Title: State v. Dorsett

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-310 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ZACHARIAH DORSETT,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 26, 2015] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element 
of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006).  We have 
for review, Dorsett v. State, 147 So. 3d 532, 536-37 (Fla. 4th DCA), review 
granted, 122 So. 3d 869 (Fla. 2013), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
held that in the prosecution of a driver for willfully leaving the scene of an accident 
involving an injury the statute requires the State to prove that the driver had “actual 
knowledge” of being involved in a crash.  The district court certified to this Court 
the following question:  “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida 
Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of 
 
 
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the crash?”  147 So. 3d at 533 (emphasis in original).  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  To answer the question, we begin by reviewing the 
facts of the case and then examine the statute and the cases construing it to 
determine whether a criminal conviction for violation of the hit-and-run statute 
requires proof of the driver’s actual knowledge rather than mere constructive 
knowledge of being involved in a crash.  For the reasons explained below, we 
answer the certified question in the affirmative.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Zachariah Dorsett was charged with leaving the scene of a crash resulting in 
an injury under this state’s hit-and-run statute, a third degree felony under section 
316.027(1), Florida Statutes (2006).  The statute is set out fully in our subsequent 
discussion.  In brief, however, the statute requires the driver involved in a 
vehicular crash to stop, provide assistance to anyone injured, and provide 
information to others and the authorities.  The district court summarized the 
underlying facts presented at Dorsett’s trial as follows: 
The defendant was driving a heavy pickup truck northbound on 
A1A.  According to the defendant, he had his windows rolled up, 
windshield wipers and air conditioner on, and was listening to the 
[portable] radio at full volume.  He saw a lot of people running across 
the street from the beach as it began to rain.  The people had cleared 
the street as he drove through the intersection.  
According to the defendant, he was unaware that a young 
teenager had lost control of his skateboard and fell as he crossed the 
road, hitting the truck’s passenger side undercarriage.  The defendant 
continued traveling north at a normal rate of speed and did not stop. 
 
 
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He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and had no 
hearing or health problems.  
Law enforcement stopped the defendant approximately three 
miles from the accident.  When questioned by law enforcement as to 
why he did not stop, the defendant explained: 
The bottom line is if I would have known I had hit 
somebody, I would have definitely stopped this truck; 
that’s the bottom line. I didn’t—there was no—at all but 
the radio and me driving; I didn’t hear anything else, 
nothing was going on.  I just found out about this person 
getting struck by my truck that I have no idea I had 
struck. 
The State charged the defendant with leaving the scene of a 
crash involving injury.  He entered a not guilty plea and proceeded to 
trial.  There, the officer who stopped the defendant testified that the 
victim was on his rear end in the crosswalk when he was hit by the 
truck.  The victim went underneath the truck and was dragged almost 
ninety feet.  There was no evidence of braking, skid marks, brake 
lights, evasive steering, or a change in speed.  There was no damage 
to the front of the truck.  
Several witnesses testified that they saw the accident.  One saw 
the truck’s wheels go over the victim’s body and heard the truck ride 
over him.  A worker testified that he heard the accident from one of 
the upper floor patios of a building where he was installing windows; 
he saw the victim skateboard into the street, go underneath the truck, 
and be dragged down the street.  His co-worker testified that he saw 
the skateboard being spit out from under the truck’s right rear tire and 
heard the skateboard crack in two.  He also saw the back right tire of 
the truck actually raise up or jump up.  
Another eyewitness testified that she was in a car at the light 
when she heard a loud noise at impact through her closed window.  
Another witness testified that he was about seventy-five to one 
hundred yards away from the road when he heard a loud thud and the 
sound of cracking wood.  Yet another witness testified that she saw 
the victim fall off the skateboard and hit the right side of the truck.  
A second officer testified that he pulled the defendant’s vehicle 
over within minutes of the accident.  The defendant immediately 
jumped out of the truck and appeared very nervous.  He was visibly 
 
 
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shaking and stuttering.  The defendant repeatedly asked why he had 
been stopped.  According to the second officer, the truck’s windows 
were up, but the radio was not on. 
Dorsett, 147 So. 3d at 533-34.   
 
Arguing that the hit-and-run statute requires proof that the driver had “actual 
knowledge” of involvement in a crash, Dorsett proposed a jury instruction that 
required the jury to find as an essential element that he “knew that he was involved 
in an accident.”  Id. at 534 (emphasis omitted).  The trial judge, however, denied 
the defendant’s request and read the standard jury instruction, which provided that 
the State must prove the defendant “knew or should have known” that he was 
involved in a crash.  Id. at 535; see Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 28.4.  The jury 
found Dorsett guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to twenty-four 
months in prison for the third-degree felony. 
 
On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Dorsett again argued “that 
the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law regarding 
section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), because the law requires actual 
knowledge of the accident.”  147 So. 3d at 534 (emphasis in original).  Citing this 
Court’s decision in State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), the district court 
concluded that proof of a defendant’s actual knowledge of the accident is required 
and the jury should be so instructed.  Dorsett, 147 So. 3d at 536-37.  As a result the 
Fourth District reversed and remanded the case for new trial but also certified the 
 
 
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following question:  “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida 
Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of 
the crash?”  147 So. 3d at 533 (emphasis in original).  
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Whether Florida’s hit-and-run statute requires the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of being involved in a crash 
is a question of law that requires interpretation of section 316.027 to give effect to 
the Legislature’s intent.  “The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and 
therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.”  Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 
1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006).  Accordingly, this “Court looks primarily at the plain 
meaning of the statute to determine the legislative intent.”  Id. at 1091.  However, 
when the language of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we employ rules of 
statutory construction to discern that intent.  Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 
811 (Fla. 2008). 
 
The relevant portion of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, subsection 316.027 
provides as follows: 
(1)(a)  The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring 
on public or private property that results in injury of any person must 
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close 
thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he 
or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062.  Any person who 
willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, 
punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. 
 
 
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(b)  The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public 
or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately 
stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and 
must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the 
requirements of s. 316.062.  Any person who willfully violates this 
paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
 
As the statute plainly states, compliance with the law requires “[t]he driver of any 
vehicle involved in a crash . . . that results in injury of any person” to “immediately 
stop,” “remain at the scene,” and comply with section 316.062, which requires the 
driver to provide reasonable assistance to anyone injured and to provide identifying 
information as specified.  § 316.027(1)(a).  
 
Although section 316.027 does not expressly state that actual knowledge is 
required for a violation, the law does expressly provide that a felony criminal 
violation requires that the driver “willfully” violate the statute.  For the reasons we 
explain, we conclude that a willful violation can be established only if the driver 
had actual knowledge that a crash occurred. 
 
In Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 370, we addressed a related claim that section 
316.027 contained a requirement of actual knowledge that an injury had occurred.  
In that case, the defendant was charged under section 316.027 with leaving the 
scene of an accident involving a personal injury or death.  He “struck two young 
women walking on a dark stretch of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County,” killing 
one and injuring the other.  Id.  Mancuso requested a jury instruction requiring the 
 
 
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State to prove that he had “actual knowledge” of the injury, i.e., that he “knew that 
he was involved in an accident which resulted in personal injury to another” and 
“willfully left the scene and willfully failed to render aid or give certain 
information.”  Id. at 371 (emphasis added).  The trial court denied the request and 
instead instructed the jury to determine whether Mancuso “knew or should have 
known that he was involved in an accident, and that he willfully failed to stop at 
the scene.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Mancuso was convicted and on appeal, the 
district court approved the trial court’s instruction and certified the following 
question to this Court: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida 
Statutes (1991), must the State show that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the injury or death; and the jury be so instructed?”  Id. at 370; see 
Mancuso v. State, 636 So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).   
On review, we relied on our decision in Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 
(Fla. 1980), to answer the question.  In that case, we rejected the contention that 
section 316.027 created two offenses—the misdemeanor of unlawfully leaving the 
scene and the felony of willfully leaving the scene—and held the statute “creates 
only the felony of ‘willfully’ leaving the scene of an accident.”  384 So. 2d at 141-
42, 143.  Accordingly, in Mancuso, we explained that  
[i]n reaching [the determination in Stanfill], this Court implicitly 
recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of 
section 316.027, for one cannot “willfully” leave an accident without 
awareness that an accident has occurred.  A majority of jurisdictions 
 
 
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that have considered similarly worded “hit-and-run” statutes have also 
concluded that knowledge of the accident must be read into the 
statute. 
Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis added). 
 
With regard to the element of knowledge of the injury, however, we held in 
Mancuso that “criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the 
driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death 
or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury 
should be so instructed.”  Id. at 372.  In so holding, we relied in part on the 
reasoning of other courts analyzing statutes based on the same uniform law that the 
“ ‘statute requires an affirmative course of action to be taken by the driver and it 
necessarily follows that one must be aware of the facts giving rise to this 
affirmative duty in order to perform such a duty.’ ”  Id. (quoting Kimoktoak v. 
State, 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978)).  
 
In Mancuso, we referred the jury instruction issue to the Supreme Court 
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases for consideration of an 
instruction consistent with our holding.  Id.  The Committee responded with a jury 
instruction that required the State to prove that the driver had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the injury.  See Std. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases (95-2), 665 So. 2d 
212, 215 (Fla. 1995).  However, the instruction also provided—and still provides—
that the driver may have either actual or constructive knowledge of the crash or 
 
 
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accident.  The standard jury instruction currently provides in pertinent part as 
follows:   
To prove the crime of Leaving the Scene of a Crash Involving Death or 
Injury, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
1. 
(Defendant) was the driver of a vehicle involved in a crash resulting in      
[injury to] [the death of] any person. 
2. 
(Defendant) knew or should have known that [he] [she] was involved 
in a crash. 
Give 3a if death is charged or 3b if injury is charged. 
3. 
a. 
(Defendant) knew or should have known of the injury to or 
 
death of the person. 
 
b. 
(Defendant) knew or should have known of the injury to 
the person. 
 
Give 4a, 4b, or both as applicable.  
4. 
a. 
(Defendant) willfully failed to stop at the scene of the 
 
crash or as close to the crash as possible and remain there 
 
until [he] [she] had given “identifying information”. . . ; 
 
 
 
[or] 
 
b. 
(Defendant) willfully failed to render “reasonable 
assistance” to the injured person if such treatment 
appeared to be necessary or was requested by the injured 
person. 
Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 28.4 (emphasis added). 
 
The standard instruction defines willfully to mean “intentionally and 
purposely,” id., and we stated in Mancuso that “one cannot ‘willfully’ leave an 
accident without awareness that an accident has occurred.”  652 So. 2d at 371.  
These statements are at odds with the instruction’s suggestion that constructive 
 
 
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knowledge that a crash occurred is sufficient to establish the willfulness of the 
defendant in leaving the scene.  In State v. Dumas, 700 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 
1997), we reinforced the principle that the duty imposed by the statute flows from 
the driver’s knowledge of the accident or crash.  The question presented was 
whether in a prosecution under the hit-and-run statute the State must prove the 
defendant’s knowledge of the results of the crash.  The statute contained two 
offenses: the third-degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving 
injury and the second-degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving a 
death.  Id. at 1224-25. This Court explained that  
Florida law imposes an affirmative duty on a driver to stop, render 
aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim 
and an accident report whenever there is an injury.  § 316.062, Fla. 
Stat. (1995).  Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete 
these duties.  § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995).  One of the main 
purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive 
medical assistance as soon as possible.  Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d 
865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of 
sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is 
rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance 
and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by 
the parties.”).  The fact that a death rather than an injury has occurred 
does not trigger a different set of duties.  Thus, the knowledge element 
that triggers the affirmative duty is the same in each circumstance, but 
the sanction imposed is determined by the results of the accident. 
 
Id. at 1225-26 (emphasis added).  As we stated in Mancuso, the duties imposed in 
this statute are triggered by the driver’s actual knowledge of involvement in a crash 
or accident.  652 So. 2d at 372.  
 
 
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Other states with similar hit-and-run statutes require the driver to have actual 
knowledge of the crash to support imposition of the attendant duties.  In State v. 
Medeiros, 997 A.2d 95, 97 n.1 (Me. 2010), for example, the operative section of 
the Maine statute provides:  “The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident 
anywhere that results in personal injury or death to a person shall immediately stop 
the vehicle at the scene of the accident . . . .”  The provision imposes duties similar 
to those in the Florida statute to report and provide assistance.  Id.  In rejecting 
Medeiros’s claim on appeal that insufficient evidence supported the finding that he 
had actual knowledge of the accident, the Maine Supreme Court explained that 
although “involve[ment] in [an] accident” was not defined by the statute, “because 
the statute imposes an affirmative duty to act, actual knowledge of involvement in 
an accident is implied within the statute’s structure.”  Id. at 100 (citing State v. 
Keiser, 807 A.2d 378, 384 (Vt. 2002), and noting that Vermont’s hit-and-run 
statute similarly requires actual knowledge of the crash); see State v. Miller, 308 
N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Iowa 1981) (stating proof of the defendant’s “actual knowledge” of 
the accident is an essential element of the crime that may be established from 
direct proof or “surrounding circumstances”). 
 
Recently, the First District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion and 
certified to this Court the same question we address in the instant case.  In Cahours 
v. State, 147 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the defendant was convicted of 
 
 
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leaving the scene of a crash involving a death under the hit-and-run statute and 
vehicular homicide.  On appeal, Cahours contended that the standard jury 
instruction for leaving the scene which requires proof that the defendant “knew or 
should have known” of involvement in a crash “misstates the law” and that to 
convict the State must prove the driver’s actual knowledge of the crash.  Id. at 576.  
Citing the Fourth District’s decision in this case, the First District concluded that 
“a defendant must have actual knowledge of the crash in order to willfully leave 
the scene.”  Id.  Accordingly, the First District “h[e]ld that a defendant cannot 
willfully, intentionally, or purposefully leave the scene of a crash without actually 
knowing that the crash occurred.”  Id. at 577.  The court noted, however, that 
proving knowledge or intent “is seldom capable of direct proof[;][it] usually is 
established from the surrounding circumstances.”  Id. at 576 n.2 (quoting Miller, 
308 N.W.2d at 7). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We agree with the Fourth District’s holding that in a prosecution under 
Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of the crash, an essential 
element of the crime of leaving the scene of a crash.  We approve the decision on 
review and answer the certified question in the affirmative.   
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D11-1530 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, James Joseph Carney, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, and Jeanine Marie Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, 
West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Jeanette Anne Bellon of Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent