Title: Coffee v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RR, INC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

507 So. 2d 476 (1987)
Richard COFFEE
v.
SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC.
84-1350.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 24, 1987.
Frank O. Burge, Jr., and Michael A. Florie of Burge & Wettermark, Birmingham, for appellant.
John B. Tally, Jr., and Paul E. Toppins of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellee.
*477 PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order granting Seaboard System Railroad's motion for a new trial. Appellant, Richard Coffee, had received a jury award for compensatory damages in the amount of $895,000.
Coffee worked as a trainman for Seaboard. Part of his job was to switch hopper cars at a private side rail owned by the Jessie Morrie Sand Company. While working at this particular location, Coffee stepped from a hopper car and tripped on an object which was hidden from view by a large accumulation of sand. He suffered severe, permanent injury to his knee. The testimony tended to show that this accumulation of sand created a generally hazardous working environment. Appellant brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. The F.E.L.A. provides that every common carrier by railroad shall be liable for damages suffered by an employee of the carrier caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence of the carrier or its agents. Under the F.E.L.A., Seaboard has a nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.
Seaboard's motion for a new trial contained several grounds in support of the motion. The trial court's order does not specify the grounds upon which it was based. Nevertheless, it is due to be affirmed if it is supported by any good ground. Johnson v. Hodge, 291 Ala. 142, 279 So. 2d 123 (1973) (overruled on other ground).
Seaboard's motion states 22 reasons why a new trial should be granted. Most of these reasons overlap and can be grouped into four separate grounds: (1) the verdict of the jury is contrary to law; (2) the verdict of the jury is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; (3) the verdict is excessive; and (4) Seaboard was denied a fair trial as a result of improper remarks made to the jury by counsel for plaintiff. The fourth ground appears to be the ground upon which the trial court relied. This is the only ground discussed by Seaboard in its brief filed in the trial court.
During cross-examination of a witness by counsel for Seaboard, Coffee's counsel made an objection which was followed by an exchange during which the improper remarks were made (Mr. Tally is counsel for Seaboard; Mr. Florie is counsel for Coffee):
A conference in the judge's chambers followed wherein counsel for Seaboard made a motion for a mistrial, based on the remarks made by plaintiff's counsel. These remarks were obviously of great concern to the trial judge, as is evidenced by the judge's statements made during the discussion in chambers:
*478 No further action was taken at that time. The next day Seaboard renewed its motion. The motion was denied. Seaboard then requested that curative instructions be given to the jury. The trial court responded as follows:
It appears, as Seaboard contends, that the trial court considered a curative instruction necessary. However, no such instruction was ever given.
This Court has on many occasions noted the impropriety of making references to agreements requiring a non-party to indemnify a party for the expenses of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Robins Engineering, Inc. v. Cockrell, 354 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1977). Counsel for plaintiff made such a reference when he stated in the presence of the jury, "They have got a claim over an agreement to get back every cent they have to give out in this lawsuit." We must depend on the discretion of the trial judge in assessing the effect of this statement. We will not reverse his finding absent a clear showing of an abuse of this discretion. Taylor v. Brownell-O'Hear Pontiac Co., 265 Ala. 468, 91 So. 2d 828 (1956). The rule recently laid down in Jawad v. Granade, 497 So. 2d 471 (Ala.1986), is inapposite. That case dealt only with the standard of appellate review when the granting or denying of a motion for new trial is based on the weight and preponderance of the evidence.
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. The order is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, BEATTY and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.