Title: Commonwealth v. Dirgo

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11992 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON DIRGO. 
 
 
June 21, 2016. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
After a jury trial, the defendant, Aaron Dirgo, was 
convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child (four counts), 
G. L. c. 265, § 23A, and indecent assault and battery on a child 
under fourteen years of age (two counts), G. L. c. 265,  
§ 13B.  He appealed from the convictions and from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial.  He argued, among other things, that 
the prosecutor's improper closing argument, to which he did not 
object at trial, created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  The Appeals Court affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 1115 (2015).  We granted further appellate review 
limited to the issues concerning the closing argument.  Because 
we conclude that the cumulative effect of various improper 
statements in the prosecutor's argument created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice, we reverse. 
 
 
1.  Facts.  The complainant in the case, whom the parties 
refer to as H.R., met the defendant when she was twelve years 
old.  Her mother and brother were friendly with the defendant 
and his son, and their families socialized together. 
 
 
The complainant testified that the defendant began to 
sexually assault her after she volunteered to babysit for the 
defendant's son.  When she babysat in the evenings, she would 
sometimes stay overnight at his house.  At first the defendant 
touched her under a blanket as they sat on the couch and watched 
television.  She described that over time the touching became 
more "intimate."  After the complainant turned thirteen years 
old, the defendant "progressed . . . [to] sexual intercourse."  
2 
 
She testified that they had sexual relations frequently between 
2010 and May, 2011, although she could not identify specific 
dates.  She also testified that, at the time, she developed 
strong feelings for the defendant and wanted to be in a 
relationship with him. 
 
 
Although the complainant told a friend at school about the 
relationship, she kept it from her mother.  She also wrote notes 
to the defendant about her feelings and their relationship, 
although she did not deliver them.  When her mother discovered 
one of her notes and confronted her, the complainant denied that 
she and the defendant had an inappropriate relationship.  She 
described her account in the note as a "dream" of hers.  Some 
months later, a family member saw the complainant smoking a 
cigarette at the defendant's automobile repair shop and reported 
this to her mother.  Her mother went through her purse and 
discovered cigarettes, a marijuana pipe, and another note.  This 
time, when she was confronted by her mother, the complainant 
revealed that she and the defendant did in fact have a sexual 
relationship.  She also repeated those allegations to the 
police. 
 
 
When she testified at trial, the complainant was fifteen 
years of age.  She stated that she probably had been in love 
with the defendant.  She maintained that she initially lied to 
her mother about their relationship in order to protect him.  
When their relationship was discovered, she continued to be 
protective toward him.  She also acknowledged that she sometimes 
"escap[ed] [her] reality" by pretending or imagining alternate 
realities.  She further acknowledged that sometimes she was 
"delusional." 
 
 
2.  Closing argument.  Although a prosecutor may argue 
forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and on 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, and 
may respond to the defense's closing argument, she must do so 
within established parameters.  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 516-517 (1987).  In the present case, the defendant claims 
that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper in three 
main respects:  first, that the prosecutor improperly asked the 
jury to find the complainant credible because she was willing to 
testify in court; second, that the prosecutor stated, without 
evidentiary support, that the complainant's knowledge of 
age-inappropriate terminology, and hence her ability to give 
sexually explicit testimony, was attributable to her alleged 
sexual experiences with the defendant; and third, that the 
prosecutor improperly suggested that multiple other witnesses 
3 
 
who had not been called to testify were available to corroborate 
the complainant's version of the events. 
 
 
a.  Comments on complainant's credibility.  On appeal, the 
Commonwealth concedes that the prosecutor improperly argued that 
the complainant was credible because of her willingness to 
testify in court.  See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 
586-588 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
824, 826 (2009) (recognizing that it was error when prosecutor, 
"[b]y alluding to conjectured embarrassment experienced by a 
young woman in coming before a group of strangers to describe a 
sexual assault, . . . sought to bolster the credibility of the 
complainant by virtue of her willingness, despite such a burden, 
to come into court and testify").  As in the Beaudry case, and 
as is often the case in matters like this, the prosecution 
depended heavily on the credibility of the complainant's 
testimony.  Beaudry, supra at 585.  There was no physical 
evidence or other eyewitness testimony.  Id.  Simply put, the 
crux of the case was whether the jurors believed the 
complainant's account of the events. 
 
 
The prosecutor's argument in this regard was not a single, 
offhanded remark.  Rather, the prosecutor established throughout 
the argument an overarching theme that the complainant was 
credible because of her willingness to testify.  After 
marshalling the evidence, the prosecutor said: 
 
 
"His Honor is going to give you some instructions 
about assessing credibility in witnesses.  And when he 
gives you that instruction, he's going to ask you, what 
does that witness stand to gain or to lose by testifying 
the way they do?  What is their motive?  . . . 
 
 
"What did [the complainant] gain by coming forward on 
this case?  What did she gain?  Did she gain anything at 
all? 
 
 
"And think about -- think to yourselves, when she sat 
on the witness stand yesterday and today and was telling 
you -- relaying all of the facts of her relationship with 
the defendant, relaying different sexual acts that they 
would engage in, do you think that was easy for her to do 
that? 
 
 
"She subjected herself to your scrutiny in telling you 
-- even still as a teenager, she's not yet [sixteen], she 
told you about what they did together.  She told you about 
4 
 
all the sexual things that they did together.  Did she seem 
embarrassed at times?  Maybe a little uncomfortable in 
using terms that for the most part were foreign to her 
before she engaged in all of these things with the 
defendant.  Think about that. 
 
 
"She subjected herself -- she answered all of [defense 
counsel's] questions.  You had an opportunity to see her.  
And despite all of the interaction and talk about how 
delusional and how she made up a lie to cover up the note 
to protect the defendant, think about what she gained when 
she sat here yesterday and today and told you about what 
happened.  I would suggest to you that she gained nothing." 
 
 
The prosecutor also reminded jurors of this theme at the 
end of her argument: 
 
 
"I urge you again to consider the whys.  Why would she 
subject herself?" 
 
 
Where, as here, defense counsel in closing argument 
challenges the credibility of the complainant, it is proper for 
the prosecutor to invite the jury to consider whether the 
complainant had a motive to lie and to identify evidence that 
demonstrates that the complainant's testimony is reliable.  
Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 40 (2012).  The prosecutor 
could have argued the implausibility of the defendant's theory 
that the complainant was lying to divert her mother's attention 
from her cigarette and marijuana use.  There was evidentiary 
support for such argument, unlike the argument that the 
complainant was credible because of her willingness to testify.  
The prosecutor's repeated suggestions that the complainant was 
credible because of her willingness to testify and to subject 
herself to the scrutiny of the jury were not collateral errors, 
but went straight to the heart of the case, the believability of 
her allegations that she was sexually assaulted by the 
defendant. 
 
 
b.  Complainant's knowledge of sexual terminology.  This 
court has repeatedly cautioned prosecutors to restrict their 
"closing argument to the evidence and fair inferences that might 
be drawn therefrom."  Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 
146-147 (2004).  In Beaudry, 445 Mass. at 579-584, we considered 
whether a prosecutor could properly argue that a child 
demonstrated knowledge of sexual acts and terms not typically 
possessed by a child her age, and ask the jury to infer that 
such knowledge was attributable to the alleged sexual abuse by 
5 
 
the defendant.  Recognizing that such knowledge might be 
attributable to any number of other sources, especially given 
the many other possible sources available to children today for 
acquiring sexual knowledge, see id. at 582-583, we held that it 
was permissible to argue that a child's knowledge of sexual 
terminology was the result of a defendant's alleged assaults, 
but only if there is "an adequate and specific basis in the 
record . . . that excludes other possible sources of such 
knowledge" (citation omitted).  Id. at 584. 
 
 
At trial, the jury heard the fifteen year old complainant 
use terminology that was sexually explicit.1  In her closing 
argument, the prosecutor repeatedly suggested that the 
complainant's knowledge of sexual terminology was attributable 
to being assaulted by the defendant.  She argued that the 
complainant "us[ed] terms that for the most part were foreign to 
her before she engaged in all of these things with the 
defendant"; "told you about things that would make most grown 
people blush and be embarrassed to talk to strangers about and 
tell you"; and "never heard [the term ejaculation] before.  She 
didn't know what that was." 2,3  In violation of our directive in 
Beaudry, id., the prosecutor made these arguments without there 
being an adequate and specific basis in the record. 
 
 
The challenged argument is particularly troubling because 
the prosecutor was (or at least should have been) aware that 
there was in fact another possible source of the complainant's 
knowledge of sexual matters.  Id. at 583.  Before trial, the 
prosecutor produced a report by the Department of Children and 
Families that described that the complainant had previously 
reported that she had been sexually abused by another child.  
                                                          
 
 
1 In her testimony, the complainant used the terms and 
phrases "sexual intercourse," "penetration," "penis," "digital 
touching," "finger me," "go down on me," "oral sex," and "blow 
job." 
 
 
2 The Commonwealth now concedes that there was no basis for 
the argument that the complainant had not previously heard the 
term "ejaculation." 
 
 
3 There was a basis in the record for finding that the 
complainant had sexual experiences with the defendant that she 
had not had previously, but that is different from finding that 
her knowledge of sexual matters and her familiarity with graphic 
sexual terminology originated from those experiences.  The 
prosecutor's argument urged the jury to find the latter. 
6 
 
The report indicates that the complainant said to her mother 
that another child "[told] her all about sex all the time" and 
"[made] her have sex with her all the time."  Additionally, 
after trial, in response to the defendant's motion for 
postconviction discovery, the Commonwealth produced a police 
report that also concerned these allegations.4  According to the 
report, the mother stated that the complainant had "detailed 
knowledge" of sexual intercourse.  Thus, the evidence produced 
before trial -- and the additional evidence discovered after 
trial -- suggested that she may have learned these words before 
the alleged sexual assaults by the defendant.  See Commonwealth 
v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 815 (1987) ("If the victim had been 
sexually abused in the past in a manner similar to the abuse in 
the instant case, such evidence would be . . . relevant on the 
issue of the victim's knowledge about sexual matters").  These 
reports further support our conclusion that the prosecutor 
improperly argued that the child's use of sexual terminology was 
attributable to the defendant without excluding other possible 
sources of knowledge. 
 
 
c.  References to other available witnesses.  Lastly, the 
defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly commented on 
the constraints of the first complaint doctrine, by suggesting 
that the Commonwealth had other available witnesses that it was 
prevented from calling to testify.  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor tried to explain to the jury why she did not present 
these additional witnesses: 
 
 
"The Commonwealth has one shot, the one witness that 
we can call and that's it.  That's it.  So it shouldn't be 
any surprise when you hear that instruction again why the 
Commonwealth did not parade witness after witness in here 
to tell you the same thing.  We can't.  We can't." 
 
 
The Commonwealth contends that this argument was a fair 
response to the judge's instructions5 and the defense's closing 
                                                          
 
 
4 In a joint motion to expand the appellate record, the 
parties stated that the police report was responsive to the 
defendant's pretrial discovery motion, but was not produced by 
the Commonwealth until after trial.  The defendant should have 
received the police report before trial.  We do not imply that 
by furnishing the police report when she did that the prosecutor 
had it before trial. 
 
 
5 Before the first complaint witness testified, the judge 
instructed the jury by using a modified version of the model 
7 
 
argument6 to the extent that they implied that the complainant 
reported the alleged sexual abuse to more than one person, but 
the Commonwealth presented only one witness. 
 
 
The prosecutor could have objected to the defendant's 
argument on grounds that it unfairly took advantage of the 
limitation on the prosecutor's ability to present this type of 
evidence, and still have been in conformance with the law of 
first complaint.  Although it is permissible for a prosecutor to 
object to errors in the jury instructions and to rebut, fairly 
and forcefully, a defense counsel's argument, the prosecutor's 
argument here strained the limits of what is permissible.  See 
Kozec, 399 Mass. at 519 (recognizing that where defense 
counsel's argument justifies rebuttal from prosecutor, "the 
prosecutor, as a representative of the government, must hold 
himself to a consistently high and proper standard").  The 
prosecutor pressed the parameters of permissibility by implying 
that, were it not for the evidentiary limits of the first 
complaint doctrine, she would have been able to "parade witness 
after witness" into court to tell the jury "the same thing," 
essentially that the complainant had given the same account to 
many others.  This kind of argument implies that the prosecutor 
possessed additional witnesses corroborating the complainant's 
testimony beyond what was legitimately in evidence, a classic 
concern of the first complaint doctrine.  See Commonwealth v. 
Misquina, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 204, 206 (2012). 
 
 
3.  Substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  In this 
case, where the defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's 
argument, our review is limited to whether there was a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
jury instructions set forth in Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 
217, 247-248 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).  By 
identifying the complainant as H.R., instead of speaking about 
the complainant in general terms, the judge may have implied 
that she, in fact, "may have reported the alleged sexual assault 
to more than one person." 
 
 
6 In his closing argument, the defense counsel stated: 
 
 
"We're dealing with a sexual assault.  Would it have 
been nice for the district attorney to at least put one of 
the Chicopee Police Department detectives, an experienced 
sexual assault investigator on the stand to tell you what 
their investigation led to?  Didn't hear from one police 
witness." 
 
8 
 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The substantial 
risk standard requires us to determine "if we have a serious 
doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different 
had the error not been made."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 
675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005), quoting Commonwealth 
v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).  This standard requires 
that we review the evidence and the case as a whole.  Azar, 
supra.  "We consider the strength of the Commonwealth's case, 
the nature of the error, the significance of the error in the 
context of the trial, and the possibility that the absence of an 
objection was the result of a reasonable tactical decision."  
Id., and cases cited.  See Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517-519 
(articulating questions that appellate court asks, on case-by-
case basis, to determine whether improper prosecutorial argument 
constitutes reversible error).  If, after such a review, we are 
left with uncertainty that the defendant's guilt has been fairly 
adjudicated, we will order a new trial. Azar, supra. 
 
 
Here, the prosecutor's improper remarks -- arguing that the 
complainant was credible because she was willing to testify at 
trial; attributing her knowledge of sexual terminology to the 
alleged assaults, without an adequate and a specific basis in 
the record that excluded other possible sources of such 
knowledge; and implying that there were more witnesses that were 
not brought before the jury that would have corroborated the 
first complaint testimony -- went directly to the jury's 
assessment of the complainant's testimony and credibility, which 
was the core of the Commonwealth's case.  Beaudry, 445 Mass. at 
585. 
 
 
This is not a situation where erroneous closing statements 
were offset by overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt.  
The Commonwealth's case depended heavily on the complainant's 
testimony, and hence her credibility.  Some of the complainant's 
testimony might have seemed implausible, including that nearly 
all of the time that the defendant sexually assaulted her on the 
couch in the living room, his girlfriend was present, either 
sleeping in the living room on another couch or in the 
defendant's bedroom.  There were no other eyewitnesses.  The 
Commonwealth offered only limited additional testimony from the 
complainant's mother regarding the complainant's relationship 
with the defendant, and from the complainant's friend, who was 
the first complaint witness.  There was no physical evidence. 
 
 
Finally, this is not a case where strong curative 
instructions offset the impact of improper argument.  With 
respect to witness credibility and closing arguments, the judge 
9 
 
merely gave the general instructions.  These instructions did 
not specifically address, and were not enough to cure the 
cumulative effect of, the particular errors we have identified. 
 
 
Because we are left with a serious doubt whether the result 
of the trial might have been different had the prosecutor's 
errors in closing argument not been made, we conclude that there 
was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Based on 
our review of the entire case, we cannot be certain that the 
defendant's guilt was fairly adjudicated.  In these 
circumstances, a new trial is necessary. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgments are reversed, the verdicts 
set aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney (Eileen 
M. Sears, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth.