Title: Warrick v. Super. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/2/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
DONALD PAUL WARRICK, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115738 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 2/2 B160462 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS  
) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent;  
) 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA230651 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES POLICE 
) 
DEPARTMENT et al.,  
) 
 
) 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
On a showing of good cause a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of 
relevant documents or information in the personnel records of a police officer 
accused of misconduct against the defendant.  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)1  
Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both “ ‘materiality’ to 
the subject matter of the pending litigation and a ‘reasonable belief’ that the 
agency has the type of information sought.”  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal 
Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 (Santa Cruz).)  A showing of good cause is 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Evidence 
Code. 
 
 
 
 
2
measured by “relatively relaxed standards” that serve to “insure the production” 
for trial court review of “all potentially relevant documents.”  (Ibid.) 
 
At issue here is the first part of the good cause requirement—the materiality 
to the pending litigation of the discovery sought.  Specifically, the question is this:  
What must the defendant show to warrant the court’s in-chambers review of 
documents or information in the officer’s personnel file that is potentially relevant 
to the claimed misconduct?  We hold that to obtain in-chambers review a 
defendant need only demonstrate that the scenario of alleged officer misconduct 
could or might have occurred. 
I. 
According to the police report, which was attributable to the three arresting 
officers, about 6 p.m. on April 23, 2002, Officers Quezada, Lopez, and Ramirez of 
the Special Enforcement Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) were 
in a marked car patrolling Fifth Street between Spring Street and Towne Avenue, 
an area known for violent crime and narcotics activities.  The officers noticed 
defendant standing next to a wall looking at a clear plastic baggie in his left hand; 
the baggie contained “off-white solids.”  When the officers got out of the patrol 
car, defendant fled, discarding “numerous” off-white lumps “resembling rock 
cocaine.”  While Officer Quezada retrieved 42 lumps from the ground, Officers 
Lopez and Ramirez arrested defendant after a short pursuit.  Defendant had an 
empty baggie in his hand; his pockets contained $2.75 in cash and three porcelain 
sparkplug chips, which Officer Quezada described as “a common tool” of auto 
thieves for smashing car windows.  Defendant was arrested for possession of 
cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and for possession of burglary 
tools (Pen. Code, § 466).  At the time of the arrest, defendant was on parole for 
burglary. 
 
 
3
Defendant was charged with one count of possessing cocaine base for sale 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and was alleged to have a prior conviction for a 
serious or violent felony (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subd. (b)), as 
well as having served a prior prison term (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)).  Defendant pled 
not guilty and denied the allegations. 
Before trial, defendant filed a so-called Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)) under section 1043 for disclosure 
of any previous citizen complaints against the three arresting officers for making 
false arrests, falsifying police reports, or planting evidence.  Defendant also sought 
discovery of a long list of other misconduct by the officers.  (See post, pp. 9-10.) 
In support of the motion, defense counsel submitted a declaration giving 
this version of the events leading to defendant’s arrest:  When the three officers 
got out of the patrol car, defendant, who feared an arrest on an outstanding parole 
warrant, started to run away, but within moments the officers caught up with him.  
Meanwhile, there were “people pushing and kicking and fighting with each other” 
as they collected from the ground objects later determined to be rock cocaine.  
After two officers retrieved some of the rocks, an officer told defendant, “ ‘You 
must have thrown this.’ ”  Defendant denied possessing or discarding any rock 
cocaine.  He said he was in the area to buy cocaine from a seller who was present 
there.  Defense counsel suggested that the officers, not knowing who had 
discarded the cocaine, falsely claimed to have seen defendant, who was running 
away, do so.  Seeking to show that the officers had falsely arrested defendant and 
fabricated the facts in the arrest report, the defense sought to discover previous 
complaints against the officers for dishonesty. 
In opposition, the city attorney on behalf of the LAPD argued that 
defendant had done nothing more than deny his guilt, and that he had not 
affirmatively set out any facts to describe a specific factual scenario.  Arguing that 
 
 
4
defense counsel’s declaration was essentially a denial of the charges, the “logical 
equivalent” of defendant’s not guilty plea, the city attorney maintained that 
defendant “needs to assert plausible facts, not reenter his plea.”  The city attorney 
also asserted that defendant’s contention that the officers falsely claimed to have 
seen defendant discard the cocaine was not plausible because defendant failed to 
explain how he happened to be in precisely the area where rock cocaine was 
allegedly discarded by another person, or why the officers would accuse him of 
having possessed the cocaine, or knowing that he was innocent why they would 
have planted it on him.  According to the city attorney, a scenario “which might 
have happened” was implausible; to be plausible a scenario must be “believable.” 
Concluding that defendant had not made the required showing of good 
cause, the trial court declined to order the LAPD to produce the officers’ records 
for in-chambers review, and it denied defendant’s Pitchess motion.  Referring to 
the allegations in defense counsel’s affidavit the trial court stated:  “It appears to 
me that this is not police misconduct but really an argument about what happened, 
one that should be resolved by the trial court, but not one that gives rise to looking 
at a police personnel file based on the paucity of information and the 
implausibility of the defendant’s allegation as to why somehow these officers must 
have engaged in misconduct.”  The court paraphrased defendant’s claim of officer 
misconduct in these words:  “ I don’t know what they did, but I did not have 
drugs, therefore they must have done something wrong. ” 
In August 2002, after the Court of Appeal’s summary denial of his petition 
for a writ of mandate, defendant sought review in this court.  We granted review 
and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal, directing that court to issue an 
order to show cause why defendant was not entitled to the relief he sought.  After 
issuing the order and receiving briefing from the parties, the Court of Appeal 
denied issuance of the writ.  It held that defendant had satisfied only one of the 
 
 
5
two requirements for good cause.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
defense counsel’s declaration presented a specific factual scenario of police 
misconduct.  But the court concluded, as the trial court had, that defendant’s 
declaration failed to satisfy “the second element of good cause, the articulation of 
a ‘plausible factual foundation’ ” for his officer misconduct claim.  Quoting a 
dictionary definition of the word plausible as “ ‘worthy of approval or acceptance; 
credible; believable,’ ” the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant’s factual 
scenario failed to show “a degree of reasonable probability, a degree of apparent 
credibility greater than mere possibility.”  It held that the trial court had not abused 
its discretion in denying defendant’s Pitchess motion, and it denied defendant’s 
petition for a writ of mandate.  As we explain below, the Court of Appeal applied 
a stricter standard for obtaining in-chambers review of officer personnel 
information than is required by law. 
II. 
This court’s 1974 decision in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 536 to 
537, established that a criminal defendant could “compel discovery” of certain 
relevant information in the personnel files of police officers by making “general 
allegations which establish some cause for discovery” of that information and by 
showing how it would support a defense to the charge against him. 
In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by 
enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code sections 
1043 through 1045.  (Added by Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 1-3 & 5-6, pp. 2082-2083; 
see City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9.)  To initiate 
discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing “good 
cause for the discovery,” first by demonstrating the materiality of the information 
to the pending litigation, and second by “stating upon reasonable belief” that the 
police agency has the records or information at issue.  (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  This 
 
 
6
two-part showing of good cause is a “relatively low threshold for discovery.”  
(Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) 
If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent 
documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the 
statutorily defined standards of relevance.  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
1216, 1226-1227; see City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
pp. 9-10.)  The trial court may not disclose complaints more than five years old, 
the “conclusions of any officer” who investigates a citizen complaint of police 
misconduct, or facts “so remote as to make [their] disclosure of little or no 
practical benefit.”  (§ 1045, subd. (b); City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 9.)  Typically, the trial court discloses only the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of individuals who have witnessed, or have previously filed complaints 
about, similar misconduct by the officer.  (See Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 
117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1089-1090.)  That practice “imposes a further safeguard to 
protect officer privacy where the relevance of the information sought is minimal 
and the officer’s privacy concerns are substantial.”  (Id. at p. 1090.) 
At issue here is the showing of good cause required for Pitchess discovery.  
According to the Court of Appeal, to establish good cause under section 1043 the 
defense must show materiality to the pending action by setting forth a “ ‘specific 
factual scenario’ ” that establishes “a ‘plausible factual foundation’ ” for the 
alleged officer misconduct.  The quoted phrases of the Court of Appeal’s test 
derive from language in certain decisions of this court, which we discuss below. 
III. 
In Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 78-79, the defendant, who was 
charged with resisting arrest, contended that officers had used excessive force to 
arrest him, and he sought disclosure of prior complaints of excessive force made 
against those officers.  Defense counsel’s supporting declaration asserted that the 
 
 
7
defendant had been handcuffed, grabbed by the hair, thrown to the ground, and 
one officer had stepped on his head while another “ ‘twisted his arm behind his 
back.’ ”  (Id. at p. 79.)  Focusing on the materiality of the information sought to 
the pending litigation, we concluded that the declaration’s description of specific 
acts of officer force against the defendant set out “a specific factual scenario” to 
support the defendant’s claim of excessive force.  (Id. at p. 85, italics added.)  We 
went on to say that when considered together with the police reports (stating that 
one officer punched defendant and then helped another officer wrestle the 
defendant to the ground), “counsel’s averments establish a plausible factual 
foundation for an allegation of excessive force.”  (Id. at p. 86, italics added.)  
Moreover, we continued, defense counsel’s averments “put the court on notice that 
the officers’ alleged use of excessive force” was a potential defense to the resisting 
arrest charge against the defendant, and they “articulate[d] a valid theory” of how 
prior excessive force complaints against the officers “might be admissible.”  (Id. at 
p. 86.)  In sum, in Santa Cruz the declaration of defense counsel “plainly 
demonstrated” the materiality of the information sought to the crime charged and 
the proposed defense to it.  (Ibid.) 
The origins of the “plausible factual foundation” language this court used in 
Santa Cruz can be traced to cases of criminal discovery predating our 1974 
decision in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.  Eight years earlier, in Ballard v. 
Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, we stated that a criminal defendant’s motion 
for discovery must describe the information sought and “must be sustained by 
plausible justification.”  (Id. at p. 167, italics added.)  Thereafter, in Hill v. 
Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, we quoted the “ ‘plausible justification’ ” 
language from Ballard and said that a criminal defendant was “not entitled to 
inspect material as a matter of right” but must make “a prior showing of good 
cause.”  (Id. at p. 817.)  Three months later, we decided Pitchess.  As mentioned 
 
 
8
earlier, under Pitchess a criminal defendant is entitled to discover certain 
information from a police officer’s personnel records that would support a defense 
to the charge against the defendant—a holding that the Legislature codified in 
1978.  Several years later, we noted the similarity between the “good cause” test of 
the statutory scheme and the “plausible justification” test used in our pre-Pitchess 
cases, and we concluded that the Legislature had not intended to abrogate that 
older case authority when it codified our Pitchess holding.  (People v. Memro 
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 679, fn. 19.) 
IV. 
 
In the 15 years since our decision in Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, the 
Courts of Appeal have repeatedly had to determine whether a defendant has shown 
good cause for in-chambers review of a police officer’s personnel records by 
making the threshold showing that the information sought is material to the 
pending litigation.  Some Courts of Appeal have described the good cause inquiry 
in language that hews rigorously to descriptive terms this court used in Santa 
Cruz, and they assess good cause under a two-part test requiring a “specific factual 
scenario” that establishes a “plausible factual foundation.”  (See, e.g., California 
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020-1023; City 
of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146-1150.)  Other 
Courts of Appeal have framed the good cause inquiry around the statutory 
formulation of materiality to the subject matter of the pending litigation (§ 1043, 
subd. (b)) or some equivalent terminology.  (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2004) 
118 Cal.App.4th 292, 303 [defense counsel’s declaration provided “a sufficient 
factual foundation” to show materiality of the officer’s truthfulness]; People v. 
Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416-417 [defendant “must make an initial 
showing that the information he is seeking is material to the case at hand”].) 
 
