Title: Yasmin Kabir v. County of Monroe

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 28  
Yasmin Kabir,
            Respondent,
        v.
County of Monroe, et al.,
            Appellants.
Howard A. Stark, for appellants.
Robert L. Brenna, Jr., for respondent.
County of Suffolk; New York State Division of State
Police, amici curiae.
READ, J.:
On this appeal, we hold that the reckless disregard
standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) only
applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved
in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct
exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1104 (b).  Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is
governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.
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No. 28
 
I.
At 3:57 PM on September 20, 2004, defendant John
DiDomenico, a road patrol deputy in the Monroe County Sheriff's
Office, was on routine patrol in a marked police vehicle when he
received a radio dispatch from the Emergency Communications
Dispatch or "911 center" directing him to respond to a stolen
vehicle report at an address in Henrietta, New York.  At the
time, he was heading south on West Henrietta Road, nearing a
traffic light at the intersection of West Henrietta Road and
Brighton Henrietta Town Line Road, which marks the border between
the Towns of Brighton (on the north side) and Henrietta (on the
south side).
DiDomenico soon received a second radio dispatch, which
requested backup for another officer who was responding to a
burglary alarm at a location in Henrietta.  Because the 911
center categorized the burglary alarm as "classification one" --
meaning "a serious call . . . that needs immediate attention" --
the deputy acknowledged the request, telling the dispatcher that
he would assist with the burglary alarm before addressing the
stolen vehicle report, which was assigned a higher classification
and therefore a lower priority.  At 4:02 PM, the dispatcher
transmitted information about the burglary call, including the
address and the names of cross streets, to the mobile data
terminal inside the deputy's vehicle.
  
DiDomenico did not activate the emergency lights or
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siren on his vehicle; he was traveling at a speed of 25 to 30
miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour zone, and does not recall if
he speeded up or slowed down after receiving the dispatch.  The
deputy explained that he was not familiar with the location of
the burglary alarm, and "due to the amount of traffic during that
time of day, [he] didn't want to initiate any emergency equipment
without knowing where [he] was positively going."  He therefore
touched the terminal and "looked down for two to three seconds"
at the display "to view [the names of] the cross streets."  When
the deputy lifted his gaze, he realized that "traffic had
slowed."  Although he immediately applied his brakes, he was
unable to stop before rear-ending the vehicle in front of him,
which was driven by plaintiff Yasmin Kabir.
There are three southbound lanes -- two through lanes
and a lefthand-turn lane -- at the intersection of West Henrietta
Road and Brighton Henrietta Town Line Road.  Kabir testified that
she was traveling in the left travel lane.  She had stopped for a
red traffic light, and was just beginning to move forward slowly
toward the congested intersection when her car was hit.  
In October 2005 and February 2006 Kabir brought
actions, subsequently consolidated, against Monroe County,
DiDomenico and others, alleging serious injury under New York's
No-Fault Law.  In May 2008, defendants moved for summary judgment
to dismiss the complaints, and in July 2008, Kabir cross-moved
for partial summary judgment on liability.  The parties disputed
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whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 applied, making DiDomenico
liable for the accident only if he acted with "reckless disregard
for the safety of others" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [e];
see also Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 505 [1994] [holding that the
standard of care under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 is reckless
disregard and addressing the conduct required to show
recklessness]).  On September 26, 2008, Supreme Court awarded
summary judgment to defendants1 (21 Misc 3d 1107[A] [Sup Ct,
Monroe Cty 2008]).  The court concluded that DiDomenico's conduct
was covered by section 1104, and that Kabir had not raised a
triable issue of fact as to whether he acted with reckless
disregard.
On December 30, 2009, the Appellate Division reversed,
with two Justices dissenting (68 AD3d 1628 [4th Dept 2009]).  The
majority held that the reckless disregard standard in section
1104 (e) is limited to accidents caused by conduct privileged
under section 1104 (b).  Because DiDomenico's injury-causing
conduct was not exempt under this provision, the majority
concluded that "the applicable standard for determining liability
[was] the standard of ordinary negligence" (id. at 1633).  The
court further observed that "a rear-end collision with a vehicle
in stop-and-go traffic creates a prima facie case of negligence
with respect to the operator of the rear vehicle"; therefore,
1At that point, the defendants remaining in the action were
the County, DiDomenico and Monroe County Sheriff Patrick M.
O'Flynn.  
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"partial summary judgment on liability in favor of the person
whose vehicle was rear-ended is appropriate in the absence of a
nonnegligent explanation for the accident" (id.).  Concluding
that Kabir had met her burden on the cross motion and that
defendants had not put forward a nonnegligent explanation, the
court reinstated the complaint against defendants and granted
Kabir's cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability.2 
The dissent interpreted section 1104 differently, taking the
position that the reckless disregard standard was applicable to
any injury-causing conduct of a driver of an emergency vehicle
involved in an emergency operation.  On March 19, 2010, the
Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal, and
certified to us the question of whether its order was properly
made (71 AD3d 1548 [4th Dept 2010]).  We now affirm and therefore
answer the certified question in the affirmative. 
II.
Section 1104 was put in place in 1957 as part of title
2We note that Kabir must still prove that she sustained a
"serious injury" within the meaning of New York's No-Fault Law in
order to recover damages from defendants for her alleged personal
injuries (see Insurance Law § 5104 [a]).  The dissent takes us to
task for supposedly "transform[ing DiDomenico's momentary glance]
into a basis for driver liability as a matter of law" (dissenting
op at 9, n 1).  As explained in the text, after determining that
section 1104 was inapplicable, the Appellate Division granted
plaintiff's cross motion because defendants did not offer a
nonnegligent explanation to rebut the prima facie case of
negligence made out by the happening of a rear-end collision.  On
appeal, defendants did not challenge the Appellate Division's
decision on that score.
