Title: In re A.L.L.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 319A19  
Filed 18 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.L.L. 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 29 
April 2019 by Judge April C. Wood in District Court, Davie County. Heard in the 
Supreme Court on 2 September 2020. 
 
Christopher M. Watford for petitioner-appellees. 
 
Jeffrey L. Miller, for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
Respondent appeals from an order entered by the Davie County District Court 
terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, Ann.1 The trial court 
determined that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1111(a)(6) and (a)(7). Although we agree with petitioners that the 
Davie County District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a termination 
order, we conclude that petitioners have not proven by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Further, we 
hold that the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) are not met in this case 
                                            
1 We refer to the juvenile by the pseudonym “Ann” for ease of reading and to protect 
the privacy of the juvenile. 
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because Ann resides with legal permanent guardians and that the record lacks any 
evidence supporting a conclusion that respondent acted willfully within the meaning 
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Accordingly, there is no cause to remand for further fact-
finding, and we reverse the trial court’s order.  
Standard of Review 
A trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction “is authorized to order the 
termination of parental rights based on an adjudication of one or more statutory 
grounds.” In re J.A.E.W., 375 N.C. 112, 117, 846 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2020). Absent 
subject-matter jurisdiction, a trial court cannot enter a legally valid order infringing 
upon a parent’s constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his or her 
child. In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 315–16, 847 S.E.2d 666, 671 (2020). Whether or not a 
trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed 
de novo. See, e.g., Willowmere Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 370 N.C. 553, 556, 
809 S.E.2d 558, 560 (2018). Challenges to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
may be raised at any stage of proceedings, including “for the first time before this 
Court.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 595, 636 S.E.2d 787, 793 (2006).  
 “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination 
under [N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)].” In re J.A.E.W., 375 N.C. at 116, 846 S.E.2d at 271 
(citation omitted). We review a trial court’s order “to determine whether the findings 
are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
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conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984). 
The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 
19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019). 
Background 
 
Respondent gave birth to her daughter, Ann, in July 2015. On the day Ann was 
born, respondent made concerning statements to hospital personnel indicating a lack 
of understanding of what was required to safely care for a newborn child. After 
receiving respondent’s mental-health treatment records, which indicated that she 
had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder, 
bipolar disorder, and an eating disorder, a doctor from the hospital conducted a 
mental health assessment and confirmed a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia. A 
report was made to the Davidson County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
alleging that respondent’s mental health conditions might render her unable to 
independently care for Ann. Respondent was unable or unwilling to provide 
information about Ann’s father. She was unable to provide DSS with the name of any 
person that could assist her in caring for Ann or who could serve as an appropriate 
kinship placement.  
Two days later, DSS filed a petition seeking to have Ann adjudicated to be a 
dependent juvenile. DSS obtained nonsecure custody and placed Ann with foster 
parents, the petitioners in the present case. Respondent entered into an out-of-home 
family services agreement, agreeing to participate in parenting classes, complete a 
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psychological and parenting capacity assessment, complete individual counseling, 
and maintain suitable housing and visits with Ann. At a hearing on 7 October 2015, 
the parties stipulated that Ann was a dependent juvenile and the Davidson County 
District Court entered an order to that effect. Respondent was ordered to make 
progress towards completing the terms of her case plan. She was allowed supervised 
visits with Ann twice a week for two hours each time.  
 
The trial court’s first permanency-planning order reflects that respondent 
made significant progress towards satisfying the terms of her case plan. She had 
completed parenting classes and a psychological and parenting capacity assessment, 
started attending therapy and counseling, and obtained stable housing. She attended 
all visitations with Ann except one. However, DSS and others involved in treating 
respondent’s mental health conditions continued to report significant concerns about 
respondent’s capacity to safely care for Ann. Although respondent was receiving 
counseling and taking medications, she denied that she had a mental illness. She also 
failed to appropriately interact with her child during visits, persisting in behaviors 
suggesting inattentiveness to or incomprehension of Ann’s needs. She demonstrated 
an unwillingness to acknowledge and address her deficiencies as a parent, 
disregarding basic parenting advice offered by DSS. Weighing respondent’s progress 
against her undeniable shortcomings as a parent, the trial court established a 
permanent plan of reunification and a secondary plan of guardianship. 
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After the first permanency-planning hearing, respondent continued to struggle 
to address her severe mental health issues. At times, respondent was combative and 
disrespectful towards DSS. She repeatedly provided Ann with gifts, clothing, and food 
that were not age appropriate. Although none of her relatives were able to serve as a 
kinship placement, a potential guardian who was acquainted with respondent’s 
immediate family was identified and approved as an appropriate alternative 
caregiver for Ann. However, the trial court changed the permanent plan to 
guardianship with a secondary plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. 
Ultimately, the trial court implemented the primary permanent plan by appointing 
petitioners as Ann’s legal permanent guardians pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-600. 
Respondent was awarded visitation with Ann for one hour every three months 
supervised by petitioners in a public place of their choosing. The trial court waived 
future permanency planning and review hearings.  
On 27 February 2018, petitioners filed a petition seeking to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights in Davie County District Court. Petitioners stated that 
they wished to have respondent’s parental rights terminated in order to adopt Ann 
“as soon as possible.” Over respondent’s objection, the trial court appointed her an 
attorney and a guardian ad litem. At a termination hearing on 15 April 2019, the trial 
court received evidence from a psychologist who evaluated respondent and the DSS 
social worker who managed respondent’s case. The evidence indicated that while 
respondent “did everything that DSS and the [c]ourt asked her to do,” her mental 
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health conditions, and resultant deficiencies as a parent, rendered her unable to 
safely care for her daughter. Testimony presented at the hearing also indicated that 
respondent had persisted in her refusal to take prescribed medication to treat her 
mental health conditions, although the DSS social worker acknowledged that even if 
respondent had complied with her medication plan, she would still lack the “mental 
health stability” necessary to be a parent.  
On 29 April 2019, the Davie County District Court entered an order 
terminating respondent’s parental rights on the grounds that she was incapable of 
providing for the proper care and supervision of Ann such that Ann was a dependent 
juvenile, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), and that she had willfully abandoned 
Ann, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent appealed the trial court’s 
order. 
Analysis 
Respondent raises three challenges to the Davie County District Court’s order 
terminating her parental rights to Ann. First, she contends that the Davie County 
District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an order terminating her 
parental rights because the Davidson County District Court had previously entered 
a permanency-planning order establishing petitioners as Ann’s legal permanent 
guardians. Second, respondent argues that the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings to support a conclusion that she lacked an “appropriate alternative child care 
arrangement” for Ann as required under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) and that the 
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requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied as a ground for 
terminating the rights of a parent whose child has been placed with legal permanent 
guardians. Third, respondent argues that the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings to support a conclusion that she had “willfully abandoned” Ann within the 
meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and that the record lacks any evidence 
indicating that her behavior was anything other than a manifestation of her severe 
mental health conditions. We address each argument in turn. 
a. Jurisdiction 
Respondent argues that the Davie County District Court lacked jurisdiction 
because the Davidson County District Court had previously entered a legally valid 
order establishing a permanent plan of guardianship in Ann’s underlying dependency 
proceeding. If respondent were correct that the Davie County trial court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction, then its order terminating respondent’s parental rights 
was “[a] void judgment [which] is, in legal effect, no judgment. No rights are acquired 
or divested by it.” Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 
678 (1956); see also In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (“Subject-matter 
jurisdiction is the indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest, 
and in its absence a court has no power to act[.]”). However, we conclude that the 
Davie County District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an order 
terminating respondent’s parental rights. 
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A trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a petition to terminate parental 
rights is conferred by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. 
The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any petition or motion relating to 
termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides 
in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county 
department of social services or licensed child-placing 
agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or 
motion. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019). Respondent does not dispute that at the time the 
termination petition was filed, Ann resided with her legal permanent guardians in 
Davie County. Respondent does not dispute that petitioners were an appropriate 
party to file a termination petition given that they had “been judicially appointed as 
the guardian of the person of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S § 7B-1103(a)(1) (2019). In an 
attempt to circumvent the necessary conclusion that the Davie County District Court 
had subject-matter jurisdiction, respondent contends that permitting one court to 
override another court’s permanency planning order frustrates the Juvenile Code’s 
overarching policy of preserving family autonomy by preventing the unnecessary 
dissolution of parent-child bonds. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-100 (2019). Further, she argues 
that permitting the Davie County District Court to exercise jurisdiction would be 
inconsistent with North Carolina’s “integrated” juvenile system, which creates “one 
continuous juvenile case with several interrelated stages, not a series of discrete 
proceedings.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 593, 636 S.E.2d at 792.  
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It is well-established that “[a] court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a termination 
petition does not depend on the existence of an underlying abuse, neglect, and 
dependency proceeding.” In re E.B., 375 N.C. at 317, 847 S.E.2d at 672. Indeed, 
although the Juvenile Code permits petitioners to seek termination in the same 
district court that is simultaneously adjudicating an underlying abuse, neglect, or 
dependency petition, the statutory language does not mandate filing in a single court. 
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102(a) (2019) (“When the district court is exercising jurisdiction 
over a juvenile and the juvenile’s parent in an abuse, neglect, or dependency 
proceeding, a person or agency specified in [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1103(a) may file in that 
proceeding a motion for termination of the parent’s rights in relation to the 
juvenile.”). Thus, as the Court of Appeals has correctly held, a trial court lacks 
jurisdiction over a termination petition if the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 
have not been met, even if there is an underlying abuse, neglect, or dependency action 
concerning that juvenile in the district in which the termination petition has been 
filed. In re J.M., 797 S.E.2d 305, 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). However, if the 
requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 have been met in one county, then a district court 
in that county has jurisdiction, even if an abuse, neglect, or dependency action is 
pending in another county.2 In this case, the petitioners were Ann’s legal permanent 
guardians who filed their petition in the district court in the county where they 
                                            
