Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: LARRY FINLEY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: LARRY FINLEY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2006 WY 46132 P.3d 185Case Number: 05-101Decided: 04/18/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: LARRY 
FINLEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner/Employee-Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Dion J. 
Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
D.J.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Larry Finley 
(Finley) appeals a district court order affirming the Office of Administrative 
Hearings' denial of his claim for worker's compensation benefits on the grounds 
that he failed to carry his burden of establishing a compensable injury.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Finley provides 
the following statement of the issue:

 
 
Did the 
district court err as a matter of law in determining that Mr. Finley was not 
eligible for permanent partial disability benefits, and past and future medical 
expenses pursuant to § 27-14-405 and § 27-14-401, because he has not met his 
burden of proof to show that treatment was the result of his work-related 
injury.

 
 
The 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) offers the 
following statement:

 
 
A 
claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits must prove that he suffered an 
injury as defined by the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, and specifically, 
that the claimed injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  Does substantial evidence support the 
hearing examiner's conclusion that Finley failed to meet this burden of 
proof?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 24, 
2003, Finley was on his lunch break at his employer's worksite when he suffered 
a seizure and fell to the ground.  
Finley suffered a severe brain injury.  On December 7, 2003, Finley filed an 
injury report claiming that he had suffered a work-related injury.  The Division issued a Final 
Determination on January 13, 2004, denying benefits:

 
 
Definition 
of injury does not include:  Injury 
caused by the fact the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of a 
controlled substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken as directed by 
an authorized health care provider.  
(Wyoming Statute 27-14-102(a)(xi)(B)(I)) Medical reports received 
indicate the incident on 11/24/2003 appeared to be the result of an alcohol 
withdrawal seizure or syncopal event related to drinking.

 
 
Definition 
of injury does not include:  Injury 
due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee.  (Wyoming Statute 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(C)).

 
 
Finley 
objected and a contested case hearing was held August 24, 
2004.

 
 
[¶4]      Finley testified 
that because of his brain injury, he had no recollection of the day of the 
accident.  Finley indicated that he 
had received conflicting descriptions of what happened from his coworkers:  Some stated that Finley had fallen off 
his trackhoe while warming up his lunch on the exhaust, and others told him that 
he was just standing on the ground when he fell.  Finley admitted that he had an alcohol 
problem and would consume a six pack of beer or more every night, including the 
night before the accident.  However, 
he denied being intoxicated on the day of the accident.

 
 
[¶5]      In addition to 
Finley's testimony, various medical records were admitted into evidence.  The records include notations made 
contemporaneously with Finley's treatment for his injury.  One record notes a history of alcohol 
use and with a blood count that "shows elevated MCV and MCH in the classic 
pattern consistent with alcohol dependence," and diagnosed "alcohol dependence 
with probable psychological dependence, possible alcohol withdrawal related 
syncope or seizure."  A treating 
physician concluded that Finley suffered a seizure or a "syncopal episode, 
probably secondary to alcohol withdrawal."  
Other records contained similar statements.

 
 
[¶6]      At the conclusion 
of Finley's testimony, he rested and the Division moved for a judgment as a 
matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52.  
The hearing examiner orally granted the motion, and a written order 
confirming the ruling was issued on September 23, 2004.  The hearing examiner found that Finley 
had suffered a seizure, and given his history of alcohol use and the medical 
records indicating an alcohol withdrawal seizure or syncopal event, he concluded 
that there "was no evidence that [Finley's] fall was the result of his work 
effort or related to his work activities."  
Accordingly, the hearing examiner concluded that Finley had failed to 
meet his burden to establish that he had suffered a compensable injury.  Finley filed a Petition for Review with 
the district court, which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.  Finley has appealed to this 
Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When a hearing 
examiner concludes that a worker's compensation claimant did not meet his or her 
burden of proof, our review is governed by the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.

 
 
Under 
the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard, we are charged with 
examining the entire record.  In our 
examination and review of a hearing examiner's determination, we defer to the 
hearing examiner's findings of fact.  
We will examine conflicting and contradictory evidence to see if the 
hearing examiner reasonably could have made its findings based on all the 
evidence before it.  The findings of 
fact may include determinations of witness credibility, as the hearing examiner 
is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses.  In our review, we will not overturn the 
hearing examiner's determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.

