Title: Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 30 
Docket: 
Yor-22-206 
Argued: 
January 12, 2023 
Decided: 
 May 23, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
RICHARD TOMINSKY 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF OGUNQUIT et al. 
 
 
CONNORS, J. 
[¶1]  This is an appeal brought by Richard Tominsky pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 80B challenging the issuance of building permits by the Town of 
Ogunquit’s code enforcement officer (CEO) to 477 Shore Road LLC.  Because the 
Town’s Board of Appeals erred in concluding that good cause existed for 
Tominsky’s untimely appeal, its decision denying Tominsky’s administrative 
appeal on the merits must be vacated and his appeal to the Superior Court must 
be dismissed.  In so ruling, we resolve thorny questions regarding the interface 
among standing requirements, M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and M.R. App. P. 2C(a)(1). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The LLC owns a parcel of property located at 477 Shore Road in 
Ogunquit.  Between December 2020 and January 2021, the CEO issued six 
 
2 
building permits to the LLC for construction relating to six single-family 
dwelling units.  The permits allowed for renovations and width and height 
changes to four existing units and the demolition and rebuild of a “barn” into 
two separate units. 
[¶3]  Tominsky owns property abutting the LLC’s parcel.  When the 
permits were issued, Tominsky was living in Florida; he only learned of the 
project when he returned to Ogunquit in May 2021.  Tominsky’s counsel 
contacted the CEO on May 27, 2021, requesting information about the project 
but did not receive a response. 
[¶4]  In June 2021, having not received a response from the CEO, 
Tominsky filed a complaint in the Superior Court requesting an injunction, a 
writ of mandamus, and a declaratory judgment against the Town, the CEO, and 
the LLC.  That matter was dismissed in early August 2021 because of 
Tominsky’s 
failure 
to 
exhaust 
his 
administrative 
remedies. 
 
On 
August 8, 2021—roughly seven months after the CEO’s issuance of the final 
building permit and three months after Tominsky learned of the project—
Tominsky filed an administrative appeal with the Board requesting that it 
overturn the CEO’s issuance of the permits. 
 
3 
[¶5]  The Board held a hearing on Tominsky’s appeal on 
September 9, 2021, and, as a threshold matter, debated whether it could hear 
Tominsky’s appeal given its untimeliness.  The Ordinance provides that once 
the CEO has “render[ed] a written decision to a party, any aggrieved party may 
file an administrative . . . appeal within 30 calendar days of the date of the 
official, written decision.”  Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-5.3.A 
(Apr. 1, 2009).  The Board may “grant exceptions to this 30-day rule” but “only 
where, in its sole and exclusive judgment, extraordinary circumstances have 
been shown which would result in a flagrant miscarriage of justice unless the 
said 30-day time period is extended.”  Id.  The Board referred to this language 
as a “good cause” exception. 
[¶6]  After debate, the Board unanimously agreed to apply the exception 
to hear Tominsky’s appeal on the merits.1  Its decision “was based, in part, on 
[Tominsky’s counsel’s] assertion that he received no response from the [CEO] 
to his May 27, 2021 request for information; and by the delay caused by . . . 
 
1  The LLC filed an appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B challenging the Board’s granting of the good 
cause exception.  The Superior Court (York County, Mulhern, J.) denied the appeal, and the LLC then 
appealed to us.  Simultaneously with this decision, we are vacating the Superior Court’s judgment 
with instructions to dismiss the appeal, 477 Shore Road LLC v. Town of Ogunquit, Mem-23-61 
(May 23, 2023), because, as discussed below, see infra ¶¶ 16-20, the LLC lacks standing to challenge 
the Town’s decision in a separate appeal. 
 
4 
Tominsky’s case in [the] Superior Court which he asserted he was forced to do 
because of the Town’s lack of response.” 
[¶7]  In the same hearing, the Board addressed the merits of Tominsky’s 
appeal.  Tominsky raised multiple arguments, focusing primarily on the manner 
in which the permits were issued and whether the sections in the Ordinance 
concerning nonconformities were applicable.  The CEO responded to each of 
Tominsky’s arguments.  The LLC was also permitted to address the Board and 
asserted, inter alia, that the Board could still decline to grant the good cause 
exception.  Ultimately, the Board voted 4-1 to deny Tominsky’s appeal on the 
merits and issued its written decision shortly thereafter. 
[¶8]  Tominsky timely appealed to the Superior Court (Tominsky I).  
See Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-5.3.K (Apr. 1, 2009); 30-A M.R.S. 
§ 2691(3)(G) (2023).  His complaint contained multiple counts and named the 
Town, the Board, the CEO, and the LLC as defendants.  On a motion to dismiss 
filed by all named defendants, the court (York County, Mulhern, J.) dismissed all 
but one count and treated the remaining count as an appeal pursuant to 
Rule 80B.  It also dismissed Tominsky’s claims against the Board and the CEO 
and ordered that the LLC remain as a party in interest. 
 
5 
[¶9]  While Tominsky I was pending, the CEO issued a certificate of 
occupancy for one of the dwelling units.  Tominsky appealed the issuance of the 
certificate to the Board.  At a hearing held in December 2021, the Board had a 
“lengthy discussion regarding whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, in 
light of the fact that it recently heard an appeal by the same appellant of the 
same building permit.”  Citing Salisbury v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2002 ME 13, 
¶ 14, 788 A.2d 598, the Board unanimously voted not to hear the appeal. 
[¶10]  Tominsky then filed a second complaint containing multiple 
counts against the Town and the LLC (Tominsky II).  The Town moved to dismiss 
the complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the action was an 
attempt to litigate the underlying building permits in violation of Salisbury.  The 
LLC joined the Town’s motion. 
[¶11]  In June 2022, the court denied Tominsky’s appeal in Tominsky I 
and dismissed his appeal in Tominsky II.  Tominsky timely appealed both 
decisions, and we consolidated the two appeals for our review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Although the complaints in Tominsky I and Tominsky II contain 
multiple counts, they each assert only an appeal pursuant to 
Rule 80B. 
 
[¶12]  The complaints in both actions originally contained multiple 
 
6 
counts.2  As noted above, the Superior Court granted a motion to dismiss 
various counts in Tominsky I and treated the remaining count as an appeal 
pursuant to Rule 80B.  In Tominsky II, the Superior Court disposed of all four 
counts in one order. 
[¶13]  It is unclear whether in the appeals to us Tominsky seeks to 
challenge the rejection of his complaints as containing anything but Rule 80B 
appeals.  In any event, the exclusive avenue to challenge a municipality’s 
adjudicative decision is a Rule 80B appeal unless that avenue is somehow 
inadequate or a statute provides otherwise.  See Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 
2016 ME 143, ¶ 24, 148 A.3d 707; Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366, 372 (Me. 1981).  
Here, the only relief Tominsky seeks is that obtainable under Rule 80B.  In 
addition, to the extent that Tominsky claims a violation of his procedural due 
process rights, the judicial review provided by Rule 80B bestows all the 
post-deprivation process that is due.  Cf. Moreau v. Town of Turner, 661 A.2d 
677, 680 (Me. 1995). 
 
2  Specifically, the complaint in Tominsky I contained five counts, captioned “Constitutional Due 
Process violations” by the CEO, the Board, and the Town; “Violation of Purposes and Policies 
Underlying Limited Allowance of Nonconformities, and the Existence of Grandfather Clauses”; 
“Violation of Ordinance Article 3 Provisions on ‘Nonconformance’”; “Ordinance Violations 
Concerning Incomplete Building Permit Applications And Failure to Follow SLR Requirements”; and 
“Variance.”  The complaint in Tominsky II contained four counts, captioned “Constitutional Due 
Process Violations”; “MR Civ P 80B”; “Administrative Procedure, 5 MRS sec. 8001 et. seq.”; and 
“Variance.” 
 
7 
B. 
The appeal to the Board in Tominsky I was untimely. 
 
1. 
If a municipal body grants the good cause exception and hears 
an untimely administrative appeal and subsequently rejects 
that appeal on the merits and the objecting party appeals the 
merits decision pursuant to Rule 80B, the party that has 
obtained municipal approval need not, and should not, file its 
own Rule 80B appeal or a cross-appeal pursuant to M.R. 
App. P. 2C(a) to challenge the application of the exception, but 
instead may argue in its briefs to the Superior Court and to this 
Court that the exception should not have been granted. 
 
[¶14]  The procedural posture of Tominsky I presents a question of first 
impression regarding what steps a party that has obtained municipal approval 
must take in a Rule 80B appeal of a municipal body’s decision on the merits in 
order to preserve an argument that its opponent’s administrative appeal was 
fatally tardy.  Here, covering nearly all possibilities, the LLC raised the 
untimeliness argument in its own Rule 80B appeal; as the Rule 80B-appellee in 
the Superior Court; and again to us as an alternative argument pursuant to M.R. 
App. P. 2C(a)(1) (“An appellee may, without filing a cross-appeal, argue that 
alternative grounds support the judgment that is on appeal.”). 
[¶15]  We conclude that a party that has obtained municipal approval 
(e.g., the permittee) need not, and should not, file its own Rule 80B appeal to 
assert that the Board improperly granted a good cause exception.  Rather, when 
an objecting party appeals a municipal body’s ruling on the merits pursuant to 
 
8 
Rule 80B, the permittee may raise the good cause issue in its brief.  Similarly, if 
the Superior Court rejects the objecting party’s appeal on the merits, the 
permittee need not file a cross-appeal should its opponent appeal to us.  Rather, 
the permittee may, pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2C(a)(1), 7A(b), raise the good 
cause issue in its brief.  We reason as follows. 
[¶16]  A party lacks standing to appeal a judgment that grants the relief 
the party sought simply because the party would prefer to have the judgment 
rest on different reasoning.3  Hence, because the LLC prevailed on the merits 
before the Board, i.e., it obtained a determination that the building permits 
were valid, the LLC was not aggrieved and lacked standing to file an appeal.  
See Witham Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2011 ME 104, ¶¶ 7, 15-16, 
30 A.3d 811; Brooks v. Town of N. Berwick, 1998 ME 146, ¶ 10, 712 A.2d 1050 
(“Although [the abutter] might have preferred that the ZBA base its decision on 
the alternative rationale that the property was no longer grandfathered, he 
nonetheless received exactly what he asked for from the ZBA: an invalidation 
of the CEO’s decision.”). 
 
3  We have noted an exception to this principle that applies “when an essential finding on which 
the judgment is based might otherwise prejudice the party through the use of collateral estoppel in 
the future proceeding.”  See Witham Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2011 ME 104, ¶ 16, 30 
A.3d 811 (quotation marks omitted).  This exception does not apply here; the LLC does not contend 
that the Board’s finding of good cause might prejudice the LLC in some future proceeding. 
 
9 
[¶17]  The requirement that a party must have standing to appeal does 
not disappear when another party appeals first.  A cross-appeal must meet the 
same justiciability requirements as an initial appeal.  See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. West Lake Acad., 548 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A cross appeal is generally 
not proper to challenge a subsidiary finding or conclusion when the ultimate 
judgment is favorable to the party cross-appealing.”); Matter of Sims, 994 F.2d 
210, 214 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A cross-appeal filed for the sole purpose of advancing 
additional arguments in support of a judgment is ‘worse than unnecessary’, 
because it disrupts the briefing schedule, increases the number (and usually the 
length) of briefs, and tends to confuse the issues.  Such arguments should, 
instead, be included in the appellee’s answering brief.” (citation omitted)). 
[¶18]  This case is further complicated by the fact that whether a 
cross-appeal is necessary is normally determined by whether the argument 
that the cross-appellant seeks to advance would result in different relief than 
that granted by the judgment.  See M.R. App. P. 2C(a) Advisory Committee 
Note—July 2022.  A timeliness argument differs from the argument that the 
merits were incorrectly decided in terms of applicable relief.  See id.  A ruling 
on the merits is a judgment on the merits, whereas a ruling that an appeal is 
untimely results in a dismissal, i.e., a “change to the judgment.”  Id. 
 
10 
[¶19]  But Rule 80B includes no provision for cross-appeals.  Indeed, it 
also does not specifically permit a motion to dismiss.  Rule 80B is designed “to 
afford prompt, effective, expeditious and direct judicial review of 
administrative action.”  Colby v. York Cnty. Comm’rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 
(Me. 1982).  It would promote form over substance, undermine the goal of 
expedition of administrative appeals, and lead to “worse than unnecessary” 
procedural complications to require a permittee to appeal municipal approval 
under Rule 80B if an opponent files a separate Rule 80B appeal simply because 
the permittee seeks to preserve its ability to advance an argument that would 
result in a dismissal of its opponent’s appeal instead of a judgment affirming 
the municipal decision.  See Matter of Sims, 994 F.2d at 214 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Moreover, the rules of civil and appellate procedure are to be 
construed to secure “the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of 
every” action and appeal.  M.R. Civ. P. 1; M.R. App. P. 1. 
[¶20]  For these reasons, the LLC did not need to file a separate Rule 80B 
appeal.4  Nor did it need to file a cross-appeal to Tominsky’s appeal.  Raising the 
good cause issue as an alternative argument pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2C(a)(1) 
was appropriate in this context. 
 
4  Thus, as noted above, supra n.1, the matter is dismissed.  477 Shore Road v. Town of Ogunquit, 
Mem-23-61 (May 23, 2023). 
 
11 
2. 
The meaning of the Ordinance’s good cause exception is 
determined by the court de novo. 
 
[¶21]  There are two types of “good cause” exceptions to the deadline for 
filing an appeal to a municipal body.  First, there is a judicially crafted exception: 
a deadline contained an ordinance or established by statute may be extended 
“when a court ‘finds special circumstances which would result in a flagrant 
miscarriage of justice.’”  Viles v. Town of Embden, 2006 ME 107, ¶ 8, 905 A.2d 
298 (quoting Keating v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 325 A.2d 521, 524 (Me. 1974)).  
With respect to this judicially crafted exception, on appeal to us, we review the 
Superior Court’s application and apply an abuse of discretion standard to the 
court’s determination of the existence of good cause and a clearly erroneous 
standard to the court’s factual findings.  See id. ¶ 9. 
[¶22]  Second, as is the case here, a deadline may be extended pursuant 
to an applicable ordinance when a municipal entity finds good cause to hear an 
appeal that would otherwise be deemed late under the ordinance.  In this 
context, the Superior Court acts in an intermediate appellate capacity, and we 
review directly the operative decision of the municipality.  See Tomasino v. 
Town of Casco, 2020 ME 96, ¶ 5, 237 A.3d 175.  As to the standard of review, 
language in Otis v. Town of Sebago, 645 A.2d 3, 5 (Me. 1994) suggests that we 
give deference to a board’s determination whether the good cause exception 
 
12 
has been met.  More precisely, our standard of review for municipal 
adjudicative decisions is to give great deference to a board’s findings of fact, i.e., 
to sustain the findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion, 
see Tomasino, 2020 ME 96, ¶ 5, 237 A.3d 175, and to give no deference to a 
board’s interpretation of an ordinance because such interpretation is a 
question of law that we review de novo, Jade Realty Corp. v. Town of Eliot, 2008 
ME 80, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 408; Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 2007 ME 85, ¶ 8, 
926 A.2d 1168; Isis Dev., LLC v. Town of Wells, 2003 ME 149, ¶ 3, 836 A.2d 1285.  
As to mixed questions of law and fact, we afford a board’s ultimate 
characterization “substantial deference.”  Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 
82, ¶¶ 8-9, 828 A.2d 768.  The test for affording substantial deference is 
whether the issue involves a situation in which the legal determination is 
“greatly informed” by the board’s factual findings.  See Lane Constr. Corp. v. 
Town of Washington, 2008 ME 45, ¶ 13, 942 A.2d 1202. 
[¶23]  Applying these principles here, we defer to the Board’s fact finding 
regarding why the appeal was filed more than thirty days after the CEO’s 
issuance of the permits.  But whether those facts present “extraordinary 
circumstances . . . which would result in a flagrant miscarriage of justice unless 
the said 30-day time period is extended” is a question of law that we review 
 
13 
de novo.  See Zoning Ordinance § 225-5.3.A.  Indeed, because the language used 
in the Ordinance to define when the good cause exception should apply mirrors 
the test we crafted in Keating, the meaning of the test is squarely a legal one for 
our resolution.5 
3. 
Tominsky did not qualify for the Ordinance’s good cause 
exception because a mistaken belief of law is not an 
“extraordinary circumstance” that would result in a “flagrant 
miscarriage of justice.” 
 
[¶24]  When interpreting a zoning ordinance,  “we first evaluate the plain 
meaning of the Ordinance and, if the meaning is clear, we need not look beyond 
the words themselves.  We construe the terms of an ordinance reasonably, 
considering its purposes and structure and to avoid absurd or illogical results.”  
Olson v. Town of Yarmouth, 2018 ME 27, ¶ 11, 179 A.3d 920 (alterations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Here, we conclude that, given the purpose of the 
Ordinance provision and the choice of words mirroring our language in Keating, 
the Ordinance’s good cause exception is intended to adopt the test we 
announced in Keating.  It follows that our decisions interpreting the contours 
of the judicial test can be applied to the analogous Ordinance exception. 
 
5  It is clear from the language in the Ordinance providing that the Board may grant the exception 
only when it concludes “in its sole and exclusive judgment” that the test has been met that the 
Ordinance intends to give a wide berth to the Board when assessing whether to grant the exception.  
That said, it is the courts’ job to interpret the language of the Ordinance in order to conclude whether 
the facts as found by the Board establish a predicate to apply that test. 
 
14 
[¶25]  “The need for a good cause exception primarily stems from the lack 
of notice of the issuance of the building permit to abutting landowners or other 
persons who may be aggrieved by its issuance.”  Viles, 2006 ME 107, ¶ 12, 905 
A.2d 298.  “Therefore, when [a fact finder] examines whether the good cause 
exception is applicable to a situation, it starts with determining whether the 
appellant received notice of the issuance of the permit.”  Id. ¶ 13.  Importantly, 
“lack of notice is a key factor, but it is not a determinative factor.  Another factor 
is the amount of time the appellant waited to file the appeal after obtaining 
actual knowledge of the permit.”  Id.  (citation omitted).  Other factors may be 
relevant because “all the equities of the situation” should be considered in 
deciding whether to grant the exception.  Id. ¶¶ 11, 13 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶26]  The first question is whether Tominsky lacked notice.  See id. ¶ 13.  
The building permits were issued between December 2020 and January 2021, 
but the Board found that Tominsky did not learn of the project until he returned 
to Ogunquit in May 2021 because he was living in Florida.  Thus, Tominsky’s 
failure to appeal between January and May based on lack of notice could trigger 
application of the exception. 
 
15 
[¶27]  After allowing for Tominsky’s inaction owing to a lack of notice, 
there is no viable excuse for the eighty-one day delay that followed.  The record 
reflects that Tominsky had actual knowledge of the project as early as 
May 19, 2021, yet he did not file his appeal with the Board until August 8.  One 
of his stated reasons—that he did not receive a response to his counsel’s 
May 27 letter to the CEO—is untethered to the lack of notice that can form a 
predicate to the application of the good cause exception.  Indeed, regarding the 
CEO’s lack of response, the letter sent to the CEO by Tominsky’s counsel on 
May 27 states, “It seems to me that such a massive proposal should at least have 
gone to the ZBA . . . .”  Although a municipal officer’s failure to respond to a 
citizen inquiry is concerning, the CEO’s lack of response did not prevent 
Tominsky from filing an administrative appeal with the Board.  There is no 
prerequisite in the Ordinance that an appellant must speak with the CEO before 
filing an appeal. 
[¶28]  Even if the CEO’s lack of a response could support a short delay 
after May 27, Tominsky did not file his appeal until August 8.  See Wilgram v. 
Sedgwick, 592 A.2d 487, 488 (Me. 1991) (determining that the good cause 
exception could not save an abutter’s untimely appeal that was filed seven 
months after the issuance of the building permit and seventy-six days after the 
 
16 
abutter obtained actual notice of the project).  The reason for Tominsky’s 
further delay cited by the Board was Tominsky’s decision to file a complaint in 
the Superior Court and waiting until that case was dismissed before appealing 
to the Board.  But delay based on ignorance of the law cannot establish an 
extraordinary circumstance that would result in a flagrant miscarriage of 
justice.  Cf. Alley v. Alley, 2004 ME 8, ¶¶ 1-2, 840 A.2d 107 (affirming the denial 
of relief under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) because “[a]n attorney’s mistaken belief as to 
the law does not rise to the level of excusable neglect” (quotation marks 
omitted)); Young v. Sturdy Furniture Co., 441 A.2d 320, 321-22 (Me. 1982) 
(compiling cases and discussing whether mistake of law can satisfy the “strict” 
standard of excusable neglect). 
[¶29]  As we noted in Young, in determining whether excusable neglect 
exists, the standard is “strict,” and extensions of time “should be limited to 
extraordinary cases.”  441 A.2d at 321.  The text of the Ordinance referencing 
the need for “extraordinary circumstances” underscores that the Ordinance 
exception does not excuse delay based on mistaken belief of the law. 
[¶30]  Nor was this even a mistaken belief as to a difficult issue of law.  
We have long required parties to exhaust their administrative remedies before 
turning to the courts for relief.  See, e.g., Bryant v. Town of Camden, 2016 ME 27, 
 
17 
¶¶ 10, 12, 132 A.3d 1183; Town of Levant v. Seymour, 2004 ME 115, ¶ 13, 855 
A.2d 1159; Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. Bureau of Rehab., 473 A.2d 406, 408-09 
(Me. 1984); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821 (Me. 1983); Levesque v. Town 
of Eliot, 448 A.2d 876, 878 (Me. 1982). 
[¶31]  In sum, the Board misapprehended the scope of the good cause 
exception, and the exception does not apply to the factual predicate reflected in 
the Board’s findings as to the cause of Tominsky’s delay in appealing.6 
 
6  Even if the appeal had been timely and we could have reviewed the Board’s merits 
determination, the Board’s decision would have been affirmed. 
 
Tominsky’s arguments can be divided into two categories: challenges to the application of the 
Ordinance’s substantive provisions and procedural challenges.  Beginning with the relevant 
Ordinance provisions, we note that Tominsky argues that the Ordinance bars six dwelling units on 
477 Shore Road.  But if there were six units there prior to the enactment of the Ordinance, then the 
units are not only grandfathered but can also be “repaired, maintained, improved, enlarged, changed 
or relocated” in conformity with all other dimensional requirements besides lot area or street 
frontage.  Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-3.4.C (Apr. 1, 2009).  Although Tominsky argues 
that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that six units pre-existed the 
Ordinance, according to the Board’s meeting minutes, he conceded that six units pre-existed the 
Ordinance.  Additionally, although the record shows that the LLC’s alterations to the units were 
substantial, given that the issue whether the construction met Ordinance standards is a fact-intensive 
question, the Board’s determination that the changes were permissible was reasonable.  See id.; 
Bizier v. Town of Turner, 2011 ME 116, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1048.  Finally, to the extent that Tominsky claims 
that the project violated shoreland zoning requirements, the Board did find, and could reasonably 
find on the evidence before it , that no construction occurred “within” that zone as required for the 
shoreland zone provisions to apply.  See Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-4.5.E (Apr. 1, 2009). 
 
Turning to his procedural arguments, we conclude that Tominsky misconstrues the applicable 
burden of proof.  He argues that the project proponents were required to prove that the proposal 
complied with the Ordinance.  Although a project proponent “shall have the burden of proving that 
the proposed land use activity is in conformity with the purposes and provisions of th[e] Ordinance,” 
id. § 225-4.5.D, that burden applies at the permitting stage.  On appeal to the Board, “[t]he person 
filing the appeal shall have the burden of proof.”  Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-5.3.F 
(Apr. 1, 2009).  Hence, it was Tominsky’s burden to prove why the project did not meet the 
requirements of the Ordinance.  To the extent that he is complaining that he did not understand how 
the CEO could have issued the permits prior to the hearing before the Board, the CEO’s decision was 
subject to de novo review before the Board, Ogunquit, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 225-5.2.A 
 
18 
C. 
The appeal in Tominsky II fails because the issuance of a certificate 
of occupancy is not an appealable event except to challenge whether 
the certificate holder adhered to the terms of the permit. 
 
[¶32]  Finally, Tominsky challenges the dismissal of his appeal in 
Tominsky II.  But Salisbury, 2002 ME 13, 788 A.2d 598, is directly on point.  
There, we stated: 
An appeal of a certificate of occupancy may not, however, 
substitute for an appeal of the underlying permit.  If the permittee 
has complied with the terms of a valid permit, an abutter may not 
challenge the issuance of the certificate of occupancy based on a 
defect in the permit.  If, however, the permittee has meaningfully 
exceeded the authority contained in the permit, or otherwise 
violated conditions of the permit, the issuance of the certificate of 
occupancy may be challenged. 
 
Id. ¶ 14 (citation omitted). 
[¶33]  Tominsky does not allege that the LLC failed to comply with the 
permits; rather, he seeks to reassert arguments raised in Tominsky I that the 
permits should not have been issued.  Thus, Tominsky II falls well within the 
type of challenge prohibited by Salisbury, and the court did not err in dismissing 
his action for failure to state a claim. 
 
(Apr. 1, 2009), and the CEO explained during the hearing how the permits met the Ordinance’s 
requirements.  Moreover, Tominsky does not explain how he suffered any specific prejudice from not 
having heard the CEO’s explanation prior to the hearing.  Cf. Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2015 ME 32, 
¶ 22, 113 A.3d 1088. 
 
To the extent that Tominsky seeks to raise any other basis to challenge the permits, his arguments 
are not adequately developed and are therefore deemed waived.  See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 
110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290. 
 
19 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶34]  For the reasons given above, the appeal in Tominsky I before the 
Board was untimely, and the appeal in Tominsky II failed to allege a viable claim 
for relief. 
The entry is: 
 
The judgment in Tominsky I, AP-21-023, is 
vacated.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for entry of a judgment vacating the 
Board’s decision and remanding the matter to 
the Board with instructions to the Board to 
dismiss the matter for want of jurisdiction.  The 
judgment in Tominsky II, AP-22-002, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William A. Hahn, Esq. (orally), Hahn & Matkov, Boston, for appellant Richard 
Tominsky 
 
Mary E. Costigan, Esq., and Zachary B. Brandwein, Esq. (orally), Bernstein Shur, 
Portland, for appellee Town of Ogunquit 
 
Matthew J. Williams, Esq. (orally), Hodson & Ayer, Kennebunk, for appellee 477 
Shore Road LLC 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket numbers AP-2021-023 & AP-2022-002  
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY