Title: State v. Coffee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1209-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mose B. Coffee, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 387 Wis. 2d 673,929 N.W.2d 246 
PDC No:2019 WI App 25 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 21, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Jorgensen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered an opinion of the court, in which 
ZEIGLER, J., joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.  HAGEDORN, 
J., did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Frances Colbert, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Frances Colbert. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by John A. Blimling. 
2020 WI 53 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1209-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2017CF542) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Mose B. Coffee,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered an opinion of the court, in which 
ZEIGLER, J., joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.  HAGEDORN, 
J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court2 denial of 
                     
1 State v. Coffee, 2019 WI App 25, 387 Wis. 2d 673, 929 
N.W.2d 245. 
2 The Honorable John A. Jorgensen of Winnebago County 
presided. 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
2 
 
Mose B. Coffee's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a 
search of a vehicle incident to his lawful arrest for Operating 
While Intoxicated (OWI) that Coffee argues violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the lawful arrest for OWI, in and of 
itself, supplied a basis to search the passenger compartment, 
and, specifically, a bag located behind the driver's seat that 
contained marijuana. 
¶2 
We disagree that the lawful arrest for OWI, in and of 
itself, supplied a sufficient basis to search the passenger 
compartment of Coffee's vehicle.  However, the search was lawful 
because police had reasonable suspicion, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, that the passenger compartment, and, 
specifically, 
the 
bag, 
might 
contain 
evidence 
of 
OWI.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Officer Timothy Skelton works for the Oshkosh Police 
Department.  On August 30, 2017, at 11:17 p.m., he observed an 
automobile driving on a city street that did not have a front 
license plate.  He instituted a traffic stop, "which was 
eventually completed in the parking lot" of a restaurant or bar. 
¶4 
The automobile parked close to another vehicle.  
Skelton testified: 
As the vehicle had pulled into the parking lot, there 
were 
other 
vehicles 
that 
were 
already 
parked. . . .  [I]n this case the vehicle as it pulled 
in pulled in at an angle and very close to a vehicle 
that was –- it would be on the driver's side.  My 
estimation was that it was no more than two feet from 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
3 
 
the other vehicle, making it very –- it was very close 
to the other vehicle and somewhat at an angle. 
Body camera footage shows that Coffee's vehicle was over the 
yellow line on the driver's side. 
¶5 
Skelton explained why he found how the vehicle was 
parked noteworthy: 
Well, it was the fact that I was performing the 
traffic stop and the vehicle continued into the 
parking lot.  And the way it had parked, the driver 
immediately was getting out of his vehicle so it was 
almost as if he was –- knew I was behind him and was 
getting out quickly. 
¶6 
Skelton asked the driver, Coffee, to stay in the 
vehicle.  "When asked how much he had to drink and from where 
was he coming, [Coffee] stated he was coming from a friend's 
house and that he had not had that much." 
¶7 
Skelton 
believed 
that 
Coffee 
was 
intoxicated.  
Coffee's speech was slurred, and his eyes were "very glazed over 
and bloodshot."  Skelton testified that the "glazed over look in 
his eyes" was a sign that Coffee was "possibly impaired by 
intoxicants and or other controlled substances."  According to 
the affidavit supporting the criminal complaint, "Skelton could 
smell an odor of intoxicants coming from the vehicle."  Skelton 
also testified that after he had Coffee "sit down in his car" he 
smelled "an odor of intoxicants coming from his person or from 
the vehicle."  Based on these observations, Skelton decided to 
ask Coffee to step out of the vehicle, so he could administer 
field sobriety tests. 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
As Skelton walked with Coffee to conduct a test, he 
realized that he met Coffee a few weeks prior.  He recalled that 
Coffee had been "very quiet at that time."  Yet, Coffee was 
presently "very talkative." 
¶9 
Coffee performed poorly on field sobriety tests.  He 
exhibited all six clues on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, 
failed to complete the nine-step-walk-and-turn test and sang the 
alphabet twice after being instructed to state the alphabet 
twice in a row without singing.  Skelton then administered a 
preliminary breath test, which indicated that Coffee had a 
prohibited alcohol level of .14.3 
¶10 Skelton arrested Coffee and secured him in the back of 
his squad car.  Skelton then instructed two other officers at 
the scene, Brenden Bonnett and Benjamin Fenhouse, to search the 
passenger compartment.  Skelton informed the two that Coffee had 
been arrested "for operating under the influence of alcoholic 
beverages."   
¶11 Bonnett testified that "the subject was in custody for 
impaired driving."  Therefore, "I'd be looking for any substance 
in the vehicle that could impair a driver's ability to operate 
the motor vehicle safely."  He further testified that he was 
"looking for any substance, whether that could be prescription 
medication, nonprescription medication, alcohol, illegal drugs, 
or even up to possibly an inhalant such as Dust-Off –- can of 
                     
3 A blood test indicated Coffee's BAC was .17. 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
5 
 
Dust-Off I know has been used before also as a substance which 
has impaired drivers." 
¶12 Bonnett found a cloth bag "right behind the driver's 
seat, whereas in the driver could have moved it with his arm 
while seated in the driver's seat."  "Inside that cloth bag were 
two mason jars.  Inside the mason jars were flakes of what was 
suspected to be marijuana."  Bonnett testified that he had to 
"dig through the bag" before locating the jars because there 
were other items on top that concealed them from sight.4 
¶13 After Bonnett found the jars with what appeared to be 
flakes of marijuana, Fenhouse searched the trunk of the vehicle.  
Fenhouse found an additional 930.7 grams of marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia. 
¶14 The State charged Coffee with possession with intent 
to deliver THC, possession of drug paraphernalia, second-offense 
OWI 
and 
second-offense 
OWI 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration.  Coffee moved to suppress "all evidence obtained" 
from the search. 
¶15 After a contested hearing, the circuit court concluded 
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The court 
found that the search of the bag was permissible because it was 
within reach from the driver's seat.  The circuit court also 
explained, "I'm really not putting much weight on the fact of 
                     
4 Among these items were many cell phones.  Additionally, 
the bag also contained little plastic bags, though Bonnett could 
not recall on the stand whether he saw the little plastic bags 
before he saw the jars.  The body camera footage is unclear.   
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
6 
 
where exactly that bottle was found because it doesn't matter if 
the defendant just threw it on top of the bag or to conceal it 
pushed it down to the bottom or in the middle.  That's easily 
done." 
¶16 After the circuit court denied Coffee's motion, he 
reached a plea agreement with the State.  He pled no-contest to 
possession with intent to deliver THC and second-offense OWI.  
The two other counts were dismissed.  After sentencing, Coffee 
appealed. 
¶17 The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Coffee, 2019 
WI App 25, 387 Wis. 2d 673, 929 N.W.2d 245.  It stated: 
[A]s a matter of law . . . when an officer lawfully 
arrests a driver for OWI, even if alcohol is the only 
substance detected in relation to the driver, a search 
of 
the 
interior 
of 
the 
vehicle, 
including 
any 
containers therein, is lawful because it is reasonable 
to believe evidence relevant to the offense of OWI 
might be found. 
Id., ¶13. 
¶18 We granted Coffee's petition for review, which argued 
that the court of appeals ignored the particular facts of the 
case.  Coffee argued that the court applied a bright-line rule, 
and therefore, the search was not justified by the totality of 
the circumstances.  We agree that bright-line rules are 
disfavored by the United States Supreme Court in its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence; however, we affirm because the totality 
of the circumstances provided the foundation for concluding that 
the search was reasonable.   
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶19 Review of a decision denying a motion to suppress 
under the Fourth Amendment presents a question of constitutional 
fact.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 
N.W.2d 120.  We employ a two-step inquiry when presented with a 
question of constitutional fact.  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, 
¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463; see also State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶13, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 
¶20 First, we uphold the circuit court's findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶26, 
235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.  Second, we independently apply 
constitutional principles to the facts.  Id.; see also Dearborn, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶13.  These principles require an objective 
application of the facts, meaning we independently examine the 
facts known to the officer at the time of the warrantless 
search.  We do not analyze what the officer subjectively 
believed or what inferences he or she actually drew.   
¶21 In the present case, we apply this two-step inquiry to 
determine whether the search of the passenger compartment, and, 
specifically, the bag, was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.5  The burden is on the State to prove that the search 
                     
5 Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is nearly 
identical to the Fourth Amendment.  We normally interpret 
Article I, § 11 consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  E.g., State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶¶14–17, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97; 
State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
8 
 
was constitutionally permissible because police did not obtain a 
warrant prior to searching the vehicle.  State v. Johnston, 184 
Wis. 2d 794, 806, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994) (citing United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)); State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 
179, ¶7, 322 Wis. 2d 576, 778 N.W.2d 157. 
B.  Fourth Amendment Principles 
¶22 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
As the text makes clear, "the Fourth Amendment does not 
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely 
proscribes 
those 
which 
are 
unreasonable." 
 
Tulberg, 
359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶29 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) 
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).  
¶23 A search is unreasonable if the individual's privacy 
interest in the area searched is not outweighed by "the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."6  Virginia v. 
                                                                  
N.W.2d 748.  Coffee has not argued that we should decide this 
case under the Wisconsin Constitution, and, therefore, we do not 
address Article I, § 11.   
6 We 
have 
considered 
the 
practices 
of 
the 
founding 
generation to determine if a search was unreasonable.  Virginia 
v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) ("In determining whether a 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
9 
 
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).  If a search was unreasonable, 
evidence obtained from it is subject to exclusion.  Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
¶24 "A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable," 
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30, because "[w]hen the right of 
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a 
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
Government enforcement agent," Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment——subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."  
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
¶25 One such exception was announced in Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009):  "[C]ircumstances unique to the 
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it 
is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle."  Automobiles are movable, making 
plausible 
an 
automobile's 
escape 
from 
a 
jurisdiction 
or 
concealment before a warrant can be obtained.  Carroll v. United 
                                                                  
search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history.").  
However, "the historical scope of officers' authority to search 
vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain."  Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thornton 
v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629–31 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
10 
 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151–53 (1925).  Therefore, people have a 
lower 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
an 
automobile, 
and 
the 
legitimate governmental interest in a warrantless search is 
stronger.7  The legitimate governmental interests, in this case, 
are particularly strong given the havoc wreaked by intoxicated 
drivers.8  Therefore, if the Gant exception is satisfied, the 
search cannot be unreasonable because the exception articulates 
a balancing of interests sufficient for this case. 
C.  Interpretations of Gant 
¶26 The Gant exception has generated much discussion.  One 
issue concerned whether the nature of an offense of arrest, in 
                     
7 To 
further 
explain, 
an 
automobile's 
"function 
is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the 
repository of personal effects.  A car has little capacity for 
escaping public scrutiny.  It travels public thoroughfares where 
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view."  United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (quoting Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality)). 
Furthermore, police are required to be in "frequent contact 
with automobiles" in the course of their duties.  South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976).  "Automobiles, unlike 
homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental 
regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and 
licensing requirements."  Id. at 368.  "As an everyday 
occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates 
or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, 
such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if 
headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working 
order."  Id. 
8 "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken 
driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it."  
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 160 (2013) (quoting Mich. 
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)).   
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
11 
 
and of itself, can supply a basis for a search of a passenger 
compartment, or whether the search must be analyzed by examining 
the totality of the circumstances.  The first approach is known 
as 
the 
"categorical 
approach," 
and 
the 
second, 
the 
"reasonableness approach." 
1.  The Categorical Approach 
¶27 The categorical approach stems from two quotes in 
Gant: 
[1.]  In many cases, as when a recent occupant is 
arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no 
reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains 
relevant evidence.  But in others, . . . the offense 
of arrest will supply a basis for searching the 
passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any 
container therein. 
. . . . 
[2.]  Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended 
license——an offense for which police could not expect 
to find evidence in the passenger compartment of 
Gant's car. 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44.  Interpreting these quotes, a Florida 
appellate court was the first to "reason[] that the [United 
States] Supreme Court intended to give its imprimatur to a 
system of classifying criminal offenses into two distinct 
groups:  those 
that 
'by 
[their] 
nature . . . might 
yield 
physical evidence' and those 'for which there is no physical 
evidence.'"  United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 
(E.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 678 
(Fla. App. 2009)).  Under this interpretation of Gant, relevant 
evidence of some crimes, such as the possession of a controlled 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
12 
 
substance, 
might 
be 
in 
the 
passenger 
compartment 
of 
an 
automobile.  Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (citing Brown, 24 
So. 3d at 677).  However, relevant evidence of other crimes, 
such as minor traffic violations, will not be in the passenger 
compartment.  Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (citing Brown, 24 
So. 3d at 677).  A search of a passenger compartment is 
permissible if a recent occupant was arrested for the former; 
for the latter, a search is not permissible. 
¶28 Following the Florida court's interpretation, some 
courts have concluded that OWI is, by its nature, a crime for 
which there might be relevant evidence in the passenger 
compartment.  State v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178, 185 (Idaho 2010) 
("Cantrell was arrested for DUI, and the DUI supplied the basis 
for the search."); People v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 902 
(2011) ("Reid's arrest for 'being under the influence of a 
controlled substance' supplied a reasonable basis for believing 
that evidence 'relevant' to that type of offense might be in his 
vehicle.").9 
                     
9 Compare Cain v. State, 373 S.W.3d 392, 396–97 (Ark. App. 
2010) (reasoning that an arrest for DUI supplied the basis for a 
search of an automobile under Gant because "an open container of 
alcohol could have been found"), with id. at 399 (Brown, J., 
dissenting) ("Officers must be put on notice about what is 
allowed following Gant, and the majority fails to define these 
limitations.  Instead, the majority sends the message that 
nothing has changed and officers can continue to search a 
vehicle incident to a lawful arrest without anything more to 
prompt such a search."). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
13 
 
¶29 These courts reason that relevant evidence of an OWI 
might be located in the passenger compartment and any container 
therein.  For example, the court of appeals reasoned in this 
case: 
Not only could an officer find evidence related to the 
offense of OWI, it indeed would not be surprising for 
an officer to find such evidence as, for example, a 
copy of a credit card receipt showing very recent 
purchases of alcoholic drinks at a local bar, a 
partially or fully consumed can of beer or bottle of 
hard liquor, a prescription drug bottle, or drug 
paraphernalia or residue. 
Coffee, 387 Wis. 2d 673, ¶12.  The court of appeals also stated: 
We need not detail the copious cases across this state 
and country in which a driver is arrested for OWI, a 
search of the vehicle is conducted, and alcoholic 
beverages and/or drugs are found. . . .  
"It is 
certainly logical and reasonable to expect that items 
related to alcohol or drug consumption, such as 
alcoholic beverage bottles or drug paraphernalia, 
might readily be contained in the intoxicated driver's 
car." 
Id., ¶12 n.6 (quoting People v. Evans, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323, 
336-37 (2011)). 
2.  The Reasonableness Approach 
¶30 Other courts have interpreted Gant as imposing a 
reasonableness approach.  Though stated in various terms, the 
approach 
involves 
"looking 
at 
common 
sense 
factors 
and 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances" to determine 
whether it was reasonable to conclude that evidence of the crime 
of the arrest might be found within the vehicle.  Reagan, 713 
F. Supp. 2d at 728 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 458 
F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
14 
 
¶31 Courts so interpreting Gant have struggled with the 
"quantum of suspicion required."  State v. Eversole, 2017-Ohio-
8436, unpublished slip op., ¶23, 2017 WL 5127369 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 6, 2017).  Unlike the categorical approach, which does not 
utilize facts particular to the case, the reasonableness 
approach requires particularization.  United States v. Taylor, 
49 A.3d 818, 826 (D.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
¶32 Determining the quantum of suspicion required is 
difficult for at least three reasons.  First, Gant stated the 
exception four times, twice using the word "might" and twice 
without using "might."  Compare Gant, 556 U.S. at 335, 343 
("reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle"), with id. at 346, 351 
("reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest").  Second, "reasonable to believe" is 
language sometimes used to describe the quantum of suspicion 
necessary for probable cause.10  And third, Gant provides little 
explanation of the exception. 
¶33 Most courts have concluded that the officer does not 
need probable cause to believe evidence of the crime will be 
found in the vehicle.  Cantrell, 233 P.3d at 183.  But see 
United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 
2009).  Otherwise, the Gant exception would be the same as 
                     
