Title: Advisory Opinion to Attorney General Re All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for State Legislature, Governor & Cabinet

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1267 
____________ 
 
 
ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
RE: ALL VOTERS VOTE IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS FOR  
STATE LEGISLATURE, GOVERNOR, AND CABINET. 
 
March 19, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The Attorney General of Florida has petitioned this Court for an advisory 
opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition to amend the Florida Constitution 
titled “All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for State Legislature, Governor, and 
Cabinet” (the Initiative).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. IV, § 10, art. V, 
§ 3(b)(10), Fla. Const. 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the Initiative complies 
with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida 
Constitution and that the ballot title and summary comply with the requirements of 
section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2019).  Accordingly, we approve the 
Initiative for placement on the ballot. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
On July 26, 2019, the Attorney General petitioned this Court for an opinion 
as to the validity of the Initiative, which is sponsored by All Voters Vote, Inc., and 
was circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution.  The 
sponsor submitted a brief supporting the validity of the Initiative.  The Attorney 
General submitted a brief in opposition, as did the Florida Democratic Party and 
the Republican Party of Florida. 
The Initiative would add several new subsections to article VI, section 5, of 
the Florida Constitution, and would read as follows: 
(c) All elections for the Florida legislature, governor and cabinet shall 
be held as follows: 
 
(1) A single primary election shall be held for each office.  All 
electors registered to vote for the office being filled shall be 
allowed to vote in the primary election for said office regardless 
of the voter’s, or any candidate’s, political party affiliation or 
lack of same. 
 
(2) All candidates qualifying for election to the office shall be 
placed on the same ballot for the primary election regardless of 
any candidate’s political party affiliation or lack of same. 
 
(3) The two candidates receiving the highest number of votes 
cast in the primary election shall advance to the general 
election.  For elections in which only two candidates qualify for 
the same office, no primary will be held and the winner will be 
determined in the general election. 
 
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a political party 
from nominating a candidate to run for office under this 
subsection.  Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a party 
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from endorsing or otherwise supporting a candidate as provided 
by law.  A candidate’s affiliation with a political party may 
appear on the ballot as provided by law. 
 
(5) This amendment is self-executing and shall be effective 
January 1, 2024. 
 
The ballot title for the Initiative is: “All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for 
State Legislature, Governor, and Cabinet.”  The ballot summary for the Initiative 
is: 
Allows all registered voters to vote in primaries for state legislature, 
governor, and cabinet regardless of political party affiliation.  All 
candidates for an office, including party nominated candidates, appear 
on the same primary ballot.  Two highest vote getters advance to 
general election.  If only two candidates qualify, no primary is held 
and winner is determined in general election.  Candidate’s party 
affiliation may appear on ballot as provided by law.  Effective  
January 1, 2024. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When this Court renders an advisory opinion concerning a proposed 
constitutional amendment arising through the citizen initiative process, “[the 
Court’s] review of the proposed amendment is confined to two issues: (1) whether 
the proposed amendment itself satisfies the single-subject requirement of article 
XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and 
summary satisfy the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes 
(201[9]).”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voter Control of Gambling, 215 So. 3d 
1209, 1212 (Fla. 2017).  In addressing these two issues, the Court must not address 
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the merits or wisdom of the Initiative.  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Treating 
People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2000).  
Further, the Court has a “duty . . . to uphold the proposal unless it can be shown to 
be ‘clearly and conclusively defective.’ ”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of 
Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786, 795 (Fla. 2014) (Medical 
Marijuana I) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla.’s Amend. to Reduce Class 
Size, 816 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2002)).  “This Court has traditionally applied a 
deferential standard of review to the validity of a citizen initiative petition and ‘has 
been reluctant to interfere’ with ‘the right of self-determination for all Florida’s 
citizens’ to formulate ‘their own organic law.’ ”  Id. at 794 (quoting Advisory Op. 
to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 
So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 2002)). 
ANALYSIS 
Single-Subject Requirement 
The Florida Constitution limits constitutional amendments proposed by 
citizen initiative to “but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.”  
Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.  The Court “require[s] strict compliance with the single-
subject rule in the initiative process for constitutional change.”  Fine v. Firestone, 
448 So. 2d 984, 989 (Fla. 1984).  “In evaluating whether a proposed amendment 
violates the single-subject requirement, the Court must determine whether it has a 
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‘logical and natural oneness of purpose.’ ”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of 
Marijuana for Certain Debilitating Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471, 477 (Fla. 2015) 
(Medical Marijuana II) (quoting Treating People Differently Based on Race, 778 
So. 2d at 891-92).  The single-subject requirement prevents an initiative from 
(1) engaging in logrolling; or (2) substantially altering or performing the functions 
of multiple branches of government.  Id.; Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & 
Land Conservation—Dedicates Funds to Acquire & Restore Fla. Conservation & 
Recreation Lands, 123 So. 3d 47, 50 (Fla. 2013).  An initiative satisfies the 
oneness of purpose standard—and therefore does not engage in logrolling—“when 
it ‘may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as 
component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme.’ ”  Water & Land 
Conservation, 123 So. 3d at 51 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fairness 
Initiative Requiring Legislative Determination, 880 So. 2d 630, 634 (Fla. 2004)). 
In the present case, the Initiative has “a logical and natural oneness of 
purpose,” namely to allow all registered voters to vote in primary elections for 
state legislature, governor, and cabinet.  To achieve this, the Initiative provides that 
all qualified registered voters can vote in such primaries regardless of party 
affiliation, that candidates qualifying for the specified offices appear on the same 
ballot, and that the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes advance 
to the general election.  Because each of the Initiative’s components are part of a 
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single dominant plan or scheme, the Initiative does not engage in impermissible 
logrolling. 
Although the interested parties do not dispute whether the Initiative 
substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches of government, 
we conclude that the Initiative does not do so.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Initiative complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of 
the Florida Constitution. 
Ballot Title and Summary 
Next, we address whether the Initiative will be “accurately represented on 
the ballot.”  Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d 786, 797 (Fla. 2014) (quoting 
Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000)).  Section 101.161(1), Florida 
Statutes (2019), which sets forth the requirements for the ballot title and summary 
of an initiative petition, provides as follows: 
[A] ballot summary of such amendment or other public measure shall 
be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot . . . . The 
ballot summary of the amendment or other public measure shall be an 
explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief 
purpose of the measure. . . .  The ballot title shall consist of a caption, 
not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly 
referred to or spoken of. 
 
