Title: State v. Sandlin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Sandlin, 86 Ohio St.3d 165, 1999-Ohio-147.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SANDLIN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Sandlin (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 165.] 
Criminal law — Sealing of record of conviction — R.C. 2953.31 and 2953.32 bar 
the sealing or expungement of the record of any other conviction when a 
person has been convicted of a violation of R.C. 4511.19. 
R.C. 2953.31 and 2953.32 bar the sealing or expungement of the record of any 
other conviction when a person has been convicted of a violation of R.C. 
4511.19, regardless of whether the R.C. 4511.19 conviction and the other 
conviction resulted from the same act. 
(No. 98-1342 — Submitted May 18, 1999 — Decided July 28, 1999.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA97-10-092. 
 
On May 14, 1992, appellant, David H. Sandlin, was indicted for one count 
of aggravated vehicular assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.08, one count of operating 
a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), a violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1), and one count of operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol 
concentration greater than .10 percent, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2).  All 
charges arose from the same incident, an automobile accident on April 27, 1992, in 
Clermont County, Ohio.  Appellant drove his vehicle left of center and struck 
another individual’s vehicle, injuring the second individual.  After the accident, a 
test of appellant’s blood yielded a blood-alcohol content of .28 percent. 
 
On June 30, 1992, appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated vehicular 
assault and one count of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration greater than 
.10 percent.  On July 1, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty of the two 
charges and on August 5, 1992, appellant was sentenced to jail time and ordered to 
pay a fine.  On August 14, 1992, the court suspended appellant’s jail sentence and 
 
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placed appellant on three to five years’ probation.  On May 27, 1994, the court 
terminated appellant’s probation. 
 
On August 22, 1997, appellant filed in the trial court a motion to seal the 
record of his aggravated vehicular assault conviction.  Appellee, state of Ohio, 
opposed the motion, asserting that appellant was not a “first offender” for purposes 
of R.C. 2953.32, and thus the trial court could not seal appellant’s record.  On 
October 6, 1997, the trial court denied appellant’s motion.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that appellant did not meet the 
definition of “first offender” because his DUI conviction must be considered a 
previous or subsequent conviction.  The court of appeals, finding its judgment in 
conflict with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District in State v. 
McGinnis (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 479, 629 N.E.2d 1084, entered an order 
certifying a conflict, and we determined that a conflict existed. 
__________________ 
 
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and David Henry 
Hoffmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Kelly & Wallace Co., L.P.A., Michael P. Kelly and Timothy J. Kelly, for 
appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The issue certified in this case is “whether a 
conviction for violation of R.C. 4511.19 which ‘shall be considered a previous or 
subsequent conviction’ pursuant to R.C. 2953.31(A), precludes a defendant from 
satisfying the statutory definition of a ‘first offender’ contained in R.C. 2953.31(A) 
even if the conviction sought to be expunged resulted from or was connected with 
the R.C. 4511.19 violation.”1 
 
A court may order all official records pertaining to a criminal conviction 
sealed (or expunged) if the offender is a “first offender” and meets certain other 
 
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criteria not pertinent to this appeal.  R.C. 2953.32(C)(2).  R.C. 2953.31(A) defines 
“first offender” as: 
 
“[A]nyone who has been convicted of an offense in this state or any other 
jurisdiction, and who previously or subsequently has not been convicted of the 
same or a different offense in this state or any other jurisdiction.  When two or 
more convictions result from or are connected with the same act, or result from 
offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one conviction. 
 
“For purposes of, and except as otherwise provided in, this division, a 
conviction for a minor misdemeanor, a conviction for a violation of any section in 
Chapter 4511., 4513., or 4549. of the Revised Code, or a conviction for a violation 
of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to any section in those 
chapters, is not a previous or subsequent conviction.  A conviction for a violation 
of section 4511.19, 4511.192, 4511.251, 4549.02, 4549.021, 4549.03, 4549.042, or 
4549.07, or sections 4549.41 to 4549.46 of the Revised Code, or a conviction for a 
violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to any of those 
sections, shall be considered a previous or subsequent conviction.” 
 
Appellant has not requested the sealing of the records pertaining to his 
conviction for DUI.  As to a violation of R.C. 4511.19, the records of the 
conviction cannot be sealed.  R.C. 2953.36.  Instead, appellant requests that the 
records pertaining to the conviction of aggravated vehicular assault be expunged,2 
asserting that because both convictions resulted from the same act, they must be 
counted as one conviction and therefore he has no other convictions and is a first 
offender. 
 
However, a conviction for a violation of R.C. 4511.19, inter alia, must be 
considered to be a previous or subsequent conviction.  R.C. 2953.31(A).  
Accordingly, when a person is convicted for DUI, he or she will have “previously 
or subsequently * * * been convicted of the same or a different offense” and cannot 
 
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meet the definition of a “first offender” under R.C. 2953.31(A).  Thus, a conviction 
of DUI always bars expungement of the record of a conviction for another criminal 
offense.  We fail to see the reason for a distinction between cases in which the two 
convictions result from the same act and cases in which the two convictions result 
from separate acts, as long as one of the convictions is for DUI. 
 
This interpretation of R.C. 2953.31 is consistent with the General 
Assembly’s intent as expressed through the expungement statutes.  Prior to 1984, 
R.C. 2953.31 defined “first offender” as “anyone who had not been convicted of 
any offense, which must be construed to include traffic violations and drunk 
driving.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Yackley (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 181, 182, 539 
N.E.2d 1118, 1119.  Thus, a relatively minor conviction (such as speeding) could 
act as a bar to expungement of another conviction.  Id.  When the General 
Assembly amended the statute, it exempted minor traffic offenses from acting as 
such a bar, but it specified that a conviction under R.C. 4511.19 would continue to 
bar a conviction under another offense.  140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2382, 2383. 
 
The exemption found in R.C. 2953.31(A) and the specific bar to 
expungement of any convictions of DUI contained in R.C. 2953.36 show how 
seriously the General Assembly considers the offense of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol.  In this light, we must hold that R.C. 2953.31 and 2953.32 bar 
the sealing or expungement of the record of any other conviction when a person 
has been convicted of a violation of R.C. 4511.19, regardless of whether the R.C. 
4511.19 conviction and the other conviction resulted from the same act. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, we answer the certified issue in the 
affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
State v. McGinnis (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 479, 629 N.E.2d 1084, the case 
with which the court of appeals certified the conflict, dealt only with the issue of 
whether two offenses resulting from two acts separated by time but occurring on 
the same day were “connected with the same act.”  The Fourth District Court of 
Appeals in McGinnis, for whatever reason, did not address the issue presented by 
the case sub judice.  Thus, the two judgments are not truly in conflict.  However, 
we choose to address the merits raised by the case sub judice, since it is one that 
may recur in the future and is of great general interest. 
2. 
Aggravated vehicular assault is an expungeable offense.  R.C. 2953.36.