Title: Attorney Grievance v. Fineblum

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Charles Allan Fineblum, Misc. Docket 
AG No. 3, September Term, 2020 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — SUSPENSION 
Respondent, Charles Allan Fineblum, violated Maryland’s Rules of Professional Conduct 
1.4, 1.15, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 8.4, along with Maryland Rules 19-407 and 19-408.  These 
violations arose from his delegation of significant responsibilities in personal injury matters 
to an independent paralegal firm; his lack of supervision over that paralegal firm and his 
clients’ cases; his sharing of fees with that firm; and his failure to properly manage his 
attorney trust account.  In light of the application of several mitigating factors, a suspension 
of six months and one day is the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County  
Case No. C-03-CV-20-001260 
Argued: February 1, 2021 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 3 
 
September Term, 2020 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES ALLAN FINEBLUM 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran 
 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Filed:  April 26, 2021 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-04-26 10:40-04:00
 
 
  
 
On March 18, 2020, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through 
Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, 
Charles Allan Fineblum.  The Petition concerned Respondent’s alleged failure to oversee 
the work of an independent paralegal firm, the improper sharing of legal fees with that 
firm, his lack of involvement in certain personal injury clients’ cases, and the mishandling 
of his attorney trust account.  Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent’s conduct constituted 
violations of Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct1 (“MARPC”) 1.1 
(Competence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.15(a) and (b) (Safekeeping Property), 
5.3(a), (b), and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Non-Attorney Assistants), 5.4(a) 
(Professional Independence of an Attorney), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), and 
8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), in addition to Maryland Rules 19-407(a)(3), (a)(4), and 
(b) (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping) and 19-408 (Commingling Funds).  Bar 
Counsel also asserted that Respondent violated the prior versions of those rules.2 
 
1 At the beginning of the period of alleged misconduct, these rules were part of the 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and were codified in an 
appendix to Maryland Rule 16-812.  Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the 
Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and were recodified in Title 19 of the 
Maryland Rules.  See Maryland Rules 19-300.1 et seq.  As there is no substantive difference 
between the two codifications of the rules, we shall employ throughout this opinion the 
simpler version of the charged rule violations, as set forth in the MLRPC.  Consequently, 
where applicable we refer to charged violations, including those that are alleged to have 
occurred after recodification, by the form used in the MLRPC, e.g., “Rule 1.1” rather than 
“Maryland Rule 19-301.1.” 
 
2 In some instances, it is unclear based upon the record before us whether 
Respondent’s conduct violated the current version of a rule, the version in place prior to 
July of 2016, or both.  However, for the purpose of determining the proper sanction it is 
irrelevant which codification was in place at the time of the misconduct.  
 
 
 
2 
 
On March 20, 2020, this Court designated the Honorable John J. Nagle, III of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County to serve as the hearing judge.  On May 21, 2020, Bar 
Counsel served Respondent via authorized counsel with the following: a Writ of Summons 
issued on March 23, 2020 by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County; the Order of the 
Court of Appeals; and the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action.  On June 22, 2020, 
Respondent filed an Answer to Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action. 
The circuit court held the hearing remotely on September 9, 2020 using Zoom for 
Government.  After the parties made their opening statements, they submitted a Joint 
Statement of Stipulated Facts.  Bar Counsel did not call any witnesses and rested 
Petitioner’s case-in-chief after submitting twenty-five of its own exhibits, including a 
transcript of Respondent’s statement under oath, given on May 17, 2019.  The hearing 
judge then heard from the following character witnesses who appeared on Respondent’s 
behalf: the Honorable Sally C. Chester of the District Court of Maryland sitting in 
Baltimore County, Lee Jacobson, Esq., and C. Kelly Gordon, one of Respondent’s former 
clients.  The witnesses testified to Respondent’s integrity, honesty, and dedication to the 
practice of law.  Respondent also testified.  He stated that although he never knowingly 
violated any ethical rules, he accepted responsibility for his shortcomings and expressed 
regret and contrition for his actions. 
After the hearing, Petitioner withdrew the charge that Respondent’s conduct 
violated Rule 1.4(a), as well as the charges that Respondent’s conduct prior to July 1, 2016 
violated the predecessors to current Maryland Rules 19-301.15(a) and (b), 19-407(a)(3), 
 
 
 
3 
 
(a)(4), and (b), and 19-408.  On October 23, 2020, Judge Nagle issued his Statement of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  On November 12, 2020, Petitioner filed its 
Recommendation for Sanction, recommending that Respondent be indefinitely suspended.  
That same day Respondent filed his Exceptions and Recommendations, in which he 
advocated for a reprimand. 
We adopt in large part the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Based on Respondent’s rule violations found herein, as well as the aggravating and 
mitigating factors we have identified, we suspend Respondent for a period of six months 
and one day. 
I. 
The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact 
We summarize here the hearing judge’s findings of fact, which are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Background 
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on January 14, 1972.  After clerking 
for the Honorable Marshall Levin on the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Respondent 
served in the Office of the Public Defender before entering private practice full time.  
During the relevant period, from 2008 through 2018, and continuing through today, 
Respondent has practiced as a sole practitioner in Baltimore County, focusing primarily on 
“auto negligence, domestic work, DUI, [and] DWI” cases.  Since his admission, 
Respondent has had no history of attorney discipline.  
 
 
 
4 
 
Respondent’s Relationship with RT & Associates 
In June of 2008, William Ronald Tilghman formed a close corporation known as 
RT & Associates, Inc. (“RT & Associates”) with the express purpose of performing 
paralegal services.  Tilghman ran RT & Associates out of his home in Cockeysville, 
Maryland.  During the relevant time frame of 2008 through 2018, neither Tilghman nor the 
other employees of RT & Associates were licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, the hearing judge found that there was “no evidence that the Respondent ever 
affirmatively held Tilghman or anyone at RT & Associates out as attorneys or affirmatively 
represented to anyone that they were licensed to practice law in Maryland or elsewhere.” 
 
The hearing judge found that “[b]eginning at or about the time RT & Associates 
was formed in 2008 and continuing through 2018, Respondent utilized RT & Associates 
as an independent contractor to provide services in the processing and resolution of 
personal injury cases.”  Respondent acknowledged during Bar Counsel’s investigation that 
he delegated significant responsibility to RT & Associates regarding client 
communications and pre-litigation case management.  Respondent did not, however, have 
a formal written agreement with RT & Associates. 
 
Respondent’s “understanding of the agreement was that [RT & Associates] would 
work up cases and [Respondent’s] name would be listed as the attorney on the case.”  In 
correspondence sent to Bar Counsel during the investigation, Respondent described the 
general duties and responsibilities of RT & Associates as follows:  
[RT & Associates] performed such paralegal functions as client 
intake, preparing letters of representation for my signature, ordering and 
 
 
 
5 
 
compiling police reports and medical records, scheduling clients for medical 
treatment, processing PIP [i.e. personal injury protection] claims, and 
working with responsible insurance carriers to resolve property damage 
claims, rental cars, repairs, etc.  He also helped to prepare settlement 
demands and assisted in the resolution of bodily injury claims.  By 
outsourcing these tasks, I was able to obtain support services and resources 
similar to those of a much larger firm.  This has allowed me to focus more of 
my time on the preparation of cases for trial and similarly substantive tasks. 
 
* * * 
 
Although he was careful to identify himself as my legal assistant, Mr. 
Tilghman had extensive client communication to obtain information 
regarding the facts of the underlying accident, the completion of PIP 
applications, coordinating medical treatment, and handling property damage, 
repairs and rental car needs.  I found his assistance to be invaluable in 
assuring prompt service to the clients in the wake of an automobile accident. 
 
 
During his statement under oath, Respondent admitted that RT & Associates 
sometimes settled cases without his involvement.  Of those cases, Respondent stated that 
he was “mostly” aware of the clients, but did not know about “some” of them.  He also 
admitted that RT & Associates referred “75 to 80 percent” of his personal injury clients to 
him.  Respondent explained that RT & Associates would have a client matter “in their 
office, but everything was under [his] name as the sole attorney on the case.”  Respondent 
also stated that clients would generally contact RT & Associates prior to having contact 
with himself. 
 
According to Respondent, although the staff of RT & Associates occasionally 
worked in Respondent’s law office, they usually worked off site.  The staff maintained 
their own set of client files and provided Respondent with copies thereof.  Respondent also 
authorized the staff at RT & Associates to use Respondent’s letterhead at their discretion, 
 
 
 
6 
 
and he admitted that he often permitted them to sign his name to correspondence that he 
had not reviewed. 
Respondent’s Payments to RT & Associates 
Respondent did not have a formal fee arrangement with RT & Associates.  He also 
did not receive periodic billing invoices or statements of services rendered.  Rather, his 
practice was to compensate RT & Associates out of his trust account with the proceeds of 
his clients’ personal injury claims, “taking into account the extent of the support which 
[Tilghman] and his staff provided and the nature of the case itself.”  He admitted that prior 
to the investigation, in calculating what he believed to be the appropriate compensation to 
RT & Associates, he would also take into account the outcome of the case.  After 
consultation with his counsel in this proceeding, Respondent claims that he has abandoned 
this practice, and has not paid RT & Associates directly out of his trust account since the 
summer of 2018. 
During the course of the investigation, Respondent produced to Bar Counsel a 
schedule of the personal injury client matters in which his clients recovered on their claims 
from 2014 through 2018.3  For each matter, the table listed the settlement amount, the 
attorney’s fee, and the support expense paid to RT & Associates, which was deducted from 
the total attorney’s fee rather than charged to the client directly.  For almost every client 
matter listed the support expense was greater than the amount of the attorney’s fee retained 
 
3 The hearing judge described the schedule as running “from 2014 through 2017.”  
Although the precise end date of the table is unclear, it includes several pages of entries for 
2018. 
 
 
 
7 
 
by Respondent.  During his statement under oath, Respondent explained that this was 
because “the staff [at RT & Associates] normally in these cases performed mostly all of 
the work relative to the case.” 
Respondent’s tax filings show that between 2013 and 2017, Respondent: (i) paid 
RT & Associates, and (ii) reported profits or losses following deduction of expenses, as 
follows: 
 
Amount Respondent 
Paid RT & Associates 
Respondent’s Profits 
or Losses 
2013 
$141,218.00 
$23,140.00 
2014 
$174,918.00 
($7,051.00) 
2015 
$221,473.00 
($11,810.00) 
2016 
$311,773.00 
$2,459.00 
2017 
$308,384.00 
$26,785.00 
Sum 
$1,157,766.00 
$33,523.00 
 
Representation of Jeron Morris 
On December 28, 2017, Jeron Morris was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 
Baltimore City.  The following day he attempted to call Respondent’s law office and was 
connected to Tilghman.  They spoke about the injuries Morris sustained in the accident, 
and Morris provided Tilghman with his insurance information and that of the other driver.  
Following the call, RT & Associates faxed a Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) release form and a Retainer Agreement to Morris.  Morris 
then signed and returned the documents.  The heading on the Retainer Agreement listed 
Respondent’s name, and the document identified Respondent as Morris’s “attorney to 
 
 
 
8 
 
prosecute a claim for [p]ersonal injuries” against the other driver involved in the accident.  
No other attorney’s name appears on the agreement.  When Morris signed the Retainer 
Agreement on December 29, 2017, he became Respondent’s client until Morris ultimately 
terminated the relationship approximately forty days later. 
On January 26, 2018, Morris signed a document titled “Dismissal of Counsel,” 
which indicated that he was discharging Respondent as his attorney in relation to the motor 
vehicle accident.  That same day, Morris also retained The Killian Law Group, a law firm 
in Owings Mills, to represent him in the action going forward.  On or around February 6, 
2018, Alex Binder, Esquire of The Killian Law Group contacted Respondent, informing 
Respondent that his firm was replacing Respondent as Morris’s counsel.  Respondent only 
saw the discharge notice signed by Morris after Respondent’s conversation with Binder.  
Thereafter, on February 8, 2018, Respondent transmitted his client file in the Morris matter 
to Binder. 
During his statement under oath prior to the hearing, Respondent indicated that he 
did not know how Morris had contacted RT & Associates.  Respondent never met with or 
spoke to Morris during the period of representation, but he also never refused to 
communicate with him.  Morris never attempted to communicate directly with Respondent 
prior to terminating the representation. 
On or around February 15, 2018, Morris filed a complaint against “Ronald 
Tilghman” with the Attorney Grievance Commission.  In the complaint, he identified 
Tilghman as the “Paralegal of Charles A. Fineblum Attorney and Couselors [sic] at Law.”  
 
 
 
9 
 
That complaint caused Bar Counsel to initiate its investigation of Respondent and his 
relationship with RT & Associates.4 
Respondent’s Trust Account Practices 
During the relevant period, Respondent maintained an attorney trust account at 
Bank of America.  During the investigation, Bar Counsel subpoenaed the trust account 
records for January 2017 through January 2019.  Respondent admitted during his statement 
under oath prior to the hearing that he did not perform the requisite monthly reconciliations, 
as mandated by Maryland Rule 19-407(b). 
Respondent also admitted that the only written records he kept in relation to his trust 
account were his check stubs.  From those stubs, he claimed that he could identify which 
clients’ funds remained in the trust account at the end of any given month.  He admitted, 
though, that he could not account for every single cent in the trust account at month’s end.  
He acknowledged that his reconciliation practices were not “perfect,” but he stated that he 
was working to fix the deficiencies.  
 
4 At the hearing, Bar Counsel offered the complaint as an exhibit.  As Morris did 
not appear at the hearing, Respondent’s counsel objected to its admission as inadmissible 
hearsay and an improper substitute for the live testimony of a complainant who failed to 
appear for trial.  The hearing judge admitted the complaint not for the truth of its contents, 
but for the limited purpose of providing context for Respondent’s subsequent response to 
Bar Counsel and the ensuing investigation.  In any event, the parties have stipulated to the 
pertinent facts in relation to Respondent’s representation of Morris. 
 
 
 
10 
 
Respondent further admitted that he would often leave earned attorney’s fees in his 
trust account for “a period of days or weeks.”5  He also did not know the precise amount 
of his own money remaining in the trust account at any given time.  He apologized for the 
practice during his statement under oath, and later indicated that he had ended it “well over 
a year” prior to the hearing, which took place on September 9, 2020. 
II. 
The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law 
The hearing judge first found that Respondent’s conduct did not violate Rule 1.1.  
The hearing judge then found that Respondent had violated Rules 1.4(b); 5.3(a)–(c); 5.4(a); 
5.5(a); 8.4(a) and (d);6 1.15(a) and (b); and Maryland Rules 19-407(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b); 
and 19-408.7  Respondent excepted to some of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Bar Counsel excepted to none. 
 
5 Respondent explained during his statement under oath that he had adopted this 
practice as a result of being advised early on in his career never to allow an escrow check 
to bounce. 
 