These statutory requirements serve to ensure that the ballot summary and 
title “provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment” to voters so 
that they “will not be misled as to [the proposed amendment’s] purpose, and can 
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cast an intelligent and informed ballot.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of 
Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998) 
(quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar, 681 So. 2d 1124, 
1127 (Fla. 1996)).  This Court has explained that “the ballot title and summary 
may not be read in isolation, but must be read together in determining whether the 
ballot information properly informs the voters.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 
Voluntary Univ. Pre-Kindergarten Educ., 824 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2002). 
In the present case, the ballot title is composed of twelve words, and the 
ballot summary is composed of seventy-three words.  These respectively fall 
within the fifteen and seventy-five-word statutory limits.  See § 101.161(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2019).   
Moreover, the ballot title and summary comply with the clarity requirements 
of section 101.161(1).  The ballot title clearly identifies the subject of the Initiative.  
The ballot summary clearly and unambiguously explains the chief purpose of the 
Initiative, which is to allow all registered voters to vote in primary elections in 
Florida for state legislature, governor, and cabinet.  Further, the ballot summary 
explains the details of this change in the primary election process by outlining that 
if the Initiative passes, all candidates for an office will appear on the same primary 
ballot, and the two highest vote getters will advance to the general election. 
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Regarding the opponents’ complaint that the summary and title do not 
explain possible ramifications of altering the current primary election process, or 
explicitly detail how party nominations will occur if the amendment passes, this 
Court has explained that “an exhaustive explanation of the interpretation and future 
possible effects of [an] amendment [is] not required” in the ballot title and 
summary.  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Treating People Differently Based on 
Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 899 (Fla. 2000); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y 
Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175, 186 
(Fla. 2009) (“[A] ballot summary need not (and because of the statutory word 
limit, often cannot) explain ‘at great and undue length’ the complete details of a 
proposed amendment, and some onus falls upon voters to educate themselves 
about the substance of the proposed amendment.” (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y 
Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 
491, 498 (Fla. 2002)); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting Pub. 
Funding of Political Candidates’ Campaigns, 693 So. 2d 972, 975-76 (Fla. 1997) 
(“[T]he [ballot] title and summary need not explain every detail or ramification of 
the proposed amendment.”). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the Initiative meets the legal requirements of 
article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and 
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summary comply with section 101.161(1).  Accordingly, we approve the Initiative 
for placement on the ballot. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., 
concurs. 
MUÑIZ, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring and concurring specially. 
 
