Title: DONALD SHANE HEMBREE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD SHANE HEMBREE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 127143 P.3d 905Case Number: 05-158Decided: 10/11/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DONALD 
SHANE HEMBREE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Donald 
Shane Hembree entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts of felony 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  He reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a 
search of his luggage following a traffic stop.  In this appeal, Hembree claims that his 
prolonged detention during the traffic stop and the subsequent search of his 
luggage was constitutionally infirm under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Finding that 
the detention and search were proper, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The only issue 
presented for our review is:

 
 
Did the 
trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress 
evidence?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 28, 2004, 
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Green stopped a car driven by Hembree after 
observing the car traveling 85 miles per hour in a 75 miles per hour zone on 
Interstate 80 just outside of Sinclair, Wyoming.  
As Trooper Green approached the driver's door, he noticed that the 
California 
license plates on the car had expired.  
Trooper Green asked Hembree for his driver's license, registration and 
proof of insurance.  Hembree 
produced a Louisiana driver's license that had expired in 
2002 and stated the car was a rental.  
Both Hembree and his passenger, Hembree's sister Bretta Hembree, told 
Trooper Green that Ms. Hembree's boyfriend, Ronnie McDowell, had rented the car 
in California 
from Enterprise Rent-A-Car.  
However, neither Hembree nor his sister could produce a copy of the 
rental agreement.  

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper Green 
asked Hembree to accompany him back to his patrol car.  Trooper Green then requested his 
dispatcher to contact Enterprise to determine who was authorized to 
drive the car and the geographic area in which it was authorized to be 
operated.  While waiting for a 
response on the status of the rental car, Trooper Green asked Hembree about his 
travel plans and how he acquired the rental car.  He also occasionally returned to the 
rental car where Ms. Hembree was situated and asked her some of the same 
questions.  Additionally, Trooper 
Green issued Hembree a citation for driving without a valid driver's license and 
warning citations for speeding and operating a vehicle with an expired 
registration, and returned the expired driver's license to Hembree.  Approximately 45 minutes into the stop, 
dispatch informed Trooper Green that neither occupant of the rental car was 
authorized to drive it, the car was not authorized to be in Wyoming, and Enterprise wanted the car impounded.  

 
 
[¶5]      Trooper Green 
advised the Hembrees that they were not authorized to drive the car and it was 
going to be impounded pursuant to Enterprise's request.  Trooper Green offered to drive them into 
town to the bus station or to a motel.  
Trooper Green also explained to Hembree that he was free to grab his bags 
and walk on down the road.  Hembree 
and his sister opted to accept the trooper's offer for a ride to a nearby 
motel.  Trooper Green advised them 
that before he loaded their luggage in his patrol car he needed to know if the 
bags contained any drugs or contraband. Hembree and his sister denied any 
illegal or harmful contents and both consented to Trooper Green searching their 
luggage.  A search of Hembree's bags 
revealed a small plastic bag containing one ounce of cocaine and five small 
plastic bags containing approximately four and one-eighth ounces of 
methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶6]      Hembree was 
arrested and subsequently charged with one count of possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver, one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
deliver, one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine, and one count of conspiracy 
to deliver methamphetamine.1  Hembree filed a motion to suppress the 
drug evidence.  After a hearing the 
district court denied the motion.  
The district court found Hembree's continued detention was lawful and 
Hembree voluntarily consented to Trooper Green's search of his luggage. Pursuant 
to a plea agreement with the State, Hembree entered conditional guilty pleas to 
the possession with intent to deliver charges, reserving the right to appeal the 
district court suppression ruling.  
In exchange for his pleas, the State dismissed the conspiracy 
charges.  The district court 
sentenced Hembree to concurrent prison terms of three to seven years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When reviewing a 
district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the 
court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it 
is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence 
and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Before we begin 
our review, we pause to comment on Hembree's statement of the issue.  Although it 
states briefly and concisely the action and ruling of the trial court claimed to 
be erroneous, it fails to state why it is claimed to be erroneous.  Rule 7.01(d) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that an appellate brief contain a statement of the 
issues presented for review.  
The statement of the issues presented on appeal is designed to 
assist the court.  Strang Telecasting, Inc. v. Ernst, 610 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 1980).  An understanding of the issues is the beginning point of 
orderly consideration by a reviewing court.  The broad form of the issue presented 
here does nothing to focus attention to any specific claim of error.  In every case the issue could be phrased 
"the judgment is erroneous" but that is not what the rules envision.  Cline v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 614 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Wyo. 1980) (abstract statement to the effect 
that summary judgment was improperly granted "is not a particularly helpful 
statement of an issue").  To best 
assist this Court, each issue should consist of a 
concise statement of the point of law sought to be argued and 
reviewed.

 
 
[¶9]      Further, a clear 
statement of the issues facilitates full advocacy and affords the 
opportunity for clarification by meaningful questions directed to the 
issues.  A 
concise statement of the reason why a judgment is in error serves to inform and 
provide to adverse parties a fair 
basis for response.  It 
should also prove to be of great assistance to appellants' counsel 
in separating meritorious points from those which have no realistic chance of 
success on appeal.  Counsel will 
find that it is extremely difficult to draft a proper point relied on if the 
error has not been properly preserved below, if no case authority can be found, 
if the evidence supporting the contention cannot be succinctly specified, or if 
reversal is foreclosed by the applicable standard of 
review.

 
 
[¶10]   Because of Hembree's abstract 
statement of the issue, this Court is forced to deconstruct the argument portion 
of his brief to determine and clarify the nature of the specific contentions 
asserted.  Besides adding to the 
appellate time and resources required for determination of this appeal, it also 
creates the obvious problem that we may interpret the thrust of Hembree's 
contentions differently than was intended by Hembree.  Within the context of this regrettable 
state of affairs we have done our best to give Hembree's brief a fair reading 
and discern his real points of contention.  
In doing so, we find that Hembree faults the district court's suppression 
ruling on two discrete grounds  the legality of the initial detention and the 
voluntariness of his consent to the search of his luggage.  

 
 
The 
Detention

 
 
[¶11]   Hembree claims Trooper Green 
violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution by unreasonably detaining him to investigate his authority 
to operate the rental car.  He 
contends the trooper should have simply issued the appropriate traffic tickets 
and released him instead of injecting himself into a civil contract dispute with 
the rental car company.  In this 
regard, Hembree portrays his detention as an unjustifiable attempt by Trooper 
Green to "enforce a civil contract" between private parties in another state.2 

 
 
[¶12]   The Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures."  The detention of an individual during a 
traffic stop, even if only for a brief period of time, constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); Campbell, ¶ 11, 
97 P.3d  at 784.  The reasonableness 
of a traffic stop detention under the Fourth Amendment is determined by applying 
the two-part inquiry set forth in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968):  (1) whether the initial stop was 
justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance."  
O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 
¶ 46, 117 P.3d 401, 414 (Wyo. 2005); Campbell, ¶ 11, 
97 P.3d  at 784.  See also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997).  Hembree's complaint concerns only the 
second part of the Terry analysis -- 
the reasonableness of the detention.

 
 
[¶13]   Generally, a detention resulting 
from a routine traffic stop must last "no longer than necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully 
tailored to its underlying justification."  
O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414 
(emphasis omitted) (citing Campbell, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d  at 
784; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)).  In 
Campbell, we 
noted:

 
 
During a 
routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof 
of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, 
and issue a citation or warning.  
The officer may detain the driver and his vehicle only for the period of 
time reasonably necessary to complete these routine matters.  Once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must 
be allowed to proceed without further delay.

 
 

Campbell, ¶ 12, 
97 P.3d  at 785 (citations omitted).  
See also United States v. 
Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997); Wood, 106 F.3d  at 945; O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414, Lindsay, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 19, 108 P.3d 852, 
857 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶14]   In this case, the district court 
concluded that Hembree's continued detention following the traffic stop to 
verify his authority to operate the rental vehicle was constitutional under the 
circumstances.  We agree.  Recently, we examined a similar 
constitutional challenge to the propriety of an extended traffic stop detention 
for such purposes in Lindsay v. 
State, 2005 WY 34, 108 P.3d 852 (Wyo. 2005).  In that case, we determined that the 
investigation of a potential unauthorized use of a rental vehicle was a 
reasonably sufficient reason to detain a driver after a traffic stop.  Lindsay, ¶ 25, 108 P.3d  at 859.  We later reaffirmed that holding in Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 11, 137 P.3d 903, 906 (Wyo. 2006).  Hembree 
provides no persuasive reason to deviate from what we said in Lindsay and Johnson.  Hembree produced an invalid driver's 
license and no proof that he was entitled to drive the vehicle.  Trooper Green detained Hembree only for 
a period of time sufficiently necessary to issue the traffic citations and to 
complete his investigation into Hembree's authority to possess and operate the 
rental car.  Under the 
circumstances, we decline to disturb the district court's ruling on this 
issue.

 
 
Consent 
to Search

 
 
[¶15]   Hembree contends that the search of 
his luggage was constitutionally infirm under the Fourth Amendment because his 
consent to the search was not voluntary.  
Before discussing this claim, we must first comment on the State's 
argument that Hembree lacks standing to challenge the search of his 
luggage.  As the State points out, 
an unauthorized operator of a rental car generally has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the car and, thus, lacks standing to object to a search of the 
vehicle.  United 
States v. 
Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 936 (10th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. 
Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
States 
v. Boruff, 
909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984).  However, the evidence sought to be 
suppressed in this case did not derive from a general search of the rental car 
but was discovered during Trooper Green's search of Hembree's personal 
luggage.  The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has recognized that, although an unauthorized driver has no privacy 
rights in the motor vehicle, he may possess a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in his personal luggage stored within the vehicle.  Edwards, 242 F.3d  at 936-37.  But see Wellons, 32 F.3d  at 119-20 (one who has 
no legitimate claim to the car he is driving cannot have any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bags found within the car).

 
 
[¶16]   We note that the State did not 
raise the issue of standing in the district court and, consequently, there are 
no findings by the district court as to whether Hembree had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his luggage.  
The State's argument raises the question whether it should be allowed to 
raise the standing issue on appeal after it failed to do so in the district 
court.  Generally, this Court will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.  Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 
490 (Wyo. 2004); Joyner v. State, 
2002 WY 174, ¶ 13, 58 P.3d 331, 336 (Wyo. 2002).  Several courts which have considered the 
government's failure to raise the issue of standing in the district court have 
determined that such a failure constitutes a waiver of that issue on 
appeal.  See United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1143 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 
602 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gonzales, 71 F.3d 819, 
827 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Price, 54 F.3d 342, 346 
(7th Cir. 1995);.  Other 
courts have reached the opposite conclusion and have declined to find a 
waiver.  See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 534 
(1st Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1462-63 
(9th Cir. 1989).  Because 
we are affirming the district court's denial of Hembree's motion to suppress, we 
will defer our resolution of this question to another day.

 
 
[¶17]   We now turn to Hembree's contention 
that his consent to the search of his luggage was involuntary.  Hembree's argument appears to be 
threefold.  First, Hembree argues 
that his consent was involuntary because it was preceded by an unlawful 
detention.  This argument fails 
because we have held that the extended detention to investigate the rental car 
situation was lawful.  Second, he 
contends that his consent was not validly obtained because Trooper Green 
exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop by questioning him about his 
travel plans and the presence of drugs.  
In this regard, Hembree depicts his detention as an unlawful drug 
investigation and equates Trooper Green's conduct to that which we condemned in 
O'Boyle and Campbell. We disagree with Hembree's 
assessment.

 
 
[¶18]   The facts of this case are easily 
distinguishable from O'Boyle and Campbell.  In O'Boyle, we recognized that a reasonable 
amount of questioning about travel plans during a traffic stop is permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment.  O'Boyle, ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 414.  See also United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); 4 Wayne L. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(d), 392-95 
(4th ed. 2004), and the cases cited therein.  However, in that case the trooper 
executing the traffic stop extensively questioned O'Boyle about matters beyond 
his travels plans, such as what he did for a living, how long he had been doing 
it, why he was visiting his son in Boston, his son's name, date of birth, 
address and phone number, how long his son had been in Boston, what college his 
son attended and what classes he was taking, the name of his son's college 
mascot, why he was driving rather than flying to Boston, the price of airfare 
from San Francisco to Boston, why the rental car was in his daughter's name, his 
daughter's phone number and where his daughter was at the time.  O'Boyle, ¶¶ 7, 10, 32, 117 P.3d  at 
404-05, 410-11.  We found that the 
trooper's intrusive questioning exceeded the permissible scope of the stop and 
was constitutionally unreasonable.  
In this case, on the other hand, Trooper Green's questions were limited 
in scope to Hembree's travel activities and matters concerning the rental 
car.  Such questions were entirely 
proper under the circumstances.  See Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d  at 1258 
(an officer may ask questions about the motorist's travel plans and authority to 
operate the vehicle). Despite Hembree's argument to the contrary, we see nothing 
excessive or unreasonable about the questions asked by Trooper Green. 

 
 
[¶19]   Likewise unpersuasive is Hembree's 
argument that Trooper Green exceeded the scope of the stop by asking him about 
the presence of drugs in his luggage.  
In Campbell, we held 
that an officer may not ask about drugs during the course of a traffic stop 
unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is 
engaged in illegal activity.  
Campbell, ¶¶ 
12-14, 97 P.3d  at 785.  The problem 
with Hembree's argument is that the district court found that the challenged 
questions occurred after Hembree's detention on the traffic violation had 
terminated.3 Trooper Green had returned 
Hembree's expired driver's license, explained to Hembree that the vehicle he was 
driving was being impounded, and advised Hembree that he was free to take his 
luggage and walk on down the road, thus concluding the detention.  As a courtesy, Trooper Green offered to 
drive Hembree and his sister to a nearby motel or bus station.  Any interaction occurring in this 
context was purely consensual.  See United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 
1176 (10th Cir. 2000) (a traffic stop becomes 
a consensual encounter when the officer returns the driver's license and other 
documents and the motorist is free to terminate the encounter).  This includes Trooper Green's questions 
regarding illegal drugs.  Under the 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trooper transgressed constitutional 
boundaries.

 
 
[¶20]   Lastly, Hembree argues that his 
consent was coerced.  Hembree 
appears to be claiming that he was forced into accepting Trooper Green's offer 
for a ride into town and consenting to the trooper's search of his luggage.  Whether Hembree voluntarily consented to 
the search is a question of fact which must be determined in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.  Grant v. State, 2004 WY 45, ¶ 22, 88 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004).  Some 
of the factors which may be considered in assessing whether the consent was 
voluntary include:  the way the 
officer phrased the request for permission to search; whether the officer told 
the individual he could refuse the request; and the presence of other coercive 
factors.  Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 
(Wyo. 
1983).

 
 
[¶21]   The district court specifically 
found that Hembree freely and voluntarily consented to the search, noting that 
Trooper Green's request to search was preceded by the trooper's advisement that 
Hembree was free to grab his bags and walk on down the road, and that Hembree 
knew at the time he consented that he was free to leave.  Our review of the record discloses ample 
evidence to support the district court's finding.  The testimony of Hembree and Trooper 
Green at the suppression hearing and the videotape of the traffic stop show that 
the trooper gave Hembree the option of leaving with his bags or accepting a ride 
to a nearby motel, and that Hembree knew he was free to walk away instead of 
accepting the trooper's offer. The videotape clearly indicates that the 
atmosphere surrounding the traffic stop and Trooper Green's request to search 
was not coercive or overbearing, and that the trooper never pressured Hembree in 
any way into accepting a ride or consenting to the search of his luggage. In 
light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Hembree's consent, 
Hembree's complaints are unfounded.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   We hold that the roadside detention 
to determine Hembree's authority to possess and operate the rental car was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
We also hold that Hembree's consent to the search of his luggage was 
given voluntarily.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1During an 
interview following his arrest, Hembree revealed that he was transporting the 
drugs to Missouri for Ronnie 
McDowell.

 
 

2Hembree also 
contends that Trooper Green had no authority to impound the vehicle and, as 
such, he had no legal basis to detain him pending a response from Enterprise.  The cases cited by Hembree in support of 
this argument pertain to non-consensual vehicle impoundments  that is, a police 
seizure without the consent of the vehicle's lawful owner.  Hembree identifies no authority which 
addresses law enforcement's authority to impound a vehicle at its owner's 
request, as was done in this case.  
In the absence of any legal authority supporting this contention, we 
decline to consider it further.

 
 

3While 
Hembree's brief contains a variation of the facts adduced at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, he does not directly challenge the factual findings of the 
district court.  Given our 
deferential standard of review and the lack of cogent argument supporting a 
contrary result, we accept the district court's findings on this matter.