Title: State v. Fugere

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2258-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Corey R. Fugere, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 381 Wis. 2d 142,911 N.W.2d 127 
PDC No:2018 WI App 24 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 28, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 24, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa 
 
JUDGE: 
Roderick A. Cameron 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. and DALLET, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kathilynne A. Grotelueschen, assistant state public 
defender. 
There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Kathilynne 
A. 
Grotelueschen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general. With whom on the brief 
Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, Misha Tseytlin, 
solicitor general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Luke N. Berg. 
  
2019 WI 33 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2258-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF169) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey R. Fugere, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Fugere, 
2018 WI App 24, 381 Wis. 2d 142, 911 N.W.2d 127, affirming the 
Chippewa County circuit court's order.1  The circuit court's 
order denied Corey R. Fugere's ("Fugere") motion to withdraw his 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
("NGI"), which was based on the circuit court providing 
inaccurate information to Fugere concerning the maximum period 
of civil commitment should he prevail on his affirmative defense 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Roderick Cameron presided. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
2 
 
to the criminal charges.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court, and we affirm the court of appeals. 
¶2 
We conclude that a circuit court is not required to 
inform an NGI defendant of the maximum possible term of civil 
commitment at the guilt phase:  (1) because a defendant who 
prevails at the responsibility phase of the NGI proceeding has 
proven an affirmative defense in a civil proceeding, avoiding 
incarceration, and is not waiving any constitutional rights by 
so proceeding in that defense; and (2) because an NGI commitment 
is not punishment, but rather a collateral consequence to one 
who successfully mounts an NGI defense to criminal charges.  We 
therefore 
decline 
to 
exercise 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority to require circuit courts to advise NGI 
defendants of the maximum period of civil commitment. 
¶3 
Fugere also requests that this court conclude that the 
circuit court's error was not harmless with respect to the 
misinformation provided to him concerning potential civil 
consequences should he prevail in his defense.  The circuit 
court here provided accurate information to Fugere regarding the 
maximum possible term of imprisonment but inaccurate information 
regarding commitment, so we thus address whether the circuit 
court's error otherwise entitles Fugere to withdraw his NGI 
plea.  We conclude that the circuit court's error was harmless 
because it was unrelated to the guilt phase of the NGI defense, 
and instead, the inaccurate information pertained to the 
potential 
civil 
commitment 
at 
the 
responsibility 
phase.  
Additionally, Fugere received the benefit of his plea agreement 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
3 
 
with the State and otherwise understood the consequences of 
prevailing on an NGI defense as he was already civilly committed 
for an unrelated charge.  Thus, there was no manifest injustice, 
and we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
In April 2015 Fugere was charged with four counts of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 12.  The 
complaint alleged that in 2008, when Fugere was 17 years old, he 
and another individual sexually assaulted an eight-year-old 
girl.  At the time these charges were filed, however, Fugere was 
serving a commitment to the Mendota Mental Health Institute 
because of a different sexual assault charge for which Fugere 
had previously been found NGI.  
¶5 
A few months after Fugere was charged, the State and 
Fugere reached a plea agreement.  Pursuant to the agreement, 
Fugere would plead NGI to one count of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child under the age of 12, and the remaining 
charges were dismissed but read in.  As a result, Fugere would 
waive his right to trial regarding guilt, admit that there was a 
factual basis that he committed the sexual assault, and the 
State and Fugere would stipulate that, based on the other case 
information and findings, Fugere lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law due to a mental disease 
or defect.   The parties agreed to recommend that the circuit 
court order a pre-dispositional investigation report and that 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
4 
 
Fugere be civilly committed for 30 years to the State of 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services ("DHS").2 
¶6 
On August 24, 2015, Fugere filed an initialed and 
signed "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" form and entered an 
NGI plea to the single count.  At the plea hearing, the circuit 
court conducted a plea colloquy and, among other things, 
confirmed with Fugere that he understood the nature of the 
charges, 
that 
he 
was 
waiving 
his 
constitutional 
rights, 
including his right to a jury trial, and that the maximum 
penalty for first-degree sexual assault was 60 years.   
¶7 
During the plea colloquy, the circuit court also 
addressed Fugere's NGI plea.  The court, the State, and Fugere's 
attorney all misinformed Fugere of the potential maximum period 
of civil commitment.  The following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT:  You are not actually going [to] be 
found guilty of the charge today.  You are going to be 
found [not] guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect, which is a bit different, but it means you 
could be placed on supervision for up to 30 years. 
[THE STATE]:  Sixty years is the maximum. 
THE COURT:  Sixty years, but the recommendation 
is 30 years, do you understand that? 
[FUGERE]:  Yes. 
Fugere informed the circuit court that he was aware of the 30-
year recommendation even though 60 years is the maximum.  Fugere 
                                                 
2 Additionally, as part of the plea agreement, Fugere agreed 
to submit a DNA sample, but that is not significant to this 
appeal. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
5 
 
confirmed that he had been on conditional release on another 
case and that he understood how conditional release worked.  
Fugere indicated that he did not have any questions.  Fugere's 
attorney confirmed that Fugere would be exposed "to some 30 more 
years of supervision, could possibly be 60 years."  His lawyer 
confirmed that Fugere understood that "if he violates any rules 
of supervision, he could end up back at Mendota or Winnebago 
during the next 60 years."  
¶8 
The circuit court accepted Fugere's NGI plea, adopted 
the parties' joint recommendation, and ordered that Fugere be 
committed for 30 years and that a pre-dispositional investigation 
be prepared.  The order of commitment specified that Fugere's 
commitment was to commence on August 24, 2015, and run concurrent 
with any other NGI commitments he was serving.  
¶9 
At 
the 
post-dispositional 
placement 
hearing 
on 
October 15, 2015, the court ordered Fugere be placed in 
institutional care.  At the hearing, Fugere did not contest the 
report's findings and admitted he was "not ready" for conditional 
release.  Fugere stated that he hoped he would be fit for 
conditional release in six months. 
¶10 Just over six months later, on April 29, 2016, Fugere 
filed a petition for conditional release with the circuit court.  
The circuit court ordered an examination by an independent 
psychologist, who recommended that Fugere be conditionally 
released.  On June 29, 2016, the circuit court granted 
conditional release subject to finding a suitable group home.  
The DHS was to provide a release plan within 60 days. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 On August 5, 2016, prior to the 60-day time period 
elapsing, the DHS informed the circuit court that it was 
"temporarily suspend[ing] planning for the conditional release" 
because the State intended to file a complaint against Fugere 
alleging that he should be separately committed as a sexually 
violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2015-16).3  The DHS 
further notified the circuit court that Fugere had recently 
committed a "new violation" by "having sexual relations with a 
peer at Mendota."  The DHS additionally stated that it intended 
to revoke Fugere's conditional release following resolution of 
the State's chapter 980 petition. 
¶12 On September 15, 2016, Fugere filed a postconviction 
motion to withdraw his NGI plea arguing that it was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  Fugere 
asserted that he was entitled to withdraw his plea because he 
was 
misinformed 
of 
the 
maximum 
civil 
commitment 
period.  
Specifically, he averred that the circuit court incorrectly 
informed him that he faced a maximum of 60 years, when the 
actual maximum was 40 years' commitment and that the circuit 
court inaccurately referenced supervision.  In response, the 
State argued that an NGI commitment is not a punishment, and 
therefore the circuit court is not required to advise Fugere of 
his 
maximum 
possible 
commitment 
to 
render 
Fugere's 
plea 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.  The State 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
7 
 
further argued that under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), defendants must be informed only of the 
maximum statutory punishment they face.  The State contended 
that the circuit court correctly informed Fugere of the maximum 
statutory punishment he faced if his NGI defense failed, and 
therefore fulfilled the circuit court's duty at the plea 
colloquy.  The State argued that no "manifest injustice" 
resulted because Fugere received the very 30-year commitment 
term he bargained for.  At a hearing on November 9, 2016, the 
circuit court agreed with the State and denied Fugere's motion. 
The court concluded: 
I think, given the fact that there's no requirement to 
provide a defendant the maximum amount of time for a 
confinement or commitment time on an NGI when he's 
told he's going to get a certain amount against that 
amount, I think that's distinguishable from the 
maximum amount of time partly because confinement is 
not a sentence and partly because he's getting exactly 
what he expected to get regardless of how much more 
time he could have gotten. So I believe under that 
analysis, that the motion is to be denied. 
¶13 Fugere appealed the circuit court's ruling.  In an 
opinion issued on March 6, 2018, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court.  Fugere, 381 Wis. 2d 142, ¶2.  It held "that 
circuit courts need not advise a defendant pleading NGI of the 
potential range of civil commitment he or she will face if found 
not mentally responsible for his or her crimes, much less do so 
correctly."  Id., ¶19.  The court of appeals explained the 
unique process that occurs with NGI pleas, which consists of two 
phases:  the guilt phase, and the responsibility phase.  Id., 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13.  The court of appeals concluded that the requirements 
established by Bangert and its progeny apply only to the guilt 
phase of an NGI proceeding.  In other words, the court of 
appeals concluded that a defendant must be informed only of the 
maximum punishment the defendant faces if he were to be found 
guilty, which implicates only the guilt phase.  Id., ¶19.  
Noting that Wisconsin courts have routinely "held that the 
responsibility phase of an NGI trial is not part of a criminal 
trial," the court of appeals further concluded that "[t]he same 
constitutional rights are not implicated or waived during the 
mental responsibility phase."  Id.  The court of appeals also 
expressed that a defendant's right to assert an NGI defense is a 
statutory right, not a constitutional right.  Id. 
¶14 As a result, the court of appeals concluded as 
follows: 
In all, the record demonstrates that the circuit 
court informed Fugere of the direct consequences of 
his plea, including the potential sixty-year prison 
sentence.  The circuit court's incorrect statement 
regarding Fugere's maximum potential period of civil 
commitment 
does 
not 
render 
Fugere's 
NGI 
plea 
unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntarily [sic].  As 
such, there was no manifest injustice, and Fugere is 
not entitled to withdraw his plea. 
Id., ¶25. 
¶15 On March 27, 2018, Fugere filed a petition for review 
with this court.  On September 4, 2018, this court granted 
Fugere's petition. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
9 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing, the defendant must prove "by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in 'manifest injustice.'"  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (citing State v. Thomas, 
2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836).  A defendant 
can meet that burden by showing that he or she did not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 
644 
N.W.2d 891; 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Warren 
v. 
Schwarz, 
219 
Wis. 2d 615, 635-36, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998); State v. Krawczyk, 
2003 WI App 6, ¶9, 259 Wis. 2d 843, 657 N.W.2d 77). 
¶17 Whether 
a 
guilty 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional 
fact.  State v. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, ¶24, 381 Wis. 2d 492, 912 
N.W.2d 74.  This court upholds a circuit court's findings of 
fact unless clearly erroneous, and "[d]etermines independently 
whether those facts demonstrate that the defendant's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶19. 
¶18 Fugere asserts that there were deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy conducted by the circuit court in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  Whether Fugere shows deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy that establish a violation of § 971.08, is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  See Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶21. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
10 
 
III.  ANALYSIS  
A.  General Principles Of Pleas And Plea Colloquies 
¶19 We begin by addressing the basic principles underlying 
pleas and plea colloquies.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.06 recognizes 
four distinct pleas that can arise from criminal matters:  (1) 
guilty; (2) not guilty; (3) no contest, which is subject to the 
court's approval; and (4) "[n]ot guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect."  § 971.06(1).  A defendant must enter a plea 
to 
a 
criminal 
charge 
"knowing[ly], 
voluntar[ily], 
and 
intelligent[ly]."  Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, ¶1; see also 
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005).  For a defendant's 
plea to be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary," the defendant 
must be fully aware of "any direct consequences" of the plea.  
Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, ¶1 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 755 (1970)).  A "direct consequence" is defined as 
"one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic 
effect on the range of a defendant's punishment."  State v. 
Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶60, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (citing 
State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199).   
¶20 On the other hand, information regarding "collateral 
consequences" of a defendant's plea "is not a prerequisite to 
entering a knowing and intelligent plea."  Id., ¶61 (citing 
Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 636).  "Collateral consequences are 
indirect and do not flow from the conviction."  Id.  In 
evaluating whether a consequence of a defendant's plea is direct 
or collateral, courts look to whether the consequence is a 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
11 
 
punishment.  See Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶27 (holding "that 
Wisconsin's sex offender registration requirements do not 
constitute 
punishment," 
and 
thus 
are 
"a 
collateral 
consequence"). 
¶21 The Wisconsin Statutes also impact a circuit court's 
role in a plea colloquy.  Under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1), circuit 
courts must conduct a plea colloquy with a defendant who pleads 
guilty or no contest, in the interest of ensuring that the 
defendant's 
plea 
is 
given 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily.  § 971.08(1)(a).  Before the circuit court accepts 
a guilty or no contest plea, it must do all of the following: 
(a)  Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b)  Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c)  Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen 
of the United States of America, you are advised that 
a plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
(d)  Inquire of the district attorney whether he 
or she has complied with s. 971.095(2).[4] 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.095(2) states as follows: 
In any case in which a defendant has been charged 
with a crime, the district attorney shall, as soon as 
practicable, offer all of the victims in the case who 
have requested the opportunity an opportunity to 
confer with the district attorney concerning the 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
12 
 
§ 971.08(1). 
¶22 As this court has explained, the plea colloquy duties 
imposed 
on 
courts 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 
are 
not 
"a 
constitutional 
requirement," 
but 
rather, 
"a 
statutory 
imperative."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 266.  However, "[t]he 
faithful discharge of these duties is the best way . . . to 
demonstrate the critical importance of pleas in our system of 
justice and to avoid constitutional problems."  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶23. 
¶23 Although the language in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 does not 
indicate that it applies to NGI pleas, as § 971.08 expressly 
refers only to "plea[s] of guilty or no contest," this court has 
stated that an NGI plea "closely parallels a plea of no 
contest."  State v. Shegrud, 131 Wis. 2d 133, 137, 389 N.W.2d 7 
(1986).  This court has concluded that a defendant must be 
informed of "the nature of the charge" and the "potential 
punishment."  Id. at 138. 
¶24 A defendant who wishes to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing bears the heavy burden to demonstrate by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that withdrawal is necessary to avoid 
"manifest injustice."  State v. Finley, 2016 WI 63, ¶58, 370 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecution of the case and the possible outcomes of 
the prosecution, including potential plea agreements 
and sentencing recommendations. The duty to confer 
under this subsection does not limit the obligation of 
the 
district 
attorney 
to 
exercise 
his 
or 
her 
discretion concerning the handling of any criminal 
charge against the defendant. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761; State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶24, 
369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659.  A plea is "manifestly unjust" 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution if it was not entered "knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily."  Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 182-83.  While Bangert 
and Wis. Stat. § 971.08 inform a court's duties when it comes to 
properly 
taking 
a 
plea, 
an 
improper 
colloquy 
does 
not 
automatically mandate withdrawal.  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 
¶¶32-40, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64; State v. Taylor, 2013 
WI 34, ¶¶32-42, 48-54, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.  An 
improper colloquy may entitle a defendant to a hearing however, 
and there, the State bears the burden of establishing that the 
guilty plea was indeed voluntary.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶36-
41. 
¶25 In the case at issue, Fugere argues that he, as a 
defendant who entered an NGI plea but was not properly informed 
of the accurate maximum length of a civil commitment, should be 
entitled to withdraw that plea on the grounds that it was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
B.  NGI Procedures 
¶26 "[A] criminal defendant's right to an NGI defense is a 
statutory right that is not guaranteed by either the United 
States or Wisconsin Constitutions."  State v. Magett, 2014 WI 
67, ¶32, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42.  NGI pleas "may be 
joined with a plea of not guilty."  Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1)(d).  
When a defendant enters this plea, the case is bifurcated into 
two phases:  the guilt phase and the responsibility phase.  See 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
14 
 
Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, ¶39.  Only if a defendant is found 
guilty in the first phase does the court withhold entry of 
judgment of guilt and the trial proceeds to the responsibility 
phase.  Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1)(d).  The responsibility phase 
"is not a criminal proceeding," but "is something close to a 
civil trial."  Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, ¶33.  Unlike a criminal 
trial, the verdict need not be unanimous, the defendant bears 
the burden of proof to establish this affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and the circuit court may direct 
a verdict.  Id., ¶¶37–39. 
¶27 On the other hand, a defendant may choose to plead NGI 
without also pleading not guilty, also known as a "standalone 
NGI plea."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1)(d).  In so doing, the 
defendant "admits that but for lack of mental capacity, the 
defendant committed all the essential elements of the offense 
charged in the indictment, information or complaint."  Id.  The 
defendant is then found guilty of the elements of the crime(s) 
and the responsibility phase is left for trial.  State v. 
Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, ¶29, 368 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 636.  As 
Fugere points out, this court has exercised its superintending 
and administrative authority with regard to plea colloquy 
requirements in the past in both Bangert and Shegrud.  The court 
has concluded that in the first phase of an NGI plea, the court 
must "address the defendant personally to determine whether the 
defendant is entering the plea voluntarily [and] with an 
understanding 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
charge. . . . [T]he 
procedures delineated in Bangert shall apply . . . ."  Shegrud, 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
15 
 
131 Wis. 2d at 138.  Also, as was the case here, the parties may 
agree to waive the trial on responsibility and stipulate that 
the defendant should be found NGI. 
¶28 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.165(3)(b), if the defendant's 
NGI defense succeeds, "the court shall enter a judgment of not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect," and "shall 
thereupon proceed under s. 971.17."5  If the defendant's NGI 
defense is unsuccessful, "the court shall enter a judgment of 
conviction and shall either impose or withhold sentence under s. 
972.13(2)."  § 971.165(3)(a). 
¶29 Defendants in criminal cases who are later found NGI 
are civilly committed rather than criminally sentenced or 
sanctioned.  If commitment occurs, the length of that commitment 
is not to exceed the maximum sentence for the charged offense 
plus 
penalty 
enhancements 
subject 
to 
statutory 
credit 
provisions.  Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(b).  As a general rule, the 
length of commitment is about two-thirds of the maximum 
potential sentence of imprisonment.6  In addition, a defendant 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17 governs the "[c]ommitment of 
persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental 
defect." 
6 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1), an NGI defendant's maximum 
possible commitment period depends on the nature of the 
underlying offense.  NGI defendants who commit a felony prior to 
July 30, 2002, or who commit a misdemeanor, may receive a 
maximum commitment period of two-thirds the maximum term of 
imprisonment that could be imposed.  § 971.17(1)(a) & (d).  NGI 
defendants who commit a felony on or after July 30, 2002, may 
receive a commitment term up to but not exceeding the maximum 
term of imprisonment that could be imposed.  § 971.17(1)(b).  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
16 
 
who succeeds on an NGI defense and is committed may file a 
petition for conditional release every six months, and if on 
conditional release, may file a petition to terminate the 
underlying order of commitment.  See §§ 971.17(4), (5).   
 
C.  Bangert And Shegrud  
¶30 Fugere asserts that this court should exercise its 
superintending and administrative authority to clarify or extend 
Bangert and Shegrud.  He argues that an NGI plea cannot be 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
or 
voluntary 
when 
a 
circuit 
court 
inaccurately informs an NGI defendant of the maximum term of 
commitment or refers to commitment as supervision.  We consider 
the unique nature of an NGI plea and the fact that the first 
phase, the admission of guilt, must be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary as the defendant is waiving, among other things, the 
right to a jury trial and putting the State to its high burden 
of proving each and every element of the offense charged.  In 
the guilt phase, the defendant waives constitutional rights and 
must understand the nature of the charge and the potential 
criminal punishment.  This understanding is important because if 
the defendant's affirmative defense fails at the second phase, 
the defendant's criminal sentence could be the maximum term of 
imprisonment.  Stated differently, a defendant who does not 
succeed in proving the affirmative defense at the responsibility 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lastly, NGI defendants who commit a felony punishable by life 
imprisonment may receive up to a lifetime commitment term.  
§ 971.17(1)(c). 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
17 
 
phase is convicted and sentenced up to the maximum possible term 
of imprisonment.  The circuit court here informed the defendant 
of 
the 
maximum 
possible 
term 
of 
imprisonment, 
the 
plea 
questionnaire outlined the same, and the record reflects a 
discussion of that maximum.7 
¶31 Fugere's 
argument, 
however, 
relates 
not 
to 
the 
potential criminal penalty if his NGI defense fails.  His 
argument is that if he succeeds in his affirmative defense and 
is found NGI, the court must have previously informed him of the 
civil consequences of proving that defense.  Fugere's argument 
focuses then not on whether the circuit court properly informed 
him of the consequences of the guilt phase of the plea.  His 
argument centers on the circuit court being required, at the 
guilt phase, to advise not only of the maximum criminal penalty 
but also the potential maximum civil commitment.  Civil 
commitment is the benefit Fugere seeks, but one that becomes 
available only if he succeeds in affirmatively proving his legal 
lack of responsibility.   
¶32 The responsibility phase of the proceedings, however, 
is 
drastically 
different 
from 
the 
guilt 
phase. 
 
The 
responsibility phase is the defendant's opportunity to present 
an affirmative defense, a legislative preference provided in the 
statutory 
right 
to 
a 
separate 
trial 
regarding 
mental 
                                                 
7 See State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 
904 N.W.2d 773; State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 
N.W.2d 482; and State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 
N.W.2d 64.  
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
18 
 
responsibility.  If successful at this phase——at which the 
defendant bears the burden of proving his defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence to a less than unanimous jury——the 
outcome is that he would be civilly committed, not criminally 
sentenced.  The maximum civil commitment is of a shorter 
duration, less restrictive than imprisonment, subject to review 
on a regular basis, and is not "punishment" but rather, is "to 
treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness and to protect the 
acquittee 
and 
society 
from 
the 
acquittee's 
potential 
dangerousness."  State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 574 
N.W.2d 660 (1998).  The defendant who succeeds in proving this 
affirmative defense is hoping for civil commitment rather than 
criminal punishment.  This court has never required circuit 
courts to conduct a colloquy with defendants to inform them of 
the benefits of successfully proving an affirmative defense.  
While courts should provide accurate information, we decline to 
extend Bangert or Shegrud to require circuit courts to advise a 
defendant of the potential consequences of prevailing on an 
affirmative defense at the responsibility phase of an NGI trial.  
The circuit court has a duty to advise of punishment at the 
guilty plea phase of an NGI, namely, the potential maximum term 
of imprisonment. 
 
1.  Constitutional rights are not waived  
at the responsibility phase. 
¶33 To be clear, defendants who submit a standalone NGI 
plea waive constitutional rights only at the guilt phase, not 
the responsibility phase.  The defendant who chooses, by NGI 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
19 
 
plea at the guilt phase, not to challenge that he committed the 
charged criminal offense, enters a plea which operates like a no 
contest plea.  See Shegrud, 131 Wis. 2d at 137.  The case then 
proceeds to the responsibility phase——a noncriminal proceeding——
where the defendant presents an affirmative defense that, if 
proven, may lead to civil commitment instead of incarceration.8  
For those who might argue that a civil commitment is a 
significant consequence for which a defendant should be advised, 
they fail to recognize the unique position of an NGI defendant 
who otherwise faces imprisonment unless that defendant can prove 
he or she is instead entitled to a civil commitment.  
¶34 This 
distinction——between 
criminal 
and 
civil 
proceedings and possible imprisonment versus civil commitment——
has significance.  Consistent with Bangert and Shegrud, circuit 
courts must inform defendants who enter a standalone NGI plea of 
the nature of the charges, the nature of the constitutional 
rights the defendant is waiving, and the maximum potential 
punishment if the defendant's NGI defense fails.  See Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 261–62; Shegrud, 131 Wis. 2d at 136–39.  This 
fulfills 
the 
constitutional 
requirements 
underlying 
a 
defendant's plea at the guilt phase of the proceedings.  Fugere 
does not dispute that the circuit court fulfilled these 
requirements at the guilt phase, and the record reflects that at 
the plea colloquy hearing the circuit court properly informed 
                                                 
8 In the case at issue, the State agreed that Fugere could 
successfully mount an NGI defense. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
20 
 
Fugere of the nature of the criminal charges against him, the 
nature of the constitutional rights he was waiving, and the 
maximum term of imprisonment.  Fugere argues though that courts 
should be required to go further and advise not just of the 
potential punishment should his defense fail, but also of the 
potential civil consequence to him should his defense succeed. 
¶35 Defendants do not waive any constitutional rights 
pertaining to the responsibility phase of an NGI proceeding.  At 
the responsibility phase, defendants have the burden to prove a 
statutorily-created affirmative defense and are not making a 
concession of any kind.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.15.  NGI 
defendants hope to prove that they are not mentally responsible 
for the crime they have already been found guilty of committing.  
There is no requirement that any defendant raise an NGI defense.  
Defendants benefit from the successful presentation of an NGI 
defense.  At the responsibility phase, a defendant has already 
been found guilty and absent success at that phase, faces 
criminal punishment not civil commitment.  Indeed, a successful 
NGI defendant avoids incarceration in favor of civil commitment 
and may seek conditional release within six months of his 
initial commitment date, and commitment, unlike incarceration, 
could be terminated entirely.  In addition, NGI proceedings are 
notably distinguishable from other forms of civil commitment 
such as those arising under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 or ch. 980, where 
the government, not the defendant, pursues the commitment and 
carries the burden of proof.  In the context of an NGI 
proceeding, the defendant willfully seeks commitment and bears 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
21 
 
the burden of proof to receive the benefit of a successful NGI 
defense. 
¶36 Our conclusion that NGI defendants do not waive any 
constitutional rights at the responsibility phase of an NGI 
proceeding is buttressed by this court's decision in Lagrone, 
368 Wis. 2d 1.  There, as in this case, Lagrone did not 
challenge the plea colloquy that occurred regarding the guilt 
phase of the NGI proceedings.  Id., ¶53.  Instead, Lagrone 
argued that he was unaware that by entering a standalone NGI 
plea, he was waiving his fundamental right to testify at a 
criminal trial regarding the validity of the charges against 
him.  Id.  This court held that circuit courts are not required 
to conduct a colloquy with defendants regarding whether or not 
they wish to testify during the responsibility phase of an NGI 
proceeding.  Id., ¶¶51–56.  Specifically, this court stated that 
"the fundamental right to testify in one's own behalf as a 
defendant 
in 
a 
criminal 
case 
does 
not 
exist 
at 
the 
responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI proceedings because that 
phase is a noncriminal proceeding to which defendants possess no 
constitutional right."  Id., ¶51 (emphasis added).  The same 
reasoning 
is 
applicable 
here. 
 
Defendants 
do 
not 
waive 
constitutional 
rights 
in 
this 
non-criminal, 
responsibility 
phase. 
 
2.  NGI commitments are not punitive  
in intent or effect. 
¶37 Circuit courts are required only to "notify the 
defendant of any direct consequence of his guilty plea."  
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
22 
 
Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, ¶1 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).  
"We have identified direct consequences of a plea as being those 
that impose punishment."  Id.  We next evaluate whether 
commitment is punitive and thus, a direct consequence of a plea.  
This court recently adopted the "intent-effects test" for 
determining whether a consequence of a plea is punitive.  Id., 
¶35. 
¶38 The United States Supreme Court first articulated the 
intent-effects test in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144, 168–70 (1963).  The intent-effects test has two parts. 
Courts look to the "statute's primary function" to determine the 
statute's intent.  Id. at 169.  If a law's intent is not 
punitive, the court then considers whether it is nonetheless 
punitive in effect.  Courts consider whether the statute's 
effect is "penal or regulatory in character."  Id. at 168-69.  
In evaluating effect, courts look to seven, non-exhaustive 
factors: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability 
or 
restraint, 
[2] 
whether 
it 
has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the 
traditional 
aims 
of 
punishment——retribution 
and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it 
applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable 
for 
it, 
and 
[7] 
whether 
it 
appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . . 
Id. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
23 
 
¶39 We conclude that applying the intent-effects test 
further demonstrates that commitment resulting from a successful 
NGI defense is not a punishment, and thus is not a direct 
consequence of a defendant's NGI plea.  The parties agree that 
NGI commitments are not intended to be punishments.  Indeed, 
this court has already held that NGI commitments are not 
intended to be punishments, holding that their purpose is "two-
fold:  to treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness and to 
protect the acquittee and society from the acquittee's potential 
dangerousness."  Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d at 504 (citing State 
v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 833, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995)).  By 
contrast, this court stated that judgments of conviction and 
sentences 
are 
"designed 
to 
accomplish 
the 
objectives 
of 
deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution and segregation."  Id.  
(citing Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive 
Criminal Law § 1.5, at 30–36 (1986)).  Thus, we conclude that 
NGI commitments are not intended to serve as punishment under 
the intent portion of the intent-effects test. 
¶40 That leaves the question of whether NGI commitments 
have a punitive effect.  Fugere focuses on factors (1), (5), and 
(7) in claiming that NGI commitments have a punitive effect.  
Applying all seven factors outlined by the United States Supreme 
Court in Mendoza-Martinez, we conclude that NGI commitments do 
not have a punitive effect. 
¶41 First, Fugere is correct that NGI commitments involve 
"an affirmative disability or restraint."  Defendants that 
successfully plead NGI are committed, which involves confinement 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
24 
 
at a mental health institution for treatment.  This is plainly 
an affirmative restraint.  The State concedes as much, but 
argues that "the mere fact that a person is detained does not 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has 
imposed punishment."  We agree.  However, that does not change 
the fact that NGI committees are affirmatively restrained. 
¶42 Second, 
measures 
such 
as 
NGI 
commitments 
have 
historically been regarded as non-punitive in nature.  In 
addition to this court's statement in Szulczewski regarding the 
purpose of NGI commitments, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that "measures to restrict the freedom of the 
dangerously mentally ill" serve a "legitimate nonpunitive 
governmental objective and has been historically so regarded."  
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (citing United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)).  The Supreme Court 
further recognized "the confinement of 'mentally unstable 
individuals who present a danger to the public' as one classic 
example of nonpunitive detention."  Id. (citing Salerno, 481 
U.S. at 748-49). 
¶43 Third, NGI commitments do not "come into play only on 
a finding of scienter."  As the State correctly notes, NGI 
commitments are necessarily premised on the absence of scienter, 
which renders an NGI defendant not legally culpable for the 
underlying criminal conduct.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1). 
¶44 Fourth, NGI commitments do not serve the "traditional 
aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence."  Rather, NGI 
commitments serve to treat defendants' mental illness and 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
25 
 
protect the public.  Such ends do not fit the traditional goals 
of 
retribution 
and 
deterrence 
associated 
with 
criminal 
convictions, judgments, and sentencing.  See Szulczewski, 216 
Wis. 2d at 504; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 
368–69 (1983) (explaining that "insanity acquittees" are not 
convicted, and thus not punished, and that "confinement rests on 
[an acquittee's] continuing illness and dangerousness").  
¶45 Fifth, NGI commitments require underlying behavior 
that results in criminal charges being brought against the 
defendant.  Though a successful NGI defense obviates the 
defendant's criminal responsibility, criminal conduct is an 
inherent underpinning of an NGI commitment. 
¶46 Sixth, NGI commitments certainly carry an alternative, 
non-punitive purpose.  As this court stated in Muldrow, this "is 
considered the most significant factor in determining whether 
the 
effect 
of 
a 
sanction 
is 
punitive." 
 
Muldrow, 
381 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶57 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, as 
noted above, the purpose of NGI commitments is to treat the 
defendant and protect the public.  NGI commitments thus carry a 
strong alternative and non-punitive purpose.  Similarly, this 
court in Muldrow held that lifetime GPS tracking for sex 
offenders had "[t]he non-punitive purpose of . . . protecting 
the public from future sex offenses," as it "ensures law 
enforcement will have ready access to evidence of an offender's 
whereabouts."  Id., ¶¶57–59.  The rationale here is even 
stronger——unlike GPS tracking, NGI commitments keep defendants 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
26 
 
away from the public and provide treatment for defendants' 
mental illness. 
¶47 Seventh, NGI commitments are not excessive in relation 
to their rehabilitative and protective purposes.  In Wisconsin, 
NGI commitment terms may not exceed the maximum confinement term 
of the charged criminal offense.  For felonies committed on or 
after July 30, 2002, NGI commitments may at most equal "the 
maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed" on 
a 
defendant 
if 
his 
NGI 
defense 
failed. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.17(1)(b).  For crimes committed prior to July 30, 2002, 
courts may at most impose a term of commitment equaling two-
thirds of the maximum term of confinement that could be imposed 
if 
the 
NGI 
defense 
failed. 
 
§ 971.17(1)(a). 
 
Sections 
971.17(1)(a) and (1)(b) set the ceiling, but nothing in § 971.17 
requires an NGI commitment term to mirror the maximum term of 
confinement 
a 
defendant 
faces 
if 
his 
NGI 
defense 
is 
unsuccessful.   
¶48 Further, NGI defendants have the ability to petition 
for conditional release six months after initial confinement, 
and every six months after a previous petition was denied or 
revoked.  Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4).  Six months after being placed 
on conditional release, an NGI defendant may even file a 
petition for termination of the underlying commitment order.  
§ 971.17(5).  Therefore, if the NGI defendant shows that he is 
no longer dangerous and is fit to re-enter society, he will be 
permitted to do so.  This indicates direct ties to the 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
27 
 
rehabilitative and protective purposes of NGI commitments in a 
manner that is not excessive. 
¶49 An application of the intent-effects test to NGI 
commitments strongly confirms that NGI commitments do not have a 
punitive intent or effect.  Therefore, NGI commitments are 
collateral consequences of a defendant's plea.  On that basis, 
we also decline to use our superintending and administrative 
authority to extend Bangert and Shegrud to require circuit 
courts to inform NGI defendants of the maximum possible term of 
commitment they face if their NGI defense succeeds. 
 
D.  The Circuit Court's Error Does Not Entitle  
Fugere To Withdraw His NGI Plea. 
¶50 Having concluded that circuit courts have no duty to 
inform NGI defendants of the maximum possible term of commitment 
they face, we still must address the circuit court's undisputed 
error in this case.  The circuit court did not use the correct 
terminology, nor did it advise Fugere as to the correct civil 
commitment length.  The parties argue over the proper standard 
in this case.  The State asserts that this court should adopt a 
harmless-error framework for considering plea colloquy defects 
where a defendant does not have a right to be informed of the 
information underlying the circuit court's purported error.  
Fugere argues that this court should employ the "manifest 
injustice" standard set forth in Bangert and its progeny.   
¶51 We conclude that the error here was not one which 
infected the plea.  The information that the circuit court 
provided did not relate to the maximum potential criminal 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
28 
 
penalty should Fugere not succeed in his affirmative defense.  
Courts are not required to inform NGI defendants of the maximum 
possible term of commitment if their defense succeeds.  This 
case is distinguishable from Bangert and its progeny, where we 
have applied a "manifest injustice" standard to determine 
whether a defendant's plea was given knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily.  As we have concluded that there is no 
requirement for a circuit court to inform NGI defendants of the 
maximum possible term of commitment, a circuit court's failure 
to convey, or to accurately convey it cannot render an NGI 
defendant's 
plea 
unknowing, 
unintelligent, 
or 
involuntary.  
While we do not condone providing misinformation regarding the 
civil outcome should a defendant be found NGI and we caution 
courts to be careful to properly advise defendants, the circuit 
court's error here was harmless. 
¶52 Though the circuit court overstated the maximum 
possible term of commitment by 20 years and said the word 
"supervision" instead of "commitment," the circuit court's error 
here was harmless.  First, the correct information was given 
regarding the maximum term of imprisonment.  Fugere entered into 
a plea agreement with the State, and the parties agreed that 
they would ask the circuit court to determine whether to impose 
institutional commitment or conditional release.  Thus, it was 
specifically contemplated that Fugere may face commitment if his 
NGI defense succeeded.  Second, at the time the at-issue 
proceedings occurred, Fugere was already committed pursuant to a 
case which charged other sexual assault crimes.  The circuit 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
29 
 
court addressed Fugere's committed status on the record at the 
hearing and confirmed that Fugere was familiar with how the 
commitment process worked.  Third, at another point in the 
hearing, Fugere's attorney stated on the record that Fugere was 
aware that if he violates the terms of any conditional release 
he may receive, he would be sent back to Mendota Mental Health 
Institute.  Fourth, given the circuit court's errant statement 
that the maximum term would be 60 years, Fugere certainly would 
have thus been aware that he could have been subject to a 40-
year term.  Fifth, the circuit court adopted the parties' joint 
recommendation of 30 years' confinement.  Fugere received 
exactly what he bargained for regarding his NGI plea:  a 30-year 
term of commitment as an alternative to a prison sentence of 40 
years with 20 years of extended supervision. 
¶53 As a result, though the circuit court undoubtedly 
erred in stating the wrong maximum term of commitment or 
supervision that would result if Fugere's NGI defense was 
successful, the circuit court's error was, at most, harmless.9 
                                                 
9 We note the court of appeals' conclusion "that circuit 
courts need not advise a defendant pleading NGI of the potential 
range of civil commitment he or she will face if found not 
mentally responsible for his or her crimes, much less do so 
correctly."  State v. Fugere, 2018 WI App 24, ¶19, 381 
Wis. 2d 142, 911 N.W.2d 127.  This statement should not be 
construed as allowing courts to provide inaccurate information 
to defendants.  Certainly, courts should exercise caution to 
ensure that information they provide defendants is correct. 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
30 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 The circuit court provided inaccurate information to 
Fugere concerning the maximum period of civil commitment should 
he prevail on his affirmative defense to the criminal charges.  
Fugere's motion, which sought withdrawal of his NGI plea as a 
result of the inaccurate information, was denied by the circuit 
court. 
¶55 We conclude that a circuit court is not required to 
inform an NGI defendant of the maximum possible term of civil 
commitment at the guilt phase (1) because a defendant who 
prevails at the responsibility phase of the NGI proceeding has 
proven an affirmative defense in a civil proceeding, avoiding 
incarceration, and is not waiving any constitutional rights by 
so proceeding in that defense; and (2) because an NGI commitment 
is not punishment but rather, is a collateral consequence to one 
who successfully mounts an NGI defense to criminal charges.  We 
therefore 
decline 
to 
exercise 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority to require circuit courts to advise NGI 
defendants of the maximum period of civil commitment. 
¶56 Fugere also requests that this court conclude that the 
circuit court's error was not harmless with respect to the 
misinformation provided to him concerning potential civil 
consequences should he prevail in his defense.  The circuit 
court here provided accurate information to Fugere regarding the 
maximum possible term of imprisonment but inaccurate information 
regarding commitment, so we thus address whether the circuit 
court's error otherwise entitles Fugere to withdraw his NGI 
No. 
2016AP2258-CR   
 
31 
 
plea.  We conclude that the circuit court's error was harmless 
because it was unrelated to the guilt phase of the NGI defense, 
and instead, the inaccurate information pertained to the 
potential 
civil 
commitment 
at 
the 
responsibility 
phase.  
Additionally, Fugere received the benefit of his plea agreement 
with the State and otherwise understood the consequences of 
prevailing on an NGI defense as he was already civilly committed 
for an unrelated charge.  Thus, there was no manifest injustice 
and we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  There is no 
dispute in this case that the circuit court gave Corey Fugere 
incorrect information regarding the length and nature of the 
commitment he faced upon pleading not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect (NGI).  Fugere was told that he faced a 
maximum 60 year term of "supervision," when he actually faced a 
maximum 40 year term of commitment to an institution. 
¶58 Sixty, however, is not forty and supervision is not 
commitment to an institution. 
¶59 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
indicates 
that 
the 
incorrect information matters not, and denies Fugere the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea.  It concludes first that "a 
circuit court is not required to inform an NGI defendant of the 
maximum 
possible 
term 
of 
civil 
commitment 
at 
the 
guilt 
phase . . . ."  Majority op., ¶2.  Second, the majority 
concludes that the misinformation provided by the circuit court 
with regard to the length and nature of the commitment he faced 
was harmless.  Id., ¶3. 
¶60 I disagree with both of these erroneous conclusions.  
In State v. Brown this court previously stated, "[i]f a 
defendant does not understand the nature of the charge and the 
implications of the plea, he should not be entering the plea, 
and the court should not be accepting the plea."  2006 WI 100, 
¶37, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  This statement is just as 
true in the NGI context as it is in a criminal case. 
¶61 Here Fugere received only half of the story.  Although 
he was accurately informed of the potential prison sentence in 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
the event his NGI defense was unsuccessful, he was deprived of 
essential information regarding the implications of his NGI 
plea.  As we have done in the past to remedy such a violation, I 
would invoke this court's superintending authority to ensure 
that NGI defendants receive full and accurate information about 
the consequences of their pleas. 
¶62 Further, the errors in this case were not necessarily 
harmless.  The circuit court was off the mark by 20 years and 
incorrectly advised the defendant that he would be placed on 
supervision rather than confined to an institution. 
¶63 Because we do not know based on the record before us 
how the errors affected Fugere's calculations in entering his 
plea, we should remand to the circuit court for a Bangert 
hearing.  See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶64 The majority's first error lies in its determination 
that "a circuit court is not required to inform an NGI defendant 
of the maximum possible term of civil commitment at the guilt 
phase . . . ."  See majority op., ¶2. 
¶65 In Bangert, this court established a mandatory rule 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
must 
"determine 
a 
defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge at the plea hearing by 
following any one or a combination of the [denominated] 
methods."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.  This rule encompasses a 
requirement that a circuit court must, in its plea colloquy, 
"[e]stablish the defendant's understanding of the nature of the 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments to 
which he is subjecting himself by entering a plea."  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶35. 
¶66 The procedures established in Bangert apply equally to 
the NGI context.  In State v. Shegrud, this court determined 
that  "a court faced with a defendant entering a plea of not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect must address the 
defendant personally to determine whether the defendant is 
entering the plea voluntarily with an understanding of the 
nature of the charge."  131 Wis. 2d 133, 138, 389 N.W.2d 7 
(1986). 
¶67 Bangert's 
chief 
aim 
was 
to 
"ensure 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea" by requiring "that a trial 
judge 
explore 
the 
defendant's 
capacity 
to 
make 
informed 
decisions."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶30.  As the Brown court 
explained, "[t]he duties established . . . in Bangert . . . are 
designed 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
defendant's 
plea 
is 
knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary.  The faithful discharge of these 
duties is the best way we know for courts to demonstrate the 
critical importance of pleas in our system of justice and to 
avoid constitutional problems."  Id., ¶23.  Put simply, "[i]f a 
defendant does not understand the nature of the charge and the 
implications of the plea, he should not be entering the plea and 
the court should not be accepting the plea."  Id., ¶37. 
¶68 Neither the Constitution nor Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
require the sort of plea colloquy for which Bangert provides.  
Instead, Bangert and its requirements act as a prophylactic 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
measure 
"[t]o 
head 
off 
postconviction 
hearings 
on 
plea 
withdrawals . . . ."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶33. 
¶69 Thus, 
rather 
than 
relying 
on 
constitutional 
or 
statutory principles, the court in Bangert and Shegrud forged 
its procedure as a function of this court's superintending 
authority.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267; Shegrud, 131 Wis. 2d at 
138; see Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1) (granting this court 
"superintending and administrative authority over all courts"); 
Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶8, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 
N.W.2d 878.  Our superintending authority is "as broad and as 
flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of 
justice in the courts of this state."  In re Kading, 70 
Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975). 
¶70 As in Shegrud and Bangert, here the court would be 
wise to utilize its superintending authority.  Specifically, 
Shegrud should encompass not only an advisement of the potential 
prison sentence an NGI defendant faces, but be extended to 
encompass the potential period of mental health commitment as 
well.  This minimal extension would ensure that NGI defendants 
are provided with all relevant information on which to base 
their decision to enter a plea. 
¶71 Such 
a 
use 
of 
our 
superintending 
authority 
is 
appropriate because the principles that drove Bangert and 
Shegrud apply with equal force here.  The "due administration of 
justice" 
requires 
that 
NGI 
defendants 
are 
properly 
and 
accurately informed of the potential commitments they face.  If 
the court is truly concerned with ensuring that a defendant's 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
plea is the result of informed decision-making, then circuit 
courts should be required to ascertain whether the defendant 
understands the consequences of a successful NGI defense.  This 
requirement 
includes 
ascertaining 
whether 
the 
defendant 
understands the maximum possible term of commitment and its 
nature. 
¶72 However, under the majority's rule, Fugere and future 
defendants 
who 
enter 
stand-alone 
NGI 
pleas 
can 
receive 
incomplete information regarding what could happen to them as a 
result of their pleas.  When the circuit court informs an NGI 
defendant of the maximum prison sentence only, the defendant 
receives just half of the information needed to make an informed 
decision. 
¶73 In other words, if the defendant is found to be not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, then the prison 
sentence is merely hypothetical.  It is commitment, and not 
imprisonment, that will actually come to fruition.  Yet the 
defendant is only informed of one possible sanction when there 
are two distinct possibilities——commitment or prison. 
¶74 This court should ensure that defendants pleading NGI 
are provided with information that is actually useful to them 
and will assist in making informed decisions regarding their 
pleas.  Accordingly, I would invoke this court's superintending 
authority to minimally extend Shegrud.  Circuit courts should be 
required not only to inform defendants of the maximum penalty if 
found guilty of the charge, but also to accurately inform NGI 
defendants of the maximum commitment they face. 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
II 
¶75 The majority's second error lies in its conclusion 
that the misinformation given by the circuit court was harmless.  
See majority op., ¶3.  Two significant pieces of inaccurate 
information marred the plea colloquy in this case.1  I address 
each in turn. 
¶76 First, 
the 
circuit 
court 
misstated 
the 
maximum 
commitment Fugere could receive.  The circuit court told Fugere 
he faced a maximum commitment of sixty years, when he actually 
faced forty years.2 
¶77 Such an error is not necessarily harmless.  "When a 
defendant is told that he faces a higher punishment than 
provided by law and pleads guilty, the plea colloquy is on its 
face defective under Bangert."  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶48, 
                                                 
1 The majority bases its determination that the errors were 
harmless on the assertion that they were "unrelated to the guilt 
phase of the NGI defense . . . ."  Majority op., ¶3.  However, 
the record reflects that there was a single plea colloquy 
instead 
of 
two 
separate 
proceedings. 
 
The 
guilt 
and 
responsibility phases were addressed by the circuit court during 
the span of the single twenty-minute plea hearing. 
2 The majority paints with a very broad brush in appearing 
to declare that a circuit court's errors in inaccurately 
conveying the maximum period of commitment will always be 
harmless.  See majority op., ¶51 ("As we have concluded that 
there is no requirement for a circuit court to inform NGI 
defendants of the maximum possible term of confinement, a 
circuit court's failure to convey, or to accurately convey it 
cannot render an NGI defendant's plea unknowing, unintelligent, 
or involuntary.") (emphasis added).  Such a pronouncement is 
ill-advised and eyebrow-raising.  If Fugere were told that he 
faced a maximum of one year of "supervision" when he actually 
faced a forty year commitment to an institution, would the error 
really be harmless?  The majority appears to say that it would. 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  
Likewise, because I determine that a circuit court should be 
required to advise a defendant pleading NGI of the maximum term 
of commitment, the same principle applies here. 
¶78 Fugere was told he faced a longer period of commitment 
than he actually faced.  At this stage of the proceedings, we do 
not know how this error affected Fugere's calculations in 
entering his plea. 
¶79 Second, the circuit court mistakenly stated that 
Fugere faced a period of "supervision," when he actually faced 
"commitment."  Again, such an error is not necessarily harmless. 
¶80 Just as there is a significant difference between 
sixty years and forty years, there likewise can be a significant 
difference 
between 
supervision 
and 
commitment. 
 
Although 
supervision is often served in the community, commitment can 
involve institutional care.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 302.113 with 
§ 971.17(3). 
¶81 The majority indicates that "[t]he circuit court 
addressed Fugere's committed status on the record at the hearing 
and confirmed that Fugere was familiar with how the commitment 
process worked."  Majority op., ¶52.  An experience of a prior 
commitment proceeding presents a slim reed upon which to rest a 
conclusion 
that 
a 
plea 
is 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily made.3  But even if the majority were correct, 
                                                 
3 The 
circuit 
court's 
"confirmation" 
of 
Fugere's 
understanding was quite cursory.  The transcript of the plea 
hearing reflects the following brief exchange: 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
wouldn't the specification that he faced "supervision" instead 
of "commitment" be particularly relevant to an individual 
familiar with the commitment process? 
¶82 Again, given the current state of the record we do not 
know if or how these errors affected Fugere's calculations in 
entering his plea.  Accordingly, I would remand to the circuit 
court for a Bangert hearing at which the State has the burden of 
proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered despite the deficiencies in the plea hearing.  See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75. 
¶83 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
THE COURT:  You've been on a conditional release on a 
different case here before, right? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Do you understand what that's all about? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
No.  2016AP2258-CR.awb 
 
1