Title: In re Justin M.B.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93329-Agenda 5-January 2003.
In re JUSTIN M.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 
 								Appellee, v. Justin M.B., Appellant).
Opinion filed March 20, 2003.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, Justin
M.B. admitted to two charges alleged in juvenile delinquency
petitions. The circuit court of Vermilion County accepted the
admissions and sentenced him to five years of probation. After a
hearing on a subsequent petition to revoke probation, the trial
court committed Justin M.B. to the Department of Corrections,
Juvenile Division. We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315)
to determine whether the requirement of section 5-620 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West
1998)) that the court make a notation of a finding of guilt is
jurisdictional in nature.

BACKGROUND
	On February 2, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition in No.
98-JD-15, which alleged that the minor, Justin M.B., committed
a residential burglary. On April 13, 1998, the parties tendered a
written plea agreement to the court. The court accepted the
agreement, which specified that the court would impose a sentence
of two years' probation.
	On September 24, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition in
No. 98-JD-196, which alleged that Justin M.B. committed
another residential burglary. The State also filed a juvenile petition
requesting that the court revoke the minor's probation for No.
98-JD-15 because the commission of the second residential
burglary constituted a violation of the conditions of his probation.
On October 19, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition in No.
98-JD-205, which alleged that he committed aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, and unlawful use of a weapon.
	At the adjudicatory hearing on February 9, 1999, the parties
offered another written plea agreement under which Justin M.B.
admitted committing residential burglary and aggravated battery.
In exchange, the State withdrew the petition to revoke probation
and the charges of aggravated assault and unlawful use of a
weapon. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Justin M.B. to five years of probation, without making an oral
finding of guilt. However, Judge Anderson referred to Justin M.B.
as being under "my jurisdiction and a ward of this court." The
docket sheet for this date states, "Admission accepted in each case;
finding of delinquency entered. Proposed plea agreement approved
and incorporated as the court's dispositional order herein."
	On July 2, 1999, the State filed a petition to revoke Justin
M.B.'s probation, alleging he violated his probation by committing
cruelty to animals. The hearing on this petition was held on
October 19, 1999, before Judge Fahey. The parties stipulated to
evidence, but the defense disputed the sufficiency of the evidence.
The transcripts of the proceeding and the docket sheet both reflect
that the court found the State met its burden of proof. The court
committed Justin M.B. to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile
Division, for a 90-day psychiatric evaluation. On February 14,
2000, the court heard testimony and committed him to the
Department of Corrections for an indeterminate period.
	Justin M.B. argues on appeal that the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the dispositional orders because
the court never noted a finding of delinquency or guilt, as required
by section 5-620 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 1998)).
The appellate court acknowledged that an opinion from a different
appellate district analyzed the same issue and held the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter dispositional orders
given its failure to make an explicit finding of delinquency first.
In re J.S.L., 197 Ill. App. 3d 148, 154 (1990). The appellate court
in the present case declined to follow J.S.L. because its
interpretation was too "formalistic" (No. 4-00-0166 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and upheld the order of
commitment.
ANALYSIS
	The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that the
court must effectuate legislative intent. Solich v. George & Anna
Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,
83 (1994). The best indicator of legislative intent is statutory
language. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). If statutory language is plain, the court
cannot read limitations or conditions into the statute. In re D.D.,
196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001). We review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. In re Application of the Cook County
Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428, 432 (1998).
	Section 5-620 of the Act states:
			"After hearing the evidence, the court shall make and
note in the minutes of the proceeding a finding of whether
or not the minor is guilty. *** If the court finds that the
minor is guilty, the court shall then set a time for a
sentencing hearing ***." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS
405/5-620 (West 1998).
The juvenile proceedings concerning Justin M.B. occurred both
before and after the effective date of the amendments to the Act
contained in Public Act 90-590 (eff. January 1, 1999). However,
these and prior amendments to this section changed only some
terminology and section numbering.(1) Previous versions of this
section contained the same requirement of a notation of the finding
of delinquency or guilt prior to the sentencing hearing. See 705
ILCS 405/5-20 (West 1996); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par.
704-8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 704-8.
	Neither party disputes that the language of section 5-620
plainly requires the court to make a notation of the finding of guilt
prior to sentencing. The issue presented by the parties is whether
failure to comply with this statutory requirement deprived the trial
court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the subsequent
dispositional order. We need not reach this issue because we find
the trial court complied with the statutory requirement.
	Defendant criticizes Judge Fahey for never making an oral or
written finding that Justin M.B. was guilty prior to committing
him to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. Judge
Fahey held a hearing on October 19, 1999, to consider the State's
petition to revoke probation in Nos. 98-JD-196 and 98-JD-205.
The petition alleged the minor had violated a condition of his
probation, which prohibited him from violating criminal statutes,
by committing cruelty to animals (510 ILCS 70/3.01 (West 1998)).
The State did not file a separate juvenile petition alleging
delinquency based on a cruelty to animals charge.
	Petitions to revoke probation differ from petitions alleging
delinquency. Petitions to revoke probation presume the minor
already has been found delinquent or guilty and already has had a
dispositional order-a sentence of probation-entered against him
or her. At a hearing on a petition to revoke probation, the State has
the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the
probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS
405/5-720(3) (West 2000); see also People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 226 (1974).
	At the hearing on the petition to revoke probation in this case,
the parties stipulated to the evidence, but defendant disputed the
sufficiency of the evidence. Judge Fahey made an oral finding,
also noted in the entry on the docket sheet, that the State had met
its burden. Judge Fahey comported with the applicable statutory
provision; he was not required to make a delinquency or guilty
finding of any sort at a hearing on a petition to revoke probation.
705 ILCS 405/5-720 (West 1998). Defendant has not raised a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, so we express no
opinion on the issue.
	We also review the adjudicatory hearing on February 9, 1999,
at which Judge Anderson imposed the five-year probationary term
for residential burglary, No. 98-JD-196, and aggravated battery,
No. 98-JD-205. The docket sheet entry for this date states:
"finding of delinquency entered." "Docket" is defined as, "A
formal record in which a judge or court clerk briefly notes all the
proceedings and filings in a court case." Black's Law Dictionary
495 (7th ed. 1999). Section 5-620 requires the court to "make and
note in the minutes of the proceeding a finding of whether or not
the minor is guilty." 705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 1998). A docket
entry, therefore, is an appropriate place for the court to record a
finding of guilt in compliance with section 5-620.
	Here, the court explicitly recorded a finding of delinquency on
the docket sheet. Although the amendment substituting the word
"guilt" for "delinquent" in section 5-620 became effective in the
month preceding this hearing, we attach no import to court's use
of the old term. The Act, before and after the amendment, retained
the same definition for "[d]elinquent minor" (705 ILCS
405/5-105(3) (West 2000); 705 ILCS 405/5-3(1) (West 1996)),
and the current finding of "guilt" refers to evaluation of allegations
of delinquency (705 ILCS 405/5-601 (West 2000)). Therefore, the
trial court clearly complied with the requirement of section 5-620.

CONCLUSION
	The trial court complied with the statutory requirement of a
written notation of guilt found in section 5-620 (705 ILCS
405/5-620 (West 1998)), so we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's probation
revocation and sentence.
Affirmed.


1.      1Prior to this amendment, the court was required to make a finding
of whether or not the minor is "delinquent" by "adjudication" rather
than "guilty" at a "trial." 705 ILCS 405/5-20 (West 1996); 705 ILCS
405/5-601, 5-620 (West 2000). Because of the timing of the
proceedings and the effective date of the amendment, all four terms are
used in this opinion.