Title: Revelle v. Schultz

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Revelle v. Schultz1988 WY 104759 P.2d 1255Case Number: 88-115Decided: 08/25/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARGARET REVELLE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

CLIFFORD AND ELLA 
SCHULTZ, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AND PERRY AND SHELIE ELLIOTT, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Bruce P. Badley 
of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellant.

Rebecca W. 
Thomson of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant, Margaret 
Revelle (Revelle), in this real estate right-of-way case, appeals from an order 
of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees as 
plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Clifford Schultz and Mr. and Mrs. Perry Elliott 
(Schultz-Elliott), on their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Schultz-Elliott successfully claimed that Revelle had improperly constructed a 
chain link fence which denied their free access to the rear portion of their 
mid-block properties over a recorded thirteen foot wide, nonexclusive 
right-of-way that first traversed Revelle's street abutted location. Revelle 
phrases the issue on appeal as:

"The district court erred 
by entering a declaratory summary judgment affecting real property without 
requiring joinder of all parties of a subdivision contrary to W.S. § 1-37-113, 
which states:

"`When declaratory relief 
is sought ALL PERSONS SHALL BE MADE PARTIES WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST WHICH 
WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE DECLARATION * * *

"And,

"`* * * In any proceeding 
which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance * * * the municipality 
SHALL be made a party * * *.'"

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The undisputed facts in 
this case are that Revelle and Schultz-Elliott own subdivision lots and live in 
the Granville Third Addition in Sheridan, Wyoming. Protective covenants governing the 
subdivision were recorded in the Sheridan County Clerk's office on December 13, 
1983, as providing in pertinent part:

"Declarant hereby 
dedicates and grants to every owner or owners of Lots 1 through 8 of the 
Granville 3rd Addition, a nonexclusive, perpetual right of way and easement over 
the easterly 13 feet of said Lots 1 through 8 for the purpose access to their 
lots. This easement is subject to the existing 13 foot utility easement 
dedicated for public use on the plat of Granville 3rd Addition. This easement 
shall be appurtenant to Lots 1 through 8 and, anything contrary in these 
covenants nonwithstanding, may not be terminated or modified without the written 
consent of all of the owners of Lots 1 through 8."

[¶4.]     Despite this covenant, 
Revelle constructed a chain link fence that had gates in it and which obstructed 
right-of-way usage by other subdivision lot owners. Schultz-Elliott, as 
included, first asked Revelle to move the fence, and that failing, filed a 
complaint seeking a declaration that they had the right to the nonexclusive use 
of the rear thirteen feet of Revelle's Lot 8 to use as a perpetual right-of-way 
for access to their homes as granted by the Declaration of Protective Covenants. 
Additionally, they prayed for an injunction restraining Revelle from maintaining 
a fence or other structure or object which blocked their access in the 
right-of-way.1 Revelle, in defense, filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the 
complaint asserting a failure by Schultz-Elliott to join indispensable parties2 as provided for in Rule 19, 
W.R.C.P. The right-of-way claimants filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting there were no material facts in dispute and they were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The trial court denied the Revelle motion to 
dismiss and granted the Schultz-Elliott motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶5.]     Revelle asserts, at the 
time she made her down payment on her lot, that the seller/developer told her 
the right-of-way across her purchased lot was to be for limited usage, i.e., for 
such things as bringing in wood or sod or to park a recreational vehicle, but 
not to be used as a driveway for the other seven affected lots. She states the 
covenants were filed after she made her down payment, but before the lot was 
deeded to her. It is her position that these circumstances create an issue of 
fact involving fraud and/or misrepresentation, which requires joinder of the 
seller/developer who still owns four of the lots. Revelle then concludes that § 
1-37-113, W.S. 1977, which is part of Wyoming's version of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, provides that "all persons shall be made parties who 
have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration," and 
requires joinder of the seller/developer. In addition to the seller/developer, 
she also contends that other lot owners who are affected by the right-of-way and 
the three mortgagees whose security might be diminished by its existence are 
indispensable parties. Although the reason is not entirely clear from the 
Revelle brief, she also asserts that the City of Sheridan is an indispensable party because the 
proceeding affects the validity of a city ordinance. Revelle does not describe 
nor enumerate the ordinance in her brief nor is there any development of this 
issue in the body of the brief providing determinative argument or citation of 
authority. We fail to see how a city ordinance interfaces with fencing of a 
recorded right-of-way as a defense, and the brief did not enlighten us. 

[¶6.]     The only issue briefed 
by Revelle in this appeal is the assertion that the trial court erred in denying 
her motion to join indispensable parties as required by § 1-37-113, W.S. 1977. 
We shall not decide this issue in light of the trial court's decision, except as 
it is intrinsic to the injunction request. A decision on the indispensable party 
issue would therefore be advisory.

