Title: R.D. v. W.H.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

R.D. v. W.H.1994 WY 61875 P.2d 26Case Number: 93-90Decided: 05/27/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
R.D., 
individually and in his capacity as personal representative for the Estate of 
G.D., and further in his capacity as next friend and legal guardian of K.D., a 
minor child,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

W.H.,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

George 
Zunker, Cheyenne, and Mitch Geller, Denver, CO.

Representing 
Appellee:

Julie 
Nye Tiedeken, Cheyenne.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

Cardine, 
J., filed specially concurring opinion.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, 
individually, as personal representative for the decedent's estate, and as next 
friend and legal guardian of the minor child, appeals from the district court's 
order dismissing his amended complaint.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our resolution:

I. 
Whether an actor, whose action creates a condition of insanity in the mind of 
another, may be held liable for the death of that other person when the death 
itself is caused by suicide.

II. 
Whether the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.

[¶4]      After the 
decedent committed suicide, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee and a 
physician. Appellee moved under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellant amended 
his complaint, and the parties stipulated that the motion to dismiss would apply 
to the amended complaint. 

When 
reviewing a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court accepts all facts stated in 
the complaint as being true and views them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. We will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal only when it is certain 
from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts which 
would entitle him to relief.

Herrig 
v. Herrig, 
844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Veile v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶5]      The facts stated 
in the amended complaint are as follows: The decedent was Appellant's wife and 
the mother of the minor child. Appellee was the decedent's stepfather. Appellant 
alleged that Appellee sexually abused the decedent throughout her childhood, 
adolescence, and early adulthood and that, as a result of this abuse, the 
decedent developed psychiatric difficulties and attempted to commit suicide on 
numerous occasions.

[¶6]      The decedent 
visited her mother and Appellee on September 20, 1990. During that visit, the 
decedent asked Appellee to provide her with a firearm for "protection." Appellee 
complied, and the decedent attempted to commit suicide with the gun he provided. 
She did not succeed because the gun jammed. Just five days later, on September 
25, 1990, the decedent again visited her mother and Appellee. She asked Appellee 
to help her obtain a prescription for Elavil (amitriptyline hydrochloride). The 
decedent claimed that she had left her medication behind at her home. Although 
he was aware, or should have been aware, that the decedent had previously 
attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of amitriptyline 
hydrochloride, Appellee contacted a physician and asked him to write a 
prescription for the decedent. The physician wrote the prescription without 
meeting with or speaking to the decedent and without contacting her treating 
physicians. On September 27, 1990, the decedent ingested an overdose of the 
prescription drug. She died a few days later.

[¶7]      Appellant 
presented several claims for relief in his amended complaint against Appellee. 
These claims included: (1) wrongful death on the basis of Appellee's negligent 
actions; (2) wrongful death on the basis of Appellee's intentional acts; (3) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The district court dismissed Appellant's amended complaint 
against Appellee for failure under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Appellant appeals from that 
dismissal.

Wrongful 
Death

[¶8]      In his amended 
complaint, Appellant alleged that Appellee committed various wrongful actions 
toward the decedent and that such actions proximately caused the decedent's 
death by suicide. Appellee asserts that Appellant did not state a legal cause of 
action because the decedent's suicide was an intervening cause which did not 
come within and complete the line of causation from the negligent acts to the 
death. Appellant contends that his amended complaint did state a claim because 
he alleged that

"the 
decedent's suicide arose from the delirium or insanity created in her by 
[Appellee] and was either an act demonstrating the decedent's inability to 
realize the nature of her act and certainty or risk of harm involved, or was an 
act of irresistible impulse caused by her insanity which deprived her of the 
capacity to govern her conduct in accordance with reason."

[¶9]      The general rule 
with regard to liability for negligent actions which lead to suicide is: The 
decedent's intentional and voluntary act in taking his own life is an 
intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation and precludes a finding of 
liability against the tortfeasor. 22A AM.JUR.2D Death § 52 (1988); 
Eidson v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621, 626-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1993); Gilmore v. Shell Oil Company, 613 So. 2d 1272, 1276-78 (Ala. 1993); 
Krieg v. Massey, 239 Mont. 469, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (1989); Watters v. 
TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming 715 F. Supp. 819 
(W.D.Ky. 1989)). However, it has long been recognized that, when the 
tort-feasor's wrongful act causes the decedent to become insane and the 
decedent's insanity prevents him from realizing the nature of his act or from 
controlling his conduct, the suicide will not be considered as being an 
intervening cause and that the tort-feasor may be held liable for the suicide. 
See, e.g., Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776, 
780 (1942); and Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 
67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 310-11 (5th ed. 1984).

[¶10]   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 
(1965) is the codification of this special causation rule. District of 
Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1275-76 (D.C.Ct.App. 1987); Watters, 904 F.2d  at 384; Stafford v. Neurological Medicine, Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 
(8th Cir. 1987); Eidson, 863 S.W.2d  at 626-27.

[¶11]   Section 455 
provides:

If 
the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of 
another as to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm 
done by the other to himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or 
insanity

(a) 
prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of 
harm involved therein, or

(b) 
makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which 
deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with 
reason.

We 
adopt the language of § 455 of the RESTATEMENT, supra, as being an 
exception to the general rule that suicide is an intervening cause.1 In order for the suicide to be an 
intervening cause, it must have been committed voluntarily. When the decedent 
acts under the conditions expounded in § 455, he is not acting with volition, 
and his suicide, therefore, does not breach the chain of causation. Runyon v. 
Reid, 510 P.2d 943, 949 (Okla. 1973); Eidson, 863 S.W.2d  at 
627.

[¶12]   Appellee argues that Appellant's 
amended complaint was deficient because the facts did not show that the decedent 
was acting under a sudden impulse when she killed herself. Appellee contends 
that the decedent's other suicide attempts and the lapse of time between 
obtaining the drug and committing the suicide negate a finding of sudden 
impulse. Whether the decedent was acting under an irresistible or uncontrollable 
impulse,2 as defined by § 455 of the 
RESTATEMENT, supra, is generally a question of fact and should not be 
decided in the context of determining whether the complaint should be dismissed 
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). See generally Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 
363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 322 N.E.2d 263, 269 (1974) (reversing 75 Misc.2d 1067, 349 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).

[¶13]   We hold, however, that the impulse 
does not need to be sudden in order to be characterized as being an irresistible 
or uncontrollable impulse. 322 N.E.2d  at 268. See also James A. Howell, 
Comment, Civil Liability for Suicide: An Analysis of the Causation Issue, 
1978 ARIZ.ST.L.J. 573, 587 (1978). "In tort law, there is a recognition that one 
may retain the power to intend and yet be subject to an irresistible impulse." 
Peters, 527 A.2d  at 1276. See also Exxon Corporation v. Brecheen, 
526 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Tex. 1975) (reversing 519 S.W.2d 170). Even "long lapses in 
time between commission of a wrong and a suicide by the victim do not 
necessarily break the causal chain." Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting 
Company, 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D.Mich. 1981). A person may be found to 
have acted under an irresistible impulse even though evidence exists which 
indicates that he previously attempted to commit suicide or that he planned his 
suicide. Fuller, 322 N.E.2d at 268-69; Orcutt v. Spokane County, 
58 Wn.2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961) (en banc) (holding that a jury question 
existed as to whether the decedent was acting under an irresistible impulse even 
though evidence existed of prior suicide attempts).

[¶14]   Appellant alleged that Appellee 
acted negligently toward the decedent and that Appellee's actions resulted 
in

the 
creation of a delirium or insanity in the decedent. The decedent's death 
occurred while delirious or insane and that delirium or insanity, created by 
[Appellee], prevented the decedent from realizing the nature of her actions and 
the certainty or risk of harm involved therein, or, made it impossible for her 
to resist an impulse caused by her insanity which deprived her of her capacity 
to govern her conduct in accordance with reason.

Under 
the foregoing legal principles, Appellant's amended complaint sufficiently 
articulated a claim for wrongful death on the basis of Appellee's 
negligence.

[¶15]   Appellant also alleged: "The sexual 
assaults perpetrated upon the decedent . . . by [Appellee] were intentional and 
were extreme and outrageous conduct which caused severe emotional distress to 
the decedent, which in turn, was a substantial factor bringing about her 
suicide." Appellee contends that the general rule that suicide is an intervening 
cause applies when the tort-feasor acts intentionally.

[¶16]   The jurisdictions which have 
considered the question of how liability may be established for suicide which 
results from intentional acts have imposed different standards for recovery. 
Some courts have recited the general rule that suicide is an intervening cause 
and then, as in the negligence context, have imposed liability when the 
intentional act created an irresistible impulse in the decedent and the decedent 
took his own life while he was acting under such irresistible impulse. See, 
e.g., Cauverien v. DeMetz, 20 Misc.2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631-32 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1959); and Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 814 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (N.D.Miss. 1993).

[¶17]   Other courts have recognized that a 
higher degree of responsibility should be imposed upon tort-feasors whose 
conduct was intentional than upon those whose conduct was merely negligent. 
See, e.g., Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 
(1960); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liability for Causing 
Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24(2) VAND.L.REV. 217, 219-20 
(1971).

[¶18]   In Tate, the District Court of 
Appeal held:

[I]n 
a case where the defendant intended, by his conduct, to cause serious mental 
distress or serious physical suffering, and does so, and such mental distress is 
shown by the evidence to be "a substantial factor in bringing about" (Rest., 
Torts, §§ 279, 280) the suicide, a cause of action for wrongful death results, 
whether the suicide was committed in a state of insanity, or in response to an 
irresistible impulse, or not. This rule would not apply where the act of the 
defendant was intentionally done, but there was no intent to cause injury. It is 
applicable only where the actor intended to cause injury, and the injury 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide, i.e., is really a cause, 
in fact, of the suicide. This does not mean that, in every case where the actor 
intentionally causes serious mental distress or physical suffering, and this is 
followed by suicide, the actor is necessarily liable for the suicide. The mental 
distress or physical suffering may not be, in the particular case, as a matter 
of fact, a substantial factor in bringing about the 
suicide.

5 Cal. Rptr.  at 36 (emphasis in original). See also Rowe v. Marder, 750 F. Supp. 718, 723-24 (W.D.Pa. 1990), judgment aff'd, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 
1991).

[¶19]   A number of variations of the 
substantial factor test seem to exist. In State ex rel. Richardson v. 
Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1968), the court found that the plaintiff's 
evidence established that the decedent was acting under an irresistible impulse 
when he took his life and that the intentional tort committed by the defendant 
was a substantial factor in causing the suicide. 214 So. 2d  at 586-87 (holding 
that, because evidence was present indicating that the decedent acted under an 
irresistible impulse, it was not necessary to decide whether the Tate standard 
applied). In Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 127 N.H. 81, 497 A.2d 1206 (1985), 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court held:

[I]n 
order for a cause of action for wrongful death by suicide to lie for intentional 
torts, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the tort[-]feasor, by extreme and 
outrageous conduct, intentionally wronged a victim and that this intentional 
conduct caused severe emotional distress in his victim which was a substantial 
factor in bringing about the suicide of the victim.

497 A.2d  at 1211.

[¶20]   In Tate, the tortious 
conduct charged was that the defendant "`intentionally made threats, statements 
and accusations against said deceased for the purpose of harassing, 
embarrassing, and humiliating him in the presence of friends, relatives and 
business associates.'" 5 Cal. Rptr.  at 30-31. The allegation of causation was 
that the defendant's conduct resulted in the deceased becoming "`physically and 
mentally disturbed,'" leading ultimately to the deceased's suicide. 5 Cal. Rptr. 
at 31. We choose not only to adopt the substantial factor test articulated in 
Tate but also to extend the rule of that case to encompass a situation in which 
an actor will be liable when he intentionally commits a tort, in this case 
sexual assault, and the commission of that tort causes an emotional or 
psychiatric illness which is a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide 
of the victim. We hold that the actor will be liable for the result even though 
he does not intend to cause the emotional or psychiatric illness. The 
substantial factor rule recognizes that a higher degree of responsibility exists 
for those who commit intentional acts than for those who merely act negligently. 
See Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶21]   Under this rule, Appellant's 
amended complaint sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful death on the basis of 
Appellee's intentional acts against the decedent.

Emotional 
Distress

[¶22]   Appellant's amended complaint 
included claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Appellee challenged those claims for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellee argued to the 
trial court that Appellant could not recover under these theories because mental 
suffering of the survivors caused by the death was not an element of damages for 
wrongful death under the ruling of Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 
298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931). The trial court dismissed Appellant's amended complaint 
"based upon the authority cited in [Appellee's] Brief in support of his Motion 
[to Dismiss]."

[¶23]   We hold that Appellant's claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were not barred by Coliseum Motor Co. The 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress torts were not recognized in Wyoming 
until long after Coliseum Motor Co. had been decided. Leithead, 
721 P.2d  at 1066; Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 198 (Wyo. 1986). The 
Court held in Coliseum Motor Co. that the survivors could not recover for 
their mental suffering which had been caused by the decedent's death. 43 Wyo. at 
318-19, 3 P.2d 105. The Court believed that it would be overly difficult to 
calculate the mental damages, it was concerned about the potential for excessive 
verdicts, and it was concerned with the possibility of feigned grief. 43 Wyo. at 
314-19, 3 P.2d 105. This Court overcame those concerns when it adopted the 
mental distress torts.

[¶24]   Also, damages claimed for negligent 
or intentional infliction of emotional distress are personal to the plaintiffs 
and do not result from the decedent's death alone. In an 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the defendant 
intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 
harm. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065-66. In a 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, the plaintiff must prove that 
he suffered emotional distress as a result of observing the infliction of a 
serious bodily injury to or the death of a relative. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
200-01. In other words, the "essence of the tort is the shock caused by the 
perception of an especially horrendous event." 719 P.2d  at 199. The two mental 
distress torts provide for recovery in special circumstances where plaintiffs 
suffer from extreme shocks. They do not provide for recovery from the typical 
type of grief suffered by all who lose a loved one.

[¶25]   In a wrongful death action, the 
statutory claimants are entitled to recover for the loss of care, comfort, and 
society of the decedent as a result of the death. Emotional distress is not a 
derivative of any of these elements; emotional distress generally occurs when a 
plaintiff witnesses the infliction of a relative's injury which has been caused 
by a negligent, intentional, or reckless act regardless of whether the injury 
results in death.

[¶26]   Appellant's emotional distress 
claims were pleaded separately from the wrongful death claims, and they were 
drafted in their generally accepted elements. See Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 
1064; and Gates, 719 P.2d  at 200-01. The claims clearly were not 
parasitic to the wrongful death claims even though they arose out of the same 
circumstances.

[¶27]   Appellee also argues that the 
emotional distress claims were insufficient because Appellant did not properly 
allege that he and the minor child were "present" as was required by both torts. 
Concerning the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, Appellant 
alleged that Appellee committed outrageous conduct by providing a loaded weapon 
to the decedent and then in assisting her to obtain the prescription drug while 
knowing of her psychiatric condition and suicidal tendencies. Appellant alleged 
that Appellee's actions were intentional and reckless and that Appellee knew or 
should have known that his actions would cause severe emotional distress to 
Appellant and the minor child. He also stated that he and the minor child had 
suffered severe emotional distress. In his 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, Appellant did not allege 
that he and the minor child were "present." However, elsewhere in the complaint, 
he stated that they had witnessed the immediate aftermath of the decedent's 
overdose.

[¶28]   Although Appellant attempted to 
characterize his claim as being a first-party 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, the gist of his amended 
complaint was that Appellee's actions, which were directed at the decedent, 
caused Appellant and the minor child to suffer severe emotional distress. This 
claim was for third-party intentional infliction of emotional distress. This 
Court has never expressly addressed a claim for third-party intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. In Leithead, we recognized a party's 
right to bring an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress which 
was directed toward him. We adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) 
as the standard to be used for such actions. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 
1065-66. Third-party actions are recognized in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
46(2) (1965).

[¶29]   We allow claims for emotional 
distress which are caused by negligent acts directed toward a third person under 
the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort. Gates, 719 P.2d 193. 
We see no reason to deny such actions in 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. "If a person can recover 
damages for negligently inflicted mental harm, then without question he should 
have a cause of action for intentional harm." Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065. 
It appears that, although we did not do so expressly, we intended in 
Leithead to adopt § 46 of the RESTATEMENT, supra, in its entirety: 
"We join the vast majority of states and hold that the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, as reflected in § 46 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts, is a valid cause of action in Wyoming." 721 P.2d  at 1066. In 
order to clarify the law, we hereby expressly adopt § 46(2) of the RESTATEMENT, 
supra, as being the basis for third-party 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims in 
Wyoming.

[¶30]   Section 46(2) 
provides:

(2) 
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to 
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 

(a) 
to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, 
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

(b) 
to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in 
bodily harm.

Under 
the RESTATEMENT provision, the plaintiff must be "present at the time" in order 
to establish liability. Most cases interpreting the presence requirement have 
held that "present at the time" means that the plaintiff must be present when 
the outrageous conduct occurs. See, e.g., Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739, 
675 P.2d 226, 229 (1984) (en banc); and Bradshaw v. Nicolay, 765 P.2d 630, 632 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988). See also Annotation, Immediacy of 
Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover Damages for Shock or Mental 
Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R. 4th 833, at § 1[a] 
(1981).

[¶31]   In this case, Appellant did not 
allege that he and the minor child were present when Appellee gave the firearm 
to the decedent or when he helped her obtain the drug. However, he did allege 
that they had witnessed the immediate aftermath of the decedent's overdose on 
the drug.

[¶32]   The drafters of § 46(2) of the 
RESTATEMENT, supra, have given us some guidance in how the presence 
requirement should be applied. Comment l provides in pertinent 
part:

l. 
Conduct directed at a third person. 

Where 
the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a third person, as where, for 
example, a husband is murdered in the presence of his wife, the actor may know 
that it is substantially certain, or at least highly probable, that it will 
cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. In such cases the rule of this 
Section applies. The cases thus far decided, however, have limited such 
liability to plaintiffs who were present at the time, as distinguished from 
those who discover later what has occurred. The limitation may be justified 
by the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere, since the number of 
persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of an assassination of the 
President is virtually unlimited, and the distress of a woman who is informed of 
her husband's murder ten years afterward may lack the guarantee of genuineness 
which her presence on the spot would afford. The Caveat is intended, however, 
to leave open the possibility of situations in which presence at the time may 
not be required.

(Emphasis 
added.) The caveat referred to in comment l states:

The 
Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other 
circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the 
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.

Courts 
have recognized that, pursuant to comment l and the caveat, special 
factual circumstances may exist where presence at the time the outrageous 
conduct occurs will not be required. See, e.g., H.L.O. by L.E.O. v. 
Hossle, 381 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1986); and Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 401 
Mass. 516, 517 N.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1988). In Foster v. Trentham's Inc., 
458 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D.Tenn. 1978), the court refused to dismiss the wife's 
complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress under § 46(2) even 
though the wife may not have been present during the malicious prosecution of 
her husband. The court considered the fact that the outrageous conduct had 
occurred in the wife's home and the continuing nature of the outrageous conduct 
in holding that the presence requirement had been satisfied for the purposes of 
a motion to dismiss. 458 F. Supp.  at 1384.

[¶33]   We believe that it is generally a 
better practice to limit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to plaintiffs who were present when the outrageous conduct occurred. 
However, this case presents a factual situation which demands special 
consideration regarding the presence requirement.

[¶34]   We hold that the facts of this case 
place it within the narrow exception to the general rule that a plaintiff must 
be present when the outrageous conduct occurs in order to recover for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress directed at a third person. 
Appellant and the minor child were present in the immediate aftermath of the 
tragic results of Appellee's outrageous conduct, and the suicide was the final 
result of a continuing course of conduct instigated by Appellee. Accordingly, 
Appellant sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and his claim should not have been 
dismissed.

[¶35]   Appellant set forth a claim in his 
amended complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial 
court also dismissed this claim. Appellee argues that the trial court's decision 
to dismiss Appellant's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
should be affirmed because Appellant did not allege that he and the minor child 
had witnessed the negligent acts. Gates defined the parameters of the 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort. One of the limitations placed 
on the tort was that a plaintiff may recover only "if he observed the infliction 
of serious bodily harm or death, or if he observed the serious bodily harm or 
death shortly after its occurrence but without material change in the condition 
and location of the victim." 719 P.2d  at 199.

[¶36]   Although Appellant did not specify 
the alleged negligent acts which resulted in his and the minor child's emotional 
distress, the face of the amended complaint supplied a number of possibilities 
including the sexual abuse and aiding the decedent in obtaining the means to 
commit suicide. Appellant did not allege that he and the minor child had 
witnessed any of these negligent events, and Appellee argues that this was fatal 
to Appellant's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We 
disagree.

[¶37]   Under the language of Gates, 
the plaintiff must have observed the infliction of serious bodily harm or death, 
or its immediate aftermath. Id. See also Thunder Hawk by and through 
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Wyo. 1992). 
In accident cases, as in Gates, the negligent act and the infliction of 
serious bodily injury or death will generally occur simultaneously. However, 
there can be times when the negligent act will be removed in time from the 
actual infliction of serious bodily injury or death.

[¶38]   For example, in Sims v. General 
Motors Corporation, 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988), the alleged negligent act was 
the improper design, et cetera, of a seat belt which resulted in a person being 
trapped in a burning car. 751 P.2d  at 359. In that case, the negligent act 
obviously occurred prior to the infliction of bodily injury. This Court affirmed 
the district court's directed verdict in favor of the defendant because the 
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant's negligence proximately caused her 
injuries. 751 P.2d  at 366. However, the decision implies that the plaintiff had 
satisfied the presence requirement by witnessing the infliction of the serious 
bodily injury. The Court reiterated the limitations on the 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort, including the presence 
requirement, and then stated: "`Once these conditions are satisfied, the case 
can go forward under normal negligence principles. The defendant must have 
been negligent and his negligence must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
mental injuries.'" 751 P.2d  at 366 (quoting Gates, 719 P.2d at 200-01) 
(emphasis in original and some emphasis omitted). Since the Court decided the 
case under normal negligence principles, it may be assumed that the limitations 
on the tort, including the presence requirement, were met even though the 
plaintiff did not observe the occurrence of the negligent 
act.

[¶39]   Cases from other jurisdictions 
support our ruling. Pearsall v. Emhart Industries, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 207 
(E.D.Pa. 1984), involved a smoke detector malfunction. A federal district court 
in Pennsylvania held that the presence requirement for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress was satisfied when the plaintiff witnessed the bodies of her 
family after they had been pulled from the burning house. 599 F. Supp.  at 212. 
The plaintiff did not allege that she had witnessed the defendant improperly 
manufacturing the smoke detector. In McCarthy v. City of Cleveland 
Heights, 65 Ohio App.3d 216, 583 N.E.2d 981 (1989), personnel at a jail left 
a prisoner unattended, and the prisoner committed suicide. 583 N.E.2d  at 982. 
The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress because they did not observe the suicide being committed. 583 N.E.2d  at 983-84. The court did not indicate that the plaintiffs were required 
to have witnessed the jailer's negligent acts.

[¶40]   In Bloom v. DuBois Regional 
Medical Center, 409 Pa. Super. 83, 597 A.2d 671 (1991), a hospital, a 
hospital administrator, and a psychiatrist were accused of being negligent in 
caring for a suicidal patient. 597 A.2d  at 673-74. The patient's husband claimed 
negligent infliction of emotional distress after he found his wife in her 
hospital room hanging by a shoestring around her neck. Id. The court 
ruled that the husband's claim should be dismissed because he did not witness 
the defendants' negligent acts; i.e., he did not witness a traumatic infliction 
of injury on his wife by the defendants. 597 A.2d  at 683. We disagree with the 
Bloom decision. The Pennsylvania Superior Court drew an artificial line 
which defies reason. Instead, we agree with the concurring and dissenting judge 
who wrote:

If 
one were to follow the majority's reasoning, Mr. Bloom's mere presence when 
staffing and supervisory decisions were made would allow him to recover for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, while viewing his wife hanging by a 
shoestring around her neck would not. . . . Only when Mr. Bloom encountered his 
wife's hanging body did he suffer the emotional distress for which he now seeks 
recovery and it is illogical to hold that observation of these negligent acts 
and omissions of defendants is the necessary element to a finding for Mr. 
Bloom.

597 A.2d  at 684 (Del Sole, J., concurring and dissenting).

[¶41]   We hold that a plaintiff is 
"present" for the purposes of establishing a 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim when he witnesses the 
infliction of a serious bodily injury or death, or its immediate aftermath, 
regardless of whether he observed the negligent act happening. Our decision 
today supports the underlying rationale for the 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort. "The essence of the tort is the 
shock caused by the perception of an especially horrendous event." Gates, 
719 P.2d  at 199. In this case, the horrendous event was the 
suicide.

[¶1.]     Appellant's amended 
complaint sufficiently alleged that he and the minor child had witnessed the 
immediate aftermath of the decedent's suicide. The district court should not 
have dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a 
claim.

[¶43]   Reversed and 
remanded.

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶44]   My problem with the court's opinion 
is with the following sentence on referring to Coliseum Motor Co. v. 
Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931):

"This 
Court overcame those concerns when it adopted the mental distress 
torts."

[¶45]   If "those concerns" refer to the 
"potential for excess verdicts" and the "possibility of feigned grief," my 
position is that the court did not "[overcome] those concerns." The court carved 
out an exception to the general rule of Coliseum Motor Co. that no 
recovery may be had for mental suffering and grief following the death of 
another by allowing recovery where plaintiff either is present and views the 
incident causing injury or death or comes upon it immediately thereafter. Absent 
this or the special circumstances of this case, there still can be no recovery 
for grief or mental suffering resulting from the death of another as expressed 
in Coliseum Motor Co. 

Footnotes

1 Courts in different situations have recognized other "exceptions" to the 
general rule that a decedent's suicide precludes a finding of liability against 
a tort-feasor. For example, some institutions, such as jails or hospitals, have 
been found to have a special duty of care to prevent those in their custody from 
committing suicide. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (1983); and Krieg, 781 P.2d  at 279. In this decision, we do 
not consider what other exception may apply in Wyoming to the general 
rule.

2 Irresistible or uncontrollable impulse tests have not been accepted in 
Wyoming in the worker's compensation or criminal law context. See, e.g., Dean 
v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 644-45 (Wyo. 1983); and State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Wyo. 1992). 
Those cases involved different legal and policy concerns and do not affect our 
decision in this case.