Title: Taylor v. Jones

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1145 
____________ 
 
 
JOHN CALVIN TAYLOR, II, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[October 12, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Calvin Taylor, II, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus 
seeking relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. 
 
Taylor’s death sentence, which his penalty phase jury recommended by a 
vote of ten to two, became final in 2004.  See Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 
2003), cert. denied, Taylor v. Florida, 541 U.S. 905 (2004).  We have held that 
Hurst applies retroactively to “defendants whose sentences became final after the 
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring[ v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
 
 
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(2002)].”  Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016).  Thus, Hurst applies 
retroactively to Taylor. 
 
Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two, 
Taylor’s death sentence violates Hurst.  See Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568, 570 
(Fla. 2017).  Accordingly, we must consider whether the error is harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[ v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as 
the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, 
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the conviction. 
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 
1986)). 
 
While the aggravators in this case are such that no reasonable juror would 
have failed to find their existence,1 based on the jury’s ten-to-two recommendation 
for a sentence of death, we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that 
the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a sentence of death.  Nor can we 
                                          
 
 
1.  “The four aggravating circumstances were: (1) Taylor was previously 
convicted of another violent felony; (2) the crime was committed while Taylor was 
engaged in the commission of a robbery [of which Taylor’s jury also found him 
guilty]; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) Taylor was 
under sentence of imprisonment at the time the murder was committed.  The trial 
court merged the murder in the course of a felony and pecuniary gain aggravators 
and considered them as a single aggravator.”  Taylor, 855 So. 2d at 13, n.9. 
 
 
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“determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators outweighed the 
mitigation.”  Kopsho, 209 So. 3d at 570.  “We can only determine that the jury did 
not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.”  Id.  Therefore, because we 
cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that the error did not contribute to 
the sentence, the Hurst error in Taylor’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Cf. Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174-75 (Fla. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 228 (2017). 
 
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted.  We 
vacate the death sentence and remand to the circuit court for a new penalty phase.  
See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ.,  dissent. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at 
*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Christopher J. Anderson of Law Office of Christopher J. Anderson, Neptune 
Beach, Florida; and Billy H. Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the 
Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Respondent