Title: Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc.1991 WY 19806 P.2d 281Case Number: 89-180, 89-181Decided: 02/19/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 

The TOWN OF 
WHEATLAND, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

BELLIS 
FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Delmar H. Landen; Jean Landen; Allen L. 
Cook; Carol 
A. Cook; Thomas R. Burns; Barbara A. Burns; County of Platte, State of Wyoming; 
Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; 

Cheryl 
Wilhelm; and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

BELLIS 
FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Jesse Jenkins; John 
Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; and Cheryl Wilhelm, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

 

v.

 

The TOWN OF 
WHEATLAND, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Platte County, C. Stuart Brown, Chief Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

Frank J. 
Jones, Douglas W. Weaver, Wheatland, for 
Town of Wheatland.

 

Kim D. 
Cannon and Anthony T. Wendtland, Sheridan, for Bellis Farms, Inc., et 
al.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 

Urbigkit, C.J., 
filed dissenting opinion. 

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  In this eminent domain appeal, the 
principal issue is whether the district court correctly applied W.S. 
1-26-504(a)(ii) of the "Wyoming Eminent Domain Act."1

 

[¶2]  The town of 
Wheatland decided to 
extend the runway of its local airport. The project required the town to acquire 
from several landowners acreage that was mostly irrigated and nonirrigated 
farmland. In August 1988, the town ended its attempt to negotiate a purchase 
price and instead initiated condemnation proceedings.2 Following a hearing3 the district court ruled, inter 
alia, that the town failed to establish that the project was planned or located 
in a manner that would be most compatible with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury. The district court also denied the landowners' application 
for attorney fees.

 

[¶3]  The town raises three issues:

 

A. Did the 
district court judge improperly substitute his judgment for that of a 
legislative body by failing to grant the request of plaintiff's 
complaint?

B. Are the 
findings of the trial court judge supported by evidence?

C. Are 
defendants entitled to recover their litigation expenses?

 

[¶4]  The landowners raise two 
issues:

 

1. Was the 
town of Wheatland required 
to prove the requirements set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-504(a) in this case by 
a preponderance of evidence?

2. Is the 
Trial Court's determination that the Wheatland airport extension proposal did 
not meet the mandatory requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-504(a)(ii) (June 1988 
Repl.) supported by substantial evidence?

 

[¶5]  In their cross-appeal, the landowners 
raise an additional issue:

 

1. Was the 
trial court statutorily required to award Bellis Farms, et al. their reasonable 
attorney's fees?

 

[¶6]  We affirm.

 

THE SECTION 
504(a)(ii) REQUIREMENT

 

[¶7]  The town claims that the district court 
misapplied W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) and for support cites Johnson County Board of 
County Commissioners v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1987). We disagree. The Atter 
case turned on the public necessity requirement found in W.S. 1-26-504(a)(i) 
and, therefore, did not reach the additional greatest public good/least private 
injury requirement found in W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii).

 

[¶8]  The role of the district court was 
discussed in Atter. In an eminent domain proceeding, the district court reviews 
the condemnor's actions vis-a-vis the three statutory requirements found in W.S. 
1-26-504(a). To comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii), the town4 needs to present evidence that it 
has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest 
public good and the least private injury.5 The district court then reviews the 
evidence and decides whether the town has met its burden. Once W.S. 
1-26-504(a)(ii) has been complied with and the landowners still wish to contest 
the action, the burden shifts to them to show that the condemnor acted in bad 
faith or abused its discretion as to that particular determination. Atter, 734 P.2d  at 553.

 

[¶9]  In this instance, the district court 
found that the town had presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it 
planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest 
public good and the least private injury.6 The district court, in a letter to 
counsel, addressed what the town needed to do to comply with W.S. 
1-26-504(a):

 

In my 
ruling, I did not intend to hold that the property in question could not be 
condemned. I intended to say that the condemnation procedures instituted by the 
town of Wheatland were 
deficient and inadequate, and that there was a failure of proof. This is not to 
say that the town cannot condemn this land, if they follow the correct 
procedures and make the required proofs.

The above 
letter does not reflect a district court's "substituting its judgment" for that 
of elected officials; rather, it reflects a district court's reviewing the 
evidence and applying a clear legislative directive to the facts.7 The district court, over the course 
of a two-day hearing, heard testimony from twenty-six witnesses and reviewed 
over seventy exhibits before making its decision.

 

[¶10]  The district court reviewed the evidence 
and found that the proposed condemnation would "substantially interfere with the 
existing irrigation system upon which the farm land adjacent to the proposed 
condemnation is dependent and cause other private harm * * *." The district 
court detailed in extensive findings the various types of private injury the 
project would cause if the condemnation went forward as planned: impairment of 
irrigation, impairment of prime agriculture land, and excessive private damage 
due to the location of the new road. The district court concluded that 520 acres 
of irrigated farm land would suffer "substantial private harm" from the 
condemnation. See State Etc. v. Standley Brothers, 215 
Mont. 475, 699 P.2d 60 (Mont. 
1985).

 

[¶11]  When we review a district court's 
decision

 

"we uphold 
the judgment if there is evidence to support it, and in doing so we look only to 
the evidence submitted by the prevailing party and give to it every favorable 
inference which may be drawn therefrom, without considering any contrary 
evidence."

 

Sun Ridge 
Development v. City of Cheyenne, Inc., 787 P.2d 583, 589 
(Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Smithco Engineering, Inc. v. International Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 
1989)).

 

[¶12]  We hold there was sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's ruling that the town failed to locate or plan the 
project "in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least 
private injury."

 

THE SECTION 
504(a)(i) REQUIREMENT

 

[¶13]  The condemnor must also comply with W.S. 
1-26-504(a)(i) and present evidence that the public interest and necessity 
require the project. The district court, in applying this section, appears to 
have balanced the minimal increase in safety, if the project was completed, 
against other factors and found this minimal increase insufficient to satisfy 
the public interest/necessity requirement.

 

[¶14]  The language of W.S. 1-26-504(a)(i) does not 
permit the district court to balance the competing interests. Once the town 
presents evidence that the project will increase safety, it has met its burden 
as to that particular determination. The burden then shifts to those opposing 
the condemnation to present evidence of bad faith or abuse of discretion. See 
Atter, 734 P.2d  at 553.

 

[¶15]  The town has filed a second condemnation 
action involving essentially the same parties and issues. Therefore, if this 
case goes before the district court a second time, it should review the evidence 
and determine whether the town has shown that the project will increase the 
safety of the airport. Once the town has established that the project will 
increase safety and the landowners are not able to demonstrate that the town 
acted improperly, the court should next review whether the evidence demonstrates 
that the town has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible 
with the greatest public good and least private injury.

 

ATTORNEY FEES

 

[¶16]  Finally, we address whether the landowners 
are entitled to attorney fees. In its amended judgment, the district court 
denied the landowners' application for attorney fees, but ruled that they were 
entitled to recover their costs incurred in defending against the condemnation. 
In their cross-appeal, the landowners claim that W.S. 16-7-116 (Oct. 1982 Repl.) 
entitles them to recover their reasonable attorney fees.8 The landowners 
argue that under the statute a final judgment in their favor entitles them to 
recover their litigation expenses.

 

[¶17]  In a Nebraska case involving essentially the same statutory framework, 
landowners attempted to recover their attorney fees under a state statute. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court's order did not prevent a 
later condemnation of the land. Sorensen v. Lower Niobrara Natural Resources 
District, 215 Neb. 681, 340 N.W.2d 164 (1983). The court noted that if the 
condemnor has the right to reinstitute the proceedings, there is no final 
judgment, and denied the landowners their attorney fees. In other words, 
attorney fees are allowable only when the "final judgment prevents the agency 
from acquiring the property by any condemnation proceeding or the agency 
abandons all attempts to acquire the property by condemnation." 
Id., 215 Neb. at 686, 340 N.W.2d  at 167.

 

[¶18]  We agree with the Nebraska court's resolution. Here, the district court has not 
issued a final judgment that the land can never be acquired by condemnation. The 
district court has instead ruled that the land may be condemned if the town 
properly follows the requirements set out in W.S. 1-26-504(a). The town has not 
abandoned the condemnation; instead, it has filed a second action. Thus, we 
affirm the district court's ruling denying the landowners their attorney 
fees.

 

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, dissenting.

 

[¶19]  In initial analysis, my strongest 
disagreement with the decision of the majority arises from this court's basic 
misunderstanding and misapplication of the separation of powers concept. See 
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting and Wyo. Const. art. 
2.

 

[¶20]  Here, instead of relinquishing judicial 
authority to an executive agency, we undermine executive discretionary authority 
by judicially undertaking to determine need and necessity for a town to have an 
adequate airport as a constituent of the municipality and its community life in 
this last decade before the twenty-first century arrives. Unfortunately, we not 
only undermine authority of the local government, but also achieve an 
improvident result in hindering efforts directed toward self-improvement of the 
community. See Morrison, A Non-Power Look at Separation of Powers, 79 Geo.L.J. 
281 (1990). Not without note is the fact that this decision deprecates 
constitutional concepts by restricting the right of eminent domain for general 
benefit of a community.1 

 

[¶21]  This court skirted by the critical basic 
issue of eminent domain in Board of County Com'rs of Johnson County v. Atter, 
734 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1987), but is now directly called to face the constitutional 
question: Are the determinate factors of eminent domain to establish the need 
and necessity of the community a decisional factor of the executive branch of 
government to be reversible by the judiciary only for abuse of discretion when 
arbitrary or capricious or do we do what is asserted by the majority here, 
analyze the evidence to evaluate factually in Cheyenne, Wyoming whether 
Wheatland, Wyoming deserves an adequate airfield which becomes judicial 
legislating as a process of government?

 

[¶22]  I would start with the Wyoming Constitution. 
In the 1890 session when the Constitution was written, eminent domain became a 
recurrent topic.2 Since that time, airport construction developed 
to be a topic of public concern sufficient to result in the passage of a 
constitutional amendment in 1947:

 

The provisions of section 6 of article XVI of this 
constitution prohibiting the state from engaging in any work of internal 
improvement unless authorized by a two-thirds vote of the people, shall not 
apply to or affect the construction, maintenance or improvement of public 
airports, aircraft landing strips and related facilities but the legislature 
shall have power to provide for the construction, maintenance and improvement of 
public airports, aircraft landing strips and related facilities, in whole or in 
part by the state, either directly or by extending aid to its political 
subdivisions and, notwithstanding said inhibition as to works of internal 
improvement, whenever grants of land or other property shall have been made to 
the state, especially dedicated by the grant to particular works of internal 
improvement, the state may carry on such particular works and shall devote 
thereto the avails of such grants, and may pledge or appropriate the revenues 
derived from such works in the aid of their completion and 
maintenance.

 

Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 11.

 

[¶23]  In clear compliance with that constitutional 
policy and message, we are here presented an effort by a town to extend its 
4,200 foot runway at its municipal airport by 2,000 feet to meet minimum federal 
safety standards. The real action in this case is the desire of contestants to 
have the airport relocated and rebuilt on someone else's property. There is no 
realistic conflict in trial evidence denying lack of safety in the facility as 
presently usable. Likewise, there is no real conflict that moving the airport 
would involve similar problems of imposition on irrigated land, a question of 
further travel, and a probable double cost with final completion, which would 
involve both reconstruction and moving existent hangar facilities, both public 
and private.

 

[¶24]  If we look at the record, the issues are 
improvement/extension to obtain a "safe" facility, move at a much higher cost to 
another location or lose available state and federal funding and retain an 
unsafe landing strip until people, which will inevitably occur, are killed in 
airplane crashes at the airport.

 

[¶25]  The technical detail of safety is 
unchallenged by expert testimony in this record.3 Since we seem 
to be dealing in a discussion of the evidence and the facts about the Wheatland 
airport's 4,200 foot runway, some consideration of what are realistically 
undisputed technical details is informative.4 The record 
reflects that for at least a decade, effort to improve the airport had been 
underway and within the documented material is a consulting engineer study dated 
June 28, 1976, which considered five questions: (1) taking of agricultural 
lands; (2) access to the north and south due to closing the road east of the 
airport; (3) safety; (4) commercial air service; and (5) cross wind runway. The 
study then concluded first with regard to safety and then in general:

 

3. Safety. Development and expansion would enhance safety 
of air operations. Lengthening the runway would allow take-offs and landings to 
occur farther to the east and would allow operations over populated areas to 
occur at a higher level. Proposed development would allow for all aspects of 
aviation to occur within acceptable safe limits.

* * * * * *

The above were the major questions which were brought out 
in the Public Hearing and subsequent written input. We feel, as was stated 
previously, that the present site has the capability for expansion to provide a 
good, safe facility for the needs of the community. There does not appear to be 
sufficient negative environmental impact to justify an alternate 
site.

 

[¶26]  Regarding existing sufficiency, a staff civil 
engineer of the Federal Aviation Administration wrote to the town under date of 
May 4, 1987, stating:

 

We understand a question has been raised on the need for 
expansion and improvements to the Phifer Field Airport at Wheatland. The current facilities include a 75' X 4200' 
runway which would satisfy the interim dimensions in the initial stage of 
developing an airport. The elevation of the airport dictates a runway 75' X 
5,500' [overwritten as 4,500'] as a minimum for the Wheatland area.

The clear zone to the west end of the runway does not 
satisfy FAA criteria and has caused the displacement of the runway by 305 feet. 
Facilities on the Fair Grounds are obstructions to the approach to runway end 8. 
The county road east of the airport is an obstruction to the app[ro]ach to 
Runway 26, which in turn is displaced by 300'. This has reduced the effective 
runway length to less than 4,000' which is a real concern to the FAA and the 
using aircraft owners.

The FAA, therefore, feels that it is imperative that the 
airport be expanded and improved to adequately satisfy the current demand.

As an added incentive to expedite actions in this matter, 
the FAA must have a grant agreement on this project by August 15, 1987, or the Federal funds will be made available to other 
Wyoming locations.

 

[¶27]  The subject was further reviewed in a letter 
of June 5, 1987, addressed to one of the affected landowners, which stated 
in pertinent part:

 

Under FAA criteria, the present runway is inadequate in 
length and results in safety problems to aircraft which operate there. For this 
reason, we placed a high priority for funding a project to extend the runway. 
The project is also included in the State of Wyoming's Airport System Plan and is high on their priority 
list.

 

[¶28]  The Wyoming Aeronautics Commission addressed 
the same landowner on December 9, 1987, stating in part:

 

I wish to inform you that the Aeronautics Commissioners 
have been aware of the desire by the town of Wheatland to improve its airport since the start of any process in 
this direction. We did assist the town of Wheatland in matching federal (FAA) funds granted for completion of 
a master plan for the airport which designated a number of alternatives for 
improvement of the Wheatland Airport. It is our desire, along with the town and the federal 
aviation administration, to improve the capabilities of Phifer Field. Some of 
the major reasons for this are:

1. The existing runway's useful length of 3900 feet is 
basically inadequate for accelerate-stop distances figured for most light 
twin-engine aircraft. Many of these types of aircraft currently utilize the 
airport including those operated by the Commission and the Wyoming Highway 
Department. Therefore, I believe, that "3200 feet" is sufficient for the largest 
aircraft using the airport is not correct.

2. In regard to the economic benefit of an airport such as 
Wheatland's (as shown in the Wyoming State Airport System Plan Update, Vol. IV, 
Estimating the Economic Benefits of Airports: A Users Guide), there is 
substantial evidence to indicate that a municipality can, and usually does, 
derive economic benefit from aircraft using their airport. This consists of 
direct (such as fuel sales) and indirect (motel, restaurant, store sales to 
pilots/passengers) benefits.

 

[¶29]  Another consulting engineering firm, on 
January 21, 1988, related to meeting FAA runway standards:

 

As discussed above, FAA minimum standards 
require a 5900 foot runway length to accommodate the class of aircraft 
presently using the airport on a frequent basis. FAA told the Town that the 
agency would support local efforts to lengthen the runway to either a Basic 
Utility Stage I (5000 feet) or Stage II (5900 feet). Town officials recognized 
that constructing the less expensive 5000 foot length would leave their facility 
below FAA minimum standards. They felt it in the best interest of the community 
to construct a facility that adequately accommodated both FAA minimum standards 
and the aircraft using the airport.

 

(Emphasis in original.)

 

[¶30]  Another document, dated January 22, 1988, 
from the Federal Aviation Administration to the Wyoming Aeronautics Commission 
obviously responding to a landowner letter to Congressman Cheney (now United 
States Secretary of Defense), stated in part:

 

We would add some comments in reference to statements 
relative to FAA involvement in the proposed project. The FAA is very interested 
in the improvements of airports in Wyoming and the other 50 states. That interest can result in 
Federal dollars in airport improvements only when a location such as Wheatland 
can qualify within the FAA priority system to justify those Federal dollars.

There are many similar airports in Wyoming competing for the limited Federal funds available for 
Wyoming airport improvements. The Wheatland Airport has shown a justifiable need and is high enough in the 
priority system to be considered for Federal funding.

The closing of the county road will require some extra 
travel in the farming operation; however, the project will include work on the 
irrigation ditch where it crosses the extended runway to assure continued water 
delivery on either side of the runway. There should be little effect on the 
availability of water to the 520 acres located below the extended 
runway.

 

[¶31]  The subject was considered by another exhibit 
in this record from the Town of Wheatland addressed to the Wyoming Aeronautics Commission of 
January 19, 1988:

 

Missouri Basin's interest in expanding Phifer Field was and continues to 
be a safety issue with their own pilots. They have expressed concern solely due 
to safety problems with their current plane "King Air".

The statement in "their interest due to their desire to 
purchase a corporate jet" is not true. Also, they are not by any means the 
single user at Phifer Field. Our Platte County Memorial Hospital has several out-of-town physicians who make regular trips 
in and out of Wheatland to see patients and perform operations.

Flight For Life services from Casper has also been a user at our Phifer Field. The Town of 
Wheatland began this project mainly from a safety viewpoint given 
our traffic flow at the airport. I sincerely hope we can continue with this 
greatly needed project.

 

[¶32]   This record also tells that in pursuit 
of the effort to improve the airport, a grant agreement was executed with the 
Federal Aviation Administration, dated August 25, 1987, and an agreement with the Wyoming Aeronautics Commission 
for application and use of grant funds dated August 23, 1988.

 

[¶33]  In simplest terms, the present Wheatland 
airport runway does not meet minimum federal safety standards for its class. 
(Testimony of the Wheatland city clerk and testimony of the FAA's civil engineer 
indicated that the length at present was 4,200 feet and the required standard is 
at least 5,000 feet.) All of this provides a status of the factually unsafe 
airport and community conflict basically from affected landowners about who 
should pay the price for general benefit of land for public use. The issue moves 
to become executive agency discretional authority, fact finding preeminence, or 
primacy of judicial review in considering a test for assessment of a public 
instrumentality's right to acquire a project for public usage.

 

[¶34]  Both the district court and now this tribunal 
convert a discretional decision into a judicially weighing test for factual 
analysis of the decision of an administrative agency. Since, philosophically, I 
lean in favor of public safety against private rights to property, the decision 
in both tribunals is just wrong. Far more pervasive in this case is the 
utilization of the wrong standard for determination and the wrong test for 
review which results in interjecting the judiciary into an administrative 
proceeding activity involving resolution of a discretional decision. This 
judicial adventure violates the Wyoming Constitution separation of powers by 
injecting the judiciary into supervision of executive decisions for conduct of 
government.

 

[¶35]  The present state of this litigation has 
nothing to do with an adequate award of damages to the private citizen as 
required by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 32. Most of the complaints recited in 
resistance to the airport extension for safety clearance addressed anticipated 
damages from land use loss. Those subjects would remain for the second stage of 
the eminent domain proceeding and in no perspective are now presented. W.S. 
1-26-701 through 1-26-713. If there are significant damages, significant 
recovery should properly be awarded. Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 739 
(1983). See also Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 1982); Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 32 and 33; and Comment, The 
Use of Opinion Testimony in Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit, 19 
Land & Water L.Rev. 43 (1984). The constitutional right to obtain property 
for public safety - as in this case for a safe airport - is not a conflicting 
principle with entitlement under the Wyoming Constitution to obtain fair 
compensation when private property is taken for public use.

 

[¶36]  Specifically, I perceive that W.S. 1-26-504 
addresses a discretional responsibility of the acquiring governmental entity and 
the test then for the judiciary is to apply the administrative abuse of 
discretion standard. It is patently disingenuous to say that the airport 
extension was not "needed" when significant safety factors existed.5 Cf. United States v. 82.46 Acres of Land, More 
or Less, Situate in Carbon County, Wyoming, 691 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1982) and 
Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1965).

 

[¶37]  It is equally invalid to consider that safety 
is not a proper concern of the town or that the availability of a convenient 
airport to a town the size and character of Wheatland is not a significant 
public purpose. Also, farsighted and businesslike approaches for public benefit 
cannot realistically be critiqued as abused discretion. Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Or. 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958). The safety concern 
which extends to need was unquestionably established and the choice of location, 
either of which was possible if sufficient money was to be realistically 
available, becomes a governmental political decision. I cannot and will not 
weigh safety against appropriate self-interest of individual landowners or, from 
Cheyenne, determine whose land should be used - whether about sixty 
acres of which thirty or forty acres are irrigated land for an extension or an 
entire 360 acres required for a new facility. Huntington Park Redevelopment 
Agency v. Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, cert. denied 464 U.S. 895, 104 S. Ct. 243, 78 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1983). This is not a gross abuse of 
discretion case. Redevelopment Agency v. Norm's Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 
219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).

 

[¶38]  Additionally, this is not a necessity case 
since alternative sites create the real issue. Safety criteria demonstrating 
necessity of improvement was not seriously in factual question. 
Cf. City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 228 Mont. 404, 743 P.2d 590 (1987), the taking of a private water 
company. The deeply entrenched governmental standard which has since been 
generally and consistently applied is well-stated in one of the earlier 
texts:

 

Some courts have held that, in order to uphold an exercise 
of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for its exercise, in 
order to accomplish the purpose sought, and that this question of necessity is 
in some way an element in determining whether the taking is for public use. Thus 
it is argued that a hotel or theater is not a public use within the meaning of 
the constitution, because the public can be accommodated in those respects 
without resorting to the power of eminent domain. Nearly all the cases, however, 
hold that the question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, 
and that the former question is exclusively for the legislature. The necessity, 
expediency or propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain, and the 
extent and manner of its exercise, are questions of general public policy and 
belong to the legislative department of the government. They have nothing to do 
with the question of what constitutes a public use.

 

1 J. Lewis, Eminent Domain § 255 at 502-503 (3d ed. 1909) 
(footnotes omitted).

 

[¶39]  My concern in this case is not limited to 
anxiety about the well being and future health of the Wheatland community; it is 
expanded in consideration of separation of power.6 Certain 
political decisions should be executive and I cannot constitutionally accept 
legislative relegation to judicial resolution. Wyo. Const. art. 2 should not be so casually disregarded. "The 
right of eminent domain is an inherent, sovereign power," and in exercise, is 
found in this case as "legislative in character." State ex rel. 
State Highway Com'n v. Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 218, 294 P.2d 603, 606 (1956) and 2 J. Lewis, Eminent 
Domain § 597 at 1056 (3d ed. 1909).

 

[¶40]  Specifically addressing this case, the 
determination of need should be executive by legislative delegation. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603. Reversal in the judicial process should then only occur with 
application of the administrative review standards when the local government in 
this case - the city council - acts in a fashion which is arbitrary and 
capricious. W.S. 16-3-114(c) controls decision by this court and provides the 
rule of review for this court.7

 

[¶41]  Since a "safe" airport is an unchallenged 
governmental obligation, the only remaining question for assessment is whether 
the action of the city council is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of 
discretion under the statutory review criteria. To seek a safer airport cannot, 
within the criteria of logic and the English language, be an abuse of 
discretion. Analysis should be confined to an ascertainment of whether the 
action was arbitrary and capricious. Lacking proof that the Town of 
Wheatland has no right to a safe airport, the inquiry is left 
whether another location is justifiable. That can only be an administrative 
decision. Knight v. Environmental Quality Council, 805 P.2d 268 
(Wyo. 1991) In making that decision, abuse of discretion is a 
question of law. Emerald People's Utility Dist. v. Pacificorp, 100 Or. App. 79, 
784 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990); Port of Umatilla, 321 P.2d  at 351. See also Application of Northern 
Utilities Co., 70 Wyo. 225, 255, 247 P.2d 767 (1952).

 

[¶42]  The recognized authority on eminent domain, 
1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.11[2] at 4-215 (rev. 3d ed. 1990) (quoting 
Boswell v. Prince George's County, 273 Md. 522, 523-24, 330 A.2d 663 (1975) and Basin Elec. Power 
Co-op. v. Payne, 298 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1980)), addresses the oft found litigated 
subject and its resolution:

 

"`Landowners when faced with a proposed acquisition of 
their land for public improvements, whether by way of easement or in fee simple, 
have often suggested to the courts that they saw a better way to do the 
improvement than that proposed by the condemning authority. * * *'"

* * * * * * 

"The issue before the trial court on such proceeding is the 
question of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion by the condemnor, the 
presence of any one of which could vitiate the taking."

 

That authoritative resource then considers the logical 
placement of discretion within this consideration of judicial review of 
administrative decisions relative to eminent domain exercise:

 

"`A broad discretion is necessarily vested in those to whom 
the power of eminent domain is delegated, in determining what property is 
necessary for the public purpose, with respect to the particular route, line, or 
location of the proposed work or improvement, and the general rule is that the 
courts will not disturb their action in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or 
gross abuse of discretion.'"

 

1A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra, at 4-215 (quoting 26 
Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 113 (1966)).

 

[¶43]  In monumental mistake, the first error of 
this majority is in converting the agency review into a plenary trial analysis. 
We should confine Atter, 734 P.2d 549 very strictly to its analysis of the 
decisional process encompassing agency review standards. On that basis, I was 
able to concur in Atter and now properly apply its confined approach to realize 
a constitutional application within Wyo. Const. art. 2 for the present eminent 
domain statute. Consequently, we are not presented a sufficiency of the evidence 
initial concept, but arbitrary and capricious examination for the administrative 
agency under agency review standards. Cf. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Cheyenne, Laramie County, Wyoming, 141 F. Supp. 300 (D.Wyo. 1956).

 

[¶44]  Close examination of W.S. 1-26-504 reveals 
two pathways to decision within the first phase, right to exercise the process 
provided. First, if the decision was initiated by a "state agency" after a 
hearing which determined public interest and necessity, the decision is pro 
forma valid. For other agencies of Wyoming government, submission of evidence is 
required at the court hearing of that agency's decision based upon the stated 
criteria: (a) public interest; (b) compatible use, greatest public good and 
least private injury; and (c) necessity. What we are then called to decide by 
this case is whether the decisional process is vested in the governmental agency 
controlled or supervised by judicial rules of review or whether the court 
becomes the political agency of initial decision. 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
supra, at 4-237. Cf. Knight, 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991). The majority of this court undertakes to make the 
political/governmental decisions as a nisi prius tribunal, while I consider the 
judicial responsibility to be vested by administrative agency review. 
Unfortunately, this majority is wrong in standard of review analysis for the 
district court and also wrong factually when it attempts to render its 
administrative decision as an executive function relating to a political 
decision of government involving the welfare of a community.

 

[¶45]  We sacrifice the community interest in bland 
or blind misconstruction of the eminent domain constitutional function which is 
first, acquisition of private property for public good, and second, adequate 
compensation to the owner of that private property.

 

Footnotes

 

 1 The act, now W.S. 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 (June 
1988 Repl.), was adopted in 1981. For a brief overview see E. Rudolph, Wyoming 
Local Government Law, § 6.2 (1985): "Eminent domain proceedings are now largely 
governed by the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, enacted in 1981, and Rule 71.1 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1965." See also Comment, 
Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 739 (1983).

Section 1-26-504. 
Requirements to exercise eminent domain.

(a) * * * the power of 
eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed use only if 
all of the following are established:

(i) The public interest 
and necessity require the project * * *;

(ii) The project is 
planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest 
public good and the least private injury; and

(iii) The property sought 
to be acquired is necessary for the project.

Whether the condemnor has satisfied each element of W.S. 
1-26-504(a) is a justiciable issue in Wyoming. See Johnson County Board of County Commissioners v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1987).

 

2 The condemnation would 
result in the town's gaining fee ownership of thirty-eight acres and a clear 
zone aviation easement of six acres.

 

3 W.R.C.P. 71.1(e) defines 
the hearing's parameters.

 

4 A town does not fall 
within the definition of a "state agency" as defined in W.S. 1-26-504(b) and, 
therefore, its condemnation action is subject to a more stringent review. See 
W.S. 16-3-101(b)(i) and (x) (Oct. 1982 Repl.); and Atter, 734 P.2d  at 
553.

 

5 In Atter this court stated, "the district court must look 
beyond the language of the resolution and examine the facts underlying the * * * 
determination * * *." Id., 734 P.2d  at 553 n. 6. The landowners attempt to use this 
statement to argue that the condemnor must prove the factual elements set out in 
W.S. 1-26-504(a) by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree; evidence that 
the town has complied with the statutory requirement is 
sufficient.

 

6 We emphasize the word 
"most" because the legislature's use of it requires that the town devote time to 
the planning/locating of a project before it exercises its power of eminent 
domain.

 

7 Contrary to the town's 
claim, judicial review of a condemnation action

does not involve a 
judicial displacement of a legislative body's judgment; it involves the judicial 
application of a state statute that requires the courts to determine whether a 
condemnor has abused its discretion through a taking that is not compatible with 
the greatest public good and least private injury.

Emerald PUD v. 
Pacificorp, 100 Or. App. 79, 784 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990).

 

8 W.S. 16-7-116 is part of 
the "Wyoming Relocation Assistance Act of 1973" found at §§ 16-7-101 through 
16-7-121. This portion of the act involves condemnations funded with federal 
financing and is patterned after 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (1982). Here, the FAA is 
funding a large portion of the costs associated with the extension of the 
Wheatland airport. The statute provides that

[i]f a condemnation 
proceeding is instituted by an agency to acquire real property for a purpose as 
set forth in W.S. 16-7-115, and the final judgment is that the real property 
cannot be acquired by condemnation or that the proceeding is abandoned, the 
owner of any right, title or interest in the real property shall be paid a sum 
which will, in the opinion of the court, reimburse the owner for his reasonable 
attorney, appraisal and engineering fees actually incurred because of the 
condemnation proceedings. The award of the sums will be paid by the agency which 
sought to condemn the property.

 

Footnotes for the Dissent

 

 1 There is much about the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act 
of 1981, now W.S. 1-26-501 through 1-26-817, that I did then and do now question 
on both a constitutional and practical basis, including incursion by the 
legislature into judicial authority to adopt rules of procedure for the court 
and incursion by the judiciary into the executive responsibility of 
determination of need and welfare, but the law can be properly applied to serve 
its constitutional purpose to promote the welfare of citizens of the state. 
Conversely, it can be misapplied to hinder and deter the state's growth and 
development. See Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 739 
(1983) and S.F. No. 037, 46th Leg., Digest of Senate Journal 59 (1981). Even a 
libertarian, a judicial liberal or just a plain humanist can recognize that 
community needs require individual sacrifice whether the burden is equalized or 
adequate compensation is provided for unequal contribution. Effective processes 
for eminent domain are essential for the maintenance of fairness in 
representative government and eminent domain is indispensable in order for 
organized society to acquire the requirements to operate and even more so in the 
high speed industrial world.

 

2 Eminent domain is 
addressed in five sections of the Wyoming Constitution: art. 1, § 3 - 
declaration of rights; art. 1, § 32 - compensation for property taken; art. 10, 
§§ 9 and 14 - corporations; and art. 13, § 5 - acquisition of water rights of 
municipalities. See also Annals of the Wyoming Constitution.

 

3 Witnesses called by appellee to contend for moving the 
airport and object to present location extension included generally involved 
landowners and two county commissioners who essentially professed that moving 
was preferable. It is completely accurate to characterize the extension 
controversy and objection by characterization of the protestants: "We are not 
concerned about safety but if you are, build on the land of someone else where 
it is not on my property or crosses our road or ditch." This was in reality a 
choice of sites controversy. Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. 
Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, cert. denied 464 U.S. 895, 104 S. Ct. 243, 78 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1983). Cf. Redevelopment Agency v. 
Norm's Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).

 

4 Wheatland's Phifer Field Airport is named for a progressive resident in earlier time who, 
with two other community spirited citizens, donated the land for the present 
airport as pioneers for promoting community benefit. It is an anomaly of note 
that progressive safety for that Phifer airfield is now seriously questioned 
within the community. It is more absurd to suggest that the use of the Guernsey, 
Wyoming airfield some twenty-eight miles away, the Cheyenne airport some seventy 
miles away, or the Denver, Colorado airport 100 miles further is sufficient to 
sustain the progressive intent and effort of the Platte County and Wheatland 
community. It is only the first step in discerning that communities of this 
character have no justified economic vitality for the next century. I reject 
both that thesis and the supposition that a safe airport is unnecessary for the 
county seat of Platte County.

 

5 If we apply either the 
rule of probabilities or the infinite nature of successive numbers included 
within the scientific concept of chaos, we learn that what can happen will 
happen. An unsafe airfield, if continued in use, will inevitably claim lives in 
some future time. The only fact which is now indeterminate is whether the use is 
totally discontinued and, if not, who is killed and when. The first occurrence 
could be some casual reader of this opinion who happens to fly into Wheatland on 
that inevitably scheduled future day.

 

6 See, for example, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1988) and Smith, 
Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of American Government, 25 Wake 
Forest L.Rev. 783, 788 (1990).

I would join with what 
Justice Scalia said in dissent in Morrison, 108 S. Ct.  at 2623 as addressing 
separation of powers and allocation of powers:

Frequently an issue of 
this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the 
potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the 
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a 
careful and perceptive analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.

I am not so sure that the 
issue comes here so much as a wolf, but now further nourished by this opinion, 
grows to achieve fully developed status for destructive capability. See 
Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation of Powers 
Wonderland, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 587 (1990). Cf. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986); and finally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, judgment aff'd 873 F.2d 1446 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied 490 U.S. 1073, 109 S. Ct. 2083, 104 L. Ed. 2d 646 
(1989).

 

7 W.S. 16-3-114(c) 
states:

To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.