Title: State v. Mendonca

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

711 P.2d 731 (1985) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwayne Nelson MENDONCA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 10192. Supreme Court of Hawaii. December 18, 1985. *732 Calvin K. Murashige (Shiraishi & Yamada, of counsel), Lihue, for defendant-appellant. Jay M. Murobayashi, Deputy Pros. Atty., Lihue, for plaintiff-appellee. LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI, and WAKATSUKI, JJ. HAYASHI, Justice. Defendant-Appellant Dwayne Nelson Mendonca (hereinafter "Mendonca") appeals from convictions for attempted first degree robbery (HRS §§ 705-500 and 708-840(1)(b)(i)) and attempted murder (HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-701). Mendonca contends he was subjected to double jeopardy when Plaintiff-Appellee the State of Hawaii (hereinafter "State") indicted and prosecuted him for two crimes arising out of the exact same facts when the evidence indicated he was guilty of only one crime (attempted robbery). We disagree and affirm the convictions based on the reasons stated below. The following facts were established at trial by the testimony of Jimmy Yasay (hereinafter "Yasay"). Mendonca and Yasay decided to rob a gambling "banker" (a person who holds gambling money proceeds). In the early morning hours of January *733 21, 1983, they drove after the car of Gary Ramos (hereinafter "Ramos") intending to rob him. While Yasay drove, Mendonca fired several shots and wounded Ramos. After chasing Ramos for a few miles and nearly crashing into Ramos' car, Yasay said, "Let's just let it go." Mendonca replied, "No; let's go, man. We have to get him now." Transcript, August 8-9, 1984 at 139 (emphasis added). After Ramos' car crashed, Mendonca jumped out of Yasay's car and began shooting. Yasay testified that Mendonca was shooting at the car; it was too dark to see exactly where Ramos was. Ramos returned fire and shot Yasay whereupon Yasay and Mendonca fled. On September 8, 1983, Yasay was convicted of assaulting Ramos. While Yasay was later serving time, he decided to testify against Mendonca because of a monetary dispute between them. On May 17, 1984, the Kauai grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Mendonca: Record at 1-2. Before trial, Mendonca moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that State improperly indicted him under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) and should have indicted him under HRS § 708-840(1)(a). Mendonca asserted that State, by indicting him under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) instead of HRS § 708-840(1)(a), was trying to convict him for two separate crimes when the facts indicated he attempted to kill Ramos during the course of the robbery so the attempted murder was not a separate crime.[1] The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial Yasay testified. Mendonca's defense witnesses did not contradict Yasay's testimony nor account for Mendonca's whereabouts in the early morning hours of January 21, 1983. On August 9, 1984, the trial court convicted Mendonca on both counts. Judgment was entered on September 7, 1984, and Mendonca filed a timely notice of appeal. We will consider the issues presented in the following order: 1) whether State improperly indicted Mendonca under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) instead of under HRS § 708-840(1)(a) thus requiring dismissal of *734 the indictment; and 2) whether Mendonca was improperly convicted for two crimes arising out of the same facts thereby violating the double jeopardy prohibition of HRS § 701-109 (1976)? A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Corpuz, 67 Haw. 438, 690 P.2d 282 (1984). In State v. Pulawa, 62 Haw. 209, 215, 614 P.2d 373, 377 (1980), we quoted from United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir.1979): "Dismissal of an indictment is required only in flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been overreached or deceived in some significant way, as where perjured testimony has knowingly been presented [footnote and citation of cases omitted]." Mendonca claims State abused its prosecutorial discretion by indicting him under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) so that State could also indict him for attempted murder. He asserts State should have indicted him under HRS § 708-840(1)(a) where attempted murder was an element of attempted first degree robbery. He contends State acted in "bad faith" by trying to prosecute him, in violation of the double jeopardy prohibition, for two crimes when he committed attempted robbery only under HRS § 708-840(1)(a). We have long held, "it is generally no defense to an indictment under one statute that the accused might have been charged under another, and the matter is necessarily and traditionally in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney." State v. Rabago, 67 Haw. 332, ___, 686 P.2d 824, 826 (1984). State v. Kuuku, 61 Haw. 79, 595 P.2d 291 (1979); State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 249, 567 P.2d 420 (1977); Territory v. Awana, 28 Haw. 546 (1925). We now hold the same rule applies to give prosecutors the discretion to decide which statutory subsection to charge the accused with. Because State had the discretion to charge Mendonca under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) instead of HRS § 708-840(1)(a), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss the indictment. Also, Mendonca has failed to show any flagrant prosecutorial misconduct warranting dismissal. We must now determine whether Mendonca was improperly convicted for two crimes arising out of the same facts. The relevant portion of HRS § 701-109 provides: (Emphasis added.) We held in State v. Pia, 55 Haw. 14, 19, 514 P.2d 580, 584-85 (1973): (Emphasis in original.) In State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 368, 616 P.2d 193, 196 (1980), however, we ruled: (Quoting People v. Howes, 99 Cal. App. 2d 808, 818-19, 222 P.2d 969, 976 (1950)).[2] In the present case, the crimes charged have different statutory elements. Attempted robbery under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i) requires State prove Mendonca had specific intent to steal, was armed with a dangerous instrument, and used force to try to overcome Ramos' resistance. See, footnote 1, supra. Attempted murder under HRS § 707-701 requires State prove Mendonca had specific intent to kill Ramos.[3] Because both crimes involve mutually exclusive mens rea requirements, the crimes charged are not lesser included offenses under HRS § 701-109(1)(a). Also, different facts go to prove each crime. Though one could argue Mendonca's shots at Ramos were part of his continuing conduct to rob Ramos under HRS § 701-109(1)(e), the trial court's finding that State proved Mendonca intended to commit two separate crimes beyond a reasonable doubt is not clearly erroneous. See, State v. Sujohn, 6 Haw. App. ___, 697 P.2d 1143 (1985) (in a jury-waived criminal case, the trial court's finding of guilt is a finding State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crimes charged). Yasay testified he and Mendonca tried to rob Ramos. But after Ramos attempted to escape and Yasay wanted to give up the chase, Mendonca said "No; let's go, man. We have to get him now." Transcript, August 8-9, 1984 at 139. After Ramos' car had crashed (so there was no need to fire the gun to halt Ramos' flight), Mendonca began firing wildly at the car while Ramos was still presumably inside. One could reasonably infer from the circumstantial evidence and Mendonca's words and acts that he then intended to kill Ramos. See, State v. Silva, 67 Haw. 581, 698 P.2d 293 (1985); State v. Yabusaki, 58 Haw. 404, 570 P.2d 844 (1977). Mendonca thus committed two separate crimes closely related in time, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Substantial evidence exists to support both convictions. State v. Lima, 64 Haw. 470, 643 P.2d 536 (1982). The judgment is affirmed. [1] The relevant portion of the statute in effect in 1983 provided: § 708-840 Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft: (a) He attempts to kill another, or intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury upon another; or (b) He is armed with a dangerous instrument and: (i) He uses force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to overcome the owner's physical resistance or physical power of resistance... . [2] The United States Supreme Court has held: [T]hat where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) (citations omitted). Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977). See, State v. DeCenso, 5 Haw. App. 127, 681 P.2d 573 (1984). The federal standard is less rigorous than that imposed by Hawaii law. Pia, 55 Haw. at 18, 514 P.2d at 584. [3] § 707-701 Murder. (1) Except as provided in section 707-702, a person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.