Title: Commonwealth v. Lora

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12887 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE LORA. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 9, 2024. - June 24, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Wendlandt, Georges, & Dewar, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Disclosure 
of evidence, Assistance of counsel, Failure to object, 
Argument by prosecutor, Cross-examination by prosecutor, 
New trial.  Evidence, Prior violent conduct, Self-defense, 
Disclosure of evidence, Prior misconduct, Impeachment of 
credibility, Prior inconsistent statement, Cross-
examination, Argument by prosecutor, Photograph, State of 
mind, Intent, Motive, Opinion.  Constitutional Law, 
Assistance of counsel.  Self-Defense.  Mental Impairment.  
  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 20, 2016. 
 
 
The case was tried before Paul D. Wilson, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on September 10, 2021, was considered by 
him. 
 
 
 
Jillise McDonough for the defendant. 
 
Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In June 2015, the victim, David Luyando, was 
shot in the head as he was visiting the burial site of a friend 
in a Worcester cemetery; the victim was an innocent bystander 
caught in a line of fire targeting Kevin Parker, who was a part 
of the group that accompanied the victim at the cemetery.  Six 
days earlier, Parker, who was a member of the Providence Street 
Posse (PSP), a Worcester-based gang, had shot the defendant, 
Jose Lora, ostensibly because the defendant, a member of a rival 
gang, the Kilby Street Posse (KSP), was in the PSP's apparent 
"territory."  Finding himself face to face with Parker so soon 
after being shot, the defendant took the opportunity for 
revenge; he discharged his firearm six times in Parker's 
direction, fatally striking the victim with one bullet.  
Following the killing, the defendant disposed of the murder 
weapon, cleaned the car in which he was travelling, and 
eventually absconded to the Dominican Republic. 
The defendant was returned to the Commonwealth, and 
following a jury trial in Superior Court, he was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  In this consolidated appeal, the defendant 
maintains that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury 
to consider Parker's known history of violence in connection 
with their assessment as to whether the defendant had a 
reasonable apprehension of Parker at the time of the killing, 
3 
 
and that the judge abused his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial because the prosecutor 
delayed disclosure of material evidence prejudicing his defense, 
and because he was provided with ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  After carefully reviewing the defendant's claims on 
appeal and having conducted an independent review of the entire 
record, we discern no error and no reason to exercise our 
extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a 
new trial or to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree 
to a lesser degree of guilt.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
conviction. 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts from the evidence presented at trial.  
a.  Commonwealth's case-in-chief.  i.  Cemetery shooting.  
On the afternoon of June 25, 2015, the victim, his aunt, Dawn 
Sims, his cousin, Ashayla Burrell, and his cousin's friend, 
Caytlin Pizarro, were at a Worcester cemetery.  Sims had driven 
the victim's group to the cemetery in her Chevrolet Equinox 
after learning from Burrell's boyfriend, Parker, that a 
headstone was missing from the burial site of a mutual friend.  
As discussed supra, Parker was a member of the PSP, a Worcester-
based gang prominent in the eastern side of the city.  Parker 
joined the victim's group at the cemetery, arriving separately 
in a black Hyundai Elantra, along with fellow PSP gang member, 
4 
 
Kevin Mulready.  Neither Parker nor Mulready was armed.  The two 
vehicles parked on opposite sides of the road near the 
gravesite.   
Sims called the city police department to report the 
missing headstone.  The victim's group waited approximately 
forty-five minutes, but the police did not arrive.  
As the victim's group prepared to leave, Parker sat in the 
Elantra's driver's seat.  The victim and Mulready were in the 
back passenger seats; the victim was on the driver's side.    
A third vehicle, a Mazda, approached the two cars.  The 
vehicle pulled close to the Elantra.  One of the Mazda's windows 
opened, and Mulready saw a firearm "c[o]me up."  Parker saw the 
defendant in the Mazda.  As Parker tried to drive away from the 
Mazda, he heard five to seven shots.  Sims, who was in the 
Equinox, saw the defendant hanging out of the Mazda1 and 
discharging his firearm in the direction of the Elantra.     
Pizarro was on her cellular telephone at the time of the 
shooting leaving a voicemail message for her doctor.  The 
voicemail recording captures the sounds of six gunshots.  
Pizarro saw the window of the Mazda close following the 
shooting.   
 
1 Burrell also saw the defendant leaning out from the Mazda. 
5 
 
After driving away from the Mazda, Parker turned and saw 
that the victim appeared to have suffered a gunshot wound to the 
head; he was struggling to breathe and was choking on his own 
blood.  Parker drove to the hospital.  The victim died later 
that day from a gunshot wound to his head.   
 
ii.  Nightclub shooting.  As discussed supra, the defendant 
was a member of the KSP, a Worcester-based gang engaged in a 
decades-long feud with the PSP.  Parker and the defendant had an 
ongoing "rivalry" that sometimes had turned "physical."  At 
trial, the prosecutor's theory was that the shooting at the 
cemetery was in retaliation for a shooting that had occurred six 
days earlier.  Specifically, on June 19, 2015, Parker had shot 
at the defendant as the defendant was in a vehicle near a 
nightclub in the PSP's "area" on the eastern side of the city; 
one bullet struck the defendant's arm.2   
iii.  Defendant's activities prior to and after the 
cemetery shooting.  On the day of the cemetery shooting, the 
defendant asked his friend, Ashley Forget,3 for a ride to another  
 
2 A responding police officer, who had been nearby, searched 
the defendant and his vehicle and found no firearm.  The 
defendant was treated for relatively minor injuries to his arm.   
 
3 Forget testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement with 
the Commonwealth. 
 
6 
 
KSP gang member's home.4  At the time, Forget was in Crystal Park 
in Worcester with Janeshley Delossantos, and a KSP gang member, 
Fred Taylor.5  Forget, accompanied by Delossantos and Taylor, 
drove her Mazda to the defendant's home, where the group picked 
him up.  En route to the KSP member's home, Forget drove, 
Delossantos was in the front passenger's seat, and the defendant 
and Taylor were in the back seat.  The defendant was on the 
driver's side. 
As the defendant's group neared the cemetery, Forget 
suggested that they stop to see whether a headstone for their 
deceased friend had been installed.6  As they approached the 
friend's gravesite, the group saw two vehicles.  Taylor surmised 
that the vehicles belonged to their friend's family, and Forget 
pulled the Mazda behind one of the vehicles.   
 
4 The defendant's vehicle was impounded in connection with 
the police investigation of the nightclub shooting.  As a 
result, the defendant sought transportation from his friend, 
Ashley Forget.  Specifically, on the day before the cemetery 
shooting, Forget gave the defendant a ride to the house of a 
fellow KSP gang member.  As discussed infra, on the day of the 
cemetery shooting, the defendant had asked Forget for a ride to 
this same KSP gang member's home.   
 
5 A Worcester police officer testified that Taylor was a 
member of the KSP.  Taylor denied that he was a gang member. 
 
6 Taylor testified, on cross-examination during the 
defendant's case, concerning a letter he had written to 
Delossantos shortly after the cemetery shooting in which he had 
posited that the defendant suggested the group go to the 
cemetery, knowing that rival gang members were there. 
 
7 
 
But Taylor was wrong.  Instead of their friend's relatives, 
the defendant's group encountered Parker.  Forget noticed Parker 
"slunched" low in the driver's seat in the vehicle directly 
across from hers.  The defendant started "freaking out" and said 
"f*** them."   
Delossantos, who was familiar with rumors that Parker had 
shot the defendant six days earlier,7 testified that she saw 
Parker "duck[]" as if searching for something in his car.  She 
did not see Parker with a firearm, however.  Instead, she saw 
that the defendant carried a firearm and heard him "clock[]" it.  
Forget, who began to drive away, heard multiple gunshots coming 
from her Mazda; Delossantos also heard the gunshots.   
Near the back entrance of the cemetery, the defendant told 
Forget to stop the car, which she did.  The defendant and Taylor 
alighted from the car.  The defendant instructed Taylor to 
dispose of the firearm.   
The defendant's group then drove back to Crystal Park and 
warned KSP members to "get out of there" in light of the 
shooting that had occurred.  Thereafter, Forget drove to 
Delossantos's home, where Forget and the defendant cleaned the 
interior of Forget's Mazda.  The defendant also smashed his 
 
7 Taylor later testified, in connection with the defense, 
that he also had heard that Parker was the rival gang member 
responsible for the nightclub shooting of the defendant just six 
days earlier. 
8 
 
cellular telephone and discarded the pieces.  He remarked to 
Forget and Delossantos that he hoped that he had "hit KP."  
Delossantos testified that "KP" was Parker's nickname. 
Days after the shooting, the defendant fled to the 
Dominican Republic, where he stayed for several months.  While 
there, he made several posts on his social media account.  In 
one post, which was dated approximately three weeks after the 
shooting, the defendant stated, "I will never drop my stripes[.]  
I did too much to get them[.]"  In another post that same day, 
the defendant stated, "[G]od protect me from my friends[.]  [I] 
can take care of my enemies[.]" 
A .380 caliber firearm was found at the cemetery near the 
crime scene.  Along the road where the shooting occurred, five 
spent shell casings were recovered; ballistic testing showed 
that the casings had been ejected from the .380 caliber firearm.  
One spent projectile, matching the caliber of the weapon found 
at the scene, was recovered from the Elantra in which the victim 
had been shot.  
b.  The defense.  At trial, the defendant asserted that, 
although he had shot the victim, he had acted in self-defense.  
The defendant, who took the stand in his own defense, testified 
that when Forget pulled behind one of the vehicles near the 
gravesite of their friend, Taylor grabbed the defendant's leg 
and gave him a "paranoid" look.   
9 
 
The defendant then saw Parker holding a firearm "right in 
[the defendant's] face."8  The defendant ducked down, cocked his 
own weapon, and fired "wildly" in Parker's general direction.  
He asserted that he did so to defend himself and his friends.  
The defendant acknowledged that he disposed of his weapon and 
cellular telephone following the cemetery shooting, explaining 
that he did so because he feared being arrested. 
The defendant also testified to two incidents that he 
claimed affected his state of mind at the time of the cemetery 
shooting.  The first occurred in October 2014, approximately 
eight months before the cemetery shooting.  At that time, the 
defendant witnessed the drive-by shooting of his best friend, 
Christian Obeng, as the two were leaving the defendant's 
relative's apartment in Worcester.  After Obeng's death, the 
defendant "didn't know what to do with [him]self" and "felt lost 
in the world."   
The second incident was the shooting of the defendant by 
Parker outside of a nightclub in the eastern side of Worcester; 
as discussed supra, this shooting transpired just six days 
before the cemetery shooting.  Although the defendant did not 
obtain a firearm after Obeng's death, he testified that he 
 
8 Although Delossantos and Taylor both testified that they 
saw Parker leaning down or grabbing something from his vehicle, 
no witness other than the defendant testified that Parker was 
armed. 
10 
 
obtained a firearm after he was shot because "too much stuff was 
happening in [his] life."9  Following the nightclub shooting, the 
defendant testified, he was afraid and no longer wanted to leave 
his house or live in Worcester.10  While the nightclub shooting 
had affected his state of mind, the defendant testified that he 
did not know that Parker had shot him.  Dr. Eric Brown, a 
clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for the defense.  
He opined that witnessing Obeng's death and then being shot 
himself outside the nightclub left him in a state of "acute fear 
and paranoia."  According to Brown, the defendant exhibited 
symptoms of paranoia, hypervigilance, and depression.  Based on 
a psychiatric assessment, Brown opined that the defendant had 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the day of the cemetery 
shooting. 
Taylor also testified on the defendant's behalf; he stated 
that, as Forget pulled her car near the two vehicles parked near 
 
9 On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached the 
defendant, showing that his testimony that he had not possessed 
a firearm until June 2015 and that he had not sold drugs were 
inconsistent with his 2011 juvenile delinquency adjudication for 
illegally carrying a firearm and his 2017 guilty pleas to 
charges related to trafficking heroin, respectively.  
 
10 The defendant's statement that he did not leave his house 
in the days before the cemetery shooting was contrary to 
Forget's testimony that she provided a ride to the defendant to 
his fellow KSP gang member's house on the day before the 
shooting. 
 
11 
 
their friend's gravesite, Taylor identified Parker and said, 
"That's Kevin."11  Taylor noticed that Parker appeared to be 
surprised and reached under his seat to try to grab something 
and pull it up.  Taylor could not identify the object. 
On cross-examination, Taylor acknowledged his grand jury 
testimony that the defendant had told him that the shooting was 
"payback."  He also acknowledged a letter he had written to 
Delossantos a few days after the cemetery shooting in which 
Taylor stated that the defendant "basically set us up to be his 
ride" to the cemetery and someone must have called the defendant 
and told him "where the ops[12] were."  As discussed supra, Forget 
had testified that it was her idea to stop by the cemetery.   
2.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted for 
murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; carrying a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and carrying 
a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  The 
Commonwealth dismissed the firearm charges, and a jury convicted 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation.  The defendant timely filed a notice 
of appeal.  The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied by 
 
11 Although Taylor was on the Commonwealth's witness list, 
he was not called in its case-in-chief. 
 
12 Taylor explained that "ops" was a term for rival gang 
members. 
12 
 
the trial judge.  We consolidated the defendant's timely appeal 
from that order with his direct appeal. 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains that the trial 
judge erred by not instructing the jury to consider Parker's 
known history of violence in connection with their assessment as 
to whether the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of Parker 
at the time of the killing, and that the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial 
because the prosecutor delayed disclosure of material evidence, 
and because the defendant was provided with ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We address each contention in turn. 
a.  Jury instruction.  The defendant first maintains that 
the judge erred by not instructing the jury to consider Parker's 
prior violent conduct when considering the defendant's claim 
that he acted in self-defense.  In connection with a claim of 
self-defense, the defendant may offer "evidence of specific 
violent acts by the victim that were previously known to the 
defendant" to "demonstrate . . . the defendant's reasonable 
apprehension of the victim."  Commonwealth v. Souza, 492 Mass. 
615, 621 (2023), citing Commonwealth v. Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 
735-736 (1986).13  The jury may consider such evidence if the 
 
13 "To establish that the defendant did not act in proper 
self-defense, the Commonwealth must prove at least one of the 
following propositions beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) the 
defendant did not have a reasonable ground to believe, and did 
13 
 
defendant knew of such conduct.  See Fontes, supra; Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 28 (2018).   
At trial, the judge discussed with the prosecutor and trial 
counsel the appropriateness of giving an instruction regarding 
Parker's prior violent conduct in view of the defendant's 
testimony that he was not aware that Parker had been the person 
who had shot the defendant six days prior to the cemetery 
shooting.  Trial counsel did not object to the judge's 
conclusion to forgo the instruction.  Therefore, "our review is 
limited to whether the [failure to give the] instruction was 
erroneous and, if so, whether it created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. 
Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 205 n.14 (2010). 
When determining whether to provide a self-defense 
instruction, including an instruction regarding the jury's 
consideration of a victim's prior violent conduct, the evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 253 (2022), S.C., 
491 Mass. 247 (2023).  Here, while the defendant testified that 
 
not believe, that he was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by using 
deadly force; or (2) the defendant had not availed himself of 
all proper means to avoid physical combat before resorting to 
the use of deadly force; or (3) the defendant used more force 
than was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the 
case."  Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008).   
 
14 
 
he did not know that Parker shot him,14 Taylor testified that the 
defendant told Taylor that the cemetery shooting was "payback."  
Forget and Delossantos also testified that, following the 
shooting, the defendant stated that he hoped he had "hit KP."  
Coupled with Delossantos and Taylor's testimony that they had 
heard rumors that Parker had shot the defendant, and viewed in 
the light most favorable to the defendant, the jury could 
reasonably find that the defendant was aware that Parker was the 
person who had shot him outside the nightclub a few days 
earlier.  See id.  
Assuming, arguendo,15 that the judge erred in not giving the 
instruction regarding the defendant's knowledge of Parker's 
prior violent conduct, we turn to consider whether the judge's 
failure to do so resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Mercado, 456 Mass. at 205 n.14.  To 
find that the defendant held a reasonable apprehension based on 
 
14 The Commonwealth proceeded under a theory of transferred 
intent, that is, that the defendant's intent to kill Parker 
transferred to the victim, making Parker's prior violent conduct 
relevant.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 540 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 837 (2021) 
("If a defendant intends to kill one person, and mistakenly 
kills another, under the doctrine of transferred intent the 
defendant is treated as though he or she intended to kill the 
other individual"). 
 
15 We do not conclude the judge erred in not providing this 
instruction where, as here, trial counsel did not request it -- 
a decision that was manifestly reasonable.  See note 17, infra. 
15 
 
Parker's prior violent conduct, the jury would have had to 
discredit the defendant's testimony that he was unaware that 
Parker had shot him.  Such a conclusion that the defendant 
testified falsely under oath would have undermined the self-
defense theory; after all, the theory required the jury to 
believe the defendant, who was the only witness to testify that 
Parker was armed at the cemetery.  Indeed, the instruction may 
have had the ill effect of bolstering the prosecutor's theory 
that the shooting was motivated by the defendant's desired 
vengeance.16  Under the circumstances, any purported error in 
failing to instruct the jury as to their consideration of 
 
16 The defendant also contends that the judge, sua sponte, 
should have instructed the jury as follows in connection with 
their assessment of the defendant's claim of mental impairment 
at the time of the shooting:   
 
"You may consider the defendant's mental condition at the 
time of the killing, including any credible evidence of 
mental impairment . . . in determining whether the 
defendant actually believed that he was in immediate danger 
of serious bodily harm or death . . . ."   
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 29.  The defendant did not 
request this instruction, and "[a]bsent a request from a 
defendant, . . . a judge is [not] required to instruct the jury 
on [a mental impairment] defense."  Commonwealth v. Santiago 
(No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 422 (2020).  We address in part 3.c.i, 
infra, whether trial counsel's failure to request a mental 
impairment instruction constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
 
16 
 
Parker's prior violence did not create a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.17  See note 21, infra. 
b.  Delayed disclosure of evidence.  We turn next to the 
defendant's claim that the judge abused his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground 
that the prosecutor delayed disclosing (1) two posts from the 
defendant's social media account, which were posted three weeks 
after the killing and in which the defendant stated, "[G]od 
protect me from my friends[.]  [I] can take care of my enemies," 
and "I will never drop my stripes[.]  I did too much to get 
them" (social media posts); (2) a letter written by Taylor 
shortly after the cemetery shooting in which Taylor told 
Delossantos that the defendant had "set [them] up," suggesting 
that the defendant had planned to take them to the cemetery 
knowing that rival gang members were there (Taylor letter); (3) 
the defendant's statement to Worcester police Officer Peter 
Roberge on the night of the Obeng shooting, denying his gang 
affiliation (defendant's gang statement); and (4) Roberge's 
statement that the defendant's friend group returned fire on the 
night of the Obeng shooting (Roberge statement).   
 
17 For the same reason, any claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request the prior violent conduct 
instruction also fails.  Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487 Mass. 
314, 325, 327 (2021) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for failure to object to jury instructions assessed under same 
"substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" standard). 
17 
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, we 
"determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion, . . . and whether any such error 
create[d] a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 176 (2021), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 355 (2016).  
Where, as here, the motion judge was also the trial judge, we 
extend special deference to the judge's decision because he "was 
in a 'superior position to assess the credibility of the 
defendant's claims.'"  Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 162 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 792 n.14 
(2004), S.C., 451 Mass. 1006 (2008).  See Rodriguez-Nieves, 
supra. 
When addressing a claim that the prosecutor has delayed 
disclosure of material evidence,18 we consider whether "[t]he 
 
18 The Commonwealth had an obligation to disclose the social 
media posts and the letter authored by Taylor, who was on the 
Commonwealth's witness list.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) ("The 
prosecution shall disclose to the defense . . . each of the 
following items . . . provided it is relevant to the case 
. . . :  (i) Any written or recorded statements . . . made by 
the defendant . . .  (vii) Material and relevant police reports, 
. . . and statements of persons the party intends to call as 
witnesses").  Moreover, because the defendant's gang affiliation 
and gang rivalry were central to the case, the prosecutor should 
also have disclosed the defendant's statement to Roberge and 
Roberge's information concerning the Obeng shooting.  See id.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 225 (2023) 
(prosecution had obligation to disclose defendant's rap lyrics 
brought forth for first time on defendant's cross-examination).  
18 
 
defendant has . . . made a showing of bad faith on the part of 
the prosecution."  Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 23 
(2000).  In the absence of bad faith,19 we consider "whether the 
defendant has shown that he was prejudiced in his ability 'to 
make effective use of the evidence in preparing and presenting 
his case' when he first learned of the evidence in the heat of 
trial."  Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 177, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 755 (1978), S.C., 397 
Mass. 751 (1986).  "[I]t is the consequences of the delay that 
matter, not the likely impact of the nondisclosed evidence."  
 
The defendant supported his contention that the information was 
not disclosed pretrial with an affidavit of trial counsel, which 
the judge was warranted in crediting.  Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 
473 Mass. 832, 838 (2016) (motion judge may "properly rel[y] on 
the affidavits submitted in support of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial"). 
  
19 The judge found that the prosecutor did not act in bad 
faith, crediting the prosecutor's affidavit, in which the 
prosecutor averred that he had "never intentionally withheld 
evidence or delayed the disclosure of evidence to a defendant," 
that he and trial counsel "were in fairly close contact during 
the build-up to trial," and that he "continued to provide [trial 
counsel] with discovery as [he] received it, including in the 
days before trial began."  The defendant speculates as to the 
prosecutor's motives based on allegations regarding the conduct 
of prosecutors at the office of the district attorney for the 
middle district.  In the circumstances, the judge's decision to 
credit the affidavit was not clearly erroneous.  See Upton, 484 
Mass. at 164 (motion judge, who was also trial judge, 
"explicitly endorsed the prosecutor's specific, credible, and 
repeated on-the-record denials of an undisclosed plea agreement" 
[quotation and alteration omitted]). 
19 
 
Rodriguez-Nieves, supra at 179, quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 
452 Mass. 601, 609-610 (2008). 
i.  Social media posts.  The defendant contends that if the 
prosecutor had disclosed the social media posts timely, trial 
counsel would have filed a motion in limine to exclude them.  
Because the social media posts reference, albeit vaguely, past 
actions by the defendant that suggest involvement in misconduct 
against "enemies" and misconduct to merit apparent esteem within 
a gang, they should be analyzed as prior bad act evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 229-230 (2023) (prior 
bad act evidence includes statements "convey[ing] ideas or acts 
that themselves could be considered bad acts").  "Although 
evidence of prior or subsequent bad acts may not be offered to 
prove bad character or criminal propensity, such evidence may be 
admitted for another purpose where its probative value is not 
. . . outweighed by the danger of prejudice" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 712 
(2016).  Evidence of subsequent bad acts is admissible to "show 
the whole transaction of which the crime was a part," so long as 
the evidence is "connected with the facts of the case" and "not 
. . . too remote in time."  Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass. 
135, 148 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 
427, 434 (2001).   
20 
 
Here, the posts were relevant to the defendant's state of 
mind at the time of the cemetery shooting, were probative of the 
defendant's retaliatory intent, and had a tendency to show that 
the defendant did not act in self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 466 (2004) ("Evidence of the defendant's 
spending habits after the murder was admissible because it was 
probative of his mental state at the time of the murder").  See 
also Correia, 492 Mass. at 228-230 (defendant's statements akin 
to bad act evidence admissible to show state of mind); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b) (2024).  Although the posts were made 
approximately three weeks after the killing, they were not too 
remote in time to be probative of the defendant's state of mind.  
See Cardarelli, 433 Mass. at 434 (evidence of defendant's 
gambling spree two weeks after killing wife was "properly 
admitted to establish motive" that defendant wanted to kill his 
wife to spend their joint assets).  In addition, the posts did 
not highlight any specific acts of violence.  Cf. Correia, supra 
at 232 (rap lyrics' prejudicial effect outweighed probative 
value where lyrics "highlight[ed] living a life of crime, 
neighborhood wars, and disliking the police [and] hardly were 
probative of the defendant's self-defense claim").  Accordingly, 
the judge did not err in concluding that the proposed motion in 
limine would have been unsuccessful and that the defendant did 
not show prejudice from the delayed disclosure. 
21 
 
ii.  Taylor letter.  During his grand jury testimony, 
Taylor was questioned about a letter he had written to 
Delossantos in the aftermath of the cemetery shooting.  In that 
letter, Taylor stated that "[the defendant] basically set us up 
to be his ride," that someone must have called the defendant and 
told him where the "ops" were, and that "we [(Taylor and 
Delossantos)] both know [Taylor] didn[']t have nothin[g] to do 
with that or knew it was happenin[g].  [The defendant] did."  At 
trial, Taylor testified contrary to these statements; 
accordingly, the prosecutor used the letter to impeach him.   
The defendant asserts that had he known about the Taylor 
letter prior to the commencement of the trial, he would have 
filed a motion in limine to exclude it.  The judge concluded 
that such a motion would have failed.  We agree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 400 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 623 (1982) ("A party has a 
right to impeach [a] witness's testimony by means of prior 
inconsistent statements . . .").20   
 
20 The defendant wrongly contends that the judge limited 
trial counsel's redirect examination regarding the Taylor 
letter.  In context, it is clear that the judge limited trial 
counsel's questions whether Taylor was badgered by the 
prosecutor during cross-examination; an issue the judge 
determined the jury could "judge for itself whether that was 
badgering."  This was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
22 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the 
letter showed the defendant went to the cemetery knowing that 
rival gang members were present.  See Commonwealth v. Denson, 
489 Mass. 138, 149-150 (2022) (prosecutor's reference in closing 
to prior inconsistent statement "not for impeachment purposes 
. . . but as substantive evidence . . . improperly employed the 
statement for its truth").  Nothing about the timing of the 
disclosure of the letter prevented trial counsel from objecting 
to the argument.  See Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 179, 
quoting Almeida, 452 Mass. at 609-610.21 
 
21 Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's use 
of the Taylor letter, which itself was contradicted by Forget's 
testimony, did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 492 Mass. 
559, 568 (2023).  Other evidence strongly indicated that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense.  Of the nine people who 
witnessed the shooting and testified, only the defendant stated 
that he saw "someone" in Parker's car holding a firearm.  The 
defendant's testimony that, upon seeing the gun, he ducked and 
shot wildly out the window is belied by the testimony of 
witnesses who saw the defendant hanging out of the Mazda's 
window and shooting directly toward Parker's car.  The 
ballistics evidence, including the five shell casings strewn on 
the road where the shooting occurred, supported these witness 
accounts.  There was no return fire, and the spent casings found 
at the crime scene only belonged to the defendant's firearm.  
The voicemail recording played for the jury confirms that the 
defendant shot at Parker's vehicle six times as it sped away. 
 
Overwhelming evidence also supported the prosecutor's 
theory that the defendant shot Parker with deliberate 
premeditation because of their personal and gang rivalry as well 
as the nightclub shooting.  See Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 
Mass. 312, 326 (2020) ("The jury were free to reject the 
defendant's testimony and instead credit the evidence presented 
by the Commonwealth").  The defendant obtained a firearm after 
23 
 
iii.  Defendant's gang statement.  On cross-examination, 
the defendant stated that he had been a member of the KSP for 
well over a decade.  Referencing a police report, the prosecutor 
asked the defendant whether he had, on the night of the Obeng 
shooting, told Roberge that he was not in a gang.  The defendant 
responded, "If that says it, yeah."  When asked whether he "lied 
to the police then, too," the defendant responded, "Yes."   
The defendant contends that, if the police report had been 
disclosed prior to trial, he would have moved to exclude 
reference to it.  However, the report recorded the defendant's 
prior inconsistent statement and was used to impeach him; the 
judge properly concluded that the statement would not have been 
excluded for this purpose by a pretrial motion.  See Parent, 465 
Mass. at 400. 
iv.  Roberge statement.  On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked Roberge whether "the individuals who shot Mr. 
Obeng were also shot at by the individuals with Mr. Obeng."  
 
the nightclub shooting, suggesting that he was planning his 
vengeance.  As several witnesses testified, the defendant 
recognized Parker as the person in the car in the cemetery as 
Forget pulled the Mazda near it.  Upon seeing Parker, the 
defendant exclaimed "f*** them."  He then "clocked" and fired 
his firearm six separate times while hanging out the window 
adjacent to Parker's car.  Thereafter, he directed Taylor to 
discard the gun, destroyed his cellular telephone, and cleaned 
Forget's car.  Days later, he fled to the Dominican Republic.  
The defendant also explained to Taylor that the cemetery 
shooting was "payback," and told Forget and Delossantos that he 
hoped he hit Parker. 
24 
 
Roberge responded, "Correct."  The prosecutor then asked, "And 
one of those individuals with Mr. Obeng was [the defendant]?"  
Roberge again responded, "That is correct."  Trial counsel did 
not object.  But he later averred that, if he had known Roberge 
would testify to someone firing back during the Obeng shooting, 
he would have attempted to impeach Roberge's testimony with 
eyewitness statements that there was only one shooter or moved 
to exclude the testimony.  The judge found that the defendant 
was not prejudiced by any delay in disclosing Roberge's account 
of the Obeng shooting because nothing prevented trial counsel 
from impeaching Roberge at trial when he made the statement and 
the statement "was not crucial to either parties' case."  Given 
the extensive evidence supporting the defendant's guilt, we 
cannot say the judge abused his discretion in so concluding.  
See note 21, supra.  See also Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 
177; Stote, 433 Mass. at 24-25 (no prejudice where "defense 
counsel was permitted to cross-examine [witness] extensively" 
and timely disclosure "would not necessarily have aided [the] 
defense").  
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  We turn next to the 
defendant's claim that the judge abused his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial because trial 
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.  "When 
reviewing a defendant's appeal from the denial of a motion for a 
25 
 
new trial in conjunction with the direct appeal of a conviction 
of murder in the first degree, 'we do not evaluate [the] 
ineffective assistance claim under the traditional standard set 
forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).'"  
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 492 Mass. 559, 568 (2023), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 656-657 (2022).  
"Instead, we apply the more favorable standard of G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and review the defendant's claim for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Gibson, supra.  
Specifically, we consider "'whether defense counsel committed an 
error in the course of trial,' and if there was error . . . 
'whether it was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 
62 (2018).22  "Where a defendant challenges tactical or strategic 
decisions by trial counsel, the court will find ineffective 
assistance 'only if such a decision was manifestly unreasonable 
when made.'"  Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 808 (2016), 
aff'd, 582 U.S. 286 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 
Mass. 286, 288 (2007). 
 
22 The judge properly applied the Saferian standard.  See 
Commonwealth v. Norris, 483 Mass. 681, 686 n.4 (2019) ("The 
defendant incorrectly states that his motions for a new trial 
were entitled to plenary review by the motion judge pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E"). 
26 
 
i.  Mental impairment instruction.  First, we consider 
whether trial counsel's failure to request a mental impairment 
jury instruction as part of the self-defense instruction 
constituted ineffective assistance.  Specifically, the defendant 
urges that trial counsel should have requested the following 
model jury instruction: 
"You may consider the defendant's mental condition at the 
time of the killing, including any credible evidence of 
mental impairment . . . in determining whether the 
defendant actually believed that he was in immediate danger 
of serious bodily harm or death, but not in determining 
whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would 
have believed he was in immediate danger." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 29.23   
"'[W]here evidence of the defendant's mental impairment is 
significant and where it is a critical aspect of [the 
defendant's] defense, the failure to instruct the jury that they 
could consider evidence of that impairment' is error."  
Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 492 Mass. 341, 352 (2023), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 799 (2011).  Brown's 
testimony that the defendant suffered from PTSD at the time he 
shot the victim provided a basis for the mental impairment 
 
23 In his brief, the defendant fails to quote the portion of 
the instruction instructing the jury not to consider the 
defendant's mental impairment "in determining whether a 
reasonable person in those circumstances would have believed he 
was in immediate danger."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
29. 
 
27 
 
instruction.24  See Armstrong, supra at 352-353, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020) 
("To be entitled to a mental impairment instruction, 'a 
defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such an 
impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question'").   
Nonetheless, the defendant has not shown that trial 
counsel's decision not to request such an instruction was 
manifestly unreasonable.  See Weaver, 474 Mass. at 808.  While 
the model instruction permits the jury to consider the 
defendant's mental impairment in determining whether the 
defendant "actually believed" he was in imminent damager at the 
time of the killing, it also instructs the jury to disregard 
such evidence when determining "whether a reasonable person in 
those circumstances would have believed he was in immediate 
danger."  Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 29.25  It was not 
 
24 Based on a psychodiagnostic interview with the defendant 
and after reviewing the police reports and other statements 
pertaining to the defendant's case, Brown opined that the 
defendant suffered from PTSD when he killed the victim.  Brown 
explained that the defendant exhibited the five required 
conditions for PTSD:  he experienced a situation in which his 
life was acutely endangered ("he was shot at and wounded, and 
. . . his friend was killed"), he had intrusive experiences, he 
became avoidant ("he was really freaked out about going 
anywhere"), he experienced alterations in mood ("he began to 
become very paranoid"), and he experienced arousal (he was 
"hypervigilant" and "looking around all the time"). 
 
25 Evidence of mental impairment bears upon the subjective 
portion of self-defense -- whether the defendant actually 
believed he was in imminent danger –- but not in determining 
28 
 
manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to reject this 
instruction in favor of the one given by the judge, which 
allowed the jury to "consider all of the circumstances bearing 
upon the defendant's state of mind at that time." 
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the failure to request the 
instruction was manifestly unreasonable, the defendant has not 
shown that the failure created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Because of the strong evidence that the 
defendant premeditated his killing of the victim, see note 21, 
supra, the requested mental impairment instruction was not 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Gibson, 
492 Mass. at 568.26 
 
"whether a defendant's belief concerning his exposure to danger 
was reasonable."  Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 576 
(1997) ("[s]ince malice does not require any actual or 
subjective intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, 
there is no basis in our law for the defendant's suggestion that 
provocation should be viewed subjectively . . . [and] [t]he same 
holds true for the self-defense test" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
 
26 In addition, Brown's opinion rested on the defendant's 
alleged fear of going outside and general paranoia; yet the 
evidence was to the contrary.  Forget testified that the 
defendant went out on the day before the cemetery shooting as 
well as on the day of the killing.  Following the shooting, the 
defendant accompanied his friends to Crystal Park and warned 
fellow KSP gang members.  In the weeks that followed the 
cemetery shooting, the defendant posted photographs on social 
media of himself at a beach in the Dominican Republic.  Also, 
although Brown's opinion rested on the defendant's scores on the 
Trauma Symptom Inventory Standardized Test for defensive 
avoidance, depression, and intrusive experiences, each of these 
was barely above the cut-off for "clinically significant" 
29 
 
ii.  Prior firearm adjudication.  The defendant maintains 
that trial counsel erred during the defendant's direct 
examination by asking the defendant whether he had a firearm 
from October 2014, the time of the Obeng shooting, to June 2015, 
the time of the nightclub shooting.  He contends that this line 
of questioning was manifestly unreasonable because it allowed 
the prosecutor to raise on cross-examination evidence of the 
defendant's juvenile firearm adjudication, which trial counsel 
successfully had excluded before trial through a motion in 
limine.  We agree with the judge that the defendant has not made 
the requisite showing.  To begin, trial counsel did not aver 
that these questions lacked a strategic basis.  In fact, the 
questions elicited the defendant's testimony supporting his PTSD 
diagnosis and his claim of self-defense.   
Contrary to the defendant's contention, trial counsel 
strategically limited the time frame of the questions so as to 
avoid opening the door to the defendant's prior firearm 
adjudication.  Rather, the defendant opened the door on cross-
examination when he testified affirmatively to the prosecutor's 
question whether his position was that he "never handled a gun 
 
scores.  Cf. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799 (failure to instruct on 
mental impairment warranted new trial given defendant's "long 
history of serious mental illness"); Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 
Mass. 672, 678 (1980) (same, given expert testimony that 
defendant "had suffered from a severe and long-standing mental 
illness"). 
30 
 
until June of 2015."  This statement by the defendant, and not 
his responses to trial counsel's more limited questions during 
his direct examination, allowed the prosecutor to raise the 
defendant's prior adjudication.  See Commonwealth v. Roderick, 
429 Mass. 271, 275 (1999) ("when the defendant answered 
untruthfully that he had never carried a gun, he opened the door 
to admission of the evidence of his prior conviction for gun 
possession").  
iii.  Failure to object during cross-examination.  The 
defendant raises several instances in which trial counsel 
purportedly should have, but failed to, object during the 
prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant.  We examine 
each of these decisions in turn to determine whether there was 
error and, if so, whether the error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Gibson, 492 Mass. 
at 568. 
A.  Gang "lifestyle."  The prosecutor cross-examined the 
defendant as follows: 
Q.:  "And you're a Kilby Street Posse member?" 
A.:  "Yes." 
Q.:  "Been one for well over a decade?" 
A.:  "Yes." 
Q.:  "That lifestyle involves guns, drugs, violence?" 
A.:  "No." 
31 
 
Q.:  "It doesn't involve any of that?" 
A.:  "Not to me –-" 
Q.:  "You've never been involved in –-" 
A.:  "I've never done drugs in my life." 
Q.:  "You never sold drugs in your life?" 
A.:  "Nah." 
After this exchange, the prosecutor impeached the defendant with 
a 2017 heroin trafficking conviction that previously had been 
excluded by trial counsel in a pretrial motion in limine.  Trial 
counsel did not object. 
Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's 
questions regarding the defendant's "lifestyle" and drug 
activities did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Gibson, 492 Mass. at 568.  First, 
the judge gave a limiting instruction that the jury could 
consider prior convictions only for impeachment purposes, and 
that the jury could not consider the convictions as proof that 
the defendant committed the crime at hand or that the defendant 
had a criminal personality or bad character.27  See Commonwealth 
 
27 The judge's instruction stated in full:   
 
"The defendant is not charged with committing any crime 
other than the murder charge contained in the indictment.  
You have heard mention of other crimes as to which the 
defendant pleaded guilty or was otherwise convicted.  You 
are not to take that as a substitute for proof that the 
defendant committed the crime charged here, nor you -- may 
32 
 
v. Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 653 (2005) (no substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice from prosecutor's improper discussion of 
details underlying prior convictions where "limiting instruction 
as to the proper use of prior convictions adequately addressed 
the prosecutor's error"); Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 
721 (2005) (where judge allows introduction of prior conviction, 
"potential prejudice may be ameliorated by an appropriate 
limiting instruction").  See also Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 473 
Mass. 415, 427 (2015) ("Jurors are presumed to follow [the 
judge's] instructions").  Moreover, the evidence of the 
defendant's deliberate premeditation was overwhelming.  See note 
21, supra. 
 
B.  Social media photographs.  The defendant argues that 
trial counsel's failure to object to two photographs depicting 
the defendant in the Dominican Republic was error because the 
photographs portrayed the defendant as "callous" and were 
unrelated to the issues of deliberate premeditation and self-
defense.  Counsel averred that his failure to object was an 
oversight and not strategic.  However, the photographs, which 
were posted within months of the cemetery shooting, were 
 
you consider it as proof that the defendant had a -- has a 
criminal personality or a bad character.  Specifically, you 
may not use this evidence to conclude that if the defendant 
committed other crimes, he must also have committed this 
crime." 
33 
 
evidence of the defendant's state of mind; they raised doubt as 
to the defendant's theory that he was isolated due to PTSD, 
because they show him out in public in the company of others, as 
opposed to being "wounded" and "really freaked out about going 
anywhere" as Brown testified.  Any objection by trial counsel 
would have been futile.  See Mendes, 441 Mass. at 466-467 
(postcrime conduct admissible to show state of mind).   
 
C.  Prearrest silence.  The prosecutor questioned the 
defendant regarding his failure to contact the police after the 
shooting.  Specifically, the prosecutor asked: 
Q.:  "Did you call the police after you shot and killed 
David Luyando?" 
 
 
A.:  "No." 
Q.:  "Did you call the police after you got back from 
Crystal Park?" 
 
 
A.:  "I actually did call the police." 
 
Q.:  "Oh, you called the police –-" 
A.:  "And you can check it on record.  I did call the 
police.  I was going to tell them what happened, but I was 
too scared for myself, so I didn't tell them."   
 
 
The prosecutor raised the issue a second time, asking 
whether the defendant was dropped off at the police station 
after the shooting, whether he turned himself in and claimed 
self-defense and, again, whether he called the police.  In his 
closing argument, the prosecutor also alluded to the defendant's 
34 
 
prearrest silence, stating that the defendant is "not being 
dropped at the police station to claim self-defense."  
While the Commonwealth rightly concedes that the 
prosecutor's questions and closing argument were improper, see 
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764, 769 (2018) ("the 
defendant's prearrest silence typically is of limited probative 
value" because "there may be many reasons why a defendant does 
not wish to come forward and speak to the police that have no 
bearing on his guilt or innocence"), trial counsel's failure to 
object did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Other evidence indicated the defendant's 
consciousness of guilt, such as the disposal of his firearm and 
cellular telephone and his flight to the Dominican Republic.  
See Correia, 492 Mass. at 236 ("Where there is other, properly 
admitted evidence of consciousness of guilt, e.g., flight, . . . 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is unlikely").  
And, as detailed in note 21, supra, the evidence that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense was overwhelming.  See 
Gardner, supra at 773 (prosecutor's references to defendant's 
prearrest silence did not create substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice "because the defendant's testimony and 
self-defense claim were extensively and primarily undermined by 
other evidence at trial"). 
35 
 
D.  Badgering.  The defendant contends that trial counsel 
improperly failed to object to the prosecutor's aggressive 
cross-examination.  To be sure, some28 of the exchanges between 
the prosecutor and the defendant were testy, with the 
prosecutor's questioning crossing the line.  But, as the judge 
noted, the defendant held his own and was "no shrinking violet."  
And, because the judge interjected to control the exchanges, it 
was not manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to decide to 
forgo further objections.29 
 
28 The defendant alleges the following questions on cross-
examination were improper:  whether "the person you actually 
killed, was an unarmed twenty-two year-old non-gang member"; 
whether the victim "deserved to be killed" because the victim 
had "throw[n] up" gang signs in pictures;  whether the 
defendant's actions were the "actions of a hero"; whether "the 
only person who agrees with you is you" about seeing a gun in 
Parker's car; and whether "all these people [(Delossantos and 
Taylor)] knew who shot you, but you had no idea?"  Also, in 
response to the defendant repeatedly stating that he was 
"defending [him]self," the prosecutor remarked, "You keep saying 
that" and "That's a great phrase."  The prosecutor's sarcastic 
remarks –- about the victim deserving to be killed, the 
defendant acting as a hero, and the defendant's claim to self-
defense being a "great phrase" –- were improper.  See 
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 493 Mass. 403, 413 (2024) (prosecutor 
badgered defendant by stating, "You're a pretty good shot" in 
response to defendant's assertion he did not see victim while 
shooting); Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473 Mass. 173, 186 (2015) 
(sarcastic questions improper). 
 
29 For example, when the defendant repeatedly noted he was 
"defending [him]self" and the prosecutor responded, "That's a 
great phrase," the judge said, "I think we understand both 
party's positions.  Let's move on."  In response to the 
prosecutor's "actions of a hero" question, see note 28, supra, 
the judge said, "That's a little argumentative . . . .  Let's 
just move on."  And during a particularly contentious back-and-
36 
 
The judge indicated that the prosecutor's questions that no 
witness besides the defendant testified to seeing anyone in 
Parker's car with a gun "did at least come close to asking [the] 
[d]efendant to comment on the credibility of other witnesses."  
See Commonwealth v. Fahey, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 310 (2021), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986) 
("[i]t is a fundamental principle that a witness cannot be asked 
to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other 
witnesses" [quotation omitted]).  However, the prosecutor did 
not ask the defendant directly to comment upon the witnesses' 
credibility, highlighting "that there were inconsistencies 
between the defendant's testimony and that of other witnesses" 
(alteration and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. McDermott, 
493 Mass. 403, 415 (2024) (no error where defendant "was not 
asked whether [other witnesses] lied" but "to square his version 
of the facts" with their testimony).  Moreover, any error did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.30  See 
 
forth in which the prosecutor and the defendant were talking 
over each other, the judge directed both the prosecutor and the 
defendant to "please stop" and, turning to the prosecutor, the 
judge admonished, "I will ask you to ask another question that's 
not argumentative."  When the prosecutor followed with another 
argumentative question, the judge said, "I'm going to sustain my 
own objection to that question.  It's been asked and answered, 
and it's argumentative." 
 
30 See note 21, supra. 
37 
 
Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 435 (2020) ("Considering 
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, we conclude 
that these impermissible comments by the prosecutor did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"). 
E.  Defendant's gang affiliation.  The defendant alleges 
trial counsel erred by failing to object to cross-examination 
regarding the defendant's gang affiliation.31  "Evidence of gang 
affiliation may be admissible to show motive."  Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 604 (2018).  "We have, however, urged 
caution in admitting gang-related evidence because of the risk 
of suggesting that the defendant may have a propensity for 
criminality or violence."  Id.   
Here, any objection to questions regarding the defendant's 
gang affiliation would have been futile because gang rivalry, 
and the defendant's and Parker's role in it, was relevant to 
show motive.  See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 471 
(2019) ("Evidence of animosity between the gangs was admissible 
 
31 The prosecutor asked the defendant if he "brag[ged] on 
social media about being a gang member."  Regarding one of the 
defendant's social media photographs, in which the defendant and 
a group of men were holding up three fingers, the prosecutor 
asked whether the defendant and his associates were "throwing up 
threes . . . a Kilby Street gang member sign."  The prosecutor 
also asked whether the friend the defendant was with on the 
night he was shot, and the friend whose house the defendant was 
going to on the day of the cemetery shooting, were KSP members.  
At one point, the prosecutor pointed to certain individuals 
watching the trial and asked if they too were KSP members. 
38 
 
. . . to establish the defendant's motive for committing the 
crimes"); Lopes, 478 Mass. at 604 ("long-standing and ongoing 
dispute between" three gangs admissible to show defendant's 
motive and intent).  The Commonwealth theorized that the 
shooting was part of a larger, decades-long gang feud between 
the PSP and the KSP.  The prosecutor's questions highlighted 
that the defendant was with fellow KSP members during crucial 
events leading up to the cemetery shooting:  the defendant 
witnessed the shooting of Christian Obeng, a KSP member, in 
October 2014; the defendant was with Fabian Beltran, another KSP 
member, when shot by Parker; and the defendant had visited a 
third alleged KSP member on the day before the cemetery 
shooting.  Obeng's and Beltran's gang affiliation particularly 
was relevant to show that the defendant may have shot at Parker 
in retaliation for two past shootings involving himself and 
other KSP members.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 
672 (2017) (evidence admissible to support Commonwealth's theory 
that murder was motivated by "retaliation for the defendant's 
and [a fellow gang member's] injuries from . . . [an] 
altercation with a leader of [a rival gang]"). 
The prosecutor's conduct -- pointing to certain individuals 
who were watching the trial and asking, "Who is a member of 
Kilby Street Posse? . . .  Those guys right there?" -- was 
improper.  However, trial counsel objected to the question, and 
39 
 
the judge struck the defendant's response32 and directed the 
prosecutor "not to go there."  See Gonzalez, 473 Mass. at 427.  
Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 844-845 (2022) ("it is 
difficult to see what more trial counsel could have done" beyond 
successfully objecting to prosecutor's insinuation that member 
of gallery was intimidating witness). 
F.  Gang opinion evidence.  Roberge, an officer in the 
Worcester police department's gang unit, testified for the 
Commonwealth regarding the cemetery shooting; he was called to 
testify again by the defendant about Parker's nightclub shooting 
of the defendant.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited 
from the officer that, based on his training and experience as a 
gang unit member, gang members do not carry firearms all the 
time; instead, Roberge testified, they do so for specific 
purposes with an intent to use them.   
Roberge's testimony that gang members generally carry 
firearms only when they intend to use them was improper.  
Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 128 (2021) (expert gang 
testimony improper where "general comments regarding gangs in 
the Boston area went beyond what was probative of the 
 
32 The defendant said that he did not know the people at 
whom the prosecutor was pointing and then said, "No, that's my 
cousin and family members." 
40 
 
defendants' criminal liability" and suggested propensity to 
commit violence).  Trial counsel's failure to object, however, 
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice because the defendant's gang membership was undisputed, 
the judge gave a limiting instruction on the use of gang 
evidence,33 and the judge questioned potential jurors during voir 
dire to screen out those with biases against gang members.34  See 
id. at 128-129 (improper gang testimony not reversible error 
where defendant's gang membership not in dispute and "judge gave 
an effective limiting instruction"); Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 
Mass. 470, 478 (2012) (judge limited prejudicial effect of gang 
evidence by issuing limiting instruction and asking jurors 
during voir dire whether gang evidence would affect their 
impartiality).  Cf. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 467-468, 470, 472 
 
33 The judge gave a lengthy instruction during the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief regarding gang evidence.  Among 
other things, the judge instructed that "[the defendant] is not 
on trial for being a member of the Kilby Street gang" and that 
"[y]ou may consider the evidence of his membership in that gang 
as bearing upon his motive for the alleged murder of [the 
victim], but you may not consider it for the purpose of showing 
that [the defendant] is or was a bad person or has the 
propensity to commit criminal acts or the propensity to be 
violent."  The judge restated this instruction after closing 
argument. 
   
34 On the juror questionnaire, potential jurors were asked 
whether they could be fair and impartial when hearing evidence 
about possible gang affiliation.  The judge struck several 
potential jurors from service for their response to that 
question. 
41 
 
(expert gang testimony constituted reversible error where expert 
testified to defendant's gang affiliation without sufficient 
factual support and judge "placed virtually no limitation on the 
use of the evidence").  Moreover, the defendant himself 
testified that he did not carry firearms generally but did so 
only after the nightclub shooting.  This was consistent with 
Roberge's testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 
399, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008), S.C., 493 Mass. 1037 
(2024) (even if expert gang testimony "constituted . . . 
improper opinion evidence[,] . . . any error was harmless 
because . . . other witnesses testified from personal knowledge 
essentially to the same effect").   
G.  Appeal to jury's sympathy.  The victim's father 
testified that his son cared for the son's sick mother, that he 
was devastated when he received a telephone call about his son's 
shooting, and that it was a heart-wrenching decision to "pull 
the plug" on his son.  The emergency room physician testified at 
length to the gruesome details of the victim's injuries and to 
the attempted life-saving measures used on the victim.  The 
prosecutor compared the victim's fatal gunshot wound with the 
defendant's slighter wound to the arm during the nightclub 
42 
 
shooting,35 and referred to the victim as an "unarmed twenty-two 
year old non-gang member." 
"It is well settled that a prosecutor may not appeal to the 
jury's sympathy."  Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 797 
(2023).  In particular, a prosecutor may not "emphasize 
'personal characteristics [that] are not relevant to any 
material issue,' if such emphasis would 'risk[] undermining the 
rationality and thus the integrity of the jury's verdict.'"  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791 
(2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022).  However, a 
prosecutor may "tell the jury something of the person whose life 
had been lost in order to humanize the proceedings."  Doughty, 
supra at 798, quoting Fernandes, supra. 
Here, failure to object to the prosecutor's reference to 
the victim as an "unarmed twenty-two year old non-gang member" 
was not error because, as the judge noted, the prosecutor "did 
not excessively highlight" this fact.  See Commonwealth v. 
Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 471-472 (2022) (no error in prosecutor's 
statement that victim was an "unarmed, defenseless sixteen year 
 
35 Regarding the defendant's wound stemming from the 
nightclub shooting, the prosecutor asked the defendant on cross-
examination, "You knew you weren't struck in the head?"; "No 
bullet entered the left side of your skull and exited the right 
side of your skull, did it?"; and "You were determined a 
Priority 3 to the hospital . . . [b]ecause you were shot in the 
arm?" 
43 
 
old" because it was true in fact and referenced sparingly).  
However, excessive appeals to sympathy that did not pertain to 
any material issue at trial -- such as the victim taking care of 
his mother, the father's experience of the victim's death, and 
the physician's extensive lifesaving efforts –- were improper.  
See Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 211-212 (2022) 
(testimony of victim's son detailing victim's work ethic and 
relationship with son improper); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 
Mass. 491, 497 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (testimony of victim's sister 
discussing her "own experience concerning the victim's death" 
improper).  The physician's gruesome description of the victim's 
wounds and the prosecutor's comparisons between the victim's and 
the defendant's injuries were also improper because they did not 
serve the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant killed with 
deliberate premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 
Mass. 587, 608 (2015) (prosecutor's description of crime scene 
as "[a] blood pool, a puddle of blood . . . seeping out of [the 
victim's] body" improper).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 
Mass. 303, 317-318 (2024) ("description of the extent of the 
victim's injuries did not amount to error" because, unlike here, 
prosecutor proceeded on theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty). 
Nonetheless, trial counsel's failure to object to these 
improprieties did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
44 
 
miscarriage of justice because, inter alia, they did not 
unfairly discredit the defendant's theory of self-defense.  See 
Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 213 (no substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice where "the improper statements did not go 
to the heart of the defense strategy and were irrelevant to any 
disputed issue of fact").  In addition, the judge instructed the 
jury that they may not decide the case based "on sympathy for 
any party, or witness, or anyone else."  See Camacho, 472 Mass. 
at 609 (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice 
where judge instructed jury "not to be swayed by . . . sympathy" 
and "jury have the ability to discount hyperbole and other 
improper statements" [citation omitted]).  The strong evidence 
of the defendant's guilt, as discussed in note 21, supra, 
further renders the "improper appeals to sympathy . . . less 
crucial."  Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 791, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 761 (1998).  See Doughty, 491 Mass. at 
799.   
H.  Delayed disclosures.  While the defendant claims that 
trial counsel erred by not objecting to the prosecutor's delayed 
disclosures,36 as discussed supra, the disclosures did not likely 
influence the jury's verdict.   
 
36 As discussed supra, trial counsel objected to the 
admission of the social media posts. 
45 
 
I.  Cumulative error.  The defendant contends that, even if 
no single error created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, they do in sum.  We disagree.  As 
discussed supra, the evidence of the defendant's deliberate 
premeditation was strong.   
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  For the same reason, 
we discern no basis for providing relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce the defendant's verdict. 
4.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree is affirmed.  The order denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial is also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.