2 We note that Davidson County and Davie County are in the same judicial district. 
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resided with Ann, satisfying the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. Accordingly, we 
reject respondent’s jurisdictional claim and turn to the merits of the termination 
order. 
b. Dependency 
 
A ground exists to terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6) if petitioners can prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that “the 
parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, 
such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-
101, and that there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue 
for the foreseeable future.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). In order for dependency to 
provide a basis for terminating parental rights, the petitioners must also prove that 
“the parent lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” Id. In the 
present case, the parties do not dispute that due to respondent’s mental health 
conditions, she is unable to care for her child. Instead, respondent argues that the 
trial court made no findings of fact which provide clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence that she “lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement” for Ann. 
A review of the record shows that respondent is correct. The burden was on the 
petitioners to prove that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) supported termination by “(1) 
alleg[ing] and prov[ing] all facts and circumstances supporting the termination of the 
parent’s rights; and (2) demonstrat[ing] that all proven facts and circumstances 
amount to clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the termination of such rights 
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is warranted.” In re Pierce, 356 N.C. 68, 70, 565 S.E.2d 81, 83 (2002). The trial court’s 
termination order contains no findings of fact addressing the availability to 
respondent, or lack thereof, of an alternative child care arrangement. Accordingly, 
the trial court’s conclusion that the ground of dependency existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights is not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence, and its conclusion that respondent’s parental rights may be terminated 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) must be vacated. 
Additionally, respondent asserts more broadly that the requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied in this case because Ann resides with 
legal permanent guardians. According to respondent, a legal permanent guardian is 
necessarily “an appropriate alternative child care arrangement” within the meaning 
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). In response, petitioners argue that the requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) have been satisfied because respondent did not herself 
identify, and is not presently able to identify, a viable alternative child care 
arrangement.  
The effect of a child’s placement with a legal permanent guardian on the 
requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) is a novel issue for this Court. However, 
this issue has been addressed by the Court of Appeals, which has concluded that the 
requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) are met even when a parent has acquiesced 
to a DSS-arranged placement, unless “the parent . . . ha[s] taken some action to 
identify [a] viable alternative[]” child care arrangement. In re C.B., 245 N.C. App. 
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197, 211, 783 S.E.2d 206, 216 (2016) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals 
explained in another case 
the fact that [the juvenile] was placed with his maternal 
grandmother cannot mean, without anything more, that 
respondent father had an alternative care arrangement. If 
this were the case, the requirement would be meaningless 
because, in the words of the guardian ad litem, “our courts 
will always do their best to ensure that someone” cares for 
children. Having an appropriate alternative childcare 
arrangement means that the parent himself must take 
some steps to suggest a childcare arrangement—it is not 
enough that the parent merely goes along with a plan 
created by DSS. 
 
In re L.H., 210 N.C. App. 355, 365–66, 708 S.E.2d 191, 198 (2011).  
We begin by noting that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) contains no language 
indicating that it is the parent, and the parent alone, who must locate and secure an 
appropriate alternative child care arrangement. See King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 
N.C. 400, 404, 758 S.E.2d 364, 369 (2014) (determining that when ascertaining the 
meaning of statutes, “we first must look to the plain language of the statutes 
themselves”). Rather, the statute provides that it is the availability or unavailability 
of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement, not the parent’s success or 
failure in identifying one, that determines whether or not N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) 
supports the termination of parental rights. This Court has previously characterized 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) utilizing language that accords with this understanding, 
stating that a ground exists for terminating parental rights upon proof of “the 
[un]availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.” In re K.L.T., 
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374 N.C. 826, 847, 845 S.E.2d 28, 43 (2020) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
By analogy, the statutory provision defining indigency for the purposes of assessing 
a defendant’s eligibility for court-appointed counsel utilizes a similarly passive 
construction. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(a) (2019) (“An indigent person is a person who is 
financially unable to secure legal representation and to provide all other necessary 
expenses of representation . . . .” (emphasis added)). In construing N.C.G.S. § 7A-450, 
this Court held that it is the availability or unavailability of sufficient resources to 
secure legal representation that determines a defendant’s eligibility for court-
appointed counsel, not the defendant’s personal role in obtaining those resources. See 
State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 373, 407 S.E.2d 200, 206 (1991) (holding that an 
otherwise indigent defendant was ineligible for assistant court-appointed counsel 
when family members paid for the defendant’s private attorney). Similarly, the most 
natural reading of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) is that it is the objective availability or 
unavailability of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement that is relevant 
in assessing dependency under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), not the parent’s personal 
role in securing the alternative arrangement.  
This reading of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) is consistent with the legislative 
intent embodied in North Carolina’s Juvenile Code. See, e.g., State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 
732, 738, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (“It is a cardinal principle that in construing 
statutes, the courts should always give effect to the legislative intent.”). The 
overarching purpose of the Juvenile Code is the “protection of children by 
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constitutional means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the needs of 
the child.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 598, 636 S.E.2d at 794. It serves the state’s 
interest in protecting children to authorize termination of parental rights when a 
parent is unable to provide appropriate care for a child and no appropriate alternative 
child care arrangement is available. However, when a parent is unable to provide 
appropriate care, but the child is residing with another appropriate permanent 
caretaker, then the parent’s incapability does not itself supply a reason for the state 
to intervene to dissolve the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship. In 
this circumstance, requiring the parent to affirmatively identify an alternative child 
care arrangement threatens the parent’s constitutional status without serving the 
state’s parens patriae interest in the child’s safety.  
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that our interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6) renders the provision meaningless. Many of the provisions supplying 
grounds for terminating parental rights apply at some points in a juvenile proceeding 
and do not apply at others. There are still circumstances in which N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6) will be a valid ground for terminating parental rights due to dependency. 
We emphasize that Ann currently resides with court-approved legal permanent 
guardians. Even if respondent could identify another appropriate alternative 
caregiver, respondent lacks legal authority to remove Ann from her guardians unless 
the trial court determines that terminating the guardianship serves Ann’s best 
interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(b) (2019). Thus, Ann will remain in her guardians’ “care, 
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custody, and control” until she reaches the age of majority or until the trial court 
determines that guardianship is no longer in Ann’s best interests, that the guardians 
are unfit or neglectful, or that the guardians are no longer willing or able to care for 
Ann. See id.  
Permanent guardianship, which provides a child with stability and the 
opportunity to develop durable, healthy, dependent bonds with adult caregivers, is 
distinct from a temporary custodial arrangement which leaves a juvenile in a state of 
ongoing uncertainty. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. Davis J. 
Juv. L. & Pol’y 1 (2015) (describing how permanent guardianship serves the juvenile 
system’s interest in permanency by facilitating stable placements and reducing 
unnecessary litigation); Sarah Katz, The Value of Permanency: State Implementation 
of Legal Guardianship Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 2013 Mich. 
St. L. Rev. 1079, 1089 (2013) (“[P]ermanent legal guardianship is widely recognized 
as a positive permanency outcome by a broad array of child-welfare experts . . . .”). 
Requiring the identification of an alternative child care arrangement serves a child’s 
interest in permanency when the child is in the custody of an incapable parent or a 
temporary caregiver. But when the child resides with a permanent legal guardian, 
the parent’s ability to identify an alternative child care arrangement is extraneous to 
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the concerns animating our Juvenile Code.3 To construe N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) to 
be satisfied in this circumstance would make a parent’s constitutional rights 
contingent on his or her ability to jump through an unnecessary procedural hoop. 
Accordingly, we hold that the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) are not 
satisfied as a ground for terminating parental rights when, as in the present case, 
the parent’s child has been placed with a legal permanent guardian pursuant to a 
valid order implementing the child’s permanency plan. Because the requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied in the present case, a remand for further 
factual findings to address the availability to respondent of an appropriate 
alternative child care arrangement is unnecessary. 
c. Willful Abandonment  
In addition to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), the trial court also found that 
termination was warranted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), which permits 
termination of parental rights if “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile 
for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or 
                                            
3 When, as in this case, the guardianship results from the implementation of a 
juvenile’s permanency plan, there is no reason for the mother to feel obligated to identify and 
propose an alternative child care arrangement which the parent will have no cause or 
authority to effectuate. By contrast, preliminary custody orders and other placement 
arrangements that recur throughout the history of abuse and neglect proceedings do not 
create the sorts of permanent alternative child care arrangements that suffice to preclude a 
finding that the parent's parental rights are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(6). Until a legal permanent guardianship has been established, a parent will 
still have reason to identify and propose an alternative child care arrangement. 
 
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motion.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Willful abandonment requires both actual 
abandonment and a “willful intent to abandon [a] child” which is “a question of fact 
to be determined from the evidence.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768, 
773 (2019). To find that a parent has willfully abandoned his or her child, the trial 
court must “find evidence that the parent deliberately eschewed his or her parental 
responsibilities in their entirety.” In re E.B., 375 N.C. at 318, 847 S.E.2d at 673. At 
the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving willful 
abandonment by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 74, 
833 S.E.2d at 771. 
There is no dispute that the trial court failed to make any findings regarding 
respondent’s conduct within the “determinative” six months preceding the filing of 
the termination petition. See id. at 77, 833 S.E.2d at 773 (“[A]lthough the trial court 
may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a 
parent’s credibility and intentions, the determinative period for adjudicating willful 
abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” 
(cleaned up)). The trial court’s order is also bereft of any factual findings or 
conclusions of law stating that respondent willfully abandoned her child.  Thus, the 
trial court’s conclusion of law that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) supplied a ground for 
terminating respondent’s parental rights is not supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence. See In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 252, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997). 
Recognizing this deficiency, petitioners invite us to remand for further fact-finding, 
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asserting that there is evidence in the underlying record that could support a 
conclusion of law that respondent willfully abandoned Ann within the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). See Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Young, 133 N.C. App. 
339, 341, 515 S.E.2d 223, 224 (1999) (determining that vacatur and remand is 
appropriate unless “the facts are not in dispute and only one inference can be drawn 
from them”). In particular, petitioners emphasize respondent’s mental-health 
treatment records, which show that during the determinative six-month window, she 
continued to suffer from “delusions” and “struggle[s] with reality,” persisted in her 
refusal to take prescribed medications, and became “easily agitated,” “delusional,” 
and “incoherent” during a visit with Ann.  
To prove that termination of parental rights is warranted, petitioners carry the 
burden of proving that respondent “acted willfully in abandoning [her] child.” In re 
L.M.M., 375 N.C. 346, 353, 847 S.E.2d 770, 776 (2020). Even if it were correct that 
respondent actually abandoned Ann, nothing in the trial court’s findings of fact 
supports the legal conclusion that respondent’s behavior evinced a “purposeful, 
deliberative” intent to “forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims 
to the child.” In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317, 319, 841 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2020) (cleaned up). 
The evidence in the record also does not support this conclusion. Instead, the evidence 
shows that respondent’s deficient conduct as a parent was largely, if not entirely, a 
manifestation of her severe mental illnesses. The trial court expressly found that 
respondent intended to be a parent to Ann, finding that she was “not capable of 
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providing proper care or supervision [to Ann], even though she desires to do so.” An 
entry in respondent’s treatment records from the night before a scheduled visit with 
Ann states that respondent was “excited for [the] visit tomorrow.” The record also 
confirms that respondent’s actions did not always mirror her intentions—for 
example, on multiple occasions she attempted to demonstrate her love and affection 
for Ann by providing gifts and expressing concern for her child’s well-being, although 
she frequently did so in misguided ways. Petitioners have not identified any evidence 
detracting from the obvious conclusion that respondent intended to parent Ann but, 
due to her mental health conditions, lacked the capacity to do so. Nothing in the 
record suggests that her conduct “manifest[ed] a willful determination to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 
at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 (citation omitted). 
Evidence that respondent acted in a manner consistent with the symptoms of 
her severe mental illness is not, standing alone, evidence that she willfully intended 
to abandon her child. Nor does respondent’s refusal to take prescribed medications 
transform her conduct into rational, volitional conduct, as both the trial court and 
petitioners imply. Respondent’s refusal to take necessary medications may itself have 
resulted from the very mental health conditions that caused her to require treatment 
in the first place. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990) (citing 
Harold I. Schwarz, William Vingiano & Carol Bezirganian Perez, Autonomy and the 
Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 30 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Hospital & Community Psychiatry 1049 (1988)) (“Particularly where the patient is 
mentally disturbed, his own intentions will be difficult to assess and will be 
changeable in any event.”). Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, 
logically, there must be “[e]vidence showing a parent’s ability, or capacity to acquire 
the ability, to overcome factors which resulted in their children being placed in foster 
care” in order to support the conclusion that a parent has willfully abandoned his or 
her child by failing to correct those conditions. In re Matherly, 149 N.C. App. 452, 455, 
562 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2002). Thus, at a minimum, a trial court presented with evidence 
indicating that a mentally ill parent has willfully abandoned his or her child must 
make specific findings of fact to support a conclusion that such behavior illustrated 
the parent’s willful intent rather than symptoms of a parent’s diagnosed mental 
illness.4  
Our reasoning should in no way be taken to suggest that every parent who 
struggles with a mental health condition lacks the capacity to make choices signifying 
an intent to abandon one’s child. Rather, just as “[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is 
neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision,” In re 
M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2017) (alteration in original), 
                                            
4 Although it may be difficult to distinguish between a mentally ill parent who makes 
a volitional choice to refuse treatment and a mentally ill parent who refuses treatment 
because of his or her mental illness, courts must make a similar distinction when deciding if 
a mentally ill litigant is competent to refuse treatment or may be forcibly medicated against 
their expressed wishes. See generally Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the 
Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 343, 370 (1995). 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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behavior emanating from a parent’s mental health conditions may supply grounds for 
terminating parental rights only “upon an analysis of the relevant facts and 
circumstances,” such as the severity of the parent’s condition and the extent to which 
the parent’s behavior is consistent with recognizable symptoms of an illness. In re 
K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 283, 837 S.E.2d 861, 868 (2020). In the present case, evidence 
that respondent “failed and refused to follow the medication regimen proposed by her 
doctors” and “dwelt in her mental illness” is insufficient to support the conclusion 
that she willfully abandoned Ann. Because there is no evidence in the record showing 
(1) that her failure to follow the medication regimen was itself a willful act, and (2) 
that compliance with her medication regimen would have enabled her to cure the 
parenting deficiencies caused by her mental illnesses, there is no cause to remand for 
further fact-finding. 
We emphasize that our decision in this case does not threaten the petitioners’ 
status as Ann’s legal permanent guardians, although we acknowledge the tangible 
and symbolic differences between guardianship and parenthood. However, the 
protections provided to parents by our Juvenile Code and by our federal and state 
constitutions are enjoyed by healthy and infirm parents alike. Moreover, parents who 
cannot provide for their children as independent caregivers may still be able to 
maintain a limited but meaningful bond with their children that may benefit both 
the parent and the child, a bond which may grow over time if the parent-child 
relationship is preserved and the parent’s condition improves. See, e.g., In re Cameron 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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B., 154 A.3d 1199, 1201 (Me. 2017) (“When it is appropriate, a permanency 
guardianship allows parents whose children cannot be returned to them to have a 
meaningful opportunity to maintain a legal relationship with their children and to 
have the court determine their rights to have contact with their children.”). Although 
respondent’s mental health challenges obviously interfere with her ability to be a 
parent to Ann, her condition is not prima facie evidence that her parental rights may 
be terminated. 
Conclusion 
The Davie County District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the 
order terminating respondent’s parental rights, notwithstanding the prior order 
establishing petitioners as Ann’s permanent guardians entered by the Davidson 
County District Court in the underlying dependency proceeding. However, 
petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proving the existence of a ground for 
terminating parental rights by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Because the 
requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) have not been met when a child has been 
placed with permanent legal guardians and because there is no evidence in the record 
indicating that respondent willfully abandoned her child, we reverse the trial court’s 
order terminating respondent’s parental rights. 
REVERSED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice NEWBY concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion 
to reverse the termination of respondent’s parental rights under subsections 7B-
1111(a)(6) and (a)(7) of our General Statutes. This case involves a mother who is 
unable to parent her child due to severe mental illness that, according to the trial 
court’s findings and evidence in the record, has only deteriorated in the over four 
years since the child was born. The majority, for policy reasons of its own, chooses 
guardianship over adoption, invalidating the trial court’s decision to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights on these two grounds, subsections 7B-1111(a)(6) and 
(a)(7). It does so by making its own findings, rendering a portion of the relevant 
statutes meaningless, and relying on social science articles and out-of-state cases that 
do not effectuate the purpose and intent of North Carolina’s statutes providing for 
termination of parental rights. I would conclude that both grounds for termination 
are satisfied here. As such, I concur in part and dissent in part.  
The first ground upon which the trial court terminated respondent’s rights was 
dependency. Subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) provides that a parent’s rights may be 
terminated when 
the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and 
supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a 
dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and 
that there is a reasonable probability that the incapability 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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will continue for the foreseeable future. Incapability under 
this subdivision may be the result of substance abuse, 
intellectual disability, mental illness, organic brain 
syndrome, or any other cause or condition that renders the 
parent unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile and the 
parent lacks an appropriate alternative child care 
arrangement. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2019). Therefore, in addition to showing an incapability to 
care for the child, there must also be a showing that “the parent lacks an appropriate 
alternative child care arrangement.” 
 
There is no dispute that respondent is incapable of parenting the child in this 
case. Additionally, it is clear that, in the four years between the child’s birth and the 
termination hearing, respondent was never able to identify an alternative childcare 
arrangement. The trial court order and record here show that from the time the child 
was born, respondent was unable and unwilling to provide the necessary information 
to establish an alternative childcare arrangement opportunity, beginning with her 
unwillingness to give any identifying information as to the child’s father. Thus, the 
express statutory language is met. The majority now holds, however, that when DSS 
places the child in an arrangement that results in permanent guardianship, the 
requirements of subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) can never be met. Simply fulfilling its 
statutory duty, DSS arranged for a suitable home for the child without any assistance 
from respondent. Contrary to the majority’s holding, a trial court can find that the 
dependency ground exists despite the fact that a child is placed in a permanent 
guardianship. Since 2011, the Court of Appeals has interpreted subsection 7B-
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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1111(a)(6) to mean “the parent must have taken some action to identify viable 
[childcare] alternatives.” In re L.H., 210 N.C. App. 355, 364, 708 S.E.2d 191, 197 
(2011). If this interpretation were wrong, the General Assembly would have acted to 
correct it. Now the majority overrules this ten-year-old precedent.  
 
The majority reasons that the statutory language does not require a parent to 
have identified any alternative childcare arrangement; in the majority’s view, where 
DSS has established an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement, the second 
prong of subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied. The majority reasons that so 
long as “the child is residing with another appropriate permanent caretaker, then the 
parent’s incapability does not itself supply a reason for the state to intervene” to 
terminate a respondent’s parental rights. Even more concerning, the majority 
reasons that the alternative childcare arrangement element is never “satisfied as a 
ground for terminating parental rights when, as in the present case, the parent’s child 
has been placed with a legal permanent guardian,” even when respondent has not 
participated in identifying a permanent guardian for the child. Thus, the majority 
holds that where DSS acts in a way to protect the child by identifying a family that 
can serve as a permanent guardian when the parent is incapable of caring for the 
child, the parent’s rights can never be terminated on dependency grounds.  
 
Surely this reasoning cannot be correct given that DSS frequently has to 
identify a placement for a child upon that child’s removal from the home and does so 
without any input from the parent. As the Court of Appeals has previously 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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recognized, a holding to the contrary renders the second portion of subsection 
7B-1111(a)(6) meaningless, which could not have been the General Assembly’s intent 
in crafting the precise language and requirements of this statutory provision. See In 
re L.H., 210 N.C. App. at 365–66, 708 S.E.2d at 198 (“[T]he fact that [the child] was 
placed with his maternal grandmother cannot mean, without anything more, that 
respondent father had an alternative care arrangement. If this were the case, the 
[statutory] requirement would be meaningless because, in the words of the guardian 
ad litem, ‘our courts will always do their best to ensure that someone’ cares for 
children.”). The fact that DSS has identified an alternative placement does not relieve 
a parent from his or her obligation to show, when dependency arises, that there is an 
alternative childcare placement that should prevent termination of parental rights. 
The majority’s opinion to the contrary creates a Catch-22 situation for DSS, 
discouraging DSS from immediately identifying a placement for the child because 
they will later be precluded from terminating a parent’s rights on dependency 
grounds.  
 
Moreover, it is the General Assembly, not this Court, that should make policy 
decisions. The General Assembly has decided as a matter of policy that a parent’s 
rights may be terminated in dependency situations where the parent has a mental 
illness that makes parenting impossible. As clearly stated in our statutes, “it is in the 
public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions, [and] to promote the 
integrity and finality of adoptions.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(a) (2019); see also N.C.G.S. 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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§ 48-1-100(b) (2019) (discussing that it is desirable to “advance the welfare of minors 
by . . . facilitating the adoption of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons 
who can give them love, care, security, and support”). The majority here advances its 
own policy preferences, favoring permanent guardianship over adoption, instead of 
deferring to the policy enactments of the General Assembly. The legislature will have 
to intervene now that the majority has rendered subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) 
meaningless under these circumstances. 
The trial court also terminated respondent’s parental rights based on N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(7) (2019), the willful abandonment ground for termination. Subsection 
7B-1111(a)(7) provides that a trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if 
“[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion.”  
 
Though the trial court here did not explicitly reference the six months 
preceding the termination hearing, it is clear the trial court considered the relevant 
period since it made numerous findings related to respondent’s abandonment of the 
child. The trial court noted that respondent persistently brought the child 
inappropriate gifts, consistently refused medication treatment for her mental illness, 
failed to comply with her physicians’ recommendations, testified about the out-of-
body experiences she has had and the times she has put herself in dangerous 
situations, and continuously demonstrated psychosis, mania, anger, poor insight, and 
poor impulse control without showing any improvement in the four years before the 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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hearing. The trial court stated that, “[s]ince the child was born, the Respondent 
Mother’s mental health status has deteriorated.” Based on the fact that, when viewed 
as a whole, there is evidence in the record that supports the trial court’s decision to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights based on her conduct within the relevant six-
month period, I would also uphold termination on this basis as well.  
 
The majority finds facts not in the trial court order or the record about 
respondent’s ability to parent the child and then concludes that there is no evidence 
that respondent’s actions have been willful. Supporting its approach with various 
social science articles not presented to the trial court and cases from other states, the 
majority reasons that where a parent has a mental illness, in many cases, the trial 
court will not be able to determine that an individual’s actions are willful if they can 
be attributable to an individual’s mental illness. Though the majority notes that 
courts must make distinctions about the willfulness of mental capacity in other 
circumstances, the majority removes the trial court’s ability to make a willfulness 
determination here; instead, it finds that the trial court should not have concluded 
that respondent’s actions could be categorized as willful. In short, the majority 
assumes itself to be in a better position to judge the willfulness of respondent’s 
conduct from a cold record than the trial court which personally observed respondent.  
Under the type of reasoning that the majority advances, the more severe the 
mental illness, the less likely it will be for the trial court to terminate parental rights 
based on any ground requiring a willfulness determination. This approach will leave 
IN RE A.L.L. 
 
Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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children in legal limbo, unable to be adopted so long as a biological parent suffers 
from a significant mental health disorder. Thus, the chances of permanency through 
adoption will dramatically decrease as a parent’s mental illness worsens. Surely this 
reasoning does not support the legislative goals of promoting the physical and 
emotional well-being of the child and providing permanency for juveniles at the 
earliest possible age. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(1), (2) (2019). Nor does this reasoning 
promote the clearly established goal to facilitate and promote the integrity and 
finality of adoptions. See N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(a), (b). The majority’s new policy-driven 
standard for preventing termination of parental rights in cases in which the parent 
has worsening mental illness undermines expressly stated statutory goals for 
termination. The General Assembly will also need to address this issue. 
 
To achieve its policy outcome the majority’s opinion sets an unrealistic 
standard for termination that undermines the goals set forth in our termination 
statutes and ignores express statutory language. It places its policy preferences over 
those enacted by the legislature. I would affirm termination of respondent’s parental 
rights on both grounds. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.