Title: Byrd v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CALVIN BYRD,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 481, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. ID. No. 0912001871 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  June 22, 2011 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  August 11, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, RIDGELY, 
Justices, and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
2 
 
 
The defendant-appellant, Calvin Byrd (“Byrd”), appeals from final 
judgments of conviction in the Superior Court for Burglary in the Second 
Degree, Theft, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest and 
Criminal Mischief.  In this direct appeal, Byrd argues that the trial judge 
violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution by 
allowing an impermissibly suggestive in-court identification of him by a 
police officer.  We have concluded that argument is without merit. 
Facts 
On November 20, 2009 the New Castle County Police received a tip 
about suspicious activity in front of a home on Old Forge Road.  Officer 
Richard Blackston responded to the call for a burglary in progress, 
reportedly involving three black male subjects.  When he arrived at the 
house in question, Officer Blackston observed that the door had been forced 
open. 
 
Upon entering the house, Officer Blackston testified that there were 
no lights on inside of the house. He observed that there was a staircase that 
came down from the second floor and faced away from the front door 
towards the rear sliding-glass door.  The base of the staircase was fifteen feet 
away from him and the sliding glass door was another three feet away.  
3 
 
Officer Blackston testified that he could not see the stairs from his location 
at the front door. 
 
After hearing movement upstairs, Officer Blackston shouted “County 
Police,” and then heard two individuals run down the stairs.   According to 
Officer Blackston, after the two men reached the bottom of the steps they 
continued out the rear sliding-glass door, but each man glanced at him for a 
brief “second.”  Officer Blackston testified that the two men were black 
males, one was “heavyset, had what appeared to be like a small Afro” and 
was of medium complexion, while the other was not as heavy as the other 
man, had cornrows in his hair, light in color, and wearing a black jacket.  
 
While Officer Blackston was pursuing the two men, Lieutenant 
Treadwell arrived in the neighborhood.  He saw one black male wearing a 
white t-shirt and blue jeans running down the street.  Lieutenant Treadwell 
did not know whether that man was involved in the incident.  He then 
observed Officer Blackston chasing a heavy-set black man.  Lieutenant 
Treadwell assisted in that individual’s apprehension.  After the heavy-set 
black male was in custody, the police found a portable game system in his 
possession and identified him as Michael Newkirk (“Newkirk”). 
 
Lieutenant Treadwell then called in the description of the first black 
male he had seen running down the street.  Tyree Pollard (“Pollard”) was 
4 
 
taken into custody on the other side of the neighborhood after matching the 
description given by Lieutenant Treadwell.  No one else was seen running 
by the other officers or taken into custody that day. 
 
While Newkirk and Pollard were being arrested, Officer Golden 
arrived at the scene.  He observed a black male standing in front of a house 
on Old Forge Road that was adjacent to the crime scene property.  Officer 
Golden secured the crime scene property, and then returned to interview the 
black male, Denzel Butler (“Denzel”), and his mother Michelle Butler 
(“Michelle”), who both told him that they resided next door.  Denzel told 
Officer Golden that earlier in the day he had observed three men in the 
street.  He spoke briefly to one of the men, “Cal,” with whom he had 
attended Christiana High School.  Michelle also stated that she observed 
three men in the street, but that she could not identify any of the individuals.  
 
Later that day, the Butlers were again interviewed by Detective 
Mayer, the Chief Investigating Officer.  During this second interview, the 
Butlers did not provide any new information to the police.  During Detective 
Mayer’s investigation, neither the Butlers nor Officer Blackston were ever 
asked to identify the men they had observed.  At trial, Detective Mayer 
testified that he never asked Officer Blackston to identify the men because 
he “didn’t know about the part about him being able to see the face.  I 
5 
 
probably just did the assuming where it was like, ah, if he’s in a foot chase, 
he’s probably not really going to see him.”   
 
A warrant for Byrd’s arrest was issued seventeen days after the 
burglary.  Byrd was indicted on charges of Burglary in the Second Degree, 
Theft, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest, and Criminal 
Mischief.  Byrd and Pollard went to trial together. 
 
At trial, Officer Blackston testified that Byrd was one of the two men 
whose face he caught a glimpse of for one second at the Old Forge Road 
property crime scene.  He also stated that he believed that Newkirk was the 
other individual he saw in the house.  Following this testimony, Byrd made a 
motion to strike the in-court identification by Officer Blackston as 
impermissibly suggestive in violation of the due process clause contained in 
the United States Constitution.  The trial judge denied that motion. 
 
Denzel testified that before the incident at the Old Forge property, 
Byrd came to his door and asked to use the bathroom.  Denzel allowed him 
to do this while the other two men remained in the street.  After Byrd left, 
Denzel testified that he and Michelle remained in their home for 
approximately 20-25 minutes until they saw the police arrive.  Denzel 
testified that he never told the police this information because he was never 
asked.  He also testified that he could not remember what Byrd wore, that he 
6 
 
did not see anyone go into the Old Forge property, and that he did not know 
whether Byrd was involved in the incident. 
 
Michelle testified that she saw three men when she came to the door. 
Contrary to her police interviews, she testified that she knew one of the men 
because he had been to her house before.  Michelle stated at trial that she did 
not provide the information identifying Byrd or his use of her bathroom 
because the officers had been rude to her, which the officers denied.  
Michelle also testified that Pollard was with Byrd that day.  Consistent with 
Denzel’s testimony, she testified that Denzel allowed Byrd to use the 
bathroom, and that approximately ten minutes after Byrd left her house the 
police arrived.  Michelle could not remember what Byrd was wearing but 
testified that he was carrying a black backpack. 
 
The State did not present any physical evidence linking Byrd to the 
crime scene, nor did it present any evidence from either of his co-defendants 
linking Byrd to the crime.  Byrd requested a jury instruction with respect to 
identification.  The trial judge issued a modified version of the requested 
instruction.  At the conclusion of the trial, Pollard was acquitted while the 
jury convicted Byrd of burglary and the other related offenses.  Byrd was 
sentenced to one year in prison followed by various levels of probation. 
 
 
7 
 
Trial Court Ruling 
 
The trial judge denied Byrd’s motion to strike the in-court 
identification made by Officer Blackston.  The trial judge agreed with Byrd 
that the identification was suggestive, but ruled that the suggestiveness did 
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  The trial judge found that 
several factors militated against a finding of unconstitutionality: 
First, your client is, has unique physical features in terms of 
complexion, cornrows, or whatever.  And, secondly, the officer 
himself is African-American.  We do not have a cross-racial 
identification issue that has been so frequently mentioned as, an 
issue in eyewitness identification by experts and courts, and so 
forth and so on.  Thirdly, we have the chase that went on 
outside which covered some distance, based on his testimony.  
Now, while he may not have turned around, and he doesn’t 
recall whether he turned and looked, I’m satisfied that there is 
sufficient basis to add to his identification of him here in the 
courtroom, granting that it was suggestive but not to the level of 
it being unconstitutionally so.  Therefore, the motion to strike is 
denied. 
 
Identification Testimony 
In-court identification is “probably the most dramatic and persuasive” 
evidence.2  The general rule is that, absent an unduly suggestive pretrial 
identification procedure, questions as to the reliability of a proposed in-court 
identification affect only the in-court identification’s weight and not its 
admissibility.  However, to satisfy due process, pretrial identifications 
                                          
 
2 United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
8 
 
resulting from a suggestive process must comport with the two-part analysis 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers.3   
Byrd acknowledges that there was no pretrial identification of him at 
all by Officer Blackston.  Nevertheless, in this appeal, Byrd contends that 
the admissibility of the in-court identification of him by Officer Blackston 
should have been determined under the two-step analysis set forth in 
Biggers.”  The first step is to determine whether the identification procedure 
was impermissibly or unnecessarily suggestive.4  At this stage of the inquiry, 
the defendant has the burden of proof.  If the defendant carries his burden of 
proof, the second step examines the five factors enumerated in Biggers to 
determine whether the identification procedure was so suggestive as to 
render the identification unreliable and, hence, inadmissible.   
At the second step of the Biggers inquiry, the State has the burden of 
proof.  In Biggers, the Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy due 
process, pretrial identifications resulting from a suggestive process must be 
examined under the totality of the circumstances in order to determine the 
identification’s reliability.5  The reliability of a pretrial identification 
resulting from a suggestive process depends on:  first, the witness’s 
                                          
 
3 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
4 See id. at 197-199. 
5 Id. at 199-200. 
9 
 
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; second, the 
witness’s degree of attention at the time of the crime; third, the accuracy of 
the witness’s prior description of the defendant; fourth, the witness’s level of 
certainty when identifying the suspect at the confrontation; and fifth, the 
length of time that has elapsed between the crime and the confrontation.6  If 
an out-of-court identification is found inadmissible under the second step of 
the Biggers analysis, a subsequent in-court identification will also be 
inadmissible unless it “did not result from the earlier confrontation . . . but 
was independent thereof.”7   
In this case, Byrd emphasizes his status as the only African-American 
male wearing “cornrows” in the courtroom during Officer Blackston’s in-
court identification testimony.  Byrd claims that in conjunction with the 
already suggestive courtroom environment, his unique appearance created an 
environment sufficiently suggestive to trigger the admissibility analysis 
which the Supreme Court of the United States applied in Neil v. Biggers.   
Byrd characterizes any division of analysis between pretrial and in-trial 
identifications as an “arbitrary line.”  Accordingly, Byrd argues that this 
Court should apply the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Neil v. 
Biggers to in-court identifications.   
                                          
 
6 Id. 
7 State v. Ober, 359 A.2d 624, 626 (N.H. 1976). 
10 
 
In-Court Identifications 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether the Biggers 
two-step analysis applies to a strictly in-court identification not preceded by 
an impermissibly suggestive pretrial confrontation.  However, “the majority 
of courts have [concluded] that Neil v. Biggers does not apply to in-court 
identifications.”8  In this appeal, we requested supplemental memoranda 
from both parties to address United States v. Domina,9 State v. Lewis,10 and 
State v. King.11   
 
In United States v. Domina,12 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declined to apply Neil v. Biggers to initial in-court identifications.  The 
Ninth Circuit noted that the concerns inherent in an in-court identification 
based on a suggestive pretrial identification process are different from those 
present in an initial in-court identification and justify different treatment in 
determining their admissibility: 
 
The concern with in-court identification, where there has 
been suggestive pretrial identification, is that the witness later 
identifies the person in court, not from his or her recollection of 
observations at the time of the crime charged, but from the 
suggestive pretrial identification.  Because the [fact finder is] 
not present to observe the pretrial identification, [the fact finder 
                                          
 
8 State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2005).  See, e.g., United States v. Domina, 
784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).   
9 United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986). 
10 State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 2005). 
11 State v. King, 934 A.2d 556 (N.H. 2007). 
12 United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986). 
11 
 
is] not able to observe the witness making that initial 
identification.  The certainty or hesitation of the witness when 
making the identification, the witness’s facial expressions, 
voice inflection, body language, and the other normal 
observations one makes in everyday life when judging the 
reliability of a person’s statements, are not available to the [fact 
finder] during this pretrial proceeding.  There is a danger that 
the identification in court may only be a confirmation of the 
earlier identification, with much greater certainty expressed in 
court than initially. 
 
 
When the initial identification is in court, . . . [t]he [fact 
finder] can observe the witness during the identification process 
and is able to evaluate the reliability of the initial 
identification.13 
 
 
In addition to affording the fact finder the opportunity to observe and 
assess the identification itself, an initial in-court identification is subject to 
immediate challenge through cross-examination.14  “Where a witness first 
identifies the defendant at trial, defense counsel may test the perceptions, 
memory and bias of the witness, contemporaneously exposing weaknesses 
and adding perspective in order to lessen the hazards of undue weight or 
mistake.”15  Counsel can also “argue in summation as to factors causing 
doubts as to the accuracy of the identification-including reference to . . . any 
suggestibility in the identification procedure.”16 
                                          
 
13 Id. at 1368 (internal citations omitted). 
14 See Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1974). 
15 People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1089 (1986). 
16 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 n. 14 (1977) (internal citation omitted). 
12 
 
In United States v. Domina, the Ninth Circuit also noted that while 
there “can be little doubt that the initial in-court identification is suggestive . 
. . procedures could be used to lessen the suggestiveness,”17 but that these 
“are matters within the discretion of the court.”18  This is due to the fact that: 
While identification testimony is significant evidence, such 
testimony is still only evidence, and, unlike the presence of 
counsel, is not a factor that goes to the very heart – the 
“integrity” of the adversary process. 
 
Counsel can both cross-examine the identification witnesses 
and argue in summation as to factors causing doubts as to the 
accuracy of the identification – including reference to both any 
suggestibility in the identification procedure and any 
countervailing testimony such as alibi.19 
 
 
In State v. Lewis,20 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the 
Neil v. Biggers test “does not apply to in-court identification and that the 
remedy for any alleged suggestiveness of an in-court identification is cross-
examination and argument.”21  Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court held that: 
Neil v. Biggers does not apply to a first-time in-court 
identification because the judge is present and can adequately 
address relevant problems; the jury is physically present to 
witness the identification, rather than merely hearing testimony 
                                          
 
17 United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1368-69. 
18 Id. at 1369. 
19 Id. (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113-114). 
20 State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 2005). 
21 Id. at 518. 
13 
 
about it; and cross-examination offers defendants an adequate 
safeguard or remedy against suggestive examinations.22 
 
 
In State v. King,23 the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the 
reasoning of both the Ninth Circuit and the South Carolina Supreme Court 
and held that: 
[b]ased upon the different considerations involved in pretrial 
and in-court identifications, we join the apparent majority of 
courts in concluding “that Neil v. Biggers does not apply to in-
court identifications and that the remedy for any alleged 
suggestiveness 
of 
an 
in-court 
identification 
is 
cross-
examination and argument.”  The inherent suggestiveness in the 
normal trial procedure employed here does not rise to the level 
of constitutional concern.  Rather . . . “[t]he manner in which 
in-court identifications are conducted is not of constitutional 
magnitude but rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.”24 
 
Majority View Adopted 
 
Based upon the different considerations involved in pretrial and in-
court identifications, we join the majority of courts in concluding that the 
two-step Biggers analysis does not apply to in-court identifications that do 
not come following an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification.  The 
inherent suggestiveness in the normal trial setting does not rise to the level 
of constitutional concern.  Rather, as stated by the court in State v. Smith,25 
                                          
 
22 Id.   
23 State v. King, 934 A.2d 556 (N.H. 2007) 
24 Id. at 561 (internal citations omitted). 
25 State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1986). 
14 
 
“[t]he manner in which in-court identifications are conducted is not of 
constitutional magnitude but rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.”26  Accordingly, we hold that the remedy for any alleged 
suggestiveness of an in-court identification is cross-examination and 
argument.27   
In this case, Officer Blackston’s in-court identification was subject to 
cross-examination and argument.  The issues raised on appeal by Byrd, such 
as the brief time that Officer Blackston observed Byrd’s face, the amount of 
time that had passed, and that Officer Blackston never made an 
identification before trial are all issues that affect the weight of the 
identification, not the admissibility of the identification.  All of these issues 
were addressed during the cross examination of Officer Blackston and 
argued to the jury during the closing remarks by Byrd’s attorney.  
It was within the discretion of the trial judge to allow or strike Officer 
Blackston’s testimony.  The circumstances that preceded his in-court 
identification of Byrd were no more suggestive than the normal inherent 
suggestiveness that is present in any trial.  The record reflects that the trial 
                                          
 
26 Id. at 193 (internal citations omitted).  See also United States v. Bennett, 675 F.2d 596, 
598 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that propriety of in-court identification procedure is 
determined in the exercise of trial court’s discretion), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982). 
27 State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d at 518. 
15 
 
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the in-court identification of 
Byrd by Officer Blackston. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.