Title: Martin v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  May 29, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

HARRY JAMES MARTIN,

	Respondent	 on Review,

	v.

BOARD OF PAROLE AND 
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CA A89428; SC S44242)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted March 3, 1998.

	Christine Chute, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L.
Linder, Solicitor General.

	George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is affirmed. 

	*Judicial Review from Board of Parole and Post-Prison

	 Supervision, 147 Or App 37, 934 P2d 626 (1997).

    **Graber, J., resigned March 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Kulongoski and Leeson, JJ., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

		GILLETTE, J.	

		This is a case involving judicial review of an order of
the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the Board). 
Respondent is a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Board by virtue of having been convicted of and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment for the crimes of sodomy in the first degree
and sexual abuse in the first degree.  He challenges a decision
of the Board that imposed on him a special condition of post-prison supervision that denies him the right to enter most of
Lane County.

		Respondent sought judicial review of the special
condition of post-prison supervision in the Court of Appeals. 
That court reversed the decision of the Board and remanded the
matter for reconsideration on the ground that the Board had not
stated in its decision "a rational explanation of its decision
that the special condition[] that it impose[d was] necessary to
effectuate the objectives of the [law authorizing post-prison
supervision]."  Martin v. Board of Parole, 147 Or App 37, 45, 934
P2d 626 (1997).  We allowed the Board's petition for review, and
now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

		In order to understand this case fully, it is necessary
to understand the crimes for which respondent was convicted.  We
turn to that subject first.

		Respondent was convicted on pleas of no contest to one
count each of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the
first degree.  The victim was a child whom respondent in effect
had purchased from the victim's mother in return for a parcel of
real estate in central Oregon.  The victim was four years old at
the time.  Respondent falsified the victim's birth certificate by
having his name placed on it as the victim's father.

		Respondent took the victim home to live alone with him. 
During the remainder of her childhood, respondent abused the
victim sexually, physically, and psychologically.  Respondent
beat the victim thousands of times; he forced her to perform
sexual acts with him and with another woman; he isolated the
victim by not letting her attend school and by telling her that
he and she "shared the same brain and he knew what she was
thinking and doing."

		Law enforcement authorities finally learned of the
victim's situation and removed her from respondent's home. 
Respondent was indicted on three counts of sodomy in the first
degree, three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, and one
count of furnishing obscene materials to a minor.  As noted, he
pleaded guilty to two of the charged offenses; the others were
dismissed.  

		When interviewed before sentencing, respondent told the
interviewer that he actually was innocent, but had pleaded guilty
to spare the victim the trauma of a trial.  He repeatedly stated
that he hoped to be reunited with the victim who, he insisted,
had been "brainwashed" by the authorities.

		Respondent had a previous conviction involving the
sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl.  He minimized the
significance of that conviction by stating that the victim in the
earlier case was "a very mature nine-year-old."  An evaluator
labeled respondent a pedophile with features of borderline,
antisocial, and narcissistic personality disorders.  Respondent
was described by the evaluator as being in "massive denial."

		The victim lives in Lane County.  With counseling, she
has managed to pick up some of the threads of a normal life,
although not without going through a long embarrassing period in
which her complete inexperience in society made her, as she
described herself, "the laugh of the school[,] * * * the school
geek."

		We turn next to the procedural history that led to the
present case.  The trial court, in sentencing respondent, ordered
that "[t]he length of post-prison supervision shall be 36
months."  Respondent was scheduled for release on supervision in
April 1995.  The Board set special supervision conditions for his
release, including conditions that he "NOT * * * ENTER LANE
CO[UNTY]" and that he have "NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT W[ITH]
VICTIM OR VICTIM[']S FOSTER FAMILY."  See ORS 144.101(1)
(authorizing the Board to impose conditions of post-prison
supervision); ORS 144.102(1), (2), and (3) (requiring conditions
of post-prison supervision to be in writing, prescribing certain
conditions, and authorizing the Board to set other, special
conditions that the Board "determine[s] are necessary because of
the individual circumstances of the person under post-prison
supervision").

		Through counsel, respondent sought administrative
review of the special post-prison supervision condition that
forbade him to enter Lane County.  He argued that that condition
should be enough because it imposes inordinate hardships on
himself and because the separate condition that he have no
contact with the victim or with her foster family adequately
protected the victim (respondent specifically noted that he did
not object to that latter condition).  In the alternative,
respondent argued that the Board at least should ease the
restriction on his ability to enter Lane County in certain places
and for certain purposes.  In so arguing, respondent placed
significant emphasis on the fact that, by forbidding him to enter
the county at all, the Board effectively had denied him the
ability to drive from the northern to the southern part of the
state at any place west of the crest of the Cascade Range.

		On reconsideration, the Board agreed to modify its
special condition relating to respondent's ability to enter Lane
County.  It stated:

	"THE BOARD HEREBY MODIFIES SPECIAL CONDITION 10 TO
ALLOW YOU TO TRAVEL IN WESTERN LANE COUNTY ALONG STATE
[sic] ROUTE 101 AND THE ADJOINING COASTAL CITIES.  YOU
ARE PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING LANE COUNTY BEYOND 5 MILES
EAST OF STATE ROUTE 101.  THE BOARD HAS CONSIDERED YOUR
REQUEST FOR CONDITIONAL ENTRY INTO LANE COUNTY AND THE
INFORMATION SUPPORTING THAT REQUEST.  HOWEVER, THE
BOARD REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE STATE'S INTEREST IN
PROTECTING THE VICTIM OF YOUR SODOMY AND SEX ABUSE
CONVICTIONS OUTWEIGHS YOUR INTEREST IN CARRYING ON YOUR
PERSONAL AFFAIRS IN THE PROHIBITED AREAS.

	"SPECIAL CONDITION 10, AS MODIFIED, IS REASONABLY
RELATED TO THE GOALS OF POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, ONE OF
WHICH IS TO PROTECT THE VICTIM FROM FURTHER INJURY." 

Still dissatisfied, respondent sought judicial review of the
Board's order in the Court of Appeals.

		In the Court of Appeals, respondent acknowledged that
the Board had the discretionary authority to impose special
conditions of post-prison supervision that reasonably are related
to the Board's legitimate goals.  However, he asserted,
conditions that are broader than necessary to achieve the Board's
legitimate statutory goals "must be vacated."  He summarized his
own argument concerning the special condition in this way: "The
public -- and the victim in particular -- are more than
adequately protected without barring petitioner from entering
Lane County.  The condition should be removed."

		In making the foregoing argument, respondent cited no
statutory or rule authority.  Instead, he relied entirely on two
Court of Appeals cases, Dingman v. Board of Parole, 114 Or App
516, 835 P2d 958 (1992) and Owens v. Board of Parole, 113 Or App
507, 834 P2d 547 (1992).  In each of those cases, the Court of
Appeals had struck down special conditions of parole that forbade
parolees from entering or residing in certain counties.  The
court reasoned in each case that the challenged condition was
broader than necessary to accomplish the Board's legitimate aims
of protecting victims and the public.  Dingman, 114 Or App at
517; Owens, 113 Or App at 511-12.  The Board in the present case
urged the Court of Appeals to overrule both of its precedents,
arguing that those two decisions did not utilize the correct
standard of review of the Board's decisions.

		The Court of Appeals chose to address the case in a
slightly different way than it was presented by respondent. 
Although acknowledging certain technical errors in both Dingman
and Owens, the court concluded that those cases nonetheless "were
correctly reasoned and * * * require that we reverse and remand
this case."  Martin, 147 Or App at 40. 

		The Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that
its authority to conduct judicial review of the Board's orders
derived from ORS 144.335(1).  Ibid.  The scope of that review, it
noted, was provided in ORS 144.335(5) and was limited to
"'affirm[ing], revers[ing] or remand[ing] the order on the same
basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8).'" Martin, 147 Or App at 40 
(quoting statute).  Translating that scope of review into the
terms of ORS 183.482(8), the court then concluded that its review 
in the present case was to determine whether the Board's order
was "'[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency
by law.'" Id. at 41 (quoting ORS 183.482(8), the judicial review
provision of the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA)).

		The foregoing line of inquiry brought the court to the
statutory source of the Board's authority, ORS 144.102(3) (since
amended by Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 525).  That statute
provides:

		"The board may establish such special conditions
as it shall determine are necessary because of the
individual circumstances of the person under post-prison supervision."

That grant of authority was a broad one, the court acknowledged,
but it was not a "blank check": 

	"The language of the statutory grant of discretion
refers to 'necessity,' which has meaning only in a
context of statutory objectives.  Moreover, it
expressly provides for judicial review, and that
implies that there must be something meaningful for the
courts to review."

Martin, 147 Or App at 41-42.

		After examining the legislative scheme governing the
Board's duties and authority, the Court of Appeals then
concluded:

		"Given the context within which the Board's
determination is required to take place, it seems clear
that the 'necessity' of special conditions must be
determined in reference to the statutory objectives
that are repeated throughout the sentencing and post-prison supervision statutes, namely, the protection of
public safety and the reformation of the offender."

Id. at 43.  However, the court then went on to hold that, in
addition to the substantive limitations imposed on the Board's
exercise of its discretion, 

	"there are limitations on its decision making that are
imposed as a function of the statutory provision for
judicial review.  Of particular importance to this case
is the requirement that the agency make findings of
fact and provide an explanation as to why its findings
lead to the conclusions that it reaches."

Ibid. (emphasis supplied; citing and relying on Home Plate, Inc.
v. OLCC, 20 Or App 188, 190, 530 P2d 862 (1975)).

		The problem with the Board's order in this case, the
Court of Appeals finally concluded, was precisely the same as the
problems found in Dingman and Owens, viz.: 

	"The Board has not explained why excluding petitioner
from the bulk of Lane County is 'necessary' to either
of the statutory objectives of protecting the public or
reforming the offender.  Indeed, it is questionable
that the Board made any finding of necessity at all. 
	* * * We * * * hold * * * that, to establish that it
exercised its discretion within the range delegated to
it by law and to provide a basis for meaningful
judicial review, the Board must offer a rational
explanation of its decision that the special conditions
it imposes are necessary to effectuate the objectives
of the statute.  The Board did not do so in this case."

Id. at 45 (emphasis supplied).  The court therefore reversed the
Board's order and remanded the case to the Board for further
consideration.  Ibid.(1)

		The Board seeks review of the Court of Appeals'
decision.  It argues that the court both misperceived the scope
of its authority on judicial review and imposed a requirement of
findings and an explanation that the Board's judicial review
statutes do not support.  We allowed review to address those
issues.

		As noted, orders of the Board are subject to judicial
review in the Court of Appeals.  ORS 144.335(1).(2)  Following such
review, the "court may affirm, reverse or remand the order on the
same basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8)."  ORS 144.335(5).  The
Board asserts that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard
in ORS 183.482(8) in the present case.

		The Board acknowledges that an appellate court's
authority is clear when it is conducting judicial review in a
case in which the agency under review is required by law to make
findings of fact and conclusions under ORS 183.470.(3)  In such
cases, the agency's order must contain findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence in the record, conclusions of
law, and a statement of the reasons why the conclusions are
justified by the findings.  See, e.g., Ross v. Springfield School
Dist. No. 19, 294 Or 357, 370, 657 P2d 188 (1982) (agency must
articulate connection between facts found and legal conclusions
drawn from those facts).  That rule is not applicable here,
however, the Board asserts, because the Board is not subject to
the findings of fact and conclusions of law requirement of ORS
183.470.

		The Board is correct that it is exempt from the APA
requirement that it make specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  ORS 183.315(1) provides:

		"Except as otherwise provided [in a section
unrelated to the Board], the provisions of ORS * * *
183.470 * * * do not apply to * * * [the] State Board
of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision."

Because it is not required by law to make findings of fact or
conclusions of law, the Board reasons, it cannot be faulted
legally for not doing so.

		The Board relies on Price v. Board of Parole, 301 Or
393, 397, 723 P2d 314 (1986), where the court said that an
appellate court's "authority to reverse or remand orders of the
Board is only as comprehensive as provided in ORS 183.482(8)." 
That case states a truism about the scope of judicial review. 
That statement does not advance the Board's argument, however. 
The real issue, it appears to us, is whether the court's
authority under ORS 183.482(8) extends to requiring that agencies
like the Board provide explanations in their opinions that
connect their choice of action with the facts of the case.

		The question of the extent of an appellate court's
authority under ORS 183.482(8) is one of legislative intent.  See
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (establishing statutory construction template).  Under the
first step of the analysis set out in PGE, the court examines the
text and context of a statute to determine legislative intent. 
Id. at 610-11.  In this case, an examination of text and context
alone yields no definitive answer -- the appellate court is
neither explicitly granted, nor is it denied, the authority in
question.  Rather, it is granted authority in more general terms,
e.g., to "remand the order to the agency if it finds the agency's
exercise of discretion to be * * * [o]utside the range of
discretion delegated to the agency by law."  ORS
183.482(8)(b)(A).

		The issue is resolved, however, when this court looks
to another source in aid of construing the statute at the first
level of analysis, viz., case law.  See Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or
247, 252, 864 P2d 1319 (1994) (case law construing the statute in
question is part of context and is pertinent at the first level
of inquiry into legislative intent).

		The case that we find to be most pertinent in this
respect is Drew v. PSRB, 322 Or 491, 909 P2d 1211 (1996).  In
Drew, the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) concluded that
the petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect and was a
danger to others.  Petitioners challenged both those conclusions
on the ground that neither was supported by substantial evidence
in the whole record.  ORS 183.482(8)(c).  Like the Board in this
case, the PSRB was exempted by ORS 183.315(1) from the
requirement that it make the kinds of findings of fact and
conclusions of law that are required by ORS 183.470(2).  This
court nonetheless ruled that the PSRB must include in its order
some explanation that connected the evidence that was in the
record with the legal conclusions that it had drawn.  Drew, 322
Or at 499-500.  The court explained:

		"Since 1975, a long and consistent line of
decisions from the Court of Appeals has held that, in
addition to the statutory requirement that findings be
supported by substantial evidence, agencies also are
required to demonstrate in their opinions the reasoning
that leads the agency from the facts that it found to
the conclusions that it draws from those facts.  This
court has followed the lead of the Court of Appeals and
adopted the same rule."

(Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)  The court then
reversed the decision of the PSRB and remanded the case to that
agency for further consideration because of "the agency's failure
to connect permissibly its facts and its holding."  Id. at 500-01.

		Drew involved judicial review under ORS 183.482(8)(c),
rather than under either subsection (a) or (b).  The Board does
not argue for any difference based on that distinction alone,
however, and none occurs to us.(4)  Drew and the present case are
too much alike to permit any meaningful distinction between them. 
		Our review of the pertinent case law satisfies us that
the requirement of some kind of an explanation connecting the
facts of the case (which would include the facts found, if any)
and the result reached by an agency is a requirement of ORS
183.482(8), as that section has been construed authoritatively by
this court.  Our PGE analysis thus ends at the first level of
analysis.

		The Board argues in the alternative that when, as here,
an agency is exempt from the requirements of ORS 183.470, the
agency should not be required to set out the rationale for its
order in the order itself but, instead, should be allowed to
advance its supporting rationale in its brief on appeal.  "That
appears to be what the court actually did in Drew * * *,"  the
Board asserts, "although the language of Drew is to the
contrary."

		The Board misunderstands what happened in Drew.  The
challenge there was to the sufficiency of the evidence.  The
court on its own was able to determine that there was evidence in
the record that would permit, although it did not require, the
action that the PSRB had chosen to take.  Drew, 322 Or at 499. 
The problem, however, lies in the fact that the PSRB never had
referred to that particular evidence, even obliquely, and the
additional fact that certain of the evidence favoring the result
reached by the agency would not have constituted substantial
evidence.  The court could not be sure which evidence had played
the decisive role in the PSRB's decision.  Without that
knowledge, which a written explanation could have provided, the
court could not affirm the agency's decision.

		Although the Court of Appeals in its opinion did, at
one point, suggest (inadvertently, we think) that the Board was
required to make findings of fact, Martin, 147 Or App at 43, the
court elsewhere correctly identified a permissible basis for its
holding, viz., the lack of a rationale connecting the facts of
the case with the legal conclusions that the Board had drawn. 
Id. at 45.  Thus, the court correctly understood the legal
standard of review to be applied in the case.  The Board's
contrary argument is not well taken.

		The question remains whether, having identified the
appropriate standard of judicial review to be used in this case,
the Court of Appeals also correctly applied it.  We turn to that
question.  

		Although respondent has labeled some of them as
"hearsay" and "hearsay on hearsay," he never has challenged the
permissibility of considering all the facts that we have recited
relating to this case.  Instead, respondent has confined his
argument to an assertion that the Board has failed to demonstrate
in its opinion why the special condition to which he objects is
necessary to accomplish the purposes of post-prison supervision.

		As noted, ORS 144.102(3) authorizes the Board to
establish "such special conditions as it shall determine are
necessary" because of the individual circumstances of the
offender.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute's
grant of discretion "has meaning only in the context of the
statutory objectives" that the Board is to pursue.  Martin, 147
Or App at 41.  We further agree with that court that, considering
the statutory text in light of its context and the legislative
scheme as a whole, "the 'necessity' of special conditions must be
determined in reference to the statutory objectives that are
repeated throughout the * * * statutes, namely, the protection of
public safety and the reformation of the offender."  Id. at 43.

		We do not understand respondent to argue otherwise. 
Instead, he asserts:

	"Nothing in [the Board's] statement[s] indicates
anything about findings (indeed, no one knows what the
Board believes respondent did to the victim, or what
the victim would experience from an accidental meeting
with the respondent); nothing is said about the state's
or the victim's interests; there is no indication of
the harm to the state or the victim of modifying
special condition 10; and there is no attempt to weigh
the supposed risk to the victim against the loss the
condition imposes on the respondent.  In sum, there is
nothing upon which this Court can properly base its
judicial review."

		None of those propositions is well taken.  The facts
that the Board necessarily found are reflected in the recitations
included within the evaluative portion of the Board's order. 
Moreover, we believe that, respondent's hyperbole to one side, no
one reasonably could doubt that any encounter between respondent
and his victim would be a psychological disaster for the victim. 
All the information available to the Board indicated that.  The
Board could not eliminate the possibility of an encounter
entirely; the vagaries of human experience are not so easily
controlled.  But the Board was not required to set conditions so
narrowly that they would permit a substantial danger that the two
would meet.  The Board's order specifically indicates that it
weighed the different interests of the parties.  Once it did so,
we hold that its choice in this case lies well within the
permissible range of choices that it could make.(5)

		It follows from the foregoing that, although we agree
with much of the substantive legal analysis found in the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, we disagree with its conclusion.  We
hold that the special condition of post-prison supervision
imposed on respondent in this case was one within the range of
choices entrusted to the agency by law, and that the agency's
explanation of why it made that choice was sufficient to
withstand a challenge on judicial review.  The contrary decision
of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
affirmed. 

1. 	Judge Leeson, in a concurring opinion, stated:

	"The facts in this case are egregious.  The Board did
not necessarily err in imposing the condition; it
simply failed to provide a rational explanation of the
nexus between the condition that plaintiff not enter
Lane County and the purposes of the statute."

Martin, 147 Or App at 45.

2. 	ORS 144.335(1) provides:

		"When a person over whom the board exercises its
jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by a
final order of the board related to * * * the
imposition of conditions of * * * post-prison
supervision * * *, such person is entitled to judicial
review of the final order."

3. 	ORS 183.470(2), a section of the APA, provides:

		"In a contested case:

		"* * * * *

		"(2) A final order shall be accompanied by
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The findings
of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the
underlying facts supporting the findings as to each
contested issue of fact and as to each ultimate fact
required to support the agency's order."

4. 	Indeed, as the Board acknowledges in its brief on the
merits, this court has imposed the same requirement in analogous
cases involving judicial review under subsection (a), see Dunning
v. Corrections Facility Siting Authority, 325 Or 269, 275-76, 935
P2d 1209 (1997) (where findings not required, appellate court
still will review such findings as agency chooses to make for
substantial evidence), and subsection (b), see Calderon-Pacheco
v. Board of Parole, 309 Or 454, 788 P2d 1001 (1990) (board action
inconsistent with board's own rule).

5. 	Our holding is a limited one.  We do not, for example,
express an opinion whether either of the two cases on which the
Court of Appeals relied was wrongly decided on its own facts.  We
note only that a "need to protect the victim" rationale is not a
panacea; exclusion orders having a scope like that in the present
case need greater justification than the fact that a victim
exists.  But the facts of the present case (as the Board was
entitled to find them) all justified the stringent condition that
the Board set.