Title: In re Covington

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  July 18, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Application for Admission
to the Bar of the State of Oregon,
VAN ALEXANDER COVINGTON, IV,
	Applicant.
(SC S48651)

	En Banc
	Application for admission to the practice of law in Oregon.
	Argued and submitted May 13, 2002.
	Susan D. Isaacs, Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for applicant.
	Jeffrey C. Sapiro, Oregon State Bar, Lake Oswego, argued the
cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Board of Bar
Examiners.
	PER CURIAM
	Applicant's application for admission to the Oregon State
Bar is denied.
		PER CURIAM
		The issue in this contested lawyer admission proceeding
is whether applicant has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that he presently possesses the good moral character necessary
for admission to the Oregon State Bar (Bar).  The Board of Bar
Examiners (Board) recommends that this court deny admission at
this time, but grant applicant leave to reapply for admission in
one year.  Applicant has petitioned this court to admit him
despite the Board's recommendation.  This court reviews de novo. 
ORS 9.536(3); ORS 9.539; BR 10.6.  For the reasons that follow,
we conclude that applicant should not be admitted to the practice
of law in Oregon at this time.
		The central concern in this proceeding is applicant's
history of drug and alcohol dependency and the criminal activity
that sometimes accompanied that dependency.  Applicant is 33
years old.  He began drinking alcohol and using marijuana at age
13, was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants
(DUII) at age 16, and was convicted of a misdemeanor resulting
from drunken behavior at about age 18.  From 1986 to 1988,
applicant continued to drink heavily and to use marijuana, was
convicted of another misdemeanor resulting from a drunken assault
in which he seriously injured the victim, and was fired from a
job for smoking marijuana.  In the spring of 1988, he began using
LSD and hallucinogenic mushrooms.
		In July 1988, applicant attended his first in a series
of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and he remained sober for
a year.  He moved to Oregon at some point in 1988, had a three-day relapse, returned to AA, and remained sober for two more
years.  Applicant relapsed again in June 1991, drinking and using
marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine intermittently over the
next three years.  In June 1992, he graduated from Oregon State
University.  In 1995, he successfully completed an outpatient
program.  He remained sober until 1996, when he again began
drinking and using marijuana.
		In the fall of 1996, at age 27, applicant began
attending law school at the University of Oregon.  In early 1997,
he was arrested while purchasing marijuana, and he subsequently
was charged with manufacture and distribution of a controlled
substance.  He later agreed to implicate the seller, and the
charges were dismissed.  In the fall of 1997, applicant
intermittently used heroin and cocaine, and, for a few months,
spent $100 weekly on methamphetamine.
		In February 1998, applicant (in his own words) "hit * * * bottom," began attending AA, obtained a sponsor, Maynard,
and attended AA regularly through June 1999, when he graduated
from law school and moved to Sandy.  He obtained a new sponsor in
Sandy, but later renewed his relationship with Maynard. 
Applicant also began attending Oregon Attorney Assistance Program
(OAAP) meetings, regularly attended AA, completed an OAAP relapse
prevention program, and developed a sponsor-like relationship
with Sweeney, a counselor from OAAP.  Applicant states that he
"really began recovery on February 13, 1998[,] as opposed to just
having stopped drinking," and that he has remained sober since
that time. 
		In June 1999, applicant was interviewed by members of
the Board; in July 1999, he took and passed the Bar examination. 
For eight or nine months in 1999 and 2000, applicant worked as a
clerk/bailiff for Judge Herndon in Clackamas County.  Applicant
then worked as a legal secretary/receptionist for a lawyer,
Smith.  Applicant later began working for a temporary agency,
Legal Northwest.  Applicant received positive reviews from all
those work experiences.
		In October 1999, applicant again was interviewed by
members of the Board.  In January 2000, a psychologist, Dr.
Pachter, evaluated applicant at the Board's request.  Pachter
recommended that applicant undergo psychotherapy, and applicant
indicated a willingness to do so.  Pachter further recommended
that the therapist should not be required to report to the Board,
so as not to hamper applicant's progress.  Applicant did not seek
therapy.
		In the spring of 2000, applicant successfully
participated in an OAAP relapse prevention program facilitated by
Cundill.  In the fall of 2000, applicant was diagnosed with
depression and began taking medication, which seemed to help him. 
He also attended three counseling sessions to discuss his
depression; however, he was uncomfortable about the sessions,
because he thought that the Board might obtain his records.
		In December 2000, a three-member Board panel conducted
a character review and heard from several witnesses.  Maynard
testified as to applicant's hard work in AA's 12-step program, 
his progress respecting his ability to cope, and his dedication
to becoming sober.  Maynard testified that applicant is honest
and trustworthy, and Maynard thought that applicant would remain
sober.
		Sweeney testified that applicant is taking "personal
responsibility" for his actions and that Sweeney has no doubts
concerning applicant's honesty, trustworthiness, respect for the
law, and good moral character.  Sweeney also testified that,
during the first year of sobriety, the relapse rate is 60
percent; after one year, it decreases to about 15 percent and,
after five years, to about eight percent.  In Sweeney's view,
applicant has an "excellent chance" of staying sober if he
continues to participate actively in AA.
		Cundill reported that applicant had done "exemplary
work" and had worked "incredibly hard" in the OAAP relapse
prevention program, and recommended that applicant deal with his
relapse issues with an AA sponsor or in therapy.  In Cundill's
view, applicant will do well if he continues working with a
strong AA program and maintains contact with a sponsor and
support group.  
		Three other AA members testified that applicant has
demonstrated dedication and sincerity in AA, is honest, and
should be admitted.  Applicant's wife also testified that
applicant is committed to his AA program and that he has matured
and accepted responsibility.  Shafer, a Multnomah County Deputy
District Attorney, stated in a letter supporting applicant that
he believes that applicant is honest, trustworthy, and ethical.
		Finally, Judge Herndon testified that, in his opinion,
applicant is "absolutely trustworthy" and honest, has good moral
character, and respects the law and the rights of others.  Judge
Herndon was not troubled by the fact that applicant had not
volunteered any information about his criminal history or alcohol
problem during his job interview with the judge.  As the judge
put it, "I didn't ask the question."  (Applicant maintains that
he "was always prepared to answer all questions truthfully" about
his past if asked by a prospective employer.)  Applicant did
later discuss his alcohol problem (but not his prior drug use)
during the course of employment.  From Judge Herndon's testimony,
it does not appear that he was aware, on the date of the hearing,
of the extent of applicant's past drug use or criminal record. 
However, the judge testified that he was not concerned that
applicant had not disclosed his history of criminal involvement
with drugs:  "I wouldn't have been concerned about that unless he
was on probation or under close supervision.  In other words, a
recent conviction."
		In July 2001, the Board recommended that this court
deny applicant admission, with leave to reapply one year after
the denial.  The Board expressed concern that applicant had not
undergone therapy, as Pachter had recommended, to explore the
underlying issues leading to his earlier relapses.  The Board
recommended that applicant participate in therapy and that his
therapist provide reports to assist the Board in evaluating
applicant's character, fitness, and risk of relapse.  As noted,
applicant now asks this court to admit him to practice. 
		The statutes and procedural rules relevant to
applications for admission set the standard that applicant must
meet.  ORS 9.220 provides, in part:
				"An applicant for admission as attorney must
apply to the Supreme Court and show that the
applicant:
		"* * * * *
		"(2)(a) Is a person of good moral character
and fit to practice law.
		"(b) For purposes of this section * * *, the
lack of 'good moral character' may be established
by reference to acts or conduct that reflect moral
turpitude or to acts or conduct which would cause
a reasonable person to have substantial doubts
about the individual's honesty, fairness and
respect for the rights of others and for the laws
of the state and the nation.  The conduct or acts
in question should be rationally connected to the
applicant's fitness to practice law."
Rule for Admission of Attorneys (RFA) 9.45(6) provides:
		"To be entitled to admission to the practice
of law in Oregon, an applicant must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that she or he has
the requisite character and fitness to practice
law."
RFA 1.05 provides, in part:
		"(1) 'Fit to practice law,' sometimes
characterized as 'fitness,' means an applicant
demonstrates a level of conduct, mental health,
judgment, and diligence that will result in
adequate representation of the best interests of
clients, including participation in the legal
process according to the Disciplinary Rules of the
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility.
		"* * * * *
		"(3) 'Good moral character' is given the same
meaning as contained in ORS 9.220(2)(b)."
	As noted above, applicant bears the burden of proving
his fitness by clear and convincing evidence.  Stated
differently, applicant must show that it is "highly probable"
that he has the good moral character and fitness to practice law.
In re Monaco, 317 Or 366, 370 n 4, 856 P2d 311 (1993).  Any
significant doubt should be resolved in favor of protecting the
public by denying admission.  In re Jaffee, 319 Or 172, 177, 874
P2d 1299 (1994).
	There is no issue in this proceeding whether
applicant's drug and alcohol history made him unfit, at some time
in the past, to be admitted to the practice of law.  It did, and
applicant does not claim otherwise.  Instead, the issue in this
proceeding is one of rehabilitation:  Has applicant shown by
clear and convincing evidence that he has rehabilitated himself,
and that there is no significant danger that he will relapse into
some version of his former behavior?  So stated, the issue is
analogous to the issue that faced this court in In re Rowell, 305
Or 584, 754 P2d 905 (1988).  In Rowell, this court admitted an
applicant who had used and sold marijuana while in college,
resulting in a five-month jail term; had been charged with crimes
resulting from drunken behavior; regularly had sold marijuana and
amphetamines; had violated his probation by possessing drugs and
leaving the jurisdiction; was involved in a drunk-driving crash
that resulted in a cocaine-possession charge (two years before
entering law school); and had smoked marijuana while in his first
year of law school, thereby again violating his probation.  Id.
at 587-88.  
	The court in Rowell reviewed the applicant's evidence
of current good character, including his decreasing drug and
alcohol use, candor, letters of reference, regret for past
actions, and participation in activities for the public good. 
Id. at 588-91.  The court also reviewed the passage of time --
four years (1) -- since the applicant had engaged in his most recent
"unacceptable conduct," namely, his most recent marijuana use
while in law school, id. at 591-92.  The court concluded:
		"The length of time without evidence of
unsatisfactory character needed to permit the
conclusion that the actor is now of good moral
character varies with, among other things, the
person's age, the length of time that the
unsatisfactory characteristics were evident and
the nature of the unacceptable behavior.  In
applicant's case, we find that four years without
engaging in the activities that evidenced his
former unsatisfactory character are sufficient to
indicate that he has changed.  His personal,
academic, professional and other achievements in
the last four years all support the conclusion
that applicant now is of good moral character."
Id. at 592.  The court also found, as "[p]erhaps most
convincing," that the applicant had demonstrated a slow and
steady maturation process that predated his decision to attend
law school.  Id. 
	Here, applicant argues that he has presented persuasive
evidence similar to that presented in Rowell, namely that:  (1)
he had been sober for three years at the time of the character
and fitness review hearing; (2) he has been candid with the
Board; (3) he regrets his past actions and has obeyed the law
since becoming sober; (4) he has participated in the public good
by helping other AA members in times of need; (5) many
individuals have attested to his honesty, trustworthiness, good
moral character, and commitment to sobriety; and (6) his earlier
criminal conduct was the result of his chemical dependency, which
he has overcome.  
	Applicant further argues that, because he "is
addressing the relapse issue adequately" through AA, the Board's
argument that he should undergo therapy is not well taken. 
Applicant also emphasizes that, contrary to the Board's view of
the record, Cundill testified that applicant's relapse issues
could be addressed in the AA context, rather than through
therapy.  Applicant further argues that the Board's
recommendation (that applicant undergo therapy and that the Board
be advised of the results) "could be a recipe for failure"
because, in his view, as well as in the view of the Board's
appointed psychologist, Pachter, therapy likely would be
successful only if applicant could be assured complete
confidentiality.  Finally, applicant argues that the public would
benefit from his admission to the Bar, as he is extremely
conscientious and hard working, is honest and trustworthy, and
has demonstrated other on-the-job attributes that will serve him
well in practice.
	In the Board's view, applicant's evidence fails in two
respects:  (1) insufficient passage of time; and (2) failure to
participate in therapy.  As to the passage of time, the Board
contrasts Rowell, in which the applicant had stopped selling
drugs eight years before applying for admission, had stopped
using drugs other than marijuana five years before applying, and
had stopped using marijuana more than two years before applying. 
Here, the Board points out, applicant's "most recent unacceptable
conduct" occurred in February 1998, well into applicant's second
year of law school.  The Board further points out that
applicant's most recent misconduct included criminal drug use
involving "very serious" drugs.  The Board also points to
applicant's relapse history as evidence that a greater passage of
time should occur before applicant is admitted.  As to therapy,
the Board characterizes both Pachter's report and Cundill's
testimony as supporting applicant's need to address the 
psychological issues underlying his drug and alcohol problems. 
Based on that evidence, the Board insists that it is essential
for applicant to undergo the recommended psychotherapy in order
to demonstrate his good character and fitness for practice. (2)
	In our de novo review of the record, we find the two
pieces of evidence that are most significant to the issue of
applicant's fitness to practice to be Judge Herndon's testimony
and Dr. Pachter's report.  Not surprisingly, in close cases like
the present one, those two pieces of evidence point in opposite
directions.
	On the one hand, Judge Herndon's wholehearted
endorsement speaks well for applicant.  Judge Herndon is
sensitive to the considerations that enter into any decision to
admit an applicant and it appears that he is entirely satisfied
that applicant possesses the requisite moral character to be
admitted now.  In our view, however, two considerations detract
somewhat from the judge's assessment:  First, and although Judge
Herndon stated that the information would not make a difference
in his present view of applicant's character, it appears that the
judge never was apprised of the full extent of applicant's drug
use and its criminal aspects.  Second, Judge Herndon has not
known the applicant for very long and did not know him at all
during any of the periods in which applicant had relapsed into
drug use. (3)
	On the other hand, there is Pachter's extensive
psychological report.  That report sets out salient points from
applicant's history, noting that applicant's "most extensive drug
use occurred between October 1997 [and] * * * February 1998, and
involved primarily alcohol and methamphetamines."  The report
further noted that applicant has experienced intermittent periods
of sobriety throughout his years of dependency.  We find the
following statement by Pachter particularly significant:
		 "[Applicant's] insistence that he is recovered
from drug addiction, without obvious concern of
relapsing is in keeping with his defensive style. 
Unfortunately, such an internal state of mind probably
increases the risk of a relapse, since useful emotions,
such as signal anxiety (i.e., worry or anxiety that
something harmful might happen) are not as easily felt. 
This, with the tendency to rationalize or externalize
events, further increases the risk."
	We share those concerns.  If, as Pachter observed,
applicant does not have clear insight either into the reasons for
his periodic, serious drug and alcohol abuse or the danger that
he will relapse into such behavior, there are substantial doubts
as to whether he now has the requisite character to be admitted. (4)
	We also are concerned that applicant's most recent drug
use was the most serious of his entire history.  That trend is
the opposite of the one that this court relied on in Rowell as an
indication of maturation.  Moreover, less time has passed since
that last relapse than had passed when the applicant in Rowell
applied for admission to the Bar. (5)  It may be, as one witness
testified, that the passage of time increases the likelihood that
applicant will not relapse and that the amount of time that has
passed here is encouraging.  But we must deal with this
proceeding on the record that is before us.  We do not find that
the period between applicant's last drug use and the closing of
the record in this matter -- nearly three years -- is sufficient
to overcome the concerns that applicant's psychological profile
and history of past relapses have generated.  In sum, applicant
has not satisfied us by clear and convincing evidence that such
relapses are unlikely.  It follows that applicant has not
demonstrated that he presently possesses the requisite good moral
character and fitness for admission to the Bar.
	As noted, the Board recommends that applicant's request
for admission to the Bar be denied, with permission to reapply
after one year.  We see no need to grant such leave, in view of
the fact that, as we read the rules for admission, applicant is
now eligible to reapply, should he wish to.
	Applicant's application for admission to the Oregon
State Bar is denied.

