Title: Dry Creek Cattle Co. v. Harriet Bros. Ltd. Partnership

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dry Creek Cattle Co. v. Harriet Bros. Ltd. Partnership1995 WY 195908 P.2d 399Case Number: 95-3Decided: 12/07/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
DRY 
CREEK CATTLE COMPANY, a Wyoming general partnership,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

HARRIET BROS. LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 

a Wyoming limited 
partnership,

 and Garry Davis, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Johnson County, John C. Brackley, J.

John W. Davis of 
Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for 
Appellant.

Timothy J. 
Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, for Appellee Harriet 
Bros.

Philip A. 
Nicholas and Jeff Anthony of Nicholas Law Offices, Laramie, for Appellee 
Davis.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The critical 
issue in this case is whether Harriet Bros. Limited Partnership (Harriet Bros.), 
the seller of ranch properties at auction, advertised and conducted an auction 
with reserves or without reserves. The published auction rules stated that, in 
first considering bids upon eleven parcels, a minimum bid was required as to 
each parcel of land. If the minimum bid were received on each parcel, then those 
parcels would be considered sold to the highest respective bidders, subject to 
offering the entire ranch property as a unit. The seller then would accept the 
highest sale price, either the aggregate of the bids on the eleven parcels or 
the bid for the ranch property as a whole. Collateral issues are raised with 
respect to the propriety of the district court's summary judgment in light of a 
claimed ambiguity in the auction rules; error in the court's refusal to rule 
that the aggregate of the parcel bids should have been accepted; and the court's 
denial of additional discovery before its ruling on the summary judgment. We 
hold the district court properly concluded there was no ambiguity in the auction 
rules; the offering of the eleven parcels was conducted as an auction with 
reserves; and there was no necessity for additional discovery. The Order 
Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants is affirmed.

[¶2]      Dry Creek Cattle 
Company (Dry Creek) states these issues in its Appellant's Opening 
Brief:

A.        Whether the 
trial court erred in refusing to declare a combination of auction bids totaling 
$4,045,000 the winner over an auction bid of $3,960,000.

B.        Whether the 
trial court erred when it granted summary judgment despite factual conflicts 
regarding the intention of the parties with respect to ambiguous contractual 
provisions.

C.        Whether the 
trial court should have permitted additional discovery to be completed before 
ruling on summary judgment.

In the Brief of 
Appellee Harriet Bros. Limited Partnership, the issues are stated to 
be:

I.          
Did the trial court properly determine that the public auction conducted 
by appellee Harriet Bros. Limited Partnership was a reserve auction?

II.          
Did the trial court properly determine that no contract existed between 
Appellant and Appellee Harriet Bros. Limited Partnership for real property sold 
at auction?

III.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion in proceeding with a 
summary judgment hearing where Appellant had conducted extensive discovery and 
had filed its own motion for judgment on the pleadings?

In the Brief of 
Appellee Garry Davis (Davis), this statement of the issues appears:

A.        Did the 
trial court properly determine that as a result of the auction no contract arose 
for Harriet Bros. Limited Partnership to sell parcel five to 
appellants?

B.        Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion by proceeding with a summary judgment hearing 
after Appellant had conducted discovery and had filed its own motion for 
judgment on the pleadings?

[¶3]      The ranch that 
was owned by Harriet Bros. is located in Campbell, Johnson, and Washakie 
Counties. It consists of approximately 93,194 acres of deeded and leased land. 
Harriet Bros. decided to dispose of the ranch and entered into a listing 
contract with Lowham Associates (Lowham) to sell the ranch at public auction. It 
was contemplated the auction would be conducted by an auctioneer retained by 
Lowham. The auction was conducted on December 10, 1993 in Buffalo, and the 
conditions of sale and the descriptions of the property were included in an 
advertising brochure. The same brochures were distributed to all bidders who 
registered before the auction commenced. The critical paragraph appearing in 
that advertising brochure reads:

Minimum Bid - Absolute 
Auction: On receiving the announced minimum bid for each offered ranch 
property, the auction will then 
move to an absolute sale with the parcels selling to the highest bidders as 
acknowledged by the auctioneer. The ranch will be offered in 11 separate ranch 
units as hereafter outlined and also in its entirety. Sellers will accept that 
bid or combination of bids that make up the highest sales price for the total 
offering. (Emphasis added.)

The brochure 
then listed the minimum bid Harriet Bros. would accept for each of eleven 
parcels, as well as a minimum bid for the entire ranch.1

[¶4]      At the 
commencement of the auction, the auctioneer told the bidders he would seek to 
obtain the minimum bid for each of the eleven parcels in the first round of 
bidding. He told the bidders they would have the opportunity to put together 
combination bids on various parcels in the second round of bidding, and that 
bidders also were free to increase their bids on the individual parcels during 
the succeeding rounds of bidding. The auctioneer announced finally that bids 
would be taken on the entire Harriet ranch as provided in the brochure, with 
bidding competition in rounds three and four.

[¶5]      As the auction 
proceeded and bids were received in each round, they were posted on blackboards 
in the front of the room. After the first round of bidding, five of the eleven 
parcels had not received the advertised minimum bid. In the second round, bids 
were received on combinations of parcels and, in the third round, the auctioneer 
requested bids on the entire ranch property, that is, for all eleven parcels as 
a unit. After the third round of bidding, Dry Creek had submitted a bid of 
$270,000 for Parcel 5, which was $71,000 above the minimum listed in the sales 
brochure. Minimum bids for Parcels 3 and 11 had not been received. At this time, 
a bid was received for the entire ranch property in the amount of 
$3,960,000.

[¶6]      During the fourth 
and final round of bidding, the auctioneer again tried to obtain minimum bids 
for Parcels 3 and 11, or a combination of bids that would result in minimum bids 
for these two parcels, but this effort was unsuccessful. In effect, the 
auctioneer stated he needed all the minimums reached, and the aggregate of the 
bids on the parcels would have to be more than the current bid on the entire 
ranch if the individual bidders were to succeed in buying the ranch.2 The requested minimum bids for all 
eleven parcels did not materialize, and the auctioneer, by the fall of the 
hammer, awarded the ranch to the high bidder on the entire ranch at a price of 
$3,960,000.

[¶7]      In his effort to 
discharge the debt of $3,960,000 to Harriet Bros., the purchaser made 
assignments of specific parcels to others in return for their payment of a 
portion of the total purchase price. He assigned to Davis the title to Parcel 5, 
which is the parcel that Dry Creek claims to own by virtue of its bid of 
$270,000 at the auction. Because the entire ranch was sold, instead of the 
several parcels, Dry Creek filed this action in the district court of Johnson 
County, seeking to establish a contract to purchase Parcel 5 for the amount Dry 
Creek bid at the auction. Dry Creek further alleged a breach of contract with 
resulting damages. Harriet Bros.' stance was that there could be neither breach 
nor damage because there was no contract formed with Dry Creek.

[¶8]      About three weeks 
after initiating the action, Dry Creek filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and, the next day, it requested a hearing be set. The trial court set 
the hearing for approximately six weeks later, but it continued and rescheduled 
that hearing when Dry Creek sought a continuance and requested additional time 
for discovery. Subsequently, Harriet Bros. filed its Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the hearing then was set for the end of May. Dry Creek filed a 
cross-motion for partial summary judgment based on its claim that the only party 
Harriet Bros. could contract with to sell Parcel 5 was Dry Creek. In addition, 
Dry Creek's cross-motion sought an extension of time to complete discovery and 
leave to amend.

[¶9]      After hearing all 
pending motions, the district court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment 
for Defendants. That order disposed of all Dry Creek's claims, leaving intact 
certain counterclaims by Harriet Bros. Later in the fall, the district court 
entered its Order for Final Judgment Under W.R.C.P. 54(b), and Dry Creek 
perfected this appeal.

[¶10]   This court previously has 
considered an auction sale of a ranch. Pitchfork Ranch Co. v. Bar TL, 615 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1980). After quoting extensively from encyclopedias and treatises 
addressing the subject of auctions, we spoke to the concept of an auction with 
reserves as compared to one without reserves: 

"In summary, then, the 
law seems to be settled that in an auction with reserves - which seems 
to include all auctions where the advertisements and preliminary information 
representations do not announce the sale to be without reserves - the 
contract is formulated by the offer of the bidder and the 
acceptance of the seller.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

A "no reserves" 
auction is significantly different than the auction with reserves above 
described. As has been noted, in auctions - with reserves - the 
bidder is deemed to be the party making the offer, while the auctioneer 
(as agent for the seller), is the offeree with authority to either accept the 
bid or reject it. The ramifications of this are that the latter need not sell if 
he or his principal chooses not to and may, at any time before the hammer falls, 
withdraw the property from the auction block. If the bidding is too low, the 
auctioneer need do nothing and there is no resulting contract between the seller 
and any bidder. This is not the case with a no-reserves 
auction.

