Title: Fila v. Spruce Mountain Inn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Fila v. Spruce Mountain Inn (2003-530); 178 Vt. 323; 885 A.2d 723

2005 VT  77

[Filed 05-Aug-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT  77
    
                                No. 2003-530

  Virginia Fila                                   Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                   Washington Superior Court

  Spruce Mountain Inn and                   September Term, 2004 
  Candace Beardsley

  Alan W. Cook, J.

  Allison A. Ericson of Law Offices of Daniel M. Sedon, P.C., Chelsea, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

  John Davis Buckley and Laura Q. Pelosi of Theriault & Joslin, P.C.,
    Montpelier, for  Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.   Plaintiff Virginia Fila appeals from a
  superior court judgment in favor of defendants Spruce Mountain Inn (SMI)
  and Candace Beardsley.  Plaintiff contends that, in granting judgment as a
  matter of law in favor of defendants, the trial court: (1) applied an
  incorrect standard in determining whether plaintiff was incapacitated for
  purposes of tolling the statute of limitations; (2) erroneously ruled that
  the question of plaintiff's incapacity was an issue for the court rather
  than the jury to decide; and (3) mistakenly concluded that plaintiff failed
  to satisfy the standard for tolling the statute of limitations. We agree
  with the first two contentions, and therefore reverse and remand for
  further proceedings. 
        
       ¶  2.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
  judgment, as we are required to do, Gero v. J.W.J. Realty, 171 Vt. 57, 59,