Title: State v. Blatterman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2107-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dean M. Blatterman, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 325, 847 N.W.2d 427) 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 5, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Hanrahan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., ROGGENSACK, C.J. (joining section 
II) and PROSSER, J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by David H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Marcus J. 
Berghahn and Hurley, Burish & Stanton, S.C., Madison, and Jonas 
B. Bednarek and Bednarek Law Office, S.C., Madison. Oral 
argument by Jonas B. Bednarek.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2107-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CT418) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dean M. Blatterman, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 5, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that reversed the circuit court's2 
ruling that admitted test results from a blood draw conducted 
after police transported Dean M. Blatterman to a hospital.  
Officers conducted an investigatory stop of Blatterman's vehicle 
that was grounded in a call from Blatterman's wife.  Police were 
concerned with possible carbon monoxide poisoning and possible 
                                                 
1 State v. Blatterman, No. 2013AP2107-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014). 
2 The 
Honorable 
William 
E. 
Hanrahan 
of 
Dane 
County 
presiding. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
2 
 
intoxication when they stopped him.  After being stopped, 
Blatterman did not comply with police orders.  Also, he 
complained of chest pain.  Based on their observations and his 
wife's concerns, police transported Blatterman to a hospital for 
medical assessment and then conducted a legal blood draw.  In 
addition, before transport, an officer checked Blatterman's 
driving record and learned that he had three prior operating 
while intoxicated (OWI) convictions.  This reduced his threshold 
for a prohibited alcohol concentration3 (PAC) from 0.08% to 
0.02%.4  Results of the blood test demonstrated Blatterman had 
operated his vehicle with a PAC. 
¶2 
We conclude that Blatterman's stop and detention 
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution because they were supported by 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention.  
Blatterman's arrest, which occurred when Deputy James Nisius 
transported 
Blatterman 
to 
the 
hospital, 
satisfied 
the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 340.01(1v) (2011–12) defines alcohol 
concentration relative to blood volume as "grams of alcohol per 
100 milliliters of a person's blood."  All subsequent references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
4 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(c) 
defines 
prohibited 
alcohol concentration as "an alcohol concentration of more than 
0.02" for persons who have three or more "prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations, as counted under s. 343.307(1)." 
There is no dispute that Blatterman was subject to the .02 PAC 
standard under § 340.01(46m)(c).   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
3 
 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because Deputy Nisius then had probable cause to 
arrest Blatterman.  Furthermore, the transportation to the 
hospital was lawful as a community caretaker function of law 
enforcement.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
decision5 
that 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
denial 
of 
Blatterman's motion to suppress.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On March 19, 2013, Deputy Nisius of the Dane County 
Sheriff's Department and several other officers received a 
dispatch that advised Nisius and the other officers that it had 
been reported to law enforcement that Blatterman was bringing 
gas into his house through a stove or fireplace to try to blow 
up the house or light it on fire.  The complainant was 
Blatterman's wife.  While Nisius was responding to the call, 
dispatch updated Nisius that Blatterman was leaving the house in 
a white minivan, with a specific license plate number.  Dispatch 
informed Nisius that Blatterman was possibly intoxicated and 
had, in the past, mentioned "suicide by cop." 
¶4 
Soon thereafter, Nisius observed Blatterman's white 
minivan approaching him.  Nisius allowed the minivan to pass 
him, made a U-turn, and followed Blatterman.   
                                                 
5 Blatterman, No. 2013AP2107-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶34. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Blatterman did not violate any traffic laws.  Nisius 
did not immediately stop the van because Blatterman may have 
been intoxicated, allegedly tried to ignite his house, and had 
previously mentioned suicide by cop.  Instead, he contacted 
other officers in order to conduct a high-risk stop.6   
¶6 
When other officers arrived, Nisius turned on his red 
and blue lights and the van pulled over.  Other officers pulled 
up next to Nisius's vehicle on each side, bringing the total 
number of officers involved and squad cars present to three.  
The back-up officers opened their doors, drew their weapons, and 
pointed them at the van.  Nisius directed Blatterman to turn off 
the vehicle, to open the driver's side window, and to put his 
hands outside. 
¶7 
Instead, Blatterman immediately opened the driver's 
side door and began walking toward the officers with his hands 
in the air.  Blatterman's actions were contrary to the 
instructions yelled by all of the officers.  One of the back-up 
officers transitioned from his duty weapon to a Taser, and told 
Blatterman that he would use the Taser on him if he did not stop 
walking.  Blatterman stopped, approximately six to eight feet 
away from the bumper of Nisius's squad car.  A back-up officer 
instructed Blatterman to turn away and get down onto the ground.  
Blatterman did not turn away, but did kneel down.  Two back-up 
                                                 
6 High risk stops involve officers stopping a vehicle in a 
safe manner when someone in the vehicle may present harm to 
himself, others, or involved officers. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
5 
 
officers forced Blatterman to the ground.  Nisius handcuffed 
Blatterman and searched him for weapons.  After the search, 
Nisius asked if Blatterman was okay.  Blatterman said that his 
chest hurt, and the officers requested emergency medical 
services (EMS).   
¶8 
Blatterman was wearing only a short-sleeve shirt and 
jeans with boots despite the cold weather at the time of the 
stop.  Nisius smelled alcohol on Blatterman and noticed his eyes 
were watery.  The officers placed Blatterman in the back of 
Nisius's squad car because it was "freezing" outside.  The back 
doors of the squad car did not open from the inside.  EMS 
arrived several minutes later, but Blatterman refused medical 
attention.   
¶9 
Nisius 
considered 
Blatterman's 
possible 
carbon 
monoxide poisoning, his chest pain, that he was potentially 
suicidal, and decided Blatterman "should get checked out at the 
hospital."  Nisius asked Blatterman what hospital he wanted to 
go to and Blatterman responded that his doctor was associated 
with St. Mary's.  After EMS was finished and before Blatterman 
was 
moved 
from 
the 
scene 
of 
the 
stop, 
Nisius 
checked 
Blatterman's driving record.  He found that Blatterman had three 
prior OWI convictions.7  Nisius also was concerned that 
                                                 
7 Nisius testified "That [Blatterman] had two prior or three 
prior convictions for OWI."  The circuit court found that when 
Nisius ran Blatterman's driving record, he found three prior OWI 
convictions.  We uphold the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 
81, ¶12, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
6 
 
Blatterman was intoxicated because of "his strange behavior by 
not responding to officers who are pointing weapons on you or at 
you," the odor of alcohol, watery eyes, and information from 
dispatch that he may be intoxicated. 
¶10 Nisius took Blatterman to St. Mary's, which was 
approximately ten miles from the scene of the stop.  He informed 
the staff that his reasons for bringing Blatterman to the 
hospital were physical and psychological medical concerns, and 
that he would "potentially [have] a need for a phlebotomist to 
do a legal blood draw."  While Blatterman remained handcuffed, 
St. Mary's staff examined him for potential carbon monoxide 
poisoning and chest pain and did not find any medical concern.  
The assessment included questions about whether Blatterman was 
suicidal.  Blatterman denied being suicidal and claimed his wife 
was just trying to get him in trouble. 
¶11 After the medical assessment was completed, Nisius 
removed Blatterman's handcuffs and had him perform field 
sobriety 
tests 
in 
the 
exam 
room. 
 
Hospital 
staff 
drew 
Blatterman's blood.  The test of Blatterman's blood sample 
showed his blood alcohol concentration was 0.118%, well over the 
threshold of 0.02% for the PAC imposed by his prior OWI 
convictions.   
¶12 Blatterman was charged with OWI, fourth offense, in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)(4).  Blatterman also was charged with a PAC, 
fourth 
offense, 
in 
violation 
of 
§ 346.63(1)(b) 
and 
§ 346.65(2)(am)(4). 
 
Because 
this 
was 
Blatterman's 
fourth 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
7 
 
offense under § 346.65(2)(am)(4) and Wis. Stat. § 939.60, the 
crime was a misdemeanor. 
¶13 Blatterman moved for suppression of the blood test 
results, claiming that his transportation to the hospital 
amounted to an arrest unsupported by probable cause.  The court 
considered whether the transport was within the vicinity under 
State v. Quartana, and whether Nisius's purpose in transporting 
Blatterman was reasonable.  State v. Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d 440, 
570 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1997).  The court concluded ten miles 
was within the vicinity.  See id. at 446-47.  As for reasonable 
suspicion for the stop and transport, the court noted that 
dispatch said Blatterman was filling a house with gas, he 
possibly was intoxicated, and he had talked about suicide by cop 
in the past.  The court noted that after stopping Blatterman, 
"there was  nothing that the defendant did that would dispel the 
notion that it was——that it was safe for the officers to 
interact with the defendant," because Blatterman did not follow 
instructions.  The court also noted that Blatterman's complaints 
of chest pain, his wearing a short-sleeve shirt without a jacket 
in cold weather, as well as Nisius's belief that Blatterman may 
have exposed himself to carbon monoxide supported transport to 
the hospital.  The court concluded that the officer's actions 
were 
objectively 
reasonable. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Blatterman's motion to suppress the blood test results and he 
pled guilty to the OWI charge. 
¶14 Blatterman appealed.  The court of appeals focused 
primarily on whether transportation outside the vicinity of the 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
8 
 
stop transformed the initial investigatory detention into a "de 
facto arrest" in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Blatterman, No. 2013AP2107-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014).  The court of appeals held that 
Blatterman's transportation to the hospital was not within the 
vicinity, exceeded the scope of investigatory detention, and 
violated Blatterman's Fourth Amendment rights.  Id., ¶¶27, 33.   
¶15 The State petitioned for review, which we granted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶16 We review the circuit court's denial of Blatterman's 
motion to suppress.  When we review a decision on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we uphold a circuit court's findings of 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶12, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  
However, we review the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts independently, as questions of law.  Id.  
Accordingly, whether there was probable cause for arrest or 
whether an officer's community caretaker function satisfies the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the federal and 
state Constitutions are questions for our independent review.  
Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 189, 
366 N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
¶16, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. 
B.  Investigatory Detention 
¶17 We 
assume 
without 
deciding 
that 
there 
was 
not 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
support 
probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
9 
 
Blatterman when the officers stopped his vehicle.  However, the 
officers' temporary investigative stop was a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the 
federal and state Constitutions.  See State v. Arias, 2008 WI 
84, ¶29, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748; State v. Williams, 
2001 WI 21, ¶18, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106.  Accordingly, 
the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied 
with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11.  See State 
v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 263, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). 
¶18 Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police 
officer may, under certain circumstances, temporarily detain a 
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior 
even though there is not probable cause to make an arrest.  Id. 
at 22; State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 
(1972). 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
codified 
the 
Terry 
constitutional standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24.   When we 
interpret § 968.24, we rely on Terry and the cases following it.  
State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 830-31, 434 N.W.2d 386 
(1989). 
¶19 According to Wis. Stat. § 968.24, an officer may 
conduct a temporary investigatory detention when "the officer 
reasonably suspects that [a] person is committing . . . a 
crime."  § 968.24.  Here, dispatch informed the officers that 
according to Blatterman's wife, Blatterman had attempted to blow 
up their home by drawing gas into the house and that he may be 
intoxicated.  The officers reasonably suspected that Blatterman 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
10 
 
had committed a crime.  Accordingly, § 968.24 authorized the 
officers to temporarily detain Blatterman for questioning.  
¶20 Working 
from 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
officers' 
temporary detention of Blatterman was supported by reasonable 
suspicion, we next consider whether the length of the stop was 
reasonable.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) 
(stating that unreasonably prolonged detentions may violate the 
Fourth Amendment absent probable cause).  We must "guard against 
police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which 
trenches 
upon 
personal 
security 
without 
the 
objective 
evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires."  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.  "[T]he police [may not] seek to verify 
their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of 
arrest."  Royer, 460 U.S. at 499.  Consequently, the detention 
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop."  Id. at 500.   
¶21 In determining whether the length of a stop is 
permissible, it is "appropriate to examine whether the police 
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it 
was necessary to detain the [person]."  United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).  "In making this assessment, courts 
should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.  In assessing 
a detention's validity, courts must consider the totality of the 
circumstances——the 
whole 
picture, 
because 
the 
concept 
of 
reasonable suspicion is not readily, or even usefully, reduced 
to a neat set of legal rules."  State v. Wilkens, 159 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
11 
 
618, 626, 465 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
¶22 In the instant case, the duration of Blatterman's stop 
was reasonable.  Nisius diligently pursued his investigation.  
He called an officer at Blatterman's residence for further 
information; he checked Blatterman's driving record; and he 
interacted with Blatterman due to what appeared to be an 
emerging medical concern.  He also sought medical attention for 
Blatterman and waited for EMS and EMS's interaction with 
Blatterman.  Medical attention is a valid reason to extend an 
investigatory detention.  State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶17, 
260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394.   
¶23 In Colstad, a chaotic accident scene required the 
attention of the police officer who stopped Colstad.  Id.  
Colstad had to wait 30 to 45 minutes for questioning to resume.  
Id.  The court of appeals held the length of detention was 
reasonable and noted that the officer spent considerable time 
providing 
medical 
assistance 
to 
the 
accident 
victim 
and 
investigating the scene.  Id.  Similarly, here, time spent 
waiting for and attempting to provide medical assistance to 
Blatterman did not cause the length of the stop to become 
unreasonable. 
¶24 Blatterman's stop and detention were supported by 
reasonable suspicion and lasted a reasonable length of time.  We 
next consider whether Nisius's transportation of Blatterman was 
within the vicinity of the stop and therefore, within the scope 
of an investigatory detention.  Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d at 446.  
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
12 
 
We also note that the express language of Wis. Stat. § 968.24, 
provided in full below,8 authorizes police to question a suspect 
"in the vicinity where the person was stopped" during the course 
of an investigatory detention.  The police may, where reasonable 
grounds exist, "move a suspect in the general vicinity of the 
stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary 
seizure into an arrest."  Id.  Therefore, when a person who is 
temporarily detained for investigation pursuant to a Terry stop 
and is then moved to another location, courts conduct a two-part 
inquiry:  "First, was the person moved within the 'vicinity' [of 
the stop]?  Second, was the purpose in moving the person within 
the vicinity reasonable?"  Id. 
¶25 In Quartana, the court of appeals referred to a 
dictionary to define "vicinity" to mean "a surrounding area or 
district" or "locality."  Id. (quoting Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary:  Unabridged 2550 (1976)).  The court 
concluded that the officer's transportation of Quartana between 
his house and the accident scene one mile away was within the 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 968.24 provides:  
Temporary questioning without arrest.  After having 
identified himself or herself as a law enforcement 
officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person 
in a public place for a reasonable period of time when 
the officer reasonably suspects that such person is 
committing, is about to commit or has committed a 
crime, and may demand the name and address of the 
person and an explanation of the person's conduct. 
Such detention and temporary questioning shall be 
conducted in the vicinity where the person was 
stopped. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
13 
 
"surrounding area" or "locality."  Id. at 447.  The court noted 
that the accident scene was within walking distance of the home, 
even in the winter, and that Quartana had initially walked from 
the scene to his home.  Id. at 444, 447. 
¶26 In 
the 
case 
now 
before 
us, 
Nisius 
transported 
Blatterman from where he was stopped to a hospital ten miles 
away. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
ten 
miles 
is 
too 
distant 
a 
transportation to be within the vicinity so long as the 
temporary detention is supported by no more than a reasonable 
suspicion.9  A transportation of ten miles from the place of the 
stop is not within "a surrounding area or district," or the 
"locality."  See id. at 446 (quoting Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary:  Unabridged 2550).  We decline to 
determine the precise outer limits of the "vicinity" for 
purposes of transportation during an investigatory detention. 
¶27 Unpublished cases interpreting Quartana, while not 
precedential, support our interpretation that the vicinity is 
less than a ten-mile distance.  See State v. Burton, No. 
2009AP180, 
unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶¶14–15 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App. 
Sept. 23, 2009) (concluding officer's transport of defendant 
eight miles from accident scene to hospital to continue OWI 
investigation, while handcuffed, was not within the vicinity); 
                                                 
