Title: People v. Jackson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91359-Agenda 19-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								KIZZY L. M. JACKSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 18, 2002.


	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case once again brings before this court a question
involving the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
	Defendant Kizzy Jackson was charged with the Class 3 felony
of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1996)) for attacking
the victim, Rebecca Fanning, with a box cutter. Defendant pled
guilty to the offense in exchange for the State's recommending a
sentence within the normal range of imprisonment. After accepting
defendant's plea, the court sentenced her to an extended term of 10
years' imprisonment. Defendant contends that this sentence
violated her due process rights, based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Apprendi. We disagree, and affirm.

BACKGROUND
	In June 1997 the State charged defendant with aggravated
battery by information. Specifically, the State alleged that on June
19, 1997, defendant caused great bodily harm to the victim,
Rebecca Fanning, during the commission of a battery, by cutting
the victim about the body. The information made no mention of
the possibility of an extended sentence or of what might have to be
proven for an extended sentence to be imposed.
	Defendant initially entered a not-guilty plea. However, in
October 1997 she pled guilty pursuant to an agreement with the
State not to seek an extended-term penalty in her case.
	Before accepting defendant's plea, the court elicited various
facts from defendant and admonished her regarding the
consequences of a guilty plea. Defendant told the court that she
was 18 years old and had finished the tenth grade. She stated that
she could read and write and understand English, and that although
she had some learning difficulties, which had led to her placement
in a special education program, she was not mentally or physically
disabled.
	The court informed defendant that she had been charged with
aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony, which normally carried a
penalty of two to five years' imprisonment in the Department of
Corrections. However, the court also told defendant that she could
be sentenced to an extended term of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment
in various circumstances. The court specifically noted that one
circumstance which might apply in defendant's case "would be a
finding by the Court that this felony offense was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, indicative of wanton
cruelty." The court told her that if she pled guilty, the
determination by the court whether the offense was subject to an
extended term would be made at a sentencing hearing, at which
both she and the State would be allowed to call witnesses.
Defendant indicated that she understood. The court stated that it
was
		"explain[ing] all this to you [defendant] in some detail
because the Court is not bound by this agreement. The
Court may impose a sentence of imprisonment within the
range of two to five years in the Department of
Corrections. The Court may disregard the State's
recommendation, high or low. I might place you on
probation with various conditions. I might impose an
extended term, if the evidence supports it."
Defendant again indicated her understanding.
	The court went on to confirm that defendant understood the
rights she was giving up by pleading guilty. The court informed
defendant that she was
		"[p]resumed to be innocent of this charge, aggravated
battery. The burden is on the State to prove you guilty of
aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. And you
don't lose that innocence until a jury of 12 finds, after a
trial, that you're guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt or a judge in a bench trial makes that finding. Do
you understand?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: If you plead guilty you lose all these
rights and there won't be any trial of any kind. Do you
know what a jury trial is?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: And let me point out to you, before you
can be convicted in a jury trial of 12 people, all 12 people
have to agree that that burden's been met by the State,
proven you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And when
you plead guilty to this offense, you give up all these
rights and there won't be any trial. Do you give up the
presumption of innocence?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: Do you give up the burden of proof on
the State to prove you guilty of aggravated battery beyond
a reasonable doubt?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: And do you give up your right to a trial
of any kind?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."
Defendant also indicated that she understood and was giving up
her rights to the assistance of an attorney, of confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses against her, to subpoena witnesses
in her favor, and her right to testify or not to testify in her own
behalf.
	After finding that defendant's guilty plea was knowing,
understanding, and voluntary, the court requested the State's
factual basis. Before this court defendant does not dispute any of
the facts underlying her conviction or sentence. In brief, the victim
was in a parked car when defendant confronted the victim about
defendant's boyfriend. Defendant, who had imbibed a large
amount of alcohol, parked her car behind the victim's, blocking
her from moving. Defendant then exited her car and walked over
to the victim, still seated in her car. She attacked the victim
through her car window with a box cutter, slashing her about the
face and neck. Defendant continued to cut the victim as the victim
tried to move away from her assault. One of the wounds to the
victim's face required over 100 stitches to close. The court
accepted the factual basis and the guilty plea.
	At the sentencing hearing, the only evidence adduced by the
State was photographs of the victim's injuries. Defendant called
several witnesses who stated that defendant was a good student
while she was in school, and she had potential to be a contributing
member of society if released. Defendant testified on her own
behalf, stating that she was sorry, and she knew that what she had
done was wrong. Defendant did admit on cross-examination that
she had purchased the box cutter in advance, although she stated
that she had obtained it for "protection." In argument, the State
noted that the court had advised defendant that an extended-term
sentence was a possibility, but argued that "the maximum sentence
under the basic sentencing structure, that five years, is an
appropriate sentence." Defense counsel urged the court to sentence
defendant to probation, noting that defendant was young, had no
previous felony convictions, and had a young child.
	The court recognized that defendant's age and lack of a prior
record were mitigating factors, as was the fact that she pled guilty.
However, the court noted that according to the presentence report
defendant had been on probation for a battery committed as a
juvenile, and that probation had been revoked. The court noted
that defendant had received services from more than 20 social
services agencies, but stated that it was "clear from reading this
presentence investigation that she's been out of control for years
and years." The court also commented on the "exceptionally
brutal" nature of the preplanned attack, calling it "about the most
serious harm you could cause someone without killing them, I
suppose." The court noted that the victim had received 150
stitches to close the wounds on her face, was permanently blinded
in one eye, and had permanent scarring on her face and neck. The
court stated that the attack was either designed to render the victim
unattractive to defendant's boyfriend or at least was committed
with indifference to the suffering that the victim would endure
"with such horribly disfiguring scars." The court found that in
either case, defendant's behavior in committing the crime was
exceptionally brutal, indicative of wanton cruelty. The court found
the need to protect the public to be "paramount," and sentenced
defendant to an extended term of 10 years' imprisonment in the
Illinois Department of Corrections.
	Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was denied.
Defendant appealed, but the appellate court remanded because
counsel had not complied with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). On
remand, defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was again
denied. Defendant again appealed, this time raising the argument
that her extended-term sentence violated her due process rights, as
set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant's guilty plea
waived her sentencing challenge. 319 Ill. App. 3d 110. After the
appellate court denied defendant's motion to reconsider, defendant
filed a timely petition for leave to appeal with this court. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a). We granted leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

	Before this court, defendant's sole contention is that her
extended-term sentence must be vacated because it was imposed
in violation of the requirements set out by the Supreme Court in
Apprendi. Defendant notes that the extended term was based on a
factual finding by the trial court that the offense was accompanied
by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty, a finding on which the burden of proof was merely a
preponderance of the evidence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2),
5-8-2(a) (West 1996). She further notes that this fact was not
alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, defendant concludes that
her sentence was imposed in violation of due process and that the
statutory scheme pursuant to which her extended sentence was
imposed is itself unconstitutional.
	The State responds that the case is moot, because defendant
has already been paroled from prison. Alternatively, the State
argues that the appellate court was correct in concluding that
defendant's sentencing challenge was waived by her guilty plea.
The State contends that if we do reach the merits of defendant's
constitutional challenge, we should uphold her sentence, because
(1) the extended-term sentencing statutes are not inconsistent with
Apprendi; or (2) even if the statutes are unconstitutional, any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no jury would
have failed to find that defendant's attack was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty. As a final alternative, the State contends that Apprendi
was wrongly decided.
	Defendant responds that the case is not moot, because she is
on parole and will so remain until June 1, 2002. Moreover, she
contends that even if the case were moot, it should be reviewed
under the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine. She
further responds that her guilty plea should not operate as a waiver
of her sentencing challenge, because Apprendi itself concerned a
guilty plea and because she was not specifically admonished that
by pleading guilty she would waive her right to require the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any facts forming the basis for
an extended-term sentence. Moreover, she contends waiver is
inapplicable where, as here, an argument is based on a contention
that the court did not have the power to impose the sentence it did
because the statute underlying her sentence is unconstitutional.
She contends that her sentence did violate Apprendi, argues that
this error is not subject to harmless error analysis, and finally
rejects as irrelevant the State's argument that Apprendi was
wrongly decided.
	To the extent necessary, we shall address these arguments in
turn.

I. Mootness
	The first question is whether the case is moot. We find it is
not. A case becomes moot where the occurrence of events since
filing of the appeal makes it impossible for the reviewing court to
render effectual relief. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health
Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1997). Conversely, an appeal remains
viable where a decision " 'could have a direct impact on the rights
and duties of the parties.' " Berlin, 179 Ill. 2d  at 8, quoting People
ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 121 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7
(1988). In this case, although she has been released from prison,
defendant remains on mandatory supervised release. And, as she
notes, whether her sentence was 5 or 10 years would affect how
long she could be reincarcerated for a violation of the conditions
of her release. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(a)(3)(i)(B) (West 1996). See
also Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1973) (complaint
seeking restoration of three months' good time credit not moot
even though prisoner on parole and no longer incarcerated). The
case is not moot.

II. Waiver
	The next question is whether defendant waived her sentencing
challenge by pleading guilty to the offense with full knowledge
that the court could impose an extended term sentence. After
careful consideration, we find that by a guilty plea a criminal
defendant does waive Apprendi-based sentencing objections on
appeal, as our appellate court has for the most part concluded. See
319 Ill. App. 3d 110; People v. Rhoades, 323 Ill. App. 3d 644
(2001); People v. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d 292 (2001). Contra
People v. Kidd, No. 1-00-1492 (February 20, 2002).
	Our analysis here must begin with a precise understanding of
defendant's argument. We turn first to Apprendi. There, the Court
held that a New Jersey "hate crime" statute ran afoul of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.
XIV), because it permitted the trial court to impose an extended
term of imprisonment based on a finding by the court, by a
preponderance of the evidence, regarding a defendant's motives.
The Court held that due process did not permit such a procedure,
based on "constitutional protections of surpassing importance": a
criminal defendant's "indisputabl[e] entitle[ment] *** to 'a jury
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355-56,
quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444, 449, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995). Based on this principle,
the Court found that as a component of due process, a criminal
defendant is entitled to require the State to prove to a jury, beyond
a reasonable doubt, all facts necessary to establish the range of
penalties potentially applicable to the defendant.
	A clear understanding of Apprendi explains why defendant's
guilty plea waived her Apprendi-based argument. The underlying
lesson of Apprendi is, "[p]ut simply, facts that expose a defendant
to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were
by definition 'elements' of a separate legal offense." Apprendi,
530 U.S.  at 483 n.10, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 450 n.10, 120 S. Ct.  at 2359
n.10. See also Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 492, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 456,
120 S. Ct.  at 2363-64 (rejecting as "nothing more than a
disagreement with the rule we apply today" the argument that
"[t]he required finding of biased purpose is not an 'element' of a
distinct hate crime offense, but rather the traditional 'sentencing
factor' of motive"). Every fact necessary to establish the range
within which a defendant may be sentenced is an element of the
crime and thus falls within the constitutional rights of a jury trial
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, made applicable to the states
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But by
pleading guilty, a defendant waives exactly those rights. A
knowing relinquishment of the right to a trial by jury is the sine
qua non of a guilty plea. Thus it is clear that Apprendi-based
sentencing objections cannot be heard on appeal from a guilty
plea.
	Defendant complains that she was not explicitly informed that
because of the extended-term sentence, the fact that the crime was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West
1996)) was one of the elements of the crime, which she was
entitled to require the State to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. This argument is without merit, because the trial court is
not required to apprise a defendant of the elements of the crimes
with which he is charged before accepting a guilty plea. See
People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 329-30 (1980) (upholding plea of
guilty to charge of attempted murder over the defendant's
complaint that he was never informed that an element of the
charge was specific intent to kill). All that the defendant need be
informed of are: (1) the nature of the charge against him; (2) the
maximum and minimum penalties to which he could be subjected;
(3) his right to plead not guilty, if he so chooses; and (4) that a
guilty plea would operate to waive his rights to a jury trial and to
be confronted with the witnesses against him. 177 Ill. 2d Rs.
402(a)(1) through (a)(4). In this case, defendant was informed of
the crime of which she stood accused, and knew that the court
could impose a sentence of up to 10 years for that crime. With this
information in hand, she made the decision to relieve the State of
its burden of proving any element of the crime, by pleading guilty.
This is quintessential waiver.
	Defendant protests that we should consider her argument
because Apprendi itself concerned an appeal from a sentence
imposed after a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement
with the State. See Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 469-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
442-43, 120 S. Ct.  at 2352. Indeed, defendant argues, the case
against waiver is more compelling here than in Apprendi, because
part of the plea agreement in the instant case was that the State
would not seek an extended sentence, whereas in Apprendi the
State explicitly reserved the right to request the court to impose an
enhanced sentence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 470,  147 L. Ed. 2d 
at 443, 120 S. Ct.  at 2352.
	Defendant's recitation of the facts of Apprendi is accurate, as
far as it goes. However, it fails to come to grips with the salient
feature distinguishing this case from Apprendi. There, at the time
that he entered his guilty plea, the defendant "reserved the right to
challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that
it violates the United States Constitution." (Emphasis added.)
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 470, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 443, 120 S. Ct.  at
2352. He then did challenge the constitutionality of the hate crime
statute in the trial court, after receiving an enhanced sentence
pursuant thereto. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 471, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 443,
120 S. Ct.  at 2352. In this case, by contrast, defendant was clearly
apprised that the court could impose an extended-term sentence,
the agreement between defendant and the State notwithstanding.
After indicating her understanding of this possibility, defendant
unequivocally and without reservation waived her right to a jury
trial at which the State would have been put to its proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. She never objected to the statute or this manner
of proceeding in any way. The petitioner in Apprendi preserved his
argument; defendant did not.
	Defendant further contends that "acceptance of the State's
guilty-plea-as-waiver theory would eviscerate the concept of a
knowing waiver." She bases this argument on the facts that (1) the
charging instrument did not mention an extended term or any
specific fact which could give rise to an extended term; (2) there
was no admission of "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior,
etc.," in the factual basis for the guilty plea; and (3) the plea
agreement precluded the State from proving that defendant was
eligible for an extended term. Addressing these arguments in turn,
first, as we recently noted (see People v. Ford, No. 90083
(October 18, 2001)), any discussion of the charging instrument in
Apprendi was dictum, as that case specifically disavowed any
holding regarding the indictment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 477
n.3, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447 n.3, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355 n.3. Nor did the
failure to mention in the charging instrument the possibility of an
extended sentence or the factual predicate which might underlie
such a sentence "eviscerate" defendant's knowing waiver, in that
the trial court took specific pains to inform defendant of this
possibility. 
	With respect to defendant's point regarding the factual basis
for the guilty plea,
		"the quantum of proof necessary to establish a factual
basis for the plea is less than that necessary to sustain a
conviction after a full trial. [Citations.] All that is required
to appear on the record is a basis from which the judge
could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant
actually committed the acts with the intent (if any)
required to constitute the offense to which the defendant
is pleading guilty." Barker, 83 Ill. 2d  at 327-28.
In this case, in reciting the factual basis for the guilty plea, the
State mentioned that "defendant, without any justification, cut [the
victim] about the head, apparently with a box cutter-type
instrument, causing a number of cuts, requiring literally hundreds
of stitches to close them." We believe that these facts, coupled
with the photographs of the victim, form a sufficient basis for the
trial court to conclude that "the offense was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty" (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1996)).
	Defendant's final argument as to how the result we reach
would "eviscerate the concept of a knowing waiver" derives from
the fact that the plea agreement precluded the State from
seeking-and thus, defendant argues, proving the basis for-an
extended term. We have already disposed of this issue by our
earlier observation that by the guilty plea the State was absolved
of its burden of proving any elements of the crime.
	Defendant contends that we should reach the merits of her
claim notwithstanding waiver, however. She relies on two legal
principles. First, defendant notes that this court has previously
allowed sentencing challenges on appeal from guilty pleas, where
the argument concerned the court's power to impose the sentence
in question. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 332-33
(1997). She contends that her Apprendi challenge fits within this
rule. Defendant also notes the rule that a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any time. See, e.g.,
People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2000). According to either
of these rules, defendant argues, we should reach the merits of her
Apprendi challenge notwithstanding her guilty plea.
	We reject these arguments. The first argument is based on the
rule that challenges to the court's power to impose a particular
sentence may be raised on appeal from a guilty plea. See People
v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998); People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997); People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 346
(1984). But defendant's argument is not truly that the court lacked
statutory authority. Such an argument, although it could be raised
on appeal, would swiftly be rejected because the statutory scheme
clearly did on its face permit the trial court to impose the sentences
in question. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (permitting court to
impose extended term upon finding that the offense was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty); 5-8-2(a) (West 1996) (extended
term for Class 3 felony is 5 to 10 years' imprisonment). It simply
cannot be said that the trial court imposed sentences for which it
lacked statutory authority.
	Petitioner also argues that, although the statutory scheme may
have permitted the sentence in question, that scheme was
unconstitutional. This is the same, she contends, as her sentence
having been imposed without any statutory authority, as
unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio. But this line of
reasoning also falls short, not because of procedural default (see
People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2001) (constitutionality
of a criminal statute may be assailed at any time); People v.
Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2000) (same)), but on its merits.
	The void ab initio doctrine only applies to facially
unconstitutional statutes. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399
(1990) (" 'When a statute is held unconstitutional in its entirety,
it is void ab initio' " (emphasis added)), quoting People v. Manuel,
94 Ill. 2d 242, 244-45 (1983). The statutes involved in this
case-sections 5-5-3.2(b)(2) and 5-8-2(a) of the Uniform Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2), 5-8-2(a) (West
2000))-are not unconstitutional on their face. A statute is facially
unconstitutional only if " 'no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.' " In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200,
210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745,  95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). This
court has already upheld an extended-term sentence imposed
pursuant to these statutes. See People v. Ford, No. 90083 (October
18, 2001). Accordingly, the statutory scheme is simply not facially
unconstitutional. The exceptions to the waiver rule upon which
defendant relies do not excuse the waiver in this case.
	Thus defendant cannot characterize her challenge as one
which goes to the trial court's authority to impose the sentence in
question, and the sentencing scheme pursuant to which her
sentence was imposed is not facially unconstitutional.
Accordingly, she is left with what has been the true nature of her
challenge all along-that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional
as applied to her, i.e., that she was denied procedural due process.
This is the essence of the Apprendi challenge-a complaint that one
or more of the elements of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted and for which he was sentenced, were not proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And for the reasons we previously
discussed, it is clear that such a claim cannot be raised on appeal
from a guilty plea. An Apprendi challenge raised in the wake of a
guilty plea is an argument that a defendant was deprived of due
process when he did not get a jury trial after waiving his right to
a jury trial. Simply to state the argument reveals why it cannot be
heard. 
	The dissent's view to the contrary notwithstanding, we are not
creating a "new set of waiver rules" by holding that by entering a
voluntary, knowing guilty plea, a defendant waives the rights to a
jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
	Also with regard to the dissent, we wish to make clear that we
are not today holding that a defendant may only challenge a
sentence as beyond the trial court's authority if the sentencing
scheme is unconstitutional on its face. But a defendant's claim that
his sentence exceeded the court's authority does not mean that it
in fact did so. In this case, for the reasons we have discussed, the
sentence was not beyond that which the court was authorized by
statute to impose. A challenge that the sentence was beyond that
authorized by statute is an argument separate and distinct from the
claim that the statutes authorizing the punishment were
unconstitutional, either on their face or as applied, and we decline
to conflate the two arguments into one.
	To conclude, defendant did knowingly waive the rights at
issue in Apprendi. This is so because Apprendi did not deal with
novel constitutional rights. Rather, the Court was concerned with
the applicability and reach of the well-established constitutional
rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rights
which a guilty plea is specifically designed to waive.
	Because defendant waived her Apprendi challenge, we need
not reach the merits of this argument, nor need we address the
State's arguments that any Apprendi error was harmless, or that
Apprendi was wrongly decided.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons above stated, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
	Affirmed.
	During the pendency of this appeal, our appellate court has
had numerous opportunities to consider the validity of Illinois'
extended-term sentencing provisions in light of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Those opinions
have declared the law unconstitutional under Apprendi because it
increases the penalty range for an offense beyond the maximum
permitted by statute without requiring the State to prove the
requisite aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and
without affording the defendant the right to have the existence of
the aggravating factor determined by a jury.(1) See People v. Bryant,
325 Ill. App. 3d 448, 457 (2001); People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d
127, 130 (2001); People v. Lucas, 321 Ill. App. 3d 49, 53-54
(2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806, 816 (2001).
	This case falls squarely within the Apprendi rule. Jackson's
extended-term sentence was imposed in accordance with a
sentencing procedure which did not require the State to prove the
existence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and
did not afford Jackson the right to have the existence of the
aggravating factor decided by a jury. Under Apprendi, the
extended-term portion of her sentence therefore violates due
process and cannot stand.
	Our court has recently concluded that no Apprendi violation
occurs when a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree
murder and is eligible for the death penalty receives an extended
term of imprisonment rather than death (People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 73-75 (2001)), but those circumstances are not present in
this case. Jackson did not commit murder, she was not death
eligible, and her sentence was clearly in excess of the normal
statutory maximum.
	Although Apprendi was not decided until after Jackson was
convicted and sentenced, she is not foreclosed from availing
herself of that decision. In Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 72-73, we
specifically held that because Apprendi announced a new
constitutional rule applicable to criminal cases, it applies to all
cases pending on direct review at the time the new constitutional
rule was declared. This is such a case.
	The majority's assertion that Jackson waived her right to
challenge the extended-term portion of her sentence when she
pleaded guilty is contrary to settled principles of law. In Illinois,
a statute found to be unconstitutional is considered void ab initio.
It is as if the law never existed. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384,
399 (1990). That being so, there was no statutory authority for the
extended-term portion of Jackson's sentence. Where, as here, a
sentence is void because it was beyond the trial court's statutory
authority to impose, the sentence may be corrected at any time.
People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). A defendant is not
foreclosed from challenging it because he or she has pleaded
guilty. Indeed, under Illinois law, a defendant challenging his
sentence as void may not only do so despite having pleaded guilty.
He may do so without first moving for withdrawal of the plea as
would normally be required. People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269,
280 (2001); People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998); People
v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997).
	The majority's attempt to avoid these principles on the theory
that they are limited to situations where a sentencing scheme is
declared unconstitutional on its face is untenable. Our court
specifically rejected that theory when it was advanced by the State
in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d  at 279-80, decided just nine
months ago.
	The court's sudden turnabout is inexplicable. It is also
unsound. For purposes of applying waiver rules, there is no
principled basis for granting relief where a sentencing statute is
facially invalid, but denying relief where it is unconstitutional as
applied. In either case, the defendant is suffering from an invalid
sentence which the constitution prohibits the state from imposing.
	I note, moreover, that while the extended-term sentencing
scheme contained in sections 5-5-3.2(b)(2) and 5-8-2(a) of the
Uniform Code of Corrections may not be invalid in all its
applications, it is nearly so. Aside from capital murder cases where
the defendant has been found death eligible (Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68),
there is no set of circumstances in which the statutory scheme
challenged here can pass constitutional muster under Apprendi.
Accordingly, this is a singularly inappropriate case to create a new
set of waiver rules.
	The majority's approach is flawed for another reason as well.
In holding that a sentencing scheme must be incapable of any valid
application before waiver rules will be relaxed, the majority
overlooks an entire line of cases dealing with sentences that are
not unconstitutional, but are invalid because they are not
authorized by statute. In those cases, the reason the sentence is
invalid is not because of any inherent deficiency in the sentencing
statute. It is because the sentencing statute did not permit the
disposition ordered by the trial court under the particular facts
present in that case. See, e.g., People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107
(1995) (order imposing concurrent terms was void where the
statutory requirements for mandatory consecutive sentences were
established at trial).
	To hold that a sentence is void because it is not authorized by
statute under the facts of the case is no different, analytically, from
holding that is void because it is unconstitutional as applied. In the
former situation, we allow the defendant to protest his sentence
even where he has pleaded guilty and has not first moved to have
his guilty plea withdrawn. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d  at 333; Wilson,
181 Ill. 2d  at 413 (challenge to a trial court's statutory authority to
impose a particular sentence not waived when a defendant fails to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment). Reason and
justice dictate the same outcome in the latter situation, where the
sentence is invalid because it is unconstitutional as applied.
Accordingly, a defendant's plea of guilty should not result in a
waiver of his right to have the sentence vacated based on
Apprendi.
	It is no answer to say, as the majority does, that under the
governing statutes, the circuit court had the power to impose an
extended term when the defendant in this case was sentenced. The
circuit court had no such power. The statutory extended-term
sentencing scheme was just as invalid at the time of sentencing as
it was when the United States Supreme Court announced its
decision in Apprendi. Under the reasoning of Apprendi, the circuit
court never had the power to increase the sentence beyond the
maximum permitted by statute without requiring the State to prove
the requisite aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and
without affording the defendant the right to have the existence of
the aggravating factor determined by a jury. Due process
prohibited it.
	The majority's argument would make sense only if Apprendi
were limited in its application to sentencing proceedings
conducted after the decision was announced. The United States
Supreme Court, however, has imposed no such limitation. To the
contrary, in Apprendi itself the Court applied the new rule
retroactively to invalidate a sentence imposed before the rule was
announced. Furthermore, as noted earlier in this dissent, this court
specifically held in Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 72-73, that the decision in
Apprendi applies retroactively to all cases which were still pending
on direct review, as this one was, when the decision was issued.
	I must also take issue with the majority's assertion that
"Apprendi did not deal with novel constitutional rights." Slip op.
at 13. While the basis for the Apprendi rule-the due process clause
and the right to trial by jury-are scarcely novel, the way in which
those constitutional guarantees were interpreted and applied in that
case is. At least four members of the United States Supreme Court
have characterized the decision as announcing "what will surely
be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 524, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 475, 120 S. Ct.  at
2380 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.).
	When the defendant in this case pleaded guilty, neither she
nor the trial court knew that this watershed change would be
implemented by the United States Supreme Court. That being so,
the defendant could not possibly have made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights as Apprendi defined
them. To hold otherwise, as my colleagues do today, makes the
concept of knowing and intelligent waiver farcical.
	The majority attempts to justify its position by relying on
appellate court decisions in People v. Rhoades, 323 Ill. App. 3d
644 (2001), and People v. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d 292 (2001),
but those cases offer scant support. Chandler involved consecutive
sentences to which Apprendi is inapplicable (People v. Wagener,
196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001)), while Rhoades is based on the same
appellate decision from which the defendant in this case was
granted leave to appeal.
	I note, moreover, that the appellate court has not spoken with
a single voice on this matter. People v. Kidd, No. 1-00-1492
(February 20, 2002), decided after Chandler and Rhoades, reached
a contrary conclusion. It correctly held that a defendant's plea of
guilty did not waive his right to raise an Apprendi challenge to his
extended-term sentence where, as in the case before us today, the
element used to enhance his sentence was never charged in the
indictment.
	Finally, we must not overlook that regardless of whether the
technical requirements for waiver are present, the ultimate
decision as to whether a criminal defendant should be permitted to
press his claim for relief is a matter for this court's discretion. As
we have often repeated, waiver is a limitation on the parties, not
on the court. The waiver rule is one of administrative convenience
rather than jurisdiction, and considerations of waiver may be
overridden when necessary to obtain a just result and maintain a
sound body of precedent. People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 200
(1995).
	In considering whether waiver rules should be relaxed, the
importance of the rights at issue is a critical factor. Few rights are
as more worthy of consideration than those present here. At stake
are constitutional protections which the United States Supreme
Court has characterized as being "of surpassing importance."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct.  at
2355. To turn Jackson's claims aside based on waiver denigrates
these core values and elevates technical formalities above basic
justice.
	No less than the procedure challenged in Apprendi, the
extended-term sentencing provisions under which Jackson was
sentenced constitute "an unacceptable departure from the jury
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice
system." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 459, 120 S. Ct.  at 2366. Under these circumstances, and for all of the
foregoing reasons, I would hold that Jackson's challenge to her
extended-term sentence was not barred by her decision to plead
guilty and is meritorious. Accordingly, I would reverse the
judgments of the circuit and appellate courts and vacate the
extended-term portion of Jackson's sentence. I therefore dissent.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1Section 5-8-2(a) was amended by Public Act 91-953, §10, which
took effect February 23, 2001, to specify that the aggravating factors
necessary to support enhanced sentences must now be found by the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.