Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino, 114 Ohio St.3d 174, 2007-Ohio-3605.] 
 
 
 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. DIMARTINO. 
[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino,  
114 Ohio St.3d 174, 2007-Ohio-3605.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Neglect of an entrusted legal matter — Failing 
to carry out a contract of professional employment — One-year 
suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2007-0319 — Submitted March 14, 2007 — Decided July 18, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-081. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Dennis DiMartino of Youngstown, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0039270, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1987.  
On December 7, 1994, this court suspended respondent’s license to practice for 
six months, stayed on conditions, because he failed to timely respond to a client's 
inquiries about her case, provide that client with a settlement statement, and 
promptly forward the client's portion of settlement proceeds.  Mahoning Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. DiMartino (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 95, 642 N.E.2d 342. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we now suspend respondent’s license to practice for one year 
but stay the entire suspension on conditions, based upon findings that he violated 
DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting the neglect of an entrusted legal matter) and 7-
101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract 
of professional employment) while representing a convicted felon.  On review, we 
adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and hold that a one-year, stayed 
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suspension is appropriate for respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, charged respondent 
with the cited misconduct, and the parties thereafter entered into a consent-to-
discipline agreement.  See Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  A panel of the board 
recommended that we accept the agreement, in which the parties stipulated to 
violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2) and proposed the one-year 
suspension, to be stayed on the conditions that respondent commit no further 
misconduct and allow a monitoring attorney to oversee his practice.  The board 
also recommended that we accept the agreement. 
{¶ 4} According to the parties’ stipulations, respondent neglected and 
failed to carry out his professional responsibilities in representing Riccardi 
Lombardi.  In September 2003, when respondent agreed to take Lombardi’s case, 
Lombardi was serving time for four felony convictions — three for cocaine-
trafficking and one for cocaine possession.  Lombardi had pleaded guilty to these 
crimes in February 2002 and, in accordance with plea agreements, had received 
mandatory sentences that were not appealable and that made him ineligible for 
early judicial release. 
{¶ 5} From September 2003 until Lombardi discharged him at the end of 
December 2004, respondent and his client miscommunicated their respective 
expectations for Lombardi’s representation.  Lombardi expected respondent to 
pursue a pro se motion that Lombardi had filed asking the court to either vacate 
his sentence or allow him to withdraw his guilty plea (the “pro se motion”), a 
claim to which the state had previously replied with a motion for dismissal or 
summary judgment. Respondent, however, recalled advising Lombardi that he 
had little chance of prevailing on that motion, and respondent thought Lombardi 
January Term, 2007 
3 
wanted him to pursue a reduction of Lombardi’s sentence through a motion for 
judicial release.  Lombardi paid respondent $5,000, which respondent accepted as 
payment for “all expenses from the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals one time.” 
{¶ 6} Respondent took four months to meet with Lombardi in prison, 
finally seeing him in early February 2004.  Later that month, respondent asked the 
court for a hearing on a motion for postsentence evaluation that Lombardi’s 
former attorney had filed in December 2002 and that the court had previously 
denied in January 2003.  Lombardi thought that respondent had obtained a 
hearing on his pro se motion, but when he asked about the result of the hearing, 
respondent sent him a copy of the court’s January 2003 order denying the motion 
for postsentence evaluation. 
{¶ 7} Further miscommunication and confusion ensued.  The court 
scheduled a hearing on the pro se motion for August 11, 2004, and respondent 
failed to appear.  Then, nearly one year after Lombardi had filed it, the court 
overruled the pro se motion, sending notice of the order to Lombardi, not to 
respondent.  The order explained that no one had opposed the state’s motion for 
dismissal or summary judgment and that Lombardi had not filed the motion 
within the time allotted for the postconviction relief he had sought. 
{¶ 8} Respondent did not appeal the denial of postconviction relief, in 
part because he did not receive notice from the court and in part because he did 
not consider himself responsible for pursuing Lombardi’s pro se motion.  The 
appeal time elapsed.  At some point, respondent realized that he could neither 
successfully appeal nor obtain judicial release for Lombardi because of the terms 
of his plea agreements. 
{¶ 9} Lombardi 
ultimately 
discharged 
respondent 
due 
to 
his 
dissatisfaction with respondent’s slow and largely unproductive pace.  
Respondent offered to refund half of his fee, and Lombardi accepted his offer. 
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{¶ 10} The parties stipulated that respondent sent various letters to 
Lombardi and attempted to contact some witnesses; however, respondent actually 
filed only two documents – a notice of appearance and the request for a hearing 
on the postsentence evaluation motion.  He also failed to attend the August 2004 
hearing on the pro se motion, and he did not appeal the denial of that relief.  The 
parties agree, however, that Lombardi could not have prevailed on any of those 
legal actions and that respondent only realized this belatedly. 
{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction, the parties, panel, and board took into 
account the aggravating and mitigating factors in respondent’s case.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10. Although the prior violations occurred more than 12 years ago, 
respondent has a disciplinary record, an aggravating factor under BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  On the other hand, respondent has made restitution to his 
client, cooperated appropriately in the disciplinary proceedings, and proved his 
good reputation and character apart from the instant misconduct, all of which are 
mitigating factors.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c), (d), and (e). 
{¶ 12} On the board’s recommendation, we accept the consent-to-
discipline agreement.  For his violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2), 
respondent is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year.  The 
suspension is stayed, however, on the conditions that respondent commit no 
further misconduct and that he serve a one-year probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 
V(9), during which a monitoring attorney, to be appointed by relator, shall 
oversee his practice.  If respondent violates the conditions of the stay, the stay will 
be lifted, and respondent will serve the entire suspension period. 
{¶ 13} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2007 
5 
 
David C. Comstock Jr., Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
Gerald Ingram, for respondent. 
______________________