Title: Davis v. Alabama Education Ass'n

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/23/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
____________________
1091745
____________________
Marquita Davis, in her official capacity as State Director
of Finance, and Thomas L. White, Jr., in his official
capacity as State Comptroller
v.
Alabama Education Association et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-10-901187)
MURDOCK, Justice.
1091745
When this action was filed, Bill Newton was the acting
1
State Director of Finance and was the named defendant.  Davis
was automatically substituted as a defendant when she became
State Director of Finance.  See Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. We
have restyled the appeal accordingly.  
The office of the comptroller is within the Department
2
of Finance.
2
The State Director of Finance, Marquita Davis ("the
finance director"),  and the State Comptroller, Thomas L.
1
White, Jr. ("the comptroller"),  appeal from a preliminary
2
injunction entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in response
to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the Alabama
Education Association ("the AEA"); Alabama Voice of Teachers
for Education, a political-action committee affiliated with
the AEA ("A-VOTE"); the Alabama State Employees Association
("the ASEA"); and the State Employees Association Political
Action 
Committee, 
a 
political-action 
committee 
affiliated 
with
the ASEA ("SEA-PAC").  We vacate the injunction and remand the
case for the circuit court to dismiss the action.
I.  Statement of Facts
Employees of the State of Alabama are paid through the
office of the comptroller.  Subject to certain conditions,
§ 36-1-4.3, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the comptroller may
make deductions from the salary of a State employee upon the
1091745
3
employee's request.  Specifically, § 36-1-4.3(a), Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"The 
state 
Comptroller 
shall 
adopt 
statewide
policies which provide for deductions from the
salaries of state employees or groups of state
employees whenever a request is presented to the
state Comptroller by a group of participating state
employees equal in number to at least 200 provided,
however, that deductions being made as of April 23,
1985, shall continue to be made. The deductions
shall be made at least monthly and shall be remitted
to 
the 
appropriate 
company, 
association, 
or
organization as specified by the employees. The
deductions may be made for membership dues, and
voluntary contributions, and insurance premiums. Any
deduction provided under the provisions of this
section may be terminated upon two months' notice in
writing by a state employee to the appropriate
company, association, or organization and to the
appropriate payroll clerk or other appropriate
officials as specified by the state Comptroller."
Section 36-1-4.4, Ala. Code 1975, prescribes other
procedures relating to the salary deductions authorized in
§ 36-1-4.3:
"The policies adopted by the state Comptroller
for deductions from the salaries of state employees
or 
groups 
of 
state 
employees 
for 
employee
organizations shall provide that the deductions for
membership dues and voluntary contributions shall be
made based on membership lists and forms provided by
the employees' organization. Such lists are to be
corrected 
and 
revised 
annually 
according 
to
procedures 
to 
be 
established 
by 
the 
state
Comptroller. 
Membership 
dues 
and 
voluntary
contributions currently authorized shall continue on
an annual basis for the current yearly period and
1091745
4
for each succeeding yearly period unless the
employee revokes the deduction in writing within 10
days of the next succeeding yearly period. Voluntary
contributions may be revoked by giving a 30-day
notice in writing. New authorizations shall be
permitted on a monthly basis according to procedures
to be established by the state Comptroller. Upon
leaving state service whether by death, retirement,
termination, resignation, leave of absence or other
means, payroll deduction of dues and authorized
voluntary deductions shall cease. When an employee
returns to state service from an approved leave of
absence or other temporary leave, payroll deductions
and voluntary contributions shall resume unless the
employee revokes the deductions in writing. When
amounts have been correctly deducted and remitted by
the state Comptroller, the state Comptroller shall
bear no further responsibility or liability for
subsequent transactions."
On July 1, 2010, the comptroller implemented a new policy
regarding salary deductions.  Under this new policy, the
comptroller 
stopped 
executing 
salary 
deductions 
designated 
for
contributions to SEA-PAC; the comptroller continued making
deductions designated for the payment of dues to the ASEA.
Likewise, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions
to a political-action committee affiliated with the Alabama
State Troopers Association.  Portions of an employee's salary
no longer deducted as a result of this policy change were
included in the employee's paychecks. 
1091745
5
The comptroller's change in the manner of executing
salary deductions caused the AEA to inquire of the comptroller
whether a similar policy change in deductions would be made as
to the salaries of State employees who elected to have
contributions deducted for the benefit of the AEA.  In
conjunction with this inquiry, the comptroller was made aware
that a portion of the deductions then being made for the
benefit of the AEA were in turn contributed by the AEA to
A-VOTE.  Because the comptroller could not ascertain what
portion of the deductions designated for the AEA were passed
on to A-VOTE, the comptroller ceased executing all salary
deductions designated for the AEA on September 1, 2010.
The comptroller based the aforesaid changes in the manner
of executing salary deductions on his interpretation of the
provisions in §§ 36-12-61 and 17-17-5, Ala. Code 1975.
Section 36-12-61, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any officer or
employee of the State of Alabama to use or to permit
to be used any state-owned property of any character
or description, including stationery, stamps, office
equipment, office supplies, automobiles or any other
property used by him, in his custody or under his
control for the promotion or advancement of the
interest of any candidate for the nomination or
election to any public office of the State of
Alabama."
1091745
As discussed infra, § 17-17-5 was amended effective
3
March 20, 2011, by Act No. 2010-761, Ala.  Acts 2010.
6
As then codified, § 17-17-5, Ala. Code 1975, provided in part
that "[n]o person in the employment of the State of Alabama
... shall use any state ... funds, property, or time, for any
political activities."  
3
On September 10, 2010, the AEA and A-VOTE filed a
complaint against the finance director and the comptroller in
the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring that
deductions designated for the AEA that benefited A-VOTE were
not prohibited by law and seeking a permanent injunction to
force the comptroller to resume the previous practice of
executing 
salary 
deductions 
designated 
for 
the 
AEA.
Simultaneously, the AEA and A-VOTE filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction or restraining order.  On September 13,
2010, the ASEA and SEA-PAC filed a motion to intervene as
plaintiffs in the action.  The circuit court set a hearing on
the motion for a preliminary injunction for the following day.
On September 14, 2010, before the hearing, the finance
director and the comptroller filed a motion to dismiss the
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  At the outset
of the hearing, counsel for the finance director and the
1091745
7
comptroller 
explained 
that 
the 
AEA 
had 
informed 
the
comptroller what portion of requested salary deductions
reflected amounts to be forwarded to A-VOTE as contributions.
Counsel for the finance director and the comptroller stated
that, 
based 
on 
that 
newly 
received 
information, 
the
comptroller would resume (and he subsequently did resume) as
of October 1, 2010, salary deductions for the AEA in an amount
that excluded the portion of those deductions that otherwise
would be passed on to A-VOTE.  
During the September 14 hearing, counsel for the
plaintiffs argued at length concerning the meaning of the
above-described statutes.  The finance director and the
comptroller called a witness to testify on their behalf.  The
plaintiffs submitted two affidavits from the executive
director of the AEA, Paul Hubbert.  Among other things,
Hubbert testified that, after § 36-1-4.3 was enacted in 1985,
the comptroller received authorization from State employees
for salary deductions for dues and contributions to A-VOTE and
remitted 
the 
amounts 
collected 
pursuant 
to 
those
authorizations to the AEA consistently from that time until
the comptroller stopped executing the deductions in September
1091745
8
2010.  Following the hearing, the circuit court denied the
finance director and the comptroller's motion to dismiss the
action; it granted the motion to intervene filed by the ASEA
and SEA-PAC.
On September 15, 2010, the ASEA and SEA-PAC filed their
complaint in intervention in which they, like the AEA and
A-VOTE, requested a judgment declaring the deductions for
SEA-PAC legal and injunctive relief from the comptroller's
change in the manner of executing State employees' salary
deductions for SEA-PAC.  On the same date, the circuit court
entered a preliminary injunction requiring that the finance
director and the comptroller 
"a) shall in all future pay periods, honor all
employee requests for payroll deductions pertaining
to, or involving, AEA or A-VOTE, and ASEA or
SEA-PAC, just as if Defendants' recent change in
that regard had never been made; and
"b) refrain from taking any action of any sort that
would impair, or interfere with the honoring of,
payroll deduction pursuant to employee requests,
involving AEA, A-VOTE, ASEA, or SEA-PAC."
The circuit court ruled that, without the preliminary
injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm
through the actions of the finance director and the
comptroller because "the Plaintiffs will not be receiving the
1091745
9
funds that their members have sought to have deducted and
forwarded to the Plaintiffs.  This will, furthermore,
irreparably diminish Plaintiff A-VOTE's, and Intervening
Plaintiff SEA-PAC's, ability to pursue their lawful goals in
the near future."  The circuit court cited the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which it stated would prohibit monetary
recovery by the plaintiffs, and the fact that it was then an
election year as further evidence of the irreparable nature of
the harm.  
The circuit court concluded that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits through 
"the strength of Plaintiffs' arguments on the proper
interpretation of Ala. Code [1975,] §§ 36-1-4.3,
36-1-4.4, and 36-12-61.  There is substantial
history at the administrative level of interpreting
the phrase 'voluntary contributions,' in §§ 36-1-4.3
and -4.4, to include contributions to political
action 
committees 
affiliated 
with 
employee
organizations. This has been the Comptroller's own
interpretation for many years. This longstanding
interpretation is persuasive evidence of the meaning
of the statutes.  Furthermore, the Court recognizes
the strength of the argument that § 36-12-61 would
not prohibit the payroll deduction of [political-
action-committee] contributions even if that statute
were standing alone.  The Court notes the purpose of
that Article of the Alabama Code as set forth in
Ala. Code [1975,] § 36-12-60, and recognizes the
strength of the argument that the longstanding
administrative practice of payroll deduction was and
will be consistent with that legislative purpose.
1091745
10
The Court further recognizes the strength of the
argument that Ala. Code [1975,] §§ 36-1-4.3 and -4.4
(along with a similar statute at the local level),
which have long been administratively interpreted as
covering 
payroll deductions for voluntary PAC
contributions, would govern if there were actually
a conflict between those statutes and § 36-12-61."
The 
following 
day 
the 
finance 
director 
and 
the
comptroller filed a notice of appeal of the circuit court's
preliminary injunction.  The finance director and the
comptroller also filed in the circuit court a motion to stay
the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal.
In support of the motion, the finance director and the
comptroller filed an affidavit from the comptroller describing
the attending risks of revising payroll data for employee
contributions at the end of the fiscal year because it would
require a substantial amount of other data adjustments.  On
September 17, 2010, the circuit court denied the motion to
stay.
The finance director and the comptroller renewed in this
Court their motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction
pending the resolution of the appeal.  They also requested
immediate relief from the preliminary injunction to prevent
the risk of interference with the completion of fiscal-
1091745
11
year-end tasks.  The finance director and the comptroller also
moved for a stay of all proceedings in the circuit court and
requested expedited review of the appeal.  The following day,
the plaintiffs filed responses to the finance director and the
comptroller's motions.  On September 24, 2010, through a
supplemental filing, the finance director and the comptroller
informed this Court that the October 1, 2010, payroll for
applicable State employees would include salary deductions for
A-VOTE and SEA-PAC in compliance with the preliminary
injunction but that such compliance did not constitute an
abandonment of the appeal. 
On October 15, 2010, this Court granted in part and
denied in part the finance director and the comptroller's
motion to stay the preliminary injunction.  This Court stayed
that portion of the circuit court's order that "requir[ed] the
Comptroller to deduct contributions to a political action
committee pursuant to an employee's request for such payment."
This Court denied a stay of that portion of the circuit
court's order that "requir[ed] the Comptroller to deduct dues
of the AEA and the ASEA pursuant to an employee's request." 
1091745
12
Subsequently, in a special session, the legislature
enacted, and the governor signed into law on December 20,
2010, Act No. 2010-761, Ala.  Acts 2010 ("the Act").  The Act
amended § 17-17-5, Ala. Code 1975, to explicitly state as
follows:
"(a) No person in the employment of the State of
Alabama ... shall use any state, county, city, local
school board, or other governmental agency funds,
property, or time, for any political activities.
"(b) No person in the employment of the State of
Alabama ... may arrange by salary deduction or
otherwise for any payments to a political action
committee 
or 
arrange 
by 
salary 
deduction 
or
otherwise for any payments for the dues of any
person so employed to a membership organization
which uses any portion of the dues for political
activity. ...
"....
"Any organization that requests the State of
Alabama, a county, a city, a local school board, or
any other governmental agency to arrange by salary
deduction or otherwise for the collection of
membership dues of persons employed by the State of
Alabama, a county, a city, a local school board, or
any other governmental agency shall certify to the
appropriate governmental entity that none of the
membership dues will be used for political activity.
Thereafter, at the conclusion of each calendar year,
each 
organization 
that 
has 
arranged 
for 
the
collection of its membership dues of persons
employed by the State of Alabama, a county, a city,
a local school board, or any other governmental
agency shall provide the appropriate governmental
entity a detailed breakdown of the expenditure of
1091745
Section 4 of the Act provides that the Act becomes
4
effective 90 days following its passage and approval by the
governor.
13
the membership dues of persons employed by the State
of Alabama, a county, a city, a local school board,
or any other governmental agency collected by the
governmental entity.  ..."
The Act became effective on March 20, 2011.  Act No. 2010-761,
§ 4.4
Following the legislature's amendment of § 17-17-5, the
AEA and A-VOTE filed with this Court a motion to vacate the
preliminary injunction that had been entered by the circuit
court and to remand this case to the circuit court to allow
the AEA and A-VOTE an opportunity to file with that court a
motion to dismiss the action without prejudice.  In their
motion, the AEA and A-VOTE argued that "the landscape of the
dispute between the parties has changed substantially" with
the passage of the Act and that there were "potential issues
of mootness, as well as many other potential issues that could
arise" from the passage of the Act.  The AEA and A-VOTE stated
that, as a result of the passage of the Act, they "no longer
wish[ed] to pursue this civil action."  They argued that this
Court's vacating the circuit court's preliminary injunction
and remanding the action so that the plaintiffs could file a
1091745
The other named federal-court defendants are then State
5
Superintendent of Education Joseph Morton, then Chancellor of
Post-Secondary Education Freida Hill, Madison County District
Attorney Robert Broussard, Lee County District Attorney Robert
T. Treese III, the Huntsville City Board of Education, the
City of Madison Board of Education, and the Madison County
Board of Education.
14
motion to dismiss the action without prejudice would "keep the
Court and the parties from having to address potentially
complex and disputed arguments about [the Act] at this time."
On December 27, 2010, the ASEA and SEA-PAC filed with this
Court a joinder in the December 23, 2010, motion of the AEA
and A-VOTE.  On January 10, 2011, the finance director and the
comptroller filed a written opposition to the plaintiffs'
motion in which, among other things, they rejected the
suggestion that the order of the circuit court should be
vacated and the case remanded based on the "potential issues
of mootness" argument made by the plaintiffs.  
On 
March 
8, 
2011, 
the 
finance 
director 
and 
the
comptroller notified this Court that on February 25, 2011, the
plaintiffs had filed in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama an action against the
governor, the finance director, the comptroller, and other
defendants ("the federal-court defendants")  challenging the
5
1091745
15
constitutionality of the Act under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Specifically,
the complaint alleged that the Act's ban on salary deductions
in support of political activities is "overbroad" and vague,
that enforcement of the Act would result in "viewpoint"
discrimination, and that the Act violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Subsequent filings in
this Court by the finance director and the comptroller
notified this Court that the federal district court on March
18, 2011, entered a preliminary injunction against the
federal-court defendants that "enjoined and restrained [them]
from implementing or enforcing [the Act]."  The federal
district court's injunctive order further stated that "[a]ll
defendants named above must honor employee requests for
payroll deductions to the Alabama Education Association
('AEA'), and must remit the deducted amounts (including
amounts representing contributions to 'A-VOTE') to AEA."  The
federal-court defendants filed a notice of appeal of the
preliminary injunction, as well as a motion to stay the
injunction, to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.
1091745
16
On April 5, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
entered an order denying the motion to stay the federal
district 
court's 
preliminary injunction insofar as it
prohibited the implementation of the Act.  The Eleventh
Circuit granted a stay, however, of the portion of the
preliminary 
injunction 
that 
required 
the 
federal-court
defendants to honor employee requests for salary deductions
designated for the AEA that represented contributions to
A-VOTE.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that, before the enactment
of the Act, the comptroller, based on preexisting Alabama law,
already had ceased executing salary deductions from applicable
State employees' paychecks that represented contributions to
political-action committees.  In particular, the Eleventh
Circuit noted:
"If, as the district court has preliminarily
concluded, the new Act is unconstitutional and its
provisions are nonseverable, the provisions of the
Alabama Code on which the Comptroller's June 28,
2010 policy was based are unaffected by the new Act.
There is nothing in the district court's memorandum
opinion, or in the law of which we are aware, to
justify a federal court injunction preventing the
[federal-court] defendants from refusing to deduct
for, 
or 
remit 
to, 
any 
organization 
amounts
representing contributions to A-VOTE or any other
[political-action 
committee], 
based 
on 
their
interpretation of pre-Act 2010-761 state law. To the
contrary, Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S.
1091745
In Ysursa, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
6
"nothing in the First Amendment prevents a State from
determining that its political subdivisions may not provide
payroll deductions for political activities."  555 U.S. 353,
355 (2009).  
17
353, 129 S.Ct. 1093 (2009), clearly permits the
defendants to refuse to collect and remit PAC
contributions."6
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the federal district court's
preliminary injunction of the implementation of the Act,
except that it stayed the injunction 
"insofar as the preliminary injunction: 1) requires
any defendant to honor employee requests for payroll
deductions for contributions to A-VOTE or to any
other [political-action committee]; 2) requires any
defendant to remit or pay over any PAC payroll
deductions to any entity or person other than the
employees from whose pay they were deducted; and 3)
prevents any defendant from remitting or refunding
any PAC payroll deduction to the employee from whose
pay it has been deducted."
On December 27, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals filed with this Court certified questions pertaining
to the Act in relation to the constitutional challenge filed
by the AEA and A-VOTE, which query has been docketed as case
1091745
In its submission of certified questions, the Eleventh
7
Circuit also further limited the federal district court's
preliminary injunction by permitting the State to enforce the
Act to the extent that it restricts "payroll deductions for
organizations engaged in electioneering activities" because
such a restriction "likely would be found constitutional under
Ysursa [v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009)]."
18
no. 1110413.   Those questions concern the interpretation of
7
the Act and specifically ask:
"1. Is the 'or otherwise' language in [the Act]
limited to the use of state mechanisms to support
political organizations, regardless of the source?
"2. Does the term 'political activity' refer only to
electioneering activities?"
On January 25, 2012, the finance director and the
comptroller filed a motion to consolidate this case with case
no. 1110413 on the ground that "the facial validity of [the
Act is] at stake in both cases, there is likely substantial
overlap between the issues raised by AEA's submission of [the
Act] to this Court in No. 1091745 and the questions due to be
considered in No. 1110413."  
On February 1, 2012, the AEA and A-VOTE filed a response
in opposition to the motion to consolidate in which they
asserted that the constitutional claims made in the federal
action concern only the new Act.  Thus, argue the AEA and
A-VOTE, those claims and the federal action "are entirely
1091745
Given our resolution of this appeal, we see no reason to
8
grant the finance director and the comptroller's motion to
consolidate this appeal with case no. 1110413.  The Act was
not the basis of the plaintiffs' action in this case, and its
validity is not before us in this appeal.  The certified
questions submitted to this Court by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in case no. 1110413 have
no bearing on the issues presented to us in this case.
Therefore, by separate order issued in conjunction with this
opinion, we are denying the finance director and the
comptroller's motion to consolidate the two appeals.
19
distinct from the question at issue in this appeal, which
concerns the proper interpretation of § 17-17-5 as it existed
before [the Act] became law."  (Emphasis added.)8
Also on January 25, 2012, the finance director and the
comptroller filed what they styled a "Renewed Motion for Stay"
of the preliminary injunction in which they requested that,
based upon the Act, this Court expand the stay it had issued
on October 15, 2010.  The motion characterized the previous
stay granted by this Court as one permitting the comptroller
to refuse salary deductions that were directly contributed to
political-action committees.  The finance director and the
comptroller assert that the comptroller also may refuse salary
deductions 
designated 
for 
dues 
to 
organizations 
that
contribute a portion of the deducted moneys to political-
action committees associated with those organizations.  On
1091745
20
February 1, 2012, the AEA and A-VOTE filed a response in
opposition to the renewed motion for a stay.
II.  Standard of Review
As to questions of fact, the ore tenus rule is applicable
in preliminary-injunction proceedings. See Water Works & Sewer
Bd. of Birmingham v. Inland Lake Invs., LLC, 31 So. 3d 686,
689-90 (Ala. 2009). As this Court noted in Holiday Isle, LLC
v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008), however,
"[t]o the extent that the trial court's issuance of
a preliminary injunction is grounded only in
questions of law based on undisputed facts, our
longstanding rule that we review an injunction
solely to determine whether the trial court exceeded
its discretion should not apply. We find the rule
applied by the United States Supreme Court in
similar situations to be persuasive: 'We review the
District Court's legal rulings de novo and its
ultimate 
decision 
to 
issue 
the 
preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion.' Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017
(2006) ...."
(Emphasis omitted.)
III.  Analysis
As noted, we have before us a motion from the plaintiffs
to vacate the circuit court's preliminary injunction and to
remand the case to provide the plaintiffs an opportunity to
file a motion requesting the circuit court to dismiss the
1091745
21
action without prejudice.  When the plaintiffs filed this
motion, their action was not moot.  Although the legislature
had enacted the Act and it had been signed by the governor, it
was not immediately effective.  Perhaps recognizing that their
claims based on the meaning of Alabama's previous statutory
scheme were not moot at the time they filed their motion, the
plaintiffs' motion stated, in pertinent part:
"Before [the] Act, th[is] case primarily involved
the interpretation of statutes that had been enacted
and codified years before the trial court's ruling.
Now, by virtue of this new legislative action, the
scope 
and 
nature 
of 
the 
issues 
potentially
implicated in a dispute about payroll deductions for
these parties has changed.  There are potential
issues of mootness, as well as many other potential
issues that could arise....  Because of this change
in circumstance, AEA and A-VOTE no longer wish to
pursue this civil action." 
(Emphasis added.)
Among other things, the finance director and the
comptroller cite this Court's decisions in 
Barber v.
Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 77-78
(Ala. 2009), and Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 989 (Ala.
2007), and oppose the plaintiffs' motion on the ground that
allowing a party who prevailed in the trial court to render an
appeal moot simply by expressing a desire to no longer pursue
1091745
22
an action raises the specter of manipulation of the court
process.  In Cornerstone,  this Court stated:  
"We also consider whether the appeals of the
preliminary injunction are or could be made moot if
this Court were to remand the case in order to allow
for a rescission by the trial court of the
preliminary injunction.  At bottom, what would then
be at issue would not be an agreement by [the
plaintiffs] to relinquish their right to engage in
any particular conduct, but rather an acquiescence
by [the plaintiffs] in having the trial court
rescind an order favoring them.  We are aware of no
cases in which a willingness by a prevailing party
in the trial court to have the case returned to the
trial court for purposes of the rescission of the
order favoring it moots the proceeding in the
appellate court.
"....
"We 
decline 
to 
hold 
that 
the 
apparent
willingness of a prevailing litigant in the court
below to have an appeal to this Court dismissed and
the case remanded for the purpose of allowing the
lower court to rescind the judgment in its favor
deprives this Court of any discretion to decide the
matter pending before us." 
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 72-74.  
We do not find it necessary at this juncture to further
consider the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss or the application
of our holding in Cornerstone to this case.  As noted, the
plaintiffs' claims in this case are based on Alabama's
statutory scheme as it existed before the effective date of
1091745
23
the Act and, in particular, seek judicial approval of their
interpretation of that statutory scheme.  The Act, however,
became effective on March 20, 2011, and by its terms now
clearly prohibits the comptroller from executing salary
deductions 
that 
contribute 
directly 
or 
indirectly 
to
political-action committees.  No claims are made in the
present lawsuit seeking the return of any moneys the
comptroller has refused to deduct in the past, and the Act now
plainly forecloses the prospective  declaratory and injunctive
relief specifically requested by the plaintiffs in this case.
By definition, therefore, this action is moot.  
 Whether former § 17-17-5 prohibited salary deductions
for contributions to political-action committees is an
abstract question, because the former statute is no longer
effective law. As this Court stated in Underwood v. Alabama
State Board of Education, 39 So. 3d 120, 129 (Ala. 2009),
"'[a] case is moot when there is no real controversy and it
seeks to determine an abstract question which does not rest on
existing facts or rights'" (quoting State ex rel. Eagerton v.
Corwin, 359 So. 2d 767, 769 (Ala. 1977) (emphasis omitted)).
See also, e.g., King v. Campbell, 988 So. 2d 969, 976 (Ala.
1091745
The finance director and the comptroller contend that the
9
plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable injury, that deductions
for the AEA or A-VOTE have been requested by fewer than the
200 employees specified in § 36-1-4.3(a), and that the
plaintiffs' claims are barred by Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.
1901.
24
2007) ("'We have held that if an event happening after hearing
and decree in circuit court, but before appeal is taken, or
pending appeal, makes determination of the appeal unnecessary
or renders it clearly impossible for the appellate court to
grant effectual relief, the appeal will be dismissed.'"
(quoting Morrison v. Mullins, 275 Ala. 258, 259, 154 So. 2d
16, 18 (1963))).
The finance director and the comptroller also make
certain arguments concerning the circuit court's jurisdiction
over this action and contend that we should address those
various arguments before reaching the issue of mootness.  This
9
argument ignores the fact that whether an action is moot is
also a matter of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Underwood, 39
So. 3d at 127 ("'"A moot case lacks justiciability." Crawford
[v. State, 153 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex. App. 2004)].  Thus, "[a]n
action 
that 
originally 
was 
based 
upon 
a 
justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions
raised in it have become moot by subsequent acts or events."
1091745
We note that
10
 
"[t]here is a well established exception to the
mootness doctrine allowing courts to reach the
ultimate issue even if it has become moot 'where "a
broad public interest is involved."' Slawson v.
Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631 So. 2d 953, 957 (Ala.
1994) (quoting Payne v. J.T.N., 568 So. 2d 830, 831
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990)).  ...
"'"The criteria for applying the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine
include the public nature of the question,
the 
desirability 
of 
an 
authoritative
determination for the purpose of guiding
25
Case [v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala.
2006)].'"  (quoting Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 983-84
(Ala. 2007)) (emphasis omitted)).  After carefully considering
the other arguments raised by the finance director and the
comptroller, we conclude that to address those arguments at
this juncture would involve the Court in answering questions
unnecessary to the disposition of the appeal.  
"'The duty of this court, as of every
other judicial tribunal, is to decide
actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter
in issue in the case before it.'"
King v. Campbell, 988 So. 2d at 976 (quoting Mills v. Green,
159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).
 
10
1091745
public officers, and the likelihood that
the question will generally recur." [1A
C.J.S. Actions § 81 (2005)] (footnote
omitted). However, this "exception is
construed narrowly ... and a clear showing
of each criterion is required to bring a
case within its terms." In re Adoption of
Walgreen, 186 Ill.2d 362, 365, 238 Ill.
Dec. 124, 710 N.E.2d 1226, 1227 (1999).'"
Underwood, 39 So. 3d at 130 (quoting Chapman v. Gooden, 974
So. 2d 972, 989 (Ala. 2007) (emphasis omitted)).  Although the
issue of what salary deductions are legally permissible may
well be a question of public interest, an authoritative
resolution of that question in relation to the previous
statutory scheme governing such deductions would offer no
guidance to public officials on how to act in the future.
Also, with the enactment of the Act and the superseding of
former § 17-17-5, we cannot conclude that that question is
likely to recur.  We see no basis, in other words, for
expending judicial resources on an examination of the
questions raised in the complaint based on the public-interest
exception to the mootness doctrine.
26
We also find unpersuasive the finance director and the
comptroller's argument that we should request the relative
positions of the parties as to the meaning of the Act before
deciding the effect of the Act on this action.  There is no
need to determine the precise reach of the Act at this
juncture.  The action before us is one that challenges the
practices adopted by the finance director and the comptroller
based on their interpretation of Alabama statutory law as it
existed before the Act became effective.  It is enough for
1091745
27
present purposes to know that the Act explicitly states a rule
that encompasses those practices.  Unavoidably, therefore, the
action before us must be considered moot.
Similarly, the fact that the constitutionality of the Act
has been challenged by the AEA and A-VOTE in federal court
does not alter our holding today.  The possibility that the
Act will be declared unconstitutional at some time in the
future is merely that -- a possibility.  The constitutionality
of the Act is not a question that has been presented to us in
the present case.  To act on such a possibility would require
speculation on our part, in conflict with the general
principle that "acts of the legislature are presumed
constitutional."  State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d
1012, 1017 (Ala. 2006).  
Because this action is moot as a result of a change in
the law, it follows that the basis for the circuit court's
preliminary injunction no longer exists.  
"'Where the grounds and reasons for which
the injunction was granted no longer exist,
by reason of changed conditions, it may be
necessary to alter the decree to adapt it
to such changed conditions, or to set it
aside altogether, as where there is a
change in the controlling facts on which
the 
injunction 
rests, 
or 
where 
the
1091745
28
applicable law, common or statutory, has in
the meantime been changed, modified, or
extended. Such change in the law does not
deprive the complainant of any vested right
in the injunction, because no such vested
right exists.'"
Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Morgan, 396 So. 2d 86, 89 (Ala.
1981) (quoting 42 Am. Jur.2d Injunctions § 334 (1969)).
Therefore, the injunction is due to be vacated. 
IV.  Conclusion
The claims presented by the plaintiffs in their action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief are now moot.
Therefore, 
we 
vacate the 
circuit 
court's 
preliminary-
injunction order and remand the case for the circuit court to
dismiss the action.
ORDER VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Woodall, Stuart, Parker, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Malone, C.J., recuses himself.