Title: State v. West

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1579 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Edwin C. West: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Edwin Clarence West, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  329 Wis. 2d 710, 790 N.W. 2d 543 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 26, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 3, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
M. Joseph Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public defender.  
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the 
brief 
was 
J.B. 
Van 
Hollen, 
attorney 
general.
 
 
2011 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1579   
(L.C. No. 
1997CI970001) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Edwin C. West: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Edwin Clarence West, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 26, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an order 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court denying Edwin Clarence 
West's (West) petition for supervised release. 
                                                 
1 State v. West, No. 2009AP1579, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010). 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
2 
 
¶2 
In 1997 a jury found that West was a sexually violent 
person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, and he was thereafter committed 
under that chapter.  Under § 980.08(1), persons committed under 
ch. 980 may petition for supervised release into the community 
after at least 12 months have passed since the person was 
committed or his last petition for supervised release was 
rejected.  The Wisconsin Legislature amended this statute in 
2005, removing language that specifically allocated the burden 
of proof to the State in a hearing on the petition.   
¶3 
In 2008 West filed a motion with the circuit court to 
interpret whether amended § 980.08(4)(cg) continues to allocate 
the burden to the State.  One month after filing this petition, 
he also filed a petition seeking supervised release.  The 
circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously placed the burden of proof with 
the committed individual.  The circuit court also denied his 
petition for supervised release. 
¶4 
West appealed, and argued to the court of appeals that 
the burden of proof does not rest with the committed person, and 
if it did, such allocation would violate the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions.  The court of appeals disagreed, 
and in a per curiam opinion affirmed the circuit court.   
¶5 
West asks us to interpret the supervised release 
provision, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg), to place the burden of 
proof with the State.  He argues that, although the statute is 
ambiguous, the language, history, and scope of the statute 
support his position.  He also asserts that the burden must 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
3 
 
remain with the State to prevent § 980.08(4)(cg) from violating 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin 
and United States Constitutions.2 
¶6 
We conclude that amended Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) 
unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed 
individual, and that the appropriate burden of persuasion is 
clear and convincing evidence.  We further hold that this 
allocation does not violate the guarantees of due process and 
equal 
protection 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions.   
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
In 1993 West was convicted of second degree sexual 
assault in violation of § 940.225(2)(a).  Prior to West's 
                                                 
2 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part, "No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  The court has held 
that the due process clause in Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution is the "substantial equivalent" of the 
federal due process clause.  Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶28 
n.11, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 (citing Neiman v. Am. 
Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 
N.W.2d 160).  Similarly, the equal protection clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution declares that, "All people are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; 
among 
these 
are 
life, 
liberty, 
and 
the 
pursuit 
of 
happiness . . . ."  Wis. Const. art I, § 1.  Our interpretation 
is the same for both the federal and state equal protection 
clauses.  Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI 20, ¶22, 
332 Wis. 2d 85, 796 N.W.2d 717 (citing Nankin v. Vill. of 
Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶11 n.5, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141).  
Accordingly, where this opinion refers to "due process" or 
"equal protection," our analysis encompasses both federal and 
state constitutions. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
4 
 
release, the State petitioned to have him committed as a 
sexually violent person, pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes ch. 980.  
West was committed under ch. 980 in July 1997.   
¶8 
In preparation for the commitment hearing to establish 
probable cause to commit West, the State offered various medical 
examinations, including a report by Dr. Kenneth Diamond (Dr. 
Diamond), a senior staff psychologist for the Milwaukee Clinical 
Services Unit of the Department of Corrections.  Dr. Diamond's 
evaluation of West compiled the results of various records and 
other, in-person, clinical evaluations.  It was Dr. Diamond's 
opinion that West suffered from cocaine and alcohol abuse (both 
in remission) and from antisocial personality disorder, a mental 
disorder warranting commitment.  Based on West's history of 
sexual assaults and his performance on various behavioral tests, 
Diamond stated: 
Psychological 
testing 
indicates 
that 
he 
is 
an 
aggressive individual with possible sexual problems.  
On the PCL-R [Psychopathy Checklist Revised], his 
total 
score 
is 
diagnostic 
of 
psychopathy.  
Additionally, he scores on several actuarial risk 
factors which are strongly indicative of violent 
recidivism and these include: a high degree of 
psychopathy, pre-treatment deviant sexual arousal, 
non-sexual criminality, denial or minimization of 
previous offense, and use of force and/or threat of 
force during crime.  It is my opinion to a reasonable 
degree of psychological certainty that the antisocial 
personality disorder, cocaine abuse and alcohol abuse 
exhibited by Edwin C. West . . . are congenital or 
acquired conditions . . . that predispose Edwin C. 
West to engage in acts of sexual violence.  It is also 
my opinion that these mental disorders exhibited by 
Edwin C. West create a substantial probability that he 
will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
5 
 
¶9 
Dr. Diamond's summary of West's history of sexual 
assaults included:  
(a) In 1982, at age 17, sexual contact with his then-15-
year-old girlfriend, whom he impregnated;  
(b) In 1988, at age 23, a conviction for choking and 
raping a female acquaintance, for which West received probation;  
(c) In 1991, a probation violation for picking up a 16-
year-old girl and threatening to rape her if she refused to kiss 
him, and then attempting to have intercourse with her;3 
(d) In 1991, an accusation that West forced a woman into 
her bedroom where he pushed her down and ejaculated on her; and, 
(e) Also in 1991, an accusation that West terrorized and 
stalked a woman on the highway, although the woman did not press 
charges. 
¶10 Finally, reports also indicated that in at least four 
states, West had adult criminal convictions including disorderly 
conduct and sexual assault, burglary and robbery, and auto 
theft.  
¶11 Based on these factors, as well as his personal 
observations, Dr. Diamond recommended West be committed under 
ch. 980.  Dr. Diamond testified at trial, and his report was 
admitted into evidence.  In May 1997 a jury found West to be a 
sexually violent person under ch. 980. He was initially admitted 
                                                 
3 It was for this offense West was ultimately convicted of 
third-degree 
sexual 
assault, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a). 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
6 
 
to the Wisconsin Resource Center for treatment, and transferred 
in 2001 to Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.   
¶12 Between January 1998 and April 2009, during re-
examination and review of West's classification as a sexually 
violent person, Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) 
evaluators consistently found that West continued to be a 
sexually violent person, and consistently recommended against 
either 
supervised 
release 
or 
discharge.4 
 
Only 
one 
re-
examination, conducted by Hollida Wakefield in May 2008, 
indicated that West had made progress.  While the report 
acknowledged that West still required treatment, it took the 
position that treatment could occur in the community.  
¶13 In West's most recent examination in April 2009, 
however, the examiner diagnosed West with four mental disorders: 
paraphilia, alcohol dependence, polysubstance dependence, and 
antisocial personality disorder.  The examiner found West to 
continue to be a sexually violent person and recommended against 
supervised release or discharge.  
¶14 During 
his 
commitment, 
West 
requested 
supervised 
release in October 2000, July 2001, April 2002, and April 2008. 
He withdrew the 2000 and 2002 petitions without judgment. West 
also petitioned for discharge in April 2007 but withdrew that 
                                                 
4 These re-examination reports and citations to the record 
do not include additional Treatment Progress Reports prepared on 
an annual basis. The Treatment Progress Reports are, however, 
considered in the re-examination reports. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
7 
 
petition after his April re-examination results.  He also 
petitioned for discharge in May 2009.  
¶15 In March 2008 West filed a motion with the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Martin J. Donald, Judge, to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) as allocating the burden of proof to the 
State in a hearing on supervised release. Prior to the statute's 
amendment,5 the presumption in supervised release cases was to 
grant a petition for supervised release unless the State met the 
burden of proving that release was not warranted.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(b) (2003-04).  The prior version of the statute 
required a circuit court to:   
grant the petition unless the state proves by clear 
and convincing evidence  . . . that it is still likely 
that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence 
if the person is not continued in institutional care 
 . . . [or] . . . [t]hat 
the 
person 
has 
not 
demonstrated significant progress in his or her 
treatment or that the person has refused treatment. 
Id.  
¶16 However, effective June 2006, the statute was revised 
to read that "[t]he court may not authorize supervised release 
unless . . . the court finds that all of the following criteria 
are met."  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg).  The amended statute does 
not mention any burden of proof. 
¶17 On August 1, 2008, the circuit court denied West's 
motion.  In its oral decision, the court determined that § 
980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the 
                                                 
5 Amended and revised by 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 118. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
8 
 
civilly-committed individual.  Additionally, the court held that 
placement of such burden on the individual offends neither the 
due process nor equal protection clauses of the Constitution.  
On the same day, the circuit court held evidentiary hearings on 
West's petition for supervised release, followed by further 
hearings on October 10, 2008.  The circuit court ultimately 
denied the petition for supervised release.   
¶18 West appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  In its decision, the court relied on State v. 
Rachel (Rachel II), 2010 WI App 60, 324 Wis. 2d 465, 782 
N.W.2d 443, in which the court of appeals rejected arguments 
identical to those raised by West.  State v. West, No. 
2009AP1579, unpublished slip op., ¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 
2010).   
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that the statute was 
unambiguous, and that the plain language indicates the burden is 
to be placed on the petitioning committed individual.  Id., ¶5.  
The court reasoned that by beginning the provision with language 
to deny supervised release unless certain criteria are met, the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
create 
a 
presumption 
of 
institutionalization that must be overcome by the moving party.  
Id.  Furthermore, "it would be impractical, if not absurd, to 
place the burden on the State to demonstrate factors weighing in 
favor of release because the State has no incentive to do so." 
Id. (citing Rachel II).  Finally, the court rejected West's 
argument that the statute, as amended, was unconstitutional.  
No. 
  2009AP1579 
9 
 
Id., ¶6.  Again, the court of appeals relied on its holding in 
Rachel II.  Id. 
¶20 West petitioned this court for review.  We granted the 
petition on January 11, 2011.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 This appeal requires us to interpret amended Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg).  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law that the court reviews de novo.  State v. Burris, 2004 WI 
91, ¶31, 273 Wis. 2d 294, 682 N.W.2d 812.  The question of who 
bears the burden of proof under a statute also is a question of 
law.  Acuity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olivas, 2007 WI 12, ¶31, 298 
Wis. 2d 640, 726 N.W.2d 258.  We determine questions of law 
independently from the circuit court and court of appeals, but 
we benefit from their analyses.  Id.   
¶22 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  "Statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, 
and 
a 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality must demonstrate that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 
328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227 (citing State v. Baron, 2009 WI 
58, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶23 West's case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) to determine who bears the burden of proof in a 
petition for supervised release.  This inquiry involves two 
components: the burden of production, and the burden of 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
10 
 
persuasion.  We next consider West's claim that to place the 
burden of proof upon the committed individual violates the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin and United 
States Constitutions.  We analyze both arguments in the context 
of the history of ch. 980 and civil commitment law. 
A. Chapter 980 Sexually Violent Person Commitments 
¶24 In May 1994 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted ch. 980, 
the Sexually Violent Person Commitment law.6  Chapter 980 permits 
the circuit court to commit an individual found to be a 
"sexually violent person" and to place the person under the 
DHFS's custody "for control, care and treatment until such time 
as the person is no longer a sexually violent person."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.06.  As originally enacted, Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) 
defined a "sexually violent person" as: 
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers 
from 
a 
mental 
disorder 
that 
makes 
it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence. 
Id. (1993-94).7  
                                                 
6 Chapter 980 was created pursuant to 1993 Wis. Act 479, § 
40. 
7 Chapter 980's definition for "sexually violent person" as 
enacted differs from the current definition which substitutes 
"likely" for "substantial probability" that the person will 
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) (2007-08) thus defines "sexually violent person" as: 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
11 
 
¶25 One year after the law's enactment, this court 
addressed the constitutionality of ch. 980 in the companion 
cases of State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995), and State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995).  In Carpenter, the petitioners argued that ch. 980 
violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 258.  In Post, the petitioners argued that the law 
violated the due process and equal protection clauses.  Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 293.  This court rejected each of these claims 
and upheld ch. 980 as constitutional.  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 
258-59; Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 293-94. 
¶26 In 
Carpenter, 
the 
issue 
at 
the 
heart 
of 
the 
petitioner's argument was that ch. 980 was a criminal statute, 
with double jeopardy and ex post facto implications.  Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d at 263, 272.  The court concluded that ch. 980 was 
not a criminal statute.  Id. at 271-72. 
¶27 The primary goals and purposes of ch. 980 are to treat 
sexually violent persons and to protect society from the dangers 
                                                                                                                                                             
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely 
that the person will engage in one or more acts of 
sexual violence. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
12 
 
posed by those persons.  Id. at 258.  Punishment is not among 
the purposes of ch. 980.  Id.  Specifically, the court held that 
ch. 980 was enacted as a civil commitment statute "to protect 
the public and provide concentrated treatment to convicted 
sexually violent persons."  Id. 
¶28 The court concluded that ch. 980's emphasis on 
treatment was evident in the chapter's plain language.  Id. at 
266.  Under then-existing Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1) (1993-94), 
persons were committed to the DHSS (now DHFS) for "control, care 
and treatment" rather than to the Department of Corrections for 
imprisonment.  Id. at 266.  Notice provisions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.015(3)(b) (1993-94) required the agency with jurisdiction 
to provide notice to the Department of Justice and district 
attorney regarding any past treatment the individual had 
received in prison.  Id.  Further, then-existing Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.06(2)(b) and (c) required the court to consider available 
arrangements to ensure access and participation in treatment, 
and where release was appropriate, required the county where the 
individual resided to identify a treatment plan for that 
individual.  Id. at 266-67.  
¶29 In addition to this explicit language, the court found 
other 
evidence 
to 
support 
ch. 
980's 
goal 
of 
treatment, 
specifically, that the State was prepared to provide specific 
treatment to committed individuals and "not simply warehouse 
them."  Id. at 267.  Committed individuals were not part of the 
general population of inmates.  Id.  Further, committed 
individuals were monitored by treatment professionals as opposed 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
13 
 
to prison guards.  Id. at 267-68.  For these reasons, the court 
concluded: 
[T]he principal purposes of ch. 980 are protection of 
the 
public 
and 
the 
treatment 
of 
convicted 
sex 
offenders who are at a high risk to reoffend in order 
to reduce the likelihood that they will engage in such 
conduct in the future. These constitute significant 
nonpunitive and remedial purposes. Chapter 980 cannot 
be characterized as only serving the punishment goals 
of deterrence or retribution.  
Id. at 271.  
¶30 Therefore, because ch. 980, as enacted, was a civil 
statute and not principally punitive, the court held that it did 
not violate the double jeopardy or ex post facto clauses.  Id. 
at 258-59. 
¶31 Similarly, 
in 
Post, 
the 
court 
emphasized 
that 
treatment for sexually violent persons is a bona fide goal of 
ch. 980.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 308.  Again it pointed to the 
State's obligation 
under § 980.06(1) (1993-94) to provide 
"control, care and treatment" to sexually violent persons as 
indicia of the chapter's treatment purpose.  Id. at 309.  
Furthermore, individuals committed pursuant to ch. 980 were 
entitled to the same patient rights as persons committed under 
ch. 51.  Id.  Significantly, the State also was required to 
conduct "periodic mental examinations" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.07(1) (1993-94) to establish whether sufficient progress 
had been made to warrant supervised release or discharge.  Id. 
at 314. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
14 
 
¶32 Post also recognized ch. 980's purpose of protecting 
society from dangerous, sexually violent persons likely to 
engage in future acts of sexual violence.  Id. at 313.  States 
have a compelling interest in protecting society by committing 
those sexually violent persons most likely to engage in sexually 
violent acts in the future.  Id. at 294.  Such commitment does 
not violate due process when the commitment's "nature and 
duration are reasonably related to such compelling state 
purposes."  Id.   
¶33 The court concluded that ch. 980 permissibly balanced 
individual liberty and "the public's right to be protected from 
the dangers posed by persons who have already demonstrated their 
propensity and willingness to commit sexually violent acts."  
Id. at 317.  The statute was "narrowly tailored to allow 
commitment only of the most dangerous of sexual offenders, those 
whose mental conditions predispose them to reoffend."  Id. at 
307.  Based on these conclusions, the court found that ch. 980 
did not violate the petitioner's right to due process.  Id. at 
294.  In Post, as well as in Carpenter, the court held civil 
commitment 
pursuant 
to 
ch. 
980 
to 
be 
constitutionally 
permissible. 
¶34 Wisconsin is not alone in passing civil commitment 
legislation to deal with sexually violent persons and combat the 
societal dangers these persons pose.  In 1990 Washington became 
the first state to enact legislation for post-prison civil 
commitment 
for 
sexually violent offenders. Other states——
including 
California, 
Kansas, 
Minnesota, 
New 
Jersey, 
and 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
15 
 
Arizona——have passed similar civil commitment statutes for 
sexually violent individuals.8 
¶35 In 1997 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of these civil commitment statutes in Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  In Hendricks, the petitioner 
argued that Kansas's civil commitment statute violated the 
constitutional guarantees of the due process, double jeopardy, 
and ex post facto clauses.  Id. at 350.  The Court rejected his 
challenge on all grounds.  Id. at 371.  
 ¶36 Kansas's "Sexually Violent Predator Act" became law in 
1994 and established procedures for involuntary civil commitment 
of individuals who, due to "mental abnormality" or "personality 
disorder," were found likely to engage in "predatory acts of 
sexual violence."  Id. at 350 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 
(1994)).  The act was intended to address the problem of repeat 
sexual offenders.9  Id. at 350.  The act defined "sexually 
                                                 
8 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq. (West 2011); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2010); Minn. Stat. ch. 253B 
(2010); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 30.4-27.24 (West 2010); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 36-3701 et seq. (2010). 
9 The Supreme Court acknowledged that this intent was set 
forth in the Kansas act's preamble, which provided:  
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually 
violent predators exist who do not have a mental 
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for 
involuntary 
treatment 
pursuant 
to 
the 
[general 
involuntary 
civil 
commitment 
statute] . . . . 
In 
contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment 
under 
the 
[general 
involuntary 
civil 
commitment 
statute], sexually violent predators generally have 
anti-social personality features which are unamenable 
to existing mental illness treatment modalities and 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
16 
 
violent predator" as "any person who has been convicted of or 
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the 
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual 
violence."  Id. at 352 (citing Kan. Stat. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)). 
¶37 In reasoning similar to this court's analysis in 
Carpenter and Post, the Supreme Court found the Kansas civil 
commitment statute to be civil, not criminal, and ultimately 
constitutional.  Id. at 368-69.  Determining whether a statute 
is civil or criminal "is first of all a question of statutory 
construction."  Id. at 361 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 
364, 368 (1986)).  Although being labeled a civil statute is not 
always dispositive, the Supreme Court stated that it "will 
reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party 
challenging the statute provides 'the clearest proof' that 'the 
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect so 
                                                                                                                                                             
those features render them likely to engage in 
sexually violent behavior. The legislature further 
finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of 
engaging in repeat acts of predatory violence is high. 
The existing involuntary commitment procedure . . . is 
inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent 
predators pose to society. The legislature further 
finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually 
violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the 
treatment needs of this population are very long term 
and the treatment modalities for this population are 
very 
different 
than 
the 
traditional 
treatment 
modalities for people appropriate for commitment under 
the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].  
Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a01 (1994). 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
17 
 
as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil'."  Id. 
at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 
(1980)). 
¶38 The Hendricks Court went on to note that the act's 
placement within Kansas's probate code and its description as a 
"civil commitment" statute indicated that the act was civil in 
nature, not criminal.  Id. at 361.  Starting with the plain 
language of the act, "[n]othing on the face of the statute 
suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other 
than a civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public 
from harm."  Id.   
¶39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the statute 
was not intended to address the criminal purposes of retribution 
or deterrence.  Id. at 361-62.  First, the statute was not 
retributive, as introduction of past sexually violent acts as 
evidence at a civil commitment hearing was not meant to punish 
the individual for past acts but rather was meant to show the 
existence of a mental condition.  Id. at 362.   
¶40 Second, the statute was not meant to serve as a 
deterrent because the very purpose of the act was to treat those 
with uncontrollable urges.  Id. at 362-63.  The mere existence 
of the act could not be said to deter sexually violent persons 
from acting upon uncontrollable urges.  Id.  The Court further 
reasoned that, under the Kansas law, committed individuals did 
not experience "the more restrictive conditions placed on state 
prisoners, 
but 
instead 
[experience] 
essentially 
the 
same 
conditions as any involuntary committed patient in a state 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
18 
 
mental institution."  Id. at 363.  Therefore, the Court did not 
believe the statute to be so punitive in purpose or effect as to 
negate the state's intention for it to be a civil statute.  Id. 
at 368-69.¶41 In 
upholding 
Kansas's 
system 
for 
civil 
commitment, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
did 
not 
find 
involuntary 
commitment to be "contrary to our understanding of ordered 
liberty."  Id. at 357.  While the Court acknowledged that 
freedom from physical restraint is at the core of liberty 
protected, that liberty is not absolute.  Id. at 356.  States 
may adopt civil commitment statutes that "have coupled proof of 
dangerousness with the proof of some other factor, such as 
'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality'" without running afoul 
of the Constitution.  Id. at 358.  Notably, the Court upheld the 
Kansas act despite its failure to contain any supervised release 
provision.  The Court's decision in Hendricks provides the 
backdrop 
against 
which 
state 
courts 
measure 
the 
constitutionality of their own civil commitment statutory 
schemes.  
¶42 Since ch. 980's enactment, the Wisconsin Legislature 
has amended the civil commitment statute on various occasions in 
furtherance of its goal of protecting the public.  Several of 
these 
amendments 
have 
dealt 
with 
the 
supervised 
release 
provisions under Wis. Stat. § 980.08 and the physical commitment 
provisions under Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  In particular, these 
amendments have served to limit the ability of a person 
committed pursuant to ch. 980 to obtain supervised release.  
No. 
  2009AP1579 
19 
 
¶43 For 
example, 
in 
1999,10 
the 
legislature 
amended 
§ 980.06 to require that "[a] commitment order under [§ 980.06] 
shall specify that the person be placed in institutional care."  
As originally enacted, ch. 980 did not require institutional 
care upon a determination that an individual was a "sexually 
violent person."  Instead, the individual could be initially 
committed to supervised release.  With this amendment to 
§ 980.06, institutionalized care became a requirement at the 
outset of commitment. 
¶44 Next, in 2003,11 the legislature amended the definition 
of a "sexually violent person" under § 980.01(7) to require a 
commitment determination based on a finding that the individual 
was "likely" to engage in acts of sexual violence.  The 
amendment defined "likely" as "more likely than not."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(1m).  This language replaced the original 
definition that a "sexually violent person" was one who was 
"substantially probable" to engage in acts of sexual violence.  
Thus, this 2003 amendment altered——and arguably lowered——the 
definition of a "sexually violent" person. 
                                                 
10 This amendment was enacted pursuant to 1999 Wis. Act 9, 
§ 3223h. The amendment also repealed Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(a)-
(c), which permitted the court to enter an initial order for the 
sexually violent person to be committed to supervised release as 
opposed to institutional care. 
11 This amendment was enacted pursuant to 2003 Wis. Act 187, 
§§ 1, 2.   
No. 
  2009AP1579 
20 
 
¶45 Most recently, in 2005,12 the legislature limited the 
frequency 
with 
which 
committed 
individuals 
could 
request 
supervised release.  When originally enacted, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(1) allowed a committed individual to petition for 
supervised release every six months.  The 2005 amendment 
required committed individuals to wait at least twelve months 
before filing another petition for supervised release.13  This 
modification 
decreased 
the 
initial 
mandatory 
period 
of 
commitment before an individual could petition for supervised 
release, but extended the waiting period between petitions.  
¶46 These amendments are examples of the changes the 
legislature has made to ch. 980 since its enactment in 1993.  As 
the legislature has amended ch. 980, the courts have been asked 
to determine the constitutionality of such amendments.  For 
example, in 2002, this court reviewed another constitutional 
                                                 
12 This amendment was made pursuant to 2005 Wis. Act 434, 
§ 113.  2005 Wis. Act 434 is the same legislation that created 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg). 
13 Prior to the amendment, Wis. Stat. § 980.08 read in 
pertinent part: "Any person who is committed under s. 980.06 may 
petition [for supervised release] if at least 18 months have 
elapsed since the initial commitment order was entered or at 
least 6 months have elapsed since the most recent release 
petition was denied or the most recent order for supervised 
release was revoked."  (Emphasis added.)  As amended, § 980.08 
reads: "Any person who is committed under s. 980.06 may petition 
[for supervised release] if at least 12 months have elapsed 
since the initial commitment order was entered or at least 12 
months have elapsed since the most recent release petition was 
denied or the most recent order for supervised release was 
revoked."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
21 
 
challenge to ch. 980 in State v. Rachel (Rachel I), 2002 WI 81, 
254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762.   
¶47 Rachel I involved a challenge to the provisions 
governing the petitioner's ability to seek supervised release.  
Specifically, the petitioner argued that amendments to ch. 980 
limited his chances of supervised release.  Id., ¶7.  The court 
found 
that 
merely 
imposing 
limitations 
on 
a 
committed 
individual's access to supervised release did not impose a 
sufficient restraint on his liberty interests to violate due 
process.  Id., ¶66.  Relying on our holdings in Carpenter and 
Post, the court held that amended ch. 980 still served 
compelling state interests in providing treatment to sexually 
violent persons and protecting society from the dangers posed by 
these individuals.  Id., ¶68.  Therefore, the amended supervised 
release 
provisions 
still 
permissibly 
balanced 
the 
public 
interest in safety and the individual liberty of the committed, 
sexually violent person.  Id. 
¶48 It is against this historical backdrop that we review 
West's challenge to the placement of the burden of proof for 
supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg).  
B. Burden Of Proof Under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) 
¶49 An individual committed under ch. 980 may petition for 
discharge or supervised release.  The provision governing 
supervised release previously read: 
(1) Any person who is committed under s. 980.06 
may petition the committing court to modify its order 
by authorizing supervised release . . . . The director 
of the facility at which the person is placed may file 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
22 
 
a petition under this subsection on the person's 
behalf at any time. 
 . . . . 
(4)(b) The court shall grant the petition unless 
the state proves by clear and convincing evidence one 
of the following: 
1. 
That it is likely that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not 
continued in institutional care. 
2. 
That 
the 
person 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
significant progress in his or her treatment or the 
person has refused treatment. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(b) (2003-04). 
¶50 In 2005 
the Wisconsin Legislature repealed this 
provision,14 and enacted the following provision in its stead: 
The court may not authorize supervised release unless, 
based on all of the reports, trial records, and 
evidence presented, the court finds that all of the 
following criteria are met: 
1. 
The person has made significant progress in 
treatment and the person's progress can be sustained 
while on supervised release. 
2. 
It is substantially probable that the person 
will not engage in an act of sexual violence while on 
supervised release. 
3. 
Treatment that meets the person's needs and 
a qualified provider of the treatment are reasonably 
available. 
4. 
The person can be reasonably expected to 
comply with his or her treatment requirements and with 
all of his or her conditions or rules of supervised 
release that are imposed by the court or by the 
department. 
                                                 
14 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 116. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
23 
 
5. 
A reasonable level of resources can provide 
for the level of residential placement, supervision, 
and ongoing treatment needs that are required for the 
safe management of the person while on supervised 
release. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) (emphasis added).15 
¶51 The issue presented is whether the amendment to Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4) has changed the burden of proof in a 
supervised release petition, and if so, to whom has it been 
shifted and how? 
¶52 The parties agree that under prior § 980.08(4)(b) the 
burden of proof was borne by the State.  The plain language of 
the statute instructed the committing court: "The court shall 
grant the petition unless the state proves by clear and 
convincing evidence" one of two factors showing that the 
committed individual was not statutorily entitled to release.  
Id.  The parties also agree that § 980.08(4)(cg) no longer 
contains language that explicitly assigns the burden.16 
¶53 When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we begin 
with the language of the statute, and give it its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  When that meaning is plain, courts will look no 
further.  Id.  We interpret statutory language in context——that 
                                                 
15 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 118. 
16 In fact, both parties in their briefs characterized Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) as ambiguous, differing, of course, on the 
proper interpretation of its alleged ambiguity.  As we explain 
infra, we are not bound by their characterizations, and we 
conclude that the statute is unambiguous. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
24 
 
is, in relation to surrounding or other closely related statutes 
and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., 
¶46.   
¶54 If the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, however, 
after considering all intrinsic sources, we look to extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history to find legislative intent.  
Id., ¶50.  A statute is ambiguous if the statutory language 
gives rise to more than one reasonable meaning.  Teschendorf v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 
N.W.2d 258 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  The 
fact that the parties advance different interpretations of a 
statute does not, alone, make the statute ambiguous.  Id.  
Furthermore, if absurd consequences would follow a plausible 
plain 
reading 
of 
a 
statute, 
that 
interpretation 
may 
be 
unreasonable.  Id., ¶21 n.9.   
¶55 We 
hold 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
amended 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) is unambiguous and clearly assigns the burden of 
producing probative evidence to the committed individual.17 
¶56 The section as amended begins by setting forth a 
presumption: "The court may not authorize supervised release 
                                                 
17 The term "burden of proof" encompasses two aspects: "the 
burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular 
issue," and the burden of persuading the fact-finder regarding 
that issue.  State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 589 N.W.2d 9 
(1999) (internal citations omitted).  We conclude that the 
committed individual bears both burdens.  In order for a court 
to grant a petition for supervised release under the statute, 
the committed individual must produce evidence on all five 
statutory criteria, and must also prove those criteria to the 
court. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
25 
 
unless . . . the court finds . . . ."  Id.  Unlike prior 
§ 980.08(4)(b), which stated that a "court shall grant the 
petition unless the state proves," the court now begins from the 
default position of denying the petition, unless and until 
certain factors are established. 
¶57 Prior § 980.08(4)(b) made it clear that it was the 
State that had to overcome the presumption that a petition would 
be granted.  By contrast, amended § 980.08(4)(cg) sets forth a 
presumption that supervised release may not be authorized 
unless, considering all the evidence, "the court finds that all 
of the following criteria are met."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶58 While this statement does not explicitly address who 
must meet these criteria, or produce evidence for the court, the 
list of criteria required for a grant of supervised release 
makes the assignment of the "burden of proof" unmistakable.  The 
list of criteria reads: 
1. 
The person has made significant progress in 
treatment and the person's progress can be sustained 
while on supervised release. 
2. 
It is substantially probable that the person 
will not engage in an act of sexual violence while on 
supervised release. 
3. 
Treatment . . . and a qualified provider of 
the treatment are reasonably available. 
4. 
The person can be reasonably expected to 
comply with his or her treatment requirements and with 
all . . . conditions 
or 
rules 
of 
supervised 
release . . . imposed 
by 
the 
court 
or 
by 
the 
department. 
5. 
A reasonable level of resources can provide 
for the level of residential placement, supervision, 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
26 
 
and ongoing treatment needs . . . required for the 
safe management of the person.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg). 
¶59 All five criteria are stated in the affirmative.  All 
five criteria are statutory prerequisites to supervised release, 
and must be supported by evidence before the court.  Most 
important, all five criteria weigh in favor of release, and are 
therefore in the committed petitioner's best interests to prove.  
A plain reading of the statute's presumption, coupled with these 
five criteria, unambiguously assigns the burden of proof (that 
is, the burden of producing the requisite evidence) to the 
committed individual seeking supervised release. 
¶60 West argues that, because the language of prior 
§ 980.08(4)(b) so clearly and unequivocally assigned the burden 
of proof to the State, the absence of equally explicit language 
in 
amended 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) 
undermines 
the 
idea 
that 
the 
legislature intended to make a change.  We disagree.   
¶61 As a general rule, the burden of proof lies with the 
petitioning party.  See State v. McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d 492, 499, 
215 
N.W.2d 459 
(1974); 
Rachel 
II, 
324 
Wis. 2d 465, 
¶13; 
Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 726, 556 
N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996).  The legislature is presumed to know 
the law, and to know the legal effect of its actions.  Schill v. 
Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶103, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 
N.W.2d 177.  We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in 
Rachel II: "The legislature's creation of a presumption in favor 
of continued commitment together with the affirmative criteria 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
27 
 
required to rebut that presumption signal the legislature's 
intent to reallocate the burden of proof."  Rachel II, 324 
Wis. 2d 465, ¶16. 
¶62 Moreover, 
to 
read 
amended 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) 
as 
allocating the burden of proof to the State would require the 
State to prove the negative of all five factors.  To do so, each 
of the five criteria would have to be construed in some manner 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.  For 
example, the State would be required to show that the committed 
individual has not made significant progress in treatment, that 
the committed individual can not be reasonably expected to 
comply with treatment requirements, and that it is substantially 
probable that the committed individual will reoffend while on 
release. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg)1.-5. 
 
Such 
a 
construction does violence to the plain language of the statute. 
¶63 The court's holding in McFarren in 1974 lays the 
groundwork for our holding here.  In McFarren, this court set 
forth a five-factor test for courts to apply in allocating the 
burden of proof.  These factors were adopted, as modified, from 
McCormick on Evidence.  McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d at 499-500 (citing 
McCormick on Evidence § 337 (2d ed. 1972).  These factors are: 
(1) the natural tendency to place the burdens on 
the party desiring change; 
(2) special policy considerations such as those 
disfavoring certain defenses; 
(3) convenience; 
(4) fairness; and 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
28 
 
(5) the judicial estimate of probabilities. 
Id. at 499-503. 
¶64 Both West and the State rely on this test to support 
their respective positions.  We consider each factor in turn. 
¶65 First, as has already been discussed, the general rule 
in the law is that the moving party who seeks a change in the 
status quo is the one who bears the burden of proof.  It is the 
committed individual——here, West——who seeks a change from secure 
institutional 
placement 
to 
placement 
in 
community 
based 
supervised release.18  This factor, therefore, favors placing the 
burden on West. 
¶66 The 
second 
factor 
encompasses 
special 
policy 
considerations, such as those disfavoring certain defenses.  
West argues that the liberty interests at stake are special 
policy considerations weighing in favor of assigning the burden 
of proof to the State.  This argument would have significantly 
more weight in the context of an initial commitment proceeding; 
in this case, however, the committed individual's liberty 
interests 
have 
already been lawfully and constitutionally 
restricted.  Furthermore, the safety of the public is a 
significant policy consideration that also must be taken into 
account 
when 
discussing 
the 
possibility 
of 
releasing 
a 
                                                 
18 West argues that this general rule should not apply 
because of the special constitutional interests at stake where 
deprivation of liberty is involved.  He does not provide case 
law or support for an exception to this general rule where 
liberty interests are at stake; accordingly, we reserve our 
review of the constitutional arguments for the following 
section. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
29 
 
dangerous, sexually violent person back into the community.  To 
the extent this factor is applicable, we find that the policy 
considerations are equally persuasive.   
¶67 The third and fourth factors consider convenience and 
fairness.  In discussing convenience, the McFarren court 
explained: "[W]here the facts with regard to an issue lie 
peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the 
burden of proving the issue."  McFarren, 62 Wis. 2d at 500 
(quoting McCormick on Evidence § 337).  West argues that the 
information needed to prove the five criteria in § 980.08(4)(cg) 
lies within the control and knowledge of the State, and, 
therefore, it would be inconvenient to assign him the burden of 
proof.  Specifically, he contends that the information necessary 
to prove the fifth criterion required for the grant of 
supervised release——that resources are "reasonably available" 
for placement, supervision, and treatment on supervised release—
—is unavailable to the committed individual. 
¶68 West's brief goes so far as to suggest that this 
information "is not only in the hands of the state" but is 
information "which the state easily manipulates."  He concedes, 
as he must, that the DHFS is separate from the prosecutors who 
oppose supervised release in the petition hearings, but argues 
that "the practical reality is that the department will 
cooperate with the prosecutors far more readily than with its 
involuntarily-committed patients."  West does not cite any 
authority or evidence in support of this assertion, and we 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
30 
 
reject the allegation that the DHFS would manipulate data or 
fail to cooperate with a committed individual.   
¶69 As the State pointed out in oral argument, it is not 
uncommon for the DHFS and the prosecutor to have different 
positions on a petition for supervised release, and in those 
cases, the DHFS may be represented by its own counsel, separate 
from the State.  Moreover, West is statutorily entitled to an 
independent expert if the DHFS does not support supervised 
release in his annual review.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  He also 
is entitled to access to his treatment records.  The information 
necessary to prove the five criteria in § 980.08(4)(cg) is not 
so unavailable to the committed individual as to make the 
factors of convenience and fairness weigh against the plain 
language of the statute. 
¶70 Significantly, West ignores the remainder of the 
language 
quoted 
in 
McFarren 
regarding 
convenience: "This 
consideration should not be overemphasized.  Very often one must 
plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior 
access 
to 
the 
proof." 
 
Id. 
 
While 
we 
reject 
West's 
characterization of this information as being within the sole 
control of the State, even to the extent that the State has 
better 
access 
to 
this 
information, 
that 
would 
not 
be 
determinative of the allocation of the burden of proof. 
¶71 Finally, 
the 
fifth 
factor 
involves 
a 
judicial 
assessment of the probabilities.  The McFarren court observed, 
"The risk of failure may be placed upon the party who contends 
that the more unusual event has occurred."  Id. at 503.  There 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
31 
 
is no question that the committed individual is the party 
contending that an "unusual" event has occurred——namely, that 
the individual, who was properly committed under ch. 980, may 
now be placed in the community on supervised release without a 
probability of committing another sexually violent offense.   
¶72 It is relevant, at this point, to reiterate the 
requirements for an individual to be committed as sexually 
violent under ch. 980.  At the time West was committed, the 
statutes provided that a person may be committed only after a 
court or jury determines that he or she is 
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent 
for 
a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers 
from 
a 
mental 
disorder 
that 
makes 
it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (1995-96). 
¶73 To carry its burden of proof, the State had to put 
forth evidence to satisfy this definition beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a) (1995-96).  West enjoyed all 
constitutional 
rights available in a criminal proceeding, 
including the right to counsel, and all rules of evidence in 
criminal actions applied.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) (1995-96).  
In light of the fact that the State successfully carried this 
significant burden of proof, it is clear that West's position 
advocates the less likely event——that, after almost two decades 
of sexual assaults, involving at least 25 women, West has made 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
32 
 
such significant progress in treatment that he will not engage 
in an act of sexual violence if placed on supervised release.  
We accordingly conclude that this fifth factor weighs strongly 
in favor of placing the burden of proof with the committed 
individual.19 
                                                 
19 West also argues that Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) may be 
properly interpreted as relieving any party from bearing the 
burden of proof.  He suggests that the list of criteria 
contained in the statute could be viewed as merely factors for 
the circuit court to weigh in making its determination whether 
to grant a petition for supervised release.  For example, in a 
sentencing hearing the circuit court judge is required to make a 
discretionary decision on the basis of statutory factors.  See 
State v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶¶19-20, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 
N.W.2d 466.  Similarly, at the dispositional phase of a 
termination of parental rights proceeding, a circuit court judge 
makes a discretionary decision based on the best interests of 
the child.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  West argues that, under 
a reasonable reading of the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg), the circuit court considering a petition for 
supervised 
release 
should 
similarly 
make 
a 
discretionary 
decision after considering all the evidence. 
The court of appeals considered this same argument in 
Rachel II.  There, the court found it significant that, unlike a 
petition for supervised release, a sentencing court has broad 
discretion in applying the statutory criteria, but is not given 
a statutory presumption.  Rachel II, 2010 WI App 60, ¶¶10-11, 
324 Wis. 2d 465, 782 N.W.2d 443.  Likewise, in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding, there is no presumption of any 
particular custody arrangement; the court's discretion is guided 
only by the best interests of the child.  Id., ¶11. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
33 
 
¶74 As noted above, the term "burden of proof" encompasses 
two aspects: "the burden of producing some probative evidence on 
a particular issue," and the burden of persuading the fact-
finder regarding that issue.  State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 15-
16, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  We 
conclude that the committed individual bears both burdens.  For 
a court to grant a petition for supervised release under the 
statute, the committed individual must produce evidence on all 
five statutory criteria and also prove those criteria to the 
court. 
¶75 While 
we 
conclude 
that 
amended 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) 
unambiguously assigns the burden of proof to the committed 
individual in a petition for supervised release, the question 
remains: What level of persuasion is required for West to carry 
                                                                                                                                                             
We agree with the analysis of the court of appeals in 
Rachel II.  As has already been discussed, the statute begins 
with the words: "The court may not authorize supervised release 
unless" 
the 
enumerated 
criteria 
are 
met. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg).  To accept West's argument would require us to 
ignore the plain language of the statute, which explicitly 
establishes a presumption of denying the petition in the absence 
of proof of entitlement to supervised release.  Without a burden 
of proof, neither the committed individual nor the State would 
be required to bring forth any evidence for or against 
supervised release.  If neither party introduced any evidence as 
to why release was warranted under the statute, the court would 
have to deny the petition.  It logically follows, therefore, 
that one party must bring forth evidence to persuade the court 
to grant release.  For the same reasons that the plain language 
of the statute leads to a conclusion that the burden properly 
lies with the committed individual, not the State, we reject the 
argument that the statute removes the burden from either party. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
34 
 
this burden?20  Because the plain language of the statute does 
not address this question, we conclude that this aspect of the 
statute is ambiguous.  
¶76 We have previously identified two different burdens of 
proof that apply in civil actions: "fair preponderance of the 
evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence."  State v. 
Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 102, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982). 
 
The fair preponderance standard applies in ordinary 
civil actions.  The clear and convincing standard 
applies in cases where public policy requires a higher 
standard of proof than in the ordinary civil action.  
This so-called middle burden of proof has been 
required in such cases as fraud, undue influence, and 
prosecutions of civil ordinance violations which are 
also crimes under state law. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶77 The court of appeals considered which burden should 
apply 
in 
Rachel 
II, 
and 
concluded 
that, 
under 
amended 
§ 980.08(4)(cg), 
the 
petitioner 
must 
prove 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing evidence that supervised release is appropriate.  
Rachel II, 324 Wis. 2d 465, ¶18.  The court of appeals correctly 
observed that, in the absence of statutory language to the 
contrary, preponderance of the evidence might be the appropriate 
burden, unless public policy considerations demand otherwise.  
Id.  The court of appeals concluded that such public policy 
                                                 
20 Under prior Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(b), the State was 
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a 
petitioner was not entitled to supervised release.  State v. 
Brown, 2005 WI 29, ¶¶11-12, 279 Wis. 2d 102, 693 N.W.2d 715. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
35 
 
concerns require the higher standard of clear and convincing 
evidence, and we agree.  Id. 
¶78 In Carpenter, we acknowledged the legitimate public 
safety concerns involved in placing a sexual offender in the 
community. 
 
We 
concluded 
that 
the 
primary 
purposes 
of 
"protection of the public and the treatment of convicted sex 
offenders who are at a high risk to reoffend . . . constitute 
significant nonpunitive and remedial purposes."  Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 271.  In the specific context of supervised release, 
we have further held that the need to return a person to a 
secure facility in the interests of public safety outweigh the 
person's interests in alternatives to having their supervised 
release revoked.  Burris, 273 Wis. 2d 294, ¶30. 
¶79 This prevailing concern for the safety of the public 
also is evident in amended § 980.08(4)(cg)2., which requires a 
showing that it is "substantially probable that the person will 
not engage in an act of sexual violence while on supervised 
release."  We have interpreted "substantially probable" to mean 
"much more likely than not."  Brown, 279 Wis. 2d 102, ¶11 
(citing State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 395, 597 N.W.2d 697 
(1999)). 
¶80 A civil commitment under ch. 980 should not and, due 
to the statutory protections, cannot be undertaken lightly.  
Nevertheless, the release of a person who has been determined to 
be sexually violent into the community where he or she may 
commit further acts of sexual violence is an equally serious 
undertaking.  The concerns for the public safety that justify 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
36 
 
restricting the individual's liberty in the initial commitment 
are perhaps even more strongly implicated in the decision to 
release the individual back into the community, because the 
initial determination involves a finding that the individual is 
likely to reoffend.  Proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
would require a mere showing that it is more likely than not 
that West would not commit another act of sexual violence.  
Where the likelihood we are weighing is whether another 
individual would be more or less likely to be a victim of an act 
of sexual violence, we are unwilling to set the standard so low. 
¶81 Consequently, we conclude that, in the absence of a 
statutory directive to the contrary, it is appropriate to 
require the committed individual to bear the burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to 
supervised release. 
C. West's Constitutional Challenges 
¶82 West contends that allocating the burden of proof to 
the committed individual, as we have determined Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(4)(cg) does, violates the due process and equal 
protection guarantees under the Constitution.  We examine each 
argument in turn. 
1. Due Process 
¶83 Under a procedural due process analysis, we must 
determine first whether there exists a liberty interest of which 
the individual has been deprived, and if so, whether the 
procedures 
used 
to 
deprive 
that 
liberty 
interest 
were 
constitutionally sufficient.  Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
37 
 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).  A protectable liberty 
interest requires more than an individual's desire or unilateral 
expectation; rather, the individual must have "a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to it."  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (citing 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).  
¶84 The State argues that West's liberty interest is 
analogous to that of a criminal parolee and thus the procedures 
provided for supervised release do not violate procedural due 
process.  In Greenholtz, the United States Supreme Court found 
no 
due 
process 
violation 
in 
Nebraska's 
parole 
system.  
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.  In its reasoning the Court held 
that a convicted person does not have a constitutional or 
inherent 
right 
to 
be 
conditionally 
released 
before 
the 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Id. at 7.  Furthermore, a state 
had no duty to establish a parole system in the first place.  
Id.  Where the state held out the possibility of parole, this 
possibility was merely a hope that the benefit might be obtained 
and was not an entitlement.  Id. at 11.  In the case of parole, 
the procedural safeguards inherent in the original conviction 
served to constitutionally extinguish the individual's liberty 
right.  Id. at 7. 
¶85 We find the comparison of supervised release to parole 
procedure instructive in this case.  While West might have a 
liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint, this right 
is not absolute, and was constitutionally limited when he was 
determined to be a sexually violent person under ch. 980.  As 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
38 
 
was discussed supra, that initial determination required the 
State to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).  Once that burden was satisfied, the 
circuit court had a statutory obligation to confine West until 
he is no longer determined to be a sexually violent person.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  Just as the State does not have a duty to 
offer parole, the State has no duty to offer supervised release.  
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (affirming what might be an 
indefinite commitment despite the absence of supervised release 
provisions).   
¶86 Further, 
the 
original 
determination 
of 
being 
a 
sexually violent person, like a conviction before parole, 
carries 
procedural 
safeguards 
that 
serve 
to 
protect 
the 
individual's due process rights.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.03.  
Where the legislature is able to establish conditions necessary 
for parole, it similarly should be able to set conditions for 
supervised release.  That these conditions must then be 
satisfied by the committed individual does not change our 
analysis, especially as he is provided significant rights in a 
supervised release petition under ch. 980, including the right 
to an attorney and the right to discovery of physical and mental 
reexaminations, examiners, and witnesses.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 980.036, 980.07, 980.08.   
¶87 We note that there is a marked difference between a 
petition for supervised release and a petition for discharge 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09. 
 
Once 
a 
discharge 
petition 
establishes through pleading and supportive evidence that "facts 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
39 
 
exist from which a court or jury could conclude the person does 
not meet criteria for commitment," the matter is set for a 
hearing at which the State has the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person still meets the criteria 
for commitment as a sexually violent person. 
¶88 A petition for supervised release more or less 
concedes that the petitioner would not expect to prevail on a 
petition for discharge, where the State had the burden of proof.  
If a petitioner is not ready to be discharged, he has the burden 
of showing that he should nonetheless be placed on supervised 
release in the community.   
¶89 West does not have a recognized, protectable liberty 
interest in supervised release; accordingly, to require him to 
bear the burden of proof in his petition does not violate due 
process. 
2. Equal Protection 
¶90 To prove an equal protection clause violation, the 
party challenging a statute's constitutionality must show that 
"the 
state unconstitutionally treats members of similarly 
situated classes differently."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 318.  The 
right to equal protection does not require that such similarly 
situated classes be treated identically, but rather requires 
that the distinction made in treatment have some relevance to 
the purpose for which classification of the classes is made.  
Id. at 321 (citing Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966)). 
¶91 In analyzing civil commitment statutes, this court has 
acknowledged that persons confined under ch. 980 are similarly 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
40 
 
situated to those confined under ch. 51.  Id. at 318-19.  
Additionally, 
courts have assumed, without deciding, that 
individuals confined under ch. 980 are similarly situated to 
those under § 971.17.  See State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 263, 
¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 1, 637 N.W.2d 791.  While the level of scrutiny 
used in analyzing whether statutes depriving liberty interests 
violate equal protection is unclear, id., ¶11, this court has 
applied, without deciding, strict scrutiny in ch. 980 equal 
protection challenges, Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 321. 
¶92 Our 
decision 
in 
Post 
is 
instructive 
to 
West's 
challenge.  In Post, the defendants challenged the validity of 
ch. 980 on equal protection grounds, arguing that individuals 
involuntarily committed under ch. 51 for mental illness were 
treated differently.  Id. at 317-18.  While the parties and the 
court agreed in finding individuals under ch. 51 and ch. 980 
similarly 
situated, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
statutorily 
distinctive mechanisms for dealing with the two classes was 
proper in light of the difference between the classifications.  
Id. at 319, 325-30.  The different procedures under the 
respective chapters reflect the relative dangerousness of each 
classification, 
and 
the 
State's 
corresponding 
compelling 
interest to protect the public from each group.  Id. at 329-30. 
¶93 Similarly, in Williams, the court of appeals held that 
persons committed under ch. 980, as a class, present more of a 
danger to public safety than those committed under ch. 51.  
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.  Because of this difference in the 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
41 
 
relative level of danger posed to public safety, the court 
concluded that different procedures were warranted.  Id., ¶16.   
¶94 The court in Williams also found significant that it 
is more difficult to commit someone under ch. 980 than under ch. 
51.  Id., ¶14.  Due to differences in the degree of 
dangerousness and in the higher degree of difficulty for 
obtaining 
initial 
confinement, 
the 
court 
concluded 
the 
difference in treatment was warranted and not in violation of 
the equal protection clause.  Id., ¶16.  
¶95 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
Williams 
also 
found 
differences in the treatment of individuals committed under ch. 
980 and Wis. Stat. § 971.1721 to be permissible.  While ch. 980 
required the State to prove the individual's mental disorder and 
dangerousness 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
at 
the 
time 
of 
commitment, § 971.17 only infers current mental illness and 
dangerousness at the time of commitment.  Id., ¶¶17-18.  This 
critical distinction reflects the legislature's judgment that 
sexually violent persons are more dangerous, and accordingly, 
that 
a 
different 
procedure 
and 
confinement 
duration 
is 
warranted.  Id., ¶18. Because the differences in procedure 
reflect the distinction in classifications, these differences 
did not violate the equal protection clause.  
¶96 In this case, placing the burden of proof for 
supervised release with West does not violate the equal 
                                                 
21 Wis. Stat. § 971.17 provides for the commitment of 
persons found not guilty by virtue of mental disease or defect. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
42 
 
protection clause when comparing persons committed under ch. 980 
with those committed under either ch. 51 or § 971.17.  The court 
has recognized that individuals committed under ch. 980 are 
similarly situated to individuals committed under ch. 51.  Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 318-19.  Individuals committed under ch. 980 have 
the burden of proving that supervised release is warranted, 
while under ch. 51 the State has the burden of proving that 
continued confinement is necessary.  Our reasoning in Post, 
coupled with the court of appeals' reasoning in Williams, shows 
that the difference in treatment is directly related to the 
distinct purposes of classification in chs. 51 and 980.  Because 
procedures between similarly situated classes need not be 
identical, and the difference in assigning the burden of proof 
is directly related to the difference in relative danger to 
public safety, we hold that there is no equal protection 
violation. 
¶97 West argues that common goals in treatment of and 
protection from individuals committed under ch. 980, ch. 51, and 
§ 971.17 makes these classes similarly situated and therefore 
requires a similar placement of the burden of proof on the 
State.  This argument, however, does not address the fact that, 
even with similarly situated classes, the State is not required 
to provide identical treatment to each class and instead need 
show only that differences in treatment are relevant to the 
classification distinction.   
¶98 Even if this court assumes the three classifications 
in ch. 980, ch. 51, and § 971.17 are similarly situated, as 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
43 
 
indicated in Post and Williams, distinctions in classifications 
exist so as to warrant different procedures.  Here, placing the 
burden of proof on ch. 980 committed individuals to obtain 
supervised release, but not on those committed under ch. 51 or 
§ 971.17, is permissible due to classification distinctions as 
to the dangerousness of those confined and does not violate the 
equal protection clause.22 
¶99 In conclusion, placing the burden of proof on the 
petitioner for supervised release under amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) does not violate substantive or procedural due 
process, nor does it violate equal protection.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶100 Chapter 980 seeks to address the dangers presented by 
persons who have been determined to be sexually violent because 
of their criminal history and serious mental disorders, without 
ignoring the interests those persons——and society——have in their 
treatment and eventual release.  We have upheld ch. 980 
commitments, and the statutory requirements for supervised 
release, on the basis of this delicate balancing of the public 
safety with individual liberty.  We find it important to note 
                                                 
22 The State argues that individuals committed under ch. 980 
and Wis. Stat. § 971.17 are not similarly situated, and offers 
evidence of a difference in that those committed under § 971.17 
receive generally finite confinement terms whereas ch. 980 
confinement is indefinite.  This argument, while plausible, is 
unnecessary to our analysis.  The classification distinction 
created in terms of proven dangerousness as opposed to inferred 
dangerousness makes the different procedures——in this case, 
assignment of the burden of proof——permissible. 
No. 
  2009AP1579 
44 
 
that if "civil confinement were to become a mechanism for 
retribution or general deterrence . . . our precedents would not 
suffice to validate it."  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
¶101 Under the facts of the instant case, however, we do 
not perceive any such retributive or deterrent aims.  Rather, we 
perceive a legislative attempt to protect the public from those 
committed individuals seeking supervised release who still 
present a substantial danger to the public. 
¶102 Accordingly, we conclude that amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously places the burden of proof with 
the committed individual.  We determine that the appropriate 
burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence.  We 
further hold that this allocation and burden do not violate the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶103 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The problems 
posed by chapter 980 commitments are difficult for both the 
legislature and the court alike.  This case, however, presents a 
fairly straightforward question of statutory interpretation.  
Rather than adhering to the statutory text, the majority 
interprets legislative silence as unambiguous intent to place 
the burden of persuasion on the committed person.  It then 
exacerbates 
any 
constitutional 
infirmities 
such 
an 
interpretation may create by contending that, based on public 
policy, the burden on the committed person is clear and 
convincing evidence.    
¶104 I agree with the majority that if chapter 980 "were to 
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence[,] our 
precedents would not suffice to validate it."  Majority op., 
¶101.  I conclude that the majority's unnecessary interpretation 
pushes chapter 980 one step closer to a punitive scheme.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.      
I 
¶105 As the majority acknowledges, prior to the 2005 
amendments to chapter 980, the State had the burden to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that supervised release was 
inappropriate.  Majority op., ¶52.  The 2005 amendments removed 
the language placing the burden on the State, but did not 
expressly assign any burden to any party.  Id., ¶50.   
¶106 The 
majority 
interprets 
the 
2005 
amendments 
to 
constitute a total reversal of prior law.  Despite the 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
2 
 
legislature's silence on the issue of burden, the majority 
determines that the legislature unambiguously intended to shift 
the burden to the committed person to meet all the criteria for 
supervised release.1  Id., ¶55.   
¶107 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
burden 
falls 
on 
the 
committed person, the majority takes its analysis one step 
further.  The words "clear and convincing" do not appear within 
the text of the supervised release provisions of chapter 980.  
The majority tacitly acknowledges that the normal burden in a 
civil case is preponderance of the evidence, in the absence of 
statutory language to the contrary.  Id., ¶77.  Nevertheless, 
the majority asserts that it is "unwilling to set the standard 
so low."  Id., ¶80.  It makes the determination that "public 
policy" compels a conclusion that the burden should be clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id., ¶77. 
¶108 As the majority contends, legislative amendments "have 
served to limit the ability of a person committed pursuant to 
ch. 980 to obtain supervised release."  Id., ¶42.  In 
determining that placing the burden on the committed person does 
not run afoul of the constitution, the majority appears to rely 
on the initial determination that the committed person is a 
                                                 
1 Under the majority's analysis, the committed person must 
prove that he has made significant progress in treatment which 
can be sustained, that it is substantially probable that he will 
not engage in an act of sexual violence while on supervised 
release, and that he can be reasonably expected to comply with 
treatment requirements and conditions and rules of supervised 
release.  Additionally, the committed person must prove that 
appropriate treatment is reasonably available and that a 
reasonable level of resources can provide for the required 
placement, supervision, and treatment needs. 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
3 
 
sexually violent person.  Id., ¶86.  It also appears to rely on 
the availability of discharge and the procedural safeguards that 
attend petitions for discharge under Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  Id., 
¶87.  It concludes that supervised release is analogous to 
parole in criminal cases, and that a committed person has no 
liberty interest in supervised release.  Id., ¶85.          
II 
¶109 I agree with the majority that the legislature 
unambiguously removed the burden of persuasion from the State.  
The statute formerly provided that a petition for supervised 
release would be granted "unless the state proves by clear and 
convincing 
evidence" 
that 
certain 
criteria 
were 
met.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) (1993-94).  The legislature removed that 
language from the statute, evincing an intent to relieve the 
State of the burden.    
¶110 I 
cannot 
agree, 
however, 
that 
the 
legislature 
unambiguously intended to place the burden on the committed 
person.  The majority sets forth several arguments in support of 
this conclusion, see majority op., ¶¶56-59, and at first blush, 
they appear persuasive.  Nevertheless, at the end of the day, 
language placing the burden of persuasion on the committed 
person is simply absent from the statute.   
¶111 The legislature routinely assigns burdens, and it does 
so by including express language.  In the former statute, the 
legislature expressly placed the burden on the State.  Likewise, 
the legislature has affirmatively assigned burdens of proof in 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
4 
 
the surrounding subsections of chapter 980.2  It is inconceivable 
to imagine that the legislature intended to assign the burden of 
persuasion to the committed person and simply forgot to include 
language doing so.  The majority does what the legislature was 
unwilling to do——it inserts a burden into the statutory text. 
¶112 The better interpretation is that the statute now 
provides no affirmative burden of persuasion on either party.  
Rather, it requires the circuit court to make a discretionary 
determination based on the statutory criteria and all the 
available evidence.      
¶113 The 
majority 
rejects 
this 
interpretation 
in 
a 
footnote.  See majority op., ¶73 n.20.  It advances that the 
interpretation is not workable because neither party "would be 
required to bring forth any evidence."  Id.  However, such a 
scheme is common in other statutes where the circuit court is 
called upon to balance competing interests.  For instance, in 
the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights 
proceeding, the court must consider various statutory criteria 
and make a determination of what is in the best interest of the 
child.  No party——neither the parent, nor the State, nor the 
guardian ad litem——is assigned a burden of persuasion.  
¶114 Not only is this interpretation consistent with the 
language of the statute, but it also helps protect the statute 
from constitutional infirmities.  Rather than interpreting 
chapter 980 to protect it from constitutional infirmities, 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a); Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3) (2009-
10).   
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
5 
 
however, 
the 
majority 
interprets 
legislative 
silence 
as 
unambiguous intent.  It further exacerbates the possibility of 
constitutional infirmities by declaring that "public policy" 
requires a higher burden than the preponderance of evidence, and 
it sets the burden at clear and convincing evidence.   
¶115 Normally, when the level of the burden of persuasion 
is unspecified, it is the preponderance of evidence.  On what 
statutory language or legislative history does the majority rely 
to discard the normal standard and set the burden at clear and 
convincing evidence?  None whatsoever.  The majority relies 
instead on its own assessment of what would be good public 
policy.  It rejects the normal preponderance burden, reasoning: 
"[W]e are unwilling to set the standard so low."  Majority op., 
¶81. 
¶116 In 
setting 
the 
burden 
at 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence, the majority relies on a rationale that is the basis 
of a criminal conviction.  A focus of a chapter 980 commitment 
is the committed person's current level of dangerousness.  This 
focus sets a chapter 980 commitment apart from a criminal 
conviction, which focuses on an initial determination of guilt.  
¶117 Yet, in setting the burden at clear and convincing 
evidence, the majority relies not on any current assessment of 
dangerousness, but rather upon the initial finding that, at the 
time of commitment, the person was more likely than not to 
reoffend.  The majority's reliance on the initial determination 
rather than a current assessment blurs the distinction between 
civil and criminal commitments.      
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
6 
 
III 
¶118 The 
majority's interpretation chips away at the 
constitutional underpinnings of chapter 980.  Chapter 980 was 
first enacted in 1993.  This court addressed various challenges 
to its constitutionality in 1995.  State v. Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d 252, 
541 
N.W.2d 105 
(1995); 
State 
v. 
Post, 
197 
Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  
¶119 This court's initial pronouncements that chapter 980 
was 
constitutional 
relied 
heavily 
on 
the 
then-existing 
supervised release provisions, which ensured that a committed 
person was placed in the least restrictive environment necessary 
to meet therapeutic and public safety needs.  These provisions 
supplied sufficient evidence that the legislature's intent and 
effect was not to punish or indefinitely incarcerate sexually 
violent persons, but rather, to treat them.  Such legislative 
intent 
and 
effect 
was 
necessary 
to 
meet 
constitutional 
standards.        
¶120 I authored the Carpenter majority opinion, in which we 
addressed double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges.  We 
concluded that chapter 980 survived those challenges because the 
"plain language" of the statute demonstrated the legislature's 
intent to "create[] a civil commitment procedure primarily 
intended to protect the public and to provide concentrated 
treatment to convicted sexually violent person, not to punish 
the sexual offender."  197 Wis. 2d at 258.   
¶121 The legislature's non-punitive intent was evinced, in 
part, 
by 
the 
then-existing supervised release provisions.  
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
7 
 
Sexually violent persons were "committed to the [DHSS] for 
control, 
care, 
and 
treatment." 
 
Id. 
at 
259-60.  
Institutionalization at a secure mental health facility was not 
automatic.  Rather, the DHSS was required to provide placement 
"in 
the 
least 
restrictive 
manner 
consistent 
with 
the 
requirements of the person."  Id. at 266.  Supervised release 
was available from day one depending on the person's therapeutic 
needs.  We explained: "These provisions lead us to conclude that 
the statute is aimed primarily at treating the sexually violent 
person, not punishing the individual."  Id. at 267. 
¶122 I joined the majority opinion of this court in Post.  
To survive a due process challenge, we explained, the nature and 
duration of commitment must "bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed."  197 
Wis. 2d at 313.  We concluded that "[t]he language of the 
statute 
provides 
the 
best 
evidence 
of 
this 
reasonable 
relationship."  Id.  The nature of the commitment was "control, 
care and treatment in the least restrictive manner."  Id.  
Further, the duration of institutionalization and commitment 
were intimately linked to treatment of the mental condition.  
Id. at 314.   
¶123 Over the last 15 years, the legislature has steadily 
chipped away at those aspects of chapter 980 upon which we 
relied in determining that the statute was constitutional.  As 
it now exists, chapter 980 is largely unrecognizable from the 
scheme that was deemed constitutional in Carpenter and Post: 
• The 
proof 
necessary to initially commit an 
individual has been significantly lowered.  When 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
8 
 
ch. 980 was first enacted, a jury was required to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
"substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) (1993-94).  Now, the jury must 
conclude only that it is "likely."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) (2009-10).    
• The nature of the commitment is significantly 
more restrictive.  When the statute was first 
enacted, 
a 
commitment 
order 
could 
specify 
"institutional care in a secure mental health 
unit 
or 
facility . . . or 
other 
facility 
or 
supervised release."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) 
(1993-94).  The DHSS was required to place the 
person 
in 
the 
"least 
restrictive 
manner 
consistent with the requirements of the person."  
Id.  Now, this discretion has been removed.  A 
commitment order "shall specify that the person 
be placed in institutional care," and the DHSS 
"shall place a person committed under s. 980.06 
at the secure mental health facility."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 980.06, 980.065(1m) (2009-10).  
• The 
duration 
of 
institutionalization 
is 
necessarily longer.  When the statute was first 
enacted, the DHSS was required to reexamine 
committed persons "within 6 months after an 
initial commitment."  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) 
(1993-94).  Now, the reexamination need not occur 
until twelve months after initial confinement.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (2009-10). 
• When the statute was first enacted, a committed 
person could petition for supervised release when 
6 
months 
had 
elapsed 
since 
the 
original 
commitment.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) (1993-94).  
Now, 
the 
committed 
person 
must 
be 
institutionalized for twelve months prior to 
petitioning for supervised release.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(1) (2009-10). 
• As discussed in this opinion, the availability of 
supervised 
release 
has 
been 
drastically 
undermined.     
¶124 In State v. Rachel (Rachel I), 2002 WI 81, ¶14, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, this court evaluated the 1999 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
9 
 
amendments to chapter 980, which "[a]s a whole . . . limit[ed] 
the 
ch. 
980 
respondent's 
ability 
to 
obtain 
supervised 
release[.]"  We concluded that despite these limitations, the 
statute remained constitutional.    
¶125 I wrote separately, concurring in the mandate.  I 
concurred 
because 
of 
the 
presumption 
that 
a 
statute 
is 
constitutional and the rule that a statute must be proven 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶86 (Bradley, 
J., concurring).  Yet, I concluded that the supervised release 
provisions, as amended in 1999, were "on the brink of running 
afoul of the constitution."  Id., ¶71.  Given the many changes 
in the law since its inception, most of them chipping away at 
the edges of this court's rationale in Carpenter and Post, I 
said that the presumption of constitutionality was "wearing 
thin."  Id., ¶75.   
¶126 With the most recent amendments, as they have been 
interpreted by the majority, I conclude that the arguments in 
favor of constitutionality have just about worn out. 
¶127 In my view, a key component of the original statute's 
constitutionality is that the burden continually fell on the 
State to justify the placement of a sexually violent person in 
the most restrictive environment——institutionalization at a 
secure mental health facility.  As amended in 1999, however, a 
committed person must be institutionalized at a secure mental 
health facility upon commitment.  Now, under the most recent 
amendments, the presumptions embodied by the statute appear to 
favor continued institutionalization.    
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
10 
 
¶128 Not only must the committed person prove that he poses 
a low risk of danger to others, he also must prove elements that 
are unrelated to his level of dangerousness.  He must prove that 
placement, supervision, and treatment are "reasonably available" 
and can be provided with a "reasonable level of resources."  As 
a result, the nature and duration of commitment may no longer be 
related to the person's legitimate treatment needs and the 
actual danger they would pose under the conditions of supervised 
release.          
¶129 When I examine how this statute has evolved over the 
last 15 years, I have increasing doubts that the "plain 
language" of the statute evinces that the legislature's choices 
are "primarily intended to protect the public and to provide 
concentrated treatment to convicted sexually violent persons, 
not to punish the sexual offender."  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 
258.  Rather, chapter 980 increasingly resembles a punitive 
scheme.3 
                                                 
3 I agree with the majority that the procedural safeguards 
attending 
initial 
commitment 
proceedings 
as 
well 
as 
the 
availability of discharge and the procedural safeguards that 
attend 
discharge 
proceedings 
are 
essential 
aspects 
of 
maintaining chapter 980's constitutionality.  Without these 
safeguards, 
a 
committed 
person 
could 
be 
indefinitely 
institutionalized even if he no longer met the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person.  Such a scheme would 
surely run afoul of numerous constitutional provisions.  Foucha 
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992). 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
11 
 
¶130 This shifting focus away from treatment and toward 
punishment is reflected in the majority's analysis.  To justify 
what it perceives to be the legislature's choice, the majority 
relies more and more on the procedural safeguards that attended 
the initial commitment and the fact that a jury once found that 
the committed person was a sexually violent person.   
¶131 The majority explains that "the original determination 
of being a sexually violent person, like a conviction before 
parole, carries procedural safeguards that serve to protect the 
individual's due process rights."  Majority op., ¶86.  It 
further contends that it is "unusual" that a person "who was 
properly committed under ch. 980, may now be placed in the 
community on supervised release without a probability of 
committing another sexually violent offense."  Majority op., 
¶71, see also id., ¶73.   
¶132 These 
justifications 
resonate 
with 
a 
criminal 
commitment scheme, in which an accused defendant is afforded 
procedural safeguards at trial, and the finality of judgment 
carries great weight after conviction.  They do not belong in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority relies on Hendricks for the stark proposition 
that a civil commitment statute need not contain any supervised 
release provision at all to pass constitutional muster.  See 
majority op., ¶41.  I do not find this argument to be 
persuasive.  It overlooks that each civil commitment scheme is 
its own package and must be evaluated as a whole based on all of 
its characteristics.  See State v. Rachel (Rachel I), 2002 WI 
81, ¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 ("[W]e think it is 
necessary to look beyond the mere amendments in our analysis to 
the statute as a whole.")  It also overlooks the fact that, as 
discussed in detail below, this court heavily relied on the 
supervised release provisions when it first pronounced chapter 
980 constitutional.   
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
12 
 
civil commitment scheme, where the nature and duration of 
commitment are supposed to be "intimately linked to treatment of 
[the] mental condition."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314.  The 
majority makes clear that it considers placement in the 
community under supervision——which was once a cornerstone of the 
statute's constitutionality——to be an "unusual event." 
¶133 Ultimately, the majority's interpretation invites an 
absurd result contrary to the legitimate purposes of chapter 
980.  It appears that it may be easier for a person who was once 
determined to be sexually violent to obtain discharge than 
supervised release.   
¶134 When a person is placed on supervised release, he 
lives in the community but at the same time is strictly 
monitored by the DHSS.  Supervised release often includes 
stringent conditions.4  If the person violates any rule or 
condition, supervised release can be readily revoked.  By 
contrast, when a person is discharged from a chapter 980 
commitment, that person is released into the community and free 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 908.08(9)(a) ("As a condition of 
supervised release . . . , for the first year of supervised 
release, the court shall restrict the person on supervised 
release to the person's home except for outings that are under 
the direct supervision of a department of corrections escort and 
that are for employment purposes, for religious purposes, or for 
caring for the person's basic living needs."); see also Wis. 
Admin. Code DHS § 98.07(3); Dept. Health Services, Conditional 
Release 
Rules 
and 
Conditions, 
available 
at 
www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/forms1/f2/f25614.doc.   
The conditions and monitoring placed on a person on 
supervised release are much more stringent than the conditions 
and monitoring placed on someone who is on extended supervision 
after serving a conviction for a criminal offense. 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
13 
 
to go about his business with no constraints.  There are no 
conditions or monitoring because he is no longer in the care, 
custody, and control of the DHSS.    
¶135 As set forth above, chapter 980 was originally found 
to be constitutional because it served the legitimate purposes 
of protection of the public and treatment of sexually violent 
persons.  I conclude that the absurd result countenanced by the 
majority undercuts both purposes.  It favors the release of 
sexually violent persons into the community without control, and 
it disfavors the therapy for sexually violent persons that can 
be best achieved in the community.         
¶136 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶137 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1579.awb 
 
 
 
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