10 Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.7(d) (5th ed. 
updated Oct. 2019) (collecting cases that use "reasonable to 
believe" to describe the quantum of suspicion necessary for an 
officer to have probable cause). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
15 
 
another simply known as the "automobile exception," and Gant 
stated the two exceptions are distinct.  United States v. 
Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. 2010) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 
347). 
¶34 Some courts have equated the Gant exception with 
reasonable 
suspicion 
but 
others 
have 
crafted 
a 
standard 
somewhere between probable cause and reasonable suspicion. 
Compare Taylor v. State [hereinafter Taylor Md.], 137 A.3d 1029, 
1033-34 
(Md. 
2016) 
(equating 
the 
standard 
in 
Gant 
with 
reasonable suspicion) and State v. Ewertz, 305 P.3d 23, 27–28 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (same), with Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 728 
(quoting Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482) (noting the standard in Gant 
does not require probable cause and stating that a "[r]easonable 
belief is established by looking at common sense factors and 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances").  At least one 
United States Supreme Court justice believes the Gant exception 
requires reasonable suspicion.  Megginson v. United States, 556 
U.S. 1230, 1230 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting from a decision to 
grant, vacate, and remand) ("This case thus appears to present 
an important question regarding the meaning and specificity of 
the reasonable suspicion requirement in Gant."). 
¶35 Whatever the quantum, courts have considered a variety 
of 
circumstances 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
quantum 
was 
satisfied:  Whether the officer observed the driver using an 
intoxicant;11 whether the officer observed an intoxicant in plain 
                     
11 United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 n.7 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
16 
 
view inside the passenger compartment;12 whether an occupant made 
a statement indicating that an intoxicant is in the automobile;13 
whether the officer smelled an intoxicant emanating from the 
passenger compartment;14 whether "the driver was traveling from a 
location such as a recreational area or campground where alcohol 
is not available unless it is transported in by private 
vehicle;"15 whether the occupant made "furtive movements," 
indicating that the occupant might be trying to conceal 
evidence;16 whether the occupant evidenced extreme intoxication;17 
                                                                  
(E.D. Tenn. 2010). 
12 Id. 
13 Id.; see also United States v. Francis, No. 11-40064-01-
RDR, unpublished slip op., 2011 WL 5837182, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 
21, 2011) (noting the driver made statements indicating she took 
medication). 
14 Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 733 n.7; see also Francis, 
2011 WL 5837182, at *3. 
15 Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 733 n.7; see also State v. 
Wilson, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0292, unpublished slip op., ¶19, 2012 WL 
1255151 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2012) ("The police had received 
prior 
tips 
about 
suspected 
drug 
activity 
at 
Appellant's 
residence, Johnston had recently entered that residence before 
leaving with Appellant in his vehicle . . . ."). 
16 State v. Ewertz, 305 P.3d 23, 27 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) 
(quoting State v. Julian, No. 105,695, unpublished slip op., 
2012 WL 1759405, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. May 11, 2012) (per 
curiam), rev'd State v. Julian, 333 P.3d 172 (Kan. 2014), 
overruled by State v. James, 349 P.3d 457 (Kan. 2015)). 
17 Ewertz, 305 P.3d at 28 ("In addition to evidence that the 
car Ewertz was driving swerved in its lane and crossed over the 
fog line, that Tatro smelled alcohol in the car after he pulled 
Ewertz over, that Ewertz failed field sobriety tests, that 
Ewertz had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and that Ewertz slurred 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
17 
 
whether the officer had knowledge of prior unlawful conduct by 
an occupant involving an intoxicant in an automobile;18 whether 
the officer had knowledge regarding the likelihood of locating 
an intoxicant in an automobile driven by an intoxicated person.19 
3.  Our Approach 
¶36 We interpret Gant as imposing the reasonableness 
approach.  Our conclusion is consistent with the principle that 
bright-line rules are disfavored in United States Supreme Court 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in 
Search of A Reason:  Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and 
Belton, 
2002 
Wis. L. Rev. 
657, 
679. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
                                                                  
her words, there is also evidence that Ewertz admitted to 
drinking at least one alcoholic beverage before driving the car. 
In light of these specific and articulable facts, as well as any 
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts, we 
conclude the district court did not err in finding it was 
'reasonable to believe' evidence relevant to the crime of 
driving 
under 
the 
influence 
might 
be 
found 
in 
Ewertz' 
vehicle."). 
18 United States v. Lopez, No. CR 18-120-BLG-SPW-TJC, slip 
op., 2019 WL 7838283, at *8 (D. Mont. Dec. 18, 2019) ("Officer 
Miner also testified that he knew drugs had been found in a safe 
in Lopez's vehicle when Lopez was previously arrested for 
driving under the influence of a controlled substance in 
Montana.  While law enforcement cannot rely on past criminal 
history alone to find reasonable suspicion, it can be considered 
as part of the totality of the circumstances."). 
19 Taylor v. State, 137 A.3d 1029, 1034 (Md. 2016).  But see 
United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 827 (D.C. Ct. App. 2012) 
("'[W]e know too little about Officer [Weber's] experience' to 
place much weight upon his conclusory statement that 'typically 
someone who is driving under the influence also has an open 
container or multiple containers of alcohol in their vehicle.'" 
(internal citation omitted)). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
18 
 
categorical approach is analytically difficult.  Lastly, the 
briefings and result in Gant do not support the categorical 
approach. 
a.  Bright-Line Rules Are Disfavored 
¶37 Bright-line rules, such as the categorical approach, 
are disfavored in Fourth Amendment United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013) 
(plurality).  This is because a strict application of a bright-
line rule could be used to justify a search even though, under 
the particular facts, the search is unreasonable.  Reagan, 713 
F. Supp. 2d at 732.  Case-by-case analysis is, therefore, 
preferred.  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158.  "Numerous police actions 
are 
judged 
based 
on 
fact-intensive, 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances analyses rather than according to categorical 
rules, including in situations that are more likely to require 
police officers to make difficult split-second judgments."  Id. 
(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–125 (2000); Ohio 
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996); Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).  Indeed, although, the legitimate 
governmental interest in limiting the number of OWIs is 
substantial, 
a 
plurality 
in 
McNeely 
rejected 
that 
this 
legitimate governmental interest is so strong as to justify a 
bright-line rule permitting warrantless blood draws when an 
officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee is 
intoxicated.  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160. 
¶38 Nevertheless, bright-line rules occasionally have been 
adopted to provide clear guidance to officers.  New York v. 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
19 
 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981), abrogation recognized by Davis 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 234 (2011).  Quoting Professor 
LaFave, the Court in Belton explained:  
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all 
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing 
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be 
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of 
lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be 
"literally impossible of application by the officer in 
the field." 
Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus 
"Standardized 
Procedures":  The 
Robinson 
Dilemma, 
1974 
S. Ct. Rev. 127, 141). 
¶39 However, 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
generally 
requires 
police to obtain a warrant because judges, and not police, are 
better 
trained 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
search 
will 
be 
unreasonable.  See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.  "The preference for 
warrants is premised on the expectation that magistrates will be 
more likely than officers to perceive when justification for a 
proposed search is inadequate."  Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 576 (1999). 
¶40 "While 
the 
desire 
for 
a 
bright-line 
rule 
is 
understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption 
of an overly broad categorical approach that would dilute the 
warrant requirement in a context where significant privacy 
interests are at stake."  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158.  Therefore, 
the rationale for adopting a bright-line rule permitting a type 
of warrantless search cannot be merely that police would benefit 
from clear guidance.  There has to be some reason that police 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
20 
 
need guidance in the same way that there has to be some reason 
for police not to obtain a warrant.20 
¶41 A bright-line rule might be justified "[w]hen officer 
safety or imminent evidence concealment or destruction is at 
issue, [because] officers should not have to make fine judgments 
in the heat of the moment.  But in the context of a general 
evidence-gathering search, the state interests that might 
justify any overbreadth are far less compelling."  Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment).  Justice Scalia, in his Thornton concurrence, 
explained that when an arrestee is secured in the back of a 
squad car, a search of the passenger compartment cannot be 
justified on the ground that "the arrestee might grab a weapon 
or evidentiary item from his car."  Id. at 629.  If the search 
is justifiable, it is "simply because the car might contain 
evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested."  Id.  
To him, "[t]his more general sort of evidence-gathering search 
[was] not without antecedent."  Id.  His comments are telling 
because the majority in Gant purported it was following Justice 
Scalia's suggestions from Thornton.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. 
¶42 In the case before us, Coffee was secured in the back 
of a squad car; therefore, the search cannot be justified 
                     
20 For example, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
235 (1973), the Court concluded that police have authority to 
search an arrestee's person and that this authority stems from 
the lawful arrest and the need for personal safety of the 
officer. 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
21 
 
because of concerns over officer safety or imminent evidence 
concealment or destruction.  If the search was lawful, it must 
be because a general evidence-gathering search is permitted 
under these circumstances.  Police did not need a bright-line 
rule under the totality of the circumstances here because they 
were not required to make split-second decisions.  Thornton, 541 
U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
b.  Difficulty of the Categorical Approach 
¶43 But 
even 
if 
police 
needed 
more 
guidance, 
the 
categorical approach would not provide it.  Some offenses are 
not easily categorized, which makes the categorical approach 
analytically difficult.  "[A]ny attempt to categorize every 
criminal offense as being either one that might yield physical 
evidence or one for which there is no physical evidence runs 
into interpretative problems."  Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 732.   
¶44 For example, a driver could be arrested for making 
criminal threats.  Evans, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 336.  "If the 
threat in question was verbal, it is surely unreasonable to 
expect evidence related to the crime to be contained in a 
vehicle."  Id.  "But if the threat was made in a text message, 
or amplified by means of props or a threatening drawing, 
evidence might well be found in the car."  Id.   
¶45 To give one more example, a driver could be arrested 
for battery or assault.  Id.  "If such crimes were committed 
with fists alone, it would generally be unreasonable to expect 
evidence of the offense in the arrestee's vehicle; if committed 
with a brick or broken bottle, on the other hand, the opposite 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
22 
 
might be true."  Id.  "Even in the case of a fistfight, might it 
be reasonable to expect to find blood, or perhaps a broken 
fingernail, in the vehicle?"  Id.  To summarize, a problem with 
the categorical approach is that "some offenses of arrest cannot 
be meaningfully evaluated without reference to the specific 
facts known to the officer."  Id.  The point of adopting a 
bright-line rule is to provide definitive guidance; if that is 
not being accomplished, a bright-line rule serves no useful 
purpose. 
c.  The Briefings and Result in Gant 
¶46 Lastly, the briefings and result in Gant suggest that 
the United States Supreme Court did not create a categorical 
approach.  Gant involved a traffic stop for driving with a 
suspended license in Arizona.  Unlike many states, in Arizona, 
driving with a suspended license is not a strict liability 
offense.21  The State must prove that the driver either knew or 
should have known his or her license was suspended. 
¶47 In Gant, Arizona admitted, "In most arrests for 
traffic-related 
offenses, 
the 
preservation 
of 
evidence 
justification for a search incident to arrest will not exist."  
Pet'r Reply Br. on the Merits, at 26, Gant v. Arizona, 556 U.S. 
332 (2009) (No. 07-542).  However, Arizona argued: 
That is not true in this case.  Under Arizona law, a 
person is guilty of driving on a suspended license 
only if "the driver knew or should have known that the 
                     
21 State v. Williams, 698 P.2d 732, 734 (Ariz. 1985) (en 
banc). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
23 
 
license 
has 
been 
suspended." 
 
Officer 
Griffith 
testified that "[l]icense paperwork from the court 
system" could possibly be found in the vehicle.  
Officer Reed testified that it would not be unusual to 
find "notification from Motor Vehicle Division that 
[Gant's] license has been suspended" or "a citation 
for a suspended license that would show that he had 
knowledge that his driver's license was suspended" in 
the 
vehicle. 
 
Thus, 
Gant's 
assertion 
that 
the 
"officers had no reason to believe that 'evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found' in 
[his] car" is inaccurate. 
Id. at 26 n.7 (alterations in original) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Pet'r Br. on the Merits, at 6–7, nn.1–2, Gant 
v. Arizona, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (discussing the testimony of the 
officers). 
¶48 Therefore, if the Gant exception were a categorical 
approach, Gant should have permitted the search:  the passenger 
compartment might have contained relevant evidence of the 
offense of arrest.  But Gant concluded that the search was 
unconstitutional.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.  Other courts, noting 
this 
potential 
contradiction, 
have 
refused 
to 
apply 
the 
categorical approach.  People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 
1057 (Colo. 2010) (en banc); see also Andrew Fois & Lauren 
Simmons, Thomas Jefferson's Carriage:  Arizona v. Gant's Assault 
on the Belton Doctrine, Am. U. Crim. L. Br., Winter 2009, at 4, 
22 ("The Court . . . holds that in Gant there is no reason to so 
believe . . . [that] the car could contain evidence of the crime 
of suspended license.  It is reasonable, however, to believe 
that the license itself, the car registration, or other evidence 
supporting the charge could have been found in the glove 
compartment."). 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
24 
 
¶49 The 
only 
way 
to 
interpret 
Gant 
as 
imposing 
a 
categorical approach is to assume that the justices did not 
fully analyze the briefs:  that is untenable.  In combination 
with the above, we interpret Gant as imposing the reasonableness 
approach. 
C.  Application 
¶50 We conclude that the reasonableness approach is the 
correct 
interpretation 
of 
Gant. 
 
Here, 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances 
objectively 
demonstrates 
that 
Skelton 
had 
reasonable suspicion that the passenger compartment, and, 
specifically, the bag, might contain relevant evidence of OWI.  
Therefore, 
the 
search 
was 
permissible 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶51 Coffee's counsel admitted at oral argument that "We 
are talking about reasonable suspicion."  We conclude that is 
the correct understanding of the reasonableness approach.  
Taylor Md., 137 A.3d at 1030; Ewertz, 305 P.3d at 27–28.  First, 
the Gant exception cannot require probable cause because then it 
would merely repeat the automobile exception.  Vinton, 594 F.3d 
at 25.  Second, one United States Supreme Court justice has 
referred 
to 
the 
Gant 
exception 
as 
requiring 
reasonable 
suspicion.  Megginson, 556 U.S. at 1230 (Alito, J., dissenting 
from a decision to grant, vacate, and remand).   
1.  The Passenger Compartment 
¶52 Skelton had reasonable suspicion that the passenger 
compartment might contain relevant evidence of OWI.  First, 
Skelton testified that when he had Coffee sit in the vehicle, he 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
25 
 
smelled "an odor of intoxicants coming from [Coffee's person] or 
from the vehicle."  Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 733 n.7.  
Although he used a disjunctive "or" to describe where the smell 
was coming from, his testimony offers support in favor of 
reasonable suspicion.  Furthermore, the affidavit does not use 
the disjunctive, or.  It states that a smell of intoxicants was 
coming from the automobile. 
¶53 Second, Coffee indicated that he was coming from his 
friend's house.  Generally, a private residence has alcohol only 
if it is brought to the residence.  Cf. id.  Coffee might have 
brought the alcohol that he consumed to his friend's house and 
have retained some in his vehicle.  The facts of this case are 
different than, for example, a case where an officer observes a 
patron drink at a bar and then immediately get into an 
automobile.  Id. at 732. 
¶54 Third, after Skelton initiated the traffic stop Coffee 
"continued into the parking lot," which could indicate that 
Coffee was hesitant to pull over because he knew there was 
something in the automobile that he should not have had.  Cf. 
Patel 
v. 
State, 
522 
S.E.2d 760, 
761 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) 
(reasoning that the failure to "immediately pull over" can 
inform an officer's probable cause determination); United States 
v. Gonzalez-Guytan, 419 F. App'x 848, 849 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(same). 
¶55 Fourth, Coffee acted strangely upon pulling into the 
parking lot because he hastily parked and immediately got out of 
his vehicle.  Ewertz, 305 P.3d at 27.  Coffee's careless parking 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
26 
 
and hasty exit from his vehicle could indicate that he was 
trying to distance himself from something in the vehicle that he 
knew he should not have had.  Stated otherwise, his actions 
indicated that he did not want to interact with police near his 
vehicle, perhaps because he did not want them to discover 
something in it. 
¶56 Fifth, Skelton had previously interacted with Coffee.  
At that prior meeting, Coffee had been quiet, but on this 
occasion, was talkative, about a variety of topics.  From this, 
Skelton could have believed Coffee was nervous because he had 
something to hide.  Cf. United States v. Vergara-Manzo, No. 13-
10179-EFM, unpublished slip op., 2014 WL 840722, at *5 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 4, 2014) (reasoning that an occupant being "extremely 
talkative" could contribute to an officer's determination to 
search the automobile). 
¶57 Sixth, Coffee was extremely intoxicated.  Ewertz, 305 
P.3d at 28.  He exhibited all six clues on the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus test, failed to complete the nine-step-walk-and-turn 
test and sang the alphabet twice after being instructed to state 
the alphabet twice in a row without singing.  Furthermore, 
Coffee's speech was slurred, and his eyes were "very glazed over 
and bloodshot."  He also parked poorly.  He was over the yellow 
line on the driver's side.  As Justice Scalia explained in his 
Thornton concurrence, "it is not illogical to assume that 
evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the suspect 
was apprehended."  Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment).  Similarly, when a person is extremely 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
27 
 
intoxicated, it is not illogical to assume intoxicants might be 
close by. 
¶58 Coffee has two arguments, neither of which cause the 
search 
of 
the 
vehicle's 
passenger 
compartment 
to 
be 
unreasonable.  First, he argues that Skelton needed to know more 
to have reasonable suspicion.  Skelton did not observe a bottle 
cap or open container nor was he tipped off that Coffee had been 
using an intoxicant in the vehicle.  But the quantum of 
suspicion required is not probable cause:  it is reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
Although 
Coffee 
acknowledges 
that 
reasonable 
suspicion is the correct quantum, his argument is phrased in a 
manner that assumes probable cause is necessary. 
¶59 Second, Coffee would have us conclude that his privacy 
interest outweighs the legitimate governmental interests because 
the probative value of evidence that might have been present in 
the passenger compartment is minimal, i.e., the primary evidence 
of OWI is the result of a blood test.  We reject this argument 
because the balancing of interests has already been done by the 
United States Supreme Court in establishing the Gant exception.  
Moreover, other courts have rejected Coffee's argument because 
"a DUI trial does not start and end with a breathalyzer report."  
Cantrell, 233 P.3d at 185; see also Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 
1205.  We agree.  Just because the result of a blood test could 
be sufficient evidence to secure a conviction does not mean that 
it will be.  Police do not have the luxury of knowing what will 
happen at trial and must collect evidence without the benefit of 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
28 
 
hindsight.  Police may search for relevant evidence; they are 
not required to weigh its probative value. 
2.  The Bag 
¶60 Coffee also argues, "[e]ven if it were reasonable to 
search the vehicle, it was not reasonable to believe evidence of 
the OWI would be at the bottom of the bag."  To explain, Coffee 
argues that Skelton did not see a furtive movement that would 
have indicated Coffee tried to hide something in the bag.  
Therefore, Coffee minimizes the circuit court's finding that 
relevant evidence could have "easily" been pushed down because, 
Coffee contends, if such an action occurred, it would have been 
seen by Skelton. 
¶61 Coffee's argument borders on an objection to the 
circuit court's findings.  Under the applicable standard of 
review, we cannot disturb those findings because they are not 
clearly erroneous.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶26.  Moreover, 
Coffee could have gotten intoxicated at his friend's house and 
then put the intoxicant in the bag in order to carry it to his 
car.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"[d]uring virtually the entire history of our country——whether 
contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 
roadster, or a modern automobile——it has been assumed that a 
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any 
container that might conceal the object of the search."  United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 n.26 (1982).  "Contraband 
goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; 
since by their nature such goods must be withheld from public 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
29 
 
view, they rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are 
enclosed within some form of container."  Id. at 820.   
¶62 This case is unlike, for example, State v. Hinderman, 
No. 2014AP1787-CR, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 
2015), on which Coffee relied below.  Hinderman was arrested for 
OWI because she appeared drunk.  Id., ¶¶2–3.  Police searched 
her automobile incident to the arrest.  Id., ¶4.  On the 
passenger seat was her purse.  Id., ¶3.  Police "looked inside 
the purse and found a closed, red zippered pouch, approximately 
three-by-three inches in length and one-half inch to three 
quarters of an inch wide."  Id., ¶4.  Inside the pouch was drug 
paraphernalia and "a clear plastic bag containing marijuana."  
Id.  The State argued that the search of the pouch was 
permissible because it might have contained a one-shot bottle of 
alcohol, similar to what is commonly served on passenger jets.  
Id., ¶12.  In a one-judge opinion, the court of appeals rejected 
this argument and concluded that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id., ¶14.  Its conclusion rested heavily on a 
finding by the circuit court that the pouch was unlikely to 
contain a one-shot bottle.  Id., ¶12. 
¶63 We need not decide whether Hinderman was correct.  It 
is sufficient to say, Hinderman presented on different facts.  
In this case, the bag police searched was significantly larger.  
It could have contained regular-sized bottles of alcohol.  
Whether police can search a small pouch, on the ground that they 
might find a one-shot bottle, or, as the court of appeals 
mentioned in this case, a credit card receipt showing very 
No. 
2018AP1209-CR   
 
30 
 
recent purchases of alcoholic drinks at a local bar, is beyond 
the scope of this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 We disagree that the lawful arrest for OWI, in and of 
itself, supplied a sufficient basis to search the passenger 
compartment of Coffee's vehicle.  However, the search was lawful 
because police had reasonable suspicion, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, that the passenger compartment, and, 
specifically, 
the 
bag, 
might 
contain 
evidence 
of 
OWI.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶65 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
¶66 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶67 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I concur with the 
court's judgment.  But I think the court handled Gant1 in a 
fashion that brings less rather than more clarity to the law 
controlling post-arrest evidence-gathering automobile searches.  
The court suggests Gant addressed itself to this question:  
"[W]hether the nature of an offense of arrest, in and of itself, 
can supply a basis for a search of a passenger compartment, or 
whether the search must be analyzed by examining the totality of 
the circumstances."  Lead op., ¶26.  The literature, as well as 
judicial opinions, generally refer to the former as the 
"categorical approach," and the latter as the "reasonableness 
approach."  And in so referring, they have contributed to the 
court's understanding that Gant created a new analytical 
methodology that is taxonomically distinct from the extant 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  But the Gant court did 
not announce a new analytical model.  Instead, it returned to 
ancient principles governing searches incident to arrest and 
applied them to the automobile context. 
¶68 Gant's significance lies in it's effort to fix a 
specific jurisprudential problem.  The Supreme Court realized 
that, after its decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), abrogation recognized by United States v. Davis, 564 
U.S. 229 (2011), police officers started conducting post-arrest 
evidence-gathering automobile searches as a matter of course, 
and in some quarters such searches were understood as a police 
                     
1 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
officer's entitlement.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 
(2009).  There is good reason for the explosion of such 
searches.  Belton held that "when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile." 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes 
omitted).  The test seemed pretty clear:  Upon arrest of an 
automobile's 
occupant, 
the 
police——without 
any 
additional 
analysis or justification——may perform an evidentiary search of 
the automobile. 
¶69 Based on law enforcement's response to Belton, the 
Gant court had to address two related questions.  First, whether 
an arrest always allows the police to perform an evidentiary 
search of an automobile recently occupied by the arrestee.  And 
second, if not, whether an arrest can ever——without more——
justify an evidentiary automobile search.  The latter question 
is the one relevant to this case, but its answer won't make any 
sense outside the context of the former.   
¶70 The first question arose because automatic authority 
for 
evidence-gathering 
automobile 
searches 
doesn't 
fit 
comfortably with Belton's rationale.  The basic substrate of the 
Belton court's reasoning comes from Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969), abrogation recognized by Davis v. United 
States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), which addressed protective searches 
(as opposed to evidence-gathering searches).  The Court observed 
that Chimel says  
a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which 
justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
of 
the 
person 
arrested 
and 
of 
the 
immediately 
surrounding 
area. 
Such 
searches 
have 
long 
been 
considered valid because of the need "to remove any 
weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order 
to resist arrest or effect his escape" and the need to 
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.   
Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
¶71 The Chimel rationale works when the arrestee is still 
in the automobile or has ready access to it.  But once the 
arrestee is immobilized or taken from the scene of the arrest, 
Chimel loses its justifying power because the arrestee can no 
longer reach any weapons or evidence that might have been in the 
automobile.  And yet courts have regularly used Belton to 
justify searches in those very circumstances.  See, e.g., Gant, 
556 U.S. at 346.  The Gant court recognized that reading Belton 
to authorize such searches would "untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception——a result clearly 
incompatible with our statement in Belton that it 'in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case 
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful 
custodial arrests.'"  Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
¶72 Gant's answer to the first question, therefore, was 
that arresting an automobile's occupant does not always justify 
an automobile search.  So it returned Belton to its Chimel 
moorings by rejecting the unjustifiably broad reading it had 
accrued over the years. It held "that the Chimel rationale 
authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search."  Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.  That is, Chimel authorizes 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
police to conduct a protective search of an automobile as an 
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. 
¶73 Having held that arrests do not always justify 
automobile searches, the Gant court then had to determine 
whether 
they 
can 
ever, 
standing 
alone, 
provide 
a 
constitutionally acceptable justification.  I believe Gant says 
they can.  The Supreme Court recognized that the Chimel/Belton 
line of reasoning is not the exclusive basis upon which officers 
can search an automobile upon arrest of one of its occupants.  
It said: 
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also 
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle 
context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest 
when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."  
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (SCALIA, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.  Gant's specific holding makes it clear 
that Justice Antonin Scalia's Thornton2 concurrence played a 
pivotal role in the court's reasoning:  
Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United 
States, [] and following the suggestion in Justice 
SCALIA's opinion concurring in the judgment in that 
case, id. at 632, we also conclude that circumstances 
unique to the automobile context justify a search 
incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe 
that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle. 
Gant 556 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted); see also id. at 347 
("Unlike the searches permitted by Justice Scalia's opinion 
concurring in the judgment in Thornton, which we conclude today 
                     
