Title: Aden v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Aden v. State1986 WY 87717 P.2d 326Case Number: 84-219Decided: 04/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
RobertADEN, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John Renneisen, S. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Roger Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,* ROONEY,[fn**] BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

[fn**] Retired 
November 30, 1985.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The major question to 
be resolved in this appeal is whether the testimony of an arson investigator who 
was presented as an expert witness must, as a matter of law, be held to be 
incompetent evidence. If that testimony is not competent, a corollary question 
then is raised as to the sufficiency of other evidence to sustain a conviction. 
We conclude that the expert testimony was competent evidence and that there is 
ample evidence to sustain the jury's finding of guilty. The judgment and 
sentence based upon that finding is affirmed.

[¶2.]     Robert Aden was 
convicted of a violation of § 6-7-101, W.S. 1977.1 The fire which the information 
charged Aden had 
started occurred in a mobile home which he occupied. During the course of the 
trial to a jury the testimony of an independent insurance investigator was 
offered as that of an expert witness, and the court permitted the witness to 
testify as an expert. The jury convicted Aden of the charge of arson in the first 
degree, and he was sentenced to not less than five nor more than seven years in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary. It is from that judgment and sentence that 
Aden 
appeals.

[¶3.]     Aden articulates the issue 
in his brief as follows:

"Whether the competent 
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain the conviction of 
willfully and maliciously setting fire to a dwelling 
house."

The State of 
Wyoming states 
the issues in this way:

"Can appellant properly 
assert error based upon the admission at trial of expert testimony to which no 
objection was made at trial?

"Was the testimony of 
James Ashby, an expert witness, incompetent and not properly admissible at 
trial?"

[¶4.]     In support of his 
argument Aden relies upon the case of Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore 
Livestock Co., Wyo., 669 P.2d 505 (1983). In that case this court held that 
there had been a failure of proof of the loss in value of real property when an 
expert witness agreed on cross-examination that prior to testifying he had not 
known of a coal lease of the land, and because of that coal lease he could not 
find a willing buyer for the land for the highest and best use upon which he had 
premised his opinion of the value. His negative response left the landowner with 
no proof of the value prior to condemnation and no proof of any diminution in 
value. In both that case and this one no objection was made as to the 
qualifications of the expert witness. Although Aden submits a different contention, there is 
no significant similarity between his case and Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. 
Elmore Livestock Co., supra.

[¶5.]     Aden premises his argument 
upon the proposition that the arson investigator did not have sufficient 
information available to him upon which to base his opinion. If the court were 
to accept Aden's 
reading of the record we might agree. Our examination of the record persuades us 
that it is significantly different from what Aden contends it to be. In Strang Telecasting, 
Inc. v. Ernst, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1980), this court 
said "[A]n imprecise factual discussion will not profit the advocate's client in 
this court. We see no reason to tolerate a practice which can only succeed if 
this court is misled." Aden also ignores the established concept that whenever 
the appellant in a criminal case challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, 
which is one of the points here, the duty of this court is to examine all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine if there is 
sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict. Broom v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 640 
(1985). When the evidence is viewed in that way Aden's claim of incompetent testimony from the 
arson investigator disappears.

[¶6.]     The fire occurred on 
March 20, 1983, just outside the city limits of Casper. The Casper Fire Department was summoned 
to the fire, and it responded even though the officers of the department 
realized as they approached the mobile home which was burning that it was 
outside the city limits. The fire was suppressed within a short period of time. 
Fire department inspectors and fire investigators from the city of Casper were on the scene. 
As a matter of routine fire suppression, burning material was taken from the 
room where the fire originated while the fire was being 
suppressed.

[¶7.]     The following morning 
the investigation was turned over to the Natrona County Fire Department, and an 
officer of the Natrona County Fire Department investigated the scene of the fire 
on March 22. Several days later, on March 26, the independent insurance 
investigator who testified as an expert at the trial was called upon to 
investigate the fire. He examined the scene of the fire and the rubbish removed 
from the fire, and he interviewed Robert Aden. Sometime later on April 18, the 
NatronaCounty fire inspector 
pursued some additional investigation at the scene. He had with him a deputy 
sheriff and the county electrical inspector. An electrical junction box was 
secured from the premises on that occasion together with some carpet samples. 
After this further investigation, the prosecution of Aden was 
commenced.

[¶8.]     The theory of the state 
of Wyoming in 
this case was that Robert Aden had intentionally started the fire which 
partially burned his mobile home. Aden's theory which he presented to the jury 
was that the fire had started accidentally because of a short in the junction 
box located in a closet of the mobile home which arced and ignited flammable 
materials which were near the junction box. Aden 
called as witnesses a captain in the Casper Fire Department, two expert 
witnesses, and Aden's bankruptcy attorney and trustee. These 
witnesses established that when the fire department arrived no flames were 
burning on the bedroom floor in the mobile home; that no accelerants were 
detected in carpet samples; that an electrical source for the fire could not be 
eliminated from the available evidence; and that Aden had no real motive for the fire. Obviously 
there was a conflict in the evidence, but our rule is that the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and conflicts in the evidence must be 
resolved by the finder of fact, the jury in this instance. We are only justified 
in setting a verdict aside if there is not sufficient evidence to support 
it.

[¶9.]     Turning then to the 
attack upon the expert testimony founded upon the Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. 
Elmore Livestock, Co., supra, case, Aden argues that we should go through a 
sequential process outlined there. He contends that we should conclude that the 
expert testimony of the insurance investigator was not competent. He then urges 
the court to conclude that in the absence of the opinion of the expert the 
evidence is not sufficient to support this verdict. The State of Wyoming suggests that we 
should disavow the rule set forth in Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore 
Livestock Co., supra, and re-establish, if it has in some way been lost, the 
proposition that the weight to be given the testimony of an expert witness is a 
question for the jury. The State bolsters this argument by the fact that at 
trial the testimony of the expert witness was not challenged as 
incompetent.

[¶10.]  Aden points out that the expert witness 
explained what one should do in investigating a fire. A detailed examination of 
the general area of origin must be pursued; each layer of debris must be 
checked; the ashes must be sifted through layer by layer; knowledge of the 
nature of the material burned is essential; and these procedures are essential 
for an investigator to determine how the fire started. Aden contends that his 
analysis of the record demonstrates that this information was not obtained by 
nor was it available to the expert; and, consequently, he did not have the 
proper basis for a valid opinion according to his own criteria. Therefore, 
Aden insists the 
testimony of the expert was not competent evidence and should be ignored in 
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.

[¶11.]  There is no necessity for receding from 
Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., supra, in this instance. The 
expert witness who testified in that case admitted the lack of the appropriate 
foundation for his expert opinion. That did not occur in this instance. The 
arson investigator did not interview the firemen who had removed the debris from 
the mobile home, but he did know what they had seen. A Casper fire department inspector testified with respect to 
things that had been removed from the closet in the bedroom in which Aden claimed the fire had 
started. He also said that he knew the height of the things that had been in the 
closet, which he said was 12 to 16 or 18 inches because the wall was clean below 
where the fire had burned. The same city fire department inspector explained 
that while the junction box was a possible source of ignition there was no 
defect in it which would indicate that it had been the source of the fire. He 
concluded that it was the only possible source of an accidental fire, but that 
he could discern that something else had caused a cushion in the bedroom to 
burn. The damage to the ceiling indicated that the fire had burned the longest 
and the hottest in the bedroom and not in the closet, but if the junction box 
had started the fire in the closet he would expect more damage 
there.

[¶12.]  The expert witness also knew that the 
county fire inspector had been in the house and had examined the room where the 
fire occurred. The county fire inspector had looked through the things that had 
been removed from the house and had spoken with Aden about the fire. The information obtained 
by the county fire inspector was taken into account by the 
expert.

[¶13.]  With respect to Aden's assertion that the 
expert's knowledge concerning the flammables contained in the room was faulty he 
relies upon cross-examination with respect to foam cushions on a loveseat. The 
expert testified, however, that those cushions would not puddle and spread in an 
ink blot pattern which he had discovered on the carpet. They would spread to a 
degree but the pattern would be uniform. The irregular pattern could not be 
caused by clothing and such. The expert agreed that other flammables could cause 
an ink blot pattern, but the things that he found to have been present would not 
have done that.

[¶14.]  The expert concluded that the evidence at 
the scene was not consistent with an accidental smoldering fire. The lowest 
point of burning, which in this case was the floor in the bedroom, is the likely 
origin. There was no enameling on windows and that is unusual if an accidental 
fire occurs because accidental fires smolder and the lack of enameling is 
inconsistent with slow smoldering. The smoke patterns demonstrated that not long 
after the fire ignited it was permitted to vent towards the back door. The 
ceiling in the bedroom in which the fire occurred was damaged in the middle of 
the room and that was the place where the only carpet burning was found. The 
burned carpet was the lowest point of the fire, and it was some five to ten feet 
from the junction box in question. There was no burning around the electrical 
outlet. The carpet was melted in an ink blot pattern, and there was only surface 
burning on the sheetrock near the junction box and slight surface burns below 
the junction box. He testified that he could eliminate the junction box inside 
the closet as the source of the fire because the damage to the hangar rod was 
not consistent with fire coming directly up from the junction box. It was 
consistent with heat coming into the closet. In his opinion the damage to the 
furniture located in the room indicated that the fire started along the entire 
ink blot pattern almost instantaneously. He concluded that the furniture damage 
was the result of a hot intense fire and flammable liquid can cause such a fire. 
He did concede that he did not know whether the circuit breaker which fed the 
line to the junction box was faulty, but he explained that once he had located 
the area of origin of the fire he did not proceed further with an examination of 
the electrical source.

[¶15.]  The arson investigator was qualified as 
an expert in accordance with Rule 702, W.R.E, which 
provides:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

He did disclose 
the underlying facts or data upon which he premised his opinion in accordance 
with Rule 705, W.R.E., which provides as follows:

"The expert may testify 
in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. 
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data 
on cross-examination."

The opinion 
which he furnished on the ultimate issue is permitted pursuant to Rule 704, 
W.R.E., which provides as follows:

"Testimony in the form of 
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."

[¶16.]  In sum total this expert witness 
testified as to an opinion which he felt qualified to give because of the 
information which was available to him. He did not concede that he was unable to 
state an opinion because of a defect or deficiency in information about which he 
had not been aware. This distinguishes the case from Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. 
v. Elmore Livestock Co., supra. We hold that the opinion of this expert was 
competent testimony to be introduced at the trial.

[¶17.]  It may be that Aden would concede the 
sufficiency of evidence issue in view of our decision that the fire-arson 
investigator's expert testimony was admissible. Other evidence, however, 
established that Aden had claimed the smoke was too heavy for 
him to leave the master bedroom through the door so he went out the window of 
the master bedroom and on to his brother's residence to call the fire 
department. The insurance adjustor testified that Aden told him a different story about the 
window. The evidence established that Aden was home alone the night of the fire. The 
Casper fire department captain said that 
Aden was fully 
clothed when the first squad arrived at the fire, and he only observed smoke 
from a crack in a window in the bedroom where the fire occurred, but if there 
had been another open window there would have been smoke coming out of the 
window. A Casper fire department engineer 
testified that the back door of the mobile home had been propped open with a 
cash register, and another Casper fire department firefighter testified 
that there was no smoke coming from open windows. The county fire investigator 
and a firefighter testified that it was difficult to close the master bedroom 
window from the outside, and the county fire investigator said that physical 
evidence indicated the master bedroom windows had been closed during the fire. 
The county electrical inspector also testified that damage to the junction box 
was consistent with the fire outside the box and others said that the heat 
source came from outside the box.

[¶18.]  Under these circumstances we have no 
difficulty in concluding that there was ample evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that Aden had started the fire. Certainly there was 
no error in refusing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground 
that a reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt as to the existence of 
any of the essential elements of the crime. Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166 
(1979).

[¶19.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 § 6-7-101, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"§ 6-7-101. 
Arson; first degree.

"Any person who willfully 
and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, 
counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, whether occupied, 
unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, shop, stable or other outhouse that is 
parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto or any standing timber on 
public or privately owned land, whether the property of himself or of another, 
shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, be 
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two (2) nor more than twenty 
(20) years."

[¶20.]  First degree arson now is limited to 
starting a fire or causing an explosion in an occupied structure and is defined 
in § 6-3-101, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.).