Title: State v. Nancy R. Lamon

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 78 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3403-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Nancy R. Lamon,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  255 Wis. 2d 831, 646 N.W.2d 854 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 19, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
Edwin C. Dahlberg   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
SYKES, J., joins the dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Timothy A. Provis, Madison, and oral argument by Timothy A. 
Provis. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Mary 
E. Burke, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 78 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3403-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 1822) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nancy R. Lamon,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Nancy R. Lamon (Lamon) seeks 
review of a court of appeals' decision that affirmed the circuit 
court's finding that the State's peremptory strike of a 
potential juror was not in violation of the test established 
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
give deference to the circuit court's decision based on the 
standard set forth in Hernandez, and hold that clearly erroneous 
is the correct standard of review in this case.  Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991). We hold that the decision of 
the circuit court was not clearly erroneous under Batson, 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
2 
 
because the State offered sufficient evidence for its race-
neutral justification. 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed.  Leeman Jones (Jones), an 
African-American, was driving home around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on 
May 31, 1998, when Nancy R. Lamon (Lamon) flagged him down.  She 
expressed the need to be taken to a telephone and got into 
Jones' car.  Jones began driving, but stopped the car upon 
Lamon's statement that her friend was in a car behind them. 
Jones stopped the car and the person in that car approached 
Jones' window and asked for Jones' wallet while Lamon threatened 
Jones with an object on his right side.  Jones complied and his 
money was taken from his wallet.  Lamon exited Jones' car and 
entered her friend's car. 
¶4 
On June 3, 1998, a complaint was filed in Rock County 
Circuit 
Court 
charging 
Lamon 
with 
violating 
Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(b)&(2)1 (armed robbery by threat of force 
with article reasonably believed to be a dangerous weapon).  The 
complaint also alleged Lamon was a repeater as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c). 
¶5 
On June 30, 1998, Lamon entered a plea of not guilty.  
Lamon then entered a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
3 
 
probable cause at the preliminary hearing.  The circuit court 
denied the motion finding that there was sufficient evidence for 
Jones to have had a reasonable belief that he was threatened by 
a weapon. 
¶6 
On April 14, 1999, jury selection for Lamon's trial 
began. Twenty out of 35 possible jurors were called and seated 
in the jury box; one of which was Mr. Dondre Bell (Bell).  Bell 
was the only African-American in the jury pool.  The circuit 
court questioned the venire first.  Bell did not respond 
affirmatively to any of these questions, although others did 
answer yes and were asked follow-up questions. 
¶7 
The court asked the potential jurors the following 
questions:  
Is anyone related by blood or marriage to Lamon? (R. 
60:7). 
Is anyone otherwise acquainted with Lamon? (R. 60:7). 
Is anyone related by blood or marriage, or otherwise 
acquainted with defense counsel or the Assistant 
District Attorney? (R. 60:8-9). 
Does anyone have any possible financial interest, or 
other possible interest in the outcome of the trial? 
(R. 60:10). 
Does anyone have some feeling of bias or prejudice for 
or against the State or the defendant, keeping in mind 
the charge of armed robbery? (R. 60:10). 
Does anyone have a compelling reason why they should 
not be compelled to serve for possibly two days? (R. 
60:10). 
Does anyone believe that they could not be fair and 
impartial? (R. 60:10-11). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
4 
 
 
¶8 
Assistant District Attorney Jodi Dabson Bollendorf 
(Bollendorf) then conducted a general voir dire of the venire.  
Bell did not respond affirmatively to any of these questions, 
but other potential jurors answered yes to some of the 
questions.   Specifically, Bollendorf asked: 
Is there any of you who has had contact with the Rock 
County District Attorney's Office in any capacity?  As 
a victim, as a witness, as a defendant?  Just to call 
up 
and 
ask 
a 
question 
or 
any 
capacity 
whatsoever? . . .  No one's had contact. (R. 60:11). 
Is there any of you who has ever been a victim of a 
crime? (R. 60:11). 
Is there anyone here who has a close friend or 
relative who has been the victim of a crime? (R. 
60:15). 
Are there other people besides those that have already 
raised their hands that are in that situation who have 
a close friend or relative who has been convicted? (R. 
60:18). 
 
¶9 
Bollendorf then asked if anyone was acquainted with or 
knew of people involved in the incident.2  Moreover, Bollendorf 
asked if anyone would have difficulty determining guilt or 
innocence based on the reasonable doubt standard, or whether 
they believed the standard should be different.  Finally, 
Bollendorf asked whether there was any reason why a juror may 
not be able to sit in judgment of another.  
                                                 
2 Bollendorf listed Leeman Jones, Officer Dan Daly, Officer 
Tom Niman, Officer Bobby Pittman, Lamon's family including 
Maggie Lamon and Bobbie Lamon a/k/a Bobbie Goode.  
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 Defense counsel, Jeffery Livingston (Livingston), then 
conducted his voir dire.  None of the prospective jurors 
responded to the following questions: 
Whether anyone had dealings with his law office under 
its current or past name.  (R. 60:21). 
Had anyone been prosecuted for a traffic crime?  (R. 
60:21). 
Did anyone feel they could not hold the state to the 
high burden of beyond a reasonable doubt?  (R. 60:21). 
Did anyone believe that a police officer made for a 
more believable witness? (R. 60:22). 
Did anyone believe that Lamon must have done something 
wrong to be in this position? (R. 60:22). 
Did anyone feel they would have a hard time judging 
the State's case without hearing Lamon testify, and 
would anyone hold it against the defense if the 
defense argued the State did not meet its burden and 
then the defense did not put on its own case? (R. 
60:23). 
¶11 The attorneys then exercised their peremptory strikes.  
Out 
of 
the 
presence 
of 
the 
jury 
Livingston 
challenged 
Bollendorf's peremptory strike of Bell.  Livingston made a 
Batson challenge, asking for a race-neutral explanation of the 
strike, on grounds that the defendant was African-American, and 
the prosecutor struck the only African-American on the panel.  
Livingston also pointed out that the victim appeared to be 
approximately the same age and the same race as the juror who 
was struck. 
¶12 The circuit court noted that Bell was the only 
African-American juror and noted that Bollendorf did not ask 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
6 
 
individual questions.  The circuit court then asked Bollendorf 
for a reason for her peremptory strike. 
¶13 Bollendorf responded giving several reasons for her 
strike.  First, Bollendorf said that her office and the federal 
prosecutor have prosecuted a number of Bells who live in Beloit 
through the years, and it is a well-known criminal name in 
Beloit.  Next, Bollendorf pointed out that Bell's address is in 
a high crime area in Beloit and that the State obtained police 
reports evidencing police contacts at that address.  These 
contacts, according to Bollendorf, ranged from civil processes 
to stolen vehicles.  Bollendorf argued that Bell in the venire 
may be related to the people at that address, and that there was 
a number of police contacts at Bell's address, yet Bell did not 
answer the State's question regarding contact with their office 
or with law enforcement officers.  Bollendorf also argued that 
Bell's juror card listed his employment as "varies." 
¶14 In response to the prosecutor's answers, Livingston 
said that Bell is a fairly common name; Bell did not respond to 
the question about family members dealing with the district 
attorney's 
office; 
and 
Bollendorf 
did 
not 
question 
Bell 
individually as to whether he was related to the Bell family 
involved in criminal activity.  Livingston also stated that the 
police contacts at Bell's address were mostly civil in nature, 
and that Bollendorf did not inquire individually into Bell's 
residence at that address.  Livingston argued that Bollendorf 
could have asked Bell questions about these circumstances 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
7 
 
individually, and asked the court to individually voir dire 
Bell.  
¶15 Bollendorf argued that Exhibit 1, the exhibit listing 
police contacts at Bell's address, clearly shows contacts with 
people named Bell.  Bollendorf reiterated her concern that Bell 
was not completely forthright and honest as a prospective juror, 
because he did not answer the questions about whether a relative 
had been convicted or the victim of a crime.  This question was 
important because there was an incident at Bell's address where 
a "Mrs. Bell" reported her husband stole the car for purposes of 
supporting a drug habit.  Bollendorf asserted that a lack of 
response from Bell the first time indicated he may not respond 
forthrightly with further voir dire, and the State didn't want 
to appear to single him out.  
¶16 The circuit court found that Bollendorf had just cause 
for the peremptory strike, but did not elaborate on its 
decision.  As a result Bollendorf's peremptory strike was 
allowed to stand.  
¶17 At trial, the jury found Lamon guilty of armed robbery 
on April 15, 1999.  On May 24, 1999, Lamon pled guilty to the 
charge of repeat offender and was sentenced to an indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed 20 years.  
¶18 Lamon filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial 
on the grounds that the State's reasons offered for the 
peremptory challenge were not sufficient justifications.  The 
circuit court, Honorable Daniel T. Dillon presiding, denied the 
motion on November 20, 2000, finding, inter alia, that it was 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
8 
 
reasonable for Bollendorf to conclude Bell was being less than 
candid in not mentioning these police contacts in which the 
victim presumably resided at the Bell residence. 
¶19 The circuit court also determined that it was not 
necessary for the State to question Bell in front of the other 
jurors in order to prove the reason for the strike.  
¶20 Lamon appealed and on April 4, 2002, the court of 
appeals held that Lamon failed to prove that the State did not 
have a race-neutral reason to strike Bell.  The court of appeals 
held that the circuit court's ruling was not clearly erroneous 
to accept the prosecutor's explanation that she did not ask Bell 
individual 
questions 
because 
she 
thought 
some 
of 
Bell's 
responses were not completely forthright and honest, and that 
she did not want to single Bell out. 
¶21 Lamon petitioned this court for review.  We granted 
review on September 26, 2002. 
 
II. PEREMPTORY STRIKES, THE BATSON TEST AND ITS PROGENY 
 
¶22 Wisconsin 
has adopted the 
Batson 
principles and 
analysis.  See State v. Davidson, 166 Wis. 2d 35, 39-40, 479 
N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, 
244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711.  For that reason, it is 
necessary that we begin our analysis with a summary of 
peremptory challenges and the Batson analysis.  
¶23 Originating in English common law, the peremptory 
challenge is part of the fabric of our jury system and allows 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
9 
 
parties to strike a potential juror without a reason stated, 
without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's 
control.3  The purpose of the peremptory strike is to eliminate 
extremes of partiality on both sides and help ensure that jurors 
will decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented.  
Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).  As a result, even though the 
peremptory strike is not constitutionally required, the United 
States Supreme Court said over a century ago that the peremptory 
challenge is "essential to the fairness of trial by jury."  
Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J. concurring) (citing Lewis 
v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)). 
¶24 A 
defendant's 
challenge 
to 
the 
State's 
use 
of 
peremptory strikes to deliberately remove jurors from the venire 
because of race was initially addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Swain, 380 U.S. 202.  In that case the Court held that 
in order for a defendant to make a prima facie showing that the 
State had used peremptory strikes in contravention of equal 
protection principles, the defendant was required to show that a 
prosecutor had a pattern of using such strikes in a racially 
discriminatory manner "in case after case".  Id. at 223.  The 
high standard was set based on a belief that any limitation 
would radically alter the traditional unfettered nature of 
peremptory strikes.  Id. at 221-22.  See also, Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 98. 
                                                 
3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103-05 (1986) 
(Marshall, J. concurring) for a detailed history of peremptory 
strikes. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 In 
1986 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
affirmed 
the 
prosecutor's general right to exercise peremptory strikes for 
any reason related to the prosecutor's view of the case outcome.  
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.  However, the Supreme Court held that: 
"the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge 
potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the 
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable 
impartially to consider the State's case against a black 
defendant." 
Id. 
 
In 
Batson, 
the 
Court 
rejected 
Swain's 
"crippling" evidentiary burden for making a prima facie case of 
equal protection violation, and held that a defendant could 
establish a prima facie case by relying solely on the facts of 
his or her case.  Id. at 91-92, 96. 
¶26 In reaching its decision, the Batson Court held that 
the "invidious quality" of government action alleged to be 
racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause "must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose."  Id. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
240 (1976)).4 
                                                 
4 "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent 
as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies 
that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course 
of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite 
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."  Hernandez 
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (citing Personnel Adm' of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
11 
 
¶27 As a result, the Batson Court outlined a three-step 
process for determining if a prosecutor's peremptory strikes 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 96-98. 
¶28 First, in order to establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory intent, a defendant must show that: (1) he or she 
is a member of a cognizable group and that the prosecutor has 
exercised 
peremptory 
strikes 
to 
remove 
members 
of 
the 
defendant's race from the venire,5 and (2) the facts and relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
peremptory strikes to exclude venirepersons on account of their 
race.  Id. at 96.  The circuit court must consider all relevant 
circumstances in determining whether a defendant made the 
requisite showing.  Those circumstances include any pattern of 
strikes 
against 
jurors 
of 
the 
defendant's 
race 
and 
the 
prosecutor's voir dire questions and statements. The Batson 
Court expressed "confidence that trial judges, experienced in 
supervising 
voir 
dire, 
will 
be 
able 
to 
decide 
if 
the 
circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against 
black jurors."  Id. at 97. 
¶29 Under the second step of Batson, if the circuit court 
finds that the defendant has established a prima facie case, 
"the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral 
                                                 
5 A defendant of whatever race is entitled to a jury 
selected without discrimination.  See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400 (1991).  See also State v. Lopez, 173 Wis. 2d 724, 728, 496 
N.W.2d 617 (1992). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
12 
 
explanation for challenging [the dismissed venireperson]."  Id.  
The prosecutor's explanation must be clear, reasonably specific, 
and related to the case at hand.  Id. at 98 n.20.  However, the 
prosecutor's 
explanation 
need 
not 
rise 
to 
the 
level 
of 
justifying exercise of a strike for cause.  Id. at 97-98. 
¶30 At the second Batson step, a "neutral explanation" 
means an explanation based on something other than the race of 
the juror.  Id. at 98.  Facial validity of the prosecutor's 
explanation is the issue.  Unless discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, "the reason offered 
will be deemed race neutral."  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. 
Unless the prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike with the 
intent of causing disparate impact, that impact itself does not 
violate the principle of race neutrality.  Id. at 362. 
¶31 A prosecutor's reasons for his or her peremptory 
challenge need not rise to the level of a for cause challenge.  
According to Purkett, the explanation proffered at the second 
step need not be "persuasive, or even plausible." Purkett v. 
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).  Purkett clarified Batson's 
requirement for a clear and reasonably specific explanation of 
legitimate 
reasons, 
related 
to 
the 
particular 
case, 
for 
exercising a challenged peremptory strike.  The Purkett court 
said:  
This warning was meant to refute the notion that a 
prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by 
merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 
by merely affirming his good faith.  What it means by 
a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
13 
 
sense, 
but 
a 
reason 
that 
does 
not 
deny 
equal 
protection.  
Id. at 769.  Moreover, as noted previously, the Court in Purkett 
said that even a "silly or superstitious" reason, if facially 
nondiscriminatory, satisfies the second step of Batson.  Id. at 
768. 
¶32 Finally, the third step of Batson requires that when 
the prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation, the circuit 
court has the duty to weigh the credibility of the testimony and 
determine 
whether 
purposeful 
discrimination 
has 
been 
established.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.  As part of this third 
step, a defendant may show that the reasons proffered by the 
State are pretexts for racial discrimination.  State v. Walker, 
154 Wis. 2d 158, 176 n.11, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990).  The defendant 
then has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the 
prosecutor purposefully discriminated or that the prosecutor's 
explanations were a pretext for intentional discrimination.  
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, 98.  Therefore, it is at this step 
that the issue of persuasiveness and plausibility of the 
prosecutor's reasons for the strike become relevant, and 
"implausible or fantastic justifications may [] be found to be 
pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 
768. 
¶33 In addition to accepting "silly", "superstitious" 
justifications for striking a juror, intuitive strikes have been 
upheld as valid strikes.  United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 
861 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1988).  See also United States v. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
14 
 
Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
adequate explanations for exercising a peremptory strike may 
include a prosecutor's "intuitive assumptions that are not 
fairly quantifiable."). 
¶34 Applying Batson and its progeny, the rule today is 
that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated simply because 
there is a racially discriminatory or a disparate impact.  Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show 
a violation of the Equal 
Protection 
Clause. 
 
As 
noted 
previously, the Court in Hernandez said: "Discriminatory purpose 
[] implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences.  It implies that the decisionmaker [] selected 
[] a particular course of action at least in part because of, 
not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  
¶35 Despite the protections outlined in the three-part 
test of Batson, Lamon contends that discrimination in jury 
selections 
"remains 
widespread." 
(Pet'r 
Br. 
at 
7). 
 
We 
recognized 13 years ago that racial discrimination in the jury 
selection process harms three distinct groups.  Walker, 154 
Wis. 2d 158 at 171.  First, defendants are harmed when racial 
discrimination infects the jury selection process.  Id.  Second, 
the rights of the excluded jurors are violated when they are 
denied the opportunity to serve as jurors on account of race.  
Id. (citing Batson at 86-87). Third, society is harmed because 
such discriminatory procedures undermine public confidence in 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
15 
 
the fairness of our system of justice.  Id.  That being said, we 
believe that the three-part Batson test acknowledges those 
potential dangers, and guards against the deprivation of equal 
protection.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
 
III. ISSUES 
 
¶36 This court is presented with two issues.  First, we 
must answer whether the circuit court's application of the 
Batson test was incomplete, so that our review should be de 
novo. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. 
¶37 Based 
on 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in 
Hernandez, we hold that the appropriate standard of review is 
clearly erroneous.6  Given the similar facts of this case, the 
determination of the credibility of prospective jurors and 
attorneys by the circuit court will be given great deference, 
and will not be overturned unless it was clearly erroneous.  
Here, the circuit court judge was present during the voir dire, 
and thus, had sufficient opportunity to observe the prospective 
juror and to ascertain the credibility of Bollendorf's reasons 
for her peremptory strike of Bell. 
¶38 Second, we must determine whether it was clearly 
erroneous 
for 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge 
to 
permit 
the 
                                                 
6 We recognize that Hernandez addresses federalism issues 
about review of state court and federal court decisions.  While 
we are not presented with any federalism issues, we nevertheless 
cite the Hernandez case for the proposition that the appropriate 
standard of review is clearly erroneous. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
16 
 
prosecution's peremptory challenge of Bell to stand.  We hold 
that under the totality of the circumstances in this case, 
individual questions did not have to be asked of the stricken 
juror, Bell.  Bollendorf proffered several race-neutral reasons 
for the strike, reinforced with evidence demonstrating a lack of 
discriminatory intent.  The primary credibility determination 
relates to the proponent of the strike, and the circuit court 
judge 
is 
in 
the 
best 
position 
to 
make 
an 
appropriate 
determination.  The record in this case supports the circuit 
court's decision to allow Bollendorf's peremptory strike to 
stand.  As a result, we hold that the circuit court decision was 
not clearly erroneous in accepting Bollendorf's reasons for 
striking Bell in this case. 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶39 We must first determine the appropriate standard of 
review. 
¶40 Lamon argues that, although the general rule set forth 
in Batson and Hernandez is to apply a clearly erroneous 
standard, the facts of this case warrant de novo review.  Based 
on Holder v. Welborn, 60 F.3d 383, 388 (7th Cir. 1995), de novo 
review is appropriate because the circuit court did not have the 
opportunity to assess the credibility of the stricken juror.  
Lamon maintains that the lack of voir dire of Bell in this case 
prevented the circuit court judge, Judge Edwin C. Dahlberg, from 
determining Bell's credibility, which is essential in making a 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
17 
 
proper step three Batson evaluation.  Accordingly, Lamon argues 
that a basis for deference does not exist in this case, and 
therefore, this court should apply a de novo standard of review.   
¶41 As noted previously, we affirm the court of appeals' 
application of the clearly erroneous standard of review as 
established in Batson and Hernandez.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 
n.21; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364.  The Court in Batson held that 
discriminatory intent is a question of fact decided by the 
circuit judge.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.  Moreover, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that, like any other factual finding, a trial 
court's conclusion on the issue of discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges at step three should be given great 
deference.  Id.  See also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364. 
¶42 In reaching that decision the Batson Court held that 
the trial court judge is in the best position to determine the 
credibility of the state's race-neutral explanations, so great 
deference will be given to that ruling.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 
n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 
(1985)). 
¶43 The general rule in Batson remains good law, and was 
reiterated and emphasized in Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.  
Hernandez held that the circuit court's finding on the issue of 
discriminatory intent should not be overturned unless it is 
found that the determination was clearly erroneous.  Id. at 369. 
The Hernandez Court explained: 
Deference to trial court findings on the issue of 
discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
18 
 
context because, as we noted in Batson, the finding 
"largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." In 
the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive 
question 
will 
be 
whether 
counsel's 
race-neutral 
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be 
believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing 
on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the 
demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.  
As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of 
the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and 
credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's 
province."  
Id. at 365 (citations omitted). 
¶44 As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that 
the 
trial 
court's 
decision 
on 
the 
ultimate 
question 
of 
discriminatory 
intent 
represents 
a 
finding 
of 
fact, 
the 
Hernandez court expressly rejected the notion of independent 
appellate review and said: 
We have difficulty understanding the nature of 
the 
review 
petitioner 
would 
have 
us 
conduct.  
Petitioner 
explains 
that 
"[i]ndependent 
review 
requires the appellate court to accept the findings of 
historical fact and credibility of the lower court 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Then, based on 
these 
facts, 
the 
appellate 
court 
independently 
determines whether there has been discrimination."  
But if an appellate court accepts a trial court's 
finding that a prosecutor's race-neutral explanation 
for his peremptory challenges should be believed, we 
fail to see how the appellate court nevertheless could 
find 
discrimination. 
 
The 
credibility 
of 
the 
prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the 
equal protection analysis, and once that has been 
settled, there seems nothing left to review. 
Id.  at 366-67 (citations omitted).7 
                                                 
7 See also United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 
94, 5th Cir. (Tex. 1988)(holding that a "clearly erroneous" or 
"great deference" standard of review is applied in the federal 
court when reviewing a Batson challenge) (internal citations 
omitted). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
19 
 
¶45 Wisconsin law is in accord with the U.S. Supreme 
Court, holding that discriminatory intent is a question of 
historical fact, and the clearly erroneous standard of review 
applies at each step of the Batson analysis.  State v. Gregory, 
2001 WI App 107, ¶5, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711; State v. 
Lopez, 173 Wis. 2d 724, 496 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1992). 
¶46 However, as pointed out by Lamon, there is an 
exception, recognized by some courts, to the general rule of 
giving deference to the lower court.  According to this 
exception, de novo review is appropriate if the trial court 
judge does not have an opportunity to evaluate credibility.  
Holder, 60 F.3d at 388 (7th Cir. 1995).  In Holder, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a trial court judge is 
not in a position to observe the members of the venire as they 
answered questions in order to make credibility determinations, 
deference will not be given to the decision and a de novo 
standard of review is appropriate.  Id. 
¶47 In Holder the habeas court held a Batson hearing eight 
years after the original voir dire and trial.  The habeas judge 
and the magistrate conducting the Batson hearing had not been 
present at the original voir dire proceeding, and "therefore did 
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the members 
of the venire as they answered the questions posed by the 
attorneys."  Id.  Furthermore, the attorneys had little memory 
of the actual voir dire.  Consequently, the habeas court was in 
no better position to judge the credibility of the prosecutor or 
the eliminated jurors than the appellate court. In light of the 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
20 
 
aforementioned circumstances, great deference to the trial 
court's decision was not warranted, and the appellate court 
applied a de novo standard of review.  Id. 
¶48 Using Holder, Lamon asserts that de novo review is 
required in this case because the reasons set forth for 
application of the clearly erroneous standard in Batson and 
Hernandez do not apply here.  It is argued that Judge Dahlberg 
was unable to evaluate the credibility of Bell; therefore, the 
basis of the Hernandez rule does not apply. 
¶49 As noted previously both Batson and Hernandez state 
that the trial court's decision enjoys great deference because 
that judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility 
of the juror and the credibility of the prosecutor's proffered 
reasons for using a peremptory strike. 
¶50 Like the magistrate in Holder, who was unable to 
evaluate the credibility of the juror, Lamon argues that Judge 
Dahlberg was not privy to an individual voir dire of Bell.  As a 
result, this court should apply the de novo standard of review 
in Holder when examining prosecutorial or juror credibility.     
¶51 Conversely, 
the 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
clearly 
erroneous standard should apply.  Great deference should be 
given to the circuit court judge here because he was present to 
personally observe and to ascertain the credibility of the 
attorneys and jurors.  The State maintains that Holder is not 
the controlling standard of review for the case at bar, because 
the procedural circumstances in Holder are distinguishable.  In 
Holder the Batson hearing was conducted eight years after the 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
21 
 
original voir dire and trial, and the presiding judge and 
magistrate were not present at the original voir dire.  In 
contrast, here, the circuit court judge was able to oversee the 
entire voir dire process. 
¶52 We agree with the State's arguments.  Although Lamon 
attempts to rely on Holder in support of his argument that the 
de novo standard is the appropriate standard of review, Holder 
is procedurally distinguishable and not controlling in this 
case.  Holder, 60 F.3d 383. 
¶53 Unlike the magistrate in Holder, the record in this 
case illustrates that the circuit court judge had sufficient 
opportunity to examine the credibility of the prosecutor's 
justifications for the strike.  In this case, Judge Dahlberg had 
other first-hand information concerning the prospective juror 
along 
with 
the 
opportunity 
to 
observe 
personally 
Bell's 
response.  Hernandez held that it is the province of the trial 
judge to weigh credibility because of the nature of that 
position, but did not hold that credibility could only be 
established through hearing personalized voir dire questions and 
answers.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.  Moreover, a juror's 
responses to voir dire may not be the judge's sole piece of 
information to be weighed in a circuit court judge's evaluation 
in a Batson hearing determination.  As previously noted, in the 
third step of Batson the court evaluates the overall credibility 
of the prosecutor's proffered explanations.  Discriminatory 
intent, if it were present, would emanate from the attorney 
striking the juror.  Hence, the judge's interpretation of the 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
22 
 
attorney's credibility is a key factor, and any juror's 
responses would only supplement that decision.  In this case the 
circuit 
court 
judge 
had 
ample 
opportunity 
to 
weigh 
the 
prosecutor's credibility. 
¶54 This case involves the same type of situation that was 
present in Hernandez.  This case involves the striking of a 
potential juror who is of the same race as the defendant.  The 
circuit court judge in this case was in the best position to 
evaluate the level of Bollendorf's knowledge of information 
relating to Bell, in combination with Bell's non-responsiveness 
to the general voir dire.  As in Hernandez, the circuit court 
judge in this case chose to believe the State's race-neutral 
explanations for the challenge.  Hernandez held that such a 
determination was a pure issue of fact under Batson and was 
subject to review under a deferential standard.  Hernandez, 500 
U.S. at 364.  In reaching its decision the Hernandez Court held 
that a clearly erroneous standard was in accord with the 
treatment of that issue in other equal protection cases.  Id. at 
364-70. 
¶55 It is important to note that an inflexible rule 
applying a clearly erroneous standard in all cases may be 
troublesome in certain situations.  Therefore, in limited 
situations where the fact that a member of the venire has not 
been questioned individually contributes to the totality of the 
circumstances disproving the credibility of the explanation 
offered by the prosecution, 
de novo 
review 
may be the 
appropriate standard, as it was in Holder. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
23 
 
¶56 Lamon is correct that lack of personalized voir dire 
of a juror may be a factor, which inhibits a judge's evaluation 
of credibility in peremptory challenge explanations.  However, 
inhibiting is not equivalent to removing the ability to 
determine.  A judge could have a basis for making a credibility 
determination without individualized voir dire.  As in this 
case, a judge could use other pieces of information, or 
"factors" to determine credibility.  Here, the circuit court 
judge relied on, inter alia, Bell's lack of response to general 
voir dire questions.  This appeared to show a lack of candor, 
when combined with the information in the police report. 
¶57 As a result, we hold that based on the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Hernandez, the facts of this case require us 
to give deference to the circuit court.  Thus, we will not 
overturn the circuit court's decision unless we find it to be 
clearly erroneous. 
¶58 We hold that under the circumstances of this case the 
prosecutor was not required to ask individual questions of the 
stricken juror.  The totality of the circumstances here convince 
us that de novo review is not required. 
 
V. 
ARGUMENTS 
ABOUT 
RACE-NEUTRAL 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR 
PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
24 
 
¶59 Given the long history of racial discrimination in 
jury selection, Lamon asks this court to reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals, and remand the case for a new trial.8 
¶60 With regard to step three of the Batson test, Lamon 
maintains the prosecutor, without asking Bell individual voir 
dire 
questions, 
illustrated 
evidence 
of 
modern-day 
jury 
selection 
discrimination. 
 
Lamon 
argues 
that 
peremptory 
challenges cannot be based solely on race, yet Bell was the only 
African-American in the venire.  Lamon argues, inter alia, that 
it is the circuit court's guidance in making the decision to 
uphold the peremptory strike, rather than the sufficiency of the 
reasons given by Bollendorf, that must be examined.  Lamon 
asserts that the totality of the circumstance test plus "other 
factors" established in Walker should be used during step three 
of the Batson test because the judge must weigh the totality of 
the circumstances. (Pet'r Br. at 10) (citing Walker, 154 
Wis. 2d at 174-175).  In support of this argument, Lamon argues 
that courts in other jurisdictions have held that the failure to 
voir dire a stricken juror is a factor in showing discriminatory 
intent. 
¶61 Lamon argues that the State's refusal to conduct 
individual voir dire of Bell raises the inference that the State 
knew its race-neutral reasons for the strike would not be 
supported by the facts.  In addition, Lamon maintains that the 
                                                 
8 Neither the State, nor Lamon challenges the validity of 
steps one and two of the Batson test.  (Pet'r Br. at 7 and 9). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
25 
 
State's evidence in Exhibit 1, a list of police contacts at 
Bell's address, was not sufficient to support any proffered 
race-neutral claims.  To the contrary, Lamon claims that the 
list does not conclusively prove that any arrests or convictions 
occurred at Bell's address.  One contact with someone named Bell 
was civil in nature and the other ended in a withdrawn 
complaint.  Additionally, Lamon claims that the evidence does 
not sufficiently prove whether prospective juror Bell lived at 
that address at the time of any of the listed occurrences.  
Finally, Lamon contends that Bell is a common name and should 
not necessitate an assumption of crime association. 
¶62 Lamon maintains prospective juror Bell did not fail to 
disclose anything during the general voir dire.  The State never 
specifically asked the venire whether any of them had "contact" 
with police, yet the State claimed one of the reasons for 
striking Bell was that he did not respond to questions about 
having contact with law enforcement officers. 
¶63 Lamon further contends that the State prejudged Bell 
when the State claimed that Bell might not have been forthright 
if asked follow-up questions.  The failure to ask follow-up 
questions, according to Lamon, is demonstrative evidence of the 
prosecutor's discriminatory intent. 
¶64 Next, Lamon argues that both the Gregory holding and 
the findings in the post-conviction motion are contradictory and 
should be ignored.  Gregory, 244 Wis. 2d 65.  Lamon contends 
that Gregory states that the decision in a Batson ruling must be 
made before the jury is sworn; thus, the State should not be 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
26 
 
able to rely on the findings of the post-conviction motion.  
Id., ¶14.  As such, Lamon argues that reliance on Judge Daniel 
T. Dillon's post-conviction findings would overrule Gregory.  
Alternatively, Lamon argues that Gregory is not applicable to 
this case because the juror who was struck in Gregory was 
questioned individually.9 
¶65 Beyond the refusal to individually voir dire Bell, 
Lamon argues that the State's use of certain terms and phrases 
was discrimination in disguise.  For example, Lamon contends 
that "high crime area" was code for "black neighborhood," and 
"varied employment" was code for "unemployed person."10 
¶66 Moreover, 
Lamon 
contends 
the State's 
claim 
that 
"individual questions for Bell would have singled him out" does 
not qualify as a race-neutral reason.  Lamon notes that the 
prosecutor singled out white jurors for individual voir dire; 
therefore, asking Bell questions would not have isolated him. 
                                                 
9  We need not address whether the holding in Gregory 
negates examining the post-conviction motion findings because 
the findings of that motion by a different circuit court judge 
are not necessary in determining the outcome of this case. 
10 "However, when attempting to prove the reasons given by 
the prosecutor were pretextual, the focus must be on what the 
prosecutor knew about the potential juror when he made the 
strike (citing Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 
1992)). Therefore, if a defendant is attempting to prove the 
prosecutor's reasons for the strike were pretextual, a defendant 
must 
show 
either 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
intentionally 
misrepresented the facts he said he relied on or that he had 
been told those facts but he knew they were erroneous."  State 
v. Gregory, 2001 
WI App 
107, ¶14, 
244 
Wis. 2d 65, 630 
N.W.2d 711. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
27 
 
¶67 Finally, given the above arguments, Lamon argues a new 
trial is warranted because the commission of a Batson error is 
not harmless error.  Lamon cites a Second Circuit decision, 
Tankleff, where the court held a Batson error is a "structural 
error," which is not subject to harmless error review.  Tankleff 
v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998). 
¶68 The State disagrees and asserts that even though the 
law has expanded to protect against discrimination since Batson, 
the right to exercise peremptory challenges is still protected. 
Additionally, the State asserts that evidence of a potentially 
discriminatory 
or 
disparate 
impact 
is 
not 
sufficient 
to 
establish a Batson violation.  To the contrary, discriminatory 
intent must be proven, and according to Purkett v. Elem, 514 
U.S. 765, 769, 775 (1995), almost any legitimate explanation 
given for a strike could satisfy the second step of Batson. 
¶69 The State maintains that Bollendorf gave several race-
neutral reasons for using her peremptory strike.  Those reasons 
were based on information obtained before voir dire, and on 
Bollendorf's observations of Bell during voir dire.  The reasons 
given by Bollendorf for her peremptory strike of Bell included: 
(1) that her office and the federal prosecutor have prosecuted a 
number of Bells who live in Beloit through the years, and it is 
a well-known criminal name in Beloit; (2) that Bell's address is 
in a high crime area in Beloit, and that the State obtained 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
28 
 
police reports evidencing police contacts at that address;11 (3) 
that Bell's juror card listed his employment as "varies," which 
goes to his responsibility as a juror; and (4) that Exhibit 1, 
containing the police contacts at Bell's address, spoke for 
itself.  The State further argued that a lack of response from 
Bell during the initial voir dire indicated that he may not 
respond forthrightly with further questioning, and the State 
didn't want to appear to single him out. 
¶70  As stated earlier, the third step of Batson is the 
relevant inquiry in this case.12  In examining that step, Purkett 
held that the burden of persuasion showing a racially motivated 
strike rests with the opponent of the strike.  Purkett, 514 U.S. 
at 767.  The State argues, using the totality of the 
circumstances test, that Lamon did not carry the burden of 
proving discriminatory intent.  The application and outcome of 
the totality of the circumstances test is determined on a case-
by-case basis.  The State maintains that the individual reasons 
given by the prosecutor should be viewed in combination with one 
another. 
                                                 
11 These contacts ranged from civil processes to stolen 
vehicles. The State argued that the Bell in the venire may be 
related to the people at that address. Moreover, there was a 
number of police contacts at Bell's address, yet Bell did not 
answer Bollendorf's question regarding contact with their office 
or with law enforcement officers.  Despite Bell's being listed 
at the address in Exhibit 1, Bell failed to mention anything 
about relatives who may have had contacts at his address. 
12 The State points out that Lamon does not take issue with 
steps one and two of the Batson test. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
29 
 
¶71 In addition, the State argues that Lamon overstates 
the holding in Walker with respect to the totality of the 
circumstances test.  Possible factors that may raise an 
inference of discrimination could contradict each other.  For 
example, failure to examine a juror or singling a juror out 
could each be argued to weigh against race neutrality, so it is 
important to examine the other circumstances surrounding the 
strike. 
¶72 Finally, the State relies on the holding in Davidson, 
which held that individual follow-up questions are not required 
in order to strike a potential juror.  Davidson, 166 Wis. 2d 35.  
Accordingly, the statement that the prosecutor believed Bell 
would not be forthright was based on research combined with 
Bell's unresponsiveness to general voir dire questions.  Hunches 
are permissible when there is no discriminatory intent, and 
discriminatory intent must be proven by the opponent of the 
strike. 
 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD TO THE 
JUSTIFICATION OFFERED 
 
¶73 As noted above, this case concerns the third step of 
the Batson test. 
¶74 Applying the clearly erroneous standard of Hernandez, 
we uphold the decision of the court of appeals that no Batson 
violation occurred. The prosecutor gave credible, race-neutral, 
reasons upon questioning by the court for her peremptory 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
30 
 
challenges.  In this case the record shows that the prosecutor 
had done research about Bell, which stands in stark contrast to 
the prosecutor in Walker who struck the only African-American 
without 
knowing 
anything 
about 
the 
juror. 
 
Walker, 
154 
Wis. 2d 158. 
¶75 In Walker, the defendant, an African-American, was 
charged with armed robbery.  The jury selection consisted of 
twenty possible jurors and only one was an African-American.  
During the voir dire examination of potential jurors, the record 
in Walker showed that African-American venireperson "did not 
answer in a way that would suggest a disqualifying attitude to 
any general questions directed at the pool of jurors by the 
judge or by the lawyers, nor did the court or counsel ask the 
[African-American] 
venireperson 
any 
specific 
questions."  
Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 164. In seating a twelve-person jury the 
prosecutor and defense counsel were each allowed to use 
peremptory challenges to eliminate four of the venirepersons 
from the pool.  The prosecutor in Walker used his third 
peremptory challenge to eliminate the only African-American 
venireperson.  Id.  On review this court found that the record 
in Walker indicated "that every prosecution witness was white 
while all alibi witnesses for the defense were [African-
American]."  Id. at 178.  Moreover, when asked his reason for 
the strike, the prosecutor admitted that he struck the African-
American venireperson "because he knew nothing about him."  Id.  
Upon an independent review of the record, this court found the 
two reasons provided by the prosecutor for using a peremptory 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
31 
 
challenge to strike the only African-American venireperson 
unacceptable. This court said: 
First, 
the 
prosecutor 
denied 
that 
he 
had 
a 
discriminatory motive. The Court in Batson declared 
that the mere denial of discriminatory intent is not 
sufficient 
to 
rebut 
an 
inference 
of 
purposeful 
discrimination.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.  Second, the 
prosecutor 
explained 
that, 
going 
into 
the 
jury 
selection process for Walker's trial, he only had 
information about jurors with juror numbers between 
841 and 906. The black venireperson had a juror number 
of 944. The prosecutor thus stated that he struck the 
black venireperson because he had no information about 
him. This explanation is unacceptable because it is 
not "clear and reasonably specific." Moreover, this 
explanation appears to be pretextual.   
Id. at 178.  Accordingly, this court held that the facts in 
Walker "raise[ed] an inference of purposeful discrimination" on 
behalf of the prosecutor.  Id. 
¶76 Thus, unlike the situation in Walker, Bell's lack of 
response to several questions, in combination with Bollendorf's 
information on Bell, gave support to Bollendorf's explanation 
for her peremptory strike of Bell.  As noted previously, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the matter of credibility 
of a prosecutor's reasons for his or her use of a peremptory 
strike in Miller-El v. Cockrell and said: "Credibility can be 
measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by 
how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by 
whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial 
strategy.  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1029 
(2003).  The Court held that a state court need not make 
detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it.  Id. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
32 
 
¶77 Although it may be argued that Judge Dahlberg did not 
set forth enough reasons for his decision to allow the State's 
strike to stand, such an argument is weakened by the holding in 
Miller-El, where the Court held that it was not necessary to 
make detailed findings so long as the arguments were adequately 
considered.  Id.  
¶78 Determining discriminatory intent under Batson simply 
requires the consideration of the "totality of the relevant 
facts."  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363; see also Walker, 154 Wis. 
2d at 173-74, 179. 
¶79 Turning to the facts of this case, it is undisputed 
that the only African-American juror was struck from the venire, 
and the defendant is African-American.  However, when questioned 
by the circuit court judge, the State offered several race-
neutral reasons for exercising her peremptory challenge against 
Bell. 
 
A. 
Name/Address 
 
¶80 When 
questioned 
why 
she 
struck Bell, 
Bollendorf 
explained that the prosecutor's office, as well as the federal 
prosecuting attorney's office, had prosecuted a number of Bells 
who live in Beloit.  According to Bollendorf, Bell is a well-
known criminal name in Beloit.  Next, the State noted Bell's 
address is in a high crime area in Beloit and that the State 
obtained police reports evidencing police contacts at that 
address.  These contacts ranged from civil processes to stolen 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
33 
 
vehicles.  The State argued that the Bell in the venire may be 
related to the people at that address and that there were a 
number of police contacts at Bell's address, yet Bell did not 
answer the State's question regarding contact with the district 
attorney's 
office 
or 
with 
law 
enforcement 
officers.  
Furthermore, he did not mention anything about relatives who may 
have had contacts, even though, in Exhibit 1, Bells are listed 
at his address. 
¶81 The 
Federal 
Court 
for 
the 
Western 
District 
of 
Wisconsin held in Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F.Supp. 782, 788 
(W.D. Wis. 1994) that a prosecutor's knowledge that a challenged 
juror possessed the same name as known criminals in the area was 
a race-neutral explanation.  Similarly, striking an African-
American juror because of a familial relationship to individuals 
involved in the criminal justice system is a neutral reason to 
strike a juror.  Id. 
¶82 In reaching its decision the Gengler court relied on a 
number of cases.  First, the court relied on United States v. 
Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991), which held that 
striking a potential juror, who was African-American, because 
his brother was once convicted of a crime and because his family 
history 
suggested 
anti-government 
bias, 
were 
race-neutral 
reasons for a peremptory strike. Id. at 1109.  Prior family 
involvement with drug offenses is a race-neutral basis to strike 
such a potential juror.  United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 
1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991) superseded by statute as stated in 
United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388, (11th Cir. 1997).  See 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
34 
 
also United States v. Hughes, 911 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(incarceration of nephew of African-American potential juror is 
a race-neutral reason for a strike). 
¶83 Additionally, when a potential juror has the same last 
name as someone previously convicted by the prosecutor, courts 
have accepted it as a race-neutral reason for a peremptory 
strike.  Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d at 94-95 n.1. 
¶84 In Terrazas-Carrasco the court of appeals held that 
the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that 
a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanic 
veniremen from the jury did not violate defendant's equal 
protection rights.  With respect to the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude the Hispanic veniremen, the 
Fifth Circuit said: 
We "must accept the [inquiring] judge's credibility 
choice" with respect to the prosecutor's reasons. 
Valid reasons for exclusion may include "intuitive 
assumptions" upon confronting a venireman. In Lance, 
we upheld such factors as eye contact, demeanor, age, 
marital status, and length of residence in the 
community as valid grounds for peremptory challenge. 
In this case, the reasons articulated are of the same 
variety. 
Id. at 94-95 (citing United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 
(5th Cir. 1988)).  In footnote one of Terrazas-Carrasco the 
court stated that the valid, race-neutral reasons articulated 
for the peremptory strike in that case "include having the same 
last name as someone previously convicted by the prosecutor; 
age; eye contact; and body language."  Id. at 95 n.1 (emphasis 
added). 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
35 
 
¶85 Along with names, addresses may provide an acceptable 
race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike.  As noted by 
the State in its brief, case law is quite clear that location of 
a venireperson's residence provides a race-neutral reason for a 
peremptory 
strike 
when 
a 
residential 
location 
has 
some 
relationship to the facts of the case.  (Resp't Br. at 22 n.3).  
For example, in United States v. Briscoe, the court upheld a 
peremptory strike where prosecutor's explanation "went well 
beyond a cursory statement that Mr. Jeffries resided on the west 
side of Chicago."  United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 
(7th Cir. 1990).  However, courts have recognized that allowing 
the exclusion of African-American venirepersons simply because 
they live or work in an area frequented by gangs has "an 
enormous potential to disproportionately exclude black jurors in 
most cases involving black gang members."  Williams v. Chrans, 
957 F.2d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1992).  With respect to the issue 
of resident location, the Ninth Circuit said: "[w]hat matters is 
not whether but how [a] residence is used."  United States v. 
Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1992). 
¶86 In support of the proffered race-neutral reasons for 
the peremptory strike the State introduced Exhibit 1 during the 
Batson hearing.  Exhibit 1 listed several law enforcement 
contacts at the address that Bell had listed in his juror 
questionnaire.  One of those contacts involved a complaint about 
a stolen vehicle and parties who were named Bell.  Accordingly, 
Exhibit 1, like the case in Briscoe, explained the nature and 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
36 
 
previous use of the residence, which went beyond a "cursory 
statement" that Bell simply lived in a high crime area.  Id.  
 
B. 
Juror Veracity  
 
¶87 Furthermore, the State argued that Exhibit 1, coupled 
with Bell's lack of response, indicated that he may not respond 
forthrightly to further voir dire questions directed to him.  
Bell's failure to disclose during voir dire any police contacts 
at his residence is a plainly race-neutral justification for 
striking him.  See Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 919-20 (7th 
Cir. 
1998) 
(calling 
the 
prosecutions 
striking 
of 
two 
venirepersons because they failed to disclose that they had been 
previously 
charged 
with 
crimes 
"legitimate 
and 
non-
discriminatory").  See also Baldwin v. State, 732 So.2d 236, 243 
(Miss. 1999) (prosecutor's explanation that venirepersons lived 
in high drug trafficking areas and had family members who had 
been convicted of crimes found to be race-neutral).   
 
C. 
Not Wanting to Single Him Out  
 
¶88 The defense maintains that Bollendorf could have asked 
Bell individual questions on voir dire.  Bollendorf stated that 
she did not want to appear to single Bell out.  While the lack 
of personalized voir dire of a juror may inhibit a judge's 
evaluation of the attorney's credibility in peremptory challenge 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
37 
 
explanations, inhibiting is different than eliminating the 
opportunity to determine credibility altogether.   
¶89 Questioning or failing to question a potential juror 
presents a problematic tautology.  Failing to examine a juror, 
or conversely singling out a juror, can be equally argued to 
weigh against a race neutral justification for a peremptory 
strike.  In Gengler the court held that a prosecutor was allowed 
to rely on information other than individual voir dire to 
provide a basis for his race neutral explanation.  Gengler, 852 
F. Supp. at 789.  According to Gengler individual follow-up 
questions on voir dire are not required in order to strike a 
potential 
juror.  
In 
this 
case 
the 
refusal 
to conduct 
individualized voir dire of Bell may be an isolated factor 
arguably evidencing discriminatory intent.  However, this factor 
alone is not conclusive of discrimination during jury selection.  
In light of the totality of the circumstances, the numerous 
race-neutral reasons proffered by the State outweigh any alleged 
discriminatory intent resulting from the failure to question 
Bell further.  
 
D. 
Unemployment 
 
¶90 The State also explained that Bell's juror card listed 
his employment as "varies," which goes to his responsibility as 
a juror.  The Seventh Circuit has held that unemployment may 
provide a sufficiently race-neutral explanation for a strike.  
United States v. Lewis, 117 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 1997).  In 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
38 
 
reaching that decision the court in Lewis relied on cases which 
recognize 
unstable 
employment, or 
unemployment 
status, as 
sufficient race-neutral explanations for a peremptory strike. 
Id. (citing United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 985, 117 S.Ct. 443, 136 L.Ed.2d 
339 (1996) and United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 230-31, 
(7th Cir. 1992)).  See also United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 
1050, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 1990); State v. Hernandez, 170 Ariz. 
301, at 305, 823 P.2d 1309 (1991). 
 
E. 
Totality of the Circumstances 
 
¶91 It is clear from the record that the evidence in 
Exhibit 1, as well as clear case law, supported Bollendorf's 
explanations for her peremptory strike.  Bollendorf relied on a 
detailed police report of contacts at Bell's address, along with 
her personal knowledge of prosecutions against other persons 
named Bell, and her observations of Bell and his answers during 
voir dire.  Based on the race-neutral reasons offered by 
Bollendorf for her peremptory strike, we find that Lamon did not 
meet the burden of proof required to show that the State's 
reasons were not race-neutral.  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals' decision and hold that the decision of circuit court 
in allowing the strike to stand was not clearly erroneous.  As a 
result, we find no error and need not engage a harmless error 
analysis.  
 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
39 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
¶92 In summary, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.  
The decision of the circuit court was not clearly erroneous when 
it determined that the State's reasons for striking the juror 
were race-neutral; and, therefore, allowed the peremptory strike 
of Bell to stand. The State listed several acceptable race-
neutral reasons for its strike of Bell and provided a detailed 
police report of contacts at Bell's address in support of its 
reasons for the strike.  Although the State did not individually 
question Bell further, Davidson instructs that such questioning 
is not necessary.  Furthermore, under the totality of the 
circumstances test, any alleged discriminatory intent evidenced 
by the prosecutor's decision not to question Bell individually, 
was outweighed by the race-neutral explanations offered.  
¶93 Based on well-settled law, we accord deference to the 
decision of the circuit court in this case and hold it was not 
clearly erroneous to accept the reasons offered by the State in 
justification for its peremptory strike.13 
                                                 
13 Contrary to the hyperbole of the dissent, we do not 
"ignore[] well-established case law."  (Dissent, ¶94).  Rather, 
we have applied the relevant case law from the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the court of appeals, and this court to the facts and 
issues presented. 
The dissent would have us strip away the deference due to 
the circuit court's determinations (Dissent, ¶99) as outlined in 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, and would, in effect, eliminate the 
defendant's ultimate burden of persuasion (Dissent, ¶128).  The 
burden would be placed on the circuit court, not on the 
defendant. 
No. 
00-3403-CR   
 
40 
 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent has forgotten the importance of peremptory 
challenges, 
and 
how 
significant 
such 
challenges 
are 
in 
furthering the purpose of eliminating extremes of partiality on 
either side of a case.  As noted earlier, the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
characterized 
peremptory 
challenges 
as 
"essential to the fairness of trial by jury."  Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 107 (Marshall, J. Concurring)(citing Lewis v. State, 146, 
U.S. at 376, 13 S.Ct. at 138). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶94 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The majority ignores well-established case law.  In so doing, 
the majority prohibitively raises the bar for a defendant 
raising a Batson challenge, lowers the bar for circuit courts 
that conduct Batson hearings, and neglects its duty to review 
circuit court determinations that no Batson violation has 
occurred, 
rendering 
the 
Constitution's 
prohibition on the 
exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race an 
illusion in Wisconsin courts.  I therefore dissent. 
¶95 Justice Thurgood Marshall, concurring in Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), warned that the Batson decision 
would not effectively eliminate discrimination in the selection 
of 
juries 
if 
prosecutors' 
easily 
asserted 
race-neutral 
explanations were simply accepted at face value.14  Justice 
Marshall explained: 
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral 
reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill 
equipped to second-guess those reasons.  How is the 
court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck 
a juror because the juror had a son about the same age 
as the defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or 
"never cracked a smile" and, therefore, "did not 
possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically 
look at the issues and decide the facts in this case"?  
If such easily generated explanations are sufficient 
to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify 
his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection 
erected by the Court today may be illusory.15 
                                                 
14 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, 
J., concurring). 
15 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶96 The majority today approves of the very behavior 
against which Justice Marshall warned.   
¶97 The circuit court in the present case did not fulfill 
its duty under the third step of the Batson analysis.  It upheld 
the prosecutor's peremptory strike of Dondre Bell, the lone 
African-American on the venire, without looking beneath the 
surface of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking 
him and without considering the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding jury selection.  It summarily concluded that the 
State "made its case" without any analysis or findings of fact 
on the ultimate issue of whether the State discriminated when it 
struck Bell.   
¶98 Instead of holding the circuit court to its duty, the 
majority rubber stamps the circuit court's conclusion under the 
guise of deference.  Moreover, the majority misconstrues the law 
to hold that the mere ability to assert easily generated, 
facially neutral reasons for striking a juror discharges the 
State's constitutional obligation to select a jury without 
discriminating on the basis of race, thereby lowering the bar 
for circuit courts that conduct Batson hearings and raising the 
bar for defendants bringing a Batson challenge.  
¶99 This case should be remanded to the circuit court for 
a proper Batson hearing.  First, the law is clear that the 
circuit court has a duty under the third step of the Batson 
inquiry to consider all of the relevant facts surrounding jury 
selection and to determine whether the defendant has met her 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination based on race.  
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Second, since there is no evidence in this case that the circuit 
court fulfilled its duty, the deference normally due its 
determination is inappropriate here.  The majority opinion, far 
from recognizing this fact, fails in its own duty to properly 
review the decision of the circuit court.  Third, had either the 
circuit court or the majority bothered to look, there are ample 
warning signs in this case that the prosecutor's actions were 
driven by the race of the struck venire member and were thus 
unconstitutional.  
A prosecutor's 
historical 
privilege of 
peremptory challenge free of judicial control is limited by the 
constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury 
service on account of race.16 
I 
¶100 This case involves step three of the Batson analysis.  
Under Batson, three steps must be taken for the defendant to 
successfully prove that the State's peremptory challenge of Bell 
violated her constitutional right to equal protection: (1) the 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution 
has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race; (2) if 
the defendant satisfies this threshold, the burden then shifts 
to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral justification 
for 
the 
disputed 
challenges; 
and 
(3) 
if 
a 
race-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the court has a duty to determine 
whether, in light of the proffered justification, the defendant 
has satisfied the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 
                                                 
16 Batson, 476 U.S. at 91. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶101 No dispute exists in the present case that the 
defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination against a 
black juror under the first step of the Batson analysis.  
Likewise, no dispute exists in this case that the State 
articulated race-neutral reasons for challenging the lone black 
juror under the second step of the Batson analysis.  The issue 
presented in this case is whether the circuit court properly 
determined whether the defendant met her burden of establishing 
purposeful discrimination under the third step in the Batson 
analysis.   
¶102 The majority opinion, however, never decides whether 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion under step 
three of the Batson analysis.  The majority errs by conflating 
the second and third steps of the Batson analysis and by 
concluding that the State's satisfaction of step two is 
sufficient, in and of itself, to defeat a charge of purposeful 
discrimination.  The majority opinion concludes, "[B]ased on the 
race-neutral reasons offered by [the prosecutor] for her 
peremptory strike, we find that [the defendant] did not meet the 
burden of proof required to show that the State's reasons were 
not race-neutral."17  Furthermore, the majority opinion holds, 
"The decision of the circuit court was not clearly erroneous 
when it determined that the State's reasons for striking the 
juror were race-neutral; and, therefore, allowed the peremptory 
strike of Bell to stand."18  The majority's conclusions simply 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶91. 
18 Id., ¶92. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
affirm what both parties have already conceded: the State's 
proffered reasons for striking Bell were race-neutral. 
¶103 The step three determination under Batson requires 
more than a conclusion that a prosecutor has put forth race-
neutral reasons for striking a particular juror.19  At step 
three, the circuit court is charged with testing those proffered 
reasons.  A reason that appears on its face to be race-neutral 
may turn out to be, upon further examination, a pretext for 
racial discrimination.  Similarly, a prosecutor may provide a 
reason that is in fact race-neutral, but that upon further 
examination is revealed not to be the actual reason that the 
prosecutor struck the potential juror.20  It is at the third step 
                                                 
19 The Seventh Circuit, in Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 
(7th Cir. 1998), explained: 
A facially neutral reason for striking a juror may 
show discrimination if that reason is invoked only to 
eliminate African-American prospective jurors and not 
others who also have that characteristic. . . . [A] 
procedure that omits the [step three] totality inquiry 
would exonerate the user of peremptories in virtually 
every case, unless the lawyer was foolish enough to 
announce her discriminatory purpose in so many words.  
Batson requires more . . . . 
Id. at 921 (citations omitted). 
20 See, e.g., Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (refusing to accept a list of neutral reasons at face 
value where they were unsupported or refuted by record); 
Davidson v. Harris, 30 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1994) (party's 
justification that African-American juror was likely to be 
sympathetic to the opposing party because she had young children 
was pretextual because white jurors with young children were 
seated on the jury); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 973 (3d Cir. 
1993) (prosecutor's explanation that he struck African-American 
juror because she had a son the same age as the defendant was 
pretextual when white jurors with children of the same age were 
seated). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
that the "persuasiveness of the [race-neutral] justification 
becomes relevant——the step in which the trial court determines 
whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of 
proving purposeful discrimination."21  At the third step, 
"implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) 
be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination."22 
¶104 The touchstone for the third step of the Batson 
inquiry is the credibility of the prosecutor: Does the circuit 
court believe that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation is 
                                                 
21 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
22 Id.  The majority opinion omits the three words "and 
probably will" when quoting this passage, subtly removing the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on the likelihood that such fantastic 
reasons will not be considered sufficient under step three of 
Batson.  See majority op., ¶32.  Moreover, immediately after the 
majority opinion quotes this passage, it incorrectly asserts 
that 
"in 
addition 
to 
accepting 
'silly,' 
'superstitious' 
justifications for striking a juror, intuitive strikes have been 
upheld as valid strikes" under step three.  Majority op., ¶33.  
The cases the majority relies upon for this proposition, United 
States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1988), 
and United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 
1991), are not cases involving a Batson step three analysis. 
In Williams, for example, the Seventh Circuit held only 
that "intuitive assumptions that are not fairly quantifiable" 
are valid race-neutral reasons that a prosecutor may offer for 
excluding a juror at stage two, not that they are valid under 
step three.  Williams, 934 F.2d at 850.  No Batson violation 
occurred in Williams because the district court "considered [the 
prosecutor's] explanation in light of of the circumstances of 
that particular case and concluded that the explanation was 
credible"——the stage three analysis.  Id.  Thus, Williams does 
not stand for the proposition that silly, superstitious, or 
intuitive race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike are 
constitutionally valid.  Rather, Williams stands for the 
proposition that such explanations satisfy the State's burden to 
provide a race-neutral reason at step two of the Batson 
analysis. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
genuine?23  As the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, in many 
cases, the "best evidence often will be the demeanor of the 
attorney who exercises the challenge."24   
¶105 That said, however, an attorney's demeanor is far from 
the only evidence that a circuit court is obligated to consider 
under Batson's third step.25  "A prosecutor's motive may be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."26   
¶106 The third step of the Batson analysis therefore 
imposes a "duty"27 on the circuit court to consider the "totality 
of the circumstances" surrounding jury selection in a given 
                                                 
23 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991). 
24 Id. 
25 In 
State 
v. 
Walker, 
154 
Wis. 2d 158, 
173-75, 
453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990), this court concluded that a court's duty to 
analyze "all relevant circumstances" includes consideration of:  
[W]hether the prosecution has eliminated all members 
of the defendant's race from the panel of prospective 
jurors; whether the race of the defendant or his or 
her witnesses is different than the race of the victim 
or the state's witnesses; whether the excluded jurors 
sharing 
the 
defendant's 
race 
responded 
to 
any 
questions of the judge or the lawyers in a manner that 
made them suitable candidates for exclusion by the 
prosecutor; how many venirepersons share defendant's 
race; and the nature of the crime. 
26 McLain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). 
27 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
case.28  A circuit court faced with a Batson challenge is charged 
with examining the "entire res gestae" of the jury selection 
process;29 when determining whether a prosecutor acted with 
purposeful discrimination, a circuit court must undertake a 
                                                 
28 United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1998) 
("At this [third] step of the analysis, the district court has 
the responsibility to assess the prosecutor's credibility under 
all of the pertinent circumstances, and then to weigh the 
asserted justification against the strength of the defendant's 
prima facie case under the totality of the circumstances."); 
United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) 
("If [the step two] burden is met, the court then addresses and 
evaluates all evidence introduced by each side (including all 
evidence introduced in the first and second steps) that tends to 
show that race was or was not the real reason and determines 
whether the defendant has met his burden of persuasion."); see 
also State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 
N.W.2d 711 (Vergeront, J., dissenting):  
[T]he third step in the Batson analysis is not 
satisfied 
by 
a 
conclusory 
statement 
that 
the 
prosecutor's explanation is race-neutral.  At the 
third step, the trial court has the duty to determine 
if 
the 
defendant 
has 
established 
purposeful 
discrimination.  The duty of assessing the credibility 
of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons embodies the 
"decisive 
question" in 
the Batson 
analysis, and 
requires the trial court to consider all the facts and 
circumstances.   
Id. ¶24 (citations omitted).  
The majority correctly explains that a circuit court must 
consider the "totality of the circumstances" when determining 
whether 
the 
State 
discriminated 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
its 
peremptory strikes.  Majority op., ¶80 (quoting Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991).  The majority errs, however, 
when it asserts that this duty can be fulfilled "simply."  Id.  
See also United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (disapproving of a trial court's conducting its 
review of a Batson application with undue haste and ruling in a 
summary fashion). 
29 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 467 (1996). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
"detailed analysis" of "all of the evidence."30  As the Seventh 
Circuit has explained, "One way or another, a trial court must 
consider all relevant circumstances before it issues a final 
ruling on a defendant's [Batson] motion."31    
¶107 Moreover, 
a 
circuit 
court's 
examination 
of 
the 
totality of the circumstances should include, whenever possible, 
an evaluation of "the differential manner in which the State" 
interacted with minority and nonminority jurors, since the 
"crucial and determinative inquiry" in a Batson claim is whether 
similarly situated venirepersons have been treated differently 
based upon race.32  For example, in its most recent decision 
discussing Batson, the United States Supreme Court identified 
disparate questioning by a prosecutor, that is, a prosecutor's 
altering the way a question asked of all venire members is asked 
                                                 
30 Coulter, 155 F.3d at 920. 
31 Id. at 921 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97).  
32 Coulter, 155 F.3d at 921; Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 
1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A comparative analysis of jurors 
struck and those remaining is a well-established tool for 
exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are 
a pretext for discrimination."); Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 
1313, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-established that 
peremptory challenges cannot be lawfully exercised against 
potential jurors of one race unless potential jurors of another 
race with comparable characteristics are also challenged."). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
of African-American venire members, as "evidence of purposeful 
discrimination" when a defendant raises a Batson claim.33 
¶108 In short, under step three, the circuit court had a 
duty to examine all the relevant facts and the totality of the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
jury selection before 
making an 
express determination as to whether the defendant has satisfied 
the burden of proving discrimination.  The demeanor of the 
prosecutor when announcing race-neutral reasons for exercising a 
                                                 
33 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 
1043 (2003).  The Court also explained that statistical evidence 
of the disproportionate number of strikes used against African-
American 
venire 
members, 
historical 
evidence 
of 
racial 
discrimination by a district attorney's office, and the decision 
to request a "jury shuffle" when a predominate number of 
African-Americans were seated in the front of the jury panel 
provided 
further 
evidence 
for 
a 
court 
to 
consider 
when 
determining whether a Batson violation had occurred.  Miller-El, 
123 S. Ct. at 1043-44. 
The State, in its brief, asserts that Wisconsin need not 
adopt a list of factors to be considered during the third step 
of the Batson analysis, like a number of southern states have 
done, 
because 
Wisconsin 
does 
not 
share 
the 
history 
of 
institutionalized 
race 
discrimination 
experienced 
by 
those 
jurisdictions.  The State points to the recent Wisconsin Public 
Trust and Confidence in the Justice System Study as evidence of 
Wisconsin's good record on racial equality, noting that the 
study "did not identify discriminatory peremptory strikes as a 
cause for concern or remedial action."  (State's Br. at 20).  
What the State does not mention is that participants in focus 
groups "said that race and class matter [in the court system].  
There is a feeling that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to escape bias in the justice system because bias 
permeates all levels-law enforcement, attorneys, judges, juries, 
and corrections officials."  Public Trust & Confidence in the 
Justice 
System: 
The 
Wisconsin 
Initiative 
(October 
2000), 
http://www.wisbar.org/bar/ptc/ptcap.html.  I do not consider it 
significant that citizen 
respondents 
did not 
specifically 
identify "discriminatory peremptory strikes" as a reason, given 
this general finding. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
peremptory strike is merely one piece of evidence for the 
circuit court to consider.  
II 
¶109 In the present case, there is no evidence in the 
record that the circuit court fulfilled its step three duty 
under Batson.34  In a single, conclusory sentence the circuit 
court ruled, "Well, I think the State has made its case and it 
does have just cause for the strike."  It made no findings of 
fact and reached no conclusions of law relevant to the Batson 
inquiry; it made "no effort to comply with the letter, much less 
the spirit, of Batson."35    
¶110 When the circuit court concluded that the State "made 
its case," did it mean that the State provided race-neutral 
reasons?  If so, which reasons provided by the State were race-
neutral?  Were any of them credible?  When the circuit court 
concluded that the State had "just cause for the strike," did it 
mean that the State did not act with purposeful discrimination?  
"The limited record developed in the present case casts doubt on 
the trial court's ability to make the required finding regarding 
the prosecutor's intent, thereby undermining the deference due 
                                                 
34 Both 
the 
majority 
opinion 
and 
the 
State's 
brief 
acknowledge the ambiguity of the circuit court's ruling.  The 
majority writes: "The circuit court found that Bollendorf had 
just cause for the peremptory strike, but did not elaborate on 
its decision.  As a result, Bollendorf's peremptory strike was 
allowed to stand."  Majority op., ¶16.  Similarly, the State 
noted in its brief, "Before reaching [his] summary conclusion, 
Judge Dahlberg did not expressly confirm that Assistant District 
Attorney Bollendorf had proffered race-neutral explanations for 
striking Bell."  (State's Br. at 5). 
35 Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
its conclusion."36  Thus the decision in the present case cannot 
be properly reviewed and the case must be remanded.37 
¶111 Nothing 
in 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
demonstrates that the circuit court looked beyond the State's 
proffered reasons in "making its case" and nothing demonstrates 
that the court considered the totality of the circumstances, all 
the relevant facts, or the entire res gestae of the jury 
selection process.38  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 
2000) ("[T]he limited record developed in the present case casts 
doubt on the trial court's ability to make the required finding 
regarding the prosecutor's intent, thereby undermining the 
deference due its conclusion."); United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 
337, 342 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Without a fuller indication of the 
circumstances that apparently led the district court to this 
conclusion, however, we cannot properly review the decision."). 
38 The relationship between a court's "duty" and the 
opponent of the strike's "burden" under Batson is not unlike the 
relationship 
this 
court 
has 
created 
between 
a 
court's 
"obligation" and the beneficiary of an error's "burden" in 
harmless error review.  It is well established in Wisconsin that 
the beneficiary of an error during trial has the burden of 
proving that the error was harmless, that is, that it is true 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.  See State v. Vanmanivong, 
2003 WI 41, ¶40, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76 (citing State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶40-41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189) 
(citing State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985))).  Yet it is also true that the harmless error rule is 
an injunction on courts requiring that a court address the 
harmless error rule regardless of whether the parties do.  
Harvey, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, 
¶47 
n.12 
(citing 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)).  Similarly, under Batson, even though 
the burden of proving purposeful discrimination is on the 
opponent of the strike, a court has "the duty to determine if 
the 
defendant 
has 
established 
purposeful 
discrimination."  
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
trial court need not make detailed findings addressing all the 
evidence before it, but Batson does require that a trial judge 
make an "ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory 
intent"39 and that the court adequately consider all of the 
relevant information and the totality of the circumstances.40  
The circuit court in the present case did not fulfill its duty 
under the third step of Batson, and a circuit court commits 
error when it denies a Batson motion without making the proper 
step three determination.41  This error undermines the deference 
due the circuit court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, the circuit court did not address whether the 
prosecutor's proffered reasons were pretextual.  The circuit 
court ruled summarily after a brief colloquy and did not 
properly conduct the third Batson step. 
39 United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
40 See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 291 (3d. Cir. 2001) 
("Although the state court is not required to comment on all of 
the evidence before it, an adequate step three Batson analysis 
requires something more than a terse, abrupt comment that the 
prosecutor has satisfied Batson."). 
41 United States v. Thomas, 320 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 
2003); see also Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 287 (3d Cir. 
2001): 
The state courts in this case rejected Riley's Batson 
claim without discussing any of the ample evidence 
that throws into question the explanations offered by 
the prosecutor for striking two of the black jurors 
and there is nothing relevant in the record that might 
otherwise support the state courts' decisions.  Thus, 
we do not know why the state courts found the State's 
explanation was plausible and credible in light of the 
other evidence.  It is because of the state courts' 
omission of a requirement under the third step of the 
Batson inquiry——of an ultimate determination on the 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶112 Furthermore, the majority opinion here fails in its 
duty to review the decision of the circuit court.  The majority 
is correct that under Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 
(1991), a circuit court's determination whether a prosecutor 
intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging a 
prospective juror is a question of historical fact that is 
entitled to deference.  In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 
(2003), however, the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "deference 
does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.  
Deference 
does 
not 
by 
definition 
preclude 
relief."42  
Furthermore, the Miller-El Court emphasized that appellate 
review includes a search for "any evidence demonstrating that, 
despite 
the 
neutral 
explanation 
of 
the 
prosecution, 
the 
peremptory strikes in the final analysis were race based."43 
¶113 As discussed above, the majority opinion's review of 
the circuit court's step three analysis in this case is actually 
an examination of the circuit court's step two analysis.  
Instead of analyzing whether the circuit court erroneously 
                                                                                                                                                             
issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts 
and circumstances——that the State's argument founders. 
42 Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1042 (referring to review in the 
context of habeas relief under Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, where the deference given to trial courts is even 
greater). 
43 Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1042 (referring to examination 
of a Batson claim in the context of a request for a certificate 
of appealability); see also Riley v. Taylor, at 286 ("Deference 
in a Batson case must be viewed in the context of the 
requirement that the state courts engage in the three-step 
Batson inquiry."). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
determined that the State did not violate the equal protection 
clause of the Constitution when it struck Bell from the venire, 
the majority opinion explains that the defendant's prima facie 
case was rebutted when "the State offered several race-neutral 
reasons for exercising her peremptory challenge against Bell."44  
And, instead of reviewing all of the relevant circumstances in 
the record that might bear on the final analysis of whether the 
peremptory strike of Bell was race based, the majority examines 
only the extent to which each of the prosecutor's proffered 
reasons, in a vacuum, was properly considered race-neutral.45  It 
did not, as Miller-El requires, search for any evidence that the 
peremptory strike in the final analysis was race-based. 
¶114 The majority also errs when it focuses exclusively on 
the circuit court's assessment of the prosecutor's subjective 
state of mind when offering race-neutral explanations for her 
strike.  The burden in a Batson challenge is on the defendant, 
and ultimately it is the objective evidence in the record that 
must persuade the circuit court that a race-neutral reason is 
                                                 
44 Majority op., ¶79. 
45 See majority op., ¶¶80-91.  Moreover, the majority 
imputes some of its own conclusions to the circuit court, in an 
effort to bolster the circuit court's determination.  For 
example, the majority asserts that "[h]ere, the circuit court 
judge relied on, inter alia, Bell's lack of response to general 
voir dire questions" and that this silence "appeared to show a 
lack of candor, when combined with the information in the police 
report" when determining if the prosecutor's explanations were 
credible.  Majority op., ¶56.  There is no evidence in the 
record that the circuit court even noticed that Bell did not 
respond to any questions asked during voir dire, let alone 
whether the circuit court drew the conclusion from this silence 
that Bell was being less than honest. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
either pretextual or disingenuous.  "Frequently the most 
probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what 
actually happened;"46 an explanation that is contrary to the 
objective facts is a sure sign of disingenuousness or pretext.  
Only by balancing the prosecutor's expressed subjective intent 
against the totality of the relevant objective evidence can a 
circuit court make its step three determination. 
¶115 In sum, the circuit court did not look beyond the 
State's proffered reasons.  It did not consider the totality of 
the circumstances.  It made no findings of fact and made no 
ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent.  
The circuit court's conclusory statement, "Well, I think the 
State has made its case and it does have just cause for the 
strike," is thus not entitled to the deference usually accorded 
step 
three 
Batson 
findings. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion, 
inappropriately focusing on step two of the Batson analysis, 
completely misses the point. 
III 
¶116 A close examination of the record——an examination that 
includes consideration of the totality of the circumstances——
reveals some disturbing information about jury selection in the 
present case.  In short, there are glaring signs in the record 
that Bell, the lone African-American juror on the venire, was 
singled out and treated differently than all other jurors, in 
part because of his race.  Consequently, had the circuit court 
                                                 
46 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
engaged in the inquiry demanded by Batson, it might have reached 
a different conclusion. 
¶117 The State admits that the day before jury selection in 
the present case, it requested a report from the Beloit Police 
Department listing police contacts at Bell's address.  There is 
no suggestion or indication that the prosecutor made a similar 
request for any other member of the venire.  We do know, 
however, that it is not standard practice for Rock County 
assistant district attorneys to run police checks on the 
addresses of potential jurors.47  
¶118 More importantly, by virtue of this police report, 
Bell became the only member of the venire for whom silence 
during voir dire created grounds for being struck due to lack of 
candor.48  The prosecutor asked a handful of questions during 
                                                 
47 In State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 
N.W.2d 711, a Beloit prosecutor struck the very same potential 
juror, Dondre Bell, the day after he was struck from the venire 
in the present case.  Bell was the lone African-American on that 
venire as well.  The prosecutor justified her strike, in part, 
because she "had received information from another assistant 
district attorney that police had responded to 1216 Wisconsin 
Avenue, Bell's residence, seventeen times between January 1996 
and October 1998."  Id. at ¶9.  Clearly it is not a common 
practice that police checks are made for every juror in every 
case.  
48 More than just creating an avenue for gauging dishonesty, 
the police report made it possible for the prosecutor to strike 
Bell regardless of his answers during voir dire.  She set him 
up.  Had he answered affirmatively to the question whether he 
knew somebody who had been convicted of a crime, the prosecutor 
would have had grounds to use a peremptory strike against him.  
Had he failed to answer that question, as he did here, the 
prosecutor could use the police report as grounds for striking 
him.  No other juror was destined to be struck in advance of 
voir dire as a result of pretrial actions taken by the 
prosecutor. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
voir dire to uncover whether any of the venire members should be 
struck for cause or through her peremptory strikes.  All of the 
questions were designed so that affirmative answers raised 
concerns and a venire member's silence meant that the prosecutor 
should not be concerned.49  For Bell, however, the exact opposite 
was true.  The police report gave the prosecutor additional 
information about Bell that permitted her to construe his 
silence as "not being completely honest."50 
                                                 
49 See majority op., ¶10. 
50 It is worth explaining that Bell did not, in fact, 
evidence any dishonesty by his failure to respond.  The 
prosecutor asked three specific questions about crime of the 
entire venire for which the police report might be used to 
indicate that Bell's silence was dishonesty.  She asked whether 
(1) anyone had had contact with the prosecutor's office; (2) 
anyone had a close friend or relative who had been a victim of 
crime; and (3) anyone had a close friend or relative who had 
been convicted of a crime. 
The police report does not indicate that anybody living at 
Bell's address has ever been arrested, convicted, or prosecuted 
for a crime.  It does not indicate that Bell, the venire member, 
lived at the address during the time of any of the police 
contacts.  It does not show that Bell, the venire member, is 
related to anyone involved in the incidents leading to police 
contact.  In fact, the defendant in Gregory, 244 Wis. 2d 65 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (a case in which Bell, again the lone African-
American on the venire, was struck from the venire based on the 
same police report), submitted a written offer of proof that 
Bell would testify that 
he 
is 
not 
related 
to 
convicted 
cocaine 
dealer 
Christopher Bell; that he did not live at 1216 
Wisconsin Avenue between September, 1995 and May, 1997 
because 
he 
was 
attending 
college 
in 
Marshall, 
Minnesota; that if there were any police contacts at 
all with 1216 Wisconsin Avenue during that period he 
was unaware of them; and that he spent a week on jury 
duty in April, 1999 and was struck from several jury 
panels.   
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶119 This case, therefore, is a classic case of disparate 
questioning with a slight twist.  The prosecutor altered the way 
she would perceive the answers given by Bell as opposed to the 
way she would perceive the same answers from all other venire 
members.  Indeed, Bell, like more than half of the venire 
members, sat silently through the prosecutor's questions, but he 
was the only silent venire member who was peremptorily struck by 
the prosecutor.51 
¶120 The circuit court did not pay any attention to this 
information before it.  The circuit court never considered that 
the prosecutor had not obtained police reports for any of the 
other venire members or any of the other listed addresses for 
the venire members.52  The circuit court never considered whether 
there was reason to infer a lack of candor or dishonesty from 
the silence of any of the other eleven silent venire members.53  
                                                                                                                                                             
Gregory, Appellant's Br. at 9. 
Thus, the prosecutor's decision to strike Bell out of a 
concern that he would be dishonest was, as she admitted during 
the Batson hearing, merely an assumption, not a decision based 
on fact. 
51 The record reveals that the venire in this case consisted 
of 20 people and that eleven jurors aside from Bell sat silently 
through the entire jury selection.  Bell was the only juror who 
sat silently who was struck by the prosecutor. 
52 If a police check was run on other jurors as well, what 
did the police reports indicate?  Did any of those jurors have 
contact with the police that they did not admit during voir 
dire? 
53 The record does not reveal whether any other members of 
the venire had indicated that they were unemployed or that their 
employment "varies."  See Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 
(E.D. Pa. 1991): 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
Neither does the majority opinion.  In fact, the majority 
opinion commends the prosecutor, without flinching, for relying 
on the police report.54   
¶121 The heart of the Batson inquiry in this case, in my 
opinion, is the role that race played in the prosecutor's 
decision to seek out a police report for Bell and not for any 
other member of the venire.  Why was Bell not treated the same 
as other venire members?55 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because 
there 
is 
a 
far 
greater 
percentage 
of 
unemployed 
minorities 
than 
there 
are 
unemployed 
persons in the general population, giving prosecutors 
carte blanche to strike jurors simply because they are 
unemployed creates a far smaller pool of potential 
minority jurors. . . . Peremptory strikes on the basis 
of 
unemployment 
should 
therefore 
be 
considered 
suspect. 
54 Majority op., ¶74 ("In this case the record shows that 
the prosecutor had done research about Bell, which stands in 
stark contrast to the prosecutor in Walker who struck the only 
African-American without knowing anything about the juror."). 
It is worth noting that the circuit court, in its post-
conviction order, also commended the prosecutor for doing "her 
homework on Mr. Bell."  The majority does not give any deference 
to the post-conviction order in this case, contrary to the 
State's request.  I agree that the post-conviction decision is 
entitled to no deference here as it did not take any new 
evidence or establish any new facts. 
55 At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor stated that she did 
not ask Bell individual questions about the police report during 
voir dire because she did "not want to appear as though [she] 
was singling him out under the circumstances."  The circuit 
court accepted this explanation without hesitation.  The 
majority goes so far as to sympathize with the predicament in 
which the prosecutor found herself——accused of discrimination if 
she did not ask Bell individualized questions and accused of 
discrimination if she did.  Majority op., ¶89.  What neither the 
circuit 
court 
nor 
the 
majority 
appreciates 
is 
that 
the 
prosecutor had already singled out Bell when she obtained and 
used the police report during voir dire.    
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶122 The record makes clear that the prosecutor was well 
aware of Bell's race in advance of voir dire.  Any citizen who 
is placed on a venire in Wisconsin must fill out a juror 
questionnaire.  The juror questionnaire is required by law to 
include the race of the prospective juror as well as the address 
and occupation of each person.56  The logical inference to be 
drawn from the record is that the prosecutor here had access to 
information from this questionnaire, for she knew both that Bell 
would be in the venire and what his address was when she 
requested the police report the day before jury selection.57  
¶123 In addition, the prosecutor anticipated that her 
peremptory strikes were going to be challenged and made 
arrangements before jury selection to have the challenge 
addressed outside of the presence of the venire.  Prior to jury 
                                                 
56 See Wis. Stat. § 756.04(6); Legislative Council Comments, 
1991, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 756.04 (West 2001).  The questionnaire 
must also include "information necessary to determine if the 
person is qualified to serve as a juror in that circuit court" 
and "the prospective juror's declaration that the responses are 
true to the best of his or her knowledge," and "may request 
other information that the court needs to manage the jury system 
in an efficient manner, including information ordinarily sought 
during voir dire examination."  Wis. Stat. § 756.04(6)(a), (c), 
(7). 
57 See also State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶45, 259 
Wis. 2d 484, 657 N.W.2d 374 (stating that despite restrictions 
on public access to juror information during jury selection, 
each party had access to juror questionnaires and therefore the 
restricted juror information); State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 
33, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996) (same).  
During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor also admitted 
that she knew from Bell's "juror card" that his employment 
varied. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
selection, when all parties were in chambers, the prosecutor 
made a special request that "if there is any objection to 
strikes of either party we either do it at the bench or in 
chambers." 
 
The 
court 
then 
clarified, 
"[Y]ou 
mean 
your 
peremptories?"  The prosecutor responded, "Yes." 
¶124 The prosecutor gave some indication of why she 
obtained the police report for Bell.  In response to the circuit 
court's inquiry into whether she had a reason for striking Bell, 
the prosecutor responded: 
Yes, your honor.  As the court is probably well aware, 
our office as well as the federal prosecutor, has 
prosecuted a number of Bells who live in Beloit 
throughout the years.  It's well known as a criminal 
name in Beloit.  I would also note that he lives at 
1216 Wisconsin Avenue which is a high crime area in 
Beloit.  Um, I also yesterday had the Beloit Police 
Department run information on the 1216 Wisconsin 
address. 
The inference to be drawn is that the prosecutor saw the name 
"Bell" and noted where he lived.58 
¶125 On its face, this would be a race-neutral explanation.  
Yet it is not so clear that race is uninvolved.  Would the 
prosecutor have run a police check on Bell if his juror 
questionnaire identified him as Asian, Latino, or Caucasian?  
Familial relationship to people involved in the criminal justice 
system alone may not be the linchpin here. 
                                                 
58 "As study after study has showed, residence, especially 
in urban centers, can be the most accurate predictor of race--
more accurate, indeed, than social class."  United States v. 
Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶126 For example, the record also reveals that one of the 
members of the venire was a man with the last name Gregory.  The 
prosecutor's office in Beloit was prosecuting a man named 
Gregory at the same time that the defendant here was being 
prosecuted.59  The likelihood of a relationship between the two 
people named Gregory was greater than the likelihood of a 
relationship between Bell and the criminal Bell family since the 
telephone directory lists 14 people named Gregory but 54 named 
Bell.60  Both venire member Bell and the criminal Bells are 
African-American; the venire member Gregory, however, is not 
African-American, while the Gregory who was prosecuted is 
African-American.  The prosecutor thus made the assumption of 
familial relation based on race, not just name.  Yet numerous 
families have members of different races, including those of 
three of the seven justices on this court (my own included), as 
well as that of the governor of the state. 
¶127 The circuit court did not engage in the inquiry 
required under step three of Batson and, as a result, the 
circuit court never noticed that Bell was treated differently 
than all other jurors on the venire and it never noticed the 
                                                 
59 It is realistic to believe that the prosecutor in this 
case knew of the prosecution of Gregory since she was in contact 
with the prosecutor of the Gregory case.  Jury selection in the 
Gregory trial began the day after jury selection in this case, 
and as mentioned above, Bell was also on the venire in the 
Gregory case.  The prosecutor in this case passed along her 
police report to the prosecutor in the Gregory case prior to 
voir dire, which resulted in Bell's being struck for the second 
day in a row. 
60 See SBC Janesville Area Smart Yellow Pages (April 2003). 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
role that race played in the prosecutor's decision to treat Bell 
differently.  As has been shown, a reasonable inference can be 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances in the present case 
that there was disparate treatment of venire member Bell based 
on race.   
V 
¶128 The ultimate burden of proving discrimination in a 
Batson challenge rests with the defendant.  The defendant in the 
present case did not raise many of the above arguments during 
the Batson hearing, making it difficult to conclude here that 
the circuit court's decision to uphold the peremptory strike of 
Bell is clearly erroneous.  Nevertheless, the circuit court has 
a duty to explore all of the relevant facts and make a finding 
about discrimination.  "Batson requires a trial judge to ensure 
that a defendant on trial is afforded the equal protection of 
the law."61  The circuit court here failed to meaningfully take 
on this duty.  Moreover, the majority has neglected to enforce 
this duty. 
¶129 Under similar circumstances, appellate courts remand 
the matter to the trial court.62  I would remand this case to the 
circuit court to conduct a new hearing and engage in the 
analysis required at the third step of the Batson inquiry, 
including 
consideration 
of 
such 
matters 
as 
whether 
the 
                                                 
61 Jordan, 206 F.3d at 201. 
62 See State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, ¶30, 244 
Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711 (Vergeront, J., dissenting); see also 
Jordan, 206 F.3d at 201; Coulter, 155 F.3d at 922. 
No.  00-3403-CR.ssa 
 
25 
 
prosecutor ran police checks on the addresses of any other 
potential jurors; whether any other potential jurors shared a 
name with an individual prosecuted by the Beloit District 
Attorney's office; and whether any other potential jurors 
indicated that they were unemployed or that their employment 
varied.  If the circuit court determines, after the hearing, 
that there was no purposeful discrimination based on race, the 
conviction should be affirmed.  If it determines that there was 
purposeful discrimination, the required remedy would be a 
reversal of the conviction and a new trial. 
¶130 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
No.  00-3403-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶131 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  For the reasons 
set forth in Parts I and II of Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent, I agree that the majority's Batson analysis is flawed 
and that it erroneously concludes that the third step of Batson 
was satisfied in this case.  I therefore join those parts of 
that dissent.  I write separately, however, because I disagree 
with portions of the analysis in Parts III and IV of her 
dissent. 
¶132 The majority correctly states that "this case concerns 
the third step of the Batson test."  Majority op., ¶73.  It also 
correctly notes that, under the third step of Batson, the 
circuit court "has the duty to weigh the credibility of the 
testimony and determine whether purposeful discrimination has 
been established."  Majority op., ¶32.  However, the majority's 
analysis essentially treats this duty as nonexistent and seems 
to indicate that the circuit court's role can be limited to 
determining that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor are 
race neutral. 
¶133 The majority ignores the circuit court's proper role 
by focusing its step three analysis on confirming that the State 
advanced race neutral reasons, which is step two of Batson.  The 
Chief Justice's dissent characterizes the majority's approach as 
"conflating the second and third steps of the Batson analysis."  
Chief Justice Abrahamson's Dissent, ¶102.  Further, her dissent 
concludes that, as a result of the conflation, the majority errs 
"by concluding that the State's satisfaction of step two is 
No.  00-3403-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
sufficient, in and of itself, to defeat a charge of purposeful 
discrimination."  Id. 
¶134 I agree with these criticisms of the majority's step 
three analysis.  By conflating step three into step two, the 
majority fundamentally undermines an important part of the 
process established by Batson to address discrimination in the 
jury selection process——namely, the circuit court's role in 
evaluating 
the 
evidence 
to 
determine 
whether 
purposeful 
discrimination has occurred.  I therefore agree with the 
conclusions set forth in Part I of the Chief Justice's dissent. 
¶135 I also agree that this record is insufficient for us 
to evaluate whether the circuit court properly engaged in the 
analysis required by step three of Batson.  It is unclear 
whether the circuit court weighed the credibility of the 
testimony 
and 
made 
a 
determination 
that 
purposeful 
discrimination had not been established.  The court made no 
findings of fact.  All that is set forth in the record is the 
court's conclusory statement:  "Well, I think the State has made 
its case and it does have just cause to strike."  Even the 
majority acknowledges that the circuit court did not elaborate 
on this conclusion.  Majority op., ¶16.  I therefore agree with 
the conclusions set forth in Part II of the Chief Justice's 
dissent. 
¶136 However, I part ways with the Chief Justice with 
regard to portions of Parts III and IV of her dissent.  Batson 
clearly places a duty on the circuit court to evaluate all 
evidence presented by the parties that is relevant to whether 
No.  00-3403-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
purposeful discrimination has occurred.  However, I am not 
convinced that Batson requires an independent inquiry by the 
circuit court to the extent suggested in Part III or that the 
required analysis is as extensive as set forth in Part IV. 
¶137 While it is certainly within the circuit court's 
discretionary authority to take the initiative in developing 
evidence of discrimination, the court is not required to do so.  
It is the defendant's, not the circuit court's, burden of 
persuasion 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
purposeful 
discrimination.  See State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 176, 453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990).  Likewise, I do not think a Batson hearing 
necessarily requires an inquiry to the extent detailed in the 
Chief Justice's dissent. 
¶138 I would remand to the circuit court to engage in the 
analysis required to satisfy step three of Batson.  If the court 
determined that there was no purposeful discrimination, it would 
affirm the conviction.  If the court determined that there was 
purposeful discrimination, the proper remedy would be a reversal 
of the conviction and a new trial.  In either event, the circuit 
court must articulate its analysis on the record.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
¶139 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this dissent.