Title: State v. Griffin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Griffin, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5481.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5481 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. GRIFFIN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Griffin, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5481.] 
Criminal procedure—Final orders—Defective judgment entry—Resentencing 
entry—Waiver of three-judge panel—R.C. 2945.06—Res judicata. 
(No. 2011-0818—Submitted January 22, 2013—Decided December 19, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Coshocton County, No. 09-CA-21,  
2011-Ohio-1638. 
____________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} At issue in this case is whether the sentence that Sandra Griffin, 
appellee, has served for the past 24 years is based on a final, appealable order that 
gave the Fifth District Court of Appeals subject-matter jurisdiction over her direct 
appeal in 1990.  The state of Ohio argues that res judicata bars a defendant from 
using a resentencing entry issued pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 
2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, to relitigate a matter that was raised or could 
have been raised on direct appeal.  The state further argues that in capital cases, a 
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final, appealable order consists of a guilt-phase entry and a sentencing opinion 
pursuant to State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9. 
{¶ 2} We recognize that this court granted the state’s appeal to review the 
application of Ketterer to the final, appealable order in this case.  Upon further 
review, we have determined that the issues presented on this appeal should be 
decided on different grounds.  However, we are not bound by any inferences that 
may have been drawn from our previous decision to review this appeal on the 
basis of Ketterer.  See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 
N.E.2d 306, ¶ 9-12. 
{¶ 3} Res judicata bars relitigation of a matter that was raised or could 
have been raised on direct appeal when a final, appealable order was issued in 
accordance with the law at the time.  Because the sentencing entry issued in 1990 
was a final, appealable order, the 2009 resentencing entry issued pursuant to 
Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, was a nullity.  We 
do not reach the state’s second proposition of law regarding Ketterer. 
{¶ 4} The cause is now before this court following our acceptance of the 
state’s discretionary appeal.  The state of Ohio presents two propositions of law: 
 
 
I. Res Judicata precludes a litigant from using a 
resentencing entry issued pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330 [893 N.E.2d 163], to relitigate an issue 
when that defendant has already litigated the same issue on direct 
appeal. 
 
II.  In cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or 
panel to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists 
of both the sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) 
and the judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32 (C). 
 
 
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{¶ 5} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the court of appeals with instructions to dismiss Griffin’s appeal. 
CASE BACKGROUND 
{¶ 6} On January 4, 1989, James Steurer Sr. was murdered in Coshocton 
County, Ohio.  The next month, Griffin was indicted for complicity to commit 
aggravated murder with an accompanying felony-murder death-penalty 
specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and a firearm specification.1 
{¶ 7} Griffin waived her right to be tried by a jury and by a three-judge 
panel.  In exchange, the state agreed not to pursue the death penalty, but it did not 
dismiss the death-penalty specification. 
{¶ 8} In a trial before a single judge, Griffin was found guilty of 
aggravated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility 
in 30 years.  The trial court filed two separate judgment entries.  On December 21, 
1989, the trial court filed a judgment entry announcing the guilt-phase findings.  
On January 25, 1990, a sentencing hearing was conducted.  In mitigation, the 
defense called Dr. James Reardon, a licensed psychologist, and three other 
witnesses.  Dr. Reardon provided comprehensive testimony about Griffin’s 
chaotic family and marital history, mental disorders, and substance abuse.  
Directly thereafter, Griffin presented a short mitigation statement.  After counsel’s 
summation, the trial court permitted the presentation of victim-impact statements 
and allowed Griffin to allocute pursuant to Crim.R. 32.  The trial court issued a 
sentencing entry without including the findings made on the record.  A sentencing 
opinion pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) was never filed. 
{¶ 9} On February 1, 1990, Griffin filed a notice of appeal that included 
the following assignment of error: “The trial court erred in the sentencing of the 
appellant by not following the mandates of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04, as well as 
allowing victim impact evidence in violation of Evid.R. 404, the Fifth, Eighth, 
                                                          
 
1 Griffin was also indicted, convicted, and sentenced on noncapital charges not relevant here. 
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and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution and Article I, §§ 
Nine, Ten, and Sixteen of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Griffin, 73 Ohio 
App.3d 546, 550-551, 597 N.E.2d 1178 (5th Dist.1992).  Then as now, R.C. 
2929.03 and 2929.04 applied when “death may be imposed as a penalty for 
aggravated murder.”  Former R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 10.  See also former R.C. 2929.03(F), id. at 13-14. 
{¶ 10} On February 12, 1992, the court of appeals affirmed Griffin’s 
convictions and sentences.  In overruling this assignment of error, the court held: 
 
 
First, although this is a “capital offense,” it is no longer a 
case within the ambit of the sentencing provisions of R.C. 2929.03 
et seq.  By pretrial agreement the appellant waived her right to jury 
trial in return for the agreement of the state not to request the death 
penalty.  The case was tried to a single judge, sitting without a 
jury.  At minimum the death penalty option was extinguished the 
moment appellant was placed in jeopardy in the trial. 
 
Id. at 553.  The court added, “The only way a defendant may be held to the death 
penalty is if he or she is tried to a jury or a three-judge panel.  R.C. 2945.06 
[three-judge court required if jury is waived and defendant is charged with offense 
‘punishable with death’].”  Id. at fn. 1.  In other words, the court held that the 
capital sentencing procedures of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 were not required, 
because the death penalty was not an option. 
{¶ 11} We declined to accept Griffin’s direct appeal.  64 Ohio St.3d 1428, 
594 N.E.2d 970 (1992). 
COLLATERAL ATTACKS 
{¶ 12} For more than 15 years, Griffin has collaterally attacked her 
conviction and sentence, without success.  On April 22, 1997, Griffin filed her 
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first federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that her waiver of a trial by jury or a 
three-judge panel, as allowed under Ohio law, was neither knowing nor intelligent 
and that the trial court’s failure to follow “mandatory statutory requirements of a 
proceeding” violated her due-process and equal-protection rights.  The district 
court held that these arguments were procedurally defaulted because they had not 
been raised in state court.  Griffin v. Rogers, S.D.Ohio No. 2:97-cv-00444 (Sept. 
30, 1998). 
{¶ 13} Griffin then filed a delayed application to reopen her appeal 
pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  Griffin’s application was denied, and this court 
declined to accept her appeal.  State v. Griffin, 86 Ohio St.3d 1489, 716 N.E.2d 
721 (1999). 
{¶ 14} On October 15, 1999, Griffin filed her second petition for a federal 
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that her agreement to waive a three-judge panel 
and a jury was void.  This petition was dismissed as barred by the one-year statute 
of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). 
{¶ 15} On October 18, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of 
whether Griffin was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  
Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.2002).  The district court held on remand 
that Griffin was not entitled to equitable tolling and again dismissed the habeas 
petition as time-barred.  On March 3, 2005, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding 
that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled, and remanded the case to the 
district court for further proceedings.  Griffin v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626 (6th 
Cir.2005). 
{¶ 16} On August 22, 2006, the district court issued a final judgment 
dismissing Griffin’s habeas petition.  Griffin v. Andrews, S.D.Ohio No. 2:99-cv-
1127, 2006 WL 2422590 (Aug. 22, 2006).  On October 23, 2006, the district court 
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denied Griffin’s request for a certificate of appealability.  Griffin v. Andrews, 
S.D.Ohio No. 2:99-cv-1127, 2006 WL 3041072 (Oct. 23, 2006). 
{¶ 17} On August 4, 2009, Griffin filed a motion in the trial court for a 
final, appealable order pursuant to Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 
893 N.E.2d 163, which construed Crim.R. 32(C) to require the judgment of 
conviction to be a “single document.”2  Id. at ¶ 1.  Griffin argued that a final, 
appealable order never issued because the trial court failed to include the court’s 
guilt-phase findings in the original judgment entry of sentence, and therefore, 
Baker’s one-document rule was violated.  The state agreed and submitted a 
proposed one-document judgment entry. 
{¶ 18} On August 27, 2009, the trial court filed a new, one-document 
judgment entry and again sentenced Griffin to life imprisonment with parole 
eligibility after 30 years plus the 3 years for the firearm specification. 
{¶ 19} Griffin appealed her convictions and sentences anew on the basis 
that in 1990, the appellate court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her 
case.  The court of appeals agreed, holding that Griffin’s original sentence was 
not a final, appealable order and that the court had lacked jurisdiction to hear her 
original appeal.  State v. Griffin, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 09CA21, 2010-Ohio-
3517, ¶ 25.  The court reversed her convictions and remanded for a new trial, 
because since her trial, we had decided State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-
Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, which held that capital sentencing provisions—
including the requirement of a three-judge panel—apply unless the capital 
specification is dismissed.  Thus, based on case law not decided at the time of the 
trial, the court of appeals decided that the failure to convene a three-judge panel 
was reversible error. 
                                                          
 
2 At the time of Griffin’s conviction and sentence, the relevant language was set forth in former 
Crim.R. 32(B): “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings and 
sentence. * * * The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.”  34 Ohio 
St.2d lxxi (1973). 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 20} On December 9, 2010, we accepted the state’s appeal, vacated the 
judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court for 
application of Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9.  
State v. Griffin, 127 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-5948, 938 N.E.2d 1036.  In 
Ketterer, we held, “In cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel 
to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the 
sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of 
conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 21} On remand, the court of appeals held that Ketterer’s syllabus did 
not apply to Griffin because it had already held that Griffin’s case was not one “in 
which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel to file a sentencing opinion,” 
Ketterer at syllabus.  State v. Griffin, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 09-CA-21, 2011-
Ohio-1638, 2011 WL 1233242, ¶ 20-21.  Therefore, the court reasoned, Baker’s 
one-document rule applied to Griffin.  Id.  It concluded: “Our original reversal 
and remand are unaffected by Ketterer, and are hereby reimposed.”  Id. at ¶ 32.  
We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I.  Final, Appealable Order 
{¶ 22} The pivotal question before the court is whether 24 years ago the 
trial court issued a final, appealable order in Griffin’s case.  Ohio’s statutory 
framework and case law at the time of Griffin’s conviction and sentence did not 
require death-penalty procedural protections, because Griffin could not be 
sentenced to death.  The trial court afforded Griffin all of the proper procedural 
protections guaranteed by law in 1990, and its sentencing entry was the final 
judgment in the case.  Therefore, we hold that the sentencing entry issued in 1990 
was a final, appealable order. 
 
 
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A. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN OHIO 
{¶ 23} Ohio has imposed the death penalty since before it became a state.  
A law promulgated by the territorial governor and two judges of the territory 
under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 read: “If any person or persons with 
malice aforethought, kill or slay another person, he, she, or they so offending, 
shall be deemed guilty of murder, and upon conviction thereof shall suffer the 
pains of death.”  (Promulgated Sept. 6, 1788.) Salmon P. Chase, 1 Statutes of 
Ohio 98 (1833).  In 1831, an Ohio statute read: “Be it enacted by the General 
Assembly of the State of Ohio, That if any person shall purposely, of deliberate 
and premeditated malice, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any rape, 
arson, robbery or burglary, kill another; every such person shall be deemed guilty 
of murder in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, shall suffer death.”  29 
Ohio Laws 136. 
{¶ 24} The Ohio Constitution addressed capital cases in 1851: “All 
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where 
the proof is evident, or the presumption great,” and “[N]o person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury.”  Ohio Constitution, Article I, former Section 9 and 
Section 10.  “Capital offenses” was not defined.  “Capital case or crime” has been 
traditionally defined as “[o]ne in or for which [the] death penalty may, but need 
not necessarily, be imposed.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 209 (6th Ed.1990). 
{¶ 25} From 1880 through 1898, the first-degree-murder statute changed 
only slightly: “Whoever purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated 
malice, or by means of poison, or in perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate, any 
rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, kills another, is guilty of murder in the first 
degree, and shall suffer death.”  R.S. 6808, 33 Ohio Laws 33. 
{¶ 26} Not until 1898 did the Ohio legislature authorize a sentence for 
first-degree murder that was not death:  “Whoever purposely, and either of 
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deliberate and premeditated malice, or by means of poison, or in perpetrating, or 
attempting to perpetrate, any rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, kills another, is 
guilty of murder in the first degree, and shall be punished by death, unless the jury 
trying the accused recommend mercy, in which case the punishment shall be 
imprisonment in the penitentiary during life.”  R.S. 6808, 93 Ohio Laws 223. 
{¶ 27} Then in 1933, the legislature required a three-judge panel to 
determine the guilt and sentencing of an accused “charged with an offense 
punishable with death” if the accused waived a jury.  G.C. 13442-5, 115 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 530, 531.  Like the jury, the panel was authorized to “extend mercy 
and reduce the punishment for such offense to life imprisonment.” 
{¶ 28} In the original promulgation of the Revised Code in 1953, former 
R.C. 2901.01 specifically stated: “Murder in the first degree is a capital crime 
under Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, Ohio Constitution.”  Otherwise, the first-
degree-murder statute was almost identical to the 1910 version: First-degree 
murder was killing another “purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated 
malice, or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, 
arson, robbery or burglary.”  The punishment remained “death unless the jury 
trying the accused recommends mercy, in which case the punishment shall be 
imprisonment for life.” 
{¶ 29} In 1965, the state legislature began anew a review of the 
procedures for the imposition of the death sentence and determined that 
compliance with the procedural rules must be strict.  See Henry J. Lehman & Alan 
E. Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio’s New Criminal 
Code, 23 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 8 (1974). Then, beginning in 1968 with an amendment 
to the Ohio Constitution, this state recognized that defendants subject to death 
deserved special procedural protections when the Ohio Constitution for the first 
time gave those whose sentence of death had been affirmed on appeal the right to 
a second appeal, to the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, 
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former Section 2(B)(2)(a)(ii).  The General Assembly in 1972 passed a 
modernized act addressing the death penalty, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 1866, 1978-1981, which identified aggravating factors and 
mitigating circumstances to consider before imposing a death sentence.  Former 
R.C. 2929.02 through 2929.04. 
{¶ 30} That act had not yet been enacted when a plurality of the justices of 
the United States Supreme Court stated that because the death penalty was being 
imposed throughout the country without any objective standards, it violated the 
Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution as cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 
(1972).  Though the 1972 law attempted to avoid the arbitrary application of the 
death penalty that had been decried in Furman, the law did not survive scrutiny 
by the United States Supreme Court.  In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 
2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), a plurality opinion stated that Ohio’s death-penalty 
statute did not provide individualized consideration of mitigating factors such as 
the defendant’s prior record, character, and age, as the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require.  Id. at 597-598, 606. 
{¶ 31} From death being the sole authorized punishment for first-degree 
murder in 1788 to its being the preferred punishment tempered only by the 
possibility that the jury might show mercy until Furman in 1972, the death 
penalty and its limited procedural requirements were accepted as part of Ohio 
law.  Modern society, however, was coming to believe that imposition of a death 
sentence required unique procedures and scrutiny. 
{¶ 32} Simultaneously, the judiciary was reassessing the constitutional 
significance of imposing the death penalty.  “The penalty of death differs from all 
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.  It is unique in its 
total irrevocability.  It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a 
basic purpose of criminal justice.  And it is unique, finally, in its absolute 
January Term, 2013 
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renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”  Furman at 306 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  Four years later, a plurality opinion added: 
 
[T]the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long.  Death, in its finality, differs more 
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from 
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, 
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case. 
 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).  The corollary conclusion is 
that when the death penalty is not an option, extraordinary procedural safeguards 
are not constitutionally necessary. 
{¶ 33} During this time, no one doubted that a defendant had a final, 
appealable order upon sentencing.  In 1976, we held, “Generally, the sentence in a 
criminal case is the judgment.  Miller v. Aderhold (1933), 288 U.S. 206 [53 S.Ct. 
325, 77 L.Ed. 702]; Berman v. United States (1937), 302 U.S. 211 [58 S.Ct. 164, 
82 L.Ed. 204]; State v. Chamberlain (1964), 177 Ohio St. 104, 202 N.E.2d 695; 
Columbus v. Stires (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 315, 224 N.E.2d 369.”  State v. Hunt, 
47 Ohio St.2d 170, 174, 351 N.E.2d 106 (1976). 
{¶ 34} In 1972, the legislature rewrote the criminal code and attempted to 
mesh the state law on the death penalty with the new requirements set by the 
United States Supreme Court.  H.B. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866.  By its 
new language, the legislature distinguished a subset of capital cases in which the 
death penalty may be imposed, or those “punishable with death.”  Id. at 1892, 
R.C. 2901.02(B).  The courts at first applied capital statutes to all capital offenses 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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even if the death penalty could not be imposed.  For example, after the United 
States Supreme Court had overturned Ohio’s death-penalty statutes, Norman 
Henry and a codefendant were indicted for an aggravated murder committed in 
1980. Then as now, R.C. 2945.20 required separate trials for defendants jointly 
indicted for a capital offense, and the murder statute stated, “Aggravated murder, 
and any offense for which death may be imposed as a penalty, is a capital 
offense.”  Former R.C. 2901.02(B), 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1892 (Jan. 1, 
1974).  The trial court had tried Henry and his codefendant jointly, reasoning that 
the law did not require capital procedures if the death penalty was not allowed.  
This court disagreed: “Pursuant to R.C. 2901.02(B), aggravated murder is a 
capital offense regardless of whether death may be imposed as a result of the 
conviction thereof.”  State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446 N.E.2d 436 (1983), 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 35} The legislature reacted to our holding in Henry by amending R.C. 
2901.02(B) to delete aggravated murder without death specifications from being 
classified as a capital offense.  1984 Am.H.B. No. 380, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
3639.  This court interpreted the change in dicta as follows: 
 
Subsequent to our decision in Henry and during the 
pendency of this appeal, R.C. 2901.02(B) was amended effective 
April 4, 1984 so that only an offense for which death may be 
imposed as a penalty is a capital offense.  As a result, special 
protections are afforded to those facing the possibility of the death 
penalty, but now the criminal justice system is relieved of the 
burden and expense of such venire where those charged do not 
face the possibility of the death penalty. 
 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
State ex rel. Corrigan v. McMonagle, 12 Ohio St.3d 15, 16, 465 N.E.2d 382 
(1984), fn. 1. 
{¶ 36} After Corrigan, courts of appeals began to consider whether 
specialized death-penalty procedures applied when a capital offense was charged, 
but death could not be imposed.  For example, R.C. 2945.06 was viewed to 
distinguish between capital cases in which the death penalty was an option and 
those in which it was not.  It states: 
 
 
In any case in which a defendant waives his right to trial by 
jury and elects to be tried by the court under section 2945.05 of the 
Revised Code, any judge of the court in which the cause is pending 
shall proceed to hear, try, and determine the cause in accordance 
with the rules and in like manner as if the cause were being tried 
before a jury.  If the accused is charged with an offense punishable 
with death, he shall be tried by a court to be composed of three 
judges * * *.” 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 37} Trial courts and courts of appeals interpreted Corrigan to require 
capital procedures only when death could be imposed: 
 
As the Supreme Court recognized in State v. Henry, supra, 
an offense may be classified as a capital offense even though the 
death penalty may not be imposed.  The General Assembly has 
used both the term capital offense and an offense punishable with 
death and we must assume that the General Assembly intended that 
there be a distinction between the two terms.  The statute, which is 
a different statute than the Supreme Court considered in Henry, is 
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clear and unambiguous.  It stated that a person who violated the 
section shall be punished by death. The question in Henry was 
whether, under R.C. 2901.02(B), a crime which was designated as 
a capital offense and punishable by death was still a capital offense 
after the Ohio death penalty was invalidated by the United States 
Supreme Court. That is not the question in this case. It appears 
obvious that the General Assembly intended that a three-judge 
panel should be provided to a defendant accused of an offense for 
which his life may be taken. Since the death penalty was not in 
effect in Ohio at the time defendant allegedly committed the crime, 
the General Assembly’s purpose in providing a three-judge panel 
where a person’s life is at stake would not have been served by 
providing him a three-judge panel. 
 
State v. Hubert, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 82AP-942, 1984 WL 5871 (Aug. 16, 
1984) (Moyer, J.). 
{¶ 38} This court observed that capital cases and those in which the death 
penalty could be imposed were not the same thing.  “[C]apital offenses may 
continue independent of the death penalty.”  State ex rel. Johnson v. Shoemaker, 6 
Ohio St.3d 215, 216, 451 N.E.2d 1231 (1983).  In other words, the possibility of 
the death penalty controls whether capital sentencing procedural protections are 
required, not whether the case is labeled a capital case. 
{¶ 39} Juvenile cases presented the same legal issues.  Though not yet 
required to do so by the United States Supreme Court, the 1981 Ohio death-
penalty law excluded those under 18 at the time of the offense from being subject 
to the death penalty.  R.C. 2929.03(E), 139 Ohio Laws Part I, 13.  Courts relied 
on Corrigan to deny juveniles who were charged with a capital offense death-
penalty procedural protections because death could not be imposed.  State ex rel. 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
Fyffe v. Evans, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 90–CA–4, 1990 WL 52518 (Apr. 11, 
1990) (pursuant to Corrigan, an indigent juvenile offender being tried as an adult 
for a capital offense was properly denied the appointment of two lawyers because 
the death-penalty could not be imposed), aff’d on other grounds, 62 Ohio St.3d 
62, 577 N.E.2d 1094 (1991); and State v. Cohen, 11th Dist. Lake No. 12–011, 
1988 WL 41545, *12 (Apr. 29, 1988) (by the language of R.C. 2945.06 [three-
judge-panel requirement], juvenile was properly denied trial before three judges 
because “the death penalty could not be imposed against him as a matter of law”). 
B. 1990 SENTENCING PROCEDURES FOR CAPITAL OFFENSES  
WHEN DEATH CANNOT BE IMPOSED 
{¶ 40} Statutes and case law closed the questions of whether adult and 
juvenile offenders were required to be tried before a three-judge panel and 
whether the appointment of two lawyers was required when a capital offense was 
charged but the death penalty could not be imposed.  The question that remained 
open was whether the sentencing procedural protections afforded in former R.C. 
2929.03(D) and (F) were required when a capital offense was charged but the 
offender could not be put to death.  Griffin, 73 Ohio App.3d 546, 597 N.E.2d 
1178, settled that question of law. 
{¶ 41} Griffin waived her right to be tried by a three-judge panel or by a 
jury in exchange for the state’s agreement not pursue a death sentence.  Griffin 
was consequently tried before a single judge, and a guilt-phase entry was issued. 
During the sentencing phase, Griffin was permitted to offer mitigation evidence 
and to allocute.  Griffin was therefore afforded all required due process.  The trial 
court then entered findings on the record and issued a sentencing entry that was a 
final, appealable order in accordance with Hunt, 47 Ohio St.2d at 174, 351 N.E.2d 
106, which stated, “Generally, the sentence in a criminal case is the judgment.”  
Griffin, the prosecution, and the courts all recognized the sentencing entry as final 
and appealable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 42} The Fifth District Court of Appeals applied the reasoning in the 
three-judge-panel and capital juvenile cases in considering Griffin’s sentencing 
challenge.  Former R.C. 2929.03(D) and (F) addressed the sentencing 
requirements that applied “when death may be imposed,” and the appellate court 
decided that they did not apply to Griffin because “the death penalty option was 
extinguished the moment appellant was placed in jeopardy in the trial.”  Griffin, 
73 Ohio App.3d at 553, 597 N.E.2d 1178.  The statutory provisions in effect at the 
time of the offenses provided: 
 
(D)(1) * * * When death may be imposed as a penalty for 
aggravated murder, the court shall proceed under this division.  
* * * The court, and the trial jury if the offender was tried by a 
jury, shall consider any report [presentence investigation] prepared 
pursuant to this division and furnished to it and any evidence 
raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing or to any factors in 
mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death, shall hear 
testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing, the mitigating factors set forth in 
division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and any other 
factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death, and 
shall hear the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, 
if any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution, that are relevant 
to the penalty that should be imposed on the offender. * * * 
* * * 
(3) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at 
trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted to 
the court pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section [requiring 
compliance if “death may be imposed”], if, after receiving 
pursuant to division (D)(2) of this section the trial jury’s 
recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the court 
finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the panel of three 
judges unanimously finds, that the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating 
factors, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender.  Absent 
such a finding by the court or panel, the court or the panel shall 
impose one of the following sentences on the offender: 
(a) Life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 
twenty full years of imprisonment;  
(b) Life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 
thirty full years of imprisonment. 
* * * 
(F) The court or the panel of three judges, when it imposes 
sentence of death, shall state in a separate opinion its specific 
findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set 
forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the 
existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and 
the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  The court or panel, when it imposes life 
imprisonment under division (D) of this section, shall state in a 
separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating 
factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Code it found to exist, what other mitigating factors it found to 
exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these 
aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  The court or panel shall file the opinion 
required to be prepared by this division with the clerk of the 
appropriate court of appeals and with the clerk of the supreme 
court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposed sentence.  
The judgment in a case in which a sentencing hearing is held 
pursuant to this section is not final until the opinion is filed. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Former R.C. 2929.03, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 10-14. 
{¶ 43} The Fifth District Court of Appeals ruled consistently with courts 
that had interpreted language similar to that in former R.C. 2929.03 delineating 
procedures “when death may be imposed.”  It held: 
 
[A]lthough this is a “capital offense,” it is no longer a case within 
the ambit of the sentencing provisions of R.C. 2929.03 et seq.  By 
pretrial agreement the appellant waived her right to jury trial in 
return for the agreement of the state not to request the death 
penalty.  The case was tried to a single judge, sitting without a 
jury.  At minimum the death penalty option was extinguished the 
moment appellant was placed in jeopardy in the trial. 
 
Griffin, 73 Ohio App.3d at 553, 597 N.E.2d 1178. 
{¶ 44} Therefore, when Griffin appealed, Ohio law provided that special 
procedural protections associated with a capital offense were required only when 
the death penalty could be imposed.  The Fifth District Court of Appeals 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
reasonably followed the other courts in this state in holding that R.C. 2929.03(D) 
and (F) also apply only when the death sentence is an option.  Id. at 553.  This 
court then denied discretionary review.  64 Ohio St.3d 1428, 594 N.E.2d 970 
(1992). 
{¶ 45} The Fifth District Court of Appeals was not alone in concluding 
that death-penalty procedures applied only when death could be imposed, and this 
court continued to deny review over defendants’ challenges.  State v. Heddleson, 
5th Dist. Stark No. 99-CA-00074, 1999 WL 770845 (Sept. 7, 1999), discretionary 
appeal not accepted, 87 Ohio St.3d 1476, 721 N.E.2d 121 (1999); State v. Steele, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-499, 2001 WL 721806 (June 28, 2001), 
discretionary appeal not accepted, 93 Ohio St.3d 1459, 756 N.E.2d 1235 (2001); 
State v. Ahart, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 93 C.A. 211, 2001 WL 1155786, *2 (Sept. 
28, 2001), discretionary appeal not accepted, 94 Ohio St.3d 1452, 762 N.E.2d 
370 (2002). 
{¶ 46} The court of appeals correctly assumed based on the law at the time 
that the trial court’s sentencing entry was a final order.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to review Griffin’s assignments of error.  
That this law may have changed a decade or more later does not justify our 
abandoning the law in place and the convictions based on it at the time of trial.  In 
2005, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals made the same point in rejecting a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel made by convicted murderer Elmer Ahart: 
 
State v. Griffin, 73 Ohio App.3d 546, 597 N.E.2d 1178, 
1183 (1992), established that when a defendant agreed to forgo his 
right to a jury trial in exchange for the prosecution’s agreement not 
to pursue the death penalty, the case could be heard by a single 
judge.  Griffin was not overruled until the Ohio Supreme Court 
issued its decision in State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 769 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
N.E.2d 846 (2002).  Thus, at the time Ahart would have appealed 
his sentence, the law did not require that his case be heard by a 
three-judge panel.  The fact that the law may have changed in 2002 
does not mean that Ahart had a nonfrivolous ground for appeal in 
1993. 
 
Ahart v. Bradshaw, 122 Fed.Appx. 188, 194 (6th Cir.2005). 
{¶ 47} We reaffirm that Griffin was afforded all procedural protections 
required by law in 1990 and that a final judgment was entered.  Therefore, the 
order that she appealed from in 1990 was final and appealable.  The finality of her 
conviction and sentence is consistent with “society’s interest in enforcing the law, 
and in meting out the punishment the legislature has deemed just.”  State v. 
Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984).  Even if in 1992 the court 
of appeals was wrong in assuming that a final, appealable order existed in 1990, 
its holding was subject to res judicata principles and therefore could have been 
challenged only in a direct appeal.  Consequently, Griffin is precluded from 
reopening her appeal by res judicata, “a rule of fundamental and substantial 
justice.”  State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 
568, ¶ 25. 
II. RES JUDICATA BARS GRIFFIN’S SUCCESSIVE  
AND COLLATERAL CHALLENGES 
{¶ 48} Because the 1990 sentencing entry was a final, appealable order, 
Griffin’s claims are barred by res judicata.  “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a 
final judgment of conviction bars the convicted defendant from raising and 
litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or 
any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the 
defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an 
appeal from that judgment.”  State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
104 (1967).  Both Griffin and defense counsel believed that the sentencing entry 
was a final, appealable order, because Griffin filed her direct appeal on February 
1, 1990. 
{¶ 49} On that direct appeal, Griffin’s assignments of error included the 
claim that “[t]he trial court erred in the sentencing of the appellant by not 
following the mandates of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 * * *.”  Griffin, 73 Ohio 
App.3d at 550-551, 597 N.E.2d 1178.  Griffin never challenged the lack of a 
Crim.R. 32(B) entry or the lack of a three-judge panel, and therefore, these claims 
are forever barred.  We consequently adopt the first proposition of law: the 
sentencing entry issued in 1990 was a final, appealable order, and the 2009 
resentencing entry issued pursuant to Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-
3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, was a nullity.  Res judicata precludes a litigant from using 
a resentencing entry issued pursuant to Baker to litigate an issue when that 
defendant has already litigated or could have litigated the issue on direct appeal. 
{¶ 50} Our holding regarding the state’s first proposition of law resolves 
the current appeal, and we therefore do not address the state’s second proposition 
of law. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 51} We therefore hold that Sandra Griffin had a final, appealable order 
when the trial court issued the sentencing entry in 1990. We further hold that res 
judicata precludes a litigant from using a resentencing entry issued pursuant to 
Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, to litigate an issue 
that defendant has already litigated or could have litigated on direct appeal. 
{¶ 52} Our holding today emphasizes the importance of final judgments: 
 
“ ‘[P]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that 
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of 
the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
settled as between the parties.’  * * *  We have stressed that ‘[the] 
doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or 
procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours.  It is a 
rule of fundamental and substantial justice, “of public policy and 
of private peace,” which should be cordially regarded and enforced 
by the courts.’ ” 
 
State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), quoting Federated 
Dept. Stores, Inc., v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 
(1981), quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 
517, 75 L.Ed.2d 1244 (1931), and Hart Steel Co. v. RR. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 
299, 37 S.Ct. 506, 61 L.Ed. 1148 (1917). 
{¶ 53} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the court of appeals with instructions to dismiss Griffin’s appeal. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 54} I respectfully dissent.  The majority opinion correctly states that the 
pivotal question before the court is whether the trial court issued a final, 
appealable order in Griffin’s case.  Majority opinion, ¶ 22.  But instead of 
deciding whether State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 
N.E.2d 163, applies, as the Fifth District Court of Appeals held, or whether State 
v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, applies, as the 
state argues, the majority refuses to apply either because the cases had not been 
decided by 1990.  I would hold that there was no final, appealable order upon 
which an appeal could be taken pursuant to Ketterer because a sentencing opinion 
January Term, 2013 
23 
 
has never been filed as required by R.C. 2929.03.  I would vacate the judgment 
entry of conviction for aggravated murder3 and remand this case to the trial court. 
{¶ 55} Sandra Griffin has served 24 years of a life sentence that permits 
parole eligibility after 30 years.  She was convicted of aiding and abetting two 
others in the aggravated murder of James Steurer Sr. and was also convicted of 
the capital specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and a firearm specification 
under R.C. 2941.141.  The state had agreed not to seek the death penalty against 
Griffin but never dismissed the felony-murder specification within her indictment. 
Therefore, she has always been charged with the capital offense of aggravated 
murder.  Yet the capital-case statutes were not followed, and the appellate court 
erred in exercising jurisdiction. 
I. “Capital Case” Defined 
{¶ 56} Since April 3, 1984, R.C. 2901.02(B) has plainly defined a capital 
case in terms of the charged offense: 
 
Aggravated murder when the indictment or the count in the 
indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more 
specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) 
of section 2929.04 of [the] Revised Code, and any other offense 
for which death may be imposed as a penalty, is a capital offense. 
 
Am.H.B. No. 380, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3639.  In addressing an earlier version 
of this statute,4 this court stated, “Pursuant to R.C. 2901.02(B), aggravated murder 
is a capital offense regardless of whether death may be imposed as a result of the 
                                                          
 
3 Griffin’s noncapital convictions for aiding and abetting unlawful possession of dangerous 
ordnance, aiding and abetting grand theft, aiding and abetting aggravated robbery, and a firearm 
specification are unaffected and therefore are irrelevant to this discussion. 
 
4 H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1892. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
conviction thereof.”  State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446 N.E.2d 436 (1983), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  We have continued to hold that it does not matter 
if the death penalty will not be imposed.  State v. Harwell, 102 Ohio St.3d 128, 
2004-Ohio-2149, 807 N.E.2d 330 (juvenile charged with aggravated murder and a 
capital specification, although ineligible for a death sentence due to age, is still 
entitled to protections of capital procedure); State v. Clinkscale, 122 Ohio St.3d 
351, 2009-Ohio-2746, 911 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 11 (the case remains a capital case even 
though the defendant could not receive a death sentence in a second trial).  An 
indictment must be amended to remove the death-penalty specification, so that the 
defendant is no longer “charged” with an offense punishable by death, for a case 
to become noncapital.  State ex rel. Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St.3d 543, 544-
545, 721 N.E.2d 1051 (2000). 
{¶ 57} Griffin’s indictment charged her with a capital offense—
aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and the felony-murder 
specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  When she waived a jury trial, the state 
did not amend the indictment to dismiss the specification.  Therefore, Griffin’s 
case remained a capital case. 
{¶ 58} We have already squarely addressed this issue:  
 
A defendant charged with a crime punishable by death who 
has waived his right to trial by jury must, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 
and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), have his case heard and decided by a three-
judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the death 
penalty. 
 
January Term, 2013 
25 
 
{¶ 59} State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 
846, syllabus.5  Parker waived his right to a trial by jury, waived his right to a 
three-judge panel, and pled guilty to aggravated murder with a death 
specification.  He was sentenced by a single judge to life imprisonment with 
parole eligibility after 20 years.  The court of appeals vacated the guilty plea and 
conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.  We affirmed, holding 
that regardless of the state’s agreement not to seek the death penalty, Parker “was 
still charged with an offense that was punishable with death.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
at ¶ 11.6     
II. Capital Procedures 
{¶ 60} When a defendant is convicted of both an aggravated-murder 
charge and a specification, the potential penalties include death as well as a term 
of life imprisonment.  R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(a).  The penalty is to be determined by 
“the panel of three judges that tried the offender upon the offender’s waiver of the 
right to trial by jury” in accordance with R.C. 2929.03(D) and (E).  R.C. 
2929.03(C)(2)(b)(i).  Furthermore, after the mitigation hearing, required by R.C. 
2929.03(D), the panel must fully consider the choices, choosing death only if they 
are unanimous, otherwise selecting one of the possible life terms.7  R.C. 
2929.03(D)(3). 
                                                          
 
5 We accepted the appeal in Parker as in conflict with State v. Griffin, 73 Ohio App.3d 546, 597 
N.E.2d 1178 (1992).  Id. at ¶ 3.  Not until April 1, 2011, did the court of appeals apply Parker’s 
holding to Griffin’s case.  2011-Ohio-1638,¶ 32. 
 
6 Although we also stated in Parker that the three-judge-panel requirement of R.C. 2945.06 was a 
jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, 
¶ 12, we modified that statement in a subsequent case by holding that the failure to convene a 
three-judge panel does not create a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that renders the trial court’s 
judgment void ab initio and subject to collateral attack in habeas corpus.  Pratts v. Hurley, 102 
Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, syllabus.  Instead, we held the error to be an 
error in the exercise of jurisdiction, correctable by appeal.  Id. 
 
7 At the time of Griffin’s crimes, former R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) provided that the possible life terms 
that could be imposed were life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 or 30 full years of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
{¶ 61} In a capital case, a final, appealable order does not exist until the 
sentencing opinion is filed.  State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-
3831, 935 N.E.2d 9.  R.C. 2929.03(F) sets forth requirements for the sentencing 
opinion in all capital cases, whether death or a life sentence is imposed.  At the 
time of Griffin’s trial, the statute stated: 
 
The court or the panel of three judges, when it imposes 
sentence of death, shall state in a separate opinion its specific 
findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set forth 
in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the 
existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and 
the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  The court or panel, when it imposes life 
imprisonment under division (D) of this section, shall state in a 
separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating 
factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised 
Code it found to exist, what other mitigating factors it found to 
exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these 
aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors. * * * The judgment in a case in which a 
sentencing hearing is held pursuant to this section is not final until 
the opinion is filed. 
                                                                                                                                                               
imprisonment.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 13.  The current statute allows life 
terms with parole eligibility after 25 or 30 years or life imprisonment without parole.  R.C. 
2929.03(D)(3)(a). 
January Term, 2013 
27 
 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 13-14. 
{¶ 62} These statutes show that the General Assembly intended to create a 
specific procedure that would be followed in capital cases.  And we have 
consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when we have reviewed 
the procedures in capital cases.  State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 
N.E.2d 867 (1999). 
III. Compliance with Capital Statutes Is Required 
Even If Death May Not Be Imposed 
{¶ 63} The majority opinion contradicts our precedent by declaring that 
“the possibility of the death penalty controls whether capital sentencing 
procedural protections are required, not whether the case is labeled a capital 
case.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 38.  The majority states on this point:  
 
Ohio’s statutory framework and case law at the time of Griffin’s 
conviction and sentence did not require death-penalty procedural 
protections, because Griffin could not be sentenced to death.  The 
trial court afforded Griffin all of the proper procedural protections 
guaranteed by law in 1990, and its sentencing entry was the final 
judgment in the case. 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 22.   
{¶ 64} But the three appellate court decisions relied on by the majority 
hardly closed the matter of whether capital procedures were required in capital 
cases for which life sentences were to be imposed.  See State v. Hubert, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 82AP-942, 1984 WL 5871 (Aug. 16, 1984); State ex rel. Fyffe v. 
Evans, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 90-CA-4, 1990 WL 52518 (Apr. 11, 1990); State 
v. Cohen, 11th Dist. Lake No. 12-011, 1988 WL 41545, *12 (Apr. 29, 1988).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
These cases were decided before this court had weighed in.  When we did address 
these issues, we required trial courts to strictly follow capital procedures 
regardless of whether death could be imposed.  For instance, in Parker we held 
that a defendant who waives a jury trial must have the case heard and decided by 
a three-judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the death penalty.  
95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, syllabus.  We also held that 
juveniles charged with aggravated murder and a capital specification are still 
entitled to the protections of capital procedure, although they are ineligible for 
death sentences due to their age.  Harwell, 102 Ohio St.3d 128, 2004-Ohio-2149, 
807 N.E.2d 330. 
{¶ 65} The majority unjustifiably refuses to acknowledge this court’s 
more recent decisions and unduly limits the review of cases to those decided by 
1990.  The general rule in Ohio is that a court decision applies retrospectively 
unless a party has contract rights or vested rights under a prior decision.  Peerless 
Elec. Co. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 129 N.E.2d 467; see also State v. 
Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 503, 709 N.E.2d 484 (1999).  Therefore, as long as the 
statutory provisions are similar, our subsequent decisions are relevant to whether 
the trial court was required to follow capital procedures when Griffin was 
sentenced and whether she  had a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 66} Parker, although not announced until after Griffin’s trial, was 
decided under the same version of R.C. 2945.06 that had been in effect since 
1981.  The portion of the statute relevant to Griffin states: 
 
If the accused is charged with an offense punishable with death, he 
shall be tried by a court to be composed of three judges * * *.  The 
judges or a majority of them may decide all questions of fact and 
law arising upon the trial; however the accused shall not be found 
guilty or not guilty of any offense unless the judges unanimously 
January Term, 2013 
29 
 
find the accused guilty or not guilty. * * * The court shall follow 
the procedures contained in sections 2929.03 and 2929.04 of the 
Revised Code in all cases in which the accused is charged with an 
offense punishable by death. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Just as in Parker, Griffin was “charged with an offense 
punishable by death” because her indictment included the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
specification.  R.C. 2945.06 mandated that capital sentencing procedures in R.C. 
2929.03 be applied because she was charged with a capital offense.  The state’s 
agreement that it would not seek the death penalty did not alter this requirement.8   
{¶ 67} With respect to Griffin’s appeal, a panel of three judges did not 
issue the sentencing opinion required by R.C. 2929.03(F) because the death 
specification remained.  A single judge had convicted her of aggravated murder 
and found her guilty of the death specification.  While stating erroneously that this 
was not a capital case, that single judge then heard considerable mitigation 
evidence at sentencing.  But no sentencing opinion under R.C. 2929.03(F) was 
ever filed.  Consequently, this is a pending case, for a final, appealable order does 
not yet exist. 
{¶ 68} It is axiomatic that courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to act 
without final, appealable orders.  State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Appellate Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, 
¶ 12.  Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution confers jurisdiction 
upon the courts of appeals to “review and affirm, modify, or reverse” lower 
courts’ “judgments or final orders.”  Because the judgment in a capital case is not 
                                                          
 
8 The trial court also should have followed the capital trial procedures.  Thus Griffin’s decision to 
waive a jury meant that her guilt or nonguilt should have been determined by three judges 
unanimously, R.C. 2945.06, and that those judges should have imposed sentence if she was found 
guilty, R.C. 2929.03(D)(3).  Although it is true that structural error does not apply to statutory 
violations, it could be argued that Griffin was denied her constitutional right to due process 
because of the numerous procedural errors in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
final until the sentencing opinion is filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F), Griffin’s 
appeal was never finalized, and res judicata cannot apply. 
{¶ 69} The court of appeals decided incorrectly that Baker rather than 
Ketterer applied, reasoning that a sentencing opinion was unnecessary because 
there was no mitigation hearing under R.C. 2929.03(D).  2011-Ohio-1638 at ¶ 19-
21.  This misses the point.  A mitigation hearing was required because the version 
of R.C. 2945.06 in effect at the time of Griffin’s sentencing required the trial 
court to follow the procedures in R.C. 2929.03 “in all cases in which the accused 
is charged with an offense punishable by death.”  (Emphasis added.)  As we 
stated in Harwell, “we looked principally to the offense charged, which was 
punishable by death, and not to the status of the defendant or the fact that death 
had been eliminated as an option.”  102 Ohio St.3d 128, 2004-Ohio-2149, 807 
N.E.2d 330, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 70} There is no denying that Griffin was charged with a capital offense.  
Contrary to the majority opinion, this fact alone does control whether a trial court 
is required to follow capital trial and sentencing procedures.  Because a 
sentencing opinion is required in a capital case, Griffin has never had a final, 
appealable order. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 71} What must be acknowledged is that the court of appeals never had 
the power to act when no final, appealable order existed in this case because a 
sentencing opinion was not filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F).  The majority 
attempts to whitewash the numerous procedural errors in this capital case by 
unduly limiting its review to case law as it existed in 1990.  Because this court has 
held that capital procedures must be followed even when the death penalty is not 
an option in a capital case, I would affirm the court of appeal’s decision to the 
extent that it vacates the conviction for aggravated murder and the felony-murder 
specification and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
January Term, 2013 
31 
 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’NEILL, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Jason W. Given, Coshocton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
________________________