9 The circuit court concluded that ten miles was within the 
vicinity.  While the circuit court characterized this conclusion 
as a finding of fact, we conclude that it was a conclusion of 
law, which we review independently.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 
¶12.   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
14 
 
State v. Doyle, No. 2010AP2466–CR, unpublished slip op., ¶13 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2011) (concluding that four mile 
transportation was "at the outer limits of the definition of 
'vicinity'").   
¶28 Since 
Nisius 
transported 
Blatterman 
beyond 
the 
vicinity of the original stop, we need not inquire whether 
Nisius's purpose in moving Blatterman was reasonable.10  See 
Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d at 446.  Furthermore, because transporting 
Blatterman to the hospital was not in the vicinity of the Terry 
stop, in order to be lawful, it must have been supported by 
probable cause to arrest or by a reasonable exercise of the 
community caretaker function.11   
C.  Probable Cause to Arrest 
¶29 Given our conclusion that Blatterman's transportation 
was outside the scope of a temporary investigatory detention, 
our 
next 
inquiry 
is 
whether 
Nisius's 
transportation 
of 
Blatterman was supported by probable cause to arrest.  It is 
necessary 
to 
determine 
when 
the 
arrest 
occurred 
because 
"[p]robable cause to arrest . . . refers to that quantum of 
evidence within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time of 
                                                 
10 We note that the parties' arguments seem to assume that 
there was a hospital that was closer than ten miles from the 
location of the traffic stop in which to address Blatterman's 
emerging medical issues. 
11 We 
do 
not 
address 
a 
circumstance 
wherein 
exigent 
circumstances would bear on the reasonableness of a defendant's 
transportation during a Terry stop.   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
15 
 
the arrest that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer 
to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle [at 
a prohibited alcohol concentration]."12  State v. Lange, 2009 WI 
49, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551.   
1.  Timing of arrest 
¶30 In Wisconsin, the test for whether a person has been 
arrested is whether a "reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would have considered himself or herself to be 'in 
custody,' 
given 
the 
degree 
of 
restraint 
under 
the 
circumstances."  State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 447, 475 
N.W.2d 148 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sykes, 
2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277.  "The circumstances 
of the situation including what has been communicated by the 
police officers, either by their words or actions, shall be 
controlling under the objective test."  Id.   
¶31 Blatterman argues that his transportation to the 
hospital while handcuffed amounted to an arrest.  Although the 
use of handcuffs is certainly restrictive, it "does not 
necessarily 
render 
a 
temporary 
detention 
unreasonable 
[or 
transform a] detention into an arrest."  State v. Pickens, 2010 
WI App 5, ¶32, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1.  However, for such 
measures to be reasonable, they must be justified by particular 
                                                 
12 State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 
551, is grounded in "operating while under the influence of an 
intoxicant."  Id., ¶19.  Blatterman was arrested for both OWI 
and PAC.  Our probable cause analysis focuses on the PAC 
violation. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
16 
 
circumstances, such as the risk of harm to the officers.  See 
State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶65, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 
N.W.2d 829.  
¶32 Here, Blatterman repeatedly failed to follow the 
officers' instructions, and dispatch informed the officers that 
Blatterman had mentioned suicide by cop, causing concern that 
their interactions with him could escalate into a violent 
confrontation.  Therefore, the use of handcuffs and detention in 
the squad car are not sufficient to transform Blatterman's 
investigatory detention into an arrest.  Furthermore, even 
though the officers approached Blatterman at gunpoint, this did 
not transform the investigatory stop into an arrest.  Jones v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 62, 70, 233 N.W.2d 441 (1975) (explaining that 
an officer drawing a weapon during a Terry stop does not 
transform the stop into an arrest). 
¶33 Though Blatterman's handcuffing and detention alone 
did not transform his temporary investigatory detention into an 
arrest, we conclude Blatterman was arrested at the time of his 
transportation 
to 
the 
hospital. 
 
Upon 
transportation, 
a 
reasonable person in Blatterman's position would have believed 
that 
he 
was 
in 
custody 
due 
to 
an 
arrest 
because 
his 
transportation was involuntary, and he had experienced a 
significant level of force and restraint since the initial stop.  
See Vorburger, 255 Wis. 2d 537, ¶68 (concluding that "we use an 
objective test, assessing the totality of the circumstances, to 
determine whether a seizure has escalated into an arrest"); 
State v. Burton, No. 2009AP180, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
17 
 
Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2009) (concluding "[a] reasonable person 
would [understand] that the level of restraint, duration of 
custody, and diminishing potential for release amounted to a 
formal arrest").   
2.  Probable cause 
¶34 Warrantless arrests are unlawful unless they are 
supported by probable cause.13   Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19.  
"Probable cause to arrest . . . refers to that quantum of 
evidence within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time of 
the arrest that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer 
to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle [at 
a prohibited alcohol concentration]."  Id.  "The burden is on 
the state to show [it] had probable cause to arrest."  Id.   
¶35 In determining whether probable cause exists, we 
examine the totality of the circumstances and consider whether 
the police officer had "facts and circumstances within his or 
her knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to 
conclude that the defendant . . . committed or [was] in the 
process of committing an offense."  State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 148, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  The probable cause 
requirement "deals with probabilities" and must be sufficient 
                                                 
13 State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 209, 212, 589 N.W.2d 
387 (1999) ("Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, probable cause must exist to 
justify an arrest. . . .  Probable cause is the sine qua non of 
a lawful arrest.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
18 
 
"to lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than 
a possibility."  Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d at 189; accord State 
v. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d 247, 254, 311 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 
1981).  This standard is case-specific:  "[t]he quantum of 
information which constitutes probable cause to arrest must be 
measured by the facts of the particular case."  State v. Paszek, 
50 Wis. 2d 619, 625, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971) (citing Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
¶36 Police may properly consider prior convictions in a 
probable cause determination.  State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶24, 
338 Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918 (evaluating probable cause to 
request a preliminary breath test); Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶33 
(evaluating probable cause to arrest).  Prior convictions are 
especially relevant in this case because the statute reduced the 
PAC threshold applicable to Blatterman from 0.08% to 0.02% 
alcohol concentration.  Goss, 338 Wis. 2d 72, ¶24; Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(c) 
(defining 
PAC 
as 
more 
than 
0.02% 
for 
individuals with three or more prior convictions).   
¶37 Here, Nisius checked Blatterman's driving record, 
which 
showed 
three 
prior 
OWI 
convictions 
that 
lowered 
Blatterman's 
PAC 
threshold 
to 
0.02%. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(c).  Nisius observed Blatterman's repeated failure 
to follow the officers' orders.  Nisius also knew, from 
dispatch, that Blatterman possibly was intoxicated.  Once 
officers had restrained Blatterman, Nisius detected the odor of 
alcohol on Blatterman's person and observed his watery eyes.   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
19 
 
