Title: State v. Bartunek

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

323 N.W.2d 121 (1982) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David Mike BARTUNEK, Defendant and Appellant. No. 13598. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs May 17, 1982. Decided August 18, 1982. *122 Richard Dale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief. Douglas J. Luebke of Horstman, Braley & Luebke, Corsica, for defendant and appellant. HENDERSON, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction finding David Mike Bartunek, appellant, guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol. SDCL 32-23-1. We affirm. After receiving a phone call from a citizen at midnight on January 12, 1981, to the effect that a motor vehicle accident had occurred south of Stickney, South Dakota, Deputy Sheriff Dwight DeBoer proceeded to the accident scene. Deputy DeBoer observed appellant and his brother near the vehicle. Both were injured, bleeding, stumbling around the wrecked vehicle and appeared to be intoxicated, according to the deputy, who thereupon summoned Sheriff Evan Edinger. Deputy DeBoer, having been called to the scene of this accident to investigate it, proceeded to ask appellant and his brother several questions. These questions included extent of their injuries, necessity of immediate medical attention, and who was driving the car. No Miranda warning was given. Appellant and his brother both readily admitted appellant was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. *123 Sheriff Edinger, upon arriving at the scene and sizing up the situation, then asked appellant to accompany him to his squad car. Appellant thereupon complied. Sheriff Edinger advised appellant he was under arrest for D.W.I., and advised him of his constitutional rights and his rights under this state's statutory implied consent law. Appellant agreed to a blood test and indicated that he understood his constitutional rights. Both appellant and his brother were transported to the Methodist Hospital in Mitchell for treatment of their injuries and to secure a blood sample from appellant. Subsequent analysis revealed appellant's blood contained 0.21% alcohol. Sheriff Edinger signed a D.W.I. complaint against appellant on January 12, 1981. A guilty plea was thereupon entered and withdrawn on the same day. A motion to suppress appellant's admission of driving to Deputy DeBoer was filed and later denied. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered thereupon. Appellant waived a jury trial whereupon trial was had to the court. On October 5, 1981, the trial court duly entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Trial on the Merits[*] and Judgment of Conviction. Appellant initially argues that his on-the-scene statement to the investigating officer that he was the driver of the vehicle which had just been involved in a one-car accident was not made knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily; that is, he should have been given his Miranda warnings prior to the officer asking him if he was the driver of the car. By statute, appellant was required to report his accident (SDCL 32-34-4): Appellant maintains that he should not be required to comply with SDCL 32-34-4 prior to a Miranda warning because compliance *124 with SDCL 32-34-4 would incriminate him in a D.W.I. offense. In this regard, the trial court entered the following conclusions of law in conjunction with appellant's motion to suppress: In State v. Werlinger, 84 S.D. 282, 170 N.W.2d 470 (1969), this Court specifically held that Miranda warnings are not necessary in vehicular accident cases involving initial questioning by an officer of an intoxicated driver. Miranda only applies when the defendant is being questioned in a custodial situation. "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725 (1966). The following findings of fact were entered by the trial court pursuant to appellant's motion to suppress: The Court's comments in State v. Branch, 298 N.W.2d 173, 174-175 (S.D.1980) (citations omitted), are pertinent to this issue: In his brief, appellant relies heavily upon Byers v. Justice Court for Ukiah Judicial District, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 458 P.2d 465 (1969) where the Supreme Court of California held that when statutorily required information would tend to incriminate an individual for violation of the California hit-and-run statute, an individual could not be prosecuted for failure to provide such information. From this, appellant deduces that if statutorily required information is so privileged so as to provide prosecutorial immunity, it is privileged enough to require a suspect be given his Miranda rights against self-incrimination. The Defendant's reliance on Byers is misplaced. The State of California appealed the Byers decision to the United States Supreme Court and that Court, in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1971), vacated and remanded the decision of the California Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court found that there was no conflict between a state statute which requires a motorist involved in an accident to stop and give his name and address to the owner of the property damaged and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The Court noted the necessity of balancing the public interest with individual protections, and felt that the Id. at 428, 91 S. Ct. at 1538, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 17. The Court in Byers further stated that the necessary disclosures must themselves confront the claimant with "substantial hazards of self-incrimination" before Miranda is necessary. Id. at 430, 91 S. Ct. at 1538, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 18. We hold that such is not the case in the instant appeal where the purpose of this disclosure statute is based upon public policy and is designed to identify those involved in vehicular accidents and the causes thereof. Furthermore, the officer was conducting general on-the-scene questioning. Secondly, appellant inferentially contends (but without specific reference to the statute) that the trial court was clearly erroneous (SDCL 15-6-52(a)) as to Finding of Fact XIV pertaining to the trial on the merits, which states: Also pertinent are the following findings of fact which reflect the trial court's review of the evidence before him: *126 Because he and his brother were intoxicated, argues appellant, their respective statements concerning appellant being the driver of the car were not a proper basis for the trial court's finding that appellant was the driver of the car. Intoxication, however, does not affect the admissibility of an on-the-scene statement, but rather goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded same. State v. Youngbear, 229 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S. Ct. 455, 46 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1975). Here, it was within the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of evidence. State v. Means, supra note, at 2. The trial court found the appellant guilty. In Means we noted that only the State of Michigan required findings of fact and conclusions of law in a criminal case and we there expressed: Means at 819. Therefore, the clearly erroneous rule as pertains to a trial court's finding of guilt does not come under consideration. In its findings of fact subsequent to trial, the trial court found: "To recognize the rule, however, is not to say that every error that occurs at trial rises to the level of plain error, for the plain error rule must be applied cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances." State v. Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1981). The trial court, in finding the appellant guilty, necessarily found that appellant was driving beyond a reasonable doubt and expressly so stated in Finding of Fact XIV. However, aside from any formal findings, implicit in the Judgment of Conviction was the finding that the state had proven each element of the crime. Thus, the trial court's findings that appellant never denied being the driver of the car was a factual observation which bolstered its ultimate conclusion that appellant was the driver of the automobile; as such, we perceive no unlawful burden being placed upon appellant due to Findings of Fact XI and XIII. Affirmed. WOLLMAN, C. J., and DUNN and MORGAN, JJ., concur. FOSHEIM, J., dissents. FOSHEIM, Justice (dissent). The majority states that appellant "inferentially" makes a clearly erroneous argument. I do not agree. Appellant argues: Since appellant clearly raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority errs in refusing to review the evidence to determine if the State has proved every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority is also wrong in concluding that substantial rights of appellant were not prejudiced when the trial court based its conclusion of guilt on two separate findings that appellant never denied he was driving the car. The majority states that these findings were merely "factual observations" which did not place an unlawful burden on appellant. I also think these findings were factual observations but that they were impermissible factual observations which were relied on by the trial court as a basis for its conclusion of guilt. This court would surely reverse if a trial court allowed a jury to consider, in arriving at a verdict, their "factual observation" that a defendant had not testified in his own defense. How can we allow a judge to do what is denied to a jury. [*] This was unnecessary under our holding in State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802 (S.D.1978).