Title: DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 12/6/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
HOPE DICAMPLI-MINTZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S194501 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 6 H034160 
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. 1-07 CV 089159 
 
 
) 
                     
 
____________________________________) 
 
Government Code1 section 915, subdivision (a) (section 915(a)), establishes 
the manner of delivery of a claim against the government.  It requires that a claim 
be presented to a local public entity by “[d]elivering it to the clerk, secretary or 
auditor,” or by mailing it to one of these officials “or to the governing body.”  
Section 915, subdivision (e) (section 915(e)), further provides that a misdirected 
claim “shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance” with section 915 if 
“[i]t is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 
entity.”  (§ 915(e)(1), italics added.)   
Here, the Court of Appeal held that “a claim may substantially comply with 
the act, notwithstanding failure to deliver or mail it to one of the specified 
recipients, if it is given to a person or department whose functions include the 
                                              
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code.   
 
2 
management or defense of claims against the defendant entity.”  We reject this 
judicial expansion of the statutory requirements and affirm that a claim must 
satisfy the express delivery provisions language of the statute.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
On April 4, 2006, Dr. Bao-Thuong Bui and Dr. Abraham Sklar performed 
surgery on plaintiff Hope DiCampli-Mintz at Valley Medical Center (VMC), a 
hospital owned and operated by the County of Santa Clara (the County).  In the 
recovery room, plaintiff complained of pain in her left leg, which appeared bluish 
and cold to the touch.  An emergency tomography disclosed that her “left iliac 
artery” was “completely interrupted.”  Plaintiff was returned to surgery and 
ultimately discharged.   
Later that year, plaintiff went to VMC‟s emergency department “in a great 
deal of pain.”  An emergency room physician told her that another procedure was 
required because blood vessels had been damaged in the first surgery.     
Plaintiff retained counsel who prepared a letter for transmission to VMC, Dr. 
Bui, and Dr. Sklar, giving “notice, in accordance with Section 364 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, that Hope DiCampli-Mintz will file suit against you for damages 
resulting from the personal injury of Hope DiCampli-Mintz.”  Code of Civil 
Procedure section 364 requires that a plaintiff give notice of an intent to sue to a 
health care provider 90 days before filing a negligence action.2  The letter stated 
that defendants negligently performed surgery, interrupting blood flow to 
plaintiff‟s leg, then failed to repair the problem.   
On April 3, 2007, plaintiff‟s counsel personally delivered copies of the letter 
to an employee of the medical staffing office in the hospital‟s administration 
                                              
2  
Code of Civil Procedure section 364 is not part of the Government Claims 
Act (§ 810 et seq.).  The notice of intent it mandates is a separate requirement.    
 
3 
building.  The letters were addressed to the Risk Management Department at 
VMC, Dr. Bui, and Dr. Sklar.3  While the letter included a request that it be 
forwarded to the recipient‟s insurance carrier, it did not request that it be 
forwarded to any of the statutorily designated recipients denoted in section 915.   
It is undisputed that the letter was never personally served or presented, nor 
was it mailed to the county clerk or the clerk of the board.  The parties likewise 
agree that plaintiff knew VMC was owned and operated by the County.  The letter 
was later received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by 
April 6, 2007.4  On April 23, 2007, Dave Schoendaler at the County‟s Risk 
Management Department spoke with plaintiff‟s counsel by telephone.  According 
to plaintiff‟s counsel, Schoendaler acknowledged receipt of the letter; orally 
opined that service on VMC required a tort claim which was late; questioned 
whether a tort claim was required as to Dr. Sklar and Dr. Bui and indicated that he 
would look into that; stated that plaintiff had an interesting case; mentioned a 
physical condition that put plaintiff at risk; and provided the name of the attorney 
handling the County‟s defense.  Schoendaler did not mention that the letter failed 
                                              
3  
Plaintiff‟s counsel also sent duplicate letters by certified mail.   
4  
According to the County, the letters were addressed to the “Risk 
Management Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC.”  Plaintiff 
did not dispute this and added that the letter was also received by the “Santa Clara 
County Risk Management Department.”  At oral argument it was clarified that the 
“Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” and the “Risk Management 
Department at the Valley Health Center Clinic at VMC” are different entities.   
 
The “Santa Clara County Risk Management Department” is a department 
within the County‟s Employee Services Agency and deals with legal claims 
against the County.  The “Risk Management Department at the Valley Health 
Center Clinic at VMC” is responsible for such things as the hospital‟s quality 
assurance and its compliance with regulatory matters.  For reasons set forth below, 
any differences are irrelevant because plaintiff failed to properly present her letter 
to a statutorily designated person, nor did any such designee actually receive the 
letter.  (§ 915(a) & (e).)       
 
4 
to satisfy section 915‟s delivery requirements.  Plaintiff never received written 
notice that her claim was untimely or presented to the wrong party.         
On July 2, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint naming Dr. Bui, Dr. Sklar, and 
VMC as defendants.  As described by the Court of Appeal, “The complaint 
acknowledged that „Plaintiff was required to comply with . . . [government claims 
statutes],‟ but asserted she was „excused‟ from doing so because defendants „failed 
to provide notice to Plaintiff as required by Government Code §§ 910.8, 911, 
911.3, and therefore waived any defenses they may have had to the sufficiency of 
Plaintiff‟s claim (Notice of Intention to Commence Action) as presented.‟ ”5     
On August 29, 2007, the County6 filed an answer denying plaintiff‟s 
allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including that plaintiff “failed to 
comply with the provisions of the California [Government] Claims Act,” and that 
her claims were “barred by the provisions of Government Code §§ 810 through 
1000, inclusive.”7     
                                              
5 
Section 910.8 requires the board of a public entity, or its designee, to give a 
claimant notice of a defective claim.  Section 911 provides if the board fails to 
provide a notice of insufficiency as required by section 910.8, the defect is waived.  
Section 911.3, subdivisions (a) and (b) require that the board, or its designee give 
written notice to the claimant that a claim was untimely.  Failure to do so waives a 
timeliness defense.  As later discussed, because plaintiff‟s claim was not presented 
to or actually received by the board or a person designated by it, sections 910.8, 
911 and 911.3 are not applicable.  (See post, pp. 10-12.)      
6  
The Court of Appeal noted that the complaint was never amended to name 
the County as the proper defendant, although the parties have acted throughout the 
proceedings as if it were.  The Court of Appeal treated this mistake as a harmless 
misnomer.  (See Plumlee v. Poag (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 541, 547; see also 4 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 477, pp. 605-606; 5 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 1219, p. 654.)  The parties do not dispute this issue 
and we need not address it.  
7 
At some point, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the suit against Dr. 
Bui and Dr. Sklar, agreeing that at all relevant times they acted within the course 
and scope of their County employment. 
 
5 
The County filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiff 
failed to comply with the Government Claims Act because her claim was never 
presented to or received by a statutorily designated recipient as required by section 
915.  In opposition, plaintiff argued that she had “substantially complied” with the 
Government Claims Act on April 3, 2007, by delivering the letter of intent to the 
Risk Management Department at VMC.  She also alleged that the letter was 
received by the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department by April 6, 
2007, and that this department was the county department most directly involved 
with the processing and defense of tort claims against the County.     
The trial court granted the County‟s summary judgment motion.  It held that 
the County made a sufficient showing of noncompliance, and that plaintiff could 
not avoid summary judgment because she failed to “raise a reasonable inference 
that her claim was actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the 
local public entity within the time prescribed for presentation thereof” and she also 
failed to “establish waiver and/or equitable estoppel.”     
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It found that plaintiff had “substantially 
complied” with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act.  The 
Court of Appeal rejected other Court of Appeal cases holding that compliance is 
deemed satisfied only by actual receipt by the statutorily designated persons, under 
section 915(e)(1).     
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  The Government Claims Act 
Suits for money or damages filed against a public entity are regulated by 
statutes contained in division 3.6 of the Government Code, commonly referred to 
as the Government Claims Act.  We have previously noted that “[s]ection 905 
requires the presentation of „all claims for money or damages against local public 
entities,‟ subject to exceptions not relevant here.  Claims for personal injury and 
 
6 
property damage must be presented within six months after accrual; all other 
claims must be presented within a year.  (§ 911.2.)  „[N]o suit for money or 
damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a 
claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been 
presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or has been deemed to 
have been rejected . . . .‟  (§ 945.4.)  „Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely 
present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing 
a lawsuit against that entity.‟  [Citation.]”  (City of Stockton v. Superior Court 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737-738 (City of Stockton).)  
Section 905 requires that, subject to exceptions not present here, “all claims 
for money or damages against local public entities” must be “presented in 
accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 
(commencing with Section 910)” of the Government Code.  “ „Local public entity‟ 
includes a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other 
political subdivision or public corporation in the State . . . .”  (§ 900.4.)   
Section 915(a) provides, “A claim . . . shall be presented to a local public 
entity by either of the following means:  [¶]  (1) Delivering it to the clerk, 
secretary or auditor thereof.  [¶]  (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to 
the governing body at its principal office.”  Section 915(e)(1) clearly and narrowly 
sets forth how actual receipt may meet the presentation requirement:  “A claim . . . 
shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even 
though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if, within the time 
prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply:  [¶]  (1) It is 
actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 
entity.”  (Italics added.)   
Even if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a 
claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied.  (City of Stockton, supra, 42 
 
7 
Cal.4th at p. 738.)  “The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the 
maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an 
element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.”  (Del Real v. City 
of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 (Del Real), italics added; Shirk v. 
Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (Shirk).)          
A goal of the Government Claims Act is to eliminate confusion and 
uncertainty resulting from different claims procedures.  (Recommendation:  
Claims Against Public Entities (Dec. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 
(1963) p. 1008.)  As we pointed out in City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
page 738, “[t]he purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but „to 
provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately 
investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 
litigation.  [Citations.]  It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even 
in face of the public entity‟s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 
the claim.‟  [Citation.]  The claims statutes also „enable the public entity to engage 
in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the 
future.‟  [Citations.]”     
Moreover, the intent of the Government Claims Act is “not to expand the 
rights of plaintiffs against government entities.  Rather, the intent of the act is to 
confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.”  
(Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776; State of 
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1242-1243.)  The claimant 
bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate public 
entity.  (Life v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 901 (Life).)8   
                                              
8  
In Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 213, we summarized the public policies 
supporting strict application of the claims presentation requirements:  “Requiring a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8 
B.  Application of the Government Claims Statute   
Several points are important here.  The County does not dispute that the 
content of the letter is sufficient to serve as a valid claim, nor does it dispute its 
timeliness.  Plaintiff does not dispute that the County was the proper public entity 
where her claim should have been presented under section 915(a).  The case stands 
or falls on whether presentation of plaintiff‟s letter of intention to someone other 
than the statute‟s designated recipients or the actual receipt of notice by a proper 
recipient, satisfies the prefiling claim requirement.   
It is uncontested that the claim was never delivered or mailed to the “clerk, 
secretary or auditor” as required by section 915(a).  Likewise, the “clerk, 
secretary, auditor or board” never actually received the claim.  (§ 915(e)(1).)  
Thus, neither section 915(a)‟s specific requirements for compliance, nor section 
915(e)(1)‟s provision deeming actual receipt to constitute compliance, were 
satisfied.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that there was “substantial 
compliance.”  This was error.   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
[claimant] . . . to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, 
affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to 
the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others.  [Citations.]  [It] also 
permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, 
memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located.  [Citations.]  Fresh notice of a 
claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to 
settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives 
it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning.  [Citations.]  The notice 
requirement . . . thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public 
entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, 
because . . . public entities . . . will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the 
taxpayers.” 
 
