Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Bergeron

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Bergeron1997 WY 140948 P.2d 1367Case Number: 95-93Decided: 12/15/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
STATE 
of WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION;

and D & S CASING SERVICE, INC.,  

Appellants (Petitioners), 

 

v. 

 

JAMES P. BERGERON, 

 Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis,

  

 

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and Jennifer 
A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division.

Douglas M. 
Lesley of Drew & Carlson, Gillette, for D & S Casing Service, 
Inc. 

George 
Santini, Cheyenne for Appellee.

 

Before 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and O'BRIEN, District 
Judge.

O'BRIEN, District 
Judge.

 

[¶1]      This worker's 
compensation case involves interpretation of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-407 (1997), 
which provides for the forfeiture of benefits if an injured worker's conduct 
tends to retard his recovery. The case was certified to this court by the First 
Judicial District Court upon a petition for review of an order awarding benefits 
entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings. We reverse and remand the 
award of benefits.

 

[¶2]      The parties agree 
that a legal issue is presented in this appeal. The facts, as found by the 
hearing examiner, are not in dispute.

 

[¶3]      While at work for 
D & S Casing Service, Inc., James P. Bergeron (Bergeron) injured his right 
hand. Two surgeries were performed on his hand, the first to make repairs and a 
second for reconstructive purposes. The latter surgery was performed on June 13, 
1994 because Bergeron "was quite bothered by the malposition of the [middle] 
finger." Approximately two weeks after the reconstructive surgery, Bergeron was 
incarcerated in the Laramie County, Wyoming jail, where he remained for four 
months awaiting trial.

 

[¶4]      Bergeron was not 
a model prisoner. From the start, he was obstreperous and obnoxious. During the 
administrative process of booking him into the jail, Bergeron threatened the 
jailors and offered to aggravate the condition of his injured hand, which had 
surgical pins protruding through the skin and was immobilized by a half splint 
held in place by an elastic bandage. Because of his aggressive behavior, 
Bergeron was twice maced during the booking. That inauspicious beginning did not 
auger well for his tenancy. Predictably, his nettlesome behavior persisted, at 
least until the end of July 1994. Bergeron continued to threaten and attempt to 
injure himself. He picked at his stitches and the surgical pins. He banged his 
injured hand against the walls or objects within the cell. He drank cleaning 
solution and liquid soap. He smeared feces on the cell door and window. Not 
surprisingly, his hand became infected and he was taken to the hospital for 
treatment.

 

[¶5]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division (the Division) thought Bergeron was undermining his 
recovery within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-407, which 
provides:

 

If an injured employee knowingly engages or persists 
in an unsanitary or injurious practice which tends to imperil or retard his 
recovery, or if he refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment reasonably 
essential to promote his recovery, he forfeits all right to compensation under 
this act. Forfeiture shall be determined by the hearing examiner upon 
application by the division or employer.

 

Accordingly, the Division 
suspended benefits. An administrative hearing followed.

 

[¶6]      The hearing 
examiner concluded that Bergeron's acts were the likely cause of the infection 
to his hand and found the evidence to be clear and convincing that his acts in 
the jail carried the potential for harm. The hearing examiner also considered 
evidence regarding the causal effect of those acts. Bergeron's treating 
physician, Dr. Slater, saw him a number of times during his incarceration. Dr. 
Slater noted the following: at the end of June 1994, Bergeron had not damaged 
his injured hand; on July 14, there was some, not unusual, swelling but the 
repaired bone was in good condition; on August 11, the hand was fairly well 
healed and recovery was on schedule; on September 27, the final visit, Bergeron 
was well healed. Dr. Slater did not see Bergeron when he was taken to the 
hospital on July 26 to deal with the infection and the Division did not pay for 
treatment. Because Bergeron was left with a small amount of deformity, Dr. 
Slater assessed the surgical results as less than optimal. Dr. Slater offered 
three possible explanations for the diminished result, including self-injury, 
but could not assign self-injury as the cause.

 

[¶7]      Based upon the 
foregoing, the hearing examiner found that Bergeron's recovery was not retarded 
by his self-injurious activities. Upon those facts, and concluding that Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Harvey, 
52 Wyo. 349, 75 P.2d 1 (1938) required proof of actual retardation of recovery 
rather than merely a potential for that result, the hearing examiner ordered 
benefits to be paid. In Stanolind Oil 
& Gas Co., 75 P.2d  at 2, this court, in interpreting the predecessor 
statute,1 said:

 

The statute states a rule in regard to avoidable 
consequences. It was intended to prevent compensation for disability resulting 
from unreasonable conduct of the injured workman. We have held that the burden 
is on the employer to prove that the workman's recovery had 
been retarded by a persistence in injurious practices, the ground of 
forfeiture stated in the first clause of the statute.

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶8]      When the 
legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, we are bound to the results so 
expressed. In City of Cheyenne v. Reiman 
Corp., 869 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Wyo. 1994), we discussed the plain meaning rule 
of statutory construction, saying:

 

For some forty years, this court has espoused and 
followed, frequently, the rule that we do not resort to rules of statutory 
construction and interpretation when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous. E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. 
v. Study, No. 93-45, 1994 WL 2811 (Wyo. Jan. 7, 1994) [866 P.2d 1288 (Wyo. 
1994)]; Wyoming State Tax Comm'n v. BHP 
Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428 (Wyo. 1993); Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993); Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94 (Wyo. 1992); Phillips v. 
Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991); Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. Comm'n 
of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & 
Assoc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989); NL 
Industries, Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1989); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State of 
Wyoming, Envtl. Quality Council, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988); Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 
726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); Thomson v. 
Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982); State, ex rel. Fawcett v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954). An unequivocal 
corollary of that rule is, if the statute is determined to be plain and 
unambiguous, the words used are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc.; Wyoming Game and 
Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993); Vandehei. Our reading of Wyo. Stat. § 
15-1-113 leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, and the words used should be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning.

 

We repeated that message in 
Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137-38 
(Wyo. 1995), where we said:

 

In construing a statute, "the initial step in 
arriving at a correct interpretation . . . is an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection." Parker Land & Cattle 
Co. [v. Wyoming Game & Fish 
Comm'n], 845 P.2d [1040] at 1042 [(Wyo. 1993)] (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 
133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, 
we apply its plain meaning and need not consult the numerous rules of statutory 
construction. Houghton v. Franscell, 
870 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wyo. 1994); Parker 
Land & Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1043.

 

[¶9]      Stripped to its 
essence, the statute provides for a forfeiture if Bergeron knowingly engaged in 
an unsanitary or injurious practice which tended to retard his recovery. The 
words "tends to" suggest a contribution to a result rather than a cause. See Matter of Andren, 917 P.2d 178, 181 
(Wyo. 1996). While proof of more than a mere possibility is required, the burden 
is most certainly less than direct causation.

 

[¶10]   In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 75 P.2d  at 
2, a worker was injured by a blow to his testicles. At issue was whether his 
pre-injury attempts to self-medicate what he thought was gonorrhea exacerbated 
his injuries and extended his recovery time. The district court found, upon 
substantial evidence, that he was not infected. On review, we observed: "With 
gonorrhea out of the case, the court was almost forced to the conclusion that 
the disability was caused by the reported injury * * *." Id. at 4. We went on, perhaps too 
casually, to offer the observation about causal nexus. By suggesting that proof 
of actual retardation was required, we demanded more than the legislature had 
ordained. The statement was unnecessary to the decision and was not supported by 
either the language of the statute or prior case law. As such, it has no value 
as precedent and, being improvidently uttered, should be corrected. To the 
extent that the Stanolind Oil & Gas 
Co. dicta is in conflict with our decision in this case, it is 
rescinded.

 

[¶11]   Since the hearing examiner 
reasonably, but erroneously, relied upon that dicta and concluded that the 
employer must prove that the worker's acts actually retarded his recovery, that 
decision must be reversed. We note the hearing examiner's observation: "The 
words used in the statute, `tends to imperil or retard,' are words whose literal 
meaning requires only a potential for harm, as opposed to an actual harm." We 
caution that more is required than proof of a mere potential for harm or a 
possibility of harm; there must be proof that the worker's acts were not benign, 
but did, in some way, contribute to recovery problems. While the record strongly 
suggests that Bergeron's conduct contributed to a less than optimal result, such 
a determination is for the finder of fact, not a reviewing court. For that 
reason, this case is remanded to the hearing examiner for decision as to whether 
Bergeron's acts tended to imperil or retard his recovery.

 

[¶12]   The Division suspended benefits 
when it concluded that the benefits were subject to forfeiture under the 
injurious practices statute. Bergeron has argued that the Division acted 
improperly as only the hearing examiner can order a forfeiture. That issue is 
not properly before this court, but may be considered on 
remand.

 

[¶13]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 

Footnotes

1 At that time, forfeiture occurred only 
if an employee persisted in injurious practices. It has since been expanded to 
provide for forfeiture when an employee engages or persists in such conduct. 
Then, as now, the statute called for a forfeiture if the employee's conduct 
tended to retard his recovery.