Title: Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Bowles

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 000069     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
RONALD L. BOWLES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 
 
Ronald L. Bowles filed a motion for judgment pursuant to 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-
60, alleging, inter alia, that Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company* (NS) was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably 
safe workplace.  Bowles sought recovery for injuries he 
asserted resulted from NS's negligence.  Following a trial, 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bowles for $1,500,000.  
The trial court denied NS's motion to set aside the verdict 
and entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.  On 
appeal, NS asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
certain opinions rendered by an expert witness, in refusing to 
strike Bowles' evidence on the issue of NS's primary 
negligence, and in refusing to grant a continuance or new 
trial based on alleged irregularities regarding provision of 
                     
* At the time of filing, the defendant's corporate name 
was Norfolk and Western Railway Company.  During the course of 
litigation the name was changed to Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company.  Pursuant to a motion granted January 5, 2001, we 
refer to the defendant as Norfolk Southern Railway Company in 
this opinion. 
the jury panel list.  For the following reasons, we reject 
NS's claims and will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  Facts 
Bowles was employed by NS in the wheel machine building 
at the Shaffer's Crossing shop in Roanoke.  For approximately 
twenty-six years, Bowles was a shift operator of the wheel 
truing machine.  When wheels of a locomotive become deformed 
through use, cutting edges on the machine return the wheels to 
a uniformly round condition.  In order for the machine to cut 
the wheels, shock absorbers that are mounted on the outside of 
the wheels must be moved out of the way.  The process involves 
pulling the locomotive through the wheel truing machine on 
specially constructed rails which raise the wheels of the 
locomotive to approximately waist height, allowing the machine 
operator access to the shock absorbers. 
The operator must remove four bolts that hold a 
rectangular plate to the outside of the axle of a wheel set.  
The bottom end of the shock absorber is attached to the plate.  
The operator pivots the shock absorber and plate up and out of 
the way, keeping them in that position while the wheels are 
being cut.  The shock absorber and plate are then lowered, and 
the four bolts are reinserted. 
Because the shock absorber expands slightly when 
disengaged from the axle, the operator must compress the shock 
 
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absorber in order to realign the plate with the bolt holes.   
If an operator does not want to apply manual pressure when 
compressing the shock absorber and realigning the plate, he 
can use a three-foot long steel pry bar to lever the plate 
into position or call for assistance. 
On June 23, 1993, as Bowles was manually compressing a 
shock absorber and replacing the first bolt, he felt a pain in 
his right lower back and upper hip.  Bowles ultimately 
underwent surgery for a herniated disc and is physically 
unable to return to his former job. 
II.  Expert Opinions 
Code § 8.01-401.3 allows a qualified expert witness to 
testify in the form of an opinion if the expert's specialized, 
technical, or scientific knowledge "will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue."  Bowles' expert, Dr. Michael D. Shinnick, testified 
that, based on a reasonable degree of professional certainty, 
"the work task was unsafe and had a potential for injury" and 
"[a] mechanical device should have been employed to perform 
the task of compressing the shock absorber."  Dr. Schinnick's 
opinions were inadmissible, NS asserts, because they "did not 
offer the jury any scientific, technical or specialized 
knowledge that was beyond the jury's knowledge, or that 
assisted the jury to understand the evidence."  This is 
 
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particularly true, NS argues, because witnesses testified at 
trial regarding the mechanics of the work task, a full size 
model of the relevant portion of the locomotive was in the 
courtroom, Bowles demonstrated his actions at the time of the 
injury, and photographs of the work site, the investigative 
reports, and accident reports were admitted as exhibits.  
Thus, NS maintains, the jury had before it the same 
information as that utilized by Dr. Shinnick in forming his 
opinions. 
 
The fact in issue in this case was whether the employer 
provided a safe workplace.  Dr. Shinnick was qualified as an 
expert in ergonomics analysis and vocational assessment.  
Ergonomics is the study of the relationship between people and 
the equipment or the systems they use, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Johnson, 251 Va. 37, 41, 465 S.E.2d 800, 804 (1996), and the 
ergonomics analysis performed by Dr. Shinnick focused on the 
work task of compressing the shock absorber.  On the basis of 
that analysis and review of other materials and statements, 
Dr. Shinnick formed his opinion that the work task was not 
safe and that a mechanical device should have been provided to 
perform the task. 
We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting 
the opinions of Dr. Shinnick complained of by NS.  We agree 
that common knowledge alone may be sufficient to decide 
 
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whether a task is physically easy or difficult to perform, and 
a difficult task may more often result in physical injury.  
However, determining whether the task itself is safe is not 
solely a function of logic.  Whether easy or difficult, a 
task's safety for the purpose of imposing liability on an 
employer is determined by its effect on the body and whether 
there is a need for alternative means of performing the task.  
Thus, Dr. Shinnick's opinions were admissible because those 
opinions, informed by his acknowledged expertise in the area, 
could assist the jury in determining the fact in issue — 
whether NS provided a safe workplace. 
III.  Proof of Negligence 
The principles applicable to a personal injury case filed 
pursuant to FELA are well-settled.  Under FELA, an employer 
has a nondelegable, continuing duty to exercise reasonable 
care in providing a safe workplace for its employees.  Id. at 
44, 465 S.E.2d at 805.  An employer fails to comply with that 
duty if its negligence played even the slightest part in 
causing injuries suffered by its employee.  Both negligence 
and foreseeability must be established by more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Trimiew, 253 Va. 
22, 27, 480 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1997).  These issues are normally 
a matter for the jury.  Johnson, 251 Va. at 44, 465 S.E.2d at 
805. 
 
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NS asserts that as a matter of law Bowles failed to 
produce evidence sufficient to support a jury determination 
that NS was negligent or had reason to foresee any 
unreasonable risk to those employees performing the task.  
Furthermore, NS asserts that it provided a mechanical device, 
a pry bar, to help employees perform the job.  NS, relying on 
Trimiew, asserts that the evidence showed only that 
compressing shock absorbers was a difficult or hard task, not 
an unsafe task, and, therefore, that the evidence failed to 
create a jury issue on the railroad's negligence.  As a 
result, NS maintains that the trial court erred in denying 
NS's motion to strike Bowles' evidence. 
The evidence in this case, unlike the evidence in 
Trimiew, includes expert testimony that the work was unsafe 
and that NS should have provided a mechanical device to 
perform the task.  See 253 Va. at 28, 480 S.E.2d at 108.  
Additional evidence relating to NS's negligence is found in 
the testimony of Bowles and of fellow workers James Simmons 
and William Dowdy, who described the task as awkward, 
cumbersome, and difficult for an employee to perform alone.  
Bowles and Dowdy testified that the pry bar was not effective 
in all circumstances because it could slip and was awkward.  
Bowles further testified that when using the pry bar, he had 
incidents that "had not been good." 
 
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The record also contains evidence regarding notice and 
foreseeability.  Dowdy and Bowles testified that they had 
complained to their supervisor about the awkwardness of the 
task, and Simmons testified that he had complained at safety 
meetings that the task was difficult to perform.  Both Simmons 
and Dowdy heard Bowles make similar complaints at safety 
meetings several times.  Following the accident, during a 
discussion about Bowles' injury, a supervisor told Bowles that 
the "railroad had a poor practice of handling shock 
absorbers." 
Considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
as we must, Sloan v. Thornton, 249 Va. 492, 495, 457 S.E.2d 
60, 61 (1995), we conclude that the record contained 
sufficient evidence regarding foreseeability and negligence by 
NS to allow the trial court to submit the issue to the jury 
for determination. 
III.  Jury Panel Lists 
 
NS's final assignment of error involves the application 
of Code § 8.01-353.  NS maintains that the provision in Code 
§ 8.01-353 that a court officer "shall make available . . . a 
copy of the jury panel to be used for the trial of the case at 
least forty-eight hours before the trial" is mandatory and the 
failure to comply with this provision is reversible error. 
 
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In this case, NS's counsel requested and received the 
jury panel list forty-eight hours before the scheduled trial.  
However, on the day of trial, a number of potential jurors 
called for jury duty could not get to the courthouse due to 
inclement weather.  Because only approximately forty potential 
jurors arrived, all the potential jurors were put into a 
combined pool.  This pool was used first for picking a jury 
for a criminal case scheduled for trial.  The remaining 
twenty-eight potential jurors were then made available for 
Bowles' trial.  The eight-member jury ultimately chosen from 
this pool for Bowles' case consisted of six persons who were 
not on the jury panel list previously furnished to NS's 
counsel.  This was error, NS concludes, and the trial court 
should have granted either NS's motion for a continuance or 
NS's motion for a new trial. 
 
Furnishing counsel with a jury panel list is part of a 
statutory procedure for the impaneling of jurors.  That 
procedure involves three separate stages at which potential 
jurors are identified prior to choosing the final members of 
the jury.  The first stage is the creation of a master jury 
list.  The master jury list is assembled annually by jury 
commissioners and utilized for the following twelve month 
period.  Code § 8.01-345.  At the second stage, a list of 
potential jurors is drawn from the master list for service 
 
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during a term of court.  Code § 8.01-348.  Counsel in jury 
cases to be tried during that term have access to this term 
list.  Code § 8.01-351.  The final stage is the creation of 
the jury panel list, the list at issue in this case.  The 
judge indicates the number of persons needed to hear the trial 
of a case and that number is selected from the term list.  
Code § 8.01-355.  Those selected are notified to appear in 
court on a day directed by the court.  Code § 8.01-353.  
Notification must be given by mailing summonses seven days 
before the potential jurors are to appear.  Code § 8.01-298. 
Alternative methods for identifying and securing 
potential jurors also are provided by statute.  Code § 8.01-
353 allows a judge to verbally direct a person already 
summoned for a jury panel to appear at a later date.  Also, if 
"a sufficient number of jurors summoned cannot be obtained for 
the trial of any case, the judge may select from the names on 
the [master jury list] the names of as many persons as he 
deems necessary and cause them to be summoned to appear 
forthwith for the trial."  Code § 8.01-355.  Finally, both 
Code §§ 8.01-352 and –353 restrict the use of certain 
irregularities or errors in providing information or selecting 
potential jurors as the basis for objections, mistrials, or 
reversible errors on appeal. 
 
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The right to a jury trial is one of the cornerstones of 
our legal system, and complying with the procedures for 
insuring the presence of a fair and impartial jury is of the 
highest priority.  As NS argues, an important part of that 
process is the ability of the parties to investigate potential 
jurors for information which may disqualify a juror for cause 
or otherwise impact the jury selection process.  However, the 
statutory scheme does not contemplate that a full and accurate 
jury panel list will always be available for counsel forty-
eight hours before the trial of the case.  For example, the 
statutes specifically allow the trial judge to delay the 
appearance of previously-summoned members of a jury panel and 
to call persons on the term list to serve for a particular 
trial, even though those persons were not on the jury panel 
list.  Code §§ 8.01-353, -355.  These provisions recognize 
that unanticipated circumstances requiring alternative means 
of securing a jury panel will arise.  In these circumstances, 
the members of the actual jury panel necessarily will vary 
from those persons listed on a jury panel list provided forty-
eight hours before trial. 
Thus, even assuming without deciding that the requirement 
in Code § 8.01-353 regarding provision of the jury panel list 
is mandatory, as NS argues, the mandatory nature of that 
provision cannot extend to requiring that the jury panel list 
 
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provided to counsel prior to trial be identical to the actual 
jury panel when circumstances require reconstitution of the 
jury panel. 
The need to reconstitute the jury panel under the 
circumstances of this case was clear and has not been 
challenged by NS.  No error was assigned to the manner in 
which the trial court reconstituted the jury panel nor was 
there any assignment of error that the resulting jury was not 
impartial.  In arguing that the provisions of Code § 8.01-353 
are mandatory, NS posits that the failure to comply with the 
statute "constitutes, in and of itself, injustice," but NS 
does not cite to any specific prejudice resulting from the 
trial court's action.  NS's only complaint is that the jury 
panel list supplied before the trial did not accurately 
reflect the true makeup of the jury panel.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying NS's 
motions for a continuance and for a new trial because some of 
the jury panel members were not identified in the jury panel 
list given to NS prior to trial. 
 
In summary, for the reasons stated, we hold that the 
trial court did not err in admitting the opinions of Dr. 
Schinnick, in submitting the issue of NS's negligence to the 
jury, and in denying NS's motions for a continuance and a new 
trial based on a discrepancy between the jury panel list and 
 
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members of the jury panel.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
trial court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.
 
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