1. 	We observe that, in Rowell, the "four year" period of
drug abstinence includes the year between the Board's character
and fitness review hearing and the issuance of this court's
decision in the proceeding.  The court's recitation of the facts
does not disclose whether the court remanded the proceeding to
the Board under RFA 9.60(6) for the admission of evidence of
Rowell's conduct subsequent to the character hearing.  If it did
remand, the discrepancy is resolved.  If not, the court's
inadvertent inclusion of the additional year was not dispositive. 
In any event, neither party in the present case requested remand. 
Accordingly, we do not consider the time that has elapsed since
the date of applicant's character and fitness review hearing in
our evaluation of applicant's fitness.

2. 	The Board emphasizes, however, that applicant's therapy
sessions should remain confidential, with the exception of
summary reports setting out the nature and goals of the therapy,
the number of visits, and general findings and conclusions, to
assist the Board's evaluation of applicant's risk of relapse.

3. 	This is in contrast to Rowell, in which a judge for
whom the applicant had worked also testified in his favor.  In
that case, the judge, who formerly had been a criminal defense
lawyer and earlier had represented Rowell in a criminal case, was
able to compare Rowell's previous and present character and to
testify to Rowell's complete turnaround.  305 Or at 590.

4. 	At the same time, we reject the Board's assertion that
applicant cannot establish his good character and fitness without
undergoing psychotherapy.  It might be true, as the Board's
argument assumes, that having applicant undergo therapy would
benefit both applicant (directly) and the Board (indirectly, by
providing more information respecting the crucial issue of
applicant's character), should applicant be denied admission now
but then reapply.  If (as we ultimately hold) applicant is to be
denied admission, then it will be up to him to decide what course
of action to follow if he wishes to apply again in the future. 
We do not consider it appropriate to dictate to an applicant how
he or she should approach a future hypothetical reapplication, or
what evidence the applicant should marshal in support of that
application.  

5. 	We do not suggest that there is any particular minimum
period of rehabilitation that an applicant must show.  We simply
conclude that, on this record of serious substance abuse, the
passage of time is too short to satisfy us.