Title: State v. Reynolds

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

887 So. 2d 848 (2004)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(In re STATE of Alabama v. Charles Donald REYNOLDS et al.)[1]
1022013.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 23, 2004.
*849 William Tipton Johnson, Jr., deputy atty. gen., Tuscumbia; and William M. Bouldin, special asst. atty. gen., Russellville, for Petitioner.
Judge Harold V. Hughston, Jr., Tuscumbia; Judge Jacqueline M. Hatcher, Tuscumbia; and Vincent McAlister and G. Rick Hall of Almon, McAlister, Baccus, Hall & Kelley, Tuscumbia, for Respondents.
HARWOOD, Justice.
The State of Alabama ("the State") petitions for a writ of mandamus ordering the Circuit Court of Colbert County to vacate its order in six condemnation actions pending before it; the order realigns certain parcels and parties in those condemnation actions.
The facts presented in the petition for mandamus are as follows. The State filed petitions in the Probate Court of Colbert County seeking to condemn five tracts of land located within the Detroit Park subdivision in the City of Muscle Shoals. As originally filed, each of those five cases sought to condemn tracts that had common ownership. The State filed a sixth petition seeking to condemn two tracts with separate owners. The probate court entered an order condemning the land and awarding compensation to the owners. After the probate court entered its judgment, the State appealed each condemnation award to the Circuit Court of Colbert County for a trial de novo. After the appeals were filed, but before the cases were tried, the owners of the tracts ("the defendants") filed motions to have the tracts and the defendants realigned so that, regardless of the ownership of the tracts as designated in the six separate actions by the State in the probate court, each case would contain all of the condemned lots in a separately platted "block" of the subdivision. Neither the State's petition to this Court nor the answer of the respondents sets out or describes with any other detail the motions filed by the defendants. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to realign the tracts and the defendants.
The State filed its "Objection to Consolidation Order Dated January 17," asserting the following:
Subsection 18-1A-73(b), Ala.Code 1975, cited by the State in its objection, reads:
The trial court overruled the objection, stating, in pertinent part:
Rule 21(a), Ala. R.App. P., provides that a petition for a writ of mandamus "shall contain," among other things, "a statement of issues presented and of the relief sought." Under the section of its petition captioned "Issues Presented," the State phrases its sole issue as follows:
Under the heading "Reasons Writ Should Issue," the State asserts:
Thus, in its petition, the sole Code section the State references is § 18-1A-73(a). In objecting to the "consolidation" before the trial court, however, the State referenced only subsection (b) of that Code section, along with § 18-1A-197(1), which reads:
As noted, the State in its petition for the writ of mandamus relies on § 18-1A-73(a) "in particular," without referring to subsection (b) in the statement of the issues presented or the statement of the reasons the writ of mandamus should issue. This Court will not reverse an order duly entered by a trial court, or issue a writ of mandamus commanding a trial judge to rescind an order, based upon a ground asserted in the petition for the writ of mandamus that was not asserted to the *852 trial judge, regardless of the merits of a petitioner's position in the underlying controversy. Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 786 (Ala.2003) ("In determining, on mandamus review, whether the trial court exceeded the limits of its discretion, `the appellate courts will not reverse the trial court on an issue or contention not presented to the trial court for its consideration in making its ruling.' Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Ala.1999)."). The respondents (Circuit Judge Harold V. Houston, Jr., Circuit Judge Jacqueline M. Hatcher, and the defendants) have answered, stating the following grounds for denying the State's petition for the writ of mandamus:
Although the parties briefed various issues, the strictures surrounding the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus are such that we cannot ignore the fact that the State referenced subsection (b) before the trial court, but refers us only to subsection (a) in its "Issues Presented" and "Reasons Writ Should Issue."
Moreover, this Court had the following to say in Ex parte Palughi, 494 So. 2d 404, 407-08 (Ala.1986):
The current version of the "Alabama Eminent Domain Code" was enacted in 1985 and is codified at § 18-1A-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the AEDC"); it is applicable to the present case. Section 18-1A-70 of the AEDC provides, as noted in footnote 1 in Palughi, that the procedure in a case such as the present one "is governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure except as otherwise provided in this chapter. The procedure in the probate court shall be as provided in this chapter." The State acknowledges in its petition that "it appears the [Ala.]R.Civ.P. did govern appeals under the former law, particularly in view of the statement in Palughi that the statute did not `affirmatively preempt' the [Ala.]R.Civ.P."
The State attempts to distinguish Palughi based on the fact that the AEDC, which became effective January 1, 1986 (see § 18-1A-311), contains the following provisions not present in the "condemnation statute" in effect at the time Palughi was decided: Section 18-1A-2(a) states that "[t]his chapter provides standards for ... the conduct of condemnation actions," and subsection (b) states that "[i]n the event of conflict between this chapter and any other law with respect to any subject governed by this chapter, this chapter prevails." The State makes the following assertion: "Section 18-1A-191 says `this article' supplements other rules of evidence." However, § 18-1A-191, dealing specifically with the jury's viewing of the property sought to be condemned, says no such thing. The section the State apparently meant to cite is § 18-1A-190(a), which states: "Actions under this chapter are governed by the rules of evidence applicable in other civil actions and as supplemented by this article."
Section 18-1A-277 of the AEDC provides: "The hearing provided for in this *854 chapter must in all respects be conducted and evidence taken as in civil cases at law, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." Section 18- 1A-310 states: "Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, general or special, the provisions of this chapter shall be controlling."
As we see it, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedural aspects of the cases involved in this appeal "except as otherwise provided" in the AEDC, and the hearings conducted in this case must in all respects be conducted and evidence taken as in civil actions, except as otherwise provided in the AEDC. The AEDC is controlling over "any other law, general or special" that is inconsistent with the provisions of the AEDC. Circuit judges have broad powers under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to order joint hearings or trials of any or all matters in actions involving a common question of law, to order actions consolidated, to order separate trials of any claim, and to sever and proceed separately with any claim. See Rules 20, 21, and 42, Ala. R. Civ. P. In their brief in support of their answer, the respondents argue that the circuit court, by its order, "sought to separate or sever and consolidate condemnation claims for lots in order to provide an orderly compatible parcel, a subdivision block, as a separate case. Separate judgments would be entered in the circuit court for each owner of lots in a block." Given the de novo status of proceedings in the circuit court following the appeal of a condemnation action decided in probate court, we do not believe that § 18-1A-73(a), even if it were properly before us for consideration, would block application of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. That section of the AEDC addressing joinder by the condemning plaintiff of several tracts in the same complaint, necessarily refers to the complaint filed in probate court, where all such actions must be initiated. § 18-1A-71, Ala.Code 1975. A restructuring of condemnation claims initially decided in the probate court without a jury, but now subject to all of the special procedural, evidentiary, and managerial problems attending a jury trial in the circuit court, is not inconsistent with § 18-1A-73(a).
The petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
SEE, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  This petition for the writ of mandamus involves six cases in the Colbert Circuit Court. Those cases are: State v. Charles Donald Reynolds et al. (CV-02-416); State v. Clare Amend et al. (CV-02-417); State v. William Conley and Bill Thompson, Revenue Commissioner (CV-02-428); State v. Stephen McAlister et al. (CV-02-429); State v. Margaret St. Clair f/k/a Margaret Dietz and Bill Thompson, Revenue Commissioner (CV-02-432); and State v. Bennie Duczyminski et al. (CV-02-433).
[2]  Effective January 1, 1986, Chapter 1 of Title 18, entitled "Condemnation of Lands for Public Uses," was repealed and replaced with Chapter 1A, "Alabama Eminent Domain Code."