Title: Attorney Grievance v. Lanocha

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 16
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
N. FRANK LANOCHA
Bell, C.J.
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
                      Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially  
                                                  Assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by  Bell, C.J.  
Wilner, Cathell, and Battaglia, JJ., Dissent
__________________________________________
Filed: April 14, 2006
1 By Rules Order dated February 8, 2005, Rule 1.8 (c) was revised, effective July 1,
2005. It now reads:
“A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary
gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person
related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift
is related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a
spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with
whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.” 
Because the respondent’s misconduct occurred prior to the promulgation of the current 1.8
(c), the former 1.8 (c) applies to this case.
With respect to the present Rule, the Comment confirms that independent counsel
still is contemplated:
"Gifts to Lawyers
“[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction
meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such
as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is
permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift,
paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it,
although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine
of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively
fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and
imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift
be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the
lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).
“[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal
instrument such as a will or conveyance, the client should have the
detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception
to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee."
Rule 1.8 (c)1, Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812, addresses the situation in which
a lawyer drafts,  for a non-related client, a will that grants a substantial gift to the lawyer or
a covered relative and the conflict caused thereby.   It provides:
“(c)   A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person
related to the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling,
or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift,
2
except where:
“(1) the client is related to the donee; or
“(2) the client is represented by independent counsel in connection with the 
gift.”
This Rule was before this Court, involved in two disciplinary proceedings, during the
2003 Term: Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372 (2003) and
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 821 A. 2d 414 (2003).    Interpreting the
Rule, we defined and established its scope and application.   We concluded:
“The Rule is mandatory and contains no provision for waiver of the provision
to consult with independent counsel. ...  The Rule is qualified in only three
ways: (1) if the gift is not ‘substantial,’ (2) if the client is related to the
attorney, or (3) if the client has consulted with independent counsel.  Unlike
the provision under the Ethical Considerations of our prior rule, this provision
and prohibition is express and mandatory.”
Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375-76.    Characterizing the violation of the Rule as “a
most serious one,” id. at 538, 819 A.2d at 376, we commented on the reasons for the Rule
and the concerns at which it was directed:
“There are many potential dangers inherent in an attorney drafting a will in
which he or she is the beneficiary. Conflict of interest, the attorney's
incompetency to testify because of a transaction with the deceased, the
attorney's ability to influence the testator, the possible jeopardy to probate of
the entire will if its admission is contested, the possible harm to other
beneficiaries and the undermining of the public trust and confidence in the
legal profession are some of the dangers.”
Id. at 538, 819 A.2d at 376, citing  In re Polevoy, 980 P.2d 985, 987 (Colo.1999);  Philip
White, Jr., Annotation, Attorneys At Law:  Disciplinary Proceedings for Drafting Instrument
Such as Will or Trust Under Which Attorney-Drafter or Member of Attorney's Family or Law
2No issue has been made as to the bequest to the respondent's wife; thus we do not
address whether a bequest of $ 1000 is, or is not, “substantial.”
3Md. Rule 16-751 (a) provides:
“(a) Commencement of Disciplinary or Remedial Action.
“(1) Upon approval of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the
Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action in the Court of Appeals.
“(2)Conviction of Crime; Reciprocal Action. If authorized by Rule 16-
771(b) or 16-773(b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals without prior approval of the
Commission. Bar Counsel promptly shall notify the Commission of the
filing. The Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition
that was filed pursuant to this subsection.
Bar Counsel previously had filed a “Statement of Charges” against the respondent.
(continued...)
3
Firm is Beneficiary, Grantee, Legatee, or Devisee, 80 A.L.R.5th 597 (2000).  Brooke,  374
Md. at 178, 821 A. 2d A. 2d at 427.   Moreover, ignorance of the Rule is not a defense. Stein,
373 Md. at 542, 819 A. 2d at 379; Brooke, 374 Md. at 179-80, 821 A. 2d at 428.
N. Frank Lanocha, the respondent, drafted the Last Will and Testament for his client,
Sarah Ann Ester Straw.  By that will, the respondent’s wife received a bequest of $10002 and,
but for a second bequest for $2000 to Chimes, Inc., the rest and residue of the estate was
bequeathed to the respondent’s adult daughter.   After the death of Ms. Straw and following
the admission of the Last Will and Testament to probate in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore
County, the Chief Judge of that Court wrote to Bar Counsel, informing him of a possible
violation of Rule 1.8 (c).   
Thereafter, Bar Counsel, acting with the approval and at the direction of the Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, see  Rule 16-751,3 filed a Petition For
3(...continued)
Adopted November 30, 2000, effective July 1, 2001, Maryland Rule 16-741 governs the
filing of “statements of charges.” It provides:
“(a) Filing of Statement of Charges.
“(1) Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel shall
file with the Commission a Statement of Charges if Bar
Counsel determines that:
“(A) the attorney either engaged in conduct
constituting professional misconduct or is
incapacitated;
“(B) the professional misconduct or the
incapacity does not warrant an immediate
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action;
“(C) a Conditional Diversion Agreement is
either not appropriate under the circumstances
or the parties were unable to agree on one;  and
“(D) a reprimand is either not appropriate under
the circumstances or (i) one was offered and
rejected by the attorney, or (ii) a proposed
reprimand was disapproved by the Commission
and Bar Counsel was directed to file a
Statement of Charges.”
The filing of the “statement of charges” triggered the peer review process, see Rules 16-
741(b), 16-742, and 16-743, which was completed prior to the filing of the Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action.
 
4Rule 8.4 (d) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (d) engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 
4
Disciplinary or Remedial Action against the respondent.     In addition to charging a violation
of Rule 1.8 (c), as expected, the petitioner also alleged a violation of Rule 8.4 (d)4 of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Following a hearing, the Hon. Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
5Rule 16-752 provides, as relevant:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action,
the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit
court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record.
The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of
discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions,
and hearing.”
6Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into
the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to
any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If dictated
into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be
filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the
conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each
party.”
7Rule 16-757(b) provides: 
“The petitioner has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear
and convincing evidence. A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or
a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or
matter by a preponderance of the evidence.”
 
5
County, to whom, pursuant to Rules 16-752,5  we forwarded the case, made findings of fact,
see Rule 16-757 (c), 6  by clear and convincing evidence, see  Rule 16-757 (b),7 as follows:
“A will was prepared by respondent N. Frank Lanocha for his client, Sarah
Ann Ester Straw to whom he was not related.   The will provided a $1,000
bequest from Ms. Straw to Teresa W. Lanocha, Respondent’s wife.  In
addition, the will also provided that the “rest and residue” of Ms. Straw’s
estate was bequeathed to Teresa Lanocha-Sisson (also known as Teresa M.
8 Brooke was charged with a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) and (d).  Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 161 n. 3, 821 A.2d 414, 417 n. 3 (2003).   Although the
hearing court determined that Brooke violated Rule 8.4 and merged it with the Rule 1.8 (c)
violation, id. at 162 n. 5, 821 A. 2d at 418 n. 5,  it did not specify whether the violation found
was of one or both of the sections.  We assume that the determination was as to both sections.
The petitioner says that the Court addressed the violation of Rule 8.4 generally and
the respondent asserts that the Rule 8.4 violation pertained to section (c).  The basis of those
assertions is unclear.     
6
Sisson).   In the event Ms. Lanocha-Sisson were to predecease Ms. Straw, the
rest of Ms. Straw’s estate was bequeathed to Ms. Lanocha-Sisson’s sons,
Respondent’s grandsons.    There is no dispute that the latter gift was
substantial.
“There is no indication that duress or improper influence were brought to bear
on Ms. Straw by Respondent or anyone else.   Ms. Straw was not represented
by independent counsel in connection with will although Mr. Lanocha
suggested that she consult other counsel.   Ms. Straw did not wish to consult
an attorney she did not know nor involve a stranger in her personal affairs.
“Respondent ‘had no knowledge whatsoever of Rule [1.8 (c)] or its existence
or content.’  ...” 
The hearing court concluded, on these facts, “that there was a violation of Rule 1.8
(c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.”
Both the petitioner and the respondent took exception to the hearing court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law.   
The petitioner’s single exception is to the hearing court’s failure to find a violation
of Rule 8.4 (d).   It relies on Brooke, in which this Court overruled the respondent’s
exception to the hearing court’s finding in that case of a violation of Rule 8.4,8 in addition
to the uncontested finding of the Rule 1.8 (c) violation.   The petitioner reminds us that we
7
held in Brooke that, because  “[a] violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may be a
basis for finding a violation of Rule 8.4,” 374 Md. at 177, 821 A. 2d at 426, the hearing court
properly found that violation on the basis of the Rule 1.8 (c) violation.
The respondent acknowledges the Brooke  holding and that it supports the petitioner’s
position.   He asks that “the Court re-examine the need for or purpose of finding a violation
of a specific rule in this instance MRPC 1.8 (c), which itself affords a basis for imposing
whatever sanction  the Court deems appropriate, also is sanctionable, premised upon the
same allegedly sanctionable conduct, under another rule, in this instance 8.4 (d).”   The
respondent offers as reasons for the reconsideration, reminiscent of the arguments Brooke
made and the concerns we addressed in that case, the lack of any necessity to do so and
avoidance of the  “aura of ‘piling on.’”  
Responding to the arguments made by the respondent in that case, this Court, in
Brooke, pointed out that the finding of a violation of one Rule of Professional Conduct based
on the violation of another was not double punishment, did not run afoul of the purpose of
attorney discipline and that, in any event, the finding of a rule violation differs from the
sanction.   374 Md. at 177, 821 A. 2d at 426.   In the latter regard, we made clear that the
number of violations does not determine the appropriate sanction, the facts and circumstances
of the particular case do. Id., citing  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554,
568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Milliken, 348 Md.
486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998)).    We shall sustain the petitioner’s exception, for the
9One of the respondent’s exceptions challenges the hearing court’s failure to
acknowledge that, in addition to the specific bequest to the respondent’s wife there was a
bequest for $2,000 to Chimes, Inc.   The respondent is, of course, correct.   We view the
matter as simply an oversight and note that it has no significance to the resolution of the issue
before this Court.
8
reasons stated in Brooke.
The respondent filed several exceptions.9   First, he excepts to the hearing court’s
conclusion that he violated Rule 1.8 (c).   Next he excepts to the hearing court’s failure to
address the tension between a lawyer’s duty to his client and his duty to comply with the
disciplinary or other regulatory rules.   Specifically, the respondent believes that the court
should have dealt with, as he put it, “the issue regarding actual or potential tensions between
a lawyer’s duty  and responsibility to carry out the instructions of a client, in this instance
disposition, upon her demise, of all of Mrs. Straw’s worldly possessions in the manner that
she chose and looked to respondent to implement and respondent’s obligation to comply with
rules regulating lawyers’ conduct, a patently difficult and demanding task which often
requires not only   wisdom, but a judicious exercise of sound judgment as well.”   Finally,
positing that the disciplinary proceedings had their genesis in a caveat action filed in the
Baltimore County Orphans’ Court and noting that the caveat proceedings have been
dismissed, and had been prior to his hearing in the Circuit Court, the respondent takes
exception to the fact that the hearing court made no findings of fact or drew any conclusions
of law “with respect to the effect on the instant disciplinary proceeding of dismissal of the
underlying caveat case from which it arose.”
9
The dispositive exception is the first one mentioned - to the conclusion, without
further elaboration of facts than those found by the hearing court, that the respondent’s
drafting of a will, the terms of which made a substantial bequest to his daughter, for Mrs.
Straw, his long-time client, to whom he was not related, and who, despite being advised to
do so,  did not seek, and therefore was not represented by independent counsel in connection
with the will, violated Rule 1.8 (c).   If we continue to hold, as we held in both Stein, 373
Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375,  and Brooke, 374 Md. at 180, 821 A.2d at 428 (“Rule 1.8 (c)
is absolute--an attorney may not prepare an instrument designating himself as legatee under
the circumstances presented herein”), that the Rule’s prohibition is both mandatory and
absolute, the other two exceptions are moot.
The respondent recognizes that Stein and Brooke make compliance with the
requirements of Rule 1.8 (c) mandatory and that, therefore, a violation follows inexorably
when they are not.   Indeed, he characterizes the Stein/Brooke approach as a “per se approach
to Rule 1.8 (c).”   Accordingly, the respondent proffers differences between his case and
Stein and Brooke, which, he maintains, either require additional fact findings or demonstrate
that the conclusion of the hearing court does not rest on the requisite evidentiary foundation.
