Title: Allstar Video, Inc. v. Baeder

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Allstar Video, Inc. v. Baeder1986 WY 221730 P.2d 796Case Number: 86-189Decided: 12/31/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALLSTAR VIDEO, INC., 
FORMERLY W.L.C., INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

LAWRENCE D. BAEDER AND JUDITH A. 
BAEDER, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Michael B. 
Wilkerson, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Jack Sundquist, 
Gillette, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal involves a 
dispute over whether a computer equipment lease between appellant/lessee and 
appellees/lessors was rescinded. Appellees Lawrence Baeder and Judith Baeder 
filed suit against appellant Allstar Video, Inc., seeking past unpaid lease 
payments, the value of unreturned computer equipment, attorney's fees, and costs 
of suit. After trial to the court, judgment was entered against appellant for 
the amounts claimed by appellees.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues on appeal to be:

"A. Did the court below 
commit error in finding and concluding that there was no evidence before the 
court of Allstar Video, Inc.'s (formerly W.L.C., Inc.) acceptance of the 
Plaintiff's [sic] offer of termination and in requiring Allstar Video, Inc. to 
pay for the new price of the computer and lease payments after the lease 
terminated[?]

"B. Did the court below 
commit error in finding that the Defendant would be the party at risk for loss 
of the computer at the time it was shipped to 
Plaintiffs[?]"

[¶4.]     Appellees state the 
issues on appeal to be:

"I. WHETHER THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO FIND THAT THE EQUIPMENT LEASE 
BETWEEN BAEDERS AND ALLSTAR VIDEO, INC., (FORMERLY W.L.C., INC.) WAS NOT 
RESCINDED.

"II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT 
COURT PROPERLY FOUND ALLSTAR VIDEO LIABLE FOR THE VALUE OF THE UNRETURNED LEASED 
EQUIPMENT AND THE UNPAID LEASE PAYMENTS FROM JULY THROUGH DECEMBER, 
1985.

"III. WHETHER APPELLEE IS 
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THIS APPEAL."

[¶5.]     Prior to changing its 
name in 1985, Allstar Video, Inc., a corporation, was known as W.L.C., Inc. 
Appellees were shareholders in the corporation, and Mr. Baeder served on the 
board of directors. In the fall of 1984, appellees purchased certain computer 
equipment which they leased to the corporation pursuant to a written lease dated 
November 27, 1984. Due to differences with other members of the board of 
directors of W.L.C., Inc., Mr. Baeder sent a letter to appellant dated January 
21, 1985, wherein he resigned as a member of the board of directors and 
requested that appellant terminate the computer equipment lease with 
appellees.

[¶6.]     According to the 
evidence offered on behalf of appellees, appellant continued to make the monthly 
computer equipment lease payments through May 1985. On May 22, 1985, appellant 
sent Mr. Baeder a check for expenses which he incurred while he was associated 
with appellant. By letter dated July 2, 1985, Mr. Baeder was advised by Mr. Ron 
Innes, appellant's president, that the check amounted to an overpayment. 
Appellees deducted the June computer equipment lease payment from the expense 
check and returned the balance. No monthly lease payments were made thereafter, 
and appellant did not advise appellees of its desire to terminate the lease. 
Intermittently during the months of September through December 1985, appellant 
shipped the leased computer equipment to appellees in several different parcels; 
however, some of the equipment valued at $5,499 was lost in 
shipment.

[¶7.]     According to the 
testimony offered on behalf of appellant relative to the termination of the 
lease, Mr. Innes notified Mr. Baeder during February 1985 that (1) appellant 
accepted his offer to terminate the lease; (2) the only reason it continued to 
make the monthly payments was to satisfy appellees' requirement that payment be 
made during the period necessary for appellant to close its loan with the Small 
Business Administration; and (3) appellees' requirement that monthly payments 
continue was in consideration for their signatures as guarantors on the loan 
which was closed July 2, 1985. Mr. Innes further testified that he asked Mr. 
Baeder to take the computer when he was in appellant's office on April 27, 1985, 
but Mr. Baeder said "he'd get it some other time."

[¶8.]     On June 3, 1986, the 
court entered judgment against appellant, awarding appellees $5,499 as the value 
of the lost computer equipment, $1,926.82 for monthly lease payments from July 
through December 1985, $2,500 for attorney's fees, and $40.25 for costs of suit. 
The judgment also included the finding that "[t]here is no evidence of 
defendant's acceptance of the offer of termination" and that "[s]ince there was 
no acceptance of the offer of termination, there was no termination of the lease 
agreement."

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶9.]     Appellant contends that 
there was evidence before the court showing that it accepted appellees' offer to 
terminate the lease and that consequently it was reversible error to find 
otherwise. We agree with appellant that there was some evidence of acceptance of 
the offer to terminate the lease; however, we hold that such does not warrant a 
reversal of the judgment.

[¶10.]  In this case, there is conflicting 
evidence as to whether or not the lease was terminated. The evidence presented 
by appellant was that, during February 1985, Mr. Innes orally advised Mr. Baeder 
that appellant accepted the offer to terminate the lease. The evidence presented 
by appellees is that they did not receive an acceptance of their offer; they 
continued to receive lease payments through May 1985; and they deducted the June 
lease payment from other moneys inadvertently sent to them, without objection by 
appellant.

[¶11.]  This Court has frequently stated its 
standard for appellate review of conflicting evidence to 
be:

"On appeal, we accept the 
evidence presented by the prevailing party as true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, giving every 
favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the successful 
party's evidence." Wangler v. Federer, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1209, 1216-17 (1986), citing Matter of 
Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985), and Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 
(1984).

[¶12.]  We are, therefore, obliged in this case 
to disregard appellant's conflicting evidence that it accepted appellees' offer 
to terminate the lease. Giving every favorable inference that may be fairly and 
reasonably drawn from appellees' evidence, we must accept the finding of the 
trial court that "there was no termination of the lease agreement" and that 
appellees were entitled to the unpaid lease payments.

[¶13.]  Appellant also contends that the court 
erred by requiring it "to pay for the new price of the computer and lease 
payments after the lease terminated." This contention is without merit. In the 
absence of a sale to appellant, appellees, pursuant to the terms of the lease, 
were the owners and entitled to possession of the leased equipment upon 
termination of the lease, regardless of how or when termination took place. In 
any event, judgment was entered against appellant for payment of "the value of 
the equipment which defendant failed to return," not the new price of the 
computer.

RISK OF 
LOSS

[¶14.]  Appellant's contention that it should not 
be liable for the value of the computer equipment lost in shipment to appellees 
would be far more persuasive had the court found that the equipment lease had 
been terminated and that Mr. Baeder agreed to accept delivery at appellant's 
office.

[¶15.]  The provision of the lease dealing with 
risk of loss of the leased equipment reads as follows:

"RISK OF LOSS OR DAMAGE: 
LESSEE HEREBY ASSUMES ALL RISK OF LOSS AND DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT FROM ANY 
CAUSE AND AGREES TO RETURN IT TO LESSOR IN AS GOOD CONDITION AS WHEN RECEIVED, 
NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR EXCEPTED. NO LOSS OF, OR DAMAGE TO, THE EQUIPMENT SHALL 
IMPAIR ANY OBLIGATION OF LESSEE UNDER THIS LEASE AND ALL SUCH OBLIGATIONS SHALL 
CONTINUE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL OTHERWISE 
DISCHARGED."

[¶16.]  This lease provision clearly places the 
risk of loss on appellant, and the trial court did not err by entering judgment 
against appellant for the value of the equipment lost in 
shipment.

ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

[¶17.]  Paragraph eight of the lease 
provides:

"ATTORNEY'S FEES: IN THE 
EVENT THAT ANY LEGAL ACTION IS FILED IN RELATION TO THIS LEASE, THE UNSUCCESSFUL 
PARTY IN THE ACTION SHALL PAY TO THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY, IN ADDITION TO ALL OTHER 
SUMS THAT EITHER PARTY MAY BE CALLED ON TO PAY, A REASONABLE SUM FOR THE 
SUCCESSFUL PARTY'S ATTORNEY'S FEES."

[¶18.]  Appellees contend that, by virtue of this 
lease provision, they are entitled to be awarded reasonable attorney's fees for 
this appeal. We agree.

[¶19.]  This Court previously held in DeWitt v. 
Balben, Wyo., 718 P.2d 854, 865-66 (1986), 
that:

"In this case, the 
parties expressly agreed in the 1980 contract that the prevailing party be 
entitled to the award of attorney's fees. We think it logical then, in 
accordance with the great weight of authority, to apply such fees to those 
incurred on the appellate level.

* * * * * 
*

"We think the appellate 
court should determine the proper attorney fees to be awarded on appeal. The 
appellate court is in a better position to review the appellate work done, and 
then set a reasonable fee."

Accordingly, a reasonable 
attorney's fee for appellees will be awarded by this Court upon receipt of 
proper documentation thereof.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, C.J., filed a specially 
concurring and dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring and dissenting.

[¶21.]  I am in accord with the disposition of 
this case made in the majority opinion save for the question of attorney fees on 
appeal. I would reiterate the remarks that I made in a specially concurring and 
dissenting opinion in DeWitt v. Balben, Wyo., 718 P.2d 854, 866 (1986), as well 
as those made by Justice Raper, Retired, in his opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. It seems that inevitably the award of a reasonable sum for 
attorney fees can inject questions of fact which best are resolved by the 
district court.