Title: State v. Vanessa D. Hughes

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Vanessa D. Hughes,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 17, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Laurence Gram 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Andrea Taylor Cornwall, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1121-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Vanessa D. Hughes,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case involves a warrantless 
police entry into a home.  The officers in question were at the 
threshold of the defendant's apartment about to investigate a 
complaint of trespassing when the door was unexpectedly opened, 
and they immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana coming 
from inside.  The officers also deduced a distinct possibility 
that any evidence of the drug would be destroyed if they did not 
immediately enter, since the people in the apartment were now 
alerted to their presence.  The question in the case is, under 
these circumstances, does the combination of the strong odor of 
marijuana coming from the apartment, and the knowledge on the 
part of the occupants that the police are standing outside, 
amount to exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry 
and subsequent search?  We hold that it does, and therefore 
FILED 
 
MAR 17, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
2 
reverse the court of appeals decision that reversed the circuit 
court's order upholding this search. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are as follows.1  Sometime between 
4:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on June 4, 1996, City of Milwaukee 
Police Officers Brad Schlei and Scott Marlock responded to a 
report of trespassing made by Richard Lucas, a security guard at 
the Windsor Court Apartments, 1127 North 18th Street.  The 
                     
1 The facts in this case are disputed.  At the suppression 
hearing the testimony given by the defendant and her family 
members often conflicted with the testimony given by the 
officers.  The trial court made a finding of credibility, 
stating: 
I found [Officer Kurth's] testimony to be extremely 
credible.  This officer, this lady, was telling the 
truth on the witness stand.  I have no doubt about 
that.  That means that some other people weren't 
telling the truth.  It also means that there certainly 
was a consent to the personal search, simply on 
Officer Kurth's testimony.  I believe that, then in 
turn, supports the credibility of the other police 
officers in their testimony. 
It is the function of the trier of fact, and not this 
court, to resolve questions as to the weight of testimony and 
the credibility of witnesses.  Estate of Dejmal, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 
151, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980).  This principle recognizes the trial 
court's ability to assess each witness's demeanor and the 
overall persuasiveness of his or her testimony in a way that an 
appellate court, relying solely on a written transcript, cannot. 
 Thus, we consider the trial judge to be the “ultimate arbiter 
of the credibility of a witness,” Posnanski v. City of West 
Allis, 61 Wis. 2d 461, 465, 213 N.W.2d 51 (1973), and will 
uphold a trial court's determination of credibility unless that 
determination 
goes 
against 
the 
great 
weight 
and 
clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 
180, 186-87 n.4, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  We find no reason here 
to disturb the trial court's determination of credibility, which 
resolved factual discrepancies in favor of the officers' 
account.  
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
3 
officers knew the complex to be an area of heavy drug activity 
where the police had made many arrests and had conducted sweeps 
in the past.   
¶3 
Upon arriving at Windsor Court, the officers spoke 
directly with Lucas, who informed them that the apartment 
manager had a standing trespass complaint against Michael Webb, 
Danny Smith and Marvin Webb, who were not welcome there because 
of their involvement with illegal drugs and because they had 
caused trouble at the complex in the past.  Lucas reported that 
he had seen Smith and Michael Webb on the premises and that they 
had entered Apartment 306, which was later identified as the 
defendant Vanessa Hughes' apartment. Officer Schlei was familiar 
with both men, and, in fact, had arrested Smith in the past. 
¶4 
The officers went to Apartment 306 to investigate.  
They knocked on the door.  Although they could hear loud music 
and many voices inside the apartment, they received no response. 
 Concerned 
by 
the 
apparent 
number 
of 
people 
inside 
the 
apartment, Officer Schlei decided to call for back up and await 
its arrival before knocking again. 
¶5 
As Schlei and Marlock waited in the hallway outside 
Apartment 306, the door suddenly opened and the officers were 
immediately confronted with (a) a very strong odor of marijuana 
coming from the apartment, and (b) a very surprised Veronica 
Hughes, the defendant's sister, who apparently was on her way to 
the store and did not expect to see two Milwaukee police 
officers in full uniform standing in the hallway.  She tried to 
slam the door. The officers, now in possession of evidence of 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
4 
illegal activity beyond a mere trespass, and their presence 
having been revealed to those inside the apartment through no 
action of their own, were faced with a changed situation.  
Concerned that the people inside would destroy any drug evidence 
if an immediate entry were not undertaken, the officers 
prevented Veronica from closing the door and went in.2 
¶6 
There was initial chaos in the apartment.  Seven or 
eight people were in the main room and two people began running 
down the hallway toward the back bedrooms of the apartment.  For 
their safety, the officers ordered the occupants to put their 
hands up and remain still.  All complied except for one Timothy 
Gibbs, who kept his hands near his pockets.  Officer Schlei's 
frisk of Gibbs turned up cocaine.  Officer Marlock attempted to 
determine who legally occupied the apartment.  Vanessa Hughes 
volunteered that she was the legal tenant.  Officer Schlei then 
took Hughes aside and explained that they wanted to search the 
apartment for any illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia.  She 
consented.  At some point after the officers entered the 
apartment, but before the search began, two back-up squads 
arrived to assist. 
                     
