Title: Wright v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

252 Ind. 418 (1969)
249 N.E.2d 33
WRIGHT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 868-S-129.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 7, 1969.
Robert G. Mann, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Curtis C. Plopper, Aaron T. Jahr, Deputies Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
ARTERBURN, J.
Appellant was tried and convicted of first degree arson on October 19, 1967. On March 7, 1968, the trial court granted appellant's petition for permission to file a belated motion for a new trial. The belated motion for a new trial was then filed and claimed that the defendant *419 did not have a fair trial for the following reasons: that he was forced into a trial without any opportunity to confer with his court-appointed counsel and without any time to secure witnesses in his defense. There are also other allegations with reference to the claim that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, to which we need not give any consideration.
At the hearing on the belated motion for a new trial the evidence was uncontradicted that the appellant was under a charge of assault and battery and carrying a deadly weapon and also under the present charge of arson. After his counsel was appointed by the court the appellant testified that the following took place:
There was no evidence offered by the state to contradict this testimony. The state did not see fit to call the court-appointed counsel of the defendant to in any fashion contradict the facts the defendant related. It appears therefore from the uncontradicted evidence in the record that the appellant was forced into a trial as a surprise, without warning and without an opportunity to consult his attorney, and his attorney failed to procure witnesses for his defense. It is quite evident from this uncontradicted evidence that regardless of the guilt or innocence of the appellant, he did not receive a fair trial.
It is to be regretted that the state did not see fit to call counsel appointed to represent the defendant to rebut the charges of incompetency and neglect in the representation of the appellant. The attorney involved here should have had the opportunity to refute the charges. We have held in this state that an attorney may intervene in an action in which he is charged with personal misconduct to protect his reputation and any reflection upon *425 his integrity. Dodd v. Reese (1939), 216 Ind. 449, 24 N.E.2d 995.
We have said previously that we need not, in a case like this, draw an exact line between competency and incompetency of counsel in order to grant the defendant a fair trial. A defendant is entitled to more than a perfunctory representation. Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848.
In Shack v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 67, 231 N.E.2d 36, 43, this Court further said:
It is evident to us from the uncontradicted facts in this case that the appellant did not receive a fair trial because of failure of counsel to properly represent him.
The court erred in overruling appellant's belated motion for a new trial, and the court is directed to grant the belated motion for a new trial and grant the appellant a new trial.
DeBruler, C.J., and Hunter, Jackson and Givan, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 249 N.E.2d 33.