Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Streeter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Streeter, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1051.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1051 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. STREETER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Streeter,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1051.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation and in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to 
practice law—Two-year suspension, 18 months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2013-0581—Submitted September 11, 2013—Decided March 25, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-055. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, David Allen Streeter Jr. of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0073936, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001. 
{¶ 2} In an August 2012 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged 
that Streeter misappropriated more than $230,000 in funds from real estate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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closings that he conducted in the operation of his business, Statewide Title 
Agency, Ltd.  The parties submitted a timely consent-to-discipline agreement, but 
the panel rejected the agreement and set the matter for hearing. 
{¶ 3} At the hearing, the parties submitted stipulations of fact and 
misconduct in which Streeter acknowledged that his conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law).  They also submitted eight stipulated exhibits, one of which 
contained more than 80 letters commending Streeter’s good character and 
reputation in his community.  Having considered this evidence and the testimony 
of Streeter and his friend and former counsel, James Marniella, the panel adopted 
the parties’ stipulations.  Finding a strong similarity between the conduct and 
mitigating factors present in this case and those present in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857, the panel felt 
constrained to impose the same sanction that we had imposed in that case—a two-
year suspension, all stayed on conditions.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
of fact and misconduct and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Relator objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that 
the facts of this case distinguish Streeter’s conduct from that of Edwards.  
Because Streeter misappropriated more than three times the money that Edwards 
did, engaged in a Ponzi-like scheme to conceal his thefts, and did not promptly 
own up to his misconduct, relator contends that his conduct warrants an actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  Relator suggests that the appropriate 
sanction is a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on the conditions 
recommended by the board.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, but sustain relator’s objection to the recommended sanction and 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
suspend Streeter from the practice of law for two years, with 18 months stayed on 
the conditions recommended by the board. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} Streeter testified that after completing law school in 2001, he 
became an associate at a law firm focusing on business transactions and probate 
matters.  Approximately one year later, the firm opened Statewide Title Agency, 
Ltd., which at the time of the misconduct was underwritten by Chicago Title 
Insurance Company.  Streeter handled Statewide’s title work, real estate files, and 
closings, while the law-firm partners controlled the company’s spending and 
major business decisions.  When the law firm dissolved in 2005, one of the 
partners took full ownership of Statewide.  Streeter continued his employment 
with Statewide and later became a partner in the business.  After he assumed full 
ownership of the business in 2007, he discovered that it had exceptionally high 
overhead and a lot of debt; he began to feel overwhelmed when he realized that he 
could not make payroll. 
{¶ 6} The parties stipulated that from February 2010 to May 2011, 
Streeter conducted real estate closings for properties sold in Ohio and received 
funds from third parties that he was required to hold in escrow and disburse in 
accordance with the closing instructions for each transaction.  See R.C. 3953.231.  
On six occasions, however, he misappropriated those funds.  Instead of depositing 
them into the trust account that he held for that purpose, he deposited them into 
his operating account and used them to cover his personal and business expenses.  
With each successive misappropriation, he would repay part or all of the previous 
misappropriation to prevent detection.  The details of each transaction are set 
forth below: 
 
 
 
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Checks Intended for Escrow But Deposited Into Operating Account 
Date 
Received 
Payment 
Amount 
Date 
Repaid 
Source of Funds 
for Repayment  
2/11/10 
Check 
$6,911.78 
7/19/10 
$40,589.43 
7/15/10 
Check 
$40,589.43 
8/27/10 
$53,814.52 
8/24/10 
Check 
$53,814.52 
9/10/10 
$53,805.28 
9/10/10 
Check 
$53,805.28 
1/21/11 
$26,000.00 and 
$48,992.75 
12/30/10 
Check 
$26,000.00 
6/9/11 
Personal 
1/21/11 
Check 
$48,992.75 
6/9/11 
8/3/11 
9/2/11 
Personal 
Personal 
Personal 
 
{¶ 7} In early May 2011, Chicago Title discovered that Statewide’s 
monthly account reconciliations were delinquent and gave Streeter a deadline of 
May 13, 2011, to provide the documents.  A Chicago Title representative 
analyzed the records that Streeter provided and discovered that a December 30, 
2010 check for $26,000 and a January 21, 2011 check for $48,992.75 had not 
been deposited into Statewide’s escrow account.  When questioned by a Chicago 
Title representative, Streeter admitted that he had deposited the two checks into 
his operating account and spent the funds.  But by February 25, 2011, his 
operating account was once again overdrawn. 
