Title: Graves v. First National Bank in Grand Forks

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

138 N.W.2d 584 (1965) Grace Moore GRAVES, Elaine Farren, Eleanor Abbott, and Manvel Moore, Petitioners and Appellants, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN GRAND FORKS as Testamentary Administrator of the Estate of Florence J. Henry, Deceased, First National Bank in Grand Forks as Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Florence J. Henry, Deceased, which is dated June 29, 1951, the Methodist Church of Hoople, North Dakota, a religious corporation, Respondents. No. 8239. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 29, 1965. *585 Letnes, Murray & Quigley, Grand Forks, for petitioners and appellants. Stokes, Vaaler, Gillig & Warcup, Grand Forks, for respondent First National Bank in Grand Forks. Shaft, Benson, Shaft & McConn, Grand Forks, for respondent The Methodist Church of Hoople. ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Grand Forks County affirming an order of the County Court of Grand Forks County which allowed the final report and account and granted the petition for distribution in the matter of the estate of Florence J. Henry, Deceased. The county court order provided for the distribution of the residue of the property in the estate to the First National Bank in Grand Forks as trustee under the trust provisions of the last will and testament of Florence J. Henry, Deceased. The will of Florence J. Henry, after first providing for the payment of her debts and funeral expenses and for the purchase of a suitable monument, devised and bequeathed all the rest and residue of her estate to a trustee. The paragraphs of the will pertinent to this lawsuit read as follows: Following the admission of this will to probate and during the course of the administration of the estate, the defendant First National Bank in Grand Forks, as administrator with the will annexed, filed its final report and accounting and petitioned that the residue of the estate be set over to the bank as trustee, pursuant to the provisions of the will. The petitioners, Grace Moore Graves, Elaine Farren, Eleanor Abbott, and Manvel Moore, alleging to be the heirs at law of the decedent, objected to the granting of the administrator's petition asking for distribution of the estate *586 to the trustee. Their objection was based on the contention that paragraphs designated "Seventh" and "Eighth" of the will contained provisions contrary to public policy and that the provisions were thus void. They asked that the court declare a resulting trust in the named heirs at law. The county court, however, granted the petition for distribution to the trustee, and it was from the order allowing the final report and accounting and granting the petition for distribution to the trustee, pursuant to the terms of the will, that the petitioners appealed to the district court. On appeal to the district court, the order of the county court was affirmed. The case was tried by the district court on the submission of briefs and on the record as contained in the county court. As no testimony was taken in county court, the only thing before us is the will. In granting the petition for distribution, the county court held that a trust was created by the terms of the will, requiring the granting of the petition for distribution of the residue of the estate to the trustee, and that construction of the trust provisions of the will was not within the jurisdiction of that court. The district court apparently adopted the same view in affirming the county court. Following this reasoning, neither of the courts reached the question of whether the trust provisions of the will were contrary to public policy and thus void. Section 111 of our State Constitution, as it relates to the question before us, reads as follows: In a 1912 decision this court held that the county court had no jurisdiction to determine adverse claims and quiet title to certain real property. The court therein said: In a very recent decision of this court we said: * * * * * * In Edinger's Estate our court, in effect, held that the county court did not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of an antenuptial agreement. The petitioners, in support of their contention that the county court has jurisdiction *587 to construe the trust provisions of the will, refer this court to the following: A further reading of that opinion discloses the following additional language: * * * * * * In reversing the judgment of the district court, which had determined that the construction of the trust provisions of a will by the county court during the administration of an estate was binding upon the district court for the reason that no appeal had been taken from the said court order, our court said: In a 1948 decision, after pointing out that Section 111 of the Constitution of North Dakota provides that county courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters, our court said: *588 In the same decision this court said: Although the appeal in Rusch was dismissed by this court because the appeal from the county court construing the will was taken directly to the Supreme Court rather than to the district court, it is significant to note the meaning given that decision in Bronson. In this instance the decisions of other states are of little help, as they are based on constitutional and statutory provisions of great variation. Many of the decisions which are rendered by the same courts draw distinctions which are exceedingly fine, if not incomprehensible. A resort to the rules of equity or of common law is also fruitless. Our conclusions, from an analysis of our Constitution and statutes and of our decisions which have attempted to construe both, is that the county court has jurisdiction, not only to construe an ambiguous will in aid of administration of an estate, but to determine the validity of a part or all of a will when such a determination is necessary for the proper administration of the estate in county court. In the instant case the appellants contended that the trust provided for in the will was invalid, as imposing conditions contrary to public policy, and thus that the entire trust failed and that the estate should be set over to the heirs at law rather than to the trustee named in the will. In order to complete the administration of the estate, is was necessary, therefore, for the court to determine to whom the property of the estate should be distributed. If the trust was valid, the court could distribute the property to the trustee; but, on the other hand, if the trust was invalid, the court could not distribute the property to the trustee but would have the additional responsibility of determining the proper parties to whom the estate should be distributed. As it was necessary in the administration of the estate for the county court to determine to whom the estate should be distributed, the county court had jurisdiction to make this determination, and this determination is appealable. As to the validity of the trust, we conclude that the condition in the will requiring Grace Moore Graves to divorce her husband and to terminate cohabitation with him as a condition precedent to receiving the trust fund is contrary to public policy and thus that the trust is void, and *589 that she is entitled to the residue of the estate free and clear of the trust. This conclusion is supported by decisions rendered in the High Court of Chancery of England years ago. In an opinion written over two hundred years ago, that court found a condition in a will requiring that the testatrix's niece live apart from her husband in order to qualify for a bequest was contra bonos mores and void, and that the legacy should go to the niece without her complying with the condition. Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden 140, 28 Eng.Rep. 637 (Ch. 1758). To the same effect is a decision rendered nearly one hundred years later in the same court. Wren v. Bradley, 2 De G. & Sm. 49, 64 Eng.Rep. 23 (Ch. 1848). The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reached the same conclusion in construing the following provisions of a will: It is interesting to note that three of the leading cases cited by the respondents in this case, namely, Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N.E. 949; Cowley v. Twombly, 173 Mass. 393, 53 N.E. 886, 46 L.R.A. 164; and Daboll v. Moon, 88 Conn. 387, 91 A. 646, L.R.A. 1915A 311, Am. & Eng.Ann.Cas.1917B, 164, are analytically covered by the Delaware chancellor as follows: In Cowley v. Twombly, 173 Mass. 393, 53 N.E. 886, 46 L.R.A. 164, it is said that the scheme of a trust similar to that now before the court "no more tended to induce the son improperly to procure a divorce between himself and his wife than to induce him to procure her death." [page 887.] To this I cannot agree. It amounts to saying that the urge to murder is no more irresistible that is the urge to divorce. Vice-Chancellor Bigelow, in Dwyer v. Kuchler et al., supra, in New Jersey, characterized the argument expressed in the above quoted excerpt from Cowley v. Twombly, supra, as "weak". Davidson v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra, 2 A.2d at 288-289. The chancellor concluded as follows: In Dwyer v. Kuchler, referred to by the chancellor in the decision just quoted, the chancery Court of New Jersey said: In the instant case the will provided that the trust should terminate and that the trust funds should be transferred to the testatrix's niece when the niece had dissolved all legal marriage relationship and cohabitation with her husband. It further provided that in the event the niece did not dissolve all legal marriage relationship and cohabitation with her husband prior to the time of her death, the trust should terminate upon her death and the trust funds should be paid over to the Methodist Church of Hoople. As the language of the will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator must be determined from the language itself. It has been contended by some that, even though the language is clear and un ambiguous, the intent of the testator must be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances. With this latter view we disagree. Here it is crystal clear that the condition imposed by the testatrix tends to encourage divorce and that such was the obvious intent of the testatrix. The condition is therefore contrary to public policy, which has as its object the preservation of the marital union. The gift therefore vests in the niece free and clear of the condition. For the reasons stated, the order of the district court affirming the order of the county court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. STRUTZ and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. TEIGEN, Judge (dissenting in part). I dissent in part. I agree with syllabuses 1 and 2 of the majority opinion. I also agree that a provision in a will professing to set up a trust creating a motive for terminating the family relation of husband and wife may be held invalid as being contrary to public policy. However, this case is not ripe for that determination on the record before us. It is correctly stated in the majority opinion that "* * * no testimony was taken in county court, the only thing before us is the will." That there may be exceptions to the general rule is clearly shown by the cases cited in the majority opinion. I do not feel that we are at liberty to look solely to the language of the will to *593 make this very important determination. We have said many times that the primary consideration in construing a will is the intention of the testatrix. In re McQueen's Estate, 64 N.D. 31, 250 N.W. 95; In re Gray's Estate, 27 N.D. 417, 146 N.W. 722, L.R.A.1917A, 611; Crabtree v. Kelly, 65 N.D. 501, 260 N.W. 262; In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300; Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 19 A.L.R.2d 1147; Hull v. Rolfsrud, N.D., 65 N.W.2d 94. Section 56-05-01, N.D.C.C., provides: In the case of Davidson v. Wilmington Trust Company, 23 Del.Ch. 1, 2 A.2d 285, upon which the majority opinion relies, the court considered evidence adduced and found: The court then concluded that the trust, therefore, appeared to be one whose sole purpose was to subserve the destruction of the marriage tie and that such purpose was obvious. The court concluded: There is no evidence on which to substantiate such a finding in this case. In the case of Hamilton v. Ferrall, 92 Cal. App. 2d 277, 206 P.2d 663, the California court, holding a similar provision in a will valid, said: The court also stated: I note the careful language of Restatement of the Law, Trusts, Second, Section 62: In the case relied upon in the majority opinion, Davidson v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra, the court was very careful to point out that the husband and wife had lived in a state of contentment and happiness for some time and from the evidence there was not the slightest reason to suggest that the thought of divorce had ever so much as occurred to either until the testator intruded the objectionable thought upon them. The court also acknowledged that there were cases where the condition may not be calculated to influence the conduct of the beneficiary, and stated: For the reasons aforesaid, I believe the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to the county court to conduct a hearing at which evidence may be adduced in order that a knowledgeable determination may be made as to the validity of the challenged portions of the will. I am also of the opinion that if the purported trust is void and where, as here, there is no other provision in the will expressing, either affirmatively or negatively, any contrary intention of the testatrix, the property should pass to her heirs at law under the laws of succession. BURKE, C. J., concurs in Judge TEIGEN'S dissent.