Title: VEILE v. BRYANT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VEILE v. BRYANT2004 WY 10797 P.3d 787Case Number: 03-186Decided: 09/14/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

DAVID 
VEILE,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

MICHAEL 
BRYANT and THE BRYANT

FUNERAL 
HOME, INC.,

 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Michael Bryant, Pro se. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

KITE, 
J., delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 

 

KITE, Justice. 

 

[¶1]      David Veile filed 
with the Board of Embalmers (Board) a petition to revoke Michael Bryant's 
funeral license alleging Mr. Bryant violated certain statutes and regulations 
governing funeral home directors.  
After Mr. Veile presented his evidence at a hearing, the Board granted 
Mr. Bryant's motion for a directed verdict and Mr. Veile filed a petition for review with 
the district court.  The district 
court denied the petition finding the Board's decision was not subject to review 
and Mr. Veile timely appealed to this Court.  We reverse the district court's denial 
of the petition and find the Board's decision was subject to review and we 
affirm the Board's order.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented by Mr. Veile are:

 

I.          
Whether the proceeding held before the Wyoming State Board of Embalming 
was a contested case, pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. 
Stat. §§16-3-101 et seq.?

 

II.          
Whether the decision entered by the Wyoming State Board of Embalming, 
pursuant to Wyo.R.Civ.P. 52(c), is arbitrary and capricious (Wyo. Stat. 
§16-3-114(c)(ii)(A))?

 

III.         
Whether the action of the Wyoming State Board of Embalming requiring 
appellant Veile, a private citizen, to prosecute a professional licensing 
disciplinary case is contrary to law (Wyo. Stat. §16-3-114(c)(ii)(A), (C) and/or 
(D))?

 

IV.        
Whether the decision entered by the Wyoming State Board of Embalming 
violates Wyo. Stat. §16-3-110?

 

V.        
Whether the Wyoming State Board of Embalming is a necessary party to this 
appeal of its decision and action?

 

[¶3]      Mr. Bryant 
rephrases the issues as follows:

 

I.          
Whether the proceeding held before the Wyoming State Board of Embalming 
was a contested case proceeding pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §16-3-101 et seq.

 

II.          
Whether the decision entered by the Wyoming State Board of Embalming was 
reasonable and rational based upon all the evidence before 
it.

 

III.         
Whether the decision of the Wyoming State Board of Embalming violates 
Wyo. Stat. §16-3-110.

 

IV.        
Whether Mr. Veile's decision to personally prosecute Michael Bryant and 
the Bryant Funeral Home, Inc., and the Wyoming State Board of Embalming's 
decision to allow the same, is an issue between Mr. Veile and the Wyoming State 
Board of Embalming, not Mr. Bryant or the Bryant Funeral Homes, 
Inc.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Mr. Veile's 
family started Veile Mortuary in Worland, Wyoming in 1921.  It was the only funeral home in Worland 
until Mr. Bryant opened Bryant Funeral Home, Inc. in 1995.  In addition to owning his own funeral 
home, Mr. Bryant worked part-time as a deputy county coroner.  

 

[¶5]      In 1996, Mr. 
Veile filed a complaint with the Board against Mr. Bryant and Bryant Funeral 
Home alleging violations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-16-310 (a)(ii)(A), (C), (D), 
(E), (N), (O) and/or (R) (LexisNexis 2003).  In compliance with its rules, the Board 
assigned the complaint to an investigative committee and, ultimately, closed the 
case for lack of evidence of any violation by Mr. Bryant.  On February 4, 1998, Mr. Veile filed a 
complaint with the Board for revocation or suspension of Mr. Bryant's license 
alleging Mr. Bryant had capped, steered and/or solicited funeral business in 
violation of § 33-16-310.  Mr. Veile 
also filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the district court seeking to 
compel the Board to proceed with disciplinary action on the underlying 
complaints against Mr. Bryant which the Board had previously dismissed.  The district court held the mandamus 
action in abeyance as a result of a stipulated agreement that the Board would 
re-investigate the initial allegations using an investigator chosen by Mr. 
Veile.  At its January 2000 board meeting, after the 
investigation had been completed, the committee was prepared to make a 
recommendation to the Board.  
However, Mr. Veile attended the meeting and requested a private 
meeting with the committee so that he could provide them with new evidence 
against Mr. Bryant.  The committee 
heard the new evidence, but before it could act, Mr. Veile filed suit against 
Mr. Bryant in federal court.1  The federal court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Bryant and the case before the Board essentially 
started over.

 

[¶6]      Mr. Veile filed a 
pleading entitled "Reassertion, Refiling and Supplement to Amended Petition for 
Revocation or Suspension of License and Complaint" on February 28, 2000.2  On August 2, 2000, the Board notified 
Mr. Bryant that Mr. Veile had refiled his complaint alleging the same charges he 
alleged in 1998.3  Mr. Bryant responded to the Board 
stating he was in full compliance with the requirements of his embalming and 
funeral director licenses and that Mr. Veile's accusations were "false, 
malicious, groundless, and should be dismissed."  Mr. Bryant also claimed the issues 
raised by Mr. Veile had been raised previously and were dismissed by the Board 
as groundless.  The Board referred 
the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  On December 29, 2000, Mr. Veile filed an 
amended petition for revocation or suspension with OAH alleging twenty-one 
specific violations by Mr. Bryant.4  Mr. Veile alleged Mr. Bryant capped, 
steered and/or solicited funeral business, and overcharged his customers 
contrary to his general price list, which is required by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) rules.5  The FTC rules require that providers of 
funeral goods and services provide customers with an itemized list of prices for 
described services to enable consumers to select and purchase only the goods and 
services they want, except for those required by law.  Chapter 3, Sec. 7 of the Board's rules 
incorporates the FTC rules.   

 

[¶7]      After Mr. Veile 
filed his amended petition with OAH, the hearing examiner set the matter for 
hearing.  Prior to the hearing, Mr. 
Bryant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the hearing 
examiner.  Mr. Veile filed a 
petition for review with the district court, which certified the case to this 
Court.  On November 20, 2001, this 
Court issued an order dismissing Mr. Veile's appeal for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies because the Board had not acted on the OAH 
recommendation to grant the summary judgment motion and remanded the matter back 
to the district court with instructions to remand it to the Board.  Upon remand, the Board issued an order 
rejecting OAH's recommendation for summary judgment and again set the matter for 
hearing. 

 

[¶8]      OAH held a 
hearing on February 4, 5 and 6, 2002, which three of the five Board members 
attended.  At the close of Mr. 
Veile's evidence, the Board granted Mr. Bryant's motion for a directed verdict 
finding Mr. Veile failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 
allegations.  Mr. Veile filed a 
petition for review with the district court, as well as a motion to join the 
Board as a party, and an appeal pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-16-312 
(LexisNexis 2003) requesting a trial de novo.6  The district court denied the petition 
for review finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-16-311 (LexisNexis 2003) permitted 
Mr. Veile to initiate a petition to revoke a license, but did not authorize him 
to prosecute the claim.  The court 
held that when the Board receives a petition to revoke/suspend, it is obligated 
only to determine if there is a sufficient basis to prosecute and, therefore, 
the hearing was not a contested case.   The court characterized the 
hearing as an investigation after which the Board determined there was not a 
sufficient basis to prosecute Mr. Veile's claims.  The court also denied Mr. Veile's motion 
to join the Board as a party.  This 
appeal followed.

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶9]      We recently 
restated our standard of review for agency decisions in State ex rel. Department of Transportation 
v. Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶¶ 9-10, 
77 P.3d 708, ¶¶ 9-10 (Wyo. 2003).

 

Our 
review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003), which 
provides:

 

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

            
. . . 

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

            
We do not afford any special deference to the district court's decision 
when we review a matter initiated before an administrative agency. Rather, this 
court reviews the case as if it came directly from the administrative 
agency. Our review must focus on the evidence and consider the reasonableness of 
the agency's exercise of judgment while determining if the agency committed any 
errors of law.  If the agency 
committed any errors of law, this court must correct them.

 

We have 
further stated:

 

When an 
agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to 
meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law" language of WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). 

 

 

Newman 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 12 
(Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  See also City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 
452 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶10]   The arbitrary or capricious test requires 
the reviewing court to determine whether the agency reasonably could have made 
its findings and order based upon all the evidence before it.  Newman, ¶ 19.  Although this case presents a slightly 
unique scenario in that the Board entered a directed verdict after Mr. Veile 
presented his evidence, that distinction does not require departure from the 
standard of review applicable when only one party presents evidence.  See Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp., 931 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 1997) (affirmed on 
other grounds) (on appeal, the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review applied to an appeal of an administrative hearing examiner's decision 
to grant a W.R.C.P. 52(c) 
motion). 

 

[¶11]   Both parties suggest the 
appropriate standard of review should include affording Mr. Veile all favorable 
and reasonable inferences in addition to the arbitrary and capricious standard 
relying on Mountain View/Evergreen 
Improvement & Service District v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529, 531 
(Wyo. 1996) and Kaiser v. Farnsworth 
Drilling Co., Inc., 851 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1993).  However, those cases involve review of 
judicial action, not administrative action.  When reviewing the Board's application 
of Rule 52(c), we look to see whether in doing so it acted reasonably, and not 
arbitrarily or capriciously. Rule 52(c) provides that in a trial without a jury, 
a court may rule against a party after fully hearing that party's evidence and 
the party against whom such a judgment is considered "shall be entitled to no 
special inference."  Mr. Veile was 
entitled to no special inferences by the Board, and we review the Board's 
decision pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.  The standard of review we apply to a 
court's decision under Rule 52(c) is not applicable to an agency's decision 
under that rule.

  

 

DISCUSSION

 

Contested 
Case

 

[¶12]     The district court denied Mr. Veile's 
petition for review, in part, because it concluded the proceedings that took 
place before the Board did not constitute a contested case hearing.  "The proceedings can best be 
characterized as an investigation after which the [Board] determined that there 
was not a sufficient basis to prosecute Petitioner's claims.  Thus, the decision of the [Board] in 
this matter is not a decision which is subject to court review."  However, the parties agree the matter 
was indeed a contested case subject to review by the district court.  For the reasons explained below, we 
agree.

 

[¶13]     A contested case is defined by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) as a proceeding including, but 
not restricted to, ratemaking, price fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges 
of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after 
an opportunity for hearing.  The 
term "hearing" means a "trial type hearing."  Id.  
Mr. Veile filed a petition to revoke or suspend Mr. Bryant's license 
in accordance with § 33-16-311, which requires a hearing.  That statute states in pertinent 
part:

 

A 
petition for the revocation or suspension of a license may be filed by the 
attorney general or by the county attorney of the county in which the licensee 
resides or has practiced, or by any 
citizen residing in this state. Said petition shall be filed with the 
Wyoming state board of embalming and shall be entitled, "In the Matter of the 
Revocation (or Suspension) of the License of (name of licensee) to Practice 
Funeral Directing", and shall state the charges against the licensee with 
reasonable definiteness. Upon the presentation of the petition to said board, 
the board shall make an order fixing a time and place of hearing 
thereon which shall not be less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30) 
days thereafter. Notice of filing of such petition and the time and place of 
hearing shall be served upon the licensee at least ten (10) days before said 
hearing. Said notice may be served by any sheriff or constable or by any person 
especially appointed by the board. Order of revocation or suspension of licenses 
shall be entered of record and the name of said licensee stricken from the 
roster of licentiates and the licensee may not engage in the practice of funeral 
directing after revocation of license or during the time for which it is 
suspended.

 

 

Id. 
(emphasis added).  

 

[¶14]   Consistent with the statute, the 
Board held a hearing on Mr. Veile's petition and conducted it as a contested 
case.  All parties, including the 
hearing examiner, treated the hearing as 
a contested case, and the Board's final decision states that the hearing was 
conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.  We hold the proceeding was a contested 
case and reverse the district court's finding to the 
contrary.

 

 

Arbitrary 
and Capricious

 

[¶15]   As the primary ground for his 
appeal, Mr. Veile contends the Board's decision that he did not meet his burden 
of proof was arbitrary and capricious.  
However, a careful review of the transcript of the hearing demonstrates 
Mr. Veile failed to present evidence to support his claims that Mr. Bryant 
violated any statutory or regulatory requirements.  Although he offered twelve witnesses who 
testified over three days, that evidence did not support Mr. Veile's allegations 
of capping, steering and/or soliciting funeral business, or misrepresentation, 
in violation of § 33-16-310(a)(ii).  
For many of the allegations he presented no evidence, and for those 
allegations for which he did present evidence, it simply did not show Mr. Bryant 
acted improperly.  For example: 

 

1.         
Mr. Veile alleged Mr. Bryant/Bryant Funeral Home "did cap and/or attempt 
to steer funeral business in the handling of the body of Robert Bell."  As part of his duties as deputy county 
coroner, Mr. Bryant was called to the scene of James Bell's son Robert's death, 
together with the Worland police and Washakie County Coroner, Mr. 
Martinson.  Mr. Bell clearly stated 
he wanted Mr. Veile to take care of his son's funeral arrangements.  However, because an autopsy was to be 
performed in Billings to determine the cause of death, Mr. Veile was not 
authorized to pick up the body at that time.  Instead, Mr. Bryant took the body to 
Billings to be autopsied.  Mr. Bell 
admitted he was uncomfortable stating in front of Mr. Bryant that he wanted Mr. 
Veile to take care of his son's body, rather than Mr. Bryant.  "Well, I just don't feel comfortable 
making those decisions with someone in the same profession already being on the 
scene."   According to Mr. 
Bell, at no time did anyone say "You must have Mr. Bryant [as your funeral 
director]," or "We want you to have Mr. Bryant [as your funeral director]."  Mr. Bell stated, "I do not have an ax to 
grind with Mr. Bryant" and while he did feel pressured because of Mr. Bryant's 
presence, he understood Mr. Bryant was there to pick up the body in his capacity 
as deputy county coroner.  Mr. 
Bryant was required to be present under the circumstances and there is no 
evidence he acted improperly.  Mr. 
Bryant did not handle the funeral, Mr. Veile did.  

 

2.         
Mr. Veile alleged that Bryant Funeral Home "did solicit, attempt to cap, 
and/or steer funeral business in the handling of the body of Howard R. Steele 
through Carmeen Sova."  Carmeen 
Sova, Mr. Bryant's mother-in-law and part-time employee, was a longtime friend 
and neighbor to Howard "Bud" Steele.  
Ms. Sova cleaned Mr. Steele's house for him every two weeks, and 
generally looked after him.  After 
Mr. Steele's daughter, Peggy Mangus, found her father dead in his home, she 
called an ambulance and the Worland police arrived at the scene.  Ms. Sova, who lived three houses down 
from Mr. Steele, came over to Mr. Steele's house.  With Ms. Sova present, Ms. Mangus 
indicated to the authorities that the family wanted Mr. Veile's mortuary to take 
care of the funeral arrangements.  
Ms. Mangus stated:  "It was 
an easy decision because I knew that's who Dad wanted, but it did make me 
uncomfortable that he asked in front of Carmeen."  However, Ms. Mangus also stated there 
was nothing that led her to believe that Ms. Sova was at Mr. Steele's house for 
an impure or ulterior motive, but was there as a friend and neighbor.  As Ms. Mangus requested, Mr. Veile 
handled Mr. Steele's funeral arrangements.  
Again, Mr. Veile presented no evidence of improper conduct by Mr. Bryant 
or his mother-in-law.

 

3.         
In eleven of the allegations, Mr. Veile alleged that Mr. Bryant billed 
customers in excess of the amounts set forth in his general price list which, 
Mr. Veile contended, violated § 33-16-310(a)(2)(A), which prohibits 
misrepresentation or fraud in the conduct of the business or the profession of a 
funeral director.  Mr. Veile alleged 
Mr. Bryant overcharged families for mileage in transporting bodies, overcharged 
for state sales tax, and double billed families for the same funeral services 
(such as removal of bodies and embalming).   

 

Mr. Bryant 
testified regarding Mr. Veile's allegations of not providing families with a 
statement of goods and services as required by Board and FTC rules.  The statement of goods and services is 
an itemized list of the goods and services the consumer selects from the general 
price list.7  Mr. Veile alleged Mr. Bryant only 
provided families with invoices and not statements of goods and services, 
contrary to FTC regulations.  
However, Mr. Bryant testified that he did provide families with a 
statement of goods and services and no testimony was presented to the 
contrary.

 

As to the allegations of overcharging families, Mr. Bryant 
testified and adequately explained that his mileage charges differed when he 
acted as a deputy county coroner rather than a private funeral home 
director.  Mr. 
Bryant also testified he did not double bill families.  In fact, during his 
testimony, it was discovered that he actually undercharged the family whom Mr. 
Veile accused him of double billing.  

 

Regarding the sales tax allegations, Mr. Robert Tomkins, 
manager of the taxpayer services section for the Wyoming Department of Revenue 
Excise Tax Division, who audited Bryant Funeral Home, testified that under the 
applicable statute, the way Mr. Bryant accounted for sales taxes on his services 
was perfectly legitimate.  Mr. Tompkins also acknowledged that the 
Department of Revenue had no problem with Mr. Bryant's business practices and 
had seen no reason to file charges against Mr. Bryant. 

 

4.         Mr. 
Veile alleged that Mr. Bryant, while acting as deputy county coroner, failed to 
provide families with a choice of funeral homes. However, the evidence did not 
support that allegation.  Mr. Martinson, the Washakie County Coroner, 
testified as to Mr. Bryant's practices as a deputy county coroner.  He testified that 
Mr. Bryant "stays in the background" so that he does not influence the family's 
decision as to which funeral home they want to use.   

 

5.         Mr. 
Gary Adams, Mr. Veile's investigator, testified regarding four of the situations 
in which Mr. Veile alleged Mr. Bryant solicited, capped, and/or steered funeral 
business from various families by failing to inform them that they had a choice 
of funeral homes.  
Mr. Adams interviewed the family members involved asking them two 
questions: "Were you offered a choice of funeral homes" and "Were you aware 
there were two funeral homes in Worland?"  The interviewees all replied they were either 
not offered a choice, or did not remember being offered a choice, nor were they 
aware there was more than one funeral home in Worland.  However, Mr. Adams 
also indicated that the interviewees said things like, "It was a long time ago," 
or "It was a difficult situation," and "I don't remember a lot of things," and 
"That was a really tough, stressful time."  Mr. Adams stated that at no time did he get 
the impression that it was suggested to any interviewee that they had to use the 
Bryant Funeral Home.  
Even Mr. Veile's own investigator was unable to find any evidence of 
improper action by Mr. Bryant.

 

6.         Mr. 
Veile called Mr. Ed Robinson as an expert witness to support his claims that 
violations had occurred.  However, the record shows Mr. Robinson did 
not testify violations had actually occurred, but speculated they may have.  On direct 
examination, Mr. Robinson testified, based on depositions and Gary Adams' 
report, that it "may 
appear" Mr. Bryant was capping the body of James Doty, that Mr. Bryant "might have" 
controlled the situation involving the body of Charles Cabarett, and that Stan 
Tims "may have 
steered business in [Mr. Bryant's] direction," but admitted there was a 
possibility he did not. 

 

7.         Mr. 
Robinson also testified regarding Mr. Veile's allegations of Mr. Bryant's 
misrepresentation of the cost of funeral services to his customers. After being 
presented with funeral invoices from the Bryant Funeral Home, Mr. Robinson 
testified that the post-funeral invoice charges did not match Mr. Bryant's 
general price list, in effect suggesting Mr. Bryant had misrepresented the cost 
of his services and violated FTC and Board rules.  However, during cross-examination, Mr. 
Robinson admitted no violation occurred, because the rules require specific 
information on statements of goods and services, not on invoices and Mr. 
Robinson had reviewed invoices and not statements of goods and services.  Mr. Robinson's 
testimony failed to support Mr. Veile's claim that Mr. Bryant had violated any 
statute or rule.

 

[¶16]   After a review of the entire record 
before us, we hold the Board's decision that Mr. Veile failed to meet his burden 
of proof was reasonable and shows no indication of arbitrariness or 
capriciousness.  
Even if we apply the standard of review applicable to judicial action, 
giving Mr. Veile all favorable inferences, we reach the same result.  The most this 
record reflects is some funeral home customers might have felt uncomfortable 
with Mr. Bryant's presence in his capacity of deputy county coroner.  However, each of 
the situations lacked evidence that Mr. Bryant acted improperly.  The record also 
reflects Mr. Bryant's practice regarding billing was appropriate. 

 

 

Costs and Fees

 

[¶17]   Mr. Veile argues the Board violated its 
own rules by refusing to participate in the contested case regarding Mr. 
Bryant's license, causing Mr. Veile to incur certain expenses for which he 
claims he should be reimbursed.  We conclude the Board acted properly and no 
authority exists to provide Mr. Veile reimbursement for the expenses he incurred 
in prosecuting his complaints.

 

[¶18]   Section 33-16-311 states:

 

A petition for the revocation or suspension of a license 
may be filed by the attorney general or by the county attorney of the county in 
which the licensee resides or has practiced, or by any citizen 
residing in this state. 

 

The statute mandates that, after receiving a petition for 
the revocation or suspension of a license, the Board "shall make an order fixing 
a time and place of hearing."  Thus, the Board followed the statute and set 
the matter for hearing based solely on Mr. Veile's petition.  However, Mr. Veile 
asserts that because the Board sent a document entitled "Notice and Complaint" 
to Mr. Bryant, the Board was somehow proceeding pursuant to Chapter 11, § 
3(b)(i) of the Board's rules which sets forth a process for handling complaints, and 
therefore, the Board should have prosecuted the case according to that provision 
of the Board's rules which states: 

 

A committee of two (2) Board members, appointed on a 
rotating basis by the president of the Board, shall review each complaint and 
where necessary, direct further investigation. 

. . .

 

(b)  Following review and investigation of a 
complaint, the committee may take any appropriate action, including but not 
necessarily limited to the following: 

 

       (i) Forward the 
complaint filed by a complainant to the Board for formal disciplinary 
proceedings. 

 

However, the rules do not address how the Board is to 
proceed when "any person" files a petition for revocation or suspension of 
license pursuant to the statute.  The "Notice and Complaint" sent by the Board 
was simply notice to Mr. Bryant as required by § 33-16-311, not a complaint 
filed on behalf of the Board.  In fact, the record indicates the Board did 
not draft, mail or serve the document.  A letter from Mr. Veile's attorney stated: 

 

Please find enclosed the original Notice and Complaint to 
be served upon Mike Bryant via the Sheriff of Washakie County.  Would you please 
have an appropriate agent or member of the Board sign this, forward it for 
service and request a return of service for filing?  

 

I am providing this to you directly so that there is no 
confusion of its whereabouts.  

 

Correspondence from the Board recognizes the purpose of the 
document is only that of notice:  "This letter is to place you on notice."  

 

[¶19]   The Board had received, considered and 
dismissed Mr. Veile's prior complaints regarding Mr. Bryant.  In a letter to Mr. 
Veile dated September 20, 1996, the Board stated:

 

Based on the evidence submitted in the complete report, the 
recommendation to the Board was to dismiss all complaints filed by you for lack 
of evidence supporting your claims.  The Board was [apprised] of the situation and 
concurred with the recommendation of the investigative committee.  Accordingly, the 
complaints against Mr. Bryant have been dismissed and the Board now considers 
the matter closed.  

 

From that point on, the Board made it clear to Mr. Veile 
that it considered the matter closed.  When Mr. Veile filed a "Petition for 
Revocation or Suspension of License," the Board immediately responded to 
"apprise [Mr. Veile] of the board's interpretation of Wyo. Stat. § 
33-16-311."  
The letter quoted the statute and then stated:

 

The statute requires the board to set the matter for 
hearing.  The 
statute does not, however, state that the board is responsible for presentation 
of the petition.  
The board contends that neither the board nor its counsel [is] 
responsible for presenting the petition or the case for consideration at the 
hearing.  The 
board interprets the statutes to mean that the petitioner is responsible for 
presentation of the petition and evidence at the hearing.  The board would 
then rule on evidence presented at the hearing. 

 

When Mr. Veile was granted permission to present additional 
information to the Board, Mr. Veile's attorney wrote the Board's attorney a 
letter on January 20, 2000, stating:

 

I would draw your attention to Wyo. Stat. 33-16-311, 
wherein it provides that, "Upon presentation of the petition to said board, the 
board SHALL 
make an order fixing a time and place of hearing hereon thereon. . ." [emphasis 
added.]  I have 
enclosed a letter from Susan Sellers, one of your predecessors, wherein she 
believes that we would be responsible for prosecuting the case before the 
Board.  I am 
not sure how that would comport with the Board's Rules, but we are fully willing 
to prosecute the case before the Board. . . . Quite frankly, I would welcome 
that opportunity.

 

We can infer from the correspondence between the Board and 
Mr. Veile that Mr. Veile filed the "Reassertion, Refiling and Supplement to 
Amended Petition for Revocation or Suspension" with full knowledge that the 
Board would not pursue the action, and that Mr. Veile would be required to do 
so.  Nothing in 
the statute or rules required the Board to do otherwise.  

 

[¶20]   The statute provides no authority for 
reimbursement of costs and fees incurred by a person pursuing a complaint.  Therefore, Mr. 
Veile's claim for such reimbursement must be rejected.  

 

 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

 

[¶21]   Mr. Veile contends the Board's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are vague, conclusory, inadequate and contrary to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2003).  Mr. Bryant counters that the Board identified 
each allegation made by Mr. Veile, stated its conclusion that the evidence 
presented by Mr. Veile did not support those findings, and they complied with § 
16-3-110.

 

[¶22]   Section 16-3-110 sets forth an agency's 
duty to support its action with sufficient factual findings:

 

A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested 
case shall be in writing or dictated into the record. The final decision shall 
include findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of 
fact if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.

 

As we recently stated in Legarda, ¶ 13:

 

In discharging its duty under § 16-3-110, the agency must 
"make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding 
and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based." Pan American Petroleum 
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 555 
(Wyo.1968). This Court needs to know "why" an agency decided the way it did. 
When an agency does not make adequate findings of basic fact, we do not have a 
rational basis upon which to review its ultimate findings and conclusions.

Scott v. McTiernan, 
974 P.2d 966f, 969 (Wyo. 
1999) (citations omitted); see also Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 
69, P13, 28 P.3d 838, P13 (Wyo. 
2001). It is insufficient for an administrative agency to state only an ultimate 
fact or conclusion. Each ultimate fact or conclusion must be thoroughly 
explained in order for a court to determine upon what basis the ultimate fact or 
conclusion was reached. Billings v. Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Guides, 2001 WY 81, P13, 30 P.3d 557, P13 (Wyo. 
2001). When an agency does not set forth the reasons for its actions-that 
is, when its findings are conclusory-this Court cannot uphold its decision. Juroszek v. City of 
Sheridan Board of Adjustment, 948 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Wyo. 1997); Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue, State 
of Wyoming, 970 P.2d 841, 854 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

[¶23]   In City of Casper, 895 P.2d  at 451-52, we discussed the issue of the adequacy of the findings where the 
agency concludes the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that 
burden:

 

We agree mere summaries of evidence are insufficient 
to constitute findings. 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 471, 478 
(1965). Our rule is that the agency, as the trier of fact, has the duty to weigh 
the evidence and determine the credibility of the evidence and the 
witnesses.

 

. . .

 

[W]e are satisfied that, when the agency concludes there is 
a failure of proof because "insufficient evidence was received by the panel" to 
permit the agency to find any of the allegations of the party charged with the 
burden of proof, Pan 
American does not apply.

. . .

     We are satisfied, given 
some thirty years of additional experience with respect to administrative 
proceedings, a practical and pragmatic rule can be announced with respect to 
this issue. We hold, since we cannot reweigh the evidence nor redetermine the 
credibility of the evidence, no purpose is to be served by demanding the agency 
explain how it evaluated the evidence in arriving at a conclusion that a party 
failed to meet its burden of proof.

 

[¶24]   While some of the Board's findings of 
fact in this case appear conclusory, a review of the entire order reveals the 
Board adequately explained its decision.  For the allegations for which Mr. Veile 
failed to present any evidence, the Board simply stated his evidence was 
insufficient, and for the allegations for which evidence was presented, the 
Board explained its reasoning for concluding it was inadequate.   Those 
findings state:

 

24.  Mr. Veile's expert witness, Ed Robinson, 
interspersed his testimony with responses such as "it appears he may have 
capped," the invoices would not comply with FTC, "as I understand the federal 
rules."  Mr. 
Robinson testified that he only assumed statements of goods and services had not 
been provided to the families.  He had no personal knowledge.  Mr. Robinson also 
testified that invoices did not have to include the same information as required 
by statements of goods and services.  He further testified that a funeral home 
director may contract with an entity such as Washakie County for prices outside 
the GPL [General Price Lists] without violating any law or rules.  Finally, he 
testified that a coroner may elect to pay more than the GPL amounts to a funeral 
home or to a deputy coroner.  

 

25.  Another of Mr. Veile's witnesses, Robert 
Tompkins, a manager with the Wyoming Department of Revenue Excise Tax Division, 
testified that Mr. Bryant's taxing procedures were perfectly legitimate.  Further, Mr. 
Tompkins testified that the Wyoming Department of Revenue had no problems with 
Mr. Bryant's business practices.

 

26.  Gary Adams, the investigator Mr. Veile paid 
to conduct the investigation in this matter, testified that, during his 
investigation, no witness ever said that someone suggested or recommended to 
them one funeral home over another.

 

27.  The county coroner for Washakie County, Mr. 
Martinson, testified that when Mr. Bryant is present at a death scene as a 
deputy coroner, Mr. Bryant stays in the background in order not to involve 
himself in any decisions about which funeral home might receive the 
business.  Mr. 
Martinson also testified that Mr. Bryant solicited advice from Mr. Martinson as 
to how Mr. Bryant could conduct himself in order to avoid any appearance of 
impropriety.  
Mr. Martinson testified it was his idea and decision as county coroner to 
pay Mr. Bryant above what Mr. Bryant's GPL set forth.  Mr. Martinson also 
testified that he, personally, does no like to use Veile for retrieval of dead 
bodies because he feels he cannot trust Veile.  Finally, Mr. Martinson testified that Mr. 
Bryant had never attempted to influence Mr. Martinson in order to obtain more 
business.

 

28.  Gloria Johnson testified that she was not 
given a choice of funeral homes by Stan Tims, deputy coroner for Washakie 
County, upon the death of her mother Mollie Zeiler.  However, Stan Tims 
testified that he advised Ms. Johnson of a choice of funeral homes in 
Worland.  Mr. 
Tims also testified that he had never attempted to cap and steer for Mr. 
Bryant.  
Finally, Ms. Johnson testified that she selected and used Veile's funeral 
home.

 

29. Throughout several hours of testimony, Mr. Bryant 
provided explanations for allegations regarding his mileage charges, his tax 
practices, how he came to have two (2) GPL's and all other allegations.

 

When reviewed as a whole, the findings fully complied with 
§ 16-3-110.

 

 

Board As A Necessary Party

 

[¶25]   Mr. Veile argues the Board is a 
necessary party to this appeal. "Generally a court or board exercising judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions, not being a party to its proceedings, and not 
having any legal interest in maintaining its determination, can neither appeal 
from a judgment or order of a court reversing the proceedings nor be heard on 
the appeal."  4 
C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error § 175 (1993),  Antelope Valley Improvement & Service District v. State 
Board  of 
Equalization, 992 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1999).  "Any person who is 
not a party in an original action is not a necessary party to an 
appeal."  Anita Ditch Co. v. 
Turner, 389 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Wyo. 
1964).  
Clearly, the Board was not a 
party to the original action and cannot be a party to this appeal.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   The record of the Board's contested 
case hearing fully supports its conclusion that Mr. Veile failed to meet his 
burden of proving that Mr. Bryant's funeral director's license should be 
revoked.  The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficiently thorough and detailed 
to allow us to understand the Board's reasoning and to conduct our own 
review.  
Further, Mr. Veile pursued the matter of his own volition and, in the 
absence of statutory authority, is not entitled to reimbursement of costs and 
fees he may have incurred.  The district court's decision to deny Mr. 
Veile's petition for review is reversed and the Board's order is affirmed. 

  

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting.

 

[¶27]      As an initial observation, I must disagree with the 
majority opinion's affirmance of the order of the Board of Embalmers.  The order on appeal 
is the order of the district court dismissing Veile's petition for review.  Even if the 
majority opinion is correct in determining that the dismissal of Veile's 
petition by the district court was in error, the appropriate resolution of this 
appeal is to remand the case to the district court.  It is for the 
district court to review the agency action in the first instance, not this 
Court.

 

[¶28]      That being said, my more fundamental disagreement with the 
majority opinion is that I believe the order of the district court dismissing 
Veile's petition for review should be affirmed.  The district court dismissed Veile's petition 
for review on the grounds that the prior proceeding before the Board of 
Embalmers was not a contested case subject to review pursuant to the WAPA.  The pertinent part 
of the district court order specifically reads:

 

That the order from which [Veile's] appeal is taken is not 
an order which is subject to review for the following reasons:

 

a.         
W.S. § 33-16-311 allows any citizen to file a petition for revocation or 
suspension of a license issued by the Wyoming Board of Embalming; however, there 
is no authorization for the citizen to prosecute the claim.

 

b.         
Upon receiving a petition for revocation or suspension of a license 
issued by the Wyoming Board of Embalming from a citizen, it is the duty of the 
Wyoming Board of Embalming to determine if there is a sufficient basis to 
prosecute.

 

c.         
W.S. § 16-3-112(c) allows the Wyoming Board of Embalming to utilize the 
attorney general's office to investigate, prepare, present and prosecute a 
contested case.  
The Wyoming statutes do not allow the Wyoming Board of Embalming to 
utilize the complaining citizen for these purposes.

 

d.         The 
proceedings which took place before the Wyoming Board of Embalming do not 
represent a contested case hearing, Instead, such proceedings can best be 
characterized as an investigation after which the Wyoming Board of Embalming 
determined that there was not a sufficient basis to prosecute Petitioner's 
claims.

 

e.         The 
decision of the Wyoming Board of Embalming in this matter is not a decision 
which is subject to court review.

 

According to the order, the district court reasoned that 
the prior proceedings before the Board could not have been a contested case 
pursuant to the WAPA because a private citizen is not statutorily authorized 
under the WAPA to prosecute a contested case.  Essentially, the district court determined 
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition.

 

[¶29]      The district court is correct in this contention, as even 
the appellant concedes.8  The fact that the Board styled the hearing as 
a contested case and all the participants conducted the proceeding as a 
contested case cannot transform the proceeding into a contested case under the 
WAPA.  Bryant 
suggests that this Court accept that the proceedings were a contested case in 
the name of judicial economy.  While I am mindful of the burden these 
proceedings have already inflicted upon all participants, such concern cannot 
create jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.  The district court's ruling that there was no 
WAPA contested case for it to review is correct and should be affirmed.

 

[¶30]      The real legal problem presented by this appeal is that the 
parties below invoked two different, and mutually exclusive, procedures.  The parties began 
the process under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-16-311,9 which allows a 
private citizen to bring a complaint.  The proceedings contemplated by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 33-16-311 and 312 seem relatively straight forward.  Once a petition is 
presented to the Board, the Board must hold a hearing and make an expeditious 
decision within thirty days.  The losing party can then "appeal" to the 
district court, and the district court conducts a full trial de novo.10  If the Board revokes or suspends someone's 
license, then the licensee must post a bond if he wants to continue business 
during the pendency of the trial.  If the parties had followed this procedure, 
Veile arguably would have been entitled to a trial de novo once the Board 
determined his complaints were not well founded.  Veile did file an "Appeal" pursuant to § 
33-16-312 requesting a trial de novo, but his "Appeal" was dismissed.  Veile has not 
appealed that dismissal to this Court so the propriety thereof is not before 
us.  See footnote 6, majority opinion.

 

[¶31]      Instead of following the dictates of §§ 33-16-311 and 312, 
however, after Veile brought a petition pursuant to § 33-16-311, the Board 
purported to turn the proceedings into a contested case pursuant to the WAPA, 
all the while maintaining Veile as the complaining party.  As already 
discussed, the district court is correct that the WAPA does not allow for a 
private citizen to prosecute a complaint under the WAPA.  Thus, despite the 
actions of the Board, and the acceptance of those actions by the parties, there 
was no official contested case pursuant to the WAPA.  The discussion of 
this Court should end with the affirmance of the district court order dismissing 
the attempt to petition the district court to review a contested case pursuant 
to the WAPA.  

 

[¶32]      The question that remained unresolved in this proceeding is 
which procedure should be applied: the statutory procedure under §§ 33-16-311, 
312, or a contested case hearing under the WAPA?  The Board utilized a hybrid procedure that, 
in essence, the district court correctly rejected.  According to 
Veile's brief, the argument presented to the district court with regards to 
dismissing Veile's "Appeal," was that § 33-16-312 has been repealed by 
implication by the passage of the WAPA.  It seems that the determination of which 
procedure applies raises an interesting question of statutory interpretation.11  The Board certainly hasn't helped resolve 
this question.  
While Chapter 11 of the Board rules sets up a contested case type 
proceeding for hearings with review pursuant to the WAPA, Chapter 10 of the 
Board rules essentially simply restates the language of §§ 33-16-311 and 
312.  Thus even 
the Board, in its own rules, does not specify the proper procedure but rather 
allows for both procedures, adding to the confusion.12  The specific 
question of which procedure applies, however, is not properly before this Court 
so it remains simply an interesting legal question, to be answered another 
day.  

 

[¶33]      Given the exact nature of the appeal taken, the order of 
the district court should be affirmed.  In either case, an analysis by this Court of 
the propriety of any action taken by the Board is inappropriate.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Mr. Veile brought the 
federal court action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging the Washakie County 
Coroner, Gordon Martinson, and others, including Mr. Bryant, deprived Mr. Veile 
and Veile Mortuary of property and liberty interests without due process of 
law.  

 

2Although the record does 
not contain these "other complaints" filed by Mr. Veile, we can infer from the 
record that the allegations in the "other complaints" were similar to those 
currently asserted.

 

3The reasserted petition 
was filed with the Board on February 28, 2000, two days before the terms of 
several Board members expired, which left the Board without a quorum for 
action.  On August 16, 2000, after the Board vacancies were filled, 
the Board had a quorum and set the matter for hearing. 

 

4Specifically, 
Mr. Veile alleged Mr. Bryant violated § 33-16-310(a)(ii)(A), (C), (D), (E), (N), 
(O), (Q) and/or (R).  
That statute states, in pertinent part: 

 

33-16-310.  Rules and regulations; inspection; employment of inspector; 
notice and hearing for suspension or revocation of license generally; prohibited 
conduct; leasing of caskets.

 

(a)  The Wyoming state board of embalming shall have powers to 
adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations relating to the business of 
funeral directing, to the sanitary condition of places where such business or 
practice is conducted, with particular regard to plumbing, sewage, ventilation 
and equipment, and generally to carry out the various provisions of this act in 
the protection of the peace, health, safety, welfare and morals of the public. 
Said board shall have the power to inspect the premises in which the business of 
funeral directing is conducted or where embalming is practiced, and for that 
purpose may employ a licensed embalmer of the state of Wyoming as an inspector 
and to aid in the enforcement of this act and rules adopted pursuant thereto, 
whose compensation and expenses shall be payable only out of the fees collected 
by the board. The board shall suspend or revoke licenses after hearing by said 
board and after ten (10) days notice to the licensee, upon such licensee being 
found guilty by said board of any of the following acts or omissions: 

(ii)  Unprofessional conduct which is hereby defined to include: 

A)  Misrepresentation 
or fraud in the conduct of the business or the profession of a funeral 
director;

. . .

C)  Solicitation of human dead bodies by the licensee, his 
agents, assistants or employees, whether such solicitation occurs after death or 
while death is impending; provided, this shall not be deemed to prohibit general 
advertising; 

(D)  Employment by the licensee of persons known as "cappers" or 
"steerers" or "solicitors", or other persons to obtain funeral directing or 
embalming business; 

(E)  Employment directly or indirectly of any apprentice agent, 
assistant, embalmer, employee, or other persons, on part or full time, or on 
commission, for the purpose of calling upon individuals or institutions by whose 
influence dead human bodies may be turned over to a particular funeral director 
or embalmer;

. . .

(N)  Violation of any of 
the provisions of this act [§§ 33-16-301 through 33-16-317]'

(0)   Violation of 
any state law or municipal or county ordinance or regulation affecting the 
handling, custody, care or transportation of dead human bodies;

. . .

(Q)  Refusing to 
promptly surrender the custody of a dead human body, upon the express order of 
the person lawfully entitled to the custody thereof.

(R) Taking undue 
advantage of his patrons or being guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in the 
sale of merchandise to his patrons.

 

516 C.F.R. §  435.2(4) (2003) 
states:

General price list.  (i)(A) Give a printed or typewritten price 
list for retention to persons who inquire in person about the funeral goods, 
funeral services or prices of funeral goods or services offered by the funeral 
provider.  The 
funeral provider must give the list upon beginning discussion of any of the 
following:

(1)  The prices of 
funeral goods or services;

(2)  The overall type of 
funeral service or disposition; or

(3)  Specific funeral 
goods or funeral services offered by the funeral provider.

 

 

 

6Although the record does 
not include the actual order denying the appeal and request for trial de novo, 
it indicates an "Order Dismissing Petitioner's Appeal and Request for Trial De 
Novo" was served on the parties.  Mr. Veile did not challenge the denial of his 
request for a trial de novo, thus, we will not address that issue. 

 

  716 
C.F.R. § 453.3(5) (2003) states:

 Statement of funeral 
goods and services selected.  (i) Give an itemized written statement for 
retention to each person who arranges a funeral or other disposition of human 
remains, at the conclusion of the discussion of arrangements.   The statement 
must list at least the following information:

   (A) The 
funeral goods and funeral services selected by that person and the prices to be 
paid for each of them;

   (B)  Specifically 
itemized cash advance items.  (These prices must be given to the extent 
then known or reasonably ascertainable.  If the prices are not known or reasonably 
ascertainable, a good faith estimate shall be given and a written statement of 
the actual charges shall be provided before the final bill is paid; and

(C)    
The total cost of the 
goods and serviced selected.

 

8In his brief, Veile 
states "[t]he bases for the dismissal were that Mr. Veile had no authority to 
investigate or prosecute the licensing matter, as asserted by Mr. Veile . . . 
."   Veile 
uses the reasoning of the district court to support his third issue regarding 
whether he should have been required by the Board to prosecute and pay for the 
proceedings before the Board: "The Board, if it had decided to defend its 
action, might have argued that Mr. Veile accepted the responsibility to 
prosecute the disciplinary case.  However, such action is void ab initio, 
because of the lack of statutory authority to do so."  In other words, 
Veile accepts that he had no statutory authority to prosecute a contested case 
under the WAPA and any attempt on his part to prosecute a contested case under 
the WAPA would be a nullity  exactly what the district court held.

 

9Quoted at ¶13 of the 
majority opinion.

 

10§33-16-312. Petition for 
revocation or suspension of license; appeal to district court.

            
Both parties shall have the right of appeal to the district court of the 
county in which the licensee resides at any time within thirty (30) days after 
entry of the order of the board.  The service of a notice in writing, of the 
intention of taking such an appeal, within ten (10) days after the entry of the 
order shall be sufficient notice to the adverse party of such appeal.  A transcript of all 
pleadings upon which the cause was submitted to the board, duly certified, shall 
be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court and such filing shall 
complete the appeal.  
The trial of the district court upon such appeal shall be de novo.  In the event the 
licensee appeals, the decision of the board shall not be stayed by the 
proceedings on appeal and such appeal shall not operate to restore the right of 
the licensee to practice pending such appeal, unless bond, with sufficient 
surety, to be approved by said clerk of the district court, shall be posted with 
said clerk of the district court, in such sums as the judge or court 
commissioner may require, conditioned that such appeal shall be prosecuted 
without unnecessary delay and in case the decision appealed from be confirmed 
the licensee shall pay all costs.  

 

11I note, for instance, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-113 of the WAPA states that the contested case procedures 
of the WAPA apply to all licensing procedures that, by law, are subject to a 
hearing.  In 
his brief, Veile presents a summary argument that the Board could proceed only 
pursuant to a contested case under the WAPA.  This argument, however, was presented in 
support of Veile's contention that the proceeding before the Board was a 
contested case under the WAPA - because it had to be a contested case under the 
WAPA.  
Obviously this argument, when placed in the context within it was 
offered, begs the question.

 

12The statutes do, of 
course, govern over agency rules.  "An agency is wholly without power to 
modify, dilute or change in any way the statutory provisions from which it 
derives its authority.'  Platte Development 
Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 
1998).  Thus, 
administrative agencies are bound to comply with their enabling statutes.  Sears v. Romer, 928 P.2d 745, 751 (Colo. App. 1996).  An administrative rule or regulation which is 
not expressly or impliedly authorized by statute is without force or effect if 
it adds to, changes, modifies, or conflicts with an existing statute.  Id. Conversely, a rule or regulation which is expressly 
or impliedly authorized by the enabling statute will be given force and 
effect."   
Billings v. Wyo. Bd. of Outfitters, 2001 WY 81, ¶24, 30 P.3d 557, ¶24 (Wyo. 
2001).