Title: Pierce v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GARY D. PIERCE, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 56, 2006 
 
Defendant-Below,   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID # 0407019516 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 21, 2006 
   Decided:  November 8, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire of Figliola & Facciolo, Wilmington, Delaware 
and James S. Friedman, Esquire, Newark, New Jersey for Appellant. 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware 
for Appellee.  
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 2
Defendant-Appellant Gary D. Pierce (“Pierce”) appeals his convictions in 
Superior Court of two counts of Attempted First Degree Rape and two counts of 
First Degree Rape.  Pierce first claims that the incident leading to his conviction 
should be viewed as a single, ongoing incident rather than four separate and 
distinct assaults because his acts took no longer than 15 minutes to complete.  He 
also claims that the Superior Court erred by refusing to give a specific jury 
instruction regarding single theory unanimity.  We find no merit to his arguments 
and affirm. 
I. 
Emily Hoffner1 was working alone as a part-time leasing agent in her model-
apartment office on Saturday, June 12, 2004.  Defendant Gary D. Pierce arrived at 
approximately 4 p.m. to take a tour of an apartment and told Hoffner that he and 
his brother were interested in renting one.  After Hoffner gave Pierce a brief tour, 
Pierce told Hoffner he was going to telephone his brother and return shortly.  Both 
Hoffner and Pierce testified to different versions of what happened next.   
Hoffner testified that several minutes after Pierce left, he returned, walked 
up to her, and grabbed her around the neck.  As she struggled, Pierce punched her 
in the face and forced her into the bathroom.  He then ordered her to remove her 
clothes, bent Hoffner over the bathtub, and tried to engage her in vaginal sexual 
                                          
 
1 Pursuant to Supr. Ct. R. 7(d), the name of the victim has been replaced with a pseudonym. 
 3
intercourse from behind.  Upon failing to do so, he moved her to the toilet and 
attempted to penetrate her again in the same manner.  Pierce then forced Hoffner 
into the adjacent bedroom where he succeeded in his attempt at the same, and the 
rape lasted two or three minutes.  He then ordered her back to the bathroom, bent 
her over the toilet and again raped her.  After a minute or two in the bathroom, the 
telephone rang and Pierce told Hoffner to answer it.  After the call ended, Pierce 
demanded her “I.D.” and Hoffner gave him her driver’s license.  Pierce then fled 
the building.  After he left, Hoffner called the police.  The entire incident lasted 
approximately ten to fifteen minutes from the time Pierce returned after the tour 
until he left with her driver’s license.  Witnesses and phone records verified this 
time frame. 
Pierce testified that he had met Hoffner prior to that day and that she had 
invited him to visit her at work.  He complied, and testified that the sexual 
intercourse was consensual.  After having sex one time, Pierce said that Hoffner 
wanted to have more sex, but Pierce refused.  According to Pierce, Hoffner then 
cursed and attacked him.  To push her away and aid his escape, Pierce said he 
“mushed” her face (i.e., “pushed her on her face with some relatively minimal 
amount of force for the sole and express purpose of getting her to release him”) 
and then quickly left the apartment.  The police arrested him almost two weeks 
later. 
 4
The State charged Pierce with two counts of First Degree Rape, two counts 
of Attempted First Degree Rape, and misdemeanor Theft.  The judge instructed the 
jury how they were to consider Pierce’s conduct with the “Separate Sexual Acts Or 
One Continuous Sexual Act” instruction.2  The jury convicted him on all charges.     
II. 
On appeal, Pierce raises five issues, four of which claim that the sexual acts 
constitute a single, continuous act and should have been treated as such from the 
start of his proceedings.  The fifth issue concerns the Superior Court’s refusal to 
give a single theory unanimity jury instruction. 
Pierce claims that the second count of Attempted First Degree Rape and the 
second count of First Degree Rape are multiplicitous and violate the Double 
                                          
 
2 The judge instructed the jury: 
The defendant is charged with two counts of first degree rape and two 
counts of attempted first degree rape.  In order to find the defendant guilty as to 
each count, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a separate and distinct 
sexual act occurred with regard to each count as opposed to one continuous sexual 
act.   
In determining whether a separate and distinct act occurred, you may 
consider the time period between the acts; any change in location; the nature of 
the act; and the intent of the defendant, that is, whether he intended to commit a 
separate additional sexual act.   
You may consider these factors, but you are to use your common sense 
and consider all of the evidence in determining, as to each count, whether a 
separate and distinct sexual act occurred or whether the separate counts actually 
constituted one continuous sexual act.  If you conclude that there was one 
continuous sexual act, then you should find the defendant guilty as to one such 
count and you must find the defendant not guilty of the other counts based on the 
same conduct. 
 5
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions.3  He contends 
that his actions constituted one continuous course of criminal conduct because they 
occurred in close spatial and temporal proximity to one another and because the 
crime involved only one victim and one perpetrator.  He also contends that the 
Superior Court committed legal error in failing to merge the second counts of rape 
and attempted rape and, in the alternative, to dismiss them.   
This Court reviews de novo both a claim of infringement of constitutional 
rights4 and denial of an application for merger.5  We review denial of a motion to 
dismiss counts of an indictment for abuse of discretion.6 
“Neither the Federal nor State Constitutions prevent the State from securing 
multiple convictions and sentences for statutory offenses occurring out of a single 
transaction.”7  “[A] defendant may be convicted of more than one count of a crime 
without violating the multiplicity doctrine if the defendant’s actions are sufficiently 
separate in time and location to constitute distinct acts.”8   
                                          
 
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb...."); DEL. CONST . art. 1, § 8 ("[N]o person shall be for the same 
offense twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."). 
4 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 362 (Del.1998). 
5 Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. 2002). 
6 See State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992). 
7 Ross v. State, 590 A.2d 503 (Del. 1991) (Table); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983). 
8 Spencer v. State, 868 A.2d 821, 823 (Del. 2005); Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 491 (Del. 
2003). 
 6
This “sufficiently separate” inquiry is fact-intensive.  As pointed out by this 
Court in Spencer v. State, 
There is no bright-line rule for determining how much time must 
elapse or how much spatial separation must exist between two 
criminal acts for those acts to constitute separate offenses.  The 
critical inquiry is whether the temporal and spatial separation between 
the acts supports a factual finding that the defendant formed a separate 
intent to commit each criminal act.9 
 
This Court has stated that one “‘who commits multiple sexual assaults upon 
the same victim may be held responsible for, and punished for, each separate and 
distinct act,’ albeit a violation of the same statute.”10  We have reasoned that a 
criminal defendant can not take advantage of the fact that he has already 
committed one sexual assault on the victim and thereby be permitted to commit 
further assaults on the same person with no risk of further punishment for each 
assault committed.”11  Each act places the victim in further danger and continues to 
denigrate the victim’s integrity.12  The key, therefore, is intent – whether the 
defendant formed a separate intent to commit each criminal act.13 
                                          
 
9 Spencer, 868 A.2d at 823 (emphasis added). 
10 Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 289 (Del. 1989) (citing Harrell v. State, 277 N.W.2d 462, 
471 (Wis. 1979)). 
11 Id. (citing Harrell, 277 N.W.2d at 469). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 289 n. 28; Spencer, 868 A.2d at 823. 
 7
In Wyant v. State,14 this Court upheld a defendant’s conviction for two 
counts of rape and one count of attempted rape where the sexual acts were 
committed against a single victim inside a single residence within a relatively short 
time period.  While on the first floor of the residence, the defendant attempted to 
rape the victim by anal intercourse and then raped her vaginally.15  The defendant 
then forced the victim upstairs, where he forced her to have sexual intercourse with 
him again.16  The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that his actions 
constituted one continuous criminal act.17   
In Feddiman v. State,18 this Court upheld a defendant’s convictions for eight 
counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree as not violating the 
multiplicity doctrine.  The defendant hit his victim with his car while she was on a 
bicycle, kidnapped her, and raped her in various places throughout Sussex County 
over the course of approximately six hours.19  The Court upheld the convictions as 
not multiplicitous because of the temporal and spatial separation between the 
offenses.20 
                                          
 
14 519 A.2d 649 (Del. 1986). 
15 Id. at 652. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 660-61. 
18 558 A.2d 278, 288-89 (Del. 1989). 
19 Id. at 280-81. 
20 Id. at 289. 
 8
Here, Pierce contends that he was unlawfully convicted of two counts of 
attempted rape as well as two counts of rape.  He argues that the second bathroom 
attempted rape was simply the continuation of his first attempt and that the 
bedroom rape was simply the culmination of his unsuccessful bathroom attempts at 
rape.  Pierce would characterize the attempted rapes in the bathroom and the later 
rapes in the bedroom and the bathroom as “one continuing episode.”  The evidence 
shows a sufficient break in conduct and time to constitute separate and distinct 
crimes.   
After Pierce first attempted to rape the victim in the bathroom by forcing her 
to kneel in front of the bathtub, he attempted rape again after pulling her up from 
the tub and forcing her to face the toilet and the wall next to the bathtub.  After this 
second attempt failed, he then forced the victim to go into the bedroom where he 
committed vaginal rape.  Then he forced the victim to return to the bathroom 
where he committed a further act of vaginal rape.   
As a matter of law, the jury was not required to accept Pierce’s contention 
that the rapes were part of the same ongoing incident.  The record also supports the 
jury’s finding of multiple sexual assaults upon the victim.  After the first attempt 
failed, an intent was formed to try again and the victim was moved to a different 
location in the bathroom.  The evidence of the actual rape in the bedroom was 
entirely additional to that of the first two attempts.  Pierce gave his victim 
 9
additional orders following this rape, and he formed a new intent to rape her again, 
manifested it, and committed that offense again after he forced her back into the 
bathroom.   
The remaining claim on appeal concerns the denial of a requested jury 
instruction.  We review the denial of a requested jury instruction de novo.21  
“Although the trial court must instruct a jury that the defendant’s guilt must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used.”22  A jury charge will not serve as grounds for 
reversible error if it is “reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by 
common practices and standards of verbal communication.”23  This Court will 
reverse only if the alleged deficiency in the jury instructions undermines the jury’s 
ability to perform intelligently its duty in returning a verdict.24   
The two counts of rape and the two counts of attempted rape alleged that the 
defendant facilitated the crimes “by the commission or attempted commission of 
assault third degree, terroristic threatening, or unlawful imprisonment in the second 
degree.”  At the prayer conference, defense counsel asked the judge to deliver a 
single theory unanimity instruction, which would require the jury to agree 
                                          
 
21 Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 2006); Ayers v. State, 844 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. 2004). 
22 Keyser, 893 A.2d at 960. 
23 Baker v. Reid, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (Del. 1947). 
24 Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1983).  
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unanimously on which of the three alternatives Pierce employed to facilitate the 
crime.  The court declined to give the instruction, relying on Richardson v. State,25 
and ruled that the jury need not be unanimous as to the underlying means the 
defendant employed to facilitate the commission of the crimes. 
A single theory unanimity instruction is required when “(1) a jury is 
instructed that the commission of any one of several alternative actions would 
subject the defendant to criminal liability, (2) the actions are conceptually different 
and (3) the state has presented evidence on each of the alternatives.”26  In this case, 
the second prong is not reached because the underlying actions are not 
conceptually different.  All three alternatives are violent crimes against the person 
and in this context, they were all means of coercing the victim into submitting to 
rape.  Because the defendant punched the victim in her face prior to the first 
attempt at rape, there exists in the record a basis for the jury to conclude that the 
defendant accomplished each attempted rape and each rape by at least this method.  
The jury instruction given by the trial court did not undermine the jury’s ability to 
return its unanimous verdict. 
III. 
                                          
 
25 673 A.2d 144, 147 (Del. 1996) (“While listing two possible means to satisfy an element of the 
offense presents a risk of less than a unanimous jury finding on that specific element, the 
Superior Court, by properly instructing the jury, ensured that the jury would reach an unanimous 
decision on the mens rea.”) (citation omitted).   
26 Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 634 (Del. 1998) (citing Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 121 
(Del. 1988) (citations omitted)). 
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The judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED.