Title: Commonwealth v. Cawthron

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12322 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEITH CAWTHRON 
(and three companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 6, 2018. - May 23, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and 
confessions, Investigatory stop.  Due Process of Law, 
Police custody.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 24, 2014. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Kenneth 
W. Salinger, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered 
by him. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by 
her to the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, 
the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further 
appellate review. 
 
 
                     
 
1 One against Cawthron and two against Craig Flodstrom. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Lindsay Kanter, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Daniel E. Callahan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for Craig Flodstrom. 
 
Thomas M. Glynn for Keith M. Cawthron. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we consider whether police 
officers were required to provide Miranda warnings prior to 
questioning two individuals who had been detained in a 
restaurant parking lot as part of a threshold inquiry into a 
street-level drug transaction.  A Middlesex County grand jury 
indicted the defendants, Keith Cawthron and Craig Flodstrom, on 
charges of trafficking in Oxycodone, in violation of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32E (c) (1), and conspiracy to traffic Oxycodone, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 40.  The defendants filed motions 
to suppress statements made to detectives and pills found in one 
of the defendants’ vehicles, arguing that they had been subject 
to custodial interrogation without adequate Miranda warnings, 
and the seizure of the pills was a result of custodial 
statements given absent such warnings.  A Superior Court judge 
concluded that the defendants had been subject to custodial 
interrogation without, in Cawthron's case, any warnings and, in 
3 
 
 
 
Flodstrom's case, an inadequate warning, and allowed the motions 
to suppress.2 
 
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.  A single 
justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's application for 
leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal and reported the matter 
to the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court issued an opinion 
reversing the judgment of the Superior Court.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cawthron, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 828 (2017).  We allowed the 
defendants' petitions for further appellate review. 
 
Applying the factors set out in Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 
Mass. 201, 211–212 (2001), we conclude that the defendants were 
not subject to custodial interrogation.  Therefore, the Superior 
Court judge's decision allowing the motions to suppress must be 
reversed. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
motion judge following an evidentiary hearing.  We indicate 
explicitly those few facts the judge found that are not 
supported by the record. 
 
On April 12, 2013, Detective Michael Donovan of the 
Tewksbury police department stopped at a convenience store on 
                     
 
2 The judge denied Flodstrom's motion to suppress statements 
that he made when officers first approached him, before they had 
asked any questions, but allowed the motion to suppress all 
statements made after the officers began asking questions. 
4 
 
 
 
Route 133 in Tewksbury.  Donovan was dressed in plain clothes 
and was driving an unmarked vehicle.  As he was walking across 
the parking lot toward the store, Donovan overheard a man, later 
identified as Cawthron, speaking on a cellular telephone outside 
the store.  Cawthron said that he was "going to pick them up 
now," and asked, "How many do you want" and, "Do you want ten?"  
Donovan suspected that Cawthron was arranging a narcotics 
transaction.  After purchasing a beverage in the store, Donovan 
returned to his vehicle and waited for Cawthron to leave the 
store.  Donovan then followed Cawthron's vehicle as it left the 
parking lot. 
Cawthron traveled a short distance on Route 133, and then 
turned into the parking lot of a fast food restaurant.  After 
briefly losing sight of the defendant's vehicle, Donovan located 
it in a nearby steakhouse parking lot; Cawthron was standing 
outside his vehicle, speaking on his cellular telephone.  
Donovan parked his vehicle fifteen or twenty yards from 
Cawthron's. 
 
Donovan contacted Detective Lieutenant Ryan Columbus of the 
Tewksbury police department and informed him of the 
investigation.  Columbus arrived, also in an unmarked vehicle, 
and established surveillance from a nearby parking lot. 
 
Approximately five minutes later, a black vehicle entered 
the steakhouse parking lot and parked next to Cawthron's 
5 
 
 
 
vehicle.  Flodstrom got out of this vehicle and approached 
Cawthron; the men shook hands and exchanged items that Donovan 
could not see.  Based on these actions, the statement he had 
overheard in the convenience store parking lot, and his 
knowledge that the parking lots along Route 133 were often used 
for illegal drug transactions, Donovan believed this to be a 
hand-to-hand drug transaction. 
 
Donovan got out of his unmarked vehicle, walked quickly to 
where the two men were standing, and identified himself as a 
police officer.  He ordered the men not to move.  At that point, 
Flodstrom said, "[T]his is how I feed my family."  Columbus 
arrived at the scene shortly after Donovan had reached the 
defendants.  He and Donovan decided to separate the two men and 
question them individually, before they had an opportunity to 
construct a shared response.3  Donovan directed Flodstrom to the 
far side of Flodstrom's vehicle; Cawthron was directed to go 
with Columbus on the far side of Cawthron's vehicle.  Each man 
moved approximately five yards from where he stood before the 
detectives arrived. 
                     
 
3 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, both detectives 
testified that separating individuals for questioning is a 
standard police tactic, to reduce the possibility that the 
individuals would be able to coordinate their responses. 
6 
 
 
 
 
Once Donovan and Flodstrom were separated from Cawthron and 
Columbus, Donovan gave Flodstrom an oral Miranda warning.4  
Donovan then asked Flodstrom what had happened.  Flodstrom 
responded that he had sold 300 Oxycodone pills to his uncle, 
Cawthron, for two dollars per pill.  Flodstrom reiterated that 
this was how he fed his children, and pulled $600 from his 
pocket.  After Flodstrom produced the money, Donovan placed him 
in handcuffs and told him that he was under arrest. 
 
While this interaction was taking place, Columbus spoke 
with Cawthron in front of Cawthron's vehicle.  Columbus 
identified himself as a police officer and asked Cawthron what 
he had purchased.  Cawthron said that he had purchased pills for 
two dollars each.  Columbus asked where the pills were, and 
Cawthron told him the pills were under the seat in his vehicle.  
Columbus looked under the driver's seat and found a full pill 
bottle.  After retrieving the bottle, Columbus handcuffed 
Cawthron, placed him under arrest, and read him his Miranda 
rights.  In response to the detective's further questions, 
Cawthron said that he was acting as the middle man for a friend. 
                     
 
4 Rather than reading the warnings from a printed card, 
Donovan gave them to the best of his ability from memory.  At 
the hearing on the motion to suppress, Donovan was unable to 
recall exactly what he told Flodstrom. 
7 
 
 
 
 
After handcuffing Cawthron, Columbus took the pill bottle 
to Donovan, who was standing with Flodstrom.5 
 
Cawthron and Flodstrom were indicted by a Middlesex County 
grand jury on charges of trafficking in over eighteen grams of 
Oxycodone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c) (1), and conspiracy to 
traffic in Oxycodone, G. L. c. 94C, § 40. 
 
Cawthron and Flodstrom filed motions to suppress their 
statements and the evidence seized.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the judge found that the detectives had reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendants and to conduct a threshold 
inquiry; that the defendants were subjected to custodial 
interrogation; and that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 
either Flodstrom or Cawthron received adequate Miranda warnings.  
Accordingly, the judge suppressed all of Cawthron's statements 
and the pill bottle found in his vehicle, and ordered 
Flodstrom's statements suppressed apart from his initial remark 
upon the first detective's arrival that "this is how I feed my 
family."6 
                     
 
5 The judge found that Columbus showed Donovan and Flodstrom 
the pills before Flodstrom finished making his statements to 
Donovan.  As discussed infra, this finding is not supported by 
the record. 
 
 
6 The judge also found that Flodstrom had automatic standing 
to challenge the search of Cawthron's vehicle, and thus 
suppressed the pills found in that vehicle with respect to the 
trafficking charge against Flodstrom, but not with respect to 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth's motion to reconsider was denied.  The 
Commonwealth then filed an application in the county court for 
leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.  A single justice of 
this court allowed the Commonwealth to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal in the Appeals Court.  After the Appeals Court reversed 
the allowance of the motions to suppress, see Cawthron, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 839, we allowed the defendants' petitions for 
further appellate review. 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge committed legal 
error when he determined that the defendants were subjected to 
custodial interrogation that necessitated Miranda warnings.  For 
the reasons that follow, we agree. 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of his 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). 
The encounter between the officers and the defendants began 
as a valid Terry-type stop, with an initial, brief inquiry into 
the suspicious transactions that a police officer believed he 
                                                                  
the conspiracy charge. The Commonwealth challenges the 
determination of automatic standing.  Because of the result we 
reach, we need not decide this issue. 
9 
 
 
 
had seen.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).  Such 
stops are permissible where an officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed.  See id.  At that point, the interaction is casual, 
and generally no Miranda warnings are necessary.  See 
Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 4 (1976). 
At some point, however, the nature of the interaction may 
change, as officers begin to focus on a particular suspect.  
Miranda warnings seek to protect an individual's "fundamental" 
right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  See Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).  Miranda warnings require 
that police officers inform suspects of their "right[s] to 
remain silent, that any statement [they] do[] make may be used 
as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed," before a 
custodial interrogation.  Id. at 444.  An interview is custodial 
where "a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would 
experience the environment in which the interrogation took place 
as coercive."  Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 
(1999).  Miranda warnings protect suspects from police-dominated 
environments that were "created for no purpose other than to 
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner."  See 
10 
 
 
 
Miranda, supra at 457; id. at 474 ("Without the right to cut off 
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on 
the individual to overcome free choice in producing a 
statement)." 
Even where a suspect is temporarily seized, "[n]ot every 
Terry-type investigative stop results in a custodial 
interrogation."  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 375 
(2007), citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).  
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 ("General on-the-scene questioning 
as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of 
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our 
holding"); Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 312 (2007) 
(defendant was not in custody, despite not being free to leave, 
where "[the] interrogation was brief and in the nature of a 
preliminary investigation, and the defendant's detention was 
minimal").  "the fact that the defendant was not free to leave 
(at least until the performance of the field sobriety tests) did 
not render the interrogation custodial."  Commonwealth v. Ayre, 
31 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 20 (1991).  "A person is in custody 
whenever [the person] is deprived of his [or her] freedom of 
action in any significant way" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Groome, 435 Mass. at 211.  See Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 
117, 123 (1998), quoting United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 
712 (1st Cir. 1996) (custody is "a formal arrest or restraint on 
11 
 
 
 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest").  See generally Grasso & McEvoy, Suppression Matters 
under Massachusetts Law § 18-3[b] (2017). 
To determine if a defendant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation, "the court considers several factors:  (1) the 
place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have 
conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion 
that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the 
interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive 
or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the 
person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the 
incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the 
interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking 
the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview 
terminated with an arrest."  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
at 211–212.  "Rarely is any single factor conclusive."  
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984). 
Applying the Groome factors to the circumstances here, we 
conclude that the defendants have not met their burden of 
showing that they were in custody when they made the 
incriminating statements.  See Larkin, 429 Mass. at 432. 
a.  Location of interviews.  To determine if the location 
of an interrogation contributed to a coercive environment, we 
consider the circumstances "from the point of view of the 
12 
 
 
 
defendant."  See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 144 
(1999), S.C., 443 Mass. 60 (2004) and 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  
The detectives questioned the defendants in a public parking 
lot, during the day, and the defendants were neither handcuffed 
nor otherwise physically restrained.  This environment is not 
police-dominated.  See Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327, 
331-332 & n.7, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 834 (1997), quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11 n.3 (1988) (suspect 
stopped on suspicion of operating motor vehicle while under 
influence of alcohol and subject to field sobriety tests on side 
of road was not in custody, because, in part, "traffic stops 
commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an atmosphere far 'less 
"police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of 
interrogation at issue in Miranda itself'").  Cf. United States 
v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 218 (1st Cir. 1999) ("a public highway 
is a neutral setting that police officers are not in a position 
to dominate"). 
In this case, the detectives instructed the defendants to 
move approximately five yards from where they had been 
conversing in the restaurant parking lot, so that each detective 
would be able to speak with one of the defendants individually.7  
                     
 
7 Flodstrom argues that the defendants' compliance with this 
instruction demonstrates that they did not believe they had any 
choice but to obey the detectives' orders.  Even assuming that 
 
13 
 
 
 
This movement did not result in a coercive atmosphere.8  See 
Vanhouton, 424 Mass. at 331-332 (officer's instruction to driver 
to get out of vehicle and perform field sobriety tests did not 
create coercive atmosphere). 
Other courts likewise have concluded that moving 
individuals a short distance, so as to interview them 
separately, does not constitute custodial interrogation.  In 
United States v. Campbell, 741 F.3d 251, 267 (1st Cir. 2013), 
for example, three individuals were traveling in a vehicle that 
was stopped by police.  Approximately five police officers 
"split up and questioned the defendants separately, such that 
each defendant was questioned by at most two officers."  Id.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held 
that the officers' decision to separate the defendants, even 
where some were interrogated by multiple police officers, did 
not create an "overwhelming" environment that was custodial and 
                                                                  
the movement was forced, however, does not necessarily result in 
a conclusion that the defendants were in custody for purposes of 
Miranda.  See Larkin, 429 Mass. at 432 (defendants have burden 
to establish that they were subject to custodial interrogation; 
restriction on freedom of movement does not necessarily amount 
to custody). 
 
8 Flodstrom also argues that his difficulty walking added to 
the coercive nature of the situation.  The judge did not make 
any findings about Flodstrom's physical condition, although 
Donovan testified that Flodstrom had a limp and appeared to have 
some difficulty moving.  No evidence in the record indicates 
that the short distance involved placed a significant burden on 
Flodstrom, such that his detention was custodial. 
14 
 
 
 
necessitated Miranda warnings.  See id.  We agree; the act of 
separating defendants briefly for individual questioning does 
not create an inherently coercive environment. 
b.  Whether the detectives conveyed a belief that the 
defendants were suspects.  If the detectives had conveyed to the 
defendants that they were suspects, that might support a 
determination that the defendants were in custody before they 
made the incriminating statements.  See Commonwealth v. Simon, 
456 Mass. 280, 287-288, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010).  When 
they approached the defendants, one of the detectives asked one 
of the defendants what he had just purchased, a question the 
defendants maintain indicates that the detectives believed the 
defendants had been involved in a public drug transaction.  We 
do not agree.  The interview occurred as part of the detectives' 
"brief, preliminary effort to confirm or dispel a suspicion" 
that the defendants had purchased and sold drugs.  See Kirwan, 
448 Mass. at 311. 
We conclude that, in their initial questioning, the 
detectives did not convey a suggestion that the defendants were 
suspects; the question could have referred to many types of 
innocent activities.  At most, it was a vague and unformed 
suspicion of some illicit activity.  In Commonwealth v. 
Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 630 (1988), officers also asked a 
defendant "what happened," after they discovered him near a dead 
15 
 
 
 
body; the court concluded that he was not in custody, albeit 
that he was not free to leave.  In Commonwealth v. Shine, 398 
Mass. 641, 648–649 (1986), the court concluded that a defendant 
was not in custody when he made a statement to police, 
notwithstanding the interrogating officer's uncommunicated 
intent to arrest the defendant, where the officer asked only 
"natural preliminary questions designed to determine the 
defendant's identity and what he knew about the crime."  In 
Simon, 456 Mass at 287, the court determined that a defendant 
was in custody because, inter alia, police officers began a 
conversation with the defendant by informing him that he was 
suspected of shooting the victim.  In this case, by contrast, 
the evidence does not clearly establish that the detectives told 
the defendants they were suspected of a crime. 
Although Columbus apparently suspected that Cawthron had 
purchased drugs, based on the conversation that Donovan 
overheard in the convenience store parking lot, this 
"unarticulated suspicion[] contribute[d] nothing to the 
objective circumstances of the encounter."  See Groome, 435 
Mass. at 212 n.13; Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 
677, 683 (2002) ("although the officers may have believed that 
the defendant was a suspect . . . the detectives did not convey 
any such belief to the defendant").  Columbus's question to 
Cawthron, "What did you just buy?" may suggest the topic of his 
16 
 
 
 
preliminary investigation.  In determining whether a suspect was 
in custody at the time a statement was made, however, police 
officers' questions are relevant if they "affected how a 
reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her 
freedom to leave."  See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 
325 (1994).  Columbus's question would not cause a reasonable 
person to feel that his freedom to leave had been curtailed to 
the degree associated with formal arrest. 
The judge found that a reasonable person in Flodstrom's 
situation would have believed that police suspected him of a 
crime, in part, because Columbus brought over the bottle of 
pills to show Donovan, in Flodstrom's line of sight, before, or 
during, Donovan's questioning of Flodstrom.  This factual 
finding is unsupported by the evidence introduced at the 
hearing, and, therefore, we decline to defer to it.9 
                     
 
9 At the end of his cross-examination of Donovan, Cawthron's 
counsel asked Donovan if Columbus brought the pills over after 
Flodstrom had told Donovan about the exchange.  Donovan first 
replied, "Yes, I believe so;" when asked if he was sure, Donovan 
said, "Yes.  [Flodstrom] had stated that he had sold [Cawthron] 
pills and handed me money."  When pressed about the timing, 
Donovan responded, "I don't remember exactly when it happened, 
no."  On redirect examination, the prosecutor again pursued this 
line of inquiry, asking, "[Y]ou were just asked if [Columbus] 
had either informed you that he had recovered the bottle of 
pills, or he had shown that to you.  And just so I'm clear, was 
that before or after [] Flodstrom had produced the six hundred 
dollars to you?"  Donovan responded, "After." 
17 
 
 
 
In response to multiple questions from both defense counsel 
and the Commonwealth, Donovan testified that Columbus showed him 
the pill bottle after Flodstrom had answered his questions and 
produced the money from his pocket.  Donovan did give one 
equivocal response on cross-examination, but never stated that 
he was shown the pill bottle before or while Flodstrom was 
answering his initial questions or producing the money from his 
pocket.  No other evidence was introduced about the timing.  
While a motion judge may decline to credit a witness's 
testimony, the judge may not make "findings that [are] 
inconsistent with the uncontradicted testimony of the" witness, 
where "there was no evidence to support those findings."  
Commonwealth v. Knowles, 451 Mass. 91, 93 n.2 (2008). 
In concluding that Flodstrom was in custody, the judge also 
relied in part on Donovan's decision to provide Flodstrom with 
some form of Miranda warning.  "[T]he reading of the Miranda 
rights does not automatically demonstrate seizure."  
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 458 Mass. 684, 695 (2011).  This court 
has encouraged police officers to give Miranda warnings before 
"the exact moment when the warnings are constitutionally 
required."  See Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 393 n.9 
(1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008).  We reiterate that a 
decision to give the warnings does not indicate that a defendant 
is, in fact, in custody. 
18 
 
 
 
c.  Tone of interviews.  On the third Groome factor, the 
judge found that the conversations between the defendants and 
the detectives "were not relaxed or conversational."  Even so, 
nothing in the record suggests that they were "aggressive," 
"persistent," or "harsh," which would support a conclusion that 
the defendants had been subject to a custodial interrogation.  
See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 155 (2000).  
The uncontroverted testimony from the detectives was that the 
interactions with the defendants occurred in a "regular tone" 
and were "very cooperative." 
In concluding that the defendants were in custody, the 
judge relied in part on the fact that "the officers asked 
questions, making clear that they expected to receive prompt 
answers, and the [d]efendants responded to each inquiry.  
Neither defendant was ever told that they were free to walk 
away, that they could terminate their interrogation whenever 
they wished . . . or anything else to offset the inherently 
coercive nature of the situation." 
Having concluded that the location of the interrogations 
was not coercive, we do not view the other facts identified by 
the judge, that the detectives wore "police badge[s]," and "were 
armed," as creating an inherently coercive environment.  The 
detectives did not display their weapons.  In the absence of 
evidence beyond the detectives' subjective suspicions that the 
19 
 
 
 
defendants had committed a crime, which are irrelevant for these 
purposes, we conclude that the tone "was neither aggressive nor 
confrontational," and that questioning was appropriate fact 
finding to confirm or dispel the detectives' belief that they 
had observed a drug transaction.  See Commonwealth v. Hilton, 
443 Mass. 597, 610 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 173 (2007).  Contrast 
Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 155 (interrogation was 
"aggressive and persistent" where "defendant's denials were 
scorned and overridden," "substance of what was said was harsh 
and intended by the questioner to be so"). 
d.  Whether the defendants were free to leave.  We turn to 
the final Groome factor, whether the defendants were free to end 
the interview by asking to terminate the interview or, simply, 
by leaving.  The detectives testified that the defendants were 
not free to leave, and that they would have prevented the 
defendants from leaving if they had tried.  Further, the 
defendants were arrested at the end of the interrogations, after 
each provided statements and physical evidence of a drug 
transaction. 
While this factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that the 
defendants were in custody, that conclusion does not necessarily 
follow.  An "arrest after an incriminating statement has been 
obtained, by itself, [does not] label[] as custodial the 
interrogation that precedes the incriminating statement" 
20 
 
 
 
(citation omitted).  Bryant, 390 Mass. at 742 n.15.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 386–387 (1989) 
(declining to suppress statements made to officer during search 
of home, because defendant was not in custody at time of making 
statements, but, rather, was arrested after police found 
evidence during search).  "Not all restraints on freedom of 
movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda."  Howes v. 
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).  "Determining whether an 
individual's freedom of movement was curtailed . . . is simply 
the first step in the analysis."  Id.  We balance the fact that 
the defendants were not free to leave the interview, and were 
arrested at its conclusion, against the other Groome factors.  A 
single factor rarely is determinative.  See Bryant, 390 Mass. at 
737.  The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that "few 
motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull 
over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told 
they might do so," but nonetheless has concluded that traffic 
stops are not custodial and Miranda warnings are not required in 
those circumstances.  See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436. 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the judge relied on 
Simon, 456 Mass. at 287, and our previous statement that "[t]he 
critical question in determining whether an individual is in 
custody is whether a reasonable person in the individual's 
position would feel free to leave."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. 
21 
 
 
 
Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996).  While this may be a critical 
factor, today we clarify that it cannot be the determinative 
factor.  Custody is "a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest," see 
Morse, 427 Mass. at 123; inability to leave may support a 
finding of custody, but a Terry-type stop, without more, is not 
custodial.  See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.  See also Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 436. 
This case is unlike Simon, 456 Mass. at 287.  There, 
officers began their conversation with the defendant by telling 
him that he had been identified as the person who shot the 
victim.  Id. at 283.  Although the conversation took place at 
the defendant's attorney's office, the defendant was aware that 
six or seven police officers had arrived and were waiting 
outside for him.  Id. at 287.  In those circumstances, the 
defendant's freedom of movement was curtailed to a degree 
associated with formal arrest, because he was not free to leave 
a building that he knew to be surrounded by police officers, and 
because he was informed that he was a suspect.  See id. at 283, 
287.  Those factors are absent from this case.  Here, the 
defendants were not told that they were suspected of a crime, 
and the discussions were held one-on-one, in an open, public 
space, rather than inside a building surrounded by other 
officers. 
22 
 
 
 
The circumstances here are similar to those in Kirwan, 448 
Mass. at 312, where we affirmed a Superior Court judge's 
determination that a defendant was not in custody, despite the 
judge's determination that the defendant was not free to leave 
his home, where he was speaking with an officer.  In that case, 
the "interrogation was brief and in the nature of a preliminary 
investigation, and the defendant's detention was minimal."  Id.  
The defendants in this case likewise were subject to a minimal 
detention when officers asked them to move a few yards; the 
detectives conducted a very preliminary investigation, by asking 
what happened and what one defendant had purchased.  Each 
defendant, at that preliminary stage of the investigation, then 
offered the incriminating statements about purchasing and 
selling pills that resulted in their arrests. 
Because we conclude that the environment was noncoercive, 
as in Kirwan, the fact that the defendants were not free to 
leave does not transform the stops into custodial 
interrogations, where the other Groome factors weigh against 
custody.  See Vanhouton, 424 Mass. at 332 (defendant suspected 
of drunk driving and subjected to field sobriety tests not in 
custody, despite not being free to leave); Callahan, 401 Mass. 
at 630 (defendant was not in custody, despite officers asking 
him "what happened" and him not being free to leave after 
officers discovered dead body); Bryant, 390 Mass. at 738–740 
23 
 
 
 
(defendant admitted to shooting victim and was likely not free 
to leave his home where he was speaking with police officers, 
but was not in custody immediately following confession when 
police officer asked him if he had anything more to say). 
In DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 375 & n.5, this court found that a 
Terry-type stop was noncustodial, even though the officers had 
seized the defendant for a frisk and the officers then asked 
him, "Do you have a gun or do you have a firearm?"  In holding 
that the environment was not police-dominated, the court 
concluded that the officers' question did not convey that they 
suspected the defendant of a crime, the tone of the interview 
was conversational, and at no point did the encounter become 
aggressive.  Id. at 376.  Here, too, the interviews were 
conversational, the interaction was not aggressive, and 
Columbus's question, "What did you just buy?" did not convey to 
Cawthron that he was suspected of a crime.  We conclude that, 
absent additional factors, the defendants were not in custody 
when they made their statements to police. 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendants' motions 
to suppress is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.