Title: SAIZ v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SAIZ v. STATE2001 WY 7630 P.3d 21Case Number: 00-170Decided: 08/20/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

IVAN 
GILBERT SAIZ, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; and Ryan  R. Roden, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      In December 1999, 
a jury found appellant, Ivan Saiz, guilty of first-degree sexual assault in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001),1 and the district court sentenced 
appellant to a seven to fourteen year prison term.  Appellant appeals from the Judgment and 
Sentence of the Court, asserting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) is 
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to his case, and that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of first-degree sexual 
assault.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
two issues on appeal:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
W.S. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague facially and as applied to the 
facts in the case, denying appellant due process of law, because it provides no 
standard of conduct for which a person of ordinary sensibilities could 
reasonably understand that which is prohibited and it allows for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
Appellant's conviction for sexual assault cannot stand because insufficient 
evidence supports it.

 

The 
State of Wyoming, as appellee, phrases the issues in substantially the same 
manner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The victim, age 
nineteen, was born with Down's syndrome and is considered "moderately 
retarded."  On September 30, 1998, 
the victim and her mother were relaxing at their Cheyenne residence upon 
returning home from school2 and work respectively.  At some point, the mother's boyfriend 
and appellant arrived at the residence and all four individuals began watching 
television.  Appellant sat next to 
the victim on the floor, where they had a brief conversation, while the mother 
and her boyfriend sat together on the couch.

 

[¶4]      The mother, the 
boyfriend, and appellant later met at a local bar to "shoot" darts,3 leaving the victim at home with her 
brother.  The victim went to her 
bedroom, closed the door and put on her pajamas, attempting to sleep while 
listening to the radio.  The three 
adults eventually returned to the residence with a twelve-pack of beer, at which 
time the mother verified that the victim was in bed.  The mother and her boyfriend retired to 
their bedroom, providing appellant a blanket and pillow, presumably to sleep on 
the couch.  Appellant obliged 
because he "pitched in on the beer" and "wanted to drink what [he] pitched 
in."

 

[¶5]      The victim 
testified that appellant, without invitation, entered her bedroom and initiated 
a sexual encounter with her.  
Appellant testified in his own defense and admitted that he entered the 
victim's bedroom, where he got into her bed, kissed the victim on the mouth, 
touched her breasts, removed the victim's pants and performed oral sex on her, 
and touched and digitally penetrated the victim's vagina.  Appellant ceased the encounter when the 
victim stated that she had to "go to school tomorrow."  Appellant then left the victim's 
bedroom, finished his beer, and went to bed in the living room.4

 

[¶6]      Appellant's 
version of the events contradicted the victim's testimony in several 
respects.  According to appellant, 
the victim initiated contact with him by hugging and kissing him and putting her 
hand on his thigh, claiming also that the victim led appellant to her bedroom, 
where she responded favorably to his sexual advances.  Nevertheless, the jury found appellant 
guilty of first-degree sexual assault.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Constitutionality of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv)

 

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague, both 
on its face and as applied to his case.  
In particular, appellant argues that the statute is facially deficient 
because it does not precisely define or objectively quantify how an actor can 
know that another person is mentally impaired or at what level, cognitive or 
otherwise, a person becomes mentally deficient, which causes one to "guess" 
whether a victim is capable of understanding the nature of his or her 
conduct.  Appellant reiterates this 
argument in the context of whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to his case, adding that the statute is subject to arbitrary and 
discriminatory application across the broad spectrum of victims' assessed levels 
of cognitive thinking and understanding.

 

[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302 provides, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual 
assault in the first degree if:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(iv)       
The actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a 
mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of 
appraising the nature of the victim's conduct.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301 (Lexis 1999) defines "actor," "victim," and "sexual 
intrusion."  "Incapable" commonly 
means "lacking capacity, ability, or qualification for the purpose or end in 
view * * *."  Merriam Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 586-87 (10th ed. 1999).  In this context, "appraising" commonly 
means "to evaluate the worth, significance, or status of."  Id. at 57.

