Title: State v. Pitt

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Pitt, No. 99, September Term, 2003.  Opinion by Bell.
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS - PLEA
AGREEMENTS
Statements obtained pursuant to a plea agreement containing a provision that defendant’s
statements are admissible at trial if the defendant breaches the agreement are inadmissible
where the State repudiates the plea agreement.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 99
September Term, 2003
_______________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
CHARLES LEE PITT
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
(retired, specially assigned),
               
                            JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Cathell, J., joins in the result only.
_______________________________________
  
Filed:   February 1, 2006
The plea agreement plays a crucial role in the administration of both this State’s
and the nation’s criminal justice system.  State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 692-693, 357
A.2d 376 (1976).  Indeed, courts have stated that plea agreements “eliminate many of the
risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to
concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law
enforcement by permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance.” 
Id. at 693, 357 A.2d at 381.  See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S. Ct.
1463, 1471, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 758 (1970), People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d
784 (N.Y. 1974),  cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 95 S. Ct. 806 42 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1975). 
Therefore, this Court has held that “plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid in the
administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.”  Id. at 693, 357 A.2d
at 381.  Plea agreements account for the disposition of an overwhelming percentage of all
criminal cases.  See J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas §§ 1.02, 1.03, 1.07(2)
(1975), A. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931 (Summer 1983) (commenting that
in some jurisdictions where plea bargaining has been prohibited, guilty pleas still account
for a high percentage of felony convictions), S. Creaton, Plea Agreements: Progressing
the Fight Against Crime or Bribing Witnesses?, 5 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 37
(2000) (stating that plea bargains continue to increase in usage, accounting for an
overwhelming percentage of guilty pleas in criminal cases), B. Kleinhaus, Two Masters:
Evaluating Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the
2
Ex Post Facto Clause, The Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 Fordham
L. Rev. 2711 (May 2005) (stating that ninety-six percent of all federal criminal
convictions result from a plea agreement by the defendant); see also State v. Rodriguez,
125 Md. App. 428, 446, 725 A.2d 635, 644 (1999).  Plea bargains aid the system because
the number of cases that go to trial are reduced, thus, preventing the courts from
becoming flooded and overcrowded.  See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92
S. Ct. 495, 498, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 432 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were subjected to
a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities”).
In Maryland, Md. Rule 4-243 prescribes the procedures to be followed and the
conditions to be observed regarding plea agreements.  Section (a) of that Rule, as relevant,
provides:
“(a) Conditions for Agreement.
“(1) Terms. The defendant may enter into an agreement
with the State's Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere on any proper condition, including one or
more of the following:
“(A) That the State's Attorney will amend the charging
document to charge a specified offense or add a specified
offense, or will file a new charging document;
“(B) That the State's Attorney will enter a nolle prosequi
pursuant to Rule 4-247 (a) or move to mark certain
charges against the defendant stet on the docket pursuant
to Rule 4-248 (a);
3
“(C) That the State's Attorney will agree to the entry of
a judgment of acquittal on certain charges pending
against the defendant;
“(D) That the State will not charge the defendant with the
commission of certain other offenses;
“(E) That the State's Attorney will recommend, not
oppose, or make no comment to the court with respect to
a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action;
“(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement
proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other
judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to
section (c) of this Rule.”
Section (c) addresses the effect of a plea agreement and, in some circumstances, its
disposition.   It provides:
“(c) Agreements of Sentence, Disposition, or Other Judicial Action.
“(1) Presentation to the Court. If a plea agreement has been
reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular
sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense
counsel and the State's Attorney shall advise the judge of the
terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge
may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve
the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection
until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as
the judge directs.
“(2) Not Binding on the Court. The agreement of the State's
Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other
judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to
whom the agreement is presented approves it.
“(3) Approval of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement is
4
approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed
sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in
the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition
more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the
agreement.
“(4) Rejection of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement
is rejected, the judge shall inform the parties of this fact
and advise the defendant (A) that the court is not bound
by the plea agreement; (B) that the defendant may
withdraw the plea; and (C) that if the defendant persists
in the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the sentence or
other disposition of the action may be less favorable than
the plea agreement. If the defendant persists in the plea,
the court may accept the plea of guilty only pursuant to
Rule 4-242 (c) and the plea of nolo contendere only
pursuant to Rule 4-242 (d).
“(5) Withdrawal of Plea. If the defendant withdraws the plea
and pleads not guilty, then upon the objection of the defendant
or the State made at that time, the judge to whom the agreement
was presented may not preside at a subsequent court trial of the
defendant on any charges involved in the rejected plea
agreement.”
It is well settled in Maryland that “plea agreements are at times entitled to judicial
enforcement.”  Brockman, 277 Md. at 694, 357 A. 2d at 381.  See Tweedy v. State, 380 Md.
475, 488, 845 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2004) (holding that where the defendant has not received
the benefit of a plea bargain to which he is entitled, the defendant ordinarily may elect to
have the bargain specifically enforced or withdraw the guilty plea), Jackson v. State, 120 Md.
App. 113, 133, 706 A.2d 156, 166 (1998) (holding that enforcing pleas maintains the interest
of the courts in sustaining the credibility of the plea bargaining process and the indispensable
role that it plays in the management of an otherwise overwhelming caseload).  In fact, our
1Maryland Rule 5-410, “Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements,” provides:
“(a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, evidence of the
following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was
a participant in the plea discussions:
“(1) a plea of guilty which was not accepted or which was
later withdrawn or vacated;
“(2) a plea of nolo contendere, except as otherwise provided
in these rules;
“(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings
under Rule 4-243 or comparable state or federal procedure
5
cases, and those of the Court of Special Appeals, make clear that we adhere to, and apply the
teachings of, Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 433, that  “when
a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”
See, e.g., Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 253-255, 322 A.2d 527 (1974) (holding that when a
defendant’s guilty plea rests in part on the prosecution’s promise not to make any
recommendation as to sentencing or disposition, and the State violates its promise, the
accused has a remedy, he or she may  elect to have the guilty plea vacated or allow it to stand
and have the agreement enforced at re-sentencing), State v. Bittinger, 314 Md. 96, 101-102,
549 A.2d 10, 12 (1988) (holding that a defendant successful in challenging the plea must
realize that the remedy is ordinarily to place the parties in their original position).
The enforceability of the agreement is not the matter at issue in this case; it presents
a question involving the admissibility of statements made by the accused during his plea
negotiations.  Such statements generally are inadmissible.  Md. Rule 5-410;1 Fed. R. Evid.
regarding a plea specified in subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this
Rule, except in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false
statement if the statement was made by the defendant under
oath and on the record; or
“(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with
an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result
in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or which result in a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere which was not accepted or was
later withdrawn or vacated.
“(b) Exceptions.
“(1) A statement of a type specified in subsections (a)(3) or
(a)(4) of this Rule is not excluded under this Rule in any
proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of
the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the
statement ought in fairness be considered with it;
“(2) A statement of the type specified in subsection (a)(3) of
this Rule may be admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding
as a prior inconsistent statement, if offered to attack the
credibility of the person who made the statement.
“(c) Definition. For purposes of this Rule, a guilty plea that is the subject of
an appeal from the District Court to the circuit court is not considered
withdrawn or vacated.”
2Federal Rule of Evidence 410, “Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and
Related Statements,” provides:
“Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not,
in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who
made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
“(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
“(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
“(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing
pleas; or
“(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with
an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result
6
410;2 see e.g., Elmer v. State, 353 Md. 1, 724 A.2d 625 (1999) (discussing the application
in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later
withdrawn.
“However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein
another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions
has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered
contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on
the record and in the presence of counsel.”
7
of Md. Rule 5-410), see also United States v. Sockwell, 699 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied 461 U.S. 936, 103 S. Ct. 2106, 77 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1983).  There are exceptions,
however, one of which this Court has recognized.
In Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), where the plea agreement,
which the defendant breached,  provided that the defendant’s inculpatory statements would
be used against him in such an event and the government neither rescinded nor breached the
agreement, we held those statements were admissible against the defendant.   Id. at 580, 515
A.2d at 1171.   On the other hand, in Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987),
where the State repudiated the plea agreement, despite recognizing that the State’s
“repudiation of the plea agreement .... was not improper,” id. at 71, 522 A.2d at 923, given
the defendant’s failure to pass a polygraph examination, which the trial court concluded was
a part of the agreement, id. at 70-71, 522 A.2d at 923, the Court reached the opposite
conclusion; we held that the inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a grand jury
pursuant to the plea agreement were inadmissible at trial.  Id. at 82, 522 A.2d at 928.  The
3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
8
Allgood plea agreement did not contain the provision that was in the plea agreement at issue
in Wright, specifying that, in the event of breach, the inculpatory statements could be used
against him at trial.  The plea agreement sub judice does.  Consequently, we must resolve the
proper balance when the defendant breaches the plea agreement and the State, in response,
rescinds the agreement.
A.
Charles Pitt (“Pitt”), the respondent, was arrested on an arrest warrant, prior to the
search of his residence pursuant to a search and seizure warrant, issued in connection with
the investigation of a burglary of a Joppa, Maryland home.  At his initiation and based on his
statement that he had “knowledge and information” regarding the Joppa burglary, and his
expression of an interest in cutting a deal, a plea agreement was drafted, which, after the
respondent was given Miranda warnings,3 was signed by both the respondent and the lead
investigating officer and later by the Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the case.   Under
that agreement, the respondent committed “fully and truthfully [to] disclose to the State any
and all knowledge and information he may have concerning the investigation [of the Joppa
burglary]” and, upon his complete and truthful cooperation, the State agreed to schedule a
bond hearing, at which it would recommend personal recognizance for the respondent and,
subsequently, to nol pros all charges against the respondent arising from the investigation.
9
The agreement also specifically provided that, in the event of the respondent’s breach, by
knowingly withholding evidence from the State or by being less than completely truthful, the
State could “prosecute [the respondent] for any offenses in which the State agreed not to
prosecute in exchange for cooperation by [the respondent] with the investigation.”   It also
permitted the State to “use against [the respondent] in all prosecutions the information and
documents that he has disclosed to the State during the course of his cooperation.” 
After the plea agreement was executed, the respondent provided the State with
information implicating an acquaintance, Jerome Bagley (“Bagley”), whom he indicated
purchased a cellular phone, using a checkbook stolen in the burglary, and had a gold watch
from the burglary hanging from the rear view mirror of his automobile.   He also informed
the State that Bagley had purchased other items with the stolen checks and pawned jewelry,
the origin of which he claimed not to have known.  Additionally, he accompanied the police
to Bagley’s home, where a sketch of the watch hanging from the rear view mirror was made,
and identified by the victims.  With this information and corroboration of some of it, the
police obtained and executed an arrest warrant for Bagley and a search & seizure warrant for
his home.  
After Bagley was questioned, the lead investigator became concerned that the
respondent “may not have told us everything as he was required to do by the agreement. He
may have knowledge concerning where the property was and additional information
concerning the burglary.”  When the respondent was confronted with this concern and
4Another provision of the plea agreement required that the respondent submit to a
polygraph examination.
10
requested to submit to a polygraph test,4 the respondent immediately acknowledged that he
had not disclosed everything.  Moreover, he admitted committing the burglary, with an
accomplice.  Nevertheless, the respondent stated that “he wanted to keep his earlier deal,”
adding that “he knew more information, but he was going to hold back and he wanted us to
honor this deal.”    
Having been informed of the foregoing, the Assistant State’s Attorney considered the
appellant’s contract “null and void due to him not completely disclosing the information.”
That conclusion was communicated to the respondent by the lead investigating officer, who
informed him that the agreement had been terminated.  
All of the respondent’s statements to the police with respect to the burglary
investigation were admitted at his trial and he was subsequently convicted of first degree
burglary, theft over $ 500, and malicious destruction of property.  The respondent noted an
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgments of the Circuit Court
for Harford County.  Pitt v. State, 152 Md. App. 442, 832 A.2d 267 (2003).  The intermediate
appellate court concluded that, although inducements in the context of plea agreements are
proper, “when the State rescinded the plea agreement, statements obtained under it
immediately lost their voluntary status and became inadmissible at trial.”  Id. at 458, 832
A.2d at 277.   It relied largely on Wright and Allgood. 
11
We granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in order to address, and clarify,
the admissibility of statements made during plea negotiations when the plea agreement
contains a provision making such statements admissible at trial in the event of breach.   State
v. Pitt, 378 Md. 617, 837 A.2d 928 (2003).   We shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate
appellate court.
B.
The State claims that neither Wright nor Allgood are directly on point and, thus, are
wholly inapplicable.   Indeed, it says, they are factually distinguishable from the case sub
judice  - in Wright, the defendant rescinded the agreement, here, it was the State ; in Allgood,
the plea agreement did not contain the clause present in Wright, permitting the state to use
the inculpatory statements made pursuant to the agreement in the event of breach, in this
case, it does.  Consequently, the State submits, neither Wright nor Allgood or their
combination requires the result reached by the Court of Special Appeals.  The State further
argues that the pertinent inquiry in resolving the issue of the admissibility of statements made
during plea negotiations or in reliance on a plea agreement should be which party breached,
rather than which party rescinded, the agreement.  Using that approach, because the
respondent breached the plea agreement, the State maintains, the statements are admissible.
It submits, moreover, that, even if rescission is determined to be the pertinent inquiry, the
respondent, by agreeing to the use of his inculpatory statements against him in the event that
12
he breached the agreement, waived any protection pursuant to the plea agreement.   
The respondent rejoins that Wright and Allgood are dispositive of this case.
Therefore, he urges, because the State rescinded the plea agreement, his statements were
inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief, and, therefore, the trial court’s denial of his  motion
to suppress was improper.  
The starting point of our analysis is Wright and Allgood.
