Title: RICHARD PAUL MEYERS v. THE STATE 0F WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD PAUL MEYERS v. THE STATE 0F WYOMING2007 WY 118164 P.3d 544Case Number: No. 05-284Decided: 07/31/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RICHARD 
PAUL MEYERS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, State 
Public Defender Program

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 
 

KAUTZ, 
District 
Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard P. Meyers 
(Meyers) sought to withdraw his nolo contendere plea after the district 
court sentenced him for attempted voluntary manslaughter.  The district court denied Meyers' motion 
without a hearing.  Meyers 
challenges the lack of a hearing, and the district court's denial of his motion 
to withdraw plea.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Meyers raises 
this issue:

 
 
Did the 
District Court err in denying Meyers' motion to withdraw his plea without a 
hearing?

 
 
The 
State presents the issue as:

                        
Did the District Court err in denying [Meyers'] post-sentence "Motion to 
Withdraw No Contest Plea" without a hearing and should his claim also be 
rejected as res 
judicata?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Most of the facts 
are stated in our decision on Meyers' first appeal  Meyers v. State, 
2005 WY 163, 124 P.3d 710 (Wyo. 2005).  
After two mistrials due to deadlocked juries, Meyers pled nolo 
contendere to a reduced charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Meyers, ¶ 7, 124 P.3d  at 
713.

 
 
[¶4]      Before accepting 
the plea, the district court asked Meyers if he understood the plea and if he 
was acting voluntarily.  Meyers 
acknowledged that he was acting voluntarily, and that he understood the 
proceedings.  He assured the court 
that he had discussed the plea to the reduced charge with his attorney and that 
he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation.  Meyers stated that he understood his 
plea of nolo contendere was the same as a guilty plea and that there 
would be no trial (another trial was set for April 6, 2004, only two weeks from 
the date Meyers pled nolo contendere).  Meyers acknowledged that the maximum 
penalty he faced was 20 years and told the court that he had no questions.  The district court accepted Meyers' 
plea.

 
 
[¶5]      On May 18, 2004, 
the district court conducted a sentencing hearing.  Meyers personally gave a long, detailed 
analytical presentation to the court.  
He gave no indication that he felt coerced to plead nolo 
contendere, but instead he said, "What I did that night was terribly wrong, 
and I accept full responsibility for that, Your Honor."  The district court imposed a sentence of 
18 to 20 years.

 
 
[¶6]      Meyers filed his 
first appeal on June 15, 2004.  In 
that appeal he did not mention any claim that his plea was not 
voluntary.

 
 
[¶7]      On May 19, 2005, 
over a year after the sentencing and 11 months after filing his first appeal, 
Meyers filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction and asked to withdraw his 
plea.  His appellate counsel filed 
an additional motion to withdraw his plea on August 1, 2005.  Both motions asserted that Meyers' plea 
was not voluntary.  Specifically, 
Meyers claimed that he only pled to get out of the CarbonCounty jail, where he was being 
mistreated.  He claimed that he was 
suicidal while in custody, and that he was subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment in the CarbonCounty jail while awaiting trial.  In support of these assertions, Meyers 
claimed:

 
 
            
(1)       
Jail logs show Meyers claimed he was suicidal in October 
2002.

            
(2)       
His medical records from October 2002 did not adequately report his 
mental health.

            
(3)       
Jailers failed to provide medication to Meyers in 
2002.

            
(4)       
The Sheriff delayed providing a mental health evaluation to Meyers in 
2002.

            
(5)       
Meyers suffered from a painful rash in 2002, and complained of that 
condition in April 2004.

            
(6)       
In September 2002, an officer injured Meyers' arms while they were in a 
"cuff chute."

 
 
[¶8]      On August 21, 
2002, the district court ordered a forensic psychological evaluation for 
Meyers.  The State attempted to 
conduct that evaluation on August 29, 2002, but Meyers refused to 
cooperate.  The court issued a 
second order for a psychological evaluation and on December 12, 2002, Meyers 
finally cooperated so the evaluation could be completed.  In that evaluation, Meyers stated that 
he had been upset in jail on numerous occasions, but did not report any mental 
health problems.  The evaluation 
determined that Meyers was competent to participate in his 
case.

