Title: John D. Freeman v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
___________
No. SC89199
___________
JOHN D. FREEMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC79651
____________
JOHN D. FREEMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
HARRY K. SINGLETARY, etc., 
Respondent.
[June 8, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
John D. Freeman, a death row inmate, appeals an order entered by the trial
1   A more detailed statement of the facts can be found in Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73
(Fla. 1990).
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court denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850, and he petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, §§ 3(b)(1),(9), Fla. Const.  The cases have been
consolidated.  For the reasons stated below, we remand for an evidentiary hearing
on Freeman's claims that defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of
this capital proceeding.  In all other respects we affirm the trial court's denial of
3.850 relief, and we deny habeas relief.
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
John D. Freeman (Freeman) was convicted of first-degree felony murder for
the 1986 killing of Leonard Collier (Collier).  Freeman was sentenced to death, and
both the conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.  See Freeman v. State,
563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990).  Collier caught Freeman in the act of burglarizing his
home.  Freeman claimed that Collier pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot
him to prevent his escape.  The two struggled over the gun and fell outside into the
front yard.  When Freeman obtained possession of the gun, he used the gun to
repeatedly strike Collier in the head ten to twelve times.  Collier died from the head
wounds.  
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During the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel made several objections to
the prosecutor's closing argument.  First, defense counsel objected arguing the
prosecutor was trying to get the jury to use this case to send a message to the
community when he argued the Legislature had enacted the felony murder law to
prevent violent felonies.  The judge overruled the objection.  Second, defense
counsel objected after the prosecutor made several comments that defense counsel
had the "gall" and the "nerve" to argue self-defense.  This objection was also
overruled.  Third, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor argued defense
counsel's request for a manslaughter conviction was an insult to the jurors'
intelligence.  The judge sustained this objection and told the jurors he would instruct
them on the law at the conclusion of closing arguments, but denied the motion for a
mistrial.  
The judge agreed to give the jury a special verdict form that included a place
under first-degree murder where the jury could check premeditated murder or felony
murder.  Second and third-degree murder did not have places to check whether they
were felony murder.  The jury was confused by the instructions and asked the judge
to clarify them.  The judge referred the jury to the page of the instructions that
would answer its question, but the jury was still confused.  They sent out the same
question again.  The judge called the jury in and explained that there was no legal
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reason for distinguishing between first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree
felony murder.  He further explained the difference between first-degree felony
murder and third-degree felony murder would depend on whether the underlying
felony was burglary or assault.  After the jury had been excused, defense counsel
objected because the judge failed to reread all the other possible offenses when he
reinstructed the jury.  In response, the judge recalled the jurors and reinstructed that
he was not trying to influence them in any way and that they should reread all of the
instructions, including the other possible offenses.  The judge then excused the jury
and asked defense counsel if that was satisfactory.  Defense counsel responded,
"Yes sir.  Thank you."  The jury convicted Freeman of first-degree felony murder.
Prior to the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel requested a
continuance because he had been unable to locate Mr. Sorrells, Freeman's best
friend, who would testify to certain nonstatutory mitigation.  This testimony would
have included Freeman's abusive childhood, his dedication to his work as a
carpenter, and his love for children.  The judge denied the request for a continuance
because defense counsel could not offer sufficient proof that a continuance would
produce the witness and because the witness had previously given similar testimony
under oath in the penalty phase of a separate first-degree murder trial, the Epps trial. 
The judge allowed Mr. Sorrells' former testimony to be read to the jury.
-5-
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor argued four statutory aggravating
factors: (1) Freeman had previously been convicted of the crimes of first-degree
murder, armed robbery, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault; (2) the murder
occurred while Freeman was committing a burglary of a dwelling;  (3) the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the murder was heinous, atrocious, and
cruel.  The State presented Ms. Epps, the wife of the other murder victim, to testify
about Freeman's previous murder conviction.  As preliminary background the
prosecutor asked Ms. Epps her occupation and if she had any children.  After Ms.
Epps responded that she did have children, defense counsel objected and moved for
a mistrial.  He argued that the prosecutor had put Ms. Epps on the stand to conjure
sympathy for the victims and that it was improper for the prosecutor to inform the
jury that Mr. Epps had surviving children.  The judge sustained the objection and
instructed the jury to disregard the remarks, but he denied the motion for a mistrial. 
Ms. Epps testified that Freeman had previously been convicted for stabbing her
husband six times when he came home during a similar burglary.  In his final
remarks to the jury, the prosecutor argued that Freeman claimed to love children,
but he could not help the Epps children. 
Defense counsel did not present any statutory mitigation and very limited
nonstatutory mitigation.  Freeman's mother and brother testified that he was abused
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by his stepfather, possessed artistic ability, and particularly enjoyed playing with
children.  A clinical psychologist testified that Freeman had a below average I.Q.
and a fourth grade achievement level.  Although Sorrells did not testify in person at
the penalty phase of this case, Sorrells' testimony from the penalty phase in the Epps
trial was read to the jury.  Sorrells' prior testimony was similar to the mitigation
evidence presented by Freeman's mother and brother. 
The jury, after only fifteen minutes of deliberations,  recommended death by a
nine-to-three vote.  Thereafter, the judge imposed the death sentence.  In his
sentencing order, the judge found three aggravating circumstances: (1) Freeman had
previously been convicted of the crimes of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and
burglary of a dwelling with an assault, all of which had been committed just three
weeks before Collier's murder; (2) Collier's murder occurred while Freeman was
committing a burglary of a dwelling;  and (3) Collier's murder was committed for
pecuniary gain.  The judge found the second and third aggravating factors merged
into one.  Although the judge did not find any statutory mitigation, he did find
nonstatutory mitigation including the fact that Freeman: (1) was of low intelligence;
(2) had been abused by his stepfather; (3) possessed some artistic ability; and (4)
enjoyed playing with children.  After weighing these factors, the judge sentenced
Freeman to death.  
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On appeal, appellate counsel argued: (1) the prosecutor erred in presenting
Ms. Epps' testimony at the penalty phase, and the trial judge erred in denying the
motion for a mistrial based on Ms. Epps' testimony;  (2) the prosecutor made several
improper comments during the penalty phase that required reversal; (3) the jury
instructions on heinous, atrocious, and cruel were unconstitutionally vague; (4) the
death penalty was proportionally unwarranted in this case; and (5) Freeman's
sentence in this case must be vacated if the Epps conviction is reversed on direct
appeal.  This Court held: (1) it was improper to allow Ms. Epps to testify, but even
without her testimony the jury would still have recommended death; (2) the
prosecutor's statements were not reversible error; (3) the heinous, atrocious, and
cruel instruction was not properly preserved for appeal; and even if it had been
properly preserved, the instruction sufficiently limited the jury's discretion so that it
was not unconstitutionally vague; (4) the death sentence was not disproportionate;
and (5) the argument to vacate if the Epps conviction was reversed was moot
because the conviction was affirmed in Freeman v. State, 547 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1989).
Freeman now appeals the trial court's summary denial of his motion for
postconviction relief and files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  In the
2   In his motion for postconviction relief, Freeman argues his motion was improperly
summarily denied for the following reasons:  (1) the jury was not presented with critical exculpatory
evidence during the guilt phase; (2) defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase; (3) his
sentencing jury did not receive proper instructions to guide and channel its discretion; (4) he was
sentenced to death in reliance upon improper automatic aggravating factors; (5) the prosecutor made
inflammatory and improper comments, which rendered the death sentence fundamentally unfair and
unreliable; (6) his death sentence was based upon an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction; (7)
the penalty phase jury instructions shifted the burden to him to prove that life was the appropriate
punishment; (8) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the Epps trial,
and the State failed to disclose critical exculpatory evidence related to the Epps murder; (9) the
State's decision to seek the death penalty in his cases was based upon racial considerations; (10)
cumulative error made his conviction and death sentence unconstitutional; and (11) portions of the
record were not attached, making the order unconstitutional.
3   In his habeas writ petition, Freeman argues ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and
constitutional error with regard to the following:  (1) failing to raise the issue that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a mistrial; (2) failing to raise the argument that the trial court reversibly
erred when reinstructing the jury during the guilt phase; (3) failing to argue numerous pretrial motions
raised by defense counsel during the guilt phase; (4) failing to raise many of the numerous pretrial
motions, objections and requests for mistrials raised by defense counsel during the penalty phase; (5)
failing to argue the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance prior to the penalty phase; (6)
failing to argue that he was denied the right to a reliable capital sentence because the jury was not
properly instructed; (7) he was sentenced to death in reliance upon automatic aggravating factors
which failed to guide and channel the sentencer's discretion; (8) the prosecutor's inflammatory and
improper comments and arguments rendered his death sentence fundamentally unfair and unreliable;
(9) the penalty phase jury instructions  shifted the burden to him to prove that a life sentence was
appropriate; (10) his death sentence was based upon an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction;
and (11) failing to assure that the record on appeal was complete. 
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postconviction appeal, Freeman raises eleven issues.2  In the petition for writ of
habeas corpus, Freeman also raises eleven issues.3
 POSTCONVICTION RELIEF APPEAL
Brady Claim and Ineffective Counsel
Freeman claims error in the trial court's summary denial of relief based on his
allegations that critical exculpatory evidence was never presented to the jury
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because of actions by the State.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  He
further contends that to the extent that these claims are not cognizable under Brady,
they demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under either theory, Freeman claims he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, and the trial court erred in failing to have such a hearing. We
disagree and affirm the summary disposition.
We begin our analysis with the general proposition that a defendant is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion,
files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.  See, e.g.,
Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170
(Fla. 1993); Hoffman v. State, 571 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1990);  Holland v. State, 503
So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1987); Lemon v. State, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850.  The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based
upon a legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet
this burden.  See Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).   However, in cases
where there has been no evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations
made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. 
See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253  (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331
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(Fla. 1997).  We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and,
if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.
   
Where a Brady violation has been alleged, the defendant must establish a
prima facie case that "there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  To meet this test, the defendant
must prove: (1) the State possessed favorable evidence, including impeachment
evidence; (2) the evidence was suppressed; (3) the defendant did not possess the
favorable evidence and could not have obtained the evidence with the exercise of
due diligence; and (4) there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the outcome would have been different.  See Buenoano v. State, 708 So.
2d 941 (Fla. 1998); Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1997); Cherry v.
State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1995); Hegwood v. State, 575 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1991). 
However, “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible
to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information
or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”  Provenzano
v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993).  Accord Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d
1255 (Fla. 1990); James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1983).
When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish
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the two prongs necessary to demonstrate ineffectiveness as outlined by the Supreme
Court in Strickland.  The Court said:
        A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a
conviction or death sentence has two components.  First,
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
466 U.S. at 687.  In reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance."  Id. at 689. 
First, Freeman argues the court erred in summarily denying his claim that the
State violated Brady by withholding exculpatory information or, alternatively, that
defense counsel had the information and was ineffective for failing to present it to
the jury during the guilt phase of the trial.  Specifically, Freeman alleges error with
regard to the following: (1) the State's failure to inform defense counsel of Kathy
Freeman’s statement or, in the alternative, defense counsel's failure to have Kathy
4   Freeman had the same defense counsel in the Epps case and the Collier case.
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Freeman testify; (2) the State's failure to conduct a proper investigation of the crime
scene or, in the alternative, defense counsel's failure to properly address this issue
when cross-examining the detectives who investigated the crime scene; and (3) the
State's failure to produce police reports and photographs which would corroborate
Freeman’s claim that Collier died from hitting his head on the porch or, in the
alternative, defense counsel's failure to present this evidence to the jury. 
Freeman alleges the State improperly withheld Kathy Freeman's statement
that Freeman told her he did not intend to kill Collier.  The record in this case
establishes that Freeman knew or should have known about the statement through
the exercise of reasonable diligence.  The State listed Kathy Freeman in its initial
and second discovery responses in the Epps case.4  The second response contained
the notation, “defendant told [Kathy Freeman] that a man named McMillion (first
name starts with a D) killed the victim and sold the property.  Defendant also
admitted committing the other murder [Collier], but said he didn’t do this one
[Epps].”  Freeman listed Kathy Freeman in his reciprocal discovery.  Thus, the
record conclusively demonstrates Freeman was aware of Kathy Freeman's potential
as a witness and that she had made known to the State statements attributable to the
defendant.  Defense counsel could have discovered the details of any statement
5   Additionally, there is no Brady violation because there is no reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different based on the fact that Freeman was convicted of felony murder
and intent to kill or lack of intent to kill would not change this crime.
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through reasonable diligence (for example, by deposition or another discovery
method).  There was no Brady violation.5
Additionally, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to have Kathy
Freeman testify.  In order to demonstrate that defense counsel was ineffective,
Freeman must establish a prima facie case that defense counsel's performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial.  See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.  Here, Freeman was convicted of felony murder.  Intent
for the murder is inferred from the underlying felony.  As a matter of law, a
statement that Freeman did not intend to kill Collier was legally insufficient to
negate a felony murder conviction.  See Gray v. State, 654 So. 2d at 552, 553 (Fla.
1995); State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165, 168-69 (Fla. 1985)(Shaw, J., specially
concurring, explaining the felony murder rule).  The jury chose not to convict 
Freeman of premeditated first-degree murder even though they were instructed that
they could choose premeditated first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder or
both.  Therefore, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that defense counsel's failure to
have Kathy Freeman testify did not affect the outcome of the case and counsel was
not ineffective for failing to have her testify.
6   Freeman also argues as Brady material that the medical examiner's testimony was flawed
and that the defense now has an expert who can point out these flaws.  This type of evidence does
not meet the definition of Brady; there is no allegation that the State had the information that is now
being offered by this defense expert. 
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Freeman also argues the State committed a Brady violation by failing to
properly investigate the crime scene,6 or, in the alternative, defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue this to the jury.  The court was correct in summarily
denying this claim because it is not truly a Brady claim.  Complaints about the
State’s treatment of the physical evidence should have been raised on direct appeal;
therefore, they are procedurally barred in collateral proceedings.  See Hardwick v.
Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1994); Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847 (Fla.
1994); Bryan v. Dugger, 641 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1994).  Moreover, defense counsel did
argue this point to the jury.  The issue was addressed in defense counsel's opening
argument, cross-examination of Detective DeWitt, and closing argument.  Thus, the
record also conclusively rebuts Freeman's allegation that defense counsel was
ineffective.  
Freeman must make a prima facie showing that defense counsel's
performance fell measurably below that of competent counsel.  See Knight v. State,
394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).   In the instant case, Freeman cannot prove
defense counsel's performance affected the outcome of his trial.  He alleges a more
7   Freeman argues both a police report by Detective DeWitt and a handwritten diagram from
the State Attorney's Office demonstrate there was blood adjacent to or on the front step, and they
were corroborative of his defense that Collier hit his head during the struggle.  While it is clear that
police reports are subject to disclosure pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 and that
this evidence meets the first three prongs under Brady, the failure to disclose under the circumstances
of this case is not prejudicial and would not result in a different outcome since there was testimony
from several State witnesses concerning blood at the scene.  Moreover, this evidence would have
been relevant in the same manner as the photograph, which was available to the defense. 
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thorough investigation would have added evidentiary support to his self-defense
claim, proving he did not intend to kill Collier.  He opines that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to inform the jury of the improper crime scene investigation. 
As previously stated, intent is inferred from the underlying felony in felony murder
cases.  Therefore, additional evidence that Freeman did not intend to kill Collier
would not have affected the outcome of this trial as a matter of law.  See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 668.
Freeman further alleges the State improperly withheld exculpatory evidence
relating to a photograph of the crime scene, a handwritten diagram of the crime
scene, and a police report.7  Freeman argues Collier died from hitting his head on
the front porch step.  He claims the prosecution withheld evidence of a picture
showing blood on the step.  There was no Brady violation pertaining to the
photograph because it was given to the defense.  See Provenzano, 616 So. 2d at
430.  In his opening statement, defense counsel referred to the photograph, arguing
Collier died from hitting his head on the step.  Counsel said, “On one of the stoops,
8   Detective DeWitt testified that there was no blood on the step but stated there was a large
circle of blood in the yard.
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and you will see the photographs.  Look at the blood in that area.”  There is no
Brady violation when the evidence complained of is in the possession of the
defense.  
In the alternative, Freeman alleges defense counsel was ineffective because
he did not present the picture to the jury or use it to impeach Detective DeWitt.8 
Again, Freeman's claim of ineffective counsel is insufficient, as a matter of law,
because he cannot demonstrate that the failure to present this evidence affected the
outcome of his trial.  Had the jury seen the picture and believed Collier died from
hitting his head on the step, it would have only lent some credibility to Freeman's
claim that he acted in self-defense.  However, self-defense is not legally available
"to a person who '[i]s attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the
commission of a forcible felony.'"  Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553, 560 (Fla, 1999)
(quoting Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 1992)).  Freeman was in the
process of escaping from the commission of a burglary in the victim's home.  
Although Freeman has subdivided this Brady/ineffective assistance of counsel issue
into separate parts concerning the Kathy Freeman statement, the crime scene
investigation, the photograph, the diagram and the police report, all of these
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subissues coalesce into one real argument--that these pieces of evidence were
material to Freeman's claim of self-defense.  While items such as these may be
material to a claim of self-defense in a premeditated murder case, this Court has
made it clear that such evidence is not material in a felony murder conviction.  See 
Young, 739 So. 2d at 560.  Freeman's jury rejected the opportunity to convict him of
premeditated murder and convicted him of first-degree felony murder only.  There is
no doubt that the evidence subsumed under this issue is not material to Freeman's
felony murder conviction; there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different had the evidence been disclosed.  The claim was therefore
properly summarily denied.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Penalty Phase
Freeman claims defense counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase of the
proceedings for failing to investigate and present to the jury crucial mitigating
evidence from neighbors and friends, for failing to present the live testimony of
Sorrells, for failing to have mental heath experts review Freeman's family history
and present this evidence along with evidence of alcohol and drug abuse, and for
failing to challenge the prior violent felony, the Epps murder.  A defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
unless the claim is legally insufficient or the record conclusively refutes the factual
9    For example, Freeman alleges he suffered a severe head injury as a child when he was run
over by a car.  This allegation should be taken as true for purposes of granting an evidentiary hearing,
unless it is conclusively rebutted by the record.  See, e.g.,; Maharaj, 684 So. 2d at 728; Anderson,
627 So. 2d at 1171; Hoffman, 571 So. 2d at 450; Holland, 503 So. 2d at 1251; Lemon, 498 So. 2d
at 923.  It is unclear whether defense counsel knew about this incident and chose not to present it as
a matter of strategy or if defense counsel failed to discover the evidence because he did not conduct
a thorough background investigation on Freeman.
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allegations.  See, e.g., Maharaj, 684 So. 2d at 728; Anderson, 627 So. 2d at 1171;
Holland, 503 So. 2d at 1251; Lemon, 498 So. 2d at 923.  On this claim we find 
Freeman was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations were
sufficiently pled and the record does not conclusively refute the allegations.
Specifically, Freeman alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
provide his only expert witness with his background, his school records, and the
insight of numerous family members and nonfamily persons into his childhood.
Freeman claims his expert was critically impeached because he did not have
substantial background information.  Freeman also alleges defense counsel was
incompetent because he failed to investigate and present his abusive childhood
through the testimony of his neighbors.  He alleges this information would not be
cumulative mitigation because it could have provided details about specific events
not presented by Freeman's family or through Sorrells' former testimony.9  The court
dismissed this claim stating that more is not necessarily better and finding defense
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present cumulative mitigation.  The
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record does not conclusively demonstrate that the mitigation evidence defense
counsel failed to present was cumulative.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla.
1996)(holding defense counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation for
possible mitigating evidence).  Therefore, an evidentiary hearing should have been
held to determine if defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present this evidence.
Freeman further alleges he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena Sorrells for the penalty
phase.  In trying to convince the trial court that a continuance was needed in order
to secure the attendance of Sorrells, defense counsel stated it was crucial to the
defense that Sorrells testify in person.  It was acknowledged that defense counsel
had failed to subpoena Sorrells prior to the commencement of the trial.  Although
the trial court allowed Sorrells' testimony from the Epps case to be read to the jury,
we cannot say that the live testimony, especially in conjunction with the other
mitigating evidence that the defense now alleges will be produced at an evidentiary
hearing, would not make a more substantial impact on the jury.  This is the type of
issue that the trial court must consider in the context of all the evidence presented at
the hearing.     
Freeman further complains defense counsel was ineffective in failing to
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produce a qualified expert witness to testify to his drug and alcohol problems. 
Despite the fact that Freeman had a substantial history of drug and alcohol abuse
and admitted to smoking marijuana on the morning Collier was killed, the only
expert defense counsel presented during the penalty phase was a clinical
psychologist who was not qualified to give an opinion on the effects of drug and
alcohol abuse.  The court also dismissed this claim, stating that more mitigation was
not necessarily better.  With Freeman's substantial history of drug and alcohol
abuse, defense counsel may have been ineffective for failing to present an expert
witness who was qualified to give an opinion on this issue.  There is a reasonable
doubt as to the effect such a witness might have had on the jury's recommendation. 
Therefore, the court should have held an evidentiary hearing.  See, e.g., Maharaj,
684 So. 2d at 728; Anderson , 627 So. 2d at 1171; Hoffman, 571 So. 2d at 450;
Holland, 503 So. 2d at 1251; Lemon, 498 So. 2d at 923.
Freeman also argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the
weaknesses in the Epps conviction.  At trial, defense counsel solicited information
from a witness on cross-examination that the Epps case was being appealed.  One 
claim in the Epps appeal was that Daryl McMillion committed the murder.  The
prosecutor objected to defense counsel debating the validity of the Epps conviction
unless he could explore the strong evidence of guilt in that case.  The judge excused
10   Mr. Stetson was the prosecutor.
11   Mr. McGuinness was counsel for Freeman.
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the jury and asked each side to proffer their questions to the witness.  After defense
counsel and the State had proffered their questions, the following discussion took
place:
THE COURT:  I can see what we are doing here.
MR. STETSON:10  We are retrying the [Epps] case.
MR. MCGUINNESS:11  All right,  your Honor.  I will cease my cross.
THE COURT:  You will?
MR. STETSON:  I don't blame you.
The defense counsel obviously gave second thought to this attempt to relitigate the
circumstances of the Epps conviction.  Postconviction counsel has failed to
demonstrate that this was error.
Ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland requires a showing that
counsel made an error that was so serious that he was not functioning as counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  In the instant case, the failure of counsel to
pursue a tactic of relitigating the Epps case was not error.  There has been no
showing that Freeman had a right to present this type of evidence.  Counsel cannot
be ineffective under these circumstances; thus, the trial court did not err in failing to
12   The instructions given on murder in the course of a felony and pecuniary gain were
standard jury instructions.  Claims concerning the impropriety of these instructions have been
repeatedly held to be without merit.  See, e.g. Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1997).
Therefore, defense counsel's objection to them would have been overruled.  Thus, even if  Freeman
had alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim would have been insufficient because there was
no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial was affected by defense counsel's failure to
object to the standard instructions. 
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have an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Instructions on Aggravating Circumstances
Next, Freeman argues the jury received inadequate instructions on the
aggravating circumstances of murder in the course of a felony, pecuniary gain, and
heinous, atrocious, and cruel.  There is no allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel on this claim.  The issue of the heinous, atrocious and cruel instruction is
not properly raised in a postconviction motion because the claim either was or could
have been raised on direct appeal.  See Hardwick, 648 So. 2d at 103; Lambrix, 641
So. 2d at 848; Bryan, 641 So. 2d at 63.  The murder in the course of a felony and
pecuniary gain instructions were not objected to at trial, and the heinous, atrocious
and cruel aggravator was objected to at trial on other grounds.  This Court
addressed the failure to object further to the heinous, atrocious and cruel aggravator
on direct appeal.  See Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d at 76.12  Accordingly, the court
was correct in summarily denying this claim.  See Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So. 2d
452 (Fla. 1993).
-23-
Automatic Aggravating Circumstances
Freeman next contends defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the application of certain aggravating factors, specifically the "during the
commission of an enumerated felony" and "for pecuniary gain" aggravators, were
improper because he was convicted of felony murder, where the underlying felony
was the same felony that created the statutory aggravators.  Defense counsel
challenged the application of automatic aggravators in a pretrial motion, but he did
not object at the time the instructions were actually given.  Freeman has not
established a prima facie case that defense counsel's failure to object to the
aggravators, after having the pretrial motion denied, was incompetent performance. 
Moreover, this Court has held there is no merit to the argument that an
underlying felony cannot be used as an aggravating factor.  See Blanco v. State, 702
So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1997).  Therefore, Freeman cannot demonstrate that the outcome
of his trial was affected by defense counsel's failure to object to these aggravating
factors.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.  This claim was properly summarily
denied.
Prosecutorial Argument
Freeman next contends the prosecutor made improper and inflammatory
remarks during his closing argument in the penalty phase and that defense counsel
-24-
was ineffective for failing to argue the impropriety of these remarks.  This issue was
raised on direct appeal and cannot be relitigated under the guise of ineffective
assistance of counsel.  See Hardwick, 648 So. 2d 100; Lambrix, 641 So. 2d 847;
Bryan, 641 So. 2d 61.  Freeman makes a conclusory statement that defense counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to many improprieties during the prosecutor's
closing arguments.  See Kennedy, 547 So. 2d at 912.  In fact, defense counsel
continually objected during the prosecutor's closing arguments.  Defense counsel
also moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the prosecutor's closing argument
based upon the numerous objections.  Freeman is merely alleging ineffective
assistance as a vehicle to have a second appeal on the merits.  This claim was
properly summarily denied.
The Epps Murder Conviction
Freeman claims that his prior conviction for murdering Mr. Epps was
unconstitutionally obtained because the trial court did not know that the prior
conviction rested on Daryl McMillion’s perjured testimony.  There is no allegation
of ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim.  This claim was raised on direct
appeal; therefore, it is procedurally barred and was properly summarily denied.  See
Hardwick, 648 So. 2d 100; Lambrix, 641 So. 2d  847; Bryan, 641 So. 2d 61.
Improper Burden Shifting
-25-
 
Freeman argues the penalty phase jury instructions on aggravating and
mitigating circumstances improperly shifted the burden to him to prove that a
sentence of life was appropriate.  He further contends defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue this issue.  The court found the merits of the claim to
be procedurally barred and the allegation of ineffective assistance insufficient to
overcome the procedural bar.  See Kennedy, 547 So. 2d at 913.  This Court has
repeatedly held there is no merit to the burden shifting claim.  See, e.g., Demps v.
Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1998); Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997). 
Therefore, even if the claim were not procedurally barred, Freeman would not be
able to prove that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to object to the
instructions.  This claim was properly summarily denied.
Exculpatory Evidence in the Epps Case
Freeman claims that the State withheld exculpatory information related to the
Epps case.  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.  Alternatively, he argues that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the unreliability of the Epps conviction. 
In summarily denying this claim, the trial court found that it was procedurally barred
because the time to challenge the Epps murder on postconviction has expired.  We
agree and find that this claim was properly summarily denied.  Freeman's bare
assertion that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue does not suffice to
13   This argument was made in the Epps case on direct appeal and rejected.  See Freeman
v. State, 547 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1989).
-26-
overcome the procedural default.13  
Racial Motivation for Death Penalty
Next, Freeman alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the
State's pursuit of the death penalty in the Epps and Collier cases was based upon
improper racial considerations.  He claims the prosecutor rejected Freeman's offer to
plead guilty in both cases if the death penalty were dropped because the State
needed to "get the numbers up" on cases seeking the death penalty where white
defendants had killed black victims.  There is no evidence in the record to refute this
allegation; therefore, it must be taken as true and the merits should be addressed in
an evidentiary hearing.  See, e.g., Maharaj, 684 So. 2d at 728; Anderson , 627 So.
2d at 1171; Hoffman, 571 So. 2d at 450 Holland, 503 So. 2d at 1253; Lemon, 498
So. 2d at 923.
The State argues this claim is legally insufficient because the decision to seek
the death penalty is within the ambit of the prosecutor's discretion.  See State v.
Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986).  However, in Bloom, this Court stated:
While recognizing a court's latitude and discretion during post-trial
disposition,  Jogan reiterated the state has absolute discretion at pre-trial.   In
considering similar circumstances, federal courts have held:
-27-
[T]he decision of whether or not to prosecute in any given
instance must be left to the discretion of the prosecutor. 
This discretion has been curbed by the judiciary only in
those instances where impermissible motives may be
attributed to the prosecution, such as bad faith, race,
religion, or a desire to prevent the exercise of the
defendant's constitutional rights.
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 59, 50 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1976) (citations omitted).  We apply
these principles and hold that article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution
prohibits the judiciary from interfering with this kind of discretionary
executive function of a prosecutor.
Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, this Court has stated that prosecutorial discretion will
not be interfered with unless there are improper motives.  Likewise, in McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court held that studies showing
disproportionate impact of death sentences on black defendants as compared to
white defendants were not sufficient to find the state’s administration of the death
penalty violated a black defendant's right to equal protection.  However, the Court
went on to say, "[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."  Id. at
292.  The claim being made here is distinguishable from cases which have alleged a
discriminatory impact proves there was a discriminatory purpose.   In this case there
is an allegation that the prosecutor made a statement that his motives in pursuing the
death penalty were based upon race.  Since this claim is legally sufficient and not
-28-
conclusively rebutted by the record, an evidentiary hearing should have been held to
determine if the State pursued the death penalty for an improper racial motive and if
the State acted with a discriminatory purpose.  We note that this case is a rare
exception limited to its facts. 
Cumulative Error
Freeman additionally argues the cumulative effect of the errors made during
his trial deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.  The trial court
summarily denied this claim as improperly pled, stating “no particular allegations or
citations to the record, nor any indication of the true nature of the claim” had been
alleged.  A postconviction movant must specifically identify the claims which
demonstrate the prevention of a fair trial.  Mere conclusory allegations do not
warrant relief.  See Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1997); Jackson v. Dugger,
633 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993); Phillips v. State, 608 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1992); Roberts
v. State, 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990); Smith v Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1990);
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).  Accordingly, this claim was
insufficiently pled and properly summarily denied.  See Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d
477 (Fla. 1998).
Record Attachments 
As his final 3.850 issue, Freeman argues that the trial court erred in failing to
-29-
attach portions of the record to its order summarily denying his motion for
postconviction relief.  He claims the order should be reversed with instructions that
the court hold an evidentiary hearing.  In Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170, 1171
(Fla. 1993), this Court held  summary denial without a hearing is proper where the
court: (1) states its rationale in the decision; or (2) attaches specific parts of the
record to the order that refute each claim.  Here, the trial court stated the reasons for
summary denial of each claim in the order.  See Diaz v. Dugger, 719 So. 2d 865
(Fla. 1998); Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1998); Mills v. State, 684 So.
2d 801 (Fla. 1996).  Thus, this claim is without merit.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The issue of appellate counsel’s effectiveness is appropriately raised in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  However, ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel may not be used as a disguise to raise issues which should have been raised
on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.  In evaluating an ineffectiveness
claim, the court must determine
whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling
measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable
performance and, second, whether the deficiency in
performance compromised the appellate process to such a
degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of
the result.
-30-
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  See also Haliburton, 691 So.
2d 470; Hardwick, 648 So. 2d 104.  The defendant has the burden of alleging a
specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel can be based.  See Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981).  "In the
case of appellate counsel, this means the deficiency must concern an issue which is
error affecting the outcome, not simply harmless error."  Id. at 1001.  In addition,
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be argued where the issue was not
preserved for appeal or where the appellate attorney chose not to argue the issue as
a matter of strategy.  See Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1991); Atkins v.
Dugger, 541 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1989) (“Most successful appellate counsel
agree that from a tactical standpoint it is more advantageous to raise only the
strongest points on appeal and that the assertion of every conceivable argument
often has the effect of diluting the impact of the stronger points.”).
First, Freeman argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
issue of the prosecutor's improper arguments made during the guilt phase of the trial
and for failing to raise as an issue the trial court's error in denying the motion for
mistrial based upon the improper comments.  Specifically, Freeman argues the
prosecutor made statements that the jury should use this case to send a message to
the community and interjected his own opinion by stating defense counsel had the
-31-
"gall" and the "nerve" to argue self-defense.  Freeman argues the underlying merits
of this issue without citing any cases to demonstrate that appellate counsel's failure
to raise the arguments fell measurably below the standard of competent counsel. 
These issues are a thinly veiled attempt to have an appeal on the merits, which is
clearly not the purpose of a habeas petition.  
Furthermore, even if appellate counsel had raised these issues on direct
appeal, they would have been found to be without merit.  Appellate counsel cannot
be ineffective for failing to raise an issue which is without merit.  See Hardwick,
648 So. 2d at 106; Atkins, 541 So. 2d at 1167.  Freeman argues the prosecutor told
the jury to use this case to send a message to the community.  In fact, defense
counsel objected before such statement was made.  The trial judge overruled the
objection, stating there was no problem with the prosecutor postulating on why we
have the felony murder law.  See Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1997);
Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1997).  Then, the judge reminded the jury that
arguments were not the law and he would instruct them on the law after closing
arguments.  When the prosecutor resumed his argument, he did not tell the jury to
use the case to send a message to the community.  Thus, the improper comment
Freeman now complains about was never actually made.  Moreover, any prejudice
created by the prosecutor's remarks prior to the objection was cured when the judge
14   See Gore  v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998)(prosecutor violated a pretrial agreement
limiting the scope of collateral crime evidence by soliciting facts in a collateral crime that were
extremely prejudicial); Riley v. State, 560 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(prosecutor called
defendant a "liar" and continually stated his opinion that the defendant was guilty of first-degree
murder).  
-32-
instructed the jury that the prosecutor's arguments were not the law.
 Freeman also argues the prosecutor's repeated reference to defense counsel's
"gall" and "nerve" in claiming self-defense was an improper statement of the
prosecutor's opinion and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
this argument on direct appeal.  The cases Freeman cites to support this argument
are distinguishable in the severity of the comments.14  The prosecutor in this
instance was pointing out the fact that it appears incredible that one who has
illegally entered the home of another to rob the occupant of his valuables would
seek to justify that invasion and the subsequent death of the occupant by claiming
self-defense.  Accordingly, Freeman has failed to meet his burden of proof that
appellate counsel was ineffective.  See Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541 (Fla.
1990) (holding appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable claim on appeal
to be effective). 
Freeman also contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the trial court erred in restricting the reinstruction of the jury.  Appellate counsel
cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise this issue because it was not
-33-
preserved for appeal.  See Medina, 586 So. 2d at 318.  At trial, defense counsel
objected to the judge's attempt to answer the jury's question concerning the
difference between first-degree felony murder and third-degree felony murder. 
Defense counsel argued that the judge emphasized first-degree felony murder and
third-degree felony murder to the exclusion of the other possible offenses.  The
judge recalled the jury and instructed it that he in no way meant to imply that the
jury should only consider first-degree felony murder and third-degree felony murder
and that the jury should read all the other possible offenses.  The judge instructed
the jury as to the page numbers for each of the other offenses.  After the jury was
excused, the judge asked defense counsel, "Was that satisfactory?"  Defense
counsel responded, "Yes, sir.  Thank you."  Therefore, the issue was not properly
preserved for appeal.  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an
issue that has not been preserved for appeal.  See Hardwick, 648 So. 2d 100;
Medina, 586 So. 2d 317.
Next, Freeman contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the trial court erred in denying the pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment
because it did not specifically charge felony murder and erred in denying motions
requesting special jury instructions.  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for
failing to raise these issues because the claims are without merit.  First, Freeman
-34-
argues the indictment should have been dropped because it only charged him with
premeditated murder, not felony murder.  This argument was rejected by this Court
in Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 964 (Fla. 1997) ("We have repeatedly rejected
claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to pursue a felony murder
theory when the indictment gave no notice of the theory.").  Second, Freeman
argues the trial judge erred in denying his special jury instructions.  The judge heard
defense counsel's arguments in favor of the requested instructions but decided to
give the standard jury instructions instead.  The standard jury instructions are
presumed to be correct.  See Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1997). 
Freeman has not shown that the instructions given were incorrect.  Thus, appellate
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these issues on appeal because they
are without merit.  
Freeman claims appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
raising on appeal the denial of several pretrial motions related to the constitutionality
of the death penalty generally and as applied in this case.  There is no merit to the
underlying motions.  See, e.g., Elledge, 706 So. 2d at 1343; Pooler v. State, 704 So.
2d 1375 (Fla. 1997); Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995).  Therefore,
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issues on appeal.
Freeman further claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
-35-
the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance of the penalty phase so that
defense counsel could locate Sorrells.  The denial of a motion for continuance is
within the trial court’s discretion.  See Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1998);
Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1992).  Defense counsel failed to subpoena
Sorrells prior to the penalty phase.  This claim has been raised as ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in the 3.850 motion.  Appellate counsel does not have to
raise every possible motion on direct appeal to be effective.  See Atkins, 541 So. 2d
at 1167.
Next, Freeman claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the instructions given to the jury on the murder in the course of a felony,
pecuniary gain, and heinous, atrocious and cruel aggravators were inadequate. 
Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise issues not properly
preserved for appeal.  See Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1995). 
Freeman did not object to the felony murder and pecuniary gain instructions at trial. 
Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these issues on
direct appeal.  
Appellate counsel challenged the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator
instruction on direct appeal.  See Freeman, 563 So. 2d at 76.  Thus, this issue is
procedurally barred.  See Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991); Porter v.
-36-
Dugger, 559 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1990).  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for
failing to convince the Court to rule in appellant's favor.  See Swafford v. Dugger,
569 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1990) (“After appellate counsel raises an issue, failing
to convince this Court to rule in an appellant’s favor is not ineffective
performance.”). 
Next, Freeman claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that applying the aggravator of murder in the course of a felony to him, when he was
convicted of felony murder based upon the same underlying felony, constitutes an
improper automatic aggravator.  This Court has repeatedly held that there is no
merit to this claim.  See Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1997); Banks v. State,
700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1995). 
Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim
because it is without merit.  See Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1998);
Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1995); Swafford, 569 So. 2d at 1264;
King v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1990).
Freeman also claims the prosecutor deprived him of due process by
presenting inflammatory evidence and by making improper comments and
arguments during the penalty phase of the trial.  The first two aspects of this
15   First, Freeman argues it was improper for Ms. Epps to testify.  This argument was
presented on direct appeal.  The Court held Ms. Epps should not have been called to testify about her
husband's murder but found beyond a  reasonable doubt that the testimony did not affect the jury's
recommendation.  Second, Freeman argues the prosecutor made several improper arguments during
closing argument.  The Court held these statements were not reversible error.  See Freeman, 563 So.
2d at 73.
-37-
argument were argued on direct appeal.  See Freeman, 563 So. 2d at 75-76.15 
Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to convince the Court.  See
Swafford, 569 So. 2d at 1266.  Freeman's only argument not raised on direct appeal
is that the prosecutor’s argument denigrated Freeman’s mitigation.  Trial counsel did
not object to the prosecutor’s penalty phase argument on this ground.  Therefore, it
was not preserved for appeal.  Appellate counsel is not ineffective for not raising an
unpreserved issue.  See Medina, 586 So. 2d at 317.
Freeman argues the penalty phase instructions improperly shifted the burden
to him to prove that a life sentence would be appropriate.  Freeman does not argue
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue.  The propriety of jury
instructions is a direct appeal issue, and will not be considered on its merits in a
habeas petition.  See Pope, 496 So. 2d at 798.  Furthermore, even if Freeman had
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the issue would be without merit
because it was not preserved for appeal, and the burden shifting argument has
consistently been held to be without merit.  See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637
-38-
(Fla. 1995).  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an
unpreserved error or an issue that is without merit.  See Swafford, 569 So. 2d 1264;
Medina, 586 So. 2d 317.
Next, Freeman argues his death sentence was improperly based on the Epps
murder aggravator because the Court vacated the death sentence in the Epps case. 
See Freeman, 547 So. 2d at 129.  This issue should be raised on direct appeal or in a
motion for postconviction relief, rather than in a habeas petition.  See White v.
Dugger, 511 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1987).  In fact, Freeman raised this issue in the motion
for postconviction relief.  There is no allegation that appellate counsel was
ineffective.
Finally, Freeman argues that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by not ensuring that the entire record below was included in the record on appeal. 
In June 1988, Freeman filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this Court, Freeman
v. Moran, No. 72,561 (Fla. July 6, 1988), attempting to prohibit the trial court from
trying him for Collier’s murder.  The basis of the petition was an allegation that a
twenty-person grand jury indicted him rather than an eighteen-person grand jury. 
The petition was denied.  In the order denying Freeman's motion for rehearing, the
Court stated “the parties are advised that the denial of the Suggestion for Writ of
Prohibition was a decision on the merits.”  Freeman now argues the record from that
-39-
proceeding should have been included with the direct appeal record because it was a
decision on the merits.  He claims the failure to include this portion of the record
deprived him of effective assistance of appellate counsel.  Even if the Court were to
assume that failure to include this portion of the record fell measurably below the
standard of competent counsel, Freeman has not demonstrated that the failure
prejudiced him.  Accordingly, this claim is without merit.  See Pope, 496 So. 2d at
800.  Freeman has failed to plead a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel.  Therefore, Freeman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.
We hereby affirm the trial court's denial of 3.850 relief except the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase which we remand for an
evidentiary hearing.  We also deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
HARDING, C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s decision to the extent that it affirms the trial court’s
denial of appellant’s motion for postconviction relief.  However, I dissent to that
-40-
part of the majority decision in which the majority reverses the trial court’s denial
and remands for an evidentiary hearing in respect to penalty-phase mitigation issues.
I dissent because I do not find that the allegations of appellant’s amended
motion meet either prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), so as
to require an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty
phase.
First, in reviewing the trial court’s decision, it is essential to give full
cognizance to the fact that, before the trial for the Collier murder, appellant had
been convicted of another first-degree murder, burglary with assault, and robbery
with a deadly weapon.  These convictions arose out of a very similar criminal
episode on October 20, 1986, less than a month before the November 11, 1986,
Collier murder.  The mitigation testimony before the jury in the previous murder
case was substantially similar to that presented to the jury in the Collier murder
case.  The jury in the first murder trial recommended life imprisonment.  However,
in the Collier murder case, the difference was the additional aggravator of the
previous murder, burglary with assault, and robbery with a deadly weapon.  Logic
dictates that the difference in the jury recommendation for life in the first case and
death in the second case was the heavy aggravation of this being appellant’s second
murder conviction in a substantially similar situation and was not the result of
-41-
counsel’s ineffectiveness in respect to the presentation of mitigation.  Furthermore,
the fact that counsel relied upon mitigation which had succeeded in the first case
clearly is an indication that counsel was not ineffective in violation of the minimal
standards of Strickland.  Counsel was functioning as counsel in that it could
reasonably be concluded that he should not vary a winning strategy.  To conclude
otherwise engages in the second-guessing precluded by Strickland.
Second, I conclude the trial judge was correct in respect to his analysis of
both of the allegations upon which the majority relies in requiring an evidentiary
hearing.  In respect to the testimony of Mr. Sorrells, I find that the real issue is
whether the trial court should have granted a continuance of the penalty phase so
that Sorrells could be subpoenaed.  This issue is only addressed as ineffective
assistance of counsel because the issue of a continuance is not properly a
postconviction issue but rather an issue which had to be raised on direct appeal.
Even if properly reached through postconviction, appellant’s allegations
demonstrate no prejudice.  Appellant asserts no testimony which would have been
presented by Sorrells at the Collier trial that was not presented through the reading
of the transcript of Sorrells’ testimony at the first murder trial.  A new penalty phase
should not be ordered because a witness does not appear live if the witness’s
testimony is not demonstrated to be materially different in substance.  New trials
-42-
should not result because of the difference between live testimony and transcript. 
This cannot be Strickland-type prejudice.  In this instance, there was an advantage
to appellant in presenting the testimony in the way that it was presented, in that it
did not open the witness to further cross-examination as to whether his opinion of
appellant was the same knowing appellant had been convicted of two similar
murders.
In respect to the additional mitigation which appellant alleges, what is being
alleged in most part is cumulative.  In fact, it is cumulative to what was effective
obtaining a life sentence in the first murder case.  A reading of the penalty-phase
testimony shows that, through the testimony of appellant’s mother, brother, and the
psychologist, the evidence of appellant’s very bad childhood was presented to the
jury.  I cannot conclude that laying out more of appellant’s background, including
his drug use, would have sufficiently influenced a jury in his favor so that the jury’s
recommendation would probably have been different in view of the fact that this
was appellant’s second murder conviction for a murder-burglary under similar
circumstances.  I find the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Glock v. Moore, 195 F.3d
625, 636 (11th Cir. 1999), to be instructive:
It is true that we have sometimes found that trial counsel’s
failure to present evidence of a defendant’s personal history or good
character is enough to demonstrate prejudice to the defendant at the
-43-
penalty phase.  See Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir.
1998); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1995);
Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763-64 (11th Cir. 1989); Blake v.
Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 534 (11th Cir. 1985).  But in those cases, we
found prejudice because of counsel’s almost complete failure to
present any mitigating evidence of significance.  See Dobbs, 142 F.2d
at 1390 (no evidence of an unfortunate upbringing presented to the
court); Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1363 (“Neither lawyer offered any evidence
regarding Jackson’s personal history or background.  Counsel were
virtually silent during two subsequent sentencing hearings before the
trial judge . . . .”); Harris, 874 F.2d at 763 (trial counsel had a
“total–and admitted–ignorance about the type of mitigation evidence
available to them”); Blake, 758 F.2d at 533 (counsel “made no
preparations whatsoever for the penalty phase” of defendant’s trial). 
Those cases are a far cry from the instant case, where much of the new
evidence that Glock presents is merely repetitive and cumulative to that
which was presented at trial.
Finally, I again make the point that under the postconviction procedure which
was in effect at the time this trial court ruled upon this motion, it was the trial
court’s responsibility to decide whether there was a need for an evidentiary hearing. 
Under this procedure, not every alleged deficiency of counsel in the penalty phase
requires an evidentiary hearing.  This trial judge followed that procedure and should
not be reversed.
HARDING, C.J., concurs.
Two Cases Consolidated:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
-44-
Donald R. Moran, Jr., Judge - Case No. 86-11599-CF
and an Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Terri L. Backhus of Backhus & Izakowitz, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitoner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent