Title: Steven Stubbs v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTES:   Stubbs v. State, No. 86, September Term, 2007
                                                                                                                                             
CRIMINAL LAW; CONSOLIDATED THEFT STATUTE; THEFT OF
PROPERTY OR SERVICES WITH A VALUE OF LESS THAN $100: Unless a
defendant has been specifically charged with theft under $100, (1) the defendant cannot
be convicted of that offense, (2) a conviction for theft under $500 does not require proof
that the defendant stole property or services worth at least $100, and (3) the penalty for
theft under $100 does not limit the sentence that can be imposed on the defendant
convicted of theft under $500.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 86
September Term, 2007  
                                                                              
STEVEN STUBBS
    
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
         *Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Cathell, Dale R.  (Retired, specially
assigned),
JJ.
                                                                              
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                              
Filed:    September 9, 2008
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, she also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
By Chapter 130, Acts of 2004, Maryland’s Consolidated Theft Statute was
amended to add the offense of theft of property or services with a value of less than $100
(“theft under $100").  It is clear from the legislative history that this offense was created
(in the words of the FLOOR REPORT of Senate Bill 513, which was passed by the
General Assembly and signed by the Governor on April 27, 2004) “in an attempt to keep
some relatively minor theft-related cases before the District Court.”  It is also clear that
the General Assembly intended that, unless this new offense was specifically charged by
the State, the offense of theft under $100 would not be a lesser included offense of theft
of property or services with a value of less than $500 (“theft under $500").  The following
provisions have been “on the books” since October 1, 2004: 
Section 7-104(g) of the Criminal Law Article, in pertinent part, provides:
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this
subsection, a person convicted of theft of property or
services with a value of less than $500, is guilty of a
misdemeanor and:
(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 18
months or a fine not exceeding $500 or both; and
(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or
pay the owner the value of the property or services.
(3) A person convicted of theft of property or services with
a value of less than $100 is guilty of a misdemeanor and:
(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 90 days
or a fine not exceeding $500 or both; and
(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or
pay the owner the value of the property or services.
***
Section 7-103 of the Criminal Law Article, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) “Value” defined. — In this section, “value” means:
2
(1) the market value of the property or service at the time and
place of the crime; or
(2) if the market value cannot satisfactorily be ascertained, the
cost of the replacement of the property or service within a
reasonable time after the crime.
***
(e) When value cannot be determined. — (1) For the purposes
of determining whether a theft violation subject to either § 7-
104(g)(1) or (2) of this subtitle has been committed, when it
cannot be determined whether the value of the property or
service is more or less than $500 under the standards of this
section, the value is deemed to be less than $500.
(2) For the purposes of determining whether a theft violation
subject to either § 7-104(g)(2) or (3) of this subtitle has been
committed, when it cannot be determined whether the value
of the property or service is more or less than $100 under the
standards of this section, the value is deemed to be less than
$100.
Section 7-108 of the Criminal Law Article, in pertinent part, provides:
(d) Lesser included crime status not available unless charged.
— Unless specifically charged by the State, theft of property
or services with a value of less than $100 as provided under §
7-104(g)(3) of this subtitle may not be considered a lesser
included crime of any other crime.  
Section 7-110(b)of the Criminal Law Article, in pertinent part, provides:
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of theft of property or
services with a value of less than $100 as provided under § 7-
104(g)(3) of this subtitle that the value of the property or
services at issue is $100 or more.
The case at bar presents the question of whether the 2004 amendments had the 
unintended consequences of (1) requiring the State to prove that a defendant charged only
3
with theft under $500 stole at least $100 worth of property or services, or (2)  limiting the
maximum sentence that can be imposed on a defendant convicted of theft under $500
when the evidence presented at trial establishes that the stolen property was worth less
than $100.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that if a defendant has not been
specifically charged with theft under $100, (1) the defendant cannot be convicted of that
offense, (2) a conviction for theft under $500 does not require proof that the defendant
stole property or services worth at least $100, and (3) the penalty for theft under $100
does not limit the sentence that can be imposed on the defendant convicted of theft under
$500.
Background  
In the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Anne Arundel County, Steven Stubbs,
petitioner, was charged by Uniform Criminal Citation with the crime of theft of property
with a value of less than $500.  The citation issued to petitioner contained the following
assertions:
It is formally charged that [petitioner] on October 12,
2006 at 4:09 p.m. at Home Depot, 66 Mountain Rd. Glen
Burnie, Anne Arundel County, Maryland did steal property of
Home Depot having a value $139.86 less than $500, in the
violation of CL 7-104 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.  
All events occurred in Anne Arundel County.
Petitioner was convicted in the District Court, noted a timely appeal, and received
a de novo trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  During the Circuit Court
4
proceeding, the State’s case consisted of a single witness -- Mr. Frank Blume, a Home
Depot loss prevention officer, who testified that he saw petitioner steal a set of wrenches. 
The prosecutor did not ask Mr. Blume any questions about the value of the wrenches. 
The following transpired at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief:
[Defense counsel]:
At this time I would like to make a motion for
judgment of acquittal in this matter.  It’s a sole
count of theft under $500.  Your Honor, I do not
believe that the State’s Attorney, I realize even
though in the light most favorable to the State at
this time, I don’t believe that they have met
their burden of proof.
I would draw the Court’s attention that
under 7-103, determination of value, there was
no value presented here today in this case at all. 
Not once did the witness testify as to what the
value of the wrenches were.  Specifically, it
says if a value can’t be determined if it’s a theft
under that would be, and I’m looking at three,
7-103(3)(e) and it does under when value
cannot be determined and then it lists basically
when it’s the theft, or the value of the property
is more or less than $500 under the standard
section it’s deemed to be less than $500 and
again then --
THE COURT:
Could you say that again, more slowly, please.
[Defense counsel]:
Sure.  It says when the value cannot be
determined for purposes of determining whether
a theft violation is subject to 7-104(g)(1) or
(g)(2), which would be the general theft
provision of theft under $500 and theft under
$100, it indicates that whether the value of the
property or service is more or less than $500
under the standards of this section the value is
5
deemed to be less than $500.
Then it goes on to subsection (2) and it
says for purposes of determining whether a theft
violation is subject again to the same 7-
104(g)(2) or (3), which excuse me would then
be the theft under $100, it’s then whether the
value of the property or service is more or less
than $100 under the standard of this section, the
value is deemed to be less than $100. 
Not at any time did the witness testify as
to what the value was of the wrench set, Your
Honor.  And I don’t believe they’ve met their
burden of proof.
***
[The Prosecutor]:
Your Honor, he’s only charged with theft under
$500.  This is not for the felony.  So by not
showing any value it is deemed to be the
misdemeanor and not the felony, which of
course he’s not even charged with that.
So I would argue to the Court that I
didn’t have to show a value for the charge that
he’s charged with.
After the Circuit Court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal,
petitioner’s trial counsel called Mr. Blume as a defense witness, and “rested” after Mr.
Blume testified that the stolen property was “worth $69.93.”  The following transpired at
this point:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would renew again a motion and
evidence I presented in a motion for judgment
of acquittal in the statements made. . . in regards
to determination of value, I will draw the
6
Court’s attention again to 7-103.
***
THE COURT:
7-103(e)?
[Defense counsel]:
Yes.  (e) and then (1) and then also (2).
THE COURT:
7-103(e).  Okay.  (e) When it cannot be
determined whether the value of the property or
service is more or less than $500, under the
standards of this section the value is deemed to
be less than $500.  Okay.
[Defense counsel]:
And then subsection (2) of that as well.
***
THE COURT:
Okay.  For the purpose of determining whether
a theft violation subject to either 7-104(g)(2) or
(3) of this subtitle have been committed, when it
cannot be determined whether the value of the
property or service is more or less than $100,
under the standards of this section the value is
deemed to be less than $100.
7-104(g)(2) and (3) is, oh, okay.  What is your
argument?
[Defense counsel]:
Your Honor, in subsection 7-104(g)(2) and
(g)(3), (g)(2) relates to theft under $500 and
(g)(3) relates to theft under $100.  We feel that
it’s been improperly charged, although it is up
to the officer with the initial citation, the State’s
attorney, the prosecutor is the one who
prosecutes this case.  They are the ones who did
the charging document.  They are the ones who
make the final decision.  And oftentimes as this
Court is well aware, charges in District Court
become different charges if they’re forwarded to
Circuit Court.  
7
At times, different state’s attorneys will
view it differently.  What I’m saying to this
Court is that the value of this one wrench set
that was turned back to Home Depot was
$69.93, that’s the testimony we have from Mr.
Frank Blume, clearly under $100.
So Your Honor, based on the fact that
this charges theft under $500 I don’t think the
State has met its burden of proof in establishing
that.  It should have been charged as theft under
$100. . . . I don’t believe the State has met its
burden beyond a reasonable doubt to find
[appellant] guilty of theft under $500.  And we
would ask this Court to dismiss this case.
***
THE COURT:
All right.  Well on your argument that they have
incorrectly charged, assuming that the charging
document is just the one count of theft under
$500, actually I’m not assuming that, State
you’ve indicated that’s the case.
And my reading of the statute is that
anything under $500, any amount, even $2 or $3
you would be able to charge theft under $500.
And then going back to your previous
argument under subsection (e), I would simply
say that this is not a case where [no one] can
determine what the value of the property is.  In
fact, the defense has put in the value of the
property as $69.  So those sections wouldn’t
apply.
So I would deny your request to dismiss
the case on that basis.
The record shows that petitioner’s trial counsel requested that the court “give him
8
a suspended sentence[,]” but did not argue that, because the set of wrenches was worth
less than $100, petitioner was subject to imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or a fine not
exceeding $500, or both.  The Circuit Court imposed an 18 month sentence, with all but
12 weekends suspended on condition that petitioner successfully complete a period of 3
years probation.  Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in which he
presented this Court with a single question: 
May a Defendant be convicted of and punished for Theft
under Five-Hundred Dollars under Md. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann., § 7-107(g)(2) when the value established for the stolen
property is under one-hundred dollars and may the court
impose a sentence in excess of that authorized for the charge
of Theft under One-Hundred Dollars under Md. Crim. Proc.
Code Ann., § 7-104(g)(3)? 
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Discussion
The issues presented in the case at bar require that we interpret the above quoted
provisions of the Consolidated Theft Statute.  In Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 924 A.2d
1175  (2007), this Court stated:
Our goal, when interpreting statutes, is to “identify and
effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at
issue.” Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 662, 887 A.2d 549, 553
(2005); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327, 872 A.2d 681, 685
(2005); Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483
(2000); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 -58, 862 A.2d 419, 425
(2004); Graves v . State, 364 Md. 329, 345, 772 A.2d 1225,
1235 (2001). See also Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 148-49,
626 A.2d 946, 951 (1993) (“‘[T]he search for [legislative]
intent is most accurately described as an effort to discern
9
some general purpose, aim, or policy of the statute.’”); In re
Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992);
Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991)
(“Our focus is, therefore, centered upon the statute’s policy or
purpose.”). The best source of legislative intent is the statute’s
plain language, and when the language is clear and
unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Gilmer, 389
Md. at 663, 887 A.2d at 553; Cain, 386 Md. at 327, 872 A.2d
at 685; Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; Drew, 379
Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672,
659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1,
6-7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993). “In the interest of
completeness, however, we may look at the purpose of the
statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain
language with that which results when the purpose of the
statute is taken into account.” Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137,
146, 626 A.2d 94 6, 950 (1993). See also Robey v. State, 397
Md. 449, 454, 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007); Stanley v. State, 390
Md. 175, 185, 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005). In other words,
the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is
not undertaken to seek contradiction of the plain meaning of
the statute. Robey, 397 Md. at 454, 918 A.2d at 502; Stanley,
390 Md. at 185, 887 A.2d at 1084. In such instances, we may
find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory
scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant
enactments. Robey, 397 Md. at 454, 918 A.2d at 502. 
Id. at 578-79, 924 A.2d at 1182.
I.  
We hold that, under the plain language of the Consolidated Theft Statute, a
defendant charged with theft under $500 -- but not charged with theft under $100 -- is not
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State has failed to establish that
the defendant stole property worth at least $100.  This holding is confirmed by the
following legislative history.  
10
The 2004 amendments to the Consolidated Theft Law resulted from the Report and
Recommendations filed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Jury Trial Prayers (the Horne
Committee) in November of 2003, the Introduction of which included the following
background information:
In May 2003, the Conference of Circuit Judges
requested that Chief Judge Bell form an ad hoc committee to
examine the issue of jury trial prayers emanating from the
District Court.  As a result, the Chief Judge formed a
committee chaired by Judge William S. Horne, Circuit Court
for Talbot County[.]
* * *
Jury trial demands from the District Court is not a new
issue and one that has been the subject of on-going concern
and discussion in Maryland for 25 years.
•
September 1978, Karwacki Committee to Study
Supreme Bench Caseload Increase
* * *
•
October 1987, Ciotola Committee on District Court
Jury Trial Prayers
* * *
•
1996 Commission on the Future of Maryland Courts 
* * *
•
2002, The Article 27 Revision Committee
unsuccessfully proposed legislative changes in
penalties associated with certain misdemeanor offenses
for purposes of retaining jurisdiction in the District
Court.
11
The Committee Deliberations and Recommendations section of the Horne
Committee’s Report and Recommendations included the following recommendations:
Enhanced Prosecutorial Discretion
While the committee recognized that if the State had
fuller discretion for charging in certain misdemeanors and
serious traffic cases might result in more of these matters
being resolved at the District Court level, it found itself
divided on an appropriate approach.  The committee
recommended in a 6 to 4 vote to establish a penalty dichotomy
of “A” and “B” categories for certain misdemeanors with one
carrying the present statutory penalty, and the other limiting
the penalty to less than 90 days imprisonment and/or a fine of
less than $500 . . . .  Such a dichotomy not only will enable
individual State’s Attorney’s Offices to evaluate and screen
these cases, but it will rest this authority with an elected
official accountable directly to the constituency within a
political subdivision.  The committee’s recommendation will
require legislation to enact the proposed change. 
Review of Criminal Penalties
[T]he committee recommended consideration for a
reduction of certain penalties below the jury right threshold. 
Specifically, the committee supported the establishment of a
3rd degree assault category excluding domestic violence and
theft/bad check under $100.  With respect to the question that
the exclusion of domestic violence from the establishment of
a 3rd degree assault may violate equal protection, Judge Horne
provided the committee with a letter of advice from the Office
of the Attorney General indicating that such an exclusion
would be constitutional (Appendix VIII - Letter of Advice). 
This recommendation will require legislation to enact the
proposed changes.
The FLOOR REPORT on Senate Bill 513 includes the following information:
12
SUMMARY OF BILL:
The bill establishes new sentencing penalties and procedures
for certain existing theft, bad check, and credit card offenses,
where the value of the goods, services, and other property
involved in the offense is less than $100. 
***
A person convicted of these offenses with a value of less than
or not exceeding $100 (depending on the offense) is guilty of
a misdemeanor and is subject to a maximum penalty of 90
days imprisonment and/or a $500 fine.  
 ***                                                 
Unless specifically charged by the State, these offenses may
not be considered a lesser included crime of any other crime.
 ***
BACKGROUND:
This bill is one of several that the Maryland Judicial
Conference requested be introduced in the 2004 session in an
effort to reduce the number of jury trials held in circuit court. 
 ***                                                
Jury demands have again increased significantly. . . . 
Consequently, at the request of the Conference of Circuit
Judges, Chief Judge Bell of the Court of Appeals established
an ad hoc committee, chaired by Judge William S. Horne, to
study the issue and recommend possible solutions.  Unlike the
previous committees that studied this issue, which were
composed almost exclusively of judges, this committee
included representatives of all sectors of the criminal justice
system. 
13
Our holding is also consistent with Waye v. State, 231 Md. 510, 191 A.2d 428
(1963), in which this Court reaffirmed the proposition that the giving of a worthless check
may be prosecuted under either the False Pretenses Act (then, Art. 27, § 140) or under the
Worthless Check Act (then, Art. 27, § 142).  Id. at 516.  In the case at bar, because the
State was not required to prove that the stolen wrench set was worth at least $100, the
evidence was sufficient to support petitioner’s conviction for theft under $500.
We also hold that, pursuant to § 7-108 of the Criminal Law Article, unless a
defendant charged with theft under $500 is also specifically charged with theft under
$100, the trial court is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction for theft under
$100.  This holding is consistent with People v. Campbell, 104 Cal.App. 4th Supp. 1
(2002), in which the appellate division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court held
that the trial court was not authorized to reduce a misdemeanor charge of petty theft to an
infraction.  Id. at 3.  
Under § 490.1(a) of the California Penal Code, the theft of property worth $50 or
less “may be charged as a misdemeanor or an infraction, at the discretion of the
prosecutor, provided that the person charged with the offense has no other theft or theft-
related conviction.”  An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment.  In Campbell, the
defendant was charged with a misdemeanor, but -- over the prosecutor’s objection -- the
trial court reduced the charge to an infraction.  The appellate court reversed that ruling
and remanded for further proceedings, stating:
1 Although this argument was not presented to the Circuit Court, the issue of
whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence can be raised for the first time in an
appellate court.  Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985).  
14
If the Legislature had intended to empower the trial
court to override the discretionary power that it specifically
bestowed only upon the prosecutor with respect to section
490.1, it would have said so.  
Id. at 6.
In the case at bar, the Circuit Court was correct in finding petitioner guilty of theft
under $500 because, under § 7-108 of the Criminal Law Article, the defendant who has
not been specifically charged with theft under $100 cannot be convicted of that offense.  
II.
Petitioner argues in the alternative that, when the evidence establishes that the
stolen property has a value of less than $100, the defendant convicted of theft under $500 
cannot receive a more severe penalty than the penalty for a conviction of  theft under
$100.1  According to petitioner, this argument is controlled by Waye, supra, in which this
Court also decided several questions that arose as a result of a 1955 amendment to the
Worthless Check Act that reduced -- to a fine of not more than $50 or imprisonment for
not more than 18 months, or both -- the maximum penalties that could be imposed on a
person who used a worthless check to obtain property valued at less than $100.  The Waye
Court stated:
Did the amendment of § 142 amend, by implication, § 140 to
15
the extent that when a worthless check is involved and the
value of the property obtained is less than $100, then the
prosecution must be under § 142 and not under § 140?  Did
the Legislature intend to limit the penalty under the above
circumstances if the prosecution be brought under § 142, but
permit the higher penalty (up to ten years, and contrary to the
above-quoted provisions of § 142), if, under identical facts,
the prosecution be brought under § 140?  These questions
must be answered in deciding the case.
Repeals by implication are not favored.  The
amendment of § 142, in 1955, did not, we think, amend by
implication § 140 to the extent that if a worthless check be
involved and the property obtained be valued at less than
$100, the prosecution is limited to § 142.  We, therefore, hold
that under such circumstances the prosecution may, as
heretofore, be brought under either section.  However, we do
not believe that the Legislature intended to create such an
anomalous and incongruous situation as to limit the penalty,
when a worthless check and property valued at less than $100
are involved, to $50 and eighteen months’ confinement when
the prosecution is under § 142, but to permit a much higher
and more severe penalty under identical facts simply because
someone decides to bring the prosecution under § 140.  We,
therefore (without considering possible constitutional aspects
that a contrary ruling might produce), hold that the
amendment of § 142 in 1955 amended, or modified, § 140 to
the extent that when there is a conviction under § 140 for the
giving of a worthless check and the property obtained is
valued at less than $100, the maximum penalty that may be
imposed is a fine of $50 and eighteen months’ imprisonment. 
Compare Chapter 616 of the Acts of 1961, Section 109 (13).
The above means that the convictions in these cases
where the property obtained was less than $100 in each case
will be sustained, but the cases will be remanded without
affirmance or reversal, so that proper sentences may be
imposed (said sentences to be whatever the trial judge deems
meet and proper, not, however, to exceed a $50 fine and
eighteen months’ imprisonment).  
16
Id. at 516-17.  Petitioner argues (in the words of his brief): 
The “constitutional aspects” here of allowing the trial
judge’s ruling and sentence to remain intact are significant. 
The trial judge’s holding would grant prosecutors the
unfettered discretion to charge under two provisions of § 7-
104(g) having identical elements but different penalties.  This
type of unchecked discretion presents very real equal
protection and due process concerns under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as under
Articles 5 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
We are persuaded, however, that the prosecutorial discretion expressly authorized
by the General Assembly does not deny either due process or equal protection to persons
who steal property that has a value of less than $100.  
In the case at bar, unlike the situation in Waye, there can be no doubt about what
the Legislature intended.  It is certain that, by enacting § 7-108 of the Criminal Law
Article, the Legislature intended to limit the penalty for theft under $100 only when the
defendant has been specifically charged with that offense.  As to the “possible
constitutional aspects” that we did not consider in Waye, in United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198 (1979), the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected
the argument that if two statutes (1) proscribe the very same conduct, and (2) require the
very same elements of proof, a defendant convicted of violating either statute can only be
sentenced to the maximum penalty under the more lenient statute.  
In Batchelder, a previously convicted felon was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Southern Division of Illinois of receiving a firearm in interstate
17
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and was sentenced to imprisonment for
five years.  On appeal, the defendant argued “that his constitutional rights were violated
because he received a five-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) whereas the identical
offense is proscribed by 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), which carries a lesser penalty.” 
United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1978).  A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with that argument, and
remanded for resentencing.  The majority opinion stated:  
Defendant’s argument is that two statutes that proscribe the
same offense and require identical proof cannot subject an
offender to different penalties. . . .  We . . . conclude that it is
impermissible to sentence a defendant for five years under
Section 922(h) when he could receive only a two-year
maximum sentence under Section 1202(a).
Id. at 629.  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the sentence imposed by the District Court.  United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198 (1979).  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall
stated:
That Congress intended to enact two independent gun
control statutes, each full enforceable on its own terms, is
confirmed by the legislative history of the Omnibus Act.
***
This Court has long recognized that when an act
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may
[prosecute] under either so long as it does not discriminate
18
against any class of defendants.  
***
The Court of Appeals acknowledged this “settled rule”
allowing prosecutorial choice.  581 F.2d at 632. 
Nevertheless, relying on the dissenting opinion in Berra v.
United States, 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013
(1956), the court distinguished overlapping statutes with
identical standards of proof from provisions that vary in some
particular.  581 F.2d at 632-633.  In the court’s view, when
two statutes prohibit “exactly the same conduct,” the
prosecutor’s “selection of which of two penalties to apply”
would be “unfettered.”  Id., at 633, and n.11.  Because such
prosecutorial discretion could produce “unequal justice,” the
court expressed doubt that this form of legislative redundancy
was constitutional.  Id., at 631.  We find this analysis factually
and legally unsound.
