Title: State v. Forcier

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_FORCIER.92-530; 162 Vt. 71; 643 A.2d 1200

[Opinion Filed May 20, 1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-530


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Michael Forcier                              December Term, 1993



 John E. Pyatak, Acting J.

 Michael P. Harty, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, and Gary Kessler,
   Supervising Appellate Prosecutor, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 David G. Reid, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor violation
 of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(A)(2), driving while intoxicated (DWI), reserving the
 right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
 pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  Defendant argues on appeal that all
 testimonial and non-testimonial evidence stemming from his DWI arrest must
 be suppressed because the officers exceeded the arrest authority provided by
 V.R.Cr.P. 3(a)(5) in that they: (1) arrested defendant more than two hours
 after the alleged offense occurred; and (2) interrogated defendant after
 they arrested him.  We reverse and remand because the V.R.Cr.P. 3(a)(5)
 arrest for DWI did not give police authority to interrogate defendant.

 

      On March 29, 1991, defendant was involved in a two-car automobile
 accident at 9:44 p.m.  State police responded to the scene and were advised
 by the operator of the other vehicle that defendant had left the scene of
 the accident and travelled to his home, which was approximately two miles
 away.  Two state troopers went to defendant's home and encountered defendant
 when he exited his home from a back porch.  The officers observed evidence
 of defendant's intoxication.  Upon questioning, defendant admitted to having
 operated his vehicle and was requested to produce his license, registration
 and proof of insurance, which he did.
      A third officer, Trooper Favreau, arrived at the scene.  He
 administered an alco-sensor test and requested that defendant perform
 dexterity tests.  Defendant's performance indicated substantial impairment;
 defendant's speech was slurred, his walking was unsteady, and he stumbled.
 Defendant admitted in response to questioning that he had had four beers and
 that the time of his last drink was about an hour earlier, around 9:30 p.m.
      At 11:10 p.m., defendant was placed in handcuffs and transported to the
 police barracks in a cruiser.  Trooper Favreau testified at the suppression
 hearing that although he could not remember exactly what he said to defend-
 ant at that time, he told defendant he was in custody for driving while
 intoxicated.  At the barracks, defendant was given Miranda warnings and,
 after waiving counsel, he was interrogated.  The interrogation yielded
 "substantial incriminating evidence."  The officers also read the Implied
 Consent Form to defendant; defendant consented to the breath sample and
 declined the offer to contact an attorney.  The officers collected the
 sample at 11:45 p.m.  Trooper Favreau entered on the arrest form that
 defendant was formally arrested at 11:50 p.m.  The trooper subsequently

 

 issued a citation to defendant for DWI and leaving the scene of an accident
 (LSA) and released defendant.
                                     I.
      On appeal, defendant argues that his arrest and subsequent
 interrogation exceeded the scope of arrest authority provided by V.R.Cr.P.
 3(a)(5).  Rule 3(a)(5) is an exception to the general rule that an officer
 cannot arrest a person without a warrant for a misdemeanor that was not
 committed in the officer's presence.  See generally V.R.Cr.P. 3(a).
 Specifically, Rule 3(a)(5) provides:
      An officer may also arrest a person without a warrant . . . (5)
      when the officer has probable cause to believe a person has
      committed or is committing a violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1128 [LSA]
      or 23 V.S.A. { 1201 [DWI].  An arrest under this subdivision shall
      be made within two hours of the time the alleged offense was
      committed, and not thereafter.  In the case of an arrest under
      this subdivision for an alleged violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201, the
      person may be detained only for the limited purpose of obtaining a
      sample of breath or blood.


 (Emphasis added.)  Because "V.R.Cr.P. 3 was designed to both codify and
 enhance the protections conferred by the Fourth Amendment," the remedy for
 violation of Rule 3 is suppression of the evidence seized under the
 exclusionary doctrine.  State v. Laflin, ___ Vt. ___, ___,