Title: McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914.] 
 
 
MCFADDEN, APPELLANT, v. CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., 
 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914.] 
Courts of appeals — En banc proceedings do not violate Section 3(A), Article IV 
of the Ohio Constitution — Courts of appeals have discretion to determine 
whether an intradistrict conflict exists; if the judges determine that two or 
more decisions of the court on which they sit are in conflict, they must 
convene en banc to resolve the conflict. 
(No. 2007-0705 – Submitted April 23, 2008 – Decided October 2, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-638, 170 Ohio App.3d 142, 2007-Ohio-939. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
En banc proceedings do not violate Section 3(A), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
2. 
Courts of appeals have discretion to determine whether an intradistrict 
conflict exists; if the judges of a court of appeals determine that two or 
more decisions of the court on which they sit are in conflict, they must 
convene en banc to resolve the conflict. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents two issues for our consideration: (1) whether 
en banc proceedings in a court of appeals violate Section 3(A), Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution and (2) if they do not violate the Constitution, whether a court 
of appeals errs by refusing to convene en banc to resolve an intradistrict conflict 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
in two or more opinions rendered by the court.  For the following reasons, we 
hold that en banc proceedings are constitutional and that courts of appeals have 
discretion to determine whether an intradistrict conflict warranting en banc review 
exists.  Because the court of appeals held that en banc proceedings are 
unconstitutional and did not formally deny such review, we remand this case to 
the court of appeals so that the court may determine whether en banc proceedings 
are appropriate in this case. 
II 
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellant, Kenneth D. McFadden, began working for 
defendant-appellee Cleveland State University in 1998 as a coordinator of sales, 
marketing, and promotions in the athletic department.  On June 11, 2003, the 
university terminated his employment. 
{¶ 3} McFadden filed a complaint in the Court of Claims on January 30, 
2006, alleging that the university had fired him because of his race.  The 
university moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, for summary 
judgment, arguing that McFadden failed to file his complaint within the two-year 
statute of limitations for such claims in R.C. 2743.16(A).  The Court of Claims 
granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the statute of limitations 
barred the claim. 
{¶ 4} McFadden appealed, arguing that a six-year statute of limitations 
applied to his claims, citing for support an unreported decision from the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County, Senegal v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 10, 
1994), Franklin App. No. 93API08-1161, 1994 WL 73895.  Senegal held that the 
six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 4101.17 governs employment-
discrimination claims against the state.  Id. at *3. 
{¶ 5} However, in a subsequent decision, the court of appeals called 
Senegal “an aberration” that “does not represent existing law on this court's 
application of the Court of Claims Act's statute of limitations.”  McCoy v. Toledo 
January Term, 2008 
3 
Corr. Inst., Franklin App. No. 04AP-1098, 2005-Ohio-1848, ¶ 10.  McCoy held 
that the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16(A) applied to 
discrimination claims against the state.  Id. at ¶ 6–7.  Because this decision was 
announced on April 21, 2005, McFadden had approximately seven weeks from 
the date of the decision to file a claim within the two-year limitations period. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals relied on McCoy to affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Claims.  “We believe McCoy more accurately reflects the law applicable 
to appellant's claim. Therefore, we reiterate the holding from McCoy that the two-
year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16 applies to claims such as appellant's 
that seek monetary damages for discrimination against the state. To the extent that 
we did not explicitly overrule Senegal in our decision in McCoy, we do so now.”  
McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., Franklin App. No. 06AP-638, 2007-Ohio-
298, ¶ 10 (“McFadden I”). 
{¶ 7} McFadden filed an application for reconsideration.  He argued that 
the court of appeals decision was invalid because it resolved an intradistrict 
conflict without an en banc proceeding.  McFadden cited In re J.J., 111 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
wherein we stated, “Appellate courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within 
their respective appellate districts through en banc proceedings.” 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals denied McFadden’s application for 
reconsideration.  It held that en banc proceedings violated Section 3(A), Article 
IV of the Ohio Constitution.  McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., 170 Ohio 
App.3d 142, 2007-Ohio-939, 866 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 8 (“McFadden II”).  The court also 
attempted to distinguish these circumstances from those in In re J.J. by noting the 
difference in time between conflicting decisions (the conflicting decisions in In re 
J.J. were released on the same day, but over 11 years had elapsed between 
Senegal and McCoy) and suggested that an en banc proceeding would be moot in 
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4 
this case because five of the eight judges in the district had already ruled in favor 
of a two-year statute of limitations.  Id. at ¶ 9–10. 
{¶ 9} We accepted McFadden’s discretionary appeal from the denial of 
his application for reconsideration.  115 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2007-Ohio-5567, 875 
N.E.2d 104. 
III 
{¶ 10} This case presents the issue of whether en banc proceedings are 
constitutional.  En banc is defined as “[w]ith all judges present and participating; 
in full court.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 568.  In an en banc 
proceeding, all appellate judges in a specific district convene to resolve an 
intradistrict conflict on a point of law so that the disputed issue may be 
conclusively settled in that district. In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-
5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 20.  En banc proceedings are well established in 
American jurisprudence; the United States Supreme Court has recognized and 
approved of them in the federal system, and at least 19 other states use some form 
of en banc review.  See Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commr. of Internal 
Revenue (1941), 314 U.S. 326, 333–335, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249; John B. 
Oakley, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Plans for the Divisional 
Organization of the Ninth Circuit (2000–2001), 34 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 483, 538–
540.  As stated previously, en banc proceedings are established in Ohio as well: 
“Appellate courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within their respective 
appellate districts through en banc proceedings.”  In re J.J. at paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals nonetheless refused to convene en banc to 
resolve the statute of limitations issue in this case, holding that such proceedings 
violate Section 3(A), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.  McFadden II, 170 Ohio 
App.3d 142, 2007-Ohio-939, 866 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 8. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 12} Section 3(A), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution states: “The state 
shall be divided by law into compact appellate districts in each of which there 
shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges.  Laws may be passed 
increasing the number of judges in any district wherein the volume of business 
may require such additional judge or judges.  In districts having additional judges, 
three judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition of each case.”  The 
court of appeals held that en banc proceedings are unconstitutional because en 
banc review would result in panels of more than three judges.  McFadden II at ¶ 
8. 
{¶ 13} We disagree with the court of appeals.  The historical background 
of Section 3(A), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution reveals that the number 
“three” in the provision is essentially a quorum requirement related to the makeup 
of appellate panels in the 19th century.  “The modern courts of appeals in Ohio 
can trace their origin to the Constitutional Convention of 1851.  The district courts 
were, at times, composed of two of the common pleas judges of the respective 
districts and one of the Supreme Court judges, any three of whom formed a 
quorum.  * * *  Thus, the limits were largely imposed by limitations on the size of 
the judiciary at the time, rather than on a predetermined formula to involve only 
three judges in a decision.”  State v. Lett, 161 Ohio App.3d 274, 2005-Ohio-2665, 
829 N.E.2d 1281, ¶ 53, fn. 8 (Gallagher, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 
citing F.R. Aumann, The Development of the Judicial System of Ohio (1932), 41 
J. of the Ohio Historical Soc. 195. 
{¶ 14} We acknowledge the reasonable view of the dissent on this issue, 
but given the context in which Section 3(A) was adopted, we conclude that the 
words should be interpreted in order that they do not prohibit en banc judgments 
in courts of appeals.  This quorum requirement does not function as a cap on the 
number of judges who may sit on a panel.  While the plain language of Section 
3(A), Article IV mandates that appellate cases shall be heard by at least three 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
judges to ensure that each case is properly reviewed, it does not foreclose the 
possibility of larger panels in special circumstances.  See also Textile Mills, 314 
U.S. at 333–335, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249 (stating that a similar statute should 
not be “taken too literally” and that sacrificing “literalness for common sense” is 
permissible when it “does no violence to the history” of the provision). 
{¶ 15} The need to definitively and efficiently resolve intradistrict 
conflicts presents a special circumstance that warrants a larger appellate panel.  
Every court of appeals in this state is composed of at least four judges, but three-
judge panels are convened to resolve cases.  When different panels hear the same 
issue, diametrically different results are possible, as this case clearly shows.  
Compare Senegal, Franklin App. No. 93API08-1161, 1994 WL 73895, *3 with 
McCoy, 2005-Ohio-1848, ¶ 6–7.  However, all court of appeals decisions are 
applicable precedent unless and until they are formally overruled.  See 
S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 4(B) (“All court of appeals opinions * * * may be cited as legal 
authority and weighted as deemed appropriate by the courts”).  Thus, schisms 
have developed in districts as different panels announce conflicting opinions on 
identical issues of law, leaving litigants to guess which decision controls.  See In 
re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 17 (noting that 
different panels of the Eighth District Court of Appeals issued two separate 
interpretations of the same issue on the same day); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of 
Ins., Delaware App. No. 04CA80, 2005-Ohio-3921, ¶ 19–21 (noting that the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals reached different conclusions on a specific issue over a 
15-month period).  The issuance of conflicting decisions from a court of appeals 
does not serve the fundamental purpose for the operation of courts—the 
resolution of legal disputes. 
{¶ 16} “ ‘The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals 
in banc is to enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it 
possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to secure 
January Term, 2008 
7 
uniformity and continuity in its decisions, while enabling the court at the same 
time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure of having panels of three 
judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no division exists 
within the court.’ ”  United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp. (1960), 
363 U.S. 685, 689–690, 80 S.Ct. 1336, 4 L.Ed.2d 1491, quoting Maris, Hearing 
and Rehearing Cases in Banc (1954), 14 F.R.D. 91, 96.  This form of review 
promotes finality and predictability of the law within appellate districts, which is 
especially important considering that the court of appeals is the final stop in the 
legal process for many cases.  See Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 335, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 
L.Ed. 249. 
{¶ 17} We therefore hold that en banc proceedings do not violate Section 
3(A), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. 
IV 
{¶ 18} In his second proposition of law, McFadden argues that the Court 
of Appeals for Franklin County abused its discretion by refusing to convene en 
banc to resolve the conflict over the statute of limitations applicable to this case.  
However, this issue is not ripe for our consideration.  Because the court of appeals 
held that en banc review is unconstitutional and provided only a short dicta 
discussion about whether it would review the conflict in this case en banc if the 
process were constitutional, it never fully decided whether to hold en banc 
proceedings.  We therefore remand the case to the court of appeals to determine 
whether to convene en banc to review the alleged conflict on the statute of 
limitations issue herein. 
{¶ 19} Two issues are relevant to this remand.  First, we hold that courts 
of appeals have discretion to determine whether an intradistrict conflict exists; if 
the judges of a court of appeals determine that two or more decisions of the court 
on which they sit are in conflict, they must convene en banc to resolve the 
conflict.  If a party believes that a court of appeals has erred in making such a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
determination, it may seek the normal remedies, such as filing a motion for 
reconsideration or appealing to this court for discretionary review of the issue.  
An abuse-of-iscretion standard applies to decisions on whether to grant en banc 
proceedings. 
{¶ 20} Second, we recognize that the procedure for initiating and 
engaging in en banc review should be dictated by a procedural rule.  The Eighth 
District Court of Appeals is the only district in this state that has promulgated 
such a rule.  See Article 8(b), Eighth District Court of Appeals Standing 
Resolution of the Rules for the Conducting of Court Work.  The Supreme Court 
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure is currently drafting a rule on 
this subject; once this rule is in place, there will be a uniform procedure for this 
process. 
{¶ 21} Until that rule becomes effective, courts of appeals may adopt 
practices and procedures to facilitate en banc resolution of conflicting decisions.  
We reject the university’s argument that en banc proceedings are impermissible 
ultra vires acts in the absence of a rule specifically authorizing them.  Our 
decisions in this case and In re J.J. provide sufficient authorization for such 
proceedings; no further authority is necessary. 
V 
{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the holding of the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the court of appeals to determine whether it should 
convene en banc to resolve the conflict raised herein. 
Judgment reversed 
 and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. dissenting. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 23} I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County that denied McFadden’s application for 
reconsideration. The court of appeals followed McCoy v. Toledo Corr. Inst., 
Franklin App. No. 04AP-1098, 2005-Ohio-1848, and “specifically overruled”  
Senegal v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 10, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93 
API08- 1161, 1994 WL 73895, an earlier case holding that a six-year, rather than 
two-year, statute of limitations applied to claims such as McFadden’s.  McFadden 
v. Cleveland State Univ., 170 Ohio App.3d 142, 2007-Ohio-939, 866 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 
3.  Thus, the court of appeals has already resolved any intradistrict conflict.  
McFadden had no basis for a motion for reconsideration. 
{¶ 24} In reversing and remanding for the court of appeals to determine 
whether to hold an en banc hearing, the majority concludes that an en banc 
proceeding is constitutional based on four points.  First, it notes that federal courts 
and a minority of state courts1 use some form of en banc review. Second, it relies 
on paragraph two of the syllabus in In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-
5484, 855 N.E.2d 851.  Third, it adds words to Section 3(A), Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution to contend that “three judges” states a quorum, instead of the 
defined number for a hearing panel on an appellate case. Fourth, it cites policy 
reasons to support an en banc procedure. Each of these points is debatable; 
cumulatively, they are unpersuasive. 
The Constitution of Ohio, unlike the federal statute,  
does not provide for en banc hearings 
                                                 
1. Only 18 states use en banc proceedings, according to  John B. Oakley, Comparative Analysis of 
Alternative Plans for the Divisional Organization of the Ninth Circuit (2000–2001), 34 U.C.Davis 
L.Rev. 483.  (One other state, New Jersey, provides for review by an expanded panel consisting of 
one additional judge. Id. at 534-537.)  Thirteen of the 40 intermediate appellate courts are, like 
Ohio, divided into geographical districts with essentially separate courts.  In only Texas and 
Florida are there district en banc proceedings.  Id. at 514-515. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 25} Since 1948, the federal circuit courts have been given specific 
power by statute to sit “in banc”2 for a hearing or rehearing.  The United States 
Supreme Court has explained the history of the procedure in W. Pacific RR. Corp. 
v. W. Pacific RR. Co. (1953), 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986.  In its 
current form, Section 46, Title 28, U.S.Code states: 
{¶ 26} “(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a 
court or panel of not more than three judges (except that the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three judges if 
its rules so provide), unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is 
ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active 
service.  A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active 
service * * *. 
{¶ 27} “(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a 
court or panel thereof, as provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 28} In contrast, Section 3(A), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
states: “The state shall be divided by law into compact appellate districts in each 
of which there shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges.  Laws may 
be passed increasing the number of judges in any district wherein the volume of 
business may require such additional judge or judges.  In districts having 
additional judges, three judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition of 
each case.” (Boldface and Italics added.)  
{¶ 29} Section 3(A), Article IV does not say “at least” three judges, 
contrary to the majority’s addition, and the word “quorum” does not appear.  The 
Ohio Constitution mandates a definite number — that “three judges shall 
participate in the hearing and disposition of each case.”   The majority cites 
                                                 
2.  Although the federal statute uses the term “in banc,” the more common term is “en banc.” 
January Term, 2008 
11 
Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue (1941), 314 U.S. 
326, 333–335, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249 (stating that a “similar statute” should 
not be “taken too literally” and that sacrificing “literalness for common sense” is 
permissible when it “does no violence to the history” of the provision).  But 
Textile Mills is inapposite here. 
{¶ 30} The statutes in Textile Mills created an anomaly because one 
statute specified that each federal circuit court of appeals “shall consist of three 
judges” (former Section 117, Title 28, U.S.Code), another statute provided that 
some circuits would have four judges (former Section 118, Title 28, U.S.Code), 
and no statute specified the number of judges who could hear and decide a case.  
Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 328-332, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249.  See also State v. 
Lett, 161 Ohio App.3d 274, 2005-Ohio-2665, 829 N.E.2d 1281, ¶ 77-79 
(Karpinski, J., dissenting). But, as noted above, that anomaly does not exist in 
Ohio, since the Constitution specifies that “three judges shall participate in the 
hearing and disposition of each case.” Section 3(A), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution. Additionally, unlike in Textile Mills, the reference here is not to a 
statute, but to the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 31} In contrast to the majority’s expansion of Section 3(A), Article IV, 
the statutes providing for the makeup of the courts of appeals have been 
consistent with the mandate of Section 3(A) that “three judges shall participate in 
the hearing and disposition of each case” in the courts of appeals. For example, 
R.C. 2501.012 designates the number of judges in each court of appeals and when 
their terms of office begin and end. As one of the dissenting judges explained in 
State v Lett, 161 Ohio App.3d 274, 2005-Ohio-2665, 829 N.E.2d 1281, with 
respect to the statute as it related to the Eighth District Court of Appeals: 
{¶ 32} “In 1959 the Ohio Constitution was amended to authorize the 
legislature to pass laws to increase the number of judges. Section 6, Article IV, 
Ohio Constitution.* * *  In 1970, R.C. 2501.012 gave a general provision for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
districts with more than three judges:  ‘In such districts, any three judges shall 
comprise the court of appeals in the hearing and disposition of cases * * *.’  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 33} “* * * This statute was repeatedly amended in 1976, 1980, 1984, 
1986, and 1990.  Each time, the legislature specifically addressed the particular 
district: ‘In the eighth district, any three judges shall comprise the court of appeals 
in the hearing and, disposition of cases * * *.’  (Emphasis added.) * * * Each time 
the number of judges changed, the legislature retained the sentence specifying the 
number of judges as three for comprising the panel to hear and dispose of a case. 
{¶ 34} “Over the years, additional judges were also added to some of the 
other districts. With each change, the legislature retained the language specifying 
a three-judge panel. Currently, the statute specifies a three-judge panel and 
reiterates this for each specific district in which additional judges have been 
added. There is a separate and identical provision for nine different districts: R.C. 
2501.012 (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) and 2501.013 (A), (B), (C), and (D) — a total 
of nine specific provisions, each time reiterating that three judges will hear and 
dispose of a case.” Id. at ¶ 83-85 (Karpinski, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 35} Similarly, R.C. 2501.012(C) provides, “In the tenth district, any 
three judges shall comprise the court of appeals in the hearing and disposition of 
cases in accordance with any local rules of practice and procedure that may be 
adopted by the judges of the court.” (Emphasis added.)  These statutes do not 
suggest that the General Assembly viewed the constitutional command of Section 
3(A), Article IV to mean that “at least three judges” of the court of appeals must 
hear and decide each case, but that, consistent with the constitutional text, “three 
judges” must do so. 
In re J.J. is distinguishable and does not control the outcome here 
{¶ 36} The second syllabus paragraph of In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 
2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, is cited as having “established” en banc 
January Term, 2008 
13 
proceedings and also as “sufficient authorization” for them.  Holding that 
“[a]ppellate courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within their respective 
appellate districts through en banc proceedings,” J.J. dealt with a multijudge court 
with a local en banc rule in place and two different three-judge panels that had 
issued conflicting opinions on the same day. This court was not asked to 
determine the constitutionality of an en banc proceeding in J.J., and no analysis 
was offered to justify the court’s holding on that point. 
{¶ 37} Furthermore, J.J. did not discuss the procedure that was to be used: 
What mechanics begin the process?  Does a litigant have power to request an en 
banc hearing or rehearing, and how many judges must respond to such petition?  
Does the court have the power, sua sponte, to consider a case en banc?  How 
many judges are required to overrule the three judges who initially heard the 
case?  Is there an appeal from the exercise of the court’s discretion?   The 
majority comments that the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Practice 
and Procedure is currently drafting a rule.  That rule would, however, conflict 
with both the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2501.012. 
Policy reasons do not justify en banc proceedings 
{¶ 38} Of the 12 appellate districts, only the Eighth and Fifth are 
mentioned as having different panels that have announced conflicting opinions 
within the same district on identical issues of law.  That all courts of appeals’ 
opinions may be considered precedent unless and until they are formally 
overruled (see S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 4(B)) does not mean that en banc is the only 
solution to the perceived problem.  The Tenth District itself has adopted the 
general rule that “the most recent decision regarding [an] issue * * * is the 
deciding precedent.”  Miller v. Lindsay-Green, Inc., Franklin App. No. 04AP-848, 
2005-Ohio-6366, 2005 WL 3220215, ¶ 101.  In addition, this court functions as 
the court of last resort in articulating what the law is, within a district as well as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
within the state.  A majority of state supreme courts with intermediate appellate 
courts have the same function. 
{¶ 39} Justice Jackson raised a note of caution when discussing en banc 
proceedings in federal courts: “Rehearings en banc are not appropriate where the 
effect is simply to interpose another review by an enlarged Court of Appeals 
between decision by a conventional three-judge court and petition to this Court. 
Delay, cost, and uncertainty, which take their toll of both the successful and the 
unsuccessful, the just and the unjust litigant, are each increased by an additional 
appeal to a hybrid intermediate court.”  W. Pacific RR. Corp., 345 U.S. at 273, 73 
S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed.986 (Jackson, J. dissenting).  Regardless of policy 
considerations, en banc proceedings are not authorized by either the Ohio 
Constitution or state statute. 
There is no need for remand to the court of appeals 
{¶ 40} Finally, in remanding the case to the court of appeals to determine 
“whether it should convene en banc to resolve the conflict,” the majority ignores 
this unanimous statement:  “Between our decision in this case and the decision of 
the panel in McCoy, five of the eight sitting judges on this court have held that 
claims such as appellant's are subject to the two-year statute of limitations set 
forth in R.C. 2743.16. There is no reason to believe that more formal en banc 
proceedings would produce a different result.”  McFadden v. Cleveland State 
Univ., 170 Ohio App.3d 142, 2007-Ohio-939, 866 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 10.  Thus, the 
three-judge court that participated in the hearing and disposition of this case has 
already determined that there is no conflict requiring an en banc hearing.  
Furthermore, the Tenth District Court of Appeals has no local rule providing for 
an en banc procedure.  And there is no guidance from this court as to how an en 
banc process should be implemented. 
{¶ 41} Because any rule would conflict with the Ohio Constitution, I 
dissent and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals in every respect. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 42} In addition to joining Justice Lanzinger’s well-reasoned dissent, I 
write separately to emphasize my strong concerns about today’s decision. 
{¶ 43} Regretfully, the majority succumbs to the siren call of convenience 
rather than adhering to an essential principle of constitutional interpretation, 
which is to apply the constitutional text only according to its plain meaning and 
intent.  The majority judicially revises the unambiguous, nearly 50-year-old 
constitutional provision requiring that cases in the district courts of appeals be 
decided by “three judges.” 
{¶ 44} The majority opines that “[t]he historical background of Section 
3(A), Article IV, of the Ohio Constitution reveals that the number ‘three’ in the 
provision is essentially a quorum requirement related to the makeup of appellate 
panels in the 19th century.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 13.  It may be that the choice of 
“three judges” originally arose in that fashion as a matter of historical practice. 
But in 1883, the earlier designation that “any three of [the judges of which the 
former ‘district courts’ were composed] shall be a quorum” was removed. That 
reference to three judges forming a “quorum” has not appeared in the 
constitutional provision pertaining to the composition of the courts of appeals 
since that time.3  
                                                 
3. See former Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5, effective from September 1, 1851, to 
October 9, 1883 (“District courts shall be composed of the judges of the court of common pleas of 
the respective districts, and one of the judges of the supreme court, any three of whom shall be a 
quorum * * *”); former Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6, effective from October 9, 1883, 
to January 1, 1913 (“Such [circuit] courts shall be composed of such number of judges as may be 
provided by law * * *”); former Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6, effective from January 
1, 1913, to January 1, 1945 (“The state shall be divided into appellate districts * * *, in each of 
which shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges * * *”); former Ohio Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 6, effective from January 1, 1945, to November 3, 1959 (same); former Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 6, effective from November 3, 1959, to May 7, 1968 (“The state 
shall be divided into appellate districts * * *, in each of which there shall be a court of appeals 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 45} Thus, the composition of the district courts from 1851 to 1883 does 
not answer the question as to what the text of the Ohio Constitution provides 
today regarding the courts of appeals.  From 1913 until today, Section 3(A), 
Article IV and its predecessors have expressly required that cases in the courts of 
appeals be heard and decided by “three judges,” even when the number of judges 
on the particular district court of appeals exceeds three. 
{¶ 46} The court’s decision to expand Section 3(A), Article IV, cannot be 
defended on the ground of necessity.  Although I fully agree that contradictory 
decisions by separate three-judge panels in courts of appeals fail to resolve 
disputes consistently and present an untenable situation, there are at least two 
methods of resolving this problem without resorting to the sort of judicial rewrite 
of the constitution found in the majority opinion. One method is through the 
court’s existing discretionary jurisdiction to accept and decide cases of “public or 
great general interest.” Section 2(B)(2)(e), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  The 
second method is through the constitutionally prescribed amendment process.  
See, e.g., Section 1, Article XVI, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 47} The first method, accepting discretionary review of conflicting 
decisions by separate three-judge panels within an appellate district, is both 
familiar and workable. When the situation arises, an appellant need merely 
include this circumstance in the jurisdictional memorandum filed with this court.  
If two decisions within the district truly conflict, this court is perfectly capable of 
resolving the legal issue by hearing the appeal of the case or cases. 
                                                                                                                                     
consisting of three judges. Laws may be passed increasing the number of judges in any district* * 
*. In districts having additional judges, three judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition 
of each case”); former Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(A), effective from May 7, 1968, to 
January 1, 1995) (“The state shall be divided by law into compact appellate districts in each of 
which there shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges.  Laws may be passed increasing 
the number of judges in any district * * *.  In districts having additional judges, three judges shall 
participate in the hearing and disposition of each case”). 
January Term, 2008 
17 
{¶ 48} The second method, amending the Ohio Constitution to authorize 
en banc proceedings under procedures that this court would be authorized to adopt 
by rule, would allow for maximum flexibility in designing a workable system and 
would allow intradistrict conflicts to be resolved, in the first instance, by the 
judges of a district court of appeals themselves.  In the past ten years, the 
constitution of Ohio has been formally amended through the constitutional 
amendment process no fewer than five times.4  There is no reason to believe that 
the constitutional amendment process would be inadequate to authorize en banc 
court of appeals proceedings. This court has never asked for such authority, either 
formally or informally.  Instead, the majority rushes headlong into judicially 
revising the constitution itself – a power clearly not granted to this court. 
{¶ 49} Moreover, today’s far-reaching decision throws open wide new 
doors for district courts of appeals to experiment with newfound flexibility.  The 
boundaries of that flexibility are wholly undefined. The majority rules, “This 
quorum requirement [of three judges] does not function as a cap on the number of 
judges who may sit on a panel. While the plain language of Section 3(A), Article 
IV mandates that appellate cases shall be heard by at least three judges to ensure 
that each case is properly reviewed, it does not foreclose the possibility of larger 
panels in special circumstances.”  (Emphasis sic.)  ¶ 14.  Today’s ruling also does 
not foreclose this possibility in any case. 
{¶ 50} What restriction, for example, prevents all of the judges of a 
district court of appeals from hearing and determining from the onset any case on 
its docket? Why would courts be limited to sitting en banc in what the majority 
characterizes as “special circumstances”?  Under today’s decision, the Ohio 
Constitution would not prevent it. The question prompting today’s decision 
pertains to the use of en banc proceedings as a method of resolving intradistrict 
                                                 
4. http://www.law.csuohio.edu/lawlibrary/resources/lawpubs/ohioconlaw/ProposedConstitutional 
Amendments.html. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
conflicts, but the court’s new interpretation of Section 3(A), Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution cannot logically be limited to that purpose. Thus, the effect of 
the majority’s interpretation is to remove any constitutional limit on how many 
judges can hear and decide any district appellate case because, as the majority 
holds, the constitution does not limit participation to three, and only three, judges. 
{¶ 51} The work load in our district appellate courts will, as a practical 
necessity, limit the size of the hearing panel, resulting in most cases being decided 
by the traditional number of three judges. It may well be, however, that a greater 
number of judges will occasionally decide to sit from the outset on cases that are 
more legally challenging or factually interesting, or in which there is great public 
interest. Today’s reading of the Ohio Constitution by the majority ostensibly 
would permit district appellate judges to make that choice. Such is the 
consequence of straying from the plain meaning of the constitutional text. 
Applying the plain meaning of the constitutional text, however, would wisely 
avoid such uncertainty and experimentation. 
{¶ 52} I respectfully dissent. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Gallagher Sharp and Timothy J. Fitzgerald; and Dennis J. Niermann Co., 
L.P.A., and Dennis J. Niermann, for appellant. 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor 
General, Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitor, Susan M. Sullivan, Assistant 
Solicitor, and Randall P. Knutti, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________