In the no reserves 
type of sale, which is the kind of sale with which we are here concerned, 
the legal relationship as between the seller and bidder is reversed. In the 
no-reserves sale, the seller becomes the offeror and the 
bidder the offeree by reason of a collateral contract theory which will 
be discussed in detail, infra. This role-switching exercise results in a 
significant readjustment of rights and obligations between the parties. For 
example, in the no-reserves auction, the contract is consummated with 
each bid, subject only to a higher bid being received. This is so because the 
seller makes his offer to sell when he advertises the sale will be a no-reserves 
sale to the highest bidder. Once the first bid has been received, the only 
acceptance which forms a binding agreement is the one offered by the highest 
bidder. In this type of sale, the seller may not withdraw his property once any 
legitimate bid has been submitted, as he may do at any time before the hammer 
falls in the with-reserves auction. In the no-reserves situation, the seller is 
absolutely committed to the sale once a bid has been entered * * *."

Pitchfork, 615 P.2d  at 548-49 (emphasis added, italics in original).

[¶11]   In this instance, Dry Creek relies 
upon the advertisement announcing an "absolute auction." That phrase cannot be 
taken out of the context of the paragraph quoted above, which announces an 
auction without reserve only after the condition precedent has been satisfied. 
That condition precedent was the receipt of the announced minimum bid for each 
offered parcel of the ranch. The advertisement went on to announce, however, 
that the ranch also would be offered in its entirety, and the sellers would 
accept the bid for the ranch in its entirety or the combination of bids for the 
several parcels, whichever constituted the highest sales price for the total 
offering.

[¶12]   Dry Creek contends the word "each" 
in the paragraph on which it relies simply meant that as each individual parcel 
received a minimum bid, the parcel moved into an absolute sale position, that 
is, the auction of the parcel became one without reserves. Since Dry Creek 
submitted the highest bid over the minimum on Parcel 5 prior to the time the 
auctioneer's hammer fell, Dry Creek insists Harriet Bros. was contractually 
obligated to sell Parcel 5 to Dry Creek. Harriet Bros.' interpretation of the 
word "each" in the context of the above paragraph is that it means "all eleven 
parcels must receive their minimum bids before there can be an absolute sale of 
the ranch." We turn to the work of lexicographers to resolve this debate. In 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 507 (6th ed. 1990), we find this definition:

Each. A distributive 
adjective pronoun, which denotes or refers to every one of the persons or 
things mentioned; every one of two or more persons or things, 
composing the whole, separately considered. The effect of this word, used 
in the covenants of a bond, is to create a several obligation. The word "any" is 
equivalent to "each." Conerty v. Richtsteig, 308 Ill. App. 321, 31 N.E.2d 351. 
[(1941)]. "Each" is synonymous with "all" and agrees in inclusiveness but 
differs in stress; "all" collects and "each" distributes. Knox Jewelry Co., Inc. 
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 519, 203 S.E.2d 739, 740 [(1974)]. 
(Emphasis added.)3

In the same 
work, we find this definition:

Every. Each one of all; all 
the separate individuals who constitute the whole, regarded one by one. The term 
is sometimes equivalent to "all"; and sometimes to "each".

BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 555.

We conclude the 
language in the advertisement which reads, "[o]n receiving the announced minimum 
bid for each offered ranch property, the auction will then move to an absolute 
sale with the parcels selling to the highest bidders as acknowledged by the 
auctioneer," is grammatically apt to convey the proposition that a minimum bid 
must be received for all of the parcels before the auction would move to an 
absolute sale. The legal effect is that this auction was one with reserves until 
that condition was satisfied as to every one of the several parcels.

[¶13]   The general definitions of these 
words are parallel. In WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 713 (1993), 
the word "each" used as an adjective connotes "being one of two or more distinct 
individuals having a similar relation and often constituting an aggregate." In 
that dictionary, at 788, "every" is defined as:

every/ * * * 1 a: being 
each individual or part of a class or group whether definite or indefinite in 
number without exception * * *.

[¶14]   In Pitchfork, we ruled an auction 
is "with reserves" in all circumstances where it is not announced, advertised, 
or represented to be an auction "without reserves." There is nothing in the 
brochure for the sale of the Harriet ranch to the effect that it was to be an 
auction "without reserves." The brochure advertised a "minimum bid - absolute 
auction," but the balance of the language of the paragraph manifests an entirely 
different concept from an auction without reserves. The condition precedent is 
clearly presented. Furthermore, the four-tier bidding process was outlined in a 
memorandum furnished at the sale and, after the first three rounds of bidding 
and a recess, the final round of bidding was described as:

FINAL ROUND OF BIDDING: 
The auction will be held open and additional bids received on all individual 
units, combinations and/or the entirety (beginning at the 
pre-recess bids level) until the auctioneer gives notice of closing the bidding 
process and sellers [sic] acceptance of the bids or combination of bids that 
result in the highest sale price for the Harriet Ranches. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶15]   It is clear from this language that 
Harriet Bros. was receiving offers up to this final round of bidding. The 
auctioneer never let the auction hammer fall, nor did he announce a sale prior 
to that last round of bidding. The sale was an auction with reserves, at least 
until the final round was reached, and the quoted language still alludes to the 
acceptance by the sellers of the bids or combination of bids resulting in the 
highest sale price.

[¶16]   The accepted bid was $3,960,000 for 
the entire ranch property. As we stated in Pitchfork, 615 P.2d  at 547 (emphasis 
added):

An advertisement of an 
auction is not an offer to sell which becomes binding, even conditionally, on 
the owner when a bid is made. Rather, an announcement that a person will sell 
his property at public auction to the highest bidder is a mere declaration of 
intention to hold an auction at which bids will be received. It is a mere 
invitation to those attending the sale to make offers by bids. The contract 
becomes complete only when the bid is accepted, this being ordinarily 
denoted by the fall of the hammer.

[¶17]   What occurred at the sale is 
entirely consistent with our interpretation of the pertinent language of the 
advertisement. In the final round, the auctioneer made it clear the seller would 
accept the aggregate of the bids on the parcels or the bid on the entire ranch, 
whichever was higher, with the caveat that the aggregate of the bids must 
include at least the minimum bid on each parcel. He summed it up in this 
way:

If you add up the total 
of what has been bid on the individual units, they, in effect, might slightly 
exceed [the bid on the entire ranch]. The problem with it is the Harriet Family 
has set minimum bids on the individual tracts. * * * They set the minimums and 
they're not willing to set - sell below the minimums.

[¶18]   Before starting the bidding on the 
final round, the auctioneer stated:

And start the entirety at 
3.96 [$3,960,000]. The total ranch. I'm going to put the clock on it. And in 
five minutes, if we do not have an increase on the entirety or if we do not have 
the minimum bids exceeding that by reaching all the minimums, we're going to 
sell the property.

The way it stands right 
now, it will be accepted as 3.96 on the total ranch.

Since there was 
no increase in the bidding to reach the minimums established for Parcels 3 and 
11, Harriet Bros. accepted the high bid for the entire ranch. At that point, a 
contract was formed between Harriet Bros. and the purchaser of the entire ranch. 
There is nothing in this record to demonstrate any contract between Dry Creek 
and Harriet Bros.

[¶19]   There was no error on the part of 
the trial court in refusing to hold that the combination of the parcel bids 
became the winner over the bid for the entire ranch. No contract was formed 
between Harriet Bros. and any of the bidders who bid only on the parcels. With 
respect to the contention that there is a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to the claimed ambiguity of the contractual provisions, there is no 
meeting of the minds in an auction sale until the offer of the bidder is 
accepted in an auction with reserves or until the high bid is made in an auction 
without reserves. It follows that any difference between the parties' 
interpretation of the language in the advertisement does not constitute a 
material fact. The only significance of the advertising brochure language is the 
effect it has in structuring an auction as one "with reserves" or "without 
reserves."

[¶20]   Turning to the final contention of 
Dry Creek that it should have been permitted additional discovery before the 
court ruled on the summary judgment, denying additional time for discovery is a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
642 P.2d 443, 444 n. 2 (Wyo. 1982). In light of our resolution of this case, we 
are not persuaded that any additional discovery would have been in any way 
fruitful. We have not been shown any abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court.

[¶21]   We hold that, with respect to the 
sale of the Harriet lands by parcels, the auction was one "with reserves," and 
no contract was ever formed for the sale of Parcel 5 between Harriet Bros. and 
Dry Creek. The Order Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1           
On page twelve of the sales brochure, each of the eleven ranch parcels 
were listed with a corresponding minimum bid price. These were designated as: 
Parcel 1, $300,000; Parcel 2, $375,000; Parcel 3, $375,000; Parcel 4, $255,000; 
Parcel 5, $199,000; Parcel 6, $75,000; Parcel 7, $258,000; Parcel 8, $400,000; 
Parcel 9, $272,000; Parcel 10, $845,000; and Parcel 11, $635,000. The minimum 
bid for the entire ranch was established at $3,870,000.

2           
The auctioneer's exact words were: "[I]f we do not have an increase on 
the entirety or if we do not have the minimum bids exceeding that by reaching 
all the minimums, we're going to sell the property. The way it stands right 
now, it will be accepted as 3.9 on the total ranch." (Emphasis 
added.)

3           
We considered the meaning of the word "any" in McKay v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 421 P.2d 166, 169 (Wyo. 1966), where we 
held that "[t]he common and ordinary understanding of the word is that it means 
all or every." Our definition of the word "any," described by BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 507 (6th ed. 1990) as equivalent to the word "each," manifests our 
prior accord with BLACK'S definitional approach.