Title: GRIFFITH v. CHOCTAW CASINO OF POCOLA

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

GRIFFITH v. CHOCTAW CASINO OF POCOLA  GRIFFITH v. CHOCTAW CASINO OF POCOLA 2009 OK 51 Case Number: 104887 Decided: 06/30/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DOROTHY GRIFFITH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHOCTAW CASINO OF POCOLA, OKLAHOMA, and the CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, Defendants/Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT, LEFLORE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, THE HONORABLE TED A. KNIGHT, DISTRICT JUDGE ¶0 Dorothy Griffith filed a petition in the state district court against the Choctaw Nation and its casino in Pocola, Oklahoma, to recover tort damages. The Choctaw Nation moved to dismiss on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. The district court dismissed the petition. Griffith appealed. We retained the appeal to address an issue of statewide importance: Whether the state district court is a "court of competent jurisdiction" as that phrase is used in the statutory class III gaming compact, DISMISSAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Eddie A. McCroskey, Poteau, Oklahoma, for plaintiff/appellant. Eric D. Janzen and Brett D. Cable, McAlester, Oklahoma, for defendants/appellees. PER CURIAM: ¶1 One question is presented in this appeal: Is the state district court a court of competent jurisdiction as used in the gaming compact between the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma such that the district court may exercise jurisdiction over this Indian-country arising negligence action filed by a casino patron against the Choctaw tribe and its casino? We answer in the affirmative. I. Facts and Proceedings ¶2 The Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Indian tribe ¶3 Dorothy Griffith ¶4 Griffith filed a tort action in the state district court in LeFlore County against the casino and the Tribe. The Tribe moved to dismiss the tort action on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity from suit in state court, arguing that Oklahoma state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign Indian tribe unless Congress or the Indian tribe has clearly consented to suit in state court or otherwise clearly waived tribal immunity. Griffith responded that the Tribe consented to suit in the compact which states the "tribe consents to suit on a limited basis with respect to tort claims" and the "tribe consents to suit against the enterprise in a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to tort claims." The Tribe argued that exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims arising in Indian country against the Tribe was vested in the tribal courts at the time the compact was executed; the compact preserved the tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction by declaring that the compact does not alter tribal, federal or state adjudicatory jurisdiction; and therefore, the consent to suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in the compact is consent to suit in tribal court only. The Honorable Ted A. Knight, Judge of the District Court, concluded that tribal courts and federal courts have jurisdiction over Indian tribes but state courts do not and dismissed the action. ¶5 Griffith appealed the dismissal. The Tribe moved to make this appeal a companion to the appeal from the same district court in Dye v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, Oklahoma, No. 104,737. The meaning of the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" as used in the compact is also a pivotal issue in the Dye case. This Court denied the motion, noting the related Dye case, and assigned the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. Thereafter, this Court received a certified question as to whether the district court in Rogers County, Oklahoma, is a "court of competent jurisdiction" as that phrase is used in the tribal gaming compact between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC, No. 105,300. We withdrew this case from assignment to the Court of Civil Appeals. ¶6 We recently handed down our opinion in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC, II. Standard of Review ¶7 A compact is defined as "an interstate [intergovernmental] agreement entered into to handle a particular problem or task. Webster's New International Dictionary 461 (3rd ed. 1961). The Tribe urges that the compact is a purely private contractual matter. However, the Model Tribal Gaming Compact may not be viewed as an ordinary private contract because it is a voter-approved statute codified in the Oklahoma Statutes. The compact is public law and must be interpreted by use of canons of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo, without deference to the lower court. Twin Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. V. Town of Forest Park, III. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) ¶8 In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided that an Indian tribe may operate bingo games on an Indian reservation located in a state that permits gaming for any purpose and that state law does not apply to bingo games played predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the Indian reservation. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, ¶9 Congress had considered the problems and benefits of Indian gaming in committee hearings for at least three years before Cabazon. Congress enacted Public Law 100-446, finding that gaming was a means of economic development for the tribes that would promote tribal self-sufficiency and strengthened tribal governments. 102 Stat. 2467 (1988). In Public Law 100-446, Congress legalized gaming in Indian country ¶10 Congress attempted to balance the federal, tribal and state interests in Indian gaming through a system of joint regulation in IGRA. ¶11 In creating the tribal-state compact system and authorizing state regulation of gambling in Indian country, IGRA does not specifically address the subjects of damages to members of the public that may be caused by wrongful activity of Indian tribes and the judicial relief against the tribes. Instead, IGRA specifically authorizes the tribes and states to compact as to "any other subjects that are directly or indirectly related to the operation of gaming activities." Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii). Tribes and states may allocate the applicable law and forum for adjudication of patron tort claims. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i), (ii). IV. The State-Tribal Gaming Act and The Model Tribal Gaming Compact ¶12 In 1988, the Oklahoma Legislature authorized the Governor to negotiate and enter into cooperative agreements with federally recognized Indian tribes in furtherance of federal policy and state-tribal relations, subject to approval by a legislative Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations. ¶13 In 2004, Oklahoma voters approved casino-style gambling at horse race tracks and in Indian country. The Oklahoma Legislature passed the State-Tribal Gaming Act and sent it to a vote of the people. ¶14 The model compact is offered, all or none, to the Indian tribes of Oklahoma, which if accepted, constitutes the gaming compact between this state and the accepting tribe for purposes of IGRA without any further action on behalf of the State of Oklahoma. Id. § 280. The model compact consists of Part 1 through Part 16. The model compact sets the fee to be paid to the state by the Indian tribe for the "substantial exclusivity and, consistent with the goals of IGRA, special opportunities for tribal economic opportunity through gaming within the external boundaries of Oklahoma in respect to the covered games." ¶15 The model compact recites the tribe's limited consent to suit for patron tort claims, mandates liability insurance coverage for the benefit of the public, prohibits the liability insurer from asserting tribal immunity, prescribes the procedure for casino patrons to claim damages, and expresses the tribe's consent to suit. ¶16 As to suits on tort claims, the tort claimant ¶17 The model compact unmistakably gives the casino patron the right to recover damages on tort claims against the Indian tribe and against the tribe's enterprise. The compact imposes specific conditions and limits on the right: 1) it limits the amount of damages for which the tribe and/or the enterprise will be liable up to the monetary limits of Oklahoma's governmental tort claims law, 2) it restricts enforcement of a damages award to the liability insurance and prohibits the insurer from asserting tribal immunity, 3) it prescribes special notice-of-claim procedures for recovery of damages parallel to the state governmental tort claims statutory procedure, 4) it authorizes a judicial remedy to recover tort damages, and 5) it provides the tribe's clear and express consent to suit for damages. The compact does not, however, restrict the casino patron to tort damages under tribal law nor does it limit the casino patron to suit against the tribe or its enterprise in tribal court. ¶18 Although there is no language in the model compact making tribal law or tribal courts the exclusive protection for a wrongfully injured casino patron, the Tribe takes the position that Part 9 limits its consent to suit to the tribal courts only. Part 9 reads: "This compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction." Part 9 expresses intent not to "alter" whatever court has adjudicatory jurisdiction, but it does nothing to define a court of competent jurisdiction. ¶19 The model compact governs Indian-country gaming activities by consent of the Indian tribe. It acknowledges that the "tribe is a federally recognized tribal government possessing sovereign powers and the rights of self-government," ¶20 We have carefully perused the model compact and studied the provisions in Part 6 pertaining to a casino patron's tort claim against the tribe. We conclude that the Tribe clearly and unequivocally consented to be sued for tort damages by a casino patron, whether suit be brought in state court, federal court, or tribal court. V. "Court of Competent Jurisdiction" ¶21 Griffith took a position that the state district court is the "court of competent jurisdiction" by default because this is not a federal-question claim, the Tribe is not a citizen for purposes of diversity of citizenship, and the Tribe had no tribal courts when the statutory compact was negotiated, passed by the Oklahoma Legislature, approved by a vote of the people, signed by the Tribe, and/or published by the United States Secretary of the Interior. The Tribe, on the other hand, took an unsettled position that exclusive jurisdiction over Indian-country arising torts was vested in the tribal courts at the time the compact was executed, the compact preserved the tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore, the consent to suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in the compact is consent to suit in tribal court only. ¶22 The Tribe argued that this Court has already recognized that a controversy such as the instant one lies exclusively in tribal court. The Tribe relies on an unpublished order of this Court in Muskogee (Creek) Nation Gaming Commission v. The Honorable Mary Fitzgerald, District Judge, No. 104,726. In that original action, the Creek Nation asked this Court to prohibit the state district court judge from proceeding further in Manwarring v. Muskogee (Creek) Nation Gaming Commission, No. CJ-207-745, Tulsa County District Court. This Court assumed original jurisdiction and issued the writ in an unpublished order. An unpublished order has no precedential value. Okla.Sup.Ct.R.1.200(b)(1) and (7), 12 O.S.2001, ch.15, app. I (Disposition of a case without a formal published opinion means that the Court did not believe the case involved any new point of law making the decision of value as precedent.). The non-precedential order in the Muskogee (Creek) Nation Gaming Commission case settled an issue for the involved parties only. An unpublished order is the law of the case but not the law of the State. ¶23 The Tribe also made a very tenuous argument that the meaning of the words "court of competent jurisdiction" "are not for this Court to decide" because Part 12 of the compact expressly provides that interpretation issues shall be decided in arbitration with review in the federal courts. Part 12 of the compact deals with resolution of disputes between the parties - the tribe and the state. Part 12(2) is the "parties consent to the jurisdiction of such arbitration [American Arbitration Association] forum and court [federal district court] for such limited purposes and no other, and each waives immunity with respect thereto." Without ruling, we express doubt that this is a dispute contemplated by Part 12 of the compact. ¶24 The phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" as used in federal statutes has long been construed to mean federal and state courts, Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 , 20 S. Ct. 222, 44 L. Ed. 276 (1900), where the statute did not "in express language prescribe either a Federal court or a state court, and did not provide for exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction." Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, ¶25 Federal, state, and even tribal laws utilize the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction." ¶26 We recognize that as a matter of federal law, tribal immunity from suit in state court is not subject to diminution by the states and that an Indian tribe is subject to suit where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived immunity. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., VI. Summary ¶27 In summary, the Tribe claims that "in a court of competent jurisdiction" means "in tribal court only." But the model compact does not say "in tribal court only." The compact says the "tribe consents to suit . . . with respect to tort claims" and the "tribe consents to suit against the enterprise in a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to a tort claim." The language in the compact could have easily restricted casino patrons' tort remedy to tribal courts, if the tribal government representatives and the state government representatives who proposed the state-tribal gaming legislation directed that those words be used in the measure. "In tribal court only" could have been typed on the keyboard by whoever typed the proposed compact. It is that simple. The language in other tribal compacts have specified that tort actions against the tribe may be filed in tribal court only. We reject the Tribe's claim that the proponents of the state-tribal gaming legislation really intended to waive tribal immunity "in tribal court only" when the compact does not disclose that intent. ¶28 We hold that Oklahoma district courts are "courts of competent jurisdiction" as that phrase is used in the Model Tribal Gaming Compact codified at DISMISSAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Taylor, V.C.J. (by separate writing), and Opala (by separate writing), Watt, Winchester, and Colbert, JJ., concur. Kauger, J., (by separate writing) concurs in part and dissents in part. Edmondson, C.J., and Hargrave and Reif (by separate writing), JJ., dissent. FOOT