Title: State v. Williams

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2868-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Clayton W. Williams, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
350 Wis. 2d 311, 833 N.W.2d 846 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 74 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe  
 
JUDGE: 
J. David Rice.  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Maura FJ Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Steven D. 
Grunder, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Steven D. Grunder.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2868-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2010CF278) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Clayton W. Williams, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, reversing a decision 
of the Monroe County Circuit Court, J. David Rice, Judge. 
¶2 
The case requires the court to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. (2009-10)1——the penalty statute for operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as the seventh, eighth, or 
ninth offense.  The meaning of one key sentence in the statute 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
2 
 
is in dispute, namely: "The confinement portion of a bifurcated 
sentence imposed on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less 
than 3 years."  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
¶3 
The parties agree that if a court orders a bifurcated 
sentence2 under § 346.65(2)(am)6., the court must impose a 
mandatory minimum period of initial confinement of three years.  
Thus, the question before us is whether § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
requires a sentencing court to impose a bifurcated sentence. 
¶4 
The underlying OWI incident occurred in September 2010 
in Monroe County in western Wisconsin.  Responding to a tip that 
Clayton W. Williams (Williams) was driving while intoxicated, a 
Monroe 
County 
deputy 
sheriff 
observed 
Williams 
driving 
erratically and pulled him over.  Williams was charged with 
several offenses, but he pled guilty to his seventh OWI offense 
and to possessing open intoxicants in a motor vehicle.  At 
sentencing, Williams asked the circuit court to place him on 
probation. 
 
The 
court 
responded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. required imposition of a bifurcated sentence 
with at least three years of initial confinement, and this was 
the confinement the court imposed.   
¶5 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. 
does 
not 
require 
a 
court 
to 
impose 
a 
                                                 
2 "A bifurcated sentence is a sentence that consists of a 
term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended 
supervision under s. 302.113."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2).  When a 
court orders a bifurcated sentence, "The portion of the 
bifurcated sentence that imposes a term of confinement in prison 
may not be less than one year . . . ."  Id., § 973.01(2)(b). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
3 
 
bifurcated sentence for a seventh offense OWI.  State v. 
Williams, 2013 WI App 74, ¶¶1, 12, 350 Wis. 2d 311, 833 
N.W.2d 846.  Consequently, the court of appeals remanded the 
case for resentencing.  Id., ¶16. 
¶6 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires 
sentencing courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least 
three years of initial confinement for a seventh, eighth, or 
ninth OWI offense.  In reaching this conclusion, we note that 
although 
the 
statutory 
history, 
context, 
structure, 
and 
contextually manifest purposes of § 346.65(2)(am)6. suggest that 
it imposes a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement, 
the statute is ambiguous.  Well-informed people may reasonably 
disagree as to whether § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires a court to 
impose a bifurcated sentence or whether probation is permitted 
and a bifurcated sentence is merely an option.  The legislative 
history resolves the ambiguity and contains several clear 
statements that § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires courts to impose a 
bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum period of initial 
confinement.  Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
According to the criminal complaint, on September 10, 
2010, in early evening, Deputy Jesse Murphy (Deputy Murphy) of 
the Monroe County Sheriff's Department responded to a traffic 
tip.  Michelle Deford (Deford) had called dispatch to report 
that Williams had been drinking in her yard and that he was 
driving while intoxicated.  After responding to the call, Deputy 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
4 
 
Murphy saw Williams' truck accelerate rapidly and twice swerve 
left of the center line.  He also noticed that one of Williams' 
brake lights was out as Williams slowed to make a right turn 
onto a dirt road.  Deputy Murphy activated his emergency lights 
and siren and observed Williams fishtail, possibly due to rapid 
acceleration on the dirt road. 
¶8 
Williams pulled over and struggled to keep his balance 
after getting out of his truck.  When asked if he knew why he 
had been stopped, Williams said, "no sir."  Williams admitted 
that he had consumed four or five beers, and Deputy Murphy 
observed that Williams' speech was slurred and that he was 
leaning on the truck to keep his balance.  Williams agreed to 
attempt field sobriety tests, which he did not complete 
successfully.  A preliminary breath test revealed a sufficient 
alcohol concentration to warrant an additional test, and the 
subsequent blood draw indicated a blood alcohol concentration of 
.248 g/100 mL. 
¶9 
On September 13, 2010, the State filed a complaint 
charging Williams with his seventh OWI offense contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (Count 1), operating a motor vehicle after 
revocation contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (Count 2), 
possessing open intoxicants in a motor vehicle contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.935(2) (Count 3), operating left of the center line 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.05(1) (Count 4), non-registration 
of a vehicle contrary to Wis. Stat. § 341.04(1) (Count 5), and 
improper display of license plates contrary to Wis. Stat. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
5 
 
§ 341.15(3) (Count 6).  On September 28, 2010, the State filed 
an amended complaint to add a charge for operating a motor 
vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (Count 7) and to include alcohol fine 
sentence enhancers for Counts 1 and 7.3  The State filed an 
information on October 6, 2010, which contained the same seven 
counts as the amended complaint. 
¶10 On April 7, 2011, Williams pled guilty to Counts 1 and 
3.  The plea agreement stated that the district attorney would 
request a bifurcated sentence of six years with three years of 
initial confinement and three years of extended supervision, but 
Williams was free to argue for different sentencing.4  The 
circuit court accepted the guilty pleas and found Williams 
guilty of Counts 1 and 3.  The court dismissed all other counts, 
but the parties agreed that Count 2 could be read in for 
sentencing. 
¶11 At the sentencing hearing on May 17, 2011, the State 
contended that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires the court 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)2. reads, "If a person 
convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.20 to 0.249, the 
applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am)3. to 5. are 
tripled." 
4 The plea agreement said, "I understand that the judge must 
impose the mandatory minimum penalty if any.  The mandatory 
minimum penalty I face upon conviction is: 24 month [driver's 
license] revocation."  However, at the plea hearing, the court 
asked Williams, "[I] believe that statute requires me to order a 
minimum term of confinement in the state prison for three years; 
do you understand that?"  Williams responded, "Yes, sir." 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
6 
 
to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of 
initial confinement for Count 1.  Williams argued that a plain 
reading of the statute does not require that the court impose a 
bifurcated sentence, and he requested that the court either 
withhold sentence and place him on probation or stay any imposed 
prison sentence.  To support his request for probation, Williams 
suggested that his situation was unique inasmuch as his last OWI 
conviction was in 1998——roughly 12 years prior to his seventh 
OWI.  The State acknowledged the gap in OWI convictions but 
pointed out that Williams had other criminal convictions during 
those 12 years. 
¶12 Ultimately, the circuit court agreed with the State 
that the statute requires the court to impose a bifurcated 
sentence with at least three years of initial confinement.  
However, the court recognized Williams' unusual situation when 
it said, "I think that there probably aren't very many members 
of the general public who would hear about a seventh offense OWI 
case and think that [it] was appropriate for probation.  I think 
if there ever was one, you might be the person, Mr. Williams."  
The court went on to discuss Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. and 
noted, "The language does not say that the court must impose a 
bifurcated sentence, but it says that . . . the confinement 
portion of a bifurcated sentence shall be not less than three 
years."  The court determined that the statute is ambiguous 
because "there is a shall in there for the confinement portion, 
but there's no shall that says I have to impose a bifurcated 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
7 
 
sentence, to me that makes the statute ambiguous . . . ."5  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶13 Turning 
to 
the 
legislative 
history, 
the 
court 
determined that a memo from the Wisconsin Legislative Council on 
the senate bill that created Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
evinced the legislature's intent to require courts to impose a 
bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial 
confinement.  Based on its interpretation of the statute, the 
court imposed a bifurcated sentence of three years of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision for Count 1.  
Although the court agreed with the State's interpretation, it 
did explain: 
[I]t's hard for me to say what I would otherwise have 
done if I hadn't thought that the law required me to 
do this.  As I've said, you're as good a candidate for 
probation probably as I would see; at the same time it 
is your seventh offense and I can't just ignore that, 
either. 
                                                 
5 The 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
also 
mentioned 
the 
statute's lack of clarity when he said, "I think it was [the 
legislature's] intention that minimum prison was necessary and I 
think that the statute is poorly written in that regard and it 
is my hope that it is modified to be more clear."  During the 
writing of this opinion, Governor Walker signed 2013 A.B. 180, 
which amends Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6.  See 2013 Wis. Act 
224, § 4.  The new law reads, "The court shall impose a 
bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01 and the confinement portion 
of the bifurcated sentence imposed on the person shall be not 
less than 3 years."  Id.  Thus, the current version of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. unequivocally requires courts to impose 
a 
bifurcated 
sentence 
with 
a 
minimum 
period 
of 
initial 
confinement.  2013 Wis. Act 224 took effect on April 10, 2014.  
Id. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
8 
 
 
But given all the circumstances, I think that the 
legislature has made the decision that that is the 
minimum term of confinement, I think that is an 
appropriate term of confinement for you. 
¶14 Judgments of conviction were filed on May 18, 2011.  
On appeal, Williams argued that the circuit court was mistaken 
in believing that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. imposes a 
mandatory minimum period of initial confinement.  Williams, 350 
Wis. 2d 311, ¶1.  The court of appeals agreed and reversed the 
circuit court.  Id.  In contrast to the circuit court, the court 
of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. is plain 
and unambiguous and does not require a court to impose a 
bifurcated sentence.  Id., ¶¶12-14.  Therefore, the court 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court 
and 
remanded 
the 
case 
for 
resentencing.  Id., ¶16.  The dissent, however, determined that 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. is ambiguous and that the legislative history 
demonstrates that the statute requires the sentencing court to 
impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of 
initial confinement.  Id., ¶19 (Blanchard, J., dissenting). 
¶15 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 21, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 This case requires an interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6.  Statutory interpretation presents a question 
of law that we review de novo, although we benefit from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  State 
v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶29, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350; 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
9 
 
State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶11, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 
N.W.2d 447. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶17 The analytical framework for statutory interpretation 
is well-established.  First, we look to the statute's language, 
and if the meaning is plain, the inquiry typically ends there.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  In determining a statute's plain meaning, the scope, 
context, structure, and purpose are important.  See id., ¶¶45-
46, 49.  "A statute's purpose . . . may be readily apparent from 
its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or 
closely-related statutes——that is, from its context or the 
structure of the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49.  As a 
result, "a plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Thus, this court considers "surrounding or 
closely-related statutes" to reach a sound interpretation and 
"to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 (citations 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
10 
 
omitted).  A reviewing court may consider the statutory history6 
as part of the context analysis.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. 
¶18 Although 
reviewing 
courts 
must 
begin 
with 
the 
statutory language, they sometimes consider it appropriate to 
turn to extrinsic sources.  For example, even if the statute is 
plain, the court may consider legislative history to confirm the 
plain-meaning interpretation.  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. 
Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  There 
also may be times when statutory interpretation leads a court to 
conclude that the statute's meaning is plain but that plain 
meaning would produce an absurd result.  On those few occasions, 
the court may consult legislative history to resolve the 
absurdity.  Id., ¶15. 
¶19 Finally, and most important, if the interpreting court 
concludes that the statute is ambiguous, the court may consider 
extrinsic sources such as legislative history to discern the 
meaning of the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  "[A] 
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses."  Id., 
¶47 (citations omitted).  In other words, ambiguity exists when 
                                                 
6 "Statutory history encompasses the previously enacted and 
repealed provisions of a statute.  By analyzing the changes the 
legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be 
assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute."  Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581 (citation omitted). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
11 
 
"well-informed persons should have become confused, that is, 
whether the statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to 
different meanings."  Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Bruno 
v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶21, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 656) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶20 As we conduct our analysis, we must keep in mind that 
"the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what 
the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  Id., ¶44.  Having laid out the familiar 
tenets of statutory interpretation, we turn now to apply them to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
A. The Language of the Statute 
¶21 The language in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. at issue 
reads as follows: "The confinement portion of a bifurcated 
sentence imposed on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less 
than 3 years."  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6.  Looking at this 
language in isolation, it is not clear whether it requires a 
court to impose a bifurcated sentence or whether it merely gives 
the court that option.  A statute that clearly gave the court 
the option to impose a bifurcated sentence might say, "If the 
court imposes a bifurcated sentence on the person under s. 
973.01, the confinement portion shall be not less than three 
years."  Conversely, a statute that clearly imposed a mandatory 
minimum sentence might say, "The court shall impose a bifurcated 
sentence under s. 973.01, and the term of initial confinement 
shall be not less than three years."  Because the language of 
the statute is somewhere between these clear alternatives, the 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
12 
 
language itself does not reveal a plain meaning.  We consider 
the statutory history, context, structure, and contextually 
manifest purposes in an attempt to discern the statute's plain 
meaning. 
B. Statutory History 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 346 was created by § 1, ch. 260, 
Laws of 1957.  The first version of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) read: 
(2) Any person violating s. 346.63(1) may be 
fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 
months or both for the first offense and, upon the 
second or subsequent conviction within 5 years, shall 
be imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than one 
year and in addition may be fined not more than $200. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1957).  The initial version of the 
statute denoted only two classes of OWIs for sentencing 
purposes: the first OWI and then all subsequent OWIs that 
occurred within a five-year period.  Notably, for the second and 
subsequent OWI offenses within five years, the statute imposed 
mandatory minimum sentences. 
¶23 After undergoing a number of revisions and amendments,7 
the statute was repealed and replaced by § 15, ch. 193, Laws of 
1977, so that it read: 
(2)(a) Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
l. 
Shall forfeit not less than $100 nor more 
than $500, except as provided in subd. 2 or 3. 
2. 
Shall be fined not less than $250 nor more 
than $1,000 and imprisoned not less than 5 days nor 
                                                 
7 First-offense OWI was decriminalized by ch. 278, Laws of 
1971. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
13 
 
more than 6 months if the total of revocations under 
s. 343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 
346.63(1) or local ordinances in conformity therewith 
equals 
2 
within 
a 
5-year 
period, 
except 
that 
revocations and convictions arising out of the same 
incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.  The 
5-year period shall be measured from the dates of the 
refusals 
or 
violations 
which 
resulted 
in 
the 
revocations or convictions. 
3. 
Shall be fined not less than $500 nor more 
than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 days 
nor more than one year in the county jail if the total 
of revocations under s. 343.305 and convictions for 
violation of s. 346.63(1) or local ordinances in 
conformity therewith equals 3 or more within a 5-year 
period, 
except 
that 
revocations 
and 
convictions 
arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall 
be counted as one.  The 5-year period shall be 
measured from the dates of the refusals or violations 
which resulted in the revocations or convictions. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (1977) (emphasis added). 
¶24 The 1977 version of the statute (1) increased the 
potential forfeiture for first-offense OWI; (2) imposed a 
mandatory minimum fine and maintained mandatory minimum jail 
time of five days for a second-offense OWI; and (3) increased 
the mandatory minimum fine and potential fine and increased 
mandatory minimum jail time to 30 days for a third and 
subsequent OWI offenses.  § 15, ch. 193, Laws of 1977. 
¶25 The legislature added new paragraphs to the statute in 
1989 Wis. Act 271, after which § 346.65(2) read: 
(2) Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
(a) Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more 
than $300, except as provided in pars. (b) to (e). 
(b) Shall be fined not less than $300 nor more 
than $1,000 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days 
nor more than 6 months if the total of revocations 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
14 
 
under s. 343.305(10)(b) and convictions under s. 
346.63(1) 
or 
a 
local 
ordinance 
in 
conformity 
therewith, or s. 346.63(1m), 1985 stats., or s. 
346.63(2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense 
involved the use of a vehicle, equals 2 in a 5-year 
period, except revocations or convictions arising out 
of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as 
one. 
(c) Shall be fined not less than $600 nor more 
than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 days 
nor more than one year in the county jail if the total 
of revocations under s. 343.305(10)(b) and convictions 
under s. 346.63(1) or a local ordinance in conformity 
therewith, or s. 346.63(1m), 1985 stats., or s. 
346.63(2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense 
involved the use of a vehicle, equals 3 in a 5-year 
period, except that revocations or convictions arising 
out of the same incident or occurrence shall be 
counted as one. 
(d) Shall be fined not less than $600 nor more 
than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 60 days 
nor more than one year in the county jail if the total 
of revocations under s. 343.305(10)(b) and convictions 
under s. 346.63(1) or a local ordinance in conformity 
therewith, or s. 346.63(1m), 1985 stats., or s. 
346.63(2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense 
involved the use of a vehicle, equals 4 in a 5-year 
period, except that revocations or convictions arising 
out of the same incident or occurrence shall be 
counted as one. 
(e) Shall be fined not less than $600 nor more 
than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months 
nor more than one year in the county jail if the total 
of revocations under s. 343.305(10)(b) and convictions 
under s. 346.63(1) or a local ordinance in conformity 
therewith, or s. 346.63(1m), 1985 stats., or s. 
346.63(2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense 
involved the use of a vehicle, equals 5 or more in a 
5-year period, except that revocations or convictions 
arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall 
be counted as one. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a)-(e) (1989-90) (emphasis added).  The 
new paragraphs continued the trend toward higher mandatory 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
15 
 
