Title: State v. Clarence M. Moore

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 38 September Term 2003 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CLARENCE M. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 15, 2004 Remanded April 27, 2004 Reargued October 24, 2005 Decided August 10, 2006 On certification to Superior Court, Appellate Division. Paul J. Casteleiro argued the cause for appellate. Jack J. Lipari and James P. McClain, Assistant Prosecutors, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Lipari, on the briefs). Christopher D. Adams argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Walder, Hayden & Brogan, attorneys). Matthew Astore, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of The Pubic Defender (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Nancy A. Hulett, Special Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ delivered the opinion of the Court. This case returns to the Court after remand for a plenary hearing in respect of the continued viability of State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 (1981), wherein the Court established guidelines for the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony proffered by a witness in a criminal trial. Based on the record developed below, and the substantial body of case law that has considered the question since Hurd was decided, we have determined that a change in course is now warranted. We are no longer of the view that the Hurd guidelines can serve as an effective control for the harmful effects of hypnosis on the truth-seeking function that lies at the heart of our system of justice. Most important, we are not convinced that it is possible to know whether post-hypnotic testimony can ever be as reliable as testimony that is based on ordinary recall, even recognizing the myriad of problems associated with ordinary recall. We therefore conclude that the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a witness in a criminal trial is generally inadmissible and that Hurd should no longer be followed in New Jersey. simply do not obviate problems [such as] the fact that the hypnotized subject enters with expectations that the procedure will be very helpful, expectations that the memories elicited will be accurate, and . . . any problems in memory that may be present prior even to the implementation of hypnosis and the Hurd guidelines. Defendant s other expert, Dr. Lilienfeld, also challenged the sufficiency of the Hurd guidelines in reducing the risk of false or inaccurate memories. He stated that the guidelines incorrectly assume that by obtaining a full recording of the interactions between the hypnotist and the subject and [then] comparing systematically the pre- versus [the] post-hypnotic report, [it is possible to determine] whether or not any of the information provided by the hypnotist was leading or misleading. He opined that there should be a per se ban on hypnotically enhanced testimony because such testimony was likely to produce invalid memories. In that regard, he referred to research suggest[ing] that hypnosis by itself can incur an increased risk of pseudo memories or false memories and that hypnosis appears to have an incremental or additional effect above and beyond leading questions or other confounding influences on memory. Finally, Dr. Lilienfeld rejected the notion that because leading questions and other similar techniques permitted in the courtroom distort ordinary recall, hypnosis should be similarly permitted. He would not lower the bar even more simply because there are already problems with certain forms of suggestive influence. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CLARENCE M. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The majority reaches two separate conclusions: that, in many respects the guidelines [under State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 (1981) governing the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony] again were not followed[,] ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2006) (slip op. at 41); and that, notwithstanding Hurd and its progeny, [t]oday we hold that in a criminal trial, hypnotically refreshed testimony of a witness generally is inadmissible in New Jersey[,] ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2006) (slip op. at 35), a rule of exclusion that is inapplicable to a defendant s testimony under Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2714, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 52 (1987). I concur with the majority s conclusion that, in this case, the procedures followed in respect of the hypnosis of the victim violated the Hurd guidelines and, hence, the victim s post-hypnotic statements should be inadmissible. However, to the extent that the majority jettisons all hypnotically refreshed testimony save for that of a defendant, I dissent. As the majority convincingly explains, the requirement that a defendant must be allowed to present his own hypnotically refreshed testimony is rooted in a defendant s constitutional right to testify on his own behalf. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2006) (slip op. at 26 42 n.14). Although the majority hews to the view that a criminal defendant s constitutional rights trump those of all others, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2006) (slip op. at 42 n.14), I disagree. In New Jersey there are competing constitutional rights that must be recognized in this context. Our Constitution explicitly provides that [a] victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. N.J. Const. art. I, 22. Implicitly acknowledging that victims as a matter of right will be witnesses at criminal trials, the Constitution further provides that [a] victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the [Court] Rules. . . . Ibid. It further explains that [a] victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature. Ibid. The Legislature implemented the mandates of paragraph 22 of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution by its adoption of the Crime Victim s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -38. Among other things, that statute specifically provides that a crime victim is entitled to the . . .right . . . [t]o be informed about the criminal justice process; . . . [t]o have inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice process minimized to the fullest extent possible; . . . [and t]o be notified if presence in court is not needed[.] N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36b, d, and g. Sustaining these rights is the clear recognition that victims have the right to testify against the person who harmed them, and that such right is of constitutional dimension in New Jersey. See footnote 15 In my view, a defendant s constitutional right to testify on his own behalf and a victim s constitutional right to testify against the one who stands accused of harming that victim cannot be of unequal constitutional dignity. If, then, the Constitution allows the barring of hypnotically refreshed testimony but requires that an exception be made for a defendant s hypnotically refreshed testimony, there is no principled basis on which to treat a victim s hypnotically refreshed testimony any differently than that of the defendant. In other words, if we abandon the principles of Hurd and conclude that, in general, hypnotically refreshed testimony is forbidden in New Jersey because of its demonstrated unreliability, then the same logic that compels an exception for a defendant s hypnotically refreshed testimony likewise compels an exception for a victim s hypnotically refreshed testimony. Therefore, to the extent the majority only admits of an exception for a defendant s hypnotically refreshed testimony, and does not allow a similar exception in respect of a victim s hypnotically refreshed testimony, I respectfully dissent. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-38 SEPTEMBER TERM 2003 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CLARENCE M. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 10, 2006 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.