law § 11.1, at 207 (2018).  It ignores, however, that gross negligence 
involuntary manslaughter is a less culpable form of depraved-heart murder.  Id. § 12.1, at 
223.  Unlawful act manslaughter’s relation to felony murder explains the added 
“continuous transaction” element to the causation requirement, as the perpetrator need not 
have any particular mens rea as to the death, but only that necessary to engage in the 
underlying felony.  See Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 643 (1974).  The Maryland 
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions recognizes this distinction—providing that, for 
unlawful act involuntary manslaughter, the State must prove that “that act resulting in the 
death of [the victim] occurred during the [commission] of the [unlawful act].”  § 4:17.9, 
at 705 (2018) (emphasis added).  Yet, for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the 
instructions only require that the “grossly negligent conduct caused the death of [the 
victim].”  Id., at 704 (emphasis added).  As discussed in detail, this case is about gross 
negligence involuntary manslaughter, not unlawful act involuntary manslaughter.  The 
dissent exclusively relies on cases involving felony murder.  These cases are inapt.  
40 
for” the defendant’s actions.  LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.4(b), at 439.  See also Jackson, 
286 Md. at 442 (“Actual causation may be examined in terms of the sine qua non.”).  
Maryland gross negligence manslaughter cases have evaluated the actual, or but-
for, cause of a given result on only a few occasions.  In one such case, the Court of Special 
Appeals determined that a mutual agreement to engage in grossly negligent conduct can be 
sufficient to find causation, even where the victim was, himself, engaged in the grossly 
negligent act.  In Goldring v. State, 103 Md. App. 728, 730–31 (1995), two racers, Hall 
and Goldring, participated in a drag race on a two-lane country highway with a posted 45-
mile-per-hour speed limit.  During the race, Hall accidently struck the side of Goldring’s 
vehicle and lost control of his car.  See id. at 731.  Hall and two pedestrians were killed.  
See id.  The court concluded that Goldring’s conduct in competing in the drag race bore a 
sufficiently direct causal connection to Hall’s death to support Goldring’s conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter, and Goldring was convicted in the death of Hall and the two 
pedestrians.  See id. at 738.  
We have also stated that a defendant does not “cease to be responsible for his 
otherwise criminal conduct because there were other conditions which contributed to the 
same result.”  Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353 (1960) (citation omitted).  See also Burlas 
v. State, 185 Md. App. 559, 578 (2009) (that the victim’s car did not pass inspection or 
might have sped up did not relieve defendant of responsibility).  In Palmer, we held a 
mother liable for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter when she failed to prevent her 
husband’s savage beatings of her daughter.  Significantly, the Court concluded that it was 
not necessary that the mother’s grossly negligent conduct be the sole reason for her 
41 
daughter’s death.  See Palmer, 223 Md. at 353.  Ultimately, her unwillingness to aid her 
child, which was her duty, resulted in the child’s death and she, too, could be convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter.  Thus, we took a broader view of actual cause, implicitly 
recognizing that the grossly negligent conduct need only be the but-for cause of the death, 
and not an independently sufficient cause of it.   
Using similar reasoning, we determined that the defendant need not be the person 
who actually caused the death where each participant “aided, abetted, and encouraged the 
other to engage” in the conduct that resulted in the victim’s demise.  Alston v. State, 339 
Md. 306, 321 (1995).  See also Hensen v. State, 133 Md. App. 156, 171–72 (2000) 
(participation in an informal street race is sufficient to establish causation, even if 
defendant’s car never contacted the victim’s car); Pineta v. State, 98 Md. App. 614, 626 
(1993) (“[W]here a third person has been killed as a direct consequence of the illegal racing 
of motor vehicles, any driver participating in the race may be convicted of manslaughter 
by automobile . . . .”).  
In this case, Colton died seated on the toilet, passed out, with his jaw propped against 
the vanity sink top.  He was holding one white Banshee heroin bag and three more bags 
had fallen to the floor beneath him—all empty.  He possessed heroin paraphernalia on his 
person and in his bedroom.  Thomas admitted to selling heroin to Colton “a few times” and 
stated that he sold him four bags of Banshee heroin on the night he fatally overdosed.  The 
Medical Examiner stated that Colton died of “alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) 
intoxication.”  Specifically, the report listed Colton’s heart blood as containing 0.08% 
42 
ethanol, 240 mcg/L free morphine, and 6-Monoacetylmorphine.  No other drugs were 
found in his system.  
While it is accurate, strictly speaking, to say that the heroin and alcohol combined 
to cause Colton’s death, the question is whether the harm would have occurred “in the 
absence of” Thomas’ distributing heroin to Colton.  Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 
204, 211 (2014) (citation omitted).  See also United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 244 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause there was no evidence in the record that [the victim] could have 
died without the heroin, the jury’s verdict was necessarily consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s requirement of but-for causation [from Burrage].”).  The State need not 
demonstrate that the heroin was independently sufficient to cause Colton’s death, only that 
it was the but-for cause.  See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 219 (there could be no conviction where 
there was no evidence that the victim “would have lived but for his heroin use”).   
The evidence shows that Colton only ingested heroin and alcohol and there is no 
allegation to the contrary.  A blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of 0.08%—Colton’s heart 
BAC—is the “legal limit” for driving in Maryland.  See Maryland Code (2005, 2012 Repl. 
Vol.), § 11-174.1(a) of the Transportation Article.  We can safely presume that a lethal 
dose of alcohol would be much higher.21  No other drugs were found in Colton’s system 
and the autopsy found no latent medical condition that otherwise contributed to his death.  
                                              
21 The Medical Examiner’s report also lists Colton’s vitreous alcohol content 
(“VAC”) as being 0.12%.  Maryland Code (2012, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(2) 
of the Transportation Article, provides for the suspension of a person’s driver’s license if 
their blood alcohol test returns a result of 0.15% or higher.  We apply the same logic as 
above in concluding that a VAC of 0.12% is not close to a lethal concentration.  
 
43 
Therefore, Colton’s death was either caused by heroin or alcohol, and the evidence and 
common sense demonstrate that it was not caused by alcohol.   
Regarding the amount of heroin consumed, out-of-state guidance and scientific 
literature demonstrate that 240 mcg/L free morphine—the concentration found in Colton’s 
heart blood—is within the range generally accepted to constitute a lethal dose.22  Moreover, 
in Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 687 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1997), the Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts set the “toxic level” of heroin-produced morphine at 200 mcg/L.  The court 
was unbothered by the fact that the victim only had 130 mcg/L free morphine in her 
system—lower than Colton’s concentration—along with a 0.20% BAC—much higher that 
Colton’s concentration—in concluding that heroin caused her death.  See id. at 271–72.  
There is no evidence in the record that Colton could have died without the heroin, and this 
is enough to find but-for causation.  See Alvarado, 816 F.3d at 244.  
Again, Thomas sold Colton four bags of Banshee heroin.  Colton ingested only these 
four bags within three hours after purchasing them, and the Medical Examiner found 
                                              
22 Toxicology, N.C. Office of the Chief Med. Exam’r (June 30, 2017) 
https://www.ocme.dhhs.nc.gov/toxicology/index.shtml 
(listing 
100–400 
mcg/L 
of 
morphine as a “lethal dose”) [archived at https://perma.cc/47FB-B5NJ]; Julia Pearson, 
PhD, et al., Postmortem Toxicology Findings of Acetyl Fentanyl, Fentanyl, and Morphine 
in Heroin Fatalities in Tampa, Florida, Acad. Forensic Pathology 5(4): 680 (Dec. 2015) 
(“In the 26 heroin deaths that did not also involve a fentanyl derivative, free and total 
peripheral blood morphine concentrations averaged [160 mcg/L] and [350 mcg/L] 
respectively.”); M. Schilz & A. Schmoldt, Therapeutic and Toxic Blood Concentrations of 
More Than 800 Drugs and Other Xenobiotics, Pharmazie 58: 458 (2003) (100–400 mcg/L 
of morphine is a “comatose-fatal” dosage).  See also Ashley D. Ellis, et al., Identifying 
Cases of Heroin Toxicity Where 6-Acetylmorphine (6-AM) Is Not Detected by 
Toxicological Analyses, Forensic Sci., Med. & Pathology 12: 245 (2016) (morphine range 
in 127 intravenous heroin deaths was between 130–1,480 mcg/L).  
44 
nothing more in his system.  As discussed above, a BAC of 0.08% is indicative of only 
moderate intoxication, whereas a blood content of 240 mcg/L free morphine is within the 
generally accepted lethal range.  Without the heroin Thomas supplied, Colton would not 
have died, and while the evidence may not establish that the heroin was independently 
sufficient to cause Colton’s death, it does demonstrate that it was the but-for cause.  For 
these reasons, there is enough evidence in the record for a trier of fact to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the heroin was the but-for cause of Colton’s death.  
Additionally, the State must demonstrate that Thomas was the legal cause of 
Colton’s death.  The concept of legal causation “is applicable in both criminal and tort law, 
and the analysis is parallel in many instances.”  Paroline, 572 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted).  
Moreover, it “turns largely upon the foreseeability of the consequence of the defendant’s” 
conduct.  Palmer, 223 Md. at 352 (emphasis added).  Thus, “it is not essential that the 
ultimate harm which resulted was [actually] foreseen or intended.”  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 
499 (citation omitted).  “It is sufficient that the ultimate harm is one which a reasonable 
man would foresee as being reasonably related to the acts of the defendant.”  Jackson, 286 
Md. at 441 (quoting 1 Francis Wharton & Ronald A. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law 
§ 68 (1957)).   
We agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ assertion that 
“[i]ntervening conduct that is reasonably foreseeable will not relieve the defendant of 
criminal responsibility.”  Catalina, 556 N.E.2d at 980.  This is supported by our ruling in 
Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 443–44 (1992), wherein we upheld a reckless endangerment 
conviction for an individual who handed a loaded gun to the victim, who then shot himself 
45 
in a game of “Russian roulette.”  The fact that the victim pulled the trigger was not 
sufficient to cut off the defendant’s liability.  See also Mills, 13 Md. App. at 202 (knocking 
the gun from the defendant’s hand was not a supervening cause sufficient to relieve the 
defendant of criminal liability).  Holding a supplier of a deadly product accountable for its 
deadly effects does not amount to “apportion[ing] criminal liability for manslaughter 
merely because of bad luck.”  Thomas, 237 Md. App. at 538.  Ingesting heroin is a 
foreseeable result of its supply, see Catalina, 556 N.E.2d at 980 (“It is untenable to suggest 
that heroin consumption is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of selling that drug 
to a known addict.”), and death a foreseeable consequence of its ingestion.  Therefore, it 
was eminently foreseeable that Colton would use the heroin that Thomas sold him and 
potentially die as a result.  
That the victim was not blameless is plain, but it is also irrelevant to our present 
analysis.  This Court has held that contributory negligence is not a defense to involuntary 
manslaughter.  See Duren, 203 Md. at 593 (“If the appellant was guilty of gross negligence, 
he cannot excuse his conduct and escape the consequences by showing that the deceased 
was guilty of contributory negligence.”).  Assuredly, Colton paid the ultimate price for his 
conduct.  The only remaining question is whether Thomas, too, should be held to our most 
minimal level of criminal homicide culpability—involuntary manslaughter—in the death 
of Colton Matrey.  
This Court need not conclude, and the State need not prove, that the four bags of 
heroin were the only reason Colton overdosed and died.  Rather, there must be sufficient 
evidence in the record to determine that Colton would not have died but for the heroin and 
46 
that his death was a foreseeable consequence of Thomas selling him the four bags of heroin.  
The State has established causation in this case.  We hold that there is sufficient evidence 
in the record to conclude that Thomas’ conduct was both the actual and legal cause of 
Colton’s death.  Thus, for the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
convicting Thomas of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.23 
 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AS TO 
GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE 
MANSLAUGHTER.  CASE REMANDED 
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS 
TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT FOR WORCESTER 
COUNTY FOR THE MANSLAUGHTER 
CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THIS 
OPINION. 
 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS SHALL CONSIDER 
ARGUMENTS 
MADE 
BY 
THOMAS 
REGARDING 
MERGER 
OF 
THE 
MANSLAUGHTER AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF HEROIN CHARGES.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY RESPONDENT.  
 
                                              
23 Thomas argues the Circuit Court for Worcester County “erred in imposing 
separate sentences for manslaughter and distribution of heroin,” and that, if this Court 
affirms the manslaughter conviction, it must remand to the intermediate appellate court to 
consider the merger issue.  We agree that we must remand.  Certiorari was not requested 
as to this issue, and we do not address its merits.  The intermediate appellate court 
recognized that it did not need to address this issue because it reversed the manslaughter 
conviction entirely.  See Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App 527, 530 n.3 (2018).  We remand 
so that the Court of Special Appeals can now address the issue.   
 
 
Circuit Court for Worcester County 
Case No.: 23-K-16-000038 
Argued: November 29, 2018 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 33 
 
September Term, 2018 
 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND   
v. 
PATRICK JOSEPH THOMAS A/K/A 
PATRICK JOSEPH PATRICK 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge,  
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J., which 
Greene and Getty, JJ., join.  
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 24, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  Undeniably, the distribution, use, 
and overdose of heroin and other opioids has received significant local and national 
attention from the general public, the Judiciary, state legislatures, and news organizations.  
The consequences of opioid use in our State can only be categorized as an epidemic, 
claiming responsibility for 86% of all alcohol and drug related deaths in Maryland in 2015.  
See Drug- and Alcohol-Related Intoxication Deaths in Maryland, 2015, Md. Dep’t of 
Health 
& 
Mental 
Hygiene 
1, 
5 
(Sept. 
2016), 
https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/Documents/2015%20Ann
ual%20Report_revised.pdf.  The Majority opinion seeks refuge in these statistics to support 
its conclusion that an individual who does nothing more than sell heroin to another can be 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter when the buyer, on their own volition, injects the 
heroin and overdoses.   
I am unable to reach such a conclusion.  There is not sufficient evidence in the 
present case to establish a causal relationship between the mere sale of heroin and the 
subsequent use and fatal overdose of the buyer.  For these reasons, I would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
The State Failed to Provide Sufficient Evidence to Sustain a Conviction of Involuntary 
Manslaughter for the Mere Distribution of Heroin 
The Majority correctly points out that the State bears the burden of establishing a 
causal relationship between Mr. Thomas’s sale of heroin and Mr. Matrey’s overdose 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Maj. Op. at 43; see Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353, 164 
A.2d 467, 474 (1960) (commenting that a defendant “is only criminally liable for what he 
 
2 
 
has caused, that is, there must be a causal relationship between his act and the harm 
sustained for which he is prosecuted.”).  However, the Majority goes on to conclude that 
“there is enough evidence in the record for a trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the heroin was the but-for cause of [Mr. Matrey’s] death.”  Maj. Op. at 44.  I am 
unable to reach a similar conclusion.   
We have explained that “there must be some nexus between the killing and the 
underlying felony.  Mere coincidence between the underlying felony and the killing is not 
enough; the conduct causing death must be in furtherance of the design to commit the 
felony.”  Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 272, 744 A.2d 1, 8-9 (2000). 1  There is a causal 
relationship between a felony and a death when the two are part of a “continuous 
transaction” and “the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are 
parts of one continuous transaction and are closely related in point of time, place, and 
causal connection.”  See Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 127, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (2012) (footnote 
omitted).  Furthermore, the grossly negligent variant of involuntary manslaughter requires 
that the defendant’s actions be the legal, but-for cause of the victim’s death.2  The Majority 
                                              
1 Judge Charles E. Moylan’s treatise, which the Majority cites throughout its 
opinion, describes unlawful act-manslaughter as “the junior varsity manifestation of 
common law felony murder” and explains, “its rationale parallels that of the felony murder 
doctrine in every regard.”  The Hon. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide Law, § 
11.1, p. 207 (2001).  This necessarily extends to the causation rules.  Accordingly, prior 
case law regarding the causal relationship in felony murder is instructive in analyzing the 
causal relationship in involuntary manslaughter.   
 
2 This but-for causation element is similarly a required finding to convict a 
defendant of the unlawful act variant of involuntary manslaughter.  See Schlossman v. 
State, 105 Md. App 277, 292, 659 A.2d 371, 378 (1995).  Therefore, case law that addresses 
 
3 
 
accurately explains that “[t]he legal cause analysis ‘turns largely upon the foreseeability of 
the consequence’ of the defendant’s acts or omissions and whether ‘the ultimate harm is 
one which a reasonable man would foresee as being reasonably related to the acts of the 
defendant.’”  Maj. Op. at 14-15 (quoting Palmer, 223 Md. at 352-53, 164 A.2d at 474 
(citation omitted)).  
The Majority references a number of non-drug related cases in an attempt to flesh 
out and analogize the “factual nuances” of the present case.  Maj. Op. at 39.  In Palmer v. 
State, we upheld a defendant’s involuntary manslaughter conviction where the defendant 
negligently and willingly allowed her boyfriend to beat their 20-month-old infant to death.  
223 Md. at 353, 164 A.2d at 474.  In Minor v. State, we upheld a reckless endangerment 
conviction for a defendant who handed a loaded gun to the victim, who then shot himself 
while playing a game of “Russian Roulette.”  326 Md. 436, 443-44, 605 A.2d 138, 141-42 
(1992).  In Goldring v. State, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed a defendant’s 
involuntary manslaughter conviction based on the defendant’s participation in an illegal 
drag race, which resulted in the crash and death of another driver.  103 Md.App. 728, 730-
31, 654 A.2d 939, 940 (1995).  In Alston v. State, we upheld a defendant’s depraved-heart 
murder conviction where he knowingly engaged in a gun battle in a residential 
                                              
the but-for causation requirement in the felony murder and unlawful act involuntary 
manslaughter context is instructive and insightful to the grossly negligent involuntary 
manslaughter causation analysis presently before this Court.   
 
4 
 
neighborhood, which resulted in a bystander being shot and killed by another participant 
in the shoot-out.  339 Md. 306, 307-08, 662 A.2d 247, 247-48 (1995).   
I do not challenge the conclusions reached by this Court and the Court of Special 
Appeals in the above referred cases.  Rather, I observe that those cases are readily 
distinguishable from the present case because the defendants’ actions and the victims’ 
death were “parts of one continuous transaction and [were] closely related in point of time, 
place, and causal connection.”  Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 127, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (2012) 
(footnote omitted).  The circumstances in the present case are starkly different.  Mr. 
Thomas was not physically present with Mr. Matrey when Mr. Matrey injected the heroin; 
he was unaware of what, if any, other substances were ingested by Mr. Matrey within the 
relevant period of time; he was not in a position to save Mr. Matrey when he overdosed; 
he did not personally prepare the heroin dose and injection for Mr. Matrey; and he did not 
engage in “collective madness display[ing] a wanton and depraved indifference to any 
human life that might randomly fall within their overlapping and deadly enfilades.”  Alston, 
339 Md. at 309, 662 A.2d at 248.  Mr. Thomas’s sale of heroin was not “reasonably related” 
to the fatal use of the substance by Mr. Matrey where the consumption occurred outside of 
the Mr. Thomas’s presence, at a different time, in a different place from the completed sale, 
and with no other involvement from Mr. Thomas.  See Palmer, 223 Md. at 353, 164 A.2d 
at 474.   
The postmortem examination conducted by the Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner opined that Mr. Matrey “died of alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) 
 
5 
 
intoxication.”  The free morphine tested positive for 6-Monoacetylmorphine, the presence 
of which “is unequivocal confirmation of heroin usage.”  Christopher J. Keary, et al., 
Toxicologic Testing for Opiates: Understanding False-Positive and False-Negative Test 
Results, Prim. Care Companion for CNS Disord. (2012).  The Majority concludes that even 
with the presence of alcohol in Mr. Matrey’s system, the undisputed presence of heroin in 
Mr. Matrey’s body was sufficient to “demonstrate that it was the but-for cause[]” of his 
death.  Maj. Op. at 44.  However, when police officers searched Mr. Matrey’s bedroom, 
they discovered a prescription pill bottle containing tramadol, an opioid analgesic, 
Schedule IV – Controlled Dangerous Substance.  Importantly, both tramadol and heroin 
convert into free morphine when they are metabolized in the body.  It is therefore unclear 
whether Mr. Matrey also ingested tramadol, along with heroin and alcohol, and how that 
may have impacted his fatal overdose.  Accordingly, the Majority’s reasoning that Mr. 
Matrey’s “death was either caused by heroin or alcohol, and the evidence and common 
sense demonstrate that it was not caused by alcohol[,]” is flawed.  Maj. Op. at 43.  The 
evidence does not establish that the heroin was independently sufficient to cause Mr. 
Matrey’s death.  The facts cannot sustain a finding of legal, but-for causation.  
Several out-of-state, drug-related cases cited by the Majority and the State are 
similarly inapplicable.  In Commonwealth v. Catalina, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts upheld the defendant’s indictment for “unlawful homicide unintentionally 
caused by wanton or reckless conduct[,]” after selling the victim a “very potent” variety of 
 
6 
 
heroin.  407 Mass. 779, 780, 789, 556 N.E.2d 973, 974, 979 (1990).3  In contrast, the type 
of heroin sold by Mr. Thomas was not categorized as “very potent,” and Mr. Thomas would 
have testified to having injected the same dose as Mr. Matrey without any instances of 
overdosing.  See also State v. Barnes, 741 S.E.2d 457, 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (upholding 
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter where the victim fatally overdosed, after the 
defendant had “nearly died the month before from an overdose”); Heacock v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 403-04, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93-94 (1984) (upholding a conviction 
of second-degree felony murder where the defendant prepared several doses of cocaine for 
injection, resulting in the first person to be injected suffering a seizure, and the second 
person fatally overdosing); but see State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 30-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016) (reversing a conviction of involuntary manslaughter where the defendant merely 
distributed heroin to the victim, without any additional causal factors, who fatally 
overdosed from its subsequent injection).   
However, the Kansas Supreme Court, in State v. Mauldin, addressed the causal 
relationship standard for murder-related charges stemming from the distribution of heroin 
                                              
3 The State cites to Catalina and other out-of-state cases to support the position that 
there was a reasonable causal relationship in the present case.  The Majority, on the other 
hand, cites these cases to support its conclusion “that the record contained sufficient 
evidence of gross negligence[.]”  Maj. Op. at 37.  While there must be sufficient evidence 
to support a finding of causation and gross negligence separately, it is clear that the analysis 
for the two are intertwined and often involve the same or overlapping factual bases.  In the 
present case, the facts, or lack thereof, that are considered in the causation analysis may 
also be considered in the gross negligence analysis – i.e., Mr. Thomas sold Mr. Matrey the 
heroin, Mr. Thomas did not prepare a specific dose or inject Mr. Matrey with the heroin, 
the heroin sold was unadulterated, Mr. Matrey injected himself at a later time and in his 
own home, and he ingested alcohol prior to his death, in conjunction with his heroin use.   
 
7 
 
under facts that are nearly identical to those in the present case.  In Mauldin, the defendant 
was charged with felony murder after selling heroin to the victim who ultimately took the 
heroin to another location, injected himself with a dose determined by himself, and 
overdosed.  215 Kan. 956, 957, 529 P.2d 124, 125 (1974).  The Kansas Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, explaining that “the defendant’s only 
connection with the homicide was that he sold a quantity of heroin to the deceased who 
some time later, voluntarily and out of the presence of the defendant, injected himself with 
an overdose and died as a result.”  Id. at 958, 529 P.2d at 126.  Similarly here, “[Mr.] 
Thomas sold [Mr. Matrey] four bags of heroin.  Later, at another time, in another place, 
[Mr. Matrey] injected himself with an amount of heroin that he chose.  He used it in 
conjunction with alcohol, which may have intensified the effect.”  Thomas v. State, 237 
Md.App. 527, 535, 186 A.3d 857, 862 (2018).   
As the Court of Special Appeals observed, “[i]t is not impossible to imagine 
scenarios in which there will be a sufficient causal connection between the sale of heroin 
and the victim’s death to satisfy this element of . . . involuntary manslaughter.”  Id. at 536, 
186 A.3d at 862.  While acknowledging the possibility of these scenarios, I disagree with 
the Majority’s belief that the present case fits within those parameters.  The facts before us 
do not support a finding of legal, but-for causation, or a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
 
8 
 
Murder-Related Charges Arising from the Distribution of Heroin is a Policy Concern 
Best Left to the Maryland General Assembly 
The State in its brief admits that, “[d]esperate to stem the tide of deaths, law 
enforcement officials in Maryland and across the country have begun charging heroin 
dealers with murder-related charges in an effort to reduce the availability of the drug.[]  The 
prosecution in this case reflects those efforts.”  The State, therefore, is calling upon this 
Court to inject itself in matters that should be left to the General Assembly.  By its own 
admission, the State is seeking to modify existing law, not through the proper avenue of 
the General Assembly, but through this Court.   
Not only does the State ask this Court to exercise legislative authority; it asks this 
Court to do precisely what the General Assembly has declined to do in the last several 
legislative sessions.  Numerous bills have been introduced before the General Assembly 
that would deem the distribution of heroin, fentanyl, and other opioids, which resulted in 
the death of the user, a felony subject to up to 30 years imprisonment.  These bills received 
either unfavorable reports following a hearing by the assigned committee, or were stalled 
before the committee, never proceeding to a vote at all.  See Md. S.B. 303 (2015 Legis. 
Session) (receiving an unfavorable report by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee; 
withdrawn); Md. H.B. 612 (2017 Legis. Session) (stalling in the House Judiciary 
Committee); Md. H.B. 1730 (2018 Legis. Session) (stalling after a first reading in the 
House Rules and Executive Nominations Committee); Md. S.B. 570 (2019 Legis. Session) 
(receiving an unfavorable report by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee).   
 
9 
 
Importantly, Senate Bill 539 was introduced before the General Assembly in 2017.  
As introduced, the Bill was titled “Distribution of Opioids Resulting in Death[,]” and 
“prohibit[ed] a person from distributing certain opioids or opioid analogues, the use of 
which caus[ing] the death of another[.]”  Md. S.B. 539 (2017 Legis. Session).  The original 
text of the bill provided that anyone convicted of such conduct would be found guilty of a 
felony and subject to imprisonment for up to 30 years.  While the bill ultimately passed in 
both Houses and was signed into law by the Governor, it was amended beyond recognition.  
The final bill, codified at Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”) §§ 5-602, 
5-608.1, was titled “Distribution of Controlled Dangerous Substances – Fentanyl” and 
“prohibit[ed] a person from . . . knowingly distributing a certain mixture of controlled 
dangerous substances[.]”  Md. Chapter Law 539 (2017 Legis. Session).  Notably, the 
Chapter Law did not address the distribution of opioids resulting in death, let alone further 
criminalize and provide specific penalties for such conduct.   
Efforts taken by the General Assembly make clear that the establishment and 
recognition of such a crime as charged in the present case is a task for legislators and 
policy-makers, not judges.  The role of this Court is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the General Assembly, not undermine and contradict it.  See Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 
38, 56, 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996).  The General Assembly has declined to pass a bill that 
would create a statutory offense for the distribution of heroin and other opioids, which 
result in the death of another, evidencing their intent to not criminalize such conduct as an 
independent murder-related conviction.  By holding that the State, under the facts before 
 
10 
 
us, may convict an individual of a murder-related offense for a death connected to the 
distribution of heroin, the Majority is stepping into the role of a policy-maker, an action in 
direct contravention of the General Assembly’s unambiguous election not to pass 
equivalent legislation criminalizing such conduct.    
Conclusion 
The State has not provided sufficient evidence establishing legal, but-for causation 
between Mr. Thomas’s distribution of heroin and Mr. Matrey’s fatal overdose to sustain an 
involuntary manslaughter conviction.  Mr. Thomas sold Mr. Matrey the amount of heroin 
Mr. Matrey requested, who then, “at another time, in another place, [] injected himself with 
an amount of heroin that he chose.”  Thomas v. State, 237 Md.App. 527, 535, 186 A.3d 
857, 862 (2018).  The record is devoid of any facts other than these that tie Mr. Thomas to 
Mr. Matrey’s unfortunate overdose.  Compare People v. Erb, 70 A.D.3d 1380, 1381, 894 
N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (2010) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal 
liability where the defendant “did not procure or inject the drugs that caused the death of 
the victim, nor did he place her in a location that made her less likely to obtain medical 
assistance[]”),  with Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 818, 823, 687 N.E.2d 
270, 273 (1997) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter after injecting heroin 
into the victim).  “Here, [] where the causal chain was broken, there can be no liability for 
. . . involuntary manslaughter.”  Thomas, 237 Md.App. at 536, 186 A.3d at 863.   
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals. 
 
11 
 
Judge Greene and Judge Getty have authorized me to state that they join in this 
opinion.