Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandes

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10610 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ODAIR FERNANDES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 6, 2017. - February 2, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Constitutional Law, Fair trial.  
Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  Fair Trial.  Evidence, 
Joint venturer.  Practice, Criminal, Fair trial, Argument 
by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 24, 2003. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Margaret R. Hinkle, J.; and a 
motion for postconviction relief, filed on October 1, 2014, was 
considered by Garry V. Inge, J. 
 
 
 
Deirdre L. Thurber for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, 
Odair Fernandes, of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation, for the killing of Jose DaVeiga, and 
armed assault with intent to murder, for the shooting of 
2 
 
 
Christopher Carvalho.1  The defendant's direct appeal was 
consolidated with his appeal from the denial of his motion for a 
new trial.  The defendant raises four issues.  First, he argues 
that his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution was violated by the trial judge's 
order limiting court room entry only to attendees whose names 
were submitted and approved.  Second, he claims that the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a 
finding of joint venture.  Third, he contends that the 
prosecutor in his closing argument used rhetorical questions to 
improperly shift the burden of proof and to address witness 
credibility.  Fourth, he argues that the trial judge erred in 
her instruction to the jury about how to evaluate the 
credibility of cooperating witnesses. 
 
We conclude that there has been no reversible error, and 
after a thorough review of the record, we decline to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside 
the verdict of murder in the first degree.  Therefore, we affirm 
the defendant's convictions.  We also affirm the denial of the 
defendant's motion for postconviction relief. 
                                                 
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant of carrying a 
firearm without a license, and possessing ammunition without a 
firearm identification card. 
3 
 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the 
legal issues. 
 
On April 17, 2003, the defendant was driving his Volkswagen 
automobile with passengers Danny Fernandes and Jose Alves when 
he cut off a vehicle driven by Joao Nunes on Bowdoin Street in 
the Dorchester section of Boston.  Nunes's passenger, Alfredo 
Goncalves, got out of the automobile and threatened the 
defendant, repeatedly stating that he was going to hurt him.  
The defendant drove away. 
 
After acquiring a handgun, Nunes and Goncalves drove back 
later that day to the Bowdoin Street neighborhood looking for 
people with whom they had "dramas."  This included the Cape 
Verdean Outlaws gang, of which the defendant and his friends 
were members.  As Nunes drove past the defendant's house, 
Goncalves pointed out Amilton Dosouto, an individual with whom 
he had issues.  Dosouto was standing in the defendant's driveway 
next to the defendant's Volkswagen Golf automobile, while Alves 
sat on the porch.  As Nunes drove by, Goncalves fired from the 
passenger side of the automobile, hitting Dosouto in the chest 
and Alves in the stomach and the leg.  The defendant ran into 
the street, firing at Goncalves.  His shots hit Nunes, who then 
crashed his vehicle. 
4 
 
 
 
When police arrived at the scene, the defendant was near 
Dosouto.  Boston police officer testified that he heard the 
defendant state repeatedly, "Somebody is going to die for this," 
and that when asked for information about the shooting, the 
defendant told him, "I got nothing to say to you.  Somebody's 
going to die for this."  Alves testified that while he was 
recovering in the hospital, he spoke to the defendant on the 
telephone and the defendant said, "Don't worry about it," 
because the people responsible were "going to get it."  Dosouto 
considered the defendant to be like a younger brother. 
 
On April 24, 2003, the defendant rented a white minivan. 
There was no indication on the record that his Volkswagen Golf 
automobile was inoperable. 
 
On April 28, 2003, three of Goncalves's friends, Jonathan 
DaSilva, Jose DaVeiga, and Christopher Carvalho, left a night 
club in Boston after 2 A.M.  DaSilva was driving his Ford Taurus 
automobile and stopped at a red traffic light on East Berkley 
Street when shots were fired at his automobile.  His passengers, 
DaVeiga and Carvalho, were both hit multiple times.  DaVeiga 
died as a result.  Carvalho survived but was paralyzed from the 
neck down and blinded in his left eye. 
 
An eyewitness to the shooting testified that two or three 
people fired shots at the Ford automobile from the passenger 
side door of a white van.  The eyewitness testified that all of 
5 
 
 
the van's occupants wore sports jerseys, and that one wore New 
England Patriots colors while another wore a green and white 
jersey. 
 
Shortly after the eyewitness notified the police of the 
shooting, officers stopped a white minivan in Dorchester.  The 
defendant, wearing a Boston Celtics jersey, was in the front 
passenger seat.  Danny Fernandes, wearing a Dallas Cowboys 
jersey, was in the driver's seat.  Carlos Silva, wearing a red, 
white, and blue Atlanta Braves jacket, was in the rear passenger 
seat.  The eyewitness was brought to the scene, where he 
identified Danny Fernandes and Silva as the driver and shooter 
but did not identify the defendant. 
 
A police search of the minivan recovered two .25 caliber 
shell casings and a nine millimeter firearm hidden underneath a 
cup holder in the back of the van.  The firearm was wrapped in a 
piece of paper torn from a Volkswagen Golf automobile manual.  A 
Volkswagen Golf automobile manual was also found in the van, 
along with a crowbar.  The firearm did not match the bullets 
recovered from the victims' bodies, but did match other spent 
shell casings recovered at the scene of the shooting.  The 
police also found a white minivan rental agreement in the 
defendant's name, dated April 24, 2003. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sixth Amendment right to public trial.  
This case was permeated with concerns about security from the 
6 
 
 
outset, as evidenced through six pretrial hearings and 
conferences and discussions at trial. 
 
At a February 3, 2005, hearing on a protective order, the 
trial judge stated that she was "terribly concerned" about 
safety issues in this case.2  Several of the codefendants and 
their family members had been shot at between the time of the 
original shooting and the defendant's indictment, and 
cooperating codefendants and witnesses had expressed concerns 
regarding distribution of the paper records of their grand jury 
testimony.3  As a result, protective orders were put in place to 
restrict access to discovery materials, and the grand jury 
minutes were impounded. 
 
At a May 11, 2006, pretrial conference, the judge again 
raised concerns about security during trial, explaining that she 
would "take every precaution," partly because the court was 
short on court officers.  She also first raised the possibility 
                                                 
 
2 The involvement by the Cape Verdean Outlaws in ongoing 
violence that generated specific concerns about retaliation and 
witness intimidation, including threats to Jose Alves, was 
discussed at the hearing on the protective order. 
 
3 The defendant was set to be tried jointly with two 
codefendants, Henrique Lopes and Jose Lopes, until the first day 
of the defendant's trial, when the charges against the 
codefendants were nol prossed because of a missing witness.  The 
Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the defendant and 
seven other individuals (including Henrique Lopes and Jose 
Lopes) perpetrated the crime in two separate automobiles.  The 
Commonwealth had alleged that Henrique Lopes and Jose Lopes were 
two of the gunmen. 
7 
 
 
of creating a list of people permitted to enter the court room, 
and asked counsel to discuss this option. 
 
On May 25, 2006, the judge reiterated her concerns that the 
gang elements of this case could exacerbate preexisting security 
problems at the court house.  The judge again suggested an 
approved attendees list and requested that counsel prepare lists 
of family members and close friends that the parties might want 
in attendance.  When counsel for then-codefendant Henrique Lopes 
objected, the judge enumerated the concerns behind her request 
for an approved attendees list.  She stated that there were 
ongoing security issues at the court house, there was a lack of 
sufficient court officers, and the case presented "at least 
overtones of Cape Verdean gangs."  The judge noted that prior 
cases with similar gang overtones had raised security issues, 
and her concern was to protect the security of everyone in the 
court room, including the defendant and court staff.  She 
emphasized that media would be permitted to attend the trial and 
reiterated that the court house was not a secure facility.  
Counsel for the defendant and both codefendants all objected to 
the proposed attendees list, and the judge noted these 
objections for the record.  She also asked counsel to propose 
other reasonable ways to address the underlying security 
concerns. 
8 
 
 
 
On May 30, 2006, the judge clarified that the parties could 
add people to the approved attendees list during trial with 
twenty-four hours' advance notice.  The advance notice was 
necessary to conduct sufficient background checks on the 
individuals to ensure that they would not pose a safety risk in 
the court room.  The judge further explained her concern about 
insufficient court officer staffing:  six court officers would 
be present in the court room during trial, but this would leave 
no one to ensure security in the hallway outside.4 
 
On June 8, 2006, the parties were again before the judge 
discussing trial security.  After the defendant and codefendants 
submitted their initial lists of desired attendees, the 
Commonwealth objected to two individuals on the lists.  The 
judge excluded one individual because he was a known associate 
of the defendant's gang, and the defendant did not object.  The 
judge again stated that people could be added to the list with 
twenty-four hours' advance notice.  She also stated that an 
individual allowed in the court room could be removed for the 
remainder of the trial if he or she exhibited "any untoward 
behavior."  There were specific security concerns at this point 
as the codefendants, Henrique Lopes and Jose Lopes, were out on 
bail and might encounter witnesses or other trial attendees in 
                                                 
 
4 The protocol was to have two court officers present for 
each defendant. 
9 
 
 
the common areas of the court or during recesses.  The judge 
wanted to avoid any potential inappropriate mingling. 
 
On June 12, 2006, the parties discussed safety issues 
relating to a cooperating witness who was scheduled to plead 
guilty to a related crime during the trial.  There were concerns 
about holding or transporting the defendant and codefendants 
near the cooperating witness.  There were also safety concerns 
about remanding the codefendants to jail during the trial, as 
there were many potential gang members in jail who might "at 
least consider, rightly or wrongly," that the two men were 
"involved in this series of violent episodes."  There also were 
ongoing issues with a key witness in the case against the 
codefendants, who were, at this point, being tried jointly with 
the defendant.  The Commonwealth eventually nol prossed the 
charges against Henrique Lopes and Jose Lopes on June 20, 2006, 
because this key witness could not be located.5 
 
Several issues rose during the trial.  Before empanelling a 
jury on the first day of trial, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion to remove one of the persons on the 
                                                 
 
5 On June 8, 2006, the prosecutor informed the judge that he 
had been unable to find or contact a key witness.  On June 13, 
2006, the Commonwealth filed a motion to continue because it 
could not locate this witness.  This witness's family members 
were also out of contact with him and had reported their 
concerns for his well-being to the Boston police department. 
10 
 
 
defendant's trial attendees list because he had a record of a 
number of violent offenses.6  The defendant did not object.7 
 
On the second day of trial, there were concerns that the 
mother of one of the victims had suffered harm, as she had not 
been in communication with her family for over two days and was 
not present, though she had planned to attend the trial.  The 
prosecutor also requested a warrant for Danny Fernandes, as he 
had not responded to subpoenas and his attorney could not locate 
him. 
 
On the third day of trial, individuals associated with the 
defendant "stared down" a witness and the victim's family as 
they left the court room, requiring the judge to speak with 
defense counsel to reiterate that there was to be no 
intimidation outside the court room. 
                                                 
 
6 Two people were also voluntarily removed by the 
Commonwealth from their own list "as a matter of equity" because 
they also had a "fairly extensive record of violent crimes."  
The protective orders in this case showed that potential 
witnesses had significant concerns for their safety should their 
testimony fall into the wrong hands before trial. 
 
 
7 Because of a motion in limine, the judge also was aware of 
threats made by the defendant's brother to a judge in an 
unrelated criminal matter.  On March 1, 2002, the defendant was 
on trial for an unrelated crime and his brother, Odairson 
Fernandes, was present at the court house with Jose Lopes, 
Henrique Lopes, and Joasihno Fernandes.  When Odairson Fernandes 
left the court room, a Boston police officer overheard him say, 
"Fuck him that faggot ass judge.  I'm seventeen years old, he 
can't fucking tell me what to do."  Joasihno Fernandes replied, 
"Fuck that judge, I'll call him.  What's the number, I call and 
threaten his fucking ass, fuck him." 
11 
 
 
 
The approved attendees list was finalized on the third day 
of trial.  The defendant did not object to this list, which 
included five of his family members and five of his friends. 
 
On the fourth day of trial, the parties were supposed to 
conduct a videotaped deposition of the surviving victim, 
Carvalho, but he expressed "second thoughts" about participating 
and was ultimately not deposed. 
 
On the fifth day of trial, the judge questioned DaSilva, 
the driver of the vehicle in which the victims were riding, 
about his desire to invoke his constitutional right not to 
testify.  He repeatedly told the judge that he was "scared" to 
testify, because "[t]he courtrooms are here, they ain't in the 
streets.  The police ain't going to be there every day for me on 
the streets."  He denied receiving any specific threats, but 
maintained that he was "scared [for] his life" because of "all 
the things going on." 
 
Dosouto, one of the victims of the April 17 shooting, 
testified on the fifth day of trial.  On the sixth day of trial, 
the prosecutor notified the judge that Dosouto's family had 
found a portion of an extensive memo prepared by counsel for 
former codefendant Henrique Lopes in their mailbox on the day 
before Dosouto's testimony.  The protective orders in this case 
were designed to prevent trial preparation material from being 
disseminated.  The judge recognized that this raised an issue of 
12 
 
 
"fairly grave concern" and stated that she was "profoundly 
troubled" by the document's appearance, given the prior hearings 
on the need for protective orders. 
 
On the eighth day of trial, the judge held a limited 
evidentiary hearing to discuss the disappearance of Danny 
Fernandes.  The judge stated that she took "very seriously . . . 
any suggestion that the disappearance of a witness . . . in any 
manner can be connected to any collusion, intimidation, or the 
like."  The judge ultimately granted the Commonwealth's motion 
for a continuance to give the Commonwealth time to find Danny 
Fernandes, stating that she was "[p]rofoundly troubled by the 
disappearance of these key witnesses."8  The Commonwealth was 
unable to produce Danny Fernandes before the end of the trial. 
 
The defendant contends, as he did in his motion for a new 
trial, that the trial judge's order requiring the use of an 
approved attendees list during the trial constituted a closure 
of the court room that violated his right to a public trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 
U.S. 209, 214 (2010); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 263 
                                                 
 
8 That same day, at the Commonwealth's request, the judge 
allowed an individual who had been attending the trial, to be 
asked to leave the court room because of a history of incidents 
with Boston police detective who was scheduled to testify that 
morning.  Rather than exclude the individual for only the 
detective's testimony and have to explain why to him, the judge 
excluded him from the morning session. 
13 
 
 
(2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011).  We conclude that 
there was no such violation in these exceptional circumstances.  
As explained infra, the trial judge satisfied the necessary 
criteria to justify a partial closure of the court room given 
the extreme security concerns presented by the case, and the 
judge hearing the defendant's motion for a new trial (motion 
judge) properly denied that motion in a carefully considered 
decision.9 
 
"[A]n open court room 'enhances both the basic fairness of 
the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential 
to public confidence in the system.'"  Commonwealth v. Cohen 
(No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010), quoting Press-Enterprise v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).  The right to a public 
trial is not absolute, however, "and in limited circumstances a 
court may bar spectators from certain portions of a criminal 
trial."  Cohen (No. 1), supra. 
 
In Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 111, we adopted the modified 
four-factor analysis established by the United States Supreme 
                                                 
 
9 We proceed under a partial rather than a full closure 
analysis because the media, family members, and other 
individuals beyond the parties and counsel were present in the 
court room.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 
110 (2010) (partial closure where family and other individuals 
were present during jury selection).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 
464 Mass. 660, 664, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 248 (2013) 
(complete closure where court room cleared of spectators during 
jury selection). 
14 
 
 
Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), to determine 
whether a partial closure violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial.  First, "where a closure is partial, it 
is necessary to show a 'substantial reason' rather than an 
'overriding interest' to justify the closing."  Cohen (No. 1), 
supra.  Second, the closure must be "no broader than necessary 
to protect [that] interest."  Id. at 113, quoting Waller, supra 
at 48.  Third, the judge must consider "reasonable alternatives 
to closing the proceeding."  Cohen (No. 1), supra at 115, 
quoting Waller, supra.  Fourth, the judge must make "findings 
adequate to support the closure."  Cohen (No. 1), supra at 115, 
quoting Waller, supra.  "In a partial closure context . . . a 
reviewing court may examine the record itself to see if it 
contains sufficient support for the closure, even in the absence 
of formal or express findings by the judge."  Cohen (No. 1), 
supra. 
 
If the closure does not satisfy these factors, "the error 
is deemed 'structural' in that prejudice is presumed and the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial."  Commonwealth v.  
Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 748, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2312 
15 
 
 
(2014), quoting Cohen (No. 1), supra at 118-119.10  We proceed by 
examining each of the Waller factors in turn. 
 
a.  First Waller factor:  substantial reason.  In this 
case, the record showed a substantial reason to partially close 
the court room.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48; Commonwealth v. 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752.  Here, the threat of violence was 
significant and the judge was properly focused on the need to 
protect everyone present, including the defendant and court 
staff. 
 
Deference is owed to a trial judge's perception of the 
dangers of threats and intimidation in the court room.  
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 753.  The trial judge must constantly 
monitor the tension in the court room, and its many different 
manifestations, and court room atmospherics are difficult to 
describe and evaluate on appeal.  See id.  Understandably, the 
judge here was "terribly concerned" about witness intimidation 
and trial safety issues.  In four separate incidents in June, 
2003, before the defendant's indictment, several of the 
codefendants and their family members had had shots fired at 
them.  Codefendants and cooperating witnesses had expressed 
                                                 
 
10 Despite the fact that this trial took place eight years 
before, and without the benefit of, Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 
466 Mass. 742, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2312 (2014), the judge 
satisfied the requirements set out in that case.  See id. at 
752. 
 
16 
 
 
grave concerns regarding retaliation.11  The disappearances of 
important witnesses before the trial heightened the concerns. 
 
Security issues also arose during the trial, further 
supporting the concerns about witness intimidation and trial 
safety.  Different key witnesses were missing on the first and 
last day of trial.  Arguable instances of gang intimidation 
occurred:  individuals associated with the defendant "stared 
down" a witness and the victim's family as they left the court 
room, requiring the judge to speak with defense counsel to 
reiterate that there was to be no intimidation outside the court 
room.  A witness who had been shot at in the April 28 incident 
told the judge that he was afraid to testify. 
In addition to the case-specific security concerns, the 
judge noted that prior cases with similar gang overtones had 
presented security issues.  The circumstances here are 
comparable to those addressed by the court in Maldonado, 466 
Mass. at 742, another case of murder in the first degree 
involving a gang-related murder.  There, we held that 
"when a member of a gang is alleged to have committed a 
shooting, there is a risk that others associated with the 
gang may attempt to intimidate witnesses to cause them to 
exculpate, or at least avoid incriminating, the accused.  
There is also the risk that animosity that may exist 
between rival gangs, or between those associated with the 
                                                 
 
11 As mentioned, as a result of these concerns, protective 
orders were in place to restrict access to discovery materials, 
and the grand jury minutes were impounded. 
17 
 
 
accused and those associated with the victim, may spill 
over into the court room or the halls of the courthouse and 
lead to disruption of the court room." 
Id. at 752-753. 
Finally, the judge had to take into account the number of 
available court officers, and whether that number was sufficient 
in these trying circumstances.12  The record leading up to the 
trial showed the judge's significant security concerns that the 
feuding gang issues in this particular case could exacerbate the 
existing security challenges at the court house. 
For all of these reasons, the first Waller factor was 
clearly satisfied.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48; Maldonado, 466 
Mass. at 747-748. 
 
b.  Second Waller factor:  no broader than necessary.  The 
second Waller factor requires us to determine whether the 
partial closure here, which resulted from an approved trial 
attendees list, was no broader than needed to accomplish its 
purpose.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48; Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 
747.  The list was expressly designed to minimize the risk of 
witness intimidation and court room disruption. 
                                                 
 
12 The judge communicated with the chief of court house 
security about her concerns.  She stated that she did not 
consider the court house to be a secure facility, and there was 
no guarantee that there would be enough court officers to secure 
both the court room and the common areas of the court house. 
18 
 
 
 
The list, as finalized by the judge, allowed friends and 
family of the defendant and codefendants to attend, as well as 
the press.  The judge also provided for additions to the list 
with twenty-four hours' advance notice.  The twenty-four hour 
advance notice was deemed necessary to allow all parties to 
identify potentially disruptive or dangerous attendees and allow 
court officers time to conduct criminal background checks.  See 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752.  See also United States v. DeLuca, 
137 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The recorded information was 
retained by the United States Marshal for use in determining 
whether the bearer had a criminal background or any connection 
with a defendant on trial such as might indicate a courtroom 
security risk").  Prior to trial, the judge excluded one gang 
member known to be an associate of the defendant.  On the first 
day of trial, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to 
remove one of the persons from the defendant's trial attendees 
list because he had a record of violent offenses.  The defendant 
did not object in either instance.  When the approved attendees 
list was finalized on the third day of trial, the defendant also 
had no objections to this list, which permitted five of his 
family members and five of his friends to attend. 
We conclude that the measures the judge took were justified 
in these exceptional circumstances and no more intrusive than 
necessary.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48; Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 
19 
 
 
748. "A judge need not wait for a witness to be intimidated, the 
court room to be disrupted, or a specific threat before taking 
appropriate steps to address the risk of such misconduct."  
Maldonado, supra at 753.  A judge's responsibility for the 
safety, security, and integrity of the court room requires an 
acute attention and an appropriate response to the risks of 
violence and intimidation.  Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 753.  See 
Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 187 (2011) (trial 
judge has discretion to take into account special circumstances 
like security concerns to protect court room and its occupants).  
That response may be proactive as well as reactive.  See 
Maldonado, supra.  Some deference is owed to the trial judge's 
discretionary decisions in this regard. See id. 
Extraordinary security concerns were obviously present 
here.  The threat of violence, retaliation, and intimidation was 
manifest.  See Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 124 (2014), 
overruled another grounds, Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 
165 (2015), quoting Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752 ("To impose a 
condition on entry, 'there must be an articulable risk of 
witness intimidation or court room disruption'").  Indeed, both 
the prosecution and defense had expressed at different times 
grave concerns about safety and security.  The list and the 
exclusions were directly responsive to the significant 
identified risks of gang-related violence and intimidation.  
20 
 
 
United States v. Deluca, 137 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998) ("screening procedure was reasonably 
designed to respond to [security] concerns").  Cf. Maldonado, 
supra ("condition on entry" must be "based on the special 
circumstances of the case").  Any exclusions were also 
appropriately based on an individualized inquiry attentive to, 
and directed at, the specific risk of violence and intimidation 
previously identified.  Importantly, no one objected to the 
particular individuals excluded. 
The defendant was able to put friends and family members on 
the list.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 417 Mass 187, 195 (1994) 
("typically, proceedings . . . may not be closed to the family 
and close friends of the defendant").13  The defendant and the 
Commonwealth also could add to the list other individuals they 
wanted with twenty-four hours' advance notice.  Finally, the 
press was expressly included on the list, and not in any way 
excluded. 
Although we emphasize that there is a strong "presumption 
of openness" and access to our court rooms, we conclude that in 
these particularly dangerous circumstances the use of an 
                                                 
 
13 Additionally, the defendant submitted, with his motion 
for a new trial, four affidavits from his cousins asserting that 
they were not permitted to enter the court room during the 
trial.  There was, however, nothing in the record suggesting 
that the affiants or the defendant requested that they be on the 
list. 
21 
 
 
approved but amendable attendees list to exclude those 
presenting a demonstrated risk of violence and intimidation 
satisfies the requirement that the intrusion on the right to a 
public trial be no greater than is necessary.  See generally 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 751-753 (sign-in and identification 
procedure appropriate given risk of gang-related witness 
intimidation).  See also Deluca, 137 F.3d at 32 (risk of 
violence and intimidation justified screening and identification 
procedure to allow criminal background checks or inquiry of 
connection to defendant that might indicate court room security 
threat).  Our conclusion here is reinforced by the fact that 
both the prosecution and defense had grave security concerns and 
the defendant did not object to the individuals excluded. 
 
c.  Third Waller factor:  reasonable alternatives.  The 
third Waller factor was satisfied because the judge took 
meaningful steps to consider reasonable alternatives to the 
approved attendees list.  See Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 748, 
quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.  Here, the judge did not 
disregard the parties' original objections to her proposed 
partial closure mechanism and specifically sought input as to 
alternative ways to address her concerns that the gang overtones 
of this case could exacerbate preexisting security problems at 
the court house.  See Commonwealth v. Wolcott, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 
457, 465 (2010) (trial judge required to consider alternatives 
22 
 
 
and must not reject objections out-of-hand).  She asked counsel 
on several occasions to propose other reasonable ways to 
sufficiently address her underlying security concerns.  The 
Commonwealth discussed having extra Boston police officers 
present, and the judge considered increasing the number of court 
officers, but she expressed concern that the court lacked 
sufficient personnel, as court officers were needed in other 
sessions.  The judge also sought meaningful alternative 
solutions by discussing her concerns with her chief justice and 
the chief court officer, neither of whom could suggest a better 
alternative.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. at 214 (trial 
courts obligated to consider alternatives even where none was 
offered by parties). 
 
Although this case occurred eight years before Maldonado 
established the requirement of providing counsel time for 
interlocutory review, the judge specifically allowed time for 
the parties to seek review by a single justice of this court and 
expressed her desire for an appellate opinion on the matter.  
See Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752.  None of the counsel for any of 
the defendant or codefendants offered any alternatives, and none 
of the parties sought interlocutory review.  We are satisfied 
that the trial judge took meaningful steps to consider 
reasonable alternatives before implementing the approved 
23 
 
 
attendees list, and that the motion judge did not err in so 
finding. 
 
d. Fourth Waller factor:  adequate findings.  The final 
Waller factor was also satisfied here, because there were 
adequate findings in the record to support the closure.  See 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 748, quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.  
Because this was a partial closure, we may consider the record 
"to see if it contains sufficient support for the closure, even 
in the absence of formal or express findings by the judge."  
Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 115.  As noted above, this case 
involved numerous requests for protective orders responding to 
codefendant and witness concerns that testifying might result in 
harm.  The minutes of the hearing on the defendant's bail status 
were impounded because of this fear.  The trial judge 
extensively discussed her security concerns and her reasoning 
for imposing the approved attendees list with the parties on 
multiple occasions prior to the trial.  Based on the substantial 
record of pretrial discussions, the disappearance of a key 
witness immediately prior to the defendant's trial, and the 
events that occurred during the defendant's trial, we are 
satisfied that the judge's findings adequately supported her 
decision to partially close the court room using an approved 
attendees list.  See Cohen (No. 1), supra at 116 (record must 
24 
 
 
allow reviewing court "to glean sufficient support for the 
extensive closure"). 
 
Exceptional facts justify the exceptional measures taken 
here.  Although the presumption should always be toward 
openness, the partial closure here was a thoughtful, measured 
response to a dangerous and difficult set of circumstances.  
Given the legitimate security concerns present in this gang-
related murder, we conclude that the Waller factors were 
satisfied and that the partial closure of the court room did not 
abridge the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty based on the Commonwealth's failure to 
present sufficient evidence of the defendant's presence at the 
scene of the shooting and shared intent.  In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth and determine whether 
"any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
evidence to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree 
on a joint venture theory.  In order to prove murder in the 
first degree on the theory of joint venture, the Commonwealth 
25 
 
 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "at the time the 
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of [murder in 
the first degree by deliberate premeditation, the defendant] had 
or shared the intent required for that crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (Appendix) (2009).  The evidence 
need not be direct; circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn 
therefrom may be sufficient.  Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 
534, 544 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 773 
(2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  
These inferences "need only be reasonable and possible and need 
not be necessary or inescapable. "  Linton, supra, quoting Lao, 
supra. 
 
Intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's spoken 
words.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 427 Mass. 90, 95 (1998) 
(declarant's threat to "get" someone admissible as evidence of 
state of mind).  The defendant's intent to kill individuals 
associated with Goncalves is sufficiently clear from his 
statements made eleven days before the shootings at issue here, 
when Goncalves had shot two of the defendant's friends.  See id.  
A police officer heard  the defendant say that "[s]omebody is 
going to die for this" fifteen to twenty times.  The defendant 
later told Alves, "Don't worry about" the shooting, because the 
people responsible were "going to get it."  Goncalves's 
association with the victims of the April 28 shooting is evident 
26 
 
 
by his presence at the scene that night in the aftermath of the 
shooting. 
 
There is also ample circumstantial evidence to show that 
the defendant participated in shooting the victims.  Shortly 
after DaVeiga and Carvalho were shot, the defendant was arrested 
in a white minivan, the vehicle that an eyewitness identified as 
involved in the shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 
775, 781-782 (2016) (evidence of defendant's knowing 
participation in shooting sufficient where defendant was 
involved in prior incident, was present at shooting, and fled 
with shooters, and where shell casings found in his automobile 
matched ballistics evidence from shooting). 
 
The defendant was in the front passenger seat of the 
minivan, wearing Boston Celtics apparel, with Danny Fernandes in 
the driver's seat and Silva in the back seat.  The eyewitness 
told the police that the shooting was perpetrated by two or 
three men, all wearing sports jerseys.  He specifically noted 
that one of the men wore green and white, the colors of the 
Celtics.  The eyewitness specifically identified Danny Fernandes 
and Silva as participants in the shooting, but the Celtics 
jersey-clad defendant was the only one in the van who matched 
the eyewitness's description of someone wearing green and white.  
See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 230 (2015) (evidence 
of defendant's involvement in shooting sufficient where he 
27 
 
 
wanted to fight victim, defendant's clothing and physical 
characteristics matched description of shooter, and automobile 
matched description of one seen shortly before shooting). 
 
The minivan identified as involved in the shooting was 
rented by the defendant four days before the shooting, even 
though he owned a functioning Volkswagen.  Police recovered a 
nine millimeter firearm in the van that matched the ballistics 
evidence from three spent shell casings found at the scene of 
the shooting.  The firearm was hidden underneath a cup holder in 
the back of the van and wrapped in a page torn from a Volkswagen 
Golf manual, which was also in the van.  Police also found two 
spent .25 caliber shell casings on the floor of the van. 
 
We conclude that this circumstantial evidence was more than 
sufficient to show that the defendant participated in a joint 
venture with intent to murder the victims.  See Gomes, 475 Mass. 
at 781-782; Watkins, 473 Mass. at 230.  A rational trier of fact 
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knowingly participated in the commission of the charged crime 
with the required intent.  See Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 32 (2017). 
 
3.  Appropriateness of closing arguments.  The defendant 
alleges two types of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments:  improper burden-shifting and improper bolstering of 
and attacks on witness credibility.  Specifically, the defendant 
28 
 
 
objected to the following part of the prosecutor's closing 
argument, in which the prosecutor asked what the defendant 
wanted the jury to believe: 
 
"What does the defense want you to believe in this 
case, ladies and gentlemen?  [The defendant's counsel] just 
gave a very eloquent closing argument.  But it's all 
coincidence.  It's all coincidence.  It's all speculation.  
What does he want you to believe?  Does the defense want 
you to believe that it just so happened that somebody used 
[the defendant's] minivan, somebody who also had the intent 
to kill, who had the motive for revenge?  What is he asking 
you to believe?  Is he asking you to believe that it's just 
coincidence that the murder weapon[14] is found in the car, 
that at 3:30 in the morning, as he continuously points out, 
near his house he happens to be in a passenger seat.  Is 
that coincidence?  Is that coincidence that his 
fingerprints are in there, that he's in there?  Is it 
coincidence that the other people involved in this case, 
[are friends] of his?  Is it coincidence that Carlos Silva 
is a friend of his, seen with him?  Danny Fernandes, 
friend, cousin?  Are those coincidences?  Those are not 
coincidences, ladies and gentlemen, that is overwhelming 
evidence of joint venture.  He was part of a team.  And it 
doesn't matter whether he pulled the trigger that caused 
the fatal shots.  It doesn't matter.  He was part of a 
team.  He shared the intent." 
 
Because the defendant objected at trial, we review that 
claim for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 
404, 423 (2000). 
 
The defense counsel focused his closing argument on the 
circumstantial nature of the evidence presented by the 
                                                 
14 The prosecutor mischaracterized the firearm as the 
"murder weapon" insofar as the recovered firearm in the minivan 
was not the firearm that fired the bullets recovered from the 
bodies of either of the victims.  The recovered firearm was, 
however, involved with the crime as it matched bullets found at 
the scene. 
29 
 
 
prosecution, arguing that the case was based on mere 
speculation.  The prosecutor was entitled to point out the 
weaknesses of the defendant's case and "make a fair reply to the 
defendant's closing argument."  Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 
1, 7 (1989).  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 226 
(2014).  The prosecutor here responded to the defendant's 
closing argument by questioning whether the established facts 
seemed like coincidence.  In closing argument, a prosecutor may 
argue "forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and on 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).  In doing so, 
the prosecutor may not shift the burden of proof or argue that 
the defendant has any affirmative duty to prove his innocence.  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 463 Mass. 95, 112 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 (2011).  Nothing in 
the prosecutor's language addressing whether the evidence was a 
series of coincidences shifted the burden of proof or otherwise 
suggested that the defendant had any affirmative duty to put 
forward other witnesses or evidence.  Rather than shifting the 
burden of proof, the prosecutor's language asking the jury to 
draw inferences based on the facts presented during trial was a 
fair response to the defendant's closing argument.  See Smith, 
supra. 
30 
 
 
 
When the defendant objected to this portion of the closing 
argument asking what the defendant would have the jury believe, 
the judge responded that she would "make clear" where the burden 
lies.  The judge's jury instruction appropriately highlighted 
the Commonwealth's sole possession of the burden of proof.  The 
judge clearly instructed the jury on the Commonwealth's burden 
of the proof at the start of trial and immediately prior to 
closing arguments.  See Kater, 432 Mass. at 423-424.  There was 
no error. 
 
Additionally, although not timely objected to at trial, the 
defendant contends that the prosecutor's use of rhetorical 
questions constituted both burden-shifting and improper vouching 
for the credibility of various witnesses.  We review this claim 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 748 (1999). 
 
The rhetorical questions in the prosecutor's closing 
argument can be divided into two categories:  those that speak 
to the evidence and which the defendant claims constituted 
improper burden-shifting, and those which speak to witness 
credibility and which the defendant claims constituted improper 
vouching. 
 
The prosecutor's rhetorical questions are exemplified by 
the following language: 
31 
 
 
 
"And think about the premeditation.  Think about the 
decisions that [the defendant] made. . . .  [H]e gets on 
the [tele]phone to Jose Alves, [tells him] . . . [t]hey're 
going to get it bad.  A few days later, four days before 
this murder he rents a white minivan.  Why?  You can make 
reasonable inferences from the facts, ladies and gentlemen.  
Why does he rent a white minivan four days before the 
murder, a couple days after saying, [t]hey're going to get 
it bad for what they did?  Because he's premeditating." 
 
Rhetorical questions commenting on the evidence are not 
improper.  They may permissibly suggest that the defendant's 
defense is implausible based on the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom.  See Commonwealth v. 
Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 13 (2014); Commonwealth v. Mattei, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 577, 582-583 (2016).  Asking rhetorical questions about 
why someone who owned a vehicle rented another one in the same 
city does not shift the burden of proof.  Rather it asks the 
jury to draw a reasonable inference.  See Nelson, supra; Mattei, 
supra. 
The prosecutor similarly asked rhetorical questions in his 
closing argument regarding the motive and credibility of key 
witnesses including the eyewitness, the two cooperating 
witnesses (Alves and Nunes), DaSilva, and Dosouto. 
A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of 
witnesses.  Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 627 (2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016).  In keeping with the 
prosecutor's ability to point out the weaknesses of the 
defendant's case and make a fair reply to his closing argument, 
32 
 
 
however, a prosecutor may address the witness's lack of motive 
to lie and do so by asking rhetorical questions relying on the 
evidence presented.  See Cassidy, 470 Mass. at 226; Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 408, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008); 
Smith, 404 Mass. at 7.  The prosecutor's rhetorical questions 
about witness credibility were based on the evidence presented 
and largely responded to the defense counsel's own discussion of 
credibility in his closing argument.  The prosecutor addressed 
the witnesses' motives in testifying with rhetorical questions 
about what reasons someone may have to lie.15  This language was 
                                                 
 
15 The prosecutor stated: 
 
 
"[W]hat reason does [the eyewitness] have to lie?" 
 
 
"Jose Alves . . . Did he seem like someone who was trying 
to say what the Commonwealth wanted?  Did he seem like someone 
who was lying, or did he seem like somebody who was scared, 
somebody who was part of the mix, as he told you?" 
 
 
"Joao Nunes, what reason does he have to lie?  What is he 
really getting from this?" 
 
 
"Jonathan DaSilva, how credible did he seem?  Again, his 
own friend is murdered right in front of him, another friend 
paralyzed for life right next to him.  But yet there he is, Oh, 
I don't remember anything." 
 
 
"But then he actually wants you to believe, Amilton Dosouto 
does, that when he's shot, [the defendant] is calmly over him 
saying, Oh, it'll be all right.  Everything is okay.  Is that 
credible?  Of course not, ladies and gentlemen.  What's credible 
is what those Boston Police Officers told you, that he was 
frantic, that he was screaming, Someone is going to die for 
this.  Amilton Dosouto was credible in certain instances and not 
credible in others." 
33 
 
 
not improper.  See Smith, 404 Mass. at 7.  Further, the jury 
instructions clearly and repeatedly stated that closing 
arguments were not evidence.  As discussed in more detail infra, 
the jury instructions were also comprehensive as to the jury's 
power to determine for themselves the credibility of witnesses.  
The jury are presumed to have followed these instructions.  See 
Cassidy, 470 Mass. at 226; Nelson, 468 Mass. at 13.  There was 
no error. 
4.  Jury instruction on cooperating witness.  The defendant 
contends that the judge erred in the instructing the jury about 
cooperating witnesses.  Jose Alves and Joao Nunes testified for 
the prosecution pursuant to cooperating witness agreements, and 
copies of these agreements were submitted to the jury.  The 
cooperation agreements were partially redacted at the defense 
counsel's request.  The redacted cooperation agreement for Alves 
retained the following relevant language: 
 
"Mr. Alves agrees to make himself available for 
interviews with law enforcement officials and to testify 
completely and truthfully before any grand jury 
investigating the shooting death of Jose DaVeiga and 
shooting of Christopher Carvalho and at any subsequent 
hearings or trials relating to the same.  Mr. Alves agrees 
that he will neither withhold any information in his 
possession nor provide false information.  Mr. Alves 
acknowledges . . . that no law enforcement official has 
told him what to say -– other than to tell the truth -– in 
any interview or testimony that Mr. Alves is to give. 
 
 
" . . . 
 
34 
 
 
 
"This agreement is also contingent upon Mr. Alves 
providing complete and truthful information and testimony 
before the grand jury and at any subsequent hearings or 
trials." 
The redacted cooperation agreement for Nunes included 
functionally the same language with respect to promises of 
complete and truthful information and testimony.  Other 
references to truthfulness were redacted from both agreements.  
The language presented to the jury, including the limited 
references to testifying truthfully, was agreed to by all 
parties. 
 
The defendant requested that what he calls a truthfulness 
instruction be given to the jury as provided in Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 263-264 (1989).  The judge did not give 
the instruction that the defendant requested, but did give the 
following instruction:16 
 
"[Y]ou heard testimony from two witnesses, Jose Alves 
and Joao Nunes, who testified under an agreement with the 
prosecution.  You should examine those witnesses' 
credibility with particular care when you assess their 
believability.  Also, ladies and gentlemen, in assessing a 
witness' credibility you may consider any earlier 
statements made by the witness which you find differ from 
the testimony that the witness has given during the trial 
. . . .  If you find that the earlier statement differs 
from the way that the witness testified in court, then you 
may consider that the witness' believability has been 
adversely affected, or you may decide that it is not 
adversely affected.  But that earlier statement may be used 
                                                 
16 The defendant's preferred instruction on truthfulness was 
not part of the record, but defense counsel's objection to the 
jury instructions at trial indicated that it was not given. 
35 
 
 
by you only for that purpose, that is to determine whether 
the witness is testifying credibly at this trial.  You may 
also . . . in assessing credibility take into account a 
witness' frankness or lack of frankness while testifying, a 
witness' believability or lack of believability in the 
testimony . . . .  You may also take into account the 
reasonableness or the unreasonableness of the witness' 
testimony.  You may take into account the probability or 
the improbability of the testimony.  You may take into 
account the accuracy of the witness' recollection and the 
degree of intelligence demonstrated by the witness."  
(Emphasis added.) 
The defendant asserts that despite the judge's instruction that 
the jury take "particular care" in evaluating the credibility of 
cooperating witnesses, the jury instruction failed to conform to 
the requirements of Ciampa, because it failed to include 
language indicating that "the government did not know whether 
[the cooperating witness] was telling the truth" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 85, 100 (2014).  
Because the defendant objected to the limited nature of the 
instruction, we determine whether there was prejudicial error. 
Kater, 432 Mass. at 423. 
 
Where a witness testifies under a cooperation agreement 
with the government, the judge must "specifically and 
forcefully" instruct the jury to evaluate the witness's 
credibility with "particular care."  Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266.  
This is necessary to counteract the cooperation agreement's 
implied representation of credibility.  Id.  If the jury are 
made aware that the witness promised to tell the truth as part 
36 
 
 
of the cooperation agreement due to either trial testimony or 
submission of the cooperation agreements as exhibits, the judge 
should additionally "warn the jury that the government does not 
know whether the witness is telling the truth."  Commonwealth v. 
Meuse, 423 Mass. 831, 832 (1996).  Nevertheless, "failure to so 
instruct, standing alone, is not reversible error. . . .  It is 
only where the prosecutor has vouched for the witness or 
suggested having special knowledge by which he or she can verify 
the witness's testimony that such an instruction must be given 
to avert reversible error" (citation omitted).  Roman, 470 Mass. 
at 100. 
 
Here, the judge gave the particular care instruction but 
did not give the instruction the defendant requested concerning 
that the agreement was conditioned on truthfulness.17  This was 
not, however, reversible error, as there was no vouching by the 
prosecutor.  See Roman, 470 Mass. at 100.  Although the 
prosecutor reminded the jury that Alves and Nunes had testified 
                                                 
 
17 The jury instruction to evaluate the credibility of 
cooperating witness testimony with "particular care" also 
immediately followed instructions to take into account a 
witness's interest, bias, or prejudice with regard to the case 
when evaluating credibility and were followed by further 
instructions on evaluating witness demeanor, reasonability, and 
motive.  These instructions specifically alerted jurors to the 
permissibility of considering a witness's motive for testifying.  
See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 264 (1989) (jury 
instructions must "focus the jury's attention on the incentives 
that could have influenced [the witness's] testimony"). 
37 
 
 
pursuant to cooperation agreements, his rhetorical questions did 
not indicate any special knowledge of their truthfulness as 
witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 44 
n.21 (2011). 
 
Moreover, there was no danger of prejudice here, as the 
testimony of Alves and Nunes did not concern the April 28, 2003, 
shooting of the victims but rather the defendant's motivation 
for the shooting.  This testimony was merely duplicative of 
other testimony, particularly the defendant's repeated 
statements to a Boston police officer at the scene of the prior 
April 17, 2003, shooting of Alves and Dosouto that "[s]omeone 
was going to die for this."  For all these reasons, the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give the 
instruction the defendant requested. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discerned no basis 
to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree 
or to order a new trial.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise 
our authority. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions.  We also affirm the denial of the 
defendant's motion for postconviction relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.