Title: Metro. Water v. Campus Crusade

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/23/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
) 
OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S141148 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E034248 
CAMPUS CRUSADE FOR CHRIST, INC., ) 
et al., 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCV 35498 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a public 
agency founded in 1928, supplies water to six Southern California counties.  In 
1997, MWD brought an eminent domain action to condemn a portion of land in 
San Bernardino County owned by Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., and Del Rosa 
Mutual Water Company (collectively Campus Crusade) to construct a segment of 
a 43-mile water pipeline to channel water from the inland areas to the coastal 
plains of Southern California.  Prior to trial on the issue of just compensation, 
MWD persuaded the trial court to exclude valuation evidence offered by Campus 
Crusade’s experts to the extent such valuation was based on the property’s 
potential use as a planned residential development and resort area, which differed 
from its current use and which was not permitted under the zoning in effect at the 
time of the taking.  The trial court also granted MWD’s request to exclude 
evidence of severance damages to the fair market value of the remainder of 
Campus Crusade’s property (i.e., the property not taken) to the extent the damages 
 
 2
were based on fear that the pipeline (which crosses the San Andreas Fault on 
Campus Crusade’s property) could rupture in an earthquake and to the extent the 
damages were based on certain other aspects of the pipeline and its construction 
process.  Finally, the trial court excluded evidence of temporary severance 
damages to the extent the damages were based on the adverse impact of the seven-
year construction period on Campus Crusade’s ability to finance and market the 
property.   
Based on these rulings, Campus Crusade waived its right to a jury trial.  
The trial court fixed just compensation at $479,278.45, none of which was 
attributable to severance damages.  Campus Crusade appealed, and the Court of 
Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding (1) that Judge John P. 
Wade, who had replaced Judge Cynthia Ludvigsen following her reassignment, 
had overstepped his authority in reconsidering and overruling her prior evidentiary 
rulings; (2) that a property owner does not bear the burden of proof on the amount 
of compensation or on any preliminary facts that may affect the jury’s 
determination of just compensation; (3) that the trial court had erred in preventing 
Campus Crusade from offering evidence that the property’s highest and best use 
was as a future planned residential and resort development, notwithstanding 
evidence of a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned in the near 
future, and had erred as well in taking that issue away from the trier of fact; and 
(4) that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of severance damages 
arising from fear of a pipeline rupture and in excluding evidence of temporary 
severance damages arising from the adverse effects of construction on Campus 
Crusade’s ability to market and finance the property.   
We granted review to clarify the respective roles of the trial court and the 
jury at a compensation trial in an eminent domain action and the nature of the 
damages that a property owner may recover.  For the reasons outlined below, we 
 
 3
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand 
for further proceedings.   
BACKGROUND1 
Campus Crusade, a charitable religious corporation, owns 1,824 acres of 
land situated partly within the northern edge of the City of San Bernardino and 
partly in unincorporated county territory within the city’s sphere of influence and 
slated for annexation.  Although most of the property is undeveloped, it is the site 
of the historic Arrowhead Springs Hotel, the International School of Theology, 
several office buildings, a conference center, a sports field, and a village.  The 
property is also the primary source for Arrowhead Mountain Spring Water.     
In early 1996, Campus Crusade retained a land developer to assist with its 
plans to create a planned residential development on the property and to restore 
the existing resort and other buildings.  The city seemed to be enthusiastic and 
supportive of Campus Crusade’s plans for future development.  But Campus 
Crusade’s plans were disrupted when MWD decided to construct a portion of the 
Inland Feeder project, a 43-mile water pipeline from Devil Canyon to Diamond 
Valley Lake, across the property.  Now built, the pipeline is 12 feet in diameter, 
constructed of welded steel, and buried hundreds of feet underground along most 
of its route.  However, the pipeline enters covered trenches along the Campus 
Crusade property that are only 10 to 12 feet deep and, in some places, the pipeline 
is as close as four feet to the surface.  The pipeline is designed to be close to the 
surface in these areas in order to facilitate repair in case of a rupture and to 
                                              
1  
Because no party petitioned for rehearing to challenge the Court of 
Appeal’s recital of the factual and procedural history, we take our statement of 
facts largely from that opinion.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)   
 
 4
function as a “safety valve” in the event of an earthquake.  The pipeline crosses 
the San Andreas Fault at this location.  
MWD’s board of directors adopted their resolution of necessity on 
December 10, 1996.  The resolution provided that MWD was to acquire the land at 
issue “for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing, maintaining, operating, 
enlarging, removing, and replacing a line or lines of pipe at any time, and from 
time to time, for water transportation, with every appendage or structure necessary 
or convenient to be installed at any time in connection therewith.”  On December 
23, 1996, MWD deposited funds into the State Treasury, thereby setting the date 
of valuation.  The following month, MWD filed its complaint in eminent domain 
and an ex parte application for possession.  The first amended complaint sought 
10.4 acres in fee, 18.7 acres of permanent easements, 27.4 acres of temporary 
construction easements for a period of seven years, and two permanent tunnel 
easements, one below ground and the other above ground. 
Campus Crusade submitted statements of valuation from three appraisers: 
E. R. Metcalfe, James Smothers, and Robert Swing.  The appraisers estimated the 
value of the property interests being taken at between $1,500,000 and $1,600,000, 
and the temporary and permanent damage to the remainder at between 
$12,600,000 and $14,000,000.  The pipeline cut across Campus Crusade’s 
property at a location that was most valuable and most amenable to development.  
One of the permanent easements ran up against some of the existing buildings, and 
the resolution provided that Campus Crusade was not to interfere unreasonably 
with MWD’s rights over the permanent easements.  Further, the resolution 
restricted Campus Crusade’s ability to modify the topography, construct buildings, 
or plant trees in the areas covered by the easements.   
The taking also interfered with Campus Crusade’s secondary access rights 
to the property by way of 40th Street, San Bernardino, over a neighboring parcel.  
 
 5
In addition, Campus Crusade contended that the pipeline, which crossed a branch 
of the San Andreas Fault at the site where the pipeline was raised to within several 
feet of the earth’s surface, posed a risk of rupture.  A breach in the pipeline could 
cause a sudden outflow of millions of gallons of water onto Campus Crusade’s 
property at a rate of 1,000 cubic feet per second.  MWD analyzed this risk as a 
significant environmental impact in its environmental impact report.   
Finally, the temporary construction easements encompassed a row of 
mature trees that served as a natural entryway for the historic hotel.  MWD’s use 
of these easements required the cutting of all the mature vegetation in the area.  
MWD disclaimed any obligation to restore the vegetation to its prior condition. 
MWD submitted a revised statement of valuation of $392,000 as just 
compensation for all the property taken, with no amount allocated for severance or 
temporary severance damages.  On October 7, 1999, MWD filed a final offer of 
compensation for $1,500,000 plus costs and interest, but subsequently increased 
its offer to $3,500,000.  Campus Crusade revised its demand to $12,500,000 for 
the property taken and severance damages.   
Prior to trial, MWD filed several motions in limine to exclude evidence.  
Judge Cynthia Ludvigsen denied most of the motions and allowed Campus 
Crusade to present evidence to support its claim of severance damages, including 
damages caused by fear of a pipeline rupture.  Judge Ludvigsen also allowed 
Campus Crusade to present evidence of construction-related damages if those 
damages were excessive and beyond the ordinary annoyances associated with a 
public works project.   
After Judge Ludvigsen was reassigned and replaced by Judge John P. 
Wade, MWD filed additional motions in limine:  requests to exclude evidence of 
temporary and permanent severance damages, including evidence of damages 
caused by the seven-year period that would be needed to complete construction of 
 
 6
the pipeline; a request to exclude valuation evidence to the extent it was based on 
uses not permitted by current zoning; a request to exclude evidence concerning 
impairment of Campus Crusade’s access to the property via 40th Street; and a 
request to exclude evidence concerning the fear of a pipeline rupture.  Judge Wade 
granted each of these motions, effectively precluding Campus Crusade from 
presenting evidence of severance damages, on the grounds that such damages were 
not recoverable as a matter of law, were too speculative, or assumed circumstances 
that did not exist on the date of valuation.   
Based on Judge Wade’s rulings, Campus Crusade reduced its demand for 
compensation to $5,380,000.  Because Judge Wade’s rulings effectively limited its 
recovery to compensation for the actual taking only, Campus Crusade also waived 
its right to a jury.  On June 12, 2003, Judge Wade awarded Campus Crusade 
$478,278.45, which did not include any amount for severance damages.   
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial.  The 
appellate court held that Campus Crusade had presented sufficient evidence of 
severance damages to warrant consideration of such damages by the trier of fact, 
that Campus Crusade had presented sufficient evidence of a likelihood that the 
property would be rezoned for residential and hotel development to permit the trier 
of fact to consider such potential uses in determining the property’s fair market 
value, and that the trier of fact should have been permitted to consider the effect of 
the seven-year-long construction on Campus Crusade’s ability to plan, finance, 
and market the property.   
We granted MWD’s petition for review.   
DISCUSSION 
This case arises under article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, 
which requires the owner whose property is taken or damaged for a public use be 
paid “just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived.”   
 
 7
The Legislature has defined the measure of just compensation as “the fair 
market value of the property taken.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.310.)2  “The fair 
market value of the property taken is the highest price on the date of valuation that 
would be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or 
urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, 
willing, and able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each 
dealing with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which 
the property is reasonably adaptable and available.”  (§ 1263.320, subd. (a).)  “As 
section 1263.320 indicates, the fair market value of property taken has not been 
limited to the value of the property as used at the time of the taking, but has long 
taken into account the ‘highest and most profitable use to which the property 
might be put in the reasonably near future, to the extent that the probability of such 
a prospective use affects the market value.’ ”  (City of San Diego v. Neumann 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 738, 744.)  This prospective use “is to be considered, not 
necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of 
demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.”  
(Olson v. United States (1934) 292 U.S. 246, 255.)     
When the property taken is part of a larger parcel, the owner is 
compensated not merely for the injury to the part taken but also for the injury, if 
any, to the remainder.  (§ 1263.410, subd. (a).)  Compensation for injury to the 
remainder is the amount of the damage to the remainder caused by the taking, 
reduced by the amount of the benefit to the remainder caused by the taking.  
(§ 1263.410, subd. (b).)  Such compensation is commonly called “severance 
damages.”  (City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 741.)  
                                              
2  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
 8
The procedures governing eminent domain actions differ in some respects 
from those governing other actions.  For example, “all issues except the sole issue 
relating to compensation[] are to be tried by the court.”  (People v. Ricciardi 
(1943) 23 Cal.2d 390, 402.)  The defendant (i.e., the property owner) shall present 
evidence on the issue of compensation first and shall commence and conclude the 
argument.  (§ 1260.210, subd. (a).)  And, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
statute, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue 
of compensation.”  (§ 1260.210, subd. (b).)  In this respect, California law differs 
from that of most other states.  (See 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 2006)  
§ 18.02[3], pp. 18-12.1 to 18-20, fn. 8.)   
A.  The Reasonable Probability of Rezoning 
The Court of Appeal found that that the trial court improperly excluded—
and thus prevented Campus Crusade’s appraisal experts from relying on—
evidence that the highest and best use of the property was comprehensive 
development for residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational uses.  In the 
view of the Court of Appeal (and echoed by Campus Crusade here), the trier of 
fact should have been allowed to consider these prospective uses in assessing the 
value of the property taken and the damage to the remainder; instead, the trial 
court usurped the jury’s role by deciding for itself, prior to trial, whether there was 
a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned to permit these other uses.  
MWD, by contrast, argues that the question whether there was a reasonable 
probability of the property being rezoned is properly entrusted to the court, not the 
jury, and that the court’s pretrial determination that rezoning was not reasonably 
probable here is supported by substantial evidence.      
There is no dispute that the existing zoning did not authorize the 
development envisioned by Campus Crusade.  The portion of the property lying 
within the City of San Bernardino was zoned residential low, which imposed a 
 
