Title: Shunn v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shunn v. State1987 WY 129742 P.2d 775Case Number: 87-32Decided: 09/18/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Laverne "Sonny" SHUNN, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE ofWyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

 
 

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; and Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel. Wyoming Defender Aid Program: Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director; John A. Coppede, and Josephine F. McClain, Student Interns, 
for Appellant.

 
 
Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald 
P. Luckhaupt, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. 

 
 
Brown, 
C. J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
judgment and sentence rendered after a jury found appellant guilty of sexual 
assault in the first degree in violation of § 
6-2-302(a) (i), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement).1 Appellant states the issue 
as:

 
 
"Whether 
the vague wording of Wyoming's marital 
exception statute, Wyoming Statute section 
6-2-307, renders Wyoming's sexual assault statute, Wyoming Statute section 6-2-302, unconstitutional as 
applied to a person convicted of sexually assaulting his 
spouse."

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     In December of 1985, 
the victim, Connie Shunn, filed a divorce action against appellant Laverne 
"Sonny" Shunn, and moved into a separate residence. A mutual restraining order 
was obtained prohibiting any contact between appellant and the victim. On March 
8, 1986, nine days before the actual divorce, the victim was confronted in her 
bedroom by appellant. Appellant began striking the victim with a wooden baton, 
drawing blood; appellant sexually assaulted her with the baton; and then had 
sexual intercourse with the victim.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant was found 
guilty of both sexual assault and aggravated assault. The district court 
sentenced appellant to a five to seven year term of imprisonment for the sexual 
assault charge and a six to eight year term on the aggravated assault charge, 
which was suspended and reduced to probation upon serving the sexual assault 
term.

 
 

[¶5.]     At issue is whether 
§ 6-2-307, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement) 
is void for vagueness. The pertinent part of that statute reads as 
follows:

 
 
"The 
fact that the actor and the victim are married to each other is not by itself a 
defense to a violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a) (i) 
* * * *."

 
 
Such 
language, appellant contends, establishes a spousal exception to sexual assault 
in Wyoming and 
renders § 6-2-302 unconstitutional as applied 
to a person convicted of sexually assaulting his spouse.

 
 

[¶6.]     A standard for 
vagueness of a statute has been defined by this and other courts.  "An ordinance or statute is void for 
vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that 
the contemplated conduct is forbidden. * * * *" Keser v. State, 
   
  Wyo., 706 P.2d 263, 266 (1985). "A statute is unconstitutionally vague when 'men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.' * * * *" Jenkins v. 
Werger, 564 F. Supp. 806, 808 
(D.Wyo.,1983).

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the phrase "not by itself a defense" contained in § 
6-2-307 is vague because no objective standard is provided by which a 
person can measure contemplated conduct. We disagree. The standard by which 
conduct is to be measured is clearly outlined in § 
6-2-302(a) (i) under which appellant was convicted.2 Appellant caused submission of the 
victim through actual force reasonably calculated to cause submission. Section 6-2-307 clearly puts an assailant on notice 
that marriage to the victim of a sexual assault is not a complete defense, but 
may be considered along with other evidence in deciding the guilt of the 
defendant. In this case appellant asserted an alibi defense and presented no 
other evidence in connection with the marital status of the 
parties.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant also argues 
that the previous statute § 6-4-3073 (which allowed an exemption to 
married couples unless a decree of judicial separation or restraining order was 
in effect), would be bypassed in favor of reinstatement of the common law 
spousal exception to rape. A brief history of the spousal exception to the crime 
of rape is enlightening. Sir Matthew Hale, an English jurist of the 17th 
Century, author of a treatise on English law, is regarded as the source for the 
spousal exception to rape. He has stated, "But the husband cannot be guilty of a 
rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial 
consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her 
husband, which she cannot retract." 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 
*629. With the adoption of the English common law, this rule was followed in 
this country for almost 200 years. Although no legal basis has been found for 
Hale's belief, there are three major justifications that have been historically 
identified as the reason for the spousal exception to rape. State v. Smith, 85 
N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38, 24 A.L.R.4th 90 (1981).

 
 

[¶9.]     The first belief was 
that the woman was considered to be property of her husband or father. Under 
this premise, the early rape laws sought compensation for the husband or father, 
rather than the victim, for the damages incurred to the 
"property."

 
 

[¶10.]  The second premise is that the wife had 
no separate legal identity. This was reinforced by Blackstone's comment made in 
his 1765 Commentaries that "* * * * The very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during this marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and [cover] 
she performs everything.' 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *441. * * * *" Statute 
Note, Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption From 
   
     Texas Law, 38 
Baylor L. Rev. 1041 n.18 (1986). Argument was made that this merger 
prevented a husband from being convicted of, in effect, raping 
himself.

 
 

[¶11.]  The third justification evolved from the 
belief that upon entering marriage, the wife consents to sexual intercourse with 
her husband. This irrevocable consent negated an essential element of the crime 
of rape, lack of consent.

 
 

[¶12.]  Thus, faulty as the legal fiction was 
behind the spousal immunity to rape, it is part of our legal heritage and was 
representative of the common law in this state. We do not agree, however, with 
appellant's reasoning that the common law marital exception to rape would be 
reinstated if the challenged statute is found to be void for vagueness.  The common law is the law of Wyoming unless abrogated 
by statute.  Condos v. Trapp, Wyo., 
717 P.2d 827 (1986). The purpose of statutes has been held to 
be to remedy defects in the common law and to adapt it to changes of time and 
circumstance.  Second Employers' Liability Case, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327 
(1912); and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 4 Otto 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 
(1876). See also, 15A AmJur.2d Common Law 818, p. 618 n.81 (1976). "The 
adoption of common law by Wyoming was not an adoption of a set code of 
law. Nor was the adoption one of status or nonchanging law." Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 714, 717 (1979). We also quote the language in 
Rodin v. State, ex rel. City of 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 417 P.2d 180, 196 
(1966):

 
 
"* * * * 
Reason is the soul of law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases so 
does the law itself * * * *." Rodin v. 
State,      
Wyo., 417 P.2d 180, 196 
(1966).

 
 

[¶13.]  To allow a spousal exception to rape 
would be inconsistent with the history of legislation in this state. When the 
legislature enacted § 6-2-307 and repealed the 
statutory spousal exception allowed by the 1977 Statutes, it removed the common 
law spousal exception to rape in Wyoming. See Vasquez v. State, 
   
 Wyo., 623 P.2d 1205 (1981) (Thomas, J., specially concurring).

 
 

[¶14.]  Statutory and societal changes have 
significantly affected the appropriateness of a marital rape exception. Today, 
Hale's theory is both unrealistic and unreasonable. We agree with the court's 
analysis in the case of People v. 
Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 
474 N.E.2d 567 (1984), that no rational basis exists for distinguishing 
between marital and nonmarital rape. The degree of violence is no less when the 
victim of a rape is the spouse of the actor. We therefore see no justification 
to reinstate the common law marital exception to sexual 
assault.

 
 

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-2-302(a) (i), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement), states in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree 
if:

 
 
"(i) The actor causes submission of the 
victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission 
of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement."

 
 

2Appellant was convicted of sexual 
assault under § 6-2-302(a) (i) W.S.1977 (1983 
Replacement), which was previously challenged and upheld by this court as 
constitutional.  Weddle v. State, 
   
 Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980). The 1977 and 1983 statutes are the same, but have been 
renumbered.

 
 

3Section 6-4-307, W.S.1977, 
provided:

 
 
"A person does not violate any provision 
of this act [sexual assault] if the actor and the victim are legally married, 
unless a decree of judicial separation or restraining order has been 
granted."