Title: State v. Edward Ramos

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-3036-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Edward Ramos, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  206 Wis. 2d 673, 558 N.W.2d 704 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 1, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 1, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
   Geske, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
Crooks, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
   Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there was 
oral argument by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Eduardo M. Borda, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward Ramos,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The issue in this case is 
whether the trial court's failure to remove a juror for cause 
constitutes reversible error when a defendant is forced to 
correct the trial court's error by using one of his or her 
statutorily provided peremptory challenges.  We hold that the 
use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court error is 
adequate grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives 
the defendant of a statutorily granted right.   
¶2 
The facts leading up to this case are tragic.  On the 
evening of November 15, 1993, the defendant, Edward Ramos, 
suffocated Brandon Webster, his girlfriend's two-year-old child. 
 Ramos was subsequently arrested and was charged with first-
degree 
intentional 
homicide 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1).  Ramos never denied killing the child, but he 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
2 
argued that he acted recklessly, not intentionally.  As such, 
Ramos opted for a jury trial to determine whether he acted 
intentionally.  The trial was held before the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Judge Patricia D. McMahon.    
¶3 
Due to the nature of the crime with which Ramos was 
charged, potential jurors underwent extensive voir dire.  The 
panel faced questions from the trial court, the prosecutor, and 
defense counsel in an attempt to impanel an unbiased, impartial 
jury.  During defense counsel's questioning of one prospective 
juror, the juror indicated that it was possible that she could 
not be a fair or impartial juror.  When pressed, the juror 
stated: "Just knowing that the child was suffocated, I guess I 
couldn't be fair."  The defense attorney asked her: "So you 
could not be fair to this man?"  The juror replied with an 
unequivocal "No."   
¶4 
During a conference in the judge's chambers, Ramos' 
counsel moved to strike the juror for cause, arguing that the 
juror stated that she could not be fair and impartial.  After 
both the prosecutor and the judge said that they did not recall 
the juror saying that she could not be fair, defense counsel 
asked that the reporter read back the juror's responses to clear 
up any confusion.  The court declined to have the answers read 
back.  Twice more, Ramos' counsel asked the court to ask the 
reporter to read back the juror's answers because the defense 
attorney was "still of the mind that she [the prospective juror] 
said she could not be fair, impartial in this case."  Both 
times, the requests of Ramos' counsel were not met, and the 
court did not strike the juror for cause. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
3 
¶5 
Ramos subsequently removed the juror through the use 
of 
his 
first 
statutorily 
granted 
peremptory 
challenge.  
Consequently, the juror did not participate in the final 
adjudication of Ramos' guilt or innocence.  On April 7, 1994, a 
jury found Ramos guilty of first-degree intentional homicide.   
¶6 
Ramos appealed to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals decided that a trial court's erroneous refusal to remove 
a potential juror for cause, which effectively forced the 
defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror, 
violated the defendant's right to due process as defined by 
state law.  The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial 
court for a new trial.  State v. Ramos, No. 94-3036-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1996).  The State 
appealed to this court, and we now affirm the decision by the 
court of appeals.  
¶7 
"The question of whether a prospective juror is biased 
and should be dismissed from the jury panel for cause is a 
matter of the circuit court's discretion."  State v. Gesch, 167 
Wis. 2d 660, 666, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992), citing State v. Louis, 
156 Wis. 2d 470, 478, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1122 (1991)(citations omitted).  This court will find an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
if 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary decision is based on an error of law.  See id., 
citing In re Marriage of Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 574, 599, 
456 N.W.2d 312 (1990).   
¶8 
In Wisconsin, a juror who "has expressed or formed any 
opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case" 
should be removed from the panel.  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
4 
Additionally, "[i]f a juror is not indifferent in the case, the 
juror shall be excused." Id.  
¶9 
In the case at bar, the challenged prospective juror 
should have been removed for cause.  She clearly expressed that 
she could not be a fair and impartial juror in the case.  The 
Wisconsin Statutes provide that "[a]ny party objecting for cause 
to a juror may introduce evidence in support of the objection." 
 Id.  Ramos' attorney attempted three times to introduce such 
evidence by having the reporter read back the challenged jurors' 
answers.  Unfortunately, the trial court prohibited him from 
doing so.  We conclude that the trial court should have allowed 
the reporter to read back the responses and should have 
dismissed the challenged juror for cause.  Therefore, we find 
that the failure to dismiss the challenged juror for cause was 
an erroneous exercise of discretion by the trial court.  
¶10 Under the statutes, Ramos was entitled to seven 
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors from the panel. 
 Wis. Stat. §§ 972.03
1 and 972.04(1).
2 The statutes provide that 
a defendant "is entitled to" and "shall be allowed" the stated 
number of peremptory challenges.  The word "shall" is presumed 
to be mandatory when it appears in a statute.  Wagner v. State 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 972.03 provides in relevant part: 
When 
the 
crime 
charged 
is 
punishable 
by 
life 
imprisonment the state is entitled to 6 peremptory 
challenges 
and 
the 
defendant 
is 
entitled 
to 
6 
peremptory challenges. . . . Each side shall be 
allowed 
one 
additional 
peremptory 
challenge 
if 
additional jurors are to be impaneled under s. 
