Title: WALTER R. KAWULOK and HELEN C. KAWULOK, husband and wife V. ROMAN J. LEGERSKI, JR.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WALTER R. KAWULOK and HELEN C. KAWULOK, husband and wife V. ROMAN J. LEGERSKI, JR.2007 WY 133165 P.3d 112Case Number: 06-281Decided: 08/17/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
WALTER 
R. KAWULOK and HELEN C. KAWULOK, husband and wife,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROMAN J. 
LEGERSKI, JR.,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of SheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Hayden 
F. Heaphy, Jr. and Alison A. Ochs of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Ochs.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

           
Stuart S. Healy of Healy Law Firm, Sheridan, Wyoming.         

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]        
Walter R. Kawulok and Helen C. Kawulok appeal from the district court's 
order granting Roman J. Legerski, Jr., a prescriptive easement across their 
property.  We conclude Mr. Legerski 
failed to present evidence to overcome the presumption that use of another's 
property is permissive as required to establish a prescriptive easement in 
Wyoming and, 
therefore, reverse the district court's order.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Kawuloks 
raise the following issues in their appeal:

 
 
1. Did 
the trial court err as a matter of law in ruling that "continuous use and 
logical inferences regarding past [property] transfers" was a proper legal 
standard to overcome the legal presumption of permissive use of a prescriptive 
easement?

 
 
2. Is 
continuous use of a driveway, without evidence of adverse or hostile use, 
sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement?

 
 
3. In 
this prescriptive easement case, does Wyoming's Dead Man Statute, W.S. § 1-12-102, 
bar corroborated testimony that a deceased predecessor in title had asked for, 
and was granted, permission to use the Driveway?

 
 
4. Did 
the trial court improperly fail to consider, on hearsay grounds, Pat and David 
Wartensleben's requests for permission to use the 
Driveway?

 
 
Mr. 
Legerski does not present a statement of the issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Kawuloks and 
Mr. Legerski became neighboring landowners in Ranchester, Wyoming, in 2004, when Mr. Legerski purchased 
and occupied a parcel (the "Legerski Tract") that abutted unimproved land (the 
"Kawulok Tract") the Kawuloks had owned since 1985.  The Kawuloks bought their land from 
Ralston and Roselie Straw, who previously also owned the Legerski Tract.  The Straws transferred the Legerski 
Tract to Theodore and Ann Yaneshek at an undetermined time but no later than 
1973.  In 1973, the Yanesheks sold 
the Legerski Tract to Edwin O. "Pat" Wartensleben, who died in 1999.  David Wartensleben inherited the parcel 
from his father and sold it to Mr. Legerski in 2004. 

 
 
[¶4]      The north side of 
the Legerski Tract fronts Halbert 
Street, and the bulk of the Kawulok Tract lies 
directly to the south of the Legerski Tract.  The Kawulok Tract has access to 
Halbert 
Street via a 10-foot wide strip (the "Strip") that 
runs along the western boundary of the Legerski Tract.  Edwin Wartensleben used the northern 
portion of the Strip as part of a driveway (the "Driveway") to access the 
Legerski Tract.  The Driveway 
extended south from Halbert 
Street along the Strip for about 20 feet and then 
angled east onto the Legerski Tract to a detached garage in the southeastern 
quadrant of the property.  Edwin 
Wartensleben continuously used the Driveway from the time he purchased the 
Legerski Tract in 1973 until 1985, when the Kawuloks purchased their 
parcel.  The Kawuloks gave Edwin 
Wartensleben, with whom they were friendly, permission to continue to use the 
portion of the Driveway that crossed the Strip. 

 
 
[¶5]      However, the 
Kawuloks were not willing to grant use of the Strip to future owners of the 
Legerski Tract.  In 2004, when the 
Kawuloks learned that David Wartensleben was planning to sell the Legerski 
Tract, they built a fence along the eastern edge of the Strip and across the 
Driveway, eliminating the Strip as a path of access from Halbert Street to 
the Legerski Tract.  David 
Wartensleben expressed his dissatisfaction with the fence but did not pursue any 
particular claim.  He accessed his 
garage by driving directly onto his property from Halbert Street.  Meanwhile, a survey conducted as part of 
the sale of the Legerski Tract revealed that some of the other fences maintained 
by the Kawuloks extended into the Legerski Tract.  After buying the parcel in 2004, Mr. 
Legerski attempted to use these intrusions to negotiate use of the Strip.  The Kawuloks were unreceptive to Mr. 
Legerski's advances and, in 2006, filed a claim to quiet title by adverse 
possession to the portions of the Legerski Tract enclosed by their fencing.  Mr. Legerski, in the counterclaim that 
is the subject of this appeal, sought to quiet title to a prescriptive easement 
over the portion of the Strip crossed by the Driveway.  After filing the counterclaim, Mr. 
Legerski constructed a new driveway immediately east of the Strip and entirely 
on the Legerski Tract. 

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Legerski's 
prescriptive easement claim relied on Edwin Wartensleben's use of the 
parcel.  Mr. Legerski asserted that 
Mr. Wartensleben had used the northern portion of the Strip for more than 10 
years in a manner that was open, notorious and continuous as well as hostile to 
the legal title of the Kawuloks' predecessors in interest, the Straws.  The Kawuloks responded that no 
prescriptive easement had been established because Mr. Wartensleben's use was 
permissive and hence lacked the essential element of hostility.  The Kawuloks argued that in Wyoming use of a 
neighbor's road is presumed permissive, and asserted that Mr. Legerski failed to 
provide the evidence of hostile use necessary to overcome this presumption. 

 
 
[¶7]      After a bench 
trial, the district court found the presumption of permissiveness was overcome 
by logical inferences and Edwin Wartensleben's continuous use.  The court noted that it was reasonable 
to infer the Straws always intended the owners of the Legerski Tract to be able 
to use the northern portion of the Strip as a driveway.  The court concluded that the 
prescriptive easement vested prior to 1985, and ruled in favor of Mr. 
Legerski.  The Kawuloks 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶8]      Because this case 
was tried without a jury, the district court judge acted as the finder of fact 
and law.  Factual determinations by 
a judge are entitled to less deference than those of a jury:  

 
 
While 
the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of 
the properly admissible evidence in the record.  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review 
does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

 
 

Harber 
v. Jensen, 2004 
WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004).  
Further, we do not set aside findings merely because we would have 
reached a different result.  Id.  We assume the evidence of the prevailing 
party is true and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference that 
can be fairly and reasonably drawn from the evidence.  Id.

 
 
[¶9]      We review legal 
determinations de novo and grant them 
no deference.  Id., ¶ 8, 97 P.3d  at 
60.

 
 
B.        
Prescriptive Easement

 
 
[¶10]   The party claiming a prescriptive 
easement must prove each of four elements:  1) adverse use; 2) claim of right under 
title or claim of right; 3) use which puts the owner of the subservient estate 
on notice of his claim; and 4) continuous and uninterrupted adverse use for at 
least ten years.   Powder River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 
2005 WY 1, ¶ 9, 103 P.3d 876, 880 (Wyo. 2005).  "Claimants have a heavy burden to 
establish adverse use in Wyoming, as prescriptive easements are not 
favored."  Id.  We presume the use of a private roadway 
by a neighbor is permissive.  Id.  "Neighborliness and accommodation to 
the needs of a neighbor are landmarks of our western life-style."'  Id., quoting Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 
1981).  To rebut this presumption of 
permissive use, the claimant's use must be "inconsistent with the rights of the 
owner, such that the use would entitle the owner to a cause of action against 
the claimant, without permission asked or given."'  Id., ¶ 10, 103 P.3d  at 880, quoting Coleman v. Keith, 6 P.3d 145, 148 (Wyo. 
2000).  The claimant must produce 
evidence that shows how the owner of the servient estate was made aware of the 
hostile nature of the claimant's use of the estate.  Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Legerski failed to overcome the 
presumption of permissive use, making it unnecessary to review his claim in 
light of each of the elements.  In 
fact, Mr. Legerski produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of 
permissiveness for the period from 1973 to 1985, the only period relevant to the 
district court's ruling.  It was 
during this period, according to the district court, that a prior owner of the 
Legerski Tract, Edwin Wartensleben, met the elements necessary to establish a 
prescriptive easement.  The district 
court ruled that the presumption of permissive use was overcome by Mr. 
Wartensleben's "continuous use and logical inferences regarding past 
transfers."  The order provided no 
description of  the "logical 
inferences from past transfers."  
Apparently, the district court concluded that because the Kawuloks' 
predecessors sold the Legerski Tract to Mr. Wartensleben, they must have 
intended that the latter could use the Strip for access.  However, such an inference fails to 
establish hostile use and, in fact, implies just the opposite, permissive 
use.  While the trial record does 
support a finding that Edwin Wartensleben continuously used the northern portion 
of the Strip during these years, it contains no evidence that such use was 
hostile or that the owners of the Strip at the time, the Straws, were given any 
notice of a hostile intent.  
Therefore, the presumption of permissiveness stands, and the district 
court erred in concluding that Edwin Wartensleben established, and Mr. Legerski 
succeeded to, a prescriptive easement on the Kawulok 
Tract.

 
 
C.        
Implied Easement

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Legerski did not assert the 
creation of an implied easement over the Strip during the trial or in his 
pleadings.  While it is not 
completely clear in the order, some of the language utilized by the district 
court suggests that the doctrine of implied easement played a role in the 
court's ruling.  Although this Court 
generally does not consider issues not properly presented at trial,  Boyle v. Boyle, 2006 WY 124, ¶ 18, 143 P.3d 368, 373 (Wyo. 2006), we have, in some instances, considered an issue not 
raised by the parties at trial if that issue was addressed and relied upon by 
the district court.  Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005).  On that 
basis, we will consider the issue of implied easement in this case.  

 
 
[¶13]     "Under certain circumstances, Wyoming will recognize an 
implied easement across another person's property. In re Estate of Shirran, 987 P.2d 140, 142 (Wyo. 
1999) (citing Beaudoin v. 
Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wyo. 1995); Corbett 
v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 
(Wyo. 
1979)). The elements which must be satisfied in order to establish an 
implied easement are: (1) common ownership followed by a conveyance separating 
the unified ownership; (2) before severance, the common owner used part of the 
property for the benefit of the other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, 
and continuous; and (3) the claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the 
enjoyment of the parcel previously benefited."  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003), quoting Beaudoin v. Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939, 941 
(Wyo. 
1995).  

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Legerski falls short of 
establishing two of the factors necessary for an implied easement.    There is no evidence in the 
record that the common owners, the Straws, used the northern portion of the 
Strip for the benefit of the Legerski Tract.  Also, Mr. Legerski presented no evidence 
indicating use of the Strip is necessary for the beneficial use of his 
property.  By building a driveway 
directly to the east of the Strip that allows him access to his garage, Mr. 
Legerski demonstrated that use of the Strip is not necessary for the beneficial 
use of his land.  The only factor 
Mr. Legerski established is both tracts were once owned by the Straws, and they 
are no longer commonly held.  By not 
meeting two of the three elements that create an implied easement, Mr. 
Legerski's claim fails.

 
 
D.        
Evidentiary Issues

 
 
[¶15]   Wyoming's Dead Man's Statute, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-12-102 (LexisNexis 2007),1 was an issue at trial because the 
Kawuloks sought to introduce evidence concerning a conversation with Edwin 
Wartensleben, who was deceased at the time of trial.  The evidence allegedly would have 
established that Mr. Wartensleben had asked the Kawuloks for permission to use 
the portion of the Driveway that crosses the Strip.  In addition, the Kawuloks offered 
evidence of Edwin and David Wartenslebens' requests for permission to use the 
driveway.  The district court 
refused admission of the Kawuloks' proposed evidence and they challenge those 
rulings on appeal.  

 
 
[¶16]   Because we conclude that Mr. 
Legerski failed to offer any evidence to rebut the presumption that Edwin 
Wartensleben's use of the driveway from 1973 through 1985 was permissive, we 
need not consider whether the Kawuloks' proposed evidence was admissible.  Moreover, the Wartenslebens' requests 
for permission to use the driveway allegedly took place after the district court 
ruled Mr. Legerski's prescriptive easement had vested and were not, therefore, 
relevant to the district court's ruling. 

 
 
[¶17]   Reversed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
1-12-102 states: 

 
 
            
In an action or suit by or against a person who from any cause is 
incapable of testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, 
heir or other representative of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment 
or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a 
party whose interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his 
trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative.  In any such action or suit, if the 
adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party 
incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in 
issue, may be received in evidence.