Title: City of Cotati v. Cashman

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/29/02 (publish Supreme Ct. opinions filed 8/29/02 in the following order: Equilon Enterprises, City 
of Cotati, and Navellier.) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF COTATI, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S099999 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 1/2 A092242, A092868 
GENE CASHMAN et al., 
) 
 
) 
Sonoma County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. SCV222677 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
We must decide in this case whether a municipality’s state court action for 
declaratory relief respecting the constitutionality of a mobilehome park rent 
stabilization ordinance, filed in response to a federal court declaratory relief action 
brought by park owners respecting the same ordinance, constitutes a strategic 
lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP)1 within the purview of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16; the anti-SLAPP statute).  We conclude 
it does not.2 
                                             
 
1  
The acronym was coined by Penelope Canan and George W. Pring, 
professors at the University of Denver.  (See generally Canan & Pring, Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (1988) 35 Soc. Probs. 506.) 
2  
This case has two companions.  (See Navellier v. Sletten (Aug. 29, 2002, 
S095000) __ Cal.4th __; Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. 
(Aug. 29, 2002, S094877) __ Cal.4th __ (Equilon).)  We granted review in this 
trio of cases in order to maximize the clarity and guidance respecting application 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2
BACKGROUND 
 
In 1998, the City of Cotati (City) adopted a mobilehome park rent 
stabilization program.  (Cotati Ord. No. 680, adding ch. 19.14 to Cotati Mun. 
Code.)  After City enacted the program, Gene Cashman and others, owners of 
mobilehome parks (collectively Owners), sued City in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California.  Owners sought declaratory relief, an 
injunction, and damages allegedly resulting from City’s ordinance.  In requesting a 
declaratory judgment, Owners alleged that “the following question [is] in actual 
controversy between the parties:  Whether [City] effects an uncompensated 
regulatory taking by implementing and enforcing the rent-restriction Ordinance, in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.” 
 
Subsequently, City sued Owners in Sonoma County Superior Court.  City’s 
complaint outlined a cause of action for declaratory relief.  City alleged that “An 
actual controversy has arisen and now exists between [City] and [Owners] relative 
to their respective rights and duties in that [City] contends that the [mobilehome 
park rent stabilization] ordinance and resolution are valid and enforceable, both on 
their face and as construed by [City].  On the other hand, [Owners] contend that 
said ordinance, on its face is unenforceable, invalid, and void as effecting an 
unconstitutional taking . . . .”  On information and belief, City also alleged that 
Owners contended the ordinance effected a taking in violation of the California 
Constitution.  City sought a judgment “declaring the respective rights and duties of 
the parties under the ordinance in question and that the ordinance is constitutional, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
of the anti-SLAPP statute the full group of decisions may provide to bench and 
bar. 
 
3
valid, and enforceable on its face and as applied to [Owners].”  After the state 
court action was filed, City filed a motion in federal court asking that Owners’ 
action be dismissed on abstention grounds.  (Younger v. Harris (1971) 401 U.S. 
37.) 
 
Owners shortly thereafter moved in state court, under the anti-SLAPP 
statute, to strike City’s complaint.  Owners argued that City’s filing of its state 
court action arose from Owners’ filing of their earlier federal action and, therefore, 
fell within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.  As evidence that City’s state court 
action was a SLAPP, Owners pointed to references in City’s complaint to Owners’ 
contention in the federal action that City’s ordinance constituted a taking. 
 
City concedes that its purpose in filing the state court action was to gain a 
more favorable forum in which to litigate the constitutionality of its mobilehome 
park rent stabilization ordinance.  Certain potentially applicable state law 
decisions on mobilehome park rent regulation, City notes, were favorable to its 
position in the underlying dispute.  (See Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of 
Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784; Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of 
Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542.)  City also concedes that in filing the state 
court action it intended subsequently to seek to persuade the federal court to 
abstain from hearing Owners’ suit. 
 
The trial court ruled in favor of Owners on the anti-SLAPP motion.  Noting 
that City’s action was filed shortly after Owners’ federal action, involved “the 
exact contention” made by Owners therein, and named only Owners as 
defendants, the trial court concluded Owners had, at the outset, carried their 
burden to show that the action “arose out of [Owners’] right of petition under the 
U.S. Constitution as defined in [section 425.16].”  (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  
Having concluded that Owners had carried their initial burden, the trial court 
considered whether City had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claim.  
 
4
Concluding City had not, the trial court granted Owners’ anti-SLAPP motion and 
ordered City’s action dismissed.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  We granted 
Owners’ petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 425.16 provides, inter alia, that “A cause of action against a person 
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition 
or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court 
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (Id., subd. (b)(1).)  “As used in this section, 
‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 
States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes:  
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or 
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
official proceeding authorized by law . . . .”  (Id., subd. (e).) 
 
Owners in their petition asked us to address two issues—whether a 
defendant in order to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion must demonstrate that the 
targeted action was intended to chill the defendant’s free speech or petition rights; 
and whether a moving defendant must show that the action had the effect of 
chilling such rights.  We conclude that defendants moving under the anti-SLAPP 
statute have neither burden.  Nevertheless, because City’s action arose from the 
underlying controversy respecting the validity of City’s ordinance rather than from 
Owners’ federal lawsuit, we further conclude that City’s action was not subject to 
a special motion to strike under section 425.16. 
 
5
 
A. 
Intent to Chill 
 
City states that it filed this action in an attempt to obtain a more favorable 
forum than federal court in which to litigate the constitutionality of its 
mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance.  “City’s initial goal was to use the 
state action to persuade the federal court to abstain in favor of the state 
proceeding.”  City in fact filed a motion in federal district court asking that the 
federal action be dismissed on a number of grounds, including abstention in favor 
of the state action.  “A secondary, alternative goal,” City claims, “was to try to 
obtain a quick favorable decision upholding the Ordinance which then could be 
used for res judicata purposes in the federal court.”  Owners argue that City’s real 
intention in filing this action went beyond the desire for a favorable forum.  
Owners speculate City actually “hoped to discourage [Owners] from continuing to 
litigate by burdening them with defending a new, costly, and duplicative lawsuit in 
a second jurisdiction.” 
 
Whether City’s subjective motivations for filing this action were, in reality, 
primarily as City describes them, or primarily in accordance with Owners’ 
speculation, cannot be ascertained with certainty from the record.  As Owners 
ultimately concede, “City’s subjective intent . . . will probably never be known.”  
Fortunately, the question of subjective intent is not relevant.  As discussed in 
detail in Equilon, supra, __Cal.4th __, the anti-SLAPP statute, construed in 
accordance with its plain language, incorporates no intent-to-chill pleading or 
proof requirement.  (Id. at pp. ___ [pp. 3-14].)  Consequently, a defendant who 
meets its burden under the statute of demonstrating that a targeted cause of action 
is one “arising from” protected activity (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)) faces no additional 
requirement of proving the plaintiff’s subjective intent.  (Equilon, supra, at pp. __, 
__ [pp. 13-14, 15].) 
 
6
 
B. 
Chilling Effect 
 
The same considerations of law and policy, generally, that bar judicial 
imposition on the anti-SLAPP statute of an intent-to-chill proof requirement bar 
judicial imposition of a chilling-effect proof requirement.  (See Equilon, supra, __ 
Cal.4th at pp. ___ [pp. 3-14]; see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & 
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 (Briggs) [rejecting judicial imposition 
of a “public interest” proof requirement].)  Here, as in Equilon, supra, __ Cal.4th 
__, the plain language of the statute and indicia of legislative intent preclude any 
such requirement. 
 
Thus, section 425.16 nowhere states that, in order to prevail on an anti-
SLAPP motion, a defendant must demonstrate that the cause of action complained 
of has had, or will have, the actual effect of chilling the defendant’s exercise of 
speech or petition rights.  Nor is there anything in section 425.16’s operative 
sections implying or even suggesting a chilling-effect proof requirement.  Since 
section 425.16 neither states nor implies such a requirement, for us judicially to 
impose one—as City suggests we should—would violate the foremost rule of 
statutory construction.  When interpreting statutes, “we follow the Legislature’s 
intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . . .  ‘This 
court has no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed 
intention which is not expressed.’ ”  (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. 
of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632-633.) 
 
Legislative intent as gleaned from legislative history materials is consistent 
with this interpretation.  “Legislative history materials respecting the origins of 
section 425.16 indicate the statute was intended broadly to protect, inter alia, 
direct petitioning of the government and petition-related statements and writings—
that is, ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 
executive, or judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) or ‘in connection with 
 
7
an issue under consideration or review’ (id., subd. (e)(2)) by such.”  (Briggs, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1120.)  “The fact the Legislature expressed a concern in the 
statute’s preamble with lawsuits brought ‘primarily’ to chill First Amendment 
rights does not mean that a court may add this concept as a separate requirement in 
the operative sections of the statute.”  (Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club 
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 480.)  Indeed, “[a]ny such requirement would be ‘too 
restrictive’ [citation] in light of the Legislature’s unqualified desire to ‘encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance’ (§ 425.16, subd. (a)).”  
(Equilon, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. __ [pp. 6-7].) 
 
In short, section 425.16 expressly “defines the types of claims that are 
subject to the anti-SLAPP procedures” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 
1083, 1087), i.e., causes of action arising from any act of protected speech or 
petitioning as these terms are defined in subdivision (e)(1)-(4) of the statute.  The 
Legislature included no limitation relating to chilling effect.  Our imposing one, 
therefore, not only would contravene the Legislature’s express command that 
section 425.16 be “construed broadly” (id., subd. (a)), it would compromise the 
Legislature’s deliberately expansive remedial design.  (See Equilon, supra, __ 
Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 7].) 
 
Finally, here as in Equilon, imposing a chilling-effect proof requirement 
would deprive of anti-SLAPP protection petitioning that is absolutely privileged 
under the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) whenever a moving 
defendant could not separately prove that the targeted cause of action actually has 
chilled, or will chill, protected speech.  “It is a fundamental rule of statutory 
construction that statutes should be construed to avoid anomalies.”  (State of South 
Dakota v. Brown (1978) 20 Cal.3d 765, 775.)  We previously have adhered to that 
rule in construing the anti-SLAPP statute (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1121; see 
also Equilon, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. ___ [pp. 11-12]), and we do so here as well.   
 
8
 
In sum, judicial imposition of a chilling-effect proof requirement would 
contradict the anti-SLAPP statute’s plain language, undermine the Legislature’s 
expressed intentions, and create anomalies.  The statute contains no such 
requirement.   
 
C. 
“Arising From” 
 
As explained more fully in Equilon, supra, __ Cal.4th __, section 425.16 
requires that a court engage in a two-step process when determining whether a 
defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be granted.  First, the court decides 
whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of 
action is one “arising from” protected activity.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)   If the 
court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider whether the 
plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.  (See generally 
Equilon, supra, at pp. ___ [pp. 14-15].)  As will appear, defendant Owners in this 
case failed to meet their threshold burden of demonstrating that City’s action is 
one arising from Owners’ protected speech or petitioning. 
 
It is indisputably true, as the trial court observed, that City’s action was 
filed shortly after Owners filed their claim in federal court.  But the mere fact an 
action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose from that 
activity.  The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be read to mean that “any claim asserted 
in an action which arguably was filed in retaliation for the exercise of speech or 
petition rights falls under section 425.16, whether or not the claim is based on 
conduct in exercise of those rights.”  (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 
Cal.App.4th 993, 1002; see also Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1114 [“arise from” 
means “based upon”].) 
 
While City’s complaint repeatedly refers to the underlying subject matter of 
Owners’ federal action (i.e., the mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance and 
arguments respecting its validity), it contains no reference to the action itself.  
 
9
California courts rightly have rejected the notion “that a lawsuit is adequately 
shown to be one ‘arising from’ an act in furtherance of the rights of petition or free 
speech as long as suit was brought after the defendant engaged in such an act, 
whether or not the purported basis for the suit is that act itself.”  (ComputerXpress, 
Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.)   
To construe “arising from” in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as meaning 
“in response to,” as Owners have urged, would in effect render all cross-actions 
potential SLAPP’s.  We presume the Legislature did not intend such an absurd 
result.  (See generally People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 912, fn. 7.)  
Absurdity aside, to suggest that all cross-actions arise from the causes of action in 
response to which they are pled would contravene the statutory scheme governing 
cross-complaints.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c) [defining “related 
cause of action”]; id., § 426.30 [compulsory cross-complaints]; id., § 428.10 
[permissive cross-complaints].)  The Legislature expressly has provided that a 
cross-action may “arise[] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges” (id., 
§ 426.10, subd. (c); see also id., § 428.10, subd. (b)(1)), rather than out of that 
cause of action itself.  Indeed, Owners’ counsel, when arguing before the trial 
court, acknowledged City’s action could not be a SLAPP if City had filed it as a 
counterclaim3 in Owners’ federal action. 
                                             
 
3  
Terminology respecting cross-actions differs in California and federal 
courts.  “In 1971 the Legislature rewrote the provisions relating to cross-actions 
(Stats. 1971, ch. 244), dictating that a complaint meant a complaint or cross-
complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10), thus [technically] eliminating the 
counterclaim by transforming those cross-actions which were formerly 
counterclaims into cross-complaints.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.80.)”  (Bertero v. 
National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52, fn. 2.)  The Federal Rules of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10
 
Nor do Owners persuasively distinguish responsive litigation, generally.  
The anti-SLAPP statute, itself, treats complaints identically with cross-complaints.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (h).)  Just as a cross-complaint often “arises out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of 
action which the plaintiff alleges” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c); see also 
id., § 428.10, subd. (b)(1)), so may a responsive but independent lawsuit arise 
from the same transaction or occurrence alleged in a preceding lawsuit, without 
necessarily arising from that earlier lawsuit itself.  (See Church of Scientology v. 
Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651.) 
 
Owners also have complained that City filed its lawsuit tactically, so that 
they would be “forced . . . to bear the expense and burden of simultaneously 
litigating two different legal actions in two different jurisdictions.”  But City’s 
subjective intent, as discussed, is not relevant under the anti-SLAPP statute.  As a 
corollary, a claim filed in response to, or in retaliation for, threatened or actual 
litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute simply because it may be viewed 
as an oppressive litigation tactic.  (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 924 (Kajima).)  That a cause of 
action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail that 
it is one arising from such.  To focus on City’s litigation tactics, rather than on the 
substance of City’s lawsuit, risks allowing Owners to circumvent the showing 
expressly required by section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) that an alleged SLAPP 
arise from protected speech or petitioning.  (Kajima, supra, at p. 933, fn. 7.)4 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Civil Procedure continue to refer to “counterclaims.”  (See generally Fed. Rules 
Civ. Proc., rule 13, 28 U.S.C.) 
4  
Contrary to Owners’ implication, thus to emphasize the anti-SLAPP 
statute’s express requirements does not leave litigants confronting meritless, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
11
 
In short, the statutory phrase “cause of action . . . arising from” means 
simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself 
have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.  (See 
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001, and cases 
cited.)  In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause 
of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of 
petition or free speech.  (Equilon, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. ___ [pp. 15-16]; see 
also Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1114.)  “A defendant meets this burden by 
demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the categories 
spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e) . . . .”  (Braun v. Chronicle 
Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043; see also Wilcox v. Superior 
Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 820.)   
 
D. 
Application 
 
What activity or facts underlie the City’s cause of action for declaratory 
relief?  “The fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an actual, 
present controversy over a proper subject.”  (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 
1997) Pleading, § 817, p. 273.)  Owners inaccurately state that “City has 
acknowledged that its only basis for alleging an actual controversy . . . was the fact 
that the park owners had previously sued the City in federal court.”  In fact, City 
has argued only that Owners’ federal court action informed City of the existence 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
retaliatory countersuits without a remedy.  “If a [defendant or] cross-defendant 
believes that a [responsive complaint or] cross-complaint has been filed ‘for an 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation,’ or that the claims against it are frivolous or 
lacking in evidentiary support, then it may move for sanctions, including attorney 
fees and other expenses, to be awarded in the trial court’s discretion.”  (Kajima, 
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 934, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7.) 
 
12
of an actual controversy justifying declaratory relief, not that Owners’ federal 
action, itself, constituted that controversy.  City has consistently taken the position 
that the actual controversy with respect to which it seeks declaratory relief is the 
same as the controversy with respect to which Owners earlier sought declaratory 
relief in federal court—i.e., the controversy over the constitutionality of City’s 
mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance.  And while the courts below have 
drawn different conclusions from the fact, both have recognized that the gravamen 
of City’s state court action is the same as that of Owners’ federal court action.   
 
That the constitutionality of an ordinance can be a proper subject for 
declaratory relief is without doubt.  “An action for declaratory relief lies when the 
parties are in fundamental disagreement over the construction of particular 
legislation, or they dispute whether a public entity has engaged in conduct or 
established policies in violation of applicable law.”  (Alameda County Land Use 
Assn. v. City of Hayward (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1723.) 
 
In deciding whether the “arising from” requirement is met, a court 
considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts 
upon which the liability or defense is based.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)  Examination 
of the relevant papers in this case confirms City’s contention that its action alleges 
the existence of a controversy—and seeks a declaration—respecting the validity of 
City’s mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance.  City alleged in its complaint, 
as mentioned, that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between 
plaintiff and defendants relative to their respective rights and duties in that 
plaintiff contends that the ordinance and resolution are valid and enforceable, both 
on their face and as construed by plaintiff.”  In moving to strike City’s action as a 
SLAPP, Owners pointed to this same allegation.  Three of the four supporting 
affidavits submitted by Owners purport to demonstrate only that Cotati’s 
mobilehome parks were in compliance with City’s ordinance; they contain no 
 
13
reference whatsoever to Owners’ federal lawsuit.  The other affidavit, by Owners’ 
counsel in the federal action, purports to demonstrate that City, after filing its state 
court action, moved to dismiss the federal action on abstention grounds, a point 
City does not dispute.  The only materials City lodged in opposition to the anti-
SLAPP motion were cases tending to support the validity of the rent stabilization 
ordinance.  And in its briefing, City reiterated that it was “merely . . . seeking a 
resolution of the controversy” underlying both lawsuits. 
 
The distinction City invokes between Owners’ federal court action on the 
one hand and the controversy underlying that action (as well as City’s own action) 
on the other is not an ephemeral or merely formalistic one.  The requirement that 
plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief allege “the existence of an actual, present 
controversy” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 817, p. 273) would be 
illusory if a plaintiff could meet it simply by pointing to the very lawsuit in which 
he or she seeks that relief.  Obviously, the requirement cannot be met in such a 
bootstrapping manner; “a request for declaratory relief will not create a cause of 
action that otherwise does not exist.”  (Mallenbaum v. Adelphia Communications 
Corp. (E.D.Pa., Dec. 29, 1994, Civ. A No. 93-7027) 1994 WL 724981, *6, fn. 9, 
affd. 74 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1996).)  Rather, “an actual, present controversy must be 
pleaded specifically” and “the facts of the respective claims concerning the 
[underlying] subject must be given.”  (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 819, 
p. 275; see City of Alturas v. Gloster (1940) 16 Cal.2d 46, 48.) 
 
In this case, as the Court of Appeal stated, a dispute exists between the 
parties over the constitutionality of Cotati Ordinance No. 680.  And just as 
Owners’ lawsuit itself was not the actual controversy underlying Owners’ request 
for declaratory relief in federal court, neither was that lawsuit the actual 
controversy underlying City’s state court request for declaratory relief.  Rather, the 
actual controversy giving rise to both actions—the fundamental basis of each 
 
14
request for declaratory relief—was the same underlying controversy respecting 
City’s ordinance.5  City’s cause of action therefore was not one arising from 
Owners’ federal suit.  Accordingly, City’s action was not subject to a special 
motion to strike. 
 
In view of our conclusion that City’s cause of action did not arise from 
Owners’ federal suit, we do not reach the anti-SLAPP statute’s secondary question 
whether City “established that there is a probability that [City] will prevail on the 
claim” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)).  In any event, while the parties in their briefs on 
the merits argued the point, neither the petition for review nor the answer to the 
petition for review requested that we address that issue.    
                                             
 
5  
Thus, as the trial court correctly noted, City’s “action references the history 
of the enactment of Ordinance No. 680 . . . and then states that an actual 
controversy exists between plaintiff and defendants in that plaintiff contends that 
the ordinance is valid whereas defendants contend that the ordinance is void . . . .  
This described contention of the plaintiff is the exact contention made by the 
defendants in their first cause of action of the federal lawsuit . . . .”  Unfortunately, 
the trial court went on to reason, fallaciously, that, since the two lawsuits reference 
the same underlying controversy, the second arose out of the first. 
 
15
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
MORENO, 
J.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
I concur in the judgment.  For the reasons offered in part C, the City of 
Cotati’s suit did not arise from the owners’ suit.  (See also Navellier v. Sletten 
(Aug. 29, 2002, S095000) ___ Cal.4th ___, ___ (dis. opn. of Brown, J. at  
pp. __-__) [pp. 4-7].)  Accordingly, the majority’s other grounds are dicta, which 
we need not address. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
2 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Cotati v. Cashman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 90 Cal.App.4th 796 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S099999 
Date Filed: August 29, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sonoma 
Judge: Laurence K. Sawyer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Endeman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater, Donald R. Lincoln, Henry E. Heater. Linda B. Reich; Walter & Pistole 
and Jeffrey A. Walter for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Pacific Legal Foundation, R. S. Radford, Meriem L. Hubbard and Harold E. Johnson for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Law Office of James J. Moneer and James J. Moneer as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Levy, Ram, Olson & Rossi, Karl Olson; Karlene W. Goller; Harold W. Fuson, Jr.; and Thomas W. Newton 
for California Newspaper Publishers Association, Los Angeles Times and Copley Press, Inc., as Amici 
Curiae. 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Henry E. Heater 
Endeman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater 
600 B Street, Suite 2400 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 544-0123 
 
R. S. Radford 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
10360 Old Placerville Road, Suite 100 
Sacramento, CA  95827 
(916) 362-2833 
 
James J. Moneer 
Law Office of James J. Moneer 
1901 First Avenue, First Floor 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 544-9151