Title: Sutherland v. Bock

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sutherland v. Bock1984 WY 106688 P.2d 157Case Number: 84-16Decided: 10/05/1984ROBERT AND LINDA SUTHERLAND, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

NORMAN AND DOROTHY BOCK, CONRAD J. AND LYDIA KERCHER, DAVID D. AND MARIETTA POND, LEW AND BARBARA VAVRA, RAY A. MINSTER AND LYNDALL AND ROSALIE LUNDY, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT AND LINDA 
SUTHERLAND, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

NORMAN AND DOROTHY BOCK, 
CONRAD J. AND LYDIA KERCHER, DAVID D. AND MARIETTA POND, LEW AND BARBARA VAVRA, 
RAY A. MINSTER AND LYNDALL AND ROSALIE LUNDY, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Allen 
Gardzelewski of Gardzelewski & Lang, Laramie, for appellants.

Michael H. 
Schilling of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
the granting of an injunction against the construction of a shop/garage. The 
issue is the propriety of enjoining the construction of a shop/garage, a project 
that was initiated before the construction of a residence on land subject to 
protective and restrictive covenants. We will affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellants, the 
Sutherlands, are the owners of Lot 6, Block 4 
of the Laramie Plains subdivision. Appellees are property owners in the same 
subdivision. At the commencement of this action appellants were in the process 
of erecting a 40-foot by 72-foot metal building. The Sutherlands represented 
that this structure was to be a shop/garage. They further said that their plan 
was to build a personal residence on the lot and that the residence was to be 
completed within a year after completion of the shop/garage. Appellants stated 
that the reason for constructing the shop/garage before the residence was for 
convenience and to save money.

[¶3.]     Appellees brought this 
action seeking to enjoin appellants from constructing the metal building. The 
basis of their petition for injunctive relief was protective and restrictive 
covenants regarding structures permitted on properties in the subdivision. The 
trial court granted a summary judgment and ordered that appellants be 
preliminarily enjoined from erecting their building. Appellants appeal that 
order.1

[¶4.]     The protective and 
restrictive covenants were placed on the property involved here in November, 
1954 by the parties' predecessor in title. The specific covenant 
provides:

"(a) No structure shall 
be erected, placed or permitted to remain on said premises except residential 
buildings * * * and outbuildings incidental to the use and occupancy of property 
for residential purposes only."

[¶5.]     In reviewing the 
propriety of granting a summary judgment we first consider whether or not there 
is a genuine issue of material fact underlying the granting of the summary 
judgment. If there is no issue of material fact we then decide whether the 
substantive law was correctly applied by the trial court. Both sides moved the 
court for a summary judgment, and neither appellants or appellees contend that 
there is an issue of material fact; therefore, we need only be concerned about 
the application of substantive law.

[¶6.]     The trial court cited 
two uncontroverted facts upon which it relied to make its conclusions: 1) a 
40-foot X 72-foot building was being erected on appellants' lot, and 2) there 
was no existing residential structure on the lot.

[¶7.]     Based on these facts 
the court concluded, in part:

"1. That the building 
being erected, as described in Finding 1, is not a residential building, is not 
an out building, and is not a building incidental to a residential purpose, and 
this Court can make no determination as to the character of said building until 
a residential structure is in existence.

"2. The announced intent 
of Defendants to build a residence in the future is insufficient to determine 
the character of a previously constructed building, and this Court cannot 
determine if such a previously constructed building is incidental to the use and 
occupancy of the property for residential purposes only.

"3. A preliminary 
injunction shall issue against Defendants placing or erecting of the building 
described in Finding 1 until a residential structure to which it may be 
incidental is in existence."

[¶8.]     Appellants contend that 
the protective and restrictive covenants do not specifically provide that a 
residence must be constructed before incidental outbuildings are constructed. 
Appellants then state that if it is unclear whether the covenants permit the 
shop/garage to be built first the covenants should be construed to allow it. 
They cite as authority Kindler v. 
Anderson, Wyo., 
433 P.2d 268, 271 (1967).

"* * * Restrictions upon 
the use of land, being in derogation of the common law, are not favored, are to 
be strictly construed, will not be extended by implication, and in case of doubt 
the restrictions will be construed in favor of the free use of the land. 
[Citations.] * * *"

[¶9.]     Appellants concede that 
"outbuildings incidental to the use and occupancy of property for residential 
purposes only" has to be out from 
something and incidental to 
something. The trial court held, in effect, that it could not tell if the 
40-foot by 72-foot structure was incidental to a nonexistent residence simply 
because there was no frame of reference. The only thing the court knew about a 
residence was appellants' representation that they planned to construct one. The 
court knew nothing about the cost, size, location with reference to the 40-foot 
X 72-foot building, or physical features of the proposed residence. Appellants 
estimated a completion date for the residence but were vague about when they 
would occupy it.

[¶10.]  We will not speculate how the trial court 
might have ruled had it been apprised of plans and specifications for a 
residence and had assurance that a residence would, in fact, be placed on the 
premises and occupied by appellants.

[¶11.]  Clearly, the protective and restrictive 
covenants contemplate that a residence is to be the principal building on the 
premises. The residence could exist without an outbuilding, but an outbuilding 
cannot legally be constructed independent of a residence. Stated another way, a 
residence cannot be incidental to an outbuilding.

[¶12.]  The court was faced with the problem of 
not knowing which was the principal building and which was the incidental 
building. Calling one structure an outbuilding does not necessarily make it an 
incidental building. Given the protective and restrictive covenants prohibiting 
the construction of a dwelling of less than 1,000 square feet or costing less 
than $10,000, the shop/garage as described by appellants could be almost three 
times larger than a residence and cost fifty percent more. In that event it 
would appear that the residence would be incidental to the 
shop/garage.

"The erection of a garage 
on a lot restricted to residences cannot be justified as incidental to a 
nonexistent residence * * * and a restriction of the property to use as a 
dwelling house site excludes the use of such site for a garage, without any 
dwelling house on the site." 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 164(3), p. 1126 
(1956).

[¶13.]  An outbuilding on a restricted lot cannot 
be justified as incidental to a residence that is not in existence. Biltmore Development Co. v. Kohn, 239 
Ky. 460, 39 S.W.2d 687 (1931). It cannot be rationally argued that an outbuilding can be 
constructed on a residential site without any residential structure on it. Seat v. Louisville & Jefferson County 
Land Co., 219 Ky. 418, 293 S.W. 986 (1927). The primary or 
principal use of lots in the Laramie Plains subdivision is for residences. 
Structures incidental to residential buildings must be subordinate and minor in 
significance. "Incidental" also incorporates the concept of a reasonable 
relationship with the primary use. Becker 
v. Town of Hampton Falls, 117 N.H. 437, 374 A.2d 653 (1977); and 7-11 Tours v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the 
Town of Smithtown, 90 A.D.2d 486, 454 N.Y.S.2d 477 
(1982).

[¶14.]  We hold that the trial court's 
interpretation of the covenants and application of the substantive law was 
reasonable.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

1 The granting of a 
preliminary injunction is not ordinarily an appealable order. The parties agree 
that in the interest of justice and economy this appeal should be decided, and 
because of circumstances peculiar to this case we have entertained this appeal.