Title: MCTAGGART v MONTANA POWER CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14850 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 ROBERT E . McTAGGART , Petitioner and Respondent, VS . THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Corette, Smith, Dean, Pohlman and Allen, Butte, Montana Kendrick Smith argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Herron and Meloy, Helena, Montana Peter M. Meloy argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: November 1, 1979 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an a c t i o n f o r t h e r e l o c a t i o n of an overhead u t i l i t y l i n e pursuant t o s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404, MCA, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, i n and f o r t h e County of L e w i s and Clark, t h e Honorable N a t Allen presiding. Respondent i s t h e owner of c e r t a i n r e a l a g r i c u l t u r a l property i n Lewis and Clark County. Appellant, t h e Montana Power Company, i s t h e owner of an overhead u t i l i t y l i n e which c r o s s e s respondent's property. Respondent f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e r e l o c a t i o n of t h e u t i l i t y l i n e pursuant t o s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404, MCA, a l l e g i n g t h a t he d e s i r e d t o i n s t a l l a "center p i v o t i r r i g a t i o n system" on h i s property which would i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e land from one-half ton of a l f a l f a per a c r e t o f i v e tons per acre. Respondent o f f e r e d a f e a s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e f o r t h e r e l o c a t i o n of t h e l i n e giving a p p e l l a n t a right-of-way t o continue i t s operation of t h e l i n e and allowing respondent t o i n s t a l l t h e new i r r i g a t i o n system. A motion t o dismiss was f i l e d by a p p e l l a n t . B r i e f s w e r e submitted on t h e motion by both p a r t i e s , and t h e motion was overruled. The motion t o dismiss presented a l t e r n a t i v e contentions t h a t t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s w e r e unconstitu- t i o n a l because they allowed a taking of p r i v a t e property f o r p r i v a t e use, o r , i f t h e taking was f o r a p u b l i c use, t h e s t a t u t e s w e r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because t h e r e was no j u s t compensation. Respondent f i l e d a motion f o r summary judgment, which was granted by t h e District Court. The c o u r t found t h a t t h e r e would be a s u b s t a n t i a l improvement i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y by i n s t a l l i n g t h e i r r i g a t i o n system and t h a t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e o f f e r e d by respondent f o r t h e reloca- t i o n of t h e power l i n e was f e a s i b l e . The c o u r t f u r t h e r found t h a t s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404, MCA, were c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and ordered a p p e l l a n t t o r e l o c a t e t h e u t i l i t y l i n e . The c o s t s of r e l o c a t i o n w e r e divided equally between t h e p a r t i e s . Appellant appeals from t h e summary judgment and order. The i s s u e s r a i s e d on appeal s o l e l y concern t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d : (1) Whether s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404, MCA, i n c l u s i v e , v i o l a t e t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, Section 29, of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n t h a t they allow t h e taking of p r i v a t e property f o r t h e p r i v a t e use of another? (2) Whether t h e use sought by respondent i s a p u b l i c use, and i f so, whether s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404, MCA, i n c l u s i v e , are a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Fourteenth Amendment to t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Section 29, of t h e 1972 Montana Constitution, because they allow t h e taking of p r i v a t e property f o r public use without j u s t compensation? The s t a t u t e s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s case are s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n s 69-4-401 through 69-4-404 of t h e Montana Code Annotated. S p e c i f i c a l l y , they provide: "69-4-401. Definitions. A s used i n t h i s p a r t , t h e following d e f i n i t i o n s apply: (1) 'Agricul- t u r a l improvement' includes, without l i m i t a t i o n , s p r i n k l e r i r r i g a t i o n systems. ( 2 ) 'Overhead u t i l i t y l i n e ' means a f a c i l i t y f o r t h e trans- mission o r d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y o r tele- phone messages along w i r e s o r c a b l e s suspended above t h e ground between s i n g l e o r double poles and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e anchors. "69-4-402. P e t i t i o n f o r r e l o c a t i o n of overhead l i n e . An owner of a g r i c u l t u r a l land across which an overhead u t i l i t y l i n e has been con- s t r u c t e d may p e t i t i o n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r an order f o r r e l o c a t i o n of the l i n e f o r t h e purpose of i n s t a l l i n g an a g r i c u l t u r a l improvement. The p e t i t i o n s h a l l set f o r t h the nature of t h e pro- posed a g r i c u l t u r a l improvement, t h e increase i n productivity of t h e land a n t i c i p a t e d t o r e s u l t from t h e improvement, and a f e a s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e route, across o t h e r land t o be provided by the p e t i t i o n e r a t no c o s t t o the owner of t h e over- head u t i l i t y l i n e . "69-4-403. Hearing and order. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h a l l , upon n o t i c e t o t h e owner of t h e overhead u t i l i t y l i n e , hear evidence bearing upon t h e matters presented i n t h e p e t i t i o n . I f t h e evidence e s t a b l i s h e s a s u b s t a n t i a l improve- ment i n a g r i c u l t u r a l productivity and t h e fea- s i b i l i t y of t h e relocated route, t h e c o u r t s h a l l g r a n t o r modify and grant, a s modified, t h e p e t i t i o n and order t h e owner of t h e l i n e t o r e l o c a t e t h e l i n e . "69-4-404. Costs of relocation. The c o s t s of r e l o c a t i n g an overhead u t i l i t y l i n e as ordered under 69-4-403 s h a l l be paid 50% by t h e u t i l i t y and 50% by t h e owner of t h e land. However, i f t h e person p e t i t i o n i n g f o r t h e order f a i l s f o r any reason t o i n s t a l l t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l improve- ment within 2 years following t h e d a t e r e l o c a t i o n i s completed, he must reimburse t h e owner of t h e l i n e t h e f u l l c o s t of relocation, and t h e c o u r t has continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t i e s f o r t h e purpose of ordering such reimbursement." Our f i r s t consideration i s t h e character of t h e above- quoted s t a t u t e s . O n one hand, respondent urges t h a t the s t a t u t e s a r e an e x e r c i s e of the p o l i c e power of t h i s state over public u t i l i t i e s and t h a t property may therefore be taken without j u s t compensation. O n t h e o t h e r hand, appel- l a n t characterizes t h e s t a t u t e s as involving the r i g h t of eminent domain, which authorizes t h e s t a t e t o take p r i v a t e property f o r public use with j u s t compensation. W e f i n d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s sound i n eminent domain. Where t h e exercise of t h e police power of the state i s d i r e c t l y connected with matters of public health, s a f e t y and welfare, we f i n d t h a t those matters a r e only i n d i r e c t l y concerned, i f a t a l l , with t h e matters r a i s e d by t h e s t a t u t e s here. More importantly, w e note t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s provide f o r a "taking'! of property without t h e consent of a u t i l i t y . They i n v o l u n t a r i l y r e q u i r e a public u t i l i t y t o move i t s power l i n e s and pay h a l f of t h e c o s t s of r e l o c a t i o n when an owner of farmland makes t h e necessary showings i n D i s t r i c t Court. That being t h e case, eminent domain, t h e r i g h t of t h e s t a t e t o take p r i v a t e property f o r p u b l i c use, and t h e p r i n c i p l e s of eminent domain are a p p l i c a b l e here. The f i r s t i s s u e concerns whether t h e taking i s f o r a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e use. It i s fundamental t o t h e law of eminent domain t h a t p r i v a t e property may n o t be taken with- o u t an owner's consent f o r t h e p r i v a t e use of another. S p r a t t v. Helena Power Transmission Company (1908), 37 Mont. 60, 94 P. 631; s e c t i o n 70-30-101, MCA. Both t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o h i b i t a taking by t h e state f o r merely p r i v a t e use. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, §17. Rather, f o r t h e r i g h t of eminent domain t o l i e , t h e use must be one which i s public. The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e has by s t a t u t e declared s e v e r a l uses t o be p u b l i c i n connection with t h e r i g h t of eminent domain. Section 70-30-102, MCA. Among t h e uses enumerated a r e : ". . . t h e r i g h t of eminent domain may be exercised i n behalf of t h e following public uses: " (2) . . . a l l o t h e r public uses authorized by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e of t h i s s t a t e ; " ( 4 ) . . . c a n a l s , d i t c h e s , flumes, aqueducts, and p i p e s f o r p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , supply- i n g . I ! . . farming neighborhoods with water H e r e , one of the uses f o r which eminent domain i s sought i s the more e f f i c i e n t use of water i n the i r r i g a t i o n of farmland. Respondent d e s i r e s t o i n s t a l l a center p i v o t sprinkling system, recognized a s a much more e f f i c i e n t method of i r r i g a t i o n than methods such a s flooding. Appel- l a n t , while acknowledging t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of such a system, argues t h a t such a use has never been s p e c i f i c a l l y declared t o be public by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Where supplying a farming neighborhood with water i s a public use, a p p e l l a n t maintains t h a t t h e means of using water once it has been supplied has n o t been recognized a s a public use. W e disagree. F i r s t , w e note s e v e r a l important provi- s i o n s which r e l a t e t o t h e use of water within t h i s s t a t e . Perhaps t h e most important of these i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i n which t h e people have declared t h a t t h e use of a l l water within t h i s s t a t e s h a l l be deemed t o be a public use. A r t i c l e I X , Section 3 (1) , of t h e 1972 Montana Consti- t u t i o n , provides: "The use of a l l water t h a t i s now o r may here- a f t e r be appropriate f o r s a l e , r e n t , d i s t r i b u - t i o n , o r o t h e r b e n e f i c i a l use, t h e r i g h t of way over t h e lands of o t h e r s f o r a l l d i t c h e s , d r a i n s , flumes, canals, and aqueducts n e c e s s a r i l y used i n connection therewith and t h e sites f o r reser- v o i r s necessary f o r c o l l e c t i n g o r s t o r i n g water s h a l l be held t o be a public use." Next, w e note t h e position of t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e with r e s p e c t t o water. Section 85-2-101, MCA, of t h e 1973 Montana Water U s e A c t , provides: "Pursuant t o A r t i c l e I X of' the Montana Constitu- t i o n , the l e g i s l a t u r e declares t h a t any use of w a t e r i s a public use and t h a t t h e waters within t h e s t a t e a r e t h e property of t h e s t a t e and f o r t h e use of i t s people. . ." Section 85-2-101, MCA, a l s o enunciates t h e policy of t h i s state concerning water: " I t i s t h e p o l i c y of t h i s s t a t e . . . t o encour- age t h e w i s e use of t h e s t a t e ' s water resources by making them a v a i l a b l e f o r appropriation con- s i s t e n t with t h i s chapter and t o provide f o r t h e wise u t i l i z a t i o n , development and conservation of t h e waters of t h e s t a t e f o r t h e maximum bene- f i t s of its people with t h e l e a s t p o s s i b l e de- gradation of t h e n a t u r a l a q u a t i c ecosystems. I n p u r s u i t of t h i s p o l i c y , t h e s t a t e encourages t h e development of f a c i l i t i e s which s t o r e and conserve waters f o r b e n e f i c i a l use, f o r the maximization of t h e use of those waters i n Montana, f o r t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of stream flows, and f o r groundwater recharge." From t h e s e provisions, w e b e l i e v e t h a t a more e f f i c i e n t use of water i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n of farmland i s indeed a p u b l i c use f o r which t h e r i g h t of eminent domain w i l l lie. While t h i s use may n o t r e a d i l y conform t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l concept of "public use," w e note t h a t t e r m i s e l a s t i c and keeps pace with changing conditions. 26 Arn.Jur.2d Eminent Domain S27, pp. 671-672. Although it is t r u e t h a t t h e r e may be a p r i v a t e b e n e f i t t o respondent here i n t h a t t h e produc- t i v i t y of h i s land w i l l be increased, it i s a l s o t r u e t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a b e n e f i t t o t h e public. W e f e e l compelled t o observe t h e high p r i o r i t i e s t h a t have been p u t on t h e use of w a t e r by t h e people of t h i s s t a t e . Water must be conserved and p u t t o t h e maximum b e n e f i t of a l l those who use it. The mere f a c t t h a t one may r e a l i z e p r i v a t e p r o f i t i n property sought t o be condemned does n o t prevent t h e use from being declared public. S p r a t t v. Helena Power Transmission Co. (1908), 37 Mont. 60, 77, 94 P. 631. Nor i s t h e mere number of people who a c t u a l l y make use of t h e p u b l i c use determinative of i t s character. This i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h e case of a r e c y c l a b l e resource. A use may be public even though it may be enjoyed a t c e r t a i n t i m e s by a comparatively s m a l l number of people. Eminent Domain S32, p. 681. W e f i n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a more efficient use of water in the irrigation of farmland is a public use for which the right of eminent domain will lie. We note additionally that these statutes do not violate the rule that where property has already been taken for a public use, it may not be condemned again except for a more necessary public use. Cocoanougher v. Ziegler (1941), 112 Mont. 76, 81-82, 112 P.2d 1058, 1060; section 70-30-103!(c), MCA. Here, the statutes provide that the owner of land offer a feasible alternative route upon which the utility may plot its power line. Because the property is substi- tuted, it cannot be said to have been "doubly condemned." We have previously upheld substitute condemnation as a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. See, State ex rel. De Puy v. District Court (1963), 142 Mont. 328, 384 P.2d 501, 20 A.L.R.3d 862, 868. Our decision today in no way involves a determination of whether the transportation of electricity or the efficient use of water has the higher priority in terms of public use. The second issue in this case involves whether there is just compensation. Section 69-4-404, MCA, provides that the costs of relocation shall be divided equally between the landowner and the owner of the power line. Appellant argues that the statute does not provide for just compensation. Appellant maintains that the principle of just compensation requires that the owner of condemned property be made whole for all of the damages sustained and that there must be full compensation. Appellant contends that 50 percent compensa- tion is only half of the compensation properly due appellant. With this proposition we fully agree. Article 11, Section 29, of the 1972 Montana constitu- tion, states: " P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s h a l l n o t be taken o r damaged f o r p u b l i c use without j u s t compensation t o t h e -- f u l l e x t e n t of t h e l o s s having been f i r s t made --- t o o r paid i n t o t h e c o u r t f o r t h e owner." (Em- p h a s i s added. ) This Court has a l s o held i n s e v e r a l c a s e s t h a t a land- owner i n a condemnation a c t i o n should be f a i r l y and f u l l y compensated, S t a t e v. Peterson (1958), 134 Mont. 52, 57, 328 P.2d 617, 620, and t h a t j u s t compensation is determined by e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , Alexander v. S t a t e Highway Commission (1966), 147 Mont. 367, 371-72, 412 P.2d 414, 416. I n Alex- ander w e s t a t e d : " J u s t compensation i s determined by e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s . Its measure v a r i e s w i t h t h e f a c t s . Where t h e circumstances w i l l n o t permit, t h e v a l u e of property cannot be measured s o l e l y by formula o r a r t i f i c i a l r u l e . . ." Here, t h e r e i s j u s t compensation i n one sense; t h e u t i l i t y i s compensated f o r t h e easement which it a l r e a d y has. The s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e t h a t t h e landowner o f f e r land upon which t h e u t i l i t y may p l o t a n a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e f o r i t s power l i n e . It i s nonetheless a f a c t , however, t h a t t h e u t i l i t y must a l s o bear h a l f t h e c o s t of r e l o c a t i o n . Where t h e land i s condemned and t h e u t i l i t y has paid f o r t h e easement once, w e t h i n k it u n f a i r t h a t it be required t o pay f o r t h e easement again. The r e l o c a t i o n of t h e power l i n e comes a t t h e i n s i s t e n c e o f t h e landowner, and it i s he who should properly bear t h e c o s t s of r e l o c a t i o n . W e f i n d t h e r e f o r e t h a t s e c t i o n 69-4-404, MCA, does n o t provide f o r j u s t compensation, and w e d e c l a r e it u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Accordingly, w e a f f i r m i n p a r t and r e v e r s e i n p a r t t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court and o r d e r t h a t respondent pay t h e e n t i r e c o s t of r e l o c a t i n g t h e overhead u t i l i t y l i n e . We concur: Ceief Justice