Title: V.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-JC-603 
In the Matter of Eq.W., M.W., A.W., S.W., and Ez.W. 
(Minor Children); V.B. (Mother), 
Appellant, 
–v–
Indiana Department of Child Services, 
Appellee. 
Argued: January 24, 2019 | Decided: June 27, 2019 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court 
Nos. 53C06-1711-JC-851, 53C06-1711-JC-852, 53C06-1711-JC-853, 
53C06-1711-JC-854, 53C06-1711-JC-855 
The Honorable Frances G. Hill, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 18A-JC-555 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice Goff concur. 
Justice Slaughter concurs in part and in the judgment with separate opinion in 
which Justice Massa joins. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 27 2019, 12:14 pm
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David, Justice. 
This case shines a spotlight on the precarious nature of CHINS 
proceedings and emphasizes the need to draw measured and appropriate 
procedural boundaries in these actions.  Our Court has frequently 
weighed in on the delicate balance between the State’s authority to 
provide protection for children’s health, safety, and stability and the 
procedural safeguards put in place to protect parents from State 
overreach.  One procedural issue that has evaded our review, however, is 
whether the State may file repeated petitions alleging children are CHINS 
without any new or substantially different evidence.   
In this case, the Department of Child Services filed an initial petition 
alleging five Children were CHINS but failed to present sufficient 
evidence of Parents’ alleged substance abuse.  After a fact-finding hearing, 
the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice and DCS filed a 
second petition containing nearly identical allegations the day after the 
first petition was dismissed.  After considering evidence and testimony 
that could have been presented during the first proceeding, the Children 
were ultimately adjudicated CHINS. 
The central issue we address in today’s opinion is whether, in light of 
the nature of CHINS proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata—and more 
specifically claim preclusion—applies to bar a repeated filing of a CHINS 
petition based on evidence that could have been produced in the first 
filing.  We find that the doctrine does apply in these proceedings, but 
because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court and because we 
find no fundamental error in the proceedings below, we affirm the trial 
court’s finding that the Children are CHINS.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Mother (V.B.) and Father (L.S.) have five children: Eq.W., M.W. (also 
referred to as M.B. throughout the filings), A.W., S.W., and Ez.W. 
(collectively “Children”).  On June 27, 2017, the Bloomington Police 
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Department responded to reports of Mother “wildly swinging [Ez.W.] in 
her arms” near the Fountain Square Mall.  (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 
24, 27).  When police arrived, the three youngest children, A.W., S.W., 
and Ez.W., were with Mother and Father; A.W. and S.W. did not have 
shoes on their feet.  As police approached the family, Mother and Father 
began to walk away.  Police observed that Mother was unstable and 
almost fell with Ez.W. in her arms.  When police searched Mother’s 
belongings, the officers found a hatchet and two different types of baby 
formula but no bottle.  The police requested assistance from the 
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) after the officers detained Mother 
and Father for suspected intoxication.  DCS removed the Children from 
Mother and Father and placed them with their paternal grandmother.  
DCS filed a petition alleging the Children were CHINS on June 29, 2017 
(hereinafter “first petition”).1  In primary support of its petition, DCS 
alleged the following material facts:  
•
Mother and Father were both impaired on June 27 with children
in their care.
•
Two of the children were not wearing shoes.
•
Along with formula, a hatchet was found in the diaper bag.  No
bottle was located.
•
Mother was impaired when speaking with a DCS case manager
and could not give a complete statement.
•
The paternal grandmother (with whom the children were
placed) reported her belief that Mother and Father were using
substances because of recent changes in behavior.
1 DCS alleged the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which 
provides that a child under eighteen years of age is a CHINS if “the child's physical or mental 
condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 
neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, 
clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision” and the child is not receiving care, 
treatment, or rehabilitation that is “unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 
intervention of the court.”  
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•
Two of the children reported a recent escalation in arguing
between Mother and Father; one of those children suspected this
was due to substance abuse.
•
Mother and Father were arrested and charged with neglect of a
dependent and public intoxication.
•
A prior CHINS case was initiated due to alleged substance abuse
by Mother and Father.
At a September 12, 2017, fact-finding hearing, the court heard evidence 
and granted DCS’s motion to continue the hearing to present expert 
testimony of Parents’ drug screens.  During the subsequent hearing on 
October 25, 2017, however, the court denied DCS’s motion to present 
telephonic testimony of a drug screen expert.  DCS offered no additional 
evidence. 
On November 7, 2017, the court dismissed the first petition without 
prejudice and, in doing so, denied Mother’s motion to dismiss with 
prejudice.  In considering the testimony of the arresting officer and the 
DCS case manager that Mother and Father were visibly impaired, the 
court noted that neither the officer nor the case manager requested a drug 
screening for either of the parents after the arrest.  Although the Parents 
received a drug screening at their detention hearing, DCS did not offer 
evidence of the test results after the court denied its motion for telephonic 
evidence.  The court ultimately concluded that DCS failed to present 
sufficient evidence to meet the preponderance of evidence standard 
required for a CHINS determination.  While the court agreed it was 
appropriate to remove the Children at the time of the arrest, it could not 
find “any signs of abnormality by Mother [that] were sufficient to show [] 
she was impaired by drug use to the extent she was endangering the 
children.”  (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 177).  The court also concluded 
that “[a]llegations from [the first petition] may be combined with future 
allegations of neglect (or endangerment by illegal drug use) as evidence of 
the element of the need for the ‘coercive intervention of the court.’”  (Id.) 
On November 8, 2017—the day after the dismissal of the first petition—
DCS filed another petition (hereinafter “second petition”) alleging the five 
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Children were CHINS.  The second petition relied on these alleged 
material facts:  
•
Mother and Father had prior involvement with the DCS, including
a case that ended in May of 2017.  Children were removed from
Father’s care due to substance abuse and the family was reunified
after Mother successfully completed services.
•
DCS was also involved with the family in November 2016 when
Mother gave birth to the youngest child in the family’s home.
Mother admitted to heroin use during her pregnancy.
•
Parents were arrested on June 27, 2017, for appearing to be
intoxicated while caring for the children.
•
Additional evidence of neglect had been obtained by the DCS
following the dismissal of the first petition.
•
Mother and Father both tested positive for methamphetamine
multiple times during the pendency of the most recent CHINS case.
Parents also failed to attend multiple drug screenings.
•
Mother failed to follow protocol during a September 19, 2017,
screening, her behavior was erratic and threatening, and the drug
screen was positive for methamphetamine. The drug screener felt
unsafe while administering the test.
•
Father tested positive for methamphetamine during a September
26, 2017, drug test.
•
Father became agitated and left an October 19, 2017, Child and
Family Team Meeting.
•
Around October 4, 2017, Parents indicated they were having
difficulty paying bills; their electricity and water were shut off.
•
Parents had a drug-related criminal history.
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In authorizing the filing of this CHINS petition, the court also determined 
continued placement of the children with their paternal grandmother was 
necessary to protect the children.2 
At the contested fact-finding hearing, DCS called several witnesses to 
offer testimony regarding the educational achievement of the Children.  
M.W. and Eq.W. each testified that they had not attended school in five 
years.  Specifically, M.W. noted he received some sort of home schooling, 
but never learned any math.  Paternal Grandmother testified that she 
worked to enroll several of the Children in schools and arranged tutoring 
services because she was concerned with preparing the older children for 
adulthood.  Additionally, a DCS caseworker expressed concerns about 
how S.W. did not know his alphabet or how to write his name at nine 
years old.  
On January 3, 2018, the court adjudicated all five Children as CHINS.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Parents had failed to 
provide necessary shelter, education, food, and supervision for the 
Children.  While “the CHINS Petition did not allege material facts of 
failure to provide education, food, or safe housing, even though the DCS 
did generally plead those issues by including the statutory language of 
CHINS neglect in IC 31-34-1-1,” the court found it could not “ignore the 
clear presentation of evidence of neglect of education (5 years without 
school for the older children) and unsafe housing due to exc[]essive clutter 
and unsupervised strangers wandering in the home.” (Appellant’s App. 
Vol. II at 62).  The court also noted that Parents were placed on notice of 
these issues and failed to object to any testimony regarding education and 
housing conditions.  The court ordered that the Children remain with 
their paternal grandmother.  Only Mother appealed.  
2 We note that this order authorizing the filing of a second CHINS petition and the continued 
detention of the Children was signed and dated on November 7, 2017—the same day the first 
petition was dismissed.  Curiously, DCS did not file its second verified petition alleging the 
children to be CHINS or its request for continued custody until November 8, 2017.  However, 
the record is unclear as to whether these two documents were offered as exhibits at the time 
the first petition was dismissed. 
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In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  
Matter of Eq.W., 106 N.E.3d 536, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), vacated in part, 
aff’d in part.  The court found Mother waived her argument that res 
judicata should have applied to bar the second petition, found no 
reversable error in the Children’s continued placement with their paternal 
grandmother after the first petition was dismissed, and found Mother 
impliedly consented to the issue of educational neglect coming up during 
the fact-finding hearing.  Id. at 540-41.  While finding sufficient evidence to 
support the CHINS adjudication, the Court of Appeals also specifically 
admonished DCS for the way in which it litigated this case.  Id. at 543.  
Mother petitioned for transfer, which we granted.  Ind. Appellate Rule 
58(A).3 
Standard of Review 
In all CHINS proceedings, “the State must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.”  In 
re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 
102, 105 (Ind. 2010)).  When reviewing a CHINS adjudication, “we do not 
reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” and will reverse a 
determination only if the decision was clearly erroneous.  In re D.J., 68 
N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017).  “A decision is clearly erroneous if the 
record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal 
standard to properly found facts.”  Id. at 578 (internal quotation omitted).   
Discussion and Decision 
Today we address three central questions that have been raised for our 
review.  First, we examine whether res judicata applies in the context of a 
CHINS proceeding.  Second, we determine whether Mother preserved her 
3 To the extent the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support each of the CHINS 
adjudications, we summarily affirm that portion of the opinion.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 
58(A)(2). 
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res judicata claim for appellate review.  Finally, if Mother did not preserve 
her claim, we must decide whether a court in a CHINS proceeding 
commits fundamental error by failing to sua sponte apply the doctrine of 
res judicata.  Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
In short, we find that the claim preclusion branch of res judicata applies 
to CHINS proceedings.  Specifically, if the State wishes to refile after a 
CHINS petition is dismissed, it must show that the new CHINS petition 
contains allegations of material fact that could not have been included in 
the dismissed action.4  Further, we also find that Mother failed to preserve 
this issue for appellate review and that the trial court did not commit 
fundamental error.  As such, we ultimately affirm the trial court’s 
judgment.  
I. The doctrine of res judicata applies in CHINS 
proceedings. 
We turn first to whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in the 
context of a CHINS proceeding.  Because we can find no decisional 
caselaw in our state specifically applying this doctrine in a CHINS context, 
we must first explore the doctrine to better understand its breadth and 
application.  We next examine the nature of a CHINS proceeding to see if 
res judicata harmonizes with the overall purpose of these proceedings.  
Finding that res judicata does apply in a CHINS proceeding, we will 
outline its scope and application.  
We begin with an overview of the doctrine of res judicata.  Generally 
speaking, res judicata operates “to prevent repetitious litigation of 
4 As discussed in greater detail below, we wish to make clear that not every subsequent 
CHINS filing by the State is necessarily barred by res judicata.  For example, we can envision 
circumstances under which the State moves to dismiss a petition before a fact-finding hearing 
but is forced to later refile the petition due to information that could not have been reasonably 
discovered at the time of the first filing.  One of the essential elements of claim preclusion is 
that the prior judgment was rendered on the merits.  See Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 
N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014).  So, unless the prior action was terminated on the merits, claim 
preclusion is arguably inapplicable. 
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disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment 
binding against both the original parties and their privies.”  Becker v. State, 
992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013).  This doctrine applies “where there has 
been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same 
parties.”  Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) 
(quoting Gayheart v. Newnam Foundry Co., Inc., (1979) 271 Ind. 422, 426, 393 
N.E.2d 163, 167).  Similar to double jeopardy in the criminal context, res 
judicata operates to prevent a party from receiving the proverbial “second 
bite at the apple.”  See Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 721 (Ind. 2013); 
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1978).  
There are two branches of res judicata:  claim preclusion—which has 
been raised in the present dispute—and issue preclusion.  First Am. Title 
Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 65 N.E.3d 1045, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).  Claim 
preclusion can be used to bar a successive lawsuit when “a particular 
issue is adjudicated and then put in issue in a subsequent suit on a 
different cause of action between the same parties or their privies.”  Ind. 
Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, 79 N.E.3d 371, 381 (Ind. 2017) 
(citation omitted).  Before a court can find that claim preclusion applies to 
bar a subsequent action, four essential elements must be met:  
(1) The former judgment must have been rendered by a court 
of competent jurisdiction;  
(2) The former judgment must have been rendered on the 
merits;  
(3) The matter now in issue was or might have been 
determined in the former suit; and 
(4) The controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have 
been between the parties to the present action or their 
privies.  
Ind. State Ethics Comm’n, 18 N.E.3d at 993. 
As one of our colleagues on the Court of Appeals recently noted, this 
doctrine “undoubtedly performs functions essential to the success of our 
American legal system” because it prevents the type of repeated litigation 
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“that would keep parties in interminable conflict, bog down our system, 
and delay or prevent the administration of justice.”  State v. Stidham, 110 
N.E.3d 410, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (May, J., concurring in result).  And 
we agree.  Res judicata is an important tool possessed by litigants and 
courts alike in quickly resolving repetitive attempts at litigation.  At 
minimum, it appears to us that this doctrine is an essential part of civil 
procedure.  But does the unique nature of a CHINS proceeding allow for 
stringent application of claim preclusion to bar the State from taking 
multiple bites at the same apple?   
