Title: Attorney Grievance v. Parris

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Keith Anthony Parris, Misc. Docket AG 
No. 22, September Term, 2021.  Opinion by Eaves, J. 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — DISBARMENT 
Keith Anthony Parris, Respondent, violated several provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) when he failed to file opposition motions on 
behalf of his client; failed to respond to discovery requests; failed to comply with court 
orders compelling him to complete discovery; failed to communicate with his client; 
repeatedly failed to respond to his client’s requests for information; misrepresented the 
status of the case to his client; made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the trial 
court; collected unreasonable fees from his client for services he did not perform; and failed 
to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information. 
Respondent’s conduct violated the following MARPC: 1.1 (Competence); 1.3 (Diligence); 
1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the 
Tribunal); 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 8.1 (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters); and 8.4 (Misconduct). These violations warrant Respondent’s 
disbarment.
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE21-10972 
Submitted on Brief: November 4, 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF MARYLAND* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 22 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
v. 
KEITH ANTHONY PARRIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
Raker, Irma S. 
(Senior 
Judge, 
Specially 
Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Eaves, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  February 1, 2023 
 
* At the November 8, 2022, general election, the 
voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 
amendment changing the name of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of 
Maryland.  The name change took effect on 
December 14, 2022.  
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials 
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this 
document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2023-02-01 11:50-05:00
 
This attorney discipline case involves the misconduct of Keith Anthony Parris 
(“Parris”), a member of the Bar of this Court.  During his representation of a client, Parris’s 
conduct evidenced a multitude of wrongdoing warranting his disbarment.  Parris failed to 
respond to motions, to respond to discovery requests, to comply with court orders 
compelling him to complete discovery, and to advise his client of the pending motions and 
discovery.  Parris neglected to respond to his client’s requests for information, and, to 
conceal his deficiencies, he misrepresented the status of the case to his client and made 
knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the trial court.  Parris’s inaction ultimately 
caused the court to impose sanctions and enter a default judgment against his client. 
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting 
through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action 
(the “Petition”) against Parris.  The Commission alleged that Parris violated the following 
nine Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”):  
1. 
19-301.1 (Competence) (1.1); 
2. 
19-301.3 (Diligence) (1.3); 
3. 
19-301.4 (Communication) (1.4); 
4. 
19-301.5 (Fees) (1.5); 
5. 
19-303.2 (Expediting Litigation) (3.2); 
6. 
19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) (3.3); 
7. 
19-303.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney) (3.4); 
8. 
19-308.1 (Bar Admissions and disciplinary Matters) (8.1); and 
9. 
19-308.4 (Misconduct) (8.4). 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-722(a), this Court entered an order referring the 
matter to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  In the Order, this Court designated 
the Honorable Wytonja L. Curry (the “hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
 
2 
and provide findings of fact and conclusions of law.  During the proceedings before the 
hearing judge, Parris did not file any responsive pleadings or respond to Bar Counsel’s 
requests for information.  As a result, the Commission filed a Motion for Order of Default.  
The hearing judge entered an Order of Default against Parris “for failure to respond to [the 
Petition] within the time permitted by the Order of the [Supreme Court of Maryland] and 
the Writ of Summons issued by the Clerk of [the circuit court].”  The circuit court held a 
hearing, at which Parris did not appear.  The hearing judge considered the evidence that 
the Commission submitted at the hearing and then filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law with this Court. 
Parris did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law.  Because (1) Parris did not file an answer to the Petition and the 
hearing judge entered an Order of Default against him; (2) the Order of Default was not 
vacated; (3) Parris did not appear at the hearing before the hearing judge; and (4) Parris did 
not file any exceptions or recommendation for sanction with this Court, he is deemed to 
have waived oral argument pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-740(a).  Accordingly, this Court 
considered the matter without oral argument based on the record before the hearing judge. 
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law for each of Parris’s violations of the professional conduct rules and disbar Parris. 
I. 
THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT 
Where, as here, neither party filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of 
fact, this Court “may treat the [hearing judge’s] findings of fact as established.”  Md. Rule 
19-740(b)(2)(A).  We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact below. 
 
3 
A. 
Background 
This Court admitted Parris to the Bar of this Court on June 18, 1987.1  At all times 
relevant to this proceeding, Parris maintained an office for the practice of law in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland.  Parris’s misconduct in this case arises out of his 
representation of the Chaddsford Community Association, Inc. (“Chaddsford”). 
B. 
Chaddsford Community Association, Inc. 
Chaddsford is a homeowner’s association for a housing community in Brandywine, 
Maryland.  In August 2010, Chaddsford retained the Law Offices of Gregory A. 
Alexandires (the “Firm”) as general counsel to Chaddsford’s board of directors (the 
“Board”).2  Among its duties, the Firm collected past due assessments from property 
owners subject to Chaddsford’s authority.  In June 2017, Chaddsford terminated the Firm 
and requested from the Firm an invoice for outstanding attorneys’ fees and collection costs.  
The Firm subsequently sent Chaddsford an itemized invoice in the amount of $77,727.43, 
accounting for the Firm’s services from August 2010 to June 2017.  Chaddsford did not 
pay the invoice, which prompted the Firm to file a lawsuit against Chaddsford in the 
District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County.  The Firm’s action against 
Chaddsford sought to collect a portion ($29,673.30) of the attorneys’ fees and collection 
costs detailed in the June 2017 invoice. 
 
1 At the time of his admission, it was the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  
As noted earlier, the name is now the Bar of the Supreme Court of Maryland. 
 
2 For simplicity, we will refer to Chaddsford’s actions through the Board as 
“Chaddsford” since the Board is authorized to make decisions on behalf of Chaddsford 
pursuant to Chaddsford’s articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
 
4 
C. 
Parris’s Representation of Chaddsford in the Firm’s Lawsuit 
On August 13, 2018, Chaddsford retained Parris to serve as its new general counsel.  
With respect to the Firm’s District Court action against Chaddsford, Parris advised 
Chaddsford that it “was not liable for approximately 40% of the attorneys’ fees and costs 
claimed . . . because the Firm failed to collect those amounts before the statute of limitations 
expired.”  Parris further advised Chaddsford that “some of the legal services included on 
the [June 2017] invoice were inconsistent with prior accountings” the Firm provided to 
Chaddsford.  Based on his advice, Chaddsford authorized Parris to represent it in the 
District Court action.  Parris billed Chaddsford $2,415 for legal services he provided in the 
District Court case from August 7–31, 2018, which Chaddsford paid in full. 
On November 29, 2018, the Firm filed a separate complaint against Chaddsford in 
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and sought to recover $75,000—nearly the 
full amount of the June 2017 invoice.  The Firm thereafter filed a motion to stay the 
proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of the circuit court action.  Parris 
did not file a response to the motion, and the District Court granted the motion.  Parris 
invoiced Chaddsford $2,460 for legal representation he provided in the District Court case 
from September 1, 2018, through December 14, 2018, which Chaddsford paid in full. 
Parris filed an answer to the circuit court complaint on March 15, 2019, in which he 
argued that Chaddsford did not owe the claimed fees and asserted several affirmative 
defenses to the Firm’s claims.  Parris then served Chaddsford’s first set of interrogatories 
on the Firm.  Among its written discovery requests, the Firm served request for admissions 
on Parris, to which Chaddsford’s responses were due on April 29, 2019.  Parris “failed to 
 
5 
timely forward the discovery requests to Chaddsford or advise [Chaddsford] of the deadline 
to respond” and “failed to timely respond to the requests.” 
As a result, the Firm filed a partial summary judgment motion contending that the 
circuit court should deem as admitted the alleged facts in the complaint due to 
Chaddsford’s failure to respond to the request for admissions.  Parris neither advised 
Chaddsford of the summary judgment motion nor filed a response to the motion.  The 
circuit court denied the summary judgment motion for nonconformance with Maryland 
Rule 2-501(a).3  The Firm subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of its summary 
judgment motion in conformance with Rule 2-501(a), which the court again denied. 
On June 28, 2019, Parris filed an answer to the Firm’s summary judgment motion 
stating in part,  
[a]s indicated in the Answer to Complaint, a large part of the [Firm’s] 
complaint is barred by the [s]tatute of [l]imitations. 
 
[Chaddsford] is still in the process of gathering discovery to establish the 
violation of the [s]tatute of limitations, in that the information is in the 
custody of the [Firm]. 
 
[Chaddsford] has been hindered in this process in not receiving documents 
and pleadings supposedly filed by the [Firm]. 
 
This matter should be litigated on the merits. [Chaddsford’s] discovery will 
be fully complied with on or before July 12, 2019.  
 
3 When a party files a motion for summary judgment with the court, “[t]he motion 
shall be supported by affidavit if it is (1) filed before the day on which the adverse party’s 
initial pleading or motion is filed or (2) based on facts not contained in the record.”  Md. 
Rule 2-501(a).  The Firm’s motion lacked this supporting affidavit. 
 
6 
The Firm, however, served Parris its answers to Chaddsford’s interrogatories and copies of 
each of its motions throughout the proceedings.  The hearing judge found that “[Parris’s] 
statements to the [trial] court that he was in the process of gathering information from the 
Firm and that he had been hindered by not receiving documents and pleadings filed by the 
Firm were knowingly and intentionally false.” 
Thereafter, the court held a pretrial conference, which Parris attended on behalf of 
Chaddsford.  At the conference, the court ordered that Chaddsford provide all outstanding 
discovery responses to the Firm by August 5, 2019.  On August 5, Parris sent his discovery 
responses to the Firm via email attachment, but the responses were incomplete and one of 
the attachments could not be opened.  The Firm sent Parris via email two requests to resend 
complete discovery responses that could be opened.  Parris did not respond to either email.  
Consequently, the Firm filed a motion for sanctions against Chaddsford for failure to 
provide outstanding discovery by the court’s deadline.  The Firm requested the court to 
award it $800 in attorney’s fees for the time it spent on additional efforts to obtain the 
outstanding discovery.  Parris did not file a response to the sanctions motion.  Parris 
proceeded to bill Chaddsford $3,955 in legal services that he claimed for the period of 
March 14, 2019, through August 14, 2019.  Chaddsford paid the invoice in full. 
The court denied the motion for sanctions and entered an order “compelling 
Chaddsford to provide electronic and hard copies of all discovery to the Firm within seven 
days” of August 30, 2019.  When Parris failed to comply with the court’s discovery order, 
the Firm filed a renewed motion for sanctions for failure to comply with second court order 
for discovery responses.  The Firm requested that the court enter an order of default against 
 
7 
Chaddsford and award the Firm attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,225.  Parris did not file 
a response to the Firm’s motion and did not provide the outstanding discovery to the Firm. 
On October 14, 2019, Parris met with Chaddsford to provide an update on the circuit 
court litigation.  According to the Board’s meeting minutes, Parris discussed the settlement 
value of the case and his anticipated attorneys’ fees.  The hearing judge found that Parris 
omitted material facts in an effort to conceal his misconduct from Chaddsford.  In 
particular, Parris did not inform Chaddsford of the outstanding discovery requests or of his 
failure to comply with court orders compelling Chaddsford to provide outstanding 
discovery.  Parris also did not advise Chaddsford of the Firm’s recent pending motion, in 
which the Firm asked the court to impose discovery sanctions and enter a default judgment 
against Chaddsford. 
On October 21, 2019, the court entered an order granting the Firm’s renewed motion 
for sanctions.  The court awarded, with post-judgment interest, $1,225 in attorneys’ fees to 
the Firm and entered a default judgment against Chaddsford in the amount of $75,000.  The 
court’s order stated that Chaddsford “shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this order 
to move to vacate this entry of default.”  Parris neither advised Chaddsford of the default 
judgment nor moved to vacate the default judgment.4 
After the court’s entry of default, Parris did not respond to Chaddsford’s 
communications to him about the status of the case.  In January 2020, Chaddsford’s 
managing agent sent three emails to Parris requesting an update.  Parris did not respond to 
 
4 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 3-507, the District Court dismissed the Firm’s District 
Court claim on January 17, 2020. 
 
8 
these emails.  Between January 2020 and March 11, 2020, the Board president made 
several phone calls and sent 17 text messages to Parris requesting information about the 
case.  Parris did not answer any phone calls but responded to some text messages, although 
his responses appeared to lack both substance and thought. 
Unbeknownst to Chaddsford, the Firm obtained and served a writ of garnishment 
on Chaddsford’s bank to collect the $75,000 default judgment.  On February 19, 2020, 
Chaddsford’s bank sent a letter to Chaddsford notifying it of the writ of garnishment with 
a copy of the writ attached—this was Chaddsford’s first notification of the default 
judgment.  Parris did not notify Chaddsford of the default judgment until March 11, 2020, 
via email.  Parris stated that the circuit court recently entered the October 21, 2019, default 
judgment against Chaddsford.  The hearing judge found that Parris’s statement that the 
default judgment was recent was “knowingly false and intentionally misleading” because 
almost five months had passed.  Parris “omitted material facts concerning his failure to 
respond to discovery and failure to comply with the court’s orders to conceal his 
misconduct.”  Parris also notified Chaddsford that he would attend a March 9, 2020, Board 
meeting to discuss the outcome of the circuit court case.  Parris did not appear at the 
scheduled meeting. 
Parris billed Chaddsford periodically throughout the litigation, and Chaddsford 
promptly paid each invoice in full.  Between August 31, 2018, and August 26, 2019, Parris 
collected $8,830 in fees from Chaddsford, at a rate of $300 per hour.  Parris created false 
time entries and billed Chaddsford for services he did not perform.  The hearing judge cited 
examples including an entry dated August 13, 2019, which reflected that Parris 
 
9 
“purportedly spent 4.4 hours reviewing and analyzing discovery” and an entry dated 
August 14, 2019, the work for which Parris “billed 2.3 hours to review and input data.”  
The hearing judge found that “the billing entries were knowingly false and intended to 
conceal [Parris’s] failure to defend Chaddsford in the litigation.” 
D. Bar Counsel’s Investigation 
On May 20, 2020, Chaddsford filed a complaint against Parris with the Commission.  
Between July 2020 and November 2020, Bar Counsel wrote to Parris on four separate 
occasions requesting a response to the complaint against him.  Parris did not respond to 
Bar Counsel’s inquiries.  On December 3, 2020, a Bar Counsel investigator went to Parris’s 
home and spoke with him.  Parris denied receiving any of Bar Counsel’s letters.  The 
investigator gave Parris copies of all four letters, and Parris said he would reach out to Bar 
Counsel that day.  Parris did not contact Bar Counsel and never responded to any of Bar 
Counsel’s requests for information. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As discussed, when neither the respondent nor the Commission files exceptions to 
any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact, this Court may accept those findings of fact as 
established.  Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A).  This Court reviews de novo the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law, Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1), and “determines whether clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that an attorney violated the MARPC[,]” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Silbiger, 478 Md. 607, 617 (2022). 
 
10 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Parris violated 
professional conduct Rules 1.1; 1.3; 1.4; 1.5(a), 3.2; 3.3(a); 3.4; 8.1(b); and 8.4(a), (c)–(d).  
Neither Parris nor the Commission filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law.  For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge that clear and 
convincing evidence establishes each of the MARPC violations in this case and conclude 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Parris. 
A. 
Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions 
of Law. 
Because the same conduct of Parris supports his violation of several rules of 
professional conduct, we first address concurrently Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 3.4.  We 
then address in turn Rules 1.5, 3.3, 8.1, and 8.4. 
Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.3 (Diligence);  
Rule 1.4 (Communication); Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 
 Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney). 
Under Rule 1.1, “[a]n attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness[,] and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  Generally, this Court will find 
that an attorney violated Rule 1.1 when he or she “fails to act or acts in an untimely manner, 
resulting in harm to his or her client.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 
694 (2019) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 319 (2012)). An 
attorney has violated Rule 1.1 when he or she failed to “file opposition motions,” failed to 
“answer discovery requests,” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 393 
 
11 
(2017), and failed to comply with court orders, Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 461 
Md. 189, 217 (2018).  An attorney has demonstrated incompetent representation by his or 
her failure to respond to discovery that results in sanctions against and pecuniary damage 
to the client.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 180 (2015). 
Rule 1.3 states that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  Due to the evident overlap between competence and 
diligence, an attorney’s “[c]onduct which violates Rule 1.1 will often also violate Rule 
1.3.”  Powell, 461 Md. at 216 (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 
398 (2008)).  An attorney can violate Rule 1.3 when he or she fails to file responsive 
motions, to respond to discovery requests, to comply with court orders to complete 
discovery, and to respond to the client’s communications about the case.  Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Williams, 446 Md. 355, 374 (2016).  E.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Leatherman, 475 Md. 80, 105 (2021).  An attorney has failed to act with reasonable 
diligence when his or her failure to respond to discovery requests causes a court to impose 
discovery sanctions against the client.  Hamilton, 444 Md. at 183 (citing Brown, 426 Md. 
at 320). 
Rule 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that an attorney shall “keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information[.]”  Rule 1.4(b) requires that “[a]n attorney shall explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”  This Court has sustained violations of Rule 1.4 for an 
attorney’s failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, to 
 
12 
promptly respond to the client’s reasonable requests for information about the case, 
Leatherman, 475 Md. at 105, and to apprise the client of pending motions and discovery 
requests, including the significance of sanctions, Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 469 
Md. 134, 147 (2020); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349–50 (2020).  
Rule 1.4 “is violated also when an attorney ‘fails to communicate crucial information about 
the status of the case,’ such as when a case is dismissed.”  Planta, 467 Md. at 349 (quoting 
Hamilton, 444 Md. at 185).  An attorney’s “failure to communicate the status of a case 
prevents the client from making informed decisions.”  Edwards, 462 Md. at 699 (citing 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 385 (2015)).  Additionally, an attorney’s 
misrepresentation of the status of the case to the client can violate Rule 1.4.  Id.  
Pursuant to Rule 3.2, “[a]n attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”  An attorney violates Rule 3.2 by 
neglecting a client’s case and failing to comply with discovery requests resulting in the 
court’s imposition of sanctions and a default judgment against the client.  Brown, 426 Md. 
at 323.  E.g., Planta, 467 Md. at 354; Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Trye, 444 Md. 201, 216 
(2015).  See also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 365 (2006) 
(concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.2, in part, as a result of his lack of 
communication with the client during litigation). 
Under Rule 3.3(c), an attorney shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the 
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists[.]”  Rule 3.4(d) provides, in applicable part, that “an attorney shall not . . . fail to 
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an 
 
13 
opposing party[.]”  We have held that an attorney’s failure to respond to discovery requests 
and adequately comply with court orders to complete discovery resulting in monetary 
sanctions violates Rule 3.4.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 667, 719–20 
(2019). 
Applying the above principles here, Parris’s derelict representation of Chaddsford 
concurrently 
violated 
professional 
conduct 
rules 
of 
competence, 
diligence, 
communication, expediting litigation, and fairness to opposing party and attorney.  Parris 
repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to adequately comply with the 
circuit court’s orders compelling discovery, and failed to file any opposition to the Firm’s 
motions for sanctions and motion for default.  Parris neglected to apprise Chaddsford of 
the Firm’s discovery requests or of the deadlines to respond to the discovery requests, to 
advise Chaddsford of the court orders compelling discovery and the possibility of 
sanctions, and to inform Chaddsford of the summary judgment, sanctions, and default 
motions.  Parris failed to substantively answer Chaddsford’s numerous and reasonable 
requests for information, and when he did communicate with Chaddsford, he intentionally 
omitted his shortcomings that resulted in harm to Chaddsford.  When Parris did provide 
discovery, he produced untimely and incomplete discovery responses on behalf of 
Chaddsford despite court orders compelling complete responses.  Parris’s continuous 
inaction at each stage of the litigation resulted in significant harm to Chaddsford in the 
form of a $75,000 default judgment and court-imposed sanctions of $1,225 in attorneys’ 
fees with post judgment interest.  Parris took no action to vacate the default judgment 
against Chaddsford and did not notify Chaddsford of the default judgment until 
 
14 
approximately five months later.  For these reasons, Parris violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 
3.3(c), and 3.3(d). 
Rule 1.5 (Fees). 
Under Rule 1.5(a), an attorney “shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect 
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”  A court considers the 
following factors in determining the reasonableness of a fee:  
(1) 
the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) 
the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment of the 
attorney; 
(3) 
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) 
the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) 
the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) 
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) 
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys 
performing the services; and 
(8) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Md. Rule 19-301.5(a).  An attorney’s fee arrangement with a client is reasonable if it is 
“commensurate with the legal services provided.”  Leatherman, 475 Md. at 106 (quoting 
Edwards, 462 Md. at 701).  Accordingly, “a reasonable fee at the outset of a representation 
‘can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.’” Id. (quoting Edwards, 462 Md. 
at 701).  An attorney’s fee arrangement with a client “is unreasonable if the attorney fails 
to perform any meaningful work on behalf of the client in exchange for the fee.”  Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 457 Md. 159, 218 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 275 (2013)).  
 
15 
Here, Parris deserted Chaddsford, after which he did not “perform any meaningful 
work on behalf of [Chaddsford] in exchange for the fee” that he charged.  Throughout the 
litigation, Parris periodically billed Chaddsford for legal services he did not provide.  For 
example, Parris billed Chaddsford $3,955 for legal services he claimed for the period of 
March 14, 2019, through August 14, 2019.  During this time, Parris filed an answer to the 
Firm’s complaint, but he neglected to respond to or inform Chaddsford of the Firm’s 
discovery requests, to sufficiently comply with a court order compelling him to complete 
discovery, and to respond to the Firm’s motions for summary judgment.  Thereafter, Parris 
failed to respond to the Firm’s sanctions motions and default judgment motion.  As the 
hearing judge found, Parris’s “billing entries were knowingly false and intended to conceal 
[his] failure to defend Chaddsford[.]”  Although Parris’s fee arrangement with Chaddsford 
may have been reasonable at the outset of the litigation, those fees became unreasonable 
when Parris ceased to provide any services of value.  Thus, we agree with the hearing judge 
that Parris collected from Chaddsford unreasonable fees totaling $8,830. 
Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal). 
Pursuant to Rule 3.3(a)(1), an attorney “shall not knowingly . . . make a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or 
law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]”  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Collins, 477 Md. 482, 504–06 (2022) (concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.3 where 
she claimed she had not received email messages notifying her of a complaint but it could 
be reasonably inferred from the record that she received such messages). “What matters 
for purposes of finding [a] [Rule]3.3(a)(1) violation is whether an attorney knows that the 
 
16 
information he or she presents to the tribunal is incorrect.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Steinhorn, 462 Md. 184, 197 (2018) (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 
32 (2006)). 
Here, pursuant to Rule 19-740, we treat as established the hearing judge’s finding 
that Parris made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the circuit court in his June 
28, 2019, answer to the motion for summary judgment.  Parris stated that he was “still in 
the process of gathering discovery” and “had been hindered in this process in not receiving 
documents and pleadings” from the Firm.  The circuit court record reflects that the Firm 
served a copy of answers to interrogatories on April 15, 2019.  We therefore agree with the 
hearing judge’s conclusion that Parris’s conduct violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). 
Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters). 
“An attorney . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly 
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary 
authority[.]”  Md. Rule 19-308.1(b).  An attorney violates Rule 8.1(b) when “he or she fails 
to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful request for information.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 213 (2020) (citing Edwards, 462 Md. at 705). 
Here, Parris failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s correspondence in 2020 dated July 
2, July 29, November 10, and November 16.  Even after receiving hand delivered copies 
of Bar Counsel’s letters at his residence and stating that he would respond, Parris still failed 
to respond in any manner.  Thus, Parris violated Rule 8.1(b). 
 
17 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct). 
Rule 8.4 states, pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct; 
*** 
(c) engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; [and] 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] 
An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) when “he or she violates any other Rule under the 
MARPC.”  Hoerauf, 469 Md. at 214 (citing Edwards, 462 Md. at 706).  We have sustained 
an attorney’s violation of Rule 8.4(c) when he or she makes a knowing and intentional 
misrepresentation to a court to conceal his or her shortcomings, id. at 215, and 
misrepresents the status of the case to his or her client, Brown, 426 Md. at 323–24.  An 
attorney’s conduct that violates Rule 8.4(c) may also violate Rule 8.4(d).  Hoerauf, 469 
Md. at 215.  Generally, an attorney violates Rule 8.4(d) when his or her conduct “impacts 
negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession.”  Id. at 214–
15 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 696 (2013)). 
Because we conclude that Parris violated multiple rules of professional conduct, we 
conclude that Parris also violated Rule 8.4(a).  With respect to Rule 8.4(c) and 8.4(d), Parris 
made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the circuit court in his June 28 
Answer; misrepresented the status of the case to Chaddsford in his March 2020 email to 
Chaddsford; and billed Chaddsford for services he never provided, all in an attempt to 
conceal his misconduct.  Further, as to Rule 8.4(d), Parris engaged in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.  Parris’s pattern of inaction and neglect caused substantial 
 
18 
harm to Chaddsford and brings the legal profession into disrepute.  Parris’s failure to 
respond to Bar counsel further brings the legal profession into disrepute. 
B. 
The Appropriate Sanction is Disbarment. 
The primary purpose of a sanction in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is to 
“protect[] the public and deter[] future misconduct rather than to punish the attorney.”  
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635; see Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480 Md. 319, 390 (2022) 
(citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 607 (2022)) (“[We] must promote 
both general and specific deterrence and safeguard the public and its confidence in the legal 
profession.”).  In determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney, “we consider the 
facts and circumstances of each case and order a sanction that is ‘commensurate with the 
nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed.’” 
Edwards, 462 Md. at 712 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352, 359 
(2015)).   
Our review of the facts and circumstances includes evaluating any mitigating and 
aggravating factors.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 741 (2020); see 
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635 (“[W]e typically consult the list of aggravating and mitigating 
factors developed by the American Bar Association.” (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Ibebuchi, 471 Md. 286, 309 (2020))).  The respondent attorney in a disciplinary proceeding 
must prove any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, Hoerauf, 469 Md. 
at 216, and the Commission must prove any aggravating factors by clear and convincing 
evidence, id.   
 
19 
Finally, we underscore that “in cases involving intentional dishonesty, disbarment 
is ordinarily warranted.” Silbiger, 478 Md. at 638; e.g., Hoerauf, 469 Md. at 218 
(concluding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for the attorney’s “numerous and 
severe violations” of the MARPC which included dishonest conduct on multiple 
occasions); Edwards, 469 Md. at 712 (determining that the attorney’s “pattern of 
dishonesty in and of itself warrant[ed] disbarment”).  An attorney’s “lack of prior discipline 
does not preclude disbarment.”  Edwards, 469 Md. at 712. 
Here, the Commission recommends that we disbar Parris.  Considering the facts and 
circumstances of Parris’s pattern of misconduct, in conjunction with the applicable 
mitigating and aggravating factors, we agree that the appropriate sanction for Parris’s 
misconduct is disbarment. 
 Parris did not offer any mitigating factors5 in his defense, as he did not file any 
responsive pleadings with this Court.  The Commission, however, identified that Parris has 
 
5The list of mitigating factors we typically consult includes: 
(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith 
efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) 
full and free disclosure to the Commission or a cooperative attitude toward 
the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or 
chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there 
is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or 
mental disability, (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused 
the misconduct, (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation, and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and 
the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
 
 
20 
an absence of a disciplinary record, which the hearing judge found was a present mitigating 
factor.  On the other hand, the hearing judge found the existence of seven aggravating 
factors:6 
(1) 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive; 
(2) 
A Pattern of Misconduct; 
(3) 
Multiple Offenses; 
(4) 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by 
Intentionally Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the 
Disciplinary Agency; 
(5) 
Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Conduct; 
(6) 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law; and 
(7) 
Indifference to Making Restitution. 
We agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence supports each 
of the above aggravating factors.  Parris exhibited a dishonest or selfish motive when he 
made knowing and intentional representations about the case to conceal his derelict 
performance from the court and Chaddsford.  Parris’s representation of Chaddsford and 
 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the [MARPC]; and (14) unlikelihood 
of repetition of the misconduct. 
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 636 n.13. 
 
6 The list of aggravating factors we typically consult includes: 
(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern 
of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [MARPC]; (5) bad faith 
obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; 
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s 
vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) 
indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635 n.11. 
 
21 
conduct in these disciplinary proceedings exhibited a clear pattern of misconduct.  Parris 
committed multiple violations of the MARPC, as detailed above. Parris engaged in bad 
faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding when he intentionally failed to comply with 
the rules and orders of the Commission and the hearing judge.  Parris’s refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct is apparent from his failure to refund 
Chaddsford’s fee payments.  Parris has substantial experience in the practice of law as he 
has been a member of the bar of this Court since 1987.  Finally, Parris’s indifference to 
making restitution is evident from the fact that he made no attempt at restitution and has 
not refunded Chaddsford.  
Therefore, “[t]o safeguard the public from future harm and to protect its perception 
of the legal community at large,” White, 480 Md. at 393 (citing Bonner, 477 Md. at 607 
and Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Karambelas, 473 Md. 134, 177 (2021)), we conclude that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Parris’s “flagrant and persistent MARPC 
violations,” id. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND 
RULE 
19-709(d), 
FOR 
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 
KEITH ANTHONY PARRIS.