Title: In re Korbet

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Korbet (2002-501); 178 Vt. 459; 868 A.2d 720

2005 VT 7

[Filed 27-Jan-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                  2005 VT 7

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-501

                               JUNE TERM, 2004

  In re Appeal of Susan and Peter Korbet }	 APPEALED FROM:
                                         }
                                         }
                                         } 	 Environmental Court
                                         }	
  	                                 }
                                         }	 DOCKET NO. 171-10-01 Vtec

                                                 Trial Judge: Alan W. Cook

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Brian Szad and Lois Patrie (applicants) appeal from an
  environmental court decision denying their application for a conditional
  use permit to operate a country store in the Village of Perkinsville, Town
  of Weathersfield.  Applicants contend the court erred in denying the
  application by: (1) applying incorrect criteria for conditional use review
  and considering the store's impact on an adjacent property owner; and (2)
  characterizing the store as a nonconforming use.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  The material facts are undisputed.  The subject property is
  located on Route 106 in the center of the Village of Perkinsville.  For
  many years, the building housed a general store, post office, and owner's
  apartment.  In 1996, however, the store closed, and two years later the
  post office moved to a location several miles outside of the Village.  When
  open, the store served as the center of activity in the village, and many
  residents have expressed a desire to have it reopen.

       ¶  3.  In 2000, applicants - who own and operate a general store in
  North Springfield, Vermont - purchased the subject property with plans to
  reopen the Perkinsville store.  In June 2001, they submitted applications
  for site plan review and a conditional use permit (CUP).  The Town planning
  commission held hearings on the site plan application in July and August. 
  Appellees Susan and Peter Korbet, who reside on the property just south of
  and adjacent to the store, attended one of the meetings and expressed some
  concerns about the proposal.  In August, the planning commission approved
  the site plan, but imposed several conditions, including the elimination of
  certain proposed parking spaces in the area of a leach field, and the use
  of natural vegetation for a proposed privacy fence between the properties. 
  The Korbets did not appeal the planning commission decision.
   
       ¶  4.  The town zoning board of adjustment held hearings on the CUP
  application in August and September.  On September 19, the Board granted
  the permit, requiring applicants to develop and operate the store in
  conformity with the approved site plan and stated hours of operation.  The
  Korbets then appealed the Board's decision to the environmental court,
  which conducted a site visit and held an evidentiary hearing in May 2002.  

       ¶  5.  In October 2002, the court issued a written decision, denying
  the CUP application because the proposal violated the Weathersfield town
  bylaws.  The court first noted that under the town's zoning bylaws, the
  store is located in an area denominated the "Village" district, where
  "Permitted" uses in the district include single- and two-family homes, bed
  and breakfast inns, and home occupations.  Uses that are "permitted upon
  granting of a Conditional Use Approval" include "Small enterprise[s],"
  defined as including a "small retail store."  It is undisputed that the
  proposed country store falls within this category of uses requiring a CUP.

       ¶  6.  In granting a CUP the town's zoning bylaws require the Board
  to consider "whether the proposed use will adversely affect . . . the
  character of the area; and/or traffic; as well as whether all applicable
  general and special provisions of these Bylaws would be met." 
  Weathersfield Zoning Bylaws § 4.2.2; see 24 V.S.A. § 4407(2)(B)-(D),
  repealed by 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 119(c) (authorizing local boards
  to allow conditional uses if the use does not adversely affect the
  character of the area, traffic and bylaws in effect).  Most importantly,
  the environmental court held that applicants' proposal did not meet the
  zoning requirement that "[c]ommercial . . . parking lots adjacent to
  residential uses shall be setback a minimum of fifty (50) feet." 
  Weathersfield Zoning Bylaws § 6.13.2.  The proposed parking scheme-nine
  spaces in the rear of the store and one on either side-violated the
  fifty-foot setback and lacked adequate screening from the view of persons
  within residential districts. (FN1) 
   
       ¶  7.  Applicants argue that the environmental court incorrectly
  classified the store as a nonconforming use.  The bylaws define
  nonconforming use as "[t]he use of structures or the use of land, which use
  does not comply with all applicable regulations of the district in which it
  is located, but which did comply . . . prior to the adoption of these
  Bylaws."  Id. § 6.4.  The environmental court reasoned that this "small
  enterprise" was nonconforming because it required a CUP and one had never
  been obtained for the site. (FN2)  The court also noted, however, that the
  store's status as a nonconforming use did not advantage the applicants in
  any way because the proposed parking plan was not preexisting.  In any
  event, status as a nonconforming preexisting use would not eliminate the
  need for compliance with the current ordinance because such use has been
  discontinued for more than one year.

       ¶  8.  Thus, applicants' only alternative is to prevail on the
  theory of noncomplying structure.  The relevant provision of the
  Weathersfield Zoning Bylaws states:

    A structure which does not comply with all applicable regulations
    of the district in which it is located, but which did comply with
    all applicable regulations prior to the adoption of these Bylaws,
    or any subsequent amendments thereto, may be maintained and
    repaired.  Such structure may also be enlarged in any manner which
    does not increase the degree of noncompliance, for example, such
    an enlargement must be in a direction where at least the minimum
    required setback would remain.

  Id. § 6.5; see also id. § 8 (defining noncomplying structure).  The
  environmental court held that applicants' store is a preexisting
  noncomplying structure under § 6.5 because it is on an undersized lot "and
  the building does not comply with the setback requirements."  Because the
  "proposed project would not enlarge the building, [] the proposed use of
  the building would comply with Section 6.5."  The court held, however, that
  noncomplying structure protection for the building does not encompass the
  parking lot and therefore would not obviate the need for the parking lot to
  comply with the current bylaws.  Applicants argue that the parking lot, as
  well as the building, is grandfathered by this status.
          
       ¶  9.  This conclusion is sustainable only if the parking lot is
  considered part of the noncomplying structure.  In fact, parking does not
  fit the definition of structure contained in the bylaws.  The bylaws define
  "structure" as "[a]n assembly of materials for occupancy or use, including,
  but not limited to: a building, mobile home or trailer, sign, wall, dock or
  athletic court."  Id. § 8.  "We use familiar rules of construction in
  interpreting zoning ordinances.  We first construe words according to their
  plain and ordinary meaning, giving effect to the whole and every part of
  the ordinance."  In re Stowe Club Highlands 164 Vt. 272, 279?80,