Title: Michael Malmstadt v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Joni B. and Richard S., 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUNE 13, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
Honorable Michael Malmstadt, 
Honorable Thomas P. Donegan, 
Honorable Christopher R. Foley, 
Honorable Mel Flanagan, 
Honorable Ronald S. Goldberger, 
Honorable Russell W. Stamper and 
Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Respondent. 
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Rights declared. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
2 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  The Petitioners
1 commenced this original 
action seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of 
1995 Wis. Act 27, § 2442v.  This particular section of the Act 
(the state budget bill) amended Wis. Stat. § 48.23(3), as 
indicated by the following underlined language: 
POWER OF THE COURT TO APPOINT COUNSEL.  Except in proceedings 
under s. 48.13, at any time, upon request or on its own 
motion, the court may appoint counsel for the child or 
any party, unless the child or the party has or wishes 
to retain counsel of his or her own choosing.  The court 
may not appoint counsel for any party other than the 
child in a proceeding under s. 48.13. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13 delineates the court's jurisdiction over 
children alleged to be in need of protection or services, commonly 
known as CHIPS actions.
2   
                     
     
1  The petitioners in the Joni B. action are indigent parents 
of children subject to CHIPS proceedings.  In the Malmstadt 
action, the petitioners are six Milwaukee Children's Court judges 
(Honorable 
Michael 
Malmstadt, 
Honorable 
Thomas 
P. 
Donegan, 
Honorable Christopher R. Foley, Honorable Mel Flanagan, Honorable 
Ronald S. Goldberger, and  Honorable Russell W. Stamper) and Chief 
Judge of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Patrick T. 
Sheedy.  Throughout this opinion they will be referred to 
collectively as the Petitioners. 
     
2  48.13 
Jurisdiction over children alleged to be in need of 
protection or services.  The court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of protection or 
services which can be ordered by the court, and: 
 
(1) Who is without a parent or guardian; 
 
(2) Who has been abandoned; 
 
(3) Who has been the victim of sexual or physical abuse 
including injury which is self-inflicted or inflicted by another 
by other than accidental means; 
 
(3m) Who is at substantial risk of becoming the victim of 
sexual or physical abuse, including injury that is self-inflicted 
or inflicted by another by other than accidental means, based on 
reliable and credible information that another child in the home 
has been the victim of sexual or physical abuse; 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
3 
(..continued) 
 
(4) Whose parent or guardian signs the petition requesting 
jurisdiction and states that he or she is unable to care for, 
control or provide necessary special treatment or care for the 
child; 
 
(5) Who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of 
law; 
 
(6) Who is habitually truant from school, after evidence is 
provided by the school attendance officer that the activities 
under s. 118.16(5) have been completed, except as provided under 
s. 48.17(2); 
 
(6m) Who is a school dropout, as defined in s. 118.153(1)(b); 
 
(7) Who is habitually truant from home and either the child 
or a parent, guardian or a relative in whose home the child 
resides signs the petition requesting jurisdiction and attests in 
court that reconciliation efforts have been attempted and have 
failed; 
 
(8) Who is receiving inadequate care during the period of 
time 
a 
parent 
is 
missing, 
incarcerated, 
hospitalized 
or 
institutionalized; 
 
(9) Who is at least age 12, signs the petition requesting 
jurisdiction and attests in court that he or she is in need of 
special care and treatment which the parent, guardian or legal 
custodian is unwilling to provide; 
 
(10) Whose parent, guardian or legal custodian neglects, 
refuses or is unable for reasons other than poverty to provide 
necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care or shelter 
so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child; 
 
(10m) 
Whose parent, guardian or legal custodian is at 
substantial risk of neglecting, refusing or being unable for 
reasons other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, 
clothing, medical or dental care or shelter so as to endanger 
seriously the physical health of the child, based on reliable and 
credible information that the child's parent, guardian or legal 
custodian has neglected, refused or been unable for reasons other 
than poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or 
dental care or shelter so as to endanger seriously the physical 
health of another child in the home; 
 
(11) Who is suffering emotional damage for which the parent 
or guardian is unwilling to provide treatment, which is evidenced 
by one or more of the following characteristics, exhibited to a 
severe degree:  anxiety, depression, withdrawal or outward 
aggressive behavior; 
 
(11m) 
Who is suffering from an alcohol and other drug abuse 
impairment, exhibited to a severe degree, for which the parent or 
guardian is unwilling to provide treatment; 
 
(12) Who, being under 12 years of age, has committed a 
delinquent act as defined in s. 48.12; 
 
(13) Who has not been immunized as required by s. 252.04 and 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
4 
 
The Petitioners claim that the amendment is unconstitutional 
on the grounds that it violates Wisconsin's separation of powers 
doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  We must presume that a statute is 
constitutional.  State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Circuit 
Court, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (citing State v. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).  This court 
will strike down a legislative enactment only if the challenger 
proves the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id.  We conclude that the Petitioners have met this burden on both 
grounds. 
 
FACTS 
 
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts.  On June 29, 
1995, the Wisconsin legislature enacted Assembly Bill 150, which 
was signed into law as 1995 Wis. Act 27 on July 26, 1995.  The Act 
included the above quoted provision, § 2442v, amending § 48.13(3) 
which governs proceedings to declare a child to be in need of 
protection and services.  The amended provision bars a circuit 
court from appointing counsel for the parents, or any party other 
than the child, in CHIPS actions.
3  
(..continued) 
not exempted under s. 252.04(3); or 
 
(14) Who has been determined, under s. 48.30(5)(c), to be not 
responsible for a delinquent act by reason of mental disease or 
defect or who has been determined, under s. 48.30(5)(d), to be not 
competent to proceed. 
     
3  The stipulated facts also included the following 
information: (1) during 1994 in Milwaukee County, 988 original 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
5 
 
On October 9, 1995, the Petitioners filed two separate 
petitions challenging the constitutionality of § 2442v and 
requesting that this court take original action pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.70 and Art. VII, sec. 3(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  This court granted those petitions on November 14, 
1995, and simultaneously ordered that they be consolidated.  
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS    
 
The Petitioners first argue that the legislature's imposition 
of a complete non-discretionary bar to appointment of counsel in 
CHIPS cases violates Wisconsin's separation of powers doctrine by 
impermissibly intruding upon the judiciary's power to appoint 
counsel.  We agree. 
 
Although the separation of powers doctrine is not explicitly 
expressed in our state constitution, we have previously recognized 
that it is implicit in that document's language dividing 
governmental powers among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches.
4  Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 42.  Under the doctrine, each 
branch is prohibited from intruding upon another's "core zone of 
exclusive authority."
5  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 13.  Further, 
(..continued) 
CHIPS petitions and 2,007 extensions were filed; and (2) during 
fiscal 1993-94, the Office of the State Public Defender provided 
counsel in 9,858 CHIPS cases, with an estimated 55% of those 
involving representation of a parent. 
     
4  See Wisconsin Constitution: Art. V, sec. 1 (executive); 
Art. IV, sec 1 (legislative); and Art. VII, secs. 2, 3 and 4 
(judicial). 
     
5 
This court has previously commented that although such 
an intrusion is prohibited, "[i]f a statute falls within the 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
6 
even in an area where the authority of the legislature and 
judiciary is shared or overlaps, "[t]he legislature is prohibited 
from unreasonably burdening or substantially interfering with the 
judicial branch."  State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 
Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990). 
 
In 
Friedrich, 
this 
court 
outlined 
the 
procedure 
for 
determining whether a legislative enactment improperly infringes 
on the judiciary.  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14-15.  First, we 
look to whether the constitution grants the legislature subject 
matter jurisdiction over the area encompassed by the challenged 
statute.  Section 2442v was passed within the context of the state 
budget bill.  Although the amended statute makes no mention of 
compensation for counsel, the Respondent reasonably argues that 
the legislative intent behind the amendment was to conserve public 
funds by prohibiting their use for the appointment of counsel for 
parents in CHIPS actions.  Since the legislature possesses the 
power to budget the state's finances, this provision could 
arguably fall under the previously recognized legislative power 
"to allocate government resources."  Id. at 16.   
 
Next, the reviewing court examines whether the "subject 
matter 
of 
the 
statute 
also 
falls 
within 
the 
judiciary's 
(..continued) 
judiciary's core zone of exclusive authority, the court may abide 
by the statute if it furthers the administration of justice, 'as a 
matter of comity or courtesy rather than as an acknowledgement of 
power.'"  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15.  Compliance, however, is 
at the discretion of the judiciary and cannot be mandated. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
7 
constitutional grant of power."  Id. at 14-15.  This court has 
repeatedly found that the judiciary's power to appoint counsel is 
inherent: 
the appointment of counsel ought to be made by a judge or 
under the aegis of the judicial system.  Attorneys are 
officers 
of 
the 
court 
and 
the 
duty 
to 
furnish 
representation derives from constitutional provisions 
that place the responsibility upon courts.  That 
responsibility has been traditionally discharged by 
courts.  It is within the inherent power of the courts 
to appoint counsel for the representation of indigents. 
 
State ex rel. Fitas v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 130, 134, 221 
N.W.2d 902 (1974).  See also  State ex rel. Chiarkas v. Skow, 160 
Wis. 2d 123, 137, 465 N.W.2d 625 (1991); Contempt in State v. 
Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 76, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987). 
 
Although the Respondent concedes that the judiciary has the 
inherent authority to appoint counsel, the parties disagree as to 
whether that power is exclusive to the judiciary or is shared with 
the legislature.  We have previously commented that, 
the constitution does not define legislative, executive or 
judicial power and that it is neither possible nor 
practicable "to classify accurately all the various 
governmental powers and to say that this power belongs 
exclusively to one department and that power belongs 
exclusively to another." 
 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 42-43 (quoting Integration of Bar Case, 244 
Wis. 8, 45, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943)).   
 
In this case, we need not decide whether the power to appoint 
counsel is exclusive to the judiciary or shared with the 
legislature, since the level of intrusion here is impermissible 
under either scenario.  Any intrusion is prohibited if the 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
8 
judicial authority is exclusive, and even if the power is viewed 
as shared, the legislature may not place an unreasonable burden on 
or substantially interfere with the judiciary's exercise of that 
power.  The amended statute's flat prohibition on appointment of 
counsel for anyone other than the child in CHIPS proceedings 
clearly intrudes upon the authority of the judiciary, as well as 
unreasonably 
burdens 
and 
substantially 
interferes 
with 
the 
judicial branch's inherent power to appoint counsel in order to 
effect the efficient administration of justice. 
 
A court's inherent power to appoint counsel is not derived 
from an individual litigant's constitutional right to counsel, 
"but rather is inherent to serve the interests of the circuit 
court."  Chiarkas, 160 Wis. 2d at 137-38 (citing Lehman, 137 
Wis. 2d at 76).  In rare cases a court may find a compelling 
judicial need for appointment of an attorney for a party even 
though that party may have neither a constitutional nor a 
statutory right to counsel.  A court may use its inherent 
discretionary authority to appoint counsel in furtherance of the 
court's need for the orderly and fair presentation of a case. 
 
In CHIPS proceedings, courts sometimes face very special 
problems with unrepresented parents.  These parents are often 
poorly educated, frightened and unable to fully understand and 
participate in the judicial process, thus sometimes creating 
exceptional problems for the trial court.  When a parent obviously 
needs assistance of counsel to ensure the integrity of the CHIPS 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
9 
proceeding, the court cannot be legislatively denied the right to 
appoint counsel, thereby placing the individual judge in the 
untenable position of having to essentially serve as counsel for 
that parent.
6   
 
By definition, the complete elimination of the court's power 
to appoint counsel even in situations where it finds appointment 
necessary in the interests of the court is an unreasonable burden 
and a substantial interference with the judicial branch's 
authority.  We hold that the amended statute impermissibly 
interferes with an inherent authority of the judiciary and, 
therefore, is violative of the separation of powers doctrine 
embodied in our state constitution. 
 
DUE PROCESS 
 
The Petitioners next argue that the amended statute violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States 
Constitution. 
 
Although 
parents 
do 
not 
have 
a 
constitutionally 
protected 
right 
to 
counsel 
in 
all 
child 
protective hearings, the Petitioners contend that due process may 
require it in particular instances.  Therefore, the circuit court 
must have the ability to make an individualized determination as 
to whether the facts of the case before it necessitates the 
appointment of counsel.  Again, we agree with the Petitioners. 
                     
     
6  The potential for complexity, both substantive and 
procedural, in CHIPS proceedings is further developed in the due 
process discussion that follows. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
10 
 
Our due process inquiry centers on the issue of fundamental 
fairness because, as we have previously stated, "[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment bars a state from denying any person a fundamentally 
fair trial."  Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 650, 482 N.W.2d 353 
(1992).  Both parties direct our attention to Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981), in which 
the United States Supreme Court confronted a claim by an indigent 
parent that her right to due process had been violated because she 
was not afforded the assistance of counsel in proceedings to 
terminate her parental rights.  The Court examined its own 
precedents on fundamental fairness and drew "the presumption that 
an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, 
if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty."  Id. at 
26-27.  Because Ms. Lassiter's physical liberty was not at stake, 
she did not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.  
However, the Court's analysis did not end there.  Rather, it 
concluded that trial courts must determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether due process necessitates appointment of counsel.  Id. at 
26, 32. 
 
The Lassiter Court devised a test, adopted by this court in 
Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 647, to determine whether due process 
requires that counsel must be appointed in a given situation.
7  
                     
     
7  In Piper, we held that, although the incarcerated indigent 
defendant in a civil tort action had no constitutional right to 
appointed counsel, due process required that he be given a 
"meaningful opportunity to be heard."  Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 658. 
 In each case, the circuit court must determine what constitutes a 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
11 
First, a court must balance the following elements of due process 
against 
each 
other: 
the 
private 
interests 
at 
stake, 
the 
government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will 
lead to erroneous decisions.  Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 647 (citing 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).  The "net weight" of these elements is 
then balanced against the presumption that a right to counsel 
exists only when personal freedom is jeopardized.  Id. 
 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
consistently 
characterized a parent's interest in the "companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children" as an important 
one that "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection."  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  The Court recognized that the right to 
raise one's children is "essential" and has invoked the Due 
Process Clause, as well as the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Ninth Amendment, in defense of the integrity of the family unit.  
Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 
316 
U.S. 535, 541 
(1942); and 
Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)).  The Lassiter Court 
asserted that parents have a particularly "commanding" interest in 
the "accuracy and justice" of proceedings that could end the 
parent-child relationship.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.   
(..continued) 
meaningful opportunity to be heard and whether that requires 
appointment of counsel in the particular instance.  Id. at 659. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
12 
 
The Respondent argues that the same interests and, therefore, 
the same due process concerns are not at stake here because the 
proceedings in Lassiter involved permanent severance of parental 
rights, whereas CHIPS proceedings represent only a "minimal" or 
"relatively 
minor 
interference" 
with 
the 
parent-child 
relationship.  On the contrary,  the interests of a parent that 
may be affected by a CHIPS hearing are far from "minimal."  One of 
the dispositional options available to the court upon a finding 
that a child is in need of protection or services is removal of 
the child from the parental home.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.345(1), 
48.34(3).  Even though placement in foster care is ideally short-
term, the reality is that many children remain out of their homes 
for extended periods of time.
8  Further, a parent's failure to 
make 
substantial 
progress 
towards 
meeting 
the 
conditions 
established pursuant to a CHIPS finding for the child's return to 
the home, is itself one of the bases for later termination of 
parental rights.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2). 
                     
     
8  In 1993 there were 9,608 Wisconsin children who, although 
not delinquent, were in out-of-home placement, with 35.7% of this 
number from Milwaukee County.  Gerald A. Born and Linda Hisgen, 
Presentation to the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee 
on Children in Need of Protection or Services, p.4, September 7, 
1994.  According to the Milwaukee County Department of Human 
Services, approximately one-half of the children placed in foster 
care remain there for more than two years and 35% live out of the 
familial home in excess of three years.  Anne Bothwell, Study 
Shows Systemic Problems in County's Services for Children, 
Milwaukee Journal, March 13, 1995. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
13 
 
Additionally, some parents may find themselves in a position 
where interests other than that of family integrity are in need of 
protection.
9  If the CHIPS action was initiated on the basis of 
allegations of neglect or abuse, as is commonly the case, the 
parent may also be facing criminal prosecution.  Once freedom of 
liberty is implicated, numerous additional due process concerns 
arise.  True, the statutory procedures provide that parents be 
informed of certain rights, including the right to a jury trial, 
to remain silent, and to summon and cross-examine witnesses.  In 
some cases, the value of such warnings alone may be questionable 
without 
the guidance of 
legal counsel 
to assist in the 
interpretation of their import in the current and potential 
ancillary proceedings. 
 
The State shares a parent's interest in a just and accurate 
outcome where the welfare of a child is concerned.  Lassiter, 452 
U.S. at 27.  The United States Supreme Court has noted that this 
interest might be best served in an adversary setting where both 
the State and the parents are represented by counsel because "just 
results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest 
of opposed interests."  Id. at 28.  Further, the Court in Lassiter 
found that although the State's pecuniary interest (in striving to 
                     
     
9  "Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly 
based on alleged criminal activity.  Parents so accused may need 
legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such 
petitions may create."  Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 
452 U.S. 18, 27 n.3 (1981). 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
14 
economize proceeding expenses by not appointing counsel) was 
legitimate, "it is hardly significant enough to overcome private 
interests as important as those here."  Id. 
 
We recognize that the legislature has a legitimate interest 
in its efforts to manage public funds responsibly.  However, we 
conclude that, in some cases, the State's pecuniary interests will 
not outweigh the interest shared by the State and the parent in a 
just and accurate result which will require the "equal contest" of 
counseled adversary proceedings.  It would be in no one's best 
interest, least of all the child's, if the finality of an adoption 
were later challenged on the basis of a constitutionally flawed 
prior CHIPS or termination proceeding. 
 
Finally, in assessing the risk of an erroneous outcome, we 
find that CHIPS proceedings can pose many of the same hazards 
which 
the 
Lassiter 
Court 
noted 
may 
occur 
in 
termination 
proceedings.  Parents involved are "likely to be people with 
little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with 
life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and 
disorienting situation."  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.  They may be 
confronted with medical and psychiatric testimony which few people 
are "equipped to understand and fewer still to confute, . . ."  
Id.  The issues may be complex and the testimony laced with 
hearsay and evidentiary pitfalls, escalating the risks of 
erroneous deprivation.
10  
                     
     
10  In Lassiter, after noting that these difficulties might 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
15 
 
During oral argument this court presented the Respondent with 
the following hypothetical scenario:  
 
A woman is severely developmentally disabled, with a 
borderline IQ, but manages to live independently, gainfully 
employed as a waitress.  She gives birth to twins and lovingly 
raises them, providing for all of their necessities.  But as the 
boys grow older they mentally outstrip their mother; she does not 
have the capacity to help them with their homework, and they soon 
find ways they can "outfox" her.  There has been no abuse or 
neglect but the county decides that it is too expensive to 
continue to provide in-home services to assist the family, so they 
file a CHIPS action requesting that the boys be placed in foster 
care. 
 
The mother desperately wants to keep her two children whom 
she intensely loves, so she contests the CHIPS petition.  Under 
amended § 48.23(3), the court is prohibited from appointing 
counsel to assist the mother, and a date for a jury trial is set 
where the mother must appear alone to argue that she should be 
allowed to keep her family intact.   
 
 
The court then posed three questions: (1) how would the mother 
conduct 
voir 
dire? 
(2) 
how 
would 
she 
cross-examine 
the 
psychiatrist who was brought in as an expert witness against her? 
(..continued) 
"overwhelm the uncounseled parent," the Supreme Court noted that 
state courts have generally found that counsel must be appointed 
for parents at termination proceedings and that a number of courts 
have extended this coverage to parents facing dependency or 
neglect hearings (the equivalent of CHIPS proceedings).  Lassiter, 
452 U.S. at 30 & n.6.  Although the Court found that fundamental 
fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the 
appointment of counsel in every termination proceeding, it stated 
that:  
A wise public policy, however, may require that higher 
standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable 
under the Constitution.  Informed opinion has clearly 
come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the 
assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental 
termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect 
proceedings as well. 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
16 
and, (3) how could such a proceeding possibly be fundamentally 
fair? 
 
We conclude that fundamental fairness requires that a circuit 
judge be given the discretion to make the determination of what 
due process requires on a case-by-case basis.  The precedent is 
clear.  Both the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter and this 
court in Piper found that there is no absolute right to the 
appointment of counsel in civil cases carrying no threat of loss 
of physical freedom.  Nevertheless, we, as well as the United 
States Supreme Court, have concluded that due process requires an 
individualized determination of the necessity for appointment 
under the circumstances presented by the particular case.  See 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32; Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 646.  As 
amended, Wis. Stat. § 48.23(3) does not afford such an opportunity 
for assessment.  Therefore, we hold that it violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We emphasize that the key to an individualized determination 
is that the need to appoint counsel will differ from case to case. 
 In other words, a circuit court should only appoint counsel after 
concluding that either the efficient administration of justice 
warrants it or that due process considerations outweigh the 
presumption against such an appointment.  If the parent does not 
request appointment of counsel and the court perceives no 
particularized need for counsel in the case before it, the court 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
17 
need not address the issue.  We do suggest, however, that when the 
court either grants or denies a request for counsel it should 
memorialize its findings and rationale on the record to facilitate 
appellate review.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 34. 
 
In conducting the balancing called for in Lassiter and Piper, 
we recommend that a court examine not only the due process factors 
(the private interests, governmental interests, and the risk of 
erroneous decisions), but also consider the following: 
-- the personal characteristics of the parent, such as age, mental 
capacity, education, and former contact with the court; 
-- the parent's demonstrated level of interest in the proceedings 
and desire to participate; 
-- whether the petition alleges incidents of abuse or neglect 
which could lead to criminal prosecution; 
-- the complexity of the case, including the likelihood of the 
introduction of medical or psychological evidence; 
-- the probability of out-of-home placement and potential duration 
of separation, based on the allegations in the petition and the 
social worker's recommendation. 
These are only suggestions, not a checklist etched in stone.  We 
do not believe it is necessary or advisable to impose inflexible 
limitations on our able state judges in the exercise of their 
inherent discretionary power to appoint counsel or in regard to 
their analysis of due process considerations. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
18 
 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 
48.23(3), as amended by 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 2442v, violates both 
the Wisconsin doctrine of separation of powers and the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Therefore, we grant the 
Petitioners' request for relief and declare the amendment 
contained in 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 2442v, void.  
 
By the Court.—Rights declared and relief granted. 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-2757-OA & 95-2758-OA 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
95-2757-OA 
 
 
Joni B. and Richard S. 
 
 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
 
 
 
95-2758-OA 
 
 
 
Honorable Michael Malmstadt, Honorable 
 
 
 
Thomas P. Donegan, Honorable Christopher R. 
 
 
 
Foley, Honorable Mel Flanagan, Honorable 
 
 
 
Ronald S. Goldberger, Honorable Russell W. 
 
 
 
Stamper and Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 13, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 3, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-2757-OA, 95-2758-OA 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioners there were briefs by Lynn 
Adelman, Jon Deitrich and Adelman, Adelman & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee; Paula K. Doyle and Law Offices of Paula K. Doyle, 
Madison; David J. Harth and Foley & Lardner, Madison and oral 
argument by Lynn Adelman and David J. Harth. 
 
 
For the respondent there was a brief by Bruce L. Harms, 
Michael J. Modl and Axley Brynelson, Madison and oral argument by 
Michael J. Modl. 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Peter M. Koneazny, Milwaukee 
for the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, 
Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mary Bednarik, John Ebbott, 
Milwaukee for the Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Gary E. Sherman, Port Wing 
and John S. Skilton, President, Milwaukee, for the State Bar of 
Wisconsin. 
 
  
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Patricia K. McDowell, 
Milwaukee, James A. Walrath, Julia E. Vosper and James M. Brennan, 
Milwaukee for the Milwaukee Bar Association, Inc. and the Legal 
Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc.