Title: Grattan v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
JONATHAN P. GRATTAN, II 
 
OPINION BY  
v. 
 
Record No. 082547 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER  
 
 
 
November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
This appeal involves two questions: whether the trial 
court's finding that the defendant was competent to stand 
trial was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it and 
whether its decision barring the defendant's introduction of 
expert testimony on the issue of his sanity at the time of the 
offenses was an abuse of discretion.  We answer both questions 
in the negative and will therefore affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding the defendant's 
convictions. 
I.  RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On the morning of April 30, 2006, Jonathan P. Grattan, 
II, using an AK-47-style, semi-automatic rifle loaded with 
steel core ammunition, fired approximately forty rounds into a 
vehicle occupied by his neighbors, Dr. William Gardner and his 
wife, Carol Gardner, as the vehicle passed by his house.  
Carol Gardner died at the scene from her wounds.  Dr. Gardner 
suffered life-threatening injuries but survived the attack. 
When the police arrived at Grattan's residence, he 
refused to come out of the house and engaged in a 20-hour 
standoff with the police, repeatedly exchanging gunfire.  He 
ultimately surrendered when the police deployed an armed robot 
into the house.  During part of the standoff, Grattan's 
grandmother was in the residence, and the police repeatedly 
fired canisters of tear gas into the house in an attempt to 
get Grattan and his grandmother to come outside.  When the 
police were finally able to enter the house and remove 
Grattan's grandmother, she told them of her suspicion that 
Grattan had been using illegal drugs. 
Several times during the standoff, Grattan spoke on a 
telephone with a police negotiator.  In those conversations, 
Grattan accused the Gardners of taking "gamma pictures" of him 
and trying to murder him.  He told the police negotiator that 
the situation could by resolved by "blow[ing] up" the 
Gardners' home and "tak[ing] the . . . refrigerator out of the 
ground."  After his surrender and arrest, Grattan stated that 
he attacked the Gardners "for justice" because they harassed 
him and shot him with "gamma rays."  He also admitted the 
Gardners were unarmed when he shot them and there had been no 
confrontation with them that morning before he started 
shooting into their vehicle. 
2 
Approximately five months prior to the shooting, Grattan 
called "911," stating that he had been shot "500 times with 
[a] f---ing gamma" and that "they" had a microwave pointed at 
him.  Grattan told the 911 operator that his neighbors had 
been firing at him for four days and that he was dying from 
radiation poisoning.  As a result of that incident, Grattan 
was hospitalized for mental health treatment with a diagnosis 
of "[a]cute paranoid psychosis probably secondary to 
methamphetamine abuse rule out underlying psychosis" as well 
as methamphetamine abuse.  After four days of treatment, 
Grattan was discharged and referred to further psychiatric 
treatment as an outpatient. 
Due to the attack on the Gardners, a grand jury returned 
16 indictments against Grattan, charging him with the first 
degree murder of Carol Gardner, in violation of Code § 18.2-
32; aggravated malicious wounding of Dr. Gardner, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-51.2; six counts of attempted capital murder of 
a law enforcement officer, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-25 and 
–31(6); and eight counts of using a firearm in the commission 
of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Prior to his 
trial, Grattan filed a notice pursuant to Code § 19.2-168, 
stating his intention to put in issue his sanity at the time 
of the charged offenses and to present expert testimony in 
support of that defense.  At a hearing on January 18, 2007, 
3 
Grattan's counsel also expressed concern about Grattan's 
competency to stand trial.  At the request of the Commonwealth 
and in accordance with Code §§ 19.2-168.1(A) and –169.1(A), 
the circuit court appointed two mental health experts to 
evaluate both Grattan's sanity at the time of the offenses and 
his competency to stand trial.  At the same hearing, the court 
advised Grattan to cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental 
health experts and that under Code § 19.2-168.1(B), his 
failure to do so could lead to the exclusion of his own expert 
evidence supporting his claim of insanity.  When asked by the 
court, Grattan indicated that he understood the court's 
instructions. 
At a hearing on January 30, the Commonwealth asked the 
circuit court to instruct Grattan once more that he must 
cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental health expert who was 
appointed to evaluate Grattan's competency to stand trial.  
The Commonwealth stated that Grattan had twice refused to meet 
with its expert, Dr. Leigh D. Hagan.  Consequently, the court 
admonished Grattan: 
I will caution you again that you are required by 
law to cooperate with the mental health evaluator 
appointed by the [c]ourt to evaluate your competency 
to stand trial. . . . [I]f the [c]ourt believes as 
it now stands that you are malingering and putting 
on a charade . . . the [c]ourt on the evidence now 
before it would be strongly inclined to find you 
competent to stand trial.  You give every appearance 
of being competent.  You have appeared competent on 
4 
all your prior appearances here.  And therefore this 
could have dire and severe consequences because when 
we commence the trial the [c]ourt will preclude any 
mental health expert opinion on your sanity at the 
time of the offense. 
 
At a subsequent hearing to determine Grattan's competency 
to stand trial, Grattan introduced testimony and a written 
report from Dr. Thomas V. Ryan, a licensed clinical 
psychologist, and a written competency evaluation by Dr. Bruce 
J. Cohen, a psychiatrist.1  Although Dr. Ryan met with Grattan 
once for five hours, Grattan refused to see him on three other 
occasions.  Dr. Cohen interviewed Grattan three times and 
reviewed, among other information, Dr. Ryan's psychological 
assessment. 
Dr. Ryan, after being qualified as an expert in 
neuropsychology, opined that Grattan was "clearly not 
competent" to stand trial.  Dr. Ryan tested Grattan's 
competency in three categories: understanding of the legal 
system, reasoning and the ability to assist counsel, and 
appreciation of the specific legal situation and circumstances 
at hand.  According to Dr. Ryan, Grattan scored "within the 
clinically significant impairment range" in all three 
categories. 
                     
1 Dr. Jeff Raynor also participated in this evaluation but 
only Dr. Cohen signed the written report.  Therefore, we will 
refer to this evaluation as being that of Dr. Cohen. 
5 
Dr. Ryan also opined that Grattan suffered from 
schizophrenia but acknowledged that a mentally ill individual 
can nevertheless be competent to stand trial.  He further 
testified that just because an individual can function in a 
structured environment such as a prison does not mean the 
person is not psychotic or mentally ill.  In his written 
report, Dr. Ryan stated that Grattan was likely "responding to 
internal stimulation and psychotic thought processes as 
evidenced by his inappropriate laughter, rapid changes in his 
demeanor, very poor eye contact, and severe restlessness."  He 
also reported that Grattan "demonstrated throughout [the] 
entire assessment tangential thinking and delusional ideation 
regarding the criminal offense."  Finally, Dr. Ryan opined 
that Grattan was not malingering, or attempting to exaggerate 
or fabricate his psychotic symptoms. 
Dr. Cohen reported, among other things, that Grattan was 
not able to engage in any meaningful discussion about the 
offenses or his case, did not understand the reason for his 
trial, had continued delusional beliefs about the victims 
shooting rays into his house, provided inconsistent and often 
delusional recollections about the offenses, did not 
understand the concept of plea bargains, and did not 
comprehend the advantages and disadvantages of pleading 
insanity.  He concluded that Grattan suffered from 
6 
schizophrenia and had "significant deficits . . . that 
specifically appeared to impair his ability to understand the 
proceedings against him, to appreciate his current life 
situation and to make decisions that would assist his 
attorneys in adequately defending him."  Based on Grattan's 
knowledge of his case and the offenses, Dr. Cohen stated that 
it was "highly unlikely that [Grattan] would be able to 
adequately assist his attorneys or participate in his 
defense."2  
Dr. Lou Gene Bartram, who qualified as an expert in 
psychiatry, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth.  Dr. 
Bartram examined Grattan in the local jail eleven days after 
his arrest.  Grattan told Dr. Bartram that he did not need a 
psychiatrist and that "it was either him or them and he was 
not sorry that he had killed them."  Dr. Bartram stated that 
she saw no psychotic symptoms nor any methamphetamine induced 
psychosis or schizophrenia, but that post acute withdrawal was 
consistent with her observations of Grattan.  Dr. Bartram 
diagnosed Grattan as having a personality disorder with 
narcissistic traits, and methamphetamine and cannabis 
dependence. 
                     
2 At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence at the 
competency hearing, Grattan's counsel proffered to the circuit 
court that their client was frequently non-responsive and 
would not return their telephone calls. 
7 
After being qualified as an expert in forensic and 
clinical psychology, Dr. Hagan testified on behalf of the 
Commonwealth about the court-ordered competency evaluation of 
Grattan he conducted on January 30 after the circuit court 
ordered Grattan to meet with him.  Dr. Hagan conducted his 
evaluation in the courtroom because, in part, 
it would be far more illuminating to the issue of 
competence to know how [Grattan] would respond in 
this particular setting where a trial would take 
place. . . . [Y]ou're much more likely to get true 
accurate data if you assess that person under the 
conditions that they are supposed to actually 
demonstrate that capacity. 
 
Based on his interview with Grattan and his review of 
other information, including the reports from Drs. Ryan and 
Cohen, Dr. Hagan rendered the following specific opinions: 
Grattan possessed the capacity to comprehend and appreciate 
the charges against him and the significant liberty interest 
at stake (Grattan recited the numerical sentencing ranges for 
the various charges); he possessed the capacity to communicate 
and provide relevant information to his attorneys and to 
participate in trial preparation, but it would be Grattan's 
election whether to do so; he understood the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings; he possessed sufficient knowledge 
of the legal strategies and options available to him; he knew 
how to behave appropriately in court; and he understood the 
roles of the primary participants in the proceedings.  Dr. 
8 
Hagan also opined that Grattan was able to modify his behavior 
because he followed the instructions of a deputy to stop 
rocking his chair during the evaluation.  In sum, Dr. Hagan 
concluded that Grattan was competent to stand trial, stating 
that he "currently possesses an understanding of the charges 
against him, of the risk attendant to those, of the options 
available, and that he is able, he has the capacity to assist 
not only in trial preparation but to have a presence in 
court."3 
Dr. Hagan acknowledged that, for purposes of the 
competency evaluation, he did not form an opinion about 
whether Grattan was suffering from a mental illness, or was 
psychotic, delusional, or hallucinating.  He stated, however, 
that he observed for such and did not "see it [or] hear it."  
He explained that a "diagnosis of schizophrenic is in and of 
itself not determinative of the issue [of competency to stand 
trial].  Some people who have a diagnosis of schizophrenic can 
be competent whereas others may not."  According to Dr. Hagan, 
competency to stand trial does not "hinge on a diagnosis" but 
is "a functional capacity."  He also stated that, after 
                     
3 Dr. Hagan's evaluation of Grattan was audio and video 
recorded, and approximately twenty-four minutes of the 
seventy-four minute videotape was played during Dr. Hagan's 
testimony.  Both the audio and video recordings of the 
evaluation were admitted as exhibits for the Commonwealth. 
9 
preparing his report, he returned to the jail to see Grattan 
again, but Grattan for the third time refused to cooperate. 
The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Frederick 
T. Wolfrey, an inmate with Grattan at the local jail.  Wolfrey 
stated that Grattan told him and another inmate that he was 
doing such things as not bathing for weeks and talking about 
frogs coming out of the toilet because it was his only chance 
at getting less than twenty years.  Wolfrey also testified 
that Grattan would act strangely one minute and the next 
minute would not.  When asked if he regretted what he did, 
Grattan told Wolfrey he would do it again. 
Several deputies who interacted with Grattan while he was 
incarcerated in the local jail likewise testified on behalf of 
the Commonwealth.  Their testimony established that when a 
deputy smelled smoke coming from Grattan's cell, Grattan 
disposed of cigarette butts in the toilet before the deputy 
could retrieve them.  The deputies also testified about 
Grattan's checking out legal books from the library, watching 
television and playing cards with other inmates, and following 
the guards' orders.  Several deputies explained that Grattan 
ordered canteen items, followed up regarding their delivery, 
and complained when he did not receive all the ordered items.  
They further related that when Grattan was moved to a 
different cell, he reminded them to move his canteen items and 
10 
library books to his new cell.  One deputy also testified that 
Grattan, upon being disciplined for involvement in a fight, 
appealed his penalty and requested that a witness testify as 
to Grattan's claim of self-defense. 
After hearing argument, the circuit court made the 
following ruling: 
Based upon the evidence that has been introduced at 
this hearing and the [c]ourt's observation of the 
defendant in the courtroom, and today we've been 
here for six, seven hours I guess, somewhere in that 
range, the [c]ourt finds that the defendant has not 
carried his burden of proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence to show that he is not fit to go to 
trial. The [c]ourt believes he is competent and has 
the capacity to understand the charges against him, 
to understand the possible penalties that he faces 
and the capacity to cooperate and work with his 
lawyers and his defense team if he cares to do so. 
Therefore, the [c]ourt will find based on the record 
and the evidence introduced today that Mr. Grattan 
is competent to stand trial. 
 
At the conclusion of the competency hearing, the 
Commonwealth informed the circuit court that Grattan continued 
to refuse to meet with Dr. Hagan to be evaluated as to his 
sanity at the time of the offenses.  In Grattan's presence, 
the court directed the Commonwealth to have both Dr. Hagan and 
Dr. Bruce Harry, the Commonwealth's other mental health 
evaluator, attempt again to meet with Grattan.  The court 
further stated it would consider at trial "whether . . . under 
the statute [Grattan's non-cooperative actions were] 
tantamount to a functional refusal . . . and then the [c]ourt 
11 
will have to determine which sanctions, if any, it will 
impose." 
On the first day of trial, the Commonwealth moved, 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-168.1, to bar Grattan from introducing 
expert testimony on the issue of his sanity at the time of the 
offenses.  The Commonwealth pointed out that Grattan only met 
with Dr. Hagan once and only for the purpose of evaluating 
Grattan's competency to stand trial.  According to the 
Commonwealth, Grattan refused on several occasions to meet 
with Dr. Hagan and also failed to cooperate with Dr. Harry for 
the purpose of their evaluating Grattan's sanity at the time 
of the offenses.  As the Commonwealth noted, Grattan did so 
despite repeated warnings from the circuit court about the 
consequences of his refusal to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth's mental health evaluators. 
The Commonwealth argued that Grattan's refusal, in light 
of his meeting with his own mental health experts, prejudiced 
its case and that the only appropriate remedy was the 
exclusion of all expert testimony on the subject of Grattan's 
sanity at the time of the offenses.  Grattan's knowing and 
voluntary choices while in jail and his competency to stand 
trial, the Commonwealth asserted, proved that whatever mental 
illness he might have did not prevent him from making his own 
decisions.  Grattan, however, argued that his mental illness 
12 
was the cause of his refusal to cooperate and that the circuit 
court should craft an alternative, less drastic, remedy.  
Grattan also noted that he had refused to meet with his own 
experts on several occasions and argued that the 
Commonwealth's experts could evaluate Grattan's sanity at the 
time of the offenses without a personal interview.4 
The circuit court granted the Commonwealth's motion, 
stating that "[u]nder all of the circumstances of this case 
. . . the only fair and reasonable alternative is to exclude 
the expert testimony of the defendant on the issue of his 
insanity at the time of the offense[s]."  Following this 
ruling, Grattan waived his right to a jury trial, and the 
circuit court heard the evidence of both parties in the form 
of proffers.  Grattan stipulated that the evidence "would be 
received as credible evidence by the trier of fact."  The 
circuit court found Grattan guilty on all sixteen charges. 
Prior to sentencing, Grattan filed a motion requesting 
the circuit court to order evaluations pursuant to Code 
§§ 19.2-176 (determination of insanity after conviction but 
before sentencing) and –169.1 (competency). Grattan argued 
                     
4 During the hearing on the Commonwealth's motion, Dr. 
Harry testified on cross-examination that, although not ideal, 
it would be feasible and proper for him to conduct an 
evaluation of Grattan without a personal interview by using 
the available medical records and the reports of Drs. Ryan and 
Cohen. 
13 
that there was "reasonable ground" to question Grattan's 
mental state and the court should thus order a sanity 
evaluation prior to sentencing.  Code § 19.2-176.  Grattan 
also argued that the court, pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1, 
should order a competency evaluation prior to sentencing. 
At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court heard 
evidence on Grattan's motion.  Inmate Dennis D. Crider 
testified to Grattan's bizarre behavior in jail.  He stated 
that Grattan would stand in the shower fully dressed and talk 
to himself, run around as if someone were chasing him, beat 
his mattress and call it names, talk to imaginary people, lick 
the wall and stare at it while on his hands and knees, and 
talk about how the telephone and the floor were dangerous. 
Dr. Ryan also testified, repeating his findings on 
Grattan's competency to stand trial and stating that Grattan 
again refused to see him after the competency hearing.  Dr. 
Ryan was, however, able to speak with several jail deputies.  
They related that Grattan had poor hygiene, exhibited bizarre 
behavior, and refused to meet with his family.  Dr. Ryan 
stated that this information, in addition to Crider's 
testimony, further supported his opinion that Grattan was 
mentally ill, incompetent to stand trial, and in need of 
medication. 
14 
Dr. Cohen then testified and reiterated the opinions set 
forth in his original report.  Dr. Cohen also stated that the 
accounts of the jail deputies and Crider affirmed his previous 
conclusions regarding Grattan's mental illness.  Dr. Cohen 
criticized Dr. Hagan's competency evaluation, calling it "a 
partial evaluation" because it did not include a "detailed 
mental status examination" and "a review of [Grattan's] past 
psychiatric symptoms and history."  Like Dr. Ryan, Dr. Cohen 
indicated that Grattan's ability to function in jail did not 
affect his diagnosis of Grattan.  He explained that a mentally 
ill individual can be out of contact with reality in some 
areas of life but not in others.  Finally, Dr. Cohen stated 
that Grattan's schizophrenia could be treated with medication 
in a mental health facility. 
The Commonwealth then presented evidence in opposition to 
Grattan's motion.  Several jail deputies testified, 
establishing that Grattan was once directed to shower because 
of his poor hygiene, he often slept and laid in bed, like many 
other inmates, and he had a small "leadership" position in the 
jail.  Chadrick Cave, who had been incarcerated with Grattan 
for two months, testified that Grattan exhibited bizarre 
behavior and, when asked why he acted that way, told Cave that 
he knew what he was doing and that he "need[ed] to get the 
insanity plea to get less time."  Grattan also told Cave that 
15 
he shot the Gardners because "the dentist shot his dog," it 
was fun, and he would do it again. 
Grattan's counsel argued that the additional testimony of 
Drs. Ryan and Cohen, Grattan's persistent bizarre behavior, 
and his refusal to meet or speak with counsel established that 
Grattan was unable to assist his attorneys and was thus 
incompetent to be sentenced.  For these reasons, Grattan 
requested additional competency and sanity evaluations.  The 
Commonwealth asked the circuit court to proceed to sentencing 
because Grattan had not met his burden of proof regarding the 
need for the requested evaluations.  The Commonwealth 
maintained that nothing regarding Grattan's mental state or 
competency had changed since the court's previous rulings and 
that the testimony proved Grattan was competent, sane, and 
capable of making his own decisions. 
The circuit court overruled Grattan's motion, finding him 
competent to be sentenced.  After hearing evidence at 
sentencing from both parties, the circuit court sentenced 
Grattan to life in prison plus seventy-four years. 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia affirmed the circuit court's judgment and upheld 
Grattan's convictions.  Grattan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
1614-07-3, slip op. at 1 (Nov. 25, 2008).  The Court of 
Appeals held that the record contained credible expert and lay 
16 
testimony sufficient to support the circuit court's 
determination that Grattan was competent to stand trial.  Id., 
slip op. at 7.  The Court of Appeals also held that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion by barring the 
introduction of expert witness testimony regarding Grattan's 
sanity at the time of the offenses.  Id., slip op. at 9. 
Now on appeal to this Court, Grattan raises two issues.  
He asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
circuit court was not plainly wrong in finding Grattan 
competent to stand trial.  He further claims that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion by barring Grattan's introduction of expert 
testimony on the question of his sanity at the time of the 
offenses.  We will address the issues seriatim. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Competency 
 
