Title: ALFONSO E ROGERS V JB HUNT TRANSPORT INC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2002  
ALFONSO E. ROGERS, Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Daimon Ja’Von Rogers, 
Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118766  
J. B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant  
and  
WESLEY HOWARD CRENSHAW,  
Defendant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
WEAVER, J.  
In this wrongful death action, we address whether a  
default entered against an employee that conclusively  
determined the employee’s negligence for the purpose of the  
employee’s personal liability is also a proper foundation for  
an order holding his employer vicariously liable. The Court  
of Appeals held that it was, thereby extending the effect of  
the default to the employer and precluding the employer from  
contesting its vicarious liability. We reverse the decision  
of the Court of Appeals and remand to the circuit court.  
I  
This action arises from an automobile accident that  
occurred in the early afternoon on June 17, 1996.  The  
decedent, Daimon Rogers, was killed when his vehicle left the  
roadway and struck a tractor-trailer rig parked on the north  
shoulder of the westbound I-96 expressway in Eaton County,  
Michigan.  It is undisputed that defendant-appellant J. B.  
Hunt owned the tractor-trailer and that defendant Wesley  
Crenshaw had been operating the tractor-trailer in the course  
of his employment with J. B. Hunt.  
J. 
B. 
Hunt 
terminated Crenshaw’s employment in July 1996.  
Subsequently, 
on 
July 23, 1996, the personal representative of  
Daimon Rogers’ estate filed a complaint against Crenshaw and  
J. B. Hunt. It alleged Crenshaw was negligent and that his  
negligence was a proximate cause of Daimon Rogers’ crash and  
death.
 It also alleged J. B. Hunt’s vicarious liability.  
J. B. Hunt filed an answer on its own behalf denying  
Crenshaw’s 
negligence 
and 
causation.  
However, 
Crenshaw 
failed  
to personally file an answer or appear in response to two  
summonses.  On March 20, 1997, the Eaton Circuit Court issued  
2  
a third summons and an order permitting alternative service of  
process by publication and by service on codefendant, J. B.  
Hunt.  Thereafter, J. B. Hunt’s attorney purported to file an  
answer on behalf of Crenshaw.  
Crenshaw 
repeatedly 
failed 
to 
appear 
for 
depositions 
over  
a fourteen-month period. 
On August 6, 1998, plaintiff  
obtained an order of default pursuant to MCR 2.313(B) and (D)  
against Crenshaw.  During the hearing on plaintiff’s motion  
for the default of Crenshaw, J. B. Hunt’s attorney moved to  
withdraw as counsel of record for Crenshaw. The trial court  
granted both motions.  J. B. Hunt did not object to the entry  
of the order of default.  
On 
December 
15, 
1998, plaintiff moved for partial summary  
disposition regarding the liability of J. B. Hunt.  Plaintiff  
argued that the default that was entered against defendant  
Crenshaw settled the question of J. B. Hunt’s liability and,  
therefore, J. B. Hunt could not contest the issues of  
negligence and causation at trial.  Plaintiff also argued that  
J. B. Hunt was precluded from presenting the affirmative  
defense of comparative negligence. The circuit court granted  
plaintiff’s motion in part, concluding that J. B. Hunt was  
vicariously liable for the negligence of Crenshaw and could  
not contest at trial the issues of negligence and proximate  
cause.  However, the trial court also denied the motion in  
3  
part, concluding that J. B. Hunt could raise the defense of  
the decedent’s comparative negligence and whether his  
comparative negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, citing “compelling policy  
consideration[s]” 
involving 
vicarious 
liability. 
 
244 
Mich 
App  
600, 610; 624 NW2d 532 (2001).  Specifically, the panel  
stated, “[e]mployers are held vicariously liable not because  
of their ability to control their employees’ conduct, but  
because they stand to profit from their employees’ conduct.”  
Id. at 610-611. With this, the panel discarded the linchpin  
justifying vicarious liability between an employer and an  
employee—that the employee committed an act producing a claim  
in the scope of employment.  The panel’s reasoning suggests  
that if the employer financially profits from an employee’s  
activities, the employer is vicariously liable not only for  
everything the employee does within the scope of employment,  
but also to all acts tangentially related to that employment  
or occurring outside the scope of employment, even if they  
occurred after the employee leaves the employment.  We granted  
leave to appeal because the panel’s suggestion that an  
employer may be vicariously liable not only for employees’  
torts committed within the scope of employment, but also for  
wrongful conduct outside the scope of employment is worthy of  
review.  
4  
  
