Title: Walton v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PERCY LAVAR WALTON 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record Nos. 980010 and 980011 June 5, 1998 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
James F. Ingram, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder convictions, 
the related felony convictions, and the death sentences 
imposed upon Percy Lavar Walton for the murders of Elizabeth 
W. Kendrick, Jessie E. Kendrick, and Archie D. Moore, Jr. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
Walton, age 18 at the time of the offenses, pled guilty 
to the following:  four charges of capital murder, three 
charges of robbery, one charge of burglary, and six charges of 
using a firearm in the commission of a felony.  Before 
accepting the guilty pleas, the trial court questioned Walton 
and made a determination that his guilty pleas were made 
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.  Walton and the 
Commonwealth stipulated evidence that would have been adduced 
had the case been tried. 
 
The trial court scheduled a separate sentencing hearing.  
The defendant and the Commonwealth presented evidence, and the 
trial court received the probation officer's report in the 
manner prescribed by law.  After considering the evidence and 
argument of counsel, the trial court stated orally that 
Walton's conduct in each murder involved depravity of mind, 
and his conduct associated with each capital offense indicated 
that there is a probability that he will commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing, serious threat 
to society.  However, the trial court entered a sentencing 
order which did not mention depravity of mind, but stated that 
"there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society."  The trial court fixed Walton's 
punishment at three separate death sentences and imposed three 
separate life sentences for each of the three robbery 
convictions, ten years' imprisonment for the burglary 
conviction, and three years' imprisonment for each of the six 
firearms convictions.*
 
We have consolidated the automatic review of Walton's 
death sentences with his appeal of right of his capital murder 
convictions, Code §§ 17-110.1(A) and -110.1(F).  We have also 
                     
* The trial court convicted Walton of three charges of 
capital murder during the commission of robbery and one charge 
of capital murder for the willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-
year period.  See Code §§ 18.2-31(4) and (8).  The trial court 
imposed the three death sentences for the three convictions 
for capital murder during the commission of robbery, and at 
the time of sentencing, the trial court dismissed the 
remaining capital murder conviction.  See Clagett v. 
 
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consolidated Walton's appeal to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia from his non-capital convictions, and we have given 
his appeals priority on our docket.  Code § 17-110.2. 
II.  FACTS 
A.  THE MURDERS OF ELIZABETH AND JESSIE KENDRICK 
 
On November 16, 1996, Barbara K. Case, who was in 
Mississippi, made a telephone call to her parents, Elizabeth 
and Jessie Kendrick, who resided in Danville.  Mrs. Case 
informed her parents during this telephone conversation that 
she planned to visit them during the approaching Thanksgiving 
holiday season.  Mr. and Mrs. Kendrick agreed to meet their 
daughter at an airport in Greensboro, North Carolina, on 
November 25, 1996, three days before Thanksgiving, and return 
to Danville for the holidays.  Mrs. Case made several attempts 
to reach her parents by telephone between November 16 and 25, 
1996, but no one answered the telephone.  Mrs. Case did not 
consider her parents' failure to answer the telephone unusual 
because her parents "traveled a lot." 
 
When Mrs. Case arrived at the airport in Greensboro on 
November 25, 1996, her parents failed to meet her.  She waited 
several hours, and then she became alarmed and disturbed.  A 
woman at the airport gave Mrs. Case a ride to Danville.   
                                                                
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 95-96, 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 (1996), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 972 (1997). 
 
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When Mrs. Case arrived at her parents' home in Danville, 
their townhouse was dark, and their car was missing.  Mrs. 
Case then went to her aunt's home, which is across the street 
from her parents' townhouse.  Mrs. Case and her aunt went to 
the Kendricks' residence, but no one answered the door. 
 
Mrs. Case spent the night of November 25, 1996, with her 
aunt, and she contacted the Danville Police Department the 
next morning.  Several police officers arrived at Mr. and Mrs. 
Kendricks' townhouse and eventually entered the residence.  
The police officers found the body of Mr. Kendrick, lying face 
down on a living room floor.  Mr. Kendrick's hands were 
"clasped, and above his head, clinched together."  The police 
found the body of Mrs. Kendrick on the floor in the den.  A 
portion of her body was covered with a sheet, and the upper 
portion of her body was wrapped in a "pinkish-orange 
material."  Mrs. Kendrick's shirt had "been rolled up, and 
then taped" and was loosely tied around her neck with a 
slipknot.  She had on undergarments below her waist, her pants 
had been cut from her body, and her body had been dragged 
across the floor. 
 
Mr. Kendrick, who was 80 years old at the time of his 
murder, had been shot in the top of the head at close range.  
He suffered a very large explosive type of wound where the 
bullet entered his head.  A "star-shaped appearance" and the 
 
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presence of soot on his head indicated that a muzzle of a gun 
was pressed tightly against the top of Mr. Kendrick's head 
when the gun was discharged and that gases emitted from the 
muzzle caused the skin around the entry point to "tear and 
rip."  Mr. Kendrick also suffered superficial non-lethal cuts 
on the front of his neck and the palmar side of his left 
wrist. 
 
Mrs. Kendrick, who was 81 years old at the time of her 
death, also suffered a tight contact gunshot wound to the top 
of her head.  Her shirt, which was fashioned into a slipknot 
and tied around her neck, did not cause or contribute to her 
death. 
 
The Kendricks were last seen alive on November 19, 1996, 
when Mrs. Kendrick, accompanied by her husband, went to a 
hospital in Danville.  The police officers found the 
Kendricks' car a short distance behind their townhouse.   
B.  THE MURDER OF ARCHIE D. MOORE, JR. 
 
On November 28, 1996, Thanksgiving Day, Roxanne Moore, 
who was in Greensboro, North Carolina, placed a telephone call 
to the Danville Police Department.  Ms. Moore informed the 
police personnel that her brother, Archie Moore, who lived at 
the Cabin Lake Apartment Complex in Danville, was supposed to 
have met her at an airport in Greensboro on November 27, 1996, 
but he failed to appear.  Ms. Moore informed the police 
 
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personnel that neither she nor her parents in North Carolina 
were able to contact Archie Moore by telephone at his Danville 
apartment. 
 
Danville police officers entered Archie Moore's apartment 
around 8:00 a.m. on November 28.  While searching the 
apartment, they found Archie Moore's body in a closet behind a 
suitcase.  A plastic bag had been placed over Mr. Moore's 
head, and his feet were "propped up" against the closet wall.  
There was a strong odor of cologne in the closet and on the 
victim's body.  The cause of Mr. Moore's death was a gunshot 
wound to his head, immediately above his left eye.  The bullet 
found on the floor in his apartment. 
 
Shortly after Moore's body was discovered, two witnesses 
informed the Danville Police Department that they had recently 
observed Walton driving Moore's Ford Mustang automobile.  
Other witnesses had also observed Walton walking on a sidewalk 
from the area near Mr. and Mrs. Kendricks' townhouse toward 
Cabin Lake on several occasions between November 19 and 
November 26, 1996. 
 
Subsequently, the police found Moore's Mustang, "parked 
right across the street from [Walton's] house."  Walton lived 
in a condominium with his parents a short distance from 
Moore's apartment and the Kendricks' townhouse. 
 
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Lieutenant Kenneth D. Fitzgerald, a Danville police 
detective, went to Walton's home, spoke with Walton, and asked 
him if he knew Moore.  Walton denied that he knew Moore, and 
he denied "ever [having] been in Archie Moore's car."  Walton 
agreed to go to the police department for further questioning.  
Detective Fitzgerald left Walton's home and later, Walton, 
accompanied by his father, went to the police department. 
 
The police obtained a search warrant for Walton's 
residence.  During a search of Walton's bedroom, police 
personnel found a silver metal box inside one of Walton's 
boots.  The box contained a diploma and an "ATM card," both 
bearing Archie Moore's name.  The police also found a set of 
car keys; one key fit Moore's Mustang and two other keys fit 
locks on the doors of Moore's apartment.  The police also 
found a ring, which contained a very distinctive letter "A", 
which was similar to a ring that Moore had been wearing before 
his death. 
 
When the police officers searched Moore's car, they found 
a box containing two dozen .32-caliber bullets as well as keys 
that fit locks in the Kendricks' car and home.  The police 
officers also found a plastic bag which contained a "plastic 
sleeve" from a wallet.  Jessie Kendrick's driver's license and 
his "Knights of Columbus" card were inside the "plastic 
sleeve."  Walton's fingerprints were identified on the 
 
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"plastic sleeve."  Walton's fingerprints were also found on 
numerous items at various locations in Moore's apartment and 
car. 
 
When the police searched the Kendricks' car, they found a 
shotgun that had been stolen from the Kendricks' townhouse.  
Walton's fingerprint was found on the shotgun.  A knife, found 
in a toolbox in the trunk of the Kendricks' car, contained 
blood which matched Mr. Kendrick's DNA. 
 
The police officers recovered two .32-caliber bullet 
cartridges that had been partially submerged near the 
shoreline of Cabin Lake.  The lake was drained, and the police 
officers recovered a .32-caliber pistol that Mr. Kendrick had 
purchased in 1970.  Ballistic tests conducted on a bullet that 
had been removed from Mr. Kendrick's head revealed that the 
bullet "matched" the .32-caliber pistol recovered from the 
lake and was consistent with the bullets that had killed Moore 
and Mrs. Kendrick.  The pistol contained four bullets and two 
spent cartridges.  The lead contained in the bullets found in 
Moore's car, the bullets recovered from the heads of the 
victims, and the bullets in the revolver originated from the 
same manufacturing source. 
 
While in jail awaiting trial for the capital murder 
charges and related offenses, Walton admitted to several 
inmates that "he had killed three people at Cabin Lake."  
 
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Walton also described the graphic details of the murders at 
length to Lacy H. Johnson, with whom Walton shared a cell in 
the Danville City Jail. 
III.  ISSUES WAIVED 
 
Walton argues that the trial court "erred in finding the 
stipulated evidence at the guilt phase sufficient to convict 
[him], even on his pleas of guilty, in violation of his rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution."  This assignment of error seeks to raise issues 
that Walton waived by the entry of his guilty pleas and, thus, 
these issues are not cognizable in this appeal.  We have 
repeatedly held that a defendant who appeals a judgment of 
death may not complain of any non-jurisdictional defects that 
occurred prior to his guilty plea.  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 
Va. 373, 380, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
118 S.Ct. 608 (1997); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 
141, 431 S.E.2d 48, 51, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); 
Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 
Va. 126, 131-32, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 
925 (1989); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 526, 352 
S.E.2d 342, 345, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Peyton v. 
King, 210 Va. 194, 196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969). 
IV.  ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE 
 
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Walton argues that the trial court erred by admitting 
"the photographs of the victims as they were discovered at the 
crime scenes and of their autopsies over defense objections 
that such photographs were so prejudicial and inflammatory as 
to outweigh any probative value in violation of Walton's due 
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution."  We find no merit in Walton's 
argument. 
 
We have repeatedly held that the admission of photographs 
in evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 459, 470 S.E.2d 
114, 126, cert. denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 222 (1996); 
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 378, 402 S.E.2d 218, 
226, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).  Photographs of a 
victim are admissible to show motive, intent, method, malice, 
premeditation, and the atrociousness of the crime.  Goins, 251 
Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126.  Photographs which accurately 
depict the crime scene are not rendered inadmissible simply 
because they are gruesome or shocking.  Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 
470 S.E.2d at 126; Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 343, 356 
S.E.2d 157, 173, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).   
 
We have examined the photographs, and we find no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court.  Furthermore, the defendant's 
conclusional assertion that the admission of these photographs 
 
10
somehow violates his due process rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United Constitution is without 
merit. 
V.  CONTINUING SERIOUS THREAT TO SOCIETY 
 
Walton argues that the trial court erred by holding that 
"the Commonwealth's evidence [was] sufficient to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the statutory aggravator of future 
dangerousness in violation of Walton's rights under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
because . . . Walton had no prior history of significant 
violent offenses."  Continuing, Walton says that his prior 
criminal history does not demonstrate a propensity for 
violence, that the circumstances surrounding the crimes that 
are the subject of this appeal do not show a propensity for 
violence, and that the credible evidence of record in this 
case does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he poses a 
threat of future danger.  We disagree with Walton's 
assertions. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.4(C) states, in relevant part: 
 
"The penalty of death shall not be imposed 
unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there is a probability based 
upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant 
or of the circumstances surrounding the commission 
of the offense of which he is accused that he would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society 
. . . ." 
 
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The evidence of record supports the trial court's finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based 
upon both Walton's prior history and the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the present offenses that he 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.  The 
evidence of record reveals that Walton killed an 80-year-old 
man and an 81-year-old woman by shooting both victims in the 
head.  Walton killed Mr. Kendrick by placing the muzzle of the 
pistol tightly against the top of the victim's head and then 
discharging the weapon.  Walton later shot Moore in the head 
and killed him simply because he wanted to drive Moore's car. 
 
When Walton was incarcerated awaiting trial for the 
capital offenses, he described the murders to several inmates, 
including Lacy Johnson, to whom he related the following 
facts.  Walton had "broken into" the Kendricks' residence when 
the Kendricks unexpectedly arrived home.  Walton forced Mr. 
Kendrick to lie face down on the floor.  Walton then turned to 
Mrs. Kendrick, who "dropped down to [her] knees," and "started 
begging and crying."  Walton told her to "shut up," and then 
he "shot her in the top of the head."  Walton then "looked 
over at Mr. Kendrick, who was laying there crying, and 
[Walton] started laughing at him, and he walked over to him.  
As [Walton] walked over to [Mr. Kendrick], [Walton] tried to 
 
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cut his throat, with a knife.  [Walton] said that didn't work, 
so he leaned down, and shot him in the top of the head."  
Walton told Johnson that Walton had seen the Kendricks before, 
but "they didn't really matter to him . . . they won't 
nobody." 
 
Walton also related the following facts to Johnson about 
Moore's murder.  Walton went to Moore's apartment and asked to 
use his telephone.  Moore permitted him to do so, and Walton 
called his own home telephone number.  Walton then returned to 
his home and used a telephone feature to acquire Moore's 
telephone number.  He later returned to Moore's residence and 
asked to use the phone again.  Moore hesitated by looking at 
Walton, who then smiled.  In response, Moore invited Walton in 
to use his telephone.  When Moore handed to Walton a portable 
telephone, Walton, using his pistol, fired a shot at Moore, 
which missed.  Walton fired a second shot which "hit [Moore] 
over the eye."  Then, Walton demonstrated to Johnson how he 
had killed Moore by "dropp[ing] to the floor . . . laughing." 
 
According to Johnson, Walton said: 
"[A]fter he did the first killing, he knew what he 
wanted to do.  And then he said that he wanted to be 
famous, for killing a bunch of people, and that's 
why he wanted a high powered enough gun, where he 
can kill everybody over in Cabin Lake, and he wanted 
to catch everybody, like at the swimming pool one 
day, and just gun 'em all down. . . .  [H]e wanted 
to be famous . . . especially, in Danville, for 
killing a bunch of folks." 
 
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We hold that the facts and circumstances surrounding 
these murders are sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding of future dangerousness.  Moreover, Walton's criminal 
history also supports the trial court's finding of future 
dangerousness.  Walton had been convicted of statutory 
burglary and grand larceny.  He had also been convicted of 
resisting arrest and assault and battery on a police officer.  
As a juvenile, Walton was convicted of two different offenses 
of possession of a firearm and one charge of assault and 
battery. 
VI.  DEPRAVITY OF MIND 
 
Walton argues that "[i]t was error for the trial court to 
find the Commonwealth's evidence sufficient to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the statutory aggravator of vileness, in 
violation of Walton's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution because the facts 
of the offenses do not establish torture, depravity of mind or 
aggravated battery to the victims."  We will not consider this 
assignment of error. 
 
As we have already mentioned in Section I of this 
opinion, the trial court stated orally that each of the three 
murders Walton committed demonstrated Walton's "depravity of 
mind."  However, the trial court's sentencing order did not 
 
14
sentence Walton to death on that basis.  Rather, the trial 
court stated in its sentencing order that there is a 
probability that Walton would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. 
We have stated that "[i]t is the firmly established law 
of this Commonwealth that a trial court speaks only through 
its written orders."  Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 
S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996).  Accord Robertson v. Superintendent of 
the Wise Correctional Unit, 248 Va. 232, 235 n.*, 445 S.E.2d 
116, 117 n.* (1994); Town of Front Royal v. Industrial Park, 
248 Va. 581, 586, 449 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1994); Martin v. 
Coleman, 234 Va. 509, 510 n.1, 362 S.E.2d 732, 733 n.1 (1987); 
Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 578, 318 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1984); 
Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 237, 315 S.E.2d 825, 829 (1984); 
Walker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 5, 8, 301 S.E.2d 28, 29 
(1983); Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 
773 (1964).  Thus, the trial court's sentence of death was not 
predicated upon the statutory aggravator of vileness. 
After oral argument before this Court, the Commonwealth 
forwarded a letter to the Clerk of this Court and a document 
which purported to be a "nunc pro tunc sentencing order."  The 
purported order, dated April 20, 1998, and signed by the trial 
court, contains a finding that the sentences of death were 
also imposed upon the defendant because in committing the 
 
15
capital murders, his acts were "outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhumane in that [the acts] involved depravity of 
mind." 
We do not consider this purported order because the trial 
court was divested of jurisdiction once the defendant filed 
his notices of appeal.  We have stated that the "orderly 
administration of justice demands that when an appellate court 
acquires jurisdiction over the parties involved in litigation 
and the subject matter of their controversy, the jurisdiction 
of the trial court from which the appeal was taken must 
cease."  Greene v. Greene, 223 Va. 210, 212, 288 S.E.2d 447, 
448 (1982). 
VII.  PASSION AND PREJUDICE 
 
Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) requires that we determine 
"[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor."  Walton argues that the trial court's failure to 
impose life sentences instead of the death penalties 
"demonstrates that [the court] was swept away on a tide of 
passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors."  We have 
reviewed the evidence of record, and we reject Walton's 
contentions because they are without merit.  Our review of the 
record indicates that the trial court gave thoughtful and 
careful consideration to all the evidence, and we find nothing 
 
16
in the record to suggest that the trial court imposed the 
sentences of death under the influence of passion, prejudice, 
or other arbitrary factors. 
VIII.  EXCESSIVENESS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY 
 
Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Walton argues 
that a review of the record of all comparable cases throughout 
the Commonwealth, including those that resulted in non-capital 
dispositions, reveal that his death sentences are 
disproportionate.  We disagree. 
 
The test of proportionality that we apply is whether 
"juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme 
penalty for comparable or similar crimes."  Murphy, 246 Va. at 
145, 431 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 260, 284, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 972 (1980)); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 
423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 
(1993). 
 
Our comparison of the record in this case with the 
records in other capital cases, including capital cases in 
which life sentences were imposed, fails to indicate that the 
death penalties imposed here are "excessive or 
 
17
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Code § 17-
110.1(C)(2). 
 
We have given particular consideration to other capital 
cases in which robbery or attempted robbery was the underlying 
felony and the death penalty was based only on the future 
dangerousness predicate.  Such cases were compiled in Yeatts 
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 143, 410 S.E.2d 254, 267-68 
(1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992), and supplemented in 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ 
(1998), Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 332-33, 448 
S.E.2d 638, 652 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995), 
and Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 351, 468 S.E.2d 98, 
113, cert. denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996). 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
Having reviewed the sentences of death and related 
convictions, finding no reversible error in the record, and 
perceiving no reason to commute the death sentences, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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