Title: The Florida Bar v. Geneva Carol Forrester

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-813
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
GENEVA CAROL FORRESTER,
Respondent.
[May 16, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Geneva Carol Forrester, a member of The Florida Bar, petitions this Court to
review a referee's report recommending that she be found guilty of ethical breaches. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we
approve the referee’s findings of guilt and recommended discipline.
FACTS
  The Bar filed a complaint against Forrester alleging that she violated Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct
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another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal
a document or other material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
relevant to a pending or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist
another person to do any such act.”), and 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”) in the context
of her representation of a construction company in civil litigation.  The referee held
a hearing and issued a report making the following findings:
[Forrester] represented Caladesi Construction Company, Inc., as one of
the defendants in civil litigation initiated by Timothy Rice (Rice) d/b/a
Palm Marsh Landscaping, (Plaintiff).  Donald Hinrichs (Hinrichs) was
the President of Defendant corporation, Caladesi Construction
Company, Inc.  Michael C. Berry, Sr. (Berry) was the attorney for the
Plaintiff in the matter.  On March 13, 1998, Berry conducted a
deposition of Hinrichs, during which Berry showed Hinrichs
Deposition Exhibit 5, a two (2) page document printed on green paper. 
[Florida Bar Exhibit No. 2]  Exhibit 5 was an original copy of a
Subcontract Agreement between Caladesi and Rice, with original
signatures.  During this deposition, both Hinrichs and  [Forrester]
expressed concern that Exhibit 5 belonged to Hinrichs, and [Forrester]
indicated that they wanted the document.  Later during the deposition,
[Forrester] asked Berry to locate certain documents.  When Berry
turned around to retrieve the documents from behind his seat, Hinrichs
removed Exhibit 5 from the table and handed it to [Forrester].  After
Hinrichs handed Exhibit 5 to [Forrester], she moved it below the table
and placed it to her right, either in or near her briefcase on the floor. 
The court reporter, Kaylynn Boyer (Boyer), observed the removal of
Exhibit 5 from the table, and during a break, communicated this
information to Berry's secretary, who shortly thereafter advised Berry. 
Berry attempted to schedule an emergency hearing, but when unable to
do so, he ordered a second court reporter to come to the deposition. 
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After ordering the second court reporter, Berry returned to the
deposition room, resumed questioning Hinrichs, and attempted to
locate Exhibit 5.  The deposition transcript, reflects the following
discourse:
Berry:  Let's see, I had his contract here, where is
that contract?
[Forrester]:  I have a copy here.  I don't know that I
have all the discovery with me.  Let me see.
Berry:  I'm looking for the Palm Marsh contract, the
green one.
[Forrester]:  Hm-mm.
Berry:  That was exhibit, I'll tell you which one it
was.
[Forrester]:  I didn't bring my box with me so I don't
know that I have a copy right now.  I'm seeing if I
did.
* * *
Berry:  Exhibit five.  All right.  So you don't have
it?
[Forrester]:  I'm not seeing it.  I had a copy but I
know when you filed the complaint didn't you
attach it?  That would be the easiest way.
Berry:  All right.
[Forrester]:  Let me look back there.  Yeah, that's it,
isn't it, a copy of it?
After the second court reporter, Beth Ann Erickson (Erickson)
arrived, Berry asked Erickson to take over for the first court reporter,
and inquired of [Forrester] as follows:
Berry:  I would like to ask Geneva Forrester if she
could show me the contract, Exhibit 5, that she
has with her documents, please.
[Forrester]:  I have this one, which is a copy, and
I have the original. 
Berry:  Okay. Do you have the green original
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Exhibit 5?
[Forrester]:  Yes.  Sure.
Berry:  Okay.  Where is it?
[Forrester]:  Right here.
[Forrester] retrieved Exhibit 5 from beside or near her
briefcase, which was located on the floor to her right, and
handed it to Berry.  
Subsequent to the March 13, 1998 deposition, a Motion
for Sanction, based in part upon [Forrester's] conduct at the
deposition, was heard by Judge James R. Case, Sixth Judicial
Circuit.  After a hearing,  Judge Case signed a July 27, 1998
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Strike and Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions. 
[Florida Bar Exhibit No. 3]  This order included the following
finding: "Ms. Forrester has not presented a satisfactory
explanation to the Court for her conduct; therefore, the Court
must refer the matter to the Florida Bar."
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing in this matter, the referee found
that Forrester knowingly and intentionally removed and concealed evidence (exhibit
5) for a period of time at the March 13, 1998, deposition.  The referee further found
that Forrester was given more than one opportunity to return exhibit 5, but did not
do so until she was confronted by opposing counsel.  Although Forrester expressed
the belief that exhibit 5 belonged originally to her client, the referee found that
Forrester's belief did not constitute a defense to her taking of the document, as
lawful remedies were available for the retrieval of the document.  Likewise, the
referee found that the availability of copies to the parties did not constitute a defense
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for Forrester's taking exhibit 5, as it was documentary evidence in a deposition. 
Accordingly, the referee recommended that Forrester be found guilty of violating
rule 4-3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to
evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other
material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending
or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another person to do
any such act.”).  
Additionally, the referee found that Forrester made an intentional
misrepresentation concerning the location of exhibit 5 when asked whether she had
it.  The referee found that, although Forrester truthfully replied, "I'm not seeing it,"
Forrester's answer was intended to mislead because she in fact knew where the
document was located and failed to disclose that information to Berry.   As such, the
referee recommended that Forrester be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) (“A
lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.”).
The referee recommended that Forrester be suspended for sixty days to be
followed by one year of probation during which Forrester must attend, and
successfully complete, The Florida Bar's ethics school.  The referee found no
1.  The referee found that Forrester had been subject to disciplinary action on
three prior occasions.  
2.  We have considered Forrester's procedural challenges, and we reject them
without further discussion. 
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mitigating factors.  In aggravation, the referee found a prior disciplinary history,1
dishonest or selfish motive, and substantial experience in the practice of law.   The
referee also recommended that the Bar be awarded $1,335.15 in costs.
Forrester has petitioned this Court to review the referee's report, challenging
the referee's recommendations as to guilt, the referee's recommended discipline, and
various procedural rulings made or actions taken by the referee.2  
ANALYSIS
Forrester first challenges the referee's finding that her conduct violated rule 4-
3.4(a).  Forrester raises three claims that rule 4-3.4(a) does not apply to her conduct
at the deposition.  We find each of her arguments to be without merit, and address
them individually.
First, Forrester argues that rule 4-3.4(a) was not intended to proscribe the
concealment of evidence where multiple copies are available or when the
concealment lasts for only a short period of time.  However, rule 4-3.4(a)
specifically prohibits the concealment of a document that “the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or a reasonably foreseeable
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proceeding.”  The rule does not distinguish the situations where multiple copies of
documents are available or when the concealment lasts for only a short duration. 
The comment to rule 4-3.4(a), although not binding authority, supports our finding
that the availability of copies of evidence is irrelevant to whether concealment of an
original violates the rule.  The comment provides, in pertinent part:
     The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the
evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending
parties.  Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by
prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence,
improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery
procedure, and the like.
     Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to
establish a claim or defense.  Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right
of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence
through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right.  The
exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered,
concealed, or destroyed.
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(a), cmt.  The comment notes that one of the purposes
of rule 4-3.4(a) is to secure fair competition in the adversary system.  Fair
competition is secured by ensuring that a party’s right to obtain relevant evidence is
not frustrated by the concealment of such evidence.  We see no reason to distinguish
the situation where multiple copies of a document are available or when the
concealment lasts for only a short period of time. Thus, we conclude that in the
interest of promoting fair competition both the availability of multiple copies and the
3.   In her reply brief, Forrester stated:
Certainly, the exhibit could have been admitted into evidence in due
course.  That eventuality did not occur.  It was certainly relevant, but it
was not the only available copy.
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duration of such concealment do not, under the circumstances of this case, negate
the specifically prohibited conduct of concealing a relevant document.  Further, we
conclude that availability of multiple copies in the instant case does not provide a
substitute for the original document that Forrester was found to have concealed.  
Secondly, Forrester argues that rule 4-3.4(a) does not apply to her conduct at
the deposition because exhibit 5 was not actual evidence because no trial had
occurred.  She argues that exhibit 5 was merely relevant to the case.  We find that
this argument supports, rather than negates, a finding that Forrester violated rule 4-
3.4(a).  Under the rule, a lawyer may be disciplined for wrongfully concealing a
document that “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a
pending or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(a). 
The comment to the rule speaks in terms of “marshalling evidence”  and “obtaining
evidence through discovery,” terms generally associated with pre-trial procedures. 
Therefore, a trial need not occur before a document is considered relevant evidence
under the rule.  Forrester admits that exhibit 5 was a relevant document in this case
and was foreseeable as trial evidence.3  We conclude that Forrester is subject to
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discipline under the rule for concealing exhibit 5.
Lastly, Forrester argues the referee erred in finding that she “removed”
exhibit 5.  She claims that exhibit 5 was handed to her by Hinrichs and thus, she did
not remove it from the table.  The referee's determination that Forrester removed
exhibit 5 is a finding of fact.  Such findings carry a presumption of correctness and
should be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous or there is no evidence in the
record to support them.  See Florida Bar v. Roberts, 789 So. 2d 284, 287 (Fla.
2001).  We conclude that although Forrester may not have physically removed
exhibit 5 from the table, she did participate in its removal. Kaylynn Boyer, the court
reporter who saw the removal, described the incident as follows:
And as I turned back around to wait, I see Mr. Heinrich [sic] reach
with his left hand, put it in his right hand, and hand it over to Ms.
Forrester who then took it, sat it in her lap, scooted the chair forward
and bent down, and I couldn’t see because she was under the table - -
see what she was doing with it and when she came up it was not in her
lap nor in her hand or on the table.
We conclude that this testimony represents competent, substantial evidence that
Forrester removed exhibit 5, placing it within her possession.  
Regardless of how Forrester defines the way she received the document, a
violation of rule 4-3.4(a) depends on whether the attorney concealed, not removed,
the relevant evidence.  We conclude that competent, substantial evidence exists in
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the record below to support the referee’s finding that Forrester concealed exhibit 5. 
Therefore, we approve the referee's recommendation that Forrester be found guilty
of a rule 4-3.4(a) violation.
Forrester next challenges the referee's finding that she violated rule 4-8.4(c). 
This rule provides that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”  This Court has held that “[i]n order
to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud,
the Bar must show the necessary element of intent.”  Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731
So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999).  Further, this Court has held that “in order to satisfy
the element of intent it must only be shown that the conduct was deliberate or
knowing.”  Id.  A finding of intent is a factual finding that must be upheld if there is
evidence in the record below to support such a finding.  See Roberts, 789 So. 2d at
287.  
In the present case, the referee found that Forrester made an intentional
misrepresentation concerning the location of exhibit 5, when asked whether she had
it.  The referee found that, although Forrester truthfully replied, "I'm not seeing it,"
Forrester's answer was intended to mislead because she in fact knew where the
document was located and failed to disclose that information to attorney Berry.  
The court reporter witnessed Forrester take exhibit 5 from Hinrichs, place it on her
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lap, and put it somewhere under the table.  Forrester denied “seeing” where exhibit
5 was located until Berry brought in a second court reporter and directly asked
Forrester to show him the document.  Forrester testified that she immediately gave
Berry the document at that time.  We conclude that the record supports the referee’s
finding that Forrester intentionally misrepresented to Berry her knowledge of the
whereabouts of exhibit 5.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation
that Forrester be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).
Finally, Forrester challenges the referee's recommendation that she be
suspended for sixty days to be followed by one year of probation.  Forrester argues
that her conduct warrants no more than a public reprimand.  This Court has held that
“[i]n reviewing a referee's recommendation of discipline, this Court's scope of
review is somewhat broader than that afforded to findings of facts because,
ultimately, it is [the Court's] responsibility to order an appropriate punishment.”
Florida Bar v. Maier, 784 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 2001).  Generally speaking,
however, this Court "will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as
long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw."  Florida Bar v.
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   In making this determination, this Court
considers not only caselaw but also the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.  See id.   
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Under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, we conclude
that suspension is appropriate in this case.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs.
6.12 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or
documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action.”); Fla. Stds. Imposing
Law. Sancs. 7.2 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).  
Although Forrester argues that a suspension is too harsh and that a public
reprimand should be imposed, we conclude that the applicable standards do not
support her argument.  Under standard 6.13, a public reprimand is appropriate only
when an attorney engages in negligent conduct. See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs.