 

[¶9]      In challenging a 
statute for facial vagueness, appellant must demonstrate that the statute 
reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,[5] or the statute specifies no standard of conduct 
at all."  Campbell v. State, 
999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 2000).  The ultimate test is "whether a person 
of ordinary intelligence could read the statute and comprehend what conduct is 
prohibited" because laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.  Id.  "A statute employs a standard, for 
purposes of vagueness, if "by [its] terms or as authoritatively construed [it 
applies] without question to certain activities, but whose application to other 
behavior is uncertain,"'" whereas a vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.  Id. 
(quoting Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 
1995) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 
976 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶10]   Every law is presumed 
constitutional, with all doubt resolved in its favor.  Campbell, 999 P.2d at 
657 (quoting Luplow, 897 P.2d 
at 466 and Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 
266 (Wyo. 1985)).  "In considering statutory language, the 
plain, ordinary and usual meaning of the words used controls in the absence of 
clear statutory provisions to the contrary."  Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 657 
(citing Keser, 706 P.2d at 266).  While penal statutes are strictly 
construed, "they need not be given unnecessarily narrow meaning in disregard of 
the obvious legislative purpose and intent."  Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 
657.  Indeed, "lack of 
precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process.'"  Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 
1033 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957)).

 

[¶11]   In Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1988), we 
established that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) "should not be 
analyzed in a vacuum.  Rather, it 
should be considered in light of the obvious legislative intent of protecting a 
class of persons who cannot fully comprehend what they are doing."6  We explicitly addressed whether Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) was unconstitutionally vague, finding 
that

 

[w]hat 
is clearly proscribed is the infliction of sexual intrusion * * * on a victim 
who is mentally deficient.  In 
essence, an ordinary intelligent person applying common sense to the statute 
would not have to guess at its meaning to understand that to avoid punishment 
under the statute, one must refrain from performing a sex act with a person who 
the actor knows, or should know, is mentally incapable of understanding the 
nature and possible consequences of sexual activity.  No other meaning would be attributed by 
persons of ordinary sensibility than that which the statute clearly states.  Section 6-2-302(a)(iv) is not 
unconstitutionally vague.

 

Righter, 752 P.2d  at 420.  In other words, considering the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language in the context of the statute's 
purpose, we found that the statute incorporates "an adequate standard of conduct 
so that a person of ordinary intelligence readily could read this statute and 
comprehend the conduct that is prohibited."  Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 470 
(Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶12]   The statute certainly is not so 
deficient as to specify "no standard at all."  "[A] person of ordinary intelligence can 
weigh his contemplated conduct against a prohibition of [inflicting sexual 
intrusion on a victim who the actor knows or reasonably should know is mentally 
incapable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of sexual 
activity] and know whether or not such contemplated conduct is proscribed by 
it."  Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 
1035.  As another court has commented regarding 
similar statutory language:

 

"The 
language . . . sufficiently warns a person of common intelligence that engaging 
in sexual [intrusion] with one who is mentally handicapped to a degree that he 
or she cannot understand the nature and consequences of engaging in the act is 
prohibited.  Under normal 
circumstances a mental incapacity to consent would be apparent in ordinary 
social intercourse.  The fact that 
further questioning may be necessary in some cases to determine if one's partner 
fully understands the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse, does not 
render the statute unconstitutional."

 

State v. 
Smith, 215 
Wis.2d 84, 572 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1997) (quoting Keim v. State, 13 
Kan.App.2d 604, 777 P.2d 278, 280-81 (1989)).  "We believe that citizens who desire to 
obey the statute will have no difficulty in understanding it * * *.'"  Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 
1035 (quoting Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 
(1972)).

 

[¶13]   Appellant also contends that the 
statute is vague as applied to his case.  
Accordingly, we must determine whether the statute provides sufficient 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that appellant's conduct was 
illegal, and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.7  "When evaluating a statute to determine 
whether it provides sufficient notice, we must again consider not only the 
statutory language but also any prior court decisions which have placed a 
limiting construction on the statute or have applied it to specific 
conduct."  Griego, 761 P.2d  
at 976.  If the statute has been previously 
applied to conduct substantially identical8 to that of the appellant, he cannot 
complain notice was lacking.  
Id.  We adequately 
considered the statutory language in the context of appellant's facial 
challenge.

 

[¶14]   The record indicates that appellant 
recognized his actions were unlawful.9  Notably, appellant at one point told a 
police officer that he could not "see himself doing anything to [the victim] 
because of her Down's syndrome" and on another occasion told the same officer 
that he previously lied about his version of what occurred because he "didn't 
want to get into trouble."  
Appellant also informed the officer that the victim's version of events 
was accurate and that he felt bad and had not been able to sleep.  The following colloquy occurred between 
the State and appellant during appellant's testimony:

 

Q.         
Mr. Saiz, you know that whatever you did back on September 
30th was wrong; is that right?

 

A.         
Yes.

 

Q.         
And you know it's wrong because [the victim] has Down's 
syndrome?

 

A.         
Now I know she has Down's syndrome, yes.

 

Q.         
And that was why it was wrong?

 

A.         
(Witness nodding head).

 

Q.         
You have to answer audibly.

 

A.         
Yes.

 

[¶15]   In Righter, 752 P.2d  at 
417, the 
appellant, a stranger, inflicted sexual intrusion on two "mildly retarded" 
victims after inviting them to his home and providing them alcohol and at least 
one other substance.  The victims 
had IQ's of 65 and 61 and functioned essentially as nine-year-olds.  Id. at 421.  One victim had previously engaged in 
sexual activity with a female, and the other victim had a "limited capability" 
to understand the nature of his conduct.  
Id. at 419, 421.  
After reviewing an array of evidence regarding the outward manifestation 
of the victims' mental deficiencies, the victims' mental capabilities, and 
whether the victims were indeed able to appraise the nature and consequences of 
their conduct, we concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
appellant's conviction.  Id. 
at 421.

 

[¶16]   Considering the evidence referenced 
in the context of appellant's sufficiency of the evidence argument, we find that 
appellant's conduct was substantially similar to that of the appellant in 
Righter, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) is therefore not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to appellant.

 

            
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

[¶17]   Appellant next argues that the 
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his first-degree sexual 
assault conviction.  According to 
appellant, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim, through a mental 
deficiency or developmental disability, was incapable of appraising the nature 
of her conduct because the victim's outward, objective manifestations (as 
opposed to "subjective" evidence regarding what appellant should have known 
about the victim's functioning level) reasonably led appellant to believe the 
victim was capable of consenting to sexual activity.10  In advancing this argument, however, 
appellant relies primarily on his own version of what occurred on September 30, 
1998, most of which contradicts the victim's testimony.

 

When 
reviewing an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, 
and any applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable 
to the State.  Nixon v. 
State, 994 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo.1999); and see Pool v. State, 2001 WY 
8, 17 P.3d 1285 (Wyo.2001).  In 
conducting such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury; rather, we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id.

 

McFarlane 
v. State, 2001 
WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, 32 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶18]   Viewing the record according to 
this standard, we find that the evidence and its accompanying inferences were 
sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew, 
or reasonably should have known, that the victim, through a mental deficiency or 
developmental disability, was incapable of appraising the nature of her 
conduct.  In Righter, 752 P.2d  at 421, we 
evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether the appellant in that 
case knew or reasonably should have known that his two "mildly retarded" victims 
had mental or developmental deficiencies, and whether as a result of those 
deficiencies, the victims were incapable of appraising the nature of their 
conduct.  In doing so, we pointed to 
evidence regarding the victims' outward appearances of mental or developmental 
deficiencies, their ability to interact socially and understand the significance 
of sexual activity, their ability to make adult rationalizations or decisions 
about the activity itself and understand the ramifications of adult 
relationships that include sexual activity, the victims' IQ's and age equivalent 
functioning levels, and their resulting vulnerability to manipulation.  Id.  The record in the instant case contains 
evidence quite similar to the evidence we found to be sufficient in 
Righter.

 

[¶19]   One clearly can infer that 
appellant knew of his victim's mental deficiency or developmental 
disability.  While growing up in 
California, appellant attended special school classes where he interacted with 
others that had Down's syndrome.  
Appellant first met the victim prior to September 30th, when he helped the victim's mother move into 
a new home.  At that time, appellant 
and the victim engaged in a brief conversation, and when asked if he noticed 
that the victim had a developmental disability, appellant replied that "[s]he 
was different, yeah."  On September 
30, 1998, the victim and appellant again briefly conversed when they began 
watching television.  The victim 
said "hi," told appellant her age, and they discussed what was on 
television.  Appellant also 
testified that when he and the victim engaged in sexual activity, he "knew" the 
victim "had something," but claimed not to know precisely what "Down's syndrome" 
was.

 

[¶20]   In addition, Officer Glenda Frank 
of the Cheyenne Police Department spoke with appellant several times in 
1998.  Appellant first denied 
committing the instant offense, stating that the victim had "come onto him" and 
that "he was aware that she had Down's syndrome and that he felt sorry for 
her."  According to Officer Frank, 
appellant later recalled that he could have done something to the victim but 
that he did not remember because he had been drinking, stating that he "couldn't 
see himself doing anything to her because of her Down's syndrome."  Appellant ultimately told Officer Frank 
that he had initially lied about his version of what occurred, that the victim's 
version of events was accurate, and that he felt bad and had not been able to 
sleep.

 

[¶21]   Knowledge is frequently proved by 
circumstantial evidence.  According 
to the victim's pediatrician, individuals with Down's syndrome typically exhibit 
certain outward attributes such as a unique, slanted eye appearance, short 
stature, weakness in strength, and mental retardation (an average IQ range of 45 
 55).  The record indicates that 
the victim was four feet, eight inches tall (the average height for individuals 
with Down's syndrome being four feet, six inches) and had worked with a speech 
therapist in the past.  Appellant's 
counsel even noted, in referring to the victim as he questioned the victim's 
pediatrician, that "we saw her in the courtroom, she's of a diminutive size, she 
looks younger than she is."  The 
victim appears to have answered counsel's questions in short, choppy and often 
incomplete sentences throughout her testimony.  Perhaps most importantly, the jury 
observed the victim testify and was able to assess factors such as her physical 
appearance, stature, demeanor, and the manner and qualitative level of the 
victim's speech.

 

[¶22]   Several witnesses also testified 
regarding the victim's IQ and age-equivalent functioning level.  The victim's mother testified that the 
victim, whose favorite toys are empty shampoo bottles, functions as a seven or 
eight year old.  According to the 
victim's special education teacher, the victim had an IQ of 52 with kindergarten 
to lower first grade math and reading comprehension levels.  The victim's pediatrician testified that 
the victim was "moderately retarded," with an IQ of 50, and functioned at the 
eight-year-old or second grade level.  
A clinical psychologist also considered the victim to be "moderately 
retarded," with a full-scale IQ of 57, placing the victim in the first 
percentile for her age.11  According to the clinical psychologist, 
the victim took a comprehensive subtest to measure her practical knowledge and 
knowledge regarding social conventions, scoring a 2 out of a 2 through 19 
scoring range.  This score placed 
the victim in the fourth percentile for her age.

 

[¶23]   These same witnesses offered their 
opinions regarding the resulting significance of the victim's IQ and 
age-equivalent functioning level.  
The special education teacher testified that the victim would never be 
able to live independently and personally observed that others are able to "very 
easily" manipulate the victim, especially if the victim feels that compliance 
would translate into acceptance by the other person.

 

[¶24]   According to the victim's 
pediatrician, Down's syndrome significantly impairs an individual's intellectual 
and emotional base, which reduces the ability to exercise judgment.  Therefore, the victim's pediatrician 
indicated that supervision is necessary to assist in exercising judgment "and 
making the right decision so that they are safe and not vulnerable to 
exploitation * * *."  The victim's 
pediatrician further observed that the victim was very limited in her ability to 
exercise judgment, and agreed that there would be situations outside the medical 
office setting in which the victim would be unable to appraise the nature of her 
conduct.  The clinical psychologist 
opined that the victim requires supervision commensurate with that of "quite a 
young child," and would have difficulty understanding social convention and 
interacting with peers.

 

[¶25]   The witnesses' opinions are 
relevant to whether the victim was ultimately capable of appraising the nature 
and possible consequences of sexual activity.  The victim's pediatrician testified that 
sexual activity involves not only an understanding of physical actions, but 
implicates an equally important psycho-emotional impact, as well as other 
consequences including pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.  In Righter, 752 P.2d  at 
421, we 
pointed to similar IQ/functioning level evidence and considered other evidence 
regarding whether the victims in that case, despite understanding the difference 
between "having sexual intercourse with a woman as opposed to a man, and to some 
degree the social stigma often associated with homosexual relations," were 
capable of making adult rationalizations or decisions about the activity itself, 
understanding the ramifications of adult relationships that include sexual 
activity, and whether the victims were vulnerable to fear and 
manipulation.

 

[¶26]   The significance of the victim's IQ 
and age-equivalent functioning level notwithstanding, when asked by appellant's 
counsel if she knew what sex was, the victim replied "no" and testified that she 
had not kissed another male or had a boyfriend before.  The victim's mother testified that she 
had never discussed sex with the victim prior to September 30, 1998, was not 
sure the victim "comprehends exactly what sex is," and that if the victim has 
sexual urges, she does not believe the victim understands them.12

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]   We find that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, or as applied to 
appellant, and that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the 
jury's guilty verdict.  Accordingly, 
appellant's first-degree sexual assault conviction and sentence are affirmed in 
all respects.

  

FOOTNOTES

   1At the close of 
the State's case-in-chief, the district court dismissed a second count of 
first-degree sexual assault due to insufficient factual evidence regarding an 
alleged October 1, 1998, incident between appellant and the 
victim.

  2The victim 
participated in a Community Living Access Skills program at Cheyenne East High 
School emphasizing independence, job, vocation, and cooking 
skills.

  3All three 
individuals consumed alcohol at various times during the 
evening.

  4According to the 
mother, appellant was gone the next morning.

  5Appellant does 
not argue that the statute reaches any form of constitutionally protected 
conduct.

  6While we do not 
consider Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) to be nearly as broad as Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001), the two statutes serve similar purposes.  We previously stated in analyzing the 
language contained in the 1977 version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 that 
"[d]ue process does not require that this statute, with its beneficent purpose, 
spell out in exact words what constitutes the conduct made punishable'" and 
further that "[a]lthough the language of the statute is broad and the 
prohibited behavior is very general, this seems necessary in the 
nature of its subject matter.'"  
Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1035 (quoting Millhollan v. State, 
221 Ga. 165, 143 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1965); Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 
(Alaska 1977); and People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (1965)) (emphasis in original).  
See also Campbell, 999 P.2d at 657-58 (discussing the need for general 
statutory language in child protection statutes).

  7There is no 
evidence in this case of arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement.

  8In citing to 
this standard in Griego, we initially used the term "identical," but 
found that Griego's conduct was "substantially identical" to the appellant's 
conduct in Sorenson.  
Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976.

  9See 
Campbell, 999 P.2d at 658-59 (discussing a defendant's knowledge 
regarding whether her conduct was unlawful in the context of an "as applied" 
constitutional challenge) and Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1035 (appellant's statement to twelve-year-old 
victim that "you won't tell anybody, will you?" reflects recognition that his 
actions constituted immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties as forbidden by the 
statute).

  10Appellant does 
not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to any other element of the 
crime charged.

   
11In other words, 
in a random sample of 100 individuals of the same age, it is predicted that 99 
of the 100 individuals would have higher IQ scores than the 
victim.

  12The victim's 
special education teacher testified that the victim participated in a sexual 
education class dealing with "good touch/bad touch, touch with a stranger, 
family touch, friend touch, that kinda thing."  Based on this information, the teacher 
believed that the victim likely knew the physical actions involved in sexual 
activity and that sexual intercourse could possibly lead to pregnancy.  However, this does not necessarily 
encompass all of the considerations relevant to whether the victim was capable 
of appraising the nature and consequences of sexual activity.  In Righter, 752 P.2d  at 
421, we found the 
evidence to be sufficient despite one victim having previously engaged in sexual 
activity with a female (as opposed to a male) and the other victim having 
possessed a "limited capability" of appraising the nature of his conduct.  The record in the instant case does not 
come close to approaching that level.  
The jury, having considered the totality of the evidence regarding this 
issue, found the evidence to be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt.  Viewing the entire record and its 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State, as we must, we 
concur with the jury's assessment.