Title: State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1374.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1374 
THE STATE EX REL. OWENS v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1374.] 
Elections — Mandamus — Writ of mandamus sought to compel the secretary of 
state to certify relator as a candidate and to instruct the boards of 
elections to place relator’s name on the primary-election ballot — Petition 
signatures improperly invalidated by board of elections — Writ of 
mandamus granted. 
(No. 2010-0481 — Submitted March 29, 2010 — Decided March 31, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the certification of relator as a candidate for the Constitution Party 
nomination for election to the office of Ohio Attorney General at the May 4, 2010 
primary election.  Because respondents, Secretary of State of Ohio Jennifer 
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Brunner and the Franklin County Board of Elections, abused their discretion and 
clearly disregarded applicable law in rejecting relator’s candidacy, we grant the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} On February 18, 2010, relator, Robert Owens, filed a declaration of 
candidacy and candidate petition with respondent secretary of state.  Owens seeks 
to be a candidate for the Constitution Party nomination for Attorney General of 
Ohio at the May 4, 2010 primary election.  When the petition was filed, Owens 
received a statement from the secretary of state’s office stating that he had filed 
approximately 980 petition signatures. 
{¶ 3} On February 22, 2010, in accordance with R.C. 3513.05, the 
secretary of state transmitted Owens’s part-petitions purporting to contain 
signatures of certain counties to the pertinent boards of elections for an 
examination of the signatures on the part-petitions.  The secretary of state also 
issued Directive 2010-28, which provided instructions to the boards of elections 
for an examination of the signatures on the part-petitions.  The secretary’s 
instructions included: 
{¶ 4} “Each signature must be individually examined.  If a signature is 
valid, please place a red check mark at the left margin beside it.  After checking 
an entire part petition, please write on the right side of the front page of each part 
petition both the number of valid signers and the initials of the board employee 
who checked the part petition under the number. 
{¶ 5} “If a signature is not valid, please indicate the problem with it by 
using the following lettered codes or, if no lettered code applies, an explanatory 
notation: 
{¶ 6} “* * *  
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 7} “ILL ‘Illegible’ applies only if both the signature and address are 
unreadable, so that it is impossible to check the signature against a voter 
registration record. 
{¶ 8} “* * * 
{¶ 9} “NG ‘Not Genuine.’  The signature on the petition does not appear 
to be the genuine signature of the person whose signature it purports to be, 
compared to the signature on file with the board of elections as of the date the 
board checks the petition. 
{¶ 10} “NR ‘Not Registered.’  The signer is not registered to vote.  Each 
person who signs a part petition must be a qualified elector as of the date the 
petition was filed with the Secretary of State’s office.”  (Emphasis omitted.)   
{¶ 11} Nineteen of the part-petitions were transmitted to respondent 
Franklin County Board of Elections, which examined the 547 signatures 
contained in the part-petitions.  The board determined that 162 of the submitted 
signatures were valid and that the remaining 385 signatures were invalid.  
Pursuant to R.C. 3513.05, the board returned the petition papers to the secretary 
of state with its certification of its determination of the validity of the signatures. 
{¶ 12} On March 5, 2010, the secretary of state issued Directive 2010-42 
to the county boards of elections.  The directive contained the form of the 
primary-election ballots for the major and minor political parties, including the 
Constitution Party, but Owens’s name did not appear on the form as a candidate 
for the primary election.  By letter dated the same day that the directive was 
issued, the secretary of state notified Owens that she was not certifying his 
candidacy, because of a lack of sufficient valid signatures on his petition.  The 
secretary determined that Owens had submitted 481 signatures, which was 19 
signatures less than the 500 valid signatures required for his name to be placed on 
the primary-election ballot. 
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{¶ 13} On that same day, Owens requested and received copies of the 
part-petitions he had filed and those filed by Eric Deaton, a candidate for the 
Constitution Party nomination for the United States Senate, which the board had 
previously examined.  On March 6, 2010, Owens attended a special meeting of 
the Franklin County Board of Elections and requested that the board conduct a 
second review of his part-petitions because “signatures were improperly 
invalidated as being illegible.”  On March 9, Owens contacted the board’s deputy 
director by e-mail to follow up on his request.  In his e-mail, Owens claimed that 
there were “FAR more than 19 signatures from Franklin County alone that were 
invalidated improperly.”  The deputy director suggested that Owens contact the 
secretary of state’s office and informed him that if the secretary asked the board to 
review the part-petitions a second time, the board would do so.  The secretary’s 
office then advised the deputy director that if the board determined that it had 
made an error in its certification of the number of valid signatures on the 
candidate’s petition, the board could amend the certification.  The board of 
elections, however, refused to recheck Owens’s part-petitions. 
{¶ 14} On March 15, Owens filed this expedited election action for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to certify his candidacy for the 
Constitution Party nomination for the office of Ohio Attorney General and to 
instruct the boards of elections to place his name on the May 4, 2010 primary-
election ballot or, in the alternative, to compel the Franklin County Board of 
Elections and other elections boards to recheck his part-petitions in conformity 
with Secretary of State Directive 2010-28 and to certify his candidacy.  
Respondents filed answers, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs pursuant 
to S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9.  Insofar as Owens attempts to submit evidence with his reply 
brief, we will not consider it because it was not submitted in accordance with 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 15} This cause is now before the court for our determination of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Laches 
{¶ 16} Respondents both claim that Owens’s mandamus claim is barred 
by laches.  Relators in election cases are required to act with the utmost diligence.  
State ex rel. Chillicothe v. Ross Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 439, 2009-
Ohio-5523, 917 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 9.  “If relators in election cases do not exercise the 
utmost diligence, laches may bar an action for extraordinary relief.”  State ex rel. 
Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706, 882 
N.E.2d 435, ¶ 11.  “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of 
time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other 
party.”  State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 17} Owens had notice of the secretary’s March 5 decision on that same 
day because, as he admits, on that day, he requested work logs and copies of the 
part-petitions he had filed and those filed by Senate candidate Deaton.  There 
would have been no reason for Owens to request these records if he had been 
certified to the primary-election ballot.  Owens thus delayed ten days from that 
date to file this expedited-election case challenging the secretary’s decision not to 
place his name on the primary ballot. 
{¶ 18} Respondents are correct that “we have held that a delay as brief as 
nine days can preclude our consideration of the merits of an expedited election 
case.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Landis v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 724 N.E.2d 775.  But here, at least some of 
Owens’s delay in filing this action was reasonable.  Part of the ten-day delay 
resulted from Owens’s diligent efforts to obtain records related to the board’s 
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review of his part-petitions and to request the board to review them again.  Cf. 
Craig, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706, 882 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 16 (court rejected 
laches as a bar to expedited-election case when “[m]uch of the nine-day period [to 
file the case] after the board’s denial of the protest here resulted from [relator’s] 
diligent efforts to secure legal counsel to review the merits of a possible legal 
challenge to the decision”).  In fact, the secretary’s office indicated in a March 11 
e-mail to a board-of-elections official that the board was authorized to act upon 
Owens’s request to again review his part-petitions to determine whether to amend 
its prior certification and that “amending is a means of avoiding costly litigation.” 
{¶ 19} Moreover, “we generally require a showing of prejudice before we 
apply laches to bar a consideration of the merits of an election case.”  State ex rel. 
Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 
N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 11.  “Normally, this prejudice in expedited election cases occurs 
because relators’ delay prejudices respondents by making the case an expedited 
election case under S.Ct.Prac.R. [10.9], which restricts respondents’ time to 
prepare and defend against relators’ claims, or impairs boards of elections’ ability 
to prepare, print, and distribute appropriate ballots because of the expiration of the 
time for providing absentee ballots.”  State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 20} Owens’s delay in filing this case did not cause it to become an 
expedited election case under S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9, which provides an accelerated 
schedule for the submission of a response, evidence, and briefs when an original 
action relating to a pending action is filed within 90 days before the election.  This 
case would still have been an expedited election case governed by S.Ct.Prac.R. 
10.9 even if Owens had filed this case on the same March 5 date that the secretary 
issued the directive specifying the form for the primary-election ballots, which did 
not include Owens’s name.  Therefore, respondents’ ability to prepare and defend 
against Owens’s mandamus claim has not been impacted by the delay.  See State 
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7 
 
ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, 
¶ 28. 
{¶ 21} Although the absentee-ballot deadline will have passed by the time 
our decision in this case is announced, that date would likely have passed even if 
Owens had filed this case within a week of the date the secretary issued her 
decision that his name would not be on the primary-election ballot.  See Brinda, 
115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13.  “This is thus a 
case in which the statutory time limits would have expired even ‘under the best of 
circumstances.’ ”  State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City Schools v. 
Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 28, quoting State 
ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883. 
{¶ 22} Finally, there is no evidence that Owens’s delay in filing this case 
was intentionally engineered to obtain a strategic advantage.  Cf. State ex rel. The 
Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 
N.E.2d 696 (expedited election claim barred by laches because of relators’ delay 
and acts of gamesmanship). 
{¶ 23} Therefore, laches does not bar our consideration of the merits of 
this expedited election case, and a consideration of the merits of Owens’s 
mandamus claim is warranted.  This is consistent with “the fundamental tenet of 
judicial review in Ohio,” which “is that courts should decide cases on their 
merits.”  State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 
N.E.2d 1228. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 24} Owens primarily requests a writ of mandamus to compel the 
secretary of state to certify him as a candidate for the Constitution Party’s 
nomination for election to the office of Ohio Attorney General and to instruct the 
county boards of election to place his name on the May 4, 2010 Constitution Party 
primary-election ballot. 
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{¶ 25} To be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief, Owens must 
establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty 
on the part of the secretary of state to provide it, and the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. 
Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 13.  Because 
of the proximity of the May 4 primary election, Owens has established that he 
lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Greene 
v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 
N.E.2d 300, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 26} For the remaining requirements, “ ‘[i]n extraordinary actions 
challenging the decisions of the Secretary of State and boards of elections, the 
standard is whether they engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or 
acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.’ ”  State ex rel. Husted v. 
Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 9, quoting 
Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 
778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 27} The secretary of state contends that under R.C. 3513.05, the 
secretary is not subject to mandamus for an alleged error committed by a board of 
elections in determining the validity of part-petition signatures sent to the board 
by the secretary.  While the secretary is correct that R.C. 3513.05 vests authority 
in the boards of elections to determine the validity of signatures contained on 
part-petitions of persons seeking to be candidates at a primary election, it is 
ultimately the secretary of state who must, for statewide candidates, “certify to 
each board in the state the forms of the official ballot to be used at the primary 
election, together with the names of the candidates to be printed on the ballots 
whose nomination or election is to be determined by electors throughout the entire 
state and who filed valid declarations of candidacy and petitions.”  R.C. 3513.05. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 28} An aggrieved prospective candidate like Owens, who is 
challenging the ultimate decision not to submit his name as a candidate on the 
primary-election ballot, properly names the secretary of state as a respondent even 
if he is challenging an election board’s verification decision, because the secretary 
is the official who relies on the board’s determination and is ultimately 
responsible to place the names of all legally viable candidates on the primary-
election ballots.  A contrary holding would lead to the absurd result that a person 
who is legally entitled to be a candidate because the person submitted sufficient 
valid signatures to be placed on the primary-election ballot would be unable to 
compel the official responsible for placing the names of primary-election 
candidates on the ballot – the secretary of state – to do so.  We will not construe 
R.C. 3513.05 in this absurd manner to disenfranchise voters by limiting their 
choice of candidates that election law dictates under these circumstances.  We do 
agree, however, that insofar as Owens requested in the alternative in his complaint 
that the Franklin County Board of Elections and other boards of elections recheck 
the part-petitions in conformity with Secretary of State Directive 2010-28, no 
statute or other law imposes this duty on the boards and Owens is consequently 
not entitled to that relief. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, to be entitled to the primary requested extraordinary 
relief, Owens must establish that the secretary of state abused her discretion and 
clearly disregarded applicable law by failing to certify his name as a candidate on 
the May 4 primary-election ballot.  The secretary relied on the certification by the 
boards of elections of the number of valid signatures to conclude that Owens’s 
petition contained 481 valid signatures, which is 19 signatures short of the 500 
valid signatures needed for the placement of his name on the primary-election 
ballot.  See R.C. 3513.05 (For primary elections, “[i]f the declaration of 
candidacy declares a candidacy which is to be submitted to electors throughout 
the entire state, the petition * * * shall be signed by at least one thousand qualified 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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electors * * * and the declaration of candidacy and petition shall be filed with the 
secretary of state * * *.  If the declaration of candidacy declares a candidacy for 
party nomination or for election as a candidate of an intermediate or minor party, 
the minimum number of signatures on such petition is one-half the minimum 
number provided in this section”). 
{¶ 30} In this mandamus action, Owens challenges the Franklin County 
Board of Elections’ rejection of 41 signatures.  Of these 41 signatures, 22 were 
rejected as illegible, 17 were rejected because the persons were not registered, one 
was rejected as not genuine, and one was rejected as a printed signature.  If 
Owens is able to establish that at least 19 of these signatures were improperly 
rejected, he would be entitled to the writ to compel the secretary of state to place 
his name on the primary-election ballot. 
{¶ 31} Owens argues that because the board of elections found the “exact 
same” signatures to be valid for Deaton’s part-petitions, the Constitution Party 
candidate for United States Senate, he has established his entitlement to the writ.  
Not so.  The signatures and accompanying written addresses on Owens’s part-
petitions are not exactly the same as the signatures and addresses on Deaton’s 
part-petitions.  And even if the signatures and addresses were identical, the board 
could have erred by validating the signatures on Deaton’s part-petitions instead of 
by invalidating the signatures on Owens’s part-petitions. 
{¶ 32} Nevertheless, Owens also argues that for his part-petitions, 
“signatures found to be illegible were in fact legible” and “voters found not to be 
registered were in fact registered as evidenced by their certified voter registration 
records attached to the evidence filed in this case.”  Owens has submitted 
evidence that includes the part-petitions containing the specified signatures and 
the board’s certified voter-registration records to support his claims. 
{¶ 33} The parties agree that the board of elections, in assessing the 
validity of the signatures on Owens’s part-petitions, should have followed the 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
secretary’s instructions as incorporated in Secretary of State Directive 2010-28.  
See R.C. 3501.11(P) (requiring boards of elections to “[p]erform other duties as 
prescribed by law or the rules, directives, or advisories of the secretary of state”); 
see also Colvin, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 57 
(court will defer to secretary of state’s reasonable interpretation of election law).  
None of the parties contests the legal propriety of these instructions, and in the 
limited context of the case before us, we will not decide an issue that has not been 
raised by the parties. 
{¶ 34} For illegible signatures, the secretary of state instructed the boards 
of election that a “signature is illegible only if both the signature and address are 
unreadable, such that it is impossible for board personnel to check the signature 
against a voter registration record.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Our review of the evidence 
establishes that at least 8 of the 22 signatures rejected for illegibility were 
sufficiently legible even if the signatures were not readable, because the addresses 
were readable and the signatures matched the board’s records. 
{¶ 35} Furthermore, our review of the evidence submitted shows that at 
least 11 of the 17 signatures rejected as being from unregistered voters were 
improperly rejected, because the board’s records show that the persons are 
registered to vote and that their petition signatures match their signatures on file. 
{¶ 36} Although the board of elections submitted evidence that its 
manager of elections operations reviewed the pertinent signatures on March 23, 
2010, and determined that at most “only four” of the signatures “could arguably 
be found to be valid,” the court’s review of the actual part-petitions and certified 
registration records contradicts this statement and establishes otherwise. 
{¶ 37} Owens has established that the board of elections erred in rejecting 
at least the 19 signatures that he needed to meet the 500-signature requirement of 
R.C. 3513.05 to have his name placed on the May 4 primary-election ballot.  We 
appreciate the difficulties that elections officials have in reviewing a high volume 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of signatures and part-petitions in the often abbreviated time period required by 
the election laws, and we accord due deference to these officials’ determinations 
when they are reasonably supported.  But when a prospective candidate 
establishes that the board erred in rejecting valid signatures and those signatures 
justify the candidate’s placement on the ballot, we must grant a writ ordering the 
secretary to place the candidate’s name on the ballot. Accordingly, the board 
abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law in failing to certify 
the validity of the signatures.  The secretary of state has clear legal duty to place 
Owens’s name on the primary-election ballot. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing, Owens has established his entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief.  We grant a writ of mandamus to compel the 
secretary of state to certify Owens’s name as a candidate for the Constitution 
Party nomination for the office Ohio Attorney General and to instruct the boards 
of election to place Owens’s name on the May 4, 2010 primary-election ballot.1 
{¶ 39} We observe that in the case before us, Owens seeks to have his 
petitions certified in connection with his candidacy for Ohio Attorney General in 
the May 4, 2010 Constitution Party primary election.  This case demonstrates that 
the election timeline promulgated by the General Assembly does not allow 
sufficient time for review and certification of nominating petitions by election 
officials or for consideration of legal challenges by this court.  We note that this is 
a matter of importance for the General Assembly to address. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
                                                 
1.  We deny Owens’s request for attorney fees. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant the writ 
of mandamus.  I believe that it is too late for us to issue a mandamus in this case.  
This court should hold that the beginning of the voting process terminates our 
ability to rule further on election challenges. 
{¶ 41} Although the issues were briefed before balloting started, we have 
not had sufficient time to review the issues.  Indeed, most of the ballots were 
probably printed by the time the briefs were filed in this case.  “A State 
indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election 
process.” Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Commt. (1989), 489 U.S. 
214, 231, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271.  Moreover, “[c]onfidence in the 
integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our 
participatory democracy.”  Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006), 549 U.S.1, 4, 127 S.Ct. 5, 
166 L.Ed.2d 1. 
{¶ 42} “Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can 
themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away 
from the polls.  As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”  Id. at 4-5.  
Clearly then, when an election has already started, a decision such as the 
majority’s will unmistakably cause confusion and disillusionment.  See also 
Westermann v. Nelson (1972), 409 U.S. 1236, 1236-1237, 93 S.Ct. 252, 34 
L.Ed.2d 207 (W.O. Douglas, Circuit Justice), denying an injunction to add a 
candidate’s name to the Arizona ballot: 
{¶ 43} “The complaint may have merit. But the time element is now short 
and the ponderous Arizona election machinery is already under way, printing the 
ballots.  Absentee ballots have indeed already been sent out and some have been 
returned. The costs of reprinting all the ballots will be substantial and it may well 
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be that no decision on the merits can be reached by the Court of Appeals in time 
to reprint the ballots excluding petitioners, should they lose on the merits. 
{¶ 44} “* * *  
{¶ 45} “On the basis of [the] papers [submitted by the parties] I have 
concluded that in fairness to the parties I must deny the injunction, not because 
the cause lacks merit but because orderly election processes would likely be 
disrupted by so late an action.” 
{¶ 46} Absentee ballots have now been mailed and voting has 
commenced.  While I believe this ballot involves only one unopposed candidate 
and may not disrupt the process too much in the number of ballots requested, a 
ballot in a contested race that would need to be changed after being mailed (and 
possibly already marked and returned) could wreak serious havoc on our system 
of orderly elections.  This case will now be precedent should such a scenario 
arise. 
{¶ 47} I strongly urge the General Assembly to examine this issue and 
impose deadlines or restrictions on future ballot challenges.  To allow challenges 
to continue after ballots have already been printed and mailed is a costly and 
disruptive result that must be fixed.  The majority believes that the current law 
requires today’s result despite the consequences.  I dissent and would hold that the 
beginning of the voting process terminates this court’s jurisdiction to alter the 
orderly voting process. 
__________________ 
 
Robert M. Owens, pro se. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein, Richard N. 
Coglianese, Damian W. Sikora, and Michael J. Schuler, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for respondent Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner. 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Nick A. Soulas Jr., 
First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony E. Palmer Jr., Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Franklin County Board of Elections. 
______________________