In Stein, he reminds us, the idea of the substantial gift which went to the attorney came from
the attorney himself.   See 373 Md. at 543, 819 A.2d at 379.   The respondent characterizes
this difference as “striking and perhaps decisive.”    In both Stein and Brooke, unlike in the
case sub judice, the respondent points out that the testamentary provision benefitted the
10
lawyer who drafted the will.  Here, the beneficiary was the respondent’s daughter, who is
both, the respondent asserts, adult and “sui juris and beyond respondent’s control with
respect to the late Mrs. Straw’s testamentary gift to her.”  Finally, he says, the concern
expressed by the Court with respect to the “inevitable lack of primary evidence,” after the
testator’s death, as to the circumstances of the gift or the making of the will are “alleviated
or mollified” in this case by the availability of two witnesses, one to be sure, being the
respondent’s daughter and beneficiary, the other a seemingly independent witness, Mrs.
Straw’s handyman and friend.
These “differences” are not, singly or cumulatively, a sufficient basis for changing the
approach that we took in Stein and continued in Brooke or for viewing the respondent’s case
from a different perspective. The concerns we identified in Stein, some of which the
respondent relies on, simply drive the need for the Rule and make its violation a “very
serious” matter.   That list was not, and was not intended to be, an exhaustive list.   See 373
Md. at 376, 819 A.2d at 537.   Nor did it list the concerns in the order of the importance that
we ascribed to the various perceived “dangers.”     We listed the public’s confidence in the
courts last and, yet, later reiterated that concern, and only that one, when announcing the
sanction we determined to be the appropriate one:
“We find an indefinite suspension is warranted in this case.   While
respondent’s lack of prior ethical violations is a mitigating factor, it does not
justify a reprimand.   As stated above, we consider a violation of Rule 1.8 (c)
to be most serious.   Respondent’s conduct undermines the public confidence
in the legal professional in a particularly egregious manner.”
10 Rule 1.15(b) provides:
“(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the
sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount
necessary for the purpose.”
11 Rule 8.1 (b) provides:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except
that this Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”
11
Id. at 379, 819 A.2d at 543.  See Brooke, 374 Md. at 180, 821 A.2d at 428 (“Deterrence of
such conduct and the public confidence in the legal profession can only be preserved by
protecting against this behavior”).
The respondent’s exceptions are overruled.
Both the petitioner and the respondent submitted recommendations regarding
sanction.    Aware of the Court’s imposition of an indefinite suspension in both Stein and
Brooke, neither of whom had a disciplinary history, the petitioner recommends that the
respondent be ordered indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, with the right to
reapply after ninety (90) days.  The recommendation is justified, the petitioner states, given
the facts that the respondent was reprimanded in 2001 for violations of Rules 1.15 (b)10 and
8.1 (b)11 and because, unlike Stein, who suggested that he be made the beneficiary, the
12
respondent did not suggest the bequest to his daughter.
Although conceding that he meets all of the prerequisites for violating the rule--he
drafted the will, for a person to whom he was unrelated, the will bequeathed a substantial gift
to his daughter and the testator was not represented by independent counsel and did not seek
such counsel--and that Stein and Brooke reflect this Court’s adoption of a bright line rule as
to the sanction to be administered for violation of Rule 1.8 (c), the respondent nevertheless
urges that the proceedings be dismissed and that no sanction be issued.   He bases that
recommendation on his view of the merits of his various exceptions.    Those exceptions have
been overruled, however.    Anticipating that eventuality, the respondent’s fall-back position
is that the appropriate sanction is a reprimand or a period of suspension not to exceed thirty
(30) days.
In both  Stein and Brooke, the beneficiaries of the client’s substantial testamentary gift
was the attorney who prepared the will.   In one case, it was the attorney himself who
suggested that he be given the bequest.   In this case, although the beneficiary is the
attorney’s daughter, she is an adult and, as the respondent points out, “sui juris and beyond
respondent’s compulsion and control with respect to the late Mrs. Straw’s testamentary gift
to her.”   There is no evidence that the respondent orchestrated the bequest to his daughter
or will share in it in any way.   Indeed, the opposite is the case, the hearing court was clear:
“There is no indication that duress or improper influence were brought to bear
on Ms. Straw by Respondent or anyone else.   Ms. Straw was not represented
by independent counsel in connection with the will although Mr. Lanocha
suggested that she consult counsel.   Ms. Straw did not wish to consult an
12In In re Disciplinary Action Against Boulger, 637 N.W.2d  710, 714-15  (N.D.
2001), the court elaborated:
“There are considerable mitigating circumstances in Boulger's favor. Boulger
has practiced law in this state for many years and has no prior disciplinary
record or history of prior misconduct. While Boulger acknowledges having
drafted the instruments with contingent devises to himself, he has made full
and free disclosure of the circumstances of this case to the Disciplinary Board
and has been cooperative throughout the proceedings. Under these
circumstances, an admonition would have perhaps been the most appropriate
sanction.”
13
attorney she did not know nor involve a stranger in her personal affairs.”
Under the circumstances, we believe that the appropriate sanction is a reprimand.  See State
v. Eisenberg, 138 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1965) (reprimanding an attorney for drafting a will,
disinheriting his uncle’s wife and daughter, in favor of his mother, from whom he might
inherit); In re Disciplinary Action Against Boulger, 637 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 2001)
(reprimanding attorney for drafting will codicil that included provisions giving him
substantial contingent testamentary gift, even though the contingencies did not arise12).  See
also In re Blair, 840 So.2d 1191 (La. 2003) (imposing a three (3) month suspension on
attorney, with no prior disciplinary record, who was relatively inexperienced and expressed
sincere remorse, for preparing will for client that gave attorney's wife testamentary gift). 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
14
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE
COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT
TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST N.
FRANK LANOCHA.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 16
September Term, 2005
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
N. FRANK LANOCHA
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
   JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed: April 14, 2006
I concur in the Court’s sustaining of Bar Counsel’s exception and its overruling of
Lanocha’s exception.  Subject to one critical caveat, I agree as well that, under the facts here,
a reprimand would be the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  The caveat is the one that I
noted in my dissent in Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 545-49, 819 A.2d 372, 380-
82 (2003).  In my view, the only effective and practical way to enforce MRPC 1.8(c) is to
require the errant lawyer to disgorge the fruits of his violation of the Rule by renouncing, or
causing any family member who is selected as the beneficiary to renounce, the legacy
obtained in violation of the Rule.
It may well be, and for purposes of this case I am willing to accept, that Mr.
Lanocha’s version of what occurred is entirely accurate – that he did nothing to induce Ms.
Straw to leave a substantial part of her Estate to Lanocha’s daughter and that she insisted on
making that gift – but we will never really know, because Ms. Straw is dead and cannot
testify.  That is the problem in every one of these cases: we get only one side of the story. 
The Court agrees that compliance with the Rule is mandatory and that a violation
“follows inexorably” when the requirements of the Rule are not satisfied.  But
notwithstanding the rhetoric, it insists on making the Rule a toothless and clawless tiger by
providing no effective sanction for its violation.  I continue to believe, and with each new
case continue to believe even more firmly, that the way to avoid violations of the Rule is “the
simple expedient of requiring the lawyer, as a minimal sanction for violating the Rule, to
disgorge what the lawyer wrongfully created.  If lawyers know that a violation of the Rule
will bring them no financial gain, they will have no incentive to violate the Rule, and that,
-2-
above all else, is what will protect the public.”  Id. at 548, 819 A.2d at 382.
The legacy here was not to Lanocha but to his adult daughter, and Lanocha has argued
that he had no control over his daughter’s acceptance of the legacy, that it was not within his
power to have her renounce it.  I am unwilling to accept that as a given.  For one thing, there
is nothing in the record to indicate that he ever asked her to renounce it.  A caveat was filed
to the Will, and Lanocha was advised at that time by his own lawyer that what he had done
was in violation of the Rule.  I am deeply skeptical that, if Lanocha had informed his
daughter that the result of her accepting the legacy might well be his suspension from the
practice of law for violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, she would nonetheless have
insisted on accepting the legacy. 
I would suspend Mr. Lanocha indefinitely.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 16
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION
v.
N. FRANK LANOCHA
Bell, CJ.
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.,
which Cathell, J., joins
Filed: April 14, 2006
I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe that a reprimand is commensurate with the
sanctions that we have imposed in cases involving violations of Rule 1.8 (c).  Based on the
language of Rule 1.8 (c), as well as the reasoning of this Court’s opinions in Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372 (2003), and Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 821 A.2d 414 (2003), in which this Court ordered an
indefinite suspension, I also would impose the sanction of an indefinite suspension upon Mr.
Lanocha.  In determining that a reprimand is appropriate, the majority distinguishes Stein and
Brooke based on the fact that in both cases the attorney who prepared the will was also the
beneficiary of a substantial testamentary gift.
The version of Rule 1.8 (c) that was in effect at the time of Mr. Lanocha’s violation
provided:
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer
or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling, or
spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where:
(1) the client is related to the donee; or
(2) the client is represented by independent
counsel in connection with the gift.
1As the majority notes, by Rules Order dated February 8, 2005, Rule 1.8 (c) was revised,
effective July 1, 2005.  The revision does not alter the independent counsel requirement of prior Rule
1.8 (c), nor does it distinguish between gifts made to the attorney and those made to the attorney’s
relatives.
-2-
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8 (c) (2004).1  As we noted in Stein:
The Rule is qualified in only three ways: (1) if the gift is not
‘substantial,’ (2) if the client is related to the attorney, or (3) if
the client has consulted with independent counsel.
Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375-76.  This Rule makes no distinction between
testamentary gifts made directly to the attorney and those made to relatives of the attorney.
The majority’s reliance on the fact that Mr. Lanocha’s daughter is an adult is
misplaced.  Rule 1.8 (c) contains no exception for substantial gifts to adult children of the
attorney.  Moreover, the assumption that in order for Mr. Lanocha to benefit from the bequest
to his daughter, he would have to either share in it or maintain some control over it, is flawed.
Certainly, the Rule anticipated that “parents” of the lawyer would be “adults,” such that adult
status should not presumptively mitigate the attorney’s violation of the Rule.
The majority also relies upon the hearing court’s determination that
[t]here is no indication that duress or improper influence were
brought to bear on Ms. Straw by Respondent or anyone else.
Ms. Straw was not represented by independent counsel in
connection with the will although Mr. Lanocha suggested that
she consult counsel.  Ms. Straw did not wish to consult an
attorney she did not know nor involve a stranger in her personal
affairs.
The finding of a violation of Rule 1.8 (c), however, does not turn on affirmative evidence of
duress or improper influence by the attorney.  Rather, such improper influence is presumed
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merely from the fact that the attorney drafted the testamentary instrument in which either the
attorney or the attorney’s relative benefitted.  If the attorney advised his or her client that the
client should seek independent counsel, which the client refused, and the attorney was
reticent to withdraw from the undertaking because of the relationship with the client, the very
concerns that gave rise to the prohibition are present.  The closeness of the relationship with
the client mandates the intervention of independent counsel to insure that the client is not
being influenced by the attorney.
Furthermore, this Court has previously observed:
[a]lthough some courts have imposed a reprimand for attorneys
who draft such instruments, such decisions are typically under
the Canons of Professional Ethics as opposed to the more
stringent Rule 1.8 (c).  See Florida Bar v. Miller, 555 So.2d 854
(Fla. 1990); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics and
Conduct v. Winkel, 541 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1995); In re Prueter,
359 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 1984); State v. Horan, 21 Wis.2d 66,
123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).  But see In re Mangold, 148 N.J. 76,
689 A.2d 722 (1997) (reprimanding attorney for violation of
New Jersey’s Rule 1.8 (c) without discussion of circumstances
of violation).
Stein, 373 Md. at 543-44, 819 A.2d at 379.  The majority relies on two cases from other
jurisdictions in support of its determination that a reprimand is appropriate: State v.
Eisenberg, 138 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1965), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reprimanded an attorney under the Canons of Professional Ethics for drafting a will that
resulted in a substantial inheritance for the attorney’s mother; and In re Disciplinary Action
Against Boulger, 637 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 2001), wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court
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reprimanded the attorney based on the application of the North Dakota Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provided in the case of a conflict of interest caused by
negligence that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  Both are distinguishable from the
case at bar based on the provision governing the imposition of the reprimand and provide no
support for reprimanding Mr. Lanocha rather than indefinitely suspending him under our
precedent.  
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s determination that a reprimand
is the appropriate sanction and would impose an indefinite suspension.
Judge Cathell joins in this dissenting opinion.