Title: Oduche v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EZEADIGO ODUCHE,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 70, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0610002513  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 1, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: April 14, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of April 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Ezeadigo Oduche, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 22, 2009 order, which adopted the 
Superior Court commissioner’s August 28, 2008 report recommending that 
the Superior Court deny Oduche’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of 
Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground 
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b). 
 
2 
that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.2  We agree and AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In October 2006, Oduche was arrested on charges of, among 
other things, Rape in the First Degree and Kidnapping in the First Degree.  
On February 20, 2007, Oduche, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty solely to 
the lesser-included offense of Rape in the Fourth Degree.  The State 
dismissed the remaining charges.  Had Oduche gone to trial on those charges 
and been convicted, he faced a minimum mandatory sentence significantly 
in excess of 15 years at Level V and as much as a life sentence.  On the 
fourth degree rape conviction, Oduche was sentenced to 15 years 
incarceration at Level V, to be suspended for time served, to be followed by 
6 months at Level IV home confinement, 18 months at Level III probation, 
and registration as a Tier II sex offender.  Oduche did not file a direct appeal 
of his conviction and sentence. 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Oduche claims that a) his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by not advising him of the collateral consequences of a 
guilty plea; b) his guilty plea was involuntary; and c) his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to request a suppression hearing.  Oduche 
also claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by issuing an order 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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on his postconviction motion that fails to provide an adequate basis for 
appellate review. 
 
(4) 
Oduche’s first claim that his counsel failed to advise him of the 
collateral consequences of a guilty plea is refuted by the record.  Oduche’s 
counsel attests in her affidavit filed in the Superior Court that she informed 
Oduche about his risk of deportation, which is confirmed by Oduche’s 
signed TIS guilty plea form.  As such, we conclude that Oduche’s first claim 
is without merit.   
 
(5) 
Oduche’s second claim that his guilty plea was involuntary also 
is refuted by the record.  The hearing transcript reflects that Oduche 
confirmed that he understood the charge to which he was pleading guilty, 
that he had conferred with his attorney about his plea and had no complaints 
about her representation, and that no one had threatened him or forced him 
to enter the plea.  In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, Oduche is bound by those representations.3  Moreover, Oduche has 
presented no evidence that, but for error on the part of his counsel, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.4  To 
the contrary, he received a clear benefit by pleading guilty.  As such, we 
conclude that Oduche’s second claim also is without merit.   
                                                 
3 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
4 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988). 
 
4 
 
(6) 
Oduche’s third claim is that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to request a suppression hearing.  Because a voluntary 
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring 
prior to the entry of the plea,5 Oduche’s third claim also fails. 
 
(7) 
Finally, there is no merit to Oduche’s argument that the 
Superior Court’s order failed to provide an adequate basis for appellate 
review.  It is within the Superior Court’s discretion to refer postconviction 
motions to the Superior Court commissioner for a report and 
recommendation and, following a de novo review, to adopt the findings and 
conclusions of the commissioner.6  There is no evidence that the Superior 
Court abused its discretion in this regard. 
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
5 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a) (5) (iv). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice