Title: State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2263.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2263 
THE STATE EX REL. DODSON, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2263.] 
Prohibition—Mandamus—Inmate waived challenge to court of appeals’ holding 
that Ohio Parole Board did not exercise judicial or quasijudicial 
authority—Inmate failed to articulate any arguments in support of 
mandamus claim in this court—Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint 
under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) affirmed. 
(No. 2022-1041—Submitted March 21, 2023—Decided July 6, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 21AP-448, 
2022-Ohio-2552. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ricardo Dodson, appeals the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for writs of prohibition and 
mandamus against appellees, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
(“DRC”), the Ohio Parole Board, and the Franklin County Child Support 
Enforcement Agency (“FCCSEA”) (collectively, “the state”).  Also pending are 
two motions filed by Dodson to strike the state’s merit brief in whole or in part.  
We deny the motions to strike and affirm the Tenth District’s judgment. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 2} In September 1990, Dodson and an accomplice abducted a woman and 
repeatedly sexually assaulted her over the course of 12 hours.  A jury found Dodson 
guilty of kidnapping, rape, and attempted rape.  State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 91AP-411, 1991 WL 227806 (Oct. 24, 1991).  Dodson was also convicted of the 
rape of a second victim, B.L.M., that took place in October 1990.  State v. Dodson, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 91AP-498, 1991 WL 227804 (Oct. 31, 1991).  In July 1991, 
B.L.M. gave birth to a child.  Although FCCSEA initiated proceedings to determine 
the child’s father, those proceedings were dismissed and did not result in a paternity 
determination. 
{¶ 3} Dodson has appeared before the parole board eight times and was 
denied parole each time.  In denying parole in 2009 and 2012, the parole board noted 
that Dodson had impregnated B.L.M.  There is no record of any reference by the 
parole board to B.L.M.’s pregnancy at later parole hearings. 
II.  Procedural history 
{¶ 4} In September 2021, Dodson filed an original action in the Tenth District 
for writs of prohibition and mandamus.  He alleged that at his 2009 parole hearing, 
B.L.M. and her husband testified that Dodson was the biological father of B.L.M.’s 
child.  According to Dodson, the parole board denied parole based on its 
determination that he is the child’s biological father and that he was responsible for 
January Term, 2023 
 
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the child’s being placed for adoption.  Dodson made similar allegations about parole 
hearings held in 2012, 2015, and 2018.  Dodson averred that the parole board lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine the child’s paternity.  Accordingly, Dodson 
demanded a writ of prohibition compelling DRC and the parole board to vacate any 
determination that he is the biological father of B.L.M.’s child and to prevent them 
from making any such determination in the future and from denying him parole on 
that basis.  Alternatively, Dodson requested a writ of mandamus compelling the state 
to order DNA testing to determine paternity and to appoint counsel to represent him 
in any administrative paternity-adjudication hearing.  Finally, he requested a writ of 
mandamus to compel FCCSEA to produce unredacted records regarding 
determinations of the child’s paternity.  After Dodson filed his complaint, FCCSEA 
notified him that all its records relating to the paternity action had been destroyed 
pursuant to its records-retention policy. 
{¶ 5} The Tenth District dismissed Dodson’s complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6).  Dodson has appealed and has filed two motions to strike the state’s merit 
brief. 
III.  Analysis 
A.  The first motion to strike 
{¶ 6} In his first motion to strike, Dodson argues that the state made false 
factual statements in its merit brief relating to the dismissed 1992 paternity action.  
We need not strike the alleged misstatements from the state’s brief, because 
whether true or false, they have no bearing on whether Dodson has stated claims 
on which relief in prohibition or mandamus can be granted. 
{¶ 7} Next, Dodson argues that the state mischaracterized arguments that 
he has made in this case.  Any disagreement over how to describe a claim or 
argument is not a basis for striking a brief. 
{¶ 8} Finally, Dodson complains that the state failed to provide page 
citations to the record in its merit brief.  It is generally incumbent on the parties to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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provide proper citations to the record, see, e.g., S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02(B)(2), but this 
case is before us on an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss.  
Therefore, the only relevant item in the record is Dodson’s complaint, and the state 
was not required to cite other documents in the record. 
{¶ 9} Accordingly, we deny Dodson’s first motion to strike. 
B.  The second motion to strike 
{¶ 10} In his second motion to strike, Dodson asserts that the state’s merit 
brief was not properly served on him.  Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.11(E)(2), we may 
strike a pleading for improper service if the unserved party was “adversely 
affected.”  Dodson alleges that he was adversely affected in that by the time he 
received a copy of the state’s brief, he had insufficient time remaining to draft and 
file a reply brief. 
{¶ 11} Dodson’s motion does not support a claim of improper service.  His 
only allegation is that he did not receive a copy of the state’s brief until 14 days 
after it was filed.  But the alleged delay may have resulted from mail-delivery 
procedures at the prison and is not necessarily attributable to the state.  Moreover, 
we granted an extension of time for Dodson to file a reply brief, but he failed to do 
so. 
{¶ 12} Dodson has not proved a lack of service or improper service, nor has 
he shown that he was adversely affected by any delay.  Accordingly, we deny 
Dodson’s second motion to strike. 
C.  Standard of review 
{¶ 13} We review the Tenth District’s dismissal of Dodson’s complaint de 
novo.  State ex rel. McKinney v. Schmenk, 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 
N.E.3d 871, ¶ 8.  “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.”  Volbers-Klarich v. 
Middletown Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11.  
“Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
January Term, 2023 
 
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is appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and 
all reasonable inferences are made in [the] relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt 
that [the] relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief.”  Clark v. Connor, 82 
Ohio St.3d 309, 311, 695 N.E.2d 751 (1998). 
D.  Dodson’s prohibition claim 
{¶ 14} To have stated a claim for a writ of prohibition, Dodson had to allege 
that the state has exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasijudicial power, 
that the state lacks authority to exercise that power, and that he lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 
Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 15} Dodson argues that the parole board lacked authority to consider 
certain statements made by B.L.M. and that by considering paternity at the parole 
hearings, the parole board effectively established paternity without authority to do 
so.  He also argues that it was unlawful for the parole board to conclude that he 
fathered B.L.M.’s child based on her testimony alone, and he questions whether his 
paternity status is at all relevant to his eligibility for parole. 
{¶ 16} We need not address these arguments, because Dodson has not 
challenged the Tenth District’s holding that the parole board did not exercise judicial 
or quasijudicial authority.  See 2022-Ohio-2552, ¶ 7.  By failing to address that 
fundamental element of his prohibition claim in this appeal, Dodson has waived any 
objection to that aspect of the Tenth District’s decision.  See U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. 
v. Broadnax, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180650, 2019-Ohio-5212, ¶ 11 (“When a 
party raises an argument below, but forsakes it on appeal, we treat it as abandoned 
and should not consider the point”).  We therefore affirm the Tenth District’s 
dismissal of Dodson’s prohibition claim. 
E.  Dodson’s mandamus claim 
{¶ 17} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Dodson must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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on the part of the state to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 
2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 18} With respect to the writ of mandamus he requested, Dodson’s merit 
brief states that he sought to compel the state “to order a DNA test to determine 
paternity, appoint him counsel for any administrative parole hearing, and an order 
directing FCCSEA to provide complete and unredacted copies of records regarding 
the determination of parentage in an administrative paternity action filed in 1992.”  
Dodson’s brief says nothing more about his mandamus claim.  By failing to 
articulate any arguments in support of his mandamus claim in this court, he has 
abandoned the claim. 
{¶ 19} We affirm the Tenth District’s dismissal of the mandamus claim. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 20} We deny Dodson’s motions to strike and affirm the Tenth District’s 
judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Ricardo Dodson, pro se. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and D. Chadd McKitrick, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellees. 
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