2 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
are reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross[3] 
allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the 
offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is 
broader.").  So let's consider Justice Scalia's "suggestion." 
¶74 Justice Scalia explained that the authority to search 
an arrestee without a warrant does not necessarily depend on the 
Chimel considerations.  Instead, the justification can arise 
from the arrest itself:  "In United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 235 [] (1973), we held that authority to search an 
arrestee's person does not depend on the actual presence of one 
of Chimel's two rationales in the particular case; rather, the 
fact of arrest alone justifies the search."  Thornton, 541 U.S. 
at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The Robinson court was 
quite explicit on this point: 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable 
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search 
incident 
to 
the 
arrest 
requires 
no 
additional 
justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest 
which establishes the authority to search, and we hold 
that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full 
search of the person is not only an exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is 
also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment.  
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.   
¶75 Justice Scalia's Thornton concurrence makes it clear 
that once the authority to conduct the search exists (by virtue 
of the arrest), the only remaining question is its scope.  The 
scope, he explained, depends on the nature of the search being 
                     
3 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
conducted——protective versus evidentiary.  Commenting on the 
Robinson case, he agreed with the Court's rejection of the 
District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that "any protective 
search would have to be limited by the conditions laid down in 
Terry[4] for a search upon less than probable cause to arrest."  
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233.  That is, the protective search is 
comprehensive, and nothing about the arrest need suggest to the 
officer that he is actually in danger or that he might actually 
find anything in need of protection.   
¶76 An evidentiary search performed after arrest, however, 
requires a connection between the offense and the search.  
Justice Scalia observed that "in the context of a general 
evidence-gathering search, the state interests that might 
justify any overbreadth are far less compelling."  Thornton, 541 
U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Therefore, he concluded, 
"I would . . . limit Belton searches to cases where it is 
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle."  Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
So 
Justice 
Scalia's 
Thornton 
concurrence was not about the authority to search, it was about 
the scope of the search.  When conducting a protective search 
consequent upon an arrest, the scope is comprehensive.  When 
conducting an evidentiary search consequent upon arrest, the 
scope is limited to where evidence of the crime might be. 
                     
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
¶77 Where that evidence might be located depends, to a 
very large extent, on the nature of the offense of arrest.  
There is good reason to believe that Gant considered the 
automobile search as a question of scope, as Justice Scalia 
plainly did, rather than one of authority, as our court does 
today.  By way of illustrating the Court's holding, Gant 
juxtaposed a few illustrative cases in which the offense of 
arrest would not extend the evidentiary search to the automobile 
against a few cases in which it would: 
[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the 
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful 
arrest when it is "reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle."  Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (SCALIA, J., 
concurring in judgment). In many cases, as when a 
recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, 
there will be no reasonable basis to believe the 
vehicle contains relevant evidence.[5]  But in others, 
including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest 
will supply a basis for searching the passenger 
compartment 
of 
an 
arrestee's 
vehicle 
and 
any 
containers therein. 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 343-44.  Gant did not assess the "totality of 
circumstances" in each case to determine whether they indicated 
there might be evidence relating to the offense of arrest in the 
automobile at issue.  It simply noted the type of offense (with 
respect to Atwater and Knowles), and called out Belton and 
Thornton without any further analysis.  Of all the cases cited 
in this illustration, Thornton is by far the most important in 
judging the fidelity of our conclusion to Gant's paradigm. 
                     
5 See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 
(2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
¶78 The 
court 
says 
that 
"[u]nlike 
the 
categorical 
approach, which does not utilize facts particular to the case, 
the reasonableness approach requires particularization."  Lead 
op., ¶31.  If the automobile search in this case may not take 
place without particularized suspicion "that the passenger 
compartment, and, specifically, the bag, might contain relevant 
evidence of OWI," id., ¶50, then Thornton does not belong in 
Gant's illustration.  In Thornton, there were quite literally no 
particularized facts connecting the offense of arrest to Mr. 
Thornton's car.  The police pulled him over because the license 
plate tags on the Chevrolet he was driving were actually issued 
to a Ford.  Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.  Mr. Thornton exited his 
car, and then consented to the officer's request to search him.  
Id.  The search of his person netted several bags of illegal 
narcotics.  Id.  The officer promptly arrested Mr. Thornton for 
possession of illegal narcotics and placed him in the back seat 
of the patrol car, whereupon the protective search justified by 
Chimel came to an end.  Id.  Nonetheless, the officer 
immediately commenced an evidentiary search of Mr. Thornton's 
car, pursuant to which he discovered a handgun (which Mr. 
Thornton was not allowed to possess).  Id. 
¶79 The search in Thornton, Gant said, was appropriate 
because "the offense of arrest . . . suppl[ied] a basis for 
searching 
the 
passenger 
compartment 
of 
[Mr. 
Thornton's] 
vehicle . . . ."  Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.  Conspicuous by its 
absence is any mention of factors other than the offense of the 
arrest.  The opinion said nothing about particularized facts, or 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
totality of the circumstances, or any of the other phrases the 
court uses to explain its holding today.  Mr. Thornton was 
arrested for drug possession ergo the police could search his 
car for evidence.   If Gant means what our court says it means, 
then the Supreme Court erred pretty remarkably when it pointed 
to Thornton as an example of its analysis.  Other than the 
offense of arrest, neither the Gant nor the Thornton court 
identified a single fact suggesting the officer might have found 
any 
evidence 
in 
the 
automobile. 
 
Consequently, 
it 
must 
necessarily be true that the United States Supreme Court 
believes that the offense of arrest, without more, can extend 
the scope of a post-arrest evidentiary search to an automobile 
recently occupied by the arrestee. 
¶80 That principle (and its application to Thornton) 
leads, almost mechanically, to the conclusion that in this case 
the scope of the post-arrest evidentiary search appropriately 
encompassed Mr. Coffee's car.  In Thornton, the arrestee 
possessed illegal drugs on his person, which was an offense 
sufficient to bring his car within the scope of the post-arrest 
evidentiary search.  Here, Mr. Coffee possessed alcohol instead 
of narcotics, and he possessed it inside his body instead of in 
a plastic baggie inside one of his pockets.  These distinctions 
appear to have no constitutional significance, nor is any such 
distinction on offer.  Further, the offense of arrest in this 
case is much more directly tied to the automobile than in the 
Thornton matter——OWI cannot be committed without the automobile, 
whereas possession of illegal narcotics can.  Therefore, if 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
possession of illegal narcotics justifies the scope of search in 
Thornton, it perforce justifies the search in this case.6 
* 
¶81 Aside 
from 
my 
disagreement 
with 
the 
majority's 
understanding of Gant, I don't think the "reasonableness" test, 
at least the way we have fashioned it, can be correct.  The 
court 
says 
"[t]hough 
stated 
in 
various 
terms, 
the 
[reasonableness] approach involves 'looking at common sense 
factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances' to 
determine whether it was reasonable to conclude that evidence of 
the crime of the arrest might be found within the vehicle."  
Lead 
op., 
¶30 
(quoting 
United 
States 
v. 
Reagan, 
713 
F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (2010) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 
458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006)).  Frankly, I don't think 
                     
6 It 
is 
theoretically 
possible 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution offers greater protection to drivers in Mr. 
Coffee's circumstances, but no one has made that argument in 
this case.  Nor does any provision of our constitution come to 
mind that might provide that protection.  And if we were 
addressing the application of the Gant/Thornton (concurrence) 
analysis for the first time to a case such as this, I'm not 
certain I would conclude that OWI is an offense of arrest 
capable of expanding the scope of the post-arrest evidentiary 
search to an automobile.  But I believe the Supreme Court's 
approval of Thornton authoritatively answers that question, and 
this court certainly has no room to disagree.  See generally, 
State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, ¶36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775 
("We are bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that sets the minimum 
protections afforded by the federal constitution." (citation 
omitted)); 
and 
State 
v. 
Foster, 
2014 
WI 131, 
¶57, 
360 
Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847 ("Our decisions interpreting the 
United States Constitution are binding law in Wisconsin until 
this court or the United States Supreme Court declares a 
different opinion or rule." (quoted source omitted)). 
No.  2018AP1209-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
that's actually a test.  Saying that we will consider "common 
sense factors" and look at the "totality of the circumstances" 
is really nothing more than saying we won't be obtuse.  It may 
be right for us to disfavor "bright-line rules" in the Fourth 
Amendment context,7 but this just seems like parameter-free ad-
hockery. 
¶82 For all these reasons, I respectfully concur with the 
court's judgment. 
                     
7 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013) ("While the 
desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth 
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad 
categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement 
in a context where significant privacy interests are at 
stake."). 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶83 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  In Arizona 
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009), the United States Supreme 
Court announced that the Fourth Amendment1 allows a warrantless 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest "when it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in 
the vehicle."2  I agree with the lead opinion that under Gant, 
the search must be analyzed by examining the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonableness approach, as opposed to applying 
a categorical approach based solely upon the nature of the crime 
of arrest.  I part ways with the lead opinion, however, in the 
application of the reasonableness approach to the facts and 
circumstances of this case.  I dissent because it was not 
reasonable for Officer Timothy Skelton to believe that Mose B. 
Coffee's vehicle contained evidence relevant to his arrest for 
operating while intoxicated (OWI).  The search of Coffee's 
vehicle incident to arrest was therefore unconstitutional. 
                     
1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides the right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   
2 The Gant Court also clarified that a vehicle may be 
searched incident to arrest when the arrestee is "within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search."  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
2 
 
I.  FACTS 
¶84 The relevant facts are set forth in both the affidavit 
in support of the complaint and the suppression hearing 
testimony. 
¶85 On August 30, 2017, shortly after 11:15 p.m., Officer 
Skelton conducted a traffic stop of Coffee's vehicle for failure 
to display a front license plate.  "Immediately" after Officer 
Skelton turned on his emergency lights, Coffee pulled over into 
a parking lot of a bar and parked very close to another vehicle.  
According to the testimony of Officer Skelton, upon parking, 
Coffee "immediately was getting out of his vehicle so it was 
almost as if he was—knew [Officer Skelton] was behind him and 
was getting out quickly."  Officer Skelton testified to the 
following conversation with Coffee as he exited the vehicle:  "I 
indicated I was performing a traffic stop for the front license 
plate and that I wanted him to stay with his vehicle," to which 
Coffee "indicated that he had been stopped for that same 
occurrence before and that was why he was getting out to show 
[Officer Skelton] that he had a warning for it."  Officer 
Skelton described Coffee as "somewhat upset" about being stopped 
again for failing to have a front license plate. 
¶86 Officer Skelton observed that Coffee had a distinct 
slur to his speech.  He instructed Coffee to "sit down in his 
car."  As he approached Coffee, Officer Skelton "could smell an 
odor of intoxicants coming from his person or from the vehicle."  
He also noticed that Coffee's eyes were glazed over and 
bloodshot, "consistent with the odor—-the strong odor of 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
3 
 
intoxicants."  The body camera footage showed that during 
Officer Skelton's conversation with Coffee, Coffee was seated in 
the driver's seat with the front door open and his legs outside 
of the vehicle, while Officer Skelton stood several feet away.  
When asked where he was coming from, Coffee responded that he 
had been at a friend's house where he "had not had that much" to 
drink. 
¶87 Officer Skelton asked Coffee to step out of his 
vehicle in order to complete some field sobriety tests "[d]ue to 
the level of odors and [his] observations of [] Coffee."  At 
this point, Officer Skelton realized that he had met Coffee a 
couple weeks earlier.  Officer Skelton noticed that Coffee was 
"very talkative" compared to the previous occasion where Coffee 
had been "very quiet."  While Coffee was performing the field 
sobriety tests with Officer Skelton, several other officers 
arrived on the scene. 
¶88 Officer Skelton testified that he believed Coffee was 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated:  "[b]ased off my 
observations of his person, the conversations I had with him, 
the odor of intoxicants, the slurred speech, the field sobriety 
tests that we did."  On re-direct examination, Officer Skelton 
reiterated that he had arrested Coffee based upon a "culmination 
of my observations of his person, field sobriety tests, and 
general odor that was coming from his person." 
¶89 Officer Skelton stated that he informed the other 
officers on scene, Officers Benjamin Fenhouse and Brenden 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
4 
 
Bonnett, that Coffee had been arrested for "operating under the 
influence of alcoholic beverages." 
¶90 Both Officer Bonnett and Officer Fenhouse testified 
that they were tasked with searching Coffee's two-door vehicle.  
When asked what Officer Skelton told him about the nature of the 
search, Officer Bonnett testified: 
A.:  I recall knowing the subject was in custody for 
impaired driving and conducted my search relevant to 
that. 
Q.:  And when you say you conducted your search 
relevant to that, what do you mean? 
A.:  I'd be looking for any substance in the vehicle 
that could impair a driver's ability to operate the 
motor vehicle safely. 
¶91 When questioned about whether there was any smell of 
alcohol emanating from the vehicle, Officer Bonnett testified: 
Q.:  So upon your initially opening the door, your 
police report doesn't mention any smells.  Did you 
smell any alcohol? 
A.:  I don't recall smelling any alcohol. 
Officer Bonnett did not mention any smells of other intoxicants. 
¶92 Officer Bonnett searched the driver-side front seat 
while Officer Fenhouse searched the passenger-side front seat.  
Neither officer found any evidence of open intoxicants.  Officer 
Bonnett subsequently searched behind the driver's seat, where he 
found a cloth bag "full of stuff," including "wires, cables, and 
phones."  Officer Bonnett testified that he looked through the 
bag "for any evidence which would impair a driver's ability to 
operate a motor vehicle."  After "dig[ging] through the bag" for 
over a minute, Officer Bonnett found two mason jars that had 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
5 
 
"flakes of what was suspected to be marijuana."  Upon discovery 
of the mason jars, Officer Bonnett and Officer Fenhouse searched 
the trunk portion of the vehicle and found roughly two pounds of 
marijuana, along with drug paraphernalia. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶93 The 
lead 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
"Skelton 
had 
reasonable suspicion that the passenger compartment might 
contain relevant evidence of OWI" for six reasons.  Lead op., 
¶¶52-57.3  As illustrated below, neither the lead opinion's 
reasons nor its conclusions are supported by the facts in the 
record. 
¶94 First, the lead opinion asserts that Officer Skelton 
could smell an odor of intoxicants coming from the vehicle, and 
therefore there was reason to believe intoxicants would be found 
in the vehicle.  Lead op., ¶52.  The lead opinion reads a 
statement in the affidavit attached to the complaint out of 
context and insinuates that the smell of intoxicants emanated 
from the vehicle separate and apart from Coffee's person.  
However, the full record indicates that Officer Skelton did not 
articulate any particularized reason to believe the smell of 
alcohol emanated from the vehicle.  As Officer Skelton's 
testimony and the body camera footage clarifies, he "could smell 
an odor of intoxicants coming from the vehicle" when Coffee was 
                     
3 The parties do not dispute that if the search of the bag 
in Coffee's backseat is upheld, the subsequent search of the 
trunk cannot be legally challenged.  At oral argument, defense 
counsel clarified that Coffee was not independently challenging 
the search of the trunk. 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
6 
 
seated in it.  During the suppression hearing, Officer Skelton 
described the odor in the following ways: 
 "I believe at that point I had him sit down in 
his car and I could smell an odor of intoxicants 
coming from his person or from the vehicle." 
 "Due to the level of odors and my observations of 
Mr. Coffee, I asked him to step out to do field 
sobriety tests." 
 A "general odor that was coming from his person." 
 "Based off my observations of his person, the 
conversations I had with him, the odor of 
intoxicants, 
the 
slurred 
speech, 
the 
field 
sobriety tests that we did, I believed he was 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
intoxicants."4 
As the body camera footage shows, Officer Skelton remained 
several feet away from the vehicle while Coffee was seated in 
the driver's seat with the door open and legs partly outside.  
Officer Skelton had no occasion to assess whether the vehicle 
independently had an odor of intoxicants. 
¶95 Additionally, Officer Bonnett testified he did not 
smell any alcohol coming from the vehicle, which he searched 
while Coffee was in Officer Skelton's squad car.  Officer 
Bonnett also did not mention the smell of any other intoxicants.  
Viewing the record in full, the claim that there was a reason to 
believe alcohol might be found in the vehicle because it smelled 
of intoxicants is unsupported. 
                     
4 Additionally, as evidenced in the body camera footage, 
Officer Skelton told Coffee to exit the vehicle and perform 
field sobriety tests because "I can smell it on ya." 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
7 
 
¶96 Second, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
Coffee's 
statement that he was coming from a friend's house provided a 
reason to believe that alcohol might be found in the vehicle.  
The lead opinion's logic is that "a private residence has 
alcohol only if it is brought to the residence" and therefore 
Coffee "might have brought the alcohol that he consumed to his 
friend's house and have retained some in his vehicle."  Lead 
op., ¶53.  The only authority cited is a footnote from United 
States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2010), a 
federal case upholding the suppression of evidence seized from a 
vehicle during a search incident to arrest.  The footnote 
follows the magistrate judge's conclusion that a search of a 
vehicle under Gant requires "a particularized and articulable 
reason to believe that evidence of [OWI] is contained inside."  
Id. at 733.  The footnote reads: 
Many different facts may provide a law enforcement 
officer with reason to believe that evidence of [OWI] 
is located inside the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle.  Examples include observations of the driver 
drinking while driving, observations of an open 
container 
of 
alcohol 
in 
plain 
view 
inside 
the 
passenger 
compartment, 
statements 
made 
by 
the 
occupants of the vehicle indicating that an open 
container is in the passenger compartment, the smell 
of 
alcohol 
emanating 
from 
within 
the 
passenger 
compartment, or indications that the driver was 
traveling from a location such as a recreational area 
or campground where alcohol is not available unless it 
is transported in by private vehicle. 
Id. at 733 n.7.  The Reagan court determined that the vehicle's 
location in a recreational area did not support a search when 
the ranger did not articulate any particularized reason why he 
believed the vehicle provided evidence of OWI.  Id. at 733-34.  
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
8 
 
The lead opinion provides no authority for the more attenuated 
proposition that if a person arrested for OWI is driving from a 
friend's house, police will have a reason to believe there is 
evidence of OWI in their vehicle. 
¶97 Third, the lead opinion misconstrues the statement 
that Coffee "continued into the parking lot" to signify that 
"Coffee was hesitant to pull over because he knew there was 
something in the automobile that he should not have had."  Lead 
op., ¶54.  This interpretation directly contradicts the evidence 
in the record which indicates Coffee immediately pulled over.  
Officer Skelton was asked point blank: 
Q.:  Okay.  So safe to say that immediately upon 
turning on your emergency lights [Coffee] pulled into 
the parking lot? 
A.:  Correct. 
The facts of record clearly show Coffee was not hesitant to pull 
over.  Therefore, this factor can not support the search of 
Coffee's vehicle. 
¶98 Fourth, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
claims 
that 
"Coffee's 
careless parking and hasty exit from his vehicle could indicate 
that he was trying to distance himself from something in the 
vehicle that he knew he should not have had."  Lead op., ¶55.  
The lead opinion ignores Officer Skelton's testimony that Coffee 
"indicated that he had been stopped for that same [front license 
plate violation] before and that was why he was getting out to 
show [him] that he had a warning for it."  Coffee's careless 
parking and hasty exit from the vehicle fails to provide any 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
9 
 
particular reason to believe that alcohol might be found in his 
vehicle. 
¶99 Fifth, the lead opinion states that because Coffee was 
more talkative than he had been during one past interaction with 
Officer Skelton, "Skelton could have believed Coffee was nervous 
because he had something to hide."  Lead op., ¶56 (emphasis 
added).  Officer Skelton described Coffee as talkative while 
they "were walking over to the area . . . to do the field 
tests."  The record of the past interaction consists of one 
statement that Coffee "had picked up an individual from a 
hospital from an accident," and had been "very quiet at that 
time." 
¶100 The lead opinion uses the term "could have believed" 
because there is no evidence that Officer Skelton believed that 
Coffee's talkativeness equated to nervousness.  Officer Skelton 
never characterized Coffee as nervous, and the State never 
argued that Coffee's nervousness formed a basis for the search.  
While a suspect's nervousness could be a factor to consider in 
other cases, see, e.g., State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 214-
15, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995), this court is bound by the facts in 
the record.  Coffee was never described as nervous, and 
therefore it could not be a factor that formed the basis for 
Officer Skelton's search of Coffee's vehicle. 
¶101 Finally, the lead opinion justifies its conclusion 
based on Coffee's state of "extreme[] intoxicat[ion]."  Lead 
op., ¶57.  As support, the lead opinion cites to a court of 
appeals case from Kansas involving the search of a vehicle based 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
10 
 
in part on an odor of intoxicant emanating from the vehicle.  
See State v. Ewertz, 305 P.3d 23, 28 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).  As 
discussed earlier, supra ¶¶94-95, there is no indication in the 
record that an odor of intoxicants was emanating from the 
vehicle. 
¶102 Of greater concern is the catchall statement that 
"when a person is extremely intoxicated, it is not illogical to 
assume intoxicants could be close by."  Lead op., ¶57.  A 
finding of "extreme intoxication" invites police to always 
search a vehicle after an OWI arrest, despite the absence of any 
facts indicating there might be evidence of OWI in a particular 
vehicle.  United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818 (D.C. 2012), 
illustrates the distinction between the lead opinion's broad 
statement and the particularization required when discussing 
whether it is reasonable to believe evidence of OWI will be 
found in a vehicle. 
¶103 In Taylor, the defendant rear-ended a vehicle occupied 
by three Deputy United States Marshals.  Id. at 820.  After 
arresting the defendant for driving under the influence, 
officers searched the truck and found a loaded handgun.  Id.  
The trial court suppressed the evidence as the fruits of an 
unlawful search.  Id. at 821. 
¶104 In upholding suppression of the evidence, the Taylor 
court addressed Gant and discussed how the principles "apply to 
this arrest for driving under the influence."  Id. at 826.  The 
Taylor court reasoned: 
Whenever probable cause exists to effect an arrest for 
DUI, there will be evidence that the individual in 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
11 
 
question is intoxicated, has been drinking recently, 
and has been driving despite being (and perhaps while 
becoming) inebriated.  In this case, the police 
certainly had reason to believe (indeed, they had 
probable cause to conclude) that Taylor was drunk.  
The smell of alcohol was on his breath, he was swaying 
back and forth, he had lost control of his vehicle, 
and he had urinated on a nearby tree.  The breath test 
showed a blood alcohol content of .161.  This evidence 
gave ample reason to believe that Mr. Taylor had 
consumed 
alcohol. 
 
But 
there 
was 
nothing 
in 
particular——no tell-tale sign——to suggest that he had 
been drinking in his vehicle. 
It was, of course, possible that evidence of drinking—
such as empty or partially full containers of alcohol—
would be found in the vehicle, just as it is possible 
that such evidence may be found in any vehicle driven 
by an intoxicated individual.  But the question 
under . . . Gant is whether it is reasonable to 
believe that such evidence might be found in this 
specific 
vehicle. 
 
The 
suspicion 
must 
be 
particularized. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶105 This case lacks particular facts to suggest that 
alcohol might be found in Coffee's vehicle.  There were signs 
that Coffee was intoxicated, but the State cannot rely solely on 
those facts to search his vehicle.  The specific facts giving 
rise to the conclusion that Coffee was intoxicated "did not make 
it any more likely that he had been drinking in the vehicle."  
Id. at 827. 
¶106 Although there was no such evidence here, there are 
factual circumstances which would support the search of a 
vehicle incident to an arrest for OWI.  For example, if police 
observed, or were informed, that a suspect was consuming alcohol 
while driving or just before driving.  See, e.g., City of West 
Bend v. Willie, No. 2018AP151, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd 
 
12 
 
Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018) (noting that the police received "a 
report from the manager of Wendy's that Willie and his passenger 
had open beers in their vehicle"); State v. Relyea, 2014AP2860-
CR, unpublished slip op., ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 18, 2015) ("The 
officer saw that Relyea was 'guzzling' from what appeared to be 
a bottle of 'microbrew' beer.").  Other circumstances include 
where an officer observes evidence of drinking or an attempt to 
hide something in the vehicle.  See, e.g., State v. Bons, 2007 
WI App 124, ¶15, 301 Wis. 2d 227, 731 N.W.2d 367 (unusual 
behavior "coupled with the presence of the shot glass on the 
console, gave [the officer] reasonable suspicion that Bons had 
been committing or was about to commit a crime involving 
alcohol").  None of these factual circumstances were present in 
this case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶107 I agree with the lead opinion that Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
requires a reasonableness approach to a search incident to 
arrest based upon the totality of the circumstances.  However, 
in this case, Officer Skelton did not have any particular reason 
to believe that Coffee's vehicle might contain evidence relevant 
to his arrest for OWI.  The search of Coffee's vehicle incident 
to arrest was therefore unconstitutional and the evidence should 
have been suppressed. 
¶108 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶109 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No. 2018AP1209.rfd