Title: State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3328.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3328 
THE STATE EX REL. VINDICATOR PRINTING CO. ET AL. v. WOLFF, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3328.] 
Public records—Court documents—Sup.R. 44 and 45—Discovery documents and 
bills of particulars—Attorney fees. 
(No. 2011-0132—Submitted May 22, 2012—Decided July 25, 2012.) 
IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action by relators, the Vindicator Printing 
Company and WFMJ Television, Inc., for a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent, Judge William H. Wolff, sitting by assignment in the Mahoning 
County Court of Common Pleas, to release all records that were sealed in State v. 
Cafaro, Mahoning Cty. C.P. Nos. 2010 CR 800 and 800A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 
and I, and a writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his December 21, 
2010 and August 24, 2011 decisions in those cases and to prohibit him from 
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issuing further orders presumptively sealing any documents or records in the 
cases.  Because relators have established their entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief based on the Superintendence Rules, we grant the writs.  This 
renders moot relators’ remaining claims based on the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions, the common law, and R.C. 149.43, the Ohio Public Records Act.  
Relators are not entitled to an award of attorney fees, because the 
Superintendence Rules do not specifically authorize such an award. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In late July 2010, a Mahoning County grand jury returned a 73-
count indictment charging seven persons, including current and former public 
officials, and three organizations with felony and misdemeanor charges, including 
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, conspiracy, perjury, bribery, money 
laundering, tampering with records, disclosure of confidential information, 
conflict of interest, filing a false financial-disclosure statement, and soliciting or 
accepting improper compensation.  The cases are designated as State v. Cafaro, 
Mahoning C.P. Nos. 2010 CR 800 and 800(A) through (I), with the defendants as 
follows:  2010 CR 800, Anthony M. Cafaro Sr.; A, the Cafaro Company; B, Ohio 
Valley Mall Company; C, the Marion Plaza, Inc.; D, John A. McNally IV; E, John 
Reardon; F, Michael V. Sciortino; G, John Zachariah; H, Martin Yavorcik; and I, 
Flora Cafaro.  Anthony Cafaro is the retired president of the Cafaro Company, 
Flora Cafaro is Anthony Cafaro’s sister and a part owner of the Cafaro Company, 
Ohio Valley Mall Company and the Marion Plaza, Inc. are affiliates of the Cafaro 
Company, McNally is a Mahoning County commissioner, Sciortino is the 
Mahoning County auditor, Reardon is the former Mahoning County treasurer, 
Zachariah is the former director of the Mahoning County Department of Job and 
Family Services, and Yavorcik is an attorney who ran an unsuccessful 2008 
campaign for Mahoning County prosecuting attorney.  The charges stemmed from 
the unsuccessful attempts of Anthony Cafaro and the Cafaro-related entities to 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
keep the Mahoning County Department of Job and Family Services located at a 
site owned by the Ohio Valley Mall Company, operating through Marion Plaza, 
Inc., which received rental income from the county while located there. 
{¶ 3} The Cafaro defendants—Anthony M. Cafaro Sr., Flora Cafaro, the 
Cafaro Company, Ohio Valley Mall Company, and the Marion Plaza, Inc.—filed 
a joint motion for a bill of particulars, and the state filed a notice of intent to 
voluntarily comply.  After the state provided bills of particulars for defendants 
Flora Cafaro and Yavorcik that resulted in local newspaper articles, including one 
from the Vindicator, the attorneys for the Cafaro defendants submitted a letter to 
respondent, Judge William H. Wolff Jr., who is sitting by assignment in the 
underlying criminal cases.  In their unfiled letter, the Cafaro defendants requested 
that the state be ordered either to produce its bills of particulars 14 days in 
advance of filing to afford them the opportunity to apply for relief or to file its 
bills of particulars under seal to permit them to move to redact the portions they 
challenge.  The Cafaro defendants claimed that the presumptive sealing of the 
bills of particulars was appropriate because the state’s responses endangered their 
ability to receive a fair trial.  The state submitted a letter to the judge objecting to 
the request.  This response was also not filed as a matter of public record. 
{¶ 4} The judge held a private, pretrial proceeding with the parties’ 
counsel that resulted in a September 9, 2010 decision in which he granted the 
defendants’ pending discovery motions.  The judge ordered that all filings in the 
case “shall be under seal with the exception of filings that are clearly procedural 
and cannot possibly implicate Defendants’ concern about receiving a fair trial.”  
He also specified that the defendants had 14 days from filing to object to the 
state’s filing and that the state had 14 days to respond, with counsel permitted to 
request a hearing.  Following an editorial that appeared in the Vindicator, the 
judge issued a supplemental order on September 14, 2010, in which he further 
explained that his “filing under seal protocol” was based on the “significant media 
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coverage” that the criminal cases had attracted and his obligation “to balance the 
right of the defendants to a fair trial and the right of the public to be informed of 
these proceedings through the media or through personal examination of the 
record.”  The judge was concerned with whether “fair and impartial potential 
jurors can be found in Mahoning County, i.e., potential jurors without 
preconceived notions of how this case should be decided that they cannot set 
aside due to pretrial publicity.” 
{¶ 5} Based on the September 9 and 14, 2010 orders, various filings, 
including the Cafaro defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the indictment and 
memorandum in support, were filed under seal.  The Cafaro defendants also filed 
under seal a motion to seal, until after trial, all bills of particulars and notices of 
intent to introduce Evid.R. 404(B) “other acts” evidence. 
{¶ 6} In November 2010, relators, the Vindicator Printing Company, 
which publishes the Vindicator, a daily newspaper distributed principally in 
Mahoning County, and WFMJ Television, Inc., which broadcasts news in 
Mahoning County, submitted to the judge and the Mahoning County clerk of 
courts requests to inspect and copy filings and documents submitted to the court 
in the criminal cases, including those that had been filed under seal.  When 
relators were not provided access to some of the requested records, they filed a 
motion for an order vacating the September 9 and 14, 2010 sealing orders. 
{¶ 7} On December 6, 2010, the court held a hearing on the Cafaro 
defendants’ motion to seal the bills of particulars and notices of intent to 
introduce evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) and relators’ motion to vacate the prior 
sealing orders.  At the hearing, the Cafaro defendants submitted the testimony of 
their sole witness, Ohio University journalism professor Hugh J. Martin.  Martin 
testified that the Vindicator was distributed to about 40 percent of Mahoning 
County households for Mondays through Saturdays and to almost 50 percent of 
county households on Sundays and that WFMJ claimed to have the most-watched 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
newscasts in Mahoning County.  Martin referred to the Vindicator’s coverage of 
the criminal cases as “very tough” on the defendants and “sharply drawn” to 
emphasize the allegations against them, but he conceded that he could not say 
whether the newspaper statements were true or false.  The defendants had 
themselves issued press releases proclaiming their innocence of the charges and a 
cable-TV infomercial.  Ultimately, Martin testified that he had “no idea” whether 
relators’ coverage of the cases prevented the impaneling of an impartial jury or 
tainted the jury pool, because that was not his “area of expertise.”  He also 
conceded that he could not render an opinion on whether opening the proceedings 
(i.e., unsealing the records) would impede the impaneling of a jury.  One of the 
Cafaro defendants’ attorneys admitted that he was not saying that they would be 
unable to pick a fair jury if the judge unsealed part of the bill of particulars, but 
merely that the jury-selection process would be burdened in the absence of a 
sealing order. 
{¶ 8} On December 21, 2010, the judge issued a decision in which he 
granted the Cafaro defendants’ motion to seal the bills of particulars that had not 
yet been filed as a public record—the bills of particulars for the Cafaro defendants 
and Zachariah—as well as any Evid.R. 404(B) notices.  He determined that the 
bills of particulars and Evid.R. 404(B) notices of other-acts evidence were in the 
nature of discovery and were not entitled to any presumption of public access and 
that even if they were entitled to a presumption of public access, that presumption 
was outweighed by the substantial probability that the defendants’ right to a fair 
trial in Mahoning County would be prejudiced.  With these exceptions, the judge 
also “sustained prospectively” relators’ motion to vacate his September 9 and 14, 
2010 sealing orders.  But he continued a protocol in which the state would submit 
to defense counsel, prior to filing, any document that “can be reasonably expected 
to trigger a concern on the part of defense counsel that publication of the 
document will prejudice the impaneling of an impartial jury in Mahoning 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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County,” thus giving the opportunity for the defendants to file a motion to seal, 
which would be served on relators’ counsel, but would not be permitted to be 
shared with relators.  A subsequent e-mail exchange confirmed that the judge’s 
intent was that motions to seal and responses to them be filed under seal, with the 
court to determine the motions in camera. 
{¶ 9} In January 2011, relators filed this action for a writ of mandamus 
to compel the judge to release all records filed with the clerk of courts in the 
underlying criminal cases and a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 21, 
2010 order, prohibit him from presumptively closing any proceedings or sealing 
any documents filed with or otherwise provided to the court, and requiring him to 
comply with all requirements of notice, evidentiary hearing, and findings before 
sealing any filed documents or records or closing any proceedings in the criminal 
cases.  The judge submitted an answer, and the Cafaro defendants filed a motion 
to intervene as respondents and an answer.  We granted the motion to intervene 
and an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the submission of evidence and 
briefs.  128 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2011-Ohio-1618, 944 N.E.2d 693. 
{¶ 10} After evidence and briefs were submitted, respondents notified this 
court that on July 11, 2011, the judge, on motion of the state, dismissed the 
indictment in the underlying criminal cases without prejudice, thereby terminating 
the prosecution of the cases.  According to a later opinion of the judge, the 
dismissal was prompted by the refusal of agents of the federal government to 
furnish the special prosecutors with materials essential to the special prosecutor’s 
duty to provide discovery to the defendants.  The respondents filed motions for 
leave to file supplemental briefs on postdismissal issues of access to the sealed 
records.  We granted the motions, and the parties submitted supplemental briefs 
on the issue of the effect of the dismissal of the underlying criminal cases on 
relators’ mandamus and prohibition claims.  129 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2011-Ohio-
4217, 951 N.E.2d 1044. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 11} Relators subsequently filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint instanter, which indicated that the following additional events had 
occurred in the underlying criminal cases after the parties had submitted evidence 
and their initial briefs.  In June 2011, before the judge dismissed without 
prejudice the indictment against the defendants, the Cafaro defendants filed—as a 
matter of public record—a motion “to dismiss the indictment to enforce non-
prosecution agreement, and due to prosecutorial misconduct and vindictiveness, 
with request for an order releasing grand jury transcripts,” with a 106-page 
memorandum in support.  The memorandum included 45 pages under the heading 
“Relevant factual background,” which purported to detail multiple instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  In response to the motion and consistent with the 
court’s protocol, the state filed under seal a memorandum in opposition, which 
included a six-page discussion under the heading “Relevant, non-vindictive 
facts.” 
{¶ 12} The Cafaro defendants filed under seal a motion to seal the 
“relevant, non-vindictive facts” from the state’s memorandum in response to their 
motion to dismiss the indictment.  Relators’ and the state’s memoranda in 
opposition to the motion to seal and the Cafaro defendants’ motion for leave to 
file a reply were also submitted under seal.  The parties also filed other unrelated 
motions, including a motion for return of property and a motion for an extension 
of time to respond under seal.  And following the court’s dismissal without 
prejudice of the indictment, various defendants, including the Cafaro defendants, 
filed under seal motions to seal the record of their cases under R.C. 2953.52.  
Responses to the motions were also submitted under seal. 
{¶ 13} On August 24, 2011, without holding any hearing, the judge 
unsealed most of the sealed filings but granted the Cafaro defendants’ motion to 
seal the six-page factual discussion in the state’s memorandum in opposition to 
the Cafaro defendants’ joint motion to dismiss.  He based his sealing order on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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following factors:  (1) the sealed portion of the state’s memorandum was not used 
by the court to decide the Cafaro defendants’ motion, because the motion was 
rendered moot by the court’s dismissal upon the state’s motion of the cases on 
July 11, 2011, (2) even if the court had been required to rule on the Cafaro 
defendants’ motion, the portion of the memorandum at issue would not have 
played a part in the court’s decisional process, and (3) like the bills of particulars 
that remain sealed by court order, the “relevant, non-vindictive facts” in the 
state’s memorandum “would trigger the same fair trial concerns that prompted the 
sealing orders in the first place.” 
{¶ 14} On October 24, 2011, the judge denied the motions of the Cafaro 
defendants and defendant Zachariah to seal the records of the dismissed criminal 
cases pursuant to R.C. 2953.52.  In his decision, he concluded that the legitimate 
governmental need to keep the records unsealed due to the ongoing criminal 
investigation of the defendants outweighed the defendants’ privacy interests. 
{¶ 15} This cause is now before this court for a consideration of the merits 
and of relators’ motions for leave to file an amended complaint, for leave to file a 
reply brief in support of their supplemental merit brief, and for a court order 
instructing the judge to file an unredacted copy of the state’s memorandum in 
response to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss in the underlying criminal 
cases. 
Legal Analysis 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
{¶ 16} Relators request leave to amend their complaint instanter pursuant 
to Civ.R. 15 to address the August 24, 2011 order sealing the factual portion of 
the state’s memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the indictment and the judge’s continued application of an allegedly 
improper protocol resulting in the improper sealing of records. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 17} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.2, the “Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
supplement these rules unless clearly inapplicable.”  Civ.R. 15(A) and (E), which 
govern amendments of and supplements to pleadings, are not clearly inapplicable 
to original actions filed in this court.  See generally State ex rel. Essig v. 
Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 16.  “Leave of 
court shall be freely given when justice so requires.”  Civ.R. 15(A).  “[T]he 
language of Civ.R. 15(A) favors a liberal amendment policy and a motion for 
leave to amend should be granted absent a finding of bad faith, undue delay or 
undue prejudice to the opposing party.”  Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 
465 N.E.2d 377 (1984). 
{¶ 18} Moreover, Civ.R. 15(E) permits parties, upon motion and upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, to “serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.”  And “in determining 
actions involving extraordinary writs, a court is not limited to considering the 
facts and circumstances at the time that the writ was requested but can consider 
the facts and conditions at the time that entitlement to the writ is considered.”  
State ex rel. Howard v. Skow, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-Ohio-3652, 811 N.E.2d 
1128, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 19} Therefore, because relators seek to amend their complaint to plead 
events that occurred after their original complaint and the submission of evidence 
and the initial merit briefs and because respondents did not file a timely 
memorandum in opposition, we grant the motion for leave to amend and consider 
the merits of the case based on relators’ amended claims. 
Relators’ Remaining Motions 
{¶ 20} We need not address the merits of relators’ remaining motions—to 
order the judge to file under seal the state’s complete memorandum in response to 
the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss and for leave to submit a reply 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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supplemental brief—because they are rendered moot by our disposition of the 
case. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 21} Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to 
provide them with access to the records from the underlying criminal cases that 
remain sealed pursuant to his challenged sealing orders, i.e., the bills of 
particulars for the Cafaro defendants and defendant Zachariah and the portion of 
the state’s memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the indictment under the heading “Relevant, non-vindictive facts.”1   
{¶ 22} To be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus, 
relators must establish a clear legal right to access to the sealed records, a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the judge to unseal them, and the 
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. 
Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 11.  
“We have determined the propriety of access restrictions in the context of 
extraordinary-writ actions.”  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Geer, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 511, 2007-Ohio-4643, 873 N.E.2d 314, ¶ 14.  Relators claim entitlement to 
the sealed records based on the Rules of Superintendence, the Public Records Act, 
the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and the common law. 
{¶ 23} We decide this case based on the Rules of Superintendence, which 
provide for public access to court records.  For the claimed violation of these 
rules, a “person aggrieved by the failure of a court or clerk of court to comply 
with the requirements of Sup.R. 44 through 47 may pursue an action in 
mandamus pursuant to Chapter 2731. of the Revised Code.”  Sup.R. 47(B); see 
                                          
 
1.  Although the December 21, 2010 order granting the Cafaro defendants’ motion to seal also 
sealed Evid.R. 404(B) notices, no such notices were filed under seal, and we consequently need 
not determine whether this portion of the judge’s order was appropriate.  
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
also Sup.R. 47(A).  Sup.R. 44 through 47 became effective on July 1, 2009.  
Sup.R. 99(KK). 
{¶ 24} Under Sup.R. 45(A), “[c]ourt records are presumed open to public 
access.”  “Court record” for purposes of the public-access superintendence rules 
“means both a case document and an administrative document, regardless of 
physical form or characteristic, manner of creation, or method of storage.”  Sup.R. 
44(B).  Relators assert that the requested records that remain sealed here—bills of 
particulars and a statement of facts in the state’s memorandum in opposition to 
the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment—are entitled to the 
presumption of public access in Sup.R. 45(A) because they constitute case 
documents, which are defined in Sup.R. 44(C): 
 
(C)(1) 
“Case 
document” 
means 
a 
document 
and 
information in a document submitted to a court or filed with a clerk 
of court in a judicial action or proceeding, including exhibits, 
pleadings, motions, orders, and judgments, and any documentation 
prepared by the court or clerk in the judicial action or proceeding, 
such as journals, dockets, and indices, subject to the exclusions in 
division (C)(2) of this rule. 
(2) The term “case document” does not include the 
following: 
(a) A document or information in a document exempt from 
disclosure under state, federal, or the common law; 
(b) personal identifiers, as defined in division (H) of this 
rule; 
(c) A document or information in a document to which 
public access has been restricted pursuant to division (E) of Sup.R. 
45[.] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 25} In his December 21, 2010 decision sealing the bills of particulars 
and his August 24, 2011 decision sealing the factual portion of the state’s 
memorandum in response to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss, the judge 
determined that these filed documents were not entitled to presumptive public 
access, because they were not used by him to render a decision in the cases. 
{¶ 26} But “[t]o interpret court rules, this court applies general principles 
of statutory construction.  * * * Therefore, we must read undefined words or 
phrases in context and then construe them according to rules of grammar and 
common usage.”  State ex rel. Law Office of Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. 
Rosencrans, 111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006-Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 23.  “If a 
court rule is unambiguous, we apply it as written.”  Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 27} There is no requirement under the Superintendence Rules that a 
record or document must be used by the court in a decision to be entitled to the 
presumption of public access specified in Sup.R. 45(A).  Instead, to qualify as a 
case document that is afforded the presumption of openness for court records, the 
document or information contained in a document must merely be “submitted to a 
court or filed with a clerk of court in a judicial action or proceeding” and not be 
subject to the specified exclusions.  Sup.R. 44(C)(1).  The bills of particulars and 
the factual portion of the state’s memorandum in response to the Cafaro 
defendants’ motion to dismiss were manifestly submitted to the common pleas 
court and filed with the clerk of court in the criminal cases, and there is no 
exception in Sup.R. 44(C) for records not used by a court to render a decision.  
Therefore, we cannot read this exception into the plain language of the 
Superintendence Rules.  See State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 
118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 26. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
{¶ 28} Respondents also claim that these sealed records are not entitled to 
the Sup.R. 45(A) presumption of public access because they are exempt from 
disclosure as discovery materials or work product, citing our decision in State ex 
rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe, 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 673 N.E.2d 1360 (1997), to support 
their claim.  Our holding in Lowe, however, was limited:  “Information that a 
criminal prosecutor has disclosed to the defendant for discovery purposes 
pursuant to Crim.R. 16 is not thereby subject to release as a ‘public record’ 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 29} Neither the bills of particulars nor the facts recited in the state’s 
memorandum in response to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss were 
“disclosed to the defendant[s] for discovery purposes pursuant to Crim.R. 16.”  
And unlike the discovery materials at issue in Lowe, these records were submitted 
to and filed with the court. 
{¶ 30} Notwithstanding respondents’ assertions, in Ohio, a “bill of 
particulars has a limited purpose—to elucidate or particularize the conduct of the 
accused alleged to constitute the offense.”  State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 
171, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985).  Its express purpose is not “to serve as a substitute 
for discovery.”  Id.  See also United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-1112 
(C.A.3, 1985), holding that the First Amendment and common-law rights of 
access “extend to bills of particulars because we think them more properly 
regarded as supplements to the indictment than as the equivalent of civil 
discovery.” 
{¶ 31} Therefore, the sealed bills of particulars are not exempt from 
disclosure under state law as either discovery materials or work product.  Nor is a 
recitation of facts in a response to a dispositive motion in a criminal case the 
equivalent of discovery or work product.  Therefore, the sealed records are 
entitled to the presumption of access accorded case documents under Sup.R. 
45(A). 
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{¶ 32} Respondents next claim that any presumptive access under Sup.R. 
45(A) has been properly overcome under Sup.R. 45(E), which provides the 
procedure for restricting public access to a case document: 
 
(E) Restricting public access to a case document 
(1) Any party to a judicial action or proceeding or other 
person who is the subject of information in a case document may, 
by written motion to the court, request that the court restrict public 
access to the information or, if necessary, the entire document.  
Additionally, the court may restrict public access to the 
information in the case document or, if necessary, the entire 
document upon its own order.  The court shall give notice of the 
motion or order to all parties in the case.  The court may schedule a 
hearing on the motion. 
(2) A court shall restrict public access to information in a 
case document or, if necessary, the entire document, if it finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of allowing 
public access is outweighed by a higher interest after considering 
each of the following: 
(a) Whether public policy is served by restricting public 
access; 
(b) Whether any state, federal, or common law exempts the 
document or information from public access;  
(c) Whether factors that support restriction of public access 
exist, including risk of injury to persons, individual privacy rights 
and interests, proprietary business information, public safety, and 
fairness of the adjudicatory process. 
 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
{¶ 33} Respondents claim that any presumptive right of access to the 
sealed bills of particulars and the statement of facts in the state’s response to the 
motion to dismiss the indictment was outweighed under Sup.R. 45(E)(2)(c) by 
clear and convincing evidence that the “fairness of the adjudicatory process” 
would be compromised by public access to these records, i.e., unsealing these 
records would substantially prejudice the defendants’ right to a fair trial. 
{¶ 34} Respondent’s claim lacks merit.  There was not clear and 
convincing evidence to establish that the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity 
generated by public access to the bills of particulars and the recitation of facts in 
the state’s memorandum in response to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the indictment would prevent them from receiving a fair trial.  The Cafaro 
defendants’ lone witness at the December 6, 2010 hearing, Ohio University 
journalism professor Martin, admitted that he had “no idea” whether relators’ 
coverage of the criminal cases would prevent the impaneling of an impartial jury, 
and although he referred to the coverage as “tough” on the defendants, he could 
not say whether the reporting was true or false.  The judge thus overstated the 
prejudicial impact of the pretrial publicity.  “ ‘[P]retrial publicity—even 
pervasive, adverse publicity—does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.’ ”  State 
v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 258, 754 N.E.2d 1129, quoting Nebraska Press Assn. 
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).  In effect, in 
the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing that the defendants’ 
right to a fair trial would be violated, the judge erroneously relied on conclusory, 
speculative assertions.  See State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 39.  In 
the order sealing the factual portion of the state’s memorandum in response, he 
did not cite any additional evidence to support the sealing of the record.  Rather, 
he merely stated that this portion of the memorandum was the “functional 
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equivalent” of a bill of particulars, which as discussed, should be presumptively 
open to the public. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, the constitutional right of the defendants to a fair trial 
can be protected by the traditional methods of voir dire, continuances, changes of 
venue, jury instructions, or sequestration of the jury.  Consequently, the sealing 
orders were improper.  Id. at ¶ 40-42. 
{¶ 36} Finally, the Cafaro defendants claim that after the judge dismissed 
the criminal cases upon the state’s motion, their postdismissal privacy interests 
outweighed the presumption of public access to the sealed records.  Not so.  As 
the judge concluded in denying the Cafaro defendants’ postdismissal motion to 
seal the entire record in the criminal cases: 
 
 
Again, the question for the court is whether this legitimate 
governmental need [of not restricting the ongoing criminal 
investigation] outweighs these defendants' privacy interests.  The 
court concludes that it does. 
As a practical matter, the defendants would gain little, if 
anything, from a sealing order.  Except for the documents the court 
has kept under seal, the entire court record in this case is in the 
public domain.  Counsel for the Vindicator and WFMJ-TV has 
represented that the Vindicator has created its own record of 
everything not under seal, and there would be no restriction upon 
its use of what it has mined, even if the court were to enter a 
sealing order.  Further, information about this case is available on 
the internet.  In short, a sealing order would do little, if anything, to 
protect the privacy of the defendants. 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
Accordingly, in “balancing the public and private 
interests,” the privacy interests of the defendants are outweighed 
by a legitimate governmental need to keep the records unsealed. 
 
(Citations omitted.)   
{¶ 37} Thus, relators have established that the presumption of public 
access has not been overcome by the requisite clear and convincing evidence of a 
higher interest and that the public is entitled to access to the sealed records under 
the Superintendence Rules.  Therefore, relators are entitled to a writ of mandamus 
to compel the judge to unseal and provide access to the bills of particulars and the 
facts in the state’s memorandum in response to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the indictment. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 38} Relators also seek a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 21, 
2010 and August 24, 2011 decisions and to prohibit the judge from presumptively 
sealing any records in the cases.  Because the sealing orders were never lifted, this 
claim is not moot.  Compare State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Heath, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 165, 2009-Ohio-590, 902 N.E.2d 976, ¶ 11-14 (court held that sealing order 
that had been lifted did not moot mandamus claim because it was capable of 
repetition, yet evading review). 
{¶ 39} Based on the previous discussion concerning relators’ mandamus 
claim, they have also established their entitlement to the requested writ of 
prohibition.  The Cafaro defendants did not submit clear and convincing evidence 
to support the court’s sealing orders and sealing protocol presumptively sealing 
records, including motions to seal and memoranda in opposition, based on a 
claimed infringement on the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, relators’ prohibition claim has merit. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Constitutional, Common-Law, and R.C. 149.43 Claims 
{¶ 41} Relators also claim entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief 
based on the United States and Ohio Constitutions, the common law, and R.C. 
149.43.  We have recognized constitutional and common-law rights to certain 
judicial records.  See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 
382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Scripps Howard 
Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div., 73 Ohio 
St.3d 19, 22, 652 N.E.2d 179 (1995).  We have also recognized the propriety of 
claims for court records under R.C. 149.43.  See State ex rel. Striker v. Smith, 129 
Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 42} Nevertheless, because relators have established their entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief on the Superintendence Rules, we need not 
address other bases for relators’ claims for records, which are rendered moot.  See 
State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 55.  “This 
result is consistent with our well-settled precedent that we will not indulge in 
advisory opinions.”  State ex rel. Keyes v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 123 
Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-4052, 913 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 29. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 43} Relators request an award of attorney fees.  But Sup.R. 44 through 
47 do not authorize an award of attorney fees to a successful litigant contesting a 
court’s denial of access to court records.  See Sup.R. 47, which does not include 
an award of attorney fees as a remedy for a person aggrieved by the failure of a 
court or clerk of court to comply with Sup.R. 44 through 47.  Thus, we deny 
relators’ request for attorney fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} In sum, relators have established their entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief.  We grant a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to unseal 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
and provide access to the bills of particulars and the factual portion of the state’s 
memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
indictment.  We also grant a writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his 
prior sealing orders and to prevent him from issuing further orders presumptively 
sealing records in the criminal cases.  Relators’ request for attorney fees is denied. 
Writs granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and Christopher J. 
Hogan, for relators. 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent, Judge William 
H. Wolff. 
 
Law Office of Martin G. Weinberg, P.C., and Martin G. Weinberg, for 
intervening respondent Anthony M. Cafaro Sr. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., Ralph E. Cascarilla, Darrell A. Clay, and 
Leslie G. Wolfe, for intervening respondent the Cafaro Company. 
 
McLaughlin & McCaffrey, L.L.P., John F. McCaffrey, and Anthony R. 
Petruzzi, for intervening respondents Ohio Valley Mall Company and Marion 
Plaza, Inc. 
 
Johnson, Bruzzese & Temple and J. Alan Johnson, for intervening 
respondent Flora Cafaro. 
 
Lucy A. Dalglish, urging granting of the writs for amicus curiae, the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 
______________________