minimums and more stringent penalties as the number of OWIs 
increased.  Consistent with previous iterations, the 1989-90 
version of the statute imposed mandatory minimum sentences for 
the second and all subsequent OWI offenses. 
¶26 The 
legislature 
later 
added 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6.-7.8 in 2007 Wis. Act 111: 
Section 3.  346.65(2)(am)6. of the statutes is 
created to read: 
346.65(2)(am)6.  Except as provided in par. (f), 
[any person violating s. 346.63(1)] is guilty of a 
Class G felony if the number of convictions under ss. 
940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus 
the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 
7, 8, or 9, except that suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
occurrence shall be counted as one. 
Section 4.  346.65(2)(am)7. of the statutes is 
created to read:  
346.65(2)(am)7. Except as provided in par. (f), 
[any person violating s. 346.63(1)] is guilty of a 
Class F felony if the number of convictions under ss. 
940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus 
the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 
10 or more except that suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
occurrence shall be counted as one. 
2007 Wis. Act 111, §§ 3-4.  In their initial form, subds. 6. and 
7. were anomalous in that they were the first subdivisions since 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(a)-(e) was renumbered in 2005 
Wis. Act 149 as Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.-5., but most of the 
language did not change. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
16 
 
the statute's creation that did not require mandatory minimum 
sentences for multiple OWI offenses.   
¶27 Then, 2009 Wis. Act 100 (Act 100) added the language 
that is particularly relevant to the present case.  Act 100 
added a sentence to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. that said, "The 
confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the 
person under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years."  2009 
Wis. Act 100, § 43.  Similarly, § 346.65(2)(am)7. was amended to 
read, "The confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed 
on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 4 years."  
Id., § 44.  Thus, with Act 100, the legislature arguably 
resolved the anomalous lack of mandatory minimum sentences in 
subds. 6. and 7. by adding mandatory minimum language. 
¶28 The use of the term "bifurcated sentence" introduced 
by Act 100 also is significant when read in context with lower 
OWI offenses.  Since 1990, the language in § 346.65(2)(am)1.-5.—
—"shall be fined . . . and imprisoned"——has remained the same.  
In contrast, the sentencing language in § 346.65(2)(am)6. did 
not take effect until 2010.  2009 Wis. Act 100, §§ 43-44, 97.  
The timing is important because Wisconsin enacted its "truth in 
sentencing" law in 1997 Wis. Act 283, which has since been 
modified.  Legis. Reference Bureau, Truth-in-Sentencing and 
Criminal Code Revision, LRB-02-WB-7, at 1 (Aug. 2002).  The 
truth in sentencing law eliminates parole and requires that when 
a court orders a person to serve a bifurcated sentence, the 
person must serve the entire term unless the person qualifies 
for a sentence adjustment or successfully completes an earned 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
17 
 
release program.9  When the substance of subds. 1., 2., 3., 4., 
and 5. was created, the current bifurcated sentencing structure 
for sentences of more than one year did not exist.  Thus, the 
difference in language between the lower OWI offenses and the 
language in subds. 6. and 7. can be explained by the fact that 
subds. 6. and 7. were created at a later time and contemplated 
more serious penalties involving mandatory prison time. 
¶29 After numerous amendments, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am), 
as it applied to Williams, read: 
(2)(am) Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
1. 
Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more 
than $300, except as provided in subds. 2. to 5. and 
par. (f). 
2. 
Except as provided in pars. (bm) and (f), 
shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 
and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 
6 months if the number of convictions under ss. 
940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus 
the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1) within a 
10−year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, 
revocations, or convictions arising out of the same 
incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. 
3. 
Except as provided in pars. (cm), (f), and 
(g), shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than 
$2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 45 days nor 
more than one year in the county jail if the number of 
convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 940.25 in the 
person’s 
lifetime, 
plus 
the 
total 
number 
of 
suspensions, 
revocations, 
and 
other 
convictions 
counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 3, except that 
                                                 
9 See Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early 
Assessments and State-Level Strategies, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1551, 
1564-77 (2012) (discussing recent developments in Wisconsin's 
sentencing laws). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
18 
 
suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out 
of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as 
one. 
4. 
Except as provided in subd. 4m. and pars. 
(dm), (f), and (g), shall be fined not less than $600 
nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 
60 days nor more than one year in the county jail if 
the number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number 
of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions 
counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 4, except that 
suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out 
of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as 
one. 
4m. Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is 
guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less 
than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if 
the number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number 
of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions 
counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 4 and the person 
committed an offense that resulted in a suspension, 
revocation, or other conviction counted under s. 
343.307(1) within 5 years prior to the day of current 
offense, except that suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
occurrence shall be counted as one. 
5. 
Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is 
guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less 
than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if 
the number of convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 
940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number 
of suspensions, revocations and other convictions 
counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 5 or 6, except 
that suspensions, revocations or convictions arising 
out of the same incident or occurrence shall be 
counted as one. 
6. 
Except as provided in par. (f), is guilty of 
a Class G felony if the number of convictions under 
ss. 940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, 
plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 
7, 8, or 9, except that suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
19 
 
occurrence shall be counted as one.  The confinement 
portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person 
under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years. 
7. 
Except as provided in par. (f), is guilty of 
a Class F felony if the number of convictions under 
ss. 940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, 
plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 
10 or more except that suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
occurrence shall be counted as one.  The confinement 
portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person 
under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 4 years. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) (emphasis added). 
¶30 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) 
reveals a general trend toward harsher mandatory minimum 
sentences as the number of OWIs increases.  The first version of 
§ 346.65(2) 
distinguished 
between 
the 
first 
OWI 
and 
all 
subsequent OWIs.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1957).  In 
contrast, the current statute makes eight different OWI-offense 
distinctions and provides increasing penalties depending on the 
number of OWIs the offender has committed and, in some 
instances, on the temporal proximity of an offense to the 
offender's previous OWI. 
¶31 Perhaps the most important aspect of the statute's 
history is that every version of the statute since its inception 
imposed mandatory minimum sentences for second and subsequent 
OWIs until subds. 6. and 7. were introduced by 2007 Wis. Act 
111.  But shortly after 2007 Wis. Act 111 went into effect, the 
legislature added minimum sentencing language in 2009 Wis. Act 
100.  The question, then, is whether subds. 6. and 7. remain 
anomalies in an otherwise consistent statutory scheme——that is, 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
20 
 
no mandatory minimum sentence of confinement is required——or 
whether the legislature imposed mandatory minimum sentences for 
seventh and subsequent OWIs so that they now conform with the 
sentencing structure for OWIs less than seven.  To help answer 
that question, we turn to the statute's structure, context, and 
contextually manifest purposes. 
C. Statutory Structure and Context 
¶32 In addition to statutory history, the structure and 
context of a statute provide insight into its plain meaning.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Even a cursory glance at the 
structure of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) reveals a pattern: the 
mandatory minimum sentences generally increase with the number 
of OWIs.  In addition, the probation statute and provisions 
within § 346.65(2)(am) implicitly permit probation  for a second 
through a sixth OWI but do not appear to consider probation for 
seventh and subsequent OWIs.  Moreover, § 346.65(2)(bm)-(dm) 
explicitly allow probation for OWIs two through four.  Thus, the 
statutory structure and context suggest that § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
imposes a mandatory minimum period of confinement so that the 
statute maintains its graduated penalty structure. 
¶33 Several provisions in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) and in 
the 
probation 
statute 
specifically 
or 
implicitly 
permit 
probation for OWI offenses less than seven but are silent as to 
seventh 
and 
subsequent 
offenses. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(bm)-(dm) plainly allow probation for OWI offenses 
two through four.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(bm)-(dm) (allowing 
a reduction of the confinement period if the offender completes 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
21 
 
"a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug 
treatment" in certain counties).  In addition, the probation 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09, specifically refers to the 
misdemeanor OWI offenses and allows probation for offenses with 
mandatory minimums of one year or less as long as the court 
requires the offender to serve the mandatory minimum sentence as 
a condition.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(1)(d), 973.09(2)(a)1.d., 
973.09(2)(am).  However, the probation statute does not mention 
the OWI felonies10 or permit probation for offenses with 
mandatory terms of imprisonment longer than one year.  The 
probation statute and Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) contain no 
language to suggest that a court could place someone on 
probation for a seventh OWI offense.11  Without some indication 
                                                 
10 Although the probation statute does not mention the OWI 
felonies, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(d) would still allow probation 
for up to six OWIs because even though a sixth OWI is a Class H 
felony, it carries a mandatory minimum sentence of less than one 
year. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.65(2)(am)5., 
973.09(1)(d).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(1)(d) states: 
If a person is convicted of an offense that 
provides a mandatory or presumptive minimum period of 
one year or less of imprisonment, a court may place 
the person on probation under par. (a) if the court 
requires, as a condition of probation, that the person 
be confined under sub. (4) for at least that mandatory 
or presumptive minimum period. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(d).  Thus, because a sixth OWI carries a 
mandatory minimum of six months, a court could still order 
probation. 
11 Although a statute need not expressly permit probation 
for a court to order probation, the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. suggests that probation is not allowed.   
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
22 
 
that probation is permitted, the mandatory minimum bifurcated 
sentence language in § 346.65(2)(am)6. makes probation for a 
seventh OWI suspect. 
¶34 Williams suggests that because § 346.65(2)(am)6. does 
not explicitly prohibit probation, the sentencing court retains 
the option to order it.  However, this is true only if 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. does not impose a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 
three 
years 
initial 
confinement. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(d); State v. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138, ¶11, 345 
Wis. 2d 342, 824 N.W.2d 921 (stating that a mandatory minimum 
bifurcated sentence is inconsistent with permitting probation).  
Thus, Williams' argument assumes his conclusion.  If the statute 
imposes a mandatory minimum in prison, there would be no reason 
to prohibit probation.  The fact that other unrelated statutes 
                                                                                                                                                             
Under one view, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(d) would prevent 
probation for a seventh OWI because it authorizes probation if 
the offense "provides" a mandatory minimum of one year or less.  
Relevant definitions of "provide" include: "to make a proviso or 
stipulation" or "to supply for use."  Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary 928 (1977).  Arguably, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
"provides" a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of three 
years, thereby falling outside the purview of the probation 
statute. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
23 
 
do explicitly prohibit probation in an abundance of caution12 is 
irrelevant. 
¶35 The structure of the statute also demonstrates that 
the place of imprisonment moves from jail to prison as the 
number of OWIs increases.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3.-
4., offenders must serve a sentence in county jail.  In 
contrast, § 346.65(2)(am)4m.——the first felony in the OWI 
sentencing scheme——does not specify where an offender must be 
confined.  The lack of specificity gives sentencing courts the 
option to sentence offenders either to jail or prison13 for 
                                                 
12 For example, Wis. Stat. § 939.618 (mandatory minimum 
sentence statute for repeat serious sex crimes) and § 939.619 
(mandatory minimum sentence statute for repeat serious violent 
crimes) both clearly require mandatory minimum sentences of 
three and a half years in addition to saying, "The court may not 
place the defendant on probation."  Wis. Stat. §§ 939.618(2)(a), 
939.619(2).  It is possible that the legislature recognized the 
serious nature of the offenses covered in § 939.618 and 
§ 939.619 
and 
decided 
to 
explicitly 
prohibit 
probation.  
However, by requiring a mandatory minimum sentence longer than 
one year, the legislature did not need to specify that the court 
could not order probation. 
13 By not expressing whether a person must be confined in 
jail or prison, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)4m. gives courts 
discretion to impose a sentence in either, so long as any jail 
term is a year or less and any prison term imposed is a year or 
more. 
Except as provided in s. 973.032, if a statute 
authorizes imprisonment for its violation but does not 
prescribe the place of imprisonment, a sentence of 
less than one year shall be to the county jail, a 
sentence of more than one year shall be to the 
Wisconsin state prisons and the minimum under the 
indeterminate sentence law shall be one year, and a 
sentence of one year may be to either the Wisconsin 
state prisons or the county jail. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
24 
 
violating subd. 4m., depending on the length of the sentence.  
Like the progression of increasing mandatory minimum sentences, 
the statute's confinement options increase in severity, moving 
from jail to an option of either prison or jail for more serious 
offenses.  The next step in that progression would be to require 
confinement in a state prison, and § 346.65(2)(am)6.-7. are the 
only subdivisions to mention bifurcated sentences specifically, 
which necessarily involve time in prison.  They are also the 
only subdivisions to mention a mandatory minimum sentence of 
more than one year.  Thus, an interpretation that subd. 6. 
requires a sentencing court to impose a bifurcated sentence with 
at least three years of initial confinement would follow the 
statute's graduated penalty structure as well as the shift from 
jail sentences to prison sentences. 
D. Contextually Manifest Purposes 
¶36 In addition to the statutory history and structure, 
the contextually manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) 
are relevant to our plain meaning analysis.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶48-49.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)'s provisions 
for probation and treatment and the escalating mandatory 
minimums 
provide 
contextual 
evidence 
of 
several 
possible 
purposes: punishment, treatment, and protecting the public from 
repeat OWI offenders.  All three purposes would be served by a 
graduated penalty structure with increasing mandatory minimums.  
The graduated structure would impose greater punishment for more 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 973.02. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
25 
 
serious 
offenses. 
 
It 
would 
allow 
for 
treatment 
during 
confinement 
in 
either 
a 
probation 
treatment 
program 
as 
contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(bm)-(dm)14 or a program 
like the Alcohol or Other Drug Abuse (AODA) program15 for 
offenders sentenced to prison.  Finally, the graduated penalty 
structure would protect the public by keeping repeat offenders 
confined for longer periods of time. 
¶37 Williams argues that reading § 346.65(2)(am)6. to 
allow courts to place the defendant on probation would not 
contradict the purpose of the statute to provide graduated 
penalties.  He suggests that the court could maintain the 
graduated penalty structure by ordering any of the following 
penalties for a seventh OWI offense: 
1. 
impose a prison sentence, including between 
three and five years of confinement (assuming no 
repeater or other sentence enhancer); 
 
2. 
impose and stay a prison sentence with 
between three and five years of confinement, and place 
the defendant on probation with up to one year of jail 
confinement as a condition; 
                                                 
14 As discussed in paragraph 33, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(bm)-
(dm) allow a reduction of the confinement period if the offender 
completes "a probation period that includes alcohol and other 
drug treatment" in certain counties. 
15 The Wisconsin Department of Corrections website describes 
the AODA program as "[a] cognitive-behavioral based treatment 
program provided to offenders with serious, chronic issues with 
both substance abuse/dependence and criminal behavior.  Lessons 
are presented by social services staff and DOC contracted 
providers to groups of 10 to 18 offenders."  Alcohol or Other 
Drug Abuse Programs, doc.wi.gov, http://doc.wi.gov/about/doc-
overview/division-of-adult-institutions/ops/primary-treatment-
programs/aoda (last visited July 3, 2014). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
26 
 
 
3. 
withhold sentence, and place the person on 
probation with up to one year of jail confinement as a 
condition; or 
 
4. 
sentence the person up to one year in jail, 
which is, in practice, nine months of confinement with 
good time. 
It is true that these four options make it possible for a court 
to impose a sentence with more confinement than required for a 
sixth OWI and retain the graduated penalty structure.  However, 
under Williams' view, a court is awkwardly confined in its 
sentencing——free to order probation with jail time as a 
condition for up to a year but precluded from ordering 
confinement terms between one and three years. 
¶38 Williams' 
interpretation 
would 
not 
advance 
the 
contextually manifest purpose to punish repeat offenders because 
a court could decline to order any period of confinement for 
someone who committed a seventh, eighth, ninth, or higher OWI 
offense.  Moreover, Williams' interpretation less effectively 
protects the public because it allows courts to release someone 
who just committed a seventh or higher OWI offense.  On the 
other hand, interpreting the statute to require a bifurcated 
sentence with at least three years of confinement advances the 
statute's purposes.  The mandatory minimum period of initial 
confinement maintains the graduated penalty structure and 
punishes more serious crimes with increased confinement.  It 
protects the public by confining repeat offenders for longer 
periods.  It also leaves room for treatment; for example, the 
judgment of conviction states that Williams is "to participate 
in AA and treatment and evaluation of alcohol condition while in 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
27 
 
prison."16  Thus, the State's interpretation more effectively 
accomplishes the statute's purposes.17 
E. Ambiguity 
¶39 Although the statutory history, structure, context, 
and contextually manifest purposes all militate in favor of an 
interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires courts 
to impose a bifurcated sentence with a minimum period of initial 
confinement, it is not unreasonable for well-informed people to 
disagree.  Standing in the way of plain meaning is the fact that 
Act 100 introduced a clear mandatory minimum in subd. 4m. but 
not in subds. 6. and 7.; § 346.65(2)(am)6. clearly did not 
require a mandatory minimum sentence before Act 100 was passed; 
and Act 100 increased probation options by allowing probation 
for second and third OWI offenses.  On balance, the statute's 
history, structure, context, and contextually manifest purposes 
point to a reading that subds. 6. and 7. require imposition of 
mandatory minimum bifurcated sentences, but the statute is not 
                                                 
16 The judgment of conviction also stated that Williams 
would "undergo AODA assessment and follow through with any 
treatment and/or counseling recommended." 
17 As is often stated in the context of a rational basis 
review of a statute, the legislature need not choose the most 
efficient or effective mechanism to achieve its purpose.  See 
Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶76, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.  However, in interpreting a 
statute, we strive to give a statute "its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Thus, 
the fact that under the State's interpretation the statute more 
effectively accomplishes its contextually manifest purposes is 
helpful in our analysis but not dispositive. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
28 
 
so clear that well-informed people should not have become 
confused.  Therefore, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous18 
and turn to the legislative history to glean the statute's 
meaning. 
F. Legislative History 
¶40 While the statutory history, structure, context, and 
purposes provide indicia that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
requires the court to impose a bifurcated sentence, the 
legislative 
history 
affirmatively 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
legislature so intended.  2009 Senate Bill 66, introduced by 
Senator Jim Sullivan, was signed into law as Act 100, which 
added the "bifurcated sentence" language to § 346.65(2)(am)6.-7.  
The Legislative Reference Bureau's (LRB) analysis of Senate 
Substitute Amendment 1 to 2009 S.B. 6619 stated:  
The substitute amendment requires a person who commits 
a seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI-related offense to 
                                                 
18 Williams contends that the legislature has required the 
court to impose mandatory minimum bifurcated sentences in other 
statutes and that if it wanted to do so in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. it could have.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 939.616.  
However, comparisons to unrelated statutes are unhelpful.  The 
mere fact that the legislature could have been clearer does not 
resolve the ambiguity.  It is a basic principle of statutory 
construction that a reviewing court may consider "surrounding or 
closely-related statutes" to arrive at the statute's plain 
meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (citations omitted).  
Thus, citations to unrelated statutes are not persuasive. 
19 Substitute Amendment 1 to 2009 S.B. 66 contained the same 
language as Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
29 
 
serve a minimum period of confinement or [sic20] three 
years in prison under a bifurcated sentence and 
requires a person who commits a tenth or subsequent 
OWI-related offense to serve a minimum period of 
confinement of four years in prison under a bifurcated 
sentence. 
Drafting File, 2009 Wis. Act 100, Analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau of Substitute Amendment 1 for 2009 S.B. 66, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  The LRB's analysis 
demonstrates that 2009 S.B. 66 created mandatory minimum 
bifurcated sentences for OWI offenses numbering seven or higher. 
¶41 In addition to the LRB analysis, the Committee Report 
from the Joint Review Committee on Criminal Penalties for 2009 
S.B. 66 supports a reading that the statute requires courts to 
impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum period of 
initial confinement.  Under a section titled, "Minimum period of 
confinement for OWI offenders with multiple prior offenses," the 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau (LFB) stated that the bill: 
would specify that the confinement portion of a 
bifurcated sentence must be not less than three years 
for a person convicted of a seventh, eighth, or ninth 
OWI offense, and not less than four years for a person 
convicted of a tenth or subsequent OWI offense. . . .  
There is currently no mandatory minimum period of 
confinement specified for these offenses. 
Drafting File, 2009 Wis. Act 100, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.   
                                                 
20 Although the LRB analysis says "or," the context makes it 
apparent that it should say "of."  As the dissent in the court 
of appeals noted, the typo should be considered in light of the 
sentence that follows it, which contains similar language 
without the error.  See State v. Williams, 2013 WI App 74, ¶32 
n.4, 
350 
Wis. 2d 311, 
833 
N.W.2d 846 
(Blanchard, 
J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
30 
 
¶42 Although the language in the LFB memorandum mirrors 
the statutory language, it is helpful because it contrasts that 
language with the assertion that there was not a mandatory 
minimum before 2009 S.B. 66, suggesting that S.B. 66 imposed a 
mandatory minimum.  The LFB also included a table that had a row 
titled, "Minimum confinement period for multiple OWI offenders; 
applicability of house arrest" and indicated, "For 7th, 8th, and 
9th offense: 3 years."  Id.  That same table indicated in a row 
titled "Probation for OWI offenders" that "Probation [is] 
allowed for 2nd and 3rd offense, in addition to 4th offense 
OWI."  Id.  The table did not suggest that probation was allowed 
for seventh and subsequent offenses. 
¶43 After 
2009 
S.B. 
66 
was 
enacted, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council released an Act Memo for Act 100.  Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Act Memo for 2009 Wis. Act 100 (Jan. 8, 
2010), 
available 
at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/act/2009/act100-
sb066.pdf.  The Act Memo states that one of Act 100's major 
changes 
is 
that 
it 
"[e]stablish[es] 
minimum 
terms 
of 
imprisonment for 4th offense felony and 5th and subsequent OWI-
related offenses."  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, the Act Memo 
equates the "shall be fined . . . and imprisoned" language for 
the fourth offense felony through sixth offense OWIs with the 
bifurcated 
sentence 
language 
for 
seventh 
and 
subsequent 
offenses.  There is no dispute that the statute imposes 
mandatory minimum sentences for fourth offense felony through 
sixth offense OWIs. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
31 
 
¶44 The Act Memo also includes a table based on the LFB's 
table and states that seventh, eighth, and ninth offense OWIs 
have a mandatory minimum confinement period of three years and 
that probation is allowed for second through fourth offense 
OWIs.  Id.  In addition, the LRB published a "Legislative Brief" 
for Act 100 that said, "The law also increases the minimum 
period of confinement for serial offenders from the current 48 
consecutive hours for all criminal OWI offenders, to a minimum 
of three years for seventh, eighth, and ninth offenses and a 
minimum of four years for a 10th or subsequent offense."  Wis. 
Legis. Reference Bureau, 
Increased Penalties and Ignition 
Interlock Requirements for Drunk Driving Offenses, LRB-10-2, at 
2 (Apr. 2010). 
¶45 Although some of the legislative history mirrors the 
language in the statute, as a whole, it clarifies the statute's 
ambiguity: Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires sentencing 
courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years 
of initial confinement.21 
¶46 Applying the correct law to Williams' case, the 
circuit court stated, "given all the circumstances, I think that 
the legislature has made the decision that that is the minimum 
                                                 
21 Because the legislative history clarifies the ambiguity, 
the rule of lenity does not apply.  The "rule of lenity provides 
generally that ambiguous penal statutes should be interpreted in 
favor of the defendant."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶67, 262 
Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700 (footnote omitted).  The rule of 
lenity applies only when "(1) the penal statute is ambiguous; 
and (2) we are unable to clarify the intent of the legislature 
by resort to legislative history."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
32 
 
term of confinement, I think that is an appropriate term of 
confinement for you."  Because the circuit court applied the 
correct law, we reject Williams' argument that the circuit court 
violated his due process right to be sentenced based on accurate 
information. 
 
Therefore, 
Williams 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
resentencing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶47 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. requires 
sentencing courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least 
three years of initial confinement for a seventh, eighth, or 
ninth OWI offense.  In reaching this conclusion, we note that 
although 
the 
statutory 
history, 
context, 
structure, 
and 
contextually manifest purposes of § 346.65(2)(am)6. suggest that 
it imposes a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement, 
the statute is ambiguous.  The legislative history resolves the 
ambiguity 
and 
contains 
several 
clear 
statements 
that 
§ 346.65(2)(am)6. 
requires 
courts 
to 
impose 
a 
bifurcated 
sentence with a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement.  
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
 
 
1 
 
¶48 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion strays far from the text of the statute to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. as requiring a mandatory 
bifurcated sentence.1  The text does not refer to a mandatory 
minimum sentence. 
¶49 The majority opinion ditches the plain text and 
interprets the statute, which it views as ambiguous,2 by 
examining the statutory history, the statutory structure, the 
legislative history,3 and the statute's "contextually manifest 
purpose," a phrase not defined in the statutes or case law.  An 
examination of a "contextually manifest purpose" is too easily 
manipulated 
to 
provide 
a 
workable 
tool 
for 
statutory 
interpretation.    
¶50 The majority opinion concludes that a mandatory 
minimum penalty conforms to the graduated penalty structure for 
serial, multiple offenders that is designed to accomplish the 
"contextually manifest purposes" of punishment, treatment, and 
protection of the public.  Majority op., ¶36.   
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶47. 
2 Majority op., ¶¶6, 39.  The defendant argued at the court 
of appeals and in this court that the statute was unambiguous 
and that its plain meaning did not create a mandatory bifurcated 
sentence.  The State argued that the statute was ambiguous and 
that it was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
3 Nothing in the legislative history expressly states the 
legislative intent about requiring a bifurcated sentence with a 
mandatory minimum confinement period of three years. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
 
 
2 
¶51 A mandatory minimum penalty is not, however, the only 
possible interpretation of the statute that would meet those 
contextually mandated purposes.  The legislature may have 
intended to grant a circuit court discretion in imposing a 
sentence on a serial offender for whom incarceration has not 
effectively deterred repeat offenses.  The legislature may have 
had in mind the beneficial effects of granting a sentencing 
court discretion to enable it to choose the most effective 
sentencing strategy for each individual to reduce recidivism and 
protect public safety.        
¶52 The legislature is well aware that the court system 
has developed effective justice strategies, including problem-
solving treatment courts, to treat and prevent behaviors such as 
substance abuse that may underlie an individual's criminal 
behavior.  The legislature has supported these efforts. 
¶53 For example, Waukesha County has an Alcohol Treatment 
Court (WATC).4  Milwaukee County runs a similar program.  Many of 
the county programs are funded by the legislature through a 
grant program (popularly known as TAD, Treatment and Diversion) 
administered by the Department of Justice.5  The goal of these 
treatment court programs is not only to address underlying 
issues such as substance abuse that may contribute to an 
                                                 
4 Waukesha Alcohol Treatment Court, Wisconsin Community 
Services, 
http://www.wiscs.org/programs/court_community_services/waukesha_
drug_treatment/ (last visited June 25, 2014). 
5 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.95 (West Supp. 2013). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
 
 
3 
individual's criminal behavior but also to enhance public safety 
and reduce recidivism. 
¶54 In contrast to the majority opinion, the court of 
appeals concluded that the statute did not establish a mandatory 
minimum sentence.  The court of appeals, like the majority 
opinion, examined the statutory history and surrounding statutes 
that contain the mandatory minimum language (that is missing in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6.), the complex sentencing scheme, 
and the public policy concerns that could have led the 
legislature not to create a mandatory minimum statute.  
¶55 After reading the majority opinion and rereading the 
decision of the court of appeals, I find the court of appeals' 
reasoning more convincing.   
¶56 Nevertheless I concur, rather than dissent, because 
the legislature has recently clarified the language of the 
statute to now require a mandatory minimum sentence.     
¶57 On April 11, 2013, the court of appeals filed its 
opinion in the instant case, holding that a bifurcated sentence 
for a seventh OWI offense was not mandatory under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65 (2009-10).  Later in the same month, 2013 Assembly Bill 
180 was introduced in the Wisconsin Assembly, requiring a court 
to impose a bifurcated sentence for a seventh, eight, ninth, 
tenth, or subsequent OWI offense.  The bill was enacted on April 
8, 2014, published on April 9, 2014, and took effect April 10, 
2014.6   
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶12, n.5. 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
 
 
4 
¶58 The 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Act 
Memorandum 
regarding the new statute states that the legislature modified 
the statute to require the mandatory bifurcated sentence 
language as a response to the court of appeals' interpretation 
in the instant case.7 
¶59 Although the new legislation does not govern the 
present case, the provisions of the new legislation may be 
accorded weight to aid us in determining what the legislature 
intended in the statute at issue in the instant case.  See, 
e.g., State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶40, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700 (interpreting a statute based on later-in-time 
"supplemental legislation"); McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 
104 Wis. 2d 414, 427, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981) (interpreting the 
purpose of child labor laws and administrative rules based on 
later enactments by the legislature).8   
¶60 In the instant case, I read the legislative response 
to the court of appeals to signal the legislature's purpose. 
¶61 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Legislative Council Act Memo, 2013 Wis. Act 224 
[2013 A.B. 180], OWI Penalties and Testing at 1, available at 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013/related/lcactmemo/act224.p
df (last visited June 25, 2014). 
8 See generally 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer,  
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:10 at 129 
(7th ed. 2012) ("Where a legislature amends a former statute, or 
clarifies a doubtful meaning by subsequent legislation, such 
amendment or subsequent legislation is strong evidence of the 
legislative intent behind the first statute," citing, inter 
alia, McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 Wis. 2d 414, 312 
N.W.2d 37 (1981)). 
No. 
  2011AP2868-CR 
 
 
 
5 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.