Title: State v. Hayes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Hayes (2000-331); 172 Vt. 613; 783 A.2d 957

[Filed 28-Aug-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-331

                               MAY TERM, 2001

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Christopher S. Hayes	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 42-11-99 Wmcr

                                                Trial Judge: David T. Suntag

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals his conviction by jury of second-degree aggravated
  domestic assault,  arguing that the information was defective, that the
  absence of a court-ordered forensic examination  prevented him from
  obtaining a fair and fully informed sentencing decision, and that the trial
  court  violated his privilege against self-incrimination by failing to
  provide him with judicial use immunity  before basing its sentencing
  decision on his refusal to acknowledge criminal responsibility.  We  reject
  each of these contentions and thus affirm the conviction and sentence.

       Defendant was charged in separate informations with simple assault
  against his girlfriend,  based on a November 7, 1998 incident, and
  second-degree aggravated assault against the same  victim, based on a
  January 9, 1999 incident.  The charges were joined at a single trial, after
  which  defendant was acquitted of the simple assault charge, but convicted
  of the second-degree aggravated  assault charge.

       On February 18, 2000, following completion of the pre-sentence
  investigation (PSI) report, the  sentencing hearing commenced.  The hearing
  was continued after the trial court, at the request of  defense counsel and
  with the acquiescence of the State, ordered that defendant be given a 
  psychological evaluation at the Woodstock Correctional Facility.  Defendant
  was held without bail  pending resumption of the hearing.  When the hearing
  resumed on April 7, 2000, the court  discovered that the evaluation had
  never been performed.  Apparently, the Department of Corrections  contended
  that the correctional facility was not responsible for providing
  "forensic," as opposed to  "treatment-oriented," evaluations, and took the
  position that a forensic evaluation would have to be  provided by an
  outside psychiatrist.  Upon inquiry from the court, the State stated that
  it did not  oppose an evaluation, but would not seek funds to have one
  done.  Defense counsel stated that her  client had been incarcerated since
  mid-February and wanted the case resolved.  She further indicated  that
  defendant was "hopeful" that he would obtain a probationary sentence, as
  had been  recommended in the PSI report.  The court then engaged defense
  counsel and defendant in an 

 

  extended colloquy in which the court repeatedly asked defendant if he
  wanted to proceed without the  evaluation and repeatedly warned defendant
  that the court was not restricted to the recommendation  contained in the
  PSI report but rather could sentence defendant up to the full extent
  permitted under  the law.  After consulting with his counsel on several
  occasions, defendant formally waived his right  to an evaluation and
  unequivocally stated that he wanted the court to proceed with sentencing 
  without the benefit of the evaluation.  The court then heard testimony and
  sentenced defendant to  one-to-five years to serve.

       On appeal, defendant first argues that the Department of Corrections'
  refusal to honor the  court's order for a psychiatric evaluation violated
  his right to a fair and fully informed sentencing  decision.  According to
  defendant, his agreement to proceed without an evaluation may have been 
  knowing and intelligent, but it was not voluntary because he could not have
  waived a right he had  already been denied.  In defendant's view, he had no
  choice but to waive the evaluation.

       We cannot agree with defendant's characterization of the stipulation. 
  Although he was  represented by counsel, defendant never argued before the
  trial court, as he does here on appeal, that  the Department had a
  statutory duty to comply with the court-ordered evaluation.  Rather than 
  contest the Department's position concerning its responsibility to provide
  the evaluation, defendant  made the conscious, voluntary choice to forego
  the evaluation, in the hope that the court would  follow the recommendation
  of the PSI report.  His gamble did not pay off, however, and he now  claims
  that proceeding without the evaluation deprived him of a fair and fully
  informed sentencing  hearing.  Based on the facts recounted above, we
  conclude that defendant waived this argument by  voluntarily agreeing to
  proceed with sentencing without the evaluation.  See Johnson v. Zerbst,