Title: Vincent v. Warden

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CEDRIC VINCENT 
 
v.  Record No. 981998    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 11, 1999 
WARDEN OF THE DILLWYN  
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL. 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we consider 
whether a certificate of discharge from probation supervision 
containing a prospective discharge date was superseded by a 
subsequent parole board warrant for the arrest and detention 
of the parolee pending a parole revocation hearing. 
The sequence of events is as follows.  On August 14, 
1997, Cedric Vincent was released from the Virginia Department 
of Corrections on mandatory parole, with a minimum parole 
supervision expiration date of February 14, 1998.  As part of 
the conditions of parole, Vincent acknowledged that his 
failure to obey all federal, state, and local laws and 
ordinances would subject him to arrest and revocation of 
parole. 
On August 21, one week after his release on parole, 
Vincent was arrested by the Fairfax County Police Department, 
charged with distribution of cocaine, and incarcerated in the 
Fairfax County Jail.  In September 1997, while incarcerated 
pending a hearing on the drug charge, Vincent was charged with 
and convicted of simple assault for an incident that occurred 
in the jail.  On January 21, 1998, Vincent pled guilty to and 
was convicted of the cocaine distribution charge. 
 
As a result of Vincent's convictions for simple assault 
and distribution of cocaine, his parole officer prepared a 
"Major Violation Report" charging Vincent with violating the 
conditions of his parole.  Based on this report, the Virginia 
Parole Board (the Parole Board) issued a Board warrant 
commanding his arrest for violation of his mandatory release 
and commanding his detention "subject to further action of 
said Board."  The Board warrant was issued on February 2, 1998 
and served on Vincent at the Fairfax County Jail on February 
11, 1998. 
Approximately one month later, March 12, 1998, a Fairfax 
County probation and parole officer gave Vincent an undated 
"Certificate of Discharge."  This undated certificate, 
generated sometime in early January 1998 by the Virginia 
Department of Corrections Information Systems, directed that 
"final Discharge be entered effective 2/14/98."  The same day, 
March 12, the probation and parole officer filed a presentence 
report in Vincent's pending sentencing proceeding for his 
cocaine distribution conviction.  In the presentence report 
the officer stated that  
[a]lthough a Parole Board warrant was issued for 
the above violations, the Parole Board elected to 
administratively discharge Mr. Vincent from 
parole on February 14, 1998. 
 
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On March 20, Vincent was sentenced on the cocaine 
distribution charge to eight years in prison with six 
years and six months suspended. 
On May 13, 1998, a Parole Board hearing was held to 
determine whether Vincent's parole should be revoked.  The 
Parole Examiner recommended that parole be revoked based on 
Vincent's admission of guilt to the charge of cocaine 
distribution and his conviction for simple assault.  The 
Virginia Parole Board revoked Vincent's parole by letter dated 
May 22, 1998.  The Parole Board denied Vincent's appeal and he 
filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pro se.  We 
ordered that counsel be appointed for Vincent and briefs be 
submitted by the parties.  
Vincent argues that his Certificate of Discharge became 
effective prior to the revocation of his parole and that, 
because he was no longer a parolee at the time of the 
revocation, the Parole Board did not have jurisdiction to 
revoke his parole.  Therefore, he concludes, his detention 
pursuant to the revocation is unlawful.  To hold otherwise, he 
asserts, is fundamentally unfair and violates his due process 
rights.  We disagree. 
A parolee's obligation to comply with the terms of his 
parole continues until the parolee is discharged from parole.  
Until that time, a parolee is subject to revocation of his 
 
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parole by the Parole Board.  In this case, Vincent violated a 
condition of the parole supervision prior to the effective 
date of his discharge from parole.  The Parole Board had the 
authority to institute revocation proceedings based on 
Vincent's violations up until the effective date of his 
discharge.  The Board exercised that authority by issuing the 
Board warrant for Vincent's arrest and detention on February 
2, 1998.  See Code §§ 53.1-136, and -161. 
Issuing a board warrant for a parolee's arrest and 
detention for an alleged violation of parole conditions is 
inconsistent with ordering discharge from parole.  Therefore, 
because the action of the Parole Board instituting parole 
revocation proceedings in this case occurred subsequent to its 
setting of a prospective discharge date, but before the 
discharge date, the subsequent action operated to nullify the 
Board's prior action.  The fact that Vincent received the 
Certificate of Discharge after he received the Board warrant 
does not alter this conclusion.  The operative event was the 
initiation of action by the Parole Board, not the subsequent 
receipt of notice of the Board's action. 
 Vincent's reliance on Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290, 
176 S.E.2d 815 (1970), and Vick v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 474, 
111 S.E.2d 824 (1960), is misplaced.  Those cases involved 
probation revocation pursuant to former Code § 53-275, the 
 
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predecessor of Code § 19.2-306, which required that the 
revocation itself be completed within a statutorily prescribed 
period.  The provisions of Title 53.1 regarding revocation of 
parole do not contain such a time limitation other than the 
requirement that an individual is a "parolee" at the time of 
the revocation and has not been validly discharged from 
parole.  See Code § 53.1-136(3).  Further, unlike the facts of 
this case, the periods of probation or suspension in those 
cases had ended before the trial court took action to revoke 
probation. 
 
Finally, Vincent argues that because he, the probation 
and parole officer who filed the presentence report in the 
drug distribution charge, and the trial court sentencing him 
for the drug distribution charge all relied on the validity of 
the Certificate of Discharge, it is fundamentally unfair to 
allow the Parole Board to revoke his parole.*  Vincent asserts 
that the sentence he received reflected the trial court's 
inclination to allow him to seek a drug treatment program and 
he contends that had the trial court known of his true parole 
                     
* Vincent argues that the Parole Board is bound by the 
representations of the parole and probation officer as 
reflected in the presentence report that the Board had 
discharged Vincent from parole.  He cites no cases in support 
of this proposition, and, to the extent he is asserting a 
claim of estoppel, we have said that estoppel does not apply 
to the government in the discharge of its governmental 
functions.  Gwinn v. Alward, 235 Va. 616, 621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 
413 (1988).  
 
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status, it might have made adjustments to accommodate that 
status while allowing entry into the drug treatment program.  
This argument falls short of raising due process 
considerations. 
 
What accommodations the trial court might have made in 
Vincent's sentence had it known that the Parole Board might 
revoke Vincent's parole is speculative at best.  Indeed, 
Vincent may have received a shorter sentence in light of the 
erroneous statement that he had been discharged from parole.  
More importantly, Vincent's discharge from parole was within 
the discretion of the Parole Board.  Code § 53.1-136(4).  A 
parolee does not have a fundamental or liberty interest in a 
discretionary final discharge from parole.  See James v. 
Robinson, 863 F.Supp. 275, 276 (E.D.Va. 1994), aff'd 45 F.3d 
426 (4th Cir. 1994), citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).  
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the Parole Board 
had jurisdiction to revoke the parole of Vincent on May 22, 
1998 and, therefore, that his detention pursuant to the 
revocation is lawful.  Accordingly, we deny the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
Petition denied. 
 
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