 
 

LAW

 
 

Withdrawal 
of Plea

 
 
[¶9]      Rule 32(d), 
W.R.Cr.P., states that after a criminal defendant who pleads nolo 
contendere is sentenced, such plea "may be set aside only to correct 
manifest injustice."  "Manifest 
injustice' contemplates a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party.'"  Deloge v. State, 2005 WY 152, 
¶ 16, 123 P.3d 573, 578 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 776 (Wyo. 1997)).  "It is, in part, intended to address a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice 
or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.'" 
Deloge, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d  at 578 (quoting United States v. 
Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 
1997)).

 
 
[¶10]   The district court has discretion 
in deciding whether or not manifest injustice exists.  Deloge, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d  at 
579.  Although W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) does 
not specify that a district court must hold a hearing on a motion to withdraw a 
nolo contendere plea in exercising its discretion, this Court has adopted 
a two-part test formerly used by the federal courts to assist in determining 
whether or not to allow the withdrawal of a plea after 
sentencing:

 
 
[I]f the 
defendant alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, the trial 
court must hold a hearing.  To 
prevent a possible deluge of unnecessary court proceedings, the second element 
of the test allows a trial court to deny a hearing if the defendant's 
allegations are contradicted by the record, are inherently unreliable, or are 
merely conclusions rather than statements of fact.

 
 

Coleman 
v. State, 843 P.2d 558, 559-60 (Wyo. 1992) (internal citations and footnote 
omitted).  We have also recognized 
that "[i]f the defendant offers no plausible reason for withdrawal, the trial 
court has discretion to deny the motion without a hearing."  Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 468 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 

Valle v. 
State, 2006 
WY 43, ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 181, 184 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶11]   Ultimately, the decision of the 
district court regarding a motion to withdraw the plea "will not be reversed [by 
this Court] for an abuse of discretion so long as the district court reasonably 
could conclude as it did."  
Deloge, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d  at 579 (quoting Nixon v. State, 
4 P.3d 864, 869 (Wyo. 2000)).  
Additionally, this Court "may affirm the district court's decision on any 
legal ground appearing in the record."  
Deloge, ¶ 17, 123 P.3d  at 579 (citing Lacey v. State, 
2003 WY 148, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 

Res 
Judicata

 
 
[¶12]   The concept of res judicata 
applies in criminal cases as well as in civil cases.  Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157 
¶ 14, 151 P.3d 261, 266 (Wyo. 2006).  
Under res judicata, "[i]t is a longstanding rule that issues which 
could have been raised in an earlier proceeding are foreclosed from 
subsequent consideration."  
Gould, ¶ 15, 151 P.3d  at 266 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 
2003)).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Hearing

 
 
[¶13]   Meyers complains that the district 
court should have held a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea.  The district court considered each of 
the allegations set out in his motion to withdraw his plea.  It found that Meyers' contention that he 
was denied a psychological evaluation was directly contradicted by the 
record.  The court attempted to 
provide Meyers with an evaluation in August 2002, but he refused.  An evaluation conducted in December 2002 
found Meyers was able to participate in his defense.  In that evaluation, Meyers represented 
that he was not suicidal and did not expect to feel that way in the 
future.

 
 
[¶14]   A hearing on Meyers' claims would 
not have presented any plausible basis for concluding that manifest injustice 
would result if withdrawal was not permitted.  Even if Meyers proved his 2002 claims 
were true at a hearing, those claims do not indicate that his 2004 plea was 
involuntary, or that manifest injustice resulted.  The evidence in the record, from the 
change of plea hearing and from the sentencing, contradicts Meyers' claim that 
he was under extreme mental duress in March 2004 as a result of jail conditions 
in 2002. 

 
 
[¶15]   The district court properly decided 
Meyers' motion to withdraw his plea without a hearing, because Meyers presented 
no plausible reason to conclude that a manifest injustice had occurred.  His claims were either contradicted by 
the record, or logically unrelated to the voluntariness of his plea in 
2004.  No hearing is required on a 
motion to withdraw plea where no plausible basis for withdrawal is presented, or 
where the allegations are clearly contradicted by the record.  Valle, 132 P.3d 181.

 
 

Res 
Judicata

 
 
[¶16]   Meyers appealed his case long 
before he moved to withdraw his plea.  
He could have claimed that his plea was involuntary in his appeal, but 
did not.  The principle of res 
judicata precludes Meyers from now claiming that his plea was 
involuntary.  Gould, 151 P.3d 261.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court properly decided 
Meyers' motion to withdraw plea without a hearing.  Meyers should have made his claim that 
his plea was involuntary in his original appeal.  Res judicata prevents him from 
making that claim now.  The action 
of the district court is affirmed on each of these 
bases.