 
9
 
Regardless of how the materiality inquiry is described, however, a showing 
of good cause requires a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery to establish not 
only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also 
to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how 
it would impeach the officer’s version of events.  This court has long required that 
the information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the 
defendant’s request is not so broad as to garner “ ‘all information which has been 
obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime’ ” but is limited to 
instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the 
defendant.  (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 537; accord, People v. Mooc, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 1226; Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 85.) 
 
This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that 
are irrelevant to the pending charges.  (See, e.g., People v. Hustead, supra, 74 
Cal.App.4th at p. 416 [prior complaints of excessive force by arresting officer 
“irrelevant” after charge of resisting arrest was dropped and remaining charge was 
evasion of arrest in an automobile].)  And it enables the trial court to identify what 
types of officer misconduct information among those requested will support the 
defense or defenses proposed to the pending charges.  This inquiry establishes the 
statutorily required materiality prong of the good cause showing that a defendant 
must make to receive in-chambers review of potentially relevant officer records. 
V. 
 
Here, the Court of Appeal characterized defendant’s discovery request as 
overbroad.  Defendant’s Pitchess motion sought complaints of officer misconduct 
and discipline relating to acts or attempted acts of “aggressive behavior, violence, 
excessive force, . . . racial bias, gender bias, ethnic bias, sexual orientation bias, 
coercive conduct, violation of constitutional rights . . . . [¶] . . . [and] misconduct 
amounting to moral turpitude” such as “false arrest, planting evidence, fabrication 
 
 
10
of police reports, fabrication of probable cause, false testimony, perjury, using 
excessive force, making false arrests, writing false police reports to cover up the 
use of excessive force, and false or misleading internal reports including . . . false 
overtime or medical reports.”  Included in this exhaustive list were items, such as 
gender or sexual orientation bias, that were completely untethered either to the 
factual scenario or to the proposed defenses outlined in defense counsel’s 
declaration.  At the hearing on the Pitchess motion, defense counsel did not 
advance any additional justification for the relevance of all the requested 
categories.  The Court of Appeal observed that “the vast majority of categories of 
possible misconduct” listed by the defense had “no support” in the factual scenario 
outlined by counsel, and it specifically rejected the request for documents in the 
officers’ personnel files that would relate to false overtime claims.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that only information about prior complaints that any of the 
three officers “had made false statements in police reports” would have relevance 
to petitioner’s claims of officer misconduct. 
 
The Court of Appeal also concluded that defendant had not shown good 
cause for discovery of prior complaints of false statements in police reports written 
by the three arresting officers, because he had not established a “plausible” factual 
scenario.  Defendant’s factual scenario, according to the Court of Appeal, “was 
not objectively plausible,” that is, “no reasonable person would find it plausible.”  
Correctly acknowledging that “collateral supportive evidence” is not necessary to 
establish a plausible factual foundation for alleged officer misconduct, the Court 
of Appeal nonetheless concluded that such evidence “contributes” to such a 
finding. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, defendant was charged with possessing cocaine 
base for sale.  Defense counsel’s declaration in support of the Pitchess motion, 
however, denied that defendant had “possess[ed] any narcotics for the purpose of 
 
 
11
sale on the date of his arrest” and denied that defendant had discarded any rocks of 
cocaine.  Instead, the declaration stated, defendant was at the scene to buy cocaine 
and, fleeing at the sight of the officers because he feared arrest for an outstanding 
parole warrant, ran past the actual seller.  Defense counsel postulated two 
explanations—either the officers did not know who had discarded the rocks of 
cocaine and they falsely accused defendant of having done so, or they knew who 
had discarded the cocaine but falsely accused defendant.  Under either theory, 
defense counsel asserted, the officers falsely arrested defendant and made false 
statements in the police report to support his arrest.  This factual scenario, the 
Court of Appeal concluded, was specific.  We agree. 
 
We are not persuaded, however, by the Court of Appeal’s further 
conclusion that defendant’s factual foundation was not “plausible.”  His proposed 
defense to the charge of possessing cocaine base for sale was straightforward:  he 
asserted he did not possess, and therefore could not have discarded, the 42 rocks of 
cocaine.  By denying the factual assertions made in the police report—that he 
possessed and discarded the cocaine—defendant established “a reasonable 
inference that the [reporting] officer may not have been truthful.”  (People v. 
Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 418.) 
 
In the Court of Appeal’s view, defendant’s showing fell short by not 
providing a plausible factual foundation for his allegations of officer misconduct.  
Referring to a dictionary definition, the court stated that “ ‘[p]lausible’ means 
‘seemingly true’ ” and “denotes a degree of reasonable probability, a degree of 
apparent credibility greater than mere possibility.”  The Court of Appeal, in effect, 
concluded that to establish good cause for Pitchess discovery a defendant must 
show not only that the proposed factual scenario when “[v]iewed in conjunction 
with the police reports” will support his allegations of officer misconduct (Santa 
 
 
12
Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 86), but also a reasonable probability that the 
defendant’s version of events actually occurred. 
 
According to the Court of Appeal, defendant’s factual scenario was “not 
objectively plausible.”  It reasoned that his possessing only $2.75 when arrested 
was materially inconsistent with his story that he was on the scene to buy, not to 
sell, cocaine and that he brought an empty baggie to hold his purchase.  The Court 
of Appeal also noted that “[o]ther undisputed facts add to the implausibility of the 
scenario” defendant had asserted.  Questioning why a person other than defendant 
would have discarded the 42 rocks of cocaine in public view, the Court of Appeal 
stated:  “[I]t defies belief that a person would have followed” the fleeing defendant 
pursued by officers “in order to discard the cocaine in [defendant’s] proximity, in 
the middle of a street.” 
 
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that defendant’s factual scenario was 
implausible turns on assumptions lacking any factual basis or relies on inferences 
it drew that went beyond the facts as described in the police report and in defense 
counsel’s declaration.  Defense counsel’s declaration asserted that the true seller 
tossed the cocaine as defendant ran past the seller “who was not running.”  The 
police report stated that two officers pursued defendant as he ran down the 
sidewalk and that he discarded the cocaine as he started to run across a street.  But 
neither the police report nor defense counsel’s declaration described the discarded 
cocaine as having been found “in the middle of the street,” as the Court of Appeal 
asserted. 
 
Defense counsel’s declaration in support of the Pitchess motion, the 
parties’ argument at the hearing on the motion, and the police report make no 
mention of the street price of a single rock of cocaine the size of the 42 pieces 
recovered, which together weighed only 0.10688 of an ounce.  The Court of 
Appeal questioned why, if defendant was buying cocaine, he had so little cash.  
 
 
13
One could just as well question why, if defendant was selling 42 rocks of cocaine, 
he had only $2.75 in his pockets with which to make change for his customers.  
Nor is it unlikely that in an area described by the officers as one of “blatant” 
narcotics sales, someone other than defendant might discard 42 rocks of cocaine to 
avoid being found in possession of a saleable quantity of drugs. 
 
Having decided that defendant had too little cash to buy cocaine and that 
only he would have discarded the rocks of cocaine in question, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that defendant’s factual scenario was implausible, not because 
his version of events could not have occurred, but because in the court’s view that 
version of events was unlikely.  In doing so, the Court of Appeal elevated the 
showing of good cause for Pitchess discovery beyond that required by law. 
 
To show good cause as required by section 1043, defense counsel’s 
declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to 
the pending charges.  The declaration must articulate how the discovery sought 
may lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment 
evidence (People v. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 417; Larry E. v. Superior 
Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 25, 32-33) that would support those proposed 
defenses.  These requirements ensure that only information “potentially relevant” 
to the defense need be brought by the custodian of the officer’s records to the 
court for its examination in chambers.  (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 1216; Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84.) 
 
Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario supporting the 
claimed officer misconduct.  That factual scenario, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the 
police report.  In People v. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 410, a defendant 
facing a charge of felony evasion of arrest brought after a high-speed automobile 
chase sought Pitchess discovery of whether the pursuing officer had “a history of 
 
 
14
misstating or fabricating facts” in police reports.  (Id. at p. 416.)  In support of the 
motion, the defense declaration denied that defendant had driven in the way or 
along the route described by the officer.  (Id. at p. 417.)  Presiding Justice Ardaiz, 
writing for the Court of Appeal in Hustead, concluded that the defendant had met 
his burden of making “an initial showing that the information he is seeking is 
material to the case at hand.”  (Id. at p. 416.)  In other words, defense counsel’s 
declaration in Hustead made allegations sufficient to “establish a plausible factual 
foundation” for a defense that the defendant did not drive in the fashion described 
in the police report and that the officer’s report was untrue.  (Id. at p. 417.) 
 
In other cases, the trial court hearing a Pitchess motion will have before it 
defense counsel’s affidavit, and in addition a police report, witness statements, or 
other pertinent documents.  The court then determines whether defendant’s 
averments “[v]iewed in conjunction with the police reports,” and any other 
documents suffice to “establish a plausible factual foundation” for the alleged 
officer misconduct and to “articulate a valid theory as to how the information 
sought might be admissible” at trial.  (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 86.)  
Although a Pitchess motion is obviously strengthened by a witness account 
corroborating the occurrence of officer misconduct, such corroboration is not 
required.  What the defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer 
misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.  (Santa 
Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 86; Haggerty v. Superior Court, supra, 117 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.) 
 
A Pitchess motion need not, however, provide a motive for the alleged 
officer misconduct.  We do not require the prosecutor to prove motive at trial in 
order to obtain a conviction.  (CALJIC No. 2.51.)  It would be anomalous to 
require a criminal defendant to do so in order to obtain discovery.  Moreover,  
 
 
15
because most defendants will only be able to postulate an officer’s motive for 
misconduct, to require every defendant to demonstrate a motive would require 
most of them “to allege with particularity the very information” they seek to 
discover.  (People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 684.)  Imposing a motive 
requirement would be contrary to the principles of discovery and would, in most 
instances, require defense counsel to engage in rank speculation.  
 
The question remaining is this:  What degree or quantity of justification 
must the moving party offer to establish a plausible factual foundation for the 
claim of officer misconduct?  Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that to be 
plausible a factual foundation must be reasonably probable or apparently credible 
and not merely possible.  In so doing, the Court of Appeal imposed a greater 
burden on the party seeking Pitchess discovery than required by our prior cases or 
the statutory scheme.  To require a criminal defendant to present a credible or 
believable factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct suggests that the 
trial court’s task in assessing a Pitchess motion is to weigh or assess the evidence.  
It is not.  A trial court hearing a Pitchess motion normally has before it only those 
documents submitted by the parties, plus whatever factual representations counsel 
may make in arguing the motion.  The trial court does not determine whether a 
defendant’s version of events, with or without corroborating collateral evidence, is 
persuasive—a task that in many cases would be tantamount to determining 
whether the defendant is probably innocent or probably guilty.  (See People v. 
Johnson, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.) 
 
Moreover, a credibility or persuasiveness standard at the Pitchess discovery 
stage would be inconsistent with the statutory language and with our previous 
decisions requiring only that defense counsel’s affidavit or declaration supporting 
a defendant’s Pitchess motion be made on information and belief.  (§ 1043, subd. 
(b)(3); People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226; Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 
 
 
16
at pp. 86-89; Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 395.)  As we 
have previously noted, the legislative history of section 1043 shows that the 
“Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement” that counsel’s 
affidavit be made on personal knowledge.  (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 
pp. 88-89, original italics.)  Because defense counsel would only rarely be present 
when the alleged officer misconduct occurred, counsel has little information to 
offer based on counsel’s personal knowledge. 
 
What standard must a moving party meet to show a “plausible” factual 
foundation for the Pitchess discovery requested?  We conclude that a plausible 
scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred.  Such a 
scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct 
that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges.  
A defendant must also show how the information sought could lead to or be 
evidence potentially admissible at trial.  Such a showing “put[s] the court on 
notice” that the specified officer misconduct “will likely be an issue at trial.”  
(Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 86.)  Once that burden is met, the defendant 
has shown materiality under section 1043. 
 
To determine whether the defendant has established good cause for in-
chambers review of an officer’s personnel records, the trial court looks to whether 
the defendant has established the materiality of the requested information to the 
pending litigation.  The court does that through the following inquiry:  Has the 
defense shown a logical connection between the charges and the proposed 
defense?  Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific and 
tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct?  Will the requested Pitchess 
discovery support the proposed defense, or is it likely to lead to information that 
would support the proposed defense?  Under what theory would the requested 
information be admissible at trial?  If defense counsel’s affidavit in support of the 
 
 
17
Pitchess motion adequately responds to these questions, and states “upon 
reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or 
information from the records” (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3)), then the defendant has 
shown good cause for discovery and in-chambers review of potentially relevant 
personnel records of the police officer accused of misconduct against the 
defendant. 
 
Here, defendant’s version of events is plausible given the factual scenario 
described in defense counsel’s declaration.  The declaration asserted that the 
officers mistook defendant for the person who actually discarded the cocaine, and 
falsely accused him of having done so.  The scenario described in defense 
counsel’s declaration is internally consistent; it conflicts with the police report 
only in denying that defendant possessed any cocaine and that he was the one who 
discarded the rocks of cocaine found on the ground.  Those denials form the basis 
of a defense to the charge of possessing cocaine for sale.  Thus, defendant has 
outlined a defense raising the issue of the practice of the arresting officers to make 
false arrests, plant evidence, commit perjury, and falsify police reports or probable 
cause.  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220 [overbroad discovery 
request is properly narrowed by the trial court to misconduct similar to that 
alleged]; People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 681-683 [“evidence that the 
interrogating officers had a custom or habit of obtaining confessions by violence, 
force” or threats would be admissible to support a coerced confession claim].)  
Defendant has established the relevance of such information to his pending trial 
(see, e.g., People v. Gill (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 743, 750 [prior complaints that 
arresting officer fabricated probable cause and planted evidence were material to 
defense that drugs were planted on a defendant changed with drug possession]), 
and having advanced a basis for admitting it into evidence at trial, he has shown its 
materiality. 
 
 
18
 
To summarize, defendant has established good cause for Pitchess 
discovery, entitling him to the trial court’s in-chambers review of the arresting 
officers’ personnel records relating to making false arrests, planting evidence, 
fabricating police reports or probable cause, and committing perjury.  In other 
words, defendant has “satisfied the criteria for discovery under section 1043, 
subdivision (b),” thus entitling him to a determination of relevance under the 
provisions of section 1045.  (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 93.)  Section 1045 
requires in-chambers record review by the trial court, permits that court to issue an 
order protecting the officer against “unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or 
oppression” (subd. (d)), and requires the trial court to limit the use of any records 
that are disclosed.  By doing so, the section maintains a balance between the 
officer’s legitimate privacy interests and the criminal defendant’s constitutionally 
guaranteed right to a fair trial.  (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to issue a writ of mandate consistent with 
the views we have expressed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
Defendant’s arrest took place in a location known for “blatant use and sales 
of narcotics.”  Police arrived on the scene.  They targeted defendant, and 
defendant began to run, the police in close pursuit.  Then, according to defendant’s 
Pitchess1 affidavit, some unknown person spilled 42 rocks of cocaine at 
defendant’s feet as he ran past.  Defendant was arrested in possession of an empty 
baggie and $2.75.  Nevertheless, his affidavit asserted he was in the area to 
purchase, not to sell, narcotics.  Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal found 
defendant’s story that someone else spilled the cocaine utterly unconvincing.  And 
no wonder.  When the lion culls the slowest, weakest, or unluckiest from the herd, 
the other gazelles run a safe distance and then return to grazing.  No gazelle 
commits suicide by flinging itself in the lion’s path.  These behaviors are 
instinctive, and we encounter them in our everyday experiences.  When freeway 
commuters who are traveling faster than the posted speed limit spot a police 
cruiser in their rearview mirrors, they slow inconspicuously, avoiding any sudden 
changes that might draw police attention.  When the police flashers are activated 
and one commuter is pulled over, the others breathe a sigh of relief and gradually 
return to cruising speed.  People no more than animals invite calamity when fate 
has already selected another victim. 
The majority concedes that a defendant must set forth a “plausible factual 
foundation” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 86 (City 
of Santa Cruz)) to support a discovery motion under Evidence Code section 1043, 
                                              
1 
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. 
 
2 
subdivision (a), but the majority then deprives the term “plausible” of any 
substantive content by holding that a defendant satisfies this requirement so long 
as his version of the facts “could have occurred” and is “internally 
consistent.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)  “Plausible,” however, implies something 
more than mere internal consistency.  (See, e.g., People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 835, 869-870 [using “plausible” to mean believable]; People v. Cash 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 724 [using “plausible” to mean reasonably believable]; 
People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123-1124 [using “plausible” to mean 
believable]; People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 244 [using “plausible” to 
mean persuasive]; In re Cudjo (1999) 20 Cal.4th 673, 695-696 [using “plausible” 
to mean believable]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 645 [using “plausible” 
to mean reasonably believable]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1138 
[same].)  I admit that plausibility in the Pitchess context might mean something 
less than believable or persuasive.  It certainly does not require circumstances that 
are probable or likely, and a trial judge ruling on a discovery motion should not 
predetermine issues that are ultimately for the trier of fact.  The judge nevertheless 
must exercise some discretionary judgment, especially when, as here, the 
defendant’s factual assertions are highly unlikely and, though related to matters 
within the personal knowledge of the defendant, they are made by his attorney on 
information and belief, rather than by the defendant directly, thereby shielding the 
defendant from perjury.  At the very least, an assertion that runs counter to 
experience, nature, logic, and reason should be rejected—even if it is technically 
possible. 
Defendant’s affidavit claimed he was at the location to purchase narcotics.  
That claim is patently absurd.  The majority concedes that 42 rocks of cocaine 
were strewn on the ground near where defendant had been running and that 
defendant was arrested holding an empty plastic baggie.  Nevertheless, the 
 
3 
majority credits defendant’s unlikely assertion that someone else—the real 
seller—spilled the cocaine just as defendant happened to run past.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 12.)  The majority also admits defendant had only $2.75 with which he 
could make his narcotics purchase.  (Ibid.)  More precisely, defendant had a $1 bill 
and seven quarters, and he possessed no paraphernalia for consuming narcotics.  
In the course of many years of studying criminal records, I have never encountered 
a case in which (a) a drug purchaser brought his own baggie, and (b) narcotics 
were sold on the street in $1 or $2 increments, making defendant’s story very 
doubtful.  The majority responds that defendant’s lack of money just as readily 
undermines the conclusion that he was selling narcotics because, with so little 
money, he could not make change for his customers.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  
Anyone, however, who has walked around the neighborhood in which this court 
has its San Francisco office knows that narcotics are sold with a simple 
handoff:  narcotics for cash. 
The majority’s credulity with respect to defendant’s unlikely assertions 
completely shifts the careful balance the Legislature struck between the rights of 
defendants to reasonable discovery and the privacy interests of police officers.  I 
would hold that, because defendant failed to establish a “plausible factual 
foundation” for his discovery motion (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 
86), the trial court was correct to deny the motion, and the Court of Appeal was 
also correct to deny the petition for a writ of mandate. 
 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Warrick v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 107 Cal.App.4th 1271 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115738 
Date Filed: June 2, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Stephen A. Marcus 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Leslie Ringold and Mark G. Harvis, Deputy Public 
Defenders, for Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Cheryl J. Ward and Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorneys, 
Kim Rodgers Westhoff, Martin R. Boags and Michelle S. Wright, Deputy City Attorneys, for Real Parties 
in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
MarkG. Harvis 
Deputy Public Defender 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 590 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3056 
 
Kim Rodgers Westhoff 
Deputy City Attorney 
500 City Hall East 
200 North Main Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 978-8024