Title: Commonwealth v. McDermott

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13394 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM F. McDERMOTT. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 2, 2023. - January 25, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Cross-examination.  Practice, Criminal, 
Postconviction relief, Conduct of prosecutor, Cross-
examination by prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury, Sentence.  Estoppel.  Constitutional 
Law, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 30, 1981. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 393 Mass. 451 (1984), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 27, 2020, was heard by 
Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
K. Hayne Barnwell for the defendant. 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
 
1 Justice Cypher participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Stephen Cook, of California, W. Lydell Benson, Jr., of New 
York, Eileen Hren Citron, William A. Bejan, & Leslie Epstein 
Wallace, of the District of Columbia, Radha Natarajan, & 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell for New England Innocence Project & 
another. 
Jeremy M. McLaughlin & Andrew J. Wu, of California, 
Nicholas N. Chan & Krishna Hedge, of Pennsylvania, & Peter W. 
Shanley for Massachusetts LGBTQ Bar Association & others. 
Stanley Donald, pro se. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 1982, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant, William F. McDermott, of murder in the first degree.  
On direct review, we held that the trial judge had erred in 
failing to instruct the jury that evidence of intoxication could 
be considered in determining whether the defendant acted with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty as to support a verdict of murder in 
the first degree.  See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 
459, 461 (1984).  Rather than ordering a new trial, the court 
exercised its authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree "given the 
entire posture of the case."  Id.  Mitigating factors included 
that the defendant was "just seventeen years old at the time of 
the incident, academically deficient, with some drug and alcohol 
problems . . . and [had] a poor relationship with his father."  
Id. at 460-461.  The court also noted the defendant's "sexual 
confusion" and evidence that he killed the victim "following, 
and in fear of repetition of, an anal rape."  Id. at 461. 
3 
 
 
In 2020, the defendant filed a second motion for a new 
trial, raising three issues:2  first, the prosecutor's cross-
examination and closing argument inserted homophobic invective 
into the case and were otherwise highly inflammatory; second, 
the judge failed to instruct the jury properly on self-defense, 
excessive use of force in self-defense, sudden provocation, and 
sudden combat; and third, a sentence of life with the 
possibility of parole, imposed on an individual seventeen years 
old at the time of the fatal shooting, is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  While finding that 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, a Superior Court judge 
(motion judge) nonetheless denied the motion for postconviction 
relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
We adopt the motion judge's finding of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Although the prosecutor had a right to challenge 
the defense, which focused on the victim's alleged undisclosed 
sexual orientation and workplace sexual assault, portions of the 
cross-examination and closing argument went beyond the bounds of 
 
2 In his first motion for a new trial, filed in 2004, the 
defendant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions on 
malice aforethought and provocation erroneously shifted the 
burden of proof.  A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's 
motion, and that decision was affirmed by the Appeals Court in 
an unpublished opinion.  See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 65 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1112 (2006).  This court denied further appellate 
review.  See 446 Mass. 1104 (2006). 
4 
 
a permissible response.  Despite these transgressions, we 
conclude that the errors arising from the prosecutor's 
misconduct, considered in context of the overwhelming evidence 
against the defendant and its likely influence on the verdict, 
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Next, we hold that the defendant's challenges to the self-
defense jury instructions are estopped by prior postconviction 
rulings, and any error in the provocation jury instructions did 
not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Finally, we conclude that neither the Eighth Amendment nor art. 
26 bars the defendant from serving a sentence of life with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years for the crime of 
murder in the second degree.  Accordingly, the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed.3 
Background.  1.  Facts.  a.  Commonwealth's case.  In the 
fall of 1981, the seventeen year old defendant met Robert Kemp, 
the manager of the Cohasset Golf Club (club).  Kemp, sometime in 
October 1981, hired the defendant as a maintenance worker.  At 
the time, Kemp owned a .22 caliber Sentinel revolver with a 
capacity of nine rounds.  He kept the firearm in a filing 
 
3 We acknowledge amicus briefs submitted by the New England 
Innocence Project and the Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard 
Law School; the Massachusetts LGBTQ Bar Association, GLBTQ Legal 
Advocates & Defenders, and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; and Stanley Donald. 
5 
 
cabinet in his office.  The filing cabinet also held a box 
containing petty cash in an amount ranging from one hundred 
dollars to $500. 
On November 20, 1981, at around 1 P.M., one of Kemp's 
friends visited him at work.  When the friend left, between 2:30 
P.M. and 3 P.M., he observed Kemp's car parked in the parking 
lot.  An hour later, a club member arrived to pick up meat he 
had purchased from the club.  While Kemp and the club member 
spoke in the kitchen, the defendant carried two boxes of meat to 
the club member's car, placing the boxes behind the car.  The 
defendant then returned to work.  The club member described the 
defendant as a considerate and polite young man. 
At approximately 4 P.M., Kemp called his wife, who expected 
him home at around 5:30 P.M.  When Kemp did not come home that 
evening, his wife searched for him all night and into the early 
morning hours without success.  Meanwhile, at 8:30 P.M., 
Marshfield police observed Kemp's car parked near a burned-down 
church in the Green Harbor section of town but had no reason at 
the time to investigate.  The car remained parked there 
overnight. 
The club's chef reported for work the next morning.  He 
observed blood droplets on the kitchen floor, a towel soaked in 
blood under the sink, a bloody squeegee beside the sink, and 
Kemp's eyeglasses on the floor behind a pan rack.  The chef 
6 
 
alerted the police.  Responding police officers noticed 
additional blood spots near the stairs leading into the club and 
bloody drag marks on a hallway carpet.  They located Kemp's 
revolver outside the kitchen atop a stone wall below a deck.  It 
contained three spent cartridge casings (one casing within the 
chamber directly under the hammer and the other two side-by-
side) followed by six consecutive empty chambers.  The officers 
observed two bullet holes in the kitchen -- one projectile had 
passed through a wooden door and the other impacted a concrete 
block wall. 
That afternoon, a neighbor discovered Kemp's body in a 
ditch within a wooded area near the eighteenth hole of the golf 
course.  Kemp was fully clothed with the pockets of his pants 
turned inside out.  Missing were his wedding band, gold watch, 
and wallet.  Police found four spent .22 caliber cartridge 
casings on the ground near Kemp's body.  Kemp died from eleven 
or twelve gunshot wounds:  four to the right side of his head, 
one to his right cheek, two to his chest, four to his back, and 
one that exited his torso and lodged into his right elbow.  A 
State police ballistician opined that the eleven projectiles 
removed from Kemp's body, as well as the spent cartridge casings 
found in the revolver and near the body, were fired from Kemp's 
revolver. 
7 
 
