Title: Summers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
WILLIAM GREGORY 
SUMMERS,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 238, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for Kent County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IK97-10-0448; 0451;  
                                      0454
 
Submitted:  July 14, 2004 
Decided:  September 20, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of September 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that:  
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William Gregory Summers, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s May 17, 2004 order denying Summers’ motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  
The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of 
 
 
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the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Summers’ 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In January 1999, Summers was found guilty in a Superior Court bench 
trial of Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the Third Degree and Misdemeanor 
Theft.  In October 1999, Summers was sentenced as an habitual offender2 to life 
imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Summers’ first two 
convictions, but reversed his conviction for misdemeanor theft.  On remand, the 
Superior Court ordered that conviction to be stricken.  Summers then filed three 
postconviction motions, each of which was denied by the Superior Court.  On 
appeal, this Court affirmed each of those decisions.  
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Summers claims that his life sentence as an habitual 
offender is illegal because, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor incorrectly 
stated that Summers’ December 3, 1993 sentence for Delivery of Cocaine occurred 
on December 3, 1999.  Summers contends that the State intentionally misstated the 
date to hide the fact that he was only 16 years of age on December 3, 1993, and, 
therefore, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.   
 
(4) 
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence 
“at any time.”  The purpose of Rule 35(a) is to permit correction of an illegal 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b). 
 
 
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sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior 
to the imposition of sentence.3  A sentence is illegal when it exceeds the 
statutorily-authorized limits or violates double jeopardy.4  A sentence also is illegal 
if it is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to its substance, or is not authorized by the judgment of conviction.5 
 
(5) 
The transcript of the October 1999 sentencing hearing clearly reflects 
that the judge understood that Summers was 16 years old at the time he committed 
the felony of Delivery of Cocaine.  Although the prosecutor erroneously stated that 
the year the offense was committed was 1999, the papers submitted to the judge in 
support of the State’s habitual offender petition clearly reflect that the offense was 
committed in 1993.  Moreover, the judge noted at the time he imposed sentence 
that, although 16 at the time of the offense, Summers was tried and convicted as an 
adult in the Superior Court.  There was, thus, no error or abuse of discretion on the 
part of the judge in determining that Summers’ sentence as an habitual offender 
was not illegal and, in fact, was mandatory once the State had presented the 
requisite proof of Summers’ prior convictions.6  
                                                 
3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b). 
 
 
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(6) 
It is manifest on the face of Summers’ opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice