Title: Greaton v. Greaton

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT     
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 17 
Docket: 
Ken-11-227 
Submitted 
   On Briefs: December 1, 2011 
Decided: 
February 21, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
DARIN R. GREATON 
 
v. 
 
LISA A. GREATON 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
[¶1]  Darin R. Greaton appeals from a divorce judgment entered in the 
District Court (Augusta, Sparaco, J.) awarding shared primary residence of the 
parties’ two children and ordering Darin to pay child support.  On appeal, Darin 
argues that the court erred in excluding the testimony of two of his expert 
witnesses and in quashing his subpoena of another witness.  Darin does not 
identify how these errors affected the court’s final judgment, nor did he file a 
transcript of the three-day hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶2]  There are two prerequisites to a successful appeal: first, the appellant 
must demonstrate that the trial court committed error, and second, the appellant 
 
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must show prejudice caused by the error.  See Alexander, Maine Appellate 
Practice § 401(a) at 213 (3d ed. 2008).  In examining for error and prejudice, our 
review is restricted to the record developed before the trial court.  See M.R. 
App. P. 5(a).  When the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the 
proceedings, or a statement of the evidence or proceedings pursuant to M.R. 
App. P. 5(d), we will assume that the transcript would support the trial court’s 
findings of fact and its rulings on evidence and procedure.  See Springer v. 
Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶ 8, 984 A.2d 828; State v. Hughes, 2004 ME 141, ¶ 7, 
863 A.2d 266. 
B. 
Adequate Record for Appellate Review 
 
[¶3]  Because his appeal lacks an adequate record, Darin is unable to make 
the two showings required of an appellant: (1) that the trial court committed error; 
and (2) that the error was not harmless, see M.R. Civ. P. 61. 
 
[¶4]  “The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record upon 
which the reviewing court can consider the arguments on appeal.”  
Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶ 2, 984 A.2d 828.  Depending on the judicial decision or 
action challenged on appeal, the record may be established through the 
presentation of the transcript, M.R. App. P. 5(b)(2), through an approved statement 
of the evidence or proceedings when a transcript is unavailable, M.R. App. P. 5(d), 
or by preparing an agreed statement of the case, M.R. App. P. 5(f). 
 
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[¶5]  In this case, Darin filed his appeal without a transcript, despite the fact 
that the three-day hearing had been recorded.  In his reply brief, Darin contends 
that the trial court’s rulings that excluded his experts and quashed the subpoena 
were issued off the record and, therefore, the appendix filed with his appeal is an 
adequate substitute for the transcript.  We find Darin’s contentions unpersuasive. 
 
[¶6]  The parties have an obligation to create a record of objections to 
evidentiary rulings of the court, even if that record comprises only a summary of 
the arguments and rulings placed on the record after a chambers conference.  If the 
trial court’s rulings were not recorded, Darin should have availed himself of the 
option of creating a statement of the proceedings, approved by the trial court, 
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 5(d).  Merely providing documents that were admitted at 
trial will rarely suffice to establish an adequate record for our review.  See 
Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶ 8 n.4, 984 A.2d 828. 
C. 
Allegations of Prejudice 
 
[¶7]  In appealing a judgment, it is not enough to challenge procedural errors 
allegedly made by the trial court without also showing actual error in the judgment.  
The party must clearly set forth the alleged error that the court made that led to the 
portion of the judgment objected to on appeal.  Darin challenges three 
discretionary rulings by the court; however, he has not identified how those rulings 
affected the court’s judgment.  Darin does not establish a correlation between the 
 
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court’s rulings and a specific outcome in the judgment that was adverse to his 
interests. Even if Darin could demonstrate error in the trial court’s rulings, we 
could not find prejudice because he has not presented us with a specific finding in 
the court’s judgment with which he takes issue.  Thus, we have not been presented 
with a foundation for reversal. 
D. 
Sanctions 
 
[¶8]  Lisa seeks the imposition of sanctions pursuant to M.R. App. P. 13(f), 
asserting that the appeal is frivolous.  As we have noted, taking an appeal without 
an adequate record, when review of the record could inform the issues raised on 
appeal, is not a good use of the resources of the parties or the Court.  See, e.g., 
Town of Porter v. Blevens, 2009 ME 48, ¶¶ 2-4, 970 A.2d 286; Edwards v. 
Campbell, 2008 ME 173, ¶¶ 10-12, 960 A.2d 324; Marshall v. Webber, 2008 ME 
126, ¶ 4, 955 A.2d 751; Rothstein v. Maloney, 2002 ME 179, ¶¶ 10-12, 816 A.2d 
812.  Although we decline to impose sanctions in this instance, on remand the trial 
court has the authority to address the cost of the appeal, including reasonable 
attorney fees.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 105 (2011); Cheoros v. Cheoros, 1997 ME 37, 
¶ 3, 690 A.2d 974.1  Accordingly, we leave the determination of costs and attorney 
fees to the trial court on remand. 
                                         
1  Before the adoption of title 19-A, we held that a trial court could award attorney fees in divorce 
cases for appeals to the Law Court pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 693 (1981 & Supp. 1996).  Cheoros v. 
Cheoros, 1997 ME 37, ¶ 3, 690 A.2d 974.  Section 904 of title 19-A replaced section 693 of title 19, P.L. 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  Remanded to the District 
Court for determination, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 105, of costs and attorney fees incurred by Lisa 
in defending this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Jeffrey T. Edwards, Esq., Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, 
for appellant Darin Greaton 
 
Daniel W. Marra, Esq., Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, Waterville, for 
appellee Lisa Greaton 
 
 
 
Augusta District Court docket number FM-2010-29 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                                                                                                                   
1995, ch. 694, Pt. B, § B-2, and section 904(1) was itself later repealed by P.L. 2005, ch. 323 § 5 
(effective Sept. 17, 2005), which also enacted the current statute 19-A M.R.S. § 105 (2011).  As with its 
predecessors, section 105 allows a trial court, after opportunity for a hearing, to order a party “to pay 
another party or another party’s attorney reasonable attorney’s fees, including costs, for participation in 
the proceedings.”  19-A M.R.S. § 105(1).