Title: P. v. Freeman

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 1/21/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S150984 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D046394 
MARILYN KAYE FREEMAN, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD171601 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
IN RE MARILYN KAYE FREEMAN 
) 
ON HABEAS CORPUS. 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D048111, D049238 
 
____________________________________) 
 
We granted review in this case to determine whether the appearance of bias 
by a judge requires recusal under the due process clause of the federal 
Constitution.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)  While this matter was pending the 
United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., Inc. (2009) __ U.S. __ [129 S.Ct. 2252].  The court‟s exhaustive review of its 
jurisprudence in this delicate realm of constitutional law compels the following 
conclusions:  while a showing of actual bias is not required for judicial 
disqualification under the due process clause, neither is the mere appearance of 
bias sufficient.  Instead, based on an objective assessment of the circumstances in 
the particular case, there must exist “ „the probability of actual bias on the part of 
the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.‟ ”  
(Id. at p.__ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2259].)  Where only the appearance of bias is at issue, 
2 
a litigant‟s recourse is to seek disqualification under state disqualification statutes:  
“Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process 
requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the 
Constitution.”  (Id. at p.__ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2267].)  Finally, the court emphasized 
that only the most “extreme facts” would justify judicial disqualification based on 
the due process clause.  (Id. at p.__ [129 S.Ct. at pp. 2265, 2266].) 
The Court of Appeal held that the circumstances of this case required the 
trial judge to recuse himself and his failure to do so violated defendant Marilyn 
Kaye Freeman‟s due process rights.  We conclude, however, in light of Caperton, 
that this case does not present the “extreme facts” that require judicial 
disqualification on due process grounds.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Facts 
The facts underlying the defendant‟s offenses were succinctly summarized 
by the Court of Appeal:  “On September 10, 2002, [defendant‟s] 14-year-old 
daughter (E.) called the police reporting that her mother had assaulted her that day 
and had been doing so on a regular basis.  E. was removed from her home and 
placed in a foster home.  [Defendant], an attorney, then engaged in an aggressive 
campaign to disrupt the foster placement and terrorize her daughter‟s foster 
parents in a misguided attempt to monitor and reunite with her daughter.  
[Defendant] solicited one of her clients to kidnap E. from the foster parents, 
burglarized the foster parents‟ home, chased the foster parents at high speeds on 
the freeway, followed them in her car on city streets, glared at them „in [an] evil 
manner‟ when she was spotted, spied on them at their residence and elsewhere, 
took pictures of them, and sprayed her perfume in their vehicle. 
3 
“The jury found [defendant] guilty of solicitation to commit kidnapping, 
residential burglary, stalking, and misdemeanor child endangerment and battery. 
She was sentenced to prison for six years.” 
B.  Procedural Background 
On the morning of December 19, 2002, defendant, then in custody, 
appeared before Judge Robert O‟Neill for a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, in which she sought to replace her court-appointed counsel.  
After the court granted her motion, the issue of bail arose.  Judge O‟Neill said he 
would set the matter for bail review before another judge.  After some further 
colloquy, defendant said,  “I was wanting to bring up at that hearing the possibility 
of house arrest there is [sic] rumors that are not really charges that I have been 
stalking poor Judge Elias.”  (Judge Elias was the judge presiding over the 
dependency court proceeding involving defendant and her daughter.) 
Judge O‟Neill replied that he was aware of the “allegation,” and 
commented, “Judge Elias and I worked together in the District Attorney‟s office.  I 
have known Judge Elias for 23 years.  He is a friend of mine, and that is another 
reason I want to set the bail review back in front of Judge Szumowski who 
originally set bail.  [¶]  There is no good cause to change bail, and I really think 
based on what I have been told I would recuse myself from the bail issue.”  
After further discussion on scheduling matters, defendant again raised the 
bail issue, telling the court she had been advised at arraignment to seek bail review 
before someone other than Judge Szumowski.  Judge O‟Neill told her she should 
discuss the situation with her newly appointed counsel “in light of the allegations 
made — just made concerning Judge Elias.  In that situation a judge who is not a 
member of the bench should hear a bail review.  That would be a retired judge or a 
judge sitting on assignment.”  Defendant observed that Judge Elias had not 
4 
recused himself because “he made it clear he doesn‟t think there is any substance 
to those allegations,” and said, “Do you think in lieu of all this craziness if I — 
that just house arrest would be a good idea?”  The court replied, in part, “What I 
am doing as to your bail motion, I am recusing myself.  I don‟t think I‟m the 
person that should hear it.” 
Between January 6, 2003, and September 3, 2003, various judges of the San 
Diego Superior Court — excluding Judge O‟Neill — presided over hearings in 
defendant‟s case related to appointment of counsel, bail review, discovery, and 
other matters.  On September 3, 2003, defendant‟s case was assigned to retired 
Judge Charles Jones for all purposes.  Judge Jones presided over defendant‟s 
preliminary hearing and bound her over for trial. 
At a May 14, 2004 status conference, Judge Jones stated on the record that 
there was a discussion in chambers about why the matter had been assigned to 
him.  “And the district attorney has advised me of how and why that came about 
and the reason.  The reason no longer exists, and it does not look like there‟s been 
a recusal of the San Diego County Superior Court, so I will put another couple of 
other matters on the record and transfer the matter back to [Judge Deddeh].” 
Later that day, Judge Deddeh explained, “With regard to the recusal issue, 
it is my understanding that it was communicated to Judge Jones that the only 
reason the bench was being recused is because there is a possibility that on . . . 
[defendant‟s] computer . . . there was some indication that she was stalking Judge 
Elias.  Apparently the computer has been reviewed. . . .  And . . . apparently 
[Judge Elias is] not a victim in this case.  And so there is apparently no reason for 
the bench to recuse itself.”  Ultimately, Judge Deddeh reassigned the case to Judge 
O‟Neill.   Defendant reminded the court that “he already recused himself.  He 
recused himself because he is a good friend of Judge Elias.”  Judge Deddeh 
5 
replied, “He can do that when I send it up there.”  Defendant said, “Okay.”  Judge 
Deddeh added, “We‟ll see whether or not this is going to be an issue for him.”  
When the case reached Judge O‟Neill that day, defendant filed a handwritten 
challenge to him in which her counsel did not join.  No action was taken on the 
challenge on that day. 
The May 20, 2004 minute order for Judge O‟Neill‟s department states that 
the matter was sent back to Judge Deddeh for reassignment that morning but does 
not reflect what discussion led to this action.  Judge Deddeh declined to consider 
the disqualification motion on the ground that it was not filed by defendant‟s 
counsel and returned the case to Judge O‟Neill.  In Judge O‟Neill‟s court, 
defendant evidently withdrew her challenge.  Judge O‟Neill returned the matter to 
Judge Deddeh “for a record to be made re: withdrawal of challenge and 
assignment back to [Judge O‟Neill].”  Back in Judge Deddeh‟s court, Judge 
Deddeh asked defense counsel, “All right.  So with regard to the [Code of Civil 
Procedure section] 170.1 challenge . . . is your client withdrawing her 170.1 
challenge?”  Defense counsel answered, “Yes, Your Honor.”  The court then 
posed the same question to defendant:  “All right.  So then is that right, Miss 
Freeman, you are withdrawing that?”  Defendant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.”  
Judge Deddeh then reassigned the case to Judge O‟Neill. 
On October 18, 2004, the day of trial, during a hearing on another Marsden 
motion, defendant again sought to disqualify Judge O‟Neill for cause.  Defendant 
claimed she had been “bullied” by her attorneys into keeping Judge O‟Neill but 
that she believed that he “was personally prejudiced; and I always have because 
you told me that in December of 2002.”  The court responded, “Ms. Freeman, you 
withdrew your challenge in front of Judge Deddeh.”   After the court denied her 
Marsden motion, defendant again claimed the court was “prejudiced” against her 
6 
and said, “I don‟t believe that once you recused yourself for cause that there was 
any possible way for that to be overridden.”  The court responded, “Ms. Freeman, 
that has been ruled upon.” 
The matter proceeded to trial and defendant was convicted and sentenced as 
noted. 
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant‟s conviction on the ground that 
defendant‟s due process rights were violated by Judge O‟Neill‟s failure to 
disqualify himself when the case was reassigned to him.1  We granted the 
Attorney General‟s petition for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Statutory Forfeiture of Claim 
Before we reach the constitutional issue, we must dispose of a preliminary 
matter:  whether defendant forfeited any claim that her statutory right to disqualify 
a judge for bias, either actual or apparent, was violated in this case.  The statutory 
basis for disqualifying judges is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, 
and other sections outline the procedures for determining the motion and the effect 
of the disqualification. 
Relevant here are two provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.3.  Subdivision (a)(1) states that, upon recusal,  the recused judge 
                                              
1 
While her appeal was pending in the Court of Appeal, defendant filed a writ 
of habeas corpus in propria persona in which she alleged that appellate counsel 
incompetently argued the judicial bias issue on appeal.  The Court of Appeal 
consolidated the two matters.  In light of its reversal of the judgment, the Court of 
Appeal found it unnecessary to reach the ineffective assistance claim and for that 
reason alone denied the petition.  Defendant did not renew her claim in this court.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the denial of the petition for the Court of Appeal to 
consider the petition on its merits in light of our opinion. 
7 
“shall not further participate in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 
170.4, unless his or her disqualification is waived by the parties as provided in 
subdivision (b).”2  Subdivision (d) provides in part:  “The determination of the 
question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be 
reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought 
only by the parties to the proceeding.”  (§ 170.3, subd. (d).)  “Under our statutory 
scheme, a petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive method for obtaining review 
of a denial of a judicial qualification motion.”  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 668, 811, italics added.) 
Defendant filed two statutory disqualification motions against Judge 
O‟Neill, one on May 14, 2004, and again on October 18, 2004.  She withdrew the 
first motion.  As to the latter motion, defendant asserted both that Judge O‟Neill 
was biased against her and that, having once recused himself from her case, “I 
don‟t believe . . . that there was any possible way for that to be overridden.”  Judge 
O‟Neill responded that her motion had been disposed of when she withdrew the 
earlier motion and, in effect, denied the October 18 motion. 
Defendant‟s failure to seek writ review of that denial forfeits both of her 
potential statutory claims:  that Judge O‟Neill should have been disqualified for 
cause and that, having once recused himself, he was statutorily precluded from 
accepting reassignment of the case.  (See Geldermann, Inc. v. Bruner (1991) 229 
Cal.App.3d 662, 665 [“The statutes, however, do not permit limited, partial or 
conditional recusal”].)  Accordingly, we address the issue of judicial 
                                              
2 
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (a) permits the recused 
judge to perform a limited number of tasks. 
8 
disqualification solely under the rubric of due process.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 344, 362.) 
B.  Due Process Violation 
We now turn to the issue on which review was granted:  does the due 
process clause require judicial disqualification based on the mere appearance of 
bias.  “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”  (In re 
Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136.)  “The Supreme Court has long established 
that the Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and 
impartial judge.”  (Larson v. Palmateer (9th Cir. 2007) 515 F.3d 1057, 1067.)  The 
operation of the due process clause in the realm of judicial impartiality, then, is 
primarily to protect the individual‟s right to a fair trial.  In contrast to this 
elemental goal, a statutory disqualification scheme, like that found in our Code of 
Civil Procedure, is not solely concerned with the rights of the parties before the 
court but is also “intended to ensure public confidence in the judiciary.”  (Curle v. 
Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1070.)3  Thus, an explicit ground for 
judicial disqualification in California‟s statutory scheme is a public perception of 
partiality, that is, the appearance of bias.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. 
(a)(6)(A)(iii); Christie v. City of El Centro (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 767, 776 
[“Disqualification is mandated if a reasonable person would entertain doubts 
concerning the judge‟s impartiality”].) 
By contrast, the United State Supreme Court‟s due process case law focuses 
on actual bias.  This does not mean that actual bias must be proven to establish a 
                                              
3 
Of course, the two goals are not unrelated and the due process guarantee of 
an impartial adjudicator would necessarily instill public confidence in the judicial 
system.   
9 
due process violation.  Rather, consistent with its concern that due process 
guarantees an impartial adjudicator, the court has focused on those circumstances 
where, even if actual bias is not demonstrated, the probability of bias on the part of 
a judge is so great as to become “ „constitutionally intolerable.‟ ”  (Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., supra, __ U.S. at p. ___ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2262] 
(Caperton).]  The standard is an objective one. 
Caperton both reviewed the court‟s jurisprudence in this area and extended 
it.  The issue in Caperton was whether due process was violated by a West 
Virginia high court justice‟s refusal to recuse himself from a case involving a $50 
million damage award against a coal company whose chairman had contributed $3 
million to the justice‟s election campaign.  The justice cast the deciding vote that 
overturned the award.  The United States Supreme Court held that, under the 
“extreme facts” of the case, “the probability of actual bias rises to an 
unconstitutional level.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2265].) 