 
9 
The proper construction of section 915 is dispositive.  “In construing any 
statute, we first look to its language.  [Citation.]  „Words used in a statute . . . 
should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use.  [Citations.]  If the 
language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it 
necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .‟  [Citation.]  „If 
the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court 
looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be 
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which 
the statute is a part.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]”  (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.)  Also, a statute “ „must be given a reasonable and 
common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of 
the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application 
will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.‟ ”  (City of Poway v. 
City of San Diego (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 858, quoting DeYoung v. City of 
San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18.)  A court may not, “under the guise of 
construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain 
and direct import of the terms used.”  (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.)  Further, “ „[w]e must assume 
that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished to do so . . . . 
[Citation]‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal erred by failing to adhere to the plain language of 
section 915.  Instead, it rewrote the statute to read as the court believed it should 
provide.   
Section 915(a)(1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent to precisely identify those 
who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity.  Section 915(e)(1) 
reflects the Legislature‟s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the 
 
10 
presentation requirement if the claim is “actually received” by a statutorily 
designated recipient.  Thus, compliance with section 915(e)(1) requires actual 
receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients.  If an 
appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or 
misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute.  (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 901.)  This straightforward construction honors the statutory language and is 
consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes.9    
While resort to extrinsic sources is unnecessary, our conclusion is consistent 
with the legislative history.  In 1959, the California Law Revision Commission‟s 
(Commission) report found that there were conflicting claim presentation 
requirements for public entities throughout the state.  The Commission urged that 
specificity and uniformity were necessary and recommended adoption of uniform 
procedures for certain claims against public entities.  (See Recommendation and 
Study relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) pp. A-57 to A-62, A-122 (1959 Study).)  
The Commission reported, “Much unnecessary litigation has been devoted to 
resolution of technical issues relating to allegedly improper presentation of 
claims. . . .  [A recurring question is] whether presentation to the wrong official 
satisfies the statute.  Avoidance of these problems can be achieved in part by clear 
identification of the officer to whom such claims are required to be presented and 
by express authorization of mailed notice.  In order to avoid doubts and to 
preclude such purely technical issues from interfering with expeditious handling of 
claims, however, it is recommended that express provision be made to cure minor 
                                              
9  
We need not determine whether section 915‟s use of the term “clerk” refers 
to the county clerk or the clerk of the board of supervisors.  It is undisputed that 
the claim was not mailed, delivered to, or received by either clerk.      
 
11 
defects in the manner of service which do not prejudice the public entity.”  (Id.  at 
p. A-122, fns. omitted.)   
The Commission also referred to a New York law providing that,  “ „[I]f 
service of such notice . . . [is] not in compliance with the provisions of this 
subdivision, such service shall be deemed valid if such notice is actually received 
by such person.‟ ” (1959 Study, supra, 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. A-
122, italics added.)  In 1959, the Legislature acted on the Commission‟s 
recommendation and added section 714, the predecessor of section 915.10  (Stats. 
1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136.)  “The scheme in effect today was established in 
1963, when the Legislature combined the requirements for claims against local 
entities with those for claims against the state in part 3 of division 3.6 of title 1 of 
the Government Code.  (Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, pp. 3369, 3372 et seq.)”  (City of 
Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 739, fn. 4.) 
It is logical to provide that actual receipt satisfies the claim presentation 
requirement.  The goals of the claims statutes are to provide entities with sufficient 
information to investigate and appropriately resolve claims and to plan for 
potential liabilities.  These goals are satisfied when an adequate claim is actually 
received by an appropriate entity representative.   The Legislature retains authority 
to determine which representatives are appropriate.  The Court of Appeal cannot 
                                              
10  
Former section 714 provided, “A claim may be presented to a local public 
entity (1) by delivering the claim to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof within 
the period of time prescribed by Section 715 or (2) by mailing the claim to such 
clerk, secretary or auditor or to the governing body at its principal office not later 
than the last day of such period.  A claim shall be deemed to have been presented 
in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as 
provided herein if it is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or 
governing body within the time prescribed.”  (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136, 
italics added.)     
 
12 
override that determination simply because it concludes receipt by others should 
be considered sufficient.       
The Court of Appeal placed substantial reliance on Jamison v. State of 
California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513 (Jamison).  Jamison proves too slender a 
reed to support the weight of the Court of Appeal‟s expansion.  The Jamison 
holding was later repudiated by its own panel and is in conflict with more recent 
authority.     
Jamison was injured in a traffic collision with a truck owned by the 
California Department of Water Resources.  His lawyer filed a claim with the 
Department of Water Resources before filing suit.  (Jamison, supra, 
31 Cal.App.3d at p. 515.)  The trial court dismissed the action for failure to 
comply with the Government Claims Act.  (Jamison, at p. 515.)  At the time, 
section 915, subdivision (c), a prior version of section 915(e), required that notice 
be filed with the State Board of Control and Jamison had failed to do so.  
(Jamison, at pp. 515-516.)  The Court of Appeal concluded Jamison had 
substantially complied with the existing statute.  It noted that most claim statute 
cases dealt with “substantial compliance” in disputes over whether the contents or 
form of the claim was adequate, not whether the filing was properly presented.  
(Id. at p. 516.)  It then reviewed the few California cases involving “the question 
of filing a proper claim with the wrong governmental department or agency.”  
(Ibid.)   
The Jamison court drew several conclusions:  (1) The statutory requirement 
is not met when a claim is filed with the wrong entity.  (Jamison, supra, 31 
Cal.App.3d at p. 517.)  That principle is reflected in Jackson v. Board of 
Education (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 856, 858-860, which held that a requirement to 
serve a local board of education is not satisfied by serving the municipality.  (2) If 
a claim is filed with the proper entity but with the wrong statutory official of that 
 
13 
entity, the statute is satisfied if the claim is actually received by the statutory 
officer.  (3) A complete failure to serve any responsible officer of the entity will 
not constitute substantial compliance.  (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.)  
As stated in Redwood v. State of California (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 501, 503-504:  
“It has been repeatedly held that where the claims statute provides for the person 
upon whom the claim is to be served . . . service upon another is insufficient.”   
The Jamison court went on to draw a fourth conclusion that it phrased as 
follows:  “Service upon any responsible official of the entity, but not the statutory 
officer, is sufficient if the party served has the duty to notify the statutory agent.”  
(Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.)  Jamison cited no California authority 
for this proposition, referring instead to cases from Indiana (Galbreath v. City of 
Indianapolis (Ind. 1970) 255 N.E.2d 225) and the District of Columbia (Stone v. 
District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 28 [applying D.C. law]).  
(Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.)  The Jamison opinion does not reveal 
whether the statutes at issue in those cases bore any similarity to the California 
statutory scheme.     
As justification for importing its fourth conclusion into California law, the 
Jamison court stated, “Certainly, any responsible officer or employee of a major 
state agency knows, or should know, that if a substantial claim for damages is 
presented that it should be forwarded to the Board of Control.  In the event the 
officer or employee actually receiving the claim does not know the proper agency, 
then a simply [sic] inquiry to the Attorney General‟s office would result in advice 
as to the proper agency.”  (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 518.)  The court 
cited no statutory authority supporting the duty it created.  Other California 
appellate courts have refused to follow it.  (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 761; 
Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894.) 
 
14 
In Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894, the plaintiff was involved in an 
automobile accident.  He was treated by medical staff at the county medical center 
that allegedly committed negligence.  The plaintiff retained counsel who sent a 
personal injury claim to the medical center‟s legal department.  (Id. at p. 897.)  
The legal department was not the proper body to receive the plaintiff‟s claim.  The 
plaintiff later retained new counsel who filed a late claim with the county board of 
supervisors.  (Ibid.)  
After the county denied the claim as untimely and his application for leave to 
present a late claim was also denied, Life filed a complaint against the county 
alleging medical negligence.  (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.)  The county 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Life had failed to timely present 
a claim.  (Id. at p. 898.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Life‟s 
presentation of the claim to the hospital‟s legal department was insufficient.  
Compliance with section 915 would have occurred only if the misdirected claim 
was “ „actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public 
entity. . . .‟ ”  (Life, at p. 900.)      
The Life court found Jamison unpersuasive because it failed to follow the 
statutory requirement that a misdirected claim be “actually received” by the 
designated party.  (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.)  The court also 
remarked that “Jamison’s reliance on a public entity‟s internal transmittal of a 
claim conflicts with section 915, which requires the claimant to file with the 
appropriate official or board.”  (Ibid.)  The court persuasively concluded that “[b]y 
focusing on the duty of a public employee in receipt of a claim to forward the 
claim to the proper agency, Jamison inappropriately shifts responsibility for filing 
a claim with the proper official or body from the claimant to the public entity.”  
(Ibid.)   
 
15 
In Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at page 764, the claim arose from an 
automobile accident with a Riverside police officer, Eric Charrette.  Del Real‟s 
attorney wrote to Charrette seeking his account of the accident and requesting that 
the letter be forwarded to Charrette‟s insurance company.  The city attorney 
responded to the letter, informing counsel that it represented Charrette and that he 
would not provide a statement.  The letter also stated that any further contact with 
Charrette should be made through the city attorney‟s office.  (Ibid.)  Del Real later 
sued Charrette and the City of Riverside.  Defendants moved for summary 
judgment alleging Del Real failed to satisfy the Government Claims statutes.  Del 
Real urged in reply that her letter to Charrette constituted a timely claim.  She 
argued that “even if the letter was not actually received by the appropriate person 
or body, it should have been,” citing Jamison for the proposition that Charrette 
had a duty to transmit the letter to the appropriate recipient.  (Del Real, at p. 770.)   
In addition to holding that the letter did not contain the contents of a proper 
claim, the Court of Appeal held that because the letter was not properly directed it 
failed to comply with section 915.  (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.)  In 
rejecting Del Real‟s argument, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated, “we 
have reconsidered our earlier decision in Jamison and, as did the court in Life v. 
County of Los Angeles, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pages 900-901, we find that it is 
at odds with section 915, subdivision (c).  We therefore decline to follow it.”  
(Ibid.)  We agree with the holdings in Life and Del Real.  Their application of the 
compliance doctrine is consistent with the language of section 915(e)(1) requiring 
actual receipt by the statutorily designated recipient.  Jamison is unpersuasive 
because it fails to follow the statutory language specifically identifying who must 
actually receive a claim.  Finding compliance when any agency employee is 
served exponentially expands the scope of the statute.  By placing a duty on a 
public employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward it to the proper 
 
16 
agency, Jamison improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting a claim from 
the claimant to the public entity.  (See §§ 910, 915.)   
Moreover, the County argues persuasively that, in addition to contravening 
section 915‟s plain language, the Jamison rule creates uncertainty about how and 
where claims must be delivered.  Misdirected claims may be received by various 
departments or employees and forwarded to multiple people and places, making it 
difficult to determine whether the claims were actually delivered to, or received 
by, a department or employee charged with the overall management of claims 
against the county.  The question of when a claim is actually received and whether 
a specific department or employee managed claims against a public entity would 
also be fodder for litigation.  This result is contrary to the Government Claims 
Act‟s goal of eliminating uncertainty in the claims-presentation requirements.  
Accordingly, we disapprove Jamison v. State of California, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 
513.     
The Court of Appeal below further relied on cases decided before the 
enactment of section 915 or its predecessor, section 714.11  When these cases were 
decided, claims against the state, local, and municipal governments were governed 
by numerous state statutes and local ordinances.  Recognizing this Byzantine 
claims system, the Legislature standardized the procedure by enacting the 
Government Claims Act.  In doing so, it replaced more than 150 separate 
procedures for directing claims against local governmental entities.  (Ardon v. City 
of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 246.)  Because of this comprehensive 
                                              
11  
Insolo v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 172; Peters v. City and 
County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419; and Los Angeles Brick & Clay 
Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 478, 486.   
 
17 
change in the statutory procedures, the early cases cited by the Court of Appeal are 
inapposite.      
The Court of Appeal also erred by relying on Elias v. San Bernardino County 
Flood Control Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 75, and Carlino v. Los Angeles 
County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533.  These cases hold 
that when the governing body of one public entity is also the governing body of 
another public entity, a claim against the subordinate entity that is delivered to the 
governing body constitutes substantial compliance with the claims statute.  (Elias, 
supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 75-77; Carlino, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533-
1534.  That is not the case here.12 
 
 
                                              
12  
The Court of Appeal additionally relied on out-of-state cases.  (Shehyn v. 
District of Columbia (D.C.  1978) 392 A.2d 1008; Stone v. District of Columbia, 
supra, 237 F.2d 28, 29-30 [applying D.C. law]; Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 
supra, 255 N.E.2d 225; Coghill v. Badger (Ind. Ct.App. 1981) 418 N.E.2d 1201, 
1206, fn.3; Hawkeye Bank v. State (Iowa 1994) 515 N.W.2d 348, 350; Webb v. 
Highway Div. of Oregon State Dept. of Transp. (Or. 1982) 652 P.2d 783, 784.)     
 
Plaintiff also cites numerous out-of-state cases.  (Finnie v. Jefferson County 
School District (Colo. 2003) 79 P.3d 1253; Robinson v. Washington County 
(Me.1987) 529 A.2d 1357; Hansen v. City of Laurel (Md. Ct.Spec.App. 2010) 996 
A.2d 882, 891; Kelly v. City of Rochester (Minn. 1975) 231 N.W.2d 275, 276; 
Kirkpatrick v. City of Glendale (Mo. Ct.App. 2003) 99 S.W.3d 57; Ferrer v. 
Jackson County Board of Supervisors (Miss. 1999) 741 So.2d 216; Myears v. 
Charles Mix County (S.D. 1997) 566 N.W.2d 470; Mount v. City of Vermillion 
(S.D. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 686.)     
 
We find these authorities unpersuasive.  Neither the Court of Appeal nor 
plaintiff explain how the claim statutes at issue in these cases were consistent with 
California‟s Government Claims Act.   
     
 
18 
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.   
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 195 Cal.App.4th 1327 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S194501 
Date Filed: December 6, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: William J. Elfving 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore, J. Michael Fitzsimmons and Lisa Jeong 
Cummins for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Cheong, Denove, Rowell & Bennett and John D. Rowell for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Miguel Marquez, County Counsel, Lori E. Pegg, Acting County Counsel, Marcy L. Berkman and Melissa 
R. Kiniyalocts, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Stephen D. Underwood; Michael M. Youngdahl and Jordan Sheinbaum for CSAC Excess Insurance 
Authority, California League of Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lisa Jeong Cummins 
Campbell, Warburton, Fitzimmons, Smith, Mendell & Pastore 
64 West Santa Clara Street 
San Jose, CA  95113-1806 
(408) 295-7701 
 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 538-2320 
 
Melissa R. Kiniyalocts 
Deputy County Counsel 
70 West Hedding Street, 9th Floor, East Wing 
San Jose, CA  95110-1770 
(408) 299-5900