Title: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING v. EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING v. EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION2002 WY 15155 P.3d 714Case Number: 01-122Decided: 10/09/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

FOR 
SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING,

Petitioner,

 

v.

 

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Respondent.

 

Petition for Writ of Review

 from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing Petitioner:

John C. McKinley and Nancy D. Freudenthal of Davis & 
Cannon, Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Mr. McKinley.

 

Representing Respondent:

Lawrence J. Wolfe and Patrick R. Day of Holland & Hart, 
Cheyenne, WY; and Brent R. Kunz of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Day.

 

Representing Amicus Curiae 
Wyoming Department of Revenue in support of Respondent:

Vicci M. Colgan, Chief Deputy Attorney General.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
LEHMAN,* and VOIGT, JJ., and KAUTZ, D.J.

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 

KAUTZ, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      The Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) determined and 
certified valuations of Exxon Mobil's gas production for the tax year 1998.  That certification 
was dated June 24, 1998. Apparently unhappy with the amount of tax Sublette 
County would receive, the Sublette County Commissioners filed an administrative 
contested case with the Wyoming State Board of Equalization (SBOE) on July 14, 
1998.   In 
that case the County claimed that 1998 tax assessments against Exxon Mobil were 
incorrect because Exxon Mobil improperly reported gas production in the county, 
because improper deductions were allowed in valuing the production, and because 
flared or vented gas was not included in Exxon Mobil's produc­tion.   

 

[¶2]      During the course of 
the case, Sublette County sought to compel discovery from Exxon Mobil about its 
gas production.  
The County sought records regarding production for years prior to 1997 as 
well as the year in question.  Exxon Mobil objected and resisted that 
discovery, claiming it was beyond the scope of the contested case. The SBOE 
issued an order compel­ling discovery, and Exxon Mobil filed a petition for 
writ of review of the discovery order with the district court.  The district court 
determined that Sublette County's administrative case was improper because it 
failed to identify specific errors on the part of the DOR.  The district court 
held that the administrative case improperly challenged the conduct of Exxon 
Mobil and attempted to invade the statutory duties of the DOR.  Further, the 
district court required substantial modi­fication of the County's claims 
before discovery could proceed.

 

[¶3]      Sublette County then 
petitioned this court for a Writ of Review of the district court's 
decision.  We 
granted that Petition to address, in part, the "County's role in a contested 
case before the Board of Equalization pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-102.1(c) (LexisNexis 2001)."

 

[¶4]      We affirm the 
district court to the extent of its order and remand the case to the 
dis­trict court to require dismissal.

 

ISSUES

 

 

[¶5]      Petitioner Board of 
County Commissioners for Sublette County lists the following issues:

 

I.                     
Whether the district court Order on Writ of Review violates 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act ("WAPA"), Wyoming Tax Statutes, Wyoming 
case law, and Sublette County's due process rights?

II.                   
Whether the State Board of Equalization's discovery order 
in this contested case was consistent with law and within the Board's 
authority?

III.                  
Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
of the State Board of Equalization's discovery order?

 

Respondent, Exxon Mobil Corporation, states the issues 
as:

 

1.                  
Does Sublette County have statutory authority to appeal 
deci­sions of the Wyoming Department of Revenue to the State Board of 
Equalization?

2.                  
If the County has such authority, what final decisions may 
the County appeal?

3.                  
Did the district court correctly determine that the State 
Board failed to limit the scope of the County's appeal to errors by the 
Department of Revenue, as required by law?

4.                  
Did the district court properly accept Exxon Mobil's 
Petition for Writ of Review?

 

[¶6]      We granted the 
Petition for Writ of Review in this case finding that it presented an issue of 
importance relating to a county's role in a contested case before the Board of 
Equali­zation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  The 
central issue here is whether Sublette County has statutory authority to bring 
the contested case before the SBOE.   A secondary issue is whether the 
district court properly defined the scope of such a contested case.  A final issue is 
whether the district court properly accepted Exxon Mobil's petition for writ of 
review.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Sublette County's 
right (or lack thereof) to an appeal is statutory and jurisdictional.  Basin Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 970 P.2d 841, 847 (Wyo. 
1998) (citing Pritchard v. State Div. of Voc. Rehab., 
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 540 P.2d 523, 524 (Wyo. 
1975)).   
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, for which the standard of 
review is de novo.    Sellers 
v. Dooley Oil Transp., 2001 WY 
44, ¶10, 22 P.3d 307, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2001) (quoting Cargill v. State, Dep't of Health, Div. 
of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998)).

 

[¶8]      This court is 
directed to "decide all relevant questions of law."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001).  We are not bound by the decision of the 
district court, but con­duct an independent inquiry into the matter just as 
if it had proceeded directly to us from the agency.  Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Employment, 6 P.3d 1287 , 1291 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

MINERAL TAXATION IN WYOMING

 

[¶9]      The Wyoming 
Constitution mandates that mineral taxes be assessed differently than normal 
property taxes. Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 3, entitled Taxation of mines and mining claims, reads:

 

All mines and mining claims . . . shall be taxed 
in addi­tion to the surface improvements, and in lieu of taxes on the lands, on the gross product 
thereof, as may be prescribed by law; provided, that the product of all mines 
shall be taxed in proportion to the value thereof.

 

(Emphasis added.)   This has been called "[t]he most 
noteworthy feature of the Wyoming property tax . . . ." E. George 
Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government Law 230 
(1985).  
Com­menting on Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 3, two other authors 
indicate:

 

            
This section provides for a gross products tax on all valu­able 
minerals in proportion to their value.  This tax [is] in addition to taxes paid on 
surface improvements, but it is in lieu of taxes on the land.  The legislature is 
responsible for deter­mining the appropriate tax rate.

 

Robert B. Keiter and Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution 218 (1993).

 

[¶10]   It is interesting to note that Dean 
Rudolph wrote, "In spite of its importance, the gross products tax has not, over 
the years, presented many legal issues of a fundamental nature.  Most of the issues 
that do arise are beyond the scope of this work because assessments are handled entirely at the state 
level."   
E. George Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government 
Law 230 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).  At the risk of 
pointing out the obvious, Rudolph's book is about Wyoming local government, with 
many chapters about counties, and yet he felt the gross products tax to be 
beyond the scope of his work.

[¶11]   The process of "valuing" mineral 
production for tax purposes is lengthy, involving these steps:

 

1.                  
The taxpayer files monthly severance tax returns. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-14-207(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001).

2.                  
The taxpayer files an ad valorem tax return by February 25 
in the year following production, and certifies its accuracy under oath.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-14-207(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001). 

3.                  
The Department of Revenue values the production at its fair 
market value based on the taxpayer's ad valorem return. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-14-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001). 

4.                  
The Department of Revenue then certifies the valuation to 
the county assessor of the county the minerals were produced in to be entered on 
the assessment rolls of the county.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-202(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001). 

5.                  
The taxpayer then has one year to file an amended ad 
valorem return requesting a refund.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-209(c)(i) (LexisNexis 
2001).

6.                  
The Department of Audit has five years from the date the 
return is filed to begin an audit, and must complete the audit within two years. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-208(b)(iii), (v)(D), (vii) (LexisNexis 2001).

7.                  
Any assessment resulting from an audit must be issued 
within one year after the audit is complete.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-208(b)(v)(E) 
(LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶12]   During the valuation process the 
taxpayer and the DOR are statutorily provided with rights to appeal.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-14-203(b)(viii) and (ix) (LexisNexis 2001) provide for the taxpayer and the 
DOR to be involved in deciding the valuation method used.  These statutes 
specify that the taxpayer or the DOR may appeal the valuation method to the 
SBOE.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-13-102(n) (LexisNexis 2001) specifies that the taxpayer may 
object to the certified valuation.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-208(b)(v)(F) 
specifies that a taxpayer may file a response or appeal to an audit. 
If a dispute arises 
during the valuation process, the DOR and the taxpayer may reach a compromise 
and settlement about the amount of tax due.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-103(a)(ii). None of 
these specific statutes about appeals or settlement give any appeal rights to 
counties.  
Counties are not involved in the valuation process.

 

DISCUSSION

 

I.  Judicial Estoppel.  

 

[¶13]   The parties' dispute predates this 
case.  In Exxon Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Sublette County, 
987 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1999), Exxon argued that the County should have appealed to the 
SBOE (as it did here) rather than petitioning under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-1-304(a)(xiv) (Michie 1997) (Repealed, now Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-102.1(c)(x) (Lexis 2001)).  The County now asserts that Exxon is estopped 
from arguing that a county cannot appeal, because it took an opposite position 
in the prior case.

 

[¶14]   This argument is fatally flawed because 
"in no event will judicial estoppel apply to legal conclusions based on 
undisputed facts."  
Ottema v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensa­tion Div., 968 P.2d 41, 46 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 445 (Wyo. 
1993)).   
It is undisputed that Sublette County filed an appeal with the SBOE, and 
whether the county had the power to do this is a question of law.   Judicial 
estoppel is inapplicable.

 

II.  Timeliness of 
Review/Mootness.  

 

[¶15]   The SBOE entered an order compelling 
discovery on April 12, 2000.  W.R.A.P. 13.03(a) required a petition for 
review "within 11 days after entry of the order from which relief is 
sought."  (A 
2001 amendment changed the time to 15 days.)  Exxon did not file its petition with the 
district court within that eleven-day period. The discovery dispute 
contin­ued, and the SBOE entered additional discovery orders on October 2, 
2000, and October 26, 2000.  The October 26, 2000 order vacated the 
October 2, 2000 order and set specific times and procedures to follow in 
discovery.  
Exxon Mobil filed a petition for writ of review with the district court 
on November 2, 2000.  
The County argues that because no petition was filed within eleven days 
of the original order, the district court should have rejected Exxon Mobil's 
petition.

 

[¶16]   Under W.R.A.P. 13.01(b) the district 
court had discretion to grant Exxon Mobil's Peti­tion for Writ of 
Review.  We 
review the district court's decision to grant the petition for abuse of 
discretion.  An 
abuse of discretion analysis considers the "reasonableness of the choice made by 
the trial court."   Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

[¶17]   The district court's decision to 
consider the petition was reasonable.  The issues were not simple discovery disputes 
but questions about the availability and scope of an appeal before the 
SBOE.  We 
issued our decision in Amoco Prod. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 12 P.3d 668 (Wyo. 2000), while the discovery dispute continued.  That decision 
addressed, to some extent, the role of the SBOE in administrative appeals and 
contributed to the issues raised by Exxon Mobil.  Exxon Mobil timely filed its petition for 
writ of review with the district court.  The October 2000 orders differed from the 
April 2000 order and were appro­priate for review.

 

[¶18]   Under the SBOE orders compelling 
discovery, Exxon Mobil produced some of the discovery material and designated a 
substantial amount of additional material for discovery.   Sublette 
County claims that neither the district court nor this court should consider the 
pre­sent petition for review because the discovery issues are moot.  An issue is moot, 
and not reviewable on appeal, when an event occurs which makes a determination 
of the issues unnecessary.  Davidson v. 
Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1348 (Wyo. 
1993).  An 
exception to the principle exists "when the case presents a controversy capable 
of repetition yet evading review."  Id.  This exception 
applies here.  
Although some discovery occurred, the central issue about the scope of an 
administrative appeal by a county remains, is likely to arise in other cases, 
and would evade review if we determined that the case was moot.  We determine that 
this case was properly before the district court (and is properly before 
us).

 

III.  Non Discovery 
Issues.  

 

[¶19]   The district court issued an order that 
reversed and vacated the SBOE's October 2000 discovery orders.  It also ordered 
that the County's contested case was limited to "specific errors alleged to have 
been committed by the Department, not the taxpayer," and prohibited the SBOE 
from considering claims which would result in a separate audit of Exxon Mobil or 
would invade statutory functions of the DOR (such as selecting a valuation 
method). The County asserts that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to address these addi­tional matters because they were beyond 
the scope of the October 26, 2000 discovery order.  The County 
characterizes these additional orders as "merely advisory" and 
improper.

 

[¶20]   The County's argument fails for two 
reasons.  
First, the writ of review granted by the district court related to the 
proper scope of discovery in the case before the SBOE.  The dis­trict 
court was required to define the extent of a contested case brought by a county 
in order to determine the appropriate scope of discovery.  The district 
court's rulings about the scope of the case were not advisory but were an 
inherent part of its decision on the scope of discov­ery.

 

[¶21]   Second, the County's position 
incorrectly limits the scope of a reviewing court's author­ity on a writ of 
review.   
When a writ of review is granted, the reviewing court "may set forth the 
particular issue or point of law which will be considered."  W.R.A.P. 13.07 
(emphasis added).   The reviewing court's review is not 
limited to only an issue defined by the respondent.  Instead the 
reviewing court may "reverse, vacate, remand or modify the decision for errors appearing on the 
record."  
W.R.A.P. 13.08 (emphasis added).  The reviewing court can review the entire 
record for abuse of discretion.  V-1 Oil Co. v. 
Ranck, 767 P.2d 612, 616 (Wyo. 
1989).  The 
district court properly reviewed the scope of the con­tested 
case.

 

IV.  County's Authority to 
Appeal.   

 

[¶22]   A county "has no sovereign power other 
than that granted by the legislature."   River Springs 
Ltd. Liability Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Teton, 899 P.2d 1329, 1335 (Wyo. 
1995).  

 
A county is a political subdivision of the state, created 
to aid in the administration of government. . . .  As an arm of the 
state, the county has only those powers expressly granted by the constitution or 
statutory law or reasonably implied from powers granted.

 

Dunnegan v. Laramie County Comm'rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Wyo. 1993).  No statute 
expressly grants counties in Wyoming the authority to file contested cases 
appealing ad valorem tax decisions.  Several statutes allow the taxpayer or the 
DOR to appeal at various points in the ad valorem tax process, but none of the 
those statutes mention counties.

 

[¶23]   Sublette County argues that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) (Lexis 1999) implies the authority of a county to appeal 
ad valorem tax decisions to the SBOE.  This statute states:

 

The state board of 
equalization shall perform the duties speci­fied in article 15, section 10 
of the Wyoming constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of 
equalization and review final decisions of the department upon application of 
any interested person adversely affected, including boards of county 
commissioners for the purposes of this subsection, under the contested case 
procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. 

 

On its face, this 
statute does not grant any authority to boards of county commissioners.  It simply describes 
duties of the SBOE.  
The question here is whether the statutory obligation of the SBOE to 
review decisions on the application of boards of county commissioners impliedly 
empowers counties to bring those appeals.

 

[¶24]   This court has 
often discussed statutory construction.

 

[W]e look first to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is 
ambiguous.  A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a 
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations.  We have said that divergent opinions among 
parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity.  However, the fact 
that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of 
ambiguity.  
Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court. 

 

Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1285 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omit­ted). 

 

[¶25]   Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) (LexisNexis 2001) is subject to varying 
interpreta­tions.  
It may mean that the SBOE must hear appeals brought by counties if 
counties are expressly granted the authority to appeal elsewhere, or it may mean 
that counties have the authority to file contested case appeals.   If it grants 
such authority to counties, it may mean that counties only may file contested 
cases on issues not specifically addressed in other stat­utes, or it may 
give counties authority to challenge issues which other statutes reserve for the 
DOR or the state (i.e., valuation method).  This statute is ambiguous.

 

[¶26]   The history of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30-11-102.1(c) (Lexis 2001) may be helpful in resolv­ing the 
ambiguity.  
"Legisprudence (the jurisprudence of legislation)" is helpful in 
determining what the legislature intended.  Parker Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993).  In 
1977, Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-304(a) read:

 

The state board of 
equalization shall perform the duties specified in article 15, section 10 of the 
Wyoming constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of equalization, 
review state excise taxes and review their own assessments of property and tax 
determinations.  
In addition, the board shall: . . .  

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-1-304(a) (Michie  Dec. 1977 Rpl.) (Repealed).  

 

[¶27]   Then, in 1991, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-1-304(a) was amended to read:

 

The state board of 
equalization shall perform the duties specified in article 15, section 10 of the 
Wyoming constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of equalization, 
review final decisions of the department on state excise taxes and review 
department assessments of property and tax deter­minations.  In addition, the 
board shall: . . .

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-1-304(a) (Michie July 1994 Rpl.) (Repealed).

 

[¶28]   Next, in 1995, the statute was amended 
to read:

 

The state board of 
equalization shall perform the duties specified in article 15, section 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution and shall hear appeals from county boards of equalization 
and review final decisions of the department upon application of any interested 
person adversely affected, including boards of county commissioners for the 
purposes of this subsection, under the contested case procedures of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. . . .  In addition, the board shall: 
. . .

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-1-304(a) (Michie 1997) (Repealed).

 

[¶29]   Then, in 1998, the Wyoming tax statutes 
were recodified and renumbered by 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 5.  The above quoted 
part of § 39-1-304(a) became Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c), but the 
wording remained identical.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) (Michie 
1998 Supp.).

 

[¶30]   A basic tenet of statutory construction 
is that changes in statutes have meaning and that the legislature intended 
something when it changed a statute.   State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo. 
1980).  
Statutory construction should give meaning to every portion and not 
render any part meaningless or superfluous.  Id. at 809.  We conclude that by 
amending Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) in 1995, the legislature intended 
to grant counties the authority to file contested cases from final decisions of 
the DOR. Unfortunately, the legislature left intact several statutes which 
specify only the taxpayer and the Department as having rights to appeal.  It did not indicate 
what decisions could be challenged by the county, or when.  It failed to 
indicate how county appeals fit into the amended return and audit process.  By granting 
counties the right to appeal, the legisla­ture may have effectively 
eliminated any possibility of settlement of tax disputes under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-11-103(b) (LexisNexis 2001) because, even if a dispute is settled, 
there is the risk of an appeal by a county.  We urge the legislature to remedy these 
problems by clearly indicating its intent with respect to county appeals of ad 
valorem taxes and by clearly defin­ing the scope and process for such 
appeals.

 

V.  Scope of Appeal 
Authority.    

 

[¶31]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001) is vague and ambiguous in that it fails to define the scope of 
a county's authority to appeal.  Does it give a county authority to challenge 
valuation methods?  
Other statutes clearly give responsibility for valuation meth­odology 
to the DOR and taxpayer.  Does this statute permit a county to audit a 
taxpayer?  Can 
such an audit occur before the time to file amended returns expires or before 
the Department of Audit has completed its work?

 

[¶32]   "Courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted."   Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo. 
1999).  "Tax 
statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer and are not to be extended 
absent clear intent of the legislature."  Id.  (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 985 (Wyo. 
1996)).  

 

In the interpretation 
of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their 
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to 
enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed 
out.  In case 
of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of 
the citizen.

 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 
1996) (citing Kelsey v. Taft, 72 Wyo. 210, 219-20, 
263 P.2d 135, 138 (1953) 
(quoting Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211 (1917))).  The same principles of strict construction 
apply to statutes which grant authority to political sub-entities.  "Since enabling 
legislation, through which all subordinate governmental instrumentalities must 
receive their authority, is a grant of sover­eign power, it is subject to 
the usual rule of strict construction applicable to such grants."  Norman J. Singer, 
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 64:1 
(6th ed. 2001 rev.) (footnote omitted).  Because 
§ 39-11-102.1(c) (LexisNexis 2001) is both a tax statute and one we are 
being asked to construe as a delegation of power from the State of Wyoming to 
the counties, we hold that it is appropriate to strictly construe it.

 

[¶33]   Assuming that the legislature intended 
to give some degree of authority to counties to appeal in ad valorem tax cases, 
principles of strict construction require us to conclude that it did not intend 
the scope of such an appeal to extend into areas specifically addressed in other 
statutes.  
Specific statutes control over general statutes involving the same 
subject.  Thunder­basin Land, Livestock & Inv. Co. v. Laramie 
County, 5 P.3d 774, 782 (Wyo. 
2000).  
Consequently, a county's appeal may not challenge valuation 
methodology.   
Such appeals are governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  
Such an appeal may not challenge an annual value certification, as that 
matter is addressed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-13-102(n) and 39-14-209(b)(iv) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  
The County cannot force an audit of a taxpayer through a contested case, 
as that responsibility is given to the Departments of Audit and Revenue under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-208(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  It follows that the 
County's appeal must be limited in scope to specific errors allegedly committed 
by the DOR.  
Such a limited scope is exactly what the district court prescribed in its 
order on Writ of Review.

 

VI.  Final 
Decision.    

 

[¶34]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001) states that the SBOE shall review final decisions.   Here, Sublette County petitioned for 
review of a value certification.  The decision of the DOR in making that value 
certification is anything but final.  The tax­payer still can file an amended 
return.  An 
audit can occur, and the value or tax can be adjusted over an eight-year 
period.

 

[¶35]   In Amoco 
Production Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 7 P.3d 900 (Wyo. 2000), we 
held that a letter sent to a taxpayer after an audit constituted a final 
decision.  At 
that point in time the DOR could do nothing more, and a final decision 
existed.   
That is the essential definition of a final administrative decision.  It is "one ending 
the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished."  MGTC, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 
1987).

 

[¶36]   The annual value certification for ad 
valorem tax is not a final decision.  Much remains to be accomplished in the tax 
process at that time.  
It is only after the time for an audit has expired, or an audit is 
complete, and the DOR has assessed on the basis of the audit (Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-14-208(b)(v)(E)) that there is nothing more to be accomplished.  Only then has the 
DOR made a final decision that a county may appeal.  Appeals by a county 
before that point are exercises in futility.1  The contested case 
brought by Sublette County does not seek review of a final order.  The district 
court's order must be modified to require dismissal of the contested 
case.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶37]   The legislature apparently intended 
that counties have some right to appeal ad valorem tax assessments but failed to 
specify how or when such an appeal is available.   Without other legislative direction, we 
conclude that such appeal rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001) do not supercede specific statutes providing for review of 
various steps in the ad valorem taxation process, nor do they permit counties to 
usurp functions of other state agencies.

 

[¶38]   The contested case here does not seek 
review of a final order.  Consequently, we affirm the district court to 
the extent of its order and remand the case to the district court to require 
dismissal. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1We note that by statute either the DOR or taxpayer may seek 
review at earlier stages in the taxation process.