Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Horton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Horton, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2390.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2390 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. HORTON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Horton, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-2390.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-
year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed. 
(No. 2017-1416—Submitted December 6, 2017—Decided June 26, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2017-011. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Debbie Kay Horton, of Solon, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0033622, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986.  On 
February 24, 2010, we suspended her for two years, with the second year stayed on 
conditions, for settling clients’ personal-injury claims and endorsing the settlement 
checks without the clients’ authority and converting the settlement proceeds to her 
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own use.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Horton, 124 Ohio St.3d 434, 2010-Ohio-579, 
923 N.E.2d 141.  We reinstated her license to practice law on May 11, 2011.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Horton, 128 Ohio St.3d 1225, 2011-Ohio-2386, 947 
N.E.2d 174. 
{¶ 2} In a March 2, 2017 complaint, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, alleged that Horton committed 17 violations of the professional-
conduct rules while pursuing personal-injury claims on behalf of a woman and her 
minor daughter.  Among other things, relator alleged that Horton failed to make 
required disclosures to her client, to obtain the client’s written consent to or 
acknowledgment of certain circumstances affecting the representation, to formally 
withdraw from the case following a disagreement with the client, to promptly 
deliver funds that the client was entitled to receive, and to maintain required records 
regarding her client trust account. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted joint stipulations of fact and aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and Horton admitted to some of the charged misconduct.  The 
parties jointly recommended that Horton be suspended from the practice of law for 
one year, with six months stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 4} The matter proceeded to a hearing before a panel of the Board of 
Professional Conduct.  The panel found that Horton committed nine of the ten rule 
violations she admitted to committing, and it unanimously dismissed the remaining 
allegations.  The panel recommended that she be suspended for two years, with one 
year stayed on the condition that she engage in no further misconduct, and further 
recommended that her reinstatement be subject to additional conditions.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction, and no objections have been filed. 
{¶ 5} Having independently reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s 
report and recommendation and suspend Horton from the practice of law for two 
years, with one year conditionally stayed. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 6} On April 13, 2012, Raquel Green retained Horton to represent herself 
and her minor daughter in a personal-injury case arising from an automobile 
collision.  Green signed Horton’s standard contingent-fee agreement, which 
provided for a fee of 33.3 percent of the amount recovered if settlement occurred 
before suit was filed and 40 percent of the recovery if a lawsuit was filed.  Horton 
stipulated that she did not countersign that contract—or any of her fee contracts—
as required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) (requiring a lawyer to set forth a contingent-
fee agreement in a writing signed by both the client and the lawyer). 
{¶ 7} Horton also failed to make and properly document other required 
disclosures. She did not inform Green that she did not carry professional-liability 
insurance or have her sign a written acknowledgment of that fact, as required by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the lawyer does not 
maintain professional-liability insurance and to obtain a signed acknowledgment of 
that notice from the client).  And although Horton orally informed Green that she 
intended to engage another attorney to serve as co-counsel, the terms of that 
relationship were never reduced to a writing that was signed by Green and the other 
attorney, as required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e)(2) (prohibiting certain fee divisions 
unless the lawyers have made certain factual disclosures to the client and received 
the client’s written consent).  Moreover, Horton admitted that she did not make 
these required disclosures to any of her other clients. 
{¶ 8} Horton filed a lawsuit on behalf of Green and Green’s daughter on 
April 4, 2014.  She voluntarily dismissed that suit in January 2015 and refiled it the 
next month.  At the final pretrial conference in January 2016, Green agreed to settle 
her daughter’s claim for the tortfeasor’s policy limits of $100,000 and to settle her 
own claim for $25,000. 
{¶ 9} Because Green’s daughter was a minor, Horton filed an application 
for probate-court approval of the settlement.  According to Horton, the magistrate 
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at the probate hearing indicated that attorney fees for a minor’s claim were limited 
to one-third of the settlement.  However, in approving the settlement, the magistrate 
also awarded Green $7,000 from her daughter’s settlement for “loss of service,” 
which according to Horton, was intended for Green to use to pay the remainder of 
Horton’s contracted fee. 
{¶ 10} When Horton and Green met at the Warrensville Public Library to 
sign the settlement checks in April 2016, they had a disagreement about Horton’s 
fees and a $5,500 discount that she had offered to Green.  As a result of their verbal 
altercation, a Warrensville police officer ordered the two women to have no contact 
with each other.  Horton testified that she felt compelled to obey that order even 
though it had not been issued by a court.  Although she ceased contact with Green, 
she failed to file a written motion for leave to withdraw from the representation as 
required by the local court rules.  She also failed to appear at a May 19, 2016 
hearing on defense counsel’s motion to enforce the settlement.  Horton stipulated 
that her failure to formally withdraw from the case violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from withdrawing from representation in a proceeding 
without leave of court if the rules of the tribunal so require). 
{¶ 11} In a May 2016 grievance, Green claimed that she had not received 
the $7,000 awarded to her by the probate court.  Horton told relator that she had 
sent Green a letter with a $7,000 check on April 19, 2016, but Green reported to 
relator that she had not received it.  Horton waited until approximately five months 
after the grievance was filed before she issued a new check to Green and stopped 
payment on the original check.  Horton admitted that her conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other 
property that the client is entitled to receive). 
{¶ 12} Horton also stipulated that she failed to maintain proper records to 
document the funds held in her client trust account, and she testified that she used 
that account to pay at least one personal expense.  She admitted that her conduct 
January Term, 2018 
 
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violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) through (5) (requiring a lawyer to hold the 
property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the 
lawyer’s own property; to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds 
are held setting forth the name of the account, the date, amount, and client affected 
by each credit and debit, and the balance in the account; and to perform and retain 
a monthly reconciliation of the lawyer’s client trust account). 
{¶ 13} Based on this evidence, the panel found that Horton’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c), 1.5(c)(1), 1.5(e)(2), 1.15(a)(2) through (5), 1.15(d), 
and 1.16(c).1  But the panel rejected the parties’ stipulation that Horton violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a copy of any fee 
agreement with each client) and unanimously dismissed that allegation, four 
allegations that relator had agreed to dismiss, and three others in support of which 
relator had presented no evidence. 
{¶ 14} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, and 
we adopt those findings as our own. 
Sanction 
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, 
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar 
cases.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). 
{¶ 16} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Horton has a prior disciplinary record, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and 
violated multiple professional-conduct rules.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), and 
(4).  Notably, as evidence of a pattern of misconduct, both the parties and the board 
                                                 
1 Although the complaint charged Horton with a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) (requiring a 
lawyer withdrawing from representation to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client’s 
interest), the parties stipulated and the board found that her conduct actually violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.16(c). 
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cited not only Horton’s failure to sign her fee agreements with and make required 
disclosures to Green and other clients but also Horton’s failure to correct her client-
trust-account management practices following relator’s dismissal of a 2015 
overdraft investigation. 
{¶ 17} In mitigation, the board found that Horton demonstrated a 
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceeding.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(4).  Specifically, Horton was forthright and honest in discussing her past 
and current mismanagement of her client trust account, waived confidentiality with 
regard to relator’s 2015 disciplinary investigation, and readily admitted to her rule 
violations.  The board noted that Horton had demonstrated a willingness to make 
necessary changes to her practice going forward but that her conduct since her 2010 
suspension demonstrates that she has difficulty understanding or implementing 
acceptable law-office practices and complying with the applicable professional-
conduct rules regarding those matters. 
{¶ 18} The board recommends that we suspend Horton for two years, with 
one year stayed on the condition that she engage in no further misconduct.  It also 
recommends that as a condition of reinstatement, she be required to submit proof 
that she has completed 12 hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) addressing 
law-office management—with three of those 12 hours focused on client-trust-
account-related instruction—in addition to the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  
The board recommends that upon reinstatement, Horton be required for one year to 
work with a practice monitor, approved by relator, who will serve as Horton’s 
mentor with regard to law-office management. 
{¶ 19} In reaching its recommendation, the board considered several cases 
in which we disciplined attorneys for comparable misconduct. 
{¶ 20} In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Royer, 133 Ohio St.3d 545, 2012-Ohio-5147, 
979 N.E.2d 329, the attorney failed to deposit one client’s funds into his client trust 
account, failed to maintain required client-trust-account records, lost evidence that 
January Term, 2018 
 
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was vital to the client’s claim, and neglected three legal matters involving another 
client.  Although Royer had committed multiple offenses that affected vulnerable 
clients, he had no prior discipline during his 46 years of practice, had not had a 
dishonest motive, had made restitution to his clients, had fully cooperated in the 
disciplinary process, and had shown remorse.  Therefore, we suspended him for 
one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he serve a two-year period of monitored 
probation without additional violations of the professional-conduct rules, retain a 
certified public accountant to review his bookkeeping procedures, and establish his 
compliance with Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 within six months of our order. 
{¶ 21} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Tomer, 138 Ohio St.3d 302, 2013-Ohio-5494, 
6 N.E.3d 1133, the attorney failed to file motions on behalf of a client, failed to 
secure signed notices from clients regarding her lack of professional-liability 
insurance, failed to refund unearned fees, failed to maintain required records 
regarding her client trust account, and submitted fabricated and backdated letters to 
the relator during a disciplinary investigation.  We recognized that Tomer had 
committed multiple offenses and had engaged in dishonest conduct during the 
disciplinary investigation, but we also acknowledged that she had no prior 
discipline, had lacked adequate training when she entered private practice after 16 
years of “exemplary service” as an assistant prosecutor, had presented evidence of 
her excellent character and reputation, and had shown significant remorse.  
Consequently, we suspended Tomer for two years, all stayed on the conditions that 
she complete a two-year period of monitored probation, complete 12 hours of CLE 
focused on law-office management, and engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 22} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, 145 Ohio St.3d 192, 2016-
Ohio-359, 47 N.E.3d 847, we imposed a two-year suspension, with the second year 
stayed on conditions, for misconduct that included several overdrafts of the 
attorney’s client trust account, misuse of that account for personal expenses, 
commingling of personal and client funds, misappropriation, and failure to maintain 
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required client-trust-account records.  Corner also failed to provide competent 
representation to a client in a bankruptcy proceeding and engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice by failing to comply with two 
disgorgement orders issued by the bankruptcy court.  Mitigating factors included 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record and a mental-health diagnosis that 
contributed to Corner’s misconduct. 
{¶ 23} We find that Horton’s misconduct is comparable to that of Royer and 
Tomer, though perhaps not as egregious as that of Corner, whose misconduct 
extended well beyond the sloppy office practices exhibited here.  We agree, 
however, with the board’s assessment that Horton’s prior disciplinary record and 
her failure to make agreed changes to her client-trust-account management 
practices following relator’s 2015 overdraft investigation weigh in favor of a 
sanction more severe than the one we imposed on Royer and Tomer, and 
comparable to that which we imposed on Corner. 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, Debbie Kay Horton is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years, with one year stayed on the condition that she engage in 
no further misconduct.  As a condition of reinstatement, Horton shall submit proof 
that she has completed 12 hours of CLE addressing law-office management, with 
three of those hours focused on client-trust-account-related instruction; those hours 
shall be in addition to the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  Upon reinstatement, 
Horton shall serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(21).  If Horton fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay 
will be lifted and she will serve the full two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
Horton. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
DEGENARO, J., not participating. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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_________________ 
Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Seth H. Wamelink, and Jon W. Oebker; and Heather 
M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, and Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Debbie Kay Horton, pro se. 
_________________