Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cramer

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cramer, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4195.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4195 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CRAMER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cramer, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-4195.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2019-1739—Submitted April 8, 2020—Decided August 27, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2018-038. 
 
 
______________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Marilyn Abrienne Cramer, of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0032947, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1977. 
{¶ 2} In a July 3, 2018 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged 
that Cramer’s conduct with respect to the ancillary administration of her mother’s 
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probate estate in Franklin County violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Cramer (1) knowingly or recklessly made 
false statements concerning the integrity of judicial officers, (2) knowingly made 
false statements of fact or law to a tribunal, (3) engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, (4) filed frivolous pleadings, (5) 
engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and (6) 
engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 3} Following a two-day hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional 
Conduct issued a report finding that Cramer committed all the charged 
misconduct and recommending that she be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law, with certain conditions on her reinstatement to the profession.  
The board adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation 
of the hearing panel.  Cramer has filed 28 objections to the board’s findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction and asks this court to dismiss 
relator’s complaint.  Based on our review of the record, we overrule each of 
Cramer’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and 
recommended sanction. 
Background 
{¶ 4} A brief summary of the underlying probate litigation in this case is 
necessary to understand the nature of Cramer’s misconduct. 
{¶ 5} Cramer’s mother, Selena Cramer, died in Alabama on September 28, 
2007, and was survived by four heirs—Cramer and her siblings, Callie Lipka, 
Myron Cramer (“Myron”), and Carrie Chaplin.  In November 2014, Lipka opened 
an estate in Limestone County, Alabama, but did not identify Cramer as one of 
Selena’s surviving children.  Lipka also retained an attorney to file an application 
for ancillary administration in Franklin County, Ohio, hired a realtor to dispose of 
a house that Selena owned in Columbus at the time of her death, and placed the 
house on the market.  Three days before the hearing on that application, Cramer 
January Term, 2020 
 
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filed in Franklin County a competing application for authority to administer 
Selena’s entire estate, along with a sworn declaration making numerous 
disparaging comments about Lipka and Myron.  Thereafter, Lipka’s counsel 
withdrew his application, citing the family’s disagreement regarding how to 
proceed. 
{¶ 6} On September 29, 2014, the probate-court magistrate ordered 
Cramer to file an amended application to be appointed as the ancillary 
administrator and stated that upon filing of the appropriate documents and bond, 
Cramer would receive the appointment.  The magistrate advised the parties that 
the ancillary administrator would have to work for the common benefit of all 
beneficiaries and that the failure to do so would result in the ancillary 
administrator’s removal and the appointment of an independent administrator.  
The magistrate stated that she would not entertain any arguments regarding the 
validity of the Alabama administration because there was no allegation that 
Selena was a resident of Franklin County at the time of her death.  Following that 
hearing, Cramer fired Lipka’s realtor and took the house off of the market.  On 
November 28, 2014, Cramer filed the necessary documents and bond and was 
appointed as the ancillary administrator to dispose of the Franklin County real 
estate. 
{¶ 7} Myron and Lipka retained another attorney to represent them in the 
Franklin County proceedings.  In April 2015, they moved for removal of Cramer 
as the ancillary administrator on the grounds that she had failed to fulfill her 
duties, in part by failing to relist the real property for sale.  At a June 2015 
hearing, the heirs—including Cramer—agreed to sell the property, pay the 
expenses of administration, and surrender the remaining proceeds to the Alabama 
estate. 
{¶ 8} On July 17, 2015, the magistrate issued a decision recommending 
that Cramer be removed as the ancillary administrator based on findings that she 
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had failed to list the property for sale and that the resulting delay in the 
administration of the estate and personal issues among the heirs required her 
removal.  See R.C. 2109.24.  On December 23, 2015, the court adopted the 
magistrate’s decision over Cramer’s objections. 
{¶ 9} In January 2016, the probate court appointed attorney Thomas 
Taneff to serve as the successor ancillary administrator.  Taneff filed a civil 
complaint to sell the real estate in a separate but related proceeding.  Cramer 
opposed Taneff’s actions at every turn and unsuccessfully attempted to remove 
him from his role as fiduciary of the estate. 
{¶ 10} At some point during Taneff’s administration, the property was 
vandalized, and Taneff received an insurance settlement of $43,500 on behalf of 
the estate.  The property was eventually appraised at $30,000, and in July 2017, 
the court approved the sale of the property for $39,000 over Cramer’s repeated 
objections. 
{¶ 11} In a December 19, 2017 judgment entry, the probate court found 
that Cramer willfully violated Civ.R. 11 by drafting and signing numerous 
documents and pleadings that lacked grounds to support the allegations made.  
The court also found that Cramer willfully violated R.C. 2323.51 by conducting 
herself in a manner intended to harass and intimidate Taneff, who was a party to 
the action, and engaging in conduct that was not warranted under existing law and 
could not be supported by good-faith arguments.  The court further determined 
that Cramer’s conduct was improper, had caused unnecessary delay, and had 
needlessly increased the costs of litigation.  On March 22, 2018, the court ordered 
Cramer to pay Taneff $22,256.65, representing the attorney fees and costs he had 
incurred as the result of her conduct. 
{¶ 12} With this backdrop, we proceed to the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 13} Relator charged Cramer with seven rule violations arising from her 
conduct in the ancillary administration of her mother’s estate.  For ease of 
discussion, the board divided those charges into three separate counts. 
Count One: False Statements Concerning the Integrity of a Judicial Officer 
{¶ 14} Relator first alleged that Cramer violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly or recklessly making false statements 
concerning the integrity of a judicial officer) by making numerous disparaging 
statements about the integrity of the probate court, repeatedly alleging that the 
court had engaged in improper ex parte communications and had appointed 
Taneff for political reasons. 
{¶ 15} Because lawyers “ ‘possess, and are perceived by the public as 
possessing, special knowledge of the workings of the judicial branch of 
government,’ ” we have recognized that “[their] statements made during court 
proceedings are ‘likely to be received as especially authoritative.’ ”  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 22, 
quoting State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 
(Okla.1988), and Gentile v. Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074, 111 S.Ct. 
2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991).  In Gardner, we adopted an objective standard to 
determine whether a lawyer’s statements about a judicial officer were made with 
knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity:  We look to the nature of the 
statements and the context in which they were made and consider what a 
reasonable attorney, in light of all his professional functions, would do in the 
same or similar circumstances.  Id. at ¶ 26.  Applying that standard, we held that 
“an attorney may be sanctioned for making accusations of judicial impropriety 
that a reasonable attorney would believe are false.”  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 16} In Cramer’s objections to the magistrate’s 2015 decision 
recommending that she be removed as the ancillary administrator, Cramer 
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referred to the removal hearing as a “pseudo-hearing” and a “charade”—largely 
because the magistrate had refused to consider arguments related to the Alabama 
probate proceedings.  Cramer also alleged that the magistrate had deprived her of 
her rights to fundamental fairness and an unbiased hearing, followed the law 
“only reluctantly,” engaged in “fundamentally unfair procedures” by distorting 
the truth and concealing evidence to arrive at “predetermined conclusions,” and 
removed her as the fiduciary to avoid work. 
{¶ 17} In addition, Cramer accused the magistrate of engaging in improper 
ex parte communications with the attorneys representing Lipka and Myron.  In 
support, she stated that she had observed the magistrate speak to one of those 
attorneys before a hearing and she cited the alleged statement of a court 
employee, but neither allegation identified the substance of the alleged 
conversations.  In its decision overruling Cramer’s objections and removing her as 
the fiduciary, however, the court addressed Cramer’s attacks on the magistrate 
and found the magistrate’s conduct to be proper. 
{¶ 18} In Cramer’s answer to Taneff’s complaint in the real-estate 
proceeding, she claimed that Taneff’s appointment as the successor ancillary 
administrator was illegal and appeared to have been “politically motivated.”  
Cramer claimed that she had arranged for the court’s appraiser to enter and 
inspect the real property after Taneff had failed to do so.  She also continued to 
attack Lipka and Myron and argued that they had acted unlawfully in the 
Alabama proceedings. 
{¶ 19} In her response to Taneff’s motion to strike her answer to the 
complaint, Cramer alleged that the clerk’s office had engaged in “particularly 
suspicious and troubling” handling of her answer and had failed to timely file it 
despite its timely submission.  The magistrate subsequently issued an order 
deeming Cramer’s answer to be timely filed but explaining why Cramer’s 
allegations of misconduct by the clerk were “unfounded and spurious.” 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
{¶ 20} In November 2016, Cramer arrived late for a scheduled hearing.  
During the hearing, Cramer continued to allege that the court had engaged in 
improper ex parte communications with Taneff and other attorneys involved in 
the case.  On cross-examination, Taneff explained that he had contacted the court 
for the purposes of scheduling hearings and locating documents.  Taneff expressly 
denied that the contacts with the court were substantive in nature.  Cramer 
declined the court’s invitation to present evidence to support her allegations that 
the court had engaged in ex parte communications with other attorneys. 
{¶ 21} After the magistrate issued a decision confirming the sale of the 
real property in November 2016, Cramer filed objections and numerous motions.  
In these filings, she continued to make disparaging comments about the court and 
Taneff.  Among other things, she alleged that Taneff’s prior service as the finance 
chair of the judge’s political campaign, combined with his monetary contributions 
to various other (unidentified) political campaigns, “create insurmountable ethical 
issues, rendering it inadvisable for the Court to entertain his motions attacking the 
heirs.”1  In early 2017, the chief justice assigned a visiting judge to preside over 
the probate proceedings. 
{¶ 22} In her answer to the disciplinary charges brought against her, 
Cramer continued to impugn the integrity of the magistrate and the court and 
commenced an attack on disciplinary counsel.  She renewed her allegations that 
the magistrate and opposing counsel had engaged in impermissible ex parte 
communications and had “schemed” to remove her as the fiduciary of the 
ancillary estate, and she repeatedly alleged that the magistrate and the judge were 
                                                          
 
1. We note that although Jud.Cond.R. 2.13(A) requires a judge to exercise the power of 
appointment impartially and on the basis of merit and to avoid nepotism, favoritism, and 
unnecessary appointments, it does not expressly prohibit the appointment of persons affiliated 
with a judge’s campaign.  Moreover, Loc.R. 8.1 of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin 
County, Probate Division, provides that “[p]ersons appointed by the court to serve as * * * 
fiduciaries * * * shall be selected from lists maintained by the court” and requires the court to 
review those lists periodically to ensure the equitable distribution of those appointments. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
corrupt.  She also claimed that assistant disciplinary counsel had “deliberately 
prepared a dishonest complaint or [was] incompetent to perform his job” and had 
engaged in misconduct for the purpose of covering up the probate court’s actions 
by “setting up and framing [Cramer].”  Moreover, she denied that any of her 
statements were improper, because the magistrate and the probate judge “ha[d] 
shown, repeatedly, that they have no integrity,” and she asserted that the “insults 
and threats in [the court’s] order [are] far more intemperate and offensive than 
anything she wrote in protest of th[e] corruption.” 
{¶ 23} Although Cramer was given multiple opportunities during her 
disciplinary hearing to submit evidence or otherwise explain the basis for her 
accusations, she adamantly maintained her position that she was the victim of a 
corrupt court.  Her primary defense was that but for collusion on the part of the 
court, she could not have been removed as the ancillary administrator and the 
court could not have made its subsequent orders.  Cramer showed no remorse for 
her misconduct.  The board found that relator had established by clear and 
convincing evidence that Cramer violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a). 
{¶ 24} Cramer raises seven objections regarding the board’s findings with 
respect to this count.  She claims that several of the board’s factual findings are 
false, and she argues that the board’s determination that she violated Prof.Cond.R. 
8.2(a) is not supported by the evidence. 
{¶ 25} After independently reviewing the record and verifying that the 
record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the board’s factual 
findings summarized above, we find that Cramer repeatedly made numerous 
accusations of judicial impropriety that a reasonable attorney would believe are 
false.  For example, we have held that it is not reasonable for an attorney to allege 
that a judge has engaged in ex parte communications based solely on the 
attorney’s observation of a judge entering his or her chambers with counsel for 
one party, coupled with the attorney’s speculation about the content of the 
January Term, 2020 
 
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communication.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010-
Ohio-6241, 940 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 53. 
{¶ 26} We therefore overrule Cramer’s first, fourth, fifth, 13th, 18th, 19th, 
and 20th objections to the board’s findings of fact, and we find that Cramer 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a). 
Count Two: Dishonest Conduct and Making False Statements to a Tribunal 
{¶ 27} Next, the board considered relator’s allegations that Cramer (1) 
misrepresented her authority as the ancillary administrator before her 
appointment, (2) gave false testimony regarding her forcible entry onto the real 
property after her authority was revoked, and (3) gave false testimony about the 
existence of a buyer who was purportedly willing to purchase the real property for 
$101,000. 
{¶ 28} Regarding the first allegation, in a September 29, 2014 order, the 
magistrate specifically cautioned that she would not appoint Cramer as the 
ancillary administrator unless and until she filed the appropriate documents and 
bond.  Cramer filed the required documents and bond and was appointed as the 
ancillary administrator on November 28, 2014.  But in October 2014, Cramer 
contacted the realtor Lipka had hired to sell the Ohio real property.  Cramer told 
the realtor that she had been appointed the ancillary administrator and that she had 
removed the realtor’s sign from the yard.  She demanded that the realtor 
immediately withdraw the property from the market and provide copies of the 
realtor’s correspondence with Lipka and Myron, and she threatened the realtor 
with legal process if she did not respond to Cramer’s demand. 
{¶ 29} With respect to relator’s second allegation, at the probate court’s 
October 27, 2017 hearing on a motion for sanctions against Cramer, Cramer 
testified that after Taneff was appointed as the ancillary administrator, off-duty 
police officer Patrick Lavender helped her forcibly enter the real property with a 
crowbar.  In an affidavit submitted to the probate court—and again in his 
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testimony before the disciplinary panel—however, Lavender adamantly denied 
that he assisted Cramer in the forcible entry of the property.  He explained that 
although he had helped Cramer secure the property while she was serving as the 
ancillary administrator, he knew that something was wrong when he noticed 
different locks on the door after the court had revoked Cramer’s authority.  He 
therefore refused to help her forcibly enter the property.  At her disciplinary 
hearing, Cramer reaffirmed that Lavender had aided her forcible entry of the 
property and further alleged that Taneff had pressured Lavender into giving false 
testimony. 
{¶ 30} Finally, throughout the probate proceedings, Cramer repeatedly 
represented to the court that she had two buyers who were willing to purchase the 
Ohio property for $101,000.  In its December 19, 2017 judgment entry finding 
that Cramer willfully violated Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, the probate court made 
the following finding: 
 
Marilyn Cramer never submitted the mystery $101,000.00+ offer 
to Mr. Taneff, and during the October 27, 2017 hearing, Marilyn 
Cramer testified that she did not send the mystery offer to Mr. 
Taneff’s office.  For Marilyn Cramer to claim Mr. Taneff is 
negligent for not acting on an offer to purchase real estate which 
she repeatedly failed to submit is duplicitous. 
 
{¶ 31} At her disciplinary hearing, Cramer called at least two witnesses in 
an effort to establish that the prospective buyers were willing to pay far more than 
Taneff obtained for the real property, but the board found that their testimony did 
not support that proffer. 
{¶ 32} On these facts, the board found that Cramer violated Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
or law to a tribunal) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
{¶ 33} The board also noted that Cramer had submitted an affidavit from 
one of the alleged prospective buyers in the underlying probate proceeding but 
found that his testimony at the disciplinary hearing demonstrated that he had no 
personal knowledge of the facts contained in that affidavit.  Having weighed the 
credibility of that witness and of Cramer, the panel determined that Cramer had 
drafted the affidavit and submitted it to the probate court and the panel, knowing 
that it was false. 
{¶ 34} Cramer raises six objections to the board’s factual findings with 
respect to this count.  As three of those objections, she claims that she did not 
misrepresent her authority before becoming the ancillary administrator, that she 
did not falsely claim to have a buyer willing to pay between double and triple the 
price that Taneff obtained for the property, and that she did not draft a false 
affidavit. 
{¶ 35} Our review of the record shows that the challenged findings of the 
board in this regard are amply supported by the evidence.  The parties submitted 
as a joint exhibit a copy of an October 22, 2014 letter to the realtor in which 
Cramer represented that she had been appointed the administrator of all the 
estate’s assets in Franklin County—five weeks before she was actually appointed 
to that role.  It is true that Cramer presented testimony regarding two people who 
had, at various times, expressed interest in purchasing the property for 
approximately $100,000, but the record shows that neither of the potential buyers 
ever made a written offer to purchase the property.  And although one of the 
potential buyers testified that he needed to assess the condition of the house in 
person before making an offer, he admitted that he never contacted Taneff or the 
realtor to inquire about viewing the property.  Instead, he relied on Cramer’s 
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representations that Taneff would not respond to her requests about gaining 
access to the property. 
{¶ 36} As her three remaining objections to the board’s findings regarding 
Count Two, Cramer asserts that Lavender gave false testimony regarding his 
participation in the forcible entry of the property and that in any event, as an heir 
with an equitable interest in the real property, Cramer’s forcible entry could not 
constitute a trespass—though she offers no legal authority to support that position.  
Because the hearing panel has the opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, 
we typically defer to its credibility determinations unless the record weighs 
heavily against those findings.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 
14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 
93 Ohio St.3d 191, 198, 754 N.E.2d 235 (2001).  Here, the record supports the 
panel’s determination that Lavender’s testimony was more credible than 
Cramer’s. 
{¶ 37} For these reasons, we overrule Cramer’s third, seventh, eighth, and 
ninth objections to the board’s factual findings and her second objection to the 
board’s conclusions of law, and we adopt the board’s findings that Cramer 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c). 
Count Three: Conduct that is Unsupported by the Law, that is Prejudicial to the 
Administration of Justice, and that Adversely Reflects on the Attorney’s Fitness to 
Practice Law 
{¶ 38} The last three allegations of misconduct against Cramer are that she 
engaged in frivolous conduct that prejudiced the administration of justice and 
adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law by acting outside the scope of her 
authority, obstructing the successor ancillary administrator’s ability to sell the real 
property, and threatening parties and witnesses in the ancillary probate 
proceedings. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 39} In support of these allegations, the board noted that in the 32-page 
judgment entry issued on December 19, 2017, the probate court found that 
Cramer willfully violated Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 and later ordered her to pay 
Taneff $22,256.65 in fees and costs that it found to be directly attributable to her 
frivolous conduct.  The court found that Cramer had filed numerous pleadings and 
other documents containing “scandalous, insulting, and groundless allegations” 
against the court and had filed actions raising issues that either were not before 
the court or had already been decided—all for the purpose of delay.  In addition, 
the court found that Cramer had conducted herself in a manner meant to harass 
and intimidate Taneff with supposition and innuendo that had no evidentiary 
support.  Moreover, the court noted that “Cramer failed to grasp the reality that 
when she was removed as the ancillary administrator, she lost the ability to dictate 
the terms of sale of the real estate” and that “[her] bad conduct and frivolous 
filings turned what should have been a simple land sale into a circus devoid of 
any respect to the court and its officers.”  On appeal, the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals affirmed the probate court’s judgment, overruling 11 of Cramer’s 
assignments of error and dismissing a 12th.  Taneff v. Lipka, 2019-Ohio-887, 124 
N.E.3d 859 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 40} Based on the probate court’s findings, the board found that Cramer 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from bringing or defending a 
proceeding, or asserting or contradicting an issue in a proceeding, unless there is a 
nonfrivolous basis in law and fact for doing so), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The board found that Cramer violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by engaging in conduct not specifically prohibited by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that adversely reflected on her fitness to practice 
law and that her conduct in violation of other professional-conduct rules was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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sufficiently egregious to warrant an additional finding that she violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 
2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 41} Cramer objects to the board’s findings of misconduct with respect 
to this count, arguing that the board was required to review the evidence de novo 
and that it failed to do so because it adopted the probate and appellate courts’ 
findings that she violated Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51.  A disciplinary hearing is 
not a substitute for an appeal, but regardless, we do not find that the board’s 
adoption of the probate court’s factual findings demonstrates that the board 
conducted anything but a de novo review.  Having reviewed the record, including 
Cramer’s numerous filings in the probate proceedings, we find that relator has 
established by clear and convincing evidence that Cramer violated Prof.Cond.R. 
3.1, 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  We therefore overrule Cramer’s second objection to the 
board’s findings of fact and her first objection to the board’s conclusions of law. 
Sanction 
{¶ 42} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 43} The board found that just one mitigating factor is present—Cramer 
has no prior disciplinary record.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1).  As for aggravating 
factors, the board found that Cramer had (1) acted with a dishonest and selfish 
motive, (2) committed multiple offenses, (3) showed a lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, (4) submitted false evidence or false statements or engaged 
in deceptive practices during the disciplinary process by submitting a false 
affidavit, and (5) refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (4) through (7). 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
{¶ 44} The board offered a nine-page explanation detailing Cramer’s 
extensive and repeated failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process.  Cramer 
failed to provide answers to relator’s discovery request and made a false 
allegation that relator had not provided discovery, necessitating a formal pretrial 
hearing to discuss discovery issues.  Because Cramer refused to divulge the name 
of one of the prospective buyers that she had purportedly identified for the real 
property, the panel chair had to order her to provide the name. 
{¶ 45} Cramer initially denied that relator had furnished her with a copy of 
a transcript, and upon being informed that the document had been provided in 
PDF format on a flash drive with other discovery materials, she eventually 
acknowledged that she had received it but stated that she did not want to open an 
“executable” file.  Cramer later requested that the board issue all its orders by 
telephone or text message.  The panel chair denied the request and instructed 
Cramer to check her e-mail account on a timely and regular basis. 
{¶ 46} After relator objected to Cramer’s proposed submission of 
numerous grievances that she had filed against judicial officers and attorneys, on 
the ground that those grievances are required to remain confidential prior to a 
determination of probable cause, see Gov.Bar R. V(8)(A)(1)(a), Cramer stated her 
intention to call relator’s counsel as witnesses.  In a 13-page response to relator’s 
motion in limine, Cramer once again made spurious allegations—this time against 
Taneff and relator—and demanded that the complaint against her be dismissed. 
{¶ 47} Cramer’s failure to cooperate culminated in her conduct during the 
disciplinary hearing.  She arrived more than an hour late on both days of the 
hearing—even after the panel chair had agreed to start the hearings at 10:00 a.m. 
and 9:00 a.m., respectively, to accommodate Cramer’s purported sleep disorder.  
On the first day, Cramer explained that it had taken her all night to drive from 
Cleveland to Columbus and stated that it was the first time that she had made the 
trip without stopping for the night.  On the second day, Cramer called the board at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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9:02 a.m. to state that she would be late because she had slept through her alarms.  
Although her hotel was only three blocks away, she did not arrive at the hearing 
until 10:35 a.m.  The panel chair viewed Cramer’s tardiness as part of her ongoing 
pattern of failing to comply with the panel’s orders and directives. 
{¶ 48} The board described Cramer’s participation at the hearing as 
rambling and argumentative, and it noted that she was unable to answer questions 
without turning the focus to how she had allegedly been victimized by the probate 
court and the disciplinary process.  The panel chair repeatedly had to admonish 
her to answer the question that was being asked.  And although Cramer repeatedly 
referred to the “ever-changing” allegations against her, she acknowledged that 
relator had never filed an amended complaint. 
{¶ 49} Cramer was fundamentally unprepared to present her own case; she 
introduced no exhibits and wanted to call a witness using her cellular phone.  
Although Cramer claimed to have “exercised due diligence,” she acknowledged 
that many things were not prepared the way she wanted them prepared.  She 
stated that she could not do more physically given the unpredictable nature of her 
disability and the fact that she had worked through the night on five of the prior 
eight days.  Cramer also indicated that she had retired from the Department of 
Justice due to her deteriorating health.  But when asked whether her physical 
issues had impacted her ability to practice law, Cramer stated that she had been 
unaware that her mental and physical health would be considered at the hearing.  
After relator’s counsel stated that he intended to file a motion for an examination 
pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(15)(C)(1)(b), Cramer stated that she had no objection 
and would cooperate with the exam. 
{¶ 50} Following the hearing, the panel chair issued an order directing 
Cramer to file an amended exhibit list and exhibits on or before June 7, 2019, and 
instructed her to include any reports and documents from a qualified healthcare 
professional she wished to have the panel consider in mitigation.  Cramer filed her 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
initial exhibit list three days late, supplemented it more than two weeks later, and 
finally tendered hard copies of all her exhibits more than one month late—but she 
never submitted any medical records.  The panel chair excluded 26 of her 110 
exhibits on the ground that they were neither offered nor referred to at the hearing 
and excluded one exhibit because it has been previously admitted.  And although 
the panel chair ordered the parties to file posthearing briefs on or before June 28, 
2019, Cramer never complied with that order. 
{¶ 51} Cramer raises ten objections to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors found by the board.  But as summarized above, the record supports the 
board’s findings.  We therefore overrule objections 10 through 12, 14 through 17, 
and 21 through 23. 
Relevant Precedent 
{¶ 52} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for 
Cramer’s misconduct, the board noted that the sanctions we have imposed on 
lawyers who had made false statements concerning the qualifications or integrity 
of a judicial officer range from a six-month suspension to a two-year suspension 
with the second year stayed on conditions.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Proctor, 131 Ohio St.3d 215, 2012-Ohio-684, 963 N.E.2d 806 (imposing a six-
month suspension on an attorney who had engaged in undignified or discourteous 
conduct that was degrading to a tribunal and had recklessly made false statements 
concerning the integrity of a judicial officer in a motion for relief from judgment 
and an appellate brief); Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 142 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2014-Ohio-4815, 27 N.E.3d 481 (imposing a two-year suspension, with the 
second year conditionally stayed, on an attorney who had knowingly or recklessly 
made in an appellate brief false allegations that a judge’s rulings against her were 
influenced by racial and gender bias and had engaged in dishonest conduct that 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice by distributing settlement funds in 
contravention of a court order).  However, the panel found this case to be most 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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similar to two cases in which we imposed indefinite suspensions on attorneys 
who—like Cramer—repeatedly leveled false or unfounded allegations against 
judges and opposing counsel and refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
their misconduct. 
{¶ 53} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-
2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, an attorney falsely accused several common-pleas-court 
judges of bias in the execution of their duties, with “nothing beyond conjecture, 
rumor, and innuendo” to support her charges, id. at ¶ 9.  She also repeatedly 
leveled against a federal judge unfounded accusations of racial bias and other 
impropriety and filed a baseless defamation suit against two attorneys who were 
her opposing counsel in a sexual-harassment case.  As aggravating factors, we 
found that Frost had engaged in dishonesty, a pattern of misconduct, and multiple 
offenses, that she had failed to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct, and 
that her attacks on judges and other public officials had eroded public confidence 
in the judiciary.  Id. at ¶ 37.  Just one mitigating factor was present—the absence 
of a prior disciplinary record.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 54} Similarly, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 
2010-Ohio-6241, 940 N.E.2d 952, an attorney recklessly filed affidavits of 
disqualification and other court documents containing unfounded accusations 
against two judges regarding the performance of their official duties.  He also 
falsely notarized a document that he had signed on behalf of his wife, submitted 
that document to a court, and caused two subpoenas to be issued in an inactive 
case to further his own personal agenda. 
{¶ 55} As aggravating factors, we found that Pullins had acted with a 
dishonest and selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed 
multiple offenses, given false and dishonest explanations of his actions, refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, and caused harm to innocent 
third parties and the reputations of the judges whose integrity he had impugned.  
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
We also attributed aggravating effect to psychological issues that remained 
unaddressed due to Pullins’s premature termination of his contract with the Ohio 
Lawyers’ Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  Id. at ¶ 82-83.  The only mitigating 
factors were the absence of a prior disciplinary record and Pullins’s full and free 
disclosure to the board and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings.  Id. at ¶ 74. 
{¶ 56} In indefinitely suspending Frost and Pullins for their repeated 
unfounded attacks on the judicial system and other dishonest conduct, we noted 
that their misconduct may have been related to unaddressed mental-health 
disorders.  Consequently, we conditioned their reinstatement to the profession on 
the submission of proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that they were 
fit to return to the competent, professional, and ethical practice of law.  Frost, 122 
Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, at ¶ 43; Pullins at ¶ 88. 
{¶ 57} Like Frost and Pullins, Cramer repeatedly and falsely accused a 
judge and a magistrate of bias and corruption, refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of her conduct, and caused considerable harm—not only to the 
public officials whom she had attacked but also to the judiciary as a whole.  The 
board also found that Cramer’s conduct throughout the disciplinary proceedings 
demonstrated a pattern of disrespect for the disciplinary process and raised serious 
questions regarding her fitness to provide competent and professional legal 
representation to her clients going forward.  Furthermore, the board expressed 
concern that Cramer’s misconduct may be related to unaddressed mental- or 
physical-health conditions.  Therefore, the board recommends that as conditions 
of her reinstatement, she be required to (1) submit to an OLAP evaluation and 
comply with any treatment recommendations arising from that evaluation, (2) 
submit an opinion from a qualified healthcare professional that she is able to 
resume the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, and (3) provide 
proof that she has paid the fees and costs assessed on her by the probate court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
{¶ 58} As her final three objections, Cramer contends that she should not 
be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law simply for filing a grievance 
against a judge, for filing a motion to consolidate hearings and a motion to 
remove a politically appointed and negligent ancillary administrator, or for 
zealously representing a client within the parameters of the law.  Renewing her 
claim that the charges against her were “ever-changing,” she urges this court to 
completely exonerate her, dismiss relator’s complaint, and grant her other forms 
of relief not available in disciplinary proceedings. 
{¶ 59} Cramer’s objections to the recommended sanction grossly 
mischaracterize her conduct in the probate proceedings in an attempt to recast her 
actions as an appropriate and reasoned response to the alleged but unsubstantiated 
misconduct of others.  But we have already overruled more than 20 objections 
directed at the board’s findings and determined—based on clear and convincing 
evidence—that she committed the rule violations alleged in relator’s complaint. 
{¶ 60} Cramer’s misconduct, the presence of numerous aggravating 
factors—including the submission of false evidence and statements during this 
disciplinary proceeding—and the single mitigating factor that Cramer has never 
before been disciplined by this court, are strikingly similar to the circumstances in 
Frost and Pullins.  We therefore overrule Cramer’s last three objections and 
conclude that the appropriate sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension.  
Cramer’s pattern of levying baseless attacks against virtually every person 
involved in the underlying probate case has now expanded to include allegations 
that the panel members and the board have distorted the record, withheld critical 
facts and evidence, and misled this court.  And in her hearing testimony, she 
steadfastly maintained that she herself had done nothing wrong and she described 
her own conduct as “brave and exemplary.” 
{¶ 61} Cramer’s profound inability to recognize the wrongfulness of her 
own actions, combined with her tardiness and evident lack of preparation for her 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
own disciplinary hearing, support the board’s finding that her misconduct may be 
the byproduct of unaddressed physical- or mental-health issues.  We therefore 
agree that her reinstatement to the practice of law must be conditioned on the 
submission of proof that she has completed an OLAP assessment, complied with 
any resulting treatment recommendations, and obtained the opinion of a qualified 
healthcare professional that she is capable of resuming the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 62} Accordingly, Marilyn Abrienne Cramer is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  In addition to the conditions for reinstatement 
set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(25), Cramer shall be required to submit proof (1) that 
she has submitted to an evaluation by OLAP and complied with any 
recommendations resulting from that evaluation, (2) that she has obtained an 
opinion from a qualified healthcare professional that she is able to resume the 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, and (3) that she has paid the 
fees and costs assessed against her in the March 22, 2018 judgment entry of the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, in case No. 567794A.  
Costs are taxed to Cramer. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Marilyn A. Cramer, pro se. 
_________________