6 The hearing judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find that 
Respondent had violated Rule 8.4(c). 
 
7 The hearing judge dealt separately with the pre- and post-July 2016 versions of the 
rules.  As Petitioner withdrew its claims that Respondent violated the pre-July 2016 
versions of Rule 1.15, and Maryland Rules 19-407 and 19-408, the hearing judge did not 
evaluate those rules.  Additionally, although Petitioner had not withdrawn its charge that 
Respondent also violated the MLRPC version of Rule 1.4(b), the hearing judge did not 
appear to make any finding as to whether Respondent violated that version of the rule. 
 
 
 
11 
 
III. 
Standard of Review 
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney disciplinary 
proceedings and ‘conducts an independent review of the record.’  The hearing judge’s 
findings of fact are left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous or either 
party successfully excepts to them.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 
286 (2019) (citations omitted).  “The hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by ‘any competent material evidence.’  We review the 
hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
IV. 
Discussion 
Respondent’s Exceptions 
Respondent makes five exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.   
First, Respondent asserts that Bar Counsel failed to present any evidence, let alone 
clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent’s clients lacked awareness of his use of 
the support staff at RT & Associates.  Respondent argues that Petitioner did not provide 
any testimony or evidence in relation to any of Respondent’s clients to establish that they 
lacked awareness of Respondent’s relationship with RT & Associates or the role that the 
firm played in their representation.  Respondent also points to the complaint filed by Jeron 
Morris, in which Morris clearly acknowledges that he understood that Tilghman was acting 
 
 
 
12 
 
as Respondent’s paralegal.  Therefore, Respondent contends that Petitioner has not 
satisfied its burden of establishing that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b). 
Respondent next argues that the wholesale repudiation of Respondent’s outsourcing 
of paralegal services is unwarranted and not mandated by the rules of professional conduct.  
Respondent claims that the rules recognize that an attorney may contract with non-
employees for the provision of certain services, and there is no requirement that such 
services be performed on site—as evidenced by the realities of the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic.  Thus, there is nothing inherently suspect or improper with Respondent’s 
engagement with RT & Associates as an independent contractor of paralegal services.  
Moreover, Respondent contends that most of the services that RT & Associates provided 
to his clients were appropriate, non-attorney functions, as recognized by this Court’s prior 
caselaw.  Therefore, Respondent argues that his violation of Rule 5.3 should be limited to 
those instances in which RT & Associates “settled cases with claims adjusters without 
[Respondent’s] oversight.” 
Respondent further claims that despite his occasional supervisory shortcomings, he 
never condoned or believed that RT & Associates was engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Bar Counsel stipulated that the staff at RT & Associates did not need a 
law license “in order to assist a supervising attorney in communicating terms of 
representation to clients, in client intake, or in the negotiation and/or settlement of personal 
injury cases.”  Additionally, Respondent finalized virtually all of the settlements himself.  
Respondent likens his employment of RT & Associates to the delegation of similar tasks 
 
 
 
13 
 
to in-house paralegals at high-volume personal injury firms, and he contends that personal 
injury cases often involve many routine tasks.  Where more strategical considerations were 
involved or more legal experience necessitated, Respondent would step in.  Therefore, 
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s legal conclusion that he violated Rule 5.5. 
Respondent next takes issue with the hearing judge’s conclusion that he improperly 
shared fees with RT & Associates.  He argues that his payments to RT & Associates 
reflected compensation for all of the work that the three to six employees of the firm 
conducted for him throughout the course of the given year, and that it is normal for such 
expenses to exceed the net income of any one attorney in the context of a high-volume 
personal injury practice.  Respondent contends that a review of the payments made to RT 
& Associates does not reveal any express pattern of a percentage-based fee sharing 
practice, and that he appropriately categorized those payments as separate expenses on his 
tax returns.  Respondent also argues that paying RT & Associates out of the earned 
attorney’s fees in his trust account does not violate any ethical rules, as he is free to dispense 
with his earned fees as he sees fit.  As such, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s 
legal conclusion that he violated Rule 5.4. 
Finally, Respondent asserts that Bar Counsel has failed to provide clear and 
convincing evidence of any occasion on which Respondent improperly commingled his 
funds with that of his clients.  He contends that Bar Counsel bears the burden of providing 
evidence of specific transactions that would show the amounts of commingled funds, the 
period for which they were commingled, the frequency with which Respondent did so, and 
 
 
 
14 
 
that none of the exceptions to the applicable rules apply.  According to Respondent, his 
candid admission that he did not always immediately withdraw all of his earned fees in 
order to ensure that any escrow checks would not bounce does not provide sufficient detail 
to establish his violation of Rule 1.15 or Maryland Rule 19-408. 
 
With those exceptions in mind, we turn now to review the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law. 
Rule 1.1 Competence 
Rule 1.1 provides that an attorney “shall provide competent representation to a 
client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  The hearing judge found that this 
was not a case of lack of competent representation and that Respondent had not violated 
Rule 1.1. 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-727(c), “Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the 
averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.”  Although Respondent 
admitted that RT & Associates was responsible for handling much of his clients’ cases, 
including settlement in some instances, Petitioner did not put forth clear and convincing 
evidence of deficient representation.  Petitioner did not show how any of the over 17,000 
pages of case files that Respondent produced evidenced incompetent representation, and 
Petitioner did not call any witnesses to complain about the quality of the representation 
they received.  Although Morris did file a complaint that included some allegations against 
Tilghman, for which Respondent could potentially bear responsibility, Morris did not 
 
 
 
15 
 
appear at the hearing, and that complaint was not offered or admitted at the hearing for the 
truth of its contents.  Bar Counsel also did not take exception to the hearing judge’s 
conclusion that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.1. 
We therefore agree with the hearing judge that Bar Counsel has not met its burden 
of establishing that Respondent’s conduct violated Rule 1.1. 
Rule 1.4(b) Communication 
 
Rule 1.4(b) provides that an attorney “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”  
This rule “requires attorneys to communicate with their clients and keep their clients 
reasonably informed of the status of their case.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 
462 Md. 642, 699 (2019).   
The hearing judge found that Respondent’s lack of communication with clients, 
including Morris, and his failure to inform them that non-attorneys at RT & Associates 
were effectively in charge of their representation constituted a violation of Rule 1.4(b).  To 
a large extent we agree with Respondent’s exception to this alleged violation, in that there 
is a lack of evidence before us regarding specific communications or failures to 
communicate.  There is also no evidence in the record regarding what Respondent’s clients 
knew or did not know in relation to the role of RT & Associates with respect to their cases.  
It is true that the general pattern of representation described by Respondent during his 
statement under oath raises questions about the extent to which many of his clients may 
have made important decisions in their cases without Respondent’s involvement and 
 
 
 
16 
 
counsel.  However, Bar Counsel failed to find answers to those questions by providing 
clear and convincing evidence regarding specific decisions made by specific clients.   
The only client for which Bar Counsel has presented relevant information regarding 
a representation is Jeron Morris.  However, Morris’s complaint shows that he understood 
that Tilghman was acting as Respondent’s paralegal and was clearly aware that Tilghman 
was actively working on his case.  The documents Respondent provided to Bar Counsel in 
response to Morris’s complaint show that only preliminary steps were taken with respect 
to his case, including reaching out to the relevant insurance companies and informing them 
of Respondent’s representation of Morris.  In a letter sent to Bar Counsel during the 
investigation, Respondent explained that “[b]eyond clerical tasks, Mr. Tilghman conducted 
the initial intake for [Morris], arranged for his medical treatment, began to compile 
information, and prepared an application for PIP benefits to Erie Insurance Company.”  
There is therefore no clear and convincing evidence that Morris made any decisions during 
Respondent’s representation of him that would have required Respondent’s prior 
explanation under Rule 1.4(b). 
It is worth noting, however, that the letter sent to the other driver’s insurance 
company, which is on Respondent’s letterhead and is signed with his name, instructs the 
company to “contact my legal assistant, Ron Tilghman . . . to discuss settlement.”  The 
record does not indicate whether any settlement discussions took place with respect to 
Morris’s claim during his representation by Respondent.  However, such an approach to 
settlement would tend to be consistent with Respondent’s admission during his statement 
 
 
 
17 
 
under oath that RT & Associates sometimes settled clients’ claims without his involvement, 
and sometimes for clients of which he was not aware.  Indeed, some of the documents that 
Respondent produced to Bar Counsel in relation to other clients similarly indicate that 
Tilghman should be contacted in relation to settlement discussions.  
Resolution of a claim through settlement is a serious decision for a client, and one 
that clearly necessitates prior communication with an attorney under Rule 1.4(b).  Cf. 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349–50 (2020) (finding Rule 1.4(b) 
violations where the attorney, inter alia, failed to inform his client of settlement offers); 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bocchino, 435 Md. 505, 518 (2013) (finding a violation of 
Rule 1.4(b) where the attorney failed to inform his clients of the opposing party’s requests 
for a settlement demand).  Thus, to the extent that any of Respondent’s clients settled their 
claims through Tilghman without prior discussion with Respondent, that would constitute 
a violation of Rule 1.4(b) on Respondent’s part.  The issue in this case, though, is that while 
Respondent has admitted that RT & Associates settled some clients’ claims without his 
involvement during the relevant time frame, we do not know exactly when, or how many 
such claims were settled in this manner. 
However, Respondent has admitted that RT & Associates settled clients’ claims on 
multiple occasions without his involvement, and we will not overlook that misconduct 
 
 
 
18 
 
merely because we do not know the precise date or number of violations.  Therefore, we 
conclude that on more than one occasion Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b).8 
Rule 5.3(a), (b), and (c) Responsibilities Regarding Non-Attorney Assistants 
 
Rule 5.3 provides in part: 
With respect to a non-attorney employed or retained by or associated with an 
attorney: 
(a) a partner, and an attorney who individually or together with other 
attorneys possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the 
professional obligations of the attorney; 
(b) an attorney having direct supervisory authority over the non-attorney 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the attorney; 
(c) an attorney shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would 
be a violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct if 
engaged in by an attorney if: 
(1) the attorney orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 
ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) the attorney is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a 
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 
take reasonable remedial action . . . . 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent’s conduct violated each of these three 
subsections of Rule 5.3.  According to the hearing judge, Respondent violated subsections 
(a) and (b) through the improper “delegation of broad authority to RT & Associates to act 
on his behalf with little or no supervision.”  The hearing judge further found that this 
 
8 Although we agree with much of Respondent’s argument with respect to his 
exception on this point, we nevertheless overrule his ultimate conclusion that he did not 
violate Rule 1.4(b). 
 
 
 
19 
 
conduct violated subsection (c) because Respondent “knew or should have known that RT 
& Associates’ unsupervised activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law.” 
As an initial matter, the hearing judge’s analysis with respect to subsection (c) 
overlooks critical language included therein, namely, that the conduct of the non-attorney 
would constitute a violation of the rules of professional conduct if it were “engaged in by 
an attorney.”  The issue with the conduct of RT & Associates, as distinguished from that 
of Respondent, is whether RT & Associates was effectively engaging in activities that 
would either require supervision or a law license.  If we assume, as the rubric of subsection 
(c) requires us to, that those activities were in fact engaged in not by RT & Associates, but 
by an attorney, then they would not constitute violations of the rules of professional 
conduct.  Moreover, any of Respondent’s actions or omissions in failing to properly 
supervise RT & Associates are not at issue under subsection (c), as distinguished from 
subsections (a) and (b).  Therefore, regardless of whether Respondent may have violated 
subsections (a) and (b), the conduct of RT & Associates alleged in this proceeding would 
not violate the rules of professional conduct under subsection (c), and therefore Respondent 
has not violated subsection (c). 
We turn now to whether Respondent’s alleged lack of supervision of the paralegals 
at RT & Associates violated the other subsections of Rule 5.3.  In Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Hallmon, this Court explained the limited role that non-attorney assistants, 
such as paralegals, may properly perform: 
 
Law clerks and paralegals perform a variety of services for attorneys 
but they may not give legal advice, accept cases, set fees, appear in court, 
 
 
 
20 
 
plan strategy, make legal decisions, or “chart the direction of a case.”  . . .  
[U]nder the supervision of a licensed attorney, a legal assistant, for example, 
may obtain facts from the client, communicate information to the client, 
interview witnesses, “perform[ ] limited research to assist the lawyer with 
the legal analysis,” obtain documents, obtain photographs, prepare 
summaries, prepare chronologies, prepare itemization of claims, prepare 
drafts of pleadings, prepare drafts of interrogatories and of production of 
document requests, prepare drafts of responses to discovery requests, prepare 
outlines for the lawyer to use in deposing a witness, index deposition 
transcripts, and prepare summaries of the evidence. 
 
The key in all of these examples is supervision.  The attorney may 
“not under any circumstance delegate to [a law clerk] the exercise of the 
lawyer’s professional judgment [on] behalf of the client. . . .”   
 
343 Md. 390, 400 (1996) (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 
As Hallmon explains, there are thus some activities that non-attorneys may never 
perform, such as appear in court or provide legal advice, and there are some activities that 
non-attorneys may only perform under the proper supervision of an attorney.  In this case, 
although there is once again a lack of evidence regarding the actions that RT & Associates 
took with respect to specific clients, Respondent’s admissions establish that he failed to 
properly supervise some of the actions of RT & Associates, and the staff there engaged in 
some actions that are impermissible for non-attorneys regardless of the level of supervision 
provided.   
Respondent admitted that, on some occasions, RT & Associates settled claims for 
clients of which he had no knowledge.  This establishes that the staff at RT & Associates 
was engaging in activity that required the close supervision of Respondent—to the extent 
they could engage in that activity at all—and Respondent failed to supervise them in 
 
 
 
21 
 
accordance with Rule 5.3(b).9  Based on his knowledge and acceptance of the conduct of 
the staff at RT & Associates, Respondent also failed to “make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that [his law firm had] in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that [RT & 
Associates’] conduct [was] compatible with [his] professional obligations.”  Rule 5.3(a).  
We therefore conclude that Respondent violated Rule 5.3(a) and (b).10  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 367–68 (2015) (finding that the attorney 
violated Rule 5.3(a) and (b) where he delegated broad authority to his legal assistant to act 
on his behalf with little supervision, including allowing her to “negotiate with insurance 
companies and to obtain consent from clients to settle”). 
 
 
9 It is possible that Respondent also failed to provide proper supervision with respect 
to other actions taken by RT & Associates.  However, Petitioner did not put forth clear and 
convincing evidence of specific actions taken by the staff at RT & Associates, and 
Respondent’s corresponding lack of supervision.  We therefore limit our analysis to his 
lack of supervision over, and in some cases knowledge of, the settlement of claims by RT 
& Associates.  We need not have before us all of the details of such representations to 
conclude that it is misconduct for an attorney to allow a paralegal to settle a claim for a 
putative client of which the attorney is not aware, as Respondent admits occurred here. 
 
10 Our conclusion is not inconsistent with Respondent’s exception on this point, 
which for the most part simply defended the general practice of outsourcing paralegal 
activities to off-site firms.  We do not here suggest that such outsourcing on its own 
constitutes a violation of Rule 5.3.  As long as an attorney provides proper oversight, such 
conduct does not violate the rule.  In his exception, Respondent suggests that his violation 
be limited to the instances in which RT & Associates “settled cases with claims adjusters 
without [Respondent’s] oversight,” which he candidly admits occurred and constitutes a 
violation of Rule 5.3.  We agree, and sustain Respondent’s exception to that limited extent, 
without suggesting that all of the other conduct of the paralegals at RT & Associates was 
necessarily proper. 
 
