Title: CATTEYSON v FALLS MOBILE HOME CEN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14239 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 ROSEMARY F. CATTEYSON, Claimant and Respondent, -vs- FALLS MOBILE HOME CENTER, INC., Employer, and GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Hon. William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Barry Olson, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: April 12, 1979 Decided : AU G - 9 1979 M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. F a l l s Mobile Home Center, I n c . , and G l a c i e r General Assurance Company, defendants, appeal from t h e modified conclusions of law and judgment dated February 27, 1978, e n t e r e d by t h e Workers' Compensation Court. Respondent claimant was a t t h e t i m e of t h e i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t employed by F a l l s Mobile Home Center, Inc. G l a c i e r General Assurance Company was employer's i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t i n s u r e r . The Workers' Compensation Court by i t s judgment decided t h a t claimant w a s e n t i t l e d t o temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y payments under s e c t i o n 39-71-701 MCA, from November 20, 1974, t o October 27, 1976, and temporary t o t a l payments from October 28, 1976, t o March 3, 1977, f o r t h e f a i l u r e of t h e carrier t o n o t i f y t h e Workers' Compensation Division of i t s i n t e n t i o n t o u n i l a t e r a l l y terminate b e n e f i t s . S e c t i o n 39- 71-609 MCA. The c o u r t f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t claimant s u f f e r e d 10 p e r c e n t permanent p a r t i a l i n j u r y under s e c t i o n 39-71- 116(12) MCA, e n t i t l i n g h e r t o b e n e f i t s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 39-71-703 MCA. F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t awarded claimant a t t o r n e y f e e s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 39-71-612 MCA, i n t h e amount of $1500. S h o r t l y before 4:00 p.m. on November 20, 1974, claimant was i n j u r e d i n an automobile a c c i d e n t a s she w a s heading n o r t h on 1 3 t h S t r e e t North i n Great F a l l s , Montana. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , claimant had two jobs--one a s a handy person f o r F a l l s Mobile Home and one a s a d i s p a t c h e r f o r Black and White Cab. There w a s some d i s p u t e as t o what claimant was doing a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . The c a r r i e r contended she was on h e r way t o h e r job a t Black and w h i t e Cab; claimant contended, and t h e Workers' Compensation Court found, t h a t she had been running an e r r a n d f o r F a l l s ~ o b i l e Home. On December 5, 1974, claimant filed for benefits and the compensation carrier for Falls Mobile Home began paying her benefits. Later, and while compensation benefits were being paid, the carrier notified claimant by letter that compensation would be discontinued when her doctor released her to work. Temporary total benefits were paid until June 25, 1976, when claimant was released for work. The payments were then discontinued and a "Compensation Advice Form" was sent to claimant on July 22, 1975, and forwarded to the Workers' Compensation Division. Thereafter, the parties corresponded for a period of ten months in an effort to determine whether claimant had suffered any permanent disability. Later claimant filed a petition with the Workers' Compensation Court for a hearing. Prior to the hearing, the carrier discovered that claimant may have been on her way to her second job at the time of the accident. It therefore withdrew its settlement offers and chose to defend on the ground that claimant had not suffered a compensable injury. The Workers' Compensation Court found in favor of claimant, and the carrier appeals. Initially we are asked to determine whether the evi- dence supports the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that the employee was injured in an industrial accident and, as a result, was permanently or partially disabled. We find that it does. While there was disputed evidence as to what claimant was actually doing at the time of the accident, the workers' Compensation Court found that she was running an errand for Falls Mobile Home. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support this finding: "Whether t h i s Court agrees i s of no moment. Since c r e d i b l e and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence ap- p e a r s i n t h e record i n support of t h e Workers' Compensation Court, w e a r e bound by i t s deci- s i o n on t h e f a c t s . " McGee v. Bechtel C o r ~ . (1979) Mont. , 595 P. 2d 1156, i158- 59, 36 St.Rep. 220, 224. There is a l s o s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence t o support a conclusion t h a t claimant w a s permanently p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l e d and e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s under s e c t i o n 39-71-703 MCA. Next w e a r e asked t o decide whether t h e Workers' Com- pensation Court e r r e d i n holding t h a t t h e c a r r i e r had uni- l a t e r a l l y terminated c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s and t h a t termination was improper. I n support of i t s conclusions of law, t h e c o u r t c i t e d Clark v. Hensel Phelps Construction Company (1977), Mont. , 560 P.2d 515, 34 St.Rep. 61. I n Clark, t h e i s s u e presented t o t h i s Court was t h e n e c e s s i t y of giving claimant w r i t t e n n o t i c e and acquiring approval of t h e Divi- s i o n of Workers' Compensation p r i o r t o t h e termination of b e n e f i t s . The Court found t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e t o be s e c t i o n 92-615, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA, which o r i g i n a l l y read: ". . . I f t h e i n s u r e r determines t o i n i t i a l l y deny t h e claim, o r a f t e r a claim has been ac- cepted, terminates biweekly compensation bene- f i t s , it may do s o o n l y a £ ter £ i f teen (15) days w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e claimant and t h e d i v i s i o n and a f t e r w r i t t e n approval of t h e d i v i s i o n . " This s e c t i o n has s i n c e been amended and no longer r e q u i r e s w r i t t e n approval of t h e Division. Section 39-71- 609 MCA. This amendment, however, has no e f f e c t on t h e Clark r u l e . The i s s u e i n Clark was one of f i r s t impression i n t h i s s t a t e . I n reaching our d e c i s i o n w e looked t o Xhode I s l a n d which had i n t e r p r e t e d a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o our p r e s e n t day s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA, and held: ". . . i f t h e employer does attempt t o u n i l a t e r - a l l y terminate t h e payment of b e n e f i t s such a t - tempted termination i s i n e f f e c t i v e . The employer remains l i a b l e f o r t h e payment of b e n e f i t s u n t i l t h e termination i s accomplished by following t h e s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e provision." Clark, 560 P.2d a t 517. Here, the c a r r i e r advised t h e employer and t h e Division some 27 days a f t e r termination and not 15 days before a s i s required by law. The Workers' Compensation Court was cor- r e c t i n i t s application of t h e Clark r u l e i n t h i s case. Once it has been determined t h a t s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA and Clark have been v i o l a t e d , t h e c a r r i e r "remains l i a b l e f o r the payment of b e n e f i t s u n t i l t h e termination is accom- plished by following t h e s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e provision. " Clark, 560 P.2d a t 517. The Workers' Compensation Court c o r r e c t l y found t h a t claimant was e n t i t l e d t o temporary t o t a l b e n e f i t s from t h e d a t e of t h e improper termination t o t h e d a t e of its order f o r t h e f a i l u r e of t h e c a r r i e r t o comply with s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA. The c a r r i e r contends t h a t even i f t h e n o t i c e of termi- nation was improper, t h a t claimant had waived her r i g h t t o notice. This contention i s without m e r i t . "No agreement by [claimant] t o waive any r i g h t s under t h i s chapter f o r an i n j u r y t o be received s h a l l be v a l i d . " Section 39-71-409 MCA . Furthermore, n o t i c e i s a l s o required t o be given t o t h e d i v i s i o n under section 39-71-609 MCA. There i s no evidence before t h i s Court t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e Division waived i t s r i g h t t o notice. The c a r r i e r questions whether t h e Workers1 Compensation Court can aggregate earnings from two separate and unrelated employments f o r t h e purpose of determining b e n e f i t s payable. This Court has r e c e n t l y approved t h e aggregation of wages from s e p a r a t e and u n r e l a t e d employments. Walker v. H. F. Johnson, I n c . (19781, Mont. , 591 P.2d 181, 35 F i n a l l y , t h e c a r r i e r o b j e c t s t o an award of a t t o r n e y f e e s . S e c t i o n 39-71-612 MCA provides t h a t i f : ". . . controversy r e l a t e s t o t h e amount of compensation due and t h e s e t t l e m e n t o r award is g r e a t e r than t h e amount p a i d o r tendered by t h e employer o r i n s u r e r , a reasonable a t - t o r n e y ' s f e e a s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e d i v i s i o n o r t h e workers' compensation judge i f t h e c a s e has gone t o a hearing, based s o l e l y upon t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e amount s e t t l e d f o r o r awarded and t h e amount tendered o r p a i d , may be awarded i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e amount of compensation. " F u r t h e r , " [ t l h e f i n d i n g t h a t claimant is e n t i t l e d t o s e c t i o n 92-703.1 [now s e c t i o n 39-71-703 MCA] b e n e f i t s t r i g - g e r s s e c t i o n 92-618 [now s e c t i o n 39-71-612 M C A ] e n t i t l i n g claimant t o '. . . a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e a s e s t a b - l i s h e d by t h e d i v i s i o n o r workmen's compensation judge . . . 1 11 Walker, 591 P. 2d a t 185. Claimant c l e a r l y f i t s i n t o both of t h e above s i t u a - t i o n s . There i s a l s o nothing t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e compensa- t i o n judge d e v i a t e d from t h e formula set o u t i n s e c t i o n 39- 71-613 MCA. The judgment of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s a£ firmed. t J u s t i c e / ' We concur: 7 A d b 4 wadq Chief Justice \.-:)i,.- t t \L~~L-/ Justices