Title: Hackett v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MATTHEW FITZGERALD HACKETT 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 160619 
CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JUNE 1, 2017 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred when it 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and affirmed the trial court’s refusal to set 
aside the conviction and sentencing orders after concluding that it had lost jurisdiction to modify 
the orders pursuant to Rule 1:1. 
I. Facts and Proceedings 
 
Matthew Fitzgerald Hackett (“Hackett”) was indicted in the Circuit Court of Franklin 
County (“trial court”) on a charge of possession with intent to distribute more than one-half 
ounce but less than five pounds of marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1.  On January 20, 
2009, Hackett pled guilty to this charge.  As part of his guilty plea, he completed a written form 
in which he affirmed that he was voluntarily pleading guilty to the charge because he was guilty 
of the charge.  As part of that form, Hackett also affirmed that no one, including the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, had made any promises to him concerning his plea of guilty.  The 
form was signed by Hackett and his attorney. 
 
There is no transcript of the January 20, 2009 proceedings.  According to the statement of 
facts in lieu of a transcript, although there was no written plea agreement, both the 
Commonwealth and the defense agreed that the appropriate disposition was to “take the case 
under advisement for an extended period of time, under any terms and conditions imposed by the 
 
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court,” and if the defendant successfully completed all terms and conditions, the felony charge 
would be reduced to a misdemeanor.  The statement of facts does not reflect whether the trial 
court was made aware of this understanding between the Commonwealth’s Attorney and defense 
counsel prior to accepting Hackett’s guilty plea and entering a conviction order.  On January 20, 
2009, the trial court entered a conviction order, finding Hackett guilty of the charged felony 
offense. 
 
The sentencing hearing was held on April 24, 2009.  The sentencing guidelines 
recommended probation.  According to the statement of facts, at this hearing Hackett asked the 
trial court to take his case under advisement and to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor if he 
successfully completed the terms and conditions imposed by the court.  The trial judge gave 
Hackett the choice to “walk out of the courtroom with a felony conviction” or “go the extra 
mile” and submit to the court’s requirements.  Hackett chose the latter option and was remanded 
to jail at the conclusion of the hearing.  On April 28, 2009, the trial court entered a sentencing 
order in which it sentenced Hackett to three years’ imprisonment, with two years and three 
months suspended for a period of five years, and two years of supervised probation upon release 
from incarceration. 
 
No orders were entered suspending the conviction or sentencing order at any time.  On 
September 1, 2009, several months after both the conviction order and the sentencing order were 
entered, Hackett’s attorney sent a letter to the trial judge, asking the court to reconsider the 
felony conviction.  A hearing was held on December 20, 2009, during which the trial court ruled 
from the bench that it would take the motion under advisement for a period of twelve months on 
the condition that Hackett be of good behavior and complete intensive supervised probation.  
The trial judge stated that if Hackett complied with the court’s conditions, that he would be 
 
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“home-free from the felony.”  On December 23, 2009, the trial court entered an order placing 
Hackett on intensive supervised probation for twelve months. 
 
The parties returned to court a year later on Hackett’s motion to amend his conviction to 
a misdemeanor.  The trial court took the motion under advisement for an additional twelve 
months, but the court released Hackett from probation.  It appears nothing additional happened in 
this matter until August 5, 2013, when Hackett filed a “motion to modify sentence.”  A hearing 
was held on August 20, 2013, during which Hackett again moved to amend his conviction to a 
misdemeanor.  The trial court entered an order on September 9, 2013, taking the motion under 
advisement “to allow investigation of recent changes in the law regarding the matter.”  Another 
hearing was held on October 8, 2013, after which the trial court entered an order wherein it 
continued to take the matter under advisement “until after the Supreme Court has made a 
decision on the appeal of the law regarding this matter.”1 
 
On December 17, 2014, another hearing was held where the trial court heard additional 
argument from the parties.  On December 30, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying and 
dismissing Hackett’s motion to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor.  In the order, the trial judge 
explained that, following the December 9, 2009 hearing, he had intended to reduce Hackett’s 
felony to a misdemeanor if Hackett complied with the terms set by the court, but that the court 
had been under the “mistaken impression that it had the discretion to reduce the charge as 
requested.”  However, the trial judge held that, in accordance with this Court’s decisions in 
Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008), Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
222, 707 S.E.2d 273 (2011), and Starrs v. Commonwealth, “even though the court intended to 
                     
 
1 It appears that the trial court was referencing the case of Starrs v. Commonwealth, 287 
Va. 1, 752 S.E.2d 812 (2014), which appeal was pending before this Court at that time. 
 
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grant defendant’s request and reduce the felony to a misdemeanor, it is clear from the authorities 
cited, this court does not have the discretion to make any disposition other than impose the 
punishment prescribed by the legislature after entering a written order finding defendant guilty 
and a written order setting his punishment.” 
 
Hackett appealed this December 30, 2014 order to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  The 
Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the appeal. Hackett v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 0084-15-3, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 14, 2015) (unpublished).  The Court of Appeals held that 
although the Commonwealth and Hackett agreed that the appropriate disposition was to take the 
case under advisement and then eventually reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor, under 
Rule 1:1, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so after 21 days passed from the entry of the 
April 28, 2009 sentencing order. Id. at 3-4.  The Court of Appeals also ruled that a court may not 
enter a nunc pro tunc order extending its jurisdiction in contravention of Rule 1:1.  Id. at 4.  
Further, the Court of Appeals held that the sentencing order was not void ab initio, concluding 
that the failure to include a provision in the order regarding taking the matter under advisement 
did not render the order void ab initio where the court had jurisdiction over the criminal matter, 
over the defendant, and had the power to enter the sentence it entered.  Id. at 5.  A three-judge 
panel subsequently affirmed the per curiam order.  Hackett v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0084-
15-3, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 15, 2015) (unpublished). 
 
Hackett appealed to this Court, and his petition for appeal was supported by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, who also assigned cross-error to the Court of Appeals’ order.  We 
granted Hackett’s appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred when it failed to find that the trial court erroneously entered a 
conviction order that that failed to take the case under advisement for a potential 
reduction of the felony offense to a misdemeanor and to subsequently modify the 
conviction order. 
 
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2. The Court of Appeals erred when it failed to find that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it entered an order of conviction and final sentencing order and continued the 
case and ordered Hackett to continue under quasi-probation status with the promise of a 
particular disposition at a later date, in violation of Hackett’s constitutionally protected 
due process rights. 
 
3. The Court of Appeals erred when it failed to find that the trial court erred when it denied 
Hackett’s motion for modification of sentence and correct the order to reflect the court’s 
intended disposition in the matter, nunc pro tunc. 
 
4. The Court of Appeals erred when it found that the trial court’s conviction and sentencing 
orders are not void ab initio. 
 
We granted the Commonwealth’s assignments of cross-error2: 
1. The trial court and the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in concluding that the trial 
court was precluded by language in this Court’s holdings in Starrs v. Commonwealth, 
Hernandez v. Commonwealth, and Moreau v. Fuller from reducing the felony conviction 
to a misdemeanor conviction where the trial court ordered the conditions of the continued 
case without rendering a final judgment that determined the rights of the parties. 
 
2. The Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in concluding that Rule 1:1 precluded the trial 
court from rendering its final determination of the rights of the defendant and the 
Commonwealth in the matters properly before it in the continued case. 
 
 
 
                     
 
2 After this appeal was granted, the Attorney General assumed representation of the 
Commonwealth, reversed the position of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and abandoned the 
assignments of cross-error.  “It is apparent that the Commonwealth has assumed inconsistent 
positions.  The Commonwealth’s Attorney, the only official legal representative of the 
Commonwealth in the trial court, acquiesced in the procedure that the Attorney General now 
attacks.  Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may not be estopped from repudiating the earlier 
position erroneously taken by the Commonwealth's Attorney, nor may the Department be 
estopped from changing its position.”  In re Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of Corr., 222 Va. 454, 
465, 281 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1981).  The Commonwealth’s Attorney asked for leave of court to file 
a brief in support of its assignments of cross-error.  We denied the motion, but invited the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney to file an amicus brief, which he did. 
 
 
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II. Analysis 
 
The issues presented in this appeal regarding whether the trial court had the authority to 
modify its conviction and sentencing orders involve questions of law, which we review de novo.  
Hernandez, 281 Va. at 224, 707 S.E.2d at 274. 
 
