Title: People v. Arredondo

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JASON ARRON ARREDONDO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S244166 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E064206 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF1310007 and RIF1403693 
 
 
December 16, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
S244166 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Jason Arredondo of multiple 
sex offenses involving several minor victims.  While three of the 
victims testified, the trial court positioned a computer monitor 
so they could not see defendant and he could not see them.  We 
granted review in this case to determine whether the trial 
court’s action violated defendant’s right of confrontation under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We 
conclude that, as to one of the witnesses, the trial court 
committed reversible error, and we reverse defendant’s 
convictions involving that witness.  Regarding the other two 
witnesses, we conclude that defendant forfeited his claim by 
failing to object to the trial court’s action, and that defendant 
has not shown his attorney’s failure to object constituted 
ineffective of assistance of counsel.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As here relevant, defendant was charged by information 
with committing the following sexual offenses involving F.R., 
Ar.R, An.R, and M.C.:  eleven counts of lewd acts upon a child 
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))1; one count of 
lewd acts upon a child under the age of 16 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)); 
one count of oral copulation of a person under the age of 14 
                                        
1 
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
(§ 288a, subd. (c)(l)); and one count of sexual penetration of a 
person under the age of 14 (§ 289, subd. (j)).  The information 
also alleged numerous enhancements.  All four victims testified 
at trial.  At that time, F.R. was 18 years of age, M.C. was 16, 
Ar.R was 14, and An.R was 13. 
When F.R. first entered the courtroom to take the witness 
stand, the bailiff said, “Right this way, Miss,” and the court 
added, “[I]f you’d just step up here, please, and follow the 
instructions of my deputy there.  He will tell you what you need 
to do.”  The bailiff then stated, “Please watch your step as you 
take the stand.  Stay standing, raise your right hand, and the 
clerk will swear you in.”  F.R. started crying, and the court 
asked, “[D]o you need a moment?”  F.R. replied, “I think so.”  The 
court then announced, “We will take a short break.  Take about 
five or ten minutes, folks, and we will attempt to start again at 
that time. . . . We will be in a short recess.”  A minute order 
indicates that the court took a recess “to allow for witness 
composure.” 
After the jury left the courtroom, the court said to the 
prosecutor, “[A]fter your victim-witness advocate has spent 
some time with her, just let me know if she is able to proceed or 
ready to proceed and we will resume.”  The prosecutor 
responded, “I am going to inquire of her if she prefers the 
advocate sits behind her.”  The court replied, “Oh, yes.  Right.  If 
there’s something like that that you can do that would make her 
more comfortable, I’m fine with that.  I mean, the law allows it.”   
When proceedings resumed about 30 minutes later, but 
before the jury reentered the courtroom, the court stated, “We’ve 
made some modifications to the witness box to accommodate the 
witness.”  After the jurors took their seats, F.R. entered the 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
courtroom and the bailiff said, “Right this way.  Watch your step 
as you take the stand.  Please remain standing and raise your 
right hand, and the clerk will swear you in.”  F.R. took the oath 
standing at the witness box and then sat down to testify, with 
her advocate sitting nearby.  After she testified that she knew 
someone named Jason Arredondo, and that he was her mother’s 
boyfriend, the prosecution asked, “Do you see Jason in court 
today?”  F.R. replied, “[Y]es.”  The prosecution then asked, “Can 
you identify an item of clothing he is wearing and where, to your 
left, to your right, is he seated?”  F.R. answered, “To my right 
with the blue shirt.”  The prosecution asked “[i]f the record could 
reflect the witness has identified the defendant,” and the court 
responded, “It may.” 
About 45 minutes later, the court took another recess.  
After the jurors left the courtroom, it said:  “I just want to note 
for the record too that I had mentioned earlier that the witness 
box had been reconfigured a little bit.  It’s not a big change, but 
the monitor was placed kind of to the witness’s right, apparently 
blocking at least some of her view of possibly [defendant].  And 
I think that was the only change that’s been made.”  Addressing 
defendant’s counsel, the court then asked, “Did you have 
anything you wanted to say about that?”  Defendant’s counsel 
responded, “Yes I did, Your Honor.  It does block [defendant’s] 
entire view of the witness.”  The court replied, “Well, he is 
present in court.  He can hear the witness, hear her answers.  I 
think [the accommodation is] appropriate given her initial 
reaction.  [¶]  Again, for the record when she first came in to 
take the oath, she was unable to proceed at that time.  We took 
about a 15–minute break before she could get her emotions back 
in order.”  Defendant’s counsel responded, “[F]or the record, I 
object to my client being unable to view the witness as the 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
witness testifies in that his knowledge of the witness would be 
able to assist counsel in her demeanor and looks, you know, as 
the quasi parent.  He is aware of how the witness looks when 
the witness is maybe not telling the truth or when the witness 
is feigning something.  I don’t have that knowledge.  I have 
never seen this witness before.  And [defendant] is unable to 
assist me in that regard because he is unable to see the witness.”  
The court, commenting that it wanted to make “the 
record[] clear,” then stated:  “It’s a fairly small computer monitor 
that’s on the witness stand.  It’s there for the witness to be able 
to view photographs that are shown on the monitor.  Again, it 
was simply repositioned so that the witness doesn’t have to look 
at [defendant].  I think — at best it’s a small infringement on 
his confrontation rights.  I think it’s an allowable infringement 
on his right to confrontation, but it’s a very limited blockage, if 
you will.”  The prosecution, stating that it wanted “to clarify” the 
record, then added:  “The position of the monitor in terms of 
where it is in the witness box is the exact same as it was for 
[M.C.].  It was elevated with a Penal Code as well as one volume 
of the CALCRIMs.”  The court thanked the prosecution “for 
noting that” and commented, “I didn’t see that.”  The 
prosecution continued, “Given that the witness had indicated 
that the defendant looked at her the first time she came in.”  The 
court added, “And whether that happened or didn’t, I think it’s 
appropriate.”   
Defendant’s counsel responded, “[F]or the record, Your 
Honor, when the witness first came in, she began crying before 
she was even able to see [defendant’s] face.  So [defendant] made 
no effort to look at her, intimidate her, or make any kind of eye 
contact or suggestive contact with her.”  The court replied:  “I 
understand.  I’m not casting any aspersions at this point.  But it 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
clearly affected her, and I think it’s appropriate for the court to 
take whatever small efforts it can make to make the witness 
more comfortable without infringing on any of [defendant’s] 
constitutional rights, and I don’t believe that his rights have 
been infringed on at this point.”  The court then “note[d]“ 
counsel’s objection “for the record” and “overruled” it. 
Later, after both sides had rested but before closing 
arguments, the prosecution noted on the record that the monitor 
had been similarly repositioned during the testimony of Ar.R 
and An.R.  Defendant’s counsel did not object to the 
repositioning with respect to Ar.R and An.R.  The fourth victim, 
M.C., had testified without the repositioned monitor.   
The jury convicted defendant of the 14 charged crimes and 
found the enhancement allegations to be true.  The court 
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 275 years to 
life, plus a determinate term of 33 years to run consecutively.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s convictions but, 
based on the parties’ agreement, remanded for resentencing on 
three counts.  Regarding defendant’s claim that repositioning of 
the monitor violated his constitutional right of confrontation, 
the court unanimously held as to Ar.R and An.R that defendant 
had (1) forfeited the claim by failing at trial to object to the 
modification’s use for these witnesses, and (2) not shown that 
his counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.  
As to F.R., the court was divided.  The majority found no error, 
concluding that the trial court’s action was consistent with 
governing precedent.  The dissent disagreed, finding that the 
trial court’s decision was inconsistent with established Sixth 
Amendment law. 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
We granted defendant’s petition for review, specifying the 
following issue for consideration:  “Was defendant’s right of 
confrontation violated when he was unable to see witnesses as 
they testified because the trial court allowed a computer monitor 
on the witness stand to be raised by several inches to allow them 
to testify without seeing him when they testified in his 
presence?”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
To address defendant’s claim, we begin by reviewing the 
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court that provide 
principal guidance on the issue — Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 
U.S. 836 (Craig), and Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy) — 
and the only case in which we have applied those decisions in an 
analogous context — People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234 
(Gonzales).  We then apply these precedents to the record before 
us.   
A.  Relevant Precedent 
In Coy, supra, 487 U.S. at pages 1012, 1014, the high court 
considered whether the trial court had violated the defendant’s 
right of confrontation by placing, as authorized by state statute, 
a large screen between him and the witness stand while two 
complaining witnesses testified that he had sexually assaulted 
them.  The court began with a general discussion of the 
constitutional right’s nature, explaining that “the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with 
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”  (Id. at p. 1016.)  
This “guarantee,” the court stated, “serves ends related both to 
appearances and to reality.”  (Id. at p. 1017.)  Because 
“something deep in human nature . . . regards face-to-face 
confrontation between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
trial in a criminal prosecution’ ” (ibid.), “the right of 
confrontation ‘contributes to the establishment of a system of 
criminal justice in which the perception . . . of fairness 
prevails’ ” (id. at pp. 1018-1019).  And “[t]he perception that 
confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the 
centuries because there is much truth to it.  A witness ‘may feel 
quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the 
man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the 
facts. . . .’  [Citation.]  It is always more difficult to tell a lie about 
a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’  In the former 
context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less 
convincingly.”  (Id. at p. 1019.)  In this sense, “the right to face-
to-face confrontation,” like the right to cross-examine the 
accuser, “serves” to “ ‘ensur[e] the integrity of the factfinding 
process.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 1019-1020.)  It is true that this “face-to-
face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim 
or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo 
the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent 
adult.  It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.”  
(Id. at p. 1020.)  
Applying these principles, the Coy court held that use of 
the screen at trial had violated the defendant’s constitutional 
right.  With the screen in place and the courtroom lighting 
adjusted, the defendant could “dimly . . . perceive the witnesses” 
while they testified, but they could not see him “at all.”  (Coy, 
supra, 487 U.S. at p. 1015.)  “It is difficult,” the court said, “to 
imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s 
right to a face-to-face encounter.”  (Id. at p. 1020.)  The court 
rejected the government’s argument that the defendant’s 
“confrontation interest . . . was outweighed by the necessity of 
protecting victims of sexual abuse.”  (Ibid.)  If there are “any 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
exceptions” to the confrontation clause’s “irreducible literal 
meaning” — i.e., the “ ‘right to meet face to face all those who 
appear and give evidence at trial’ ” — “they would surely be 
allowed only when necessary to further an important public 
policy.”  (Id. at p. 1021.)  “Since there have been no 
individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed 
special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by 
any conceivable exception.”  (Ibid.) 
Two years later, in Craig, the high court took up the issue 
again in a case where an alleged child abuse victim had testified 
at trial in a room separate from the courtroom, in the physical 
presence of only the prosecutor and defense counsel, while the 
defendant, the judge, and the jury remained in the courtroom 
and watched the testimony by one-way closed-circuit television.  
(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 840.)  The court began by explaining 
that the confrontation clause does not “guarantee[] criminal 
defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with 
witnesses against them at trial.”  (Id. at p. 844.)  “Although face-
to-face confrontation forms ‘the core of the values furthered by 
the Confrontation Clause,’ [citation] . . . it is not the sine qua 
non of the confrontation right” and is not required “in every 
instance in which testimony is admitted against a defendant.”  
(Id. at p. 847.)  “[I]n certain narrow circumstances, ‘competing 
interests, if “closely examined,” may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 848.)  In other words, “ ‘the 
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial,’ [citation], a preference that ‘must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.’ ”  (Id. at p. 849.)  However, the Craig 
court 
cautioned, 
“[t]hat 
the 
face-to-face 
confrontation 
requirement is not absolute does not . . . mean that it may easily 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
be dispensed with.”  (Id. at p. 850.)  On the contrary, “a 
defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be 
satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial 
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further 
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the 
testimony is otherwise assured.”  (Ibid.)   
Turning first to the latter requirement, the high court in 
Craig found that the Maryland procedure provided sufficient 
“assurances of reliability” because it “preserve[d] all of the other 
elements of the confrontation right:  The child witness must be 
competent to testify and must testify under oath; the defendant 
retains 
full 
opportunity 
for 
contemporaneous 
cross-
examination; and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view 
(albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness 
as he or she testifies.”  (Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 851.)  
Notwithstanding 
“the 
many 
subtle 
effects 
face-to-face 
confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceeding, 
the presence of these other elements of confrontation — oath, 
cross-examination, 
and 
observation 
of 
the 
witness’ 
demeanor — adequately ensures that the testimony is both 
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner 
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person 
testimony.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, Maryland’s “use of the one-way closed 
circuit television procedure . . . does not impinge upon the truth-
seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”  (Id. 
at p. 852.) 
The Craig court next considered whether “use of the 
procedure [was] necessary to further an important state 
interest.”  (Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 852.)  The court first 
recognized the “ ‘compelling’ ” (ibid.) nature of the state’s 
interest in protecting “ ‘minor victims of sex crimes from further 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
trauma and embarrassment’ ” (ibid.), and concluded that, upon 
“an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in 
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a 
child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a 
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to 
testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face 
confrontation with the defendant” (id. at p. 855).  “To be sure,” 
the court explained, “face-to-face confrontation may be said to 
cause trauma for the very purpose of eliciting truth.”  (Id. at p. 
856.)  However, “where face-to-face confrontation causes 
significant emotional distress in a child witness, there is 
evidence that such confrontation would in fact disserve the 
Confrontation Clause’s truth-seeking goal.”  (Id. at p. 857.)  
Thus, “where necessary to protect a child witness from trauma 
that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of 
the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the 
child’s ability to communicate, the Confrontation Clause does 
not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-
to-face confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by 
subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing and thereby 
preserves the essence of effective confrontation.”  (Ibid.)   
Regarding the requirement that denial of face-to-face 
confrontation be “necessary to further” the state’s interest 
(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 852), the Craig court stressed that 
“[t]he requisite finding of necessity must . . . be a case-specific 
one:  The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether 
use of the [alternative procedure] is necessary to protect the 
welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify.  
[Citations.]  The trial court must also find that the child witness 
would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by 
the presence of the defendant.  [Citations.]  Denial of face-to-face 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
confrontation is not needed to further the state interest in 
protecting the child witness from trauma unless it is the 
presence of the defendant that causes the trauma.  In other 
words, if the state interest were merely the interest in protecting 
child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial of face-
to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because the child 
could be permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, 
albeit with the defendant present.  Finally, the trial court must 
find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in 
the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more 
than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to 
testify.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 855-856.)  The Craig court declined to 
specify “the minimum showing of emotional trauma required for 
use of the special procedure,” reasoning that the Maryland 
statute “clearly suffice[d] to meet constitutional standards” 
because it “require[d] a determination that the child witness will 
suffer ‘serious emotional distress such that the child cannot 
reasonably communicate.’ ”  (Id. at p. 856.)  
Finally, the Craig court applied these principles to the 
record before it, which showed the following:  The state moved 
to invoke the statutory closed-circuit television procedure and 
presented “expert testimony that the named victim” and several 
“other children who were alleged to have been sexually abused 
by” the defendant “ ‘would have some or considerable difficulty 
in testifying in [the defendant’s] presence’ ” and “would suffer 
‘serious emotional distress such that [they could not] reasonably 
communicate,’ [citation], if required to testify in the courtroom.”  
(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 842.)  “The trial court . . . found 
that, ‘based upon the evidence presented . . . the testimony of 
each of these children in a courtroom will result in each child 
suffering serious emotional distress . . . such that each of these 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
children cannot reasonably communicate.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 842-843.)  
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, finding 
that the state’s showing was, under Coy, insufficient to 
overcome the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses face-to-
face.  (Craig, at p. 843). 
In reviewing this decision, the high court began by 
observing that there were sufficient assurances of reliability 
because “the child witnesses . . . testified under oath, were 
subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be observed 
by the judge, jury, and defendant as they testified.”  (Craig, 
supra, 497 U.S. at 857.)  The court next explained that, on the 
issue of necessity, the Court of Appeals’ analysis was “consistent 
with our holding today” to the extent it stated that a trial court 
must “make a specific finding that testimony by the child in the 
courtroom in the presence of the defendant would result in the 
child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child 
could not reasonably communicate.”  (Id. at p. 858.)  However, 
the high court continued, the Court of Appeals erred insofar as 
it concluded that a trial court must “observe the children’s 
behavior in the defendant’s presence and . . . explore less 
restrictive alternatives to the use of the one-way closed circuit 
television procedure.”  (Id. at pp. 859-860.)  “Although . . . such 
evidentiary requirements could strengthen the grounds for use 
of protective measures, . . . as a matter of federal constitutional 
law, [there are no] such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for 
the use of the one-way television procedure.  The trial court in 
this case, for example, could well have found, on the basis of the 
expert testimony before it, that testimony by the child witnesses 
in the courtroom in the defendant’s presence ‘will result in 
[each] child suffering serious emotional distress such that the 
child cannot reasonably communicate,’ [citation].  [Citations.]  
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
So long as a trial court makes such a case-specific finding of 
necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State 
from using a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the 
receipt of testimony by a child witness in a child abuse case.  
Because the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not 
made the requisite finding of necessity under its interpretation 
of ‘ . . . [Coy] . . .’ [citation], we cannot be certain whether [the 
state appellate court] would reach the same conclusion in light 
of the legal standard we establish today.  We therefore vacate 
the judgment of the [state appellate court] and remand the case 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”  
(Craig, at p. 860.) 
In the nearly thirty years since the high court decided 
Craig, we have applied these high court precedents in a relevant 
context only once — in Gonzales.  There, the defendant, in 
appealing from a murder conviction, argued that the trial court 
had violated his right of confrontation by admitting at trial a 
videotape of his son’s preliminary hearing testimony.  (Gonzales, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1261.)  As here relevant, the defendant 
based this claim on the fact that his eight-year-old son, while 
testifying at the preliminary hearing, had been “seated at an 
angle, not directly facing the defendant[].”  (Id. at p. 1265.)  This 
arrangement, the defendant asserted, was invalid under Craig 
because (1) the preliminary hearing court “fail[ed] to make a 
case-specific factual finding of necessity” (id. at p. 1266), (2) the 
prosecution, which requested the arrangement because the son 
“had expressed great fear of [the] defendant” (id. at p. 1265), 
“made no factual showing to support its claim” (id. at p. 1266), 
and (3) “the court’s concerns on this point were not based on any 
information specific to this case” (ibid.).  We rejected the claim, 
explaining first that, because the defendant “had no 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
[constitutional] right to confront” his son “at the preliminary 
hearing,” “there was no occasion for the preliminary hearing 
court to make Craig findings, and defense counsel did not 
request them.”  (Id. at p. 1267.)  The defendant’s argument to 
the contrary, based on attachment of his confrontation right 
“when the videotape of the preliminary hearing testimony was 
introduced,” is “particularly artificial.”  (Ibid.)   
“In any event,” we continued in Gonzales, “the claim fails 
on its merits.”  (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1267.)  
Although “the preliminary hearing court made no factual 
findings on the need to shield [the witness] from [the] 
defendant’s gaze, the trial court made extensive findings that 
the child would be traumatized if he were made to testify at 
trial.  [The] [d]efendant does not dispute the vulnerability of the 
young witness, either at the time of the preliminary hearing or 
the time of trial.  Indeed, [the] defendant claims that testifying 
against his father was so traumatic for [the witness] that even 
the videotape should have been excluded from evidence. . . . 
[W]e conclude that the seating arrangement for the child 
witness’s testimony was fully justified by the record, and 
defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated when the 
videotape was introduced at trial.  The seating arrangement at 
the preliminary hearing satisfied the central concerns of the 
confrontation 
clause: 
‘physical 
presence, 
oath, 
cross-
examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 1268.) 
B.  F.R. 
Based on these authorities, defendant attacks the trial 
court’s ruling as to F.R. on numerous grounds.  After noting that 
F.R. was 18 years old when she testified, he argues that because 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
there is “no ‘transcendent’ state interest in protecting adult 
witnesses as exists for child witnesses,” no accommodation was 
permissible.  He also argues that, even were there a compelling 
state interest at stake, the particular accommodation the court 
chose was impermissible because it “wholly blocked [his] view 
of” F.R. and completely precluded him from observing her while 
she testified.   Thus, to the extent any accommodation was 
necessary, the trial court should have selected a “less 
restrictive” one that “would have adequately protected” his right 
of confrontation, such as “rearrang[ing] the courtroom so [F.R.] 
could look away from” him — as in Gonzales — or using a closed-
circuit television procedure — as in Craig.  Procedurally, 
defendant complains that the trial court failed to hold an 
evidentiary hearing and to require expert testimony regarding 
the relevant factors Craig sets forth, i.e., whether the 
defendant’s presence would traumatize the witness, whether 
the witness’s emotional distress would be more than de minimis, 
and whether accommodation is necessary to protect the 
witness’s welfare.  He also complains that Craig requires 
express, particularized, case-specific findings on these matters 
and that the court failed to make such findings.  Finally, he 
argues there was insufficient evidence to support the findings 
that Craig requires to justify an accommodation. 
Defendant also makes several related arguments based on 
section 1347, which, as here relevant, sets forth a procedure for 
allowing some child witnesses to testify remotely by closed-
circuit television “out of the presence of the judge, jury, 
defendant or defendants, and attorneys” when their testimony 
will involve reciting the facts of “[a]n alleged sexual offense 
committed on or with” them.  (§ 1347, subd. (b)(1).)  As pertinent 
to defendant’s arguments, the statute:  (1) requires the 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
prosecution to give written notice that the accommodation is 
sought at least three days before the witness is scheduled to 
testify, unless the court takes up the issue “during the course of 
the proceeding on [its] own motion” (id., subd. (b)); (2) authorizes 
the procedure’s use only for witnesses “13 years of age or 
younger at the time of the motion” (ibid.); and (3) requires the 
court to make a finding that it has been “shown by clear and 
convincing evidence” that testifying in front of the defendant 
“would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress so 
that the child would be unavailable as a witness” (id., subd. 
(b)(2)(a)). 
Defendant acknowledges that section 1347 is “not 
applicable” with respect to F.R. because she was older than 13 
when she testified, but asserts that it “defines the extent of 
accommodations in California” because it reflects “the 
Legislature’s determination as to a proper balance between the 
defendant’s rights and protecting the victim.”  “[A]t the very 
least,” he asserts, we should “use [it] as the template for any 
protections offered to traumatized witnesses.”  Thus, he argues, 
“in line with” this section, no accommodation was permissible 
here because F.R. was “over the age of 13” when she testified, 
the prosecution failed to give written notice of its request for 
accommodation at least three days before F.R.’s scheduled 
testimony, and there was not “clear and convincing evidence” 
that testifying in front of defendant would cause F.R. “trauma 
so great as to render [her] unavailable.”  Moreover, even had a 
proper 
showing 
been 
made, 
the 
only 
“authorized” 
accommodation, other than rearranging the courtroom so F.R. 
could look away from defendant, was using the closed-circuit 
television procedure “set forth in section 1347.”  The 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
accommodation the court chose, which completely blocked 
defendant’s view of F.R., was unauthorized and impermissible. 
We reject defendant’s argument that, in light of section 
1347, a court is constitutionally precluded from ordering an 
accommodation as to witnesses older than 13 years of age, and 
from ordering an accommodation other than testimony by 
closed-circuit television.  Nothing in the statute’s language or 
legislative history suggests that the particular accommodation 
the statute sets forth is the only permissible accommodation.  
On the contrary, relevant legislative history indicates that the 
Legislature enacted the statute in 1985, not to set forth a 
comprehensive resolution of all confrontation issues, but to 
address Hochheiser v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 
777, 780, which held that a trial court had “exceeded its 
authority” under state law in allowing a minor, who was the 
alleged victim of a sex offense, to testify from a separate room 
by closed-circuit television.  The appellate court based its 
conclusion on “the lack of explicit legislative authority for [the 
trial court’s] order” (id. at p. 783), reasoning that a trial court’s 
“inherent powers” (id. at p. 787) are insufficient to authorize use 
of such a “radical innovation,” (ibid.) and that “explicit statutory 
authorization” (ibid.) was “necessary . . . for such a drastic 
deviation from settled procedures” (ibid.).   
Less than a month after Hochheiser’s publication, the bill 
through which the Legislature enacted section 1347 was 
introduced.  (Sen. Bill No. 46 (1984-1985 Reg. Sess.).)  One 
analysis of the bill explained:  (1) in Hochheiser, the court “found 
that no statutory authority exists for using closed-circuit 
television testimony during a trial”; and (2) this bill “was 
introduced to provide this authority.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 46 (1984-1985 Reg. Sess.), as amended 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
Jan. 10, 1985, p. 4.)  Another explained that “[b]ased on 
Hochheiser, legislative action is necessary before” courts may 
use a closed-circuit television procedure for child witnesses.  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 46 
(1984-1985 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 11, 1985, p. 3.)  Given 
the statute’s language and legislative history, we reject 
defendant’s view that the authorization section 1347 provides 
for one particular accommodation implicitly precludes any other 
accommodation, and that the statute reflects the Legislature’s 
view regarding the limit of what is constitutionally permissible.2   
Supporting this conclusion are decisions affirming use of 
accommodations other than those section 1347 authorizes.  As 
previously discussed, and as defendant himself acknowledges, 
in Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at page 1265, we affirmed an 
alteration of the courtroom seating arrangement that placed the 
witness “at an angle, not directly facing the defendant[].”  In 
People v. Lujan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1499, the court affirmed 
use of a remote, closed-circuit television procedure for a child 
witness who fell “outside the ambit of section 1347” (id. at p. 
1506) as it read at the time, concluding that the accommodation 
stood “on solid constitutional footing” (id. at p. 1507) and was a 
                                        
2  
In any event, regarding the latter point, for purposes of 
evaluating the claim at issue here — that the accommodation 
violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights — a legislative 
determination of what the confrontation clause permits would 
not bind this court.  “[W]hatever the Legislature’s intent may 
have been, ‘the ultimate constitutional interpretation must 
rest . . . with the judiciary.’ ”  (City of San Buenaventura v. 
United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1209, fn. 
6.)  The Legislature is free to provide protections that exceed the 
constitutional minimum, but any decision to do so cannot alter 
the requirements of the Constitution itself. 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
proper exercise of  the trial court’s “constitutionally conferred, 
inherent authority to ‘create new forms of procedures’ in the 
gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court” (ibid.).  
And in People v. Sharp (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772, 1780-1781, 
the court, citing Craig, affirmed use of an accommodation that 
allowed the prosecutor to sit or stand next to a young victim 
witness during examination so she could look away from the 
defense table while testifying, limiting the defendant’s view of 
her to the side and back of her head.  These decisions further 
undermine defendant’s argument regarding the exclusivity of 
the accommodation that section 1347 sets forth.   
We need not address defendant’s other arguments under 
section 1347, or his remaining procedural arguments, because 
we ultimately agree with him that the record before us is 
insufficient to sustain the trial court’s accommodation order.  
The relevant evidence before us is quite sparse:  After entering 
the courtroom, being directed to the witness stand, and being 
advised to “step up here,” “follow the instructions of” the bailiff, 
“watch your step as you take the stand,” “[s]tay standing” and 
“raise your right hand” while “the clerk . . . swear[s] you in,” F.R. 
started crying.  When the court asked if she “need[ed] a 
moment,” she replied, “I think so.”  These are the only facts in 
the record that underlie the court’s subsequent statement that 
F.R. was “unable to proceed at that time.”  Assuming F.R.’s act 
of crying and her equivocal response support the court’s 
statement, they provide little support for a finding that the 
trauma F.R. would have suffered upon testifying in defendant’s 
presence 
was 
such 
that 
an 
accommodation 
abridging 
defendant’s right of face-to-face confrontation was necessary.  
Indeed, the court also stated for the record that F.R. was able to 
“get her emotions back in order” after a relatively short break.  
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
Consistent with this observation, as far as the record shows, 
after the break, F.R. reentered the courtroom, walked to the 
stand, and took the oath, all with an unobstructed view of 
defendant and without any apparent emotional difficulty.  She 
also identified defendant during her testimony — stating that 
she saw him in the courtroom and describing where he was 
sitting and what he was wearing — again, as far as the record 
shows, without any apparent emotional difficulty.   
Other aspects of the record on which the People rely do 
little, if anything, to establish the requisite necessity.  According 
to the People, before the prosecution called F.R. as a witness, 
“[h]er best friend of six years, [M.C.], had already testified that 
when she confronted [F.R.] about [defendant’s] abuse, [F.R.] 
initially refused to disclose the abuse to her despite the girls’ 
very close relationship.”  Thus, the People argue, when F.R. first 
entered the courtroom, “[t]he trial court was already aware that 
[she] had particular difficulty disclosing the abuse.”  However, 
M.C.’s testimony actually cuts against the People’s ultimate 
position, because (1) it indicates that F.R. had difficulty 
disclosing the abuse to anyone, even her best friend, and (2) 
under Craig, an accommodation that abridges the right of face-
to-face confrontation is constitutionally permissible only if the 
harm the witness may suffer from testifying is caused by “the 
presence of the defendant,” “not by the courtroom generally.”  
(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 856.)  Notably, consistent with what 
M.C.’s testimony indicates, F.R. mentioned or indicated 
numerous times during her testimony that she had difficulty 
telling anyone about defendant’s acts, even her mother.3 
                                        
3  
Asked what part of defendant’s body was touching her, 
F.R. replied, “I don’t want to say it.”  Asked why she had testified 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
Likewise unpersuasive is the People’s reliance on the 
court’s exchange with counsel as to whether facing defendant 
was the cause of F.R.’s emotional difficulty the first time she 
entered the courtroom.  As the People note, after explaining that 
the monitor had been elevated by placing it on several books, the 
prosecution added, “Given that the witness had indicated that 
the defendant looked at her the first time she came in.”  But the 
court did not accept the prosecution’s unsworn statement, 
instead commenting, “And whether that happened or didn’t, I 
think it’s appropriate.”  Defendant’s counsel then stated that 
F.R. “began crying before she was even able to see [defendant’s] 
face,” and that defendant “made no effort to look at her, 
intimidate her, or make any kind of eye contact or suggestive 
contact with her.”  The court replied:  “I understand.  I’m not 
casting any aspersions at this point.  But it clearly affected her, 
and I think it’s appropriate for the court to take whatever small 
efforts it can make to make the witness more comfortable 
                                        
that the events were not still fresh in her mind, she replied, “I 
don’t want to.”  Asked why she hadn’t told anyone what 
defendant had done, she replied, “I don’t know.”  Asked if she 
had recently talked to M.C. about the case, F.R. replied, “No.  I 
don’t like talking about it.”  Asked if she was scared about being 
in court, she replied, “I just don’t like being in court.”  Asked 
why she had not told M.C.’s mother or defendant’s mother about 
what defendant had done, she replied, “Just didn’t want to tell 
anyone.”  Asked why she had not earlier told M.C. what 
defendant had done, F.R. replied, “I was always scared,” “It was 
just no one’s business,” “It was just something I didn’t want to 
talk about,” and “[I]t’s still something — I never liked talking 
about it.”  F.R. also testified that she was shy with “everyone” 
other than her mother, and that even though she was “not shy” 
with her mother, she did not tell her mother at first about 
defendant’s acts because “that’s the hardest thing you could ever 
say to someone” and “it’s so hard to say anything like that.”   
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
without infringing on any of [defendant’s] constitutional rights, 
and I don’t believe that his rights have been infringed on at this 
point.”  (Italics added.)  Given the court’s failure to disagree with 
defense counsel’s statement, the court’s stated refusal to “cast[] 
aspersions,” and the court’s earlier statement that the 
accommodation was appropriate “whether [defendant looked at 
F.R.] or didn’t” when she first entered the courtroom, we cannot 
determine to what the court was referring when the court said 
“it” clearly affected F.R.  In other words, it appears that the trial 
court expressly declined to resolve the competing accounts 
offered by the prosecution and the defense, and that it ordered 
the accommodation without determining whether it was 
defendant personally, or the courtroom more generally, that 
upset F.R.  In any event, even interpreting this comment as the 
People suggest — that “it” referred to facing defendant — the 
circumstance that facing defendant “clearly affected” F.R. when 
she first entered the courtroom would be insufficient alone to 
establish the level of emotional trauma Craig requires to justify 
use of an accommodation that abridges a defendant’s right of 
face-to-face confrontation.  (Cf. Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 856 
[“ ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to 
testify’ ” is insufficient].)   
In summary, we cannot conclude here that the 
accommodation was “fully justified by the record.”  (Gonzales, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1268.)  To find that an accommodation 
was constitutionally permissible merely because F.R. — a young 
adult — started crying the first time she entered the courtroom 
and the court took a short recess to allow her to compose herself, 
would give courts license to abridge the right of face-to-face 
confrontation almost any time a witness breaks down on the 
stand.  This does not appear to be what the high court in Craig 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
had in mind when it cautioned that the constitutional “face-to-
face confrontation requirement” may not be “easily. . . dispensed 
with,” and then added that “a defendant’s right to confront 
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-
face confrontation at trial only where denial of such 
confrontation is necessary to further an important public 
policy.”  (Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 850.)  In terms of 
establishing that necessity, the evidence in the record here falls 
short.4 
Regarding prejudice, consistent with our case law, the 
parties agree that violations of the confrontation clause are 
subject to the federal harmless error analysis of Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, under which reversal is required 
unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have reached the same verdict absent the error.  (People 
v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159.)  In Coy, the high 
court explained that in this context, “[a]n assessment of 
harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the 
witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s 
assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an 
                                        
4  
Although our conclusion makes it unnecessary to address 
defendant’s assertion that Craig requires express findings, we 
caution that trial courts normally should make such findings 
before ordering an accommodation.  Among other reasons, 
because the determinations necessary under Craig depend 
heavily on considerations that are difficult to convey through a 
paper record, it may be quite difficult for an appellate court to 
glean adequate implied findings from the record on appeal.  
Nevertheless, we do not foreclose the possibility that, on some 
records, the degree and cause of witness distress and the need 
for accommodation may be so manifest that an accommodation 
ordered without express findings may survive on appeal. 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and 
harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the 
remaining evidence.”  (Coy, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 1021-1022.)  
After quoting this explanation, the People do not contend that 
as to the convictions involving acts against F.R. — counts 3, 4, 
and 5 — if there was error, it was harmless in light of the 
evidence aside from F.R.’s testimony; instead, they ask in their 
brief that we remand the case to allow them an opportunity to 
retry defendant on those counts or dismiss those counts and 
resentence defendant.  We agree that, as to those counts, the 
error was not harmless in light of the remaining evidence and 
that reversal is necessary.5 
C.  Ar.R and An.R 
Regarding Ar.R and An.R, we agree with the People and 
the Court of Appeal that defendant forfeited his claim under the 
confrontation clause by failing to object at trial to the 
repositioning of the monitor during their testimony.  As a 
general rule, a defendant’s failure to object to an alleged trial 
error relieves an appellate court of the obligation to consider the 
claim on review.  (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.)  
The reason for this rule is to allow the trial court to correct its 
                                        
5  
At oral argument, the People, contrary to what they stated 
in their brief, asserted that were we to find the record 
insufficient to sustain the trial court’s order, the remedy should 
be a remand “to the trial court to make a clearer record” 
regarding the relevant considerations at this 2015 trial.  Given 
the People’s failure to raise this question sooner, and 
defendant’s lack of opportunity to address the question, we 
decline to consider it.  (See People v. Pena (2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 
403 [“ ‘[a]n appellate court is not required to consider any point 
made for the first time at oral argument, and it will be deemed 
waived’ ”].) 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
errors and “to prevent gamesmanship by the defense.”  (Ibid.)  
We have applied this rule numerous times to find forfeiture of a 
constitutional right of confrontation claim.  (People v. Riccardi 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 827, fn. 33; People v. Dement (2011) 53 
Cal.4th 1, 23; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730; People 
v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 289-290; People v. Raley (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 870, 892.)  As the People argue, had defendant objected 
to the repositioning of the monitor during the testimony of Ar.R 
and An.R, “the trial court would have had an opportunity to 
correct [any] error (by lowering the monitor), or to make 
additional findings on the record regarding the necessity of the 
accommodation as to” these witnesses.  Because defendant did 
not object, he has forfeited his claim. 
Defendant fails to persuade us that we should “excuse[]” 
his failure to object because an objection would have been 
“futile.”  According to defendant, given the standard the trial 
court set forth in connection with F.R. — whether defendant 
“was present and could hear the witnesses” — and the trial 
court’s finding as to F.R., the court “would undoubtedly have 
made the same ruling as to” Ar.R and An.R, who were “younger 
witnesses.”  However, as detailed above, the trial court 
explained that it had repositioned the monitor during F.R.’s 
testimony because of “her initial reaction” upon entering the 
courtroom, i.e., “when she first came in to take the oath, she was 
unable to proceed at that time.”  Given this explanation, the 
record offers no support for defendant’s assertion that had he 
objected, the trial court would have ordered the accommodation 
simply because Ar.R and An.R were “younger witnesses,” 
without regard to whether they were having difficulty testifying.  
Defendant’s futility argument therefore fails.  
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
Likewise 
unpersuasive 
is 
defendant’s 
alternative 
argument:  if “further objection was necessary,” then his 
attorney’s failure to object constituted “ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”  To prevail on this claim, defendant must show, among 
other things, that his “counsel’s performance was deficient, in 
that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 
986, 1009.)   In evaluating his claim, we “defer[] to counsel’s 
reasonable tactical decisions” and presume that “counsel acted 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  
(Ibid.)  Thus, defendant “ ‘must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be 
considered sound trial strategy.” ’ ”  (People v. Fairbank (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 1223, 1243, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
466 U.S. 668, 689.)  His burden in this regard “is difficult to 
carry” in this case, because this is a direct appeal and the record 
does not disclose the reason for counsel’s failure to object.  
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437.)  For those reasons, 
we may reverse “only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses 
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act 
or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to 
provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory 
explanation.”  (Mai, at p. 1009; see People v. Earp (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 826, 896 [“When . . . defense counsel’s reasons for 
conducting the defense case in a particular way are not readily 
apparent from the record, we will not assume inadequacy of 
representation unless there could have been ‘ “no conceivable 
tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s actions”].)  This rule “is 
particularly apt” where, as here, “the asserted deficiency arises 
from defense counsel’s failure to object.  ‘[D]eciding whether to 
object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
establish ineffective assistance.’ ”  (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 93, 172.) 
Defendant has failed to carry his burden because counsel 
was not asked why he failed to object, the record does not 
affirmatively disclose that counsel had no rational tactical 
purpose for the omission, and we are not convinced there could 
be no satisfactory explanation.  Counsel could have concluded, 
based on his experience with F.R.’s testimony, that the 
repositioned monitor — which did not interfere with defense 
counsel’s view of F.R., did not prevent defendant from hearing 
F.R., did not prevent F.R. from testifying that she saw defendant 
in the courtroom, and did not preclude F.R. from describing 
where defendant was sitting and what he was wearing — had 
no meaningful impact on defendant’s right of confrontation or 
on his ability to assist his counsel, and that any benefit from 
preventing the accommodation’s use for Ar.R and An.R therefore 
did not outweigh the risk of upsetting them during their 
testimony and arousing sympathy for them with jurors that 
might work to defendant’s detriment and prejudice his case.  In 
other words, counsel could have concluded, based on his 
experience with F.R., that taking steps to minimize any trauma 
to Ar.R and An.R was actually in defendant’s best interests.  
Because this rational tactical reason could account for counsel’s 
failure to object, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails.  
And because defendant does not claim that the error with 
respect to F.R. prejudiced him with respect to the convictions 
involving acts against Ar.R and An.R, there is no basis to reverse 
those convictions. 
PEOPLE v. ARREDONDO 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse defendant’s 
convictions on counts 3, 4, and 5, we affirm the remainder of 
defendant’s convictions, and we remand for resentencing on 
counts 1, 12, and 14 (as the Court of Appeal ordered) and for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Arredondo 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  XXX 13 Cal.App.5th 950 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S244166 
Date Filed: December 16, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  David A. Gunn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Johnson, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Steven T. Oetting, Meredith S. White, A. Natasha Cortina, Meagan Beale and Annie Featherman Fraser, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee S. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steven A. Torres 
Torres & Torres 
3579 East Foothill Boulevard  
Pasadena, CA 91107  
(626) 836-5855 
 
Annie Featherman Fraser 
Deputy Attorney General    
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800    
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9137