Title: Robert W. Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2592 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert W. Bartholomew Individually and as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Helen 
Bartholomew, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and 
Compcare Health Services Insurance Corporation, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Prakash Shah, M.D. and The Medical Protective 
Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 5, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren, III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Timothy J. Aiken, James C. Gallanis, and Aiken & Scoptur, 
S.C., Milwaukee; Paul Gagliardi and Gagliardi, O’Brien, Olson & 
Capelli, Salem, and oral argument by Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
 
 
2
For 
the 
defendant-respondent 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
Compensation Fund, there was a brief by Steven P. Means, Roisin 
H. Bell, Michael A. Hughes, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Steven P. Means. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner III, Milwaukee; Lora 
A. Kaelber and Gray & End LLP, Milwaukee; Linda Meagher and 
Habush Habush & Rottier SC, Milwaukee on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2006 WI 91
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2592  
(L.C. No. 
2001CV1261) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert W. Bartholomew, Individually and as  
Special Administrator of the Estate of Helen  
Bartholomew,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
              v. 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and  
Compcare Health Services Insurance Corporation,  
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Prakash Shah, M.D. and The Medical Protective  
Company,  
 
 
Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals summarily affirming the 
judgment and order of the circuit court for Kenosha County, 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
2 
 
Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge.1  This lawsuit arose because Helen 
Bartholomew died as a result of medical malpractice, leaving her 
husband, Robert Bartholomew, surviving.  The plaintiff is Robert 
Bartholomew individually and as special administrator of the 
Estate of Helen Bartholomew.  The defendants are the Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund,2 Compcare Health Services Insurance 
Corporation, Doctor Prakash Shah, and the Medical Protective 
Company.3 
¶2 
The issue in the present case is whether the following 
awards collectively are limited to the maximum allowed under the 
cap on wrongful death actions:  the jury award for noneconomic 
damages to the estate of Helen Bartholomew for her predeath 
pain, suffering, and disability; the jury award to Robert 
Bartholomew for noneconomic damages for the predeath loss caused 
by his wife's disability; and the jury award to Robert 
Bartholomew for noneconomic damages for his postdeath loss of 
his wife's society and companionship. 
¶3 
The issue, in other words, is whether the court should 
adhere to Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866, which held that when a victim of medical malpractice 
                                                 
1 Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, No. 2004AP2592, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2005). 
2 The Fund's name was recently changed to "Injured Patients 
and Families Compensation Fund." 
3 Two defendant doctors were named in the complaint.  One of 
the doctors was found not liable and is therefore not a party to 
this review. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
3 
 
dies, the cap for wrongful death actions limits all noneconomic 
damages.4  A majority of the court, namely the author of this 
opinion and Justices Bradley, Crooks, and Butler, concludes that 
Maurin was wrongly decided and must be overturned.  Justice 
Butler so decides on different grounds from those stated in this 
opinion.   
¶4 
In addition, a majority of the court, the same four 
justices, agrees that the estate of Helen Bartholomew is 
entitled to the full $500,000 award for Helen Bartholomew's 
predeath 
pain 
and 
suffering, 
that 
Robert 
Bartholomew 
individually is entitled to the full $350,000 award for his 
noneconomic damages for his predeath loss of his wife's society 
and companionship, and that Robert Bartholomew individually is 
entitled to the full $350,000 award for his postdeath loss of 
his wife's society and companionship (wrongful death loss of 
society and companionship).  Justice Butler reaches this result 
on different grounds. 
¶5 
Three justices, namely the author of this opinion and 
Justices Bradley and Crooks, join this lead opinion. 
¶6 
The challenge to Maurin in the present case is not to 
that part of Maurin holding that, when medical malpractice 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (2003-03) for the wrongful 
death cap.   
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 
version unless otherwise stated. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
4 
 
results in death, the wrongful death cap5 applies to a claimant's 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship.  Nor is any challenge made in the instant case to 
the constitutionality of applying the wrongful death cap to a 
claimant's noneconomic damages for postdeath loss of society and 
companionship in a medical malpractice case.6  The present case 
therefore leaves undisturbed that part of Maurin that holds the 
wrongful death cap applicable to a claimant's noneconomic 
damages for postdeath loss of society and companionship in a 
medical malpractice action. 
¶7 
To better understand the issue presented, this opinion 
sets forth the jury award for the noneconomic damages and the 
circuit court's application of a cap.   
¶8 
The jury awarded a total of $1,200,000 for noneconomic 
damages as follows: 
• $500,000 to the estate of Helen Bartholomew for her 
noneconomic damages for predeath pain and suffering;  
• $350,000 to Robert Bartholomew individually for his 
noneconomic damages for his predeath loss of his 
wife's society and companionship; and  
                                                 
5 The phrase "wrongful death cap" refers to the amount 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) as the cap on recovery for 
noneconomic damages for postdeath claims for loss of society and 
companionship. 
6 For purposes of the present review, Robert Bartholomew 
treats the $350,000 he received under the circuit court judgment 
as satisfying the jury award for noneconomic damages for his 
postdeath 
claim 
for 
loss 
of 
his 
wife's 
society 
and 
companionship.   
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
5 
 
• $350,000 to Robert Bartholomew individually for his 
noneconomic damages for his postdeath loss of his 
wife's society and companionship. 
¶9 
On July 1, 2004, the circuit court issued a written 
decision, holding that the noneconomic damages were limited to 
the cap provided by the medical malpractice cap statute,7 that 
is, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d).  At that time § 893.55(4)(d) 
capped medical malpractice damages at $422,632.  The circuit 
court thus reduced the $1,200,000 total damage award for 
noneconomic damages to $422,632, as the defendants requested.   
¶10 On July 2, 2004, Maurin was mandated.  In Maurin, the 
court held that when a victim of medical malpractice dies, all 
noneconomic damages are capped by the wrongful death cap.  
¶11 After this court issued its decision in Maurin, and 
upon motion of the defendants, the circuit court revised its 
judgment to comply with Maurin and reduced the three jury awards 
for noneconomic damages collectively to $350,000, the wrongful 
death cap.  As a result of the revised judgment, Robert 
Bartholomew argues that in effect he received his entire award 
for noneconomic damages for his claim for his postdeath loss of 
his wife's society and companionship ($350,000), but he received 
nothing for his predeath claim for his loss of his wife's 
society and companionship and the estate received nothing for 
five years of Helen Bartholomew's predeath pain and suffering. 
                                                 
7 The phrase "medical malpractice cap" refers to the amount 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) as the cap on recovery for 
noneconomic damages awarded in medical malpractice actions. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
6 
 
¶12 Relying on Maurin, the court of appeals summarily 
affirmed the revised judgment.    
¶13 Robert Bartholomew challenges Maurin as erroneously 
holding that the wrongful death cap on noneconomic damages 
applies not only to noneconomic damages for claims for postdeath 
loss of society and companionship, but also to noneconomic 
damages for his claim as special administrator of Helen 
Bartholomew's estate for Helen Bartholomew's predeath pain and 
suffering and to Robert Bartholomew's individual claim for 
noneconomic damages for the predeath loss of society and 
companionship. 
¶14 Again, Robert Bartholomew does not challenge Maurin's 
application of the wrongful death cap to his noneconomic damages 
for his postdeath loss of his wife's society and companionship.  
Rather, he asserts that his awards of noneconomic damages for 
predeath claims are governed by the medical malpractice cap 
established in § 893.55(4)(d), namely $422,632.8  Because the 
medical 
malpractice 
cap 
in 
§ 893.55(4)(d) 
was 
declared 
unconstitutional in Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-04) provides: 
The limit on total noneconomic damages for each 
occurrence under par. (b) on or after May 25, 1995, 
shall be $350,000 and shall be adjusted by the 
director of state courts to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index for all urban consumers, U.S. 
city average, as determined by the U.S. department of 
labor, at least annually thereafter, with the adjusted 
limit 
to 
apply 
to 
awards 
subsequent 
to 
such 
adjustments. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
7 
 
Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, Robert 
Bartholomew argues that for the purposes of the instant action 
no cap exists on his award of noneconomic damages for predeath 
claims.9 
¶15 The defendants contend that Maurin was correctly 
decided and is settled law and that the court should adhere to 
the Maurin decision and affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals in the present case.  
¶16 Four justices, namely the author of this opinion and 
Justices 
Bradley, 
Crooks, 
and 
Butler, 
agree 
with 
Robert 
Bartholomew that Maurin must be overturned.  Three justices, 
namely the author of this opinion and Justices Bradley and 
Crooks, agree with the position advocated by Robert Bartholomew, 
which is the position taken by the concurring opinion in 
Maurin.10  These three justices, in this opinion, conclude that 
Maurin's interpretation of Wisconsin's medical malpractice and 
                                                 
9 Effective April 6, 2006, the legislature has set new 
limits for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in 
§ 893.55(4)(d)1.  See 2005 Wis. Act 183, § 7 (effective Apr. 6, 
2006); see also 2005 A.B. 1073, § 7. 
No 
one 
argues 
that 
the 
new 
§ 893.55(4)(d) 
applies 
retroactively to the instant case.  The Act states that it 
applies to acts or omissions of health care providers after the 
effective date of the statute, which is April 6, 2006.  Both 
Robert 
Bartholomew 
and 
the 
defendants 
argue 
that 
the 
modification of § 893.55(4)(d) supports their interpretations of 
the medical malpractice and wrongful death statutes.  This 
opinion does not address the 2005 legislation. 
10 Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶128, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring, joined 
in part by Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
8 
 
wrongful death statutes as imposing a single global wrongful 
death cap on all noneconomic damages is flawed because it fails 
to take into account the well-established distinction in 
Wisconsin tort law between actions for noneconomic damages for 
predeath claims and a "wrongful death" claim, that is, a claim 
for noneconomic damages for postdeath loss of society and 
companionship.  This opinion concludes that the legislature 
adopted two caps that apply in the event of death resulting from 
medical malpractice: a medical malpractice cap for noneconomic 
damages for predeath claims and a wrongful death cap for 
noneconomic damages for postdeath claims.  Claimants may thus 
recover for these two types of claims up to the limits of each 
applicable cap.  Justice Butler, writing separately, concludes 
that there is a "global" cap in medical malpractice cases, but, 
unlike the Maurin majority, concludes that the "global" cap is 
the medical malpractice cap, not the wrongful death cap.11 
¶17 The conclusions in this opinion are compelled by the 
principles of tort law, the text of the medical malpractice and 
wrongful death statutes and the statutory and legislative 
histories, and the policy the legislature enunciated in enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), namely to place medical malpractice 
wrongful death claims "on the same footing" as wrongful death 
claims in other tort actions.12      
                                                 
11 See Justice Butler's concurrence, note 7. 
12 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶69.  See also id., ¶147 
(Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
9 
 
¶18 Accordingly, four justices, namely the author of this 
opinion and Justices Bradley, Crooks, and Butler, reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and overturn any contrary 
holding in Maurin.  We remand the matter to the circuit court to 
reinstate each jury award for noneconomic damages, though 
Justice Butler reaches this result on different grounds.  The 
analysis in this opinion is presented as follows: 
¶19 I. The facts.   
¶20 II. The standard of review.  
¶21 III. The decision to overturn Maurin in light of 
considerations of stare decisis.   
¶22 IV. A review of tort law treating noneconomic damages 
for predeath claims differently from noneconomic damages for 
postdeath claims.   
¶23 V. An examination of the text of the applicable 
medical malpractice and wrongful death statutes and their 
statutory and legislative histories to establish that the 
legislature did not create a single wrongful death cap for both 
pre- and postdeath claims when the medical malpractice results 
in death.  Rather, the legislature adopted two caps: a medical 
malpractice cap for noneconomic damages for predeath claims and 
a wrongful death cap for noneconomic damages for postdeath 
claims.  Claimants can thus recover each type of damages under 
the applicable cap.        
¶24 VI. An examination of an alternative interpretation of 
the cap statutes allowing claimants to choose between bringing 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
10 
 
an action for noneconomic damages for predeath claims or 
bringing an action for noneconomic damages for postdeath claims.  
I 
¶25 The following facts are undisputed.  This case arises 
out of a claim for medical malpractice in the treatment of Helen 
Bartholomew.  The specifics of Helen Bartholomew's medical 
treatment and resultant injuries are not relevant to the issue 
before the court, and this opinion will therefore only briefly 
discuss the medical aspects of her case. 
¶26 In December 1998, the defendant doctor treated Helen 
Bartholomew for chest pain, arm and shoulder pain, shortness of 
breath, sweating, and fainting feelings.  She returned to work a 
few days later and, that evening, suffered a heart attack.  The 
heart attack resulted in substantial physical deficiencies and 
brain damage such that Helen Bartholomew was never able to 
return home.  Largely bedridden and with a substantially 
decreased quality of life, she lived the rest of her life in a 
nursing home until she passed away in October 2003, nearly five 
years after the heart attack. 
¶27 A complaint was filed in 2001 (prior to Helen 
Bartholomew's death) claiming that her injuries resulted from 
medical malpractice.  Following Helen Bartholomew's death, 
Robert Bartholomew, as special administrator of his wife's 
estate, was substituted as a plaintiff for Helen Bartholomew.     
¶28 On April 4, 2004, the jury returned a verdict, finding 
that negligence by one of the defendant doctors was the cause of 
Helen Bartholomew's injuries and death and awarding noneconomic 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
11 
 
damages as described above.  The circuit court ultimately 
ordered the awards to comport with the Maurin decision.   
¶29 Robert Bartholomew filed a notice of appeal with the 
court of appeals on September 28, 2004.  On July 14, 2005, this 
court issued the Ferdon decision.  In response to Ferdon, Robert 
Bartholomew moved the court of appeals to allow supplemental 
briefing or, in the alternative, to certify the cause in the 
present case to this court.  On August 24, 2005, the court of 
appeals issued an order summarily denying the motion for 
supplemental 
briefing 
or 
certification 
and 
affirming 
the 
judgment of the circuit court, stating that it did not have the 
authority to overrule Maurin.  Robert Bartholomew filed a 
petition for review, which was granted.  
II 
¶30 The 
issue 
in 
the 
present 
case 
involves 
the 
interpretation and application of medical malpractice statutes 
and the wrongful death statute.  The interpretation of and 
application of a statute to undisputed facts ordinarily present 
questions of law that this court decides independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses. 
III 
¶31 This 
opinion first 
explores 
the 
advisability of 
overturning Maurin.  Stare decisis, let the decision stand, is a 
basic tenet of law.  "This court follows the doctrine of stare 
decisis scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
12 
 
of law."13  Stare decisis contributes to the integrity of the 
judicial process.  Nonetheless, "stare decisis is not a 
mechanical formula for adherence to the latest decision," and a 
court should, in applying the doctrine of stare decisis, 
overturn its own decisions when the situation calls for such a 
measure.   
¶32 Any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis, 
however, demands special justification.14  "No change in the law 
is justified by a change in the membership of the court or a 
case with more egregious facts."15 
 
¶33 Five factors typically contribute to a decision to 
overturn prior case law.  This court is more likely to overturn 
a prior decision when one or more of the following circumstances 
is present: (1) Changes or developments in the law have 
undermined the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) 
there is a showing that the precedent has become detrimental to 
coherence and consistency in the law; (4) the prior decision is 
                                                 
13 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
14 Id., ¶96; Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 
Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266. 
15 State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
13 
 
"unsound in principle;" or (5) the prior decision is "unworkable 
in practice."16   
¶34 Furthermore, "the decision to overrule a prior case 
may turn on whether the prior case was correctly decided and 
whether it has produced a settled body of law."17  A court must 
keep in mind that it does "more damage to the rule of law by 
obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision."18 
¶35 This 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
these 
factors 
are 
sufficiently implicated in the present case to justify our 
overturning Maurin.19   
¶36 First, Maurin is unsound in principle and was wrongly 
decided.  The Maurin opinion was, as this opinion shall explain 
further, founded upon an ill-fitted analysis of what a wrongful 
death action is and a failure to fully understand and explain 
the distinction between noneconomic damages for postdeath loss 
of society and companionship and noneconomic damages for 
predeath claims.  A decision based on a faulty interpretation of 
over 150 years of case law is "unsound in principle."  The 
                                                 
16 Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99 (citing State 
v. 
Stevens, 
181 
Wis. 2d 410, 
442, 
511 
N.W.2d 591 
(1994) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring) 
and 
Allied-Signal, 
Inc. 
v. 
Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992)). 
17 Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶99. 
18 Id., ¶100. 
19 Justice Butler's opinion does not directly discuss stare 
decisis, but it also concludes that Maurin must be overturned. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
14 
 
bottom line is that there was no basis in Maurin for rolling 
both the postdeath and predeath claims into the wrongful death 
cap.  
¶37 Second, Maurin has not produced a settled body of law.  
Only three members of this court would decide the instant case 
in accordance with Maurin.  The other members of the court have 
concluded that it is not appropriate to impose a single wrongful 
death cap globally to limit all noneconomic damages in all 
medical malpractice cases resulting in death. 
¶38 The Maurin holding is perhaps best explained as 
resulting from a concern with the equities of the substantial 
medical malpractice award for Shay Leigh Maurin's predeath pain 
and suffering when the child survived for less than 48 hours and 
was unconscious some of that time.20  In the instant case, the 
equities are obviously different; the medical malpractice victim 
survived for almost five years. 
¶39 Instead of overturning Maurin, Maurin might be limited 
to its facts.  Limiting Maurin to its facts rather than 
overruling it is not a good idea.   
¶40 No workable rule for applying caps based on the length 
of time the medical malpractice victim survives appears evident.  
Should the court adopt an arbitrary bright-line survival rule?  
Or should the court determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether 
                                                 
20 See Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶161; Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶10-12; Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶252, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 
701 N.W.2d 440 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
15 
 
the victim has survived a sufficiently long time to avoid the 
Maurin decision?   
¶41 This opinion agrees with Robert Bartholomew and the 
defendants 
that 
nothing 
in 
the 
statutes 
or 
case 
law 
distinguishes 
between 
tort 
victims 
(including 
medical 
malpractice tort victims) who survive a very short period of 
time and those who survive for a longer period for purposes of 
applying the caps.  This opinion further agrees with the parties 
that whatever caps apply to those who survive only a short time 
(such as Shay Leigh Maurin) should be the same caps that apply 
to those 
who 
survive 
for 
several 
years 
(such 
as 
Helen 
Bartholomew).  Unable to identify in the statutory text, case 
law, or public policy any distinction regarding length of 
survival as governing the applicable cap, this opinion declines 
to limit Maurin to its facts.  Predictability and certainty are 
best achieved by applying the same caps regardless of how long 
the medical malpractice victim survives, even though the amount 
of damages a victim suffered might depend on the length of time 
the victim survives. 
¶42 The Maurin majority's concern about the high award for 
noneconomic damages for Shay Leigh Maurin's predeath pain and 
suffering was and remains misplaced.  Remittitur is the way to 
address inappropriately high awards for predeath claims.21  
                                                 
21 See Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6), which states in relevant 
part: 
805.15 New trials. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
16 
 
¶43 Third, the Maurin holding is difficult to apply.  For 
example, when different claimants are entitled to separate 
awards for noneconomic damages, Maurin does not determine how 
the caps should be allocated to the various claimants.  For 
example, applying Maurin to the instant case, the circuit court 
declared without explanation that the jury award of $500,000 for 
the noneconomic damages sustained by Helen Bartholomew prior to 
her death would not be awarded to the estate.22  As a result of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
revised 
judgment, 
Robert 
Bartholomew 
received a total of $350,000.  The jury awarded him $350,000 for 
predeath loss of society and companionship and $350,000 for 
postdeath loss of society and companionship.  The circuit court 
did not determine whether the $350,000 wrongful death cap 
applied to the $350,000 jury award for his postdeath claim for 
loss of society and companionship or to the $350,000 jury award 
for his predeath claim for loss of society and companionship or 
was allocated in to each.  Allocation of the cap to the awards 
                                                                                                                                                             
(6) Excessive or inadequate verdicts.  If a trial 
court determines that a verdict is excessive or 
inadequate, not due to perversity or prejudice or as a 
result of error during trial (other than an error as 
to damages), the court shall determine the amount 
which as a matter of law is reasonable, and shall 
order a new trial on the issue of damages, unless 
within 10 days the party to whom the option is offered 
elects to accept judgment in the changed amount. 
22 The defendants contend that Robert Bartholomew requested 
this allocation.  We cannot find such a request in the record.  
Regardless, the point remains that the proper method for 
allocation under Maurin is unclear and not provided for by the 
statutes. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
17 
 
in the present case may not have been important, but an 
allocation is important when different claimants have separate 
awards. 
¶44 Fourth 
and 
finally, 
this 
opinion 
observes 
that 
Maurin's application of the wrongful death cap to predeath 
claims may be constitutionally suspect.  The constitutionality 
of the caps analyzed in the Maurin majority is suspect for 
several reasons.   
¶45 First, 
Maurin's 
constitutional 
discussion 
focuses 
entirely on the constitutionality of caps in wrongful death 
claims, that is, caps on noneconomic damages for postdeath 
claims for loss of society and companionship.23  But then in 
conclusory 
fashion, 
Maurin 
applies 
this 
constitutional 
discussion to its expanded and erroneous view that wrongful 
death claims encompass noneconomic damages for predeath claims.24 
¶46 Second, the Maurin decision may have the impermissible 
effect of creating an unconstitutionally low cap for noneconomic 
damages for predeath claims.  In Ferdon, the court held that the 
$350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
actions (adjusted for the consumer price index) set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-04) is unconstitutional under 
the Wisconsin Constitution.25  The cap was unconstitutional 
because it was not rationally related to the legislative 
                                                 
23 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶91-115. 
24 Id., ¶116. 
25 Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶¶9-10.  
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
18 
 
objectives 
proffered: 
lowering 
medical 
insurance 
premiums, 
lowering health care costs, and avoiding a health care crisis.26   
¶47 Ferdon was not a wrongful death case; the victim of 
medical malpractice survived.  Ferdon did not address Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.55(4)(f) 
and 
895.04(4), 
the 
statutory 
provisions 
addressed in Maurin.  The Ferdon reasoning may, however, affect 
the Maurin decision to the extent it applied the wrongful death 
cap to the recovery of noneconomic damages for predeath claims.   
¶48 Applying the wrongful death cap to the recovery of 
noneconomic damages for predeath claims is not rationally 
related to the legislative objectives for capping medical 
malpractice awards.  Furthermore, the rationality of the law of 
medical malpractice is compromised when a medical malpractice 
victim sustains serious injury but survives and is subject to no 
cap on noneconomic damages, while a victim who is fatally 
injured and suffers for years before death resulting from 
medical malpractice is limited in noneconomic damages for 
predeath claims to the $350,000 wrongful death cap. 
¶49 The defendants contend that the court's language in 
Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶¶16, 35-36, forecloses any analysis in 
the present case of the constitutionality of the wrongful death 
cap.  As explained previously, this opinion does not address in 
the instant case the constitutionality of the wrongful death cap 
as applied to wrongful death damages properly understood, namely  
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
                                                 
26 Id., ¶¶105, 113. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
19 
 
companionship.  As the court of appeals properly explained, 
Ferdon did not abrogate Maurin, and the court made clear in 
Ferdon that Maurin's discussion of the constitutionality of the 
wrongful death cap did not control the Ferdon case.  Ferdon 
addressed 
other 
issues; 
it 
did 
not 
determine 
the 
constitutionality of Maurin's global cap.   
¶50 That the holding in Maurin applying the wrongful death 
cap to noneconomic damages for predeath claims, however, may 
raise constitutional concerns under Ferdon is reason to be wary 
of this part of the Maurin decision.  
¶51 For the reasons set forth, this opinion, joined by 
Justice Butler, concludes that Maurin's holding that the 
wrongful death cap in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) is the single cap 
to be applied globally to all noneconomic damages when a victim 
of 
medical 
malpractice 
action 
dies 
should 
be 
overruled, 
notwithstanding stare decisis.   
IV 
¶52 This opinion turns now to discuss claims for wrongful 
death, that is, claims for noneconomic damages for postdeath 
loss of society and companionship, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 
895.04, and other claims relating to the death of a tort victim.  
Time is spent on drawing this distinction because the Maurin 
majority opinion erred by failing to appreciate the distinction 
between these types of claims.  
¶53 Both 
the 
present 
case 
and 
Maurin 
address 
the 
application of damage caps to postdeath loss of society and 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
20 
 
companionship (noneconomic damages in wrongful death claims) and 
to predeath pain and suffering of the victim of the tort.27 
¶54 The 
distinction 
between a 
claim 
for 
noneconomic 
damages for postdeath injuries (wrongful death) and claims for 
noneconomic damages for a victim's predeath pain and suffering 
is well established in Wisconsin law.  The two claims are 
separate claims for separate injuries that may belong to 
different people.  As the court has stated, one cause of action 
begins where the other ends.28  The two claims for noneconomic 
damages, those for the victim's predeath injury and those for a 
family member's postdeath injury, do not provide a double 
recovery, "but a recovery for a double wrong."29 
¶55 A wrongful death claim refers to the statutory cause 
of action belonging to named persons for injuries suffered 
postdeath.30   
¶56 As is observed in Prosser and Keaton on the Law of 
Torts, at English common law there was no civil action against 
                                                 
27 See Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶13. 
28 Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 56, 208 
N.W. 901 (1926). 
29 Id. 
30 Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03, 895.04(1); see also Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶131 (Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring); 
W. Page Keaton et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts 
§ 127, at 946 (5th ed., lawyers ed., 1984). 
The wrongful death statutes allow recovery for pecuniary 
damages 
and 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
21 
 
an individual for wrongfully killing another.31  Wisconsin 
apparently followed this rule prior to the adoption of the first 
wrongful death statute in 1857.32  A wrongful death claim is a 
new cause of action unknown at common law.33   
¶57 Furthermore, at common law, many claims did not 
survive the death of the victim or the tortfeasor.34  The rule of 
non-survival of actions was referred to at common law by its 
Latin name, action personalis moritur cum persona, a personal 
action dies with the person.35  Prior to the adoption of a 
survival statute,36 the common law rule of non-survival of 
                                                 
31 Keaton, supra note 30, § 125A, at 940-41; see generally 
Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 
1043, 1044 (1964-65). 
32 See ch. 71, Laws of 1857 (first wrongful death statute). 
Under the wrongful death statute, no damages were permitted 
for loss of society and companionship until the statute was 
amended in 1931.  See § 2, ch. 263, Laws of 1931; see also 
Bernard T. McCartan, Children: Chattels to Chums—Shockley v. 
Prier, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1976). 
33 Brown v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140, 77 
N.W. 748 (1898). 
34 Keaton, supra note 30, § 125A, at 940-41; see generally 
Malone, supra note 31, at 1052-76. 
35 Malone, supra note 31, at 1044. 
36 Wisconsin's 
present 
"survival 
statute," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.01, provides in relevant part: 
(1) In addition to the causes of action that survive 
at 
common 
law, 
all 
of 
the 
following 
also 
survive: . . . 
. . . . 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
22 
 
actions was generally followed in Wisconsin.37  At common law, a 
victim's claim for predeath pain and suffering did not survive 
the victim's death.38   
¶58 Noneconomic damages for the victim's predeath pain and 
suffering survive the victim's death under the survival statute 
and are referred to as survival actions.39  "The survival 
action . . . is not a new cause of action.  It is rather the 
cause of action held by the decedent immediately before or at 
death, now transferred to his personal representative."40 
                                                                                                                                                             
(g) Causes of action for a violation of s. 
968.31(2m) or other damage to the person. 
Personal injury actions are causes of action for the 
recovery 
of 
"damage 
to 
the 
person" 
that 
survive 
under 
§ 895.01(1).  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 310, 294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980). 
Damages "to which a decedent would have been entitled for 
pain and suffering survive his death and pass to the estate of 
the decedent."  Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 310 (citing Koehler, 190 
Wis. at 55). 
37 See Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 340, 99 N.W. 909 
(1904); see also Mesar v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 197 
Wis. 578, 580, 222 N.W. 809 (1929); see generally Malone, supra 
note 31, at 1045-52. 
38 Koehler, 190 Wis. at 56. 
39 Id. 
"Survival actions," in addition, may refer to the survival 
of 
a 
claim 
after 
the 
death 
of 
the 
tortfeasor. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01.  This type of action is not presently 
before the court. 
40 Keaton, supra note 30, § 126, at 942-43. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
23 
 
¶59 Claimants recovering under a wrongful death claim and 
claimants recovering under a survival claim for predeath pain 
and suffering may, but need not, be the same person.  A wrongful 
death claim is brought by or on behalf of the statutorily named 
beneficiary.41  The personal representative of the victim's 
estate brings a survival action for a victim's predeath pain and 
suffering; any recovery is disbursed according to the relevant 
testate or intestate laws.42   
¶60 The defendants support the Maurin decision, arguing 
that the phrase "wrongful death" in the medical malpractice 
statutes refers not to a specific cause of action, namely 
noneconomic damages for loss of society and companionship, but, 
rather, to any cause of action seeking noneconomic damages when 
medical malpractice results in death.  Nothing in the text of 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
statute 
(§ 893.55(4)(f)) 
or 
the 
statutory and legislative histories signals that the phrase 
"wrongful death" means anything other than its usual meaning in 
the statutes, namely postdeath claims. 
¶61 This court's case law has recognized the distinction 
between wrongful death and survival actions dating back until at 
least 1868.43   
                                                 
41 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(1); see Keaton, supra note 30, § 127, 
at 946. 
42 See Keaton, supra note 30, § 127, at 947. 
43 Woodward v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 400, 405-06 
(1868) (discussing survival and wrongful death actions). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
24 
 
¶62 The earliest case in which this court explained the 
distinction is Brown v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,44 in 
which the court stated that wrongful death and survivor actions 
"refer to entirely distinct losses recoverable in different 
rights:  the one in the right of the deceased for the loss 
occasioned to him; the other in the right of the surviving 
relatives for the loss to them.  Both are dependent on the 
injury, but only one dependent on the death with surviving 
relatives to take under the statute."45  The Brown court refused 
to adopt the Railway Company's interpretation of the statutes 
(reminiscent of Maurin's interpretation of the statutes) that 
the wrongful death statute encompasses all claims when death 
results and the survival statute applies only to cases in which 
death does not ensue from the injury.46  
¶63 The distinction between wrongful death and a victim's 
predeath claim for pain and suffering has been accepted in 
                                                 
44 Brown v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 142, 77 
N.W. 748 (1898). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 141. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
25 
 
Wisconsin case law; Maurin appears to be the only exception.47  
Maurin erred in conflating a wrongful death and a survival 
action and subjecting both to the wrongful death cap. 
                                                 
47 Compare Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶28-31, with State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶51 n.7, 275 
Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75 (Eleven days after its decision in 
Maurin mandated, this court stated, "A wrongful death claim 
belongs to the surviving spouse, not the deceased's estate."); 
Petta v. ABC Ins. Co., 2005 WI 18, ¶50, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 
N.W.2d 639 
(Wilcox, 
J., 
concurring) (wrongful 
death 
claim 
separate and distinct from survival claim); Muchow v. Goding, 
198 Wis. 2d 609, 627, 544 N.W.2d 218 (1995) (Survivors "have an 
independent claim based upon the wrongful death of their 
daughter.  Their claim is separate and distinct from the claims 
of the estate to which [the tort victim's] claims have passed 
under the survival statute."); Weiss v. Regent Props. Ltd., 118 
Wis. 2d 225, 233, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984) ("[T]he wrongful death 
action is separate and distinct from the survival action."); 
Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 310-15 
(addressing punitive damages 
separately in context of wrongful death and survival actions); 
Koehler, 190 Wis. at 56 (A survival action "is a separate and 
distinct 
one 
from 
the 
cause 
of 
action 
purely 
statutory, . . . which substantially follows the so-called Lord 
Campbell's Act of England in 1846, abolishing here and there the 
common-law rule that for the death of a person there could be no 
damages recovered in favor of any survivor."); Brown, 102 Wis. 
at 142 (explaining the distinction between survival and wrongful 
death 
actions); 
Woodward, 
23 
Wis. 
at 
405-06 
(discussing 
separately survival and wrongful death actions); Estate of 
Merrill ex rel. Mortenson v. Jerrick, 231 Wis. 2d 546, 549-50, 
605 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A survival action is distinct 
from 
a 
wrongful 
death 
action."); 
Miller 
v. 
Luther, 
170 
Wis. 2d 429, 435-36, 489 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992) (Wrongful 
death "is not an action that survives the decedent's death; it 
is a new action brought for the benefit of the statutory 
beneficiaries"); Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 
784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1985) ("The survival action and the wrongful 
death action are distinct under Wisconsin law. The survival 
action is brought by the decedent's estate for the injury to the 
decedent; the wrongful death action belongs to the named 
beneficiaries for their injury. '[T]he latter action begins 
where the former ends.'" (citations omitted)). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
26 
 
¶64 In Maurin only two types of claims, wrongful death 
(claim of a family member for postdeath loss of society and 
companionship) and survival (claim of the victim for predeath 
injury), were present.  In the present case, however, another 
type of predeath claim for noneconomic damages is present, 
namely, a claim for a family member's noneconomic damages for 
predeath loss of society and companionship.48 
¶65 Maurin did not address this latter predeath claim 
because no claim for predeath loss of society and companionship 
was made in that case.  Nevertheless, Maurin's categorical 
holding that the wrongful death cap applies to all noneconomic 
damages in the event of death may very well cover this kind of 
predeath claim for loss of society and companionship. 
¶66 Claims for predeath noneconomic damages for loss of 
society and companionship are similar to survival actions in 
that both refer to a predeath claim that may be asserted after 
the victim dies.  In the medical malpractice context, predeath 
loss of society and companionship is listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55 as an element of noneconomic damages a jury may award 
in a medical malpractice case.49 
                                                 
48 The victim's claim for pain and suffering and a family 
member's claim for predeath loss of society and companionship 
exist regardless of whether the victim dies. 
49 See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(5)(b) ("Every award of damages 
under ch. 655 shall specify the sum of money, if any, awarded 
for each of the following . . . (b) Loss of consortium, society 
and companionship or loss of love and affection.").  
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
27 
 
¶67 Claims for noneconomic damages for predeath loss of 
society and companionship are easily distinguishable from claims 
for noneconomic damages for postdeath loss of society and 
companionship (wrongful death).  "In contrast [to wrongful 
death], the common-law right of spouses to bring an action for 
loss of consortium compensates injuries to a spouse during the 
period of the injured spouse's disability."50  
¶68 Unlike wrongful death, which is a statutory claim, a 
claim 
for 
a 
husband's 
loss 
of 
his 
wife's 
society 
and 
companionship upon the wife's injury existed at common law.51  
Though these claims for loss of society and companionship 
originally were limited to a husband's claim for a wife's 
disability, the doctrine has been expanded to claims upon injury 
to a husband, child, or parent.52   
                                                 
50 Kottka v. PPG Indus., Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 499, 519, 388 
N.W.2d 160 (1986). 
51 Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 292, 195 
N.W.2d 480 (citing Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville, 24 Wis. 618 
(1869) and other more recent cases). 
52 Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 511-513, 519-
28, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984) (minor child's claim for loss of 
parent's society and companionship); Shockley v. Prier, 66 
Wis. 2d 394, 402-05, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975) (parent's claim for 
loss of society and companionship of minor child); Ferdon, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, ¶20 (parent's claim for loss of society and 
companionship of child); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 
34 Wis. 2d 542, 558, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967) (wife's claim for 
loss of husband's society and companionship); Susan M. Knepel, 
Torts——Child May Recover for Loss of Parent's Society and 
Companionship, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 174, 174-76 (1984-85); Bernard 
T. McCartan, Children: Chattels to Chums—Shockley v. Prier, 59 
Marq. L. Rev. 169, 170-71 (1976); see also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law 
of Remedies 8.1(5), at 400-03 (2d ed. 1993). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
28 
 
¶69 Claims for predeath loss of society and companionship 
survive the death of the victim of the underlying tort and may 
be brought in addition to wrongful death claims for postdeath 
loss of society and companionship.53   
¶70 On the basis of this analysis of the types of claims 
made in the present case, this opinion, joined by Justice 
Butler, concludes that the implication in Maurin that a claim 
for predeath noneconomic damages for loss of society and 
companionship should be combined with a claim for postdeath 
noneconomic damages for loss of society and companionship 
(wrongful death) is just plain wrong. 
¶71 Having established that survival actions, predeath 
claims for loss of society and companionship, and wrongful death 
actions are separate causes of action with possibly different 
claimants, this opinion turns now to the medical malpractice 
statutes and wrongful death statutes and applies these statutes 
to the present case. 
 
 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 515-20 (court rejects 
argument that common-law claim for loss of consortium due to 
injury of spouse is extinguished by death of spouse or 
alternatively that claim survives but legislature intended to 
limit amount recovered by wrongful death cap in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(4); contrary to insurer's claim that wife's loss of 
consortium during last months of husband's life is included in 
her 
claim 
for 
nonpecuniary 
wrongful 
death 
damages 
under 
§ 895.04(4), wife permitted to bring action for both pre- and 
postdeath loss of society and companionship).  See also 2 Dan B. 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies 8.3(5), at 442-43 (2d ed. 1993). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
29 
 
V 
¶72 In Maurin, this court set forth three possible 
interpretations of the statutes governing medical malpractice 
and wrongful death caps when a victim of medical malpractice 
dies.  
¶73 (1) Two caps apply when medical malpractice results in 
death: (a) The wrongful death cap limits noneconomic damages for 
postdeath claims,54 and (b) the medical malpractice cap, if any, 
limits noneconomic damages for predeath claims.55  The claimants 
recover the damages governed separately by each cap.  (This 
position was advocated by the plaintiffs in Maurin,56 and again 
by Robert Bartholomew in the instant case.  It was adopted by 
the concurring opinion in Maurin57 and is adopted in this 
opinion). 
¶74 (2) A single cap limits all noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases regardless of whether the medical 
malpractice results in death.  The cap on all noneconomic 
damages is the medical malpractice cap in § 893.55(4)(d).  
Noneconomic 
damages 
for 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship (that is, the wrongful death claim) are further 
limited to the amount stated in § 895.04(4).  (This position was 
                                                 
54 Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
55 Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d). 
56 See Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶18. 
57 Id., 
¶¶117-234 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
& 
Crooks, 
J., 
concurring). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
30 
 
advanced by the defendants in Maurin and is adopted by Justice 
Butler in the instant case.) 
¶75 (3) A single cap limits all noneconomic damages when 
medical malpractice results in death.  The cap is the wrongful 
death cap in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  (This position was adopted 
by the Maurin majority opinion, by the circuit court's revised 
judgment filed after Maurin was mandated, and by the court of 
appeals in the instant case.  This position is also advanced by 
the defendants and Justice Roggensack's opinion, joined by 
Justices Wilcox and Prosser, in the instant case, but these 
three justices would allow the claimants to choose to be 
governed instead by the medical malpractice cap.) 
¶76 This opinion concludes that the first interpretation 
is consistent with the text of the statutes and the statutory 
and legislative histories of the statutes and the policy the 
legislature enunciated in enacting § 893.55(4)(f), namely to 
place medical malpractice wrongful death claims "on the same 
footing" as wrongful death claims in other tort actions.58  
¶77 This decision is explained by examining first the 
statutes 
and 
their 
statutory 
and 
legislative 
histories, 
beginning with chapter 655. 
A 
¶78 Chapter 655 governs the liability of health care 
providers for injury caused to patients.59  Wisconsin Stat. 
                                                 
58 Id., ¶69.  See also id., ¶147 (Abrahamson, C.J., & 
Crooks, J., concurring). 
59 See generally Wis. Stat. §§ 655.001-.009. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
31 
 
§ 655.017 provides for limits on noneconomic damages for acts or 
omissions by a heath care provider.  Specifically, § 655.017 
provides as follows: 
The amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by a 
claimant or plaintiff under this chapter for acts or 
omissions of a health care provider if the act or 
omission occurs on or after May 25, 1995, and for acts 
or omissions of an employee of a health care provider, 
acting within the scope of his or her employment and 
providing health care services, for acts or omissions 
occurring on or after May 25, 1995, is subject to the 
limits under s. 893.55 (4)(d) and (f). (emphasis 
added). 
¶79 Section 655.017 is relevant to the present discussion 
because it refers to both Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) and Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), governing noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions.  A critical word in § 655.017 is "and."  By 
using the conjunctive word "and" instead of the disjunctive word 
"or," § 655.017 makes clear that the caps in paragraphs (d) and 
(f) are not alternative provisions.60  
                                                 
60 Discussing the legislature's choice of the conjunctive 
word "and," the Maurin concurring opinion observed: 
The text of § 655.017 does not limit recovery to the 
lesser of either the § 893.55(4)(d) limit for medical 
malpractice or the § 893.55(4)(f) limit for wrongful 
death. 
Rather, 
§ 655.017 
directs 
us 
to 
both 
§§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f) to assess the limits on 
damages imposed in 
cases 
of medical 
malpractice 
causing wrongful death.   
Section 655.017 recognizes that both the limit on 
noneconomic damages under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) 
and the limit on wrongful death damages under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) 
are 
applicable 
in 
medical 
malpractice actions.  Had the legislature intended to 
limit recovery to either the § 893.55(4)(d) limit or 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
32 
 
¶80 Paragraph (d) of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) sets out the 
limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions for 
each occurrence of medical malpractice.  The cap as it existed 
when the instant case was tried was $350,000, adjusted to the 
consumer price index.  Section 893.55(4)(d) (2003-04) provided 
as follows: 
The limit on total noneconomic damages for each 
occurrence under par. (b) on or after May 25, 1995, 
shall be $350,000 and shall be adjusted by the 
director of state courts to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index for all urban consumers, U.S. 
city average, as determined by the U.S. department of 
labor, at least annually thereafter, with the adjusted 
limit 
to 
apply 
to 
awards 
subsequent 
to 
such 
adjustments. 
In Ferdon the court declared this cap unconstitutional.61   
¶81 Paragraph (f) of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) addresses the 
limits on noneconomic damages for wrongful death in medical 
malpractice cases and directs us to § 895.04(4) of the wrongful 
death statute setting forth such limits.  Section 893.55(4)(f) 
states: 
Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers and an employee of a health care 
provider, acting within the scope of his or her 
employment and providing health care services, for 
wrongful death are subject to the limit under s. 
895.04(4).  If damages in excess of the limit under s. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the § 893.55(4)(f) limit depending on whether the 
patient died, it would have used different language. 
See Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶181-182 (Abrahamson, C.J., & 
Crooks, J., concurring). 
61 Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶10. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
33 
 
895.04(4) 
are 
found, 
the 
court 
shall 
make 
any 
reduction required under s. 895.045 and shall award 
the lesser of the reduced amount or the limit under s. 
895.04(4)  (emphasis added). 
¶82 Section 893.55(4)(f) serves as a limitation on Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(4)(d).  The first clause of § 893.55(4)(f) says: 
"Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages under this 
subsection [4]. . . ." 
 
