Title: Copp v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ.  
 
ADAM CHARLES COPP 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090345 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO  
 
 
 
April 15, 2010 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL  
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Robert M. D. Turk, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal in a declaratory judgment proceeding brought 
by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the issue is whether the 
circuit court erred in holding that Nationwide owed no duty to 
defend Adam Charles Copp, one of its insureds, in a tort action 
brought against him by Gregory M. Jacobson.  Finding that the 
circuit court did err in this respect, we will reverse its 
judgment. 
 
At the time of the incident in question, Copp was an 
insured under a homeowner’s policy and an umbrella policy issued 
by Nationwide to Copp’s parents.  The homeowner’s policy 
provided coverage for an “occurrence,” described as bodily 
injury or property damage “resulting from an accident,” but 
excluded coverage for liability “caused intentionally by or at 
direction of an insured, including willful acts the result of 
                     
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 12, 
2010. 
which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the 
insured’s conduct.” 
 
The umbrella policy provided coverage for personal injury 
and property damage arising from an “occurrence,” meaning an 
“accident.”  The umbrella policy contains one clause excluding 
liability for “personal injury arising out of . . . willful 
violation of a law by or with the consent of the insured” and a 
second clause excluding liability for “bodily injury or property 
damage intended or expected by the insured.”  However, this 
latter clause specifically provides that it “does not apply to 
bodily injury or property damage caused by an insured trying to 
protect person or property.” 
BACKGROUND 
 
In the hearing on the motion for declaratory judgment, 
Nationwide introduced into evidence both insurance policies, the 
motion for judgment filed by Jacobson against Copp, an 
examination under oath of Copp, a deposition of Copp, and a 
deposition of Jacobson.  The parties had agreed and stipulated 
to the use of these materials in the declaratory action. 
 
Copp and Jacobson were not acquainted with one another 
prior to the incident in question on May 5, 2002.  From Copp’s 
examination under oath and deposition, it appears that Copp and 
Sean Manley, one of his roommates in an apartment at Blacksburg, 
had just finished their final examinations at Virginia 
 
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Polytechnic Institute and State University and were celebrating 
by playing a drinking game called “beer pong.”  Two individuals 
they “had never seen . . . before” entered the apartment through 
a “cracked” door and asked if they could challenge Copp and 
Manley to a game. 
 
After about ten minutes of playing the game, one of the 
newcomers, Carson Dugger, made a remark that offended Copp, who 
then asked the two men to leave the apartment.  When they did 
not leave, Copp put his hand on Dugger’s arm, told him to “[g]et 
out,” escorted him to the door, opened it, and pushed him into 
the hallway.  The two then engaged in an exchange of profanity 
in loud voices. 
 
Copp’s roommate, Manley, stepped between Copp and Dugger 
and tried to get both to calm down.  Manley got Copp back into 
their apartment and locked the door.  Dugger was “outside still 
yelling” so Copp, angry by now, exited through another door of 
the apartment to try to talk with Dugger to get him to leave.  
When Copp opened the door, he was confronted with several people 
who were attending a gathering on the floor above, had heard the 
shouting between Copp and Dugger, and had come downstairs to 
investigate.  One of these individuals was Jacobson, who was a 
friend of Dugger. 
 
When Copp stepped out of the door, there were four or five 
people between him and Dugger, including Jacobson.  Copp tried 
 
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to walk forward to get to Dugger but three of the people pushed 
him back, wrestled with him, twisted his arm, and kept him “from 
walking anywhere.”  At one point, he was pinned against the 
stairwell, but he was able to stand up and push one of the 
people off of him and then “someone, one of those individuals 
took a swing at [him] and [he] was able to duck [his] head and 
dodge the swing.”  He realized that he was “outnumbered” and 
that his “safety definitely was in jeopardy,” and he was able to 
get away from “the other individual” who was holding him and 
free himself. 
 
“[I]n the process of getting free,” Copp “swung [his] arm 
[with his fist closed] over top of someone’s head, kind of like 
a swim movement in football” and, “with that move,” Copp thought 
he “possibly struck Gregory Jacobson unintentionally.” 
 
Jacobson fell to the floor.  Copp heard someone say 
“[l]et’s beat the [expletive] out of him,” and he left 
immediately, going to the apartment of a friend. 
 
In Jacobson’s deposition, he stated that he did not 
“remember any of [what happened at the apartment] except [his] 
trying to tell [Copp] to calm down.”  However, he did remember 
getting between Copp and Dugger “because [Dugger was] his 
friend.”  He also remembered that he did not see anyone touch or 
“take a punch at” Copp, that Copp was “throwing punches [in] the 
air at people,” and that “Copp intentionally hit [him].” 
 
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Jacobson was knocked unconscious by the blow to his head 
and did not regain consciousness until he was in an ambulance on 
the way to a hospital.  It was determined that his orbital 
socket was fractured, requiring surgery on two occasions. 
 
Copp was charged with assault and battery on Jacobson under 
Code § 18.2-57, and he entered a plea of no contest to the 
charge.  He was ordered to enroll in an anger management class, 
perform community service, serve a period of probation, and 
reimburse Jacobson for his “initial hospital visit and ambulance 
ride.”  In addition, on the morning after the incident in 
question, Copp went to the apartment above his “to apologize and 
talk with Ryan Salomon,” who hosted the gathering 
Jacobson was attending before the commotion occurred downstairs.  
Copp felt he needed to apologize to Salomon “in part” for 
disturbing “his peaceful party.”  Salomon told Copp he would 
“forward [Copp’s] apology” to “the person whom [Copp] had hit.” 
 
Jacobson’s motion for judgment consisted of two counts.  
Count I was a claim for compensatory damages for assault and 
battery alleging that Copp “willfully and intentionally hit 
[Jacobson]” and that Copp’s “actions were unjustified [and] 
malicious.”  Count II was a claim for punitive damages for 
assault and battery with similar allegations of willful, 
intentional, unjustified, and malicious conduct on the part of 
Copp. 
 
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Nationwide and Copp each filed a memorandum of law.  
Nationwide argued that it did not have a duty to defend or owe 
coverage for any of the intentional acts alleged in the motion 
for judgment because they “cannot be considered an accident or 
accidental under the terms of the policies.”  Copp argued that 
Nationwide owed him the duty to defend and provide coverage 
based upon the limitation in the umbrella policy providing that 
the exclusion of liability for bodily injury or property damage 
intended or expected by the insured “does not apply to bodily 
injury or property damage caused by an insured trying to protect 
person or property.” 
 
In a letter opinion, the circuit court stated that although 
it had reviewed all the transcripts and the memoranda in 
arriving at its decision, it felt compelled to resolve the issue 
based on the pleadings, “ ‘and not by the testimony of witnesses 
or other evidence’ ” (quoting Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal 
Aluminum & Const. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 230 
(1981)).  The court held that “[c]learly under the facts as 
alleged, [Jacobson’s] claim against [Copp] is for an intentional 
act” and that “[b]ased upon the language in the insurance 
contract and the pleadings as set forth, . . . Nationwide is not 
obligated to defend [Copp] in the underlying tort claim.” 
 
While the court purported to quote all the exclusionary 
clauses in the two policies, it omitted that part of the 
 
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umbrella policy providing that the exclusion for intended or 
expected bodily injury and property damage “does not apply to 
bodily injury or property damage caused by an insured trying to 
protect person or property.” 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The interpretation of a contract presents a 
question of law subject to de novo review.  
Additionally, 
 
[c]ourts interpret insurance policies, like 
other contracts, in accordance with the 
intention of the parties gleaned from the 
words they have used in the document.  Each 
phrase and clause of an insurance contract 
should be considered and construed together 
and seemingly conflicting   provisions 
harmonized when that can be reasonably done, 
so as to effectuate the intention of the 
parties as expressed therein. 
 
Furthermore, 
 
[i]nsurance policies are contracts whose 
language is ordinarily selected by insurers 
rather than by policyholders.  The courts, 
accordingly, have been consistent in 
construing the language of such policies, 
where there is doubt as to their meaning, in 
favor of that interpretation which grants 
coverage, rather than that which withholds 
it.  Where two constructions are equally 
possible, that most favorable to the insured 
will be adopted.  Language in a policy 
purporting to exclude certain events from 
coverage will be construed most strongly 
against the insurer. 
 
Seals v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 277 Va. 558, 562, 674 S.E.2d 
860, 862 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
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[O]n appeal we are not bound by the trial court’s 
interpretation of the contract provision at issue; rather, 
we have an equal opportunity to consider the words of the 
contract within the four corners of the instrument itself.   
 
Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631,  
 
561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
[A]n insurer’s duty to defend . . . is broader than [the] 
obligation to pay, and arises whenever the complaint 
alleges facts and circumstances, some of which would, if 
proved, fall within the risk covered by the policy. 
 
. . . . 
 
[T]he obligation to defend is not negated merely by the 
unsuccessful assertion of a claim otherwise facially 
falling within the risks covered by the policy.  Various 
defenses applicable to specific factual circumstances may 
be successfully asserted against claims otherwise covered 
by the policy. The insurer has the obligation to defend the 
insured in such circumstances even though the obligation to 
pay is not ultimately invoked. 
 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Northbrook Property & Cas. 
Insurance Co., 252 Va. 265, 268-69, 475 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 
(1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
Nationwide contends that in determining whether an 
insurance company has a duty to defend the insured under a 
contract of insurance, the allegations in the underlying 
complaint and the insurance policy are examined, and if the 
complaint alleges facts and circumstances, some of which, if 
proved, would fall within the risk covered by the policy, then 
 
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the obligation to defend arises.  However, Nationwide maintains, 
matters raised by the insured in defense of the claim are not to 
be considered in evaluating whether there is a duty to defend. 
 
Continuing, Nationwide submits that if “it appears clearly 
that the insurer would not be liable under its contract for any 
judgment based upon the allegations in the complaint (and not 
considering the defenses), it has no duty to defend.”  This 
evaluation process, Nationwide asserts, is known as the “eight 
corners rule” because the analysis concerns only the four 
corners of the policy and the four corners of the complaint. 
 
Here, Nationwide says, the four corners of the complaint 
only alleged intentional torts, and the insurance policies 
provided coverage only for an “occurrence,” which is defined as 
“resulting from an accident.”  Therefore, Nationwide concludes, 
“there were no facts or circumstances alleged in the complaint 
that would fall within the risk covered by the policy,” and “the 
trial court could not consider Copp’s claim that his acts were 
made in self defense, because matters raised by the insured in 
defense of the claim are not to be considered in evaluating 
whether there is a duty to defend.” 
 
In several prior decisions in this type of case, we have 
applied the rule that only the allegations in the complaint and 
the provisions of the insurance policy are to be considered in 
deciding whether there is a duty on the part of the insurer to 
 
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defend and indemnify the insured.  Brenner v. Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corp., 240 Va. 185, 189, 192, 397 S.E.2d 100, 102, 104 
(1990);2 Reisen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 331, 302 
S.E.2d 529, 531 (1983); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Obenshain, 
219 Va. 44, 46, 245 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1978); Norman v. Insurance 
Co. of North America, 218 Va. 718, 724, 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 
(1978); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., 
Inc., 188 Va. 195, 199-200, 49 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1948).    
 
None of our prior decisions, however, has involved the type 
of situation we have here, where in one of the four corners of 
an insurance policy there is a provision specifically stating 
that an exclusion “does not apply to bodily injury or property 
damage caused by an insured trying to protect person or 
property.”  This provision must be considered and construed 
                     
 
2 Nationwide cites Brenner six times in its opening brief.  
But the case is not as hidebound as Nationwide makes it out to 
be.  Although we said that an insured in this type of case is 
limited to “the claim actually made” in the complaint and cannot 
in a cross-bill add a claim “for which there may have been 
coverage,”  
240 Va. at 192, 397 S.E.2d at 104, we also stated as follows: 
 
 
The duty to defend is to be determined initially from 
the allegations of the complaint.  But if it is doubtful 
whether the case alleged is covered by the policy, the 
refusal of the insurer to defend is at its own risk.  And, 
if it be shown subsequently upon development of the facts 
that the claim is covered by the policy, the insurer 
necessarily is liable for breach of its covenant to defend. 
 
Id. at 189, 397 S.E.2d at 102 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 
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together with each phrase of the umbrella policy.  Seals v. Erie 
Insurance Exchange, 277 Va. at 562, 674 S.E.2d at 862. 
 
Nationwide opines that what Copp really wants this Court to 
do is to “create an exception to [the] well settled law when the 
insured intends to argue self defense.”  But Copp has not asked 
us to create any exceptions.  He says that the exclusion of 
coverage for “bodily injury or property damage intended or 
expected by the insured . . . in fact contains an exception that 
the Circuit Court wholly ignored,” i.e., the proviso that 
“[t]his does not apply to bodily injury or property damage 
caused by an insured trying to protect person or property.”  
Copp asserts that “[i]f permitted to stand, the Circuit Court’s 
ruling would have the effect of denying coverage in the only 
circumstance in which the exception to the intentional acts 
exclusion could ever apply.” 
 
Although the circuit court stated in its opinion that it 
had “reviewed all of the transcripts” of the parties, it did not 
say that it had considered what was contained in the transcripts 
in making its decision.  To the contrary, it said it felt 
“compelled to initially resolve this issue based on the 
pleadings,” because “ ‘[t]he issues in a case are made by the 
pleadings, and not by the testimony of witnesses or other 
evidence’ ” (quoting Ted Lansing Supply Co., 221 Va. at 1141, 
277 S.E.2d at 230).  The underscoring was supplied by the 
 
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circuit court, not this Court.  And the court made its decision 
that Nationwide was not obligated to defend Copp in the 
underlying tort action “[b]ased upon the language in the 
insurance contract and the pleadings as set forth.” 
 
We agree with Copp that the umbrella policy contains an 
exception to the exclusion relating to “bodily injury or 
property damage intended or expected by the insured.”  The 
exception is found in one of the four corners of the insurance 
contract and stands on an equal footing with other provisions 
thereof.  It cannot be ignored or explained away on specious 
grounds.  And it requires consideration of an insured’s claim 
that he or she caused bodily injury or property damage trying to 
protect person or property in evaluating whether there is a duty 
to defend in a given case. 
 
We hold that this is such a case and that Nationwide has 
the duty under its umbrella policy to defend Copp in the 
underlying tort action.  Copp’s version of events is not 
inherently incredible, and Nationwide does not contend that it 
is.  The trier-of-fact could believe his version and return a 
verdict in his favor or it could disbelieve him and return a 
verdict against him.  But the fact that the latter result might 
occur does not negate Nationwide’s duty to defend in the first 
instance.  See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Northbrook Property 
& Cas. Co., 252 Va. at 269, 475 S.E.2d at 266. 
 
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Nationwide argues, however, that “even assuming for the 
purpose of argument that coverage were initially established by 
Copp under the eight corners rule, there was more than 
sufficient factual evidence for the trial court to conclude that 
Copp’s acts were not caused by an insured trying to protect 
person or property, and thus excluded under the terms of the 
policy.”3  But there was no such conclusion made by the circuit 
court in this case, and whether Copp’s acts were or were not 
caused by his trying to protect person or property must be left 
to the fact-finder in the subsequent trial of the underlying 
tort action.4  
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court and remand the case with direction to enter an order 
declaring the rights and duties of the parties consistent with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
 
3 Nationwide also argues that Copp’s actions caused “a 
willful violation of the law” and that Copp’s “no contest” plea 
“is prima facie evidence relevant to whether [Copp] 
intentionally assaulted and battered Jacobson.”  However, this 
argument is defaulted.  It is made for the first time on appeal, 
and we will not consider it.  Rule 5:25. 
 
4 We do not decide whether Copp had coverage under the 
homeowner’s policy.  That question is not before us. 
 
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