Title: In re I.J.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 5/9/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re I.J. et al., Persons Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
) 
S204622 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 
) 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B237271 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
v. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK 59248 
 
 
) 
J.J., 
) 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld a juvenile court‟s finding that a father sexually 
abused his daughter over a three-year period.  It further held that this finding 
supports the determination that the daughter and her younger sister are dependents 
of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.  Those questions are 
not before us.  Rather, we must decide whether a father‟s sexual abuse of his 
daughter supports a determination that his sons are juvenile court dependents 
when there is no evidence the father sexually abused or otherwise mistreated the 
boys, and they were unaware of their sister‟s abuse before this proceeding began. 
We conclude that a father‟s prolonged and egregious sexual abuse of his own 
child may provide substantial evidence to support a finding that all his children are 
juvenile court dependents. 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We take these facts largely from the majority opinion in the Court of Appeal. 
J.J. (father) is the father of two daughters and three sons.  On August 8, 2011, 
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 
(Department) filed a petition alleging that all five children — daughters who were 
then 14 and nine years old, twin 12-year-old boys, and a boy who would soon turn 
eight years old — were dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300.1  The petition alleged that father had sexually 
abused I.J., the older daughter, and that the abuse also placed the younger siblings 
at risk of harm.  Regarding the younger siblings, the petition cited section 300, 
subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling).  
Father denied the allegations of sexual abuse. 
The juvenile court sustained allegations that on August 2, 2011, “and on prior 
occasions for the past three years,” father sexually abused I.J. “by fondling the 
child‟s vagina and digitally penetrating the child‟s vagina and forcefully raped the 
child by placing the father‟s penis in the child‟s vagina.  On prior occasions, the 
father forced the child to expose the child‟s vagina to the father and the father 
orally copulated the child‟s vagina.  On a prior occasion, the father forced the 
child to watch pornographic videos with the father.  [I.J.] is afraid of the father due 
to the father‟s sexual abuse of [I.J.].  The sexual abuse of [I.J.] by the father 
endangers [I.J.‟s] physical health and safety and places the child and the child‟s 
siblings . . . at risk of physical harm, damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure to 
protect.” 
                                              
1 
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. 
 
 
3 
There is no evidence or claim that father sexually abused or otherwise 
mistreated his three sons, and the evidence indicates that they had not witnessed 
any of the sexual abuse and were unaware of it before this proceeding began.  The 
boys said they felt safe in the home and liked living with their parents. 
After sustaining the factual allegations, the juvenile court declared all the 
children dependents of the court.  It found, “by clear and convincing evidence, . . . 
that there is a substantial danger to the children, if returned to the home, to the 
physical health, safety, protection, physical, emotional well-being of the children, 
and there are no reasonable means by which the children‟s physical health can be 
protected without removing the children from the father‟s custody in this case.”  It 
removed the children from father‟s custody, and ordered them placed with their 
mother under the Department‟s supervision.  The court ordered visits for father 
monitored by someone other than the mother, and ordered father to attend a 
“program of sex abuse counseling for perpetrators” and to undergo family 
counseling. 
Father appealed.  The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the juvenile court‟s finding that father had sexually 
abused I.J., and that the abuse supported the court‟s declaring I.J. and her sister to 
be dependants of the court.  It divided on the question of whether the abuse also 
warranted the court‟s further declaring her brothers to be dependents of the court.  
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Grimes, joined by Presiding Justice 
Bigelow, upheld the jurisdictional finding.  Justice Flier dissented, arguing that 
father‟s sexual abuse of his daughter, without more, did not warrant the court‟s 
assuming jurisdiction over his sons. 
We granted father‟s petition for review to decide whether his abuse of his 
daughter supported the court‟s declaring his sons to be dependents of the court. 
 
 
4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the evidence supports the 
juvenile court‟s finding that father abused his daughter.  That holding is not before 
us on review and, accordingly, we accept the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion in this 
regard.  (See People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1076-1077.)  Father 
contends, however, that evidence that he sexually abused his daughter does not 
support the juvenile court‟s finding that his sons are dependents of the court under 
section 300. 
Section 300 begins:  “Any child who comes within any of the following 
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that 
person to be a dependent child of the court . . . .”  Then follow several 
subdivisions describing children who may be adjudged dependents of the court.  
The Department alleged that the younger siblings, including the sons, come within 
three of these subdivisions:  subdivision (b) (“The child has suffered, or there is a 
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a 
result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or 
protect the child . . . .”); subdivision (d) (“The child has been sexually abused, or 
there is substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 
11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent . . . .”); and subdivision (j) (“The 
child‟s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), 
(e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, 
as defined in those subdivisions.”). 
The Department has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the children are dependents of the court under section 300.  (§ 355, 
subd. (a); see In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) 
The Court of Appeal below correctly stated the applicable standard of 
review:  “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
 
 
5 
the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, 
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.  „In making this determination, we 
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and 
orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to 
the court‟s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the 
province of the trial court.‟  (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)  
„We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely 
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.  
[Citations.]  “ „[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light 
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is 
appropriate].‟ ”  [Citation.]‟  (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)”  
(See also In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) 
No evidence exists that father physically or sexually abused or neglected the 
boys themselves.  But section 300 does not require that a child actually be abused 
or neglected before the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction.  The subdivisions at 
issue here require only a “substantial risk” that the child will be abused or 
neglected.  The legislatively declared purpose of these provisions “is to provide 
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, 
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure 
the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are 
at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2, italics added.)  “The court need not wait until a 
child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps 
necessary to protect the child.”  (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) 
“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a 
minor comes within the dependency court‟s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can 
affirm the juvenile court‟s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the 
 
 
6 
statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by 
substantial evidence.  In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider 
whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are 
supported by the evidence.”  (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) 
Subdivision (j) of section 300 is the one that most closely describes the situation 
regarding the boys.  Accordingly, we will focus on that subdivision. 
Subdivision (j) applies if (1) the child‟s sibling has been abused or neglected 
as defined in specified other subdivisions and (2) there is a substantial risk that the 
child will be abused or neglected as defined in those subdivisions.  (§ 300, subd. 
(j).)  Here, father sexually abused the boys‟ sister as defined in subdivision (d).  So 
the first requirement is met.  At issue is the second requirement.  “[S]ubdivision (j) 
was intended to expand the grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction as to children 
whose sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in section 300, subdivision 
(a), (b), (d), (e), or (i).  Subdivision (j) does not state that its application is limited 
to the risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in the same 
subdivision that describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling.  Rather, subdivision 
(j) directs the trial court to consider whether there is a substantial risk that the 
child will be harmed under subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e) or (i) of section 300, 
notwithstanding which of those subdivisions describes the child‟s sibling.”  (In re 
Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 64 (Maria R.).) 
Unlike the other subdivisions, subdivision (j) includes a list of factors for the 
court to consider:  “The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the 
abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the 
abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and 
any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a 
substantial risk to the child.”  (§ 300, subd. (j).)  “The „nature of the abuse or 
neglect of the sibling‟ is only one of many factors that the court is to consider in 
 
 
7 
assessing whether the child is at risk of abuse or neglect in the family home.  
Subdivision (j) thus allows the court to take into consideration factors that might 
not be determinative if the court were adjudicating a petition filed directly under 
one of those subdivisions.  [¶]  The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly 
indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of the 
child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk 
of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision 
(j).  The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise 
jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than 
the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.”  (Maria R., supra, 185 
Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) 
Several Court of Appeal cases have considered, in varying factual contexts, 
whether sexual abuse of a daughter supports finding a son to be a dependent of the 
court, with sharply conflicting results.  (Compare In re R.V., supra, 208 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 842-848 [upholding finding the son was a court dependent 
when the son had witnessed some of the sexual abuse], In re Ana C. (2012) 204 
Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330-1332 [upholding, over a dissent, finding the son was a 
court dependent], In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1410-1415 
[upholding finding the son was a court dependent when the father exposed himself 
to a daughter while the son was in the same room], In re P.A. (2006) 144 
Cal.App.4th 1339, 1345-1347 [upholding finding the son was a court dependent], 
In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 89-91 [upholding finding the sons were 
court dependents when the sons had observed some forms of physical abuse and 
heard their sister report a rape to their mother], and In re Jason L. (1990) 222 
Cal.App.3d 1206, 1213-1218 [upholding finding the son was a court dependent 
when there was also evidence the father had engaged in at least one homosexual 
relationship, shared a bedroom with the son, and showered with him at least twice] 
 
 
8 
with In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 53-56 [overturning finding the son 
was a court dependent], Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62-70 
[overturning finding the sons were court dependents], and In re Rubisela E. (2000) 
85 Cal.App.4th 177, 197-199 [overturning finding the sons were court 
dependents]; see also In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 137-139 
[upholding the juvenile court‟s refusal to find the son was a court dependent].) 
Some of these cases are distinguishable from this one and each other, in that 
some of the cases upholding the jurisdictional finding contained additional 
evidence that is lacking here.  But to some extent, the cases simply disagree with 
each other.  The majority below agreed with the cases finding the evidence 
sufficient, while the dissent agreed with the cases finding the evidence 
insufficient. 
Two typical cases upholding the jurisdictional finding are In re P.A., supra, 
144 Cal.App.4th 1339, and In re Karen R., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 84.  The Karen 
R. court said that “a father who has committed two incidents of forcible incestuous 
rape of his minor daughter reasonably can be said to be so sexually aberrant that 
both male and female siblings of the victim are at substantial risk of sexual 
abuse . . . .  Although the danger of sexual abuse of a female sibling in such a 
situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a male sibling, the 
danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still substantial.  Given 
the facts of this case, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude every minor in 
the home, regardless of gender, was in substantial danger of sexual abuse by 
father.”  (In re Karen R., supra, at pp. 90-91.) 
In P.A., the juvenile court sustained an allegation that the father had 
sexually abused his daughter by touching her vagina under her clothes and on top 
of her underwear.  (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1341, 1343.)  There 
was no evidence the father had inappropriately touched or otherwise sexually 
 
 
9 
abused his sons, and it appeared the boys were unaware of the abuse.  (Id. at p. 
1345.)  Nevertheless, relying in part on In re Karen R., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 
the court upheld the jurisdictional finding as to the sons.  It acknowledged that the 
abuse in its case was “less shocking than the abuse in Karen R.,” but it was 
“convinced that where, as here, a child has been sexually abused, any younger 
sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to 
be at risk of sexual abuse.  As we intimated in Karen R., aberrant sexual behavior 
by a parent places the victim‟s siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant 
sexual behavior.”  (In re P.A., supra, at p. 1347.) 
The P.A. court found its conclusion “consistent with section 355.1, 
subdivision (d), which provides in pertinent part that:  „(d)  Where the court finds 
that either a parent, a guardian, or any other person who resides with . . . a minor 
who is currently the subject of the petition filed under Section 300 . . . (3) has been 
found in a prior dependency hearing . . . to have committed an act of sexual 
abuse, . . . that finding shall be prima facie evidence in any proceeding that the 
subject minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d) of Section 
300 and is at substantial risk of abuse or neglect.  The prima facie evidence 
constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.‟  [¶]  
Although section 355.1, subdivision (d), was not triggered here because there was 
no prior dependency proceeding at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, it 
nonetheless evinces a legislative determination that siblings of sexually abused 
children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the 
juvenile courts.”  (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) 
A relatively early case overturning the jurisdictional finding is In re 
Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 177.  The Rubisela E. court did “not discount 
the real possibility that brothers of molested sisters can be molested [citation] or in 
other ways harmed by the fact of the molestation within the family.  Brothers can 
 
 
10 
be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the trust of their sister.  
They can even be harmed by the denial of the perpetrator, the spouse‟s 
acquiescence in the denial, or their parents‟ efforts to embrace them in a web of 
denial.”  (Id. at p. 198.)  But, the court found, “in the case at bench, while such a 
showing is possible, there has been no demonstration by the department that „there 
is a substantial risk [to the brothers] that [they] will be abused or neglected, as 
defined in . . . [the applicable] subdivisions . . . .”  (Id. at p. 199.) 
Relying partly on In re Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 177, the Maria 
R. court “disagree[d] with prior cases to the extent that they have held, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that a parent‟s sexual abuse of a daughter, either alone or 
in combination with a factor or factors that have no established correlation with 
sexual abuse, is sufficient to establish that the parent‟s son is at risk of sexual 
abuse by that parent . . . .”  (Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)  It agreed 
with Rubisela E. “that the brothers of molested girls may be harmed by the fact of 
molestation occurring in the family,” but it did not “agree with prior cases to the 
extent that they have held or implied that the risk that the brothers face may — in 
the absence of evidence demonstrating that the perpetrator of the abuse may have 
an interest in sexually abusing male children — be deemed to be one of „sexual 
abuse‟ within the meaning of subdivision (d). . . .  [T]he phrase „sexual abuse‟ for 
purposes of section 300 is defined by reference to the offenses enumerated in 
Penal Code section 11165.1, whether the allegation of sexual abuse is filed under 
subdivision (d) or (j).  [Citation.]  Penal Code section 11165.1 refers to specific 
sex acts committed by the perpetrator on a victim . . . and does not include in its 
enumerated offenses the collateral damage on a child that might result from the 
family‟s or child‟s reaction to a sexual assault on the child‟s sibling.”  (Maria R., 
supra, at pp. 67-68.) 
 
 
11 
The Maria R. court noted that “[n]one of the courts that have held or 
impliedly concluded that a child, regardless of gender, whose sibling was sexually 
abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse under subdivision (d), either 
directly or under subdivision (j) [of section 300], has cited any scientific authority 
or empirical evidence to support the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses 
a female child is likely to sexually abuse a male child.  [Citing In re P.A., supra, 
144 Cal.App.4th 1339, and In re Andy G., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1405.]  In the 
absence of evidence demonstrating that a perpetrator of sexual abuse of a female 
child is in fact likely to sexually abuse a male child, we are not persuaded that the 
rule of general applicability enunciated in P.A., and repeated by the Andy G. court, 
is grounded in fact.  For this reason, we decline to adopt the reasoning of P.A. and 
Andy G.”  (Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.)  The court concluded that 
“[s]ince there is no evidence in the record that would tend to support a finding that 
[the father] has an interest in engaging in sexual activity with a male child, we 
cannot . . . conclude that [the father‟s] sexual abuse of his daughters — as aberrant 
as it is — establishes that [the son] is at substantial risk of sexual abuse within the 
meaning of subdivision (j), as defined in subdivision (d) and Penal Code section 
11165.1.”  (Ibid.)2 
We agree with the majority below that the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to support the juvenile court‟s dependency finding.  Among the factors 
cited in subdivision (j) for the court to consider are the circumstances surrounding, 
and the nature of, father‟s sexual abuse of his daughter.  By citing these factors, 
                                              
2  
However, the Maria R. court remanded the matter to the juvenile court for 
further proceedings to determine whether the son might be a dependent child 
under section 355.1, subdivision (d)(3).  (Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
69-72.)  In light of our resolution of this case, we need not, and do not, consider 
whether the Maria R. court erred in this respect. 
 
 
12 
subdivision (j) implies that the more egregious the abuse, the more appropriate for 
the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over the siblings.  (§ 300, subd. (j).)  
“Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability 
because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. . . .  Conversely, a 
relatively high probability that a very minor harm will occur probably does not 
involve a „substantial‟ risk.  Thus, in order to determine whether a risk is 
substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that harm will occur and 
the magnitude of potential harm . . . .”  (People v. Hall (Colo. 2000) 999 P.2d 207, 
217-218 [considering what constitutes a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of 
death].)  In other words, the more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the 
required probability of the child‟s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is 
at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.  If the sibling abuse is 
relatively minor, the court might reasonably find insubstantial a risk the child will 
be similarly abused; but as the abuse becomes more serious, it becomes more 
necessary to protect the child from even a relatively low probability of that abuse. 
The majority below accurately described father‟s behavior as “aberrant in 
the extreme:  he sexually abused his own daughter „by fondling the child‟s vagina 
and digitally penetrating the child‟s vagina and forcefully raped the child by 
placing the father‟s penis in the child‟s vagina.‟ ”  Also relevant to the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the sibling abuse is the violation of trust shown by 
sexually abusing one child while the other children were living in the same home 
and could easily have learned of or even interrupted the abuse.  “[S]exual or other 
serious physical abuse of a child by an adult constitutes a fundamental betrayal of 
the appropriate relationship between the generations. . . .  When a parent abuses 
his or her child, . . . the parent also abandons and contravenes the parental role.  
Such misparenting is among the specific compelling circumstances which may 
justify state intervention, including an interruption of parental custody.  (See 
 
 
13 
§ 300, subds. (d), (e), (j).)”  (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76-77.)  The 
serious and prolonged nature of father‟s sexual abuse of his daughter under these 
circumstances supports the juvenile court‟s finding that the risk of abuse was 
substantial as to all the children. 
The Maria R. court criticized cases like In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 
1339, for not citing scientific authority or empirical evidence to support the 
conclusion that a father who abuses his daughter is likely to abuse his son.  (Maria 
R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.)  But nothing in the statutes suggests a 
legislative intent to require a court to consult scientific authority or empirical 
evidence before it makes the “substantial risk” determination.  The specific factors 
the Legislature stated in section 300, subdivision (j) do not include such evidence.  
Rather, after considering the nature and severity of the abuse and the other 
specified factors, the juvenile court is supposed to use its best judgment to 
determine whether or not the particular substantial risk exists.  As the majority 
below noted, “It is of course impossible to say what any particular sexual 
predator — and here a predator who has raped his own daughter — is likely to do 
in the future in any particular instance.  But in our view that very uncertainty 
makes it virtually incumbent upon the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over the 
siblings . . . .” 
Another statute that does not directly apply here supports the conclusion 
that a court need not consult scientific authority before it finds the requisite 
substantial risk when a parent has sexually abused a sibling.  Section 355.1, 
subdivision (d), provides that a prior finding of sexual abuse (of anyone, not just a 
sibling) is prima facie evidence that the child who is the subject of the dependency 
hearing is subject to the court‟s jurisdiction under section 300.  When it enacted 
subdivision (d) of section 355.1, the Legislature found “that children of the State 
of California are placed at risk when permitted contact with a parent or caretaker 
 
 
14 
who has committed a sex crime.  Further, the Legislature finds that children 
subject to juvenile court dependency jurisdiction based on allegations of 
molestation are in need of protection from those persons.”  (Stats. 1999, ch. 417, 
§ 1, p. 2780.)  Nothing in this subdivision suggests it is limited to sexual abuse of 
a person of the same gender as the child before the court. 
Father correctly argues that section 355.1 does not apply here because there 
was no finding in a prior proceeding that he committed sexual abuse.  But neither 
the P.A. court, nor the Court of Appeal here, nor the Department contends it does 
apply.  Rather, section 355.1 is relevant because it evinces a legislative intent that 
sexual abuse of someone else, without more, at least supports a dependency 
finding.  (See In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) 
Citing empirical studies, father argues that when a father sexually abuses a 
daughter, his sons are at significantly lower risk of sexual abuse than are his other 
daughters.  Amicus curiae California State Association of Counties challenges 
father‟s statistics and argues that empirical studies show the risk to boys when a 
sister is abused is greater than father argues.  We need not examine these studies in 
detail.  For present purposes, we may assume that father‟s other daughter is at 
greater risk of sexual abuse than are his sons.  But this does not mean the risk to 
the sons is nonexistent or so insubstantial that the juvenile court may not take steps 
to protect the sons from that risk.  “Although the danger of sexual abuse of a 
female sibling in such a situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse 
of a male sibling, the danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still 
substantial.”  (In re Karen R., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 91.)  The juvenile court 
need not compare relative risks to assume jurisdiction over all the children of a 
sexual abuser, especially when the abuse was as severe and prolonged as here. 
The juvenile court‟s assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 does not 
itself mean father will lose all parental rights.  “A dependency adjudication is a 
 
 
15 
preliminary step that allows the juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert 
supervision over the endangered child‟s care.  But it is merely a first step, and the 
system includes many subsequent safeguards to ensure that parental rights and 
authority will be restricted only to the extent necessary for the child‟s safety and 
welfare.”  (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 617.)  All we are holding at this 
point is that when a father severely sexually abuses his own child, the court may 
assume jurisdiction over, and take steps to protect, the child‟s siblings. 
We agree with the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion.  “The juvenile court is 
mandated to focus on „ensur[ing] the safety, protection, and physical and 
emotional well-being of children who are at risk‟ of physical, sexual or emotional 
abuse.  (§ 300.2.)  That is what the court did here.”  As we noted earlier, the 
juvenile court found, “by clear and convincing evidence, . . . that there is a 
substantial danger to the children, if returned to the home, to the physical health, 
safety, protection, physical, emotional well-being of the children, and there are no 
reasonable means by which the children‟s physical health can be protected without 
removing the children from the father‟s custody in this case.”  In upholding the 
assertion of jurisdiction in this case, we are not holding that the juvenile court is 
compelled, as a matter of law, to assume jurisdiction over all the children 
whenever one child is sexually abused.  We merely hold the evidence in this case 
supports the juvenile court‟s assertion of jurisdiction.  (Cf. In re Jordan R., supra, 
205 Cal.App.4th 111 [upholding the juvenile court‟s refusal to assert 
jurisdiction].) 
 
 
16 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and disapprove, to the 
extent they are inconsistent with this opinion, In re Alexis S., supra, 205 
Cal.App.4th 48, In re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 48, and In re Rubisela E., 
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 177. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re I.J. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 207 Cal.App.4th 1351 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S204622 
Date Filed: May 9, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Timothy R. Saito 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Jack A. Love, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Emery El Habiby, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Cristina Gabrielidis 
6977 Navajo Road, Suite 303 
San Diego, CA  92119 
(619) 733-1328 
 
Emery El Habiby 
Deputy County Counsel 
201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite 1 
Monterey Park, CA  91754-2142 
(323) 526-6228