2 There is also testimony in the record from both Veronica 
and Vanessa Hughes that Veronica screamed when she saw the 
police; this, of course, would have very dramatically alerted 
the occupants of the apartment to the presence of the police and 
increased the urgent necessity of entry to prevent evidence 
destruction.  However, it is not clear from the record whether 
Veronica screamed immediately upon seeing the officers or after 
they entered the apartment, and the trial court never made a 
finding on the subject. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
5 
¶7 
During the search, Hughes repeatedly taunted the 
officers.  By her own testimony, she "got to yelling at the 
police."  According to Michael Webb, Hughes was running around 
and "going off on the police."  Hughes testified that she argued 
with the officers about putting her hands up and remaining 
still.  She also refused to sit down when the officers told her 
to. 
¶8 
As 
the 
officers 
searched 
the 
apartment, 
Hughes 
repeatedly told them to go ahead and search, because they would 
find nothing.  In fact, the officers found no marijuana.3  
However, they did find evidence of drug activity.  In the 
garbage, they found the remains of a blunt, a cigar used to 
smoke marijuana by hollowing out the center and inserting the 
drug.  They found numerous baggies with corner cuts, commonly 
used to package illegal drugs.  They also found a gram 
electronic digital scale with a white residue on it. 
¶9 
Schlei and Marlock summoned a female officer, Tina 
Kurth, to conduct a pat-down search of Hughes.  When Kurth 
arrived, Hughes was seated at the kitchen table.  Kurth 
testified that she approached Hughes about the search: 
 
[Defense Counsel]: And you talked with her? 
 
OFFICER KURTH: That's when I said, I'm here to search 
you.  All right?  And that's whatshe's like, okay.  
And that was it.  She was cooperative. 
 
                     
3 Although the officers found no marijuana, Hughes admitted 
at the suppression hearing that people were in fact smoking 
marijuana in her apartment on June 4, 1996.  
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
6 
[Defense Counsel]: Did you tell her that she did not 
have to give you permission to search her? 
 
OFFICER KURTH: No.  I did not do that. 
 
¶10 Due to the number of people in the kitchen, Kurth 
escorted Hughes into one of the bedrooms for the search.  In the 
bedroom, before Kurth began the search, and without any 
prompting, Hughes lifted her skirt and stated that she was 
wearing a pad.  Hughes stated that the lump in her underwear was 
Kleenex and removed it. 
¶11 After 
Hughes removed 
the 
tissue, 
however, 
Kurth 
noticed another lump in Hughes' underwear, which she removed 
herself.  The second lump was actually a clear plastic bag 
holding 22 individual corner-cuts containing crack cocaine and 
one larger chunk of crack cocaine.  In all, the bag contained 
5.39 grams of cocaine.   
¶12 Hughes was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 161.16(2)(b)(1) and 161.41(1m)(cm)(2).4  Hughes moved to 
suppress the evidence seized from her person as being the fruit 
of an illegal search of her apartment, alleging that the police 
entered her apartment without a warrant, searched without her 
consent, and that the search was not supported by probable cause 
or justified by exigent circumstances.   
                     
4 Effective July 9, 1996, both statutes were amended and 
renumbered by 1995 Wis. Act 448, §§ 245 and 371 to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 961.16(2)(b)(1) and 961.41(1m)(cm)(2), respectively.  
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
7 
¶13 The trial court determined that the strong odor of 
marijuana coming from the apartment gave the officers probable 
cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed on 
the 
premises 
and 
that 
there 
were 
sufficient 
exigent 
circumstances to justify the officers' entry without a warrant. 
 In addition, the court found that Hughes consented to both the 
search of her property and of her person.  On August 22, 1996, 
Hughes pled guilty to the charges against her.  On October 29, 
1996, she was sentenced to 24 months in prison. 
¶14 Hughes appealed.  In a summary disposition, the court 
of appeals reversed, finding that the search of Hughes' 
apartment violated her Fourth Amendment rights because it was 
not supported by probable cause, and the odor of burning 
marijuana, without further evidence of an exigency, did not 
justify the warrantless entry. 
¶15 Review of an order granting or denying a motion to 
suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional fact, 
which we review under two different standards.  We uphold a 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 207, 589 N.W.2d 
387 (1999).  We then independently apply the law to those facts 
de novo.  State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 475, 569 N.W.2d 
316 (Ct. App. 1997).  
¶16 This case presents us with a dilemma as old as the 
constitution itself: how best to balance the government's 
interest in law enforcement with the individual's right to be 
left alone.  Although we generally give deference to the rights 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
8 
of the individual, we recognize that sometimes those rights must 
yield to the government's duty to enforce the law.  
¶17 A police officer's warrantless entry into a private 
residence is presumptively prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution,5 and article I, section 11, of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.6  However, this court and the United 
States Supreme Court have recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement where the government can show both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances that overcome the individual's right 
to be free from government interference.  Payton v. New York, 
                     
5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.  
  