Rule 1:1 provides in relevant part that, “All final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject to be 
modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.”  We 
have explained that “a final judgment is one which disposes of the entire action and leaves 
nothing to be done except the ministerial superintendence of execution of the judgment.”  Super 
Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc., v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 560, 561 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2002).  
Furthermore, “[t]he running of the twenty-one-day time period prescribed by Rule 1:1 may be 
interrupted only by the entry, within the twenty-one-day period, of an order modifying, vacating, 
or suspending the final judgment order.”  Id.  The record in this case demonstrates that the 
conviction order in this case was entered on January 9, 2009, and the sentencing order was 
entered on April 28, 2009.  Neither of these orders was modified, vacated or suspended within 
twenty-one days of their entry.  Accordingly, they became final and the trial court lost 
jurisdiction to modify the conviction3 in this case. 
 
We recognize that the record demonstrates an oral understanding between the trial court, 
the defendant, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney that the trial court would modify the 
conviction upon completion of certain conditions.  This understanding, however, was never 
                     
 
3 Under Code § 19.2-303, trial courts retain the authority to modify or suspend any 
unserved portion of a sentence up until a defendant sentenced for a felony is transferred to the 
custody of the Department of Corrections.  However, this statute is not implicated in this case 
because Hackett has only attempted to modify his conviction, not his sentence. 
 
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reduced to a written plea agreement, and the conviction order was never modified, vacated or 
suspended within twenty-one days of its entry.  By the time of the December 21, 2009 hearing, 
where defense counsel asked the trial court to modify the conviction and the trial court placed 
Hackett on probation, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to modify the conviction in this case 
and simply did not have the power to do what the parties asked it to do. 
 
Hackett and amicus argue that the trial court erred by failing to resolve this case by 
utilizing a nunc pro tunc order.  We have explained that 
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order entry is to correct mistakes of 
the clerk or other court officials, or to settle defects or omissions in 
the record so as to make the record show what actually took place.  
It is not the function of such entry by a fiction to antedate the 
actual performance of an act which never occurred, to represent an 
event as occurring at a date prior to the time of the actual event, or 
to make the record show that which never existed. 
 
Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 293, 94 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1956) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  When presented with the argument that he resolve this case by 
entering a nunc pro tunc order under the theory that there was a scrivener’s error in the 
conviction and sentencing orders, the trial judge stated on the record that “it’s not a scrivener’s 
error.  I mean this is exactly what was agreed to be done and what was supposed to be done and 
what I did.  There is no scrivener’s error in that.”  The trial judge’s own words demonstrate that 
no scrivener’s error occurred in the preparation of the conviction and sentencing orders.  The 
orders reflected the actions that the trial court intended to take when those orders were entered. 
 
Hackett’s final argument is that the conviction and sentencing orders were void ab initio.  
We have held that 
An order is void ab initio if entered by a court in the absence of 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, if the character of 
the order is such that the court had no power to render it, or if the 
 
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mode of procedure used by the court was one that the court could 
not lawfully adopt. 
 
Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51-52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, in the present case there is no dispute that the trial court 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter – a criminal case – and the parties.  The trial court had 
the power to convict the defendant of the felony, to which Hackett had pled guilty, and to 
sentence him on that felony.  There is no evidence of any defect in the procedure used by the trial 
court to convict the defendant and sentence him.  Rather, the procedure the parties wanted the 
trial court to follow, to reduce Hackett’s conviction after it became final, would have been a 
procedure the court could not lawfully adopt. 
 
In Burrell v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 474, 480, 722 S.E.2d 272, 275 (2012), we held that 
a provision in a sentencing order which stated that the court would reduce the conviction from a 
felony to a misdemeanor following the defendant’s incarceration and probation was an ultra vires 
provision that rendered the sentencing order void ab initio.  That provision was ultra vires 
because the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment reducing Burrell’s 
conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor more than five years after its entry of the sentencing 
order.  Id.  Our decision in Burrell makes clear that the conviction and sentencing orders in this 
matter were not void ab initio, but they very well might have been had the trial court employed 
the procedure requested by counsel. 
 
This Court is aware that Hackett complied with all the terms and conditions set by the 
trial court, with the understanding that by doing so his felony conviction would be reduced to a 
misdemeanor.  However, once the trial court’s conviction and sentencing orders became final, 
the trial court lost its authority to modify the conviction.  The Court of Appeals did not err in 
 
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affirming the trial court’s ruling that it lacked the authority to amend the conviction after more 
than 21 days had passed since entry of the conviction and sentencing orders. 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.