972.04(1).   
2 Wis. Stat. § 972.04(1) provides, in part, that "[t]he 
number 
of 
jurors 
impaneled 
shall 
be 
prescribed 
in 
s. 
756.096(3)(a) or (am), whichever is applicable unless . . . the 
court orders that additional jurors be impaneled." 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
5 
Medical Examining Bd., 181 Wis. 2d 633, 643, 511 N.W.2d 874 
(1994).  Therefore, we find that Ramos had a right to the 
maximum amount of peremptory challenges prescribed by the 
statute.   
¶11 Ramos contends that the failure to dismiss the juror 
for cause forced him to spend one of his peremptory challenges 
to correct the trial court error, thereby depriving him of his 
statutorily guaranteed right to a full complement of peremptory 
challenges.  The State, relying largely on the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), 
contends that despite the trial court error, Ramos is not 
entitled to a new trial because the jury that ultimately decided 
Ramos' case was impartial.         
¶12 In Ross, the United States Supreme Court considered 
the issue of when a trial court's erroneous refusal to strike a 
juror for cause constitutes reversible error. Ross, a capital 
case, involved a prospective juror who had stated that he would 
vote to impose the death penalty automatically if the jury found 
the defendant guilty.  Based on this statement, the defendant 
moved to have the juror struck for cause.  The trial court 
refused this request.  However, the defendant struck the juror 
using one of his peremptory challenges.  On appeal, the 
defendant asserted that the trial court's error in failing to 
remove the juror for cause violated "both his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process."  Id. at 85.   
¶13 In the first part of the opinion, the United States 
Supreme Court held that requiring a defendant to use a 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
6 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been 
removed for cause did not violate the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury.  Id. at 88.  The Court 
also stated that peremptory strikes were not of a constitutional 
dimension and that they are merely a means to achieving an 
impartial jury.  Id. As long as the jury was impartial, the fact 
that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve 
the result did not mean that the Sixth Amendment was violated.  
Id.   
¶14 In 
the 
second 
part 
of 
the 
opinion, 
the 
Court 
considered the defendant's claim that the trial court's failure 
to remove the juror for cause violated his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process by arbitrarily depriving him of the full 
complement of peremptory strikes allowed under Oklahoma law.  In 
discussing this issue, the Court noted "that the right to 
exercise peremptory challenges is 'one of the most important of 
the rights secured to the accused.'"  Id. at 89, quoting Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).  The Court also stated 
that "[t]he denial or impairment of the right is reversible 
error without a showing of prejudice."  Id. at 89.   
¶15 In analyzing whether the defendant's right to exercise 
peremptory challenges was denied or impaired, the Court ruled 
that these challenges were creatures of state law and that it 
was "for the State to determine the number of peremptory 
challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of 
their exercise."  Id. Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that "the 
'right' to peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' only if 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
7 
the defendant does not receive that which state law provides."  
Id.   
¶16 Oklahoma law requires that a defendant who disagrees 
with the trial court's ruling on a for-cause challenge must use 
his or her peremptory challenges to remedy trial court errors in 
order to preserve the claim that the ruling deprived him or her 
of a fair trial.  See id.  The Court in Ross found that the 
defendant received all that Oklahoma law allowed when he was 
forced to use a peremptory challenge to remedy the trial court's 
erroneous failure to remove the juror for cause.  Therefore, the 
defendant in Ross was not denied his due process right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   
 ¶17 Wisconsin Statutes do not suggest that a defendant 
should be required to use a peremptory challenge against a juror 
who should have been removed for cause; neither does Wisconsin 
case law.  In fact, this court found exactly the opposite in 
State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).  In 
Gesch, we held that prospective jurors who are related to a 
state witness by blood or marriage in the third degree must be 
struck from the jury panel on the basis of implied bias.  This 
court rejected the State's argument in Gesch that the failure to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to the questionable juror 
resulted in a waiver of the defendant's right to raise the issue 
of whether the juror should have been struck for cause.  Id. at 
671.  The court declined to require that a defendant use a 
peremptory challenge to correct the errors of the trial court, 
noting that "[t]he peremptory challenge is one of the most 
important of the rights secured to the accused."  Id.   
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
8 
¶18 While the analysis provided by the Court in Ross is 
applicable in the case at bar, the ultimate result in Ross does 
not dictate the ultimate result in this case because, as 
demonstrated, Oklahoma law and Wisconsin law differ regarding 
the use of peremptory challenges.  Oklahoma law requires a party 
to use peremptory challenges to correct trial court errors;  
Wisconsin law does not.   
¶19 As demonstrated by the decision in Ross, there is a 
clear distinction between the right to a fair and impartial jury 
as 
found 
in 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and the right to due process of law as defined by 
state law or by statute.  See Ross, 487 U.S. at 89.  Unlike the 
defendant in Ross, Ramos makes no claims that his constitutional 
right to a fair and impartial jury has been violated.
3  In fact, 
the right to peremptory challenges has no basis in the 
Constitution.  See id. at 88.  Several cases, both federal and 
state, 
rely 
on 
this 
distinction 
in 
analyzing 
whether 
a 
defendant's rights have been violated. 
¶20 The Seventh Circuit Court opinion in United States v. 
Beasley, 48 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1995) is instructive on the 
issue.  Beasley involved a Sixth Amendment challenge by a 
defendant who claimed that a trial court's failure to strike for 
cause a juror whose brother was a police chief and whose son was 
a police officer violated the defendant's right to an impartial 
                     
3 Because the juror who was challenged for cause was 
eventually struck from the panel, Ramos concedes that the 
impaneled jury was impartial.  Therefore, he further concedes, 
Article 1, section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution have not been 
violated.   
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
9 
jury. 
 
Although 
the 
court 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional argument, it made the following observation: 
 
Beasley [the 
defendant] 
could have made 
another 
argument.  Although peremptory challenges are not of a 
constitutional dimension, see Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 
108 S.Ct. at 2278, it could be argued that the 
designation 
of 
ten 
peremptory 
challenges 
under 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 24 is a matter of federal law.  A 
district court error, hence, in refusing to strike a 
juror for cause would deprive the defendant of a 
federally granted peremptory challenge. . . . However, 
Beasley does not make this argument. 
Id. at 268, note 5.
4  While the defendant in Beasley did not make 
a statutory claim, the argument described by the court therein 
is precisely that made by Ramos in the instant case.  We embrace 
this argument.    
 
¶21 Several other states have adopted this approach and 
held that reversal is required when a trial court erroneously 
refuses to dismiss a juror for cause, even if the challenged 
juror does not participate in the final decision.  See, e.g., 
People v. Prator, 856 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1993); Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1177 (1994); State v. Cross, 658 So.2d 683 (La. 1995); State v. 
Phillips, 461 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va. 1995); State v. Bingham, 859 P.2d 
769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).  Because Kentucky law and Wisconsin 
                     
4 The Third Circuit opinion in Kirk v. Raymark Industries, 
Inc., 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995) also demonstrates the 
difference between an analysis focused on the Sixth Amendment 
versus an analysis based on a party's right to due process of 
law as defined by statute.  The Kirk court held a "showing of 
prejudice 
is 
not 
required 
to 
reverse 
a 
verdict 
after 
demonstrating that a statutorily-mandated, peremptory challenge 
was impaired."  Id. at 160.   
 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
10
law are similar with respect to peremptory challenges,
5 we look 
to the Kentucky Supreme Court case of Thomas v. Commonwealth for 
instruction.  
 
¶22 Like Wisconsin law as established in Gesch, Kentucky 
law does not require that a defendant use his or her peremptory 
challenges on jurors who should have been excused for cause.  
See Thomas, 864 S.W.2d at 259.  In Thomas, the court held, in 
relevant part, that the failure to sustain challenges for cause 
deprived the defendant of his peremptory challenges.  Therefore, 
his conviction had to be overturned regardless of whether any 
juror proved to be disqualified on voir dire actually sat on the 
panel.  The court explained its holding in the following manner: 
 
The object of voir dire is to start the trial on a 
level playing field; it is not a level playing field 
if there are jurors on the panel who are predisposed 
to decide one way or the other.  A defendant has been 
denied 
the 
number 
of 
peremptory 
challenges 
procedurally allotted to him when forced to use 
peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been 
excused for cause. 
Id.  Finally, the court notes that “[t]he rules specifying the 
number of peremptory challenges are not mere technicalities, 
they are substantial rights and are to be fully enforced.”  Id.  
¶23 Much like the Kentucky Supreme Court, this court has 
opined that if a defendant is deprived of the right to exercise 
the full complement of his or her peremptory challenges, the 
                     
5 The Kentucky statute at issue in Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
864 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1993), provides in pertinent part that “[i]f 
the offense charged is a felony . . . the defendant [is entitled 
to] eight (8) peremptory challenges,” and if “additional jurors 
[alternates] are called, the number of peremptory challenges 
allowed each side and each defendant shall be increased by one 
(1).”  Id. at 258-59.  
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
11
defendant is entitled to a new trial.  See State v. Wyss, 124 
Wis. 2d 681, 724, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985)(“[t]here is little doubt 
that if the trial court or the prosecution had deprived [the 
defendant] of his right to the effective exercise of his 
peremptory challenges it would have provided grounds for a new 
trial”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d 493, 505-06, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  In the instant 
case, only the state received that to which it was entitled 
under state law.  Ramos was denied his right to exercise all of 
the peremptory challenges to which he was entitled as a result 
of the trial court's error.  The juror in this case clearly 
indicated to everyone in the courtroom that she could not be 
fair to the appellant.  Yet, the juror remained on the jury 
panel (until the defendant used a peremptory challenge to strike 
her) only because the trial court was steadfast and arbitrary in 
its refusal to take the seconds necessary to have the court 
reporter read back the juror's statement.   
 ¶24 The State relies on several cases in support of its 
proposition that the erroneous exercise of the trial court in 
refusing to strike the challenged juror for cause resulted in 
nothing more than a harmless error.  Relying on Carthaus v. 
State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891) and other 19th Century 
cases, the State asserts that nothing else matters if the 
defendant received a trial by a fair and impartial jury.  
Without any analysis, this court in the Carthaus case quipped: 
“A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could 
the defendants ask for?”  Id. at 568.   
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
12
¶25 If Ramos were making a claim that his Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair and impartial jury had been violated, then 
Carthaus would control.  However, the Carthaus court did not 
address the underlying statute at issue and came to no decision 
as to whether the defendants’ statutory rights were violated, 
presumably because no such argument was presented by the 
parties.  As previously demonstrated, the issue in this case is 
not whether a fair and impartial jury was impaneled, but whether 
Ramos’ statutory rights were violated.  Therefore, we find that 
Carthaus is not controlling here.            
¶26 The State also relies on the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals' case of State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 489 N.W.2d 
626 (Ct. App. 1992).  In Traylor, the court held that where a 
fair and impartial jury was impaneled, the defendant could not 
complain that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to have the juror removed for cause.  The Traylor court 
relied on two cases from the 19th Century which reasoned that a 
defendant's right to a fair trial and impartial jury was not 
violated unless a biased juror actually served on the jury. For 
the same reason that we find that Carthaus is not controlling, 
we also distinguish Traylor. 
¶27 In the case at bar, even if a fair and impartial jury 
was impaneled, the trial court’s failure to dismiss the 
challenged juror for cause effectively deprived Ramos of the 
right 
to 
exercise 
all 
seven 
of 
his 
statutorily 
granted 
peremptory challenges.  Although it is a shame to have a new 
trial in this tragic first-degree murder case when a fair and 
impartial jury made the final decision, the error by the trial 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR 
 
 
13
court requires that the defendant receive a new trial.  We hold 
that the use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court 
error is adequate grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily 
deprives 
the 
defendant 
of 
a 
statutorily 
granted 
right.  
Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
join the majority opinion. I write separately to add some 
further considerations supporting the rule announced today, 
which I believe is both correct as a rule of law and necessary 
to implement the public policy underlying the statutes.  
¶29 All members of the court agree on the following 
principles: The defendant does not claim that his Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated. Rather, he 
claims that the circuit court violated his statutory rights (and 
accordingly his procedural due process rights) by denying him 
the effective exercise of all seven peremptory challenges 
guaranteed him by Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1995-96). Ross v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), frames our inquiry. Under Ross a 
criminal defendant is not entitled to a new trial if state law 
requires the defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge when 
the trial court errs in refusing to remove a challenged juror 
for cause. In Wisconsin, a criminal defendant need not exercise 
a peremptory challenge to a juror who should have been dismissed 
for cause; the criminal defendant does not waive the objection 
to the juror by failing to use a peremptory challenge. State v. 
Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 671, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992). 
¶30 The members of the court disagree about the nature of 
the Wisconsin statutory right to peremptory challenges. 
¶31 The majority opinion holds that a criminal defendant 
in Wisconsin is entitled to his full complement of peremptory 
challenges; if he uses a peremptory challenge to strike a juror 
who should have been struck for cause, as he requested, the 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
2 
conviction will be reversed.
6 The majority concludes that 
reversal is the only feasible way to vindicate a party's right 
to peremptory challenges when that right is impinged by the 
circuit court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause. 
¶32 The dissenting opinion contends that the purpose of 
peremptory challenges is to impanel an impartial jury. According 
to the dissenting opinion, a defendant cannot be heard to 
complain if he uses some or all of his peremptory challenges to 
correct the circuit court which has erroneously refused, on 
request of the plaintiff, to strike jurors who should as a 
matter of law be struck for cause.
7 The rule proposed by the 
dissenting opinion would ill serve the purposes of both 
peremptory and for-cause challenges and would fail to give 
effect to the statutory provisions mandating challenges for 
cause and peremptory challenges.  
¶33 I believe the majority opinion accurately describes 
the nature of the statutory right to peremptory challenges; I 
find no convincing indication that the statutory right to 
                     
6 The use of peremptory challenges that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause is not at issue in this case. 
7 The State concedes that situations might arise which 
warrant reversal in connection with the use of peremptory 
challenges. For example, according to the State, prejudicial 
error 
might 
occur 
when 
the 
trial 
judge 
repeatedly 
and 
deliberately misapplies the law to force the defendant to use 
his peremptory challenges or when the circuit court makes good 
faith errors forcing the defendant to use most or all of his 
peremptory challenges to correct the errors. Brief for State 
at 20.  
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
3 
peremptory challenges is limited in the manner the dissenting 
opinion suggests. 
¶34 Wisconsin's 
relevant 
statutes 
are 
written 
in 
unconditional 
and 
mandatory 
terms. 
"If 
a 
juror 
is 
not 
indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused." Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08(1) (applicable to criminal trials by virtue of Wis. 
Stat. § 972.01). "[T]he defendant is entitled to 6 peremptory 
challenges." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.03.
8 
By 
providing 
for 
both 
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause, the legislature 
can be presumed to have intended the two types of challenges to 
serve distinct purposes. 
¶35 The 
dissenting 
opinion 
views 
the 
purposes 
of 
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause to be the same, 
namely to impanel an impartial jury. Accordingly the dissenting 
opinion would allow peremptory challenges to correct trial court 
errors with regard to challenges for cause and would test 
prejudice to the defendant solely by asking whether the jury was 
impartial. The two types of challenges serve different purposes 
and it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended 
these distinct purposes to be given effect.  
¶36 Challenges 
for 
cause 
are 
intended 
to 
remove 
prospective jurors "on a narrowly specified, provable, and 
legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. 
                     
8 Because alternate jurors were called in this case the 
defendant was entitled to an additional peremptory challenge as 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 972.03. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
4 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The ancient right
9 to peremptory 
challenges serves less discrete purposes; the right "permits 
rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily 
designated or demonstrable." Id. As the name suggests, the right 
is peremptory; no reason need be had or given.
10 
¶37 Blackstone provided two grounds for the right to 
peremptory challenges: to involve defendants intimately in the 
selection of their jurors and to remove any disincentive to 
thorough voir dire. Blackstone set forth the two purposes as 
follows: 
 
1. 
As 
every 
one 
must 
be 
sensible 
what 
sudden 
impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to 
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; 
and how necessary it is, that a prisoner, (when put to 
defend his life,) should have a good opinion of his 
jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; 
the law wills not that he should be tried by any one 
man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even 
without being able to assign a reason for such his 
dislike; 2. Because upon challenges for cause shown, 
if the reasons assigned prove insufficient to set 
aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his 
indifference may sometimes provoke resentment; to 
prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner 
is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to 
set him aside. 
4 Blackstone's Commentaries 353, quoted in People v. Bodine, 1 
Denio 281, 310 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (holding that a court 
                     
9 Chief Justice Burger traced the right of peremptory 
challenge from the Roman era through the English Middle Ages to 
the early American republic in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
118-20 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
10 The United States Supreme Court has described the right 
of peremptory challenge as "one of the most important of the 
rights secured to the accused." Pointer v. United States, 151 
U.S. 396, 408 (1894). 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
5 
"certainly would not be allowed to disregard a challenge for 
cause, and turn the party making it over to his peremptory 
challenges").
11 
¶38 The harmless error analysis urged by the dissent would 
fail to serve the purposes of the statutes. The defendant in the 
present case cannot show the effect of the judge's error on the 
verdict; he has shown, however, that he had to expend a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who was required to be 
removed for cause. If the statutory right to peremptory 
challenge is to be meaningful, the parties must be able to 
exercise their challenges independent of the circuit court's 
striking for cause. "[B]urdening the parties with a supervisory 
duty over the trial court when it errs in denying a challenge 
for cause . . . eviscerates the substance of challenges for 
cause as well as peremptory challenges." State v. Huerta, 855 
P.2d 776, 780 (Ariz. 1993). 
¶39 Our determination of legislative intent in this case 
is guided also by the principle that circuit courts must be 
encouraged to assiduously guard a defendant's right to an 
impartial jury. The court has admonished circuit courts that 
"because it preserves the appearance as well as the reality of 
                     
11 For recent discussions of the respective purposes of 
peremptory and for-cause challenges see United States v. 
Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1136-39 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(holding that erroneous denial of peremptory challenge requires 
automatic reversal of conviction); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond 
Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Role of the Jury, 73 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1041 (1995). 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.ssa 
 
6 
an impartial trial," circuit courts should err on the side of 
dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror's 
presence may create bias or an appearance of bias, even when an 
appellate court would not reverse the circuit court's decision 
to allow the juror to sit. Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956). A restrictive 
view of the purposes of peremptory challenges would provide the 
opposite incentive to the circuit courts.  
¶40 The 
majority 
opinion 
properly 
concludes 
that 
peremptory challenges are not substitutes for challenges for 
cause. In this case the defendant was forced to surrender his 
statutory right to a peremptory challenge to preserve his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury. Because the defendant 
was denied a substantial right guaranteed by statute, his 
conviction must be reversed.  
¶41 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶42 I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
1 
¶43 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Dissenting.)  I dissent 
because I conclude that the circuit court did not deprive 
Edward Ramos of his right to the effective exercise of a 
peremptory challenge under Wisconsin law.  Instead, I 
conclude that by using a peremptory challenge to strike a 
juror who should have been excused for cause, Ramos 
effectively exercised this challenge for the purpose it is 
intendedto impanel an impartial jury.  Further, I conclude 
that Ramos is not entitled to automatic reversal of his 
conviction because it is well established that, in cases 
like this, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial 
unless 
a 
biased 
juror 
actually 
sat 
on 
the 
jury.  
Consequently, I conclude that Ramos' challenge under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution must 
fail because he was not deprived of any right to which he 
was entitled under Wisconsin law.  Thus, although I agree 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it failed to excuse the juror for cause, I conclude 
that this error was harmless. 
A. 
¶44 Ramos 
concedes 
that 
an 
impartial 
jury 
was 
impaneled in this case.  See majority op. at 8, n.3.  
Accordingly, Ramos does not claim that his right to an 
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment was violated.  
Rather, Ramos claims that his right to due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because the circuit 
court, 
by 
failing 
to 
excuse 
the 
juror 
for 
cause, 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
2 
effectively 
deprived 
Ramos 
of 
a 
statutorily-provided 
peremptory challenge.   
¶45 The United States Supreme Court considered an 
analogous 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
challenge 
in 
Ross 
v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
12  The Court indicated: 
"Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute 
and are not required by the Constitution, it is for the 
State to determine the number of peremptory challenges 
allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their 
exercise."  Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted).  
Accordingly, the Court determined that a defendant's right 
to due process is violated "only if the defendant does not 
receive that which state law provides."  Id.  Applying 
Oklahoma law, the Ross Court concluded that the petitioner 
was required to exercise his peremptory challenge to remove 
the juror, and that the trial court's error constituted 
"grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all 
peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced 
upon him."  Id.  Since a biased juror was not forced upon 
the petitioner, the Court held that Ross has received all 
                     
12 
The 
Ross 
Court 
also 
considered 
whether 
the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury had 
been violated.  The Court held: "So long as the jury that 
sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a 
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean 
the Sixth Amendment was violated."  Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 81, 88 (1988).  However, since Ramos is not making a 
Sixth Amendment challenge, this portion of the Ross opinion 
is not controlling. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
3 
that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge failed.  Id. at 89-91.   
B. 
¶46 Accordingly, this court must determine whether 
Ramos received all that Wisconsin law allowed him in order 
to decide whether his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process has been violated.  See id. at 89.  As indicated by 
the majority, see majority op. at 4-5, Ramos clearly was 
entitled to the effective exercise of seven peremptory 
challenges.  See Wis. Stats. §§ 972.03 & 972.04(1); State 
v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 724, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985) 
(indicating that a defendant has a "right to the effective 
exercise of his peremptory challenges"), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 
752 (1990).  However, the Wisconsin Statutes do not 
indicate in what manner these peremptory challenges may be 
used.  Consequently, in order to determine whether Ramos 
"effectively" exercised all of his peremptory challenges, 
and thereby received that to which he was entitled, this 
court must look to Wisconsin precedent.  See Ross, 487 U.S. 
at 89 (court looked to Oklahoma precedent to determine 
whether defendant received that which state law provided). 
¶47 The majority essentially concludes that, under 
Wisconsin law, if a defendant uses a peremptory challenge 
to strike a "for cause" juror, the defendant is thereby 
deprived of the effective exercise of that challenge 
because he or she did not use it to strike a juror for "no 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
4 
cause," i.e., based on a hunch or intuition.
13  In other 
words, the majority holds that a defendant "effectively" 
exercises 
his 
or 
her 
full 
complement 
of 
peremptory 
challenges only if he or she uses every challenge to strike 
a juror for "no cause."  Accordingly, the majority 
concludes that it is irrelevant that an impartial jury was 
impaneled in this case; all that matters is that Ramos used 
one of his peremptory challenges to strike a "for cause" 
juror, and therefore did not use it to strike a "no cause" 
juror. 
¶48 After carefully reviewing Wisconsin precedent, as 
well as federal case law, I reach the opposite conclusion. 
 It is well settled that peremptory challenges are "but one 
state-created means to the constitutional end of an 
impartial jury and a fair trial."  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 
U.S. 42, 57 (1992); accord Ross, 
487 
U.S. 
at 
88.  
Therefore, peremptory challenges are not intended to enable 
the state or the defendant to select particular jurors who 
they think may be more favorable to their side; rather, 
peremptory challenges are intended to be a means to the end 
                     
13  However, the majority presumably would agree that a 
defendant has no right to exercise a peremptory challenge 
to strike a juror based on race, see Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986), or gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).  
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
5 
of ensuring the selection of an unbiased jury.
14  See 
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57; Ross, 487 U.S. at 88.  Consistent 
with this purpose, Wisconsin courts have determined that a 
defendant is not deprived of the right to the effective 
exercise of a peremptory challenge simply because the 
defendant uses a challenge to strike a juror who should 
have been removed for cause. 
¶49 Specifically, in Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 
47 N.W. 629 (1891), the defendants argued that they were 
entitled to reversal of the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction because they "were compelled, as shown by the 
record, to exercise their eighth and last peremptory 
challenge" to strike a juror that should have been struck 
for cause.  Defendants' brief in Carthaus at 10 (emphasis 
original).  Therefore, the defendants in Carthaus made the 
same argument that Ramos makes in this case:  they claimed 
that because of the circuit court's error, they "were 
obliged to challenge [the juror] and thus lost one strike." 
 State's brief in Carthaus at 30 (emphasis added).  This 
court disagreed, concluding: 
 
As to the objection to the juror . . .  we think 
it has no merit.  He was peremptorily challenged 
                     
14  As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has indicated:  
"As important as the . . . proper exercise of peremptory 
challenges undoubtedly are, these procedures are designed 
to insure the selection of a fair and impartial jury, not 
to enable the accused himself to select particular jurors." 
 State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 507-08 (Tenn.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982). 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
6 
by the defendants, and set aside.  It is said the 
defendants should not have been put to their 
peremptory challenges as to this juror . . ., 
because 
in 
so 
doing 
they 
exhausted 
their 
peremptory challenges; but it does not appear 
that they were prejudiced in any way by that 
fact.  A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, 
and what more could the defendants ask for? 
78 Wis. at 508.  Therefore, this court held that where a 
defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for 
cause" juror, and no prejudice thereby results to the 
defendant, the defendant has received all that Wisconsin 
law provides.  See id.    
¶50 Similarly, in Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. 
Co., 94 Wis. 447, 69 N.W. 65 (1896), this court held that 
where a circuit court errs in overruling a challenge of a 
juror for cause, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial 
"unless it is shown that an objectionable juror was forced 
upon the party, and sat upon the case after such party had 
exhausted 
his 
peremptory 
challenges." 
Id. 
at 
453.  
Likewise, in Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 
N.W.304 (1900), this court concluded that a defendant is 
not entitled to reversal where a circuit court refuses to 
discharge a juror for cause unless prejudice results to the 
defendant. Id. at 438-39.   
 ¶51 More recently, in State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 
393, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App.) review denied, 491 N.W.2d 
768 (Wis. 1992), the defendant contended that his counsel 
was ineffective because she used peremptory challenges to 
strike certain jurors rather than moving the court to 
excuse the jurors for cause.  Id. at 395-96.  The court of 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
7 
appeals, 
relying 
on 
Carthaus 
and 
Pool, 
concluded: 
"Wisconsin's longstanding rule is that where a fair and 
impartial jury is impaneled, there is no basis for 
concluding that a defendant was wrongly required to use 
peremptory challenges."  Id. at 400.  Furthermore, the 
court determined that unless a defendant can show that "the 
exhaustion of peremptory challenges left him with a jury 
that included an objectionable or incompetent member," the 
defendant is not entitled to reversal of his or her 
conviction under Wisconsin law.  Id. 
¶52 Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, and Traylor establish 
that, under Wisconsin law, "effective" exercise of a 
peremptory challenge does not mean that the defendant must 
use every peremptory challenge to strike a juror for "no 
cause."  Instead, these cases demonstrate that where a 
defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a "for 
cause" juror, the defendant has effectively exercised the 
challenge for the purpose it is intendedto impanel an 
impartial jury.  Further, these cases clearly establish 
that, under Wisconsin law, a defendant is not entitled to a 
new trial unless he or she can make some showing of 
prejudice.
15   
                     
15  Accordingly, a defendant is afforded no more 
protections under Wisconsin law than are provided by the 
Sixth Amendment.  See Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 (holding that, 
where a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a 
"for cause" juror, the Sixth Amendment is not violated so 
long as the jury was impartial). 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
8 
¶53 The majority dismisses Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, 
and Traylor because it concludes that these cases are 
relevant only when a defendant makes a Sixth Amendment 
challenge, since the courts in these cases focused on 
whether an impartial jury had been impaneled.  However, the 
majority wrongly assumes that when a defendant makes a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on state law, it is always 
irrelevant whether an unbiased jury was impaneled.  Ross 
establishes that the essential inquiry in a Fourteenth 
Amendment case of this type is whether the defendant 
received all that he or she was entitled under state law.  
487 U.S. at 89.  Therefore, in such a case, if a defendant 
is not entitled to a new trial under the applicable state 
law unless a biased juror sat on the jury, then it is 
highly relevant that an impartial jury was impaneled.  See 
id. at 89-91 (in deciding petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, court considered it relevant that under Oklahoma 
law, a defendant is entitled to a new trial "only if the 
defendant 
exhausts 
all 
peremptory 
challenges 
and 
an 
incompetent juror is forced upon him."). 
                                                             
Furthermore, I conclude that Wisconsin law is similar 
to Oklahoma law, in that both establish that where a trial 
court erroneously refuses to remove a juror for cause, such 
an error provides grounds for reversal "only if the 
defendant 
exhausts 
all 
peremptory 
challenges 
and 
an 
incompetent juror is forced upon him."  See id. at 89  
(describing Oklahoma law).  Therefore, I also conclude that 
Wisconsin law is not similar to Kentucky law.  See majority 
op. at 10-11 (describing Kentucky law). 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
9 
 ¶54 Moreover, contrary to the majority's conclusion 
that Carthaus, Pool, and Bergman are limited to an 
articulation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, these three cases dealt solely with the right to 
peremptory challenges under Wisconsin law.  This is so 
because the U.S. Supreme Court did not even determine that 
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was 
applicable to the states until 1966.  See Parker v. 
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966).
16  Indeed, the briefs as 
well as the opinions in these cases are bereft of any 
citation to the state or federal constitutions.  It is 
therefore clear that this court in Carthaus, Pool, and 
Bergman considered the very issue that we fact today: to 
what was the defendant entitled under Wisconsin law?  Thus, 
I conclude that Carthaus, Pool, Bergman, as well as 
Traylor, are controlling here. 
¶55 Further, I do not agree that State v. Gesch, 167 
Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992), is applicable in this 
case.  In Gesch, the defendant argued that his right to an 
impartial jury was violated because the circuit court 
failed to excuse a juror who was related by blood to a 
state witness.  Id. at 662-65.  Unlike the present case, in 
                     
16  A few years earlier, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 
372 
U.S. 
335 
(1963), 
and 
right 
to 
confrontation, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), 
were applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
10
Gesch the defendant did not exercise a peremptory challenge 
to strike the "for cause" juror; therefore, he sat on the 
jury.  Id. at 671.  The State argued that because the 
defendant had not exercised a peremptory challenge, he had 
waived his right to raise the circuit court's error on 
appeal.  Id.  The court concluded that the defendant had 
not waived this issue, and further held that his right to 
an impartial jury had been violated.  Id.   
¶56 However, 
the 
Gesch 
court 
did not 
determine 
whether the defendant's right to the effective exercise of 
a peremptory challenge would have been violated had he used 
a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, because this 
was not the issue before the court.  Moreover, the court 
apparently agreed with the State that if the defendant had 
struck the juror and subsequently been convicted, the 
circuit court's refusal to excuse the juror would have been 
harmless error.  See id. at 671.  Finally, since the 
defendant in Gesch claimed that his right to an impartial 
jury had been violated, see id. at 665-66, pursuant to the 
majority's own reasoning, Gesch is inapposite in this case. 
 See majority op. at 12 (arguing that Carthaus involved the 
right 
to 
an 
impartial 
jury 
and 
therefore 
is 
distinguishable). 
¶57 Today's decision effectively overrules Carthaus, 
Pool, Bergman, and Traylor, and marks a departure from this 
court's commitment to upholding controlling precedent.  
This court's covenant of faithfulness to the doctrine of 
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
11
stare decisis cannot be overemphasized, for it underpins 
the very legitimacy of the judiciary.  Fidelity to 
precedent helps to ensure that the existing law will not be 
abandoned without strong justification.  See State v. 
Stevens, 
181 
Wis. 
2d 
410, 
441-42, 
511 
N.W.2d 
591 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 
S. Ct. 2245 (1995).  The principle underlying Carthaus, 
Pool, Bergman, and Traylor applies as vigorously today as 
it did when those cases were decided.  Therefore, there is 
no justification for overruling these cases.  As such, I 
conclude that Ramos received all that Wisconsin law 
provides.  Consequently, his Fourteenth Amendment challenge 
fails.  Accordingly, I conclude that although the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in this case by 
failing to excuse the challenged juror for cause, such 
error was harmless.  It did not deprive Ramos of any right 
to which he was entitled under Wisconsin law.
17  Thus, I 
would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
                     
17  Wis. Stat. § 805.18 provides that an error is 
harmless if it does not effect the substantial rights of 
the party seeking reversal of the judgment.  Although 
§ 805.18 is part of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this court has determined it is applicable in criminal 
cases pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  See State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  Thus, 
because Ramos received all to which he was entitled under 
Wisconsin law, and therefore his substantial rights were 
not violated, I conclude that the circuit court's error was 
harmless.  
 
 
No. 94-3036-CR.npc   
 
12
¶58 In closing, I emphasize that the majority has 
effectively created a "win-win" situation for defendants.  
Pursuant to Gesch, if a circuit court erroneously fails to 
excuse a juror for cause, the defendant may refuse to 
exercise a peremptory challenge, wait until the jury 
renders its verdict, appeal if he or she does not like the 
result, and then receive a new trial.  Pursuant to the 
majority's decision in this case, even if a defendant uses 
a peremptory challenge to strike the "for cause" juror in 
such situations, the defendant may wait until the jury 
renders its verdict, appeal if he or she does not like the 
result, and then receive a new trial.  Therefore, Gesch, 
combined with the majority's opinion today, will result in 
a tremendous waste of judicial resources and taxpayers' 
moneyin this case and in future cases as well.    
¶59 For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent.