Title: Georgia v. Abdullah

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket Nos. 31659, 39417 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant 
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Boise, November 2014 Term 
 
2015 Opinion No. 29 
 
Filed: March 2, 2015 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
  
    
 
 
Appeal from the district court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
 
of Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 
 
 
The convictions, sentences, and the order denying post-conviction relief 
 
are affirmed. 
 
 
Sara B. Thomas, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney 
 
for appellant.  Shannon N. Romero argued. 
 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for 
 
respondent.  LaMont Anderson argued. 
_____________________________ 
 
WALTERS, Justice pro tem 
On November 19, 2004, a jury found Azad Haji Abdullah guilty of first-degree murder, 
first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. 
The case proceeded to sentencing and the jury found the existence of two aggravating 
circumstances. The jury also found that all the mitigating circumstances when weighed against 
each aggravating circumstance individually were not sufficiently compelling to make the death 
penalty unjust. Pursuant to the jury verdicts, the district court entered judgments of conviction 
and sentenced Abdullah to death for first-degree murder and to a total of eighty years 
imprisonment for the remaining five convictions. Abdullah sought post-conviction relief. On 
October 14, 2011, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Abdullah’s 
petition for post-conviction relief in its entirety. Abdullah appeals to this Court, including both 
 
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his direct appeal from the trial and his appeal from the post-conviction proceedings. We affirm 
the convictions, the sentences, and the order denying post-conviction relief. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 14, 2002, the grand jury sitting in Ada County indicted Abdullah on one 
count of murder in the first degree, a felony, Idaho Code sections 18-4001 to -4003; one count of 
arson in the first degree, a felony, Idaho Code section 18-802; three counts of attempted murder 
in the first degree, a felony, Idaho Code sections 18-4001 and 18-306; and one count of injury to 
a child, a felony, Idaho Code section 18-1501(1). The State alleged that on October 5, 2002, 
Abdullah murdered his wife Angela Abdullah (Angie) in their home and then set fire to the home 
with two of the children (A.H. and M.A.) and a young friend (S.S.) asleep inside and one of their 
children (N.A.) in the backyard. On November 18, 2002, the district court arraigned Abdullah, 
and, on November 26, 2002, Abdullah pled not guilty.  
On December 3, 2002, the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty for 
the crime of first-degree murder. In this notice, the State identified that it would rely on four 
aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity; (3) by the murder or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant 
exhibited utter disregard for human life; and (4) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society.  
The Ada County Public Defender initially represented Abdullah, but, on June 19, 2003, 
private counsel Kim and Mitchell (Mitch) Toryanski (collectively “the Toryanskis”) filed a 
notice of appearance. The district court granted their motion for substitution of counsel.  
On February 23, 2004, the State amended the indictment. The original indictment 
provided that Abdullah killed Angie by suffocation. The amended indictment provided that 
Abdullah killed Angie “by suffocating her and/or by acute Prozac (fluoxetine) poisoning from 
which she died.”  
The case proceeded to trial in September of 2004. On September 10, the parties began 
voir dire of the prospective jurors. On September 23, the parties accepted the jury as empaneled 
and the jurors were sworn. The State gave its opening statement. The defense reserved its 
opening statement until after the State’s presentation of its case-in-chief.  
 
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As an appellate court, our function is to examine the evidence, not reweigh it, and we 
construe all facts and inferences in favor of upholding the district court’s decision. State v. Bush, 
131 Idaho 22, 33, 951 P.2d 1249, 1260 (1997). With this standard in mind, the jury reasonably 
could have found the following facts based on the evidence presented at trial:1 
Angie and Abdullah were married in March of 2001. Abdullah is Muslim and a Kurdish 
refugee from northern Iraq. Angie converted to Islam for Abdullah before they married. Angie 
had a daughter, A.H., from a previous marriage, and Abdullah had a son, R.A., from a previous 
marriage. Angie and Abdullah had two sons together, N.A. and M.A. A.H. was nine years old at 
the time of Angie’s death, R.A. was five years old, N.A. was eighteen months old, and M.A. was 
three weeks old.  
Angie and Abdullah’s marriage was troubled, and one point of disagreement was 
Abdullah’s religious studies. Abdullah wanted to move the family to South Africa or Saudi 
Arabia to study Islam, but Angie did not want to move. They also had financial troubles. A 
financial analyst with the FBI opined that Angie and Abdullah were “living month to month” and 
borrowing money to make ends meet. Shortly before the birth of M.A., Angie told health 
professionals she was contemplating divorce. On September 9, 2002, Angie met with an attorney 
to discuss divorce and other marital issues.  
Abdullah, Angie, and their children lived in a home on 2292 North Siesta Way in Boise, 
Idaho. Angie owned the Siesta residence. In June of 2002, Abdullah offered to sell everything in 
the residence to a co-worker. In August of 2002, Abdullah tried to sell the residence without 
Angie’s consent.  
In response to a co-worker’s question as to the differences between American and 
Kurdish culture, Abdullah told his co-workers it was acceptable to kill one’s wife or to have the 
wife killed in his culture if she cheated on the husband and the husband made an offering to the 
wife’s family. He made this comment in July or August of 2002.  
Abdullah and Angie ran a vending machine business part-time. In the summer of 2002, 
Abdullah stored the vending machines in the garage of the Siesta residence. On August 21, 2002, 
Abdullah purchased a $50,000 insurance policy in cash to cover the vending machines if 
destroyed by a fire. Although he was storing the vending machines at home, he was interested in 
                                                 
1 The summary of the evidence presented at trial follows in many respects the district court’s outline of the facts in 
its memorandum decision regarding post-conviction relief. 
 
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only fire insurance and not theft insurance. Abdullah was a named insured on Angie’s 
homeowner’s policy.  
On October 2, 2002, Abdullah told a co-worker that divorce is “extremely frowned upon 
in Islam, and that it just doesn’t happen.” He also went shopping at India Emporium that day and 
received a plastic bag to hold his purchase.  
On October 4, 2002, Abdullah drove to Salt Lake City, Utah, with his son R.A. Although 
Abdullah wanted to take N.A., his favorite child, on the trip, he did not take N.A. He claimed 
that the purpose of the trip was to get halal meat, which is a meat specially prepared for Muslims 
under the Islamic dietary guidelines and was not available in Boise. Before Abdullah left for Salt 
Lake City, he purchased approximately seventeen gallons of gasoline at a Chevron station in 
Boise. He also made a separate purchase of about five gallons of gasoline for a gas can. 
On October 4, 2002, a little before 4:00 p.m., Abdullah went to the Halal Market in Salt 
Lake City, but he did not buy any halal meat or discuss that kind of purchase with the owner. At 
approximately 4:15 p.m., Abdullah checked into the Dream Inn in Salt Lake City. At 
approximately 6:30 p.m., Abdullah purchased two red plastic gas cans from Food 4 Less. At 6:52 
p.m., Abdullah purchased at a Halloween store a long black cape that fully covered an adult and 
a mask that fully covered an adult head. The Abdullah family did not observe Halloween for 
religious reasons.2 Abdullah also visited the mosque. At 8:10 p.m., Abdullah purchased twenty-
two and a half gallons of gasoline, Cheetos, and coffee at a 7-Eleven in Salt Lake City. Twenty-
two and a half gallons was more than the tank capacity of Abdullah’s van, which could hold a 
little more than twenty-one gallons, but not twenty-two gallons. No one saw Abdullah in Salt 
Lake City from approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 4, 2002, to 7:00 a.m. on October 5, 2002.  
At seventy-five to eighty miles per hour, it would take about four and a half hours to 
drive between Salt Lake City and Boise, approximately 330 miles. Abdullah’s van gets a little 
over twenty-six miles per gallon and takes about thirteen gallons to make the trip.  
In Boise, around noon on October 4, 2002, ten-year-old S.S., a friend of A.H., was taken 
to the Siesta residence by S.S.’s mother to sleep over that night. Abdullah knew S.S. would be 
staying the night. S.S.’s mother spent about an hour and a half with Angie discussing M.A.’s 
                                                 
2 Imam Khaja Shuab Din testified that some Muslims allow their children to celebrate Halloween, but there would 
be no reason for adult costumes.  
 
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baby shower and testified that Angie seemed normal.3 Around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., Angie took 
A.H., N.A., M.A., and S.S. to Angie’s Aunt Charlene Javernick’s house in Eagle, Idaho, for 
dinner. Angie was acting normal, and she seemed relaxed and comfortable, not depressed, sad, or 
tense. On the way home from dinner, Angie rented a movie for A.H. and S.S. Angie and the 
children arrived home at approximately 10:30 p.m., and A.H. and S.S. watched the movie in the 
family room. Around midnight A.H. and S.S. fell asleep in the family room. Before going to 
sleep, Angie asked A.H. and S.S. to lock the doors. A.H. and S.S. made sure the front door and 
back door were locked. A.H. and S.S. did not check the door in the master bedroom, which went 
out to the back porch, or the door to the garage. A.H. and S.S. observed that Angie was wearing 
a “blue tank top dress” or “dress kind of gown with little purple flowers” for pajamas.  
Marjorie Wood, a clerk at a Chevron station in Mountain Home, Idaho, saw Abdullah in 
the Chevron store a little after midnight on October 5, 2002. Wood identified Abdullah from a 
photograph for law enforcement on October 11, 2002, and she told law enforcement that she was 
100 percent sure Abdullah was in the store.4  
On October 5, 2002, shortly before 1:54 a.m., S.S. woke up because she felt heat. S.S. 
saw “fire everywhere.” S.S. woke up A.H. by slapping her. A.H. saw fire “[a]ll over the roof” 
(evidently referring to the ceiling). A.H. and S.S. saw a path through the garage and ran out of 
the burning home. A.H. and S.S. had a minute or less to respond to the fire before a risk of death.  
Edward Kerschensteiner and his wife, who lived across the street from the Siesta 
residence, were awakened a little before 2:00 a.m. by A.H. and S.S. ringing their doorbell. A.H. 
and S.S. told Edward that Angie and the other children were still in the house. Brian and Linda 
Wright, who lived next to the Siesta residence, went with Edward to help search for other 
individuals in the burning home. Edward kicked down the door to the master bedroom, which 
was locked, ran into the bedroom, and rescued M.A., who was lying on the bed crying. Brian 
helped Edward rescue M.A. and then went into the family room with Edward to search for 
Angie. Neither Edward nor Brian saw N.A. in their search of the home. 
M.A. had soot and oily residue around his mouth and nose and on his clothing. If M.A. 
had not been rescued from the home, there was a very high probability M.A. would have died 
before the firefighters arrived at the scene.  
                                                 
3 S.S.’s mother had never let S.S. sleep over before because she was uncomfortable with Abdullah. 
4 Wood observed Abdullah talking with two other men with “black beards” in a different language in the store. 
Wood testified, “They were all the same race,” and they left the store “at pretty much the same time.”  
 
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At approximately 2:00 a.m., the firefighters arrived and initially entered the burning 
home in rescue mode. The firefighters quickly went into defensive mode, however, due to 
concerns of flashover, which is when everything in the room reaches ignition temperature and 
ignites at one time. Shortly after the firefighters retreated from the home through the front door, 
the living room flashed over. There was a very high probability of fatal injuries to the firefighters 
if any of them had been in the room when it flashed over.  
One firefighter found N.A. in the backyard during a secondary search around the burning 
home. N.A. was sitting on a large comforter from the master bedroom. N.A. was not covered in 
soot, did not smell like smoke, and did not have any signs on his body of being in a fire. N.A. 
could not open the door to the master bedroom or carry the comforter by himself. Due to the 
intense fire load, N.A. would have been burned if he remained in the backyard.  
The firefighters found that the front door was open with no signs of a forced entry, even 
though A.H. and S.S. had checked the lock before they went to bed.  
The firefighters used a thermal imager to scan the Siesta residence and saw a female 
body, identified as Angie, lying on the bed in the southwest bedroom, which was one of the 
children’s rooms. Angie had no clothing on except a sports bra. A plastic bag was over her head 
and covered her face. The firefighters observed that her “face was down” and “her back side was 
up in the air.” The body was in a peculiar and unusual position for a fire fatality. A nightgown 
with flowers on it was found on a bedpost in the master bedroom.  
Lance Hart, a senior special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF), explained that the fire was intentionally set by someone who poured gasoline in the 
garage, the living room, and the southwest bedroom in which Angie was found. So much 
gasoline was poured in the garage that the gas water heater pilot light prematurely ignited the 
fumes and caused the garage to explode before the other gas pours could be linked or ignited. 
The explosion was so strong that it blew the bottom panel of the garage door off, which allowed 
A.H. and S.S. to escape. The neighbors in the house behind the Siesta residence had to put water 
on their roof to prevent their house from catching on fire. The Wrights could feel the heat from 
outside their home, the paint peeled off their home due to the heat, and the nearby foliage was 
singed. 
Firefighters found a new red plastic gas can in the driveway of the Siesta residence that 
matched the one Abdullah had purchased in Salt Lake City at Food 4 Less. The gas can was 
 
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melted due to the fire, but contained a small amount of gasoline. Law enforcement took the gas 
can and transferred the remaining gasoline to a vial. The firefighters found a black cape at the 
scene identical to the one purchased by Abdullah at the Halloween store in Salt Lake City. 
On October 5, 2002, in Salt Lake City at approximately 7:00 a.m., Abdullah went to the 
mosque, stayed for a few minutes, and then returned to the Dream Inn. He told law enforcement 
that he slept until 10:35 a.m. and then checked out. At 11:36 a.m., Abdullah purchased another 
sixteen gallons of gasoline at a Maverik gas station in Salt Lake City.5 He also went to the Halal 
Market again between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., but did not place an order or purchase any 
meat. Around noon he bought new sandals.  
Around 2:00 p.m., Abdullah returned to the mosque. Abdullah then went to lunch with 
Imam Khaja Shuab Din (Imam Din) at his home and stayed for the next five hours. At 3:30 p.m., 
Abdullah learned of the fire and Angie’s death. Abdullah left his van at Imam Din’s house and 
flew to Boise with R.A. Law enforcement interviewed Abdullah at the airport immediately upon 
his arrival in Boise.  
On October 7, 2002, Abdullah learned law enforcement was going to verify his story. 
Abdullah called his friend Moctar Ba that morning. Abdullah asked Ba to call Imam Din and ask 
him to go to a pay phone to call Ba. Abdullah also asked Ba to ask Imam Din to go to Food 4 
Less, purchase two gas cans, fill them with gas, and place them in his van, which was still parked 
at Imam Din’s home. Abdullah told Ba that Imam Din’s phone was under surveillance. Ba told 
Abdullah that he would not do as Abdullah requested. 
Also on October 7, 2002, Abdullah left a voicemail for Imam Din, asking him to return 
his phone call, that it was urgent, and that he should use a pay phone and not his home phone. 
Imam Din purchased a phone card and returned Abdullah’s phone call from a pay phone. 
Abdullah asked him to buy two red plastic gas cans, purchase gasoline, empty the gas cans, and 
place them in his van. Abdullah told him that he was afraid the police would not believe his story 
that R.A. did not like the smell of the gas cans so he threw them in the dumpster. Imam Din 
refused.  
When law enforcement took possession of Abdullah’s van, it did not contain any gas 
cans, the cape, or the mask.  
                                                 
5 Other than the drive to Boise and the arson, there was no explanation as to how Abdullah could have used sixteen 
gallons of gas between 8:00 p.m. on October 4, 2002, and the next morning on October 5, 2002. 
 
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During an interview on October 11, 2002, law enforcement observed “a healing-type 
wound with scabs” on Abdullah’s left arm. Law enforcement collected hair samples from both of 
Abdullah’s arms. A forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police laboratory found that the hair 
samples from both arms showed exposure to high heat. 
On October 17, 2002, at law enforcement’s request, Imam Din called Abdullah to clarify 
some questions. In the recorded call, Imam Din asked Abdullah about his activities in Salt Lake 
City. In particular, Imam Din asked Abdullah about the purchase of the cape and mask, and he 
told Abdullah that law enforcement had a cape. Abdullah denied purchasing the cape or mask.  
DNA from the cape and gas can found at the scene were compared with Abdullah’s 
DNA. The gas can had DNA profiles from more than one individual, and Abdullah was excluded 
as a major and minor contributor with a combination of three samples obtained from the gas can. 
The cape had multiple DNA profiles as well. Abdullah was excluded as a major contributor, but 
could not be excluded as a minor contributor to the cape.  
Law enforcement sent gasoline samples to the Southwest Research Institute and Ethyl 
Corporation for testing. They sent a sample of the gasoline in the gas can from the crime scene 
and gasoline control samples from the Chevron station in Boise where Abdullah purchased 
gasoline on October 4, 2002, before leaving for Salt Lake City and the 7-Eleven in Salt Lake 
City where Abdullah also purchased gasoline on October 4, 2002. In October of 2002, Sinclair 
Oil Company supplied gasoline to the 7-Eleven in Salt Lake City. The gasoline contained an 
additive HiTEC 6423. 
Melissa Williams, a senior research assistant at Southwest Research Institute, tested the 
gasoline samples from the crime scene, 7-Eleven, and Chevron for Chevron’s fuel marker.6 
Williams found that it was unlikely the gasoline samples from the crime scene and 7-Eleven 
contained the Chevron marker. The gasoline sample from Chevron tested positive for the 
Chevron marker.  
Dr. William Colucci, a senior research advisor at Ethyl Corporation, explained that Ethyl 
Corporation (now Afton Chemical) supplies HiTEC 6423 to about forty percent of the national 
gasoline market. Dr. Colucci tested the gasoline samples from the crime scene, 7-Eleven, and 
Chevron for HiTEC 6423. He found HiTEC 6423 in the gasoline samples from the crime scene 
and 7-Eleven. There was no HiTEC 6423 in the Chevron gasoline sample. Dr. Colucci also 
                                                 
6 A fuel marker identifies the fuel, but does not change its properties.  
 
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testified that both the gasoline sample from the crime scene and 7-Eleven had the lowest additive 
concentration (LAC) of HiTEC 6423 with a similar fuel component that made quantifying the 
LAC difficult. 
Dr. Glen Groben, a forensic pathologist with the Ada County Coroner’s Office, 
performed the autopsy of Angie’s body on October 5, 2002. He determined Angie died before 
the fire. During the external examination of the body, Dr. Groben noticed melted plastic on the 
back of Angie’s head. He observed that a strip of plastic went all the way around her neck. The 
bag was from India Emporium, where Abdullah had been three days before Angie’s death and 
received a similar plastic bag. Dr. Groben did not find any petechial hemorrhages, which would 
indicate strangulation, or any indicators of blunt force trauma. He also found no signs of 
defensive wounds. He found that Angie had a full stomach of vegetable matter at the time of 
death.7 Due in part to the fact that the first toxicology exam was negative for all tested 
substances, Dr. Groben determined Angie’s manner of death as homicide caused by 
“asphyxiation due to a plastic bag over the head.” He testified that he ruled out suicide because 
the position of the body was inconsistent with suicide, “there were . . . no drugs on board at that 
point in time to suggest” suicide “and no one places a bag over their head without drugs on 
board,” and “other things.”  
In December of 2003, Dr. Groben requested an additional toxicology exam to test for 
certain antidepressants, including Prozac, the trade name for fluoxetine. He requested the 
additional exam after receiving a letter from Mitch Toryanski that indicated Angie had a history 
of depression. Dr. Groben learned that antidepressants such as fluoxetine were not tested in the 
earlier toxicology exam, although he had believed otherwise when he requested the exam. The 
additional toxicology exam was positive for fluoxetine in Angie’s blood with a potentially lethal 
concentration. Through additional testing, Dr. Groben learned that a smaller concentration of the 
metabolite of fluoxetine, norfluoxetine, was present in Angie’s blood and gastric contents. This 
testing indicated to Dr. Groben that Angie was taking fluoxetine at therapeutic levels and 
subsequently had “an acute increase in [f]luoxetine in the blood and then immediate death, not 
allowing for any metabolism.” Dr. Groben found no indicators of the use of hypodermic needles. 
He amended his autopsy report to change the cause of death to “acute fluoxetine poisoning 
associated with asphyxiation due to a bag over the head.”  
                                                 
7 It takes approximately an hour and a half for the stomach to empty.  
 
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Dr. Ronald Backer, the president and laboratory director of Ameritox Laboratories, 
testified that an individual would display symptoms of toxicity, such as seizures, sedation, or 
difficulty breathing, with the level of concentration of fluoxetine found in Angie’s blood. He 
opined that an individual would need to ingest forty to 100 forty-milligram capsules to obtain 
that level of concentration. Assuming such ingestion, Dr. Backer would expect to find a 
significant level of concentration of fluoxetine in the gastric contents of that individual. Only a 
small level of concentration of fluoxetine was found in Angie’s gastric contents, however. Dr. 
Backer explained that the level of concentration of fluoxetine found in Angie’s blood could be 
dissolved in eight ounces of fluid or less and, if ingested on an empty stomach, could more 
rapidly pass through the stomach into the small intestines. In his opinion, the administration of 
fluoxetine to Angie had to have occurred before her last meal of vegetable matter due to the low 
level of concentration of fluoxetine in the gastric contents.  
Dr. Edward Barbieri, a forensic toxicologist at National Medical Services, explained that 
the levels of concentration of fluoxetine and norfluoxetine in Angie’s blood and gastric contents 
indicated therapeutic levels of Prozac taken chronically with an acute administration of a large 
dose of Prozac superimposed on top of the therapeutic dosage. Dr. Barbieri opined Angie had to 
have ingested the Prozac after her meal at Aunt Charlene’s house, but before her last meal of 
vegetable matter. Dr. Barbieri explained that an individual would have to ingest thirty to 100 
forty-milligram capsules to reach the level of concentration fluoxetine in Angie’s blood. He also 
explained that the ingestion of that many capsules would show up as a mass of gelatinous 
material in the stomach. Angie’s autopsy report contained no finding of gelatinous material in 
the gastric contents, however. Dr. Barbieri stated that the fluoxetine capsules can be opened, the 
contents have a slightly bitter taste that can be masked with a sweetener, and ingestion of the 
contents with a liquid is an effective delivery system. He opined that this was a possible manner 
of administration in this case. In Dr. Barbieri’s opinion, fluoxetine was a contributory factor in 
Angie’s death that may have debilitated her, but it was not a competent cause of her death.  
Angie took a therapeutic dose of Prozac in the months prior to her death. Angie’s 
obstetrics-gynecology nurse practitioner recognized no characteristics in Angie to indicate she 
was suffering from depression to the point of self-harm. Angie’s psychiatrist opined that Angie 
displayed no characteristics of self-harm or suicide. Angie’s psychiatry nurse practitioner found 
 
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no characteristics of self-harm in Angie. Angie’s therapist stated she never found Angie to be 
someone who was working toward self-harm.  
Defense investigator Glen Elam testified for the State regarding a letter he found at the 
Siesta residence on February 14, 2003, before the crime scene was destroyed. The letter appeared 
to be written by Angie to Abdullah, and it conveyed Angie’s thoughts on their relationship, 
Islam, and their children. A redacted version of the letter was read to the jury admitted only to 
show Angie’s state of mind and not for the truth. The letter below is the redacted version:8 
Azad,  
I have once again found myself devastated by you and your behavior. I felt 
deep in my heart after you had made the Hajj our lives would be good again. I 
have lost all faith in that and you. I am writing you because I can’t stand to hear 
more lies and watch you turn everything around and make it look like I am stupid 
and crazy. 
The hardest part of being with you is the fact that you are such a hypocrite. 
On the outside you ACT [sic] like such a good Muslim. On the inside you are no 
better than What [sic] I cannot understand is that no matter what any Muslim in 
this town or any other sees, Allah, the all knowing and all seeing knows what a 
hypocrite you are. Now that you have completed the Hajj, the sins that you are 
repeating are not going to be forgiven. Why do you act like such a good Muslim 
when deep inside you are everything but one? I became a Muslim to better my 
life, not to find myself in this situation. How would you feel if I just quit 
practicing Islam? You would be ashamed and hurt. I am ashamed and hurt. You 
have two faces and Allah knows them both. 
I KNOW [sic] you did not go to South Africa. Why lie to me about that? 
Not only did you lie about it, and then you made up all the information about 
what it was like. On top of that, I was in the hospital trying to keep our baby from 
coming too early.  
I know you love me. I learned a long time ago that love is not enough. 
You must have respect, trust, belief, and security. I feel none of these for you. I 
don’t think I ever can. The biggest issue is the children. I don’t want my children 
(including [R.A.]) to be raised by a hypocrite.  
Before you tell me I am crazy and give me more lies, please remember, I 
do my homework before I confront anyone about anything. I will not tolerate 
more lies and deceit. I will not forgive anymore. I am finished. There is nothing 
left in my heart.  
 
 
On November 9, 2004, the State rested its presentation of evidence, and the defense gave 
its opening statement. The defense presented testimony from (1) Abdullah’s former teacher and 
close friend Sherry Rogers; (2) Abdullah’s cousin Jihad Kurmay (Jihad); (3) Abdullah’s cousin 
Fuad Kurmay; (4) family friend Aida Meta; (5) fellow member of the Islamic Center of Boise 
                                                 
8 Both the redacted and unredacted versions of the letter are in the record, and the Court has reviewed both.  
 
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Zaid Ahmed-Zaid; (6) realtor and Abdullah’s friend Furqan Mehmood (Mehmood); (7) 
Abdullah’s co-worker Brian Holford; (8) Abdullah’s sister Farma Abdullah (Farma); (9) human 
resource manager at Abdullah’s former employment Pam Chut; (10) Abdullah’s sister-in-law 
Mischa Harkovich (Harkovich); and (11) Abdullah’s acquaintance Rubina Gelel. This testimony 
generally showed Angie and Abdullah were happily married and Abdullah was a loving and 
caring father. Some testimony also addressed the vending machine business, the attempted sale 
of the home, and the items found at the crime scene. For example, Jihad testified that Abdullah 
wanted him to operate the vending machines in Nashville, Tennessee, but Abdullah would still 
own the machines. Similarly, Farma testified that Angie was trying to sell the vending machines. 
In addition, Mehmood discussed his involvement in Abdullah’s attempt to sell Angie’s home. 
Finally, Harkovich testified that she went with her husband (Abdullah’s brother), Abdullah’s 
father, and Abdullah to examine the crime scene on October 14, 2002. She testified that they 
found clothing and other items in the garage that they believed to be evidence and she gave those 
items to law enforcement the following day.  
Dr. Groben testified for the defense that Angie had no defensive wounds and showed no 
signs of strangulation. Clay Ward, a licensed psychologist, opined that Angie had suicidal 
thoughts and displayed suicide risk factors based on his review of medical and autopsy records. 
Ashraf Mozayani, chief toxicologist and laboratory director for the Harris County Medical 
Examiner in Houston, Texas, testified that it was impossible for an individual to have such a high 
level of concentration of fluoxetine in the blood immediately before death with such a small 
level of concentration of fluoxetine in the gastric contents. Dr. Mozayani opined that Angie 
could have been a slow or poor metabolizer, which would explain the different concentration 
levels. Dr. Mozayani stated the contents inside the Prozac capsules have a very bitter taste that 
cannot be sweetened. Defense investigator Terry Murphy testified as well. Abdullah elected not 
to testify. On November 14, 2004, the defense rested.  
In the State’s rebuttal case, a forensic psychologist opined that there was a very low 
probability Angie committed suicide on October 4–5, 2002. Similarly, Angie’s therapist testified 
on rebuttal that Angie never talked about suicide and would have never committed suicide 
because Angie’s last husband, A.H.’s father, committed suicide. Her therapist stated, “Angie 
would have never done that to [A.H.].” Additionally, ATF senior special agent Hart testified that 
there were no articles of clothing found in the garage. He explained that it was impossible for 
 
13 
clothing to be found there because the firefighters removed all debris and applied water to the 
concrete floor. If anything remained, Hart explained, it would be charred remains of clothing due 
to the forty to fifty foot flames and fire temperatures in excess of 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. 
On November 18, 2004, the State and defense gave closing arguments. On November 19, 
2004, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all six counts. The district court ordered the jury to 
remain sequestered to go immediately into the sentencing phase for first-degree murder.  
On November 19, 2004, the State and defense gave opening statements in the sentencing 
phase. The State presented aggravating evidence from two witnesses: Boise Police Department 
Detective Tod Littlefield9 and Steven Bankhead, an inmate at Idaho State Correctional 
Institution (ISCI). Bankhead provided Littlefield with information significant to his investigation 
of the Abdullah case. Bankhead testified regarding Abdullah’s plan for Bankhead to kill Angie. 
Bankhead explained that while he was incarcerated in ISCI in late 1999, early 2000, he met 
Abdullah, who was a volunteer for Islamic studies. According to Bankhead, he and Abdullah had 
a close relationship. After Bankhead was paroled in August of 2000, Bankhead testified that 
Abdullah asked him to kill Angie on or about November 1, 2000. Bankhead explained that 
Abdullah gave him a vial of a chemical to knock Angie unconscious and told him to rape her and 
cut her throat with a knife, also provided by Abdullah. Bankhead said Abdullah paid him $1,000 
in cash to kill Angie. Bankhead testified that he knew he was not going to do it so, after taking 
methamphetamines, he threw the knife and chemical vial in the trash at the Boise Greyhound bus 
station and took a bus to Lewiston, Idaho. Bankhead testified that he returned to prison a number 
of months later. 
Abdullah presented mitigating evidence through testimony of (1) Michael Gunter, a 
professor of political science and expert in the Kurdish situation; (2) Abdullah’s father Haji 
Fetah; (3) Abdullah’s brother Dilshad Abdullah; (4) Abdullah’s cousin Nichivan Abdullah; (5) 
Pam Lewis, who participated in a church-sponsored program in 1992 to assist the Abdullah 
family in adjusting to life in the United States; (6) Jim Rogers, a friend of the Abdullah family; 
(7) Aaron Irish, a deputy sheriff at the Ada County Jail where Abdullah was housed; (8) Michael 
                                                 
9 Littlefield was the case officer assigned to this case. On September 3, 2004, lead prosecutor Patrick Owen 
disclosed to the district court and the Toryanskis that he had learned the week prior that prosecutor Erika Klein, the 
assistant counsel in the case, had an affair with Littlefield during Littlefield’s investigation of the case. Owen 
removed Klein from the case the day after the disclosure. On September 7, 2004, the defense moved for a 
continuance to inquire into potential misconduct. The district court denied the motion. 
 
14 
Shutz, an inmate at ISCI; and (9) Abdullah’s mother Rihan Mustafa. Abdullah did not testify or 
allocute. 
Following Abdullah’s mitigation case, the State presented victim impact statements from 
Angie’s mother Evelyn Whittington, her sister Randy Jewett, her stepsister Stephanie Williams, 
and her cousin Leslie Beck on behalf of A.H.  
On November 23, 2004, the State and defense gave closing arguments. Later that day, the 
jury reached a verdict. The jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons and (2) by the murder or 
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human 
life. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the two remaining aggravating 
circumstances: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity and (2) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of 
the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute 
a continuing threat to society. The jury found that all mitigating circumstances when weighed 
against the great risk aggravator and the utter disregard aggravator individually were not 
sufficiently compelling to make the death penalty unjust.  
On March 4, 2005, the district court held a sentencing hearing for arson, three counts of 
attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. The district court sentenced Abdullah 
to death for first-degree murder, to twenty-five years imprisonment for arson, to fifteen years 
imprisonment for each count of attempted first-degree murder, and to ten years imprisonment for 
felony injury to a child, a total of eighty years imprisonment. On March 4, 2005, the district 
court filed its judgments of conviction and sentences. On March 11, 2005, Abdullah filed a 
notice of appeal. The district court appointed the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) to 
represent Abdullah on all matters pertaining to the direct appeal and the petition for post-
conviction relief. 
On April 15, 2005, Abdullah filed his original Post-Conviction Petition. On May 12, 
2005, the State answered. The district court held a status conference on June 29, 2005, and the 
parties agreed that they needed substantially more time to investigate potential post-conviction 
claims. The district court issued a scheduling order allowing for an extension for Abdullah to file 
 
15 
an amended petition. The district court later granted two motions by Abdullah for extensions.10 
On August 29, 2008, Abdullah filed a Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On 
March 31, 2009, the State answered and moved for summary disposition. Abdullah requested an 
evidentiary hearing. The district court ruled an evidentiary hearing was necessary to a number of 
Abdullah’s claims. 
An evidentiary hearing was held from September 2, 2010, to September 16, 2010. Mitch 
and Kim Toryanski, Ada County Public Defender Gus Cahill, defense expert Craig Beaver, 
Ph.D., and defense investigator Terry Murphy testified. The district court held a final hearing on 
June 16, 2011.11 The district court took the matter under advisement on September 23, 2011.  
On October 14, 2011, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision Re: Post-
Conviction Relief. The district court found all of the witnesses credible and their testimony 
remarkably consistent on material issues. The district court found Abdullah lacked credibility 
and was “willing to say whatever he believes in order to suit his needs, regardless of the truth.” 
The district court concluded Abdullah was not entitled to any of the requested post-conviction 
relief. On October 14, 2011, the district court entered a final judgment dismissing Abdullah’s 
petition.  
On November 25, 2011, Abdullah filed a notice of appeal. On January 16, 2014, 
Abdullah filed his Second Revised Brief with this Court. The State responded with its brief on 
January 21, 2014. On March 26, 2014, Abdullah replied, and on April 23, 2014, Abdullah filed a 
supplemental brief.  
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL12 
                                                 
10 Based on SAPD’s representation that it had no involvement with the trial, the district court found good cause to 
allow SAPD more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. The district court then learned through its 
review of the material in support of the Final Amended Petition that SAPD provided advice to the Toryanskis 
before, during, and after trial. The district court found that SAPD had a conflict of interest. The district court 
appointed outside counsel to advise Abdullah about the conflict. Although Abdullah initially refused to waive the 
conflict and asked for the appointment of conflict counsel, Abdullah informed the district court approximately one 
week later that he had changed his mind. Abdullah then knowingly and voluntarily waived the conflict. The district 
court reappointed SAPD to represent Abdullah.  
11 Prior to the hearing, the district court and the parties learned of the Idaho State Laboratory’s issues with lab 
technician Susan Williams, who had tested certain pieces of evidence in Abdullah’s case for the presence of 
gasoline. Williams breached State lab administrative policies by purchasing 100 grams of gamma-hydroxybutyric 
acid (GHB, also known as the date rape drug) in excess of the amount allowed by the lab’s manual, and she hid her 
mistake from the yearly auditor. Abdullah filed an additional claim alleging a Brady violation by failing to disclose 
impeachment material. The district court rejected this claim. Abdullah does not appeal this claim to this Court.  
12 This Court recognizes that Abdullah identifies over forty issues on appeal. Our identification of thirty-eight issues 
in no way indicates that we overlooked or disregarded issues adequately raised on appeal. Rather, in some instances 
this Court has simply combined two or more issues based on subject matter. We must caution, however, that we 
 
16 
A. 
GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
1. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Abdullah’s requests 
for funding for an expert to evaluate the DNA evidence. 
2. 
Whether two allegedly biased jurors resulted in fundamental error during the guilt 
and penalty phases of trial. 
3. 
Whether sufficient evidence supported Abdullah’s convictions of first-degree 
murder, first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and 
felony injury to a child. 
4. 
Whether a jury instruction on the definition of “willfully” resulted in fundamental 
error. 
5. 
Whether the district court erred by admitting Angie’s out-of-court statements.  
6. 
Whether the district court erred by admitting Abdullah’s out-of-court statements. 
7. 
Whether the district court erred by excluding evidence of Angie’s life insurance 
policy. 
8. 
Whether the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct at trial resulted in 
fundamental error. 
9. 
Whether the district court violated Abdullah’s constitutional rights by failing to 
properly swear the bailiff charged with custody of the jury. 
10. 
Whether the district court violated Abdullah’s constitutional rights by failing to 
record all proceedings. 
11. 
Whether the district court erred by finding no basis for Abdullah to challenge the 
grand jury term. 
12. 
Whether the errors in the aggregate resulted in cumulative error at trial. 
B. 
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
13. 
Whether this Court’s decision in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 
(2013), violates Idaho Code section 19-2827, the separation of powers doctrine, 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or the right to due 
process. 
14. 
Whether Abdullah was eligible to receive a death sentence in conformity with the 
ex post facto clause and the right to due process. 
                                                                                                                                                             
refuse to consider issues Abdullah attempts to raise in his appeal purely by an incorporation by reference of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. As we have consistently held numerous times, issues raised on appeal without 
argument or authority are deemed waived by this Court, and this Court does not search the record for errors. See, 
e.g., Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168–69, 321 P.3d 709, 718–19 (2014) (waiver of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims without legal authority); State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 362, 313 P.3d 1, 18 (2013) (“we will not 
scour the record in an effort to find errors not identified by the defendant”). Abdullah cannot incorporate by 
reference his petition for post-conviction relief to submit any additional issues on appeal other than those raised with 
sufficient argument and authority. See, e.g., State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999) (only 
addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claim with argument and authority). 
 
17 
15. 
Whether Idaho’s death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
16. 
Whether the district court erred by failing to strike the State’s notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty because the aggravating circumstances were not alleged in 
the indictment with a finding of probable cause and factual support. 
17. 
Whether the statutory aggravating factors are void for vagueness under the due 
process clause and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
18. 
Whether this Court’s limiting construction of the statutory aggravating factors 
violates the separation of powers doctrine. 
19. 
Whether the district court erred by admitting a victim impact statement from 
Angie’s step-sister. 
20. 
Whether the alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty 
phase resulted in fundamental error. 
21. 
Whether the district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury during the 
penalty phase. 
22. 
Whether the district court erred by limiting Abdullah’s right of allocution in 
violation of his right to due process. 
23. 
Whether the errors in the aggregate resulted in cumulative error during the penalty 
phase. 
C. 
POST-CONVICTION PHASE ISSUES 
24. 
Whether the district court applied the correct standard for Abdullah’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 
25. 
Whether the district court erred by denying Abdullah’s discovery requests for 
gasoline additive evidence. 
26. 
Whether the district court erred by destroying certain jury questionnaires. 
27. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to the removal of a letter from the crime scene, 
stipulation to the letter’s admission into evidence, and failure to object when the 
State disclosed that the defense’s investigator discovered the letter. 
28. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to investigate, prepare, and present an adequate 
case in mitigation. 
29. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present an eyewitness identification expert. 
30. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present testimony from a forensic pathologist. 
31. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to consult and present a gasoline expert. 
 
18 
32. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission of the defense’s letter 
to prosecutors requesting additional testing of Angie’s blood. 
33. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for delaying opening statement. 
34. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present an alibi defense. 
35. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for conceding Abdullah’s presence in Boise on the night of 
the murder. 
36. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding his right to testify in the guilt and penalty phases 
and to allocute. 
37. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during jury selection. 
38. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to object to defective guilt and penalty phase jury 
instructions. 
III.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. 
Abuse of Discretion 
The Court determines whether the district court abused its discretion by examining: “(1) 
whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010). 
B. 
Harmless Error 
 
Under the harmless error standard, the defendant has the initial burden of establishing an 
error, at which point the State has the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
221, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 973, 979 (2010) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967)). 
C. 
Fundamental Error 
[I]n cases of unobjected to fundamental error: (1) the defendant must demonstrate 
that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 
(2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
 
19 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in 
most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The burden is on the defendant to prove “there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Id.; see also State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361–63, 313 P.3d 1, 17–19 (2013) (applying the harmless error and 
fundamental error standards from Perry to capital cases). 
D. 
Post-Conviction Phase 
A post-conviction relief petition initiates a civil, rather than criminal, 
proceeding. Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). Like the 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 
19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). “An 
application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil 
action[.]” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)) (internal 
quotations omitted). The “application must contain much more than ‘a short and 
plain statement of the claim’ that would suffice for a complaint under [Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.)] 8(a)(1).” Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 
628. The application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. I.C. § 19-
4903. 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443–44, 180 P.3d 476, 482–83 (2008) (first alteration in 
original). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court’s 
own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent 
of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Summary dismissal is permissible only 
when the applicant’s evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if 
resolved in the applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief 
requested. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 
1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State 
does not controvert the applicant’s evidence because the court is not required to 
accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). 
On the other hand, “[w]hen appellate review of a district court’s denial of post-conviction 
relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a summary dismissal, the evidence must be 
 
20 
‘viewed most favorably to the trial court’s findings.’” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 849, 103 
P.3d 460, 462 (2004) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 304, 986 P.2d 323, 327 (1999)). 
“[T]his Court will not disturb the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.” McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (citing I.R.C.P. 
52(a)). “This Court exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to 
the facts.” McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 849–50, 103 P.3d at 462–63. “Constitutional issues are pure 
questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 
561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). “If a district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous 
theory, this Court will affirm the order upon the correct theory.” McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 
992 P.2d at 149.  
A majority of Abdullah’s post-conviction claims involve allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. “The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 
13 of the Idaho State Constitution.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 
(2014) (quoting Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)). This Court 
utilizes the Strickland two-prong test to determine whether a defendant in a criminal case 
received effective assistance of counsel. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). See also State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 
306, 986 P.2d at 329. To establish deficient performance, “the defendant must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011).  
The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption “that counsel ‘made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “A fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, strategic 
 
21 
decisions are “virtually unchallengeable” if made after a “thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options.” Id. at 690. Decisions “made after less than complete investigation” 
are still reasonable to the extent “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation.” Id. at 691. Counsel is permitted to develop a strategy “that was reasonable at the 
time” and may “balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.” 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This opinion is divided into three sections, first examining the guilt phase issues, then the 
penalty phase issues, and finally the post-conviction phase issues. Upon this Court’s review of 
the issues adequately raised on appeal, we affirm the district court’s judgments of conviction and 
sentences and its dismissal of Abdullah’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
A. 
Guilt Phase Issues 
1. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abdullah’s requests for 
funding for an expert to evaluate the DNA evidence. 
a. 
Facts 
Before trial, Abdullah filed an ex parte motion for funding to hire a forensic scientist. He 
submitted that a forensic scientist was essential to evaluate the State’s DNA evidence, including 
the cape and the gas can found at the crime scene. The district court denied Abdullah’s request, 
explaining that he failed to (1) identify a forensic scientist expert; (2) contend the DNA evidence 
was tainted or improperly prepared; and (3) explain how the expert would aid in his defense. 
Abdullah then filed a supplemental ex parte motion for funding to hire a forensic expert in which 
he identified an expert and the cost. He argued that he sought a corresponding forensic DNA 
expert as a basic tool of an adequate defense. He also argued that the State would use the DNA 
evidence as circumstantial proof that he was present at the Siesta residence at the time of the fire. 
To support his argument, he attached a document by the State’s DNA experts that analyzed the 
DNA found on the gas can and cape. The district court again denied Abdullah’s motion, 
explaining that Abdullah did not contend that the DNA evidence was tainted, mishandled, or 
improperly prepared. Further, the district court noted that the DNA evidence from the cape and 
gas can was mostly exculpatory. 
At trial, the State’s DNA expert testified that samples one, two, and three of the swabs 
from the gas can handle had a mixture of DNA profiles from more than one individual. Abdullah 
could not be excluded as a minor contributor of DNA from samples one and two. On number 
 
22 
three, however, the DNA expert obtained a higher concentration of DNA material and excluded 
Abdullah as a major and minor contributor. The swabs and cuttings from the cape also had a 
mixture of DNA profiles. Abdullah could not be excluded as a minor contributor from samples 
one, two, three, and four from the cape. The expert then opined that the probability of randomly 
selecting an unrelated individual with a DNA profile consistent with the DNA profile from 
sample one of the cape is 1 in 16,000 in a Middle Eastern population database. When asked by 
the prosecutor, the expert calculated that one would expect a possibility of ten male individuals 
in the Boise area, based on a population of 250,000, to match the DNA profile from the first 
sample from the cape. The prosecutor reiterated the expert’s calculation in closing argument.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“[D]enial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be disturbed absent a 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly 
erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the case.” State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395, 
648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982).  
c. 
Analysis 
 
The denial of access to the basic tools of an adequate defense impinges on the 
defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. Olin, 103 Idaho at 394, 648 P.2d at 206. “[A] 
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without 
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective 
defense.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). However, “[t]he constitution does not 
require a state to provide expert or investigative assistance merely because a defendant requests 
it.” Olin, 103 Idaho at 394, 648 P.2d at 206.  
 
This Court stated in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013): “Before 
authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose in an indigent’s defense, the 
trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of justice.” Id. at 382, 
313 P.3d at 38 (quoting State v. Lovelace (Lovelace I), 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 
(2003)). This Court also stated, “A defendant’s request for expert or investigative services should 
be reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the standard of ‘fundamental 
fairness’ embodied in the due process clause.” Id. at 381–82, 313 P.3d at 37–38 (quoting 
Lovelace I, 140 Idaho at 65, 90 P.3d at 290).  
 
23 
 
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abdullah’s request 
for funds for a forensic and DNA expert. There were no allegations that the DNA evidence was 
improper or tainted or that the testing methods or conclusions were flawed. The DNA evidence 
was mostly exculpatory—Abdullah was excluded as a major and minor contributor to the gas can 
and as a major contributor to the cape. In addition, Abdullah does not claim on appeal that the 1 
out of 16,000 probability was incorrect. Thus, Abdullah has not shown that the district court’s 
decision was clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the case. Based on the 
record, the district court properly determined within its discretion the funds were not “necessary 
in the interest of justice.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 382, 313 P.3d at 38.  
 
Abdullah takes great issue with the expert’s testimony that possibly ten men in the Boise 
population matched the DNA on the cape. He submits that this testimony was devastating to his 
defense. However, even if the expert or the prosecutor misrepresented this calculation,13 it did 
not require expert testimony to rebut or explain. The validity of this calculation and its 
significance was a proper inquiry for cross-examination and could have been adequately 
addressed in closing argument. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791 (2011) (“In many 
instances cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert’s presentation.”) It 
was not necessary in the interest of justice for the defense to call a forensic or DNA expert to 
rebut or explain this testimony. 
 
This Court also recognizes that the United States Supreme Court in Ake outlined three 
factors to determine whether the participation of an expert “is important enough to preparation of 
a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access.” 470 U.S. at 77. The 
United States Supreme Court delineated these factors in the context of the defense’s request for a 
psychiatrist when the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense was a substantial factor in his 
                                                 
13 Abdullah states that this calculation is the “so-called ‘prosecutor’s fallacy,’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 
127 (2010): 
 
 
The prosecutor’s fallacy is the assumption that the random match probability is the same 
as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample. In other words, if a 
juror is told the probability a member of the general population would share the same DNA is 1 in 
10,000 (random match probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance 
that someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime scene (source 
probability), then he has succumbed to the prosecutor’s fallacy. It is further error to equate source 
probability with probability of guilt, unless there is no explanation other than guilt for a person to 
be the source of crime-scene DNA. This faulty reasoning may result in an erroneous statement 
that, based on a random match probability of 1 in 10,000, there is a .01% chance the defendant is 
innocent or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty. 
 
Id. at 128 (citation omitted). 
 
24 
defense. Id. at 72, 74, 86–87. The three factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected 
by the action of the State”; (2) “the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is 
to be provided”; and (3) “the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards 
that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those 
safeguards are not provided.” Id. at 77.  
 
 There is little or no substantive difference between the Ake standards and this Court’s 
standards in Olin, Lovelace, and Dunlap. State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 363, 195 P.3d 716, 722 
(Ct. App. 2008), review denied. While this Court’s precedent and the Ake factors articulate the 
test differently, “each of these cases requires the provision of assistance at public expense where 
it is necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, while sifting out 
requests for services that are not shown to be reasonably necessary for these purposes.” Martin, 
146 Idaho at 363, 195 P.3d at 722. In an abundance of caution, however, we will apply the Ake 
factors here. Based on our application of the Ake factors, we conclude that participation of a 
forensic or DNA expert was not “integral to the building of an effective defense.” 470 U.S. at 77. 
As discussed above, the DNA evidence was not improper, tainted, or the result of flawed testing 
or conclusions. The expert’s testimony of the DNA statistics was not identified as incorrect or a 
miscalculation. Moreover, the DNA evidence was mostly exculpatory. Thus, while we recognize 
that “[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life 
or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling,” the probable value of an additional forensic 
science or DNA expert and risk of erroneous deprivation due to the State’s expert were both 
minimal to nonexistent in this case. Id. at 78–79. Balancing the three factors provided by Ake, 
funds for a forensic science or DNA expert for Abdullah were not important enough to the 
preparation of a defense to require the State to provide him with access. Id. at 77. 
 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
funding for a forensic or DNA expert for Abdullah’s defense.  
2. 
Abdullah has waived any challenge to two allegedly biased jurors. 
 
Abdullah challenges the district court’s failure to excuse sua sponte two jurors for cause: 
Juror 59 and Juror 83.  
The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from “consciously” inviting 
district court action and then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal. State v. 
Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 837, 673 P.2d 436, 437 (1983). “It has long been the law in Idaho that 
 
25 
one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented 
to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.” Id. at 838, 673 P.2d at 438 (citation omitted); see 
also State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35 (2013) (applying invited error to a 
capital case). In this case, the doctrine of invited error applies to any assignment of error 
regarding Juror 59 and Juror 83. During voir dire Abdullah passed for cause on both jurors. He 
did not use a peremptory challenge on Juror 59 or Juror 83 and again passed for cause on the 
jury. Abdullah then accepted the jury as empaneled, which included Juror 59 and Juror 83. In 
short, Abdullah failed to raise any objection to these jurors at any time and allowed these jurors 
to be empaneled without any reservation. Thus, any error was invited and is not reversible.14 
Although Abdullah waived this issue on direct appeal, he also challenges these jurors’ 
alleged bias again in the post-conviction phase. For this reason alone, we review the alleged bias 
of these jurors. 
 
The Idaho Constitution states that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate.” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7. That a jury be “impartial,” as “guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is made applicable to the 
individual states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 
892, 896, 655 P.2d 99, 103 (Ct. App. 1982). “In essence, the right to jury trial 
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent 
jurors.” Id. “The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the 
minimal standards of due process.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1971). Thus, 
“the Due Process Clause protects a defendant from jurors who are actually 
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, based on the evidence and the law.” 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972).  
 
State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 862, 332 P.3d 767, 774 (2014) (alteration in original). “The 
decision whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is directed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Yager, 139 
Idaho 680, 688, 85 P.3d 656, 664 (2004). 
                                                 
14 Other jurisdictions have ruled similarly. United States v. Ahmad, 974 F.2d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1992) (any error in 
court’s dismissal of juror for cause invited because counsel approved of dismissal); Vann v. State, 880 So. 2d 495, 
497–99 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (prejudicial statement by juror was invited error because defense counsel agreed 
with trial court’s decision not to question prospective jurors); State v. Rubio, 195 P.3d 214, 216–18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008) (defendant waived any error in trial court’s failure to remove prospective juror for cause because the 
defendant must use a peremptory strike to remove an objectionable juror “whom the trial court has refused to 
remove for cause” to preserve the issue for appeal); People v. Taylor, 220 P.3d 872, 893–95 (Cal. 2009) (“[W]e 
adhere to the well-established rule that to preserve a claim a biased juror was improperly permitted to serve, the 
defense must exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as sworn.”); State v. Lee, 128 P.3d 1179, 
1182–83 (Utah 2006) (invited error precluded defendant from challenging the jury’s composition on appeal because 
defendant raised no objection to the jurors in trial court); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2003) (defense counsel estopped from raising any error in court’s discharge of juror because counsel requested 
discharge). 
 
26 
 
 “[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the 
community is impartial . . . so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their 
sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 
(1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986)); see also 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 69, 253 P.3d 727, 743 (2011) (“A juror is presumed to be 
impartial.”). A juror lacks impartiality if actual or implied bias exists, and the Idaho Code provides 
criminal defendants with the right to strike a biased juror for cause. I.C. §§ 19-2017, -2019, -2020.  
 
The Idaho Code defines “actual bias” as “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the 
juror in reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion 
on the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality.” I.C. § 19-
2019(2). Despite a juror’s expression of bias towards a party, “disqualification is not necessarily 
required.” State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609, 150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2006). A juror does 
not have to be disqualified “if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170, 
1180 (1999) (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)). If a juror admits bias, “and 
gives no unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts by the court 
or counsel to elicit such an assurance,” the juror should be disqualified for lacking impartiality. 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610, 150 P.3d at 303. 
Similar rules regarding juror bias and disqualification apply in capital cases. To 
determine “when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on 
capital punishment,” the “standard is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). 
This standard does not require that “a juror’s bias be proved with unmistakable clarity” because 
“determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain 
results in the manner of a catechism.” Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]his is 
why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” Id. at 426. Certain 
responses by jurors, however, reflect “directly on that individual’s inability to follow the law.” 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735 (1992). “It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, 
swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining . . . dogmatic beliefs about the 
death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so.” Id. For example, “[a]ny juror who would 
 
27 
impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot follow the dictates 
of law.” Id. “[S]uch jurors—whether they be unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death 
penalty in every case—by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with 
law, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.” Id.  
 
With these standards in mind, a summary of the information provided by Juror 59 and 
Juror 83 follows.  
 
Juror 59 attained a bachelor of science from University of Idaho in 1996 with areas of 
concentration in criminal justice and sociology. While in college, Juror 59 interned with the 
Moscow Police Department. At the time of trial, Juror 59 was interviewing and testing with the 
Boise Police Department, Idaho State Police, and Meridian Police Department. Juror 59 testified 
that he15 was intrigued by law enforcement work after a class in high school with a deputy 
county sheriff and he thought law enforcement would be a rewarding and enjoyable job. Juror 59 
tried to get a law enforcement job right out of college, but he could not find a position. He 
worked as a security officer for a hotel in the past and currently worked as a trainer for Micron. 
Juror 59 stated in the questionnaire that he would tend to believe the testimony of a law 
enforcement officer more than most witnesses.  
 
The district court asked Juror 59, “Is there anything about [the internship with the 
Moscow Police Department] that makes you think that you would favor the prosecution over the 
defense or vice versa?” and Juror 59 responded, “Oh, no.” The district court also asked Juror 59, 
“Because you’re currently . . . trying to become employed by [the various police departments], 
do you believe that you are going to have to treat their testimony . . . like it is more credible 
because you are worried about being able to get the job?” and Juror 59 responded, “No.” The 
district court then followed-up with the question, “[I]f they come in, are you going to be able to 
find that their testimony is not credible if, in fact, you believe it was not credible?” and Juror 59 
responded, “I would look at it either way. Not from the point of view of the job, but the person.”  
 
Defense counsel asked Juror 59 if he would “tend to believe law enforcement more than 
other witnesses?” and Juror 59 responded, “I tend to believe them a little more, yes.” Defense 
counsel then asked, “If you were instructed by the judge that you were to consider all witnesses 
in equal fashion, do you think that’s something that you could do?” and Juror 59 responded, “I 
                                                 
15 To preserve anonymity and for sake of clarity, we refer to all jurors with the pronouns “he” or “him.” 
 
28 
think, yeah, if I was instructed. I guess the same as going back to the law, you have to put your 
personal opinions aside.”  
 
Juror 59 thought the death penalty “is appropriate in some cases.” Juror 59 “generally 
favor[ed] the death penalty, but [he] would base a decision to impose it on the facts and law in 
the case.” The “facts of the case” would be most important to him when deciding whether a 
person received a death sentence or life in prison. Juror 59 answered affirmatively when the 
district court asked if he would be able to follow the district court’s instructions and be willing to 
consider not imposing a death sentence. He also testified that the fact that children were in the 
house when the fire occurred would not influence his ability to follow the district court’s 
instructions on imposition of the death penalty. He affirmed that he would consider and weigh 
mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel asked Juror 59 how would the fact that children were 
present while the murder took place affect his ability to judge the case, and Juror 59 responded: 
“If the Court instructed that that’s one of the aggravating circumstances according to law, then it 
becomes part of the evidence, but if not, then it’s -- then it becomes my opinion on the -- which -
-.”  
 
In the questionnaire, Juror 59 disagreed with the premise “Not executing murderers is 
disrespectful to victims.” He disagreed with the propositions that “murder is murder,” and 
understanding motives and circumstances is not important, and it does not matter what kind of 
childhood a murderer had. He also disagreed with the premise “People who kill should be 
punished no matter what the circumstances are.” 
 
Abdullah highlights certain statements by Juror 59 regarding the death penalty. Juror 59 
responded in his questionnaire that he ranked his belief in the death penalty a nine out of ten (ten 
being the strongest belief and one the least). On the juror questionnaire, Juror 59 (1) agreed 
executions are necessary to protect the public; (2) disagreed16 life in prison without the 
possibility of parole is not a harsh enough penalty for murder; (3) agreed society would be 
stronger if the death penalty were imposed more often; (4) disagreed only the worst murderers 
should be executed; (5) strongly disagreed it would be hard to vote to kill someone; and (6) 
disagreed it is better for society to let some guilty people go free than to risk convicting an 
innocent person. Juror 59 believed the best argument for the death penalty was “multiple 
                                                 
16 Abdullah stated in his brief that Juror 59 “strongly agreed” that life in prison without the possibility of parole was 
not a harsh enough penalty for murder, but Juror 59 actually stated in his questionnaire that he “disagreed” with this 
premise. 
 
29 
homicide or children.” Juror 59 testified that “children being a victim” was one of the best 
arguments for the death penalty.  
 
Juror 83 was the manager of the Laboratory Improvement Section of the Idaho Bureau of 
Laboratories. He responded in his questionnaire that he ranked his belief in the death penalty 
nine out of ten. Juror 83 “generally favor[ed] the death penalty, but [he] would base a decision to 
impose it on the facts and law in the case.” He believed the best argument for the death penalty is 
“life for a life.” “Circumstance-Intent” was the most important to Juror 83 in deciding whether to 
sentence a person to death or life in prison in a murder case. Juror 83 believed the death penalty 
“is appropriate in certain heinous crimes. Intent to do the act would certainly be required.” Juror 
83 told the district court he would be willing to consider not imposing the death sentence and 
“[a]bsolutely” would fairly consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. He answered 
“[n]o” when asked if his views on the imposition of the death penalty would prevent or 
substantially impair him from following the district court’s instructions. He was not of the 
opinion that death was the only appropriate sentence for murder in the first-degree.  
 
In the questionnaire, Juror 83 (1) strongly disagreed murder is murder and understanding 
the motives and circumstances is not important; (2) disagreed no one convicted of murder should 
ever be allowed out of prison; (3) disagreed life in prison without the possibility of parole is not a 
harsh enough penalty for murder; and (4) disagreed people who kill should be punished no 
matter what the circumstances are. Juror 83 did not feel his views on the death penalty would 
prevent or substantially impair his ability to view the facts impartially.  
 
Abdullah highlights that Juror 83: (1) strongly agreed “I support the use of the death 
penalty”; (2) disagreed only the worst murderers should be executed; (3) agreed our society 
would be stronger if the death penalty were imposed more often; (4) agreed executions are 
needed to protect the public; (5) agreed someone already convicted of a murder is likely to kill 
someone else; and (6) agreed it doesn’t matter what kind of childhood a murderer had. Abdullah 
also highlights certain statements made by Juror 83 during voir dire. Juror 83 explained that he 
ranked his belief in the death penalty at nine out of ten because he believed “it is warranted in 
heinous situations and that the State of Idaho now has agreed that there is a death penalty 
warranted, so I agree with that. I think there is a place for the death penalty.” He explained his 
“life for a life” argument as:  
 
30 
Well, I feel strongly in justice issues that there needs to be a notion of justice in 
all that we do and if someone takes someone’s life, it is reasonable to expect that 
their life may be taken for that purpose. And I realize there is a lot of mitigating 
circumstances and that’s why under law we have various levels; first degree, 
second degree and so forth in which it may not be warranted, but there are some 
situations that I do believe are heinous enough and with so much malice that it is 
warranted. 
 
When asked by defense counsel if Juror 83 could wait to hear defense counsel’s mitigating facts 
and circumstances before making a decision, Juror 83 said, “Yes, I believe so.”  
Contrary to Abdullah’s allegations, Juror 59 and Juror 83 had no actual bias. Both jurors 
stated that they were strongly in favor of the death penalty for specific reasons (“multiple 
homicide or children” for Juror 59 and “a life for a life,” “heinous crimes” for Juror 83), but both 
jurors also stated that they would base a decision to impose the death penalty on the facts and 
law in the case. Many other questionnaire and voir dire responses by Juror 59 and Juror 83 
showed that they recognized a death sentence was appropriate only in certain limited 
circumstances as instructed by the district court. In the questionnaire and voir dire, each juror 
exhibited the ability to “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court.” Hairston, 133 Idaho at 506, 988 P.2d at 1180 (quoting Murphy, 421 
U.S. at 800). Neither juror exhibited an unalterable, unwavering view on capital punishment that 
would prevent him from carrying out his duties in accordance with the law. Based on the record, 
Juror 59 and Juror 83 were not biased due to their views on the death penalty. 
Specific to Juror 59, Abdullah also argues that Juror 59 was biased because he was 
interviewing for a job with law enforcement and stated in his questionnaire that he found law 
enforcement officers more credible than other witnesses. When questioned by the district court 
and defense counsel, however, Juror 59 repeatedly stated he would judge the credibility of a 
witness, including law enforcement officers, in accordance with the instructions. “Although not 
always dispositive, the trial judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons 
concerning partiality or bias.” Yager, 139 Idaho at 688, 85 P.3d at 664 (citing Hairston, 133 
Idaho at 506, 988 P.2d at 1180). Based on all the information provided by Juror 59, an inference 
Juror 59 would act biased due to favoritism toward law enforcement officers is not supported by 
the record.17 
                                                 
17 In addition, Abdullah argues that Juror 59 was biased because there was no jury instruction to counter Juror 59’s 
witness credibility predispositions. To the contrary, Jury Instruction 4 provided in part:  
 
 
31 
 
Specific to Juror 83, Abdullah also argues that Juror 83 was biased because Juror 83 
mistakenly believed mitigating evidence was presented during the guilt phase, not during the 
sentencing phase, and his misunderstanding was not corrected by the district court or the parties. 
According to Abdullah, once Juror 83 found Abdullah guilty of first-degree murder, the juror had 
already decided the penalty of death. Juror 83’s comments do not indicate that Juror 83 would 
automatically sentence Abdullah to death based on a conviction of first-degree murder. In other 
parts of Juror 83’s questionnaire and in his statements during voir dire, Juror 83 said he would 
consider not imposing a death sentence, follow the instructions, listen to mitigating 
circumstances, and did not believe death was the only appropriate sentence for first-degree 
murder. Based on all the information provided by Juror 83, and the detailed jury instructions, an 
inference Juror 83 would automatically impose a death sentence for a first-degree murder 
conviction is not supported by the record. 
 
In summary, we do not review any alleged bias of Juror 59 and Juror 83 on direct appeal 
due to the invited error doctrine, but we hold for purposes of post-conviction phase issues 
discussed subsequently herein that Juror 59 and Juror 83 were not biased.  
3. 
Abdullah’s convictions for first-degree murder, first-degree arson, three counts of 
attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child were supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 
Abdullah challenges his six convictions for lack of substantial evidence. We hold that 
there was substantial evidence upon which any rational trier fact could have found the essential 
elements of first-degree murder, first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree 
murder, and felony injury to a child beyond a reasonable doubt. 
a. 
Standard of Review 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In doing so, you must follow my instructions 
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be . . . . The law requires that your 
decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. . . .  
 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. . . .
 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you 
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs you 
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you attach 
to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making 
these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations.  
 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses 
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each 
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say.  
 
32 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that 
due process, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction 
except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of 
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). The relevant inquiry is not 
whether this Court would find the defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). 
 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012). 
 
“Thus,” when determining whether Abdullah’s convictions should be upheld, “the only 
inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 
have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of [each crime] beyond 
a reasonable doubt.” Id.   
In conducting this analysis, the Court is required to consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  
 
Id. 
b. 
Abdullah’s conviction for first-degree murder was supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
 
For the charge of first-degree murder, the State alleged in the indictment that Abdullah 
“willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice aforethought,” killed 
Angie “by suffocating her and/or by acute Prozac (fluoxetine) poisoning from which she died.” 
See I.C. §§ 18-4001 to -4003. In addition, the State had to prove Angie’s death was caused by a 
criminal act of Abdullah, which may be satisfied solely by circumstantial evidence. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 713, 215 P.3d 414, 433 (2009). 
 
Abdullah argues that the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt because 
the State’s theory required proof that Abdullah was responsible for causing Angie’s death due to 
a combination of fluoxetine poisoning and suffocation. According to Abdullah, an integral 
condition precedent to the suffocation of Angie with the plastic bag was her fluoxetine-induced 
incapacitation. He argues that the evidence showed Angie ingested fluoxetine before her last 
meal between 10:00 p.m. and midnight, but he did not arrive in Boise until 1:00 a.m. or later. 
Therefore, Abdullah asserts that the State offered no evidence to demonstrate that he was 
 
33 
responsible for or connected to Angie’s ingestion of fluoxetine. For this reason, Abdullah 
submits that his first-degree murder conviction was not supported by substantial evidence.18  
 
By focusing only on the State’s failure to connect Abdullah with Angie’s ingestion of 
fluoxetine, Abdullah ignores that the indictment alleged that Abdullah killed Angie by 
suffocation “and/or” fluoxetine poisoning. In Severson, the State alleged that the defendant killed 
the victim by “overdosing her, suffocating her, or both.” 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432. The 
Court stated that the fact that the victim may have died from one or two possible causes did not 
preclude the jury from finding the defendant guilty of murder. Id. at 713, 215 P.3d at 433. “[T]he 
State was not required to prove the specific cause” of the victim’s death. Id. The Court noted 
parenthetically: “The state is required only to show a hypothesis that death occurred by criminal 
agency; it is not required to show a hypothesis of a specific cause of death.” Id. (quoting Sheriff, 
Washoe Cnty. v. Middleton, 921 P.2d 282, 286 (Nev. 1996)). Upon review of the evidence, the 
Court in Severson concluded that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the 
jury’s conclusion that the defendant was the person who killed the victim by overdosing her, 
suffocating her, or both. Id. at 713–14, 921 P.3d at 433–34. The Court reasoned, “The fact that 
the State did not provide direct evidence to that effect does not prohibit this conclusion. The 
evidence produced at trial revealed that it was unlikely that [the victim’s] overdose was self-
imposed, but there was substantial evidence linking [the defendant] to her murder.” Id. at 714, 
921 P.3d at 434 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  
 
In this case, the jury was instructed that the State must prove Abdullah engaged in 
conduct which caused Angie’s death. The jury was provided with substantial evidence to make 
this finding. The State was not required to prove the specific cause of Angie’s death. Severson, 
147 Idaho at 713, 215 P.3d at 433. Nor was the State required to prove Abdullah administered 
the fluoxetine to Angie due to the “and/or” language in the indictment. Viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found Abdullah 
killed Angie by suffocating her with a plastic bag. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at 432. 
Like the victim in Severson, there was no evidence to indicate Angie “died from natural causes,” 
and “the evidence produced at trial revealed that it was unlikely that [Angie’s] overdose was 
self-imposed,” which, in any event, was a determination for the jury. 147 Idaho at 713–14, 215 
P.3d at 433–34. Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was substantial evidence upon 
                                                 
18 Abdullah presents no other argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for first-degree murder.  
 
34 
which a reasonable jury could have found the State met its burden of proving the essential 
elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this Court affirms 
Abdullah’s conviction for first-degree murder.  
c. 
Abdullah’s conviction for first-degree arson was supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
 
For the charge of first-degree arson, the State alleged in the indictment that Abdullah 
“willfully and unlawfully by fire or explosion” damaged the Siesta residence. The jury 
instruction on arson provided that the State had to prove Abdullah “willfully . . . by fire or 
explosion . . . damaged . . . a dwelling.” Idaho’s arson statute provides: “Any person who 
willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages . . . [a]ny dwelling, whether occupied or 
not . . . is guilty of arson in the first degree . . . .” I.C. § 18-802.  
 
Abdullah contends that he is liable only for attempt to commit first-degree arson. He 
argues that he should have been charged with attempted arson because the evidence showed the 
gasoline was prematurely ignited by the pilot light from the water heater, not by the human hand. 
We disagree. The attempt statute does not apply to Abdullah’s criminal activity. Under Idaho 
law, a “person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the 
perpetration thereof” is guilty of attempt to commit the target crime. I.C. § 18-306. Here, 
Abdullah did not fail in attempting to commit the crime, nor was his attempt prevented or 
intercepted. His conduct caused the intended result—the damage of a dwelling by fire. I.C. § 18-
802. In other words, the fire would not have occurred but for his conduct and the fire was the 
foreseeable, probable, and intended result of his conduct. Abdullah is liable for the targeted 
crime of arson, rather than attempt, because his criminal conduct damaged a dwelling by fire. 
 
Abdullah reads Idaho’s arson statute narrowly to demand ignition by the human hand. 
Idaho’s arson statute is not that narrow, however. Based on the plain language of the statute, it 
requires only that a person damages “by fire or explosion” any dwelling. I.C. § 18-802. In 
contrast to arson statutes in other jurisdictions, Idaho’s arson statute does not contain any 
language referencing that a person “sets fire” or “starts a fire.” Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 
451 (“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or 
causes to be burned . . . any structure, forest land, or property.”), and OR. REV. STAT. § 164.325 
(“A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if . . . [b]y starting a fire or causing an 
explosion, the person intentionally damages . . . [p]rotected property of another . . . .”), with 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (“A person is guilty of arson if . . . the person by means of fire . . . 
 
35 
unlawfully and intentionally damages . . . the property of another.”), and WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.48.020 (“A person is guilty of arson in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously 
. . . [c]auses a fire or explosion which damages a dwelling . . . .”). Idaho’s arson statute requires 
only that a person willfully cause damage by fire or explosion. Thus, Idaho’s arson statute 
imposes criminal liability not only on individuals that start a fire with the human hand, but also 
on individuals that cause a fire or explosion through other means.  
 
Abdullah submits that even if he engaged in more than “mere preparation” of the crime 
by intentionally pouring the gasoline, he cannot be liable for first-degree arson because he did 
not provide the ignition source. Drawing an analogy to first-degree murder, Abdullah asserts that 
an intentional stabbing that does not kill the victim surely cannot be considered first-degree 
murder simply because the stabbing was more than “mere preparation” for the crime. The flaw 
with Abdullah’s analogy, and his argument here, is that he disregards the fact that the intended 
result occurred. In this case, Abdullah’s willful, unlawful conduct damaged a dwelling by fire. 
Thus, the correct analogy to the crime of first-degree murder also would have to include the 
intended result: the victim’s death. What this analogy makes clear is that the defendant’s possible 
criminal liability is not an issue of attempt, but rather an issue of proximate cause. “An 
intervening, superseding cause generally refers to an independent act or force that breaks the 
causal chain between the defendant’s culpable act and the victim’s injury. The intervening cause 
becomes the proximate cause of the victim’s injury and removes the defendant’s act as the 
proximate cause.” State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374–75, 223 P.3d 750, 757–78 (2009) 
(citations omitted). The defendant is relieved of criminal liability only if the intervening cause is 
“an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.” Id. at 375, 223 P.3d at 758. “The defendant 
remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might reasonably have been 
contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could 
result from his act.” Id. Based on our interpretation of Idaho’s arson statute, we recognize that in 
subsequent arson prosecutions an instruction on causation may be necessary depending on the 
facts of the case. Yet in this case Abdullah did not submit any issue as to causation. We will not 
address whether a causation instruction would have been warranted. See State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).19 
                                                 
19 
Even assuming Abdullah may have been entitled to a jury instruction on proximate cause, any error in the 
omission of that instruction was harmless. An argument based on proximate cause is “merely one of many ways in 
 
36 
 
In summary, this Court recognizes that proximate cause could serve to limit criminal 
liability for arson in some cases. In this case, however, Abdullah raised no such objection to the 
jury instructions on arson, and he submits no such argument on appeal. Abdullah raises no other 
challenge to his conviction for first-degree arson, and this Court affirms his arson conviction 
because it was supported by substantial evidence. Any reasonable jury could have found the 
State met its burden of proving the essential elements of arson beyond a reasonable doubt. 
d. 
Abdullah’s convictions for three counts of attempted first-degree murder were 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 
For the three counts of attempted first-degree murder, the State alleged in the indictment 
that Abdullah “willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice 
aforethought” attempted to kill A.H., M.A., and S.S. “by setting fire” to the Siesta residence 
while A.H., M.A., and S.S. were “asleep inside.” The jury was instructed that State was required 
to prove Abdullah “did some act which was a step towards committing the crime of Murder in 
the First Degree” of A.H., M.A., and S.S. and “when doing so” Abdullah “intended to commit 
that particular crime.” The jury also was instructed on the requirements for attempt and the 
elements of first-degree murder.  
 
Abdullah argues that the evidence supporting his convictions for attempted first-degree 
murder was insufficient in two respects. First, he argues that the State failed to prove the charges 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the defense may attempt to cast doubt on the State’s case.” State v. Munoz, 970 P.2d 143, 147 (N.M. 1998). 
Here, it is improbable that a rational jury would find that the premature ignition broke the casual chain because 
ignition is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a substantial quantity of poured gasoline in an enclosed room 
with a pilot light. For example, in People v. Sullivan, the defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a jury instruction on the issue of causation on a murder charge. 6 N.E.3d 888, 896 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2014). The Appellate Court of Illinois held that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong of the two-part 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel because it was “not reasonably probable” that the jury would have found 
that the victim’s subsequent injuries, which led to the victim’s death, broke the casual chain. Id. at 898. The court 
explained, “To be guilty of murder, a defendant’s acts are not required to be the sole and immediate cause of death: 
it is sufficient that the defendant’s criminal acts contribute to the victim’s death.” Id. at 897. Thus, “to be a true 
intervening cause, the victim’s death must be unrelated to the criminal act of the defendant.” Id. at 898. The court 
determined that the defendant set in motion the chain of events which led to the victim’s death. Id. Due to the 
connection between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s death, the court held that it was not reasonably probable 
that jury would have found the defendant not liable based on proximate cause. Id.  
 
In this case, the intervening act of ignition by the pilot light was not “unforeseeable and extraordinary” or 
unrelated to Abdullah’s willful, criminal actions. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 375, 223 P.3d at 758. To the contrary, 
Abdullah’s willful, criminal actions set in motion the chain of events that directly and irrefutably led to the ignition 
of the gasoline. Applying either the harmless or fundamental error standard, Abdullah cannot prevail. Beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of a causation instruction did not contribute to the verdict obtained, and there is not a 
reasonable possibility that the absence of a causation instruction affected the outcome at trial. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 221, 226–227, 245 P.3d 961, 973, 978–79 (2010). Any reasonable person would foresee the possibility of 
premature ignition based on the volume of gasoline poured in an enclosed room where a pilot light is located. Id. at 
374, 223 P.3d at 757. 
 
37 
set forth in the indictment because he did not set fire to the residence. He submits that he only 
attempted to set fire to the residence before the pilot light prematurely ignited the gasoline. This 
argument fails for similar reasons as discussed above regarding the arson conviction. Due to 
Abdullah’s willful, criminal conduct in pouring such a large amount of gasoline to cause a 
premature ignition, any reasonable jury could have found based on the evidence that Abdullah 
intentionally set fire to the residence in an attempt to kill the children in the home. 
 
Second, Abdullah argues that no evidence supports the conclusion that he had the specific 
intent to kill A.H., M.A., and S.S. He submits that he was trying to rescue the children in the 
Siesta residence, evidenced by the fact that N.A. was found in the backyard. As discussed in the 
following section, Abdullah’s intent was a determination for the jury. Any rational jury could 
conclude that the evidence of Abdullah’s removal of N.A. from the residence demonstrated that 
Abdullah wanted to remove N.A. only. This evidence substantiated, rather than negated, his 
intent to murder the other children. In this case, there was substantial evidence for a reasonable 
jury to conclude Abdullah intended for S.S., A.H., and M.A. to die in the burning home. 
Therefore, this Court affirms Abdullah’s three convictions of attempted first-degree murder 
because any rational trier of fact could conclude the State proved all essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
e. 
Abdullah’s conviction for felony injury to a child was supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
For the charge of felony injury to a child, the State alleged in the indictment that 
Abdullah “did, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, commit an 
injury upon” N.A.  
by unlawfully and willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed in a 
situation endangering his health or person, while having care and/or custody of 
the child by setting fire to his residence . . . and fleeing to avoid capture, while 
leaving the child in the backyard of the burning residence unsupervised. 
 
The statute for this offense provides:  
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily 
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon 
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of 
any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be 
injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation 
that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one 
(1) year nor more than ten (10) years. 
 
 
38 
I.C. § 18-1501(1). 
 
Abdullah submits only one challenge to this conviction. He argues that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of felony injury to a child because the 
reasonable inferences from the evidence showed Abdullah moved N.A. from inside the burning 
home to a position of relative safety at the time of ignition.  
Although a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence only if the 
circumstances, as found by the jury, are consistent with the defendant[’]s guilt and 
inconsistent with his innocence, the conclusion of guilt need not necessarily 
follow from the circumstances in proof, but may be obtained therefrom by 
probable deductions. A mere possibility of innocence will not render a verdict of 
guilty a nullity.  
 
State v. Price, 93 Idaho 615, 617, 469 P.2d 544, 546 (1970) (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). By arguing that the evidence showed Abdullah was trying to save 
N.A., Abdullah is simply asking this Court to displace the role of the jury. The mere possibility 
that Abdullah may have intended to move N.A. from a place of danger to a place of safety does 
not invalidate his conviction. “[E]ven when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted 
consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it 
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432. 
The evidence showed Abdullah placed an eighteen-month-old child in the backyard of a burning 
house with a fire so intense it would burn the child if the child was not moved to an area of 
safety. This evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to reach a conclusion that Abdullah 
was guilty of the crime charged. “The cumulative effect of this evidence is more than adequate to 
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Where, as here, there is competent, substantial, though 
conflicting, evidence to sustain a jury’s verdict, this Court will not disturb the judgment.” Price, 
93 Idaho at 617, 469 P.2d at 546. Abdullah’s challenge to his conviction for felony injury to a 
child fails because there was substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find Abdullah willfully 
caused N.A. to be placed in situation that endangered N.A.’s person or health. I.C. § 18-1501. 
Therefore, this Court affirms Abdullah’s conviction for felony injury to a child. 
4. 
The jury instruction on the definition of “willfully” did not cause fundamental error 
at trial. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court’s instruction to the jury on the definition of 
“willfully” for the crime of arson caused an error in the jury’s determination of guilt for first-
degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. 
 
39 
a. 
Facts  
 
The jury initially did not receive an instruction on the definition of “willfully,” even 
though all of the crimes charged had a “willful” element. While deliberating, the jury submitted a 
question to the district court, asking: “In the instruction No. 20 item #3 can we be given the legal 
definition of ‘willfully.’” Jury Instruction 20 pertained to the elements of arson. The district court 
conferred with the parties, and they agreed to provide the following definition: “An act is 
‘wilfull’ or done ‘wilfully’ when done on purpose. One can act wilfully without intending to 
violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” This definition is similar to the 
Idaho Code’s definition of “wilfully,” which provides:  
The word “wilfully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the 
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure 
another, or to acquire any advantage. 
 
I.C. § 18-101(1). The jury did not submit any further questions to the district court. 
 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court reviews this issue for fundamental error because Abdullah did not object to the 
instruction. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). “Whether jury 
instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 
P.3d 652, 654 (2000). The Court examines the jury instructions “as a whole, not individually, to 
determine whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed.” State v. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 355, 373–74, 247 P.3d 528, 600–01 (2010).  
 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah argues that it must be presumed that the jury applied the definition of willful 
not only to arson, but also to every offense containing a willful element. After asserting this 
presumption, Abdullah submits argument on why the definition of willful was improper for first-
degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child.  
 
Abdullah relies on Brown v. State, 137 Idaho 529, 50 P.3d 1024 (Ct. App. 2002), to 
support his assertion: “When a jury receives only one definition, it must be presumed that the 
jury applied that definition.” In Brown, the defendant was charged with five counts of grand theft 
by possession of stolen property, two counts of burglary, and one count of grand theft. 137 Idaho 
at 532, 50 P.3d at 1027. For one of the burglary charges, the jury instructions were incomplete 
 
40 
because they did not include the definition of theft, a crime the defendant allegedly intended to 
commit during the burglary. Id. at 533–34, 50 P.3d at 1028–29. The defendant claimed his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the incomplete instructions. Id. at 533, 50 P.3d at 
1028. Due to the missing definition for theft, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the 
instructions failed to comply with “the well-established rule that a jury must be instructed on the 
State’s burden to prove every element of a charged crime.” Id. at 534, 50 P.3d at 1029. Without 
deciding whether the defendant’s counsel was deficient, the Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because he was not prejudiced by his 
counsel’s performance. Id. The jury was provided with all the elements of theft in the instruction 
of another charge, “theft by possession of stolen property.” Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
“that the jury followed the only definition of theft they were given,” i.e., the jury applied the 
instruction for theft by possession of stolen property to the theft alleged in the burglary charge. 
Id. For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the inclusion of additional elements” 
for theft in the burglary instruction “could not have prejudiced the defendant.” Id. 
 
Based on Brown, Abdullah contends that we must presume the jury applied the only 
definition of willful they were given to the other charges of first-degree murder, attempted first-
degree murder, and felony injury to a child. Brown is inapposite to the case at hand. Unlike the 
theft instruction in Brown, the jury was not provided an instruction of willful at the outset of 
deliberations. Thus, there is no initial presumption as in Brown that the jury applied the willful 
definition to all occurrences of the term. 
 
There is no evidence to support a presumption that the jury applied the willful definition 
for arson to the remaining charges. The jury specifically requested a definition of willful for 
arson, and the definition of willful was in response and attached to the jury’s question. The 
nature of the jury’s request logically narrows the application of the district court’s response to 
their request. Without any evidence to the contrary, this Court will not assume the jury went 
beyond the scope of their question to the judge and applied the willful definition for arson to the 
other offenses.  
 
We conclude that the willful instruction for arson did not alter or affect the other jury 
instructions for the crimes charged. Abdullah’s arguments with respect to the jury instruction for 
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child are premised on 
this willful definition. No other error in the guilt phase instructions was raised to this Court with 
 
41 
adequate argument and authority, and thus Abdullah’s challenges to the guilt phase jury 
instructions fail.  
5. 
The district court did not err by admitting Angie’s out-of-court statements. 
 
Abdullah challenges the admission of Angie’s out-of-court statements, elicited by the 
State through the testimony of (1) Angie’s obstetrician Dr. Brenda Williams; (2) her nurse 
practitioner Velma Seabolt; (3) her therapist Gina Wolfe Seybold; and (4) attorney Deborah 
Kristal.  
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred by admitting the testimony of Dr. Williams, 
Seabolt, Seybold, and Kristal. He asserts that this testimony was irrelevant because “Azad did 
not suggest suicide during the criminal investigation; as a result, the district court erred by 
admitting evidence purporting to rebut a suicide defense theory during the State’s case-in-chief.” 
“Instead,” he argues, “Angie’s statements were nothing more than prejudicial, inflammatory 
character evidence having little or no relationship to a state of mind inconsistent with suicide.” 
He further argues that Angie’s statements to Kristal were not consistent with suicidal ideation. 
a. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court “reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a mixed 
standard of review. First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free 
review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted). 
“Second,” the Court reviews “the district court’s determination of whether the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.” Id.  
b. 
Analysis 
i. 
Testimony of Dr. Williams, Seabolt, and Seybold  
 
Dr. Williams, Angie’s obstetrician, testified that Angie requested a tubal ligation 
following the delivery of M.A. Dr. Williams explained that her standard approach is to discuss 
whether a vasectomy is a more reasonable option because it is less invasive and less expensive, 
and she believed that she discussed that option with Angie. Dr. Williams testified that Angie 
responded that “her husband would not have a vasectomy and that she wanted a tubal ligation.” 
Dr. Williams also testified, “It was very clear that Angie had made this decision on her own, that 
she would undergo sterilization; that not being sterilized, for her, was not an option regardless of 
her situation.” Dr. Williams stated, “Not that I recall,” when asked by the prosecutor, “Did the 
defendant come to attend to his wife after her [tubal ligation]?” Dr. Williams’s testimony was 
 
42 
admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception in Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 803(4) for medical 
diagnosis and treatment.  
 
Seabolt was Dr. Williams’s primary nurse practitioner and assisted her in Angie’s care. 
During a prenatal visit while Angie was pregnant with M.A., Seabolt testified that she had a 
conversation with Angie regarding the condition of her marriage. Seabolt explained: 
Angie said that -- it was probably the last trimester, she said that she was going to 
get a divorce, but she had to stay married until after the pregnancy because she 
didn’t have any health insurance, and she was a housewife at the time so she 
couldn’t afford the children. So she said that she was going to pursue a divorce 
after the pregnancy. 
 
Seabolt’s testimony also was admitted pursuant to the exception in I.R.E. 803(4) for medical 
diagnosis and treatment.  
 
Seybold was a therapist in private practice, and she had counseled Angie on and off for 
approximately seven years. She testified to Angie’s view of her marriage in the spring of 2002. 
She explained: 
In the spring of 2002 there had been events that she had experienced with Mr. 
Abdullah that led her to believe that he was being unfaithful. And she was very 
concerned about her relationship with him. I think she struggled for a couple of 
years with issues of infidelity, and I believe toward the last when I saw her there 
was a concern that he was bringing pornography though the computer ---  
 
Abdullah immediately objected, but only to Seybold’s statement that Angie said Abdullah “was 
bringing pornography through the computer.” The district court sustained Abdullah’s objection, 
struck the “last answer” on pornography, and instructed the jury to disregard it. 
 
As to Dr. Williams’s testimony of the tubal ligation and vasectomy, there was no error. 
The transcript reveals that Abdullah did not challenge the relevancy of these statements at trial. 
Abdullah specifically objected on hearsay grounds. He submitted no argument as to relevancy. 
Indeed, the district court found that the evidence was relevant and stated on the record 
“[A]pparently [defense] counsel agrees with me.” Abdullah responded, “Well, I have thoroughly 
read the . . . sections that are relevant, so I can see the Court’s point.” Further, the district court 
actually sustained Abdullah’s objection in part, finding that the State could not ask Dr. Williams 
about Angie’s general feelings toward sterilization. Finally, we note that Abdullah submits on 
appeal that Dr. Williams’s testimony was not relevant because it was inconsistent with suicide, 
but the record plainly indicates that the district court found Dr. Williams’s testimony relevant on 
other grounds—for which Abdullah submits no argument. Based on our review of the record, we 
 
43 
conclude that the district court properly determined that Dr. Williams’s testimony was relevant 
and exercised its discretion pursuant to I.R.E. 403. Moreover, we conclude that any challenge as 
to the admission of Dr. Williams’s testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4) is waived. Abdullah 
provides no argument or authority on this issue. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
 
As to Seabolt’s testimony of Angie planning to divorce Abdullah after her pregnancy, the 
transcript again reveals that Abdullah did not object on relevancy or I.R.E. 403 grounds. Instead, 
he objected on the basis that Seabolt’s testimony as to the condition of Angie’s marriage was 
“beyond the scope of treatment” to fall within the hearsay exception in I.R.E. 803(4). On appeal, 
Abdullah has submitted no argument or authority as to this hearsay exception. Abdullah has 
waived any issue regarding the admissibility of Seabolt’s testimony See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 
263, 923 P.2d at 970.   
 
As to Seybold’s testimony, the transcript again illuminates the real issues discussed by 
the parties and the court. The record shows that Abdullah only objected to Seybold’s statement 
regarding pornography, which was sustained by the district court. On appeal, Abdullah raises no 
issue with the district court’s ruling on the pornography statement, and he fails to provide any 
argument to show that Seybold’s testimony regarding Abdullah’s unfaithfulness was improperly 
admitted by the district court. Abdullah has waived his appeal of the admissibility of Seybold’s 
testimony. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
ii. 
Testimony of Kristal 
 
Kristal, an attorney in general practice, met with Angie on September 9, 2002, about four 
weeks before her death and about one week before she gave birth to M.A.  
 
Immediately prior to Kristal’s testimony of Angie’s statements during their meeting, 
Abdullah objected. The district court overruled the objection and discussed its ruling with the 
parties: 
 
[THE COURT:] This is -- the statements that are about to be admitted are 
not testimonial statements that would be -- to which Crawford would apply. I 
want to make it clear that although it appears that the defense is suggesting that 
what we’re talking about with the so-called state of mind exception is 803 
subsection 3, then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, but that’s, in 
fact, not what we’re talking about. 
 
What we’re talking about is out of court statements which, regardless of 
their truth, imply the -- in this case -- the intention, motive, or a particular state of 
 
44 
mind of the person making the declaration. In this case, Ms. Abdullah. That’s all 
they’re being offered for. 
 
What I’m going to do is I’m going to allow them because they are being 
offered only as circumstantial evidence to establish her state of mind in the weeks 
leading up to her death. 
 
In particular, in this case, they are relevant for several reasons. One of 
those reasons is, as I understand it, the defense in the case is that Ms. Abdullah 
committed suicide. And so these statements clearly go to what was going on in 
her mind at that time. But they also go to what she was thinking about in the 
weeks leading up to her death. 
 
Before -- before Ms. Kristal will continue her testimony, and we’ll go 
down that path, I’m going to instruct the jury -- I’m going to give them a limiting 
instruction which indicates they’re about to hear testimony about certain 
statements that may have been made by Ms. Abdullah to her attorney. Those 
statements are not being offered -- and I’m going to tell them this -- they’re not 
being offered for the truth of the statements made by Ms. Abdullah, but they’re 
being offered solely to establish the state of mind that Ms. Abdullah had in talking 
to her attorney, and they’re not to consider it for any other purpose. 
 
Does either party object to that limiting instruction given? 
 
MS. DUNN [the prosecutor]: No, Your Honor. 
 
MR. TORYANSKI: No objection. 
 
THE COURT: So I’m overruling the objection. We can bring in the jury. 
 
And also, just for the record, I do understand that this is a matter of 
discretion for the Court, and in making that determination I have also applied a 
403 analysis and determined in looking at the probative value of the statements 
and what they’re being offered for, their probative value is not significantly 
outweighed by any potential substantial prejudice to the defendant, and it’s not -- 
will not be a waste of the jury’s time or confuse the issues.20 
 
                                                 
20 The district court had previously ruled on the admissibility of Kristal’s testimony before the State called Kristal as 
a witness. The State wanted to give the district court and Abdullah a “heads up” on their witness. Abdullah objected 
to Kristal’s testimony, arguing that it was not probative because Angie’s state of mind did not go to whether 
Abdullah harmed her or set the Siesta residence on fire and there were no facts showing that Abdullah was aware of 
her state of mind. The district court ruled:  
 
We have evidence already here, and that I believe was his coworker who testified that divorce was 
not acceptable, at least in his view, in the Muslim faith and that we -- and if we have evidence that 
she had actually sought the advice of a lawyer for the -- for a couple of purposes, but one of those 
purposes was for a divorce, then it seems to me that that is relevant and probative to the -- in my 
view, anyway, it’s probative to potential motive and to the State’s contention that he is in fact the 
person who did this crime. And in this case -- so I do think it’s relevant. 
 
I also think that it is nonhearsay because it goes -- it’s being offered for state of mind. 
And I have done a 403 analysis and have found that it is probative, and it’s [sic] probative value is 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, nor is it likely to 
confuse the issues or mislead the jury. And it certainly doesn’t unduly delay the -- or result in a 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. So it seems to me that it is admissible. 
 
And I do understand, again, that rulings of this nature are within the sound discretion of 
the court. And so unless there is some other problem with this testimony that has not been 
identified for me, then I’m going to allow this testimony to come in. 
 
45 
Kristal then testified to numerous statements made by Angie during their meeting. Kristal 
testified that Angie said, “My mom thinks I’m down here getting a divorce, but I’m not sure I’m 
ready for that, I just want to talk to you about that.” Kristal testified that Angie said “she was 
concerned about the present financial status and what would happen if she got divorced.” Kristal 
stated that Angie also met with her because she wanted to make a formal will “that would cover 
the child that she was pregnant with and her other son [N.A.]” Kristal explained that Angie had a 
Muslim will for A.H. According to Kristal’s testimony, Angie told her: (1) “her husband wasn’t 
good with money, he wasn’t trustworthy with money”; “[b]ills were unpaid”; and “he was just so 
bad with money”; (2) she had to borrow $3,000 from her credit card to pay back Abdullah’s 
brother after Abdullah used $3,000 from his brother for a trip to Mecca; (3) after experiencing 
preterm labor in Nashville and being advised by her doctor to go to Boise, Angie had to borrow 
money from family to return to Boise because Abdullah did not want her to go back or did not 
have the money; (4) Abdullah had listed her house for sale, although the house was in her name; 
(5) Abdullah had been accepted for religious studies in Saudi Arabia and South Africa; Angie 
refused to go to Saudi Arabia; Angie considered South Africa “because they spoke English 
there,” but she “just wasn’t sure with the state of her marriage that she wanted to be that far away 
and that she wanted to do it”; (6) “[s]he was concerned that he would take the children” if there 
was a divorce; (7) either “my husband isn’t a good man or my husband isn’t a nice man,” and 
“he’s very controlling and he can’t be trusted,” but there was no physical abuse; (8) Abdullah 
had an affair with “two girls” when she was pregnant with N.A.; (9) before going forward with 
the divorce, she was going to wait to have the baby and also contact an elder in the Muslim 
community to “talk some sense into him” or “save their marriage”; (10) “she wasn’t sure that she 
wanted to go home to her husband that night”; and (11) she had left Abdullah before and he had 
“made her come back.” Abdullah did not object to any of these specific statements. 
 
On cross-examination, Kristal testified that Angie told her: (1) to send the legal bill in 
care of her mother and to not telephone the house because she did not want Abdullah to know of 
her visit; (2) Abdullah would take the children out of the United States if they divorced; (3) “he 
was not the religious person that he portrayed himself to be because in order to go to Mecca, 
you’re not supposed to do it unless you can do it without harming your family”; and (4) 
Abdullah did not have a driver’s license, which showed “how he was irresponsible and didn’t 
think the laws applied to him.”  
 
46 
 
We first observe that some of the allegedly inadmissible statements identified by 
Abdullah in his brief were elicited by the defense on cross-examination. Abdullah cannot 
complain of any error in out-of-court statements he elicited. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 
844 P.2d 691, 695 (1992) (“Appellant cannot now be heard to denounce testimony that he 
roused. This constitutes invited error.”). 
 
We conclude that Kristal’s testimony was relevant. Statements of the declarant-victim’s 
state of mind may be admitted “only after a determination that (1) the declaration is relevant, and 
(2) the need for and value of such testimony outweighs the possibility of prejudice to the 
defendant.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364, 247 P.3d 582, 591 (2010) (citing State v. 
Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 382, 630 P.2d 665, 669 (1981)). The Court has recognized “four well-
defined categories in which a declarant-victim’s state of mind is relevant because of its 
relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” Id. The four categories are:  
(1) when the defendant claims self-defense as justification for the killing; (2) 
when the defendant seeks to build his defense around the fact that the deceased 
committed suicide[,] evidence introduced which tends to demonstrate that the 
victim made statements inconsistent with a design to take his or her own life is 
relevant; (3) when the defendant claims the killing was accidental; and (4) when a 
specific “mens rea” is in issue.  
 
Id. (citing State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477 n.7, 546 P.2d 1180, 1185 n.7 (1976)). In regard 
to the second category of the suicide defense, the Court stated that “where defendant seeks to 
defend on the ground that the deceased committed suicide, evidence that the victim had made 
statements inconsistent with a suicidal bent are highly relevant.” Garcia, 102 Idaho at 382, 630 
P.2d at 669 (quoting United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Here, 
Abdullah focuses on the second category, that of a suicide defense. He raises no argument with 
respect to the other three categories.  
 
In Shackelford, the Court held that the district court erred by admitting the victim’s out-
of-court statements, which were inconsistent with suicide, because the statements were not 
relevant. 150 Idaho at 363–66, 247 P.3d at 590–93. The Court explained that “to determine 
whether the statements here were relevant to rebut a defense theory of suicide,” the Court first 
“must determine whether there was a defense theory of suicide.” Id. at 365, 247 P.3d at 592. In 
that case, the Court determined that the defense “did not present a theory of suicide during the 
trial itself.” Id. at 366, 247 P.3d at 593. “Instead, the State offered testimony regarding 
Shackelford’s statements during the initial investigation about suicide, and the defense merely 
 
47 
offered testimony to show that any mention Shackelford made of suicide during the initial 
investigation did not affect the investigation in any way.” Id. Those statements made during the 
criminal investigation “were not sufficient to allow rebuttal of a defense theory of suicide.” Id. at 
365–66, 247 P.3d at 592–93. Therefore, the Court held that the district court erred in allowing 
the State to introduce the victim’s out-of-court statements to show a state of mind inconsistent 
with suicide. Id. at 366, 247 P.3d at 593. 
 
Although the evidence was inadmissible in Shackelford, the Court limited its holding. We 
cautioned: “We are not excluding the possibility that a defendant could make statements during a 
criminal investigation that would create a theory of defense such that the State would find it 
necessary to offer evidence in their case-in-chief or as rebuttal during trial.” Id. at 366, 247 P.3d 
at 593. The Court also stated that “in State v. Radabaugh, [93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582 (1970)] 
this Court did not expressly condition the admission of state of mind evidence on it being offered 
to rebut a defense theory.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 365, 247 P.3d at 592. Thus, this Court has 
recognized that other representations by the defendant could open the door for the admission of 
relevant evidence during the State’s case-in-chief regarding the defense’s suicide theory.  
 
Limiting our conclusion to the facts here, we conclude that Abdullah made sufficient 
representations to permit the State to present evidence of Angie’s out-of-court statements to 
show a state of mind inconsistent with suicide. In this case, the district court stated to the parties 
during one of its rulings on the admissibility of Angie’s out-of-court statements that “as I 
understand it, the defense in the case is that Ms. Abdullah committed suicide.” Abdullah voiced 
no objection to the district court’s assessment of his case, and he had represented to the district 
court earlier in the trial that suicide was a defense. Moreover, Abdullah has provided no evidence 
to support a finding that he was compelled to present a suicide defense due to the State’s 
preemptive presentation of witnesses to rebut that defense. Abdullah questioned the jurors during 
voir dire on suicide and questioned the State’s witnesses on depression, antidepressant 
medication, and suicidal ideation. Even though there is no showing that Abdullah explicitly 
made statements during a criminal investigation to create a suicide defense theory, whether or 
not Angie committed suicide was a central issue throughout the trial, making it permissible for 
the State to offer evidence of Angie’s state of mind during its case-in-chief. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho at 366, 247 P.3d at 593. The State may always present evidence which excludes other 
agents or theories of death. See 40A AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 271 (“The state may also present 
 
48 
evidence of the victim’s character, habits, traits, and relationships to negate theories of suicide, 
natural death, accidental death, justifiable or excusable homicide, or continuing life in absentia, 
as part of the circumstantial evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti.”). Therefore, based on 
the facts of this case, the State was permitted to offer evidence in their case-in-chief regarding 
the defense’s suicide theory.  
 
We further reject Abdullah’s argument that Angie’s out-of-court statements were 
irrelevant as to whether Angie committed suicide or had suicidal ideations. Angie’s out-of-court 
statements were inconsistent with “a design to take his or her own life” or a “suicidal bent” and 
thus relevant. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364, 247 P.3d at 591; Garcia, 102 Idaho at 382, 630 
P.2d at 669. 
 
We also conclude that the district court properly admitted Angie’s out-of-court 
statements on nonhearsay grounds. Generally, hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence or by the rules promulgated by this Court. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 
364, 247 P.3d at 591; I.R.E. 801, 802. Out-of-court statements of the declarant’s state of mind 
can be offered pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, I.R.E. 803(3),21 but 
those statements of state of mind also can be offered for a nonhearsay purpose.  
Offering evidence under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is 
different from offering it for a non-hearsay purpose such as to show the 
declarant’s state of mind, in that the exception to the hearsay rule is invoked when 
a statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted and shows the declarant’s 
state of mind, whereas the mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its 
truth, may indicate circumstantially the declarant’s state of mind, and is not 
hearsay. 
 
 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1179 (2014). See also 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE §§ 274–275 (7th ed. 2014); 29 AM. JUR. 2d. Evidence § 677 (2014). For example, “I 
hate X” offered under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule goes to the truth of the 
matter asserted and the declarant’s state of mind. Smith v. Duncan, 411 F.3d 340, 346 n.4 (2d 
Cir. 2005). In contrast, “I am Napoleon” as non-hearsay goes to the declarant’s state of mind, but 
not to the truth of the matter asserted. Id. As explained by the Court in Radabaugh:  
                                                 
21 I.R.E. 803(3) provides the following as an exception to the hearsay rule:   
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will. 
 
49 
Declarations showing the declarant’s then presently existing state of mind are 
admissible when relevant. If the declaration is offered to evidence the declarant’s 
state of mind circumstantially, the hearsay rule is not encountered. If the 
declaration is offered for the truth of the fact asserted, as whether the declaration 
is “I hate X,” the declaration is hearsay but is admissible under the state-of-mind 
exception to the hearsay rule. Since the declaration is admissible in either event, it 
seems of no practical importance to determine in a given instance whether the 
declaration offered to show the declarant’s existing state of mind is technically 
hearsay or non-hearsay. 
 
93 Idaho at 731, 471 P.2d at 586 (citation omitted) (quoting RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, § 270, 
pp. 260, 261, 9th ed. (1964)). In this case, the district court limited the admissibility of Angie’s 
statements to the nonhearsay purpose of circumstantially showing her state of mind. The district 
court clearly ruled that the state of mind hearsay exception in I.R.E. 803(3) did not apply to 
Angie’s statements. For this reason, Abdullah’s argument is misplaced by focusing solely on the 
hearsay exception in I.R.E. 803(3). Based on the record, we conclude that the district court 
properly admitted Angie’s statements as nonhearsay. We also conclude that the district court 
properly exercised its discretion pursuant to I.R.E. 403.  
iii. 
Harmless error 
 
Finally, we conclude that any error in the admission of Dr. Williams, Seabolt, Seybold, or 
Kristal’s testimony of Angie’s out-of-court statements was harmless. According to Abdullah, this 
evidence was improperly admitted to show Abdullah was “a bad husband” and to prejudice the 
jury against him. Assuming all of Angie’s out-of-court statements were inadmissible, any error 
beyond a reasonable doubt did not contribute to the verdict obtained based on the overwhelming 
evidence against Abdullah and the district court’s instructions to the jury. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010).  
6. 
The district court did not err by admitting Abdullah’s out-of-court statements. 
a. 
Facts 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, the State informed the district court that it intended to 
elicit testimony from Abdullah’s former co-worker, Ed Reagles, about a statement made by 
Abdullah that “in Kurdistan it is not illegal to kill your wife if she is . . . unfaithful to you.” 
Abdullah argued that the statement was not probative and the prejudice vastly outweighed any 
probative value. The district court admitted Abdullah’s statement, explaining that the statement 
was relevant because “it certainly does go to Mr. Abdullah’s state of mind, especially in the 
months leading up to what occurred in October” and “if the words are accurately reflected that 
 
50 
‘we’ --- so he’s still associating himself with this country . . . it is something that is odd for him 
to pick out in the months leading up to the fire and death of Ms. Abdullah.” Although it was “a 
very close question,” the district court concluded that the probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  
 
Reagles told the jury he was driving with Abdullah and a few other co-workers to lunch 
in the summer of 2002. Another co-worker asked Abdullah about the “differences in cultures.” 
Reagles explained, “And so he [the co-worker] wanted to know, he said, you know, tell me 
something about, you know, what it’s like over there versus here in the United States.” Reagles 
testified that Abdullah said in response “it was legal to kill your spouse where he was from as 
long as you explained it to his -- or excuse me, the daughter’s family and then made an offering 
of some sort, of money or something.” Reagles clarified that Abdullah did not say spouse, but 
rather “wife.” Reagles testified that Abdullah did not explain anything about the “offering” and, 
to the best of Reagle’s recollection, Abdullah did not make any other comments regarding the 
cultural differences. 
 
On cross-examination, the defense elicited testimony that Abdullah did not (1) “state that 
he thought it was a good idea”; (2) “state that he agreed with what he said they’d do over there”; 
(3) “say that he endorsed the idea”; or (4) “express his feeling that that’s something that should 
be adopted in America.”  
 
On redirect examination Reagles repeated the statement by Abdullah: “It was, you know, 
it’s okay to kill your wife as long as you -- you know, if she was unfaithful -- as long as you 
explain to her parents, you know, why and made them an offering.” On recross-examination, the 
defense asked Reagles if Abdullah used the word “unfaithful,” and Reagles responded, “Not 
unfaithful. I’m sorry. The word was . . . [i]f you cheated on your wife or if your wife cheated on 
you. That was it.” He testified that Abdullah did not indicate to him that he felt Angie had been 
unfaithful. 
 
Another co-worker, Rod Adams, corroborated Reagles’s testimony. Adams testified that 
in July or August of 2002, while driving to lunch with Reagles, Abdullah, and a few other co-
workers, Abdullah “mentioned that in his country it was an acceptable practice to murder or have 
your wife murdered if she did commit adultery.” Adams recalled that they were having a 
conversation about the cultural differences between northern Iraq and America. He explained, 
 
51 
“We are just talking about some cultural differences, and the subject of adultery was brought 
up.” Adams did not remember anything else about the conversation on that topic.  
 
On cross-examination, Adams acknowledged: (1) there was no discussion “about what a 
wife could do” if her husband committed adultery; (2) Abdullah did not “indicate that he thought 
that it was a good idea”; (3) Abdullah did not “indicate in any way that he personally adopted . . . 
this practice”; (4) Abdullah did not “express that he thought that this practice should be 
implemented here in the United States”; and (5) Abdullah did not “mention his wife at all during 
this conversation.”  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court “reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a mixed 
standard of review. First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free 
review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted). 
“Second,” the Court reviews “the district court’s determination of whether the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.” Id. Due to Abdullah’s 
preservation of this issue with an objection, the Court reviews the admission of Abdullah’s 
statement under the harmless error standard. Perry, 150 Idaho at 221, 227, 245 P.3d at 973, 979. 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred by admitting his statement because it was not 
relevant. He further argues that the danger of unfair prejudice from Reagles’s and Adam’s 
testimony far outweighed its probative value. 
 
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. “Whether a fact is ‘of consequence’ or material is determined 
by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364, 
247 P.3d at 591 (quoting State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008)). Here, 
Abdullah was charged with first-degree murder, which requires proof of deliberation, 
premeditation, willfulness, and malice aforethought. I.C. §§ 18-4001–-4003(a). A statement by 
the defendant regarding an acceptable circumstance to murder the victim makes the existence of 
that mental state “more probable . . . than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. Thus, 
Abdullah’s statement was relevant to illustrate his state of mind in the months prior to Angie’s 
 
52 
death and his motive. There was no error in the admission of Abdullah’s statement on relevancy 
grounds. 
 
I.R.E. 403 requires the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury.” I.R.E. 403. In this case, Abdullah’s statement was prejudicial because it supports an 
inference that Abdullah believed he could kill his wife without offending those in his community 
with similar views. However, Abdullah’s statement was highly probative for the very same 
reason. The statement assists the State in proving its case because it goes directly towards 
Abdullah’s state of mind and motive for the murder. “[A]lmost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in prejudice to a 
defendant.” State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989). Hence, “[t]he fact 
that certain evidence is horrifying and gruesome, is not in and of itself sufficient reason for 
exclusion.” Id. Exclusion is necessary only if the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. This balancing test is a discretionary decision for the 
district court. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591, 301 P.3d 242, 249 (2013). The district court 
in this case recognized Abdullah’s statement was prejudicial, but the probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Based on the record, the district court 
perceived the admission of Abdullah’s out-of-court statements as a matter of discretion, acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within I.R.E. 403, and reached its 
decision to admit the statements through an exercise of reason. There was no error. See Perry, 
150 Idaho at 221, 227, 245 P.3d at 973, 979.  
7. 
The district court did not err by excluding evidence of Angie’s life insurance 
policies. 
a. 
Facts 
 
Approximately five years before her death and about three years before her marriage to 
Abdullah, Angie purchased a $500,000 life insurance policy for herself and a $250,000 policy 
for A.H. Angie kept these policies current until her death. The State filed a motion in limine to 
exclude this evidence as irrelevant. Abdullah argued the evidence was relevant because (1) it 
supported the defense theory that Angie committed suicide; (2) it showed Angie was untruthful 
based on misrepresentations and omissions on the policy applications; and (3) it countered the 
State’s theory that Abdullah murdered Angie to obtain insurance money. As evidence of Angie’s 
untruthfulness on the insurance applications, the district court recognized that Angie was not 
 
53 
testifying and therefore concluded that the evidence was irrelevant and the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. As evidence of Angie’s suicide, the 
district court determined that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial because “the bare fact” 
that she had life insurance did not make it more likely that she committed suicide. 
 
Abdullah raised the admissibility of evidence of Angie’s life insurance policies again at 
trial. He argued that the evidence of the policies was relevant to rebut the State’s claim that 
Abdullah had a financial incentive for the murder because Abdullah was not a beneficiary under 
those policies. He also argued that it was relevant because the State elicited at trial that Angie 
had taken out a loan on the policy. The district court again concluded that the evidence was 
irrelevant and the probative value did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, and waste of time.   
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court “reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a mixed 
standard of review. First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free 
review.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (citation omitted). “Second,” the Court 
reviews “the district court’s determination of whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.” Id. The Court reviews the district 
court’s exclusion of evidence of Angie’s life insurance policy under the harmless error standard. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221, 227, 245 P.3d at 973, 979. 
c. 
Analysis  
 
Even if the existence of the life insurance policy was relevant, the district court properly 
exercised its discretion to determine the probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and waste of time. I.R.E. 403. As alleged by 
Abdullah, the existence of life insurance policies was probative to show Abdullah had less 
financial incentive for the murder because he was not a beneficiary to Angie’s policy. This 
probative value was minimal in relation to the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
and waste of time. The life insurance policy evidence did not alter the fact that Abdullah took out 
the vending machine insurance policies shortly before Angie’s death. The life insurance policies 
were an extraneous piece of information that had little to do with the case. The district court did 
not err by excluding evidence of Angie’s life insurance policies. Further, any error was harmless 
 
54 
because beyond a reasonable doubt any error in the exclusion of Angie’s life insurance policy 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Perry, 150 Idaho at 221, 227, 245 P.3d at 973, 979. 
8. 
The alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not cause fundamental error 
at trial. 
 
Abdullah identifies four instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Abdullah argues 
that these four instances of misconduct individually and cumulatively caused fundamental error 
and entitle him to a new trial. 
a. 
Standard of Review 
 
“Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only 
reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
480, 272 P.3d 417, 452 (2012) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979). 
b. 
Analysis 
 
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set 
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979.  
 
As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defendants 
receive fair trials. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43–44, 71 P. 608, 610–11 (1903). In 
carrying out this duty, a prosecutor must “guard against anything that would 
prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only 
the evidence introduced.” Id. at 44, 71 P. at 611. A prosecutor must also ensure 
that the jury receives only competent evidence. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 
463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007). 
 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). “However, in reviewing 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct the Court must keep in mind the realities of trial. A fair 
trial is not necessarily a perfect trial.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62, 253 P.3d 727, 736 
(2011) (citation omitted).  
i. 
The prosecutor’s comment on a witness’s inability to identify Abdullah at 
a pretrial proceeding was not misconduct. 
 
 
The first alleged error occurred during the prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to a 
judicially-noticed fact from the direct examination of Marjorie Wood, the clerk at the Chevron 
gas station in Mountain Home. At trial, Wood identified Abdullah as the person she saw inside 
the Chevron gas station a little after midnight on October 5, 2002, during her shift. She also 
testified that two police officers showed her a photograph depicting Abdullah during her shift on 
 
55 
October 11, 2002, and she had identified the person in the photograph as the same person from 
October 5, 2002. She testified that she had “[n]o doubt in my mind” and was “100 percent” sure 
“at the time” the person from the photograph was the same person from October 5, 2002. 
However, she testified that she was only “80 percent” sure when identifying Abdullah in court as 
the person from the Chevron gas station on October 5, 2002, because “[i]t’s been a long time, a 
couple of years.” Wood then acknowledged that she had testified at pretrial proceedings when 
Abdullah was not present. Following this testimony, the prosecutor proposed: 
Your Honor, I would ask if you would be willing to take judicial notice of the fact 
that the defendant had actually been removed from a prior proceeding when Ms. 
Wood testified approximately a year ago at a time she would have been able to 
make an identification at a time more recent in her memory to the actual event. 
 
The district court asked if defense counsel objected and counsel responded, “No, Judge.” The 
district court then took “judicial notice of the fact that the last time that Ms. Wood testified in 
front of this court the defendant had actually been removed from the court at that time.” The 
prosecutor asked the district court to clarify that Abdullah’s removal from the court was at the 
defense’s request, but Abdullah objected and the district court said, “I’m not going to respond to 
that. The fact is that I’ll take judicial notice of the fact that the defendant was not present during 
that testimony when she was here in the courtroom.” During closing argument, the prosecutor 
referenced Wood’s testimony, stating:  
 
There was something about [Abdullah] that struck Marjorie Wood so 
significantly that she remembered him. When the police came to her store on 
October 11th, sometime after 11:00 o’clock, put that picture down, she knew who 
that was. She remembered it. . . . What did he do? She hasn’t so much seen a 
picture of this man in two years. She’s been to court before.  
 
You learned in the course of her testimony that on the prior court 
appearance, not the trial, but some earlier court appearance, the defendant caused 
himself to be removed from the room so she could not see him and yet here she 
came two years later. Of course, she can be as certain today as she was two years 
ago. 
 
Abdullah argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument on his absence was prejudicial and akin 
to comments on his right to remain silent. He also contends that the prosecutor intended to 
inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury by suggesting Abdullah was absent from the earlier 
proceeding to hide from Wood.  
 
Abdullah has failed to provide this Court with authority to establish “a due process right 
to be absent from the prior hearing to avoid a suggestive pretrial identification procedure.” The 
 
56 
United States Supreme Court has “held that the Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on 
a case-by-case basis, whether improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.’” Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012) (quoting Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972)). The United States Supreme Court explained, however, that 
“the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its introduction at the 
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 728. With this caveat, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded: “The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper 
state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for 
reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. Therefore, contrary to 
Abdullah’s argument, the United States Supreme Court precedent stands for a due process right 
to exclude eyewitness identifications based on a number of factors. Id. at 730 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The Court correctly concludes that its precedents establish a due process right to 
the pretrial exclusion of an unreliable eyewitness identification only if the identification results 
from police suggestion.”). These cases do not create a due process right to be absent from a 
potentially unreliable misidentification.  
 
The right advocated by Abdullah arguably is more in line with the right to remain silent.  
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 
I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right 
not to be compelled to testify against himself. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right also 
to bar the prosecution from commenting on a defendant’s invocation of that right. 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965). 
 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60, 253 P.3d at 734. But unlike the right to remain silent, which is rooted 
in the Fifth Amendment, Abdullah has failed to point to any authority to establish a 
constitutional right to be absent at a pretrial proceeding. To the contrary, criminal defendants 
have “the right to be present at all stages of a criminal proceeding ‘if absence could, under some 
set of circumstances, be harmful.’” State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 108, 967 P.2d 702, 722 (1988) 
(quoting State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 95, 577 P.2d 1135, 1143 (1978)). Without a right to be 
absent from a proceeding, there is no constitutional basis for the prosecutor to be precluded from 
commenting on that absence, unless the comment itself is sufficiently egregious to result in 
fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 219, 245 P.3d at 971. 
 
The prosecutor’s statement was not so egregious as to prejudice the minds of the jurors. 
The purpose of the prosecutor’s statement regarding Abdullah’s absence was to bolster Wood’s 
 
57 
credibility. Wood acknowledged that she was only eighty percent sure at trial when she 
identified Abdullah as the person in the gas station on October 5, 2002, even though she had no 
doubt when she identified him to the police shortly after the crime. To counter an inference by 
the jury that Wood’s confidence in her identification has deteriorated over time, the prosecutor 
introduced Abdullah’s absence at the earlier proceeding to show that Wood had not had an 
opportunity in over two years to identify Abdullah. The focus of the prosecutor’s remarks was 
not on Abdullah intentionally hiding from a witness to avoid identification. Moreover, 
Abdullah’s argument is a moot point because he conceded in closing argument that he was not 
contesting that he drove to Boise the night of the alleged crime. Hence, Abdullah now has no 
reason to challenge Wood’s identification of him as the person in the gas station in Mountain 
Home the night of the alleged crime.  
 
In summary, the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument was not misconduct, and 
thus Abdullah has failed to demonstrate a violation of an unwaived constitutional right under the 
first prong of the fundamental error standard. Further, even assuming this comment was 
misconduct, any error was harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility the error 
affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
ii. 
The prosecutor’s use of state of mind evidence to prove Abdullah’s motive 
was not misconduct and any error was harmless. 
 
 
Regarding the second error, Abdullah argues that the prosecutor relied on evidence 
admitted to show Angie’s state of mind to prove the truth of the matter asserted. When 
discussing Abdullah’s motive for the murder, the prosecutor stated in closing argument: 
 
We’ll first look at motive. It had become clear certainly that Angie was 
not going abroad with the defendant. That testimony comes from a variety of 
sources. Certainly by the time she wrote the letter that was read to you aloud . . . 
she was finished. She certainly was not going to South Africa. When he made up 
the details of the trip to South Africa, he was supposedly scoping it out as an 
alternative to Saudi Arabia, and he makes up what it was like there. Doesn’t even 
go . . . . Doesn’t go at all . . . . [Y]ou see that knowledge reflected in a letter that 
Glen Elam read to you which says, “I cannot believe that you made up the details 
of that trip.” It further diminished her trust in him and obviously she isn’t going 
anywhere with him at that point. That’s communicated to Deborah Kristal and 
others.  
 
She wasn’t going to let her kids go either. She was already conversing 
with Deborah Kristal about how to make sure that the defendant did not make 
remove [sic] her children from the country. She was talking to Deborah Kristal 
about leaving him. That letter makes it pretty clear. Leaving a marriage is not like 
living [sic] a building, you are not in it one minute and out the next. It was a 
 
58 
process. And for Angie it was a process that was complicated by something that 
seems pretty simple, health insurance. [M.A.] was a troubled pregnancy as far as 
her preterm labor. She knew she needed health insurance through the delivery. 
She communicate [sic] to Dr. Williams and Velma Seabolt that she was going to 
stay with him until she was through the delivery. Then you found out from Dr. 
Shaffer that [M.A.] was to the pediatrician six times in his short 18 days before 
Angie’s death. 
 
She may have mentally left that marriage already, but she was going [to] 
physically stay until she was resolved that [M.A.]’s health was more stable. 
Again, she was not in one minute and out the next, but she was clearly on her way 
out. 
 
He needed money. You cannot move to another country for free. . . . 
Think about back on Stephanie Hobbs, what did the defendant say to her on 
October 3rd, about 36 hours before his wife died? Words to the effect of, “We 
don’t do divorce.” Angie wanted this marriage to end. The defendant had different 
ideas about how that should happen. 
 
She told Deborah Kristal her one last best hope of turning the defendant 
around was to go to the Muslim community elders and ask them for help, but as 
part and parcel of that she has to tell the Muslim community about his failings, 
about her position that he is a hypocrite, that he was either not a good or nice 
man. . . . What do you suppose he thought of that? 
 
And, again, when you pull motive away from this interlocking set of 
factors, you begin to see things pretty clearly.  
 
 
Under the fundamental error standard, Abdullah had the burden to establish that the 
prosecutor’s comments caused a plain violation of his unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. We are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s comments rise to this 
level of error. First, the prosecutor’s statements did not appeal to the passions or prejudices of the 
jury. Second, the prosecutor’s comments primarily reviewed for the jury the evidence of Angie’s 
state of mind presented at trial through witnesses such as Kristal and the health professionals. We 
recognize that a few of the prosecutor’s remarks could be construed as interpreting the evidence 
in an inaccurate light and inconsistent with the district court’s rulings on the scope of this 
evidence. However, despite these remarks, the prosecutor’s comments here in their entirety were 
not sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 219, 245 P.3d at 
971. 
 
Even assuming the prosecutor’s statements were improper, any error was harmless. 
“[I]nappropriate prosecutorial statements may be cured by appropriate instructions by the trial 
court.” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013). Here, the district court 
instructed the jury that certain evidence, such as Angie’s out-of-court statements, was admitted 
for a limited purpose and that the jury could not consider that evidence for any other purpose. 
 
59 
The district court also instructed the jury that the prosecutor’s statements during closing 
argument were not evidence. These instructions cured any error. Further, this closing argument 
on motive goes towards the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Abdullah 
committed the murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation and malice aforethought, 
but the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence of Abdullah’s intent through other 
means than the motive. See 40A AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 450 (motive is not an element of first-
degree murder, but may be relevant to prove intent). Even if the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct, the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless because there is not a reasonable 
possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  
iii. 
The prosecutor’s comments on “the truth” were not misconduct. 
 
 
Regarding the third error, Abdullah argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on 
evidence as the truth in closing argument. In summarizing Wood’s identification of Abdullah, 
the prosecutor stated:  
[Law enforcement said,] “We’re doing an investigation. Do you recognize this 
man?” And [Wood] said, “Yeah, I know him.” And she provides the dates. She 
provides the time. Why? Because it is accurate. It is the truth and he made such an 
impression on her she could remember it. She was a very no nonsense, unbiased 
kind of a witness. Nothing to gain by being here. And she remembered him 
because he was rude. That’s consistent with him being in a hurry. He had business 
in Boise. Putting him here at midnight gave him plenty of time to drive home and 
set the fire. Plenty of time. 
 
The prosecutor then stated during rebuttal: 
I want to talk to you about fluoxetine and Prozac. . . . You will recall that we 
learned about that when the defendant’s lawyers wrote us and asked us to check 
for that. . . . We did it and I will tell you that everyone connected with the 
prosecution of the defendant from myself, Dr. Groben, the police agency were 
just shocked to find out about the extreme level of Prozac in the blood of Angie 
Abdullah.    
 
The district court struck this last statement sua sponte and instructed the jury to disregard it. The 
prosecutor then stated shortly thereafter:  
Now, it got tough to figure out because all of the doctors, all the medical 
professionals expected to find the significant content of either the pill material, 
fluoxetine material, the gel capsules in her stomach or GI tract and that’s kind of 
confusing until you figure out it only -- there’s only one thing left that would 
explain it, that if she drank something. Then it would clear her stomach, and, you 
know, she had to drink it before the last meal because there’s nothing in the 
 
60 
contents, the stomach was full. If she had taken it with the meal, it would still be 
there. I’m not a toxicologist, but it is the only explanation that fits the evidence, 
and therefore, it is the truth. 
 
The district court again struck this last statement sua sponte and instructed the jury to disregard 
it.  
 
Neither of the prosecutor’s remarks on “the truth” was misconduct. In closing argument, 
the prosecutor may discuss whether “evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of 
particular witnesses. . . . It is improper, however, for the prosecution to express a personal belief 
as to the credibility of witnesses, unless the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence 
presented at trial.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citation 
omitted). The first statement of Wood’s testimony as “the truth” was not misconduct because it 
was based solely on inferences presented at trial. The prosecutor was not expressing a personal 
opinion on Wood’s credibility, but inviting the jury to make an inference based on Wood’s 
detailed recollection of her encounter with the person she identified as Abdullah. See State v. 
Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 722, 264 P.3d 54, 63 (2011); State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627, 262 
P.3d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 2011). The second statement of the toxicologist’s explanation as “the 
truth” was not misconduct for similar reasons. The prosecutor was not vouching for the 
toxicologist’s testimony, but rather emphasizing to the jury that the evidence supported only one 
explanation for the potentially lethal concentration of fluoxetine in Angie’s blood. Therefore, 
Abdullah has failed to demonstrate a violation of an unwaived constitutional right due to the 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
Moreover, assuming misconduct, any error in the prosecutor’s comments on “the truth” 
was harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of 
the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. “[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so egregious or 
inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the 
trial court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 
280, 77 P.3d at 969 (quoting State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 
2001)). Hence, “inappropriate prosecutorial statements may be cured by appropriate instructions 
by the trial court.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 369, 313 P.3d at 25. In this case, the district court 
instructed the jury that “[t]he arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence.” The 
district court also instructed: “Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including . 
 
61 
. . arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in their . . 
. closing arguments . . . is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence.” In 
addition, the district court charged the jury “[a]s the sole judges of fact” to determine what 
evidence to believe and the weight of such evidence and to evaluate testimony. “We presume 
that the jury followed the jury instructions given by the trial court in reaching its verdict.” 
Carson, 151 Idaho at 718, 264 P.3d at 59. Due to these instructions, it is not reasonably possible 
the prosecutor’s first statement on “the truth” of Wood’s testimony affected the outcome at trial 
because the multiple jury instructions cured any inappropriate comment. Turning to the 
prosecutor’s second statement on “the truth” of the toxicologist’s explanation, it is not 
reasonably possible this comment affected the outcome due to the jury instructions and the fact 
that the district court immediately struck the statement and instructed the jury to disregard it. 
Based on the above reasons, Abdullah has failed to demonstrate fundamental error in the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct of commenting on “the truth” of certain evidence. 
iv. 
The prosecutor’s comment to be “shocked and outraged” was not 
misconduct. 
 
 
Regarding the fourth and final allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, Abdullah argues 
that the prosecutor appealed to the jury’s passion and prejudice by stating during rebuttal: 
You should be shocked and outraged that at the conclusion of this trial in his very 
last statements, Counsel wants you to believe that his client was here in Boise, did 
all the things that the State has proven he’s done to get himself here and that he 
drove himself back to Salt Lake City and engaged in no criminal conduct. None. 
 
The prosecutor’s statement was in response to the following statement by the defense in closing 
argument: “Now, let me tell you right up front we are not going to be arguing that Azad did not 
drive to Boise on the morning of 5 October, 2002.”  
 
“Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to 
the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. “Despite this 
wide latitude, ‘appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory 
tactics are impermissible.’” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146, 334 P.3d 806, 820 (2014) (per 
curiam) (quoting Ellington, 151 Idaho at 62, 253 P.3d at 736). In this case, the prosecutor did not 
engage in misconduct. The prosecutor’s comment on the defense’s concession expressed to the 
jury the improbability based on the evidence that Abdullah was in Boise but did not commit the 
crime. It also highlighted to the jury that the defense presented no alternative explanation as to 
 
62 
why Abdullah would drive to Boise that night. This was not “inflammatory language seemingly 
calculated to arouse negative emotions.” State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 
(Ct. App. 2007). Even assuming that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, any error was 
harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221, 245 P.3d at 973.  
9. 
Abdullah’s constitutional rights were not violated by the absence of evidence in the 
record to show the content of the oath given to the bailiff charged with custody of 
the jury. 
a. 
Facts 
 
After the State and Abdullah gave closing arguments and just prior to sequestration of the 
jury for deliberations in the guilt phase of trial, the record states:  
THE COURT: At this time we will give the oath to the bailiffs and then we will 
pick the alternates. 
 
 
(Oath given to the bailiffs.) 
 
THE COURT: At this time we will pick the alternates.  
 
Similarly, after closing arguments in the penalty phase and just prior to sequestration of the jury 
for deliberations, the record states: 
THE COURT: At this time we need to swear the bailiffs. 
 
 
 
(Bailiffs are sworn.) 
 
THE COURT: At this time I would ask the bailiffs to take the jurors to the 
appropriate -- keep alternates separate at this point, but to take the jurors to the 
appropriate jury room. . . . 
 
Abdullah argues that the record does not affirmatively show the district court properly swore the 
bailiffs who took custody of the sequestered jury during the guilt and penalty phases, which 
violated his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court exercises free review over constitutional questions and interpretation of a 
statute. State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 24, 319 P.3d 1191, 1193 (2014); State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 
738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
In State v. Rodriguez, the Court held that “the record must affirmatively show that the 
bailiff was sworn” because the relevant Idaho statute, Idaho Code section 19-2126, “speaks in 
 
63 
mandatory terms.” 93 Idaho 286, 289, 460 P.2d 711, 714 (1969). Idaho Code section 19-2126 
provides in part:  
[W]hen first given custody of the jury the officer or bailiff must be sworn to keep 
the jury together during each recess and adjournment during the trial; to allow no 
person to speak to or communicate with them, or any of them, nor to do so 
himself, on any subject connected with the trial, and to return them into court as 
ordered by the court.22 
I.C. § 19-2126. This “statutory requirement that the bailiff be sworn to keep the jury together in a 
murder trial was enacted to guarantee defendant a fair and impartial trial.” Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 
at 289, 460 P.2d at 714 (footnote omitted). “Whatever is essential in a criminal proceeding to 
deprive a person of his liberty must appear of record and nothing is taken by intendment or 
implication.” Id. For example, in Rodriguez the Court determined that “the mere claim that the 
oath was given is not sufficient to resolve” whether the bailiff was properly sworn prior to 
placing the jury in his custody. Id. The record in Rodriguez provided: 
The Court: Do you remember? Did you swear the Bailiff?  
The Clerk: No, I don’t recall and I don’t have it in my minutes.  
The Court: I was quite sure that she did. In fact, I was quite sure I could 
remember what she told him.  
[Rodriguez’s counsel] Mr. Reeves: It is our recollection from our notes that there 
was no swearing until the time of the final submission and may the record show 
that the Clerk indicates that she does not recall?  
The Court: She says she don’t [sic] remember.  
Mr. Reeves: Does the Bailiff perhaps recall whether he was sworn?  
The Court: Do you recall whether we had you sworn when we started?  
The Bailiff: I don’t remember whether I was or not. I thought I swore every time 
the rest did. 
 
Id. at 289 n.2, 460 P.2d at 714 n.2. The Court then explained, “A record is constituted of proper 
and legitimate elements set down in their order; for it is certainly not the law that all the gossip a 
clerk or prothonotary writes down in his docket, ipso facto becomes the voice of undeniable 
truth.” Id. at 289, 460 P.2d at 714 (quoting Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 130 (1891)). The 
Court concluded that the record in Rodriguez did “not reflect that the bailiff was sworn prior to 
                                                 
22 A related statute provides:  
 
After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in court or may retire for deliberation. If they 
do not agree without retiring, an officer must be sworn to keep them together in some private and 
convenient place, and not permit any person to speak or communicate with them, nor to do so 
himself, unless by order of the court, or to ask them whether they have agreed upon a verdict, and 
to return them into court when they have so agreed, or when ordered by the court. 
 
I.C. § 19-2133. 
 
64 
placing the jury in his custody.” Id. Although the record did not show that the bailiff was sworn, 
the Court ultimately held that the error was harmless. Id. at 289–90, 460 P.2d at 714–15. 
 
This case is distinguishable from Rodriguez. The issue in Rodriguez was whether the oath 
was given at all. In contrast, the record in this case clearly shows that an oath was given to the 
bailiff. Rodriguez was limited to the facts of the case, and its holding does not require in every 
case that the court reporter transcribe the oath given to the bailiff verbatim. In other words, 
Rodriquez did not create a bright-line rule that the oath must be in the record in its entirety in all 
criminal cases. In this case, the record complies with Idaho Code section 19-2126 and Rodriguez 
by affirmatively showing the bailiff was sworn. There was no error in the district court’s failure 
to transcribe the specific oath provided to the bailiff in the record. 
 
Moreover, there is no allegation that any error was prejudicial to Abdullah. There is no 
indication that the bailiff caused the jury to be tainted in some way due to an improper oath. Nor 
is there any allegation that the jury acted improperly. In a related context, the Court presumes 
“regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers.” Roberts v. Bd. of Trs., 
Pocatello, Sch. Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000). “Absent evidence 
to the contrary,” public officers “are presumed to have properly carried out the duties of their 
office.” Farm Bureau Fin. Co. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980). This 
presumption can be rebutted by a production of evidence showing that the public officer failed to 
carry out the duty at issue. Roberts, 134 Idaho at 894–95, 605 P.2d at 1112–13. A similar 
presumption to the swearing of the bailiff is applicable here. Abdullah points to nothing in the 
record to show that an improper swearing of the bailiff prejudiced his rights at trial. Rodriguez, 
93 Idaho at 289–90, 460 P.2d at 714–15. Absent evidence to the contrary, this Court presumes 
the bailiff was properly sworn. 
10. 
Abdullah’s constitutional rights were not violated by the district court’s failure to 
record the oath given to the bailiff charged with custody of the jury.  
a. 
Facts 
 
The swearing of the bailiffs prior to sequestering the jury during their deliberations in the 
guilt and penalty phase of trial were not recorded and therefore not available as a transcript for 
Abdullah on appeal. Similar to Abdullah’s argument above regarding the court reporter’s failure 
to transcribe the bailiff’s oath verbatim, he argues that the district court’s failure to record the 
oath violates his due process right to meaningful appellate review of his trial and sentencing 
proceedings.  
 
65 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court exercises free review over constitutional questions and interpretation of a 
statute. Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24, 319 P.3d at 1193; Rogers, 144 Idaho at 740, 170 P.3d at 883. 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Idaho Code section 1-1103 provides that the reporter “shall correctly report all oral 
proceedings had in said court and the testimony taken in all cases tried before said court.” I.C. § 
1-1103. For death penalty cases, the transcript on appeal “shall include all hearings and 
proceedings held in the trial court of every nature and description.” Idaho Appellate Rule 
(I.A.R.) 25(e). For indigent defendants, “[t]he State is only required to provide . . . a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002). The State’s 
failure to provide a sufficient record for adequate appellate review may amount to a denial of 
equal protection and due process. Griffin v. Illinois, 315 U.S. 12, 16–19 (1956).  
 
In State v. Lovelace (Lovelace I), 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003), the Court rejected 
the defendant’s claim that “the district court committed reversible error in failing to record all 
oral proceedings such that they could be transcribed for purposes of appeal.” Id. at 65, 90 P.3d at 
290 (2003). The defendant contended that “the unrecorded proceedings probably dealt with 
appealable issues,” but the Court found these contentions to be “nothing more than speculation.” 
Id. The Court explained, “It is basic to appellate practice that error will not be presumed, but 
must be affirmatively shown by an appellant.” Id. “Furthermore,” the Court stated, “error in the 
abstract does not necessarily rise to the level of constitutional dimension unless and until a 
defendant properly presents a specific prejudice from such error.” Id. Thus, because the 
defendant identified no appealable issues with any specificity, the Court rejected the defendant’s 
claim of reversible error in the failure to record all proceedings. Id.  
 
Abdullah’s argument is distinguishable from Lovelace I in that Abdullah appears to argue 
that the failure to record the proceedings in and of itself deprives him of due process and the 
right to appeal. Despite these differences, Abdullah’s assignment of error fails for similar reasons 
as in Lovelace I. Abdullah does not allege that any specific prejudice occurred from the failure to 
record the swearing of the bailiffs. He does not allege that he is unable to raise a specific 
appealable issue due to the absence of a recording. Nor does he even allege than the unrecorded 
swearing of the bailiffs “probably dealt with appealable issues.” Id. As noted in the preceding 
 
66 
section, Abdullah points to nothing in the record to show that an improper swearing of the bailiff 
prejudiced his rights at trial or tainted the jury. There was no error here.  
11. 
The district court did not err in rejecting Abdullah’s request to view the grand jury 
selection transcripts. 
a. 
Facts 
 
On June 5, 2012, Abdullah filed a second objection to the record on appeal. He argued 
that the district court should have added to the record “[a]ny and all documents and/or transcripts 
relating to the formation and term of the grand jury which indicted Mr. Abdullah.” On June 21, 
2012, the State responded to Abdullah’s objection and requested that the district court deny 
Abdullah’s request.23  
 
On August 13, 2012, the district court denied Abdullah’s objection, but added to the 
record three public orders to summon jurors and notice the empaneling of a grand jury Panel A 
and Panel B. The district court also conducted an in camera review of the grand jury materials 
and determined that the grand jury was duly empaneled and not expired on the date of 
Abdullah’s indictment. The district court further determined from its review that the indictment 
was proper. Therefore, the district court found no good cause to release the underlying grand jury 
proceedings or make them part of the record on appeal, except the three public orders.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The Court defers to the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, but exercises free review over the district court’s conclusions of law. State 
v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order that denied his request 
to add grand jury documents to the record on appeal. He further requests that this Court, upon 
vacating the district court’s decision, order the district court to provide the grand jury selection 
transcripts to him for review and permit supplemental briefing if necessary. Alternatively, he 
requests that this Court remand this issue to the district court for that court to provide the grand 
jury selection transcripts.  
                                                 
23 The State also submitted that Abdullah attempted to circumvent the district court’s order by filing an objection to 
the record rather than a motion. On April 6, 2012, the district court learned that the State Appellate Public Defender 
(SAPD) contacted the Ada County Jury Commissioner by phone to inquire and request grand jury information 
related to Abdullah’s case. The district court filed an order admonishing SAPD and informed them that the only 
appropriate method to seek grand jury information is by filing a motion with a district judge with notice to the State.  
 
67 
 
According to Abdullah’s brief, he seeks the grand jury selection transcripts to determine 
whether he has any basis to challenge the grand jury term. He explains that the grand jury 
documents he has been provided indicate that the grand jury empaneled may not have been the 
same grand jury that indicted him and thus the grand jury term may have expired prior to his 
indictment. Abdullah rests his argument on the fact that the court minutes show that the grand 
jury selection for Grand Jury Panels A and B began at 9:15 a.m. on August 28, 2002, but the 
three court orders to summon jurors for the panels state that jury selection would begin at 1:30 
p.m., not 9:15 a.m. Based on this discrepancy, he asserts that “[t]here is no document showing a 
relationship between jurors who indicted Azad on November 14, 2002, and jurors impaneled the 
morning of August 28, 2002.”  
 
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, “No person shall be held to 
answer for any felony . . . unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . .” IDAHO 
CONST. art. 1, § 8. “[N]o grand jury shall serve more than six (6) months unless specifically 
ordered by the court which summoned the grand jury.” Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 6.8. An 
indictment is void and the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the grand jury issues 
an indictment past its six-month term. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840–41, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258–59 (2011).  
 
“Grand jury proceedings are intended, to the extent possible, to be secret.” In re Petition 
for Review of Hearing Comm. of Prof’l Conduct Bd. of Idaho State Bar, 140 Idaho 800, 805, 102 
P.3d 1119, 1124 (2004). I.C.R. 6.4 provides, “No other person present in a grand jury proceeding 
shall disclose to any other person what was said or done in the proceeding, except by order of 
any court for good cause shown.” I.C.R. 6.4(c). Therefore, Abdullah must demonstrate “good 
cause” for this Court to allow his review of the grand jury selection transcripts. 
 
Abdullah’s argument that the grand jury term may have expired is meritless. He submits 
that there is no document showing a relationship between “jurors who indicted” and “jurors 
impaneled,” but this assertion is incorrect. Although the district court’s three public orders 
indicate that the jurors were to be summoned at 9:15 a.m., the court minutes—which were 
provided to Abdullah—show that on August 28, 2002, Grand Jury Panel A and B were seated 
and administered the oath by the judge. The grand jury indictment—also provided to Abdullah—
shows that Grand Jury Panel B issued the indictment on November 14, 2002. These facts plainly 
show that Grand Jury Panel B was properly empaneled and issued an indictment within the six-
 
68 
month term limit. Based on these facts, Abdullah provides no legal basis for this Court to allow 
his review of the grand jury selection transcripts. We decline to order the district court to provide 
Abdullah with the grand jury selection transcripts. 
12. 
The alleged errors in the aggregate did not result in cumulative error at trial. 
 
Abdullah argues that the accumulation of errors deprived him of his constitutional rights 
to due process and a fair trial before an impartial jury.  
 
“Under the cumulative error doctrine, ‘an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of the defendant’s right to due process.’” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 385, 
247 P.3d 582, 612 (2010) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 723, 215 P.3d 414, 443 
(2009)). “[A] necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one 
error.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). In this case, Abdullah “has 
failed to demonstrate at least two errors, a necessary predicate to the application of our 
cumulative error doctrine.” Id. at 231, 245 P.3d at 983. This Court affirms Abdullah’s judgments 
of conviction. 
B. 
Penalty Phase Issues 
13. 
The Court’s decision in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013), does not 
violate Idaho Code section 19-2827, the separation of powers doctrine, the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or the right to due process. 
 
In Abdullah’s supplemental brief, he submits that this Court should revisit its decision in 
Dunlap regarding the standard of review for unpreserved errors in capital cases. In Dunlap, this 
Court held that the standards of review from Perry, a non-capital case, applied to capital cases as 
well. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361–63, 313 P.3d at 17–19. This Court stated, “Our reasoning in 
Perry is as applicable in capital cases as in other situations.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 363, 313 P.3d 
at 19. Applying Perry, this Court in Dunlap provided the following standards of review:  
[W]hen this Court considers appeals in capital cases, we will consider the issues 
the defendant has identified, including those claimed errors raised for the first 
time on appeal. On review of these unpreserved claims, the defendant has the 
burden of proving that an error occurred and that the error is not harmless, 
meaning that the defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that 
the defendant would not have been sentenced to death. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978. When reviewing alleged errors that were properly preserved 
by an objection, we apply the harmless error test, which first requires the 
defendant to demonstrate that there was an error. Then, upon that showing, the 
 
69 
State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
did not contribute to the death sentence. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. 
 
155 Idaho at 363, 313 P.3d at 19.  
 
After this Court issued its opinion in Dunlap, the defendant in Dunlap petitioned for a 
rehearing. Among other issues, the defendant specifically requested that this Court reconsider its 
decision to apply the standards of review outlined in Perry to capital cases. This Court denied the 
defendant’s petition. 
 
Abdullah raises nearly identical arguments as the defendant in Dunlap regarding the 
standard of review for unpreserved errors in capital cases. He argues that the application of the 
fundamental error standard in capital cases (1) disregards the plain language of Idaho Code 
section 19-2827, which requires the Court to review “all claims of error the defendant raises on 
appeal” in a capital case, Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 362, 313 P.3d at 18; (2) violates separation of 
powers principles; (3) violates Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment principles of 
meaningful appellate review of death sentences; and (4) violates his due process rights. These 
arguments are similar or identical to those raised by the defendant in Dunlap in his reply brief, 
response to the State’s supplemental brief, and brief in support of his petition for rehearing. 
Thus, this Court has considered these arguments raised by Abdullah numerous times throughout 
the Dunlap case. Upon our reconsideration—again—of these arguments in favor of revisiting the 
Dunlap decision, we are unpersuaded. This Court reaffirms that the standard of review for 
unpreserved errors in capital cases is the fundamental error standard and the standard of review 
for preserved errors in capital cases is the harmless error standard. 
14. 
Abdullah was eligible to receive a death sentence in conformity with the ex post 
facto clause and right to due process. 
 
 
Abdullah argues that Idaho did not have a valid death penalty statute in effect at the time 
of the murder. As a result, he contends that his death sentence pursuant to Idaho Code section 
19-2515 violates the ex post facto and due process clauses of the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions. 
a. 
Standard of Review 
 
Abdullah preserved this issue for appeal, and therefore the harmless error standard 
applies to the Court’s review. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 363, 313 P.3d at 19. Constitutional issues are 
questions of law subject to free review by the Court. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 
P.3d 709, 714 (2014). The constitutionality of Idaho’s capital sentencing scheme is a question of 
 
70 
law over which the Court exercises free review. Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 132, 233 P.3d 
61, 63 (2010).  
b. 
Analysis 
 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit ex post facto laws. 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 & n.8 (1981); State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 852, 275 P.3d 
864, 867 (2012). 
The ex post facto clauses prevent the enactment of “any statute [1] which 
punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; 
[2] which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 
commission, or [3] which deprives one charged with crime of any defense 
available according to law at the time when the act was committed . . . .”  
 
Forbes, 152 Idaho at 852, 275 P.3d at 867 (quoting Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 
147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 P.3d 988, 993 (2009) (omission in original)); see also Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977). “Through this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that 
legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning 
until explicitly changed. The ban also restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and 
potentially vindictive legislation.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28–29 (citations omitted). 
 
At issue here is the second category of ex post facto laws, those that make “more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission.” Forbes, 152 Idaho at 852, 275 
P.3d at 867. The ex post facto clause “was intended to secure substantial personal rights against 
arbitrary and oppressive legislation and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes 
of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.” Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 
(1925) (citation omitted). Hence, “[e]ven though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, 
a procedural change is not ex post facto.” Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293. In contrast, a substantive 
change to the law such as an increase in punishment is ex post facto. State v. Lovelace (Lovelace 
I), 140 Idaho 53, 69, 90 P.3d 278, 294 (2003) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 580 (1884)).  
 
The change in the law at issue here is the amendments to Idaho Code section 19-2515 to 
comply with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
In Ring, the United States Supreme Court held, “Capital defendants, no less than 
noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature 
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” Id. at 589. “The effect of Ring was to 
convert statutory aggravating circumstances relevant to sentencing into ‘the functional equivalent 
 
71 
of an element of a greater offense,’ which was to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Lovelace I, 140 Idaho at 66, 90 P.3d at 291 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609). Ring was decided on 
June 24, 2002, and at that time Idaho’s death penalty procedure statute Idaho Code section 19-
2515 “required the trial judge to make the factual findings regarding the existence of aggravating 
circumstance.” Lovelace I, 140 Idaho at 66, 90 P.3d at 291; see also I.C. § 19-2515 (Michie 
2002). “Ring rendered unconstitutional the sentencing scheme of I.C. § 19-2515 . . . .” Lovelace 
I, 140 Idaho at 66, 90 P.3d at 291. 
 
On February 13, 2003, the legislature amended Idaho Code section 19-2515 to comply 
with Ring. Ch. 19, § 4, 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws 71, 72–74. Pursuant to Ring, the jury must find 
the existence of aggravating circumstances and weigh each aggravating circumstance against all 
mitigating circumstances to determine whether the imposition of the death penalty would be 
unjust. Id.; see also I.C. § 19-2515. The legislature deemed the amendment retroactive, stating:  
 
This act shall apply to any capital sentencing proceeding occurring after 
the effective date of this act, including those cases where the murder for which 
sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective date of this act and 
including those cases where a first-degree murder conviction or death sentence 
occurring before the effective date of this act has been set aside and the case is 
before the court for retrial or resentencing; provided however, that the provisions 
of this act relating to mandatory fixed life sentences based upon the finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance apply only to crimes occurring after the 
effective date of this act and provided further that the provisions of this act 
relating to notices of intent to seek the death penalty apply only to cases where the 
entry of a plea occurs after the effective date of this act. No provision of this act 
shall be construed to invalidate a death sentence that has been imposed prior to 
the effective date of this act. 
 
Ch. 19, § 6, 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws at 75–76. 
 
Subsequently, in Schriro v. Summerlin, the United States Supreme Court held, “Ring’s 
holding is properly classified as procedural.” 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). The United States 
Supreme Court explained: 
This holding did not alter the range of conduct [state] law subjected to the death 
penalty. It could not have; it rested entirely on the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial 
guarantee, a provision that has nothing to do with the range of conduct a State 
may criminalize. Instead, Ring altered the range of permissible methods for 
determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable by death, requiring that 
a jury rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment. 
 
 
72 
Id. As in Summerlin, this Court has repeatedly recognized that Ring issued a procedural rule. See, 
e.g., Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139–40, 233 P.3d at 70–71; Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 
P.3d 958, 960 (2005). 
 
In a post-Ring decision, Lovelace I, the Court rejected Lovelace’s argument that the 
imposition of the new death penalty procedures in Idaho Code section 19-2515 violated the ex 
post facto clause. 140 Idaho at 69–70, 90 P.3d at 294–95. The Court held that the resentencing of 
the defendant pursuant to directives from Ring was purely procedural. Lovelace I, 140 Idaho at 
69–70, 90 P.3d at 294–95. The Court explained that the new guidelines in Idaho Code section 
19-2515 did not place the defendant “in jeopardy of any greater punishment.” Id. at 70, 90 P.3d 
at 295 (quoting State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 928 (Ariz. 2003)). Nor did the new guidelines alter 
the aggravating circumstances or the State’s burden of proof. Id. The Court recognized that Idaho 
Code section 18-4004 prescribed the punishment of life imprisonment or death for first-degree 
murder at the time of the commission of the crime. Id. at 69, 90 P.3d at 294. “Clearly,” the Court 
explained, “Lovelace had fair warning that death was a possible punishment for first-degree 
murder.” Id. Therefore, the Court could not “conclude that the subsequent statute authorized a 
more onerous punishment than that authorized by the unconstitutional statute.” Id.  
 
The Court revisited the defendant’s ex post facto argument in State v. Lovelace (Lovelace 
II), 140 Idaho 73, 77–78, 90 P.3d 298, 302–03, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 936 (2004). The Court 
reaffirmed that the resentencing of the defendant pursuant to the Ring directives was purely 
procedural. Id. The Court stated, “The revised death penalty scheme only provides new 
procedures for determining the aggravating circumstances redefined as the functional equivalent 
of elements of capital murder of which Lovelace had notice.” Id. at 78, 90 P.3d at 303. The Court 
concluded, “Idaho’s new sentencing statutes do not place Lovelace in jeopardy of any greater 
punishment than that prescribed under the superseded statutes. Thus, the newly enacted statutes 
do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. 
 
Similar to Lovelace I and II, the United States Supreme Court confronted an ex post facto 
issue in Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282. Although Dobbert was issued before Ring, it presented an almost 
identical issue—whether a state’s amendment of its death penalty statute to conform with United 
States Supreme Court precedent violated the ex post facto clause. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 287–88. 
 
In Dobbert, the defendant committed a crime punishable by death. Id. at 288. After the 
commission of the crime, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that invalidated the 
 
73 
state’s death penalty statute. Id. Consequently, the state amended its death penalty statute to 
comply with the United States Supreme Court’s ruling. Id. These amendments changed the role 
of the judge and jury at sentencing,24 but did not change the possibility of a death sentence for 
the crime charged. Id. at 288–92. The defendant in Dobbert first argued that the change in the 
death penalty statute constituted an ex post facto violation. Id. at 292. The United States Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that “the change in the statute was clearly procedural.” Id. at 293. The 
United States Supreme Court explained, “[N]ot only was the change in the law procedural, it was 
ameliorative. It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the 
prior law.” Id. at 294. The United States Supreme Court held, “The new statute simply altered 
the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no 
change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.” Id. at 293–94.  
 
The defendant also argued that there was no valid death penalty in effect at the time of 
the murder. Id. at 297. The United States Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument. Id. at 297–
98. The United States Supreme Court explained:  
[T]his sophistic argument mocks the substance of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Whether or not the old statute would in the future, withstand constitutional attack, 
it clearly indicated Florida’s view of the severity of murder and of the degree of 
punishment which the legislature wished to impose upon murderers. The statute 
was intended to provide maximum deterrence, and its existence on the statute 
books provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State 
ascribed to the act of murder. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
Here the existence of the statute served as an ‘operative fact’ to warn the 
petitioner of the penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him if he were 
                                                 
24 Florida’s death penalty statute provided that “a person convicted of a capital felony was to be punished by death 
unless the verdict included a recommendation of mercy by a majority of the jury.” Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288. This 
was held unconstitutional in Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972), based on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288. Florida amended its death 
penalty statute to provide:  
 
After a defendant is found guilty of a capital felony, a separate sentencing hearing is held before 
the trial judge and the trial jury. Any evidence that the judge deems relevant to sentencing may be 
admitted, and certain evidence relating to aggravating or mitigating circumstances must be 
admitted. The jury, by a majority vote, then renders an advisory decision, not binding on the court, 
based upon these aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court must then also weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If the court imposes a sentence of death, it must set 
forth written findings of fact regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. A judgment 
of conviction and sentence of death is then subject to an automatic, priority review by the Florida 
Supreme Court. 
 
Id. at 290–92. The United States Supreme Court upheld this procedure as constitutional. Id. at 289.  
 
74 
convicted of first-degree murder. This was sufficient compliance with the ex post 
facto provision of the United States Constitution. 
 
Id. In summary, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a 
change in the procedure itself to impose a death sentence triggered the ex post facto clause. The 
United States Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that a punishment is invalid 
simply because the procedure to impose it is invalid. 
 
Abdullah argues that his case is distinguishable from this Court’s and the United States 
Supreme Court’s precedent, which we recognize to completely foreclose his assignment of error. 
Based solely on the date of the crime—October 5, 2002—he contends that the State cannot 
impose the death penalty. Abdullah explains that at the time of the murder Idaho’s death penalty 
procedure was invalidated by Ring, but the legislature had not yet amended Idaho Code section 
19-2515 to comply with Ring. Without a valid statute to impose the death penalty, he asserts that 
the death penalty did not exist in Idaho at the time he committed the murder. He also argues that 
the aggravating circumstances, which he submits to have a unique role in Idaho’s death penalty 
laws to create death-eligible offenses, were therefore void at the time of his offense. We 
conclude that Abdullah’s argument is unavailing. 
 
Abdullah’s argument is premised on factual distinction without a difference. The fact that 
Abdullah committed the crime after Ring but before the legislature amended Idaho’s death 
penalty procedural statute does not insulate him from a death sentence. A similar argument was 
rejected in State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190 (Neb. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1010 (2010). 
The same timeline of events occurred in Galindo as in the case here: the defendant committed a 
death-eligible crime after Ring invalidated Nebraska’s death penalty procedure, but before the 
Nebraska legislature amended its statute to comply with Ring. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d at 209–10. 
The defendant argued that the imposition of the death penalty under the new statute violated the 
ex post facto clause because “his crimes occurred during a brief moment when there was no 
death penalty in Nebraska.” Id. at 212–13. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 
argument. The court reasoned:  
[D]espite the fact that there was no constitutional means to carry out a death 
sentence, the sentence itself was not invalid. Similarly, despite the fact that during 
the months between Ring and [the amendment to the death penalty statute], there 
was no constitutional procedure to determine death eligibility in a trial for first 
degree murder, it does not follow that Nebraska law no longer provided for the 
death penalty as the maximum punishment at the time of [the defendant]’s crimes.  
 
 
75 
Id. at 214. The court concluded, “Ring invalidated a particular procedure for determining death 
eligibility at trial, but it did not invalidate the death penalty.” Id. at 213. 
 
We hold that Ring did not affect the penalties in Idaho for first-degree murder or alter 
Idaho’s aggravating circumstances. “The invalidity of a single provision purely procedural in 
nature does not automatically invalidate the underlying punishment to which that procedure 
applies.” Galindo, 774 N.W.2d at 213. At the time of Abdullah’s offense, the death penalty 
certainly existed as a possible punishment. I.C. § 18-4004 (Michie 2002). In fact, Idaho Code 
section 18-4004 has prescribed a punishment of death for first-degree murder since its enactment 
in 1972. Ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844, 928. In addition, the aggravating 
circumstances were unchanged by Ring. The aggravating circumstances have been part of Idaho 
Code section 19-2515 since 1977. Ch. 154, § 3, 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 390, 391–93. “Clearly,” 
Abdullah “had fair warning that death was a possible punishment for first-degree murder.” 
Lovelace I, 140 Idaho at 69, 90 P.3d at 294. The new procedural changes in Idaho Code section 
19-2515 did not place Abdullah “‘in jeopardy of any greater punishment than that already 
imposed under the superseded statutes,’ and therefore do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” 
Id. at 71, 90 P.3d at 295 (quoting Ring, 65 P.3d at 928); see also Lovelace II, 140 Idaho at 78, 90 
P.3d at 303.  
Finally, we address Abdullah’s argument that this Court’s decision in State v. Lindquist, 
99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979), supports his position that Idaho Code section 19-2515 cannot 
be retroactively applied to him. Abdullah’s argument is misplaced. In Lindquist, the Court 
vacated the defendant’s death sentence “on the basis that Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976), had effectively invalidated Idaho’s then mandatory death penalty” for first-degree 
murder in Idaho Code section 18-4004. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 374, 670 P.2d 463, 475 
(1983) (summarizing Lindquist). The Court refused to apply an amended version of Idaho Code 
section 18-4004 retroactively to the defendant, recognizing that the legislature did not expressly 
declare the amended version was retroactive. Lindquist, 99 Idaho at 768, 589 P.2d at 103. The 
Court also noted that “a retroactive construction” of the former Idaho Code section 18-4004 “to 
make it constitutional . . . poses serious ex post facto problems.” Id. at 770, 589 P.2d at 105. In 
contrast to Lindquist, the statute at issue here is not the statute which prescribes the penalties for 
first-degree murder. At issue here is only the procedural statute for imposition of the death 
penalty. Additionally, unlike the statute in Lindquist, the new version of Idaho Code section 19-
 
76 
2515 applied retroactively. Ch. 19, § 6, 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws at 75 (“This act shall apply to any 
capital sentencing proceeding occurring after the effective date of this act, including those cases 
where the murder for which sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective date of this 
act . . . .”). Therefore, Lindquist does not support Abdullah’s position. 
Based on the above reasons, the imposition of a death sentence does not violate the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws.25  
15. 
Idaho’s death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
 
Abdullah argues that his death sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In support of this 
argument, Abdullah explains that “[o]ur evolving standards of decency, which mark our progress 
as a maturing society, no longer support the death penalty as an acceptable sentencing option.” 
Abdullah relies upon the fact that an increasing number of states have chosen to abolish the death 
penalty or issued moratoriums on scheduled executions and that public opinion polls indicate, as 
a society, support for use of the death penalty as a sentencing option is low.  
a. 
Standard of Review 
 
“The requirements of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions are questions of law, over which 
this Court has free review.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 598, 261 P.3d 853, 875 (2011). 
When examining whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment: 
The Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in 
legislative enactments and state practice” to determine whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 572 (2005). Next, guided by “the standards elaborated by controlling 
precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s test, history, meaning, and purpose,” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407, 421 (2008), the Court must determine in the exercise of its own 
independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the 
Constitution. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572.  
 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 598, 261 P.3d at 875 
(reciting the same standard).  
b. 
Analysis 
                                                 
25 Abdullah submits that the imposition of the death penalty violates the ex post facto and due process clauses, but 
provides no sufficient argument or authority on due process. Therefore, any issue as to due process that is separate 
and distinct from the ex post facto issue is waived. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996). 
 
77 
The Eighth Amendment states “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth 
Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). Article I, 
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution also prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishments. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6.  
This Court has held that Idaho’s death penalty statute does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 101–03, 967 P.2d 702, 715–17 (1998) (holding 
Idaho’s statutory scheme for consideration of the death penalty constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 741–42, 768, 810 P.2d 680, 705–06 (1991) (holding 
Idaho Code section 19-2515 does not violate the Eighth Amendment), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991). “[T]he punishment of death is 
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
35, 48 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). Capital 
punishment is not prohibited under the United States Constitution, and “the States may enact 
laws specifying that sanction.” Id. at 61. “State efforts to implement capital punishment must 
certainly comply with the Eighth Amendment, but what that Amendment prohibits is wanton 
exposure to ‘objectively intolerable risk,’ not simply the possibility of pain.” Id. at 61–62 
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 & n.9 (1994)). 
Here, Abdullah’s sole argument rests on the premise that, as a society, support for the use 
of the death penalty is declining. While Abdullah may have identified a shift in support for 
imposition of the death penalty, this shift does not provide objective indicia of society’s 
standards, such as legislative enactments or executive action, to allow this Court to determine 
that there is a national consensus against the death penalty as a sentence for first-degree murder. 
Draper, 151 Idaho at 598–99, 261 P.3d at 875–76. Thirty-two states, the military, and the federal 
government continue to allow the death penalty as a sentencing option. See DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last 
visited February 23, 2015); Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Capital 
Punishment, 
2012–Statistical 
Tables 
(Rev. 
2014), 
available 
at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Trop v. Dulles: 
 
78 
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral 
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are 
forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a 
day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional 
concept of cruelty. 
 
356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). “[I]t is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is 
in fact widely tolerated.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 53. Therefore, absent some legislative or executive 
action, a determination by this Court that Idaho’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional based 
on evolving standards of decency and public opinion is unsupported. “Courts are not 
representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.” Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment)). Abdullah’s death sentence is affirmed 
on the basis that it does not amount to cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.    
16. 
The district court did not err by failing to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek 
the death penalty.  
a. 
Facts 
 
On November 15, 2002, the State filed an indictment charging Abdullah with first-degree 
murder, first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a 
child. On December 3, 2002, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.26 In this 
notice, the State provided that it would rely on four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (2) the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity; (3) by the murder or 
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited an utter disregard for human 
life; and (4) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, 
has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat 
to society.27 Abdullah moved to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and 
the district court denied Abdullah’s motion. Abdullah appeals the district court’s denial of his 
motion. 
b. 
Standard of Review 
                                                 
26 The State subsequently filed an amended indictment.  
27 In 2002, the statute contained ten aggravating circumstances. I.C. § 19-2515(h) (Michie 2002). It now contains 
eleven. I.C. § 19-2515(9). 
 
79 
 
“The requirements of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions are questions of law, over which 
this Court has free review.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 598, 261 P.3d 853, 875 (2011). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Based on various constitutional and statutory provisions, Abdullah raises a few 
interrelated challenges to the State’s failure to include the statutory aggravating circumstances in 
the indictment or otherwise provide factual support for the aggravating circumstances. He relies 
on Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides in part, “[n]o person shall be 
held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor,” and the notice 
requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states in part, “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation.” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.28 He also relies on 
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b), which states, “[t]he indictment or the information shall be a plain, 
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” and 
Idaho Code section 19-1409, which states that the indictment “must contain . . . [a] statement of 
the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to 
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.” I.C. § 19-1409; I.C.R. 
7(b). He argues that these constitutional and statutory provisions require the State to include the 
aggravating circumstances in the indictment, subject to a probable cause determination, or to 
submit a factual basis for each aggravating circumstance in the alternative.  
 
Abdullah’s argument is premised on the changes to Idaho’s death penalty law due to 
Ring. “In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee requires that a jury, not a judge, find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.” Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 
782, 102 P.3d 1099, 1101 (2004). The Ring decision was based solely on the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. The United States Supreme Court specifically noted in 
Ring that it did not address “whether notice of a fact that would be used to support a sentence 
had to be conveyed to the defendant through an indictment versus some other means.” State v. 
Lovelace (Lovelace I), 140 Idaho 53, 70, 90 P.3d 278, 295 (2003) (quoting Terrell v. State, 572 
                                                 
28 “The notice provision of the Sixth Amendment is incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and is therefore fully applicable to the states.” Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
80 
S.E.2d 595, 602 (Ga. 2002)); see Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (“Ring does not contend that his 
indictment was constitutionally defective.”); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 
n.3 (2000) (“Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional claim based on the omission of any 
reference to sentence enhancement . . . in the indictment. . . . We thus do not address the 
indictment question separately today.”). Although Ring was silent with respect to the indictment 
issue, “[t]he effect of Ring was to convert statutory aggravating circumstances relevant to 
sentencing into ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ which was to be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 387, 247 P.3d 
582, 614 (2010) (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609). Based on this “functional equivalent” language 
from Ring, Abdullah argues that the aggravating circumstances are elements of the offense of 
first-degree murder and must be included in the indictment. 
 
Although this indictment issue has not been considered by this Court, this Court in Porter 
discussed Ring in the context of whether it applied “retroactively to cases that have already 
become final on direct review.” 140 Idaho at 782, 103 P.3d at 1101. In explaining the effect of 
Ring on Idaho’s death penalty law, the Court stated:  
Section 19-2515 did not define a separate crime of capital first-degree murder. It 
merely set forth the procedures that must be followed in order to impose a death 
sentence, defined the statutory aggravating circumstances, and required that at 
least one aggravating circumstance be found beyond a reasonable doubt before a 
defendant could be sentenced to death. Ring did not elevate those statutory 
aggravating circumstances into elements of a crime, nor did it create a new 
crime. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court lacks the authority to enact or amend state legislation. Only our 
state legislature has that authority, and it did not make the aggravating 
circumstances elements of the crime. Ring merely held that a state cannot impose 
the death penalty unless its sentencing procedures have the jury, not the judge, 
determine the existence of a statutory aggravator. 
 
Porter, 140 Idaho at 784, 103 P.3d at 1103 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court stated in clear 
terms that the statutory aggravating circumstances are not elements of a crime.  
 
The Court’s discussion of Ring in Porter forecloses Abdullah’s argument, and this 
outcome is consistent with the majority rule. Due to this “functional equivalent” language from 
Ring, many other jurisdictions have discussed whether Ring required the aggravating 
circumstance “elements” be included in the indictment. Upon review of this issue, the 
overwhelming majority of states have distinguished between the “functional equivalent of an 
element” and the actual elements of the offense to hold that the aggravating circumstances do not 
 
81 
need to be alleged in the indictment pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, or Due 
Process Clause.29 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(a) & nn.41–44 
(2013); 41 AM. JUR. Indictments and Informations § 117 & nn.7–13 (2d ed. 2014); 42 C.J.S. 
Indictments § 172 & nn.16–17 (2014). For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 
“[United States Supreme] Court’s conclusion that sentencing factors operate as the ‘functional 
equivalent’ of elements for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right does not dictate that 
such factors are elements for purposes of a Minnesota indictment.” State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 
597, 611 (Minn. 2006) (en banc). The Minnesota Supreme Court explained: 
The right to a jury trial serves a different purpose than the “nature and cause” 
requirement [in the Sixth Amendment] and the due process notice requirement; 
the former addresses the adequacy of proof of the offense charged and of the 
aggravating sentencing factors, while the latter simply provides a defendant notice 
of the charges. 
 
Id. Similarly, in State v. Siers, the Washington Supreme Court concluded, “The United States 
Constitution does not require states to allege aggravating circumstances in local 
prosecutions. Neither does the Washington Constitution require aggravators to be alleged in an 
information.” 274 P.3d 358, 363–64 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). The Washington Supreme Court 
highlighted some policy concerns, stating, “In our view, treating aggravators as the functional 
equivalent of essential elements that must be pleaded in the charging document is harmful to the 
public interest because it wastes valuable judicial resources and imposes too heavy a burden on 
the criminal justice system.” Id. at 364. The analysis of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. 
Scott, 183 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2008), is also informative. The Kansas Supreme Court recognized that 
                                                 
29 As stated in Evans v. State, 886 A.2d 562, 573 (Md. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1219 (2006): 
 
Under Ring, . . . aggravating factors are no longer regarded as mere sentencing factors, but as 
matters to be determined by a jury . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, but that does not, ipso facto, 
mean that they have to be alleged in an indictment. That has been the view expressed by every 
State court, save New Jersey, that has considered the effect of Ring on the indictment issue. 
 
See also Lewis v. State, 24 So. 3d 480, 533–35 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff’d, 24 So.3d 540 (Ala.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 
1078; McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 100 P.3d 18, 20–23 (Ariz. 2004); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 
788, 793 (Fla. 2003); Jones v. State, 653 S.E.2d 456, 461–62 (Ga. 2007); People v. McClain, 799 N.E.2d 322, 335–
36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 841–43 (Ky. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 
(2005); State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 611 (Minn. 2006); Stevens v. State, 867 So. 2d 219, 226–27 (Miss. 2003), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 858 (2004); State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 48 (Mo. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 971 
(2007); State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593, 602–06 (N.C.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985 (2003); Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 
893, 899–900 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 944 (2004); State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722, 727 (Or. 
2005); State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 233–34 (R.I. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003); Moeller v. Weber, 
689 N.W.2d 1, 18–22 (S.D. 2004); State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 311–12 (Tenn. 2005); Renteria v. State, 206 
S.W.3d 689, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Morrisette v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 613 S.E.2d 551, 556 (Va. 
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1225 (2006); State v. Siers, 274 P.3d 358, 363–64 (Wash. 2012). 
 
82 
the Sixth Amendment right to notice of the “nature and cause of the accusation” was applicable 
to the states and required some form of notice of the aggravating circumstances. Id. at 835. 
However, the Kansas Supreme Court held that this notice requirement did not demand notice of 
the aggravating circumstances in the indictment. The Sixth Amendment required “only that the 
defendant be given ‘notice and an opportunity to respond.’” Id. (quoting Fawcett v. Bablitch, 962 
F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1992)). The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed its statutory notice 
procedures, which required the State to notify the defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty 
within five days of the arraignment and to inform the defendant of the specific aggravating 
circumstances “prior to the sentencing proceeding,” and determined its procedures were 
“sufficient to give the defendant a meaningful opportunity to respond to the aggravating factors 
against him or her.” Id.  
 
We hold that Ring did not transform the “functional equivalent” elements of aggravating 
circumstances to the level of actual elements of an offense to require the State to allege the 
aggravating circumstances in the indictment or information. Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b) and Idaho 
Code section 19-1408(2) are therefore inapplicable because those provisions pertain to the facts 
and allegations that must be stated in an indictment. Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution is inapplicable because it too involves the requirements of an indictment.  
 
Without the designation of aggravating circumstances as elements of a crime, the State’s 
formal notification of the intent to seek the death penalty does not carry the constitutional 
requirements of an indictment or information.  
Although prosecutions in the federal courts require, under the Fifth Amendment, 
that aggravators be alleged in an indictment and supported by probable cause, the 
same requirement is inapplicable to prosecutions in our state courts. . . . Because a 
state is not required, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to empanel grand 
juries for purposes of indictment, it would be anomalous for us to require, under 
the United States Constitution, that a grand jury determine probable cause as a 
basis for alleging aggravating factors.  
 
McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 100 P.3d 18, 20 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (citation 
omitted). In other words, “[b]ecause the aggravating circumstances are not required to be 
pleaded in the charging document, it naturally follows that they are not subject to a probable-
cause determination.” Maestas v. State, 275 P.3d 74, 87 (Nev.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 275 
(2012). Thus, we also hold that there is no constitutional requirement that the State present 
 
83 
evidence demonstrating probable cause for each aggravating circumstance to properly notify the 
defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty.30 
 
We recognize that the Sixth Amendment’s “nature and cause” provision and the right to 
due process impose a notice requirement on the aggravating circumstances, but Idaho’s statutory 
procedures fully satisfy these constitutional protections. The requirements of Idaho Code section 
18-4004A provide defendants with adequate notice of the State’s intent to seek the death penalty 
and the aggravating circumstances. “The Sixth Amendment and basic principles of due process 
guarantee a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusations against him so that he may have a meaningful opportunity to prepare an adequate 
defense against every issue raised by those accusations.” Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859, 866 (9th 
Cir. 2013), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1 (2014). Idaho Code section 18-
4004A requires that the State notify the defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty “no later 
than sixty (60) days after entry of a plea.” I.C. § 18-4004A(1). The notice “shall include a listing 
of the statutory aggravating circumstances that the state will rely on in seeking the death 
penalty.” I.C. § 18-4004A(1). We hold that the requirements in Idaho Code section 18-4004A 
comport with the Sixth Amendment and due process by notifying the defendant of the nature of 
the aggravating circumstances and by providing the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to 
respond and prepare. See Terrell, 572 S.E.2d at 602–03 (finding constitutionally sufficient notice 
of State’s intent to seek the death penalty with notice filed several months before trial); Scott, 
183 P.3d at 835 (holding that notice of intent to seek the death penalty sufficient under the Sixth 
Amendment); State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593, 604–06 (N.C. 2003) (holding that aggravators do 
not need to be pled in the indictment because statutory notice and procedures are sufficient under 
the Sixth Amendment). These notice requirements in Idaho Code section 18-4004A are 
constitutionally adequate and stand “in lieu of charging them in the information or indictment.” 
State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 513 (Mo. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058 (2005). 
 
Finally, Abdullah argues that due process requires that a defendant be apprised “not only 
of the name of the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is alleged to 
                                                 
30 Most recently, this Court reached a similar result regarding a non-death eligible crime in State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 
488, 337 P.3d 647 (2014). In Schall, this Court held that Idaho Code section 18-8005(6), which requires that a 
violation of Idaho’s DUI statute be enhanced to a felony in certain circumstances, did not create a separate offense. 
Id. at 492, 337 P.3d at 651. Rather, Idaho Code section 18-8005(6) is an enhancement provision. Id. at 492–95, 337 
P.3d at 651–54. Relevant here, this Court stated, “The fact that an enhancement provision has serious ramifications 
for a defendant tells us nothing about whether the Legislature intended to define a new offense or to enhance the 
penalty associated with a pre-existing offense.” Id. at 495, 337 P.3d at 654. 
 
84 
have been committed.” In Gray v. Netherland, however, the United States Supreme Court stated, 
“A defendant’s right to notice of the charges against which he must defend is well established. 
But a defendant’s claim that he has a right to notice of the evidence that the state plans to use to 
prove the charges stands on quite a different footing.” 518 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1996) (citations 
omitted). “[T]here is no extant constitutional right to advance notice of the evidence to prove 
such charges in a capital sentencing hearing.” United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 929 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Gray, 518 U.S. at 166–70). Thus, the State “is not required to provide specific 
evidence in its notice of intent” to seek the death penalty. United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 
1347 (11th Cir. 1999).  
 
Consistent with the foregoing, we hold that there is no due process right to be informed 
of the specific evidence or factual basis underlying each aggravating circumstance alleged by the 
State. The State’s notification of the aggravating circumstances that it will rely upon to seek the 
death penalty is sufficient to inform the defendant of the “general terms” or basis of each 
aggravating circumstance. “The nature of the aggravators themselves ensures that defendants 
will be reasonably apprised of the evidence that could lead to a sentence of death.” Hunt, 582 
S.E.2d at 605. Idaho’s statutory aggravating circumstances “are sufficiently distinct that, in 
almost all cases, it will be apparent to the defendant prior to trial which factors the State will be 
relying on.” Scott, 183 P.3d at 835; see also I.C. § 19-2515(h) (Michie 2002). “Even in the event 
there is some ambiguity as to the factors that will be relied on, the State is required to provide the 
exact factors prior to the penalty phase.” Scott, 183 P.3d at 835. The State’s identification of the 
four aggravating circumstances in its notice to seek the death penalty was sufficient to notify 
Abdullah of the facts underlying each aggravating circumstance and satisfy due process. 
 
In conclusion, this Court holds that Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho 
Criminal Rule 7(b), and Idaho Code section 19-1409(2) do not require that the aggravating 
circumstances be alleged in the indictment. This Court also holds that compliance with the notice 
requirements in Idaho Code section 18-4004A is sufficient to satisfy due process and the Sixth 
Amendment notice requirement. Finally, this Court holds that the State is not required by the due 
process clause to submit a factual basis for each aggravating circumstance. This Court affirms 
the district court’s denial of Abdullah’s motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty. 
 
85 
17. 
The statutory aggravating circumstances are not void for vagueness under the Due 
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
 
Abdullah argues that the four aggravating circumstances alleged by the State are 
unconstitutionally vague and therefore violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
a. 
Facts 
 
In its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the State provided that it would rely on 
four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of 
death to many persons (great risk aggravator); (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity (HAC aggravator); (3) by the murder or 
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited an utter disregard for human 
life (utter disregard aggravator); and (4) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society (propensity aggravator). Abdullah moved for 
the district court to declare the four aggravating circumstances unconstitutional under the Idaho 
and United States Constitutions, including the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. 
The district court denied Abdullah’s motion.  
 
Although the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the HAC and propensity 
aggravators, the jury found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
the great risk and utter disregard aggravators. The jury weighed the great risk aggravator and 
utter disregard aggravator individually against all mitigating circumstances and found that the 
mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be 
unjust.  
b. 
Standard of Review  
 
As a preserved claim of error, the Court employs the harmless error standard to 
Abdullah’s challenges to the aggravating circumstances. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). “The requirements of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions are questions of 
law, over which this Court has free review.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 598, 261 P.3d 853, 
875 (2011).  
c. 
Analysis 
 
86 
 
“Our capital punishment doctrine is rooted in the principle that ‘[t]he Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems 
that permit this unique penalty to be . . . wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed.’” State v. Card, 
121 Idaho 425, 434, 825 P.2d 1081, 1090 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 
(1990) (alteration in original) (omissions in original)). “This principle requires a State to 
‘channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and 
detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death.’” Id. (quoting Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774).   
 
“Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capital 
punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment . . . .” Maynard v. Cartwright, 
486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988). These claims “characteristically assert that the challenged provision 
fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result 
leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid 
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).” Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361–62; see also id. at 362 
(“Furman held that Georgia’s then-standardless capital punishment statute was being applied in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner; there was no principled means provided to distinguish those 
that received the penalty from those that did not.”). A claim of vagueness is analyzed by 
determining whether the challenged aggravating circumstance adequately informs the jury of 
what it must find in order to impose the death penalty, or whether it leaves the jury with 
unchanneled discretion to make an arbitrary and capricious decision. State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 
530, 536, 873 P.2d 784, 790 (1993). The aggravating circumstances must be construed to permit 
the jury to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those 
who do not. Card, 121 Idaho at 434–35, 825 P.2d at 1090–91. 
 
“[W]here the statutory language defining the aggravating circumstance is itself vague, 
there must be a limiting construction if the state is to meet its constitutional obligation to ‘tailor 
and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death 
penalty.’” State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 771, 810 P.2d 680, 709 (1991) (quoting Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)), overruled in part on other grounds by Card, 121 Idaho 425, 
825 P.2d 1081. 
i. 
Any challenge to HAC and propensity aggravators is moot. 
 
 
87 
 
The constitutionality of the HAC aggravator and propensity aggravator is moot because 
the jury did not reach a unanimous decision as to these aggravators. The Court does not decide 
moot issues. Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 912, 303 P.3d 587, 599 (2013). An issue is 
moot if it “does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded 
through judicial decree of specific relief” or if “a favorable judicial decision would not result in 
any relief or the party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Arambarri v. 
Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739, 274 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2012) (citations omitted). Without a 
unanimous decision, these aggravators were not subject to any weighing against the mitigating 
circumstances to determine whether the death penalty would be unjust. Hence, the HAC and 
propensity aggravators had no bearing on the jury’s decision to sentence Abdullah to death. The 
Court cannot invalidate his death sentence on factors that in no way influenced the jury’s 
decision. A decision regarding these factors in Abdullah’s favor would not result in any relief to 
Abdullah. Put another way, even if Abdullah could establish that the aggravators were 
unconstitutionally vague, any constitutional error beyond a reasonable doubt did not contribute 
to the jury’s decision to sentence Abdullah to death. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 
979.  
ii. 
The utter disregard aggravator is not void for vagueness. 
 
Abdullah argues that the utter disregard aggravator is unconstitutionally vague because 
the jury sentencing requirement from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), renders the limiting 
construction of utter disregard inadequate to properly instruct the jury.  
 
The utter disregard aggravator requires a limiting construction to meet constitutional 
requirements. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 417–19, 631 P.2d 187, 199–201 (1981). The 
limiting construction provided by the Court in Osborn construes “utter disregard” “to be 
reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, 
callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.” Id. at 419, 631 P.2d at 
201. The United States Supreme Court in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993), reviewed the 
Court’s construction in Osborn of the utter disregard aggravator and “held that because this 
construction ‘defines a state of mind that is ascertainable from surrounding facts,’ the aggravator 
was not unconstitutional.” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 377, 313 P.3d 1, 33 (2014) (quoting 
Creech, 507 U.S. at 471–74). The Osborn construction satisfies the Eighth Amendment by 
 
88 
genuinely narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474–
75.  
 
“In Creech, the Court used both ‘sentencer’ and ‘sentencing judge’ when referring to the 
entity that would apply the aggravator to determine a sentence.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 377, 313 
P.3d at 33 (quoting Creech, 507 U.S. at 474–76). The defendant in Dunlap contended “that the 
Creech Court found the Osborn construction sufficient only in the context of judge sentencing.” 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 377, 313 P.3d at 33. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument, 
explaining that “the determination in Creech was based upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
consideration of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the limiting construction that this Court had applied to 
the statutory language.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 377–78, 313 P.3d at 33–34 (citing Creech, 507 
U.S. at 472). The United States Supreme Court did not base its determination on any difference 
between judge and jury sentencing. Id. Therefore, the Court held in Dunlap “that the utter 
disregard aggravator is not rendered unconstitutional by the change from judge to jury 
sentencing.” Id. at 378, 313 P.3d at 34.  
 
Abdullah raises a similar argument. He argues that this Court’s construction of utter 
disregard is no longer valid because it relied on the fact that judges, who understand and apply 
narrowing constructions to avoid vague aggravators, would sentence the defendant to death. 
Abdullah’s argument has been foreclosed by Dunlap. We reaffirm Dunlap’s holding that the 
utter disregard aggravator with a limiting construction is not void for vagueness under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
In this case, Jury Instruction 46 provided:  
“Exhibited utter disregard for human life,” with regard to the murder or the 
circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or circumstances 
surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for 
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. “Cold-blooded” means marked 
by absence of warm feeling: without consideration, compunction, or clemency, 
matter of fact, or emotionless. “Pitiless” means devoid of or unmoved by mercy 
or compassion. A “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer” refers to a slayer who kills 
without feeling or sympathy. The utter disregard factor refers to the defendant’s 
lack of conscience regarding killing of another human being.  
 
This instruction “accurately instructed the jury as to this limiting construction” of utter disregard. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 378, 313 P.3d at 34. Abdullah’s void for vagueness challenge to the utter 
disregard aggravator fails. 
iii. 
Any error with regard to the great risk aggravator was harmless. 
 
 
89 
 
Abdullah raises three separate issues with respect to the great risk aggravator. First, he 
argues that the great risk aggravator itself is unconstitutionally vague. Second, he argues that the 
district court’s jury instruction for the great risk aggravator was a legislative act in violation of 
separation of powers principles. Finally, he argues that the district court’s jury instruction 
violated his due process rights because it failed to connect the great risk aggravator with the 
offense of first-degree murder.  
 
It is not necessary for this Court to consider these arguments on appeal. Even if the great 
risk aggravator is unconstitutional or if the district court’s instruction was inadequate, any error 
was harmless. “In Idaho, the [jury] must weigh each of the aggravating circumstances separately 
against all of the mitigating circumstances.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 509–10, 988 P.2d 
1170, 1183–84 (1999); see also I.C. § 19-2515(c) (Michie 2002); I.C. § 19-2515(3)(b), (7), 
(8)(a).  
When such an analysis is followed, the invalidation of one or more of the 
aggravating circumstances has no effect on the validity of the sentence imposed; 
[the jury] has already determined that any one of the aggravating circumstances 
standing alone outweighs all the mitigating circumstances, thus justifying the 
death sentence. 
 
Hairston, 133 Idaho at 510, 988 P.2d at 1184. In this case, the jury found that the State had 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of two aggravating circumstances: great risk and 
utter disregard. Weighing each aggravating circumstance individually, the jury found that all 
mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust 
based on either aggravating circumstance standing alone. Therefore, even if the great risk 
aggravator was unconstitutionally vague and should not have been submitted to the jury without 
a limiting construction from the Court, this Court affirms the jury’s finding to impose the death 
penalty based on the utter disregard aggravator. See id.; State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 105–06, 
967 P.2d 702, 719–20 (1998). 
18. 
This Court’s limiting construction of the HAC and utter disregard aggravators does 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
 
Abdullah argues that this Court’s limiting construction of the HAC aggravator and utter 
disregard aggravator from State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), and State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), respectively, violates the separation of powers 
doctrine because the Court’s limiting constructions “rewrote” those aggravating circumstances in 
contravention of the legislature’s exclusive power to define the elements of a criminal offense. 
 
90 
Abdullah bases his argument on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which he contends to 
have elevated the aggravating circumstances to elements of a crime. However, the Court held 
that “Ring did not elevate those statutory aggravating circumstances into elements of a crime, nor 
did it create a new crime.” State v. Porter, 140 Idaho 780, 784, 103 P.3d 1099, 1103 (2004). The 
aggravating circumstances are only “the functional equivalent” of elements of a crime. State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 387, 247 P.3d 582, 614 (2010) (discussing Ring). As such, the 
Court’s limiting construction of an aggravating circumstance is not constrained by the separation 
of powers doctrine. 
 
This Court is within its constitutional authority to narrowly construe an aggravating 
circumstance to avoid an unconstitutionally vague statute. “In charging the jury, the court must 
state to them all matters of law necessary for their information.” I.C. § 19-2132. “[P]ossible 
infirmity for vagueness may be avoided if the statute is given a limiting judicial construction, 
consistent with the apparent legislative intent and comporting with constitutional limitations.” 
State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244, 248 (1998) (quoting State v. Richards, 127 
Idaho 31, 38, 896 P.2d 357, 364 (Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a facial vagueness challenge)).  
It is the courts alone that have the power to determine the validity or invalidity of 
a statute. It is the role of the courts to ascertain and give effect to the intention of 
the legislature as expressed in the statutes. To apply the principle of statutory 
interpretation is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
 
Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 555 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citations omitted) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim that the court’s narrowing construction of the HAC aggravator violates the 
separation of powers doctrine), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1080 (1996). See also State v. Breton, 824 
A.2d 778, 827–28 (Conn.) (reaffirming its holding that the court has the power to define 
“especially cruel” and the power is not reserved to the legislature), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1055 
(2003); Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 104 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting without discussion the 
defendant’s claim that the court’s limiting construction of the HAC aggravator violates the 
separation of powers). “In choosing between two constructions of a statute, one valid and one 
constitutionally precarious,” the Court may “search for an effective and constitutional 
construction that reasonably accords with the legislature’s underlying intent.” State v. Breton, 
562 A.2d 1060, 1066 (Conn. 1989). Therefore, we hold that our limiting construction of an 
aggravating circumstance to avoid an unconstitutionally vague statute does not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
 
91 
19. 
The district court did not err by admitting a victim impact statement from Angie’s 
step-sister. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred when it permitted Angie’s step-sister 
Stephanie Williams to offer victim impact testimony during the sentencing proceeding. Abdullah 
argues that Idaho Code section 19-5306 does not permit step-siblings the opportunity to offer 
victim impact evidence because they are not immediate family members.  
a. 
Standard of Review 
Abdullah did not object to the admission of Williams’s victim impact statement, and 
therefore this alleged error is subject to the fundamental error standard. State v. Dunlap, 155 
Idaho 345, 363, 313 P.3d 1, 19 (2013). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 
(2008). 
b. 
Analysis 
 
Article I, Section 22(6) of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code section 19-5306 
guarantee victims the right to be heard, upon request, at sentencing. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(6); 
I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e), (h); see also Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 150. A victim may 
exercise the right to be heard with a victim impact statement at the defendant’s sentencing 
hearing. State v. Hansen, 156 Idaho 169, 173, 321 P.3d 719, 723 (2014). In cases of homicide, 
Idaho Code section 19-5306 limits victim impact statements to immediate family members of the 
victim. I.C. § 19-5306(3); Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 150. “Immediate family 
members” is not defined in Idaho Code section 19-5306. Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 
150.  
 
Whether step-siblings are immediate family members entitled to give a victim impact 
statement is a matter of first impression for this Court. In Payne, the Court turned to other 
definitions of “immediate family members” in the Idaho Code and Black’s Law Dictionary to 
determine the definition for purposes of Idaho Code section 19-5306. The Court explained:   
For instance, in I.C. § 41-1325, “‘immediate family member’ means a parent, 
mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband, wife, sister, brother, brother-in-law, sister-
in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, or a son or daughter.” I.C. § 41-1325(2). 
Likewise, in I.C. § 44-1601, “‘[i]mmediate family member’ means the spouse, 
children, brother, sister, mother or father.” Similarly, Black’s defines “immediate 
family member” as: “1. A person’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings. 2. A 
person’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings, as well as those of the person’s 
spouse.” Black’s Law Dictionary 273 (2d Pocket Ed. 2001). 
 
 
92 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 150. Thus, the Court indicated that relatives related by 
marriage, such as in-laws, are immediate family members. It logically follows that siblings 
related by marriage are also immediate family members. Black’s Law Dictionary also supports 
this determination, which notes in its definition of “immediate family members” that 
“[s]tepchildren and adopted children are usu[ally] immediate family members.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 721 (10th ed. 2014). Therefore, this Court holds that step-siblings of the victim are 
immediate family members for purposes of providing a victim impact statement pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 19-5306. For this reason, the district court did not err when it permitted 
Williams to read a victim impact statement during the sentencing proceeding. 
20. 
The alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase did not 
result in fundamental error. 
 
Abdullah submits one instance of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase of 
trial. He argues that this error violated his right to due process, his right to a fair trial, and the 
equal protection clause.  
a. 
Facts 
 
During closing argument of the penalty phase, the prosecutor discussed the penalty of 
death under Islamic law. The transcript provides: 
MR. OWEN [the prosecutor]: You will recall that point in the trial when I 
examined that Imam from the mosque in Salt Lake City . . . you will recall that in 
answer to counsel’s question, I asked the Imam what is the penalty for murder 
under Islam-- 
 
THE COURT: Counsel, side bar. 
 
(bench conference as follows:) 
 
THE COURT: I know where you’re going. Don’t go there. 
 
MR. OWEN: I don’t think you know. 
 
THE COURT: Are you bringing in the fact that the penalty should be death? 
 
MR. OWEN: With the understanding that that’s not the law that we have in this 
state, that we don’t get to execute somebody just because they commit a murder. 
That’s the point. 
 
THE COURT: All right. I didn’t want -- 
 
MR. OWEN: I’m not going to make that point. 
 
(Back on the record.) 
 
MR. OWEN: You’ll recall in response to the question by counsel what the penalty 
for murder under Islamic law is and the answer was death for death. But we’re not 
 
93 
Islamic law. You are obligated to follow the laws of the state as given to you by 
this Judge. That law is expressed in this instruction that you have. Idaho law has 
been structured so that the only persons who will eligible [sic] to receive the death 
penalty are the worst of the worst. That’s why you have to find an aggravator. 
Once you find an aggravator, that’s why you have to weigh all of the mitigation 
against that.  
 
Abdullah did not object to the prosecutor’s statement. 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only 
reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
480, 272 P.3d 417, 452 (2012) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 
(2010)); see also State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 363, 313 P.3d 1, 19 (2013). The first step in 
considering Abdullah’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is to determine whether “the alleged 
conduct actually rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 368, 313 
P.3d at 24. 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah argues that the prosecutor’s comment on Islamic law was an attempt to ask the 
jury to decide the penalty based on factors other than evidence and law. He also contends that the 
prosecutor’s argument undercut the jurors’ sense of responsibility for imposing the death 
penalty. In Abdullah’s supplemental brief, he contends that the prosecutor emphasized Islamic 
law to highlight Abdullah’s ethnicity and religion at a time when the American public was 
hostile towards Iraqis and Muslims due to the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent war 
in Iraq. Abdullah submits that the prosecutor’s reference to Islamic law was an appeal to jury 
prejudice based on religion and ethnicity.  
 
The prosecutor’s comment was not misconduct. Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when 
the prosecutor “attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than . . . the evidence admitted 
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. It also occurs when the prosecutor “[a]ppeals to emotion, passion 
or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 
62, 253 P.3d 727, 736 (2011) (quoting State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. 
App. 2007)). Neither occurred here. The jury did not learn from the prosecutor that the penalty 
for murder was death under Islamic law. The defense’s cross-examination of a witness during the 
 
94 
guilt phase informed the jury of this penalty.31 In referencing this evidence presented by the 
defense, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to draw any negative inferences from that evidence. 
Rather, the prosecutor noted the evidence and then directed the jury to follow the instructions of 
the district court. Thus, the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty based on excluded or 
admissible evidence. Further, the prosecutor did not appeal to emotion, passion, or prejudice of 
the jury. The prosecutor’s reference to Islamic law served to emphasize to the jury to follow the 
law of Idaho. To reach Abdullah’s contention that the prosecutor attempted to capture the 
general public’s alleged animosity towards certain ethnicities and religious groups for the 
September 11 terrorist attacks would require inference upon inference, all in spite of the 
instruction to the jury that prejudice should not influence their deliberation. Finally, any error 
was harmless. Abdullah has failed to show that there is a reasonable possibility the prosecutor’s 
comment on Islamic law affected the outcome of the sentencing phase. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 
363, 313 P.3d at 19.  
21. 
The district court did not err by failing to properly instruct the jury during the 
penalty phase. 
  
Abdullah raises five challenges to the district court’s jury instructions during the penalty 
phase. This Court concludes that there was no error in the district court’s jury instructions. 
a. 
Standard of Review 
 
“Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the 
applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. 
Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000). Abdullah did not object to these 
instructions at trial, and therefore their validity is reviewed under the fundamental error standard. 
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 363, 313 P.3d 1, 19 (2013). 
b. 
Jury Instruction 47: Definition of “Many Persons” 
 
The district court instructed the jury that “many persons” for the great risk aggravator 
“means more than four people.” This instruction is identical to the instruction requested by 
Abdullah. Abdullah argues that this definition defined “many” too narrowly. We reject 
                                                 
31 Defense counsel elicited this information during cross-examination of Imam Din. The defense counsel asked on 
cross-examination, “What does the Islamic faith say about killing a human being?” and Imam Din responded, “It is a 
major sin and it is -- the person will be punished in the hereafter by being put in the hellfire.” Defense counsel then 
asked, “Does it say anything about punishment here on earth?” and Imam Din responded, “Yes. According to 
Islamic law, there is death for death, like the Taliban.” On redirect, the prosecutor asked, “Did I understand you to 
state that murder in the Muslim faith is haram?” (“Haram” “is something that is forbidden by God.”) Imam Din 
responded, “Yes.”  
 
95 
Abdullah’s assignment of error. Abdullah “cannot assert as error on appeal the giving of an 
instruction which he himself requested.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589, 261 P.3d 853, 866 
(2011) (quoting State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363, 690 P.2d 293, 298 (1984)). 
c. 
Jury Instruction 53: No Definition of “Sufficiently Compelling”  
 
 
The district court instructed the jury:  
 
If you find that all the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently 
compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, or you cannot 
unanimously agree on that issue, then the judge must sentence the Defendant. 
. . . .  
 
You must each decide for yourself whether all mitigating circumstances 
presented, when weighed against each statutory aggravating circumstance proven 
by the State, are sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death 
penalty unjust. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court’s failure to define “sufficiently compelling” is 
unconstitutional. He explains that “sufficiently compelling” did not inform the jury on how to 
weigh each aggravating circumstance against the mitigating evidence. This Court recently 
addressed a similar argument in Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1. The Court explained: 
Dunlap argues that “sufficiently compelling” should have been defined because 
the jury might have thought that the phrase required some specific amount of 
mitigation to overcome the aggravating circumstance. We disagree. It is 
unnecessary to define “sufficiently compelling” because the phrase is comprised 
of ordinary words that do not require definition. 
 
Id. at 365, 313 P.3d at 21. We reaffirm that a definition of “sufficiently compelling” is 
unnecessary. Therefore, we reject Abdullah’s assignment of error.  
d. 
Jury Instruction 53: Failure to Instruct Jury on Judge Sentencing  
 
The district court’s instruction at issue provided: 
If you find that all the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently compelling to 
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, or you cannot unanimously agree 
on that issue, then the judge must sentence the Defendant. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court’s instruction was erroneous because the district court 
should have instructed the jury that the judge would sentence him to life imprisonment if the jury 
found aggravating circumstances existed but the death penalty would be unjust when weighing 
each aggravating circumstance against all mitigating circumstances.  
 
At the time of Abdullah’s offense, Idaho Code section 18-4004 provided: 
[E]very person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or 
by imprisonment for life, . . . and provided further that whenever the court shall 
 
96 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment, the court shall set forth in its judgment 
and sentence a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years 
during which period of confinement the offender shall not be eligible for parole or 
discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, except for 
meritorious service. 
 
I.C. § 18-4004 (Michie 2002). As apparent by the statute, the judge could sentence the defendant 
to life imprisonment with a range of fixed years from ten years to life for the crime of first-
degree murder. 
 
On February 13, 2003, the legislature amended Idaho’s death penalty statutes to require 
the judge to sentence the defendant to “a fixed life sentence” if the jury finds “a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition of the death 
penalty would be unjust.” Ch. 19, § 1, 2003 Idaho Session Laws 71, 71; I.C. § 18-4004 (Michie 
2003); I.C. § 18-4004 (2014) (same). The legislature also required that the jury shall be informed 
accordingly: 
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no 
mitigating circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death 
penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to death by the court. 
(b) If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds 
that the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death 
penalty unjust or the jury cannot unanimously agree on whether the existence of 
mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the 
defendant will be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole; and 
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance 
or if the jury cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the court to a term of life 
imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten (10) years. 
 
Ch. 19, § 1, 2003 Idaho Session Laws at 74; I.C. § 19-2515(7) (Michie 2003); I.C. § 19-2515(7) 
(2014) (same). Thus, according to the current death penalty laws, the jury must be informed that 
the court will sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the 
jury finds the existence of aggravating circumstances, but also finds all mitigating circumstances 
outweigh each aggravating circumstance.  
 
This fixed life sentence penalty and requirement to inform the jury of the fixed life 
sentence were not retroactive. The legislature stated: “[T]he provisions of this act relating to 
mandatory fixed life sentences based upon the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance 
apply only to crimes occurring after the effective date of this act [February 13, 2003] . . . .” Ch. 
19, § 1, 2003 Idaho Session Laws at 75. Abdullah’s crime occurred in October of 2002.  
 
97 
 
Abdullah contends that the district court had to inform the jury of the possible penalties. 
He relies on United States Supreme Court case law, but those cases are inapplicable in this 
context. The United States Supreme Court held in “Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 
(1994), that when ‘a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing 
alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due 
process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury 
instruction or in arguments by counsel.’” Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39 (2001) (alteration in 
original)). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the Simmons rule only “comes 
into play” when the state law provides “no third choice,” i.e., the jury has only two sentencing 
options: death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 51. 
“Simmons applies only to instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if 
the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 
169 (2000).  
 
In this case, due to the date of Abdullah’s offense, the jury was not faced with only two 
sentencing options: death or a fixed life sentence. If the jury found the existence of aggravating 
circumstances, but all the mitigating circumstances outweighed each aggravating circumstance, 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was not the only alternative sentence. The 
district court could sentence Abdullah to life imprisonment with a range of fixed years from ten 
to life. I.C. § 18-4004 (Michie 2002). Therefore, Simmons is inapplicable, and Abdullah was not 
entitled to a jury instruction on the judge’s sentencing options in the event that the jury did not 
recommend a death sentence. See Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir.) (Simmons 
provides no support to the defendant’s due process challenge because the defendant faced an 
alternative sentence with the possibility of parole after forty years), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1084 
(2002); State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 503 (Tenn.) (“Since Tennessee is a state in which 
defendants sentenced to life imprisonment are eligible for parole, Simmons does not require that 
the jury be given information about parole availability.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953 (1997). 
 
We note that Abdullah’s argument implies that he submitted a proper instruction to the 
district court, which the district court improperly rejected. However, the record proves otherwise. 
The record shows that Abdullah proposed the following instruction in writing:  
 
98 
If you find that all the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently compelling to 
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, or you cannot unanimously agree 
on that issue, then the defendant will be sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. 
 
Then on three separate occasions during the district court’s discussions with the parties on jury 
instructions, Abdullah represented that he wanted the instruction to end with the precise language 
adopted by the district court: “then the judge must sentence the defendant.” This instruction was 
a correct representation of the law at the time of Abdullah’s offense, as discussed above, and it 
was the instruction sought by Abdullah. Abdullah cannot complain that the district court failed to 
use the erroneous instruction he proposed to the court. There was no error in the district court’s 
instruction. 
e. 
Jury Instruction 53: Double-Counting Aggravator Evidence 
 
In regards to the evidence for each aggravating circumstance, Abdullah proposed the 
following instruction: 
If you find that two or more of the aggravating factors are proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you are to consider that as 
supporting only one aggravating factor. For example, the exhibited utter disregard 
for human life aggravator and knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons may be considered as only being a single aggravating factor. 
 
During oral conference on the jury instructions, the district court informed Abdullah that his 
proposed instruction was contrary to Idaho law. After further discussion, the district court 
determined the double-counting instruction would provide: “In determining whether a certain 
aggravating circumstance exists, you may consider the same evidence you considered to support 
a different aggravator so long as you find additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of 
that particular aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.” This rule against double-counting or 
double-weighing has been consistently upheld by this Court “because we presume that the 
legislature did not intend to duplicate aggravating circumstances.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 365, 313 
P.3d at 21. 
 
Abdullah contends that the district court’s instruction in this case was confusing and 
unclear as to the evidence the jurors could rely on to find multiple aggravating circumstances. 
We disagree. The district court’s instruction properly instructed the jury against double-counting. 
In fact, the district court modeled its instruction after State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 
(1998), which stated: “In determining whether a certain aggravating circumstance exists, the 
sentencing judge may consider the same evidence he considered in relation to a different 
 
99 
aggravator so long as he finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that 
particular aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 104, 967 P.2d at 718. We hold that this 
instruction adequately informs the jury of the applicable law, and therefore Abdullah has failed 
to establish any error with respect to the double-counting instruction. 
 
Assuming the district court’s instruction was in error, any error was harmless. In Dunlap, 
the jury found the existence of three aggravating circumstances, but the jury did not receive a 
double-counting instruction. 155 Idaho at 365, 313 P.3d at 21. The Court held that “the trial court 
erred by failing to instruct the jurors that they were required to find independent evidence existed 
for each aggravator.” Id. Even so, the Court held that any error was harmless. The Court 
explained: 
We accept Dunlap’s implicit premise that the jury may have relied upon the 
entirety of the evidence in aggravation as supporting each of the three aggravating 
circumstances they found to be true. However, we do not accept his explicit 
premise that we don’t know which specific aggravator can be supported by the 
evidence. To the contrary, the entirety of the evidence in aggravation would 
support the finding of any of the three aggravating circumstances, as the jury’s 
verdict reflects. Although as a matter of law, the jury could not consider all of the 
evidence in aggravation as supporting each of the aggravators, this simply means 
that the verdict cannot stand as to all three aggravators, not that all three 
aggravators are unsupported by the evidence. Because each of the three 
aggravators was supported by the entirety of the evidence, at least one remains 
unaffected by the failure to give the required instruction. 
 
Id. Similar to Dunlap, at least one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury in this 
case remains unaffected by an erroneous instruction on double-counting. The utter disregard 
aggravator, standing alone, remains valid and justifies the death sentence, even if the jury found 
that the same evidence supported it and the great risk aggravator. Therefore, any improper jury 
instruction on double-counting was harmless error. 
f. 
Jury Instruction 50, 53, & 58: Duty to Consult & Unanimous Verdict 
 
Finally, Abdullah argues that the district court’s instructions did not make clear to the 
jury it did not have to reach a unanimous verdict in deciding whether all the mitigating evidence 
made the imposition of the death penalty unjust.  
 
Abdullah takes issue with three jury instructions. First, Jury Instruction 50 provided:  
As jurors, you have a duty to discuss the case with one another and to deliberate 
in an effort to reach a just verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, 
but only after you consider the evidence impartially with your fellow jurors. 
During your deliberations, you should not hesitate to re-examine your own views 
 
100 
and change your opinion if you become convinced that it is wrong. However, you 
should not change your honest belief as to the weight or effect of the evidence 
solely because of the opinions of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of 
returning a verdict. 
 
This instruction was almost identical to Abdullah’s proposed instruction.32 Second, Jury 
Instruction 53 provided, in relevant part,  
 
If the State has failed to prove the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, you need not deliberate further. Merely notify the bailiff that you 
are done. The judge must then sentence the defendant. 
 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven the existence of a 
statutory aggravating factor, then you must so indicate on the verdict form. You 
must also then consider whether any mitigating circumstances exist that make the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust. 
 
If you find that all the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently 
compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, or you cannot 
unanimously agree on that issue, then the judge must sentence the Defendant. 
 
If you find that all mitigating circumstances do not make the imposition of 
the death penalty unjust, then the defendant will be sentenced to death. 
 
You must each decide for yourself whether all mitigating circumstances 
presented, when weighed against each statutory aggravating circumstance proven 
by the State, are sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death 
penalty unjust. Any finding by you that the mitigating circumstances do or do not 
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust must be unanimous, but you do 
not have to unanimously agree upon what mitigating circumstances exist. The 
existence of mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. You must each decide for yourself whether mitigating circumstances exist 
and, if so, then consider them in your individual weighing process. 
 
Once you have reached a unanimous decision on whether or not all 
mitigating circumstances, when weighed against each aggravating circumstance, 
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, or have concluded that you are 
unable to reach a unanimous decision on that issue, so indicate on the verdict 
form and notify the bailiff that you are done. 
 
Like Jury Instruction 50, this instruction was almost identical to Abdullah’s proposed 
instruction.33 Third, Jury Instruction 58 provided, in relevant part:  
                                                 
32 The only difference between this instruction and Abdullah’s proposed instruction is that Abdullah’s proposed 
instruction included “a just and unanimous verdict,” rather than “a just verdict” in the first sentence. Abdullah 
agreed during oral conference on the jury instructions that “it is misleading” to include “unanimous” in this 
instruction. 
33 Abdullah’s proposed instruction had three differences. First, the very first reference to aggravating circumstances 
stated “any statutory aggravating circumstance,” rather than “a statutory aggravating circumstance.” Second, he 
requested specific language on his possible sentencing options rather than “the judge must sentence the defendant.” 
Third, he requested that the district court include as the last sentence of Jury Instruction 53: “However, regardless of 
your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you are never required to recommend a 
sentence of death.”  
 
101 
 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate 
before making your individual decisions. . . .  
 
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own 
views and change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by 
fair and honest discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the 
evidence the jury saw and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these 
instructions. 
 
Consult with one another. Consider each other’s views, and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing 
your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you 
should do so only after a discussion and consideration of the case with your 
fellow jurors. 
 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the 
weight or effect of the evidence because a majority of the jury feels otherwise or 
for the purpose of returning a verdict. 
 
This instruction was almost identical to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 204, “Concluding 
Remarks (How to Deliberate).” The record indicates that the district court proposed this 
instruction, but Abdullah informed the district court that he had no objection to it.  
 
Abdullah argues that these instructions, taken together, erroneously informed the jurors to 
be unanimous in deciding whether the mitigating evidence made the death penalty unjust. He 
relies on Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 
(1990), in which the United States Supreme Court “held invalid capital sentencing schemes that 
require juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously.” Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 
406, 408 (2004).  
 
We reject Abdullah’s challenge to these jury instructions for two reasons. First, any error 
was invited. Abdullah’s argument is premised on Jury Instruction 53, as this instruction 
specifically informed the jury on how to deliberate on the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. This instruction was proposed by Abdullah, and the district court adopted 
Abdullah’s instruction in all respects related to this assignment of error. Similarly, the district 
court adopted Abdullah’s proposed instruction for Jury Instruction 50 almost verbatim, excluding 
just two words. Due to Abdullah’s proposal of the instructions he now challenges on appeal, he 
cannot allege any error as to those instructions. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 589, 261 P.3d at 866.  
 
Second, even assuming the invited error doctrine does not apply, there was no error in the 
district court’s jury instructions. Abdullah has selected piecemeal phrases of the jury instructions 
to support his argument. Taken as a whole, however, the instructions clearly inform the jurors 
that they do not have to unanimously agree on the mitigating evidence and their decision does 
 
102 
not have to be unanimous. The instructions also informed the jurors that they must make an 
individual decision. For example, Jury Instruction 53 instructed the jury to “decide for yourself” 
whether the mitigating circumstances were sufficiently compelling and to “decide for yourself” 
whether the mitigating circumstances exist in an individual weighing process. Similarly, Jury 
Instruction 58 instructed the jury to “consider each other’s views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment.” Moreover, Jury Instruction 55, the verdict form, provided the following option for 
each aggravator found by the jury: “we are unable to unanimously decide whether or not all 
mitigating circumstances are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.” 
Additionally, the jury was explicitly informed: “you do not have to unanimously agree upon 
what mitigating circumstances exist,” thus satisfying the rule from Mills and McKoy. There was 
no error in these instructions. 
22. 
The district court did not limit Abdullah’s right of allocution in violation of his right 
to due process. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred by imposing unreasonable restrictions on the 
scope of his allocution during the penalty phase in violation of his due process rights, which 
resulted in a complete denial of his right to allocute.  
a. 
Facts 
 
The issue of allocution was first raised after the defense rested its mitigation case. While 
discussing the penalty phase jury instructions, the district court provided its position on 
allocution for the record. The district court stated that Idaho law established a right to allocute 
with judge sentencing, but it was not clear whether that right remained with the change to jury 
sentencing. The district court explained that it would “like to err on the side of protecting the 
defendant’s rights.”  
 
The following day the district court took up the issue of allocution. Abdullah told the 
district court he intended to allocute, and the State opposed any allocution. The district court then 
reviewed the scope of allocution with Abdullah’s counsel. Based on Abdullah’s counsel’s 
representations, the district court was concerned that Abdullah would attempt under the guise of 
allocution to testify without being subject to cross-examination. The district court took a brief 
recess to allow Abdullah’s counsel to discuss the parameters of allocution with him. Following a 
recess, the district court explained that Abdullah had a right to allocute and to address the jury as 
a form of mitigation, but the right was limited. Specifically, the district court informed Abdullah 
 
103 
that he could not “use allocution as a way to circumvent the traditional rules of evidence and 
make unsworn statements to the sentencing jury as to matters of fact going to guilt without being 
subject to cross-examination.” The district court also warned Abdullah that any statement could 
be used against him in further proceedings. In addition, the district court explained that the jury 
was instructed not to consider unsworn statements. According to the district court, the purpose of 
allocution was not “to allow him to -- in essence to testify as to factual matters.” Abdullah’s 
counsel informed the district court that Abdullah wanted  
to talk about how much his family means to him, his love and respect for his 
family the -- I guess some overseas trips, explain some overseas trips that he 
made, the support his family received from other members of the family, his 
thoughts and feelings throughout this process, and relationships. Not challenging 
any factual statements made by Mr. Bankhead,34 but the nature of his relationship 
with him.  
 
Based on this information, the district court informed the parties that if Abdullah began to 
discuss factual matters, such as his relationship with Bankhead and the overseas trips, the State 
could object and the district court would rule accordingly. Abdullah’s counsel also indicated that 
Abdullah wanted to testify, and the district court said it would allow the defense to reopen the 
mitigation phase to allow Abdullah to testify. The district court warned that it would not allow 
Abdullah to revisit the guilt phase.  
 
After another recess, Abdullah informed the district court that he wished to testify. 
Abdullah also told the district court, “I never wanted to give up my right for the guilt phase to 
testify.” The district court explained to Abdullah that he could not reopen the guilt phase, but he 
could testify regarding Bankhead in the mitigation phase. The district court also explained that 
Abdullah would be subject to cross-examination. Abdullah was informed by the district court 
that he could allocute as well, but “allocution is not a substitute for testimony.” The district court 
stated, “It has to be really going to asking the jury to mitigate against the death penalty.” The 
                                                 
34 Steven Bankhead testified during the penalty phase. In the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, Bankhead met 
Abdullah in prison while Abdullah was a volunteer for Islamic study. Bankhead was subsequently released from 
prison in August of 2000, and Abdullah and Bankhead continued to have a close relationship. In November of 2000, 
while Bankhead was out of prison, Abdullah asked him to kill Angie. Bankhead was to knock Angie unconscious 
with poison provided by Abdullah, rape her, and then slit her throat with a knife, also provided by Abdullah. 
Abdullah paid Bankhead $1,000 to kill Angie. Bankhead did not go through with Abdullah’s plan and left town 
instead. A number of months later, Bankhead returned to prison. 
 
104 
district court also stated, “The right to allocute, it is true that -- that there are very few 
restrictions, but you don’t get to go and make factual statements in that allocution.”35 
 
Following yet another recess, the district court had another colloquy with Abdullah 
wherein the district court found Abdullah waived his right to testify in the mitigation phase.  
 
After the State presented victim impact evidence, the district court confirmed that 
Abdullah intended to allocute. The district court told Abdullah: 
You understand, again, that you have the right -- that anything you say in that 
discussion can be used against you in other proceedings and you also understand 
that you also -- that it is your decision to allocute and that you really have to -- 
this allocution should be confined to those matters which have to do with the 
mitigation of punishment. All right. At this point I’m not allowing any -- what is 
in effect testimony. 
 
Abdullah stated that he understood. After a recess, the district court told Abdullah it would 
require his allocution statement to be made in writing for the district court and the parties to 
review to ensure that he does not “effectively attempt to circumvent the rules of evidence by 
talking about the guilt phase.” The district court also “wanted to make clear that I’m not going to 
allow statements of fact to be made in the form of allocution.”  
 
The district court received Abdullah’s written allocution statement and reviewed it with 
the parties and Abdullah. The district court told Abdullah that it would not allow Abdullah to 
discuss (1) Angie’s wishes for her family (“For her family to accept her as she was and what she 
was accepted as Muslim”); (2) “things I wish could happen at trial, not blaming anyone”; and (3) 
any “attack” on Bankhead’s testimony. The district court again warned Abdullah not to stray into 
those areas. Abdullah’s counsel requested a short recess to make sure Abdullah understood the 
district court’s parameters.  
 
After the recess, the district court was informed by Abdullah’s counsel that he “has 
changed his mind on allocution.” The following colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: Mr. Abdullah, I have indicated to you -- we spent a lot time [sic] 
on this. You do have the right to allocution and address the jury and that your 
attorney can’t make that decision for you. Now you are indicating that you don’t 
want to allocute; it that correct? 
 
                                                 
35 Abdullah states in his brief that the district court stated that it would allow the defense to reopen the mitigation 
phase so Abdullah could testify, but this occurred outside Abdullah’s presence. Abdullah contends that the record 
does not show that the offer to reopen the mitigation phase was made to Abdullah or in his presence. However, the 
record shows otherwise. This allegation that Abdullah did not know he could reopen the mitigation phase is 
completely baseless—the record shows that Abdullah was present and discussed with the district court that he could 
reopen the mitigation phase if he wished to testify.  
 
105 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: And you understand that you have the right to do that, but, in 
effect, what you are doing is waiving the right to allocute to the jury; is that 
correct? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, but my reasons start why I’m changing 
my mind. 
 
THE COURT: Well, I don’t know what your reasons are at this time. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: The fact that the trial, you know, I’m not allowed to say 
anything about the trial or my thinking or feelings and everything else has been 
mentioned already. 
 
THE COURT: The only thing the Court has prevented you from talking about is 
your wife’s wishes toward her family, which is simply not proper mitigation at 
all. Furthermore, what happened in the trial could be the subject of an appeal, but 
is not relevant and not something that the jury has any business making a decision 
about. So it is not relevant to mitigation. That’s the reason the Court has excluded 
those two items. They have nothing to do with the decision of punishment. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: The fight about Mr. Bankhead, I’m not arguing with you or 
anything, but I just want to let you know I have been there three years teaching 
and I never met him one time in prison. So I’m not allowed to mention him. 
 
THE COURT: If you want to testify about that, you can testify, but you chose not 
to testify after extensive, excruciating discussion with the Court. I’m not going to 
let you make statements of fact that are not subject to cross-examination. All 
right. And as far as I know, you have not indicated to me anything about -- all I 
have told you with respect to Mr. Bankhead to the extent that you try to introduce 
facts, I’m not allowing you to do that. But if you want to talk about your teaching, 
because that clearly is mitigation, the fact that you have taught other people about 
your religion and -- 
 
THE DEFENDANT: He never attended any of my classes, your Honor, so I don’t 
know -- 
 
THE COURT: Well, I know, but you didn’t -- you didn’t want to testify about 
that fact and be subject to cross-examination.  
 
THE DEFENDANT: That’s true. 
 
THE COURT: That’s true, right? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. And so that was a decision that you made. So I’m not going 
to allow you to get up and introduce facts that are not subject to cross-
examination. That’s not what allocution is about. Allocution is about mitigating 
factors for them to consider, but to the extent that you are introducing facts, they 
must be made as testimony. Just like every other witness, every other witness has 
to testify under oath. And that’s why the Court told you if you want to testify, and 
I gave you the opportunity several times this morning to do that so you could 
 
106 
testify and you chose not to after a great deal of discussion. So to this extent if 
you are still of the opinion you do not want to allocute, I want to know right now; 
is that true? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: That is your decision and not your attorneys’ decision? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
The district court did not discuss allocution further. Shortly thereafter, the district court gave the 
jury their instructions and the parties gave closing arguments.  
 
After the jury returned its verdict recommending a sentence of death, but before the 
district court issued its judgments, the district court issued a written memorandum to reflect its 
reasoning on the scope of allocution.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The issue raised by Abdullah on appeal is specific: whether the district court 
unconstitutionally limited the scope of Abdullah’s allocution, which caused him to waive his 
right to allocute. There is nothing in the record, however, affirmatively showing Abdullah or his 
counsel opposed the district court’s limitations on the scope of allocution. Although the district 
court engaged in multiple discussions with parties and Abdullah, Abdullah did not submit any 
legal argument or briefing on the proper scope of allocation to comport with constitutional 
standards. In addition, Abdullah ultimately decided to waive his right to allocute,36 and his 
counsel voiced no objection on the record at that time. Nor did his counsel raise any objection to 
the district court’s scope of allocution at any time. Based on the above reasons, we review this 
issue for fundamental error.  
c. 
Analysis 
 
Under the first prong of the fundamental error standard, the defendant must establish that 
an unwaived constitutional right was violated. State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 565, 300 P.3d 
1046, 1053 (2013). Pursuant to this fundamental error approach, it is not necessary to discuss the 
parameters or scope of the right of allocution. Rather, the resolution of this issue depends solely 
on whether a constitutional right to allocution in fact exists. We hold that there is no 
constitutional right of allocution. It follows that any limitation by the district court on the scope 
of Abdullah’s allocution did not violate any constitutional right, regardless of whether the district 
court improperly defined the parameters of Abdullah’s allocution. 
                                                 
36 Abdullah makes no argument on appeal that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
 
107 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines allocution as:  
1. A trial judge’s formal address to a convicted defendant, asking whether the 
defendant wishes to make a statement or to present information in mitigation of 
the sentence to be imposed . . . 2. An unsworn statement from a convicted 
defendant to the sentencing judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for 
mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say anything else in 
effort to lessen the impending sentence. This statement is not subject to cross-
examination . . . . 
 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 91 (10th ed. 2014). The Delaware Supreme Court has observed the 
history and modern practice of allocution:  
 
Allocution is a historic common-law right of a defendant in a capital case. 
At common law, allocution consisted of the court’s asking the defendant if he 
[had] anything to offer why judgment [of death] should not be awarded against 
him. Allocution provided the accused with the only opportunity to present one of 
four strictly defined reasons why he should not be executed: (1) he was not the 
person convicted; (2) he had the benefit of clergy or pardon; (3) he was insane; or 
(4) if a woman, she was pregnant.  
 
 
At common law, allocution was essential because the accused was neither 
permitted to have counsel at trial nor to testify on his or her own behalf. 
Furthermore, the judge possessed little sentencing discretion because the 
mandatory punishment for almost all felonies was death. Thus, the defendant’s 
response to the tribunal’s invitation to speak had little to do with pleading for 
leniency but was the defendant’s only opportunity to present one of the specific 
legal defenses which might arrest the proceedings. 
 
. . . .  
 
With the development of modern criminal procedure, such as the right to 
counsel and the accused’s right to testify, the need for common law allocution 
diminished. Today, it is argued, any defense, including those recognized at 
common law, can be properly brought up by counsel during the trial. As the trial 
courts have been granted greater discretion in sentencing, allocution has evolved 
into a mechanism in which a defendant in a criminal case may express remorse 
for his crime and plead for leniency. 
 
Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 491–92 (Del. 2000) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
“[T]he opportunity to personally address the sentencer retains both symbolic and 
practical significance. It may increase for some defendants the perceived equity of the process.” 
6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(g) (3d ed. 2013). The New Jersey 
Supreme Court recognized another purpose of allocution:  
Under our system of capital punishment, a jury of men and women forms the 
essential link between society and the defendant before the court. Each capital 
 
108 
jury expresses the collective voice of society in making the individualized 
determination that a defendant shall live or die. Whatever the Constitution 
permits, it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to 
death by a jury “which never heard the sound of his voice.” McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 220 (1971). . . . It is difficult to sympathize with 
defendants who have caused so much suffering, but we need not discard our 
common humanity in the process of decision.  
 
State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022, 1045–46 (N.J. 1988). Thus, allocution serves two purposes: “it 
reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an 
opportunity to ask for mercy” and “it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her 
feelings of remorse.” Shelton, 744 A.2d at 492 (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 757 
(N.J. 1994)). 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and Idaho Code section 19-2510 establish a procedural, statutory 
right of allocution. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a)(1) provides in relevant part: “Before imposing 
sentence the court . . . shall address the defendant personally to ask if the defendant wishes to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” I.C.R. 33(a)(1). 
Idaho Code section 19-2510 states:  
 
When the defendant appears for judgment he must be informed by the 
court, or by the clerk, under its direction, of the nature of the indictment and of his 
plea, and the verdict if any thereon, and must be asked whether he has any legal 
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. 
 
I.C. § 19-2510 (emphasis added). These two provisions provide the foundation for the right to 
allocute in Idaho. The Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (I.C.J.I.) also recognize a right of 
allocution. Drafted specifically for capital cases, I.C.J.I. 1709 states: 
 
The Defendant has the right to personally address you. This is called the 
“right of allocution.” Allocution is not made under oath and is not subject to 
cross-examination. The law provides that these statements are something that the 
defendant is allowed to present to you as mitigation. You may consider these 
statements in your deliberations. 
 
I.C.J.I. 1709 (The Defendant’s Right to Allocution, Death Penalty Sentencing Instruction). 
 
The constitutional ties, if any, to the right of allocution have not been explored by this 
Court. A dissenting opinion by Justice Bistline provides some guidance, however. Justice 
Bistline referred to allocution as a “basic right,” but also stated that the right was granted to the 
defendant “by statute.” State v. Coutts, 101 Idaho 110, 114, 609 P.2d 642, 646 (1980) (Bistline, 
J., dissenting). Justice Bistline made no mention of any constitutional underpinnings to the right. 
He noted that this right was “established as a part of the Idaho law in the Criminal Practice Act 
 
109 
of 1864.” Id. The defendant’s right of allocution was described as “his right to be asked whether 
any reason exists why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and to explain mitigating 
factors to the court.” Id. Justice Bistline recognized that “it has been suggested that giving the 
defendant this final opportunity to speak before sentencing is pronounced may have a therapeutic 
effect rather than helping the trial court exercise a reasoned discretion.” Id. at 117, 609 P.2d at 
649 (citation omitted).  
 
The Court briefly discussed the right of allocution in State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 
546 P.2d 1180 (1976). In Goodrich, this Court outlined the proper procedure in the trial court for 
the defendant to exercise his right to allocute: 
 
To avoid problems with regard to the right of a defendant under I.C.R. 
32(a),37 a trial judge before sentencing must directly address the defendant, and 
offer him personally a clear opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf, 
and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. Affording only the 
defendant’s counsel the right to speak on the accused’s behalf does not constitute 
compliance with this rule. 
 
Id. at 480, 546 P.2d at 1188. Again, the Court did not discuss any constitutional basis for 
allocution. 
 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explored the right of allocution in some detail. Most 
recently, the Court of Appeals held that the due process clause does not require that the 
defendant be afforded the right of allocution. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 888, 303 P.3d 241, 
247 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. The Court of Appeals reasoned:  
Although Idaho appellate courts have stressed the importance of the right of 
allocution, we have never explicitly held that due process, required under Article 
I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, requires that a defendant be afforded the 
right to allocution. Rather, in our jurisprudence, we have depended on [I.C.R.] 
33(a), prior precedent, and the role of allocution in the history of Idaho’s criminal 
justice system. We have referenced a criminal defendant’s due process rights in 
regards to sentencing and, within that context, examined other jurisprudence that 
recognizes that the right of allocution is vital to a defendant’s defense. Even 
where we reference constitutional due process rights of a criminal defendant, we 
have only gone so far as to acknowledge there is case law that accepts allocution 
as a constitutional right guaranteed by due process when a defendant requests to 
make a statement and the district court affirmatively denies the request.  
 
Id. (citations omitted). Based on this reasoning, the Court of Appeals determined that a defendant 
was unable to meet the first prong of the fundamental error standard based on a claim that the 
                                                 
37 I.C.R. 33(a)(1) was codified at I.C.R. 32(a) at the time of Goodrich. 
 
110 
trial court’s failure to invite the defendant to make a statement of allocution violated his due 
process rights. Id. at 885, 888, 303 P.3d at 244, 247. 
 
Turning to other jurisdictions, “[m]odern treatment of the right to allocution has varied 
significantly. In fact, we are surprised by the lack of uniformity among the federal courts and the 
state jurisdictions that provide a right to allocution.” Shelton, 744 A.2d at 492.  
On the one hand, several jurisdictions hold that the common-law right of 
allocution encompasses the right of the defendant to make unsworn statements to 
the jury that are not subject to cross-examination. Moreover, some states have 
determined that allocution is a right protected by their state constitutions. . . . A 
minority of jurisdictions adheres strictly to the common-law right of allocution, in 
that the court will ask the accused only whether any legal cause exists to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him or her. . . .  
 
On the other hand, several jurisdictions have held that there is no 
common-law right to allocution. Moreover, the majority of federal courts and 
state jurisdictions hold that the United States Constitution does not protect the 
right to allocution.  
 
The federal courts of appeals are split on whether the right of allocution 
expressly provided by . . . the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a right 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
Id. at 492–494 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). In addition, some courts have abolished 
the right of allocution in capital cases: “[M]ost of the state and federal courts presented with 
allocution statute language referring to the court and a separate death penalty sentencing 
provision that is silent on allocution have concluded that a defendant has no statutory right to 
allocution in front of the death penalty jury.” State v. Stallings, 163 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Kan. 2007) 
(citing cases). In contrast, “[s]ome jurisdictions have allowed a defendant to make a statement to 
the jury, despite the absence of statutory authority,” in capital cases. Id. at 1238 (citing cases). 
 
Despite this varied treatment, most courts hold that there is no state or federal 
constitutional right of allocution. Every federal circuit court of appeals, except the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, “has held that allocution is not a constitutional right.” State v. Roberts, 998 
N.E.2d 1100, 1121 (Ohio 2013) (citing federal circuit court of appeals cases); see United States 
v. Carper, 24 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing case law holding that the due process 
clause guarantees a right of allocution, but a violation of the right limited to circumstance in 
which the trial court denies the defendant’s affirmative request to speak before sentencing). The 
majority of state courts agree, holding that there is no constitutional right of allocution. State v. 
Colon, 864 A.2d 666, 794–95, 799 (Conn. 2004) (citing cases and holding accordingly); Shelton, 
744 A.2d at 493 & n.124 (citing cases); see 3 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE 
 
111 
ACCUSED 3d § 21:9 & n.36 (3d ed. 2014) (right of allocution is not a constitutional right); 3 
ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 530 & n.33 (4th ed. 2014) 
(allocution is not a right protected by constitution); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2048 & nn.6–8 
(2014) (no separate constitutional right of allocution); see also State v. Young 853 P.2d 327, 360 
& n.177 (Utah 1993) (citing cases that hold allocution is a statutory right); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(g) & nn.133–34 (2013) (right to allocution recognized in 
most jurisdictions by court rule or statute).  
 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right of 
allocution. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 425–26, 428 (1962), the United States 
Supreme Court rejected a petitioner’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the 
trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of the federal rule of criminal procedure 
governing allocution. The United States Supreme Court held:  
 
The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney 
whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error 
of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an 
error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental 
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an 
omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.  
 
Id. at 428. Although the United States Supreme Court rejected this claim based on the trial 
court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s allocution, the United States Supreme Court 
expressly reserved for consideration whether a trial court’s denial of a petitioner’s affirmative 
request for an opportunity to speak would raise constitutional issues. Id. at 429. Subsequently, in 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
it “has not directly determined whether or to what extent the concept of due process of law 
requires that a criminal defendant wishing to present evidence or argument presumably relevant 
to the issues involved in sentencing should be permitted to do so.” Id. at 218. The United States 
Supreme Court again expressly reserved for consideration whether “silencing a defendant who 
wished to speak would rise to that level” of “constitutional dimensions.” Id. at 218 n.22. The 
United States Supreme Court still has not addressed the issue. 
 
We agree with the majority rule. We hold that allocution is purely a statutory, procedural 
right guaranteed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and Idaho Code section 19-2510. In other words, the 
right of allocution is not guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Idaho and United States 
 
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Constitutions. The right of allocution derives from the common law and is preserved by statute 
only.  
 
Abdullah has failed to meet the first prong of the Perry analysis based on a claim that his 
due process rights were violated by the district court’s limitations on the scope of his allocution. 
Further, we conclude that Abdullah’s argument fails on the third prong of Perry as well. There is 
not a reasonable possibility any error in the scope of allocution affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Based on the evidence 
presented at trial, it is not reasonably possible that Abdullah’s allocution would affect the jury’s 
unanimous finding that all mitigating circumstances when weighed against the utter disregard 
aggravating factor were not sufficiently compelling to make the death penalty unjust. Therefore, 
this Court rejects this assignment of error. 
23. 
The alleged errors in the aggregate did not result in cumulative error during the 
penalty phase. 
 
Abdullah submits that the accumulation of errors deprived him of his constitutional rights 
to due process and a fair trial before an impartial jury. “When there is an ‘accumulation of 
irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show 
the absence of a fair trial,’ the cumulative error doctrine requires a reversal of the conviction as 
the trial has contravened the defendant’s right to due process.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
568, 199 P.3d 123, 143 (2008) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572–73, 165 P.3d 273, 
286–87 (2007)). “[A] necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more 
than one error.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982. In this case, Abdullah “has failed to 
demonstrate at least two errors, a necessary predicate to the application of our cumulative error 
doctrine.” Id. at 231, 245 P.3d at 983. There was no cumulative error. 
C. 
Post-Conviction Phase Issues 
24. 
The district court applied the correct standard for Abdullah’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence 
standard to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and by failing to consider ABA 
guidelines for effective assistance of counsel in capital cases.  
a. 
Facts 
Abdullah’s petition raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by both 
the Ada County Public Defender and the Toryanskis. In its memorandum decision denying post-
 
113 
conviction relief, the district court stated that Abdullah needed to “prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.” This statement forms the basis of Abdullah’s claim 
of error. 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
Under the second prong of Strickland, the defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of trial would be different but for counsel’s deficient performance. State v. 
Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998). “A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court rejected a preponderance of the evidence 
standard for demonstrating prejudice when asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
466 U.S. at 693 (“[A] defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than 
not altered the outcome in the case.”). The United States Supreme Court explained, “The result 
of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the 
errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the 
outcome.” Id. at 694. 
The United States Supreme Court rejected an assignment of error similar to Abdullah’s in 
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam). In Jackson, the defendant sought post-
conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 650. In denying relief, the state 
court cited to the correct Strickland standard, but also stated that in post-conviction proceedings 
the defendant carries the burden of proving allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 
654. The state court also noted the defendant “failed to carry his burden of proving that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for those errors.” Id. at 654–55 
(citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court held that, given the context of these 
statements, the reference to a “preponderance of the evidence” was generally referring to the 
state’s post-conviction standards and did not demonstrate that the state court applied that 
standard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 654–55. The United States 
Supreme Court further explained that “the unadorned word ‘probably’ is permissible shorthand 
 
114 
when the complete Strickland standard is elsewhere recited.” Id. at 655 (citing Woodford v. 
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23–24 (2002) (per curiam)). 
 
Thus, in the post-conviction phase, the context in which a district court articulates the 
Strickland standard is central to the determination of an error in the standard itself. In this case, 
the context of the statement in the district court’s memorandum decision demonstrates that the 
district court applied the correct standard. Idaho Criminal Rule 57 provides that a petitioner must 
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction 
relief is based. I.C.R. 57(c). In its memorandum decision, the district court correctly applied this 
burden, stating that Abdullah must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’” Immediately following this statement, the district court properly defined 
“reasonable probability”: “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
Additionally, in the initial paragraph addressing Abdullah’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, the district court stated that to demonstrate prejudice Abdullah must show “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.” The 
district court reiterated this standard again on the following page. Finally, the district court used 
the reasonable probability language, absent the preponderance standard, in other instances in its 
decision. Upon our review of the context of the “preponderance of the evidence” statement, it is 
clear the district court did not improperly apply the prejudice standard addressed in Strickland. 
We observe that Abdullah overstates the effect of the district court’s “preponderance of 
the evidence” statement. This statement “does not require that [Abdullah] establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result would be different, but rather, that [Abdullah] 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the result 
would have been different.” Jeremiah v. State, 73 S.W.3d 857, 858–59 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002). This is consistent with Strickland in the context of a post-
conviction proceeding. Id. The district court properly applied Strickland to evaluate the prejudice 
prong of Abdullah’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 
Next, the district court accorded appropriate weight to the ABA guidelines. In Strickland, 
the United States Supreme Court stressed that the standard for deficient performance is one of 
reasonableness and that “[m]ore specific guidelines are not appropriate.” 466 U.S. at 688. 
Likewise, in Bobby v. Van Hook, the United States Supreme Court again stated that the ABA 
 
115 
guidelines “can be useful as ‘guides’ to what reasonableness entails, but only to the extent they 
describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place.” 558 U.S. 4, 7 
(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In addressing the standard for deficient 
performance, the United States Supreme Court explained: 
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence 
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions. 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. 
 
Here, the district court’s memorandum decision demonstrates that its focus was on the 
prevailing professional norms at the time of trial. Although the district court did not expressly 
state that it considered the ABA Guidelines, it did not state that it was rejecting them either. In 
other contexts, this Court has previously declined to adopt ABA Guidelines. State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 782, 948 P.2d 127, 137 (1997) (declining to adopt the ABA Guidelines requiring two 
attorneys be appointed to represent a defendant in a capital case). Given the district court’s 
correct emphasis on the prevailing professional norms at the time of trial, the district court 
properly applied the correct standards to evaluate the deficiency prong of Abdullah’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  
25. 
The district court did not err by denying Abdullah’s discovery requests for gasoline 
additive evidence. 
Abdullah contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to 
have gasoline samples sent to his post-conviction expert for testing and also by denying his 
request for the underlying data used by the state’s expert.  
a. 
Facts 
At trial, the State presented testimony from Dr. William Colucci, a senior research 
advisor for Ethyl Corporation. Dr. Colucci testified that gasoline found at the crime scene 
contained a performance additive, HiTEC 6423, which he also located in a gasoline sample taken 
from the 7-Eleven store in Salt Lake City where Abdullah purchased gas on October 4, 2002. Dr. 
Colucci also testified that other businesses produce additives and Ethyl Corporation produces 
additives other than HiTEC 6423. He indicated that Ethyl supplies around forty percent of the 
gasoline performance additives in the United States market. Dr. Colucci did not testify that 
 
116 
gasoline with the HiTEC 6423 additive could be purchased in Boise or the surrounding area. 
While Abdullah did not conduct independent tests to confirm or dispel Dr. Colucci’s testing 
results, Abdullah explored the methodologies employed by Dr. Colucci during cross-examination 
at trial. 
During post-conviction proceedings, Abdullah requested that gas samples from the scene 
and the Salt Lake City 7-Eleven be given to his expert, John Lentini, for testing to determine if 
HiTEC 6423 was present. Abdullah also sought the underlying data relied on by Dr. Colucci to 
reach the conclusions he testified to at trial. Abdullah contended that this evidence was necessary 
to support his claim that the Toryanskis were ineffective for failing to move to exclude Dr. 
Colucci’s testimony or, in the alternative, for failing to adequately challenge his testimony. 
After argument, the district court reserved ruling on the motion until completion of the 
Toryanskis’ depositions. Abdullah subsequently limited his request to the data underlying Dr. 
Colucci’s opinion. The district court indicated that it may not be willing to order the disclosure 
of such information if it were proprietary. The State agreed to contact Ethyl and check if the 
underlying data was proprietary information. The State subsequently submitted a response 
indicating the data was indeed proprietary. Abdullah then renewed his request for the data, and 
the district court denied this request. Finally, Abdullah filed a motion seeking clarification of the 
district court’s ruling. The district court denied this motion, stating that Abdullah did not have an 
expert with the requisite knowledge or ability to find the performance additive and therefore any 
attempt to look for the marker was irrelevant without a qualified expert.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
A district court has discretion to grant discovery in post-conviction proceedings. I.C.R. 
57(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45, 253 P.3d 716, 719 (2011). However, discovery is required 
when a petitioner demonstrates it is necessary to protect his substantial rights. Hall, 151 Idaho at 
45, 253 P.3d at 719. The petitioner “must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is 
requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application.” Id. 
(quoting State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003)). While 
reasonable discovery may be permitted, the district court should not allow the petitioner to 
engage in a “[f]ishing expedition.” Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. 
App. 2006). “The UPCPA provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to 
research for grievances.” Id. 
 
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c. 
Analysis 
Initially, Abdullah contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
request for gasoline samples to be sent to Lentini for testing. However, Abdullah expressly 
withdrew this portion of his request and sought only the data underlying the conclusions testified 
to by Dr. Colucci. We “will not review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the record 
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error.” State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008) (quoting Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 622–
23, 84 P.3d 551, 558–59 (2004)). Although the district court, in an abundance of caution, 
provided a ruling on this issue, Abdullah withdrew his request for the gasoline samples to be sent 
to Lentini. Thus, the district court’s ruling was not necessary and cannot form a basis for appeal. 
Even if the district court’s gratuitous ruling preserved the issue for appeal, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Abdullah has not alleged or 
demonstrated that the State’s “testing was flawed or that there is new technology that would 
make current testing more reliable.” Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 
(2001) (rejecting the argument that where a district court finds deficient performance by trial 
counsel, discovery should be authorized to permit scientific testing without a showing of “any 
probability that the independent examination will yield exculpatory evidence”). Abdullah’s 
request for the gasoline samples was speculative. Accordingly, the district court properly refused 
this request. 
Next, Abdullah contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant 
him access to the data underlying Dr. Colucci’s opinion. Abdullah asserts that this information 
was necessary to assess whether Dr. Colucci’s methods were reliable. The State responds that 
Abdullah’s proposed expert Lentini did not have the requisite training and expertise in the 
subject area. 
The record demonstrates that Lentini holds a Bachelor of Arts in Natural Sciences and 
has taken post-graduate courses in chemistry and criminal investigation. Lentini has extensive 
experience in fire cause and origin investigations. On the other hand, Dr. Colucci held a Bachelor 
of Science in biochemistry and a Ph.D. in organic chemistry and has two years of post-doctoral 
work in pharmaceuticals. Dr. Colucci’s expertise, as it pertained to the trial, focused on fuel 
performance additives and markers. Abdullah has failed to present evidence that Lentini 
possessed expertise in this area. Abdullah also has failed to establish that Lentini could perform 
 
118 
the requisite tests to uncover the additive. Because the evidence indicates that Abdullah was 
generally exploring this area in the lower court with the hopes of developing a claim for post-
conviction relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order discovery of 
the data underlying Dr. Colucci’s expert opinion. Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750 
(“‘Fishing expedition’ discovery should not be allowed.”). 
Finally, Abdullah contends that the restrictions on discovery should be relaxed if the 
petitioner establishes a prima facie case or the district court orders an evidentiary hearing. He 
asserts that, in those circumstances, discovery is governed by Idaho Code section 19-4907(a). 
Idaho Code section 19-4907(a) of the UPCPA provides, “All rules and statutes applicable 
in civil proceedings including pre-trial, discovery and appellate procedures are available to the 
parties.” I.C. § 19-4907(a). However, Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b), which also governs post-
conviction proceedings, provides, “[T]he provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall not apply to the proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial 
court.” I.C.R. 57(b) (emphasis added). “When a statute and rule ‘can be reasonably interpreted so 
that there is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a 
way that results in a conflict.’” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008) 
(quoting State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 543, 700 P.2d 942, 946 (1985) (Bakes, J., 
dissenting)). “When there is a conflict between a statute and a criminal rule, this Court must 
determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance; if the conflict is 
procedural, the criminal rule will prevail.” Id. 
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between what is 
substantive and what is procedural, the following general guidelines provide a 
useful framework for analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal 
conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the 
essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, 
and remedies are effectuated. 
 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863–64, 828 P.2d 891, 892–93 (1992) (quoting Currington, 108 
Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944). Here, post-conviction discovery is a practice and procedure that 
pertains “to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, 
and remedies are effectuated.” Id. (quoting Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944). Thus, 
the conflict between Idaho Code section 19-4907(a) and Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) is procedural 
and Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) governs. See Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Beam, 
 
119 
121 Idaho at 863–64, 828 P.2d at 892–93. Contrary to Abdullah’s argument, the discovery 
restrictions in post-conviction proceedings do not become relaxed upon an evidentiary hearing or 
establishment of a prima facie case.  
 
The district court correctly perceived the discovery request as a discretionary issue, acted 
within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the applicable legal 
standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Therefore, the district court did not 
err by denying Abdullah’s requests for gasoline additive evidence. 
26. 
The district court did not err by destroying certain jury questionnaires. 
Abdullah argues that the district court’s failure to preserve the Toryanskis’ copies of the 
jury questionnaires deprived him of due process, a meaningful right to appeal, and his statutory 
right to seek post-conviction relief.  
a. 
Facts 
Prior to jury selection, the district court advised the parties and the veniremen that all 
copies of the completed jury questionnaires would be returned to the district court. The district 
court also explained that one copy would be retained for court records and all other copies would 
be destroyed. Abdullah did not object to this process, and the additional questionnaires were so 
destroyed. In her deposition, Kim Toryanski confirmed that she wrote notes on the questionnaire 
copies to aid in jury selection, including her impressions about potential jurors.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“In criminal appeals in which the death penalty was imposed, all documents in the trial 
court file of every nature, kind and description, except that the presentence investigation report 
shall be forwarded as an exhibit to the record.” I.A.R. 28(b)(2)(O). “In criminal appeals in which 
the death penalty was imposed the standard transcript shall include all hearings and proceedings 
held in the trial court of every nature and description.” I.A.R. 25(e). For indigent defendants, the 
State “is only required to provide . . . a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate 
review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 
462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002). The State’s failure to provide a sufficient record for adequate 
appellate review may amount to a denial of equal protection and due process. Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 16–19 (1956). This Court exercises free review over constitutional questions and 
the interpretation of statutes. State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 24, 319 P.3d 1191, 1193 (2014); State 
v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007). 
 
120 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Due to Abdullah’s failure to object to the destruction of the questionnaires, the 
fundamental error standard requires that he demonstrate the alleged error violated an unwaived 
constitutional right. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Accordingly, 
the initial inquiry is whether Abdullah’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment38 
was violated by the failure to maintain defense counsel’s copy of the jury questionnaires for 
appellate review. 
 
Due process requires a record sufficient for adequate appellate review of the alleged 
errors. Strand, 137 Idaho at 462, 50 P.3d at 477. Here, the relevant alleged error is the 
Toryanskis’ ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection. In support of this error, the 
record contains the transcript of voir dire, the jury questionnaires and responses (without the 
Toryanskis’ notes), deposition testimony from the Toryanskis, and a preemptory challenge 
matrix that contains notes made by the Toryanskis regarding their impressions of each juror. This 
is an adequate record for appellate review of Abdullah’s claim of error. Thus, Abdullah failed to 
demonstrate the destruction of the jury questionnaires violated his right to due process and this 
claim of error fails to meet the first prong of the fundamental error standard. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978. As Abdullah failed to satisfy this threshold requirement, Abdullah’s claim 
of error is not reviewable on appeal. See id. 
27. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to the removal of a letter from the crime scene, stipulation 
to the letter’s admission into evidence, and failure to object when the State disclosed 
that the defense’s investigator discovered the letter. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to a letter admitted at trial based on three 
distinct actions: (1) the removal of the letter from the Siesta residence; (2) the Toryanskis’ 
stipulation to admit the letter into evidence; and (3) the Toryanskis’ failure to object when the 
State elicited testimony indicating that the investigator who discovered the letter worked for 
Abdullah’s former defense counsel. 
a. 
Facts 
                                                 
38 Abdullah also cites to a similar provision of the Idaho Constitution. However, Abdullah has made no showing or 
any compelling argument regarding how the standards applied by the Idaho Constitution would be applied any 
differently than those of the United States Constitution. “In absence of such a showing, this Court normally applies 
federal constitutional standards.” State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 923 n.1, 231 P.3d 1016, 1020 n.1 (2010). 
Accordingly, we address this issue under the United States Constitution.  
 
121 
 
At trial, the investigator Glen Elam, who worked for Abdullah’s former counsel Gus 
Cahill, testified that he went to the Siesta residence to examine the crime scene before it was 
destroyed.39 At the residence, Elam located a letter apparently written by Angie to Abdullah 
wedged between a dresser and a trash can in the master bedroom. The letter conveyed Angie’s 
thoughts on their relationship, religion, and children. It also discussed intimate details of Angie 
and Abdullah’s sexual relationship and contained accusations of infidelity and prejudicial sexual 
proclivities, which were redacted for the jury. By stipulation, the redacted version of the letter 
was admitted for a limited purpose to show Angie’s state of mind. 
 
During post-conviction proceedings, Cahill testified that he was with Elam at the scene, 
but he could not remember specifically if he was present when Elam discovered the letter or if 
Elam showed him the letter while still at the scene. In either event, Cahill testified that Elam told 
him “pretty early on that he had found something there.” Cahill could not recall whether there 
was any discussion or thought of simply leaving the letter at the scene. Cahill then researched his 
ethical obligations and ultimately turned the letter over to law enforcement. Cahill also explained 
that he did consider seeking an in camera review with the court, but he could not recall why he 
declined to pursue that route.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege apply solely to 
communicative evidence. State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 710, 471 P.2d 553, 565 (1970). These 
privileges do not apply to real evidence. Id. “An attorney may not act as a depository for criminal 
evidence, and he may not suppress such evidence.” Id.; see also State v. Guthrie, 631 N.W.2d 
190, 194 (S.D. 2001) (“Physical evidence, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, cannot be 
withheld by a criminal defense attorney.”). 
c. 
Analysis 
i. 
The removal of the letter from the Siesta residence was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
Abdullah contends that Elam’s removal of the letter from the Siesta residence constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. He also submits that the district court failed to address this 
claim. In its memorandum decision, however, the district court stated: 
                                                 
39 The State had previously sent Cahill and co-counsel a message indicating the Siesta residence needed to be 
demolished.  
 
122 
 
Abdullah argues if his previous trial counsel had left the letter at the scene, 
then there would be no duty to disclose the fact of its discovery or its contents to 
the State. However, while the attorney-client privilege protects any 
communication between a defendant and his counsel regarding the location of 
evidence, once the evidence is in counsel’s possession he is still obligated to 
provide it to the prosecution under state law. . . .  
 
Here, Abdullah’s original trial counsel, Gus Cahill, testified that the 
existence of the letter and its location were not known to defense counsel prior to 
their final inspection of the Siesta residence. Thus, there was no communication 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Once Elam discovered the letter and 
took it from the scene, defense counsel were in possession of evidence and 
became obligated to disclose the letter under [Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct] 3.4 and pursuant to discovery. Therefore, appointed counsel’s disclosure 
of the letter to the State is not a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel with 
respect to either counsel. 
 
Thus, the district court reviewed and then rejected this argument, concluding that Cahill was 
obligated to turn it over to the State once the letter was in his possession. We recognize that the 
district court may have in part erroneously based its decision on Idaho Code section 18-2603, 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4, and the Idaho Criminal Rules addressing discovery. 
Those statutes and rules likely do not apply to this situation.40 “Where the lower court reaches 
                                                 
40 Idaho Code Section 18-2603 provides: 
 
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other object, 
matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence upon any trial, 
proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully destroys, alters or 
conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, used or discovered, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature 
and involves a felony offense, in which case said person is guilty of a felony and subject to a 
maximum fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and a maximum sentence of five (5) years in 
prison. 
 
This statute likely does not apply to the instant facts because the first element—the individual “knew that an object 
was about to be produced, used, or discovered as evidence in any legally authorized trial, proceeding, inquiry, or 
investigation”—probably is not met. See State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607, 610, 83 P.3d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(stating the elements of Idaho Code section 18-2603). Furthermore, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(a) 
prohibits an attorney from unlawfully obstructing “another party’s access to evidence” and unlawfully altering, 
destroying, or concealing “a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.” Thus, this Rule hinges 
upon unlawful conduct, which did not occur here. 
 
Lastly, Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(1) provides: 
 
(c) Disclosure of Evidence by the Defendant Upon Written Request. Except as otherwise 
hereinafter provided in this rule, the defendant shall at any time following the filing of charges 
against the defendant, upon written request by the prosecuting attorney, disclose the following 
information, evidence and material to the prosecuting attorney, which shall not be filed with the 
court, unless otherwise noted. 
     
(1) Documents and Tangible Objects. Upon written request of the prosecuting attorney, 
the defendant shall permit the prosecutor to inspect and copy or photograph books, 
papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, 
 
123 
the correct result by an erroneous theory, however, this Court will affirm the order on the correct 
theory.” Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001). In addition, the district court 
also premised its decision on the absence of attorney-client privilege. As discussed below, we 
agree with the district court’s determination that no ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in 
the removal of the letter from the crime scene. 
 
Abdullah’s argument relies on People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Meredith, 
the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. Id. at 48. Prior to 
trial, an investigator for the defense removed the victim’s wallet from a location where the 
defendant previously told his attorney it would be. Id. The defendant’s attorney subsequently 
turned the wallet over to police. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that California Evidence 
Code section 95441 barred testimony concerning the location of the wallet. Id. at 50. The 
California Supreme Court held: 
 
We therefore conclude that whenever defense counsel removes or alters 
evidence, the statutory privilege does not bar revelation of the original location or 
condition of the evidence in question. We thus view the defense decision to 
remove evidence as a tactical choice. If defense counsel leaves the evidence 
where he discovers it, his observations derived from privileged communications 
are insulated from revelation. If, however, counsel chooses to remove evidence to 
examine or test it, the original location and condition of that evidence loses the 
protection of the privilege. 
Id. at 54 (footnote omitted). Thus, Meredith involved the discovery of evidence based on a 
privileged communication. Id. In contrast, the case here did not involve any communication from 
Abdullah regarding the letter. We are not persuaded that a defense attorney can provide 
ineffective assistance of counsel by disclosing to the State accusatory evidence discovered as the 
result of a happenstance discovery by a defense investigator without any communication from 
the defendant. Furthermore, whether disclosure of the letter was required by rule or statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
which are within the possession, custody or control of the defendant, and which the 
defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
 
In order for this rule to apply, the defendant must intend to introduce the evidence at trial. Here, there was no 
indication that Abdullah intended to introduce the letter at trial. Indeed, due to the damaging and prejudicial nature 
of the unredacted version, it is highly unlikely Abdullah would have offered it at trial. Thus, the district court’s 
reasoning appears to have been in error in part. 
41 California Evidence Code section 954 provides in pertinent part, “[T]he client, whether or not a party, has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client 
and lawyer . . . .” Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b) likewise provides, “A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating 
the rendition of professional legal services . . . .” 
 
124 
presented a complex legal issue neither Cahill nor Elam could be expected to understand in full 
at the Siesta residence. Removing the letter and subsequently performing the necessary research 
was not deficient performance. This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Along the same lines as Abdullah’s challenge to Cahill’s removal of the letter, Abdullah 
argues that Cahill’s failure to move for an in camera review of the letter prior to disclosing it 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Abdullah fails to cite any authority in support of 
this contention, and this argument is waived. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 
966, 970 (1996). Further, his argument presents a novel legal theory, and this Court “will 
generally not find deficient performance” in such circumstances. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 
622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010). In addition, “[w]here the alleged deficiency is counsel’s 
failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by 
the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test.” State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez v. 
State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995)). Once the letter had been removed 
from the scene (and the Siesta residence subsequently destroyed), it is highly likely that the 
district court would have ordered disclosure to the State. See Dillon, 93 Idaho at 710, 471 P.2d at 
565 (“An attorney may not act as a depository for criminal evidence . . . .”). This Court rejects 
this assignment of error. See also Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677, 686–87 (Md. 1992) (collecting 
cases holding that a defense attorney may not conceal physical evidence and must turn over such 
evidence to the prosecution). 
ii. 
The Toryanskis’ stipulation to admit a redacted version of the letter was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 
 
Next, Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
stipulating to the admission of the redacted letter. Specifically, Abdullah contends that the State 
was not able to meet the foundational elements to have the letter admitted at trial and thus the 
Toryanskis provided deficient performance in stipulating to its admission.  
 
Tactical and strategic decisions by trial counsel will not be second-guessed and “cannot 
serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382–83, 247 P.3d 582, 609–10 (2010). In the 
absence of evidence that a strategic decision was “the product of inadequate preparation or 
 
125 
ignorance of the relevant law,” this Court will not find deficient performance. Johnson v. State, 
156 Idaho 7, 11, 319 P.3d 491, 495 (2014); State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 
(2013).  
 
As a condition precedent to the admissibility of a document, an offering party must 
present “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims.” I.R.E. 901(a). When seeking to admit a writing, which is not self-authenticating, a party 
must provide proof of its genuineness separate from the writing itself before it is admissible. 
Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 262, 596 P.2d 429, 435 (1979). “The purported 
signature or recital of authorship on the face of a writing will not be accepted as sufficient 
preliminary proof of authenticity for the admission of a writing in evidence.” Id. Idaho Code 
section 9-405 provides that a writing can be authenticated in the following ways: (1) by anyone 
who saw the writing executed; (2) by evidence of genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; 
or (3) by a subscribing witness. I.C. § 9-405. 
 
 In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate error. In this 
case, there is no evidence that the decision to stipulate was the product of inadequate preparation 
or ignorance of the law. Decisions by trial counsel are presumed to be made “in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. By stipulating to the admission 
of the redacted letter, the Toryanskis effectively excluded highly prejudicial information, such as 
Abdullah’s sexual proclivities. Through a stipulation the Toryanskis were able to control 
precisely what information was excluded and avoid the risk and uncertainty of the admission of 
certain extremely unfavorable portions of the letter. In addition, the letter provided support for a 
suicide defense. Thus, the stipulation was a strategic decision by the Toryanskis and not the 
result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of relevant law. See Johnson, 156 Idaho at 11, 319 
P.3d at 495. The Toryanskis’ stipulation was not deficient performance. 
iii. 
The Toryanskis’ failure to object when the State disclosed that the 
investigator who discovered the letter worked for defense counsel was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
 
Finally, Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
object when the State revealed Elam was acting as an investigator for Cahill when Elam 
discovered the letter. Specifically, Abdullah contends that this testimony implied the defense was 
gathering evidence against their own client or Elam learned about the letter through 
conversations with Abdullah. In turn, this implied Abdullah knew about the letter. Abdullah also 
 
126 
speculates that the jurors could have assumed former counsel ceased representing Abdullah after 
discovering the letter because the letter led his counsel to believe Abdullah was guilty.  
 
In support of this argument, Abdullah relies on cases from other jurisdictions which stand 
for the proposition that the source of evidence located by defense counsel via a privileged 
communication and then turned over to the State cannot be disclosed to the jury. Meredith, 631 
P.2d at 54 n.8 (“In offering the evidence, the prosecution should present the information in a 
manner which avoids revealing the content of attorney-client communications or the original 
source of the information.”); Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) 
(holding that to meaningfully preserve the privilege, the State could not introduce evidence that 
the State received incriminating physical evidence from defendant’s attorney); People v. Nash, 
313 N.W.2d 307, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (no violation of defendant’s attorney-client 
privilege in requiring attorney to relinquish physical evidence, but testimony that evidence 
obtained pursuant to search of attorney’s office violated privilege because infers the defendant 
gave evidence to attorney); Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 123 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986) 
(stating where physical evidence, obtained by the defense from a privileged communication from 
the defendant, is turned over to the State by the defense, the State cannot disclose to the finder of 
fact the source of the evidence); State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. 1964) (where State 
received incriminating evidence from defense counsel, the prosecution “should take extreme 
precautions to make certain that the source of the evidence is not disclosed in the presence of the 
jury” to preserve the attorney-client privilege). However, these cases are inapposite because in 
this case the letter was not discovered as the result of a privileged communication. The letter was 
revealed to defense counsel by an investigator without any communication from Abdullah. “If 
the location of the real evidence was revealed to defense counsel by a non-client third party, then 
the attorney-client privilege does not prohibit the State from proving, even through testimony 
from the attorney or the attorney’s agent, where and how the evidence was located.” Rubin, 602 
A.2d at 687. Therefore, the attorney-client privilege did not prohibit the State from introducing 
evidence regarding where and how the letter was located. Thus, the State’s question to Elam was 
not improper and the Toryanskis did not render deficient performance by failing to object. State 
v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 445, 180 P.3d 476, 484 (2008) (attorney not required to object to 
admissible evidence).  
 
127 
iv. 
Abdullah has not shown prejudice for any ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim regarding the letter. 
 
 
Finally, even if Abdullah established deficient performance on any of the above claims, 
he has failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result. Upon admission of the 
letter, the district court informed the jury it was admitted only for the purpose to show Angie’s 
state of mind and directed the jury not to consider it for any other purpose. Furthermore, the 
redacted letter omitted highly prejudicial portions and formed a basis for Abdullah’s suicide 
defense, which Kim Toryanski referenced in her closing argument. Lastly, the prejudice 
Abdullah asserts from the State revealing Elam discovered the letter is highly speculative and 
unfounded. The district court’s limiting instruction to consider the letter for only Angie’s state of 
mind would have prevented the jury from making such attenuated assumptions. See State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989) (it is presumed a jury obeys a court’s 
curative instruction). Therefore, Abdullah has failed to establish either prong of the Strickland 
two-part test, and this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
28. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to investigate, prepare, and present an 
adequate case in mitigation. 
a. 
Facts 
 
Numerous witnesses testified on Abdullah’s behalf in the penalty phase. First, the 
Toryanskis called Dr. Michael Gunter, an expert in Kurdish history. Dr. Gunter testified that the 
Kurds are a separate ethnic group in the Middle East and they do not have their own independent 
state. Dr. Gunter explained that the Kurds desire cultural, political, and social autonomy. 
However, the nations where the Kurds reside (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria) will not provide 
those conditions. Dr. Gunter then testified about Koreme, a village in northern Iraq where 
Abdullah was raised. Saddam Hussein, in conjunction with the Anfal campaign, destroyed 
Koreme in the late 1980s. The Anfal campaign involved the genocide of the Kurdish people and 
the destruction of their villages. During this period, attacks from the Iraqi Army forced villagers 
from Koreme to flee into the mountains and live in caves. When some villagers went back to 
retrieve belongings, the Iraqi Army summarily executed them. The district court recognized this 
testimony to be “moving” and “very powerful.” 
 
128 
 
Abdullah’s father, Haji Fetah, also testified about the Anfal campaign and Saddam 
Hussein’s systematic destruction of his family’s village and the Kurdish people. Fetah explained 
that he was imprisoned for fighting in opposition to the Iraqi Army. Fetah also noted that 
Musheer, Abdullah’s older brother, is mentally handicapped. As a result of these circumstances, 
Abdullah assumed a leadership role in the family, acting as the head of the household and 
looking after the family. Abdullah helped smuggle his family out of Iraq.  
 
Abdullah’s brother, Dilshad, also testified about life in northern Iraq. Dilshad stated that 
helicopters would often come to bomb their homes. Other times, the helicopters would observe 
them and leave, only for soldiers to return later and burn their homes. Dilshad also established 
the family’s agrarian lifestyle. Dilshad recounted one occurrence where the Iraqi Army removed 
their father’s cousin from the village, tortured him with electricity by applying it to his “private 
parts,” and returned him to the village paralyzed. Further, Dilshad testified to the brutal killing of 
their uncle, who was shot to death by Iraqi soldiers while he prayed. Dilshad explained in 
graphic detail that his uncle owned a cement wall and that “his brains were all over that.” After 
killing their uncle, the soldiers came to the family’s home searching for their father. The family 
concealed their father from the soldiers by hiding him in a hole and covering him with blankets. 
However, the soldiers kicked the family members, including their pregnant mother. Dilshad also 
testified about the family’s struggles while fleeing Iraq in 1988. Dilshad stated the decision to 
flee came after the family received warning of a chemical weapons attack. The district court 
characterized this testimony as “very moving.” 
 
Abdullah’s cousin, Nichivan, also testified. Nichivan recounted the conditions of Turkish 
refugee camps endured by the family. Nichivan explained that the family lived in tents despite 
inclement weather conditions. Nichivan stated snowfall could sometimes reach three feet in 
depth. While surviving in these conditions, the family did not have shoes, jackets, or adequate 
food. Once a week, soldiers provided them bread. Their other source of food came from 
vegetables grown within the camp and from leftover scraps from the soldiers. Nichivan detailed 
one incident in which a fight broke out between the Turkish military and the Kurds inside the 
camp. Soldiers shot an individual in the head while that individual stood next to Nichivan’s 
brother. Abdullah, present at the scene, guided Nichivan and Nichivan’s brother home and 
instructed them to stay away from the area for the rest of the day. Nichivan also testified to an 
 
129 
episode where he fell into a hole and Abdullah rescued him. Nichivan hypothesized that 
Abdullah’s actions likely saved his life.  
 
Rahan Mustafa, Abdullah’s mother, testified as well. Mustafa explained that Abdullah 
was a critical part of their family and was an honest man. Mustafa also requested mercy for 
Abdullah.  
 
Finally, the Toryanskis produced witnesses to demonstrate Abdullah’s positive 
community relationships. Pam Lewis assisted Abdullah and his family in adjusting to life in 
America when they first immigrated here. Lewis testified that Abdullah learned quickly and was 
always helpful to other individuals. Jim Rogers, a family friend, testified that Abdullah had a 
loving character and cared about people. Aaron Irish, a deputy sheriff, observed Abdullah in jail 
and noted how respectful Abdullah was toward jail personnel. Moreover, Michael Shutz, a 
fellow inmate housed with Abdullah, testified to Abdullah’s good behavior and that Abdullah 
assisted him studying Islam.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
Trial counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation in preparation for 
the penalty phase of a capital case. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009). Defense counsel 
must obtain information the State has and plans to use against the defendant. Rompilla v. Beard, 
545 U.S. 374, 387–90 (2005).  
Presentation of some mitigating evidence, even if strong, is insufficient if other 
mitigating evidence is available upon reasonable investigation. Rompilla, 545 
U.S. at 387–93. However, no relief is mandated where counsel’s investigation is 
not as thorough as it could have been because the courts “address not what is 
prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.” Burger v. 
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). This Court held, in State v. Row, that counsel is 
not required to investigate a defendant’s “entire life in order to objectively present 
. . . mitigation evidence” and that decisions regarding mental health and allocution 
statements are “strictly strategic and shall not be second-guessed by this Court.” 
131 Idaho 303, 313, 955 P.2d 1082, 1092 (1998). 
 
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 388, 313 P.3d 1, 44 (2013) (omission in original).  
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah’s argument consists of three components: (1) the timing of the mitigation 
investigation; (2) the failure to present additional testimony from family members; and (3) the 
failure to retain a cultural expert with sufficient background and experience. Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
 
130 
i. 
The timing of the Toryanskis’ decisions on conducting a mitigation 
investigation did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Abdullah contends that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to begin a mitigation investigation at the earliest possible stages, by instructing mitigation 
specialist Rosanne Dapsauski to cease working on the case until a few days before sentencing, 
and by pursuing a theory of the case that blamed the victim.  
 
In support of this argument, Abdullah relies in large part on the ABA Guidelines and its 
accompanying commentary. Guideline 4.1 provides in capital cases, “The defense team should 
consist of no fewer than two attorneys . . . , an investigator, and a mitigation specialist.” ABA 
Guideline 4.1(A)(1). Further, the commentary to ABA Guideline 1.1 provides that the 
investigation for the mitigation case must begin immediately upon counsel’s entry into the case. 
ABA Guideline 1.1 cmt. As discussed above, the ABA standards provide non-binding guidance 
to determine the reasonableness standard. Indeed, this Court has previously recognized that 
mitigation experts are not always required in death penalty cases. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 
496, 516, 988 P.2d 1170, 1190 (1999) (district court did not abuse discretion, or violate United 
States or Idaho Constitutions, in refusing to appoint mitigation specialist in death penalty case). 
Counsel does have a duty “to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background,” 
however. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). 
 
During the early stages of this case when Abdullah was still represented by the Ada 
County Public Defender, Cahill retained mitigation specialist Dapsauski. Dapsauski started to 
investigate a mitigation strategy. Specifically, she completed a “draft chronology” on Abdullah’s 
life, requested records from Abdullah’s past, and met with members of the Boise Muslim 
community. Dapsauski also traveled to Tennessee and conducted preliminary interviews with 
Abdullah’s family and associates.  
 
The Toryanskis continued to utilize Dapsauski’s services when they substituted in as 
counsel. Initially, Dapsauski participated in some of the defense team meetings. As time 
progressed, however, the Toryanskis devoted more attention to guilt phase issues and Dapsauski 
was invited to fewer meetings. At one point, Kim informed Dapsauski her services were no 
longer needed. As a result, Dapsauski ceased working on Abdullah’s case for a number of 
months. A few days prior to sentencing, Kim approached Dapsauski and requested that she 
resume work on Abdullah’s case.  
 
131 
 
The foregoing facts, combined with the evidence presented during the penalty phase, 
demonstrate that the Toryanskis pursued a constitutionally sufficient mitigation investigation on 
Abdullah’s behalf. The period of time where the Toryanskis focused on guilt phase issues was in 
accord with Abdullah’s statements. “The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined 
or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are 
usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 
information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. In a letter addressed to 
Cahill, Abdullah stated the following: 
 
Now to the death penalty. The State said they will seek the death penalty 
when they find me guilty. You are so worried about that; you’re not focusing on 
the guilty part. I know you have to do certain things in death penalty cases. I 
admire you for being so worried about it, but I have told you over and over 
again, “Don’t worry about the death penalty, and please work on the case to 
make it ready in time for the trial.” . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . All I ask is please work on the case and get it ready for me. . . . As for the 
death penalty, Allah, or god, is sufficient for me and will protect me. I have put 
my trust in him, for He is the one who makes the decisions about life and death. 
My life is in His hands, and not even the state of Idaho will make me worry. . . . 
If my life is to be gone, neither you nor I, or anybody else, can save me. That is 
why I’m asking you to do your job, please. 
. . . .  
 
Again, I ask you with all due respect to please work on the guilty part of 
the case. If you have extra time, then go ahead and work on the death penalty 
part. Know that neither you nor the state can change the time of my death one 
second earlier or later. Please, Gus, I am not worried about that at all. What I am 
worried about is going in front of the jury and not having answers, witnesses, 
evidence, etc., there with us. . . . Let’s get ready for the trial, please. 
Furthermore, in the Final Amended Petition itself, Abdullah conceded his “objective was to 
obtain an acquittal, or other form of relief that would not involve prison time. . . . Abdullah made 
it clear to all who ever represented him that he did not want potential penalty phase outcomes, 
even the potential of a death sentence, to affect his guilt phase objective.” The reasonableness of 
the Toryanskis’ actions should be examined within the context of these instructions from 
Abdullah. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Given these directions from Abdullah, and 
considering the efforts the Toryanskis still devoted to the mitigation case, the Toryanskis did not 
provide deficient performance. For this reason, as well as the lack of prejudice discussed below, 
 
132 
this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
based on mitigation. 
ii. 
The Toryanskis did not render ineffective assistance by failing to present 
additional mitigation testimony from family members. 
 
Abdullah also contends that the Toryanskis’ inadequate investigation and preparation led 
to their failure to present and prepare meaningful and compelling mitigation evidence through 
the testimony of family members. We disagree. The evidence that Abdullah contends should 
have been presented is cumulative of the evidence presented during the sentencing phase. In 
summary, the proffered evidence consists of the following: violent, horrific incidents Abdullah 
witnessed and was subjected to as a child; deplorable conditions Abdullah endured while living 
in refugee camps in Turkey; and the impact of a death sentence on Abdullah’s family. This 
proffered testimony is undoubtedly heartfelt, emotional, vivid, and moving. But, as recounted 
above, so was the testimony the Toryanskis presented at the penalty phase. The decision to 
present a fewer number of witnesses than Abdullah would now prefer on appeal is a conceivable 
tactical decision. Under the deferential Strickland standard, this decision is “strongly presumed” 
to be reasonable. 466 U.S. at 690. Thus, Abdullah has failed to establish deficient performance, 
and this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
iii. 
The Toryanskis did not render ineffective assistance by failing to retain an 
adequate cultural expert. 
 
Abdullah also contends that Dr. Gunter, the expert retained by the Toryanskis, did not 
have the requisite background and experience to sufficiently convey the experiences Abdullah 
endured growing up as a Kurd in northern Iraq. A review of the record disproves these 
assertions. Dr. Gunter testified that he had been a professor in political science at Tennessee 
Technological University since 1981. His primary area of instruction was international relations, 
and he also taught courses on international law, international organizations, and American 
foreign policy. In addition, Dr. Gunter had been a “senior Fulbright lecturer of international 
relations” at the Middle East Technical University in Turkey during the 1978–79 academic year. 
Dr. Gunter also testified that he was a leading expert in the world on the “Kurdish situation.” He 
provided detailed testimony about the Anfal campaign, the village of Koreme, and the hardships 
endured by the Kurdish people. Thus, the Toryanskis did not provide deficient performance in 
 
133 
selecting Dr. Gunter as a cultural expert. This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
iv. 
The case law relied on by Abdullah does not support his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
The cases Abdullah relies on to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding 
mitigation involve situations where counsel completely failed to investigate and present critical 
mitigating evidence.42 For example, in Williams, the defendant was convicted of robbery and 
capital murder and sentenced to death. 529 U.S. at 368–70. At sentencing, trial counsel offered 
the testimony of the defendant’s mother, two neighbors, and a recorded statement by a 
psychiatrist. Id. at 369. The testimony from witnesses was brief and described the defendant as a 
“nice boy” and not violent. Id. The recorded statement “did little more than relate Williams’ 
statement during an examination that in the course of one of his earlier robberies, he had 
removed the bullets from a gun so as not to injure anyone.” Id. The United States Supreme Court 
held that trial counsel “failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive 
records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic 
calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records.” Id. 
at 395. The United States Supreme Court further held that when this missing mitigation evidence 
was considered in conjunction with the mitigation evidence presented at sentencing, there was a 
reasonable probability the result would have been different. Id. at 398–99. 
 
Likewise, in Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and 
two counts of theft. 539 U.S. at 515. At sentencing, counsel made a motion to bifurcate the 
hearing into two phases. Id. One phase would focus on whether the defendant acted as a 
“principal in the first degree.” Id. In the other phase, counsel would present psychological reports 
and expert testimony demonstrating the defendant’s “limited intellectual capacities and childlike 
emotional state” and also “the absence of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for 
empathy, and his desire to function in the world.” Id. at 515–16. The trial court denied the 
motion. Id. at 515. During sentencing, counsel did not introduce any evidence of the defendant’s 
life history and simply challenged the guilt aspect of the case. Id. A jury sentenced the defendant 
to death. Id. at 516. During post-conviction proceedings, a social worker prepared a report that 
                                                 
42 Abdullah cites to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), and Rompilla 
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 
134 
revealed the defendant had undergone extensive sexual and physical abuse as a child at the hands 
of numerous perpetrators. Id. at 516–17. 
 
On habeas corpus review, the United States Supreme Court recognized: “The ABA 
Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to 
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating 
evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Id. at 524 (quoting ABA Guideline 
11.4.1(C)). The Court then explained that trial counsel had departed from these standards and 
“abandoned their investigation of petitioner’s background after having acquired only 
rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.” Id. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the failure to investigate the defendant’s upbringing “did not reflect 
reasonable professional judgment,” the evidence counsel failed to discover was powerful, and 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 534–36. 
 
Finally, in Rompilla, the State indicted the defendant for murder. 545 U.S. at 377. A jury 
found the defendant guilty of murder and a number of related counts. Id. at 377–78. At the 
sentencing phase, the State argued three aggravating factors justified imposition of a death 
sentence: “that the murder was committed in the course of another felony; that the murder was 
committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions 
indicating the use or threat of violence.” Id. at 378. “Rompilla’s evidence in mitigation consisted 
of relatively brief testimony: five of his family members argued in effect for residual doubt, and 
beseeched the jury for mercy, saying that they believed Rompilla was innocent and a good man.” 
Id. The jury sentenced the defendant to death. Id.  
 
During post-conviction proceedings, it was revealed that trial counsel failed to examine 
the defendant’s prior conviction file before sentencing. Id. at 382–84. On federal habeas review, 
the United States Supreme Court held that counsel provided deficient performance. Id. at 393. 
The Court explained that counsel provided deficient performance “because they failed to make 
reasonable efforts to review the prior conviction file, despite knowing that the prosecution 
intended to introduce Rompilla’s prior conviction not merely by entering a notice of conviction 
into evidence but by quoting damaging testimony of the rape victim in that case.” Id. at 389. In 
such a circumstance, “[i]t flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer should try to look at a 
file he knows the prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence, let alone when the file is sitting 
in the trial courthouse, open for the asking.” Id. Addressing the question of prejudice, the Court 
 
135 
summarized the overlooked evidence and recognized that it created “a mitigation case that bears 
no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury.” Id. at 393. 
 
In contrast to the roles of counsel in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the Toryanskis 
conducted an extensive investigation of Abdullah’s background and upbringing. They uncovered 
mitigation evidence from family members and acquaintances who testified to the oppressive 
environment in which Abdullah was raised and the hardships he endured while in refugee camps. 
Further, the Toryanskis elicited testimony regarding atrocities experienced by Abdullah’s family 
members and fellow villagers. The Toryanskis hired an expert on Abdullah’s Kurdish heritage 
who testified in depth about the culture in which Abdullah was raised, the brutal regime of 
Saddam Hussein, and the persecution of the Kurdish people. In addition, the Toryanskis called 
witnesses to attest to Abdullah’s good character in general and his model behavior as an inmate 
following his arrest. The mitigation investigation and case presented by the Toryanskis goes far 
beyond that in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Thus, this Court affirms the district court’s 
determination that the Toryanskis did not provide deficient performance in mitigation. 
v. 
Abdullah failed to establish prejudice. 
 
Finally, after examining the evidence that Abdullah contends should have been presented 
at the mitigation hearing, this Court determines that there is not a reasonable probability the 
result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different. The mitigation evidence proffered 
by Abdullah is cumulative to what was provided at sentencing. For additional mitigation 
evidence to demonstrate prejudice in a post-conviction proceeding, it simply cannot be 
cumulative of evidence presented at sentencing, but rather must create a substantial likelihood of 
a different sentence. Compare Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1409–10 (2011) (evidence 
introduced during a collateral proceeding on an ineffective assistance claim that “largely 
duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial” did not satisfy a showing of prejudice under 
Strickland), and Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1161–63 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the 
cumulative nature of the “new” evidence presented and holding petitioner failed to demonstrate 
Strickland prejudice), with Foust v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 539 (6th Cir. 2011) (where the new 
evidence, “[f]ar from being cumulative . . . paints an altogether different picture” of the 
petitioner’s childhood, Strickland prejudice prong is met). 
 
In addition, the brutal and callous nature in which Abdullah perpetrated this crime cannot 
be ignored. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 12–13 (2009) (holding the Sixth Circuit Court of 
 
136 
Appeals erred by focusing on the “number of aggravating factors instead of their weight” in 
conducting a Strickland prejudice analysis). Abdullah premeditated the murder of his wife, 
placed a bag over her head to asphyxiate her, poured gasoline throughout their home, and left 
three children inside a home engulfed in flames to cover up his actions. The brutal nature of this 
crime is evidenced by the jury’s finding of the utter disregard aggravator.  
 
Abdullah contends that “the perceived brutality or egregious nature of a particular crime 
is never an excuse for counsel to fail to do their job to present a readily-available mitigation case, 
and is no basis for a court to deem the presentation of a slip-shod mitigation case adequate or 
effective.” In support of this argument, Abdullah cites to Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551 (5th 
Cir. 2001). In pertinent part, Gardner addressed the demonstration of prejudice in the context of 
a Fifth Amendment Estelle violation.43 Gardner, 247 F.3d at 562–63. There, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reasoned: 
Almost without exception, the cases we see in which conviction of a capital crime 
has produced a death sentence arise from extremely egregious, heinous, and 
shocking facts. But, if that were all that is required to offset prejudicial legal error 
and convert it to harmless error, habeas relief based on evidentiary error in the 
punishment phase would virtually never be available, so testing for it would 
amount to a hollow judicial act.  
Id. at 563. Gardner is distinguishable, however, in that it involved a situation where the 
defendant was not informed of his constitutional right to remain silent when ordered to undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation during sentencing. Id. at 557–58. The defendant made statements in the 
evaluation which led the evaluator to conclude the defendant posed a significant risk of future 
dangerousness. Id. at 562. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the evaluator’s 
testimony as follows: 
Dr. Griffith testified, with “one hundred percent certainty,” that Gardner would 
“commit violent acts in the future”; that he was “super dangerous, and [would] 
kill [again] given any chance at all”; and that he would be a danger to others even 
if incarcerated. “Would”: not “might,” not likely “would,” but absolutely 
“would.” Dr. Griffith further testified that Gardner exhibited no remorse for his 
crimes and that any behavior to the contrary should not to be believed [sic]. 
Id. (alterations in original). It was in this context that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
the State’s argument that the brutality of the crime demonstrated harmless error. Id. at 562–63. 
                                                 
43 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981), held that where psychological evaluations are used to determine 
whether the death penalty should be imposed, such evaluations must be preceded by Miranda warnings. 
 
137 
 
By contrast, Abdullah contends that his attorneys should have presented more detailed 
and vivid testimony during the mitigation phase, even though this testimony was cumulative. 
This is a far cry from the extremely damaging testimony erroneously admitted in Gardner 
through the defendant’s own statements. It is well established that when analyzing the prejudice 
prong of an ineffective assistance claim, a court should consider the strength of aggravating 
circumstances associated with the defendant’s case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (“Given the 
overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence 
would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed.”). See also Smith v. Gibson, 197 
F.3d 454, 463–64 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding testimony from family members, friends, employers, 
and former coaches insufficient to demonstrate jury would have returned a different sentence “in 
light of the brutal and senseless nature” of the crime and the State’s strong evidence supporting 
the aggravating circumstances); Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (analysis 
of Strickland prejudice prong must take into account aggravating circumstances of the case). 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the district court’s determination that Abdullah failed to establish 
a reasonable probability the result of the sentencing phase would have been different but for any 
deficient performance. Therefore, this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
29. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present an eyewitness identification expert. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance in failing to retain 
and call an expert on the reliability of eyewitness testimony at both the pretrial suppression 
hearing and at trial.  
a. 
Facts 
 
A key witness in the State’s case was Marjorie Wood. She worked as a gas station clerk 
in Mountain Home and identified Abdullah as having entered the gas station around midnight on 
the night of the murder. Wood identified Abdullah for law enforcement a week after the crime 
from a single photograph depicting Abdullah. The detectives asked Wood whether she had seen 
that individual in the photograph before, and Wood immediately responded that she had seen the 
individual a week prior. She further indicated that she remembered Abdullah because he had 
acted rude, which caused him to stand out in her mind.  
 
138 
 
In seeking to challenge the identification made by Wood, among other things, Abdullah 
requested a memory and identification expert. The district court denied this motion because 
Abdullah failed to identify a specific expert and budget. Abdullah then requested the 
appointment of Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, a Washington-based psychologist. The district court denied 
this request because Abdullah failed to explain why an expert in the local area could not testify 
and why these issues could not be addressed in pretrial motions. Abdullah then renewed his 
request, asking that Dr. Charles Honts be appointed. The district court granted this request.  
 
Abdullah filed a motion to suppress Wood’s identification. Wood and the detectives 
involved in the identification testified at the suppression hearing. The district court concluded 
that there were no due process implications, nor was there a substantial risk of mistaken 
identification. Even assuming suggestive procedures, the district court examined the relevant 
factors and concluded Wood’s identification was sufficiently reliable to outweigh any potential 
low-level suggestiveness. 
 
The State then filed a motion in limine, asserting that expert testimony on the topic of 
eyewitness identifications was not scientific. The State also challenged the qualifications of Dr. 
Honts. The Toryanskis decided not to oppose the State’s motion for the following reasons: (1) 
they concluded Dr. Honts did not qualify as an expert in eyewitness identification; (2) the topic 
of eyewitness identifications may not be proper science for expert testimony; and (3) due to 
strategic choices on where to focus their time and energy. At the evidentiary hearing, Mitch 
Toryanski confirmed a dispute existed as to whether Dr. Honts qualified as an expert witness in 
eyewitness identifications and with respect to the scientific field generally. Mitch indicated that 
he wanted Dr. Honts to testify because he thought it was important to have a witness explain 
eyewitness identification issues to the jury.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
To determine whether evidence of an out-of-court identification violates 
due process, this Court applies a two-step test. See State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 
153, 162, 657 P.2d 17, 26 (1983). First, the defendant must establish that the 
identification procedure was overly suggestive. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 240 n.31 (1967); Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26. Second, if the 
defendant meets that burden, courts consider whether the identification was 
nonetheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 
at 162, 657 P.2d at 26. This second step entails considering the witness’s 
opportunity to view the perpetrator, his degree of attention, the accuracy of his 
description, his level of certainty, and the time between the crime and pretrial 
confrontation, and then weighing those factors against the “corrupting effect of 
 
139 
the suggestive identification.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 108 (1977); 
Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26. Thus, greater indicia of reliability 
may be necessary the more egregious the suggestive procedures. 
 
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 593, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013).  
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah first argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to have Dr. Honts testify at the suppression hearing. In support of this argument, Abdullah 
cites to an affidavit of Dr. Honts, an affidavit of Dr. Roy Malpass (an expert retained on post-
conviction relief), and a publication by the United States Department of Justice—Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.  
 
“Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the 
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of 
both prongs of the [Strickland] test.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 
(2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 
(Ct. App. 1995)). In this case, the considerations addressed in the affidavits and attached 
publication on eyewitness evidence relied on by Abdullah are predominantly covered by factors 
articulated in Idaho case law. In Payne, this Court reaffirmed the factors Idaho courts consider 
when examining claims involving eyewitness identification procedures: 
 
For an out-of-court identification to taint an in-court identification, the 
out-of-court identification must have been “so suggestive that there is a very 
substantial likelihood of misidentification.” State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 892, 
980 P.2d 552, 556 (1999). “Due process requires the exclusion of identification 
evidence if police suggestiveness created a substantial risk of mistaken 
identification, except where the reliability of the identification is sufficient to 
outweigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification.” Id. (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). “[S]ingle subject showups are inherently suspect and 
generally not condoned . . . .” State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 162, 657 P.2d 
17, 26 (1983). However, “reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony.” Id. at 161, 657 P.2d at 25 (quoting 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). The question of whether 
improper suggestiveness exists is determined from a totality of the circumstances. 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972). Factors to review in determining 
whether an identification is reliable include: “(1) the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention; (3) 
the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of 
certainty demonstrated at the identification; and (5) the length of time between the 
crime and the identification.” Trevino, 132 Idaho at 893, 980 P.2d at 557. 
 
 
140 
Id. (alteration in original) (omission in original). Given these factors, the proposed expert 
testimony at the suppression hearing would have been cumulative. 
 
Further, while use of a single photo can create suggestiveness, Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 
162, 657 P.2d at 26, the situation here was not a traditional line-up or photo array procedure. 
Wood was neither a victim nor an eyewitness to a crime. In the traditional context, a victim or 
eyewitness being shown a single photo might suggest that the individual in the photo is the 
perpetrator. That risk did not exist here. Calling an expert to testify would not have provided any 
additional information for the district court to consider not already addressed in Idaho’s case law. 
 
Moreover, Kim examined witnesses and made arguments regarding many of the topics 
addressed in the affidavits of Dr. Malpass and Dr. Honts. For example, at the suppression 
hearing, Kim examined Detective Chip Morgan regarding the suggestiveness of using a single 
photograph and the procedural safeguards to minimize inherent suggestiveness. On examination 
by the State, Detective Morgan acknowledged, “In my opinion, any time I’m only showing one 
photo, the potential exists for a false positive . . . .”  
 
Even assuming the use of a single photograph was impermissibly suggestive, the district 
court’s findings of fact indicate the following: (1) Wood had an opportunity to observe Abdullah; 
(2) only one week passed between this observation and the identification; (3) Wood was certain 
of her identification; (4) Abdullah’s behavior drew Wood’s attention to him and caused Wood to 
remember him; (5) Wood was focused on Abdullah while he was in the store; and (6) the 
situation was non-threatening and non-stressful. There was substantial and competent evidence 
to support the district court’s findings. Based on these findings, the identification was reliable 
even assuming any suggestiveness. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the testimony of 
Wood would not have been suppressed even if an expert testified at the suppression hearing. This 
Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 
 
In addition to the above discussion, Kim testified during the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing that the decision not to have an expert testify was strategic. While Kim was considering 
the testimony of an eyewitness expert, she was also considering a number of medical and 
scientific issues and was “intensely . . . focused” on scientific evidence. Abdullah has failed to 
present any evidence that indicates this decision was anything but strategic.44 “The decision of 
                                                 
44 Abdullah’s brief cites to portions of the record that indicate during post-conviction proceedings Kim could not 
recall why they did not have Dr. Honts testify. Abdullah also cites to testimony from Mitch indicating there were 
 
141 
what witnesses to call ‘is an area where we will not second guess counsel without evidence of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation.’” Payne, 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138 (quoting State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 
234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). These strategic reasons provide another basis to conclude that 
the Toryanskis did not render deficient performance at the suppression hearing by failing to call 
an expert on eyewitness identifications. 
 
 
Abdullah next argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
present an eyewitness expert at trial. Specifically, he contends that “[s]uch testimony would have 
assisted jurors by helping them understand factors that impact the reliability of an identification 
and by helping them understand the fallibility of such identifications generally.” Abdullah 
further argues that an expert would have cast doubt on Wood’s identification and demonstrated 
that the techniques used by officers in securing the identification were flawed, thereby rendering 
the identification unreliable.  
 
Abdullah’s challenges to the techniques used by detectives are unfounded. In seeking to 
locate a potential eyewitness along the route from Salt Lake City to Boise, two detectives drove 
that route stopping at all gas stations and convenience stores along the freeway. This 
investigative trip lasted around seventeen hours. Throughout the trip, the detectives asked clerks 
whether they worked on the night in question. If a clerk responded in the affirmative, the 
detectives inquired further by showing a picture of Abdullah and asking whether they had seen 
him. The detectives used special caution not to mention Abdullah’s name. While the affidavit of 
Dr. Honts contends that the detectives should have considered a “double-blind lineup using live 
persons,” this contention ignores the nature of the investigation. During the detectives’ 
seventeen-hour trip, they questioned around 120 potential witnesses without inquiring into any 
particular incident or mentioning Abdullah’s name. The detectives could not have feasibly 
utilized a double-blind live lineup in this situation, and there is no justification for such a 
procedure in this context. 
                                                                                                                                                             
questions regarding the qualifications of Dr. Honts and the Toryanskis were unsure whether this area of science 
(eyewitness experts) was legitimate. Finally, Abdullah cites the affidavit of Dr. Honts, which indicates the 
Toryanskis informed him he could not testify because the district court believed Abdullah to be Caucasian, and thus 
the district court did not find cross-racial identification issues relevant. However, none of this amounts to evidence 
demonstrating a misunderstanding or ignorance of Idaho law, nor does it demonstrate any other shortcomings in the 
Toryanskis’ performance. At best, it demonstrates the Toryanskis recognized this was an unsettled and questionable 
area of expertise and strategically decided to focus their efforts elsewhere.  
 
142 
 
Moreover, Abdullah has failed to demonstrate that the decision not to call an expert was 
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation. On the contrary, Kim testified that the decision was strategic and that she 
and Mitch were focused on other aspects of the trial. Abdullah’s argument is similar to an 
argument this Court addressed in Payne. In Payne, the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder based in part on eyewitness testimony placing the defendant at a location from which the 
victim was abducted. Id. at 561–62, 199 P.3d at 136–37. The defendant asserted ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on the failure to present an expert “on the fallibility of eyewitness 
identifications.” Id. at 563, 199 P.3d at 138. Rejecting this claim, this Court held: 
Here, Payne has provided no evidence which suggests that this decision resulted 
from inadequate preparation, ignorance or other shortcomings. Therefore, the 
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the acceptable range of 
professional assistance leads the Court to conclude that failing to introduce expert 
legal testimony did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Id. (footnote omitted). The situation here is analogous to Payne as Abdullah has not provided 
any evidence to indicate that the decision to not call an expert on eyewitness identifications 
resulted from “inadequate preparation, ignorance, or other shortcomings.” Id. Accordingly, the 
Toryanskis did not render deficient performance. 
 
Finally, even if Abdullah established deficient performance in failing to call an expert at 
trial, he cannot establish prejudice. At trial, Detective Heatherley testified that Wood 
immediately identified Abdullah from the photograph and stated that Abdullah had been in the 
store a week prior around midnight. Wood testified that she was one hundred percent sure she 
had seen Abdullah at the time detectives showed her the photo of him. Other evidence 
established Abdullah’s presence in Boise, such as the cape, gas can, the fuel contaminant and 
additive in the gas from that can, the DNA evidence, the removal of N.A. from the fire, and the 
lack of forced entry into the Siesta residence. Based on the evidence in the record, Abdullah has 
failed to establish a reasonable probability the result would have been different but for any 
deficiency. This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 
30. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present testimony from a forensic pathologist. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance in failing to call a 
forensic pathologist to testify that Angie’s cause of death was undetermined.  
a. 
Facts 
 
143 
 
Before the grand jury, Dr. Glen Groben, a forensic pathologist with the Ada County 
coroner’s office, testified that he determined Angie’s cause of death to be “homicide.” Dr. 
Groben explained that he considered the possibility that Angie may have committed suicide, but 
rejected that theory, in part, because the first toxicology exam revealed no alcohol or drugs in her 
system. At trial, Dr. Groben reiterated this testimony before the jury. Dr. Groben also testified 
that he amended his autopsy report because subsequent toxicology testing revealed Angie had a 
potentially lethal concentration of fluoxetine in her blood when she died. Due to this additional 
information, Dr. Groben changed the cause of death to “acute fluoxetine poisoning associated 
with asphyxiation due to a bag over the head.” Dr. Groben did not amend the manner of death 
from homicide.  
 
Before trial, the Toryanskis retained forensic pathologist Dr. Paul Hermann to assist in 
Abdullah’s defense. Dr. Hermann opined the manner of death was undetermined because 
circumstances existed which weighed in favor of homicide as well as suicide. Specifically, Dr. 
Hermann pointed to Angie’s psychiatric history, the absence of trauma on Angie’s body, and the 
high level of fluoxetine in her system as supporting a finding of suicide. The Toryanskis did not 
call Dr. Hermann to testify at trial. 
 
Abdullah retained Dr. Clifford Nelson during the post-conviction proceedings to proffer 
additional information, namely, that an overdose of medication and the placement of a plastic 
bag over one’s head is the recommended method of suicide in the book Final Exit and that many 
circumstances supported a finding of suicide. Dr. Nelson also opined that the manner of death 
was undetermined. 
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“In our view, counsel’s choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of 
objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions, as does counsel’s 
presentation of medical evidence.” Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994). 
“[S]trategic and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-
conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown 
to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.” Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 
(2000). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
144 
 
Abdullah argues that the failure to call Dr. Hermann resulted from the Toryanskis’ legal 
misunderstanding of Idaho Rule of Evidence 410. Specifically, based on Kim’s deposition 
testimony, Abdullah contends that she erroneously believed Dr. Hermann could be impeached 
with statements from plea negotiations with the State about the circumstances surrounding 
Angie’s death. 
 
Our consideration of Abdullah’s argument is unnecessary because the district court 
properly determined Abdullah could not establish prejudice. Abdullah has not established a 
reasonable probability of a different result but for any deficient performance in the Toryanskis’ 
failure to call Dr. Hermann to testify at trial. As explained by the United States Supreme Court: 
“In many instances cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert’s 
presentation. When defense counsel does not have a solid case, the best strategy can be to say 
that there is too much doubt about the State’s theory for a jury to convict.” Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S. Ct. 770, 791 (2011). Here, the Toryanskis inquired into their perceived issues with Dr. 
Groben’s autopsy and testing, highlighting the initially undiscovered fluoxetine and the amended 
cause of death. Additionally, Dr. Hermann would not have directly contradicted the manner of 
death, as he would have opined that the manner of death was undetermined, which offers 
significantly less support to a suicide defense. Finally, the factors Dr. Hermann believed to 
indicate suicide were addressed by other witnesses—Dr. Clay Ward addressed Angie’s 
psychiatric history and Dr. Groben addressed the absence of trauma and high concentration of 
fluoxetine. Thus, Dr. Hermann’s testimony would have been cumulative and its addition does not 
establish a reasonable probability of a different result based on our review of the record. This 
Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
31. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to consult and present a gasoline expert. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by failing to present 
expert testimony that the additive HiTEC 6423 found in the gasoline from the gas can at the 
Siesta residence could be purchased in Boise.  
a. 
Facts 
 
The Toryanskis conferred with a forensic science consultant, Dr. John Thornton, early on 
in their case. The Toryanskis utilized Dr. Thornton as an arson expert. Dr. Thornton informed the 
Toryanskis that an arson accelerant, likely gasoline, was applied inside the Siesta residence and 
garage. Dr. Thornton was not able to determine whether the gasoline contained the marker in 
 
145 
question because he had not received the relevant discovery materials. Dr. Thornton explained to 
Kim that he needed “Chevron laboratory’s discovery material concerning the identification of 
geographic markers introduced into the gasoline,” the underlying database of proprietary 
information, and “[b]ench notes pertaining to the Idaho State Crime Lab’s analysis of the 
gasoline.” Kim eventually responded, informing Dr. Thornton that no report was required and he 
would not be called to testify at trial.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“[C]ounsel’s choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to 
testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions, as does counsel’s presentation of 
medical evidence.” Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368. “[S]trategic and tactical decisions 
will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.” 
Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. 
c. 
Analysis 
 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Kim testified that Dr. Thornton’s testimony 
would not aid their case because he agreed with the State’s theory that the fire was a result of 
arson. Kim also testified that calling Dr. Thornton as a witness was not “particularly helpful to 
us.” Additionally, Kim recognized the discovery problems associated with the requested 
underlying data from Ethyl being proprietary information neither the Toryanskis nor the State 
had in its possession. Thus, the decision not to call Dr. Thornton was strategic to avoid 
presenting a weakness in Abdullah’s case. 
 
Additionally, the essence of the information that Abdullah contends should have been 
presented to the jury by an expert was covered by Mitch’s cross-examination of Dr. Colucci. 
Specifically, Dr. Colucci testified that the Ethyl additives are present in other areas of the 
country, Ethyl supplies forty percent of the fuel additives used in America, and the probability of 
purchasing gas with one of the Ethyl additives ranges from ten percent to eighty percent, 
depending on the location. While Dr. Colucci did not expressly testify that his additives are 
available in Boise, the jury could have reasonably inferred that from his testimony. 
“Strickland does not enact Newton’s third law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for 
every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense. . . . In many instances 
 
146 
cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert’s presentation.” See 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791 (2011). The decision to elicit this information on 
cross-examination as opposed to calling an additional expert did not constitute deficient 
performance.  
 
Abdullah also failed to demonstrate prejudice. As noted above, the jury could reasonably 
infer that HiTEC 6423 was available in Boise. Furthermore, the State did not exclusively focus 
on the additive to link the gas recovered at the Siesta residence to the 7-Eleven in Salt Lake City. 
Rather, the State also focused on an overlap the testing revealed with an unknown fuel 
component. This component was located in the sample from the 7-Eleven in Salt Lake City as 
well as in the sample from the Siesta residence when determining the lowest additive 
concentration.45 The State also emphasized that Abdullah had purchased more fuel at the 7-
Eleven than was able to fit inside his vehicle’s gas tank. Given the totality of this evidence, 
Abdullah failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result. Thus, this Court affirms 
the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
32. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission of the defense’s letter to 
the prosecutors requesting additional testing of Angie’s blood. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to 
the admission of Mitch’s letter to the State requesting additional testing of Angie’s blood for 
certain prescription drugs. Abdullah contends that the jury could infer that the request was made 
because the defense team knew substances should have been in Angie’s blood at the time of her 
death.  
a. 
Facts 
 
In December of 2003, Mitch sent the State a letter requesting further testing on Angie’s 
blood. As a result of this letter, Dr. Groben requested additional testing, which revealed a 
potentially lethal concentration of fluoxetine in Angie’s blood. During Dr. Groben’s testimony at 
trial, the State asked about the letter before asking about the additional testing. The Toryanskis 
did not object to the admission of the letter or the testimony about it.  
 
During closing argument, the State argued: 
                                                 
45 Dr. Colucci explained this is the lowest concentration of an additive that the law requires be present in gasoline at 
“[forty] pounds per thousand barrels of fuel.”  
 
147 
I want to talk to you about fluoxetine and Prozac. A lot of things have been said 
by the defendant’s attorneys about that. You will recall that we learned about that 
when the defendant’s lawyers wrote us and asked us to check for that. Dr. Groben 
thought it had been determined [sic] he was wrong. The check had been for 
tricyclic antidepressants, not for SSRIs. We did it and I will tell you that everyone 
connected with the prosecution of the defendant from myself, Dr. Groben, the 
police agency were just shocked to find out about the extreme level of Prozac in 
the blood of Angie Abdullah. 
 
The district court then requested a side bar with the State and subsequently struck the 
prosecutor’s last statement.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“A trial court has ‘broad discretion’ in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, 
‘and its judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6, 304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013) (quoting State 
v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485, 488 (2009)). “[T]he trial court’s conclusion that 
the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its unfair prejudice is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah’s argument hinges on Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) 401, 402, and 403.46 
I.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 402 states the general rule: “All relevant evidence 
is admissible.” I.R.E. 403 requires the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury.” 
 
Assuming deficient performance, Abdullah cannot establish a reasonable probability of a 
different result absent the admission of the letter. The letter simply explained why Dr. Groben 
performed additional testing after he completed the autopsy and accompanying report. 
Abdullah’s speculations about what the jury may have inferred are unwarranted and, even if 
                                                 
46 Abdullah also contends the Toryanskis were ineffective “for failing to move to have an independent lab conduct 
the testing.” Abdullah fails to support this contention with any argument or authority, and thus it is waived. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (issues on appeal not supported by argument or authority will 
not be considered). 
 
148 
accepted, do not undermine confidence in the outcome.47 Assuming but for the Toryanskis’ 
failure to object to the admission of the letter, and further assuming the district court would have 
excluded any reference to the letter, there is not a reasonable probability of a different result. 
Thus, Abdullah failed to establish prejudice.  
 
This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
33. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel by delaying opening statement. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by delaying opening 
statement until after the State’s case-in-chief.  
a. 
Facts 
 
The Toryanskis decided to delay opening statement until the close of the State’s case. 
During the delayed opening statement, Mitch highlighted Angie’s emotional, mental, and 
physical struggles. The theme of the defense opening statement centered on Angie’s depression 
and laid a further foundation for the suicide defense.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The decision on when, and if, to present an opening statement is a matter of trial strategy 
that will not be second-guessed absent evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant 
law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 905, 
539 P.2d 254, 258 (1975). See also United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“[T]he decision whether to make an opening statement and when to make it is ordinarily a 
matter of trial tactics and strategy which will not constitute the incompetence basis for a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Jones v. Smith, 772 F.2d 668, 674 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The 
attorneys’ decision to waive opening argument at the guilty phase was one of reasonable trial 
strategy.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The timing 
of an opening statement, and even the decision on whether to make one at all, is ordinarily a 
mere matter of trial tactics and in such cases will not constitute the incompetence basis for a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
c. 
Analysis 
                                                 
47 While Abdullah contends the State used this letter to create an improper inference during closing argument, 
Abdullah does not attribute error to that portion of the closing argument. The State’s closing argument has no 
bearing on whether the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance in failing to object when the letter was admitted 
during trial. 
 
149 
 
Abdullah first contends that the district court erred by finding some of his statements 
credible, but finding other statements incredible. Abdullah asserts that if he is not to be believed, 
“he is not to be believed with respect to anything he told the Toryanskis and anything he said in 
his affidavit.” This argument is contrary to our long-standing and well-settled law: “The 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court.” State v. 
Dunlap, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). We conclude this argument is meritless. 
 
Next, Abdullah argues that the decision to defer opening statement until after the State’s 
case-in-chief was not strategic, but based on a desire to not make a decision. At the evidentiary 
hearing, however, Kim testified that she weighed the advantages and disadvantages of delaying 
their opening statement and concluded the delay would allow them to retain flexibility in terms 
of the theory of the defense’s case. Likewise, Mitch testified that they thought it would be to 
Abdullah’s advantage because they would be able to listen to the State’s evidence and would 
gain a better perspective on the State’s presentation of evidence. Mitch further indicated that he 
did not want to make promises to the jury they would not be able to keep. Although Abdullah 
suggests that there was no reason the opening statement given could not have been presented 
prior to the State’s case without compromising any possible defenses, this is not the correct 
context in which courts assess an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The inquiry is whether, 
at the time of the decision, counsel’s actions were objectively reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688–89. Given the tactical and strategic reasons provided by both Mitch and Kim, and the failure 
of Abdullah to provide any evidence of ignorance of relevant law, inadequate preparation, or 
other evidence of shortcomings capable of objective evaluation, Abdullah has failed to 
demonstrate deficient performance. Further, this Court concludes that there was no prejudice 
because there is not a reasonable probability of a different result but for any error in the delayed 
opening statement based on the overwhelming evidence at trial establishing guilt. Id. at 694. 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
34. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to present an alibi defense. 
 
Abdullah contends that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
pursue a defense that he was not in Boise at the time of Angie’s death.  
a. 
Facts 
 
150 
 
Abdullah identifies the following witnesses as supporting a potential alibi defense. None 
were called to testify at trial. 
i. 
Michael Quintana 
 
Before trial, law enforcement interviewed Michael Quintana48 and a defense investigator 
interviewed Quintana’s girlfriend, Molly Thompson. Quintana and Thompson indicated that they 
stayed in the motel room adjacent to Abdullah’s in Salt Lake City on October 4–5, 2002. 
Quintana stated that he heard voices intermittently and the television all night in the room next to 
his. Quintana later clarified that he was sure he heard the TV and may have heard voices coming 
from the room next to his. Quintana also stated that he saw a short, dark-skinned man with curly 
hair smoking a cigarette outside the motel, but was unsure of where this man went.  
ii. 
Lance Donnelson 
 
Lance Donnelson was a gas station attendant working in Farr West, Utah, the night of 
Angie’s death. Donnelson estimated that around 2:30 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. two men of Middle 
Eastern descent entered his store. Donnelson, who had a law enforcement background, paid close 
attention to the men because he suspected they may attempt to shoplift or rob the store. 
Donnelson indicated that he heard one man speak English with a foreign accent and that they 
spent approximately fifteen to twenty minutes in the store. A week after this encounter, two 
detectives interviewed Donnelson. The detectives showed Donnelson a picture of Abdullah, and 
Donnelson positively identified Abdullah as one of the men who had been in his store the prior 
week. Donnelson also told detectives that the store’s security cameras would have footage from 
the incident, but he personally did not have access to it. Donnelson informed the detectives that 
the store’s manager could access it for them and that the video footage would be retained only 
for a limited period of time, approximately two weeks.49 Donnelson also provided the detectives 
with a written statement. 
iii. 
Shad Mohammad  
 
Shad Mohammad was in attendance at the mosque in Salt Lake City on the morning of 
October 5, 2002. According to Mohammad, Abdullah arrived at the mosque around 6:55 a.m. to 
7:00 a.m., was late for the morning prayer, and did not smell of gasoline, fire or smoke. 
Mohammad also noted that Abdullah did not look tired, but rather looked “fresh.”  
                                                 
48 Quintana was scheduled to be deported before trial, but his testimony was preserved by deposition. 
49 The video footage had been erased by the time the police requested it. 
 
151 
iv. 
Abdul Afridi 
 
Abdul Afridi owns a car dealership in Salt Lake City. Afridi saw Abdullah and R.A. at 
his car lot on October 5, 2002, around 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. Afridi did not smell gasoline or 
smoke coming from Abdullah. Nor did Afridi see any singed or burned hair on Abdullah’s body. 
Afridi also indicated that Abdullah did not look sleepy, but rather looked “fresh.”  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
“[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions 
regarding” his case, including the decision on “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in 
his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). However, 
“when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may 
allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas.” 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). Tactical decisions made by counsel will not be 
second-guessed on post-conviction relief, unless made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). 
 
The choice of defenses to pursue is a strategic decision left to the judgment of counsel. 
State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 344–45, 941 P.2d 337, 372–73 (Ct. App. 1997). Likewise, the 
decision to present an alibi defense is also a strategic choice left to the judgment of counsel. See, 
e.g., People v. Tackett, 742 P.2d 957, 961 (Colo. App. 1987) (“[W]here, as here, defendant’s 
alibi is to be established by testimony of witnesses other than defendant, the decision whether to 
present such defense is a strategic and tactical decision within the exclusive province of defense 
counsel.”); Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 675 (Fla. 2010) (“[T]rial counsel made a reasonable 
strategic decision to utilize an alibi defense as the main defense . . . .”); Reeves v. State, 705 
S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. 2011) (“[W]hether to present an alibi defense is a strategic and tactical 
decision that, after thorough investigation and client consultation, is virtually unchallengeable 
and does not require a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
152 
 
Abdullah contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the 
Toryanskis failed to pursue an alibi defense.50 Contrary to Abdullah’s argument, a review of the 
record demonstrates that the Toryanskis carefully considered an alibi defense, weighed the 
benefits and risks of presenting such a defense, and made the strategic decision to forego such a 
defense. Each relevant witness will be addressed in turn. 
i. 
Michael Quintana 
 
Quintana’s deposition testimony demonstrates his memory to be unclear, unsure, and of 
little value in support of an alibi defense. As noted above, Quintana stated he heard voices 
intermittently and the television all night in the room next to his. Quintana later clarified, 
however, that he was sure he heard a TV and may have heard voices coming from the room. This 
generalized, non-committal description of his observations provided little, if any, support for an 
alibi defense. Further, Quintana’s girlfriend, Molly Thompson, was interviewed by defense 
investigator Ted Cilwick, and she indicated that she never saw anyone near the room next to 
theirs and she did not hear any voices other than the TV. Thompson further stated that Quintana 
consumed a few beers that night and she was prescribed and taking methadone at that time as 
well. Thompson also stated that Quintana was not impaired and the methadone did not affect her 
memory, hearing, or general cognitive abilities. Given Quintana’s nondescript, vague, and 
ambiguous deposition testimony, coupled with Thompson’s statements that she did not hear any 
voices other than the TV, the Toryanskis’ decision not to introduce such testimony was 
objectively reasonable. 
ii. 
Lance Donnelson 
 
Abdullah contends that the Toryanskis should have called Lance Donnelson as a witness 
or, at the very least, should have brought him to Boise to assess whether he could identify 
Abdullah. We disagree. Donnelson had previously provided two descriptions of Abdullah, 
neither of which correlated with Abdullah’s actual appearance. First, when interviewed October 
11, 2002, Donnelson described the man in his store as “being heavy set, with a mustache, 
speaking broken English.” Second, when interviewed by defense investigator Steve Clark in 
October 2003, Donnelson described the man as being in his late thirties, having a large belly, a 
                                                 
50 Abdullah also contends the district court erroneously concluded the testimony of Donnelson and Quintana was 
perjured or counsel believed it was. This conclusion appears to be an alternate basis for the district court’s decision. 
Given our conclusion that Abdullah failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice, this claim need not be 
addressed further. 
 
153 
beard, and between 5’8” and 5’9”. On this occasion, Donnelson also indicated that the man in his 
store spoke broken English with a foreign accent. In contrast to these descriptions, the jail 
booking sheet for Abdullah indicates that he was twenty-five years of age, 5’7”, and 155 pounds 
at the time of his arrest. Further, Clark testified at the evidentiary hearing that Abdullah was not 
heavy set, had a beard rather than mustache, and spoke fluent English, albeit with an accent. 
Therefore, as recognized by the district court, Donnelson’s possible identification in court was 
problematic.  
 
Further, Donnelson’s timeline could have played to the State’s advantage. At the 
evidentiary hearing, Murphy explained that the State could have attacked the timing of 
Donnelson’s identification. Murphy recognized that if the State revealed Donnelson identified 
Abdullah in the gas station somewhere around 4:30 a.m. to 5:00 a.m., Donnelson would have 
become a very favorable State’s witness. Kim recognized this risk as well because “the timelines 
[sic] were not nailed down.” Kim also testified that it seemed to her Abdullah agreed the 
prospect of presenting an alibi defense was ill-advised.  
 
Combined with other substantial evidence that Abdullah was in Boise, including the cape, 
the gas can, the DNA evidence, and Wood’s testimony, the presentation of Donnelson’s 
testimony plainly was a strategic decision. Besides the problematic identification and the time 
line issue, the defense team also recognized that it could lose credibility with the jury. Defense 
investigator Terry Murphy noted the risk associated with Donnelson’s testimony in an email to 
Mitch on October 15, 2004. In this email, Murphy states:  
The only problem I see is, now we have to maintain that [Abdullah] wasn’t up 
here and that hurts our credibility. It’s a catch 22. I think [Donnelson’s] testimony 
has to be very tight but he may not be willing or may be unable to say, “That was 
him, and I’m positive.” I think we have to know exactly what he is going to say. 
 
Moreover, Donnelson’s potential testimony was inconsistent with the version of events Abdullah 
told law enforcement—that he remained in the Dream Inn sleeping the entire night of the crime. 
His testimony was also inconsistent with the version of events Abdullah told his counsel. Based 
on the evidence in the record regarding the Toryanskis’ assessment of value and risk of 
Donnelson’s testimony at trial, the Toryanskis carefully considered presenting an alibi defense 
via Donnelson’s testimony and rejected this defense for sound strategic and tactical reasons. 
iii. 
Shad Mohammad & Abdul Afridi 
 
154 
 
Abdullah argues that Shad Mohammad and Abdul Afridi would have supported an alibi 
defense because they met with Abdullah in Salt Lake City on October 5, 2002, and did not smell 
any gasoline or smoke coming from his person. Testimony from Mohammad and Afridi would 
have been cumulative because Imam Din from the mosque in Salt Lake City testified to similar 
facts. Imam Din indicated that he saw Abdullah at around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of October 
5, 2002, that he was only four feet away from Abdullah, and that he did not smell gasoline on 
Abdullah. Mohammad’s and Afridi’s testimony would have been of little evidentiary value. 
Furthermore, given the previously mentioned challenges with an alibi defense, the Toryanskis 
made an objectively reasonable decision to forego such a defense. There was no deficient 
performance. 
iv. 
State’s Evidence 
 
Lastly, Abdullah argues that the State’s evidence weighed heavily in favor of presenting 
an alibi defense. The State’s evidence demonstrated that Angie had an acute overdose of 
fluoxetine in her blood that contributed to her death. At the time of her death, Angie had a full 
stomach with a partially digested meal, but her gastric contents contained very little fluoxetine. 
According to the State’s experts Dr. Barbieri and Dr. Backer, Angie would have ingested the 
fluoxetine before her last meal sometime between 10:00 p.m. and midnight. Marjorie Wood 
placed Abdullah in Mountain Home a little after midnight, however. This evidence indicates 
Abdullah did not administer the fluoxetine to Angie in person.  
 
Although the State’s evidence did present a question as to how, and if, Abdullah 
personally administered the fluoxetine to Angie, this question did not mandate an alibi defense. 
Instead, the Toryanskis made the strategic decision to utilize this evidence to pursue a suicide 
defense. Focusing on this point in closing argument, Mitch stated, “So whatever reason that 
toxicology reads like it does, there’s one overriding fact, and that is that there is no fact in 
evidence connecting Azad to Prozac. None.” The choice to pursue a suicide defense comported 
with the State’s evidence and Abdullah’s concession that he was in Boise the night of the crime. 
This was an objectively reasonable decision at the time of trial. 
v. 
Summary 
 
The proposed alibi testimony lacked coherence and presented an implausible story. When 
considered in light of Abdullah’s concession that he was in Boise in the early morning hours of 
October 5, 2002, the Toryanskis’ decision to pursue a suicide defense instead of an alibi defense 
 
155 
was objectively reasonable. See Wright v. United States, 979 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C. 2009) (where 
potential alibi witnesses would present conflicting versions of events, an attorney’s decision not 
to call them is reasonable); Gilmore v. State, 712 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (where 
potential alibi witnesses’ testimony is inconsistent and contradicts defendant’s testimony, 
counsel does not provide ineffective assistance in failing to call such witnesses). Abdullah failed 
to present evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review and thus failed to establish deficient performance. Likewise, 
Abdullah has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different result based the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt and the attenuated, improbable facts that allegedly would 
support the alibi defense. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, this Court 
affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
35. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to counsel conceding Abdullah’s presence in Boise the 
night of the murder. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
conceding his presence in Boise in the early morning hours of October 5, 2002.  
a. 
Facts 
 
In closing argument, Mitch conceded Abdullah’s presence in Boise. Specifically, Mitch 
stated as follows: 
 
Now, let me tell you right up front we are not going to be arguing that 
Azad did not drive to Boise on the morning of 5 October, 2002. We’re not going 
to do that. Obviously there’s evidence he did. But the essential thing you’ve got to 
know when deciding if the government’s [sic] proved their charge here in this 
case is what happened inside that house because it is inside that house that Angela 
Abdullah died before the fire and it is in the garage of that house where the 
accidental ignition occurred. What happened inside that house and who beyond 
any reasonable doubt is responsible, that is the fundamental question that you’ll 
have to decide. 
 
The remainder of the Toryanskis’ argument focused on a suicide defense, disputed the State’s 
theories of motive, and generally called into question the State’s evidence.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The right to effective assistance extends to closing arguments. See Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701–02 (2002); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 
(1975). Nonetheless, counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a 
client, and deference to counsel’s tactical decisions in his closing presentation is 
particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate defense strategy at 
 
156 
that stage. Closing arguments should “sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution 
by the trier of fact,” Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, but which issues to sharpen and 
how best to clarify them are questions with many reasonable answers. Indeed, it 
might sometimes make sense to forgo closing argument altogether. See Bell, 535 
U.S. at 701–02. Judicial review of a defense attorney’s summation is therefore 
highly deferential . . . .  
 
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003). 
 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah first argues that the concession that he was in Boise reduced the State’s burden 
of proof and was tantamount to a confession. This is a mischaracterization of Mitch’s argument. 
Mitch’s concession that Abdullah was in Boise did not amount to a concession of guilt for the 
crimes charged.51 Mitch maintained that there was no evidence connecting Abdullah to the 
fluoxetine found in Angie’s blood. Mitch also attempted to focus the jury on the lack of evidence 
regarding what occurred inside the Siesta residence the night of the crime. At this point in the 
case, the State had presented the following evidence to establish Abdullah’s presence in Boise: a 
cape at the scene was identical in appearance to the one purchased by Abdullah in Salt Lake 
City; a gas can at the scene was identical in appearance to the one purchased by Abdullah in Salt 
Lake City; DNA evidence on the cape from which Abdullah could not be excluded as a minor 
contributor; Wood placed Abdullah in Mountain Home at approximately midnight on the night 
of the crime; only Abdullah’s favorite child N.A. was removed from the burning home; there 
was no forced entry into the Siesta residence; no one saw Abdullah in Salt Lake City from 
approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 4, 2002, to 7:00 a.m. on October 5, 2002; Abdullah 
purchased more gasoline than could fit into the tank of his vehicle; and the expert testing of the 
                                                 
51 We recognize that such concessions (or partial concessions) of guilt in opening statement or closing argument 
have been upheld by federal appellate courts. See Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Where 
counsel acknowledges, in closing argument, the overwhelming weight of evidence that has been admitted against his 
client, even conceding his client’s guilt, we have found that such an acknowledgment of the obvious may be a trial 
tactic that does not reach the level of ineffective assistance.”); Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1161–62 (10th Cir. 
1999) (court held counsel pursued a reasonable strategy in conceding guilt to a rape charge defendant had confessed 
to in an attempt to persuade the jury defendant was not guilty of first-degree murder charge or to spare defendant’s 
life); United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 624–25 (5th Cir. 1999) (where defense counsel implicated his client in 
the drug trade during closing argument, court held such action was a “reasonable strategic approach of trying to 
establish his credibility with the jury and enhance his chances that the jury would accept his arguments on the more 
serious counts,” in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt adduced at trial); United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 
409 (1st Cir. 1991) (counsel’s concession to jury that defendant was guilty of one of three offenses “was a tactical 
decision, designed to lead the jury towards leniency on the other charges and to provide a basis for a later argument . 
. . for a lighter sentence”); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging guilt can be an 
effectual tactic when evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is advantage to be gained by making such 
acknowledgment). 
 
157 
gasoline additives and fuel components. Further, the State presented ample evidence of motive 
and intent. Based on the overwhelming nature of this evidence establishing Abdullah’s presence 
in Boise, the defense investigator Terry Murphy testified that Mitch felt he would lose the jury if 
he attempted to argue otherwise. The fact that this strategy proved unsuccessful is not the 
standard by which an ineffective assistance claim is reviewed; rather, counsel’s performance 
must be evaluated with a high degree of deference and without the distorting effects of hindsight. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Given the wide discretion afforded counsel in closing arguments, the 
Toryanskis made an objectively reasonable tactical decision to concede Abdullah’s presence in 
Boise.  
 
Next, Abdullah contends that the district court’s finding that counsel pursued a strategy 
of trying to avoid death was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. A review of 
the record proves otherwise. First, we note that the district court did not find that Mitch conceded 
guilt or abandoned the guilt phase arguments. The district court simply found due to the 
overwhelming evidence that Abdullah was in Boise counsel made the strategic choice to concede 
his presence, which would aid Abdullah in avoiding a potential death sentence. At the 
evidentiary hearing, Murphy testified that he felt one reason for making the concession was he 
did not want to lose the jury. Such a factor is important not only to the guilt phase, but also the 
sentencing phase. The district court’s finding was supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.52 
 
Abdullah also contends that the concession was against his express instructions to 
counsel. In addition to the concession being a strategic decision made by counsel, the district 
court found Abdullah acquiesced to this strategy and Abdullah’s assertion that he objected was 
not credible. There was substantial and competent evidence to support this finding. For example, 
Kim testified that Abdullah was advised they would make the concession and she and Mitch 
believed doing so “would really help his case and resonate with the jury.” Mitch also testified 
that he or Kim would have presented Abdullah with a document explaining the plan to concede 
his presence in Boise. Thus, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the district 
court’s finding that Abdullah acquiesced to the strategy of conceding his presence in Boise. 
                                                 
52 Even if the district court’s finding on this point was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, where 
the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct 
theory. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001). For the reasons set forth, the district court 
reached the correct result. 
 
158 
 
Finally, Abdullah failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result had 
the Toryanskis not made the concession he was in Boise. Again, the State presented 
overwhelming evidence of Abdullah’s presence in Boise. Accordingly, this Court affirms the 
district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
36. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the right to testify in the guilt and penalty phases 
and to allocute.  
 
Abdullah asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his claims regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel on his right to testify and allocution. He argues that the 
Toryanskis deficiently advised him that he would have to testify in the narrative form during the 
guilt phase because his testimony would be false. Abdullah also maintains that the Toryanskis 
deficiently advised him on his right to allocution, which caused him to waive his right to testify 
and allocute in the penalty phase. He submits that both deficient performances prejudiced him 
because there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the guilt phase and penalty phase would 
have been different had he testified. 
 
Abdullah also states in a footnote that this Court must determine whether he “was denied 
his fundamental right to testify” in the guilt phase. He submits that this Court must “evaluat[e] 
whether Azad proved he was deprived of his right to testify, and if so, whether the State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that deprivation was harmless.” For this issue to differ from his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we assume that Abdullah is alleging he was somehow 
coerced or forced to waive his right to testify. This allegation, however, is unsupported by the 
record. The district court found that “trial counsel and their investigator credibly testified that 
they believed testifying held potential dangers for Abdullah but that it was his decision.” 
Abdullah’s defense team informed him that he was the only one who could make the decision to 
testify. The district court also found that it engaged in a colloquy with Abdullah on his right to 
testify. Abdullah then waived his right to testify. Thus, the district court properly found no one 
intentionally deprived Abdullah of his right to testify based on the record (excluding any 
deprivation of his right to testify based on ineffective assistance of counsel). Therefore, this 
Court rejects Abdullah’s argument that he was deprived the fundamental right to testify through 
means other than ineffective assistance of counsel. 
a. 
Abdullah did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his right to 
testify in the guilt phase.  
 
159 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis were deficient because they improperly advised him 
on his right to testify at the guilt phase. He asserts that he would have offered exculpatory 
testimony on his activities on October 4 and 5, 2002, such as an explanation of his purchase of 
the gas can and cape and the phone call to Imam Din. He further suggests that he was prejudiced 
because, but for the Toryanskis’ deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability his 
exculpatory testimony would have changed the outcome at trial.  
 
The district court found that the defense team knew Abdullah intended to testify falsely 
based on the “firm factual basis” standard. Due to the Toryanskis’ knowledge that Abdullah 
intended to testify falsely, the district court found that they advised him of the dangers of 
testifying and also that he would have to testify in the narrative form. The district court 
determined that this advice was proper because a criminal defendant has no constitutional right 
to present false testimony. Further, the district court recognized that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct barred the Toryanskis from presenting false testimony as officers of the 
court. Therefore, the district court ruled that the Toryanskis were not deficient in advising 
Abdullah of the scope of his right to testify. Further, the district court ruled, “Abdullah has not 
shown how he was prejudiced even assuming he was prevented from testifying during the guilt 
phase.” Based on Abdullah’s letter to the Toryanskis reflecting his intended testimony, the 
district court found that “there is no way it would have changed the outcome of the trial.”  
i. 
The district court adopted and applied the correct standard to determine 
the Toryanskis knew Abdullah would testify falsely at his trial.  
 
 
 We first review the district court’s factual findings regarding this claim. The district 
court explicitly found: “Abdullah is not a credible witness.” The district court explained, 
“Abdullah irrefutably misled and lied to his trial counsel and investigator from the very 
beginning of their representation in several material aspects.” For example, Abdullah informed 
his counsel about a potential alibi witness, which he later confessed did not exist. Similarly, 
Abdullah consistently informed his counsel he was present at the scene of the crime—even 
stating “he actually moved the body” and describing “the body’s condition”—but later informed 
his counsel he was in Salt Lake City the night of the crime. The district court stated, “Since 
December 2003, Abdullah had been telling his counsel and their investigator that he had been at 
the scene and had moved the body. . . . Prior to his admission in December 2003, he lied to them 
about potential witnesses and evidence.” His defense team would investigate these leads, learn 
that the witness or evidence did not exist, and then Abdullah would admit that he lied to them. 
 
160 
The district court recognized, “While it is true that as they approached trial, Abdullah told [his 
defense team] he wanted to testify that he was in Salt Lake City and gave various versions of 
what that testimony might look like, there is no credible evidence that he ever indicated that he 
wanted to testify that way because it was the truth.” The district court found, “Abdullah 
constantly modified his story that he told his trial counsel and his investigator in an effort to fit 
the evidence and to put himself in a more favorable light.” The district court also found, “It is 
clear from all of the evidence that Abdullah did not want to testify unless trial counsel 
affirmatively elicited testimony from him that they understood was false. It is clear from the 
evidence, Abdullah wanted them to lead him through stories that were constantly evolving.”  
 
On the day before Abdullah waived his right to testify, November 15, 2004, “he wrote 
down a new story that involved him being in Salt Lake City . . . . [that] contained elements that 
his trial counsel had actually investigated and knew were demonstrably false.” In this letter, he 
informed his counsel: 
 
This is why I want to testify. After we came back from Tennesse [sic] 
someone told my wife that Azad and another girl went to a trip in Las Vagas [sic] 
while you were in the Hospital/Nashville. This is when my wife asked did you go 
to S. Africa and if you did tell me about it what was it like. I did not tell her 
directly No I didn’t go Nor did I say yes I did go. I did not need to go to S. Africa 
period because of what I found about it. It was a place of crime & dangerous for 
family and kids and my wife went it [sic] to go there over Saudi Arabia. I didn’t 
give her any straight answer so she automaticaly [sic] thought I realy [sic] did go 
to Las Vagas [sic] with a girl. After she checked my worked [sic] & it showed 
that I was in town [and] working but it was to [sic] late and her trust & feelings 
were unstable. So when I was going to Salt Lack [sic] City she wanted me to take 
[A.H.] & I refused to take [A.H.] & [R.A.] both so she became suspicious again. 
 
So she had her Plann [sic] to have someone follow me or spy on me. I 
notice at the time of this when I was in hotel. After I went to hotel from 7 eleven 
about 10–11 p.m. I have forgotten the side rice that I bought in the car/van so I 
went to get it between the commercial. As I opened the van I found the middle 
door open. It was not big deal at first. So I went and closed it & went back to the 
room. Ate rice watch t.v. and started thinking about the door for long time 
because I know me or [R.A.] were not exited it from that door so I did start to be 
syspicious [sic]. [R.A.] was a sleep [sic] I put him in the van and went down to 
the gas station next to the 6 motel and called with cash because the phone card 
was not working at that time as you know. I did called [sic] I know it was after 
11:30 and may be before 12:30 or after little bit not 100% sure. When she 
answered the phone [N.A.] & [M.A.] were both crying and I said “was someone 
following me?” she said “yes, I know don’t tell me I’m crazy”. And she begin 
crying on the phone “I said when will you trust me Honey”? she said “Please be 
 
161 
patient with me for little while” Also she said “Please don’t ever take any trip 
without us”.  
 
I said “I have to go [R.A.] is sleeping see you tomorrow” That is when I 
hanged up. I did not check any of the items I bought weather [sic] they were in the 
van or not in fact I did not know what has happened to them or where they went 
till I came to Boise few days after that and the media. I did had [sic] one can of 
gas in the van I thought that was the only thing missing I didn’t know the cape & 
mask were missing also.  
 
My wife has done this in the past after [N.A.] was Born in the help of 
Wally’s [sic] her stepfather and I know of one time at work Also she has done 
this. Can you ask me questions if I do testify please? 
 
As recognized by the district court, “Not only was this an entirely new and very elaborate story 
diametrically opposed to the story he had been telling them consistently for over nine months, at 
least some of the story trial counsel knew was false.”53  
 
Based on the evidence in the record, the district court concluded the Toryanskis had a 
“firm factual basis” that Abdullah would testify falsely. Abdullah argues that the district court 
applied the incorrect standard. He asserts that the ethical rules require “actual knowledge of a 
client’s perjury before an attorney’s ethical obligation to take remedial action is triggered.” 
Applying this standard, Abdullah alleges that there is no evidence to indicate that his counsel 
actually knew he would commit perjury.  
 
“It is well established that a criminal defendant’s right to testify does not include the right 
to commit perjury.” LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998). “Whatever the scope of a 
constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying 
falsely.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986). In Whiteside, the defendant informed his 
counsel he would testify falsely at his trial. Id. at 166. In response, counsel warned the defendant 
that it was his duty to inform the court if the defendant committed perjury, he “probably would 
be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony,” and he would seek to withdraw if 
the defendant “insisted on committing perjury.” Id. at 161. The defendant did not commit perjury 
on the stand, but subsequently claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsel’s refusal 
to cooperate with the defendant’s intention of presenting perjured testimony as a defense at trial. 
Id. at 159, 162–63, 166. The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s assertion of 
error. The United States Supreme Court explained: 
                                                 
53 Even Abdullah’s affidavit in the post-conviction record is inconsistent with the November 15, 2004, letter. In this 
affidavit, Abdullah alleges that he decided to return to Boise the night of October 4, 2002, because Angie was upset 
on the phone, but he changed his mind after making it as far as Ogden, Utah, and returned to the Dream Inn.  
 
162 
 
In Strickland, we recognized counsel’s duty of loyalty and his overarching 
duty to advocate the defendant’s cause. Plainly, that duty is limited to legitimate, 
lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a search for truth. 
Although counsel must take all reasonable lawful means to attain the objectives of 
the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any way assisting the client 
in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law. . . . [T]he legal 
profession has accepted that an attorney’s ethical duty to advance the interests of 
his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and 
standards of professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not 
use false evidence.  
 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166–68 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant’s counsel’s actions fell “well within 
accepted standards of professional conduct and the range of reasonable professional conduct 
acceptable under Strickland.” Whiteside, 465 U.S. at 171. 
 
As explored in Whiteside, counsel does not engage in deficient performance by advising 
against or preventing the defendant from committing perjury. Yet Whiteside provides little 
guidance on the standard to determine whether counsel “knows” his client will commit perjury. 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (I.R.P.C.) fail to offer a definite standard as well. 
I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly” offering evidence that “the lawyer knows 
to be false,” including the testimony of his client. I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(3). The commentary to I.R.P.C. 
3.3 elaborates that the rule “requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s 
obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false 
evidence.” I.R.P.C. 3.3 cmt. [5]. This prohibition on the presentation of false evidence applies 
“to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases.” I.R.P.C. 3.3 cmt. [7]. Comment 8 
discusses the standard for “knowingly”:  
The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows 
that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does 
not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that 
evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, 
although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other 
evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.  
 
I.R.P.C. 3.3 cmt. [8]. I.R.P.C. 3.3 and the commentary provided above are identical to the 
American Bar Association’s model rule and comments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.3(a)(3) & cmts. [5], [7], [8] (1983). 
 
163 
 
The appropriate standard to determine a lawyer’s “knowledge” that his client’s testimony 
will be false is a matter of first impression for this Court. Other jurisdictions have addressed the 
issue, however, and come to various conclusions on the appropriate standard. As noted by the 
district court in this case, “Not unexpectedly, courts have adopted differing standards to 
determine what an attorney must ‘know’ before concluding that his client’s testimony will be 
perjurious.” The Honorable Raymond J. McKoski explained:  
[M]ost courts either refine or ignore the ABA’s actual knowledge standard and 
establish their own test to determine the sufficiency of the factual information 
supporting counsel’s belief that a defendant is about to lie on the stand. 
. . . Some courts interpret the ABA’s standard to require a “firm factual basis that 
the testimony will be false.” Other courts equate the firm factual basis test with 
“good cause to believe the defendant’s proposed testimony would be deliberately 
untruthful” or a good faith determination of untruthfulness “based on objective 
circumstances firmly rooted in fact.” Yet other courts describe the firm factual 
basis standard as no standard at all. Declining to adopt the firm factual basis test, 
Illinois established its own unique standard which affords defense counsel “great 
discretion” in making a good faith determination that the defendant will commit 
perjury. A few jurisdictions require that counsel possess proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a client will testify falsely.54 Another test requires 
“compelling support” for a conclusion that perjury is about to be committed. 
 
Raymond J. McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal Defendant: It’s All About the Lawyer, 
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1575, 1615–16 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Edward L. Wilkinson, 
“That’s a Damn Lie!”: Ethical Obligations of Counsel When a Witness Offers False Testimony 
in a Criminal Trial, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 407, 412–13 (2000) (reciting various standards for 
“knowledge”).  
 
Although some standards are more stringent than others, the courts generally agree on 
what will not suffice as “knowledge”:  
 
All tests require a belief based on articulable facts and not upon mere 
conjecture, speculation, or a “gut-level belief” that the defendant will lie. The fact 
that the accused’s version of events has internal inconsistencies or discrepancies 
has varied from time to time, or conflicts with other more convincing evidence is 
                                                 
54 For example, Wisconsin has adopted the one of the strictest standards: 
[W]e determine that an attorney may not substitute narrative questioning for the traditional 
question and answer format unless counsel knows that the client intends to testify falsely. Absent 
the most extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the client’s expressed 
admission of intent to testify untruthfully. While we recognize that the defendant’s admission need 
not be phrased in “magic words,” it must be unambiguous and directly made to the attorney. 
 
State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 514 (Wis. 2004). 
 
164 
insufficient. Indeed, even a “manifestly incredible” or “absurd” story does not 
mean that the defendant may not present it. 
 
McKoski, supra, at 1616 (footnotes omitted). 
 
In this case, the district court adopted the “firm factual basis” standard. This test has been 
used by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Lord v. Wood, 184 
F.3d 1083, 1095 n.9 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1198 (2000); United States v. Omene, 
143 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445–46 (8th Cir. 
1988); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977). The 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also recommends the firm factual basis standard:  
A lawyer’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. Actual 
knowledge does not include unknown information, even if a reasonable lawyer 
would have discovered it through inquiry. However, a lawyer may not ignore 
what is plainly apparent, for example, by refusing to read a document. A lawyer 
should not conclude that testimony is or will be false unless there is a firm factual 
basis for doing so. Such a basis exists when facts known to the lawyer or the 
client’s own statements indicate to the lawyer that the testimony or other evidence 
is false. 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (2000) (citation 
omitted). In addition, the firm factual basis standard has been adopted in California, People v. 
Riel, 998 P.2d 969, 1013 (Cal. 2000), Washington, State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1987), and Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1247 (Mass. 
2003).  
 
We hold that the firm factual basis standard is appropriate to determine whether counsel 
knows his client will testify falsely. The firm factual basis standard “satisfies constitutional 
concerns because it requires more than mere suspicion or conjecture on the part of counsel, more 
than a belief and more information than inconsistencies in statements by the defendant or in the 
evidence.” Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d at 1247 (footnote omitted). This standard also permits counsel 
to “act on the information he or she possesses” and does not “impose an independent duty on the 
part of counsel to investigate,” which would be “incompatible” with the fiduciary nature of the 
attorney-client relationship and “is unnecessary when an attorney relies, in significant part, on 
incriminating admissions made by the client.” Id. In contrast to the firm factual basis standard, 
we are persuaded that a standard of “actual knowledge” or knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt 
is “unworkable, as it will be all but impossible, particularly in the crucible of a trial where the 
evidence is often conflicting and counsel is under enormous stress, for counsel to ever know 
 
165 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s proposed testimony is false.” Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, No. CRIM. A. 9673CR0312, 2000 WL 33119695, at *20 (Mass. Dist. Ct., Super. Ct. 
Dec. 18, 2000), aff’d, Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237. Such a stringent standard “would be virtually 
impossible to satisfy unless the lawyer had a direct confession from his or her client or 
personally witnessed the event in question. Consequently, the standard of actual knowledge 
would eviscerate the rules of professional responsibility forbidding a lawyer from presenting 
perjured testimony.” State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 2002). The firm factual basis 
standard strikes a balance between the competing interests of the defendant’s constitutional right 
to testify and the attorney’s ethical obligation as an officer of the court.  
 
As explored above, the district court applied the firm factual basis standard to find that 
the Toryanskis knew Abdullah would testify falsely. The district court found: 
 
In this case, Abdullah’s trial counsel were not faced with mere 
discrepancies in details told to them by Abdullah at various times. Trial counsel 
were faced with direct and repeated admissions from Abdullah’s own lips that he 
had been present at the scene and even moved the body. Those admissions, 
combined with the substantial evidence produced by the State, corroborated his 
presence, producing a firm factual basis for their belief. The Court finds the 
record amply supports a finding that trial counsel had a firm basis in objective fact 
for their good faith determination that Abdullah intended to commit perjury. 
 
In light of the fact that Abdullah merely challenges the district court’s use of the firm factual 
basis standard, this assignment of error is rejected. The district court’s factual findings were not 
clearly erroneous. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014). In fact, the 
district court’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
Therefore, the district court adopted and applied the correct standard to determine the Toryanskis 
knew Abdullah would testify falsely at his trial. 
ii. 
Abdullah’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on the prejudice 
prong. 
 
 
We resolve Abdullah’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his right to testify 
in the guilt phase on the prejudice prong from Strickland.  
 
In Whiteside, the majority opinion examined both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of 
Strickland to hold that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
his counsel’s refusal to assist his client with a defense based on false testimony. Whiteside, 475 
U.S. at 171, 175–76. The United States Supreme Court explained in its prejudice analysis:  
 
166 
 
Whether he was persuaded or compelled to desist from perjury, Whiteside 
has no valid claim that confidence in the result of his trial has been diminished by 
his desisting from the contemplated perjury. Even if we were to assume that the 
jury might have believed his perjury, it does not follow that Whiteside was 
prejudiced.  
 
Id. at 175–76. Thus, the United States Supreme Court held that, “as a matter of law, counsel’s 
conduct complained of here cannot establish the prejudice.” Id. at 175. In other words, there was 
no reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different based on false 
testimony. 
 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, concurred in the 
judgment in Whiteside and stated that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
should be resolved on the prejudice prong only—without “attempting to resolve this thorny 
problem” of “[h]ow a defense attorney ought to act when faced with a client who intends to 
commit perjury at trial.” Id. at 177–78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Blackmun explained: 
 
This Court long ago noted: “All perjured relevant testimony is at war with 
justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot 
be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial.” When the 
Court has been faced with a claim by a defendant concerning prosecutorial use of 
such evidence, it has “consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing 
use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury.” Similarly, the Court has viewed a defendant’s use of such 
testimony as so antithetical to our system of justice that it has permitted the 
prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to combat it. The 
proposition that presenting false evidence could contribute to (or that withholding 
such evidence could detract from) the reliability of a criminal trial is simply 
untenable. 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . To the extent that Whiteside’s claim rests on the assertion that he would have 
been acquitted had he been able to testify falsely, Whiteside claims a right the law 
simply does not recognize. “A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a 
lawless 
decisionmaker, 
even 
if 
a 
lawless 
decision 
cannot 
be 
reviewed.” Since Whiteside was deprived of neither a fair trial nor any of the 
specific constitutional rights designed to guarantee a fair trial, he has suffered no 
prejudice. 
 
Id. at 185–87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The same reasoning expressed in the 
majority opinion and Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Whiteside applies here. Abdullah cannot 
establish prejudice because as a matter of law the presentation of false testimony has no 
 
167 
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Assuming the Toryanskis were deficient in 
advising Abdullah to testify in the narrative form and further assuming but for their deficient 
advice Abdullah would have testified in his defense, the Toryanskis nonetheless would have 
elicited false testimony. A claim that Abdullah “would have been acquitted” based on false 
testimony is a claim “the law simply does not recognize.” Id. at 186. For this reason, Abdullah 
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel by the Toryanskis’ advice on Abdullah’s right to 
testify in the guilt phase. This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
b. 
Abdullah did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his right to 
testify and allocute in the penalty phase.  
 
Abdullah argues that the district court did not have substantial and competent evidence to 
find that the Toryanskis properly advised Abdullah of the scope of allocution during the penalty 
phase. Abdullah relies on the defense investigator’s testimony to demonstrate that the Toryanskis 
“told Azad if he waived his right to testify, he would be able to address the jury on a broad range 
of topics through allocution.” Based on this testimony, Abdullah asserts that the Toryanskis 
misinformed Abdullah about the scope of allocution, which caused him to waive his right to 
testify and allocute in the penalty phase. Abdullah further argues that he was prejudiced by the 
Toryanskis’ deficient performance because Abdullah would have testified during the penalty 
phase or made a statement of allocution but for the Toryanskis’ “interference.”55 According to 
Abdullah, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the penalty phase would have been 
different had he testified or offered a statement of allocution.  
 
The district court determined that the Toryanskis were not deficient. Based on the 
evidence in the record, the district court found:  
[Abdullah’s] trial counsel properly advised him and encouraged him to allocute; 
they did not tell him he could dispute guilt phase evidence during allocution. 
Indeed, trial counsel, Mitch Toryanski, credibly testified that they did not advise 
Abdullah to waive his right to testify during the guilt phase because he would be 
able to challenge guilt phase evidence during allocution and not be subject to 
cross examination. In fact, trial counsel credibly testified he would not have told 
him anything like that. The Court finds that his testimony is credible. 
                                                 
55 Abdullah again states in his brief that the parties and the district court discussed outside Abdullah’s presence that 
the district court would allow the defense to reopen the mitigation phase so Abdullah could testify. Abdullah 
contends the record “fails to reflect the court or counsel told Azad of the court’s decision” to allow for the defense to 
reopen its case. This statement is untrue. The record plainly shows that Abdullah was present and discussed with the 
district court that he could reopen the mitigation phase if he wished to testify.  
 
168 
 
The Court further finds that Abdullah’s trial counsel were prepared to help 
Abdullah present proper mitigation during allocution including helping him 
display photographs and going over material. Trial counsel credibly recalled 
explaining to Abdullah the allocution rules described by the Court. 
 
Turning to prejudice, the district court determined that “there is no evidence that [Abdullah’s] 
failure to allocute affected the jury’s decision in the penalty phase.”  
 
The district court also noted that Abdullah primarily sought to raise issues pertaining to 
the guilt phase of trial, rather than address the issues relevant to sentencing and mitigation. The 
district court explained: 
Abdullah was well aware that he had the right to allocute to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment and that it was his decision to decide 
whether to allocute. His trial counsel did not misinform him.  
 
Abdullah, however, indicated to the Court that he wanted to make 
statements directly challenging his guilt and to introduce evidence to be 
considered by the jury. Moreover, he wanted to do it without being under oath or 
subject to cross-examination. As the Court informed him, he could no longer 
challenge his guilt once the jury had found him guilty and his unsworn statements 
regarding evidence introduced in the guilt phase was simply not allowed; they 
were irrelevant and did not constitute mitigation. 
. . . .  
. . . Moreover, at the end of the penalty phase after the defense had rested, the 
Court unmistakably offered Abdullah the opportunity to re-open the sentencing 
phase and take the stand and testify, but he refused. 
 
i. 
The Toryanskis were not deficient in their advice on the scope of 
allocution. 
 
Abdullah argues that the district court erroneously discounted the credible testimony of 
defense investigator Murphy in order to find that the Toryanskis did not deficiently advise 
Abdullah of the scope of allocution. Abdullah contends that the district court should have given 
weight to Murphy’s testimony over the vague testimony of Mitch Toryanski. He submits that the 
evidence shows he was misinformed that he could “tell his story.”  
 
The district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). “A factual finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is not supported by ‘substantial and competent evidence in the record.’” 
Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995) (quoting Pace v. Hymas, 111 
Idaho 581, 589, 726 P.2d 693, 701 (1986)). “The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely 
within the province of the district court.” Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382. “There is a 
 
169 
‘strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional 
assistance.’” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999) (quoting Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). 
 
Abdullah’s argument is meritless because this Court will not disturb the district court’s 
well-supported factual findings. Further, Abdullah misconstrues investigator Murphy’s testimony 
on appeal. Based on the evidence in the record, the district court had substantial and competent 
evidence to find that the Toryanskis did not advise Abdullah he could “tell his story” in 
allocution without any limitations on the scope.  
 
Abdullah misrepresents Murphy’s testimony on appeal. At the evidentiary hearing, 
Murphy first testified that he did not “recall specifically” any discussions with the Toryanskis 
and Abdullah concerning allocution. Murphy subsequently recalled that he had received a letter 
from Abdullah and had met with Mitch to discuss the letter. In this letter, Abdullah wrote to 
Murphy: 
 
There is something that I need to talk to you about. Something very 
important. I don’t want to talk to Kim & Mitch because we are starting the trail 
[sic] & I don’t want them to be mad or get their mind off of the trial or for picking 
the Jorrs [sic]. 
 
So I know that you also will be angry & mad but I feel strongly about this 
and must know and you decide if I should tell Kim & Mitch. 
 
I decited [sic] to tell you this after hearing the Jorrs [sic] and the 
seriousness of this case. Also I want to testify in trial and want Kim & Mitch to 
help me for that so I feel they should know and also I don’t want to hide any 
things from Kim and Mitch. 
 
They are for me and my kids for that reson [sic] I don’t want to keep any 
secrets from them. It’s not easy for me to be fully opened [sic] person that easy 
but I must be so that Kim & Mitch can get me fair trial. It’s going to harm my 
case and may be help me I don’t know. I have being [sic] unfair to you & Kim & 
Mitch wich [sic] I don’t want to have any of that from now on. 
 
To give you a heads up It’s about me coming to Boise from Salt Lack [sic] 
City that night. 
. . . Also I hope that this will not create any more troubles. My intentions are only 
to do what is right. I know It’s little bit too late sorry for that. 
 
In the margin near the italicized language, Murphy had written during his meeting with Mitch, 
“Mitch will have himself removed. No way. Do it at sentencing. No Cross.” 
 
During Murphy and Mitch’s discussion of this letter from Abdullah, Murphy testified that 
Mitch brought up allocution, which was the first time Murphy had heard the term. Murphy 
testified that Mitch “was explaining to me that at that time that it had to do with the defendant 
 
170 
getting up prior to sentencing and saying whatever he wanted to to the Court.” Murphy 
explained, “And we were talking about Mr. Abdullah wanting to tell his story, he wanted to say 
something to the Court. And Mr. Toryanski said that if Mr. Abdullah chooses not to testify at the 
trial, that he could still tell his story at allocution.” Murphy later met with Abdullah and he 
testified that he did not think that he talked about allocution, but also that he did not recall the 
allocution issue. Upon questioning by the district court, Murphy clarified, “[A]ll I understood 
was that if Mr. Abdullah had been found guilty, there would be some time prior to his sentencing 
that he would be able to stand before the Court. And that was reference to his allocution.” 
Murphy testified that he did not know whether Mitch “was talking about the traditional 
allocution” before the Court or “about something that occurred during the sentencing phase” 
with the jury. He also explained that he was “just the investigator and this was in passing as a 
brief explanation to me as an investigator, not being an attorney, to explain allocution to me.”  
 
 Abdullah argues that this testimony supports a finding that his counsel told him he could 
tell his story during allocution. Abdullah’s argument is misplaced for more than one reason. 
First, the evidence he relies on reflects a conversation between Mitch and Murphy wherein Mitch 
briefly explained in passing the term allocution. Murphy’s testimony shed no light on the 
Toryanskis’ understanding of what Abdullah’s “story” at sentencing would entail. Along the 
same lines, this conversation has little to no influence on the determination of the legal advice 
given to Abdullah by the Toryanskis. Hence, it was reasonable for the district court to base its 
factual finding on the testimony of Mitch, rather than Murphy. Mitch’s testimony provides: 
Q. [by the State] Now, with regard to allocution, did you inform Mr. Abdullah 
that it was his decision whether or not he would make an allocution to the jury? 
 
A. [by Mitch Toryanski] Yes. 
 
Q. And did you inform him that he had that right? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Did you make the decision for him about allocution? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. And then -- and I think you said earlier, did you, in fact, encourage him that he 
should allocute? 
 
A. I did. I remember offering to display pictures on an overhead for him which he 
could then discuss to talk about his family and -- and other various things that he 
wanted to talk about. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
171 
THE COURT: Let me ask you two questions. What did you tell him he could say 
during allocution? And what’s the time frame that you would have had this 
discussion? 
 
THE WITNESS: Judge, it would have been -- I remember many -- many 
conversations and -- and I think some were held in the -- in chambers. I seem to 
remember Mr. Abdullah being -- being brought back. There were conversations in 
the courtroom. And there was discussions [sic] between counsel and the Court. 
And I -- I remember encouraging him to -- to allocute. As far as we told him what 
he could and could not say, I recall making notes when the Court set out the -- the 
rules and -- and explaining as best as I could what those rules were to him. 
 
Similar to Mitch’s testimony, Kim explained, “I -- I think that Mitch and I together with Azad 
were trying to convey that this was an important opportunity for him and that it was different. 
And -- and we -- I remember Mitch very much wanting to help to elicit that -- that allocution 
testimony.” Kim testified, “I think there may have been a conversation in court on that, too, 
about the differences” between allocution and testimony. Kim did not remember the differences, 
but she testified, “I believe, it went beyond just the conversations that Mitch and I would have 
had directly with Mr. Abdullah, the scope of an allocution and -- that’s parameter -- the 
parameters of that, I think, was something that was considered in court.” Kim testified that she 
“[p]robably” discussed with Abdullah the subject matters of allocution, but she did not “really 
remember.” She did remember some photographs, however. Kim also testified, “I think we were 
interpreting [the areas Abdullah could cover in allocution] very broadly, that he would be able to 
-- he would be able to say what he wanted to say. But I also remember that we had a hearing in 
court and -- on the -- on the scope.”  
 
Based on this evidence in the record, the district court had substantial and competent 
evidence in the record to find: “Abdullah’s trial counsel were prepared to help Abdullah present 
proper mitigation during allocution including helping him display photographs and going over 
material. Trial counsel credibly recalled explaining to Abdullah the allocution rules described by 
the Court.” It was “solely within the province of the district court” to give weight to Kim’s, 
Mitch’s, and Murphy’s testimony on the scope of allocution and to draw inferences from their 
testimony. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382. Abdullah has identified no evidence to 
overcome the presumption of competent counsel and disturb the district court’s findings. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance”). Therefore, this Court rejects Abdullah’s assertion that this Court should reweigh the 
evidence and infer from Murphy’s testimony that the Toryanskis misinformed Abdullah on the 
 
172 
scope of allocution. Based on the evidence in the record, this Court affirms the district court’s 
determination that the Toryanskis were not deficient. 
ii. 
Even assuming the Toryanskis deficiently advised Abdullah on the scope 
of allocution, Abdullah was not prejudiced by their deficient performance. 
 
 
Abdullah argues that there a reasonable probability the outcome at sentencing would have 
been different had he presented mitigating evidence through testimony or allocution. This Court 
concludes that Abdullah has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
 
Any error in Abdullah’s counsel’s deficient performance on the scope of allocution was 
cured by the district court’s multiple colloquies with Abdullah on his right to testify and allocute 
in the penalty phase and the scope of such testimony and allocution. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 
159, 167–68, 321 P.3d 709, 717–18 (2014). In Murray, the Court stated that “the district court’s 
efforts” to inform the defendant of his Estrada rights, which counsel had deficiently failed to 
advise on, “bear on the prejudice prong of Strickland.” Murray, 156 Idaho at 167, 321 P.3d at 
717. The Court explained that the record conclusively established that the defendant fully 
understood his Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them after the district court informed the 
defendant of his Estrada rights. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167–68, 321 P.3d at 717–18. The Court 
held that the defendant failed to show prejudice because there was not a substantial likelihood or 
reasonable probability of a different result had the defendant’s counsel not been deficient. Id. at 
168, 321 P.3d at 718. In this case, the district court advised Abdullah multiple times of his right 
to testify and allocute. The district court described to Abdullah the differences between 
testimony and allocution numerous times. The district court explained to Abdullah that he could 
reopen mitigation and testify and that he could allocute. The district court also explained in great 
detail the permissible scope of allocution. At one point, the district court went through 
Abdullah’s written allocution statement subject by subject and examined which subjects were 
admissible. Even with counsel’s assumed deficient performance, Abdullah still chose not to 
testify or allocute after receiving the proper advisements from the district court many times. 
Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability the result would have been any different but for 
his counsel’s deficient performance.  
 
Our conclusion on the prejudice prong is further bolstered by Abdullah’s proposed 
testimony and allocution in the penalty phase. Abdullah submits that he  
wanted to testify at the penalty phase about a number of issues, including his 
relationship with Angie and their children, Angie’s conversion to Islam, the affair, 
 
173 
his discussions with Angie about moving out of the country and selling the home, 
the vending machine business, the financial situation of their house, and the fact 
he never asked Steven Bankhead to kill Angie.  
 
He also asserts: 
Mitigating evidence has the ability to tip the scales in favor of life. Azad’s 
testimony was mitigating evidence that would have demonstrated to the jury he 
loved Angie, he loved his children, he regretted having the affair but believed 
Angie forgave him, his feelings about divorce, his Kurdish cultural beliefs, his 
experiences in Kurdistan, and his family’s journey to Turkey and the United 
States. 
 
 
We recognize that simply because Abdullah wanted to testify about a certain subject does 
not mean that he would have been permitted to do so. The district court repeatedly explained to 
Abdullah that he could not use his penalty phase testimony to address issues pertaining to the 
guilt phase, including his overseas trips and the family’s plan to move overseas. The district 
court also explained that Abdullah could not use allocution to raise factual issues or address non-
mitigation subjects, including his contact with Bankhead, Angie’s wish for her family to accept 
her as Muslim, his frustrations about his lack of participation in his case, and extensive 
discussion on his denial of guilt. In addition, the defense presented mitigating evidence on 
Abdullah’s experiences in Kurdistan and his family’s journey to Turkey and the United States 
through an expert of the Kurdish situation and Abdullah’s family. Thus, much of Abdullah’s 
proposed testimony or allocution would have been cumulative or irrelevant.56 Based on the 
evidence presented at trial, there is not a reasonable probability the jury would not have 
sentenced Abdullah to death but for his counsel’s deficient performance regarding his right to 
testify or allocute in the penalty phase. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (“Given the overwhelming 
aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability the omitted evidence would have changed 
the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, 
hence, the sentence imposed.”) This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
                                                 
56 At sentencing for the remaining charges, the district court also recognized Abdullah’s lack of remorse:  
 
Mr. Abdullah in his writing appears to suggest that somehow his life is justified. He did not appear 
to recognize or acknowledge the impact his actions have had on others and instead wrapped 
himself in his beliefs not acknowledging the pain the victims feel until today in court. In his 
writing he talks about his piety and own loss. But until today in court throughout his more than 40-
page [sentencing] statement, he did not express any empathy for the victims, his own children or 
family, including his own immediate family. Finally today he acknowledged for the first time that 
the children may have been hurt by this.  
 
174 
37. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during jury selection. 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance in conducting voir 
dire and selecting a jury, which led to the empaneling of a biased jury. 
a. 
Facts 
 
Prospective jurors were each provided a forty-five page questionnaire that included 
inquiries about general background, knowledge of the law, facts of the case, and views of the 
death penalty. The portion addressing views about the death penalty was extensive. After 
reviewing the completed questionnaires from jurors, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of a 
number of jurors for cause. The remaining jurors were brought in for voir dire and a petit jury 
was selected.  
b. 
Standard of Review 
 
The right to due process encompasses the opportunity to question jurors in order to 
disclose grounds for removal for cause during voir dire. The United States Supreme Court has 
said: 
The Constitution, after all, does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that 
the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Even so, part of the guarantee of a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify 
unqualified jurors. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1950); 
Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 259 (1950). “Voir dire plays a critical 
function in assuring the criminal defendant that his [constitutional] right to an 
impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s 
responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to 
follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.” 
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
Hence, “[t]he exercise of [the trial court’s] discretion, and the restriction upon 
inquiries at the request of counsel, [are] subject to the essential demands of 
fairness.” Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). 
 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729–30 (1992) (alterations in original). 
 
In a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when “the juror’s views 
would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). “[A] juror who in no case would vote for capital 
punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed 
for cause.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728. Conversely, “[a] juror who will automatically vote for the 
death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and 
 
175 
mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do” and must also be removed for 
cause. Id. at 729. 
 
“The choice of questions to ask prospective jurors during voir dire is largely a matter of 
trial tactics.” Milton v. State, 126 Idaho 638, 641, 888 P.2d 812, 815 (Ct. App. 1995). These 
tactical decisions made by counsel will not be second-guessed on post-conviction relief, unless 
made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); 
Milton, 126 Idaho at 641, 888 P.2d at 815. See also State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 
127, 148 (1997) (tactical decisions not to remove jurors will not be questioned by the Court on 
appeal).  
 
 
Other jurisdictions employ an equally deferential approach. See, e.g., Echols v. State, 127 
S.W.3d 486, 502 (Ark. 2003) (“This court will not label counsel ineffective merely because of 
possible bad tactics or strategy in selecting a jury.”); People v. Reese, 460 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1984) (the review of counsel’s performance in an ineffective assistance claim does not 
extend to areas involving trial tactics or strategy, such as jury selection); State v. Adams, 576 
S.E.2d 377, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]rial counsel are necessarily given wide latitude in 
matters involving strategic and tactical decisions such as which jurors to accept or strike.”); State 
v. Lindsey, 721 N.E.2d 995, 1007 (Ohio 2000) (“[C]ounsel’s failure to rehabilitate jurors does 
not render trial counsel ineffective, as counsel is in a better position to determine whether the 
jurors merited in-depth examination.”). 
c. 
Analysis 
 
Abdullah’s argument consists of three parts: (1) the stipulation to excuse jurors for cause; 
(2) inadequate voir dire of the venire; and (3) inadequate voir dire of the panel. 
i. 
The decision to stipulate to excuse certain jurors for cause before voir dire 
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Prior to voir dire, the district court requested that the parties review the completed juror 
questionnaires to determine whether individual jurors should be excused for cause without 
requiring those jurors to come to court. The district court explained that these jurors would be 
excused for cause only by stipulation and it would not grant any for cause challenges without 
voir dire. The Toryanskis emailed the State a list of thirteen jurors which they believed should be 
struck for cause. The Toryanskis contended that these jurors had already judged Abdullah’s guilt, 
could not consider mitigating evidence, or would hold it against Abdullah if he did not testify. 
 
176 
The State refused to stipulate to strike any of the jurors requested.57 The State also emailed the 
Toryanskis a list of seventeen jurors which they proposed be struck by stipulation. The 
Toryanskis stipulated to twelve of these jurors being struck for cause, including the following 
jurors: 12, 15, 64, 75, 82, 117, and 154. 
 
Abdullah contends that the Toryanskis’ stipulation was attributable to fatigue and a desire 
to appear reasonable to the State in order to procure a favorable plea deal.58 A review of the 
questionnaires, however, reveals that sound strategic and tactical reasons support the Toryanskis’ 
decision to stipulate.  
 
Initially, we note that every juror challenged by Abdullah in this section chose the 
following statement as most accurately representing their view on the death penalty: “I am 
personally, morally, or religiously opposed to the death penalty, and would never vote to impose 
it, regardless of the facts and the law in the case.” Harboring this view of the death penalty is 
sufficient reason in and of itself to stipulate to the removal of such jurors. See Morgan, 504 U.S. 
at 728 (“[A] juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her 
instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.”). In the discussion below, 
we review additional information in each juror’s questionnaire that demonstrates further tactical 
and strategic reasons for the Toryanskis’ stipulation. 
(1) 
Jurors 12, 15, 82, and 15459 
 
Abdullah submits the same argument with respect to Jurors 12, 15, 82 and 154. He argues 
that these jurors were not per se excludable for cause. He explains that these jurors provided a 
potential inconsistency in their responses in that the jurors indicated their views would not 
prevent or impair their impartiality, but the jurors also stated that they could not impose the death 
penalty regardless of the facts and law. Abdullah also argues that these jurors’ position on the 
death penalty was unclear because they may have opposed the death penalty based only on the 
belief that innocent people have been wrongly executed. 
                                                 
57 While Kim could not recall the outcome of this email at deposition, both parties agree the State refused to 
stipulate.  
58 Abdullah attempts to incorporate by reference his detailed argument regarding each one of these jurors from his 
final amended petition. This Court declines to address these specific challenges, as this would allow Abdullah to 
subvert the page limit he has been allotted on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); see also Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 
(2012) (“The incorporation of arguments by reference in an appellate brief is forbidden.”). Accordingly, only the 
arguments actually set forth in Abdullah’s appellate brief are addressed herein. 
59 Again, we refer to an individual juror with the pronouns “he” or “him,” but we recognize that some of the jurors 
were female.  
 
177 
 
We disagree with Abdullah’s argument. As discussed below, the Toryanskis had 
legitimate strategic and tactical reasons to stipulate to remove these jurors for cause.  
 
Juror 12’s questionnaire indicated that Juror 12 had been the victim of robbery three 
times. The questionnaire further revealed Juror 12 had a history of depression and Juror 12 was 
taking antidepressants. In describing Juror 12’s feelings towards antidepressants, Juror 12 
indicated that they “can greatly improve quality of life.” This view potentially posed a threat to 
the suicide defense as Juror 12 could have connected with Angie and been reluctant to believe 
the story that an individual utilizing antidepressants under the care of a physician would commit 
suicide. A valid strategic basis existed for stipulating to removing this juror for cause. 
 
Juror 15’s questionnaire indicated that Juror 15 felt “a defendant should be required to 
testify” and “a defendant who does not testify is probably guilty or has something to hide,” and 
Juror 15 would “hold it against” Abdullah if he did not testify. Juror 15 further indicated that 
Juror 15 would consider the failure to testify as an indication of guilt and that “only a guilty 
person would not want to tell his side of the story.” The Toryanskis did not provide deficient 
performance in stipulating to remove this juror for cause. 
 
 Juror 82’s questionnaire indicated a belief that “a defendant should be required to 
testify.” Juror 82 further indicated that Juror 82 held “religious, philosophical or moral belief[s]” 
that would not permit Juror 82 to sit as a juror and reach a final verdict. Juror 82 also stated, 
“The life and death should be left to God.” Finally, Juror 82 indicated having trouble with the 
English language. Thus, multiple reasons existed for the Toryanskis to stipulate to remove this 
juror for cause. 
 
Juror 154 provided that the best argument against the death penalty was “moral grounds.” 
Juror 154 also indicated that Juror 154 strongly disagreed with imposition of the death penalty on 
only the worst murderers and strongly disagreed that society would be stronger if the death 
penalty were imposed more often. Juror 154 strongly agreed that, “Matters of life and death 
should be left to God.” Juror 154 agreed with the statement that, “It doesn’t matter what kind of 
childhood a murderer had.” Juror 154 also indicated that Juror 154 strongly disagreed with the 
statement, “I could vote for the death penalty in some cases if I were on a jury” and the statement 
 
178 
“I support the use of the death penalty.” These responses demonstrate sufficient strategic reasons 
to stipulate to Juror 154’s removal for cause.60 
(2) 
Jurors 64, 75, and 117 
 
Abdullah submits a similar argument with respect to Jurors 64, 75, and 117. He argues 
that these jurors expressed strong opinions against the death penalty, but these jurors did not 
indicate that their attitude would prevent or impair their impartiality.  
 
We again disagree. The Toryanskis had legitimate strategic and tactical reasons to 
stipulate to remove these jurors for cause. 
 
Juror 64 expressed the following beliefs: “that a defendant should be required to testify,” 
“that a defendant who does not testify is probably guilty or has something to hide,” and that if 
Abdullah exercised the right to remain silent, that Juror 64 would “hold that against him and 
consider it as an indication of guilt.” Juror 64 also indicated that Juror 64 held a “religious, 
philosophical or moral belief” that would not permit him “to serve as a juror and reach a final 
verdict.” This was because, “As a Jehovah’s witness, [Juror 64] could not decide if a persons 
[sic] life is involved – or capitol [sic] punishment.” Further, Juror 64 provided that Juror 64 
could not judge whether Abdullah was guilty because, “If it is a capital case – if the death 
penalty were involved I could not in good conscience decide.” Finally, Juror 64 indicated that 
Juror 64 would not “follow the instructions upon the law given by the Judge” because Juror 64 
“cannot decide on a death penalty case.” Adequate strategic reasons existed for the stipulation to 
remove this juror for cause. 
 
Juror 75 indicated “a defendant who does not testify is probably guilty or has something 
to hide,” and that “only a guilty person would not want to tell his side of the story.” Juror 75 also 
indicated his “views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair [his] ability to 
view the facts impartially,” and that his “views on the death penalty would prevent or 
substantially impair [his] ability to return a guilty verdict of First Degree Murder against the 
Defendant even if the State had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Juror 75 stated, “I 
have strong emotional feelings about personally imposing the death penalty on another human.” 
Moreover, Juror 75 indicated “I am familiar with this case and I am personally acquainted with 
                                                 
60 Furthermore, jurors in the pool for preemptory challenges only went through Juror 116. The last seated juror was 
Juror 103. Thus, any juror further down the roster would not have been considered for the jury regardless of whether 
the defense agreed to strike them from the panel. Accordingly, no prejudice can be established for the dismissal of 
any jurors past Juror 103. 
 
179 
someone who knows the defendant and his deceased wife and kids.” Juror 75 further explained 
that Juror 75 knew one of the witnesses and that Juror 75’s spouse “went to school with Angie.” 
Finally, Juror 75 stated, “I have heard and currently believe that Azad Haji Abdullah committed 
murder.” Again, adequate strategic reasons existed for the stipulation to remove this juror for 
cause. 
 
Juror 117 indicated “a defendant who does not testify is probably guilty or has something 
to hide.” Further, Juror 117 strongly agreed that, “Matters of life and death should be left to 
God” and also indicated his “views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair 
[his] ability to view the facts impartially.” The Toryanskis had sufficient strategic reasons for 
stipulating to remove this juror for cause 
(3) 
Summary 
 
Based on the information provided by these jurors in the questionnaires, the Toryanskis 
did not provide deficient performance by stipulating to the dismissal of these jurors prior to voir 
dire. There is no evidence that any of these decisions were based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. See Payne, 146 
Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Milton, 126 Idaho at 641, 888 P.2d at 815. Moreover, dismissal of 
these jurors did not prevent the empaneling of an impartial jury. See Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 
833, 844 (6th Cir. 1999) (relevant inquiry in assessing court’s dismissal of jurors for cause is 
whether the trial court’s decision prevented the empaneling of an impartial jury). 
 
Finally, with respect to Abdullah’s contention that the decision to stipulate was driven by 
a desire to secure a favorable plea deal, Mitch explained that he was not very focused on 
pursuing a plea deal at that time, but rather was “very focused on preparing and trying to pick the 
very best jury possible.” Likewise, Mitch indicated his approach to jury selection was not 
tempered in an effort to pursue a favorable plea deal. Moreover, Kim’s perception was simply: 
“We were not aggressive in our response on that.” This does not evince deficient performance, 
but rather demonstrates Kim utilized a tactical choice in responding to the State. Thus, this Court 
affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
ii. 
The Toryanskis’ voir dire of the venire did not constitute ineffective 
assistance. 
 
Abdullah next argues that the Toryanskis conducted inadequate voir dire of the venire 
and the inadequate voir dire led to the seating of two biased jurors: Juror 59 and Juror 83. 
However, as discussed in the guilt phase section, these jurors were not biased. Moreover, the 
 
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record provides legitimate strategic and tactical reasons for the Toryanskis’ decision not to strike 
Juror 59 and Juror 83.  
 
Abdullah’s remaining argument hinges on the Toryanskis’ failure to exclusively follow 
the Colorado Method of jury selection.61 Abdullah contends that the Colorado Method is 
grounded in well-established Supreme Court jurisprudence and implicitly asserts that the failure 
to adhere to this method was deficient performance. He references case law such as Morgan, in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that “a capital defendant may challenge for cause 
any prospective juror” who will automatically vote for the death penalty in each case and will not 
consider aggravating and mitigating evidence as the instructions require. 504 U.S. at 729. Based 
on this law, Abdullah contends that the failure to move to strike these jurors for cause constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel because certain jurors were “automatic killers” under the 
Colorado Method.  
 
Abdullah’s argument assumes that the Colorado Method is an infallible method for 
identifying such jurors and is not over-inclusive. This Court is not persuaded that the Colorado 
Method is the only mechanism for counsel to evaluate prospective jurors. For one, the Colorado 
Method could incidentally or incorrectly identify jurors that would not automatically impose the 
death penalty (without considering aggravating and mitigating evidence), and such jurors would 
not necessarily be required to be struck for cause. Abdullah failed to present any evidence on the 
efficacy of the Colorado Method in these particular respects. Second, Abdullah failed to cite to 
any legal authority demonstrating that the Colorado Method is the prevailing professional norm 
in capital cases. Third, as Strickland has unequivocally stated: 
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence 
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions. 
466 U.S. at 688–89. Accordingly, we assess the Toryanskis’ performance in voir dire by 
examining the objective reasonableness of their actions at the time of voir dire. See id. See also 
Phillips v. State, 587 S.E.2d 45, 47 (Ga. 2003) (in assessing ineffective assistance of counsel 
                                                 
61 In support of this argument, Abdullah filed an affidavit by David Lane, a criminal defense attorney with 
significant capital litigation experience. Lane explained that the Colorado Method of jury selection is a strategy that 
involves rating jurors on a scale of one to seven, taking into account solely the likelihood each juror would vote to 
impose the death penalty. 
 
181 
claim, inquiry is whether the failure to strike jurors for cause, from perspective of voir dire, was 
objectively unreasonable); In re Yates, 296 P.3d 872, 896 (Wash. 2013) (“Yates’s presumption 
that the Colorado method is the only approach to jury selection that is constitutionally adequate 
lacks any support.”). 
 
While the Colorado Method focuses solely on prospective jurors’ views on the death 
penalty, the Toryanskis focused on both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase in accordance 
with Abdullah’s desires. For example, at the evidentiary hearing, Kim testified that the Colorado 
Method was not in perfect harmony with their goals because they desired success in the guilt 
phase as well. Likewise, Mitch testified that the Toryanskis utilized the Colorado Method to an 
extent, but it was only one part of their voir dire strategy. Mitch further stated that it is necessary 
to take the totality of the circumstances into account when choosing a jury.  
 
An examination of voir dire demonstrates that the Toryanskis spent considerable time 
exploring a multitude of aspects regarding each juror. Counsel questioned prospective jurors on 
their views of the death penalty, mitigation, and their disposition towards individuals from 
different cultures. In addition to the forty-five page questionnaire, the Toryanskis also utilized a 
“preempt matrix” to keep notes on every juror (including ratings assigned under the Colorado 
Method) during voir dire. 
 
Further, the district court found both Mitch and Kim testified credibly at the evidentiary 
hearing, where Mitch explained, “it’s not only what a -- prospective juror says, but also how they 
carry themselves, their attitude, the feeling that you get from them.” Likewise, Mitch testified, 
“what somebody says and it’s reduced to writing can be different from the impression that they 
leave when you’re watching their body language, watching the tone of their voice.” Thus, in 
addition to the questions and answers revealed in the voir dire transcripts and questionnaires, the 
Toryanskis based their decisions on intangibles as well—a commonly recognized approach to 
jury selection. See, e.g., Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Few decisions at 
trial are as subjective or prone to individual attorney strategy as juror voir dire, where decisions 
are often made on the basis of intangible factors.”); State v. Mammone, 13 N.E.3d 1051, 1085 
(Ohio 2014) (“Decisions about voir dire are highly subjective and prone to individual attorney 
strategy because they are often based on intangible factors.”). The techniques employed by the 
Toryanskis and the decision to only utilize the Colorado Method as a part of their overall strategy 
 
182 
in conducting voir dire was an objectively reasonable approach. Accordingly, this Court affirms 
the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
iii. 
The Toryanskis’ voir dire of the panel did not constitute ineffective 
assistance. 
 
Finally, Abdullah asserts that the Toryanskis conducted inadequate voir dire with respect 
to jurors that composed the panel. Each juror Abdullah challenges will be addressed in turn. 
(1) 
Juror 28 
 
Abdullah argues that Juror 28 may have been substantially impaired in his ability to 
meaningfully consider mitigation and a sentence other than death. Abdullah also argues that 
counsel should have “stripped” Juror 28 under the Colorado Method to determine if he would 
automatically impose the death penalty in every case,62 and because Juror 28 indicated that he 
would believe law enforcement officers more than other witnesses, that Juror 28 was a better 
juror for the State. However, Juror 28 explained that his preference for law enforcement 
testimony was because law enforcement officers are trained to observe, which arguably had no 
bearing on the law enforcement testimony in this case because no law enforcement officer 
observed the crimes. Also, when asked about his feelings regarding the death penalty as an 
appropriate punishment for first-degree murder, Juror 28 responded by stating: 
 
That is a deep philosophical question that you are asking me, how I feel 
about it. This isn’t the movies. This is a real-life situation. It’s going to be -- I 
would just have to look at it at the time I was going through it after I learned 
everything. . . . [T]he death penalty in some cases in society to protect society 
would probably be the correct way to go. 
 
Counsel then asked whether there are other ways of protecting society and Juror 28 responded, 
“Yes, there are other alternatives.”   
 
Juror 28 explained there are circumstances where he could consider the death penalty as 
an appropriate punishment, for instance: 
It depends on the case . . . if it was a mass murder or murder where it was just 
violently done and destruction of another human being with forethought. . . . 
                                                 
62 Lane’s affidavit explained stripping as follows: 
 
The Colorado Method instructs counsel to “strip” the juror by asking a question along the lines, 
“Okay, I want you to assume that we’re talking about a guy who wanted to kill, planned the 
killing, deliberated on it, thought about it, wanted to do it for weeks in advance, and did it without 
any self-defense, no insanity, no excuses. Now what about the death penalty for someone like 
that?” It is essential that jurors be “stripped” of any reasons not to impose a death penalty to 
ascertain their true feelings. 
 
183 
There’s so much to go into this I really can’t speak upon it until I worked on it, 
being -- the material being given to me and I have a chance to assimilate it. 
 
Counsel then inquired as to whether in a case of premeditated first-degree murder, Juror 28 could 
consider mitigating evidence, such as a lack of criminal record and being a good employee. Juror 
28 responded that he could take into account such mitigating evidence. Lastly, Juror 28 
appropriately committed to following the district court’s instructions to both consider imposing 
and not imposing the death penalty. Thus, there was no evidence this juror was biased or subject 
to be struck for cause. 
(2) 
Juror 36 
 
Abdullah argues that the answers provided by Juror 36 demonstrate Juror 36 decided to 
vote for the death penalty before the trial. In support of this argument, Abdullah cites to a portion 
of the juror’s voir dire where Juror 36 stated as follows: 
Quite honestly, I was thinking about this. I would -- I would with great remorse 
go for it. I would vote for the death penalty, but I would also want to be there with 
the person to pray right before they died. I don’t think that’s fair. I don’t think that 
would be allowed, but I would be praying for that person also if that was 
something that had to be done. 
 
Abdullah fails to mention the follow-up question by counsel: “And when you say you would go 
for it, that would be after weighing the laws and the facts and all of the circumstances?” Juror 36 
responded, “Yes, absolutely.” Further, in responding to the district court’s voir dire, Juror 36 
agreed he would weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, listen to arguments by the 
parties, and apply the law as instructed by the district court. Juror 36 also responded he would 
consider not imposing the death penalty. Moreover, Juror 36 indicated that he could give value to 
an individual’s lack of criminal record, good history of providing financial support to his family, 
and community service—all mitigating circumstances in Abdullah’s case. Thus, there was no 
evidence this juror was biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(3) 
Juror 44 
 
Abdullah contends that, while counsel inquired whether Juror 44 could “give value” to 
mitigation evidence, this question was inadequate and further inquiry was necessary. Yet Kim 
also inquired whether Juror 44 could “give value to the fact that a person maybe has a long 
history of good relationships with their friends or family members.” Juror 44 responded that he 
could. Juror 44 also explained that he worked with individuals of Middle Eastern ancestry while 
in the military, had “no problems at all,” and thought they were “good people.” Counsel did not 
 
184 
perform deficiently in conducting voir dire of this juror, and there was no evidence this juror was 
biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(4) 
Juror 45 
 
Abdullah argues that the Toryanskis were ineffective for failing to ask Juror 45 single 
question about the death penalty or about Juror 45’s willingness to listen and give meaningful 
consideration to mitigation evidence. This argument ignores the forty-five page questionnaire 
completed by Juror 45, which provided a plethora of information regarding his views on the 
death penalty. Furthermore, Juror 45 indicated that he would consider imposing and not 
imposing the death penalty, and would weigh both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
coming to that decision. There was no evidence this juror was biased or subject to be struck for 
cause. 
(5) 
Juror 68 
 
Abdullah argues that Juror 68 was “an example of someone who would likely be moved 
by mitigation and would be inclined to vote for a life sentence,” but counsel made no effort to 
educate Juror 68 about preserving “personal moral integrity through a jury verdict.” Under the 
Colorado Method, this is known as “empowering” a juror. Abdullah fails to cite any authority to 
support the notion that counsel can render deficient performance by failing to “empower” a juror. 
This argument is waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (issues 
on appeal not supported by adequate authority will not be considered). 
 
Even if the Court were to consider this argument, Juror 68 indicated that he would 
consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. There was no evidence this juror was 
biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(6) 
Juror 81 
 
During voir dire, Juror 81 stated: 
What I feel is, like I told the Judge, I believe in the death penalty, but I also 
believe that it depends on the case. I personally believe that there are two types of 
murderers; one where somebody gets hot headed and loses it for a moment; they 
do something stupid. And then there are people who think it through. I think 
everybody feels they are going to get away with it or they wouldn’t do it in the 
first place. 
 
Based on this statement, Abdullah contends that counsel had a duty to ask follow-up questions 
about the death penalty.  
 
185 
 
However, when the State asked Juror 81 whether he could apply the law during the 
penalty phase, Juror 81 responded: 
 
I will be very deliberate now that it’s done. The way I see it is I try to put 
myself in that man’s position. If that was me sitting there, I would want people to 
look at everything and weigh it very carefully. I figure at the very least, the man 
has the potential of the death penalty hanging over his head. And I know if that 
was me, I would want everybody to look at everything very hard. 
 
Further, Juror 81 committed to follow the district court’s instructions and indicated that he would 
consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. There was no evidence this juror was 
biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(7) 
Juror 96 
 
Abdullah contends that Juror 96 was amenable to considering mitigating evidence and 
that the Toryanskis provided ineffective assistance in failing to “empower” the juror. Abdullah 
fails to cite any authority indicating counsel can render deficient performance by failing to 
“empower” a juror, and thus this argument is waived. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
 
Even if the Court were to consider this argument, Juror 96 indicated that he would 
consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. There was no evidence this juror was 
biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(8) 
Juror 98 
 
Abdullah contends that Juror 98 was emotionally invested in the case, believed 
Abdullah’s arrest was sufficient to demonstrate some level of guilt, and should have been 
challenged. Abdullah also argues that counsel provided deficient performance by failing to 
reveal this juror as someone who would automatically impose the death penalty and was 
substantially impaired in his ability to give meaningful consideration to mitigation.  
 
When the district court inquired whether Juror 98 was “of the opinion that death is the 
only appropriate penalty for murder in the first degree,” Juror 98 responded, “Absolutely not.” 
Juror 98 also indicated that he would consider both imposing and not imposing the death penalty. 
Moreover, the “emotional investment” to which Abdullah refers is based on this juror’s 
statement that Juror 98 was a parent like Angie and that the death was tragic. This does not 
demonstrate a unique emotional connection to cause the juror to be biased. Moreover, after Juror 
98 indicated that he thought Abdullah’s arrest demonstrated some level of guilt, counsel further 
inquired whether he could base his decision solely on the evidence in court and whether he could 
 
186 
disregard information from the media. Juror 98 responded appropriately to both inquiries. There 
was no evidence this juror was biased or subject to be struck for cause. 
(9) 
Summary 
 
Abdullah failed to articulate or present any evidence that any of the jurors on the panel 
were biased or subject to be struck for cause. All jurors on the panel appropriately indicated that 
they would consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. Likewise, they all committed 
to following the district court’s instructions. Counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here, the decisions made by the Toryanskis in 
conducting voir dire were strategic, and Abdullah has failed to proffer any evidence of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation. Abdullah failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice. Thus, this Court 
affirms the district court’s dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
38. 
The district court did not err by dismissing Abdullah’s claim of ineffective 
 
assistance of counsel by failing to object to defective guilt and penalty phase jury 
 
instructions. 
 
Abdullah argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to erroneous jury 
instructions or to request proper jury instructions. Abdullah does not identify these flawed 
instructions, however. Rather, he submits that the “pervasive problems with the jury instructions 
in Azad’s case have been identified and analyzed previously and are incorporated by reference.” 
Based on Abdullah’s arguments in the guilt and penalty phase sections of his brief, we must 
assume Abdullah is referring to the following six jury instructions: (1) the definition of “willful” 
for arson in the guilt phase; (2) the definition of “many persons” for the great risk aggravator in 
the penalty phase; (3) judge sentencing in the penalty phase; (4) double-counting aggravator 
evidence in the penalty phase; (5) the jury’s duty to consult and unanimity in the penalty phase; 
and (6) the lack of a definition for “sufficiently compelling” in the penalty phase. 
a. 
Abdullah cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel in four of the six jury 
instructions because the instructions were not erroneous. 
 
 
The same analysis applies to four of the jury instructions challenged by Abdullah in the 
post-conviction phase: (1) the definition of “willful” for arson; (2) judge sentencing; (3) double-
counting aggravator evidence; and (4) duty to consult and unanimous verdict. 
 
187 
 
As discussed in guilt and penalty phase sections, there was no error in these four 
instructions. For the willful instruction, there was no error because the district court provided the 
definition of willful at the request of the jury, and it was unreasonable to assume the jury went 
beyond the scope of the instruction to apply the definition of willful to offenses other than arson. 
For the judge sentencing instruction, Abdullah was not entitled to an instruction detailing the 
possible penalty options based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that the jury must be informed the defendant would be 
sentenced to a fixed life sentence if the jury did not recommend execution. This rule applies only 
when those two sentencing options exist, which was not the case here. For the double-counting 
instruction, there was no error because the instruction mirrored the exact language provided by 
this Court on the issue. For the duty to consult and unanimity instructions, there was no error 
because the instructions as a whole informed the jurors to reach an individual decision and that 
they did not have to unanimously agree on mitigating circumstances or reach a unanimous 
decision. Because these four instructions were not erroneous, Abdullah cannot establish deficient 
performance. See Brown v. State, 533, 50 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Whether [the 
petitioner’s] attorneys were deficient for failing to object to the instructions depends upon 
whether the instructions contained errors.”). Therefore, Abdullah has not shown ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
b. 
Abdullah cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the two remaining 
jury instructions. 
 
 
The two remaining jury instructions at issue here are: (1) the lack of a definition for 
“sufficiently compelling” and (2) the definition of “many persons” for the great risk aggravator.  
 
As discussed in the penalty phase section, there was no error in the omission of an 
instruction on the definition of “sufficiently compelling.” In that section, we concluded 
Abdullah’s argument was foreclosed due to our holding in State v. Dunlap that “sufficiently 
compelling” was a phrase “of ordinary words that do not require definition.” 155 Idaho 345, 365, 
313 P.3d 1, 21 (2013). Abdullah now argues in the post-conviction phase that his counsel should 
have objected to the lack of a definition for “sufficiently compelling.” Abdullah cannot satisfy 
the first prong of Strickland of deficient performance because a definition of “sufficiently 
compelling” was not necessary to properly instruct the jury.  
 
In a related context, “[w]here the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is 
 
188 
generally determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez v. State, 127 
Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995)); see also State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho 
160, 165, 786 P.2d 551, 556 (1989) (no basis for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to file motion to suppress evidence when no unlawful search occurred). Applying that 
concept here, it is not deficient performance for counsel to fail to request a jury instruction if that 
instruction had no legal basis and was unnecessary. Therefore, Abdullah has not established 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a jury instruction on the definition of 
“sufficiently compelling.” 
 
Abdullah also contends that his counsel was ineffective for proposing an improper 
instruction on the definition of “many persons” for the great risk aggravator. The district court 
instructed the jury: “The phrase ‘great risk of death to many persons’ means more than a 
showing of some degree of risk of bodily harm to a few persons. ‘Great risk’ means not a mere 
possibility but a likelihood or high probability. ‘Many persons’ means more than four people.” In 
the penalty phase section, we determined that any error in the jury instruction on the definition of 
“many persons” was invited because Abdullah’s counsel submitted the instruction. In addition, 
we concluded that any unconstitutional vagueness in the instruction was harmless because the 
jury’s decision to impose death may be based solely on the utter disregard aggravator. Therefore, 
even assuming deficient performance, any improper instruction did not prejudice Abdullah. “To 
demonstrate prejudice, the appellant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.’” Dunlap, 
155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39 (quoting Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 385 
(2004)). In this case, even if the great risk aggravator instruction was invalid, the death sentence 
remains valid because the jury also determined the utter disregard factor standing alone justifies 
the death penalty. See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 509–10, 988 P.2d 1170, 1183–84 (1999); 
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 105–06, 967 P.2d 702, 719–20 (1998). Therefore, Abdullah cannot 
show a reasonable probability the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different but 
for Abdullah’s counsel’s alleged deficient performance regarding the great risk aggravator jury 
instruction.  
 
189 
 
In summary, Abdullah received effective assistance of counsel with regard to the jury 
instructions in the guilt and penalty phase. This Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of this 
claim. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The judgments of conviction and sentences pronounced by the district court, including 
the death penalty based on the utter disregard aggravating circumstance found by the jury, are 
affirmed. The judgment dismissing Abdullah’s petition for post-conviction relief also is 
affirmed. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR