Title: In re Estate of Nielsen

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN ISABEL NIELSEN, a/k/a HELEN I. NIELSON, a/k/a HELEN NIELSON, Deceased: PAUL D. MATHEWSON v. THE ESTATE OF HELEN ISABEL NIELSEN, a/k/a HELEN I. NEILSEN, a/k/a/ HELEN NIELSEN2011 WY 71Case Number: No. S-10-0200Decided: 04/25/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN ISABEL NIELSEN, a/k/a HELEN I. NIELSEN, a/k/a 
HELEN NIELSEN, Deceased:PAUL D. MATHEWSON,Appellant 
(Objector),v.THE ESTATE OF HELEN ISABEL NIELSEN, 

a/k/a 
HELEN I. NIELSEN, a/k/a HELEN NIELSEN, Deceased.Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Paul 
D. Mathewson, pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Edward 
G. Luhm, Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Paul 
Mathewson (Grandson) objected to an application for summary distribution of his 
grandmother Helen Nielsen's estate.  
The district court overruled Grandson's objection and granted summary 
judgment to the applicants.  After 
the district court denied Grandson's motion for a new trial, he appealed.  We conclude that Grandson's motion for a 
new trial was actually a void motion for reconsideration, rendering his notice 
of appeal untimely.  This Court, 
therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider his appeal.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue is whether Grandson's notice of appeal was timely, thereby conferring 
jurisdiction on this Court.  

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Helen Nielsen 
died testate on May 29, 2008.  She 
owned a mobile home and real property in Thermopolis, Wyoming.  Ms. Nielsen's will devised all of her 
personal property to her daughter, Ember Mathewson (Daughter) and the remainder 
of her estate to her three children, Gerald Brotherston, Dennis Nielsen and 
Daughter, in equal parts.  The will 
also appointed Daughter as "Executrix."  
Grandson is Daughter's child.    

 
 
[¶4]      It is unclear 
what happened with Ms. Nielsen's estate, but prior to a final distribution, both 
Daughter and Mr. Brotherston died.  
Daughter and her husband, Kenton Mathewson, were residents of Washington 
and had, in 2007, executed a community property agreement which declared all of 
their property and any property later acquired by either of them to be community 
property and "upon the death of either of us, title to all community property as 
defined in the preceding paragraph is to vest immediately in fee simple in the 
survivor."    

 
 
[¶5]      After Daughter's 
and Mr. Brotherston's deaths, Mr. Nielsen, Mr. Brotherston's heirs and Kenton 
Mathewson (applicants) filed an application for decree of distribution under the 
summary procedures applicable to estates valued at less than $150,000.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1-201 through 205 
(LexisNexis 2009).  The application 
indicated that the only assets of the estate were the real property and mobile 
home, and they had been appraised at $51,000.  Kenton Mathewson claimed Daughter's 
share of Ms. Nielsen's estate under the terms of the community property 
agreement.  Grandson filed an 
objection, claiming that under Wyoming law he was a rightful heir to Daughter's 
estate and Ms. Nielsen's property was not governed by the community property 
agreement because Ms. Nielsen's estate had not been probated or distributed at 
the time of Daughter's death.  The 
applicants filed a response to Grandson's objection and requested summary 
judgment on the issue of whether or not the community property agreement applied 
to the Thermopolis property and a decree ordering distribution of the estate 
property.   

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court held a hearing and, on May 20, 2010, entered an order granting summary 
judgment and a decree of distribution in favor of the applicants.  The district court concluded that the 
community property agreement applied to the Thermopolis property and distributed 
Daughter's share to her husband, Kenton Mathewson.     

 
 
[¶7]      Although Grandson 
had been represented by counsel during the summary judgment proceedings, he 
filed a pro se motion for a new trial 
on May 28, 2010.  His stated bases 
for the new trial motion were:

 
 

1.    
Judge 
erred in not granting request for additional hearing to provide testimony of 
witnesses, additional proof of ownership interests and intent, audio recordings 
documents and probate.

 
 

2.    
 Judge erred in not ordering Probate.  Distribution by Affidavit and Summary 
Procedure is illegal in said case per Wyoming Law.

 
 
WS 
2-1-201(a)(i) Probate code

      The value of 
entire estate exceeds 150,000 dollars. Check Exhibit A.

 
 
WS 
2-1-201(a)(iii) Probate code

      Ember Mathewson 
was named in will and appointed Personal Representative of estate and retained 
Jerry Williams for Probate.  
noteJudge Skar stated in court "Mrs. Mathewson obviously wanted husband 
to receive all of her Hiers [sic] inheritense [sic], because she signed a 
community property agreement".  
Well, she did not sign an order or statement for Estate to be distributed 
by Affidavit and Summary Procedure and for her son, Paul Mathewson, not to 
attain ownership of property if she died before Probate.  "Obviously".  The court is not a two way street, 
subject to a Judges whimsey [sic].

 
 
WS 
2-1-201(a)(iv)  Probate 
code

      Claiming 
distributee Kenton Mathewson is not entitled to payment or delivery of 
property.  Paul and Richard 
Mathewson have rights of distributees, per Wyoming law, as direct 
descendants.  

 
 
WS 
2-1-205 Probate code

      Notice by 
publication was not made for Helen Isabel Nielsen.

 
 

3.    
Attorney 
for Objectee [sic] (Paul Mathewson) was inefficient; Did not introduce evidence 
or witnesses that had been provided.

 
 

4.    
No 
new representative was appointed by court after Executors [sic] death, as per 
Wyoming Law.

 
 

5.    
Slayer, 
Kenton Mathewson, cannot benefit from slayee's, Ember Mathewson, estate, per 
Wyoming Law.  Ember's death is still 
under investigation due to circumstances.

 
 

6.    
Error 
by court, in that Community Property Agreement does not encompass after death, 
as decedent has no future and Wyoming laws do not recognize step-fathers or 
husbands of Hiers [sic] as an Hier [sic].

 
 
[¶8]      Grandson's 
Exhibit A was an unsigned and unverified list of assets that he apparently 
claimed should have been included in the Nielsen estate and would have 
disqualified it from summary distribution.  
The list stated:

 
 

1.    
$40,000 
cash in bank

2.    
$30,000 
cash left in home

3.    
$17,000 
in bonds

4.    
$10,500 
in uncashed ssi checks

5.    
$6,000 
received in estate sale

6.    
2 
vehicles valued at $5,000  

7.    
Property 
valued at $60,000

8.    
Life 
insurance value?

9.    
And 
this is just what I personally know of and can be verified by other 
parties

 
 
[¶9]      Grandson amended 
his motion for a new trial on July 28, 2010, by requesting a stay of execution 
of the summary judgment and decree of distribution; arguing that the community 
property agreement was not valid in Wyoming because it was not properly 
witnessed in accordance with Wyoming will execution laws; moving "the court 
approve appeal to Supreme Court for a ruling as to the issue of who the Heirs 
are . . . ;" and requesting that the court vacate the summary judgment 
order.       

 
 
[¶10]   The district court held a hearing 
on August 2, 2010, and ordered the applicants' attorney to "provide to the Court 
in writing a list of assets which had belonged to the deceased and which have 
been distributed or transferred out of the state of Wyoming."  The applicants objected to the order, 
arguing that "the Court does not have jurisdiction to make such order and that 
[Grandson] did not seek any such order."  
Nevertheless, the applicants provided an accounting on August 19, 2010, 
which indicated that Ms. Nielsen's bank accounts were not part of the estate 
because they were co-owned with Daughter and passed by operation of law upon 
death, other personal property items had apparently been disposed of by Daughter 
prior to her death, the cash referenced in Grandson's Exhibit A was not located 
in the house and a few old Social Security checks, totaling $2,600, had been 
reissued and the funds were used to pay attorney fees.  The district court did not rule on the 
applicants' accounting and, instead, on the same day (August 19, 2010) entered 
an order denying Grandson's motion for a new trial.  Grandson filed a notice of appeal on 
August 30, 2010.        

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   
Although neither party to this appeal raised the issue of 
jurisdiction, this Court has a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal.  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
existence of jurisdiction is a question of law and our review is de novo.  Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 
8, *** P.3d *** (Wyo. 2011).  This 
Court's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final, appealable orders.  Plymale, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d  at 1023.  
See also, W.R.A.P. 1.04(a) and 1.05.  W.R.A.P. 2.01 requires that a notice of 
appeal be filed within 30 days from entry of an appealable order.  

 
 
[¶12]   Only proper post-judgment motions 
toll the time for filing an appeal.  
Ragsdale v. Hartford Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 2007 WY 163, ¶ 3, 169 P.3d 78, 79-80 (Wyo. 2007).  Motions for reconsideration are not 
allowed by our court rules and do not toll the time for filing an appeal.  Plymale, ¶ 7, 125 P.3d  at 1024; Ragsdale, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d  at 81.  A post-judgment motion which is 
otherwise titled but, in actuality, only requests reconsideration of the 
district court's judgment will be considered an improper motion for 
reconsideration and will not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.  Id., ¶¶ 7-8, 169 P.3d  at 81.  This Court looks to the substance of a 
post-judgment motion to determine its appropriateness.  Id., ¶ 4, 169 P.3d  at 80.  

 
 
[¶13]   Grandson filed a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59.  Rule 
59 articulates the following grounds for a new trial:

 
 

(a) 
Grounds.  
A new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties, and on all or part of the issues. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment, if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings 
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted for any of 
the following causes:

            
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee, master 
or prevailing party, or any order of the court or referee, or abuse of 
discretion, by which the party was prevented from having a fair 
trial;

            
(2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;

            
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against;

            
(4) Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice;

            
(5) Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large 
or too small;

            
(6) That the verdict, report or decision is not sustained by sufficient 
evidence or is contrary to law;

            
(7) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which the 
party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial;

            
(8) Error of law occurring at the trial.

 
 
Rule 
59(a) presupposes that the district court conducted a trial, and the grounds 
upon which a new trial may be granted all pertain to irregularities in the trial 
proceedings or errors committed at trial.  
There was no trial in this case; the district court decided the case on 
summary judgment.  Thus, a motion 
for a new trial was not appropriate.

 
 
[¶14]   Giving Grandson the benefit of the 
doubt, we conclude that he may have intended to file a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59(e).  
Our case law is clear with regard to the bases for altering or amending a 
judgment.  

 
 
A 
Rule 59(e) motion is only appropriate if one of three grounds exists: 1) the 
availability of new evidence not previously available; 2) an intervening change 
in controlling law, or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent 
manifest injustice. 

 
 

Ragsdale, 
¶ 
5, 169 P.3d  at 80.  

 
 
[¶15]   The majority of Grandson's 
complaints were based upon perceived violations of the Wyoming probate code and 
the efficacy of the community property agreement.  He did not indicate that there was an 
intervening change in controlling law nor did he demonstrate a need to correct a 
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.  He did introduce "evidence" that was not 
presented to the district court during the summary judgment proceeding; however, 
there was absolutely no indication that this evidence was not previously 
available.  

 
 
[¶16]   We will not separately address each 
of Grandson's claims, but it is helpful to provide a couple of 
illustrations.  He claimed that the 
estate should not have been settled by summary disposition because it was valued 
at more than $150,000.  During the 
time relevant to this matter, sections 2-1-201 through 205 provided a summary 
procedure for distribution if the value of the entire estate did not exceed 
$150,000.1  That law did not change during the time 
between the judgment and Grandson's new trial motion and he made no showing that 
the evidence pertaining to the value of the estate could not have been provided 
during the summary judgment proceeding.  
Similarly, Grandson's arguments with regard to the efficacy of the 
community property agreement were simply a rehash of the arguments presented in 
opposition to the applicants' motion for summary judgment.  

 
 
[¶17]   A motion to alter or amend a 
judgment "is not a mechanism to relitigate issues that the court has already 
decided, nor should parties make additional arguments which should have been 
made before judgment."  Ragsdale, ¶ 5, 169 P.3d  at 80.  Grandson did not present any valid 
reason to alter or amend the judgment; he was simply seeking reconsideration of 
the district court's summary judgment order.  As such, his Rule 59 motion was actually 
a motion for reconsideration and did not toll the time for appealing from the 
district court's order granting summary judgment and distributing the estate 
assets.  The summary judgment order 
was entered on May 20, 2010.  
Grandson's August 30, 2010, notice of appeal was untimely under W.R.A.P 
2.01 because it was not filed within 30 days after entry of a final appealable 
order.    

 
 
[¶18]   Appeal dismissed.   

 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The legislature amended the relevant statutes, effective July 1, 2011, to 
allow summary distribution if the entire value of the estate located in Wyoming 
or subject to probate administration in this state does not exceed 
$200,000.   2011 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 58 (S.F. 68).