Title: State ex rel. Goodwin v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Goodwin v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-166.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-166 
THE STATE EX REL. GOODWIN, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Goodwin v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-166.] 
Workers’ compensation — Temporary total disability compensation — 
Temporary total disability compensation cannot be paid for period 
claimant received wages — Temporary total disability compensation can 
be paid when claimant is not working and medical evidence corroborates 
claimant’s physical inability to return to former job. 
(No. 2008-2497 — Submitted November 3, 2009 — Decided January 28, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-90, 
2008-Ohio-5971. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Raymond A. Goodwin, received temporary total 
disability compensation from late 2004 through November 9, 2006.  Appellant, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, later learned that Goodwin worked for 
approximately one week in mid-June 2005.  The commission vacated all 18 
months of compensation that followed that employment and declared both fraud 
and overpayment.  That decision is now before this court. 
{¶ 2} Goodwin strained his lower back in 2001 while working for Manco 
Real Estate Management, Inc.  In April 2005, his workers’ compensation claim 
was additionally allowed for lumbar stenosis.  He requested temporary total 
disability compensation from November 1, 2004, through June 5, 2005, and 
submitted a C84 disability form from David Heuser, D.C.  Based on the C84 and 
an independent medical review, Goodwin’s request was granted.   
{¶ 3} Throughout the summer, Goodwin participated in physical and 
vocational rehabilitation.  It was not enough to permit a return to his former 
position of employment, although there is a notation in a June 21, 2005 physical 
therapy report that Goodwin “worked 1 x at YMCA 6/6 – 6/11/05,” which the 
parties agree refers to a brief period of employment that is at the heart of this 
litigation.  Goodwin was still physically unable to return to his former job in 
autumn, and a more comprehensive, year-long rehabilitation plan was proposed 
that would focus on work-hardening and alternative job-skills development.  
During this time, Dr. Heuser continued to certify Goodwin as temporarily and 
totally disabled, and based on these C84s, temporary total disability compensation 
was eventually paid through November 9, 2006. 
{¶ 4} In 2006, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation learned that 
Goodwin had been employed for one week at the YMCA in June 2005.  
Investigation revealed that Goodwin was paid $249.38 for 33 hours of work.  
According to his YMCA job description, Goodwin had been hired part-time as a 
weekend building supervisor.  This was a light-duty job that primarily entailed 
opening and closing the building on weekends along with “some light 
housekeeping or cleaning.” Goodwin claims that he left the job because his injury 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
prevented him from doing all of the required tasks, and the commission does not 
dispute this assertion. 
{¶ 5} The bureau’s investigation unit recommended that temporary total 
disability compensation be declared overpaid from March 28, 2005, through July 
5, 2005, and also asked for a finding of fraud.  The March date corresponds with 
the date Goodwin completed the YMCA employment application.  The latter date 
presumably comes from the June 13, 2005 C84 that certified temporary total 
disability from June 5, 2005, through July 5, 2005, during which the period of 
employment fell.1 
{¶ 6} A commission district hearing officer (“DHO”) declared overpaid 
all temporary total disability compensation awarded after Goodwin’s first day of 
YMCA employment – June 6, 2005, through November 9, 2006.  In vacating the 
entire postemployment award, the hearing officer noted that each C84 submitted 
in support of temporary total disability compensation listed Goodwin’s last date 
worked (“LDW”) as August 4, 2004, rather than June 2005.  The district hearing 
officer was not persuaded that this was an inadvertent error but instead believed 
that it reflected a deliberate attempt to conceal the June 2005 employment.  A 
staff hearing officer affirmed and reconsideration was denied. 
{¶ 7} Goodwin filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County.  The court ruled in Goodwin’s favor and ordered the 
commission to reinstate the entire award minus the amount Goodwin had received 
from the YMCA.  The court noted that Goodwin did not receive his initial 
temporary total disability compensation check until after he had stopped working.  
It also rejected the commission’s reliance on State ex rel. Ellis v. Indus. Comm. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 508, 751 N.E.2d 1015,  as authority for vacating the entire 
                                                 
1.  The bureau’s formal motion for overpayment asks that temporary total disability compensation 
be vacated through July 5, 2006.  The latter appears to be a typographical error, as we can find no 
significance to the July 2006 date.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
award, and found instead that State ex rel. Griffith v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio 
St.3d 479, 2006-Ohio-2992, 849 N.E.2d 28, controlled. 
{¶ 8} The commission now appeals to this court as of right. 
{¶ 9} Temporary total disability compensation cannot be paid over any 
period when a claimant has (1) been working, i.e., exchanging labor for pay, State 
ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.2d 578, 433 
N.E.2d 586, or (2) engaged in activities medically inconsistent with his or her 
purported inability to return to the former job, even if done for free, State ex rel. 
Parma Community Gen. Hosp. v. Jankowski.  95 Ohio St.3d 340, 2002-Ohio-
2336, 767 N.E.2d 1143.  Goodwin does not contest his ineligibility for temporary 
total disability compensation during the week that he worked at the YMCA but 
disputes the commission’s decision to vacate all temporary total disability 
compensation paid afterwards.  Goodwin argues that he was entitled to that 
compensation because he was not working and unrefuted medical evidence 
corroborated his physical inability to return to his former job.  The commission 
asserts that the wrong LDW appeared on every C84 submitted, which left each 
one irreparably tainted and Goodwin’s temporary total disability compensation 
request medically unsupported. 
{¶ 10} Two cases dominate discussion.  The first is Ellis, 92 Ohio St.3d 
508, 751 N.E.2d 1015.  In July 1997, Ellis requested temporary total disability 
compensation from January 31, 1997, through December 1, 1997. Id. at 508-509.  
His C84 contained his doctor’s statement that not only was Ellis unable to return 
to his former position of employment, he was incapable of all work.  Id. at 509.  
The C84 also contained Ellis’s averment that he had not worked during the 
claimed period of disability. Id. at 508.  Based on that form and others like it, Ellis 
eventually received temporary total disability compensation through April 30, 
1998. Id. at 509. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 11} In August 1997, the bureau was tipped that Ellis was working, and 
an investigation confirmed full-time janitorial employment since January 31, 
1997. Id. at 509-510.  Ellis resigned on December 1, 1997, after being confronted 
with the bureau’s evidence against him. Id. at 512. 
{¶ 12} The commission found fraud and vacated the entire award. Id. at 
510. Ellis objected, claiming that he should retain compensation from December 
1, 1997, through April 30, 1998, because he did not work during that time. Id. at 
512. 
{¶ 13} We rejected that argument.  Id. We reasoned that regardless of 
whether Ellis actually worked from December 1, 1997, through April 30, 1998, 
the C84 that generated temporary total disability compensation was prepared 
while Ellis was still working. Id.  As a result, two key elements of the C84 were 
invalid:  (1) Ellis’s attestation that he was not, and had not been, working, and (2) 
his doctor’s certification that Ellis could do no work. Id.  Because the commission 
was entitled to reject the C84 in its entirety, compensation over the 
postemployment period was medically unsubstantiated. 
{¶ 14} The other case germane to this controversy is Griffith, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 479, 2006-Ohio-2992, 849 N.E.2d 28.  Griffith helped renovate a friend’s 
auto body shop in November or early December 2001.  Id. at ¶ 3.  Shortly after 
that job was done, Griffith was hurt at his regular full-time job.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
Griffith was medically released to light-duty work, but because his employer had 
no such work available, he applied for temporary total disability compensation. 
Id.  His motion was granted, with temporary total disability compensation 
commencing as of December 17, 2001, to continue upon submission of medical 
proof. Id. 
{¶ 15} Griffith’s friend paid him $288 for the earlier renovation work.  Id. 
at ¶ 2.  The friend later paid approximately the same amount for some 
miscellaneous light-duty errands that Griffith did for him over two weeks in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
January 2002. Id.  When the bureau learned of these two payments, it asked the 
commission to declare an overpayment and fraud. Id. at ¶ 5. 
{¶ 16} The commission found that Griffith worked for a portion of this 
period and retained the ability to continue with such work activity, but rather than 
vacating only the temporary total disability compensation that corresponded to the 
brief errand period, the commission vacated all of the temporary total disability 
compensation that was paid thereafter, even though Griffith had done no work 
over that time. Id.  The commission based this decision on Griffith’s purported 
“ability to continue with such [previous] work activity.” Id.  The commission, 
however, never stated whether that “work activity” was inconsistent with the 
medical restrictions that prevented Griffith’s return to his former position of 
employment. Id. 
{¶ 17} We reversed that decision, stressing that there was no evidence that 
Griffith had engaged in any activity that was inconsistent with the medical 
restrictions that prevented him from returning to his former job. Id. at ¶ 11.  
Consequently, those activities could not preclude temporary total disability 
compensation unless he had been paid for them.  We concluded that Griffith could 
not retain temporary total disability compensation over the period that he had 
been paid, but that he was entitled to the balance of the award. Id. at ¶ 10, 14. 
{¶ 18} In each case, there was a concurrent payment of wages and 
temporary total disability compensation, and at issue in each was the claimant’s 
ability to retain previously paid temporary total disability compensation for 
periods after the conflicting employment ended.  The commission contends that 
the salient distinction between Griffith and Ellis is that Ellis involved C84s that 
contained a material misrepresentation.  The commission argues that the C84s in 
this case also contain a material misrepresentation – the wrong LDW – so Ellis 
should control. Goodwin asserts that his case does not involve the massive fraud 
perpetrated in Ellis but involves instead an isolated period of minimally 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
remunerated employment similar to Griffith and that therefore Griffith should 
apply. 
{¶ 19} Goodwin has the stronger argument for two reasons.  First, we are 
not persuaded that Goodwin’s misrepresentation was “material.” In Ellis, we 
affirmed that a finding of fraud requires not just a misrepresentation, but a 
material misrepresentation.  “Material” facts are those “facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123.  In Ellis, the claimant’s misrepresentation that 
he was not working was material because the truth (1) would have precluded 
temporary total disability compensation as a matter of law and (2) discredited 
every C84 because every C84 indicated that Ellis was incapable of all work. 
{¶ 20} In Ellis, moreover, every misrepresentation was a new 
misrepresentation, as Ellis asserted with each new C84, and over a changing time 
frame, that he was not working.  In this case, a new misrepresentation was not 
made on each C84.  Instead, the same misrepresentation – that the LDW was 
August 2004, not June 2005 – was repeated on each one, and this is significant, 
because it raises the question of materiality.  This misstatement was material, 
insofar as temporary total disability compensation was paid in June 2005 when 
Goodwin worked briefly at the YMCA.  After that period, however, the relevance 
of the wrong LDW increasingly wanes, because a doctor’s certification of 
temporary total disability derives from the findings elicited from the claimant’s 
most recent medical examination.  It therefore follows that the further removed 
the claimed disability period was from the week of YMCA employment, the less 
effect it had on temporary total disability compensation eligibility.  Whether 
Goodwin last worked in 2004 or 2005 should have no bearing, for example, on 
the findings elicited from a 2006 medical evaluation.  This makes it much harder 
to justify voiding all of the claimant’s C84s. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 21} Second, this case does not involve the massive fraud seen in Ellis. 
While we do not condone any contemporaneous receipt of wages and temporary 
total disability compensation, Goodwin worked a total of 33 hours for minimal 
remuneration and then stopped working because his allowed conditions prevented 
him from doing the job.  Goodwin also immediately reported his attempt at 
employment to his rehabilitation counselor.  Ellis, on the other hand, had worked 
full time for nearly a year and stopped only when he was caught.  Ellis also lied 
about his work activities to bureau investigators when confronted. 
{¶ 22} Griffith more closely resembles the case at bar. Unquestionably, 
Griffith requires vacation of temporary total disability compensation during the 
time that Goodwin received wages.  After that period, there is no evidence that 
indicates that Goodwin engaged in any activities incompatible with his medical 
restrictions. The DHO order refers to an alleged statement from Dr. Heuser in 
which the doctor claimed that had he known Goodwin worked in 2005, he would 
not have certified temporary total disability.  This document is not, however, in 
the record.  Accordingly, there is nothing to support the denial of temporary total 
disability compensation after Goodwin’s week of YMCA employment ended. 
{¶ 23} There is one aspect of the court of appeals’ decision that must be 
corrected.  The court of appeals suggested that concurrent payment of wages and 
temporary total disability compensation was ameliorated by the fact that when 
Goodwin received his first temporary total disability compensation check, he was 
no longer working at the YMCA.  2008-Ohio-5971, ¶ 9.  This is incorrect.  A 
claimant cannot receive wages and temporary total disability compensation for the 
same time period.  The relevant issue is not whether a claimant was working 
when the temporary total disability compensation check was received.  The issue 
is whether the claimant was working over a period in which temporary total 
disability compensation was paid.  The timing of the check’s arrival is irrelevant. 
{¶ 24} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Joseph E. Gibson, for appellee. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Douglas R. Unver, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
______________________