Title: Rogers v. North Dakota

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2017 ND 271Ronald William
Rogers, Jr., Petitioner and Appellantv.State of North Dakota, Respondent and
AppelleeNo. 20170026Appeal from the District Court of Cass
County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Thomas
R. Olson, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Justice.Samuel A. Gereszek (argued) and Anna Dearth
(appeared), third-year law student, under the Rule on Limited Practice of Law by Law Students,
East Grand Forks, MN, for petitioner and appellant.Tristan J. Van de Streek, Assistant State's Attorney,
Fargo, ND, for respondent and appellee.Rogers v.
StateNo. 20170026Jensen,
Justice.[¶1] Ronald Rogers, Jr., appeals from a judgment
denying his application for post-conviction relief and orders denying his post-hearing motions to
amend the findings of fact and for a new trial. Because the district court did not err in ruling that
Rogers received effective assistance of trial counsel or abuse its discretion in denying the
post-hearing motions, we affirm the district court's judgment denying the request for
post-conviction relief.I[¶2] Rogers
conditionally pled guilty to murdering his wife and to willful disturbance of a dead body,
reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his confession to
police based on a lack of Miranda warnings and involuntariness. In State v. Rogers, 2014 ND 134, ¶ 30, 848 N.W.2d 257, this Court
affirmed the conviction, concluding "Rogers was not in police custody when he confessed to the
crimes and his confession was voluntary." Pertinent to this proceeding, this Court
explained:Looking at the totality of the facts, we conclude Rogers'
confession was voluntary. Applying the first prong, the characteristics and condition of the
accused at the time of the confession, the district court found, "[Rogers] had taken a sleep aid,
but was not otherwise under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [Rogers] indicated that he felt
good or fine on more than one occasion." The court also found "[Rogers] denied being suicidal,
and any mental health issues he may have been experiencing at the time were not significant
enough to delay his release." The court additionally noted Rogers' medical assessments appeared
to be in the normal ranges. The court determined there was no indication that the sleep aid
Trazadone affected his cognitive abilities. The district court's findings are supported by sufficient
competent evidence, as indicated by the testimony of the detectives and [Rogers' hospital
RN]. Id. at ¶ 28.[¶3]
Rogers filed an application for post-conviction relief contending he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in the district court because his attorney did not adequately attack the
validity of his confession by pointing out his altered mental state caused by the combination of
his excessive blood alcohol level and contemporaneous use of Trazadone. Following a hearing,
the district court denied the application because Rogers failed to demonstrate his trial attorney's
representation was deficient. The court also denied his motions to amend the findings and for a
new trial. Subsequent to filing the notice of appeal Rogers filed a motion to correct the record
which was also denied by the district court.II[¶4] Rogers argues the district court erred in ruling he received effective
assistance of counsel from his trial attorney.[¶5] To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Rogers must show: 1) his counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
See, e.g., Booth v. State,
2017 ND 97, ¶ 7, 893 N.W.2d 186. The
second prong is satisfied in the context of a guilty plea if the defendant shows there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial. Id. at
¶ 9. Whether a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law fully reviewable on appeal.
Id. at ¶ 7.[¶6]
Rogers' arguments focus on his trial attorney's failure to stress Rogers' extreme intoxication,
coupled with the effects of Trazadone, at the time he was questioned by police and confessed. In
particular, Rogers focuses on our prior decision that quoted the district court's determination that
Rogers "was not otherwise under the influence of drugs or alcohol." Rogers, 2014 ND 134, ¶ 28, 848 N.W.2d 257. Rogers argues that
this is contrary to the record which clearly establishes that he was under the influence of both
alcohol and drugs at the time of his confession and that his trial counsel should have offered
evidence of how the interaction of alcohol and Trazadone would have altered his mental
state.[¶7] At the post-conviction relief hearing, Rogers testified he
had a blood alcohol concentration of .375 several hours before his confession as verified by his
medical records. He further testified that based on his calculations utilizing a .015 blood alcohol
dissipation rate per hour, he would still have had a blood alcohol concentration of .16 when
police began questioning him. He also testified that he would have been under the influence of
Trazadone when police began questioning. Rogers contends these facts establish that his
confession was involuntary. He offered no expert testimony to support his claim. In denying the
petition, the district court found Rogers' trial attorney was not deficient because the "issues that .
. . Rogers now characterizes as relating to 'mental state' were addressed by Attorney Brandborg
and the trial court judge as part of the analysis of the issue of whether the confession was
voluntarily made."[¶8] The record of the suppression hearing
supports the district court's decision. Documentary evidence introduced at the hearing informed
the court that Rogers had a blood alcohol level of .3754 when admitted at 10:40 a.m. and before
confessing he had been given Trazadone to help him sleep. His trial attorney pointed out that
Rogers was "depressed and drinking heavily" before being admitted to the hospital and was
"under the influence of sleeping medication" when questioned. The only thing that was not
brought specifically to the court's attention was Rogers' own estimation that he had a .16 blood
alcohol concentration when questioning began. However, the district court in the suppression
order specifically found Rogers "was not under the influence of alcohol, and there was no
indication that the Trazadone given to him to help him sleep affected his cognitive abilities." In
the order denying the request to suppress the confession Rogers gave to law enforcement the
district court noted that it had considered all of the circumstances present at the time of the
confession. Those circumstances included the statements made by Rogers, that Rogers initiated
the contact with law enforcement, that Rogers indicated he felt fine, the observations of Rogers
made by medical staff and that the hospital staff was both checking on Rogers and being
protective of Rogers' well-being. Based on a review of the record, the district court did not err in
finding that Rogers' trial counsel's failure to provide additional evidence on the interaction of
alcohol and Trazadone did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of all
the other evidence establishing that the confession was given voluntarily.[¶9] The position asserted by Rogers relies on his own extrapolation of his blood
alcohol concentration at the time of his confession and the naked assertion that his extrapolated
blood alcohol concentration coupled with the Trazadone precludes a determination that his
confession was voluntary. His position essentially asserts that as a matter of law it was
ineffective assistance of counsel not to call an expert witness when a defendant has given a
confession subsequent to the consumption of alcohol coupled with the use of a drug.
See Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D. 1974) ("experts in this
field can arrive by the process of extrapolation at a fairly reasonable estimate of the percentage of
blood alcohol in the average person at the time of a certain event") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Given the facts of this case, where the district court had access to the medical records,
there was a videotape of the confession, medical personnel provided their observations of the
defendant, the defendant initiated the contact with law enforcement, the defendant repeatedly
indicated he felt okay, the defendant stated he was proceeding voluntarily and his trial counsel
argued the defendant's mental state in conjunction with the assertion that the confession was not
voluntary, the district court did not err in finding that Rogers' trial counsel's representation did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. In the absence of something more than
Rogers' naked assertion that his mental state would have been altered at the time of his
confession, the district court did not err in finding that Rogers failed to establish a reasonable
probability that, but for his trial counsel's alleged unprofessional errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.III[¶10] Rogers argues the district court erred in denying his post-hearing
motions.[¶11] After the district court denied his request for
post-conviction relief, Rogers moved to amend the district court's finding that the issues were
addressed by his trial counsel and the district court in the suppression proceedings. The abuse of
discretion standard of review applies to a district court's ruling on a motion to amend the district
court's findings. See Werven v.
Werven, 2016 ND 60, ¶ 24,
877 N.W.2d 9. A district court abuses its discretion only if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable or
unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a
reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. See Eagleman v. State, 2016 ND 54, ¶ 19, 877 N.W.2d 1. The motion to
amend the findings was simply a repeat of the arguments Rogers submitted in support of his
denied application for post-conviction relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.[¶12] Rogers next filed a motion for new
trial again asserting the same arguments previously rejected in the denial of his request for
post-conviction relief. The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a district court
decision on a motion for a new trial. See State v. Lemons, 2004 ND 44, ¶ 18, 675 N.W.2d 148. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.[¶13]
Following the denial of his application for post-conviction relief, the denial of his motion to
amend the findings and the denial of his motion for a new trial, Rogers filed a notice of appeal
from the denial of his application and the two post-hearing motions. A couple of months later,
Rogers filed a motion to "correct the record" pursuant to N.D.R.App.P. 10(h). It was accompanied by a
66-page brief which contained documents copied from the internet related to "Trazadone
Interaction" and the rate at which alcohol metabolizes. The documents are consistent with his
testimony at the hearing on his application. The district court denied the motion, but allowed the
submission to become part of the record essentially as an "offer of proof." Rogers did not file an
appeal from the order denying his request to correct the record. Even if the denial of his motion
to correct the record could be considered on appeal, the abuse of discretion standard of review
applies to a district court decision on a motion to correct the record under N.D.R.App.P. 10(h)(2). See generally
Waldie v. Waldie, 2008 ND 97, ¶ 11, 748 N.W.2d 683 ("When a district
court may do something, it is generally a matter of discretion.") (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because the documents were not erroneously omitted or misstated in the record
of Rogers' post-conviction hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.IV[¶14] The district court properly
determined that Rogers' trial counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and Rogers failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for his trial
counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
amend the findings and the motion for a new trial. We affirm the district court's judgment
denying the request for post-conviction relief.[¶15] Jon J. JensenJerod E. TufteDaniel J.
CrothersRonald E. Goodman, S.J.Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
[¶16] The Honorable Ronald E. Goodman, S.J., sitting in place of McEvers, J., disqualified.