Title: State v. Murrell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Murrell, 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002-Ohio-1483.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MURRELL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489.] 
Criminal law — Search and seizure — When police officer has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile. 
(No. 00-1757 — Submitted October 17, 2001 at the Greene County Session — 
Decided April 3, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-000103. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that automobile.  (New York v. 
Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 
775, followed; State v. Brown [1992], 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, 
syllabus, overruled; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, harmonized.) 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  This case requires us to consider the allowable 
scope of an automobile search incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle.  
For the reasons that follow, we overrule this court’s decision in State v. Brown 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, and therefore affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
I 
Facts and Procedural History 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
On September 15, 1999, a Cincinnati police officer stopped an automobile 
driven by defendant-appellant, Marvin Murrell, on a street with a posted speed 
limit of thirty-five miles per hour after the officer’s laser device registered 
appellant’s speed at forty-nine miles per hour.  The officer ran a check on 
appellant’s license, which showed that there was an outstanding warrant for 
appellant’s arrest for failure to pay child support.  The officer arrested appellant, 
handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the police car. 
 
The officer then proceeded to search appellant’s vehicle.  On the 
floorboard in front of the driver’s seat, the officer found a small cloth bag.  He 
opened it and found crack cocaine and powdered cocaine.  The officer then also 
arrested appellant for drug possession. 
 
Appellant was indicted on two counts of possession of cocaine.  He filed a 
motion to suppress the results of the search, and the trial court held a hearing on 
the motion on November 19, 1999.  The arresting officer provided the only 
testimony at the hearing, giving his account of the stop and arrest.  The officer 
testified that the traffic stop was a routine one, that he never felt that he was in 
any danger during the course of the stop, that he never sought appellant’s 
permission to search the vehicle, and that he would not have impounded the car 
(and therefore no inventory search of the vehicle would have occurred) if he had 
not found the cocaine. 
 
On February 10, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in a 
handwritten entry that gave no reasons for the ruling.  The trial court apparently 
relied on this court’s decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, in 
which this court held at the syllabus that “[a] police officer may not open a small, 
closed container found inside an automobile’s glove compartment solely as a 
search incident to the driver’s arrest for a traffic violation, after the officer has the 
suspect—and sole occupant of the vehicle—under control in the police cruiser.  
(New York v. Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 
January Term, 2002 
3 
distinguished; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, applied.)” 
 
The state appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67, certifying that the appeal 
was not taken for the purpose of delay and that the trial court’s ruling rendered the 
state’s proof so weak that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution was 
destroyed.  See Crim.R. 12(K) (formerly Crim.R. 12[J]). 
 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, 
distinguishing the situation before it from that in Brown.  The court of appeals 
focused on the fact that Brown’s syllabus specifically mentioned arrest for a 
“traffic violation,” and found that Brown did not apply because appellant was not 
arrested for a traffic violation but for nonpayment of child support.  While 
acknowledging that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that there 
was contraband in the vehicle, the court of appeals upheld the search pursuant to 
the United States Supreme Court’s Belton decision. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
II 
Search of Automobile Incident to Arrest of Occupant 
 
In Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775, the 
United States Supreme Court articulated a specific rule for automobile searches 
within the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1  The Belton court held that 
“when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
                                                          
 
1. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
passenger compartment of that automobile.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Earlier, the 
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 
2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694, a case not involving a motor vehicle, had held 
that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless search of 
the person arrested and of the immediate surrounding area is justified to discover 
any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use and to prevent the concealment or 
destruction of evidence. 
 
The Supreme Court viewed its holding in Belton as the establishment of a 
bright-line rule that extended the principles of Chimel to arrest situations 
involving motor vehicles.  The Supreme Court in Belton, in explaining why 
searching a closed container found in the passenger area of the vehicle is also 
permissible, further illuminated its reasoning, stating that “[i]t follows [from 
Chimel] that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found 
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within 
reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.  * * *  Such 
a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the 
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the 
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any 
privacy interest the arrestee may have.”  453 U.S. at 460-461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 
69 L.Ed.2d at 775. 
 
In support of its decision to apply a bright-line rule, the Belton court stated 
that “as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set 
of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct 
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the 
interest of law enforcement.’  LaFave, ‘Case-By-Case Adjudication’ versus 
‘Standardized Procedures’:  The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127, 142. 
 
“* * * 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
“In short, ‘[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, 
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and 
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’  
Dunaway v. New York [1979], 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 [99 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 60 
L.Ed.2d 824, 836].”  453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2863, 69 L.Ed.2d at 773-774. 
 
The Belton court then reviewed cases from other courts that had 
encountered the issue before it, and observed that “[w]hile the Chimel case 
established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of 
‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably 
includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.  Our 
reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively 
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might 
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].’  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 
[89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694].  In order to establish the workable rule this 
category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area 
that may be searched in light of that generalization.”  453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 
2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-775. 
 
With this court’s decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, 
Ohio follows a different rule on automobile searches incident to an arrest than 
was established in Belton.  The Brown opinion actually set forth two separate 
rationales for not following Belton.  Although the syllabus in Brown and the text 
of the opinion (see id. at 351-352, 588 N.E.2d at 115) assert that the court 
“distinguishe[s]” the situation in that case from the situation in Belton, this court 
in Brown also stated, “If Belton does stand for the proposition that a police officer 
may conduct a detailed search of an automobile solely because he has arrested one 
of its occupants, on any charge, we decline to adopt its rule.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115.  The Brown opinion then included a footnote to the 
effect that if the two cases were not distinguishable, the decision to decline to 
adopt Belton’s rule was based on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution2:  
“ ‘Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more 
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.’ ”  Id. 
at fn. 3, quoting California v. Greenwood (1988), 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S.Ct. 
1625, 1630, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39.  See, also, Brown at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115 
(stating that the warrantless search of the automobile violated the Ohio 
Constitution). 
 
A close reading of both Belton and Brown reveals that, although the 
Brown opinion attempted to distinguish that case from Belton based on the 
differing facts of the two cases, the attempt was unfounded.  While it appears 
clear that there was probable cause for the search in Belton, while there was not in 
Brown (the point upon which the opinion in Brown relied to distinguish the two, 
id. at 351-352, 588 N.E.2d at 115), the United States Supreme Court in Belton 
deliberately chose not to analyze the situation before it under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement, which is based on probable cause.  Id., 453 
U.S. at 462-463, 101 S.Ct. at 2865, 69 L.Ed.2d at 776, fn. 6 (“Because of this 
disposition of the case, there is no need here to consider whether the search and 
seizure were permissible under the so-called ‘automobile exception.’ ”).  Instead, 
the Belton court purposely determined to craft a bright-line rule of sufficient 
scope to encompass the facts of Brown, as well as those of the case sub judice. 
 
Given these considerations, it becomes apparent that this court’s statement 
in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115, that “the warrantless search of 
                                                          
 
2. 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person and things to be seized.” 
January Term, 2002 
7 
Brown’s automobile was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution” 
was, at most, only partially supportable.  Since Belton should not have been 
distinguished, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Belton as to the 
Fourth Amendment was binding on this court, and this court should have held that 
the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the search in Brown.  Therefore, the 
only possibly justifiable rationale behind this court’s decision in Brown is the 
alternative reasoning set forth in that case—that the search was inconsistent with 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
III 
State v. Brown Reassessed 
 
The resolution of the case before us thus turns on a consideration of this 
court’s decision in Brown, which can accurately be said to have relied on Section 
14, Article I to decline to give full effect to Belton.  Within that consideration, and 
depending on its outcome, a further issue potentially could arise in the 
circumstances here, based on the court of appeals’ decision to distinguish 
Brown—if Brown should be reaffirmed, what should its scope be? 
 
The Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I contain virtually 
identical language, with both prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and 
both imposing a warrant requirement.  See State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767.  For that reason, this court observed in 
Robinette that, for some time, it “has interpreted Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution as affording the same protection as the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 
238, 685 N.E.2d at 767.  See, also, State v. Orr (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391, 
745 N.E.2d 1036, 1038-1039.  In making that point, this court in Robinette cited a 
number of cases, including State v. Geraldo (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 125-126, 
22 O.O.3d 366, 369-370, 429 N.E.2d 141, 145-146 (reach of Section 14, Article I 
is coextensive with that of Fourth Amendment); and State v. Andrews (1991), 57 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273, fn. 1 (this court has interpreted Section 
14, Article I to protect the same interests and in a manner consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 
After reviewing the cases, this court in Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 239, 
685 N.E.2d at 767, determined that “we should harmonize our interpretation of 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment, unless 
there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”  This court in Robinette obviously 
left open the possibility that, depending on the circumstances, this court may 
decide to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I in the appropriate case. 
 
In actually relying on Section 14, Article I to find that the evidence was 
inadmissible on the facts before it, the Brown court did not cite any authorities, 
including those cited in Robinette that appear inconsistent, for its decision to 
interpret Section 14, Article I more stringently than the Fourth Amendment.  
Also, Robinette, decided more than five years after Brown, did not cite Brown in 
its consideration of when Section 14, Article I might be interpreted differently 
from the Fourth Amendment. 
 
As several of the briefs in this case indicate, most jurisdictions, unlike 
Ohio in Brown, follow the Belton rule regarding automobile searches incident to a 
lawful arrest, even where the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police 
vehicle at the time of the search.  See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 
41, 57-58, 754 A.2d 463, 472; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 
789, 791-792, fn. 1; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44.  
Included within the group of states that follow Belton are states with specific 
constitutional provisions that, like Ohio’s Section 14, Article I, essentially mirror 
the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. Charpentier (1998), 131 Idaho 649, 
962 P.2d 1033; State v. Fry (1986), 131 Wis.2d 153, 171-172, 388 N.W.2d 565, 
573.  While a few states, such as Ohio in Brown, have rejected Belton in part, 
most states have chosen to fully embrace Belton’s bright-line rule. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
 
In light of the standard set forth in Robinette, we take this opportunity to 
review the propriety of this court’s decision in Brown.  To the extent that Brown 
apparently found persuasive reasons not to harmonize Section 14, Article I with 
the Fourth Amendment in the situation before it, we believe that the time has 
come to reassess Brown and the assumptions upon which that decision was based. 
 
As a starting point, it is critical to recognize that Belton’s rule applies only 
when there is already a lawful custodial arrest.  Concerns about a possible lack of 
probable cause to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that 
probable cause must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the 
first place.  In addition, as the Belton holding explicitly states, a Belton search 
must be “contemporaneous” with the arrest, occurring at or very near the time of 
the arrest.  Id., 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775.  
Furthermore, on its face, Belton’s rule applies only if an arrest is “custodial.”  Id.  
The United States Supreme Court, in Knowles v. Iowa (1998), 525 U.S. 113, 118-
119, 119 S.Ct. 484, 488, 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497-498, found that a “search incident 
to citation,” in which a police officer searched a vehicle incident to the issuance 
of a citation in lieu of an arrest in a routine traffic stop, violated the Fourth 
Amendment when there was no prior arrest to justify the search.3  Belton does not 
authorize indiscriminate fishing expeditions; only motor vehicles very recently 
occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to a Belton 
search. 
                                                          
 
3. 
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated its commitment to Belton’s bright-
line rule in Florida v. Thomas (2001), 532 U.S. 774, 121 S.Ct. 1905, 150 L.Ed.2d 1.  In that case, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider whether [the Belton] rule is limited to situations 
in which the officer initiates contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person remains 
inside the vehicle.”  Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1908, 150 L.Ed.2d at 5.  However, the court never 
reached that issue on the merits, holding that the case did not involve a final judgment or decree 
from the court below and that the case did not fit any category that would nevertheless allow it to 
be treated as final for jurisdictional purposes, and so dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction.  
Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1909-1910, 150 L.Ed.2d at 6.  The specific issue in Thomas is not relevant 
to the case sub judice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
The Belton court reached a calculated conclusion that a search of the 
motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a reasonable one, justified 
principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving evidence, and the 
advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations.  We find it significant 
that Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Belton, also wrote the 
majority opinion in Chimel, which established strict limitations on the “search 
incident to arrest” exception, and which reversed the conviction at issue in that 
case as based on a search the Chimel court determined to be unreasonable.  See 
395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. at 2043, 23 L.Ed.2d at 697.  Obviously, Justice Stewart 
and the other justices in the majority in Belton believed that the specific concerns 
at issue in that case justified extension of the Chimel rule to cases involving an 
arrest of the occupant of a motor vehicle.  Both Chimel and Belton are seminal 
Fourth Amendment decisions that contribute to a comprehensive jurisprudence 
regulating what is acceptable police conduct and what is not in warrantless 
searches incident to an arrest. 
 
We believe that the same considerations that led the Belton court to 
establish its bright-line rule justify the adoption today of that rule by this court.  
We now conclude that Brown was erroneously decided, and that this court in 
Brown failed to appreciate the practical advantages underlying Belton’s bright-
line rule.  The case before us and Brown do not present persuasive reasons to 
depart from the principle that Section 14, Article I and the Fourth Amendment 
should be harmonized whenever possible. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in the circumstances before 
us we should harmonize the Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution.  We thus overrule Brown and its syllabus paragraph.  
Consistent with Belton, we hold that when a police officer has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
January Term, 2002 
11 
automobile.  Under our holding, the warrantless search of appellant’s vehicle did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment or Section 14, Article I. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
conclusion that this court must overrule State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 
588 N.E.2d 113, for the sole purpose of aligning our jurisprudence with that of the 
United States Supreme Court.  For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the trial 
court was correct in granting the motion to suppress based upon this court’s 
decision in Brown. 
 
The overarching question, which the majority fails to satisfactorily 
answer, is why this court needs to reverse itself by overruling Brown, and in doing 
so, adopt the United States Supreme Court’s bright-line rule announced in Belton.  
“ ‘[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of 
adherence to the latest decision.’ ”  Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 257, 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting, 
quoting Helvering v. Hallock [1940], 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 
604).  However, this court has also observed that “ ‘any departure from the 
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.’ ”  Wampler v. Higgins 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 120, 752 N.E.2d 962, quoting Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union (1989), 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132.  The 
majority offers no special justification for overruling the unanimous decision in 
Brown. 
 
The majority relies on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in New 
York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
justification to overrule Brown.  In Belton, the court discerned a need for a bright-
line rule and held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of 
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”  (Footnote 
omitted.)  Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768.  The court thereby 
concluded that such a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The Belton court derived its bright-line rule from its decision in Chimel v. 
California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.  However, 
Chimel involved a search incident to an arrest in a residence, not an automobile.  
The Chimel court held that, in a residential setting, once an arrest is made, police 
officers may search the arrestee and the area within the arrestee’s immediate 
control.  Id. at 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.  The court concluded that 
a search of the immediate area after the arrest was justified “ ‘by the need to seize 
weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an 
escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the 
crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the 
accused’s person or under his immediate control.’ ”  Id. at 764, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 
L.Ed.2d 685.  Thus, the justification for the search in Chimel was specifically 
based on well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, which are designed to protect the safety of the arresting 
officer and to prevent the destruction of crime evidence. 
 
In Belton, the United States Supreme Court sought to create a bright-line 
rule for the search of a motor vehicle by applying the rule in Chimel, allowing for 
a search of the area within the immediate reach of the arrestee, to the facts in 
Belton.  Unfortunately, in applying Chimel to Belton, the court stretched the 
underlying justification supporting Chimel beyond its rationale. 
 
The Supreme Court applied the rationale of Chimel to a case where the 
occupants of a motor vehicle were ordered out of the car and arrested.  When a 
January Term, 2002 
13 
police officer arrests a vehicle occupant, the arrestee is generally removed from 
the automobile.  At that point, there is no longer any danger to the officer from 
anything in the passenger compartment of the vehicle and it is not possible for the 
arrestee to destroy evidence that may be in the vehicle.  In Brown, we observed 
that the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after the occupant had 
already been arrested could not be justified by the same motivations as Chimel 
because “[t]he contents of the automobile were no longer within the arrestee’s 
immediate control.”  Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 353, 588 N.E.2d 113. 
 
The majority concedes this point by stating that “only motor vehicles very 
recently occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to 
a Belton search.”  The majority acknowledges that the occupant must first be 
removed from the automobile and placed under arrest before the police officer 
may search the automobile.  Therefore, since the occupant is already under arrest 
and separated from the vehicle, the Chimel justifications for the search, i.e., police 
officer safety and the protection of evidence, disappear. 
 
The absence of the Chimel justifications are apparent in the facts of 
Belton.  In Belton, a police officer stopped a motor vehicle for speeding.  The 
officer had probable cause to suspect that there was marijuana in the vehicle and 
therefore he ordered all four men out of the vehicle, placed them all under arrest, 
patted them down, and “split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway * * 
* so they would not be in physical touching area of each other.”  Id. at 456, 101 
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768.  It was not until the police officer completed this 
procedure of securing the arrestees that he searched the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle.  The facts clearly demonstrate that at the point of the vehicle search, 
the police officer was not in danger and any evidence in the vehicle was secure. 
 
The facts of both Brown and the case at bar illustrate the obvious absence 
of the Chimel justifications supporting the search of the passenger compartment 
of an automobile after the occupants have been arrested.  In Brown, the police 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
officer arrested the vehicle occupant and “placed him in custody in the patrol car” 
before searching the arrestee’s automobile.  Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 349, 588 
N.E.2d 113.  Similarly, in the case sub judice the majority acknowledges that the 
police officer “arrested appellant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat 
of the police car.”  Only after Murrell was secured did the police officer proceed 
to search the appellant’s vehicle. 
 
The majority states that the Belton court “reached a calculated conclusion 
that a search of the motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a reasonable 
one, justified principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving evidence, 
and the advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations.” 
 
Since the traditional justifications of officer safety and preservation of 
evidence found in Chimel do not apply to Belton, and by extension do not apply to 
the case at bar, the only valid justification for the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Belton is the need for a bright-line test. 
 
The Belton court stated that, without a bright-line rule, police officers 
would be overwhelmed in attempting to decide whether probable cause exists to 
search the passenger compartment of an automobile after the occupant is arrested.  
Id., 453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768.  In order to alleviate this 
supposed confusion, the court reasoned that “ ‘[a] custodial arrest of a suspect 
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; 
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification.’ ” Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, quoting United States 
v. Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427. 
 
There is nothing in the record before us to support a conclusion that since 
our decision in Brown, law enforcement officers have encountered particular 
difficulty in knowing when to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to an occupant’s arrest. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
 
The majority, stating no special justification for adopting the Belton 
bright-line rule, contends that “[c]oncerns about a possible lack of probable cause 
to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that probable cause 
must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the first place.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  In my view, we need a more persuasive reason to justify the 
automobile search. 
 
It is well settled that a state supreme court may interpret its state 
constitution to provide greater individual rights than those provided in the federal 
Constitution.  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins (1980), 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 
S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741.  We did that in Brown when we unanimously held 
that the warrantless search of Brown’s vehicle was unreasonable and violated 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
In the time since Brown was decided, nothing has changed to warrant the 
majority’s sudden compulsion to overrule Brown.  The only reason given by the 
majority to demonstrate that the time is now ripe to overrule Brown is this court’s 
decision in State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762.  In 
Robinette we acknowledged the similarity in language between the Fourth 
Amendment and Section 14, Article I, and therefore indicated that the two should 
be harmonized.  Id. at 766-767, 685 N.E.2d 762.  However, as the majority 
correctly observes, “Robinette obviously left open the possibility that, depending 
on the circumstances, this court may decide to give independent effect to Section 
14, Article I in the appropriate case.”  The case at bar is an appropriate case for 
this court to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I. 
 
In Brown, this court unanimously rejected Belton in stating that “[w]e do 
not believe that the certainty generated by a bright-line test justifies a rule that 
automatically allows police officers to search every nook and cranny of an 
automobile just because the driver is arrested for a traffic violation.”  Brown, 63 
Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d 113.  Moreover, the facts in Belton were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
significantly different from those in Brown and the case at bar.  In Belton the 
police officer had probable cause to search the vehicle after the arrest because the 
arrest was based on probable cause that there was marijuana in the vehicle.  The 
vehicle search therefore flowed directly from the arrest. 
 
However, in Brown, the arrest was for driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  The probable cause that the officer possessed to make the arrest had no 
connection to the contents of the vehicle.  In the case at bar, the connection is 
even more difficult to make.  Murrel was arrested for failure to pay child support.  
There was no connection between the reason for the arrest and the contents of the 
automobile. 
 
Because Robinette does not prevent this court from giving independent 
effect to Section 14, Article I, Brown should continue to control.  Moreover, since 
the determinative facts here are closer to Brown than they are to Belton, we 
should follow our own jurisprudence as reflected in Brown. 
 
The unanimous opinion of this court in Brown, that the sole justification of 
the need for a bright-line rule is not enough to warrant “an extensive search based 
on facts that could never support a warrant because of the lack of probable cause,” 
should not be altered.  Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352, 588 N.E.2d 113. 
 
I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  This court’s holding in State v. Brown (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, should control this case.  The Brown opinion is 
measured and wise, and allows for the search of the interior of an automobile 
incident to a driver’s arrest when necessary.  Under Brown, police officers can 
search an automobile if there is probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains 
contraband, if there is a suspicious item in plain view, or if an officer is searching 
January Term, 2002 
17 
for weapons within the immediate control of the suspect.  These are all reasonable 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches.  
The majority’s holding today seems inclined to skirt the Fourth Amendment 
rather than work within it.  I dissent and also join the dissent of Chief Justice 
Moyer. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott A. 
Rubenstein, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Arenstein & Gallagher and Hal R. Arenstein, for appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
 
H. Fred Hoefle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Greater Cincinnati 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
Kravitz & Kravitz and Max Kravitz, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________