Title: People v. Montoya

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

538 P.2d 1332 (1975) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David Luther MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellee. No. 26678. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. June 30, 1975. J. E. Losavio, Jr., Dist. Atty., Cecil L. Turner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellant. Darol C. Biddle, James A. Carleo, Pueblo, for defendant-appellee. GROVES, Justice. This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress tangible evidence. The defendant is charged with possession of a narcotic drug (heroin) and with theft (over $100). A warrant had been issued for the search during which the evidence was seized. The warrant was supported by an affidavit of a police officer whose information came from an anonymous informant. *1333 The issues argued on appeal are whether there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; and, if not, whether there was probable cause for the arrest with the search and, if so, whether the search was incident thereto. The court ruled only that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. This we affirm. We remand for a ruling on the other questions. The affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant in this case was sworn to by a police officer on February 11, 1974. It is long and filled with immaterialities. We paraphrase it as follows : The two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, requires firstthat the affidavit set forth underlying circumstances so as to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's conclusion that criminal activity exists. The second prong requiresthat the affiant-police officer support his request for *1334 a warrant with information showing that the informant was credible, or his information was reliable.[1] The first prong goes to the logic of the propositionWhat caused the informant to conclude that criminal activity was taking place? This prong can be satisfied in several ways, one of which is the assertion of personal knowledge: the informant saw the incriminating activity, and that fact is related to the magistrate. The second prong goes to the trustworthiness of the informantWhat caused the police officer to believe the information relayed by the informant? To satisfy this test, an assertion that the informant has previously furnished solid material information of specified criminal activity will suffice. An affidavit does not satisfy the second prong by merely stating that the informant is reliable, or that he has supplied information in the past which proved to be accurate. People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971). Nor are irrelevant, albeit correct, details sufficient. We hold that the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is met by the informant's assertion of personally viewing the powder; and by being told by the defendant that it was heroin and that it was for sale. The fatal defect in the affidavit is its failure to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The affidavit fails to give sufficient information so that the independent judicial determination of the informant's credibility, or the information's reliability can be reached. There is no allegation that any information supplied by the informant led to any arrests or convictions. Although the informant had told the police officer of a named individual who was dealing in heroin, the subsequent arrest apparently was not dependent upon that information. As shown in the affidavit, the informant gave information previously concerning this defendant, which information proved to be wrong. This weakens the informant's credibility. The other information about defendant's innocent behavior, and concerning the defendant's association with a "known drug dealer" or user, is simply meaningless here for its intended purpose. See Smaldone v. People, 173 Colo. 385, 479 P.2d 973 (1971). Thus, the statements as to information previously furnished to the informant are not sufficient to satisfy the second prong. We must look, therefore, to see if there is sufficient independent verification to meet the test. While some of the information was substantiated, there was no verification of the facts relating to alleged criminal activity of the defendant. Neither was the verification shown sufficient to lend credence to the unverified portion of the information. Further, there is no evidence that the informant had said that he had purchased or used narcotics, nor made any other statement against his own penal interests. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971). In accordance with standard appellate practice, we must affirm the trial court's ruling under the second prong. The affidavit being defective, the search warrant was invalid. The People contend that, even if the search warrant was invalid, probable cause existed for the arrest. This position is predicated upon the fact that upon the arrival of the police at the residence, the defendant, knowing them to be police officers, put his hand to his mouth, ran into the house, and closed the door behind him. The police officers, including the affiant in the affidavit, broke down the door, seized the defendant and forced him to spit *1335 a piece of plastic and tinfoil from his mouth. This material contained heroin. Also seized was a foil packet of white powder which was found by one of the officers near the front door of the searched premises. The officers found another foil wrapped package lying on a table in the living room, which when opened was found to contain two rings with identification and price tags still attached. The rings were seized. The defendant's motion to suppress is based solely upon the invalidity of the search warrant, the failure of the officers to knock and announce their authority before entering the premises, and the fact that some of the property seized was not described in the search warrant. In the court's written order, it merely granted the motion to suppress without any findings. In its prior oral ruling, it made the following findings: That the affidavit supporting the search warrant satisfied the first prong of the Aguilar test; that the affidavit did not "satisfy or meet the requirements of the second prong of the AGUILAR test, in that the facts stated in the affidavit were insufficient to establish the reliability of the confidential informant." And that We know that the officers suspected the defendant of the possession of drugs. We know that mere suspicion does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). It was stated in Lucero v. People, 165 Colo. 315, 438 P.2d 693 (1968): The trial court has not passed on the question posed in the last quoted sentence. The trial court should make a ruling as to whether, in spite of the invalidity of the search warrant, there was probable cause for the arrest. If it finds such probable cause, then it should further determine whether the seizure or portions thereof were incident to that arrest. Testimony along these lines was introduced, but the court, in its discretion, may wish to have the introduction of further testimony. We hasten to add that we are not unmindful that the trial courtand not the appellate courtis the judge of credibility based, among other things, upon the characteristics of witnesses, which often do not appear in the record. The ruling of invalidity as to the search warrant is approved. The court shall conduct further proceedings as indicated and, if it suppresses evidence, which the district attorney certifies is a substantial part of the proof of the charges pending against the defendant, the People may return here with an interlocutory appeal. HODGES and LEE, JJ., do not participate. [1] For a thorough treatment of Aguilar-Spinelli, see Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741 (1974).