Title: JAMES LITTLE V BETTY H HIRSCHMAN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 31, 2004 
JAMES LITTLE, CHERYL LITTLE,
STEVEN RAMSBY, MARY KAVANAUGH,
STANLEY W. THOMAS, NANCY G.
THOMAS, MICHAEL McCLUSKEY, GLADYS
McCLUSKEY, and ANN SKOGLUND, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants/Appellants, 
v 
No. 121836 
BETTY H. HIRSCHMAN,, 
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/
Appellee, 
and 
GERALD W. CARRIER, SALLY ANN
CARRIER, JOHN P. VIAU, and
GENEVIEVE GUENTER VIAU, 
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, 
and 
FRANCES J. VANANTWERP, ELIZABETH
VANANTWERP, MASON F. SHOUDER,
and JEAN ANN SHOUDER, 
Defendants. 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider 
whether a 1913 plat dedication of two parks “to the owners 
of the several lots” is valid. 
That is, is it enforceable 
by those in the chain of title from the original purchasers 
of the lots.  The Court of Appeals held that it was not on 
the basis that private dedications are invalid. 
We 
disagree with the Court of Appeals and thus reverse its 
judgment 
and 
remand 
to 
that 
Court 
for 
further 
consideration. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case involves a dispute regarding alleys and 
parks located within the Ye-qua-ga-mak subdivision in 
Inverness Township in Cheboygan County, where Mullet Lake 
and the Cheboygan River meet. 
The subdivision plat was 
filed in 1913 and reflects the presence of several streets 
and alleys and two parks (Lakeside Park and Riverside 
Park). 
The plat states that “the streets and alleys as 
shown on [the] plat are dedicated to the use of the 
public.” 
Regarding the parks, the plat states that they 
are “dedicated to the owners of the several lots.” 
Betty Hirschman is the current owner of two waterfront 
lots numbered 46 and 47. 
Her property is bordered by 
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Riverside Park on the east, Lakeside Park on the south, and 
an alley that provides access to Lakeside Park on the west. 
Lakeside Park contains a beach area that abuts Mullet Lake, 
and Riverside Park is a grassy area that has been used by 
lot owners for fishing and walking. 
Dating back to at 
least the 1940s, which is as far back as anyone can now 
remember, the residents of the subdivision have used the 
alley between lots 47 and 48 for access to Lakeside Park 
and 
have 
used 
Lakeside 
Park 
itself 
for 
sunbathing, 
swimming, picnicking, and other beach-related activities. 
In 1998, Hirschman and some other lot owners in the 
subdivision obtained a judgment against the Cheboygan 
County Road Commission vacating the rights of the public to 
use several of the alleys that provided back lot owners 
access to Lakeside Park. 
Having secured that ruling, they 
blocked the alley west of Hirschman’s property. 
Several back lot owners, claiming the right to use the 
alley because of the plat’s public dedication of the alley 
and the right to use the parks because of the plat’s 
private dedication, filed an action asking the circuit 
court to stop defendants from continuing to block access to 
Lakeside Park through the alley. 
Defendants filed an 
answer and counterclaim asserting that plaintiffs not only 
had no right of access to Lakeside Park through the vacated 
alleys, but also that the claimed private dedication of the 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
parks had failed because of nonacceptance by the lot 
owners. 
After a two-day trial the court rendered its decision 
finding (1) plaintiffs were entitled to the use of the 
alleys for access to the beach and (2) plaintiffs had the 
right to reasonable use of the parks pursuant to the plat 
as lot owners. 
Hirschman appealed as of right, arguing that the 
dedication of the parks to the owners of the several lots 
in 
the 
plat 
was 
an 
invalid 
dedication 
because 
the 
dedication was not directed to the public. 
The Court of 
Appeals, deferring to the earlier published Martin 
Redmond, 248 Mich App 59; 638 NW2d 142 (2001),1 vacated the 
trial court’s holding that the lot owners had property 
rights in the parks pursuant to the dedication in the plat.2 
1 We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in Martin v 
Beldean, 469 Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2004), which we also
issue today. 
In Martin, the Court of Appeals had ruled
that a 1969 plat with a purported private dedication of an
outlot “for the use of the lot owners” was invalid because,
in the panel’s view, dedications could not now be, or ever
in the past have been, private. 
We held that the Court of 
Appeals had misread MCL 560.253(1), which is part of 1967
PA 
288, 
because 
it 
specifically 
authorized 
private
dedications. 
2 Little v Hirschman, unpublished opinion per curiam,
issued April 19, 2002 (Docket No. 227751). 
The Court of 
Appeals also held that plaintiffs, as lot owners in the
plat, are entitled to the use of the alleys, even if the 
public dedication of the alleys had not been properly
4 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Court of Appeals in this case recognized that the 
Martin case involved a 1969 dedication that was controlled 
by the Land Division Act, MCL 560.101 et seq., whereas the 
Court was considering a 1913 plat that was controlled by 
earlier statutes. 
But, because the Martin panel had 
earlier concluded that private dedications “before and 
after” the platting statutes were enacted were prohibited, 
the Court of Appeals followed that holding. 
We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal 
and ordered that the case be argued and submitted with 
3
Martin.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a dedication of land for private use failed 
under the law governing the creation of plats is a question 
of law. 
We review de novo questions of law.  Cardinal 
Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 
437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). 
ANALYSIS 
From statehood until 1925 our various plat acts 
authorized public dedications,4 but did not specifically 
accepted by the relevant public authority. That holding is 
not at issue in this appeal. 
3 468 Mich 869 (2003).
4 
As 
we 
explain 
in 
Martin, 
a 
dedication 
was 
traditionally understood to be “an appropriation of land to
some public use, accepted for such use by or in behalf of 
the public.” 
Martin, 469 Mich ___, quoting Clark v Grand 
5 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
refer to private dedications. 
Yet, during this era, 
without exception that has been brought to our attention or 
discovered by our research, plats with dedications to 
private individuals or groups were reviewed and approved by 
the Auditors General of this state,5 and relied upon by 
purchasers and their successors. 
Moreover, 
not 
only 
have 
the 
Auditors 
General 
considered this to be the law, but, also, the courts have 
recognized and enforced private dedications from this era. 
In Schurtz v Wescott, 286 Mich 691; 282 NW 870 (1938), this 
Rapids, 334 Mich 646, 656-657; 55 NW2d 137 (1952). The law 
recognized two types of dedications: statutory dedications
and common-law dedications. 
Alton v Meeuwenberg, 108 Mich
629; 66 NW 571 (1896). 
“The effect of a dedication under 
the statute has been to vest the fee in the county, in
trust for the municipality intended to be benefited,
whereas, at common law, the act of dedication created only
an easement in the public.” 
Grandville v Jenison, 84 Mich
54, 65; 47 NW 600 (1890). 
5 Our plat acts have required that proposed plats be
reviewed and approved as being in conformity with the
applicable plat act by government officials such as the
Auditor General and, later, the State Treasurer. 
Once 
reviewed and approved for conformity with the applicable 
act, the plat was eligible for recording with the register
of deeds and was considered “prima facie evidence” of the
making and recording of such plat in conformity with the
governing statute. 
1839 PA 91 (1871 CL 1344, ch 32), see
1929 PA 172, p 430, as amended by 1873 PA 108, § 1, and
1885 PA 111, § 1; 1929 PA 172, § 70; 1967 PA 288, § 251, 
MCL 560.251. Our Court, in discussing statutes controlling
the discharge of a public official’s duties, has indicated
it will give weight to such conclusions. 
As stated in 
Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 236; 229 NW 911
(1930), 
“Practical 
construction 
given 
to 
doubtful 
or 
obscure statutes by public officers, the discharge of whose
duties are affected thereby, will be considered and given
weight by courts in construing such laws.”
6 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Court considered an 1891 plat that, while it dedicated the 
streets to the public, was silent with regard to the 
designated parks. 
We found, with respect to the parks, 
that any lot owner had the right to the use of the parks. 
286 Mich 697. 
Specifically, we noted that no one objected 
to the use of the parks by the lot owners and the public 
until shortly before appellant Schurtz filed his complaint. 
We held: 
The making and recording of the plat, the 
sale of lots, the use of the streets and parks by
the lot owners for a great many years estops
appellant Schurtz from now claiming exclusive 
rights in the parks and streets." [Id.] 
This was in effect a finding that a private dedication 
was valid and enforceable. 
Moreover, the Schurtz Court, 
quoting Westveer v 
Ainsworth, 279 Mich 580; 273 NW 275 
(1937), found such private dedications were irrevocable 
upon the sale of the lots. 
This second holding means that 
a private dedication is effective upon the sale of a lot 
because it is reasonably assumed that the value of that 
lot, as enhanced by the dedication, is reflected in the 
sale 
price. 
That 
is, 
purchasers 
relied 
upon 
the 
dedications that made the property more desirable. 
In Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 286; 380 NW2d 463 
(1985), we enforced a 1907 plat with a private dedication 
that stated that driveways, walks, and alleys shown on the 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
plat were “dedicated to the joint use of all the owners of 
the plat.” 
We also held that this dedication gave the lot 
owners an easement in the dedicated areas. 
Private dedications were first statutorily recognized 
in the 1925 plat act (1925 PA 360). 
This act required all 
roads not dedicated to the public on a plat to be marked as 
private roads and further indicated: 
[I]f there be any street, park, or other 
places which are usually public but not so 
dedicated on said plat the character and extent
of the dedication of such street, park or other
public place shall be plainly set forth in said
dedication. . . . [1925 PA 360, § 1.] 
The clear import of this language is that streets and parks 
may be dedicated to less than the general public, which, of 
necessity, means to private persons or entities. 
Although 
the 1925 plat act does not expressly grant legitimacy to 
private dedications contained in plats recorded before the 
effective date of that statute, the act nonetheless is 
significant in understanding the status of pre-1925 private 
dedications because the statute did not so much authorize 
the creation of private dedications as it presupposed that 
such dedications were already legitimate. Cases construing 
this statute have been in accord with this understanding of 
the 1925 act. 
In Minnis v Jyleen, 333 Mich 447; 53 NW2d 328 (1952), 
this Court considered a plat that had been recorded in 1926 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
and that dedicated some streets shown on the plat to the 
public with all other roads “dedicated to the use of the 
property owners in the subdivision.” 
333 Mich 449. 
In 
resolving a dispute that had developed over one of the 
private roads, this Court stated: 
The rights granted under the dedicatory
clauses in the plat to the owners of lots in the
subdivision may not be infringed by one lot owner
for his own convenience to the detriment of his 
fellow lot owners. [333 Mich 454.] 
This, then, is the recognition of the validity of the 
plat’s private dedication that was reinforced when the 
Court also held that the lot owners had a private easement 
in the road, which they were “entitled to use and enjoy.” 
333 Mich 451. 
In 1974 in Feldman v Monroe Twp Bd, 51 Mich App 752, 
754-755; 216 NW2d 628 (1974), the Court of Appeals 
considered a 1928 plat that dedicated parks to the use of 
the property owners only. 
The Court of Appeals found this 
to have been a valid irrevocable private dedication and 
ruled as in Minnis that the lot owners had an easement in 
the privately dedicated lands.6 
6Feldman, unlike the other cases we discuss, was 
addressed by the Court of Appeals in Martin. 
That Court 
rejected it because it believed the Feldman panel had
misread the law.  The Martin panel indicated that the
Feldman Court had read the Westveer and Kirchen v Remenga,
291 Mich 94; 288 NW 344 (1939), cases, in which private
9 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
  
Similarly, in 1975, in Fry v Kaiser, 60 Mich App 574; 
232 NW2d 673 (1975), the Court of Appeals held that a 1950 
plat that dedicated the streets to the public and the 
channels “to the use of the lot owners” gave the lot owners 
an easement in the channels. 
Again, in 1981, in Walker v Bennett, 111 Mich App 40; 
315 NW2d 142 (1981), in considering a 1956 plat with a 
private drive, the Court of Appeals held that the lot 
owners had an easement in the private drive and further 
noted the important legal proposition that a purchaser of 
platted lands receives not only the interest described in 
the deed, but also whatever rights are reserved to the lot 
owners in the plat. 
In the last case controlled by the 1925 act, Dobie v 
Morrison, 227 Mich App 536, 537; 575 NW2d 817 (1998), the 
Court of Appeals considered a 1966 plat that dedicated a 
park to “the use of the owners of lots in this plat which 
have no lake frontage.” The Court of Appeals, consistently 
with the earlier cases and with the scope of the 1925 act, 
rights arose from public dedications, to erroneously allow
for private dedications. 
Whatever the strength of that
proposition, the Martin panel failed to account for the
Feldman Court’s additional reliance on Schurtz, which, as
we have explained, approved a private dedication in an 1891 
plat. Schurtz then, as a private (not a public) dedication
dedication case, was on point and the Feldman panel was
entitled to rely on it. 
More to the point, it was
irrelevant that Feldman may have read too much into 
Westveer and Kirchen. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals was in
error to reject the holding of Feldman. 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
  
 
held that such a dedication was valid and granted the lot 
owners without lake frontage an easement in the park. 
All 
these 
cases, 
i.e., 
Schurtz, 
Thies, 
Minnis, 
Feldman, Fry, Walker, and Dobie, stand for the proposition 
that, in both the era of statutory silence on private 
dedications (1835-1924) and the era of implicit statutory 
recognition 
of 
private 
dedications 
(1925-1966), 
a 
dedication of land for private use in a recorded plat gave 
owners of the lots an irrevocable right to use such 
privately dedicated land. We agree with such holdings. 
Finally, to complete the review of private dedication 
law, as we have explained in the Martin case of the same 
date as this, which involves the period since the latest 
plat act in 1967 (1967 PA 288), MCL 560.101 et seq., 
private dedications are expressly allowed.7
 The Court of 
Appeals obiter dictum to the contrary in Martin concerning 
pre-1967 private dedications relied on a few cases such as 
7 MCL 560.253(1) provides: 
When 
a 
plat 
is 
certified, 
signed,
acknowledged and recorded as prescribed in this
act, every dedication, gift or grant to the 
public or any person, society or corporation
marked or noted as such on the plat shall be
deemed sufficient conveyance to vest the fee 
simple of all parcels of land so marked and
noted, and shall be considered a general warranty
against the donors, their heirs and assigns to 
the donees for their use for the purposes therein
expressed and no other. [Emphasis added.] 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Kraushaar v Bunny Run Realty Co, 298 Mich 233, 241-242; 298 
NW 514 (1941), and subsequent cases citing it,8 that 
included language stating that there is no such thing as a 
dedication between the plat dedicator and individuals and 
that the public must be a party to every dedication. 
Yet, 
when read carefully, these statements must be discounted 
because the foundational case, Kraushaar, actually reached 
a conclusion that allowed private users to benefit from a 
private dedication notwithstanding the above referenced 
contrary language in the Court’s opinion.  In any event, 
with today’s decision, we disavow such language and clarify 
that private dedications are valid in plats registered both 
before and after 1967. 
With the overview of private dedications completed, we 
turn to the specific dedication at issue in this case.  The 
1913 Ye-qua-ga-mak subdivision plat stated that the parks 
were “dedicated to the owners of the several lots.” 
This 
dedicatory phrase is legally indistinguishable from the 
language found in Thies, 424 Mich 286, which also concerned 
a pre-1925 dedication, in which this Court held that a 
dedication, “to the joint use of all the owners of the 
plat,” was enforceable by those lot owners. 
Further 
8 Detroit Edison Co v Detroit, 332 Mich 348, 353; 51
NW2d 245 (1952), and West Michigan Park Ass'n v Dep’t of
Conservation, 2 Mich App 254, 267; 139 NW2d 758 (1966).
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reinforcing our conclusion about the efficacy of the 
instant dedicatory language is the fact that it clearly 
gives more to the grantees than the mere silence regarding 
the right to use of the park that was found in Schurtz to 
be sufficient to establish enforceable rights by the lot 
owners. 
Accordingly, following the lead of both the Thies and 
Schurtz Courts, we hold that plaintiffs have an irrevocable 
right to use the parks. 
To the extent it could be argued 
that the case law at the time of the dedications in 
Schurtz, Thies, and the instant case did not explicitly 
recognize the validity of private dedications, for the 
class of plat dedications dating from before the 1925 
statute, we follow the rationale of Schurtz and find that 
defendants are estopped from claiming exclusive rights in 
the parks. Our holding, presaged by not only our case law, 
but also the Auditor General’s approval of this plat ninety 
years ago, is supported by the clear intent of the 
dedication grantors as expressed in the words of the plat 
and the reliance the original purchasers were entitled to 
place on the private dedication in the plat. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, we hold that dedications of 
land for private use in plats before 1967 PA 288 took 
effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
dedicated land. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14