Title: State ex rel. Dann v. Taft

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DANN v. TAFT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825.] 
Public records — Executive privilege — Qualified gubernatorial-communications 
privilege recognized — Procedure for invoking and overcoming privilege. 
(No. 2005-1222 — Submitted November 9, 2005 — Decided April 13, 2006.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A governor of Ohio has a qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege 
that protects communications to or from the governor when the 
communications were made for the purpose of fostering informed and 
sound gubernatorial deliberations, policymaking, and decisionmaking. 
2.  The qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege is overcome when a 
requester demonstrates that the requester has a particularized need to 
review the communications and that that need outweighs the public’s 
interest in according confidentiality to communications made to or from 
the governor. 
__________________ 
 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action in mandamus filed by relator, Marc 
Dann, seeking a writ ordering respondent, Governor Bob Taft, to disclose certain 
weekly reports prepared for him by executive-branch officials.  Dann, a member 
of the Ohio Senate, claims in a complaint filed in his individual capacity that the 
governor has a clear legal duty to disclose to Dann the weekly reports, pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43, the Public Records Act.  The governor has filed a motion for 
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protective order relative to Dann’s discovery requests.  Dann has filed a motion to 
compel discovery. 
{¶ 2} Our decision on the merits, as well as disposition of these motions, 
is contingent upon determination of the following issue: may a governor of Ohio 
assert executive privilege as a legitimate basis for maintaining the confidentiality 
of documents prepared for his or her review?  The issue of gubernatorial 
executive privilege is a matter of first impression in this court. 
{¶ 3} We hold that a governor of Ohio possesses a qualified privilege by 
which communications to or from him or her will, under certain circumstances, be 
accorded confidentiality and deemed beyond the scope of discovery under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Public Records Act.  In addition to 
defining the scope of that qualified privilege, we establish a framework by which 
the validity of the governor’s claim of executive privilege will be determined. 
I 
Factual and Procedural Background 
A 
The Governor’s Weekly Reports 
{¶ 4} The executive branch of state government comprises 18 state 
departments and over 200 boards, commissions, and authorities.  These executive 
agencies are responsible for formulating policies, enforcing laws, and providing 
services to Ohio residents over a wide range of substantive areas.  The cabinet 
agencies include the 18 state departments and seven other major boards or 
commissions, including the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  The governor 
employs executive assistants, who act as policy advisors in various matters and as 
liaisons to specific clusters of cabinet agencies.   
The governor’s office uses 
several methods to communicate with subordinate executive officers to keep 
apprised of significant developments, policies, issues, and concerns occurring 
within the executive branch.  Those methods include face-to-face meetings with 
January Term, 2006 
3 
agency employees, memoranda and correspondence, meetings between the 
executive assistants and agency personnel, telephone contacts, and e-mail. 
{¶ 5} Cabinet directors and executive assistants to the governor also 
communicate with the governor’s office through weekly reports.  Cabinet 
directors prepare these short topical reports at the end of each week and send them 
to a person in the governor’s office.  The reports are available for review over the 
weekend before the governor’s weekly policy meeting with his executive staff on 
Monday afternoons.  At the end of each week, the governor receives a report from 
each executive assistant that advises him and his executive staff of the status of 
issues. 
{¶ 6} The formats and styles of the weekly reports vary, with each 
cabinet director and executive assistant expected to use his or her best judgment 
to decide what topics to include and how detailed the discussion should be.  The 
reports typically contain information concerning significant events and particular 
concerns, issues, or information that the cabinet directors and executive assistants 
believe should be brought to the attention of the governor.  Many of the topics in 
the weekly reports are strictly informational and do not require any action by the 
governor, and some of the information is not sensitive, confidential, or 
proprietary. 
{¶ 7} If a topic or issue requires a more detailed explanation or analysis, 
it is usually presented through some means other than the weekly reports, e.g., a 
specific memorandum on that issue or a meeting.  In fact, cabinet members often 
withhold sensitive information from the weekly reports and use other means to 
communicate this information to the governor.   
 
{¶ 8} In any week, one or more of the reports may require action by the 
governor in the form of advice, a recommendation, or a decision and may contain 
information that the governor considers sensitive and confidential.  Weekly 
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reports may also contain candid comments, opinions, criticism, and analyses by 
the cabinet director or executive assistant. 
{¶ 9} The weekly reports constitute one institutionalized, written means 
of communication used by the governor.  They are distributed to the governor, his 
executive staff, and some administrative personnel.  There are no written 
guidelines or policies in the governor’s office concerning the dissemination of the 
weekly reports.  Copies of weekly reports may be released to the public when 
requested if the request addresses a particular topic or agency and a specific, 
narrow period of time, and the matter is not otherwise deemed to be privileged.  
The governor’s office does not release weekly reports if the request is not limited 
to a particular topic, agency, or period of time. 
B 
Case History 
{¶ 10} In the spring of 2005, several Ohio newspapers reported that 
questionable investment practices had produced a significant loss in the employer-
contribution fund of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  On June 13, 2005, 
relator requested from respondent, Ohio Governor Bob Taft, copies of “[a]ll 
weekly memoranda or other periodic reports required by statute or office 
procedure or practice from former Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
Administrator and CEO James Conrad to the Office of Governor from the years 
1998-2005.”  The governor disclosed the requested records for the period from 
August 2004 to June 15, 2005, but refused to provide copies of Conrad’s weekly 
reports from 1998 until August 2004.  The governor claimed that these weekly 
reports “are protected by the executive privilege.” 
{¶ 11} On June 16, 2005, Dann, as a private citizen, requested that the 
governor provide copies of additional records, including weekly reports prepared 
by James Samuel, for the years 1998 to 2005.  As the governor’s executive 
January Term, 2006 
5 
assistant for business and industry, Samuel acted as a liaison between the 
governor and the bureau. 
{¶ 12} The governor reaffirmed his decision to withhold most of the 
requested reports from Conrad to the governor’s office and further denied Dann’s 
request for copies of requested reports from Samuel to the governor because of 
“executive privilege and deliberative process privilege.”   
{¶ 13} On that same day, Dann filed this action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the governor to make the requested records available for inspection and 
copying under R.C. 149.43, the Public Records Act.  According to Dann, he had 
requested the records “to obtain more detailed information regarding the 
governor’s awareness of the investment practices of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation * * * and its related entities.” 
{¶ 14} We granted an alternative writ and ordered an accelerated evidence 
and briefing schedule.  106 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2005-Ohio-3519, 830 N.E.2d 1166.  
Dann served notices of deposition on the governor, Conrad, Samuel, Jon Allison 
(the governor’s chief of staff), Brian Hicks (the governor’s former chief of staff), 
and Mark Nedved (the former legislative liaison for the bureau). 
{¶ 15} The governor moved for a protective order to preclude the taking 
of the depositions, citing government-official, executive, and deliberative-process 
privileges. He instead offered Dann the opportunity to depose Kate Bartter, the 
governor’s chief policy advisor and director of cabinet affairs.  In that capacity, 
Bartter is the official custodian of the weekly reports, and she has personal 
knowledge of their general content and use in the governor’s office.  According to 
the governor, Bartter would be able to provide Dann with “general, non-
privileged information as to the contents of weekly reports, the distribution of the 
weekly reports within the office, and the general use and function of the weekly 
reports within the executive branch.” 
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{¶ 16} The governor moved to dismiss Dann’s complaint, claiming that he 
had produced documents in response to Dann’s requests and that the action was 
thus moot. But the Samuel reports that the governor did provide to Dann 
contained redactions, and over 200 other Samuel reports were withheld based on 
the governor’s conclusion that they did not contain information relating to the 
bureau from 1999 to 2005. 
{¶ 17} We denied the governor’s motion to dismiss and stayed the filing 
of evidence and briefs until further order.  106 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2005-Ohio-3977, 
832 N.E.2d 60.  We also held in abeyance the governor’s motion for protective 
order and Dann’s motion to compel discovery.  106 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2005-Ohio-
4370, 833 N.E.2d 299.  We stayed all further discovery and ordered the parties to 
brief the following issues: 
{¶ 18} “1) Whether the Governor of Ohio may claim an executive 
privilege to prevent disclosure of documents provided to the Governor by staff 
members or other executive-branch officials. 
{¶ 19} “2) Whether the Governor of Ohio and other high-ranking 
government officials may claim an executive privilege, or other justification, to 
prevent discovery by deposition or as otherwise authorized by the Ohio Rules of 
Civil Procedure.” 
II 
Privilege in Context of Public Records Act Requests 
{¶ 20} It has long been the policy of this state, as reflected in the Public 
Records Act and as acknowledged by this court, that open government serves the 
public interest and our democratic system.  We have repeatedly espoused this 
principle: “ ‘R.C. 149.43 [the Public Records Act] is construed liberally in favor 
of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public 
records.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-
January Term, 2006 
7 
Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. 
Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334. 
{¶ 21} There is no dispute that the governor’s office is a public office, the 
governor is a public official, and the requested weekly reports are records for 
purposes of R.C. 149.43.  See R.C. 149.011(A), (D), and (G).  However, by the 
express language of R.C. 149.43, not every record produced or kept by a public 
office is a “public record” falling within the scope of the act.  The General 
Assembly exempted certain types of governmental records from the disclosure 
requirement.  As relevant here, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)provides: 
{¶ 22} “(A)  As used in this Section: 
{¶ 23} “(1)  ‘Public record’ means records kept by any public office. * * *  
‘Public record’ does not mean any of the following: 
{¶ 24} “ * * * 
{¶ 25} “(v) Records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal 
law.” 
{¶ 26} We have previously recognized that certain privileges exempt 
records from disclosure under R.C. 149.43 because their release is “prohibited by 
state or federal law” under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v).  In State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 24, 
we observed that records of communications between attorneys and their state-
government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice do not fall within the 
scope of the Public Records Act, since the release of these records is prohibited 
by state law, i.e., they are protected by this state’s common law of attorney-client 
privilege.  We rejected the relator’s argument that because the statutory version of 
the privilege does not apply to government clients, the records must be disclosed:  
“Even assuming that R.C. 2317.02(A) does not extend attorney-client privilege to 
government entities (see R.C. 2317.021, defining ‘client’), the common-law 
attorney-client privilege recognized in Ohio would apply.”  Id. at ¶ 26. 
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{¶ 27} We have also recognized that certain papers executed by members 
of the judicial branch of government are beyond the scope of the Public Records 
Act.  A trial judge’s personal handwritten trial notes are not public records subject 
to the act: “permitting a litigant access to a judge’s personal trial notes would 
intrude upon a judge’s subjective thoughts and deliberations, threatening the 
orderly administration of justice.”  State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688.  Similarly, in TBC Westlake, Inc. v. Hamilton 
Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 58, 64, 689 N.E.2d 32 we 
characterized the above statement as describing the common-law “judicial mental 
process privilege,” and we relied on it to exempt an attorney-examiner’s report 
prepared for the Board of Tax Appeals from the Public Records Act.  We 
concluded that “the judicial mental process privilege, a common-law privilege, is 
state law that prohibits release of the attorney-examiner’s report to the parties.  
Thus, under R.C. 149.43(A)(1), this report is not a public record.” Id. at 64, 689 
N.E.2d 32. 
{¶ 28} Pursuant 
to 
the 
definition 
of 
public 
records 
in 
R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v), privileged records do not fall within the scope of the Public 
Records Act because state law prohibits compelled disclosure of privileged 
material.  If gubernatorial communications are indeed privileged, they do not fall 
within the scope of the act.  They are simply not “public” records, but rather 
confidential records. 
{¶ 29} Thus, pursuant to the Public Records Act, the question whether 
executive privilege exists in Ohio as a matter of statutory or common law is a 
threshold issue that must be determined in this case.  If the governor is correct in 
asserting the existence of an executive privilege and its applicability to the weekly 
reports, Dann has no right of access to them under the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 30} No statute establishes executive privilege.  The governor argues, 
however, that Section 6, Article III of the Ohio Constitution vests him with the 
January Term, 2006 
9 
authority to determine for himself whether the weekly reports sought by Dann 
under the Public Records Act are confidential.  Section 6, Article III grants the 
governor the authority to “require information, in writing, from the officers in the 
executive department, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective 
offices.”  He argues that this provision bars the General Assembly from including 
within the scope of the Public Records Act documents provided to him. 
{¶ 31} The text of Section 6, Article III does not include language 
warranting the conclusion that information provided to the governor pursuant to 
that section should be considered proprietary to him or otherwise confidential.  
We therefore reject the governor’s attempt to create what would amount to an 
absolute privilege for gubernatorial communications based on Section 6, Article 
III. 
III 
The Concept of Executive Privilege, Allowing a Person Holding the 
Highest Public Executive Office to Withhold Some 
Communications from Public Disclosure, Is Well Established 
{¶ 32} In the absence of controlling Ohio statutory, constitutional, or 
common-law authority concerning gubernatorial executive privilege, it is 
appropriate to review federal law and the law of other states that have addressed 
the issue of executive privilege. 
A 
Federal Law of Executive Privilege 
{¶ 33} Executive privilege has been asserted by the executive branch of 
the United States to protect various types of information, including military and 
state secrets, the identity of confidential government informants, and facts 
concerning pending investigations.1  See United States v. Reynolds (1953), 345 
                                                 
1.  For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to give Congress FBI investigative files, 
President Eisenhower invoked executive privilege on over 30 occasions, and President Kennedy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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U.S. 1, 6-8, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727; Totten v. United States (1875), 92 U.S. 
105, 106-107, 23 L.Ed. 605; Roviaro v. United States (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 59-61, 
77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639.  Presidents have also asserted a common-law 
privilege, commonly referred to as the “deliberative process” privilege, which 
protects against disclosure of government documents prepared in connection with 
deliberation and decisionmaking.  See, generally, In re Sealed Case 
(C.A.D.C.1997), 121 F.3d 729, 736-741.  Yet another category of federal 
common-law privilege is the presidential-communications privilege, which is 
based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers.  United States v. 
Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
1 
Deliberative-Process Privilege 
{¶ 34} The most frequently asserted form of executive privilege is the 
“deliberative process” privilege; “it allows the government to withhold documents 
and other materials that would reveal ‘advisory opinions, recommendations and 
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and 
policies are formulated.’ ” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737, quoting Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena (D.D.C.1966), 40 F.R.D. 318, 324.  
Predecisional and deliberative materials are protected, but documents that merely 
state or explain a decision that has already been made or contain purely factual 
information are not.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice (C.A.D.C.2004), 365 
F.3d 1108, 1113; Colorado Springs v. White (Colo.1998), 967 P.2d 1042, 1051.  
                                                                                                                                     
cited the privilege to prevent congressional oversight of foreign policy.  See Priester, Rozelle, and 
Horowitz, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Legal History (1999), 62-WTR Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 5, 79.  See, also, Iraola, Congressional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for 
Information Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions (2002), 87 Iowa L.Rev. 
1559, 1570.    
 
 
January Term, 2006 
11 
The privilege extends beyond the chief executive officer of a governmental unit 
such as a president or governor. Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. West Virginia Dev. 
Office (1996), 198 W.Va. 563, 572, 482 S.E.2d 180.  This category of executive 
privilege is grounded in judicial recognition of a “valid need for protection of 
communications between high Government officials and those who advise and 
assist them in the performance of their manifold duties.” United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. at 705, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  It does not have its 
underpinnings in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.  Id. 
{¶ 35} At different pertinent times in this case, including in his motion for 
protective order, the governor asserted deliberative-process privilege as 
justification for his refusal to disclose the weekly reports requested by Dann.  He 
now, however, expressly disclaims any reliance on that privilege, and we 
accordingly do not examine the common-law deliberative-process privilege in 
today’s decision. 
2 
Presidential-Communications Privilege 
{¶ 36} The governor asserts that an executive privilege analogous to the 
presidential-communications privilege should be recognized in Ohio and applied 
to protect the confidentiality of the weekly reports. 
{¶ 37} The seminal federal case recognizing and interpreting the 
presidential-communications privilege arose when President Nixon invoked the 
privilege in an attempt to quash a subpoena from a special prosecutor for the 
Watergate tapes in a criminal case naming the President as an unindicted 
coconspirator.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 
1039.  In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that certain presidential communications were 
entitled to a presumptive privilege justified by the public’s interest in ensuring 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that the president may receive frank and candid information requisite to wise 
decisionmaking: 
{¶ 38} “The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his 
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial 
deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the 
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of 
the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in 
Presidential decisionmaking.  A President and those who assist him must be free 
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions 
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.  These 
are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential 
communications.  The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government 
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 39} Because “a President’s communications and activities encompass a 
vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ‘ordinary 
individual,’ ” it is “necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential 
confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of 
justice.”  Id. at 715, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 40} The court recognized that “the importance of this confidentiality is 
too plain to require further discussion.  Human experience teaches that those who 
expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a 
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the 
decisionmaking process.  * * *  [T]he privilege can be said to derive from the 
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.  
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the 
protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar 
January Term, 2006 
13 
constitutional underpinnings.” (Footnotes omitted.)  Id. at 705-706, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 
41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 41} We have found no more precise and persuasive statement of the 
rationale for executive privilege than these words in the unanimous opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  The rationale applies with equal force to the 
chief executive official of a state. 
{¶ 42} Under federal law, “[u]nlike the deliberative process privilege, 
which is a general privilege that applies to all executive branch officials, the 
presidential communications privilege is specific to the President and ‘applies to 
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well 
as pre-deliberative ones.’ ”  Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1113-1114, quoting 
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745.  The presidential-communications privilege thus 
does not protect “only the deliberative or advice portions of documents.”  Sealed 
Case, 121 F.3d at 745.  That is, final or postdecisional materials “often will be 
revelatory of the President’s deliberations — as, for example, when the President 
decides to pursue a particular course of action, but asks his advisers to submit 
follow-up reports so that he can monitor whether this course of action is likely to 
be successful.  The release of final and post-decisional materials would also limit 
the President’s ability to communicate his decisions privately, thereby interfering 
with his ability to exercise control over the executive branch.”  Id. at 745-746. 
{¶ 43} The United States Supreme Court justified a distinction between 
the presidential-communications and deliberative-process privileges because the 
“presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles 
and the President’s unique constitutional role,” whereas “the deliberative process 
privilege is primarily a common law privilege.”  Id. at 745, citing Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 731, 732, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349. 
{¶ 44} Ultimately, however, the court in United States v. Nixon held that 
under the facts of that case, the presumptive privilege in presidential 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
communications “cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of 
law in the fair administration of criminal justice” and that the “generalized 
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence 
in a pending criminal trial.”  418 U.S. at 713, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  
The court required Nixon to provide the requested tapes to the special prosecutor. 
B 
State Law of Executive Privilege 
{¶ 45} “It is generally acknowledged that some form of ‘executive 
privilege’ is a necessary concomitant to executive power.”  Annotation, 
Construction and Application, Under State Law, of Doctrine of Executive 
Privilege (1981), 10 A.L.R.4th 355, 357.  Other states that have recognized 
executive privilege have not deemed it to be absolute.  “[M]odern authority has 
generally held that the privilege not to disclose information in the possession of 
the governor is qualified, and that determination of the existence of the privilege 
is within judicial discretion, based on a determination respecting whether or not 
the particular disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.”  Id. at 358. 
{¶ 46} In an early case involving a request for disclosure of certain 
documents resulting from an investigation of a state office, the governor of 
Arizona alleged that it was his duty to determine whether, and to what extent, 
information reaching him in his official capacity should be made public. Mathews 
v. Pyle (1952), 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893. As in the case at bar, the governor 
argued that his determination should be deemed final and beyond the scope of 
judicial review. 
{¶ 47} The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the argument, 
characterizing it as “inconsistent with all principles of Democratic Government.”  
Id. at 80-81, 251 P.2d 893.  It acknowledged that the governor possessed the 
authority initially to deny a right of inspection “if he thinks that the document is 
privileged or confidential, or if he thinks that it would be detrimental to the 
January Term, 2006 
15 
interests of the state to permit its contents to be known either to newspaper editors 
or other citizens.”  Id.  The court made it clear, however, that the ultimate 
determination of that issue rested with the judicial branch.  It instructed the trial 
court, on remand, to order disclosure only if it found that the documents were “not 
confidential or that a disclosure of their contents would not be detrimental to the 
best interests of the state.”  Id. at 81, 251 P.2d 893. 
{¶ 48} In 1978, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, accorded its governor “a qualified power to 
protect the confidentiality of communications pertaining to the executive 
function” analogous to the qualified constitutionally based privilege of the 
President. Nero v. Hyland (1978), 76 N.J. 213, 225, 386 A.2d 846. Other state 
courts that have addressed the issue have similarly recognized that “a governor, in 
the discharge of official duties, is entitled to an executive privilege analogous to 
the President’s.”  Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist. (Alaska 
1986), 721 P.2d 617, 623. 2   
{¶ 49} Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor state supreme 
courts have been persuaded by arguments similar to those asserted by relator here 
that the recognition of an executive privilege threatens the viability of our 
democratic institutions.  Rather, to the extent that an executive privilege facilitates 
candor and open, vigorous debate in the formulation of public policy, it lubricates 
the decisional process. 
IV 
Qualified Gubernatorial-Communications Privilege in Ohio 
                                                 
2.  See, also, Hamilton v. Verdow (1980), 287 Md. 544, 556, 414 A.2d 914 (“the Governor is 
entitled to the same privileges and exemptions in the discharge of his duties as is the President”); 
Killington, Ltd. v. Lash (1990), 153 Vt. 628, 636, 572 A.2d 1368 (“Federal and state courts have 
accorded to the chief executive of the nation or of a state [an executive] privilege”); New England 
Coalition for Energy Efficiency & Environment v. Office of Governor (1995), 164 Vt. 337, 341, 
670 A.2d 815; Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm. (Del.Super.1995), 659 A.2d 777, 783.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
A 
Confidential Communications in the 
Legislative and Judicial Branches 
{¶ 50} Confidentiality of certain internal communications in the 
legislative and judicial branches of Ohio government has been recognized.  
Section 13, Article II, Ohio Constitution expressly states that “[t]he proceedings 
of both Houses shall be public, except in cases which, in the opinion of two-thirds 
of those present, require secrecy.” The General Assembly itself has recognized 
the necessity of limited confidentiality in R.C. 101.30(B), which provides that 
legislative documents arising out of the confidential relationship between 
legislative staff, General Assembly staff, and each member of General Assembly 
are not public records under R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 51} That documents reflecting the adjudicative process of courts are 
confidential is well established and universally accepted.  See discussion above at 
Section II.  In State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 67 Ohio St.3d at 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, 
we held that “if R.C. 149.43 were interpreted to mandate public access to a trial 
judge’s personal notes, that result could be construed as an unconstitutional 
legislative encroachment upon the independence of the judiciary.” 
B 
The Governor’s Status as Chief Executive Officer in a State 
Government of Three Coequal Branches Justifies 
Recognition of a Qualified Gubernatorial-Communications Privilege 
{¶ 52} Section 5, Article III of the Ohio Constitution specifies that “[t]he 
supreme executive power of this State shall be vested in the governor,” and 
Section 6, Article III imposes a duty on the governor to “see that the laws are 
faithfully executed.”  The governor is thus the chief executive officer of the state 
and possesses authority comparable to that of the executive authority exercised by 
the President under Sections 1 and 3, Article II of the United States Constitution. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
{¶ 53} Dann correctly notes that the drafters of the 1802 Ohio 
Constitution contemplated that the executive and judicial branches would be 
subordinate to the legislative branch.  He argues that communications to and from 
the highest official of the executive branch therefore should not be accorded 
confidentiality. 
{¶ 54} We acknowledge that early versions of the Ohio Constitution 
severely restricted the governor’s powers, in part based upon the distrust of a 
strong executive after Arthur St. Clair’s turbulent term as governor of the 
Northwest Territory, and that the 1851 Ohio Constitution curtailed legislative 
power and increased judicial authority.  Terzian, Ohio’s Constitutions: An 
Historical Perspective (2004), 51 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 357, 358, 364, 378.  But over 
the years, various constitutional amendments increased the power of the executive 
branch to achieve a rough equality with the other branches, as noted in our cases.  
For example, in 1903, the Ohio Constitution was amended to give the governor 
the power to veto legislation adopted by the General Assembly.  Section 16, 
Article II, Ohio Constitution.  A 1912 amendment to that provision gave the 
governor the line-item veto for appropriation bills, which is a power exceeding 
that of the President.  Id. 
{¶ 55} The principle of separation of powers into three coequal branches–
executive, legislative, and judicial—and the checks and balances that principle 
ensures are now deemed fundamental to our democratic form of government.  
“While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision 
specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly 
embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that 
define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state 
government.” S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 158-159, 28 OBR 
250, 503 N.E.2d 136. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶ 56} The separation-of-powers doctrine requires that each branch of 
government be permitted to exercise its constitutional duties without interference 
from the other two branches of government.3  The gubernatorial-communications 
privilege protects the public by allowing the state’s chief executive the freedom 
that is required to make decisions.  Recognition of a qualified gubernatorial-
communications privilege advances the same interests advanced by the analogous 
presidential privilege, including the “public interest in candid, objective, and even 
blunt or harsh opinions” in executive decisionmaking.  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 94 
S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. Our decision in this case will thus affect the quality 
of decisionmaking by the highest executive officer of Ohio government. 
{¶ 57} We agree with the unassailable premise established in Nixon, and 
reiterated in federal and state case law, that the public interest is served by 
allowing a chief executive officer of a state or the federal government to receive 
                                                 
3.  {¶ a} In Loving v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 748, 757, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36, the 
court observed that the separation-of-powers doctrine “requires that a branch not impair another in 
the performance of its constitutional duties."  More recently, the court noted that the “public 
interest requires that a coequal branch of Government ‘afford Presidential confidentiality the 
greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice’ * * * and give recognition to 
the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might 
distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties.”  Cheney v. United States 
Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia (2004), 542 U.S. 367, 382, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459, 
quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ b}See, also, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (“The [presidential-
communications] privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted 
in the separation of powers under the Constitution”); Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (“The 
presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles and the President’s 
unique constitutional role”); Hamilton, 287 Md. at 562, 414 A.2d 914 (“In light of the reasons 
underlying the privilege, and considering the express separation of powers provision in [the 
Maryland Constitution], we do recognize as part of the law of this State the doctrine of executive 
privilege”);  Nero, 76 N.J. at 225-226, 386 A.2d 846 (a gubernatorial-communications privilege 
“protects and insulates the sensitive decisional and consultative responsibilities of the Governor 
which can only be discharged freely and effectively under a mantle of privacy and security”); 
State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court (1981), 96 N.M. 254, 258, 629 P.2d 330 
(“Inherent in the successful functioning of an independent executive is the valid need for 
protection of communications between its members”).   
 
January Term, 2006 
19 
information, advice, and recommendations unhampered by the possibility of 
compelled disclosure of every utterance made, and every piece of paper 
circulating, in the governor’s office. 
{¶ 58} The people of Ohio have a public interest in ensuring that their 
governor can operate in a frank, open, and candid environment in which 
information and conflicting ideas, thoughts, and opinions may be vigorously 
presented to the governor without concern that unwanted consequences will 
follow from public dissemination.  It is for the benefit of the public that we 
recognize this qualified privilege and not for the benefit of the individuals who 
hold, or will hold, the office of governor of the state of Ohio. 
{¶ 59} Consequently, and in accordance with the persuasive weight of 
authorities that have addressed these issues, we recognize a qualified 
gubernatorial-communications privilege in Ohio.  Because communications to or 
from an Ohio governor are qualifiedly privileged, a governor’s initial assertion 
that a communication is within the scope of this privilege is not conclusive.  It is 
ultimately the role of the courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
public’s interest in affording its governor an umbrella of confidentiality is 
outweighed by a need for disclosure. 
{¶ 60} Accordingly, we hold that a governor of Ohio has a qualified 
gubernatorial-communications privilege that protects communications to or from 
the governor when the communications were made for the purpose of fostering 
informed 
and 
sound 
gubernatorial 
deliberations, 
policymaking, 
and 
decisionmaking.  This qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege is 
overcome when a requester demonstrates that the requester has a particularized 
need to review the communications and that that need outweighs the public’s 
interest in according confidentiality to communications made to or from the 
governor. 
V 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Procedural Framework for Invocation of 
Gubernatorial-Communications Privilege 
{¶ 61} Governor Taft has claimed a gubernatorial-communications 
privilege both to preclude discovery sought by Dann under the Civil Rules and to 
justify his refusal to permit disclosure of the weekly reports sought under the 
Public 
Records 
Act. 
 
Having 
recognized 
a 
qualified 
gubernatorial-
communications privilege, we now outline the procedures we will apply to 
determine the validity of the governor’s assertions that the weekly reports sought 
by the relator should remain confidential, and beyond the scope of the Public 
Records Act.  Until the applicability of the gubernatorial-communications 
privilege is determined, it would be premature to dispose of the governor’s 
motion for protective order against depositions of executive officials. 
{¶ 62} When a governor’s invocation of gubernatorial-communications 
privilege is legally challenged, a three-step process ensues to determine whether 
the privilege applies: 
{¶ 63} •First, the governor must formally assert the privilege, resulting in 
a presumption that the requested documents are legally protected and confidential. 
{¶ 64} •Second, to overcome the presumptive privilege, the party seeking 
disclosure must demonstrate a particularized need for disclosure of the material 
deemed confidential by the governor. 
{¶ 65} •When both of these conditions have been met, the court shall 
order the governor to provide the material at issue for in camera review.  The 
court must then determine whether the communications to the governor were, in 
fact, made for the purpose of fostering informed and sound deliberations, 
policymaking, and decisionmaking.  If the court determines that the 
communications were made for the purpose of fostering informed and sound 
deliberations, policymaking, and decisionmaking, it will balance the requester’s 
need for disclosure against the public’s interest in ensuring informed and 
January Term, 2006 
21 
unhindered gubernatorial decisionmaking.  The qualified privilege is overcome 
only where that balancing weighs in favor of disclosure. 
{¶ 66} To satisfy the first of the three steps, a governor4 must formally 
assert the privilege by declaring that he or she has reviewed the requested 
materials and concluded that the materials meet the criteria of the privilege, i.e., 
that they constitute a communication either to or from him and were made for the 
purpose of fostering informed and sound gubernatorial deliberations, 
policymaking, and decisionmaking. 
{¶ 67} Once the governor asserts the privilege, the burden shifts to the 
party seeking disclosure to produce evidence demonstrating a particularized need 
to overcome the privilege and examine the documents at issue.  The requester, 
without relying on civil discovery to establish it, must demonstrate particularized, 
rather than generalized, need and explain why that need outweighs the qualified 
privilege. 
{¶ 68} A requester with the authority and obligation to investigate 
criminal or civil matters may demonstrate a particularized need when documents 
are required to fully prosecute civil or criminal matters.  Thus, for example, an 
authorized legislative committee or a grand jury may demonstrate a particularized 
need to obtain communications to or from the governor. Similarly, a court may 
find a particularized need when disclosure is sought by a uniquely qualified 
representative of the general public who demonstrates that disclosure of particular 
information to it will serve the public interest.  Particularized need, however, does 
not exist when privileged information can be obtained elsewhere. Whether a 
requester’s asserted need is sufficient is a matter of law. 
                                                 
4.  Cf. Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C.1999), 186 F.R.D. 236, 242 (“The President alone possesses 
[the] authority” to invoke presidential-communications privilege).  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 69} In the absence of a proper demonstration of need, a court should 
respect the governor’s characterization of the material as warranting 
confidentiality.  In deferring initially to the governor’s own evaluation of 
communications to him or her as confidential, the judicial branch accords the 
governor autonomy consistent with the principle of separation of powers. 
{¶ 70} We share the sentiment of the Supreme Court of the United States 
that executive privilege should not be lightly invoked.  United States v. Reynolds, 
345 U.S. 1, 7, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727.  When executive privilege is asserted in 
court proceedings, the judiciary “is forced into the difficult task of balancing the 
need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s [constitutional] 
prerogatives.  This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the 
Executive’s claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore 
difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances.  These 
‘occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches’ should be 
avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of 
Columbia (2004), 542 U.S. 367, 389-390, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459, 
quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 692, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 71} Where both of the first two steps have been satisfied, the court will 
undertake an in camera review of the requested materials and either uphold or 
reject the governor’s claim of confidentiality.  In conducting the balancing of the 
competing public interests of gubernatorial confidentiality and the demonstrated, 
particularized need for disclosure, a court may uphold, or reject, the claim of 
privilege in its entirety.  It may require disclosure of some, but not all, of the 
materials sought. 
{¶ 72} We acknowledge that a person invoking the Public Records Act, 
R.C. 149.43, is not required to demonstrate need or even to state a reason for 
requesting disclosure of public records pursuant to the act.  State ex rel. Fant v. 
Enright (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 186, 610 N.E.2d 997, syllabus.  However, we 
January Term, 2006 
23 
reiterate that documents protected by the gubernatorial-communications privilege 
do not fall within the definition of “public records” for purposes of the act.  R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v).  See Section II above.  For that reason, this decision should not 
be construed as changing existing precedent. 
VI 
Application of Gubernatorial-Communications Privilege in the Case at Bar 
{¶ 73} We have today established the perimeters of a qualified 
gubernatorial-communications privilege in Ohio.  Previous orders of this court 
have stayed the parties from proceeding in this case pending our resolution of the 
executive-privilege issues presented.  106 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2005-Ohio-3977, 832 
N.E.2d 60; 106 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2005-Ohio-4370, 833 N.E.2d 299.  We assume 
that either or both parties may wish to proceed with the submission of evidence. 
{¶ 74} We therefore order that respondent, Governor Taft, may submit to 
this court, within 15 days of the announcement of this decision, a formal assertion 
of the gubernatorial-communications privilege defined in this opinion.  Relator 
Dann may assert, within 15 days thereafter, his particularized need to review any 
weekly reports that the governor asserts are privileged.  We defer ruling on the 
pending motion for protective order relating to discovery until we determine 
whether the governor has established a gubernatorial-communications privilege. 
So ordered. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 75} I fully agree with all that Justice Pfeifer has written in his powerful 
and compelling dissenting opinion.  I write only to add that even the majority’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
adoption of a gubernatorial-communications privilege fails to justify the 
protection it affords to the documents at issue. 
{¶ 76} Lying at the heart of the executive privilege for presidential or 
gubernatorial communications “is the necessity for protection of the public 
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential [or 
gubernatorial] decisionmaking.  A President [or governor] and those who assist 
him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express 
except privately.”  United States v. Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 
3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  This protection “is for the benefit of the public and not 
the governmental officials who claim the privilege.”  Hamilton v. Verdow (1980), 
287 Md. 544, 563, 414 A.2d 914. 
{¶ 77} The privilege “is limited to communications * * * made ‘in the 
process of shaping policies and making decisions.’ ”  Nixon v. Admr. of Gen. 
Servs. (1977), 433 U.S. 425, 449, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, quoting United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  It is properly 
invoked when the chief executive is “asked to produce documents or other 
materials that reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations.”  In re Sealed 
Case (C.A.D.C.1997), 121 F.3d 729, 744.  “The presidential communications 
privilege should never serve as a means of shielding information regarding 
governmental operations that do not call ultimately for direct decisionmaking by 
the President.”  Id. at 752. 
{¶ 78} The executive privilege, whatever its form, is “not to be lightly 
invoked.”  United States v. Reynolds (1953), 345 U.S. 1, 7, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 
727.  The communications privilege in particular “is invoked only rarely.”  Sealed 
Case, 121 F.3d at 738.  Otherwise, “the insubstantial exercise of the privilege 
inevitably bears costs in credibility and public accountability, upon which each 
January Term, 2006 
25 
branch of government fundamentally relies.”  Killington, Ltd. v. Lash (1990), 153 
Vt. 628, 641, 572 A.2d 1368. 
{¶ 79} Thus, it is imperative that the governor be required to specifically 
identify and precisely describe the nature of the documents sought to be protected 
and explain why they fall within the scope of the privilege.  See Herald Assn., 
Inc. v. Dean (2002), 174 Vt. 350, 356, 816 A.2d 469; New England Coalition for 
Energy Efficiency & Environment v. Office of Governor (1995), 164 Vt. 337, 344, 
670 A.2d 815; Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist. (Alaska 1986), 
721 P.2d 617, 626; Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am. (C.A.D.C.1977), 564 F.2d 
531, 543; Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange (E.D.Wis.1972), 57 
F.R.D. 133, 138; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena (D.D.C.1966), 40 
F.R.D. 318, 326.  See, also, Reynolds, supra, 345 U.S. at 9-10, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 
L.Ed. 727 (“Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the 
caprice of executive officers”). 
{¶ 80} In this case, Governor Taft, albeit through counsel, has been 
claiming all along that public access to the weekly reports from James Conrad and 
James Samuel “would discourage future necessarily candid advice from Directors 
and Executive Assistants to the Governor” and “make it impossible for Directors 
and staff to communicate openly and effectively with the Governor—particularly 
about sensitive policy initiatives, legal issues or other ideas still in the formative 
stages.”  However, the governor’s office has since released all of the requested 
weekly reports from Conrad for the period January 1999 through August 2004 
and certain weekly reports from Samuel that contain information relating to the 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, and these reports do not bear out the 
governor’s claims. 
{¶ 81} These reports do not reflect gubernatorial decisionmaking, and 
they do not appear to meet the majority’s test, i.e., they were not “made for the 
purpose of fostering informed and sound gubernatorial deliberations, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
policymaking, and decisionmaking.”  Nothing about these reports is advisory, 
investigatory, decisional, consultative, deliberative, or sensitive in nature, at least 
not in any sense or to any degree that would justify their protection under the 
executive privilege.  They are, by and large, innocuous administrative and 
bureaucratic transmissions, at times informative of public events, but by no means 
so reflective of the sensitive decisional responsibilities of the governor as to 
warrant the protection of such a high privilege.  Indeed, the governor’s chief 
policy advisor and director of cabinet affairs testified at deposition that executive 
administrators have used other means of communicating sensitive information to 
the governor. 
{¶ 82} It should be immediately obvious to anyone conducting a 
forthright review of these reports that they are manifestly distinguishable from the 
investigative and advisory records that have been held by various courts to raise a 
presumptive privilege for presidential or gubernatorial communications.  They are 
so far removed from the vital public interest in the effectiveness of the governor’s 
decisionmaking duties that to even suggest their entitlement to protected status 
makes a mockery of the executive privilege, whatever its form. 
{¶ 83} And yet the majority establishes a paradigm for invoking the 
privilege that enables the governor to withhold the remaining undisclosed reports 
by Samuel without having to satisfy the criteria of the privilege.  Under the 
majority’s paradigm, the governor must first assert the privilege himself by 
declaring that he “has reviewed the requested materials and concluded that the 
materials meet the criteria of the privilege, i.e., that they constitute a 
communication either to or from him and were made for the purpose of fostering 
informed 
and 
sound 
gubernatorial 
deliberations, 
policymaking, 
and 
decisionmaking.”  This declaration by the governor “result[s] in a presumption 
that the requested documents are legally protected and confidential.” 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 84} But the governor is not required to explain how these reports are 
related to the gubernatorial decisionmaking, deliberative, or policymaking 
process, and the party seeking disclosure, in this case Senator Dann, is not 
permitted to rebut the presumption by showing that the documents sought to be 
withheld are unrelated to the gubernatorial decisionmaking process.  As strange as 
it sounds, the senator cannot rebut the presumption that the criteria of the 
privilege have been met by showing that the criteria of the privilege have not been 
met.  Instead, to overcome the presumptive privilege, Senator Dann “must 
demonstrate a particularized need for disclosure of the material deemed 
confidential by the governor.”  Only then will the majority “determine whether 
the communications to the governor were in fact made for the purpose of 
fostering informed and sound deliberations, policymaking, and decisionmaking.” 
{¶ 85} By requiring the senator to demonstrate a particularized need for 
the requested reports before a judicial determination is made as to whether the 
material is sufficiently related to the gubernatorial decisionmaking process to 
qualify for confidential treatment under the executive privilege, the majority 
makes it possible for the governor to withhold the documents on the basis of a 
privilege that is not applicable in the first place.  Thus, if Senator Dann is unable 
to show a particularized need for the Samuel reports, the majority will deny him 
access without ever deciding whether the criteria of the privilege are met.  In that 
event, judicial control over the question of applicability will have been abdicated 
to the caprice of the governor. 
{¶ 86} I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 87} “A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.  
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” 
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings of 
James Madison (1910) 103. 
{¶ 88} For over 200 years, the state of Ohio has existed without a 
gubernatorial-communications privilege.  For over 200 years, we have had an 
open government, with an executive branch designed to be limited in power.  
Why now does the governor come before this court claiming a heretofore 
unrecognized privilege?  Are we in the midst of a crisis of state?  No, the 
governor is in the midst of a crisis of politics.  That he chooses these 
circumstances to assert that the privilege is “essential for effective governance” is 
a Farce; the majority, in ignoring our Constitution, statutes, and traditions to grant 
his wish, has written a Prologue to a Tragedy. 
The Applicability of the “Deliberative Process” Privilege 
{¶ 89} To dissent from this court’s grant of unprecedented power is not to 
presume to open the inner workings of the governor’s office to one and all.  
Certainly, the governor is entitled to privacy in the making of decisions, and, to 
that end, the common law recognizes the “deliberative process” privilege.  The 
deliberative-process privilege “allows the government to withhold documents and 
other materials that would reveal ‘advisory opinions, recommendations and 
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and 
policies are formulated.’ ” In re Sealed Case (C.A.D.C.1997), 121 F.3d 729, 737, 
quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena (D.D.C.1966), 40 F.R.D. 
318, 324.  The aim of the privilege is to encourage unrestrained debate in the 
formulation of policy, but to keep public purely factual information: 
{¶ 90} “Two requirements are essential to the deliberative process 
privilege: the material must be predecisional and it must be deliberative. * * * 
Both requirements stem from the privilege’s ‘ultimate purpose[, which] * * * is to 
prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions’ by allowing government 
January Term, 2006 
29 
officials freedom to debate alternative approaches in private. [Natl. Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975)], 421 U.S. [132] at 151, 95 S.Ct. 
[1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29].  The deliberative process privilege does not shield 
documents that simply state or explain a decision the government has already 
made or protect material that is purely factual, unless the material is so 
inextricably intertwined with the deliberative sections of documents that its 
disclosure would inevitably reveal the government’s deliberations.”  In re Sealed 
Case, 121 F.3d at 737. 
{¶ 91} Why is the deliberative-process privilege not enough for the 
governor?  We do not know.  However, we do know that “where there is reason to 
believe [that] the documents sought may shed light on government misconduct, 
‘the [deliberative-process] privilege is routinely denied,’ on the grounds that 
shielding internal government deliberations in this context does not serve ‘the 
public’s interest in honest, effective government.’ ” Id. at 738, quoting Texaco v. 
Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs (C.A.1, 1995), 60 F.3d 867, 885. 
The Inapplicability of Nixon 
{¶ 92} It is appropriate only on an ironic level that the majority relies so 
heavily on United States v. Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 
L.Ed.2d 1039, a case wherein President Nixon raised the lofty ideals of separation 
of powers and the necessity of candor in presidential decisionmaking to prevent 
the release of evidence about what Presidential Press Secretary Ron Ziegler 
famously called a “third-rate burglary.”  Having demeaned the office of the 
presidency, Nixon cloaked himself in its majesty in a vain attempt to save 
himself.  Lest we forget, Nixon lost.  But since that time, we have been living 
with the effects of the dicta from Nixon wherein the court stated that presidential 
communications – not just deliberative or predecisional communications – are 
privileged. Id. at 708-712, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. It is debatable whether 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
that privilege has inured to the benefit of the republic or merely to the benefit of 
executives who wish to avoid embarrassment. 
{¶ 93} But that is not our concern here.  We are not dealing with the 
Presidency and its exceptional privileges.  We are dealing with the governorship 
of Ohio.  In ruling against Nixon, the court found it significant that he did “not 
place his claim of privilege [against disclosure] on the ground [that] they are 
military or diplomatic secrets.  As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have 
traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.” Nixon, 
418 U.S. at 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  The duties present in Article II 
for the President that most require secrecy — national security and diplomacy – 
simply are not part of the governor of Ohio’s responsibilities.  The Nixon court 
establishes the uniqueness of the federal executive-communications privilege, a 
privilege that owes itself to “the singularly unique role under Art. II of a 
President’s communications and activities, related to the performance of duties 
under that Article.” Id. at 715, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 94} The court makes it clear that the sensitivity of the information 
available to the President necessitates the privilege: 
{¶ 95} “[A] President’s communications and activities encompass a vastly 
wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ‘ordinary individual.’  
It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality 
the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.  The need 
for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates in which casual 
reference might be made concerning political leaders within the country or 
foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.” (Footnote omitted.) 
Id. 
{¶ 96} There is a dramatic difference in degree between the duties and 
responsibilities of the president and the Ohio governor.  One has global impact 
daily; the other clearly does not.  Though their roles may be analogous, their 
January Term, 2006 
31 
duties and responsibilities are far from equal.  The scale of the privilege should 
reflect the difference in scale between the offices.  The common-law deliberative-
process privilege is an appropriate privilege for the governor’s office. 
The Ohio Constitution and Open Records Law 
{¶ 97} As the majority points out, there is an “absence of controlling Ohio 
statutory, constitutional, or common-law authority concerning gubernatorial 
executive privilege.”  That is exactly the point, and we need not look further.  
Ohio has its own Constitution and laws, and those together demonstrate this 
state’s tradition of open government and limited gubernatorial power.  There is no 
room under Ohio law for a gubernatorial-communications privilege. 
{¶ 98} Ohio has a long tradition of open government, dating back to the 
formation of its Constitution.  In Nixon, the court speaks of secrecy in government 
as mundane: 
{¶ 99} “There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality.  The 
meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete 
privacy. * * * Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 
30 years after the Convention. * * * Most of the Framers acknowledge that 
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been 
written.”  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, fn. 15. 
{¶ 100} Ohio history belies the court’s characterization.  Unlike the 
federal constitution, Ohio’s Constitution was created in the open.  Thousands of 
pages of contemporaneous writings, including transcripts of the debate, from 
Ohio’s constitutional conventions of 1802, 1851, 1873, and 1912 have been 
published.  Ohio has been open from the beginning: 
{¶ 101} “The common-law right to inspect government documents has 
been recognized in Ohio since the earliest reported court decisions.  As there was 
no statutory provision to the contrary (and no constitutional mandate), the right to 
inspect public records was subject only to the condition that the inspection did not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
endanger the safety of the record or unreasonably interfere with the duties of the 
public official having custody of the record.” (Footnote omitted.) Moyer, 
Interpreting Ohio’s Sunshine Laws: A Judicial Perspective (2003), 59 
N.Y.U.Ann.Surv.Am.Law 247, 248. 
{¶ 102} The Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, is a statutory 
acknowledgement of Ohio’s tradition of open government.  As this court just 
stated in Kish v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 
17: 
{¶ 103} “[O]ur founders rejected the English common law and property 
theories that curtailed citizens’ access to governmental information.  See [State ex 
rel.] Natl. Broadcasting Co., [Inc. (1988)] 38 Ohio St.3d [79] at 81, 526 N.E.2d 
786; Wells v. Lewis (1901), 12 Ohio Dec. 170; Moyer, 59 N.Y.U.Ann.Surv.Am.L. 
at 247-248.  Instead, our legislators, executives, and judges mandated and 
monitored the careful creation and preservation of public records, White [v. 
Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996)], 76 Ohio St.3d [416] at 419, 667 N.E.2d 
1223, and codified the people’s right to access those records.  Such statutes, 
including * * * R.C. Chapter 149, reinforce the understanding that open access to 
government papers is an integral entitlement of the people, to be preserved with 
vigilance and vigor.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 623, 640 N.E.2d 174; [State ex rel. Strothers v.] 
Wertheim [(1997)], 80 Ohio St.3d [155] at 157, 684 N.E.2d 1239; Dayton 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 107, 109, 74 O.O.2d 209, 341 
N.E.2d 576.” 
{¶ 104} This court in the past has emphasized that underlying the Public 
Records Act is the “ ‘fundamental policy of promoting open government, not 
restricting it.’ ” Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 
N.E.2d 564, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. The Miami Student v. Miami Univ. (1997), 
79 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 680 N.E.2d 956.  The rule in Ohio is that public records 
January Term, 2006 
33 
are the people’s records and that the officials in whose custody they happen to be 
are merely trustees for the people. State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers (1960), 171 
Ohio St. 369, 371, 14 O.O.2d 116, 171 N.E.2d 508.  Moreover, the Act “is 
construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of 
disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334.  Can the majority truly say that 
there is not “any doubt” that the governor’s claimed privilege is as broad as he 
represents? 
{¶ 105} R.C. 149.43 does provide specific exceptions to the general 
requirement that “all public records” be available for public review.  R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v) removes from the definition of “public record” “[r]ecords the 
release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  R.C. 101.30(B) excepts 
from the definition of public records certain documents created by legislative staff 
for members of the General Assembly.  However, the General Assembly did not 
create any such exception for gubernatorial documents.  This is the case despite 
the fact that R.C. 149.03 specifically authorizes the governor to require reports 
from the offices he oversees: “The governor may at any time require to be filed 
with him a detailed report from any state officer, board, or commission.” 
{¶ 106} The Ohio Constitution also specifically allows for certain 
legislative proceedings to be held in secret.  Section 13, Article II.  Although the 
decision to hold secret proceedings in the General Assembly requires a two-thirds 
vote and is rarely used, no section provides for any type of similar secrecy for 
gubernatorial communications.  The constitution does expressly contemplate 
communications between the governor and other persons within the executive 
branch.  Section 6, Article III grants the governor the authority to “require 
information, in writing, from the officers in the executive department, upon any 
subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,” but does not grant the 
governor the authority to keep that information secret. 
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{¶ 107} The majority recognizes that Ohio is a state that has severely 
restricted the powers of governors.  Governor Thomas Corwin told friends that 
“they overestimated the honor of being Governor of Ohio.  The framers of the 
constitution stripped the Governor of Ohio of all power and made him a mere 
dummy to fill the Governor’s chair.” John Jay Janney and his “Recollections of 
Thomas Corwin” (1964), 73 Ohio History 100, 109. 
{¶ 108} Over the years, the Ohio Constitution has been amended to give 
more power to the governor.  The General Assembly has set forth duties and 
powers of the governor in legislation.  Those powers, which are carefully 
described by constitutional amendment and statute, have never included an 
entitlement to a gubernatorial-communications privilege. 
Separation of Powers 
{¶ 109} Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution lays to rest any 
concerns about a gubernatorial privilege being necessary to preserve the 
separation of powers.  That section reads: “[N]o special privileges or immunities 
shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general 
assembly.”  The Ohio Constitution grants the power to the General Assembly to 
lay waste to any privilege claimed by the governor or acknowledged by this court.  
Ohio, which, as the majority acknowledges, “unlike other jurisdictions, does not 
have a constitutional provision specifying the concept of separation of powers,” 
does specifically establish the primacy of the General Assembly in regard to 
privileges and immunities. 
{¶ 110} The majority establishes the gubernatorial privilege as an 
inherent, constitutional power that is untouchable by the General Assembly.  This 
phantom constitutional privilege is in complete contravention of Section 2, Article 
I, an actual constitutional provision, which gives the General Assembly the power 
to alter, repeal, or revoke any privilege. 
January Term, 2006 
35 
{¶ 111} The majority seems to imply that since the legislature has a 
statutorily created privilege, and the courts have a common-law privilege 
protecting certain notes from disclosure under the Public Records Act, the 
governor should also have some privilege to keep him on equal footing with the 
other branches of government.  The three branches of government, however, are 
not three children that must be treated equally to ensure domestic peace.  
Moreover, the privilege requested by the governor dwarfs those enjoyed by the 
General Assembly and the judicial branch.  It is as if one sibling demands a 
bakery because his two siblings received a piece of pie. 
{¶ 112} As mentioned above, R.C. 101.30(B) excepts from the definition 
of “public records” certain documents created by legislative staff for members of 
the General Assembly.  The extremely limited exception to the Public Records 
Act for the courts was set forth in State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, where this court held that the notes a judge took 
as he presided over a murder trial were not public records under R.C. 149.43.  
This court wrote that R.C. 149.43(A)(1) “does not define a ‘public record’ as any 
piece of paper on which a public officer writes something.  No law or regulation 
requires such notes.” Id. at 440, 619 N.E.2d 688.  This is to be contrasted with 
reports prepared for the governor by his directors, administrators, and 
commissioners.  Although R.C. 149.03 and Section 6, Article III of the Ohio 
Constitution do not require the submission of reports to the governor by other 
executive officers, those reports are accounted for in statute and constitutionally, 
in contrast to the type of writings we dealt with in State ex rel. Steffen.  There is 
no doubt that this court would extend the note-taking privilege to the governor, 
were he to seek it.  Nor is there any doubt that this court would recognize a 
deliberative-process privilege applicable to the governor were he to request it.  
Instead, he has asked for the moon.  And this court has given it to him — the 
governor emerges from this case with a communications privilege grossly out of 
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scale with his own responsibilities and with the privileges accorded the other 
branches of government. 
The Public Interest 
{¶ 113} The majority writes: 
{¶ 114} “We agree with the unassailable premise established in Nixon, 
and reiterated in federal and state case law, that the public interest is served by 
allowing a chief executive officer of a state or the federal government to receive 
information, advice, and recommendations unhampered by the possibility of 
compelled disclosure of every utterance made, and every piece of paper 
circulating, in the governor’s office.” 
{¶ 115} It may be an unassailable premise that every utterance or paper 
scrap from the governor’s office should not be made public, but that is a premise 
wholly irrelevant to this case.  Senator Dann is not asking for every utterance or 
paper scrap.  Thus, we do not need to create from whole cloth an overarching, all-
powerful executive privilege to achieve a modicum of executive privacy. 
{¶ 116} The statements in Nixon regarding the importance of candor in 
presidential decisionmaking make more sense within the context of that case.  
There, recorded conversations were at issue.  If conversations were fair game for 
public disclosure, people interacting with the governor might indeed feel checked 
in their speech for fear of saying something inappropriate.  Here, we are dealing 
with documents — reflective, written communications from the governor’s staff 
and the heads of state agencies.  Is it “unassailable” that seasoned public officials 
cannot be candid with each other in conducting the public’s business if their 
written communications might be revealed to the public?  What is more likely is 
that public officials would be a little more reflective, careful, and thoughtful 
before circulating a letter or e-mail.  It also means that they would be careful not 
to suggest what otherwise would be foolish, unwise, or politically motivated 
decisions, or decisions that violate statutes or regulations. 
January Term, 2006 
37 
{¶ 117} The majority exempts the governor from one of this state’s 
clearest guiding principles, open government, on the basis of vague conclusions 
about human behavior.  Can we really know whether the quality of gubernatorial 
advice would suffer without the creation of a brand new privilege?  Could it be 
that a governor might be more inclined to take good advice if he knows that the 
public will one day see that he was offered it?   
{¶ 118} Certainly, reasonable minds could differ on the question.  The 
point is that we need not answer it.  Instead of speculating, we should simply read 
the Public Records Act.  We must not turn our backs on our Constitution, laws, 
and history based on conclusory assumptions about the way people might behave. 
{¶ 119} However, if this court must travel down the road of speculation, 
we should face the practical implications of the privilege.  With the gubernatorial-
communications privilege as defined by this court, every memorandum in the 
executive branch will read, “To: The Governor,” whether it is intended for the 
governor’s eyes or not.  Just adding the governor’s name to a document will cloak 
it in secrecy.  True, this court does enunciate a test for determining whether the 
privilege applies to specific documents.  But anyone who requests a document 
under the Public Records Act can now be forced by the governor to pursue a 
difficult legal battle to retrieve it.  The act is designed to make it easy for citizens 
to learn about their government.  The majority has made it easy for the governor 
to thwart that intent. 
{¶ 120} Through its requirement of a “particularized need” on behalf of 
the requester, this court has essentially slammed the door on open government as 
it pertains to the governor.  In this case, since Senator Dann is not seeking records 
on behalf of a committee of the General Assembly, he will be found wanting in 
regard to a particularized need.  The same would be true for any other of Ohio’s 
11 million citizens seeking such information.  More astounding is the requirement 
that state and federal prosecutors, law-enforcement agents, the inspector general, 
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38 
and even committees of the General Assembly would be required to file a 
complaint for a writ of mandamus and persuade a court that they have a 
particularized need before being able to review documents when the governor 
asserts the privilege. 
{¶ 121} Finally, in addition to shielding the governor from the operation 
of our Constitution, statutes, and long-established common law, the majority 
today exempts the governor from this court’s Rules of Civil Procedure.  Without 
the ability to ask any executive branch functionary any question pertaining to 
documents, the particularized need becomes even more difficult to prove. 
{¶ 122} With documents under guard by the governor, many things will 
remain secret that are the public’s business.  The public will have to rely on leaks, 
or even illegally disclosed information, to have an understanding of what 
government is really up to.  We are never well served if Ohio citizens must rely 
on leaks and off-the-record comments from unknown sources to disclose the 
important activities of government that affect our lives.  Continuing to require that 
all records be public far better serves our interests.  We need not rely on political 
spin – the documents are what they are, and they speak for themselves. 
{¶ 123} The majority writes that “[t]he gubernatorial-communications 
privilege protects the public by allowing the state’s chief executive the freedom 
that is required to make decisions.”  The idea that the governor seeks this 
privilege and that the majority undertakes this judicial grant for the good of the 
public is inconceivable.  This public records request relates to a serious state 
government scandal, and the factors that brought about the scandal – secrecy, 
unaccountability, and inside dealing – are the “privileged” matters that this court 
would shield from public view. 
{¶ 124} This whole imbroglio arises from cynicism about government.  
What we have here is a small group of people using government and its resources 
to enrich themselves or their friends.  It started when one person on the fringes of 
January Term, 2006 
39 
state government, with the help of friends inside government, maneuvered a pot 
of money in the workers’ compensation system to a position of low-hanging fruit.  
The workers’ compensation system is a grand and noble idea, based in our 
Constitution, to compensate people hurt in the workplace.  The people involved in 
this scandal took that grand idea and made it small, using the fund as a 50-
million-dollar hog trough. 
{¶ 125} Now the governor, like Nixon, parlays the philosophical power 
of his office into a shameless attempt to shield himself from scrutiny.  Ultimately, 
whatever financial impact this scandal has on the accounts at the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation will be absorbed.  But today, the majority has crafted a 
lingering monument to bad government.  For the first time in our history, Ohio 
governors will be free to operate in the dark. 
__________________ 
Gittes & Schulte, Frederick M. Gittes, and Kathaleen B. Schulte, for 
relator. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General; and Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, 
Kathleen M. Trafford, Bryan R. Faller, and Anne M. Hughes, for respondent. 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and Carrie L. Davis, in support of relator for amicus 
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
Scott A. Pullins, in support of relator for amicus curiae Ohio Taxpayers 
Association.