¶38 By the time Nisius transported Blatterman to the 
hospital, 
Nisius 
had 
ascertained 
Blatterman's 
prior 
OWI 
conviction record and, together with information from dispatch 
and his own observations, had established probable cause to 
arrest Blatterman for a 0.02% PAC violation.  Accordingly, 
Blatterman's arrest when he was transported to the hospital was 
lawful and did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment 
and 
Section 
I, 
Article 
11 
of 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
Constitutions.  See Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19.   
D.  Community Caretaker Exception 
¶39 The federal and state Constitutions protect persons 
against unreasonable seizures.  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶13.  We 
"have recognized that a police officer serving as a community 
caretaker 
to 
protect 
persons 
and 
property 
may 
be 
constitutionally permitted to perform" seizures without probable 
cause. 
 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 
346, 
¶14 
(citing 
Cady 
v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973)); accord Kramer, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶18.  A law enforcement officer exercises a 
community caretaker function, rather than a law enforcement 
function, when an "officer discovers a member of the public who 
is in need of assistance."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.  It is 
the State's burden to prove that the officer's conduct is a 
reasonable community caretaker function.  Id., ¶17. 
¶40 In the case before us, we discuss the applicability of 
the community caretaker exception as an alternative ground for 
the officer's transportation of Blatterman to the hospital, 
assuming arguendo, that the officer's arrest of Blatterman was 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
20 
 
unsupported by probable cause.  We "interpret the provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 as equivalent in 
regard to community caretaker analyses."  Id., ¶18.  Therefore, 
"we look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the community caretaker exception."  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 
¶14 (citing Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶18). 
¶41 The community caretaker exception has its origins in 
Cady.  In Cady, Dombrowski's car was disabled by an accident and 
sitting on the side of a road.  Cady, 413 U.S. at 435-36.  The 
responding officers knew Dombrowski was a Chicago police officer 
and believed he was required to carry a service revolver at all 
times.  Id. at 436.  The officers conducted a warrantless search 
"to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver 
would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."  Id. at 
443.  The Court upheld the warrantless search, providing the 
following rationale: 
Local 
police 
officers, 
unlike 
federal 
officers, 
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which 
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in 
what, for want of a better term, may be described as 
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition 
of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute. 
Id. at 441.  Soon after, we first applied the community 
caretaker exception in Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 
461 (1977).  In Bies, we noted that "[a]s a general matter 
[checking noise complaints] is probably more a part of the 
community caretaker function of the police which, while perhaps 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
21 
 
lacking in some respects the urgency of criminal investigation, 
is nevertheless an important and essential part of the police 
role."  Id. at 471. 
¶42 In Kramer, we adopted a three-component test for 
evaluating potential community caretaker functions.  Kramer, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶21.  When the State asserts a community caretaker 
function as the basis for a seizure, the circuit court must 
determine:  "(1) that a seizure within the meaning of the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether the police 
conduct was [a] bona fide community caretaker [function]; and 
(3) if so, whether the public . . . interest outweigh[s] the 
intrusion [on] the privacy of the individual."  Id. (quoting 
State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 169, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. 
App. 1987)).  We now apply the Kramer test. 
1.  Seizure 
¶43 A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
occurred here.  We assume for the purposes of this discussion 
that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest 
Blatterman at that time.  See Vorburger, 255 Wis. 2d 537, ¶68.  
Accordingly, our discussion of the community caretaker exception 
focuses on whether the officer was exercising a community 
caretaker function at the time of Blatterman's transportation.  
However, as we explain further below, the officer began 
exercising his community caretaker function earlier in his 
interaction 
with 
Blatterman 
and 
therefore, 
our 
community 
caretaker analysis begins before Blatterman's transportation. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
22 
 
2.  Bona fide community caretaker function 
¶44 The second component in reviewing whether an officer 
was acting as a community caretaker requires the officer to be 
engaged in a bona fide community caretaker function if the 
officer's conduct is to be upheld.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶23 
(citing State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶35, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
626 N.W.2d 777).  In evaluating this component, we examine the 
totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
police conduct.  Id., ¶30 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 440).  We 
have rejected the contention that community caretaker functions 
must be totally independent from the detection, investigation, 
or acquisition of evidence relating to the commission of a 
crime.  Id.  Rather, we have concluded that "in a community 
caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances 
an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker 
function is shown, that determination is not negated by the 
officer's subjective law enforcement concerns."  Id.   
¶45 Here, we conclude that the officer was engaged in a 
bona fide community caretaker function.  The officer began to 
exercise his community caretaking function shortly after he 
stopped Blatterman's vehicle.  Our conclusion is based on the 
circuit court's findings of fact14 that dispatch informed the 
officer that Blatterman attempted to blow up his house by 
                                                 
14 The circuit court did not decide whether Blatterman's 
transport to the hospital was undertaken as a community 
caretaker function, but the court did find that the officer's 
medical concern for Blatterman was justified.   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
23 
 
filling it with gas, that Blatterman may be intoxicated, and 
that Blatterman had, in the past, talked of suicide by cop.15  
The circuit court also found that Blatterman exhibited erratic 
and disoriented behavior, he complained of chest pain, and he 
was wearing only a short-sleeve shirt and jeans in very cold 
weather.   
¶46 The officer kept Blatterman handcuffed, placed him in 
the back of a squad car, called EMS, and transported Blatterman 
to the hospital after he refused EMS attention.  The handcuffs 
kept Blatterman from hurting himself or others if concerns about 
his mental state were correct.  Placing Blatterman in the back 
of a squad car kept him out of the cold weather.  Calling EMS to 
assess his medical condition and transporting him to the 
hospital 
also 
addressed 
the 
officer's 
concerns 
about 
Blatterman's possible carbon monoxide poisoning, his self-
reported chest pain, his possible alcohol use, and his mental 
health.  The totality of circumstances demonstrates that the 
officer's 
actions 
were 
undertaken 
as 
community 
caretaker 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin's 
emergency 
detention 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.15, authorizes police officers to take an individual into 
custody if they have "cause to believe that the individual is 
mentally ill" and if that individual has demonstrated "[a] 
substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself" 
or "[a] substantial probability of physical harm to other 
persons."  § 51.15(1)1.-2.  Though neither party addressed this 
statute, it is worth noting that according to Horngren, police 
action pursuant to § 51.15 is a community caretaker function.  
State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, ¶11, 238 Wis. 2d 347, 617 
N.W.2d 508. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
24 
 
functions, directly related to concern for Blatterman's physical 
and mental health.  See Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30.   
¶47 We conclude that although Nisius held subjective law 
enforcement 
concerns, 
as 
we 
have 
explained 
above, 
those 
subjective concerns did not negate the objectively reasonable 
basis for a community caretaker function.  Id.  Officers may 
base their actions simultaneously on law enforcement and 
community caretaker functions.  We have repeatedly explained 
that officers are charged with both law enforcement and 
community caretaker functions as part of their service of the 
public.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶53; Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶32.   
As an officer goes about his or her duties, an officer 
cannot always ascertain which hat the officer will 
wear——his 
law 
enforcement 
hat 
or 
her 
community 
caretaker hat. . . .  Accordingly, the officer may 
have law enforcement concerns, even when the officer 
has an objectively reasonable basis for performing a 
community caretaker function.   
To 
conclude 
otherwise 
would 
ignore 
the 
multifaceted nature of police work and force police 
officers to let down their guard and unnecessarily 
expose themselves to dangerous conditions. 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶32-33.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the officer was engaged in a bona fide community caretaker 
function when he transported Blatterman to the hospital. 
3.  Reasonableness balance 
¶48 We now consider the third component:  "whether the 
officer's exercise of a bona fide community caretaker function 
was reasonable."  Id., ¶40 (citing Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
25 
 
¶35).  We consider the third component by "balancing a public 
interest or need that is furthered by the officer's conduct 
against the degree of and nature of the restriction upon the 
liberty interest of the citizen."  Id. (citing Arias, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶32).  "The stronger the public need and the more 
minimal the intrusion upon an individual's liberty, the more 
likely the police conduct will be held to be reasonable."  Id., 
¶41.  We balance these interests by weighing four factors: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation; 
(2) 
the 
attendant 
circumstances surrounding the seizure, including time, 
location, the degree of overt authority and force 
displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and 
(4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Id. (quoting Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶36). 
a.  public interest and exigency 
¶49 The first factor is "the degree of the public interest 
and the exigency of the situation."  Id.  An individual's 
physical and mental health status is an issue of public interest 
and presents an exigency when an officer reasonably determines 
that physical or mental health could be in jeopardy.  See 
Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶47-48.   
¶50 In Pinkard, officers entered a residence when two 
occupants were unconscious.  Id., ¶5. In weighing public 
interest and exigency as a factor to determine whether exercise 
of 
the 
community 
caretaker 
function 
was 
reasonable, 
we 
considered the medical consequences of officers not exercising 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
26 
 
the community caretaker function.  Id., ¶¶47-48.  "If Pinkard 
and his companion had been suffering from a cocaine overdose, a 
reasonable inference based on these facts, the officers were 
presented with a significant exigency, for every passing minute 
could have been the difference between life and death."  Id., 
¶47.  Similarly, here, the officer reasonably inferred that 
Blatterman could have been suffering from carbon monoxide 
poisoning or other serious illness, given the information from 
dispatch that he had been exposed to some kind of gas and his 
own statement that he had chest pain.   
¶51 In State v. Horngren, 2011 WI App 177, 238 Wis. 2d 
347, 617 N.W.2d 508, officers entered a residence in response to 
a call that an individual there was threatening to commit 
suicide.  Id., ¶2.  When the court of appeals weighed public 
interest and exigency as a factor to determine whether exercise 
of the community caretaker function was reasonable, the court 
stated that "the public good involved preventing a suicide, and 
securing medical assistance for a troubled individual. . . .  
The exigency of such a situation is obvious."  Id., ¶¶14-15.   
¶52 In the case now before us, the officer knew of 
Blatterman's previous remarks about suicide by cop.  Though the 
circumstances here differ from the threats of suicide in 
Horngren, nevertheless they evidence a similar public interest 
at stake and exigency presented to the officer.  The public has 
a substantial interest in police ensuring the well-being and 
safety of citizens who may be suffering from health concerns 
that present exigencies.  Accordingly, the first factor favors 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
27 
 
the conclusion that the officer reasonably performed his 
community caretaker function. 
b.  attendant circumstances 
¶53 In considering the second factor, whether the time, 
location, and degree of authority and force displayed were 
appropriate under the circumstances, we refer to the information 
available to the officer at the time of the investigatory stop 
and observations by the officer subsequent to the stop.  In 
Pinkard, we "first note[d] that the officers did not control the 
time of day or location," but were responding to a phone call.  
Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶49.  Similarly, here, Blatterman's 
seizure stems from Nisius being dispatched in response to a 
phone call by Blatterman's wife. 
¶54 Nisius and the other officers undeniably displayed 
overt authority and force when they stopped Blatterman and 
handcuffed him.  This initial show of authority, exerted by 
three officers who were involved in the investigatory stop, was 
based on reasonable suspicion.16  Nisius placed Blatterman, 
handcuffed, in the back of his squad car while he waited for EMS 
                                                 
16 The involvement of several officers during the stop does 
not foreclose their exercise of a community caretaker function.  
In Pinkard, we held that officers reasonably exercised their 
community caretaker function when they entered and searched a 
residence for two unconscious individuals.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 
346, ¶2.  After receiving an anonymous tip about the unconscious 
individuals, an officer thought the residence sounded like a 
"drug house."  Id., ¶54.  We held that sending five officers 
from the unit that performed narcotics investigations "was a 
reasonable 
precautionary 
measure 
to 
prepare 
for 
another 
eventuality."  Id. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
28 
 
because it was very cold outside and Blatterman was wearing a 
short-sleeve 
shirt 
and 
jeans 
without 
a 
jacket 
or 
coat.  
Blatterman was transported to the hospital, following his 
refusal to accept medical treatment from EMS, because Nisius 
remained 
concerned. 
 
His 
concern 
was 
reasonable 
given 
Blatterman's wife's report that he had attempted to blow up his 
house by drawing gas inside; he possibly was intoxicated; he may 
have had thoughts of suicide; he failed to follow the officer's 
directives; and he had chest pain.   
¶55 The degree of force and display of authority were 
reasonable 
given 
the 
officer's 
concerns 
for 
Blatterman's 
physical and mental health.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
second factor favors the conclusion that the officer reasonably 
performed his community caretaker function. 
c.  vehicle 
¶56 The third factor addresses whether a person's privacy 
interests were being invaded while he or she was in a vehicle.  
Here, Blatterman's comments that his chest hurt could evidence a 
heart condition, and his wife had reported that he may have been 
drunk.  Medical assessment of both concerns was required because 
if Blatterman were to have a heart attack or was intoxicated, he 
could cause harm to other drivers, as well as to himself.  See 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶44.  Furthermore, "a citizen has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile."  State v. 
Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶31, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565.  
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the conclusion that 
the officer reasonably performed a community caretaker function.   
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
29 
 
d.  alternatives 
¶57 Under the fourth factor, "we consider the feasibility 
and availability of alternatives" to taking Blatterman to the 
hospital.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶45.  Blatterman argues that 
calling the EMS was sufficient to address any medical concern.  
However, 
this 
alternative, 
which 
stops 
short 
of 
Nisius 
transporting Blatterman to the hospital, fails to acknowledge 
the circumstances surrounding Blatterman's stop.  At the time 
that officers took Blatterman into custody, he had refused to 
comply with the officers' commands; the officers also were 
concerned about possible carbon monoxide poisoning, possible 
suicidal thoughts, and his chest pain.   
¶58 As we have explained previously, "[p]rinciples of 
reasonableness demand that we ask ourselves whether 'the 
officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted 
otherwise.'"  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶59 (quoting State v. 
Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 239 (S.D. 2009)) (additional internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For example, if the officer, despite 
the information relayed by dispatch and his observations of 
Blatterman during the investigatory stop, had facilitated no 
medical assessment and Blatterman or another member of the 
community were injured, Blatterman and others would have 
understandably viewed the lack of medical assessment as shoddy 
police work.  Id.  That Blatterman did not require treatment at 
the hospital for any physical or mental health issue is not 
relevant to our consideration.  See id. (stating "'that, as it 
turned out, no one was injured is of no moment'") (quoting State 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
30 
 
v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 582 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990)).  Hindsight 
is often 20/20.  Based on the circumstances relevant to this 
inquiry, we conclude that the fourth factor also weighs in favor 
of 
concluding 
that 
the 
officer 
reasonably 
exercised 
his 
community caretaker function. 
¶59 We conclude that the officer was engaged in a bona 
fide community caretaker function and that he exercised the 
community caretaker function reasonably under the totality of 
the 
circumstances. 
 
Therefore, 
Nisius's 
transportation 
of 
Blatterman to the hospital was a lawful community caretaker 
function.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 We conclude that Blatterman's stop and detention 
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution because they were supported by 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention.  
Blatterman's arrest, which occurred when Nisius transported 
Blatterman 
to 
the 
hospital, 
satisfied 
the 
reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because Nisius then had probable cause to arrest 
Blatterman.  Furthermore, the transportation to the hospital was 
lawful as a community caretaker function of law enforcement.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision that 
reversed the circuit court's denial of Blatterman's motion to 
suppress. 
No. 
2013AP2107-CR   
 
31 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶61 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write further to briefly explain why 
the officer here was not required to first administer a 
preliminary breath test ("PBT") to Dean Blatterman in order to 
have his blood tested at the hospital.1  I also concur and write 
separately to further discuss why odor alone establishes 
probable cause to arrest and test a serial offender, like 
Blatterman, who smells of intoxicants and is driving.  We took 
this case to do more than apply previously existing probable 
cause principles.  We accepted review in this case to decide 
whether there is probable cause to arrest and test a driver, who 
is subject to the .02% alcohol concentration limit,2 based upon 
odor of alcohol alone. 
                                                 
1 Blatterman's blood draw occurred before the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).  In McNeely the United States Supreme 
Court held that "the natural metabolization of alcohol in the 
bloodstream [does not present] a per se exigency that justifies 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual 
blood 
testing 
in 
all 
drunk-driving 
cases."  
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).  
Thus, under McNeely, "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they 
do so."  Id. at 1561 (citation omitted).  A warrantless blood 
draw is constitutional under McNeely if justified by exigent 
circumstances.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶¶41-51, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120.  However, we need not determine 
whether exigent circumstances justified Blatterman's blood draw 
because he does not rely on McNeely.  Further, the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule would apply because the blood 
draw occurred before McNeely.  See State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 
132, ¶¶35-37, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834; State v. Foster, 
2014 WI 131, ¶¶47-58, 360 Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847. 
2 "Alcohol concentration" means "[t]he number of grams of 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶62 Why is it important to address this issue?  The courts 
and law enforcement face these real life determinations when 
evaluating whether probable cause to arrest exists for a .02% 
prohibited alcohol concentration ("PAC") offense, especially in 
light of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013).  For example, what if the officer had sought a warrant 
to draw a suspected .02% PAC offender's blood based upon odor 
alone?  Does probable cause exist or not?  What if a law 
enforcement officer had asked a suspected offender——known to be 
a repeat operating-while-intoxicated ("OWI") offender, subject 
to a .02% PAC legal limit and smelling of intoxicants——to submit 
to a PBT, and the PBT was refused?  Would the suspect be free to 
leave?  Are officers on scene always required to obtain a PBT 
from a suspected .02% PAC offender?  If a PBT is refused, is 
that, coupled with odor, enough for probable cause?  What if the 
officer does not have a PBT device?  Are officers without the 
lawful ability to pursue whether such chronic offenders are 
committing the crime of operating with a .02% PAC or above?3  
What exactly is required to establish probable cause for the 
stand-alone crime, operating in violation of a .02% PAC limit?  
We should explain what we expect of our law enforcement and the 
courts.  Now is the time to answer those pressing questions.  I 
would conclude that odor of intoxicants alone establishes 
                                                                                                                                                             
alcohol per 100 milliliters of a person's blood" or "[t]he 
number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of a person's breath."  
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(1v)(a), (b). 
3 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(b) and 340.01(46m)(c). 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
probable cause for the crime of operating with an alcohol 
concentration of .02% or above.   
¶63 I reach my conclusion because the legislature has 
spoken by enacting legislation that prohibits a serial OWI 
offender, like Blatterman, from operating a motor vehicle with 
this exceedingly small amount of alcohol, .02%, in his system.  
The 
legislature 
essentially 
imposed 
an 
absolute 
sobriety 
standard by adopting the .02% limit for serial OWI offenders 
while they are operating a motor vehicle.4  The legislature did 
not set such an extraordinarily low legal limit for first, 
second, or third offenders.  In fact, most drivers are subject 
to a PAC legal limit of .08%, not a limit of .02%.  Blatterman, 
however, was subject to this low legal limit, .02%, because he 
had 
three 
prior 
OWI-related 
convictions.5 
 
When 
officers 
encountered him driving on March 19, 2013, knowing that he was 
subject to a .02% PAC legal limit and that he smelled of 
                                                 
4 "Beginning on January 1, 2001, [1999 Wis.] Act 109 
require[d] that drivers with three or more prior convictions may 
not exceed an absolute sobriety standard of .02 BAC.  (A BAC of 
.02 is considered 'absolute sobriety' because of the limitations 
in breath testing devices and the fact that the slight alcohol 
content of mouthwash or some medications can influence a test.)"  
Legislative Briefs, OWI Laws Revised, LB-00-7, at 1 (July 2000), 
available 
at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/lb/00lb7.pdf. 
The 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau's 
"statements 
carry 
some 
weight" and its "analyses are entitled to consideration."  
Schilling v. State Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶22 
n.7, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (citation omitted). 
5 OWI-related 
convictions 
include 
"prior 
convictions, 
suspensions or revocations, as counted under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 343.307(1)."  See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c). Specifically, 
Blatterman previously violated the OWI laws once in 1991 and 
twice in 1992, which makes the present offense a fourth offense.   
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
intoxicants, the officers were not wrong to pursue whether 
Blatterman was operating with a PAC.  I would not limit this 
case to a discussion of probable cause for Blatterman.  This 
court's role is not that of error correcting. We accept cases to 
discuss broader issues.  I would do so and conclude that those 
serial offenders, such as Blatterman, who are subject to a .02% 
PAC limit, may be arrested and tested if they are operating a 
motor vehicle and smell as if they have been drinking alcohol.  
In other words, courts and law enforcement should know that 
probable cause, for these serial offenders, is established based 
upon odor of intoxicants alone. 
 
I.  THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND TEST 
BLATTERMAN UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
¶64 Blatterman's traffic stop was not an ordinary OWI 
investigation.  Blatterman was pulled over because his wife 
called police to report that he had driven away from their house 
after he tried to blow it up or start it on fire by drawing in 
carbon monoxide.  She also reported that he might be intoxicated 
and that he had mentioned "suicide by cop" in the past.  
Officers subsequently found Blatterman's vehicle and performed a 
"high risk" traffic stop.  Immediately after being pulled over, 
Blatterman exhibited odd and potentially dangerous behavior.  
Contrary to the officers' orders, Blatterman exited his vehicle 
and began to approach the officers.  He was wearing jeans, 
boots, and a short-sleeve shirt without a coat, although the 
temperature outside was freezing cold.  Even more curiously, 
Blatterman continued walking toward the officers despite the 
fact that the officers were pointing guns at him and had ordered 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
him to stop moving.  His behavior was consistent with a desire 
to die through "suicide by cop."  Blatterman finally stopped 
walking when he was six to eight feet from the front squad car.  
The officers told him to turn away and get onto the ground, but 
he continued facing the officers and knelt down.  The officers 
then put Blatterman to the ground and handcuffed him.  Deputy 
James Nisius later testified that "I smelled alcohol on him when 
I got up close to him."6  
¶65 After Blatterman was placed in handcuffs, he told the 
officers that his chest hurt.  Based on his chest pain, the 
officers were reasonably concerned that he may have impending 
health issues.  Due to his wife's report that he had mentioned 
"suicide by cop" in the past and that he had been drawing carbon 
monoxide into the house, the officers were reasonably concerned 
that he may have been suicidal.  Clearly, the officers were 
concerned about Blatterman's well-being.  The officers then 
summoned 
emergency 
medical 
services 
("EMS") 
to 
evaluate 
Blatterman's health, namely, his chest pain.  In the meantime, 
the officers placed Blatterman in the back of a squad car, as he 
was not dressed appropriately for the cold weather.  When EMS 
arrived, Blatterman refused attention.  After EMS talked to 
Blatterman, but before leaving the scene of the traffic stop, 
Deputy Nisius checked Blatterman's driving record and discovered 
that Blatterman, who smelled of intoxicants, had three prior 
                                                 
6 This quote comes from Deputy Nisius's testimony at a 
hearing on Blatterman's suppression motion, held on July 22, 
2013. 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
OWI-related convictions and was therefore subject to a PAC legal 
limit 
of 
.02%. 
 
Deputy 
Nisius 
subsequently 
transported 
Blatterman to a hospital for an evaluation regarding his chest 
pain.  Once at the hospital, Deputy Nisius informed the hospital 
staff that Blatterman had chest pain, was possibly suicidal, and 
had been exposed to carbon monoxide.  Deputy Nisius also told 
the 
hospital 
staff, 
"there's 
potentially 
a 
need 
for 
a 
phlebotomist to do a legal blood draw."7  Hospital staff examined 
Blatterman and found no concern with his chest pain.  Blatterman 
told hospital staff that he was not suicidal.  Deputy Nisius 
then removed Blatterman's handcuffs and administered field 
sobriety tests in the hospital examination room.8  Hospital staff 
drew Blatterman's blood.9  Blatterman's blood test results 
revealed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of .118%, 
well over the .02% limit to which he was subject while driving.   
¶66 Under the facts of this case, the officers could not 
be expected to request a PBT before transporting an offender 
like Blatterman to the hospital.  Officers stopped Blatterman in 
response to a serious domestic complaint.  Although he was 
driving 
normally, 
Blatterman 
exhibited 
undeniably 
strange, 
                                                 
7 This quote comes from Deputy Nisius's testimony at a 
hearing on Blatterman's suppression motion, held on July 22, 
2013.  
8 The record does not reflect why Deputy Nisius removed 
Blatterman's handcuffs and administered field sobriety tests, 
and the record does not reflect how Blatterman performed on the 
tests. 
9 This blood draw occurred before the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely.  See supra note 1. 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
disobedient, and volatile behavior.  He exited his vehicle after 
being told not to do so.  He then walked straight toward the 
officers, who were pointing guns at him, after being told not to 
do so.  He was wearing a short-sleeve shirt without a coat in 
freezing cold weather.  His unusual behavior was consistent with 
the unusual behavior reported by his wife.  In light of 
Blatterman's strange behavior and reported past remark about 
"suicide by cop," the officers had plenty of reason to take him 
into custody.  Blatterman was also complaining of chest pain.  
The officers were certainly reasonable to transport him to the 
hospital and not administer any tests at the scene——even a PBT.  
To require an officer to ignore these facts and request a PBT, 
instead of responding to the immediate needs of the situation at 
hand, is inconsistent with our case law and common sense.10 
¶67 In the case at issue, these legitimate concerns alone 
support the officers' decision to transport Blatterman to a 
hospital for testing without first requesting that he submit to 
a PBT.  Should officers be expected to request a PBT breath 
sample from a driver who smells of alcohol, is subject to a .02% 
PAC legal limit, acts very strangely, is potentially dangerous, 
                                                 
10 Standard field sobriety tests are not required in order 
to arrest a suspect for an OWI-related offense.  Tullberg, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶40 & n.22.  A PBT is not required either.  See 
Cnty. of Dane v. Sharpee, 154 Wis. 2d 515, 519, 453 N.W.2d 508 
(Ct. App. 1990) ("There is no question that, absent the 
preliminary 
breath 
test, 
probable 
cause 
existed 
for 
the 
arrest."); Cnty. of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 316, 603 
N.W.2d 541 (1999) ("An officer may request a PBT to help 
determine whether there is probable cause to arrest a driver 
suspected of OWI . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
and has chest pain?  No.  Our precedent does not require a PBT 
under these circumstances, and the majority opinion is correct 
not to require that here.  However, we did not accept review of 
this case to recite existing precedent or to apply previously 
existing probable cause principles.  Hence, I engage in the 
following analysis to address the more pressing issue——why we 
accepted review.  
 
II.  AN OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND TEST  
A MOTORIST IF THE MOTORIST EMITS AN ODOR OF INTOXICANTS  
AND THE OFFICER KNOWS THE MOTORIST IS SUBJECT TO A PROHIBITED  
ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION LEGAL LIMIT OF .02% 
¶68 I write separately because I conclude that odor of 
intoxicants alone is sufficient to establish probable cause to 
arrest and further test an operator of a motor vehicle when the 
officer knows that the operator has three or more previous OWI-
related convictions.  When practical, a PBT will be a useful 
tool in determining whether to arrest and further test.  In 
general, PBTs serve to bolster the probable cause analysis.  
However, a PBT is not always required and if it is refused by 
the chronic offender who is required not to exceed a .02% PAC 
while driving, I would conclude that probable cause to arrest 
exists based upon odor alone.  Field sobriety tests may also be 
administered, but are not required, for the seemingly obvious 
reason that in order to exceed the .02% PAC legal limit, the 
operator need not exhibit any indicia of intoxication or 
impairment.  Because the law requires that this class of serial 
drunk drivers maintain an alcohol concentration of less than 
.02% if operating a motor vehicle, probable cause must exist 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
based on the odor of alcohol alone.  These repeat drunk drivers 
are already on notice that they place themselves at great risk 
of arrest if they ingest any amount of alcohol and get behind 
the wheel.  
¶69 The 
law 
concerning 
probable 
cause 
is 
not 
new.  
Probable cause is required for an arrest to be valid.  State v. 
Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999) (citing 
State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992)).  
"Probable cause to arrest is the quantum of evidence within the 
arresting officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest which 
would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the 
defendant probably committed or was committing a crime."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  "There must be more than a possibility or 
suspicion that the defendant committed an offense, but the 
evidence need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not."  Id. (citing 
Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 681-82).  Probable cause to arrest 
depends on the totality of the circumstances.  State v. Kennedy, 
2014 WI 132, ¶21, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834.  An officer 
may have probable cause to arrest a person for an OWI-related 
offense without administering a PBT.11  See Cnty. of Dane v. 
                                                 
11 There are many reasons why an officer might not request a 
PBT.  Perhaps a motorist who is suspected of committing an OWI-
related offense is unconscious or otherwise incapable of 
submitting to a PBT.  See State v. Disch, 129 Wis. 2d 225, 236, 
385 N.W.2d 140 (1986) (holding that the defendant was not 
conscious enough to give or withhold consent to submit to 
testing under Wis. Stat. § 343.305, Wisconsin's implied consent 
law).  Perhaps the motorist is in need of medical care.  See 
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶¶48-51 (upholding a blood draw of a 
suspected drunk driver who was hospitalized and in need of a CT 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
Sharpee, 154 Wis. 2d 515, 519, 453 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1990) 
("There is no question that, absent the preliminary breath test, 
probable cause existed for the arrest."); Cnty. of Jefferson v. 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 316, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999) ("An officer 
may request a PBT to help determine whether there is probable 
cause to arrest a driver suspected of OWI . . . ." (emphasis 
added)).  
¶70 Given that a law enforcement officer must have 
probable cause in order to arrest, it is important to pay heed 
to the elements of the PAC offense and then evaluate what 
quantum of evidence satisfies probable cause for each element.  
This crime is not complex.  The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b), which has only two elements: (1) operating a 
motor vehicle; (2) with a PAC.  See State v. Alexander, 214 
                                                                                                                                                             
scan).  Perhaps the motorist is hospitalized and receiving 
medical attention.  See State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 182-
83, 471 N.W.2d 226 (1991) (upholding a blood draw of a suspected 
drunk driver who was receiving treatment at a hospital for an 
automobile accident).  Perhaps the motorist is seriously 
injured.  See State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 678-79, 682-85, 
518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding a blood draw of a 
suspected drunk driver who was admitted to an emergency room for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident).  Perhaps officers 
will encounter an accident scene that possibly resulted from 
drunk driving but they may not immediately know the identity of 
the driver responsible for the accident.  See State v. Gracia, 
2013 WI 15, ¶¶6-7, 40-41, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 
(upholding the arrest of a suspected drunk driver who fled the 
scene of an automobile accident); see also Tullberg, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶¶12-16 (explaining that the defendant and a 
passenger in his truck falsely told a detective that the 
defendant had not been driving his truck when it was involved in 
an OWI-related accident).  For these reasons and many more, an 
officer might choose not to request a PBT. 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 628, 651, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997); Wis JI——Criminal 2660C.  
If a person has "3 or more prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations, as counted under [Wis. Stat. §] 343.307(1)," his or 
her PAC is .02%.  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c).   
¶71 Specifically, the legislature has determined that for 
this unique group of repeat drunk drivers, .02%, not .08%, is a 
PAC.  See 1999 Wis. Act 109, §§ 16d, 16e.12  In adopting such a 
low legal limit, the legislature essentially required absolute 
sobriety of this group of drivers.  The Legislative Reference 
Bureau has explained that "Act 109 require[d] that drivers with 
three or more prior convictions may not exceed an absolute 
sobriety standard of .02 BAC.  (A BAC of .02 is considered 
'absolute sobriety' because of the limitations in breath testing 
devices and the fact that the slight alcohol content of 
mouthwash 
or 
some 
medications 
can 
influence 
a 
test.)" 
Legislative Briefs, OWI Laws Revised, LB-00-7, at 1 (July 2000), 
available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/lb/00lb7.pdf.  
¶72 Operating a motor vehicle with a PAC is a stand-alone 
crime.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).  As for the first 
element, if one is driving, probable cause undoubtedly exists 
with respect to this element.  The second element becomes the 
issue before the court.  What information would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant's 
                                                 
12 The 02% PAC legal limit took effect on January 1, 2001. 
See 1999 Wis. Act 109, § 91.  This court decided Renz in 1999, 
and the traffic stop at issue in that case occurred in 1996, 
several years before the .02% PAC legal limit took effect.  See 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 296. 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
alcohol concentration probably is .02% or above?  Not much.  In 
my view, odor of intoxicants must be sufficient.  No other 
indicia of intoxication can be required to establish probable 
cause for this crime for which intoxication has no significance.  
Clearly, the legislature did not contemplate intoxication or 
impairment when it chose .02% as the legal limit.  As the court 
in State v. Goss aptly recognized, "[t]he ordinary investigative 
tools employed in an investigation of an OWI case with a .08 PAC 
standard are of little or no use where the PAC standard is [.02] 
because the ordinary physical indications of intoxication are 
not typically present in a person with that level of blood 
alcohol content."  State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶27, 338 
Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918.   
¶73 Simply stated, a person can commit a PAC offense 
without being or appearing intoxicated or impaired.  A person 
who is subject to a .02% PAC legal limit could rarely, if ever, 
exhibit any sign of intoxication or impairment when operating 
with a PAC.  To require more than odor of an intoxicant would 
require more than is legislatively contemplated. 
¶74 Specifically, an operator who is subject to this low 
legal limit can certainly reach a .02% PAC without exhibiting 
any of the traditional indicia of intoxication.  See State v. 
Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d 502, 505, 347 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 
1984).  In other words, such a prior offender need not be 
intoxicated or otherwise impaired in order to be in violation of 
the PAC law.  Id.; see also State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 
414, 
338 
N.W.2d 466 
(1983). 
 
For 
these 
offenders, 
the 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
legislature must have intended that odor of intoxicants alone 
raises a red flag.  A PAC violation is "highly plausible" when a 
person who is subject to a PAC legal limit of .02% operates a 
motor vehicle and smells of alcohol.  Goss, 338 Wis. 2d 72, ¶26.  
An officer certainly has probable cause to arrest when a law 
violation is "highly plausible."  See Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 
212 (citation omitted) (explaining that probable cause to arrest 
requires more than suspicion or a possibility, but the evidence 
need not establish that guilt is more likely than not).  Indeed, 
in Secrist we held that probable cause to arrest may be based on 
odor.  See id. at 217-18 ("We hold that the odor of a controlled 
substance may provide probable cause to arrest when the odor is 
unmistakable and may be linked to a specific person or 
persons . . . .").  To conclude that the odor of alcohol alone 
establishes probable cause to arrest and test an offender who is 
subject to a .02% PAC limit, is to afford proper deference to 
the legislature's determination that operating with even the 
smallest amount of alcohol——an alcohol concentration of .02%——is 
prohibited for those serial drunk drivers. 
¶75 Thus, 
the 
legislature 
has 
spoken 
and 
set 
a 
particularly low PAC limit for a driver who has three or more 
prior OWI-related convictions.  In other words, the legislature 
sent a strong message to those serial offenders not to drink and 
drive.  Those serial offenders who want to test what amount of 
alcohol they can have and not reach .02% do so at great risk.  
Those drivers know that they place themselves at great risk of 
arrest if they have any alcohol in their system and get behind 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
the wheel.  If this court were to conclude that more than the 
odor of intoxicants is required to arrest a motorist subject to 
a .02% PAC legal limit, we would undermine, if not invalidate, 
the .02% PAC offense as a stand-alone crime.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(b), 340.01(46m)(c).  Our court is to listen to the 
policy choices of the legislature, and here the law is clear. 
¶76 Blatterman argues that Goss requires a PBT under all 
circumstances.  It does not.  In fact, Goss supports the 
conclusion that I reach today.  The sole question before the 
Goss court was whether the officer had probable cause to request 
a PBT.  Goss, 338 Wis. 2d 72, ¶2.  The court concluded that a 
PBT may be requested of a prior offender who is subject to a 
.02% PAC legal limit based upon odor alone.  Id., ¶¶2, 25-27.  
The Goss court did not address whether a PBT was required in 
order to arrest someone for a PAC offense.  The Goss court did 
not decide what happens if the operator refuses a PBT.  Under a 
natural extension of Goss, an officer has probable cause to 
arrest a driver who smells of alcohol and is subject to a PAC 
legal limit of .02%, even if the driver does not exhibit strange 
behavior like Blatterman did.  Although Blatterman is correct 
that probable cause to request a PBT is a lower standard than 
probable cause to arrest,13 his grounds for arguing that odor 
                                                 
13 Probable cause to request a PBT requires "'a quantum of 
proof that is greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to 
justify an investigative stop, and greater than the "reason to 
believe" necessary to request a PBT from a commercial driver, 
but less than the level of proof required to establish probable 
cause for arrest.'"  State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶25, 338 
Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918 (quoting Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 317). 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
alone is not probable cause to arrest a .02% PAC offender are 
not particularly persuasive.14  Although those two standards are 
different, each standard is satisfied by the odor of alcohol on 
a driver who is subject to a .02% PAC legal limit. 
¶77 Finally, I address why, even if we were to conclude 
that odor alone is sufficient in .02% PAC cases, law enforcement 
will most often resort to using a PBT first, if practicable.  As 
a practical matter, an officer will likely request a PBT from a 
driver who smells of alcohol and who is subject to a PAC legal 
limit of .02%.  Goss allows officers to do so based on odor 
alone.  Requesting a PBT can help to resolve doubt as to whether 
such a driver has a .02% PAC or above.  If the PBT results 
reveal that a motorist does not have a PAC, the officer may 
release the motorist, save time, and proceed onto other duties.  
An officer would not likely prefer to arrest such a driver, go 
through the required paperwork, transport the suspect to 
testing, perhaps spend time and significant resources to get a 
search warrant from a judge, sit at a hospital waiting for a 
                                                 
14 It may be worthwhile to spend a few moments considering 
the facts of Goss and the case now before the court.  Goss and 
Blatterman were both pulled over for reasons unrelated to 
suspicion of OWI.  Neither Goss nor Blatterman were originally 
being investigated for OWI.  Each of them was placed in a squad 
car for reasons unrelated to suspicion of OWI.  Officers began 
to suspect both Goss and Blatterman of a PAC violation after 
placing them in squad cars.  In each of the cases, the officers 
knew that the defendant was subject to a .02% PAC legal limit 
before requesting sobriety testing.  In Goss the officer 
requested Goss to submit to a PBT, the results of which 
indicated that further testing could be pursued.  In the present 
case, the officers did not ask Blatterman to submit to a PBT——
for good reason (see section I of this concurrence.). 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
blood draw, and all the time take one more officer off the 
street, when a PBT is a quick and easy tool at the officer's 
disposal.  The practical nature of a PBT being used in most 
circumstances involving such a driver is apparent.  Although 
Goss does not require an officer to request a PBT before 
arresting a driver who smells of alcohol and is subject to a PAC 
legal limit of .02%, Goss certainly instructs that an officer is 
allowed to do so.  I have no doubt that law enforcement will 
most often request that a suspected .02% PAC offender submit to 
a PBT in lieu of all that ensues when someone is otherwise taken 
into custody. 
¶78 When we decline to answer the issues for which we 
accepted review in this case, we leave significant uncertainty 
for the courts and law enforcement.  We should answer whether 
odor of intoxicants alone is probable cause to arrest those 
operators who are subject to a .02% PAC legal limit.  If the 
officers had requested that Blatterman submit to a PBT, what 
would have happened if he refused?  Goss does not answer that; 
we should.  Could a driver like Blatterman, who exhibited very 
odd and potentially dangerous behavior, avoid being arrested and 
tested for a PAC violation because a PBT was not administered?  
Goss does not answer that; we should.  Law enforcement and the 
courts could benefit from us answering whether odor alone is 
sufficient 
to 
establish 
probable 
cause 
for 
these 
serial 
offenders. 
¶79 Although 
I 
join 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
I 
write 
separately to explain that Deputy Nisius had probable cause to 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
arrest and test Blatterman based on the facts of this case.  I 
would 
further 
conclude 
that 
odor 
of 
intoxicants 
alone 
establishes probable cause sufficient to arrest and test 
operators of motor vehicles who are subject to the .02% PAC 
legal limit.  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this concurrence and that Chief Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins section II of this concurrence. 
 
No.  2013AP2107-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1