6.13 (“Public Reprimand is appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in
determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action
when material information is being withheld.”).  However, the referee found
Forrester’s misconduct to be intentional, and, as previously discussed, there is
competent, substantial evidence in the record to support this finding.  Thus,
Forrester’s intentional misconduct does not fall within the scope of conduct
justifying a public reprimand under standard 6.13.  Further, this Court has held that
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a “public reprimand should be reserved for isolated instances of neglect, lapses of
judgment, or technical violations of trust accounting rules without willful intent.” 
Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1998); see also Florida Bar v.
Rogers, 583 So.2d 1379, 1382 (Fla. 1991).  We find that Forrester’s misconduct
was neither an isolated instance of neglect nor a lapse of judgment because she
intentionally concealed exhibit 5 and misrepresented its whereabouts when asked.
Further, we conclude a sanction harsher than a public reprimand should be
imposed based on the fact that Forrester has three prior disciplinary actions.  In
1994, Forrester received an admonishment for violating rule 4-1.7(a) (Representing
Adverse Interests).  See Florida Bar v. Forrester, No. 80,442 (unpublished order)
(Fla. Apr. 21, 1994).  In 1994, Forrester received twenty-four months' probation for
violating rule 4-1.16(d) (Protection of Client’s Interest).  See Florida Bar v.
Forrester, 659 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1995) (table).  Finally, in 1995 Forrester received a
ninety-day suspension for violating rule 4-1.5(a) (Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly
Excessive Fees) and a public reprimand for violating rules 5-1.1(g) (Disbursement
Against Uncollected Funds) and 5-1.2(c)(1)(A)(B) (Minimum Trust Accounting
Procedures).  See Florida Bar v. Forrester, 656 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1995).  In
assessing discipline, "this Court also considers prior misconduct and cumulative
misconduct as relevant factors, and deals more severely with cumulative misconduct
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than with isolated misconduct. "  Florida Bar v. Williams, 753 So. 2d 1258, 1262
(Fla. 2000).
Forrester cites this Court's opinion in Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell, 659 So.
2d 1082 (Fla. 1995), to support her argument that a sixty-day suspension is too
severe.  In Burkich-Burrell, the Court imposed a thirty-day suspension for attorney
Burkich’s failure to disclose material facts to opposing counsel where she
represented her husband, Burrell, in a personal injury action.  See id. at 1084.  The
Court found that Burkich had firsthand knowledge of the nondisclosed material facts
which contradicted the responses made in the interrogatories by her husband.  See
id.   Burkich never reviewed or amended her husband's interrogatories.  See id.  
Although the conduct in Burkich-Burrell is somewhat analogous to the
present case, we conclude that there are some important distinguishing
characteristics between these two cases.  In imposing discipline, this Court in
Burkich-Burrell stated that “while Burkich is guilty of serious misconduct, in light of
the unique facts of this case and the mitigating factors present, a thirty-day
suspension is sufficient discipline.”  Id.   In mitigation, the referee had found (1)
Burrell’s alcohol abuse, (2) Burrell's physical and mental abuse of attorney Burkich,
(3) Burkich’s lack of prior misconduct, and (4) Burkich's lack of experience in
personal injury litigation.  See id. at 1083.  On the other hand, in the instant case the
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referee did not find any mitigating factors.  Further, in the present case, the referee
found the aggravating factor of a prior disciplinary history, which was not present in
Burkich-Burrell.  We conclude that in light of Forrester's history of misconduct and
the lack of mitigation found by the referee, the instant case is distinguishable from
Burkich-Burrell and imposition of a harsher sanction is thus appropriate.   See
generally Williams, 753 So. 2d at 1262.  Therefore, based on the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and Forrester’s cumulative misconduct, we approve the
referee’s recommendation of a sixty-day suspension, to be followed by one year of
probation.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we approve the referee's report in full.  Geneva Carol Forrester
is hereby suspended from the practice of law for sixty days followed by probation
for one year.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this
opinion so that Forrester can close out her practice and protect the interests of
existing clients.  If Forrester notifies this Court in writing that she is no longer
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Forrester shall
accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is
completed.  Judgment for costs in the amount of $1,335.15 is entered against
4.  We find no merit to Forrester's challenge to the referee's award of costs to
the Bar.
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Forrester and in favor of The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399, for which sum let execution issue.4    
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Susan V. Bloemendaal, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel
and Susan Gralla Zemankiewicz, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant
Henry P. Trawick, Sarasota, Florida,
for Respondent