Title: Niese v. City of Alexandria

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
ROBBY NIESE 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 012007 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Alfred D. Swersky, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in sustaining the City of Alexandria’s (the “City”) special plea 
of sovereign immunity and dismissing Robby Niese’s (“Niese”) 
motion for judgment. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
The special plea of sovereign immunity was submitted to the 
trial court on the pleadings.  “[W]here no evidence is taken in 
support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the appellate 
court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving 
the issue presented.”  Lostrangio v. Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 
497, 544 S.E.2d 357, 358 (2001).  The facts as stated in the 
pleadings by the plaintiff are taken as true for the purpose of 
resolving the special plea.  Id. 
 
Niese’s pleadings allege that during the summer of 1998, 
Niese was experiencing behavioral difficulties with her son, 
Steven Niese (“Steven”).  Steven was admitted to This Way House, 
a group home and counseling center that provided services to 
troubled families.  In August 1998, Niese met Raleigh Harsley 
(“Harsley”), a City police officer, and sought his help with her 
son’s problems.  On September 1, Harsley visited Niese’s place 
of employment in a marked police cruiser, where he told Niese 
that he wanted to “make a game plan for Steve.”  Harsley agreed 
to take Steven to the “Sports Orientation Night” at Steven’s 
high school that evening. 
 
Niese arrived at Steven’s high school later that evening 
but she did not see her son at the event.  When she located 
Harsley in the parking lot and inquired about her son, Harsley 
directed her into his marked police cruiser.  Niese complied and 
when she again inquired about Steven, Harsley told Niese he 
would follow her to her home where they could discuss her son.  
After arriving at Niese’s home, Harsley asked Niese to accompany 
him to a restaurant “to discuss her son.”  Niese rode in 
Harsley’s marked police cruiser to the restaurant. 
 
Niese’s pleadings allege that Harsley subsequently drove 
her home and “insisted that he accompany Niese to her 
apartment.”  At the door, Harsley demanded to be admitted to the 
apartment in order to inspect Steven’s bedroom.  Niese allowed 
Harsley to enter the apartment, but when he asked to see Niese’s 
bedroom, Niese refused and attempted to escort him from her 
apartment.  At the front door, “Harsley suddenly grabbed Niese,” 
overpowered her, and removed some of her clothing.  Niese’s 
pleadings alleged that over her repeated protests, Harsley 
 
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forcibly assaulted and raped her and then immediately exited the 
apartment. 
 
Two days later, on September 3, Niese reported the rape, 
and the fact that the perpetrator was a City police officer, to 
a counselor with the City’s Department of Mental Health.  On 
September 6, she reported the rape to Chuck Selner, an 
administrator at This Way House. 
 
On September 18, Harsley arrived at Niese’s apartment 
complex in his marked police cruiser.  Niese’s pleadings allege 
that Harsley gained entrance to her apartment “by means of 
intimidation,” where he raped Niese for the second time.  During 
the middle to latter part of September, Niese learned that she 
was pregnant as a result of Harsley’s rape.  She informed 
Harsley of her pregnancy, and Harsley “insisted that Niese 
terminate the pregnancy.”  Harsley began contacting Niese by 
telephone and in person at Steven’s high school, and he informed 
Niese that he would “not allow her to hurt him.” 
 
On October 2, in response to a demand from Harsley, Niese 
met him at the City Police Department to discuss the pregnancy.  
Niese’s pleadings allege that Harsley then drove her to 
Washington D.C. and stopped his vehicle in a park area, where he 
raped Niese for the third time. 
 
On October 5, Niese sought assistance from the Office on 
Women, Sexual Assault Response and Awareness Program (“SARA”), a 
 
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department under the authority and supervision of the City.  
Niese reported to Sara Donahue (“Donahue”), the SARA program 
director, that she had been raped by a City police officer.  
Donahue reported Niese’s complaint to the City Police Department 
on October 7. 
 
