Title: Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Dennison. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

Law tise
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
ee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000 ===

SSS
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-appellant,

DONALD H. DENISON and LYNN T. DENISON,

Individually and as Next Friend of TYRONE
DENNISON, a minor, Defendante-Appellees.

SS

 

No. 24975

Ley Jo
sel RAT a

11 400 $00

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. NO. 00-21-1323)

aad

Wil LViSION

 

ocTosER 11, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
ACOBA, J., DISSENTING

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
This action for declaratory relief arises out of an
automobile accident in which then-fifteen year old Tyrone
Dennison (Tyrone) suffered severe injuries, including brain
damage. The dispute on appeal centers around Tyrone’s father,
defendant-appellee Donald H. Dennison (Donald) and hie separate
claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. Briefly stated,
although Donald was not involved in the accident, he claimed
emotional distress as a result of seeing his son being attended

to by emergency medical personnel at the triage area near the

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

accident scene and eventually taken away by the medi-vac
helicopter. Plaintiff-appellant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company [hereinafter Liberty Mutual] tendered a policy limit

payment for UIM benefits? to Donald and defendant-appellee Lynn
‘Tr. Dennison (hereinafter, collectively, the Dennisons) as next

friends of Tyrone. Donald also filed a separate claim for UM

 

benefits based on his emotional distress. Liberty Mutual
subsequently filed this declaratory judgment action, requesting
the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the Honorable Richard W.
Pollack presiding, to declare that, because Donald was not

involved in nor witnessed the accident, he was not entitled to

compensation under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 431:10C-206(b) (1993)? and First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i v.

 

\ Ae the Eine of the accident, Tyrone’e parents were the naned
insureds under a soter vehicle insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual that
iheluded a UI" coverage endorsement of a policy Limit of §35,000:00 per
aceldent

2 gns_g 431:10¢-306(b) (1993), which has since been anended, was in
tect at the tine of the February 21, 1987 accident and is, therefore,
Gpplicable in the instant case. See i987 Haw. Seas, 1. Act 347, 9 4
$337 uaw. Sees. L. Act 252, § 70 at S53, It provided in pertinent part

 

 

   

(®) Tort Liability is not abolished as to the following

persons, their personal representatives, or their legal

Guaraiane in the following circumstances:

fi) Ta) "beath occurs to such person in such a motor
vehicle accident;

 

(2) injuty’oceura to euch person in a motor vehicle
ing in which the azount paid cr accrued exceeds
Eke medical-rehabilicative lime established in
Section 431:10C-308 for expenses provided in section
431;10¢-203 (10(a) and. (8) ; provided that the expenses
paid shail be presumed to be reasonable and necessary
Ehlestabliening the nedical-rehsbilscative limit; oF
(3) Injury‘occure to such person ip auch an accident and
aa 2 result of such injury that the aggregate limit
Of no-fault benefite cutiined in sectin
51:200-103 (10) payable to such person are exhausted.
(continued...)

 

 
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i 2, 681 P.2d 489, reconsideration denied, 77

Hawai'i 373, 684 P.2d 1149 (1994) (hereinafter, Lawrence) .”
Liberty Mutual appeals from the circuit court’s:

(2) September 26, 2001 order denying its motion for summary

judgnent (hereinafter, motion or motion for sunmary judgment] ;

and (2) February 5, 2002 judgment in favor of the Dennisons,

individually and as next friends of their son, Tyrone. on

 

note that Lawrence concerned the then-repealed HRS chapter 294
‘“[al 1though Hawas‘s’s No-Pault Law, HRS chapter 294 (1968)
Fepeaied in 1967, it. (vas) applicable [in Laurance] because the recodified
chapter HRS chapter 431:10C, becane effective after the dave of the accident
involved in (lawrence].” Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i at 4 n.3, €81 P.2d at 91m)
(citation onitted). The precise statute at issue in Lawrence was HRS § 34-6
(G05), which provides in relevant parts

   

Molition of tort liability. (a) Tor: Liability of the
omer, operator, of user of an insured actor veicié, or the
Operator cr use! of an uninsured moter vehicle, oF the
ator or user of an uninaured moter vehicle’ who operate:
SFuses euch vehicle without Fesscn co believe feiee'se ae
Uningured motor vehicle, with respect to accidental harm
arising fron motor vehicle accidents occurring in chis

 

   

Accident; cr injury eccurs to such person which consists, in
whole or in part, ina significant permanent loss of use of
a part or function of the body; or injury ccoura te gush
Reisen which consicts of a permanent and sericus
Gifigurament which resulte in subjection of the injured
Person co mental or emotional suffering,

(2). injury occurs

in which the amount paid or accrued exceeds the medical
yehabilitative limit established in section 294-20(b) for
expenses provided in section 294-1(10) (a) and (B); provided
Chat the expenses paid shail be presumed to be reasonable

 

and necessary in establishing the medical “rehabilitative
sity or
(3) Injury occurs and as

@ result of such injury the aggregate limit of no-fault
benefits outlined in section 294-2(10) payable to such
person are exhausted

Id, at 8, 691 7.26 at 495 (cleing HRS § 294-6(a) (2885)) (emphasis in
original). However, a previously indicated, we apply che subssantively
similar HRs § 431:10c-306 (b) (1993) to the inetant cave

 

“ae
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appeal, Liberty Mutual contends that the circuit court erred in

denying ite motion and entering judgment in favor of the
Dennisons based on its conclusion that Donald was not precluded
from filing, under hie insurance policy, a separate and
independent claim for emotional distress allegedly arising from
the instant accident.‘ Liberty Mutual maintains that, because
Donald was neither involved in the car accident ‘nor witnessed the
accident, he is precluded from recovering for any emotional
distress under HRS § 431:10C-306(b) and Lawrence, 77 Hawai"i 2,
e61 P.2d 489.

As discussed more fully infra in section ITI, we vacate
the circuit court’s September 26, 2001 order and February 5, 2002
Judgment and remand this case for entry of judgment in favor of

Liberty Mutual.

 

+ gpeeitically, Liberty Mutual contends that the circuit court
"notion for summary judguent based on ite holding that

 
 

the Injury-producing event at the tine it occurred but arrived onto the
accident scene shorely thereateer,’ and thus, Donald ia not ‘precluded
matter of lav from asserting an itdependent claim for emotional distres:
Regarding the circuit coure’s judgment, Liberty Mutual arguen:

   

‘the [cirevit) court erred in entering a judgnent in favor of
the Dennisone and against Liberty Mutual following the
hon-jury trial, besed on its conclusions that:

‘3) Donald “suffered hie ‘accidental hare’ ip the
accident within the peaning Of HRS Chapter 432:10¢-308 (b)~
(emphasis in original)

5) s*divect emotional trauma’ may be inflicted where
the claimant did not witness the injury-producing event at
the tine it occurred but arrived onto rhe accident scene
shortly thereafter") and

2) sIbonald) is not precluded from aaserting a
separate [UIN] policy limit under the applicable policy for
Rie enotional distress claim.”

 

 

 

 

(omphas:

 

in original.)

 
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Eactual Backoround

The parties stipulated to the following statement of

facts:

2. At approximately 2:06 a.m. on Friday, February
22, 1997, (Tyrone) was a paseenger in a 1992 Toyota Corolla
@riven by nineteen year old Michael Lutz

2." {lutz) hada blood alcohol level of .08
and had lose control of the Teyota Corolla which crashed
into a utility pole on Kuloa avenue ia Kapolei.

3. Tyrone), the son of [the Densisons] , was
t1tceen youre Sid'at' che’ sine (Dos denusry 13, 1583)

Inyrone) suffered severe injuries, including
brain Sinase ‘and jaw injuries in the collision.

(Iyrone]_ was founé unconscious and in critical
condition in the back teat of the Lute vantcle,

Go” "(ine Dennigons) “were not in the Lstz car when
the collisicn occurred and they did not witness the actual
sellision

7” At about 1:30 a.m., police officer Joseph
TabareJO, one of the investigating officers, went to the
Dennison’ hone and told (tke Deanisons) that Tyrone was in an
accident and that they vere going to medevac him.

a. "At that tine, (Donald) had already heard
helicopter overhead

3. “Prior to notification by officer Tabarejo,
[Donald] was not aware that hie son had been involved or
injured in an accident.

 

 

 

 

10. Tanedi sti
bie ceraae house
a whieh us he aies

Sollision, [Donald] estimated that the distance from The
Wail behind his house to the ambulance may have been about
the length of a football fiele-

it." (Donald) looked closely at two boys who were on
gurneys.” either was his son Tyrone. Both boye were

ned £0 be wrong with then. After
he saw those two boys, [Donald] knew that the medevac
helicopter was for nis son

32. “{Donald) proceeded toward the ambulance at the
scene and looked inside

13, “Wedical technicians and a fireman were in the
ambulance intubating a patient, i.e. placing 2 mask ateached
fo a manual pump, over the patient's nose and mouth

4. The patient's face was partially covered, so
(Donaid) “could not recognize nis. on.

25. ""one of the medical technicians asked (Donald)
wwho you looking for?” "{Donald) said "my son." The
attendant said “what, che kid with the tattoo’ (oenald]
Said "yeah" and the medical technician said “that’s him
there)", referring to the individual the medical
Eechnicians were working on

 

 

 
 

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26. [tyrone] was unconscious and completely
unresponsive.
Tr. {Donald} knew that his son's condition was

 

serious when be ea 1 eechaiel
Turone. “He wondered how long his son haa nor been breathing
End how long his brain had been deprived of oxygen.

Ye. [Donald] asked if Tyrone was going to make it
land no one would give Aim an answer, The medical
technicians just fold (Donald) that they were going to fly
[nyrone) to Queen's Medical Center and that he should go
there.

19. The medica technicians then took Tyrone out of
tthe ambulance and wheeled him by gurney to the helicopter

hich was waiting. -[Sonsid] cowie gee bleod on is son's

20. Ae [Tyrone] was being taken to the medevac
helicopter, [Donald] told him to chang ont and "I love you"

i.’ [Donald] van back to hie Rouse and told his wife
what happened. (Donald) then broke down and cried,

‘Er [ine Dennigons] then went to the hospital and
were told that Tyrone was in critical condition. (Tyrone)
aa in a coma, which lasted approximately two months.

25. Madcer the accident, [Donald] underwent
individual and group counseling on the mainland for
paychological injuries

24. Robert C. Marvit, 1g0 reviewed medical
records and examined [Donald] ahd states in his February 20,
2001 report that wit is {his} opinion with reasonable
Probabliity that Sndeed, (Oonala had suffered a
Eigniticast, severe, sental and emotional distress of this
Gutoncbile accident and hie coming upon the scene in the
manner described.”

Der ag the time of the accident, [the Dennisons] were the
famed insureds under «motor vehicle ineurance policy issued by
Liberty Mutual, wich & polley period of January’ 10, 1997 to
Sanuary 30,1998, whieh included an (UIN coverage] endorsement.

Ze.” the insuring agreement for the Ur" endorsement

provided in pertinent part:
fhe will pay damages which an insured is
Jegally entitled to recover from the omner
or operator of an underinsured motor
veniele because of bodily injury:
TI" Sustained by an insured; and
2) Caused by an accident,
The omer's of operator's liability for
these damages must arise cut of the
Owerenip, maintenance or use of the
Snderingured motor vehicle:
We will pay under this coverage only after
the Limits of iabiiiey under any
applicable bodily injury Tiability bends
OF policies have been exhausted by payment
of Sucguents or settlenents

27, The UIM endorsenent provided that the (Ur
policy limit wae $25,000 per accident, stacked tines two
Benicle(e), oF $70,000.

Ger” Re the eine of the underlying accident, tLutz)
was insured by AIG Hawaii (“AI0"), with a bodily injury
policy limit sf 625,000 per persos.” On Auguet 30, 1999,

Rio, on benalf of [itz], tendered the sum of $50,000. One
£25,000 policy limit van paid for the injuries to’ (Tyron

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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es

A neparate policy limit of $25,000 was paid for what AIG
characterized as (Donald)’s' independent’ claims.

25. “Thereafter, Liberty Mutual tendered a UIM policy
Limit in'the amount of $70,000 to [the Deanisons), as Next
of Friend of [Tyrone]

30 te . Bo)
under Butual SE Bs
‘motional distress.

policy linit tor (Donald) -2 clains_and filed the above:

Ssptioned declaratory ludenent action Of Aerii sa seed
(rackets and underscored emphases added.) (Bold emphases in
original.)

B. Procedural Backaround

On April 24, 2000, Liberty Mutual filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment, wherein it sought “[a] declaration that
(Wonald) is not entitled to [VIM] benefits under the policy
arising out of the underlying accident [.]* on May 17, 2000, the
Dennisons filed an answer to the complaint.

On August 14, 2002, Liberty Mutual filed a motion for
sunmary judgment, acknowledging that “the crux of this case is
whether [Donald]’'s alleged emotional distress is derivative of
Tyrone’s injuries in the accident.” Liberty Mutual contended
‘Under the controlling authority of Eirat Insurance Co. of Hawaii
ve. Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i 2, 881 P.2d 489 (1994), (Donald) ‘s
alleged enotional distress is clearly derivative of tyrone’s
injuries, and [Donald] is therefore not entitled to a separate
UIM policy limit as a matter of law.” (Bnphases in original.)
(Parenthetical notation omitted.) Liberty Mutual also asserted
that, “since it is undisputed that [Donald] was not ‘in’ the

motor vehicle accident that injured hie gon, his claim for

 
 

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ee

[negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)] is derivative
and he is not entitled to a separate UIM policy limit as a matter
of Hawaii motor vehicle insurance law.* (Capital letters
altered.) On September 7, 2001, the Dennisons filed a memorandum
in opposition to Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment,
arguing that Donald’s claim for emotional distress was not
derivative -- i.e., it was separate from and independent of
ayrone’s claim -- and that, therefore, he was not precluded from
recovering UIM benefits from Liberty Mutual.

on September 17, 2001, the circuit court held a hearing
on Liberty Mutuals motion. The court entered an order denying
Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment on September 26,
2001. Therein, the court noted that, under Lawrence, “tdirect

joi cauma’ i whe laimant

witness the injury-producing event at the time it occurred but
arrived onto the accident scene shortly thereafter." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the court denied Liberty Mutual's motion and ruled
that Donald was not precluded from asserting an independent claim
for emotional distress.

Following the denial of Liberty Mutual’s motion for
summary judgment, a bench trial commenced on November 13, 2001.
on November 26, 2001, the parties entered into the foregoing
stipulated statement of facts, The stipulated statement phrased

the issue before the circuit court as follows:

 
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Whether (Donald) ie precluded from making
claim ona separate policy limit of [UIN] ‘coverage for
hiv emotional distress allegedly suffered in the
Subject February 21, 1997 motor vehicle coliieien,
Because (Donald) was not in the motor vehicle with his
son (Tyrone] at the time of the collision snd aia not
witnest the actual collision it
Liberty mutual and (the Dennia

above captioned [alecla Giudgment

The following issues which are re
private [UIk] arbitration under the terns of the Liberty

Mutual auto policy issued to (the Dennigons) :

 

 

 
 

      

 

Li" The extent of damages, 1f any, to which (Donald)
is entities for his enotional distress claim:

2. Tesues of proximate cause.

3. Issues of Regiigence and tort Liability of the

responsible driver in thie single car accident, (Lite).

on February 5, 2002, the circuit court entered ite
judgment in favor of the Denniscne and against Liberty Mutual,
concluding that “[Donaid) is not precluded from asserting a
separate (UIM] benefits policy limit under the applicable policy
for his enotional distress claim.” Liberty Mutual filed its
timely notice of appeal on March 7, 2002.

TI, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Statutory Interpretation

wthe standard of review for statutory construction is
well-established. The interpretation of a statute is a question
of law which this court reviews de nove. where the language of
the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give
effect to ite plain and obvious meaning." Labrador v. Liberty
Mut. Group, 102 Hawai'i 206, 211, 81 P.3d 386, 392 (2003)
(citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
B.  Conclues

we review the circuit court's conclusions of law de

nove." Chock v. Gov't gmplovees Ins. Co., 103 Hawai'i 263, 265,

“3.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

e1 P.3d 1178, 1180 (2003) (citing Trover v, Adams, 102 Hawai'i
399, 409-10, 77 P.3d 83, 93-94 (2003)).

TIT. PESCUSSION

 

‘The sole issue in the instant case

cher (Donald) is precluded from making a claim on a
arate policy limit of [UIM) coverage for his enotional
Siseress allegedly suffered in the subject February 21, 1937
motor vehicle collision, because [Donald] was not in the
motor vehicle with his gon (Tyrone) at the tine of the
collision and did not witness the actual collision itselt?

    

 

As the parties suggest, ERS § 431:10C-306(b) and this court's
decision in Lawrence are dispositive of the issue before this
court

Liberty Mutual contends that, under the plain language
of HRS § 431:10C-306(b), see supra note 2, “Donald did not
sustain his alleged accidental harm ‘in’ a ‘rotor vehicle
accident’* and, thus, is precluded fron recovering UIM benefits
for his emotional distress. Liberty Mutual also argues that,
pursuant to Lawrence, ‘a claimant is required to ‘witness an
event that caused injury’ in order to assert an independent claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress." (Brackets
omitted.) Thus, Liberty Mutual urges that, because Donald did
not witness the car accident and arrived at the “triage area”
thirty minutes after the accident occurred, Donald is precluded
from recovering UIM benefits separate and apart from Tyrone’s
claim.

In response, the Dennison assert that the circuit

court properly concluded that Donald was not precluded from

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covering for his emotional distress inasmuch as “Lawrence did

 

not establish a requirement that the actual impact must be
observed.” (Capital letters altered.) The Dennisons argue that:

All of the Sa

   

raised on this appeal are controlled
ee P24 .

sither che accl ereafter:

(Enphasie added.)

tion

 

Preliminarily, we note that the Dennisona’ ai
emphasized above is merely their interpretation of the holding in

Lawrence. No such language exists in that opinion. Moreover,

 

@iscussed infra, the holding in Lawrence does not allow for
independent YIM claims where the claimant did not witness the
event causing injury or death to the host plaintiff.

As this court noted in Lawrence, the state legislature
abolished tort liability for accidental harm arising from motor
vehicle accidents such that accident victims are no longer able
“to maintain a traditional negligence tort action against an
alleged wrongdoer’ except in specific circunstances as delineated
under HRS § 431:10C-306. 77 Hawai'i at 7-8, 882 P.2d at 494-95
(quoting Parker v. Nakaoka, 68 Haw. 557, 560, 722 P.2d 1028, 2030
(986). In that regard, ERE § 431:10C-306 does not abolish tort
liability where, inter alia, *[iJnjury occurs to such person in a

motor vehicle accident {.]* (Emphasis added.) As such,

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Se
s{p]ureuant to the plain and unambiguous language of [HRS

§ 431:210¢-306(b)], persons . . . may assert a claim for
accidental harm[*] as long as the threshold requirements are met
-- the first being that death or injury occurs ‘to such person

a motor vehicle accident." Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i at 8, 882

 

P.2d at 195 (emphasis in original). Although the parties in thie
case agree that, pursuant to HRS § 431:10C-306(b), Donald may not
recover insurance benefits from Liberty Mutual unless he suffered
emotional distress ‘in’ the February 21, 1997 car accident, they
disagree as to whether Donald was *in* the accident for purposes
of HRS § 432:10C-306. Thus, the issue before this court is
whether Donald, who was not a passenger in the Lutz car, did not
witness the car accident, and arrived “down the street from the
site of the collision” approximately thirty minutes after the

accident occurred, sustained his emotional distress “in” the car

 

accident for purposes of HRS § 431:10C-306(b) and, therefore, may
maintain an independent claim against Liberty Mutual.

In Lawrence, 77 Hawai‘ at 4, 861 P.2d at 491, this
court addressed whether emotional distress claims brought by
family members, who were not involved in and did not witness the
car accident that killed their relative, are entitled to

independent protection under Hawaii‘s no-fault law. Tn that

case, Christopher smith, Jr. (Christopher), a pedestrian, was

 

‘tm bawrence, this court held that ‘the statutory definition of
accidental hara incluses emotional distress {.)" 77 Hawaii at 4, 861 P.2é at

ir

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OO ————

struck and killed by a car being pursued by the police
Lawxence, 77 Hawai'i at 5, 881 P.24 at 492. Christopher's

parents, wife, and children {hereinafter, collectively, the

 

Smiths) thereafter filed an action claiming NIED against the
ariver and the driver's parents, who were insured by First
Insurance Co. of Hawai'i (First Insurance). Id. Tt was
undisputed that “[t]he Smiths were not involved in nor did they

witness the accident." Id. Thus, First Ineurance argued that

 

the Smiths’ NIED claims ‘were derivative and, therefore, subject
to a single limit of liability coverage under the policy." Id.
The circuit court disagreed, ruling that *NIED is an independent
tort requiring proof based on ordinary tort principles and exists
apart from the underlying tort claimed by the host tort
plaintiff." Id. (ellipses points, brackets, and internal
quotation marks omitted) .

on appeal, this court reversed in part the circuit
court’s order, holding that, “although NIED claims are entitled
to independent protection under general Hawai'i tort law, such

derivative, [‘] subject to the exception discussed below!.]" id.
at 4, 881 P.2d at 491 (emphasis added); see alec id, at 10, 862
P.2d at 497 (noting that “derivative claims . . . arising from
bodily injuries suffered by one’s spouse in an automobile

‘this court noted that ** [dlerivative’ means ‘that which has not
ite origin in itself, but owes itu existence to something foregeing.=
Lawrence, 77 Hawai'd at 10 2.10, 862 P.24 at 496 N.10 (sone brackets omitted,
Some acsed)

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accident . . . are not independent to the extent that they may be

asserted without regard to the nature or extent of the injuries
to the person suffering accidental harm’ (citing Doi v. Hawaiian
Ins. & Guar. Co., 6 Haw. App. 456, 727 P.2d 884 (1986) (emphasis
omitted))). This court formated the “exception” to the general
rule after reviewing the following cases from other
jurisdictions: Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 105 Cal. Rptr.
505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (hereinafter, Foust]; Crabtree v. state
Farm Ing. Co.,, 632 So. 24 736 (La. 1994) (hereinafter, Crabtree];
Wolfe v. State Farm Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 871, cert. denied, 546
A.2d 562 (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter, Wolfel; State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 368 §.B.2d 477 (S.C. Ct. App.}, aff'd, 374
8.8.24 896 (S.C. 1988) [hereinafter, Ramsey]. With respect to

 

 

Ramsey, Wolfe, and Foust, this court stated:

fe cases and find a common, factually
Qlscinguishable thread running through thes. in Zamsey, the
other wie be ettuck in an
Tutonsbile accident’ in Holt, the father pulled hie
Guughter from a car where she had been fatally exposed co
Garbon monoxide and carried her into the hone where he and
fie wite belplesely watched 2 first aid squads attempr at
fevival foil. Pinally, in Bouse, = nother witnessed che
‘itomeblie accident where her son was atruck and the father
fearned of his child's severe injuries within ten minutes of
the accident

ie have reviewed th:

    

 

ee casea, a family member sein
the accidents Here, none of the Smiths were present at the
accident scene and their basis to recover damages is upon
the enotional distress they allegedly suffered after
Christopher's death Thus, the Ssithe’ claims are
Conseguentially related to Christopher's death

 

 

Lawcence, 77 Hawai'i at 11, 681 7.24 at 498 (footnote omitted)
(emphases added). This court also discussed Crabtree v. state

Farm Ins. Co., 632 So. 24 736 (La, 1994), wherein “the wife of a
motorcycle rider . . . witnessed a vehicle strike him head-on.”

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77 Hawai'i at 12-13, 881 P.2d at 499-500 (emphasia

 

added). Relying on these cases, this court “adopt [ed] the
proposition that, if the Smiths had been witnesses to the event
that caused Christopher's death, they would have non-derivative
and wholly independent NIED clains that would trigger separate
single limits under the policy as to each proven claim." Id. at
13, 881 P.24 at 500 (some emphasis in original, some added). In
other words, the Lawrence court held that NIED claims are
derivative under Hawaii’s no-fault law unless ‘the claimant
witnessed the event causing injury or death to the host
plaintiff. On this basis alone, it appears that, because it is
undisputed that Donald *[was) not in the Lute car when the
collision occurred and . . . did not witness the actual
collision" and because Tyrone survived the car accident, Donald's
claim for enotional distress ie derivative of Tyrone’s claim for
UIM benefits.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Dennisons

point to the Lawrence court's conclusion that:

 

Ta) arise in the context of

= are derivative if they.
‘motor vehicle accidents ana (b) *owe their existence” to any

Sirect emotions! trsums to 2 witness oF bvetande;.as in
Hantey Wolfe, Foust, and Crabtres(.1*

Id, at 17, 681 P.2d at 504 (emphases added). Based on thie

 

statement, the Dennisons assert that “the dispositive question in
this appeal is therefore whether [Donald] experienced the kind of

‘direct emotional trauma’ illustrated in Ramsey, Wolfe, Foust,

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and Crabtree.” The Dennisons focus on Wolfe inasmuch as they
believe the claimants in that case “did not see the actual impact
or injury-producing event."” Rather, contrary to the Lawrence
court's characterization of Molfe as a case in which “a family
member directly witnessed the accident (,]" Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i
at 11, 881 P.2d at 498, the Dennigons assert that, in Wolfe,
“{w]hat her parents actually witnessed was an unsuccessful
attempt to revive her.” Thus, the Dennisons believe that the
Lawrence court did not limit recovery to only those claimants who
witnessed the injury producing event. Ne disagree.

In Wolfe,

Brenda Haines hereinafter, Brenda) died from being exposed
to carbon sonoxice while she gat in a car belonging to David
A. Phillipe. srenda’s father pulled her from ene car, and
Carried her into the house and called the local first ald
Squad. Brenda's parente and their other children watched
helplessly ae the fire: aid squad's revival attompr failed

 

 

 

 

540 A.2d at 872 (brackets added). Inasmuch as Brenda’s father
opened the car door, exposing himself to the carbon monoxide that
caused Brenda’s death, we believe her father was involved in the

circumstances of her death. In other words, in coming upon the

* We note that the Dennisons further cite to cases from other
jurisdictions that concern NIED generally =~ i.@,, not in the context of
ho-fault insurance coverage. Similarly, im Lawreice, the Siths referred to
the following cases, which did not concern automobile ingurance:

State: 52 Hav. 56, 472 P.24 509, rehva denied, 52 Haw. 156, 472 F-24509
(i570) (claim for property damage caused by surface waters overfloving a
blocked dvainage culvert), and Campbell v, Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw.
359, €32 F.2d 1066 (196)) (claim for emotional distress surferea wnen the
plaintiffs’ dog died in the Animal Quarantine Station), 77 Havai's at 9) 681
Bidavat 456. However, the Lawrence court stated: “the crucial distinction
Overlooked by the appellees if that the Smiths’ NIZD clains are not being
Yeviewed within a ‘pure’ tort context’. . the appellees have apparently
overlooked the fact that Rodrigues and campbell were not considered within the
Context of automobile insurance coverage.” id. at 9, 861 P-2d at 496.
Sinilarly, the casee cited by the Dennison do not céncern no-faule insurance
Coverage and are, therefore, inapposite eo the instant ca

 

  

 

 

 

 

     

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scene of Brenda’s death as he did, Brenda's father witnessed the
fatal “accident.” Thus, the Lawrence court properly
characterized Wolfe as a case in which the claimant, Brenda’s
father, witnessed the event causing her death. Furthermore, this
court noted that the Wolfe court

ied in ite reasons a aicte zen
‘Slaimanta have not witnessed the accident ceaultiog in
Spiury oF death:
While any harm to a spouse or a family member causes
Sorrow, we are here concerned with a more narrowly
Confined interest in mental and emotional stability.
hen contronted with accidental death, the reaction to
be expected of normal persons, is shock and fright
it is the sensory perception of a shocking event which
causes a separate, compensable injury. in 3 Portee
clais,*" se ie the piainesff's perception which causes
the perceiver to suffer a traumatic sense of lot
Such emotional distress ie not equivalent of grief
from losing a loved one, but is inflicted by the
trauma of seeing a loved one suffer or die or of
Hing efforts to revive her being unsuccessful

   

 

 

 

 

refers to Portes v. dating, 8¢ N.0. a8,
herein the court hela that enoticnal
Gistréss clains are’ not derivative, but separate snd
independent actions.

 

Lawrence, 77 Hawai'i at 11-12, 681 P.2d at 498-99 (quoting Wolfe,

540 A.2d at 873) “(ellipses points omitted). This court

  

 

additionally found it significant that Wolfe distinguished United
Pacific Ing, Co. v, Edsecomb, 706 P.2d 223 (Wash. 1985), wherein

a father’s claim was held to be “derivative from his son's

 

injuries particularly because he did not witness the accident
Ad. at 12, 881 P.2d at 499 (brackets omitted) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Molfe, 540 A.2d at 674). Consequently,
because Brenda’e father witnessed the event which caused her
death, the Wolfe court held that his claim was separate from and

independent of Brenda’s claim.

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Citing Wolfe, the Dennisons assert that Donald may
recover for his emotional distress inasmuch as he observed Tyrone
“suffer or die or . . . efforts to revive [him] being
unsuccessful." It is noteworthy, however, that the Lawrence
court did not expressly adopt that assertion and, moreover, even
assuming that this court agreed with Wolfe's assertion, the facts
of this case do not permit such recovery. First, inasmuch as
Tyrone survived the accident, Donald did not witness unsuccessful
revival efforts or Tyrone’s death. Second, it is undisputed that
‘Tyrone was “unconscious and completely unresponsive" when Donald
saw him and remained as such for two months after the accident.
Thus, it cannot be said that Donald observed Tyrone suffering in
pain. As euch, Donald's claim for emotional distress is

See id. at 9,

 

derivative of Tyrone’s claim for UIM benefits.
861 P.2d at 496 (noting that “[clonmon sense dictates that but
for Christopher's death, [the Smiths] would not have any clains

+ We agree with the diesent’s proposition that this court in Lawrence
recognized the potential for an independent claim by a family menber for

 

Seitnessing serious injury to's close relation... coming Gato the
fr Dissent at 3 (citation oniteed) (emphasis in
original), fod ih Crabtres ané Leteune v. Rayne Branch Heap. 586 80.

  

However, we do not believe Chat it applies to the facts of
the inetant case. In Crabtree, the court held that a voman’s claims for
notional distrece were independent because she was "in the accident.” 632
So. 24 at 745. There, the claimant, who was following her husband in another
vehicle, witnessed a vehicle strike him head-on, and rushed to nis side where
‘the saw bis leg nearly completely severed below the knee. Tn Lejeune, the
Court approved of a cause of action by the wife of a comatose patient who
arrived at his hospital room shortly after a rat had bitten him on the face
and before he had either been moved or bandaged. $56 So. 2d at S72. These
facts do not align thenselves with the instant cage inasmuch ss Sonalé di@ not
Stinely arrive at the immediate acene of the accident." Crabtree, €32 80. 24
at 745 nsl3. Rather, Donald learned of the accident while at home and arrived
at the “riage ares waich wae "down the street fron the site of he
collision," stipulated Statements of Pact (68?) No. 10, approximately chirty
minutes after the accident occurred and saw Tyrone uncenecioue in the
ambulance. gee SEP Nos. 1, 7, 3, and 26

2a 355 (La.

   

 

 

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of severe emotional distress to assert in the first instance” and
that, “{blecause the Smiths’ claims clearly originate[] from the

primary claim -- the death of Christopher

 

we conclude that
such claims are derivative.”). Therefore, we hold that the
circuit court erred in concluding that Donald was not precluded
from asserting a separate and independent UIN benefits claim for
his enotional distress.
1V. coNCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold, ae a matter of law,
that Donald’s claim for enotional distress is derivative of
Tyrone‘s claim for UIM benefits. Accordingly, we vacate the
circuit court’s September 26, 2001 order denying Liberty Mutual's
motion for summary judgment and February 5, 2002 judgment in
favor of the Dennisons and renand this case with instructions for

the circuit court to enter judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual.

tends, anaoco na Tro

Ing & Kawashima), for Rete
min tae

Komeya (of Cronin, Fried, mes

Sekiya, Kekina & Fairbanks),
for defendants-appellees

 

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