Title: State ex rel. Bruner v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Bruner, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., 
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Appellees. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Bruner v. Indus. Comm. (1997), ____ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
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Workers’ compensation -- Application for permanent total disability 
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compensation 
-- 
Denial 
of 
application 
by 
Industrial 
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Commission an abuse of discretion when commission’s order 
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does not satisfy requirements of Noll -- Commission’s 
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explanation of claimant’s vocational potential too brief to 
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withstand scrutiny. 
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(No. 94-2571 -- Submitted October 8, 1996 -- Decided January 15, 
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1997.) 
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APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
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93APD10-1389. 
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Appellant-claimant, Hugh Bruner, sustained several industrial injuries 
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while in the course of and arising from his employment as a window washer 
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and maintenance worker for the city of Cleveland.  The most severe injury 
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occurred in 1989, and claimant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed 
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for “bruised left elbow; strain and sprain left ankle; lumbar spine and thigh; 
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herniated lumbar disc L5-S1 and aggravation of pre-existing degenerative 
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disease.”  Claimant did not return to work.  He received temporary total 
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disability compensation until December 29, 1992, during which time he 
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retired. 
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Claimant eventually filed an application for permanent total disability 
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compensation, which was heard by a commission deputy pursuant to State 
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ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 534 N.E. 2d 46. 
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Claimant was awarded permanent total disability compensation  from 
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December 30, 1992 through April 10, 1993, and further compensation was 
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to be considered on the date of the full commission hearing. 
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Claimant’s application was held in abeyance pending his examination 
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by commission specialist Dr. Timothy J. Fallon.  In his report of April 22, 
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1993, Dr. Fallon assessed a twenty-five percent permanent partial 
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impairment and imposed only one restriction on claimant--no lifting in 
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excess of twenty-five pounds.  Dr. Fallon felt that claimant was capable of 
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sustained remunerative employment, but that he could not return to his 
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former job. 
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Claimant’s application was heard by the full commission on June 9, 
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1993.  The commission in its order denied permanent total disability 
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compensation, writing: 
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“Claimant is 59 years old, has a general equivalency diploma and his 
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work history consists of maintenance work and window washer.  Claimant’s 
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treatment has been conservative consisting primarily of physical therapy for 
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relief of his back pain.  Claimant has not had surgery or been hospitalized 
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for any of his allowed conditions[.]  Dr. Fallon, Commission P.M.R. 
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Specialist, opined that claimant is capable of engaging in sustained 
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remunerative employment.  Dr. Fallon indicated that claimant’s impairment 
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is 25% and that claimant is restricted from lifting in excess of 25 lbs.  He 
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stated that claimant is capable of handling standing and walking activities.  
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After considering the above, the Commission finds that the allowed 
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conditions do not render claimant permanently and totally disabled.  
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Specifically, the report of Dr. Fallon reflects that claimant is only restricted 
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to lifting no more than 25 lbs. and thus could perform sedentary or light 
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duty employment.  Despite claimant’s work experience, the Commission 
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finds that claimant has sufficient vocational skills to obtain or be trained for 
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sedentary or light employment consistent with the 25 lbs. lifting restriction.  
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The Commission particularly relies upon claimant’s attainment of a GED 
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and the fact that there are positions available in the labor market at the 
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unskilled sedentary and light level.  Accordingly, for the above, claimant’s 
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Application for Permanent Total Disability is denied.”  
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Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
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Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in 
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denying him permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals 
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disagreed and denied the writ. 
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This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
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Stanley L. Josselson, for appellant. 
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Per Curiam.  We are once again asked to evaluate the sufficiency of 
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an order by the commission denying permanent total disability 
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compensation.  Upon review, we find that the order does not satisfy State ex 
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rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. 
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We are disturbed by the increasing frequency with which the 
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commission has denied permanent total disability compensation based on 
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“transferable skills” that the commission refuses to identify.  This lack of 
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specificity is even more troubling when those “skills” are derived from 
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traditionally unskilled jobs.  As such, we find that the commission’s 
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explanation of claimant’s vocational potential in this case is too brief to 
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withstand scrutiny. 
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Having found Noll noncompliance, we must select the appropriate 
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remedy.  Claimant’s request for relief consistent with State ex rel. Gay v. 
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Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666, is inappropriate in this 
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case.  Claimant possesses a high school equivalency degree and his age is 
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not work-prohibitive.  Equally significant, claimant’s degree of physical 
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impairment is relatively low, and only one medical restriction has been 
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imposed on him.  Claimant’s residual capacities do suggest that there may 
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be sustained remunerative employment of which he is capable.  As such, the 
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cause is more properly returned to the commission for further consideration 
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and amended order. 
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We note that claimant has also raised a proposition of law regarding 
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his retirement.  Since claimant’s retirement did not form the basis for the 
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denial of his application for permanent total disability compensation, we 
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find that further discussion on this issue is premature. 
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The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and a limited writ is 
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issued returning the cause to the commission for further consideration and 
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amended order. 
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Judgment reversed 
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and limited writ granted. 
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DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ. concur. 
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MOYER, C.J., COOK and STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
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COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
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The majority attacks the commission’s order as Noll-deficient because it 
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does not delineate “transferable skills” possessed by Bruner.  Because the 
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commission’s order is based on Bruner’s ability to obtain another unskilled 
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position with minimal lifting requirements, Bruner’s “transferable skills” 
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were not pivotal to the commission’s conclusion regarding Bruner’s 
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potential reemployment. Accordingly, delineation of  “transferable skills” 
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flowing from Bruner’s prior work experience is unnecessary to provide a 
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meaningful review of the commission’s order. 
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Work experience of any type develops certain disciplines that are 
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transferable.  Sometimes these disciplines are apparent (e.g., dexterity 
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developed from certain types of manual labor, clerical skills developed from 
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office employment, light duty repair knowledge developed from 
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maintenance positions, etc.).  It serves little purpose to require the 
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commission to delineate obvious skills that are widely transferable.  To the 
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contrary, when the commission must rely on skills of the claimant that are 
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not apparent from his or her prior work history to overcome other factors, 
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the delineation of such skills will prove meaningful.  Accordingly, the 
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commission should be required to specifically delineate “transferable skills” 
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only when such skills are not obviously possessed by the claimant through 
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his or her prior work experience and where such skills are pivotal to the 
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claimant’s opportunity for reemployment.   
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The commission’s decision does not rest on transferable skills 
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possessed by Bruner.  While the commission notes that Bruner possesses 
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“vocational skills” that would aid him in obtaining or retraining for 
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sedentary or light employment consistent with his lifting restrictions, it 
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specifically relies on Bruner’s vocational aptitude, as evidenced by his 
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attainment of a GED, in support of its conclusion that he is not foreclosed 
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from obtaining unskilled sedentary or light duty employment.  Absence of 
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transferable skills does not foreclose a claimant from reemployment in a 
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new position.  As we reiterated in State ex rel. Ehlinger v. Indus. Comm. 
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(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 400, 402, 667 N.E.2d 1210, 1212, “‘[a] permanent 
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total disability compensation assessment examines both claimant’s current 
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and future, i.e., potentially developable, abilities.’”   
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The commission is exclusively responsible for judging the weight and 
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credibility of evidence before it. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. 
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(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 31 OBR 70, 72, 508 N.E.2d 936, 938.  
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Accordingly, we should uphold a commission decision where it is based on 
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the appropriate considerations and is supported by some evidence. State ex 
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rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 
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N.E.2d 1055, 1057.   Here the commission order reveals that it considered 
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all relevant medical and nonmedical evidence attributable to Bruner.  The 
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commission concluded that the medical restrictions placed on Bruner 
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because of his allowed conditions were minimal and that Bruner possessed 
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the vocational aptitude to overcome possible impediments to reemployment 
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posed by his age and lack of experience in what is traditionally considered 
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“skilled” employment.  As such, the commission’s order complies with Noll 
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and is supported by some evidence.  
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I would therefore affirm the appellate court’s judgment.    
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MOYER, C.J., and STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
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opinion. 
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