Title: People v. Scott

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85409-Agenda 28-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								LARRY SCOTT, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 26, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Larry Scott, brings this appeal from an order
of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the defendant received the death
sentence for the underlying murder conviction, the present appeal
lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
	The defendant was charged with a number of offenses for the
murder and sexual assault of a woman in Chicago in August 1984.
Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury found
the defendant guilty of murder and attempted robbery and guilty
but mentally ill of aggravated criminal sexual assault. After a
bench sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the defendant
to death for the murder conviction and to 30 years' imprisonment
for the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction; the judge did
not sentence the defendant on the attempted robbery conviction.
On direct appeal this court affirmed the defendant's convictions
and sentences. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479 (1992). The United
States Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Scott v. Illinois, 507 U.S. 989, 123 L. Ed. 2d 156, 113 S. Ct. 1590 (1993).
	The defendant then initiated the present post-conviction action
in the circuit court of Cook County, challenging his convictions
and death sentence on a variety of grounds. The post-conviction
court allowed the defendant an evidentiary hearing on one of the
issues raised in the petition, concerning the defendant's remorse
for the offenses; after the hearing, the judge denied all relief. The
defendant brings the present appeal to this court (134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a)), contesting the circuit court's decision.
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through
122-7 (West 1994)) allows a defendant to challenge a conviction
or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights.
People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 157 (1994). An action for
post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding rather than an
appeal from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a
defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or
state constitutional rights in the proceedings that led to the
judgment being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994);
People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Principles of res
judicata and waiver will limit the range of issues available to a
post-conviction petitioner "to constitutional matters which have
not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated."
People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly,
rulings on issues that were previously raised at trial or on direct
appeal are res judicata, and issues that could have been raised in
the earlier proceedings, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed
waived. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995).
	The defendant's primary focus in this appeal, as it was in the
proceedings below, is on what effect his remorse for the offenses
should have on his death sentence. The defendant argues that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present, at the capital
sentencing hearing, evidence of the defendant's remorse. The
defendant observes that the sentencing judge, in deciding to
impose the death penalty in this case, found that there were no
mitigating circumstances at all in this case; at sentencing, the
judge said that the evidence did "not disclose one single iota of a
mitigating factor." The defendant further contends that remorse is
recognized as a mitigating circumstance in death penalty
jurisprudence and that the evidence introduced at the post-conviction hearing demonstrates that he was remorseful for these
offenses. The defendant deduces from these propositions that he
must receive a sentence other than death, given the presence of
remorse in this case.
	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish both that counsel's performance was so
deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that the defendant was so prejudiced by counsel's conduct that
he was denied a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984).
To satisfy the second part of the Strickland test, a defendant must
show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	At the post-conviction hearing, the defendant testified briefly
about his feelings regarding these offenses. The focus of his
testimony was his belief that he deserved the death sentence
because of the crimes he had committed. On direct examination,
defense counsel asked the defendant first about his feelings at the
time of trial, and then about his feelings at the time of the
evidentiary hearing:
			"Q. How did you then feel about what you did?
Whether it was right or wrong, how did you feel about it?
			A. I feeled [sic] like it was wrong.
			Q. How do you feel about it today?
			A. That it was wrong.
			Q. Do you feel that it was wrong just for you or wrong
for the lady you killed and her family? Do you have any
remorse? Did you have any remorse then? What do you
feel?
			A. I feel the same way I did, that it was wrong.
			Q. How wrong was it?
			A. It was wrong enough to get the death sentence."
At the evidentiary hearing, the defense also presented affidavits
from the defendant's two trial lawyers, Bob Lee and Don Paull.
Both of them stated that experts who examined the defendant for
fitness reported to counsel that the defendant said that he wanted
to receive the death penalty. The lawyers also stated that the
defendant said that he recognized that he what he did was wrong,
that he was sorry, and that he wanted to be punished.
	The same judge presided at both the defendant's trial and the
post-conviction proceedings below. The judge therefore could
uniquely determine what likely effect the defendant's additional
evidence of remorse would have had on the prior decision. In this
case, the judge concluded that presentation of this evidence at the
sentencing hearing would not have altered his decision to sentence
the defendant to death. In making this ruling, the judge
commented on the brutality of the defendant's offenses, including
evidence that the defendant bit off the victim's nipples and bit her
vagina during the attack. The judge explained:
			"Fifteen years after this event happened, when I was
reading this file here this morning to refresh my
recollection as to the facts, my blood still runs cold with
the cruelty and the heinousness and the inhumanity and
the cannibalistic fervor that was exhibited by this man as
he killed this woman, bit off both her nipples,
cannibalized her vagina orally.
			He wasn't satisfied with killing her, he had to
cannibalize her body. He desecrated, he had no feeling of
this woman as a human being.
			So, no, I don't have any feeling that what I did then was
wrong and I don't have any feeling that what I'm doing
now is wrong, and I say for the record that the question of
remorse, I accept it and I put it on the scales as I must, and
it still doesn't outweigh the heinous act that this man
committed in taking that woman's life."
The judge's findings demonstrate that he would not have imposed
a different sentence on the defendant even if the evidence of
remorse had been fully developed at the sentencing hearing, as the
defendant now contends it should have been.
	The post-conviction judge's ruling must be affirmed unless it
is manifestly erroneous. See People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500,
528 (1999); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). We
do not believe that it is. Our cases have previously held that the
presence or absence of remorse may be considered at a capital
sentencing hearing. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281 (1989);
People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 80-81 (1984). The presence of
remorse does not preclude a sentence of death, however. We
believe that the post-conviction judge's determination in this case
is entitled to substantial deference, and we see no reason to reach
a different result. The judge carefully considered the defendant's
new evidence, yet he still concluded that his original sentencing
determination would not have been affected by that evidence. We
cannot say that the post-conviction judge's conclusion was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. The offenses in the present
case were particularly brutal, as the judge noted. Moreover, the
expression by the defendant of his feelings regarding these crimes
focused more on the appropriateness of the death penalty as
punishment in this case, and less on a sense of contrition for his
actions.
	Even though the judge originally believed, at the time of the
sentencing hearing, that no mitigation at all existed in this case,
the new evidence of remorse, or of any other mitigating
circumstance, does not now automatically compel a sentence other
than death. At the conclusion of the second stage of a capital
sentencing hearing, after the presentation of evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, a sentence of death will be imposed
unless the jury or judge, as the case may be, finds that there is
mitigation sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1996). Thus, the existence of mitigating
evidence does not by itself bar imposition of a death sentence
(People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 493 (2000)); rather, the
mitigating evidence must be sufficient to preclude a sentence of
death, when considered together with the evidence in aggravation.
In this case, the post-conviction judge found that the new evidence
would not have precluded a sentence of death, even if that
evidence had been introduced at the sentencing hearing.
	The defendant next raises two related arguments concerning
the scope and nature of the hearing conducted below. The
defendant first contends that the post-conviction judge erred in
limiting what evidence the defense could introduce at the hearing.
In essence, the defendant believes that the proceeding was in
reality a new sentencing hearing, and that the judge therefore
should have allowed the defense to introduce further mitigating
evidence, including, specifically, evidence about the defendant's
favorable adjustment to prison life. The defendant notes that
evidence of good conduct while incarcerated is mitigating (Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6-7, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1671 (1986); People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 345 (1998)),
and he emphasizes that an individualized sentencing
determination, based on the full range of information known about
a defendant, is necessary in a capital proceeding (People v.
Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 243 (1997); People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 368 (1997)).
	We do not question the importance of an individualized
sentencing determination to the proper application of the death
penalty, nor do we dispute the possible mitigating force of
evidence of a defendant's favorable adjustment to institutional life.
We do not agree with the premise of the defendant's argument,
however, that the proceeding below was actually a new sentencing
hearing. Although the post-conviction judge on several different
occasions made comments suggesting that he was holding a fresh
sentencing hearing, we believe that the full measure of his remarks
indicates that he understood that he was conducting only an
evidentiary hearing on one part of the defendant's post-conviction
petition. For example, in court on November 13, 1997, when the
prosecutor referred to the limited nature of the evidentiary hearing
and disputed the defendant's assertion that it was a new sentencing
hearing, the post-conviction judge stated that he agreed with the
prosecutor's assessment of the status of the proceeding.
	A brief consideration of the nature of post-conviction relief
and of the availability of review for post-conviction decisions
offers further support for our conclusion that the hearing below
was not, and could not have been, a new sentencing hearing. If a
judge hearing a post-conviction petition determines that a
defendant should receive a new sentencing hearing, the State is
entitled to appeal that determination, prior to the holding of a fresh
hearing. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a); see People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225,
227 (1953); People v. Andretich, 244 Ill. App. 3d 558, 559-60
(1993); see, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997) (affirming,
on State's appeal, judgment of circuit court granting defendant
post-conviction relief and ordering new sentencing hearing).
Under the approach suggested by the defendant, however, a new
sentencing hearing would be held, even before another court had
an opportunity to review the order granting post-conviction relief.
The defendant's theory would thus deny the State review of the
post-conviction judge's decision. The availability of review of
judgments granting post-conviction relief thus provides additional
support for our conclusion that the judge below could not have
intended for the evidentiary hearing to be a new sentencing
hearing.
	The defendant raises the related contention that he was
entitled at the hearing below to elect whether the new evidence
would be considered by a jury. Again, the premise for this
argument is the notion that the proceeding was actually a new
capital sentencing hearing, at which a defendant has a statutory
right to a jury. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1996).
	This argument is without merit. As we have explained, the
proceeding below is properly characterized as an evidentiary
hearing on one claim in the defendant's post-conviction petition,
and not a fresh sentencing hearing. The Post-Conviction Hearing
Act establishes "an original and independent remedy by a
proceeding, civil in nature" (People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 615
(1953)), that examines allegations of constitutional error, and its
procedures are controlled by statute. Unlike statutes that
specifically grant a defendant a right to a jury determination at
certain proceedings, such as a capital sentencing hearing (720
ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1996)) or a fitness hearing (725 ILCS
5/104-12 (West 1996)), the Post-Conviction Hearing Act makes
no provision for a jury. Accordingly, the defendant was not
entitled to present to a jury the matters raised in his post-conviction petition. The correct procedure, which was followed in
this case, was to have any evidence submitted to the post-conviction court alone, sitting without a jury. See 725 ILCS
5/122-6 (West 1996) ("The court may receive proof by affidavits,
depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence").
	The defendant next raises a series of arguments concerning
the jury instructions used at his trial, contending that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel by his attorneys' failure
to ensure that the jury was properly instructed. The defendant
elected to be sentenced by the judge, so all the instructional
questions arise from the guilt phase of the proceedings. The post-conviction court dismissed these allegations of error without an
evidentiary hearing, and therefore our review is de novo (People
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89 (1998)). The defendant raised
many of the same issues on direct appeal, when he contested the
jury instructions used at his trial. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479,
532-39 (1992). Res judicata bars our reconsideration of those
questions here. Other issues were not raised on direct appeal but
could have been, and the waiver doctrine precludes our
consideration of those matters. We briefly summarize these issues
below, setting forth what determination, if any, was made in the
earlier appeal.
	The defendant first challenges the failure to include a
reference to the insanity defense within the issues instructions for
each offense. This court rejected the same argument on direct
appeal, however, concluding that the instructions used did not
deny the defendant a fair trial (Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 538), and we
must therefore conclude that consideration of the issue here is
barred by res judicata.
	The defendant next questions the wording of the insanity
instruction used at trial, asserting that the jury might have believed
that the defense applied only to the charge of murder. Again, this
court rejected the same argument on direct appeal, noting that the
jury received four different verdict forms for each offense: not
guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty, and guilty but
mentally ill. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 538-39. Further consideration of
the issue here is therefore barred by res judicata. Nor is this
argument aided by the defendant's additional contention that
counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because counsel failed to
cite a particular decision, People v. Wells, 110 Ill. App. 3d 700
(1982), in support of this allegation of error. We have examined
that opinion, and we do not believe that there is a reasonable
probability that our decision on this issue would have been
different if the case had been cited to us on appeal.
	The defendant also argues that the instructions used at trial
were defective because one of them told the jury to determine
whether he was insane on August 4, 1984, the day of the offenses,
rather than at the specific time when he committed the offenses.
This court considered the same contention on direct appeal and
concluded that the instructions in their entirety correctly informed
the jurors that they were to consider the defendant's sanity at the
time of the offenses. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 539. Res judicata thus
precludes us from reexamining the same question in this appeal.
	The defendant also argues that the guilty but mentally ill
(GBMI) instructions used at trial were defective and prejudicial.
On direct appeal, this court addressed in detail the propriety of the
instructions and agreed with the defendant that they were
erroneous. After carefully considering the evidence in this case,
the defense theory at trial, and the verdicts returned by the jury, the
court concluded that the error in the instructions was harmless.
Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 536-38. Again, principles of res judicata bar
consideration of this issue here.
	The defendant next complains that the trial judge, in reading
the charges in the indictment to the jurors, stated that the
defendant was pleading not guilty but did not mention at the same
time, in referring to the plea, that the defendant was raising the
insanity defense. Unlike the preceding issues, this question was
not raised on direct appeal. We find, though, that the defendant has
waived consideration of this question, for he could have raised it
on direct appeal. The grounds for this issue were apparent from the
trial transcript, and nothing precluded the defendant from raising
it on direct appeal. We note, moreover, that the jury was fully
aware of the defense theory at trial, which involved the
defendant's concession that he committed the present offenses and
asserted insanity as a defense to them. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 514.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the insanity defense and
provided the jury with the relevant verdict forms.
	In his final challenge to the jury instructions used at trial, the
defendant argues that the trial judge inserted confusing surplusage
in one of them when he read it to the jury. Specifically, the judge
told the jurors:
		"A person is guilty but mentally ill at the time of the
commission of an offense, a person is guilty but mentally
ill if at the time of the commission of the offense, he was
not insane but was suffering from a mental illness."
It is clear that the judge misspoke when he began reading the
instruction, omitting the word "if" when he said, "A person is
guilty but mentally ill [if] at the time of the commission of an
offense." The judge then immediately corrected his error,
repeating the opening clause and adding the omitted conditional.
Again, the defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, and
it must therefore be deemed waived. In any event, we do not
believe that the jurors misunderstood the judge's meaning.
	The defendant also raises a number of additional challenges
to his convictions and death sentence, arguing that the post-conviction judge erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on
these questions. We will briefly summarize these additional issues.
	The defendant first argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel when his lawyers failed to
argue that placing the burden of proving insanity on the defense in
a capital case violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment found in the eighth amendment. This
court has previously held that the provisions imposing this burden
on the defense do not violate due process under the federal or state
constitutions (Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 540-43), and the defendant has
not presented us with any reason that would warrant our reaching
a different result under the eighth amendment.
	The defendant also contends that a person who is mentally ill
should not be subject to the death penalty. This court has
previously held, however, that a person found guilty but mentally
ill may be executed. People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 280-81
(1988). Here, the jury found the defendant guilty of two of the
offenses, murder and attempted robbery, and guilty but mentally
ill of the third, aggravated criminal sexual assault. On review, this
court concluded that death is not an excessive or inappropriate
sentence in this case, notwithstanding the evidence of the
defendant's psychological problems. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 561. The
defendant argues further that the Illinois statutes, by placing the
burden of proving insanity on the defense, fail to ensure that a
capital defendant who receives the death penalty is not insane. As
noted above, the assignment to the defense of the burden of
proving insanity does not violate due process.
	The defendant next contends that the Illinois death penalty
statute violates equal protection because blacks do not have equal
access to mental health treatment yet remain subject to the death
penalty even if they are mentally ill. We conclude that the
defendant has waived this objection. The defendant offers no data
in support of his assertion regarding the unavailability of mental
health treatment to minorities, and he failed to raise this point
either at trial or on direct appeal.
	The defendant argues that counsel on direct appeal acted
under a per se conflict of interest because both she and the
defendant's two trial lawyers were from the office of the Cook
County public defender. This court has previously rejected the
argument that successive representation by members of the same
agency gives rise to a per se conflict (People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1996)), and the defendant has not presented any further
evidence that would cause us to reach a different result in his case.
	The defendant also contends that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because of conduct that precluded this court
from finding reversible error on direct appeal with respect to a
number of issues. The defendant specifically refers to nine
different instances in which trial counsel's conduct led this court
to conclude that the defendant had waived alleged errors or had
otherwise forfeited the opportunity to complain of certain rulings
or testimony. We will address these issues in the sequence in
which the defendant raises them; in several instances, we have
combined contentions relating to the same subject.
	The defendant first points to trial counsel's acquiescence in
the prosecution's use of patient progress notes made of the
defendant while he was receiving treatment at Cermak Hospital
during his incarceration in the Cook County jail. On direct appeal,
this court determined that the notes were not so unreliable that
expert witnesses could not make use of them in evaluating the
defendant, and the court also noted that the defense invoked the
records to help demonstrate the defendant's lengthy history of
mental illness. As the State observes, insanity was the defense at
trial, and counsel acted appropriately in attempting to find within
these records evidence to support the defendant's claim of mental
illness.
	Also with respect to the psychiatric testimony, the defendant
complains that he was not advised of his rights before speaking to
two psychiatrists, and that counsel erred in failing to preserve the
issue in the trial court. On direct appeal, this court concluded that
the error was harmless, given the defense decision to present
psychiatric evidence. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. We continue to
adhere to that decision. The defendant cannot show prejudice if the
error was harmless. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 266 (1999).
	The defendant next complains of counsel's failure to object to
testimony that the defendant had been found fit for trial. On direct
review, this court concluded that any objection to the references to
the defendant's fitness had been waived, noting that counsel did
not object to the testimony and, further, that much of the testimony
had been elicited by the defense. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 530-31. The
court also concluded that these references to fitness were harmless.
Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 531. The defendant is unable to demonstrate
prejudice from these rulings. Again, if the error was harmless, the
defendant cannot show prejudice from counsel's failure to raise
the point. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d  at 266.
	The defendant raises once again a complaint regarding the use
of the GBMI jury instructions at trial. The defendant now contends
that trial and appellate counsel should have argued that the
erroneous instructions could not be deemed harmless. We have
already addressed these issues at length, both on direct review and
in this appeal, and we do not believe that any further discussion is
necessary.
	The defendant next challenges trial counsel's decision to
invoke favorable evidence about the victim's character. In his
confession, the defendant stated that the victim used a racial slur
against him. The trial evidence showed, however, that the victim,
a student at the Moody Bible Institute, was quiet and polite.
Defense counsel attempted to use this evidence to the defendant's
advantage by arguing that the defendant's misperception was
evidence of delusive thinking. On direct appeal, in response to the
defendant's challenge to the introduction of favorable evidence of
the victim's character, this court found that the evidence did not
deprive the defendant of a fair trial because defense counsel
argued that it was relevant. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 545 ("Given the
fact defendant argued the relevance of the character evidence, we
find that these references did not deny defendant a fair trial"). We
conclude that trial counsel's decision to use the evidence in this
way was, in essence, a matter of trial strategy, and therefore it is
accorded substantial deference under the Strickland
ineffectiveness standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
	The defendant also contends that trial counsel erred in failing
to preserve an issue regarding the testimony of one of the
prosecution's expert witnesses, Dr. James Cavanaugh. At one
point in his testimony, Dr. Cavanaugh gave an incorrect definition
of insanity, using the phrase "irresistibly driven" in defining the
term. Defense counsel objected to this definition but did not
include the issue in the post-trial motion. On direct appeal, this
court considered only whether the testimony was plain error, in
light of counsel's failure to preserve the issue in the post-trial
motion, and concluded that it was not. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 547-48.
The defendant complains that counsel's inaction resulted in this
court's deciding the issue under a plain error standard rather than
a more rigorous test. As this court noted on direct appeal, the
instructions given to the jury at the close of testimony correctly set
forth the applicable standard. We do not believe that there is a
reasonable probability that our result would have been different if
counsel had properly preserved an objection to the testimony.
	The defendant also argues that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's comment in
closing argument at trial that the defendant had been truant while
enrolled in school. On direct review, this court held that the
comment was not plain error; the court employed that standard
because of counsel's failure to properly object to the comment at
trial. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d  at 550. We do not believe that this brief and
isolated remark could have denied the defendant a fair trial.
	The defendant, in his brief before this court, also raises
several catch-all arguments, framing them in broad terms and
invoking issues he raised on earlier occasions. Thus, the defendant
contends that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel because they "failed to raise the issues raised in
Points 3 through 9 of the Petition [citation] at trial, in post-trial
motions, and on appeal"; he also "reasserts all constitutional issues
asserted in defendant's direct appeal and readopts those
arguments"; finally, he contends, as a general matter, that this
court should apply provisions of state constitutional law in any
instance in this case in which the result would be more favorable
to him under the Illinois Constitution. We agree with the State that
the defendant's general references to these issues, unsupported by
argument or citation to authority, are inadequate to justify their
treatment here. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
*  *  *
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to
enter an order setting Tuesday, January 16, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death, entered in the circuit court of Cook
County, is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the
manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this
case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where the
defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Scott's convictions should not be disturbed. In my
view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand.
For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial
dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death
penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). Scott's sentence of death should therefore be vacated and
the cause should be remanded for imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j).