Title: Nix v. Franklin County Dept. of Human Resources

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 04/14/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1160494
____________________
Jerry Nix
v.
Franklin County Department of Human Resources
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court
(CV-15-900196)
MAIN, Justice.
Jerry Nix appeals from a summary judgment entered by the
Franklin Circuit Court finding that he is an adult in need of
protective services under the Adult Protective Services Act of
1160494
1976, §§ 38-9-1 to -11, Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act").  We
reverse and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On December 7, 2015, the Franklin County Department of
Human Resources ("DHR") filed a petition in the Franklin
Circuit Court pursuant to § 38-9-5, Ala. Code 1975, and § 38-
9-6, Ala. Code 1975, seeking emergency protective placement
for Nix.  DHR alleged that Nix, then 78 years old, was an
"adult in need of protective services" as that term is defined
by the Act.  The petition claimed that Nix had not been taking
his medications for diabetes and hypertension and that he had
been the victim of a postal scam costing him thousands of
dollars.  DHR further alleged that Nix urgently required
nursing-home care to protect his health and safety and that,
otherwise, Nix was in immediate danger.  DHR requested 
emergency-protective placement for Nix and that the court set
a hearing pursuant to § 38-9-6 to determine Nix's need for
protective services. 
On the same day the petition for emergency placement was
filed, the trial court entered an order declaring that Nix was
indigent, that he was in need of protective services, and that
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he needed a conservator and a guardian to administer his
estate and to see to his medical needs.  The trial court
ordered DHR to provide protective services for Nix, appointed
a guardian ad litem to represent Nix in the proceedings, and
appointed Nix's son, Darren Nix, as conservator of Nix's
estate and guardian of his person.  The trial court set a
hearing on the matter for December 21, 2015.  Nix was removed
from his home and was placed in the Shoals Hospital Senior
Care Center in Muscle Shoals.
On December 14, 2015, Nix, represented by his guardian ad
litem, filed an answer to DHR's petition, denying all material
allegations.  The trial court set the matter for a jury trial
on February 29, 2016.
On January 12, 2016, DHR filed a motion to replace Darren
Nix as Nix's guardian and conservator with the Franklin County
sheriff.  DHR informed the court that Darren Nix no longer
wished to serve as his father's guardian or conservator.  DHR
also requested that the new guardian/conservator be 
allowed to
sell Nix's house to pay for his care and that Nix be
transported from Shoals Hospital Senior Care Center to an
assisted-living facility.  Nix, through his guardian ad 
litem, 
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responded that he had no objection to the removal of his son
as guardian and conservator and the appointment of the
Franklin County sheriff as his guardian and conservator, but
he objected to the sale of his house or any of his assets
"before there has been an adjudication by a jury that [Nix] is
an adult in need of protective services."  On January 13,
2016, the trial court removed Darren Nix as guardian and
conservator and replaced him with the Franklin County sheriff. 
The trial court also entered an order authorizing the newly
appointed guardian and conservator to sell Nix's house at or
above fair-market value.
For reasons unclear from the record, the case did not
proceed to trial as scheduled on February 29.  On May 18,
2016, Nix, through his guardian ad litem, filed a motion for
an independent mental evaluation.  Nix contended that the
doctors who had previously evaluated him were employed or
retained by DHR and therefore were not independent.  He also
requested that he be permitted an independent medical exam by
a doctor specializing in geriatrics.  Nix alleged that he was
financially able to pay for the mental evaluation.  Nix
further requested that the case be set for a final hearing. 
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On May 23, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying
Nix's request for an independent mental evaluation.
On June 17, 2016, DHR filed a "Petition for the Sale of
Real Estate," seeking to be allowed to sell Nix's house.  DHR
asserted that it had found a buyer for the house and attached
a sales contract showing a $70,000 purchase price.  DHR
contended that the funds from the sale of the house would be
used to pay for Nix's stay at the assisted-living facility. 
The trial court granted DHR's petition on June 20, 2016.  On
June 22, 2016, Nix, through his guardian ad litem, filed an
objection to the sale of his house and a motion to set the
case for trial.  Nix argued:
"1.
The defendant, Jerry Nix, has been held in the
custody of the Franklin County Department of
Human Resources since December 7, 2015, without
a trial in this matter.
"2.
The defendant is opposed to his home being
sold, and in the event he is determined not to
be an adult in need of protective services, he
would need to be able to return to his home.
"3.
Under Code of Alabama Section 38-9-6 the
defendant is entitled to a hearing not more
than thirty days from the filing of the
petition, and a jury of six persons shall be
empaneled for said hearing to serve as a trier
of facts.
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"4.
Under Code of Alabama Section 38-9-6(c), the
Court shall give preference in making a
determination to the least drastic alternative
considered 
to 
be 
proper 
under 
the
circumstances, including a preference for non-
institutional care whenever possible.
"5.
Defendant maintains that non-institutional care
such [as] return to his home with home health
services 
would 
be 
proper 
in 
this 
case. 
Defendant 
would 
further 
consent 
to 
a
conservator being appointed to assist the
management of his affairs upon his returning to
his home."
In response to Nix's objection, the trial court entered the
following order:
"The Court has been made aware that [DHR] is filing
a motion for summary judgment.  This motion will
have to be ruled on before a final sale of the home
can be made.  If the Motion is denied then the Court
will address the sale of the home."
On June 27, 2016, DHR filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  DHR requested that the trial court "enter a final
order determining that Jerry Nix is an adult in need of
protective services and ... allowing for the sale of Jerry
Nix’s home."  DHR contended that the undisputed facts
establish that Nix is an adult in need of protective services
under § 38-9-6.  In support of its motion, DHR attached a
number of exhibits, including the report of a United States
postal inspector stating that Nix had been the victim of an
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illegal mail-lottery-prize scam.  According to the postal
inspector, Nix had fallen victim to a scam in which he mailed
sums of money to out-of-state addresses known to be associated
with foreign-lottery scams to claim promised -- but
nonexistent -- lottery prizes.  The postal inspector stated
that some of Nix's mail had been seized by the United States
Postal Service and that "[e]xamination of the contents of the
letters revealed Mr. Nix sent cash, checks, money orders, and
credit card information for the purpose of claiming prizes." 
The postal inspector said it had been explained to Nix that
the prize schemes were fraudulent and illegal and that Nix
promised not to participate further.  Nevertheless, Nix
continued to send money to addresses associated with the
illegal scheme.
DHR also attached letters and medical records from three
of Nix's physicians who had treated Nix both before and since
he was removed from his home.1  Each doctor wrote that Nix was
suffering from dementia.  Dr. Leonides Santos, Nix's longtime
1Although no sworn, certified, or otherwise authenticated
documents were attached to DHR’s motion, Nix did not object to
the admissibility of, or move to strike, any of the exhibits
offered by DHR and does not argue on appeal that the trial
court erred in considering those documents.
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physician, stated that Nix suffers from "major neurocognitive
disorder" and recommended that he be admitted to a long-term-
care assisted-living facility to protect him from harm and
manipulation.  Dr. Timothy L. Carpenter, the attending
psychiatrist at Shoals Hospital Senior Care Center, wrote that
Nix suffers from "Major Neurocognitive Disorder, Alzheimer’s
Type."  Dr. Carpenter stated that he believes Nix is at high
risk of being harmed or of harming others and recommended in
his January 6, 2016, letter that Nix be provided a court-
appointed guardian.  Dr. Loren McCoy wrote that he evaluated
Nix on January 26, 2016.  Dr. McCoy wrote that he had
concluded that Nix was not competent to make decisions for
himself regarding his finances or medical care and that Nix
needed to be in an assisted-living facility.
In its summary-judgment motion, DHR also argued that the
sale of Nix's house was necessary because Nix's assets were
"depleted to the point that he no longer can afford to pay to
reside at [the assisted-living] facility without selling his
home."2 
2No evidence of Nix's assets was submitted.
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On June 27, the same day DHR filed the motion for a
summary judgment, the trial court entered an order granting
the motion and authorizing the sale of Nix's house to proceed. 
On June 29, 2016, Nix moved to set aside the summary judgment,
arguing that the entry of the court's order granting DHR's
summary-judgment motion on the date the motion was filed
violated the time and notice requirements of Rule 56(c)(2),
Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court set aside its summary judgment
and set a hearing on the summary-judgment motion for July 8,
2016.
On July 7, 2016, Nix, through his guardian ad item, 
filed a response in opposition to DHR's summary-judgment
motion.  Nix argued that under the Act he was entitled to a
jury trial to determine whether he was an adult in need of
protective services.  He also argued that, even if he was in
need of protective services, there was no evidence indicating
that institutionalization was the least drastic alternative
available.  Nix submitted his own affidavit in opposition to
summary judgment.  In that affidavit, Nix testified:
"My name is Jerry Nix and I am over the age of
19 years and have full knowledge of the matters and
facts alleged herein.
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"I am currently residing at the Brentwood
Assisted Living facility against my will.  Since
December 7, 2015, I have been in the custody of the
Franklin County Department of Human Resources, who
placed me at Shoals Senior Care/Shoals Hospital.  I
am not an adult in need of protective services.  I
disagree with any medical opinion that says I cannot
adequately live at my home alone and take care of
myself.  My home is located at 247 Woodmont Drive,
Russellville, Alabama.  While I have some minor
medical issues, I can live at home with the
assistance of home health services, and make
adequate decisions regarding my care.  While I also
believe that I have the ability to manage my assets,
I am not opposed to a conservator, if the Court
would allow me to return to my home.  Although I am
well aware of the allegations that I have lost a lot
of money due to scams, I do not deny that I have
lost a significant amount of money but it is my
money and it would be no different than if I went to
Las Vegas or Tunica and lost all the money gambling. 
I simply made some poor financial decisions but
those decisions were not based upon me being
mentally incompetent.
"I am a veteran and fought for my country and
feel like my rights are being taken away from me
because the Franklin County Department of Human
Resources believes I cannot take care of myself the
way they see fit.  I own my own home, I have an
adequate monthly income, and just want to be left
alone to live my life the way I see fit.
"I would like a hearing in front of a jury of my
peers to plead my case to them."
DHR moved to strike Nix’s affidavit on the ground that Nix was
not mentally competent to testify on his own behalf.  The
trial court did not rule on the motion to strike.
10
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At the summary-judgment hearing, Nix was present, and the
trial court permitted him to testify on his own behalf. 
Although he had trouble remembering the names of the
medications he was taking and seemed confused about the
different doctors he had seen, Nix's testimony was, for the
most part, lucid and responsive, as the following transcribed
portion indicates:
"Q:
Tell the Court your full name, Jerry.
"A:
Jerry Clayton Nix.
"Q:
Okay.  And what's your date of birth?
"A:
August 28, 1937.
"....
"Q:
And do you know where you're living at?
"A:
Yes.
"Q:
Tell us where you're living.
"A:
You talking about the home that I'm in now?
"Q:
No. No.  Your house.  Where is your house at?
"A:
It's at 247 Woodmont Drive in Russellville.
"Q:
And then, of course, you haven't been there for
a while.  Do you know when you were removed
from your home?
"A:
Seven months ago.  It was December 5.
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"....
"Q:
And where are you currently at?
"A:
I'm at the retirement home in, it's Muscle
Shoals.  I don't know the exact address, but
it's in Brentwood.
"Q:
And do you have any kind of income?  Do you
draw a Social Security check?
"A:
Yes.
"Q:
Do you know what you're drawing?
"A:
I think it's [$]1901, I think it is.
"Q:
Okay.  And, of course, Jerry, you understand
that –- or do you understand that DHR has
alleged that you don't have the ability to take
care of yourself any longer?  That you are what
they call an adult in need of protective
services?  Are you aware of that information?
"A:
Yes.
"....
"Q:
Okay.  And again, today, for the record, do you
disagree with DHR that you are an adult in need
of protective services?
"A:
No, I do not need protective services.  I'm
fully capable of doing anything that any normal
person can on a given day.  Because I'm a
trained cook so I can cook.  I was in the
military, I've been in all kinds of situations
and still capable today of taking care of
myself and providing for myself."
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Nix also admitted that he had lost a significant amount of
weight before he was placed in the assisted-living facility. 
He explained that around the time of his weight loss he had
just lost his wife of 16 years, had recently moved to
Russellville from Atlanta, and, given these circumstances,
simply had not been cooking as he normally would.
Nix also agreed that he had lost some money but did not
admit to being scammed.  He testified: "Well, I was completely
aware of what I was doing.  I didn't think that I was going to
win, you know, probably, but I knew that I had an option to
possibly winning, and it wasn't a large amount of money."
Nix further testified that he would be willing to undergo
further evaluation by an independent doctor; that he would
consent to someone helping him with his money; and that he was
open to home-health services.  On cross-examination, Nix
admitted that he had no medical records to dispute the
opinions of Dr. Santos, Dr. Carpenter, and Dr. McCoy.
On July 15, 2016, the trial court entered a summary
judgment for DHR "based on the medical records submitted with
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the motion."  Further, the trial court lifted the stay it had
imposed on the sale of Nix's house.3  Nix appealed.4
3Although the trial court's final order did not
specifically provide for the appropriate placement of Nix, it
is clear from the record and the testimony that the placement
made the basis of the summary judgment was Nix's continued
residence at the assisted-living facility.  It is apparent
from the record and submissions of the parties that the trial
court and the parties considered the order a final disposition
of all the issues pending before the trial court.  Thus, we
treat the order as a final order.
4Nix appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.  On March 15,
2017, the Court of Civil Appeals transferred Nix's appeal to
this Court on the basis that it had no subject-matter
jurisdiction.  We agree that appellate jurisdiction of this
case properly lies in this Court. This appeal is from a final
judgment in a civil action brought under the Act.  The Act
contains 
no specific 
provision 
concerning 
an 
appeal. 
Nevertheless, § 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, confers to all
parties a right of appeal "to the appropriate appellate court"
from any final judgment of the circuit court.  This Court has
been 
empowered 
to 
"exercise 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
coextensive
with the state," unless otherwise provided by law.  § 12-2-7,
Ala. Code 1975.  The Court of Civil Appeals' appellate
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is limited.  That court
"shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all civil
cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and
costs, 
does 
not 
exceed 
$50,000, 
all 
appeals 
from
administrative agencies other than the Alabama Public Service
Commission, all appeals in workers' compensation cases, all
appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment,
divorce, 
adoption, 
and 
child 
custody 
cases 
and 
all
extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases."  §
12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975.  The present case is not one of the
types of cases upon which appellate jurisdiction has been
expressly assigned to that court by § 12-3-10.  Accordingly,
the Court of Civil Appeals properly transferred this appeal to
this Court.
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II.  Analysis
On appeal, Nix argues that the trial court erred in
granting DHR's motion for a summary judgment.  He contends
that questions of fact exist as to whether he was an adult in
need of protective services and, if so, whether a less drastic
protective placement was available and would be more
appropriate.
Our standard of review from a summary judgment is well
settled:
"We review a summary judgment de novo. Potter v.
First Real Estate Co., 844 So. 2d 540, 545 (Ala.
2002)(citing American Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth
Bank, 825 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 2002)).
"'"We apply the same standard of review the
trial court used in determining whether the
evidence presented to the trial court
created a genuine issue of material fact.
Once a party moving for a summary judgment
establishes that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, the burden shifts to
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present 
substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact. 'Substantial evidence' is
'evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'
In reviewing a summary judgment, we view
the evidence in a light most favorable to
the 
nonmovant 
and 
entertain 
such 
reasonable
inferences as the jury would have been free
to draw."'
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"844 So. 2d at 545 (quoting Nationwide Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369,
372 (Ala. 2000))(citations omitted).
"Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate 
only 
when 
there
is no genuine issue of any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P."
Hooper v. Columbus Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 956 So. 2d
1135, 1139 (Ala. 2006).  At the summary-judgment stage, it is
not the trial court’s function "'to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.'"  Camp v. Yeager, 601 So.
2d 924, 927 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  Furthermore, "'"a court may
not determine the credibility of witnesses on a motion for
summary judgment."'"  Wilson v. Teng, 786 So. 2d 485, 498
(Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Usrey, 777 So. 2d 66, 68 (Ala.
2000), quoting in turn Phillps v. Wayne’s Pest Control Co.,
623 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Ala. 1993)).
In the present case, DHR petitioned the trial court to
order protective placement for Nix.  Section 38-9-6 governs
the 
procedure 
for 
a 
judicial 
determination 
ordering 
protective
placement of or protective services for an adult.  That
section provides, in part:
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"(a) An 
interested person may 
petition the 
court
to order protective placement or other protective
services for an adult in need of protective
services.  No protective placement or other
protective services may be ordered unless there is
a determination by the court that the person is
unable to provide for his or her own protection from
abuse, neglect, exploitation, sexual abuse, or
emotional abuse.  Upon a petition, setting forth the
facts and name, age, sex, and residence of the
person, the court of the circuit in which the person
resides shall appoint a day, not more than 30 days
from the filing of the petition, for a hearing on
the petition.  If, on the hearing of a petition, the
person is not represented by counsel, the court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent him
or her.  A jury of six persons shall be impaneled
for the hearing to serve as the trier of facts."
A condition precedent to ordering protective placement is
a determination that the person as to whom protective
placement is being sought is an "adult in need of protective
services."  The Act defines that term as follows:
"A person 18 years of age or old whose behavior
indicates that he or she is mentally incapable of
adequately caring for himself or herself and his or
her interests without serious consequences to
himself or herself or others, or who, because of
physical or mental impairment, is unable to protect
himself 
or 
herself 
from 
abuse, 
neglect,
exploitation, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse by
others, and who has no guardian, relative, or other
appropriate person able, willing, and available to
assume the kind and degree of protection and
supervision required under the circumstances."
§ 38-9-2(2), Ala. Code 1975.
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The drafters of the Act were keenly aware of the tensions
between ensuring the public health and protecting individual
liberties and expressed an intent to strike a balance between
the two.  The statement of legislative findings and intent in
the Act provides that "[t]his chapter is designed to establish
[protective] services and assure their availability to all
persons when in need of them, and to place the least possible
restriction 
on 
personal 
liberty 
and 
exercise 
of 
constitutional
rights consistent with due process and protection from abuse,
exploitation and neglect."  § 38-9-3, Ala. Code 1975.  In that
regard, and in addition to the promise in § 38-9-6(a), Ala.
Code 1975, of a speedy jury trial, the Act requires a court to
"give preference in making a determination to the least
drastic alternative considered to be proper under the
circumstances, including a preference for noninstitutional
care whenever possible."  § 38-9-6(c), Ala. Code 1975. 
Further, the Act requires the court to obtain a "comprehensive
evaluation of the adult in need of services," id.; guarantees
that "[n]o civil rights are relinquished as a result of any
protective placement under this chapter," § 38-9-6(i), Ala.
Code 1975; and provides that, "[a]s far as is compatible with
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the mental and physical condition of the adult in need of
services or claimed to be in need of services under this
chapter, every reasonable effort shall be made to assure that
no action is taken without the full and informed consent of
the person."  § 38-9-6(j), Ala. Code 1975.  
In this case, DHR sought to establish that Nix was an
adult in need of protective services, specifically protective
placement in an assisted-living facility; that Nix was unable
to protect himself from abuse, neglect, or exploitation; and
that, therefore, it was entitled to a summary judgment.  In
support of its motion, DHR offered medical records and letters
from three physicians who had personally examined Nix and who
had each determined that Nix suffers from dementia and is
unable to care for himself and evidence indicating that Nix
had fallen victim to a lottery scam.  Nix countered this
evidence by testifying that he was, in fact, capable of taking
care of himself and not in need of protective services.  He
further testified that he could live at home with the aid of
home-health services and that he was open to the appointment
of a conservator to oversee his estate.  The question directly
before this Court, therefore, is whether Nix's testimony
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established a genuine issue of material fact precluding a
summary judgment.  It did.
In this case, from the evidence in the record, we fail to
see how the weighty issues before the court are fully resolved
so as to entitle DHR to a judgment as a matter of law.  Even
if we agreed that Nix was an adult in need of protective
services, there are, at the very least, questions of fact
bearing on his need for protective placement and the "least
drastic alternative" appropriate for Nix.  Nix presented
testimony concerning his abilities to live at home and to take
care of himself, as well as testimony regarding his preference
to remain in his home.  That testimony was sufficient to
establish a genuine issue of material fact.  Accordingly, 
summary judgment was improper.
Moreover, although we do not question that all involved
in this case desire the best for Nix, we are troubled by the
apparent lack of urgency and attention to statutory
formalities in the prosecution of this petition for 
protective
services.  The trial court granted DHR's emergency petition on
December 7, 2015.  Under the Act, Nix was entitled to a
hearing within 30 days.  Nevertheless, 7 months passed before
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the trial court entered the summary judgment finding Nix to be
an adult in need of supervision, and it is now more than 15
months since Nix was removed from his home.  It may very well
be that an assisted-living facility is the appropriate and
lawful protective placement for Nix, but he is still entitled
to all the procedural safeguards due him under the Act,
including a timely adjudication of his need for such services. 
Indeed, without a faithful adherence to the Act and the due-
process protections owed to each person protected by the Act,
we risk unnecessary and wrongful deprivation of liberty and
property.  For those "protected persons" dispossessed of 
their
house and their assets, this may seem a fate far worse than a
foreign-lottery postal scam. 
III.  Conclusion
For the above reasons, the summary judgment, as well as
the order authorizing the sale of Nix's house, is reversed,
and the case is remanded for the trial court to conduct, as
soon as practicable, a formal hearing as required by § 38-9-6. 
  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.
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