In Wright v. State, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant reneges on a plea
agreement and the plea agreement provides for the use, by the State, against the defendant,
of inculpatory  statements in that event, statements he made when negotiating and performing
the plea agreement were admissible against him at trial, the State having neither rescinded
nor breached the agreement.  307 Md. at 584-585, 515 A.2d at 1173-1174.   Kenneth Coley
(“Coley”), one of three co-defendants charged with felony murder, premeditated first degree
murder, and attempted robbery, had entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant
to which he agreed to  give a full statement and testify both before a grand jury and at trial
in exchange for the State’s promise to accept a guilty plea to second degree murder.   He
made inculpatory statements concerning his role in the charged crimes.  The plea agreement
explicitly stated that if Coley broke his promise and breached the plea agreement, the State
could use any and all of his statements against him at trial.  Coley reneged and rescinded the
agreement by pleading not guilty and choosing to stand trial.  He moved to suppress all the
inculpatory statements he had made, arguing that they were involuntary.  Although
5In Hillard, this Court held that promises of help or other advantages rendered a
confession inadmissible.  286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420.  Other cases have
demonstrated this point.  See Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 423 A.2d 552 (1980) (holding
inadmissible inculpatory statements resulting from a promise made by police that
defendant’s wife would not be arrested if defendant produced drug evidence, and
rejecting the State’s argument that benefit to a family member was not the type of
advantage contemplated in Hillard); Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 141 (1873) (excluding
statements made by defendant as a result of police threat that defendant confess first to
avoid harm resulting from co-defendants confession); Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6, 8 A. 571
(1887) (holding inadmissible statement procured under a hope of favor); Watts v. State,
99 Md. 30, 57 A. 542 (1904) (holding inadmissible confession that was induced by
newspaper reporter); Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 129 A. 275 (1925) (applying the
inducement rule to the conduct of the State’s Attorney, who told the defendant, “‘Tell the
truth about it.  You’ve got nothing to fear if you tell the truth, and you weren’t in it’”);
Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1, 22 A.2d 455 (1941) (holding inadmissible a confession
obtained by a police officer who told defendant that an admission was not necessary but
certainly favorable); Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 208 A.2d 614 (1965) (holding
involuntary statements obtained by police officer who promised probation if defendant
cooperated and longer sentence if he did not cooperate); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 132
A.2d 494 (1957) (holding inadmissible statements made by defendant while under
medical examination, where doctor offered to stop the examination if defendant
confessed); Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 71 A.2d 487 (1950) (holding inadmissible
confession resulting from police showing defendant a letter from convict displaying
convict’s regret at not confessing when he had the opportunity).
13
acknowledging that he had been given Miranda warnings, Coley maintained that his plea was
induced by the State’s promise to accept a second degree murder plea.  307 Md. at 579, 515
A.2d at 1171.  Thus, he argued, relying on the rule in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d
415 (1979),5  his statements made in reliance on the rescinded plea agreement were rendered
inadmissible as a result of this inducement.  Rejecting these contentions, the trial court
denied the suppression motion and the statements were admitted at trial. 
This Court recognized that the circumstances surrounding Coley’s plea agreement
14
negotiation were different from those surrounding the defendant’s confession in Hillard:
“Under the principle applied in the [Hillard], if the [State] had simply told
Coley that a confession and guilty plea to second degree murder would result
in his not being prosecuted for first degree murder, and if Coley had confessed
because of that inducement, his confession would be deemed involuntary and
inadmissible at his trial.  The instant case, however, involves something quite
different ... Here, the inducement by the State took the form of promises under
a negotiated plea bargain agreement, made in exchange for Coley’s promises
under that agreement.  The agreement was sanctioned and regulated by
Maryland Rule 4-243.  The mutual promises were specifically authorized by
Rule 4-243.  The State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.  Finally,
the agreement specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could
be used against him at trial.  None of the Maryland cases relied upon involved
circumstances like these.”
307 Md. at 584-585, 515 A.2d at 1173-1174.
Observing that previous Maryland decisions that held that inducements by the State
were “improper” did not involve inducements that occurred during a plea negotiation, the
Court held, “[i]t would be anomalous .... to hold that the State’s actions were ‘improper’
when they are expressly authorized by law (i.e., Rule 4-243) and when the State neither
rescinds nor breaches the plea bargain agreement.”  307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d at 1174.
Although the Court recognized that “defendants would be reluctant to enter plea
bargaining agreements if the State could thereafter rescind or breach the agreements, and
then use at trial the defendant’s inculpatory statement made as part of the agreement,” 307
Md. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174-1175, it also saw that Coley’s plea contained an agreement that
provided for such statements to be admitted at trial in the event of breach and that “the State
neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.”  307 Md. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174-1175.
6The plea agreement stated the following:
“The Defendant, George Allgood, in case # 18335307-11, agrees to testify
truthfully before the Grand Jury and in all criminal proceedings against those suspected
and or charged with the murder of Mr. Marion Harris on or about November 16, 1983, in
Baltimore City. In addition to testifying truthfully as stated heretofore, George Allgood
also agrees to testify to everything he remembers or should reasonably remember
regarding the murder of Mr. Marion Harris. George Allgood also agrees to reveal to the
State's Attorney Office of Baltimore City, prior to any sworn testimony the truth
concerning the murder of Mr. Marion Harris leaving nothing out that he reasonably
15
 Concerned that defendants would thereby be encouraged to rescind plea agreements
without justification, we declined to extend Hillard to the Coley situation, where the
defendant breaches a plea agreement with a provision for the use against the defendant of any
inculpatory statement by the State and the State neither breaches nor rescinds the plea
agreement.   We concluded that when plea agreements contain a clause that provides for
statements made during plea negotiations to be used at trial in the event of a breach by the
defendant and the State neither rescinds nor breaches the agreement, such statements are
admissible at trial.  307 Md. at 585-587, 515 A.2d at 1175.
In Allgood v. State, the Court held that, where the State repudiates a plea  agreement,
inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a grand jury pursuant to that plea agreement
are not admissible at trial.   Allgood was arrested and charged with, inter alia, first degree
murder and robbery with a deadly weapon.   He entered into a plea agreement with the State,
pursuant to which, in exchange for his truthful testimony and full disclosure of what he knew
of the murder, the state would pursue only the manslaughter charge against him and agree
to a probationary, rather than a prison, sentence.6  After accepting the plea and providing the
should remember.
“The State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore City, as considerations for the above,
agrees to proceed against George Allgood only on the charge of manslaughter. This office
also agrees to a suspended sentence along with a probationary period in lieu of any
sentence involving actual incarceration after he enters a guilty plea to manslaughter in the
case involving the death of Mr. Marion Harris. Further, this office will recommend the
release of George Allgood from jail to the U.S. Navy on June 11, 1984. Finally, this
office will write a letter to the U.S. Navy citing George Allgood's cooperation in pursuing
the conviction of those responsible for the murder of Mr. Marion Harris.”  
309 Md. at 58, 522 A.2d at 917.
16
State with information pursuant to it, the State, suspicious and concerned that Allgood was
not being completely forthcoming, demanded that he take a polygraph test.  When Allgood
subsequently took the polygraph test and failed, the State, deeming the plea agreement to
have been breached by Allgood, 309 Md. at 64, 522 A.2d at 920, wrote a letter to Allgood’s
attorney “to officially notify you that there is no plea agreement concerning this murder case
between the State and your client, George Allgood.” (Emphasis in original).  Id.  Further, the
letter advised:
“The [State] .... had discussed a plea agreement with you concerning this case
which was predicated upon your client successfully passing a polygraph
examination administered by Corporal Sheldon of the Maryland State Police.
As you are aware, on July 3, 1984, your client took a polygraph examination
and Corporal Sheldon found that your client's answers indicated deception...
Accordingly, your client's failure to pass the polygraph examination is a
material breach of any plea agreement and renders such agreement null and
void. The State intends to call for trial this case as well as the case of the
co-Defendant, Michael Walker, on Indictment Nos. 18417201-03 on
September 11, 1983 in Part 3. Furthermore, the State intends to take the steps
necessary to have George Allgood returned from the Navy to the Baltimore
City Jail pending the trial on September 11, 1984.”
Id.   
7There was a dispute, which the trial court resolved, as to whether the failure of the
polygraph test, the proffered basis by the State, was a part of the plea agreement. 309 Md.
at 68-70, 522 A.2d at 921-923.  The State argued that “the purpose of the polygraph was
to determine whether [Allgood] was lying or not, and the purpose of determining whether
he was lying or not was to determine whether we were bound by the agreement.”  309
Md. at 67-68, 522 A.2d at 921.  Allgood maintained that it was not, that the polygraph
test was not part of the plea agreement, and that its results did not play any role in
determining whether or not Allgood’s plea agreement was valid or invalid.  309 Md. at
68, 522 A.2d at 922.  He submitted that he agreed to the test so that he could be
transferred to the Navy and out of city lockup and that he understood the polygraph only
to relate that request. [cite]  The trial court found that there was a plea agreement prior to
its withdrawal by the State, that the polygraph test was part of the agreement, and that the
parties were to be guided by the results. 309 Md. at 70-71, 522 A.2d at 923.  We
determined that the trial court’s findings in that regard were not clearly erroneous. 309
Md. at 72, 522 A.2d at 923-924.
17
Allgood denied breaching the agreement.7  He moved, on the contrary,  to enforce the plea
agreement.  That motion was denied, and he was convicted.
Comparing Coley’s situation to Allgood’s, this Court found that, “[t]he decisive
difference between Coley's situation and that of Allgood is that the defendant reneged on the
agreement in the former but the State terminated the agreement in the latter.  In Coley's case,
‘the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.’” 309 Md. at 77, 522 A.2d at 926,
citing Wright, 307 Md. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174.  In Allgood, the State flatly rescinded the
agreement in a letter to defense counsel, and thereafter refused to submit the plea agreement
to the trial court.  The State proceeded to try Allgood, using his inculpatory statements
against him, despite his desire to plead pursuant to the agreement. 
The Allgood court acknowledged that the Coley plea agreement contained a provision
the Allgood plea did not, it "specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could
18
be used against him at trial." 309 Md. at 77, 522 A.2d at 926, citing Wright, 307 Md. at 585,
515 A.2d 1157.  Nevertheless, we determined the teachings of Wright to be:
“1) When statements are obtained from a defendant upon promises made him
by  the State by way of a plea bargain agreement, the statements, in the light
of Rule 4-243, are not inadmissible per se, under the inducement doctrine, in
the State's case in chief at trial on the merits.
“2) When the State rescinds, repudiates, or breaches the plea bargain
agreement, for whatever reason, after the statements are so obtained, the
statements, as a matter of law, are inadmissible per se in the State's case in
chief at trial on the merits.”
309 Md. at 78, 522 A.2d at 926-27.   We explained how we arrived at that distillation:
“Wright fully appreciated that promises to the defendant of the nature usually
encompassed in plea bargain agreements certainly suffice to induce a statement
obtained, so that, ordinarily, the inducement most assuredly would be
improper.   The intervention of a plea bargain agreement, however, expressly
authorized by law, serves to make the inducement proper.   Thus, the plea
agreement, in itself, does not render the statement inadmissible.   On the other
hand, Wright recognized the chilling effect on plea bargaining were the State
permitted to enter into a plea agreement, obtain a statement thereunder, abort
the agreement, and then use the statement in its case in chief at trial on the
merits.   The reason for the State's repudiation of the agreement is immaterial
with respect to the admissibility of the statement.   Whether its reason be sound
or unsound, technical or substantial, in good faith or simply because the
prosecutor had misgivings or a change of heart, or was utterly arbitrary, is of
no matter.   The justification vel non of the rescission, repudiation, or breach
of the agreement by the State goes to whether the defendant is entitled to have
the agreement enforced;  it does not affect the admissibility of the statement
obtained under it.   This is in accord with the rationale of Wright.”
Id. at 78-79, 522 A.2d at 927.
19
C.
Like the Court of Special Appeals, we are unpersuaded that, by including in the plea
agreement a clause, like that inserted in the Coley plea agreement, permitting the  State to use
any inculpatory statements made by the respondent should he breach the agreement, the
respondent’s inculpatory statements are rendered admissible notwithstanding the State’s
rescission of the plea agreement.  That clause, in other words, is not dispositive.  It is
Allgood’s analysis of Wright, reconciling the two situations those cases presented, makes that
quite clear.   As indicated, Allgood interprets Wright as making clear that when the State
rescinds a plea agreement for any reason, the obtained statements are rendered inadmissible
per se.  152 Md. App. at 459, 832 A.2d at 277.  Again, as already seen, it explained clearly
its basis for that conclusion:
“The reason for the State's repudiation of the agreement is immaterial with
respect to the admissibility of the statement. Whether its reason be sound or
unsound, technical or substantial, in good faith or simply because the
prosecutor had misgivings or a change of heart, or was utterly arbitrary, is of
no matter. The justification vel non of the rescission, repudiation, or breach of
the agreement by the State goes to whether the defendant is entitled to have the
agreement enforced; it does not affect the admissibility of the statement
obtained under it. This is in accord with the rationale of Wright.”
309 Md. at 79, 522 A.2d at 927 (emphasis added).
Wright controls the situation in which a defendant breaches a plea agreement
containing a provision burdening that defendant’s breach with the admissibility of the
inculpatory statements he or she made pursuant to the plea agreement, and there has been no
breach or rescission by the State: the plea is rendered invalid in favor of the State, the
20
admissibility clause is triggered, and as a result,  the defendant’s statements are admissible.
Allgood controls, however,  where the State does breach or rescind the plea agreement, even
though the defendant’s breach of the agreement may have caused or justified the State’s
rescission and even though  the defendant’s breach would have permitted the admission of
his or her inculpatory statements: the defendant’s statements are inadmissible, the plea
agreement having been being rendered invalid by virtue of the rescission.
Neither Allgood nor Wright is compromised by this decision.  If there has been no
breach or rescission by the State, the defendant’s statements, under the express provision, are
admitted, consistent with Wright.  If the State repudiates, rescinds, or breaches for any
reason, including because it believed, in good faith, that the defendant had breached first, the
statements are inadmissible to protect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment interests (“Wright
recognized the chilling effect on plea bargaining were the State permitted to enter into a plea
agreement, obtain a statement thereunder, abort the agreement, and then use the statement
in its case in chief on the merits”).  309 Md. at 79, 522 A.2d at 927.
D.
The State relies on two cases,  People v. Saunders,  482 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App.1985) and
McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231 (Miss. 1997),  as persuasive authority, as, it proffers, they
demonstrate how other courts, in analyzing cases where the defendant, as part of the plea
agreement, agreed to the admissibility of his or her inculpatory statements in the event of the
8Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (f) provides: 
“If a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, or if a plea of guilty
is not accepted or is withdrawn, or if judgment on a plea of guilty is
reversed on direct or collateral review, neither the plea discussion nor any
resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the
defendant in any criminal proceeding.”
21
defendant’s breach, they focused primarily on the element of breach.  We are not persuaded
that these cases support using breach as the dispositive element in determining the
admissibility of statements made during or pursuant to a plea agreement.  On the contrary,
they provide support for considering rescission as the dispositive factor.
 In Saunders, a negotiated plea agreement provided that the defendant, Saunders,
would give a complete statement to the authorities regarding the murder with which he was
charged, in exchange for which, the State promised favorable pretrial release and sentencing
considerations. 482 N.E.2d at 88.  Prior to trial, he moved to suppress statements made
during plea negotiations with the State, alleging that his prior trial testimony against a co-
defendant and statements made to the prosecutor  “were violative of Supreme Court Rule 402
(f)[8] and principles of due process and voluntariness,” as they were induced by promises of
leniency by the State, which were not fulfilled.  Id. at  87.  It was disputed whether Saunders
had fully cooperated, the defendant alleging that he had and the State maintaining that he had
not, as required by the plea agreement, given a complete statement prior to the arrest of his
co-defendants.  Saunders’s motion was denied and he was convicted. 482 N.E.2d at 89. 
22
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that Supreme Court Rule 402 (f)
was not applicable in the matter of the admissibility of the defendant's prior testimony and
statement to the prosecutor.  It explained:
“This is not a situation where the agreement has been withdrawn or unaccepted
by the court, but is rather a situation where the defendant himself was in
breach of the agreement. Being in this position, the defendant cannot complain
about the State's failure to live up to its end of the bargain. Further, the
defendant's testimony, although made after and pursuant to the agreement, was
not made while he was negotiating over the disposition of his case. Thus, the
purpose of the rule, i.e., to ‘encourage the negotiated disposition criminal
cases,’ would not be served by rendering the statements inadmissible.”  
482 N.E.2d at 94.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on, adopting the rationale of, United
States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 824, 99 S. Ct. 93, 58 L.
Ed. 2d. 116 (1978) and United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  Saunders, 482
N.E.2d at 94.  In Stirling, the defendant failed to plead guilty, thus violating the terms of a
plea agreement.  The court opined on that violation and its consequence, as follows:
“All [the defendant] had to do was live up to his end of the bargain.  His
failure to do so justly exposed him to prosecutorial use of his Grand Jury
testimony....  It may be true that [the defendant] would not have testified
before the Grand Jury had it not been for the plea agreement.... [The
defendant] voluntarily negotiated his plea agreement...and voluntarily decided
to violate his plea agreement.  He could have relied on the agreement to protect
himself....  His breach of the agreement removed that protection.”
571 F.2d at 732-733.    Addressing the plea agreement violations by the defendants in that
case,  the Davis court observed:
“Excluding testimony made after - and pursuant to - the agreement would not serve
23
the purpose of encouraging compromise...such a rule would permit a defendant to
breach his bargain with impunity: he could renounce the agreement and return to the
status quo ante whenever he chose....”
Id. at 685.   The Saunders court took note, and emphasized, that the breach by the defendants
in Stirling and Davis negated any failure of compliance on the State’s part.  482 N.E.2d at
95.
The State in this case also relies on McGowan v. State, supra, a robbery conspiracy
and murder case, that also relies on the rationale of both Stirling and Davis.  706 So.2d at
239-241.  There, the defendant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which, in exchange
for his cooperation and testimony against the other robbers at any subsequent trial, he was
allowed to plead guilty and receive a recommended lighter sentence, thus avoiding a possible
capital sentence. 706 So.2d at 233.  When, however, the defendant breached the plea
agreement by refusing to testify against a co-conspirator, his guilty plea was vacated, the
original charges were reinstated and he was tried and, with the use of the statements he made
during plea negotiations, convicted of capital murder.  706 So.2d at 233-234.  Before trial,
the defendant moved to suppress the statements he gave after his guilty plea.  The trial court
denied that motion and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed that ruling.  706 So.2d
231.  In so doing, it opined, “even though [the defendant’s] agreement did not include
language that information obtained could later be used, it appears fundamentally fair that
such statements given after the plea agreement be admissible.”  706 So.2d at 241.
Accordingly, the court “adopt[ed] the view that where a defendant willfully breaches a plea
24
bargain agreement, statements made by the defendant after a valid plea agreement has been
entered be admissible at the later trial of the defendant if voluntarily made.”  Id.
Neither Saunders nor McGowan is persuasive.  First, their basic premise and approach
is directly contrary to this Court’s precedents.  While we have recognized that a rescission
of a plea agreement by the State has consequences, Allgood, 309 Md. at 78-79, 522 A.2d at
927, they, both cases, focus only on the defendant’s breach, and, in that context, emphasizing
the need to disadvantage the defendant as a result of that breach, excuses the State’s failure
to comply with its obligations under the agreement.  Saunders, 482 N.E.2d at 93-94, citing
Stirling, 571 F.2d at 732-733, Davis, 617 F.2d at 685. Moreover, this Court has specifically
and clearly prescribed the disadvantage that a defendant will suffer should he or she breach
his or her plea agreement: he or she loses the “entitlement to have the plea agreement
enforced,” Allgood, 309 Md. at 74, 522 A.2d at 924, and, if the plea agreement so provides,
and the State has not breached or rescinded the agreement, his or her statements made
pursuant to or during the plea agreement or negotiations may be used by the State at trial in
its case in chief.  Id. at 77, 522 A.2d at 926; Wright, 307 Md. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174-1175.
 We have also clearly prescribed the effect of the State’s rescission, repudiation or breach,
for whatever reason, of a plea agreement after the defendant has made statements pursuant
to the agreement: the statements are inadmissible in the State’s case in chief.  Allgood, 309
Md. at 78, 522 A.2d at 927.  Again,  “[t]he justification vel non of the rescission, repudiation,
or breach of the agreement by the State goes to whether the defendant is entitled to have the
9The courts in   People v. Saunders,  482 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App.1985) and United
States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979) find the idea of defendant’s “breach[ing]
with impunity” to be returned to the status quo ante to be appalling, thus, improper result.  
25
agreement enforced;  it does not affect the admissibility of the statement obtained under it.”
Id. at 79, 522 A.2d at 927.   
The effect of Allgood and Wright is to ensure that neither the defendant nor the State
benefits from breaching the plea agreement.   A defendant who breaches a plea agreement
loses his or her entitlement to enforce the agreement and, if the agreement so provides and
the State has not also breached, rescinded, or repudiated the agreement may have any plea
related statements used against him or her at trial.   On the other hand, where the State
breaches, rescinds or repudiates the agreement, it will lose the benefit of the defendant’s
inculpatory statements.  Where both breach, the parties are returned to square one, the status
quo ante.9  We do not share the State’s concern that, under the Allgood approach, defendants
will be motivated to “breach with impunity” in order to compel the State to rescind the
agreement.   It is difficult to see what a defendant would gain from doing so.  More to the
point, aware of the ground rules, it is difficult to imagine that the State would fall prey to
such a ploy.  
   
E.
Finally, the State argues that even if the admissibility of the statements made by a
defendant pursuant to a plea agreement turns on whether the State rescinded the agreement,
26
the statements may nevertheless be admissible, if the defendant waives their inadmissibility.
Relying on  United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 115 S. Ct. 797, 130 L. Ed. 2d. 697
(1995), the State maintains that the respondent, by agreeing to the admissibility of any
inculpatory statements he might make in the course of plea negotiations or pursuant to the
plea, waived any right he had to suppress his inculpatory statements and that he should be
held to the terms of the agreement. 
In  Mezzanatto, the defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with
the intent to distribute.   Before trial, he and his attorney met with the prosecutor to discuss
the possibility of cooperating with the Government.   As a condition for the meeting, the
prosecutor required the defendant “to agree that  any statements he made during the meeting
could be used to impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial if the case
proceeded that far.”   513 U.S. at 198, 115 S. Ct. at 800, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 702. After
conferring with his counsel, the defendant agreed to so proceed.  Id.  When the defendant’s
statements were determined to be inconsistent with the surveillance evidence the 
Government
had amassed, the prosecutor terminated the meeting.  Id. at 199, 115 S. Ct. at 800, 130 L. Ed.
2d at 703.   The prosecutor cross-examined the defendant at his trial, over his objection,
using the statements he made during the plea discussion meeting and, when the defendant
denied having made certain statements, called an agent to impeach him.   Id. at 199, 115 S.
Ct. at 800-801, 130 L. Ed.2d at 703.   His conviction having been reversed, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals holding that in creating the exclusionary provisions of Federal Rule of
10Two other Justices, Souter and Stevens dissented and, thus, would have not have
permitted waiver even for impeachment.   United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,
211, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806, 130 L. Ed. 2d. 697, 710-711 (1995), Souter, J., dissenting.
27
Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), Congress intended to
preclude waiver agreements, United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454-1456 (9th
Cir. 1993), the Supreme Court issued the writ of certiorari to review that decision.
Reversing, the Court held, “ absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was
entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions
of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.”  513 U. S. at 210, 115 S. Ct. at 806,
130 L. Ed. 2d at 710.
It is evident that Mezzanatto is inapposite.   In this case, rather than for impeachment
purposes, the statements in this case were introduced and admitted in the State’s case in chief.
The Supreme Court in Mezzanatto, as elucidated by the three concurring justices,10 513 U.
S. at 211, 115 S. Ct. at 806, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 710, determined that waiver applied to plea
statements only for purposes of impeachment.  They expressed doubt as to the  enforceability
of  waiver where the prosecution wished to use the plea  statements in its case-in-chief, as
the State does here, stating that, “to use such statements in the case-in-chief would more
severely undermine a defendant’s incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining.”
513 U.S. at 211, 115 S. Ct. at 806, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 710 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).  
Moreover, applying Mezzanatto to hold that any knowing and voluntary waiver of the
exclusionary provisions of Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-410 is valid and enforceable would
28
undermine both Wright and Allgood, rendering the question of whether the State rescinded
or breached the plea agreement irrelevant.
 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Judge Cathell joins in the result only.