Title: DANIEL M. PITTARD V. GREAT LAKES AVIATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANIEL M. PITTARD V. GREAT LAKES AVIATION2007 WY 64156 P.3d 964Case Number: 05-230Decided: 04/24/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DANIEL 
M. PITTARD,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 

GREAT 
LAKES 
AVIATION,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David G. 
Ditto of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bradley 
T. Cave of Holland & Hart, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Dannie B. Fogelman of 
Ford & Harrison, LLP, Washington, DC.  
Argument by Mr. Fogelman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Daniel M. Pittard appeals from an order 
granting summary judgment for Great Lakes Aviation (Great 
Lakes) on its breach of contract claim.  He contends the district court erred 
by:  1) assuming jurisdiction of an 
employment dispute subject to mandatory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act 
(RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; 2) enforcing an individual contract that 
conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement; and 3) granting summary 
judgment despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact on his 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims.  
We affirm.    

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  The issues for our determination 
are:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether Great Lakes' state law breach of 
contract claim was pre-empted by the RLA.

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the district court erred in enforcing an agreement that allegedly 
conflicted with and was superseded by the collective bargaining agreement.  

 
 
            
3.         
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on 
Great Lakes' breach of contract claim.          
 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In June of 2002, Mr. Pittard submitted 
an application for employment as a pilot with Great 
Lakes.  At the time, he 
was employed as chief pilot at a pilot training school in California.  A few weeks after receiving his 
application, Great Lakes informed Mr. Pittard that he had been approved to fly 
for Great Lakes subject to successful completion of training to qualify him as a 
pilot on the BE 1900, a commercial turbo-prop aircraft.  Great Lakes asked Mr. Pittard to report 
for training in Cheyenne on August 5, 2002.  

 
 
[¶4]  Mr. Pittard quit his job in California and relocated to Colorado.  On August 5, 2002, he reported for 
training in Cheyenne.  
He was presented with a pilot training agreement and a promissory note, 
which he signed and dated that day.  
The pilot training agreement provided that Mr. Pittard was a pilot 
candidate being considered for training and, if he successfully completed the 
training, employment with Great Lakes.  It further provided that Great Lakes 
would advance the cost of the training ($7,500); however, in the event Mr. 
Pittard was hired by Great Lakes after completing the training but did not 
remain employed for at least fifteen months, he would be required to repay the 
$7,500 plus interest at the rate of 9.5% per year.  The promissory note evidenced Mr. 
Pittard's agreement to repay the training costs in accordance with the training 
agreement. 

 
 
[¶5]  Mr. Pittard successfully completed the 
pilot training and was employed by Great Lakes 
beginning on September 14, 2002.  
Mr. Pittard resigned from his position with Great 
Lakes on October 21, 2002, thirty-seven days later.  In accordance with the terms of the 
training agreement, Great Lakes requested 
reimbursement from Mr. Pittard for the cost of his training.  Mr. Pittard did not respond to Great 
Lakes' requests and, on July 15, 2004, Great Lakes filed a complaint for breach 
of contract in the LaramieCounty district court.  Great Lakes alleged damages in the 
amount of $7,356.97, i.e. the $7,500 training cost plus interest less Mr. 
Pittard's final paycheck which Great Lakes 
retained as payment toward his alleged debt.   

 
 
[¶6]  Prior to and during Mr. Pittard's 
employment with Great Lakes, Great Lakes' pilots were represented by the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division, Teamsters Local 747 
(Local 747), which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with 
Great Lakes in 1997.  Of relevance to the present dispute, the 
CBA provided that any subsequent agreements between parties to the CBA shall 
"become a part of" the CBA.  It also 
provided that pilots employed by Great Lakes 
"shall not be required to pay for any training."  The CBA also established a procedure for 
resolving grievances arising under its terms and provided that decisions 
concerning such grievances were final and binding.    

 
 
[¶7] On 
August 4, 2004, Local 747 filed a grievance with Great Lakes asserting that the 
training agreement Mr. Pittard had been required to sign violated the provision 
of the CBA prohibiting Great Lakes from 
requiring pilots to pay for training.  
Great Lakes rejected the grievance and, 
on August 17, 2004, Local 747 filed a grievance with the system board of 
adjustment, the board established pursuant to the RLA to decide disputes arising 
under the CBA.    

 
 
[¶8]  While the grievance was pending before 
the system board of adjustment, Great Lakes' 
claim in district court proceeded.  
Mr. Pittard filed an answer to the complaint in which he asserted, among 
other affirmative defenses, that Great Lakes' claim was precluded because the 
training agreement was unconscionable, he signed it under duress, and Great Lakes failed to disclose material information prior 
to having him sign the agreement.  
Mr. Pittard also filed a counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation and 
nondisclosure, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
breach of contract and violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104 (LexisNexis 
2005).1       

 
 
[¶9]      Great Lakes answered the counterclaim and then filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  In its 
memorandum supporting the motion, Great Lakes argued summary judgment was 
appropriate on its breach of contract claim because the contract unambiguously 
provided that if Mr. Pittard did not remain employed by Great Lakes for at least 
fifteen months, he would be required to repay the $7,500 training cost with 
interest.  Great Lakes alleged that the terms of the agreement, the 
fact that Mr. Pittard left his employment after thirty-seven days and the amount 
of damages were undisputed; therefore, it was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on its breach of contract claim.  
Great Lakes further argued it was entitled to summary judgment on Mr. 
Pittard's counterclaim because contrary to his assertions of nondisclosure, the 
evidence was undisputed that he was aware of the terms of the agreement before 
he accepted employment with Great Lakes.  

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Pittard filed a response to 
Great Lakes' motion together with a motion to 
dismiss or alternatively for partial summary judgment.  Mr. Pittard sought dismissal of the 
action on the grounds that Great Lakes' breach 
of contract claim was preempted by the mandatory arbitration provisions of the 
RLA.  Alternatively, Mr. Pittard 
sought partial summary judgment on the ground that the CBA superseded any 
individual agreement between himself and Great 
Lakes.  Responding to 
Great Lakes' summary judgment motion, Mr. Pittard asserted genuine issues of 
material fact existed concerning the enforceability of the agreement, 
specifically as to his claims that the agreement was unconscionable, there was 
insufficient consideration for the agreement and Great 
Lakes failed to disclose material terms of the agreement.     

 
 
[¶11]  The district court convened a hearing on 
the motions.  After the hearing, the 
court entered an order granting Great Lakes' 
motion and denying Mr. Pittard's motion.  
The district court found the following facts were 
undisputed:

 
 
[Mr. 
Pittard] completed an online employment application on June 27, 2002.  On the application, [Mr. Pittard] 
answered "Yes" to the question, "Are you willing to sign a training 
agreement?"  Thereafter, on August 
5, 2002, and prior to beginning his training with the Company, [Mr. Pittard] was 
presented with a Pilot Training Agreement ("Agreement") and a Promissory Note, 
which [he] signed.  According to the 
terms of the Agreement, [Mr. Pittard] agreed to reimburse [Great Lakes] the 
stipulated cost of his training ($7,500.00) should he resign, voluntarily 
terminate his employment, or be discharged at any time during his training or 
within fifteen (15) months of his actual hire date.  [Mr. Pittard] voluntarily resigned his 
employment with [Great Lakes] on October 21, 
2002, 37 days after his hire date.  
In accordance with the parties' Agreement, [Great 
Lakes] withheld $1,241.51 from [Mr. Pittard's] final paycheck.  [Mr. Pittard] did not challenge this 
withholding.  [Great Lakes] demanded payment of the balance owed, but 
[Mr. Pittard] refuses to satisfy his breach of the 
Agreement.

 
 
[¶12]  The district court concluded these 
undisputed facts showed that the parties entered into a valid and binding 
agreement, and Mr. Pittard breached the agreement.  The court ordered Great Lakes to submit a motion for entry of judgment 
together with affidavits showing the amount due under the agreement and 
promissory note and an application for attorney's fees and costs.  Thereafter, based upon the affidavits, 
the district court entered judgment awarding Great 
Lakes $7,225.74, the amount due on the promissory note, plus 
$6,362.00 for attorney's fees and costs, for a total judgment of 
$13,587.74.        

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Pittard appealed the district 
court's order to this Court.   
After he filed his appellate brief, but before Great 
Lakes filed its brief, the system board of adjustment issued a 
decision on Local 747's grievance.  
In its decision, the arbitrator concluded the CBA permitted Great Lakes 
to enforce pre-employment training agreements requiring pilot candidates to 
reimburse the cost of pre-employment training in the event they were hired but 
did not remain employed by Great Lakes for at 
least fifteen months.2

 
 
 STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]  When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we consider the record de 
novo.  Hincks v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 WY 12, 
¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007).  
Our review of orders granting summary judgment is governed by W.R.C.P. 
56(c), which provides in pertinent part:  

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We view 
the evidence offered in support of and in opposition to the motion in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record.  Hincks, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d  at 670.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                              
Pre-emption 
by RLA

 
 
[¶15]  Mr. Pittard's first claim on appeal is 
that Great Lakes' state law breach of contract claim was pre-empted by federal 
law because it arose from an employment dispute between an employee and an air 
carrier governed by the RLA3 and such disputes are subject to a 
mandatory arbitration procedure.  
Pursuant to the 1997 CBA entered into by Great Lakes and Local 747, Mr. 
Pittard claims the system board of adjustment had exclusive jurisdiction over 
Great Lakes' dispute with 
him.

 
 
[¶16]  Great Lakes argues the mandatory 
arbitration procedure provided by the RLA does not apply to its breach of 
contract claim because the arbitration procedure only applies to disputes 
requiring interpretation of the CBA and its contract claim does not involve 
interpretation of the CBA.  Because 
the contract claim is based entirely on a separate, individual, pre-employment 
agreement between Great Lakes and Mr. Pittard, Great 
Lakes asserts it is entirely independent of the CBA and does not 
implicate the system board of adjustment or the RLA. 

 
 
[¶17]  In its order, the district court 
resolved the preemption issue as follows:

 
 
The 
issue of whether the Agreement violates the collective bargaining agreement is 
for the System Board of Adjustment to decide.  Unless, and until, the System Board of 
Adjustment determines that the terms of the parties' Agreement violate the 
collective bargaining agreement, [Great Lakes] 
has every right to enforce the terms of the Agreement.  Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway 
Labor Executives' Association, 491 U.S. 299 (1989). The issue properly 
before this Court is whether the parties entered into a valid and binding 
agreement, and whether [Mr. Pittard] violated that agreement, not whether the 
Agreement violates the collective bargaining agreement.

 
 
[¶18]   We disagree with the district 
court's conclusion that Great Lakes was free to 
enforce the training agreement in state court without a determination by the 
arbitrator as to whether the agreement violated the CBA.  The issue concerns Congress' power to pre-empt 
state law, which power is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the 
United States Constitution.  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985).  While congressional power to legislate 
in the area of labor relations has long been recognized, Congress has never 
occupied the entire field of labor legislation.  Id.  The question whether a certain state 
action is pre-empted 
by federal law is one of congressional intent.   Id.

 
 
[¶19] 
Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in 
labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving 
labor disputes.  Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 250, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 129 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1994).  To accomplish this purpose, the RLA 
established a mandatory arbitration procedure for the prompt and orderly 
settlement of two classes of disputes.  
Id.  The first class, major disputes, 
involves disputes over the formation of a CBA or efforts to secure one.  Id.  The second class, minor disputes, 
involves disputes over the meaning of an existing CBA in a particular fact 
situation.  Id.  Thus, major disputes seek to create 
contractual rights; minor disputes seek to enforce them.  Id.  Both types of disputes are resolved 
through the RLA processes, which include the employer's internal dispute 
resolution procedure and an adjustment board established by the employer and the 
union.  A determination that a 
dispute constitutes a major or minor dispute under the RLA pre-empts a state law 
cause of action.    

 
 
[¶20]  Great 
Lakes' claim against Mr. Pittard did not concern a dispute over the 
formation of a CBA.  Its claim, 
therefore, did not constitute a major dispute governed by the RLA.  The claim, however, did involve a 
dispute over the meaning of a CBA such that it may have constituted a minor 
dispute governed by the RLA.  We 
turn to consideration of the types of minor disputes involving CBAs that are 
governed by the RLA.

 
 
[¶21]   The RLA preempts minor disputes 
that are grounded in the CBA.  It 
does not preempt disputes involving rights or obligations that exist 
independently of the CBA.  Among the 
many cases illustrating the difference between disputes grounded in the CBA and 
those involving rights independent from the CBA are Andrews v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 
406 U.S. 320, 92 S. Ct. 1562, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1972) and Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. 
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1987).  In Andrews, the employee's wrongful 
discharge claim was based on an alleged breach of the CBA.  The Court held the state law claim was 
pre-empted, stating:

 
 
Here it 
is conceded by all that the only source of petitioner's right not to be 
discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a "wrongful" one that 
entitles him to damages, is the collective-bargaining agreement between the 
employer and the union. Respondent in this case vigorously disputes any intent 
on its part to discharge petitioner, and the pleadings indicate that the 
disagreement turns on the extent of respondent's obligation to restore 
petitioner to his regular duties following injury in an automobile accident. The 
existence and extent of such an obligation in a case such as this will depend on 
the interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Thus petitioner's 
claim, and respondent's disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations 
of the collective-bargaining agreement.

