Title: State v. Aiwohi. Concurring Opinion by J. Levinson, with whom C.J. Moon joins [pdf]. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 12/12/2005 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

** FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
=--000---
see
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee
TAYSHEA AIWOHI, Defendant-Appellant
Oe
No. 26838

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(EC-CR. NO. 03-1-0036)

NOVEMBER 29, 2005

osm

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.y
LEVINSON, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY,

WITH WHOM MOON, C.J., JOINS, a
AND ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

S2:O)HY 62 AONSUNE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendant-Appellant Tayshea Aiwohi (hereinafter

vaiwohi") appeals from the First Circuit Court's October 4, 2004

judgment of conviction for manslaughter, in violation of Hawai'i

Revised Statutes (hereinafter “HRS”) § 707-702(1) (a) (1993),

 

Judge Michael A. Town presiding.
Riwohi gave birth to Treyson Aiwohi on July 15, 2001.
Tragically, Teeyson died two days later on July 17, 2001. Susan
Siu, the Chief Investigator for the Department of the Medical
Examiner, testified at the grand jury proceeding that Aiwohi
admitted to smoking cxystal methamphetamine on July 12, 13, 14,
and 15. Dr, William Goodhue, First Deputy Medical Examiner of
the city and County of Honolulu, testified at the grand jury

proceeding that the cause of Treyson’s death was the toxic
 

'* FOR PUBLICATION,
effects of methamphetamine. Aiwohi was thus indicted for
manslaughter on October 9, 2003, for recklessly causing the death
of her newborn son, Treyson Aiwohi-

on March 2, 2004, Aiwohi filed the following three
motions with the circuit court: (1) "Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Based on Insufficient and/or Impermissible Evidence Presented at

the Grand Jury Proceedings”; (2) “Motion to Dismiss Based on the

 

unconstitutionally Vague and/or Overbroad Nature of the
prosecution as Applied to the Defendant and/or the
unconstitutional Failure te Provide Fair Notice to the
Defendant”; and (3) “Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on
Violation of the Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Privacy.”
The circuit court denied all three motions. Aiwohi subsequently
negotiated a conditional plea agreement with the State of Hawai'i

he prosecution”) under which she entered a no

 

(hereinafter
contest plea to the charged offense, but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the foregoing motions.

on appeal, Aiwohi raises the following six issues: (1)
whether Aivohi’s prosecution for manslaughter is within the plain
meaning of HRS § 707-702(1) (a)? (2) whether HRS § 707-702(1) (a),
as applied to Aiwohi, fails to provide fair notice and is

therefore unconstituticnally vague in violation of article I,

 

section § of the Hawai'i Constitution; (3) whether HRS § 707-
702(1) (a), a8 appiied to Aiwohi, fails to provide fair notice and
Sa therefore unconstitutionally vague in violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; (4)

whether Aivohi’s prosecution for manslaughter interferes with an

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expectant mother’s fundamental right to procreate, in violation
of article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution; (5) whether
Aiwohi’s prosecution for manslaughter is an unconstitutional,
retroactive expansion of HRS § 707-702(1) (a), in violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitutions and (6)
whether Aiwohi was denied her right to present a defense, in
violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution, when the circuit court rejected Aiwohi’s
common law defense of immunity for an expectant mother’s prenatal
conduct.

1. BACKGROUND

In the present case, Aiwohi pled no contest pursuant to
a conditional plea agreement, and therefore there was no trial.
As a result, there are no findings of fact. Accordingly, the
following factual background will rely on the testimony provided
by witnesses at the grand jury proceeding, as well as factual
allegations made by the parties in their briefs found in the
record on appeal.

At the time of the incident in question, Aiwohi was
already the mother of four children. Aiwohi gave birth to her
fifth child, Treyson, on July 18, 2001. At the time of Treyson’s
birth, Aiwohi already had a long-standing and well-documented
history of substance abuse for which she had received treatment
from various programs. Although Aiwohi was tested for substance
abuse in various intervals, it appears that she was not tested in
the weeks just prior to Treyson’s delivery. After delivery,

Aiwoh{ was allowed to breast f

 

d the baby several times on

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guly 15 and 16. The hospital discharged Aiwohi and Treyson on

 

guly 16, 2001 at approximately 7:00 p.m., and Aiwohi reported
breast feeding the baby again at approximately 1:30 a.m. ‘The
family subsequently went to sleep.

Aivohi subsequently reported thet her husband woke her
up and teld her that Treyson wasn’t breathing and that they
needed to cell 911. An ambulance then arrived, taking Treyson to
the hospital. That morning, July 17, 2001, at approximately
6:32 asm., Treyson AiwohS was pronounced dead at Castle Medical
center.

‘the completed autopsy report revealed that the baby's
death was caused by drugs. The autopsy report was prepared by
the First Deputy Medical Examiner of the City and County of
Honolulu, Dr. William Goodhue, who testified that the level of
methamphetamine and amphetamine in Treyson’s body was consistent
with exclusive prenatal exposure through the mother. Dr. Goodhue

also testified that there was no evidence of disease or disorder,

 

or any evidence of accidental death by suffocation caused by an
adult sleeping in the sane bed as the baby.

Subsequently, on August 23, 2001, the Chief
Investigator for the Department of the Medical Examiner contacted
Aiwohi by phone. ‘The chief investigator specifically asked
Aiwohi if she used crystel methamphetamine during her pregnancy,
‘at which point Aivohi began to cry and adnitted to such use.
specifically, Aivohi admitted to smoking crystal methamphetamine
on duly 12, 13, and 14, ag well as one “hit” on July 15, the

morning of the baby’s birth. Following presentation of the case
 

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to the O'ahu Grand Jury on October 9, 2003, Aiwohi was indicted
for the offense of manslaughter, in violation of HRS § 707-
70242) (a) «

on March 2, 2004, Aiwohi filed the following three
motions with the Firet Circuit Court: (1) “Motion to Dismiss
Indictment Based on Insufficient and/or Impermissible Evidence
Presented at the Grand Jury Proceedings”; (2) “Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment Based on the Unconstitutionally Vague and/or
overbroad Nature of the prosecution as Applied to the Defendant
and/or the Unconstitutional Failure to Provide Fair Notice to the
Defendant”; and (3) “Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on
Violation of the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Privacy.”
‘The prosecution filed its memorandum in opposition on May 20,
2004.

on May 25, 2004, @ hearing on Aiwohi’s motions to
dismiss was held. The circuit court considered the arguments
presented by each counsel, and, on June 3, 2004, orally denied
Aiwohi's three motions to dismiss the indictment. The circuit
court also filed a written decision on June 3, 2004.

on gune 17, 2004, pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement, Aiwohi entered a plea of no contest to the charged
offense of manslaughter. As part of the plea agreement, Aiwohi
reserved the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of her
three motions to dismiss the indictment. on August 25, 2004, the
circuit court adjudged Aiwohi guilty as charged and sentenced her
to a ten-year term of probation without incarceration.

on September 23, 2004, Aiwohi filed a timely notice of

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appeal. Subsequently, on October 4, 2004, the court filed an
“amended Judgment Guilty Conviction and Probation Sentence.” On
october 5, 2004, Aiwohi filed a timely amended notice of appeal.

IX, STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the present case, this court is faced with a
question of statutory interpretation and questions of
constitutional law. However, inasmuch as the plain language of
the Hawai'i Penal Code (hereinafter “HPC”) is dispositive, the
only applicable standard of review is that with respect to
questions of statutory interpretation. In State v. Arceo, 04
Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (citations omitted), this
court stated that “the interpretation of a statute... isa
question of law reviewable de novo.”
III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Aiwohi’s Prosecution for Manslaughter is Consistent
With the Plain Meaning of HRS § 707-702(1) (a)

1. Summary of Aivohi's axaument
on appeal, Aiwchi argues that her manslaughter
prosecution contravenes the plain meaning of HRS § 707-702(1) (a).
First, Aiwohi contends that her alleged prenatal
conduct was directed at her fetus, which is not 2 “person” as
required by the statute. For support, Aiwohi points to @
decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (hereinafter “ICA”)

in State v. ine, 101 Hawai't 3, 61 P.3d $14 (App. 2002), in

 

which the ICA evaluated a defendant's invocation of the defense
of others with respect to an unborn child. The ICA stated that

“unborn children are not ‘natural persons’ who can be victims of

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a crime unless the legislature expressly included them within the
applicable definition.” Jardine, 101 Hawai'i at 9-10, €1 P.3d at
519-520.

Second, Aiwohi contends that both the proscribed
conduct and the proscribed result of conduct must occur when the
object of that conduct and its result is presently a “person.”
Aiwohi argues that the circuit court improperly focused solely on
the result of conduct element, “thereby ensnar{ing) conduct that
4s not perpetrated on a person.” For support, Aiwohi cites to
Colline v. State, #90 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), a decision
by the Texas Court of Appeals. The Collins court stated that
“the Penal Code does not proscribe any conduct with respect to 4
fetus, and the Legislature, by its definitions of ‘child,’
sperson,’ and ‘individual,’ has specifically limited the
application of [Texas’] penal laws to conduct committed against @
human being who has been born and is alive.” Id. at 897-898
(emphasis in original).

‘Third, Aiwohi contends that the HPC emphasizes the
principles of strict statutory construction and the rule of
lenity. Aiwohi contends that her prosecution for and conviction
of manslaughter amounts to the creation of new criminal offenses
perpetrated against the unborn.

In light of the foregoing, Aiwohi urges us to vacate
the “Amended Judgment Guilty Conviction and Probation Sentence”
filed on October 4, 2004, vacate the circuit court's decision and
order denying Aiwohi's motions, and remand for dismissal of the

indictment.
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2. Summary of the prosecution's argument

in response, the prosecution argues that there is no
violation of the plain language of the manslaughter statute.

First, the prosecution contends that although Aiwohi
engaged in the proscribed conduct when Treyson was prenatal,
there is no doubt that Tzeyson was born alive and was therefore
indisputably 2 “person” at the time of his death. The
prosecution thus argues that Treyson was a “person” within the

definition supplied by the manslaughter statute and that the only

 

remaining issue was Aiwohi’s state of mind -- an issue for the
trier of fact at trial.

Second, the prosecution contends that Aiwohi is wrong
in her assertion that she cannot be held criminally liable for
‘treyson's death merely because her alleged culpable conduct
occurred prior to Treyson’s birth. For support, the prosecution
cites to another decision of the Texas Court of Appeals, Cusllar
va State, 957 $.W.2d 134 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The Cuellar court
assessed a third party's liability for manslaughter when the
defendant's car collided with another car driven by a mother who
was seven and one-half months pregnant. Cuellar, 957 S.W.2d at
137. The fetus was born alive, but subsequently died due to
injuries caused by the car accident. Id. The Cuellar court
stated that “[ilt 1s axiomatic that a homicide conviction,
requiring the death of the victim as an element of the offense,
may stand even though the victin’s death is not instantaneous
with the defendant’s conduct but results from that conduct at a

later time.” Id. at 139.
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‘Thus, the prosecution urges us to affirm the circuit
court’s decision and order denying Aivohi’s respective motions to

dismiss the indictment.

3. The manslaucht. cutis a mothe: renal
orn alive is sister the -anin
the HEC.

‘The prosecution essentially contends that Treyson was
born alive and therefore qualifies as a “person” under HRS § 707-
700 (1993), that Aiwohi’s alleged voluntary ingestion of crystal
methamphetamine while pregnant caused Treyson’s death, and that,
therefore, prosecution of Aivohi for manslaughter is clearly
consistent with the plain language of the statute. Although
facially appealing, the prosecution’s argument must fail because
it does not fully account for the three material elements of the
manslaughter offense.

a. Requisite elements of manslaughter

HRS § 707-702(1) (a) states that “[a] person commits the
offense of manslaughter if . . . (ble recklessly causes the death
of another person.” HRS § 707-702(1) (2). The HEC generally
Gefines “person” as “any natural person.” HRS § 701-116(7)
(1993). Furthermore, for the purposes of HRS chapter 707, HRS §
707-700 defines “person” as “a human being who has been born and
is alive.” HRS § 707-700.

As a general rule, the essential elements of an offense
are “such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3)

results of conduct, as .

 

ajre specified by the definition of

HRS § 702-

 

the offense, and. . . [nJegative a defense .

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205 (1993). Consequently, in order to satisfy the state of mind
requirement, a person must act “intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to
each element of the offense.” HRS § 702-204 (1993). In the
present case, the offense is manslaughter. Thus, the requisite
state of mind is “recklessly.” HRS § 707-702(1) (a). HRS § 702-
206(3) (1993) defines the term “recklessly” as follows:
(a) A.person acts recklessly with respect to his conduct
then he consciously disfegards « substantial and
Unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct Se of
the specified nature,
(e) A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant
CiFeunscance when he consciously disregards

Satstentiel and unjustifiable risk that such
circumstances exis

 

 

 

 

(c) A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of
fit conduct when he consciously disregards a
Substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct
Will cause such a result.

 

HRS § 702-206(3) (2)~(c).
bt spect 2_pr: ion "

when the. 's bes nal ve.

An overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions
confronted with the prosecution of a mother for her own prenatal
conduct, causing harm te the subsequently born child, refuse to
permit such prosecutions. See People v, Morabito, 580 N.¥.S.2d
843, 847 (N.Y, Crim, Ct. 1992) (holding that the defendant mother
could not be charged with endangering the welfare of a child
based upon prenatal acts endangering an unborn child); State v
Grav, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ondo 1992) (holding that a parent may

not be prosecuted for child endangerment for prenatal substance

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abuse); Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 898 (holding that the defendant
mother did not have notice that her voluntary, prenatal ingestion

of cocaine could subject her to prosecution under the Texas

injury te child statute); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State
of Arizona, 894 P.2d 733, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that

defendant mother could not be prosecuted under the child abuse
statute for prenatal conduct that resulted in harm to the
subsequently born child); State v. Dunn, 916 F.2d 952, 956 (Wash.
Ce. App. 1996) (dismissing the second degree criminal
mistreatment of a child charge, holding that fetus was not a
child within the meaning of the criminal mistreatment statute)
‘State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 342 (Fla. 1997) (stating that to
allow the manslaughter prosecution of @ mother for prenatal
conduct “would require that this Court extend the ‘born alive’
doctrine in a manner that has been rejected by every other court
to consider it”); State v. Deborah Jiz., 596 N.W.2d 490, 496
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant mother's fetus was
not a human being for the purposes of the attempted first degree

intentional homicide and first degree reckless injury statutes);

carol Jean Sovinski, iz Mati bs!
‘Abuse: A Quick Fix to a Complex Problem, 25 Perr. L. Rev. 107,
126-127 (1997) (summarizing Mother Charged After Her Baby Dies of

cocaine, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at AL® (reporting that the
county grand Jury refused to indict defendant mother for
involuntary manslaughter on the ground that the legislature did
not intend for the manslaughter statute to impose criminal

liability on women for prenatal conduct that caused the death of

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her subsequently born, two-day-old daughter)). The various
analyses in these jurisdictions either expressly or impliedly
rely upon the proposition that the conduct must be committed
against 2 “person” or “child” as defined by the relevant statute.
In Morabito, a pregnant mother smoked cocaine, thereby
causing her child to be born premature and with cocaine
circulating in its blood system. Morabito, S80 N.¥.S.2d at 844.
‘he mother was subsequently charged with the offense of
endangering the welfare of a child, by “knowingly act[ing] in a
manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral
welfare of a child... .” Id. The court stated that, in New
York, there is no rule that a penal statute must be strictly
construed against the accused, and that therefore the provisions
wmust be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
promote justice and effect the objects of the law.” Id, at 845.
‘The court reasoned that the intent of the legislature was clear
from the language of the statute and that the term “child”
necessarily excluded unborn children. Id, at @46. Therefore, in
accordance with the fair import of the words, as well as
legislative intent, the court held that the endangering the
welfare of @ child statute did not apply to the case at bar. Id.
at 847. Implicit in the Morabito court's ruling was the
proposition that the relevant proscribed conduct must be directed

against a child who has already been born and is already aliv

 

In Gray, the defendant mother was charged with one

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count of child endangerment! for ingesting cocaine in her third
trimester of pregnancy, which resulted in physical harm to the
subsequently born child. Gray, $84 .N.E.2d at 710. The trial
court granted the mother’s motion to dismiss, and the Court of
Appeals for Lucas County affirmed. Id, On review, the Ohio
Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that “(i]t is well
recognized that the criminal statutes of the Revised Code are to
be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed
in favor of the accused.” Jd, at 711. The court subsequently
concluded that a “review of the terms ‘parent’ and ‘child’ within
their common usage supports the conclusion that R.C. 2919.22(A)
does not proscribe the conduct at issue.” Id. According to the
court's reasoning, the mother “did not become a parent until the
birth of the child. Furthermore, the child did not become a
‘child’ within the contemplation of the statute until she was
born.” id, at 711. Thus, the fundamental concept implicit in
the court’s reasoning was that it was the victim's status at the
time of the defendant's proscribed conduct that was
determinative.

In Collins, the defendant mother smoked cocaine while
pregnant, and her subsequently born child suffered pain from

‘The Ohio Suprene Court stated that the Revised Code of Ohio,

section 2819,22(A), provides in relevant
No person, who 12 the parent, gua
having euttody or control, of
child under eighteen yeare of
Shysica!ly handscopped child under twenty-one Years of age,
Shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of
the child, by violating @ duty of care, protection, or

 
  
  
 

‘dian, custodian, person
fon in loco parentis of 2
of a mentally oF

 

 

 

 

suppers.
Guay, 5048 Ev2d ae 712

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cocaine withdrawal. Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 995. Although the
original indictment alleged injury to @ child, id. at 896 n.2,
the prosecution proceeded on the lesser included offense of
recklessly causing injury toa child. Id. at 896. The mother
pled no contest, and the trial court convicted her of the charged
offense. Id. On review, the Texas Court of Appeals, found it
significant that “the Penal Code does not proseribe any conduct
with respect to a fetus, and the Legislature, by its definitions
of ‘child, ‘person,’ and ‘individual,’ has specifically limited
the application of [Texas’] penal laws to conduct committed
against @ human being whe has been born and is alive.” Id. at
897-898. Furthermore, the court stated that:

under the State's interpretation of Section 22.04, Appellant
Se subject to prosecution, even though her conduct was not
an offense at the time it'was committed, because the result
Of her conduct did not occur until after the child was porn
Ghd’ became a person under Texas law, Mhile the State's
Gttempe te Bring Appellant’ s conduct within the reach of
Section 22.04 s2 creative, it ignores the fact that
Appellant's conduct was net a crime when committed. Under
Texas lau, the elenents of a criminal offense are: (1) the
forbidden’ conduct, (2) the required culpability, (3) any
Fequised result, and (4) the negation of any exception to
the offense. it ie the stated purpose of the Penal Code to
proseribe certain types of hareful conduct, not simply the
Fesulta of conduct. “While injury to a child is a “result of
Eiiduct” cr “opecific result” offense, [1] this dees not mean
that the actor ie prosecuted for the result of the conduct,
Father than the conduct itself. Instesd, this means that
the conduct mist be done with the required culpability to
eifect the result the Legislature has specified, #0 that the
Sulpable mental state relates to the result of the
Gefencant's conduct, ond not the nature of the conduct

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

Ida at 898 (emphases in original), The court subsequently held

that the statute was impermissibly vague as applied to the

 

complex than this. See

 

+ our anslysis of the HPC ‘s somewhat m
nia section IITA.3-3

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mother’s conduct. Id, Thus, the Texas Court of Appeals,
explicitly recognized the concept that the conduct must be
perpetrated against @ human being who has been born and is alive.
In Reinesto, the defendant mother ingested heroin
during pregnancy and subsequently gave birth to a heroin-addicted
child. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 734. The indictment alleged that
the mother knowingly caused injury to a child by ingesting heroin
during pregnancy, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes
Annotated section 13-3623.B.1. Id, The mother filed a motion to
dismiss or to remand for a redetermination of probable cause,
contending that the term “child” was not adequately defined for

the grand jury. Id, The mother also alleged that the

 

legislature did not intend to encompass fetuses within the
definition of “chile” and that she did not receive fair warning
that the statute applied to her conduct. Id, The trial court
denied the mother's motions, but the mother filed a special
action with the Arizona Court of Appeals and was granted review.
Id, The court stated that the plain language of the statute does
not support the mother’s prosecution, reasoning that:

the legislature intended to proseribe conauct by any sezson that

gases phyticas beam fo saad: WMPUACY tute tetere te

Conduct that directly endangers a child, not to activity that
Gifects a fetus and thereby ultimately harms the resulting child.

 

Id, at 735 (emphases in original). Based on the foregoing, the
court dismissed the indictment against the defendant mother. Ids
at 738, Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed
the concept that the relevant proscribed conduct must be

committed against a child who has been born and is alive.

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In Dunn, the defendant mother ingested cocaine during
her pregnancy, and the newborn child tested positive for cocaine.
Dunn, 916 P.2d at 953. The state subsequently charged the mother
with second degree criminal mistreatment? of her viable unborn
child, alleging that the mother “did recklessly create an
imminent and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm by
taking cocaine during pregnancy after being warned by the doctor
that it was harmful to the unborn child.” Id. at 953, The trial
court dismissed the charge, and the state appealed. Id. The
Washington Court of Appeals held that the state “failed to name a
victim that came within the protection of the criminal
mistreatment statute and failed to allege or prove an essential
elenent of the crime.” Id, at 956. The court reasoned that no
Washington criminal case had ever interpreted the term “person”
to include an unborn child or fetus. id, at 955. The court
further stated that “{cJonsidering the Legislature's broad,
almost plenary, authority to define crimes, the fact that it did
not specifically define ‘child’ in RCW 9A.42.010(3) to include a
fetus indicates it did not intend to depart from the typical
definition of a child as a person from the time of birth to age
18.” Id. Here, again, the concept that the conduct must be

committed against a “child” was foundational to the court's logic

 

‘The state alleged that the mother’s conduct viclated the Revised
code of Rashington section 9A.42-030(1), which states that “[a] parent of
Gaile or the person entrusted with the physical custody of @ child or
Sepencent person is guilty of criminal istreatment in the second degree if he
OiPehe recklessly either (a) creates an imuinent and substantiel risk of death
Gr great bodily harm, or (B) causes substantial bodily harm by withholding eny
Of the basic necessities of Life.” Dunn, 916 F.2d at 953 n.3

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and holding. It was not enough that the mother’s alleged
ingestion of cocaine created @ substantial risk of death or great
bodily harm te the subsequently born child. It was necessary
that the mother’s conduct be directed against 2 person who had
been born and was under the age of 18. See discussion supra.

In Deborah J.2., the defendant mother was drinking at a
local tavern, while pregnant, one week before her expected due
date. Deborah J.2., $96 N.W.2d at 491. While at the tavern, the
mother thought she was about to give birth and was taken to the
hospital. Id, she allegedly told a nurse at the hospital that
“if you don’t keep me here, I’m just going to go home and keep
drinking and drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this
thing because I don't want it anyways.” Id. After speaking with
a physician, the mother consented to a caesarean section and gave
birth to a baby girl. Id. The baby girl wi
nted fetal alcohol defects. Id. at 491-492. The state

 

extremely small and

pre!

 

subsequently charged the mother with attempted first degree
intentional homicide and first degree reckless injury. Id. at
492, ‘The mother subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which
the trial court denied, and she then filed a petition to review
the non-final order denying her motion. Id. On appeal, the
mother argued that:

the legislature did not Intend to include the actions of a

 

 

Under Wisconsin law, (1

first degree intentional homicide is
eetined az “caus ling)

Geath of another human being with intent to kill
Pe jegree reckless injury is sefined 2s “caus{ing] great
bouiay hare to another hikan being under circumstances which show utter
Gisregard for human Life,” and (3) the term "human being” is defined ae “one
(me has been born alive,” Deborah J.2., $96 N.W.2d at 492-493.

       

 

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pregnant woman vis-d-vis her unborn child under either
Efatuce because they epply only to one who causes death or
Enjury to another human being who has been born alive. Any
intent or indifference that abe may have manifested by her
Continued dependence on, snd abuse of, alcohol

Bregnancy was directed toward her own’ body and the unborn
ERiYo"ohe Carried within her, not toward another human
eine.

 

   

Idk at 493. ‘The Wisconsin Court of Appeals accepted the mother’s

 

argument, stating thai
according to the plain language of the first-degree
Ententional. homicide and faret=degree reckless injury
statutes, the Legislature did not intend for these statutes

The

SGylSiature clearly intended to excluge_an unborn child when
if iiaite the definition of = "husan being” to include only
None uho has been born alive,”

Ida (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court
concluded that probable cause did not exist to charge the nother
with the crimes of attempted first degree intentional homicide
and first degree reckless injury. Id, at 496. The court

subsequently reversed the trial court’s denial of the mother’s

 

motion to dismiss. Id. Thus, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
recognized the concept that the relevant proscribed conduct must
be committed against a human being “who has been born alive.”
Id. at 493.

The one case cited by the parties that affirmed a
mother's conviction for prenatal conduct that harmed her
subsequently born child is Whitner v. State, 492 $.£.2d 777 (S.C.
1997). In Whitner, the mother was charged with, and pled guilty
to, the offense of criminal child neglect* for ingesting cocaine

' Section 20-780 of the South Carolina Code Annotated provides
shat
Ialny person having the legal custody of any child or

38
 

FOR PUBLICATION
during her third trimester of pregnancy, thus causing the baby to
be born with cocaine in its system. Id, at 778-779, The mother
was convicted by the trial court, and she did not appeal her
conviction. Id, Rather, the mother filed a petition for post
conviction relief, contending, among other things, that the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept a
guilty plea to a nonexistent offense. Id. at 779. The trial
court granted the mother’s petition for post-conviction relief,
put the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
word “child” as used in the relevant statute included viable
fetuses. Id. at 778-779. The court first looked to the plain
language of the statute and South Carolina’s policy concerning
children, set forth in section 20-7-20(C) of the South Carolina
code, Annotated, as follows:

on the

 

wrt shall be the policy of this State to concentra
prevention of children’s ercblens 2s the most smportant
Ree eter Be planned and implemented on behalf of
sriigect tnd their families," ‘The abuse or neglect of a
SRHG'se gay tune during childhood can exact. profound toll
Sethe child herself ae well as on society as a whole.
Rowever, ‘the consequences of abuse or neglect which takes
Hitec steer birch sften pale in comparison to those
Peluicing fren abuse suffered by the viable fetus before
EfEch "als policy of prevention supports a reading of the
word sperson* to include viable fetuses.

‘Jd. at 780 (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that the

plain language, when coupled with the foregoing policy, evidenced

helpless person, who shall, without lowful excuse, refuse oF
pepiete ee provide, as defined in § 20-7490, the proper
Eare and steention for such ghild or helpless person, ‘so
{hie ine life, heelth of comfort of such child or helpless
ferton is endongered of Af likely to be endangered, shall be
Pitty of a micceneaner and ehsli be punished within the
Efscration of the circuit court,

wetener, 492°8:£.20 60 179 (emphases in original) «

 

19
 

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a clear legislative intent to include viable fetuses within the
definition of “person.” Id, at at 781. The court further
reasoned that “South Carolina law has long recognized that viable
fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges.”
Id. at 779. The court subsequently concluded that “it would be
absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of
homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of
statutes proscribing child abuse.” Id, at 780. The court
distinguished other similar cases from other jurisdictions by
simply stating that “the states in which these cases were decided
have entirely different bodies of case law from South Carolina.”
Id. at 782. Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the trial court’s grant of the mother’s petition for
post-conviction relief. Id, at 786.

Although Whitner appears to contradict the trend of
decisions issued by other jurisdictions, the dissenting justices
in Wdhitner made compelling arguments that the majority's analysis
was strained. Chief Justice Finney contended that “it is
apparent from 2 reading of the entire statute that the word child
in § 20-7-50 means a child in being and not @ fetus.” Id.
(Finney, C.J, dissenting). The chief justice continued by
arguing that the majority's analysis, at best, merely raised
ambiguity as to whether viable fetuses were included within the
term “child,” and that “[e]ven if these wrongful death, conmon
law, and Children’s Code decisions [were] sufficient to render
the term child in § 20-7-50 ambiguous, it is axiomatic that the

ambiguity must be resolved in respondent's favor.” Id, at 187

20
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

(Finney, C.J., dissenting). Justice Moore concurred with Chief
gustice Finney's dissent, but wrote separately to point out that
the legislative history contained persuasive evidence that the
child abuse and neglect statute was not intended to apply. Id.
(Wore, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Moore contended
that the legislature repeatedly tried and failed to pass proposed
bills addressing the problem of drug use during pregnancy and
that such failure was sufficient evidence that the legislature
did not intend that the child abuse and neglect statute be used
to prosecute mothers for prenatal conduct. Id.

Thus, in summary, other jurisdictions overwhelmingly
refuse to permit a mother’s prosecution for prenatal conduct that
causes harm to her newborn child, because the mother’s conduct is
not conmitted at a tine when the child is born and is alive.

most durisdictions do not require that conduct be
ae nai a

isalive.’

 

on the other hand, an overwhelming majority of the
jurisdictions confronted with the prosecution of a third party
for conduct perpetrated against a pregnant mother, causing the
death of the subsequently born child, uphold the convictions of
the third parties. See State v, Hammett, 384 9.8.24 220, 221

(Ga, 1989) (holding that defendant who injured a pregnant woman
such that her fetus, though born alive, subsequently died could
be charged with the offense of vehicular homicide); People v

Hall, 557 N.¥.8.26 679, 685 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the

evidence established that the infant was born alive and thus was

2
 

**% FOR PUBLICATION ***
a “person” within the meaning of the homicide statute, and that
defendant's manslaughter conviction for the death of the infant
did not violate either due process or equal protection); Cuellar,
957 $.W.2d at 141 (affirming defendant’s conviction for
intoxication manslaughter for injuries suffered by a fetus, who
was born alive and subsequently died as a result of the accident
injuries); State v. Cotton, 5 P.3d 918, 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the homicide statutes apply to the killing of a
child who is born alive, even if the death results from injuries
inflicted before birth).

In Hammett, the defendant lost control of her car and
collided with @ vehicle in which a woman, thirty-five weeks
pregnant, was a passenger. Hammett, 384 S.E.2d at 220. The
expectant mother was immediately transported to the hospital and
underwent an emergency caesarean section. Id. The newborn child
lived for eleven hours before dying from the injuries received
from the accident. Id, The defendant was charged with vehicular
homicide,® but the trial court ruled that the baby was 2 fetus at
the time of the accident (the time of the conduct) and that
therefore the state failed to charge the defendant with @
cognizable offense. Id, The state appealed the trial court's
judgment, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. Id. The
court referred to the opinion of Sir Edward Coke in an old

«the relevant vehicular homicide statute in Georgia states that

sta}ny person who covses the death of another person, without an intention to

Go ae, by viclating any provision of thie title other than [certain code

Sections snapplicable here) commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the

Secone degree when euch violation is the cause of said death.” Official Code
feorgis Annotated § 40-60393(b) (2974)

    

 

22
 

FOR PUBLICATION

FOR PUBLICATION #97

English common law case discussing the common law status of an

unborn child, which states the followin

 

[i1E 6 woman be quick with childe, and by © potion ox
Sthernise kitieth it in her wonbe, oF if a man beat hery
Ghereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she 1s delivered
Dis dead childe, this s9 6 great misprision, end no murders
Bae sf’ the chide be born alive and dyeth of the potion,
Patcery, or other cause, this is murder: for in law it is
Decsunted'« reasonable creature, 4p rerum patura, when it is
born alive

    

Id, at 221 (citations omitted). The court thus concluded that
the victin’s status at the time of death determines the crine,
and not the victim’s status at the time of the injury. id. The
court subsequently stated that “{nJothing in the OCGA § 40-6-
393(b) limits consideration of the status of the victim to the
moment at which the injury is inflicted, since the statute
explicitly states that second degree vehicular homicide is
comitted when 2 person ‘causes the death of another person.’
Id. (emphasis in original). The court found it persuasive that
“there are many instances where an adult victim has died some
considerable tine after the infliction of the fatal blow or
wound. If the victim recovers and survives, whether by reason of
medical or surgical treatment, or otherwise, there is no
homicide; yet if he dies from such wounds, it is murder.” Id.
(citing State v. Anderson, 343 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1975).
Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the judoment
of the trial court. Ide

In Hall, the defendant got into an altercation with
another customer at the grocery store. Hall, 587 N.Y.8.2d at
880. The defendant subsequently procured a gun and returned to

the scene of the altercation. Id. When his target emerged, the

23
»** FOR PUBLICATION ***

defendant opened fire from across the street. 1g, Although the
defendant missed his target, two bullets struck a nearby pregnant
mother in the arm and abdomen. Id. The mother underwent an

emergency caesarean section, and her newborn baby lived for

 

approximately thirty-six hours before it eventually died. Id.
The defendant was charged with the murder, among other things, of
the newborn infant. Id, Initially, a mistrial was declared
because the jury was unable to reach a verdict, but in the second
trial the defendant was found guilty of second degree
manslaughter. Id, at 880-881. On appeal, the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, relied on the case law of other
jurisdictions to support its conclusion that an individual can be
convicted of homicide for injuries inflicted on a fetus that led
to the death of the child subsequently born alive. Id, at @84-
885, The court also rejected defendant's claim that the existing
penal scheme did not give him fair notice in violation of his
right to due process, stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that a
perpetrator of illegal conduct takes his victims as he finds
them, so it is entirely irrelevant whether defendant actually
knew or should have know that @ pregnant women was in the
vicinity and that her fetus could be wounded as a result of his
actions.” Id, at 885. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
conviction. Id. at 886.

In Cuellar, the defendant, while drunk, drove his car
into ancther car being driven by a woman who was seven and one~
half months pregnant. Cuellar, 957 8.W.2d at 196. The mother

subsequently underwent an emergency caesarean section and gave

24
   

* FOR PUBLICATION
birth to a baby girl. Id, Although the baby was born alive, she
eventually died as a result of the injuries suffered from the car
accident, surviving for only forty-three hours after birth. Id.
The defendant was subsequently charged with and convicted of the
offense of intoxication manslaughter.’ Id, The Texas Court of
Appeals began by stating that the definition of the term
“individual” as one who “has been born and is alive” is ambiguous
as to what point in time the individual needs to have been born
and be alive. Id, at 137. The court then stated that it was
free to examine the common law in order to resolve the ambiguity.
Id. Like the Georgia Court of Appeals in Hammett, the Texes
court of Appeals found the language of Sir Edward Coke"
instructive. Cuellar, 957 $.W.2d at 137-138. The court was also
persuaded by the analyses in Hammett and Hall.” Id. at 136.
Accordingly, applying the statutory definition of “individual” to
the facts, the court expressly held that the newborn infant was
an “individual” under Texas criminal law. Id, at 140. The court
thus rejected defendant's contention that the victim of the
offense was a fetus at the time he engaged in his culpable

conduct and was therefore not an “individual” within the meaning

 

of the intoxication manslaughter statute. 1

Despite the holding in Cuellar, its reasoning is

 

the court charact

 

erized the elenents of intoxication manslaughter as

   

 

follows: "iti person (2) operating # moter vehicle ina public place (3) who
iDUNGkicatees ana (4) by reason of that intoxication causes the death of
another." Ida at 140

+ See discussion supra.

see discussion gupee for the reasoning in Hammett and Hall.

25
   

FOR PUBLICATION
questionable. To that effect, Justice Rodriguez wrote @ cogent
dissent, criticizing the “judicial activism” of the majority.
‘Id. at 141-143 (Rodriguez, J., dissenting). Justice Rodriguez
asserted that “[t]he penal code has not proscribed any conduct
with respect to a fetus, and the legislature, by its definitions
of “another,” “person,” and “individual” has specifically limited
the application of [Texas] penal laws to conduct committed
against @ human being who has been born and is alive.” Ida at
142 (Rodriguez, J., dissenting). Consequently, guided by the
previous Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in Collins, he
concluded that “the legislature intended that any conduct
proscribed by the penal code must occur against a victim who ‘has
been born and is alive’ at the time the conduct occurs." Id.
(citations omitted).

Finally, in Cotton, the defendant accidentally shot his

girlfriend, who was eight and om

 

alf months pregnant, in the
back of the head. Cotton, 5 P.3d at 920, Although hi
girlfriend died, the baby was born alive. Id, However, the baby

 

died one day later due to the lack of blood caused by the fatal
injury to its mother. Id. The state charged defendant with two
counts of reckless second degree murder, but the jury found
defendant guilty of two counts of the lesser included offenses of
reckless manslaughter. Id. On appeal, defendant argued, among
other things, that the injury was inflicted on a fetus and
therefore the victin was not a “person” within the meaning of the
homicide statutes. Id, The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that

[t]he flaw in Cotton's reasoning is that Cotton caused the death

26
'* FOR PUBLICATION ***

not of a fetus, but of a child who had been born.” Id, at 921.
‘the court acknowledged the language in Reineste and Collins, but
distinguished those cases on the basis that they “focus{ed) on
voluntary acts or choices by the mother that relate[d] to her
health or well-being.” Id, at 922. Thus, the court rejected
defendant’ s argument and ultimately affirmed his conviction of
reckless manslaughter. Id. at 925.

the foregoing cases illustrate a modern trend in other
jurisdictions supporting the proposition that a third party may
be prosecuted for conduct perpetrated against a pregnant mother
that causes the death of the child subsequently born alive.
these jurisdictions all focus on the victin’s status at the time
of death, as opposed to the victim’s status at the time of the
injury initially inflicted as a result of the defendant’s
conduct. See discussion supra at Part III.A.3.c.

Consequently, there appear to be two analytical
approaches developing in other jurisdictions -- one with respect
to the prosecution of pregnant mothers for their own prenatal
conduct, see discussion supra at Part IIT.A.3.b, and the other
with respect to the prosecution of third parties for conduct
perpetrated against pregnant mothers. See discussion supra at
part ITI.A.3.c. The difficulty lies in the fact that the logic
cf the two lines of cases are mutually exclusive. On the one
hand, courts rejecting the prosecution of pregnant mothers hold
that the conduct must be committed against a person who has been
born and is alive. See discussion supra at Part T1I.A.3.b. On

the other hand, courts upholding the prosecution of third parties

27
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

hold that the conduct need not be directed against a person who
has been born and is alive, so long as the result of the conduct
(death) occurs with respect to a person who has been born and is
alive. See discussion supra at Part III.A.3.c. The two
propositions cannot logically coexist. Thus, it is difficult to
reconcile the decisions of jurisdictions such as Arizona! and
Texas,” that adopt both lines of reasoning.

Nevertheless, we are convinced that the jurisdictions
requiring that conduct must be committed against a person who has
been born and is alive state the more cogent rule. These
jurisdictions sll rely on the concept that the defendant's
conduct must occur at a time when the victim is within the class
contemplated by the legislature. Although these decisions do not
expressly articulate the underlying rationale for the
aforementioned proposition, the Model Penal Code and its
supporting commentary provide the missing link.

d. Zhe Model Pena) Code requires that the defendant's

01 ‘ocean when the: i
within the class contemplated by the leaislature,

Other jurisdictions addressing the present issue focus
entirely on the “conduct” and “result” elements of the specific
offense. An examination of the Model Penal Code and its
commentary, however, suggests that it is more logically

consistent to focus on the element of attendant circumstances.

 

See discussion sunra cf Ksinesto; but see discussion supre of

Seg discussion aunra of Collins; bub ate discussion aumza of

28
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

Initially, we note that neither party referred in their
briefing to the Model Penal Code or its conmentary. However, the
Hawai'i Penal Code and the Model Penal Code both state that
conduct, attendant circumstances, and result of conduct, are the
three material elements of any criminal offense." The Hawai's
Penal Code is substantially derived from the Model Penal Code."
Accordingly, it is appropriate to look to the Model Penal Code
and its commentary for guidance.

Comment 3 to section 2.02 of the Model Penal code
initially points out that “[t]he distinction between conduct and
attendant circumstance or result is not always a bright one, so
the attempt to draw a line involves difficult and unnecessary
problems of drafting or interpretation.” Movet Pena Cove § 2.02
ont. at 3 (1962). ‘Thus, the commentary indicates that it is
often difficult and unnecessary to distinguish among the three
elements. Nevertheless, the commentary provides the following
two examples to illustrate how the three elements are generally

classified:

 

 

% Section 1.13(9) of the Model Penal Code states that the term
cvelenent of an offense” means (1) such conduct or (14) such attendant
Circumstances cr (2i1) such o result of conduct as (a) 18 included in the
Gescripticn of the forbidsen conduct in the definition of the offense; or (b)
establishes the required kind of culpability) or (c) negatives an excuse or
Sostifieation for such conduct; or (@) negatives a defense under the statute
BF iiaitetiones or te) establishes Juriadiction oF venue.” MoceL Prsat Coot §
2.1315) (1962)

 

 

 

 

 

' phe commentary te section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code states that
many jurisdictions have accepted the Model, Penal Code’s formulation of
Teckiassness, end subsequently Lists Hawal't among those jurisdiction in a
Eootnste. Wooe Primi Coop § 2.02 cat. at 3 n.18 (1962). Furthermore, this
ESurt nas acknowledged that “che Model Penal Code (MPC), as adopted at the
$362 enna! meering of The Anerican Law Institute, was ‘used by the Judicial
Counei! of (Hawai':] ag the guide for the (HPC).’* "Stare x Gavlosd, 78
fowal'i 129, 340 n.22, 890 P.2e 1167, 1160 m.22 (2998) (citations omitted)

29

 
 

 

 

 
 

** FOR PUBLICATION

FOR PUBLICATION P87

1h senate Judiciary Committee Report gives some examples as
Pohow offense elements are classified, not ail of which ere
cbvious. It says

section 171¢ provides that 2 person is guilty of
an offense “if, with intent to obtain
Glansportation, he secretes himself aboard .

a vessel or aircraft thet is the property of
insther and 12 aboard when it Leaves the point
SPenbarketion.” The culpability level for the
Conaucts ies, eeereting oneself aboard a vessel
Co'Nretaft, de *knowing"? the culpability level
teaching to the existing circunstances that the
Jesse! or aizeraft is the property of another
Gna thet the actor is aboard at the time of its
Geparture 1s, By contrast, set at, the lower
fevel of “reckless”. The’ phrase “with intent to
Obtain transportation” does not describe a
General state of mind, But rather a specific
Purpose for which the conduct is done.

 

 

Sen, oudiciary Comm. Report 53 (S. 1, 1975) (footnote
onitveal-

It snalyzes @ second crime in the following may:

28 U.8.c. 112 makes
Gngaged in the performance of his duties a
felony. In the past the courte hi

the question whether it is neces:
that a person charged under this section knew
thet the person he was assaulting wes a Federal
officer... Instead, the stendara would be
Feckless becase the element, "e Federal
Gfficer,” se an ettendant circumstance.

 

walt on @ Federal officer

 

 

 

 

 

Hd, (at) 59-60.
Moon Pena Coot § 2.02 omt. at 3m. 22. In the first example, the
attendant circumstances are that the vessel or aircraft is the
property of ancther and that the actor is aboard at the time of
departure. In the second example, the attendant circunstance is

that the person as:

 

ulted ie a federal officer. Although the
Model Penal Code does not define the term “attendant
circumstance,” it has been proposed that an attendant

circumstance is essentially 2 circumstance that “exist (s]

30
#** FOR PUBLICATION ***
independently of the (actor's conduct]." Audrey Rogers, New

si Operation: at
Liability, 38 U. RicH. L. Rev, 477, 485 (2004) (citing R.A. Duff,
‘The Circumstances of an Attempt, 50 Camsnupce L.J. 100, 104
(1991). ‘The ICA also applied a similar definition in State v
Moser, 107 Hawai'i 159, 172, 111 P.3d 54, 67 (2005), stating that
“[alny circumstances defined in an offense that are neither
conduct nor the results of conduct would, by default, constitute
attendant circumstances elements of the offense.” Id.

In the present case, a person is guilty of the offense
of mansleughter if that person “recklessly causes the death of
another person.” HRS § 707-702(1) (2). Thus, applying the
aforenentioned definition of an “attendant circumstance,” the

conduct is any voluntary act or omission, the result is death,

 

and the attendant circumstance is “of another person.” HRS §
707-7021) (a) (emphasis added). Cf. State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i
87, 112-113, 997 P.2d 13, 38-39 (2000) ("{Flor the purposes of
HRS § 134-6(e) [(1993 & Supp. 1999), ie., “Carrying or use of
firearm in the commission of a separate felony,”] ‘carry’ must be
analyzed employing @ two-pronged analysis: (1) the volustary act
of ‘carrying’ an object is, by way of HRS § 702-202, established
when an individual acte knowingly with respect to thet conduct.

and (2) the circumstances attendant to ‘carrying’ that cbject,
due, the object's par at! a
criminal offense =~ i ca 4

== is, by way of HRS § 702-204 established by proof of a reckless
state of mind.” (Emphases added)); State v, Valentine, 93

3
 

we FOR PUBLICATION ***
Hawai'i 199, 207, 998 P.2d 479, 487 (2000) (“Pursuant to HRS §
702-205 (1993), ‘{t]he elements of an offense are such (1)
conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of
conduct [] as. - . [a]ze specified by the [statutory] definition
of the offense.’ For purposes of HRS § 134-7(b) ((1993 & Supp.
1997), isee, “ownership or possession prohibited, when,”} as it
pertains to the present matter, is comprised of the following
elements: (1) that a person convicted of a felony (attendant
circumstance); (2) possesses or controls an object (conduct); (3)
sxbibiting the attributes of a firearm (attendant circumstance) [+
and} (4) that the person does so intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.” (Some brackets added and sone in original)
(Ellipses points in original) (Emphases added)).

As a result of this classification, Aiwohi did not have
the requisite state of mind. In order to be guilty of
manslaughter, Aiwohi muet have “acted . . . recklessly . . . with
respect to each element of the offense.” HRS § 702-204. with
respect to the attendant circumstance element, HRS § 702-

206(3) (b) states that “{a] person acts recklessly . . . when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

(enphasis added). In the present

 

such circumstances exist.” L

case Aiwohi simply could not have disregarded a substantial and

 

unjustifiable risk that the requisite circumstance existed,
because the requisite circumstance did not exist at the time she
engaged in what the prosecution claims was culpable conduct.
More specifically, there was no other “person” at the relevant

time because a fetus is not a “person” within the plain meaning

32
 

'* FOR PUBLICATION ***
of the statute, as discussed infra. The mere fact that the fetus
would later be Treyson, another person, does not alter the
conclusion. The plain language of the statute clearly requires
that the actor disregard 2 substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such circumstances presently exist, not that such
circumstances miaht later exist.

Consequently, 6

 

king in terms of attendant
circumstances, we hold, in the context of offenses against
persons set forth in HRS chapter 707, that the defendant’ s
proscribed conduct must be committed at a time when the victim is
within the class contemplated by the legislature because the
specified class is an attendant circumstance. As applied to
reckless manslaughter, the actor must disregard @ substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the attendant circumstance exists, and
therefore, a fortiori, the attendant circumstance must exist at
the time of the conduct’s commission. Accordingly, in the
present case, the proscribed conduct must have been committed at

a time when Treyson qualified as a “person,” defined by the

ie note that in ite appellate brief, and also et oral argument,
the prosecution mentioned chat there may be an igsue as to whether the
Senslaaghter offence, 22 codified in HRS § 707-702(4) (a), actually contains an
megadade circumstance elenent. For support, the prosecution relied on our
2eSi°Stdeenent in Stake v--Aaanon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303, 36 P.3¢ 1263, 1273
PEool), thar “the two elements of second degree murder in this case are
sreeecer TS Sng resuls.'® However, ae noted by Justice Levinson in his
CSncurfing opshion, Agangn does not properly stand for the proposition that we
Soprubciish the attenaant cireunstance elenent from the offense of reckless
Rekelaagheer, an clement expressly required by the plein language of the HEC.
weet 2e%tesinsen’s concurring opinion, slip op. at 4,6. Rather, inasmuch as
Seke Cloneseal status of tpersonnced’* waz not at issue in Adanon, we felled
Cevadequetely extract st from the conduct and result of conduct elements of
the offense of second degree mr Nevertheles#, a8 Justice
[evinesn candidly suggests, we now have eccasion to redeem our prior
‘Sealyeicsl sin.” Idy at 4

 

     

 

 

33
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Hawai'i Penal Code as
alive.” HRS § 707-700."

e. According te the plain lancuace of the HEC, a
fetus is not included within the definition of

“person.”

 

human being who has been born and is

Having established that the offense of reckless
manslaughter contains a conduct element and that the conduct must
be directed against a “person,” the final sub-issue is whether
the HEC's definition of “person” includes a fetus. We hold that
it does not.

According to HRS § 701-104 (1993), “[t)he provisions of
[the HPC) cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes
not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and
effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be
given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of the
words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the
context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.”
AS § 701-104 (emphasis added). Furthermore, this court has
declared that @ criminal statute “must be strictly construed and
that it cannot be extended beyond the plain meaning of the terns
found therein.” State v. Johnson, 50 Haw. 525, 526, 445 P.2d 36,

37 (1968) (citing Territory v, Balarosa, 34 Haw. 662, 665-666
(1938). That declaration is consistent with the legislature's

% me Logical implication is that third party conduct that occurs
jainst 8 pregnant worsn, cousing the death of her child subsequently born
Jive: aise cannct De prosecuted under the manslaughter statute, inasmuch as
the iégisiature has not included fetuses within the definsticn of the term

ferton,” To conclude otherwise would require us to subvert the plain meaning
of the statute ang render an inconsistent holding in order to produce =
Gesired Fesult. However, we need not delve any deeper into this sesue as
Senet before us today.

 

 

      

 

34
 

we* FOR PUBLICATION *
statement that “definitions of crimes are to be strictly

construed.” Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1-72, in 1972 Senate

 

Journal, at 734. Thus, in the present case, we interpret the
relevant provisions of the HPC in accordance with the foregoing
maxims of statutory construction.

According to the “fair import of the words, taken in
their usual sense," HRS § 701-104, @ fetus is clearly not one
vwho has been born and is alive.” HRS § 707-700, The plain
Language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and therefore
we need not go any further. See State v. Haugen, 104 Hawai'i 72,
76, 85 P.3d 178, 183 (2004) (stating that “[iJt is a cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of 2
statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at
Liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning”).

Even if, arguendo, the statutory language were
perceived to be ambiguous, the term “person” may not be construed
s0 as to include fetuses, where statutory language is ambiguous,
HRS § 1-15 (1993) directs this court to look to “{t}he reason and
spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to
enact it... ." HRS § 1-15. in the present case, there is
nothing in the legislative history indicating thet the
legislature intended to include fetuses within the definition of

the term “person.” In the absence of clear statutory languags

 

and with no legislative guidance vis-a-vis legislative history,
the applicable doctrine is the rule of lenity. See State w
Shimabukure, 100 Hawai'i 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002)

(stating that “[w)here a criminal statute is ambiguous, it is to

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be interpreted according to the rule of lenity"); State ve
Kaakimaka, 64 Hawas'i 280, 292, 933 P.2d 617, 629 (1997) (stating
that “[almbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity”) (citations omitted).
consequently, even if the language were viewed as ambiguous, the
statute would still have to be strictly construed in favor of
Aiwohi and against the prosecution.

Finally, it is important to clarify thet we are dealing
strictly with an issue of statutory interpretation in the present
appeal. Although we recognize that there may be significant
policy inplications and social ramifications surrounding the
present issue, it is well established that the legislature is
best suited to assess such considerations. See State Farm Mut.
auto. Ins. Co. vs Gepava, 103 Hawai'i 142, 192, 80 P.3d 321, 331
(2003) (stating that “such policy decisions are expressly within
the constitutional purview of the legislature”); Jardine, 101
Hawai'i 3, 10, €1 P.3d 514, $21 (observing that “[w]hile there may
be sound policy reasons to allow a choice of evils justification
defense for the protection of unborn children, the adoption of
such 2 public policy is best left to the state Legislature”); In
Re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 192, 9 F.3d 409,
504 (2000) (stating that “the ‘how’ or the public policy making
function was properly reserved for the legislature”); Lee v.
Correcedore, #3 Hawai'i 154, 171, 925 P.3d 324, 341 (1996)
(stating that broad policy decisions are “best left to the branch
of governnent vested with the authority and fact finding ability

to make such broad public policy decisions, namely the Hawai'i

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Legislature”

 

‘Therefore, we hold that, according to the plain
language of the HPC, a fetus is not included within the

definition of the term “person

 

B. Resolution of the First Is: of the Case

 

Dispe
Although Aivohi advances several other arguments
challenging the constitutionality of her prosecution under HRS §
707-702(1) (a), we need not address them in this opinion.
specifically, as we have noted, Aivohi contends that: (1) BRS §
707-702 (1} (a) fails to provide fair notice and/or is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of article I, section § of
the Hawai'l Constitution; (2) HRS § 707-702(1) (a) fails to
provide fair notice and/or is unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
constitution; (3) Aiwohi's prosecution for manslaughter
interferes with an expectant mother’s fundamental right to
procreate, in violation of article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i

Constitution; (4) Aiwohi’s prosecution for manslaughter is an

 

unconstitutional, retroactive expansion of HRS § 707-702(1) (al,
in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
constitution; and (5) Aiwohi was denied her right to present a
defense, in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, when the circuit court rejected
Aiwohi’s common law defense of immunity for an expectant mother’s
prenatal conduct.

Inasmuch as our holding -- that Aiwohi’s prosecution

for the offense of manslaughter is unsupported by the plain

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language of the HPC -- is dispositive, it is unnecessary to
address Aiwohi’s remaining constitutional arguments.
Iv. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis we hold that a mother’s
prosecution for her own prenatal conduct, which causes the death
of the baby subsequently born alive, is not within the plain
meaning of HRS § 707-702(1) (a), in conjunction with the general
provisions of penal liability found in the HPC. Therefore the
circuit court erred when it denied Aiwohi’s “Motion to Dismiss
Indictment Based on Insufficient and/or Impermissible Evidence
presented at the Grand Jury Proceedings." Accordingly, we
reverse the “Amended Judgment Guilty Conviction and Probation

RH Rinnae——

Glenn J. Kim, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney,

for plaintiff-appellee Peccetee Co Naty
State of Hawai's
Gon c, Rueo Ors