Title: State v. Randol

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

226 Kan. 347 (1979)
597 P.2d 672
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
CHARLENE F. RANDOL, Appellee.
No. 50,820

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 14, 1979.
Leonard J. Dix, county attorney, argued the cause and Robert Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Daniel C. Walter, of Ryan, Kent, Wichman & Walter, of Norton, argued the cause and John F. McClymont, of the same firm was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an appeal by the State on a question reserved from a district court ruling that K.S.A. 21-3405 (vehicular homicide) is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.
The appellee, Charlene F. Randol, was found not guilty after a trial to the court on two counts of vehicular homicide. She was found not guilty for two reasons: (1) that she was not guilty of more than simple negligence and (2) K.S.A. 21-3405 is unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite. The district court held that the words "material deviation", as used in the statute and as previously applied in decisions of this court, were so vague and indefinite that the statute violated the constitutional guarantees of due process. The State is not challenging the "not guilty" verdict *348 and the sole question on appeal is the constitutionality of the statute. Under these circumstances it is not necessary to recite the facts other than to state that appellee was the driver of an automobile involved in a two-car collision in which both occupants of the other vehicle were killed.
K.S.A. 21-3405 reads:
"(3) Vehicular homicide is a class A misdemeanor."
In construing the constitutionality of a statute there are certain familiar rules to be followed:
The vagueness test applicable to criminal statutes was set out in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977):
See also Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 562 P.2d 65 (1977); State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 502 P.2d 705 (1972); State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
The test, under Section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, is the same as that applicable in determining whether a statute violates *349 the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution and was analyzed and discussed in State v. Hill, 189 Kan. at 410-411:
Another principle discussed in State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, is particularly applicable to our current analysis:
With the foregoing general principles in mind, we now turn to the question before the court. Are the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3405 so vague and indefinite that the statute is unconstitutional? We think not.
The predecessor to our present statute was the negligent homicide statute, K.S.A. 8-529, which read:
This statute was repealed in 1969 with the adoption of K.S.A. 21-3405. The 1969 statute was identical with today's except the term "material deviation" in section (1) read "substantial deviation." The word substantial was changed to material in 1972.
A conviction under the present statute requires a finding that the defendant was guilty of conduct "which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances."
In State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643, 549 P.2d 886 (1976), we considered the 1972 amendment while determining the degree of negligence necessary to convict under this statute.
In the case sub judice the trial court found that the words "material deviation" were so vague and indefinite that the statute was unconstitutional. While the statute in its present form no longer refers to negligence as the basis for the offense, the overwhelming majority of vehicular homicide statutes from other jurisdictions contain some express reference to "negligent conduct." Some require only "simple" negligence while others require "criminal" and "gross" negligence. Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 473. Cases under our old negligent homicide statute interpreted it *351 to apply to ordinary negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle which proximately resulted in the death of another. State v. Champ, 172 Kan. 737, 242 P.2d 1070 (1952); State v. Miles, 203 Kan. 707, 457 P.2d 166 (1969).
Even though "negligence" is not expressly mentioned in 21-3405, we have held that it is still the gravamen of the offense. State v. Choens, 224 Kan. 402, 580 P.2d 1298 (1978); State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 576 P.2d 666 (1978). In Makin the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and appealed to this court asserting that the vehicular homicide statute, being a specific statute, superseded the general manslaughter statute. We held that it did except in cases of wanton conduct which was equated with gross negligence. This determination was amplified upon in Choens. It is now established that the "material deviation" required for a conviction under 21-3405 requires something more than ordinary or simple negligence yet something less than gross and wanton negligence. It was the necessity for this determination that the trial court found made the statute vague and indefinite and therefore unconstitutional.
It is true that no hard and fast rule can be stated that would set an obvious standard of conduct in every factual situation. No such standard is required. The fact that the prescribed standard of conduct in a criminal statute may be one of varying degree dependent upon the factual circumstances in each case does not make a criminal law unconstitutional. As Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 57 L. Ed. 1232, 33 S. Ct. 780 (1913):
The Supreme Court has also noted that there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls. However, this is not sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957).
The terms "ordinary or simple negligence" and "gross and wanton negligence" have been ingrained in our law for years and are now generally accepted and understood by the legal profession and the judiciary. It is no longer argued that such terms are so vague and indefinite that juries and courts cannot apply them to particular circumstances or facts. See PIK Civ.2d 3.01  3.04 (1978). There are many terms now accepted as establishing reasonably definite standards of proscribed criminal conduct which are not explicit and are not subject to specific definition applicable to all possible factual situations. In United States v. Henderson, 121 F.2d 75, 76-77 (D.C. Cir.1941), a statute which prohibited "the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not willfully or wantonly" was attacked on constitutional grounds. The court said:
There is no limit to the terminology used in criminal cases which is not subject to specific definition which would apply to all facts and circumstances. A few that readily come to mind include: beyond a reasonable doubt; prudent man; greater weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; a preponderance of the evidence; reasonable man; substantial rights; prejudicial error, etc. All such terms require the trier of the facts or the court on appeal to apply a general standard, not a specific one, to the circumstances in the particular case. In State v. Wojahn, 204 Ore. 84, 282 P.2d 675 (1955), the court in an extensive and comprehensive *353 opinion reviewed the vehicular death statutes then in effect in many of the United States. Decisions are cited and quoted finding statutes constitutional which use such diverse and general terms as: "without due caution or circumspection"; "driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and proper"; "operation of a vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed"; "lack of due caution and circumspection"; "culpable negligence"; "driving in negligent disregard of the safety of others"; "exercising all reasonable care"; "reckless disregard"; and others.
In Makin, we recognized the difficulty in distinguishing "wanton conduct" (gross negligence) from "simple negligence".
As we have indicated previously, a material deviation is such a departure from the ordinary standards of due care to amount to more than simple or ordinary negligence yet less than gross and wanton negligence. State v. Choens, 224 Kan. 402; State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743. We have also held that material deviation is the same as substantial deviation. State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643. This court has found the qualifying term "substantial" to be reasonably definite as used in the phrase "real or substantial value." State, ex rel., v. Fairmont Foods Co., 196 Kan. 73, 410 P.2d 308 (1966). The terms material and substantial have been considered in literally hundreds of appellate decisions involving innumerable factual circumstances and standards. See 26A Words and Phrases, pp. 209-294, and 40 Words and Phrases, pp. 757-853. *354 Material is a relative term which must be gauged by all the circumstances surrounding the transaction or event to which it refers. It imports a considerable amount in opposition to that which is inconsequential or small. It is serious as opposed to trivial or minimal. It is extraordinary as opposed to ordinary. It is major as opposed to minor. In short, when applied to the statute in question it is more than the everyday minimal departures from the ordinary standard of care required by our vehicle and traffic statutes and ordinances yet something less than the reckless disregard and complete indifference and unconcern which are inherent in the more serious offenses involving gross or wanton conduct. A driver of a vehicle exceeding the speed limit by 5 miles per hour would be in violation of the statute or ordinance establishing the same but would not be considered to be materially deviating from the standard. On the other hand a violation of exceeding the limit by 30 miles per hour, under certain circumstances such as in a school zone, might be a material deviation. We recognize that the use of synonyms and antonyms to define or describe a term in a criminal statute does not result in that degree of specificity that would be ideal; however, when the terms of the statute and the words used to define them are words of general usage, commonly known and understood by the public, they are sufficient to meet constitutional muster.
Each case must be considered upon its own set of facts and circumstances and each judge or jury must determine whether the alleged conduct constitutes such a deviation from the norm as to fall within the proscribed conduct. It was this duty that the trial judge in the instant case did not feel he could meet although he had no difficulty in finding the defendant was guilty of ordinary negligence and had departed from the required minimum standards of care. Likewise, he had no difficulty in determining that the actions of the defendant did not constitute wanton or willful negligence. If the facts had warranted it, we believe the court could also have determined that the conduct fell between these two extremes so as to constitute a violation of the statute.
In State v. Ashton, 175 Kan. 164, 262 P.2d 123 (1953), the constitutionality of the negligent homicide statute, G.S. 1949, 8-529 was considered. This court said:
....
....
As reasonable certainty is all that is required, we hold that the words "material deviation" as used in K.S.A. 21-3405 are not unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite when the standard proscribed therein is measured against the parameters of ordinary negligence on the one hand and gross and wanton negligence on the other.
The appeal is sustained.