Title: Commonwealth v. Huang

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11575 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DA LIN HUANG. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 10, 2021. - February 16, 2022. 
 
Present:  Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Mental Impairment.  Constitutional 
Law, Sentence.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Photograph, 
Expert opinion, Opinion, Prior inconsistent statement, 
Competency, Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, 
Jury and jurors, Challenge to jurors, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Sentence, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 20, 2001. 
 
The case was tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on April 9, 2019, was heard by 
Michael D. Ricciuti, J. 
 
 
Susan J. Baronoff for the defendant. 
David D. McGowan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Tatum 
A. Pritchard, & Steven J. Schwartz, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Da Lin Huang, was convicted 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
cruelty for the killing of his wife, Gin Hua Xu, who was 
bludgeoned by over forty blows, some of which pierced her skull 
and fractured her cheekbones, and manually strangled.  The 
couple had separated a few months earlier, and the victim 
recently had announced her decision to file for divorce.  On the 
day of the killing in late January 2001, she had returned to the 
couple's apartment apparently believing she would visit their 
minor children, ages ten and three.  The children, however, were 
not there; earlier, the defendant had made an unusual decision 
to send the children on an approximately forty-five minute, 
midwinter walk to visit his brother, who lived about one and 
one-half miles away.  The defendant presented a defense of 
diminished capacity at trial.  Following his conviction, his 
motion for a new trial was denied by a judge who was not the 
trial judge. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant contends that 
reversal of his conviction is required because the prosecutor 
improperly exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a male 
juror, the trial judge abused her discretion in connection with 
certain evidentiary decisions, the prosecutor made improper 
statements in his closing argument, and the jury instruction on 
mental impairment was insufficient.  He also maintains that 
denial of his motion for a new trial constitutes an abuse of 
discretion because he is intellectually disabled, and, as such, 
3 
 
imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on him 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or a reduction in the 
verdict.  We affirm the conviction and the order denying his 
motion for a new trial and discern no reason to grant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts find 
support in the evidence presented at trial. 
 
In October 2000, approximately ten years into a marriage 
that had grown increasingly acrimonious, the victim moved out of 
the apartment that she and the defendant had shared with their 
two children -- a ten year old son and a three year old 
daughter.  The victim, who worked outside the home to provide 
financial support for the family, told the defendant that she 
was going to file for divorce. 
 
The couple had immigrated to the United States from China 
in 1993.  They lived next door to the defendant's brother, who 
lived with his wife, two children, and a nephew; the defendant's 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, the Center for Public 
Representation, and the Disability Law Center. 
4 
 
other brother lived about one and one-half miles away with his 
wife and children. 
 
Since a car accident in 1999 in which he sustained injuries 
to his neck and back, the defendant had been the primary 
caregiver for the couple's children, providing them with meals, 
assisting his son with homework, and taking care of the 
apartment.  The defendant's niece, who lived next door and saw 
him near daily, testified to her observations of the defendant 
taking care of the children, doing chores, and cooking meals.  
One of the defendant's nephews, who also saw him daily, 
testified that the defendant shopped for groceries, cooked, and 
checked in on the nephew.  Neither the niece nor the nephew 
observed anything unusual about the defendant's intelligence or 
memory. 
Over the years, the defendant and the victim argued about 
the defendant's daily gambling habit.  The defendant's son 
testified that when the victim refused to give the defendant 
funds for gambling, the defendant would raise his voice, speak 
to the victim disrespectfully, and sometimes use physical force 
to get the money, several times shoving her and causing her to 
cry.  The defendant's nephew also testified that the defendant 
would take money from the victim using physical force, raise his 
voice, and shove her.  The son and nephew intervened on 
5 
 
occasion, physically blocking the defendant from striking the 
victim.2 
In December 2000, approximately one month before the 
killing, the defendant and the victim met with the victim's 
lawyer to discuss whether the defendant would agree to a 
proposed joint separation agreement.  Assisted by an 
interpreter, the victim's lawyer reviewed the separation 
agreement with the defendant.  The lawyer testified that the 
defendant did not speak much during the meeting, but he 
apparently understood what was going on.  The meeting ended when 
the defendant walked out, refusing to sign the agreement. 
Approximately one week before the victim was killed, police 
officers responded to a report of a domestic dispute at the 
couple's apartment.3  An argument between the victim and the 
defendant had arisen over the care of the couple's son.  One of 
the responding officers, who had spoken to the defendant, 
testified that he did not notice anything unusual about him at 
that time. 
The killing occurred in late January 2001.  That day, 
around 11 A.M., the victim's friend, with whom she normally 
 
2 The couple also had heated arguments about the victim's 
parents, who stayed with them when visiting from China. 
 
3 As set forth supra, by then the victim had moved out of 
the couple's apartment. 
6 
 
carpooled to work, drove her to the Chinatown train station so 
that she could visit her children at the defendant's apartment.  
Earlier that winter morning, however, the defendant had made the 
unusual decision to send the couple's children on a walk to the 
home of his older brother, about forty-five minutes away; he 
asked his nephew to accompany them. 
 
At around 9 or 10 P.M., the defendant's sister-in-law sent 
the children home; she called the defendant's home telephone 
twice, but there was no answer.  The defendant's niece and 
nephew, who lived next door, went to check on the defendant and 
were unable to open the front door of the apartment.  The 
defendant's niece observed blood on and around the door.  The 
landlord, who lived upstairs and had a key to the defendant's 
apartment, unlocked the door but could not open it; it was 
chained from the inside, and there was something on the floor 
behind the door, blocking it. 
 
Police officers and emergency medical technicians responded 
to the scene.  They observed blood smeared on the apartment door 
and the adjacent walls.  After removing the door chain, they 
entered the apartment.  Directly behind the door, they found the 
victim's body in a state of rigor mortis. 
 
The victim had been badly beaten.  Her body was bruised, 
her shirt and bra had been pulled up, and her pants pulled down.  
There was a long, metal object protruding from her vagina, which 
7 
 
later was determined to be an eighteen-inch knife-sharpening rod 
with a six-inch handle.  Hair-covered pliers lay on her stomach.4  
The victim and the surrounding walls and door were splattered 
with blood, and the victim's socks were covered with blood and 
hair.  The back door to the apartment was locked from the inside 
with two separate locks. 
 
In the bedroom, officers found the defendant in a bed, 
unconscious and not breathing; he was covered in the victim's 
blood,5 and a cell phone and a bottle of alcohol lay next to him.  
Two bloodstained pill bottle lids were also recovered from the 
bedroom.  From the kitchen, officers retrieved five empty 
prescription pill bottles bearing the defendant's name on the 
label.6  Paramedics administered Narcan to the defendant, after 
which he began to breathe on his own. 
 
An autopsy of the victim showed that she had sustained at 
least forty-six laceration wounds to the head, face, and 
forehead, several of which went through the skin to the bone.  
 
4 Testing revealed that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) matching 
the defendant was on the handle of the knife sharpening rod and 
on the handle of the pliers. 
 
5 The victim's DNA was found on the defendant's clothes. 
 
6 The bottles were covered in blood.  DNA matching the 
victim was found on two of the bottles.  Officers also found a 
mug with bloodstains on the outer lip and handle.  Fingerprints, 
which were subsequently individualized to the defendant, were 
found on the mug and on a second mug found in the hallway, along 
with DNA matching the victim. 
8 
 
She had facial bruising and multiple fractures to the skull and 
cheekbones.  Some lacerations on the victim's forehead matched 
the end of the pliers.  Beneath her scalp, she had a hemorrhage, 
the diffuse nature of which indicated that she had been alive 
when the multiple wounds to her head, face, and forehead were 
inflicted.  She had defensive wounds on the back of her hands.  
Her neck had contusions, four fractures, and hemorrhaging caused 
by blunt trauma or compression.  The medical examiner concluded 
that the cause of death was blunt head trauma and manual 
strangulation.  Additionally, there were lacerations and cuts 
through her nipples, and penetration into her vagina and bowel 
with the knife-sharpening rod, each of which appeared to have 
been inflicted after death. 
 
b.  Defendant's case.  At trial, the defendant asserted a 
defense based on diminished capacity.7  Clinical forensic 
 
7 "Although the mental impairment [defense] is often 
colloquially referred to as 'diminished capacity,' it is well 
established that 'there is no "diminished capacity" defense in 
this Commonwealth.'  However, '[i]n accordance with Commonwealth 
v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 673 (1980), a defendant "may produce 
expert testimony on the issue whether or not the impairment of 
his mental processes precluded him from being able to 
deliberately premeditate,"'" Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 
801, 804 n.3 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Companonio, 445 
Mass. 39, 45 n.7 (2005), or on the issue of intent, Commonwealth 
v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 422 (2020) ("a jury could 
find that, by virtue of a mental impairment, a defendant lacked 
the requisite intent to commit murder in the first degree").  
See Commonwealth v. Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 538 n.6 (2021) ("There 
is no diminished capacity defense in the Commonwealth.  A jury, 
however, may consider credible evidence of mental impairment in 
9 
 
psychologist Jeffery Long opined that the defendant had 
posttraumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder so 
severe that he became psychotic at times, and that the defendant 
suffered from several psychiatric issues that "collectively 
impaired his ability to premeditate killing his wife, [to 
intend] to kill his wife, and [to understand] that his actions 
would lead to her death."  On cross-examination, Long 
acknowledged that he had not been aware of some details of the 
killing; he testified that he might reconsider his opinion if he 
were to learn new details, such as that the victim was manually 
strangled,8 and that the front door was locked with both a 
deadbolt and security chain.9 
 
Dr. Rebecca Brendel, a psychiatrist who examined the 
defendant seven times between 2006 and 2010, concluded that it 
was "highly unlikely that [the defendant] was able to form 
specific intent at the time of the alleged offense," and that 
there was "significant uncertainty that [the defendant] was able 
 
deciding whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of proving 
the defendant's state of mind" [citation omitted]). 
 
8 Long testified that his understanding was that the 
defendant had killed his wife by stabbing her in the head with 
pliers, and that he did not know that the victim also had been 
manually strangled. 
 
9 Long testified that he was aware that the front door had 
been locked, but he was not aware that the chain also had been 
secured. 
10 
 
to premeditate at the time of the alleged offense."  In 
addition, she testified that the defendant had limited cognitive 
functioning, perhaps attributable to the head injury he had 
sustained in the 1999 car accident and his intelligence quotient 
(IQ) being in the tenth percentile or below of all adults.  On 
cross-examination, Brendel acknowledged that, when forming her 
opinion, she was not aware that the defendant had asked his 
nephew to take his children to a relative's house that was a 
forty-five minute walk away on the morning of the killing, that 
it would have been preferable to interview the defendant closer 
in time to the killing, and that jurors or others who heard more 
information about the defendant's functioning around the time of 
the killing might be better positioned than she to "make certain 
decisions about this case."10 
 
10 In addition to Long and Brendel, Jody Schapiro, a 
forensic psychologist and court clinician who examined the 
defendant in March 2004, more than three years after the 
killing, opined that the defendant appeared to have psychotic 
symptoms and schematic delusions, as well as some memory 
problems and thought disorganization.  She did not proffer an 
opinion as to the defendant's mental state at the time of the 
killing. 
 
The defendant also presented testimony from his brothers, 
who testified that their father had suffered from mental 
illness, that the defendant had looked unhappy since his car 
accident, and that he was quieter now than he had been in China.  
One brother testified that the defendant reported that 
"sometimes he doesn't know what he's doing and . . . his mind 
cannot be controlled" as a result of the pain medication he was 
prescribed following the accident. 
11 
 
 
c.  Commonwealth's rebuttal.  Dr. Gail Lee, who was the 
defendant's physician from March 1999 to July 2000, testified 
that she prescribed an opioid to the defendant to treat his pain 
after the 1999 car accident, and that she had observed no 
symptoms of mental illness, brain injury, or cognitive 
impairment. 
 
Psychiatrist Dr. Alison Fife interviewed the defendant in 
January 2010, nine years after the killing, and examined 
documentary evidence, such as the defendant's medical records, 
grand jury minutes, police interviews, and photographs of the 
crime scene and autopsy.  In view of the defendant's "level of 
functioning in his life preceding the crime [and] immediately 
after the crime," Fife opined that the defendant did not have a 
mental illness at the time of the crime.11  She saw no signs of 
hallucinations, delusions, cognitive impairment, or psychotic 
symptoms, and concluded that the defendant's admission that he 
had attempted suicide following the killing evidenced his 
"awareness of responsibility, and a guilty feeling, an 
acknowledge[ment] of having done something for which he is 
responsible." 
 
11 Fife explained that in assessing the defendant's "level 
of functioning," she considered the defendant's self-care and 
activities of daily living, such as whether he was able to 
"shower, bathe, brush [his] teeth, prepare [his] food, [and] 
take adequate nutrition." 
12 
 
 
Psychologist Caleb Ho twice evaluated the defendant at 
Bridgewater State Hospital in February 2001, approximately one 
month after the killing, and concluded that the defendant "did 
not exhibit signs that would lead [Ho] to conclude that he was 
suffering from a major mental illness."  Ho observed that the 
defendant appeared to have logical thought processes and noted 
that the defendant did not report experiencing hallucinations 
and did not believe himself to have a mental illness.  Ho 
concluded that the defendant's symptoms of depression were "a 
function of situational stress," caused by the defendant's 
unfamiliarity with the protocol and procedures of the American 
legal system. 
 
d.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted in 2001 
by a grand jury in Suffolk County for murder, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 1.  In 2004,12 the court allowed the defendant's 
motion for a referral to Bridgewater State Hospital for 
evaluation for competency and lack of criminal responsibility.13  
 
12 Between 2001 and 2004, the defendant and the Commonwealth 
filed a series of motions related to evidence, witnesses, and 
fees.  Status reviews were held at least every other month 
during this period. 
 
13 A court may order an examination of a defendant by a 
qualified physician or psychologist if it "doubts whether a 
defendant in a criminal case is competent to stand trial or is 
criminally responsible by reason of mental illness or mental 
defect."  G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). 
 
13 
 
Following a jury trial, which began in January 2010,14 the 
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Prior to sentencing, the 
court granted defense counsel's request to have a court 
clinician evaluate the defendant for competence.  The judge 
found "nothing in the [clinician's] report that indicates . . . 
that there's any issues in regard to competency today," and 
sentenced the defendant to the statutorily mandated sentence of 
life in prison without parole.  The report also recommended 
commitment of the defendant to Bridgewater State Hospital for a 
period of six months pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a), which 
the judge allowed.  The defendant filed a direct appeal. 
 
In April 2019,15 the defendant filed a motion for a 
reduction in verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, 
arguing that a postconviction neuropsychological examination, 
together with the evidence presented at trial, demonstrated that 
 
14 Between 2005 and 2008, the court continued to hold 
regular status reviews and entered numerous continuances.  The 
trial was scheduled for January 2008, but was delayed after the 
defendant filed a pro se motion to remove counsel and appoint 
new counsel.  Defense counsel withdrew soon after, and new 
counsel was appointed.  In 2008 and 2009, the defendant filed 
three motions to change the trial date, each of which was 
allowed; the parties agreed to a January 2010 trial date. 
 
15 Between 2014 and 2019, the court allowed several motions 
to stay or to extend appellate deadlines, which the defendant 
requested, to provide time for the defendant's medical 
evaluation and neurological testing and for the filing of a 
motion for new trial. 
14 
 
he is intellectually disabled, and that imposing a life sentence 
would violate his State and Federal constitutional rights.  The 
motion judge, who was not the trial judge, held a nonevidentiary 
hearing and subsequently denied the defendant's motion in 
January 2021. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
erred in not requiring the Commonwealth to explain the use of a 
peremptory challenge to strike a male prospective juror, abused 
her discretion in connection with certain evidentiary rulings, 
allowed improper statements in the prosecutor's closing 
argument, and provided deficient jury instructions related to 
mental impairment.  He further contends that the motion judge 
erred in denying his motion for a reduction in verdict or new 
trial.  Finally, he asks that this court exercise its power 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or a reduction 
in the verdict.  We address each contention in turn. 
 
a.  Peremptory challenge against male prospective juror.  
On the second day of jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a 
peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror no. 56, a male 
law school student.  Defense counsel objected, noting that the 
prosecutor had used seven of its ten challenges against male 
prospective jurors.  The trial judge denied the defendant's 
challenge without requiring the prosecutor to explain the basis 
for the peremptory challenge.  On appeal, the defendant 
15 
 
maintains that the objection was sufficient to raise an 
inference of gender discrimination, and that the judge should 
have required the prosecutor to give a gender-neutral 
explanation for the challenge. 
 
Peremptory challenges may not be used to discriminate 
against a potential juror on the basis of gender.  See J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994); Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488-489, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 
(1979).  "A challenge to a peremptory strike, whether framed 
under State or Federal law, is evaluated using a burden-shifting 
analysis."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 488 Mass. 191, 195-196 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 603, 606 
(2018).  "First, the burden is on the objecting party to 
establish a prima facie showing of impropriety sufficient to 
overcome[] the presumption of regularity afforded to peremptory 
challenges" (quotations omitted).16  Carter, supra at 196, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 311 (2020).  
"The issue here is whether the judge abused her discretion by 
concluding that the defendant[] had not made a prima facie 
 
16 If the judge finds that the objecting party has satisfied 
this burden, the burden shifts to the party exercising the 
challenge to provide a "group-neutral" reason for the challenge.  
Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 311 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 319 (2017).  The judge 
then evaluates "whether the proffered reason is both adequate 
and genuine" (quotations omitted).  Henderson, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 391 (2018). 
16 
 
showing of [gender] discrimination as to . . . the peremptory 
challenge[] of" prospective juror no. 56.  Carter, supra. 
 
The burden of raising an inference that a prospective juror 
was struck because of his or her protected status is not 
onerous.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 513-514 
(2020), citing Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005). 
"In determining whether a prima facie case of 
discriminatory purpose has been established, a judge may 
consider all relevant circumstances, including (1) the 
number and percentage of group members who have been 
excluded; (2) the possibility of an objective group-neutral 
explanation for the strike or strikes; (3) any similarities 
between excluded jurors and those, not members of the 
allegedly targeted group, who have been struck; 
(4) differences among the various members of the allegedly 
targeted group who were struck; (5) whether those excluded 
are members of the same protected group as the defendant or 
the victim; and (6) the composition of the jurors already 
seated" (citation and quotations omitted). 
 
Carter, 488 Mass. at 196-197, quoting Henderson, 486 Mass. at 
311-312. 
 
Although we agree with the defendant that the record 
supports a differential in the prosecutor's strike rate between 
male and female prospective jurors,17 a neutral explanation for 
the exclusion of prospective juror no. 56, who was a law school 
student at a law school where the trial judge taught a class, 
plainly emerges from the record.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 
 
17 The prosecutor exercised strikes against indifferent male 
prospective jurors at a rate of fifty percent and against 
indifferent female prospective jurors at a rate of about 
eighteen percent. 
17 
 
Mass. 593, 601 (2018) (finding prospective juror's "two 
significant experiences with the law provided a sufficient and 
obvious basis for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge").  
Also, although we do not give it undue weight, see Sanchez, 485 
Mass. at 512 n.16, the jury at that point comprised six male 
jurors and four female jurors.18 
 
b.  Evidentiary rulings.  The defendant challenges the 
admission of three categories of evidence:  testimony concerning 
specific bad acts of the defendant, testimony about and 
photographs of the victim's postmortem injuries, and lay and 
expert testimony relating the defendant's mental capacity.  He 
further contends that he should have been permitted to introduce 
additional evidence of his mental condition.  We review 
evidentiary decisions of the trial judge for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 
(2020); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586, 596 (2012). 
 
18 Although we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
decision to allow the exercise of a peremptory challenge to 
strike juror no. 56 without further explanation, we again "urge 
judges to think long and hard before they decide to require no 
explanation from the prosecutor for the challenge and make no 
findings of fact," so as to avoid a "needless risk of reversal 
by failing to require the prosecutor to explain [his or her] 
reasons" for the challenge.  Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 
11 n.14 (2013).  See Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607 n.9; Jones, 477 
Mass. at 325-326. 
18 
 
 
i.  Bad acts.  Through the testimony of the defendant's 
niece,19 nephew,20 and son,21 and the officer who responded to a 
report of a domestic dispute at the defendant's apartment about 
a week before the killing,22 the prosecution introduced evidence 
that the defendant and the victim argued, sometimes with 
physical contact, about the defendant's gambling, childcare 
issues, and the victim's parents visiting from China.  The 
defendant maintains that evidence of these acts had minimum 
probative value and significant prejudicial effect, and thus 
should have been excluded. 
 
19 The defendant's niece testified that, after the defendant 
and victim had separated, the defendant and the victim argued 
over the defendant taking care of their son, and that police 
were called. 
 
20 The defendant's nephew testified that the defendant and 
the victim argued about the defendant's gambling, that he saw 
the defendant push the victim during an argument, and that, on 
occasion, the defendant's son would ask the nephew to help 
separate the defendant and the victim. 
 
21 The defendant's son testified that his parents argued on 
more than one occasion about his grandparents visiting from 
China, and that the arguments were "quite heated."  The son also 
testified that when the defendant and the victim argued about 
the defendant's gambling, the defendant sometimes would shove 
the victim, take money from her by force, and make her cry, and 
that he would get between them when these physical assaults 
occurred. 
 
22 The officer testified that, approximately one week before 
the killing, he responded to a domestic disturbance call at the 
defendant's apartment, spoke to the victim and the defendant, 
and made sure that the defendant was "going to take custody of 
the child as opposed to leaving him at the wife's workplace at 
eleven o'clock at night." 
19 
 
 
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is inadmissible 
"for the purposes of showing [the defendant's] bad character or 
propensity to commit the crime[s] charged."  Commonwealth v. 
Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).  See Commonwealth v. 
Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 500 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
1579 (2018); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 775, 783 (2016); 
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2021).  Such evidence, however, may 
be admissible if it is relevant for other purposes.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 806 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007) 
("Evidence of a hostile relationship 'that tends to explain the 
purpose of a crime is relevant to the issue of malice or intent' 
. . ."); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  Even where such evidence 
is relevant for a permissible purpose, it is inadmissible if 
"its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 
228, 249 n.27 (2014) (clarifying that "'other bad acts' evidence 
is inadmissible where its probative value is outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, even if not 
substantially outweighed by that risk").23 
 
23 Although the defendant's trial took place before our 
decision in Crayton, the trial judge did not abuse her 
discretion under either standard, so we "need not decide whether 
the new standard we articulated in Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 n.27 (2014), applies retroactively."  
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 n.21 (2020). 
20 
 
"When assessing whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the challenged evidence, 
the factors a reviewing court considers may include 
(1) whether the trial judge carefully weighed the probative 
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence introduced at 
trial . . . ; (2) whether the judge mitigated the 
prejudicial effect through proper limiting instructions 
. . . ; (3) whether the challenged evidence was cumulative 
of other admissible evidence, thereby reducing the risk of 
any additional prejudicial effect . . . ; and (4) whether 
the challenged evidence was so similar to the charged 
offense as to increase the risk of propensity reasoning by 
the jury." 
 
West, supra at 807, quoting Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 
386 (2020). 
 
The challenged evidence was relevant to show the volatile 
nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim 
in the weeks and months preceding the murder and to explain "the 
defendant's . . . state of mind toward the victim."  West, 487 
Mass. at 806.  The evidence was also probative of the 
defendant's intent.  See id. 
 
Moreover, the trial judge carefully weighed the probative 
value against the possible prejudicial effect of the evidence, 
as demonstrated by the specific findings she made during sidebar 
discussions.  See Peno, 485 Mass. at 394 ("A record of the 
thoughtful weighing of the risks of unfair prejudice . . . may 
indicate a reasonable exercise of discretion").  Further, the 
evidence was not "so similar to the charged offense as to 
increase the risk of propensity reasoning by the jury."  West, 
21 
 
487 Mass. at 807, quoting Peno, supra at 386.  Accordingly, the 
judge did not abuse her discretion. 
 
ii.  Postmortem injuries.  The trial judge admitted 
testimony and photographs of the postmortem injuries inflicted 
on the victim.  The defendant contends that the evidence should 
have been excluded. 
 
"[T]he intent to inflict an injury may be inferred from, 
among other things, the condition of the body after death."  
Commonwealth v. Harvey, 397 Mass. 803, 810 (1986), citing 
Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81 (1978).  Evidence of 
actions done to the victim's body postmortem may be "relevant to 
show the defendant's state of mind and hence malice."  
Commonwealth v. Casavant, 426 Mass. 368, 369 (1998) (admission 
of evidence of aerosol can placed in victim's vagina following 
her death not abuse of discretion).  Moreover, "[p]hotographs 
depicting the extent of a victim's injuries, such as the force 
applied and the number of wounds, may be probative of whether a 
defendant acted with deliberate premeditation or with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty."  Commonwealth v. Walters, 485 Mass. 271, 
283 (2020).  "It is also well settled that, if the photographs 
possess evidential value on a material matter, they 'are not 
rendered inadmissible solely because they are gruesome or may 
have an inflammatory effect on the jury.'"  Commonwealth v. 
22 
 
Vazquez, 419 Mass. 350, 354 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Bys, 
370 Mass. 350, 358 (1976). 
 
Here, the photographs and the challenged testimony were 
relevant to the defendant's intent, see Harvey, 397 Mass. at 
810, and malice, see Casavant, 426 Mass. at 369.  See also 
Vazquez, 419 Mass. at 354.  The trial judge carefully considered 
the probative value and risk of prejudice of the evidence, 
noting that the prosecutor did not seek to introduce all 
available photographs of the victim's body, excluded the more 
gruesome autopsy photographs in favor of less graphic evidence, 
and redacted parts of some photographs depicting certain 
postmortem injuries.  See West, 487 Mass. at 807.  Further, the 
judge gave contemporaneous limiting instructions, cautioning 
that the jurors must not decide the case based on sympathy for 
the victim; she repeated these instructions in the final jury 
charge.  See Walters, 485 Mass. at 284 (concluding that there is 
"no cause to disturb the verdict" where "[t]he judge limited the 
number of photographs that could be shown," "repeatedly 
cautioned the jurors that, despite the gruesome nature of the 
photographs, they were to render a verdict based on the 
evidence, rather than on sympathy, anger, or passion," and 
"prevented the prosecutor from displaying enlarged versions of 
the autopsy photographs").  Therefore, the judge did not abuse 
her discretion. 
23 
 
 
iii.  Testimony concerning mental capacity.  A.  Lay 
observations.  The defendant next contends that it was error for 
the trial judge to allow the prosecutor to elicit testimony 
concerning the defendant's intelligence, memory, and mental 
state from lay witnesses, including the defendant's son,24 
niece,25 and nephew,26 and the attorney with whom the victim and 
defendant had met regarding the divorce agreement.27 
 
Lay witnesses may testify about "facts observed," but not 
"about whether another person suffered from mental illness."  
Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 330 n.43 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Monico, 396 Mass. 793, 803 (1986).  See 
 
24 When asked whether he "observe[d] anything about [the 
defendant's] mental functioning that prevented him from being a 
parent," the son testified, "No, there weren't," and when asked 
the same about his observations of the defendant's physical 
functioning, the son testified, "No, there weren't." 
 
25 The niece described the defendant's intelligence as 
"[l]ike ordinary people," and that his memory was "[j]ust like 
ordinary.  No big problem."  When asked if she ever saw the 
defendant "do anything that was very unusual," she testified 
that she "saw him do the family chores and eating, and he was 
very ordinary." 
 
26 The nephew described the defendant's intelligence as 
"like general people" and described his memory by testifying, 
"In general, he's just like ordinary people." 
 
27 The attorney testified that, during her meeting with the 
defendant and the victim, she did not observe any signs that the 
defendant was hearing voices or mumbling or anything unusual 
about his attire or personal hygiene, and "saw nothing that led 
[her] to conclude or suspect [that he had] a mental illness."  
She also said that the defendant did not speak much during the 
meeting but was nodding in apparent understanding. 
24 
 
Mass. G. Evid. §§ 701, 702.  The challenged testimony of the 
defendant's son, niece, and nephew concerned their direct 
observations of the defendant's memory, level of intelligence, 
and ability to parent, as did the attorney's observations that 
the defendant was not mumbling and did not appear to be hearing 
voices during their meeting, that she did not notice anything 
unusual about his attire or hygiene, and that he nodded as they 
reviewed the separation agreement.  The trial judge did not 
abuse her discretion by admitting these "facts observed."  
Sliech-Brodeur, supra, quoting Monico, supra. 
 
The defendant is correct, however, that it was error to 
allow the attorney to testify that she "saw nothing that led 
[her] to conclude or suspect [that the defendant had] a mental 
illness."  See Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. at 330 & n.43 ("[I]t 
was error for the prosecutor, as part of the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief, to ask three lay witnesses whether the defendant 
ever showed 'overt signs of a mental illness.'  These witnesses 
were not qualified to give such an opinion" [footnote omitted]).  
See also Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 511 (2000) 
("Whether a person suffers from a mental abnormality . . . [is 
a] matter[] beyond the range of ordinary experience and 
require[s] expert testimony").  However, given the properly 
25 
 
admitted expert testimony,28 it is unlikely that the attorney's 
lay opinion concerning the defendant's lack of mental illness 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.29  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 689-690 (2011). 
 
B.  Expert testimony.  The defendant argues that Fife's 
rebuttal testimony that the defendant did not suffer from mental 
illness at the time of the killing should have been excluded 
because it violated G. L. c. 233, § 23B,30 which prohibits the 
admission of statements made by a defendant during a psychiatric 
examination on issues other than his mental condition or that 
constitute a confession of guilt.31  Fife testified that she 
 
28 The prosecutor introduced expert testimony from Fife and 
Ho, who each opined that the defendant did not suffer from a 
mental illness. 
 
29 The defendant did not object to the admission of this 
testimony. 
 
30 General Laws c. 233, § 23B provides: 
 
"In the trial of an indictment or complaint for any crime, 
no statement made by a defendant therein subjected to 
psychiatric examination pursuant to [G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 
and 16,] for the purposes of such examination or treatment 
shall be admissible in evidence against him on any issue 
other than that of his mental condition, nor shall it be 
admissible in evidence against him on that issue if such 
statement constitutes a confession of guilt of the crime 
charged." 
 
31 The defendant also contends that Fife's testimony should 
have been excluded because her expert report "only contained an 
opinion as to criminal responsibility, which was not at issue" 
in the trial.  To the contrary, Fife's report disclosed her 
opinion that the defendant 
26 
 
disbelieved the defendant's statements that he did not have 
problems in his marriage or with managing money, was not 
bothered by the separation, and did not have a memory of the 
killing. 
 
The defendant's statements were neither "a confession of 
guilt of the crime charged" nor "inculpatory statements 
constituting admissions short of a full acknowledgement of 
guilt."  Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 763 (1977).  
Compare Commonwealth v. Callahan, 386 Mass. 784, 787-788 (1982), 
S.C., 401 Mass. 627 (1988) (statements by defendant that he "was 
enraged, picked up the gun and shot her, with the thought 
beforehand that, 'shoot her . . . [and] you're going to jail for 
murder,'" "constituted a confession of guilt and were 
inadmissible under the provisions of [§ 23B]").  Accordingly, 
G. L. c. 233, § 23B, does not prohibit such statements on the 
issue of the defendant's mental condition.  See note 30, supra; 
Commonwealth v. Street, 388 Mass. 281, 288 n.6 (1983) ("We 
 
 
"did not have a mental illness at the time he allegedly 
killed his wife.  Because he did not have a mental illness, 
there is no relationship in this case between mental 
illness at the time of the crime and the issues of 
substantial lack of appreciation of wrongfulness or 
substantial ability to conform behavior." 
 
Fife's conclusion that the defendant did not have a mental 
illness at the time of the crime was properly disclosed, and was 
a central issue of the case; thus, the trial judge did not err 
by admitting her testimony. 
27 
 
perceive no problem in the admissibility of statements made by 
the defendant to the psychiatrist who examined him . . . .  
[T]he statement in the case before us was admissible on the 
issue of his mental condition").  Fife explained that each 
statement was "relevant to the work [she] did, and the opinions 
[she] came to" regarding the defendant's mental condition.  The 
statements "helped [her] to understand that he had no mental 
illness," because she "saw that the defendant had the capacity 
to manipulate information such that he presented things in a way 
that put him in a positive light and denied anything that would 
place him in a negative light," making her "consider that the 
defendant is malingering mental illness, and that he does not 
truly have a legitimate mental illness."32 
 
32 The defendant also apparently asserts that Fife's 
testimony should have been excluded for noncompliance with a 
discovery order under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (2), as appearing 
in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  Fife examined the defendant pursuant 
to court order, with the assistance of an interpreter.  
Following the examination, the defendant filed a motion alleging 
that the interpretation of the examination was inaccurate.  The 
trial judge allowed the defendant's request for a continuance to 
allow a different interpreter to review the recording of the 
examination and determine whether the interpretation was 
accurate. 
 
The reviewing interpreter determined that the examination 
interpreter had used Cantonese rather than the defendant's 
native Toisanese, and suggested that the examination be redone.  
With the agreement of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, 
Fife reexamined the defendant with the assistance of an 
interpreter translating in Toisanese.  We discern no discovery 
order violations related to Fife's examination of the defendant 
that would be sanctionable under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (2). 
28 
 
 
C.  Excluded evidence related to defendant's mental 
condition.  The defendant next contends that the trial judge 
erred by excluding his son's video-recorded statement and 
evidence that the defendant was unable to handle his financial 
affairs and was placed under guardianship. 
 
I.  Video recording.  The defendant sought to introduce 
video footage of his then ten year old son's interview with a 
prosecutor, recorded following the killing, in which the son 
stated that his father was a good man who went "nuts" after his 
car accident.  The defendant argues that, despite the son's 
testimony at trial that he could not remember either making this 
statement or observing conduct that made him think his father 
was "nuts," the statement should nonetheless have been admitted 
as a past recollection recorded or as a prior inconsistent 
statement.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
A recording may be admissible under the hearsay exception 
for past recollection recorded if "(i) the witness has 
insufficient memory to testify fully and accurately, (ii) the 
witness had firsthand knowledge of the facts recorded, (iii) the 
witness can testify that the recorded statement was truthful 
when made, and (iv) the witness made or adopted the recorded 
statement when the events were fresh in the witness's memory."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(5).  Here, the son did not testify that the 
statement was truthful when made.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 
29 
 
449 Mass. 343, 365-366 (2007) (third prong of test not met where 
witness was unable to confirm at trial that his recorded 
statement to police was truthful when made).  In addition, the 
son did not make the statement when the events were fresh in his 
memory; the car accident occurred in 1999, and the son made the 
recorded statement shortly after the killing in 2001. 
 
"A party has a right to impeach an adverse witness's 
testimony by means of prior inconsistent statements . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 623 (1982).  The 
defendant's attempt to introduce the video recording on cross-
examination, however, was not to impeach the son.  Rather, trial 
counsel confirmed when asked by the judge that he sought to use 
the video recording to refresh the son's memory as to his 
observations of the defendant's mental state following the car 
accident, and stated that the recording raised an issue under 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980). 
 
II.  Guardian ad litem.  The defendant also contends that 
the judge erred by precluding him from admitting evidence that a 
guardian ad litem was appointed in October 2001 to oversee his 
financial affairs related to a personal injury lawsuit in New 
Hampshire.  The appointment of the guardian was triggered by an 
ex parte motion that the defendant was not competent to stand 
trial, which the judge allowed.  There was no error. 
30 
 
 
A finding of incompetency is distinct from a finding of 
mental impairment.  See Vuthy Seng v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 
536, 545 (2005), S.C., 456 Mass. 490 (2010), quoting Baqleh v. 
Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 4th 478, 495 (2002) ("A competency 
examination is not directed to the ultimate issue to be decided 
-- whether the defendant is guilty of the crime . . . .  A 
competency exam does not bear on the defendant's guilt, but on 
his or her current ability to understand the proceedings and 
participate in the defense.  These are collateral to, and 
'cannot directly result in[,] the functional equivalent of 
criminal adjudication of guilt'").  The evidence of the 
appointment was thus not relevant to the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the crime.  Because the evidence did not 
"tend[] to prove an issue in the case or render a desired 
inference more probable than it would be without [the evidence]" 
(citations and quotations omitted), Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 
Mass. 732, 750 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002), the 
trial judge did not abuse her discretion by excluding the 
testimony. 
 
c.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that several statements made in closing argument were improper.  
Remarks made during closing argument are considered in the 
context of the entire argument, together with the evidence 
presented at trial and the judge's instructions to the jury.  
31 
 
See Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 581-582 (1997); 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987). 
 
i.  False mental health defense.  The defendant first 
challenges the prosecutor's suggestion that the defendant's 
mental health defense was fabricated.  A "prosecutor is entitled 
to make a fair reply to the defendant's closing argument," 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7 (1989), and "may properly 
comment on the trial tactics of the defen[s]e and on evidence 
developed or promised by the defen[s]e," Commonwealth v. 
Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 507 (1992), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Dunker, 363 Mass. 792, 800 (1973).  The prosecutor's statements 
here were responsive to the defendant's mental health defense 
and the defense's statement in closing argument that "[t]he 
issue in this case is not did he do it.  He did.  The issue is 
what was he thinking?  How was he feeling?"  See Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. 
McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 764 (2000) ("A prosecutor may address a 
particular point in defense counsel's closing argument as a 
sham, but he may not characterize the entire defense as such"). 
 
ii.  Son "hanging off" defendant during assaults.  Next, 
the defendant challenges the prosecutor's characterization of 
the defendant's son as "hanging off" of the defendant while he 
assaulted the victim on prior occasions.  The statement was 
based on the evidence, which showed that the son would "get 
32 
 
between" his parents when the defendant used force against the 
victim.  Excusable hyperbole in closing arguments is acceptable, 
see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 107 (1997) 
("'[E]nthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable 
hyperbole' are not grounds for reversal"), and juries are 
expected to exercise a degree of skepticism, see Wilson, supra 
(jurors "have a certain measure of sophistication in sorting out 
excessive claims on both sides").  Thus, the prosecutor's 
characterization was not improper. 
 
iii.  Request for accountability.  Finally, the defendant 
challenges the prosecutor's statement:  "There does come a time 
in every man's life for accountability.  Even for Da Lin Huang 
there is a time for accountability.  Ladies and gentlemen, now 
is the time for Da Lin Huang to be held accountable for what he 
did to Gin Hua Xu."  This statement by the prosecutor was 
improper.  See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 797 
(2011) ("prior cases have suggested that holding the defendant 
accountable is improper language"). 
 
The statement, to which the defendant did not object, did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See id. at 796, citing Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 15 
(2010).  The statement was made in the context of the entire 
closing argument, which properly marshalled the evidence against 
33 
 
the defendant and demonstrated the strong case against him.  
Moreover, the judge instructed the jury that closing arguments 
are not evidence, that their memory of the evidence controls, 
and that they should not be swayed by sympathy for the victim.  
See Jenkins, supra at 797 (concluding that reference to 
accountability in closing argument did not create substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice where "[t]he Commonwealth's 
case was strong, and the judge instructed the jury that closing 
arguments are not evidence and that the jurors must consider the 
evidence impartially without bias, prejudice, or sympathy"). 
 
d.  Jury instructions on mental impairment.  The trial 
judge's instructions on murder in the first degree mirrored the 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 (1999).  In 
Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 49 (2012), we declined 
to revise the model jury instructions to include language 
concerning a defendant's ability to appreciate the consequences 
of his choices.  We reasoned that 
"while reduced mental capacity is relevant to the jury's 
exercise of their broad discretion as a reflection of the 
community's conscience, there is no greater mens rea 
required for murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty than 
there is for murder in the second degree, and the crime 
does not require that the defendant be aware that his acts 
were extremely cruel or atrocious." 
 
Id. at 45, 48-49, quoting Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 
837, 848-849 (2006).  The defendant has not presented, and we do 
34 
 
not discern, any reason to abandon our analysis in Szlachta and 
the cases preceding it. 
 
e.  Sentence.  On appeal from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial, the defendant argues that the imposition of a life 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and art. 26 because he is 
intellectually disabled.  Following his conviction, the 
defendant was evaluated by Dr. Doriana Chialant, a 
neuropsychologist, on two occasions in 2016.  She administered 
standardized tests but noted that due to the defendant's 
illiteracy, lack of formal education, and lack of English, as 
well as the fact that the tests were developed for the American 
population and there were no available tests developed for the 
Chinese population, the defendant "cannot be evaluated 
completely and to the same level of scientific accuracy that 
could be obtained under different circumstances."  After noting 
these limitations, Chialant concluded that "[the defendant's] 
performance across a relatively wide range of tests indicated 
significant and widespread deficits and was overall suggestive 
of a low intellectual capacity," and that he had an "overall 
intellectual index score of 77, which falls at the 6th 
[percentile] and is equivalent to the performance of individuals 
younger than 6 years of age." 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the motion judge 
abused his discretion because Chialant's report, along with the 
35 
 
reports of the expert witnesses at trial, show significant 
limitations in the defendant's functional capacity and indicate 
that he is intellectually disabled,33 and that, therefore, the 
imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole 
violates his constitutional rights. See Commonwealth v. Grassie, 
482 Mass. 1017, 1017-1018 (2019); Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 
Mass. 53, 60, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1072 (2012).  Experts at 
trial, including those called by the defendant, did not opine 
that the defendant had an intellectual disability.  To the 
contrary, the evidence at trial was that the defendant had 
reasonably high-level adaptive functionality, including 
testimony that he cooked, cleaned, and cared for his children, 
and helped his son with math homework.  Indeed, even Chialant's 
evaluation placed the defendant's IQ above the usual cutoff for 
intellectual disability.  See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 720 
 
33 "Person with an intellectual disability" is 
"characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual 
functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, 
social and practical adaptive skills and beginning before age 
[eighteen], and consistent with the most recent definition 
provided by the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities."  G. L. c. 123B, § 1.  The American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
defines "intellectual disability" as "a disability characterized 
by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and 
in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social and 
practical skills.  This disability originates before the age of 
[twenty-two]."  American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual 
Disability, https://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability 
/definition [https://perma.cc/9KP7-SE9U]. 
36 
 
(2014).  We therefore decline to consider whether the imposition 
of a life sentence on a person with an intellectual disability 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 479 Mass. 1, 18 (2018) ("Whether it is cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments or cruel or unusual 
under art. 26 to impose a mandatory sentence of life without 
parole on a person with an intellectual disability is a 
difficult question that is not before us here . . ."). 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After careful review 
of the entire record, we conclude that there is no reason to 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or reduce the verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a  
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.