Title: Torres v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13056 
 
JAN TORRES  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
April 14, 2021. 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Jan Torres, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
Torres has been charged in a complaint with trafficking in 
heroin, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c); operating a 
motor vehicle with a suspended license, in violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 23; and two civil motor vehicle infractions.1  In August 
2019, he filed a motion to suppress, which a judge in the 
District Court denied after an evidentiary hearing.  Torres then 
filed an application for leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 
476 Mass. 1501 (2017).  A single justice of this court denied 
the application.  Then, back in the District Court, Torres filed 
a motion for leave to file a renewed motion to suppress as well 
as a motion for recusal of the District Court judge.  The judge 
denied both motions, and Torres thereafter filed his G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition.  A different single justice denied the 
petition without a hearing.    
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that 
"review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be 
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial 
 
 
1 The trafficking charge was subsequently amended to 
possession with intent to distribute a class A substance, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32. 
2 
 
court or by other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  
Torres has not made, and cannot make, such a showing.  He argues 
that during the course of the trial court proceedings there have 
been "multiple" decisions by the judge that have been "unfairly 
prejudicial" to him -- that the judge interrupted his counsel 
during the cross-examination of a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing on his motion to suppress; that the judge did not allow 
defense counsel to submit a posthearing memorandum; and that the 
judge denied Torres's motion for leave to file a renewed motion 
to suppress and his motion to recuse without a hearing.   
 
 
To the extent that Torres seeks review of issues related to 
the motion to suppress, those issues were the proper subject of 
Torres's application to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the 
denial of that motion, and indeed he raised at least one of 
those issues in that application, which the single justice 
denied.  Torres has "already availed himself of the opportunity 
to seek leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal (albeit 
unsuccessfully), and can still raise his challenge to the 
suppression ruling [and related issues] in a direct appeal if he 
is convicted after trial."  Goguen v. Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 
1006, 1006 (2010).  The denial of Torres's motion to recuse can 
equally be addressed in a direct appeal.  See, e.g., Jian Jiang 
v. Qilun Liu, 481 Mass. 1024, 1024 (2019), and cases cited 
("[T]here is no reason why the denial of any such motion [to 
recuse] could not be adequately addressed in a direct appeal 
from any adverse judgment").2  Notwithstanding Torres's arguments 
to the contrary, there is nothing exceptional about his case 
that warrants the exercise of this court's extraordinary power 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.   
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
2 The petitioner is correct that in Commonwealth v. Cousin, 
484 Mass. 1042 (2020), we considered the issue of a judge's 
denial of a motion to recuse in an interlocutory appeal, by the 
Commonwealth, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  In that case, the 
single justice, in her considerable discretion, had considered 
the substantive merits of the petition.  See id. at 1045.  That 
is a different circumstance from the one presented here, where 
the single justice, again in his considerable discretion, 
declined to consider the merits of the petition on the basis 
that the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy.     
3 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
Laurence J. Cohen for the petitioner.