Title: State v. Wogenstahl

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WOGENSTAHL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Wogenstahl (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Appellate procedure — S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1) — Delayed application for 
reopening appeal from judgment and conviction based on claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — Application denied when 
applicant fails to establish good cause in filing an untimely delayed 
application. 
(No. 98-1146 — Submitted August 19, 1998 — Decided November 10, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-930222. 
 
Appellant, Jeffrey A. Wogenstahl, was convicted of aggravated murder, 
kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to death.  The Court of 
Appeals for Hamilton County affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  State v. 
Wogenstahl (Nov. 30, 1994), Hamilton App. No. C-930222.  This court affirmed 
the convictions and death sentence.  State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
344, 662 N.E.2d 311. 
 
During the pendency of the appeal of his convictions and death sentence, 
appellant filed an application before the court of appeals to reopen his appeal 
pursuant to App.R. 26(B), arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  The 
court of appeals denied appellant’s application to reopen for lack of jurisdiction 
pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1).  The court of appeals noted that under State v. 
Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, paragraph two of the 
syllabus, appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could be 
raised on his direct appeal to this court. 
 
Upon appeal, this court affirmed.  State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 273, 662 N.E.2d 16.  Shortly after that decision was rendered, this court 
amended S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1) to permit the court of appeals to retain 
 
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jurisdiction to rule on an application for reopening while the case is pending 
before the Ohio Supreme Court. 
 
On or about March 4, 1998, appellant filed a “Delayed Application for 
Reopening” before the court of appeals, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  In an entry filed May 21, 1998, the court of appeals denied the 
application because appellant had failed to demonstrate good cause for filing the 
application more than two years after the amendment to the Supreme Court Rules 
of Practice.  In addition, the court of appeals held that appellant’s application was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, since appellant had already raised, and this 
court determined, the issue of appellate counsel’s effectiveness in his direct appeal 
to this court. 
 
Appellant now appeals the denial to this court. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. 
Breyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Jeffrey A. Wogenstahl, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The determinative question before this court is whether the 
court of appeals erred in dismissing appellant’s delayed application to reopen for 
lack of good cause shown and on grounds of res judicata.  We find that the court 
of appeals was correct in dismissing appellant’s application to reopen, since 
appellant failed to demonstrate good cause in filing an untimely delayed 
application. 
 
Moreover, our decision in State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 351, 662 
N.E.2d at 318, determined that appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel lacked merit.  In his instant appeal before this court, appellant 
 
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simply argues the same errors that we rejected in his original death penalty appeal.  
Therefore, that decision is res judicata.  Application of the res judicata doctrine in 
this case is not unjust.  See State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d at 66, 584 N.E.2d at 
1209. 
 
Appellant’s argument that this court failed to separately consider and decide 
each and every instance of claimed ineffective assistance in that appeal is plainly 
wrong.  As we noted in appellant’s capital appeal, “this court is not required to 
address and discuss, in opinion form, each and every proposition of law raised by 
the parties in a death penalty appeal.  See, e.g., State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio 
St.3d 263, 267, 643 N.E.2d 524, 528.”  State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 351, 
662 N.E.2d at 318.  Moreover, we stated that “[w]e have carefully considered each 
of appellant’s propositions of law  * * *.   * * * [A]ppellant received  * * * 
competent representation both at trial and on appeal.  We address, in opinion form, 
only those matters that merit some discussion.” (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.