Title: Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1126 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Milwaukee District Council 48, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Frank  
Jurena, Jr.,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee County and Milwaukee County  
Pension Board,  
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  231 Wis. 2d 237, 604 N.W.2d 304 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 15, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr. 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Alvin R. Ugent and  Podell, Ugent, Haney & 
Miszewski, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alvin R. Ugent 
and Robert E. Haney. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief 
and oral argument by Timothy R. Schoewe, deputy corporation 
 
2 
counsel. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeffrey P. 
Sweetland and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, 
Hawks & Domer, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Federation 
of Nurses and Health Professionals, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Franklyn M. 
Gimbel, Aaron M. Hurvitz and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff's 
Association. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lucy T. Brown 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Education Association Council, and 
oral argument by Lucy T. Brown. 
 
2001 WI 65 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1126  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee District Council 48, American  
Federation of State, County and Municipal  
Employees, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Frank  
Jurena, Jr.,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County and Milwaukee County  
Pension Board,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing an order 
of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Charles F. Kahn, Jr., 
Judge.  The case involves Milwaukee County's procedure for 
denying pension benefits to employees who have been discharged 
for "cause." 
                     
1 Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, No. 98-
1126, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1999).  
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
2 
¶2 
Under the Milwaukee County ordinances, a Milwaukee 
County employee has a property interest in a deferred vested 
pension after ten years of creditable service unless the 
employee is terminated for "fault or delinquency."  This 
contingency——termination for "fault or delinquency"——nullifies 
the employee's pension eligibility, irrespective of the length 
of the employee's service. 
¶3 
The principal issue in this case relates to procedure: 
May Milwaukee County deny a pension to an employee who has ten 
years of creditable service after terminating the employee for 
"cause" (following a due process hearing), without also holding 
a due process hearing to determine whether the employee was 
terminated for "fault or delinquency"?  A secondary issue is 
whether a labor organization may seek a declaratory judgment to 
obtain an answer to the first issue in these circumstances. 
¶4 
Because the record before this court is sparse, we 
proceed 
with 
some 
reluctance, 
limiting 
our 
holding 
to 
acknowledged facts.  On this basis, we reverse the court of 
appeals and declare rights as set forth below. 
¶5 
We conclude that Milwaukee County may not deny a 
pension to an employee whose length of service with the county 
has satisfied the minimum requirement for a deferred vested 
pension without first affording the employee procedural due 
process, including a hearing to determine whether the employee 
is being or was terminated for "fault or delinquency," as 
provided in Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, County 
Employes' Retirement System § 201.24 (4.5) (1996). 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
3 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
¶6 
Milwaukee 
County 
employs 
thousands 
of 
people in 
different capacities for public service work.  Milwaukee 
District Council 48, American Federation of State, County & 
Municipal Employees (District Council 48 or the union), is the 
exclusive bargaining agent for approximately 6,000 of these 
public employees. 
 
¶7 
Most 
county 
employees, 
including 
nurses, 
deputy 
sheriffs, and the members of District Council 48's bargaining 
unit are "members" of the Milwaukee County Employes' Retirement 
System (retirement system or the system), which is the only 
county-operated retirement system in Wisconsin.  Milwaukee 
County has maintained a retirement system for its employees 
since 1937.  The enabling legislation for the system is Chapter 
201, Laws of 1937.  This nonstatutory session law has been 
amended many times since its enactment by the legislature, and 
today, its provisions, as amended, together with the county 
ordinances supplementing it, are contained in Chapter 201 of the 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, entitled "County 
Employes' Retirement System." 
¶8 
Milwaukee County's retirement system is a defined 
benefit plan.  In Association of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee 
County, 199 Wis. 2d 549, 559 n.3, 544 N.W.2d 888 (1996), the 
court discussed the county's system and this plan, and it 
explained the nature of a defined benefit plan: 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
4 
 
[A]n actuary projects the amount necessary to fund the 
future payment of benefits to retirees and then 
calculates a single appropriate sum to be contributed 
to the pension fund.  Defined benefit schemes benefit 
"vested" employees only and vested employees must 
usually wait until retirement age to receive their 
benefits. 
¶9 
Chapter 201 of the county ordinances lays out the 
rules determining the size of an employee's pension and the date 
when the employee becomes eligible to receive the benefit.  The 
chapter also establishes the rules on "vesting."  A member who 
began work for the county after January 1, 1971, but before 
January 1, 1982, "shall not be eligible for a deferred vested 
pension if his employment is terminated prior to his completion 
of six (6) years of service."  Milwaukee County Code of General 
Ordinances, County Employes' Retirement System § 201.24 (4.5) 
(¶2) (1996).  A member who began employment on or after January 
1, 1982, is not eligible "if his employment is terminated prior 
to his completion of ten (10) years of service."  Id.   
¶10 Most employees understand the concept of ten year 
vesting.  Until they have ten years of creditable service, these 
employees have no right to any county pension.  District Council 
48 
alleges, 
however, 
that 
many 
county 
employees 
do 
not 
understand that, even after they have established ten years of 
creditable service, they may lose their pensions if they are 
terminated for "fault or delinquency."  
No. 98-1126  
 
 
5 
¶11 The controlling provision on this point comes out of 
the 1937 session law2 and now reads as follows: 
 
A member shall be eligible for a deferred vested 
pension if his employment is terminated for any cause, 
other than fault or delinquency on his part, provided 
that he elects not to withdraw any part of his 
membership account and that his pension at age sixty 
(60) is at least ten dollars ($10.00) per month. 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, County Employes' 
Retirement System § 201.24 (4.5) (¶1) (emphasis added). 
 
¶12 The 
1937 
session 
law 
and 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Ordinance draw a distinction between "cause" and "fault or 
delinquency," the latter being a subset of the former. 
¶13 The word "cause" also appears in Wis. Stat. § 63.10 
(1997-98),3 a section included in the chapter entitled "County 
and City Civil Service."  Wisconsin Stat. § 63.10 details 
procedures for local governments to deal with employees who are 
allegedly incompetent to perform their duties or who otherwise 
merit demotion or dismissal.  Wisconsin Stat. § 63.10(1) speaks 
of "cause" for discharge.4  "At the termination of the hearing 
                     
2  Chapter 201, Laws of 1937, § 6(b) refers to "a member who 
is removed or otherwise involuntarily separated from service for 
any cause other than fault or delinquency on his part." 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 volumes unless otherwise noted.  
4  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.52(8)(b) provides a "just cause" 
standard for law enforcement employees: 
A law enforcement employee of the county may not be 
suspended, demoted, dismissed or suspended and demoted 
by the civil service commission or by the board, based 
either on its own investigation or on charges filed by 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
6 
the [local personnel] commission shall determine whether or not 
the charge is well founded and shall take such action by way of 
suspension, demotion, discharge or reinstatement, as it may deem 
requisite and proper under the circumstances and as its rules 
may provide."  Wis. Stat. § 63.10(2). 
 
¶14 In Milwaukee County, a superior officer (supervisor), 
the director of human resources, or any citizen may file charges 
against a county employee seeking the employee's demotion or 
discharge.  These charges must be based on "cause."  The 
employee is given notice of the charges and a due process 
hearing before the Milwaukee County Personnel Review Board. 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, Civil Service Rules 
for Milwaukee County Government, Rule VII, §§ 2-4 (1997). 
 
¶15 According to the rules, the complaint given to the 
employee 
"shall 
state 
specifically 
the 
facts 
alleged 
to 
constitute cause for . . . discharge, and shall refer to section 
4 of this rule under which said charges are brought."  Milwaukee 
County Code of General Ordinances, Civil Service Rules for 
Milwaukee County Government, Rule VII, § 3(2) (1997). 
¶16 Section 4 is entitled "Cause for discharge, suspension 
or demotion and/or reevaluation."  The section reads in part: 
 
(1) The following are declared to be cause for 
discharge, suspension or demotion and/or the approval 
of or the imposition of an employe reevaluation period 
as provided in rule VI . . . though charges may be 
                                                                  
the sheriff, unless the commission or board determines 
whether there is just cause, as described in this 
paragraph, to sustain the charges. 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
7 
based upon causes and complaints other than those here 
enumerated. 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, Civil Service Rules 
for Milwaukee County Government, Rule VII, § 4 (1997). 
¶17 The section then lists 46 specific grounds amounting 
to "cause" for discharge or demotion, including: 
 
(a) Theft of private or county property. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(m) Threatening, intimidating, coercing or harassing 
employes or supervision at any time. 
 
(n) Making false or malicious statements, either oral 
or written, concerning any employe, the county or its 
policies. 
 
(o) Unexcused, unauthorized, or excessive absence. 
 
(p) Unexcused, unauthorized, or excessive tardiness. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(t) Failure or inability to perform the duties of 
assigned position. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(cc) Reporting to work or working while under the 
influence of intoxicating beverages and/or narcotics 
or other drugs or having unauthorized possession of 
same on county premises during working hours. 
Id. 
 
¶18 Among 
other enumerated grounds for 
discharge or 
demotion under Rule VII, § 4 are: 
 
 
(c) Unauthorized use of county premises. 
 
 . . . . 
 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
8 
(f) Distributing or posting handbills, pamphlets or 
other written or printed material in any work area 
without authorization. 
 
(g) Posting, 
removing 
or 
tampering 
with 
county 
bulletin board material without authorization. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(j) Littering, creating or contributing to unsanitary 
or unsafe conditions on county premises. 
 
(k) Refusing or failing to obey orders of supervisor 
whether written or oral. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(r) Leaving place of 
work during working 
hours 
without authorization, wasting time or loitering. 
 
(s) Stopping work before designated quitting time. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(jj) Engaging in horseplay or scuffling on county 
premises during working hours. 
 
(kk) Engaging in personal activities during working 
hours. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(rr) Removal of permanent residence to some place 
outside of Milwaukee County, except as specifically 
authorized by the commission or failure to establish 
permanent residence in Milwaukee County within the 
time limited by the commission. 
Id. 
¶19 When an employee is terminated for "cause," the 
employee is entitled to certiorari review in circuit court.  
State ex rel. Iushewitz v. Pers. Review Bd., 176 Wis. 2d 706, 
710, 500 N.W.2d 634 (1993) (citing State ex rel. Johnson v. 
Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971)). 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
9 
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
¶20 On December 6, 1994, District Council 48 sought a 
declaratory judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04, against 
Milwaukee County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board.  In its 
complaint, the union asserted that it had been certified by the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission as the exclusive 
representative of more than 6,000 county employees with regard 
to their wages, hours, and working conditions, and that it was 
party to a contract with Milwaukee County, governing, among 
other things, fringe benefits (including pensions).  District 
Council 48 stated that the collective bargaining agreement 
acknowledged that employees terminated with less than ten years 
of service were not entitled to a deferred vested pension.  It 
claimed, however, that the county was wrongfully construing the 
pension ordinance and the labor agreement to mean that if an 
employee is terminated for "cause" after ten years of service, 
the employee is disqualified for a deferred vested pension. 
¶21 The complaint states in part: "Within the past three 
years, several members of the Bargaining Unit represented by 
Plaintiff, have been terminated for an alleged 'just cause' 
after 10 years of service and have been denied pension benefits 
by said defendants." 
¶22 District Council 48 also claimed that, normally, 
employees subject to discharge were given the opportunity to 
resign instead of having a hearing on their termination "and by 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
10
so 
doing, 
[they] 
retain 
their 
vested 
pension 
benefits."  
However, "[t]hose employees who have exercised their right to a 
hearing and who have subsequently been terminated by the 
Milwaukee County Personnel Review Board, were denied a deferred 
vested pension." 
¶23 District 
Council 
48 
stated 
that 
it 
sought 
a 
declaratory judgment to have the court "determine the rights, 
status and other legal relations" of members of the bargaining 
unit with regard to their pension benefits. 
¶24 The case was assigned to Milwaukee County Circuit 
Judge Laurence C. Gram, Jr.  In May 1995, Judge Gram ordered a 
briefing schedule.   
¶25 With its first brief, the union argued that the county 
could not deprive a vested employee of a pension after ten years 
of service, even though the employee had been terminated for 
"cause."  It said that pension denial was inconsistent with 
vesting.  In addition, the union claimed a breach of its 
collective bargaining agreement and a misconstruction of the 
pension ordinance.  It contended that county employees had 
always been allowed to quit rather than wait to see if they 
would be terminated.  According to the union's brief:   
 
If they do not quit, and instead wait for a hearing 
and a subsequent ruling, their pension benefits are 
lost if they are terminated by the Personnel Review 
Board. 
 
. . . . 
 
No one should be required to risk the loss of 27 years 
of pension benefits just to have a due process hearing 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
11
on the question of just cause.  Some long term 
employees rolled the dice and had the hearing only to 
find 
that 
they 
were 
terminated 
and 
they 
lost 
everything. 
¶26 The union filed portions of deposition testimony by 
Jac R. Amerell, Executive Director of the Milwaukee County 
Retirement Plan, tending to support its claim that termination 
for "cause" led to forfeiture of an employee's pension. 
¶27 In its answer, the county argued strenuously that 
District Council 48 lacked standing to bring a declaratory 
judgment action as "the union asserted no claim of right in its 
own behalf."  The county also contended that the matter was not 
ripe for judicial determination.  It also claimed that any 
rights to a deferred vested pension were "contingent upon 
leaving county service in good standing."  The county said that 
the union had sought to change this practice through collective 
bargaining but had failed.  The county asked the court to deny 
the request for declaratory relief and dismiss the case. 
¶28 The county filed with its answer an affidavit from 
Henry H. Zielinski, director of labor relations for Milwaukee 
County.  In his affidavit, Zielinski said: "There is a long 
standing practice of denying deferred pension benefits to 
employees who do not leave county service in good standing 
pursuant to the ordinance adopting the state law." 
¶29 In its reply brief, the union responded to the claim 
that it lacked standing, saying that it had been a plaintiff in 
many court actions to enforce contract provisions for the 
benefit of its members.  "The union has an interest to see to it 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
12
that its members receive all of the benefits due to them."  
Claiming its action was ripe, the union argued that "certain 
Milwaukee County employees have been severely damaged and harmed 
and have lost substantial pension benefits pursuant to the wrong 
interpretation given to the pension laws by Milwaukee County and 
the Pension Board."  It submitted an affidavit naming two former 
county employees, Frank Jurena, Jr., and Ronald Pavelko, who 
were members of the bargaining unit before being terminated.  
Both men allegedly "lost all pension benefits."  It also filed 
another affidavit naming a 27-year employee, John Kropp, 
allegedly in danger of being terminated and thereby losing his 
benefits. 
¶30 In November 1995, Judge Gram dismissed the case on the 
merits, without explaining his reasoning on the record or in a 
written opinion.  The union appealed, and in June 1996 the court 
of appeals reversed and remanded the cause with directions.  The 
court of appeals reversed because the circuit court "failed to 
state any basis for its discretionary decision dismissing the 
union's complaint."  Dist. Council #48 v. Milwaukee County, No. 
95-3522-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 25, 1996). 
¶31 On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Charles F. 
Kahn, Jr.  The union filed an amended complaint in which Jurena 
was added as a named plaintiff.  The union also modified its 
claims against the county, focusing on the lack of procedure 
provided by the county in terminating the pension benefits of a 
discharged employee, as opposed to the ultimate right of the 
county to deny pension benefits to a discharged employee. 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
13
¶32 In March 1998, Judge Kahn ruled in favor of the union 
and Jurena.  In his written order, Judge Kahn declared "[t]hat 
the practice and procedure utilized by [the county] of denying 
pension benefits to longstanding employees terminated for cause 
is an unconstitutional denial of due process and denial of equal 
protection of the laws." 
¶33 In October 1999, the court of appeals reversed the 
decision of Judge Kahn.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee 
County, No. 98-1126, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 
1999).  The court of appeals held that the union had failed to 
establish a due process violation.  In addition, the court of 
appeals ruled that the union had waived any equal protection 
claim.5  The union appealed and we granted review.   
 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
 
¶34 We must first address whether declaratory relief is 
appropriate in this case.  The county contends that the union 
lacks standing because it has no claim of right in its own 
behalf.  Furthermore, the case is not ripe because the factual 
record is inadequate.  The county's brief states that "Frank 
Jurena has yet to be formally denied a pension;" and other 
                     
5 The union has failed to address that portion of the 
circuit court's ruling that declared the county's practices 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  As the court of appeals 
found, we also find that the union has waived any equal 
protection claim. 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
14
allegations have not been established.  As a result, the county 
reasons that any declaratory relief could not be conclusive upon 
the controversy submitted to the court, and a court has no 
business entangling itself in abstract disagreements. 
¶35 The power of courts to issue a declaratory judgment is 
statutory.  Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 199, 203, 242 N.W. 570 
(1932).  Wisconsin Stat. § 806.04 grants broad authority to a 
circuit court "to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."6 
                     
6 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 806.04, 
the 
Uniform 
Declaratory 
Judgments Act, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) SCOPE.  Courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed.  No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.  
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative 
in form and effect; and such declarations shall have 
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, 
except that finality for purposes of filing an appeal 
as of right shall be determined in accordance with s. 
808.03 (1). 
 
 . . . . 
 
(2) 
POWER 
TO 
CONSTRUE, 
ETC. 
 
Any 
person 
interested under a deed, will, written contract or 
other writings constituting a contract, or whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected 
by 
a 
statute, 
municipal 
ordinance, 
contract 
or 
franchise, 
may 
have 
determined 
any 
question 
of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder.  No party shall be denied the right to 
have declared the validity of any statute or municipal 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
15
                                                                  
ordinance by virtue of the fact that the party holds a 
license or permit under such statutes or ordinances. 
 
(3) BEFORE BREACH.  A contract may be construed 
either before or after there has been a breach 
thereof. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(5) ENUMERATION NOT EXCLUSIVE.  The enumeration 
in subs. (2), (3) and (4) does not limit or restrict 
the exercise of the general powers conferred in sub. 
(1) in any proceeding where declaratory relief is 
sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate 
the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 
 
(6) DISCRETIONARY.  The court may refuse to 
render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where 
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would 
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving 
rise to the proceeding. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(8) SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF.  Further relief based on 
a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted 
whenever 
necessary 
or 
proper. 
 
The 
application 
therefor shall be by petition to a court having 
jurisdiction to grant the relief.  If the application 
be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable 
notice, require any adverse party whose rights have 
been 
adjudicated by 
the 
declaratory judgment or 
decree, to show cause why further relief should not be 
granted forthwith. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(11) PARTIES.  When declaratory relief is sought, 
all persons shall be made parties who have or claim 
any 
interest 
which 
would 
be 
affected 
by 
the 
declaration, and no declaration may prejudice the 
right of persons not parties to the proceeding. . . .  
 
(12) CONSTRUCTION.  This section is declared to 
be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
16
¶36 A decision to grant or deny declaratory relief falls 
within the discretion of the circuit court.  Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 409, 320 N.W.2d 175  (1982).  The circuit 
court's decision to grant declaratory relief will not be 
overturned unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 423, 491 N.W.2d 484 (1992).  This court 
will uphold a discretionary act if the circuit court "examined 
the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using 
a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 414-15 
(citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971)).   
¶37 This court has adopted standards to evaluate the 
appropriateness of declaratory relief.  A declaratory judgment 
is fitting when a controversy is justiciable.  Loy, 107 Wis. 2d 
at 410.  In determining justiciability, we employ the following 
test: 
 
There must exist a justiciable controversy——that is to 
say: 
 
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it. 
 
(2) The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests are adverse. 
 
                                                                  
rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be 
liberally construed and administered. 
 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
17
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy——that is to say, a 
legally protectible interest. 
 
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must be  
ripe for judicial determination. 
Miller Brands-Milwaukee v. Case, 162 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 470 
N.W.2d 290 (1991) (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 410).  "If all 
four factors are satisfied, the controversy is 'justiciable,' 
and it is proper for a court to entertain an action for 
declaratory judgment."  Id. 
 
¶38 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in issuing declaratory relief.  Both the 
union and Frank Jurena have interests opposed to the county 
insofar as pension benefits are concerned.  The union is the 
exclusive 
representative 
of 
approximately 
6,000 
county 
employees, many of whom have ten years of service.  The union 
has a duty to represent its members in discharge proceedings and 
in contemporary proceedings affecting their pensions, but it may 
not have a duty to represent them many years in the future when, 
as former members, they apply for pensions.  The union must give 
its members sound advice.  It must represent them well.  It must 
also hold down unnecessary legal costs.  The union has a 
tangible interest in knowing what the law is and what rights its 
members have, so that it can do its duty.7  
                     
7  There are two additional reasons to support our 
recognition of the union's standing in this case.  First, 
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.04 "is to be liberally construed and 
administered."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12).  Second, standing is 
generally 
a 
matter 
of 
judicial 
policy 
rather 
than 
a 
jurisdictional prerequisite.  Wis. Bankers Ass'n v. Mut. Sav. & 
Loan, 96 Wis. 2d 438, 444 n.1, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980). 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
18
¶39 For his part, Frank Jurena wants a pension.  Because 
he served as a county employee for approximately 16 years before 
he was terminated for "cause," he is vested in the sense that he 
completed enough years of creditable service to earn a pension——
unless 
he 
was 
specifically 
terminated 
for 
"fault 
or 
delinquency."  Jurena has a protectible property interest, and 
he asserts a right to make his claim in the proper forum. 
¶40 On the facts of this case, both Jurena and the union 
have standing to seek a declaratory judgment. 
¶41 This suit is also ripe for judicial determination.  By 
definition, the ripeness required in a declaratory judgment is 
different from the ripeness required in other actions.  For 
example, in a declaratory action involving a forfeiture statute, 
"[p]otential defendants may seek a construction of a statute or 
a test of its constitutional validity without subjecting 
themselves to forfeitures or prosecution."  State ex rel. Lynch 
v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 674, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976).  Thus, a 
plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment need not actually suffer 
an injury before seeking relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2).  
Nonetheless, a matter is not ripe unless the facts are 
sufficiently developed to allow a conclusive adjudication.  Id. 
¶42 The county argues that the matter is not ripe because 
it has not officially denied Jurena a pension.  The county also 
maintains that the controversy is not ripe because a pension 
cannot vest under its agreement with the employees before an 
employee has completed honorable service for the county (i.e., 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
19
no "fault or delinquency" during service).  These arguments 
fail. 
¶43 The controversy is ripe because the union seeks a 
declaration of law concerning the procedural due process 
available to an employee to contest termination of employment 
and loss of pension when the determination of one may lead 
automatically to the determination of the other.  The due 
process at issue is the process afforded to test whether the 
county has presented the proper grounds and taken the necessary 
steps to deny a vested employee a pension.  This is a prelude to 
the ultimate question of whether a so-called "vested" employee 
may be denied a pension.   
¶44 An employee need not have been denied pension benefits 
to satisfy the ripeness required in this type of action.  See 
id. at 674.  The union seeks a declaration about the decision-
making process in which an employee is discharged and then 
denied benefits.  Following his discharge, Jurena wants to know 
his rights. 
¶45 The 
union's 
standing 
and 
the 
ripeness 
of 
this 
controversy are very much related.  The union does not stand 
wholly apart from its members.  In theory, thousands of the 
union's vested members could have filed suit as individuals 
seeking a declaration of their due process rights in connection 
with the potential denial of their pensions.  Instead, they took 
action collectively through the union.  On these facts, the 
union's participation is a logical extension of its normal 
activities of representing employee members in regard to wages, 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
20
hours, and working conditions.  We see no reason why the union 
cannot bring a declaratory judgment action to gain "relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and 
other legal relations" of its members on such a broad and 
important legal issue.  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12).8 
 
¶46 We note that the vast majority of individual employees 
will be in the same position as the union with regard to 
ripeness.  Very few individuals are in a position to assert that 
their termination for "cause" is imminent and that their loss of 
pension is imminent.  Waiting until both events actually occur 
would defeat the purpose of the declaratory judgment statute.  
                     
8 The United States Supreme Court has developed a three-part 
standing test for associational litigants, including unions, in 
litigation of federal issues.  UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 
(1986).  The test allows an association 
to bring suit on behalf of its members when:  (a) its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
the 
participation 
of 
individual 
members 
in 
the 
lawsuit. 
 
Brock, 477 U.S. at 282 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).  This test, however, limits 
the power of the federal judiciary, in part to comply with 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.  
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown 
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996).  We do not apply this 
test 
here 
but cite it 
as 
persuasive 
authority for the 
proposition we adopt on the facts of this case: "[I]n certain 
circumstances, particular relationships . . . are sufficient to 
rebut the background presumption . . . that litigants may not 
assert the rights of absent third parties."  Id. at 557. 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
21
In Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 413, the court quotes from Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments: 
 
Perhaps 
the 
principal 
contribution 
that 
the 
declaratory judgment has made to the philosophy of 
procedure is to make it clear that a controversy as to 
legal rights is as fully determinable before as it is 
after one or the other party has acted on his own view 
of his rights and perhaps irretrievably shattered the 
status quo.   
Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 58 (2d ed. 1941). 
 
¶47 Applying these principles, we think judicial economy 
and common sense dictate that the union is authorized to seek a 
declaration of rights. 
 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
 
¶48 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
protects 
life, 
liberty, 
and 
property 
from 
government impairment.9  No state or political subdivision may 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law.  "An essential principle of due process is that 
a deprivation of . . . property 'be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" 
 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) 
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 313 (1950)).  "The fundamental requisite of due process of 
                     
9 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
22
law is the opportunity to be heard."  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914).  This opportunity to be heard "'must be at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.'"  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)). 
¶49 The type of hearing required depends upon the nature 
of the case, Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550, and the hearing "must 
be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are 
to be heard."  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69.  "'[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.'"  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972)). 
¶50 The "property interests protected by procedural due 
process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, 
chattels, or money."  Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).  "Property interests, of course, 
are not created by the [United States] Constitution.  Rather 
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law——rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits."  Id. at 577. 
¶51 We have said that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the property interests of state employees, Arneson v. Jezwinski, 
225 Wis. 2d 371, 393, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999), and county 
employees, Stas v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission, 75 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
23
Wis. 2d 465, 470, 249 N.W.2d 764 (1977), in their employment.  
Due process in this context means that an employee subject to 
discharge is "'entitled to the full panoply of due-process 
protections, the minimum requirements of which include a timely 
and adequate notice of the reasons for the discharge, an 
impartial decisionmaker, and the opportunity to confront and 
cross examine adverse witnesses.'"  Stas, 75 Wis. 2d at 470-71 
(quoting State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council of City of 
Franklin, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 679, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976)). 
¶52 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 63.10 also imposes 
procedural mandates, including a hearing requirement, when the 
county attempts to discharge an employee.  Wis. Stat. § 63.10(1) 
and (2).  There is no dispute that county employees who have 
passed their probationary period have a protectible property 
interest in their jobs because state law precludes their 
discharge without "cause."10 
¶53 Milwaukee 
County 
employees 
also have 
a property 
interest in a pension after they have earned ten years of 
creditable service.  Ass'n of State Prosecutors, 199 Wis. 2d at 
552, 560.  This property interest is distinct and different from 
their 
interest 
in 
employment. 
 
According 
to 
the 
county 
ordinance, the Milwaukee County Pension Board is not free to 
deny an employee a deferred vested pension once the employee has 
become eligible to receive it unless the employee has been 
terminated for "fault or delinquency."   
                     
10  See also Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(b).  
No. 98-1126  
 
 
24
¶54 Termination of an employee for "cause" is not enough 
to deprive the employee of a vested pension.  Termination for 
"fault or delinquency" is the statutory prerequisite for denial 
of a vested pension. 
¶55 Inasmuch 
as vested 
employees have 
a 
protectible 
property interest in their pensions, they may not be deprived of 
their pensions without due process of law.  This requires notice 
and a hearing. 
¶56 We have examined the ordinances and rules of Milwaukee 
County related to the matters at issue.  The rules of the 
Milwaukee County Pension Board are quite specific.  Rule 806, 
"Termination for fault or delinquency," provides: 
 
Pursuant to section 4.5 of the Retirement Act, a 
member 
forfeits 
his 
pension 
if 
he 
terminates 
employment with the county for fault or delinquency on 
his part.  For purposes of section 4.5 of the 
Retirement 
Act, "fault 
or delinquency" 
shall be 
determined solely by the personnel review board of the 
county. 
 
The 
pension 
board 
shall 
rely 
on 
the 
determination of "fault or delinquency" made by the 
personnel review board and shall not independently or 
separately determine whether a member's termination 
resulted from fault or delinquency.  The pension board 
shall rely on the determination made by the personnel 
review board of the county because it believes the 
personnel review board is operating appropriately.  
The 
pension 
board 
may 
periodically 
review 
the 
operation of the personnel review board to determine 
whether it continues to operate appropriately. 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, Rules of the 
Employes' Retirement System, Rule 806 (1997). 
¶57 Rule 806 assumes that the Milwaukee County Personnel 
Review Board will make a finding of "fault or delinquency."  
No. 98-1126  
 
 
25
However, we have not discovered any county ordinance or rule 
explaining what "fault or delinquency" is, or how the Personnel 
Review Board should make its determination.  It is not clear 
whether the board actually makes this determination. 
¶58 Looking at Civil Service Rule VII, § 4, we find 46 
enumerated grounds of "cause" to discharge a county employee. 
Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances, Civil Service Rules 
for Milwaukee County Government, Rule VII, § 4 (1997).  The rule 
does not clarify whether all 46 grounds, plus others that might 
serve 
as 
the 
basis 
for 
discharge, 
constitute 
"fault 
or 
delinquency," or whether the Personnel Review Board draws 
consistent distinctions among the 46 grounds, or whether the 
board applies the various grounds differently in different 
cases.  Id.  If the Personnel Review Board were to regard all 46 
grounds for discharge as "fault or delinquency," then it would 
be saying that a county employee could lose his or her vested 
pension for tampering with county bulletin board material, 
stopping work before designated quitting time, horseplay on 
county premises during working hours, and making malicious 
statements about county policies. 
¶59 The record indicates, through the deposition testimony 
of Jac R. Amerell, that vested employees can be terminated for 
inability to perform the duties of their assigned position even 
though the inability stems from a non-work related disability.  
In these cases, they may still lose their pensions if they do 
not have 15 years of creditable service.  "[M]ore often than not 
it's my belief that they lose their pension right" in this 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
26
situation, he said.  Is inability to perform duties because of a 
non-work related disability "fault or delinquency" as opposed to 
"cause"? 
¶60 Amerell manages the county's pension system.  In his 
deposition, he described a letter he had written to Ronald J. 
Pavelko, an employee discharged for "cause."  Pavelko had 
requested a form so that he could apply for pension benefits.  
Amerell wrote back that the discharged employee was not 
"qualified" for a pension.  Amerell admitted the reason Pavelko 
was denied pension application paperwork was that he had been 
discharged for "cause."  Amerell did not testify that any 
additional consideration, namely "fault or delinquency," played 
a role in his decision to refuse pension paperwork to the 
discharged employee. 
¶61 The record shows that Milwaukee County has failed to 
establish clear rules on "fault or delinquency."  It has 
consistently failed to make individual assessments of whether 
employee discharges rise to the level of "fault or delinquency." 
 It has failed to provide hearings at which employees may be 
heard on this issue at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. 
 It has failed to make evidentiary-based findings that are 
capable of being reviewed by certiorari in circuit court.  In 
short, the county has failed to give due process consideration 
to the termination of pension rights based upon "fault or 
delinquency." 
¶62 We conclude that Milwaukee County may not deny a 
pension 
to 
an 
employee 
who 
has 
satisfied 
the 
minimum 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
27
requirements of creditable service for a deferred vested pension 
without first affording the employee the procedural due process 
of a hearing to determine whether the employee is being or was 
terminated for "fault or delinquency."  The hearing must be 
preceded by fair notice.11  The county must also establish 
standards for "fault or delinquency."  The determination of 
"fault or delinquency" must provide an evidentiary record 
capable of review by certiorari in circuit court.12 
¶63 We are not holding or implying that the county must 
hold a completely separate due process hearing for the denial of 
a pension.  The requirements of procedural due process are 
flexible enough, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, that the county may 
offer a hearing that considers both "cause" for discharge and 
"fault or delinquency."  We do find, however, that the county 
must provide a hearing of some type that considers the impact of 
the discharge on pension benefits.  The county must allow the 
discharged employee to tell "his [or her] side of the story."  
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 546. 
¶64 Our holding today is confined to procedural rights.  
We are neither asked nor required to define the exact interest 
that a county employee has in a pension after the employee has 
worked the minimum number of years to qualify for a pension.  We 
                     
11 Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural 
Resources, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 78, 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986) (citing 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).  
12 State ex rel. Harris v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 87 Wis. 2d 
646, 651-52, 275 N.W.2d 668 (1979).  
No. 98-1126  
 
 
28
find merely that such an employee has a property interest in his 
or her pension that requires due process before the county can 
declare the employee ineligible for the pension as a result of 
discharge. 
 
¶65 We decline to rule on whether the 1937 session law and 
the ordinance place unreasonable pressure on employees to give 
up their rights for a due process hearing on employment 
termination to preserve their eligibility for a future pension. 
 This question was insufficiently briefed and argued to this 
court to require a response. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
¶66 The record is sparse but sufficient to permit a 
declaration that Milwaukee County may not deny a pension to an 
employee who meets the minimum requirements of creditable 
service for a deferred vested pension without first affording 
the employee procedural due process, including a hearing to 
determine whether the employee is being or was terminated for 
"fault or delinquency."  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for entry of a declaratory order consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 98-1126  
 
 
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