 
 
406 U.S.  at 324.  In contrast, in Buell, the railroad employee's claims 
were brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 
et seq., which provides a remedy for railroad workers injured due to an 
employer's or co-worker's negligence.  
The Court held the claims were not pre-empted.  The Court said:

 
 
The fact 
that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was caused by conduct that 
may have been subject to arbitration under the RLA does not deprive an employee 
of his opportunity to bring a FELA action for damages. . . .  

 
 
The FELA 
not only provides railroad workers with substantive protection against negligent 
conduct that is independent of the employer's obligations under its collective 
bargaining agreement, but also affords injured workers a remedy suited to their 
needs, unlike the limited relief that seems to be available through the 
Adjustment Board.  

 
 
480 U.S.  at 564-65.  

 
 
[¶22]   The standard applied in RLA cases 
is virtually identical to the pre-emption standard the United States Supreme 
Court has employed in cases involving § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185.  For 
example, in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic 
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 
108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988), a 
LMRA case, the Court said that where the resolution of a state-law claim depends 
on an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is pre-empted.  However, purely factual questions about 
an employee's conduct or employer's conduct or motive do not require a court to 
interpret any term of a CBA. "As long as the state-law claim can be resolved 
without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the 
agreement for . . . pre-emption purposes."  
Id.  
at 410.  

 
 
[¶23]   Concluding that Lingle provides an appropriate framework 
for addressing pre-emption under the RLA, the Court in Norris adopted the Lingle standard to resolve claims of RLA 
pre-emption.  512 U.S.  at 263.  The Court applied the standard in Norris to hold an employee's claim was 
not pre-empted by the RLA when the employer had a state law obligation, wholly 
separate from any provision of the CBA, not to fire an employee in violation of 
public policy or in retaliation for whistle-blowing.  Because the issue to be decided  
whether the employer's actions gave rise to a wrongful discharge under 
Hawaii law  
was a purely factual question wholly independent of the CBA, the Court held the 
employee's claims for discharge in violation of public policy and in violation 
of the Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act were not pre-empted by the RLA. 

 
 
[¶24]  In the present case, Great Lakes asserts that its state law breach of contract 
claim was wholly separate from the CBA because it was based upon an individual 
contract between itself and Mr. Pittard.  
Therefore, Great Lakes contends, it was 
not a minor dispute and was not subject to the mandatory RLA arbitration 
process.  Mr. Pittard responds that 
the pilot training agreement was in direct contravention of the CBA and 
interpretation of the CBA was necessary in order to determine the validity of 
the pilot training agreement. Therefore, he asserts, the state law claim could 
not be resolved without interpreting the CBA and the state law claim was 
pre-empted. 

 
 
[¶25]  The CBA provides in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
Section 
1

Recognition 
and Scope

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
B. This 
Agreement shall supersede all existing or previously executed Agreements by and 
between the Company and the Union or any other labor organization or individual 
with respect to the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions specifically 
covered by the provisions of this Agreement in accordance with the provisions of 
the Railway Labor Act as amended.  
Any and all subsequent Agreements 
between the parties shall be reduced to writing, signed by their authorized 
representatives, and become a part of this Agreement.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).

 
 
Section 
11

Training

 
 
A.  General Guidelines

 
 
            * * * 
*

 
 
17. 
 A pilot employed by the Company 
shall not be required to pay for any training . . . .  This includes all Company initial, 
recurrent, flight training, ground training and 
checkrides.

 
 
[¶26]  Although Great 
Lakes' breach of contract claim was based upon the individual 
training agreement with Mr. Pittard, the validity of that agreement was 
dependent upon an interpretation of the two provisions of the CBA quoted 
directly above.  Because the issue 
to be decided  whether Mr. Pittard breached the training agreement and was 
liable for damages  could not be decided without first determining whether the 
agreement was valid under the CBA, the state law claim was not resolvable 
without interpreting the CBA and the state law claim should not have proceeded 
without a ruling from the arbitrator.  
The district court's conclusion to the contrary was in error and its 
ruling on the state law claim was premature.  As this case evolved, however, we 
conclude the error was harmless.  
Upon a ruling by the arbitrator on Local 747's grievance, the district 
court would have been free to decide whether summary judgment was appropriate on 
Great Lakes' state law breach of contract 
claim. Given the arbitrator's ruling that the training agreement did not violate 
the CBA, no harm resulted from the district court prematurely ruling on the 
motion.   

  

 
 

2.                  
District 
Court's Authority to Determine Whether the Agreement Violated the CBA  

 
 
[¶27]  In his appellate brief, which he filed 
prior to the arbitrator's ruling, Mr. Pittard's second claim was that the 
district court erred in enforcing the pilot training agreement because it 
conflicted with and was superseded by the CBA.  As noted, the arbitrator subsequently 
issued his ruling, concluding that Great Lakes' 
training agreement did not violate the CBA.  Pursuant to the terms of the CBA, the 
arbitrator's decision is final and binding.  It would not have been the district 
court's function, nor is it this Court's function, to review the merits of his 
decision.

 
 
[¶28]  The United States Supreme Court has 
said:

 
 
Collective-bargaining 
agreements commonly provide grievance procedures to settle disputes between 
union and employee with respect to the interpretation and application of the 
agreement and require binding arbitration for unsettled grievances.  In such cases, and this is such a case, 
the Court made clear almost 30 years ago that the courts play only a limited 
role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.  The courts are not authorized to reconsider 
the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award 
rests on errors of fact or on 
misinterpretation of the contract.  
* * * As long as the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the 
collective bargaining agreement," and is not merely "his own brand of industrial 
justice," the award is legitimate. 

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"The courts, therefore, have no business 
weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a 
particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the 
written instrument which will support the claim."    

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
[A]s 
long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and 
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed 
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.  Of course, decisions procured by the 
parties through fraud or through the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be 
enforced. But there is nothing of that sort involved in this case.   

 
 

United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1987) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

 
 
[¶29]   Misco was a direct appeal to federal 
court seeking review of an arbitrator's decision.   The present case was a separate 
proceeding filed in state court alleging a state cause of action for breach of 
an individual contract between employer and employee.  There was no arbitrator decision until 
after the state district court ruled and Mr. Pittard had filed his brief on 
appeal.  Thus, initially neither 
party to this appeal sought direct review of the arbitrator's decision as was 
the case in Misco.  Despite these differences, we are 
persuaded the principles espoused in Misco apply with equal force in the 
present case.  The arbitrator has 
ruled that the pilot training agreement did not violate the CBA and we are not 
at liberty to reconsider that ruling.  
For a similar result, see Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (recognizing that while state courts have 
jurisdiction over actions for wrongful termination of employment covered by a 
labor agreement . . . they should not undertake to review the merits of a 
grievance decision rendered by an arbitrator).  Therefore, we decline to consider Mr. 
Pittard's claim that the district court erred in enforcing the pilot training 
agreement because it allegedly violated the CBA.   

 
 
3.         
Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses and 
Counterclaims

 
 
[¶30]  Mr. Pittard claims the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment for Great 
Lakes on its breach of contract claim because genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to whether the contract was enforceable under the 
common law.  The gist of his claim 
is that the terms of the training agreement were not discussed with or disclosed 
to him prior to his arrival in Cheyenne for 
training at which point he had already quit his job in California and 
relocated.  Then, he asserts, the 
agreement was foisted upon him without giving him adequate time to review it and 
with the threat of not being employed by Great 
Lakes if he refused to sign it.  In essence, Mr. Pittard claims the 
training agreement was unenforceable because Great 
Lakes' nondisclosure of its terms was unconscionable and he signed 
it under duress. 

 
 
[¶31]  Viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Pittard, the following evidence was presented in support of his claims.  Mr. Pittard submitted an affidavit in 
which he stated that prior to accepting the offer with Great Lakes, quitting his 
job in California, moving to Colorado and arriving in Cheyenne to begin 
training, he was not informed that he would be required to repay the training 
costs if he did not remain employed by Great Lakes for a specified time 
period.  He stated that finances 
were a major concern for him at the time and he would not have accepted 
employment with Great Lakes had he known about 
the re-payment obligation.  On the 
first day of training in Cheyenne, the pilot 
training agreement was placed in front of him and he was told he must sign it if 
he wanted to work for Great Lakes.  He felt he had no choice but to sign the 
agreement since he had already quit his previous job and moved.    

 
 
[¶32]   Mr. Pittard also submitted an 
affidavit from another pilot, Dale Kessler, in support of his 
counterclaims.  Mr. Kessler stated 
he went through pilot training with Great Lakes 
in 2001 and was not informed about a training agreement or a requirement to 
repay training costs.  After the 
training, Great Lakes informed him the company 
had miscalculated and did not need him.  
Great Lakes called him for training 
again in August 2002.  Prior to 
arriving in Cheyenne, he was not informed about a training 
agreement or requirement to repay training costs.  When he reported for training on August 
5, 2002, he was given a copy of the training agreement and told he had to sign 
it if he wanted to work for Great Lakes.  This was the first time Great Lakes mentioned a training agreement to him.  Like Mr. Pittard, Mr. Kessler felt he 
had no choice but to sign the agreement since he had already quit his previous 
job. 

 
 
[¶33]   We do not lightly interfere with 
the freedom of contract.  Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 247 
(Wyo. 2000).  We, therefore, 
approach claims that a contract is unconscionable cautiously. Id.  The question of whether a contract is 
unconscionable is determined as of the time the contract was made and not in 
hindsight.  Id.  

 
 
 
 
[¶34]   In deciding whether a contract is 
unconscionable, we consider the claim from two perspectives.  First, we consider whether the contract 
provisions unreasonably favor one party over the other.  Second, we consider whether the latter 
party lacked a meaningful choice in entering into the contract.  The first perspective concerns the 
contract's substantive unconscionability.  
The second concerns its procedural unconscionability.  As noted in Roussalis, 4 P.3d  at 246, most courts 
require evidence of both and take a balancing approach in applying them.  In other words, both the absence of 
meaningful choice and the presence of contract provisions unreasonably favorable 
to one party must be found in order to sustain a claim that a contract is 
unconscionable.  Id.    

 
 
[¶35]   We have identified the following 
factors for consideration in addressing claims that a contract is procedurally 
unconscionable:  

 
 
[D]eprivation 
of meaningful choice as to whether to enter into the contract, compulsion to 
accept terms, opportunity for meaningful negotiation, such gross inequality of 
bargaining power that negotiations were not possible, characteristics of alleged 
aggrieved party (underprivileged, uneducated, illiterate, easily taken advantage 
of), and surprise by fine print or concealed terms.  

 
 

Id. at 
247.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Pittard, evidence was presented tending to show several of the 
factors necessary for procedural unconscionability, including evidence 
suggesting that he did not have an opportunity for meaningful negotiation and 
was surprised by terms allegedly concealed from him.  However, no evidence was presented 
showing the training agreement itself was substantively unconscionable.  Mr. Pittard presented no evidence 
showing that the provision requiring him to repay the $7,500 cost of training if 
he did not remain employed by Great Lakes for more than fifteen months 
unreasonably favored Great Lakes over him.  To the contrary, given that Great Lakes was agreeing to provide valuable training for 
free, it was not unreasonable for it to require repayment if the employment 
ended prematurely before it received the benefit of the trained pilot's 
service.  Absent evidence that the 
training agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, 
summary judgment was appropriate on the breach of contract claim because Mr. 
Pittard did not establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on 
his affirmative defense that the agreement was 
unconscionable.

 
 
[¶36]  As a second affirmative defense, Mr. 
Pittard claimed that he signed the training agreement under duress.  We have said duress exists whenever a 
person is induced, by the unlawful act of another, to perform some act under 
circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.  Kendrick v. Barker, 2001 WY 2, ¶ 24, 15 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2001).  Because 
Mr. Pittard alleged that he had no choice but to sign the agreement after having 
quit his job in California and relocated to 
Colorado, his 
claim was one of economic duress.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶37] In 
order to prove a claim of economic duress, Mr. Pittard must show:  1) he involuntarily accepted the terms 
of the training agreement; (2) circumstances permitted no other alternative; and 
(3) such circumstances were the result of coercive acts by Great Lakes.  
Id.  He must show that he was the victim of a 
wrongful act and had no reasonable alternative but to agree with Great Lakes' terms or be faced with a serious financial 
hardship.  Id.  Whether particular circumstances are 
sufficient to constitute economic duress is a question of law; the existence of 
those circumstances is a question of fact.  
Blubaugh v. Turner, 842 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Wyo. 1992).  

 
 
[¶38]  We applied these principles in Blubaugh to uphold summary judgment on a 
claim of economic duress.  In Blubaugh, an employee was summoned to 
his employer's office and told he could resign or be terminated.  He was presented with a release 
providing that if he resigned and released his employer from any future claims, 
he would receive his normal separation pay plus an additional $4,500 and 
outplacement counseling.  He signed 
the release and later filed suit, alleging among other claims a claim for 
economic duress.  In resistance to 
the employer's summary judgment motion, the employee claimed he was told if he 
did not resign and sign the release, he would be fired and would lose the 
opportunity for outplacement counseling and the additional $4,500.  He also claimed he was not given an 
opportunity to negotiate any of the terms of the release agreement and was in a 
state of shock from being told to resign or be fired.  In upholding the summary judgment, we 
agreed with the district court's conclusion that, even assuming the facts 
alleged by the employee were true, those facts did not show he was deprived of 
the exercise of free will or that he had no viable alternative but to resign and 
sign the release.   The court 
specifically noted those claiming economic duress must provide evidence they 
would "face such immediate financial ruin that they could not seek a remedy to 
provide redress to them. . . ."  Id. at 1076.

 
 
[¶39]  More recently, we applied these same 
principles to reverse a judgment awarded after a bench trial on an economic 
duress claim.  In Dobson v. Portrait Homes, Inc., 2005 WY 
95, 117 P.3d 1200 (Wyo. 2005), after Portrait Homes settled a lien claim against 
its property, it sued claiming the settlement was obtained under duress because 
it had to pay the lien claim or risk derailing a pending sale of the property 
thus creating economic duress.  We 
held Portrait Homes failed to prove the last two elements necessary for a claim 
of economic duress, i.e. that it had no reasonable alternative other than to pay 
the outstanding amount on the lien and that the lien claimant's act in 
furtherance of its lien was wrongful. 

 
 
[¶40]  As these cases illustrate, more is 
required from a party asserting economic duress than bald assertions that he or 
she was deprived of the exercise of free will, had no reasonable alternative and 
was coerced by another's wrongful act.  
To establish a prima facie 
claim for economic duress sufficient to withstand summary judgment, a party must 
present concrete evidence of the particular factors depriving him of his free 
will and giving him no reasonable alternative.  A party must also present evidence 
showing that he was coerced by wrongful conduct.  Bare allegations that these 
circumstances existed, without specifics showing their existence, are not 
sufficient.

 
 
[¶41]  Mr. Pittard's evidence consisted of his 
affidavit and that of another pilot, stating they were not informed before they 
reported for training of the contractual provision requiring reimbursement of 
the training costs if they left Great Lakes' 
employment within fifteen months.  
Mr. Pittard's affidavit also stated he quit his former employment and 
relocated to Cheyenne based on Great Lakes' offer of employment.  We hold this evidence was insufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether he was 
deprived of the exercise of free will.  
Mr. Pittard made no showing that he was not free to refuse to sign the 
training agreement and look for a job elsewhere.  Viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Pittard, the evidence that he quit his job in California and relocated to 
Wyoming and only then realized that he would have to re-pay the $7,500 if he was 
not employed for at least fifteen months simply did not show he faced "immediate 
financial ruin" and had no alternative remedy.  He presented no evidence showing why he 
could not have refused to sign the agreement and, if his refusal caused 
Great Lakes not to hire him, looked for a job 
elsewhere.  In fact, just over a 
month later, he voluntarily chose to terminate his employment with Great Lakes, 
suggesting he was not so financially burdened that he was unable to leave 
Great Lakes and seek other 
employment.

 
 
 [¶42]  Finally, Mr. Pittard failed to present 
evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether 
Great Lakes' conduct was wrongful.  Even viewed in the light most favorable 
to Mr. Pittard, there is no evidence that Great Lakes intentionally concealed 
the details of the training agreement in order to coerce him into quitting his 
job and relocating only to spring it upon him and force him to sign it once in 
Cheyenne.  As a matter of law, the 
evidence Mr. Pittard presented was not sufficient to sustain his affirmative 
defense of economic duress and the district court properly granted summary 
judgment for Great Lakes on its breach of 
contract claim.           

 
 
[¶43]  Mr. Pittard also claims the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment for Great 
Lakes on his counterclaims for negligent 
misrepresentation/nondisclosure and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  He claims genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to these claims which precluded summary 
judgment.  We address the 
counterclaims separately, beginning with his claim for negligent 
misrepresentation.  A plaintiff 
claiming negligent misrepresentation must show:

 
 
One who, 
in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability 
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information. 

 
 

Birt v. 
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 42, 75 P.3d 640, 
656 (Wyo. 2003).  Mr. Pittard 
presented no evidence indicating Great Lakes 
presented false information about the requirement of re-paying the cost of 
training.   The essence of his 
affidavits was that Great Lakes failed to 
disclose that re-payment was required.  
We have said nondisclosure of information cannot support a claim for 
misrepresentation; since nothing has been represented, an essential element of 
the claim is missing.  Id. at 657.  The district court did not error in 
granting summary judgment on Mr. Pittard's negligent misrepresentation 
claim.

 
 
[¶44]  In his counterclaim, Mr. Pittard also 
alleged that Great Lakes failed to timely 
disclose that he would be required to sign a pilot training agreement and 
promissory note pursuant to which he would incur liability if he failed to 
remain employed for at least fifteen months.  Wyoming has not adopted the tort of 
nondisclosure and Mr. Pittard presents no argument to support its adoption in 
this case.  Absent cogent argument 
and citation to authority concerning the tort of nondisclosure, we decline to 
consider it.

 
 
[¶45]  Mr. Pittard also alleged that Great Lakes breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  Addressing the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, this Court has 
said:

 
 
All 
contracts of employment contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. However, a duty giving rise to tort liability for breach of the implied 
covenant exists only in rare and exceptional cases.   In order for a duty to arise, 
there must be a showing of a special relationship of trust and reliance between 
the employee seeking to recover and the employer. "Trust and reliance may be 
found by the existence of separate consideration, common law, statutory rights, 
or rights accruing with longevity of service." 

 
 

Life 
Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 
WY 38, ¶ 21, 65 P.3d 385, 394 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted).  Mr. Pittard did not allege the existence 
or nature of any special relationship of trust and reliance in his 
counterclaim.  In his summary 
judgment brief, however, he asserted "the [RLA] is a specific statutory 
provision created to provide protection to employees governed by collective 
bargaining agreements" and "the CBA imposed a separate obligation on Great Lakes to prevent it from collecting training fees 
from pilots."  In light of the 
arbitrator's ruling that the pilot training agreement did not violate the CBA, 
we decline to address Mr. Pittard's argument that the CBA created a special 
relationship of trust and reliance supporting his claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  We also decline to address Mr. Pittard's 
claim that the RLA gives rise to a special relationship.  Other than the statement quoted above 
from his summary judgment brief, he cites no authority and presents no argument 
supporting his assertion that the RLA gave rise to a special relationship.  Absent proper argument and citation of 
authority, we simply are not willing to extend Wyoming precedent to conclude that the RLA created a 
special relationship of trust and reliance between Mr. Pittard and Great Lakes sufficient to support a claim for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.      

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶46] A 
decision on Great Lakes' state law breach of contract claim required 
interpretation of the CBA entered into between Great 
Lakes and Local 747, a matter exclusively within the province of an 
arbitrator.  The district court 
should have stayed or dismissed without prejudice the state action until the 
arbitrator issued a ruling on the Local 747 grievance.  However, any error by the district court 
in proceeding with the state law claim was harmless given the arbitrator's 
subsequent ruling that the training agreement did not violate the CBA.  The arbitrator's ruling is binding and 
not subject to re-consideration or review by this Court. 

 
 
[¶47] 
Addressing Mr. Pittard's affirmative defenses that the training agreement was 
unconscionable and he signed it under duress, we hold he failed to present 
evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and summary 
judgment was proper on the breach of contract claim.  Finally, with respect to his 
counterclaims, Mr. Pittard did not present sufficient evidence to support a 
negligent misrepresentation claim and has failed to present cogent argument or 
legal authority supporting his claims of nondisclosure and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
We, therefore, decline to address those issues.   

 
 
[¶48]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The statute 
requires an employer to pay wages earned by an employee within five days after 
employment ends.

 
 

2Because the 
arbitrator did not issue its decision until after Mr. Pittard appealed from the 
district court's order, the decision is not part of the appellate record.  Rather, the decision is attached as an 
appendix to Great Lakes' brief. We take 
judicial notice of the decision.  Henneberger v. County of Nassau, 465 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 (U.S.D.C. E.D.N.Y. 
2006); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Honeywood 
Dev. Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 654, n. 
4.

  

3The RLA was 
extended in 1936 to cover the airline industry.  See Act of April 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 
Stat. 1189; 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188.