Title: Sparre v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-891 
____________ 
 
DAVID KELSEY SPARRE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[January 22, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction of 
first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
 
We reject the three claims that David Kelsey Sparre has raised in this appeal.  
In his first claim, Sparre argues that the trial court erred by not calling its own 
witnesses who potentially had knowledge of mitigating factors against the 
imposition of the death penalty.  We determine that there is insufficient evidence in 
the record to support this claim.  Nevertheless, we take this occasion to emphasize 
that when a defendant who is facing the death penalty waives the presentation of 
 
 
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mitigating circumstances, as Sparre has done, the trial courts shall ensure that they 
are considering comprehensive presentencing investigation (PSI) reports and 
accompanying records in accordance with the standard established in Muhammad 
v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001).   
In his second claim, Sparre invites us to recede from our holding in 
Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988).  However, Sparre fails to show why 
the policy that we established in Hamblen is unworkable under the requirements of 
Florida law.  Therefore, we reject Sparre’s second claim and deny him any relief 
thereunder.  In his third claim, Sparre argues that his sentence of death violates the 
requirements established in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This claim is 
without merit.  Therefore, we deny Sparre any relief under this claim as well. 
We find there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 
trial court’s judgment that Sparre is guilty of committing first-degree murder.  
And, because the aggravating circumstances greatly outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances, the death penalty imposed on Sparre is proportionate to the 
circumstances established in cases where we affirmed the death penalties imposed 
on other defendants who were convicted for committing capital murder. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Sparre was convicted for the first-degree murder of Tiara Pool.  In July 
2010, Tiara Pool lived in an apartment located in Jacksonville, Florida.  During 
 
 
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that month, her husband Michael Pool, a sailor in the United States Navy, was at 
sea aboard a naval ship.  The Pools’ two young sons were in Bonifay, Florida, 
living with their paternal grandmother.  Michael Pool later testified that he and 
Pool had had some marital problems, and that he had some suspicions that Pool 
had been involved with other men.  Michael Pool testified that he never met 
Sparre. 
On July 1, 2010, Pool posted an ad on Craigslist in which she indicated that 
she wanted to meet a white male that met certain criteria that she outlined.  
However, nothing about Pool’s Craigslist posting was sexually suggestive.  On 
July 5, Sparre initially responded to Pool’s Craigslist posting.  From Sparre’s 
initial contact with Pool until July 8, Sparre and Pool spoke to each other multiple 
times by phone and exchanged numerous text messages; some of the text messages 
Sparre and Pool exchanged contained sexually explicit content. 
On July 12, Nichelle Edwards, a friend of Pool’s and her part-time sitter, 
went to Pool’s apartment to check on her because Pool had been incommunicado 
for several days.  Edwards entered the apartment using a key that Pool had 
previously given her.  When Edwards went to the master bedroom and slightly 
opened the door, she saw a hand on the floor.  Edwards immediately ran out of the 
apartment and dialed 911. 
 
 
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Officer Wesley Brown of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO) was the 
first responder on the scene.  Officer Brown went into the apartment and found 
Pool’s bloody, nude body on the master bedroom floor.  A short time later, 
Detective Deborah Brookins and other crime scene investigators arrived to relieve 
Officer Brown and to begin their work of processing the murder scene.   
The crime scene investigators found no indications of forced entry into 
Pool’s apartment.  However, they found Pool’s open, rummaged-through purse on 
a table in the living room, and her cellular phone placed on the back of the sofa.  In 
the master bedroom, there was blood around Pool’s body—on the carpet, 
baseboards, door, and wall.  Investigators also found a blue towel under Pool’s 
body.  On the bed, there was blood, various articles of clothing, and a bottle of 
Oxi-Clean.  There was blood on the master bathroom door, and blood droplets at 
the entrance to the bathroom.  There was blood in the grout on the floor near the 
tub and the toilet.  A large knife, matching those in a knife block set in Pool’s 
kitchen, was resting against the side of the bath tub.  The knife’s tip was broken 
off, and the blade was bowed.  This knife was later established as the murder 
weapon. 
Dr. Jesse Giles, a medical examiner, opined that Pool was alive and 
conscious through at least eighty-eight sharp-force injuries, which included thirty-
 
 
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nine defensive wounds.1  Investigators testified that the crime scene was “cleaned” 
to such an extent that virtually no evidence of Pool’s assailant was recoverable.  
However, investigators found a mixture of DNA material on the murder weapon.  
Jason Hitt, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement biological/DNA analyst, 
testified that when he tested the mixture of DNA material recovered at the murder 
scene he was able to rule out ninety-nine percent of the world’s population; yet, 
Sparre and Pool were possible contributors to the mixture of DNA material found 
on the murder weapon.  In addition, Kevin Noppinger, a former DNA analyst, 
testified that he found Y-DNA material taken from the murder weapon’s handle 
matched Sparre’s.   
Investigators found that the following items of Pool’s were missing: her 
2003 Chevrolet Malibu, a PlayStation 3 game console, a DVD, and a wireless 
modem.  During a routine patrol on July 14, JSO Officer Christine Upton located 
Pool’s automobile parked one block north of St. Vincent’s Hospital. 
 
Because he was a person of interest in the case, also on July 14, JSO 
Detectives Patrick Bodine and James Childers traveled to Brantley County, 
Georgia, where Sparre resided.  Deputy John Simpson, a Brantley County Sheriff’s 
                                          
 
 
1.  The following are among the most remarkable injuries that Pool suffered:  
(1) two single deep stab wounds that penetrated each of the lungs (both potentially 
fatal wounds); (2) a deep slash to her throat and neck (a potentially fatal wound); 
and (3) a deep stab wound to her skull in which the broken knife tip was found. 
 
 
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Office investigator, accompanied the JSO detectives to Sparre’s residence.  Sparre 
consented to being interviewed and accompanied the JSO detectives to the local 
sheriff’s office.  Deputy Simpson actually transported Sparre to and from the local 
sheriff’s office where Sparre’s interview took place on July 14.   
JSO detectives video-recorded their interview with Sparre at the sheriff’s 
office in Brantley County.  Sparre informed the detectives that he met Pool after he 
responded to an ad that Pool had posted on Craigslist.   
In his initial interview with the detectives, Sparre represented that he and 
Pool agreed to meet at St. Vincent’s Hospital in Jacksonville on July 8.  According 
to Sparre, after meeting Pool, she drove him to her apartment where they engaged 
in consensual sexual relations.  Sparre alleged that Pool drove him back to the 
same hospital a few hours later, left him near the main entrance, and drove away.   
Later, due to inconsistencies in Sparre’s account of his July 8 encounter with 
Pool, and other evidence uncovered during their investigation, Sparre became the 
detectives’ prime suspect in Pool’s murder.  One of the discrepancies the detectives 
found was Sparre’s false statements about the location from which he sent two text 
messages to Pool’s phone on the evening of July 8.  Karen Mildrodt of Verizon 
Wireless later provided testimony about the activity on Sparre’s phone based on 
the location of cellular phone towers on July 8.  The investigating detectives had 
 
 
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utilized location information about his phone activity to determine that Sparre had 
not been completely truthful about the timing of his whereabouts on July 8. 
On July 23, Detectives Bodine and Childers obtained a warrant for Sparre’s 
arrest.  The detectives learned that sometime after meeting with them on July 14, 
Sparre left Brantley County, Georgia, and relocated to Charleston, South Carolina.  
Therefore, on July 24, Detectives Bodine and Childers traveled to Charleston to 
arrest Sparre and interview him there.  Sparre’s interview on July 24 was also 
video-recorded.  The jury later viewed a version of Sparre’s July 24 interview with 
JSO detectives, portions of which the trial judge ordered to be redacted in 
accordance with mutual consent of the parties.  The video-recording shows that 
after he gave the detectives various versions of his encounter with Pool, Sparre 
ultimately admitted that he murdered her with the kitchen knife investigators found 
at the murder scene.   
Sparre also told the detectives that he remembered everything that he 
touched in Pool’s apartment.  Sparre boasted to the detectives that he painstakingly 
wiped down, with his socks, every area or item that he contacted in Pool’s 
apartment.  Sparre also stated that he wiped his fingerprints from Pool’s car in the 
same manner.  Richard Kocik, a JSO latent fingerprint examiner, later testified that 
he did not detect any of Sparre’s fingerprints at the murder scene, or in and on 
Pool’s car.  And when the detectives asked Sparre where he learned how to “clean” 
 
 
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a crime scene, Sparre stated that he learned by watching the television program 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A grand jury indicted Sparre for one count of first-degree murder that 
occurred in Duval County sometime on or between July 8, 2010, and July 12, 
2010.  The State gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202.  Sparre was represented by the Office of 
the Public Defender. 
III.  GUILT PHASE 
The guilt phase of Sparre’s trial was conducted from November 28, 2011, 
through December 2, 2011.  Following jury selection, the prosecution presented its 
opening statements.  However, prior to defense counsel’s opening statement, and 
when the jury was excused, defense counsel informed the trial court that Sparre 
agreed with the defense strategy to argue he committed second-degree murder.  
The trial judge conducted a colloquy to confirm whether Sparre knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed to the strategy defense counsel announced.  When the 
proceedings resumed, defense counsel conceded in the opening statement that 
Sparre committed second-degree murder, not first-degree murder.  
 
 
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Notwithstanding defense counsel’s admission that Sparre was Pool’s murderer, 
during its case-in-chief, the State presented fourteen witnesses.2   
A key witness for the State was Sparre’s former girlfriend Ashley 
Chewning.  Chewning testified that prior to his arrest Sparre had confessed to her 
that he had killed a black woman in the victim’s Jacksonville apartment.  
Chewning testified that she did not initially believe Sparre’s confession, but she 
remembered asking him about a PlayStation 3 game console that he had at the 
time.  According to Chewning, Sparre told her that “he stole it from the woman he 
killed.”   
After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal as 
to premeditation and felony murder.  The trial court denied the motion.  Defense 
counsel then informed the trial court that Sparre would not present a defense.  The 
trial court conducted a colloquy with Sparre to confirm whether his decision to 
forego putting on a defense, including the exercise of his right as the defendant to 
testify in his own behalf, was a knowing and voluntary one.  Following the trial 
court’s colloquy with Sparre, defense counsel renewed the motion for judgment of 
                                          
 
 
2.  The State’s witnesses were:  Nichelle Edwards, Officer Wesley Brown, 
Detective Deborah Brookins, Michael Pool, Detective Patrick Bodine, Karen 
Mildrodt, Detective James Childers, Officer Christie Upton, Richard Kocik, Jason 
Hitt, Kevin Noppinger, John Simpson, Ashley Chewning, and Dr. Jesse Giles.   
 
 
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acquittal without providing any additional argument.  The trial court denied the 
renewed motion.   
The prosecutor and defense counsel presented closing arguments.  The 
defense argued that Sparre had no prior plan to murder Pool, and that the killing 
was a second-degree murder.   
After the closing arguments concluded, the trial court instructed the jury on: 
(1) first-degree premeditated murder; and (2) first-degree felony murder with 
burglary as the underlying felony.  The trial court instructed the jury on the lesser 
included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter.   
The jury retired to deliberate from 9:42 a.m. to 10:16 a.m.  The jury 
convicted Sparre by special verdict for both premeditated murder and felony 
murder with both burglary and that Sparre carried, displayed, used, threatened to 
use, or attempted to use a weapon as the underlying felonies.   
IV.  PENALTY PHASE 
On December 13, 2011, the trial court conducted the penalty phase.  Before 
the jury was called, defense counsel alerted the trial court that although the defense 
team was poised to present several witnesses with knowledge of mitigation 
evidence, Sparre informed them that he did not want any mitigation case presented.  
Defense counsel assured the trial court that there was substantial mitigation they 
were prepared to present including mental health mitigation which the defense 
 
 
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uncovered through the work of two mitigation specialists, David Douglas and Dan 
Roberts, who traveled to Georgia to investigate the proffered mitigation.3   
The trial court conducted a Koon4 inquiry with Sparre to confirm whether 
his waiver of putting on the mitigation evidence proffered by his defense team was 
knowing and voluntary.5  Defense counsel also informed the trial court that it did 
not believe Sparre was incompetent, but that he simply rejected the advice of 
counsel to put on the mitigation case his defense team had investigated and 
prepared for presentation to the jury.  The trial court found Sparre’s waiver of his 
                                          
 
 
3.  In summary, Sparre’s defense team proffered that it was prepared to 
present the following mitigation evidence: (1) Sparre has no significant criminal 
history as mitigation; (2) four mental health experts that would testify as to mental 
health mitigation; (3) Dr. Harry Krop was prepared to testify that Sparre had five 
diagnoses of ADHD, posttraumatic stress disorder (PSTD), substance abuse, 
intermittent explosive disorder, and bipolar schiziod-affective disorder; (4) Dr. 
Buffington was prepared to testify that Sparre’s continued use of hydrocodone, 
possibly powder cocaine, alcohol, and other drugs could cause blackouts, and 
memory loss; (5) both Dr. Alligood and Dr. Greenberg were prepared to testify 
regarding Sparre’s PTSD dating from the time he was in the Tara Hall School for 
Boys in South Carolina when he was 11, 12, or 13 years old; (6) Shannon Bullock, 
a missionary and counselor at Tara Hall would testify as to Sparre’s dysfunctional 
family, his mother’s neglect of him, and Sparre’s belief in God; (7) several of 
Sparre’s family members were prepared to testify about his dysfunctional family 
background and personal history; and (8) James Dunn, the director of Tara Hall, 
would testify as to the little family contact Sparre had while he was at the school. 
 
4.  See Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993). 
 
5.  The trial judge conducted the same colloquy with Sparre at the 
conclusion of the State’s case in the penalty phase about his declination to put on 
the proffered mitigation evidence. 
 
 
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right to present mitigation to be knowingly and voluntarily entered.  The trial court 
also found Sparre lucid during its inquiry with him.   
Prompted by an objection made by the defense, the State informed the trial 
court that it was withdrawing its previous request that the trial court instruct the 
jury on the pecuniary gain and the CCP aggravators.  The State presented Michael 
Pool, Thelma Summers (Michael Pool’s grandmother), and Valerie Speed (Pool’s 
aunt) as witnesses with victim impact statements.  These witnesses simply read 
prepared statements to the jury, without examination by the lawyers.  Afterward, 
the State rested.   
Following its consultation with Sparre, the defense withdrew its request that 
the trial court instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating circumstance that Sparre 
had no significant criminal history mitigator as a matter of law because the State 
was prepared to introduce rebuttal evidence that Sparre committed domestic 
violence against his former girlfriend.  Prior to the defense’s decision to withdraw 
its request for the instruction on no significant criminal history, the trial court ruled 
that if defense counsel introduced evidence regarding the no significant criminal 
history mitigator, it would allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence that Sparre 
had a history of intentionally hurting animals to relieve stress.6  Under oath, Sparre 
                                          
 
 
6.  The State was prepared to present evidence that Sparre made admissions 
to Dr. Krop about deliberately killing animals—Sparre shot dogs with firearms, 
and he once ran over a cat with a lawnmower.   
 
 
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testified before the trial judge that he agreed with defense counsel’s withdrawal of 
its previous request for a jury instruction on the no significant criminal history 
mitigating factor.   
Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury on two aggravating 
circumstances of felony murder and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC).  It also instructed the jury on the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance statutory mitigator and the age statutory mitigator.  The trial court also 
instructed the jury on the general catch-all mitigation of “any other factors in the 
defendant’s character, background or life.”  The trial court also gave the jury 
special instructions on seventeen nonstatutory mitigators.   
The jury retired to deliberate.  However, less than an hour later, the jury 
posed a question to the trial court regarding the meaning of the eighth nonstatutory 
mitigating factor—the incident was situational.  The Defense objected to the trial 
court providing any further definition to the jury.  The State also objected for the 
same reason.  The trial court responded to the jury in the presence of Sparre and 
counsel as follows:   
Ladies and gentlemen, I don’t have any additional definitions 
for you as to that.  I’m just going to ask you to rely on your common 
sense and the instructions as I have already given them to you and ask 
you to continue to deliberate on your recommendation, okay?  Thank 
you.  
 
 
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The jury resumed its deliberations from 3:05 to 3:27 p.m.  Afterward, by a 
twelve-to-zero vote, the jury recommended that the trial court impose the death 
sentence.   
The trial court ordered a PSI report.  The trial court also requested 
sentencing memoranda from the parties.  The trial court informed Sparre that he 
had a right to present mitigation evidence during the prospective Spencer7 hearing.   
V.  SPENCER HEARING 
On January 27, 2012, the trial court conducted a Spencer hearing.  At the 
start of the Spencer hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that Sparre 
maintained his refusal to allow his defense team to present mitigation.  Defense 
counsel proffered to the trial court that mitigation evidence would have been 
presented through twenty-five witnesses.  Moreover, counsel represented that it 
was the same mitigation evidence the defense team would have presented at the 
penalty phase, except that one additional witness would have appeared during the 
Spencer hearing.  The trial court conducted another colloquy with Sparre to 
confirm whether his waiver of mitigation was knowing and voluntary.   
The trial judge inquired whether the parties had any arguments pertaining to 
the filed PSI report.  Defense counsel raised no objections to the trial court about 
the PSI report as filed.  The State, however, initially sought to correct Sparre’s 
                                          
 
 
7.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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military background contained in the PSI report to include a fight, but later the 
State conceded that Sparre’s Chapter 11 administrative discharge from the Army 
noted in the PSI report sufficed for its concerns.  The Chapter 11 administrative 
discharge that Sparre received indicated that he had problems adjusting from 
civilian life to military life.  Prompted by a concern raised by the State, the trial 
court stated for the record that it had no intention of considering the sentencing 
recommendation made by the parole officer who prepared the PSI report.   
The State presented the testimony of JSO Officer Daisy Peoples and 
Chewning for purposes of identifying a letter Sparre attempted to mail to 
Chewning.  The letter, dated January 2, 2012, was retrieved by correctional staff 
and not mailed.  We note that the trial judge ordered that the letter be sealed, and 
neither witness was permitted to read from or disclose on the record any of the 
contents of the letter.8  The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this 
additional testimonial evidence on the basis that it was offered to reinforce 
aggravation already proven.   
The State presented Officer Peoples because her job was to monitor letters 
sent out or received by inmates.  Officer Peoples testified that she retrieved from 
                                          
 
 
8.  We note that the unsworn contents of Sparre’s letter dated January 2, 
2012, describes his assertion that he deliberately planned Pool’s murder several 
days beforehand.  Therein, Sparre alleged that he intended to carry out the murder 
by stabbing or other sharp force trauma. 
 
 
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Sparre the letter dated January 2, 2012, when he was housed in a one-man holding 
cell.  Therefore, Officer Peoples testified that she was certain that she retrieved the 
letter at issue from Sparre.  Chewning testified during direct examination that she 
recognized the handwriting in the letter as Sparre’s handwriting.  The defense did 
not cross-examine Chewning.   
Following the testimony, defense counsel moved for a new trial.  The trial 
court denied the defense’s motion for a new trial.  Defense counsel also 
unsuccessfully moved the trial court for a new penalty phase.   
The trial court conducted a colloquy with Sparre to confirm whether his 
declination to exercise his right as the defendant to testify at the Spencer hearing 
was knowing and voluntary.  The State advised the trial court that it was prohibited 
from giving the jury’s recommendation to impose the sentence of death great 
weight because the defense chose not to present any mitigation during the penalty 
phase.  The State further argued that two aggravators were proven: (1) the felony 
murder aggravator; and (2) HAC.  The State argued that the trial court should give 
these aggravators great weight.  The State discussed the following mitigating 
circumstances: (1) it argued against the extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
mitigator; (2) it acknowledged that the statutory age mitigator applied, but urged 
the trial court to give it little weight because even though Sparre was nineteen 
 
 
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years old, he was not an inexperienced young man; and (3) it discussed the 
nonstatutory mitigators, urging the court to give them little weight.   
After the Spencer hearing, both parties filed respective memoranda 
addressing whether the death penalty should be imposed.  And, on February 9, 
2012, the trial court entered an order admitting into evidence Sparre’s letter dated 
January 2, 2012.   
VI.  SENTENCING 
On March 30, 2012, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing.  After 
hearing from the lawyers, the trial court read into the record a substantial portion of 
its previously prepared, written sentencing order.  The trial court noted that it 
ordered a PSI report and that “this Court has carefully considered the entire record 
including the PSI in evaluating mitigating circumstances.”  The trial court found 
two aggravating circumstances to which both were assigned great weight: (1) 
HAC; and (2) the murder was committed during the course of a burglary.   
The trial court found a single statutory mitigating circumstance—Sparre was 
nineteen years old at the time of the murder—to which it assigned moderate 
weight.  The trial court explained its weighing decision regarding the age 
mitigating circumstance, noting that to be significantly mitigating, age must be 
“linked with some other characteristic” such as immaturity, but the trial court 
found “no evidence of significant emotional immaturity.”  The trial court noted 
 
 
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that Sparre “had received his GED; had served in the Army National Guard for a 
year; and was a father.”  The trial court also stated that it considered the totality of 
circumstances in the case.  However, it ultimately rejected the statutory mitigating 
circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance based on the following 
rationale.   
Despite defense counsel’s proffer that mental health experts could establish 
that Sparre suffered from PTSD, Sparre’s efforts to conceal his involvement, 
including cleaning up the crime scene and attempting to establish an alibi by 
sending a text to the victim after she was dead, negated the likelihood that Sparre 
was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.  The 
trial court also observed that the defendant wrote in a letter to his ex-girlfriend that 
he wanted to murder someone just to see how it felt, all of which negated any 
claim of extreme emotional disturbance.  Based on the evidence in the record and 
the PSI report, the trial court found thirteen nonstatutory mitigating factors and 
assigned each of them weights.9  
                                          
 
 
9.  Nonstatutory mitigators found were: (1) Sparre accepts responsibility for 
his actions (little weight); (2) Sparre has been neglected (some weight); (3) Sparre 
suffers from emotional deprivation and was emotionally abused (some weight); (4) 
Sparre was physically abused by his step-father and mother (some weight); (5) 
Sparre lacks a good support system (some weight); (6) Sparre’s father was absent 
from his life (some weight); (7) Sparre is good at fixing things (slight weight); (8) 
Sparre dropped out of high school but obtained a GED (little weight); (9) Sparre 
participated in ROTC in high school and was in the U.S. military (slight weight); 
(10) Sparre is devoted to his grandmother (little weight); (11) Sparre has a child 
 
 
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In its final analysis, the trial court concluded that based on the “heinous 
nature of Tiara Pool’s murder,” the “aggravating circumstances in this case far 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances” and the scales “tilt unquestionably to the 
side of death.”  The trial court explained that it was not giving the jury 
recommendation great weight because the defendant waived presentation of 
mitigation.  The trial court sentenced Sparre to death.   
VII.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Muhammad Claim 
Sparre argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not calling the 
proffered witnesses as its own after the defense team informed the trial court that 
Sparre forbade it from putting on a mitigation case.  The State argues that Sparre 
cannot waive the presentation of mitigation evidence during the trial, and then raise 
the claim during his direct appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
calling its own witnesses that had knowledge of mitigation.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we conclude there is insufficient evidence in the record to support 
Sparre’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by violating our holding 
in Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 343. 
1.  Standard of Review 
                                                                                                                                        
(some weight); (12) Sparre loves his family (some weight); and (13) Sparre’s 
family loves him (some weight). 
 
 
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When a capital murder defendant waives his or her right to present a 
mitigation case, if the trial court is alerted to the probability of significant 
mitigation, the court has discretion to call its own witnesses or to appoint special 
counsel for purposes of introducing such evidence.  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d 
at 364.  A trial court’s “ ‘[d]iscretion is abused only “when the judicial action is 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion 
is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.”  Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 963 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Trease v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 
1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990))).’ ”  This Court will only disturb the trial court’s 
discretionary judgment when the record shows that the judgment was an abuse of 
discretion. 
2.  Merits 
 
Sparre asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not calling its own 
witnesses from a list of twenty-five people, including four clinicians, that defense 
counsel proffered would provide substantial mental mitigation evidence.  In 
Muhammad, this Court established the existing policy requiring preparation of a 
comprehensive PSI report when a capital murder defendant waives the presentation 
of mitigation evidence.   
[W]e have now concluded that the better policy will be to require the 
preparation of a PSI in every case where the defendant is not 
 
 
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challenging the imposition of the death penalty and refuses to present 
mitigation evidence.  To be meaningful, the PSI should be 
comprehensive and should include information such as previous 
mental health problems (including hospitalizations), school records, 
and relevant family background.  In addition, the trial court could 
require the State to place in the record all evidence in its possession of 
a mitigating nature such as school records, military records, and 
medical records.  Further, if the PSI and the accompanying records 
alert the trial court to the probability of significant mitigation, the trial 
court has the discretion to call persons with mitigating evidence as its 
own witnesses. . . .  If the trial court prefers that counsel present 
mitigation rather than calling its own witnesses, the trial court 
possesses the discretion to appoint counsel to present the mitigation as 
was done in Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991) or to utilize 
standby counsel for this limited purpose. 
Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363-64 (footnotes omitted).   
For more than a decade, we have upheld the Muhammad policy, which 
requires that comprehensive PSI reports be prepared and filed with the trial court 
whenever a capital defendant facing the death penalty waives his or her right to 
present a mitigation case.  See, e.g., Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2011) 
(discussing Muhammad requirements); McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 879-80 
(Fla. 2011) (citing Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363).   
Here, we reemphasize that the trial courts should take the necessary steps to 
ensure that the PSI reports that they order are indeed prepared in a comprehensive 
manner.  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363.  To that end, we emphasize that the 
record on appeal must be comprised of PSI reports that are meaningful in 
 
 
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circumstances in which a competent defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives 
the presentation of mitigation evidence. 
We think it is prudent that trial court orders contain language that does not 
leave to chance that PSI reports, prepared by non-lawyers, will satisfy the 
Muhammad standard.  Rather, such orders should specify the kind of information 
the trial judge needs to consider.  Trial court orders that provide sufficient 
guidance for the preparers of PSI reports will invariably operate to ensure that in 
every case the PSI reports will provide the trial courts with meaningful information 
about the defendant’s background and personal history.  In Muhammad, we 
contemplated that comprehensive PSI reports and their accompanying records 
would put the trial court on notice about any potentially significant mitigation that 
exists.   
Sparre now claims that he is entitled to relief because the trial court violated 
the Muhammad standard because without hearing testimony from the proffered 
witnesses, the guilt phase evidence and the PSI provided the only basis for finding 
the mitigating circumstances against imposing the death penalty.  The PSI report 
addressed Sparre’s physical and mental health as follows:   
When interviewed at the Pre-Trial Detention Facility on December 28, 
2011, the defendant stated he was in good physical health and denied 
being depressed or suicidal.  The defendant showed no obvious signs 
of impairment to this officer.  The defendant’s grandmother disagreed 
with the defendant’s self-assessment.  She stated the defendant was 
 
 
- 23 - 
“mentally challenged and had mental problems,” in addition to 
suffering from ADHD. 
And, regarding Sparre’s alcohol and drug abuse, the PSI report stated: 
 
 
The defendant admits to both heavy drinking and extensive 
drug use since an early age.  The defendant states he has been using 
pills since age 14.  He stated he had illegally used Xanax, Ecstasy, 
Hydrocodone and Percocet pills.  He stated his drug of choice is 
alcohol.  He admits that he preferred vodka, and was a blackout type 
of drinker, on average blacking out two times per month.  He stated he 
was normally non-violent and laid back under the influence of 
alcohol.  He stated he did not prefer bourbon, because he did not like 
the effect as it was the opposite of feeling laid back.  He admitted he 
blacked out on his 18th birthday when drinking and partying with his 
mother. 
We observe that neither party raised any objection on the record or 
otherwise informed the trial court that the PSI report filed is inadequate under 
Muhammad or any other legal standard.  Accordingly, under the totality of the 
circumstances present in Sparre’s case, we are unpersuaded that the PSI report the 
trial court considered lacked meaningfulness to the point of violating the 
Muhammad standard that it be a comprehensive document.  Id.   
Moreover, there is insufficient information in the record showing that the 
trial judge’s declination to call any witnesses alleged to have knowledge of 
mitigation evidence pertaining to Sparre’s sentence reflects a departure from the 
Muhammad standard.  In its sentencing order, the trial court entered findings from 
which it concluded that Sparre was not under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.  The trial court addressed evidence that Sparre had planned 
 
 
- 24 - 
the crime several days before meeting Pool in Jacksonville.  Next, the trial court 
addressed Sparre’s numerous actions to conceal his involvement after he murdered 
Tiara Pool.10 
The record also reflects that the trial court properly found that Sparre’s age 
of nineteen years at the time of the crime was established under the statutory 
requirements.  See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2010).  And, the trial court’s 
discretionary judgment to assign this statutory mitigating factor moderate weight in 
Sparre’s case is supported by existing case law.  See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 
845, 859 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is 
within the trial court’s discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”); 
see also Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 661 (Fla. 2003) (“The determination of 
whether age is a mitigating factor depends on the circumstances of each case, and 
is within the trial court’s discretion.”); Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 697-98 (Fla. 
2002) (“[W]here the defendant is not a minor, i.e., under eighteen, ‘no per se rule 
exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic circumstance in mitigation.  
Instead, the trial judge is to evaluate the defendant’s age based on the evidence 
                                          
 
 
10.  The record shows the following evidence in support of the trial court’s 
judgment: (1) Sparre cleaned the murder scene and bragged to detectives about 
doing so; (2) Sparre tried to establish an alibi by sending a text to Tiara Pool; (3) 
Sparre parked Tiara Pool’s car away from the hospital and its surveillance 
cameras; (4) Sparre burned the clothes he wore on the day of the murder; and (5) 
Sparre made statements in a letter dated September 16, 2011, stating “I slumped 
[i.e., killed] that b[*]tch.”  
 
 
- 25 - 
adduced at trial and at the sentencing hearing.’ ” (quoting Shellito v. State, 701 So. 
2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997))). 
Furthermore, we determine that there is competent, substantial evidence in 
this record for the thirteen nonstatutory mitigating factors for which the trial court 
assigned some, little, and slight weights.  See Spann, 857 So. 2d at 854 (“[T]he 
trial court must consider all mitigation anywhere in the record to the extent it is 
believable and uncontroverted even when a defendant waives the presentation of 
mitigating evidence.” (citing Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2001))).   
The record shows that the trial court cautioned Sparre about the risks 
involved with his decision to forbid defense counsel from putting on mitigation 
evidence.  The trial court also cautioned Sparre that there were risks in declining to 
exercise his right to testify on his own behalf.  The trial court informed Sparre that 
under the circumstances there could be insufficient evidence in the record for 
finding mitigation that potentially counterbalances any aggravating factors in 
support of the death penalty.   
An argument can be made that Sparre’s proffered mitigation evidence would 
have rebutted the PSI report’s entry stating: “The defendant showed no obvious 
signs of impairment to this officer.”  However, Sparre has the burden to show that 
the trial court’s judgment to forego calling mitigation witnesses after Sparre 
 
 
- 26 - 
waived introducing such evidence “is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.”  Ocha, 
826 So. 2d at 963.   
In light of the trial court’s findings and the reasons it provided for how it 
judged the alleged mitigation, there is no showing that the trial court failed to 
follow established procedure or engaged in actions that were arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable with regard to its judgment that it was unnecessary to call any of the 
mitigation witnesses proffered by Sparre’s defense team.11  Russ, 73 So. 3d at 190 
(“Further, we have stated that ‘[p]roffered evidence is merely a representation of 
what evidence the defendant proposes to present and is not actual evidence.’. . . 
                                          
 
 
11.  The trial court performed the requirements set forth in Koon to assess 
Sparre’s waiver of presenting mitigation evidence: (1) Sparre testified under oath 
that he consulted with his lawyers about his decision to refuse putting on 
mitigation evidence; (2) the court informed Sparre that it would instruct the jury 
about aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (3) the court informed Sparre 
about the statutory basis for aggravation and the rationale on whether it would be 
applied in his case; (4) the court also informed Sparre about statutory mitigation, 
and the risks of not having it applied if the experts did not testify; (5) the court also 
informed Sparre about the risks of not having testimonial evidence in support of 
nonstatutory mitigators; (6) after this exchange with the court, Sparre personally 
informed the court that he fully understood everything that it explained and 
declined the court’s invitation to ask questions; (7) defense counsel stated for the 
record that it did not believe that Sparre lacked competence to make the decision to 
refuse to put on a mitigation case; (9) at the prompting of the State, the court asked 
Sparre whether he was under the influence of any medication—to which Sparre 
responded that he had been prescribed Thorazine and Celexa, but he stopped taking 
them because they gave him “the shakes”; and (10) the court commented on the 
record that Sparre appeared to be lucid and confirmed with counsel that there was 
an absence of competency with respect to Sparre’s involvement with all aspects of 
the trial. 
 
 
- 27 - 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to consider the proffered mitigation 
evidence that was presented during the Koon hearing.”).   
The trial court’s detailed sentencing order provides sufficient evidentiary 
bases that would discourage a reasonable person from rejecting its judgment.  Id.  
Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence in the record showing a probability of 
substantial mitigation that the trial court should have further considered by calling 
its own witnesses in accordance with the governing standard.  See Muhammad, 
782 So. 2d at 364; Russ, 73 So. 3d at 191 (“Here, the PSI report did not alert the 
court to the probability of significant mental mitigation.”). 
The trial court’s order reflects that under the totality of circumstances 
surrounding Sparre’s case, it judged that the trial evidence and the PSI report 
provide sufficient grounds for the mitigation found and the weights it assigned to 
each factor.  We agree and conclude that Sparre simply fails to establish by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record how the trial court abused its 
discretion in declining to call its own mitigation witnesses.   
3.  Harmless Error 
Even if it can be later shown that the trial court’s declination to call its own 
mitigation witnesses or appoint special counsel to put on a mitigation case under 
the circumstances was an abuse of discretion, such judgment by the trial court was 
 
 
- 28 - 
not reversible error.  In light of the two very weighty aggravators: HAC12 and 
murder committed during the course of a burglary,13 any error that occurred by the 
trial court’s abuse of discretion concerning this issue is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See generally Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 548 (Fla. 2009) 
(“We find that although the trial court’s treatment of this mitigator was improper, 
the error was harmless given the severity of the three aggravators in the case and 
other relatively weak mitigation.”); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 959 (Fla. 
2003) (determining “that even if any error occurred in not admitting the letters 
[during the penalty phase], which it did not, such error was harmless”). 
Based on the aggravating factors that the trial court found and assigned great 
weight, and notwithstanding any weight assigned to the proffered mitigating 
factors, there was no reasonable probability the finding of such mitigating factors 
would have changed the jury’s death penalty recommendation or the trial court’s 
judgment to impose the sentence of death.  See Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 867 
(Fla. 2009) (“The trial court expressly stated that any one of the aggravators found 
(except felony probation) was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors due to 
the totality of the aggravating factors that we uphold and affirm today.  There is no 
possibility that any erroneous finding on this issue affected the sentence 
                                          
 
 
12.  See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
13.  See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010) 
 
 
- 29 - 
imposed.”).  Under the circumstances found in this case, if the trial court’s exercise 
of discretion in declining to call its own mitigation witnesses regarding these 
statutory mitigating factors could be deemed an abuse of discretion, such a 
judgment constituted harmless error.   
We note that the trial court found that no evidence was introduced for the 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance “the Defendant’s judgment was impaired.”  
However, in a portion of the redacted video-recording of Sparre’s interview with 
detectives on July 24 that was replayed for the jury, Sparre made a statement that 
could be deemed evidence of his impaired judgment.  The jury heard the detectives 
ask why he killed Pool, and Sparre’s response.  The record reflects that Sparre 
responded by stating that when he went into the kitchen he retrieved the large knife 
and returned to the bedroom where Pool was lying supine and nude across her bed.  
Sparre states that he began massaging her at first, but then he started stabbing her 
and described his experience during the attack as “tripping out.”  Sparre did not, 
however, explain what he meant by his self-assessment that he was “tripping out.”   
The record shows that when the detectives asked him about whether he had 
taken any drugs prior to committing the crime, Sparre denied that he was under the 
influence of any drugs during his fatal attack of Pool.  Sparre’s “tripping out” 
expression could be viewed as constituting some evidence that “he was not in a 
state of mind where he could make clear and rational decisions.”   
 
 
- 30 - 
On the other hand, the ambiguous meaning of “tripping out” is not in itself 
competent, substantial evidence that warrants a finding of the nonstatutory 
mitigating factor.  In light of this aspect of the video-recording evidence from 
Sparre’s interview with detectives, if the trial court erred by ruling there was no 
evidence presented in support of the defendant’s impaired judgment nonstatutory 
mitigating factor, its error was in not exploring what Sparre meant by his assertion 
that he began “tripping out” during his attack on Pool.  
Even if the trial court should have found evidence that Sparre’s “judgment 
was impaired,” a failure to find this nonstatutory mitigating factor would constitute 
harmless error in light of the overwhelming weight of evidence that he was guilty 
of committing first-degree murder and the findings of very serious aggravating 
circumstances.  See Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 1210 (Fla. 2009) (“The test for 
harmless error is set out in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).  Under 
DiGuilio, ‘[t]he question [for harmless error analysis] is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.’  Id. at 1139.”).  
Accordingly, we reject this claim and deny Sparre any relief thereto.   
B.  Invitation to Recede from Hamblen 
Next, Sparre urges us to recede from our holding in Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 
800.  Sparre specifically argues that the following excerpt from Hamblen is 
problematic: 
 
 
- 31 - 
We find no error in the trial judge’s handling of this case.  Hamblen 
had a constitutional right to represent himself, and he was clearly 
competent to do so.  To permit counsel to take a position contrary to 
his wishes through the vehicle of guardian ad litem would violate the 
dictates of Faretta.  In the field of criminal law, there is no doubt that 
“death is different,” but, in the final analysis, all competent defendants 
have a right to control their own destinies.  This does not mean that 
courts of this state can administer the death penalty by default.  The 
rights, responsibilities and procedures set forth in our constitution and 
statutes have not been suspended simply because the accused invites 
the possibility of a death sentence.  A defendant cannot be executed 
unless his guilt and the propriety of his sentence have been established 
according to law.   
Id. at 804.   
According to Sparre, Hamblen and its progeny are based on two faulty 
premises.  First, the appointment of special counsel would interfere with a 
defendant’s right to self-representation.  Second, a case-by-case approach ensures 
that the death penalty is imposed fairly, reliably, and uniformly.   
We find that Sparre has not provided a good-faith basis for suggesting that 
we recede from controlling precedent comparable to that which we established in 
Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992).  In Haag, Justice Kogan writing for a 
unanimous Court stated:   
We recognize that our opinion today recedes from and 
overrules earlier precedent in this jurisdiction.  The opinions of the 
district courts in Lindsay v. State, 579 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1991), Ruggirello v. State, 566 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA), review 
dismissed, 569 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1990), Clifford v. State, 513 So. 2d 
772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Tucker v. Wainwright, 235 So. 2d 38 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1970), contain results or analyses inconsistent with our 
views and accordingly are disapproved to the extent that they conflict 
 
 
- 32 - 
with this opinion.  We also are receding from Walker v. Wainwright, 
303 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974), and State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 
2d 518 (Fla. 1964), to the extent they conflict with the views 
expressed above. 
While the doctrine of stare decisis normally would require a 
greater deference to this prior precedent, we find that the demands of 
justice and the principles of constitutional law recited above require 
an alteration in the precedent.  As is self-evident, even the common 
law must bend before the dictates of the Florida Constitution.  Not 
even the hoariest precedent is permitted to violate the guarantees of 
habeas relief, equal protection, and equal access to the courts, or any 
of the other fundamental rights set forth in the Declaration of Rights. 
Art. I, Fla. Const. 
 . . . . 
It is a rule that precedent must be followed except when departure is 
necessary to vindicate other principles of law or to remedy continued 
injustice.  McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 
323 (1935).  We find that the guarantees embodied in Florida’s 
Declaration of Rights are best vindicated by overruling the contrary 
precedent noted above. 
Id. at 617-18.   
Therefore, we reject Sparre’s suggestion and explain why we decline to 
recede from Hamblen.  First, Sparre’s case-specific and self-serving arguments do 
not rise to the level of showing that “the demands of justice and the principles of 
constitutional law recited above require an alteration in the precedent” due to a 
recurring problem pertaining to this issue.  Haag, 591 So. 2d at 618.  Next, Sparre 
fails to point our attention to any specific way that Hamblen and its progeny, e.g., 
Muhammad, foster patent injustices, or otherwise stand contrary to constitutional 
imperatives in Florida’s death penalty cases.  Next, we find that the State raises a 
legitimate concern that the rule change that Sparre advocates could foreseeably 
 
 
- 33 - 
result in violations of the United States Supreme Court’s longstanding holding in 
Faretta.14  Under Faretta, competent capital defendants have the right to decide the 
courses of their own defense. 
We find no compelling reason to alter the Hamblen policy.  This policy 
subjects a trial court’s judgment about whether to call its own mitigation witnesses 
or appoint special mitigation counsel to an abuse of discretion standard on review.  
And, the present abuse of discretion review framework provides an adequate 
safeguard for capital defendants’ constitutionally protected rights.  Accordingly, 
we reject Sparre’s second claim as lacking merit and deny him any relief 
concerning this issue.   
C.  Ring Claim 
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), the Supreme Court 
“overrule[d] [Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)] to the extent that it allows a 
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”  We have repeatedly stated that the 
rule established by Ring does not apply under Florida’s death penalty law.  
See, e.g., Martin v. State, 107 So. 3d 281, 322 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2832 (U.S. 2013) (“This Court has repeatedly held that Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme does not violate the United States Constitution under Ring.” (citing Abdool 
                                          
 
 
14.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
 
- 34 - 
v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 228 (Fla. 2010))).  Accordingly, we reject Sparre’s claim, 
because Ring is not applicable under Florida law.   
 
Even if Ring applied under Florida law, Sparre’s claim is without merit for 
the following reasons.  First, the penalty phase jury in considering the evidence 
presented found that the aggravating circumstances, HAC and the murder was 
committed during an armed burglary, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 2003) (citing Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 
119 n.79 (Fla. 2003); Doorbal, 837 So. 2d at 963.  Second, the jury unanimously 
voted to recommend that Sparre be sentenced to death.  Therefore, it is axiomatic 
that the jury unanimously found that one or both aggravating factors should apply 
toward its recommendation for the death penalty.  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not violate Ring in sentencing Sparre to death.   
D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
“[T]his Court has a mandatory obligation to independently review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a sentence of death has been 
imposed.”  Martin, 107 So. 3d at 325 (citing Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 850 
(Fla. 2007)).  “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime 
 
 
- 35 - 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 
(Fla. 2001)).   
 
There is competent, substantial evidence in the record for the jury to convict 
Sparre of premeditated first-degree murder and first-degree murder during the 
course of an armed burglary.  Under Florida law, premeditation prior to the act of 
murder is understood as requiring proof that the defendant was aware of the 
consequences of the actions that caused death, and that the defendant had the 
opportunity for reflection prior to committing the fatal act.  Patrick v. State, 104 
So. 3d 1046, 1063 (Fla. 2012) (“Premeditation is defined as more than a mere 
intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose to kill 
may be formed a moment before the act but must also exist for a sufficient length 
of time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the 
probable result of that act.” (quoting Bigham v. State, 995 So. 2d 207, 212 (Fla. 
2008))), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 85 (2013); Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 951 
(Fla. 2007) (citing Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993)).   
The evidence in this record shows that Sparre made a conscious decision to 
walk from the victim’s bedroom to retrieve a large kitchen knife as his weapon of 
choice to carry out a sustained knife attack on his defenseless victim after walking 
back from the kitchen to the bedroom where she was lying down.  Testimony from 
the medical examiner confirmed Sparre’s statement that it took Pool several 
 
 
- 36 - 
minutes to die from her wounds; she fought for her life and sustained at least 
eighty-eight sharp-force injuries, including thirty-nine defensive wounds, before 
succumbing to death.  In the opinion of the medical examiner, the fatal wounds 
inflicted by Sparre came near the end of his attack on Pool.  It is evident that 
Sparre had time even after he began his vicious attack on Pool to stop himself 
before he inflicted any of the mortal wounds.  See Patrick, 104 So. 3d at 1063 
(“The record here demonstrates sufficient evidence for the jury to have inferred 
that Patrick did intend for [the victim] to die.”). 
The commission of the murder during an armed burglary was established 
when Sparre’s invitation into Pool’s residence was effectively rescinded.  See 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 681 (Fla. 2010) (“Shortly after the decision in 
[Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000)], the Florida Legislature enacted 
legislation abrogating that decision, and clarifying that ‘for a burglary to occur, it is 
not necessary for the licensed or invited person to remain in the dwelling, structure 
or conveyance surreptitiously.’ ”) (footnote omitted).   
In other words, Sparre was no longer an invitee at the point in time he began 
his fatal attack on Pool, and she began futilely attempting to defend herself.  In 
addition, Sparre exhibited his intent to commit burglary when he remained in 
Pool’s residence and committed a forcible felony against her (murder).   
 
 
- 37 - 
The trial court instructed the jury on the requirements under Florida law for 
all applicable offenses, including premeditated murder and felony murder with the 
underlying felony of burglary.  And, the jury returned a special guilty verdict for 
“the killing was done during the commission of a felony, to wit: Burglary.”  We 
have previously held that such verdicts as the one the jury returned for Sparre are 
permissible under Florida law.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla. 2004) 
(“[I]t is well settled that if an indictment charges premeditated murder, the State 
need not charge felony murder or the particular underlying felony to receive a 
felony murder instruction. . . .  As long as the definition of the underlying felony 
provided to the jury is sufficiently definite to assure the defendant a fair trial, ‘[i]t 
is not necessary . . . to instruct on the elements of the underlying felony with the 
same particularity as would be required if the defendant were charged with the 
underlying felony.’ ”) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence 
in this record to support the jury’s guilty verdict of first-degree murder under both 
theories presented by the State in its capital murder case against Sparre.   
E.  Proportionality 
Our “proportionality review focuses on the totality of the circumstances in 
one case and compares it with other similar capital cases to ensure uniformity in 
application.”  Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 141 (Fla. 2001) (citing Urbin v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla. 1998)); see also Russ, 73 So. 3d at 198 (“[T]his 
 
 
- 38 - 
Court must conduct a qualitative analysis and comparison of other capital cases to 
determine whether the death sentence is proportionate.”); Barnes v. State, 29 So. 
3d 1010, 1028 (Fla. 2010) (“The death penalty is ‘reserved only for those cases 
where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.’ ” (quoting 
Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996))).  We have previously concluded 
that the HAC aggravating factor is one of the most serious established under the 
Florida Statutes.  Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 610 (Fla. 2009). 
In Sparre’s case, the trial court assigned great weight to the two aggravating 
factors found.  The only statutory mitigating factor—Sparre was nineteen years 
old—was assigned moderate weight.  And, the thirteen nonstatutory mitigating 
factors were respectively assigned some, little, and slight weights.  All of the trial 
court’s findings in aggravation and mitigation were based on competent, 
substantial evidence in this record. 
 
We have previously affirmed the death penalty in cases where two weighty 
aggravating factors—HAC and murder during the commission of a felony 
(burglary)—were proven, and these aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors found.  See Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 533 (Fla. 2008) (finding 
Woodel’s sentence of death proportionate for the stabbing death of an elderly 
couple for which the trial court found four aggravators—HAC, murder occurred 
during the commission of a burglary, previously convicted of another capital 
 
 
- 39 - 
felony, and advanced age of the victims made them particularly vulnerable—and 
four statutory mitigators—no significant criminal history; defendant’s age; 
substantial impairment of capacity to appreciate actions or conform conduct to the 
requirements of law; and extreme emotional disturbance—and ten nonstatutory 
mitigators); Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1066 (Fla. 2007) (finding Merck’s 
death sentence to be proportionate in light of the trial court’s finding of two 
aggravating factors, conviction of a prior violent felony and HAC; one statutory 
mitigating factor, defendant’s age of nineteen at the time of the murder; and 
several nonstatutory mitigating factors); Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 
874-76 (Fla. 2006) (finding Schoenwetter’s death sentences were proportionate 
when the victims were repeatedly and fatally stabbed, which supported the HAC 
finding; the trial court also found elimination of witness/avoid arrest as an 
aggravating factor; and considered statutory mitigators—defendant’s age, lack of 
prior criminal history, impaired capacity, and extreme emotional disturbance—and 
nonstatutory mitigating factors); Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96, 104 (Fla. 1996) 
(finding Geralds’ death sentence was proportionate after vacating the CCP 
aggravating factor because “two substantial aggravators [remained], including the 
heinous, atrocious, [or] cruel aggravator, and mitigation that the trial judge gave 
‘little weight.’ ”).   
 
 
- 40 - 
In light of existing case law, Sparre’s sentence is proportionate to other cases 
in which this Court has considered similar facts and aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and affirmed the death penalty imposed on those defendants.  See, 
e.g., Geralds, 674 So. 2d at 104. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sparre’s conviction for first-degree 
murder and the sentence of death imposed upon him.   
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in affirming Sparre’s conviction for first-degree murder.  I dissent, 
however, from the affirmance of his sentence of death.  In my view, the trial court 
erred by failing to call mitigation witnesses and by then rejecting the proposed 
mitigating factors that the testimony of these witnesses may have established, 
particularly where defense counsel stated that they could present potentially 
significant and compelling mitigating evidence regarding Sparre’s mental health 
and dysfunctional personal history.   
 
 
- 41 - 
I write to explain why this error cannot be considered harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and also to urge that this Court adopt specific guidelines for when 
trial courts should either appoint special counsel or call mitigation witnesses in any 
case where the defendant validly waives the presentation of mitigating evidence.  
While I agree with this Court’s continued emphasis on ensuring that all available 
mitigation is considered by the trial court, see Marquardt v. State, No. SC12-555, 
slip op. at 48-49 (Fla. Jan. 22, 2015), I would go one step further and require the 
appointment of special counsel in every case where the defendant waives 
mitigation.        
I. 
A. 
In this case, Sparre was only nineteen years old at the time of the crime and 
had a history of mental illness and physical and emotional abuse.  Four mental 
health experts were prepared to testify as to the nature of his illness and that he had 
diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, and 
Bipolar Schizoaffective Disorder—and that his PTSD dated back to his childhood 
when he was in a boys’ school in South Carolina.  Defense counsel also informed 
the trial court that they were prepared to present testimony that Sparre’s continued 
 
 
- 42 - 
use of drugs, such as hydrocodone and cocaine, could cause blackouts and memory 
loss, and that he had a dysfunctional family and personal history.  
Despite being informed about all of this potentially significant mitigating 
evidence, including mental health mitigation, the trial court failed to take any 
action, other than to order a comprehensive presentence investigation report (PSI) 
as required by Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 2001).  The trial 
court did not hear from witnesses that could have testified as to what may have 
prompted Sparre’s PTSD during childhood, nor did the trial court ascertain any 
other potentially compelling mitigation concerning Sparre’s mental health and the 
mitigating circumstances that may apply—even though the trial court was 
specifically alerted to the existence of this potentially significant evidence.  Thus, 
aside from what can be gleaned from the PSI, the record is devoid of any evidence 
in mitigation for this young offender since none of the mitigation that clearly exists 
was ever presented. 
Although this Court has left it to the discretion of the trial courts to 
determine whether to call mitigation witnesses or appoint special counsel to 
present mitigating evidence in cases where the defendant waives mitigation, see id. 
at 364, a trial court’s discretion is not without limits.  In particular, trial courts still 
have an obligation to consider and weigh all possible mitigation in the record and 
to call witnesses when the PSI “alerts the court to the existence of significant 
 
 
- 43 - 
mitigation.”  Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 189 (Fla. 2011).  By improperly limiting 
its consideration of the mitigating evidence to only what was contained in the PSI, 
even though the trial court was alerted to “the existence of significant mitigation” 
in this case, I would conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, which must 
be exercised in a way that enables the trial court and this Court to accurately and 
reliably determine whether a death sentence is warranted under Florida law.   
The sole reason offered by the trial court in its written sentencing order for  
not exercising its important discretion to call mitigation witnesses, or to appoint 
special counsel to do so, based on the mitigation that defense counsel informed the 
trial court that they could present, was that Sparre did not want any witnesses to be 
called.  This was error since the trial court is required by Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute to ensure that the defendant is truly deserving of the death 
penalty, which is not solely dependent on a defendant’s own wishes to be 
sentenced to death.  See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2012) (requiring a trial court to 
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, if imposing a sentence of 
death, to state that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances).  In fact, not only did the trial court fail to call 
witnesses or appoint special counsel even after being alerted to the existence of this 
significant mitigation, but the trial court then compounded this error by rejecting 
defense counsel’s proposed mitigating circumstances that testimony from these 
 
 
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witnesses may have established, stating that it “was not required to accept” those 
mitigators as proven based on the information defense counsel brought to the trial 
court’s attention.   
Because the trial court failed to even explore the proposed mitigators based 
on evidence that could have been presented, this Court is likewise unable to 
adequately fulfill our constitutional and statutory responsibilities to determine 
whether this case constitutes one of the most aggravated and least mitigated of all 
murders, for which the death penalty is properly imposed.  See State v. Dixon, 283 
So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973).  This is of particular concern because “it is not necessarily 
those most deserving of the death penalty (e.g., the most aggravated and least 
mitigated) who seek its imposition and refuse to present mitigation.”  Muhammad, 
782 So. 2d at 369 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).    
B. 
This Court’s attempt on appeal to perform a harmless error analysis reveals 
the inherent problems created by the trial court’s error.  See majority op. at 27-30.  
Simply put, because none of the potentially significant mitigation was ever 
presented, there is no basis in the record for the majority to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced—that is, that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the jury or trial judge would have been affected by 
potentially compelling mitigation evidence to which they were never exposed.   
 
 
- 45 - 
This Court’s decision in Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991), 
perfectly illustrates why the trial court’s error cannot be considered harmless.  
Klokoc, who wished to be executed, waived the presentation of mitigating 
evidence, but the trial court appointed special counsel, who offered testimony 
concerning, among other things, Klokoc’s mental illness.  Id. at 220.  On direct 
appeal, this Court vacated the death sentence, concluding—based in large part on 
the evidence obtained and introduced by special counsel—that the murder occurred 
while Klokoc “was under extreme emotional distress” and that he suffered “from 
bipolar affective disorder, manic type with paranoid features, and that his family 
has a history of suicide, emotional disturbance, and alcoholism.”  Id. at 222.        
Similarly, in this case, we are confronted with a young offender who has a 
potentially compelling mental health and dysfunctional family background, 
including a diagnosis of PTSD dating to childhood and a physically and 
emotionally abusive upbringing.  Just as in Klokoc and our subsequent cases, this 
Court is required to consider whether this is truly a case deserving of the death 
penalty or whether the death penalty is not warranted, given both the nature of the 
crime and this young man’s history.  See Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 
1993) (explaining that the requirement that all mitigation be considered and 
weighed “applies with no less force when a defendant argues in favor of the death 
 
 
- 46 - 
penalty, and even if the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating 
evidence”).   
Yet, in the absence of any witness testimony or evidence introduced by 
special counsel, as was done in Klokoc, we are unable to consider the impact of 
Sparre’s mental illness on the commission of this crime, which hinders our 
responsibility to ensure that the death penalty is reliably and uniformly imposed in 
all cases.  Accordingly, a new penalty-phase proceeding is required. 
II. 
In my view, this case also represents another important reminder that the 
time has come to prospectively require the appointment of special counsel in any 
case in which the defendant waives mitigation, “in order to better assist the trial 
court and this Court in fulfilling its constitutional and statutory obligations in death 
penalty cases.”  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 368 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).  
As then-Chief Justice Barkett opined over twenty years ago, the appointment of 
special counsel is critical in order for this Court “to ensure a reliable and 
proportionate sentence.”  Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 251 (Fla. 1993) 
(Barkett, C.J., specially concurring).  “It should be the state’s independent and 
informed decision that imposes death and not the decision of a defendant who uses 
the state as an instrument for suicide.”  Farr, 621 So. 2d at 1371 (Barkett, C.J., 
specially concurring).   
 
 
- 47 - 
This case demonstrates why it is critical that we “have a uniform procedure 
to be followed in all cases where the defendant waives mitigation so that available 
mitigating evidence is placed in the record at the time of the original sentencing 
proceedings.”  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 368 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).  
Since Muhammad, where this Court authorized trial courts in their discretion to 
appoint special counsel, we have unfortunately continued to encounter some cases 
where special counsel has been appointed and others where trial courts have 
chosen not to do so, and this Court has still offered no definitive guidelines as to 
when the appointment of special counsel is appropriate.  Compare Russ, 73 So. 3d 
178 (appointing special counsel), with Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2002) 
(not appointing special counsel).       
Joined by Justices Shaw and Anstead in Muhammad, I stated as follows in 
asserting why appointment of special counsel should be required in all cases where 
the defendant waives mitigation, which remains as true today as it did over thirteen 
years ago: 
Because of the tremendous responsibilities placed on the trial 
court and this Court in death penalty cases, rather than leave the 
appointment of counsel to the trial court’s discretion on a case-by-case 
basis, I would thus adopt a prospective rule that would provide for the 
appointment of special counsel to present available mitigation for the 
benefit of the jury, the trial court and this Court in order to assist the 
judiciary in performing our statutory and constitutional obligations.  
This procedure, of course, would not prevent the defendant himself or 
herself from arguing in favor of the death penalty. 
 
 
- 48 - 
Adoption of this procedure would serve to promote several 
important interests critical to the integrity of the process: (1) it would 
assist any advisory jury in making a more informed sentencing 
recommendation of either death or life and in fulfilling its statutory 
obligation to weigh mitigating and aggravating circumstances under 
section 924.141(2)(b); (2) it would assist the trial court in making a 
more informed decision as to whether to impose the death sentence by 
ensuring that the court has before it the available mitigating evidence; 
and (3) it would facilitate this Court’s constitutionally mandated 
obligation to review each death sentence for proportionality. 
I also believe that adoption of this procedure would serve the 
important additional goal of promoting finality when a sentence of 
death is imposed. 
 
Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 370-71 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (emphasis 
added).  As further explained, “not only would a procedure providing for 
appointment of special counsel promote the fair and efficient administration of 
justice, but it would do so without requiring significant additional resources.”  Id. 
at 371. 
If a majority of this Court does not agree to prospectively require the 
appointment of special counsel in all cases where the defendant waives mitigation, 
trial courts should at least be provided guidance as to how to exercise their 
discretion, which is not boundless, in these difficult cases.  In particular, I would 
advise trial courts that, when they are made aware of the probability of significant 
mental health mitigation—as here—special counsel should be appointed, or 
alternatively, one or more of the mental health experts should be called to testify.  
This would be an additional step to further this Court’s important task to ensure 
 
 
- 49 - 
reliability and uniformity of cases where the death penalty is imposed and would 
be consistent with this Court’s own precedent regarding the basis for the trial court 
to call witnesses or appoint special counsel in the first place.  See Muhammad, 782 
So. 2d at 364 (“Further, if the PSI and the accompanying records alert the trial 
court to the probability of significant mitigation, the trial court has the discretion to 
call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses. . . .  If the trial court 
prefers that counsel present mitigation rather than calling its own witnesses, the 
trial court possesses the discretion to appoint counsel to present the 
mitigation . . . .” (emphasis added)).     
Finally, while it is true that no lawyer raised objections to the adequacy or 
comprehensiveness of the PSI in this case, without the appointment of special 
counsel, there was no attorney in a position to object to the PSI.  The reality is that 
no matter how often we direct that the PSI must be “comprehensive,” the very fact 
that the PSI is compiled by non-lawyers who are less familiar with the types of 
available and compelling mitigation that can be effectively presented makes the 
trial court’s decision of whether to call additional witnesses a difficult one.  
Requiring the appointment of special counsel to evaluate the PSI and present 
witnesses would assist the trial court’s ability to ensure that it has been fully 
informed about all mitigating evidence before determining whether to impose a 
 
 
- 50 - 
death sentence and would thus foster consistency and integrity in sentencing 
proceedings.     
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Elizabeth Anne Senterfitt, Judge - Case No. 162010CF008424AXXXMA 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada Margaret Carey, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee