Title: Oscar Ray Bolin v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1.  § 90.504, Fla. Stat. (1985).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95775
____________
OSCAR RAY BOLIN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellee.
[July 13, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death imposed upon Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr.  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We reverse Bolin’s conviction and sentence and
order a new trial as the trial court erred in admitting evidence protected by the
spousal privilege.1
Bolin was initially convicted and sentenced to death in 1991 for the first-
degree murder of Stephanie Collins.  This Court, holding that evidence protected
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by the spousal privilege was improperly admitted at trial, vacated Bolin’s sentences,
reversed his convictions, and remanded for a new trial.  See Bolin v. State, 650 So.
2d 21 (Fla. 1995) (hereinafter Bolin I).  The pertinent facts, described in Bolin I, are
as follows.
Stephanie Collins was last seen on November 5, 1986, in the
passenger's seat of a white van.  On December 5, 1986, her body was
discovered alongside a road in Hillsborough County.  An autopsy
revealed that Collins sustained a number of stab wounds and several
potentially fatal blows to the head.
The investigation into Collins' murder proved unavailing until
July 1990, when Danny Coby telephoned Crime Stoppers in Ft.
Wayne, Indiana, with information about the murder.  Danny Coby
obtained the information from his wife, Cheryl Coby, who had
acquired the information during her prior marriage to Bolin.  After Mr.
Coby's call, Mrs. Coby told investigators that on November 5, 1986,
Bolin, her husband at the time, picked her up from a restaurant and
took her back to their travel trailer.  Coby stated that while they were
driving, Bolin made several attempts to explain the presence of a dead
body in their trailer.  Bolin finally told Coby that he killed a girl by
hitting her over the head and stabbing her.  Coby further explained
that, upon their arrival at the trailer, she saw Bolin load what appeared
to be the body wrapped in a quilt onto his truck.  He and Coby then
drove to a spot where Bolin dumped the body.  Coby later identified
that spot to police.  When she returned to the trailer, Coby observed
that everything inside, including a knife beside the kitchen sink,
appeared wet.  Coby also noticed several blood stains in the trailer.
Id. at 22-23.
After Coby’s disclosures, Bolin was extradited to the Hillsborough County
2.  At the time of Coby’s disclosures, Bolin was incarcerated in Ohio for an
unrelated crime.
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Jail to await trial for the murder of Stephanie Collins.2  On June 22, 1991, Bolin
attempted suicide.  After Bolin was taken to the hospital, the chief investigator,
Captain Gary Terry, entered Bolin’s cell and saw a cardboard box sitting on the
commode.  A stamped envelope addressed to Captain Terry was on top of the
box.  Captain Terry had built a rapport with Bolin by interviewing him several times
both in Ohio and in Hillsborough County.  Captain Terry opened the envelope and
read the letter, which discussed, among other things, the murder investigation.
In Bolin’s first murder trial, Bolin asserted the spousal privilege and objected
to the admission of Coby’s testimony.  Bolin’s objection was overruled by the trial
court, which found Bolin’s taking of Coby’s discovery deposition waived the
spousal privilege.  Subsequently, Coby testified regarding the confidential
statements Bolin had made to her while Bolin and Coby were married.  As Coby
suffered from a terminal illness, her trial testimony was videotaped to perpetuate the
testimony.  We reversed in Bolin I, holding that the trial court erred in admitting
Coby’s testimony regarding Bolin’s confidential statements as Bolin’s taking of
Coby’s discovery deposition did not waive the spousal privilege.  See id.  
In
Bolin I, we stated that although Bolin’s taking of Coby’s deposition did not waive
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the spousal privilege, Bolin’s letter to Captain Terry could potentially constitute a
waiver of the spousal privilege pursuant to section 90.507, Florida Statutes (1993). 
See Bolin I, 650 So. 2d at 23.  Specifically, we stated:
The issue then with respect to the waiver is whether the
circumstances surrounding the letter and the content of the letter
demonstrate that this defendant voluntarily consented to law
enforcement officers talking with his spouse about her knowledge of
his alleged criminal activities.  Because this issue was not addressed at
the trial, the record is not sufficiently complete for us to determine
whether the letter constituted a voluntary consent.4  If on remand the
trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was
sent5 and from the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a
voluntary consent to such disclosure, then the marital privilege would
be waived pursuant to section 90.507.  Bolin’s voluntarily consent[ing]
to the questioning of his former spouse about her knowledge of the
criminal activities for which Bolin was being investigated would permit
his former spouse to testify as to Bolin’s statements to her regarding
the murder because the statements comprised part of what she knew
about his activities.  If the court determines, however, that the
circumstances together with the content of the letter do not indicate
that Bolin voluntarily consented to disclosure by Coby of what she
knew about Bolin’s alleged criminal activities, then there was not a
waiver.
FN4.  There is testimony in the record about the
letter, but the letter itself is not included.
FN5.  The testimony of the officer who received
the letter indicates that it might have been written in
conjunction with a suicide attempt by Bolin.  That fact
alone would not render the content of the letter
involuntary.  The court, however, should consider the
alleged suicide attempt as evidence relevant to whether
the letter contained a voluntary consent.
 
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Id. at 24 (footnote 3 and citation omitted).
At retrial, Bolin again objected to the introduction of Coby’s videotaped
testimony and asserted the spousal privilege.  The trial court below overruled
Bolin’s objection, this time finding that the language of Bolin’s suicide letter
constituted a waiver of the spousal privilege.  The trial court had originally
suppressed the letter, finding that the State did not have probable cause to seize
Bolin’s letter.  The State filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Second District
reversed, holding that Bolin did not have an expectation of privacy in his cell and
therefore the letter should not have been suppressed.  See State v. Bolin, 693 So.
2d 583, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
On remand, the trial court examined the letter and found that Bolin voluntarily
waived the spousal privilege.  The pertinent portion of the letter is as follows:
PS.  these were the only five for the state of Fla. that i knowed
anything about.  if there’s Ever anything Else that you really want to
know about then you’ll haft to ask [Coby], Because she knew just
about Every thing that i was Ever a part of.  She help spend the money
from most of all the armed Robbery’s, and she know about all 3 of
these homicide which I’m charged with.
Thus, despite Bolin’s objections, Coby’s videotaped testimony regarding Bolin’s
incriminating statements was presented to the jury.
As we noted in footnote 4 of Bolin I, we did not have the letter in the record
3.  The spousal privilege only applies to confidential communications.  See §
90.504(1), Fla. Stat. (1985).  Therefore, while Coby’s testimony regarding Bolin’s
confidential statements to her is privileged, Coby’s testimony regarding what she
witnessed is not privileged.
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at the time of Bolin I.  See id. at 24 n.4.  Nor did we have developed in the record
the circumstances regarding the letter and how the letter left Bolin’s possession.  In
this appeal, we have a developed record regarding whether Bolin waived his
spousal privilege in the letter.
In Bolin I, we refined the waiver issue by our holding:  “[I]f a person
volunteers that his or her spouse may be questioned about his or her involvement in
an event or events, this may equate to consent which constitutes a waiver pursuant
to section 90.507, Florida Statutes (1993).”  Id. at 24.  Therefore, the question
which has to be answered is whether under the totality of the circumstances Bolin
voluntarily consented to Coby’s disclosure of Bolin’s statements to her regarding
his involvement in these criminal activities.3  We recognize that this is an issue of
fact, but on the record here, we do not find there to be competent, substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s decision that Bolin made a voluntary waiver
through the letter.  See Hill v. Ray Carter Auto Sales, Inc., 745 So. 2d 1136, 1138
(Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (waiver is question of fact, and trial judge will be reversed only
if there is no competent, substantial evidence to support finding).
4.  Bolin was being separately tried for two other Florida homicides.
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Throughout these legal proceedings, both before and after the letter, Bolin
had steadfastly asserted his spousal privilege.  However, just prior to Bolin’s
suicide attempt, a trial court in another of Bolin’s murder trials4 held that Bolin’s
taking of Coby’s discovery deposition constituted a waiver of his spousal privilege. 
Nevertheless, Bolin continued to assert his spousal privilege.  In fact, Bolin had
complained about the ineffectiveness of his counsel for taking the discovery
deposition which resulted in the trial court’s ruling that Bolin waived his spousal
privilege.  This Court subsequently reversed that trial court’s finding of waiver. 
See Bolin v. State, 642 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1994).  The language of the letter
simply does not state that Bolin, by his letter, voluntarily waived the same privilege
that he had steadfastly maintained until the time he wrote this letter.  Rather, in view
of the timing of the letter, which was written after a trial court held that Bolin’s
taking of the discovery deposition had waived the privilege, with respect to the
privilege, it must be concluded that Bolin was acting under a reasonable belief that
he did not have the privilege to waive.  See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.
219, 225-26 (1968); Zeigler v. State, 471 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). 
At most, it can only be reasonably inferred that Bolin was acquiescing in the trial
court’s ruling, not voluntarily waiving the spousal privilege.
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Importantly, the language of Bolin’s letter does not state that he waived the
spousal privilege with respect to Coby’s previously given testimony.  The pertinent
portion of the letter says, “[T]hese were the only five in the state of Fla. that i
knowed anything about.  if there’s ever anything else that you really want to know
about then you’ll haft to ask [Coby], Because she knew just about everything that i
was ever a part of.”  This is clearly a statement directing Captain Terry to talk to
Coby about other matters that Bolin would no longer be available to discuss once
Bolin had committed suicide.  There is no other reasonable meaning for Bolin’s use
of “anything else” and his use of the future tense “you’ll haft to.”
What is actually at issue is whether Bolin’s letter clearly withdraws Bolin’s
prior assertion of the privilege with respect to Coby’s videotaped testimony, to
which the privilege had previously been asserted and overruled.  We cannot agree
that competent, substantial evidence supports a finding that there was a waiver
regarding Coby’s previously given testimony.
Furthermore, the letter was not voluntarily delivered and therefore could not
be a voluntary waiver.  Although we agree with the Second District that the letter
did not have to be suppressed, that does not answer the question of whether the
circumstances of law enforcement obtaining the letter indicate that Bolin voluntarily
waived the privilege.  In the case before us, the circumstances in which the letter
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was written do not indicate that Bolin voluntarily consented.  Bolin never
transferred control of the letter to an agent of the State and therefore did not make a
voluntary delivery.  See Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1992) (delivery of
pro se filing occurs “when the inmate loses control over the document by
entrusting its further delivery or processing to agents of the state”).  As there was
no voluntary delivery of the letter, we conclude that the circumstances in which the
letter left Bolin’s possession do not provide competent, substantial evidence that
the letter was a voluntary waiver of Bolin’s spousal privilege.
Finally, even if the letter was deemed a waiver, the waiver was revoked by
Bolin again objecting to the use of Coby’s testimony.  See Sykes v. St. Andrews
School, 619 So. 2d 467, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (waiver of psychotherapist/
patient privilege revocable).  While we recognize that information revealed after a
privilege is waived cannot be concealed by reinvoking the privilege, see Hamilton v.
Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (“[O]nce the
privilege is waived, and the horse out of the barn, it cannot be reinvoked.”), in
Bolin’s case, no privileged information was elicited as a consequence of the letter. 
As the State was seeking to use Coby’s previously given testimony, Bolin’s
renewed objection revoked any waiver that could be found in the letter to this
previously given and objected-to testimony.
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For these reasons, we conclude that there is not competent, substantial
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s admission of Coby’s testimony
concerning Bolin’s privileged statement.  The trial court’s error is not harmless
error, as Coby’s testimony regarding Bolin’s privileged statements was the central
focus of the State’s case against Bolin.  Therefore, we reverse Bolin’s conviction
and sentence and remand for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
J. Rogers Padgett, Judge - Case No. 90-11833
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Norgard and Douglas S.
Connor, Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
David Rothman, President, Miami, Florida, and James T. Miller, Jacksonville, Florida,
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for Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL), Amicus 
Curiae