Grattan argues that the circuit court was plainly wrong 
in finding him competent to stand trial.  He contends that the 
competency evaluations of Drs. Ryan and Cohen, along with the 
facts of the crime, his bizarre behavior, his inability to 
communicate with his attorneys, and his refusal to meet with 
mental health experts prove his incompetency.  In addition, 
Grattan asserts that Dr. Hagan's evaluation was inadequate 
17 
because he performed no testing and declined to give an 
opinion as to whether Grattan suffers from a mental illness. 
In contrast, the Commonwealth contends that the circuit 
court heard the testimony of both expert and lay witnesses and 
observed Grattan first-hand on several occasions.  The 
Commonwealth further argues that the circuit court, as the 
fact finder, was entitled to accord more weight to testimony 
of Dr. Hagan than to the testimony of Grattan's expert 
witnesses.  Thus, according to the Commonwealth, the circuit 
court's finding that Grattan failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand 
trial was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  
We agree with the Commonwealth. 
As the party asserting incompetency to stand trial, 
Grattan had the burden of proving such by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Code § 19.2-169.1(E).  A defendant is 
considered competent to stand trial if he has the capacity to 
understand the criminal proceedings against him and is able to 
assist counsel in his defense.  Id.; see also Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (stating that the standard for 
competency is whether the defendant has " 'sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him' ") (quoting 
18 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per 
curiam)).  Therefore, to prove incompetency, a defendant must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he either lacks 
the capacity to understand the criminal proceedings against 
him or lacks the ability to assist counsel in his defense. 
A trial court’s determination of a defendant's competency 
to stand trial is a question of fact and will not be reversed 
on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.  Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 486, 500, 628 
S.E.2d 344, 351 (2006); see also Code § 8.01-680.  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 
the prevailing party on this issue in the circuit court.  
Orndorff, 271 Va. at 500, 628 S.E.2d at 352. 
At the hearing to determine Grattan's competency to stand 
trial, the circuit court heard conflicting expert testimony.  
As we have previously stated, " '[c]onflicting expert opinions 
constitute a question of fact' " and it is "within the 
province of the finder of fact . . . 'to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and the probative value to be 
given their testimony.' "  Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 
329-30, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004) (quoting Mercer v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 242, 523 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2000)).  
Like the competency determination itself, this question of 
fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly 
19 
wrong or without evidence to support it.  Mercer, 259 Va. at 
243, 523 S.E.2d at 217. 
Based on the evidence in this case in light of these 
established principles, we conclude that the circuit court's 
determination that Grattan was competent to stand trial was 
not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Dr. 
Hagan, who qualified as an expert in forensic and clinical 
psychology, concluded that Grattan "possess[ed] an 
understanding of the charges against him" and "the capacity to 
assist not only in trial preparation but to have a presence in 
court."  In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Hagan relied on jail 
records, the evaluations of both Dr. Ryan and Dr. Cohen, his 
personal observations of Grattan in court and in jail, and his 
seventy-four minute interview with Grattan. 
As Grattan points out, his expert witnesses reached 
contrary conclusions.  It is also true that Dr. Hagan 
expressed no opinion as to whether Grattan suffers from a 
mental illness.  Dr. Hagan stated that whether Grattan was 
mentally ill was "not determinative of the issue."  Moreover, 
Dr. Ryan acknowledged that an individual could be mentally ill 
but yet competent to stand trial. 
Additionally, both testifying experts, Dr. Hagan and Dr. 
Ryan, criticized the evaluation methods of the other.  For 
example, Dr. Hagan criticized the test used by Dr. Ryan to 
20 
measure Grattan's understanding, reasoning, and appreciation 
because the test utilizes "fictitious scenarios unrelated to 
his case."  Dr. Ryan, however, considered the test appropriate 
because it "separate[s] the individual from his or her crime 
and make[s the evaluation] less anxiety provoking."  Dr. Ryan 
criticized Dr. Hagan for conducting his interview of Grattan 
in a courtroom in the presence of deputies.  Dr. Hagan 
maintained there were no professional guidelines against 
having others in the evaluation room and that the deputies did 
not affect the evaluation in any way.  In fact, Dr. Hagan 
thought Grattan had the ability to learn and modify his 
behavior because he followed the directions of a deputy who 
told him not to rock his chair.  Presented with conflicting 
opinions, the circuit court elected to accord more weight to 
Dr. Hagan's testimony.  That credibility determination was not 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  See Mercer, 
259 Va. at 243, 523 S.E.2d at 217. 
In addition, the circuit court heard lay testimony 
concerning Grattan's behavior at various times.  Several 
deputies testified about Grattan's conduct while in jail, 
including his appeal from a disciplinary action.  Grattan 
maintained he had acted in self-defense and requested a 
witness to testify in support of his claim.  His actions 
demonstrated, in that instance, he understood the disciplinary 
21 
charge and how to defend against it.  The testimony of 
Grattan's fellow inmate, that Grattan stated he was behaving 
strangely because it was his only way to get less than twenty 
years, supported the conclusion that at a minimum, Grattan 
understood the severity of the charges against him and the 
role that an insanity defense could play in the sentence he 
could receive. 
Furthermore, in making its competency determination, the 
circuit court relied on its own observations of Grattan during 
both the competency hearing and prior court appearances.  The 
court noted during the January 30 hearing that Grattan 
appeared competent then and during his prior appearances.  
When the court made its competency determination, it 
referenced the six-to-seven hour period it had observed 
Grattan in open court.  Finally, the court viewed a portion of 
the video recording of Grattan's interview with Dr. Hagan, 
from which the court could draw its own conclusions.  In sum, 
as the Court of Appeals concluded, the record contains 
sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's 
determination that Grattan was competent to stand trial.5  See 
Grattan, slip op. at 7. 
                     
5 We reach the same conclusion with regard to the circuit 
court's finding that Grattan was competent to be sentenced. 
22 
Nevertheless, Grattan maintains that his refusal to 
cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental health experts proved 
he was incompetent.  However, nothing in the statutory 
competency standard requires a defendant to actually assist 
himself or counsel in his defense – it merely requires that a 
defendant have the ability to do so.  See Code § 19.2-
169.1(E); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396.  Thus, we find no reason 
to disturb the circuit court's determination that Grattan was 
competent to stand trial and to be sentenced. 
B.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony 
 
Under Code § 19.2-168, when a defendant decides to put 
his sanity at the time of the charged offense in issue and 
present expert testimony in support thereof, he must notify 
the Commonwealth.  If the Commonwealth then seeks an 
evaluation of the defendant's sanity at the time of the 
offense, a trial court must appoint "one or more qualified 
mental health experts to perform such an evaluation."  Code 
§ 19.2-168.1(A).  In addition, the court "shall order the 
defendant to submit to such an evaluation and advise the 
defendant on the record in court that a refusal to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth's expert could result in exclusion of 
the defendant's expert evidence."  Id. Subsequent to that 
admonition to the defendant, 
23 
[i]f the court finds, after hearing evidence 
presented by the parties, that the defendant has 
refused to cooperate with an evaluation requested by 
the Commonwealth, it may admit evidence of such 
refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar the 
defendant from presenting expert psychiatric or 
psychological evidence at trial on the issue of his 
sanity at the time of the offense.  
 
Code § 19.2-168.1(B). 
Grattan argues the circuit court abused the discretion 
afforded to it under this statute by invoking the harshest 
penalty for his refusal to cooperate with the evaluation 
requested by the Commonwealth, i.e., excluding his expert 
testimony on the issue of his sanity at the time of the 
offenses.  Grattan claims that his failure to meet with the 
Commonwealth's mental health experts was a product of his 
mental illness.  He launches a four-prong attack on the 
circuit court's exercise of its discretion.  Grattan first 
asserts that the court failed to consider what Grattan 
describes as his "undisputed mental illness" in deciding what 
remedy to invoke.  He next argues that if the court had 
allowed his mental health experts to testify, the Commonwealth 
would nevertheless have been able to defend against his claim 
of insanity because Dr. Harry acknowledged that it was 
ethically permissible to evaluate a defendant's sanity without 
the benefit of a personal interview.  Third, Grattan contends 
the court should have considered a less drastic remedy, such 
24 
as telling a jury about his refusal to cooperate, as provided 
in Code § 19.2-168.1(B), or admonishing a jury to view 
Grattan's evidence of insanity with skepticism.  Finally, 
Grattan argues that, before barring his expert testimony, the 
court should have found that Grattan's refusal to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth's mental health evaluators was motivated 
by strategic reasons or a desire to obstruct justice. 
In evaluating whether a trial court abused its 
discretion, as Grattan contends the circuit court did in this 
case, "we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 
court.  Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly 
supports the trial court's action."  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 
Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (1997); see also Noll v. 
Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 801-02, 250 S.E.2d 741, 745 (1979) (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying an expert 
witness even though "reasonable trial judges could properly 
disagree" and "some members of this [C]ourt, had they presided 
at the trial, may have admitted" the testimony); Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005) 
("Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an 
abuse of discretion has occurred.").  " 'The abuse–of-
discretion standard [also] includes review to determine that 
the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal 
conclusions.' "  Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260, 661 
25 
S.E.2d 415, 445 (2008) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 100 (1996)).  Considering the record before us in 
light of these principles, we cannot say the circuit court 
abused its discretion by barring Grattan's introduction of 
expert testimony in support of his claim of insanity at the 
time of the offenses. 
First, the circuit court's finding that Grattan was 
competent to stand trial refutes his argument that the court 
abused its discretion.  As we have already stated, competency 
to stand trial means that a defendant has the capacity to 
understand the criminal proceedings against him and the 
ability to assist counsel in his defense.  See Code § 19.2-
169.1(E); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (the standard of competency 
is whether a defendant has " 'sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him' ") (quoting 
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).  Having found Grattan competent to 
stand trial, a finding that we have decided was supported by 
the evidence, it was reasonable for the circuit court to 
conclude that Grattan understood the court's repeated 
instructions that he was required to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth's mental health evaluators and its constant 
warnings about the potential ramifications of his refusal to 
26 
do so.6  This is especially so when Grattan himself affirmed 
his understanding of the court's instructions. 
Grattan maintains that his refusal, however, was a 
product of mental illness.  The record does not support that 
contention. Although Grattan refused to meet with Dr. Ryan 
several times, he nevertheless met with his own mental health 
evaluators on four separate occasions.  He also met with Dr. 
Hagan on January 30, although the evaluation was limited to 
the question of competency to stand trial.  Grattan cooperated 
with Dr. Hagan on this one occasion after the circuit court 
told him in open court to do so and warned him again as to the 
consequences if he refused.  In addition, while Dr. Ryan and 
Dr. Cohen opined that Grattan suffers from schizophrenia, they 
did not explain how that mental illness would account for 
Grattan's refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental 
health evaluators. 
In addition to the competency determination, the record 
contains other evidence that demonstrates the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion when it barred Grattan from 
introducing expert testimony.  For example, Grattan pursued an 
                     
6 We note that in McCall v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1218 (Ind. 
1980), a case relied upon by Grattan, the trial court never 
put the defendant on notice that his failure to cooperate 
could result in the exclusion of expert testimony in support 
of his insanity defense.  Id. at 1221. 
27 
appeal and called for a witness to testify on his behalf when 
he was charged with a jail infraction.  A fellow inmate 
testified that Grattan stated he was behaving strangely 
because it was his only chance of receiving less than twenty 
years of incarceration.  Also, Dr. Hagan noted that, during 
his competency interview, Grattan modified his behavior when a 
deputy told him to stop rocking his chair.  Finally, the 
circuit court had the benefit of its own observations of 
Grattan on several occasions and could glean from Grattan's 
responses, demeanor, and behavior in open court that he, in 
fact, understood the court's directions to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth's mental health evaluators and the court's 
warning that it could bar his own mental health experts from 
testifying if he failed to do so. 
We are not persuaded that the circuit court abused its 
discretion merely because Dr. Harry indicated that it would be 
ethically permissible to evaluate Grattan's sanity at the time 
of the offenses without the benefit of a personal interview.  
Since Grattan was armed with two sanity evaluations, each 
based, in part, on lengthy personal interviews with him, the 
Commonwealth was entitled to have its mental health experts 
perform their own evaluations based on their first-hand 
observations of Grattan.  We agree with the Commonwealth's 
assertion that it should not be "saddled with or limited by 
28 
what [Grattan's] experts did or did not do in their 
evaluations, or their methodology."  Indeed, the provisions of 
Code § 19.2-168.1 evince the General Assembly's clear intent 
to provide the Commonwealth with its own evaluation and to 
allow a trial court to exclude a non-cooperating defendant's 
expert testimony on the subject, regardless of whether the 
Commonwealth's experts can formulate an opinion about the 
defendant's sanity without the defendant's cooperation.  As we 
recognized in Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 619 
S.E.2d 16 (2005), the Commonwealth, like the defendant, is 
entitled to a fair trial, which includes "the right to a fair 
rebuttal of mental health evidence presented by the 
defendant."  Id. at 507, 619 S.E.2d at 85. 
Nor was the circuit court required to consider 
alternative, less drastic remedies not contemplated by the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-168.1(B).  That subsection provides 
two possible sanctions when a defendant refuses to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth's mental health evaluators: admit 
evidence of the refusal or, in the trial court's discretion, 
bar the defendant from presenting expert testimony on the 
subject of sanity at the time of the offense.  Code § 19.2-
168.1(B).  Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion by choosing one of the remedies provided by the 
statute instead of the non-statutory alternatives suggested by 
29 
Grattan.  Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988) 
("It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate 
and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that 
they would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and 
that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather 
than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the 
adversary process."). 
Finally, the circuit court was not required to find that 
Grattan's failure to cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental 
health experts was motivated by strategic reasons or a desire 
to obstruct justice.  Such findings are not required by the 
provisions of § 19.2-168.1(B).  It is a defendant's refusal to 
cooperate, not his motivations, that is determinative.  
Furthermore, as the Commonwealth points out, the circuit 
court, having found Grattan competent to stand trial, 
implicitly found that Grattan understood the court's 
instructions to cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental 
health evaluators and its warnings about the consequences of 
failing to do so, thus making his refusal to cooperate 
intentional.  The fact that he cooperated with his own mental 
health evaluators also demonstrates that his refusal to 
cooperate with the Commonwealth's experts was knowing and 
intentional. 
30 
Grattan argues, however, that those defendants who are 
the "sickest" are the ones most likely to refuse to cooperate 
with a mental health evaluation.  While we do not necessarily 
disagree, we find Grattan's selective refusal to cooperate 
telling.  We also note that Grattan's expert, Dr. Ryan, 
acknowledged that Grattan understood the parameters of Dr. 
Ryan's evaluation and consented to proceed with the 
evaluation. 
We recognize that due process of law affords a defendant 
the right to present witnesses to establish a defense.  See 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).  "[A] trial court 
may not ignore the fundamental character of the defendant's 
right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor.  But 
the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and 
invariably outweigh countervailing public interests."  Taylor, 
484 U.S. at 414.  "[T]he accused, as is required of the 
[prosecution], must comply with established rules of procedure 
and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability 
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."  Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).  "The adversary process 
could not function effectively without adherence to rules of 
procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and 
arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to 
31 
assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponent's case."  Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-11. 
While there is no constitutional right to assert an 
insanity defense in a criminal proceeding, see Commonwealth v. 
Chatman, 260 Va. 562, 567-68, 538 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (2000), 
"Virginia has long recognized the common law defense of 
insanity."  White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 625, 636 
S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006).  The General Assembly, however, has 
statutorily prescribed the procedure for asserting that 
defense.  See Code §§ 19.2-168 and –168.1.  In this case, 
Grattan did not follow the statutory procedure when he refused 
to cooperate with the Commonwealth's mental health evaluators.  
In accordance with the provisions of Code § 19.2-168.1, the 
circuit court excluded only Grattan's expert testimony on the 
subject.  The court did not prevent Grattan from introducing 
relevant lay testimony.  In fact, Grattan proffered evidence 
from his family, fellow inmates, and police interviews 
addressing his behavior, demeanor, and mental state.  In sum, 
we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court's 
finding that Grattan was competent to stand trial was not 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  We also 
conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by 
32 
barring Grattan's introduction of expert testimony on the 
issue of his sanity at the time of the offenses.  We will 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.7 
Affirmed. 
                     
7 In his only constitutional argument, Grattan asserts 
that barring his introduction of expert testimony in support 
of his defense of insanity at the time of the offenses 
violated his right to call for evidence under the Sixth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The Court of Appeals held that Grattan failed to 
present this argument in the circuit court and therefore 
defaulted it under Rule 5A:18.  Grattan, slip op. at 9-10.  
Grattan did not assign error in this Court to the Court of 
Appeals' application of Rule 5A:18.  Therefore, we will not 
consider the argument.  See Rule 5:25. 
33