{¶ 8} Chicago Title terminated Statewide’s agency relationship on May 
16, 2011, after further investigation revealed that Streeter had misappropriated the 
four additional checks identified in the table above.  At that time, $74,992.75 of 
the funds Streeter had misappropriated remained unreimbursed.  Streeter repaid 
that amount with personal and borrowed funds, making payments of $13,000 and 
$26,000 on June 9, 2011, $32,000 on August 3, 2011, and $3,992.75 on 
September 2, 2011. 
{¶ 9} Chicago Title reported the misappropriation to relator and local 
law-enforcement authorities, but no criminal charges resulted.  The parties 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
stipulated and the panel and board found that Streeter’s conduct involved 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, that it adversely reflected on his 
fitness to practice law, and that it therefore violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 
8.4(h) as charged in relator’s complaint.  We adopt these findings of fact and 
misconduct. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  We also weigh evidence of 
the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board found that just one aggravating 
factor is present—that Streeter acted with a selfish motive by taking funds that 
should have been placed in escrow and using them to operate his business and 
avoid laying off his employees.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 12} Stipulated mitigating factors adopted by the board include (1) the 
absence of prior disciplinary offenses, (2) Streeter’s payment of full restitution, 
(3) his cooperation throughout the disciplinary process, and (4) his positive 
reputation in the legal and general communities, as demonstrated by more than 80 
character letters submitted by Streeter’s friends, family, former clients, and 
colleagues.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e). 
{¶ 13} The parties also submitted a report from Dr. Galit Askenazi, a 
board-certified forensic psychologist, who diagnosed Streeter with major 
depressive disorder and general anxiety disorder dating back to at least 2005.  Dr. 
Askenazi states with reasonable psychological certainty that these conditions 
contributed to the misconduct at issue in this case.  He reports that although 
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Streeter has ongoing symptoms of depression and anxiety, he participates in 
individual and group counseling and is committed to improving his mental health 
and overall quality of life.  Paul Caimi, associate director of the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”), also reports that Streeter signed a three-year 
OLAP contract on September 22, 2011.  Pursuant to that contract, he states, 
Streeter has actively participated in private and group counseling with OLAP and 
Emotions Anonymous and has shown marked improvement in his mental health.  
Both Dr. Askenazi and Caimi conclude that Streeter is capable of returning to the 
competent and ethical practice of law.  Therefore, the board determined that 
Streeter’s stipulated mental disability also qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant 
to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 14} At the hearing, Streeter argued that a two-year suspension, all 
stayed on conditions, is the appropriate sanction for his misconduct in light of this 
court’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-
Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857.  In contrast, relator argued that while the same 
mitigating factors are present in this case and Edwards, the cases differ in that 
Edwards misappropriated approximately $70,000 from his client trust account, 
while Streeter misappropriated more than $230,000.  Therefore, relator urged the 
board to recommend a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 15} Finding 
that 
the 
difference 
in 
the 
amount 
of 
money 
misappropriated by Edwards and Streeter was not material, the board stated that it 
was constrained from making any recommendation that conflicted with the 
Edwards rationale.  Therefore, it recommended that Streeter be suspended from 
the practice of law for two years, all stayed on the conditions that he continue 
with his OLAP contract, extend the present term of that contract if recommended 
by OLAP, continue his individual therapy with a treating healthcare professional, 
and commit no further misconduct. 
 
 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
Relator’s Objection to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 16} Relator objects to the board’s recommended sanction.  He argues 
that the fully stayed suspension we imposed in Edwards is an exception to the 
general rule that attorney misconduct involving the misappropriation of funds 
warrants, at a minimum, an actual suspension from the practice of law.  Relator 
distinguishes Streeter’s misconduct from that of Edwards based on the sum of 
money misappropriated, his selfish motive, his initial mischaracterization of his 
misappropriation as accidental when confronted by Chicago Title, and Streeter’s 
conscious decision not to report his misconduct and contends that an actual 
suspension is therefore necessary in this case. 
{¶ 17} Streeter, on the other hand, contends that Edwards marks a new 
and enlightened departure from our earlier precedent that replaces the 
presumption of an actual suspension for misconduct involving misappropriation 
with a fully stayed suspension for attorneys whose contributing mental disabilities 
have been treated and controlled.  Our holding in Edwards is not so much a grand 
departure from our precedent, however, as it is an application of our past holdings 
to the specific facts of that case. 
{¶ 18} Edwards, an attorney who had practiced law for more than 30 
years without incident, wrote ten checks—totaling $69,500—to himself from his 
client trust account during a 17-month period in 2009 and 2010.  Edwards, 134 
Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857, ¶ 7.  The last of those checks 
resulted in an $832.34 overdraft of his client trust account.  Id.  In response to 
relator’s letter of inquiry regarding the overdraft, Edwards admitted not only his 
responsibility for the overdraft but also disclosed his pattern of misappropriating 
client funds.  Id. 
{¶ 19} Edwards stipulated that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) 
(requiring a lawyer to hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client 
trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property) and that he consequently 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, in violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  Edwards at ¶ 8.  We also found that his unauthorized 
removal of funds from his client trust account and use of those funds for his own 
purposes necessarily involved dishonesty in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  Id. 
{¶ 20} We have consistently recognized that because each disciplinary 
case presents unique facts and circumstances, we are not limited to the factors 
enumerated in the rules, but may consider “all relevant factors” in determining the 
appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(A) and 
(B).  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Oberholtzer, 136 Ohio St.3d 314, 2013-
Ohio-3706, 995 N.E.2d 217, ¶ 29; Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 45; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. 
Podor, 121 Ohio St.3d 131, 2009-Ohio-358, 902 N.E.2d 488, ¶ 11;  Akron Bar 
Assn. v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 21} Although we begin with the idea that each case is different, we 
recognize that there are presumptive sanctions for some common forms of 
attorney misconduct.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-2076, 865 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 19 (“an attorney’s neglect of legal 
matters and failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation warrant 
an indefinite suspension”); Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 
387, 2009-Ohio-1389, 904 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 14 (disbarment is the presumptive 
sanction for the misappropriation of client funds); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995) (“When an attorney 
engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4) [prohibiting conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], the attorney will be 
actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time”). 
{¶ 22} The presumption in favor of a specific sanction may be overcome, 
however, if “an abundance of mitigating evidence” warrants a different result.  
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003-Ohio-
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
4129, 794 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 5, 8 (acknowledging that misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation usually requires an actual 
suspension from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time, but 
imposing a six-month fully stayed suspension based on substantial mitigating 
evidence). 
{¶ 23} Our decision in Edwards acknowledges that the presumptive 
sanction for misappropriation is disbarment, but it also recognizes that that 
presumption “may be tempered with sufficient evidence of mitigating or 
extenuating circumstances.”  Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 
N.E.2d 857, at ¶ 18, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 294, 
2007-Ohio-6436, 878 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 28 (finding that disbarment was unwarranted 
for attorney’s misappropriation in view of the applicable mitigating factors); 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Gerren, 103 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-4110, 812 N.E.2d 
1280, ¶ 11, 16 (imposing a six-month actual suspension for misappropriation of 
client funds in recognition of the fact that the misconduct represented an isolated 
incident in an otherwise unblemished career).  Thus, Edwards embodies the 
application of our precedent to the facts of the case—not a departure from that 
precedent. 
{¶ 24} Just one aggravating factor was present in Edwards—a pattern of 
misconduct over a period of one-and-a-half years.  But significant mitigating 
factors persuaded us that a two-year suspension, all stayed on conditions, would 
adequately protect the public from future harm.  Edwards at ¶ 19-20.  Edwards 
had practiced law for more than 30 years without a disciplinary violation.  Id. at 
¶ 10; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  He fully cooperated in relator’s 
investigation, disclosing the full extent of his misappropriation in response to 
relator’s letter of inquiry regarding an $832.34 overdraft of his client trust 
account, and acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Edwards at ¶ 7, 
10; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d).  In December 2009—approximately ten 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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months before the bank reported the overdraft of his trust account to relator—
Edwards had used his own money to begin repaying the funds that he had 
misappropriated.  Edwards at ¶ 7, 11. 
{¶ 25} Edwards also presented evidence that in part because of difficulties 
in his marriage, he suffered from adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and 
depressed mood that contributed to his misconduct.  Edwards at ¶ 13-14.  He gave 
most of the funds he had misappropriated to his estranged wife in a misguided 
attempt to win her back and reunite his family.  Id. at ¶ 12, 14.  But with the 
assistance of OLAP and individual counseling, he came to understand how his 
mental issues had affected his judgment.  Id. at ¶ 15.  He made positive life 
changes and demonstrated that he was capable of returning to the competent, 
ethical, and professional practice of law.  Id. 
{¶ 26} We acknowledge that there are many similarities between the facts 
in Edwards and the facts at issue in this case.  We find, however, that the subtle 
yet important differences in Streeter’s conduct warrant an actual suspension from 
the practice of law. 
{¶ 27} Like Edwards, Streeter misappropriated funds that he should have 
held in a trust account.  But in contrast to Edwards, Streeter took affirmative 
action to cover up his theft by repaying the money with more misappropriated 
money rather than with his own funds.  When first confronted with evidence of 
his misconduct, he claimed that it was accidental rather than admit any 
wrongdoing—let alone the full extent of his wrongdoing.  And while he now 
freely admits that he misappropriated funds from his trust account, he continues to 
minimize the extent of his theft by arguing that his Ponzi-like scheme to repay the 
funds resulted in a net misappropriation of just $75,001.99.  All told, however, his 
misappropriations totaled more than $230,000—more than three times the amount 
that Edwards misappropriated. 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
{¶ 28} Streeter also emphasizes that he has submitted more than 80 letters 
from family, friends, clients, clients, and colleagues attesting to his character, 
reputation, integrity, and professionalism, in contrast to the eight letters submitted 
by Edwards.  While these letters speak to his integrity, professionalism, and 
concern for his fellow human beings, some of them expressly deny knowledge of 
the specifics of this action, while others refer to his intentional misconduct as a 
“mistake,” a “discrepancy,” an “unintentional error,” or the “commingling” of 
escrow and operating funds, and others make no reference to the charges against 
him.  Thus, we are left to question whether the writers fully understood the nature 
of Streeter’s admitted misconduct or, in some cases, the purpose for which their 
letters were solicited. 
{¶ 29} Perhaps, the most important distinction between the conduct of 
Edwards and Streeter is the circumstances under which their misappropriations 
arose.  Edwards was providing increasing financial support to his aging parents 
and had advanced over $200,000 of his own funds to cover expenses in some of 
his environmental cases.  Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 
N.E.2d 857, at ¶ 14.  He became distraught when his wife left him and became 
obsessed with winning her back.  Edwards at ¶ 14.  He began loaning her money 
from his client trust account to support her business, convincing himself that this 
financial support would encourage her to return to their marriage.  Edwards at 
¶ 12, 14.  These factors suggest that Edwards’s misconduct resulted from the 
convergence of several stressful life events, at least some of which were out of his 
control. 
{¶ 30} Streeter’s misconduct, in contrast, is the result of a crisis that he 
could have avoided, or at the very least minimized, with the exercise of due 
diligence.  He testified that when he and his business partner decided to amicably 
dissolve their relationship, he assumed full ownership of Statewide Title, its 
assets, and its liabilities, without making any inquiry into the financial condition 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of the business.  He admitted that he did not understand the accounting side of the 
business, that he did not know what balance sheets or profit and loss statements 
were, and that he had no idea how to run a business.  Streeter viewed sole 
ownership of Statewide as an opportunity to advance his career and proceeded 
blindly, without conducting any of the due diligence that one would expect of 
someone—especially 
an 
attorney—entering 
into 
a 
significant 
business 
transaction. 
{¶ 31} After Streeter assumed sole ownership of Statewide he realized 
that the business was mired in debt for which he was personally responsible and 
burdened by high overhead expenses and salaries.  With the decline of the real 
estate market, he soon recognized that the business was no longer financially 
viable.  But rather than lay off employees or shut down, he began 
misappropriating funds from the real estate transactions conducted by Statewide 
and using the money to keep the business afloat. 
{¶ 32} Given Streeter’s failure to investigate the business before he 
assumed full ownership of Statewide, his decision to misappropriate funds from 
his business clients in an effort to rectify his own ill-advised business decisions, 
his affirmative acts to cover up his theft, his failure to promptly disclose the full 
extent of his wrongdoing, and his ongoing efforts to minimize the extent of his 
theft, we find that the facts of this case are substantially different from those of 
Edwards.  Therefore we sustain relator’s objection to the board’s recommended 
sanction and agree that a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the board, is the appropriate sanction for Streeter’s 
misconduct. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, David Allen Streeter Jr. is suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the final 18 months of that suspension 
stayed on the conditions that he will extend the term of his OLAP contract if 
OLAP so recommends, comply with all of the treatment recommendations made 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
by OLAP and his treating professionals, and commit no further misconduct.  
Costs are taxed to Streeter. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
____________________ 
Scott Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Koblentz & Penvose, L.L.C., Richard S. Koblentz, Bryan L. Penvose, and 
Kevin R. Marchaza, for respondent. 
_________________________