Title: Pinney v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12774 
 
FREDERICK PINNEY  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
February 21, 2020. 
 
 
Bail.  Practice, Criminal, Findings by judge. 
 
 
 
 
The defendant, Frederick Pinney, is charged with murder in 
the first degree.  After his first trial ended in a mistrial, he 
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that a 
second trial would violate the guarantee against double 
jeopardy.  A judge in the Superior Court denied the motion; a 
single justice of this court denied Pinney's G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition seeking review of that ruling; and we affirmed the 
single justice's judgment.  See Commonwealth v. Pinney, 479 
Mass. 1001 (2018) (Pinney I).  While Pinney's appeal was pending 
here, he moved for bail in the Superior Court.  After a hearing, 
bail was set in the cash amount of $250,000 with certain 
conditions. 
 
 
After our decision in Pinney I, and in the course of 
proceedings in the trial court related to retrial, Pinney, who 
has been unable to pay the cash bail and remains in prison, 
filed a motion to suppress, which was allowed in part.  Both 
Pinney and the Commonwealth sought and received leave to appeal 
from that ruling.  Those appeals are currently pending in the 
Appeals Court, and the trial court proceedings have been stayed 
pending their outcome.1  Pinney then filed a motion in the 
Superior Court for bail review, which a second judge (not the 
judge who had set bail previously) denied.  Pinney subsequently 
filed a petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
                                                 
1 Oral argument in those appeals was held on February 4, 
2020. 
2 
 
 
§ 3, for bail review.  A single justice denied the petition, and 
Pinney appeals.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  Pinney has been held in pretrial custody since 
he was arrested in March 2014, prior to his first trial without 
bail and now, pending retrial, because he cannot pay the cash 
bail.  In setting bail at $250,000, the first judge set forth 
some of his reasons from the bench at the bail hearing: 
 
"Many times, the Commonwealth takes the position that, 
presumptively, first degree murder cases are no bail, no 
right of bail, and there's some basis for that, where . . .  
the Court isn't limited to a traditional assessment under 
[G. L. c. 276, § 58]. . . .  That's the position they're 
taking here.  But, this is unusual, in that the Defendant 
presents with no record, a circumstantial case, which 
actually made it to trial and didn't result in a 
conviction.  Granted, it's on appeal, and there's two ways 
that this [argument can] go. 
 
"He's got a work record.  I do take into account the 
finances, but they're not predominant.  He's got . . . 
extended family, although they're not in the area.  On 
balance, I will . . .  make the determination that he 
should be given a right to bail, although it should be a 
significant cash bail.  In my mind, that means $250,000.00 
cash.  If that amount is posted, he is to be under [global 
positioning system (GPS)] observation at all times with 
home confinement to a Commonwealth address." 
 
The judge also completed a "Findings and Order Regarding Bail" 
form on which he indicated that Pinney had the ability to pay 
"$0 cash," and noting Pinney's "long work history including his 
own business." 
 
 
The judge also noted that he had considered the following 
factors in setting bail:  that the charged offense is murder in 
the first degree, for which the Commonwealth alleges a strong 
case, although the case is on appeal pending retrial; that 
Pinney has a large family in Connecticut who all work; that 
Pinney "has [a] Chelmsford residence" that is available; that 
Pinney has no prior criminal record, but he has been the subject 
of previous restraining orders; that, as to Pinney's risk of 
flight, the Commonwealth reports suicidal ideation by him; that 
Pinney has already been incarcerated for four years; that the 
Commonwealth alleges new deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence 
(since the first trial); that Pinney alleges that the victim's 
3 
 
 
boyfriend committed the murder; and that the first jury 
deliberated for three days.  Finally, the judge indicated that 
if Pinney does post bail, certain conditions would apply, 
including GPS monitoring and home confinement. 
 
 
As noted supra, when Pinney sought review of the bail 
determination and to have the amount of cash bail reduced, a 
different judge denied the petition.  That judge did so from the 
bench at the bail review hearing, stating, "This is a first-
degree murder case.  Given the DNA representations and the 
strengths of the Commonwealth's case, the petition to reduce the 
bail is denied." 
 
 
Discussion.  Pinney raises two arguments in his appeal to 
this court:  first, that Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (e), as amended, 
476 Mass. 1501 (2017), mandates his release on personal 
recognizance pending disposition of the interlocutory appeals 
currently in the Appeals Court; and second, that his due process 
rights were violated by the judge who set bail in the amount of 
$250,000, and by the judge who subsequently denied his petition 
for bail review, because each judge knew that Pinney could not 
pay that amount and each failed to explain the basis for his 
respective decision as required by Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 
Mass. 691 (2017), and Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747 
(2019).  We address each issue in turn. 
 
 
1.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (e).  Rule 15 (e) provides, in 
relevant part, that where, as here, the Commonwealth takes an 
interlocutory appeal from a suppression ruling, the trial court 
proceedings shall be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal 
and, furthermore, that "the defendant may be released on 
personal recognizance during the pendency of the appeal" 
(emphasis added).  Pinney urges the court to interpret this 
provision to make release on personal recognizance pending 
appeal mandatory or, at the very least, presumptive. 
 
 
He recognizes, as he must, that the word "may" generally 
indicates judicial discretion.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 558 (2014) ("The use of the word 'may' in 
a statute is generally permissive, reflecting the Legislature's 
intent to grant discretion or permission to make a finding or 
authorize an act").  He suggests, however, that the subject of 
the discretion is unclear.  In his view, the word "may" could 
mean either that a judge has the discretion whether to release a 
defendant at all or that a judge has the discretion to release a 
defendant on personal recognizance.  We are not persuaded. 
 
4 
 
 
 
Among other reasons, the use of the word "may" in the final 
provision of rule 15, the whole of which is set out in the 
margin,2 contrasts with the use of the word "shall," which 
appears several times earlier in the same rule.  If the intent 
of the rule were that a defendant always be released in these 
circumstances, the word "shall," rather than the word "may," 
could easily have been used in the final provision.  
Furthermore, reading the word "may" to mean "shall" is counter 
to the general proposition that the exercise of the power to 
grant bail is highly discretionary, particularly in a case such 
as this, involving a charge of murder in the first degree.  See 
Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 752 (for defendant charged with murder in 
first degree, bail "is not a matter of right but is 
discretionary with the judge" [citation omitted]).  See also, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Bautista, 459 Mass. 306, 312 (2011) 
(Massachusetts has "long followed the common-law rule allowing 
the courts discretionary power in granting bail"). 
 
 
We have also considered Pinney's arguments based on the 
history of rule 15 and the corresponding provisions, and 
legislative history, of G. L. c. 278, § 28E.  We do not find 
anything there that compels an interpretation of rule 15 (e) 
that requires release as a matter of right, on personal 
recognizance or otherwise, in the circumstances presented here. 
 
 
2.  Due process.  We turn now to Pinney's argument that his 
due process rights were violated because the bail judges failed 
to sufficiently explain the bases for their decisions.  As a 
starting point, we note that it is well settled that bail for a 
defendant charged with murder in the first degree is not a 
                                                 
2 Rule 15 (e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), provides in full: 
 
"Stay of the Proceedings.  If the trial court issues an 
order which is subject to the interlocutory procedures 
herein, the trial of the case shall be stayed and the 
defendant shall not be placed in jeopardy until 
interlocutory review has been waived or the period 
specified in [rule 15 (b) (1)] for instituting 
interlocutory procedures has expired.  If an appeal is 
taken or an application for leave to appeal is granted, the 
trial shall be stayed pending the entry of a rescript from 
or an order of the appellate court.  If an appeal or 
application therefor is taken by the Commonwealth, the 
defendant may be released on personal recognizance during 
the pendency of the appeal." 
5 
 
 
matter of statutory right; it exists only as a matter of a 
judge's discretion.  See Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 752-753, and 
cases cited (G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, do not apply in capital 
cases). 
 
 
That discretion, however, is not unlimited.  If, in his or 
her discretion, a judge decides to admit a defendant to bail and 
sets a cash bail in an amount that the defendant cannot afford 
to pay, thus effectively imposing pretrial detention, the judge 
must set forth the reasoning justifying the decision (just as 
the judge would be required to do in other types of cases).  See 
id. at 753-754 (setting forth types of factors judges should 
consider).  See also Brangan, 477 Mass. at 705-710 (discussing 
bail considerations in noncapital cases).  Here, in Pinney's 
view, both judges failed to meet this requirement. 
 
 
As set forth supra, the first judge, who set bail in the 
amount of $250,000, provided some of his reasoning from the 
bench and at the bail hearing, and he followed that up with 
findings on a written bail form.  Taken together, the judge's 
findings and reasons are sufficient to satisfy the due process 
considerations.  It is clear that the judge gave consideration 
to various relevant factors and engaged in the required 
individualized bail determination, again in the context of a 
charge of murder in the first degree.  He weighed, among other 
things, Pinney's finances and work history, the fact that Pinney 
does not have family in Massachusetts, and the nature of the 
charges and the strength of the Commonwealth's case.  He also 
took into account the fact that Pinney has already been 
incarcerated for a number of years.  While the judge could have 
better detailed some of his findings, which we have said we 
expect judges to do, see, e.g., Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 759-760, 
his over-all consideration and treatment of the issue was 
sufficient. 
 
 
As to the second judge, who denied Pinney's petition for 
bail review in a short statement from the bench, if that alone 
had been the basis for an initial bail determination, it would 
not have been sufficient.  As it was, however, the judge was not 
acting on a blank slate.  The first judge's findings and 
reasoning, which we have indicated were sufficient, remained 
relevant and applicable, forming the backdrop for the second 
judge's decision.3  We are satisfied that any shortcomings in his 
                                                 
3 There is, furthermore, no impropriety stemming from the 
fact that the judge did not reduce his findings and reasoning to 
writing.  See Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747, 760 n.11 
6 
 
 
explanation do not rise to the level of a deprivation of 
Pinney's due process rights. 
 
 
As we noted in the Vasquez case, a judge's exercise of 
discretion when considering bail for a defendant charged with 
murder in the first degree "should not rest solely on a 
presumption against bail, but should be based on a careful 
review of the specific details of the case and the defendant's 
history."  Vasquez, 481 Mass. at 748.  No such presumption 
against bail was made here, where a cash bail was set, and the 
setting of that bail, in turn, involved an adequate 
consideration of the circumstances and details of this 
particular defendant and this particular case. 
 
 
Conclusion.  Where the bail determinations were properly 
made and no violation of Pinney's rights has occurred, the 
single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying 
Pinney's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, seeking review of the bail 
determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Shane T. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                 
(2019) (recognizing that "it is often not realistic for the 
judge to reduce his or her findings to writing . . . .  Oral 
findings in most instances are not only permissible, but also to 
be expected").