Title: Munker v. Juvenile Court, Seventh Judicial Dist.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Munker v. Juvenile Court, Seventh Judicial Dist.1992 WY 113837 P.2d 676Case Number: 91-88Decided: 09/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
State Public Defender, 
Leonard D. MUNKER, 

Petitioner,

v.

JUVENILE COURT, SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and Honorable Dan Spangler, Juvenile Court Judge, 

Respondents.

 

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender and Barbara L. Lauer, 
Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at oral 
argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The only question 
to be addressed in this case is whether the office of the Public Defender must 
pay the fees of a guardian ad litem appointed to protect the interests of 
a juvenile who is a party to a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The district 
court sitting as the juvenile court ordered the Public Defender to pay the fees 
of the guardian ad litem who was appointed, as well as additional fees 
incurred because of the attempt to recover the original fees. We hold the Public 
Defender had no responsibility for payment for the services of the guardian 
ad litem, and we order that the writ of prohibition filed in this case be 
made absolute.

[¶2]      In the brief 
filed in this proceeding, the Public Defender set forth this statement of the 
issues:

     I. The Juvenile Court 
has no jurisdiction to order the State Public Defender to pay the fees of a 
properly appointed guardian ad litem.

     II. The absolute writ 
of prohibition is the appropriate remedy to restrain enforcement of orders 
entered without jurisdiction.

[¶3]      These issues 
arose because the Public Defender, on February 6, 1990, filed a motion, in a 
juvenile proceeding in the trial court, urging the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for the juvenile party to the proceedings. At that time, the 
juvenile was at the Wyoming State Hospital for an evaluation in the course of 
those proceedings, and it was apparent that the juvenile's mother was not the 
appropriate person to look out for the best interests of the child. At best, the 
mother was subject to external factors that interfered with her competency to 
maintain the best interests of the child, and it appears to be even more likely 
that her interests were adverse to those of the child. The motion by the Public 
Defender was denied but, later, this court issued an order requiring an 
additional detention hearing for the juvenile. After the Public Defender renewed 
the motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the district court 
made that appointment by an order entered on March 6, 1990. That appointment was 
reconfirmed after additional hearings were held in the juvenile matter by an 
order entered on May 4, 1990.

[¶4]      In January, 1991, 
the guardian ad litem applied to the Public Defender for payment of the 
fees that were due. In a response, dated January 14, 1991, the Office of the 
Public Defender advised it would not pay the fees because there was no provision 
made in the budget of the Public Defender for payment of such fees and because 
no statutory provision imposed that obligation upon the Public Defender. The 
application for payment was again submitted to the Public Defender and payment 
again was refused. The district court, on March 7, 1991, entered an order in the 
juvenile proceeding directing the Public Defender to pay the fees sought, as 
well as additional fees attributable to the attempt to recover the original 
fees. On March 21, 1991, the Public Defender sought an order vacating the order 
requiring it to pay the guardian ad litem, but that motion was denied by the 
district court. In its order on the motion, entered on March 26, 1991, the court 
stated that, "the Guardian Ad Litem was appointed only upon the 
representation of the State Public Defender that the fees would be paid by his 
office, and that a Guardian Ad Litem would not have been appointed 
otherwise." The office of the Public Defender filed a Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition in this court on April 17, 1991.

[¶5]      Pursuant to that 
petition, an Order Granting Alternative Writ of Prohibition was entered by this 
court on April 25, 1991. That order inhibited the district court from further 
proceedings in the juvenile matter until further order of this court. The Public 
Defender then filed a brief in this court on July 30, 1991. No brief was filed 
by the respondents.

[¶6]      There is a 
prospect for confusion in the statutory references with respect to the payment 
of the fees of a guardian ad litem that initially could lead to difficulty in 
determining the responsibility for payment. For example, Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-109 
(1987) provides:

     (a) Nothing in this 
act shall prevent a court on its own motion or upon application by the state 
public defender or by the individual defendant, from appointing an attorney 
other than the public defender to represent the defendant or to assist in the 
representation of the defendant at any stage of the proceedings or on 
appeal.

     (b) If a court assigns 
an attorney to represent a needy person, it may recommend a reasonable rate of 
compensation for his services and shall determine the direct expenses for which 
he should be reimbursed. The state public defender shall consider the court's 
recommendation and the customary compensation as prescribed by the standard fee 
schedule promulgated pursuant to W.S. 7-6-103(c)(vi), and shall pay the 
appointed attorney for his services when the case for which he was appointed is 
concluded.

     (c) An attorney appointed 
under subsection (b) of this section shall be compensated for his services with 
regard to the complexity of the issues, the time involved, prevailing local fees 
of attorneys, the amount reasonably necessary to provide a defense as is 
required by constitutional process and other relevant considerations as 
determined by the court.

This provision 
is followed by Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-112 (1987), which provides that the Public 
Defender Act does not apply to "[m]atters arising out of an action 
pending in the juvenile courts of this state unless it is in a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding." In this instance, the juvenile party was charged with 
delinquency by an allegation that she had committed attempted first degree 
murder. 

[¶7]      If we look to the 
fact that the application for guardian ad litem was filed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 14-6-216 (1986), we discover that the pertinent statutory language 
reads:

     The court shall 
appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to proceedings 
under this act if the child has no parent, guardian or custodian appearing in 
his behalf or if the interests of the parents, guardian or custodian are adverse 
to the best interest of the child. A party to the proceeding or employee or 
representative thereof shall not be appointed guardian ad litem for the 
child.

In this 
instance, the guardian ad litem was appointed because the interests of 
the juvenile party's mother were adverse to the interests of the juvenile 
party.

[¶8]      We then turn to 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-235 (1986), which provide:

     (a) There is no fee 
for filing a petition under this act nor shall any state, county or local law 
enforcement officer charge a fee for service of process under this act. Witness 
fees, juror fees and travel expenses in the amounts allowable by law may be paid 
to persons other than the parties who are subpoenaed or required to appear at 
any hearing pursuant to this act.

     (b) The following 
costs and expenses, when approved and certified by the court to the county 
treasurer, shall be a charge upon the funds of the county where the proceedings 
are held and shall be paid by the board of county commissioners of that county 
[emphasis added]:

(i) Witness fees and 
travel expense;

(ii) Jury fees, costs and 
travel expense;

(iii) Costs of service of 
process or notice by certified mail;

(iv) Costs of any 
physical or mental examinations or treatment ordered by the court;

(v) Reasonable 
compensation for services and costs of counsel appointed by the 
court;

(vi) Reasonable 
compensation for services and costs of a guardian ad litem appointed by the 
court [emphasis added]; and

(vii) Any other costs of 
the proceedings which would be assessable as costs in the district 
court.

     (c) Legal services 
rendered to a child for his benefit and protection are necessities which the 
child's parents or any person obligated by law for the child's support may be 
held responsible. The court may order that all or any part of the costs and 
expenses enumerated in subsection (b) of this section except jury fees, costs 
and travel expenses, be reimbursed to the county by the child, his parents or 
any person legally obligated for his support, or any of them jointly and 
severally, upon terms the court may direct. An order for reimbursement of costs 
made pursuant to this subsection may be enforced as provided in W.S. 
14-6-236.

[¶9]      When these 
statutes are read in pari materia, as our rules of construction provide 
they must be, it is clear that the Public Defender's obligation was to provide 
primary legal representation with respect to the allegation of juvenile 
delinquency. See B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809 (Wyo. 1992); Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989). It 
is clear, in addition, that this is an instance in which the guardian ad 
litem was appointed pursuant to § 14-6-216, and not to provide additional 
representation on the delinquency allegation pursuant to § 7-6-109. The correct 
application of the applicable statutes leads to the conclusion the obligation to 
pay the guardian ad litem fees belonged to Natrona County, not to the 
Public Defender.

[¶10]   Our conclusion in this case is 
consistent with the resolution of Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 1979). In 
that instance, the responsibility of the Public Defender to pay the fees and 
expenses of a private attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant was 
resolved by the issuance of an order in the criminal proceeding that the voucher 
to the county be paid by the Public Defender. There, we concluded the court had 
no jurisdiction in the criminal proceeding to consider the issue of 
responsibility for attorney fees and expenses as between the county and the 
Public Defender. The same proposition might well be true in this instance but, 
instead of taking an appeal, the Public Defender has attacked the authority of 
the trial court by a Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Consequently, the merits 
are directly raised, and we dispose of them.

[¶11]   The Alternative Writ of Prohibition 
in this case is made absolute, and the district court is ordered to desist from 
further actions directed at requiring the Public Defender to pay the fees of the 
guardian ad litem appointed for the juvenile party in the 
proceeding.