Title: Leonard Northup v. Howard W. Acken, M.D., P.A.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-2435
____________
LEONARD NORTHUP,
Petitioner,
vs.
HERBERT W. ACKEN, M.D., P.A.,
Respondent.
[January 29, 2004]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Herbert W. Acken, M.D., P.A. v.
Northup, 827 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), which certified conflict with the
decision in Gardner v. Managed Care of Boca Raton, Inc., 831 So. 2d 676 (Fla.
4th DCA 2002).  We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const., and quash
the decision below.  
Facts and Procedural History
The instant discovery dispute arose within an action for medical malpractice
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filed by the petitioner, Leonard Northup, alleging that the respondent, Dr. Herbert
Acken, failed to diagnose a cancerous tumor which resulted in the death of
petitioner’s wife.  See Acken, 827 So. 2d at 1071.  Pursuant to the trial court’s
pretrial case management order, the petitioner submitted a witness and exhibit list
to the court, which included Dr. Michael Dillon as an expert witness, in November
of 2000.  See id.  In the process of litigation preparation, the respondent's
attorneys gathered deposition testimony Dr. Dillon had previously given in
unrelated civil actions.  Subsequently, the petitioner served a Request for
Production upon respondent which sought copies of the deposition testimony
transcripts possessed by defense counsel.  See id.  The respondent filed an
objection to this request, asserting that the depositions requested were exempt
from disclosure under the attorney work product doctrine.  See id.  The petitioner
then moved to compel production, requesting that the trial court order the
respondent to produce the entirety of the depositions and sworn statements of Dr.
Dillon in the possession of defense counsel.  See id.  
Although not in the district court’s opinion, the record reveals that during
the hearing on the motion to compel, it was the specifically stated position of
defense counsel that Dr. Dillon had been deposed in this case and that the defense
intended to impeach him during trial with the use of the deposition transcripts
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defense counsel had previously secured but refused to disclose.  Defense counsel
asserted that he was entitled to, and intended to, use the deposition transcripts to
impeach Dr. Dillon during trial but the defense was not required to disclose or
produce the transcripts until during the trial when the transcripts would be actually
used.  It was defense counsel's position that the petitioner was not entitled to
information concerning the prior depositions or copies of the transcripts until after
the impeachment occurred during trial.
Following this hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the petitioner’s
motion and ordered the respondent to produce copies of the depositions and other
documents.  Thereafter, Dr. Acken filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
Second District arguing that disclosure of the deposition transcripts would reveal
counsel’s mental impressions regarding the relative importance of various issues at
trial as well as counsel’s strategy for trial, and thereby invade the work product of
counsel.  Counsel specifically took the position that he was not required to
produce the depositions even if he used them as impeachment at trial and
specifically attempted to distinguish Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704 (Fla.
1980).
Dr. Acken relied on Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co., 632 So. 2d 696
(Fla. 3d DCA 1994), for the proposition that the collected deposition transcripts
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were protected from disclosure as attorney work product, even though the defense
intended to use them at trial for impeachment.  The Second District agreed and
quashed the trial court’s order, but certified conflict with Gardner,831 So. 2d at
676, writing:
The facts of the case at bar may be closer to those in Gardner 
than those in Smith because there must be a “finite” number of 
depositions that Dr. Dillon has given in prior cases.  However, we
question whether Smith and Gardner can be reconciled.  We adopt the
rationale in Smith, and, applying that rationale here, conclude that the 
group of Dr. Dillon’s prior depositions that Dr. Acken’s counsel has
collected to impeach Dr. Dillon is attorney work product, which is not
subject to disclosure.  To the extent that Gardner would dictate a
contrary result, we certify conflict.
Acken, 827 So. 2d at 1072.  This Court granted review on March 20, 2003.  See
Northup v. Acken, 842 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2003) (table).
Analysis
In its 1947 opinion in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the United
States Supreme Court originated what has become known as the "attorney work
product privilege."  With words which have not lost their poignancy, the Court
concluded:
In performing his various duties, . . . it is essential that a lawyer work
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel.  Proper preparation of a client's
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and
1.  This Court first recognized the work product doctrine and privilege in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Allen, 40 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1949).
