Title: State v. Robar

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-341


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Donald Robar                                 December Term, 1990


Edward J. Cashman, J.

William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and
  Pamela Hall Johnson and Gary Kessler, Department of State's Attorneys,
  Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   The defendant, Donald C. Robar, appeals from his con-
viction by jury for burglary in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 1201(a), arguing
that testimony from an inquest was improperly considered, the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the deferred sentence statute is
unconstitutional.  We hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction as a matter of law, and reverse.
                                             I.
     Defendant was charged with breaking into the Fish Bank Restaurant in
South Burlington in December 1985 and stealing $25 worth of beer and $100
worth of pork ribs.  The charge resulted from a June 10, 1986 inquest held
by the State's Attorney to aid the South Burlington Police Department with
the investigation of the burglary.
     At the inquest, the State took sworn testimony from Tracy Atkins who
testified that she was with defendant and her brother Brian Atkins one night
shortly before Christmas in 1985 when they stopped near the Fish Bank
Restaurant.  She testified that her brother and defendant told her that they
were going to the Fish Bank, and left her alone in the car for about fifteen
minutes.  They returned carrying two cases of beer, three or four packs of
wine coolers, and fifty pounds of pork ribs.  She testified that she knew
the restaurant was closed when defendant and her brother went there, and
that she "knew what they were going to do."  She stated that the three then
returned to her apartment where they ate the ribs and drank the beer.
     The State called Tracy Atkins to testify at the trial, but she claimed
no recollection of the events occurring on December 23, 1985.  She remem-
bered testifying at the inquest in June of 1986, but did not recall what she
had said.  Reading a transcript of her testimony at the inquest failed to
refresh her memory.  She testified, however, that at one time she remembered
the events of the night of December 23, 1985, and that her testimony at the
inquest was the truth as she knew it at the time when she remembered those
events.
     Over defendant's objection, the court then allowed the State to read
the inquest testimony into evidence with the state's attorney reading the
question and Atkins reading her inquest answer.  In this manner, the jury
heard Atkins' inquest testimony.
     The State also presented other testimony from police officers involved
in the investigation, and from the manager of the Fish Bank at the time of
the burglary.  These witnesses testified about the specific details of the
burglary, such as what was stolen, and the method of entry.  The only
evidence presented that identified defendant as one of the perpetrators,
however, was the recorded recollection of Tracy Atkins.  The case was
submitted to the jury, which found the defendant guilty.
     Defendant raises three arguments on appeal:  (1) Atkins' inquest
testimony was not properly admitted into evidence, and thus may not support
defendant's conviction; (2) even if Atkins' testimony was properly admitted,
it was insufficient to sustain a conviction; and (3) the court's failure to
consider deferral of sentence pursuant to 13 V.S.A. { 7041 in spite of the
State's refusal to consent was unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation of powers.  Because we find the evidence insufficient to support
the conviction, we reverse defendant's conviction and do not reach the third
issue.
                                    II.
     Defendant first challenges the admissibility of Tracy Atkins' inquest
testimony.  The trial court admitted the testimony as past recollection
recorded, under V.R.E. 803(5), which permits the admission of
         [a] memorandum or record concerning a matter about which
         a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient
         recollection to enable [her] to testify fully and
         accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the
         witness when the matter was fresh in [her] memory and
         to reflect that knowledge correctly.  If admitted, the
         memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may
         not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by
         an adverse party.
Documents admitted under Rule 803(5) must meet three foundational
requirements:
         "(1) The document must pertain to matters about which
         the declarant once had knowledge; (2) The declarant must
         now have an insufficient recollection as to such
         matters; (3) The document must be shown to have been
         made by the declarant or, if made by one other than the
         declarant, to have been examined by the declarant and
         shown to accurately reflect the declarant's knowledge
         when the matters were fresh in [her] memory."
State v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 1, 3,