Title: In re A. D. T.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re A.D.T., Juvenile (2002-124); 174 Vt. 369; 817 A.2d 20

[Filed 01-Nov-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2002-124


  In re A.D.T., Juvenile	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Chittenden Family Court


                                                 August Term, 2002

  Ben W. Joseph and Dean B. Pineles, JJ.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Appellant Father.

  Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Appellant Mother.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Les Birnbaum,
    Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       SKOGLUND, J.  The Chittenden Family Court terminated mother's parental
  rights in A.D.T. and B.D. in June 2001, and terminated father's rights in
  A.D.T. in a separate order issued in February 2002.  Mother's attorney did
  not appeal the June 2001 termination decision as she requested, and she now
  asks this Court to reinstate her appeal rights and reverse the termination
  order.  Although we take jurisdiction over mother's appeal, we affirm the
  order terminating her rights to both children.  We also affirm the court's
  order terminating father's rights in A.D.T.
   
       The factual and procedural complexity of this appeal requires a
  somewhat detailed recitation of the facts and circumstances below.  Mother
  gave birth to B.D. on October 5, 1994.  In November 

 

  1997, B.D. came into the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of
  Social and Rehabilitation Services ("SRS"), along with B.D.'s younger
  brother J.D. (FN1)  Prior to their placement in SRS custody, the children
  lacked stable housing, and mother was involved in criminal activity,
  struggled with substance abuse problems, and had other mental health issues
  bearing on her ability to parent.  In October 1998, mother had made enough
  progress on her SRS-prepared plan of services that the agency placed B.D.
  back in mother's care.  By February 1999, mother's progress stagnated.  She
  spent two days in prison for a probation violation, and, without informing
  SRS, left B.D. with an inappropriate caregiver.  She discontinued
  counseling, quit her job, and tested positive for opiates at the end of
  March. SRS removed B.D. from mother's care once again on April 20, 1999. 
  On April 22, mother took B.D. from day care and fled Vermont.  Five days
  later, mother was arrested in Chicago and charged with custodial
  interference.  On June 29, 1999, SRS moved to terminate mother's rights to
  B.D. and J.D.  On December 10, 1999, mother was sentenced to serve one to
  four years on the custodial interference charge.  At that time, mother was
  pregnant with A.D.T.
   
       A.D.T. was born on December 22, 1999 while mother was incarcerated. 
  SRS removed the child from mother's care immediately upon her birth.  The
  trial court adjudicated A.D.T. a child in need of care and supervision
  ("CHINS") on February 8, 2000.  The next month, SRS petitioned to terminate
  mother's parental rights to the child, but not the rights of A.D.T.'s
  father, who was unknown at the time.  
   
       Between April 1999 and December 2000, mother was in and out of prison. 
  While out on furlough in June 2000, mother sought visitation with her
  children.  She had not seen B.D. since April 

 

  1999 and last saw A.D.T. when the child was born.  The court denied
  mother's request.  It noted that termination petitions were pending, a
  significant question existed about mother's compliance with the case plan,
  and resumption of contact could be disruptive for the children in light of
  mother's lack of contact with them.  The court decided that it would
  determine the appropriateness of visitation after evidence in the
  termination hearing was presented, effectively denying mother's request
  during the pendency of the proceeding.  Sometime after the order, mother
  violated her furlough and was reincarcerated.

       Hearings on the termination petitions concerning mother's parental
  rights took place in September, October, and November 2000.  In December
  2000, father's paternity of A.D.T. was finally established.  Mother was on
  furlough at that time, but on January 21, 2001, she left Vermont for
  Nevada.  In April 2001, mother wrote her attorney and stated her intent to
  appeal the order she anticipated would flow from the termination hearings. 
   
       The court issued its termination order regarding mother's rights in
  B.D. and A.D.T. on June 14, 2001. (FN2)   Despite mother's April 2001
  letter, her attorney did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days of
  that order.  During the appeal period, mother was incarcerated in Reno,
  Nevada.  She returned to Vermont pursuant to an extradition proceeding on
  August 2, 2001.  On August 31, 2001, mother's attorney notified her of the
  June 14, 2001 termination order for the first time.  As a result, mother
  wrote the court in early September and October asking to appeal the June
  termination order. 

 

  She explained that she did not know about the June order until August 31,
  2001.  The court took no immediate action on either request.

       SRS's petition to terminate father's rights in A.D.T. was filed in
  July 2001 and heard on December 14, 2001.  Father was not present at the
  hearing, although his attorney was.  The court terminated father's rights
  in a February 19, 2002 order.  The court found that father had refused to
  participate in disposition planning for A.D.T., did not return phone calls
  from the SRS caseworker assigned to the case, had not contacted the
  caseworker to inquire about A.D.T's well being, and has never had any
  contact with A.D.T. since her birth.  The court concluded that termination
  of father's rights in A.D.T. was warranted because clear and convincing
  evidence established that father is neither willing nor available to
  provide a home for A.D.T., and that there was no reasonable likelihood that
  father could become a parent to the child within a reasonable period of
  time.

       Two days after the court terminated father's rights, and through new
  counsel the court appointed for mother in January 2002, mother filed a
  motion under 33 V.S.A. § 5532 to vacate or modify disposition of A.D.T. and
  B.D.  In her motion, mother asked the court to reissue the June 14, 2001
  termination order to give her another opportunity to appeal in light of her
  original counsel's failure to file a timely appeal.  The court denied the
  motion on March 13, 2002.  On March 15, 2002, father appealed the February
  19, 2002 order terminating his rights in A.D.T.  On March 27, 2002, mother
  filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal the (1) March 13, 2002 order
  denying her motion to vacate/modify, (2) February 19, 2002 order
  terminating father's rights in A.D.T., and (3) June 14, 2001 order
  terminating mother's rights in B.D. and A.D.T. (FN3)

 
      
       We first address mother's claim that she is entitled to appeal the
  family court's June 14, 2002 decision terminating her rights to B.D. and
  A.D.T. notwithstanding the fact that her notice of appeal was filed outside
  the thirty-day time period.  Mother presents two rationales for reinstating
  her otherwise lost appeal rights.  First, as to A.D.T., mother argues that
  her notice of appeal was timely because she filed it within fourteen days
  of father's notice of appeal.  See V.R.A.P. 4 (if a timely notice of appeal
  has been filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal
  within fourteen days of the first notice).  She asserts that the rights of
  both parents must be terminated and the child freed for adoption before an
  order terminating one parent's rights becomes final and appealable. 
  Second, mother argues that her lawyer's failure to follow her directive to
  appeal the June 14, 2001 order was per se ineffective assistance of
  counsel, and she is entitled to an appeal as a matter of law by showing
  only that she would have taken the appeal absent her lawyer's omission.  We
  address each argument in turn.
   
       An appealable order is one that finally disposes of the matter before
  the court by settling the rights of the parties on issues raised by the
  pleadings.  Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 264, 265,