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plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.  That is the
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to
protect their clients' interests.  This work is reflected, of course, in
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways--aptly though roughly termed . . . the "work product
of the lawyer."  Were such materials open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten.  An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would
not be his own.  Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation
of cases for trial.  The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing.  And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served.
Id. at 510-11.  In accordance with this reasoning, the United States Supreme Court
established the "privacy of [an attorney's] professional activities," id. at 513, and
foreclosed discovery of materials created by an attorney in preparation for
litigation absent "adequate reasons to justify production."  Id. at 512.
This Court's decision in Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So. 2d 108 (Fla.
1970), provides the established bedrock principles applicable in considering the
attorney work product privilege in Florida.1  In Surf Drugs, this Court addressed
interrogatory questions, but expressed the broad balancing considerations involved
in the discovery and litigation process.  This court recognized:
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A primary purpose in the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure is to prevent the use of surprise, trickery, bluff and legal
gymnastics.  Revelation through discovery procedures of the strength
and weaknesses of each side before trial encourages settlement of
cases and avoids costly litigation.  Each side can make an intelligent
evaluation of the entire case and may better anticipate the ultimate
results. 
Surf Drugs, 236 So. 2d at 111.  In placing the work product protection within the
scope of discovery, the Court stated:
What constitutes "work product" is incapable of concise
definition adequate for all occasions.  Generally, those documents,
pictures, statements and diagrams which are to be presented as
evidence are not work products anticipated by the rule for exemption
from discovery.  Personal views of the attorneys as to how and when
to present evidence, his evaluation of its relative importance, his
knowledge of which witness will give certain testimony, personal
notes and records as to witnesses, jurors, legal citations, proposed
arguments, jury instructions, diagrams and charts he may refer to at
trial for his convenience, but not to be used as evidence, come within
the general category of work product.
Id. at 112 (emphasis supplied).  Pertinent to the instant action is the holding in
Surf Drugs that the scope of the attorney work product privilege protection is
specifically bounded and limited to materials which are not intended for use as
evidence or as an exhibit at trial.  See id. at 112.
This precept was recognized, expanded upon, and specifically enunciated in
our later decision in Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1980).  In addressing
the petitioner's contention that surveillance video recordings in the possession of
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the respondent were discoverable and not protected under the work product
privilege, this Court made the following potent statement:
Any work product privilege that existed . . . ceases once the materials
or testimony are intended for trial use.  More simply, if the materials
are only to aid counsel in trying the case, they are work product.  But,
if they will be used as evidence, the materials . . . cease to be work
product and become subject to an adversary's discovery.
Id. at 707.  Thus, in accordance with Surf Drugs and Dodson, we reiterate our
dedication today to the principle that in Florida, when a party reasonably expects
or intends to utilize an item before the court at trial, for impeachment or otherwise,
the video recording, document, exhibit, or other piece of evidence is fully
discoverable and is not privileged work product.
In essence, Florida litigants must make a simple and discrete decision prior
to entry of a pretrial case management order by the trial court.  An attorney must
evaluate whether he or she intends to use evidence in his or her possession for
strategy and trial preparation purposes only, which would qualify the selection of
the particular items as a protected product of the thought processes and mental
impressions of an attorney.  On the other hand, if the evidence or material is
reasonably expected or intended to be disclosed to the court or jury at trial, it must
be identified, disclosed, and copies provided to the adverse party in accordance
with the trial court's order and the discovery requests of the opposing party.
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The instant case is clearly governed by this principle.  At the hearing before
the trial court regarding the instant discovery dispute, Dr. Acken's attorney
specifically submitted the following argument:
There's no procedure that says that a party is entitled to get
impeachment materials which are not evidence before trial.  That's
obviously work product.
. . . .
These are depositions which are going to be used for impeachment. 
They're not evidence at trial.  So therefore they don't go on a witness
list, they don't have to be produced to the other side.  Classic
impeachment materials would be these depositions.  That's why
there's no case law on this topic because clearly this is protected by
work product privilege and should not be produced.