To answer that question, we pause to briefly review the nature of these 
proceedings.  CHINS proceedings are civil actions.  In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 
1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).  As such, parties to CHINS proceedings are bound 
by the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and generally have all the rights 
and duties prescribed thereunder.  Ind. Code § 31-34-9-7.  But we have 
also recognized that CHINS proceedings carry a significant potential to 
“interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children.”  
In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258 (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 108 (Ind. 
2010)).  Accordingly, due process concerns at all stages of a CHINS 
proceeding are of paramount concern.  Indeed, “procedural irregularities 
… in a CHINS proceeding may be of such import that they deprive a 
parent of procedural due process with respect to a potential subsequent 
termination of parental rights.”  Id. (quoting In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961, 967 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). 
Because “[t]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, 
not punish parents,” id. (citations omitted), both the legislature and our 
courts have instituted significant procedural safeguards in this context—
some of which go beyond our Rules of Trial Procedure—to protect both 
the safety of children and the integrity of the family unit.  See, e.g., Ind. 
Code § 31-32-1-4 (requiring notice of CHINS proceedings to all parties); 
Ind. Code § 31-32-2-3 (giving parents the right to cross-examine witnesses, 
obtain witnesses and evidence by compulsory process, and introduce 
evidence); In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1163-64 (Ind. 2014) (finding, inter alia, 
that Ind. Code § 31-34-4-6 provides a statutory right to court appointed 
counsel for a parent in a CHINS case if the parent requests the 
appointment of counsel and the trial court finds the parent to be indigent); 
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In re T.N., 963 N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ind. 2012) (holding due process requires a 
court to conduct a fact-finding hearing when one parent admits a child is a 
CHINS and the other parent wishes to deny that status).  It is apparent 
that Indiana places extra emphasis on these proceedings and urges parties 
to cautiously and meticulously move through each stage of a CHINS 
proceeding. 
The State argues that the answer to the question of whether res judicata 
applies in a CHINS proceeding—at least in this case—is a resounding no.  
In support of its position, the State leans on codified juvenile law and the 
Indiana Rules of Evidence to make the point that CHINS proceedings are 
different than other types of actions.  That is to say evidence of parents’ 
past involvement with DCS or the criminal justice system is usually 
relevant to the central question of a CHINS proceeding.  To be certain, 
Indiana Code section 31-34-12-5 provides:  
Evidence that a prior or subsequent act or omission by a parent, 
guardian, or custodian injured or neglected a child is 
admissible in proceedings alleging that a child is a child in 
need of services to show the following: 
(1) Intent, guilty knowledge, the absence of mistake or 
accident, identification, the existence of a common scheme 
or plan, or other similar purposes. 
(2) A likelihood that the act or omission of the parent, 
guardian, or custodian is responsible for the child's current 
injury or condition.  
At first blush, this statute supports the State’s position that a parent’s 
prior acts are relevant to that parent’s fitness at the time of a CHINS 
proceeding.  See Matter of M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) 
(finding that, albeit during a termination of parental rights hearing, courts 
should judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the hearing and should 
consider habitual patterns of conduct to determine probability of future 
neglect or deprivation). 
Indeed, some Indiana courts have found that when children are 
alleged to be CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which is the 
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statute relied upon in the present case, a parent’s character is a material 
issue in the proceeding.  Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 667 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1996). 5  To that end, the court in Matter of J.L.V., Jr. reasoned Indiana 
Rule of Evidence 405(b)6 allows admission of specific instances of a 
parent’s character because “a parent’s past, present, and future ability to 
provide sufficient care for his or her child forms the basis for a CHINS 
adjudication” and “a parent’s character is an integral part of assessing that 
ability.”  Id. at 190-91.  Taken together, the State advances a colorable 
argument that CHINS proceedings are distinct enough from ordinary civil 
proceedings such that evidence of a parent’s prior acts is pervasively 
relevant to all potential future CHINS proceedings involving the parents 
and children. 
We agree with the State’s general position that past acts by parents 
can be relevant to new CHINS filings involving the same parents and 
children.  There are several compelling reasons to stand by this approach, 
none clearer than the legislature’s express approval of this practice.  See 
Ind. Code § 31-34-12-5.  Additionally, as discussed above, the nature of a 
CHINS proceeding is such that a trial court must consider a broad range 
of evidence to ensure the State has met its burden in proving its case, 
including “consider[ing] the family’s condition not just when the case was 
filed, but also when it is heard.”  In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) 
(citation omitted).  But we also think that this procedure is ripe for 
potential abuse by the State.  The dispute before us today emphasizes this 
point.  
Here, DCS filed its first petition alleging the Children were CHINS on 
June 27, 2017.  Distilled to its essential material facts, the petition was 
based on Mother and Father’s alleged impairment, prior DCS involvement 
                                                 
5 Matter of J.L.V., Jr. examined a substantially similar version of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 
that existed prior to the recodification of Title 31.  See 1997 Ind. Acts 315 (recodification).  That 
version was codified at Indiana Code section 31-6-4-3(a).  
6 Indiana Rule of Evidence 405(b) provides: “When a person’s character or character trait is an 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may also be proved by 
relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.” 
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due to substance abuse, and Parents’ ultimate arrest while several of the 
Children were in their presence.  Because DCS’s motion to present 
telephonic testimony of Parents’ drug screen results was denied and 
because DCS apparently presented no other evidence to the court, the first 
petition was dismissed for the State’s failure to meet its burden of proof.  
The very next day, DCS filed its second petition that contained no 
additional allegations that would have occurred after the October 25, 
2017, fact-finding hearing on the first petition. 
To us, this case screams out as an obvious “second bite at the apple.”  
The fact of the matter is that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to 
meet its burden of proof on the first go–round.  While the record is 
unclear as to why the trial court allowed the second petition to be filed, 
the court specifically denied Mother’s request for dismissal with prejudice 
and noted that the allegations of the first petition could be combined with 
future allegations as evidence of the need for coercive court intervention.  
DCS plainly failed to follow this instruction and filed a second petition 
with essentially the same allegations as its first petition.  While we 
understand the pressures placed on DCS to protect the safety and well-
being of children in our state, we can in no way endorse the procedural 
tactics employed in this case to essentially string out the CHINS 
proceeding until enough evidence was collected, all the while keeping the 
children separated from their parents.  There is simply too much at stake 
to condone these actions.   
We hold today that the claim preclusion branch of res judicata applies 
to CHINS proceedings.  We extend this basic principle to these 
proceedings in large part because of the heightened due process 
protections we give to children and parents involved in CHINS 
proceedings.   For example, invocation of this doctrine could prevent 
repeated filings by DCS with no new factual basis until one petition finally 
sticks.  It could also prevent repetitive litigation of issues that have been or 
could have been decided in an initial CHINS filing.  As such, application 
of this doctrine to CHINS proceedings encourages DCS to fully investigate 
and present a more complete picture of the type of alleged conduct 
underpinning a CHINS petition.  After all, trial courts certainly do not 
suffer when an issue is fully briefed and supported by evidence.   
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That is not to say application of res judicata in a CHINS proceeding is 
without limits.  We stand by the proposition that, “[b]y their very nature, 
[CHINS] cases do not fit neatly defined guidelines.”  In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 
at 1255.  DCS must necessarily rely on the past actions of parents to give a 
trial court the full story of why a CHINS petition was filed in the first 
place.  But to escape the preclusive effect of res judicata in a CHINS 
proceeding, the State’s subsequent petition must include new allegations 
of material fact separate from what was available to DCS to use at the 
original fact-finding hearing.7  This new evidence will necessarily include 
allegations of new material facts that took place in time after the relevant 
CHINS petition was dismissed. 
In our view, this rule bridges the gap between reliable application of 
claim preclusion and the unique nature of CHINS proceedings.  Parties 
seeking to bar a subsequent CHINS petition on claim preclusion grounds 
must still demonstrate each of the four elements of claim preclusion we 
mentioned above.  See Ind. State Ethics Comm’n, 18 N.E.3d at 993 (outlining 
the four elements of claim preclusion).  But in examining the third element 
of claim preclusion—that the matter at issue was, or could have been, 
determined in the prior action—courts must also consider the rule we 
have enunciated today.   
Practically speaking, if the parent or guardian is successful in showing 
claim preclusion applies to bar a subsequent petition, the CHINS petition 
must be dismissed.  However, this dismissal does not mean the State is 
forever barred from filing a subsequent CHINS petition or even from 
using a parent’s prior actions as evidence in support of a new filing.  As 
long as there are no other procedural bars to the filing and the State 
demonstrates that the subsequent petition contains new allegations of 
                                                 
7 See Matter of J.R., 98 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that, when a CHINS 
petition should have been dismissed for failure to complete a factfinding hearing within the 
statutory timeframe, DCS could refile the petition, but “would not be able to rely solely on the 
evidence that was admitted at the original CHINS factfinding” and instead “would have to 
also submit new evidence regarding the conditions at the current time”). 
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conduct that took place after the dismissal of the prior proceeding, the 
State may file a new CHINS petition. 
Having determined that claim preclusion applies to CHINS 
proceedings, we now consider whether this issue was properly placed 
before the trial court for its consideration. 
II. Mother failed to raise this issue in the trial court. 
The State contends that, even if res judicata does apply in this context, 
Mother did not preserve this issue for our review because she failed to 
raise the issue in the trial court.  Mother’s primary argument on this point 
is that no motion was required.  In other words, Mother believes a trial 
court does not have discretion to ignore res judicata.  In the alternative, 
Mother argues that her closing argument during the fact-finding hearing 
on the second petition should be construed as a motion to dismiss.  We 
will address each of Mother’s arguments in turn. 
Mother urges us to find a “trial court … does not have discretion to 
ignore the doctrine of res judicata.”  M.G. v. V.P., 74 N.E.3d 259, 263 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2017).  In other words, Mother would have us hold that a trial 
court must look beyond the parties’ pleadings, filings, and motions and 
sua sponte dismiss a CHINS petition if it perceives the new filing is 
precluded by a prior adjudication.  We decline to hold as much and find 
that the issue must be raised by a party to the proceeding so as to bring it 
to the court’s attention for review.  Once the issue is raised and proven, a 
court does not have discretion to ignore the doctrine of res judicata.  This 
finding held true in M.G., the case Mother uses in support of her primary 
position, where the parties put the trial court on notice that a third 
consecutive protective order petition should have been dismissed on res 
judicata grounds.  Id. at 264.  
Our holding on this point also finds support in the general structure of 
CHINS proceedings.  Although the burden of proof rests on the State to 
prove the basic elements of CHINS allegations, “each parent has the right 
to challenge those elements.”  In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1254.  As such, 
Mother had at least some cognizable responsibility to challenge the 
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CHINS petition on res judicata grounds.  Furthermore, to require the trial 
court to rule from the bench on this issue without the benefit of advocacy 
from either party would deprive reviewing courts of an adequate record 
from which to assess the issue.  We entrust trial courts with many 
responsibilities and decline to add one more requirement to this list, 
especially when attorneys are present to keep the court informed of all 
potential issues. 
Having found no requirement that trial courts must address res 
judicata issues sua sponte, we turn to Mother’s next argument that, during 
her closing argument at the second fact-finding hearing, she in fact did 
argue the petition should be barred on res judicata grounds.  In relevant 
part, Mother argued: 
The end of June the children were removed and the parents 
requested a contested fact-finding hearing. They didn’t get it 
until September … where DCS put on evidence and then was 
allowed to continue it for another month until the end of 
October and they said that they were gonna bring more 
evidence because they hadn’t put on enough. [T]hey came back 
and didn’t put on any new evidence and the Court dismissed 
the CHINS petition and DCS immediately refiled and said 
there was gonna be new evidence that would be presented that 
had come to light … in the time since they have lost their initial 
petition…. [We] are supposed to be hearing that new evidence 
of … what circumstances have changed since we were here in 
September and DCS failed to prove their case the first time … I 
[don’t] think we’ve heard any new information. 
(Tr. at 71-72).  It is difficult for us, however, to recognize a motion from 
these closing arguments and we do not expect the trial court would have 
been able to extrapolate a motion from this argument either.    
Nevertheless, Mother asks our Court to not elevate form over substance 
and construe her closing argument as an oral motion to dismiss the 
petition based on claim preclusion.  As we have previously said, CHINS 
proceedings are civil in nature and are thus governed by the Indiana 
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Rules of Trial Procedure.  Ind. Code § 31-34-9-7.  In relevant part, Trial 
Rule 7(B) provides that “[u]nless made during a hearing or trial, or 
otherwise ordered by the court, an application to the court for an order 
shall be made by written motion.  The motion shall state the grounds 
therefor and the relief or order sought.”  While the best practice is to file a 
written motion with the court, Trial Rule 7(B) contemplates that parties 
have the ability to make oral motions during a hearing or trial.  However, 
Trial Rule 7(B) requires that no matter whether written or made orally, a 
motion must state the grounds of the motion and the relief or order 
sought.  See Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b) that “[a]ll motions…must set 
forth with particularity the relief or order requested and the ground 
supporting the application”).  Mother did not meet that threshold in this 
case. 
We further note that res judicata is usually an affirmative defense 
under Trial Rule 8(C).  Under that rule, parties seeking to invoke the 
doctrine of res judicata must do so in a responsive pleading.  However, 
the structure of an initial hearing in a CHINS action is not conducive to 
responsive pleadings.  Indiana Code chapter 31-34-10 sets forth the 
parameters of initial hearings.  At this hearing, the trial court informs the 
parties of several important rights, duties, and procedural requirements.  
See Ind. Code §§ 31-34-10-4, -5.  One critical duty of the court is to 
“determine whether the parent, guardian, or custodian admits or denies 
the allegations of the [CHINS] petition.”  Ind. Code § 31-34-10-6.  The 
statute further provides, “A failure to respond constitutes a denial.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  When allegations are denied, the matter is set for a 
fact-finding hearing.  Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1.  See also In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 
at 1255. 
In our view, the statute outlining the procedure for initial hearings 
gives protections to parents who do not respond—whether by affirmative 
choice or by neglecting to do so—to the allegations set forth in a CHINS 
petition by automatically requiring that the matter move to a fact-finding 
hearing in front of the court.  Thus, it does not appear there is a 
requirement that a parent must file a responsive pleading.  See generally 
Matter of K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (stating there was 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JC-603 | June 27, 2019 
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no requirement for a responsive pleading in an action where Mother 
contested personal jurisdiction under Trial Rule 12(B)(2)).  Still, the best 
practice for the moving party is to move for dismissal on res judicata 
grounds at the earliest opportunity.8   
At any rate, we find that Mother failed to move for dismissal on res 
judicata grounds.  As such, this issue is waived on appeal.  See Brewington 
v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted).  But whenever
possible, this Court “prefer[s] to resolve cases on the merits instead of on 
procedural grounds like waiver.”  Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 359 (Ind. 
2016) (quoting Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015)).  Having 
determined that res judicata applies to CHINS proceedings and finding 
Mother waived this issue on appeal, we will examine whether the trial 
court’s failure to address the res judicata issue constituted fundamental 
error. 
III.
The trial court did not commit fundamental error
by failing to address the issue of res judicata.
On rare occasions, appellate courts may analyze an issue under the 
fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise procedurally 
defaulted claim.  Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008).  However, 
this review is extremely narrow and “available only when the record 
reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, 
where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which 
violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair 
trial impossible.”  Id.  We must review the alleged misconduct in the 
8 As we have already established, if a party moves for dismissal on res judicata grounds 
during a hearing, Trial Rule 7(B) allows for the motion to be made orally.  If a party makes an 
oral motion, however, we urge the trial court to ensure that “(1) the motion is on the record, 
(2) the parties are present or promptly notified of the motion, and (3) the motion—including 
whose it is—is clearly reflected on the chronological case summary (“CCS”).” In re Adoption of 
J.R.O., 95 N.E.3d 73, 74 (Ind. 2018) (Rush, C.J., dissenting from denial of transfer).  This 
practice helps create a clear record, which is essential for appellate review.  Id. (citing James v. 
State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Ind. 1991)). 
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context of all that happened in the proceeding and all the relevant 
information presented to the court.  See Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 
(Ind. 2014).  
Examining the case before us, we ultimately conclude there was no 
fundamental error.  We subscribe to the idea that “[a] finding of 
fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred … by not 
acting when he or she should have, even without being spurred to action 
by a timely objection.”  Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 974 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted).  Certainly, “[a]n error blatant enough to require a 
judge to take action sua sponte is necessarily blatant enough to draw any 
competent attorney’s objection.”  Id.  Having found no requirement today 
that a trial court must sua sponte address perceived res judicata issues in 
CHINS proceedings, we cannot now say the trial court committed 
fundamental error by failing to do so.  
As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Conclusion 
As a final point, we re-emphasize the critical importance of the 
procedural safeguards put in place at every stage of a CHINS proceeding.  
We in no way condone the repetitive filing put into issue in the present 
action.  We expect a lot out of attorneys in our state and hold DCS to the 
same standard of practice as attorneys in other civil proceedings.  We are 
confident that DCS can do better to protect the integrity of these 
proceedings and clamp down on repetitious filings, especially when it has 
the opportunity to present detailed evidence to the trial court and bring 
about a quick and fair disposition on the first try. 
To summarize our decision today, we find that the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata applies in the context of a CHINS proceeding.  
Because Mother failed to adequately raise this issue in the trial court, the 
issue was waived on appeal. Trial courts are not required to sua sponte 
address perceived res judicata issues and we find no fundamental error in 
these proceedings.  We also summarily affirm the portion of the Court of 
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Appeals opinion in this case that found sufficient evidence to support a 
CHINS adjudication for each child.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that each child in this 
case was a child in need of services.  
Rush, C.J., and Goff, J., concur. 
Slaughter, J., concurs in part and in the judgment with separate 
opinion in which Massa, J., joins. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T 
Kyle K. Dugger 
Monroe County Public Defender’s Office 
Bloomington, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Katherine A. Cornelius 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Slaughter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment. 
I agree with much of the Court’s opinion, including its judgment that 
Mother gets no relief. I write separately to clarify what I believe our 
governing rules of trial procedure require of litigants in child-in-need-of-
services cases. 
I’ll start with my three areas of agreement with the Court. First, 
principles of res judicata apply in CHINS proceedings. Second, Mother 
waived any objection on grounds of res judicata by failing to raise the 
issue in the trial court. Third, the trial court did not commit fundamental 
error by failing to raise the issue on its own. Thus, I share the Court’s view 
that the trial court’s CHINS adjudication against Mother must be 
affirmed. Despite these substantial areas of overlap, I am unable to join 
the Court’s opinion in full because of what strike me as its misstatements 
of governing law, some of which cannot be reconciled with our trial rules. 
To begin with, the Court treats the doctrine of res judicata as having 
two branches—one claim preclusion; the other issue preclusion. In my 
view, these two forms of preclusion are not separate branches but separate 
trees. The form of preclusion at issue here—res judicata—ought to refer 
solely to claim preclusion. Claim preclusion requires, among other things, 
that the court in the first action have decided the merits of a claim and, in 
a second action, the losing party in the first action have sought to relitigate 
what was—or might have been—decided in the first. Indiana State Ethics 
Comm'n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014). This contrasts with 
another form of preclusion—issue preclusion, also known as collateral 
estoppel—which “bars subsequent relitigation of the same fact or issue 
where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit”. 
Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 
2012). Issue preclusion applies even if a subsequent lawsuit concerns a 
different claim. Id.  
Next, although res judicata (claim preclusion) generally applies in 
CHINS and other civil actions, it does not apply here because the trial 
court’s initial judgment—a dismissal without prejudice—was not a 
decision on the merits. Wood v. Zeigler Bldg. Materials, Inc., 436 N.E.2d 
1168, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (“A dismissal without prejudice is not a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JC-603 | June 27, 2019 
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determination of the merits of a complaint and does not bar a later trial of 
the issues.”); accord Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
505–06 (2001). As Mother requested, the trial court should have dismissed 
the first CHINS case with prejudice. The Department went to trial and 
presented evidence in support of its claim that Mother’s children needed 
services. Given the trial court’s determination that the Department failed 
to sustain its burden of proof, the court should have entered a merits 
judgment against the Department and in favor of Mother. The court’s 
failure to do so was reversible error. But Mother elected not to appeal, 
although the without-prejudice dismissal was a final judgment. Wall v. 
Hutton, 92 Ind. App. 705, 706, 173 N.E. 600, 601 (1930). 
Finally, when (unlike here) a trial court has entered a merits judgment, 
to preserve a res judicata objection, the prevailing party must object in the 
second case by asserting the objection as an affirmative defense. Our trial 
rules expressly identify “res judicata” as an affirmative defense that 
“shall” be asserted in a “responsive pleading”, Ind. Trial Rule 8(C), on 
pain of having the defense waived. Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 
1185 (Ind. 2006) (citing T.R. 8(C)). I do not quarrel with the Court that an 
objecting party may also need to move separately to preserve this 
objection. But given Trial Rule 8(C), any such motion is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for preserving it. Yet the Court dispenses with the 
responsive-pleading requirement by observing that the legislature 
purports to excuse parents (and others) against whom CHINS claims have 
been filed from having to file a responsive pleading. See Ind. Code § 31-
34-10-6.  
The problem with the Court’s conclusion, even ignoring the 
longstanding rule that on matters of procedure the legislature’s edicts 
must yield to our own rules, Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1099 (Ind. 
2018), is that the scope of this statute is not as far-reaching as the Court 
suggests. By its terms, Section 31-34-10-6 merely says that a parent’s 
failure to respond to a CHINS petition means its allegations are denied. 
The statute does not say that a CHINS respondent’s silence at the pleading 
stage preserves his affirmative defenses. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JC-603 | June 27, 2019 
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Trial Rule 1 could not be clearer that “all suits of a civil nature”—which 
includes CHINS cases—are governed by our trial rules: “Except as 
otherwise provided, these rules govern the procedure and practice in all 
courts of the state of Indiana in all suits of a civil nature whether 
cognizable as cases at law, in equity, or of statutory origin.” T.R. 1 
(emphasis added). 
Perhaps the Court is correct in implying that Rule 8(C)’s requirements 
of a responsive pleading do not reflect the reality of CHINS practice on 
the ground in our trial courts. But as long as the trial rules apply to all 
civil suits, we should enforce the rules as written and not sanction the 
short-cut practices that today’s decision ratifies. 
Massa, J., joins.