The 
only 
paragraph 
in 
subsection 
893.55(4) containing limits on noneconomic damages is paragraph 
(d), the medical malpractice cap.  So, § 893.55(4)(f) should be 
read as follows:  "Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic 
damages under" § 893.55(4)(d), "damages recoverable against 
health care providers . . . for wrongful death are subject to 
the limit under s. 895.04(4)"  (emphasis added). 
¶83 The meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) depends on 
understanding two terms in paragraph (f): "notwithstanding" and 
"wrongful death."  
¶84 What does "[n]otwithstanding the limits on noneconomic 
damages under" Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) mean?  Notably, 
paragraph (4)(f) is more specific than paragraph (4)(d).  
Paragraph (f) refers to a specific type of noneconomic damages 
resulting from a medical malpractice claim, that is, damages for 
postdeath loss of society and companionship caused by the 
medical malpractice victim's death.  Under paragraph (f), the 
§ 895.04(4) cap on noneconomic damages for postdeath loss of 
society and companionship in wrongful death claims governs, 
notwithstanding (that is, in spite of) any provision contained 
within § 893.55(4) governing other noneconomic damages. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
34 
 
¶85 On its face, the "notwithstanding" phrase points us 
away from Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) (the cap on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice) and specifically directs us toward 
§ 895.04(4) 
(the 
cap 
on 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship in wrongful death actions) to determine the 
recovery limits available in a wrongful death action.  To read 
the 
statute 
otherwise 
would 
render 
the 
language 
"notwithstanding" superfluous.62 
¶86 "Wrongful 
death" 
is, 
as 
discussed 
previously at 
length, a phrase of art that refers to a specific type of 
action: the statutory action assigned to certain family members 
to maintain a cause of action for postdeath loss of society and 
companionship caused by the death of a tort victim.  At the risk 
of being repetitive: Wrongful death does not include claims for 
predeath noneconomic damages. 
                                                 
62 As is explained in the treatise on Wisconsin damage law: 
The legislature has limited an injured plaintiff's 
right to recover damages for pain and suffering in 
claims against health care providers.  A $350,000 cap 
(to be adjusted at least annually by the director of 
state courts to reflect changes in the consumer price 
index) was imposed, effective May 25, 1995, on 
noneconomic damages, defined to include pain and 
suffering, in medical negligence cases in which the 
claim accrued on or after the statute's effective 
date.  Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(a), (d); 655.017. 
Wrongful 
death 
claims 
are 
excepted 
from 
this 
noneconomic 
loss 
cap. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(f) . . . . (emphasis added). 
1 The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 5.5, at 3 n.1 (Russell M. 
Ware ed., 3d ed. 2003). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
35 
 
¶87 Tracking the reference in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) to 
§ 895.04(4), this opinion turns to § 895.04(4).  Section 
895.04(4) limits noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions 
to $350,000 per occurrence in the case of a deceased adult.  
Section 895.04(4) provides the wrongful death cap as follows: 
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action. Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death (emphasis added). 
¶88 Section § 895.04(4) provides a limit for wrongful 
death damages.  For purposes of the present case, it limits 
nonpecuniary (that is, noneconomic) damages for postdeath loss 
of society and companionship.  No mention is made of claims for 
the victim's pain and suffering, and no mention is made of 
claims for noneconomic damages for predeath loss of society and 
companionship.  In other words, nothing is said in the wrongful 
death statute about limits on noneconomic damages for predeath 
claims.63   
                                                 
63 The title of Wis. Stat. § 895.04 makes clear that the 
statute applies to a "[p]laintiff in a wrongful death action."  
Although a title is not determinative of the meaning of the 
statute, it is informative.  State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 
645, 526 N.W.2d 132 (1994) ("In the face of such plain and 
unambiguous language we must disregard the title of the statute.  
Consideration of a statutory title may be used only to resolve 
doubt as to the meaning of the statute."). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
36 
 
¶89 Nothing in any of the statutes indicates a legislative 
intent to conflate noneconomic damages for predeath claims (such 
as the victim's pain and suffering and a family member's 
predeath loss of society and companionship) and noneconomic 
damages for wrongful death claims for postdeath loss of society 
and companionship into a single cause of action or a single 
statutory cap.  In past cases the court has been unwilling to 
conflate these damages in interpreting the wrongful death 
statute.64   
¶90 The legislature could have easily conflated the claims 
by merely adding the phrase "damages for predeath pain and 
suffering 
and 
damages 
for 
predeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship" to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), which addresses 
only wrongful death damages. 
¶91 The words "per occurrence" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
lead us to the last statutory provision to be examined,  
§ 893.55(4)(b), which states the scope of the damage caps in 
medical malpractice claims for each occurrence.  Section 
893.55(4)(b) (2003-04) provides: 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for bodily 
injury or death, including any action or proceeding 
based on contribution or indemnification, may not 
exceed the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence on 
or after May 25, 1995, from all health care providers 
and all employees of health care providers acting 
within the scope of their employment and providing 
health care services who are found negligent and from 
                                                 
64 See Brown, 102 Wis. at 141; Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 515-
20; ¶¶61, 68, supra. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
37 
 
the injured patients and families compensation fund 
(emphasis added).   
¶92 It has been argued that the language in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.55(4)(b) and 895.04(4) referring to "each occurrence" and 
"per occurrence," respectively, establishes that there must be a 
single global cap for all noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions. 
¶93 Two possible analyses may result from this view of the 
word "occurrence" used in these two statutes.  One analysis is 
that the wrongful death cap limits all noneconomic damages when 
death results from the medical malpractice, a view adopted by 
this court in Maurin.  An alternative analysis is that the 
medical malpractice cap, § 893.55(4)(d), limits all noneconomic 
damages when death results from medical malpractice (and the 
wrongful death cap may limit the damages for postdeath loss of 
society and companionship within the medical malpractice cap). 
Reliance on the word "occurrence" in each of these statutes as 
referring to an act of medical malpractice and requiring a 
single global cap on all noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice cases is misplaced under both analyses.  
¶94 The Maurin majority correctly observed that it could 
"conceive of no purpose for creating § 893.55(4)(f) if the 
legislature intended to retain the single cap in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(d) [the medical malpractice cap] to cover total 
noneconomic damages in a wrongful death case involving medical 
malpractice."65  This observation is sound.  Subsection (f) was 
                                                 
65 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶35 (emphasis in Maurin opinion). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
38 
 
enacted, as the statutory and legislative histories show, to 
overturn the case law interpreting the medical malpractice cap 
as imposing a single global cap for all noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases regardless of the death of the 
victim.66       
¶95 To understand the words "for each occurrence" in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(4)(b), one must read them with the words "total 
noneconomic damages" and "bodily injury or death." 
¶96 The words "total noneconomic damages" and "bodily 
injury or death" and "for each occurrence" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(b) suggest that § 893.55(4)(b) might be the only cap 
that applies to all noneconomic damages when a victim dies as a 
result of medical malpractice.  But the words "or death" do not 
have the same meaning in the law as "wrongful death."  Properly 
read, section 893.55(4)(b) applies to noneconomic damages for 
predeath claims, regardless of whether the medical malpractice 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
Maurin 
majority 
opinion 
also 
observed 
that 
the 
statement in Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 
182 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 512 N.W.2d 764 (1994), that ch. 655 had "set 
tort claims resulting from medical malpractice apart from other 
tort 
claims," 
"is 
the 
complete 
answer 
to 
the 
otherwise 
legitimate argument that negligence claims and wrongful death 
claims are separate and distinct causes of action."  Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶84.  As Robert Bartholomew observed in his brief 
and at oral argument, this comment is not a complete answer 
because it fails to account for the distinction between actions 
for wrongful death claims and actions for predeath claims.  This 
opinion does not disrupt the holding that ch. 655 set medical 
malpractice claims apart from other tort claims by capping 
claims for noneconomic damages for predeath claims.  
66 See Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 665-69, 456 
N.W.2d 336 (1990). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
39 
 
victim incurs bodily injury or death.  Thus total noneconomic 
damages for predeath claims for the victim's pain and suffering 
and a family member's predeath claim for loss of society and 
companionship are covered under the medical malpractice cap. 
¶97 In contrast, total noneconomic damages for postdeath 
claims for loss of society and companionship are subject to the 
wrongful 
death 
cap 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.04(4) 
(and 
§ 893.55(4)(f)).  
¶98 The words "per occurrence" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
do not implicate this opinion's interpretation that predeath 
claims are limited in a medical malpractice action by the 
medical malpractice cap.  The words "per occurrence" in the 
wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), were not 
inserted to provide the wrongful death cap as a single global 
cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions for 
losses other than postdeath claims for loss of society and 
companionship.  As the Maurin majority opinion carefully 
explained, the words "per occurrence" were inserted in the 
wrongful death statute to ensure that all claimants for wrongful 
death (that is, those asserting claims for postdeath loss of 
society and companionship) share a single wrongful death cap.67   
                                                 
67 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶79 (quoting Memorandum from Don 
Dyke, Senior Staff Attorney, Wisconsin Legislative Council 2 
(Apr. 21, 1998) (on file with Wisconsin Legislative Council, 
Madison, 
Wis.)) 
("The 
legislature 
added 
the 
phrase 
'per 
occurrence' to make it clear that 'in wrongful death medical 
malpractice actions, the limit is a total limit and does not 
apply individually to each person who may bring an action for 
loss of society and companionship.'").  See also Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶80. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
40 
 
¶99 The statutory and legislative histories of the medical 
malpractice and wrongful death cap statutes endorse this view 
that the words "total noneconomic damages," "bodily injury or 
death," "per occurrence" and "each occurrence" do not impose a 
single global cap of either the medical malpractice cap or the 
wrongful death cap. 
¶100 Prior to 1986, no cap existed on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice cases.   In 1986, the legislature created 
a cap of $1 million on noneconomic damages, amending § 655.017 
to state that "the amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by 
a claimant under this chapter . . . is subject to the limit 
under s. 893.55(4)" and creating § 893.55(4).68  Neither ch. 655 
nor § 893.55(4) contained any reference to wrongful death.  The 
caps sunset on January 1, 1991. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The memorandum states: 
Act 89 replaces the current $150,000 limit on damages 
for loss of society and companionship in wrongful 
death actions with a $500,000 limit per occurrence in 
the 
case 
of 
a 
deceased 
minor 
or 
$350,000 
per 
occurrence in the case of a deceased adult.  The new 
limits apply both to wrongful death actions involving 
medical malpractice and 
to other 
wrongful 
death 
actions.  Presumably, reference is made to "per 
occurrence" to provide that in wrongful death medical 
malpractice actions, the limit is a total limit and 
does not apply individually to each person who may 
bring an action for loss of society and companionship.  
(As noted above, in wrongful death actions not 
involving medical malpractice, s. 895.04(4), Stats., 
has already been interpreted as applying the current 
$150,000 limit in the aggregate.). 
68 See 1985 Wis. Act 340, §§ 30, 72; Wis. Stat. §§ 655.017, 
893.55(4) (1987-88). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
41 
 
¶101 The court interpreted this cap in Rineck v. Johnson, 
155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990), holding that when 
wrongful death resulted from medical malpractice, noneconomic 
damages for wrongful death, along with other noneconomic 
damages, were governed by the medical malpractice cap in 
§ 893.55(4), not the wrongful death cap in § 895.04.69  In other 
words, as the statutes were written at the time, the wrongful 
death cap in § 895.04(4) did not apply in medical malpractice 
cases.  In support of this proposition, the Rineck court 
observed: 
Significantly, ch. 655, Stats., does not state that 
damages recoverable in medical malpractice cases are 
also subject to the . . . limitation under the general 
wrongful death provisions of sec. 895.04(4).  Had the 
legislature 
desired 
to 
appropriate 
the 
more 
restrictive damage limits of sec. 895.04(4) it would 
have provided so explicitly as it did in other 
instances . . . . 
 
We 
do 
not 
believe 
that 
the 
legislature would have taken pains to specifically 
refer to particular statutes . . . if it intended to 
incorporate 
without 
mention 
other 
miscellaneous 
general provisions, such as sec. 895.04(4).70 
¶102 The holding in Rineck is clear.  Without a provision 
in ch. 655 or 893 referring to the wrongful death cap, the 
wrongful death cap was inapplicable in medical malpractice 
cases. 
¶103 Six months after the court decided Rineck, the sunset 
provision in Wis. Stat. §§ 655.017 and 893.55(4) took effect, 
                                                 
69 Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665-69. 
70 Id. at 666-67. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
42 
 
and the medical malpractice cap ended.  In Jelinek v. St. Paul 
Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 512 N.W.2d 764 
(1994), the court held that after the medical malpractice cap 
was sunset, noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions, 
including noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions in 
which death resulted, were not capped.71   
¶104 This "uncapped" situation for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice actions continued until 1995, when the 
legislature 
amended 
the 
statutes 
to 
reinstate 
a 
medical 
malpractice cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) and (d) and to 
create § 893.55(4)(f) governing wrongful death claims.72   
¶105 The creation of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) was a 
critical event in the development of caps for noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice actions.  The legislature in 
effect overturned the court's decisions in Rineck and Jelinek 
applying the medical malpractice cap to wrongful death claims 
and instituted a damage cap for a wrongful death claim arising 
from medical malpractice.  Under the new § 893.55(4)(f), the 
same cap that applied to noneconomic damages for wrongful death 
claims in tort actions applied to noneconomic damages for 
wrongful death claims in medical malpractice actions.   
¶106 The question that arose in Maurin and arises in the 
present case 
is how the 
wrongful 
death 
cap 
in medical 
                                                 
71 Jelinek, 182 Wis. 2d at 9-10. 
72 See 1995 Wis. Act 10, §§ 5, 8, 9, 10; see also 1995 A.B. 
36. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
43 
 
malpractice actions interacts with the medical malpractice cap 
in medical malpractice actions.  This opinion has analyzed the 
text and the statutory and legislative histories of the statutes 
and concluded that the statutes create two caps.   
¶107 The purpose enunciated by the legislature in enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) supports this interpretation of the 
statutes.  
B 
¶108 As both the majority and concurring opinions in Maurin 
observed, the legislative purpose in enacting § 893.55(4)(f) was 
to place medical malpractice wrongful death claims "on the same 
footing" as wrongful death claims in other tort actions.73   
¶109 In non—medical malpractice tort cases, when the tort 
victim dies, there are two types of claims for noneconomic 
damages: one for predeath damages and the other for postdeath 
damages (that is, for wrongful death).   
¶110 To put a wrongful death claim in a medical malpractice 
action on the same footing as a wrongful death claim in tort 
actions generally, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) provides that the 
same cap that generally applies in tort wrongful death actions 
                                                 
73 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶69; see id., ¶147 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring). 
The court reached a similar conclusion six years ago in 
Czapinski v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶16, 236 
Wis. 2d 316, 
613 
N.W.2d 120: 
"Section 
893.55(4)(f) 
made 
applicable to medical malpractice cases the limit on damages for 
loss of society and companionship that was established in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), the wrongful death statute." (footnote 
omitted). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
44 
 
for postdeath loss of society and companionship applies in 
medical malpractice tort actions as well.   
¶111 If, as the majority held in Maurin, the wrongful death 
cap serves in medical malpractice actions as a single cap for 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship, as well as for the medical malpractice victim's 
predeath pain and suffering, and for a family member's predeath 
claims 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship, 
medical 
malpractice wrongful death claims are not on the same footing as 
wrongful death claims in other tort cases.  On the contrary, the 
Maurin majority's 
interpretation imposing a 
single 
global 
wrongful death cap on all noneconomic damages forces a wrongful 
death claimant in a medical malpractice action to share the 
capped amount with claimants for predeath noneconomic damages. 
Recoveries for noneconomic damages for wrongful death claimants 
in medical malpractice cases are, under Maurin, more severely 
limited than damages wrongful death claimants recover in other 
tort actions.  
¶112 Similarly, if a claim for noneconomic damages for 
wrongful 
death 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
single 
global 
medical 
malpractice cap (as well as the wrongful death cap), a wrongful 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
45 
 
death claim in a medical malpractice case is not on the same 
footing as a wrongful death claim in other tort actions.74   
¶113 Thus, if the legislature's enunciated public policy is 
to be the touchstone of the analysis, the outcome must be that 
the medical malpractice and wrongful death statutes provide two 
separate caps. 
¶114 This opinion thus reaches the following conclusions 
regarding the statutory caps:  
¶115 (1) If the medical malpractice does not result in the 
death of the victim, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d), the medical 
malpractice cap, limits the amount all claimants may recover for 
noneconomic damages resulting from the malpractice.  Because 
                                                 
74 Applying both the medical malpractice cap and the 
wrongful death cap to wrongful death claims for postdeath 
noneconomic loss of society and companionship leads to absurd 
consequences.  From 1998 until Ferdon was decided in 2005, the 
wrongful death cap for minor children ($500,000) was higher than 
the "total noneconomic damages cap" for medical malpractice 
($350,000 adjusted for inflation).  Thus a bigger cap is forced 
to fit within a smaller cap.  The $500,000 cap on wrongful death 
claims would not be realized in a medical malpractice claim 
because the cap exceeded the limit for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice. 
Thus, under the view taken in Justice Butler's concurrence, 
the legislature in 1998 passed a statute that resulted in the 
embedding of the $500,000 cap for the wrongful death of a child  
into 
the 
$350,000 
(inflation-adjusted) 
cap 
for 
medical 
malpractice.  Such an interpretation produces an absurd result.  
See Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶32, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
("Because 
a 
literal 
application . . . would 
produce 
an 
absurd 
and 
unreasonable 
result . . . [the court must] construe the statute to avoid that 
result.").  Justice Butler's concurrence fails to follow the 
rule of statutory interpretation that courts should construe 
statutes to avoid absurd results. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
46 
 
§ 893.55(4)(d) was declared unconstitutional in Ferdon, no cap 
applies to claims governed by this section, except as affected 
by statutory revisions adopted after Ferdon.   
¶116 (2) If the victim dies as a result of medical 
malpractice, recovery for claims for noneconomic damages for 
postdeath loss of society and companionship (i.e., wrongful 
death) is governed by the wrongful death cap under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(4).  The medical malpractice cap limits recovery for 
noneconomic damages for predeath claims.  In other words, the 
wrongful death statute and the medical malpractice statutes 
create different caps for the different injuries to the various 
individuals for their claims for noneconomic damages for pre- 
and postdeath loss of society and companionship. 
¶117 (3) When awards are made for noneconomic damages for 
both predeath claims for noneconomic damages and wrongful death 
claims, the awards should not, as the circuit court suggested, 
be regarded as "stacked."75  In insurance law, "stacking" refers 
to "the process of obtaining benefits from a second policy on 
the same claim when recovery from the first policy alone would 
                                                 
75 The circuit court stated in its July 1, 2004 decision on 
the various postverdict motions that applying two caps is 
"commonly referred to as 'stacking the caps.'"   
The circuit court concluded that the medical malpractice 
cap and the wrongful death cap should not be "stacked." 
The Maurin majority opinion also used the words "stack one 
on top of the other" to refer to applying both caps.  Maurin, 
274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶42. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
47 
 
be inadequate."76  In stacking insurance policies, one policy is 
placed on top of the other, providing additional coverage for 
the same claim.   
¶118 If the insurance concept of stacking were applied in 
the context of medical malpractice damage awards, "stacking" 
would refer to putting one damage cap on top of another to allow 
greater recovery for the same claim.  But a wrongful death claim 
and a claim for predeath noneconomic damages are not the same 
claim; recovery for each claim is not recovery for the same 
claim.  Thus, awarding noneconomic damages for both a wrongful 
death claim and a predeath claim does not constitute stacking 
awards or damages. 
¶119 (4) The unremarkable conclusion of this opinion is 
that the legislature allowed for the recovery of greater but 
still limited damages when medical malpractice results in a 
victim's death than when medical malpractice does not result in 
the victim's death.77   
 
 
                                                 
76 Black's Law Dictionary 1412 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
77 The defendants contend that this outcome has the effect 
of overturning the court's decision in Czapinski v. St. Francis 
Hospital, Inc., 2000 WI 80, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120.  
The Czapinski decision governed only who is eligible to bring a 
cause of action for wrongful death in a medical malpractice 
case; it did not address the amount of damages those claimants 
could recover.  Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶2; see Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶154 (Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring).  
The holdings of the instant case have no effect on Czapinski. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
48 
 
VI 
 
¶120 Thus far, this opinion has concluded that Maurin was 
incorrectly decided and must be overruled.  In its place, this 
opinion has adopted an interpretation consistent with the text 
of the medical malpractice and wrongful death statutes and the 
statutory and legislative histories of the statutes and the 
enunciated legislative policy of placing medical malpractice 
wrongful death claims "on the same footing" as wrongful death 
claims in other tort actions.78  In rejecting Maurin and adopting 
a two-cap analysis of the medical malpractice and wrongful death 
caps, this opinion rejects two alternative readings of the 
malpractice caps when medical malpractice results in death:  a 
single global medical malpractice cap for all noneconomic 
damages and a single global wrongful death cap for all 
noneconomic damages.   
¶121 This opinion now considers another analysis of the cap 
statutes, suggested at oral argument.   Under 
this 
analysis, 
Maurin is correct.  Claimants may, however, avoid the result 
dictated by Maurin by pursuing only the claims for predeath 
noneconomic damages under the medical malpractice cap and 
abandoning noneconomic damages for a wrongful death claim for 
postdeath loss of society and companionship.  If the claimants 
choose to proceed with a wrongful death claim, their noneconomic 
damages are limited by the single global noneconomic damages cap 
                                                 
78 Maurin, 
274 
Wis. 2d 28, 
¶69; 
see 
also 
id., 
¶147 
(Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
49 
 
adopted in Maurin.  In other words, claimants may avoid the 
result dictated by Maurin by proceeding as though the medical 
malpractice 
victim 
had 
not 
died. 
 
According 
to 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence 
(joined 
by 
Justices 
Wilcox 
and 
Prosser), it is not too late for  Robert Bartholomew to reject 
noneconomic damages awarded for wrongful death and, instead, 
accept the noneconomic damages for his and the estate's predeath 
claims that under Ferdon are not capped, or vice versa. 
¶122 This analysis fails both in theory and practice.  It 
fails in theory because it relies on this court's erroneous 
decision in Maurin. Furthermore, nothing in the statutes 
indicates that the legislature intended to force claimants to 
give up some of their claims in order to enable other claimants 
to recover more on their claims.  Had the legislature intended 
to force the victim's family and estate to choose between 
noneconomic pre- and postdeath claims, it would have said so 
explicitly. 
¶123 Moreover, forcing claimants to choose one of these 
paths fails to effectuate the legislative policy underlying the 
wrongful death cap in medical malpractice actions, namely to 
place wrongful death claims in medical malpractice cases on the 
same footing as wrongful death claims generally in tort cases.  
In medical malpractice cases, claimants would be forced to 
choose between noneconomic damages for postdeath loss of society 
and companionship (wrongful death) and recovery for predeath 
noneconomic damages.  But in other tort cases the statutes force 
no such choice.  Thus, this "choose your claim" analysis does 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
50 
 
not effectuate the legislative policy underlying the wrongful 
death cap in medical malpractice actions. 
¶124 This suggested analysis fails in practice because 
claimants may have conflicting interests and may not agree on 
which path to follow.  The present case may be an easy case in 
which to apply the suggested analysis.  If Robert Bartholomew is 
the sole beneficiary of his wife's estate, he is the sole 
recipient of all the noneconomic damage awards.  He may choose 
the path leading to the cap that is most advantageous to him.   
¶125 But not every case is an easy case.  When a wrongful 
death claimant is not the same person as the beneficiary of the 
estate or a claimant for noneconomic damages for predeath loss 
of society and companionship, the claimants may disagree about 
which path to follow.  Nothing in the statutes and no case law 
has been cited to resolve a stalemate among the claimants.79 
¶126 Because Maurin was wrongly decided and because there 
are practical impediments to the "choose your own claim" 
analysis, this opinion and Justice Butler do not adopt this 
analysis. 
                                                 
79 In addition, even if there were no conflict among 
claimants, claimants may not be able to control which cap 
applies.  If a claimant states claims based only on predeath 
injuries, a defendant might defend on the ground that the 
medical malpractice resulted in death and that, under Maurin, 
the damages are subject only to the wrongful death cap.  Or if 
the claimant states claims based only on wrongful death, the 
defense might be that the medical malpractice did not result in 
death.  Under either circumstance the claimant may lose all 
noneconomic damages.  These are issues not addressed by Maurin 
or this alternative interpretation. 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
51 
 
* * * * 
¶127 In sum, the author of this opinion, Justice Bradley, 
and Justice Crooks agree with the position advocated by Robert 
Bartholomew, which is essentially the position taken by the 
concurring opinion in Maurin.  We three and Justice Butler 
conclude that Maurin's interpretation of Wisconsin's medical 
malpractice and wrongful death statutes to impose a single 
global wrongful death cap on all noneconomic damages is flawed 
because it failed to take into account the well-established 
distinction in Wisconsin tort law between actions for predeath 
damages and actions for postdeath damages (wrongful death 
actions).  We three further conclude that the legislature 
adopted two caps: a medical malpractice cap for noneconomic 
damages for predeath claims and a wrongful death cap for 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
postdeath 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship.  Claimants can thus recover for the different 
damages up to the separate limits of the applicable respective 
cap.     
¶128 The conclusions in this opinion are compelled by basic 
principles of tort law and by the text and the statutory and 
legislative histories of the medical malpractice and wrongful 
death statutes capping noneconomic damages, and the policy 
enunciated by the legislature in adopting a wrongful death cap 
in medical malpractice actions.     
¶129 We three, joined by Justice Butler (whose rationale is 
different), therefore hold that the jury award of noneconomic 
damages for predeath claims, namely the claim for the decedent's 
No. 
2004AP2592   
 
52 
 
predeath pain and suffering, and the jury award for predeath 
loss of society and companionship are governed by the cap set 
forth in the medical malpractice statutes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(d).  In the instant case, however, no cap applies to 
these noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions because 
§ 893.55(4)(d) was held unconstitutional in Ferdon.  The jury's 
$350,000 award for Robert Bartholomew's postdeath loss of 
society and companionship stands; it is within the wrongful 
death cap. 
¶130 Accordingly we three, joined by 
Justice Butler, 
overturn the contrary holding in Maurin and reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.  We remand the matter to the circuit 
court to reinstate each of the jury's awards for noneconomic 
damages in accordance with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
1 
 
¶131 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I join the lead 
opinion, 
and 
strongly 
support 
its 
conclusion 
that 
"the 
legislature adopted two caps that apply in the event of death 
resulting from medical malpractice:  a medical malpractice cap 
for noneconomic damages for predeath claims and a wrongful death 
cap for noneconomic damages for postdeath claims."  Lead op., 
¶16.  I write separately to address Justice Butler's concurrence 
and his erroneous interpretation and application of the phrase 
"for each occurrence" in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b)(2003-04).1  He 
claims that the phrase results in an "occurrence-based total 
global cap on the recovery of all noneconomic damages that arise 
from medical malpractice."  Justice Butler's concurrence, ¶154 
(footnote omitted).  As we discussed in our concurrence in 
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, 
(Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, 
J.) 
an 
interpretation 
of 
the 
phrase 
"for 
each 
occurrence" that imposes a global cap on recovery in both 
survivorship and wrongful death claims in a suit involving 
medical malpractice is unconstitutional, leads to an absurd 
result, and ignores the scope, context, purpose, structure, and 
even the legislative history of that statute, when looked at 
with related statutes.   
¶132 Justice 
Butler's 
concurrence 
advances 
an 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(b) and (4)(d) that 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
2 
 
clearly renders the statutes unconstitutional.2  In concluding 
that the legislature created a total global cap on the recovery 
of all noneconomic damages arising out of an occurrence of 
medical malpractice,3 Justice Butler's erroneous interpretation 
of the statute leads to a global cap that is violative of both 
Article I, Section 5 and Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, when linked and read together, as well as 
principles of equal protection.4  As we stated in our concurrence 
in Maurin: 
                                                 
2 Contrary to the statement in Justice Butler's concurrence, 
I would have this court decide constitutional issues that need 
to be reached based on recent legislative actions.  See Justice 
Butler's concurrence, ¶150 n.2.  I write to address the 
constitutional infirmity of the erroneous position set forth in 
Justice Butler's concurrence.   Despite his best effort to avoid 
the constitutional principles involved, his concurrence is 
unpersuasive when it contains the claim that our decision in 
Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, makes a constitutional analysis 
unnecessary.  Such a claim ignores the fact that the Wisconsin 
Legislature 
has 
recently 
enacted 
a 
new 
cap 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (2005-06).  
3 Justice Butler's concurrence, ¶154.  His concurrence must 
be met head-on now, since it could conceivably have significant 
implications, especially if, in the future, this court were to 
find the recently enacted cap on noneconomic damages in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) to be constitutional. 
4 Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part: "No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."   
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution states, 
in relevant part: "All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed." 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
3 
 
Such a low cap on noneconomic damages effectively 
denies plaintiffs the constitutional right to trial by 
jury under Article I, Section 5 and, in turn, to a 
remedy as guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Moreover, the majority’s 
conclusion is violative of equal protection principles 
embodied 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions.   
Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶197 (Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., 
concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.)(footnotes omitted).   
¶133 Courts in several other states have reached similar 
conclusions that, under certain circumstances, statutory damages 
caps unconstitutionally limit a claimant's access to the courts 
and right to a remedy.5  It has been noted before that medical 
malpractice cases are very expensive to litigate.6  See id., 
¶209.  The imposition of a global cap on the recovery of all 
noneconomic damages arising out of an occurrence of medical 
malpractice, as championed in Justice Butler's concurrence, 
frustrates the ability of medical malpractice claimants to 
obtain legal counsel and, most significantly, to have access to 
¶a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, Section 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, especially when read in conjunction with 
Article I, Section 9 of that constitution.  
                                                 
5 See Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶198-202, 274 Wis. 2d 
28, 
682 
N.W.2d 
866 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
and 
Crooks, 
J., 
concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.).  States having 
determined 
that 
certain 
statutory 
damages 
caps 
do 
unconstitutionally limit a claimant's access to the courts and 
right to a remedy include Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, New 
Hampshire, Maine, and Missouri.  Id. 
6 The expense of medical malpractice cases is due, at least 
in part, to the need for expert testimony.  See id., ¶209. 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
4 
 
¶134 Wisconsin courts have long recognized the importance 
of a litigant's right to a remedy.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶203 
(Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, J.) (citing Knickerbocker v. Beaudette Garage Co., 190 
Wis. 474, 480-81, 209 N.W.2d 763 (1926)).  Article I, Section 9 
of the Wisconsin Constitution does not confer any rights per se, 
but it does ensure a remedy when an injury results from 
violation of a legal right.  Id., ¶207.  Justice Butler's 
concurrence states that all claims arising out of an occurrence 
of medical malpractice——regardless of whether the claim is for 
injury, for wrongful death, or for both——are subject to the 
limit 
established 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d). 
 
Justice 
Butler's concurrence, ¶154.  It is important to understand that 
the imposition of a single global cap on noneconomic damages 
effectively deprives a wrongful death claimant in a medical 
malpractice case of a remedy for his or her claim, and forces 
him or her to share the capped amount recovered with claimants 
for predeath noneconomic damages.  Lead op., ¶111. 
¶135 Additionally, the erroneous interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(b) and (4)(d), as set forth in Justice 
Butler's concurrence, violates the equal protection clause of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, because it unduly burdens medical 
malpractice plaintiffs without a rational basis to justify such 
an 
interpretation. 
 