 9
maximum density of 3.1 dwelling units per gross acre and does not allow 
commercial uses.  The remaining property was zoned rural living, which imposed 
a minimum three-acre lot size; single residential, which permitted a slightly higher 
density; and resource conservation, which imposed a minimum 40-acre lot size.  
The existing buildings on the property, including the hotel, predated the current 
zoning and were operating as legal nonconforming uses.   
Prior to trial, MWD filed a motion in limine “for an order prohibiting the 
presentation of any evidence treating Campus Crusade’s property as zoned for 
anything other than the uses permitted by the Resource Conservation zone unless, 
and until, Campus Crusade has borne its burden of proof and convinced the Court, 
outside of the jury’s presence, that there is substantial evidence of a reasonable 
probability of rezoning on the date of value.”  After conducting a pretrial 
evidentiary hearing, Judge Wade granted the motion.  He agreed with MWD that 
the question whether a reasonable probability of rezoning existed in the near future 
was for the court to decide, and he determined, based on the evidence presented by 
both sides at the pretrial hearing, that “it is not reasonably probable that the subject 
property would be rezoned in the reasonably near future.” As a result, Judge Wade 
prohibited Campus Crusade’s appraisers “from valuing the remainder as anything 
other than Resource Conservation.”  Unfortunately, the trial court thereby usurped 
the role of the jury in valuing the property.   
“Where due to zoning restrictions the condemned property is not presently 
available for use to which it is otherwise geographically and economically 
adaptable, the condemnee is entitled to show a reasonable probability of a zoning 
change in the near future and thus to establish such use as the highest and best use 
of the property.”  (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 867.)  The 
jury’s role in this assessment is settled.  “ ‘[T]he determination as to whether or 
not there is a reasonable probability of a [use] change is ordinarily a question of 
 
 10
fact for the jury.’ ”  (Redevelopment Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. (1982) 
135 Cal.App.3d 73, 84, quoting People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Arthofer (1966) 
245 Cal.App.2d 454, 467; see Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson 
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 336, 345 [“the court . . . correctly left to the jury the 
determination whether there was a reasonable probability of a zone change”]; see 
also City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 872 [“the purported need 
for airport parking and the suitability of defendant's property for that purpose were 
critical to the issue of valuation”]; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. 
Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 354 [criticizing defendant’s proffered jury 
instruction concerning the probability of rezoning where the evidence was 
conflicting because of “the possible implication that the court had concluded as a 
matter of law that there was a reasonable probability of a zoning change”]; accord, 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra, § 12C.03[3], p. 12C-82 [“The existence of a 
reasonable probability of an imminent change in zoning is a question of fact”]; id., 
§ 12C.03[3], p. 12C-88 [“it is for the jury to consider the weight to be given the 
testimony based on such probability, whether there is such probability, and its 
effect on the fair market value”].) 
Before such evidence may be presented to the jury, however, the trial court 
must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence that would permit a jury 
to conclude there is a reasonable probability of rezoning in the near future.  
Evidence of a reasonable probability of a zoning change in the near future “ ‘must 
at least be in accordance with the usual minimum evidentiary requirements, and 
that which is purely speculative, wholly guess work and conjectural, is 
inadmissible.’ ”  (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 868.)  The 
evidence, if credited, must also be sufficient to establish that rezoning is 
reasonably probable.  (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Arthofer, supra, 245 
Cal.App.2d at p. 466 [upholding the exclusion of testimony from an expert whose 
 
 11
opinion “was based on a ‘reasonable possibility’ instead of a ‘reasonable 
probability’ of zone change”].)  If the trial court determines that no fact finder 
could find a reasonable probability of rezoning on the record presented, it may 
exclude all evidence and opinions of value based on a use other than that 
authorized by the existing zoning.  (Id. at p. 467; accord, City of San Diego v. 
Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 744 [evidence of a probability of rezoning is 
relevant only “ ‘to the extent that the probability of such a prospective use affects 
the market value’ ”].)  If, on the other hand, the trial court determines that there is 
sufficient evidence of a reasonable probability of rezoning to warrant submitting 
the issue to the jury, it is for the jury, in considering the weight to be given 
valuation testimony based upon a reasonable probability of rezoning, to determine 
whether there was a reasonable probability of rezoning and, if so, its effect on the 
market value of the property.  Thus, before a jury may even reach the question 
whether a use which was unauthorized by the existing zoning otherwise meets the 
criteria of a highest and best use, the jury must first find that there was a 
reasonable probability of rezoning to permit that use.  Once that has been 
established, neither party bears the burden to persuade the fact finder of the effect 
of this probability on the valuation of the property.  (§ 1260.210, subd. (b); accord, 
2 Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (2007) CACI No. 3503; cf. Evid. Code,  
§ 403, subd. (c)(1), (2).) 
Relying on language in certain Court of Appeal decisions, MWD contends 
that the property owner bears the burden of proving that a reasonable probability 
of rezoning exists.  MWD relies in particular on County of San Diego v. Rancho 
Vista Del Mar, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058 (Rancho Vista Del Mar), 
which asserted that “[t]he property owner has the burden of showing a reasonable 
probability of a change in the restrictions on the property,” as well as on City of 
San Diego v. Rancho Pensaquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013, 
 
 12
1028, and City of San Diego v. Barratt American, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 
917, 934, which simply quote this passage from Rancho Vista Del Mar.  But these 
statements must be interpreted against the backdrop of section 1260.210, which 
provides:  “(a) The defendant shall present his evidence on the issue of 
compensation first and shall commence and conclude the argument.  [¶]  (b) 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has 
the burden of proof on the issue of compensation.”   
What does section 1260.210, subdivision (b) mean when it says that neither 
party “has the burden of proof on the issue of compensation”?  “We begin with a 
discussion of key terms:  burden of proof and burden of producing evidence.  
Attorneys, judges, and commentators often have confused these terms and the 
concepts they represent.  As the United States Supreme Court observed, ‘For many 
years the term “burden of proof” was ambiguous because the term was used to 
describe two distinct concepts.  Burden of proof was frequently used to refer to 
what we now call the burden of persuasion—the notion that if the evidence is 
evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose.  But it 
was also used to refer to what we call the burden of production—a party’s 
obligation to come forward with evidence to support its claim.’ ”  (Sargent 
Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1666-1667, italics 
omitted.)  With those definitions in mind, we can now construe section 1260.210.  
Subdivision (a) articulates a burden of production, which is merely the burden of 
going forward with (or producing) some evidence of a material fact.  
(Redevelopment Agency v. Metropolitan Theatres Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 
808, 811, fn 3; see generally Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
826, 862.)  Here, the property owner has the burden to produce evidence to 
support a finding that rezoning is reasonably probable.  Once that burden has been 
satisfied, however, subdivision (b) makes it clear that neither party bears a 
 
 13
particular burden of persuasion with respect to convincing the trier of fact that the 
reasonable probability exists or what effect such probability would have on the 
valuation of the property.   
We thus understand the “burden” described in Rancho Vista Del Mar, 
supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058, and its progeny to be the burden of production, 
not the burden of persuasion.  This accords with the Law Revision Commission 
Comment to section 1260.210, which explains that “[a]bsent the production of 
evidence by one party, the trier of fact will determine compensation solely from 
the other party’s evidence, but neither party should be made to appear to bear 
some greater burden of persuasion than the other.”3  (Cal. Law Revision Com. 
com., 19 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1982 ed.) foll. § 1260.210, p. 746.)   
Accordingly, when presented with a proffer that there is a highest and best 
use that is not permitted by the property’s current zoning, the trial court should 
examine whether the proffer supplies sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find 
that there was a reasonable probability of rezoning to permit that use in the near 
future.  The jury should then be instructed that it may consider the change in use, 
provided that it first finds a reasonable probability the property could be rezoned 
in the near future.  In this case, however, the trial court collapsed these two steps 
into one by deciding, prior to trial, whether it was convinced there was a 
reasonable probability of rezoning.  Because the trial court examined the evidence 
of rezoning under an unduly rigorous standard, we direct the Court of Appeal to 
                                              
3  
MWD relies as well on our statement in City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 
supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 868 that “ ‘[t]he burden of proof as to reasonable 
probability of zone change is on the landowner.’ ”  But, as MWD concedes, the 
trial in Decker preceded the effective date of section 1260.210, and Decker did not 
purport to decide the new law’s effect other than to alert the trial court to its 
existence as “guidance” on retrial.  (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 
Cal.3d at p. 872.)     
 
 14
remand the matter to the trial court to reexamine the record under the correct 
standard in the first instance.  (E.g., Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 785, 802-803; Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 
882, 889.) 
B.  Severance Damages  
The Court of Appeal also found that the trial court usurped the jury’s role 
by purporting to determine whether Campus Crusade had proven an entitlement to 
severance damages and then excluding evidence of such severance damages from 
the trial.  The Court of Appeal held that it was for the trier of fact to determine 
whether the fear of a pipeline rupture during an earthquake and whether the impact 
of the delay in construction on Campus Crusade’s ability to market and finance the 
property negatively affected the value of the property not taken—or, in other 
words, whether these factors established severance damages.  MWD, on the other 
hand, contends that the trial court should decide first whether severance damages 
exist; if so, only then does the jury determine the amount of those damages.  We 
agree with the Court of Appeal, but only in part.   
Severance damages, as noted above, consist generally of the diminution in 
the fair market value of the remainder property caused by the project.  “ ‘Where 
the property taken constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the owner is entitled to 
recover, inter alia, the difference in the fair market value of his property in its 
“before” condition and the fair market value of the remaining portion thereof after 
the construction of the improvement on the portion taken.  Items such as view, 
access to beach property, freedom from noise, etc. are unquestionably matters 
which a willing buyer in the open market would consider in determining the price 
he would pay for any given piece of real property.’  [Citation.]  Severance 
damages are not limited to special and direct damages, but can be based on any 
factor, resulting from the project, that causes a decline in the fair market value of 
 
 15
the property.”  (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. 
Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 712, italics added 
(Continental Development).)   
The property owner in an eminent domain action “is entitled to a jury trial 
on the issue of just compensation.”  (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court 
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 816.)  Because a condemnation suit is a special proceeding, 
however, “all issues except the sole issue relating to compensation[] are to be tried 
by the court,” including, “except those relating to compensation, the issues of 
fact.”  (People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 402.)  “ ‘It is only the 
“compensation,” the “award,” which our constitution declares shall be found and 
fixed by a jury.  All other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, are to be 
tried, as in many other jurisdictions they are tried, without reference to a jury.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  
In support of its theory that entitlement to severance damages is for the 
court and only the amount thereof is for the jury, MWD points to certain issues 
related to severance damages that we have deemed issues for the trial court.  For 
example, we have held that what constitutes the larger parcel (for purposes of 
determining severance damages) “is essentially a question of law for the 
determination of the court” (Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Etc. Co. (1915) 171 
Cal. 392, 397); whether separate parcels may be aggregated and considered as one 
larger parcel is “an issue of law to be decided by the trial court” (City of San 
Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 757); and whether a taking has 
substantially impaired access to the remaining property is “a matter of law” for the 
court (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 664).  Similarly, it is 
for the trial court to decide whether a party had acquired an avigation easement 
over a neighboring property that was condemned (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. 
Peterson (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 434, 438) and, more generally, to determine 
 
 16
whether a party had a cognizable legal interest in the condemned property.  
(County of San Diego v. Miller (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 424, 433.) 
Both sides here thus agree that the court, not the jury, must make certain 
determinations that are a predicate to the award of severance damages.  But MWD 
is on weaker ground when it attempts to derive from the above cases a general rule 
that “as a matter of constitutional and decisional law, all issues having to do with 
the existence of, or entitlement to, severance damages are entrusted to the trial 
judge,” such that “[o]nly after the trial judge has determined that severance 
damages exist does the jury consider the amount of those severance damages.”   
MWD’s proposed rule assumes that questions relating to the measurement of 
severance damages can be readily distinguished from questions relating to the 
entitlement to them in the first place but, as we have previously cautioned, the two 
concepts are not necessarily “so easily separable.”  (City of San Diego v. 
Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 757.)  Even if these two concepts can be separated 
for purposes of allocating decisionmaking between the court and the jury, MWD’s 
proposed rule does not find much support in the law.  Severance damages 
“normally are measured by comparing the fair market value of the remainder 
before and after the taking.”  (City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 
745.)  The fair market value of a property is a fact to be determined by the jury.  
(Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Etc. Co., supra, 171 Cal. at p. 400; San Diego 
Land Etc. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 57.)  “The jury is entitled to and should 
consider those factors which a buyer would take into consideration in arriving at a 
fair market value, were [the buyer] contemplating a purchase of the property.”  
(People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 352.)     
The factors Campus Crusade identified below—e.g., fear that the pipeline 
will rupture in an earthquake, negative visual and aesthetic impacts on the 
landscaping, and limitations on potential development caused by grading 
 
 17
restrictions and placement of the pipeline—at least arguably have the potential of 
affecting the market value of the remaining property.4  As long as the effect of 
these factors on market value is not conjectural, speculative, or remote, it is for the 
jury to decide the extent to which they may affect the value of the property.  (City 
of Pasadena v. Stimson (1891) 91 Cal. 238, 259 [trial court erred in precluding 
jury from deciding whether the temporary escape of sewer gas during reasonable 
repairs to the sewer reduced the market value of abutting property]; San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Lux Land Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 472, 482 [whether 
appraisers should have considered the effects of unsightly towers, damage to 
existing views, the shape of the remaining land, and interference with radio 
reception “were questions of fact for the jury to determine”]; People v. O’Connor 
(1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 157, 159 [the effects of widening the highway, such as 
decreasing the distance from the house to the highway, adverse impact on 
landscaping, and increased traffic noise and hazards, were proper subjects of 
expert testimony “and the jury could determine what weight to give the opinions 
in proportion to the weight the reasons had with them”]; see generally Continental 
Development, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 718 [“in determining a landowner’s 
entitlement to severance damages, the fact finder . . . shall consider competent 
evidence relevant to any conditions caused by the project that affect the remainder 
property’s fair market value, insofar as such evidence is neither conjectural nor 
speculative” (italics added)].)  
By contrast, the issues we have reserved for the trial court in condemnation 
actions have been issues of law—or mixed issues of law and fact where the legal 
                                              
4  
We need not decide whether Campus Crusade satisfied its burden of 
production with respect to these factors inasmuch as that issue was not included in 
our grant of review.    
 
 18
issues predominate, even if there are also underlying disputes of fact—antecedent 
to the valuation of the property and the question of severance damages.  (See 
Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 
Cal.App.4th 1083, 1117.)  In such circumstances, reserving the issue for the court 
is consistent with the state constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of just 
compensation and facilitates the conduct of the trial.  (Cf. Merced Irrigation Dist. 
v. Woolstenhulme (1971) 4 Cal.3d 478, 498, fn. 12.)  Once the court performs its 
role—e.g., once the court finds that the taking has substantially impaired the 
property owner’s right of access—it is for the jury to determine the effect of the 
impairment, if any, on the property’s market value.  (People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. 
Wks. v. Presley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 309, 313.)  Similarly, where the property 
owner produces evidence tending to show that some other aspect of the taking—
such as the risk of a pipeline rupture—“naturally tends to and actually does 
decrease the market value” of the remaining property, it is for the jury to weigh its 
effect on the value of the property, as long as the effect is not speculative, 
conjectural, or remote.  (Gas & Electric Co. v. Miller & Lux Inc. (1931) 118 
Cal.App. 140, 144.)  
MWD then contends that, even if such factors are for the jury to consider, 
the property owner still bears the burden to prove the existence of severance 
damages.  But this misconceives the nature of severance damages, which is simply 
a shorthand term describing the diminution in the market value of the remaining 
property as a result of a taking and, hence, of describing the compensation for the 
property owner’s loss.  (Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Lewis (Ark. 
1968) 422 S.W.2d 866, 868.)  It is plain that the property owner bears the burden 
of producing evidence tending to show the diminution in market value under 
section 1260.210, subdivision (a) (Redevelopment Agency v. Metropolitan 
Theatres Corp., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 811, fn. 3)—otherwise neither the 
 
 19
testifying experts nor the jury would have any basis for justifying severance 
damages—but the jury then decides what effect (if any) the evidence, taken “as a 
whole,” may have on the value of the property.  (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Hufford (1957) 49 Cal.2d 545, 561; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Daley (1988) 
205 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1351; see generally People v. Thompson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 
13, 25 [“It became a question of fact then, which the court properly left to the jury, 
whether severance damage occurred and, if so, in what amount”].)  Under section 
1260.210, subdivision (b), the fact finder must ascertain the value of the property 
before and after the taking and fix the amount of compensation without assigning 
a burden of persuasion to either party.  “As the Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws state in their Comment to Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 904, 13 U.L.A. 93-
94 (1980), ‘[i]t seems difficult to assign an intelligible meaning to the concept of 
“burden of proof” in the eminent domain context, since the pleadings are not 
required to allege or deny the amount of compensation claimed, and the ultimate 
standard of decision is the constitutional rule of “just compensation.” ’  
Necessarily, as they go on to say, ‘the ultimate determination necessarily reflects 
the weight and degree of credibility accorded to [conflicting] estimates.’ ” 
(Winooski Hydroelectric Co. v. Five Acres of Land (2d Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 79, 
84.)       
The foregoing is sufficient to dispose of most of the issues presented in the 
petition for review concerning severance damages.  Having now determined the 
respective roles of the judge and jury in connection with severance damages and 
the nonexistence of a burden of persuasion with respect to such damages, we have 
no cause to determine whether the trial court overstepped its bounds in excluding 
evidence of certain severance damages prior to trial or whether the trial court erred 
in finding that certain other severance damages had not been established at trial, 
inasmuch as MWD (with one exception) has not challenged here any part of the 
 
 20
Court of Appeal’s opinion relating to severance damages, nor did Campus Crusade 
challenge in its answer any such ruling by the trial court.   
The lone exception concerns Campus Crusade’s attempt to recover 
temporary severance damages for the allegedly adverse impact of the project on its 
ability to use, develop, and market its property during the seven-year period of 
construction.  The trial court granted MWD’s motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of such damages, observing that “[t]he time period of construction may 
result in severance damages as to rental losses, for example, but not as to 
marketability.”  The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that Campus Crusade 
should have been allowed to present evidence to show how the project as proposed 
interfered with its plans for developing the property, “especially in regards to 
obtaining financing and marketing the property.”     
In support of its claim of temporary severance damages, Campus Crusade 
relies on Placer County Water Agency v. Hofman (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 890, but 
the case provides scant support.  In Hofman, the owner alleged that the agency’s 
temporary easement for the construction of a pipeline across the owner’s property 
“substantially prevented use of the property for cattle and sheep ranching” and 
sought damages in the form of the cost to rent comparable ranching facilities.  
(Hofman, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 894.)  In other words, the taking interfered 
with the owner’s actual intended use of the property.  Here, by contrast, Campus 
Crusade has not identified any intended use of the property during the relevant 
period, nor has it identified any specific loss attributable to the delay in 
construction.  (City of Los Angeles v. Ricards (1973) 10 Cal.3d 385, 388; Orange 
County Flood Control Dist. v. Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 742, 
762.)  Although the Court of Appeal was correct in saying that a property owner 
generally should be able “to present evidence to show whether and to what extent 
the delay disrupted its use of the remaining property,” Campus Crusade has failed 
 
 21
to support its allegation of damages in this court with any specificity—or, indeed, 
with any citation to the record.   
If Campus Crusade had sold the property during the construction period and 
if the ongoing construction had temporarily lowered the sales price of the property, 
it would appear that Campus Crusade would be entitled to recover that loss from 
MWD.  (See City of Los Angeles v. Ricards, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 388.)  But the 
mere fact of a delay associated with construction of the pipeline did not, without 
more, entitle Campus Crusade to temporary severance damages relating to the 
financing or marketing of the property in this eminent domain action.  (People ex 
rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Home Trust Investment Co. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1022, 
1026-1027 [owner failed to show how it had been damaged by decade-long delay 
in constructing a freeway].)   
This is not to say, however, that Campus Crusade is barred from recovering 
damages for actual injury it may have suffered during the construction of the 
pipeline.  On remand, Campus Crusade may have the opportunity before the trial 
court to create an appropriate record to support its claim of severance damages.  In 
addition, “[w]hen the condemnation action is tried before the improvement is 
constructed, and substantial although temporary interference with the property 
owner’s rights of possession or access occurs during construction, the property 
owner may maintain a subsequent action for such damage occurring during 
construction.”  (People v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 229.)      
 
 22
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Metropolitan Water District v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 135 Cal.App.4th 568 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S141148 
Date Filed: July 23, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: John P. Wade 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Redwine & Sherill, Justin M. McCarthy, Scott R. Heil; Berger & Norton, Michael M. Berger, Gideon 
Kanner, John T. Fogarty; Matteoni, Saxe & O’Laughlin, Matteoni, O’Laughlin & Hechtman, Norman E. 
Matteoni, Peggy M. O’Laughlin and Gerry Houlihan for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Jenny, Jenny & Jenny and Scott E. Jenny as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Sullivan, Workman & Dee, Roger M. Sullivan and Gary A. Kovacic as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron and Patrick A. Hennessey as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Peter D. Lepiscopo, Peter D. Lepiscopo and James M. Griffiths for Pacific Justice Institute 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
James S. Burling for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Jeffrey Kightlinger, Henry S. Barbosa Lauren R. Brainard, Karen Tachiki, Sydney B. Bennion, Joseph A. 
Vanderhorst; Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Kenneth B. Bley and Edward C. Dygert for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Janet Morningstar for Municipal Water District of Orange County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Schneider and Katherine E. Stone for League of California Cities, 
California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Ferguson, Case, Orr, Paterson & Cunningham, Douglas E. Kulper and Sandra M. Robertson for Calleguas 
Municipal Water District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Norman E. Matteoni 
Matteoni, O’Laughlin & Hechtman 
848 The Alameda 
San Jose, CA  95126 
(408) 293-4300 
 
Kenneth B. Bley 
Cox, Castle & Nicholson 
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2800 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(31) 284-2231