Title: CORRINE L. SHEAFFER v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, through its BOARD OF TRUSTEES; RICHARD C. JOHNSON, Individually; KEVIN A. WHITE, Individually; and BRUCE HOOPER, Individually

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CORRINE L. SHEAFFER v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, through its BOARD OF TRUSTEES; RICHARD C. JOHNSON, Individually; KEVIN A. WHITE, Individually; and BRUCE HOOPER, Individually2009 WY 19202 P.3d 1030Case Number: No. S-07-0269Decided: 02/19/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CORRINE 
L. SHEAFFER,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.STATE OF WYOMING 
ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, through its BOARD OF TRUSTEES; RICHARD C. 
JOHNSON, Individually; KEVIN A. WHITE, Individually; and BRUCE HOOPER, 
Individually,Appellees,(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bill 
G. Hibbler of Bill G. Hibbler, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from summary judgment granted against appellant Corrine Sheaffer ("Sheaffer") 
and for appellees the State of Wyoming ex. rel. the University of Wyoming ("UW") 
and its employees Richard Johnson, Kevin White, and Bruce Hooper ("Johnson," 
"White," and "Hooper").  Sheaffer 
worked for UW for over twenty-five years.  
After her involvement in an illicit audio tape incident, UW terminated 
her employment in February of 2004.  
The termination precipitated this lawsuit and on appeal, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sheaffer presents 
five issues for review:

 
 

1.                         
The 
third reason proffered by [the University of Wyoming] for terminating [Sheaffer] 
presents a genuine issue of material fact, thereby reversing summary 
judgment.

2.                         
The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against [Sheaffer's] claim for 
retaliatory discharge for protected activity in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

3.                         
The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against [Sheaffer's] claim for 
gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.

4.                         
The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against [Sheaffer's] claim for 
wrongful termination/breach of contract in violation of UniReg 5 and/or 
174.

5.                         
The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against [Sheaffer's] claim for 
interference with contract.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      UW employed 
Corrine Sheaffer for more than twenty-five years.  However, in February of 2004, UW 
terminated Sheaffer from her position as Transportation and Parking Services 
(TransPark) Manager.  UW's position 
is that Sheaffer was terminated "for cause" pursuant to UW's University 
Regulation (UniReg) 174 for her role in a secret audio tape recording of a 
meeting of the UW Traffic Appeals Committee (TAC).

 
 
[¶4]      In 2002, upon 
assuming the position of TransPark Manager, Sheaffer became interested in the 
TAC, which granted or denied appeals regarding campus traffic violations.  Her interest apparently stemmed from the 
fact that granting traffic appeals directly affected TransPark's income.  As time progressed, Sheaffer expressed 
periodic dissatisfaction with the TAC to Richard Johnson, her immediate 
supervisor.

 
 
[¶5]      Sheaffer's main 
complaints to Johnson centered on the number of appeals that were being granted 
and a general lack of consistency in the handling of the appeals.  There was a generalized perception by 
Sheaffer that the members of the TAC were biased in favor of faculty, 
administration, and student athletes.  
Along with those complaints, Sheaffer's employee, Paul Kunkel, added his 
own concerns.  According to Kunkel, 
TAC appellants who came to the "red house"1 to discuss their appeals were able 
to overhear portions of the meeting while waiting in the reception area.  Along with the appellants, other 
employees of TransPark could also hear portions of the meeting, and a specific 
complaint2 by one employee, Angie Bules, 
prompted a conversation between Sheaffer, Kunkel, and Sheaffer's assistant, Fred 
Lorenz.

 
 
[¶6]      During that 
conversation, Sheaffer, Kunkel, and Lorenz agreed that the only way to make the 
UW administration react to concerns about the inappropriate behavior of the TAC 
would be if the administration heard exactly what took place during a meeting of 
the TAC.  They discussed the 
possibility of secretly taping a meeting of the TAC, and Kunkel said that at the 
end of the conversation, Sheaffer directed him to purchase a tape recorder and 
to tape a meeting of the TAC, unbeknownst to the members.  Sheaffer admits that she authorized the 
purchase of a tape recorder, but denies that she directed Kunkel to use the 
recorder to tape a meeting of the TAC.

 
 
[¶7]      According to 
Sheaffer's direction, Kunkel purchased a tape recorder on November 4, 2003.  After making the purchase, he testified 
that he hid the tape recorder in the TAC meeting room on November 6, 2003, 
pressed "record," and exited the room before the meeting began.  Indeed, most of the meeting was secretly 
recorded, including a number of minutes of discussion of current events by 
members of the TAC as they waited for the meeting to begin.  Bob Beck, Kevin White, and Bruce Hooper, 
the three members of the TAC present that day, had no knowledge that the meeting 
was being taped.

 
 
[¶8]      After the 
meeting, Kunkel delivered the tape to Sheaffer.  Lorenz and Sheaffer listened to the 
tape, and when Sheaffer's supervisor, Richard Johnson, returned the following 
Monday, November 10, 2003, Sheaffer and Lorenz met with him to discuss the TAC's 
inappropriate behavior and disclosed that they had a tape recording of a 
meeting.  Johnson was immediately 
concerned about the propriety of the secret taping, and the next day, he 
informed UW attorney Rod Lang and the 
head of Human Resources of the taping.  
He then initiated his own investigation of how the tape was made.  During that meeting, he talked to 
Kunkel, who relayed the background of how the tape was 
made.

 
 
[¶9]      Meanwhile, 
attorney Lang contacted the Chief of UW Police, Tim Banks, and requested an 
investigation and that the matter be turned over to the Albany County District 
Attorney for a determination as to whether or not a crime had been 
committed.  Following the Albany 
County Attorney's decision to not prosecute anyone, the UW disciplinary 
investigation also concluded.

 
 
[¶10]   On February 10, 2004, Sheaffer 
received written notice of UW's intent to terminate her.  The notice detailed the reasons for 
termination and notified Sheaffer of her right to a pre-termination 
hearing.  Sheaffer exercised her 
right to a hearing and asked for clarification of the decision to 
terminate.  Subsequent to the 
hearing, Sheaffer appealed her termination through the process set out in the 
UniRegs.  However, Sheaffer withdrew 
her Petition for Review in exchange for UW's agreement to not contest her claim 
for unemployment benefits.

 
 
[¶11]   Sheaffer then filed claims of sex 
and age discrimination and retaliatory discharge with the EEOC.  Following a receipt of a "right to sue" 
letter, Sheaffer brought the instant action alleging six claims for relief on 
October 26, 2006.3  The State filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 1, 2007, which the district court granted.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   When we review the granting of a 
summary judgment,

 
 
[W]e 
employ the same standards and use the same materials as were employed and used 
by the trial court.  We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record.  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue as to any 
material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as 
a matter of law.  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have 
the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense which the parties have asserted.  We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a 
question of law de novo and 
afford no deference to the trial court's ruling.

 
 

Platt 
v. Creighton, 
2007 WY 18, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 1194, 1198 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 
Black 
v. William Insulation, Co., 
2006 WY 106, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 123, 126-27 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
[¶13]   We will affirm a grant of summary 
judgment if it can be sustained on any legal ground appearing in the 
record.  Lever v. Community First 
Bancshares, Inc., 989 P.2d 634, 637 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Duncan v. Town 
of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Genuine 
Issue of Material Fact 

 
 
[¶14]   
In her first issue on appeal, Sheaffer argues that the third reason 
given by UW as to why Sheaffer was terminated presents a genuine issue of 
material fact, requiring reversal of the district court.  Specifically, the third reason given by 
UW regarding Sheaffer's termination was, "Deception and dishonesty in the 
investigation of the misconduct."  
Sheaffer contends that it is "implausible" that the district court found 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed about who said what during the 
investigation of the taping incident.  
Specifically, Sheaffer argues that allegations of deception and 
dishonesty are questions of credibility, and, as such, whether or not she was 
dishonest to a point resulting in her termination is a question of fact to be 
determined by a jury.  Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 640 
(Wyo. 1986).  On the other hand, UW 
asserts that no issue of material fact exists.  The question, UW insists, is not whether 
UW's reasons were wise, fair, or correct, but rather whether it acted in good 
faith.

 
 
[¶15]   We agree with UW that Sheaffer's 
argument fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding UW's 
proffered explanation.  Evidence 
that the employer should not have made the termination decision -- for example, 
that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment -- is not 
sufficient to show that the employer's explanation is unworthy of 
credibility.  Young v. Dillon 
Companies, Inc., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006); Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 
1999).

 
 
The 
relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer's] proffered reasons were wise, 
fair or correct, but whether [it] honestly believed those reasons and acted in 
good faith upon those beliefs.

 
 

Bullington 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002).  See Sanchez v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Title VII is not violated 
by the exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment."); Kariotis 
v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677  (7th Cir. 1997) ("Arguing 
about the accuracy of the employer's assessment [of plaintiff's performance] is 
a distraction, because the question is not whether the employer's reasons for a 
decision are right but whether the employer's description of its reasons is 
honest."); Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 318 
U.S. App. D.C. 186, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding relevant 
issue was whether the employer honestly believed in the reasons it offered for 
not promoting plaintiff and not the correctness or desirability of those 
reasons).

 
 
[¶16]   Perhaps a reasonable fact-finder 
could observe all the witnesses and believe Sheaffer's version of the events 
surrounding the surreptitious taping.  
As previously noted, however, that is not the issue.  See Bullington, 186 F.3d  at 
1318.  What is at issue is whether 
the evidence of misconduct presented a genuine issue of material fact.  Thus, the relevant "falsity" inquiry is 
whether the employer's stated reasons were held in good faith at the time of the 
discharge, even if they later prove to be untrue, or whether plaintiff can show 
that the employer's explanation was so weak, implausible, inconsistent or 
incoherent that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that it was not an 
honestly held belief but rather was subterfuge for discrimination.  See Rivera v. City & County of 
Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004).  The reason for this rule is plain:  Our role is to prevent intentional 
discriminatory hiring practices, not to act as a "super personnel department," 
second guessing employers' honestly held (even if erroneous) business 
judgments.  See Jones v. 
Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003).

 
 
[¶17]   Throughout the investigation of the 
taping, Johnson and UW Vice President Elizabeth Hardin, kept detailed notes of 
their interviews, meetings, and discussions concerning the potential discipline 
of Sheaffer.  Johnson testified at 
his deposition about the instances when he felt Sheaffer was dishonest and 
deceitful during his personnel investigation.  He testified that:

 
 

1.            
[Sheaffer] 
initially did not tell Johnson that an audio tape of the TAC meeting 
existed.

2.            
[Sheaffer] 
originally told him that she taped the TAC meeting 
herself.

 
 
[¶18]   The written documentation, as well 
as the testimony of Johnson and Hardin, identically track with the reasoning 
given to Sheaffer for her termination.  
The evidence on the record shows that UW--the decision-maker--believed, 
based upon other employees' reports, that Sheaffer had, in fact, directed the 
taping.  At the very least, UW 
believed that Sheaffer, as manager, had a direct hand in the taping.  We find no evidentiary basis suggesting 
that UW came to this belief in bad faith.  
As a result, while UW's conclusion about Sheaffer's conduct may have been 
off base, we see no basis upon which a reasonable fact-finder could have found 
that it was not honestly held.  
Given the facts known to UW at the time, its decision seems 
reasonable.

 
 
[¶19]   Although Sheaffer did not, at the 
summary judgment stage, have a burden to establish conclusively whether UW's 
stated reliance on the results of the investigation was pretextual, she was 
required to "establish that there is a genuine factual dispute with regard to 
the truth."  Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005).  
Viewing Sheaffer's evidence in the light most favorable to her position, 
the evidence demonstrates that UW may have been unwise or utilized questionable 
judgment, but it does not draw into question whether UW actually relied, 
honestly and in good faith, upon the appearance of improprieties arising from 
the evidence gathered in the investigations.  We will not disturb the district court's 
ruling on summary judgment on this issue.

 
 
Retaliatory 
Discharge/Title VII

 
 
[¶20]   Sheaffer next argues that UW 
committed a retaliatory termination against her because she participated in 
protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964  
i.e., reporting complaints against the TAC and then providing recorded evidence 
of the hostile behavior, language, and conduct of the TAC members.  UW responds that there is no direct 
evidence, nor any inference, that it retaliated against Sheaffer because she 
engaged in any "protected activity."

 
 
[¶21]   Section 704 of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any of his 
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  Section 703(a) of the Act defines an 
"unlawful employment practice" as follows:

 
 

It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin[.]

 
 
42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

 
 
[¶22]   Where a plaintiff cannot produce 
direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent, the plaintiff may prove 
his case with circumstantial evidence under the burden-shifting scheme of proof 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36  L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).  In the instant case, Sheaffer has 
presented no direct evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of UW.  Therefore, she must rely on the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to establish her cause of action for 
retaliatory discharge and to survive summary judgment.  See Kruzich v. Martin-Harris Gallery, 
LLC, 2006 WY 7/SPAN>, 
¶ 14, 126 P.3d 867, 872-873 (Wyo. 2006) (the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting scheme applies in analyzing retaliation claims under Title 
VII).

 

 
[¶23]   Under McDonnell Douglas, the 
initial burden falls on Sheaffer to demonstrate a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge.  
Id., ¶ 13, 126 P.2d  
at 872.  If Sheaffer 
satisfies this initial burden, then a presumption of discrimination arises, and 
the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for its adverse employment action.  
Id. 

 
 
If 
the employer proffers a legitimate reason, the employee then must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's explanation is merely a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination.  
At this point, the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its 
presumptions and burden shifting, drops out and the sole issue is whether 
unlawful discrimination occurred.

 
 

Id., ¶ 14, 126 P.2d  at 873 (internal 
citations omitted).

 

 

[¶24]   To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to 
discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse, and (3) 
that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the 
materially adverse action.  Argo 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006).  If a plaintiff is unable to make out a 
prima 
facie case, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.  See Aquilino v. Univ. of Kan., 
268 F.3d 930, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's denial of a 
post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law where court held plaintiff 
did not suffer from an adverse employment action).  To 
establish the first of these elements -- participation in a protected activity 
-- Sheaffer need not prove that the conditions against which she protested 
actually amounted to a violation of Title VII.  See id.  Rather, she must demonstrate only that 
she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions 
of the employer violated the law.  Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984).

 
 
[¶25]   Protected activities fall into two 
distinct categories under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision: (1) opposition 
to an employer's discriminatory employment practices; or (2) participation in an 
ongoing investigation or proceeding conducted pursuant to Title VII.  Under the opposition clause, an employer 
is prohibited from discriminating against an employee "because he has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  To qualify for protection under the 
opposition clause, an employee's behavior need not rise to the level of formal 
charges of discrimination against his employer.  Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 
647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981).  
Protected activity under the opposition clause includes "utilizing 
informal grievance procedures as well 
as staging informal protests and 
voicing one's opinions in order to bring attention to an employer's 
discriminatory activities."  
Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 
(4th Cir. 1998) (citing Armstrong, 647 F.2d at 448)).  To determine whether or not an employee 
has engaged in legitimate opposition activity, courts traditionally "balance 
the purpose of [Title VII] to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities 
opposing  discrimination, against Congress' equally manifest desire 
not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of 
personnel.'"  Armstrong, 647 F.2d  at 448 (quoting Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976)).

 
 
[¶26]   
Although the district court found that Sheaffer met the first 
requirement to establish that a prima 
facie case of retaliation had been met, UW maintains its argument on appeal 
that Sheaffer failed to meet the first requirement in establishing her prima facie case.  We agree with UW.

 
 
[¶27]   Sheaffer argues on appeal that she 
participated in a protected activity  that is, reporting complaints and 
providing recorded evidence of the "hostile, vulgar, unprofessional, abusive, 
discriminatory and offensive behavior, language and conduct" of the TAC members 
 specifically, that her workplace could be defined as a "hostile work 
environment."  In her complaints, 
Sheaffer repeatedly criticized the TAC members' conduct, saying that they were 
partial to UW employees, faculty, and student athletes, and that decisions of 
the TAC generally lacked consistency.  
Her final act of "protected activity," in her estimation, was presenting 
the recorded meeting of the TAC to Johnson in an effort to show the hostile work 
environment.

 
 
[¶28]   In order for a hostile work 
environment claim to survive a summary judgment motion,

 
 
a 
plaintiff must show that a rational jury could find that the workplace [was] 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment and create an abusive working environment.

 
 

Penry 
v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 
155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  To evaluate whether a working 
environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, we examine all the 
circumstances, including: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) 
the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening 
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct 
unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).  In addition, the environment must be 
both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive.  Id.; see also Davis v. United 
States Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 
1998).

 
 
[¶29]   The Supreme Court has instructed 
that courts judging hostility should filter out complaints 
attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use 
of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.  See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998) 
(sex discrimination).  This 
screening is in place to ensure that Congressional enactments do not become 
trivialized as a civility code.  
Id.  In particular, 
courts should filter out offhand comments and isolated incidents (unless 
extremely serious).

 
 
[¶30]   Applying these principles, we find 
that Sheaffer's allegations regarding the behaviors of the TAC fall short of 
demonstrating a pervasive or severely hostile work environment.  The evidence proffered by Sheaffer 
includes "hostile, vulgar, unprofessional, abusive, discriminatory and offensive 
behavior" and gender-based appellate decision-making.  Specifically, when considering the TAC's 
conduct, we cannot conclude that the committee's sometimes off-the-record 
joking, gossip, and swearing could be considered hostile  perhaps 
unprofessional, but not hostile.  
There is no evidence, in our estimation, that a hostile work environment, 
as is defined by civil rights laws, existed in the instant case.  Furthermore, we note that Sheaffer never 
complained of being personally victimized by the allegedly offensive behavior of 
TAC members, or even present during their allegedly "vulgar" 
behavior.

 
 
[¶31]   Even if Sheaffer had met her burden 
of establishing a prima facie case, 
UW, under its burden, produced legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing 
Sheaffer.  In fact, UW provided 
three specific, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination: (1) significant 
misconduct and carelessness by engaging in activities (secret audio taping of 
the [TAC]) which are detrimental to the operations of UW and which impair UW 
missions, purposes, and objectives as an institution of higher education and 
which caused an irreversible erosion of trust; (2) asking a subordinate employee 
(Paul Kunkel) to implement detrimental activities; and (3) deception and 
dishonesty in the investigation of the misconduct.  UW also explains in the same document 
listing the reasons for termination that any one of the three reasons given, 
standing alone, was sufficient cause for termination.

 
 
[¶32]   In view of our discussion above, 
without a prima facie showing of 
retaliation, Sheaffer's claim fails on appeal.

 
 
Gender 
Discrimination

 
 
[¶33]   Sheaffer next contends that UW 
unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in violation of 
Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  Similar to our 
previous discussion, under Title 
VII, a plaintiff who has received a "right to 
sue" letter from the EEOC must first make out a prima facie case of gender 
discrimination, thus creating a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination.  Bachmeier v. 
Hoffman, 1 P.3d 1236, 1243 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

 
[¶34]   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the phrase "terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment" reflects a congressional intent "to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in 
employment," including hostile or abusive work environments.  Harris, 510 U.S.  at 21 (citing Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 
(1986)).  When the workplace is 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult of sufficient 
severity or pervasiveness to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 
create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.  Id.  The anti-discrimination provision seeks 
a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status.

 
 
[¶35]   UW concedes that Sheaffer met the 
requirement of showing a prima facie 
case for gender discrimination.  
Therefore, the burden then shifts to UW to articulate a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.  If the employer meets that burden of 
production, the presumption created by the prima facie case is rebutted 
and drops from the case.  Once the 
employer meets its burden of production by offering a legitimate rationale in 
support of its decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the 
employer's proffered reasons were pretextual.  The plaintiff must present specific 
facts significantly probative to support an inference that the employer's 
proffered justifications were simply a pretext for discrimination.  Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994).  The plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by 
showing that either a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer 
or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.  Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. 
Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1994).

 
 
[¶36]   In the instant case, because 
Sheaffer met her burden of establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts 
to UW to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Sheaffer's 
termination.  The burden is of 
production, not persuasion, which UW easily satisfies.  We previously set out UW's reasons for 
firing Sheaffer, but because this is a different issue, we state them 
again.  UW's three specific, 
non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were: (1) significant misconduct 
and carelessness by engaging in activities (secret audio taping of the [TAC]) 
which are detrimental to the operations of UW and which impair UW's missions, 
purposes, and objectives as an institution of higher education and which cause 
an irreversible erosion of trust; (2) asking a subordinate employee (Paul 
Kunkel) to implement detrimental activities; and (3) deception and dishonesty in 
the investigation of the misconduct.  
UW also explained in the same document listing the reasons for 
termination that any one of the three reasons given alone was sufficient cause 
for termination.

 
 
[¶37]   Because UW met its burden of 
production, the burden shifted once again back to Sheaffer to show UW's reasons 
for termination were not legitimate, but pretextual.  Here, Sheaffer argues that she was 
discriminated against because she is a woman.  In support of her argument, she first 
points to the fact that Kunkel and Lorenz were granted immunity from prosecution 
during the Albany County Attorney's investigation.  However, there is absolutely no evidence 
that UW in any way affected the grants of immunity issued by the county 
attorney.  Also, Sheaffer contends 
that pretext abounds because Kunkel and Lorenz were not terminated, but instead 
only received two-day suspensions without pay.  Here, we agree with the district court 
that while Sheaffer was treated differently than Kunkel and Lorenz, in that she 
was fired and they were not, the different treatment is explained by a 
non-discriminatory motive.  UW 
terminated Sheaffer because it concluded, in good faith, that she was dishonest 
and deceitful during its personnel investigation.   UW explained its legitimate 
reasons for not firing Kunkel or Lorenz  they found both men to be honest, 
contrite and remorseful during the investigation of the taping incident.  Again, UW is not required to be correct 
in its assessment that Sheaffer was, in fact, dishonest and deceitful; it is 
only required to have come to its conclusions in good faith and in a 
non-discriminatory manner.

 
 
[¶38]   UW completed a thorough personnel 
investigation surrounding the audio taping incident, concluded that Sheaffer was 
dishonest and deceptive, and relied upon that conclusion in good faith when 
terminating Sheaffer.  This is all 
that the law can require of an employer.  
Thus, we can find no discrimination against Sheaffer on the basis of her 
gender, and the district court is affirmed on this issue.

 
 
Breach 
of Contract

 
 
[¶39]   
Sheaffer next claims on appeal that UW breached its contract when it 
fired her.  She claims that she was 
employed pursuant to either an express or implied contract, and that she could 
only be terminated for cause.  UW, 
of course, denies that it breached its contract with Sheaffer.  Furthermore, and as a threshold issue, 
UW asserts that Sheaffer is collaterally estopped from asserting in this suit 
that there was not cause to terminate her because she sought to resolve the 
breach of contract issue through UniReg 174.

 
 
[¶40]   We first look to UW's collateral 
estoppel, or issue preclusion, claim.

 
 
The 
doctrine of issue 
preclusion prevents the relitigation of issues actually and 
necessarily decided previously in an action between the same parties. Collateral 
estoppel forecloses relitigation when the issue presented is identical to one 
determined in a prior proceeding; when the prior proceeding produced a decision 
on the merits of the issue; when the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with the party, 
in the prior proceeding; and when the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the prior proceeding.

 
 

Bender 
v. Uinta County Assessor, 
14 P.3d 906, 910 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶41]   As Sheaffer points out, UW urges 
this Court to apply the doctrine of administrative collateral estoppel.  However, the doctrine of administrative 
collateral estoppel cannot be applied to this case because of a legislative 
change to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  That statute now excludes UW from agency 
status.  See Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 
2001 WY 98, 33 P.3d 161 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶42]   Accordingly, we turn to Sheaffer's 
claim that UW breached her implied employment contract and wrongfully terminated 
her.  Though Sheaffer did not have 
an express employment contract with UW, both parties have assumed that the 
UniRegs removed Sheaffer from "at-will" employment and allowed her to only be 
terminated "for cause."

 
 
Ordinarily, 
in implied employment contract cases, a breach of contract is established by the 
employer's failure to follow the procedures contained in the handbook, by a 
showing there was no cause for termination, or by both.

 
 

Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 
WY 38, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 385, 391 (Wyo. 2003).  In order to establish a breach 
of contract claim based upon a violation of personnel rules, a 
plaintiff must prove two things: (1) The handbook actually became part of the 
employment contract, and (2) the terms of the handbook were breached.  Id.

 
 
[¶43]   Sheaffer asserts that UW violated 
UniReg 5 in the course of her termination.  
First, Sheaffer complains that UW committed an act of retaliation against 
her for reporting harassment and/or discrimination, as defined by UniReg 5.4  However, Sheaffer's claim regarding 
retaliation in violation of UniReg 5 fails because she never actually reported 
her claim that she was terminated in retaliation.  Sheaffer had ample opportunity to do so 
 including at her pre-termination hearing and post-termination dispute 
resolution proceeding available to her.  
The post-termination appeal afforded Sheaffer a hearing before an 
independent hearing examiner, but Sheaffer reached an agreement with UW before 
that hearing could take place.  
Without having the opportunity to cure a reported incident, UW cannot be 
held responsible for a claim to which they were never 
privy.

 
 
[¶44]   Sheaffer also contends that, 
allegedly in violation of UniReg 5, UW failed to ensure that the work 
environment was free of discrimination and harassment; that UW failed to ensure 
that any report of discrimination and harassment shall be forwarded to the next 
level; and that Vice President Hardin failed to promptly address any instance of 
discrimination and harassment.  
Sheaffer contends that the complaints she received, she reported to her 
supervisor, defendant Johnson.  
However, Sheaffer again failed to adhere to the requirements of the 
UniRegs by not submitting a report to an Employment Practices 
Officer.

 
 
[¶45]   UW has defined procedures, set out 
in the UniRegs, providing the process that a UW employee must follow in 
complaining of discrimination and harassment.  These procedures allow UW to investigate 
and correct the problem.  However, 
UW must learn that a problem exists before it can actually address it.  Here, it was Sheaffer, not UW, who did 
not follow proper procedure.  
Accordingly, we find no breach of Sheaffer's implied contract with 
UW.

 
 
[¶46]   Our analysis does not end there, 
however.  Sheaffer can also prove 
breach of her employment contract by showing that she was terminated without 
cause.  This, essentially, is our 
"good faith" analysis:

 
 
Under 
this standard, the question to be resolved by the fact finder is not, "Did the 
employee in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?'"  Rather, it is, "Was the factual basis 
on which the employer concluded a dischargeable act had been committed reached 
honestly, after an appropriate investigation and for reasons that are not 
arbitrary or pretextual?'"  "Cause" 
is defined under this standard as 

 
 

fair 
and honest 
reasons, regulated by good faith 
on the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, 
unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual. A reasoned conclusion, in 
short, supported by substantial evidence gathered through an adequate 
investigation that includes notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance for 
the employee to respond.

 
 

Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc., 
¶ 15, 65 P.3d  at 392 (internal citations omitted).

 
 
[¶47]   UW conducted an investigation into 
the taping incident, from which it concluded that Sheaffer directed the audio 
recording to be performed, or, at the very least, that Sheaffer had a large hand 
in ensuring that the taping occurred.  
Our review of the record shows that the investigation was appropriate and 
altogether thorough, lasting nearly one month until any disciplinary actions 
were discussed and recommended.  
Notes taken by Johnson, who primarily conducted the internal UW 
investigation, and Vice President Hardin, provide a chronology of the 
investigation itself and the considerations each person took into account in 
reaching their disciplinary decisions.

 

[¶48]   Furthermore, other facts support 
UW's decision to terminate Sheaffer, among them that Sheaffer initially did not 
tell Johnson that an audio tape of the TAC meeting existed, that Sheaffer 
directed Johnson not to speak to Kunkel about the audio tape, and that Sheaffer 
requested that Johnson return "her" audio tape and tape recorder, though it was, 
in fact, purchased by UW.  Johnson 
concluded that Kunkel was honest throughout the investigation, and even 
remorseful for his participation in the audio recording.  After Johnson's investigation, he, along 
with Hardin, concluded that termination was proper.

 
 
[¶49]   The question on appeal is not who 
taped the meeting, or even who ordered the taping, but rather, did UW act in 
good faith in terminating Sheaffer?  
After a thorough review of the record, we can confidently conclude that 
UW did act in good faith.

 
 
Interference 
with Contract

 
 
[¶50]   
Sheaffer's final argument on appeal is that Bruce Hooper and Kevin 
White, as individuals, wrongfully interfered with her implied employment 
contract with UW.  Specifically, 
Sheaffer complains that Hooper and White both "urged" Johnson to terminate 
Sheaffer.  She argues that whether 
or not that was within the scope of their duties as UW employees is a question 
for the jury to ponder, making it inappropriate for summary judgment.  Also, Sheaffer contends that Hooper 
failed to perform random drug testing and granted appeals specifically to 
decrease TransPark's revenue.

 
 
[¶51]   In Gore v. Sherard, 2002 WY 114, ¶ 13, 
50 P.3d 705, 710 (Wyo. 2002), this Court established the elements for 
interference with a contract:

 
 
In 
Wyoming, the following elements must be demonstrated to sustain a cause of 
action for tortious interference with a contract or prospective economic 
advantage: (1) The existence of a valid contractual relationship or business 
expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the 
interferer; (3) intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a 
breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant 
damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. 
[Citations omitted.]

 
 
The 
plaintiff has the burden of proving the four elements of intentional or tortious 
interference with a contract. Id.  Whether or not interference with a 
contract was improper is a question of fact.  Here, Sheaffer fails to establish any 
facts supporting her claims against either Hooper or White.  We find no direct evidence in the record 
regarding Sheaffer's claims that Hooper failed to drug test, or that he granted 
traffic appeals specifically to decrease Sheaffer's department's 
revenue.

 
 
[¶52]   As to Sheaffer's claim that Hooper 
and White improperly interfered with her contractual relationship with UW, we 
also find the record lacking in evidence to support that claim.  Mr. Johnson interviewed both Hooper and 
White (separately) regarding the taping incident, during his investigation.  During those separate interviews, 
Hooper, when asked, "What do you feel should be done about what happened?" 
replied that Sheaffer should either be punished with unpaid leave, or 
fired.  When asked the same 
question, White replied that Sheaffer should either be removed from her position 
as manager of TransPark or "mainly fired."

 
 

[¶53]   Hooper and White were interviewed 
as part of UW's official internal investigation regarding the taping 
incident.  Other committee members 
were also questioned, and everyone interviewed was asked the same set of 
questions.  Furthermore, the 
investigation was conducted during business hours.  There is, accordingly, no evidence that 
either Hooper or White was acting outside the scope of their employment or that 
their actions were legally improper.  
Bear v. Volunteers of America, Wyo., Inc., 964 P.2d 1245, 
1248-1254 (Wyo. 1998).  
It 
is clear that Sheaffer failed to meet her burden of proof of the four elements 
of a cause of action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship 
or business expectancy.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶54]   No genuine issues of material fact 
exist on Sheaffer's claims on appeal.  
Both her gender discrimination claim and hostile work 
environment claim fail to raise further questions.  There was no breach of contract by 
UW.  Furthermore, we find nothing in 
the record to support her claims against the individuals Hooper and White for 
interference with a contract.

 
 
[¶55]   The district court is affirmed in 
all respects.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The "red house" is a small building on the north side of the UW campus 
where the TAC held its meetings.

 
 

2Bules complained that while she worked on a computer outside the 
committee meeting room, she could hear TAC members discussing a particular 
appellant's case.  That appellant 
happened to be sitting in the reception area with Bules, and both of them could 
hear remarks about how stupid the appellant had to have been to have committed 
the violation in question.

 
 

3Sheaffer's initial complaint alleged the following claims for relief: 1. 
Retaliation/Retaliatory Discharge for Protected Activity in Violation of Title 
VII; 2. Sex/Gender Discrimination; 3. Age Discrimination; 4. Wrongful 
Termination/Breach of Contract; 5. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing; and 6. Interference with Contract.

 
 

4UniReg 5 defines retaliation as:

 
 
Adverse action or threat made in reprisal against any individual who 
participates as an actual or potential party, witness or representative relating 
to a report of discrimination or harassment as authorized by this 
policy.

 
 
University Regulation 5, Rev. 1 (Mar. 
2005).