. . . .   [A] decision to proceed under § 922(h) does not
empower the Government to predetermine ultimate criminal
sanctions.  Rather, it merely enables the sentencing judge to
impose a longer prison sentence than § 1202(a) would permit
and precludes him from imposing the greater fine authorized
by § 1202(a).  More importantly, there is no appreciable
difference between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when
deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with
different elements and the discretion he exercises when
choosing one of two statutes with identical elements.  In the
former situation, once he determines that the proof will
support conviction under either statute, his decision is
indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context. 
The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available
upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give
rise to violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clause. . . .   Just as a defendant has no constitutional right to
elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the
basis of his indictment and prosecution neither is he entitled
to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be
sentenced.
2 The legislation that established the District Court included a provision that
prohibited the State from “demanding” a jury trial in any criminal or traffic case.  That
prohibition currently appears in § 4-302(e)(iii) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.  Under Md. Rule 4-246(a), “in the circuit court. . . , the State may not elect a trial
by jury.”
19
442 U.S. at 119-125, 99 S.Ct. at 2204-05.  
We recognize that a penalty scheme that does not violate the federal constitution
may nonetheless violate Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In the case at
bar, however, we hold that Justice Marshall’s analysis in Batchelder is applicable to
petitioner’s Article 24 argument.  To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with this
Court’s holding in Lloyd v. State, 219 Md. 343, 149 A.2d 369 (1959).
Before the District Court of Maryland was established in 1971, because of
statutory limitations on sentences that could be imposed by a justice of the peace, by a
magistrate, and/or by a judge of the Municipal Court for Baltimore City, a prosecutor’s
“choice of forum” could determine the maximum sentence for certain offenses that could
have been -- but need not have been -- tried before courts of limited jurisdiction.  
In Lloyd, supra, the appellant was convicted of assaulting his wife and was
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of eighteen months.  Although the appellant was
originally charged with this offense in magistrate’s court, the State prayed a jury trial,2
and the case was transferred to the Criminal Court of Baltimore.  Before this Court, the
appellant argued that the sentence imposed by the Criminal Court of Baltimore was
“illegal” because (1) he was originally charged in magistrate’s court, and (2) under § 410
20
of the Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, if he had been convicted in that
court,  the maximum sentence that could have been imposed was a fine not exceeding
$100 or imprisonment not exceeding one year.  This Court rejected that argument, stating:
The sentence for the assault and battery on his wife
was not illegal and did not, as the defendant contends, subject
him to cruel and unusual punishment.
* * *
The defendant contends that for the assault and battery
on his wife he should not have been fined more than $100 or
imprisoned in excess of one year instead of the sentence of
eighteen months he received.  Citing Heath v. State, [198 Md.
455, 85 A.2d 43 (1951)], [common law rights are subject to
change by the legislature], he insists that the unlimited
common law penalty for assault and battery was superseded
by the penalty fixed by § 140, supra, as amended.  We do not
agree.
Section 410, supra, as amended, fixed only the
jurisdiction of the police magistrates in Baltimore City and
did not in any way affect, alter or modify the power and
authority of the Criminal Court of Baltimore to impose
punishment for the common law offense of simple assault and
battery.
* * *
[W]e think it is clear that § 140, supra, as amended, did no
more than fix the maximum penalty that a police magistrate
has authority to impose upon a person brought before him
charged with assault and battery.  When the prosecuting
officer prayed a jury trial, as he had a right to do under the
statute, the police magistrate was thereby divested of any
further jurisdiction over the defendant, who, by operation of
law, immediately became subject to the jurisdiction of the
Criminal Court of Baltimore as fully and effectually as if it
21
had acquired jurisdiction originally.  
219 Md. at 351-53, 149 A.2d at 374-75.  
For the reasons stated above, we sustain both the conviction for theft under $500
and the sentence that exceeded the maximum penalty for theft under $100.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED;
PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.