[¶7.]     In Kane v. Kane, Wyo., 
706 P.2d 676, 679 (1985), we held that we need not address issues regarding the 
propriety of a judgment premised on Wyoming's version of the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act where there was in the record another proper basis for upholding 
the judgment of the trial court. Similar circumstances are present here. The 
trial court did, indeed, include in its order a provision declaring the rights 
of the parties vis-a-vis the covenant as coordinate with the injunctive prayer. 
However, the trial court also found the covenant to govern the relations of 
these parties insofar as the controversy between them was concerned and, in 
addition, granted injunctive relief requiring Revelle to remove the obstruction 
from the right-of-way which hindered their usage. The injunctive judgment 
provided the effective relief sought by Schultz-Elliott in their complaint after 
damage claim dismissal.

[¶8.]     Schultz-Elliott, as 
plaintiffs, were not obligated to litigate issues involving the seller/developer 
or other lot purchasers in their action to enforce the right-of-way. Obviously, 
Revelle could have initially chosen to, and did not, broaden this litigation by 
third-party claim under Rule 14, W.R.C.P.

[¶9.]     We agree with the trial 
court that these two lot owners were not obligated to undertake to litigate 
Revelle's argument against the seller/developer no matter how egregious that 
circumstance may have been. Schultz-Elliott purchased lots with the benefit of a 
rear lot access and that is all they seek to maintain despite what Revelle would 
contend in summary conclusion statement in brief:

"Unless the district 
court is reversed, Mrs. Revelle, a 60 year old widow, will be faced with an 
adverse and illegal judgment requiring her to bear the entire loss herself, or 
to commence, at her own expense, litigation against third parties for the 
fraudulent and misrepresented sale. * * *"

[¶10.]  In reviewing the property of a summary 
judgment, we first consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact 
underlying the granting of the summary judgment. If there is no issue of 
material fact, we then decide whether the substantive law was correctly applied 
by the court. Sutherland v. Bock, Wyo., 688 P.2d 157, 158 (1984). In making this 
analysis, we rely on the six-stage analysis as set out in Cordova v. Gosar, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 634 (1986). See also Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 
744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1987). Revelle does not question that the covenant 
encumbered the deed to her property or that it is plain and unambiguous on its 
face. Rather, she asserts that prior to her making her down payment on her lot, 
she was told by the seller/developer that the right-of-way was for more limited 
uses than those which Schultz-Elliott are making of it. (She was defrauded or 
mislead.) It is sufficient here to note that where the terms of the writing are 
sufficiently clear, a covenant such as this is to be construed without reference 
to attendant facts and circumstances or extrinsic evidence. Knadler v. Adams, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1983); Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 508 P.2d 15, 18 (1973). Thus, we hold 
the trial court properly found that the covenant entitled Schultz-Elliott to use 
the right-of-way unobstructed by Revelle's fence and that extrinsic evidence 
concerning oral representations made to Revelle by the seller/developer were 
neither relevant nor informative to a determination of the parties' rights 
vis-a-vis the duly filed covenant which created the access interest as a title 
record document.

[¶11.]  In attempting to broaden this litigation 
to involve other parties, Revelle relies heavily on this court's decision in 
State, By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil Co. of Delaware, Wyo., 575 P.2d 262, 268 (1978) and our holding in that case that the lack of an indispensable 
party is of such importance that we may properly raise the question on our own 
motion. In that case, we held that the City of Cheyenne and the State Board of Control were indispensable 
parties to a declaratory judgment action which could affect a water right held 
by the City of Cheyenne. That case is not relevant to 
litigation between dominant and subservient landowners contesting use of a 
recorded house lot right-of-way. In this case, all parties necessary to a full 
adjudication of the controversy between Schultz-Elliott and Revelle under the 
plain language of the covenant were present before the court and the 
adjudication does not purport to affect the rights of any other parties, 
including the seller/developer as a remaining owner of three of the lots. Reilly 
v. Reilly, Wyo., 671 P.2d 330, 332-333 (1983); Levinson 
v. Costello, 74 N.J. Super. 539, 181 A.2d 791, 795 (1962); Annotation, Necessary parties defendant to suit to 
prevent or remove obstruction or interference with easement of way, 28 
A.L.R.2d 409 (1953).

[¶12.]  Schultz-Elliott sought a certification 
that there was no reasonable cause for this appeal pursuant to Rule 10.05, 
W.R.A.P. We decline to so certify.

[¶13.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 A damage claim which had 
been also included was dismissed without prejudice in order for this case to 
have achieved a final order status for appeal.

2 Contended to be 
indispensable were the seller/developer and its agents, other lot purchasers, 
the city, and mortgage holders for eight lots, including those of 
Schultz-Elliott. The seller/developer reversed frontages for Lots 8 and 9 to 
access from a different street. The Revelle Lot 8 was reduced in size from the 
general 11,657 square feet to 7,371 square feet and the effect on Revelle's 
usability becomes significant if the right-of-way footage 13 by the 117 linear 
feet or 1,521 square feet further reduces the total, to leave a lot of 5,850 
square feet, which is about half the size of the other lots in the one block 
subdivision.