Title: VOSS v. ALBANY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VOSS v. ALBANY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS2003 WY 9474 P.3d 714Case Number: 02-68, 02-101Decided: 08/14/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

MARK 
and  LAURA 
VOSS,

DAVID 
and VIRGINIA MACEY,

 

Appellants(Petitioners),

 

v.

 

ALBANY 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;

KIM 
and PETER STEVENS; RICHARD and

BEVERLY 
GOODMAN,

                                                                                                

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR A

PRIVATE 
ROAD BY MARK & LAURA VOSS:

 

KIM 
and PETER STEVENS,

 

Appellants(Respondents/Cross-Petitioners),

                                                                                                

v.

 

MARK 
and LAURA VOSS

 

Appellees(Petitioners)

and

 

THE 
ALBANY COUNTY BOARD OF

COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS,

 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

 

Representing 
Mark and Laura Voss and David and Virginia Macey:

Mark 
and Laura Voss, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Don W. Riske of Riske & Arnold, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Kim and Peter Stevens and Richard and Beverly Goodman:

Daniel 
B. Frank of Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
the Albany County Board of County Commissioners:

            
No 
brief filed

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and PERRY, 
D.J.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Mark 
and Laura Voss, with co-owners David and Virginia Macey, petitioned the Albany 
County Board of Commissioners (Board) to establish a private road across their 
neighbors' property, as authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 
1999).  The Board, following the 
administrative procedure outlined in the statute, established the road in a 
location other than that requested by the petitioners.  The district court, finding that the 
Board erred in establishing a road that traversed federal property, reversed and 
remanded to the Board for the consideration of an alternate location for the 
road.  The petitioners for the road 
and the respondents through whose land the road was established filed 
cross-appeals.  We conclude that the 
district court's decision should be affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the Board.

 

Issues

 

[¶2]           
The 
petitioners for the private road assert the following 
issues:

 

1.  Did the district court err in remanding 
this matter for a good faith determination, after affirming that the Board had 
jurisdiction to proceed pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101?

 

2.  May the Board establish a private road 
beyond the general location of the road proposed by the 
applicant?

 

3.  May the Board confirm actions of viewers 
that are in violation of W.S. 24-9-101 & 103?

 

4.  May the Board delegate its duty to 
determine the ultimate fact of the reasonableness of the proposed road to the 
viewers?

 

5.  May the Board establish an unreasonable 
and inconvenient road and fail to properly consider the reasonable road 
proposed?

 

6.  May the Board modify the viewers' 
selection of a road?

 

7.  May the Board establish a road that had 
not been marked pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101?

 

8.  Did the Board err when it concluded that 
a determinable easement in gross constituted adequate legally enforceable 
access?

 

9.  May the Board allow its counsel to 
participate as an advocate and de facto hearing officer in proceedings before 
the Board?

 

10.  May the Board fail to enter its own 
findings and conclusions and fail to perform its duties as an 
agency?

 

In 
their cross-appeal, Respondents Kim and Peter Stevens present the issues as 
follows:

 

1.  Does BLM land containing no restrictions 
on use by motor vehicle constitute a public road such that it is not a factor in 
determining whether a landowner's property is landlocked under W.S. § 
24-9-101?

 

2.  If crossing BLM land is a factor, does a 
Right of Way Grant issued by the BLM pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1761 and the regulations at 43 C.F.R. Part 2800, 
which is for a term of 30 years and renewable, constitute "an outlet to, or 
connection with a public road" under W.S. § 24-9-101?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In 
1996, Mark and Laura Voss purchased 151 acres of land near the Buford exit of 
Interstate Highway 80 in Albany County.   Vosses and their predecessors in 
title usually accessed the property from the highway exit, first crossing land 
owned by Richard and Beverly Goodman, then proceeding upon the southern edge of 
the Stevens property, and finally across federal land managed by the Bureau of 
Land Management ("BLM").  This 
access route was referred to below as "the Highway-BLM Road."  An alternative means of access is from 
the Crystal Lake Road, which is east of the Voss property and runs generally 
north and south from the Buford exit.  
This means of access required Vosses to travel westward from Crystal Lake 
Road across the Stevens property before reaching their own land.  This "Creek Road" parallels South Crow 
Creek which effectively bisects the Stevens property but avoids the Goodman and 
BLM properties.  The record shows 
both methods of access were used at times by Vosses and their predecessors in 
title, but no access easements were of record when Vosses purchased their land 
in 1996.

 

[¶4]           
For 
two years after purchasing the property Vosses attempted to secure easements 
from their neighbors in order to formally secure their property access.  In June 1997, the Stevenses tendered to 
Vosses a restricted easement for their portion of the Highway-BLM Road, the 
restriction being that the easement would lapse if Vosses ever conveyed less 
than their entire 151-acre parcel.  
In December 1997, the BLM issued a "Right-of-Way Grant" to Vosses for the 
portion of the route that crossed BLM property.  The grant is for a term of thirty years 
and is renewable if Vosses have not violated its terms at the time of 
renewal.  In February 1998, the 
Goodmans delivered to Vosses an unrestricted easement over their portion of the 
Highway-BLM Road.  This easement was 
recorded February 12, 1998.

 

[¶5]           
In 
March 1998, Vosses offered to purchase an unrestricted easement from the 
Stevenses for the Highway-BLM Road, as well as a separate easement for the Creek 
Road.  Negotiations apparently broke 
down at that point.  Although the 
timing of events is disputed by the parties, the precise chronology is not 
relevant to the issues.  Vosses 
filed with the Board of County Commissioners a notice of intent to petition for 
a private road, while the Stevenses cut off Vosses' access to the Creek Road and 
recorded a copy of the restricted easement for Vosses' use of the Highway-BLM 
Road.  Vosses then filed their 
petition for establishment of a private road in January 1999, claiming that 
their property was landlocked and seeking to establish the Creek Road as a 
private road across the Stevens property.  
Although the only property affected by the Creek Road is the Stevens 
property, Vosses also notified the Goodmans of the private road petition because 
Goodmans hold a mortgage on the Stevens property.

 

[¶6]           
The 
first hearing in the matter was held on March 2, 1999, following which the Board 
made no express factual findings but appointed viewers "to examine the various 
possibilities for access and determine the location of a private road according 
to the requirements set out by the Wyoming Statutes."1  In an April 23, 1999, ruling on a motion 
by Vosses, the Board further instructed the viewers to "proceed to meet as 
required by statute to view and locate a private road and assess damages to be 
sustained thereby, and make a report thereof as required by 
law."

 

[¶7]           
The 
viewers met at the parties' property on May 11, 1999, visited separately with 
the Vosses and Stevenses, and submitted their report to the Board on June 29, 
1999.  They examined both the 
proposed Creek Road and the Highway-BLM Road.  The viewers rejected the Creek Road and 
recommended that the private road be established substantially as the 
Highway-BLM Road existed, with one modification.  The modification would be to move the 
right-of-way where it crossed the Goodman property, to keep it entirely on the 
Goodman property and avoid encroachment on the property of another landowner who 
had not been made a party to the proceeding.  The Board conducted a hearing on August 
2, 1999, at which the parties questioned the viewers and presented arguments to 
the Board.  Following the filing and 
dismissal as unripe of several district court petitions for review, the Board 
issued an "Order Confirming Viewers Report" on March 7, 2000, directing the 
petitioners to prepare and file a formal plat of the modified Highway-BLM 
Road.   The Board accepted the 
plat and issued its final order in the matter on April 17, 2001.  The road established by the Board's 
order was the Highway-BLM Road, with a slight detour to avoid where the road 
encroached on property of an owner who had not been made a party to the 
proceeding.

 

[¶8]           
Petitioners 
and Respondents both petitioned for review of the Board's decision.  The district court concluded that the 
matter should be remanded to the Board, ruling that the Highway-BLM Road did not 
provide the Vosses adequate legal access to their land because the BLM 
Right-of-Way Grant does not provide legally enforceable permanent access.  The district court also instructed the 
Board on remand to make an express determination of Petitioners' good faith in 
bringing the petition in the first instance.  Vosses appealed; Respondents Stevens and 
Goodman filed a cross-appeal.

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶9]           
Appellate 
review of administrative decisions is pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003):

 

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

See 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
2003 WY 22, ¶6, 63 P.3d 887, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003); Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶9, 49 P.3d 163, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002).  Questions of law raised in an 
administrative context are reviewed by this Court de novo.  Sinclair Oil Corp., ¶7; State by and through Dep't of Rev. v. Buggy 
Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001).  When an agency has not applied the 
correct rule of law, we correct the agency's error.  Id.  We recently stated these principles in 
the context of a private road action in Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶10, 28 P.3d 838, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶10]      
In 
reviewing factual issues in an administrative review, as we are required to do 
pursuant to § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), we must determine if there exists substantial 
evidence in the record to support the agency's decision.  Substantial evidence is "relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
the agency."  McTiernon v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, ¶11, 31 P.3d 749, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001). 

 

That 
duty requires a review of the entire record to determine if there is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
decision.  Occasionally, the process 
of review will necessarily require the reviewing court to engage in an 
assessment of the facts adduced during the administrative hearing.  That assessment does not usually involve 
a reweighing or reconsideration of the basic facts found by the agency.  However, as a byproduct of that process, 
the reviewing court may arrive at an ultimate conclusion derived from those 
basic facts that is different from the agency's.  A court will reach a different 
conclusion based on the evidence only in those situations where the agency's 
conclusion is clearly contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.

 

Id. 
at ¶16 (citation and footnote omitted).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]      
Vosses' 
major contention on appeal is that the road established by the Board does not 
provide them with the type of access to their lands guaranteed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-9-101 et seq.  They 
contend the BLM-Highway Road is inadequate for two reasons: it crosses the BLM 
land under a mere license, and the easement across the Stevens property is 
restricted by a condition subsequent. 

 

[¶12]      
The 
private road statute requires the Board to initially conduct a hearing to 
determine "the necessity of the road" petitioned for by "any person whose land 
has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 
1999).  We said in McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980), and affirmed in Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 
(Wyo. 1989), that the "no outlet to, nor connection with" language means "no 
legally enforceable, existing outlet to nor connection with a public road."  Also in Reaves, at 1137, we 
quoted from McIlquham v. Anthony 
Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. 53, 63, 104 P. 20, 22 (Wyo. 1909), that 
the access provided for in the statute must be an  "incorporeal right appurtenant to the 
estate granted, not a personal right or one incident to personal 
property."

 

[¶13]      
The 
BLM was not a party to the private road proceeding, nor has the United States 
waived its sovereign immunity for suits against it by private individuals 
seeking private roads.  Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).  Vosses' right to cross the federal land 
is pursuant to a "Right of Way Grant" which they obtained from the BLM in 
December 1997.  The grant is made 
pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.  The right-of-way grant includes the 
following terms:

 

c.  This instrument shall terminate on 30 
years from its effective date . . . .

 

d.  This instrument may be renewed.  If renewed, the right-of-way or permit 
shall be subject to the regulations existing at the time of renewal and any 
other terms and conditions that the authorized officer deems necessary to 
protect the public interest.

 

Right-of-Way 
Grant/Temporary Use Permit, Serial Number WYW-141561.  The document continues with several 
pages of regulations that are in fact conditions upon the Vosses' right to 
renew.  43 C.F.R. § 2803.6-5 
(1999).  The right-of-way is 
assignable only with the approval of the BLM.  Id. at § 2801.1-1(e).  The right-of-way may be suspended or 
terminated by the BLM upon breach of its terms prior to the expiration of 30 
years.  Id. at § 2803.4(b) - 
(d). Without determining the exact nature of the grant, it is abundantly clear 
that the Vosses' permit is personal to them and does not pass automatically upon 
conveyance of the property. As in Reaves, the permit is not an appurtenant 
right and "therefore, does not constitute an outlet or connection within the 
purview of the statute."  782 P.2d  
at 1137.

 

[¶14]      
Since 
the BLM Road is not adequate under Reaves and the BLM has not made itself 
subject to the Board's jurisdiction, the petition must be remanded to the Board 
for reconsideration in a manner consistent with this decision.  The remand renders many of the issues 
raised by the parties moot; however, we will address some of those issues that 
are likely to recur upon remand.  
McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286.

 

[¶15]      
Several 
of the Vosses' issues relate to the Board's authority to establish a private 
road other than that proposed in the petition.  "The legislature obviously intended to 
allow the applicant to choose the general location of the [proposed] road."  Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 65 (Wyo. 
1997).  However, the statute also 
grants the viewers substantial leeway in locating the 
road:

 

The 
viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road in accordance 
with the application or in such other 
manner and location they deem appropriate, provided the location of the road 
shall not be marked out to cross the lands of any person whose lands were not 
described in the application and who was not given notice of the 
application.

 

§ 
24-9-101 (emphasis added).

 

[¶16]      
The 
legislative history of this section is informative, as the same section until 
1985 did not contain the emphasized language, and the title of the bill amending 
the law that year included in its purpose "authorizing viewers to locate a 
private road other than as indicated in the application . . . ."  1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 56.  Although an applicant may propose 
alternative locations for a road, Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 65, the applicant 
does not have authority to limit the Board to the consideration of one road 
only.  Upon remand, therefore, the 
Board is not constrained to consideration of the Creek Road proposed by the 
Vosses.

 

[¶17]      
Although 
the 1985 version of the law is controlling in this case, it is informative in 
interpreting it that the legislature in 2000 further limited an applicant's 
ability to control the location of a private road when it more expressly 
authorized viewers to propose and commissioners to consider possible 
alternatives to the route proposed by the petitioner, joining additional 
landowners as parties if necessary.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 2001).  

 

[¶18]      
Applicants 
make numerous procedural challenges to the actions of the Board and viewers, 
including:  1) the lack of an order 
directing the viewers to meet and locate a private road as statutorily required; 
2) the failure of the viewers to take an oath; 3) a potential conflict of 
interest by one viewer; 4) the manner in which the viewers met with the parties; 
5) Vosses' opportunity to examine the viewers; and, 6) the viewers' role in 
determining the reasonableness of the road.

 

[¶19]      
We 
do not find it necessary to examine each one of the alleged procedural defects 
in detail.  Although the Board and 
viewers should have presented us with a more complete record to document 
compliance with statutorily-required procedures, we find that the alleged 
irregularities are generally de minimis and that the Board substantially 
complied with procedural requirements of the statute and due process.  The applicants in many of their 
allegations  seem to confuse the 
role of the viewers and the Board.  
Although the procedure for the viewers is set out in the statute in some 
detail, it is the Board that constitutes the administrative agency acting in an 
adjudicative capacity in a private road proceeding.  Due process requirements attach more 
strictly to the proceedings before the Board than to those of the viewers.  Carney v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Sublette 
Cty., 757 P.2d 556, 560 (Wyo. 1998).  
The record shows that the parties were notified through counsel of the 
viewers' schedule, and in fact Goodmans and Vosses appeared and were heard on 
site by the viewers, although not in the presence of one another.  The parties were afforded abundant 
opportunity to present evidence and legal argument at formal hearings before the 
Board, as well as to voir dire the viewers and cross-examine the respondents' 
witnesses in formal hearing.

 

[¶20]      
The 
Board held its first hearing on March 2, 1999, at which both petitioners and 
respondents presented testimony subject to cross-examination.  The Board then issued an order 
appointing viewers on March 16, 1999, and a clarifying order on April 23, 
1999.  Although the Board in its 
orders appointing viewers did not expressly find that the Vosses were 
landlocked, that finding is necessarily implied in its decision to appoint 
viewers and was explained further in the Board's later Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law when it stated that "due to the fact that the easement 
narrows to approximately three (3) feet in width at the west end of the Goodman 
easement, the Petitioners are effectively landlocked."  Although the Board should have taken 
greater care to document compliance with the statutory requirements, the Board's 
second order directed the viewers to act in accord with the Wyoming private road 
statute.  Moreover, the Board, 
viewers and parties all subsequently acted upon the assumption that the Vosses 
had established that their property was landlocked, and no misapprehension, 
confusion or prejudice resulted.

 

[¶21]      
The 
record does not clearly establish whether the viewers took an oath to 
"faithfully and impartially perform their duties," as required by the 
statute.  One of the viewers 
testified under oath that he had been sworn, while another could not remember 
being sworn.   A presumption of 
regularity attaches to such administrative proceedings, and the failure to 
subscribe to an oath in the exact manner prescribed in a statute is a mere 
irregularity that does not invalidate the entire procedure, Miller v. Hagie, 59 Wyo. 383, 395, 140 P.2d 746, 750 (1943), as the failure to swear a witness in a judicial proceeding 
does not necessarily create grounds for a new trial.  Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707, 709 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

[¶22]      
Vosses 
complain that one of the viewers was a member of a law firm which had previously 
represented Respondent Goodman.   
The statute requires the Board, if it finds that a private road is 
necessary, to appoint "three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the 
county, as viewers and appraisers . . . ."  
§ 24-9-101.  Vosses cite case 
law interpreting the Wyoming Rules of Professional Responsibility for attorneys, 
assuming that, since one of the viewers was an attorney, the test of 
disinterestedness is the same as that for conflict of interest under those 
rules.  However, those rules and 
cases concern questions of conflict arising in an attorney's representation of a 
client and are not controlling.  The 
Board took evidence on the issue at the hearing following the viewers' report on 
August 2, 1999, and concluded that the viewer was not a member of the law firm 
at the time of the prior representation, that there was no current 
representation, that he did not know the people involved and that he had no 
knowledge about the prior representation.  
The Board's conclusion that the viewer was disinterested in the private 
road matter is thus supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed 
on appeal.

 

[¶23]      
Petitioners 
next challenge the viewers' actions because they failed to meet simultaneously 
with both sides when viewing the affected property; however, they offer no 
authority for the proposition that they are entitled to attend all of the 
viewers' discussions or to a hearing before them.  As we stated in Carney, the parties to a private road 
action are afforded due process by their right to a contested case hearing 
before the Board, a right to which the parties availed themselves.  757 P.2d  at 560.  There is no basis in the statute or 
considerations of due process for dual hearings.  

 

[¶24]      
The 
petitioners also contend that the Board improperly delegated to the viewers the 
determination of the reasonableness of the road's location.  In addition to bootstrapping upon their 
argument that the Board and viewers could consider only the road proposed by 
petitioners, they base this contention upon the Board's conclusions of law that 
incorporated the viewers' conclusions and recommendations, specifically their 
conclusion that "[t]he Petitioners and Respondents had the opportunity to 
address the viewers with comments as to a reasonable route to ensure legal 
access . . ." and that "[t]he viewers' choice of routes was appropriate . . . 
."  Those conclusions came only 
after the Board received the viewers' report and heard the testimony of the 
viewers and the evidence of the affected parties.  The process complained of is simply that 
required by the private road statute:

 

The 
viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road in accordance 
with the application or in such other manner and location they deem appropriate, 
provided the location of the road shall not be marked out to cross the lands of 
any person whose lands were not described in the application and who was not 
given notice of the application.  
The proposed road . . . shall be located so as to do the least possible 
damage to the lands through which the private road is 
located.

 

§ 
24-9-101.  The viewers "will be 
knowledgeable with respect to the local conditions and will apply that knowledge 
and their common sense in arriving at a determination."  Carney, 757 P.2d  at 561.  The process apparently advocated by the 
petitioners in this case would reduce the role of the viewers to mere hikers 
whose only function is to mark on the ground the road proposed in the 
application.

 

[¶25]      
We 
agree with the petitioners that the district court erred in instructing the 
Board to consider on remand whether the Vosses' private road petition was filed 
in good faith.  We stated in 
McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286, that "[t]he applicant has the responsibility 
for studying alternative routes and asking in good faith for one that is 
reasonable and convenient.  Only 
then may the applicant be said to have complied with the law so that the county 
commissioners have jurisdiction to proceed."  See also, Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 
65.  In this regard, the posture of 
the current case is identical to that in Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001), a private road appeal in which we reiterated a definition of 
"good faith."  Id. at ¶16. 
 The Board of Commissioners 
did not make a specific finding of good faith in either case; however, as in Mayland, it is clear from the record 
that allegations of bad faith were brought before the Board during the contested 
case hearings and strenuously litigated.  
Although petitioners were requesting the Creek Road route, they testified 
about the two existing routes to their property and why the proposed route was 
preferable.  They convinced the 
Board that they were landlocked "due to the fact that the easement narrows to 
approximately three (3) feet in width at the west end of the Goodman 
easement."  Under these 
circumstances, we agree with petitioners that the requisite finding of good 
faith is implicit in the Board's conclusion that a private road is 
necessary.

 

[¶26]      
Finally, 
we consider the effect of the restrictive easement granted by the Stevenses for 
the portion of the Highway-BLM Road which crosses their property. Vosses contend 
that the Stevens easement, because it is subject to termination in the event 
Vosses transfer less than all of their property, does not give them the "legally 
enforceable" right of access required by the statute and Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 
(Wyo. 1989).  They argue that the 
possibility of termination renders the easement the functional equivalent of an 
easement in gross, personal to the Vosses, rather than an appurtenant 
easement.

 

[¶27]      
We 
recently addressed easements in Hasvold 
v. Park Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, 45 P.3d 635 (Wyo. 
2002):

 

An 
easement is defined as an interest in land which entitles the easement holder to 
a limited use or enjoyment over another person's property.  In construing an easement, we seek to 
determine the intent of the parties to the easement.  We begin by attempting to glean the 
meaning of the easement from its language.  
If the language of the easement is clear and unambiguous, we interpret 
the easement as a matter of law, without resorting to the use of extrinsic 
evidence to determine the parties' intent.  
If, however, the language is ambiguous, then the court looks to extrinsic 
evidence to ascertain the parties' intent.

 

Id. 
at ¶13 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  We distinguish between appurtenant 
easements and easements in gross as follows:

 

An 
easement is appurtenant to the land when the easement is created to benefit and 
does benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the land.  In contrast, an easement is in gross 
when it is not created to benefit or when it does not benefit the possessor of 
any tract of land in his use of it as such possessor.  An easement will not be presumed to be 
in gross when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant.  

 

Id. 
at ¶14 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 

[¶28]      
Also 
in Hasvold at ¶21, we reiterated the six 
"badges" of an appurtenant easement that we first identified in R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 
978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999):  (1) 
that the easement was created to benefit a specific tract of land; (2) that the 
grant was for a perpetual right-of-way for ingress and egress; (3) that the 
grantee has the right to inspect and maintain the easement; (4) that the right 
is not limited to the possessor personally; (5) that the grant expressly extends 
the right to the grantees, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, 
assigns and legal representatives; and (6) that the easement document does not 
contain any limitations on the transferability of the easement to future 
transfers of both the dominant and servient estates.

 

[¶29]      Applying 
these criteria to the easement given by the Stevenses to Vosses, we see that it 
incorporates some but not all of the badges of an appurtenant easement.  The easement document identifies the 
grantors and grantees of an "ingress and egress easement" that is described by 
metes and bounds across the Stevens property but does not describe the Vosses' 
benefited land.  The document 
recites that the easement is for the use of "the Grantors [sic]2, their heirs, personal 
representatives and assigns" without stating that the grant is perpetual.  Most significantly, the easement 
contains the limitation that "[t]he easement granted herein shall automatically 
terminate should Grantees, their heirs, personal representatives or assigns ever 
sell or convey any portion of the benefitted [sic] lands in a quantity of acres 
less than exists as of the date of the granting of this easement."  This easement document is sufficiently 
ambiguous to require inspection of extrinsic evidence to determine the nature of 
the easement.

 

[¶30]      
On 
March 2, 1999, Kim Stevens signed and recorded an "Affidavit Affecting Title to 
Correct and Clarify Previously Recorded Instrument," which recited the full 
names of the grantors and grantees of the easement, included a legal description 
of the benefited lands, and stated that the previously-granted ingress and 
egress easement "was intended to benefit and be appurtenant to" the Vosses' 
property.  This was apparently done 
unilaterally, on the day of the necessity hearing.  Mrs. Stevens also testified that the 
purpose of the affidavit was to clarify their intention that the access easement 
be appurtenant to the Voss property but that it not be expanded to a subdivision 
easement without renegotiation and additional consideration.  This resolves any ambiguity as to the 
Stevenses' intent to convey an appurtenant easement, leaving only the legal 
question of whether an appurtenant easement may automatically lapse upon 
subdivision of the dominant estate.

 

[¶31]      
The 
question is whether, under the above standards, the restriction in the easement 
constitutes such a limitation on the transferability of the easement to Vosses' 
successors in title, as to render it in effect a personal right of the 
Vosses.  Although the grant may 
appear to be in perpetuity, in more direct terms the easement is granted only as 
long as the Vosses or their successors do not sell off any part of the Voss 
property as it now exists.  The 
easement may be analogized to a fee subject to divestment, rather than a fee 
simple interest.  We have held that 
upon subdivision of a dominant estate, the subdivision grantees succeed to the 
privileges of use of the servient estate authorized by an appurtenant 
easement.  Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505 
(Wyo. 1994).  Since the effect of 
the restriction is to prevent transferability of the easement to all transferees 
receiving  anything less than the 
entire Voss property, we conclude that the restriction is in fact the type of 
limitation on transferability that is inconsistent with an appurtenant 
easement.

 

[¶32]      
The 
effect is more than hypothetical or inchoate, as there was unrebutted testimony 
at the hearing that the current value of the Voss property is diminished if 
future access is put into question by the easement restriction.  We stated in Snell v. Rupert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 n.5 
(Wyo. 1975), overruled on other grounds, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 
811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1992), that the premise of the private road 
statute is that "[t]here is a public interest in giving access by individuals to 
the road and highway network of the state as a part and an extension thereof for 
economic reasons and the development of land as a resource for the common good, 
whether residential or otherwise."  
In Hulse v. First American 
Title, 2001 WY 95, ¶¶33-35, 33 P.3d 122, ¶¶ 33-35 (Wyo. 2001), which 
involved vacating a private road, we disapproved of an easement that was limited 
to "farming and ranching purposes" that did not provide the type of "legally 
enforceable, unrestricted access to a public road" required by the private road 
statute.  Upon remand, therefore, if 
the Board determines that the private road will include the easement through the 
Stevens property, then the private road will be free of the restriction 
contained in the Stevens-Voss grant of easement.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶33]      
The 
determination of the Board of Commissioners that Petitioners established the 
necessity of a private road is affirmed, including an implied finding of 
Petitioners' good faith in bringing the petition.   The Board and viewers have 
authority, even a statutory obligation, to consider any reasonable, convenient 
location for the private road.  
However, the permissive use of BLM property under a 30-year license is 
not sufficient to give the Petitioners legally enforceable access, nor is an 
easement across Respondents' property that would lapse if the Petitioners ever 
subdivide their property.  The case 
is remanded to the Board of Commissioners for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, as provided in the private road statute and the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The entirety of the Board's order after the first hearing on necessity 
stated:

            
Upon the Application of Mark and Laura Voss, et al, for the appointment 
of viewers to establish the location of a private road pursuant to 
law:

            
The Board having provided a full hearing in which applicants for a 
private road were heard, and testimony was taken from applicants and from those 
neighboring landowners present to object to the applications, and from a former 
neighbor by telephone, and the Board having given the matter full consideration, 
it is hereby determined:

            
That viewers ought to be, and will be, appointed to examine the various 
possibilities for access and determine the location of a private road according 
to the requirements set out by the Wyoming 
Statutes.

2The typographical error does not void the easement where the obvious 
intent is that the Grantors convey an 
easement to the Grantees.