Title: In the Matter of the Adoption of Lybrand

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF Kristen Dyan
LYBRAND; John Wesley King v. Sharon Lybrand

97-94                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 23, 1997


1.   Adoption -- jurisdiction -- trial court had personal
     jurisdiction of appellant. -- Where appellant appeared in the
     adoption proceeding; where, instead of asking that the matter
     be dismissed for lack of notice to him, he asked that the
     adoption be set aside and the proceeding reopened; and where
     this request was honored, the supreme court had no hesitation
     in concluding that the trial court had personal jurisdiction
     of appellant.

2.   Appeal & error -- abstract did not reflect ruling on issue at
     trial -- issue not reached on appeal. -- Appellant's argument
     that the Putative Father Registry Act, Ark. Code Ann.  20-
     18-701 through 20-18-705 (Repl. 1991 and Supp. 1995), was
     unconstitutional was not addressed on appeal where the
     abstract of the record did not demonstrate that any ruling was
     made on the point at trial.  

3.   Adoption -- adoption statutes strictly construed -- finding
     that consent unnecessary on account of nonsupport or failure
     to communicate not reversed unless clearly erroneous. --
     Adoption statutes are strictly construed; a person who wishes
     to adopt a child without the consent of the parent must prove
     that consent is unnecessary by clear and convincing evidence;
     a finding that consent is unnecessary on account of a failure
     to support or communicate with the child is, however, not
     reversed unless clearly erroneous; the issue of justifiable
     cause is viewed as factual but one that is largely determined
     on the basis of the credibility of the witnesses; the supreme
     court gives great weight to a trial judge's personal
     observations when the welfare of young children is involved. 
     

4.   Adoption -- principles relevant for examination of consent
     statutes -- duty to support not excused on basis of other
     people's conduct unless that conduct prevents performance of
     duty. -- In analyzing the relevant consent statutes,
     additional principles are relevant: a failure to communicate
     without justifiable cause is one that is voluntary, willful,
     arbitrary, and without adequate excuse; the one-year period,
     moreover, may be any one-year period, not merely the one-year
     period preceding the filing of the adoption petition; it is
     not required that a parent fail "totally" in these obligations
     in order to fail "significantly" within the meaning of the
     statutes; the duty to support is not excused on the basis of
     other people's conduct unless such conduct prevents the
     performance of the duty of support. 

5.   Adoption -- abandonment of child given as ground for adoption
     -- trial court's decision that appellant's consent unnecessary
     not clearly erroneous. -- The trial court determined that
     under Ark. Code Ann.  9-9-207 (a)(1) (Repl. 1993), consent to
     adoption is not required from a parent who has "abandoned" a
     child; where appellant denied paternity when support for the
     child was sought and did not attempt to assert his paternity
     until some eight years later, and there was no "paper record"
     of any support being paid, the supreme court could not say,
     given the deference accorded to the trial court's
     determination of the credibility of the witnesses, that it was
     clearly erroneous to hold that appellant's consent was not
     required.

6.   Adoption -- decision regarding best interest of child to be
     adopted -- when reversed. -- The supreme court will not
     reverse a probate court's decision regarding the best interest
     of a child to be adopted unless it is clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence, giving due regard to the
     opportunity and superior position of the trial court to judge
     the credibility of the witnesses.


7.   Adoption -- evidence in support of adoption positive -- no
     error found in trial court's granting of petition for
     adoption. -- Where the evidence presented with respect to the
     putative adoptive father's relationship with the child was all
     positive, his marriage to the child's mother was apparently
     stable, and he had worked for the same employer for sixteen
     years and was apparently able to continue supporting his
     family, the supreme court could not say that the trial court
     erred in granting the adoption petition.


     Appeal from Grant Probate Court; Gary Arnold, Probate Judge;
affirmed.
     Thurman, Lawrence & Heuer, P.L.C., by:  Sam Heuer, for
appellant.
     No response.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     This is an adoption case in which the natural father of the
adopted child challenges the adoption on the ground that he
received no notice and did not give his consent.  He further
contends the adoption was not in the best interest of the child. 
We affirm the decision.  
     The appellant, John Wesley King, and a woman whose name is now
Sharon Lybrand married in 1976.  They divorced and then remarried. 
After the divorce and prior to their remarriage in 1984, Kristen
Dyan Lybrand was born to Ms. Lybrand.  Mr. King and Ms. Lybrand
thereafter divorced again, and the decree did not mention Kristen. 
Ms. Lybrand married Joseph Lybrand in 1986.  In 1987, Ms. Lybrand
sued Mr. King alleging that he was the father of Kristen and
seeking child support.  Mr. King denied paternity, and apparently
the action was dropped by Ms. Lybrand.  
     In March 1995, Mr. King filed a "visitation motion" in Pulaski
County where he resides, asserting that he is the father of
Kristen.  In May 1995, Mr. Lybrand petitioned the Grant Probate
Court to adopt Kristen.  On June 13, 1995, Mr. King's Pulaski
County action was dismissed, as venue was improperly laid.  It was
refiled as a paternity action by Mr. King in Grant County on June
16, 1995.  Ms. Lybrand answered and denied Mr. King's allegation
that he was Kristen's father.
     On August 22, 1995, a final adoption order was entered in
favor of Mr. Lybrand.  On August 31, 1995, Ms. Lybrand moved to
dismiss Mr. King's paternity suit, attaching to her motion the
final adoption decree making Kristen the daughter of Mr. Lybrand.
     Mr. King moved to set aside the adoption decree and to
"reopen" the adoption proceeding.  He claimed he was entitled to
have notice of the adoption proceeding but had not received notice. 
The motion to set the adoption aside was granted, and the
proceeding was thus reopened.  Prior to the ensuing hearing, Ms.
Lybrand filed a further response to Mr. King's paternity action,
and she admitted that Mr. King was Kristen's father.  
     At the ultimate hearing, there was testimony about acrimony
between Ms. Lybrand and Mr. King.  The evidence showed that,
although Ms. Lybrand allowed the child to spend considerable time
with Mr. King's mother, she attempted to keep Mr. King from seeing
the child.  Mr. King asserted that he had indeed seen Kristen
despite the attempts to keep her away from him and that he had
supported her to some extent by reimbursing his mother for gifts
and expenditures she had made for Kristen.  
     The Lybrands contended Mr. King was not entitled to notice of
the adoption proceeding because he had not registered as a putative
father pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  20-18-702 (Repl. 1991) and
because he had abandoned or deserted Kristen.  The Trial Court's
order dismissed Mr. King's paternity petition and granted Mr.
Lybrand's adoption petition.  Mr. King has raised four points of
appeal.  

                         1. Jurisdiction
     Mr. King contends that he was not given notice of the
initiation of the adoption petition by Mr. Lybrand.  He contends
the failure to give him notice was fatal to the Trial Court's 
"jurisdiction" because of the lack of strict compliance with the
adoption statutes requiring such notice.  Although he does not say
so directly, Mr. King's suggestion seems to be that the Court in
that circumstance lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.  That
is not so.  The cases Mr. King cites have to do with jurisdiction
of the person.  
     In Hughes v. Cain, 210 Ark. 476, 196 S.W.2d 758 (1946), the
natural parent of an adopted child petitioned for habeas corpus
contending that the adoption was invalid because the natural
parents had not been given notice.  The writ was granted, and we
affirmed.  Our holding was that the adoption was void because the
nonresident parents of the child had not been given notice by
publication as required by statute.  We held, "it was necessary
that service be obtained by publication as provided in  256 of
Pope's Digest, ... before the probate court could acquire
jurisdiction of the person of the appellee."  Hughes v. Cain, 210
Ark. at 482, 196 S.W.2d  at 760 (emphasis added).
     In Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18,