Title: Cordova v. Gosar

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cordova v. Gosar1986 WY 118719 P.2d 625Case Number: 85-271Decided: 05/20/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Elmer CORDOVA and Dorothy 
Cordova, husband and wife, Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Antonia GOSAR, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, J.

Robert A. Magee, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

John W. James of 
James & James, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1.]     By summary judgment the 
trial court, for contended mutual mistake, invalidated a 12-year-old deed 
description which would terminate the interest of an 80-year-old widow in her 
home after the grantee served a notice to quit. Grantee, unsuccessful in the 
trial court, appeals and is now again denied by this court's 
affirmance.

[¶2.]     In June, 1973, Antonia 
Gosar, as seller, entered into a sales agreement with Elmer Cordova and Dorothy 
Cordova for the sale of real estate in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Described in the agreement was Lot 
13, Block 2, Pilot Butte Addition (417 Tisdel), City of Rock Springs, and by 
separate paragraph a portion of Block 7 (810 Pilot Butte Avenue) of the same 
subdivision. The payment price was $12,000, payable after down payment on 
monthly installments to an escrow agent which also held a document escrow 
including the unrecorded executed deed. The payment schedule carried a time 
period of approximately ten years. At the expiration of that period, 1983, the 
escrow was closed and legal documents were delivered to the buyer, who then 
recorded the deed which documented the conveyance of two separate parcels of 
land and two noncontiguous houses.

[¶3.]     Cordova occupied one 
parcel after initial purchase, and Gosar continued to occupy her home on the 
other parcel, without notable event until October, 1984, when a notice to quit 
was served on Gosar by Cordova for failure "to pay rent since November 7, 1983, 
when we became legal owners," which apparently is the day that the escrow 
payments were completed and the deed was delivered to the buyer by the escrow 
holder.

[¶4.]     Gosar, of Yugoslavic 
extraction, was aged 80 years, and had lived 54 years continuously on the 
Tisdel 
Street property. She first came to know that the 
original sales documents included both properties, one of which was her home, by 
receipt of the notice to quit, as she had continued to pay taxes and provide 
insurance for the property to current time.

[¶5.]     Reacting to the notice 
to quit, Mrs. Gosar filed suit, claiming adverse possession, mutual mistake of 
fact and failure of consideration, and requested a temporary restraining order 
and injunction to retain possession during the litigation. Cordova answered in 
essence by general denial, and did not include any affirmative defenses or 
counterclaim in the pleading. A temporary restraining order and interim 
injunction was granted by the trial judge.

[¶6.]     The simplistic 
resolution of this appeal which could have been afforded after a trial is denied 
by the district court's grant of summary judgment; consequently more detailed 
factual and pleading review is mandated.

[¶7.]     Following entry of the 
temporary restraining order, counsel for Cordova, on October 29, 1984, moved for 
change of judge, which motion was denied by order entered October 30, 1984. Rule 
40.1(b), W.R.C.P., the Wyoming peremptory judicial disqualification 
rule affording disqualification opportunity as of right, had been eliminated in 
1982, and then reinstituted effective October 31, 1984, one day after the denial order was 
entered.

[¶8.]     A request for admission 
was served by Gosar and answered by Cordova, with the parties pursuing other 
discovery. The case then came, in July, 1985, from filing date of October, 1984, 
to a motion for summary judgment by Gosar. It is from the affidavits spawned by 
that motion that this resolution is now required.

[¶9.]     Gosar averred 
ownership, tax payment, fire insurance coverage, execution of the 1973 
agreement, continuous possession, and:

"17. Any claims of the 
said Defendants, and each of them, are without right whatever, that the said 
Defendants have no right, title, claim, lien, estate, interest or equity 
whatever in, to or upon said real property and premises or any part thereof, 
which property is described in Paragraph 3 hereof, namely the said Lot 13, Block 
2, of the Pilot Butte Addition to the City of Rock Springs, Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming.

* * * * * *

"19. For a continuous 
period of more than ten years last past, Plaintiff and her predecessors in title 
have, under claim of ownership, been in open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, 
adverse, lawful, peaceable and actual possession of, and have owned in fee 
simple, all of the above described real property and premises described in 
Paragraph 3 above, during all of which time they have asserted such ownership 
against the above named and mentioned Defendants, and against all the 
world.

* * * * * *

"21. In signing Exhibits 
`C' and `D', which are attached hereto, being the sales agreement and the 
warranty deed, respectively, it was not the intent of either the seller in that 
contract, the Plaintiff herein, nor the intent of the buyers in that contract, 
the Defendants herein, to sell and transfer to the Defendants the above 
described real property and premises more particularly described in Paragraph 3 
above."

[¶10.]  Jere Ryckman, a practicing attorney in 
Green River, stated by affidavit as to the 
Tisdel property:

"2. That during the 
latter part of August, 1984, or the beginning of September, 1984, Dorothy 
Cordova sought legal advice from affiant in connection with a sales agreement 
dated June 1, 1973, between Dorothy Cordova and her husband, Elmer Cordova, as 
buyers, and Antonia Gosar, as seller.

"3. At the time Dorothy 
Cordova spoke with affiant regarding said sales contract for real property, she 
indicated her concern to be that Robert L. Bath would some how attempt to retake 
the property she had purchased under the contract, located at 810 Pilot Butte 
Avenue, which was her residence and which is more particularly described as 
follows:

"[Description.]

"and that a second parcel 
of property had been mistakenly included in the said contract of sale and 
deed.

"4. Dorothy Cordova was 
further concerned that she would be assessed real property taxes by the County 
of Sweetwater for two parcels of property located in Rock Springs, Wyoming, when 
she only owned one, which was her residence above mentioned, located at 810 
Pilot Butte Avenue.

"5. In order to protect 
her residence and to negate the possibility of paying taxes on property she did 
not own, which from my information seemed to be Antonia Gosar's home located at 
417 Tisdel, Rock Springs, Wyoming, Dorothy Cordova authorized me to contact 
attorney John James, who she thought was representing Antonia Gosar, and advise 
Mr. James of the above circumstances set forth in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and 
take whatever steps were necessary in order to clear up the mistake in the above 
mentioned contract and the deed prepared pursuant thereto so that Dorothy 
Cordova's home would be protected and Mrs. Gosar's property would again be in 
her name alone. It was my understanding from speaking with Dorothy Cordova that 
the contract mistakenly included Mrs. Gosar's home located at 417 Tisdel and so 
did the deed. Dorothy Cordova authorized me to advise Mr. James that she and her 
husband, Elmer Cordova, would sign a deed conveying Mrs. Gosar's home, located 
at 417 Tisdel, back to her, which property is more specifically described 
as:

"[Description.]

"in order to remedy the 
mistaken inclusion of this property in the said contract of sale and deed of 
June 1, 1973.

"6. Pursuant to the 
authorization of Dorothy Cordova to contact John James and advise him of the 
above, affiant contacted John James a couple of days prior to September 18, 
1984, by telephone and advised him of the above. Pursuant thereto Mr. James 
prepared the deed conveying the property at 417 Tisdel from Dorothy Cordova and 
Elmer Cordova to Antonia Gosar, along with a transmittal letter dated 9/18/84, 
which is attached hereto and made part hereof as Exhibit `A.' Upon receiving the 
deed attached as Exhibit `A,' affiant advised Dorothy Cordova of such receipt 
and advised that it was ready to be executed by her and her husband, Elmer 
Cordova. After receiving this information, Dorothy and Elmer Cordova refused to 
execute said deed, and obtained other legal counsel in regard to this 
matter."

[¶11.]  Robert L. Bath, the drafting attorney for 
the original agreement related in his affidavit the sales events, and stated 
that it was not intended to include both homes, that the purchase price was 
insufficient for both, and that inclusion of the Gosar house in the description 
was a mistake.

[¶12.]  Further included in support of the motion 
for summary judgment was an affidavit of the deputy assessor of the county, 
involving a telephone call with Mrs. Cordova discussing the description mistake 
and the erroneous inclusion of two parcels instead of only the one which had 
been occupied by purchaser. Gosar filed an extensive brief in support of the 
motion for summary judgment. Cordova filed a brief in opposition, contending 
that the issues of fact should render summary judgment inappropriate. Attached 
to the brief were affidavits of Elmer Cordova and Dorothy Cordova.

[¶13.]  Elmer Cordova, by responsive affidavit, 
denied facts stated by Gosar, Bath and Ryckman, stated that both properties 
were properly included, and: 

"4. That in fact, for 
many months before June, 1973, Antonia Gosar had offered to sell the residences 
at 417 Tisdel and 810 Pilot Butte to me.

"5. That during that 
period, Antonia Gosar said she would sell both residences to him `cheap' because 
she said she `wanted to go back to the old country.'

"6. That Antonia Gosar, 
prior to the sale, said she wanted to stay in the residence at 417 Tisdale [sic] 
until she went `back to the old country' and would pay the taxes and insurance 
on that residence until then.

* * * * * *

"10. That several months 
after the agreement was signed, Antonia Gosar remarked to Affiant that he might 
remodel the 417 Tisdel residence after she had gone to the old country, for 
himself.

"11. That Antonia Gosar 
resided at 417 Tisdel with his consent, it having been agreed that so long as 
she paid the taxes and kept insurance, she would not pay any rent.

* * * * * *

"13. Antonia Gosar knew 
what she was doing, and told Affiant her reasons for what she wanted to do, and 
fully intended to sell both residences at the time of the agreement.

* * * * * *

"14. That in 1980, 
Antonia Gosar pointed out the cupboards in the 417 Tisdel residence, commenting 
on their condition, and suggesting that Affiant could replace them after she had 
gone `to the old country.'

"15. That in view of the 
agreement Affiant had made with Antonia Gosar about her staying in the 417 
Tisdel residence until she returned to Europe and as long as she paid the taxes 
and kept the insurance on that property, Affiant did not know whether he could 
ask her to pay rent and he was unsure of how long he had to wait for Antonia 
Gosar to leave the premises."

[¶14.]  Dorothy Cordova also averred by three 
affidavits facts generally contrary to the affidavits of Bath, the deputy assessor 
and Ryckman.1

[¶15.]  The case then came in August to a further 
motion to disqualify the judge by present counsel for Cordova, supported by 
affidavits of prior counsel and Dorothy Cordova, contending for bias and 
prejudice of the presiding judge. The motion was denied by an order wherein the 
court

"* * * finds that he is 
not biased and prejudiced and is capable of giving the Defendants a fair 
trial."

[¶16.]  A ten-page opinion letter was entered, 
speaking to the determination in favor of Gosar, with a resulting 
summary-judgment order entered, from which this appeal now comes.

[¶17.]  We must decide whether the summary 
judgment in favor of Gosar can be sustained, or whether the case should be 
remanded for a trial on the issues developed by the conflicting 
affidavits.

[¶18.]  Approximately one-fourth of all appeals 
maturing to opinions since October 31, 1985 in this court, excluding criminal 
and worker's compensation cases, have involved summary judgment or sustained 
motions to dismiss.2 The appeals have advanced from a 
plethora to an avalanche. This case presents a particularly unusual appellate 
challenge.

[¶19.]  The trial court postulated his position 
in determination of summary judgment: 

"Elmer Cordova has filed 
herein an affidavit alleging a parol agreement was entered into between him and 
Gosar to the effect that she would be permitted to occupy the Tisdel property 
until she returned to Yugoslavia as long as she paid the 
taxes and kept the place insured. This is clearly inconsistent with the terms of 
the written Agreement, as noted above, with respect to the taxes and insurance. 
Inasmuch as the subject matter of his affidavit `is not only dealt with in the 
written contract but is fully covered thereby, parol evidence with respect to a 
collateral matter (i.e. taxes and insurance) it is not admissible.'

* * * * * *

"I have examined the file 
and read the briefs and the affidavits and feel that the Defendants would be 
unable to refute the testimony and evidence of the Plaintiff and also that 
Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that could well entitle her to a 
directed verdict if uncontroverted at a trial. I might add that I do not believe 
there are any genuine issues of 
material fact necessitating a trial. Furthermore, this is not a jury matter, 
but a trial before the Court. If I were to hold here that the motion be denied 
and that a trial be had, I would be confronted by the same testimony as is set 
forth in the affidavits, and being so confronted feel I would be compelled to 
rule in favor of the Plaintiff or, had it been a jury trial, directed a verdict 
for Plaintiff."

[¶20.]  The first factual issue of this case is 
whether Gosar intended to sell one or two parcels of land, with the consequent 
question of a scrivener's mistake in draftsmanship. The second is the existence 
of any coordinate oral agreement.

[¶21.]  We are led in syllogistic analysis to the 
following factual review:

1. Contested contention 
of the erroneous inclusion of property by description in a sales 
transaction;

2. Clear factual 
circumstances supporting the analysis of a mistake;

3. Buyers' response and 
answer to the factual circumstances alleging the existence of an oral agreement 
which sustains and describes the facts which did occur in order to rebut mutual 
mistake.

[¶22.]  In support of this analysis, we have the 
comment in the Cordova brief:

"* * * The court erred in 
not reading Elmer Cordova's affidavit as a response to such an assertion, but 
more importantly as explaining a subsequent course of action."

[¶23.]  This explanation is

"That Antonia Gosar, 
prior to the sale, said she wanted to stay in the residence at 417 Tisdale [sic] 
until she went `back to the old country,' and would pay the taxes and insurance 
on that residence until then."

And:

"That Antonia Gosar 
resided at 417 Tisdel with his consent, it having been agreed that so long as 
she paid the taxes and kept insurance, she would not pay any rent."

[¶24.]  We are then faced with the "explanation" 
in consonance of the fact that Cordova did not wait until Gosar "went back to 
the old country" to demand possession as he first initiated this possession 
action by notice to quit in 1984.

[¶25.]  In a reply brief, Cordova 
stated:

"Applying a 
reasonable-man test to the actions of Elmer Cordova, it is possible to conclude 
that the price he paid was reasonable in view of what could amount to a life 
estate in Antonia Gosar, although her possession of the Tisdel property would 
only be until she returned to the old country, and that after so many years he 
began to wonder whether she would ever return * * *."

[¶26.]  In oral argument, as an explanation of 
the institution of the dispossessory action, it was indicated by counsel that 
Cordova got tired of waiting for Gosar to return to Yugoslavia.

Issues

[¶27.]  Cordova states the issues as: 

I. "The District Court 
erred in concluding that mutual mistake had been established on appellee's 
motion for summary judgment and in its handling of parol and extrinsic evidence 
in reaching that conclusion."

II. "The court below 
erred in granting summary judgment."

III. "The court erred in 
denying the motion for change of judge."

[¶28.]  The appellee stated the issues 
differently:

"A. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.

(1) Whether self-serving 
inferential affidavits filed by the Appellants in the trial court, which 
contradict the course of dealing and course of performance of both Appellants 
and Appellee, and which clearly contradict the independent direct and 
circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom are adequate to raise an issue 
of material fact.

"B. Whether Rule 40.1(b), 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, permitted preemptory challenge of a judge on 
October 30, 1984.

"C. Whether it was 
reversible error for the trial court to deny appellants' motion to disqualify 
him from sitting on the case due to bias and prejudice constituting antagonism 
and opposition to one of the appellants, Dorothy Cordova."

[¶29.]  This opinion will be rearranged for 
discussion by the following topics:

I. Recusal and judicial 
disqualification.

II. 
Privilege.

III. Sufficiency of the 
evidence on mutual mistake.

IV. Summary 
judgment.

V. Parol 
evidence.

I

Recusal and Judicial 
Disqualification

[¶30.]  Appellant strongly contends that the 
trial judge should have been recused.

[¶31.]  Clearly, the mandatory-removal provision 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure was not in effect at the time the motion 
was either filed or determined. We are not now called to decide what would have 
occurred if counsel had waited to file until after the reinstated rule went into 
effect or if the court had delayed its order for two more days. For a similar 
reason we will not now determine hypothetically whether the status of the case 
at the time the motion was filed was of a nature so that the present Rule 
40.1(b)(1), W.R.C.P., Cum.Supp. 1985, would have required peremptory removal as 
challenged.3

[¶32.]  In review of the disqualification for 
cause section, it is apparent that the relevant provision is (E): "is biased or 
prejudiced against the party or his counsel." We are bothered by the time 
sequence upon which the supporting affidavit for removal is based, wherein it 
indicates that the event occurred on October 23, 1984, between counsel and the 
court, as recited in an affidavit dated June 24, 1985, and then first filed by 
motion to disqualify the judge in a briefing order regarding the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment entered on July 22, 1985, or seven months later at a 
time after the motion for summary judgment had been filed. Earlier attention to 
the claimed bias would have been more persuasive when compared with the later 
effort to change judges when an undesired result may have been 
anticipated.

[¶33.]  We will hold that, as a concern of the 
exercise of discretion by the sitting judge, no sufficient evidence was afforded 
upon which the motion to disqualify would have to be sustained. Kobos v. 
Sugden, Wyo., 
694 P.2d 110 (1985); Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725 (1979). It is also noted 
that the argument submitted in appellant's brief was not supported by the 
"cogent authority" required under our rules of appellate practice. Rule 5.01, 
W.R.A.P.; Clouser v. Spaniol 
Ford, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1360 (1974). The record does not reflect a basic unfairness in the judicial 
process denominating inappropriate bias for disqualification for cause under the 
Wyoming 
rule.

II

Privilege

[¶34.]  Another issue concerns this court, 
although not discussed by counsel as a basis for appeal or by brief, involving 
the affidavit of Jere Ryckman, an attorney for Dorothy Cordova. May it suffice 
to serve as a warning that affidavits of this kind should not casually reappear 
in trial records in the future unless a proper privilege hearing is held to 
determine that the privilege did not exist or has been waived. In this case, the 
text of the affidavit at least preliminarily satisfies the waiver of privilege 
concern by virtue of statements that the direction given to the attorney was to 
communicate to the attorney of the opposing side, and consequently the affidavit 
relates only to what was directed and done.

"(a) The following 
persons shall not testify in certain respects:

(i) An attorney or a 
physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or patient in 
that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician 
may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or 
patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be compelled to 
testify on the same subject; * * *." Section 1-12-101, W.S. 1977.

See Berggren v. 
Berggren, 77 Wyo. 438, 317 P.2d 1101 (1957), and Rule 501, 
W.R.E.

[¶35.]  Additionally, the affidavit was answered 
by Mrs. Cordova by her own affidavit, and no motion to strike or to suppress was 
presented so that a question could be raised requiring judicial resolution. 
Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, Wyo., 713 P.2d 786 
(1986).

III

Sufficiency of Evidence 
or Mutual Mistake

[¶36.]  Factually established without conflict, 
is that Gosar continued to occupy the Tisdel property as owner. Cordova, 
responding to claims for mutual mistake, now attests that such occupancy was 
permissive only until Gosar, having lived there for now 54 years, would return 
to the old country. Cordova's patience then became exhausted, since Mrs. Gosar 
not only continued to live but continued to live in Rock 
Springs and not in Yugoslavia, from where she had come 
not less than 54 years earlier.

[¶37.]  We take some comfort in the comment of 
the Court of Appeals in Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962), 
a case involving a mutual-mistake question:

"* * * [T]he finding of 
mutual mistake can be fairly said to be derived not solely from application of 
legal standards, but from the trial judge's experience with human 
affairs."

[¶38.]  Factually, the evidence addressing mutual 
mistake was not only substantial, but persuasive if not overwhelming. A review 
of the documents cannot lead one to conclude that Antonia Gosar intended to sell 
her residence of then over 40 years at the time that she entered into the 
contract to sell the second piece of property which was then being rented from 
her by Cordova. Parol evidence is available to prove mutual mistake of fact in 
deed description. Neeley v. Kelsch, Utah, 
600 P.2d 979 (1979). The parol-evidence rule will be discussed generally in a 
later section of this opinion.

[¶39.]  Standing at this stage of case 
resolution, if unanswered by Cordova, Gosar was certainly entitled to succeed in 
the litigation. Harden v. Gregory Motors, Wyo., 
697 P.2d 283 (1985); Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Russell v. Curran, 66 
Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159 (1949).

"`However, if the movant 
makes out a prima facie case that would entitle him to a directed verdict if 
uncontroverted at trial, summary judgment will be granted unless the party 
opposing the motion offers some competent evidence that could be presented at 
trial showing that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. One 
commentator explains this process as follows: "the burden of producing evidence 
is shifted to the party opposing the motion," * * *' 10 Wright and Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2727, pp. 536-537 (1973)." Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo., 550 P.2d 490, 492 (1976).

IV

Summary 
Judgment

[¶40.]  This case is difficult by resolution of 
summary-judgment concepts, and consequently more extended review will be pursued 
to accommodate perceived justice and yet avoid what otherwise might appear as a 
result-determined concept anomaly.

[¶41.]  Evaluation of the last 150 Wyoming cases (15 years) course of summary-judgment 
decisions demonstrates that summary judgment is a, if not the, principal case 
disposition process in Wyoming at this time and with proportionately 
increasing frequency. Since an order denying summary judgment is not appealable 
and consequently usually only motions granting are appealed, the frequency of at 
least initial use may approximate half the civil nonagency litigation at this 
time.

[¶42.]  In a particular effort to make some sense 
in consistency, and afford a justified basis for decision in this case, the 
course and sequence of summary judgment will be analyzed.

[¶43.]  The stage analysis of a summary-judgment 
case would normally involve the following:

1. Legal sufficiency of 
the complaint.

2. Procedural sufficiency 
of the motion for summary judgment and attached affidavits and deposition 
material.4

3. Substantive 
sufficiency of the affidavits to initially support the motion.

4. Procedural sufficiency 
of responsive affidavits.

5. Substantive legal 
issue disposition.

6. Substantive 
sufficiency of responsive affidavits.

[¶44.]  The next stage, if achieved, would be 
motion denial and trial disposition.

[¶45.]  A highly contributory factor in the 
complexity and variegated results is discerned from the failure of counsel and 
court to analyze the stage in a particular case where the contested decision is 
required. Undoubtedly, also, it is the stage six decisions that are the most 
complex, varied, and discontinuous. 

"* * * Trial by affidavit 
is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of `even 
handed justice.'" Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S. Ct. 486, 491, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962).

"Summary judgment is an 
extreme and treacherous remedy, not to be entered unless movant has established 
its right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and 
unless the other party is not entitled to recover under any set of discernible 
circumstances [citation]. Summary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for the 
determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and other 
subjective feelings play dominant roles [citation]." Croxen v. United States 
Chemical Corporation of Wisconsin, 558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D.C.N.D. 
1982).

"* * * To determine the 
propriety of a summary judgment, we must examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was entered and give to 
that party the benefit of all inferences which properly can be drawn from the 
available evidence. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., [Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 
(1984)]. If we find that an inquiry into the facts was necessary for the proper 
application of the law, we must overturn the summary judgment. Kimbley v. 
City of Green River, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 446 (1982)." 
Greaser v. Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327, 332 (1985).

[¶46.]  Applying, then, the issue of resolution 
to the claim of Mrs. Gosar to eliminate the contended mutual-mistake-of-fact 
deed which encumbered her home, in order to determine whether, in the fact of 
conflicting affidavits, summary judgment should have been granted, we will 
consider each stage serially.

[¶47.]  Stage One: insufficiency of the original 
complaint (statute of frauds, statute of limitations, malicious prosecution, 
failure to state a claim), cf. Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808 (1986). Davis v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 710 P.2d 827 (1985); Venson Ford v. 
Madia, Wyo., 480 P.2d 101 (1971); Hamel v. American Continental Corporation, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1152 
(1986). Under present pleading strictures, the Gosar complaint is obviously 
sufficient.

[¶48.]  Stage Two: procedural sufficiency of the 
movant affidavits. Timely filed and obviously in compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 56, W.R.C.P.; not premised on hearsay, they were based on 
knowledge, and signed and sworn to in the required fashion. The proceeding for 
hearing was properly noticed and held in accord with Rule 56. Torrey v. 
Twiford, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 1160 (1986); Fiedler v. Steger, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 773 (1986); Hickey v. Burnett, Wyo., 707 P.2d 741 (1985); Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443 (1982).

[¶49.]  Stage Three: sufficiency of the movant 
affidavits. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); 
F.S. Bowen Electric Co. v. J.D. Hedin Construction Co., 114 A.D.C. 361, 316 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Garner v. Hickman, 
Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 (1985); Hinkle v. Siltamaki, Wyo., 361 P.2d 37 (1961). The affidavits and 
documentary material were substantially embodied with factual matters of 
admissible evidence, defined in proper terms to address mutual mistake. A proper 
evidentiary basis for the intial burden for summary judgment was addressed by 
facts admissible in evidence. Riggs v. British Commonwealth Corp., 459 F.2d 449 
(10th Cir. 1972).

[¶50.]  A difference obviously exists as to the 
evidentiary burden of movant to produce evidence sufficient if unanswered to 
determine the case, as contrasted with the respondent's evidentiary burden, 
which will be addressed in a discussion of stage six. This is sometimes defined 
as the difference between the burden of the evidence and the burden of the 
contention. National Industries, Inc. v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982); Doff v. Brunswick Corporation, 372 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 820, 88 S. Ct. 39, 19 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1967). At this 
stage, we find sufficient evidence properly submitted to conclude that a prima 
facie case of mutual mistake had been established, and, consequently, 
appellant's argument No. 1 is not well taken. Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, supra.

[¶51.]  Stage Four: procedural sufficiency of 
responsive affidavits. These affidavits were timely filed, properly served, 
signed, and stated facts based on personal knowledge. On this basis, unless 
other resolution is derived by consideration of stages five and six inquiries, 
it would be necessary for the motion for summary judgment to be denied. Board of 
County Commissioners of Fremont County v. Memorial Hospital of Natrona County, 
Wyo., 682 P.2d 334 (1984); Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 
(1981).

[¶52.]  Stage Five: legal issue disposition. 
Resolution in many cases is accommodated at this time by a determination that 
the issue between the parties is not factual in nature, but rather involves a 
contested issue of law which consequently will decide the case. This stage 
resolution involves interpretation of unambiguous contracts, suits on rationally 
uncontested promissory notes, and a variant kind of circumstance where the facts 
are not in dispute but the legal principles are otherwise at issue. Ogle v. 
Caterpillar Tractor, Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986); 
City of Casper v. International Association of 
Firefighters, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1187 (1986); Duffy 
v. Brown, Wyo., 708 P.2d 433 (1985); Sannerud v. First 
National Bank of Sheridan, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236 (1985). We find 
no dispositive legal issue. The question is credibility and factual dispute. 
Consequently, the remaining determination can only be made as a stage six 
resolution by determining the substantive sufficiency of the responsive 
affidavits.

[¶53.]  Stage Six: dozens of Wyoming cases, hundreds 
of federal cases, and thousands of cases from other states discern general 
principles or advance interesting statements for summary judgment grant or 
denial at the stage six decision. Proper understanding and suitable analysis for 
this kind of case requires confinement to the issue now remaining as to the 
sufficiency of the responsive affidavit or if the issues of fact should be 
reserved for trial in order to differentiate between legal rule disposition and 
desired result justification.

"* * * When the moving 
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. 
[Citations.] In the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come forward 
with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Fed.Rule 
Civ.Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added)." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corporation, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

[¶54.]  Clearly in this case, if the decision of 
the trial court granting summary judgment to Mrs. Gosar is to be affirmed, it 
becomes necessary for this court to deny the efficacy of the Cordova affidavits 
as a stage six decision.

[¶55.]  Evidentiary rules relating to the 
responsive affidavit include the following:

(a) affidavit rejected as 
hearsay, conclusory, or 
nonsubstantive.

(b) affidavit rejected as 
not affording fact conflict on a material 
issue.

(c) no evidentiary basis 
in the affidavit to create an actual fact 
conflict.

(d) facts stated are not admissible as trial 
evidence.

[¶56.]  We cannot find that the facts stated in 
the affidavit in this case are not inadmissible hearsay or conclusory, and 
consequently the affidavit cannot be disregarded or rejected on that basis. Cook 
Ford Sales, Inc. v. Benson, 
Wyo., 392 P.2d 307 
(1964).

[¶57.]  The issue created as an explanation for 
the Gosar deed by the Cordova affidavit as an agreement to lease and retain 
possession, is obviously material, and resolution on this basis is not 
justified. The factual conflict raised is material. Fiedler v. Steger, 
supra.

[¶58.]  Thirdly, is a real issue created? 
Reference to the rule itself is useful. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., requiring "his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule" must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

[¶59.]  It is in this definition of what is the 
genuine issue for trial that the major case conflict and the imposing difference 
of the legal scholars are attended.5

[¶60.]  The frustration in analysis in like 
fashion led the Kansas Supreme Court to state:

"* * * However, care will 
be taken to stay close to the provisions of the statute itself which are quite 
clear as to procedure and standards to be applied in passing on such motions. An 
attempt to apply and follow the multitude of cases considering the federal or 
similar state rules may cause a court to be governed more by aphorisms announced 
in the opinions than by the unambiguous provisions of the statute." Secrist v. 
Turley, 196 Kan. 572, 412 P.2d 976, 979 
(1966).

[¶61.]  Extended analysis of cases by time and 
court system tends to suggest that there sometimes exists a result-oriented 
case-by-case dispository tendency, without either the trial bench or the 
appellate tribunal clearly understanding the issue of an evidentiary 
insufficiency to justify granting of the motion as a stage six decision 
(sufficiency of the responsive affidavits to demonstrate a genuine issue).6 

[¶62.]  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
said, as is also confirmed by other federal courts:

"Summary judgment must be 
denied if a genuine issue of material fact is presented to the trial court. 
Exnicious v. United 
States, 563 F.2d 418, 423 (10th Cir. 1977). In 
making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. National Aviation Underwriters v. 
Altus Flying Service, Inc., 555 F.2d 778, 784 (10th Cir. 1977). Thus, summary 
judgment should be denied if differing inferences can be drawn from conflicting 
evidence. Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027, 1036 (10th Cir. 1978)." Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 
1270 (10th Cir. 1982).

See also 
National Aviation Underwriters v. Altus Flying Service, Inc., 555 F.2d 778 (10th 
Cir. 1977); Exnicious v. United 
States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977); Madison v. Deseret 
Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 
155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946).

[¶63.]  This court, although not necessarily 
separately defining the sufficiency of the responsive affidavit, has said: 

"* * * `Summary judgment 
should not be granted where contradictory inferences may be drawn from 
undisputed evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] `Even where the facts bearing upon 
the issue of negligence are undisputed, * * *, if reasonable minds could reach 
different conclusions and inferences from such facts, the issue must be 
submitted to the trier of fact.' [Citation.] `"Evaluative judgment between two 
rationally possible conclusions from facts cannot be engaged in on summary 
judgment."' [Citation.] `Summary judgment is not appropriate where the record, 
including documents and pleadings, establishes facts which give rise to 
contradictory inferences, one of which supports the party opposing the motion.' 
[Citation.]" Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 
574 P.2d 751, 754 (1978).

"* * * The motion for 
summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to pierce the 
formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy - but only when no 
material issue of fact is present. [Citations.] * * * Although both parties are 
obligated to come forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party 
to demonstrate clearly that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and if that is not done, the motion for 
summary judgment should be denied. This court looks at the record from the 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all 
favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the affidavits, 
exhibits, and depositions. [Citations.] * * *

"* * * If the evidence is 
subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds might differ as to 
its significance, summary judgment is improper" Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 986-987 
(1980).

[¶64.]  Precedentially significant are the 
credibility and the reasonable-inference principles. Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 
(10th Cir. 1977); Greaser v. Williams, supra.

[¶65.]  If the melange and compendium of cases 
can be critiqued with any consistency, the conclusion could be derived that two 
standards implicitly exist as differently defined by semantic 
characterization.

[¶66.]  The narrow approach is the 
slightest-doubt criterion, the broader and probably better answer as an issue 
test is the benefit-of-all-reasonable-doubt standard, Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2727, p. 550.7

[¶67.]  We would synthesize the general 
principles advanced by some Wyoming cases and general standards of many 
well-reasoned cases from the federal courts and other states:

(a) The motion for 
summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to pierce the 
formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy - but only when no 
material issue of fact is present. Although both parties are obligated to come 
forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

(b) The court should 
scrutinize with care movant's affidavits and indulge leniency to respondent's 
affidavits but not to permit overtrading on the indulgence of the court since 
there must be a genuine issue of a material fact to be tried after looking at 
the record from the viewpoint most favorable to respondent and giving to him all 
favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the affidavits, 
exhibits, and depositions.

(c) When credibility is 
to be tested, the witnesses should testify at trial.

(d) Cross-motions do not 
concede the absence of factual issues.

(e) Finally, then, to 
determine whether the evidence is in factual dispute or subject to conflicting 
interpretation or of differing significance with respondent afforded the benefit 
of reasonable doubt.

[¶68.]  Summarized as the legal 
standard:

The motion for summary 
judgment should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue 
considering movant's burden, respondent's right to the benefit of all favorable 
inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility questions to be resolved 
by trial.8

To thus conclude on this 
subject, we cannot sustain the trial court decision on the basis of the issue of 
substantive insufficiency of the respondent affidavits to state a triable fact 
issue.

V

Parol 
Evidence

[¶69.]  The case would then be determined in 
final inquiry by considering whether the responsive Cordova affidavit failed due 
to evidentiary inadmissibility by virtue of its failure to "set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence." Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.

[¶70.]  We so hold and consequently 
affirm.

[¶71.]  Obviously, as a self-standing principle, 
an agreement of the character suggested by Cordova that Gosar would own or rent 
the property for free until she returned to the old country, and then that the 
property would be vested in Cordova, could fall within the statute of frauds as 
a contract not carried into effect within a period of one year. See Miller v. 
Stovall, Wyo., 717 P.2d 798 (1986). However, the 
statute of frauds has not been raised by Gosar as a defense to the Cordova 
agreement testimony presented by them to deny contentions of mutual mistake.9 If the case were to be remanded, it 
could then be further considered and might in itself be dispositive.

[¶72.]  The district court correctly concluded 
that consideration of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of showing that there 
had been a mutual mistake does not violate the parol-evidence rule. The court 
was also correct in determining that extrinsic evidence submitted for the 
purpose of showing that an oral agreement was made contemporaneous to the 
written agreement which added to the terms of the written agreement does violate 
the parol-evidence rule. Therefore, the court properly considered the affidavits 
submitted by Mrs. Gosar while disregarding the affidavit of Mr. Cordova which 
explained the oral "old country" agreement.

[¶73.]  The parol-evidence rule as it relates to 
this case may be explained as follows:

"* * * Where there is 
nothing ambiguous or uncertain in the terms of a deed it speaks for itself, and 
parol evidence tending to show a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement or 
tacit understanding with respect to the terms of the conveyance is inadmissible. 
Pinsky v. Sloat, 130 Cal. App. 2d 579, 279 P.2d 284." Rock v. Birdwell, 149 
Mont. 449, 429 P.2d 634, 639 (1967).

McReynolds v. 
McReynolds, 147 Mont. 476, 414 P.2d 531, 534 
(1966).

[¶74.]  There are exceptions to the 
parol-evidence rule, one being the situation where a mutual mistake has 
occurred:

"* * * The general rule 
is that parol evidence may not contradict, vary, or add to deeds. This Court, 
however, has recognized mutual mistake as an exception, even if the property 
description is definite and certain. This Court has said that one type of 
mistake justifying reformation is where the deed fails `to conform to what both 
parties intended.'" Neeley v. Kelsch, supra, 600 P.2d  at 981.

[¶75.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court delineated the 
parol-evidence rule when it said in Cary v. Manfull, 41 Wyo. 476, 287 P. 433, 
435 (1930), "[n]othing can be added to or taken from the contract, except for 
fraud or mistake;" and then said in Russell v. Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159, 1166-1167 (1949):

"It is proper to note 
also that in Stoll v. Nagle, 15 Wyo. 86, 86 P. 26, 28, this court has recognized 
the rule that parol evidence is admissible to reform an instrument on account of 
mistake and it was remarked that there can be no doubt of the rule's 
correctness. In the same case Mr. Justice Beard also said that: `The mistake, 
however, must have been a mutual one. There must have been a meeting of the 
minds and a contract actually entered into, but, by reason of the mistake, the 
instrument as written does not express what was really intended by the parties. 
Both the mistake and its mutuality must be established by evidence that is clear 
and satisfactory.'

"These rules were 
reiterated in Grieve v. Grieve, 15 Wyo. 358, 89 P. 569, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 1211, 11 
Ann.Cas. 1162."

[¶76.]  For another case where parol evidence was 
admitted to show that the litigants had agreed to the sale of property and by 
mistake the deed described the intended property plus an additional parcel, see 
Sonnenberg v. Ashby, 17 Ariz. App. 60, 495 P.2d 500 (1972).

[¶77.]  We think it was entirely proper for the 
district court to consider affidavits submitted by Mrs. Gosar to show that the 
deed covered more property than she intended to sell and more property than the 
Cordovas at the time believed that they were buying.

[¶78.]  Conversely, the district court, as 
earlier quoted in this opinion, invoked the parol-evidence rule to find that Mr. 
Cordova's affidavit was inadmissible.

[¶79.]  Mr. Cordova submitted his affidavit for 
the purpose of showing that an oral agreement, made prior to or contemporaneous 
with the contract for sale, added to the terms of the written agreement a verbal 
understanding that Mrs. Gosar had actually intended to sell her home but could 
stay there until she returned to Yugoslavia. This evidence is clearly 
inadmissible under the parol-evidence rule as set out in the language already 
quoted in this opinion from Rock v. Birdwell, supra. Laird v. Laird, Wyo., 597 P.2d 463 
(1979).

[¶80.]  While it may seem harsh to find the oral 
evidence submitted by one party admissible under an exception to the 
parol-evidence rule while finding the oral evidence of the other party then 
inadmissible, an explanation of the reasoning behind the rule may be helpful and 
afford justification:

"* * * The rule has been 
developed to effectuate two important policies. The first has its basis in the 
assumption that the written evidence is more accurate than human memory. 
Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 [548], 436 P.2d 561, 564 
(1968); Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P.2d 449 (1937). By elevating 
this assumption to the level of a presumption of law, it renders contractual 
undertakings more certain when they are reduced to an integrated writing. Zone 
Co. v. Service Transp. Co., 137 N.J.L. 112, 57 A.2d 562 (1948); Tees v. Lee, 234 
Wis. 607, 291 N.W. 792 (1940). Secondly, it reduces the opportunities for innocent parties to 
be victimized by the fraud or perjury of others. Masterson v. Sine, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 548, 436 P.2d  at 564; In re Tomarchio, 269 F. 400 (E.D.Mo. 1920); Bauer v. 
Monroe, 117 Mont. 306, 158 P.2d 485, 489 (1945)." Kupka v. 
Morey, Alaska, 
541 P.2d 740, 747-748, n. 9 (1975).

[¶81.]  The Court of Appeals of Washington capably 
summarized this issue in Schinnell v. Doyle, 6 Wn. App. 830, 496 P.2d 566, 
568-569 (1972) when it said:

"Parol evidence is 
admissible only if a contract is ambiguous as a matter of law. Such evidence 
should not be introduced for the purpose of creating ambiguity but should be 
admitted only when the court has determined that parol is necessary in order to 
explain or remove ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument. [Citations.] 
Where a contract is not ambiguous, its meaning should be ascertained from the 
language of the contract and not from parol evidence concerning it. 
[Citation.]

"`[W]here there is no 
ambiguity, all conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements 
between the parties prior to a written agreement are merged therein. In the 
absence of accident, fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible for the 
purpose of contradicting, subtracting from, adding to, or varying the terms of 
such written instruments.'

"Fleetham v. Schneekloth, 
52 Wn.2d 176, 178, 324 P.2d 429, 430 (1958). The rule is controlling even though 
one of the parties contends, as here, that part of the agreement had been 
committed to writing and another part of the transaction was embodied in an oral 
agreement. [Citation.]"

[¶82.]  Initial logic might be found in the 
argument of Cordova that if Gosar is entitled to use parol evidence to contend 
for a mutual mistake in an erroneous description, then the buyer should be 
entitled to use parol evidence to explain by other understandings how the 
developing factual situation is consistent with the original written agreement. 
The dilemma afforded, in addition to the parol-evidence dispositive rule already 
discussed, is that a remand trial might not reasonably be expected to present 
further evidence which could make the "old country" agreement realistically very 
credible in the face of the action of Cordova in failing to wait until Gosar in 
fact returned to the old country. Laird v. Laird, supra.

[¶83.]  Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Dorothy Cordova's third 
affidavit stated:

"2. That I have read the 
affidavit of Jere Ryckman, Attorney, filed in this case.

"3. That I contacted Mr. 
Ryckman, without my husband's knowledge or consent, to get his opinion as to the 
ownership of the properties at 417 Tisdel and 810 Pilot Butte.

"4. That I told Mr. 
Ryckman that my husband and I were having marital difficulties and I wanted to 
know about the property because my husband was going to file for 
divorce.

"5. That I asked Mr. 
Ryckman to keep this information strictly confidential.

"6. That at no time since 
then have I waived the attorney-client privilege.

"7. That at no time did I 
authorize Mr. Ryckman to contact Mr. James or anyone else to offer any kind of 
deed on the 417 Tisdel property.

"8. That Mr. Ryckman 
asked me whether I wanted to put Mrs. Gosar out of her residence, that I had 
every right to do so, and asked me if I wanted him to do it right 
then.

"9. That I told him I did 
not know what to do then because of my marital problems and that I would have to 
wait and see what my husband would do.

"10. That Mrs. Gosar 
called me to tell me that her son, Tony, was with Mr. Ryckman, and that she, 
Mrs. Gosar, was afraid of Tony, and that Tony had all her papers.

"11. That on the 
following day, I asked Mr. Ryckman whether he had talked to Tony Gosar, and he 
denied doing so at first, then stated that Mr. James had sent Tony 
there."

2 Gates v. Richardson, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 193 (1986): negligent infliction of emotional damage, order 
affirming motion to dismiss reversed, Cardine, J., Rooney, J., Retired partially 
dissenting; Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Wyo., 718 P.2d 890 (1986): oil-field 
accident, summary judgment against plaintiff reversed, Cardine, J., Urbigkit, J. 
and Brown, J. dissenting; Ward v. First Interstate Bank of Riverton, Wyo., 718 P.2d 886 (1986): letter of credit, summary judgment in favor of the Bank 
affirmed, Brown, J.; Durdahl v. Bank of Casper, Wyo., 718 P.2d 23 (1986): 
promissory note, security document conflict, summary judgment reversed, 
Urbigkit, J.; Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation-Excise Tax Division v. 
First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Kemmerer, Wyo., 718 P.2d 31 (1986): sales tax statute 
interpretation, summary judgment affirmed, Brown, J.; Toltec Watershed 
Improvement District v. Johnson, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808 (1986): abuse of process and 
intentional interference with contract; summary judgment for defendant granted; 
affirmed, Brown, J., Urbigkit, J. dissenting; Greub v. Frith, Wyo., 717 P.2d 323 
(1986): city employees' employment, affirmed, Brown, J.; Koontz v. Town of South 
Superior, Wyo., 716 P.2d 358 (1986): road easement, summary judgment for Town, 
reversed, Cardine, J., Rooney, J. dissenting; Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986): summary judgment granted in favor of manufacturer and 
distributor of industrial equipment from which injury resulted, summary judgment 
affirmed as to warranty and reversed as to negligence, Cardine, J., Brown, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part; Nation v. Nation, Wyo., 715 P.2d 198 
(1986): grandparent visitation controversy, summary judgment granted for 
visitation, reversed on procedural grounds, Urbigkit, J., Macy, J. dissenting; 
Travelers Insurance Company v. Palmer, Wyo., 714 P.2d 765 (1986): suit on 
subrogation account, complaint dismissed with prejudice for failure to attend 
pretrial conference, remanded for entry of order dismissing without prejudice, 
Urbigkit, J.; Midway Oil Corporation v. Guess, Wyo., 714 P.2d 339 (1986): 
default judgment in money damage suit, reversed on procedural basis, Urbigkit, 
J., Rooney, J. specially concurring; City of Casper v. International Association 
of Firefighters, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1187 (1986): litigation involving firefighters' 
contract, summary judgment in favor of the union, reversed, Rooney, J; Farrell 
v. Hursh Agency, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 1174 (1986): default judgment entered for 
failure to comply with discovery orders, affirmed, Rose, J.; Torrey v. Twiford, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 1160 (1986): summary judgment on malicious prosecution, reversed 
on procedural basis, Urbigkit, J., Rooney, J. dissenting; Hamel v. American 
Continental Corporation, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1152 (1986): lien foreclosure, summary 
judgment for defendant, affirmed, Raper, J., Retired; Conway v. Guernsey Cable 
TV, Wyo., 713 P.2d 786 (1986): negligence in cable television installation, 
summary judgment for defendant, procedural issue, no affidavit by plaintiff, 
affirmed, Macy, J; Fiedler v. Steger, Wyo., 713 P.2d 773 (1986): medical 
malpractice action, summary judgment for doctor, affirmed, Urbigkit, J; Noonan 
v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986): industrial accident on drill rig 
with suit against oil company, summary judgment for oil company, affirmed, 
Brown, J., Thomas, C.J. concurring, Rose, J. dissenting; Shanor v. A-Pac Ltd., 
Wyo., 711 P.2d 420 (1986): summary judgment on lease obligation and attorney's 
fees, reversed and remanded for trial as to attorney's fees only, Guthrie, J., 
Retired; Colorado National Bank v. Miles, Wyo., 711 P.2d 390 (1985): summary 
judgment on mortgage foreclosure, affirmed, Brown, J; Davis v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 710 P.2d 827 (1985): action against municipality, motion to dismiss for 
failure to file within period of limitations, affirmed, Cardine, J; Metzger v. 
Kalke, Wyo., 709 P.2d 414 (1985): medical malpractice, summary judgment granted 
in favor of the physician, reversed, Rose, J., Rooney, J. dissenting; Garner v. 
Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 (1985): suit by purchaser of modular home against 
dealer and bank, summary judgment granted on defendant's motion in favor of the 
bank, affirmed, Brown, J; Seafirst Mortgage Corp. v. Specialty Concrete 
Construction, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1245 (1985): mechanics lien foreclosure, summary 
judgment in favor of contractor against mortgagee, reversed, Rooney, J.; Skurdal 
v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1241 (1985): employee suit against the State of Wyoming 
to receive worker's compensation benefits in coin, dismissal affirmed, Rose, J; 
Sannerud v. First National Bank of Sheridan, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236, (1985): bank suit for 
foreclosure, summary judgment in favor of the bank against third-party 
claimants, affirmed, Raper, J., Retired; Hochhalter v. Great Western 
Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 708 P.2d 666 (1985): 
default judgment, failure to answer, affirmed, Rose, J; Duffy v. Brown, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 433 (1985): employment contract, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, 
summary judgment for defendant, affirmed, Rooney, J.

3 Rule 40.1(b)(1) and (2), 
W.R.C.P., Cum.Supp. 1985, reads:

"(b) Change of judge.

"(1) Peremptory 
disqualification. - A district judge may be peremptorily disqualified from 
acting in a case by the filing of a motion requesting that he be so 
disqualified. The motion shall be filed by a plaintiff at the time the complaint 
is filed, designating the judge to be disqualified. The motion shall be filed by 
a defendant at or before the time the first responsive pleading is filed by him 
or within thirty (30) days after service of the complaint on him, whichever 
first occurs. One made a party to an action subsequent to the filing of the 
first responsive pleading by a defendant cannot peremptorily disqualify a judge. 
In any matter, a party may exercise the peremptory disqualification only one (1) 
time and against only one (1) judge.

"Disqualification for 
Cause. - Whenever the grounds for such motion become known, any party may move 
for a change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge (A) has 
been engaged as counsel in the action prior to his election or appointment as 
judge, (B) is interested in the action, (C) is related by consanguinity to a 
party, (D) is a material witness in the action, or (E) is biased or prejudiced 
against the party or his counsel. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit 
or affidavits of any person or persons, stating sufficient facts to show the 
existence of such grounds. Prior to a hearing on the motion any party may file 
counteraffidavits. The presiding judge shall rule on the motion and if he grants 
the same shall immediately call in another district judge to try the 
action."

4 Obviously not only 
affidavits are used to support or resist summary judgment. Affidavits for the 
purpose of delineation in this discussion will also include any other factual 
material available to the court for any ruling on the motion, which might 
include depositions, interrogatories, admissions, noticed facts, or 
stipulations. The word "affidavit" is used only because it is the most prevalent 
and serves as a generic designation for factual evidence made a part of the 
record.

5 Clearly, as determinable 
not only from practical observation but by factual review of the cases, the 
definitional answer by the Wyoming Supreme Court and the Federal rule 
particularly utilized by the Tenth Circuit may not be consistent in 
result.

6 Greaser v. Williams, 
supra: if find inquiry into the facts was necessary for the proper application 
of the law, summary judgment is improper; credibility of witness is issue of 
fact; O'Donnell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 (1985): drastic remedy; 
movant has heavy burden; look at record from viewpoint most favorable to 
respondent and give him all favorable inferences; no issue of material fact 
involved and not inquire into facts to clarify application of law; Hyatt v. Big 
Horn School District No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525 (1981): competent evidence 
admissible at trial showing a genuine issue of material fact; Weaver v. Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980): reasonable minds might differ; 
Wells v. Jeep Corporation, Wyo., 532 P.2d 595 (1975): conclusions and 
categorical assertions of ultimate facts not sufficient; Maxted v. Pacific Car 
& Foundry Co., Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974): mere assertions insufficient; 
cannot rely on conclusions; not test judge with "burden of clairvoyance which is 
doubtful that the prophetic powers of Nostradamus could meet"; Clouser v. 
Spaniol Ford, supra: pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits - not 
establish factual situation but determine if any genuine issue exists as to 
facts; Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners, Wyo., 407 P.2d 710 (1965): both parties moving for summary judgment does not dispel 
factual issue if it exists; Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, Wyo., 355 P.2d 377 (1960): not expect to rely on cross-examination at trial to create 
factual issue; only raise issue, not decide; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962): inferences in the light most 
favorable - no magical talisman - not make findings at the appellate level; 
National Industries, Inc. v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1258 (9th 
Cir. 1982): all permissible inferences, but not speculation or surmise; 
Fireman's Insurance Company of Newark v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1982): 
not rely on bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicion; Ruhs v. 
Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982): most favorable light 
and denied if differing inferences from conflicting evidence; Ness v. Marshall, 
660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981): not rely on vague accusations, conclusory 
allegations or suspicions but determine issue to exist; not determine facts and 
not resolve genuine issues of credibility; Dolence v. Flynn, 628 F.2d 1280 (10th 
Cir. 1980): claim not frivolous; make a rational argument on the facts or law in 
support of his claim; trial not solely on affidavits; Vette Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1980): extreme and 
treacherous remedy, not to be entered unless established with such clarity to 
leave no room for controversy and movant not entitled to recover under any 
discernable circumstance; Madison v. Deseret Livestock, 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 
1978): beyond a reasonable doubt; to be denied if different inferences possible 
from conflicting affidavits; Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 
1977): light most favorable to respondent with factual inference most favorable 
to existence of issue as demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt; National 
Aviation Underwriters v. Altus Flying Service, Inc., 555 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 
1977): credibility and demeanor evidence is real evidence; denied if not 
demonstrated that there is absence of issue beyond a reasonable doubt; Kern v. 
Tri-State Insurance Co., 386 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1967): not hearsay; admissible 
facts required; reject pure speculation without substantial evidence; Union 
Insurance Society of Canton, Limited v. William Gluckin & Co., 353 F.2d 946 
(2d Cir. 1965): support a finding that reasonable men could not differ as to 
intent; Jacobson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 336 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied 379 U.S. 964, 85 S. Ct. 655, 13 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1965): lack of any doubt 
clearly established; shown to be a sham, frivolous, or so insubstantial that a 
trial would be futile; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. United States 
Rubber Co., 279 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1960): hearsay not sufficient; Atlas 
Insurance v. Standard Buick, 264 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1959): no admissible 
evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred; Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955): not if credibility question; this is one of the classic 
summary-judgment cases involving a majority opinion by Frank, J.; Repsold v. New 
York Life Insurance Company, 216 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1954): plausible grounds for 
the maintenance; Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952): directed 
verdict status sufficient. Special concurrence rejects directed verdict rule if 
question is credibility; this is the second of the classic-cases opinions, by 
Hand, J., with Frank J., specially concurring; Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 
155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946): power to pierce flimsy and transparent veil be 
temperately and cautiously used lest abuse reap nullification; Arnstein v. 
Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); slightest doubt as to the facts; not 
granted if determined by reliability of witnesses; this is another of the 
classic cases by Frank, J., Clark, J., dissenting; "adscititious fortuity 
inherent in the stated standard," id. at 476; Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 
185 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1960): not create credibility issue by stating in 
response that movant's affidavit is false; Frito-Lay v. Canas, 92 F.R.D. 384: 
more than gossamer threads of whimsy speculation or conjecture do more than 
expect that something "may turn up at trial" or whet curiosity of the court by 
supporting vague accusation and surmise with concrete facts; RFC v. First 
National, 17 F.R.D. 397 (Wyo. 1955): no matter how persuasive the evidence is, 
it is improper to anticipate the degree of such persuasiveness at trial, since a 
party is entitled to more than trial by anticipation; Webb v. City and Borough 
of Sitka, Alaska, 561 P.2d 731 (1977): if reasonable minds draw different 
inferences and reach different conclusions to be reserved for trial; 
Alaska-Canadian Corporation v. Ancow Corporation, Alaska, 434 P.2d 534 (1967): 
eliminate by exposure, superficial issues created by innuendo instead of direct 
allegation of fact; Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971): strictly construed against movant and liberally construed in favor 
of respondent, with any doubt resolved in favor of respondent; School District 
No. 6 in Weld County v. Alfred Watts Grant and Associates, 156 Colo. 328, 399 P.2d 101 (1965): drastic remedy never warranted except on clear showing that no 
divergent inferences could be drawn permitting contrary results; Mechtly v. 
Price, Kan., 536 P.2d 1385 (1975): surmise or belief of trial court, no matter 
how reasonable, is not sufficient to grant summary judgment; record show 
conclusively no genuine issue; search record for a reasonable doubt; Essmiller 
v. South West Bell Tel. Co., 215 Kan. 74, 524 P.2d 767 (1974): not evade with 
hope something may develop at trial; Cheyenne Western Bank v. Young, 179 Mont. 
492, 587 P.2d 401 (1978): respondent present facts as material and substantial 
and not fanciful, gauzy, frivolous, nor merely suspicious; Pharmaseal 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1977): respondent given 
benefit of all reasonable doubts to determine if issue exists; Meadows v. 
Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn.2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967): scrutinize with 
case movant's affidavit and indulge leniency to respondent's affidavit but not 
to permit overtreading on the indulgence of the court since there must be a 
genuine issue of material fact to be tried; Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2726, p. 521: if credibility is question, 
summary judgment not appropriate, and id., § 2727 p. 550: slightest-doubt test 
affords misleading gloss on genuine issue as a more narrow approach than 
warranted with better rule to be benefit of all reasonable doubt.

7 A third or sub standard 
which may be comparable to the second standard is to state the question as a 
person test rather than an issue test, as to whether reasonable persons could 
differ, Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, supra.

8 Discussed by the trial 
court in this case and by textwriters is a differentiation between jury and 
nonjury trials for analyzing the burden of proof to determine the sufficiency of 
responsive affidavits. The rule is not generally approved by specific cases that 
discuss the question. Subin v. Goldsmith, supra n. 6. See, however, Schwarzer, 
Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 477.

9 Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855 (1984); Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1155 (1982); Jim's Water Service, Inc. v. 
Alinen, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 667 (1980); Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605 (1928).

In this regard, we would 
agree with the special concurrence of Chief Justice Thomas if the statute of 
frauds had been raised by respondent or considered by the trial court. Likewise, 
neither had a factual determination and legal decision on adverse possession 
been made by the trial court, although probably appropriate.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶84.]  I agree that the grant of summary 
judgment by the district court should be upheld in this case. I would do that, 
however, on the grounds that the record discloses that whatever may have been 
the situation with respect to the deed from Antonia Gosar to the Cordovas, and 
even conceding a transfer of the property at 417 Tisdel to them, this record 
discloses as a matter of law that she re-acquired title by adverse possession. I 
am satisfied that the record discloses all of the elements of adverse possession 
in accordance with our Wyoming precedents. Harsha v. Anastos, Wyo., 693 P.2d 760 (1985); Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 
(1983); Farella v. Rumney, Wyo., 649 P.2d 185 (1982); and Shores v. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895 (1979). The only refutation 
of the establishment of title in Antonia Gosar by adverse possession following 
the deed to the Cordovas is found in the affidavit of Elmer Cordova to the 
effect that her possession of the property was consensual because of an apparent 
lease arrangement.

[¶85.]  As I analyze Elmer Cordova's affidavit he 
is asserting that Antonia Gosar was permitted to remain in the residence at 417 
Tisdel until she "went back to the old country" and that the agreement was that 
she would pay the taxes and insurance in lieu of rent. In substance this 
describes a lease for a term longer than one year which is required to be in 
writing under our version of the statute of frauds. § 1-23-105, W.S. 1977. It 
follows for me that Elmer Cordova's recitation in his affidavit of a lease 
arrangement for a term in excess of a year that is not in writing is not 
competent evidence. It, therefore, is subject to being ignored in accordance 
with Rule 56, W.R.C.P. because the facts presented by affidavit to the district 
court must be admissible evidence. When these contentions of Elmer Cordova's 
affidavit are ignored, there is nothing to refute the record showing of adverse 
possession in Antonia Gosar. This case is thus distinguishable from Harsha v. 
Anastos, supra.

[¶86.]  For this reason I would agree to affirm 
the summary judgment of the district court. 

BROWN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶87.]  I concur in the result. The majority 
opinion is the product of a prodigious amount of valuable research and 
compilation.

[¶88.]  Were I writing for the majority I would 
try to be less detailed, but the result would be the same.

MACY, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶89.]  I concur in the result based on the 
well-established standards governing appellate review of summary judgments. The 
related matters contained in the majority opinion would, however, be more 
appropriately addressed in a law review article.