Title: TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN V STATE OF MICHIGAN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 30, 2004 
TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS,
AND LAURA BAIRD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 122830 
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
NORTH AMERICAN SPORTS MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC, IV, and GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC., 
Intervening Defendants-Appellees, 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.   
In this declaratory action, we must determine: 
(1) 
whether House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 115 (1998), the 
Legislature’s approval by resolution of tribal-state gaming 
compacts, constituted “legislation” and therefore violated 
Const 1963, art 4, § 22; (2) whether the compacts’ 
amendatory provision providing that the Governor may amend 
 
 
 
  
the compacts without legislative approval violates the 
separation of powers doctrine found in Const 1963, art 3, § 
2; and (3) whether HCR 115 is a local act in violation of 
Const 1963, art 4, § 29. 
We hold that the Legislature’s approval of the 
compacts through HCR 115 did not constitute legislation. 
In approving those compacts by resolution, the Legislature 
did not modify Michigan law in any respect; instead, the 
Legislature 
simply 
expressed 
its 
approval 
of 
valid 
contracts between two independent, sovereign entities. 
Although Michigan’s gaming law would have applied to gaming 
on tribal lands in the absence of a tribal-state compact, 
it applied only as a matter of federal law. 
Compacts 
establishing the terms of class III gaming on tribal lands 
modified only federal law. 
Therefore, our Constitution 
does not require that our Legislature express its approval 
of these compacts through bill rather than resolution. 
We further hold that although the issue of the 
amendment provision in the compacts may now be ripe for 
review, the lower courts have yet to review this issue and 
make any specific findings regarding whether the amendatory 
provision in the compacts, as now invoked by Governor 
Granholm, violates the separation of powers provisions 
found in Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Finally, we hold that HCR 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
115 is not a “local act” and therefore does not violate 
Const 1963, art 4, § 29. 
Accordingly, we remand the 
amendment provision issue to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration, but otherwise affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
A. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL LAW REGARDING TRIBAL GAMING 
Knowledge of the underlying federal law is necessary 
to understand the factual posture of this case. 
In 
California v Cabazon, 480 US 202, 207; 107 S Ct 1083; 94 L 
Ed 2d 244 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that 
state laws may only be applied to tribal lands “if Congress 
has expressly so provided.” 
The Court held that because 
Congress had not provided for the regulation of tribal 
gaming, a state could only prohibit gaming on tribal lands 
if the state completely prohibited all gaming within its 
borders. 
In response to Cabazon, Congress passed the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 USC 2701 et seq., which 
divides gaming activities into three classes. 
Class I 
gaming consists of “social games solely for prizes of 
minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged 
in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, 
tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 USC 2703(6). Class 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II gaming includes bingo and card games (but not banking 
card games) that are played in conformance with state laws 
and 
regulations 
regarding 
hours 
of 
operation 
and 
limitations on wagers or pot sizes. 25 USC 2703(7). Class 
III gaming includes all other forms of gambling, including 
casino gaming. 25 USC 2703(8). 
At issue in this case is class III gaming. 
Under 
IGRA, tribes may engage in class III gaming only pursuant 
to a tribal-state compact that is approved by the Secretary 
of the Interior. 
25 USC 2710(d) provides, in relevant 
part: 
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be
lawful on Indian lands only if such activities 
are— 
* * * 
(B) located in a State that permits such
gaming 
for 
any 
purpose 
by 
any 
person,
organization, or entity, and 
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-
State compact entered into by the Indian tribe
and the State under paragraph (3) that is in
effect. 
* * * 
(3) (A) Any 
Indian 
tribe 
having
jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
class III gaming activity is being conducted, or
is to be conducted, shall request the State in
which such lands are located to enter into 
negotiations for the purpose of entering into a
Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of 
gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe
in good faith to enter into such a compact.[1] 
* * * 
(C) Any 
Tribal-State 
compact 
negotiated
under subparagraph (A) may include provisions
relating to -
(i) the application of the criminal and 
civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or
the State that are directly related to, and 
necessary for, the licensing and regulation of
such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil 
jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws
and regulations; 
(iii) the assessment by the State of such
activities in such amounts as are necessary to
defray the costs of regulating such activity; 
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such
activity 
in 
amounts 
comparable 
to 
amounts 
assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
(vi) standards for the operation of such
activity and maintenance of the gaming facility,
including licensing; and 
(vii) 
any 
other 
subjects 
that 
are 
directly related to the operation of gaming
activities. 
1 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44;
116 S Ct 1114; 134 L Ed 2d 252 (1996), the United States
Supreme Court held that 25 USC 2710(d)(7), which permits
Indian tribes to sue a state in federal court when that 
state has refused to negotiate in good faith for a tribal­
state compact, was an unconstitutional violation of state
sovereign immunity as preserved by the Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* * *  
(5) Nothing in this subsection shall impair
the right of an Indian tribe to regulate class
III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with
the State, except to the extent that such 
regulation 
is 
inconsistent 
with, 
or 
less 
stringent than, the State laws and regulations
made 
applicable 
by 
any 
Tribal-State 
compact
entered into by the Indian tribe under paragraph
(3) that is in effect. 
Through § 2710(d), Congress expressly provided for tribal­
state negotiations regarding class III gaming. 
Through 
this compacting process, the tribes and the states may 
agree to the terms governing such gaming. 
B. FACTUAL HISTORY 
The compacts at issue in this case were first signed 
by Governor Engler and four Indian tribes2 in January of 
1997. 
Each compact provided that it would take effect 
after “[e]ndorsement by the Governor of the State and 
concurrence in that endorsement by resolution of the 
Michigan Legislature.”3  The compacts were modified and re­
2 These tribes are the Little Traverse Bay Band of
Odawa Indians, the Pokagon Band of Ottawa Indians, the
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and the Nottawaseppi
Huron Potawatomi. 
The Little Traverse Bay Band and the
Little River Band currently operate casinos. 
3 See § 11 of the compacts. 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
executed in December 1998, and the Legislature then 
approved the compacts by resolution through HCR 115.4 
The validity of the 1998 compacts was challenged 
through several lawsuits.5
 Plaintiffs filed this suit 
against defendant in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the compacts do not comport with 
various constitutional provisions. 
Plaintiffs argue that 
the compacts amount to legislation and, therefore, pursuant 
to Const 1963, art 4, § 22 the Legislature was required to 
adopt them by bill rather than approve them by resolution. 
The circuit court held that the compacts should have been 
approved by bill. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court decision, concluding that the compacts do not 
4 Although a bill must be passed by a majority of
elected 
and 
serving 
members 
of 
the 
Legislature, 
a 
resolution may be passed by a majority vote of those
legislators present at the time, provided a quorum is
present. 
The House of Representatives approved the 
7compacts by a resolution vote of 48 to 47, and the Senate
followed suit by a resolution vote of 21 to 17. 
5 The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Lake Superior sued in
federal court to enjoin the operation of the new casinos,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit dismissed this suit on standing grounds. Sault Ste 
Marie Tribe v United States, 288 F3d 910 (CA 6, 2002). Two 
state legislators also challenged the approval of the 
Secretary of Interior of Michigan’s 1998 compacts, but that
suit was also dismissed on standing grounds by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Baird v 
Norton, 266 F3d 408 (CA 6, 2001). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
constitute legislation because they contain no enforcement 
provision that would ensure that their terms are satisfied 
and because the power of the state to legislate in this 
area is preempted by federal law. 
The Court of Appeals 
opined that the compacts constitute mere contracts and, 
therefore, approval by resolution was not constitutionally 
infirm. 
Plaintiffs also contend that the provision in the 
compacts that purports to empower the Governor to amend 
them without legislative approval violates Const 1963, art 
3, § 2, the “separation of powers” doctrine. 
The circuit 
court agreed with plaintiffs. 
The Court of Appeals, 
however, reversed the decision of the circuit court on the 
basis that the amendatory provision issue was not ripe for 
review because the Governor had not yet attempted to amend 
the compacts. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the compacts violate 
Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the “local acts” clause. The 
circuit court disagreed, holding that art 4, § 29 is not 
implicated. 
The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the 
circuit court on this issue. 
This Court granted leave to appeal. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision 
regarding a motion for summary disposition. Van v Zahorik, 
460 
Mich 
320, 
326; 
597 
NW2d 
15 
(1999). 
The 
constitutionality of a legislative act is a question of law 
that is reviewed de novo. 
DeRose v DeRose, 469 Mich 320, 
326; 666 NW2d 636 (2003). 
III. THE LEGISLATURE’S APPROVAL OF THE COMPACTS WAS NOT LEGISLATION 
Resolution of whether HCR 115 constituted legislation 
necessarily turns on the definition of “legislation.” 
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature’s approval of the 
compacts must be legislation because HCR 115 had the effect 
of altering legal rights and responsibilities. 
We find 
this 
definition 
of 
“legislation” 
overly 
simplistic. 
Although it is true that legislation alters legal rights 
and responsibilities, not everything that alters legal 
rights and responsibilities can be considered legislation. 
Legal rights and responsibilities may also be altered 
through contracts. 
Therefore, the fact that the legal 
rights or responsibilities of the parties involved may have 
been altered in some way is not dispositive. 
We 
hold 
that 
a 
more 
accurate 
definition 
of 
“legislation” is one of unilateral regulation. 
The 
Legislature is never required to obtain consent from those 
9  
 
 
 
who are subject to its legislative power. Boerth v Detroit 
City Gas Co, 152 Mich 654, 659; 116 NW 628 (1908). 
This 
unilateral action distinguishes legislation from contract: 
“‘The power to regulate as a governmental function, and the 
power to contract for the same end, are quite different 
things. One requires the consent only of the one body, the 
other the consent of two.’” 
Detroit v Michigan Pub 
Utilities Comm, 288 Mich 267, 288; 286 NW 368 (1939), 
quoting City of Kalamazoo v Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 200 
Mich 146, 159-160; 166 NW 998 (1918). 
Here, the Legislature was required to approve the 
compacts only as the result of negotiations between two 
sovereigns: 
the Legislature could not have unilaterally 
exerted its will over the tribes involved. 
Because the 
tribes’ consent is required by federal law, the compacts 
can only be described as contracts, not legislation. 
A. THE STATE’S LIMITED ROLE UNDER IGRA 
In order to understand the contractual nature of the 
compacts, it is essential to understand the state’s limited 
role under federal law generally, as well as IGRA. 
Since 
at least 1832, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized tribal sovereignty. 
In Worcester v Georgia, 31 
US 515, 557; 8 L Ed 483 (1832), the United States Supreme 
Court noted that the tribes were “distinct political 
10  
 
 
 
 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which 
their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the 
lands 
within 
those 
boundaries, 
which 
is 
not 
only 
acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.” 
This 
tribal sovereignty is limited only by Congress: 
“The 
sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique 
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” 
United 
States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 323; 98 S Ct 1079; 55 L Ed 2d 
303 (1978). 
Similarly, only the federal government or the 
tribes themselves can subject the tribes to suit; tribal 
immunity “is not subject to diminution by the States.” 
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Mfg Technologies, Inc, 523 US 
751, 754, 756; 118 S Ct 1700; 140 L Ed 2d 981 (1998). 
Through IGRA, however, Congress has permitted the states to 
negotiate with the tribes through the compacting process to 
shape the terms under which tribal gaming is conducted. 
The states have no authority to regulate tribal gaming 
under the IGRA unless the tribe explicitly consents to the 
regulation in a compact. 
Although 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C) provides that class III 
gaming 
activities 
are 
only 
lawful 
if 
conducted 
in 
conformance with a tribal-state compact, that does not mean 
the states have any authority to regulate class III gaming 
11  
 
 
 
 
  
 
activities in the absence of a compact. 
States may not 
enforce the terms of IGRA; rather, the only enforcement 
provided for in the IGRA is through the federal government. 
The IGRA provides that civil enforcement lies only with the 
tribes themselves or with the National Indian Gaming 
Commission, which was created by IGRA. 
25 USC 2713. 
Judicial review of the Commission’s decision may only be 
obtained in federal court. 
25 USC 2714. 
Similarly, 
criminal 
enforcement 
is 
left 
solely 
to 
the 
federal 
government under 18 USC 1166(d). 
See also Gaming Corp of 
America v Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F3d 536, 545 (CA 8, 1996) 
(“Every reference to court action in IGRA specifies federal 
court 
jurisdiction. 
. 
. 
. 
State 
courts 
are 
never 
mentioned.”). 
In 
other 
words, 
although 
it 
may 
be 
“unlawful” for the tribes to engage in class III gaming 
absent a compact, the Legislature is powerless to regulate 
or prohibit such gaming. 
State legislatures have no 
regulatory role under IGRA aside from that negotiated 
between the tribes and the states. 
In Gaming Corp, supra at 546-547, the court explained: 
Congress thus left states with no regulatory
role over gaming except as expressly authorized
by IGRA, and under it, the only method by which a
state can apply its general civil laws to gaming
is through a tribal-state compact. Tribal-state
compacts are at the core of the scheme Congress
developed to balance the interests of the federal 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
government, the states, and the tribes. They are
a creation of federal law, and IGRA prescribes 
“the permissible scope of a Tribal-State compact,
see § 2710(d)(3)(C).” 
Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v Florida, [517 US 44; 116 S Ct 1114; 134 L Ed 2d
252 (1996).] Such compacts must also be approved
by 
the 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Interior. 
§
2710(d)(3)(B). 
* * * 
Congress thus chose not to allow the federal
courts to analyze the relative interests of the
state, tribal, and federal governments on a case
by case basis. 
Rather, it created a fixed 
division of jurisdiction. 
If a state law seeks 
to regulate gaming, it will not be applied. If a 
state law prohibits a class of gaming, it may
have force. The courts are not to interfere with 
this balancing of interests, they are not to
conduct a Cabazon balancing analysis. 
This 
avoids inconsistent results depending upon the
governmental interests involved in each case. 
With only the limited exceptions noted above,
Congress left the states without a significant
role under IGRA unless one is negotiated through
a compact. 
The only way the states can acquire regulatory power over 
tribal gaming is by tribal consent of such regulation in a 
compact. 
In fact, our Legislature has recognized that the 
state’s regulatory authority cannot extend to tribal 
gambling. MCL 432.203(5) provides that state regulation of 
tribal casinos can only occur “[i]f a federal court or 
agency rules or federal legislation is enacted that allows 
a state to regulate gambling on Native American land.” 
Absent 
such 
federal 
authorization, 
MCL 
432.203(2)(d) 
13  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
    
  
acknowledges 
that 
the 
state’s 
gambling 
regulatory 
requirements do not apply to “[g]ambling on Native American 
land and land held in trust by the United States for a 
federally recognized Indian tribe on which gaming may be 
conducted under [IGRA].” 
Further, contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, 18 USC 
1166 does not change this analysis. Section 1166 provides: 
(a) Subject to subsection (c), for purposes
of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the
licensing, 
regulation, 
or 
prohibition 
of 
gambling, including but not limited to criminal
sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in 
Indian country in the same manner and to the same
extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State. 
(b) Whoever in Indian country is guilty of
any act or omission involving gambling, whether
or not conducted or sanctioned by an Indian 
tribe, which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if
committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of
the State in which the act or omission occurred,
under 
the 
laws 
governing 
the 
licensing,
regulation, or prohibition of gambling in force
at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like
punishment. 
(c) For the purpose of this section, the
term "gambling" does not include— 
(1) class I gaming or class II gaming
regulated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or 
(2) class III gaming conducted under a 
Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of
the Interior under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act [25 USC 2710(d)(8)] that is
in effect. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
(d) The United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction 
over 
criminal 
prosecutions 
of 
violations of State gambling laws that are made 
applicable under this section to Indian country,
unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State
compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior
under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act [25 USC 2710(d)(8)], or under any
other provision of Federal law, has consented to
the 
transfer 
to 
the 
State 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the 
lands of the Indian tribe. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 1166 does not grant the state regulatory authority 
over tribal gaming; rather, it simply incorporates state 
laws as the federal law governing nonconforming tribal 
gaming. 
Thus, although a state’s gaming laws apply in the 
absence of a tribal-state compact, they apply only as 
federal law. It follows that when the Legislature approves 
a tribal-state compact, it approves a change in federal law 
rather than its own. 
Moreover, 
this 
“federalization” 
of 
state 
law 
regulating gambling does not give a state enforcement power 
over violations of state gambling laws on tribal lands 
because “the power to enforce the incorporated laws rests 
solely with the United States.” 
United Keetoowah Band of 
Cherokee Indians v Oklahoma, 927 F2d 1170, 1177 (CA 10, 
1991). 
The 
state 
remains 
powerless 
to 
assert 
any 
regulatory authority over tribal gaming unless the tribes 
have assented to such authority in a compact under IGRA. 
15  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
AT&T Corp v Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 295 F3d 899, 909 (CA 9, 
2002). 
Although 18 USC 1166(d) effectively “borrows” Michigan 
law for purposes of federal law, it does not delegate any 
regulatory power to the states. 
Section 1116(d) is not a 
way to extend the state’s power to regulate tribes through 
the federal government. Rather, the federal government may 
conclude at any time that it will no longer apply state law 
and so amend the IGRA. In other words, the fact that, for 
purposes 
of 
expediency, 
the 
federal 
government 
has 
currently chosen to apply Michigan law for purposes of 
federal law does not mean that it will always choose to do 
so. 
Therefore, § 1166(d) cannot be viewed as a delegation 
of regulatory power to the states. 
B. THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF COMPACTS 
As explained above, IGRA only grants the states 
bargaining power, not regulatory power, over tribal gaming. 
The Legislature is prohibited from unilaterally imposing 
its will on the tribes; rather, under IGRA, it must 
negotiate with the tribes to reach a mutual agreement.6
 As 
6 IGRA even prohibits the state from frustrating the
tribe’s desire to enter into class III gaming by refusing
to negotiate. In the event that a state will not negotiate
or an agreement cannot be reached, although under Seminole 
(continued…) 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
further noted above, the hallmark of legislation is 
unilateral 
imposition 
of 
legislative 
will. 
Such 
a 
unilateral imposition of legislative will is completely 
absent in the Legislature’s approval of tribal-state gaming 
compacts under IGRA. 
Here, the Legislature’s approval of 
the compacts follows the assent of the parties governed by 
those compacts. Thus, the Legislature’s role here requires 
mutual assent by the parties—a characteristic that is not 
only the hallmark of a contractual agreement but is also 
absolutely foreign to the concept of legislating. 
Rood v 
Gen Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 118; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). 
See Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v 
Johnson, 135 Wash2d 734, 750; 958 P2d 260 (1998) (“Tribal­
state gaming compacts are agreements, not legislation, and 
are interpreted as contracts.”) 
Further, the compacts approved by HCR 115 do not apply 
to the citizens of the state of Michigan as a whole; they 
only bind the two parties to the compact. 
Legislation 
“looks to the future and changes existing conditions by 
making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some 
part of those subject to its power.” 
Dist of Columbia 
(…continued) 
Tribe the state may not be sued, it appears that the tribe 
may approach the Secretary of the Interior, who can approve 
a compact under 25 USC 2710(d)(8).  
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court of Appeals v Feldman, 460 US 462, 477; 103 S Ct 1303; 
75 L Ed 2d 206 (1983), quoting Prentis v Atlantic Coast 
Line Co, 211 US 210, 226; 29 S Ct 67; 53 L Ed 150 (1908). 
Here, the compacts approved by HCR 115 have no application 
to those subject to legislative power; rather, they only 
set forth the parameters within which the tribes, as 
sovereign nations, have agreed to operate their gaming 
facilities. 
Under the terms of the compacts, the tribes 
themselves, not the state, regulate the conduct of class 
III gaming on tribal lands. 
The Legislature has no 
obligations regarding the regulation of gaming whatsoever, 
nor can the state unilaterally rectify a violation of the 
compacts. 
Similarly, in approving the compacts at issue here, 
the Legislature has not dictated the rights or duties of 
those 
other 
than 
the 
contracting 
parties. 
Despite 
plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, we find that § 18 of 
the compacts does not obligate local units of government to 
create local revenue sharing boards. 
Indeed, because the 
local government units are not parties to the contract, it 
would not be possible for the compacts to impose any 
obligations on the local governments. Third parties cannot 
be bound by the terms of the compacts. 
Instead, the 
compacts 
make 
local 
units 
of 
government 
third-party 
18  
 
 
 
 
beneficiaries of the compacts, with the creation of the 
revenue sharing boards simply a condition precedent to 
receiving those benefits. 
A party is a third-party 
beneficiary if the promisor “has undertaken to give or do 
or refrain from doing something directly to or for said 
person.” 
MCL 600.1405(1). 
Here, the tribes have promised 
to give 2% of their net earnings to local communities, 
provided those communities create the revenue sharing 
boards to receive and disburse the payments. 
If the local 
governments choose not to create the sharing boards, they 
simply can no longer receive the benefit of the funds. But 
they are under no obligation to create the revenue sharing 
boards and receive the benefit granted by the tribes. 
Further, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Legislature’s approval by resolution has affected the 
rights of state citizens by setting age limitations for 
gaming or employment in the tribal casinos. 
These 
restrictions are not restrictions on the citizens of 
Michigan; rather, they are restrictions only on the tribes. 
The compacts provide the minimum requirements that the 
tribes agree to use in hiring and admitting guests to the 
casinos. The state has no power to regulate the casinos or 
enforce violations of the compact, but must use the dispute 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
resolution 
procedure 
provided 
in 
the 
compacts 
if 
a 
violation occurs. 
Finally, we hold that the Legislature’s approval of 
the tribal-state compacts does not create any affirmative 
state obligations. 
The compacts do not create any state 
agencies or impose any regulatory obligation on the state. 
The state also has no responsibility to enforce the 
compacts’ requirements—that responsibility falls on the 
tribes alone. 
In this way, the compacts here can be 
distinguished from those at issue in the cases relied upon 
by plaintiffs. 
In Kansas v Finney, 251 Kan 559; 836 P2d 
1169 (1992), the compact at issue created a state gaming 
agency responsible for monitoring the tribe’s compliance 
with the contract, and the compact was not submitted to the 
legislature for any form of approval. 
The court found 
that, under Kansas law, the creation of a state agency was 
a legislative function. 
Absent an appropriate delegation 
of power by the legislature or legislative approval of the 
compact,7 the compacts could not bind the state to the 
increased obligations. 
Unlike the compact in Finney, 
however, the compacts at issue here do not create any state 
7 The court did not specify what form that legislative
approval would have to take. 
20  
 
 
 
agencies 
and 
were 
presented 
to 
the 
Legislature 
for 
approval. 
Similarly, in New Mexico v Johnson, 120 NM 562; 904 
P2d 11 (1995), the compacts authorized more forms of gaming 
than were otherwise permitted in New Mexico. As in Finney, 
the compacts were not presented to the state legislature 
for any form of approval. The court held that the governor 
could not enter into the compacts and thereby create new 
forms of gaming without “any action on the part of the 
legislature.” Id. at 574. Unlike the compacts in Johnson, 
the compacts here do not create new forms of gaming and 
were presented to the Legislature for approval. 
Thus, the 
compacts do not impose new obligations on the citizens of 
the state subject to the Legislature’s power; they simply 
reflect the contractual terms agreed to by two sovereign 
entities. 
C. LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL VIA RESOLUTION WAS APPROPRIATE 
Once it is determined that HCR 115 did not constitute 
legislation, we must then determine whether resolution was 
an appropriate method of legislative approval of the 
compacts. 
We therefore turn to our Constitution. 
Our 
Constitution 
does 
not 
prohibit 
the 
Legislature 
from 
approving contracts, such as the compacts at issue here, by 
concurrent resolution. 
Unlike the federal constitution, 
21  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
our Constitution “is not a grant of power to the 
legislature, but is a limitation upon its powers.” 
In re 
Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313, 333; 289 NW 493 
(1939). Therefore, “the legislative authority of the state 
can do anything which it is not prohibited from doing by 
the people through the Constitution of the State or the 
United States.” 
Attorney General v Montgomery, 275 Mich 
504, 538; 267 NW 550 (1936). 
This has been discussed by 
this Court in the past by analogizing our Legislature to 
the English Parliament. See Young v City of Ann Arbor, 267 
Mich 241, 243; 255 NW 579 (1934), in which this Court 
stated: 
A different rule of construction applies to
the Constitution of the United States than to the 
Constitution of a State. The Federal government
is one of delegated powers, and all powers not
delegated are reserved to the States or to the
people. When the validity of an act of congress
is 
challenged 
as 
unconstitutional, 
it 
is 
necessary to determine whether the power to enact
it has been expressly or impliedly delegated to
congress. 
The 
legislative 
power, 
under 
the 
Constitution 
of 
the 
State, 
is 
as 
broad,
comprehensive, absolute and unlimited as that of
the parliament of England, subject only to the 
Constitution 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
the 
restraints and limitations imposed by the people
upon such power by the Constitution of the State
itself.[8] 
8 See also Thompson v Auditor General, 261 Mich 624,
642; 247 NW 360 (1933), in which the Court stated:
(continued…) 
22  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
Regarding any limitations in our constitution, art 4, § 22 
only requires the approval of legislation by bill, but is 
silent regarding the approval of contracts. 
We have held that our Legislature has the general 
power 
to 
contract 
unless 
there 
is 
a 
constitutional 
limitation. 
Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 
PA 240, 400 Mich 311; 254 NW2d 544 (1977). 
It is 
acknowledged by all that our Constitution contains no 
limits on the Legislature’s power to bind the state to a 
contract with a tribe; therefore, because nothing prohibits 
it from doing so, given the Legislature’s residual power, 
we conclude that the Legislature has the discretion to 
approve the compacts by resolution.9 
(…continued) 
The power of the legislature of this State
is as omnipotent as that of the parliament of
England, 
save 
only 
as 
restrained 
by 
the 
Constitution 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
the 
Constitution of this State. . . . 1 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.), p. 354. 
9 In fact, action by concurrent resolution is common
when the Constitution is silent regarding the appropriate
procedure. 
Various 
constitutional 
provisions 
require
legislative action but fail to specify its form: 
Const 
1963, art 4, § 53 (appointment of auditor general); Const
1963, art 11, § 5 (approval of certain civil service pay
increases); Const 1963, art 4, § 17 (establishing special
legislative committees); and Const 1963, art 10, § 5 
(designation of land as part of state land reserve). 
In 
such situations, the Legislature has historically acted by
concurrent resolution. 
23  
 
 
 
  
 
This understanding of legislative power is well­
established. 
Our Legislature has in the past used the 
resolution process to ratify amendments of the federal 
constitution. 
This Court has declared the resolution 
process 
proper 
in 
such 
a 
circumstance 
because 
the 
Legislature did not engage in a legislative act that 
enacted a law, but merely expressed its assent to the 
proposed amendment. 
Decher v Secretary of State, 209 Mich 
565, 571; 177 NW 388 (1920). 
In the same way, the 
Legislature here is merely expressing its “assent” to the 
compacts through HCR 115. 
More importantly, because our Legislature had the 
discretion to approve the compacts by resolution rather 
than by bill, the courts cannot interfere with that 
legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. 
As this 
Court recognized long ago in Detroit v Wayne Circuit Judge, 
79 Mich 384, 387; 44 NW 622 (1890): 
It is one of the necessary and fundamental
rules of law that the judicial power cannot 
interfere with the legitimate discretion of any
other department of government. 
So long as they
do no illegal act, and are doing business in the
range of the powers committed to their exercise,
no outside authority can intermeddle with them
. . . . 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the 
Legislature’s 
discretionary 
decision 
to 
approve 
the 
compacts by resolution. 
IV. THE BLANK/CHADHA FACTORS 
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded by 
plaintiffs’ argument that the factors set forth in the lead 
opinion in Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103; 611 
NW2d 530 (2000), adopted from Immigration & Naturalization 
Service v Chadha, 462 US 919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 
(1983), apply to this case. 
Blank and Chadha involved the 
Legislature’s 
power 
to 
alter 
or 
amend 
the 
statute 
delegating rule-making authority without doing so by 
statute. Blank held that once the Legislature grants power 
to an agency by statutory action, it cannot then diminish 
or qualify that power except by further statutory action. 
This “legislative veto” practice at issue in Blank also had 
a significant state constitutional history.  Const 1963, 
art 4, § 37 allowed temporary legislative vetoes of agency 
regulations between legislative sessions. 
In 1984, the 
people rejected a proposal to amend § 37 and permit the 
type of permanent legislative veto at issue in Blank. 
The 
fact that the legislative veto at issue in Blank was not 
permitted by the Constitution and had been rejected by the 
people further illuminates the Blank decision. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No such environment exists here, however, as our 
Constitution is silent regarding the proper form of 
legislative approval of tribal-state gaming compacts under 
IGRA and the people have not expressed a view on this 
question. 
Therefore, 
we 
do 
not 
believe 
that 
the 
Blank/Chada analysis should be applied here. 
In response to the Justice Markman’s dissent, however, 
we note that even were the Blank/Chadha analysis to be 
applied, 
the 
factors 
do 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
Legislature’s approval of the compacts was an act of 
legislation. 
A. THE COMPACTS DO NOT ALTER THE LEGAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND 
RELATIONS OF PERSONS OUTSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
To make sense, this factor must apply to persons 
outside the legislative branch who are subject to the 
Legislature’s authority. 
Here, the compacts do not give 
the state the power to alter the rights, duties, or 
relations of anyone subject to the Legislature’s authority. 
Rather, the compacts only set forth the parameters the 
tribes agree will apply to their operation of gaming 
facilities. 
The Legislature has no regulatory duty under 
the compacts, nor do the compacts confer any “rights” upon 
the state other than contractual rights. 
For example, 
although the state may inspect tribal facilities and 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
records, it has no power to enforce those provisions. 
Any 
contractual disputes under the compacts must be submitted 
to the dispute resolution procedure outlined in the 
compacts. All duties and restrictions in the compacts fall 
on the tribes themselves, who are sovereign entities and 
have consented to the restrictions and additional duties. 
B. THE RESOLUTION DID NOT SUPPLANT LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Unlike the actions taken in Blank, HCR 115 did not 
have 
the 
effect 
of 
amending 
or 
repealing 
existing 
legislation when it approved the compacts. As noted above, 
given the Constitution’s silence regarding the form of 
approval necessary for tribal-state gaming compacts, the 
Legislature had the discretion to approve the compacts by 
resolution. 
Further, as explained above, the compacts do 
not impose any affirmative obligations on the state, create 
rules of conduct for Michigan citizens, or create new state 
agencies. 
Such changes would require legislation, but are 
absent from the compacts. 
Therefore, legislation is not 
required and this Court should not interfere with the 
Legislature’s discretion in approving the compacts by 
concurrent resolution. 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. THE COMPACTS DO NOT INVOLVE POLICY DETERMINATIONS REQUIRING
LEGISLATION 
First, it must be remembered that not all policy 
decisions made by the Legislature are required to be in the 
form of legislation. 
See Blank, supra at 170 (Cavanagh, 
J.). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Yakus 
v United States, 321 US 414, 424; 64 S Ct 660; 88 L Ed 834 
(1944), “[t]he essentials of the legislative function are 
the determination of legislative policy and its formulation 
and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct 
. . . .” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Here, HCR 115 neither 
promulgated a legislative policy as a defined and binding 
rule of conduct nor applied it to the general community. 
Instead, HCR 115 simply assented to the negotiated contract 
between two sovereign entities, recognizing that the 
compacts created no new legal rights or duties for the 
state or its citizens. 
Indeed, HCR 115 could never be 
considered a “promulgation of a legislative policy as a 
defined 
and 
binding 
rule 
of 
conduct” 
because 
the 
Legislature lacks the authority to bind the tribes at all. 
Without the tribes’ approval, the compacts have no force. 
Through IGRA, Congress has determined that states may not 
unilaterally impose their will on the tribes regarding 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
gaming; rather, the states may only negotiate with the 
tribes through the compacting process. 
D. CHADHA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FACTOR IS NOT APPLICABLE GIVEN THE 
NATURE OF OUR STATE CONSTITUTION 
As noted above, our Constitution differs from the 
federal constitution: 
the federal constitution grants 
Congress its power, while our Constitution limits the 
plenary power of our Legislature. 
As this Court has 
recognized: 
A different rule of construction applies to
the Constitution of the United States than to the 
Constitution of a state. 
The federal government
is one of delegated powers, and all powers not
delegated are reserved to the states or to the
people. 
When the validity of an act of Congress
is 
challenged 
as 
unconstitutional, 
it 
is 
necessary to determine whether the power to enact
it has been expressly or impliedly delegated to
Congress. 
The legislative power, under the 
Constitution 
of 
a 
state, 
is 
as 
broad,
comprehensive, absolute, and unlimited as that of
the Parliament of England, subject only to the 
Constitution 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
the 
restraints and limitations imposed by the people
upon such power by the Constitution of the state
itself. 
[Young v Ann Arbor, 267 Mich 241, 243;
255 NW 579 (1934).] 
Thus, the fourth Chadha factor, which was not applied in 
Blank, is inapplicable here because our Constitution does 
not grant authority to the Legislature, but instead limits 
the Legislature’s plenary authority. 
As explained above, 
our Constitution’s silence regarding the form of approval 
needed for tribal-state gaming compacts, therefore, does 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
not lead to the conclusion that the Legislature is 
prohibited from approving the compacts by resolution; 
rather, it leads to the conclusion that the form of the 
approval is within the discretion of the Legislature. 
V. THE AMENDMENT PROVISION ISSUE SHOULD BE REMANDED 
Although we agree with plaintiffs that Governor 
Granholm’s recent amendments make the amendment provision 
issue ripe for review, the lower courts have not yet been 
able to assess this issue since the amendments. 
It is not 
proper for us to do so now. 
Therefore, we remand this 
issue to the Court of Appealsto consider whether the 
provision in the compacts purporting to empower the 
Governor to amend the compacts without legislative approval 
violates the separation of powers doctrine found in 
Const 
1963, art 3, § 2. 
The Court of Appeals should remand to 
the trial court if it determines that further fact-finding 
is necessary to resolve the issue. 
VI. HCR 115 DOES NOT VIOLATE CONST 1963, ART 4, § 29 
The “local act” provision of art 4, § 29 of Michigan’s 
Constitution provides: 
The legislature shall pass no local or 
special act in any case where a general act can
be made applicable, and whether a general act can
be made applicable shall be a judicial question.
No local or special act shall take effect until
approved by two-thirds of the members elected to
and serving in each house and by a majority of 
30  
 
 
 
the electors voting thereon in the district 
affected. . . . 
In Hart v Wayne Co, 396 Mich 259; 240 NW2d 697 (1976), 
this Court considered whether a provision of the municipal 
courts of record act requiring Wayne County to supplement 
salaries for recorder's court judges constituted a “local 
act” subject to Const 1963, art 4, § 29. We held that the 
provision did not constitute a “local act” because a 
recorder’s court performs state functions and the funding 
of such a court is a state function. 
Id. at 272. 
In 
Attorney General ex rel Eaves v State Bridge Comm, 277 Mich 
373; 269 NW 388 (1936), this Court considered whether state 
legislation authorizing a bridge to Canada located at Port 
Huron constituted a local act. 
We held again that it did 
not, stating: “The bridge in question is international in 
character and will be used by those from all parts of both 
nations who desire to enter or leave the United States 
through Port Huron.” Id. at 378. 
Hart and Eaves, applied to the facts of this case, 
lead to the same conclusion: tribal-state compacts are not 
“local acts.” 
In the absence of express congressional 
consent, the Legislature has no authority to regulate 
casino gambling on Indian lands. Like the bridge in Eaves, 
Indian casinos, located as they are on tribal lands, are 
31  
 
 
 
                                                 
“international 
in 
character” 
and 
are 
likely 
to 
be 
frequented by Michigan citizens from throughout the state 
as well as by members of various Indian tribes. Therefore, 
the approval of state compacts regarding Indian casinos 
pursuant to IGRA constitutes a unique state function with 
interests “international in character,” rather than a 
function of a local unit of government with predominantly 
local interests. 
Thus, we hold that the compacts are not 
“local acts.” 
Further, tribal lands subject to compact negotiations 
are declared as such not by the state or even by the 
tribes, but by the Department of the Interior. 
The 
Department of the Interior has thus far granted to the 
tribes lands located in the counties specified in the 
compacts.10  If, however, the department were to grant to a 
tribe lands located outside such counties, IGRA would 
direct the state to negotiate in good faith with the tribe 
10 The mere fact that Indian land is located in a 
specific county does not give that county jurisdiction over
that land, just as Michigan does not have absolute 
jurisdiction over all tribal lands located within its 
borders. 
As already noted, absent express congressional
consent, neither the state nor a local unit of government
may regulate tribal affairs. 
Thus, the compacts are not
“local acts” because the tribal lands that they regulate
are not subject to local jurisdiction as contemplated by
Const 1963, art 4, § 29. 
32  
 
 
 
to reach a compact applicable to that land as well. 
For 
this additional reason, we are not persuaded that the 
compacts are “local acts” merely because they reference 
those specific counties in which the tribes have thus far 
been granted lands by the department. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals that the compacts do not violate Const 1963, art 4, 
§ 29, albeit for the reasons expressed above. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We hold that HCR 115 was a valid method of approving 
the compacts. 
The compacts, and hence the Legislature’s 
approval of those compacts, do not alter the legal rights 
or duties of the state or its citizens, nor do they create 
any state agencies. 
Therefore, no legislation is required 
to approve them. Rather, the compacts are simply contracts 
between two sovereign entities. 
Without the compacts, the 
state is prohibited under IGRA from unilaterally regulating 
tribal gaming in any manner. 
Further, our Constitution 
does not limit the Legislature’s discretion regarding the 
proper approval method for tribal-state gaming compacts. 
Absent a constitutional limitation, the Legislature has 
discretion 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
method 
for 
approving a contract. 
Moreover, we hold that HCR 115 is 
not a “local act” and so does not violate Const 1963, art 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4, § 29. 
Finally, because no lower courts have had the 
opportunity 
to 
consider 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
amendment 
provision in the compacts since the issue became ripe for 
review, we remand that issue to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration. 
In all other respects, we affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
CAVANAGH, J. 
I concur only with respect to part IV. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
MARKMAN, J. 
I concur only with respect to part VI. 
Stephen J. Markman 
34  
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST 
CASINOS and LAURA BAIRD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 122830 
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
NORTH AMERICAN SPORTS MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC, IV, and GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC., 
Intervening Defendants-Appellees, 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
In 1997 and 1998, Governor John Engler negotiated 
tribal-state gaming compacts with four west Michigan 
tribes. Under their terms, the compacts would become 
effective only when all of the following occurred: 
(A) Endorsement by the tribal chairperson
and concurrence in that endorsement by resolution
of the Tribal Council; 
(B) Endorsement by the Governor of the State
and concurrence in that endorsement by resolution
of the Michigan Legislature; 
(C) 
Approval 
by 
the 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Interior of the United States; and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D) Publication in the Federal Register.
[Compact with Little Traverse Bands of Odawa 
Indians, § 11.] 
The compacts met all four requirements and became effective 
on February 18, 1999. 
The Legislature approved the compacts by concurrent 
resolution. The plaintiffs then filed suit asserting that 
the compacts are legislation. 
Consequently, they argue, 
the Michigan Constitution requires that they be approved 
only by bill. Const 1963, art 4, § 22. At issue in this 
appeal is whether the approval process used by the Michigan 
Legislature was constitutional. 
A majority of Justices, myself included, hold that the 
tribal-state gaming compacts at issue are not legislation. 
They are more appropriately viewed as a communication 
between sovereign entities. The compacts do not impose 
duties on or restrict the people of the state. Instead, 
they are contractual in nature, conveying the rights and 
obligations of the parties, the state, and the various 
tribes. Therefore, the Legislature's approval by concurrent 
resolution was appropriate. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
We find unpersuasive Justice Markman's reliance on 
this Court's decision in Blank1 to reach a contrary 
conclusion. Blank is inapplicable to this case. 
Because 
the tribal-state gaming compacts are valid, a majority 
affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of 
defendants with the exception of the issue regarding the 
governor's recent compact amendment. 
On that issue, a 
majority agrees to remand the case to the Court of Appeals 
for consideration of the plaintiffs' argument. 
I. Standard of Review 
The circuit court ruled for plaintiffs on cross­
motions for summary disposition. 
Decisions on motions for 
summary disposition are reviewed de novo. 
American 
Federation of State, Co and Muni Employees v Detroit, 468 
Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). The question presented 
is whether the legislative action was constitutional. 
Similarly, issues of constitutionality are reviewed de 
novo. 
Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6; 664 NW2d 767 
(2003). 
1 Blank v Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich 103; 611 NW2d
530 (2000). 
The Blank plurality adopted the United States
Supreme Court's test regarding legislative veto enunciated
in Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US
919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983). 
462 Mich at 
115. 
3  
 
 
 
 
II. The Role of Federal Law 
Through 
the 
Commerce 
Clause, 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
grants 
the 
federal 
government 
exclusive 
jurisdiction over relations with Indian tribes. US Const, 
art I, § 8, cl 3. The clause gives Congress the power "[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Id. 
The so­
called Indian Commerce Clause places relations with Indian 
tribes within “the exclusive province of federal law.” 
Oneida Co v Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 US 226, 
234; 105 S Ct 1245; 84 L Ed 2d 169 (1985). Given the 
existence 
of 
the 
Indian 
Commerce 
Clause, 
state 
law 
generally 
is 
not 
applicable 
to 
Indians 
on 
tribal 
reservations unless Congress has specifically made it 
applicable. McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Comm, 411 US 
164, 170-171; 93 S Ct 1257; 36 L Ed 2d 129 (1973). 
In recognition of this principle, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that, if state gambling policy is 
regulatory rather than prohibitory, then state law is 
inapplicable to Indian gaming on Indian lands. 
California 
v Cabazon Band of Indians, 480 US 202, 209; 107 S Ct 1083; 
94 L Ed 2d 244 (1987). 
If state law allows gaming but 
seeks to regulate it, the state is not authorized to 
enforce that law on Indian reservations. The Cabazon Court 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
made 
clear 
that 
regulation 
of 
Indian 
gaming 
is 
fundamentally the province of federal law. 
Tribes retain 
the exclusive right to regulate gaming on their lands in 
states where all gaming activity is not prohibited. Id. at 
207. 
In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 USC 2701 et 
seq. With this act, Congress has provided a comprehensive 
federal regulation of tribal gaming. This framework allows 
state regulation only to the extent that it is negotiated 
into the terms of a tribal-state compact. 
Such a compact 
must set forth the parameters under which an Indian tribe 
will establish and operate casino-style gaming facilities. 
25 USC 2710(d)(3). 
IGRA provides that Indian tribes may engage in class 
III gaming only if “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-
State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the 
State . . . .” 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C). 
Because it is not 
classified as class I or class II style gaming, the casino­
style gambling at issue in this case involves class III 
gaming. 25 USC 2703(8). 
By allowing the states to play a role through the 
compacting process, IGRA “extends to the States a power 
withheld from them by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 58; 116 S Ct 1114; 134 L Ed 
2d 252 (1996). 
IGRA does not furnish states with the 
ability to unilaterally regulate tribal gaming. Rather, it 
provides them an opportunity to oversee tribal gaming. The 
role of the state is limited to the terms the state is able 
to negotiate with a tribe. 
IGRA requires a tribe to obtain a compact with a state 
in order to engage in casino-style gambling. A compact is 
[a]n 
agreement 
or 
contract 
between 
persons,
nations or states. Commonly applied to working
agreements between and among states concerning
matters of mutual concern. A contract between 
parties, which creates obligations and rights
capable of being enforced, and contemplated as
such between the parties, in their distinct and
independent characters. 
[Black's Law Dictionary
(6th ed).] 
States cannot prevent tribal gaming by refusing to 
negotiate or by demanding unreasonable conditions.  They 
must negotiate in good faith upon a request by the tribe 
for such negotiation. 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(A). While Seminole 
held that Eleventh Amendment immunity protects states from 
suit by Indian tribes, it did not eliminate a state's duty 
to negotiate in good faith. 
If 
a 
state 
refuses 
to 
engage 
in 
good-faith 
negotiations, it can lose its ability to influence the 
regulation of casino gaming on tribal land. The Seminole 
Court expressly refused to comment on substitute remedies 
6  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
tribes might seek for a state's failure to negotiate in 
good faith. Seminole, supra at 76 n 18.2 
According to IGRA: 
Indian tribes have the exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the
gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by
Federal law and is conducted within a State which 
does not, as a matter of criminal law and public
policy, prohibit such gaming activity. 
[25 USC
2701(5).] 
Michigan allows various forms of gambling. They 
include horse racing,3 a state lottery,4 and voter-approved 
casino gambling in the city of Detroit.5 It cannot 
reasonably be argued that Michigan prohibits, rather than 
regulates, gambling. 
Therefore, Michigan’s direct power 
2 I note that 25 USC 2710(d)(8) does not, as Justice
Corrigan suggests, allow the tribe to go directly to the
Secretary of Interior who can then approve the compact. The
section simply gives the secretary the authority to approve
a gaming compact entered into between an Indian tribe and a
state. It does not authorize the secretary to approve a
compact to which either side has not manifested its assent.
After the Seminole case, the remedy for a tribe is unclear.
Before Seminole, it was clear that the remedy was that each
side would submit a proposed compact to a mediator, who
would choose one of the two. 
25 USC 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
This remedy was available only after issuance of a federal
district court order. Id. Because Seminole affirmed a 
state's immunity from federal suit, it is unclear if this
remedy is still available. 
3 MCL 431.301 et seq. 
4 MCL 432.9. 
5 See MCL 432.201 et seq. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
with 
respect 
to 
gambling 
in 
Indian 
country 
is 
the 
bargaining power given to it by the federal government 
through IGRA. 
Relying on Blank, Justice Markman argues that the 
subject of the compacts, state oversight of tribal gaming, 
can be achieved only through legislation. This misconstrues 
the state's ability to pass laws applicable to Indians. It 
is a unique situation. 
"State law is generally not 
applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an 
Indian tribe, absent the consent of Congress." Cohen's 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 5.A. 
The Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act6 recognized 
this principle and provided that, in the future, Congress 
could delegate to the state jurisdiction over Indian gaming 
on Indian lands. But until or unless that occurs, the only 
way the parties can authorize Indian gaming is by mutually 
agreeing to a compact. 
Were this untrue, the Legislature 
could simply amend the gaming control act to unilaterally 
regulate gaming on tribal land. 
Plaintiffs argue that 18 USC 1166 gives the state a 
regulatory role in tribal gaming without the need for a 
negotiated 
compact 
in 
which 
the 
tribe 
has 
ceded 
6 MCL 432.201 et seq. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs misconstrue 18 USC 1166. This 
federal statute provides that state laws with respect to 
gambling apply in Indian country in the same manner in 
which they apply throughout the rest of the state. 18 USC 
1166(a). At 18 USC 1166(d), it provides that 
[t]he 
United 
States 
shall 
have 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
over 
criminal 
prosecutions 
of 
violations of State gambling laws that are made
applicable under this section to Indian country,
unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State
compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior
. . . has consented to the transfer to the State 
of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling
on the lands of the Indian tribe. 
Section d retains federal jurisdiction over Indian 
gaming unless a tribe negotiates it away in a compact. 
Without a compact, a state has no jurisdiction over gaming 
on Indian land. 
Hence, 18 USC 1166 does nothing more than 
adopt state law as the governing federal law for purposes 
of Indian gaming. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians 
v Oklahoma, 927 F2d 1170, 1177 (CA 10, 1991). Plaintiffs' 
arguments to the contrary are misguided. 
IGRA allows tribes to engage in some forms of 
gambling. However, in recognition of the state's interest 
in the issue, IGRA requires a tribe to have a valid tribal­
state gaming compact in place before it can engage in class 
III gambling. In exchange for giving states this power, 
IGRA requires the states to negotiate with tribes in good 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
faith. While IGRA provides for the negotiation of tribal­
state compacts, it does not specify the manner in which a 
state must approve a compact. 
Therefore, one must consult 
state law to make this determination. 
III. The Role of State Law 
The 
Michigan 
Constitution 
requires 
that 
“All 
legislation shall be by bill and may originate in either 
house.” Const 1963, art 4, § 22. It further provides that, 
"No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a 
majority of the members elected to and serving in each 
house." Const 1963, art 4, § 26. 
According to the 
Legislature's internal rules, concurrent resolutions need 
be approved only by a majority of those present at the time 
they are voted on. 
See Mason's Manual of Legislative 
Procedure, § 510(1) p 338. 
If only a concurrent resolution is required, the 
tribal-state gaming compacts were properly approved and are 
valid. However, if the compacts are legislation, they were 
not properly approved by the Legislature, because a 
majority of those elected and serving did not approve them. 
While the Michigan Constitution requires that all 
legislation 
be 
passed 
by 
bill, 
it 
does 
not 
define 
legislation. The dictionary defines "legislation" as "the 
act of making or enacting laws." Random House Webster's 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
College Dictionary (2000). "Law" is defined as "the 
principles and regulations established by a government or 
other authority and applicable to a people, whether by 
legislation or by custom enforced by judicial decision." 
Id. 
A 
similar 
definition 
is 
found 
in 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary (6th ed), which describes "legislation" as 
"[t]he act of giving or enacting laws. . . . 
Formulation 
of rule for the future." 
"Law" is further defined as 
"[t]hat which must be obeyed and followed by citizens 
subject to sanctions or legal consequences . . . ." Id. 
These definitions suggest that legislation involves 
the Legislature's power to formulate rules applicable to 
its people. The central characteristic of legislation is 
the ability of the Legislature to act unilaterally in 
creating rules applicable to those subject to its power. In 
Westervelt,7 a plurality of this Court stated, “[T]he 
concept of ‘legislation’, in its essential sense, is the 
power to speak on any subject without any specified 
limitations.” (Emphasis in original). Where Indian gaming 
is concerned, the Legislature has no such power. According 
7 Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412,
440; 263 NW2d 564 (1978) (opinion by Williams, J.). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
to IGRA, the Legislature must obtain tribal consent before 
the tribe will be bound by state law. 
The compacts are not legislation. They place no 
restrictions or duties on the people of the state of 
Michigan. 
They create no duty to enforce state laws on 
tribal lands. 
Sale of liquor to Indian casinos is subject 
to the same requirements as sales to other Michigan 
businesses. 
The compacts do not impose duties, responsibilities, 
and costs on the state. 
They do not force the state to 
assume 
the 
obligation 
to 
oversee 
and 
implement 
the 
unemployment and worker's compensation statutes. 
The 
compacts merely obligate the tribes to provide the same 
benefits to their employees as those employees would be 
entitled to if they worked for an off-reservation business. 
A representative provision reads: 
The tribe shall provide to any employee who
is employed in conjunction with the operation of
any gaming establishment at which Class III 
gaming activities are operated pursuant to this
Compact, such benefits to which the employee
would be entitled by virtue of the Michigan
Employment 
Security 
Act, 
and 
the 
Worker's 
Disability Compensation Act of 1969, if his or
her employment services were provided to an 
employer engaged in a business enterprise which
is subject to, and covered by, the respective
Public Acts. [Compact with Little Traverse Band
Bands of Odawa Indians, § 5. (internal citations
omitted)]. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There 
is 
no 
requirement 
in 
that 
representative 
provision that the tribe fulfill this obligation through 
state agencies. It is entirely possible that the tribe has 
its own system for providing such benefits. 
Justice Weaver claims that the tribes have the 
authority to tax gaming activity under the IGRA. 
Opinion 
of Weaver, J., post at 8. 
We find the claim to be of no 
consequence 
in 
this 
case. 
That 
tribes 
may 
have 
relinquished certain rights as part of the bargaining 
process has no effect on the proper characterization of the 
compacts during review of the Legislature's actions. 
A higher tax is not placed on Indian gaming proceeds. 
There is no restriction on advertising related to Indian 
casinos. The compacts do not give special treatment to 
Indian casino suppliers. No burden is placed on the people 
of the state of Michigan through the negotiated compacts. 
Plaintiffs 
argue 
that 
the 
compacts 
mandate 
the 
creation of local revenue sharing boards. However, local 
governments are not obliged to create these boards unless 
they wish to take advantage of the monetary contribution 
the tribes have voluntarily agreed to provide. 
The 
compacts essentially assign third-party beneficiary status 
to local governments. In order to accept the benefits of a 
compact, a local government must comply with the conditions 
13  
 
 
 
 
set out in the compact. 
The compact, however, does not 
force a local government either to share in the benefits of 
the compact or to create a local board. 
The compacts essentially advise local governments 
that, to exercise local control over the payments that the 
compacts obligate the tribes to disburse to them, they must 
establish a board. 
The board must be given the authority 
to accept the payments. 
The fact that local governments 
may exhibit rational self-interest and proceed to set up 
such boards does not render the compacts legislation. Nor 
does the fact that new businesses will be located on 
reservations near these communities render the subject of 
the compacts legislative. 
Any large business that locates 
a branch near a small community might increase local 
governmental expenses due to the enhanced economic activity 
that the branch occasions. 
The compacts are applicable only to the tribes. The 
tribes are generally not subject to the legislative power 
of the state. To the extent that the compacts delineate 
rules of conduct applicable to tribal gaming, they do not 
do it through the use of the Legislature’s unrestricted 
power. They do it through the affirmative choice of the 
tribes. 
The 
compacts 
are 
government-to-government 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
agreements. 
Black's, 
supra 
at 
6. 
Each 
explicitly 
acknowledges that it is between two sovereigns. 
Accordingly, the compacts are not legislation. They 
are more closely analogous to contracts and have been so 
treated by other states. The Washington Supreme Court has 
held that "Tribal-state gaming compacts are agreements, not 
legislation, 
and 
are 
interpreted 
as 
contracts." 
See 
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v Johnson, 
135 Wash 2d 734, 750; 958 P2d 260 (1998). 
See also 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v Oregon, 
143 F3d 481 (CA 9, 1998); Gallegos v Pueblo of Tesque, 132 
NM 207, 218; 46 P3d 668 (2002). 
As explained previously, the state does not possess 
the power to apply its law unilaterally to gaming on tribal 
land. The state and a tribe must negotiate a mutual 
agreement describing the regulations that may be applied to 
class III gaming on Indian lands. 
The power to legislate is distinct from the power to 
contract. Whereas, normally, legislation requires only the 
agreement of a majority of the lawmakers, a contract must 
have the agreement of all its parties to all its terms. 
Boerth v Detroit City Gas Co, 152 Mich 654, 659; 116 NW 628 
(1908). The compacts explicitly provide that they do not 
take effect unless all parties, the state and the tribes, 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
agree to them. The compacts are not a product of the 
unilateral action or unrestricted power of the Legislature, 
but, instead, result from negotiations between sovereign 
entities, the state and the tribes. 
Because 
the 
compacts 
are 
not 
legislation, 
the 
Legislature was not required to approve them by bill. In 
Michigan, the "legislative authority of the State can do 
anything which it is not prohibited from doing by the 
people through the Constitution of the State or of the 
United 
States." 
Huron-Clinton 
Metro 
Auth 
v 
Bds 
of 
Supervisors of Five Cos, 300 Mich 1, 12; 1 NW2d 430 (1942), 
quoting Attorney General v Montgomery, 275 Mich 504, 538; 
267 NW 550 (1936). 
Nothing 
in 
the 
federal 
or 
state 
constitutions 
prohibits the Legislature from approving intergovernmental 
agreements by concurrent resolution. The Legislature's 
internal rules allow for this form of approval. Negotiated 
compacts might involve legislation, for example, where they 
require the state to create a new agency or extend state 
jurisdictional authority to tribal land. However, the 
compacts at issue do not involve these concerns. 
The Legislature was not restricted in its approval 
process by IGRA or by the state constitution. Contrary to 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Justice Markman's position,8 our state constitution is 
unlike the federal constitution in this respect: 
whereas 
the power of the federal government is provided for and 
limited by the United States Constitution, the power of 
state 
government 
is 
inherent 
in 
the 
state. 
This 
distinction is well-recognized: 
The government of the United States is one
of enumerated powers; the national Constitution
being the instrument which specifies them, and in
which authority should be found to the exercise
of any power which the national government
assumes to possess. In this respect, it differs
from the constitutions of the several States,
which are not grants of powers to the States, but
which apportion and impose restrictions upon the
powers 
which 
the 
States 
inherently 
possess.
[Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, vol I, p 
12.] 
There is no provision in the state constitution 
indicating how the Legislature should address an executive 
agreement negotiated by the Governor and presented to the 
Legislature for its approval. 
Because there was no 
restriction on its ability to act, the Legislature followed 
its internal procedure, one that it used when approving 
compacts that the Governor negotiated in 1993. We conclude 
that, given the unique nature of tribal-state gaming 
8 Opinion of Markman, J., post at 38. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
compacts and the content of the particular compacts at 
issue, this form of legislative approval was appropriate. 
IV. Separation of Powers 
At the time that plaintiffs filed suit, no amendment 
of the compacts had been made. 
For that reason, it is 
arguable that plaintiffs' separation of powers claim is not 
ripe for review. If that is the case, plaintiffs' challenge 
is a facial challenge only. 
To establish that an act is facially unconstitutional, 
the 
challenging 
party 
must 
show 
that 
"no 
set 
of 
circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid." 
Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 543; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), 
quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 
2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). Plaintiffs cannot meet this 
burden. 
The amendment provision of the compacts survives a 
facial challenge to the Separation of Powers Clause of the 
Michigan Constitution. 
Const 1963, art 3, § 2. There are 
many conceivable amendments that a governor might make to 
these compacts. For example, a governor could amend the 
provision relating to dispute resolution or the provision 
about the timing of payments. 
Because there was no amendment to challenge at the 
time plaintiffs brought suit, arguably the issue is not 
18  
 
 
 
 
ripe for review. 
Admittedly, the jurisprudence in this 
area is unclear. 
No controlling state precedent exists 
regarding when a court is to analyze the ripeness issue. 
Federal secondary authority suggests that a suit must be 
ripe when it is instituted: 
"[t]he doctrines of standing 
and ripeness focus on aspects of justiciability at the time 
the action is commenced." Moore's Federal Practice, vol 15, 
§101.05. In addition: 
The burden is on the plaintiff to allege in
the complaint sufficient facts to establish the
court's jurisdiction. The court will review the
issue for ripeness as of the time the litigation
is commenced. The matter must have been ripe for
review at that time; subsequent ripening . . . is
not 
sufficient 
to 
confer 
the 
court 
with 
jurisdiction that did not originally exist when
the action was initiated." [Id. at § 101.74.] 
Unfortunately, 
Moore's 
offers 
no 
authority 
for 
this 
proposition. 
Clearly, during the pendency of this litigation, 
Governor Granholm made amendments to the gaming compacts at 
issue. 
It is argued that these render the issue ripe for 
this Court's review. However, the amendments were made 
after the opinions from the lower courts were released. 
This 
Court 
has 
consistently 
declined 
to 
entertain 
constitutional questions where it lacks the benefit of a 
fully developed lower court record. 
In re CAW, 469 Mich. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192; 665 NW2d 475 (2003); Jenkins v Patel, 471 Mich ___; 
___ NW2d ___ (2004). 
We may possess jurisdiction to decide the issue. 
However, the parties addressed the issue only in a cursory 
fashion, 
each 
premising 
its 
argument 
on 
its 
characterization 
of 
the 
original 
compacts 
as 
either 
legislation or contract. 
Also, the Court of Appeals did 
not address the issue. 
Absent a more developed record, in 
the exercise of judicial restraint, we decline to decide 
it. 
Consistent with our practices, a majority of the Court 
agrees that the issue of whether the Governor's recent 
amendments violate the Separation of Powers Clause should 
be remanded for Court of Appeals consideration. 
V. Local Acts Provision 
Finally, because the compacts at issue are not 
legislation, they do not violate the local acts provision 
of the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 4, § 29. We 
disagree with Chief Justice Corrigan's local acts analysis. 
The local acts provision reads: 
The legislature shall pass no local or 
special act in any case where a general act can
be made applicable, and whether a general act can
be made applicable shall be a judicial question.
[Const 1963, art 4, § 29.] 
20  
 
 
 
 
An act is legislation. Black's Law Dictionary defines a 
legislative act as: "[a]n alternative name for statutory 
law. A bill which has been enacted by the legislature into 
law." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). Since tribal-state 
gaming compacts are not legislation, as discussed supra, 
the local acts provision of our Constitution is not 
applicable to them. 
V. A response to the dissents 
We are unpersuaded by Justice Markman's argument which 
has as its premise that Blank is applicable to the facts of 
this case. Blank involved a case where the Legislature 
delegated power to an administrative agency but attempted 
to retain a legislative veto. 
462 Mich at 113. 
In 
contrast, the present case involves two separate branches 
of government approving agreements with sovereign Indian 
tribes. The question presented is whether the Legislature's 
ratification of the agreements by concurrent resolution was 
the appropriate manner in which to manifest its assent. 
The extra-jurisdictional cases that the dissents rely 
on are distinguishable from the present case. In each, the 
governor of the state acted unilaterally to bind the state 
to the compact. 
While those cases hold that legislative 
approval is required, no case suggests the form that such 
approval must take. See State of Kansas ex rel Stephan v 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finney, 251 Kan 559; 836 P2d 1169 (1992); Narragansett 
Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v Rhode Island, 667 A2d 280 
(1995). 
In the present case, the Michigan Legislature 
expressed its approval of the compacts. 
The unique 
question before us is whether that Legislature's approval 
was sufficient under the Michigan Constitution. We hold 
that it was. 
Both Justice Markman and Justice Weaver rely on Becker 
v Detroit Savings Bank, 269 Mich 432, 257 NW 853 (1934). 
Becker is inapplicable to this case. 
It dealt with a 
legislative resolution that purported to convey to the 
courts the Legislature's intent in passing a certain law. 
The Court held that, while the resolution was entitled to 
"respectful consideration," it was not the law. 
Id. at 
436. 
Becker concluded that the courts are bound to apply 
the law as written. Id. 
The question here is not whether the compacts must be 
followed in light of conflicting statutory authority. 
It 
is whether the Legislature was required to voice its 
approval in the form of a bill that is passed into law. 
Becker notes that "[j]oint resolutions *** are often used 
to express the legislative will in cases not requiring a 
general law." Id. at 435, quoting Hoyt v Sprague, 103 US 
613, 636; 26 L Ed 585 (1880). Becker does not aid in 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
determining whether the compacts at issue require a general 
law. 
VI. Conclusion 
A majority of Justices, myself included, hold that the 
tribal-state gaming compacts at issue are not legislation. 
They 
are 
appropriately 
viewed 
as 
agreements 
between 
sovereign entities. 
They do not impose duties on or 
restrict the people of the state. 
Instead, they are 
contractual in nature, conveying the rights and obligations 
of the parties, the state, and the various tribes. 
Therefore, a concurrent resolution of the Legislature was 
appropriate to validate them. 
For these reasons, a majority affirms the Court of 
Appeals decision in favor of defendants, except as to the 
recent amendments made by Governor Granholm. On that issue, 
a majority agrees to remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals for consideration of plaintiffs' separation of 
powers claim. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS,
AND LAURA BAIRD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 122830 
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
NORTH AMERICAN SPORTS MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC, IV, and GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, 
 
Intervening Defendants-Appellees, 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the majority’s holding that the compacts 
do not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the “local acts” 
clause.1
 But I dissent from the majority’s decision that 
the tribal-state gaming compacts at issue, entered into and 
signed by various Indian tribes and Governor Engler on 
1 The majority correctly holds that the “local act”
provision of Michigan’s constitution, art 4, § 29, is not
implicated by the compacts; I concur in the majority’s
decision to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
behalf of the state pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 USC 2701 et seq., were validly 
approved 
by 
a 
joint 
resolution 
of 
the 
Legislature. 
Accordingly, I would hold that the compacts are void 
because they are legislation that is required to be enacted 
by bill, not passed by issuing a joint resolution, and I 
therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals decision on 
this issue. 
I would also hold that the power to bind the state to 
a compact with an Indian tribe is an exercise of the 
legislative power, and that the Governor does not have the 
authority to bind the state to such a compact. Art 4, § 22 
of 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution 
requires 
that 
“[a]ll 
legislation shall be by bill . . . .” A resolution is not 
a constitutional method of expressing the legislative will 
where that expression is to have the force of law and bind 
people other than the members of the house or houses 
adopting it. 
Becker v Detroit Savings Bank, 269 Mich 432, 
434-435; 257 NW 855 (1934). 
The tribal-state compacts 
have the force of law and bind people other than the 
legislative members who adopted them. 
Therefore, the 
Legislature must exercise its power to bind the state to a 
compact with an Indian tribe by enacting a bill, not by 
passing a joint resolution. 
I would reverse the Court of 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Appeals on this issue and hold that the compacts at issue 
are void. 
Because I would hold that the compacts are void, it is 
unnecessary to remand to the trial court for consideration 
of whether the provision in the compacts that permits the 
Governor to amend the compacts without legislative approval 
violates Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
Such an issue is moot in light of my conclusion 
that the compacts are void. 
I 
The compacts at issue were signed by Governor Engler 
and the various Indian tribes, and approved by the 
Legislature pursuant to a joint resolution.2
 Appellants 
argue that the Legislature’s approval by joint resolution 
was 
not 
valid. 
Appellants 
assert 
that 
the 
policy 
determinations in deciding whether and how to allow Indian 
tribes to operate casinos in Michigan are legislative in 
nature, and therefore the compacts must be approved by 
bill, 
not 
joint 
resolution, 
because 
the 
Michigan 
2 See House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 115 (1998).
While a bill must be passed by a majority of elected and
serving members of the Legislature, a resolution may be
passed by a majority vote of those legislators present at
the time, as long as a quorum is present. 
3  
 
 
                                                 
Constitution, art 4, § 22 requires that “[a]ll legislation 
shall be by bill.” 
Underlying the issue of whether the compacts were 
validly approved is a more fundamental question: who, under 
Michigan law, has the authority to bind the state of 
Michigan to a compact negotiated under IGRA. 
If the 
authority is vested in Michigan’s Governor, the Governor’s 
approval alone would be sufficient to render the compacts 
valid, there would be no requirement that the Legislature 
approve the compacts at all, and the manner in which the 
Legislature approved the compact would not be governed by 
the Constitution. 
See Panzer v Doyle, __ Wis 2d __, __; 
680 NW2d 666 (2004). 
But if the authority to approve a 
compact is vested in Michigan’s Legislature, then it is 
necessary to determine whether approval by resolution was a 
valid exercise of the Legislature’s power under Michigan’s 
Constitution. 
II 
IGRA does not specify which branch of a state 
government should bind the state to a compact with Indian 
tribes.3
 Rather, the determination whether a state has 
3 The IGRA provides, in pertinent part: “Any Indian
tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which
(continued…) 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
validly bound itself to a compact is a matter of state 
sovereignty and left to state law. 
Saratoga Co Chamber of 
Commerce Inc v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 822; 798 NE2d 1047 
(2003). For the reasons set forth below, I would hold that 
it is the Legislature that has the authority to bind the 
state to a compact under IGRA and that the Governor does 
not have the authority to bind Michigan to a compact under 
IGRA. 
Michigan’s 
Constitution 
separates 
the 
powers 
of 
government: “The powers of government are divided into 
three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. 
No 
person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise 
powers properly belonging to another branch except as 
expressly provided in this constitution.” 
Const 1963, art 
3, § 2. 
The executive power is vested in the Governor, 
Const 1963, art 5, § 1, and the legislative power is vested 
in a senate and a house of representatives. 
Const 1963, 
art 4 § 1. The executive power is, first and foremost, the 
power to enforce the laws or to put the laws enacted by the 
Legislature into effect. 
The People ex rel Sutherland v 
(…continued)
a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be
conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are
located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct
of gaming activities.” 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(A). 
5  
 
 
 
Governor, 29 Mich 320, 324-325 (1874), People ex rel 
Attorney General v Holschuh, 235 Mich 272, 274-275; 209 NW 
158 (1926); 16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 258, p 165 
and § 275, p 193. 
The legislative power is the power to 
determine the interests of the public, to formulate 
legislative policy, and to create, alter, and repeal laws. 
Id. 
The Governor has no power to make laws. 
People v 
Dettenthaler, 118 Mich 595; 77 NW 450 (1898). 
“[T]he 
executive branch may only apply the policy so fixed and 
determined [by the legislative branch], and may not itself 
determine matters of public policy or change the policy 
laid down by the legislature. 
16 CJS Constitutional Law § 
216, p 686. 
As explained below, I conclude that binding the state 
to a compact with an Indian tribe involves determinations 
of public policy and the exercise of powers that are within 
the exclusive purview of the Legislature. 
IGRA itself contemplates that states will confront 
several policy choices when negotiating tribal gaming 
compacts. 
Saratoga Co Chamber of Commerce Inc v Pataki, 
supra at 822. Under IGRA, a compact may include provisions 
relating to: (i) the application of directly related 
criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Tribe or the 
State; (ii) the allocation of jurisdiction between the 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
State and the Tribe to permit enforcement of such laws; 
(iii) State assessments to defray the costs of regulating 
gaming; (iv) taxation by the Tribe of such activity; (v) 
remedies 
for 
breach 
of 
contract; 
(vi) 
standards 
of 
operation for gaming and maintenance of gaming facilities; 
and (vii) “any other subjects that are directly related to 
the 
operation 
of 
gaming 
activities.” 
25 
USC 
2710 
(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii). 
The Little River Band compact contains examples of 
policy decisions made for each of the seven issues 
recognized in 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C)(i-vii). 
(i) Tribal law 
and regulations, not state law, are applied to regulate 
gambling.4  But the compact applies state law, as amended, 
to 
the 
sale 
and 
regulation 
of 
alcoholic 
beverages 
encompassing certain areas. 
(section 10 [a], p 13). 
(ii) 
The tribe, not the state, is given responsibility to 
administer 
and 
enforce 
the 
regulatory 
requirements. 
4 The compact states, “Any limitations on the number of
games operated or played, their location within eligible 
Indian lands as defined under this Compact, hour or period
of operation, limits on wages or potsize, or other 
limitations shall be determined by duly enacted tribal law
or regulation. 
Any state law restrictions, limitations or
regulation of such gaming shall not apply to Class III
games conducted by the tribe pursuant to this compact.”
(section 3[a][8], p 5 of the Little River Band compact). 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
(section 4[m][1], p 9). 
(iii) To allow state assessments 
to defray the costs of regulating gaming, the compact 
states that the tribe shall reimburse the state for the 
costs up to $50,000 it incurs in carrying out functions 
that are authorized within the compact. 
(section 4[m][5], 
p 10). Also, the compact states that the tribe must pay 2% 
of the net win at each casino derived from certain games to 
the county treasurer.5
 (section 18(a)(i), p 18). 
(iv) 
Under IGRA the tribe could tax the gaming activity, but the 
compact does not allow such taxation. 
(v) The compact 
provides for dispute resolution procedures in the event 
there is a breach of contract. (p 11). (vi) The compact 
includes standards for whom a tribe can license and hire in 
connection 
with 
gaming, 
(section 
4[d], 
p 
6), 
sets 
accounting standards the gaming operation must follow, 
(p 
7), and stipulates that gaming equipment purchased by the 
tribe must meet the technical standards of the state of 
Nevada or the state of New Jersey. (section 6[a], p 11). 
5 The compact states that it is the “States intent, in
this and its other compacts with federally recognized 
tribes, that the payments to local governments provided for
in this section provide financial resources to those 
political 
subdivisions 
of 
the 
State 
which 
actually
experience increased operating costs associated with the
operation of the class III gaming facility.” 
(section
18[a][ii], p 18). 
8  
 
 
 
 
(vii) The compact addresses the “other subjects that are 
directly related to the operation of gaming facilities” 
throughout the document. 
For example, it allows for 
additional class III games to be conducted through the 
agreement of tribe and the state. (section 3[b], p 5). 
Also, the compact states that the tribe must purchase the 
spirits it sells at the gaming establishments from the 
Michigan Liquor Control Commission and that it must 
purchase beer and wine from distributors licensed by the 
Michigan Liquor Control Commission. (section 10[b], p 13). 
These 
compact 
provisions 
necessarily 
require 
fundamental policy choices that epitomize "legislative 
power." Decisions involving licensing, taxation, criminal 
and civil jurisdiction, and standards of operation and 
maintenance require a balancing of differing interests, a 
task 
the 
multi-member, 
representative 
Legislature 
is 
entrusted to perform under the constitutional separation of 
powers. 
See Saratoga Co Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 
NY2d 801, 822-823; 798 NE2d 1047; 766 NYS2d 654 (2003). 
To date, every other state supreme court that has 
addressed whether the governor or the legislature of a 
state has the authority to bind the state to a compact with 
an Indian tribe under IGRA has concluded that the state’s 
governor lacks the power unilaterally to bind the state to 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
tribal gaming compacts under IGRA. 
See State ex rel 
Stephan v Finney, 251 Kan 559; 836 P2d 1169 (1992); State 
ex rel Clark v Johnson, 120 NM 562; 904 P2d 11 (1995); 
Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v Rhode Island, 
667 A2d 280 (1995); Pataki, supra; 
Panzer, supra.6  These 
cases concluded that entering into a tribal-state compact 
under 
IGRA, 
and 
thereby 
committing 
the 
state 
to 
a 
particular position with respect to Indian gaming, involves 
subtle and important decisions regarding state policy that 
are at the heart of legislative power. 
Panzer, supra at 
62. 
Further, the cases have relied on the fact that their 
state 
constitutions, 
like 
Michigan’s, 
provide 
for 
separation of powers, vesting the legislative power in the 
legislature 
and 
vesting 
the 
executive 
power 
in 
the 
governor. 
Finney, supra at 577; Clark, supra at 573; 
Narragansett Indian Tribe, supra at 280; Pataki, supra at 
821-822; Panzer, supra at ___. 
The cases recognized that 
6 A federal district court held that the governor of
Mississippi did have the authority to bind the state to a
compact with the Indian tribes, based on a Mississippi
statute which authorizes the governor to transact business
with other sovereigns, such as other states, territories,
or the United States Government. 
Willis v Fordice, 850 F 
Supp 523 (1994). 
Unlike Mississippi, Michigan has no
statutory or constitutional provision giving the Governor
authority to bind the state in a compact with an Indian
tribe. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the legislature creates the law, that the governor executes 
the laws, and that a compact with an Indian tribe did not 
execute existing law, but was, instead, an attempt to 
create new law. 
Finney, supra at 573, and Clark, supra at 
573. 
The courts also focused on the balance that the 
compact struck on matters of policy such as the regulation 
of class III gaming activities, the licensing of its 
operators, 
and 
the 
respective 
civil 
and 
criminal 
jurisdictions of the state and the tribe necessary for the 
enforcement of state or tribal laws or regulations. Clark, 
supra at 574; Pataki, supra at 822; Panzer, supra at __. 
The approval of a compact with an Indian tribe 
involves numerous policy decisions. 
The executive branch 
does not have the power to make those determinations of 
public interest and policy, but may only apply the policy 
as fixed and determined by the legislature. 
I would agree 
with the other state courts that have examined this issue, 
and hold that committing the state to the myriad policy 
choices 
inherent 
in 
negotiating 
a 
gaming 
compact 
constitutes a legislative function. 
Thus, the Governor 
does not have the authority to bind the state to a compact 
with an Indian tribe; only the Legislature does. 
11  
 
 
 
 
I 
III  
Having determined that binding the state to a compact 
is a legislative function, the question then becomes 
whether the Legislature may do so by a joint resolution. 
would conclude that it may not because under the Michigan 
Constitution a resolution is not a valid exercise of the 
legislative power. 
The 
Michigan 
Constitution 
requires 
that 
“[a]ll 
legislation shall be by bill . . . .” Const 1963, art 4, § 
22. 
This Court has previously recognized that “[a] mere 
resolution, therefore, is not a competent method of 
expressing the legislative will, where that expression is 
to have the force of law, and bind others than the members 
of the house or houses adopting it.” 
Becker v Detroit 
Savings Bank, 269 Mich 432, 434-435; 257 NW 855 (1934). 
In the 1997-1998 term there were 117 concurrent 
resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives. 
Approximately 
23 
concurrent 
resolutions 
were 
adopted, 
including HCR 115, which approved the compacts at issue. 
The other 22 concurrent resolutions adopted included 
resolutions commemorating the 150th anniversary of the 
selection of the city of Lansing as the permanent capital 
of the state of Michigan [HCR 24]; urging the President of 
the United States to designate the Detroit River as an 
12  
 
 
 
American 
Heritage 
River 
[HCR 
69]; 
prescribing 
the 
legislative schedule [HCR 74 & HCR 113]; and renaming the 
Michigan Civilian Conservation Corps’ Camp Vanderbild in 
the honor of State Representative Tom Mathieu [HCR 117]. 
A joint resolution is not an act of legislation, and 
it cannot be effective for any purpose for which an 
exercise of legislative power is necessary. 
Cleveland 
Terminal & Valley RR Co v State, 85 Ohio St 251, 293; 97 NE 
967, 973 (1912). In issuing the joint resolution approving 
of the compacts in the instant case, the Legislature 
purported to bind the entire state to the policy decisions 
of and the terms set forth in the compacts, which would be 
in place for at least twenty years. 
This was not a valid 
exercise of the legislative power, because art 4, § 22 
requires that legislation be by bill. 
Conclusion 
I would hold that the power to bind the state to a 
compact with an Indian tribe is an exercise of the 
legislative power, and that that the Legislature must 
exercise its power to bind the state by enacting a bill, 
not by passing a joint resolution. 
Accordingly, I would 
conclude that the compacts are void, and I would reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue. 
Because I would hold that the compacts are void, it is 
13  
 
 
 
 
unnecessary to address whether the provision that permits 
the Governor to amend the compacts is unconstitutional. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS,
AND LAURA BAIRD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 122830 
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
NORTH AMERICAN SPORTS MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC, IV, and GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC., 
Intervening Defendants-Appellees, 
MARKMAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion, except 
as to part VI thereof, in this declaratory action in which 
we granted leave to appeal to consider: (1) whether the 
tribal-state gaming compacts at issue, entered into and 
signed by various Indian tribes and Governor Engler on 
behalf of the state pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming 
Regulatory 
Act, 
25 
USC 
2701 
et 
seq., 
constitute 
“legislation” such that Michigan’s Legislature violated 
Const 1963, art 4, § 22 when it approved them by resolution 
 
 
 
 
rather than by bill; (2) whether the provision in the 
compacts that purports to empower the Governor to amend 
them without legislative approval violates Const 1963, art 
3, § 2, the separation of powers doctrine; and (3) whether 
the compacts violate Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the “local 
acts” clause. 
Regarding the first issue, the circuit court concluded 
that the compacts constitute legislation and, therefore, 
the Legislature was required to adopt them by bill. 
The 
Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the decision of the 
circuit court. 
In my judgment, the compacts constitute 
legislation and, therefore, the Legislature violated art 4, 
§ 
22 
when 
it 
adopted 
them 
by 
a 
resolution 
vote. 
Accordingly, I dissent from the lead opinion, and I would 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue 
and reinstate the decision of the circuit court. 
Regarding 
the 
second 
issue, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded that the compacts violate art 3, § 2. 
The Court 
of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court on 
the basis that this issue was not ripe for review because 
the Governor had not yet attempted to amend the compacts. 
However, Governor Granholm recently sought to amend one of 
the four compacts and, therefore, in my judgment, this 
issue is ripe. 
I conclude that the amendatory provision 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
violates art 3, § 2 and, therefore, I dissent from the lead 
opinion on this issue. 
Regarding the third issue, the circuit court concluded 
that art 4, § 29 is not implicated. 
The Court of Appeals 
agreed and affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 
I 
concur with the analysis set forth in part VI of the lead 
opinion finding that art 4, § 29 is not implicated and, 
accordingly, I would affirm the decisions of the lower 
courts on this issue. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In California v Cabazon, 480 US 202; 
107 S Ct 1083, 94; 
L Ed 2d 244 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether California could legally enforce its 
regulatory gambling laws on Indian reservations if the 
state did not completely prohibit such gambling.1  While the 
Court affirmed that it “has consistently recognized that 
Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both 
their members and their territory,’ . . . and that ‘tribal 
sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the 
Federal Government, not the States,’” it also acknowledged 
1 If the state prohibited class III gaming within its
borders, Cabazon held that California could enforce its 
criminal laws relating to that prohibition on Indian lands
through 18 USC 1162. 
3  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
that “[i]t is clear . . . that state laws may be applied to 
tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has 
expressly so provided.” Id. at 207.2  Thus, the question to 
resolve in Cabazon was whether the Congress had expressly 
provided that state laws that regulate, but do not 
prohibit, gambling may be applied on Indian reservations. 
The Court answered that question in the negative and, 
accordingly, held that California had no legal right to 
enforce those laws on reservations. 
In response to Cabazon, the Congress, in 1988, passed 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC 2701 et seq. 
(IGRA). 
The United States District Court for the District 
of South Dakota in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v South 
Dakota, 830 F Supp 523, 526 (D SD, 1993), aff’d 3 F3d 273 
(CA 8, 1993), stated: 
The IGRA was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon. Congress
wished to give states a certain amount of input
into gambling on Indian reservations. S. Rep. No.
446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071. 
2 Additionally, the Court in Cabazon held that “[under] 
. . . exceptional circumstances a State may assert 
jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal
members” 
even 
absent 
express 
Congressional 
consent. 
Cabazon, supra at 215. 
However, the Court resolved that
tribal 
gambling 
was 
not 
an 
area 
encompassing 
such 
“exceptional circumstances” so as to “escape the preemptive
force of federal and tribal interests . . . .” Id. at 221. 
4  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The IGRA gives states the right to get
involved in negotiating a gaming compact because
of the obvious state interest in gaming casino
operations within the state boundaries . . . .[3] 
IGRA divides gaming activities into three classes. 
Class I gaming consists of “social games solely for prizes 
of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming 
engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection 
with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 
25 USC 2703(6). 
Class II gaming includes bingo and card games—other than 
banking card games—that are played in conformance with 
state laws and regulations regarding hours of operation and 
limitations on wagers or pot sizes. 25 USC 2703(7). Class 
III gaming includes all other forms of gambling. 
25 USC 
3 See also United States v Santa Ynez Band of Chumash 
Mission Indians, 983 F Supp 1317, 1323 (CD Cal, 1997) (“In
[Cabazon], the Supreme Court sharply limited the power of
states to apply their gambling laws to Indian gaming. An
essential element of its decision was that Congress had not
acted specifically to make state gambling laws applicable
in Indian country. This decision made clear that it would
require a new act of Congress for states to have any
effective ability to prevent or regulate Indian gaming.
IGRA was enacted in direct response to Cabazon. . . . 
Subsection (a) of § 1166 expressly makes state gambling
laws applicable in Indian country. . . .”) 
See also 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v United
States, 110 F3d 688, 692 (CA 9, 1997); Pueblo of Santa Ana 
v Kelly, 104 F3d 1546, 1548 n 3 (CA 10, 1997); Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v South Dakota, 830 F Supp 523, 525-526
(D SD, 1993), aff’d 3 F3d 273 (CA 8, 1993). 
5  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
2703(8). 
At issue in this case is class III gaming, referred to 
throughout the remainder of this opinion as “gambling” or 
“casino gambling.” 
18 USC 1166 provides a starting point 
to IGRA as it relates to gambling. It states: 
(a) Subject to subsection (c), for purposes
of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the
licensing, 
regulation, 
or 
prohibition 
of 
gambling, including but not limited to criminal
sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in 
Indian country in the same manner and to the same
extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State. 
(b) Whoever in Indian country is guilty of
any act or omission involving gambling, whether
or not conducted or sanctioned by an Indian 
tribe, which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if
committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of
the State in which the act or omission occurred,
under 
the 
laws 
governing 
the 
licensing,
regulation, or prohibition of gambling in force
at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like
punishment. 
(c) For the purpose of this section, the
term "gambling" does not include— 
(1) class I gaming or class II gaming
regulated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or 
(2) class III gaming conducted under a 
Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of
the Interior under [25 USC 2710(d)(8)] of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that is in effect. 
(d) The United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction 
over 
criminal 
prosecutions 
of 
violations of State gambling laws that are made
applicable under this section to Indian country
. . . . 
6  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
Thus, IGRA generally provides that in the absence of a 
tribal-state compact, for purposes of federal law, all 
state gambling laws, including regulatory, as well as 
prohibitory, laws and regulations and any relevant criminal 
punishments, apply on Indian land just as they apply 
elsewhere in the state, albeit with the proviso that 
criminal prosecutions are within the jurisdiction of the 
federal government.4 
4 It appears that states have some enforcement powers
under § 1166(a)—civil enforcement powers. 
See Santa Ynez 
Band, supra at 1322: 
Consideration of the structure of § 1166
suggests 
strongly 
that 
Congress 
intended 
to 
distinguish civil enforcement to prevent future
acts 
of 
non-conforming 
gaming 
from 
criminal 
enforcement efforts to punish past acts. 
As to 
the latter, § 1166(b) and (d) leave no doubt that
criminal enforcement is the exclusive province of
the United States. The United States contends 
that Congress also intended for it to have the
same exclusive power to bring civil enforcement
actions under § 1166(a). The statute says nothing
at all to suggest this. On the contrary, the more
natural inference to be drawn from Congress’
decision to make state law applicable, as such,
in § 1166(a), rather than to convert it to 
federal law as in § 1166(b), is that Congress
intended to divide the enforcement of the two 
subsections between the states and the United 
States. 
If Congress had not intended § 1166(a) to be
used by the states for civil enforcement of the
state laws made applicable by it, there was no
need first to make all state gambling laws 
applicable, as such, and then to carve out only
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
If a tribe wishes to “opt-out” of the default federal 
law rule of § 1166 and to lawfully engage in casino 
gambling on its Indian land, it may do so in accordance 
with 25 USC 2710(d) of IGRA. 
That section provides, in 
relevant parts: 
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be
lawful on Indian lands only if such activities 
are— 
* * * 
(B) located in a State that permits such
gaming 
for 
any 
purpose 
by 
any 
person,
organization, or entity, and 
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-
State compact entered into by the Indian tribe
and the State under paragraph (3) that is in
effect. 
* * * 
(3)(A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction
over the Indian lands upon which a class III
gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be
conducted, shall request the State in which such
lands are located to enter into negotiations for
the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State 
compact 
governing 
the 
conduct 
of 
gaming
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in 
good faith to enter into such a compact.[5] 
(…continued)
those acts which would be punishable under state
law and redefine them as identical, independent
federal offenses [under § 1166(b)]. 
5 In 1996, the United States Supreme Court somewhat
limited the reach of IGRA in Seminole Tribe of Florida v 
Florida, 517 US 44; 116 S Ct 1114; 134 L Ed 2d 252  (1996).
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                 
 
* * * 
(C) 
Any 
Tribal-State 
compact 
negotiated
under subparagraph (A) may include provisions
relating to— 
(i) the application of the criminal and 
civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or
the State that are directly related to, and 
necessary for, the licensing and regulation of
such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil 
jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws
and regulations; 
(iii) the assessment by the State of such
activities in such amounts as are necessary to
defray the costs of regulating such activity; 
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such
activity 
in 
amounts 
comparable 
to 
amounts 
assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
(vi) standards for the operation of such
activity and maintenance of the gaming facility,
including licensing; and 
(vii) any other subjects that are directly
related to the operation of gaming activities. 
(…continued)
In Seminole Tribe, the Court considered 25 USC 2710(d)(7)
of IGRA, a provision that permits Indian tribes to sue a
state in federal court when that state has refused to 
negotiate in good faith for a tribal-state compact. 
The 
Court ruled that this provision violates state sovereign 
immunity as preserved by the Eleventh Amendment of the
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
is 
therefore 
unconstitutional. 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* * *  
(5) Nothing in this subsection shall impair
the right of an Indian tribe to regulate class
III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with
the State, except to the extent that such 
regulation 
is 
inconsistent 
with, 
or 
less 
stringent than, the State laws and regulations
made 
applicable 
by 
any 
Tribal—State 
compact
entered into by the Indian tribe under paragraph
(3) that is in effect. 
Thus, under § 2710(d), a state and a tribe are 
encouraged to negotiate with one another with the ultimate 
goal of entering into a mutually agreeable tribal-state 
compact that makes gambling on that tribe’s lands lawful 
and 
that 
may 
alter 
the 
general 
gambling 
laws 
and 
regulations and enforcement procedures that otherwise apply 
to that tribe through § 1166. 
In essence, by providing under § 1166 that, in the 
absence of a compact, state gambling laws and regulations 
apply on Indian land, the Congress provided the consent to 
the states that was found lacking in Cabazon to regulate 
tribal gambling in the same manner and to the same extent 
that states regulate gambling elsewhere within their 
borders.6  However, to maintain the proper balance between 
6 For example, if state law provides that casino
gambling anywhere in the state is prohibited and punishment
for illegal casino gambling is imprisonment of five years
and a fine of $10,000, that is the law that applies to
(continued…) 
10  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Indian and state affairs, the Congress further provided 
under § 1166 that the federal government is charged with 
enforcing state criminal gambling laws and regulations on 
Indian land. 
This point was succinctly made by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Artichoke Joe’s 
California Grand Casino v Norton, 353 F3d 712, 721-722 (CA 
9, 2003). There, the court addressed the role of IGRA and, 
of particular relevance, 18 USC 1166, insofar as that 
provision grants states the power to generally regulate 
gambling on Indian land. The court stated: 
IGRA changed the landscape . . . . 
[I]t
devised a method to give back some of the 
regulatory [italics in original] authority that
the Supreme Court had held inapplicable to Indian
lands in Cabazon. One of the bases of the holding 
(…continued)
tribal lands under § 1166 in the absence of a compact. If 
the state decides at some later point, perhaps because of a
large illegal gambling problem specifically on tribal 
lands, to amend its laws to hold that gambling is still
entirely prohibited, but that the punishment is now 
imprisonment of twenty-five years and a $200,000 fine, that 
amended law becomes the law that is applicable to tribal
lands under § 1166 in the absence of a compact. 
Thus, by
making state gambling laws—whatever those laws are at a
given time—applicable to Indian land in the absence of a
compact, IGRA gives states meaningful regulatory authority
over casino gambling on Indian land. 
Therefore, Chief
Justice Corrigan is incorrect when she states that “states
have no authority to regulate tribal gaming under IGRA
unless the tribe explicitly consents to the regulation in a
compact.” Ante at 11. 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
in Cabazon was that Congress had not explicitly
ceded regulatory authority for gaming to the 
states in Public Law No. 280 or otherwise. IGRA 
responded by creating a statutory basis for 
gaming regulation that introduced the compacting
process as a means of sharing with the states the
federal government’s regulatory authority over 
class III gaming. Simultaneously, IGRA put into
effect 18 USC 1166, which provides that “all 
State 
laws 
pertaining 
to 
the 
licensing,
regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including
but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable
thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the
same manner and to the same extent as such laws 
apply elsewhere in the State.” 
18 USC 1166(a).
The federal government retained the power to 
prosecute violations of state gambling laws in
Indian country, so as to preserve the delicate 
balance of power between the States and the 
tribes. 
However, the fact that the federal 
government retained that power does not change 
the fact that California may enact laws and 
regulations concerning gambling that have an 
effect on Indian lands via § 1166. 
[Artichoke 
Joe’s, 
supra 
at 
721-722 
(citations 
omitted;
emphasis added).][7] 
Moreover, through § 2710(d), the Congress provided the 
states with a direct means of “escap[ing] the preemptive 
7 See also Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v Roache, 788
F Supp 1498, 1506 (SD Cal, 1992), aff’d 54 F3d 535 (CA 9,
1994) (“The balance struck by Congress under the IGRA
appears to be that the state laws governing gaming apply,
for the most part, with the same force and effect the laws
would have elsewhere in the state. Thus, by federalizing
state law, the states could generally define the boundary
between legal and illegal gaming, and could be assured that
activities that would be illegal if performed outside the
reservation boundaries would also be illegal within the
reservation boundaries.”) 
12  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
force of federal and tribal interests”8 regarding class III 
gaming on Indian land by granting states the power to 
specifically make lawful and regulate casino gambling on 
particular Indian land, as long as such actions arise from 
the negotiation process and are otherwise in accordance 
with IGRA. 
In 1993, Governor Engler, pursuant to § 2710(d) of 
IGRA, 
entered 
into 
tribal-state 
compacts 
with 
seven 
Michigan tribes that were already conducting class III 
gambling before the Congress’s passage of IGRA.9
 As 
required by the terms of a consent judgment that resolved a 
federal lawsuit filed by the tribes against the Governor to 
compel negotiations, the compacts were approved by the 
Legislature 
by 
resolution 
and 
became 
effective.10 
8 Cabazon, supra at 221. 
9 These tribes were the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, the
Hannahville 
Indian 
Community, 
the 
Bay 
Mills 
Indian 
Community, the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe. 
All these tribes are currently operating casinos. 
10 After IGRA was passed, the tribes that were already
engaged in casino gambling in Michigan requested that the
Governor negotiate gaming compacts. 
The negotiations
stalled and the tribes filed suit in federal court to 
compel negotiations. 
See Sault Ste Marie Tribe v Engler,
93 F Supp 2d 850 (WD Mich, 2000). During this litigation,
the parties reached a settlement and the Court entered a
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Additional state court litigation followed in which the 
Michigan Court of Appeals twice confirmed that the Governor 
did not violate the separation of powers clause by binding 
the state to tribal-state compacts where the Legislature 
had approved those compacts by resolution. Thus, the Court 
of Appeals implied that mere resolution approval by the 
Legislature of tribal-state compacts was proper. 
See 
(…continued)
consent judgment. 
Essentially, the consent judgment is
constituted of the seven 1993 compacts entered into by
Governor 
Engler 
and 
the 
tribes 
in 
accord 
with 
the 
settlement. 
This 
consent 
judgment 
should 
not 
be 
interpreted as a federal court determination that a 
resolution vote is a proper adoption because the court did
not address this question; it merely incorporated into the
consent judgment the terms of the settlement as agreed to
by Governor Engler and the tribes. 
Moreover, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Keweenaw 
Bay Indian Community v United States, 136 F3d 469, 477
(1998), in which the court addressed an issue pertaining to
one of the 1993 consent judgment compacts (but not the
issue implicated in this case), stated: 
Regarding obtaining the Michigan Governor's
“approval” twice, we point out that a governor's
endorsement of a compact as required by the terms
of 
a 
compact 
is 
coincidental, 
varied 
and 
dependent on the relevant state laws. See, e.g.,
[Pueblo of Santa Ana v Kelly, 104 F3d 1559 (CA
10, 1997)], cert den 522 US 807 [118 
S Ct 45;
139 
L Ed 2d 11] (1997) (deciding that Governor
of New Mexico lacked authority, under New Mexico
Constitution or state statute, to bind state to
tribal-state compacts). 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit expressly recognized that a 
governor might not have the power to bind the state to an
IGRA compact and that the question is a matter of state
law. 
14  
 
 
  
                                                 
McCartney v Attorney General, 231 Mich App 722, 728; 587 
NW2d 824 (1998); Tiger Stadium Fan Club v Governor, 217 
Mich App 439; 553 NW2d 7 (1996). 
The compacts at issue in this case were first signed 
by Governor Engler and each of four different Indian tribes 
in January of 1997.11
 Each compact was to take effect, 
according to a compact provision, after “[e]ndorsement by 
the 
Governor 
of 
the 
State 
and 
concurrence 
in 
that 
endorsement by resolution of the Michigan Legislature.”12 
The compacts were modified and re-executed in December 
1998, and the Legislature proceeded to consider them by 
resolution. See HCR 115 (1998). Unlike a bill, which must 
be passed by a majority of elected and serving members of 
the Legislature, a resolution may be passed by a majority 
vote of those legislators present at the time, as long as a 
quorum is present. 
The House of Representatives approved 
the compacts by a resolution vote of 48 to 47, and the 
Senate followed suit by a resolution vote of 21 to 17. 
11 These tribes are the Little Traverse Bay Band of
Odawa Indians, the Pokagon Band of Ottawa Indians, the
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and the Nottawaseppi
Huron Potawatomi. Of these tribes, the Little Traverse Bay
Band and the Little River Band are currently operating
casinos. 
12 See § 11 of the compacts. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following is a list of the essential compact terms: 
• 
The compacts permit a variety of gambling
activities. 
• 
The compacts provide that the tribe and the
Governor may subsequently agree to expand the list of
class III gaming activities permitted by the compacts. 
• 
The compacts provide that the tribe shall
“enact a comprehensive gaming regulatory ordinance”
but if any regulation imposed by the tribe is less
stringent than that imposed by the compact, the 
compact governs. 
• 
The compacts provide that the tribe shall
have 
responsibility 
to 
administer 
and 
enforce 
applicable regulatory requirements. 
• 
The compacts provide limitations on the 
tribe’s hiring practices, for example, the tribe may
hire no one under age 18 (whereas non-Indian casinos
in Michigan may employ only those who are 21 or
older). 
• 
The compacts allow persons aged 18 and over
to gamble (whereas the age requirement in the rest of
Michigan is 21). 
• 
The compacts incorporate the protections of
the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL 421.1 et 
seq.; and the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of
1969, MCL 418.101 et seq. 
• 
Any disputes between the tribe and the state
are to be resolved through binding arbitration. 
• 
The tribe must post a sign in the gaming
facility noting that the facility “is not regulated by
the State of Michigan.” 
• 
The compact is binding for a period of 
twenty years after it becomes effective. 
• 
The tribe must make semi-annual payments of 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8% of the net win at the casino to the Michigan
Strategic Fund. 
• 
The tribe must make semi-annual payments of
2% of the net win to the treasurer of the relevant 
county to be held by the treasurer on behalf of the
Local Revenue Sharing Board. To this end, counties in
the vicinity of the class III gaming facilities shall
create a Local Revenue Sharing Board. 
• 
The 
compacts 
contain 
a 
provision 
that 
purports to empower the Governor to amend them without
legislative approval. 
Various lawsuits were filed questioning the validity 
of the 1998 compacts. 
The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Lake 
Superior sued in federal court to enjoin the operation of 
the new casinos, but the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit dismissed this suit on standing grounds. 
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe v United States, 288 F3d 910 (CA 6, 
2002). 
Two state legislators also challenged the approval 
of Michigan’s 1998 compacts by the Secretary of Interior, 
which suit was also dismissed on standing grounds by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Baird v Norton, 266 F3d 408 (CA 6, 2001). 
Plaintiffs-appellants, 
the 
Taxpayers 
of 
Michigan 
Against Casinos and Laura Baird, filed this suit against 
Michigan in the Ingham Circuit Court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the compacts do not comport with various 
constitutional provisions. 
Plaintiffs contend first that 
the compacts amount to legislation and, therefore, pursuant 
17  
 
 
 
  
 
to Const 1963, art 4, § 22 the Legislature was required to 
adopt them by bill rather than approve them by resolution. 
The circuit court held that the compacts should have been 
approved by bill. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court decision, concluding that the compacts do not 
constitute legislation because they contain no enforcement 
provision that would ensure that their terms are satisfied 
and because the power of the state to legislate in this 
area is preempted by federal law. 
The Court of Appeals 
opined that the compacts constitute mere contracts and, 
therefore, approval by resolution was not constitutionally 
infirm. 
Plaintiffs also contend that the provision in the 
compacts that purports to empower the Governor to amend 
them without legislative approval violates Const 1963, art 
3, § 2, the “separation of powers” doctrine. 
The circuit 
court agreed with plaintiffs. 
The Court of Appeals, 
however, reversed the decision of the circuit court on the 
basis that the amendatory provision issue was not ripe for 
review because the Governor had not yet attempted to amend 
the compacts. 
Plaintiffs additionally contend that the 
compacts violate Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the “local acts” 
clause. The circuit court disagreed, holding that art 4, § 
29 is not implicated. 
The Court of Appeals agreed and 
affirmed the circuit court on this issue. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation 
are reviewed de novo by this Court. Harvey v Michigan, 469 
Mich 1, 6; 664 NW2d 767 (2003); Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen 
Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
This Court has been called upon to consider, in this 
action seeking declaratory judgment, matters of significant 
constitutional concern. 
We are asked to consider whether 
the challenged tribal-state compacts and various actions 
undertaken by our legislative and executive branches of 
government pertinent to those compacts are consistent with 
the 
enactment 
requirement, 
the 
separation 
of 
powers 
doctrine, 
and 
the 
local 
acts 
provision 
embodied 
in 
Michigan’s Constitution. 
“[D]eciding whether a matter has 
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to 
another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is 
itself 
a 
delicate 
exercise 
in 
constitutional 
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.” House Speaker v 
Governor, 443 Mich 560, 575; 506 NW2d 190 (1993). 
A. DO COMPACTS CONSTITUTE “LEGISLATION”? 
The first question presented on review requires that 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
we consider whether the tribal-state compacts at issue 
constitute 
“legislation.” 
The 
Michigan 
Constitution 
requires that “[a]ll legislation shall be by bill . . . .” 
Const 1963, art 4, § 22. 
In addition, “[n]o bill shall 
become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the 
members elected to and serving in each house.” Const 1963, 
art 4, § 26. 
Plaintiffs contend that the compacts 
constitute legislation and, therefore, the Legislature was 
required to approve them by bill—by a majority vote of the 
members elected to and serving in each house. 
Defendants 
contend that the compacts do not constitute legislation and 
instead are contracts of a unique nature that the state may 
validly enter into pursuant to federal law as provided in 
IGRA and, therefore, the compacts are not subject to Const 
1963, art 4, §§ 22 and 26. 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines “legislation” 
as “[t]he process of making or enacting a positive law in 
written form, according to some type of formal procedure, 
by a branch of government constituted to perform this 
process-Also termed lawmaking . . . .” 
Michigan’s 
Constitution provides that “[t]he legislative power of the 
State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of 
representatives.” 
Const 1963, art 4, § 1. 
Thus, the 
branch 
of 
government 
“constituted 
to 
perform 
[the 
20  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
lawmaking] process” is the Legislature, and the “formal 
procedure” 
by 
which 
this 
process 
is 
to 
occur 
is 
constitutionally defined—lawmaking is to be “by bill” and 
is subject to a majority vote of those elected to each 
house of the Legislature. Const 1963, art 4, §§ 22 and 26. 
Accordingly, the definition of “legislation” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary requires that we consider whether the compacts 
amount to “positive lawmaking.” 
In Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103; 611 
NW2d 530 (2000), this Court considered whether a provision 
in the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., 
that 
required 
administrative 
agencies 
to 
obtain 
the 
approval of a joint committee of the Legislature or the 
Legislature itself before enacting new administrative rules 
violated the enactment and presentment requirements of 
Michigan’s Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, §§ 26 and 33.13 
In analyzing the question presented in Blank, we 
addressed whether the challenged action—a vote of the joint 
committee or the Legislature itself on an administrative 
rule—was “legislative” in nature, so that it was subject, 
under 
the 
enactment 
and 
presentment 
requirements 
of 
13 The differences between the two concurring opinions 
in Blank and the majority opinion are not pertinent to the
analysis of Blank as set forth in this opinion. 
21  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
Michigan’s Constitution, to a majority vote of the full 
Legislature and gubernatorial approval.14 
In resolving that question, we employed the analytical 
framework laid out by the United States Supreme Court in 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919; 
103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983). 
As we noted in 
Blank, the United States Supreme Court in Chadha made four 
observations in determining that the action challenged in 
that case was inherently legislative and was subject to the 
enactment and presentment requirements of the United States 
Constitution: 
First, the action "had the purpose and 
effect of altering ... legal rights, duties and
relations of persons ... outside the legislative
branch." 
Second, 
the 
action 
supplanted
legislative action. The only way the House could
have obtained the same result would have been by
enacting legislation. Third, the House's action
involved determinations of policy. Fourth, the
constitution 
explicitly 
authorizes 
only 
four 
instances where one house of Congress can act
alone. It does not include the authority for one
house to exercise a legislative veto over duly
authorized 
actions 
of 
the 
executive 
branch. 
14 In this case, the presentment requirement embodied
in Michigan’s Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 33, 
requiring that laws enacted by the Legislature be approved
by the Governor before taking effect, is not at issue
because the Governor signed the compacts. Thus, the issue,
as noted, is whether the compacts violate the enactment
requirements of Const 1963, art 4, § 26 because they
constitute legislation. 
22  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
[Blank, supra at 114, quoting Chadha, supra at 
952-956 (citations omitted).] 
Applying Chadha’s framework in Blank, this Court held 
that the challenged action was “legislative” in nature and, 
therefore, it was subject to the enactment and presentment 
requirements of Michigan’s Constitution. 
 
Because the Chadha/Blank framework provides necessary 
guidance 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
challenged 
action 
constitutes “legislation” subject to the constitutional 
enactment requirements, I employ it in the context of this 
case.15  Accordingly, in my judgment, we must consider: (1) 
whether the compacts at issue “‘had the purpose and effect 
15 
Chief 
Justice 
Corrigan 
determines 
that 
the 
Chadha/Blank framework is not applicable to this case,
despite the fact that the issue in this case is whether a
certain deliberate act undertaken by a branch of our 
government violates the Constitution because the substance
of 
the 
act 
constitutes 
“legislation,” 
and 
this 
is 
specifically the issue that was addressed in Chadha and 
Blank. 
She contends that the Chadha/Blank framework is 
inapplicable because this case concerns IGRA compacts and
not a legislative veto power and “our Constitution is
silent regarding the proper form of legislative approval of
tribal-state gaming compacts under IGRA. . . .” 
Ante at 
25. However, the point of invoking Chadha/Blank is only to
determine whether the compacts amount to legislation. 
If 
they do, Const 1963, art 4, § 22 and § 26 require that they
be subject to bill-making approval. 
She tautologically
surmises that the Chadha/Blank framework is not relevant 
because the compacts do not constitute legislation, but the
very point of utilizing the Chadha/Blank framework is to 
determine whether the compacts constitute legislation. 
If 
so, then our Constitution is not silent on this issue. 
23  
 
 
 
of altering . . . legal rights, duties and relations of 
persons . . . outside the legislative branch,’” Blank, 
supra at 114; (2) whether the Governor’s action in 
negotiating the compacts and the Legislature’s resolution 
vote on the compacts supplanted legislative action; (3) 
whether the compacts involved determinations of policy; and 
(4) whether Michigan’s Constitution explicitly authorizes 
the Legislature to approve these compacts by a resolution 
vote even if they otherwise constitute “legislation.” 
i. LEGAL RIGHTS, DUTIES AND RELATIONS 
The first factor, whether the compacts had the purpose 
and effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations 
of persons outside the legislative branch, i.e., whether 
they have a general effect upon the citizens of Michigan, 
addresses essentially the same question as does the 
definition of “legislation” in Black’s Law Dictionary. That 
is, Black’s primarily defines “legislation” as the making 
of positive law, and when an action has the purpose and 
effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons outside the legislative branch, that action is 
typically an exercise in positive lawmaking. 
What is important to understand is that, in the 
absence of the challenged tribal-state compacts, gambling 
on the subject Indian land was unlawful. 
Gambling in the 
24  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
absence of a compact was unlawful pursuant to 18 USC 1166, 
which, as noted above, provides that, in the absence of a 
tribal-state compact, state laws regulating or prohibiting 
gambling “shall apply in Indian country in the same manner 
and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the 
State,” albeit, at least for criminal laws, through federal 
enforcement. 18 USC 1166(a). Casino gambling in Michigan 
is generally unlawful. 
MCL 750.301. 
The only casino 
gambling that is authorized in Michigan is that gambling 
conducted in accordance with the Michigan Gaming Control 
and Revenue Act (MGCRA), MCL 432.201 et seq. 
However, by 
its express terms, the MGCRA does not apply to “gambling on 
Native American land.” 
MCL 432.203(2)(d),(5). 
Thus, 
casino gambling on Indian land cannot be authorized and 
conducted pursuant to the MGCRA, which leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that casino gambling on Indian lands 
located in Michigan is, pursuant to § 1166, subject to 
Michigan’s general prohibition against such gambling.16 
16 Moreover, I find to be of significance the fact that
MCL 432.203 not only expressly provides that the MGCRA is
inapplicable to casino gambling on Indian lands, but it
also provides:
If a federal court or agency rules or 
federal legislation is enacted that allows a 
state to regulate gambling on Native American
land or land held in trust by the United States
(continued…) 
25  
 
 
   
                                                 
  
 
 
Accordingly, under § 1166, in the absence of a tribal-state 
compact, casino gambling on Indian land within Michigan’s 
borders is unlawful, and that general unlawfulness is to be 
enforced by the federal government.17 
(…continued)
for a federally recognized Indian tribe, the 
legislature shall enact legislation creating a
new act consistent with this act to regulate
casinos that are operated on Native American land
or land held in trust by the United States for a
federally 
recognized 
Indian 
tribe. 
The 
legislation shall be passed by a simple majority
of members elected to and serving in each house.
[MCL 432.203(5).]
Thus, within the framework of the MGCRA, the Legislature
apparently recognized that if Michigan is granted the right
to regulate gambling on Indian lands within Michigan’s
borders, such ensuing regulation would be “legislative” in
nature and would require legislative action in accordance
with the enactment requirement of Const 1963, art 4, § 26.
In fact, the MGCRA requires that the Legislature pass
legislation regulating gambling on Indian lands if federal
law so permits. 
It is clear, in my judgment, that IGRA 
grants states, through both § 1166 and the compacting
process of § 2710(d), a means of regulating gambling on
Indian lands. 
Accordingly, pursuant not only to Const
1963, art 4, §§ 22 and 26, but also pursuant to the
Legislature’s own self-imposed mandate in MCL 432.203(5),
the compacts, because they represent federally permitted
state regulation of gambling on Indian lands, should have
been passed by a majority of those elected to and serving
in each house. 
17 My colleagues in the majority, in my judgment,
simply ignore the relevance of § 1166 in determining the
lawfulness, in the absence of a compact, of casino gambling
on Indian land. 
They do this by summarily noting and
relying on the fact that it is the federal government that
is charged under § 1166 with enforcing the applicable state
law regulations. Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 14-16;
opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 9-10. 
As already indicated,
(continued…) 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Moreover, gambling on the subject Indian lands absent 
the challenged compacts was unlawful pursuant to 25 USC 
2710(d)(1)(C). 
This is because, as noted, § 2710(d) 
provides that “[c]lass III gaming activities shall be 
lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are . . . 
conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact 
entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . .” 
Therefore, 
before 
these 
challenged 
compacts 
existed, 
gambling on the subject Indian lands was unlawful. 
(…continued)
I agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Artichoke Joe’s, supra at 722, that, “the 
fact that the federal government retained [the enforcement]
power does not change the fact that [states] may enact laws
and regulations concerning gambling that have an effect [in
the absence of a compact] on Indian lands.” 
That is, the
states retain substantive authority over gambling law on
Indian lands. 
See n 6. 
Chief Justice Corrigan further
states that § 1166 does not truly give the states 
regulatory power because “the federal government may
conclude at any time that it will no longer apply state law
and so amend IGRA.” Ante at 16. While it is true that it 
is within Congress’s power to amend IGRA, this fact is
irrelevant because we are called upon to decide this case
under the law as it is today, and not under the law as it
could conceivably one day be. 
Moreover, Chief Justice
Corrigan opines that Congress chose to make state casino
gambling laws applicable to Indian land “for expediency.”
Id. 
She provides no support for this finding. 
The 
relevant legislative history indicates that Congress chose
to make state gambling laws applicable to tribes not for
reasons of “expediency,” but to specifically give states
some regulatory power over casino gambling on Indian land.
See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, supra at 526. 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, it becomes clear that, before the challenged 
compacts existed, the tribes would have been engaging in an 
unlawful activity had they endeavored to operate their 
respective casinos. 
It necessarily follows that the 
compacts had the intended purpose, and the effect, of 
altering legal rights and relations of Michigan citizens 
generally. 
The compacts purport to allow Indian tribes to 
lawfully engage in activities that would otherwise be 
unlawful. 
Moreover, the compacts impose specific duties upon 
both the members of the tribes and upon non-Indian peoples 
and entities. 
By way of example, the compacts impose a 
duty on the tribes to administer and enforce on the casinos 
the regulatory requirements embodied in the compacts. 
Further, the compacts impose a duty on local units of 
government to create a local revenue sharing board to 
receive and distribute a percentage of casino profits that 
the tribes are required under the compacts to disburse. 
Alternately, if the local units of government do not create 
a local revenue sharing board, it may be said that the 
compacts impose a duty on local units of government to 
expend their own government funds to cover the inevitable 
costs for public services, police, etc., that they will 
incur as a result of having a casino in their area. Under 
28  
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
either scenario, the compacts impose duties on local units 
of government.18  Accordingly, it is clear that the compacts 
18 Defendants argue, and the majority concludes, that
the compacts do not actually require the creation of local 
revenue sharing boards, but rather permit local units of 
government to voluntarily create such boards if they wish
to enjoy the benefits of the annual percentage payment that
the tribes are to make to those local units of government
pursuant to the compacts. 
Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante 
at 18-19; opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 13-14. 
This 
argument is both flawed and disingenuous. 
First, as is
expressly stated in the compacts themselves, the annual
payment of funds by the tribe to the local revenue sharing
boards is meant to “provide financial resources to those
political 
subdivisions 
of 
the 
State 
which 
actually
experience increased operating costs associated with the
operation of the Class III gaming facility[ies].” 
See §
18(A)(ii) of the compacts. 
Thus, it is evident that the
“choice” the local units of government have is either: (1)
to create a local revenue sharing board or (2) to simply
assume the actual costs incurred by the unit of government
in the operation of the casinos. 
Either choice, as noted
above, imposes a duty on local units of government.
Moreover, I note that the compacts purport to mandate the 
creation of the local revenue sharing boards, as evidenced
by the term “shall.” That is, the compacts provide that “a
Local Revenue Sharing Board shall be created by those local
units of government . . . .” Thus, the compacts themselves
do not purport to provide any “choice” on this matter. 
My 
colleagues 
espouse 
a 
third-party 
beneficiary
analysis in reaching their conclusion that the compacts
impose no duties on local units of government. 
Opinion of
Corrigan, C.J., ante at 18-19; opinion of Kelly, J., ante 
at 14.  It may be that under contract law, the local units
are indeed third-party beneficiaries. 
However, that is
simply not dispositive, nor particularly relevant, in this
case. The fact remains that local units of government must
either create the revenue sharing boards or assume the
actual costs incurred by the units of government in the
operation of the casinos. 
29  
 
 
 
 
had the intended purpose and the effect of altering the 
legal duties generally of Michigan citizens. 
Further, 
the 
tribal-state 
compacts 
alter 
legal 
relationships because the compacts remove from the federal 
government the jurisdiction to enforce the applicable state 
gambling laws and regulations that apply, pursuant to § 
1166, on Indian land in the absence of a tribal-state 
compact and place that jurisdiction in the hands of the 
tribes themselves. 
This change in jurisdiction affects 
Michigan citizens generally because citizens engaging in 
gambling in tribal casinos were formerly subject to federal 
jurisdiction, but are now subject to tribal jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the compacts alter the legal relationships of 
Michigan citizens generally because they may allow anyone 
over the age of eighteen to gamble in tribal casinos, 
whereas the legal gambling age that applies to Michigan 
casinos subject to the MCGRA is twenty-one. 
Thus, the first factor of the Chadha/Blank framework 
leads to the conclusion that the compacts constitute 
legislation. 
That is, the compacts “had the [intended] 
purpose and effect of altering . . . legal rights, duties 
and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative 
branch.” Blank, supra at 114. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Supplanting legislative action 
The second 
Chadha/Blank 
factor requires that we 
consider whether the Governor’s action in negotiating the 
compacts and the Legislature’s resolution vote on the 
compacts “supplanted legislative action.” 
In Blank, supra 
at 114, we further elaborated on this point, as did the 
United States Supreme Court in Chadha, by considering 
whether “[t]he only way the House could have [properly] 
obtained the same result would have been by enacting 
legislation.” 
Thus, we must consider how, in the absence 
of 
the 
challenged 
compacts, 
the 
Legislature 
could 
alternatively have achieved the same result, i.e., how the 
Legislature could alternatively have made gambling on 
Indian land lawful. 
If no IGRA tribal-state compact 
exists, general state laws pertaining to the regulation or 
prohibition of gambling apply on any particular Indian land 
as they apply elsewhere in the state. 
18 USC 1166. 
Therefore, in the absence of a compact, if the Legislature 
wanted to make gambling on Indian land lawful, the only way 
it could do that would be by either changing the gambling 
laws that are generally applicable within the state or by 
changing the reach of the MGCRA. 
Changing those laws 
would, 
it 
cannot 
seriously 
be 
disputed, 
require 
“legislation.” 
Thus, it becomes clear that the compacts 
31  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
effectively supplanted legislative action and, therefore, 
they themselves constitute “legislation.”19 
iii. DETERMINATIONS OF POLICY 
The 
third 
Chadha/Blank 
factor 
requires 
that 
we 
consider whether the compacts “involved determinations of 
policy.” 
Blank, supra at 114. 
The compact negotiation 
process required the Governor to undertake and resolve 
multiple policy-making decisions of great consequence to 
this state, the most significant of which was the initial 
decision to make lawful what was otherwise unlawful—casino 
gambling on the subject Indian lands. The fact that casino 
gambling engenders considerable controversy and passion 
throughout our society at large, as evidenced by the very 
existence of this lawsuit, underscores the significance of 
the policy decision that these compacts represent. 
Moreover, the compacts represent a host of additional 
policy decisions that sprang from the initial decision to 
make gambling lawful on the subject Indian lands. 
These 
19 Furthermore, the compacts “supplant legislative 
action,” Blank, supra at 114, because they attempt to bind
the state to their terms for a period of twenty years, and
during those twenty years, the Legislature may not, even by
appropriate 
legislative 
action, 
amend 
or 
repeal 
the 
compacts. 
Thus, the compacts not only supplant current
legislative actions, but in effect, they likewise supplant
any future proper legislative action that the Legislature
might otherwise undertake regarding this issue. 
32  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
include, but certainly are not limited to, decisions 
regarding the number of compacts to sign and the number of 
casinos to allow, the minimum gambling age that would be 
enforced in the relevant casinos, the percentage of profits 
that the tribes would be required to submit to the state 
and the subsequent use of those funds by the state, the 
decision to incorporate into the compacts the protections 
of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL 421.1 et seq., 
and the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 
et seq., and the decision to leave enforcement of the 
compact rules and regulations to the tribes themselves 
rather than delegating that duty to the relevant state 
agencies as the state clearly could have done pursuant to 
25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C).20 
20 It appears that that Court of Appeals considered
significant the fact that the compacts do not give the
state the power to enforce them other than by arbitration
or mediation. 
The Court of Appeals stated, “While states
may have the ability [under IGRA] to negotiate and include
regulatory terms in the compacts, there is no mechanism for
enforcement. 
Rather, 
any 
dispute 
is 
submitted 
to 
arbitration or a mediator. Consequently, the challenge to
the method of approval by resolution is without merit.”
Slip op at 13. 
Likewise, defendants emphasize, as did the
Court of Appeals, id., that the compacts confer no 
regulatory power on the state because the responsibility to
ensure that the compacts' "regulatory requirements" are
being enforced within the casinos lies solely within the
tribes’ 
hands; 
and 
therefore 
the 
compacts 
are 
not 
“legislation.” 
However, IGRA provides that compacts may 
include provisions relating to “the allocation of criminal
(continued…) 
33  
 
 
                                                 
 
In my judgment, these policy decisions are exactly the 
sorts of decisions that properly belong within the province 
of the Legislature.21
 This point was well made by the 
(…continued)
and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and 
regulations . . . .” 
25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C)(2). 
Thus, the
compacts could have granted the state the jurisdiction to
enforce the relevant laws and regulations. 
Justice Kelly
concedes 
that 
if 
the 
compacts 
“extend[ed] 
state 
jurisdictional authority to tribal land,” they would 
constitute legislation. 
Ante at 16. 
In my judgment, the
decision to place the enforcement jurisdiction entirely
within the tribes’ hands, as well as the decision to
resolve compact disputes through mediation and arbitration,
were, in fact, policy decisions made by the Governor that
may not now be used to insulate the compacts from a finding
that they constitute legislation. 
Chief Justice Corrigan
likewise refers to many of the compact terms in order to
support her contention that the compacts do not constitute
legislation. Ante at 17-21. As an example, she notes that
“[u]nder the terms of the compacts, the tribes themselves,
not the State, regulate the conduct of Class III gaming on
tribal lands. The Legislature has no obligations regarding
the regulation of gaming whatsoever, nor can the State
unilaterally enforce a violation of the compacts.” Ante at 
17-18. This term, and the other compact terms discussed in
the Chief Justice's opinion, were the direct result of
policy choices made on behalf of the state by the Governor
and should not now be used circularly to insulate the
compacts from being characterized as legislation. 
It is,
in part, precisely because the compacts resolve such 
fundamental 
policy 
choices 
that 
they 
constitute 
legislation. 
21 As noted in n 16, MCL 432.203 indicates that the
Legislature itself recognized this when it provided in the
MGCRA that the Legislature must, if permitted by federal
law, enact an act similar to and consistent with the MGCRA
that would govern casino gambling in Indian territory, just
as the MGCRA governs other casino gambling that is 
authorized in Michigan. 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
highest court for the state of New York, the Court of 
Appeals of New York, in a decision in which that Court held 
that IGRA tribal-state compacts represent legislation. 
In 
Saratoga Co Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 
822-823; 798 NE2d 1047; 766 NYS2d 654 (2003), the Court 
stated: 
IGRA itself contemplates that states will
confront several policy choices when negotiating
gaming 
compacts. 
Congress 
provided 
that 
potential conflicts may be resolved in the 
compact 
itself, 
explicitly 
noting 
the 
many
policies affected by tribal gaming compacts. 
Indeed, gaming compacts are laden with policy
choices, as Congress well recognized. 
“Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under
subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating
to— 
“(i) the application of the criminal and
civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or
the State that are directly related to, and 
necessary for, the licensing and regulation of
such activity; 
“(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil
jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws
and regulations; 
“(iii) the assessment by the State of such
activities in such amounts as are necessary to
defray the costs of regulating such activity; 
“(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such
activity 
in 
amounts 
comparable 
to 
amounts 
assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
“(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
“(vi) standards for the operation of such
activity and maintenance of the gaming facility,
including licensing; and 
“(vii) any other subjects that are directly
related to the operation of gaming activities.” 
[25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C).] 
Compacts addressing these issues necessarily
make fundamental policy choices that epitomize
"legislative 
power." 
Decisions 
involving 
licensing, 
taxation 
and 
criminal 
and 
civil 
jurisdiction require a balancing of differing
interests, 
a 
task 
the 
multi-member, 
representative 
Legislature 
is 
entrusted 
to 
perform 
under 
our 
constitutional 
structure. 
[Emphasis added.] 
I agree with the court’s decision on this issue in 
Saratoga Co and with the other state supreme courts that 
have 
considered 
this 
issue 
and 
reached 
a 
similar 
conclusion. See State ex rel Clark v Johnson, 120 NM 562; 
904 P2d 11 (1995); State ex rel Stephan v Finney, 251 Kan 
559; 836 P2d 1169 (1992); Panzer v Doyle, __ Wis 2d __; 680 
NW2d 666 (2004); Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island 
v Rhode Island, 667 A2d 280 (RI, 1995).22
 It is evident 
22 My research revealed that every state supreme court
that has directly considered this issue has held that
tribal-state gaming contracts constitute legislation. 
The 
majority cites to Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis 
(continued…) 
36  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that the compacts “involved determinations of policy,” 
Blank, supra at 114, such that they themselves constitute 
“legislation.” 
iv. Michigan Constitution 
The fourth Chadha/Blank factor requires that we 
consider 
whether 
Michigan’s 
Constitution 
explicitly 
authorizes the Legislature to approve these compacts by 
resolution even if the compacts otherwise constitute 
legislation. 
Before 1908, the Michigan Constitution allowed the 
Legislature to make laws by the resolution process. 
See 
Const 1850, art 4, § 19. 
However, the constitutions of 
1908 and 1963 leave out that earlier proviso, and our 
Constitution now makes it entirely clear, as already 
(…continued)
Reservation v Johnson, 135 Wash 2d 734, 750; 958 P2d 260
(1998), for an opposite conclusion. Opinion of Corrigan, 
C.J., ante at 17; opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 15. 
In 
that case, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that
tribal-state compacts are “agreements” and not legislation.
However, the issue in that case was whether the compacts
were subject to Washington’s public records disclosure act,
and the court’s statement regarding the legislative nature
of a compact, which was made with no analysis whatever, was
therefore not in response to a direct consideration of that
question. Justice Kelly likewise string cites Confederated 
Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v Oregon, 143 F3d 481
(CA 9, 1998), and Gallegos v Pueblo of Tesque, 132 NM 207,
218; 46 P3d 668 (2002). 
Both those cases are equally
irrelevant to the instant issue. 
37  
 
 
 
  
 
explained, that lawmaking is subject to the enactment 
requirement. See Const 1963, art 4, §§ 1, 22, and 26. 
In Becker v Detroit Savings Bank, 269 Mich 432, 434­
436; 257 NW 855 (1934), this Court considered whether a 
legislative 
resolution 
can 
create 
binding 
law. 
In 
accordance with our Constitution, the Becker Court held 
that it could not, stating: 
The language of the constitution is in 
itself a complete answer to the proposition. It
provides in express terms that there shall be but
one mode of enacting a “law” thereunder, and that
mode is the exclusive measure of the power of the
legislature in that regard. A mere resolution, 
therefore, 
is 
not 
a 
competent 
method 
of 
expressing 
the 
legislative 
will, 
where 
that 
expression is to have the force of law, and bind
others than the members of the house or houses 
adopting it. . . . The requirements of the 
Constitution are not met by that method of 
legislation. “Nothing becomes law simply and 
solely because men who possess the legislative
power will that it shall be, unless they express
their determination to that effect in the mode 
pointed out by the instrument which invests them
with the power, and under all the forms which
that instrument has rendered essential.” Cooley,
[Const Lim at 155, ch 6.] . . . 
* * * 
[W]hile the resolution of the Legislature is
entitled to respectful consideration, it is not
law and courts are bound by the law. 
[Id. at 
434-436 (emphasis added).] 
Moreover, Michigan’s Constitution provides a number of 
specific instances in which the Legislature is explicitly 
authorized to act by way of resolution. 
See Const 1963, 
38  
 
 
                                                 
 
art 4, §§ 12, 13, 37; art 5, § 2; art 6, § 25. 
However, 
none of these provisions is applicable to this issue and 
none provides a basis for concluding that our Constitution 
explicitly grants the Legislature the authority to approve 
the instant compacts by way of resolution even though they 
otherwise 
constitute 
legislation.23
 
Therefore, 
the 
Legislature’s approval of the challenged compacts is not 
constitutionally 
exempted 
from 
the 
general 
lawmaking 
procedures embodied in our Constitution. 
Thus, the fourth 
Chadha/Blank factor likewise leads to a finding that the 
Legislature was required to adopt the compacts consistently 
with the enactment requirements of Michigan’s Constitution. 
Accordingly, in my judgment, the tribal-state compacts 
at issue constitute legislation. 
The compacts had the 
purpose and effect of generally altering legal rights, 
23 The majority concludes that legislative approval by 
resolution was appropriate because the Constitution is a
limit on our Legislature’s power rather than a grant of
power and, therefore, the Legislature may do anything that
it is not specifically prohibited by the Constitution from
doing. 
Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 21-22; opinion
of Kelly, J., ante at 17. 
It may well be true that the
Constitution is a limit on legislative power, but one of
those limits is embodied in Const 1963, art 4, § 22 and §
26, and these require that legislation be by bill. 
The 
majority essentially engages in a faulty, circular argument
to support the conclusion that the compacts are not 
legislation. 
39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
duties, and relations of Michigan citizens; they supplanted 
legislative action; they represent determinations of policy 
issues of fundamental importance to the social and economic 
environment of the state of Michigan; and our Constitution 
does not authorize the Legislature to approve the compacts 
by a resolution vote. 
B. 
IS A RESOLUTION NONETHELESS CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Having determined that the Chadha/Blank analytical 
framework leads to the conclusion that the compacts 
constitute 
“legislation” 
subject 
to 
the 
enactment 
requirement of Michigan’s Constitution, I will now consider 
the significant issues raised by defendants and upon which 
the majority opinions are primarily based. 
i. 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
First, Justice Kelly concludes that the compacts are 
not “legislation” because federal law preempts Indian 
gambling regulation unless the state prohibits gambling. 
Thus, because Michigan permits limited casino gambling, 
Justice Kelly reasons that Michigan may not legislate with 
respect to gambling on Indian land. 
Ante at 5-8. 
In 
support of this proposition, the opinion refers to 25 USC 
2701 of IGRA, which provides: 
40  
  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
The Congress finds that 
(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right
to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if 
the 
gaming 
activity 
is 
not 
specifically
prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within
a State which does not, as a matter of criminal
law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity. 
Justice Kelly has misconstrued the relevance of § 
2701(5). This provision is simply a part of the Congress’s 
legislative “findings” and does not constitute substantive 
law.24  That is, the Congress found, before enacting IGRA, 
that Indian tribes had the "exclusive right to regulate 
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity 
[was] not specifically prohibited by Federal law and [was] 
conducted within a State which did not . . . prohibit such 
gaming activity."25 
Id. 
Having so found, the Congress 
24 A “findings” statement in a federal act is a part of
what is commonly referred to as the “preamble.” 
As long
ago as 1889, the United States Supreme Court, in Yazoo & M 
V R Co v Thomas, 132 US 174; 10 S Ct 68; 33 L Ed 302
(1889), stated: “[A]s the preamble is no part of the act,
and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words
of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the
necessity or resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the
true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself
fatal to the claim set up.” 
See also Singer, 1A 
Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed), § 20:3, p 123: 
“The function of the preamble is to supply reasons and
explanations and not to confer power or determine rights.
Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope
or effect of a statute.” 
25 This congressional finding comports with the pre-
IGRA opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Cabazon 
(continued…) 
41  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
subsequently enacted IGRA in order to “provide a statutory 
basis for the regulation of gaming . . . .” 
25 USC 
2702(2). 
Because 25 USC 2701(5) is not substantive law, 
Justice Kelly errs in invoking it as such and using it to 
effectively shield Indian tribes from state regulation of 
gambling otherwise consistent with the text of IGRA. 
ii. 
STATE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 
Second, defendants argue that the compacts cannot 
constitute legislation because the state has no authority 
to 
legislate 
casino 
gambling 
on 
Indian 
lands, 
and, 
therefore, the compacts merely constitute an “agreement” 
between the tribe and the state that has nothing to do with 
“legislation.” 
However, pursuant to the express terms of 
IGRA itself, the Congress recognized that a tribal-state 
compact may result in state legislation. 
Therefore, it 
cannot be disputed that IGRA permits states to legislate 
pursuant to a compact. 
Section 2710(d)(5) of IGRA 
(…continued)
in 
which 
the 
Court 
acknowledged 
that 
if 
California 
prohibited casino gambling within its borders, California
could 
enforce 
its 
criminal 
laws 
relating 
to 
that 
prohibition on Indian lands through 18 USC 1162; but absent
express Congressional permission, California could not 
enforce its purely regulatory gambling laws on Indian 
lands. 
Thus, under Cabazon, Indian tribes indeed had the 
exclusive right to regulate casino gambling on Indian lands
if the gambling was not specifically prohibited by federal
law and was conducted within a state that did not prohibit
such gambling. 
42  
 
 
 
provides: 
Nothing in this subsection shall impair the
right of an Indian tribe to regulate class III
gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the
State, except to the extent that such regulation
is inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the
State laws and regulations made applicable by any
tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian
tribe under paragraph (3) that is in effect. 
This section both affirms that an Indian tribe’s right 
to regulate gambling on its lands is not exclusive and that 
the state does, indeed, have authority to regulate gambling 
on Indian lands through lawmaking. 
The compact provisions 
in IGRA merely ensure that any state regulation over tribal 
gambling arises out of the negotiation process; they do 
not, however, prohibit such regulation. 
The majority concludes, however, that the fact that 
the compacts must arise out of the negotiation process 
means that they do not constitute “legislation” because 
legislation must be “unilateral.” 
Opinion of Corrigan, 
C.J., ante at 9-10; opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 11-12. 
That is, if a tribal-state compact, and thus any state 
regulation over tribal gambling, can only result through a 
federally mandated negotiation process, it cannot be said 
that the state enjoys a right to “unilaterally” legislate 
gambling on Indian land. 
In support of this theory—that 
unless a state may “unilaterally” regulate, it may not 
43  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
“legislate”—Justice Kelly refers to this Court’s opinion in 
Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412, 440; 263 
NW2d 564 (1978). Ante at 11-12. 
Westervelt considered whether an executive agency 
“legislates” when it engages in rulemaking pursuant to a 
legislative delegation of power. 
If so, the executive 
agency would be violating the separation of powers doctrine 
embodied in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 because, pursuant to 
Const 1963, art 4, § 1, “[t]he legislative power of the 
State of Michigan is vested in [the Legislature].”26 
Westervelt, in concluding that an executive agency does not 
legislate when it engages in rulemaking, stated, “the 
concept of ‘legislation,’ in its essential sense, is the 
power to speak on any subject without any specified 
limitations.” 
Westervelt, supra at 440. 
(Emphasis 
deleted). 
The “specified limitations” referred to in 
Westervelt 
were 
those 
limitations 
inherent 
in 
the 
legislative delegation of authority to the executive 
branch. 
Because an executive agency is confined in its 
exercise 
of 
authority 
to 
the 
relevant 
legislative 
26 Compare the United States Constitution, art I, § 1,
in which "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist 
of 
a 
Senate 
and 
House 
of 
Representatives.”
(Emphasis added.) 
44  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
delegation, including any specific limitations upon such 
delegation set by the Legislature, the power to engage in 
rulemaking is not a power to “legislate.” 
It could not be 
such a power under the Constitution if the delegation is 
valid because the Constitution does not allow any entity to 
exercise “legislative power” other than the Legislature.27 
Justice Kelly argues that the power to speak “without 
any 
specified 
limitations” 
means 
the 
power 
to 
“unilaterally” legislate. 
In this case, she argues, the 
Legislature may not speak “without specified limitations” 
because it is limited by the mandate that the state must 
negotiate in good faith with the tribes and, therefore, it 
may not legislate. 
Ante at 11-12. 
In my judgment, 
Westervelt must be interpreted within the different context 
of that case. 
I see no reason to expand its specific 
holding 
to 
mean 
that 
any 
time 
the 
Legislature 
is 
constricted in any sense by “any specified limitation,” it 
may not “legislate.” 
A legislature is always subject to 
27 Westervelt, considered in its totality, actually
supports plaintiffs’ position in this case. 
This is 
because the compacts constitute legislation, yet the 
legislative power is exclusively vested in the Legislature.
Const 1963, art 4, § 1. Thus, when the Governor negotiated
and signed the compacts without having first received a
proper delegation of power from the Legislature, he 
effectively 
exercised 
the 
Legislature’s 
functions 
in 
contravention of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. 
45  
 
 
 
“specified limitations,” such as those posed by the federal 
and state constitutions, or, in this case, by federal law. 
Indeed, the very premise of our constitutional system is 
that all governmental institutions operate under "specified 
limitations." 
The fact that federal law imposes some 
limits on the state’s power to regulate in a specific area 
simply cannot mean that any legislative action touching 
upon such an area is not actually “legislation.” 
Chief Justice Corrigan, in support of her contention 
that the state has no power to “unilaterally” regulate, and 
therefore legislate, tribal gambling under § 2710(d), cites 
Boerth v Detroit City Gas Co, 152 Mich 654; 116 NW 628 
(1908), and Detroit v Michigan Pub Utilities Comm (MPUC), 
288 Mich 267; 286 NW 368 (1939), for the proposition that 
the power to legislate does not require “consent” from 
those subject to its powers. 
Ante at 9-10. 
Because § 
2710(d) provides for a process of negotiation, the Chief 
Justice opines that it gives tribes a power to “consent” 
that 
negates 
a 
finding 
that 
a 
compact 
constitutes 
legislation. 
In Boerth and MPUC, this Court held that, 
absent a legislative delegation of power to Detroit, 
Detroit possessed no legislative power to set gas rates 
because such power was within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Legislature. 
However, Detroit was found to possess a 
46  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
power to contract for reasonable gas rates under its power 
to control its streets. 
In this case, the state possesses 
regulatory power over tribal casino gambling even in the 
absence of a compact, see § 1166, including the outright 
power to prohibit such gambling. 
Moreover, the “consent” 
that the Chief Justice argues that the tribes may exercise 
in this case, by virtue of § 2710(d), is the type of 
“consent” referred to in Boerth and MPUC. 
Although § 
2710(d) provides for a negotiation process, the tribes are 
not wholly free to withhold their “consent” from the 
Legislature to enter into contracts regulating casino 
gambling on their lands and to, instead, engage in such 
gambling without compacts. 
This is because in the absence 
of a compact, casino gambling is unlawful. § 2710(d)(1).28 
28 I do not accept the premise of the Chief Justice
that, when a state exercises its regulatory authority over
casino gambling within its borders, expressly granted to it
by Congress, and makes that which was unlawful into that
which is lawful, and in doing so binds itself to specific
terms and conditions under which that which was unlawful is 
now lawful, the state is not “legislating” merely because
IGRA 
provides 
a 
mechanism 
by 
which 
the 
tribes 
may
participate in the negotiation process. 
The pertinent
consideration in determining whether a compact constitutes
legislation is not whether IGRA purports to compel a state
to negotiate in good faith with a tribe, but rather whether
the compact bears the larger hallmarks of “legislation.” 
These 
hallmarks 
are 
sufficiently 
expounded 
upon 
in 
Chadha/Blank, and, as already discussed, I believe they
(continued…) 
47  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
iii. CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF COMPACTS 
Third, the majority concludes that the tribal-state 
compacts are not legislation because they merely constitute 
contracts between two sovereign entities that the Governor, 
pursuant to IGRA, may enter into on behalf of the state and 
that the Legislature may approve of by resolution vote.29 
Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 9-10; opinion of Kelly, 
J., ante at 15. 
I do not dispute that the compacts are 
akin to contracts of a unique nature. 
However, as 
explained above, these “contracts” create new law and 
constitute legislation and they purport to bind the state 
of Michigan to that legislation. 
That is the pivotal 
consideration in this case. 
A “contract” may, in effect, 
(…continued) 
lead to the conclusion that these sorts of compacts 
constitute legislation.  
29 If the majority were correct, but for the term in
the compacts themselves stipulating that they become 
effective only upon resolution approval by the Legislature,
the Legislature would not be required to approve them.
This is because the Legislature’s power is the power to
legislate. 
Const 1963, art 4, § 1. 
Therefore, unless the
compacts constitute legislation, neither the Constitution
nor any other source of law would require that they be
approved by the Legislature by any method. Thus, under the
majority’s faulty analysis, there is no reason that the
Governor, in the future, cannot simply bind the state to
casino compacts without even seeking resolution approval
from the Legislature. 
Thus, the compacts would have been effective between
the state and the tribe once they had been signed by the
Governor. 
48  
 
 
 
                                                 
  
create new law and such a legislative contract should not 
be exempt from the constitutional provisions otherwise 
applicable to legislation.30  Neither the executive nor the 
legislative branch of our state government may circumvent 
the 
constitutionally 
mandated 
processes 
for 
enacting 
legislation by entering into a contractual relationship. 
However, I will consider whether there is some source of 
law that does allow the Governor to enter into a compact 
without 
legislative 
approval 
consistently 
with 
the 
enactment requirement of Michigan’s Constitution. 
First, it should be considered whether IGRA itself, 
regardless of state constitutional procedures, provides 
that a Governor may enter into a tribal-state compact with 
only a resolution vote of the Legislature. 
It is clear 
that IGRA does not so provide. 
The court in Saratoga Co, 
supra at 822, stated: 
30 See Flint & F Plank-Road Co v Woodhull, 25 Mich 99,
(1872), in which Justice Cooley acknowledged that a 
charter-compact is both a “law” and a contract. “It is not 
disputed . . . that the charter of a private corporation is
to be regarded as a contract, whose provisions are binding
upon the State . . . . Such a charter is a law, [and] it .
. . also . . . contains stipulations which are terms of 
compact between the State as the one party, and the 
corporators as the other . . . .” 
Id. at 101. 
(Emphasis
added.) 
Thus, a “contract” may clearly be a vehicle for
creating both legislation and contractual terms that are
binding on the state. 
49  
 
 
 
IGRA imposes on “the State” an obligation to
negotiate in good faith (25 USC 2710[d][3][a]),
but identifies no particular state actor who 
shall negotiate the compacts; that question is
left up to state law . . . . As the Supreme Court
noted, the duty to negotiate imposed by IGRA “is
not of the sort likely to be performed by an
individual state executive officer or even a 
group of officers.” [Quoting Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 75 n 17; 116 S Ct
1114; 134 L Ed 2d 252 (1996), citing State ex rel 
Stephen Finney, supra.] 
Likewise, in Clark, supra at 577, the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico stated: 
We entertain no doubts that Congress could,
if it so desired, enact legislation legalizing
all forms of gambling on all Indian lands in
whatever state they may occur. . . . 
That is,
however, not the course that Congress chose. 
Rather, Congress sought to give the states a role
in the process . . . . 
It did so by permitting
Class III gaming only on those Indian lands where
a negotiated compact is in effect between the
state and the tribe. [25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C).] To
this end, the language of the IGRA provides that
“Any State . . . may enter into a Tribal-State
compact governing gaming activities on the Indian
lands of the Indian Tribe.” Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
The 
only 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
this 
language is that it authorizes state officials,
acting pursuant to their authority held under 
state law, to enter into gaming compacts on 
behalf of the state. [Emphasis added.] 
Accordingly, IGRA does not provide or require that the 
Governor shall have the power to bind the state to tribal­
state 
compacts 
with 
only 
a 
resolution 
vote 
of 
the 
Legislature. 
The pertinent consideration is which state 
actor has the power to bind the state to a legislative 
50  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
compact and according to which procedures under state law.31 
Second, it is therefore necessary to consider whether 
state law grants the Governor the authority to bind the 
state to a tribal-state compact with only a resolution vote 
of 
the 
Legislature 
regardless 
whether 
that 
compact 
31 Because IGRA does not purport to require or allow
the Governor to negotiate a tribal-state compact subject 
only to a resolution vote, we need not consider whether
such a provision in the IGRA would be lawful. 
However, I
note the following statement made by the court in Clark, 
supra at 577: 
[The 
governor] 
. 
. 
. 
argues 
that 
he 
possesses the authority, as a matter of federal 
law, to bind the State to the terms of the
compact . . . . We find the Governor’s argument
on these points to be inconsistent with core
principles of federalism. The Governor has only
such authority as is given to him by our state
Constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to it.
. . . We do not agree that Congress, in enacting
the IGRA, sought to invest state governors with
powers in excess of those that the governors
possess 
under 
state 
law. 
Moreover, 
we 
are 
confident that the United States Supreme Court
would reject any such attempt by Congress to
enlarge state gubernatorial power. Cf. Gregory [v 
Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460; 111 S Ct 2395; 119 L
ED 2d 410 (1991)] (recognizing that “[t]hrough
the structure of its government . . . a State
defines itself as a sovereign”); New York v. 
United States, [505 US 144, 176; 112 S Ct 2408;
120 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1992)] (striking down an act
of Congress on the ground that principles of
federalism 
will 
not 
permit 
Congress 
to 
“‘commandeer[] the legislative processes of the
States’” by directly compelling the states to
act) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, [452 US 264, 288; 101 S Ct
2352; 69 L Ed 2d 1 (1981)] . . . . 
51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
constitutes 
legislation. 
The 
Michigan 
Constitution 
provides that “[t]he executive power is vested in the 
governor.” 
Const 1963, art 5, § 1. 
The majority 
essentially argues that the executive power includes the 
power to bind the states to contractual agreements with 
sovereign entities and, therefore, whether those agreements 
otherwise constitute “legislation” is irrelevant. 
The 
“executive power” is, first and foremost, the power to 
enforce. 
This observation was concisely summed up by this 
Court in People ex rel Attorney General v Holschuh, 235 
Mich 272, 274-275; 209 NW 158 (1926), in which we stated, 
“Consideration of some fundamental principles relative to 
the powers of government will aid greatly in determining 
the issues before us. . . . 
The law . . . must observe 
constitutional limitations; but within such limitations the 
legislative power may command, the executive power must 
enforce, and the judicial power respond.” 
(Emphasis 
added.)32
 While our state Constitution grants specific 
32 See Const 1963, art 5, § 8: “The governor shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 
See also The 
People ex rel Sutherland v Governor, 29 Mich 320, 324-325
(1874), in which Justice Cooley stated: “And that there is
such a broad general principle seems to us very plain. Our
government 
is 
one 
whose 
powers 
have 
been 
carefully
apportioned 
between 
three 
distinct 
departments, 
which 
emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike
(continued…) 
52  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
additional powers to our executive branch of government 
beyond the “enforcement” of legislative enactments, I find 
no provision in our Constitution that supports a finding 
that the Governor possesses broad powers to bind the state 
to legislative compacts with foreign sovereignties absent 
legislative 
action 
consistent 
with 
the 
enactment 
requirement. 
Nor have my colleagues pointed to any 
language of that sort. 
In addressing this issue, it is also necessary to 
consider what our Constitution does say regarding the 
Governor’s right to bind the state to an “intergovernmental 
agreement.” Const 1963, art 3, § 5 provides: 
Subject to provisions of general law, this
state or any political subdivision thereof, any
governmental authority or any combination thereof 
may enter into agreements for the performance,
financing 
or 
execution 
of 
their 
respective
functions, with any one or more of the other
states, the United States, the Dominion of 
Canada, or any political subdivision thereof 
unless otherwise provided in this constitution.
. . . 
(…continued)
limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal
dignity, and within their respective spheres of action
equally independent. One makes the laws, another applies 
the laws in contested cases, while the third must see that 
the laws are executed. This division is accepted as a
necessity 
in 
all 
free 
governments, 
and 
the 
very
apportionment of power to one department is understood to
be a prohibition of its exercise by either of the others.”
(Emphasis added.) 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, pursuant to this constitutional provision, the 
Governor of this state may enter into intergovernmental 
agreements 
without 
the 
advice 
or 
consent 
of 
the 
Legislature—whether by resolution vote or consistently with 
the enactment requirements of our Constitution. 
However, 
this power is not unlimited. 
First, it is specifically 
limited to agreements with “the other states, the United 
States, 
the 
Dominion 
of 
Canada, 
or 
any 
political 
subdivision 
thereof.” 
The 
power 
to 
enter 
into 
an 
intergovernmental 
agreement 
with 
an 
Indian 
tribe 
is 
conspicuously absent. 
Second, the power is specifically 
limited to those agreements necessary “for the performance, 
financing or execution of [its] functions.” 
Neither IGRA 
nor any other law places the duty or the power to determine 
the scope and parameters of gambling within Michigan’s 
borders, on or off Indian lands, within the “functions” of 
the executive branch. 
Accordingly, unless the Legislature 
properly delegates to the executive branch a rulemaking 
power to set the parameters for gambling on Indian lands 
within Michigan’s borders, that power is not, in my 
judgment, reasonably within the scope of the executive 
branch’s “functions.” 
It may be said that because the intergovernmental 
agreement provision of the Michigan Constitution does not 
54  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
refer to agreements with Indian tribes that provision is 
inapplicable to this case. 
However, in light of the fact 
that 
the 
powers 
of 
the 
executive 
branch 
are 
constitutionally defined, I read additionally a negative 
implication in Const 1963, art 3, § 5. 
Because our 
Constitution 
contains 
an 
express 
provision 
regarding 
intergovernmental agreements that may validly be entered 
into by governmental authorities, I conclude that, subject 
to provisions of general law, intergovernmental agreements 
beyond the scope of Const 1963, art 3, § 5 are invalid.33 
Moreover, even were I to decline to read a negative 
implication into Const 1963, art 3, § 5, this provision is, 
nonetheless, significant insofar as it expressly provides 
that, 
in 
the 
realm 
of 
applicable 
intergovernmental 
agreements, no branch of the government may contract in 
33 Const 1963, art 3, § 5 provides that it is “subject
to general law.” 
Therefore, a governmental authority may
enter into an intergovernmental agreement with an Indian 
tribe despite the fact that tribes are not specifically
mentioned in art 3, § 5 provided the agreement is 
consistent with provisions of general law. 
Federal law,
under IGRA, permits a state to enter into a tribal-state
gambling compact. 
However, because the compacts at issue
constitute legislation, state law, particularly Const 1963,
art 4, §§ 22 and 26, requires that they be approved by the
Legislature by bill. 
Therefore, consistently with these
provisions of general law, the Legislature may bind the 
state to tribal-state gambling compacts despite the fact 
that “Indian tribes” are not specifically referenced in art
3, § 5. 
55  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
such a way that is inconsistent with its own powers or that 
usurps the powers of another branch. 
That rule, which is 
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine of Const 
1963, art 3, § 2, should apply equally to intergovernmental 
agreements that are expressly subject to Const 1963, art 3, 
§ 5, as well as those that are not.  Thus, in any case, a 
governmental authority may only bind the state to an 
intergovernmental agreement that is “for the performance, 
financing or execution 
of their respective functions 
. . . .” 
Id.
 As already noted, absent a proper 
legislative delegation of power to the executive branch, 
the duty and power to set the parameters for casino 
gambling on land within Michigan’s borders is not in any 
comprehensible sense a “function” of the executive branch. 
The United States Constitution expressly provides that 
the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .” 
US Const, 
art II, § 2, cl 2.34
 The Michigan Constitution notably 
34 It is noteworthy that federal case law acknowledges
that treaties are both agreements with other sovereignties,
and they create “law.” See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v 
Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 US 155, 167; 119 S Ct 662; 142 L Ed 2d
576 (1999), in which the United States Supreme Court 
stated: “‘Because a treaty ratified by the United States is 
not only the law of this land, see U.S. Const., Art. II, §
(continued…) 
56  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
contains no explicit authorization for the Governor to 
enter into treaties with sovereign nations without the 
majority approval of the entire Legislature. 
I have found 
no case law, nor have my colleagues identified such a law, 
that would support a determination that, despite our 
Constitution’s silence on the issue, such a right exists.35 
(…continued)
2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we have
traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the
negotiating and drafting history (travaux préparatoires)
[italics 
in 
original] 
and 
the 
post-ratification
understanding of the contracting parties.’” 
(Citation
omitted; emphasis added.) 
The point is that, pursuant to
US Const, art II, § 2, treaties are binding even though
they amount to lawmaking because the federal Constitution 
expressly so provides. 
Thus, that the tribal-state 
compacts at issue here are akin to contracts with a 
sovereign power does not, by that fact alone, mean that the
compacts do not constitute “lawmaking.” 
I believe the 
majority's conclusion that the compacts are not legislation
simply because they are “contracts” with sovereign nations
to be without merit. See also n 30. 
35 
Does 
the 
Governor 
possesses 
some 
"inherent" 
authority to bind the state to a legislative compact with
only a resolution vote of the Legislature, or indeed 
unilaterally? 
While the Governor has the power to issue
executive orders on his own accord that have the status of 
enacted law, the permissible scope of such orders is 
limited 
by 
the 
express 
powers 
constitutionally 
or 
legislatively delegated to the Governor. 
See, generally,
House Speaker v Governor, supra at 578-579; see also Straus 
v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 228-230; 583 NW2d 520 (1998).  
Further, the separation of powers doctrine embodied in
Michigan’s 
Constitution 
provides 
that 
“[n]o 
person
exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another branch except as expressly
provided in this constitution.” 
Const 1963, art 3, § 2.
Tribal-state 
compacts 
constitute 
legislation, 
and 
all 
(continued…) 
57  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
I believe that no source of law, federal or state, 
exists that would permit the Governor to bind the state to 
these legislative compacts without the approval of the 
Legislature consistent with the enactment requirements of 
Michigan’s Constitution. 
Because the compacts constitute 
legislation, they were subject to Const 1963, art 4, §§ 22 
and 26. 
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that the approval 
of HCR 115 by resolution, rather than by bill, did not 
comport 
with 
the 
enactment 
requirement 
of 
our 
Constitution.36 
C. 
DO AMENDATORY PROVISIONS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION? 
Each of the challenged tribal-state compacts contains 
(…continued)
legislative 
power 
is 
constitutionally 
vested 
in 
the 
Legislature. 
Const 1963, art 4, § 1. 
Therefore, the
Governor may not bind the state to such a compact under
some “inherent” power because the Governor may exercise
legislative powers only “as expressly provided in this
constitution.” 
Const 1963, art 3, § 2.  Nowhere does our 
Constitution expressly, or otherwise, grant the Governor a
power to bind the state to a legislative agreement with
another sovereignty.
36 The pertinent question in this case is whether the 
compacts constitute legislation. 
Because they do, the
Legislature should have approved HCR 15 by bill. 
If the 
compacts 
did 
not 
constitute 
legislation, 
then 
no 
legislative approval, by either bill or resolution, would
have been constitutionally required. 
In that case, the
Legislature would have been required to approve the 
compacts only because the compacts themselves expressly
required it in § 11, and either resolution or bill approval
of HCR 115 would have been sufficient. 
58  
 
 
 
                                                 
a provision that purports to empower the Governor to amend 
it on behalf of the state without seeking legislative 
approval of any specific amendment.37
 This provision, 
plaintiffs contend, violates the separation of powers 
doctrine embodied in art 3, § 2 of Michigan’s Constitution 
because it grants broad authority to the Governor to usurp 
a legislative power. 
That is, plaintiffs argue that, like 
the 
original 
compacts, 
any 
amendment 
constitutes 
“legislation” that is subject anew to the enactment 
requirement of Const 1963, art 4, § 26. 
Plaintiffs 
essentially argue that even had the Legislature properly 
adopted the compacts, the specific amendatory provision 
would nonetheless violate the separation of powers doctrine 
because the Legislature may not, even by properly enacted 
legislation, grant the Governor a general power to amend 
that legislation. 
Defendants contend, on the other hand, 
that the amendments to the compacts, like the compacts 
themselves, 
in 
no 
way 
implicate 
“legislation,” 
and, 
therefore, 
the 
Governor 
does 
not 
usurp 
legislative 
functions in exercising his power to amend them. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that this issue was not 
ripe for review because the Governor had not yet attempted 
37 See § 16 of the compacts. 
59  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to amend the compacts. 
However, during the pendency of 
this suit, Governor Granholm purported to amend the compact 
with the Odawa Tribe by (1) extending the terms of the 
compact from twenty to twenty-five years, (2) requiring the 
eight percent semiannual payment that the tribes must make 
to the Michigan Strategic Fund to instead be made “to the 
State . . . as the governor so directs,” (3) increasing the 
semiannual payment from eight percent of profits to either 
eight, ten, or twelve percent depending on the profits of 
the casino, and (4) providing less restrictive limitations 
on gaming by requiring the tribe to make the semiannual 
payments to the state only as long as the state does not 
authorize new gaming in ten specified counties rather than 
statewide 
as 
under 
the 
original 
compact 
terms. 
Accordingly, this issue is at present ripe for review. 
38 
As long ago as 1874, this Court recognized the 
importance of respecting the proper lines of demarcation 
38 The majority concludes that the issue may now be
ripe for review, but that this Court should nonetheless
decline to review it because the lower courts did not 
assess this issue. 
Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 30;
opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 19. 
It is true that the 
Court of Appeals declined to address the issue. 
However,
the circuit court considered it and found a constitutional 
violation. Further, the parties briefed this issue and, in
my judgment, the record is sufficiently developed that we
may consider this question without having to first remand
it to the lower courts. 
60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
between the practices of our three branches of government. 
In Sutherland, supra at 324-325, Justice Cooley stated: 
And that there is such a broad general
principle seems to us very plain. Our government
is 
one 
whose 
powers 
have 
been 
carefully
apportioned between three distinct departments,
which emanate alike from the people, have their
powers 
alike 
limited 
and 
defined 
by 
the 
constitution, are of equal dignity, and within
their 
respective 
spheres 
of 
action 
equally
independent. 
. . . This division is accepted as
a necessity in all free governments, and the very 
apportionment of power to one department is 
understood to be a prohibition of its exercise by
either of the others. [Emphasis added.] 
This “broad general principle” elaborated upon by Justice 
Cooley in Sutherland is what is now embodied in the 
separation of powers doctrine of Michigan’s Constitution. 
Art 3, § 2 of our Constitution provides, “The powers of 
government are divided into three branches; legislative, 
executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one 
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another 
branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” 
“The legislative power of the State of Michigan is 
vested in a senate and a house of representatives.” 
Const 
1963, art 4, § 1. 
Thus, the Governor may not exercise 
legislative power unless expressly provided for in the 
Constitution. Yet, the amendatory provision of the tribal­
state compacts purports to grant the Governor a broad and 
undefined legislative power—the power to amend legislation. 
61  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
The Legislature may not, either by resolution or by bill, 
delegate to the executive branch a broad and undefined 
power to amend legislation. 
Thus, I would reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold 
that the amendatory provision contained in each compact 
violates the separation of powers doctrine and is, thus, 
void insofar as it may be regarded as granting sole 
amendatory power over legislation to the Governor.39 
D. 
DO COMPACTS CONSTITUTE LOCAL ACTS? 
For the reasons set forth in part VI of Chief Justice 
Corrigan’s lead opinion, I do not believe that the compacts 
violate Const 1963, art 4, § 29. 
Accordingly, on this 
39 Justice Kelly concludes that plaintiffs’ challenge
to the amendatory provision fails because plaintiffs cannot
show that “no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[a]ct would be valid.” 
Ante at 18. 
She explains that
“[t]here are many conceivable amendments that a governor 
might make to these compacts. For example, a governor could
amend the provision relating to dispute resolution or the
provision about the timing of payments.” 
Id. at 18.  For 
reasons already explained in part III (A) of this opinion,
Justice Kelly's examples represent legislative decisions
that are properly within the province of the Legislature.
That is, such amendment would constitute important policy
decisions undertaken in the process of lawmaking and they
would 
supplant 
legislative 
action. 
Therefore, 
such 
amendments, undertaken by the Governor and not approved by
the Legislature pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, §§ 22 and 26
would offend the separation of powers doctrine. 
Justice 
Kelly has not demonstrated that there are, in fact,
“conceivable amendments that a governor might make to these
compacts,” id., so as to not offend this doctrine. 
62  
 
 
 
 
  
issue, I concur in the lead opinion that the decisions of 
the lower courts should be affirmed. 
 
 
 
E.
 
CONCLUSION & CONSEQUENCES 
We have been asked to consider, in an action seeking 
declaratory relief, whether the four tribal-state compacts 
at issue are inconsistent with various procedures and 
doctrines embodied in Michigan’s Constitution. 
Having 
considered the questions presented, I strongly dissent from 
the majority judgment that these compacts have been 
effected consistently with our Constitution. 
I would hold 
that these compacts constitute legislation and, thus, were 
subject 
to 
legislative 
approval 
consistent 
with 
the 
lawmaking procedures of art 4, §§ 22 and 26 of our 
Constitution. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the 
circuit court on this issue. 
Further, in my judgment, the provision in the compacts 
that purports to empower the Governor with sole amendatory 
power over their covenants violates the separation of 
powers doctrine of art 3, § 2 of our Constitution. 
therefore would hold that this provision is void insofar as 
it grants sole amendatory power over legislation to the 
Governor. 
Absent a proper delegation of power to the 
executive 
branch, 
amendments 
of 
the 
compacts 
must 
63  
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
themselves 
comport 
with 
the 
bill-making 
enactment 
procedures of our Constitution. 
Accordingly, I would 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the judgment of the circuit court on this issue as well. 
Finally, I believe that the compacts do not violate 
the 
local 
acts 
provision 
of 
art 
4, 
§ 
29 
of 
our 
Constitution. 
Accordingly, on this issue, I concur with 
the analysis as set forth in part VI of the lead opinion, 
and would affirm the decisions of the lower courts. 
Concerning the consequences of this opinion for the 
casinos operated by defendants, I would afford plaintiffs 
no more relief than that requested. 
That is, in this 
action for declaratory judgment, I have sought only to say 
what the Constitution requires of the compact process. 
In 
order to assess the consequences of this requirement for 
the 
compacts 
at 
issue, 
other 
considerations 
must 
necessarily come into play, including the standards to be 
applied by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to 25 
USC 2710(d)(8), in approving a compact, in particular, a 
compact approved through procedures apparently acquiesced 
in by the executive and legislative branches of a state;40 
40 Generally, deliberate acts of any of the three
branches of government are presumed constitutional and,
(continued…) 
64  
 
 
 
                                                 
the standards by which the Secretary of the Interior will 
revisit prior approval of a compact;41 and various equitable 
considerations pertinent to casinos that have already been 
built and are presently operating. 
The analyses of the majority are deeply flawed and 
circular. 
As is typical in cases of this sort, the long­
term consequences of the majority judgment cannot be fully 
predicted, but what is predictable is that there will be 
consequences in terms of the relationships between the 
branches of government. 
The result of the majority's 
analyses in this case is that a matter of fundamental 
policy concern to the people of this state—casino gambling 
and its social and economic impact—a realm in which the 
federal government has unequivocally authorized Michigan to 
(…continued)
moreover, “state officials and those with whom they deal
are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state [act],
[performed] 
in 
good 
faith 
and 
by 
no 
means 
plainly
unlawful.” See Lemon v Kurtzman, 411 US 192, 209; 93 S Ct
1463; 36 L Ed 2d 151 (1973). 
See also Thompson v 
Washington, 179 US App DC 357; 551 F2d 1316 (1977), Bd of 
Comm’rs of Wood Dale Pub Library Dist v Co of Du Page, 103
Ill 2d 422; 469 NE2d 1370 (1984), and, of significant
interest, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians v Michigan Gaming Control Bd, 
2002 WL 1592596 (WD
Mich, 2002). 
41 The compacts at issue have already been approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, and any declaratory judgment
along the lines of this dissenting opinion would not,
without further action by the Secretary, render such 
approval null and void. 
65  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
exercise regulatory authority, has now been transformed 
into the exclusive province of a single public official, 
the Governor.42
 By concluding that tribal-state casino 
gambling compacts do not constitute legislation, and are 
not required to conform to the legislative process set 
forth in the Michigan Constitution, the majority has 
effectively ensured that in future cases the Legislature's 
role in approving such compacts will exist merely at the 
sufferance of the Governor. 
That is, according to the 
understanding of the majority, unless the Governor agrees 
in future compacts to affirmatively grant a role for the 
Legislature, it will have no role. 
Rather than both the 
executive and legislative branches being required to 
42 Moreover, I fear that the majority’s "contractual"
approach to Michigan constitutional law in this case cannot
be cabined to apply only to tribal-state casino gambling
compacts, and do not understand why it would not be equally
applicable to any compact between Michigan and an Indian
tribe, a sister state, or a sovereign nation to which the
Governor may be inclined to unilaterally bind the state.
The majority appears to grant the Governor a broad power,
not 
even 
implicitly 
recognized 
in 
the 
Michigan
Constitution, to bind the state as the Governor sees fit,
as long as the Governor does so within the framework of the
majority's “contractual" approach to compacts, i.e., an
approach in which state compacts can be fully understood
through resort to the four corners of the compact itself
and without consideration to surrounding constitutional 
circumstances, including the Constitution's separation of
powers 
doctrine, 
its 
legislative 
processes, 
and 
the 
specific limitations it places upon the individual branches
of government. 
66  
 
 
 
 
 
approve the expansion of casinos within Michigan, the 
approval of a single branch, the executive branch, will be 
sufficient. 
The lead decision represents the first state supreme 
court decision in the United States to conclude that a 
tribal-state casino gambling compact does not constitute 
"legislation" and, therefore, does not require the approval 
of 
the 
branch 
of 
government 
that 
is 
most 
directly 
representative of the people. 
Stephen J. Markman 
67