 
 

Boyce v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2005 
WY 9, ¶6, 105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Brees v. Gulley Enterprises, Inc. 6 P.3d 128, 132 (Wyo. 2000)). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      The hearing 
examiner concluded that Finley had failed to carry his burden of establishing 
that he had suffered a compensable injury1:

 
 
An 
employee-claimant in a worker's compensation case has the burden to prove all 
the statutory elements which comprise a compensable injury by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶6, 
16 P.3d 710, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); Sherwin-Williams Company v. Borchert, 
994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 2000); Thornberg 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 913 P.2d 863, 866 
(Wyo. 1996).  This includes 
establishing the cause of the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 
17, ¶10, 19 P.3d 500, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); Hanks, ¶6; State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 1996).

 
 

Bruns v. 
TW Services, Inc., 2001 
WY 127, ¶12, 36 P.3d 608, 613 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
An 
injury "aris[es] out of" the employment when a causal connection exists between 
the injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed.  [Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 
Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208, 210 (Idaho 1963).]  Under these guidelines, "if the injury 
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been 
contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a 
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it 
arises "out of" the employment."  
Id. (quoting Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 
Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736, 738-39 (Idaho 1951)).  An injury is not compensable if it 
cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing cause and if it 
comes from a hazard that the employee would have been equally exposed to outside 
of the employment. 380 P.2d  at 210-11.

 
 

State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376-77 (Wyo. 1997); see also Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 90, ¶11, 48 P.3d 1057, 
1062 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶9]      We need not 
consider any of the evidence relating to Finley's history of alcohol abuse or 
the medical records ascribing Finley's seizure to a syncopal event caused by 
alcohol withdrawal in order to uphold the hearing examiner's conclusion that 
Finley failed to meet his burden of proof.  
Finley's case that he suffered a compensable injury rests entirely upon 
the fact that the injury occurred while he was at work.  Presence on an employer's premises is 
insufficient by itself to establish the requisite nexus between the injury and 
employment.  Matter of Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 
60 (Wyo. 
1986); 1 Modern Workers Compensation, Employment Connection § 110:7 at 17 
(1993) (citing Corean); see also 82 
Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation § 
249 at 238 (2003).  As we noted in 
Corean, a claimant's burden to 
establish a compensable injury pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LexisNexis 2005) encompasses two distinct concepts:

 
 
The 
critical statutory phrase emphasized above [the definition of "injury"] is found 
in the worker's compensation statutes of most states.  The courts in these states recognize a 
subtle distinction between the phrases "arising out of" employment and "in the 
course of employment."  An accident 
arises out of employment if it is causally connected to the employment; it 
occurs in the course of employment if it occurs at the time or place, or under 
the circumstances of the employment.  
1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.10 at 3-3 (1985).  In a majority of the states, when an 
employee is hurt on the employer's premises, it is conclusively established 
under the premises rule that the employee was acting within the course of his 
employment.  Id., § 15.00 at 4-3.  This does not mean, however, that the 
worker is necessarily entitled to benefits.  He still must show that the harm arose 
out of his employment, i.e., was causally connected to his employment. 
Id., § 12.32 
at 3-348.79.

 
 

Corean, 
723 P.2d  
at 60.  Accordingly, we rejected a 
contention that a causal nexus between an employee's injury and his employment 
should be conclusively established based solely upon the fact that the injury 
occurred on the employer's premises.  
Id. at 60-61; see also Richard v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division, 831 P.2d 244, 247 (Wyo. 1992); State 
ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Miller, 787 P.2d 89, 90 
(Wyo. 1990); and Archuleta v. Carbon County School District 
No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 93-94 (Wyo. 1990).  The sum total of Finley's evidence is 
that he was at work, suffered some sort of seizure or blackout, and fell 
striking his head on the ground.  
Finley makes no argument, and our review of the record discloses no 
evidence, that any condition of his employment was the cause of his injury.  In the absence of such evidence, Finley 
has failed to establish that his injury "arose out of" his employment.  Accordingly, the hearing examiner 
correctly concluded that Finley had failed to carry his burden and establish 
that he suffered a compensable injury.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court order affirming 
the hearing examiner's denial of benefits is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2005) 
defines "injury" as:

 
 
 any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extra hazardous duties incident to the business.