Title: State v. James

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  November 14, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Appellant-Cross-Respondent,
v.
MORRICE ABDUL JAMES,
Respondent-Cross-Appellant.
(CC 00433302; SC S51472)
En Banc
On appeal from an order of the Multnomah County Circuit
Court under ORS 138.060(2)(a).
David Gernant, Judge.
Argued and submitted December 14, 2004.
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the case and filed the brief for appellant-cross-respondent.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Kathleen M. Correll, Portland, argued the case and filed the
brief for respondent-cross-appellant.
DURHAM, J.
The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
DURHAM, J.
In this aggravated murder and robbery case, the state
appeals from a pretrial order suppressing evidence of statements
that defendant made to police detectives during a custodial
interrogation.  The question presented is whether the trial court
erred in requiring the state to demonstrate that the police
obtained defendant's statements in compliance with his right to
counsel under Article I, section 11,of the Oregon Constitution,
such as by first obtaining defendant's valid waiver of that right
before eliciting the challenged statements. (1)  For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court did not err and
affirm its order suppressing evidence.
In February 2000, an assailant shot Portland taxicab
driver Johnson (victim) to death in his taxicab and stole money
from the vehicle.  The police suspected defendant and contacted
him, because a videotape from a security camera depicted him
leaving an apartment building around the same time that a man had
used a nearby telephone booth to summon victim's taxicab just
before the killing.
Defendant agreed to speak with police about the
homicide.  At an interview on April 10, 2000, defendant explained
to detectives Weatheroy and Kanzler that he had visited a friend
at an apartment complex near the scene of the crime, but had not
used the telephone booth or called a taxicab.  Defendant stated
that he had used his friend's telephone to call his girlfriend
for a ride home.  The detectives asked defendant if he would take
a polygraph test.  Defendant said that he would, and asked,
"[C]an I bring an attorney with me?"  The detectives told him
that he could do so.The next day, April 11, 2000, defendant quarreled with
a different girlfriend.  She called the police and the police
arrested defendant.  Because the girlfriend disclosed to police
that defendant had told her that he had shot a taxicab driver,
detectives Weatheroy and Kanzler interviewed defendant a second
time.  At the beginning of that interview, the detectives advised
defendant of his Miranda rights, after which defendant signed a
form on which he acknowledged that he had read the constitutional
rights listed thereon and understood them.
The parties disagree as to what transpired during the
remainder of that approximately hour-long interview.  Defendant
contends that, after signing the form, he requested the
assistance of a lawyer more than once, but the detectives ignored
his requests, telling him that a lawyer could not help him. 
According to defendant, detective Weatheroy warned that, if
defendant claimed that he was innocent, he would get the electric
chair, because no one would believe the word of a "black * * *
gang member."  Also, according to defendant, detective Weatheroy
suggested that defendant should make a taped apology stating that
the shooting had occurred accidentally during a scuffle after
defendant attempted to leave the taxicab without paying. 
Defendant claimed that the detectives said that, if defendant did
so, they could guarantee that defendant would get seven to eight
years in jail on a charge of manslaughter, rather than the death
penalty.  Defendant testified that the detectives had used other
coercive tactics and that, ultimately, he had agreed to tape a
false confession because he was scared and confused.
In contrast, the state asserts that defendant
voluntarily confessed to the shooting and ensuing robbery after
detective Weatheroy informed him that telephone records
contradicted his story.  The state maintains that defendant did
not mention a lawyer until detective Kanzler produced a tape
recorder in order to record his formal confession.  According to
the detectives, it was only at that point that defendant asked,
"Do I need an attorney before this?"  They testified that
detective Weatheroy explained that he could not advise defendant
on that point, but that, if defendant wanted a lawyer, the
detectives would stop the interview.  Detective Kanzler stated
that defendant then responded, "I want a tape.  Turn it on."
A grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of
aggravated murder and one count each of robbery in the first
degree, felon in possession of a firearm, and tampering with
physical evidence.  Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence of his purported statements during and attendant to his
April 10 and 11, 2000, police interviews.  The parties offered
evidence and presented arguments on the motion.  The trial court
orally announced its ruling, which allowed in part and denied in
part defendant's motion.  In particular, the trial court
suppressed defendant's statements from the April 11 interrogation
because, on the question of whether defendant invoked his right
to counsel, the court found parts of both versions of the facts
convincing.  Subsequently, the state asked the trial court to
clarify and reconsider the factual basis of its oral rulings. 
The state argued that the legal obligations of detectives
Weatheroy and Kanzler turned on whether defendant had requested a
lawyer and whether he had done so equivocally or
unequivocally. (2)  The trial court reconsidered its oral
rulings and issued a written opinion and order that again allowed
in part and denied in part defendant’s motion to suppress.  The
trial court reiterated its finding that there was a direct
conflict in the credible testimony given by defendant and the
detectives on the issue whether defendant had invoked his right
to have a lawyer present at the April 11 interrogation.  The
trial court stated that, "[t]he evidence [is] in equipoise on
this point."  The trial court concluded, 
"When the testimony is in equipoise on a point
as to which the state bears the burden of proof, the
court has to rule that the state has not carried its
burden."
Accordingly, the trial court suppressed all statements that
defendant made during the April 11 interview, including the
audiotaped portion after the point at which defendant testified
that he first expressed a desire for a lawyer.
The state appealed the trial court's order to this
court under ORS 138.060(2)(a), which authorizes the state to take
an expedited appeal directly to this court of a pretrial order
suppressing evidence in a murder or aggravated murder case. (3) 
Defendant filed a cross-appeal under ORS 138.040, (4)
challenging the trial court's decision to deny suppression of
other incriminating statements.
We begin with the state's appeal.  The parties agree
that the April 11, 2000, interview was a custodial interrogation.
This court reviews a challenge to the admissibility of a
defendant's statements during custodial interrogation as an issue
of law.  State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 135, 806 P2d 92 (1991). 
"[W]e review legal conclusions regarding the invocation of the
right to counsel for legal error."  State v. Terry, 333 Or 163,
172, 37 P3d 157 (2001).  The question of what transpired during a
custodial interrogation, however, is an issue of fact for the
trial court and the facts found may be -- indeed, usually are --
dispositive of the legal inquiry.  We are bound by the trial
court's findings of historical fact if evidence in the record
supports them, although we assess anew whether the facts suffice
to meet constitutional standards.  Stevens, 311 Or at 135;  Ball
v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487-88, 443 P2d 621 (1968).  As we shall
explain, that deference extends to the trial court's factual
determination that the evidence that each party offered in regard
to a particular disputed fact is equally convincing. (5)
As a threshold matter, we address the trial court's
asserted inability to come down decisively on one side or the
other on the central question of whether defendant invoked his
right to counsel.  As noted, the state asserts that a finding
that the evidence on that issue is in "equipoise" was a "non-finding" that is not binding on this court and that this court
therefore should remand for further factual findings.  For the
following reasons, we disagree.
There is a difference between a trial court's failure
or refusal to make a finding of fact on a pertinent factual issue
and a trial court's determination that the conflicting evidence
in the record on a factual issue is in equipoise.  The latter
determination means that, in the trial court's view, the record
contains some evidence that supports the factual claim of the
party charged with the burden of persuasion, but also contains
evidence that supports a different factual inference.  As a
result, the trial court cannot find as true the fact that the
party with the burden of persuasion asserts.  A statement by a
trial court that disputed evidence is in equipoise is an
observation about what the record evidence proves or does not
prove and, consistent with familiar rules of appellate review, it
is binding on an appeal of the trial court's judgment.  As this
court decided in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 523, 73 P3d 282
(2003), this court is bound by a trial court's determination that
a party's evidence is not sufficiently persuasive:
"[W]e are bound by a trial court's 'finding' that a
party's evidence is not sufficiently persuasive * * *
because [that rule] incorporates the same judicial
respect for the trial court's weighing of the evidence
[as do the familiar rules set out in Ball, 250 Or at
487 and State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 227, 709 P2d 225
(1985), cert den, 475 US 1141, 106 S Ct 1793, 90 L Ed
2d 339 (1986)].  Thus, unless the evidence in a case is
such that the trial court as finder of fact could
decide a particular factual question in only one way,
we shall in the future consider ourselves equally bound
by a trial court's acceptance or rejection of
evidence."
Finally, the state argues that a determination that
evidence is in equipoise operates differently in a suppression
hearing than it does in a trial on a party's ultimate claim for
relief.  We disagree.  There is no functional difference in the
role of the finder of fact weighing the evidence on a preliminary
fact question in a suppression hearing and weighing the evidence
on the ultimate issue at trial.  In each of those settings, a
determination that disputed evidence is in equipoise reflects the factfinder's conclusion that the evidence in the record does not
preponderate either in support of or against the truth of the
fact in controversy. 
We turn to a second question that this case poses: 
What is the consequence of a trial court's finding that evidence
is in equipoise as to whether a defendant unequivocally invoked
his or her right to counsel after having previously waived that
right?  The answer to that question depends on which party bears
the burden of persuasion on the issue whether the police afforded
defendant the right to counsel before obtaining his statements,
because after a determination that the evidence is in equipoise,
the party with that burden loses.
Because the subject of the parties' burdens of
production of evidence and persuasion "is among the most slippery
in the larger areas of procedure and evidence," Christopher B.
Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence: Practice Under the
Rules § 3.1, 159 (2d ed 1999), a discussion of the terms "burden
of proof," "burden of production," and "burden of persuasion"
will help to frame our analysis.  
In the early part of the twentieth century, a number of
scholars and courts recognized that practitioners were using the
term "burden of proof" to describe two distinct concepts, which
the courts now commonly refer to as the "burden of persuasion"
and the "burden of production."  See Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 US 267, 272-76, 114 S Ct 2251, 129 L Ed 2d 221 (1994) (discussing history of
efforts by courts and scholars to promote terminological
accuracy). (6)  That linguistic imprecision led John Henry
Wigmore to lament the "ambiguity of phrase and confusion of
terminology under which our law has so long suffered."  John
Henry Wigmore, 9 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2485, 283
(Chadbourn rev 1981).  This court observed in 1920, 
"The phrase 'burden of proof' has two meanings:  One to
express the idea that a named litigant must in the end
establish a given proposition in order to succeed; the
other, to express the idea that at a given stage in a
trial it becomes the duty of a certain one of the
parties to go forward with the evidence."
Hansen v. Oregon-Wash R. & N. Co., 97 Or 190, 210, 188
P 963 (1920).  In 1923, the United States Supreme Court
began consistently to distinguish between the "burden
of proof," which it defined as the burden of
persuasion, and the concept that it increasingly
referred to as the "burden of production," meaning "the
burden of going forward with the evidence."  Greenwich
Collieries, 512 US at 274.  This court noted in 1985
that the term "burden of proof" itself was "outdated,"
stating that the term is "consonant with the newer term
'burden of persuasion.'"  State v. Rainey, 298 Or 459,
464 n 6, 693 P2d 635 (1985). (7)   
Further complicating matters, many practitioners and
scholars confuse the term "burden of proof" with the term
"standard of proof."  The standard of proof is not a burden. 
Rather it is the measure of conviction that a party must achieve
in the mind of the trier of fact in order to meet the burden of
persuasion e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear and
convincing evidence, or by a preponderance of the evidence.  See
Addington v. Texas, 441 US 418, 423, 99 S Ct 1804, 60 L Ed 2d 323
(1979) (A standard of proof operates, within the concept of due
process, to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness
of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.")
(quoting In re Winship, 397 US 358, 370, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed 2d
368 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring)).  
Finally, one must guard against confusing the burden
that a prosecutor bears to persuade the judge or jury that he or
she has proven all elements of a criminal case by the required
standard of proof –- or a criminal defendant's burden of
persuasion as to affirmative defenses -- and the burden of
persuading a judge as to the existence or non-existence of a
specific fact at issue.  Those are distinct concepts. 
Unfortunately, many attorneys, scholars, and courts have used the
ambiguous phrase "burden of proof," rather than the more precise
phrases "burden of persuasion" and "burden of production," in
analyzing them.  This has led, at times, to the use by
practitioners of the same phrase to refer to different concepts,
as in the case at bar.  To avoid confusion in the future, this
court will use the phrases "burden of persuasion" and "burden of
production," as we define them below, rather than the inexact
phrase "burden of proof."    
We take the definitions of the pertinent burdens from
the Oregon Evidence Code. (8)  OEC 305 describes the burden of
persuasion:
"A party has the burden of persuasion as to
each fact the existence or nonexistence of which the
law declares essential to the claim for relief or
defense the party is asserting." 
The burden of persuasion summarizes the obligation of a party to
convince the trier of fact that the party's assertion about an
essential fact is true.  If that party does not establish the
truth of that essential fact in the mind of the factfinder by the
requisite standard of proof, then the factfinder cannot find that
the fact exists.  Oregon Evidence Code, Report of the Legislative
Interim Committee on the Judiciary, December 1980, 25 (citing
Edmund Morris Morgan, 1 Basic Problems of Evidence 19 (1954)).   
The law's assignment of the burden of persuasion is a
method for allocating the risk of non-persuasion.  Wigmore, 9
Evidence § 2485 at 285.  The burden of persuasion is, in essence,
a method of breaking ties regarding disputed factual questions. 
If the trier of fact, after having heard the evidence, is able to
render a finding in favor of one party or the other by the
requisite standard of proof, the burden of persuasion does not
come into play.  If the factfinder cannot say in whose favor the
evidence weighs more heavily, then the factfinder must resolve
the evidentiary question against the party upon whom the burden
of persuasion rests.  See Riley Hill General Contractor v. Tandy
Corp., 303 Or 390, 394-95, 737 P2d 595 (1987)(discussing
principle).   
OEC 307 describes the operation of the burden of
production of evidence:
"(1) The burden of producing evidence as to a
particular issue is on the party against whom a finding
on the issue would be required in the absence of
further evidence.
"(2) The burden of producing evidence as to a
particular issue is initially on the party with the
burden of persuasion as to that issue."
The word "burden," when used in reference to a criminal
proceeding, however, can be misleading.  In a proceeding on a
motion to suppress statements obtained while a defendant was in
custody, as in the instant action, the defendant is the moving
party but the state bears the burden of persuading the trial
court that the accused voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his or her rights under the state and federal
constitutions to have counsel present during questioning.  See
State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 321, 108 P3d 1139 (2005) (to be
valid under both state and federal constitutions, "waiver of the
right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
under totality of the circumstances").  In this context, the
defendant, as the moving party, may seek suppression of disputed
statements.  However, in doing so, the defendant does not assume
a burden of persuasion with respect to any fact concerning the
right to counsel.  
In the case at hand, the state acknowledges that the
government bears the burden of persuasion as to whether a
"defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily
waived those rights."  Defendant concedes -- and the trial court
found -- that the state met that burden because, immediately
prior to the April 11 interrogation, detectives read defendant
his Miranda rights and defendant signed a form indicating that he
understood his rights.   The parties disagree, however, about
whether a "burden" then shifts to defendant to prove that he 
subsequently invoked the right to counsel.  The question is
significant because, if the evidence shows that a defendant
unequivocally requested counsel, and the authorities continued
questioning him or her thereafter, the trial court must suppress
the defendant’s subsequent statements.  State v. Simonsen, 319 Or
510, 518, 878 P2d 409 (1994).  
The state asserts that, once it has met its burden of
persuasion to show a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, it
has made a prima facie showing of compliance with Miranda,
rendering subsequent statements by a defendant presumptively
admissible.  That presumption, the state argues, operates to
shift the burden to the defendant to prove that he or she
unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel and that the
detectives continued their interrogation despite that invocation
of rights.  The state contends that the court may suppress a
defendant's post-Miranda-waiver statements only if the defendant
persuades the trier of fact that the government obtained those
statements through coercion or some other improper conduct.  If,
as here, the evidence is in equipoise on that factual issue, the
state argues that the defendant "has not defeated the presumption
of continued validity of the initial waiver."  Applying that rule
to the facts of this case, the state explains that, because the
trial court "could not or would not find" that defendant invoked
his right to counsel, "the validity of the initial waiver is
presumed to have continued."  Moreover, the state contends that,
because defendant did not meet his burden of proving that he
invoked his right to counsel and that detectives thereafter
continued to question him, "there exists no factual predicate for
suppression" under either the Oregon or United States
constitutions.  Therefore, according to the state, the trial
court erred in suppressing defendant’s statements.
In contrast, defendant argues that the burden of
persuading the trial court that a defendant's statements were
voluntary and therefore admissible remains with the prosecution
from the beginning of a custodial interrogation to the end, even
after the defendant has waived his or her rights at the
commencement of interrogation.  Defendant contends that a trial
court must determine the admissibility of all custodial
statements that the prosecution seeks to introduce into evidence. 
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 469, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d
694 (1966).  Defendant acknowledges that, once the state has
proved a voluntary waiver, he must offer evidence of a subsequent
assertion of his constitutional right to counsel.   Defendant
claims that he did so by testifying that he invoked his right to
counsel and that detectives continued to question him thereafter.
He concludes that the trial court properly held that, because the
evidence was in equipoise on the issue of invocation, the state
did not meet its burden of persuasion.  Consequently, the trial
court did not err in suppressing defendant’s statements.
As noted earlier, the state bears the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that it afforded the right to
counsel in connection with an interrogation of defendant.  That
burden does not shift.   
The state, however, asks us to apply to the issue of
the state's compliance with the right to counsel the federal
approach to certain search and seizure cases that this court
adopted in State v. Johnson, 335 Or at 520-21.  The state’s
reliance on Johnson is misplaced.  In Johnson, the issue was
whether the trial court erred in suppressing evidence that the
police had seized pursuant to a valid search warrant on the
ground that the seizure was tainted by an earlier, unlawful
seizure of the same evidence.  On review, this court observed
that, normally, when state agents have acted under authority of a
warrant, Oregon law assigns the burden of persuasion to the party
seeking suppression –- the defendant –- to prove the unlawfulness
of the search or seizure.  Id. at 520 (citing State v. Sargent,
323 Or 455, 460, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (stating that rule)); 
ORS 133.693(3) (same).  This court further noted, however, that
no Oregon law addressed a situation in which the police first
seized the evidence in question unlawfully and the defendant
asserted that a later "reseizure" of that same evidence pursuant
to a warrant was tainted by the initial illegal search.  Having
determined that the approach taken by several federal courts was
reasonable and consistent with the rule articulated in Sargent,
this court, in Johnson, adopted the procedure set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States, 394 US
165,89 S Ct 961, 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969)) that, "[a]lthough a
defendant seeking suppression 'must go forward with specific
evidence demonstrating taint,' the government has 'the ultimate
burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted.'"
Johnson, 335 at 520.  In other words, although the party with the
ultimate burden of persuasion usually also bears the initial
burden of production, in suppression hearings involving a search
pursuant to a warrant allegedly tainted by earlier police
illegality, the defendant bears the initial burden of production,
while the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Under Johnson, the defendant's burden of production
amounts to a duty to demonstrate "a 'factual nexus' between the
illegality and the challenged evidence –- at a minimum, the
existence of a 'but for' relationship."  335 Or at 520 (citations
omitted).  That test is distinguishable from, and more rigorous
than, the one that a defendant must meet in a suppression hearing
involving a defendant’s incriminating statements.  The defendant
bears the initial burden in suppression hearings under Johnson. 
If the defendant does not meet the factual nexus test under
Johnson, he or she loses.  The court presumes that the warrant is
lawful because an independent magistrate has determined that
probable cause exists.  Id. 335 Or at 521 (citing 5 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(b), 39 (3d ed 1996).  Under
Johnson, once a defendant is able to show a factual nexus between
the evidence and some prior governmental misconduct, the
presumption of the regularity of the warrant is overcome and the
burden of persuasion shifts to the government to prove that the
police misconduct did not taint the evidence.  Johnson, 335 Or at
521. In short, this court assigned to the defendant an initial
burden of production, measured by a "but for" factual nexus test,
and left to the state the ultimate burden of persuasion.
We apply a different rule in the context of the right
to counsel because there is no presumption of regularity of
government action during a custodial interrogation.  That is why
the initial burden of production lies with the government in
suppression hearings concerning custodial interrogations. 
Moreover, because the government enjoys no presumption that the
police afforded the right to counsel to the suspect in the
interrogation context, the government properly bears the burden
of persuasion in a suppression hearing.  The factors that this
court ordinarily considers in allocating the burden of
persuasion, including access to the evidence, fairness to
litigants, and the probability of the existence or nonexistence
of the pertinent facts, support that conclusion.  See Report of
the Legislative Interim committee on the Judiciary at 25.
(listing those factors).
From the foregoing discussion, we can summarize the
following principles concerning the burdens that apply in the
context of a motion to suppress statements obtained during a
police interrogation.  The burden of persuasion regarding
compliance with the right to counsel remains with the state and
does not shift.  As the party with the burden of persuasion, the
state bears an initial burden of production to show that the
police afforded the right to counsel or that defendant validly
waived his or her right to counsel.  Once the state has offered
such evidence, the trier of fact can accept it.  And, because the
trier of fact may accept that evidence, the defendant risks
losing unless the defendant produces evidence that he or she
subsequently invoked the right to counsel.  See State v. Ruiz,
251 Or 193, 195, 444 P2d 32 (1968) (stating that, after the
police deliver Miranda warnings and the suspect understands his
or her rights, the burden is upon suspect to invoke rights)
(interpreting Miranda, 384 US at 474.  The state then can decide
to adduce still further evidence that the defendant did not
invoke or validly waived his or her rights, or it can risk
success on the record as it stands at that point.  If the trial
court finds from the evidence in the record -- whatever that
evidence is, and whoever offered it -- that the defendant
unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel, and that the
authorities continued their questioning, the court must suppress
the defendant's subsequent statements.  If the trial court finds
that the defendant did not invoke his or her right to counsel, or
invoked it but validly waived that right after invoking it, the
subsequent inculpatory statements are not subject to suppression. 
And, finally, when, as here, the trial court determines that the
evidence regarding invocation of the right to counsel is in
equipoise, the state necessarily has failed to meet its burden of
persuasion, and the state loses.
In the case at hand, the state met its initial burden
to produce evidence that, if believed, would show that defendant
had notice of and waived his right to counsel.  It was then
defendant's choice either to hope the trier of fact would not
accept that evidence or to produce evidence showing either that
he had not waived his rights or that, after waiving his rights,
he had invoked his right to counsel and the police nevertheless
continued to interrogate him.  Defendant chose to solve that
question by testifying that he had requested counsel and that the
police continued to question him.  The state then pointed to
evidence in the record indicating that defendant had not invoked
his rights unambiguously and that he had voluntarily requested
that the detectives turn on the tape recorder so that he could
make a confession.  Subsequently, the trial court accepted
aspects of both parties' evidence as being credible on the issue
of the invocation of the right to counsel.  However, the trial
court could not resolve the conflict in the evidence about
whether the police had continued to question defendant consistent
with his right to counsel.  As to that question, in order for the
state to prevail, it was essential that the evidence supporting
the state's position preponderate over the evidence supporting
defendant's position.  The trial court determined that it did
not.  Having therefore concluded that the state failed to meet
its burden of persuasion, the trial court correctly ruled that
defendant's statements must be suppressed.
We turn to the assignments of error that defendant
raises on cross-appeal.  When the state appeals an intermediate
ruling of the trial court pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a), as it
has done here, the defendant may cross-appeal under ORS 138.040. 
ORS 138.040(1)(a) provides that, on a cross-appeal, the appellate
court may review * * * [a]ny decision of the court in an
intermediate order or proceeding." (Emphasis added.)  In State v.
Shaw, 338 Or 586, 618, 113 P3d 898 (2005), this court decided
that it ordinarily would exercise that discretion by declining to
review such decisions on cross-appeal until the trial court had
entered a judgment.  In Shaw, this court also stated that it will
limit its consideration of a defendant's cross-appeal "only to
those assignments of error that are inextricably linked, either
factually or legally, to the state's assignments of error on
appeal."  Id. at 618-19.  In the case at hand, all defendant's
assignments of error go beyond the factual and legal scope of the
state's appeal. (9)  We therefore decline to exercise our
discretion to address defendant's assignments of error on
cross-appeal.
The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
1. Two provisions of the Oregon Constitution bear on a
person's rights during a police interrogation.  Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution protects the right to
counsel: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to * * * be heard by himself and counsel * * *."
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution protects a
person against compelled self-incrimination: 
"No person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal
prosecution to testify against himself."
2. When a suspect in police custody makes an unequivocal
request to speak with a lawyer, police must grant that request
and cease all questioning.  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572, 789
P2d 1352 (1990).  This court adopted that rule in order "to
protect a suspect in custody from being 'badgered' by the
police."  Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044, 103
S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983)).  When the suspect’s request
for a lawyer is equivocal, however, the police may ask questions
intended to clarify whether the suspect meant to invoke his or
her right to counsel.  State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339, 963 P2d
656 (1998). 
3. ORS 138.060(2) provides, in part:
"Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section,
when the state chooses to appeal from an order listed
in paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection, the state
shall take the appeal from the circuit court to the
Supreme Court if the defendant is charged with murder
or aggravated murder. The orders to which this
subsection applies are:
"(a) An order made prior to trial suppressing
evidence[.]"
4. ORS 138.040 (2001) provides, in part:
"Except as provided under ORS 138.050, the
defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
judgment or order described under ORS 138.053 in a
circuit court, and may cross-appeal when the state
appeals pursuant to ORS 138.060 (1)(c) or (2)(a). The
following apply upon such appeal or cross-appeal:
"(1) The appellate court may review:
"(a) Any decision of the court in an
intermediate order or proceeding."
(Emphasis added.)
5. This court held in Ball, 250 Or at 487, that, if the
trial court fails to make findings on all historical facts, and
there is evidence from which the trial court could decide those
disputed facts more than one way, we will presume that the court
found the facts in a manner consistent with the trial court's
ultimate conclusion.  Here, the state contends that this court
cannot employ that familiar rule to "fill the factual void" in
this "unique" type of case.  Instead, the state argues, "where a
court states that it is not making factual findings, and instead
bases its ruling on purely a legal proposition," this court
should review for errors of law under Meade, 327 Or at 342 n 7.
There are two problems with that assertion.  First, the
state mischaracterizes the trial court’s comments in this case. 
The trial court did not announce that it was "not making factual
findings" as the state claims it did.  Rather, in a colloquy with
the prosecutor, the trial court stated, "I have not failed to
make findings [on the invocation of the right to counsel].  I
have not declined to make findings.  I have said that the finding
is impossible to make.  And that’s different."  Second, as we
explain in this opinion, we agree with the trial court that a
determination that evidence about a disputed factual issue is in
equipoise permissibly conveys a factfinder's view that
conflicting evidence fails to preponderate in favor of or against
a particular resolution of the factual dispute.  A trial court's
determination of that kind is binding on this court.
6. Greenwich Collieries, offers an illuminating
description of the efforts of various judges and scholars to
eliminate the ambiguity of the term "burden of proof," beginning
with the seminal Massachusetts case of Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass
69 (1833), in which Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw attempted to
distinguish the burden of proof from the burden of producing
evidence.  See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 US 653,
669, 99 S Ct 2529, 61 L Ed 2d 153 (1979) ("The term 'burden of
proof' may well be an ambiguous term connoting either the burden
of going forward with the evidence, the burden of persuasion, or
both."); Russell v. Ford Motor Company, 281 Or 587, 596-97, 575
P2d 1383 (1978) ("once the defendant has come forward, we believe
that the burden of proof (or again, more precisely, the risk of
non-persuasion) must remain with the plaintiff; if the scales
remain in equilibrium on the point, plaintiff is the loser"
(quoting Southwire Co. V. Beloit Eastern Corp., 370 F Supp 842,
857-58 (ED Pa 1974)); Raz v. Mills, 231 Or 220, 227, 372 P2d 955
(1962) ("Haltom v. Fellows[, 157 Or 514, 73 P2d 680 (1937)] * * *
confused the defendant's burden of going forward with evidence to
meet a prima facie case with the ultimate burden of proof which,
of course, remains upon the plaintiff."); Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Oregon Evidence § 305.03, Art III-3 (4th ed 2002) ("'[B]urden of
proof' is a frequently confused concept.  It may refer to the
party's burden of producing evidence, or it may refer to a
party's obligation to persuade the trier of fact regarding the
existence or nonexistence of a fact.  In Article III [of the
Oregon Evidence Code], these two meanings of burden of proof are
clearly separated.").
7. This court first used the term "burden of persuasion"
in 1957 in Gum, Adm. v. Wooge et al, 211 Or 149, 160, 315 P2d 119
(1957).  It did not use the term "burden of production" until
1984, in Teledyne Wah Chang v. Energy Fac. Siting Council, 298 Or
240, 249, 692 P2d 86 (1984), although the court did begin using
the equivalent phrase "burden of going forward with the evidence"
as early as 1916. See Hancock Land Co. v. Portland, 82 Or 85, 89,
159 P 969 (1916) (quoting Edward W. Tuttle, 9 Encyclopedia of
Evidence 885 (Edgar W. Camp and John F. Crowe eds., 1906)).  See
also Carroll v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 130 Or 294, 302, 279
P 861 (1929) ("It is not strictly accurate, however, to say that
the burden of proof shifts, unless such words are used to express
the idea that at a given stage of the trial it becomes the duty
of a certain one of the parties to go forward with the
evidence.") (citing Hansen, 97 Or at 210-11).
8. Although the rules of evidence, except privilege rules,
do not govern the determination of preliminary questions of fact
concerning the admissibility of evidence in a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence, State v. Wright, 315 Or 124, 129, 843 P2d
436 (1992) (interpreting OEC 104(1)), the "'courts may apply the
rules of evidence by analogy'" in a suppression hearing.  Id.
quoting Laird C. Kirkpatrick, (2d ed 1989). 
From 1862 until 1981, Oregon statutes described only the
burden of proof.  With the exception of punctuation, the
definition remained unchanged throughout that time.  See General
Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch IX, § 777, p 343 (Deady 1845-1864). 
Former ORS 41.210 (1979), repealed by Or Laws 1981, ch 892, § 98,
provided:
"The party having the affirmative of the issue
shall produce the evidence to prove it.  Therefore, the
burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated
if no evidence were given on either side."
The Oregon Legislative Assembly abandoned the phrase "burden
of proof" in favor of the more precise terms "burden of
persuasion" and "burden of production" when it promulgated the
Oregon Evidence Code in 1981.  Or Laws 1981, ch 892, §§ 14-16. 
OEC 305 and 307 replaced former ORS 41.210.  
9. Defendant's assignments of error on cross-appeal are as
follows: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that defendant was
not illegally arrested when he was handcuffed by police during a
stop in relation to the domestic violence incident with his
girlfriend; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress
evidence obtained when the police exploited that illegal arrest
in order to question defendant about why Portland police
detectives wished to talk with him; (3) the trial court erred by
failing to suppress certain statements to and overheard by
detectives Weatheroy and Kanzler because such statements were
obtained by exploiting defendant's earlier illegal arrest; and(4)
the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence of two
phone calls defendant made immediately following the custodial
interrogation at issue in this case.