Title: State v. Savage

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP90-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
George E. Savage, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 390 Wis. 2d 835,939 N.W.2d 885 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 23, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Sanders   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Sonya Bice Levinson and Donald V. Latoraca, assistant 
attorneys general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Sonya Bice. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, LTD., Waukesha. There was 
an oral argument by Mark S. Rosen. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Ellen Henak, Robert 
R. Henak, and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 93 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP90-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF3498) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
George E. Savage, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 23, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Savage, 
No. 2019AP90-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 
2020), reversing the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 judgment 
and order denying George E. Savage's postconviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  We reverse.  
¶2 
Savage was charged with "violation of sex offender 
registry" for failing to provide an updated address.  Savage 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark A. Sanders presided.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
2 
 
entered a guilty plea and was sentenced.  Nearly one year later, 
Savage filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that 
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance such that his 
plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.  He argues that 
his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to inform 
Savage that State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 
N.W.2d 787, provided him with an allegedly viable defense that, 
as a homeless registrant, he is "exempt" from sex offender 
registration requirements.  Savage asserts that if he had known 
of this alleged defense, he would not have pleaded guilty to the 
charge and would have instead proceeded to trial.   
¶3 
After a Machner2 hearing on Savage's postconviction 
motion, the circuit court denied Savage's motion, explaining 
that 
Savage's 
trial 
counsel 
did 
not 
provide 
ineffective 
assistance because Dinkins was inapplicable to his case.  The 
court of appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court 
misconstrued Dinkins, and remanded the case to the circuit court 
to analyze Savage's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
The court of appeals' interpretation of Dinkins is wrong.    
¶4 
We conclude that counsel was not ineffective and 
Savage is not entitled to withdraw his plea post-sentencing.  
Savage failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
manifest injustice merits plea withdrawal because Dinkins does 
not conclude that homeless sex offenders are "exempt" from 
                                                 
2 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
3 
 
registration requirements.  Thus, Savage's trial counsel did not 
provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform Savage about 
Dinkins because Dinkins does not provide Savage with a defense.3  
Accordingly, we reverse.  
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On November 3, 2014, Savage was convicted of exposing 
his genitals to a child.  For this conviction, the circuit court 
imposed a sentence of one year and six months of initial 
confinement 
with 
two 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  
Additionally, the circuit court ordered Savage to register as a 
sex offender for ten years, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.048 
(2017-18).4  While on the sex offender registry, Savage was 
required to comply with the reporting requirements under Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45, including providing updated information to the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) at regular intervals.  
¶6 
On March 22, 2016, the day before his initial 
confinement 
was 
to 
end, 
Savage 
signed 
a 
Sex 
Offender 
Registration 
form. 
 
This 
form 
essentially 
restates 
the 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals wrongly withheld its independent 
review of Savage's claim based on a misreading of State v. 
Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89.  While it is 
true that Sholar requires the court of appeals to leave both the 
deficient performance and prejudice prongs to be addressed after 
a Machner hearing, Sholar's holding presupposes a Machner 
hearing has not yet occurred.  See id., ¶54.  In this case, the 
circuit court held a Machner hearing.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals could have analyzed both Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), prongs.   
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
4 
 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 and registers an individual 
on the sex offender registry.  The statute and the form require 
that 
a 
sex 
offender 
registrant 
provide 
information 
and 
subsequent changes to that information such as the registrant's 
residence, employment, e-mail addresses, internet identifiers, 
school enrollment, and name change.  On the form, instead of 
listing an address, Savage indicated that he was homeless.  At 
the end of this form was a "Notice of Requirements to Register."  
It stated, in relevant part, that "when on Wisconsin [DOC] 
Supervision" the registrant must, "prior to any change in 
residence, 
employment, 
school 
enrollment, 
email 
addresses, 
internet identifiers, or name change, report the change directly 
to [the registrant's] assigned Community Corrections Agent.  
[The Registrant] will also report the change to [the Sex 
Offender Registry Program] . . . ."  Savage initialed after this 
section to indicate that he understood the requirement for 
reporting changes in information to his Community Corrections 
Agent and the Sex Offender Registry Program.   
¶7 
The following day, Savage was released from his 
confinement.  Because of his homelessness, Savage was placed on 
a discretionary GPS monitor, pursuant to DOC Administrative 
Directive #15-12.5  This guidance document requires a homeless 
sex offender registrant to "call and speak with the [Probation 
and Parole Agent] once every seven days, on a weekday, to report 
                                                 
5 We took judicial notice of this Directive on July 15, 
2020. 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
5 
 
'HOMELESS' status and the location(s) in the city where he/she 
has been frequenting and sleeping for the previous seven days 
and plans for the next seven days."  DOC Admin. Directive #15-
12.  The sex offender registrant must also "report the addresses 
or nearest locations where he/she has frequented and slept, and 
his/her anticipated residence plan for the upcoming week" and 
"also update any other required registry data changes."  Id.   
¶8 
Savage remained compliant with his sex offender 
registry requirements for several months.  However, on May 5, 
2016, Savage cut off his GPS bracelet and absconded from 
supervision.  Savage's Community Corrections Agent informed the 
Sex Offender Registry Program of his absconder status on May 18, 
2016.  
¶9 
Savage called the Sex Offender Registry Program 
hotline twice over the next month providing an updated address, 
but he never called to update his Community Corrections Agent, 
as the Sex Offender Registration form required.6  Savage's last 
confirmed call to the hotline occurred on June 17, 2016.  From 
May 5 until he was subsequently arrested, Savage continued his 
non-compliance with supervision.  
¶10 On August 4, 2016, the State filed a criminal 
complaint in the circuit court charging Savage with a single 
count of "violation of sex offender registry."  The State 
alleged Savage "knowingly failed to comply with reporting 
                                                 
6 Savage claims he called two more times, but the Sex 
Offender Registry Program had no record of these calls nor the 
message he claims he left.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
6 
 
requirements under Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45(2) to (4), contrary to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(6), 
contrary 
to 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§§] 301.45(6)(a)1., 939.50(3)(h)."  Specifically, Savage "failed 
to provide the [DOC] with updated information after a change to 
the information required to be provided by Wis. Stat. sec. 
301.45(2)(a)."  Savage's judgment of conviction from his 2014 
crime and his signed Sex Offender Registration Form were 
attached to the criminal complaint.  The court issued a felony 
arrest warrant for Savage.  
¶11 Savage was arrested and made his initial appearance 
before the circuit court on February 17, 2017.  The court found 
probable cause for the charge and advised Savage of the maximum 
penalties, stating, if convicted, he "could face maximum 
penalties of a $10,000 fine, six years imprisonment."  Savage 
stated that he understood these charges.  In a discussion about 
bail and bail conditions, Savage's trial counsel stated the 
following: 
I believe for Mr. Savage, Your Honor, this is not a 
situation where he's unwilling or refusing to follow 
any registry requirements.  He, given homelessness, 
simply has been unable to do so given that he's simply 
not going to be able to post any cash bail whatsoever.  
As the court is aware, there is the felony [violation 
of parole] hold in place for Mr. Savage.  I would ask 
for a PR bond or a minimum amount of cash bail.  I 
doubt he could pay anything at all. 
The court ordered a $1,000 signature bond with conditions.   
¶12 On February 28, 2017, Savage waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing, and the State filed an Information alleging 
the same criminal count and penalties stated in the complaint.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
7 
 
Savage then entered a plea of not guilty to the charge contained 
in the Information. 
¶13 On May 23, 2017, after learning that the parties 
reached a plea agreement, the circuit court held a plea hearing.  
The State informed the court that "[Savage] will be pleading as 
charged.  At sentencing, the state will recommend one year in 
the 
House 
of 
Correction." 
 
Savage 
filed 
his 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form indicating that he would 
plead guilty to the charge.7 
¶14 Savage 
does 
not 
assert 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
conducted a defective plea colloquy.  Rather, his argument is 
                                                 
7 The record also contains a copy of the jury instruction, 
which Savage separately initialed, listing the elements of 
failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements, 
as follows: 
1. 
The defendant was a person who was required to 
provide information under [Wis. Stat. §] 301.45. 
  A person who is required to comply with the sex 
offender registration is required to provide 
information under section 301.45.  
2. 
The defendant failed to provide information as 
required. 
  Section 
301.45[(4)] 
provides 
that 
persons 
required to provide information under section 
301.45 
must 
provide 
changes 
to 
school; 
employment; addresses as required by law.  
3. 
The defendant knowingly failed to provide the 
required information.  
  This requires that the defendant knew that [he] 
was required to provide the information. 
Wis. JI——Criminal 2198 (2012) (modified). 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
8 
 
that because counsel did not properly advise him of a defense 
under Dinkins, his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made.  
¶15 Immediately after accepting Savage's guilty plea, the 
circuit court heard arguments from both the State and Savage 
regarding sentencing.  The State, in accordance with the plea 
agreement, recommended one year in the House of Corrections.  As 
relevant to this appeal, Savage's trial counsel made the 
following sentencing argument regarding his homelessness: 
There are so many components and collateral 
[e]ffects of these registry requirements that can make 
it very difficult for people who have nothing to 
comply with it.  I don't know how you can return a 
letter if you don't have an address for which the 
letter to be sent. 
 
I believe that was the issue for Mr. Savage and 
sadly for many others that they are incarcerated.  
Ultimately the sentence is finished, completed, and 
they are released but often released back into the 
community with nothing.  And I believe that was the 
situation for Mr. Savage. 
 
In reviewing the notes from the agent and the 
registry, he was, in fact, calling in, leaving 
messages with phone numbers, with addresses, emails 
which he could actually access at a library or other 
community centers and trying to do so. 
 
In fact, at one point in time his agent told him, 
meaning Mr. Savage, to use her office address as he 
would need to see her and then they could continue 
with the compliance requirements of the registry. 
 
It is noted in those reports it appears his 
intent was to remain compliant, but there's also an 
acknowledgment that it can be difficult.  And I quote, 
"This is happening quite a bit especially with the 
homeless." 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
9 
 
 
I believe that is exactly the situation for 
Mr. Savage.  The GPS here was discretionary.  I don't 
know 
what 
the 
thought 
was 
behind 
that 
or 
the 
reasoning.  But Mr. Savage literally was staying where 
he could whether it was empty buildings, back of a 
car, stairwells. 
 
In speaking with him and hearing his experiences 
were just frankly horrifying that any individual would 
have to go through that.  I believe he was doing the 
best he could. 
 
It's so difficult already to find housing, 
employment, basic services, being part of the registry 
and then to also throw on what I refer to as an 
electronic tether for Mr. Savage.  I believe he became 
frustrated, aggravated, and cut it off and then didn't 
report. 
 
He 
was 
also 
told 
that 
because 
it 
was 
discretionary -– This is also in the notes that, "A 
felony charge -– again I'm quoting, "for tampering 
with it could not be issued.  We will wait to see the 
outcome of the letter for any further noncompliance." 
 
I also note they kept sending letters to an 
address where, in fact, the letters were returned.  
The act of non-reporting, not reporting to his agent 
ultimately led in Mr. Savage being served with 
revocation papers. 
 
There was a hearing.  The agent was seeking all 
the time available, two years and three days; and 
that's exactly what Mr. Savage received. 
 
Outside of the court system, he now is in the 
prison system and will be serving two years and three 
days. 
 
I would ask this court to consider that as I know 
you would but also ask this court to run a sentence 
here concurrent to that two years.  It's a significant 
amount of time for Mr. Savage.  He's not going to be 
involved in any programming. 
After hearing the sentencing arguments, the circuit court did 
not follow the plea agreement and instead sentenced Savage to 30 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
10 
 
months of initial confinement followed by 24 months of extended 
supervision to run concurrently with his current sentence.8 
¶16 On April 10, 2018, 11 months after being sentenced, 
Savage filed a postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  Savage claimed that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his plea because he received ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  Specifically, he claimed that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for "failing to inform him that he could not be 
convicted of his failure to provide an address as part of his 
Sex Offender Registration Requirements due to his homelessness."9  
On June 11, 2018, the State filed its response to Savage's 
postconviction motion.   
¶17 On January 3, 2019, the circuit court held a Machner 
hearing regarding Savage's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  At the hearing, the circuit court heard from both 
Savage's trial counsel and Savage.  As is relevant to this 
                                                 
8 Savage was already serving a revocation sentence of two 
years and three days, of which 21 months remained.  Because of 
the concurrent nature of the sentences, the circuit court's 
sentence for "violation of sex offender registry" added nine 
months on to Savage's confinement from his revocation and placed 
him on extended supervision for an additional 24 months.  
9 Savage also claimed that his trial counsel promised him 
that any sentence he received from his plea would run 
concurrently such that he would not serve additional time in 
jail beyond his current supervision revocation sentence.  The 
circuit court held that his trial counsel did not deficiently 
perform regarding this claim and denied Savage's motion to 
withdraw his plea based on this claim.  Savage did not appeal 
the circuit court's determination on this claim to this court, 
so we do not address it.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
11 
 
appeal, Savage's postconviction counsel engaged in the following 
questioning of Savage's trial counsel: 
Q. 
Okay.  Now, also [Savage] was homeless, correct? 
A. 
It's my understanding he was homeless.  I 
discussed with him that homelessness was not an 
absolute defense to the charge. 
 
 
I explained as well there was, in fact, a 
homeless protocol in place through the Sex 
Offender Registry.  For lack of a better word, 
I'll call them specialists working with DOC. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Okay.  Now, you agree that you're familiar with 
State versus Dinkins, correct? 
A. 
Somewhat. 
Q.  Just for the record, that is Supreme Court case 
339 Wis. 2d 78, 2012.  And that does state that 
homelessness is not a defense, correct? 
A. 
Correct.  
Q. 
But it also indicates that, "An inability to 
provide an address such as if someone is living 
on a park bench or a stairwell is a defense to 
registration requirement." 
A. 
If that's what you believe the decision stands 
for. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And 
you 
never 
advised 
Mr. 
Savage 
that 
an 
inability to provide an address is a defense, 
correct? 
A. 
No.  Because there was a bigger issue that he 
also cut off the GPS monitoring unit.  
Q. 
Right. 
 
Which 
you 
told 
the 
judge 
was 
discretionary, correct? 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
12 
 
A. 
According to the author of the report, it was 
discretionary.  But the specialist or another 
employee had placed that GPS monitoring unit on 
Mr. Savage prior to his period of non-compliance.  
¶18 On cross-examination, the State asked Savage's trial 
counsel the following questions: 
Q. 
And 
you're 
familiar 
with 
the 
homelessness 
protocol? 
A. 
Yes.  
Q. 
And that is a protocol that is I guess maybe even 
more prevalent since the [Dinkins] decision.  And 
you've seen that protocol [be] used in other 
situations; is that fair? 
A. 
I have.  And I've also spoken to specialists at 
the preliminary hearing to inquire specifically 
more details of that protect [sic] so I could 
share it with clients who are facing that 
situation. 
Q. 
Because ultimately if people can become compliant 
and 
aware 
and 
understand 
the 
protocol, 
it 
benefits everybody; is that fair? 
A. 
Very much so. 
Q.  So you have it sounds like almost done your own 
research into the homelessness protocol so that 
you would be able to better explain it to other 
clients that you had had.  Is that accurate? 
A.  That is.  I've asked the specialist specifically 
what it is, and I can share it with other 
individuals.  I even asked if they had a written 
one.  I wasn't given a written one that described 
that they would accept park locations, cross 
streets as long as a call was made in accordance 
with the registry conditions. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did you have adequate time to discuss all of 
Mr. Savage's options with him on proceeding to 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
13 
 
trial or accepting a plea, any following of the 
homelessness [protocol], any of those? 
A.  I did.  I had given Mr. Savage my direct office 
line so he could reach me for which he did not 
need money or phone cards.  And I actually met 
with him at the jail as well in person to afford 
him a level of privacy and confidentiality that's 
not always available over the phone given that 
they are public at the jail or the House of 
Correction[s] and had discussions with him about 
both the revocation hearing and the pending case.  
¶19 After a brief redirect, the circuit court heard 
testimony from Savage.  As relevant to this appeal, Savage's 
postconviction counsel asked him the following questions: 
Q. 
Okay.  What did [your trial counsel] ever tell 
you about good faith efforts to comply with sex 
offender supervision requirements?  
A.  Nothing.  
Q. 
Did she ever discuss that sort of defense with 
you? 
A. 
No. 
¶20 Savage argued that Dinkins provided him with a defense 
because of his homelessness and had he known about the defense, 
he would have taken his case to trial.  The State countered by 
pointing 
to 
Savage's 
trial 
counsel's 
familiarity 
with 
homelessness claims and her own research into the DOC's homeless 
sex offender registrant protocol.  Thus, the State argued that 
Savage's trial counsel was not deficient and that any alleged 
deficiency did not prejudice Savage. 
¶21 After the parties finished their arguments, the 
circuit court made findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
court found Savage's trial counsel's testimony "more credible, 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
14 
 
more persuasive, and to carry the day."  Moving to the circuit 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court 
stated the following:  
 
With respect to the [homelessness defense] claim 
by the defense, there is likewise no prejudice.  That 
is because the defense misconstrues the decision in 
Dinkins.   
 
Dinkins contains the words that are recited by 
the defense but does not contain the meaning for which 
it is cited.  
 
The [Dinkins] decision involves a defendant who 
is in custody on a sex related crime.  The defendant 
is being released at his maximum discharge date and 
will no longer be supervised by anyone.  
Consistent 
with 
statute, 
the 
defendant 
was 
required to report to the Sex Offender Registry within 
ten days of his release –- that is, prior to release, 
where he was going to live. 
 
The defendant didn't do that.  He didn't do that 
because he was in custody and was unable to find a 
place to live. 
. . . . 
 . . . The defense presents a semantic argument.  
The defense says, of course, homelessness isn't a 
defense; but not knowing where you are going to live 
and not having a home is a defense which is being 
homeless.  
 
That is not what Dinkins stands for.  Dinkins 
stands for the proposition that if it is impossible 
for a person to report an address because of something 
outside of their control like, for example, being in 
prison at the time, then there may be a defense.  That 
is not Mr. [Savage's] circumstance. 
 
[His trial counsel] did not tell [Savage] that he 
had a defense in Dinkins.  That is because he did not 
have a defense in Dinkins.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
15 
 
 
As a result, there is not prejudice as a result 
of her not telling him that there was a defense.  
 
Having found that there was not prejudice . . . , 
I will deny the defense motion for postconviction 
relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  
¶22 Savage appealed.  On January 22, 2020, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court.  Savage, No. 2019AP90-CR, 
¶3.  The court of appeals concluded, contrary to the circuit 
court, that Dinkins may have provided a defense to Savage.  Id., 
¶26.  The court of appeals stated that it was "neither finding 
that trial counsel's performance was deficient nor that Savage 
suffered any prejudice."  Id., ¶31.  Instead, because of its 
interpretation of this court's holding in State v. Sholar, 2018 
WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89, the court of appeals 
remanded the case to the circuit court "to make the proper 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Savage's 
allegations that trial counsel was ineffective in representing 
him" in light of the court of appeals' interpretation of 
Dinkins.  Savage, No. 2019AP90-CR, ¶31. 
¶23 On February 20, 2020, the State petitioned this court 
for review.  We granted the petition.  
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 Savage asks this court to review the circuit court's 
denial of his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  
We review a circuit court's decision to deny a plea withdrawal 
motion under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85, ¶27, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  
A defendant seeking to withdraw a plea after sentencing must 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
16 
 
show by clear and convincing evidence that "allowing the 
withdrawal of the plea 'is necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice.'"  Id., ¶32 (quoting State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 
25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996)).   
¶25 "One way to demonstrate manifest injustice is to 
establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶84, 358 Wis. 2d 543, 
859 N.W.2d 44.  "Whether a defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact."  
State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 
N.W.2d 93.  "The factual circumstances of the case and trial 
counsel's conduct and strategy are findings of fact, which will 
not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; whether counsel's 
conduct constitutes ineffective assistance is a question of law, 
which we review de novo."  Id.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims have two prongs:  "counsel's performance was 
deficient and that deficient performance was prejudicial."  Id.  
We review de novo whether Savage has proven his trial counsel 
provided constitutionally deficient assistance and, if so, 
whether counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him.  Id., 
¶¶38-39.  "If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong, we 
need not consider the other."  Id., ¶37. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶26 We begin our analysis with a discussion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims generally before turning to 
Savage's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
17 
 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Generally 
¶27 "The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the 
effective assistance of counsel at 'critical stages of a 
criminal proceeding,' including when he enters a guilty plea."  
Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 
(2017).10  To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a "defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  While the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to 
effective assistance of counsel, this right's purpose is "not to 
improve the quality of legal representation . . . .  The purpose 
is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial."  Id. at 689.  Accordingly, "[s]urmounting Strickland's 
high bar is never an easy task."  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 371 (2010).   
1.  Deficient Performance Prong 
¶28 The first prong of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim asks whether counsel performed deficiently.  
Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38.   Establishing that counsel's 
performance was deficient "requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  Stated another way, when evaluating whether 
                                                 
10 This right was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and applies to the states.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 342-43 (1963) (acknowledging incorporation). 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
18 
 
counsel performed deficiently, a defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel's performance fell below "an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38 (quoting State 
v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305).  
Courts afford great deference to trial counsel's conduct, 
presuming that it "falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance."  Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 2010 WI 
40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695).  Moreover, in 
analyzing whether performance was deficient, "every effort 
[should] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate from counsel's perspective 
at the time."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
¶29 Accordingly, 
courts 
evaluate 
whether 
counsel 
deficiently performed on a case-by-case basis.  See id. at 688-
89 ("No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct 
can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances 
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.").  While 
each case is evaluated on the specific facts before the court, 
certain conduct of counsel will generally fall below the 
objective standard of reasonableness.  See, e.g., Porter v. 
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39-40 (2009) (per curiam) (holding 
counsel deficiently performed by failing to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the defendant's background); State v. Domke, 
2011 WI 95, ¶41, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364 ("Counsel must 
either reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
19 
 
reasonable 
strategic 
decision 
that 
makes 
any 
further 
investigation unnecessary."); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
470, 
477 
(2000) 
("[A] 
lawyer 
who 
disregards 
specific 
instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts 
in a manner that is professionally unreasonable."); State v. 
Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶18, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 
("[F]ailure to raise arguments that require the resolution of 
unsettled legal questions generally does not render a lawyer's 
services 'outside the wide range of professional competent 
assistance' sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment." (quoted 
sources omitted)).  
¶30 The permissible range of options for counsel is vast.  
As such, "ineffective assistance of counsel cases should be 
limited to situations where the law or duty is clear . . . ." 
Breitzman, 
378 
Wis. 2d 431, 
¶49 
(quoting 
Lemberger, 
374 
Wis. 2d 617, ¶33).   
¶31 Thus, to satisfy the first prong of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, that counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
2.  Prejudice Prong 
¶32 After establishing that counsel performed deficiently, 
the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
asks "[w]hether any deficient performance was prejudicial."  
Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶39.  To show prejudice, a defendant 
must show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
20 
 
reliable."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Explained further, to 
prove prejudice, "a defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's professional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Id. at 694.    
¶33 We have previously stated that "[w]hen the alleged 
deficiency concerns the plea process, Hill says the prejudice 
component specifically requires that 'the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.'"  State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, ¶29, 387 
Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 59 (1985)).  This inquiry "focuses on a defendant's 
decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of 
conviction after trial."  Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966.  In Lee, the 
United States Supreme Court explained the Hill inquiry further: 
A defendant without any viable defense will be 
highly likely to lose at trial.  And a defendant 
facing such long odds will rarely be able to show 
prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him 
a better resolution than would be likely after trial.  
But that is not because the prejudice inquiry in this 
context looks to the probability of a conviction for 
its own sake.  It is instead because defendants 
obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding 
whether to accept a plea.  See Hill, [474 U.S. at 59].  
Where a defendant has no plausible chance of an 
acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will 
accept a plea if the Government offers one. 
But common sense (not to mention our precedent) 
recognizes that there is more to consider than simply 
the likelihood of success at trial.  The decision 
whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
21 
 
respective consequences of a conviction after trial 
and by plea.  See INS v. St. Cyr, [533 U.S. 289, 322–
323 (2001)]. When those consequences are, from the 
defendant's perspective, similarly dire, even the 
smallest 
chance 
of 
success 
at 
trial 
may 
look 
attractive. 
 
For 
example, 
a 
defendant 
with 
no 
realistic defense to a charge carrying a 20–year 
sentence 
may 
nevertheless 
choose 
trial, 
if 
the 
prosecution's plea offer is 18 years.  Here Lee 
alleges 
that 
avoiding 
deportation 
was 
the 
determinative factor for him; deportation after some 
time in prison was not meaningfully different from 
deportation after somewhat less time.  He says he 
accordingly would have rejected any plea leading to 
deportation——even if it shaved off prison time——in 
favor of throwing a "Hail Mary" at trial. 
Id. at 1966-67.  As this passage indicates, while generally a 
defendant will change his or her plea only if there is a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits, there may be 
particularized circumstances that may cause the defendant to 
change his or her plea.   
¶34 However, the United States Supreme Court did not go so 
far as to endorse a fully subjective standard either.  As the 
Court explained, "[a]s a general matter, it makes sense that a 
defendant who has no realistic defense to a charge supported by 
sufficient evidence will be unable to carry his burden of 
showing prejudice from accepting a guilty plea."  Id. at 1966.  
Further, the Court stated that "[c]ourts should not upset a plea 
solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how 
he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies.  
Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to 
substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences."  Id. at 1967.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
22 
 
¶35 As Lee instructs, to show prejudice from accepting a 
plea, the defendant has two independently sufficient options to 
prove that he or she would have not pleaded guilty and would 
have instead proceeded to trial.  First, the defendant can 
demonstrate based on "contemporaneous evidence" that counsel's 
deficient performance so offended "expressed preferences" such 
that the defendant would have not pleaded guilty.  See id.  
Second, the defendant can demonstrate that the defense would 
have likely succeeded at trial.  See id. at 1966. 
¶36 Upon showing that counsel's deficient performance 
caused 
prejudice, 
the 
defendant 
has 
successfully 
cleared 
Strickland's high bar.   
B.  Savage's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶37 Applying those principles, we turn to Savage's claim 
that his trial counsel failed to raise a defense under Dinkins.  
To succeed on this claim, Savage must show that his trial 
counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable 
standard.  A trial counsel performance generally falls below an 
objectively reasonable standard when counsel fails to raise an 
issue of settled law.  See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49; see 
also Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶33.  The question in this case 
is whether Dinkins provided Savage with a defense to his 
"violation of sex offender registry" charge and that if he had 
known of this defense, he would have changed his plea.  We 
conclude that Dinkins does not provide a defense to Savage, so 
trial counsel did not perform deficiently.  Thus, Savage's claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.   
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
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¶38 Turning to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, 
we must consider whether Savage's trial counsel performed 
deficiently.  To prove deficient performance, Savage must show 
that Dinkins provides him with a defense and his trial counsel 
failed to raise such a defense.  See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 
¶49.  Dinkins provides no such defense for Savage.  
¶39 In Dinkins, this court was addressing a homeless 
defendant's conviction for failing to provide an address for the 
sex offender registry.  See Dinkins, 339 Wis. 2d 78, ¶5.  In so 
doing, this court answered the "narrow question of whether, 
under the circumstances where Dinkins attempted to comply with 
the registration requirements but was unable to find housing, he 
can be convicted of a felony for failing to notify the DOC of 
'[t]he address at which' he would 'be residing' upon his release 
from prison."  Id., ¶28.  The court answered this question in 
the negative, stating: 
[A] registrant cannot be convicted of violating Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the address at 
which he will be residing when he is unable to provide 
this information . . . . [A] registrant is unable to 
provide the required information when that information 
does not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable 
attempt to provide it. 
Id., ¶63.   
¶40 To reach this conclusion, the court interpreted 
several statutory provisions from Wis. Stat. § 301.45, including 
§ 301.45(2)(d). 
 
See 
id., 
¶¶30-32. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d) provides, in relevant part: 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
24 
 
A person subject to [the registration requirements] 
who is not under the supervision of the [DOC] or the 
[DHS] shall provide the information specified in par. 
(a) to the [DOC] in accordance with the rules under 
sub. (8). If the person is unable to provide an item 
of information specified in par. (a), the [DOC] may 
request assistance from a circuit court or the [DHS] 
in obtaining that item of information. 
The court relied on the "unable to provide" language from this 
statute to reach its conclusion that "a registrant cannot be 
convicted of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) . . . when he [is] 
unable to provide this information."  Dinkins, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 
¶52.11   
¶41 With this understanding of Dinkins, it is evident that 
Savage does not have a defense under Dinkins for three reasons.  
First, Savage was under the supervision of the DOC, so he was 
required 
to 
report 
information 
pursuant 
to 
a 
different 
subsection of the statute than Dinkins analyzed.  Second, the 
court 
in 
Dinkins 
recognized 
that 
the 
DOC 
Administrative 
Directive #15-12 may have addressed the problem in Dinkins.  
Finally, the holding in Dinkins must be couched within the 
factual record in which it rests and is inapplicable to Savage 
because of key factual differences.   
                                                 
11 The court further explained that "a registrant is unable 
to provide the required information when that information does 
not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable attempt to 
provide it."  State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶52, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 
810 N.W.2d 787.  Relying on this explanation and Dinkins' 
attempts to comply with the statute, the court determined that 
Dinkins could not be convicted for violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(6).  Id., ¶63.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
25 
 
¶42 As discussed above, Dinkins reached its conclusion 
based on Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d).  However, Savage was not 
subjected to the requirements of § 301.45(2)(d).  Because he was 
under DOC supervision, Savage was subject to the requirements of 
§ 301.45(2)(b).  Section 301.45(2)(b) provides that "[i]f the 
[DOC] has supervision over a person subject to sub. (1g), the 
[DOC] shall enter into the registry under this section the 
information specified in par. (a) concerning the person."  This 
statute does not contain the same "unable to provide" language 
upon which the court in Dinkins relied.  Compare § 301.45(2)(b) 
with § 301.45(2)(d).  Any hypothetical defenses formulated based 
upon the "unable to provide" holding in Dinkins cannot be 
imputed to a case dealing with a defendant who is under DOC 
supervision 
pursuant 
to 
§ 301.45(2)(b). 
 
In 
Dinkins, 
we 
recognized this limitation of our holding.  Dinkins, 339 
Wis. 2d 78, ¶53 ("We emphasize that our interpretation of the 
statute is unlikely to apply to a large number of registrants. 
Typically, 
registrants 
leaving 
prison 
will 
be 
under 
the 
supervision of the DOC or the DHS."). Thus, the "unable to 
provide" language from Dinkins does not provide Savage with a 
defense to his "violation of sex offender registry" charge as he 
claims.  
¶43 Furthermore, DOC's Administrative Directive #15-12 
regarding homeless sex offender registrants undermines Savage's 
claim that Dinkins provides him with a defense.  Prior to this 
court announcing its decision in Dinkins, the DOC promulgated 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
26 
 
DOC Administrative Directive #11-04.12  Id., ¶¶53-54.  Despite it 
not applying to the facts in Dinkins, this court noted that "the 
DOC has promulgated new reporting requirements and guidelines 
for addressing the problem presented in this case."  Id., ¶54.  
This statement shows that those to whom the DOC's Administrative 
Directive applies, like Savage, may be outside the scope of any 
hypothetical Dinkins defenses.   
¶44 Similarly, the factual differences between Dinkins and 
this case demonstrate that, even if Dinkins provided a defense, 
Savage would not qualify.  Dinkins' charge stemmed from "failing 
to provide his residence [ten] days prior to release from 
prison" and the circuit court found Dinkins "attempted to comply 
with the statute, but has been unable to find housing for 
himself upon release."  Id., ¶¶20-21.  In contrast, Savage was 
already released from prison when he was charged.  Moreover, his 
charge stemmed from his decision to cut off his GPS bracelet and 
abscond——failing to provide the DOC with updated information 
about where he was living within ten days of a change.  Thus, 
any argument that Savage is similar to the defendant in Dinkins 
and entitled to a similar defense fails.   
¶45 Therefore, Dinkins does not provide a defense to 
Savage.  Savage cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel 
deficiently performed, and we need not address prejudice.  See 
Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶37.  As a result, Savage cannot 
                                                 
12 DOC Administrative Directive #11-04 was superseded by the 
DOC Administrative Directive #15-12 on March 1, 2015.  
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
27 
 
prove that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Savage failed to demonstrate 
manifest injustice, and the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it denied Savage's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶46 We conclude that counsel was not ineffective and 
Savage is not entitled to withdraw his plea post-sentencing.  
Savage failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
manifest injustice merits plea withdrawal because Dinkins does 
not conclude that homeless sex offenders are "exempt" from 
registration requirements.  Thus, Savage's trial counsel did not 
provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform Savage about 
Dinkins because Dinkins does not provide Savage with a defense.  
Accordingly, we reverse. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2019AP90-CR   
 
 
 
1