Title: MUELLER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MUELLER v. STATE2001 WY 13436 P.3d 1151Case Number: 00-211Decided: 12/27/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                

 

DETLEV BILL 
MUELLER, JR., 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona 
County

The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. 
Yoder.

 Representing Appellee: 

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. 
Alan Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Elrod.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, Detlev Bill 
Mueller (Mueller), was found guilty by a jury of two counts of felony 
interference with a police officer.1  The district court entered judgment and 
sentence on that verdict imposing two consecutive sentences of 4260 months of 
imprisonment.  
Mueller appeals from the district court's judgment and sentence 
contending that the district court erred in refusing to give lesser-included 
offense instructions offered by him, that there was insufficient evidence of the 
crimes charged, and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 
argument.

 

[¶2]      We will reverse and 
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 

 

[¶3]      Mueller raises these 
issues:

 

I.          
Did the trial court error [sic] in refusing to 
instruct on one or both lesser included offenses?

 

II.          
Was there sufficient evidence of Appellant's violation of each element of 
W.S. § 6-5-204(b)?

 

III.         Was 
it proper for the prosecutor to misstate some of the evidence and the law on 
probable cause and unfairly comment upon the credibility of witnesses to the 
jury?

 

The State rephrases the issues thus:

 

I.          
Did the district court properly refuse Appellant's request for 
lesser-included offense jury instructions?

 

II.          
Are Appellant's convictions supported by sufficient evidence?

 

III.         Has 
Appellant suffered any prejudice where the State's comments in closing argument 
were within the bounds of permissible argument and posed no substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice?

 

 

[¶4]      The issues to be 
decided in this case are best understood if we begin our recitation of the 
operative facts with an acknowledgment that Mueller was, in some ways, a victim 
of mistaken identity.  
In addition, many facts are included here that relate primarily to our 
review of Mueller's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions and, hence, are presented in a light most favorable to the State 
(that standard does not apply to the issue of whether lesser-included offense 
instructions should have been given).  At about 4:00 p.m. on September 10, 1999, 
Mueller was standing in the parking lot of the Yellowstone Motel in Casper when 
two police officers, clad in t-shirts and jeans and operating undercover so as 
to more readily fit into the drug culture, drove up, jumped out of their 
unmarked car, pointed their guns at Mueller and his companion, identified 
themselves as police officers, and told Mueller to get on the ground.  Mueller's response 
was to say "f--- you" and attempt to get away from the two men.  After a struggle, the 
policemen eventually subdued Mueller.  All of this occurred in about a minute or 
two.

 

[¶5]      Now, we must reverse 
field to explain how Mueller ended up where he did.  At the time of their 
encounter with Mueller, the policemen were looking for a man named Steve Spurlin 
(Spurlin).  As 
part of an undercover drug operation, the police had identified Spurlin as a 
potential drug dealer.  
On September 2, 1999, a confidential informant had purchased 
methamphetamine from Spurlin and a woman named Altina Crenshaw (Crenshaw).  On September 3, 1999, 
the police searched Spurlin's trailer (where the drug buy was made) and, amongst 
other things, seized methamphetamine.  Crenshaw "cooperated" with the police in 
several unsuccessful drug buys, and also told police that Spurlin was involved 
with a woman named Allyson Burkey (Burkey).  Another informant told the police that Spurlin 
might have a gun, and the police considered him to be dangerous.

 

[¶6]      The policemen had never 
really seen Spurlin up close, and they did not know what he looked like.  On the date of 
Mueller's interaction with the policemen, they had decided to seek out Spurlin 
by trying to find Burkey.  They also did not know what Burkey looked like, 
but they knew that she drove a blue Buell motorcycle and that Spurlin had 
received a call from the Yellowstone Motel, as the call was listed on his caller 
ID during the search of his trailer.  With this information in hand, they drove by 
the Yellowstone Motel and spotted a blue Buell motorcycle parked outside one of 
the rooms.2  Initially, they knocked on the door of the 
room, in front of which the motorcycle appeared to be parked, but there was no 
answer to their knock and, indeed, that was not the room that Burkey was 
in.  The 
policemen then went to the motel office and attempted to find out what room 
Burkey was in, but the clerk would not give out that information (and Burkey was 
registered under an alias so the clerk did not recognize the name Burkey).3  However, as they were 
leaving the motel office, a woman came out of a room near where the motorcycle 
was parked and got onto it.  Mueller followed close behind and kissed4 Burkey.  The policemen were 
"pretty sure" Mueller was Spurlin.5  The policemen did not plan on arresting Spurlin 
but rather were "checking it out."  The policemen drove up at a high rate of speed 
in their car, so as to block Burkey's motorcycle, jumped out of their car, and 
"yelled rather loudly, so there's no mistake, police, get down on the 
ground."  
According to the policemen, one officer was showing his badge and the 
other was not.  
The policemen repeated the command to get down on the ground several 
times, but Mueller did not comply:  "Mr. Mueller just, he kind of scowled, he 
frowned like he was angry, and he started backing up and I remember him saying, 
why."  One of the 
policemen testified that he determined that Mueller was not armed, that he did 
not fear that they were going to be seriously injured by Mueller, and so he did 
not use his firearm.  
As noted earlier, in the attempt to have "contact" or "check out" the 
situation with Spurlin, the policemen ordered Mueller to the ground.  When Mueller did not 
obey, they attempted to subdue him, and in that attempt Mueller first struck one 
policeman and then the other.  Mueller was charged with two counts of felony 
level resisting arrest.  
One policeman was struck on the head, and it caused him pain, a 
"headache," and the other was struck in the jaw, and he also testified that the 
blow caused his jaw to be sore for that evening and the next day.

 

[¶7]      There were no direct 
eyewitnesses to the events described above other than the two policemen, and 
Mueller and Burkey.  
Mueller did not testify, and Burkey's testimony was equivocal about 
whether the policemen had identified themselves as policemen.  The clerk at the 
motel witnessed portions of the episode.  She missed a portion of what happened because 
she called 911 to report what she thought was an attempt by the policemen (whom 
she did not know were policemen) to rob Burkey and Mueller.  Indeed, police and 
firemen responded to the call and arrived very shortly after Mueller was 
subdued.  The 
motel clerk did not see the policemen show badges, did not hear them identify 
themselves as policemen, and did not see Mueller strike either policeman, though 
she conceded that she might not have been able to hear or see all that went on 
from her vantage point.

 

 

Lesser-Included Offense of Resisting Arrest (Misdemeanor)

 

[¶8]      The pivotal issue in 
this case is whether the district court erred in refusing to give a 
lesser-included offense instruction with respect to misdemeanor resisting 
arrest.  We 
include the pertinent statute for the sake of convenience:

 

§ 6-5-204. Interference with peace officer;  disarming peace 
officer;  
penalties

 

            
(a) A person commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with or 
resists arrest by a peace officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties.

            
(b) A person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause 
bodily injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than ten (10) years.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204 (a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶9]      The applicable standard 
of review is well-established:  Jury instructions should inform the jurors 
concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings 
with respect to the material facts, instructions should be written with the 
particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from 
case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally 
correct, a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and 
the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.  Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶23, 29 P.3d 76, ¶23 (Wyo. 
2001); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 
2000).  With 
specific regard to lesser-included offense instructions, we recently held that a 
trial court must first determine if all the elements of the lesser offense are 
included within the greater.  If that is the case and there is some evidence 
that would rationally permit the jury to find the accused guilty of the lesser 
and not the greater offense, the instruction should be given.  Sanders v. State, 7 P.3d 891, 894 (Wyo. 2000) (citing State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1140, (Wyo. 1993) 
(Cardine, J., concurring)).  The test is more fully expressed in this 
five-step analytic process:  (1) a proper request for the instruction is 
made; (2) the elements of the lesser-included offense are identical to part of 
the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some evidence that would 
justify conviction of the lesser-included offense; (4) the proof on the element 
or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute that the 
jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of 
the lesser-included offense; and (5) mutuality exists such that the 
lesser-included charge can be demanded by either the prosecution or the 
defense.  When 
all five parts of this test are met, and the lesser-included offense instruction 
is not given, the trial court commits reversible error.  Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 94-95 (Wyo. 1988).  Indeed, a trial court 
may, and sometimes should, give such an instruction without request from either 
party.  State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1134-35 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶10]   With respect to part one of the test, an 
instruction was requested.  Mueller asked that the trial court give an 
instruction along the lines of the applicable Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction 52.04A (and see W.Cr.P.J.I. 1.08):

 

The elements of the crime of Interference with a Peace 
Officer, as charged in this case, are:

 

1.  
On or about the _____ day of _____, 199_ [sic]

2.  
In ____________ County, Wyoming

3.  
The Defendant _____________

4.  
[Knowingly obstructed, impeded or interfered with] [Resisted arrest by] a 
peace officer

5.  
While that peace officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties.

 

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 

[¶11]   The language of the instruction submitted 
to the trial court provided:

 

            
The elements of the crime of resisting arrest, a lesser included offense 
of interference with a Peace officer, as charged in this case are:

 

            
1.  On or 
about the 10th day of September, 1999

            
2.  In 
Natrona County, Wyoming

            
3.  The 
Defendant, Bill Mueller

            
4.  Resisted arrest by a peace officer

            
5.  While 
that peace officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.

 

            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the defendant guilty.

            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 

[¶12]   With respect to part two of the test, 
elements 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the lesser-included offense are identical to part of 
the elements of the greater offense.  The instruction given the jury mirrors Wyoming 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 52.04B:6

 

            
The elements of the crime of Interference with a Peace Officer, as 
charged in I, are:

 

            
1.  On or 
about the 10th day of September, 1999

            
2.  In 
Natrona County, Wyoming

            
3.  The 
Defendant, Detlev Bill Mueller, Jr.

            
4.  
Intentionally and knowingly caused or attempted to cause[7] bodily injury to a peace officer 
namely, Mark Sellers

            
5.  While 
that peace officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.

 

            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the defendant guilty.

            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 

[¶13]   The phrase, "bodily injury," set out in 
the fourth element is defined by statute and plays an important role in 
differentiating between the misdemeanor level of interference with a peace 
officer and the felony level of that same crime.  As set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2001), "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness or any 
impairment of physical condition."  Here, that definition applies only to the 
extent that "physical pain" was inflicted on the policemen.

 

[¶14]   As can be readily deduced from a 
side-by-side reading, the elements are identical except that the greater offense 
requires that the defendant is required to have intended to inflict bodily 
injury on the peace officer (or to have attempted to do so), while the lesser 
offense only requires that the defendant has resisted the efforts of the peace 
officer to arrest him, without there having necessarily been an injury or an 
attempt to injure.

 

[¶15]   With respect to part four of the test 
(the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two is sufficiently in 
dispute that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the 
greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense), it is evident from the 
record that Mueller's view of the case was that he was assailed by two men who 
did not appear to be policemen, who did not identify themselves as policemen (or 
failed to make that sufficiently clear given an elapsed time of only 60 
seconds), and that he had no intent to cause the policemen pain but rather 
reacted as many might, i.e., attempting to flee two 
men pointing guns at him.  Perhaps most importantly, both the motel clerk 
and Burkey testified that they did not see Mueller doing any "punching," and 
reasonable jurors might well conclude that injuries suffered by the policemen, 
as such,8 were the result of a brief melee in which Mueller 
resisted arrest, rather than the result of intentional and knowing action to 
injure the men who may or may not have promptly identified themselves as 
policemen.  The 
evidence was sufficiently in dispute so that the fact-finder should have been 
empowered to make the differentiation, if one was to be made.  See Walter v. State, 811 P.2d 716, 717-18 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

[¶16]   As to the fifth part of the test, 
clearly, there is mutuality, especially in the sense that if the prosecution had 
requested such an instruction, it would have been given.  Indeed, the State, in 
its exercise of discretion, might only have charged Mueller with the misdemeanor 
offense.

 

[¶17]   Our conclusion is that the trial court 
committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury as to the 
lesser-included offense, and it is necessary that the matter be remanded to the 
district court for a new trial or other appropriate proceedings.

 

 

[¶18]   Mueller also contends that a 
lesser-included offense instruction should have been given with respect to the 
offense of simple battery, as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001):

 

§ 6-2-501. Simple assault; battery; penalties.

 

            
(a) A person is guilty of simple assault if, having the present ability 
to do so, he unlawfully attempts to cause bodily injury to another.

            
(b) A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a 
rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another.

            
(c) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, simple assault 
is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00).

            
(d) Except as provided by subsection (f) of this section, battery is a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine 
of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.  Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the term of probation imposed by a judge under this 
subsection may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment established for the 
offense under this subsection provided the term of probation, together with any 
extension thereof, shall in no case exceed one (1) year.

            
(e) A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who is convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of simple assault against any 
other household member, after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 
6-2-502,  
6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or any other 
state, tribe or territory against any other household member, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine 
of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.

            
(f) A household member as defined by  W.S. 35-21-102 who commits a second or 
subsequent battery against any other household member shall be punished as 
follows:

            
(i) A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found 
guilty of a second offense under this subsection against any other household 
member, after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found 
guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f),  6-2-502,  6-2-503,  6-2-504 or other 
substantially similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against 
any other household member within the previous five (5) years is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both;

            
(ii) A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found 
guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this subsection against any other 
household member, after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f),  6-2-502,  6-2-503,  6-2-504 or other 
substantially similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against 
any other household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, a fine of not 
more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 

[¶19]   Mueller offered this lesser-included 
offense instruction:

 

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the necessary elements of the lesser 
included offense of the crime of Battery are:

 

1.  
That on or about the 10th day of September 
1999,

2.  
In the County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming,

3.  
The Defendant, Bill Mueller

4.  
Intentionally, Knowingly, or Recklessly and unlawfully;

5.  
Caused bodily injury to another person.

 

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
any of these elements has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the Defendant not guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that each of these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty.

 

[¶20]   Applying the test set out above, an 
instruction was offered, but a side-by-side comparison readily reveals that part 
two of the test is not met.  The elements of the lesser-included offense 
are identical to part of the elements of the greater offense.  However, elements 4 
and 5 do not require that the person be a peace officer, and we conclude that 
this difference is significant enough so that the identity factor is not 
met.  The 
remaining elements are identical, but those relate only to non-substantive 
elements of the crime (date, place, and name of defendant).  Another 
differentiating factor is that the battery statute appears in Chapter 2 of Title 
6, which deals with the general subject of offenses against the person, whereas, 
interference with a peace officer appears in Chapter 5 of Title 6, which deals 
with a more specific subject matter, offenses against public 
administration.  
Thus, these two statutes vindicate two different and distinguishable 
interests of the State in exercising its police powers. 

 

[¶21]   The trial court did not err in refusing 
the proposed lesser-included offense instruction on battery.

 

 

[¶22]   When addressing a claim that the 
evidence is not sufficient to sustain the conviction for a crime, we apply this 
standard:  We 
assess whether all of the evidence which was presented was adequate enough to 
form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to 
be drawn by a fact-finder when that evidence is viewed in a light most favorable 
to the State.  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we apply 
that rule, and our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and 
rational jurors would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did in the case under review.  Robinson v. State, 
11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Hodges v. State, 
904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

[¶23]   Applying this standard to the evidence 
we have set out in detail above, we conclude that a reasonable and rational 
trier of fact could conclude that Mueller was guilty of either the greater or 
the lesser offenses defined by Wyo. Stat Ann. § 6-5-204(a) and (b), or have 
acquitted him.9

 

 

[¶24]   We need not discuss this issue in great 
detail since we reverse on other grounds.  However, we will mention one specific instance 
that is troubling.  
The prosecutor presented this argument in rebuttal to defense counsel's 
proper argument that there was conflicting evidence with respect to what the 
police officers did, as well as what Mueller did, and that it was the jury's job 
to resolve those conflicts:

 

            
MR. SILVA:  
Thank you, sir [addressing the Court].  Go ahead and look over there at Officer 
McFarland and say, bad cop, bad cop, bad cop.  Officer McFarland, Officer Sellers, you guys 
are bad, bad cops.[10]  That's the defense 
in this case.  
That they are bad, bad police officers.  That they have done something here that is 
bad.

            
Is that what the evidence showed?  What did the evidence show you?  What did the 
evidence show you that they did?  How did they treat Ms. Burkey?  Did they treat Ms. 
Burkey bad?  No, 
they didn't treat her badly.  Nothing happened to Ms. Burkey, because she 
complied.  Did 
they get Mr. Spurlin and properly get a search warrant and do everything that 
was required in regards to getting Mr. Spurlin, a medium level drug dealer as 
Officer McFarland testified?  No, they did that absolutely right.  They check out their 
information in regard to Mr. Mueller [sic, Spurlin 
intended], you better believe they did.

            
They found their information in the course of their performance as 
officers, through search warrants, through surveillance, they checked those 
things out.  
They found out that Ms. Allyson Burkey was at the motel.  How?  Because they went 
and asked Craig Burkey.  They had a biographical [sic] description of Mr. Spurlin.  How?  From the personal 
observations and a CAD sheet.

            
They didn't shoot Mr. Mueller.  That would be bad officers, that would be too 
provocative.  
Not bad officers.  Bad defendant, bad Detlev Mueller.  What does he 
do?  He says, 
fuck you.  
That's what he says.  And he takes off, and it isn't quick, you 
know.  They are 
complaining that they didn't advise, they did not advise the defendant that 
there was a warrant,[11] that they were 
going to arrest him.  
This is quick, quick, quick.  He says, fuck you, he takes off and he goes to 
fight.

            
And he's got a warrant for his arrest, for what?  Eluding a police 
officer.[12]  Big surprise he takes off and runs.  Big surprise.  Not bad police 
officers, bad defendant.  The Defendant is on trial here today, not the 
police officers.  
The only way that you can find the Defendant not guilty is to believe 
that the police officers are lying.

            
Now, what evidence do you have that they are lying?  They arrest the 
Defendant for a lie?  
They do all the paperwork that's required for a case like this for a 
lie?  They come 
to court and sit in trial for two days for a lie?  Officers that get search warrants and conduct 
surveillance and do wires on Steve Spurlin, that doesn't look like officers that 
would lie.  
Officers that when the Defendant is beaten up call the ambulance to help 
him.  Is that 
officers that would lie?  And he refuses treatment.

            
The way that they treated Ms. Burkey.  Is that officers that would lie?  Even in the way they 
treated Sandi McKenzie, they didn't tell her, no, we're not police 
officers.  They 
didn't lie to her.[13]  Nothing in this case 
shows that these officers did anything wrong.  Also in this case  or back to the lie, 
something when you go back in the jury room you should think about, okay?  Because if these 
officers are lying about this, they are not very good at it, okay?  They are not good 
liars because what's a better lie?  Now, let's think.  What is smarter to 
do, to find out that the Defendant has got a warrant for his arrest, okay?

            
If you're a liar you say, we were looking for Allyson Burkey in regard to 
Steve Spurlin.  
We went down to the motel, we got there because we saw on the caller ID a 
call from the Yellowstone Motel, Steve Spurlin's house.  We go down there and 
we don't think we see Steve Spurlin, we don't have probable cause for Steve 
Spurlin.  We 
think we see Detlev Mueller, and we know he has a warrant for his arrest.  And that's who we go 
down there to arrest and that's when he becomes combative.

            
Now, if they wanted to lie to you, that's the lie they should tell.  That's the lie they 
should tell.  
They can't defend that lie.  That's the lie they should tell.  But, no, they come 
in here and tell you the truth.  Absolutely tell you the truth.  And then they 
complain they didn't advise Mr. Mueller that they were arresting[14] him thinking they were Spurlin [sic].  I suppose Officer Sellers should have advised 
him when he got punched in the face.

            
MR. SMITH:  
You Honor, I don't think Mr. Silva should vouch for the credibility of 
any witness in the case.

            
MR. SILVA:  
Your Honor, I don't think I vouched for the credibility of anybody.

            
THE COURT:  
I think I know what the objection is.  Let me handle it this way:  Ladies and 
gentlemen, the credibility of the witnesses in this case is something for you to 
decide.  To the 
extent that Mr. Silva was vouching for the credibility, he's stepping over the 
line.

            
As I heard it, he was arguing facts upon which you might consider the 
credibility, but I'll leave that up to you.  You may proceed.

            
MR. SILVA:  
I would never do that.  In fact, I would want you to base their 
credibility on the way they came up here and they testified.  Base their 
credibility on the facts and circumstances of this case.  Because in this 
case, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, there is really no evidence that the 
Defendant did not do this.  All the witnesses' stories are consistent and 
they are credible.

 

[¶25]   We can only conclude that the prosecutor 
was vouching for the credibility of his police witnesses.  See Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403-5 (Wyo. 1998); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 742-43 (Wyo. 1986); and 
Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1982).  That is clear from 
the excerpt set out above.  An objection was made, and so this error would 
not need to be evaluated under the plain error doctrine.  The remedial 
instruction given by the trial court was a step in the right direction but was 
incomplete and failed to adequately address the magnitude of the error repeated 
over and over in the excerpt, as well as immediately following the trial court's 
limited admonition to the jury.  We call attention to this error, trusting it 
will not be repeated but do not specifically hold that it would provide an 
independent ground for reversal of Mueller's conviction.

 

 

[¶26]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are reversed for the reason that the district court failed to 
give a lesser-included offense instruction as more fully set out above.  The matter is 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

   1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204 (LexisNexis 2001) states:

 

§ 6-5-204. Interference with 
peace officer; disarming peace officer; penalties.

 

            
(a) A person commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with or 
resists arrest by a peace officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties.

            
(b) A person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause 
bodily injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than ten (10) years.

            
(c) A person who intentionally and knowingly disarms a peace officer of 
his firearm while that peace officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than five (5) years. 

 

  2The record strongly suggests that at the time of the 
encounter with Mueller, the only thing the police knew for sure was that they 
recognized the blue motorcycle.

 

  3Painting in rather broad strokes, the police 
indicated they did not identify themselves as police officers because some motel 
clerks are given to tipping off criminals in some instances.

 

   
4This is significant because the police viewed Burkey 
as Spurlin's "girl."  
As it turns out, Burkey was married and continues to be married to her 
husband, and she did have relationships with Spurlin and with Mueller.  The prosecution made 
much use of Burkey's lifestyle in attacking her credibility.

 

   
5Again, painting in rather broad strokes, the police 
conceded that Mueller looked only vaguely similar to Spurlin (though they both 
fit a rather broad general description of a white male, with brown hair, five 
feet seven inches, 165 pounds), but in their view, the individual they saw was 
most likely Spurlin attempting to conceal his identity.

   
6The pattern instruction is set out as follows:

 

   The elements of the crime of 
Interference with a Peace officer, as charged in this case, are:

 

  1.  On or about the _____ day of _________ 199_ 
[sic]

  2.  In __________ County, Wyoming

  3.  The Defendant, _________________

  4.  Intentionally and knowing [caused] [attempted 
to cause] bodily injury to a peace officer

  5.  While that peace officer was engaged in the 
lawful performance of his official duties.

 

    If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

      If, on the other hand, you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

            

   
7Although it is not raised as an issue, and it plays 
no part in our resolution of this case, we take note that the jury instruction 
given in this regard contained both the theory that injury was actually caused 
and that an attempt was made to cause it.  It is evident from the pattern instruction set 
out above that generally the prosecution and the trial court must elect between 
the causing of injury and the attempt to cause injury.  If no election is 
made, then the jury is presented with two alternate theories, and the attempt 
theory requires additional instructions defining what attempt means.  W.Cr.P.J.I., Part 
11

 

   
8Although it is not evident in the record, the 
presentence report indicates that neither police officer wanted to make a 
statement in their role as victims and that both "denied being hurt or requiring 
medical attention."  
Their testimony at trial with respect to pain was equivocal.  When asked if they 
suffered, both responded in the affirmative but used the descriptive words 
"headache" and "sore jaw" which, in common parlance, may suggest something a 
level below "pain." 

   
9Since this matter may be retried before another jury, 
we include all three possibilities in our analysis, out of our desire that the 
prosecutor not argue to the jury that this Court has opined that Mueller is 
guilty.

 

   
10We inject, to make ourselves perfectly clear, that we 
do not consider the policemen to have been "bad."  However, consistent with the instructions 
given this jury and the laws that govern this State and this nation, it is the 
role of the jury to resolve disputed factual issues  not the prosecutor or the 
courts.

 

   
11Evidence was admitted that there was a misdemeanor 
arrest warrant outstanding for Mueller, but the policemen were unaware of that 
at the time they contacted Mueller.  That warrant was admitted as evidence for the 
ostensible purpose of showing that Mueller had a motive to flee from the police, 
although there was no evidence that Mueller was aware of the existence of the 
warrant.  The 
admissibility of that evidence is not raised as an issue in this appeal, and no 
objection was made to its admission below.  It is our view that the evidence, if offered 
again, must be carefully analyzed under W.R.E. 404(b) because its prejudicial 
effect may well outweigh its probative value, if any.

 

12   Although admitted to show motive, the 
argument is to the effect that he acted consistently with prior bad behavior of 
running from cops.  
The warrant was issued for eluding police when an attempt was made to 
stop Mueller for traffic violations.

 

   
13No contention was made that the policemen lied in 
this regard, only that McKenzie, the motel clerk, did not know and was not 
informed, that they were policemen and, indeed, reported their activities as a 
possible crime.

 

14   The testimony of the policemen took some 
pains to articulate intent only to contact Spurlin (not Mueller), and that they 
had no intent to arrest Spurlin (much less Mueller) but only to "contact" 
him.