Title: McCloud v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DEREK LAMONT MCCLOUD 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 041200 
    JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
March 3, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA∗
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., Judge 
 
Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.6(A), the Commonwealth 
petitioned the Circuit Court of Prince William County (trial 
court) to civilly commit Derek Lamont McCloud, a prison inmate, 
as a sexually violent predator.  Subsequently, a jury rendered a 
unanimous verdict determining McCloud to be a sexually violent 
predator as defined in Code § 37.1-70.1.  Following a 
determination of McCloud’s treatment needs and that alternatives 
to involuntary confinement and treatment were unsuitable, the 
trial court ordered that McCloud be committed to the custody of 
the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment and 
confinement pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.9(C). 
                     
∗ In the trial court this case was styled “Jerry W. Kilgore, 
Attorney General of Virginia, ex rel. Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Derek Lamont McCloud.”  We have amended the style of the case 
to reflect that the Commonwealth is the direct party in 
interest, not a relator.  See Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
___, ___ n.*, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ n.* (2005) (today decided). 
 
 
McCloud has appealed that judgment, asserting that the 
trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider evidence of 
his convictions for crimes other than sexually violent offenses 
defined in Code § 37.1-70.1, that the trial court erred in 
finding that there was no suitable less restrictive alternative 
to involuntary institutional confinement, and that the trial 
court erred in considering McCloud’s failure to present an 
alternative treatment plan to justify his involuntary 
commitment.  McCloud seeks a new trial as a result of these 
asserted errors.  The Commonwealth, by assignments of cross-
error, asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to admit 
evidence of all McCloud’s institutional infractions and in 
qualifying and permitting McCloud’s expert witness to testify. 
BACKGROUND 
Between late 1988 and early 1989, McCloud was convicted in 
the trial court of two counts of rape, one count of abduction, 
and one count of indecent liberties.  For these felony offenses, 
McCloud received sentences totaling eighty-seven years’ 
imprisonment with fifty-five years suspended.  Because certain 
of McCloud’s sentences were ordered to run concurrently, his 
total active time to serve following these convictions was 
seventeen years and six months. 
On March 13, 2003, as required by Code § 37.1-70.4(C), the 
Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections notified the 
2 
Commitment Review Committee (CRC) that McCloud was scheduled to 
be released from prison on November 16, 2003, and had been 
identified through testing as being likely to commit sexually 
violent offenses in the future.  Dr. Daniel Sheneman, a forensic 
clinical psychiatrist and sexual offender treatment provider, 
conducted an examination of McCloud as required by Code § 37.1-
70.5(B).  The CRC completed its assessment of McCloud for 
possible commitment and, on June 12, 2003, forwarded to the 
Attorney General a recommendation that McCloud be committed as a 
sexually violent predator. 
The Attorney General, on behalf of the Commonwealth, filed 
a petition in the trial court for the civil commitment of 
McCloud as a sexually violent predator on September 9, 2003.  
Following the appointment of counsel, pursuant to Code § 37.1-
70.2, McCloud filed a motion requesting that Dr. Jerome J. 
Miller be appointed as a mental health expert, pursuant to Code 
§ 37.1-70.8, to assist McCloud on the matters relating to his 
mental health.  Dr. Miller is a licensed clinical social worker 
who holds a doctorate in social work “with a psychiatric 
emphasis.” 
On November 7, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing as 
required by Code § 37.1-70.7 and determined that there was 
probable cause to believe that McCloud is a sexually violent 
predator.  During that hearing, the trial court also heard 
3 
argument on McCloud’s motion for appointment of Dr. Miller as 
McCloud’s mental health expert.  The Commonwealth opposed this 
motion because Dr. Miller is not a licensed psychiatrist or a 
licensed clinical psychologist.  The Commonwealth contended 
that, because Code § 37.1-70.5(B) requires a licensed 
psychiatrist or psychologist to conduct the CRC’s evaluation of 
McCloud, any expert appointed to assist McCloud was subject to 
the same requirement.  The trial court granted McCloud’s motion 
for appointment of Dr. Miller, noting that the Commonwealth 
could challenge Dr. Miller’s qualifications at trial.  Pursuant 
to Code § 37.1-70.9(B), McCloud requested a trial by jury on the 
Commonwealth’s petition for his civil commitment. 
Prior to trial, McCloud filed a motion in limine seeking to 
prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of his 
criminal convictions for abduction and indecent liberties.  
McCloud contended that the Commonwealth should be limited to 
proving only convictions of predicate violent sexual offenses as 
defined by Code § 37.1-70.1.  McCloud also sought to prohibit 
the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of institutional 
infractions committed while he was incarcerated. 
On February 2, 2004, the trial court commenced a jury trial 
on the Commonwealth’s petition.1  Prior to seating the jury, the 
                     
1 As discussed infra, pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.9(C), the 
jury’s role was to determine whether McCloud met the definition 
4 
trial court heard argument on McCloud’s motion in limine.  The 
trial court ruled that the Commonwealth would be allowed to 
present evidence of the convictions for abduction and indecent 
liberties as well as evidence of those institutional infractions 
involving prohibited “sexual advances.”  The trial court 
prohibited the presentation of evidence of an infraction 
involving only an attempted sexual act or any nonsexual act.  
The trial court reasoned that the convictions for abduction and 
indecent liberties and the infractions involving prohibited 
sexual behavior were relevant because they tended to show 
McCloud’s predatory nature. 
In the status determination phase of the trial, the 
Commonwealth introduced certified copies of the orders 
reflecting McCloud’s convictions and the sentences imposed for 
the rapes, abduction, and indecent liberties offenses.  Dr. 
Sheneman testified, based upon a review of records maintained by 
the Department of Corrections regarding McCloud’s personal and 
criminal background, a clinical interview with McCloud, and 
various diagnostic tests, that McCloud suffers from “antisocial 
                                                                  
of a sexually violent predator under Code § 37.1-70.1.  The 
nature of treatment McCloud would receive if the jury so found 
would be determined by the trial court.  The parties accordingly 
agreed to bifurcate the presentation of the evidence.  We will 
refer to the jury stage of the trial as the “status 
determination phase” and the subsequent proceedings before the 
trial court alone as the “treatment determination phase.” 
 
5 
personality disorder.”  Dr. Sheneman also testified concerning 
McCloud’s institutional infractions that involved prohibited 
sexual behavior.  In addition, Cindy Collins, a criminal records 
manager with the Department of Corrections, testified, in accord 
with the trial court’s prior ruling, that McCloud had incurred 
three disciplinary actions for prohibited sexual behavior while 
incarcerated, two for making “sexual advances towards others” 
and one for “indecent exposure.”2  McCloud did not introduce any 
evidence at this stage of the trial. 
After hearing argument of counsel and being instructed by 
the trial court, the jurors were provided with an interrogatory 
verdict form directing them to determine whether McCloud was a 
sexually violent predator.  During deliberations, the jury sent 
out four questions to the trial court, including one question 
concerning the “time frames/dates of the sexual institutional 
infractions committed by Mr. McCloud.”  The trial court answered 
this question by advising the jurors that they should rely on 
their collective memories as to what facts were presented 
                     
2 Because the issues raised in this appeal relevant to this 
phase of the trial are limited to the effect of the trial 
court’s ruling on McCloud’s motion in limine and the limitation 
placed upon the Commonwealth’s presentation of all of McCloud’s 
institutional infractions, we need not relate in detail the 
entire testimony of Dr. Sheneman that supports the jury’s 
determination that McCloud is a sexually violent predator.  
McCloud does not directly challenge the jury’s determination 
and, accordingly, we do not address that issue in this appeal. 
 
6 
concerning the infractions.  The jury returned its verdict 
finding that McCloud meets the definition of a sexually violent 
predator. 
During the treatment determination phase, the Commonwealth 
recalled Dr. Sheneman who then testified that in his opinion 
“in-patient treatment would be more appropriate for” McCloud.  
Dr. Sheneman testified that he was “not familiar with what [form 
of out-patient treatment] is available” in Prince William 
County, but opined that regardless of the form of out-patient 
treatment, McCloud would be at “risk for non-compliance and 
inability to follow the program [and] that would not be an issue 
if he were an in-patient.”  Although no plan for treating 
McCloud by medication had yet been developed, Dr. Sheneman 
opined that “if that route were to be taken, [it should be] done 
on an in-patient basis so that they could accurately see what 
treatments were effective more consistently through 
observation.”  Dr. Sheneman further testified that he believed 
“McCloud presents a risk to public safety if he were to be 
released” immediately, but that if held for in-patient 
treatment, he might be ready for release to an out-patient 
program “[p]robably [within] a few months” if he “participated 
to the utmost” in the in-patient treatment. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Sheneman conceded it was possible 
that with “enough structure in Mr. McCloud’s life . . . out-
7 
patient treatment [could be] successful.”  However, he 
reiterated that McCloud “would not be able to participate in as 
much treatment as he would have available to him on an in-
patient basis.” 
Dr. Miller was called to testify for McCloud.  Dr. Miller 
testified that after obtaining his doctorate in social work he 
worked in various professional, governmental, and academic 
settings.  In 1979, Dr. Miller founded the National Center on 
Institutions and Alternatives, which is devoted to developing 
alternatives to in-patient treatment for institutionalized 
persons.  In 1984, Dr. Miller founded the Augustus Institute, 
which provides clinical services for sex offenders.  Dr. Miller 
testified that he serves on the board of the Institute for the 
Study, Prevention, and Treatment of Sexual Trauma at Johns 
Hopkins University.  Dr. Miller is a licensed clinical social 
worker and is certified by Virginia as a sex offender treatment 
provider. 
The Commonwealth renewed its objection to having Dr. Miller 
testify on the ground that he was not a licensed psychiatrist or 
licensed clinical psychologist.  The trial court agreed that Dr. 
Miller could not testify concerning “any evaluations as to 
different psychosis . . . but I think he can testify with 
regards to socialization issues.”  Accordingly, the trial court 
8 
overruled the Commonwealth’s objection and permitted Dr. Miller 
to testify. 
Dr. Miller testified that he had interviewed McCloud and 
reviewed his mental health records.  Dr. Miller opined that 
McCloud’s violent tendencies were the result of his use of PCP 
and other psychedelic drugs.  Dr. Miller further opined that 
McCloud’s antisocial tendencies would decrease with age.  Dr. 
Miller also testified that he believed that “sex offenders . . . 
do not recidivate at the rates commonly understood.” 
Dr. Miller maintained that McCloud “would do well in [out-
patient] therapy” and “would be very treatable with a good 
community program.”  Dr. Miller further maintained that he would 
be willing to provide services for McCloud through the Augustus 
Institute or to refer him for treatment elsewhere. 
McCloud’s father, Fred W. McCloud, Jr., testified that he 
and his wife would be willing to provide McCloud with a place to 
live and transportation if he were permitted to receive 
treatment as an out-patient.  McCloud’s father stated that he 
was financially able to provide for such treatment for his son.  
He further testified that if McCloud failed in his treatment 
obligations, “[my] wife and I would get all over him about it 
and then if we saw that he continued to do something wrong it 
would be reported” to McCloud’s probation officer or the trial 
court. 
9 
At the conclusion of the treatment determination phase, the 
trial court found that the Commonwealth had “investigated less 
restrictive alternatives to involuntary institutional 
confinement and treatment [and] that in the context of this 
case, these less[] restrictive alternatives to involuntary 
institutionalization are unsuitable at this time.”  Accordingly, 
the trial court ruled that “the government met its burden of 
proof” and ordered that McCloud be placed in the custody of the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services for in-patient treatment as required by Code 
§ 37.1-70.10.  On February 21, 2004, the trial court entered an 
order committing McCloud as a sexually violent predator.  This 
appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
This case, along with Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___ (2005) (today decided) and Commonwealth v. Allen, 
269 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2005) (today decided), presents the 
first opportunity for this Court to review the procedures 
required to be followed in order for the Commonwealth to have a 
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
declared to be a sexually violent predator and to have that 
person involuntarily committed to a secure mental health 
facility upon his release from prison.  The statutory scheme 
embodying those procedures is set out in Chapter 2, Article 1.1 
10 
of Title 37.1, commonly referred to as the Sexually Violent 
Predators Act (SVPA).  Code § 37.1-70.1 through Code § 37.1-
70.19.  Of the three SVPA cases we decide today, we have 
selected this case to review in more detail the procedures of 
the SVPA as well as the standards to be applied in the trial 
court in considering whether to commit a person determined to be 
a sexually violent predator. 
Code § 37.1-70.1 defines a “sexually violent predator” as 
“any person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense or has been charged with a sexually violent offense and 
is unrestorably incompetent to stand trial pursuant to § 19.2-
169.3 and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior 
which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.”3  The 
statute further defines a “sexually violent offense” as “a 
felony conviction under . . . §§ 18.2-61 [rape], 18.2-67.1 
[forcible sodomy], or § 18.2-67.2 [object sexual penetration] or 
subdivision A 1 of § 18.2-67.3 [aggravated sexual battery]” or a 
conviction under the law of the Commonwealth for certain types 
of forcible sexual offenses committed prior to July 1, 1981.  A 
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is defined for 
                     
3 This case and those referenced above involve convicted 
persons (prisoners) rather than persons incompetent to stand 
trial (defendants).  See Code § 37.1-70.2.  For clarity, we will 
use the designation of “prisoner” hereafter in this opinion. 
11 
purposes of the SVPA as “a congenital or acquired condition that 
affects a person’s emotional or volitional capacity and renders 
the person so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he 
constitutes a menace to the health and safety of others.” 
The SVPA involves the potential involuntary loss of a 
prisoner’s liberty.  Although a proceeding under the SVPA is a 
civil one, a prisoner subject to the SVPA is afforded certain 
rights generally applicable to criminal proceedings.  These 
include the right to receive adequate notice of the proceeding; 
to be represented by counsel; to remain silent or to testify; to 
be present during the hearing or trial; to present evidence and 
to cross-examine witnesses; and, to view and copy all petitions 
and reports in the court file.  Code § 37.1-70.2.  The prisoner, 
however, is not permitted to challenge the validity of his prior 
criminal sentences or institutional convictions.  Id.  In 
addition, the prisoner has “the right to employ experts at his 
own expense to perform examinations and testify on his behalf” 
or to request that the trial court appoint such experts for him 
as are “deem[ed] necessary” by the trial court.4  Code § 37.1-
70.8(A). 
                     
4 In 2004, Code § 37.1-70.8(A) was amended to require that 
any expert appointed to assist a respondent “shall have the 
qualifications required by subsection B of § 37.1-70.5.”  Acts 
2004, ch. 764.  Code § 37.1-70.5(B) sets the qualifications for 
the professional designated by the CRC to perform the mental 
health examination of a prisoner identified as being subject to 
12 
The prisoner may request a trial by jury, as may the 
Commonwealth.  Code § 37.1-70.9(B).  As in this case, when a 
jury trial is conducted, the jury’s role is to determine whether 
the prisoner is a sexually violent predator as statutorily 
defined.  The ultimate determination whether a prisoner 
determined to be a sexually violent predator will be subject to 
involuntary confinement or some less restrictive form of 
treatment remains vested in the trial court.  Code § 37.1-
70.9(C). 
The process for determining whether a prisoner will be 
committed under the SVPA begins when the Director of the 
Department of Corrections identifies a prisoner, who is serving 
a sentence for a sexually violent offense and is scheduled for 
release within ten months, as being likely to commit future acts 
of sexual violence based upon initial screening conducted by the 
Department.5  Any such prisoner must be referred to the CRC for 
further screening and assessment.  Code § 37.1-70.4(C). 
                                                                  
the SVPA and provides that the examination must be conducted by 
“a licensed psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist, 
designated by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental 
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services.”  A 
further provision of the amended version of Code § 37.1-70.8(A) 
provides that a privately employed expert need only be “a 
licensed psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist.” 
 
5 If a defendant charged with a sexually violent offense is 
adjudged to be unrestorably incompetent by the Director of the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services and is unable to stand trial for that reason, a 
13 
The CRC’s assessment of a prisoner referred to it by the 
Director “shall include a mental health examination, including a 
personal interview, of the prisoner by a licensed psychiatrist 
or a licensed clinical psychologist, designated by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, who is skilled in the 
diagnosis and treatment of mental abnormalities and disorders 
associated with violent sex offenders, and who is not a member 
of the CRC.”  Code § 37.1-70.5(B).  In addition to the report 
prepared by the professional performing the mental health 
examination of the prisoner, the CRC will include in its 
assessment the prisoner’s score on the screening test used by 
the Department of Corrections or a similar test and review “(i) 
the prisoner’s institutional history and treatment record, if 
any; (ii) the prisoner’s criminal background; and (iii) any 
                                                                  
recommendation is to be made to the trial court having 
jurisdiction over the defendant as to whether he should be 
committed pursuant to the SVPA.  Code § 19.2-169.3(A).  If the 
trial court determines that the defendant will not stand trial 
because he is unrestorably incompetent, the recommendation that 
he be committed as a sexually violent predator is referred 
directly to the Attorney General.  Code § 19.2-169.3(D).  If the 
Attorney General declines to seek commitment of the defendant as 
a sexually violent predator, the case will be remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with the 
treatment of unrestorably incompetent criminal defendants.  Id.  
The procedures for commitment as a sexually violent predator of 
an unrestorably incompetent defendant are comparable to those 
applicable to a prisoner incarcerated for a sexually violent 
offense. 
 
14 
other factor which is relevant to the determination of whether 
such prisoner is a sexually violent predator.”  Id.
Upon completion of the assessment, the CRC is required to 
forward the report of the professional performing the mental 
health examination of the prisoner and all relevant records 
relating to the assessment to the Attorney General.  The CRC 
must also make a recommendation that the “prisoner (i) be 
committed as a sexually violent predator pursuant to this 
article; (ii) not be committed, but be placed in a conditional 
release program as a less restrictive alternative; or (iii) not 
be committed because he does not meet the definition of a 
sexually violent predator.”  Code § 37.1-70.5(C).  In order to 
recommend that a prisoner be placed in a conditional release 
program, the CRC must “find[] that (i) such prisoner does not 
need inpatient hospitalization, but needs outpatient treatment 
and monitoring to prevent his condition from deteriorating to a 
degree that he would need inpatient hospitalization; (ii) 
appropriate outpatient supervision and treatment are reasonably 
available; (iii) there is significant reason to believe that the 
prisoner, if conditionally released, would comply with the 
conditions specified; and (iv) conditional release will not 
present an undue risk to public safety.”  Code § 37.1-70.5(D). 
Upon receipt of the recommendation and supporting 
documentation from the CRC, the Attorney General must determine 
15 
within 90 days whether to file a petition seeking the civil 
commitment of the prisoner as a sexually violent predator upon 
his release from prison.  Code § 37.1-70.6(A).  The petition is 
to be “filed in the circuit court wherein the prisoner was last 
convicted of a sexually violent offense.”  Id.  A copy of the 
petition is to be served on “the warden or superintendent of the 
correctional facility wherein the person is then confined” and 
delivered to the prisoner.  Code § 37.1-70.7(A).  Additionally, 
the prisoner is to be given “a written explanation of the 
sexually violent predator involuntary commitment process and the 
statutory protections associated with the process.”  Id.
Upon the filing of the petition by the Attorney General, 
the circuit court must enter an order directing that the 
prisoner will “remain in the secure custody of the Department of 
Corrections” until a final order is entered on the petition, 
even if such time extends beyond the prisoner’s scheduled date 
of release from prison.  Code § 37.1-70.7(A).  The circuit court 
then must conduct a probable cause hearing within 60 days to 
determine whether there is a sufficient basis “to believe that 
the person named in the petition is a sexually violent 
predator.”  Id.  Prior to that hearing, the circuit court must 
assure that the prisoner has the opportunity to retain counsel 
or, if he has not had such opportunity or cannot afford to 
retain counsel, the court will appoint counsel for him.  Code 
16 
§ 37.1-70.7(B).  If the circuit court finds that there is 
probable cause to believe that the prisoner is a sexually 
violent predator, it must conduct a trial on the Commonwealth’s 
petition within 90 days of that determination.  Code § 37.1-
70.9(A). 
At trial, the Commonwealth is required by Code § 37.1-
70.9(C) to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the 
prisoner is a sexually violent predator as defined by Code 
§ 37.1-70.1.  Upon such a finding by the circuit court, or by 
the jury if a jury trial was conducted, “the court shall then 
determine the nature of treatment the person is to receive.”  
Id.  Before ordering that the prisoner be committed to a secure 
mental health facility, the circuit court must find “that 
alternatives to involuntary confinement and treatment have been 
investigated and deemed unsuitable and there is no less 
restrictive alternative to institutional confinement and 
treatment.”  Id.  If the circuit court finds that involuntary 
confinement is not required, the case is continued in order for 
the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services to provide a report 
“suggesting possible alternatives to full commitment.”6  Id.
                     
6 The SVPA contains further provisions for the placement of 
prisoners found to be sexually violent predators in a secure 
mental health facility, the procedures for review of the 
continuation of their confinement and for prisoners so confined 
17 
Applying this statutory scheme, we turn to our 
consideration of the issues raised by McCloud and the 
Commonwealth in this appeal.  We will consider assignments of 
error and cross-error in the order in which the issues to which 
they relate arose in the trial court, beginning with the pre-
trial rulings on the admissibility of evidence in the status 
determination phase to prove that McCloud is a sexually violent 
predator.  Specifically, McCloud has assigned error to the trial 
court’s ruling permitting the Commonwealth to adduce evidence of 
his convictions for abduction and indecent liberties because 
those offenses are not defined by Code § 37.1-70.1 as sexually 
violent offenses.  The Commonwealth has assigned cross-error to 
the trial court’s ruling to limit its introduction of certain 
evidence concerning McCloud’s institutional infractions. 
To support his first assertion of error, McCloud relies on 
the principle applicable to criminal trials that generally bars 
the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of other crimes or 
bad acts by a defendant to prove his guilt of the crime charged.  
See, e.g., Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 462, 470 S.E.2d 
114, 127 (1996); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 
                                                                  
to petition for release, and penalties for escape from a secure 
mental health facility or violation of conditional release 
status.  Because these provisions of the statutory scheme are 
not at issue in any of the cases presently under consideration 
by this Court, we need not describe those provisions in further 
detail. 
18 
176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).  McCloud further relies on the 
principle that “ ‘a judgment of conviction or acquittal in a 
criminal prosecution does not establish in a subsequent civil 
action the truth of the facts on which it was rendered . . . and 
such judgment of conviction or acquittal is not admissible in 
evidence.’ ”  Godbolt v. Brawley, 250 Va. 467, 470, 463 S.E.2d 
657, 659 (1995) (quoting Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 
466, 472, 111 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1959)).  McCloud’s reliance on 
both of these principles is misplaced. 
“Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or 
is pertinent to, matters in issue.”  Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 
Va. 253, 257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001); see also Barkley v. 
Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 373, 595 S.E.2d 271, 273 (2004); Velocity 
Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 205, 585 
S.E.2d 557, 566-67 (2003).  In determining whether relevant 
evidence should be admitted, the trial court must apply a 
balancing test to assess the probative value of the evidence and 
any undue prejudicial effect of that evidence.  Dandridge v. 
Marshall, 267 Va. 591, 596, 594 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2004); Brugh v. 
Jones, 265 Va. 136, 140, 574 S.E.2d 282, 284-85 (2003).  The 
Commonwealth’s burden in a proceeding under the SVPA is to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence both that the prisoner has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense and because of a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder, the prisoner finds it 
19 
difficult to control his predatory behavior which makes the 
prisoner likely to engage in sexually violent acts in the 
future.  Thus, evidence that tends to prove or is otherwise 
pertinent to either of those elements is relevant.  Beyond 
question, evidence that McCloud had been convicted of an 
abduction related to a rape and evidence that he had been 
convicted for indecent liberties were pertinent to the question 
whether McCloud was likely to commit sexually violent acts in 
the future and, thus, were relevant. 
The determination to admit such relevant evidence rested 
within the trial court’s sound discretion and will only be 
disturbed on appeal upon a showing of an abuse of that 
discretion.  Dandridge, 267 Va. at 596, 594 S.E.2d at 581; 
Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484, 492, 551 S.E.2d 349, 353 
(2001).  McCloud’s conviction for abduction was inextricably 
connected with his conviction for the rape; both offenses 
occurred during the same series of events.  Thus, the abduction 
is highly probative of predatory behavior.  McCloud’s conviction 
for indecent liberties occurred in relative proximity to his 
other convictions for sexual offenses, and is highly probative 
of his inability to control his impulsive sexual behavior.  Any 
prejudicial effect this evidence might have had on the minds of 
the jurors was far outweighed by its probative value on the 
issue to be determined by the jury.  Accordingly, we hold that 
20 
the trial court did not err in permitting admission of this 
evidence.7
In its assignment of cross-error, the Commonwealth contends 
that the trial court erred in limiting the introduction of 
evidence concerning McCloud’s misbehavior while in prison to 
instances of infractions for prohibited sexual behavior.  The 
Commonwealth contends that because a prisoner subject to the 
SVPA will have been incarcerated for many years prior to the 
time of the trial on the petition seeking his commitment, 
evidence of his behavior while incarcerated is the best evidence 
available to the Commonwealth to establish whether he has the 
ability to control his predatory impulses or is likely to re-
offend.  This is particularly true, the Commonwealth contends, 
because a person unable to control his behavior within the rigid 
structure of a prison, where presumably misbehavior is 
immediately discovered and punished, will be even less likely to 
be able to control his behavior once he is returned to free 
                     
7 There is simply no merit to McCloud’s reliance upon 
Godbolt.  Its discussion and holding with respect to 
admissibility of prior criminal proceedings related to the 
collateral estoppel use in a later civil suit of facts allegedly 
determined in a prior criminal proceeding.  See 250 Va. at 470, 
463 S.E.2d at 659 (discussing the mutuality requirement and same 
object/same results tests).  That decision also turned upon the 
rules relating to the use of a criminal conviction where a 
convicted defendant seeks to recover as a plaintiff in a civil 
suit for the very wrong he perpetrated.  Id. at 471, 463 S.E.2d 
at 660. 
 
21 
society.  Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that in addition to 
evidence of McCloud’s sexual misbehavior, the trial court should 
also have permitted introduction of all McCloud’s infractions, 
or at least permitted it to present evidence of the number of 
infractions he committed. 
The record in this case reflects that McCloud incurred 
eighty-two institutional infractions over a period of years.  
Those infractions, other than those the trial court admitted 
into evidence, ranged in degree of apparent severity from 
“disregarding a direct order” to “assault” and “possession of a 
weapon.”  The record contains no details regarding the 
circumstances involved in these infractions.  The trial court in 
limiting the Commonwealth’s evidence to infractions for 
prohibited sexual behavior reasoned that the other infractions 
would not be probative of McCloud’s predatory behavior and that 
simply permitting the Commonwealth’s witness to recite the 
number of infractions without giving the specifics of the 
circumstances involved “might mislead the jury.”  We are of 
opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
limiting the Commonwealth’s evidence in this manner.  It simply 
cannot be reasonably concluded that a prisoner who violates an 
institutional rule while incarcerated such as disregarding a 
direct order or “being in an unauthorized area” is likely to 
commit a sexually violent offense or other criminal offense upon 
22 
his release from prison.  Science has yet to reach that degree 
of accuracy in prediction and in its absence such evidence, if 
not confusing to a jury, would only be prejudicial in its 
presentation to the jury. 
We now consider the Commonwealth’s assignment of cross-
error concerning the qualification of Dr. Miller as an expert 
witness for McCloud during the treatment determination phase of 
the trial.  Initially, we note that the Commonwealth’s concerns 
underlying this assignment of error have been addressed by the 
recent amendment to Code § 37.1-70.5(A) which, as we have noted 
above, now provides that any expert appointed to assist a 
prisoner subject to a SVPA petition “shall have the 
qualifications required by subsection B of § 37.1-70.5.”  
Because the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court and in 
light of our ultimate resolution of McCloud’s appeal, the issue 
of Dr. Miller’s qualification as an expert by the trial court in 
this case is moot.  Accordingly, we will not address this issue 
further in this opinion. 
We turn now to consider McCloud’s remaining two assignments 
of error.  These relate to the trial court’s finding that less 
restrictive alternatives to involuntary confinement were 
investigated and deemed unsuitable and whether the trial court 
improperly shifted the burden of showing that such alternatives 
were available to McCloud when, according to McCloud, it 
23 
implicitly based its decision to have him involuntary confined 
in part on his failure to present a specific plan for 
alternative treatment. 
With respect to the first issue, McCloud essentially 
contends that the evidence introduced at the treatment 
determination phase of his trial does not support the trial 
court’s finding that alternatives to involuntary confinement 
have been investigated and deemed unsuitable as required by Code 
§ 37.1-70.9(C).  To the extent that McCloud suggests that the 
language of this statute imposes in every case a requirement 
upon the Commonwealth to propose specific alternatives to 
commitment and then to show that they are unsuitable, we 
disagree.  We have no reservation in concluding that the General 
Assembly did not intend to impose such a futile requirement upon 
the Commonwealth in cases where out-patient treatment of a 
sexually violent predator is not indicated by expert opinion. 
Nevertheless, McCloud contends that Dr. Sheneman’s 
testimony does not establish that out-patient treatment would be 
unsuitable, particularly when considered in conjunction with the 
testimony of Dr. Miller and McCloud’s father.  Again, we 
disagree.  While the trial court was required to consider all 
the evidence in determining the nature of the treatment McCloud 
is to receive, under familiar principles the trial court was 
entitled to resolve any conflicts in that evidence and to accord 
24 
the testimony of each witness the weight it determined to be 
appropriate.  Dr. Sheneman testified that out-patient treatment 
was not appropriate for McCloud.  He indicated specific concerns 
with McCloud’s ability to comply with rules and opined that 
McCloud’s lack of insight into his personality disorder would 
interfere with his receiving treatment unless he was in a 
setting in which his behavior was controlled and monitored.  
This evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude 
that alternatives to involuntary confinement had been 
investigated by the Commonwealth and were found to be 
unsuitable. 
With regard to the second issue, McCloud contends that when 
the trial court ruled in its summation that “no medication 
regimen, no specific diagnosis, no positive regimen for Mr. 
McCloud’s acknowledged substance abuse issues, no behavioral 
adaptation or precise plan for Mr. McCloud’s reintegration into 
the community can be presented at this time,” it implicitly 
imposed upon McCloud the burden of providing such a plan to the 
trial court for consideration.  McCloud contends that the trial 
court “us[ed] McCloud’s failure to present a conditional release 
plan at the dispositional phase of the trial as a reason for 
imposing institutional confinement.” 
McCloud is correct that the burden of proving that there is 
no suitable less restrictive alternative to involuntary 
25 
confinement rests with the Commonwealth, and that burden cannot 
be shifted to the prisoner.  However, when, as here, the 
Commonwealth has adduced evidence sufficient to satisfy the 
trial court that involuntary confinement is necessary and, thus, 
less restrictive alternatives are unsuitable, the prisoner then 
has the burden of going forward with his case if he is to rebut 
the Commonwealth’s evidence.  See Shope v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
203, 205, 321 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1984). 
We find nothing in the trial court’s statement referenced 
by McCloud, or at any other point in the record, to support the 
contention that the trial court either required McCloud to 
produce a specific conditional release plan or that the trial 
court’s decision to order McCloud to be involuntarily confined 
was based on the failure of McCloud to present such a plan.  To 
the contrary, the statement cited by McCloud clearly indicates 
the trial court’s finding that it agreed with the Commonwealth 
that no such plan for conditional release could be developed at 
that time because involuntary confinement was the only suitable 
form of treatment for McCloud.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
trial court did not improperly shift to McCloud the burden of 
proving that there was a suitable alternative to involuntary 
confinement. 
CONCLUSION 
26 
For the reasons stated with regard to each of McCloud’s 
assignments of error and the Commonwealth’s assignments of 
cross-error, we hold that there is no error in the judgment of 
the trial court that McCloud is a sexually violent predator 
requiring treatment through involuntary confinement in a secure 
mental health facility.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial 
court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
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