Title: KING v. WYOMING DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KING v. WYOMING DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION2004 WY 5289 P.3d 341Case Number: 03-62Decided: 05/07/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

ROGER 
A. KING,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

THE 
WYOMING DIVISION OF

CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The Wyoming 
Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) denied Roger King's (King) 
application for a concealed firearm permit because he had been convicted of 
breach of peace involving an altercation with his spouse.  Mr. King sought reconsideration of that 
decision claiming his conviction was not a "misdemeanor crime for domestic 
violence" as provided by federal law, which would prevent issuance of the 
permit.  The district court affirmed 
DCI's decision, and we do the same.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. King presents 
the following issues:

 

I.          
The Division of Criminal Investigation made an error of law in its 
misapplication of statutory and case law when it denied the appellant's 
application.

 

II.          
The Division[']s denial of the permit violated appellant's right to due 
process.

 

[¶3]      DCI phrases the 
issue as follows:

 

Did appellee 
properly deny appellant's application for a concealed firearm 
permit?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On December 6, 2001, 
Mr. King applied for a concealed firearm permit through the Albany County 
Sheriff's office.  
The application and other pertinent documents were forwarded to DCI for 
processing.  As 
part of the application process, DCI performed a routine criminal background 
check of Mr. King, which revealed that on August 21, 1990, Mr. King was charged 
with disturbing the peace under Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-102(a) and (b) (Michie 1988) 
after a domestic dispute with his estranged wife.  The information alleged Mr. King "forced his 
way into the home of his estranged wife, Linda King, grabbed her by her arms, 
threw her down, threatened to hit her with a closed fist, and broke several 
items of personal property."  Mr. King pled guilty to the charge and the 
court entered a judgment and sentence on September 28, 1990.

            

[¶5]      In a letter dated May 
2, 2002, DCI notified Mr. King his application was denied based upon his 1990 
conviction.  DCI 
reasoned that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) prohibits 
issuance of a concealed firearm permit to those persons not eligible to possess 
a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  The federal statute makes it unlawful for any 
person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to 
possess a firearm.  
DCI informed Mr. King he could contact the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF) or the U.S. Department of Justice regarding his eligibility to 
possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and indicated it would reconsider 
its decision if Mr. King could obtain written documentation indicating he was 
eligible to possess a firearm under federal law. 

 

[¶6]      On May 20, 2002, Mr. 
King requested reconsideration of DCI's denial of his application for the permit 
claiming the 1990 conviction did not make him ineligible to possess a firearm 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  He provided DCI with a protection order that 
was issued involving his estranged wife and a copy of the September 28, 1990, 
judgment and sentence for his disturbance of the peace conviction.  However, Mr. King did 
not provide any documentation from ATF or the Department of Justice indicating 
he was eligible to possess a firearm.  DCI sought an opinion from the U.S. Attorney's 
office as to Mr. King's status under federal law.  The U.S. Attorney's office determined that 
"after reading the applicable statutes, researching the matter, and consulting 
with other attorneys in this office, our consensus is that under the proper 
factual circumstances, and assuming the statutory prerequisites are met, a 
person convicted of § 6-6-102 would be prohibited from possessing firearms under 
federal law."  

 

[¶7]      On June 26, 2002, DCI 
affirmed its decision to deny Mr. King's application for a concealed firearm 
permit.  Mr. King 
filed a petition for writ of review with the district court.  The district court 
affirmed DCI's denial of Mr. King's application concluding, "DCI is correct in 
its assertion that [Mr. King] is precluded from possessing a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g).  
That being the case, the agency was obliged to deny his application for a 
permit to carry a concealed firearm pursuant to W.S. § 6-8-104(m)(ii), and its 
decision must be affirmed here."  This appeal followed.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Our review of an 
administrative agency's decision is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003) as set forth in State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. 
Legarda, 2003 WY 
130, ¶¶ 9-10, 77 P.3d 708, ¶¶ 9-10 (Wyo. 2003):

 

  
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

. . . 

     (ii) Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A)                 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law;

. . . 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on 
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 

Our review is further governed by the following 
standards:

 

     We do not afford any special 
deference to the district court's decision when we review a matter initiated before an administrative agency. Rather, this court reviews the case as if it came 
directly from the administrative 
agency. Our review must focus on the evidence and consider the reasonableness of 
the agency's exercise of judgment while determining if the agency committed any 
errors of law. If the agency committed any errors of law, this court must 
correct them.

 

[¶9]      This case also involves 
a question of statutory interpretation about which we have said:

 

We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. 
This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. A "statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability." A "statute is ambiguous 
only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations." If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain language of the statute. We begin by making an "inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection." We construe the statute as 
a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia. If 
we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent.

 

Airtouch Communications, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue, 2003 WY 
114, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 342, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 
2003) (citations omitted).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Mr. King argues DCI's denial of his 
application for a concealed firearm permit based on his conviction for breach of 
peace was erroneous.  
He contends that a conviction under a Wyoming statute containing "violent 
actions" as an element is not adequate to trigger the federal statute that 
prohibits those convicted of a "misdemeanor for domestic violence" from 
possessing a firearm.

 

[¶11]   Section 6-8-104(b) authorizes the Wyoming 
attorney general, through DCI, to issue a permit to carry a concealed firearm to 
any qualified person.  
The statute lists nine conditions that an applicant must meet in order to 
qualify for a concealed firearm permit.  Those conditions are:

 

(b)  The attorney general is authorized to issue permits to carry 
a concealed firearm to persons qualified as provided by this subsection. The 
attorney general shall promulgate rules necessary to carry out this section no 
later than October 1, 1994. Applications for a permit to carry a concealed 
firearm shall be made available and distributed by the division of criminal 
investigation and local law enforcement agencies. The permit shall be valid 
throughout the state for a period of five (5) years from the date of issuance. 
The permittee shall carry the permit, together with valid identification at all 
times when the permittee is carrying a concealed firearm and shall display both 
the permit and proper identification upon request of any peace officer. The 
attorney general through the division shall issue a permit to any person who: 

            
(i)  Is a resident of the United States and has been a resident of 
Wyoming for not less than six (6) months prior to filing the application. The 
Wyoming residency requirements of this paragraph do not apply to any person who 
holds a valid permit authorizing him to carry a concealed firearm authorized and 
issued by a governmental agency or entity in another state that recognizes 
Wyoming permits, is a valid statewide permit, and the state has laws similar to 
the provisions of this section, as determined by the attorney general, including 
a proper background check of the permit holder; 

            
(ii)  Is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; 

 (iii)  Does not suffer from a physical infirmity which prevents the 
safe handling of a firearm; 

 (iv)  Is not ineligible to possess a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
section 922(g) or W.S. 6-8-102; 

 (v)  Has not been committed to a state or federal facility for the 
abuse of a controlled substance or convicted of a violation of the Wyoming 
Controlled Substances Act of 1971, W.S. 35-7-1001 through 35-7-1057 or similar 
laws of any other state or the United States relating to controlled substances; 

 (vi)  Does not chronically or habitually use alcoholic liquor and 
malt beverages to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired. It shall be 
presumed that an applicant chronically and habitually uses alcoholic beverages 
to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired if the applicant has been 
involuntarily committed to any residential facility pursuant to the laws of this 
state or similar laws of any other state as a result of the use of alcohol; 

 (vii)  Demonstrates familiarity with a firearm. A legible photocopy 
of a certificate of completion of any of the courses or classes or a notarized 
affidavit from the instructor, school, club, organization or group that 
conducted or taught the course or class attesting to the completion of the 
course or class by the applicant or a copy of any document which shows 
completion of the course or class or evidences participation of firearms 
competition, shall constitute evidence of qualification under this paragraph. 
Any one (1) of the following activities listed in this paragraph shall be 
sufficient to demonstrate familiarity with a firearm: 

 (A)  Completion of any certified firearm safety or training course 
utilizing instructors certified by the National Rifle Association or the Wyoming 
law enforcement academy; 

 (B)  Completion of any law enforcement firearms safety or training 
course or class offered for security guards, investigators, special deputies, or 
any division of law enforcement or security enforcement; 

 (C)  Experience with a firearm through participation in an 
organized handgun shooting competition or military service; 

 (D)  Completion of any firearms training or safety course or class 
conducted by a state certified or National Rifle Association certified firearms 
instructor; 

 (E)  Be certified as proficient in firearms safety by any Wyoming 
law enforcement agency under procedures established by that agency; or 

 (F)  Honorable retirement as a federal or state peace officer who 
has a minimum of ten (10) years of service. 

 (viii)  Is not currently adjudicated to be legally incompetent; and 

         (ix) Has 
not been committed to a mental institution. 

 

[¶12]   In denying Mr. King's permit, DCI relied 
upon § 6-8-104(b)(iv) which prohibits a person from receiving a concealed 
firearm permit if he is ineligible to possess a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 
922(g)(9).1  This federal statute provides it is illegal for 
any person "who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce."  
Id. A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" 
is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) as follows:

 

33)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term 
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" means an offense that--        (i) is a 
misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and        (ii) has, as 
an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of 
a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of 
the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a 
person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, 
parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or 
guardian 

of the victim.

      (B) (i) A person shall not be 
considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this 
chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], unless

(I) the person was represented by counsel in the case, or 
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case; and

(II) in the case of a prosecution for an offense described in 
this paragraph for which a person was entitled to a jury trial in the 
jurisdiction in which the case was tried, either

(aa) the case was tried by a jury, or(bb) the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right 
to have the case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise.

            
(ii) A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an 
offense for purposes of this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.] if the conviction 
has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been 
pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable 
jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless 
the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that 
the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

 

[¶13]   The federal statute explicitly requires 
that the predicate offense, which creates the ineligibility, must include as an 
element "the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a 
deadly weapon."  
In 1990, the Wyoming breach of peace statute read as follows: 

 

(a)               
A person commits breach of the peace if he disturbs the peace 
of a community or its inhabitants by using threatening, abusive or obscene 
language or violent actions with knowledge or probable cause to believe he will 
disturb the peace. 

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-6-102 (Michie 1990).  This Court must 
decide whether the "violent actions" portion of the Wyoming breach of peace 
statute satisfies the federal statute's requirement of "the use or attempted use 
of physical force."  
Mr. King argues that "violent actions" are not necessarily the use of 
physical force.    

 

[¶14]   The distinction between "violent actions" 
and "physical force" is lost on this Court.  The definitions of each phrase are illustrative 
of their similarity.  
"Violent," as defined by Webster's Dictionary, means "marked by extreme 
force or sudden intense activity, an attack."  "Actions" are "the bringing about of an 
alteration by force."  
"Physical" encompasses things "of or relating to the body," and "force" 
is "to do violence to."  
The two phrases are almost synonymous and their respective meanings are 
indistinguishable. 

 

[¶15]   United States v. 
Nason, 269 F.3d 10, (1st Cir. 2001), provides a helpful discussion of 
the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which 
suggests Congress considered "misdemeanor crime of violence" as a subset of 
crimes involving "the use or attempted use of physical force 
involving risk of injury or harm:"  

 

Discussing section 922(g)(9) on the Senate floor shortly 
before its passage, Senator Lautenberg observed: 

The revised language includes a new definition of the crimes 
for which the gun ban will be imposed. Under the original version, these were 
defined as crimes of violence against certain individuals, essentially 
family members. Some argued that the term crime of violence was too broad, and 
could be interpreted to include an act such as cutting up a credit card with a 
pair of scissors. Although this concern seemed far-fetched to me, I did agree to 
a new definition of covered crimes that is more precise, and probably 
broader.

Under the final agreement, the ban applies to crimes that 
have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon. This is an improvement over the earlier 
version, which did not explicitly include within the ban crimes involving an 
attempt to use force, or the threatened use of a weapon, if such an attempt or 
threat did not also involve actual physical violence.

The court also stated:

While the remarks of the chief sponsor of a bill by no means 
control a court's construal of the enacted statute, they nonetheless can provide 
reliable insights into its construction. Here, the specificity of the comments, 
precisely directed toward the intended meaning of the statute's mode of 
aggression component, lends substantial credence to them. We conclude, 
therefore, that Senator Lautenberg's statements, which plainly indicate that a 
principal purpose underlying Congress's substitution of "crimes involving the 
use or attempted use of physical force" for "crimes of violence" in section 
922(g)(9) was to broaden the spectrum of predicate offenses covered by the 
statute, are worthy of respect.

 

In context, these insights are quite helpful. A comparison of 
the plain meanings of "crimes of violence" and "physical force" highlights the 
consonance between the purpose and effect of the revised language. "Violence" is 
essentially a subset of physical force involving injury or risk of harm. See 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dict. (1989) (defining violence as the "exertion 
of physical force so as to injure or abuse"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining "violent felony" to include crimes involving "conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"). The 
substitution of "physical force" as the operative mode of aggression element 
effectively expanded the coverage of section 922(g)(9) to include predicate 
offenses whose formal statutory definitions contemplated the use of any physical 
force, regardless of whether that force resulted in bodily injury or risk of 
harm.

 

Id. at 17-19. 

 

[¶16]   In Nason, the 
defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possession of a 
firearm after pleading guilty to violation of Maine's general-purpose assault 
statute.2  On appeal, the question was whether "offensive 
physical contact" under Maine's general assault statute constituted the "use or 
attempted use of physical force" necessitated by the federal statute.  Specifically, the 
court stated:

 

[T]he key distinction between the federal and state statutes 
is one of perspective:  
the physical force rubric employed in the federal statutes focuses on the 
assailant's conduct (i.e. whether the assailant directed physical force against 
the victim), whereas both variants of the Maine general-purpose assault statute 
focus on the victim's circumstances (i.e., whether the victim endured either 
bodily injury or an offensive physical contact). . . . 

 

The short of it is that both variants of assault regulated 
under Maine's general purpose assault statute necessarily involve the use of 
physical force.

 

Nason, 269 F.2d  at 19-20, 30-31.  The court held all convictions under the Maine 
statute necessarily involved, as a formal element, the use of physical 
force.  

 

[¶17]   We have no difficulty concluding the 
"violent action" language in our breach of peace statute is included within the 
federal statute which prohibits those convicted of "domestic violence" from 
possessing firearms.  
However, the language of the breach of peace statute raises another issue 
when it provides breach of peace can also be committed by "loud noise or music 
or by using threatening, abusive or obscene language" which obviously would not 
constitute "physical force" as contemplated by the federal statute. Recently, 
the United States District Court for the District of Montana held Wyoming's 
battery statute, which also contains alternative grounds, too broad to qualify 
as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."  In United States v. 
Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, (9th Cir. 2003), the defendant was convicted of 
battery, which the statute defines as "unlawfully touches another in a rude, 
insolent or angry manner, or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The court 
concluded the Wyoming statute "embraces conduct that does not include the use 
or attempted use of physical force.'"  Belless at 1067.  The court 
explained:

 

Any touching constitutes "physical force" in the sense of 
Newtonian mechanics.  
Mass is accelerated, and atoms are displaced.  Our purpose in this 
statutory construction exercise, though, is to assign criminal responsibility, 
not to do physics.  
As a matter of law, we hold that the physical force to which the federal 
statute refers is not de minimis.  The traditional 
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, that "the meaning of 
doubtful words may be determined by reference to associated words and phrases," 
guides us in our inquiry.  In the federal definition, the associated 
phrase is "threatened use of a deadly weapon."  That is a gravely serious threat to apply 
physical force.  
By contrast, the Wyoming statute criminalizes conduct that is minimally 
forcible, though ungentlemanly.

 

. . .

 

But the Wyoming law against rude touchings does not meet the 
requirements for the federal statute that defines the predicate offense for a 
felony firearm conviction: "the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon.  That category does not include mere impolite 
behavior.  More 
inclusive battery statutes such as Wyoming's may be drafted to embrace conduct 
that too often leads to the more serious violence necessary as a predicate for 
the federal statute, but they are not limited to it, so cannot supply the 
necessary predicate.  
The phrase "physical force" in the federal definition means the violent 
use of force against the body of another individual.

 

Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).  Having found the state statute too broad to 
automatically trigger the federal firearm prohibition, the court looked to the 
record to try to determine whether the acts perpetrated by the defendant were 
sufficient to meet the intent of the federal statute.  The court found the 
record indicated Mr. Belless was charged with conduct that was a violent act and 
not merely a rude or insolent touching.  However, because the record did not reveal the 
conduct to which Mr. Belless pleaded guilty and for which he was convicted, the 
court could not conclude Mr. Belless was guilty of conduct that served as a 
predicate offense.

 

[¶18]   Unlike Belless, 
the record in this case does reveal the conduct to which Mr. King pleaded 
and for which he was convicted.  Indeed, the record details Mr. King's conduct 
sufficiently for this Court to conclude his actions were such that they are 
enough to serve as an element of the predicate offense.  United States v. Smith, 56 M.J. 711, 714 (U.S.A.F. 2001) plainly states courts "may 
peek beneath the coverlet" to resolve any ambiguity caused by a broad state 
statute.  Even 
Mr. King admits that "the charging papers, or information contain language that 
would indicate the crime might fit the prohibition of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)."

 

[¶19]   In addition, Mr. King was not charged 
generally under the statute.  Rather, the charge against him specifically 
alleged "violent actions" as described in the information:

 

Roger King . . . did disturb the peace of an inhabitant of 
the community by violent actions with reason to 
believe he would in fact disturb her peace, to-wit; the Defendant, Roger King, 
forced his way into the home of his estranged wife, Linda King, grabbed her by 
her arms, threw her down, threatened to hit her with a closed fist, and broke 
several items of personal property, in violation of Section 6-6-102(a) and (b) 
(emphasis added).

 

Clearly, the actions described in the charging document 
involved "the use, or attempted use of physical force" as required by the 
federal statute.  
The record also shows that Mr. King pleaded guilty to those charges 
voluntarily and intelligently and the court found that an adequate factual basis 
for the guilty plea existed.  DCI points out, and we agree, that although the 
record does not contain a transcript of the hearing where the factual basis for 
the plea was offered, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn that it duplicated 
the allegations contained in the charging document because the judgment and 
sentence states that Mr. King entered the plea "according to the 
Information."  
Nothing in the record indicates otherwise.  Mr. King was charged with and pled guilty to a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence that involved an element of physical 
force. 

 

                                                                                                                                                

The Relationship Element 

 

[¶20]   Mr. King also argues the predicate crime 
must have as an element that it was committed against a household member, which 
§ 6-6-102 does not.  
Case law abounds establishing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not require 
the predicate offense to contain as an element the relationship between the 
defendant and the victim.  See United States v. 
Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, (5th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Thomson, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8627 (C.D. Utah); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, (2nd Cir. 2002); Smith, 171 F.3d  at 620; United 
States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2002); and United States v. 
Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2002). 

 

[¶21]   The Lautenberg Amendment was enacted to 
prevent domestic offenders convicted of  misdemeanors from possessing firearms.  United States v. Blosser, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19339 (D. Kan. 2002).  The purpose of the law would be thwarted if the only crimes 
actionable were those titled "domestic" and containing an element of a domestic 
relationship.  Id. An entire segment of offenders, which were 
specifically targeted by this legislation, would fall through the cracks.  Id. 

 

[¶22]   United States v. 
Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D. Mass. 1977), contains one of the better 
discussions of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), the section that defines "misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence."  In Meade, the court 
considered whether the language of section 921(a)(33)(A) requires the predicate 
offense contain as elements the use of physical force and 
also that the force be committed by a person having a domestic relationship 
with the victim.  
The court stated:

 

The crux of the matter is whether the phrase "as an element" 
modifies both requirements or just the use of force requirement.  The inclusion of both 
the use of force and domestic relationship requirements in one sentence does not 
mandate that they be treated as one element.  In drafting the statute Congress placed the 
singular word, "element," immediately before the use of force requirement.  In choosing the 
singular word "element," Congress intended to modify only the language 
immediately following the phrase.  If Congress had intended that both requirements 
be mandatory elements of the underlying state statute, the word "element" would 
have been in the plural to encompass both requirements.  Reading the phrase 
"has, as an element" in its ordinary plain meaning, it is clear the singular 
element modifies only the use of force requirement.

 

Barnes, 295 F.3d  at 1362-1363.  Contrary to Mr. King's argument, 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9) does not require that § 6-6-102 have, as an element, that the physical 
force be perpetrated upon a household member.

 

 

Delays in Issuance of the Denial of Permit 

 

[¶23]   Mr. King contends that the length of the 
delay in denying his application warrants reversal.  DCI issued its 
initial denial five months after the application was submitted, rather than 
sixty days as required by statute, and issued the final denial thirty-nine days 
after Mr. King's request for reconsideration, rather than the statutory twenty 
days.  Mr. King 
cites to § 6-3-114(D) in support of his timeliness argument.  This statute does not 
exist.  Section § 
6-8-104(m) seems to match the statute Mr. King discussed in his brief.3

            

[¶24]   The response periods in § 6-8-104(m)(ii) 
are merely directory and not mandatory.  Griess v. Office of the 
Attorney General, Division of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 740 (Wyo. 
1997).  The 
statute does not provide that time is of the essence and contains no language 
that would negate the exercise of authority after the prescribed time 
period.  Id. In Griess, there was a 
delay in the issuance of the final denial letter after a request for 
reconsideration was presented to DCI.4  The record, however, 
contained "no evidence serving to demonstrate that the delay in rendering the 
decision on Mr. Griess' request for reconsideration prejudiced either his 
personal rights or any public interest."  Id. Like Griess, the record in this case lacks a showing of 
prejudice to Mr. King's personal rights or the public's interest.  Thus, the delay 
experienced by Mr. King does not justify reversing the denial of his 
application.

 

 

Due Process

 

[¶25]   In Mr. King's final argument, he 
contends DCI's action violated his due process rights because he was not 
provided notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the denial of his permit 
application.  He 
contends he has a fundamental right to own a firearm, guaranteed in part by 
article 1, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, and that he was, therefore, 
entitled to a hearing.  

 

[¶26]   The United States and Wyoming 
constitutions each provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of 
law.  Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 937, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting XIV, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
6).  It is basic 
that before a property interest can be terminated, except in emergency 
situations, due process must 
be afforded to litigants in the form of notice and a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard.  Id. This Court has reiterated that 
sentiment:

 

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, provides that "no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law." The similar provision found in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. "Notice and the 
opportunity to be heard are touch stones of this due 
process of law." The notice and hearing 
opportunity must be "appropriate to the nature 
of the case," and the opportunity to be 
heard must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." The party 
claiming an infringement of his right to due 
process has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a 
protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible 
way. The question is whether there has been a denial of fundamental 
fairness.

 

DH v. 
Department of Family Services (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 
79 P.3d 997, ¶ 38 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted).

 

[¶27]   However, Mr. King wrongly assumes he has 
a protected property interest in obtaining a concealed weapon permit.  Although both the 
federal and Wyoming constitutions guarantee citizens the right to bear arms, 
that right does not translate into the right to carry a concealed weapon.5    This Court has addressed the 
distinction between a right to bear arms and a right to carry a concealed weapon 
under the Wyoming constitution.  In Mecikalski v. Office 
of the Attorney General, 2 P.3d 1039, (Wyo. 2000), we explained that distinction stating:

 

The Constitution of the United States does not grant a right 
to bear arms: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 
infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. The United States Supreme Court has construed 
the Second Amendment (in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment) as not affecting 
the right of a citizen to bear arms. It means no more than that the right may 
not be infringed by Congress and constrains the federal government but not the 
several states. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. Ed. 615 (1886).  Wyoming has a parallel constitutional 
provision: "The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of 
the state shall not be denied." Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 24. However, 
contemporaneously with adoption of the Wyoming Constitution, the legislature 
enacted this statute: "Every person, not being a traveler, who shall wear or 
carry any dirk, pistol, bowie-knife, dagger, sword-in-cane or any other 
dangerous or deadly weapon concealed, or who shall carry or wear any such weapon 
openly, with the intent or avowed purpose of injuring his fellow-man, shall be 
fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars." 1890 Wyo. Territorial Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 73 § 96 (11th Legislative Assembly). The statute prohibiting the 
carrying of concealed weapons has undergone many revisions over the years, and 
we shall set out the details of the current version of that statute in a later 
section of this opinion. We also note at this juncture that we have held that a 
statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons is constitutional under 
Wyoming's right to bear arms provision. State v. 
McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

Id. at 1040-1041.  Much like a driver's license, a permit to carry 
a concealed weapon is a "privilege" and not a "right."  Id. Just as one may not drive an automobile without a 
license, one may not carry a concealed weapon without a permit.  Id.

 

[¶28]   Having concluded that no constitutional 
right to a hearing existed in this circumstance, we look to the statutes to 
determine whether the proper procedures were followed concerning notice and 
opportunity to contest DCI's action.  Neither the concealed weapon statute nor the 
Administrative Procedures Act contains any requirement for a hearing.  Under the concealed 
weapon permit statute, an aggrieved applicant is given the opportunity to rebut 
DCI's findings and conclusions through a request for reconsideration of the 
denial of a permit.  
Mr. King took advantage of that opportunity, albeit without success.  The Administrative 
Procedures Act requires a hearing only when the case is considered contested.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-107 (LexisNexis 2003).  This Court has previously construed the 
meaning of a "contested case" to be where legal rights exist 
which, under the law, are to be determined after an opportunity for a 
trial-type hearing.  
Id.  Mr. King failed to identify any legal right which required 
such a hearing.  
Mr. King received adequate notice of the decision and had the opportunity 
to seek reconsideration as provided by statute.  We hold  DCI's rejection of 
Mr. King's application for a concealed weapon permit did not result in a denial 
of his right to due process.

 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1This statute is commonly 
referred to as the "Lautenberg Amendment."

 

2Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 
17-A, § 207 provides that "a person can be guilty of misdemeanor assault in one 
of two ways, namely (1) if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another, or (2) if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
causes offensive physical contact to another."

 

3W.S. §6-8-104(m) states: 

 

The division shall, within 
sixty (60) days after the date of receipt of the items listed in subsection (e) 
of this section, either:  (i) Issue the permit; 
or  (ii) Deny the application based on the ground that the 
applicant fails to qualify under the criteria listed in this section or upon 
reasonable grounds for denial specified under subsection (g) of this section. If 
the division denies the application, it shall notify the applicant in writing, 
stating the grounds for denial and informing the applicant of a right to submit, 
within thirty (30) days, any additional documentation relating to the grounds of 
denial. Upon receiving any additional documentation, the division shall 
reconsider its decision and inform the applicant within twenty (20) days of the 
result of the reconsideration. The applicant shall further be informed of the 
right to seek review of the denial in the district court pursuant to the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. No person who is denied a permit under this 
section shall carry a concealed firearm under a permit issued in another state, 
so long as he remains a resident of this state, and he remains ineligible for a 
permit in this state.

 

4The exact delay is 
unspecified.

 

5The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 83 L. Ed. 1206, 59 S. Ct. 816 (1939) held the Second Amendment does not confer an 
absolute individual right 
to bear arms, but a "collective right", of states to arm their militias.,  Since Miller, "the lower federal courts have 
uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than 
individual, right."  
Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998).  Recently, in United 
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir 2001), cert. denied, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Second 
Amendment does confer an individual right to bear arms, apart from any 
connection to a state-run militia.  However, as the 10th Circuit noted in United 
States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004), that court stands alone among the 
federal circuit courts in its conclusion.