See 
Maurin, 
274 
Wis. 
2d 
28, 
¶214 
(Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, J.).  In order to bring an equal protection claim, a 
party must prove that a statute treats similarly situated 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
5 
 
members of a class differently.  Id., ¶212.  In medical 
malpractice 
cases, 
no 
fundamental 
right 
is 
implicated; 
therefore, a rational basis standard applies.  Id.  A statute 
will be upheld under equal protection principles if we find that 
a rational basis supports the legislative classification.  Id.   
¶136 The rationale adopted in Justice Butler's concurrence 
fails to advance the purpose of the legislature, and assigns to 
medical malpractice plaintiffs the unfair burden of maintaining 
the financial well-being of the medical industry.  Id., ¶213.  
As explained in the lead opinion in this case, the application 
of a single global medical malpractice cap places wrongful death 
claimants in medical malpractice actions on different footing 
than wrongful death claimants in other tort actions.  Lead op., 
¶112.  This differential treatment of similarly situated 
claimants offends principles of equal protection.  See Maurin, 
274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶212-215 (Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., 
concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.).   
¶137 Additionally, the application of a single global 
medical malpractice cap to wrongful death claims for postdeath 
noneconomic 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship 
and 
to 
survivorship claims for noneconomic loss leads to absurd 
results.  See id., ¶194; see also lead op., ¶112 n.74. As the 
lead opinion explained: 
the rationality of the law of medical malpractice is 
compromised when a medical malpractice victim sustains 
serious injury but survives and is subject to no cap 
on noneconomic damages, while a victim who is fatally 
injured and suffers for years before death resulting 
from medical malpractice is limited in noneconomic 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
6 
 
damages for predeath claims to the $350,000 wrongful 
death cap.   
Lead op., ¶48. 
¶138 As noted previously, it is important to look at scope, 
context, purpose, structure, and even the legislative history of 
the statutes involved.  It is relevant to consider the 
relationship among the principal statutes at issue.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.55(4)(b), the medical malpractice statute, provides, 
in pertinent part: "[t]he total noneconomic damages recoverable 
for bodily injury or death . . . may not exceed the limit under 
par. (d) for each occurrence on or after May 25, 1995, from all 
health care providers . . . who are found negligent. . . ." 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶139 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f), relating to wrongful 
death, provides, in relevant part:  "[n]otwithstanding the 
limits on noneconomic damages under this subsection, damages 
recoverable against health care providers . . . for wrongful 
death 
are 
subject 
to 
the 
limit 
under 
s. 
895.04(4)."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4), directed at wrongful death claims, 
provides, in relevant part: "[j]udgement for damages for 
pecuniary injury from wrongful death may be awarded to any 
person entitled to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional 
damages not to exceed . . .  $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of a deceased adult, for loss of society and companionship. . . 
." 
¶140 In 
the 
Maurin 
concurrence, 
we 
explained 
that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(d) and (4)(f) provide "separate and 
distinct" limits on noneconomic damages when medical malpractice 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
7 
 
results in wrongful death.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶177 
(Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by 
Bradley, 
J.). 
 
As 
we 
noted 
in 
that 
concurrence, 
Wis. Stat. § 655.017 provides "'[t]he amount of noneconomic 
damages recoverable by a claimant or plaintiff under this 
chapter for acts or omissions of a health care provider . . . is 
subject to the limits under s.893.55(4)(d) and (f). . . .'"  
Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶180 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 655.017) 
(emphasis in Maurin).  Rather than limiting recovery to "the 
lesser 
of 
either 
the 
§ 893.55(4)(d) 
limit 
for 
medical 
malpractice or the § 893.55(4)(f) limit for wrongful death. . . 
. § 655.017 directs us to both §§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f) to assess 
the limits on damages imposed in cases of medical malpractice 
causing wrongful death."  Id., ¶181; see also lead op., ¶79.  
The use of the conjunctive word "and" is extremely important in 
properly interpreting the relationship of these sections.   
¶141 Having identified a phrase ("for each occurrence") in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) that he claims was "ignore[d]" by the 
lead opinion, Justice Butler's concurrence applies what is 
claimed to be a plain meaning analysis to the phrase, and 
reaches the conclusion that such phrase unambiguously creates an 
"occurrence-based total global cap on the recovery of all 
noneconomic damages 
that 
arise from 
medical 
malpractice."  
Justice Butler's concurrence, ¶154 (footnote omitted).   His 
concurrence lacks a thoughtful, careful analysis because the 
phrase "for each occurrence" is viewed in isolation.  The 
concurrence fails to take into account the statutory scope, 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
8 
 
context, purpose and structure, and ignores the legislative 
histories of the medical malpractice and wrongful death cap 
statutes.  See lead op., ¶¶ 99-107.  A one paragraph analysis of 
the phrase "for each occurrence" is simply not sufficient under 
such circumstances. 
¶142 Far from ignoring the statutory language, the lead 
opinion engages in a substantive discussion of the "occurrence" 
language in "Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(4)(b) and 895.04(4) referring 
to 'each occurrence' and 'per occurrence,' respectively. . . ."  
Lead op., ¶92.  The lead opinion explains that to understand the 
meaning of the words "for each occurrence" in § 893.55(4)(b), 
one must consider it in the context of statutory phrases "total 
noneconomic damages" and "bodily injury or death."  Id., ¶95.   
¶143 Because the words "or death" have a separate and 
distinct 
meaning 
in 
the 
law 
from 
"wrongful 
death," 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) 
must 
be 
read 
as 
applying 
"to 
noneconomic damages for predeath claims, regardless of whether 
the medical malpractice victim incurs bodily injury or death."  
Lead op., ¶96.  I wholeheartedly agree with the lead opinion 
that the words "per occurrence" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4), the 
wrongful death statute, do not impose a single global cap on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.  The 
statutory "per occurrence" language was inserted "to ensure that 
all claimants for wrongful death (that is, claims for postdeath 
loss of society and companionship) share a single wrongful death 
cap."  Id., ¶98; see also id., ¶98 n.67. 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
9 
 
¶144 Furthermore, I am satisfied that the lead opinion is 
correct when it highlights the Maurin majority's significant 
observation that it could "'conceive of no purpose for creating 
§ 893.55(4)(f) if the legislature intended to retain the single 
cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) [the medical malpractice cap] 
to cover total noneconomic damages in a wrongful death case 
involving medical malpractice.'"  Lead op., ¶94 (quoting Maurin, 
274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶35 (emphasis in Maurin)).  As the lead opinion 
here explains, subsection (4)(f) "was enacted, as the statutory 
and legislative histories show, to overturn the case law 
interpreting the medical malpractice cap as imposing a single 
global cap for all noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases regardless of the death of the victim."  Lead op., ¶94 
(citing Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 665-69, 456 N.W.2d 
336 (1990)).   
¶145 The legislative history buttresses my conclusions 
here.  As we concluded in our concurrence in Maurin, referring 
to a Memorandum, in regard to 1997 Act 89, from a senior staff 
attorney at the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB)7 the LRB 
"analysis of the bill . . . demonstrates that the bill creates 
two separate statutory limits, one on noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases and one on damages for wrongful death 
(loss of society and companionship) arising from medical 
malpractice."  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶193 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.) 
                                                 
7 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶161 n.41 (Abrahamson, C.J., and 
Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.); see also 
lead op., ¶98 n.67. 
No.  2004AP2592.npc 
 
10 
 
(footnotes omitted).  Because it would render that and related 
statutes unconstitutional, lead to absurd results, and is at 
odds with the statutory scope, context, purpose, structure, and 
legislative history, Justice Butler's erroneous interpretation 
of the phrase "for each occurrence" in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) 
cannot be accepted, even though he reaches the correct result as 
far as the mandate in this case.  Where a death results from 
medical malpractice, the legislature enacted two caps on 
noneconomic damages, one for predeath claims and a wrongful 
death cap for postdeath claims.  I strongly support the 
reasoning and conclusions of the lead opinion and write 
separately in order to respond to Justice Butler's concurrence. 
¶146 For the forgoing reasons, I join the lead opinion, and 
respectfully concur.   
 
 
 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶147 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  The lead 
opinion holds that the jury award of noneconomic damages for 
pre-death claims to Robert Bartholomew (Bartholomew) is governed 
by the cap set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-04).1  
Lead op., ¶129.  As the lead opinion recognizes, however, no cap 
applies to these noneconomic damages in this case because 
§ 893.55(4)(d) was held unconstitutional in Ferdon v. Wisconsin 
Patients 
Comp. 
Fund, 
2005 
WI 
125, 
284 
Wis. 2d 573, 
701 
N.W.2d 440.  Lead op., ¶129.  The lead opinion also holds that 
the jury's $350,000 award for Bartholomew's post-death loss of 
society and companionship stands; it is within the wrongful 
death cap.  Id.   
¶148 In reaching this decision, the lead opinion adopts 
"essentially the position taken by the concurring opinion in 
Maurin [v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866.]"  
Lead op., ¶127.  The lead opinion concludes that Maurin's 
interpretation of Wisconsin's medical malpractice and wrongful 
death statutes to impose a single global wrongful death cap on 
all noneconomic damages is flawed because it failed to take into 
account the well-established distinction between actions for 
pre-death and post-death actions for damages.  Id.  The lead 
opinion further concludes that the legislature adopted two 
separate caps, one for pre-death claims and one for post-death 
claims, and that both claims can be stacked up to the separate 
limits of the applicable respective cap.  Id.  The lead opinion 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
2 
 
would accordingly overturn the contrary holding in Maurin and 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals in this case. 
¶149 Justice Roggensack's concurring/dissenting opinion, on 
the other hand, concludes that Maurin correctly decided that the 
legislature created an occurrence-based cap on the recovery of 
all noneconomic damages that arise from medical malpractice, to 
which all plaintiffs and all types of claims are subject.  
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶174. 
Justice 
Roggensack also concludes that Maurin does not prevent selecting 
whichever cap on noneconomic damages the plaintiffs prefer.  Id.  
She would not overrule Maurin, but does concur in the mandate to 
reverse the court of appeals.  Id.           
¶150 The lines drawn in each of these opinions are 
essentially the same lines drawn in Maurin.  The lead opinion 
(and the Maurin concurrence) seeks to preserve all pre-death and 
post-death common law claims as separate and distinct, in spite 
of legislation to the contrary.  Justice Roggensack's opinion 
(and the majority in Maurin) rewrites that legislation in the 
face of express language to the contrary.  Although I agree with 
today's mandate, I write separately because I respectfully 
disagree with both opinions' analyses regarding the interaction 
between the statutory limits on recovery for injuries caused by 
medical malpractice and the statutory limits on recovery for 
medical 
malpractice 
that 
results 
in 
wrongful 
death. 
I 
essentially conclude that the position advocated by Dr. Hall and 
the Patients Compensation Fund in Maurin properly interprets 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
3 
 
Wisconsin's statutory scheme, as it then existed.2 In other 
words, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) then provided a global cap for 
pre-death and post-death noneconomic damages. That statute was 
subsequently held to be unconstitutional in Ferdon, so that the 
global cap no longer exists in this case.  The wrongful death 
cap remains in the wrongful death action. Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.                     
¶151 The lead opinion relies on Wis. Stat. § 655.017 (2003-
04) in concluding that the amount recoverable for medical 
malpractice injuries is found in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) and 
(f).  Lead op., ¶¶78-79.  The lead opinion concludes that there 
are two separate and independent caps: "a medical malpractice 
cap for noneconomic damages for pre-death claims and a wrongful 
                                                 
2 I do not reach the question of whether, when there are 
multiple 
claimants, 
claims, 
or 
awards, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution prohibits reducing a medical malpractice award 
within an occurrence-based total global cap.  See lead op., ¶43.  
Based on how I construe the plain meaning of the statutes in 
this case, and based on our decision last term in Ferdon v. 
Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 
N.W.2d 440, I see no reason to reach the other constitutional 
issues that Justice Crooks' concurrence would have us decide.  
Compare Justice Crooks' concurrence.  See also State v. Manuel, 
2005 WI 75, ¶25 n.4, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811 (citing 
Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938)) (only 
dispositive issues need be addressed). We do not normally decide 
constitutional questions if the case can be resolved on other 
grounds. State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637; Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 
351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984). I discern only that the 
legislature statutorily created an occurrence-based total global 
cap on the recovery of all noneconomic damages that arise from 
medical malpractice, and that cap has previously been ruled to 
be 
unconstitutional 
in 
Ferdon. 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.017, 
"[t]he 
amount 
of 
noneconomic 
damages 
recoverable 
by 
a 
claimant . . . is subject to the limits under s. 893.55(4)(d) 
and (f)." 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
4 
 
death cap for noneconomic damages for post-death claims."  Id., 
¶16.  Under the lead opinion's decision, neither subsection 
controls nor impacts the other. 
¶152 The lead opinion is correct, up to a point.  The 
distinction between claims for noneconomic damages for a 
victim's pre-death pain and suffering (survival actions) and 
claims for noneconomic damages for post-death (wrongful death) 
injuries is well-established in Wisconsin law.  Lead op., ¶54 
(citing Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 56, 208 N.W. 
901 (1926)).  See also Brown v. The Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 102 
Wis. 137, 142, 77 N.W. 748 (1898), reh. den., 78 N.W. 771 
(1899); Woodward v. The Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 400, 405-
06 (1868).  Claimants for the two types of actions might not be 
the same person.  Lead op., ¶59.  The two claims do not provide 
for a double recovery, but instead provide "recovery for a 
double wrong."  Id., ¶54.  Under common law, "stacking" these 
different types of claims has already been recognized by this 
court.  See id., ¶69 n.53.  In the absence of clear legislation 
to the contrary, I would join the lead opinion.3           
¶153 However, the lead opinion's analysis ignores the 
impact of subsection (4)(b). Lead op., ¶¶91-93 (examining 
                                                 
3 See Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶29, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 
694 N.W.2d 296 ("Statutes in derogation of the common law are to 
be strictly construed."); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. 
Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981) ("Statutes are 
not to be construed as changing the common law unless the 
purpose to effect such change is clearly expressed therein.  To 
have such effect the language (of the statute) must be clear, 
unambiguous and peremptory . . . . The legislative intent to 
change the common law must be expressed beyond any reasonable 
doubt." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b)).  This case presents a question of 
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. 
Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315.  "We 
begin with the statute's language because we assume that the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the words it used."  Id.  
In addition, statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely related statutes, and interpreted to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
See also State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 326-30, 243 
N.W.2d 410 (1976) (concluding that when two statutes are "in 
pari materia, the court must harmonize them if possible"). 
¶154 Subsection (4)(b) clearly stated that the total amount 
recoverable for all claims arising out of an occurrence of 
medical malpractice——regardless of whether the claim is for an 
injury, for wrongful death, or for both——is subject to the limit 
established in § 893.55(4)(d).  The statute stated: 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for bodily 
injury or death, including any action or proceeding 
based on contribution or indemnification, may not 
exceed the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence on 
or after May 25, 1995, from all health care providers 
and all employees of health care providers acting 
within the scope of their employment and providing 
health care services who are found negligent and from 
the injured patients and families compensation fund. 
§ 893.55(4)(b).4  Based on this language, I agree with Justice 
Roggensack and the Maurin majority that the legislature created 
                                                 
4 On March 22, 2006, this subsection was amended.  2005 Wis. 
Act 183, § 6.   
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
6 
 
an occurrence-based total global cap on the recovery of all 
noneconomic 
damages 
that 
arise 
from 
medical 
malpractice.5  
Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶174; Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶44.   
¶155 I do not agree with the Maurin court's conclusion that 
the words of the statute, "or death," "show that the legislature 
intended to provide a single recovery even if the medical 
malpractice resulted in wrongful death." Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 
¶23.6  Nor do I agree with Justice Roggensack that the "stacking 
of caps for the recovery of noneconomic damages is precluded by 
statute."  Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶182.  To 
read the statute in this fashion would read out of the statute 
the phrase, "including any action or proceeding based on 
contribution or indemnification[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(b) 
(emphasis added).  It would also fail to take into account 
subsection (4)(d), which refers to "[t]he limit on total 
                                                 
5 As indicated earlier, I do not reach the question of 
whether, when there are multiple claimants or multiple awards, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
prohibits 
reducing 
a 
medical 
malpractice award within an occurrence-based total global cap.  
See supra, n.2.  
6 The decision in Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, is "unsound in principle," as it 
contradicts the express language of the statute and ignores 
common law that has not been affected by the creation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f).  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers 
Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257 (citations omitted).  As such, although I disagree 
with the lead opinion's rationale, I agree that Maurin's holding 
"that the wrongful death cap in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) is the 
single cap to be applied globally to all noneconomic damages 
when a victim of medical malpractice action dies should be 
overruled[.]"  Lead op., ¶51. 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
7 
 
noneconomic damages for each occurrence under par. (b)[.]"  
Finally, it would fail to take into account that portion of 
subsection (4)(b) with respect to "bodily injury or death."  
These subsections, when read together, indicate that multiple 
claims, whether for injury or death, arising out of the same 
occurrence of malpractice are governed by one total global cap.  
Nothing in the language of these statutes suggests that the 
legislature limited or eliminated the number of claims, parties, 
or types 
of 
actions that 
could 
be 
brought 
for medical 
malpractice within the total global cap.7  I interpret and apply 
the law as drafted by the legislature, as opposed to what it 
might mean based on our construction of what the legislature may 
have intended to do.8    
                                                 
 
7 See Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶29.  See also Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶184.  To the extent that the 
creation of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) does not expressly alter 
any common law, common law prevails. 
8 "Ours is 'a government of laws not men,' and 'it is simply 
incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with 
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what 
the 
lawgiver 
meant, 
rather 
than 
by 
what 
the 
lawgiver 
promulgated. . . .  It is the law that governs, not the intent 
of the lawgiver . . . .  Men may intend what they will; but it 
is only the laws that they enact which bind us.'" State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶52, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation 17 (Princeton University Press) (1997) (footnote 
omitted)). 
Contrast 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence, 
¶136; 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶179. 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
8 
 
¶156 Subsection (4)(f), which limits the recovery for 
medical malpractice that results in wrongful death,9 operates 
within the total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims 
arising out of the same occurrence of medical malpractice under 
subsection (4)(d).10  Together, subsections (4)(b), (4)(d), and 
(4)(f) create a "cap within a cap."  Pursuant to subsection 
(4)(b), recovery for injuries caused by medical malpractice 
cannot exceed the limits established in subsection (4)(d), 
recovery for medical malpractice that results in wrongful death 
cannot exceed the limits established in subsection (4)(f), and 
together, the total recovery for medical malpractice injury and 
medical malpractice that results in wrongful death cannot exceed 
the limits established in subsection (4)(d).  A plaintiff or 
different plaintiffs could bring both survivorship claims and 
                                                 
9 Under subsection (4)(f), recovery for medical malpractice 
that results in wrongful death is limited to the statutory limit 
for 
any 
other 
wrongful 
death 
claim, 
established 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f). 
10 I agree with Justice Roggensack that the creation of 
subsection (4)(f) was intended to overrule this court's decision 
in Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 
512 
N.W.2d 764 
(1994). 
The 
Maurin 
majority, 
however, 
misinterprets the reason for the creation of subsection (4)(f).  
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶34-35, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866.  In my view, subsection (4)(f) created the necessary 
link that would create a "cap within a cap" that was held to be 
absent in Jelinek, and made it clear that there was, indeed, a 
wrongful death cap in medical malpractice actions included 
within the total global cap.         
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
9 
 
wrongful death claims under the statute, as long as those claims 
did not exceed the total global cap under subsection (4)(d).11  
¶157 In Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶10, subsection (4)(d) was 
ruled unconstitutional.12  As a result, there now is no statutory 
limit on the total amount that Helen's estate or her husband 
could recover.  However, the wrongful death limit, pursuant to 
subsection (4)(f), remains in effect.   
                                                 
11 There is simply no basis under the statutes or common law 
that would require a plaintiff or different plaintiffs to "pick 
and choose" which cap is best for them, or for the circuit court 
to decide which cap should be applied.  See Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶197, 200. 
I also note that were the court to follow the approach 
advocated by Justice Roggensack in her concurrence/dissent, 
whereby claimants must choose between the different caps on 
noneconomic damages, such a choice would implicate those 
constitutional 
concerns 
raised 
by 
Justice 
Crooks 
in 
his 
concurrence.  Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶132. 
12 This ruling resolves the concerns raised in the lead 
opinion about the absurdity of trying to fit the wrongful death 
cap for minor children post-1998 into the "total noneconomic 
damages cap" for medical malpractice as adjusted in this case.  
See lead opinion, ¶110 n.73. 
No.  2004AP2592.lbb 
 
10 
 
¶158 Because the jury award for Helen's wrongful death did 
not exceed the $350,000 statutory limit on medical malpractice 
resulting in wrongful death, the jury award——$500,000 to Helen 
Bartholomew's estate for her pre-death pain and suffering, 
$350,000 to Robert Bartholomew for his pre-death loss of society 
and companionship, and $350,000 to Robert Bartholomew for his 
loss of society and companionship after Helen's death——was 
within the statutory limits. 
¶159 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
   
No.  2004AP2592.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶160 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  In Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866, this court was asked to interpret and apply the 
medical malpractice and wrongful death statutes in the case of a 
child who died as the result of a physician's failure to 
diagnose her acute diabetic ketoacidosis. 
¶161 The facts were critical to the disposition of the 
case.  The child's mother brought her to a clinic on a Tuesday.  
Late Wednesday evening, the child was taken to a hospital.  The 
failure to make a correct diagnosis occurred at this time.  The 
next morning, Thursday, the child was returned to the hospital 
where a correct diagnosis was made.  After the hospital 
attempted treatment, it rushed the child to Children's Hospital 
of Wisconsin in Milwaukee.  On Friday the child died.  The child 
lost consciousness during the ambulance ride to Children's 
Hospital. 
¶162 In subsequent litigation, a Washington County jury 
awarded the child's estate $550,000 for the child's pre-death 
pain and suffering.  It awarded $2,500,000 to the child's 
parents as wrongful death damages for their loss of society and 
companionship.  At that time, there was a cap of $381,428 on 
medical malpractice noneconomic damages and a cap of $150,000 on 
wrongful death noneconomic damages.   
¶163 The Washington County Circuit Court determined that 
the $150,000 wrongful death cap was unconstitutional.  This 
ruling made the child's parents eligible for the $2,500,000 jury 
No.  2004AP2592.dtp 
 
2 
 
award.  However, the court remitted the $550,000 award for the 
child's pre-death pain and suffering to $100,000.1 
¶164 In this court, the plaintiffs sought to uphold the 
$2,500,000 award and to overturn the remittitur.  As a fallback 
position, plaintiffs sought to add the two caps of $381,428 and 
$150,000 for an award of $531,428. 
¶165 Two members of the court——Chief Justice Abrahamson and 
Justice Crooks——bought into the plaintiffs' argument that the 
wrongful death cap was unconstitutional.  Three members of the 
court——Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice 
Crooks——declared that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in remittitur.  The same three members of the 
court concluded that the statutory scheme made the plaintiffs 
eligible for the limits on noneconomic damages for both medical 
negligence and wrongful death, i.e., $531,428. 
¶166 A majority of the court concluded that the statutory 
scheme contemplated a single award for a single occurrence in a 
medical malpractice case.  Derivative claims from that single 
occurrence were governed by the applicable cap, which, in that 
case, was the wrongful death cap.  The court's analysis in 
reaching this conclusion is set out at considerable length.  
Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d at 28, ¶¶18-89. 
¶167 The present case has very different facts because 
Helen Bartholomew lived for five years after the alleged 
malpractice.  That she ultimately died does not alter the fact 
                                                 
1 The child was conscious for less than 24 hours after the 
misdiagnosis. 
No.  2004AP2592.dtp 
 
3 
 
that she clearly qualified under the medical malpractice 
statute.  Her husband Robert's derivative claims did not need to 
be brought under the wrongful death statute. 
¶168 I join the concurrence/dissent of Justice Roggensack 
in its entirety because it fully explains Maurin and produces a 
fair result in this case. 
¶169 In retrospect, a judicial writer is often able to 
conceive of a more precise, inclusive, or felicitous phrase than 
one he used in a published opinion.  That is true with the 
Maurin opinion.  Yet, after reflection, I would not change the 
substance or analysis of the Maurin opinion in any significant 
way because I think now, as I thought then, that it faithfully 
follows the language of the statute and the legislature's 
intent. 
¶170 As Abraham Lincoln might have put it, if I were to try 
to answer all the attacks on my opinions, "this shop might as 
well be closed for any other business.  I do the very best I 
know how——the very best I can; and I mean to keep on doing so 
until the end."  If the fair-minded reader reviews the Maurin 
analysis and agrees with the opinion, then all the condemnation 
won't amount to anything.  If the fair-minded reader thinks the 
analysis is not supported by the statutes, then ten angels 
swearing otherwise will make no difference. 
¶171 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
 
 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶172 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   The lead opinion concludes that our 
recent decision in Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 
682 N.W.2d 866, should be overruled in regard to Maurin's 
holding that the legislature established a single cap on the 
recovery of all noneconomic damages resulting from an occurrence 
of medical malpractice.  Lead opinion, ¶16.  The lead opinion is 
driven by its conclusion that Maurin "fails to take into account 
the well-established distinction in Wisconsin tort law between 
actions for noneconomic damages for predeath claims and a 
'wrongful death' claim, that is, a claim for noneconomic damages 
for postdeath loss of society and companionship."  Id.  
¶173 The lead opinion's conclusion is unsupported by legal 
principles for at least three reasons:  (1) At common law, there 
was no claim for wrongful death; the wrongful death claim was 
created entirely by the legislature.  Accordingly, there is no 
"well-established" postdeath common law claim which Maurin fails 
to take into account; (2) There is no compelling reason to 
disregard stare decisis and overturn Maurin; and (3) The lead 
opinion is based on its own policy choice about what is best for 
Wisconsin, 
rather 
giving 
deference 
to 
the 
acts 
of 
the 
legislature that created an occurrence-based classification for 
all noneconomic damages that result from medical malpractice.   
¶174 I conclude that Maurin correctly decided that the 
legislature created an occurrence-based cap on the recovery of 
all noneconomic damages that arise from medical malpractice, to 
which all plaintiffs and all types of claims are subject.  I 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
2 
 
also conclude that Maurin does not prevent the plaintiffs from 
selecting whichever cap on noneconomic damages they prefer.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion's 
decision to overrule Maurin.  However, I concur in the mandate 
to reverse the court of appeals because I would remand to the 
circuit court for a hearing on which cap is to be applied——the 
cap set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) or the cap set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶175 The lead opinion correctly sets out that Helen 
Bartholomew was the victim of medical malpractice when she had a 
heart attack that was not discovered soon enough to keep her 
from catastrophic injuries.  Lead op., ¶¶25-26.  After her 
release from the hospital, she remained in a nursing home until 
her death, five years after the occurrence of malpractice.  Id. 
at ¶26.   
¶176 Helen and her husband, Robert, began an action for 
malpractice before her death.  Id. at ¶27.  When she died, 
Robert, as the special administrator of Helen's estate, added a 
claim for wrongful death as well.  Id.  At the time those claims 
were tried, they had the potential to be affected by two 
different 
caps 
on 
the 
recovery 
of 
noneconomic 
damages.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-04)1 had the potential to 
apply to the recovery of predeath noneconomic damages arising 
from the medical malpractice, and Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) to the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
3 
 
recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages.2  However, in 
Maurin we concluded that the stacking of caps3 for the recovery 
of noneconomic damages that arose from an occurrence of medical 
malpractice 
was 
not 
permitted 
under 
the 
statutory 
plan 
established by the legislature.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶22.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶177 In order to decide whether stacking of caps for 
noneconomic damages arising from medical malpractice practice is 
permitted when the injured party lives for five years after an 
occurrence of medical malpractice, we apply statutes to known 
facts.  This presents a question of law for our independent 
review.  State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶5, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 
N.W.2d 276.  Whether a prior decision controls the question 
presented for review, is also a question we review de novo.  See 
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶¶37-38, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266.    
 
                                                 
2 The cap on noneconomic damages established in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4)(d) was held unconstitutional in Ferdon v. Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 
N.W.2d 440.   
3 The lead opinion asserts that it is not authorizing 
stacking of caps because stacking applies when there is only one 
claim and here there is more than one claim.  Lead op., ¶¶117-
18.  I disagree.  What the lead is endorsing is the stacking of 
the recovery of damages for direct and derivative claims arising 
out of an occurrence of medical malpractice where only one 
person suffers a direct injury from medical malpractice.  In my 
view, this is no different from stacking insurance policy limits 
to cover direct and derivative claims arising out of an 
automobile accident.   
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
4 
 
B. 
The Central Issue 
¶178 The central issue presented is whether plaintiffs may 
recover total noneconomic damages in an amount that is equal to 
the stacking of the cap for the recovery of noneconomic damages 
for wrongful death found in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) on top of the 
cap for the recovery of predeath noneconomic damages found in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d), when both claims arise from an 
occurrence of medical malpractice.   
 
1. 
Nature of the claims 
¶179 The lead opinion chooses to overrule Maurin based in 
large part on what it asserts to be the "well-established 
distinction" between claims for predeath noneconomic damages and 
postdeath noneconomic damages.  Lead op., ¶16.  This distinction 
has no relevance to the question Maurin decided which is, simply 
stated:  whether the legislature intended to limit the recovery 
of noneconomic damages for an occurrence of medical malpractice 
to one global cap.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶22. 
¶180 In order to re-examine that question, it is important 
to keep in mind that a claim for wrongful death did not exist at 
common law; it is a claim for relief that was created entirely 
by statute.  Weiss v. Regent Props., Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 
346 N.W.2d 766 (1984) (citing Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 
714, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968)).  The claim belongs to the 
beneficiaries of the deceased and was "designed to compensate 
for the loss of the relational interest existing between the 
beneficiaries and the decedent."  Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 230 
(citing Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 703, 709-10, 148 N.W.2d 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
5 
 
86 (1967)).  When the legislature created the claim for wrongful 
death, it limited who may sue for it; who may own the proceeds 
of the claim; and what damages may be recovered.  Weiss, 118 
Wis. 2d at 230-31.   
¶181 A claim for the deceased's predeath pain and suffering 
passes to the deceased's estate at death, and can be brought by 
the personal representative as part of his wrongful death 
action.  Schwab v. Nelson, 249 Wis. 563, 568, 25 N.W.2d 445 
(1946).  Under the wrongful death statute, the legislature has 
established a maximum amount that can be recovered for the 
death, no matter how many beneficiaries are entitled to share in 
the recovery.  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(3) and (4).  In a wrongful 
death action, recovery for a claimed relational injury is not 
automatic, but rather, the amount of damages must be proved by 
each survivor claiming an interest.  Keithley v. Keithley, 95 
Wis. 2d 136, 138, 289 N.W.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1980).  Wrongful 
death damages are not a part of the decedent's estate, to be 
divided simply based on a biological relationship to the 
decedent.  Id.  When the death is not caused by medical 
malpractice, the only limit is that set out in § 895.04(4).  
¶182 However, the claim for wrongful death is entirely a 
creature of the legislature, as are the limits on recovery of 
noneconomic damages due to medical malpractice.  The legislature 
has shown these classifications are linked by responding to an 
earlier decision of this court wherein we concluded that the 
caps on the recovery of noneconomic damages arising from medical 
malpractice caps did not apply to wrongful death claims.  
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
6 
 
Jelinek v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 512 
N.W.2d 
764 
(1994). 
The 
legislature 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(4) to overrule Jelinek.  Accordingly, as the wrongful 
death claim, the caps on wrongful death recovery and the caps on 
the recovery of noneconomic damages based on proven medical 
malpractice all are creatures of the legislature, it is 
reasonable 
to 
conclude, 
as 
we did 
in 
Maurin, 
that the 
legislature limited plaintiffs who have claims arising from an 
occurrence of medical malpractice to one global cap on the 
recovery of all noneconomic damages.  That is, stacking of caps 
for the recovery of noneconomic damages is precluded by statute.  
Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶22.   
2. 
Chapter 655  
¶183 Furthermore, we have also concluded that in regard to 
recoverable damages arising from an occurrence of medical 
malpractice, ch. 655 modifies the common law and other statutory 
law for claims made and the noneconomic damages that may be 
recovered.  Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶35, 265 
Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353.  The modification that ch. 655 
undertakes is in regard to "general civil law in instances where 
[ch. 655] speaks to a given subject."  Id.  If "general 
statutory provisions conflict with Chapter 655, the latter will 
trump the general statute."  Id.   
¶184 In Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4), the legislature spoke to 
the subject of recovery of noneconomic damages arising from 
medical 
malpractice.4 
 
Section 
893.55(4) 
established 
an 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4) is tied to ch. 655 because the 
claims arose out of medical malpractice.  
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
7 
 
occurrence-based 
disposition 
for 
the 
"total" 
recovery 
of 
noneconomic damages that arise out of "each occurrence" of 
medical practice, regardless of whether "injury or death" 
results.  Section 893.55(4)(b) states: 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for 
bodily injury or death . . . may not exceed the limit 
under par. (d) for each occurrence on or after May 25, 
1995, from all health care providers and all employees 
of health care providers acting within the scope of 
their employment and providing health care services 
who are found negligent and from the injured patients 
and families compensation fund.  (Emphasis added.) 
The 
single 
limit 
on 
recovery 
of 
noneconomic 
damages 
of 
§ 893.55(4)(b) unambiguously applies whether the claim is for 
predeath or wrongful death noneconomic damages.  Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶23.  Simply put, the legislature limited the 
recovery of noneconomic damages for an occurrence of medical 
malpractice, no matter how many persons may have claims, direct 
or derivative, and no matter how many persons participated in 
the malpractice, directly or by failing to supervise or properly 
train a direct participant.  Id., ¶29; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.007;5 Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f);6 Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4). 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.007 provides: 
On and after July 24, 1975, any patient or the 
patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, 
parent, minor sibling or child of the patient having a 
derivative claim for injury or death on account of 
malpractice is subject to this chapter. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) provides: 
Notwithstanding the limits on noneconomic damages 
under this subsection, damages recoverable against 
health care providers and an employee of a health care 
provider, acting within the scope of his or her 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
8 
 
3. 
Stare decisis 
¶185 Before coming to this conclusion about the meaning of 
the relevant statutes in Maurin, we performed a thorough review 
of the statutory language, of the legislative history and of our 
previous decisions with regard to legislative changes and 
policies that limit damage recovery for noneconomic damages for 
medical malpractice claims.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶20-90.  
The lead opinion's decision to re-interpret the same statutes 
and overturn Maurin less than two years after Maurin was 
mandated is a significant departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis.   
¶186 The lead opinion recognizes that to overrule precedent 
requires a special justification.  Lead op., ¶32.  It then cites 
factors that it asserts can constitute special justification to 
overturn prior precedent:   
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law; (4) the prior decision is "unsound in principle;" 
(5) the prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Id., ¶33 (citing Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).  
It 
concludes 
that 
the 
listed 
factors 
are 
"sufficiently 
implicated" in the present case to justify overruling Maurin's 
conclusion that the cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages 
                                                                                                                                                             
employment and providing health care services, for the 
wrongful 
death 
are 
subject 
to 
the 
limit 
under 
§ 895.04(4). 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
9 
 
for a wrongful death claim cannot be stacked on top of the cap 
on the recovery of noneconomic damages in a personal injury 
claim.  Lead op., ¶35. 
¶187 The lead opinion initially focuses on the fourth of 
these five factors, that this court's prior decision in Maurin 
is "unsound in principle and was wrongly decided."  Id., ¶36.  
In order for this assertion to constitute a sufficient reason to 
overturn Maurin, whose decision is driven by our statutory 
interpretation, the lead opinion would have to show that the 
statutes did not mean there was to be only one cap on the 
recovery of all noneconomic damages arising out of an occurrence 
of medical malpractice.  However, the lead opinion does not 
review 
Maurin's 
careful 
and 
comprehensive 
statutory 
interpretation.  Instead, it asserts we erred in Maurin because 
our decision was: 
founded upon an ill-fitted analysis of what a wrongful 
death action is and failing to fully understand and 
explain the distinction between noneconomic damages 
for postdeath loss of society and companionship and 
noneconomic damages for predeath claims.  A decision 
based on a faulty interpretation of over 150 years of 
case law is "unsound in principle." 
Id., ¶36.   
¶188 Maurin is based on what the statutes mean.  It has 
nothing to do with any lack of understanding about the nature of 
predeath and wrongful death noneconomic damages or claims.  The 
lead opinion's rationale for deciding to overturn our decision 
is breathtaking.  First, it shows a lack of respect for the 
institutional integrity of our opinions, and second, it shows an 
equal lack of respect for the policy choices made by the 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
10 
 
legislature, as it substitutes its own policy choice for 
Wisconsin.  The lead opinion's rationale is an insufficient 
justification for ignoring stare decisis, one of the pillars 
that support the institutional integrity of the court.  As has 
been explained: 
Adherence 
to 
stare 
decisis 
is 
crucial 
because 
"[r]espect for precedent 'promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development 
of 
legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, 
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process.'" 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶138 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
¶189 One of the lead opinion's two alternate rationales for 
ignoring precedent is that Maurin is "difficult to apply."  Lead 
op., ¶43.  There are no facts to support this assertion.  As of 
June 10, 2006, there has been only one other appellate case, 
besides the instant case, that address Maurin's limitation on 
noneconomic damages, Pierce v. Physicians Insurance Co. of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 2005 WI 14, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 692 N.W.2d 558.   
¶190 In Pierce, we were asked to address Maurin in the 
context of medical malpractice that resulted in a stillborn 
child.  Pierce, 278 Wis. 2d 82, ¶28.  We concluded that Maurin 
did not apply to the attempted recovery of noneconomic damages 
because no stacking of caps was involved.  Id., ¶28.  We 
distinguished the claim in Pierce from that presented in Maurin 
because in Maurin, only one person suffered a direct injury as 
the result of malpractice and the other claims were derivative 
of that one injury.  Id.  In Pierce, there were two persons who 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
11 
 
each sustained a direct injury from medical malpractice.  Id.  
Therefore, each person had a right to her own cap on the 
recovery of noneconomic damages.  
¶191 The lead opinion also hints that if stacking of caps 
is not permitted, a plaintiff in a personal injury action may 
receive constitutionally inadequate damages.  Lead op., ¶44.  
This contention is an attempt to create a straw man that the 
lead opinion can then knock down.  As I noted above at ¶180, a 
wrongful 
death 
claim 
is 
totally 
a 
creature 
of 
statute.  
Therefore, the legislature could entirely eliminate the claim if 
it chose, by changing the law so that $0.00 could be recovered 
for wrongful death.    
¶192 In addition, my review of the factors we have held 
were sufficient to cause us to overrule a prior decision, in 
light of the circumstances of this case, lead me to the 
conclusion that none of the factors are met.  First, no changes 
or developments in the law have occurred that would undermine 
the rationale of Maurin.  Maurin concluded that the legislature 
meant to permit one global cap to be applied under the exact 
same statutes that apply to this case.7  Second, it is undisputed 
that there is no need to make Maurin correspond to newly 
ascertained facts.  Third, there has been no showing that the 
Maurin decision has become detrimental to coherence in the law.  
As explained above, we analyzed Maurin under new facts in Pierce 
and further explained the rule of law established in Maurin.   
                                                 
7 This court's decision in Ferdon, decided in the term after 
Maurin, did not reach Maurin's global cap.  Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 
573, ¶¶35-36. 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶193 The lead opinion suggests that the factual situation 
of the present case is sufficiently distinct from that of Maurin 
because there was a significant length of time after an 
occurrence of medical malpractice before death occurred.  Id., 
¶38.  However, the lead opinion also contends that the factual 
distinction in the two cases should not be a basis for 
distinguishing Maurin.  Id., ¶¶39-40.  The lead opinion 
concludes that nothing in the statutes or the case law 
distinguishes between medical malpractice victims who survive 
for different lengths of time and therefore, it declines to 
create a judicial distinction in that regard.  Id., ¶41.  All of 
this may be true.  That Helen survived for five years after she 
was injured is a significant fact that may affect how Maurin 
will be applied, but that fact provides no basis for overruling 
Maurin; the lead opinion simply chooses to do so.8  
4. 
Helen's injury 
¶194 This review does not question that Helen suffered 
catastrophic 
injuries 
due 
to 
an 
occurrence 
of 
medical 
malpractice for which she and her husband, Robert, sought 
compensation for the personal injuries she sustained and for the 
derivative injuries Robert sustained.  Helen lived five years 
and when she died, Robert sought compensation for her wrongful 
death.  He sued on his own behalf and on behalf of Helen's 
estate.  Robert, individually, and Helen's estate were awarded 
                                                 
8 If the lead opinion becomes the law of Wisconsin, there 
would be nothing to prevent Robert from commencing a wrongful 
death action years after the initial personal injury action had 
been concluded and payments made. 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
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noneconomic damages of $850,000 for their personal injury claims 
and Robert was awarded noneconomic damages of an additional 
$350,000 for his wrongful death claim.   
¶195 However, Maurin did not require Robert to bring a 
wrongful death claim, and Maurin does not require that he accept 
the noneconomic damages awarded for the wrongful death claim, as 
limited by the cap of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  Maurin does not 
require that Robert reject the recovery permitted for his 
derivative claims and Helen's claims that the estate holds.   
¶196 Maurin concerned a child who lived for only two days 
after an occurrence of medical malpractice.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 
28, ¶¶10-12.  The Maurin lawsuit, which was brought by her 
estate and her parents, claimed for personal injury, direct and 
derivative, and her parents claimed for wrongful death, which is 
also a derivative claim.  Id., ¶1.  We concluded that the 
legislative plan set out in ch. 655 required that there be a 
single global cap on the total recovery of noneconomic damages 
from the collective group of health care providers that were 
participants in an occurrence of medical malpractice.  Id., 
¶¶52-82.   
¶197 The Maurins never sought to retain the noneconomic 
damages for their personal injury claims and to reject the 
damages awarded for the wrongful death claims.  They sought to 
stack the limits on the recovery of noneconomic damages from the 
wrongful death claim on top of the limit on recovery of 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
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noneconomic 
damages 
for 
their 
personal 
injury 
claims.9  
Similarly, until oral argument, Robert never addressed whether 
he could have rejected the noneconomic damages awarded for 
wrongful death and accepted the noneconomic damages for his and 
the estate's personal injury claims.  He sought to stack both 
caps on the recovery of noneconomic damages, just as the Maurins 
had.  In my view, the legislature has not prevented Robert, 
individually, and Helen's estate from choosing whichever cap is 
best for them.  
¶198 Although many other states have caps on medical 
malpractice awards for noneconomic damages, the statutes by 
which they accomplish this vary.  However, Michigan does have a 
statutory limit on the recovery on noneconomic damages that has 
two differing caps, which caps encompass noneconomic damages for 
survivors' actions and for wrongful death.  Shinholster v. 
Annapolis Hosp., 471 Mich. 540, 559-60, 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004).   
¶199 In Shinholster, Betty Shinholster had experienced a 
number of "mini-strokes" before having a massive stroke that 
caused her death.  Id. at 547-48.  Michigan has a $280,000 cap 
on the recovery of all noneconomic damages for all claims unless 
one of several statutory factors applies.  MCL 600.1483(1).  
Those factors describe the types of disabilities that resulted 
from the malpractice.  MCL 600.1483(1)(a)-(c).  If any of the 
factors set out in MCL 600.1483(a)-(c) apply, the limit on the 
                                                 
9 The jury awarded noneconomic damages of $550,000 in the 
personal injury action and noneconomic damages of $2,500,000 for 
the parents' wrongful death claim.  Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 
¶13, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866. 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
15 
 
recovery for noneconomic damages is an aggregate of $500,000.  
Id. at 560.  The question before the court was whether that 
higher limit could be applied in a wrongful death action or 
whether the injured person had to survive and endure the 
disability to be able to recover the higher amount.  Id.  The 
court, based on its interpretation of Michigan statutes, 
concluded that the legislature permitted "a decedent's estate to 
recover everything that the decedent would have been able to 
recover had she lived."  Id. at 564 (emphasis in original).  
Accordingly, it permitted the recovery of noneconomic damages 
totaling $500,000.  Id.   
¶200 Although Shinholster is based on Michigan statutes, 
the claims addressed are the same as are presented by Robert, 
individually, and Helen's estate.  They involved claims for 
Betty's predeath pain and suffering that the estate held and 
claims for her survivors with derivative claims for wrongful 
death.  The court in Shinholster saw no problem in limiting 
recovery of all noneconomic damages, for all types of claims 
that arose out of medical malpractice, to one limit.  In a 
similar manner, I agree with Maurin that the legislature did 
limit the recovery of noneconomic damages to one statutory cap 
for an occurrence of medical malpractice.  I also conclude that 
the legislature has not directed which cap is to be selected.  
Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and remand to 
the circuit court for a hearing on which cap is to be applied, 
the cap set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) or the cap set out 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). 
No.  2004AP2592.pdr 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
¶201 I conclude that Maurin correctly decided that the 
legislature created an occurrence-based cap on the recovery of 
all noneconomic damages that arise from medical malpractice, to 
which all plaintiffs and all types of claims are subject.  
However, I also conclude that Maurin does not prevent selecting 
whichever cap on noneconomic damages the plaintiffs prefer.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion's 
decision to overrule Maurin, but I concur in the mandate to 
reverse the court of appeals.    
¶202 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
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