 
II  
The 
law 
regarding 
respondeat 
superior 
and, 
in 
particular,  
how the entry of a default against an employee affects the  
liability of an employer where the employer’s sole source of  
liability is vicarious are questions of law.  We review  
questions of law de novo. Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465  
Mich 29, 34; 632 NW2d 912 (2001). The grant of a motion for  
summary disposition is also reviewed de novo.  MacDonald v  
PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 332; 628 NW2d 33 (2001).  
III  
In addressing this issue as posed by the Court of  
Appeals, it is important to clarify why the courts have  
imposed liability on those who were not the actors, but merely  
the masters of the actors.  The reason is that “a master is  
responsible for the wrongful acts of his servant committed  
while performing some duty within the scope of his  
employment.” Murphy v Kuhartz, 244 Mich 54, 56; 221 NW 143  
(1982).
 An employer is not vicariously liable for acts  
committed by its employees outside the scope of employment,  
because the employee is not acting for the employer or under  
the employer’s control. For example, it is well established  
that an employee’s negligence committed while on a frolic or  
detour, Drobnicki v Packard Motor Car Co, 212 Mich 133; 180 NW  
459 (1920), or after hours, Eberle Brewing Co v Briscoe Motor  
5  
 
Co, 194 Mich 140; 160 NW 440 (1916), is not imputed to the  
employer.  In addition, even where an employee is working,  
vicarious liability is not without its limits. For example,  
we have held that “there is no liability on the part of an  
employer 
for 
torts 
intentionally or recklessly committed by an  
employee beyond the scope of his master’s business.”  Bradley  
v Stevens, 329 Mich 556, 562; 46 NW2d 382 (1951).  
Likewise, respondeat superior or vicarious liability  
principles do not support imposing liability on J. B. Hunt in  
the present case merely on the basis of Crenshaw’s default.  
When Crenshaw failed to participate in this litigation, he was  
not acting within the scope of employment. Rather, Crenshaw  
was acting on behalf of himself only in regard to the  
litigation. In fact, his procedural failures were committed  
when he was a former employee of J. B. Hunt. 
Because his  
nonparticipation was not in the course of his employment with  
J. B. Hunt, extending liability to J. B. Hunt for Crenshaw’s  
nonparticipation is beyond the scope of vicarious liability.  
In this regard, we emphasize that the basis of vicarious  
liability is not merely that an employer typically has a  
greater ability to pay than an employee.  As a leading  
treatise on American tort law explains, additional rationales  
for vicarious liability for acts of agents within the scope of  
employment include providing an incentive for employers to  
6  
 
 
attempt to reduce tortious conduct by their employees and the  
fair 
distribution 
of 
risk 
associated 
with 
activity  
characteristic of a business or other entity.  See Dobbs,  
Torts, § 334, pp 908-910.  Risks typically associated with  
operating trucks may fairly be said to be characteristic of J.  
B. 
Hunt’s 
business 
activities. However, an employee’s refusal  
to participate in litigation is not a characteristic risk of  
operating 
a 
trucking 
business. 
Accordingly, 
such  
nonparticipation is not something that an employer can  
reasonably be expected to deter or fairly be expected to  
absorb as a cost of doing business.  
Here Crenshaw was not, in his capacity as a litigant,  
acting for J. B. Hunt.  To bind an employer to the actions of  
a party who was not acting within the scope of employment at  
the time those actions occur, violates the central tenet of  
vicarious 
liability 
that a master’s liability is derivative of  
the servant’s.  In sum, the rationales that support the  
imposition of vicarious liability on a master also support  
limiting such liability to conduct that occurs within the  
scope of employment.  Id., p 910. By misapplying the policies  
underpinning vicarious liability, the Court of Appeals panel  
in this case took the doctrine too far.  
Moreover, the Court of Appeals approach is contrary to  
longstanding legal principles related to the effect of a  
7  
default.  As a sanction for Crenshaw’s failure to cooperate  
with the discovery process, the trial court entered an order  
of default against him.  It is well settled under the law that  
this default operates as an admission of Crenshaw’s  
negligence. However, a traditional rule of default provides  
that the default of one party is not an admission of liability  
on the part of a nondefaulting coparty.  Allstate Ins Co v  
Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 73; 499 NW2d 743 (1993).  Thus, the  
default entered against Crenshaw does not establish any  
liability on the part of J. B. Hunt.  
While the doctrine of vicarious liability allocates the  
risk of an employee’s negligent acts occurring during the  
course of employment on the employer, we cannot agree that  
this rule justifies the extension of the effect of a default  
to a codefendant.  Default is a punitive measure, appropriate  
in defined circumstances, the threat of which encourages the  
cooperation of parties to a suit. Our court rules governing  
the entry of defaults and default judgments are narrowly  
designed to sanction an uncooperative party. Nowhere in the  
rules is it contemplated that a cooperating party can be  
sanctioned 
for 
a 
coparty’s 
procedural 
shortcomings.1  
1 MCR 2.313(D)(1)(a) provides that “just” sanctions are 
appropriate where a party fails to appear for depositions 
after 
being 
served 
proper notice.  MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c) provides 
for “rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient 
party.”  
8  
  
Obviously, J. B. Hunt could not force its former employee,  
Crenshaw, to participate in discovery. Indeed, it has never  
been contended that J. B. Hunt controlled Crenshaw’s  
litigation activity or participated in misconduct that  
produced Crenshaw’s default. Therefore, the goal of forcing  
defendants to properly cooperate with litigation would not be  
reasonably furthered by extending the consequences of the  
default to J. B. Hunt. As recognized by Stillwell v City of  
Wheeling, 210 W Va 599, 606; 558 SE2d 598 (2001),  penalizing  
a party that has no control over a co-party’s default would  
“have no deterrent effect.”  
Our 
decision 
is 
informed by our court system’s preference  
for disposition of issues on their merits. North v Dep’t of  
Mental Health, 427 Mich 659, 662; 397 NW2d 793 (1986)  
(addressing this preference in the context of a dismissal with  
prejudice). For this reason, defaults and default judgments  
are not favored in the law. Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter- 
Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573, 586; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). 
In this  
regard, it is important to emphasize that the entry of a  
default against Crenshaw does not establish that he was  
actually negligent in connection with the accident underlying  
this case.  Rather, the entry of the default bars him from  
contesting the issue of his negligence because of his failure  
to properly participate in the litigation. Unlike Crenshaw,  
9  
J. B. Hunt has participated in the litigation. Thus, there is  
nothing inconsistent in allowing J. B. Hunt to contest the  
alleged negligence of Crenshaw even though Crenshaw himself  
would not be allowed to do so in light of the default entered  
against him.  
Our decision does not undercut the validity of default as  
a sanction for discovery abuses.  Contrary to the Court of  
Appeals concerns, allowing J. B. Hunt to contest Crenshaw’s  
negligence 
and 
causation does not render the punitive purposes  
of the default meaningless.  The default remains in force  
against Crenshaw and forecloses his ability to present proofs  
denying his own negligence.2
 Potentially, plaintiff is  
prejudiced to the extent that he cannot depose Crenshaw.  
However, J. B. Hunt’s defense is similarly potentially  
prejudiced by the absence of Crenshaw’s testimony.
 The  
possible prejudicial consequences of a party’s failure to  
appear and resultant default do not justify the extension of  
the punitive effect the sanction to an appearing party or  
denying that party the opportunity to present its defense.  
IV  
We conclude that, where a party’s sole source of  
liability is vicarious, a default entered against a coparty  
2 As Crenshaw’s alleged negligence has yet to be 
litigated, we express no opinion on the merits of the 
negligence or proximate cause issues.  
10  
 
does not preclude the former from contesting its vicarious  
liability. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed  
and this matter remanded to the circuit court for further  
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.  
11  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALFONSO E. ROGERS, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Daimon Ja'Von Rogers, deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 118766  
J. B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
WESLEY HOWARD CRENSHAW.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority's narrow view of vicarious  
liability.  
The Court of Appeals held, for legal and public policy  
reasons, that it is proper to hold the employer, J. B. Hunt  
Transport, Inc., liable for a tort that was established by  
default. In doing so, it followed the law:  
Where several defendants are treated as one, 
as in cases involving employers and employees, but 
one defaults, the defaulter still has the benefit 
of any contributory negligence established against 
the plaintiff by the remaining defendant.  Thus, 
where vicarious liability is found, the court 
should tell the jury that the defaulting employee 
has been found negligent, and his negligence should  
 
be compared to that of the plaintiff in determining 
the defendants' liability. 
[57B Am Jur 2d, 
Negligence, § 1276, p 174.]  
I agree with the Court of Appeals, which used the default of  
the driver, Wesley Crenshaw, to preclude Hunt from denying  
liability for Crenshaw's negligence.  
The majority relies on the notion that Hunt's "control"  
of Crenshaw at the time of the default is the key to whether  
Hunt is liable.  It assumes that the only time when liability  
for Crenshaw's acts could attach was when Crenshaw was an  
employee of Hunt.  
Certainly, control is one of the considerations upon  
which respondeat superior liability reposes. However, it is  
not the only consideration.  When the majority uses control as  
its only consideration, it confuses liability arising from  
respondeat superior with vicarious liability arising from  
another doctrine, agency.  
The difference between the two is explained by 27 Am Jur  
2d, Employment Relationship, § 460, pp 897-898:  
Vicarious 
liability 
based 
on 
agency 
is  
distinct 
from 
liability 
based 
on 
respondeat 
superior in that the employer is not liable for the 
acts of the employee under the former theory unless 
the employee acted on behalf of or under the 
authority of the employer and unless the employer 
clearly approved of the wrongful conduct.  
The majority is using an agency theory to support vicarious  
liability.  Because Hunt had no control over Crenshaw when the  
2  
 
latter defaulted, the majority will not allow vicarious  
liability to attach.  
Vicarious liability should be found in this case not on  
the basis of agency, but on the basis of the doctrine of  
respondeat superior. 
Holding the employer liable for the  
underlying tort, even though its employee defaulted, would  
satisfy vital policy interests, such as justice, convenience,  
deterrence, social justice, and the ability to give the victim  
an effective remedy. These approaches have been explained in  
Am Jur 2d:  
The modern basis for vicarious liability is 
that, as a matter of public policy, an enterprise 
or an activity should bear the risk of a tort-
-
committed or resulting from omission-
-
-of those who, 
in fact, carry on the enterprise, activity or 
operation.
 It is a part of the cost of doing 
business or carrying on various activities; and, in 
modern society, in Western countries at least, the 
cost is spread throughout industries or even the 
public at large by use of liability insurance and 
similar self-insurer devices-
-
-rather than being 
borne by some hapless injury victim. 
Thus, the 
doctrine has been developed and extended out of the 
necessity 
of 
changing 
social 
and 
economic  
conditions.  [57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence, § 1753, pp 
447-448.]  
The authors of Torts, Prosser and Keeton, also assert  
that vicarious liability is not a mere question of control,  
and that other bases exist for it:  
The losses caused by the torts of employees, 
which as a practical matter are sure to occur in 
the conduct of that employer's enterprise, are 
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required 
cost of doing business. They are placed upon the  
3  
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, 
which will on the basis of all past experience 
involve harm to others through the torts of the 
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just 
that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff 
should bear them; and because he is better able to 
absorb them, and to distribute them, through  
prices, rates or liability insurance, to the  
public, and so to shift them to society, to the 
community at large. [Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th 
ed), § 69, pp 500-501.]  
Therefore, the majority errs by giving undue weight to  
control.  Had Crenshaw been held liable after a trial, Hunt  
would have been liable for Crenshaw's negligence, even though  
it has no control over what Crenshaw did, said, or admitted at  
trial.  This is because, on a respondeat superior theory, the  
employer is normally liable for the employee's underlying  
tort.  
There is another good reason to hold the employer liable  
here.  Default is considered to be a punitive measure, but it  
is accepted in the law because it is needed to preserve a fair  
tribunal, free of egregious discovery abuses.  Despite this  
need, the majority allows the employer a potential benefit  
from the driver's default, the driver's absence from trial as  
a major witness.  
Moreover, the policy reasons cited by the majority  
support the use of the default against Hunt.  As it points  
out, the imposition of vicarious liability serves as an  
incentive for employers to reduce tortious conduct and  
4  
promotes a fair distribution of risk.  Trucking companies hire  
drivers to traverse multiple states where they might become  
involved in accidents.  They must be held to know that a  
lawsuit and the potential default of an out-of-state driver  
are risks to be expected in their business.1  In balance, it  
is better that Hunt not be allowed a potential benefit from  
the absence of Crenshaw at trial.  
Finally, it should be noted that the imposition of  
vicarious liability on Hunt would not render it defenseless at  
trial.  A default would establish negligence on the part of  
Crenshaw, but it would not determine the extent of Hunt's  
liability.  Under the Court of Appeals decision, Hunt would  
still be able to contest up to ninety-nine percent of its  
liability at trial.  
Because I believe that the majority's analysis is too  
restrictive a view of vicarious liability based on respondeat  
superior, I dissent.  
1In fact, it has happened before that a trucking 
company's driver, resident in another state, became involved 
in an accident and defaulted upon being sued.  See, e.g., J B  
Hunt Transport, Inc v Bentley, 207 Ga App 250; 427 SE2d 499  
(1993).  
5