Title: LISA G. WILSON and KIM WILSON V. TOWN OF ALPINE, WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LISA G. WILSON and KIM WILSON V. TOWN OF ALPINE, WYOMING2005 WY 57111 P.3d 290Case Number: 04-167Decided: 05/09/2005
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
LISA G. 
WILSON and KIM WILSON,

wife and 
husband,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
TOWN OF 
ALPINE, WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
            
V. Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Richard Rideout of Law Offices of Richard Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; BURKE, Justice, filed a dissenting 
opinion, with which KITE, Justice, joined.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court dismissed this negligence action because the appellants' notice of 
governmental claim did not meet constitutional requirements.  We dismiss this appeal for the same 
reason.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
            
1.         
Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim?

 
 
            
2.         
Was the appellee barred by the equitable doctrine of either estoppel or 
laches from asserting the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2]      On July 2, 1998, 
while staying in Alpine, Wyoming, Lisa Wilson allegedly contracted e-coli 
poisoning and Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome by drinking water from the Town of 
Alpine's (the appellee) municipal supply.  
On June 7, 1999, Wilson and her husband (the appellants) presented a 
notice of claim to the appellee pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101, et seq. 
(Lexis 1999), alleging that the appellee's negligence had caused the 
appellants' injuries.  The notice of 
claim was signed by the appellants' attorney, rather than by the appellants, and 
was not certified to under penalty of perjury.  The appellee denied the claim, and the 
appellants filed suit on May 19, 2000.  
On May 28, 2004, the district court entered an order granting the 
appellee's motion to dismiss, citing Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 15, 
86 P.3d 863, 868-69 (Wyo. 2004) and Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004), for 
the proposition that a governmental claim not meeting the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements is deficient, thereby depriving the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction.1  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      The appellee's 
motion to dismiss did not identify a particular court rule as its basis, did not 
mention subject matter jurisdiction, and alleged solely that the notice of claim 
was defective.  Logically, such a 
motion could have been made under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  
The district court, however, noting that the absence of a valid notice of 
claim is jurisdictional, treated the motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).

 
 

[¶4]      On appeal, the 
appellants insist that, because the district court considered the notice of 
claim, a copy of which was attached to the motion but which had not been 
attached to any pleading, the motion was converted to a W.R.C.P. 56 motion for 
summary judgment.  The district 
court's order does not, however, evidence such conversion, and does not contain 
the findings and conclusions that would suggest summary judgment.2  We are inclined to follow suit and to 
consider the motion as it was entitleda motion to dismiss.  In the end, it makes little difference 
because the material facts are not in dispute and judgment was entered as a 
matter of law.  In reviewing both 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgmentas well as motions for 
judgment on the pleadingsthe facts are considered in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, and the motion is granted only if those facts 
dictate that judgment should be entered as a matter of law.   See Bonnie M. Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW, 
Inc., 2004 WY 65, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 146, 148 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Manion v. 
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2002 WY 49, ¶ 6, 43 P.3d 576, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 
2002)); Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 4, 50 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Greeves v. Rosenbaum, 965 P.2d 669, 
671 (Wyo. 1998)); and McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 
WY 111, ¶ 6, 34 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wyo. 2001).  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 
2004 WY 29, ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 843, 847 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction

 
 

[¶5]      
The 
appellants presented to the appellee a notice of claim that did not meet the 
requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitutionit was neither 
signed by the claimants nor certified to under penalty of perjury.  We will affirm the district court's 
order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 
2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893 (Wyo. 2005), and 
the cases cited therein.  
Furthermore, even if the matter was not considered jurisdictional, the 
notice of claim indisputably did not meet constitutional requirements and was, 
on its face, invalid as a governmental claim, thereby entitling the appellee to 
judgment as a matter of law.  
Id.  
And finally, the district court appropriately dismissed with 
prejudice, inasmuch as it was then impossible for the appellants to comply with 
the mandatory filing deadline of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113, which is a 
substantive non-claim statute, rather than a procedural statute of 
limitations.  Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 25-36, 101 P.3d 465, 472-76 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
            
Equity

 
 
[¶6]      Because the 
record on appeal is so sparse, we have no way of knowing whether the appellants' 
estoppel and laches arguments were raised below and, if so, how they were 
treated by the district court.  We 
suspect, given the jurisdictional dismissal, that they were not considered by 
that court.  In this Court, the 
appellants' equitable arguments are supported largely by reference to their 
attorney's affidavit setting forth the amount of time and money spent on the 
litigation.  This affidavit may or 
may not have been considered by the district court, and it played no part in its 
decision.  Because we agree with the 
jurisdictional dismissal, we will not further consider the equitable 
arguments.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶7]      The complaint in 
this action is based upon an invalid governmental claim.  That fact deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction to consider the matter on the merits.  Because we can have no better 
jurisdiction than did the district court, we dismiss this appeal.  Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, 
¶ 23, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 2004).

  

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶8]      I dissent because I am convinced that the 
holding of Beaulieu 
v. Florquist, 2004 WY 
31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu 
II), 
relating 
to subject matter jurisdiction, should not be retroactively applied in this 
case.

 
 

[¶9]      In Beaulieu II, this Court determined that 
a failure to comply with the execution and certification requirements of 
Article 
16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution created a subject matter jurisdiction 
defect.  In so holding, the Court 
specifically overruled Martinez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 
1990), which held that a failure to properly verify or certify a governmental 
claim as required by Article 
16, § 7 "is nothing more than a defect or irregularity that is not 
jurisdictional."  Beaulieu II, 
¶¶12-13.

 
 

[¶10]   In 
Wooster 
v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 
47, ____ P.3d. ____ (Wyo. 2005), 
this 
Court declined to limit Beaulieu II 
to prospective application and affirmed summary judgment against Mr. Wooster 
because he had failed to comply with Article 16, § 7.  In justifying its decision, the Court 
stated:

 
 

The 
dissent contends that the erroneous holding of Martinez should be applied to the instant case 
to save the appellant's invalid claim, because Martinez was not overruled until Beaulieu II in 2004.  We decline to do so, for three 
reasons.  First, as recited above, 
the appellant's notice of claim was presented to the appellee sixteen months 
after 
the publication of Beaulieu I, 
where we clearly announced that, to be valid, 
governmental claims had to be signed by the claimant and certified to under the 
penalty of perjury.  

 
 

Wooster, 
¶18.  

 
 

[¶11]   In 
this case, all essential facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction must be 
determined predate Beaulieu 
v. 
Florquist, 2001 WY 
33, 20 P.3d 521 (Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu I).  
The incident upon which appellants' claim is based occurred in 
July, 1998.  Appellants presented 
their Notice of Claim in June, 1999.  
They commenced this action by filing their complaint in May, 2000.  Beaulieu I was decided in 2001.  The factual predicate which provides the 
foundation for the majority's decision to allow retroactive application in 
Wooster is absent 
here.

 
 

[¶12]   Pursuant 
to Martinez, 
appellee was required to timely raise lack of compliance with Article 16, § 7 as 
a defense to the claim.  
Failure 
to timely assert the defense resulted in waiver of the defense.  Martinez, 791 P.2d  at 958.  Appellee did not raise the defense until 
April, 2004, nearly four years after litigation had 
commenced.

 
 
[¶13]   Prior to Wooster, we consistently rejected retroactive 
application of a new rule of law when such application would produce substantial 
inequitable results.  Wooster, ¶¶24-28 (Burke, J., dissenting).  In making a determination as to whether 
a decision of this Court should be applied retroactively, we employ a three part 
test:

 
 
First, 
the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of 
law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have 
relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not 
clearly foreshadowed.  Second, it 
has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case 
by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, 
and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."  Linkletter v. Walker, [381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 
14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965)].  Finally, we 
have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a 
decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied 
retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or 
hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."  Cipriano v. City of Houma, [395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 1900, 
23 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1969)].  

 
 

Hanesworth 
v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 177 (Wyo. 
1989) (emphasis omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Application of that test 
inescapably leads to the conclusion that Beaulieu II should not be applied 
retroactively in this case.3

 
 

a.                  
Beaulieu 
II created 
new law by overruling the clear past precedent of Martinez.

 
 

b.                  
There is 
no valid purpose to be served by retroactive application.

 
 

c.                  
Retroactive 
application produces substantial inequitable results in this case.  Appellants are prevented from having 
their case determined on the merits.  
Appellee, which waived its Article 16, § 7 compliance defense, is 
fortuitously released from potential liability for its wrongful acts.

 
 
[¶15]   In summary, Wooster is 
factually distinguishable and is not binding precedent with respect to the issue 
of retroactive application of Beaulieu 
II in this case.  Appellants 
meet the three requirements of the Hanesworth test and are entitled to 
protection from retroactive application of Beaulieu II.  The decision of the district court 
should be reversed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides as follows:

 
 
No money 
shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on 
warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands against 
the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a 
full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall 
be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the 
same.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

2None of 
the following were included in the record on appeal, leaving a considerable gap 
in this Court's ability to understand what happened below:  the appellants' traverse to the motion 
to dismiss, the appellee's response to that traverse, and the hearing 
transcript.  We do not know, for 
instance, whether the district court considered the affidavit of the appellants' 
counsel.

3See the 
dissent in Wooster for 
further discussion of proper application of the Hanesworth test as it relates to the 
holding of Beaulieu II.  Wooster, ¶¶­­­­ 28-50.