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VII of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which was intended to
"creat[e] a uniform set of traffic regulations, or the 'rules of
the road' . . . to update and replace the former traffic
regulations, and bring them into conformance with the Uniform
Vehicle Code adopted in other states" (Riley v County of Broome,
95 NY2d 455, 462 [2000] [internal citations omitted]; see also L
1957, ch 698).  Subdivision (a) of this provision empowers the
driver of an "authorized emergency vehicle" (defined in Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 101)3 when involved in an "emergency operation"
(defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b)4 to "exercise the
privileges set forth in this section [1104], but subject to the
conditions herein stated" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [a]
[emphases added]).  The statute then lists these privileges in
subdivision (b):
"1. Stop, stand or park irrespective of the provisions
of this title [VII];
"2. Proceed past a steady red signal, a flashing red
signal or a stop sign, but only after slowing down as
may be necessary for safe operation;
"3. Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does
3Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101 defines an "Authorized
emergency vehicle" to include "[e]very . . . police vehicle"; and
for purposes of section 101, a "[p]olice vehicle" includes a
vehicle "operated by . . . a sheriff, undersheriff or regular
deputy sheriff" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 132-a).
4An "Emergency operation" includes "[t]he operation . . . of
an authorized emergency vehicle, when such vehicle is engaged in
. . . responding to . . . [a] police call" (Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 114-b).
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not endanger life or property; 
"4. Disregard regulations governing directions of
movement or turning in specified directions" (Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1104 [b]).
The privileges correspond generally with articles in title VII of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law, entitled "Rules of the Road" (see
articles 32, "Stopping, standing and parking" and 29, "Special
stops required"; article 24, "Traffic signs, signals and
marking"; article 30, "Speed restrictions"; and articles 25,
"Driving on right side of roadway, overtaking and passing, etc.,"
26 "Right of way," and 28, "Turning and starting and signals on
stopping and turning").
Subdivision (c) of the statute sets out prerequisites
or conditions upon the exercise of the privileges listed in
subdivision (b): except in the case of police vehicles or
bicycles "the exemptions herein granted" are available only when
the authorized emergency vehicle is making use of prescribed
audible and visual signals.
Finally, subdivision (e) of section 1104 specifies that
"[t]he foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due
regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions
protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless
disregard for the safety of others" (Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1104 [e] [emphasis added]).  Thus, subdivision (e) cautions these
drivers to operate their vehicles as safely as possible in an
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emergency and makes them answerable in damages if their reckless
exercise of a privilege granted by subdivision (b) causes
personal injuries or property damage.
But defendants and the dissent do not see it that way. 
They understand subdivision (e) to apply the reckless disregard
standard of care to all injury-causing conduct of drivers of
authorized emergency vehicles involved in emergency operations,
whether or not that conduct is exempt under subdivision (b).  But
subdivision (e) links the reckless disregard standard of care to
"[t]he foregoing provisions," which include the conditions in
subdivision (c) and the privileges in subdivision (b).
The dissent complains that we have "interpret[ed]
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) as if it read: 'When the
driver of an emergency vehicle engages in privileged conduct,
that driver will be protected from liability unless he or she
acts in reckless disregard of the safety of others'" (dissenting
op at 10).  The dissent, however, interprets subdivision (e) to
mean "The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in
an emergency operation shall be protected from liability unless
he or she acts in reckless disregard of the safety of others." 
As the dissent acknowledges, though, subdivision (e) is written
in the negative; it refers only to "[t]he foregoing provisions";
and the "foregoing provisions" only privilege the conduct
identified in subdivision (b), not any and all conduct of a
driver.
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Further, the dissent opines that the "evident intent"
of the reference to "foregoing provisions" in Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1104 (e) "was to ensure that the creation of the privileges 
earlier in the statute would not be misinterpreted as precluding
an emergency responder from being held accountable when he or she
caused an accident while engaged in privileged conduct"
(dissenting op at 10).  Thus, such emergency responder "cannot
receive a traffic citation" for conduct enumerated under section
1104 (b) (id. at 3); and "the fact that a driver failed to
conform to a traffic law" would not "constitute prima facie
evidence of negligence," or "be viewed as recklessness per se"
(id. at 11-12).  Assuming this interpretation of the interplay
between subdivisions (b) and (e) is correct, it does not follow
that section 1104 (e) creates a reckless disregard standard of
care for unprivileged conduct.  Indeed, the logical implication
of the dissent's reading of section 1104 is that the standard of
care for all emergency driving -- even if privileged under
subdivision (b) -- is negligence.5 
5This is exactly what the majority of states have decided,
contrary to our decision in Saarinen (see e.g. Tetro v Stratford,
189 Conn 601, 609; 458 A2d 5, 9 [Conn 1983] ["[E]mergency vehicle
legislation provides only limited shelter from liability for
negligence.  The effect of the statute is merely to displace the
conclusive presumption of negligence that ordinarily arises from
the violation of traffic rules.  The statute does not relieve
operators of emergency vehicles from their general duty to
exercise due care for the safety of others"] [emphasis added];
City of Little Rock v Weber, 298 Ark 382, 389; 767 SW2d 529, 533
[Ark 1989] [the "driver of an emergency vehicle is held to a
standard of ordinary care in the exercise of [the] statutory
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The Legislature certainly knew how to create the safe
harbor from ordinary negligence envisioned by defendants and the
dissent.  For example, the Legislature might simply have
structured section 1104 (a) and (b) along the lines of section
1103 (b).  As originally adopted in 1957, this provision stated
in relevant part that
"[u]nless otherwise made specifically applicable, the
provisions of this title [VII] shall not apply to
persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment
while actually engaged in work on a highway . . . but
shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling
to or from such work" (former Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1103 [b] [emphasis added]).
   
Thus, rather than taking the approach of section 1104
(a) and (b) -- excusing the driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle from complying with certain rules of the road when
involved in an emergency operation -- the Legislature in section
1103 (b) exempted "persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other
equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway" from all
the rules of the road, subject to any statutory exceptions. 
Subsequently, the Legislature "soften[ed] the outright exemption"
in section 1103 (b) by adding the due regard/reckless disregard
language of section 1104 (e) (Riley, 95 NY2d at 465; see also L
privileges"]; Barnes v Toppin, 482 A2d 749, 755 [Del 1984] [if
police officer "was found to be excused from obeying the speed
limit" under the statute, he was still required "to drive with
due regard for the safety of all persons" and thus was "governed
by the usual rules of negligence" [internal quotation marks
omitted]; Lee v City of Omaha, 209 Neb 345; 307 NW2d 800 [Neb
1981]; Rutherford v State, 605 P2d 16 [Alaska 1979]; Doran v City
of Madison, 519 So 2d 1308 [Ala 1988]).
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1974, ch 223).  In addition, in 1987 the Legislature created a
statutory exception, making "specifically applicable" those
provisions in title VII regarding driving under the influence of
drugs or alcohol (L 1987, ch 528).6 
 Legislative history further supports the view that the
reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1104 (e) is limited to accidents or incidents caused by exercise
of a privilege identified in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b). 
In its 1954 report, the New York State Joint Legislative
Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems described section 114 of its
proposed text -- adopted by the Legislature in 1957 as Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1104 with minor, non-substantive changes (see L
1957, ch 698), and now Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (a), (b),
6This exception to the exemption granted by section 1103 (b)
was intended to allow highway workers to be prosecuted if they
operated vehicles while in an intoxicated or impaired condition
(see Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1987, ch 528, at 6
["(a)lthough present (s)ection 1103 (b) does not relieve (highway
workers) from the provisions of (t)itle VII . . . from the duty
to proceed with due regard for the safety of all persons and from
the consequences of their reckless disregard of the safety of
others, this provision is applicable only with respect to civil
actions against the operators or their employers and not to the
accountability of the operator under the Vehicle and Traffic
Law"]; see also Letter of Michael Colodner, Unified Court System,
to Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor, dated July 9, 1987,
Bill Jacket, L 1987, ch 528, at 20 [noting that "under current
law, highway work crews are exempt from prosecution for reckless
driving or for driving while intoxicated"]).  Under our view of
section 1104, intoxicated or impaired emergency vehicle operators
involved in an accident when engaged in an emergency operation
would be subject to prosecution and to civil liability for
ordinary negligence.  
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(c) and (e)7 -- as follows:
"Section 114 lists certain privileges accorded 
drivers of authorized emergency vehicles when
responding to an emergency call or when in pursuit of
an actual or suspected violator of the law.  They may
park in prohibited places, pass stop signs or signals,
exceed the speed limits and disregard turning
restrictions, but in all cases only with due regard for
the safety of others.  The special privileges are
granted, except in the case of police vehicles, only
when the driver . . . is giving such audible signal as
may be reasonably necessary and when his vehicle is
displaying the proper warning lights"
(1954 NY Legis Doc No. 36, at 35 [emphases added]).
Further,
"Section 114 (i.e., section 1104) is divided into
four subsections.  Subsection (a) (i.e., section 1104
[a]) states when, and under what circumstances, the
driver of an authorized vehicle may exercise the
special privileges conferred by subdivision (b) . . . 
"Subsection (b) (i.e., section 1104 [b]) sets
forth four immunities which are granted to emergency
vehicles when they satisfy all the other prerequisites
of section 114 . . . 
"[T]hese privileges are conditioned [in subsection
(c); i.e., section 1104 (c)] upon proper identification
of the emergency vehicle so that motorists will have
sufficient warning of their approach.  The exemption
given to police vehicles is required because they may
need to approach suspected criminals without giving
advance notice.
"Finally, subsection (d) (i.e., section 1104 [e])
again repeats the caveat of paragraph (b) of section
2248 by requiring safe driving from the drivers of
7Section 1104 (d) was identical to the Committee's proposed
section 114 (d).  The wording of subdivision (d) has never
changed, although it was relettered subdivision (e) in 1968 when
a new subdivision (d) was added to the statute (L 1968, ch 336).
8Section 224 set out the rules governing ordinary vehicles
when an authorized emergency vehicle approaches in performance of
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emergency vehicles under all circumstances.  It makes
it clear that the exemptions shall not be construed to
relieve a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons, nor shall the grant of these privileges
protect the driver from the consequences of his
reckless disregard for the safety of others" (id., at
36-37 [emphases added]).  
This discussion confirms that these provisions are interrelated
such that subdivision (e) does not create a reckless disregard
standard of care independent of the privileges enumerated in
subdivision (b).
Additionally, we note that this is the first time we
have been asked to decide the question presented by this appeal. 
This is not entirely surprising: subdivision (b) exempts the
conduct most likely to lead to a motor vehicle accident severe
enough to prompt a lawsuit; for example, speeding or running a
red light.  Defendants and amici curiae insist, however, that in
our prior decisions, particularly Saarinen and Szczerbiak v Pilat
(90 NY2d 553 [1997]), we have held that the reckless disregard
standard of care applies when the conduct of an emergency vehicle
driver involved in an emergency operation causes personal
injuries or property damage, regardless of whether that conduct
emergency duties.  Paragraph (b) provided that "[t]his section
[224 would] not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons using the highway."  Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1144, entitled "Operation of vehicles on approach of
authorized emergency vehicles," originally included the same
language (see L 1957, ch 698).  In 1960, section 1144 (b) was
amended slightly to substitute "reasonable care" for "due regard"
(see L 1960, ch 300, § 48).
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is privileged under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b).9  Amicus
curiae New York State Division of State Police, for example,
argues that "[w]hile the facts of [Saarinen] involved a police
officer who exceeded the speed limit during a chase . . . the
Court's holding was broad and unambiguous," quoting the following
passage:
"Faced squarely with this question of statutory
interpretation for the first time, we hold that a
police officer's conduct in pursuing a suspected
lawbreaker may not form the basis of civil liability to
an injured bystander unless the officer acted in
reckless disregard for the safety of others" (Saarinen,
84 NY2d at 501 [emphasis added]).
Whether the police officer in Saarinen was entitled to
have his actions judged by the standard of care in section 1104
9The dissent likewise suggests that since our decision in
Saarinen, section 1104 (e) has been universally understood in
this way.  The fact is, though, that in the majority of cases
implicating section 1104, the conduct allegedly causing the
accident is, in fact, listed in subdivision (b).  For example,
the dissent cites Herod v Mele (62 AD3d 1269, 1270 [4th Dept
2009]), decided by the Fourth Department seven months before its
decision in Kabir, to support the thesis that our interpretation
(and the Fourth Department's) in this case is novel.  The issue
on this appeal did not arise in Herod, however, because there the
deputy was "exceeding the posted speed limit at the time of the
collision" (id. at 1270).  The same is true of Gonyea v County of
Saratoga (23 AD3d 790 [3d Dept 2005]), also cited by the dissent. 
In Gonyea, a deputy responding to a two-car accident parked her
vehicle such that it protruded into the travel lane of the
roadway by about 18 inches, allegedly causing a motorist to
swerve and hit a motorcyclist traveling in the opposite lane. 
The third case mentioned by the dissent -- Rodriguez v
Incorporated Village of Freeport (21 AD3d 1024 [2d Dept 2005]) --
is a memorandum decision with few facts where the parties
evidently focused on whether the police officer was engaged in an
"emergency operation" at the time of the accident, which occurred
while she was parking her patrol car.
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No. 28
(e) was not at issue, as the Division acknowledges.  The dispute
was over what that standard entailed.  Thus, in the paragraph
preceding the quoted language, we explained that "[b]ecause the
statute makes reference to both 'due regard' and 'reckless
disregard' for the safety of others, the courts of this State
have had some difficulty articulating the precise test for
determining a driver's liability for injuries resulting from the
operation of an emergency vehicle" (id. at 500).  We observed
that some New York courts had settled on "recklessness" as the
standard, while others adopted "'unreasonable under the
circumstances' . . . and 'negligence' . . ., either alone or
interchangeably with 'recklessness,' to describe the level of
culpability that will support liability under Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1104 (e)" (id. [citations omitted]).  The "question of
statutory interpretation" that we referred to in the language
cited by the State Police was therefore the nature of the
standard of care established by section 1104 (e) in a situation
where the police officer was clearly entitled to its benefit.
And notwithstanding arguments made to the contrary,
dicta in Saarinen undercut, rather than support, defendants' view
of section 1104.  For example, the very first paragraph of the
opinion includes the following language:
"Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 . . . qualifiedly
exempts [drivers of authorized emergency vehicles] from
certain traffic laws when they are 'involved in an
emergency operation.'  At issue in this appeal are the
meaning and effect of the statute's provisions for
civil liability in the event of an accident. 
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No. 28
Consistent with its language and purpose, we hold that
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) precludes the
imposition of liability for otherwise privileged
conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of
recklessness" (id. at 497 [citation omitted] [emphases
added]).10
Importantly, we later noted that "[t]he touchstone of our
analysis" in Saarinen was Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104
"which permits the driver of an 'authorized emergency
vehicle' to proceed past red traffic lights and stop
signs, exceed the speed limit and disregard regulations
regarding the direction of traffic, as long as certain
safety precautions are observed.  The privileges
afforded by the statute are circumscribed by section
1104 (e) [which] establishes the standard for
determining an officer's civil liability for damages
resulting from the privileged operation of an emergency
vehicle" (id. at 499-500 [internal citations and
quotation marks omitted] [emphases added]).
In Szczerbiak, a case that went to trial about six
weeks after we handed down our decision in Saarinen, the sole
question on appeal was "whether [the police officer's] conduct in
driving the automobile rose to the level of 'reckless disregard'
10Similar descriptions of section 1104 appear in dicta in
other cases (see e.g. Gonzalez v Iocovello, 93 NY2d 539, 551
[1999] ["Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 excuses the violation of
certain traffic laws by authorized vehicles involved in an
emergency operation" [emphasis added]; Criscione v City of New
York, 97 NY2d 152, 156 [2001] ["(T)he driver of an 'authorized
emergency vehicle' engaged in an 'emergency operation' is exempt
from certain 'rules of the road' under Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1104" [citing Riley, 95 NY2d at 462] [emphasis added]; Williams v
City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 364 [2004] [section 1104 "creates a
privilege exempting drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from
certain provisions in the Vehicle and Traffic Law" [emphasis
added]; and Ayers v O'Brien, 13 NY3d 456, 457 [2009] ["Operators
of authorized emergency vehicles are protected from liability for
conduct privileged under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, unless
their conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard"]
[emphasis added]).
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No. 28
for the safety of others required by Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1104 (e)" (Szczerbiak, 90 NY2d at 554-555).  The accident at
issue was arguably caused by the police officer's failure to keep
a proper lookout: just as he took his eyes off the road to
activate his emergency lights and siren, the officer hit and
killed a 16-year-old pedestrian/bicyclist.  As a result, the
plaintiffs in Szczerbiak might have contended that the officer's
conduct was not to be evaluated under the reckless disregard
standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) because
the fatality did not result from his exercise of a privilege
granted by section 1104 (b).  But they never made this argument
and we therefore did not decide this issue; we merely remarked
that even if the officer "were negligent in glancing down, this
'momentary judgment lapse' does not alone rise to the level of
recklessness required of the driver of an emergency vehicle in
order for liability to attach" (id. at 557).
Finally, the dissent devotes several pages to a
discussion of the many supposed "practical problems" presented by
our interpretation of the statute (dissenting op at 16-19). 
Simply put, section 1104 (e) establishes a reckless disregard
standard of care "for determining . . . civil liability for
damages resulting from the privileged operation of an emergency
vehicle" (Saarinen, 84 NY2d at 500); if the conduct causing the
accident resulting in injuries and damages is not privileged
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b), the standard of care
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for determining civil liability is ordinary negligence.    
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question should be
answered in the affirmative.
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Kabir v Monroe County
No. 28
GRAFFEO, J. (dissenting):
By concluding that the conduct of a driver of an
emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation should be
assessed under the reckless disregard standard of care under
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only when the driver is engaged
in one of the activities privileged in section 1104(b), the
majority reads a limitation into section 1104(e) that I believe
is unworkable, incompatible with our precedent and unwarranted
given the language in the statute.  The majority's new rule is
also inconsistent with the public policy underlying section 1104
because it creates an unjustifiable distinction that extends the
protection of qualified immunity only to police, fire or
ambulance personnel who speed, run a red light or violate a
handful of other traffic laws while responding to emergency
calls.  Thus, the majority holding has the perverse effect of
encouraging conduct directly adverse to the public policy of
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No. 28
requiring emergency responders to exercise the utmost care during
emergency operations.  As we observed in Saarinen v Kerr (84 NY2d
494 [1994]), section 1104(e) provides emergency responders with
the benefit of the heightened "reckless disregard" standard of
liability in recognition of the fact that these responders must
make split-second decisions (that sometimes may include violating
traffic laws) in service of a greater good.  Because the majority
undermines this proposition, I respectfully dissent.
I.
While driving a marked police vehicle, and in the
course of responding to a radio call of a possible burglary in
progress, Monroe County Deputy Sheriff John DiDomenico collided
with a vehicle operated by plaintiff Yasmin Kabir after he
momentarily took his eyes off the road to consult a data terminal
in his vehicle.  Because DiDomenico was operating an "authorized
emergency vehicle" as defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101
while engaged in an "emergency operation" as defined in Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 114-b, any liability arising from his conduct
must be assessed under the standard set forth in Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104.  That statute contains two provisions that
are at the heart of this controversy.  The first -- section
1104(b) -- creates four categories of "privileged" conduct,
specifically permitting an emergency responder to disregard a
variety of traffic laws, including proceeding through red lights
and exceeding maximum speed limits.  In other words, section
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1104(b) exempts emergency responders from compliance with certain
rules of the road.  As a result, the operator of a fire truck
who, for example, drives through a red light while responding to
a call cannot receive a traffic citation since that conduct is
permitted under section 1104(b).
But section 1104(b) says nothing about the standard of
liability that applies when an emergency responder is involved in
an accident giving rise to a lawsuit seeking civil damages.  That
issue is addressed in section 1104(e), which provides:
"The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons, nor shall such
provisions protect the driver from the
consequences of his reckless disregard for
the safety of others." 
Although we have previously recognized that this provision is not
a model of clarity, in Saarinen (84 NY2d 494) we determined that
it imposes a heightened "reckless disregard" standard of care
applicable to police officers and other responders engaged in
emergency operations.  We held that:
"a police officer's conduct in pursuing a
suspected lawbreaker may not form the basis
of civil liability to an injured bystander
unless the officer acted in reckless
disregard for the safety of others.  This
standard demands more than a showing of a
lack of 'due care under the circumstances' --
the showing typically associated with
ordinary negligence claims.  It requires
evidence that 'the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was
so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow' and has done so with
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conscious indifference to the outcome" (id.
at 501 [citations omitted]).
This statement of the relevant was unconditional and encompassed
every aspect of a police officer's "conduct" -- we did not
suggest that an emergency responder's actions are to be assessed
under the reckless disregard standard only if, at the time of the
accident, he or she was engaged in conduct privileged under
section 1104(b).  Prior to the Appellate Division decision in
this case, no court had imposed such a limitation on the scope of
section 1104(e).
Since Saarinen, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 has been
understood to impose a two-part test: if the driver was operating
an "authorized emergency vehicle" and was involved in an
"emergency operation" as those terms are defined in the statutory
scheme, the driver was entitled to the qualified immunity
afforded by the reckless disregard standard (see e.g. Herod v
Mele, 62 AD3d 1269 [4th Dept 2009]; Gonyea v County of Saratoga,
23 AD3d 790 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 13 NY3d 717; Rodriguez v
Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 21 AD3d 1024 [2d Dept 2005]).  The
majority now adds a third component to the equation, precluding
emergency responders from obtaining the benefit of the reckless
disregard standard unless -- ironically -- they violated one of
the traffic rules listed in section 1104(b).  Police officers,
firefighters or ambulance drivers who manage to obey traffic
signals or travel within the speed limit are out of luck if they
are involved in an accident.  Their conduct will be assessed
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under the ordinary negligence standard, making it much easier for
these "law abiding" emergency responders to be held liable for
damages.  Does this make sense?  
The precise issue presented in this case was not raised
by the parties in Saarinen and the police officer whose conduct
was under review in that case had apparently exceeded the speed
limit, thereby engaging in privileged conduct.  But our
explanation of the legislative policy underlying the statute --
as well as our analysis in that case and others -- is
antithetical to the approach now taken by the majority.  We
explained that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104
"represents a recognition that the duties of
police officers and other emergency personnel
often bring them into conflict with the rules
and laws that are intended to regulate
citizens' daily conduct and that,
consequently, they should be afforded a
qualified privilege to disregard those laws
where necessary to carry out their important
responsibilities.  Where the laws in question
involve the regulation of vehicular traffic,
the exercise of this privilege will
inevitably increase the risk of harm to
innocent motorists and pedestrians.  Indeed,
emergency personnel must routinely make
conscious choices that will necessarily
escalate the over-all risk to the public at
large in the service of an immediate,
specific law enforcement or public safety
goal.  Measuring the 'reasonableness' of
these choices against the yardstick of the
traditional 'due care under the
circumstances' standard would undermine the
evident legislative purpose of Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104, i.e., affording operators
of emergency vehicles the freedom to perform
their duties unhampered by the normal rules
of the road . . . [T]he possibility of
incurring civil liability for what amounts to
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a mere failure of judgment could deter
emergency personnel from acting decisively
and taking calculated risks in order to save
life or property or to apprehend miscreants"
(84 NY2d at 502).
Saarinen's public policy analysis is inconsistent with
the majority's holding here which apparently requires parsing the
specific conduct that a police officer was engaged in during an
emergency operation to distinguish privileged acts from non-
privileged acts for the purpose of altering the standard of
liability depending on which immediate conduct caused the
accident.  This approach is incompatible with Saarinen's concern
that emergency responders be given appropriate latitude to make
the quick decisions that are necessary when responding to police
calls and other emergency situations.  Under the rule the
majority now adopts, police officers are free to make such
decisions without fear of reprisal only when the judgment
involves running a red light or exceeding the speed limit; if
drivers choose instead to adhere to the rules of the road, any
accompanying lapse in judgment may give rise to civil liability.  
We have never applied different standards of liability
to an officer's conduct depending on whether it did or did not
fit within one of the privileges articulated in Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104(b).  In Saarinen, when the police officer
observed a car being driven recklessly, he began to follow the
vehicle, activating his siren and emergency lights.  When the
vehicle failed to pull over, instead speeding away, the officer
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gave chase, driving above the speed limit in pursuit.  During the
chase, the suspect's car crashed into a vehicle operated by a
civilian bystander, causing injury.  The civilian sued both the
suspect and the officer's municipal employer.  After finding that
section 1104(e) imposed a reckless disregard standard, the Court
held that the municipality was entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the complaint.  As is common in section 1104 cases,
resolution of whether the officer's conduct met the reckless
disregard standard (ie., whether there was a question of fact on
that score) turned not on the so-called privileged conduct --
there, speeding -- but on other actions taken by the driver.  We
explained:
 
"[A]s a matter of law, Officer McGown's
pursuit of [the suspect] did not overstep the
limits of the statutory qualified privilege. 
It is true that McGown exceeded the posted
speed limit, but that conduct certainly
cannot alone constitute a predicate for
liability, since it is expressly privileged
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)(3). 
The other circumstances on which plaintiff
and defendant [suspect] rely -- the wet
condition of the road, the possibility of
other vehicular traffic in the vicinity, the
over-all speed of McGown's vehicle and
McGown's purported delay in calling his
headquarters -- are similarly unpersuasive,
particularly in the context of an inquiry
based on the 'reckless disregard' standard"
(Saarinen, 84 NY2d at 503).
We thus applied the reckless disregard standard to all of the
officer's conduct, including claims that he failed to properly
consider the fact that other traffic might be in the area and
failed to promptly report the chase to his supervisors (who might
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have ordered him to desist).  We did not analyze the privileged
conduct under the heightened standard and then apply another,
less stringent standard to conduct not addressed in section
1104(b).
We followed the same approach in Szczerbiak v Pilat (90
NY2d 553 [1997]), a case similar to this case because it involved
an allegation that an accident was caused by an officer
momentarily removing his eyes from the roadway.  There, while
driving his police vehicle in response to a radio call of a fight
in progress at a nearby location, a police officer struck and
killed a teenager riding a bicycle.  Just prior to the collision,
the officer had 
"accelerated past the drivers in the passing
lane, and then pulled into the passing lane
himself with the intention of activating his
emergency lights and siren.  Officer Pilat
testified that he did not have his siren on
at the time of the impact, and he appears to
have struck [the decedent] while glancing
down from the road momentarily to turn on his
emergency lights and headlights" (id. at
555).  
The decedent's estate sued and, at trial, the trial court issued
a directed verdict in favor of the defense at the close of
plaintiff's case, finding that plaintiff's evidence did not meet
the reckless disregard standard as a matter of law.  This Court
agreed, reasoning:
"It can by no means be said that the risk
which Officer Pilat took in accelerating down
Dick Road was unreasonable, especially in
light of his duty to respond to the report of
five males engaged in a melee, or that he had
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created a great risk of probable harm by
driving 800 feet before attempting to engage
his emergency lights and siren.  When Officer
Pilat did glance down from the road to
activate his emergency lights, there was no
pedestrian traffic in sight and he was
several blocks from the next intersection . .
.  At any rate, even if Officer Pilat were
negligent in glancing down, this 'momentary
judgement lapse' does not alone rise to the
level of recklessness required of the driver
of an emergency vehicle in order for
liability to attach" (id. at 557 [internal
citation omitted] [emphasis added]).
Although the officer's act of "glancing down" was not conduct
enumerated in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), we nonetheless
applied the reckless disregard standard to that conduct in
determining whether that act could give rise to liability,
concluding that it did not meet the heightened standard of
liability as a matter of law.  Consistent with the analysis in
Szczerbiak, I would hold that Deputy DiDomenico's similar conduct
of glancing down to check the data terminal in his vehicle does
not rise to the level of reckless disregard as a matter of law.1 
In my view, the majority's treatment of DiDomenico's conduct is
difficult to square with our analysis in Saarinen and Szczerbiak.
II.
1 Indeed, in this case, not only does the majority conclude
that reversal of the judgment dismissing the complaint was
warranted but it also upholds the grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff.  But DiDomenico's momentary
glance down at his data terminal -- an action that, at worst,
would amount to nothing more than a lapse in judgment under
Saarinen and Szczerbiak insufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment -- has been transformed into a basis for driver
liability as a matter of law.
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I might be able to overlook these concerns if the
majority's conclusion was compelled by the plain language of the
statute.  But I find its construction of the statutory language
unpersuasive.  The majority interprets Vehicle and Traffic Law 
§ 1104(e) as if it read: "When the driver of an emergency vehicle
engages in privileged conduct, that driver will be protected from
liability unless he or she acts in reckless disregard of the
safety of others."  But that is not what section 1104(e) says. 
Rather than identifying a set of circumstances when an emergency
responder is protected by the reckless disregard standard, the
provision does just the opposite.  Written in the negative, the
subsection carves out the single situation when an emergency
responder is not protected from liability.  As we explained in
Saarinen, that circumstance is when the driver is operating the
vehicle "with reckless disregard for the safety of others."
I agree with the majority that it is significant that
the Legislature began section 1104(e) with a reference to the
"foregoing provisions," a phrase that clearly refers to the
privileges and conditions listed in other subsections such as
1104(b).  The evident intent in beginning section 1104(e) with a
reference to the "foregoing provisions" was to ensure that the
creation of the privileges earlier in the statute would not be
misinterpreted as precluding an emergency responder from being
held accountable when he or she caused an accident while engaged
in privileged conduct.  If the Legislature had not cross-
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referenced the other statutory privileges and conditions in
section 1104(e), a case could be made that the privileges were
absolute and that a driver was immune from suit whenever engaged
in such exempt conduct.  In other words, by referencing the
"foregoing provisions" in section 1104(e), the Legislature
clarified that, notwithstanding its decision to exempt emergency
responders from compliance with certain traffic laws, a driver
could be liable for any "consequences" flowing from his or her
reckless disregard for the safety of others regardless of whether
the driver was or was not engaged in privileged conduct.  
Plaintiff argues that an interpretation of section
1104(e) that permits an emergency responder to receive the
benefit of the reckless disregard standard regardless of the
nature of his or her conduct renders the privileges articulated
in section 1104(b) superfluous.  But this is not true.  The
privileges prevent police officers, firefighters and ambulance
drivers from being prosecuted when they find it necessary to
violate certain vehicle and traffic laws during emergency
operations.  Moreover, the privileges provide a significant
benefit for drivers (and the state and municipal entities that
are vicariously liable for their conduct) in civil actions.  In
the typical motor vehicle accident case, the fact that a driver
failed to conform to a traffic law -- particularly a driver's
disregard of a traffic signal or the speed limit -- would
constitute prima facie evidence of negligence, ensuring that the
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case would go to the jury and providing strong evidence in
plaintiff's favor.  Absent the section 1104(b) privileges,
conduct such as running through a red light -- frequently found
to be reckless when it occurs in other contexts -- might be
viewed as recklessness per se.  
By creating the privileges, the Legislature has
precluded a plaintiff from relying solely on the fact that an
emergency responder drove through a red light or exceeded the
speed limit to establish a prima facie case.  Because the statute
expressly permits this conduct, a plaintiff must offer additional
evidence demonstrating why the emergency responder's actions rose
to the "reckless disregard" standard under the circumstances
presented.  As noted above, our previous cases reflect that it is
often the driver's "non-privileged" conduct that is cited to
prove the requisite heightened recklessness.  There can be no
doubt that the section 1104(b) privileges are an important part
of the statutory scheme -- but there is no basis to conclude, as
the majority has, that an emergency responder's participation in
exempt conduct is a condition precedent to the application of
section 1104(e)'s reckless disregard standard. 
III.
Also unpersuasive is the majority's reliance on
legislative history.  None of the legislative history cited in
the opinion reflects an intent to restrict the applicability of
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e)'s reckless disregard standard
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to the conduct specified in the section 1104(b) privileges.  The
quoted passages express points about the statute that are not in
dispute.2  The legislative history confirms that subsection
1104(b) "lists certain privileges accorded drivers of authorized
emergency vehicles when responding to an emergency call or when
in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law" (see
1954 NY Legis Doc No. 36, at 35).  And it clarifies "that the
exemptions shall not be construed to relieve a driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due
regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall the grant of
these privileges protect the driver from the consequences of his
reckless disregard for the safety of others" (id. at 36-37). 
This latter point is precisely why it was necessary for the
2 The same is true of the quotations from Saarinen cited in
the majority opinion ( see maj op at 15-16).  In Saarinen, the
Court observed that section 1104 "qualifiedly exempts [drivers of
emergency vehicles] from certain traffic laws when they are
'involved in an emergency operation'" (Saarinen, at 497).  This
is an accurate observation about subsection 1104(b) over which
there is no controversy.  The Saarinen Court further noted that
section 1104(e) "precludes the imposition of liability for
otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to
the level of recklessness" (id.).  Again, we all agree that an
emergency responder can be held liable under the reckless
disregard standard even when he or she engages in privileged
conduct.  As the majority explains, the issue raised here was not
presented in Saarinen so the Court never had the opportunity to
address the crux of our disagreement -- whether an emergency
responder must engage in privileged conduct in order to gain the
benefit of the heightened "reckless disregard" standard.  But
nothing in our Saarinen decision undermines my conclusion that
qualified immunity is not contingent on exercise of one of the
1104(b) privileges -- and much of the analysis in that case
supports it.
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Legislature to cross-reference the subsection 1104(b) privileges
in the "reckless disregard" provision.  What the legislative
history does not say is that the reckless disregard standard was
intended to be applicable only when an emergency responder is
engaged in privileged conduct.  
Nor does the majority's reference to Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1103(b), applicable to road workers, lend support
to its conclusion.  That provision was adopted in 1957 at the
same time as section 1104, although the two provisions were
originally very different (see L 1957, ch 698).  Section 1103(b)
generally exempted vehicles engaged in road work from all rules
of the road and it did not include a reckless disregard provision
but instead was silent on the standard of care applicable to road
workers.  In contrast, in its original form, section 1104
permitted emergency responders to violate only specified vehicle
and traffic laws, but it adopted a "reckless disregard" standard
that provided some measure of protection against civil liability
-- just as it does today.  The legislative history does not
reveal why the drafters of these statutes initially took such
different approaches to these classes of drivers.  
The Legislature later concluded that the liability of
road workers should be assessed in the same manner as emergency
responders and, in 1974, it added "reckless disregard" language
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to section 1103(b) (see L 1974, ch 223).3  We held in Riley v
County of Broome (95 NY2d 455 [2000]) that, in the wake of this
amendment, road workers and emergency responders would now enjoy
the same qualified immunity under the heightened "reckless
disregard" standard.  Reiterating the rationale behind limiting
the liability of emergency responders that we had established in
Saarinen, we noted that it was "unclear" whether the extension of
the reckless disregard standard was "similarly justified" for
road workers (id. at 467).  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
"the Legislature ha[d] spoken clearly, giving vehicles engaged in
road work the benefit of the same lesser standard of care as
3 As the majority notes, section 1103(b) was also amended in
1987 to clarify that road workers are not exempt from compliance
with DWI and DWAI laws and may be prosecuted criminally for such
violations (see L 1987, ch 528).  It was obviously unnecessary to
similarly amend section 1104 since that statute never exempted
emergency responders from compliance with this category of laws. 
Based on the amendment to section 1103(b), the majority
extrapolates that emergency responders who engaged in such
conduct would be subject to civil liability under an ordinary
negligence standard (see maj op at 11, n 6).  It is clear from
the legislative history, however, that the amendment to section
1103(b) was intended to facilitate criminal prosecution of road
workers that violated DWI laws; there's no indication that it was
meant to address the civil liability of intoxicated road workers
-- much less the civil liability of emergency responders.  This
amendment to another statute lends no support to the majority's
claim that emergency responders should be subject to an ordinary
negligence standard unless they are engaged in privileged
conduct.  Moreover, I think it likely that a plaintiff who proved
that an emergency responder violated DWI or DWAI laws would have
little difficulty establishing liability under the section
1104(e) reckless disregard standard as few courses of conduct
more clearly evince a conscious disregard for the safety of
others than operating an emergency vehicle in an impaired or
intoxicated condition.
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emergency vehicles" (id. at 468).  
Given this observation, it is ironic that, relying in
part on the language in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), the
majority accepts a view of section 1104(e) that grants road
workers substantially broader protection from civil liability
than is enjoyed by emergency responders.  Since the majority keys
the applicability of the reckless disregard standard to the
exercise of privileged conduct, it has now excluded a category of
emergency responder conduct from the qualified immunity umbrella. 
Because road workers are exempt from all of the provisions of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law (except DWI and DWAI laws), the end
result is that the "reckless disregard" standard will be applied
to virtually all accidents involving vehicles engaged in road
work but only a subset of accidents involving emergency
responders.  Nothing in the legislative history of either statute
supports such a result.
IV.
Finally, I am also troubled by the fact that the
majority imposes its new limitation on the scope of the reckless
disregard standard without explaining how the standard is to be
applied or responding in any way to the practical problems
presented by its new rule, which are highlighted in the Appellate
Division dissent and the briefs submitted by the amici.  The
questions the majority has chosen not to answer demonstrate the
unworkable nature of the new rule.  Does the liability standard
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fluctuate within the course of an emergency route depending on
whether, at a particular moment, an officer is speeding or
running a red light?  Or is the reckless disregard standard
triggered with respect to the entire emergency operation once the
officer initiates that standard by violating one of the laws
cited in section 1104(b)?  Is the jury to parse through the
different acts of a driver that might have contributed to the
accident, applying the reckless disregard standard to the conduct
privileged under section 1104(b) and the ordinary negligence
standard to the remainder?  How will the standard be applied when
the accident is attributed to multiple causes, some involving
privileged acts and some not?  The majority doesn't say.  
In this case, for example, the majority finds that
Deputy DiDomenico's conduct must be assessed under the ordinary
negligence standard since he took his eyes off the roadway when
approaching the intersection and was not speeding or running a
red light at the time.  But what if DiDomenico had testified at
his deposition that the light had been red when he and the
plaintiff approached the intersection?  Would he then be entitled
to have his conduct assessed under the reckless disregard
standard on the theory that he was attempting to run a red light
when he caused the accident?  What if DiDomenico had been driving
one mile above the speed limit when he looked up and saw
plaintiff's car?  Would the jury apply the reckless disregard
standard to all of his conduct or only to the speeding component,
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judging his momentary glance away from the roadway under the
ordinary negligence standard? 
One thing is certain -- the majority's new rule will
engender much confusion as litigants attempt to sort out these
issues.  It will also lead to an unusual shifting of positions:
plaintiffs will now argue that the emergency responder that
caused the accident scrupulously adhered to the rules of the road
(meaning that liability should be determined under the ordinary
negligence standard) while emergency responders will emphasize
all the traffic laws they violated on the way to the accident (in
an effort to gain the benefit of the reckless disregard
standard).  Indeed, one could say that the majority rule
encourages police officers, firefighters and ambulance drivers to
violate the rules of the road, thus ensuring that their actions
will be assessed under the qualified immunity standard in Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1104(e) in the event they are in an accident
(we are all fortunate that the people attracted to jobs of this
nature are not likely to be motivated by such self interest). 
And it has created a situation where traffic violators are
rewarded with greater protection than is available to those who
conform to the rules of the road.  I am confident that this was
not what the Legislature had in mind when it adopted a statute
meant to cloak emergency responders with qualified immunity.  To
this end, perhaps this case will provide the Legislature an
opportunity to review the statute to assess whether revision is
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necessary to clarify its intent.
For all of these reasons, I would reverse the order of
the Appellate Division and reinstate Supreme Court's judgment
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the affirmative.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Pigott and Jones concur.  Judge Graffeo dissents and votes
to reverse in an opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Smith
concur.
Decided February 17, 2011
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