Title: In re Wool

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Wool  (99-064); 169 Vt. 579; 733 A.2d 747

[Filed 10-May-1999]

      

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-064

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 1998

In re Joseph S. Wool, Esq.	}	Original Jurisdiction
                                }
                                }
                                }	Professional Conduct Board
                                }	
                                }
                                }	DOCKET NOS. 94.03, 94.04 & 94.61 

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Pursuant to the recommendation of the Professional Conduct Board filed
  February 17, 1999, and  approval thereof, it is hereby ordered that Joseph
  S. Wool, Esq. be publicly reprimanded for the  reasons set forth in the
  Board's report attached hereto for publication as part of the order of this 
  Court.  A.O. 9, Rule 8E.

       Attorney Wool shall also be placed on probation for 18 months with the
  conditions set forth in the  attached report; however, the potential
  sanction in Condition 1 of immediate suspension is  modified to require
  appropriate prior review by the Board.  The period of probation shall begin
  on  June 1, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
131.PCB

[12-Feb-1999]

                              STATE OF VERMONT
                         PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BOARD

In re:	  Joseph S. Wool, Esq.--Respondent
          PCB Files No. 94.03, 94.04 and 94.61

                      Final Report to the Supreme Court

                             DECISION NO.   131

       This matter concerns an experienced practitioner's violation of a
  number of disciplinary  rules involving mishandling of client monies and,
  in one instance, improper communication with a  represented party.  It is
  before us by stipulated facts which we adopt as our own and attach hereto 
  as Appendix 1.  In addition, we rely upon uncontroverted facts submitted to
  a sanctions panel by  the bar counsel.  Those facts were adopted by the
  sanctions panel, are adopted by reference here,  and are attached hereto as
  Appendix 2.  

       Respondent has waived all procedural rights accorded him by
  Administrative Order 9,  Rule 8, although he has reserved  the right to
  appeal a recommended sanction if that sanction is  greater than a public
  reprimand.  Upon consideration of all the stipulated facts, we conclude
  that  Respondent should be publicly reprimanded.

       Respondent has been a member of the bar of the State of Vermont for
  more than sixty  years.  This disciplinary proceeding is a result of his
  conduct in representing three different clients.	
					
PCB File 94.03

       Respondent represented MB in the summer of 1992 in connection with
  some post-divorce  litigation.  MB paid Respondent an advance of $1,000 in
  July of 1992.  MB was not satisfied with  the quality of the representation
  he received during 1992. In the spring of 1993, MB realized that he would
  need to pursue some additional issues in  court. He wanted to hire another
  lawyer to help him.  He contacted Respondent and asked  for a  refund of
  the $1000.  

       Respondent told MB that he had already provided services in excess of
  the $1,000  advance.  MB asked for an accounting as to how the $1000 fee
  had been spent. Respondent prepared three documents,  none of which
  properly detailed the scope of  Respondent's services to MB.  Each is
  simply a list of charges for services performed on certain  dates, without
  specification as to how much time Respondent spent on each of these
  services.  Further, all of the letters are inconsistent.

       The first letter claimed that MB owed Respondent $230.00.  The second,
  written some  two weeks later, claimed that $525.00 in services had been
  rendered, but noted the $1000.00 paid  on account.  This would have left a
  balance of $475.00 owed to MB.  Subsequently, Respondent  amended this
  bill, adding an additional $345.00 in charges for services rendered in June
  and July  of 1993.  MB had not retained Respondent to represent him in June
  or July of 1993.  There is  some evidence that Respondent may have provided
  some legal services to MB at that time. As of this date, Respondent has yet
  to provide MB with a detailed explanation as to how  Respondent applied 
  the $1000.00 fee. 

       Disciplinary Rule 2-106 prohibits a lawyer from collecting an
  excessive fee.  In order to  determine whether a fee is excessive, the
  lawyer needs to be able to account to the client as to  what the lawyer did
  to earn the fee.  Because of Respondent's failure to account for his
  services, it  is impossible to determine whether or not the $1000.00 fee
  was earned.

       Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3) imposes upon all lawyers a duty "to
  maintain complete  records of all funds...coming into the possession of the
  lawyer" and a duty "to render appropriate  accounts to the client regarding
  them."  We find Respondent violated that disciplinary rule by  failing to
  comply with his duty to render an appropriate account to MB.

PCB File No. 94.04

       Respondent represented FM, an elderly man entitle to monthly  Social
  Security and  veteran's benefits.  During 1986,  FM was incarcerated.  He
  gave Respondent a power of attorney  and asked Respondent to take care of
  his finances for him.  At that time, FM was receiving  Veterans benefits of
  $135 per month and Social Security benefits of $337 per month.   In July of
  1986, Respondent opened a  trust savings and checking account at a local
  bank.  There is some evidence that some of FM's monthly checks were
  deposited to that account.  There  is some evidence that funds were
  withdrawn from the account. There is no evidence as to how  those funds
  were expended.  There is no evidence as to when that account was closed. In
  early 1992, one HC, the niece of Respondent's client FM, telephoned
  Respondent.  She  had  FM's power of attorney.  She asked Respondent for an
  accounting of her uncle's money that  had come into Respondent's possession
  during the time her uncle had been incarcerated. Respondent had a few
  records of this account, but they were in no way complete.  Respondent
  wrote to the bank in February of 1992 and on at least three other
  occasions, asking  the bank to supply records about the account.  HC
  continued to contact Respondent, seeking  information about her uncle's
  funds.  She filed a complaint with this Board.  Bar counsel also  contacted
  Respondent, seeking information about FM's assets.

       Finally, in June of 1993, a bank representative wrote to Respondent
  that it would be able  to search its records for information about the
  trust account.  However, the research would cost  $15.00 per hour. 
  Respondent elected not to have the bank proceed with the research. At
  sometime later, bar counsel began a full investigation into HC's
  allegations of  mismanagement.  By that time, the bank records had been
  destroyed.  There is now no reliable  way to determine how much money went
  into the account, when the money was withdrawn, and  to whom the money was
  paid.  The parties have stipulated - and we so find - that Respondent has 
  not accounted for at least $2,000 that he received in trust for FM while FM
  was incarcerated.(FN1)

       Respondent had a duty to maintain records of the trust funds and to
  account for them to  HC as FM's attorney in fact.  DR 9-102(B)(3).  His
  failure to expend the $15.00 an hour to obtain  essential bank records,
  knowing that bar counsel was investigating HC's complaint, is inexplicable. 
  This failure to account for the funds violates DR 9-102(B)(3).
  
       Respondent has an obligation to "promptly pay or deliver to the
  clients as requested by a  client the funds ...in the possession of the
  lawyer which the client is entitled to receive."  DR 9-102(B)(4).  The
  client, via the attorney in fact, HC, sought return of whatever funds
  Respondent  had received on behalf of her uncle but which Respondent had
  not returned or expended for her  uncle's benefits.  Once the client
  requests return of trust funds, the burden is on the attorney to  return
  the funds or demonstrate that all funds have been returned to or used for
  the benefit of the  client. See, e.g.,  Louisiana State Bar Association v.
  Keys,