6 Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
identical in substance to the Fourth Amendment and states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
 
 
This court follows the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the search and seizure provision of the Fourth 
Amendment in construing the same provision of the state 
constitution.  State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 171-72, 388 N.W.2d 
565 (1986). 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
9 
445 U.S. 573, 575, 583-88 (1980); State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 
220, 228, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).  We find that the record in 
this case establishes both, and thus hold that the entry was 
permissible. 
¶18 To determine whether the entry was lawful, we must 
answer two questions: first, did the officers have probable 
cause to believe that Hughes' apartment contained evidence of a 
crime, and second, did exigent circumstances exist at the time 
of the 
entry 
to 
establish 
an exception 
to 
the warrant 
requirement? 
¶19 The 
Fourth Amendment 
requires probable 
cause to 
support every search or seizure in order to "safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions 
by government officials."  State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 
130, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990).  Probable cause is a fluid concept, 
assuming different requirements depending upon its context.  
County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 304, 603 N.W.2d 
541 (1999).  This case concerns probable cause to search, not 
probable cause to arrest.  Although the two concepts are 
sometimes treated interchangeably, they in fact require two 
distinct inquiries because they implicate distinct liberty 
interests.  Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 209. 
¶20 The probable cause requirement in the arrest context 
protects an individual's interest in his or her personal 
liberty.  Thus, the proper inquiry in an arrest challenge is 
whether probable cause exists to believe that a particular 
suspect has committed a crime.  State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
10
82, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995).  This, however, is not an arrest but 
a search case.   
¶21 In 
the 
search 
context 
the 
individual's 
privacy 
interest in his or her home and possessions is at stake.  Id. at 
83.  In this context, the proper inquiry is whether evidence of 
a crime will be found.  Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 209 (citing 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
§ 3.1(b), at 7-8 (3rd ed. 1996)).  The quantum of evidence 
required to establish probable cause to search is a "fair 
probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983).   
¶22 The unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from Hughes' 
apartment provided this fair probability.  Many cases have 
addressed the situation in which an officer relies upon his or 
her sense of smell to detect the presence of illegal drugs.  See 
Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 479 (odor of marijuana emanating from 
bedroom provided officers with probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant); State v. Brockman, 231 Wis. 634, 641-42, 283 N.W. 338 
(1939)(distinctive odor of fermenting mash detected by officers 
was sufficient to support a magistrate's finding of probable 
cause justifying the issuance of a search warrant); Secrist, 224 
Wis. 2d at 210 ("unmistakable odor of marijuana" emanating from 
a car provided probable cause for an officer to believe that the 
car contained evidence of a crime and thus to search).  The 
United States Supreme Court has also recognized that "[the odor 
of a controlled substance] might very well be found to be 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
11
evidence of the most persuasive character" in finding probable 
cause to issue a search warrant.  Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 13 (1948). 
¶23 When the strong smell of marijuana is in the air, 
there is a "fair probability" that marijuana is present.  This 
is common sense.  In this case, the officers also knew that the 
building was an area of high drug activity and that the security 
guard saw two men entering the apartment who were not welcome at 
the complex because of their illegal drug activity. In deciding 
whether actions are permissible under the Fourth Amendment, we 
need only determine that the actions of law enforcement were 
reasonable.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990). 
 Under these circumstances, it was entirely reasonable to 
conclude that evidence of illegal drug activity would probably 
be found in Apartment 306.   
¶24 Once probable cause to search has been established, 
the state must also demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify 
the warrantless entry into the apartment.  The objective test 
for determining whether exigent circumstances exist is whether a 
police officer, under the facts as they were known at the time, 
would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search 
warrant would gravely endanger life, risk destruction of 
evidence, or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's 
escape.  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230. 
¶25 In Smith, we recognized four circumstances which, when 
measured against the time needed to obtain a warrant, constitute 
the exigent circumstances required for a warrantless entry.  Id. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
12
at 229.  Those circumstances are (1) an arrest made in "hot 
pursuit," (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or others, (3) a 
risk that evidence will be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that 
the suspect will flee.  Id. 
¶26 The State says that the third factor, the risk of 
destruction of evidence, is implicated in this case.  We agree. 
 The strong odor of marijuana that hit the officers as the door 
to the defendant's apartment was opened gave rise to a 
reasonable belief that the drugthe evidencewas likely being 
consumed by the occupants and consequently destroyed.  But the 
greater exigency in this case is the possibility of the 
intentional and organized destruction of the drug by the 
apartment occupants once they were aware of the police presence 
outside the door.  Marijuana and other drugs are highly 
destructible.  Hughes has conceded as much.  It is not 
unreasonable to assume that a drug possessor who knows the 
police are outside waiting for a warrant would use the delay to 
get rid of the evidence. 
¶27 Hughes argues that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Johnson requires us to invalidate this appeal because a 
warrantless entry is not permitted solely on the basis of the 
smell of burning drugs.  But we do not base our finding of 
exigent circumstances on the marijuana odor alone, and so  
Johnson is distinguishable.  We have in this case an additional 
and important factor that was not present in Johnson: the 
suspects here were fully aware of the presence of the police.  
In Johnson, the police smelled burning opium while they were 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
13
standing in the hallway outside Johnson's closed hotel room 
door; the defendant was unaware of their presence.  Johnson, 333 
U.S. at 12.  Thus, the only risk of evidence destruction 
implicated in Johnson is that associated with the burning of the 
drug in order to consume it, rather than the risk of intentional 
destruction of the drug in order to avoid its discovery and 
seizure by the police.  Id. at 15.  Under the circumstances of 
this case, the apartment occupants had every incentive to 
intentionally destroy evidence once they knew the police were 
present outside. Had the officers stayed outside and called for 
a warrant, the evidence very likely would have been lost. 
¶28 Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 460, and State v. Wilson, 
229 Wis. 2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999) are also 
distinguishable.  In Kiekhefer, as in Johnson, the police 
detected the odor of marijuana while they were standing outside 
the defendant's closed bedroom door; the defendant was in his 
room apparently unaware of their presence until they entered 
without a warrant.  The officers entered the room based upon the 
odor alone, in the absence of any other facts suggesting 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
14
exigency, and the court of appeals found this insufficient to 
justify the warrantless entry and search.7 
¶29 Wilson presents a different situation entirely.  In 
Wilson, a police officer went to the defendant's home looking 
for a juvenile for whom he had an arrest warrant.  Wilson, 229 
Wis. 2d at 260.  The officer walked around to the backyard of 
the home, where he encountered one of the defendant's children. 
 He followed the child to the back door of the house and entered 
the doorway, at which point he observed smoke and smelled the 
odor of marijuana coming from the basement.  Id. at 260-61.  The 
                     
7 The court of appeals in Kiekhefer emphasized that the 
police had the situation “well in hand” at the time they 
detected the marijuana odor, that there was “no indication that 
Kiekhefer was aware of their presence,” and that they “were not 
confronted with the sounds of destruction emanating from within 
Kiekhefer's room so as to excuse the warrantless entry.”  
Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 477-79, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 
1997).  This differs significantly from this case.  Here, the 
presence of the police was unexpectedly revealed to the people 
in the apartment when Veronica Hughes opened the door; that she 
rapidly tried to shut it again when she saw them standing there 
in full uniform was reasonably interpreted by the officers as 
representing a consciousness of the illegal activity going on 
inside and a concomitant desire to avoid its discovery by the 
police. 
It is also important to note that this is not a situation 
in which the exigency was created by the police themselves, 
which would generally not justify a warrantless search of a 
home.  See Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 476.  The police were 
lawfully in the hallway waiting for backup before investigating 
a trespass complaint.  They did not detect the marijuana odor 
until Veronica Hughes unexpectedly opened the door.  They were 
faced with the choice of remaining outside and calling for a 
warrant based upon the odor of the drug, or immediately entering 
to prevent the evidence destruction that would likely have begun 
as soon as she closed the door.  Not having created the exigency 
themselves, the latter choice was reasonable. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
15
court of appeals found a Fourth Amendment violation based upon 
its conclusion that the officer was unlawfully inside the 
curtilage of Wilson's home when he smelled the marijuana; in 
other words, he should not have been in a position to smell the 
marijuana in the first place.  Id. at 266.  In this case, 
however, the officers were entitled to be in the public hallway 
outside Hughes' apartment and to approach her door in order to 
investigate the trespass complaint.   
¶30 Hughes also argues that pursuant to the rationale in 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in 
Welsh 
v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), the crime of possession of 
marijuana is not serious enough to justify a warrantless entry 
under these circumstances.  We disagree.  In Welsh, the 
defendant drove his car off the road, left the scene and walked 
home.  Id. at 742.  The police, having determined the 
defendant's identity, and suspecting that he was intoxicated, 
entered his home without a warrant and placed the defendant 
under arrest.  Id. at 742-43.  The state attempted to justify 
the entry based upon, among other things, the exigency of 
destruction of evidence: by the time they could obtain a 
warrant, Welsh's body would metabolize the alcohol, and thus 
destroy the evidence of his intoxication.  The defendant argued 
that no exigent circumstances justified the entry into his home. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, holding: 
 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a 
minor offense, [the presumption of unreasonableness of 
warrantless home entries] is difficult to rebut, and 
the government usually should be allowed to make such 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
16
arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
 
Id. at 750.  The Welsh court held that the gravity of the 
offense is an important factor to consider in determining 
whether exigent circumstances will justify a warrantless entry 
of a home.  Id.  The court did not definitively say, however, 
that certain categories of offenses are per se insufficiently 
grave to justify a warrantless entry, only that the minor, 
noncriminal, nonjailable traffic violation in that case (first 
offense drunk driving) was so.8  Welsh essentially holds that the 
less significant the offense, the more significant the exigent 
circumstances must be in order to justify a warrantless home 
entry under the Fourth Amendment. 
¶31 The Welsh court suggested in a footnote that the 
penalty which a state attaches to a particular offense provides 
"the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's 
interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that 
offense." Id. at 754 n.14.  This footnote provides Welsh's only 
                     