I fully concur in the majority opinion and write separately to explain why I 
disagree with the dissent’s view that three defects in the ballot title and summary 
preclude us from approving the initiative for placement on the ballot.  The dissent 
argues that in addition to changing the constitutional status quo by creating an 
“all-candidate, all-voter top-two primary election for the legislature, governor, and 
cabinet” as disclosed in the ballot summary, the proposed amendment would also 
upend the constitutional status quo in a second, undisclosed manner that is not 
argued by a single opponent of the proposed amendment—namely, by taking away 
the Legislature’s discretion to provide for state-run elections to choose political 
party nominees for those offices.  Dissenting op. at 20, see also id. at 25-28.  
Drawing from this conclusion, the dissent further argues that the ballot summary 
misleads in two additional ways.  First, the dissent contends that the ballot 
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summary “leads voters to believe that party-nominated candidates would 
necessarily be a feature of the primary election scheme” even though “the 
proposed amendment itself neither requires nor assumes the existence of such 
candidates.”  Id. at 20; see also id. at 28-29.  Finally, the dissent argues that the “all 
voters vote” language in the ballot title and summary misleads by falsely signaling 
that the proposed amendment “would expand access to voting” even though it 
would also “contract access to voting” by preventing voters from selecting 
political party nominees for the offices at issue via state-run elections.  Id. at 29-30.  
I respectfully disagree. 
The proposed amendment does not preclude a state-sponsored partisan 
nomination process. 
 
 
In analyzing the requirement of section 101.161(1) for the ballot summary to 
be “an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief 
purpose of the measure,” the dissent correctly begins its thoughtful analysis with 
the text of the statute.  Ultimately, however, the dissent concludes that “the chief 
purpose” means all “material legal effects,” with “material” meaning all changes to 
the constitution “that would be material to an objectively reasonable voter.”  
Dissenting op. at 24-25.  I am unconvinced that the dissent’s ultimate conclusion as 
to the meaning of the statute is faithful to the plain language of the text.  See 
Dianderas v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 973 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2007) (“When a term is undefined by statute, ‘[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets 
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of statutory construction’ requires that we give a statutory term ‘its plain and 
ordinary meaning.’ ” (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992))). 
Regarding “the chief purpose” requirement of section 101.161(1), because, 
in the context of the statute, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “chief” is 
“[t]he principal or most important part,” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), 
and because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “purpose” is “[a]n 
objective, goal, or end,” id., I am inclined to read “the chief purpose” as meaning 
the principal or most important objective, goal, or end.1 
 
As the majority explains, the ballot summary satisfies the statutory 
requirement to clearly and unambiguously explain the chief purpose—i.e., the 
principal or most important objective, goal, or end—of the proposed amendment, 
“which is to allow all registered voters to vote in primary elections in Florida for 
state legislature, governor, and cabinet.”  Majority op. at 7.  The ballot summary 
plainly tells voters that the amendment would create a voting process in which 
“[a]ll candidates for an office, including party nominated candidates, appear on the 
same primary ballot” and that a “[c]andidate’s party affiliation may appear on 
                                          
 
1.  The dissent uses a more specialized definition of “purpose” in its 
analysis, which appears to be consistent with our case law and does not appear to 
be clearly erroneous.  In this case, the legal analysis is not materially altered by 
using the more specialized definition of purpose (as meaning “legal effect”) instead 
of the more common definition (“objective, goal, or end”).  Given the limited 
objective of this concurring opinion, I find it unnecessary to further analyze the 
word “purpose” in the context of section 101.161(1) and will limit my analysis to 
the dissent’s questionable reading of the word “chief” in this context. 
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[that] ballot as provided by law.”  It also discloses that the “[t]wo highest vote 
getters” from this primary will “advance to [the] general election.”  The differences 
between the proposed system and our long-standing statutorily created partisan 
primary system are self-evident and would be obvious to any reasonable voter. 
Although the dissent acknowledges that in plain language the statute 
requires disclosure of “ ‘the chief purpose,’ singular,” of the measure, dissenting 
op. at 24, and that “chief” in this context “has to mean ‘marked by greatest 
importance, significance, influence,” id. at 23 (quoting Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 387 (1993)) (emphasis added), the dissent explains that 
the statute should not be read to mean “only the most important” purpose because 
“article XI, section 3 allows a proposed amendment to contain multiple 
components, so long as those components are ‘parts or aspects of a single 
dominant plan or scheme.’ ”  Id. at 24 (quoting Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re 
Rights of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar Energy Choice, 188 So. 3d 822, 828 
(Fla. 2016)).  The dissent further explains, “If the constitution permits multi-
component (but single subject) proposals, it makes most sense to read section 
101.161(1) as requiring the ballot summary to identify all material components of 
the overall plan.”  Id.  This strikes me as a justification for discarding the plain 
language of the statute in favor of a discordant reading that the dissent views as 
reflecting better policy than the words chosen by the Legislature.  Even if I viewed 
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this as an appropriate approach to statutory construction, I am not convinced that 
requiring disclosure of “all material components of the overall plan” makes more 
sense than requiring disclosure of “only the most important,” i.e. “the chief,” 
purpose of a ballot initiative.  We put a candidate’s name on the ballot and expect 
voters to educate themselves outside of the ballot box as to the pros and cons of 
voting for one candidate over another.  Requiring a plain statement of “the chief 
purpose” of a proposal would leave it to voters to educate themselves about the 
pros and cons of the proposal, which is how our political process normally works.  
In addition, it seems highly unlikely that citizens will wait until they are voting to 
study the ballot summary in an attempt to figure out their position on a ballot 
measure.  These measures are routinely debated with rigor by proponents and 
opponents before an election—and I fail to see how requiring long summaries that 
clutter a ballot in an attempt to explain all effects that amendment sponsors predict 
this Court will view as significant enough to require explanation would add 
significant value to the process. 
However, even if I could agree to read the statute’s “the chief purpose” 
requirement as tantamount to a requirement for the ballot summary to explain both 
“the chief purpose” and all secondary, tertiary, or other “material legal effects” of a 
proposed amendment, I would still disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the 
ballot summary is fatally flawed.  The proposed amendment simply does not have 
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the undisclosed secondary purpose of precluding a state-sponsored partisan 
nomination process.  Notwithstanding the lack of express language to this effect in 
the proposed amendment, the dissent infers from the provision “[a] single primary 
election shall be held for each office” that the proposed amendment would strip 
away the Legislature’s power to provide for state-sponsored partisan nomination 
elections before the all-voter primary election.  It would not. 
To the contrary, proposed subsection (c)(4) expressly states that the 
amendment does not prohibit a party nomination process that would necessarily 
take place prior to the new all-voters primary: “Nothing in this subsection shall 
prohibit a political party from nominating a candidate to run for office under this 
subsection.”  Additionally, the same subsection contemplates that the Legislature 
will have a role in defining how party affiliation is handled on the ballot: “Nothing 
in this subsection shall prohibit a party from endorsing or otherwise supporting a 
candidate as provided by law.  A candidate’s affiliation with a political party may 
appear on the ballot as provided by law.” 
In the absence of express language limiting the Legislature’s power to create 
a state-sponsored partisan nomination process, the proposed amendment, if 
approved by the voters, cannot be construed as having this effect—not only 
because we cannot add words to the constitution, Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 
(Fla. 2009) (“We remain mindful that in construing a constitutional provision, we 
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are not at liberty to add words that were not placed there originally . . . .”), but also 
because the amendment would have to be construed in harmony with the portion of 
the constitution giving the Legislature broad authority to exercise “[t]he legislative 
power of the state,” art. III, § 1, Fla. Const.  If an amendment does not expressly or 
by necessary implication repeal or modify an existing provision, the amendment 
co-exists with all other provisions of the constitution that have not been repealed 
by another amendment.  Jackson v. Consol. Gov’t of Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497, 
500-01 (Fla. 1969) (“Unless the later amendment expressly repeals or purports to 
modify an existing provision, the old and new should stand and operate together 
unless the clear intent of the later provision is thereby defeated.” (citing Bd. of Pub. 
Instruction of Polk Cty. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Polk Cty., 50 So. 574 (Fla. 1909))); 
see also State v. Div. of Bond Fin., 278 So. 2d 614, 617-18 (Fla. 1973) (“It is a 
fundamental rule of construction that, if possible, amendments to the Constitution 
should be construed so as to harmonize with other constitutional provisions . . . .”). 
Under the broad power granted to the Legislature by article III, section 1 of 
the Florida Constitution, “the Legislature may exercise any lawmaking power that 
is not forbidden by the organic law of the land.”  Stone v. State, 71 So. 634, 635 
(Fla. 1916) (interpreting a similar provision in a prior version of the constitution).  
This power includes, of course, the power to provide for the organization and 
regulation of state-sponsored elections to select nominees of political parties.  
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Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that such elections are “universally held to be 
proper subjects for legislative action.”  Dissenting op. at 26 (quoting State ex rel. 
Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 505 (Fla. 1936)). 
Contrary to what the dissent asserts, therefore, the proposed amendment 
does not strip the Legislature of its power to provide for state-sponsored elections 
to establish party nominees before the all-voter primary.  The dissent erroneously 
reads that limitation into the proposed amendment, contrary to its plain language 
and the remainder of the constitution. 
The ballot summary’s reference to “party nominated candidates” is not 
misleading. 
 
The dissent next argues that because the ballot summary references “party 
nominated candidates,” it misleads voters “to believe that party-nominated 
candidates would necessarily be a feature of the primary election scheme” even 
though “the proposed amendment itself neither requires nor assumes the existence 
of such candidates.”  Dissenting op. at 20; see also id. at 28-29.  As the dissent 
acknowledges, this conclusion is “closely related” to the dissent’s first perceived 
defect.  Id. at 28. 
However, even setting aside the dissent’s faulty premise that the proposed 
amendment would preclude a state-sponsored partisan nomination process, the 
ballot summary’s reference to “party nominated candidates” is not misleading.  
Subsection (c)(4) of the proposed amendment provides that “[n]othing in [the 
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proposed amendment] shall prohibit a political party from nominating a candidate 
to run for office under this subsection” or “prohibit a party from endorsing or 
otherwise supporting a candidate as provided by law,” and further provides that 
“[a] candidate’s affiliation with a political party may appear on the ballot as 
provided by law.”  Nothing in the text of the ballot summary misleads voters to 
believe that party-nominated candidates are required to be a feature of the 
proposed “all voters vote” primary election scheme.  Rather, the ballot summary 
explains that “[a]ll candidates for an office, including party nominated candidates, 
appear on the same primary ballot” and further states that “party affiliation may 
appear on ballot as provided by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  This language fairly 
informs the voter—and any reasonable voter would understand it to mean—that in 
the proposed “all voters vote” primary, any party-nominated candidate would be 
included on the same ballot as all of the candidates who qualify for the office and 
that how or whether party affiliation appears on the ballot will be determined by 
general law. 
Moreover, any doubt that the ballot summary misleads voters to believe that 
party-nominated candidates are “a necessary feature of the election scheme under 
the proposed amendment,” dissenting op. at 29, is dispelled by the ballot summary 
provision that reads “[i]f only two candidates qualify, no primary is held and the 
winner is determined at the general election.”  This provision does not qualify the 
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word “candidates” or otherwise suggest that at least one candidate must be a 
party-nominated candidate. 
Accordingly, the ballot summary does not mislead voters to believe that 
party-nominated candidates are a necessary feature of the proposed “all voters 
vote” primary election scheme. 
The “all voters vote” language of the ballot title and summary does not 
mislead voters to believe that voting access is expanded rather than 
contracted. 
 
 
The final flaw argued by the dissent is that the “all voters vote” language of 
the ballot title and summary misleads voters to believe that voting access is 
expanded rather than contracted.  See dissenting op. at 29-30.  Like the dissent’s 
second perceived flaw, this conclusion flows from the erroneous premise that the 
proposed amendment, if adopted, would preclude a state-sponsored nomination 
process and, in that way, “contract” access to voting.  However, as explained 
above, the plain language of the proposed amendment does not do this, and if the 
proposed amendment is adopted, we could not interpret it to preclude a state-
sponsored partisan nomination process prior to the “all voters vote” primary.  
Accordingly, the “all voters vote” language is not misleading. 
Conclusion 
As explained in the majority opinion, this Court has a “duty . . . to uphold 
the proposal unless it can be shown to be ‘clearly and conclusively defective.’ ”  
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Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 
So. 3d 786, 795 (Fla. 2014) (Medical Marijuana I) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y 
Gen. re Fla.’s Amend. to Reduce Class Size, 816 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2002)).  
This “deferential standard of review [applied] to the validity of a citizen initiative 
petition” is appropriately grounded in our “ ‘reluctan[ce] to interfere’ with ‘the 
right of self-determination for all Florida’s citizens’ to formulate ‘their own 
organic law.’ ”  Id. at 794 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to 
Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 
2002)). 
Read together, the ballot title and summary accurately explain the proposed 
amendment, which does not, as the dissent argues, have an undisclosed secondary 
purpose of precluding a state-sponsored partisan nomination process prior to the 
“all voters vote” primary.  Nor are the title and ballot summary misleading for the 
related reasons argued by the dissent regarding the necessity of party-nominated 
candidates or contraction of voting access.  Because the ballot title and summary 
are not clearly and conclusively defective, I fully join the majority in approving the 
initiative for placement on the ballot. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
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MUÑIZ, J., dissenting. 
 
The proposed amendment would change the constitutional status quo in at 
least two significant ways.  First, it would mandate an all-candidate, all-voter top-
two primary election for the legislature, governor, and cabinet.  Second, by 
mandating “a single primary election” for each office, it would take away the 
Legislature’s discretion to provide for state-run elections to choose political party 
nominees for those offices.  The ballot summary here discloses the first change, but 
not the second.  In fact, the ballot summary does not even hint at the second 
change, which would upend voter expectations by prohibiting an election practice 
that has prevailed in our state for over a century.  In a related way, the ballot 
summary is affirmatively misleading.  It leads voters to believe that party- 
nominated candidates would necessarily be a feature of the primary election 
scheme under the proposed amendment.  But the proposed amendment itself 
neither requires nor assumes the existence of such candidates.  These defects in the 
ballot summary are fatal under section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2019), and I 
therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to approve the proposed 
amendment for placement on the ballot. 
Section 101.161(1) requires the ballot summary to disclose the proposed 
amendment’s material legal effects. 
 
The relevant part of section 101.161(1) says that the ballot summary must be 
“an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose 
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of the measure.”  The statute does not define any of the key terms: explanatory, 
chief, and purpose.  Therefore, we must give those terms their ordinary meaning, 
informed by the context in which they appear. 
Although it is central to the requirements of section 101.161(1), the word 
“purpose” as used in this context does not have an obvious meaning.  After all, 
“[a]ny provision of law or of private ordering can be said to have a number of 
purposes, which can be placed on a ladder of abstraction.”  Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 18 (2012).  And 
“nearly every end is a means to another end.”  Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 876 (1930). 
Recognizing this difficulty, courts have distinguished between a law’s 
“ultimate purpose” and its “immediate purpose.”  See, e.g., Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 
139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019).  A law’s ultimate purpose is remote, relatively abstract, 
and often contestable.  By contrast, a law’s immediate purpose can be derived from 
the words of the statute itself.  See id.  Put differently, a statute’s immediate 
purpose consists of the specific means by which the statute pursues its more remote 
objectives or goals.  See Radin, supra at 877.  The closest dictionary definition for 
immediate purpose is the one that defines “purpose” as “effect or result . . . 
attained.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1847 (1993).  There are 
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several reasons why section 101.161(1) is best understood as using the word 
purpose in the sense of immediate purpose. 
Only a measure’s immediate purpose—the specific changes it would make 
to the constitutional text—can be determined objectively.  The more remote the 
statement of a measure’s purpose, the more subjective (and debatable) that purpose 
becomes.  Textually, section 101.161(1) requires a statement of the purpose “of the 
measure.”  But as one moves up the ladder of abstraction, the focus inevitably 
shifts to the subjective purpose of the sponsor in proposing the measure. 
The very nature of a ballot demands objectivity in the presentation of a 
measure’s purpose.  A ballot puts before the voter a choice.  To make an informed 
decision, the voter must know how a measure would amend the constitution; the 
why behind a measure is far less relevant, if relevant at all.  Stating a measure’s 
more abstract purpose—as opposed to its immediate purpose—can get too close to 
advocacy, which has no place on a ballot.  “Ballots serve primarily to elect 
candidates”—or, in this context, to approve or disapprove proposed constitutional 
amendments—“not as forums for political expression.”  Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997). 
Finally, by consistently equating purpose in the context of section 
101.161(1) with legal effect, this Court’s case law reflects an implicit 
understanding that the statute refers to immediate purpose.  The Legislature 
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adopted section 101.161(1)’s “chief purpose” requirement for ballot summaries in 
1980.  Ch. 80-304, 2, Laws of Fla.  Soon thereafter, in Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 
2d 151 (1982), we analyzed a ballot summary in terms of whether it accurately 
presented “the amendment’s chief effect.”  Id. at 155.  Two years later, we said that 
“[t]he ballot summary should tell the voter the legal effect of the amendment, and 
no more.”  Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984).  Jumping ahead 
several decades, we said in one of our most recent ballot initiative cases that we 
determine a proposed amendment’s purpose by looking at “objective criteria 
inherent in the amendment itself, such as the amendment’s main effect.”  Advisory 
Op. to Att’y Gen. re Citizenship Requirement to Vote in Fla. Elections, 45 Fla. L. 
Weekly S7, S8 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2020) (citation omitted). 
Having established that the word “purpose” in section 101.161(1) means 
immediate purpose or legal effect, it remains necessary to determine what the 
statute means by “chief purpose.”  (Emphasis added.)  In this context, “chief” has 
to mean “marked by greatest importance, significance, influence.”  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 387 (1993).  This introduces a concept of 
materiality.  As our cases have repeatedly observed, a ballot summary “need not 
discuss every detail or consequence of the amendment.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y 
Gen. re Raising Florida’s Minimum Wage, 285 So. 3d 1273, 1277 (Fla. 2019) 
(citation omitted).  Instead, the legislature’s use of the phrase “chief purpose” 
- 24 - 
 
means that the ballot summary must set forth the legal effects that would be 
material to an objectively reasonable voter.  See Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound 
Ass’n, 253 So. 3d 513, 520 (Fla. 2018) (a ballot summary that fails to inform the 
voter of an amendment’s “material effects” is defective). 
Section 101.161(1) refers to “the chief purpose,” singular, of the measure.  
Does this mean that the author of a ballot summary must determine a proposed 
amendment’s discrete legal effects and then set forth only the most important one 
in the ballot summary?  That would be an unreasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  We have consistently held that article XI, section 3 allows a proposed 
amendment to contain multiple components, so long as those components are 
“parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme.”  Advisory Op. to the Att’y 
Gen. re Rights of Electricity Consumers Regarding Solar Energy Choice, 188 So. 
3d 822, 828 (Fla. 2016).  If the constitution permits multi-component (but single 
subject) proposals, it makes the most sense to read section 101.161(1) as requiring 
the ballot summary to identify all material components of the overall plan.  This 
reading is consistent with the statutory text.  The immediate purpose of a proposed 
amendment is to enact a bundle of related legal effects.  Therefore, the “chief 
purpose” of the amendment can be understood in terms of the subset of those legal 
effects that would be material to a reasonable voter. 
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Finally, section 101.161(1) says that the ballot summary must be an 
“explanatory” statement, and that the summary must be printed on the ballot “in 
clear and unambiguous language.”  To explain means “to make manifest; present 
in detail,” or “to make plain or understandable.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 801 (1993).  A ballot summary cannot be explanatory, 
and its language cannot be clear and unambiguous, unless it makes understandable 
to the voter the material legal effects of the proposed amendment.2 
The ballot summary fails to disclose that, by mandating a “single 
primary election,” the proposed amendment would prohibit state-run 
elections to select political party nominees for the affected offices. 
 
The ballot summary in this case violates section 101.161(1) because it 
completely fails to identify—much less explain—a material legal effect of the 
proposed amendment.  Since 1913, the Legislature has exercised its discretion to 
require that political party nominees for the legislature, governor, and cabinet be 
elected in state-run primary elections.  Long ago we explained: “[B]ecause of the 
public importance of securing proper party nominations, the regulation of party 
primary elections, and the institution of official state-controlled primaries to be 
                                          
 
2.  In his thoughtful concurrence, Justice Lawson argues that “chief purpose” 
as used in section 101.161 means “the principal or most important objective, goal, 
or end.”  Using this definition would still lead to a requirement that a ballot 
summary disclose the proposed amendment’s material legal effects.  As I have 
explained, section 101.161 requires disclosure of the chief purpose “of the 
measure,” not of the sponsor.  Assuming one can impute to a legal text an 
“objective, goal, or end,” that text’s most important objective, goal, or end is 
necessarily to bring about its material legal effects. 
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conducted and held at public expense, and under the eye of public officials, are 
universally held to be proper subjects for legislative action.”  State ex rel. Andrews 
v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 505 (Fla. 1936).  For Florida voters who are members of 
political parties—which is to say, a strong majority of voters—the century-old 
tradition of electing party nominees in state-run primary elections is an essential 
aspect of participation in the electoral process.  It is not an exaggeration to say that 
Floridians likely consider voting in such elections to be their right. 
 
The proposed amendment would take away the Legislature’s discretion to 
provide for these state-run party nominating elections for the affected offices.  This 
legal effect is evident from the plain meaning of the proposed amendment’s text.  
That text opens with the statement: “All elections for the Florida legislature, 
governor and cabinet shall be held as follows.”  (Emphasis added.)  And the text 
goes on to say: “A single primary election shall be held for each office.”  
(Emphasis added.)  “Single” means one.  And it is self-evident that the proposed 
amendment does not use the phrase “primary election” to mean an election to 
select a political party’s nominee for the general election.  Rather, the proposed 
amendment uses “primary election” the way the dictionary generically defines the 
phrase: “an election in which qualified voters nominate or express a preference for 
a particular candidate or group of candidates for political office.”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 1800 (1993).  “Primary” being a relative term, under 
- 27 - 
 
the proposed amendment a “primary election” is simply an election before the 
general election.  Cf. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Implementation of 
Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration Amendment, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S10, S14 
(Fla. Jan. 16, 2020) (absent contextual indication of technical meaning, words in 
the constitution should be interpreted in their “plain, common sense”).   
Taken as a whole, the clause “[a] single primary election shall be held for 
each office” must mean that the state may hold only one election before the general 
election at which the listed offices will be voted on.  That “single primary election” 
is necessarily the all-voter, all-candidate primary election that the proposed 
amendment seeks to bring to life.  Any other state-run election before the general 
election would be an additional, constitutionally prohibited primary election.3 
 
The ballot summary does not come close to disclosing this legal effect, even 
though it would change the constitution in a way that meets any reasonable 
definition of materiality.  The ballot summary does not tell the voters that the 
proposed amendment mandates “a single primary election” for the affected offices.  
                                          
 
3.  At oral argument, the amendment sponsor maintained that the proposed 
amendment would permit a hypothetical state-run pre-primary election to select 
political party nominees (who presumably could then run as party-nominated 
candidates in the all-voter, all-candidate top-two primary).  This is of no 
consequence, however, because a sponsor’s stated interpretation of a proposed 
amendment cannot trump the plain meaning of the amendment’s text.  If the 
amendment were to become part of the constitution, it is the text that would 
govern, not the sponsor’s subjective intentions.  Advisory Op. to the Governor re 
Implementation of Amendment 4, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at S12. 
- 28 - 
 
A reader of the ballot summary would have no way of knowing that the all-voter, 
all-candidate primary described in the summary would be the state’s 
constitutionally exclusive primary election for those offices. 
This proposed change to the constitutional status quo—a status quo that has 
allowed the Legislature for over 100 years to mandate state-run elections to select 
political party nominees—is not a mere detail.  The proposed amendment would 
make the selection of political party nominees for the affected offices a private 
affair, subject to each party’s discretion.  Given the expense and the logistical 
complexity of conducting a statewide election in our large and diverse state, no 
substitute, party-run nomination process is likely to resemble our existing state-run 
elections.  And any objectively reasonable voter would consider this change a 
material legal effect of the proposed amendment. 
The ballot summary is affirmatively misleading. 
 
This brings us to a closely related way in which the ballot summary is 
actually affirmatively misleading.  The first sentence of section 4 in the proposed 
amendment reads:  “Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a political party from 
nominating a candidate to run for office under this subsection.”  Read together 
with the remainder of the proposed amendment, this sentence confirms that, going 
forward, political parties’ nomination of candidates for the affected offices would 
be a private affair, neither required nor prohibited by the proposed amendment.  It 
- 29 - 
 
is impossible to know whether, if the proposed amendment were to become law, 
any political party would continue to nominate candidates for the legislature, 
governor, and cabinet.  (For that matter, given the mandatory all-voter, all- 
candidate primary, it is equally impossible to know what such a “nomination” 
would mean in practice and effect.) 
 
Contradicting the text of the proposed amendment, the ballot summary 
expressly assumes that there will continue to be party-nominated candidates for 
these offices.  Specifically, the summary says:  “All candidates for an office, 
including party nominated candidates, appear on the same primary ballot.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In fact, as explained, party-nominated candidates are not a 
necessary feature of the election scheme under the proposed amendment.  Absent 
qualifying language, the ballot summary’s reference to “party nominated 
candidates” is affirmatively misleading. 
 
Finally, the ballot title and summary mislead in yet another way.   
The ballot title announces: “All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for State 
Legislature, Governor, and Cabinet.”  The opening line of the ballot summary says: 
“Allows all registered voters to vote in primaries . . . regardless of political party 
affiliation.”  This repeated “all voters vote” theme signals to voters that the 
proposed amendment would expand access to voting, and that is partly true.  But 
- 30 - 
 
the “all voters vote” language makes it less likely that voters will perceive that the 
proposed amendment would contract access to voting in a separate, critical respect. 
Conclusion 
The ballot summary here is clearly defective under section 101.161(1).  The 
summary’s flaw is not that it fails to speculate about what candidate nominating 
processes, if any, the political parties might adopt to replace state-run primary 
elections—section 101.161(1) prohibits such speculation.  The summary’s flaw is 
not that it fails to identify the proposed amendment’s every detail and 
ramification—section 101.161(1) does not require that either.  The summary’s flaw 
is not in the merits of the underlying amendment—our state’s existing election 
practices, however longstanding, are not entitled to any special protection from this 
Court.  The ballot summary here is fatally flawed because it does not explain a 
known, material legal effect of the proposed amendment: the enactment of a 
constitutional prohibition on state-run primary elections to select political party 
nominees for legislature, governor, and cabinet.  And the ballot summary is 
defective for the additional reason that it affirmatively misleads voters by 
representing that political party nominees are a necessary feature of the proposed 
amendment’s election scheme, when that is not the case.  I respectfully dissent. 
Original Proceeding – Advisory Opinion – Attorney General 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey 
Paul DeSousa, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
- 31 - 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Mark Herron and Robert A. McNeely of Messer Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Interested Party, Florida Democratic Party 
 
Benjamin Gibson, Jason Gonzalez, Daniel Nordby, Amber Stoner Nunnally, and 
Rachel Procaccini of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Interested Party, Republican Party of Florida 
 
Glenn Burhans, Jr., Tallahassee, Florida, and Eugene E. Stearns of Stearns Weaver 
Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Interested Party, All Voters Vote, Inc.