 
 
22 
 
Rule 5.4(a) Professional Independence of an Attorney 
 
Rule 5.4(a) provides, with certain exceptions not relevant here, that “[a]n attorney 
or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-attorney.”  The hearing judge found that 
Respondent regularly violated this rule by paying RT & Associates a portion of the 
contingent attorney’s fees from his clients’ settlements.  The hearing judge found that, as 
evidenced by the table Respondent provided, this practice took place from at least 2014 
through the summer of 2018. 
As the hearing judge found, that table, which was admitted at the hearing as 
Petitioner’s Exhibit 17, shows that in nearly every case Respondent paid the majority of 
the total attorney’s fees to RT & Associates.  In fact, an independent review of that schedule 
shows that out of the approximately 800 total settlements, Respondent retained the majority 
of the attorney’s fee in fewer than 3% of the cases.11  Moreover, nearly 90% of the time 
RT & Associates was paid between 50 and 70% of the earned attorney’s fee.  In sum, out 
of all the attorney’s fees Respondent earned during that five-year period, Respondent paid 
more than 63% of that amount to RT & Associates. 
 
11 The table that Respondent provided has several entries that are marked by 
asterisks.  Often, those entries immediately follow an entry for a client with the same last 
name and show blanks under the Settlement Amount and Support Expense columns, listing 
only an Attorney’s Fee amount.  There is no explanation in the record as to what those 
asterisks represent or why those entries list only an Attorney’s Fee.  For purposes of our 
empirical analysis, we assume that those entries represent instances in which Respondent 
represented multiple clients as part of a single joint representation, and we consolidate the 
seemingly related entries as one settlement.  However, even were our reading of the table 
in that regard to be misguided, our legal conclusions would remain the same.  
 
 
 
23 
 
As Respondent argues, paying a team of paralegals more than a single attorney 
might net in the attorney’s own income does not on its own indicate improper fee sharing.  
It is also true, as Respondent contends, that there is no set percentage that he would pay to 
RT & Associates.  However, that compensation should be closely tied to the value of the 
services provided.  As RT & Associates never provided itemized invoices, there was no 
way of tracking exactly what services the staff at RT & Associates provided on each case 
or how many total hours they worked.  Moreover, the only consistent predictor of the size 
of the payment made to RT & Associates is the amount of the attorney’s fee.  Respondent 
even admitted in a letter to Bar Counsel that the compensation paid to RT & Associates 
“often reflected, at least in part, the outcome of the case.” 
Thus, even if Respondent would also somehow take into account other factors, such 
as the nature of the case and how much work RT & Associates likely contributed, we 
cannot escape the conclusion that Respondent’s payment structure with RT & Associates 
constituted improper fee sharing.12  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brennan, 350 Md. 
489, 501 (1998) (holding that it would be a violation of Rule 5.4 to share fees with a 
paralegal and noting that “any arrangement, salary or otherwise, based on, or calculated 
from the fees of clients or otherwise tantamount to a draw, would be equally impermissible 
as long as it suggested that the title of paralegal or clerk merely covered up what was, in 
 
12 While discussing payment to RT & Associates during his statement under oath, 
Respondent asked that Bar Counsel “please remember that I wasn’t writing a check to Ron 
Tilghman, I was paying three to six people for all the work they were doing throughout the 
year.”  We have no reason to doubt the veracity of Respondent’s statement in that regard, 
but the records he provided show that he was doing so by way of improper fee sharing. 
 
 
 
24 
 
substance, a continuation of the practice of law”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
James, 340 Md. 318, 326 (1995)).  Therefore, we find that Respondent routinely violated 
Rule 5.4(a) by sharing fees with RT & Associates, and we overrule Respondent’s exception 
to this violation. 
Rule 5.5(a) Unauthorized Practice of Law 
 
Rule 5.5(a) provides that an attorney “shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in 
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 
doing so.”  The hearing judge found that Respondent violated this rule by assisting RT & 
Associates in the unauthorized practice of law.   
As discussed above, Respondent admitted that RT & Associates sometimes settled 
claims for clients of which Respondent was unaware.  At least with respect to such clients, 
RT & Associates was effectively acting as their attorney, notwithstanding the fact that no 
one at RT & Associates was licensed to practice law.  As Respondent was apparently aware 
of this practice and allowed it to continue, while RT & Associates was using his letterhead 
and sending correspondence bearing his signature without his awareness but with his 
authorization, Respondent was assisting the paralegals at RT & Associates in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 
104, 117 (2015) (finding that knowingly permitting a non-attorney to handle client intake 
and provide legal advice constituted assisting in the unauthorized practice of law); Smith, 
443 Md. at 368 (“Permitting a non-lawyer assistant to send demand letters to insurance 
 
 
 
25 
 
companies, settle claims, and provide legal advice to clients without supervision constitutes 
assisting another in the unauthorized practice of law.”) (citation omitted).   
We acknowledge the points Respondent makes in taking exception to this alleged 
violation.  However, they ultimately stand merely for the proposition that not all of 
Respondent’s alleged supervisory shortcomings also constitute violations of Rule 5.5.  That 
fact does nothing to excuse those instances in which the actions of the staff at RT & 
Associates rose to the level of unauthorized practice of law.13  In his exception, Respondent 
also argues that he never believed that he was facilitating the unauthorized practice of law.  
Regardless of whether he believed he was, we find that Respondent was in fact assisting in 
the unauthorized practice of law, and we overrule his exception on that basis. 
Once again, the record before us does not indicate how many times this took place, 
or the exact dates thereof.  However, based on his own admissions, we find that on more 
than one occasion Respondent’s conduct violated Rule 5.5(a).   
We turn now to consider Respondent’s actions and omissions in relation to his 
attorney trust account. 
Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b) Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping 
 
Maryland Rule 19-407 provides in part: 
 
13 As with our analysis of Respondent’s violation of Rule 5.3, it is possible that other 
actions taken by RT & Associates also constituted the unauthorized practice of law.  
However, in the absence of any specific details of the paralegals’ conduct and 
Respondent’s corresponding supervision or lack thereof, Petitioner has failed to meet its 
burden with respect to such other conduct. 
 
 
 
26 
 
(a) Creation of Records.  The following records shall be created and 
maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third 
persons: 
* * * 
(3) Client Matter Records.  A record for each client matter in which 
the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows: 
(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that 
shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the 
amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose for 
which the funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee 
and the check number or other payment identification; and (v) 
the balance of funds remaining in the account in connection 
with the matter; and 
(B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion 
of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to 
be returned to a person other than the client. 
(4) Record of Funds of the Attorney.  A record that identifies the funds 
of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 
19-408 (b). 
(b) Monthly Reconciliation.  An attorney shall cause to be created a monthly 
reconciliation of all attorney trust account records, client matter records, 
records of funds of the attorney held in an attorney trust account as permitted 
by Rule 19-408 (b), and the adjusted month-end financial institution 
statement balance.  The adjusted month-end financial institution statement 
balance is computed by adding subsequent deposits to and subtracting 
subsequent disbursements from the financial institution’s month-end 
statement balance. 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent failed to keep the proper records in 
accordance with all of the above-listed subsections of Maryland Rule 19-407.  Specifically, 
he failed to keep client matter records or records of his own funds held in his attorney trust 
account pursuant to subsection (a).  He also failed to create monthly reconciliations in 
accordance with subsection (b).  
Although Respondent claimed to have his own system of keeping track of the funds 
in his attorney trust account, he admits that he failed to create the proper records and 
 
 
 
27 
 
reconciliations in strict accordance with this rule during the relevant period.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Respondent regularly violated Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b) 
up through at least the initiation of Bar Counsel’s investigation, if not longer. 
Maryland Rule 19-408 Commingling Funds 
 
Maryland Rule 19-408 provides: 
(a) General Prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney 
trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by 
Rule 19-404 or permitted to be so deposited by section (b) of this Rule. 
(b) Exceptions. 
(1) An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an attorney 
trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges, or minimum 
balance required by the financial institution to open or maintain the 
account, including those fees that cannot be charged against interest 
due to the Maryland Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to 
Rule 19-411 (b)(1)(D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the 
financial institution to have any fees or charges deducted from an 
operating account maintained by the attorney or law firm.  The 
attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any 
funds expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to 
be reimbursed to the attorney by the client. 
(2) An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account 
funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially 
to the attorney or law firm.  The portion belonging to the attorney or 
law firm shall be withdrawn promptly when the attorney or law firm 
becomes entitled to the funds, but any portion disputed by the client 
shall remain in the account until the dispute is resolved. 
(3) Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and 
commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held for other 
clients or beneficial owners. 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent violated this rule when he admittedly left 
earned attorney’s fees in his attorney trust account for “a period of days or weeks” after 
depositing client settlement proceeds and distributing the other portions of those proceeds.  
 
 
 
28 
 
Respondent explained that he did so in order to avoid allowing an escrow check to 
bounce.  The parties also stipulated that there is “no evidence that any of Respondent’s 
clients have suffered any loss of funds maintained in his attorney trust account or otherwise 
entrusted to him.”  However, a violation of Maryland Rule 19-408 is not triggered solely 
where clients suffer financial losses, and Respondent’s reasoning for leaving his own funds 
in the trust account after he earned them does not fall within the rule’s exceptions.  
Although Bar Counsel has not provided evidence of specific transactions, Respondent’s 
own admissions sufficiently establish that he improperly commingled funds under the rule.  
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 371 (2005) (finding that an 
attorney’s failure to promptly remove earned fees from his trust account constitutes 
impermissible commingling under the pre-July 2016 versions of Maryland Rules 19-408 
and 19-301.15(a)).  Therefore, Respondent violated Maryland Rule 19-408, and we 
overrule his exception to this violation. 
Rule 1.15(a) and (b) Safekeeping Property 
 
Rule 1.15 provides in part: 
(a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an 
attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
attorney’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and 
records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that 
Chapter.  Other property shall be identified specifically as such and 
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be 
created and maintained.  Complete records of the account funds and of other 
property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of 
at least five years after the date the record was created. 
(b) An attorney may deposit the attorney’s own funds in a client trust account 
only as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b). 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
The hearing judge found that as Respondent violated Maryland Rules 19-407 and 
19-408, that conduct also violated both cited subsections of this rule.  For the reasons 
provided in the preceding two sections, we agree that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) 
and (b).  Specifically, he did so by failing to keep proper trust account records or create the 
necessary monthly reconciliations in accordance with 19-407, and commingling his funds 
with his clients’ funds in violation of 19-408 by failing to promptly remove earned 
attorney’s fees from his trust account. 
Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) Misconduct 
 
Finally, Rule 8.4 provides in relevant part: 
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another; 
* * * 
(c) 
engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; [or] 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . . 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent violated subsections (a) and (d) of this 
rule.  First, as the hearing judge found various other rules violations, Respondent also 
violated Rule 8.4(a).  Second, the hearing judge found that when viewed as a whole, 
Respondent’s conduct negatively impacted the public’s perception of the legal profession, 
thereby violating 8.4(d).  However, the hearing judge found that Bar Counsel had failed to 
establish that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c), as there was not clear and convincing 
 
 
 
30 
 
evidence that Respondent made knowing false statements or misrepresentations, or 
intended to deceive anyone. 
We of course agree with the hearing judge that Respondent’s various violations of 
the rules of professional conduct, detailed above, also compel the conclusion that he 
violated Rule 8.4(a).  E.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cherry–Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 
159 (2005) (“Because we have held that Respondent has violated several Rules of 
Professional Conduct, she necessarily violated Rule 8.4(a) as well . . . .”).  We further agree 
that Petitioner has failed to establish that Respondent acted fraudulently or dishonestly or 
made any misrepresentations.  The record is devoid of any evidence that Respondent 
misled his clients regarding the nature of RT & Associates’ involvement in their cases or 
any of the other misconduct outlined here.  Therefore, we find that Petitioner did not meet 
its burden of establishing that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). 
Under Rule 8.4(d), this Court has explained that a wide range of conduct can be 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 411 
Md. 83, 96 (2009).  “In general, an attorney violates [Rule] 8.4(d) when his or her conduct 
impacts negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession.”  
Id.  In Smith, we concluded that an attorney’s conduct met this standard where the attorney, 
among other things, commingled personal and client funds in a trust account and failed to 
keep adequate trust account records.  443 Md. at 377.  The Court also found that Smith 
“virtual[ly] abandon[ed]” his law practice “to the charge of his non-lawyer assistant, with 
little or no supervision, to such an extent that [the assistant] engaged in the unauthorized 
 
 
 
31 
 
practice of law and was able to misappropriate client monies for almost four years.”  Id.  
Respondent similarly mismanaged his trust account and, at least in relation to those clients 
for which RT & Associates handled the entire case up through settlement, failed to 
adequately supervise his paralegal assistants and allowed them to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Therefore, we agree with the hearing judge that 
Respondent’s conduct negatively impacts the public’s perception of the legal profession, 
and that Respondent therefore violated Rule 8.4(d). 
V. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
In determining the proper sanction, this Court considers not only the nature of the 
underlying conduct, but also the presence of both aggravating and mitigating factors.  E.g., 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 462 Md. 422, 432–33 (2019).  We recognize the 
following aggravating factors: 
(1) prior attorney discipline;  
(2) a dishonest or selfish motive;  
(3) a pattern of misconduct;  
(4) multiple violations of the [rules of professional conduct];  
(5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this 
Court or the hearing judge;  
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding;  
(7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature;  
(8) the victim’s vulnerability;  
(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;  
(10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences;  
(11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled 
substances; and  
 
 
 
32 
 
(12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018) (citation omitted) 
(reformatted).  “Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors 
by clear and convincing evidence.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bah, 468 Md. 179, 215 
(2020) (citation omitted). 
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the fourth and ninth 
factors applied, as Respondent committed multiple offenses and had substantial experience 
in the practice of law at the time of his misconduct, having practiced in Maryland for nearly 
fifty years.  We agree, and further find that the third factor applies.  Respondent has 
admitted that much of the conduct underlying his violations constituted his routine business 
practices, including with respect to fee sharing and his mismanagement of his trust account, 
establishing that Respondent has also engaged in a “pattern of misconduct.”  See Sperling, 
459 Md. at 276 (“Factor 3, a pattern of misconduct, applies when an attorney’s behavior 
shows a pattern of inappropriate conduct, as evinced by multiple violations over time, or a 
series of acts with one goal.”).  This is especially true with respect to the improper fee 
sharing with RT & Associates, for which we have not only Respondent’s own admissions, 
but also documentary evidence establishing the pattern over the course of five years. 
 
This Court also recognizes the following mitigating factors: 
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline;  
(2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;  
(3) personal or emotional problems;  
(4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s 
consequences;  
 
 
 
33 
 
(5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a cooperative attitude toward 
the attorney discipline proceeding;  
(6) inexperience in the practice of law;  
(7) character or reputation;  
(8) a physical disability;  
(9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug 
abuse, where:  
(a) there is medical evidence that the [attorney] is affected by a 
chemical dependency or mental disability;  
(b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the 
misconduct;  
(c) the [attorney’s] recovery from the chemical dependency or mental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and  
(d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct’s 
recurrence is unlikely;  
(10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding;  
(11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions;  
(12) remorse;  
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the [rules of professional conduct]; and  
(14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 647 (2018) (reformatted).  “The 
respondent in an attorney disciplinary proceeding must prove the presence of mitigating 
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Bah, 468 Md. at 215 (citation 
omitted).  
 
The hearing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that seven of those 
factors applied.  First, Respondent has had a long and unblemished career with no prior 
disciplinary record.  Second, there was no evidence that Respondent acted selfishly or with 
a dishonest motive.  Instead, the evidence showed that Respondent is an honest man but, 
as he has admitted and is evidenced by his tax forms, he was “a better lawyer than . . . a 
businessman.”  Third, Respondent engaged in full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel 
 
 
 
34 
 
during the investigation, responding “in a timely manner to all requests for information by 
the Office of Bar Counsel” and producing “in excess of 17,000 pages of documents during 
the course of this investigation.”  The hearing judge also found that Respondent displayed 
a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  Fourth, Respondent has engaged in good 
faith efforts to rectify his misconduct by discontinuing the outsourcing of his paralegal 
services and cutting back on the volume of his practice. 
Fifth, based on the testimony of Respondent’s three character witnesses, 
Respondent “enjoys an excellent reputation for good character” among members of the 
bench and bar, along with his own clientele.  Sixth, the hearing judge found that 
Respondent accepts complete responsibility for his shortcomings and is “credibly 
remorseful” for his actions.  And finally, Respondent has been working with the counsel 
representing him in this proceeding and an accountant to improve upon the practices that 
form the foundation of his violations.  Indeed, Respondent asserted during the hearing that 
he and his counsel “have spent as much time on ways to improve my practices as we have 
in trying to defend them.”  As Respondent is committed to improving his practices in the 
future, the hearing judge found that it was unlikely that he would repeat his misconduct 
going forward.  For all of the reasons provided by the hearing judge, this Court agrees and 
finds that those seven mitigating factors apply in this case. 
 
 
 
35 
 
VI. 
The Sanction 
We must now determine the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s ethical 
violations, in light of the mitigating and aggravating factors identified above.  “In 
fashioning the appropriate sanction to be imposed, we are guided by our interest in 
protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595 (2005) (citation omitted).  “As we 
have often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the 
[attorney], but to protect the public as well as to deter other [attorneys] from engaging in 
similar misconduct.”  Id. at 596 (citation omitted).  “When determining the appropriate 
discipline, we consider the facts and circumstances of each case and order a sanction that 
is ‘commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which 
they were committed.’”  Edwards, 462 Md. at 712 (citation omitted). 
We begin our analysis of the proper sanction in this case by noting once again that 
the record before us is insufficient to support many of the allegations Bar Counsel made in 
the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action.  Though we are troubled by the specter 
that we may not appreciate the full scope of Respondent’s potential misconduct, that 
uncertainty appears to be no fault of Respondent.  By all accounts, including that of Bar 
Counsel, Respondent has been both cooperative and forthcoming during the course of this 
investigation, submitting over 17,000 pages of requested documents and answering every 
question propounded of him.  Rather, the deficiency of the record appears to be owing to 
 
 
 
36 
 
the failure to elicit all of the requisite details.  We shall therefore strictly limit, as we must, 
our consideration of Respondent’s misconduct to that as we have found proven, as outlined 
above, and tailor the sanction accordingly. 
Petitioner asserts that the proper sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension.  
Petitioner relies first on Barton, in which this Court indefinitely suspended an attorney, 
inter alia, for failing to supervise a non-attorney employed in her office and allowing that 
employee to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.  442 Md. at 139–40, 149–50.  
Respondent argues that unlike in this case, Ms. Barton, whose conduct prompted 
three petitions for disciplinary action, gave her office manager, Mr. Tolbert, “total control 
of the firm bank accounts” and “continued to provide ‘blank’ checks to Mr. Tolbert for 
several months after she had learned that Mr. Tolbert had stolen money from the firm.”  
Barton, 442 Md. at 96, 102, 106, 117.  Barton also refused to return unearned fees to clients, 
failed to keep clients’ fees in an attorney trust account, and did not disclose fees she had 
received to the Bankruptcy Court, as required.  Id. at 117–18.  She also did not properly 
communicate with her clients and failed to provide competent representation to nine of her 
bankruptcy clients, to their detriment.  Id. at 115–16, 146.  Furthermore, the Court found 
that Barton “embodied a dishonest and selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, 
committed multiple offenses, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct 
and has shown no effort to make restitution, despite a court order to do so.”  Id. at 145.  
After finding only two mitigating factors, the Court indefinitely suspended Barton.  Id. at 
147–50.  
 
 
 
37 
 
We agree with Respondent that although some of Respondent’s misconduct was 
similar in nature to that of Barton, that case is distinguishable in that Barton engaged in a 
“bevy” of rule violations not applicable here and had many more aggravating factors and 
fewer mitigating ones.  Id. at 148.  Therefore, Barton does not compel us to issue an 
indefinite suspension in this case. 
Respondent directs us instead to other cases involving attorneys who failed to 
supervise employees and assisted in the unauthorized practice of law in which we issued 
definite suspensions where the circumstances so warranted.  In Brennan, we suspended the 
attorney for ninety days for assisting a suspended lawyer to engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  350 Md. at 501–02.  There, Brennan had gone into practice with James, 
the suspended attorney, purportedly acting as his supervising attorney while James claimed 
to be acting as a law clerk or a paralegal.  Id. at 492.  However, James “continued to draft 
legal documents, negotiate on behalf of clients, and even sign legal documents.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Therefore, it could appear to the public that the suspended attorney was 
still holding himself out as a practicing attorney, and thus was engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Id.  With respect to one matter, the clients believed that James was their 
attorney and that Brennan was just his assistant, who might not have even been an attorney.  
See id. at 493–94.  The clients paid James for the representation, and he split that fee with 
Brennan.  Id.  During that representation, Brennan also failed to appear at a hearing and 
was unavailable to the clients thereafter.  Id. at 494.  We nonetheless determined that a 
ninety-day suspension was the proper sanction.  Id. at 502. 
 
 
 
38 
 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Dore, we considered an attorney who did not 
properly supervise his employees.  433 Md. 685 (2013).  The employees were regularly 
signing his name on affidavits in foreclosure actions on his behalf, which he had authorized 
them to do, but then also notarizing the false signatures.  Id. at 689.  Once Dore learned 
that his employees were notarizing the signatures, he banned the practice of signing on his 
behalf, instituted a new procedure, and spent significant time and expense to correct the 
falsified notarizations.  Id. at 693–94.  The Court also found similar mitigating factors to 
those that we have found here and determined that a ninety-day suspension was 
appropriate.  Id. at 720, 727.  Important for our present purposes, we stated in Dore that we 
“refrain[ed] from an indefinite suspension only because of the many mitigating 
circumstances.”  Id. at 727. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris-Smith, we issued a thirty-day 
suspension to an attorney who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and failed to 
supervise one of her employees, among other violations.  356 Md. 72 (1999).  Although 
Harris-Smith was licensed to practice in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia, she was not barred in Maryland, though she was admitted to the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland.  Id. at 74.  Harris-Smith limited her practice 
exclusively to bankruptcy matters.  Id.  She practiced as a named principal at a firm in 
Maryland that ran advertisements suggesting that their attorneys were experienced in 
dealing with foreclosures, personal injury claims, employment law, and bankruptcy.  Id. at 
74–76.  Other advertisements indicated solely that potential clients should reach out if they 
 
 
 
39 
 
were being threatened with foreclosure and made no mention of bankruptcy law.  Id. at 76.  
The advertisement in the classified telephone directory listed the following under her name: 
“Specializing in Bankruptcy—Real Estate & Personal Injury.”  Id.    
Harris-Smith’s business card listed the firm’s Maryland address, but did not indicate 
that she was not licensed to practice in Maryland.  Id. at 77.  She also performed the initial 
intake meeting with most clients, referring non-bankruptcy clients to other attorneys at the 
firm.  Id.  We ultimately affirmed the hearing judge’s conclusion that although Harris-
Smith never made direct misrepresentations to clients, she improperly held herself out as 
licensed to practice in Maryland and failed to disclose that her practice was limited to 
bankruptcy.  See id. at 78.  Relying in part on the fact that the violations were unlikely to 
continue, as the firm had since dissolved and Harris-Smith had moved her practice to the 
District of Columbia, we determined that a thirty-day suspension was the appropriate 
sanction.  Id. at 90–92. 
Finally, in Hallmon we issued a ninety-day suspension to an attorney who: (1) 
assisted an unlicensed law school graduate in the unauthorized practice of law by failing 
to adequately supervise her, (2) failed to maintain an escrow account, and (3) failed to 
respond to Bar Counsel.  343 Md. at 393, 394, 396–97, 401–09.  We also required that the 
termination of Hallmon’s suspension be subject to his satisfaction of certain conditions, 
including that he complete courses on the rules of professional conduct and law office 
management, and that he engage a monitor to oversee his practice.  Id. at 410–11.   
 
 
 
40 
 
We find that Respondent’s misconduct relating to his failure to properly supervise 
RT & Associates, his assistance in their engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, and 
his sharing of fees warrants a sanction more akin to those we issued in Brennan, Dore, 
Harris-Smith, and Hallmon, as opposed to the indefinite suspension we issued in Barton. 
Petitioner also cites to cases in which this Court has issued indefinite suspensions 
to attorneys who have mishandled their trust accounts.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 43, 49 (2016); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bell, 432 Md. 542, 
557, 564 (2013).  In Mahone, the attorney failed to keep the proper trust account records, 
deposited earned attorney’s fees into the account, created negative balances in accounts 
belonging to at least four clients, used funds in the account for unauthorized purposes, and 
withdrew $1,500 in cash from the account.  451 Md. at 38–39.  Mahone also failed to fully 
cooperate with Bar Counsel during his investigation and had been sanctioned by this Court 
on three previous occasions, one of which involved similar misconduct.  Id. at 38, 48.  Here, 
by contrast, there is no indication that Respondent improperly used funds in his trust 
account or mishandled his clients’ accounts.  He has also cooperated with Bar Counsel in 
this investigation and has no history of discipline. 
In Bell, the attorney regularly made personal payments out of his trust account, 
deposited and stored attorney’s fees in the account, wrote forty-five checks to cash out of 
the account, took unearned fees from the account, over-drafted the account on one 
occasion, and failed to maintain the proper records.  Bell, 432 Md. at 551–53, 557.  After 
considering Bell’s multiple offenses, and his prior reprimand for violating Rule 8.4(a) by 
 
 
 
41 
 
attempting to obtain an unreasonable fee from a client, the Court determined that an 
indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after thirty days was appropriate.  Id. at 560, 
564.   
Although we do not in any way condone Respondent’s actions in failing to maintain 
the proper records and reconciliations and failing to promptly remove earned attorney’s 
fees from his trust account, there is no indication that he was using it as a personal account, 
that he was taking fees that he was not entitled to, or that he ever over-drafted the account.  
In fact, he claims that his intention in leaving his fees in the account was to avoid such a 
situation.  The rules of professional conduct do not allow for this practice, but Respondent’s 
violations are not as severe as those in Bell and Mahone, and Respondent has no prior 
disciplinary record during his nearly fifty-year career. 
Critical to this case is the fact that the record does not show that Respondent acted 
with bad intent, dishonesty, or to further his own personal interests.  See Bell, 432 Md. at 
559 (“Although ignorance does not excuse a violation of disciplinary rules, a finding with 
respect to the intent with which a violation was committed is relevant on the issue of the 
appropriate sanction.”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 658 
(2006)).  Furthermore, Bar Counsel has not presented evidence that any of Respondent’s 
clients suffered financial losses or other concrete prejudice to their claims on account of 
Respondent’s conduct.14  Therefore, we find that Respondent’s conduct is more akin to 
 
14 We do recognize, though, that not receiving the proper representation and counsel 
from an attorney during the settlement process is a harm in and of itself. 
 
 
 
42 
 
cases in which we have issued definite suspensions.  For example, in Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Goldberg, the attorney delegated responsibilities to his secretary and she, 
without his knowledge, failed to take certain actions on behalf of clients, including failing 
to file pleadings and causing clients’ accounts to have negative balances.  292 Md. 650, 
651–53, 656 (1982).  We issued a thirty-day suspension, relying in part on the fact that 
there was no financial harm to the clients and the attorney had “overhauled his office” since 
learning of the misconduct.  Id. at 658. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sapero, we considered an attorney who 
delegated management of his escrow account to his employees, which resulted in earned 
attorney’s fees being left in the account on several occasions between 1991 and 2005.  400 
Md. 461, 466 (2007).  He also failed to maintain proper trust account records, failed to 
adequately communicate with a client, and did not promptly produce records to Bar 
Counsel.  Id. at 467, 469, 490.  However, we found that Sapero’s misconduct “was 
determined to be neither detrimental to his clients, nor intentional or motivated by fraud.”  
Id. at 490.  We further found that his lack of communication “did not result in any injury 
to [his clients], and commingling of his funds with those of his clients did not result in any 
misappropriation of client funds.”  Id.  After finding similar mitigating factors to those 
applicable here, including that Sapero’s misconduct was not willful, he was remorseful, he 
had taken extensive remedial action such that the violations were unlikely to recur, and he 
had no history of discipline, we determined that a reprimand was the appropriate sanction.  
Id. at 489–91.   
 
 
 
43 
 
Respondent also urges this Court to consider his cooperation in these proceedings 
and the unlikelihood that he will repeat this misconduct as key factors in determining the 
appropriate sanction.  We agree and find that those factors are important in distinguishing 
this case from others in which we have issued a more severe sanction, such as indefinite 
suspension.  This Court has recently explained that an indefinite suspension is an “extreme” 
sanction, “one of the strongest we may order against an attorney.”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Milton, 467 Md. 433, 461 (2020).  We are not persuaded that such a sanction 
is warranted in this case.  Rather, we are convinced that a definite suspension, in 
conjunction with the requirement that Respondent establish thereafter that he is competent 
to practice law in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-752 (criteria for reinstatement when 
an attorney is suspended for more than six months), will serve the interests of these 
proceedings.   
Therefore, we suspend Respondent for a period of six months and one day, 
commencing thirty days after the date on which this opinion is filed, after which he may 
petition this Court for his reinstatement.  Should he be successful, Respondent’s 
reinstatement shall be further conditioned on his engagement of an attorney monitor for an 
additional three months following the date of his reinstatement in order to ensure that he 
practices in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations.  The monitor must be 
acceptable to Bar Counsel and shall be engaged at Respondent’s expense. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT SHALL PAY 
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS 
COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
 
 
 
44 
 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 
19-709, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
CHARLES 
ALLAN 
FINEBLUM.