Title: Evans v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12337 
 
MARJORIE Y. EVANS  vs.  FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
& another.1 
 
 
April 10, 2019. 
 
 
Summary Process.  Housing Court.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Marjorie Y. Evans, appeals from a judgment 
of a single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm.2 
 
 
The respondent, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), purchased Evans's home at a foreclosure sale in 
March 2015 and then commenced a summary process eviction action 
against Evans in October 2015.  The summary process trial was 
continued several times, at least in part because of discovery 
disputes between the parties, but was eventually scheduled to 
                                                 
 
1 The petitioner also named the Worcester Division of the 
Housing Court Department (now part of the Central Division, see 
St. 2017, c. 47, § 78) as a respondent.  The court is a nominal 
party only.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996). 
 
 
2 This case is one of three that we decide today that 
involve self-represented litigants engaged in summary process 
proceedings in the Central Division of the Housing Court 
Department.  See Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court 
Dep't, 481 Mass.     (2019); Hilton v. Central Div. of the Hous. 
Court Dep't, 481 Mass.     (2019).  The petitioner in this case 
is also a petitioner in both the Adjartey and the Hilton cases.  
To the extent that she raises issues here that are also raised 
and addressed in those cases, we do not address them separately 
here. 
2 
 
 
 
commence on June 8, 2016.  On that day, Evans filed a motion for 
a continuance and for a reasonable accommodation on the basis of 
a disability.3  Before the judge ruled on these motions, Evans 
left the court house.  The judge denied the motions, and because 
Evans was not present for trial, a default judgment for 
possession entered against her.  Evans's motion to vacate the 
judgment was denied, and she subsequently filed a notice of 
appeal.  Over the next several months, Evans filed numerous 
motions to stay execution of the judgment, in both the Housing 
Court and the Appeals Court, to allow her time to pursue her 
appeal.  She successfully secured a stay, but was ordered to 
make monthly use and occupancy payments while the appeal was 
pending.  After Evans failed to make use and occupancy payments 
for several months, Freddie Mac levied on its execution for 
possession of the property on May 4, 2017.  On that same day, 
Evans filed, and the single justice denied, a G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition as well as another motion to stay. 
 
 
In her appeal to this court, Evans argues, among other 
things, that the Housing Court judge erred in denying her 
request for a reasonable accommodation; erred in violating a 
Federal Bankruptcy Court automatic stay order; and, more 
generally, violated her right to due process.  She asks the 
court for various forms of relief, including reversing the 
Housing Court's "erroneous rulings" and vacating the Housing 
Court's void judgments.  The petitioner has not, however, met 
her burden "to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of other 
remedies," as she must for the purposes of G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2001).  In fact, she 
has not even addressed the issue.  As we further explain today 
in the Adjartey case, we recognize the challenges that self-
represented litigants may face in summary process actions, but 
this does negate the statutory requirement.  Relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, is "properly denied where there are adequate and 
effective routes other than [G. L.] c. 211, § 3, by which the 
petitioning party may seek relief."  Greco v. Plymouth Sav. 
Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996).  This applies to self-
represented litigants as well as those who are represented by 
counsel.  See International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 
841, 847 (1983) (unrepresented litigants are bound by same rules 
of procedural and substantive law as represented litigants). 
 
                                                 
 
3 The accommodation that Evans sought was a postponement of 
the proceedings to allow her to obtain counsel because, she 
argued, appearing pro se put significant stress on her health.  
This was not the first time that Evans had made such a request. 
3 
 
 
 
 
For example, Evans could have sought review of the denial 
of her motion to vacate void judgments, which she filed pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), in a 
direct appeal.  See Brown v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 481 
Mass. 1036, 1037 (2019) (denial of motion to vacate void 
judgment can be addressed in direct appeal).  This is equally 
true of the denial of any recusal request.  See Hilton v. 
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass.     (2019).  
Similarly, if Evans believed she was prejudiced by a judge's 
erroneous denial of her requests for reasonable accommodations, 
she could have raised that claim in a direct appeal.4  To the 
extent that Evans argues that the Housing Court denied her 
request for assembly of the record, thus preventing her from 
pursuing her appeal, her argument on this point is not well 
developed.  And while the Housing Court docket does indicate 
that a motion to assemble the record was denied, the basis for 
the denial is not clear; in any event, the denial of such a 
motion is also subject to appellate review in the form of a 
direct appeal.  See, e.g., Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 
1001-1002, cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 
1003 (1998).  See also Skandha v. Clerk of the Superior Court 
for Civ. Bus. in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2015) 
(detailing "variety of . . . practical and legal steps" 
available when seeking to compel assembly of record). 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Central Division of the Housing Court Department. 
 
Brian Linehan for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
 
Marjorie Evans, pro se. 
 
Christine Hilton, pro se. 
 
John Schumacher, pro se. 
 
Annette Bent, pro se. 
                                                 
 
4 We make clear today in Adjartey, 481 Mass. at    , that 
where a party in a Housing Court case is found to have a 
disability, the court is required to provide that party with 
reasonable accommodation for that disability.  Without passing 
on the merits of the decisions in this case not to grant the 
petitioner's accommodation requests, we note that at least as to 
the request associated with the summary process trial, the judge 
set forth in writing her reason for denying the request. 
4 
 
 
 
 
Mychelyne Oliveira, pro se.