8 At the time of Welsh, first-offense operating under the 
influence of an intoxicant was punishable by a non-criminal 
civil 
forfeiture 
not 
to 
exceed 
$200. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(1977-78).  A second or subsequent offense within 
five years became a misdemeanor and carried a fine of no more 
than $500 and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more 
than one year.  The Court refrained from drawing a bright-line 
rule: “Because we conclude that, in the circumstances presented 
by this case, there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to 
justify a warrantless home entry, we have no occasion to 
consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban 
on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.”  Welsh, 
466 U.S. at 750 n.11.  
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
17
guidance on how to determine the seriousness of an offense for 
purposes of evaluating whether exigent circumstances justify a 
warrantless entry of a home for arrest or search.  The State 
advocates adopting the approach used by the Supreme Court in 
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989), which 
dealt with determining whether an offense is petty or serious 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  As 
in Welsh, Blanton looked to the legislature as the best judge of 
the seriousness of a particular offense.  Id. at 541.  
¶32 Blanton held that the seriousness of an offense for 
Sixth Amendment purposes should be objectively determined by 
looking to the maximum penalties fixed by the legislature.  Id. 
 The primary focus is on the maximum potential incarceration 
(under Blanton, an offense with a six-month maximum is presumed 
to be petty); however, other statutory penalties are also 
relevant.  Id. at 542-43.   
¶33 This approach to the analysis has its limitations when 
applied in this context.  We are not engaged in a static 
evaluation of the seriousness of a single, particular, charged 
offense for Sixth Amendment right to jury trial purposes.  
Rather, 
we are engaged 
in 
a broader 
evaluation of the 
seriousness of a number of potentially chargeable offenses, 
balanced against a certain sort of exigency (here the likely 
intentional destruction of evidence) for purposes of determining 
the legality of a warrantless entry and search under the Fourth 
Amendment, for which the touchstone is always reasonableness. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
18
¶34 Hughes suggests that we look only to the punishment 
for first-offense possession of marijuana to determine the 
seriousness of the crime at issue in this search.  But this 
approach is too narrow, and ignores both the facts of this case 
which established the probable cause in the first place, and the 
legislature's election to punish drug offenses on a graduated 
basis, depending upon the defendant's status as a mere possessor 
or presumptive dealer as well as his or her status as a first 
time offender or a repeater.  It also ignores the practical 
realities facing officers in the field under circumstances such 
as those presented here.  Particularly in the drug context, 
officers are called upon to make rapid decisions balancing the 
risk of intentional evidence destruction against the seriousness 
of what may be a variety of potentially chargeable offenses. 
¶35 At the time of the entry in this case, the police did 
not know with certainty whether they were dealing with mere 
first offense possessors of small amounts of marijuana, or 
repeat offenders, or those who possessed larger amounts from 
which intent to deliver could be inferred.  What they did know, 
however, was that they were investigating a trespass by persons 
who were known to be involved with illegal drugs in a building 
known for its heavy drug activity, and that a strong odor of 
marijuana was present, establishing probable cause that some 
quantity of the drug was present.  They also knew that once the 
people inside the apartment were alerted to their presence, the 
likelihood of intentional evidence destruction was extremely 
high. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
19
¶36 We conclude that, under the circumstances of this 
case, the determination of the seriousness of the offense for  
purposes of Fourth Amendment exigent circumstances analysis 
requires an evaluation of the overall penalty structure for 
offenses 
of this 
type. 
 
The legislature's 
view of the 
seriousness of marijuana-related offenses is reflected not only 
in the penalty it has established for first offense possession 
of a small quantity of the drug, but also the penalty it has 
established for repeat offenders, and those who possess larger 
amounts giving rise to the inference that they possessed the 
drug with intent to deliver.   
¶37 First-time possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor, 
punishable by up to six months incarceration.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(e).  A second or subsequent offense is a felony, 
punishable by up to one year in state prison.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.48(2).  An offender is also subject to a fine of $1000 for 
a first offense or $2000 for a second or subsequent offense.  
Wis. Stat. § 961.48(2).  In addition, even for first-time 
offenders, Wisconsin law provides for mandatory suspension of 
operating privileges for a maximum of five years.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.50.  
¶38 The legislature has also established a graduated scale 
of penalties which raises the maximum penalties as the quantity 
of the drug increases and intent to deliver is present.  At the 
time of Hughes' arrest,9 first-offense possession of marijuana 
                     
9 Effective December 31, 1999, Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h) 
has been amended to provide longer maximum sentences. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
20
with intent to deliver 500 grams or less or ten or fewer plants 
carried a fine of $500 to $25,000 and the potential of 
imprisonment 
for 
up 
to 
three 
years. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(h)(1).  These penalties increased to a fine of up 
to $50,000 and imprisonment for three months to five years for 
500 to 2500 grams of marijuana or 10 to 50 plants.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(h)(2).  For possession with intent to deliver any 
quantity over 2500 grams or 50 plants, an offender faced a fine 
of $1000 to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to ten years.  Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)(3).  Repeat offender penalty enhancers 
also apply to possession with intent to deliver.  For a second 
or 
subsequent 
offense, 
the 
maximum 
potential 
term 
of 
incarceration doubles.  Wis. Stat. § 961.48(2). 
¶39 Possession of marijuana, therefore, even a first 
offense and a small amount, is treated significantly more 
seriously than the noncriminal, nonjailable first offense drunk 
driving violation involved in Welsh, subjecting an offender to a 
range of penalties, including incarceration, fines and loss of 
driving privileges.10  Furthermore, the nature of the exigency in 
this case (the intentional destruction of evidence) is far more 
immediate and compelling than that involved in Welsh (the slow 
                     
10 The complaint in this case also contained the allegation 
that the offense took place within 1000 feet of a school, 
requiring the court to impose 100 hours of community service, in 
addition to any other penalties, for first-offense simple 
possession.  Wis. Stat. § 961.495.  For first-offense possession 
with intent to deliver, this enhancer potentially adds up to 
five 
years 
incarceration 
to 
a 
sentence. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.49(1)(b)(6).  
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
21
metabolization of alcohol).  Therefore, taking the overall 
penalty structure for marijuana possession into consideration, 
and evaluating it against the backdrop of the very real and 
serious exigency present here, we conclude that Welsh does not 
require invalidation of this warrantless home entry.11 
¶40 Having established that the entry was justified, we 
now turn to the second issue raised by the parties: whether 
Hughes' consent to the personal search was voluntary and not the 
result of police coercion.  The trial court found that Hughes' 
consent was voluntary.  The court of appeals disagreed, finding 
that Hughes' consent was not sufficiently attenuated from an 
entry that the court had determined was unlawful.  We have found 
the entry in this case to be lawful, and so the attenuation 
analysis need not be undertaken.  We further find, based upon 
Hughes' words and actions, that her consent was otherwise 
voluntary and not coerced. 
¶41 The 
question of 
whether 
a 
defendant 
voluntarily 
consented to a search is determined independently by applying 
the appropriate constitutional principles to the facts as found 
by the trial court.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 194-95, 
577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  The test for voluntariness is whether 
                     
11 The State makes an alternative argument in defense of 
this entry: that the police may enter a residence without a 
warrant to arrest for a misdemeanor when they have probable 
cause to believe that the crime is being committed in their 
presence by persons inside.  We have upheld this entry and 
search based upon the presence of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances involving the risk of evidence destruction.  We do 
not, therefore, reach the State's alternative argument. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
22
consent to search was given in the "absence of actual coercive 
improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of 
a defendant."  State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 245, 401 
N.W.2d 759 (1987).  In making this determination, no single 
factor is dispositive.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198.  Instead, 
we examine the totality of the circumstances, with special 
emphasis placed on the circumstances surrounding the consent and 
the characteristics of the defendant.  Id. 
¶42 The State has the initial burden to show that the 
defendant's consent was voluntary.  State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 
348, 359, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993).  Once the State has 
shown that the defendant gave consent, was willing to give it, 
and that he or she did not give it as a result of duress, 
threats, coercion or promises, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the police used improper means to obtain 
his or her consent.  State v. Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d 688, 696, 
523 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶43 The State has presented evidence that the defendant 
not only verbally consented to the search of her person, but 
also affirmatively assisted the police in performing that 
search.  Officer Kurth, whom the trial court singled out as 
being "especially credible," testified that Hughes verbally 
consented to the search.  The evidence also established that 
without any prompting, Hughes lifted her skirt and essentially 
revealed the drugs concealed in her underwear before Kurth even 
began the pat-down.   
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
23
¶44 Hughes offers almost no evidence of improper police 
practices.  Hughes' primary argument is that she did not 
voluntarily consent but "merely acquiesced" to what Kurth stated 
she was there to do.  We are not persuaded.  Hughes' behavior 
suggests that she was not simply going along.  She actively 
cooperated with the search, lifting her skirt without being 
directed to do so, perhaps (as suggested by the State) in a 
calculated effort to take control of the search to prevent the 
officer from discovering the cocaine she knew she was hiding on 
her person.  Such behavior goes beyond "mere acquiescence."   
¶45 Hughes' behavior during the search also contradicts 
her argument that she was intimidated into acquiescence.  By her 
own testimony, she was initially yelling at the police and 
actively disobeying the officers' orders.  Hughes' boyfriend 
Michael Webb testified that Hughes was "going off" on the police 
as they searched the apartment.  If Hughes was frightened into 
submission by a show of authority on the part of police, as she 
claims to have been, it seems she would have been more likely to 
sit quietly by than to actively disobey and verbally assault 
them.  Hughes' actions at the time of the search speak louder 
than her words now.   Her behavior contradicts any argument that 
she felt compelled by the police to consent to the search. 
¶46 Hughes asserts that her particular characteristics 
made her vulnerable to coercion.   She cites factors regularly 
considered by courts in determining voluntariness, including her 
age, education, emotional state, and prior experience with 
police.  However, Hughes, at 20 years old, was not a minor at 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
24
the time of the search.  See Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 202.  She 
had completed the eleventh grade, and has presented no evidence 
 of below average intelligence or abilities.  See id.  Although 
Hughes herself had no prior record, she had lived for over a 
year in a building that was often the subject of drug sweeps by 
the Milwaukee Police Department.  She could not have been 
completely unfamiliar with the police.  We are not persuaded 
that Hughes was unusually susceptible to coercion.   
¶47 Hughes also argues that the officers' failure to 
inform her that she had the right to refuse consent to the 
search 
made 
her 
particularly 
vulnerable 
to 
involuntary 
acquiescence in it.  Although this factor generally weighs 
against a determination of voluntary consent, it is not the only 
factor in the analysis and does not mandate a finding of 
involuntariness.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 
(1973).  Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is 
not significant enough to tip the balance against a finding of 
voluntary consent.  
¶48 We hold, therefore, that the police officers' entry 
into Vanessa Hughes' apartment to search for evidence of 
marijuana possession was supported by probable cause and 
justified by exigent circumstances.  We also find, based upon 
her words and actions, that Hughes voluntarily consented to the 
search of her person.  Thus, the circuit court properly denied 
Hughes' motion to suppress, and the decision of the court of 
appeals is reversed. 
No. 
97-1121-CR 
 
 
25
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
97-1121.awb 
 
1 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (dissenting).   In the late 
afternoon of June 4, 1996, officers purportedly with guns drawn 
barged into a two-bedroom apartment in the City of Milwaukee 
because they smelled the odor of marijuana.  They could have, 
but did not, obtain a search warrant.  Instead, fearful that the 
evidence of a first offense possession of marijuana might be 
destroyed, they made a warrantless entry. 
 
¶50 The “physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” 
 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972).   In no setting is the “zone of privacy more clearly 
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions 
of an individual’s home.”  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 
(1980).  Accordingly, warrantless searches and seizures inside a 
home are “presumptively unreasonable.”  Id. at 586.  
¶51 The heightened protection afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment generally requires the issuance of a warrant by a 
neutral magistrate before the police may enter the thresholds of 
our residences.  This constitutional requirement is not a mere 
formality.  The neutral magistrate decides when our right to 
privacy must yield to the police need for intrusion.  A 
warrantless entry, as here, negates the role of the neutral 
magistrate and circumvents constitutional protections. 
97-1121.awb 
 
2 
¶52 This court has recognized the limited exceptions to 
warrantless searches, including exigent circumstances based on 
the destruction of evidence.  State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 
89-90, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995).  Unfortunately, the majority’s 
validation of the facts of the present case as exigent 
circumstances threatens to swallow the rule by relaxing the 
restraint embodied in the Fourth Amendment.  The destruction of 
marijuana upon which the officers justified their search of 
Hughes’s home does not rise to the level of exigency required to 
rebut the presumption of the search’s unreasonableness. 
¶53 In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court explained that the application of 
the exigent circumstances exception to the exclusionary rule in 
the context of home entries should rarely be sanctioned where 
there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has 
occurred.  The majority’s attempt to distinguish and dismantle 
the precedential importance of Welsh is unconvincing.  
¶54 In its attempt to distinguish Welsh, the majority 
first acknowledges that Welsh does not stand for the proposition 
that certain types of offenses are per se minor so as to 
invalidate a warrantless entry, but rather stands for the rule 
that the minor offense at issue in that case did not justify the 
search.  Majority Op. at ¶30.  Then, the majority observes that 
the Welsh Court offered scant guidance on defining the precise 
97-1121.awb 
 
3 
meaning of a minor offense and only mentioned in a footnote that 
the penalty attaching to a particular offense provided the best 
indication of the gravity of that offense.  Majority Op. at ¶31.  
¶55 This observation ignores the ample discussion in Welsh 
on the method of determining the gravity of an offense.  In 
addition to the footnote to which the majority points, the Court 
in Welsh refers to Payton and its recognition of the importance 
of a felony limitation on warrantless intrusions into the home. 
 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 n.12.  
¶56 The Welsh Court further amplifies the definition of 
“minor offense” by quoting with approval from Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459-60 
(1948): 
Whether there is a reasonable necessity for a search  
without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends 
somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be 
in progress as well as the hazards of the method of 
attempting to reach it . . . . It is to me a shocking 
proposition that private homes, even quarters in a 
tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or 
threats of it. . . . When an officer undertakes to act 
as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to 
justify it by pointing to some real immediate and 
serious consequences if he postponed action to get a 
warrant.  
 
(emphasis added). 
¶57 Welsh 
also 
restricts 
focus 
on 
the 
first-time 
commission of a particular offense absent knowledge that the 
97-1121.awb 
 
4 
suspect is a repeat offender subject to enhanced penalties.  466 
U.S. at 746 n.6, 754.  Consistent with Welsh, other courts have 
also evaluated exigency by focusing on first offense or simple 
marijuana 
possession 
when 
probable 
cause 
of 
aggravating 
circumstances has not been present.  See e.g., State v. Holland, 
2000 WL 92231, *6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jan. 26, 2000); State 
v. Wagoner, 966 P.2d 176, 182 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). Contrary to 
the majority’s conclusion, the United States Supreme Court in 
Welsh 
provides 
sufficient 
direction 
in 
determining 
what 
constitutes a minor offense. 
¶58 In the present case, it is undisputed that the 
officers only had probable cause to believe that the occupants 
of Hughes’s apartment were committing a first offense of 
marijuana possession, the State having conceded that point 
during oral argument.  The crime for which probable cause 
existed to obtain a search warrant, the first offense of 
marijuana possession, is neither a felony nor a crime involving 
violence or threats of it.  Pursuant to the Welsh analysis, the 
offense is “relatively minor.”  
 
 
 
¶59 The majority sidesteps the breadth of discussion in 
the Fourth Amendment case of Welsh and instead resorts to a 
Sixth Amendment case, Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 
U.S. 538 (1989), for instruction on determining the gravity of 
marijuana possession in the Fourth Amendment context.  In 
97-1121.awb 
 
5 
Blanton, the Court noted that although the penalty for an 
offense may include a fine and probation, primary emphasis in 
the determination of the gravity of the offense should be placed 
on the maximum potential incarceration.  Id. at 542.  That is 
because a fine or probation “cannot approximate in severity the 
loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”  Id.  Indeed, the 
Blanton Court concluded that a $1,000 fine and the revocation of 
driving privileges, in addition to six months incarceration, did 
not transform the “petty” offense of driving under the influence 
of alcohol into a serious one.  Id. at 544-45. 
¶60 Having invoked Blanton, the majority nevertheless 
dismisses the case because of its focus on a particular single 
offense.  The majority states that it wishes to embark instead 
upon “a broader evaluation of the seriousness of a number of 
potentially chargeable offenses . . . .”  Majority Op. at ¶33.  
The majority 
cites 
no authority 
for 
its 
leap 
into the 
examination of the entire penalty scheme for a host of 
marijuana-related offenses. 
¶61 This unwarranted leap represents the majority’s effort 
to dismantle the precedential importance of Welsh.  Its attempt 
to depict the gravity of first-time marijuana possession in an 
opaque light by examining penalties for other marijuana offenses 
directly contravenes the Welsh mandate that the focus be on a 
first offense absent knowledge of aggravating circumstances.  
97-1121.awb 
 
6 
Furthermore, the evaluation of a range of offenses completely 
ignores the State’s concession that the officers in this case 
only had probable cause to believe that a first offense was 
being committed. 
¶62 The majority’s criticism of Hughes’s myopic focus on 
the first offense fails to recognize that it is precisely this 
myopic view that the United States Supreme Court in Welsh 
contemplates when officers do not have probable cause to suspect 
other offenses. 466 U.S. at 746 n.6, 754.  The attempt to 
deflect attention from the first offense of marijuana possession 
by an elaborate recitation of potential penalties for other 
marijuana 
offenses 
and 
potential 
penalty enhancers 
evades 
controlling precedent.  
¶63 The simple truth is that first-time possession of 
marijuana carries a maximum period of incarceration of six 
months.  Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).  The parties concede that 
generally it can be charged either as a criminal misdemeanor or 
as a civil forfeiture.  For first-time offenders, a court may 
even 
conditionally 
discharge 
and 
place 
the 
defendant 
on 
probation without any adjudication of guilt.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.47(1).   
¶64 Indeed, shortly after the events transpired in this 
case, the City of Milwaukee enacted an ordinance decriminalizing 
the possession of 25 grams or less of marijuana.  See Milwaukee 
97-1121.awb 
 
7 
Code of Ordinances, 106-38 (1997).  This 1997 ordinance provides 
for a civil forfeiture as penalty and appears consistent with 
the penalty for possession of small quantities of marijuana in 
the suburbs of Milwaukee and other Wisconsin cities.12 
¶65 Before the court of appeals, the State even made a 
concession that first offense marijuana possession is a minor 
offense.  After citing to Welsh in its initial brief to the 
court, the State then noted that it “concedes that the offense 
apparent to the police in this case, possession of marijuana, is 
‘minor’ since the maximum penalty is only six months in jail.  
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e) (1995-1996).”  The State’s subsequent 
endeavor to temper this concession by claiming that it was made 
in the context of a separate argument is unpersuasive.   
¶66 Allowing 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
to 
gauge 
the 
severity of an offense by considering the entire penalty scheme 
for a range of related offenses sets a dangerous precedent.  Any 
offense that is included in a scheme of graduated penalties 
would thereby be rendered serious.  This rationale would even 
include the first offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) at 
issue in Welsh, because a subsequent DWI would impose stricter 
                     
12 See e.g., Glendale City Ord. § 11-2-11; Greenfield City 
Ord. § 10.161.41(3); Madison City Ord. § 23.20(6); Menomonee 
Falls City Ord. § 1031(q); Waukesha City Ord. § 11.01(5); West 
Allis City Ord. § 6.02(3).  
97-1121.awb 
 
8 
penalties and a potential incarceration period of one year.  466 
U.S. at 746.   
¶67 The Welsh Court, however, explicitly rejected a focus 
on heightened penalties and repeat offenses without knowledge of 
the defendant’s prior arrests or convictions.  Indeed it is 
rather ironic that the defendant in Welsh was actually a repeat 
offender and yet the Court specifically required police to 
presume a first offense without further knowledge of his 
repeater status.  However, in this case, Hughes had no prior 
criminal history and yet the majority sanctions the presumption 
of repeater status as well as an intent to deliver marijuana.  
This the majority cannot do.  
¶68 Several courts have faithfully adhered to the Welsh 
limitations on warrantless entries into the home.  See e.g., 
Holland, 2000 WL 92231 at *6-*7; Wagoner, 966 P.2d at 182; State 
v. Ramirez, 746 P.2d 344, 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Curl, 869 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Idaho 1993).  These courts have not 
encountered 
difficulty 
in 
applying 
Welsh 
to 
invalidate 
warrantless searches based on the destruction of evidence of 
first offense or simple marijuana possession.  Furthermore, they 
have done so without resort to an examination of the entire 
penalty scheme for marijuana possession or the intent to deliver 
marijuana. 
97-1121.awb 
 
9 
¶69 In recognizing the first offense of drunk driving at 
issue in Welsh as “relatively minor,” the United States Supreme 
Court was addressing the legal, not societal, consequences of 
the offense.  Likewise, recognizing first offense marijuana 
possession as minor addresses the legal status of that offense. 
¶70 Both drunk driving and illegal drug use represent 
blights on our communities.  Yet, the United States Supreme 
Court has refrained from allowing moral judgments to obscure the 
legal reality that in the battle against drunk driving, some 
violations lie on the lower end of the spectrum of gravity.   
The same is true for the war on drugs.  The Court has mandated 
that only exigent circumstances in serious offenses excuse a 
warrantless entry in the home. 
¶71 Consistent 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
directive, the majority should be unwilling to sacrifice the 
sanctity of the home and be wary of so easily diluting our 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom from warrantless entry.  
Today’s decision relaxes without justification the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment and allows exigent circumstances to be 
the rule rather than the exception.  Because the majority casts 
aside controlling precedent and upholds a constitutionally 
infirm search, I dissent. 
97-1121.awb 
 
10
¶72 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this dissenting 
opinion.