Title: In re N.B.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-53 
No. 291A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 9 March 
2020 by Judge Joseph Moody Buckner in District Court, Orange County.  This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but was 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Stephenson & Fleming, LLP, by Angenette Stephenson, for petitioner-appellee 
Orange County Department of Social Services. 
 
Olabisi A. Ofunniyin and Matthew W. Wolfe for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant father.  
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother Stacey W. appeals from the trial court’s orders 
terminating her parental rights in N.B., N.M.B., and M.R., while respondent-father 
Jerald B. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights in N.B.1  
                                            
1 N.B., N.M.B., and M.R., respectively, will be referred to throughout the remainder 
of this opinion as Natasha, Nylah, and Merise, which are pseudonyms used for ease of reading 
and to protect the juveniles’ privacy. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
After careful review of the record in light of the applicable law, we affirm the trial 
court’s orders. 
I. 
  Factual Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 25 July 2017, a child protective services agency in Hagerstown, Maryland, 
received a referral expressing concern that Natasha and Nylah had been neglected 
by a woman with whom they had lived in Maryland during a time in which 
respondent-mother had been incarcerated.  At the time of the making of this referral, 
Natasha, Nylah, and Merise were residing in Chapel Hill with the sister of a woman 
that respondent-mother described as her “foster mother” and that the children 
referred to as their “great-aunt” despite the absence of any biological relationship 
between this individual and either respondent-mother or the children.  The children 
had begun living with this individual in January 2017, when this individual had 
traveled to Maryland and retrieved the children in light of respondent-mother’s 
incarceration and the inability of the persons with whom the children had initially 
been left to provide adequate care for them. 
¶ 3 
 
Upon learning that the children had been living in Chapel Hill for the last six 
months, the Maryland child protective services agency contacted the Orange County 
Department of Social Services, which undertook responsibility for investigating the 
report.  At the time that DSS became involved with the children, respondent-mother, 
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who had been released on parole, had been unable to establish consistent employment 
or housing while respondent-father was incarcerated. 
¶ 4 
 
In the course of the investigation, Natasha and Nylah reported that 
respondent-mother had frequently been incarcerated and that they had been 
subjected to inappropriate discipline by caretakers, had been exposed to illegal drugs, 
and had endured inappropriate touching.  In light of these allegations of abuse, a 
child medical evaluation was conducted upon Natasha and Nylah on 14 September 
2017.  At the conclusion of the examination, the examiner expressed concern that 
both Natasha and Nylah had been physically and sexually abused. 
¶ 5 
 
On 3 November 2017, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that Natasha, 
Nylah, and Merise were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles.  In its petitions, 
DSS asserted that respondent-mother had a history of incarceration, during which 
the children had lived with multiple caretakers who subjected the children to 
excessive discipline, failed to provide the children with adequate food, and failed to 
provide the children with an adequate level of care.  In addition, DSS alleged that the 
children had been physically and sexually abused while in respondent-mother’s care 
and that respondent-mother had been released from incarceration and was 
threatening to remove the children from the home of their current caretaker.  In order 
to prevent respondent-mother from taking the children into her care, DSS sought and 
obtained the entry of an order placing the children into nonsecure custody and 
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allowing them to continue living with their current caretaker.  Eventually, the 
children’s caretaker became unable to care for them, so that the children entered 
foster care. 
¶ 6 
 
After an adjudicatory hearing held on 15 February 2018, the trial court entered 
an order on 26 March 2018 finding that the children were neglected and dependent 
juveniles.  The trial court ordered that the custody of the children remain with DSS, 
required respondent-mother to comply with a family services agreement, and 
authorized respondent-mother to engage in supervised visitation with the children.  
In view of the fact that respondent-father continued to be incarcerated, the trial court 
ordered him to provide DSS with a specific release date. 
¶ 7 
 
On 19 July 2018, the trial court held an initial permanency planning hearing.  
On 31 August 2018, the trial court entered a permanency planning order in which it 
found that, while DSS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their 
parents, neither respondent-mother nor respondent-father had been actively 
attempting to successfully reunify with the children or making themselves available 
to DSS.  As a result, the trial court adopted a primary permanent plan of adoption, 
with a secondary permanent plan of reunification, and authorized DSS to seek the 
termination of the parents’ parental rights in the children. 
¶ 8 
 
On 21 October 2019, DSS filed separate motions seeking to have respondent-
mother’s parental rights in all three children terminated based upon neglect, 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful failure to make reasonable progress toward 
correcting the conditions that had led to the children’s placement in DSS custody, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  In addition, DSS alleged that respondent-mother’s 
parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination based upon abandonment, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  Similarly, DSS filed a motion seeking to have respondent-
father’s parental rights in Natasha terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1); willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
conditions that had led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2); and dependency.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). 
¶ 9 
 
On 28 November 2018, after a hearing held on 1 November 2018, Judge 
Beverly Scarlett entered a permanency planning order in which she found that DSS 
continued to have difficulty in communicating with respondent-mother, that 
respondent-mother had sent clothing to the children on three occasions, and that 
respondent-father continued to be incarcerated.  In addition, Judge Scarlett 
reiterated the trial court’s earlier conclusion that neither parent was making 
adequate progress toward reunification with the children.  As a result, Judge Scarlett 
retained the existing primary permanent plan of adoption and secondary permanent 
plan of reunification. 
¶ 10 
 
After a hearing held on 6 February 2020, the trial court entered orders on 9 
March 2020 in which it determined that respondent-mother’s parental rights in all 
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three children and respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were subject to 
termination based upon neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful failure to make 
reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to the children’s 
placement in DSS custody, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); that respondent-mother’s 
parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination based upon abandonment, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7); and that respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha 
were subject to termination for dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).  In addition, 
the  trial court concluded that the children’s bests interests would be served by the 
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in all three children and that 
Natasha’s best interests would be served by the termination of respondent-father’s 
parental rights.2  Respondent-mother and respondent-father noted appeals to this 
Court from the trial court’s termination orders. 
II. 
  Substantive Legal Analysis 
 
A.  Respondent-Mother’s Appeal 
¶ 11 
 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court, 
respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred by concluding that her 
parental rights in the children were subject to termination.  A termination of parental 
                                            
2 At the time of the termination hearing, paternity for Nylah had not been established.  
As a result, a proceeding to terminate the unknown father’s parental rights in Nylah had 
been initiated and service of the unknown father by publication was in process.  Although 
paternity for Merise had not yet been established either, a putative father had been identified 
and DSS was making efforts to determine whether that individual was actually Merise’s 
father. 
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rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.  
N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110 (1984).  At 
the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more of the grounds for termination 
delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a).  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019).  This Court 
reviews a trial court’s adjudicatory decision “to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
conclusions of law.”  In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In 
re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)).  In the event that the petitioner was able to prove 
the existence of one or more grounds for termination, “the court proceeds to the 
dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best 
interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.”  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 
842 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).  “[A]n 
adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a 
termination of parental rights.”  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019). 
¶ 12 
 
A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that it concludes that the parent has neglected the 
juvenile as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 
(2019).  A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose parent, 
guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or 
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discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare . . . .”  
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  Although the trial court is authorized to terminate a 
parent’s parental rights in a juvenile based upon neglect that is occurring at the time 
of the termination hearing, see, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020) 
(stating that “this Court has recognized that the neglect ground can support 
termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by abandonment”), the 
fact that “a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of 
time prior to the termination hearing” would make “requiring the petitioner in such 
circumstances to show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . 
impossible.”  In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 80 (2019) (cleaned up).  In such a situation, 
“evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child — including an 
adjudication of such neglect — is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate 
parental rights[,]” but “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed 
conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition 
of neglect.”  In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984).  As a result, the trial court is also 
entitled to find that the parent’s parental rights are subject to termination on the 
basis of neglect if it concludes that the evidence demonstrates “a likelihood of future 
neglect by the parent.”  In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020).  As a result, even if 
the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show the existence of current neglect, 
the trial court may find that a parent’s parental rights are subject to termination 
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based upon a determination of past neglect and a showing that a repetition of neglect 
is likely if the child is returned to the parent’s care, id., at 841, n.3, with the trial 
court being required to evaluate the likelihood of future neglect on the basis of an 
analysis of any “evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of 
past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.”  In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 
212, 835 S.E.2d 425, 430 (2019) (citing Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715). 
¶ 13 
 
The record reflects that the trial court found that the children were neglected 
in an adjudication order that was entered on 26 March 2018.  In addition, the trial 
court found that, prior to the children’s placement in DSS custody, there was a 
“pattern of neglect due to housing instability; substance abuse, specifically cocaine; 
leaving the juvenile[s] with inappropriate caretakers . . . ; and domestic violence 
between Respondent parents.”  In addition, the trial court found that, prior to the 
time at which DSS obtained custody of the children and while she was pregnant with 
Merise, respondent-mother and the children had resided at a Salvation Army shelter; 
that, after respondent-mother’s incarceration for drug violations, she had failed to 
make proper arrangements for the children’s care; that Merise, when she was an 
infant, had been “found alone in a car outside a courthouse”; that, following 
respondent-mother’s release from incarceration, she had failed to visit with the 
children or provide financial assistance for their care; that respondent-mother lived 
in a half-way house while on parole and had failed to establish safe, stable, and 
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suitable housing for the juveniles; that a child medical examination had resulted in 
a determination that Natasha and Nylah had been physically and sexually abused 
and that they had suffered trauma because of respondent-mother’s failure to protect 
them; and that respondent-mother had exposed Natasha and Nylah to “multiple 
unsafe situations involving but not limited to inappropriate discipline, inappropriate 
supervision resulting in abuse, and inadequate food.”  Based upon these findings of 
fact, the trial court determined in all three termination orders that:  
Much of the neglect experienced by the juvenile[s] is 
directly related to Respondent mother’s instability, drug 
use, 
incarcerations, 
and 
placement 
with 
multiple 
caretakers to whom Respondent mother entrusted that 
subjected the juvenile[s] to physical and sexual abuse as 
well as neglect. 
¶ 14 
 
According to respondent-mother, the quoted finding demonstrates that the 
trial court relied upon a showing of past neglect rather than upon an analysis of the 
circumstances that existed at the time of the termination hearing in determining that 
her parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect.  
Instead of evidencing a determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in 
the children should be terminated based solely upon evidence of past neglect, 
however, we interpret the quoted language as nothing more than a summary of the 
prior neglect to which the children had been subjected.  In reaching this conclusion, 
we particularly note the trial court’s findings that, after DSS obtained custody of the 
children, respondent-mother had failed to maintain consistent contact with them and 
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did not understand or acknowledge the negative impact that the manner in which 
she had chosen to live and the identity of the caretakers with whom she had placed 
the children had had upon them. 
¶ 15 
 
The trial court’s findings also reflect that respondent-mother did not enter into 
a case plan with DSS until 1 November 2018, which was more than a year after they 
had been placed in DSS custody.  The trial court found that the terms and conditions 
set out in respondent-mother’s court-ordered case plan required her to comply with a 
visitation agreement; resolve all of her pending legal matters; obtain and maintain 
housing that was sufficient for herself and the juveniles; provide verification of the 
stability of her housing arrangements through the provision of a lease agreement; 
obtain and maintain lawful employment that produced sufficient income to meet her 
own needs and those of the children; verify the nature and amount of her income by 
providing copies of pay stubs; refrain from the use of illegal or impairing substances 
and submit to random drug screens; comply with the requirements of her parole; 
obtain comprehensive mental health and substance abuse assessments and comply 
with any resulting recommendations; complete parenting education and demonstrate 
the ability to use the skills that she had learned as the result of that process; maintain 
consistent contact with DSS; sign releases authorizing the provision of information 
allowing DSS to verify her compliance with the components of her case plan; and 
provide certificates showing that she had satisfied the conditions of her release on 
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parole and her compliance with the other provisions of her case plans.  In addressing 
the extent of respondent-mother’s compliance with the provisions of her case plan, 
the trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact:3 
54. 
[DSS] has had ongoing difficulty in Respondent 
mother signing releases for service[] providers or 
obtaining documentation about completed services. 
 
. . . .  
 
59. 
A letter from Alternative Drug and Alcohol 
Counseling, LLC was admitted and received by the 
Court to Respondent mother’s parole officer 
indicating successful completion of treatment.  She 
did not previously provide this documentation.  
Documentation of completed drug screens was never 
received. 
 
60. 
While on probation, Respondent mother was 
engaged in Potomoc Case Management Services.  
She did not provide documentation to or sign 
releases for [DSS] to obtain information about 
engagement in services or services offered by the 
agency. 
 
. . . .  
 
62. 
Due to lack of releases or documentation, it cannot 
be 
determined 
whether 
Respondent 
mother 
completed 
a 
comprehensive 
mental 
health 
                                            
3 There are minor variations in the numbering of the findings of fact contained in the 
separate different orders that the trial court entered with respect to each of the juveniles.  In 
the interests of brevity and for ease of reference, we will quote the trial court’s findings as set 
out in the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Natasha in the text of 
this opinion.  As a result of the fact that respondent-mother has failed to challenge any of 
these findings as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, they are binding upon us for 
purposes of appellate review.  In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). 
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assessment 
or 
whether 
engagement 
in 
case 
management services adequately addressed her 
mental health needs. 
 
63. 
After completing parole in Maryland, Respondent 
mother relocated to Yonkers, New York where the 
maternal grandmother resides. 
 
. . . .  
 
65. 
Despite 
the 
distance 
from 
the 
juvenile[s], 
Respondent 
mother 
could 
have 
consistently 
communicated with [DSS], executed releases for 
providers, provided verification of engagement in 
services, and appropriately participate[d] in case 
planning. 
 
. . . . 
 
67. 
In June 2019, Respondent mother provided a drug 
and alcohol counseling letter for Alssaro Counseling 
Services in New York; however, [DSS] was unable to 
confirm that Respondent mother was engaged in 
their services. 
 
68. 
Respondent mother subsequently indicated that she 
did not use Alssaro Counseling Services due to 
insurance issues and having to find another 
provider. 
 
69. 
Respondent mother reports being drug tested, but 
she has not provided any documentation of 
completed negative drug screens.  
 
70. 
On August 1, 2019, when Respondent mother was 
present for a Permanency Planning Review Hearing, 
[DSS] referred Respondent mother for a hair follicle 
drug screen. 
 
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71. 
Respondent mother failed to complete the requested 
hair follicle drug screen. 
 
72. 
Respondent mother provided the results of a blood 
test from Empire City Laboratories completed on 
January 2, 2020; however, the test appears to be 
related 
to 
immunizations 
and 
communicable 
diseases.  The test did not screen for substances.  
 
. . . . 
 
75. 
Respondent mother has not completed a parenting 
curriculum and applied learned knowledge of skills 
to address her deficits. 
 
76. 
Respondent mother continues to have housing 
instability.  She reports renting a room or subletting 
an apartment; however, she has not provided an 
address to [DSS] or a copy of a lease or other housing 
agreement.  Respondent mother receives her mail at 
the maternal grandmother’s home. 
 
Based upon these findings of evidentiary fact, the trial court determined that: 
Respondent mother’s continued failure to maintain a safe 
and stable home, and her failure to assure that the 
juvenile[s] received proper supervision and necessary care 
subjects the juvenile[s] to the risks of physical and 
emotional harm and creates an environment injurious to 
[their] welfare. 
The trial court also noted that Natasha and Nylah had “heightened trauma-related 
therapeutic needs due to Respondent mother’s neglect” and that Nylah had required 
residential treatment for the purpose of addressing her mental health problems and 
accompanying behaviors.  According to the trial court, the neglect that the juveniles 
had suffered in the past was likely to “repeat or continue” in the event that the 
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juveniles were returned to respondent-mother’s care, with this determination resting 
upon evidence concerning the prior neglect that the juveniles had experienced 
coupled with respondent-mother’s failure to establish a “safe, stable, substance-free 
home”; her lack of contact with the juveniles; and her inability to address the 
juveniles’ trauma-related needs. 
¶ 16 
 
In response, respondent-mother asserts that the trial court’s findings do little 
more than restate earlier findings and that certain of them lack sufficient evidentiary 
support.  However, the record does not support respondent-mother’s contentions.  For 
example, respondent-mother conceded that, at the time of the termination hearing, 
she was subletting a single room for herself, admitted that she did not have a lease, 
and acknowledged having lived with a friend before beginning to rent the room that 
she occupied at the time of the termination hearing.  In light of this evidence, the trial 
court could have properly determined that respondent-mother had failed to establish 
stable housing that was suitable for both herself and the juveniles.  See In re D.L.W., 
368 N.C. at 843 (stating that it is the trial court’s duty to consider all of the evidence, 
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to determine the inferences that 
should be drawn from that evidence). 
¶ 17 
 
In addition, the record reflects that respondent-mother’s case plan required 
her to submit to random drug screens.  According to a social worker who testified at 
the termination hearing, respondent-mother never submitted to random drug 
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screens.  The same social worker testified that, even though DSS had requested that 
respondent-mother submit to a hair follicle screen when she was in North Carolina 
in August 2019, she failed to do so.  For that reason, the social worker testified that 
DSS had been unable to verify that respondent-mother had maintained sobriety.  As 
a result, the trial court had ample justification for concluding that respondent-mother 
had failed to overcome her substance abuse problems. 
¶ 18 
 
As far as the issue of visitation is concerned, the record reflects that Natasha 
did not wish to have any contact with respondent-mother, whom she blamed for 
causing the circumstances in which the children found themselves.  In addition, the 
record contains evidence tending to show that, for a period of time, Nylah lacked the 
stability to permit visitation with respondent-mother.  A social worker testified that 
respondent-mother had a “strained relationship” with Merise in light of respondent-
mother’s “lack of involvement” with the child and asserted that respondent-mother 
had not seen Merise since her incarceration, which had occurred when Merise was 
four months old, and that Merise did not recognize respondent-mother.  On the one 
occasion when she actually visited with Merise, respondent-mother only spent half of 
her allotted visitation time with the child.  For all of these reasons, we hold that the 
record contains ample support for the trial court’s determination that there had been 
little contact between respondent-mother and the children. 
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¶ 19 
 
The record also contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
determination that respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate the ability to deal 
with the juveniles’ “trauma-related needs and accompanying behavior[s].”  Although 
respondent-mother testified that she was being treated for depression, she never 
provided any verification that tended to show the completion of a comprehensive 
mental health assessment or that she had been complying with any resulting 
treatment recommendations.  In addition, a social worker and a social work 
supervisor both testified that respondent-mother had a limited understanding of the 
mental health problems from which the children suffered.  According to both the 
social worker and the social work supervisor, respondent-mother believed that the 
children “just want to come home.”  Moreover, the social worker testified that, in light 
of Natasha and Nylah’s special needs, both children needed a caretaker who 
thoroughly understood their mental health diagnoses and related treatment needs 
and that respondent-mother did not appear to have these attributes.  Finally, a social 
worker testified that she had been unable to verify that respondent-mother had 
completed the parenting class required by her case plan.  As a result, the trial court 
had ample justification for concluding that respondent-mother was not prepared to 
address the juveniles’ trauma-related needs. 
¶ 20 
 
Although respondent-mother contends that the trial court failed to give proper 
consideration to the progress that she had made and the extent to which her 
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circumstances had changed since her release from incarceration and that the trial 
court’s determination that “[t]he risk [to the juveniles of] continued mental, physical, 
and emotion[al] impairment if [they were] in Respondent mother’s custody remains” 
lacked sufficient record support, we are not persuaded by this argument.  The trial 
court’s orders contain numerous findings describing the components of her case plan 
that respondent-mother successfully completed.  For example, the trial court found 
that respondent-mother had successfully satisfied the terms and conditions of her 
parole and that respondent-mother had obtained gainful employment.  According to 
well-established North Carolina law, however, respondent-mother’s compliance with 
a portion of her case plan “does not preclude a finding of neglect.”  In re J.J.H., 376 
N.C. 161, 184 (2020) (citing In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40 (2020)); see also In re 
Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120, 131 (2010) (acknowledging that a “case plan is not just 
a check list” and that “parents must demonstrate acknowledgement and 
understanding of why the juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed 
behaviors”).  Although respondent-mother had made some progress toward satisfying 
the requirements of her case plan, the trial court could reasonably determine, based 
upon the prior neglect that the children had experienced, respondent-mother’s failure 
to establish stable housing that was free from substance abuse, respondent-mother’s 
lack of contact with the juveniles, and respondent-mother’s inability to meet the 
children’s trauma-related needs, that future neglect was likely in the event that they 
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were returned to her care, see In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) (holding that, even 
though the respondent claimed to have made reasonable progress toward satisfying 
the requirements of his case plan, the trial court’s findings relating to his failure to 
adequately address the issue of domestic violence, which had been the primary reason 
for the children’s removal from the family home, were, “standing alone, sufficient to 
support a determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect”), and that 
respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on 
the basis of neglect.  As a result, since the trial court’s conclusion that a single ground 
for termination exists is sufficient, in and of itself, to support termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights, In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395, and since 
respondent-mother has not argued that the trial court’s determination that 
termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interests 
constituted an abuse of discretion, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019), we affirm the 
trial court’s orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in all three 
children. 
B.  Respondent-Father’s Appeal 
¶ 21 
 
Similarly, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by concluding 
that his parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination.  In determining that 
respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination for 
neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(i), the trial court made findings of fact 
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describing the circumstances that led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody and 
noting that respondent-father had been incarcerated and had failed to take any action 
to facilitate a placement for Natasha when she entered foster care.  In addition, the 
trial court found that: 
41. 
Respondent father is incarcerated . . . [in] 
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.  He has a tentative 
release date in 2021. 
42. 
Respondent father has not provided any tangible 
items for the juvenile or otherwise provided financial 
assistance to support the juvenile.  His ability is 
limited by incarceration. 
43. 
Respondent father did not remain in consistent 
contact with [DSS] while the juvenile has been in 
foster care. 
44. 
Recently, contact with Respondent father has 
improved.  He has acknowledged and expressed 
remorse for his inability to protect the juvenile from 
abuse and neglect due to multiple inappropriate 
caretakers. 
45. 
Respondent father did not correspond or sen[d] 
letters to the juvenile until a recent letter in which 
he expressed how much he cared for the juvenile and 
to ask for forgiveness.  
¶ 22 
 
In his initial challenge to the trial court’s termination order, respondent-father 
argues that Finding of Fact No. 42 lacks sufficient evidentiary support.  After 
conceding that a social worker had testified that he had failed to provide any financial 
assistance to Natasha’s caretaker, respondent-father directs our attention to the 
report relating to Natasha’s child medical examination, in which Natasha’s caretaker 
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
2021-NCSC-53 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
had stated that respondent-father was “help[ing] out materially and financially to 
provide for . . . [Natasha].”  As we have previously noted, however, the trial court is 
responsible for resolving such contradictions in the record evidence.  See In re D.L.W., 
368 N.C. at 843.  As a result, we hold that Finding of Fact No. 42 has sufficient record 
support. 
¶ 23 
 
Secondly, respondent-father contends that Finding of Fact No. 43 conflicts with 
the record evidence.  In support of this contention, respondent-father points to 
evidence that (1) he contacted the guardian ad litem on 9 November 2017 for the 
purpose of offering to assume responsibility for caring for Natasha and Nylah 
following his release from incarceration; (2) that DSS had noted in a February 2018 
court report that respondent-father had signed and returned the information release 
and consent forms that DSS had sent to him; and (3) that respondent-father had 
informed DSS on 25 October 2018 that he might be released prior to his tentative 
release date, that he did not wish to relinquish his parental rights, that he hoped to 
reunify with Natasha, and that he wanted a social worker to tell Natasha that he 
loved and missed her. 
¶ 24 
 
Although the record clearly reflects that respondent-father had some contact 
with DSS, it also supports the trial court’s finding that his contacts with DSS had 
been inconsistent.  For example, the record evidence tends to show that respondent-
father had not had any contact with DSS between late 2018 and the preparation of a 
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
2021-NCSC-53 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
court report in February 2020, in which DSS had stated that “[c]ontact with 
[respondent-father] has been inconsistent until recently when he reached out 
wanting to discuss his case[.]”  The court report further indicated that DSS had been 
able to maintain contact with respondent-father in recent months and that he had 
expressed remorse about his inability to care for and protect Natasha when she 
needed his help.  Although respondent-father did send Natasha a letter in which he 
asked for her forgiveness and made clear how much he cared for her, the letter in 
question had been his first contact with Natasha after her entry into DSS custody.  
As a result, the record adequately supports the trial court’s finding concerning the 
inconsistency of respondent-father’s contacts with DSS.4 
¶ 25 
 
The trial court further found that the neglect that Natasha had experienced 
was likely to “repeat or continue” in the event that she was returned to respondent-
father’s care, with the trial court having based this finding upon the evidence 
concerning the neglect that Natasha had previously suffered, the fact that the neglect 
that led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody had occurred while he was 
incarcerated, and the fact that Natasha had been temporarily placed in foster care 
while in respondent-father’s custody in 2007.  In addition, the trial court found that, 
because of his lack of regular contact with Natasha and the fact of his incarceration, 
                                            
4 We also note that the trial court softened the import of Finding of Fact No. 43 in 
Finding of Fact No. 44 by noting the recent improvements in the level of contact between 
respondent-father and DSS. 
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
respondent-father had failed to ensure that Natasha had received appropriate care 
and supervision.  The trial court further found that respondent-father’s “criminal 
activity and absence from the juvenile’s life constitutes abandonment resulting in his 
inability to protect her from abuse and neglect [which] subject[ed] the juvenile to 
physical and emotional harm.”  Finally, the trial court found that respondent-father 
remained incarcerated, that it was “unclear whether reentry upon release will be 
successful[,]” and that respondent-father “does not have the present or near future 
ability to establish a safe home for the juvenile.” 
¶ 26 
 
In respondent-father’s view, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Natasha experienced neglect while in his care, with the only 
support for this assertion consisting of references contained in child protective 
services reports from 2007 to 2016.  According to respondent-father, the statements 
in question constituted mere allegations and were, for the most part, directed toward 
conduct in which respondent-mother had engaged.  A careful review of the record 
reflects, however, that a social worker had testified that, in 2007, Natasha had been 
placed in foster care as the result of concerns relating to domestic violence, drug 
distribution, and respondent-father’s use of drugs.  In light of this evidence, the trial 
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court was entitled to infer that neglect by respondent-father had resulted in 
Natasha’s placement in foster care in 2007.  See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843.5 
¶ 27 
 
In addition, respondent-father argues that the trial court’s references to his 
incarceration as having resulted in neglect or abandonment rested upon a 
misapprehension of law given that “[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword 
nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision,” In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 
198, 207–08, aff’d 357 N.C. 568 (2003), with the trial court having erroneously 
predicated its determination that he had neglected Natasha upon the mere fact of his 
incarceration.  Id.  Although the trial court did find that respondent-father had failed 
to send any tangible items for Natasha’s benefit or to provide her caretakers with 
financial assistance, it acknowledged that respondent-father’s incarceration limited 
his ability to do so.  Cf. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516, 530 (2020) (stating that “[a] parent’s 
incarceration is a circumstance that the trial court must consider in determining 
whether the parent has made reasonable progress toward correcting those conditions 
which led to the removal of the juvenile” (cleaned up)).  The trial court also found 
that, during his period of incarceration, respondent-father made no attempt to 
                                            
5 Even if this finding lacked sufficient evidentiary support, any such defect would not 
fatally undermine the trial court’s order given the absence of any dispute about whether 
Natasha had been adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile in 2018.  See In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 
149, 153 (2017) (holding that a prior adjudication of neglect based on a mother’s substance 
abuse and mental health issues was “appropriately considered” by the trial court as “relevant 
evidence” in proceedings to terminate the parental rights of a father who was incarcerated at 
the time of the prior adjudication). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
contact Natasha, with the exception of sending a single letter, and that he had had 
limited contact with DSS.  See In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 75–76 (2020) (stating that 
“incarceration does not negate a father’s neglect of his child because the sacrifices 
which parenthood often requires are not forfeited when the parent is in custody,” so 
that, “while incarceration may limit a parent’s ability to show affection, it is not an 
excuse for a parent’s failure to show interest in a child’s welfare by whatever means 
available” (cleaned up)).  Finally, the trial court made the unchallenged finding that, 
when respondent-father was not incarcerated, “he was only involved in the juvenile’s 
life in a limited way[.]”  As a result, while the trial court did refer to respondent-
father’s incarceration in its findings of fact, it did so only in the context of 
acknowledging the limitations upon his ability to take certain steps that would have 
helped him develop and maintain a relationship with Natasha that resulted from his 
incarceration rather than basing its finding of neglect solely upon the fact that he 
was incarcerated.  As a result, after a careful examination of the record, we hold that 
the trial court did not err by concluding that a repetition of neglect was likely, see In 
re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 653–54 (2020) (stating that “evidence of changed 
conditions must be considered in light of the history of neglect by the parents and the 
probability of a repetition of neglect” and that, although respondent-father had made 
some recent, minimal progress in attempting to reunify with Natasha, “the trial court 
was within its authority to weigh the evidence and determine that these eleventh-
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
2021-NCSC-53 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his persistent failures to make 
improvements . . . and to conclude that there was a probability of repetition of neglect” 
(citation omitted)), and that respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were 
subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 
¶ 28 
 
Secondly, respondent-father contends that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the termination hearing.  In respondent-father’s view, the failure of his 
trial counsel to ensure that he was able to attend the termination hearing on a remote 
basis and the fact that his trial counsel failed to present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, lodge any objections, or advance any arguments on respondent-father’s 
behalf constituted deficient performance that prejudiced his chances for a more 
favorable outcome at the termination hearing.  We do not find respondent-father’s 
argument persuasive. 
¶ 29 
 
A “parent has the right to counsel, and to appointed counsel in cases of 
indigency, unless the parent waives the right,” in a termination of parental rights 
proceeding.  N.C.G. S. § 7B-1101.1(a) (2019).  “Counsel necessarily must provide 
effective assistance, as the alternative would render any statutory right to counsel 
potentially meaningless.”  In re T.N.C., 375 N.C. 849, 854, 851 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2020).  
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive 
[him] of a fair hearing.”  Id. (cleaned up).  “To make the latter showing, the respondent 
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
2021-NCSC-53 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
must prove that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there 
would have been a different result in the proceedings.’ ”  Id. (quoting State v. 
Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985)). 
¶ 30 
 
A careful examination of respondent-father’s brief clearly demonstrates that 
he has failed to show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the allegedly 
deficient performance of his trial counsel.  Simply put, nothing in the record suggests 
that there was anything that respondent-father’s trial counsel could have done to 
overcome the obstacles that he faced in this case arising from the undisputed evidence 
that respondent father had failed to make any significant effort to prevent Natasha 
from entering into DSS custody and had failed to take significant steps to develop 
and maintain a relationship with Natasha or to remain in consistent contact with 
DSS once Natasha had entered DSS custody.  Thus, we hold that respondent-father 
is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s termination order on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  As a result, given that the trial court’s 
determination that a single ground for termination exists is sufficient, in and of itself, 
to support the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha, In re 
E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395; the fact that respondent-father has not argued that the trial 
court’s determination that the termination of his parental rights would be in 
Natasha’s best interests constituted an abuse of discretion; and the fact that 
respondent-father’s challenge to the quality of the representation that he received 
IN RE N.B., N.M.B., M.R. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
from his trial counsel lacks merit, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent-father’ parental rights in Natasha as well. 
AFFIRMED.