Title: Taylor v. Nationsbank

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A.
No. 139, September Term, 1999
HEADNOTE:
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS; 
NATIONAL 
BANKING 
ASSOCIATION;
CONFIDENTIAL FINANCIAL RECORDS; DISCLOSURE PROHIBITED;
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CONTRACT
Grant of summary judgment was improper where the voluntary disclosure by a banking
institution of a depositor’s name and unlisted telephone number, thereby identifying that
depositor’s checking account number to another depositor, constituted a violation of both the
depositor’s contract with the banking institution and the common law, thus presenting a
genuine dispute as to material facts.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 97-252053
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 139
September Term, 1999
GARFIELD TAYLOR
v.
NATIONSBANK, N.A.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
           Karwacki, Robert L. (retired, specially           
                                  assigned)
           Bloom, Theodore G. (retired, specially          
                              assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
            Filed:      July 17, 2001
In this case, we are asked to decide whether a banking institution’s disclosure of the
name and unlisted telephone number of one of its depositors, which, under the circumstances,
1 NationsBank, N.A. has since merged with Bank of America; nevertheless, for the
sake of clarity, we shall continue to refer to the respondent as NationsBank.
2 The petitioner also pled loss of consortium, but, responding to the respondent’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, agreed that it should be dismissed. 
had the effect of identifying that depositor’s checking account number to another depositor,
with knowledge of their respective identities, constitutes a violation of Maryland Code (1980,
1998 Replacement Volume), §§ 1-301-1-305 of the Financial Institutions Article, the
depositor’s contract with the banking institution and the common law.  Garfield Taylor (the
“petitioner”), filed an action against NationsBank, N.A.1 (the “respondent”), alleging breach of
contract, breach of privacy and breach of legally guaranteed confidentiality,2 premised on one
of the respondent’s agents having identified his private checking account by disclosing the
petitioner’s name and by giving his unlisted phone number to one of the petitioner’s co-
workers.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the respondent’s motion for summary
judgment, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding, as to the breach of contract
action that the disclosure was a violation of neither the petitioner’s right to privacy nor his
contract with the respondent.  Taylor  v. NationsBank, 128 Md. App. 414, 419-22, 738 A.2d
893, 896-98 (1999).  Having granted the petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 357 Md.
481, 745 A.2d 436 (2000), we shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
I.
The petitioner and Walter Scott, both employees of the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”), with checking accounts at the respondent banking institution,
signed up with their employer to have their paychecks deposited directly into their checking
2
accounts.  Although they both received pay advice stubs, the account number on Mr. Scott’s
pay advice stub, as it was subsequently discovered, was not his account number.  Moreover, Mr.
Scott learned that his pay had not been deposited to his account, prompting him to call the
respondent.  During the conversation with a service representative, he learned both that the
account number on the pay advice stub was not his and that his paycheck had been deposited
into that account.  The customer service representative identified the account into which the
funds were deposited, and so informed Mr. Scott, as one belonging to the petitioner.  After a
discussion of what could be done to protect Mr. Scott’s money - it was a Saturday and, thus,
the earliest the respondent could correct the error was Monday, the customer service
representative gave Mr. Scott the petitioner’s unlisted home telephone number, suggesting that
he might call the petitioner and explain the situation.  Mr. Scott did call the petitioner at home
and, in a short conversation, conveyed his concerns to the petitioner.
Alleging that, as a “private person by nature” the ensuing unexpected conversation
“caused him a great deal of mental anguish and mental pain, and a severe shock to his nervous
system,” the petitioner filed suit against the respondent in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  Following a hearing, the trial court granted
the respondent’s motion and denied the petitioners’, concluding, “I don’t believe that under the
undisputed facts presented by this case that it presents viable causes of action. . . .  The case
is hereby dismissed.”
3 The Court of Special Appeals did not address whether the disclosures made by the
respondent violated Maryland Code (1980, 1998 Replacement Volume), §§ 1-301-1-305
of the Financial Institutions Article.
3
As indicated, the judgment was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court.3  With
regard to the breach of contract count, the court held that the depositor agreements which the
petitioner signed were not controlling and that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment.  128 Md. at 418, 738 A.2d at 896.  Focusing on the disclosure of the petitioner’s
unlisted phone number, it concluded that “[a]n unlisted telephone number . . . hardly qualifies
as account information,” the concern of the depositor’s agreements.  The Court of Special
Appeals also rejected the petitioner’s argument that Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App.
335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979) controlled the resolution of the case.  Noting that Waller makes
clear that disclosure of a depositor’s name and telephone number to another customer is
improper only in the absence “‘of the express or implied consent of the depositor,’” 128 Md.
at 420, 738 A.2d at 896 (quoting Waller, 44 Md. App at 344, 408 A.2d at 764), and that the
depositor agreement in this case exempted the respondent from responsibility for the release
of information to a third person when the third person has acquired, and is in possession of,
the depositor’s account number, id., the court determined that “it is uncontradicted that Walter
Scott, through no fault of NationsBank, possessed appellant’s account number not from
NationsBank, but from reading his payment advice stub.”  Id. at 420, 738 A.2d at 896-97.  Once
again, the court focused on the disclosure of the unlisted phone number, pointing out that
Waller did not address the legality of divulging that kind of information.  Id.
4
Relying upon Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 166, 502 A.2d
1101, 1118 (1986) and Professor Prosser’s seminal article describing the tort, William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 393-396 (1960), the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s grant of the respondent’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the
count of the complaint alleging invasion of privacy.  Id. at 420-422, 738 A. 2d at 796-98.
Thus, aware that, for an action for invasion of privacy to be maintained, there must be public
disclosure of a private matter, the court explained:
“In other words, the plaintiff must be able to show more that just a desire to keep
a particular fact private, but that the matter revealed must be a personal matter
that would be highly offensive for a reasonable person to have disclosed to
others.”
Id. at 420, 738 A.2d at 897.  As to whether, in this case, a private matter had been disclosed,
it reasoned:
“Here, the supposedly private fact, the unlisted telephone number, is hardly the
kind of matter that a reasonable person would suffer mental distress upon
learning that it had been revealed to one other person, in this case, a co-worker,
who used it by calling to request that his earned wages, which had been
mistakenly deposited in the appellant’s account, not be withdrawn over the
weekend.  The particular number, the fact of its being unlisted or anything else
about a telephone number, does not achieve the level of a private fact that, if
revealed, could cause a reasonable person the kind of mental distress that
resembles the distress suffered by victims of defamation.  In order to be
actionable, the disclosure must be about private facts that would be highly
offensive and objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.  The revelation
of an unlisted telephone number is unlikely to offend a person of ordinary
sensibilities, and to trespass substantially upon another’s right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, the right to live without interference by the public into
matters with which the public is not properly concerned, the heart of the right
to privacy.
*     *     *     *
5
“Even if the unauthorized revelation of an unlisted telephone number could
somehow be considered a wrong that could cause an injury from defamation, the
revelation to a single person, as NationsBank did here, would not generate
sufficient intrusion to constitute a violation of one’s right to privacy.”
Id. at 420-21, 738 A.2d at 897 (internal citations omitted).
II.
At issue in this case is the propriety of the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the respondent.  It is resolved by reference to Maryland Rule 2-501 and the cases that have
construed it.  This Court has made clear that “[t]he purpose of the summary judgment
procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there
is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried,” Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding
Co., 362 Md. 661, 675, 766 A.2d 617, 624 (2001); Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership v. Brown
& Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93, 756 A.2d 963, 972 (2000), and, therefore, it is not a substitute for
trial.  Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 205, 680 A.2d 1067, 1077
(1996).  Thus, Rule 2-501 (e) provides that a trial judge may grant summary judgment “if the
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that party
in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  A material fact
is “‘a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.’”  Jones v.
Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. at 675, 766 A.2d at 624 (quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md.
98, 111, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985)).  In making that determination, the evidence, and all
inferences therefrom, are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Natural
Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 62, 485 A.2d 663, 671 (1984).  Evidentiary matters,
6
credibility issues, and material facts which are in dispute cannot properly be disposed of by
summary judgment.  See Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 536, 754 A.2d 1030,
1042 (2000) (recognizing that “Maryland law . . . has not viewed the function of summary
judgment to be determining whether an issue is genuine based on credibility.”).
An appellate court’s review of the grant of summary judgment involves the
determination whether a dispute of material fact exists, Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247,
255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625
A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993), and “whether the trial court was legally correct.”  Heat & Power
Corporation v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206
(1990) (citations omitted).  That the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment is not
dispositive of the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  In that event, as indeed is the
case whenever a motion for summary judgment is filed, the court must assess each party’s
motion on its own merits, drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party.  Natural
Design, 302 Md. at 62, 485 A.2d at 671.
III.
Although Breach of Privacy was one of the counts in the Complaint that he filed against
the respondent, see Count II, and one of the issues addressed by the Court of Special Appeals
in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the petitioner does not argue its
applicability in this Court, thus refraining from challenging the intermediate appellate court’s
ruling in that regard.  Instead, he confines his challenge to the other two issues the Court of
7
Special Appeals decided - whether by making the disclosures at issue, the respondent breached
its contract with the petitioner and violated its common law duty of confidentiality - and one
which was raised in the brief filed with the Court of Special Appeals and in the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, see Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 9, n.1, 728 A.2d 1280, 1284, n.1 (1999)
(in a case decided by the Court of Special Appeals, ordinarily the issues before this Court are
those set forth in the certiorari petition, not the briefs); Maryland Rule 8-131(b) (whether the
disclosures violated the statutory prohibition on the release of account information), but which
that court did not address.
To prevail in an action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a contractual obligation and that the defendant breached that obligation.  See
Continental Masonry Co., Inc. v. Verdel Const. Co., Inc., 279 Md. 476, 480, 369 A.2d 566,
569 (1977).  It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove damages resulting from the breach, for
it is well settled that where a breach of contract occurs, one may recover nominal damages
even though he has failed to prove actual damages.  Hooton v. Kenneth B. Mumaw Plumbing
& Heating Co., Inc., 271 Md. 565, 572-73, 318 A.2d 514, 518 (1974); Asibem Assoc., Ltd.
v. Rill, 264 Md. 272, 276, 286 A.2d 160, 162 (1972); Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 438,
177 A.2d 258, 260 (1962); Gilbert Const. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 412, 129 A.2d 518, 523
(1956); Envelope Co. v. Balto. Post Co., 163 Md. 596, 606, 163 A. 688, 692 (1933); see
Mallis v. Faraclas, 235 Md. 109, 116, 200 A.2d 676, 680 (1964).
The breach of contract count is premised on the depositor agreements that the
petitioner entered into with the respondent, and its predecessor, prohibiting the disclosure of
4 When he opened his account with Sovran Bank, the respondent’s predecessor, the
petitioner agreed to the rules and conditions established by the bank.  The rule relevant to
the disclosure, by the Bank, of the petitioner’s account information, provided:
“Disclosure of Account Information.  The Bank will disclose information to
third parties about your account or any transaction thereon in certain
circumstances, including, but not limited to, situations where it is necessary for
completing any transaction, for complying with government agency or court
orders, or for verifying the existence or condition of your account for a third
party such as a credit bureau or a merchant or for reporting losses incurred by
the Bank in maintaining your account to its subsidiaries and affiliates.”
8
the information that the respondent disclosed or, stated differently, providing that the
information that the petitioner gave to the bank would be kept private.  In effect when the
disclosures at issue in this case were made, the respondent’s deposit agreement, which the
petitioner signed, provided in Paragraph 15:4
“Account Information.  You agree that we may furnish our customer lists to
others.  We may also provide account information: (1) to Chex Systems, Inc.,
Equifax or other account information services; (2) to anyone who we reasonably
believe is conducting a legitimate credit inquiry, subject to any applicable
financial privacy laws or other laws or regulations, including, without limitation,
inquiries to verify the existence or condition of an account for a third party such
as a merchant or credit bureau; (3) in response to any subpoena, summons, court
or administrative order, or other legal process which we believe requires our
compliance; (4) in connection with collection of indebtedness or to report
losses incurred by us; (5) in compliance with any agreement between the Bank
and a professional regulatory or disciplinary body; and (6) to NationsBank
Corporation and any of its subsidiaries or affiliates.  You acknowledge that we
provide for your convenience various methods by which you can obtain
information on your accounts, and that our reasonable security measures cannot
absolutely ensure against ‘unauthorized’ inquiries.  You therefore agree that we
will not be responsible for the release of information to anyone not authorized
by you who has gained possession of your ATM access device or who has
learned your identifying characteristics such as personal identification number
(PIN), account number, or social security number.  You further agree that if you
give your account number to a third person by telephone, that act authorizes that
third person to initiate debits to the account even if a particular transaction was
9
not authorized.  You hereby authorize us to obtain credit reports, verification of
employment and other information in respect to your accounts at any time.”
This section of the depositor agreement also is pertinent to the common law confidentiality
issue.
The respondent argued in the Circuit Court that the petitioner, by signing the deposit
agreement, specifically agreed to the disclosure of his name and telephone number.  In support,
it pointed to the petitioner’s agreement that it be permitted to furnish its depositor lists to
others and to the petitioner’s acknowledgment that the respondent would not be held liable for
releasing information to a person in possession of “identifying characteristics” of the
petitioner.  The trial court apparently accepted the arguments.  Although, by focusing on the
disclosure of the unlisted telephone number and not considering the fact that the petitioner’s
name was revealed or the context in which it was disclosed, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that the deposit agreement was not controlling.  On the other hand, noting this time
that the disclosure included the petitioner’s name, the intermediate appellate court, concurring
with the respondent, determined that the deposit agreement protected the respondent from
liability for the disclosure because the petitioner’s account number had been supplied to Mr.
Scott by Fannie Mae.
This case is not about the disclosure of just the name and telephone number of a
depositor; rather, it is about the disclosure of that depositor’s account information.  To be sure,
the deposit agreement permitted the respondent to disclose the petitioner’s account
information under certain circumstances.  None of those circumstances was, or is, present in
10
this case.  More than the petitioner’s name and telephone number, the respondent disclosed
to Mr. Scott the petitioner’s account number.  Fannie Mae may have given Mr. Scott the
numbers and Mr. Scott may have known their significance, i.e., that they represented an account
number, but Mr. Scott was not told by Fannie Mae whose account number it was and, indeed,
he had no idea.  Without a name to go with the number he was given, his mere possession of
the number was useless.  Thus, it was the disclosure of the petitioner’s name, by the
respondent’s customer service representative, in the context of the inquiry by Mr. Scott, which
made the information supplied by Fannie Mae meaningful.  The effect of putting a name to the
numbers was to reveal that the account number was the petitioner’s and the deposit to that
account.
The respondent submits that the mere possession of the account number, obtained from
a source other than the respondent, even though it is without knowledge as to whose account
number it is, is enough to insulate it from the consequences of its intentional act of disclosure.
That argument is belied by the agreement itself.  The agreement recognizes two ways in which
the bank could disclose account information:  intentionally, pursuant to the parties’ specific
agreement, and accidentally.  With respect to the former, the agreement is indeed specific,
allowing the bank to disclose account information in accordance with the six enumerated
circumstances, as well as to disclose it in connection with furnishing its customer lists.  The
petitioner’s account number, name and telephone number were not disclosed in connection
with any of the enumerated circumstances and the respondent was not furnishing its customer
lists when it communicated that information.
11
The latter part of the agreement recognizes that unintentional - accidental - disclosures
are bound to occur, “that [the bank’s] reasonable security measures cannot absolutely ensure
against ‘unauthorized’ inquiries.”  Rather than permit those disclosures, the agreement excuses
the respondent from liability for them under certain circumstances, one of which being when
a third party, without the depositor’s consent or knowledge, learns the depositor’s account
number.
Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation and construction.  Adloo
v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 266, 686 A.2d 298, 304 (1996).  As explained
in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310
(1985) (citations omitted), that means:
“A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the
language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the
parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated.  In addition, when the
language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for
construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they
expressed.  In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the
parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the
position of the parties would have thought it meant.  Consequently, the clear and
unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away [sic] to what the
parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean.”
It is clear, both from the plain language of the agreement and the context, that the exemption
to which the petitioner agreed covered only those disclosures that were accidental, or
inadvertent, and did not include a deliberate disclosure, not in accordance with the permitted
disclosures, to one whom the respondent knew was not the petitioner.
Given this interpretation of the deposit agreement, which necessarily is a rejection of
12
the interpretation of the deposit agreement  advocated by the respondent and adopted by the
Court of Special Appeals, the undisputed material facts show a contractual obligation that the
respondent owed the petitioner and the breach of that duty.  Therefore, it follows that summary
judgment was improperly entered on this point.
Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979), which the
petitioner maintains controls the outcome of this case, is the foundation for the petitioner’s
allegations that the respondent breached his right to confidentiality.  In that case, the
intermediate appellate court considered the “novel question of the existence and scope of a
bank’s duty of confidentiality concerning the affairs of its depositors.”  Id. at 336, 408 A.2d
at 760.  There, Waller deposited $800, consisting of fifty and one hundred dollar bills,
sequentially numbered, in his bank account at Suburban Trust Company.  Believing the money
to be stolen, an assistant security officer employed by the bank, who had been alerted by a
suspicious teller, called law enforcement officials and disclosed the customer’s name, address,
description, and employment, as well as the information concerning his deposit.  Following
his arrest and the eventual dismissal of the charges against him, Waller sued the bank, alleging
that the bank had invaded his privacy and breached an implied condition of their contract, i.e.,
the obligation of confidentiality.  Id. at 337-38, 408 A.2d at 761.
Regarding the existence and scope of a bank’s duty of confidentiality, the court, id. at
344, 408 A.2d at 764, concluded:
“We think that a bank depositor in this State has a right to expect that the bank
will, to the extent permitted by law, treat as confidential, all information
regarding his account and any transaction relating thereto.  Accordingly, we hold
13
that, absent compulsion by law, a bank may not make any disclosures concerning
a depositor’s account without the express or implied consent of the depositor.”
We agree with Waller.  The respondent disclosed to a third party, whom it knew was not
the petitioner, the petitioner’s name and telephone number and it did so under circumstances
that identified, for the third party, the account number in his possession as that belonging to
the petitioner and the fact that a deposit recently had been made to that account.  Unless the
respondent was permitted, expressly or impliedly by the deposit agreement, to make the
disclosure, then the holding in Waller applies equally to the case sub judice.  We have already
rejected the rationale advocated by the respondent and which carried the day in the intermediate
appellate court - “that Walter Scott, through no fault of NationsBank, possessed [the
petitioner’s] account number not from NationsBank, but from reading his payment advice
stub.”
The petitioner challenges, finally, the grant of summary judgment with respect to the
allegation that the respondent acted in violation of § 1-302 when it disclosed to Mr. Scott his
name, telephone number, account number and that Mr. Scott’s pay check had been deposited
in the petitioner’s account.  Given the latter disclosure, he submits that “the bank released
account activity to Mr. Scott,” which “is clearly account information under any possible
reasonable definition of the term, and is certainly within the scope of § 1-301 et seq. of the
Financial Institutions Code, as well as the definition provided in Waller.”
Determining whether the respondent violated § 1-302 involves statutory construction.
The canons of statutory construction are well settled.  See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power Supply
14
Ass’n v. Public Service Com’n of Maryland, 361 Md. 196, 203, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000);
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000);
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin. for Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517-18 (1996).  Those pertinent to the case sub
judice are, in pursuing the real goal of statutory interpretation, the discernment of the intent
of the Legislature, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, when they are clear
and unambiguous, we normally end it there, as well.  We neither add nor delete words to a clear
and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used
or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s
meaning.  Moreover, whenever possible, the statute should be read so that no word, clause,
sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.
Section 1-302 provides, as relevant:
“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this subtitle, a fiduciary institution,
its officers, employees, agents, and directors:
“(1) May not disclose to any person any financial record relating to a customer
of the institution unless:
“(i) The customer has authorized the disclosure to that person;
“(ii) Proceedings have been instituted for appointment of a
guardian of the property or of the person of the customer, and
court-appointed counsel presents to the fiduciary institution an
order of appointment or a certified copy of the order issued by or
under the direction or supervision of the court or an officer of
the court;
“(iii) The customer is disabled and a guardian is appointed or
qualified by a court, and the guardian presents to the fiduciary
15
institution an order of appointment or a certified copy of the
order issued by or under the direction or supervision of the court
or an officer of the court;
“(iv) The customer is deceased and a personal representative is
appointed or qualified by a court, and the personal representative
presents to the fiduciary institution letters of administration
issued by or under the direction or supervision of the court or an
officer of the court;
“(v) The Department of Human Resources requests the financial
record in the course of verifying the individual’s eligibility for
public assistance; or
“(vi) 
The 
institution 
received 
a 
request 
or 
subpoena 
for
information directly from the Child Support Enforcement
Administration of the Department of Human Resources under §
10-108.2 or § 10-108.4 of the Family Law Article or indirectly
through the Federal Parent Locator Service under 42 U.S.C. §
666(a)(17).”
Section 1-301 (b) (1) defines “financial institution” to include a “national banking association,”
which the respondent concedes it is and, thus, that it is subject to the provisions of the Act.
“Financial records” are defined by § 1-301(c)(1).  It provides:
“Financial record.- (1) “Financial record” means the original or any copy or
record of:
“(i) A document that grants signature authority over a deposit or
share account;
“(ii) A statement, ledger card, or other record of a deposit or
share account that shows transactions in or with respect to that
deposit or account;
“(iii) A check, clear draft, or money order that is drawn on a
fiduciary institution or issued and payable by or through a
fiduciary institution;
“(iv) Any item, other than an institutional or periodic charge, that
5 The petitioner also relies on Nichol v. Howard, 112 Md. App. 163, 684 A.2d 681
(1996).  It is not apposite.  As the respondent points out, the court in that case held that the
institutions in that case were not fiduciary institutions, subject to the confidentiality
provisions of § 1-302, and so did not reach, and it was not necessary to decide, whether that
statute prohibited disclosure of a name and an address.
16
is made under an agreement between a fiduciary institution and
another person and that constitutes a debit or a credit to that
person’s deposit or share account; or
“(v) Any information that relates to a loan account or an
application for a loan.”
By its plain terms, what is contemplated to be prohibited, with the possible exception
of item (v), pertaining to loan accounts and applications for loans, is the disclosure of certain
records, rather than information about those records.  Section 1-301 (c) is specific in its
reference to “the original or any copy or record of” certain documents, subsection (1) (i),
certain statements, ledger cards or “other records,” subsection (1) (ii), certain checks, clear
drafts or money orders, subsection (1) (iii), certain items, subsection (1) (iv), and certain
information.  Subsection (1) (v).
There is in this case no contention that any records were given to Mr. Scott - no
originals or copies of any documents, statements, ledger cards, checks, clear drafts, money
orders, items of any kind, or information is alleged.  Rather, the only allegations, and the
undisputed facts, are that the respondent orally disclosed information that undoubtedly is
account information.  That does not, however, render the information financial records and,
therefore, violative of the statute.  We hold that the statute was not violated.
The petitioner relies, in advocating the opposite result, on Waller,5 directing our
17
attention to the court’s reference to the predecessor of §§ 1-301- 1-306.  Of particular
relevance to the petitioner is the fact that the court, while acknowledging the statute’s
inapplicability to that case, stated that the action of the General Assembly in enacting it
buttressed the conclusion it reached in that case.  44 Md. App. at 344-46, 408 A.2d at 764-65.
It is also true that the court used expansive language when speaking of the purpose of the
statute, e.g., “By the enactment of Laws 1976, ch. 252, the people of Maryland, through their
duly elected representatives, made explicit what had theretofore been implicit banks may not,
absent legal compulsion or express or implied authorization from the depositor concerned,
reveal any information to any one, including police and other government agencies, about the
depositor’s dealings with the bank.”  Id. at 345, 408 A.2d at 765.  Nevertheless, we are not
persuaded.
What the court said does not support the conclusion that the petitioner draws.  In
explaining its conclusion that the legislative action was consistent with its decision, the Court
of Special Appeals stated:
“Apparently disturbed by what it believed to be the trend, out of all scotch and
notch,  among banks and other fiduciary institutions to furnish information
without compulsion to governmental agencies, the Legislature in its preamble
to Laws 1976, ch. 252 said:
‘(a) The General Assembly of Maryland finds and declares that:
‘(1) procedures and policies governing the relationship between
fiduciary institutions and government agencies have in some
cases developed without due regard to the constitutional rights of
customers of those institutions; and
‘(2) the confidential relationships between fiduciary institutions
18
and their customers must be preserved and protected.’
‘(b) It is the purpose of this Act to protect and preserve the
confidential relationship between fiduciary institutions and their
customers and to promote commerce by prescribing policies and
procedures applicable to the disclosure of customer records by
fiduciary institutions.’”
44 Md. App. at 344-45, 408 A.2d 764-65 (footnote omitted).  Thus, the concern that the
statute addressed was one which lends credence to the interpretation of the statute that we
reach.  Moreover, we agree with the respondent that “Waller does not stand for the general
proposition that § 1-301 et seq. provides blanket protection for depositors ‘from disclosure
of information by a bank.’”
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED, IN PART. 
 
CASE
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THAT
COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS,
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.