As the Caperton court noted, in the high court‟s first foray into this area in 
Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, it had “concluded that the Due Process 
Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when 
he has „a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest‟ in a case.”  (Caperton, 
supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2259].)  Caperton observed, however, that 
“new problems have emerged that were not discussed at common law” leading it 
to identify “additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal.”  
(Ibid.)  Tumey itself was such a case.  Tumey involved a mayor-judge authorized to 
conduct court trials of those accused of violating a state alcoholic beverage 
prohibition law; if a defendant was found guilty, a percentage of his fine was paid 
to the mayor and the rest was paid to the village‟s general treasury.  The court held 
that the system violated the defendant‟s due process rights even assuming that the 
10 
mayor-judge‟s direct pecuniary interest would not have influenced his decision.  
“The [Tumey] Court articulated the controlling principle:  [¶]  „Every procedure 
which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget 
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies 
the latter due process of law.‟ ”  (Caperton, at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].) 
The Caperton court observed that, even in that early case, the high court 
was “concerned with more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct 
pecuniary interest.  It was also concerned with a more general concept of interests 
that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  The court in Caperton reviewed two of its other decisions 
implicating indirect pecuniary interests that in its view tested the neutrality of the 
adjudicators in those cases.   Ward v. Monroeville (1972) 409 U.S. 57 involved 
another mayor-judge, but in that case the mayor‟s compensation was not tied to his 
adjudications.  Rather, “the fines the mayor assessed went to the town‟s general 
fisc.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S.  at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  Nonetheless, the 
Monroeville court found the procedure to violate due process because of the 
“ „ “possible temptation” ‟ ” the mayor might face to maximize the town‟s 
revenues at the expense of defendants appearing before him.  (Caperton, at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].) 
Finally, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie (1986) 475 U.S. 813, the 
court “further clarified the reach of the Due Process Clause regarding a judge‟s 
financial interest in a case.  There, a justice had cast the deciding vote on the 
Alabama Supreme Court to uphold a punitive damages award against an insurance 
company for bad-faith refusal to pay a claim.  At the time of his vote, the justice 
was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical suit pending in Alabama‟s lower courts.  
11 
His deciding vote, this Court surmised, „undoubtedly “raised the stakes” ‟ for the 
insurance defendant in the justice‟s suit.  [Citation.]  [¶]  The Court stressed that it 
was „not required to decide whether in fact [the justice] was influenced.‟  
[Citation.]  The proper constitutional inquiry is „whether sitting on the case then 
before the Supreme Court of Alabama “ „would offer a possible temptation to the 
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.‟ ” ‟  
[Citation.]  The Court underscored that „what degree or kind of interest is 
sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting “cannot be defined with precision.” ‟  
[Citation.]  In the Court‟s view, however, it was important that this test have an 
objective component.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at pp. __-__ [129 S.Ct. at 
pp. 2260-2261].) 
The Caperton court then examined another line of cases in which the court 
had found that the probability of actual bias was so high as to require recusal 
under the due process clause.  “The second instance requiring recusal that was not 
discussed at common law emerged in the criminal contempt context, where a 
judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but was challenged because of a 
conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.”  (Caperton, supra, 
__ U.S.  at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2261].)  That case, In re Murchison, supra, 349 
U.S. 133, involved a judge who presided over the contempt trial of two witnesses 
whom the same judge had charged with contempt following his examination of 
them at a proceeding to determine whether to file criminal charges; a so-called  “ „ 
“one-man grand jury.” ‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S.  at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 
2261], quoting In re Murchison, supra, 349 U.S. at p. 133.) 
As Caperton explained, the Murchison court set aside the contempt 
convictions “on grounds that the judge had a conflict of interest at the trial stage 
because of his earlier participation followed by his decision to charge them. . . .  
12 
The [Murchison] Court recited the general rule that  „no man can be a judge in his 
own case,‟ adding that „no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in 
the outcome.‟  [Citation.]  [Murchison] noted that the disqualifying criteria „cannot 
be defined with precision.  Circumstances and relationships must be considered.‟  
[Citation.]  These circumstances and the prior relationship required recusal:  
„Having been part of [the one-man grand jury] process a judge cannot be, in the 
very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those 
accused.‟  [Citation.]”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S.  at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2261].) 
The Caperton court then turned to another decision in this line of cases — 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania (1971) 400 U.S. 455 — which held that “ „by reason of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant in criminal 
contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than the 
one reviled by the contemnor.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at 
p. 2262], quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 466.)  In so 
holding, however, the Mayberry court had “considered the specific circumstances 
presented” and was not propounding a general rule that “ „every attack on a judge 
. . . disqualifies him from sitting.‟ ”  (Caperton, __ U.S. at p. __ [229 S.Ct.  at 
p. 2262]; see Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575.)  Rather, “[t]he inquiry is an 
objective one.  The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively 
biased, but whether the average judge in his position is „likely‟ to be neutral, or 
whether there is an unconstitutional „potential for bias.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, __ 
U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2262].) 
The Caperton court then applied the principles derived from these cases to 
the issue before it — the impact of campaign contributions on judicial impartiality 
— acknowledging that its prior cases had not addressed this circumstance.  Noting 
that the West Virginia justice‟s rejection of the petitioners‟ disqualification motion 
13 
was based on his conclusion that he harbored no actual bias, the court said:  “We 
do not question his subjective findings of impartiality and propriety.  Nor do we 
determine whether there was actual bias.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 
S.Ct. at p. 2263].)  Rather, the court suggested, the inherent subjectivity involved 
in an individual judge‟s examination of his or her own bias “simply underscore[s] 
the need for objective rules. . . .  In lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal 
inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge‟s determination respecting actual bias, 
the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not 
require proof of actual bias.  [Citations.]  In defining these standards the Court has 
asked whether, „under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness,‟ the interest „poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the 
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 
implemented.‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.) 
Emphasizing that the case before it was “exceptional,” the court concluded 
that “there is a serious risk of actual bias — based on objective and reasonable 
perceptions — when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by 
raising funds or directing the judge‟s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at pp. 2263-
2264].)  In so concluding, the court focused on the relative size of the contribution 
in relation to the total amount spent on the campaign — it was larger than the 
amount spent by all other contributors and 300 percent greater than that spent by 
the campaign committee — and the “temporal relationship between the campaign 
contributions, the justice‟s election, and the pendency of the case . . . .  It was 
reasonably foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that the 
pending case would be before the newly elected justice.”  (Id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at 
14 
pp. 2264-2265].)  The court concluded:  “On these extreme facts the probability of 
actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.”  (Id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2265].) 
In deflecting the assertion by the respondent coal company that its ruling 
would open a floodgate of due-process-based recusal motions, the Caperton court 
again emphasized the exceptional nature of the cases in which it had been 
compelled to conclude that the due process clause had been violated by a judge‟s 
failure to recuse himself.  “In each case the Court dealt with extreme facts that 
created an unconstitutional probability of bias that „ “cannot be defined with 
precision.” ‟  [Citation.]  Yet the Court articulated an objective standard to protect 
the parties‟ basic right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.  The Court was careful to 
distinguish the extreme facts of the cases before it from those interests that would 
not rise to a constitutional level.  [Citations.]”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at pp. 2265-2266].)  As the court also observed, the states have moved 
to adopt judicial conduct codes to eliminate “even the appearance of partiality” 
(id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2266]), and these codes comprise “ „standards more 
rigorous than due process requires.‟ ”  (Id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2267].)  The 
court, reiterating that the due process clause provides the “ „constitutional floor‟ ” 
in matters involving judicial disqualification concluded:  “Because the codes of 
judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes 
over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.  
Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus be 
confined to rare instances.”  (Ibid.) 
The rule of judicial disqualification limned in Caperton may be complex 
but its application is limited.  According to the high court, the protection afforded 
a litigant under the due process clause in the realm of judicial disqualification 
extends beyond the narrow common law concern of a direct, personal, and 
15 
substantial pecuniary interest in a case to “a more general concept of interests that 
tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  Where such interests are present, a showing of actual bias 
is not required.  “The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively 
biased, but whether the average judge in his position is „likely‟ to be neutral, or 
whether there is an unconstitutional „potential for bias.‟ ”  (Id., at p. __ [129 S.Ct. 
at p. 2262].)  Moreover, the court has said that  “ „what degree or kind of interest 
is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting “cannot be defined with precision.” ‟ 
”  (Id., at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2261].)  Nonetheless, the court has also made it 
abundantly clear that the due process clause should not be routinely invoked as a 
ground for judicial disqualification.  Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting 
extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.  (Id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. 
at p. 2267].)  Less extreme cases — including those that involve the mere 
appearance, but not the probability, of bias — should be resolved under more 
expansive disqualification statutes and codes of judicial conduct.  (Ibid.) 
In supplemental briefing regarding the impact of Caperton on this case, 
defendant argues that the facts here may present the kind of extreme case that 
implicates the due process clause.   Defendant cites the Court of Appeal‟s analysis 
in which it concluded that Judge O‟Neill‟s friendship with Judge Elias, and the 
similarity between the stalking charges against defendant and the allegation that 
she had stalked Judge Elias, were “consistent with what one would typically 
associate with actual bias.”  She also maintains that Judge O‟Neill‟s acceptance of 
reassignment of her case after he had once recused himself constitutes 
unprecedented and extreme circumstances that may present a due process 
violation.  At minimum, she requests that her case be remanded to the Court of 
16 
Appeal for a determination of whether the probability of actual bias on Judge 
O‟Neill‟s part was constitutionally intolerable. 
We reject defendant‟s arguments.  This case does not implicate any of the 
concerns — pecuniary interest, enmeshment in contempt proceedings, or the 
amount and timing of campaign contributions — which were the factual bases for 
the United States Supreme Court‟s decisions in which it found that due process 
required judicial disqualification.  While it is true that dicta in these decisions may 
foreshadow other, as yet unknown, circumstances that might amount to a due 
process violation, that dicta is bounded by repeated admonitions that finding such 
a violation in this sphere is extraordinary; the clause operates only as a “fail-safe” 
and only in the context of extreme facts. 
In this case, defendant had a statutory remedy to challenge Judge O‟Neill‟s 
refusal to disqualify himself and failed to pursue it.  Having forfeited that remedy, 
she cannot simply fall back on the narrower due process protection without 
making the heightened showing of a probability, rather than the mere appearance, 
of actual bias to prevail.  We also reject defendant‟s claim that Judge O‟Neill‟s 
acceptance of her case after he had once recused himself presents the kind of 
exceptional facts that demonstrate a due process violation.  At most, Judge 
O‟Neill‟s decision to accept reassignment of defendant‟s case may have violated 
the judicial disqualification statutes that limit the actions that may be taken by a 
disqualified judge.  (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kelso (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 374, 
383; Geldermann v. Bruner, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 665.)  But, without more, 
this does not constitute the kind of showing that would justify a finding that 
defendant‟s due process rights were violated. 
In short, the circumstances of this case, as we view them, simply do not rise 
to a due process violation under the standard set forth by Caperton because, 
17 
objectively considered, they do not pose “ „such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, __ U.S. at p. ___ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2263]) as to 
require disqualification.4 
III.  DISPOSITION 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacate its 
denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and remand the matter to that court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
                                              
4 
Defendant cites two opinions of the Court of Appeal for the proposition that 
due process may be violated by the appearance of bias alone.  Both of those 
decisions, Catchpole v. Brannon (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 237 and Hall v. Harker 
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 836, involve a pattern of conduct by the judicial officer that 
rendered a fair trial impossible.  This is also true of In re Marriage of Iverson 
(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1495 and Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 
452.  Thus, notwithstanding language in those decisions about the appearance of 
bias, the facts amounted to a showing of actual bias based on comments by the 
judges about women (Catchpole, Iverson), lawyers (Hall) and noncitizens 
(Paicius) and should be understood in the context of those facts.  To the extent that 
these opinions, contain language inconsistent with our analysis in this case, that 
language is disapproved.  (Hernandez v. Paicius, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 
Hall v. Harker, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 836, Catchpole v. Brannon, supra, 36 
Cal.App.4th 237, and In re Marriage of Iverson, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 1495.) 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Freeman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 147 Cal.App.4th 517 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S150984 
Date Filed: January 21, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Robert F. O‟Neill 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Carl M. Hancock, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant and for 
Petitioner. 
 
Marilyn Kaye Freeman, in pro. per., for Petitioner. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, Pamela Ratner Sobeck, Steven T. Oetting and Christopher P. Beesley, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carl M. Hancock 
4225 Executive Square, Suite 1500 
La Jolla, CA  92037 
(888) 789-0123 
 
Christopher P. Beesley 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2567