Title: State v. Armstrong

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

103 Ariz. 280 (1968) 440 P.2d 307 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John L. ARMSTRONG, Appellant. No. 1546. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. May 16, 1968. Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., James S. Tegart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Chris T. Johnson, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. In deciding this case, State v. Armstrong, 103 Ariz. 174, 438 P.2d 411, we routinely remanded for determination by the trial judge the voluntariness of an asserted confession in accordance with our decision in State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2, 401 P.2d 404. Defendant now, in his motion for rehearing, urges that, since we decided the trial judge should have resolved the question of voluntariness, it was fundamental error not to have had the jury at the trial pass upon the same question. A re-examination of the record has lead us to certain conclusions which we think are of sufficient significance to require their disposition by way of a written decision. The defendant was charged with the crime of robbery. He was arrested by a City of Phoenix police officer, Jack Dunn, a detective, and taken to the police station and there interrogated in the presence of Police Officer Richard O. Rimer. At the trial on April 22, 1964, Detective Rimer was called to the witness stand. When it became apparent that he was going to relate a conversation with defendant, defense counsel requested permission to interrogate the witness on voir dire "just to see about the statements that are being made to determine whether or not they will be admissible." Permission having been granted, defense counsel questioned Detective Rimer, in part, as follows: Detective Rimer then related statements of the defendant to the effect that he and another had committed the robbery. Detective Dunn was also called to the witness stand. He testified without objection that the defendant had admitted to him "that he had committed this particular robbery and others." Since the trial of this case was prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, the trial judge applied the accepted law of this state as of that time. See State v. Hudson, 89 Ariz. 103, 358 P.2d 332. Arizona did not then require a specific determination of voluntariness by the trial judge but only a decision that there was a question of fact for the jury to resolve. Cf. State v. Owen, 96 Ariz. 274, 394 P.2d 206. After the opinion in Jackson v. Denno, we said: In the present case no question of voluntariness was raised either by defendant's attorney or by the evidence. Accordingly, we have concluded that the trial judge was not required, sua sponte, to enter upon an examination outside of the presence of the jury to determine the possible involuntariness of the confession. Armstrong took the witness stand and testified in his own behalf: Defendant's testimony is that he did not make the statements attributed to him by the police officers. He made no claim whatsoever that the purported statements were coerced or were otherwise involuntary. We recognize the right of a defendant to both deny the making of a confession and assert under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that a confession was involuntary. Lee v. State of Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 300, 92 L. Ed. 330. We do not, however, believe that the principle of that case has application here. As stated, the defendant in the instant case did not, in the court below or in this Court, urge that the confession was involuntary. He did state that he was offered an inducement to plead guilty but that he rejected it. The first suggestion of involuntariness was presented in defendant's motion for new trial in which he set forth: Doubtless the trial court in denying the motion considered first that the defendant had not, in fact, objected to the introduction of the confessions and second that at that time the law of this jurisdiction did not require that an accused be warned of his legal rights by arresting officers or that he be furnished the assistance of counsel prior to arraignment. State v. Goff, 99 Ariz. 79, 407 P.2d 55; State v. Schumacher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P.2d 584. Since the decision in Jackson v. Denno, supra, other courts have held that, where there was no claim that an inculpatory statement was involuntary and the defendant denied making the statement, the trial court did not err in failing to, sua sponte, make a specific finding relative thereto, and that the failure to submit the question of voluntariness to the jury is not error. United States v. Frazier, 385 F.2d 901, 6th Cir., Nov. 1967; Woody v. United States, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 353, 379 F.2d 130, May 1967, cert. denied 389 U.S. 961, 88 S. Ct. 342, 19 L. Ed. 2d 371; People v. Washington, 4 Mich. App. 453, 145 N.W.2d 292, Oct. 1966. But cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 427 Pa. 313, 233 A.2d 870. In Woody v. United States, supra, the defendant took the stand and denied committing the offense and making the incriminating statements attributed to him. The circuit court observed that a remand to determine voluntariness "would call on the District Judge to decide on the voluntariness of statements which Appellant insists he never made." 379 F.2d at 131. The Court further held: *283 In United States v. Frazier, the Court said: In People v. Washington, the Court said: For the foregoing reasons, the order heretofore entered in our decision of March 6, 1968, directing that the superior court enter into a determination of voluntariness pursuant to the dictates of Jackson v. Denno, supra, and State v. Simoneau, supra, is vacated and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. McFARLAND, C.J., UDALL, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur. BERNSTEIN, Justice (dissenting). I believe this case should be overruled for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in State of Arizona v. Armstrong, 103 Ariz. 174, 438 P.2d 411.