The clearly erroneous position of the respondent in the trial court was that he was
totally free to use depositions at trial and read portions thereof in the presence of
the jury without ever disclosing the depositions until the impeachment actually
occurred during trial.  We conclude and specifically announce today that all
materials reasonably expected or intended to be used at trial, including documents
intended solely for witness impeachment, are subject to proper discovery requests
under Surf Drugs, Dodson, and a host of lower court decisions, and are not
protected by the work product privilege.  Florida's dedication to the prevention of
"surprise, trickery, bluff and legal gymnastics," Surf Drugs, 236 So. 2d at 111, at
trial holds no exception for impeachment materials.  Indeed, approval of the
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arguments submitted by the respondent would bring great harm upon and
undermine the idea that in this State, litigants are entitled to evaluate "the strength
and weaknesses of each side before trial" and have the ability to "make an
intelligent evaluation of the entire case . . . [to] better anticipate the ultimate
results."  Id.  Trial by ambush is distant history, and it is clear that respondent had
knowledge of the materials that would actually be used at trial.
In its decision below, the Second District concluded that the trial court's
order compelling production of a discernible group of documents gathered by
counsel "departed from the essential requirements of the law."  Acken, 827 So. 2d
at 1071.  The panel relied heavily upon Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co., 632
So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), and concluded "that the group of Dr. Dillon's
prior depositions that Dr. Acken's counsel has collected to impeach Dr. Dillon is
attorney work product, which is not subject to disclosure."  Id. at 1072.  We
approve this reasoning to the extent that it reiterates our longstanding
jurisprudence regarding work product, as expressed in this opinion.
However, the Second District's analysis of the instant case cannot be
approved solely within a "discovery vacuum."  We note that the court declined to
2.  In a footnote, the Second District stated, “While the parties discussed the
possible use of the depositions for impeachment at trial, the issue of whether such
use is proper is not before us and we do not address it.”  Acken, 827 So. 2d at
1071 n.1.
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address the expected and intended use of Dr. Dillon's depositions at trial,2 and
instead examined an academic question: whether the gathering and review of Dr.
Dillon's depositions could be protected as attorney work product.  We agree that
work product privilege could protect the depositions at issue from discovery, but
only if the respondent never expected or intended to use them for impeachment at
trial.  Dodson and other decisions demand that evidence reasonably expected or
intended for trial use be produced when requested.  As noted above, the
respondent in this case clearly intended to use portions of the depositions during
trial.  Thus, the Second District's decision is erroneous to the extent that it could
be interpreted to insulate these depositions and preclude discovery until the actual
testimony of Dr. Dillon is presented at trial. 
On the other hand, we do not approve the broad sweep of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's decision in Gardner v. Manor Care of Boca Raton, Inc.  The
district court's approval in Gardner of an order requiring "counsel to 'cull' through
various surveys and personnel files to determine which ones are relevant," 
Gardner, 831 So. 2d at 678, an action which the court admitted "may indicate
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counsel's strategy," id., goes entirely too far.  The overriding touchstone in this
area of civil discovery is that an attorney may not be compelled to disclose the
mental impressions resulting from his or her investigations, labor, or legal analysis
unless the product of such investigation itself is reasonably expected or intended
to be presented to the court or before a jury at trial.  Only at such time as the
attorney should reasonably ascertain in good faith that the material may be used or
disclosed at trial is he or she expected to reveal it to the opposing party.  Because
the Fourth District's Gardner decision conflicts with this principle, we must
disapprove that portion of the opinion requiring counsel to evaluate the
comparative relevance of documents for purposes of an opponent's discovery.
Conclusion
In accordance with the above analysis and conclusions, we quash the
decision under review, Herbert W. Acken, M.D., P.A. v. Northup, 827 So. 2d 1070
(Fla. 2d DCA 2002), but approve the reasoning to the extent that it reiterates the
principles espoused in this opinion, and disapprove the portion of Gardner v.
Managed Care of Boca Raton, Inc., 831 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), that is
inconsistent with this opinion.  Although not directly addressed by the Second
District, we also explicitly hold that if attorney work product is expected or
intended for use at trial, it is subject to the rules of discovery.  Therefore, we also 
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approve the order entered by the trial judge in this case and remand the instant
cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL,
JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Second District - Case No. 2D02-1166
(Polk County)
Scott M. Whitley of Morgan, Colling and Gilbert, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Richard E. Ramsey and Michael R. D'Lugo of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy,
Graham & Ford, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Respondent