Also on October 7, Niese’s pleadings allege that while 
seeking medical care related to her pregnancy, she reported the 
rapes and the identity of the perpetrator to the Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic.  Despite Niese’s numerous reports to 
various City agencies, on October 8 Harsley arrived at Niese’s 
apartment, directed her into his vehicle, drove to an empty 
parking lot in Arlington, and raped Niese for the fourth time. 
 
On December 8, as a result of arrangements made by Donahue, 
Niese spoke with detectives from the City Police Department to 
discuss her original complaint of rape by Harsley.  The City 
Police Department conducted an investigation of Niese’s 
complaint, and as a result Harsley was terminated from his 
employment on February 3, 2000. 
 
On August 31, 2000, Niese filed a motion for judgment 
against Harsley and the City, seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages for sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and negligent retention.  In Count I, 
Niese alleged that Harsley, while acting as an employee and/or 
agent for the City, repeatedly sexually assaulted her.  She 
 
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maintained that “[a]t all times relevant herein, Harsley was an 
employee of the City and was clothed with the authority of an 
Alexandria police officer. . . . [and he] was entrusted by the 
City with a marked Alexandria police cruiser,” which he drove 
during many of his contacts with her.  As a direct and proximate 
result of the sexual assaults, Niese alleged that she suffered 
severe and permanent emotional and mental injuries. 
 
In Count II, she alleged that Harsley, while acting as an 
employee of the City, “through intentional threats and 
intimidation, produced fear of severe bodily injury to Niese and 
her son.”  She further alleged that Harsley “perpetrated 
outrageous and intolerable acts upon [her], which were offensive 
to the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.”  
Niese alleged that she suffered “severe and permanent emotional 
distress” as the direct and proximate result of Harsley’s 
conduct. 
 
In Count III, Niese claimed that the City negligently 
retained Harsley as an employee after she sought assistance from 
the Department of Mental Health, a department of the City, and 
from SARA, another City department.  Niese alleged that the City 
had either actual or constructive notice of the rapes and sexual 
assaults perpetrated by Harsley, and the City failed to exercise 
ordinary care in the investigation of her reports.  She further 
alleged that the City failed to properly train its employees to 
 
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handle sexual assault and rape complaints.  As a direct and 
proximate result of the City’s negligent retention of Harsley, 
Niese alleged that she was repeatedly raped and suffered from 
severe and permanent emotional and mental injuries.   
 
In Count IV, Niese sought punitive damages for the “acts 
and omissions of Harsley, while acting as an employee and/or 
agent for the City, and while clothed with the authority of an 
Alexandria police officer, and the acts and omissions of the 
City, by and through its employees and agents.”  Niese alleged 
that these acts and omissions constituted “willful, wanton and 
malicious” conduct and demonstrated a “conscious and utter 
disregard of Niese’s rights, health and safety.” 
 
The City filed a special plea of sovereign immunity and 
asserted that the “maintenance and operation of a municipal 
police force is a governmental function, and a city is immune 
from lawsuits alleging negligence, including intentional torts 
in the provision of police service.”     
 
By letter opinion dated December 21, 2000, the trial court 
sustained the City’s special plea of sovereign immunity to 
Counts I through III.  The court noted that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity protected the municipality from allegations 
of negligence by its police officers and held that “[i]t is 
generally accepted that the sovereign is immune from suit for 
the intentional, as well as negligent, torts of its employees 
 
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engaged in governmental functions.”  On February 12, 2001, the 
trial court entered a consent order granting Niese leave to 
amend her pleadings. 
 
Niese filed her amended motion for judgment on February 14, 
2001.  In the amended motion she included Counts I through IV of 
the original motion for judgment and added two additional 
counts: Count V “Violation of Statutory Duties” and Count VI 
“Punitive Damages for Violation of Statutory Duties.” 
 
In Count V, Niese argued that the City’s employees violated 
Code § 63.1-55.3, which placed an affirmative duty upon the 
Department of Mental Health counselor to whom Niese had reported 
the rape to immediately report the matter to the local law 
enforcement agency.  According to Niese, no report was ever 
generated and because the employees and staff of the Department 
of Mental Health were acting as agents and employees of the 
City, the City failed to perform its statutory duties pursuant 
to Code § 63.1-55.3.  Niese maintained that the reporting 
requirements were “ministerial not discretionary.”1  Count VI 
requested punitive damages for the violations alleged in Count 
V. 
 
The City filed a special plea of sovereign immunity to the 
amended motion for judgment.  In response to the allegation of a 
 
7
violation of statutory duties, the City argued that “the 
provision of counseling and mental health care services by a 
municipal corporation to its citizens is the essence of the 
promotion of public health and well being, and therefore, is a 
governmental function.”  Accordingly, the City maintained that 
it was immune from any and all liability arising out of the 
allegedly negligent failure by City employees to report the 
assaults. 
 
By letter opinion dated May 23, 2001, the trial court 
sustained the City’s special plea of sovereign immunity to 
Niese’s amended bill of complaint.  The trial court held that 
the City was performing a governmental function when providing 
the mental health counseling and treatment; therefore, the trial 
court held that the City would be immune from suit even if its 
employees were not immune.  The court stated: 
 
Assuming, as the Court has here, that the 
[City] employees failed in the performance of a 
ministerial duty [to report under the 
statutes], the only way that the City itself 
could be liable is by the application of the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  To impose 
liability upon the municipality or state for 
the negligent acts of its employees in the 
performance of ministerial duties while engaged 
in governmental functions emasculates the 
sovereign immunity doctrine.  See, Ashbury v. 
City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278 [147 S.E. 223] 
(1929); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43 [282 S.E.2d 
                                                                  
 
1 Niese further argued that alleged reporting requirements 
under Code § 37.1-84.1 were violated.  She has abandoned this 
argument on appeal. 
 
8
864] (1980), wherein the Court distinguishes 
between the sovereign and its employees in 
imposing liability under these circumstances. 
 
The trial court entered an order memorializing its decision on 
June 12, 2001.  Having previously dismissed the City as a 
defendant to Counts I – III2 of the amended motion for judgment, 
the trial court sustained the City’s special plea of sovereign 
immunity to Counts V and VI of the amended motion and dismissed 
the City from the action with prejudice.3  Niese appeals the 
judgment of the trial court. 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Niese asserts that the City is not protected by 
sovereign immunity for the intentional torts committed by 
Harsley while he was “functioning in a government capacity.”  
Niese further argues that the City’s negligent retention of 
Harsley, after receiving notice of his misconduct, is not 
protected by sovereign immunity.  Finally, Niese maintains that 
the reporting requirement of Code § 63.1-55.3 is a ministerial 
act; accordingly, the City is not immune from liability for its 
employees’ negligence in failing to report the sexual assaults. 
 
The City argues that it acts in a governmental capacity 
when maintaining a police force.  According to the City, 
                     
 
2 Count IV sought punitive damages for the complaints 
alleged in Counts I through III. 
 
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[w]hen a municipal corporation acts in its 
governmental capacity, it is considered to be 
an agency of the state and, therefore, it is 
not liable for damages to an individual who was 
injured by the wrongful act of an employee 
while the employee is engaged in the 
performance of the governmental function. 
 
Therefore, the City maintains that it is not liable for the 
intentional torts of its employee committed while the employee 
was carrying out the governmental function.  The City further 
argues that decisions regarding the hiring and employing of an 
individual police officer are an “integral part” of the 
governmental function of providing a police force; accordingly, 
the City is protected by sovereign immunity for these acts.  
Finally, the City maintains that because the provision of mental 
health counseling is a governmental function, the City’s 
immunity is not abrogated by its employees’ failure to perform a 
ministerial task “as part of [his or] her employment with the 
City.” 
 
“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ 
in Virginia.”  Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 
657, 660 (1984).  It is well established that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability 
arising from the exercise of governmental functions.  Hoggard v. 
                                                                  
 
3 On July 25, 2001, the trial court entered an order to stay 
the proceedings against Harsley, pending a decision by this 
Court in this appeal. 
 
10
City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939).  
As we explained in Hoggard: 
 
[A] municipality is clothed with two-fold 
functions; one governmental, and the other 
private or proprietary.  In the performance of 
a governmental function, the municipality acts 
as an agency of the state to enable it to 
better govern that portion of its people 
residing within its corporate limits.  To this 
end there is delegated to, or imposed upon, a 
municipality, by the charter of its creation, 
powers and duties to be performed exclusively 
for the public.  In the exercise of these 
governmental powers a municipal corporation is 
held to be exempt from liability for its 
failure to exercise them, and for the exercise 
of them in a negligent or improper manner.  
This immunity is based on the theory that the 
sovereign can not [sic] be sued without its 
consent, and that a designated agency of the 
sovereign is likewise immune. 
 
 
 
There are granted to a municipal 
corporation, in its corporate and proprietary 
character, privileges and powers to be 
exercised for its private advantage. . . .  For 
an injury resulting from negligence in their 
exercise or performance, the municipality is 
liable in a civil action for damages in the 
same manner as an individual or private 
corporation. 
 
Id.
 
In general, a municipality is immune from liability for 
negligence associated with the performance of “governmental” 
functions, but can be held liable for negligence associated with 
the performance of “proprietary” functions.  Id., see also 
Burson v. City of Bristol, 176 Va. 53, 63, 10 S.E.2d 541, 545 
(1940).  A function is governmental if it is “directly tied to 
 
11
the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens.”  Edwards v. 
City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 171, 375 S.E.2d 747, 750 
(1989).  Stated another way, a governmental function involves 
“the exercise of an entity’s political, discretionary, or 
legislative authority.”  Carter v. Chesterfield County Health 
Comm’n, 259 Va. 588, 591, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2000) (citing 
First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 
(1983)). 
 
“[A] municipal corporation acts in its governmental 
capacity in . . . maintaining a police force.”  Hoggard, 172 Va. 
at 148, 200 S.E. at 611.  Accordingly, a municipality is immune 
from liability for a police officer’s negligence in the 
performance of his duties as a police officer. 
 
Although this Court has not addressed the issue of a 
municipality’s liability for an intentional tort committed by an 
employee in the performance of a governmental function, other 
courts have addressed the issue.  For example, in Carter v. 
Morris, 164 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 1999), Carter sued the City of 
Danville and others, asserting both federal claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law tort claims arising out of her 
treatment by officers of the City of Danville Police Department.  
Id. at 217.  The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the City on all 
of Carter’s claims.  Id.  With respect to Carter’s state law 
 
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tort claims against the City, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that a City is immune 
from liability for the intentional torts of its employees.  Id. 
at 221.  The court explained that it could “find no authority 
that this immunity has been waived.”  Id.  Furthermore, the 
court noted that the Virginia Tort Claims Act, which waives the 
state’s immunity for certain claims, unequivocally states that 
the Act cannot be so construed as “to remove or in any way 
diminish the sovereign immunity of any county, city or town in 
the Commonwealth.”  Id.; see Code § 8.01-195.3. 
 
We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit and hold 
that a municipality is immune from liability for intentional 
torts committed by an employee during the performance of a 
governmental function.  In the present case, Harsley committed 
the alleged intentional torts against Niese during the ongoing 
investigation of her complaint concerning her son.  The 
investigation of a citizen’s complaint is certainly part of the 
governmental function of providing a police force.  Accordingly, 
the City cannot be held liable for the alleged intentional torts 
committed by Harsley. 
 
Niese next asserts that the City’s retention of Harsley as 
a police officer, after receiving notice of his alleged 
misconduct, is negligence which is not protected by sovereign 
immunity.  Niese correctly notes that the independent tort of 
 
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negligent retention is recognized in Virginia.  Southeast 
Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 260, 513 S.E.2d 
395, 397 (1999).  However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
protects municipalities from liability for negligence in the 
performance of governmental functions.  As stated previously, 
the maintenance of a police force is a governmental function.  
Hoggard, 172 Va. at 148, 200 S.E. at 611.  The decision to 
retain an individual police officer is an integral part of the 
governmental function of maintaining a police force.  
Accordingly, we hold that the City is immune from liability for 
any negligence associated with its decision to retain a specific 
police officer. 
 
Niese urges this Court to adopt an exception to the rule of 
sovereign immunity for the tort of negligent retention, as we 
did with respect to the doctrine of charitable immunity for the 
tort of negligent hiring.  See J. . . v. Victory Tabernacle 
Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 210, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1988) 
(holding that the independent tort of negligent hiring “operates 
as an exception to the charitable immunity of religious 
institutions”).  In Messina, 228 Va. at 307-08, 321 S.E.2d at 
660, we explained the purpose behind sovereign immunity as 
follows: 
 
 
One of the most often repeated 
explanations for the rule of state immunity 
from suits in tort is the necessity to protect 
 
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the public purse.  However, protection of the 
public purse is but one of several purposes for 
the rule. . . . [S]overeign immunity is a 
privilege of sovereignty and . . . without the 
doctrine there would exist inconvenience and 
danger to the public in the form of officials 
being fearful and unwilling to carry out their 
public duties. . . . [I]f the sovereign could 
be sued at the instance of every citizen the 
State could be ‘controlled in the use and 
disposition of the means required for the 
proper administration of the government.’ 
 
(Internal citations omitted).  The same purposes do not underlie 
the doctrine of charitable immunity and we decline to create an 
exception to the protection afforded by sovereign immunity for 
the independent tort of negligent retention. 
 
Finally, Niese maintains that the reporting requirement in 
Code § 63.1-55.3 is “ministerial,” and the City is not protected 
by sovereign immunity.4  The 1998 version of Code § 63.1-55.3(A) 
requires social workers, mental health professionals, and others 
“who [have] reason to suspect that an adult is an abused, 
neglected or exploited adult” to “immediately” report the 
suspected abuse to the local department of the city or county 
where the abuse was believed to have occurred.  Similarly, Code 
§ 63.1-55.3(C) states that any person required to make a report 
in Code § 63.1-55.3(A) who has “reason to suspect” that an adult 
                     
 
4 The question whether provision of mental health services 
by the City is a governmental function is not addressed in an 
assignment of error. 
 
15
has been sexually abused “shall immediately report” the sexual 
abuse to the local law enforcement agency.  
 
We have addressed the liability of cities and towns on 
numerous occasions and have never retreated from the rule 
articulated in Burson v. City of Bristol, 176 Va. 53, 63, 10 
S.E.2d 541, 545 (1940), wherein we held: 
In this State, we have long determined the 
liability or non-liability of a city for acts 
committed by it according to whether the act 
was done in its governmental or proprietary 
character.  If the act be done in carrying out 
a governmental function, the city is not 
liable; if it be done in the exercise of some 
power of a private, proprietary or ministerial 
nature, the city is liable. 
 
Niese’s characterization of the reporting requirement as 
“ministerial” is incorrect.  The words, “who has reason to 
suspect that an adult is an abused, neglected or exploited 
adult,” in Code § 63.1-55.3(A), require the exercise of judgment 
and discretion in concluding that a report must be made.  While 
individual cases may present patently obvious circumstances 
where reporting must take place, other cases may be subtle and 
more questionable.  We must focus upon the statute and not the 
circumstances in this case to determine whether the statutory 
duty is ministerial.  We hold that the provisions of Code 
§ 63.1-55.3 applicable to this case impose a discretionary duty 
and not a ministerial duty upon those individuals with reporting 
requirements. 
 
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court 
sustaining the City’s plea of sovereign immunity. 
Affirmed. 
 
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