Title: ALAN ARTHUR SANDOVAL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALAN ARTHUR SANDOVAL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 121217 P.3d 393Case Number: S-09-0023Decided: 10/06/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D.  2009

 
 
ALAN 
ARTHUR SANDOVAL,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Alan Sandoval 
pled guilty to second degree murder in the beating death of his girlfriend's one 
year old daughter.  After the 
district court sentenced him to serve seventy years to life in prison, he 
appealed.  Mr. Sandoval argues that 
he was denied a fair sentencing when the prosecutor argued facts outside the 
record at the sentencing hearing and the district court failed to provide him a 
full right of allocution.  We 
conclude that the vast majority of the prosecutor's statements were appropriate 
and the one inappropriate statement did not prejudice Mr. Sandoval.  Additionally, he was afforded a 
sufficient opportunity of allocution.  

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Sandoval 
presents a general issue on appeal: 

   

I.          
Was Mr. Sandoval's right to a fair sentencing 
violated?

 
 
The 
State's statement of the issue is similar.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On April 17, 
2008, Mr. Sandoval killed his girlfriend's one year old daughter, AM.  He confessed the homicide to law 
enforcement officers and his confession was recounted in the affidavit of 
probable cause that accompanied the felony information charging him with second 
degree murder.1  Although Mr. Sandoval initially pleaded 
not guilty to the charge, he later changed his plea to guilty.  His guilty plea was "cold," meaning it 
was not made pursuant to any agreement with the State.  At his change of plea hearing, Mr. 
Sandoval recounted the events of April 17th and the district court 
incorporated the probable cause affidavit into the factual basis for the 
plea.    

 
 
[¶5]      At the sentencing 
hearing, defense counsel argued that Mr. Sandoval had killed the child in a 
short outburst of anger and he had taken responsibility for his crime by 
pleading guilty.  He also made an 
impassioned plea for mercy, asking that Mr. Sandoval be sentenced to the minimum 
term of twenty years to life in prison.  
Mr. Sandoval gave a short statement apologizing for his actions and 
asking for leniency.  The State 
advocated for a significantly more severe sentence of seventy years to life in 
prison.  In support of its position, 
the State argued that the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Sandoval's crime was 
brutal and prolonged and did not amount to a short fit of rage.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court accepted the State's recommendation and sentenced Mr. Sandoval to 
serve seventy years to life in prison.  
He appealed.   

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      At his 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Sandoval did not object to the district court's 
sentencing procedures.  Our review 
is, therefore, limited to a search for plain error.  In order to establish plain error, the 
defendant must show that the record patently demonstrates the district court 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law and such violation adversely 
affected his substantial right.  Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
[¶7]      Although our 
review is for plain error, we are also guided by other principles.  Sentencing decisions rest within the 
broad discretion of the district court.  
DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 
¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237-38 (Wyo. 2002).  
We will not reverse a sentencing decision "absent a showing by the 
defendant of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, 
circumstances that manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct that 
offends the public sense of fair play."  
Id.  

 
 
[¶8]      Due process 
requires that the court consider only accurate information in imposing 
sentence.  Manes, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 292.  "[A] sentencing decision cannot be based 
upon unreliable information, undocumented information, or inaccurate 
information."  Hubbard v. State, 2008 WY 12, ¶ 24, 175 P.3d 625, 630 (Wyo. 2008).  If a 
prosecutor brings undocumented or inaccurate allegations to the district court's 
attention during sentencing, he engages in misconduct.  Id.  
Nevertheless, a showing that inaccurate information was presented to 
the court will not necessarily justify a reversal; "the defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in sentencing to 
prevail."  Manes, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 292.   See also, Hubbard, ¶ 19, 175 P.3d  at 
629.  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
1.         
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Sandoval 
claims that his right to a fair sentencing was violated when the prosecutor 
introduced facts at the sentencing hearing that were not documented in the 
record.  He points to several 
different instances which he claims amount to prosecutorial misconduct. 

 
 
[¶10]   First, Mr. Sandoval  contests the prosecutor's assertion that 
he joked with his father about the homicide.  The prosecutor stated:  

 
 
            
Is there remorse?  Does [Mr. 
Sandoval] feel bad?  Maybe, but in a 
conversation he had with his father, Your Honor, his father told him, "Somebody 
saw you - - somebody saw you on TV down in Denver.  You're famous."  They chuckled about 
it.

 
 
He 
claims that the "chuckling incident" was undocumented and the prosecutor should 
not have mentioned it at sentencing.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Sandoval is apparently correct 
in his assertion that this conversation was not documented in the record.  The prosecutor, therefore, committed 
misconduct by referring to it at sentencing.  See, DeLoge, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d  at 1239.  However, in order to warrant reversal, 
Mr. Sandoval  must demonstrate that 
he was prejudiced because the district court relied upon the improper 
information in passing sentence.  He 
concedes that there is no indication that the improper statement influenced the 
judge's sentencing decision.  As 
such, he has failed to show plain error justifying reversal of his 
sentence.  

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Sandoval also challenges the 
prosecutor's statement that "Your Honor, we've given him a concession for his 
taking of responsibility in the form of a second-degree murder charge."  He claims this statement was inaccurate 
because he was never charged with anything other than second degree murder, 
there was no plea agreement between him and the State and, consequently, no 
"concession" by the State.  

 
 
[¶13]   The prosecutor's statement about 
the charging concession was an understandable response to defense counsel's 
statement that it was appropriate that Mr. Sandoval faced second degree murder 
penalties rather than first degree murder penalties because he did not 
premeditate the murder.2  Defense counsel also recognized, 
however, that even without premeditation the State could have charged Mr. 
Sandoval with felony murder, in which case Mr. Sandoval would have faced first 
degree murder penalties.  With 
defense counsel's argument about the charge in mind, the prosecutor's statement 
that Mr. Sandoval had already received a concession in the form of a second 
degree murder charge makes sense and was accurate.  As such, Mr. Sandoval has failed to show 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Sandoval's third contention of 
prosecutorial misconduct pertains to the prosecutor's recitation of the details 
of the crime and the child's injuries.  
He claims that the prosecutor's description of the episode resulting in 
the child's death indicated it was far more prolonged and extensive than 
described in the factual basis at his change of plea hearing.  For example, Mr. Sandoval pointed to the 
following statement by the prosecutor as being improper:  

 
 
Your 
Honor, this was not a brief moment of lapse in judgment, an instance of a loss 
of control.  This was a brutal 
attack on a helpless baby girl, an attack that from the physical evidence saw 
the defendant swinging this child around the room, throwing her around the room, 
slamming her into objects such as the crib with enough force to actually break 
the crib with her tiny little head.    

 
 
He 
also contends that the prosecutor strayed from the evidence by describing the 
disarray in the child's room as evidence of Mr. Sandoval's prolonged fit of rage 
and stating that "[h]e beat this baby to death and beyond."    

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Sandoval claims that it is 
clear the district court relied on the prosecutor's statements.  In his reasons for imposing the lengthy 
sentence, the judge stated:

 
 
[M]ost 
troubling is, I think, the continuing nature of the rage after this child was 
already, I think, pretty clearly unconscious and badly injured, apparently, the 
beating and throwing about continued. . . .  This really is not an incident - - a 
momentary outburst of anger.  This 
apparently went on over some nightmarish period of time in which the baby was 
thrown about.  The apparent breaking 
of the crib rail by striking the baby against it is breath taking. 

 
 
The 
district court stated that such facts justified imposing a more severe 
sentence.    

 
 
[¶16]   Of course, no one but Mr. Sandoval 
knows what actually happened during the episode that led to the child's 
death.  At his change of plea 
hearing, he stated:

 
 
            
I continued to drink the Jack Daniels, and at one point in time, the baby 
was crying, and I became frustrated with her.  So I grabbed her on the leg and squeezed 
it.

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]:             
Did that help?

 
 
            
The Defendant:        No.  She continued to cry, and I got 
frustrated with her and intended to remove her away from me so I could calm 
down, and upon doing so, I tossed her down onto her bedroom 
floor.

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]:   Do you believe that's when she hit her 
head?

 
 
            
The Defendant:        Yes, 
I believe that's when she hit her head.

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: You believe 
that's when she suffered the injuries that caused her 
death?

 
 
            
The Defendant:        Yes, 
I believe that's when she suffered her injuries, and I rolled her around a 
couple of times back and forth, and noticed there was some blood in her 
mouth.  I believe she had bit her 
tongue, and so I wiped that off, and returned to the living room, and after a 
couple of moments I went and grabbed the baby and checked on her, and she seemed 
kind of listless, wasn't crying or anything.  So I picked her up, carried her into the 
living room, was holding her.             

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: And the autopsy and information 
obtained by law enforcement of the case showed that the child died of injuries 
consistent with what Mr. Sandoval has told you here today. 

 
 
            
The Court:     
So, Mr. Sandoval, your actually throwing the baby down on the floor 
killed her?

 
 
            
The Defendant:        I 
believe so.  

 
 
[¶17]   The district court then asked 
whether the State had anything to add to the factual basis.  The prosecutor asked that the unredacted 
version3 of the affidavit of probable cause 
be incorporated into the factual basis.  
Mr. Sandoval confirmed the information in the affidavit which 
stated:      

 
 
            
Detective Garrison asked Sandoval to go through his interaction with AM 
the day of 4/17.  Sandoval confirmed 
that [the child's mother] was working and that she had come home for lunch and 
that AM was fine.  [The mother] 
returned to her work.  At 
approximately 2:30 p.m. Sandoval related that he was tired and had been drinking 
Jack Daniel's when AM began to cry.  
Sandoval indicated that he grabbed the upper part of AM's leg and 
squeezed, leaving a visible bruise.  
When AM would not quit crying Sandoval stated that he picked AM up and 
threw her onto the floor in AM's bedroom.  
Sandoval indicated that in his opinion this is when AM received the fatal 
head injury.  Sandoval went on to 
say that he then pushed AM around the room causing the lacerations to her head 
and facial area.  At one point 
during this interview Sandoval made the statement "I killed my daughter."  Sandoval further indicated that AM was 
bleeding so he cleaned some of the blood off of AM and took her to the couch 
because AM was not acting right.  
Sandoval related that AM began getting sleepy so he checked to make sure 
AM was breathing and returned AM to the crib in AM's room.  Sandoval then went to sleep on the 
couch.  

 
 
[¶18]   On appeal, Mr. Sandoval contests 
the prosecutor's description of the attack and the child's injuries and argues 
that the prosecutor was not qualified to testify about the medical 
evidence.  The autopsy report and 
photographs of the child and child's bedroom were admitted into evidence at the 
sentencing hearing without objection.  
Just the list summarizing the injuries to the child was more than a page 
long and included multiple injuries to her head and neck; chest, abdomen and 
pelvis; and extremities.  The 
autopsy also noted that the child had older injuries that were in the process of 
healing at the time of her death.  
The photographs of the child's body revealed numerous injuries and 
massive skull fractures.      

 
 
[¶19]   The photographs of the child's room 
showed that the rail of the child's crib was broken and pieces of wood from the 
rail were resting on the mattress and pillow.  Another photograph apparently depicted a 
wood chip in the  child's hair.  The photographs also revealed that the 
room was in a state of disorder.  
Mr. Sandoval claims that other interpretations of the evidence, besides 
the State's "tale of maniacal violence," were reasonable.  For example, he states that the disarray 
in the child's room could be attributed to attempts to resuscitate the 
child.  While Mr. Sandoval's 
interpretation of the evidence may be appropriate, the prosecutor's statements 
about the condition of the room and the child's injuries also amounted to a 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence.   

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Sandoval's own statements 
confirm that the attack went on for a significant period of time.  He stated that he squeezed the child's 
leg causing a visible bruise, then he threw her to the floor causing the fatal 
head injury, and finally he pushed her around the room causing additional 
lacerations to her head and facial area.  
The district court judge asked about the final set of injuries at the 
sentencing hearing:  

 
 
            
As I read this presentence investigation report and the rest of the 
record . . . I think on three occasions [there are references] to the fact that 
after Mr. Sandoval threw [the child] to the floor striking the back of her head 
on the floor, which apparently caused massive fractures to the skull, resulted 
in her death, it was after that that he said he pushed her around the floor 
thereby causing lacerations and perhaps contusions to her face.  That seemed very unclear. Was he pushing 
her with his foot or pushing her in what manner?  

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: With his hand, 
Your Honor.

 
 
            
The Court:     
Having a little bit of a hard time understanding how that fit into the 
picture.  Was that still during the 
continuation of the apparent fit of rage or anger?

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: This would just 
be my interpretation.  He admitted 
his - - and I believe he - - [what]  caused the death was the throwing [the 
child] to the ground.  I believe 
that was the event.  I believe that 
was more than - - well, I think it would just be suspicion on my part as to what 
role that played.  What I do know, I 
don't believe that was the cause of death.

 
 
            
The Court:     I 
think that's pretty clear.  It just 
seems odd in the record.  That sort 
of stands out.  

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: My best guess is 
it's some sort of - - I believe it would fall into the incomprehensible nature 
of what had happened, and his - - I just don't know how a human being reacts 
after they've done something like this.  
I don't know if it was an effort to see if the child was all right or was 
going to be responsive.  I don't 
necessarily believe it was done with the intention to cause more harm to the 
child.  That's the best I can 
answer. 

 
 
[¶21]   The prosecutor described the brutal 
and prolonged nature of the attack to refute Mr. Sandoval's argument that he 
simply lost his temper for a short period of time and his claim that he should 
be afforded the same punishment as a defendant who had killed his child by 
shaking him.  Most of the 
prosecutor's statements were derived directly from the undisputed autopsy and 
photographic evidence.  There is 
nothing obviously inaccurate in his statements or which could not be inferred 
from the evidence.  He simply argued 
his interpretation of the evidence; he did not submit inappropriate "medical 
testimony" as suggested by Mr. Sandoval on appeal.

 
 
[¶22]   The record shows the district court 
paid particular attention to Mr. Sandoval's own statements about the crime.  It also asked the defense if it had 
anything additional to offer after the prosecutor's presentation and description 
of his version of the attack.  The 
defense declined the opportunity to contest the prosecutor's statements and 
chose, instead, to simply plead for mercy.  
Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's statements about the evidence 
and the nature of the attack did not amount to misconduct and, consequently, Mr. 
Sandoval has failed to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal error of law 
to establish plain error.  

 
 
2.         
Right of Allocution

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Sandoval also claims that his 
right to a fair sentencing was violated because he was not afforded a full right 
of allocution.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(c) 
governs sentencing and states in relevant part:

 
 
(c) 
Sentence. 

 
 
            
(1) Imposition.  
Sentence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay, but the court may, when 
there is a factor important to the sentencing determination that is not then 
capable of being resolved, postpone the imposition of sentence for a reasonable 
time until the factor is capable of being resolved. Prior to the sentencing 
hearing, the court shall provide the counsel for the defendant and the attorney 
for the state with a copy of the probation officer's report. . . .  At the sentencing hearing, the court 
shall afford the counsel for the defendant and the attorney for the state an 
opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's report and on other matters 
relating to the appropriate sentence. Before imposing sentence, the court shall 
also:

            
(A) Determine that the defendant and defendant's counsel have had the 
opportunity to read and discuss the presentence investigation report made 
available pursuant to subdivision (a)(3)(A);

            
(B) Afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity to speak on behalf of 
the defendant; and

            
(C) Address the defendant personally and determine if the defendant 
wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the 
sentence.

 
 
            
The attorney for the state shall have an equivalent opportunity to speak 
to the court. Upon a motion that is jointly filed by the defendant and by the 
attorney for the state, the court may hear in camera such a statement by 
the defendant, counsel for the defendant, or the attorney for the 
state.

 
 
[¶24]   Rule 32(c) provides a criminal 
defendant the right to allocution, i.e., to make a statement on his own 
behalf.4  See, Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S. Ct. 653, 655, 5 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1961) (interpreting similar federal 
rule); Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1987).  We have 
also recognized that a criminal defendant's right to allocution is protected by 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  Christy, 731 P.2d  at 1207; Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1082 
(Wyo. 1992). 

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Sandoval maintains that the 
district court violated his right of allocution by failing to personally address 
him to determine if he wanted to make a statement or had information to present 
in mitigation of sentence, as required by Rule 32(c).  He claims that the court only said "good 
afternoon" and "thank you" to him and this did not satisfy its burden to 
personally address him.  After Mr. 
Sandoval's family members and defense counsel made pleas for leniency on behalf 
of Mr. Sandoval, defense counsel broached the subject of Mr. Sandoval offering 
an allocution.  

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: Then, if 
appropriate, I'd like to have Mr. Sandoval make a brief 
statement.

 
 
            
The Court:     He certainly is welcome to do 
so.  Good afternoon, Mr. 
Sandoval.

 
 
Mr. 
Sandoval then made a statement, and the judge thanked him.    

 
 
[¶26]   In the context of Rule 32(c) and 
the constitutional right of allocution, we have stated that "[a] defendant's 
right of allocution is not violated when he has been given an adequate 
opportunity under the circumstances to speak on his own behalf.'"  Wilson, ¶ 15, 155 P.3d  at 1012, quoting 
U.S. v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1025 
(10th Cir. 1993).  Here, 
under the circumstances where defense counsel asked if the defendant could make 
a statement and the court responded in the affirmative and greeted the 
defendant, the district court complied with its responsibility to personally 
address the defendant.  Compare, U.S. v. Benitez-Diaz, 320 
Fed.Appx. 868, 2009 WL 931708 at 6 (10th Cir. 
(Kan.) Apr. 08, 2009) (unpublished opinion holding the defendant's right of 
allocution was violated when the sentencing court only addressed him to ask if 
he agreed with the proposed sentence and he did not make a statement on his own 
behalf).  Mr. Sandoval points to no authority 
indicating that specific words must be uttered by the court in order to fulfill 
its obligation.  Moreover, given 
that Mr. Sandoval presented a statement on his own behalf and he does not 
describe, on appeal, the additional information he would have presented to the 
district court had he been asked in a different manner, we conclude he was 
provided a sufficient opportunity to allocute.

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Sandoval also argues on appeal 
that in order for his right of allocution to be meaningful he should have been 
afforded the right to speak after the prosecutor's remarks.  In this case, the child's mother and 
grandmother spoke and then the prosecutor stated that he did not have any other 
witnesses at that time and defense counsel wished to go next.  Mr. Sandoval's defense attorney and 
family members spoke on his behalf and he gave a brief statement apologizing for 
his actions and asking for leniency.  
Defense counsel then stated that he was finished for the time being and 
indicated the prosecutor may have some comments to make, after which he might 
respond.  The State presented the 
evidence and argument in support of its request for a lengthy sentence.  Defense counsel responded to the State's 
argument and again asked that Mr. Sandoval be treated leniently.  After defense counsel's response, the 
court asked if there was "anything else on behalf of the State or the 
defense."  Neither party offered 
additional information or argument pertaining to sentencing.      

 
 
[¶28]   Rule 32(c) does not state that the 
defendant, himself, will be provided with the last opportunity to speak before 
the judge passes sentence.  It only 
states that he will be provided the opportunity to present a statement and 
information in mitigation of the sentence and that the State will have an 
equivalent opportunity to speak to the court.  Here, the defendant was given the 
opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment and a statement on 
his own behalf.  His attorney had 
the last word before the court announced its sentence and the defense declined 
the district court's invitation to offer additional comments.  As such, Mr. Sandoval was provided a 
sufficient opportunity of allocation and has, therefore, failed to establish 
plain error.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Sandoval received a fair 
sentencing hearing.  The vast 
majority of the prosecutor's argument was acceptable and based upon the 
evidence; consequently, Mr. Sandoval failed to show a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal error of law to establish plain error.  Mr. Sandoval also made no showing of 
plain error to justify reversal as a result of the one improper statement about 
the "chuckling incident" because he did not establish that he was prejudiced by 
the error.  Finally, because Mr. 
Sandoval was given an adequate opportunity to allocute on his own behalf, he 
cannot establish plain error in that regard.  

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2009) governs second degree 
murder:

 
 
            
Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during 
life.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 2009) governs first degree 
murder:

 
 
            
(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, sexual abuse of a 
minor, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse 
of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty 
of murder in the first degree.

            
(b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by 
death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment according to law, 
except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder 
committed before the defendant attained the age of eighteen (18) 
years.

 
 

3The district court had ordered that the affidavit of probable cause be 
sealed from public inspection until the preliminary hearing because the 
investigation was ongoing.  Thus, 
the non-confidential file contained only a redacted version of the 
affidavit.

 
 

4In the context of criminal sentencing, "allocution" means "an unsworn 
statement from a convicted defendant to the sentencing judge or jury in which 
the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the 
crime, or say anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence."   Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 
2004).  See also, Wilson v. State, 2007 WY 55, ¶ 10, n. 1, 
155 P.3d 1009, 1011, n. 1 (Wyo. 2007).