Title: League of Women Voters of Wisconsin v. Evers

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP559 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The League of Women Voters, Disability Rights of  
Wisconsin, Inc., Black Leaders Organizing for 
Communities, Guillermo Aceves, Michael J. Cain, 
John S. Greene and Michael Doyle, in his 
official capacity as Clerk of Green County, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Tony Evers, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
          Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 15, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
DALLET, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J., 
and A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the intervening-defendant-appellant, there were briefs 
filed by Misha Tseytlin and Troutman Sanders LLP., Chicago, 
Illinois. There was an oral argument by Misha Tseytlin.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Tamara B. Packard, Lester A. Pines, Aaron G. Dumas, Beauregard 
W. Patterson, and Pines Bach LLP, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Tamara B. Packard. 
 
 
 
2
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Kurt M. Simatic, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, 
Madison. With whom on the brief was Deana K. El-Mallawany, Ben 
Berwick, and The Protect Democracy Project, Inc., Watertown,  
Massachusetts; along with Lawrence S. Robbins, Carolyn Forstein, 
Wendy Liu, and Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & 
Sauber LLP., Washington, DC. There was an oral argument by 
Jeffrey A. Mandell. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Democracy Campaign by Jeanne M. Armstrong, Christopher J. Dodge, 
and Fuhrman & Dodge, S.C., Middleton. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce by Corydon J. Fish and Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Law School 
Professors Hal Harlow and Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison; with 
whom on the brief was Daniel Hemel and University of Chicago Law 
School, Chicago, Illinois.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal 
Scholars by Barry J. Blonien, Eric A. Baker, and Boardman & 
Clark LLP, Madison; with whom on the brief was Robert Yablon and 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Sustain Rural 
Wisconsin Network, River Alliance of Wisconsin, Friends of the 
Lower Wisconsin Riverway, and Milwaukee Riverkeeper by Robert D. 
Lee and Midwest Environmental Advocates, Madison.  
 
 
2019 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP559 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV84) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, Disability 
Rights Wisconsin, Inc., Black Leaders 
Organizing for Communities, Guillermo Aceves, 
Michael J. Cain, John S. Greene and Michael 
Doyle, in his official capacity as Clerk of 
Green County, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Evers, in his official capacity as 
Governor of the State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Richard G. Niess, Judge.  Vacated and cause remanded for 
dismissal. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We accepted the League of 
Women Voters of Wisconsin's1 petition to bypass the court of 
                                                 
1 The petition was filed by the League of Women Voters of 
(continued) 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
2 
 
appeals in order to decide whether the Wisconsin Legislature's 
December 2018 extraordinary session comported with the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The League maintains that extraordinary sessions 
are unconstitutional; therefore, all legislation passed during 
the December 2018 session is void ab initio and the Senate's 
confirmation of 82 gubernatorial appointees during the session 
was invalid.2  Governor Tony Evers agrees with the League.  The 
Legislature argues that extraordinary sessions clearly conform 
with the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 13.02 (2017-
18), making the passage of the three Acts as well as the 
appointments entirely lawful.3  The circuit court agreed with the 
League and the Governor, declared the Acts unconstitutional, and 
issued a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of all 
three Acts and vacating all 82 appointments. 
¶2 
We hold that extraordinary sessions do not violate the 
Wisconsin Constitution because the text of our constitution 
directs the Legislature to meet at times as "provided by law," 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 13.02(3) 
provides 
the 
law 
giving 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin, Disability Rights Wisconsin, Inc., Black Leaders 
Organizing for Communities, Guillermo Aceves, Michael J. Cain, 
John S. Greene and Michael Doyle, in his official capacity as 
Clerk of Green County.  For ease of reference, we refer to all 
petitioners collectively as the "League." 
2 The 
three 
Acts 
passed 
during 
the 
December 
2018 
extraordinary session and subsequently signed by the Governor 
were 2017 Wisconsin Act 368, 2017 Wisconsin Act 369, and 2017 
Wisconsin Act 370. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
3 
 
Legislature the discretion to construct its work schedule, 
including preserving times for it to meet in an extraordinary 
session.  The work schedule the Legislature formulated for its 
2017-2018 biennial session established the beginning and end 
dates of the session period and specifically contemplated the 
convening of an extraordinary session, which occurred within the 
biennial session.  The circuit court invaded the province of the 
Legislature 
in 
declaring 
the 
extraordinary 
session 
unconstitutional, enjoining enforcement of the three Acts, and 
vacating the 82 appointments.  We vacate the circuit court's 
order and remand the matter to the circuit court with directions 
to dismiss the League's complaint.4 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The biennial session period for the 2017 Legislature 
began on Tuesday, January 3, 2017 and ended at noon on Monday, 
January 7, 2019.  The Legislature adopted its work schedule in 
2017 Senate Joint Resolution 1, which was "[r]esolved by the 
senate, the assembly concurring."  (Hereinafter "JR1".) 
                                                 
4 The circuit court's March 21, 2019 order also denied the 
Legislature's motion to dismiss as well as the Legislature's 
motion for a stay of the temporary injunction.  We need not 
specifically address the circuit court's action on either 
motion.  Orders from the court of appeals and this court already 
addressed the circuit court's denial of the Legislature's motion 
for a stay.  Our disposition vacates the circuit court's order 
in 
its 
entirety 
and 
requires 
dismissal 
of 
the 
League's 
declaratory 
judgment 
action. 
 
This 
decision 
upholds 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
their 
enactment 
in 
an 
extraordinary 
session. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
4 
 
¶4 
JR1 contains two "Sections."  "Section 1" has six 
subsections: 
• 
Subsection (1) lists the dates of the 2017-
2018 session——January 3, 2017 to January 7, 
2019. 
• 
Subsection 
(2) 
extends 
the 
statutorily 
prescribed budget deadline. 
• 
Subsection 
(3) 
sets 
forth 
"Scheduled 
floorperiods and committee work periods."   
• 
Subsection (4) sets the timeframe for the  
"Interim period of committee work." 
• 
Subsection 
(5) 
addresses 
"Special 
and 
Extraordinary Sessions." 
• 
Subsection (6) specifies the date for the 
"End of Term" of the 2017 legislature. 
¶5 
Subsection (3) of Section 1 contains 24 paragraphs 
labeled (a) through (x).  Paragraph (3)(a) addresses "Unreserved 
days" and provides: 
Unless reserved under this subsection as a day to 
conduct an organizational meeting or to be part of a 
scheduled floorperiod of the legislature, every day of 
the biennial session period is designated as a day for 
committee activity and is available to extend a 
scheduled 
floorperiod, 
convene 
an 
extraordinary 
session, or take senate action on appointments as 
permitted by joint rule 81. 
(Emphasis added.)  Paragraphs (3)(b)-(x) set specific dates for 
"Inauguration," 
"Floorperiod[s]," 
"Bills 
to 
governor," 
"Nonbudget bills to governor," "Budget bill to governor," "Last 
general-business floorperiod," "Limited-business floorperiod," 
and "Veto review floorperiod." 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Subsection (5) of Section 1, titled "Special and 
Extraordinary Sessions" comprises three paragraphs.  Paragraph 
(5)(a) provides: 
Adjournment.  Except for consideration of executive 
vetoes or partial vetoes, a motion adopted in each 
house to adjourn a special or extraordinary session 
pursuant to this joint resolution shall constitute 
final adjournment of the special or extraordinary 
session. 
Paragraph (5)(b) provides: 
Bills to governor.  No later than 4:30 p.m. on the 
first Thursday occurring 2 full weeks after the day a 
bill is passed by both houses in identical form after 
May 9, 2018, in special or extraordinary session, the 
chief clerk of the house in which it originated shall 
submit it to the governor for executive action 
thereon. 
Paragraph (5)(c) provides: 
Veto review.  A special or extraordinary session shall 
reconvene upon a call of a majority of the members of 
the joint committee on legislative organization solely 
for the consideration of executive vetoes or partial 
vetoes if an enrolled bill passed by both houses 
during the special or extraordinary session was vetoed 
or partially vetoed. 
¶7 
The last subsection of Section 1 sets the "end of 
term" and provides: 
The biennial term of the 2017 legislature ends on 
Monday, January 7, 2019.  Pursuant to section 13.02(1) 
of the statutes, the inauguration of the members of 
the 2019 legislature will be on Monday, January 7, 
2019. 
¶8 
Finally, Section 2 of JR1 provides notice of the first 
meeting date for the 2019 session organization: 
Notice is hereby given that the biennial session 
of the 2019 legislature will hold its first meeting, 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
6 
 
pursuant to section 13.02(1) of the statutes, on 
Monday, January 7, 2019, and that the meeting will 
begin at 2 p.m. 
¶9 
In December 2018, acting pursuant to JR1, Section 1, 
para. (3)(a), the Legislature convened an extraordinary session 
and passed three Acts that were subsequently signed into law by 
Governor Scott Walker:  (1) 2017 Wisconsin Act 368, (2) 2017 
Wisconsin Act 369, and (3) 2017 Wisconsin Act 370.  During the 
same extraordinary session, the Senate also confirmed 82 
appointees nominated by Governor Walker.5 
¶10 On January 10, 2019, the League filed a summons and 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  
The League asked the Dane County Circuit Court to declare the 
three Acts unconstitutional and unenforceable because, the 
League alleged, each was passed in a constitutionally invalid 
session.  Similarly, the League contended in its Complaint that 
confirmation of the 82 nominees during the extraordinary session 
was unconstitutional and unenforceable.  The Complaint sought an 
injunction "barring any State official from attempting to apply, 
implement, or enforce any actions taken by the Legislature at 
the December 2018 Extraordinary Session[.]"  The case was 
assigned to Branch 15, the Hon. Stephen E. Ehlke presiding. 
¶11 Five days later, the League filed an Amended Complaint 
and a motion for a temporary injunction.  Both Complaints named 
                                                 
5 The 82 nominees confirmed during the extraordinary session 
involved appointments to various "State authorities, boards, 
councils, and commissions." 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
7 
 
as 
Defendants 
seven 
officers 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission and Governor Tony Evers.  Two weeks later, the 
Legislature filed a motion to intervene.  On the same day, the 
League filed a request for substitution of Judge Ehlke, which 
was granted, and the case was reassigned to the Hon. Richard G. 
Niess.  Judge Niess granted the Legislature's motion to 
intervene.6  The Elections Commission defendants and the 
Legislature filed motions to dismiss.  The Legislature also 
filed a motion requesting a stay of any injunction the circuit 
court might issue. 
¶12 The circuit court held a hearing on all of the pending 
motions.  Before the circuit court ruled on the Elections 
Commission Defendants' dismissal motion, the parties stipulated 
to their dismissal.  In March 2019, the circuit court issued an 
order denying the Legislature's motion to dismiss, granting the 
temporary injunction, and denying the Legislature's motion to 
stay the injunction.  The Legislature appealed to the court of 
appeals and after a substantial number of filings and procedural 
matters not relevant here, the League filed a petition with this 
court requesting to bypass the court of appeals and asking "for 
expedited Supreme Court review" because uncertainty will loom 
until this court provides the "final resolution."7  We granted 
                                                 
6 For the remainder of the opinion, we refer to Judge Niess 
as "the circuit court." 
7 This court recounted in detail the procedural history of 
this case in its order dated April 30, 2019, which addressed the 
Legislature's request for temporary relief pending our review. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
8 
 
the League's bypass petition, adopted an accelerated briefing 
schedule, and heard oral argument on May 15, 2019. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶13 The 
dispositive 
issue 
presented 
is 
whether 
the 
Legislature convened its December 2018 extraordinary session in 
accordance with the Wisconsin Constitution.  The answer to that 
question requires interpretation of constitutional and statutory 
provisions, both of which involve questions of law we review de 
novo.  See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, ¶14, 
319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700. 
B.  Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
¶14 There are two constitutional provisions relevant to 
the issue in this case.  Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, 
Section 11 provides: 
Meeting of legislature.  SECTION 11. [As amended Nov. 
1881 and April 1968]  The legislature shall meet at 
the seat of government at such time as shall be 
provided by law, unless convened by the governor in 
special session, and when so convened no business 
shall be transacted except as shall be necessary to 
accomplish the special purposes for which it was 
convened. 
(Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Constitution, Article IV, Section 8 
says: 
Rules; contempts; expulsion.  SECTION 8.  Each house 
may determine the rules of its own proceedings, punish 
for contempt and disorderly behavior, and with the 
concurrence of two−thirds of all the members elected, 
expel a member; but no member shall be expelled a 
second time for the same cause. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
9 
 
¶15 The pertinent statute, Wis. Stat. § 13.02, provides: 
Regular sessions. The legislature shall meet annually. 
(1) The legislature shall convene in the capitol 
on the first Monday of January in each odd-numbered 
year, at 2 p.m., to take the oath of office, select 
officers, and do all other things necessary to 
organize itself for the conduct of its business, but 
if the first Monday of January falls on January 1 or 
2, the actions here required shall be taken on January 
3. 
(2) The regular session of the legislature shall 
commence at 2 p.m. on the first Tuesday after the 8th 
day of January in each year unless otherwise provided 
under sub. (3). 
(3) Early in each biennial session period, the 
joint committee on legislative organization shall meet 
and develop a work schedule for the legislative 
session, which shall include at least one meeting in 
January 
of 
each 
year, 
to 
be 
submitted 
to 
the 
legislature as a joint resolution. 
(4) Any measures introduced in the regular annual 
session of the odd-numbered year which do not receive 
final action shall carry over to the regular annual 
session held in the even-numbered year. 
(Emphasis added.) 
C.  Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
¶16 Article IV, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
describes when the Legislature meets:  "The legislature shall 
meet at the seat of government at such time as shall be provided 
by law, unless convened by the governor in special session[.]"  
The text of this constitutional provision is plain.  No one 
disputes that this sentence authorizes the Legislature to meet 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
10 
 
at the State Capitol "at such time as shall be provided by law."8  
All 
parties 
agree 
that 
the 
drafters 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution meant the Wisconsin Statutes when they used the 
phrase "provided by law."  We agree that "provided by law" means 
our statutes, and have specifically said so.  See State v. City 
of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶27, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 
("[T]he drafters meant statutory law when they used the phrase, 
'provided by law.'") (emphasis added). 
¶17 Accordingly, the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes the 
Legislature to lawfully meet when a statute so provides.  
Wisconsin Statute § 13.02 is the sole statute addressing when 
the Legislature can meet.  Subsection (1) sets the date, time, 
and location for the Legislature to convene to take oaths, 
select officers, and organize.  Subsection (2) sets the date and 
time for the regular session to begin unless the Legislature 
changes them under sub. (3).  Subsection (3) directs that early 
in the "biennial session" "the joint committee on legislative 
organization shall meet and develop a work schedule for the 
legislative session[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  Subsection (4) 
permits bills in the first year to carry over to the second year 
of the biennial session. 
                                                 
8 Article IV, Section 11 authorizes two times when the 
Legislature may meet:  (1) when "provided by law"; and (2) when 
the governor calls a "special session."  It is undisputed that 
the Governor did not call a "special session"; therefore, we 
consider only whether the extraordinary session was "provided by 
law." 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
11 
 
¶18 The parties delve deep into past practices of the 
Legislature, as well as a 1968 constitutional amendment.9  A 
historical review, however, is unnecessary to resolve this case.  
There is no dispute as to the meaning of the governing 
constitutional text, which requires the Legislature to meet at 
such time as provided by statutory law.  The controversy centers 
on whether the text of Wis. Stat. § 13.02(3), which authorizes 
the Legislature's joint committee on legislative organization to 
develop 
a 
work 
schedule, 
allows 
the 
Legislature 
to 
constitutionally convene an extraordinary session. 
¶19 Our analysis therefore turns to the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 13.02(3).  In interpreting a statute's text, we 
start with the language of the statute and if the meaning of the 
language is plain, our inquiry ordinarily ends.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The text of § 13.02(3) is plain.  
It authorizes the Legislature's joint committee on legislative 
organization to set the "work schedule" for the biennial term. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 13.02(3) imposes only two statutory 
limitations on that committee:  the work schedule "shall include 
at least one meeting in January of each year" and must "be 
                                                 
9 Before the 1968 constitutional amendment, Article IV, 
Section 11 read: 
Meeting of legislature.  The legislature shall meet at 
the seat of government at such time as shall be 
provided by law, once in two years, and no oftener, 
unless convened by the governor, in special session[.] 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
12 
 
submitted to the legislature as a joint resolution."  It is 
uncontroverted that the committee developed a work schedule that 
included at least one meeting each January of the biennial 
session period, and that the work schedule was submitted to the 
Legislature as a joint resolution and was enrolled as JR1.10 
¶21 The pivotal text within Wis. Stat. § 13.02(3) is "work 
schedule" and the dispositive question is whether the work 
schedule can specify when the Legislature will meet.  The law 
itself says so.  Given the nature of the legislative function, a 
"work schedule" for the Legislature necessarily expresses when 
the body will meet.  The Legislature consists of the people's 
representatives who are elected to meet and enact laws for 
Wisconsin.  State ex rel. Milwaukee Med. Coll. v. Chittenden, 
127 Wis. 468, 502, 107 N.W. 500 (1906) ("The constitutional 
authority vested in the legislature appertains wholly to the 
making of law.").  A "work schedule" in the context of a 
legislature would be meaningless without specifying when and how 
to meet.  The Legislature cannot perform its constitutionally 
assigned work unless it meets in the chambers of the Senate and 
the Assembly at the State Capitol to vote on proposed 
legislation.  The plain text of § 13.02(3), directing a 
committee of the Legislature to "develop a work schedule for the 
legislative 
session," 
satisfies 
the 
"provided 
by 
law" 
requirement under Article IV, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
10 No one disputes that the Legislature complied with JR1. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
13 
 
Constitution.  The work schedule dictates when the Legislature 
will meet, in accordance with the constitution. 
¶22 The League and the Governor recognize Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.02 as the "law" referenced in Article IV, Section 11 
setting forth when the Legislature can meet, but contend this 
statute limits the Legislature's meeting to the "regular" 
session only.  They argue that the statute does not authorize 
the "extraordinary" session.  While the statute does not use the 
term "extraordinary" session, the absence of that word in 
§ 13.02 does not make an extraordinary session unconstitutional, 
just as the absence of the words "floorperiods," and "committee 
work periods" from the statute doesn't make those meetings 
unconstitutional either.  If "extraordinary sessions" are 
unconstitutional because the term does not appear in § 13.02, so 
are 
"floorperiods" 
and 
any 
other 
characterization 
the 
Legislature adopts to describe its business. 
¶23 When asked during oral argument why the nonappearance 
of "floorperiods" in Wis. Stat. § 13.02 does not render them 
unconstitutional, the League's counsel pointed to JR1.  The 
League's counsel argued that floorperiods are constitutional 
because JR1 sets forth floorperiods as part of the regular 
session.  JR1 says no such thing.  JR1 mentions floorperiods, 
but nowhere does it confine floorperiods to regular sessions.  
The only reference to "regular" sessions within JR1 appears in 
six paragraphs concerning "bills to governor" in which JR1 sets 
deadlines for sending bills to the governor that have "been 
passed by both houses, in regular, extraordinary, or special 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
14 
 
session."  JR1, Section 1, paragraphs (3)(h), (k), (L), (t), 
(v), and (x).  Bills are passed during floorperiods, and JR1 
ties floorperiods to all three types of sessions: regular, 
extraordinary, and special sessions.  Floorperiods are either 
prescheduled in JR1 or they occur in extraordinary or special 
sessions, 
which 
by 
their 
nature 
have 
not 
been 
assigned 
prescheduled dates. 
¶24 The League alternatively suggests that "floorperiods" 
are fine because they are part of the "regular session."  While 
Wis. Stat. § 13.02 does use the term "regular session," nowhere 
does the statute say "floorperiods" are part of the "regular 
session."  The term "floorperiods" does not appear in the 
statute at all.  "Floorperiods," like "extraordinary sessions," 
are terms the Legislature uses in setting its work schedule in 
order to conduct the business pertinent to the legislative 
process.  The specific terminology it chooses is not prescribed 
or limited by our constitution or by statute.11 
¶25 The League also argues that the Legislature terminated 
its 2017-18 session when it concluded its "last general-business 
floorperiod, which was adjourned on March 22, 2018."  It 
contends the conclusion of that floorperiod constituted a sine 
                                                 
11 The terminology chosen by the Legislature occasionally 
finds its way into individual statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.625(1m)(b)1 ("A contribution to a candidate for legislative 
office may be made during that period only if the legislature 
has concluded its final floorperiod, and is not in special or 
extraordinary session.") (emphasis added). 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
15 
 
die adjournment,12 which prevented the 2017-18 Legislature from 
reconvening unless the Governor called a special session. 
Characterizing the conclusion of the March 22, 2018 floorperiod 
as a sine die adjournment directly conflicts with both the work 
schedule adopted in JR1, as well as cases defining sine die 
adjournment. 
¶26 The 2017-18 Legislature's session began in January 
2017, in accordance with the dates required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.02.  The Legislature's session continued pursuant to the 
work schedule enrolled as JR1, which plainly sets forth the 
beginning and end of the 2017-18 biennial session.  The 
Legislature continued its biennial session until January 7, 
2019, consistent with both the text of § 13.02(3) and this 
court's cases.  The Legislature is "in session" continually 
during the biennial session until a sine die adjournment.  State 
ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 275, 289-90, 125 
N.W.2d 636 (1964) (citing State ex rel. Sullivan v. Dammann, 221 
Wis. 551, 555, 267 N.W. 433 (1936)).  In Thompson, we held "that 
one single session may be interrupted by recesses, and valid[ly] 
continue after a recess as long as such recesses can reasonably 
be said to be taken for a proper legislative purpose."  22 
                                                 
12 "Sine die" means "without day"; adjournment sine die 
means:  "The ending of a deliberative assembly's or court's 
session without setting a time to reconvene."  Adjournment sine 
die, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also State ex 
rel. Sullivan v. Dammann, 221 Wis. 551, 559, 267 N.W. 433 (1936) 
("When a Legislature adjourns sine die, it ceases to exist[.]"). 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d at 290.  A sine die adjournment occurs only "[w]hen a 
Legislature . . . ceases to exist . . . [i]ts officers are no 
longer officers.  Their tenure of office ends at the moment of 
adjournment."  Dammann, 221 Wis. at 559. 
¶27 Neither the record nor JR1 supports a sine die 
adjournment on March 22, 2018.  When the Legislature adjourned 
on March 22nd, it did so pursuant to JR1, which provides the 
2017-18 session ends on January 7, 2019.  There is no indication 
the Legislature altered that date.  Further, JR1 established a 
"limited-business floorperiod" to commence on April 17, 2018, 
and a "veto review floorperiod" to commence on May 8, 2018.  
Both of these floorperiods post-date March 22, 2018, directly 
contradicting the League's notion of a sine die adjournment in 
March.  If the Legislature adjourned sine die on March 22nd, 
these floorperiods and the additional parts of JR1, Section 1, 
paragraphs (3)(t)-(x) would be superfluous, as would JR1, 
Section 1, sub (6), which specifically set the "end of term" as 
January 7, 2019.  Nothing supports the League's position that 
the Legislature adjourned sine die on March 22, 2018. 
¶28 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
mandates 
that 
the 
Legislature meet "at such time as shall be provided by law."  
The Legislature did so.  Wisconsin Stat. § 13.02(3) confers on 
the Legislature, through its joint committee on legislative 
organization, the right to construct its own work schedule, 
which necessarily includes setting times when the Legislature 
may meet.  In addition to being authorized by Article IV, 
Section 11, this statutory provision is expressly authorized 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
17 
 
under Article IV, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
says:  "Each house may determine the rules of its own 
proceedings."  The Legislature's "rules of its own proceedings" 
include "those rules having 'to do with the process the 
legislature uses to propose or pass legislation[.]'"  Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶18 (quoting Custodian of 
Records for the LTSB v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶30, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 
680 N.W.2d 792).  The constitution does not mandate any 
procedural rules governing the enactment of legislation; rather, 
it merely directs the Legislature to prescribe its time of 
meeting "by law" and empowers the Legislature "to determine the 
rules of its own proceedings."  Because the Legislature met its 
constitutional obligation to provide by law the time of its 
meetings, any recourse against errors in the execution of the 
Legislature's own procedures is properly pursued within the 
political realm not in courts of law. 
D. 
Separation of Powers 
¶29 The League asks this court to invalidate laws enacted 
by the Legislature based solely on the procedures employed to 
pass them.  This controversy implicates the separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branches of government and 
how the Legislature may administer those powers within its 
domain.  We are attentive to the constitutional limits on the 
judicial power to intercede in legislative affairs, and duty-
bound to respect them. 
¶30 "[O]ne of the fundamental principles of the American 
constitutional system is that governmental powers are divided 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
18 
 
among the three departments of government[.]"  Goodland v. 
Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 466, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943).  "Like its 
federal counterpart, '[o]ur state constitution . . . created 
three branches of government, each with distinct functions and 
powers,' and '[t]he separation of powers doctrine is implicit in 
this tripartite division.'"  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 
2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 (quoted source 
omitted; alterations and ellipsis by Gabler).  "Three clauses of 
the Wisconsin Constitution embody this separation:  Article IV, 
Section 1 ('[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a senate 
and assembly'); Article V, Section 1 ('[t]he executive power 
shall be vested in a governor'); and Article VII, Section 2 
('[t]he judicial power . . . shall be vested in a unified court 
system')."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11 (alterations and 
ellipsis by Gabler). 
¶31 By vesting certain powers exclusively within each of 
the three co-equal branches of government, the drafters of the 
Wisconsin Constitution recognized the importance of dispersing 
governmental power in order to protect individual liberty and 
avoid tyranny.  See id., ¶¶4-9, 11.  Two years ago, this court 
exhaustively examined the separation of powers principles 
underlying the United States Constitution, which "inform our 
understanding of the separation of powers under the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Id., ¶11.  "As Madison explained when advocating 
for the Constitution's adoption, neither the legislature nor the 
executive nor the judiciary 'ought to possess, directly or 
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
19 
 
administration of their respective powers.'"  Id., ¶4 (quoting 
Federalist No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
¶32 Accordingly, "the Constitution gives 'to those who 
administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others,' 
therefore guaranteeing 'security against a gradual concentration 
of the several powers in the same department.'"  Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶7 (quoting Federalist No. 51, supra ¶31, at 318-19 
(James Madison)).  In the same fashion as the United States 
Constitution, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
preserves 
the 
independence of each branch vis-à
-vis the others and precludes 
each branch from obstructing the performance of another branch's 
constitutional duties.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) ("It is the intention of the Constitution 
that 
each 
of 
the 
great 
co-ordinate 
departments 
of 
the 
government——the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial——
shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others."); see also 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) ("Even when a 
branch does not arrogate power to itself, moreover, the 
separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair 
another in the performance of its constitutional duties." 
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-408 
(1989)). 
¶33 "Each branch has exclusive core constitutional powers 
into which other branches may not intrude."  State v. Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (citing State ex rel. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
20 
 
Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 
N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  "This court is highly mindful of the 
separation 
of 
powers. 
 
It 
does 
not 
engage 
in 
direct 
confrontation with another branch of government unless the 
confrontation is necessary and unavoidable."  State v. Moore, 
2015 WI 54, ¶91, 363 Wis. 2d 376, 864 N.W.2d 827; see also 
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 48, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943) 
("The state suffers essentially by every . . . assault of one 
branch of the government upon another; and it is the duty of all 
the co-ordinate branches scrupulously to avoid even all seeming 
of such." (quoting In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 240 (1875)). 
¶34 "[C]ore zones of authority are to be 'jealously 
guarded' by each branch of government." Barland v. Eau Claire 
Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998) (citing 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14).  "The co-ordinate branches of the 
government . . . should 
not 
abdicate 
or 
permit 
others 
to 
infringe upon such powers as are exclusively committed to them 
by the Constitution."  Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 514, 
236 N.W. 717 (1931).  "Each branch's core powers reflect 'zones 
of authority constitutionally established for each branch of 
government upon which any other branch of government is 
prohibited 
from 
intruding. 
 
As 
to 
these 
areas 
of 
authority, . . . any exercise of authority by another branch of 
government is unconstitutional.'"  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31, 
(quoting State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 
Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990) (ellipsis by Gabler)).  
In Gabler, this court invalidated a legislative action because 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
21 
 
it 
invaded 
the 
exclusive 
province 
of 
the 
judiciary 
and 
threatened judicial independence.  In this case, we reverse a 
judicial encroachment on the exercise of powers constitutionally 
vested exclusively in the Legislature. 
E.  The Legislative Power 
¶35 "The people bestowed much power on the legislature, 
comprised of their representatives whom the people elect to make 
the laws."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶60.  The separation of 
powers "operates in a general way to confine legislative powers 
to the legislature."  Goodland, 243 Wis. at 467.  "From the very 
nature of things, the judicial power cannot legislate nor 
supervise the making of laws."  State ex rel. Rose v. Superior 
Court of Milwaukee Cty., 105 Wis. 651, 675, 81 N.W. 1046 (1900). 
¶36 The judiciary may not interfere with the Legislature's 
execution of its constitutional duties.  "[T]his court will not, 
under separation of powers concepts and affording the comity and 
respect due a co-equal branch of state government, interfere 
with the conduct of legislative affairs."  State ex rel. 
La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 368, 338 N.W.2d 684 
(1983).  The proper judicial role does encompass consideration 
of the constitutionality of the laws enacted by the Legislature.  
"When the legislative process has been completed, a court may 
then in a proper case consider whether the power of the 
legislature has been constitutionally exercised or whether the 
law enacted in the exercise of its power is valid."  Goodland, 
243 Wis. at 469.  The process by which laws are enacted, 
however, 
falls 
beyond 
the 
powers 
of 
judicial 
review.  
No. 
2019AP559   
 
22 
 
Specifically, the judiciary lacks any jurisdiction to enjoin the 
legislative 
process. 
 
"Because 
under 
our 
system 
of 
constitutional government, no one of the co-ordinate departments 
can interfere with the discharge of the constitutional duties of 
one of the other departments, no court has jurisdiction to 
enjoin the legislative process at any point."  Id. at 468.  For 
example, 
"[i]f 
a 
court 
can 
intervene 
and 
prohibit 
the 
publication of an [A]ct, the court determines what shall be law 
and not the legislature."  Id.  Judicial interference with the 
procedures employed by the Legislature to pass laws "invades the 
constitutional power of the legislature to declare what shall 
become law.  This it may not do."  Id.  While it is the duty of 
the judiciary to interpret the law and to strike any law whose 
substance violates the constitution, the judiciary has no 
authority "to interfere with the right of the legislature to 
enact and put in force a law."  Id. at 469. 
¶37 How the Legislature meets, when it meets, and what 
descriptive titles the Legislature assigns to those meetings or 
their operating procedures constitute parts of the legislative 
process with which the judicial branch "has no jurisdiction or 
right" to interfere.  State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 
WI 43, ¶8, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436 (quoted source 
omitted). 
The judicial department has no jurisdiction or right 
to interfere with the legislative process.  That is 
something committed by the constitution entirely to 
the legislature itself.  It makes its own rules, 
prescribes its own procedure, subject only to the 
provisions of the constitution. 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
23 
 
Goodland, 243 Wis. at 467.  No court may "intermeddle in purely 
internal 
legislative 
proceedings[.]" 
 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶18. 
¶38 With respect to legislative procedures, the judicial 
role consists of reviewing whether "a law was actually passed by 
the 
respective 
houses 
in 
accordance 
with 
constitutional 
requirements."  La Follette, 114 Wis. 2d at 366 (quoting 
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12, 50 N.W. 185 (1891)).  
"Further than this the courts will not go."  McDonald, 80 Wis. 
at 412.  The constitutional requirement at issue in this case 
limits the Legislature to meeting only at times provided by law.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 13.02(3) satisfies the Wisconsin Constitution 
by authorizing the Legislature's own committee to set its work 
schedule. 
¶39 While 
we 
have 
examined 
the 
work 
schedule 
the 
Legislature adopted in JR1 to govern its proceedings, generally 
"this court will not determine whether internal operating rules 
or 
procedural 
statutes 
have 
been 
complied 
with 
by 
the 
legislature in the course of its enactments."  La Follette, 114 
Wis. 2d at 364.  We reviewed JR1 for the limited purpose of 
ensuring the Legislature's compliance with the constitution's 
directives governing the exercise of legislative powers.  Those 
directives are few in number and broadly stated.  As pertinent 
to this case, the constitution requires the Legislature to meet 
at such time as the Legislature itself statutorily decrees, and 
confers discretion on the Legislature to determine for itself 
the rules of its own proceedings.  This court "will not 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
24 
 
intermeddle in what we view, in the absence of constitutional 
directives 
to 
the 
contrary, 
to 
be 
purely 
legislative 
concerns[.]"  Id.  In convening the December 2018 extraordinary 
session, the Legislature fully complied with all applicable 
constitutional mandates.  Our judicial review proceeds no 
further. 
¶40 Declining to "inquire into whether the legislature has 
complied with legislatively prescribed formalities in enacting a 
statute" springs from the principles of "separation of power and 
comity."  Id. at 364-65.  "[T]he legislature's adherence to the 
rules or statutes prescribing procedure is a matter entirely 
within legislative control and discretion, not subject to 
judicial review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by 
the constitution."  Id. at 365.  "If the legislature fails to 
follow self-adopted procedural rules in enacting legislation, 
and such rules are not mandated by the constitution, courts will 
not intervene to declare the legislation invalid."  Id. 
¶41 The Legislature remains accountable to the people of 
Wisconsin for any failure to follow its self-imposed statutory 
or procedural rules.  The judiciary serves as a check on the 
Legislature's actions only to the extent necessary to ensure the 
people's elected lawmakers comply with our constitution in every 
respect.  Provided the Legislature acts in accordance with its 
mandates, the constitution confers no power on the judiciary to 
enjoin or invalidate laws as a consequence for deficiencies in 
the implementation of internally-imposed legislative procedures. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
25 
 
¶42 The 
December 
2018 
extraordinary 
session 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Legislature was constitutional.  The text of Article 
IV, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution directs the 
Legislature to meet at a time provided by law.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 13.02(3) constitutes the law authorizing the Legislature to 
set its own biennial work schedule.  The extraordinary session 
comports with the constitution because it occurred as provided 
by law.  The terminology the Legislature chooses to accomplish 
the legislative process is squarely the prerogative of the 
Legislature.  The Wisconsin Constitution itself affords the 
Legislature absolute discretion to determine the rules of its 
own proceedings.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 8.  Recognizing the 
Legislature's rules and procedures reside solely within the 
legislative domain, we review only whether the Legislature acted 
in accordance with the Wisconsin Constitution.  Having so 
concluded, this court's jurisdiction ends.13 
By the Court.—Order of the circuit court is vacated and the 
cause is remanded for dismissal. 
                                                 
13 The League also contends the extraordinary sessions were 
unlawful because no quorum of the Legislature called the 
extraordinary session.  The Wisconsin Constitution requires a 
quorum "to do business."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 7 ("a majority 
of each shall constitute a quorum to do business").  Nothing in 
our constitution requires a "quorum" to call an extraordinary 
session.  Rules pertaining to extraordinary sessions are 
developed by the Legislature as rules of its own proceedings, 
with which this court will not "intermeddle."  Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 
N.W.2d 700; Wisconsin Const., art. IV, § 8 ("Each house may 
determine the rules of its own proceedings."). 
No. 
2019AP559   
 
26 
 
 
 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 1 
 
 
¶43 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Legislature unconstitutionally met in an "extraordinary session" 
in December 2018 and therefore 2017 Wisconsin Act 368, 2017 
Wisconsin Act 369, and 2017 Wisconsin Act 370 are void ab initio 
and the Senate's confirmation of 82 gubernatorial appointments 
is invalid.  In order to uphold the constitutionality of the 
December 2018 extraordinary session, the majority opinion 
subverts the plain text of Article IV, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Therefore, I dissent.   
¶44 Constitutional interpretation is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶17, 358 
Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888.  We look first to the words of the 
constitutional provision at issue to determine its meaning.  See 
Coullee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶57, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 (noting that the "authoritative, and 
usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is the 
text——the actual words used.")  Constitutional language is to be 
read, whenever possible, to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage.  See Appling, 358 Wis. 2d 
132, ¶23.  
¶45 Article IV, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
constrains the Legislature from meeting except under two 
circumstances:  (1) "at such time as shall be provided by law," 
and (2) "unless convened by the governor in special session."  
The majority agrees that "provided by law" means our statutes.  
Majority op., ¶16; see also State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 2 
 
9, ¶27, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 ("[T]he drafters meant 
statutory law when they used the phrase, 'provided by law.'").  
The only "such time" that is "provided by law" for the 
Legislature to meet is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 13.02, entitled 
"Regular sessions."  Subsection 1 of § 13.02 authorizes the 
Legislature to convene at the outset of the biennieum "to 
organize itself for the conduct of its business."  Subsections 2 
and 4, accordingly, describe when the regular session commences 
and the fate of measures that have not received final action by 
the adjournment of the regular session.  Subsection 3 instructs 
the joint committee on legislative organization to meet early in 
each biennial session period to "develop a work schedule for the 
legislative session . . . to be submitted to the legislature as 
a joint resolution."  § 13.02(3).  Senate Joint Resolution 1 
("JR1") outlined the work schedule for the 2017-2018 biennial 
session period with dates upon which the floorperiods began and 
ended.1   
¶46 The December 2018 extraordinary session was not a date 
identified in JR1.  March 22, 2018, was the final date the 
                                                 
1 For example, JR1 provides that "[a] floorperiod commences 
on Tuesday, January 16, 2018, at 10 a.m., and, unless adjourned 
earlier, ends on Thursday, January 25, 2018."  JR1 prescribes 
times and dates for each event on the schedule.  JR1 is also 
broken up into different sections, including "Floorperiod[s]," 
"last general-business floorperiod," "limited-business floor 
period," etc. 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 3 
 
Legislature met pursuant to the work schedule2 and, as was the 
practice at the end of each legislative session, bills that were 
not passed in identical fashion by both houses expired.3  
Although the Legislature can, utilizing proper procedure, recess 
and reconvene on a future specified date, pursuant to Thompson 
and Dammann, the Legislature set no future meeting date upon its 
adjournment.  See State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 
275, 290, 125 N.W.2d 636 (1964); State ex rel. Sullivan v. 
                                                 
2 JR1 states that "[t]he last general-business floorperiod 
commences on Tuesday, March 13, 2018, at 10 a.m., and, unless 
adjourned earlier, ends on Thursday, March 22, 2018." 
3 To disprove the fact that the Legislature adjourned sine 
die on March 22, 2018, the majority opinion points to JR1's 
identification of a "limited-business floorperiod" to commence 
on April 17, 2018 and end no later than April 19, 2018 and a 
"veto review floorperiod" to commence on May 8, 2018 and end no 
later than May 9, 2018.  Majority op., ¶27.  The Legislature did 
not make this argument on appeal, probably because it never 
actually met on those dates.  As counsel for Governor Evers 
noted to the circuit court at oral argument:  "[t]here were some 
sort of contingent dates [in April and May 2018], but they never 
actually came back for those dates."  Senate and Assembly 
calendars and journals affirm the fact that the last date that 
the Legislature met in regular session was March 22, 2018.   
Further, while the majority opinion asserts that the 
Legislature adjourned sine die on January 7, 2019, there is 
no proof presented or journal entries that document that date 
as the date of adjournment.  The "Session Calendar" available 
on the Legislature's website says that "March 23, 2018 to 
January 7, 2019" is designated "Interim, committee work."  See 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/session 
calendar/ 
calendar; see also https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related 
/session_calendar/floor_period_calendar.pdf. 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 4 
 
Dammann, 221 Wis. 551, 267 N.W.2d 433 (1936).4  As provided by 
law, the next regular session was set to commence on January 7, 
2019, unless the Governor convened a special session.  On 
March 22, 2018, the Legislature adjourned sine die, or ceased to 
exist, as there were no future scheduled meetings of the regular 
session laid out in JR1.5  Therefore, there was no authority for 
the majority of members of two committees to convene a 
previously unscheduled meeting of the full Legislature in early 
December 2018.6   
                                                 
4 Thompson and Dammann also clarify that it is the 
Legislature's lawmaking authority in session that terminates 
upon its sine die adjournment, not its other work functions, 
including committee meetings.  See State ex rel. Thompson v. 
Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 275, 290, 125 N.W.2d 636 (1964); State ex 
rel. Sullivan v. Dammann, 221 Wis. 551, 267 N.W.2d 433, 437 
(1936).  It is of no import to this case that committee work 
continued after March 22, 2018, because this work is not part of 
the 
Legislature's 
lawmaking 
authority 
and 
such 
committee 
meetings are not the type of meetings defined by Article IV, 
Section 11.   
5 As support for its assertion that the Legislature 
adjourned sine die on March 22, 2018, the League underscores how 
legislators and observers alike understood that the regular 
session ended on that date.  See, e.g., Rep. Hesselbein, Capitol 
Update (Apr. 13, 2018) ("The Wisconsin State Assembly wrapped up 
its floor period for the 2017-18 session on March 22."); 
Hamilton Consulting Group, LLC, Hamilton Political Tidbits–2018 
Session Wrap Up (Mar. 23, 2018) ("[T[he legislature will not 
reconvene until January 2019."); Joe Forward, Legislative Wrap-
Up, 10 Inside Track No. 6 (State Bar of Wisconsin), Apr. 4, 2018 
("The Wisconsin Legislature passed a barrage of bills [in March 
2018] to close the 2017-18 session."). 
6 The December 2018 meeting of the Legislature was convened 
upon the votes of five members of the Assembly, out of 99 
members, and three members of the Senate, out of 33 members. 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 5 
 
¶47 The majority opinion subverts the constitutional text 
in two ways to legitimize the December 2018 extraordinary 
session. 
 
First, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
the 
extraordinary session was really part of a regular session 
because when the Legislature first met on January 3, 2017, to 
convene its regular session, it stayed in a continuous two-year 
"biennial session" until January 7, 2019.7  It is elementary to 
point out that an "extraordinary," or "special," session by its 
very name, is the opposite of a "regular," or "planned," 
session.  Although the title of Wis. Stat. § 13.02, "Regular 
sessions," alone is not dispositive, it is "persuasive evidence 
of a statutory interpretation."  Mireles v. LIRC, 2000 WI 96, 
¶60 n.13, 237 Wis. 2d 69, 613 N.W.2d 875.   
¶48 Under the majority opinion's reading of Article IV, 
Section 11, the words "at such time" and "unless" become 
superfluous because the Legislature could meet at any time.  
Yet, this court has recognized that "[t]o avoid surplusage, our 
analysis must also take into account and give meaning to the 
choice 
of 
the 
word[s]" 
in 
the 
constitutional 
provision.  
Appling, 358 Wis. 2d 132, ¶25.  A continuous two-year session 
                                                 
7 The majority opinion continuously references the term 
"biennial session"; however, Wisconsin has not had a biennial 
legislative session for nearly 50 years.  Since 1971, the law 
has mandated that the Legislature "shall meet annually."  Wis. 
Stat. § 13.02.  Section 13.02(3) says that the Legislature 
"shall" hold "at least one meeting in January of each year."  If 
there is a singular meeting coextensive with the entire biennial 
session period, this phrase is meaningless.   
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 6 
 
would 
also 
render 
meaningless 
several 
other 
laws 
which 
distinguish between days that the Legislature is in session and 
days when it is not.8  The majority opinion fails to logically 
explain how a continuous two-year session comports with the 
constitutional mandate to meet at "such time as shall be 
provided by law."9   
¶49 Second, the majority opinion further subverts the 
constitutional text by redefining the clause "as shall be 
provided by law" to include a joint resolution passed by the 
Legislature.10  The majority accepts the Legislature's assertion 
                                                 
8 For 
example, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 13.625(1m)(b)1 
prohibits 
lobbyists from making financial contributions to legislators 
until "the legislature has concluded its final floorperiod."  
Under this statutory section, no lobbyist could ever be certain 
that the Legislature "has concluded its final floorperiod."  
Further, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
757.13, 
which 
limits 
the 
courts' 
jurisdiction over members of the Legislature while they are "in 
session," would be rendered virtually meaningless if the 
Legislature was in one perpetual session.  Finally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.123, which sets forth the extent to which legislators are 
entitled to a per diem allowance for food and lodging, would be 
meaningless if the Legislature met perpetually.  Under the 
majority's reasoning, legislators would be entitled to per diem 
reimbursement every day of every year, which undermines the 
entire purpose of a per diem reimbursement.   
9 Since 1848, Article IV, Section 11 has been amended twice, 
but it is noteworthy that neither revision has transferred 
extraordinary convening authority to the Legislature.   
10 In a novel argument that the majority raises on behalf of 
the Legislature, it asserts that like extraordinary sessions, 
floorperiods are not mentioned in the statutory text.  Majority 
op., ¶22.  However, as counsel for the League properly pointed 
out at oral argument, the work schedule, which governs the 
regular session, references floorperiods and the legislative 
journals inform us that floorperiods have long been considered 
part of the regular session.  On the other hand, non-
(continued) 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 7 
 
that the work schedule set forth in JR1 allowed the Legislature 
to reserve to itself every unscheduled day for the possible 
convening of an extraordinary session.  I agree with the circuit 
court that the Legislature's purported ability to meet any day, 
even if it is not scheduled, is the antithesis of a work 
schedule as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 13.02(3) "by both 
definition and force of logic."  The distinction between a 
session "provided by law" as set forth in § 13.02 and the 
Legislature's attempt to reserve to itself through a joint 
resolution the unlimited power to schedule an extraordinary 
session is made even clearer by the existence of specific 
statutory provisions that do explicitly set forth extraordinary 
sessions.11  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 196.497(10)(c) ("[w]ithin 
120 days after the bill is introduced the appropriate committees 
in 
each 
house 
of 
the 
legislature 
shall 
authorize 
an 
extraordinary session of the legislature to commence within the 
120 days and to extend until the legislature passes the bill or 
passes a joint resolution which disapproves of the agreement or 
modification . . . ) (emphasis added); see also 1987 Wisconsin 
Act 4 (temporarily creating Wis. Stat. § 13.02(3m) to authorize 
an extraordinary session between the biennial session period's 
                                                                                                                                                             
prescheduled floor sessions, like the extraordinary session 
here, were not part of the regular session. 
11 The explicit reference to an extraordinary session in our 
statutes also shows that regular and extraordinary sessions are 
treated distinctly and are different in kind.  This is more than 
just a dispute over taxonomy and the proper naming of sessions.   
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 8 
 
two regular annual sessions).  Ultimately if the Legislature 
wanted to meet in December 2018 in accordance with the 
Constitution, it should have passed a bill to authorize 
extraordinary sessions, as it has done in the past.     
¶50 In its analysis of the meaning of Article IV, Section 
11, the majority opinion dismisses the importance of the intent 
of the drafters.12  See majority op., ¶18.  However, this court 
"gives[s] effect to the apparent understanding of the drafters 
and the people who adopted the constitutional provision under 
consideration."  State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶15, 341 
Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460.  It is undisputed that at the time 
of its passage, Article IV, Section 11 was understood to place 
limits on legislative power.  In 1848, the drafters sought to 
avoid a continuation of colonial-era abuses involving irregular 
meetings of the Legislature.  See Robert Luce, Legislative 
Assemblies, at 123 (1924) (describing "irregularity of sessions 
[]as a bitter grievance with the colonists").  The drafters 
accordingly constrained and limited the Legislature's power, 
including where, when, and how often it could meet.  See G. Alan 
Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 Temple L. Rev, 1169, 
1174 (1992) (noting that limitations on legislative power were 
"designed to ensure a more open and orderly deliberative 
                                                 
12 Although the majority opinion labels proof of the 
drafter's intent an unnecessary "historical review," majority 
op., ¶18, it relies upon the drafter's intent in another section 
of its opinion where it bolsters its argument.  See majority 
op., ¶31.  
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 9 
 
process . . . in response to widespread legislative abuses").  
The Constitution therefore includes specific constraints on the 
Legislature in order to protect against "the tyranny of 
legislation."  Views of "K"—No. 2, Madison Express (Mar. 26, 
1846), reprinted in Milo M. Quaife, The Movement for Statehood 
1845-1846, at 146 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1918).  
Despite this fear of legislative abuses and the drafters' goal 
to ensure transparency, the majority opinion now broadens the 
Legislature's powers.   
¶51 The majority dedicates pages of its opinion to a 
discussion of separation of powers and "[t]he [l]egislative 
[p]ower."  See majority op., ¶¶29-41.  It fails to account for 
the fact that "[j]udicial respect for its co-equal branch, the 
legislature, cannot amount to surrender of judicial power or 
abdication of judicial duty."  Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured 
Patients and Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶84, 383 
Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (R.G. Bradley, J, concurring).  As the 
majority opinion correctly notes, "[t]he judiciary serves as a 
check on the Legislature's actions only to the extent necessary 
to ensure the people's elected lawmakers comply with our 
constitution in every respect."  Majority op., ¶41.  That is 
exactly what happened here:  the Legislature violated the plain 
constitutional text, and this court must act as a check.   
¶52 Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, Section 8 also 
cannot justify judicial non-interference here, as the majority 
opinion suggests.  Article IV, Section 8 simply states:  "[e]ach 
house may determine the rules of its own proceedings."  Section 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 
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8 should not swallow Section 11 whole, as the majority opinion 
seems to suggest.  According to the Legislature, Article IV, 
Section 8 gives it unlimited power to name and determine the 
procedures it follows, even if it acts in violation of Article 
IV, Section 11.  The majority opinion claims that this court 
should 
not 
"'intermeddle 
in 
purely 
internal 
legislative 
proceedings,'" citing to Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 
WI 79, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.  Majority op., ¶37.  
However, in Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, this court acknowledged 
that while the Legislature has discretion in "choosing how to 
comply with the publication requirement" in Article IV, Section 
17(2), it may not "ignore the constitutional publication 
requirement altogether."13  Id., ¶33.  Instead, this court 
defined its role as follows:  "[w]hile we are conscious of the 
substantial deference we owe to the other independent branches 
of 
government 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
their 
constitutional 
responsibilities, 
we 
are 
also 
conscious 
of 
our 
own 
responsibility to determine whether the provisions of the 
                                                 
13 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel court cited to La Follette 
in favor of that proposition.  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. 
DOA, 2009 WI 79, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (citing La 
Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983)).  
In La Follette, this court held that it would not "review 
legislative conduct to ensure the legislature complied with its 
own procedural rules or statutes in enacting the legislation."  
La Follette, 114 Wis. 2d at 364.  However, the court noted that 
this was because these were "purely legislative concerns" in the 
"absence of constitutional directives to the contrary."  Id.  In 
contrast, this case deals with constitutional requirements that 
the Legislature turned a blind eye to in December 2018.  
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 
11 
 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
have 
been 
followed." 
 
Id. 
 
The 
Legislature's ability to determine the rules of its proceedings 
pursuant to Article IV, Section 8 does not swallow up the 
meeting requirements of Article IV, Section 11 or allow it to 
wield unbridled power.   
¶53 The plain constitutional text of Article IV, Section 
11 makes clear that with the exception of the Governor's ability 
to call special sessions, the Legislature has authority to 
"meet" only at "such time as shall be provided by law."  Yet, 
the majority opinion ignores this clear language and instead 
concludes that a joint resolution work schedule is "law" that 
allows for a continuous, perpetual legislative session and the 
ability to convene at any time without notice.  Because the 
Legislature unconstitutionally met in an "extraordinary session" 
in December 2018, the passage of 2017 Wisconsin Act 368, 2017 
Wisconsin Act 369, and 2017 Wisconsin Act 370 is void ab initio 
and the Senate's confirmation of 82 gubernatorial appointments 
is invalid.  
¶54 I respectfully dissent.  I would vacate the court of 
appeals' stay and affirm the circuit court.   
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP559.rfd 
 
 
 
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