While searching Kemp's car, investigators found the club's 
petty cash box and bloodstains on the back seat.  Outside the 
vehicle in a wooded area, police also located two sets of keys 
to the car and Kemp's bloodstained jacket, which had six bullet 
holes in the upper body area. 
At the time of the shooting, the defendant lived with his 
parents approximately two miles from the church parking lot.  In 
a search of the defendant's bedroom, various bloodstained 
articles of clothing -- including jeans, underwear, shoes, and a 
jacket -- were discovered.  On November 23, 1981, the defendant 
was arrested at his sister's house in Pennsylvania, where he had 
fled the day after the fatal shooting. 
b.  Defendant's version.  The defendant testified that he 
met Kemp in September 1981 while he was hitchhiking to a party 
in Marshfield.  Later that day, Kemp offered the defendant a 
"big money" maintenance job at the club.  Within a few days, the 
defendant called Kemp to follow up on the job offer.  Kemp 
picked up the defendant at a fast-food restaurant, bought him 
alcohol, and offered the defendant thirty dollars if Kemp could 
perform oral sex on him.  The defendant agreed, and they drove 
to a nearby cemetery.  The defendant was unable to become 
aroused during the sex act, but Kemp paid him anyway. 
On October 2, 1981, the defendant, accompanied by his 
girlfriend, filled out a job application at the club.  
8 
 
Afterward, the three of them went to a bar, where Kemp got the 
defendant alone and begged to perform oral sex on him.  After 
dropping off the defendant's girlfriend, Kemp and the defendant 
snorted cocaine purchased by Kemp and attempted to have oral 
sex.  Kemp, once again, paid the defendant thirty dollars. 
The pattern continued over the next three weeks or so:  
Kemp supplied the defendant with alcohol and narcotics, placed 
his mouth on the defendant's penis, and gave him thirty dollars 
each time.  Kemp also pressured the defendant for anal sex, 
asking the defendant to let Kemp "put it up [his] bum."  One 
time, Kemp bragged about knowing "people in Rhode Island" who 
break legs, cut off "pricks," and stuff them in their victim's 
mouths. 
On November 20, 1981, the defendant telephoned Kemp to see 
if he was needed at work.  Kemp told the defendant to finish 
painting the women's bathroom and that he would pay his taxicab 
fare.  The defendant arrived at around 1:30 P.M.  Kemp was 
inside his office talking to a friend.  The defendant consumed a 
mixed drink, served by Kemp, and went upstairs to the second 
floor to paint the bathroom.  While working, the defendant drank 
a few more mixed drinks and smoked marijuana. 
After completing the painting, the defendant was on a 
ladder removing tape from the ceiling when Kemp entered the 
bathroom.  Kemp grabbed the defendant by the penis and told him 
9 
 
he needed to comply to keep both his job and his "prick."  The 
defendant testified: 
"[H]e forced me down on the couch and took off my pants, 
and he put his penis in my bum.  He had his hands wrapped 
around me -- around my waist. . . .  He [then] got up and 
left for some reason.  He threw me a hundred-dollar bill 
and told me I liked it." 
 
The defendant was frightened, felt violated, and was in pain 
from the sexual assault.  He also felt disorientated from the 
alcohol and drugs he had consumed earlier that day. 
The defendant dressed and went downstairs to the kitchen, 
where Kemp was speaking to a club member.  The defendant carried 
meat to the club member's car.  He attempted to enter the car, 
but the doors were locked.  He then returned to the kitchen.  As 
soon as the club member left, Kemp grabbed the defendant by his 
hair and jacket, and kicked him on the backside.  Kemp insisted 
that they "finish."  They returned to the second-floor bathroom, 
where Kemp ordered the defendant to remove his pants.  The 
defendant managed to break free from Kemp by telling him that he 
needed to use the bathroom.  Kemp removed his revolver from his 
waistband, slamming it down on the vanity. 
The defendant grabbed the firearm and ran downstairs to the 
kitchen.  Kemp chased after him.  The defendant tripped, fell on 
the ground, and fired the revolver in Kemp's direction as he got 
up.  He did not aim the firearm, nor did he see Kemp as he 
fired.  Kemp fell to the kitchen floor. 
10 
 
The defendant was confused and disoriented.  In this 
panicked state, he attempted to clean up the blood spilled from 
Kemp's body.  He then dragged Kemp outside and into the car.  
The defendant dropped Kemp's body in a ditch by the side of the 
road.  He denied shooting Kemp while he was in the ditch or 
reloading the nine-shot revolver.  He also denied rummaging 
through Kemp's pockets or stealing his money or jewelry.  The 
defendant drove to Marshfield, parked in a church parking lot, 
tossed the keys into a wooded area, and walked home.  The next 
day, after purchasing a train ticket with the one hundred dollar 
bill Kemp had thrown at him, he traveled to Pennsylvania. 
The defendant called Peter Werner to testify that Kemp was 
not open about his sexual orientation and used his position as 
club manager to proposition young men.  Werner, age twenty-two, 
described a sexual encounter with Kemp at a highway rest area on 
or around October 20, 1981.  Werner stopped at the rest area to 
meet other men.  He met an individual, matching Kemp's 
description, who introduced himself as "Robert Kemp" and wore a 
windbreaker embroidered "Bob" and a "Cohasset Golf Club" cap.  
Kemp asked Werner if he wanted to "fool around."  They walked to 
a remote area where Kemp paid Werner thirty dollars so that Kemp 
could perform oral sex on him.  Kemp "began to blow" Werner, but 
Werner could not get an erection because Kemp "didn't turn [him] 
on."  Werner testified, "I then proceeded to masturbate myself, 
11 
 
and he did the same to himself."  Prior to the sex act, Kemp 
offered Werner a maintenance job.  They met again, by chance, a 
week later at another rest area.  Werner explained that he did 
not pursue the job opportunity because he knew that Kemp would 
demand sex "all the time." 
c.  Rebuttal evidence.  The Commonwealth called several 
witnesses on rebuttal.  Kemp's wife testified that they were 
married for fourteen years and had three children, ages five, 
nine, and twelve.  She had no suspicions that her husband was 
gay.  A seventeen year old club employee testified that Kemp did 
not proposition him and that he never observed Kemp supply the 
defendant with alcohol.  In addition, a State police trooper, 
who interviewed Werner before trial, testified to Werner's prior 
inconsistent statements.  Werner told the officer that the 
incident took place "sometime in September of 1981," and that 
the man introduced himself as "Bob" (not "Robert Kemp").  
Describing the encounter, Werner stated that Kemp offered to 
fellate him in exchange for twenty dollars.  Werner did not want 
to have oral sex with Kemp, so they "struck a bargain" for Kemp 
to masturbate in Werner's presence for the fee of twenty 
dollars. 
2.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
charging the defendant with murder in the first degree, G. L. 
c. 265, § 1, and armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17.  Following a 
12 
 
nine-day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree and acquitted him of armed robbery.  
On direct appeal, this court exercised its authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and ordered the verdict reduced to murder in the 
second degree.  See McDermott, 393 Mass. at 459, 461. 
On August 3, 2004, the defendant filed his first motion for 
a new trial, alleging that the trial judge's malice and 
provocation instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of 
proof.  The motion judge denied the defendant's request for 
postconviction relief, which was affirmed by the Appeals Court 
in an unpublished decision in 2006.  See Commonwealth v. 
McDermott, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (2006).  This court denied the 
defendant's application for further appellate review.  See 446 
Mass. 1104 (2006). 
The defendant, in October 2020, filed his second motion for 
a new trial, and a motion to stay execution of his sentence.4  He 
subsequently, in March 2021, filed a motion for alternative 
relief, requesting a reduction to manslaughter under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  On May 
 
4 A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's motion to 
stay the execution of his sentence, in which the defendant 
sought release due to the dangers of COVID-19.  See Commonwealth 
v. McDermott, 488 Mass. 169, 170 (2021).  A single justice of 
the Appeals Court affirmed the denial of that motion, based on 
the defendant's serious flight risk, and we upheld that order.  
Id. at 170, 172. 
13 
 
26, 2022, the motion judge denied the defendant's second motion 
for a new trial and his motion to reduce the verdict.  The 
defendant filed a timely appeal from the decision, and we 
allowed his petition for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  The defendant did not 
object to the prosecutor's closing argument, the contested jury 
instructions, or most of the disputed cross-examination at 
trial.  The defendant also did not raise any of these issues in 
his direct appeal or in his first motion for a new trial.  In 
these circumstances, we review to determine whether any of the 
alleged errors created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294-295 
(2002); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 
444 Mass. 72 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 
169, 174 (1999). 
A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists where 
we have "a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might 
have been different had the error not been made."  Azar, 435 
Mass. at 687, quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 174.  This standard 
of review considers "(1) the strength of the Commonwealth's 
case, (2) the nature of the error, (3) the significance of the 
error in the context of the trial, and (4) the possibility that 
the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision" (citation and alteration omitted).  
14 
 
Commonwealth v. Desiderio, 491 Mass. 809, 815-816 (2023).  See 
Randolph, 438 Mass. at 297 ("Errors of this magnitude are 
extraordinary events and relief is seldom granted"); Azar, supra 
(new trial based on unpreserved error is "extraordinary 
situation"). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant's appeal is 
"foreclosed" by this court's plenary review in 1984.  That 
argument only goes so far.  "Section 33E, the mechanism by which 
this court exercises plenary review of all convictions of murder 
in the first degree, provides this court with extraordinary 
powers to consider the whole case, both the law and the 
evidence, to determine whether there has been any miscarriage of 
justice" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Watt, 493 Mass. 322, 326 (2024).  Reversible error is unlikely 
where "the defendant's conviction in a capital case has 
undergone the exacting scrutiny of plenary review under § 33E."  
Randolph, 438 Mass. at 297.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins 
(No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 805, S.C., 486 Mass. 1021 (2021).  
Notwithstanding the court's exacting level of review, 
postconviction relief under the substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice standard is not entirely foreclosed.  Id.  
"Although this court takes its § 33E review obligation seriously 
and conducts a thorough review to the best of its ability, no 
one is infallible. . . .  [W]e must maintain a means of 
15 
 
addressing the possibility of error and of grave and lingering 
injustice" (quotations and citations omitted).  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 320 (2011). 
2.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  We first consider whether 
the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument crossed 
the line that separates strong advocacy from prohibited 
misconduct.  Most pointedly, the defendant asserts that the 
prosecutor convinced the jury to convict by "wield[ing] 
homophobic invective."  He claims also that the prosecutor 
engaged in other prohibited tactics, including asking questions 
designed to badger or harass the defendant and playing to the 
jury's sympathy for the victim in the closing argument.  
Although the Commonwealth concedes that some of the prosecutor's 
tactics were improper, it contends that the defendant is unable 
to demonstrate a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
because of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.5 
 
5 The Commonwealth introduced the defendant's statements 
before the parole board to cast doubt on the truthfulness of his 
defense.  In these proceedings, the defendant disavowed his 
trial testimony.  He testified, in 2012 and 2019, that the self-
defense claim was a lie -- that is, that Kemp did not rape him, 
and that the defendant's attorney procured Werner's testimony.  
It would not be in the interest of justice, the Commonwealth 
argues, to grant the defendant a new trial considering his 
admission to fabricating a defense.  The defendant objected to 
the consideration of the parole board evidence, contending that 
the statements are irrelevant or of dubious value considering 
his incentive to mollify parole officials.  See Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 528 S.W.3d 342, 347-348 (Ky. 2017) (expressing doubt over 
 
16 
 
a.  Cross-examination.  A defendant who voluntarily takes 
the witness stand to testify on his own behalf is subject to 
"the ordinary rigors of proper cross-examination."  Commonwealth 
v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 639 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 573 (2002).  There are, 
however, limits to cross-examination.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fahey, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 309 (2021).  Among those 
limitations:  (1) "a prosecutor may not ask the defendant a 
question for which the prosecutor cannot reasonably expect the 
witness to provide an affirmative answer in order to communicate 
an impression . . . by innuendo"; (2) the defendant cannot be 
asked to assess the credibility of another witness; and (3) a 
prosecutor may not ask the defendant questions that only serve 
"to harass, annoy or humiliate" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  Id. at 310. 
 
reliability of admissions "induced solely by the yearning to be 
free").  Here, the motion judge found that the defendant's 
admissions "may be probative," and that such evidence "arguably 
take[s] some of the sting" out of the prosecutor's misconduct.  
We leave for another day the issue whether the Commonwealth may 
introduce admissions before the parole board in a motion for a 
new trial.  Where, as here, the motion judge did not preside 
over the trial or conduct an evidentiary hearing, we review his 
decision de novo.  Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790, 793-794 
(2022).  Thus, we rely on the trial transcripts and other 
documentary evidence, absent the parole board admissions, to 
determine whether the asserted error or errors created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
17 
 
 
We first address the prosecutor's questions concerning the 
defendant's sexual orientation.  To test the credibility of the 
defendant's version of the facts, the prosecutor asked the 
defendant, in essence, why he continued to work for Kemp if sex 
was a condition of employment.  The defendant answered that Kemp 
continued to pay him thirty dollars for oral sex and "I guess I 
told [Kemp] it was all right, because he did it."  The 
prosecutor then inquired into the defendant's sexual 
orientation: 
Q.:  "Did you ever have homosexual sex with other 
people -- " 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "-- before that?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "Any familiarity with homosexuals?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "Up to that point; are you sure?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Did you ever hear of a place named 'Skippers'?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "Did you?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
 
Following this exchange, defense counsel asked for a side 
bar conference.  He informed the judge that the Commonwealth had 
18 
 
not provided any pretrial discovery linking the defendant to 
"Skippers."  Counsel requested an offer of proof "to see if that 
is fair cross-examination."  The prosecutor explained that 
Skippers is a "homosexual bar," and that he had "soft 
information" that the defendant "may have been there."  The 
trial judge did not accept the Commonwealth's offer of proof.  
He stated that "it certainly isn't appropriate to ask a question 
of a witness if you know, or if you understand that in the event 
that he answers in the negative, that you're not going to be 
able to show some evidence of it."  He promised, "[a]t some 
point," to provide an appropriate jury instruction "with 
reference to that."  The judge did not do so. 
The prosecutor, as the Commonwealth now concedes, made 
inappropriate insinuations regarding the defendant's sexual 
orientation without foundation.  It is error, as we explained in 
Commonwealth v. Fordham, 417 Mass. 10, 20-21 (1994), for a 
prosecutor "to communicate impressions by innuendo through 
questions which are answered in the negative . . . when the 
questioner has no evidence to support the innuendo.  A 
prosecutor may not conduct cross-examination in bad faith or 
without foundation" (quotations and citations omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 734 (2021); Commonwealth 
v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 559-561 (2000), overruled on other 
grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002). 
19 
 
Moreover, this line of questioning was premised on 
homophobic stereotyping.  The Commonwealth suggested that 
tolerance of workplace sexual harassment varied according to 
sexual orientation.  That is, according to the Commonwealth, a 
heterosexual employee (as the defendant claimed to be through 
his counsel) would have quit.  See Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473 
Mass. 173, 186 (2015), citing Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(C) 
note (2015) (biased questions raising racial, ethnic, or gender 
stereotypes inappropriate); Commonwealth v. Capone, 39 Mass. 
App. Ct. 606, 611 (1996) ("error for a prosecutor to make 
insinuations about a defendant's sexual orientation which are 
likely to prejudice a defendant"). 
The prosecutor also badgered the defendant during cross-
examination by asking hostile and repetitive questions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 540 (2000).  For 
example, the defendant testified that he shot blindly at Kemp.  
Expressing incredulity (given the number of well-placed gunshot 
wounds), the prosecutor asked, "You didn't see him while you 
were shooting him?"  The defendant responded, "No, I wasn't 
looking at him."  The prosecutor countered, "You're a pretty 
good shot."  Later, the trial judge offered to "take the recess 
now and cool the court room down a little." 
While we therefore agree with the motion judge that the 
prosecutor's insinuations and badgering were improper, not all 
20 
 
the motion judge's characterizations of the prosecutor's cross-
examination are accurate.  Specifically, the motion judge found 
that the prosecutor "tempt[ed]" the defendant into commenting on 
the credibility of police officers.  See Commonwealth v. 
Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986) (prosecutor baited defendant 
into calling his own mother, who offered different version of 
facts, liar); Fahey, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 310 (prosecutor asked 
defendant, "So, you're telling the truth and no one else is?").  
We disagree with this characterization of the testimony.  The 
prosecutor asked: 
Q.:  "Now, you heard Lieutenant McGuinness testify before 
this jury, didn't you?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And you heard Sergeant Rhodes of the Cohasset police 
testify also, correct?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Do you remember Sergeant Rhodes saying that there 
were three empty casings in this weapon when he found it on 
the wall?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "How did that happen?" 
 
[objection overruled] 
 
A.:  "I don't know." 
 
Q.:  "Well, how many times did you shoot Robert Kemp?" 
 
A.:  "I don't know." 
 
21 
 
Q.:  "You heard Sergeant McGuinness testify that there were 
four casings in the vicinity of where the body was found.  
Do you remember that testimony?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And that those four casings were fired from that gun?  
You heard that, didn't you?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Didn't you shoot Robert Kemp when you had him in the 
ditch?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
The defendant testified that he did not know how many 
rounds he fired.  He also denied shooting Kemp in the wooded 
area.  The prosecutor confronted the defendant with undisputed 
ballistics evidence, including the revolver's nine-shot capacity 
and the number of gunshot wounds and expended shell casings.  
The defendant was not asked whether the crime scene 
investigators lied.  Referencing the testimony of those police 
officers, he was asked to explain how the nine-shot revolver was 
emptied, and to square his version of the facts with the shell 
casings recovered next to the body.  "It is not improper for the 
prosecutor to point out, through this line of questioning, that 
there were inconsistencies between the defendant's testimony and 
that of [other witnesses], so long as the defendant was not 
asked to assess the credibility of the [witness's] testimony" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 
Mass. 8, 18-19 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
22 
 
678, 687 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014) (no error where 
questions "do not involve any direct request of [the defendant] 
to comment on the credibility of witnesses"). 
b.  Closing argument.  The prosecutor made two improper 
remarks in his closing argument.  First, he played to the jury's 
potential bias against gay men by dismissing Werner as a "male 
prostitute," and telling the jury that Werner was "very proud of 
the fact he is gay.  Fine.  Great.  That's not the issue here."  
See Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 663, 674 (2021) (arguments 
that invoked racial biases "grossly improper"); Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 328 (2001) (argument "went too 
far" by prejudicial name-calling).  Second, the prosecutor 
inappropriately appealed to the jury's sympathy for the victim.  
He argued, "[The defendant] had to come up with something; he 
had to.  It's an overwhelming case.  He murdered him, and he 
robbed him.  Unfortunately for the memory of Robert Kemp, think 
of what this man has come up with."  See Commonwealth v. Bois, 
476 Mass. 15, 34 (2016) ("Prosecutorial appeals to sympathy 
. . . obscure the clarity with which the jury would look at the 
evidence and encourage the jury to find guilt even if the 
evidence does not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" [quotation omitted]). 
 
c.  Substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.  The 
Commonwealth concedes prosecutorial misconduct.  The motion 
23 
 
judge aptly observed, "If [the d]efendant's entitlement to a new 
trial turned solely on whether the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct at his original trial, the [c]ourt would allow [the 
d]efendant's [s]econd [m]otion.  That, however, is not the 
standard."  Applying the standard of review for unpreserved 
claims, we conclude that the defendant has not demonstrated a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  On these facts, 
notwithstanding improprieties in the prosecutor's cross-
examination and closing argument, this case does not warrant a 
new trial.  See Randolph, 438 Mass. at 297. 
We first examine the strength of the Commonwealth's case.  
See Desiderio, 491 Mass. at 815-816; Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.  
The record supports the conclusion that there was overwhelming 
evidence of guilt.  The motion judge found, and we agree, that 
"[n]otwithstanding anything that the prosecutor did or said 
at [the d]efendant's trial, it remains undisputed that [the 
d]efendant shot Kemp ten to eleven times -- including five 
times to the face and head -- with a nine-shot [r]evolver.  
Because [the d]efendant fired ten or eleven shots into 
Kemp's body with a nine-shot weapon, it also is true that 
[the d]efendant undeniably had the opportunity and the 
presence of mind, in the midst of killing Kemp, to stop and 
reload the [r]evolver at least once." 
 
There was also strong evidence rebutting the defendant's 
narrative of events.  For example, he testified that he shot 
Kemp while falling, and did not aim the revolver or even see 
Kemp before pulling the trigger.  Yet he fired multiple fatal 
shots, striking Kemp in vital areas of his body.  He also 
24 
 
testified that he did not rifle through Kemp's pockets, leading 
to an unbelievable "grave robber" argument that teenagers 
partying in the woods spotted Kemp's body in the ditch overnight 
and stole his wallet and jewelry.6  Further, the defendant's 
testimony that he did not shoot Kemp in the ditch was 
contradicted by the presence of shell casings near the body. 
We next examine the second and third Desiderio and Azar 
factors.  It goes without saying that cross-examination or a 
closing argument that plays on a juror's potential homophobic 
bias has no place in a criminal trial.  Whether misconduct leads 
to a new trial on collateral review, however, depends on the 
nature of the errors and the significance of the errors in the 
 
6 The jury acquitted the defendant of armed robbery and 
felony-murder.  See McDermott, 393 Mass. at 457 (jury "clearly" 
rejected felony-murder).  These verdicts, however, do not 
foreclose a finding that the defendant rummaged through Kemp's 
pockets and stole the petty cash box.  It is a question of when 
the defendant formed the intent to steal, not whether he stole 
from Kemp.  The judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth 
was required to prove the defendant formed an intent to steal 
prior to the shooting, not afterward.  He instructed:  
"[S]peaking just hypothetically, depending upon how you might 
view the evidence, certainly if he took property from Robert 
Kemp or from his body after the fact of a killing and did not 
have the specific intent at the time of the killing to rob from 
him, then that crime would not be armed robbery."  See 
Commonwealth v. Roderick, 429 Mass. 271, 277 (1999) (felony-
murder applies where killing occurred during commission or 
attempted commission of predicate felony). 
 
25 
 
context of the trial.  See Desiderio, 491 Mass. at 816; Azar, 
435 Mass. at 687.7 
The defense alleged that Kemp hid his sexual orientation 
and used his position as golf course manager to take advantage 
of younger men.  In so doing, the defense appealed to homophobic 
tropes.  What began as "homosexual seduction," as defense 
counsel stated, "resulted in a degrading[] defilement, and on 
November 20[], the homosexual rape of Billy McDermott."  Defense 
counsel emphasized that the defendant was a "real [heterosexual] 
boy" attacked by a larger, older gay man.  As evidence of the 
defendant's heterosexuality, his girlfriend testified that he 
"became aroused" in response to "heavy petting."  Defense 
counsel argued, "I'm glad I called [the defendant's girlfriend], 
because I think it really rounds out what we are dealing with 
here, a boy."  Defense counsel further stated that Werner's 
testimony, where Werner described consensual sex for a fee with 
Kemp, "contextualizes the horror of Billy McDermott." 
The prosecutor was entitled to challenge the defendant's 
version of the facts and Werner's testimony concerning Kemp's 
alleged undisclosed sexual orientation.  This was a delicate 
task given the danger of importing bias into the trial.  He 
 
7 This case does not raise the fourth factor, i.e., "the 
possibility that the absence of an objection was the result of a 
reasonable tactical decision."  Desiderio, 491 Mass. at 816. 
26 
 
failed.  We conclude, however, that the prosecutor's "Skippers" 
question and reference to Werner's sexual orientation did not 
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The 
"Skippers" question was part of the prosecutor's ham-handed 
attempt to counter the defendant's narrative that an innocent 
"real" heterosexual boy, cornered in the bathroom, justifiably 
resorted to deadly force to repel an attack by an older, gay 
man.  In response to the prosecutor's question whether he was 
familiar with "Skippers," the defendant answered "no," the 
prosecutor moved on to another topic, and the judge effectively 
curtailed further inquiry.  See Christian, 430 Mass. at 560-562 
(prosecutor questioned defendant "at some length" about 
incriminating statements made to nontestifying jailhouse 
informant drawing "consistent denials").  Similarly, in a 
lengthy closing argument, the derisive comments about Werner's 
sexual orientation were made in passing amid appropriate 
argument challenging Werner's testimony. 
We next consider the prosecutor's inappropriate appeal to 
sympathy.  A prosecutor is afforded leeway to humanize the 
proceedings but not in a way that plays on the jury's sympathy 
and emotions.  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 201 
(2017).  The absence of an objection, although not dispositive, 
is "some indication that the tone, manner, and substance of the 
now challenged aspects of the prosecutor's argument were not 
27 
 
unfairly prejudicial" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Duguay, 430 Mass. 397, 404 (1999).  Here, the judge instructed 
the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and that the 
jurors were required to decide the case "without reference to 
any ignoble motive" such as "fear, prejudice, pity, [or] 
sympathy."  See Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 560-561 
(2007) (general jury instructions may mitigate prejudice).  The 
potential damage to Kemp's reputation as a "family man" was 
front and center in the trial.  He was either a rapist targeting 
young male employees, who hid his sexual orientation from his 
friends and family, or a murder victim unfairly sullied by the 
defense.  "[I]t is unlikely that the prosecutor's argument had 
an inflammatory effect on the jury beyond that which naturally 
would result from the evidence presented" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 754 
(2022).  Finally, the prosecutor's aggressive questioning, in 
context, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Having carefully reviewed the transcripts, we agree 
with the Commonwealth's contention that the length of the cross-
examination was in many ways attributable to the prosecutor's 
legitimate goal of rebutting the defendant's statements during 
direct examination point by point.  Further, the harsh tone of 
the prosecutor's questioning is not the type of error leading to 
a new trial in this procedural posture. 
28 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  The defendant next contends that 
the trial judge provided erroneous self-defense, sudden 
provocation, and sudden combat jury instructions.  In brief, he 
claims that the self-defense instructions "failed to place the 
burden squarely and continuously upon the Commonwealth," and 
that the sudden provocation and sudden combat instructions were 
incomplete.  The motion judge rejected these claims.  He 
concluded that these issues were "fully litigated and addressed 
by both [this court] and the Appeals Court in the course of [the 
d]efendant's prior appeals.  In other words, all of the 
requirements for the application of direct estoppel have been 
met."8 
 
As a threshold issue, we consider whether the defendant 
should be estopped directly from challenging the jury 
instructions where the issues were decided in his first motion 
for a new trial and subsequent appeal.  "Under the principle of 
direct estoppel, a judge is precluded from reviewing an issue 
that previously was litigated and determined, if such 
determination was essential to the conviction, and the defendant 
 
8 We are not convinced that the burden of proving self-
defense was litigated and determined in the direct appeal.  The 
McDermott court addressed the narrow self-defense issue whether 
the judge was required to instruct the jury that an individual 
may use deadly force to resist rape (as distinct from force used 
to resist death or serious injury).  See McDermott, 393 Mass. at 
459-460. 
29 
 
had an opportunity to obtain review of the determination" 
(quotations and alterations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 
492 Mass. 440, 447 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Arias, 488 
Mass. 1004, 1006 (2021). 
 
The defendant's first motion for a new trial challenged 
impermissible burden-shifting language within the voluntary 
manslaughter instruction.  The Commonwealth conceded that the 
judge failed to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth had to 
prove the absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
denying the motion for a new trial, the first motion judge found 
that the unobjected-to erroneous jury instruction did not create 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  "[I]t would 
have been better practice," she stated, "for the judge to 
instruct that the Commonwealth had to prove the absence of 
provocation beyond a reasonable doubt."  She reasoned that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the error because reading "the 
charge as a whole" (including the self-defense instruction) the 
judge repeatedly emphasized "that the Commonwealth bore the 
burden of proof, that it had to prove all elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the defendant bore no burden." 
On the defendant's appeal from the denial of his first 
motion for a new trial, the Appeals Court considered the 
defendant's argument that "the judge incorrectly instructed the 
jury on the Commonwealth's burden of proof on provocation, which 
30 
 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  
McDermott, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1112.  The judge gave the jury the 
same burden-shifting instruction found to be prejudicial error 
in Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716 (1998).  "The 
correct rule is that, where the evidence raises the possibility 
that the defendant may have acted on reasonable provocation, the 
Commonwealth must prove, and the jury must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act on reasonable 
provocation."  McDermott, supra, quoting Acevedo, supra.  The 
Appeals Court went on to decide whether the Acevedo error 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice requiring 
a new trial.  Affirming the denial of the defendant's first 
motion for a new trial, the Appeals Court stated, "The error, 
which the Commonwealth concedes, did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice because the trial judge gave a 
lengthy and correct instruction on self-defense, in which he 
properly allocated to the Commonwealth the burden to prove the 
absence of self-defense."  McDermott, supra.  The Appeals Court 
further noted, "The judge gave a lengthy instruction on self-
defense, in which he properly, forcefully, and repeatedly 
allocated to the Commonwealth the burden to prove the absence of 
self-defense."  Id. 
In this appeal, the defendant is estopped from relitigating 
the issue whether the judge properly allocated the burden of 
31 
 
proof in the self-defense instruction.  The claim was "actually 
litigated and determined" by the Appeals Court, and "such 
determination was essential to the [defendant's] conviction" 
(citations omitted).  Pfeiffer, 492 Mass. at 447.  The 
defendant's argument that the Appeals Court's statements 
concerning the correctness of the self-defense instruction "is 
nonbinding dicta" is unavailing.  Jury instructions are 
considered as a whole "to determine the probable impact, 
appraised realistically . . . upon the jury's factfinding 
function" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022).  Where the Appeals Court 
determined that the jury instructions, in their entirety, did 
not shift the burden of proof, the defendant is estopped from 
relitigating this claim. 
Direct estoppel, however, does not bar the defendant from 
challenging jury instructions unrelated to the allocation of the 
burden of proof.  As such, we next consider the defendant's 
arguments that the trial judge failed to explain or define 
adequately the terms "sudden provocation" and "sudden combat."  
Because the issue is raised for the first time in this appeal, 
32 
 
we examine any alleged errors for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.9 
The judge instructed: 
"[M]anslaughter takes into account the human frailties of 
human beings. . . .  It allows the jury to consider on the 
totality of the evidence whether or not the perpetrator of 
the crime was overcome by provocation at the time that he 
committed the crime.  If so, was he so overcome?  Was he so 
overcome with human emotion and human frailty and human 
weakness based upon a provocation that he, indeed, acted 
not out of response to deliberation, not out of response to 
malice but out of response to human weakness, but, 
nevertheless, committed an unlawful killing?" 
 
In response to the jury's request to redefine manslaughter, 
the judge provided a supplemental instruction: 
"[The law] recognizes the weaknesses of human beings and 
their frailties and their responses to sudden provocation 
or sudden assaults in the heat of passion of mankind.  If 
the jury find[] that there is, indeed, an unlawful killing 
of another . . . but that that killing was after an assault 
 
9 The defendant, citing Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 
Mass. 446, 450 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 
572, 576 (1997), contends also that the judge erred by failing 
to instruct the jury that intoxication mitigates the subjective 
prong of self-defense.  The argument is not supported by either 
case.  Harrington, supra, established that self-defense requires 
evidence that a defendant reasonably and actually believed he 
was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.  In 
Barros, supra, the court did not reach the issue whether a judge 
is required to instruct the jury that they may consider 
intoxication as it relates to the defendant's actual belief that 
it was necessary to resort to deadly force.  It was not 
necessary to resolve the issue, the Barros court concluded, 
because the evidence did not warrant a self-defense instruction.  
Id.  In any event, the absence of such an instruction would not 
have created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  If 
the jury had credited the defendant's version of events, he 
would have had a reasonable and actual belief that deadly force 
was necessary to protect himself from Kemp's sexual assault 
regardless of his sobriety. 
33 
 
or a provocation upon the [d]efendant which resulted in the 
[d]efendant reacting in a heat of passion where judgment 
is, in effect, clouded by the heat of passion, then in fact 
in that situation the notion of malice that can be inferred 
from the intentional use of deadly force is negated, and 
the malice does not exist.  In that situation the killing, 
rather than being murder, is manslaughter." 
 
The defendant maintains that the court "should have, but 
did not convey, the precise and complete definitions of 
provocation and sudden combat that this [c]ourt had established 
before this trial."  A more thorough definition, he argues, 
would have informed the jury that "sudden provocation included 
anger, fright and excitement as valid states of mind in this 
context to warrant a manslaughter verdict."  See Commonwealth v. 
Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Hodge (No. 2), 380 Mass. 858, 865 (1980) (manslaughter is 
homicide committed "in heat of blood, a perturbation of mind 
palliating the intent to inflict injury.  The fatal blow not 
purposeful but is the result of chance and frailty of 
humanity").  This was a critical mistake, he argues, because 
Kemp initiated sudden combat by kicking the defendant and there 
was insufficient time between the defendant's justifiable anger 
and the shooting for "cool reflection." 
Here, the instruction required the jury to consider whether 
the defendant's "judgment was clouded" so that he was "overcome 
with human emotion and human frailty and human weakness based on 
provocation."  We conclude that any error in the provocation 
34 
 
instruction could not have created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The theory of the defense was that the 
defendant shot Kemp to fend off a brutal forcible rape.  Defense 
counsel argued that the defendant, on cross-examination, was 
forced to relive the "torture" of November 20, 1981.  The 
defendant, he argued, was alone, drunk, and afraid.  "He was in 
pain, both from his knees and from his rectum.  He was confused, 
degraded, demeaned, raped, and cornered."  The jury would 
commonly understand that Kemp's alleged sexual assault 
constituted an act of provocation in the manner described by the 
judge. 
4.  Life with possibility of parole sentence.  The 
defendant contends that a sentence of life with the possibility 
of parole, imposed on a teenager, violates the prohibition 
against cruel or unusual punishment secured by the Eighth 
Amendment and art. 26.  Relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 
460, 472 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010), 
he reasons that all former juvenile offenders, convicted of 
homicide or other serious offenses, are entitled to 
individualized sentencing hearings.  In the defendant's view, a 
mandatory life sentence for murder in the second degree, even 
with the possibility of parole, "is constitutionally infirm due 
to the automatic process behind its imposition." 
35 
 
 
The defendant's Federal constitutional challenge fails 
because there is no Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
sentencing a juvenile offender to life with the possibility of 
parole.  The United States Supreme Court, in a series of 
decisions spanning roughly twenty years, has recognized that 
children constitutionally are different from adults for purposes 
of sentencing.  In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), 
the Court held that capital punishment of offenders who were 
under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed 
violates the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Following Roper, the Court examined the 
constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to "the second most 
severe penalty permitted by law" (citation omitted), Graham, 560 
U.S. at 69 -- life imprisonment without parole.  The Graham 
Court held that for "a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide[,] the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life 
without parole."  Id. at 74.  Two years later, in Miller, 567 
U.S. at 479, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's 
probation against cruel and unusual punishment proscribes the 
imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for individuals under the age of eighteen 
at the time they committed murder.  "[B]y making youth (and all 
that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest 
prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of 
36 
 
disproportionate punishment."  Id.  Then, in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016), the Court determined that 
Miller's substantive holding barring life without parole for all 
but the rarest of juvenile offenders was retroactive to cases on 
collateral review.  Most recently, in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 
S. Ct. 1307, 1320-1321 (2021), the Court decided that the Eighth 
Amendment did not require a judge to make separate factual 
finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a 
discretionary sentence of life without parole on a juvenile 
homicide offender. 
 
Because the defendant was sentenced to life with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years, see G. L. c. 279, 
§ 24, his sentence does not violate juvenile-specific Eighth 
Amendment protections.  It is well settled that a mandatory 
sentence to anything less than life without the possibility of 
parole is not prohibited by Miller.  See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 
212 (State may remedy Miller violation by permitting juvenile 
homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than 
resentencing them); Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (mandatory lifetime 
incarceration without possibility of parole "regardless of . . . 
age and age-related characteristics" violates ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 ("State is not 
required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender" 
but must provide "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
37 
 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation").  See also 
Brown v. Precythe, 46 F.4th 879, 886 (8th Cir. 2022) ("Miller 
factors . . . apply as a constitutional matter only to a judge's 
decision at sentencing whether to impose a term of life 
imprisonment without parole for a juvenile homicide offender"); 
Atkins v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476, 478 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2786 (2020) ("Miller's holding simply does 
not cover a lengthy term of imprisonment that falls short of 
life without parole"); United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748, 
754 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020) 
("Miller has no relevance to sentences less than [life without 
parole]"). 
The defendant's art. 26 argument fares no better.  In 
Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 86, cert. denied, 142 
S. Ct. 408 (2021), we considered whether art. 26 prohibits a 
juvenile, convicted of murder in the first degree, from serving 
a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty 
years.  There, the defendant maintained that the combination of 
his youth and intellectual disabilities rendered his mandatory 
sentence disproportionate to his conviction.  Id. at 86.  The 
court concluded that the sentencing scheme, "a product of post-
Diatchenko I developments in our case law," did not violate art. 
26.  Id. at 87-88.  See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 
38 
 
471 Mass. 12 (2015).  In so holding, we considered the gravity 
of the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and 
that art. 26, in extraordinary cases, allows a judge to sentence 
a juvenile to terms with parole eligibility exceeding fifteen 
years.   Concepcion, supra at 88.  See Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 
482 Mass. 399, 405 (2019); Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 
685-686 (2017), S.C., 480 Mass. 562 (2018).  A sentence of life 
with the possibility of parole "would not in itself prevent [the 
defendant] from having 'a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.'"  
Concepcion, supra at 88-89, quoting Diatchenko I, supra at 674.  
A twenty-year period before a juvenile becomes eligible for 
parole is not so lengthy as to be the functional equivalent of 
life without parole.  Concepcion, supra at 88. 
We reach the same result in this case.  The defendant's 
sentence to life with the possibility of parole after fifteen 
years does not violate rights secured by art. 26.  Contrary to 
the defendant's argument, art. 26 does not prohibit the 
imposition of a mandatory sentence.  Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 
87.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 686 (2013) 
("[N]either Miller nor [Diatchenko I] precludes mandatory 
sentencing for all juveniles in all circumstances.  The holding 
of Miller was cabined specifically to the need for discretion in 
imposing the 'particular penalty' of life without parole"). 
39 
 
The defendant's sentence provides a "meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation."  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  The effective date of 
his sentence was November 25, 1981, and after the reduction of 
his sentence to murder in the second degree, he became eligible 
for parole fifteen years later on November 24, 1996.  He has 
been denied parole at least five times.  See McDermott vs. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1985CV00788 
(Worcester County Jan. 6, 2020).  The defendant appealed from 
the April 2019 denial of his parole application, contending that 
the parole board failed to consider "the distinctive attributes 
of youth" in determining whether he was likely to reoffend.  See 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 
12, 23 (2015) (Diatchenko II).  The Appeals Court affirmed a 
Superior Court judge's allowance of the parole board's cross 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  See McDermott v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2022).  The 
court determined that "the full administrative record, including 
the transcript of the hearing before the board and the questions 
asked by board members, reflected a thoughtful and sufficient 
consideration of the [Miller and Diatchenko II] factors."  Id. 
Accordingly, there was no violation of either the 
defendant's Federal or State constitutional rights. 
40 
 
Conclusion.  The order dated May 26, 2022, denying the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.