Title: FLANDERMEYER v. BONNER

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

FLANDERMEYER v. BONNER  FLANDERMEYER v. BONNER 2006 OK 87 152 P.3d 195 Case Number: 103509 Decided: 11/21/2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DOUGLAS FLANDERMEYER, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE STEPHEN BONNER, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND COUNTY, Respondent, and TRACEY FLANDERMEYER, Real Party in Interest. ¶0 The Real Party in Interest, Tracy Flandermeyer (wife) initiated divorce proceedings against the Petitioner, Douglas Flandermeyer (husband). The trial, which was anticipated to take a day, was instead held over the course of a year. At the last scheduled hearing, the husband moved for a mistrial and requested a new trial, insisting that the piecemeal hearing process violated his due process rights guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art 2, §7 and the right to a speedy and certain remedy provided by the Okla. Const. art 2, §6. The trial court denied the request and the husband filed an application for extraordinary relief with this Court. We determine that conducting a trial in a serial fashion implicates fundamental fairness, due process, and the right to a speedy and certain remedy. However, under the facts presented, because it appears that the delays were more attributable to the actions of the petitioner than those of the trial court, the application to assume original jurisdiction and the petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus is denied. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS DENIED. David L. Thomas, J. David Terrell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner. George H. Brown, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Real Party in Interest. KAUGER, J., ¶1 This application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus was brought by the petitioner (husband) after his divorce proceedings were rescheduled and heard piecemeal over a period of a year. We agree with the petitioner that holding a trial in a serial fashion implicates fundamental fairness, due process, and the right to a speedy and certain remedy. DISPUTED FACTS ¶2 On December 29, 2004, Tracey Flandermeyer (wife) initiated divorce proceedings in the District Court of Cleveland County. On January 3, 2005, the Petitioner, Douglas Flandermeyer (husband) filed his answer and cross petition. The husband's counsel filed a Resolution Conference Statement on April 11, 2005, which indicated that the length of the trial would be one (1) day. The trial was set for May 12, 2005. ¶3 Because the husband failed to comply with the court's Resolution Conference Order and failed to respond to wife's discovery requests prior to the trial, the district court ordered that the husband could not call his witnesses to testify at trial and could not offer to admit any of his exhibits. However, the court gave the parties another opportunity to produce and exchange exhibits. ¶4 On May 12, 2005, the trial began, but the matter was not concluded in one day. Instead, the trial court continued the matter until October 7, 2005. The wife was prepared for trial on October 7, 2005; however, the husband's counsel informed the court that he had a scheduling conflict and could not proceed. The trial was reset to October 13, 2005, but the matter was not concluded on that day due in part to the husband's failure to exchange or produce exhibits. The trial court again reset the matter for January 20, 2006. ¶5 Before the January trial date, the husband hired new counsel, and at the January, 20, 2006, hearing, his lawyer spent most of the time covering issues which had been discussed before. When he was questioned on previous matters, the husband allegedly recanted his prior testimony, requiring the wife to produce a witness to refute the husband's statements. Due to this repetitive testimony, the trial was not finished on this date. It was tentatively reset to February 3, 2006. On February 3, 2006, another case took the entire day, and the trial was reset to May 25, 2006. ¶6 On May 25, 2006, all parties and counsel appeared to proceed on what was expected to be the final day of trial. The only remaining witness was the wife. However, the husband's counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that because the trial had been conducted in a piecemeal fashion over an entire year, his rights to due process were denied. The trial court denied the motion. The husband's counsel then requested that the case be stayed pending the filing of the husband's pleadings with this Court and the district court granted the request. The husband filed his application for extraordinary relief with this Court on June 30, 2006. ¶7 IN THE ABSENCE OF DILATORY BEHAVIOR BY THE LITIGANTS, HOLDING A TRIAL IN A SERIAL FASHION IMPLICATES FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, DUE PROCESS, AND THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND CERTAIN REMEDY. ¶8 The husband argues that because the district court did not hear this cause on successive days: 1) his procedural due process rights were violated; a. Due Process ¶9 The United States Constitution guarantees that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ¶10 Before any deprivation can occur a fundamental requirement of due process must be satisfied: the opportunity to be heard b. Right to a Speedy and Certain Remedy ¶ ¶12 In Barker v. Wingo, ¶14 On appeal, the Court in addressing whether holding the hearing in a serial fashion violated the policemen's right to a speedy trial, the Court said: In Chase v. Watson, Okla. The Gresham Court considered: 1) the circumstances of the particular case; 2) whether the postponement had any importance on appeal; 3) what, if any, prejudice resulted from the postponement; ¶15 Here, an estimated one day trial that is still continuing over one year later involved twice the delay involved in Gresham and appears unreasonable. Serialization of trial dates is an ineffective and unreliable method of docket management. It is not approved by this Court and piecemeal proceedings should be used by the trial court as an exception, not as the norm. ¶16 Under the particular facts of this cause, after scrutinizing the docket scheduling, it is clear that the trial court is perilously close to manifestly unreasonable scheduling practices. Attempting to hold this trial in a serial fashion implicates both parties' right to a speedy and to a certain remedy. However, we are not inclined to grant the husband's requested relief because he has failed to show that the delays he has suffered were not in fact attributable to him and his conduct at the hearings. CONCLUSION ¶17 We are loathe to interfere in the matter of docket control unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court comes dangerously close to exceeding its discretion and warranting intervention. However, because it appears that the delays were more attributable to the actions of the husband than those of the trial court, the application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus is denied. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS DENIED. HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ., concur. WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, OPALA, JJ., dissent. FOOT