Title: Julie M. Lassa v. Todd Rongstad

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 105 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP377 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Julie M. Lassa, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Todd Rongstad and The Valkyrie Group, LLC, 
          Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
 
Does 1-5, in their individual capacities, 
          Defendants, 
 
American Family Insurance Company, 
          Intervenor, 
     v. 
Alex Paul, 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2006 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, CROOKS, and ROGGENSACK, J.J., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-appellants there 
were briefs by Michael P. Crooks and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, 
S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Michael P. Crooks. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Edward R. 
Garvey, Pamela R. McGillivray, and Garvey & Stoddard, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Pamela R. McGillivray and John 
Skilton. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brady C. Williamson, 
Kendall W. Harrison, Brian A. Dillon, and LaFollette Godfrey & 
Kahn, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 
Wisconsin 
Newspaper 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association, 
American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union 
of 
Wisconsin 
Foundation, Wisconsin Realtors Association, Wisconsin Bankers 
Association, and Wisconsin Builders Association, and there was 
oral argument by Brady C. Williamson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David C. Bender and 
Bender Law Offices, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Democracy 
Campaign, Inc. and Madison Teachers, Inc. 
 
 
2006 WI 105
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP377  
(L.C. No. 
2003 CV 177) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie M. Lassa, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Todd Rongstad and The Valkyrie Group, LLC, 
 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Does 1-5, in their individual capacities, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Family Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervenor, 
 
     v. 
 
Alex Paul, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Maryann Sumi, Judge.   Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case comes to us on 
certification from the court of appeals.  It requires that we 
address the propriety of discovery and contempt sanctions.  
Although the underlying defamation lawsuit has been dismissed 
with prejudice, we must nevertheless address on appeal issues 
that arose while the defamation case was pending. 
¶2 
The underlying defamation suit was brought by Julie 
Lassa against Todd Rongstad and others, including unknown 
defendants, based on a political mailer that criticized Lassa.  
An organization headed by Rongstad, the Alliance for Working 
Wisconsin, sent the mailer.  Rongstad, along with his company, 
the Valkyrie Group, LLC, appeals the circuit court judgment 
adopting the parties' settlement agreement, under which Lassa 
agreed to dismiss her claim with prejudice and Rongstad agreed 
to pay $65,000 in attorney's fees and forfeitures as sanctions 
for failing to comply with discovery orders.1 
¶3 
Rongstad asserts that the sanctions in this case 
cannot stand for essentially four reasons: 
(A) The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
by compelling discovery and imposing sanctions over his claim of 
constitutional privilege before considering whether Lassa's 
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted; 
                                                 
1 Judge Michael N. Nowakowski presided over the circuit 
court proceedings until a substitution request resulted in a 
transfer of the case to Judge Maryann Sumi.   
No. 
2004AP377   
 
3 
 
(B) The 
circuit 
court 
incorrectly 
applied 
the 
constitutional balancing test under NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958), and other cases interpreting it; 
(C) Rongstad made a "substantiated assertion of privilege" 
under Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), a 
case involving expert witness privilege, thus providing him with 
justification for failing to comply with the circuit court's 
discovery orders; and 
(D) The severity of the sanctions imposed bore no rational 
relationship to Rongstad's conduct or to the harm suffered by 
Lassa. 
¶4 
In addition, Rongstad argues that we should exercise 
our superintending authority to establish an interlocutory 
appeal as a matter of right in cases involving threatened 
sanctions for refusal to disclose information based upon claims 
of constitutional privilege.   
¶5 
We address the issues raised by Rongstad's arguments 
as follows: 
(A) In defamation cases, circuit courts should ordinarily 
decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
before sanctioning a party for refusing to disclose information 
that 
would 
identify 
otherwise-anonymous 
members 
of 
an 
organization.  Under the circumstances here, however, the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
compelling discovery and imposing sanctions before deciding 
Rongstad's motion to dismiss. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
4 
 
(B) The 
circuit 
court 
properly 
rejected 
Rongstad's 
assertion of privilege under the balancing test of the NAACP 
line of cases because Rongstad failed to make the required 
preliminary factual showing to support his assertion. 
(C) Alt has no applicability in this case.  The showing 
that Rongstad had to make was the one required under NAACP, not 
a "substantiated assertion" of evidentiary privilege under Alt. 
(D) We reject Rongstad's challenge to the severity of the 
$65,000 in attorney's fees and forfeitures because the circuit 
court did not set that amount——the parties did by stipulation.  
Rongstad cannot claim that the amount of $65,000 has no rational 
relationship to the harm suffered or that the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in setting the amount.  Rather, the 
issue of the amount of monetary sanctions was pending before the 
court when the parties stipulated to $65,000.  We also determine 
that Rongstad's challenge to the sanction of a default judgment 
on liability is moot under the parties' settlement agreement.2 
¶6 
In addition, we decline to exercise our superintending 
authority to establish an interlocutory appeal as a matter of 
right in defamation cases involving discovery sanctions that 
                                                 
2 Four members of the court are participating in this case.  
Determinations (A) and (D) above constitute a majority opinion 
in this case.  Three members of the court, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice Butler, form the 
majority in those determinations.  See concurrence, ¶95.  In 
determinations (B) and (C), Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice 
Bradley constitute a lead opinion. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
5 
 
raise questions of a constitutional privilege.3  Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court judgment.4        
I 
¶7 
The Alliance for Working Wisconsin is a 501(c)(4) 
organization whose main purpose is "to educate the public about 
public policy issues related to business, taxes and families in 
Wisconsin on a national, state and local level."  A few days 
before the general election in November 2002, the Alliance sent 
a mailer criticizing then-State Representative Lassa for alleged 
connections to then-State Senate majority leader Chuck Chvala.   
¶8 
Among other things, the mailer said that Lassa wanted 
to become a state senator, so she "hooked up" with Chvala.  The 
mailer also stated that "[n]obody knows for sure what she had to 
promise to gain his approval."  
¶9 
At the time, Lassa was running for re-election to the 
Assembly.  Also at that time, Chvala had just been charged with 
20 felonies, including extortion, misconduct while in public 
office, and falsifying reports to the State Elections Board.  
                                                 
3 A majority of the court in this case, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice Butler, declines to 
exercise 
our 
superintending 
authority 
to 
establish 
an 
interlocutory appeal as a matter of right in defamation cases 
involving 
discovery 
sanctions 
that 
raise 
questions 
of 
a 
constitutional privilege.  See concurrence, ¶95. 
4 A majority of the court in this case, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice Butler, agrees that the 
circuit court judgment must be affirmed.  See concurrence, ¶95 
n.1. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
6 
 
The mailer made this apparent by including images of a newspaper 
clipping and Chvala's booking photograph.  
¶10 The mailer concluded with this statement: 
Extortion, misconduct in public office, pay to play, 
lying, cheating and stealing.  Wisconsin politics has 
gone 
completely 
astray. 
 
Please 
call 
Julie 
Lassa . . . and the rest and ask them the tough 
questions——did you compromise your integrity, did you 
play along with an illegal game, did you misuse tax 
dollars to win elections? 
And, most importantly, will you please clean up your 
act? 
¶11 Lassa filed a defamation action against Rongstad, the 
Alliance, the Valkyrie Group, and five unknown "Doe" defendants 
in their individual capacities for their role in publishing and 
distributing the mailer.5  At the time, she was considering 
whether to run for her district's state senate seat, soon to be 
vacant.  She immediately sought to depose Rongstad in order to 
ascertain the identities of the "Does" involved in the mailer.  
During 
Rongstad's 
deposition, 
Lassa 
asked 
him 
questions 
regarding who from the Alliance may have played a role in the 
mailer.  Rongstad objected, refusing to answer a number of these 
and related questions and asserting a constitutional privilege. 
¶12 The parties called the court to obtain a ruling on 
Rongstad's assertion of privilege.  Rongstad argued that Lassa's 
questions pertained to the membership of the Alliance and 
therefore involved constitutionally-protected rights of free 
                                                 
5 Lassa also named A.M. Mailing Services, Inc., as a 
defendant.  A.M. Mailing's role in the mailer is not relevant to 
this appeal. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
7 
 
speech and freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  He relied on a number of cases, including NAACP, in 
which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a discovery 
sanction against the NAACP for refusing to disclose membership 
lists to the State of Alabama in the course of a discovery 
dispute.  Under the principles in those cases, Rongstad 
contended, Lassa was not entitled to discover the identities of 
Alliance members.  
¶13 The court ruled at a hearing the next day, February 4, 
2003.  It observed that the cases on which Rongstad relied 
required 
a 
preliminary 
factual 
showing 
of 
a 
reasonable 
probability that compelled disclosure of members' identities 
would subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from 
either government officials or private individuals.  The court 
determined that Rongstad failed to make such a showing.  Even if 
he 
had, 
the 
court 
determined, 
the 
Alliance 
members' 
associational rights were outweighed by other interests that the 
court was required to balance against the members' rights.  
These other interests, the court explained, included Lassa's 
interest in clearing her name and the state's interest in 
preventing fraud and libel, an interest that is heightened 
during election campaigns. 
¶14 The court thus overruled Rongstad's constitutional 
objection to Lassa's questioning.  It ordered Rongstad to answer 
all questions pertaining to the identity of individuals involved 
in the preparation, funding, or distribution of the mailer. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
8 
 
¶15 Although Rongstad's deposition continued, he moved the 
court to reconsider its February 4 order and submitted an 
affidavit in an apparent attempt to make the required factual 
showing.  Specifically, Rongstad averred that members of the 
Alliance had told him that if he was compelled to disclose the 
identity of members of the organization, they would no longer be 
interested in participating in the organization or any such 
organization for fear of public reprisal and potential legal 
action.  The court again determined that Rongstad failed to make 
the required preliminary factual showing, deeming his affidavit 
conclusory and insufficient.  Thus, the court denied Rongstad's 
motion to reconsider, and ordered Rongstad to submit to a 
continued deposition. 
¶16 Rongstad also sought to challenge the circuit court's 
February 4 order in the court of appeals.  He petitioned the 
court of appeals for interlocutory relief, claiming the circuit 
court committed error in rejecting his assertion of privilege 
under NAACP.  Ultimately, however, he failed to pursue the 
appeal, and on March 4, 2003, the court of appeals dismissed his 
petition for leave to appeal after the time had lapsed for the 
filing of arguments. 
¶17 While Rongstad's petition for interlocutory relief was 
pending, he filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim on February 11, 2003.  He argued in the motion that none 
of the communications in the mailer was capable of defamatory 
meaning, as required to survive a motion to dismiss.  Within two 
days, the circuit court set a briefing schedule with reply 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
9 
 
briefs due on March 28.  Rongstad did not object to this 
schedule or request a different schedule.   
¶18 In 
the 
interim, 
the 
parties' 
discovery 
dispute 
continued.  On February 21, Lassa filed a motion for "sanctions 
for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery," asserting 
that Rongstad had failed to comply with the court's previous 
orders.  She requested that Rongstad be held in contempt and 
that the court impose forfeitures under Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)4 
(2003-04) for any continuing violation of the court's orders.6   
In addition, she requested an award of attorney's fees under 
§ 804.12(2)(b) and a default judgment under § 804.12(2)(a)3.7 
                                                 
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.12(2) reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
Failure 
to 
comply 
with 
order. 
 
(a) 
If 
a 
party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, . . . the court in which the action 
is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others the following: 
. . . . 
3. An order . . . rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party. 
4. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
physical, 
mental 
or 
vocational 
examination. 
(b) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, the court shall require the party 
failing to obey the order or the attorney advising the 
party 
or 
both 
to 
pay 
the 
reasonable 
expenses, 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
10 
 
¶19 At a February 28, 2003 hearing on Lassa's motion, her 
attorney indicated that the governor had called a special 
election for April 1 to fill the open state senate seat and that 
Lassa had decided to run for the seat, making it especially 
important that she discover as soon as possible who was 
responsible for the mailer in order to clear her name.  She 
asserted that Rongstad continued to refuse to answer questions 
concerning anyone who had funded the Alliance or was a member of 
the Alliance.  Rongstad's counsel reiterated the constitutional 
issues involved and asserted that, in his view, Rongstad had 
complied with the court's discovery orders. 
¶20 Adding to its previous orders, the circuit court 
ordered Rongstad to disclose the identity of anyone who had 
contributed $100 or more to the Alliance in 2002.  The court 
postponed hearing Lassa's motion for sanctions, however, because 
of concerns as to whether Rongstad had been properly served with 
notice of the motion.  Lassa re-filed her motion on March 3, 
2003, asserting that Rongstad was in violation of the court's 
February 28 order in addition to its previous orders. 
¶21 On March 11, the court heard the motion.  It found 
that Rongstad intentionally failed to comply with the court's 
                                                                                                                                                             
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 785.04(1)(c) authorizes the circuit court to 
impose a daily forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 as a remedial 
sanction for each day that a contempt of court continues. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
11 
 
orders and that Rongstad was in contempt.  The court noted it 
appeared that Rongstad had lied under oath and that he had given 
evasive answers designed to avoid providing the information 
ordered.  It imposed a sanction of $32,587 in attorney's fees.  
In addition, it ordered that beginning March 13, Rongstad would 
pay a forfeiture in the amount of $1,000 per day until he had 
fully complied with the court's orders.  The court declined to 
enter a sanction of default judgment against Rongstad, but 
stated that it would entertain a motion for default judgment on 
liability issues as a future sanction if Rongstad failed to 
comply with the court's discovery orders by April 4. 
¶22 The parties' discovery dispute nonetheless continued 
and, on April 11, Lassa moved for default judgment against 
Rongstad on all liability issues, asserting that Rongstad 
remained in violation of the court's discovery orders.  Rongstad 
filed a motion for relief from sanctions arguing, in contrast, 
that he was in compliance with the court's discovery orders 
because he provided Lassa with some documentation relating to 
contributions to the Alliance.  In addition, he requested that 
the 
court 
address 
his 
pending 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
before 
proceeding on any other motions. 
¶23 Consistent 
with 
Rongstad's 
request, 
the 
court 
addressed Rongstad's motion to dismiss before proceeding on the 
other pending motions.  It denied the motion to dismiss on July 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
12 
 
8, concluding that the mailer contained communications that were 
capable of a defamatory meaning.8 
¶24 Several weeks later, on August 15, the circuit court 
addressed Rongstad's motion for relief from sanctions and 
Lassa's motion for a default judgment.  The court began by 
thoroughly reviewing the history of the parties' discovery 
dispute.  In a detailed oral decision, the court determined that 
Rongstad was not in compliance with the discovery orders and 
that he continued to be in contempt.  In addition, the court 
found that Rongstad's conduct was egregious and in bad faith.  
The court denied Rongstad's motion for relief from sanctions and 
granted Lassa's motion for default judgment.  
¶25 At a subsequent hearing, the court determined that 
attorney's fees remained an appropriate sanction.  Lassa agreed 
to submit a new statement of attorney's fees for the court's 
approval, and Rongstad agreed to address the statement and 
object to fees he deemed unrelated to the discovery dispute.  
The court withheld decision on the final amount of attorney's 
fees and on the proper amount of forfeitures for further court 
proceedings.  
¶26 Shortly thereafter, the parties instead submitted a 
settlement agreement to the court.  It provided that Lassa would 
agree to dismiss the underlying defamation claim with prejudice 
and that Rongstad would consent to a judgment against him for a 
                                                 
8 By this point in the proceedings, the case had been 
transferred from Judge Nowakowski to Judge Sumi. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
13 
 
stipulated amount of $65,000, with $43,000 considered to be 
contempt-related attorney's fees and $22,000 considered to be 
forfeitures payable to the school fund.  The agreement also 
stated that Rongstad reserved certain rights to appeal.   
¶27 The circuit court entered a judgment in accordance 
with the parties' agreement.  Rongstad appealed, and we accepted 
the court of appeals' certification of the case pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
II 
¶28 Because the parties agreed to dismiss the defamation 
claim underlying this case, we begin with a brief discussion of 
why this court has jurisdiction over Rongstad's appeal.9  Stated 
succinctly, 
the 
reason 
is 
straightforward: 
 
Rongstad 
is 
aggrieved by the final judgment entered upon the parties' 
settlement agreement because it required him to pay $65,000 in 
sanctions. 
¶29 By the time the parties agreed to settle their case 
and dismiss the underlying defamation claim, the circuit court 
had 
already 
imposed 
discovery 
and 
contempt 
sanctions 
on 
Rongstad.  More specifically, at the time Rongstad entered into 
the settlement agreement, the circuit court had imposed over 
$30,000 in attorney's fees as a discovery sanction, had imposed 
a $1,000 per day fine for continuing contempt, and had granted 
Lassa's motion for default judgment.  Rongstad was, and remains, 
                                                 
9 In this discussion, ¶¶28-36, Chief Justice Abrahamson and 
Justice Bradley constitute a lead opinion. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
14 
 
aggrieved by the circuit court's orders for discovery and 
contempt sanctions.  Those orders, in turn, are properly before 
this court as part of Rongstad's appeal from the final judgment 
entered on the parties' settlement agreement.  See Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.10(4).10 
¶30 Although Rongstad advances several grounds for circuit 
court error, his central contention is that the sanctions orders 
were unlawful because they were imposed over his assertion of a 
constitutional privilege.  We must address both this contention 
and other arguments that Rongstad advances in order to decide 
the propriety of the sanctions.  
¶31 NAACP and Alt, two cases on which Rongstad relies, are 
examples of other instances in which courts were required to 
address the merits of an assertion of privilege in order to 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) § 809.10(4) provides as follows:  
Matters reviewable. 
An appeal 
from 
a 
final 
judgment or final order brings before the court all 
prior nonfinal judgments, orders and rulings adverse 
to the appellant and favorable to the respondent made 
in the action or proceeding not previously appealed 
and ruled upon. 
The concurrence leaps from the general propositions that an 
order or judgment must be appealable for an appellate court to 
exercise jurisdiction and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred 
by consent to the conclusion that "[a]s such, [Rongstad]'s 
stipulation preserving certain appellate rights was invalid."  
Concurrence, ¶101.  One of the linchpins of the concurrence's 
conclusion is its determination that Rongstad is not aggrieved 
from "that" judgment in which he "sought and secured a dismissal 
with prejudice."  Id., ¶104.  This determination is difficult to 
fathom in light of the sanctions orders and the simple fact that 
this case involves only one final judgment. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
15 
 
determine the propriety of discovery sanctions.  NAACP, 357 U.S. 
at 460-66; Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 84-95.  In both cases, the court 
could not decide whether the sanctions orders were lawful 
without addressing the assertion of privilege over which the 
sanctions were imposed.  Likewise, here, the validity of the 
sanctions depends on whether they were properly imposed in light 
of an asserted privilege. 
¶32 Also somewhat analogous is Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, 
Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 531, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999).  In Jandrt, 
sanctions for maintaining a frivolous lawsuit were at issue.  
Jandrt, 227 Wis. 2d at 539.  The underlying suit was voluntarily 
dismissed, but the parties continued to litigate the question of 
frivolousness.  Id. at 538.  Obviously, the court had to address 
the merits of maintaining the underlying claim——even though it 
was dismissed——in order to address the propriety of the 
sanctions.  See id. at 572-73. 
¶33 Although here we need not address the merits of the 
plaintiff's defamation claim in order to decide the propriety of 
sanctions, we must address the assertion of privilege, just as 
in NAACP and Alt.  Rongstad's assertion of privilege is not a 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
16 
 
defense to Lassa's defamation claim.  Rather, it is a defense to 
the discovery and contempt sanctions.11 
¶34 Of course, an order or judgment must be appealable for 
an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction, and "consent of the 
parties involved cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists." 
Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thoma, 45 Wis. 2d 580, 587, 173 N.W.2d 
717 (1970).  Nonetheless, parties sometimes settle issues in a 
controversy, as here, such that the only question or questions 
remaining are ripe for appeal.  Similarly, issues presented on 
appeal are often at least partly the product of one or more 
stipulations in the circuit court.  See, e.g., Petta v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 2005 WI 18, ¶32, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 N.W.2d 639 (in which 
this court's decision was based, in part, on a stipulation that 
the 
plaintiffs 
had 
not 
been 
made 
whole 
by 
a 
lump-sum 
settlement); see also, e.g., Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶¶7-
                                                 
11 Again, the concurrence reaches a conclusion that is 
difficult to understand.  It concludes that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider Rongstad's assertion of any privilege 
because the assertion of such a privilege is a defense to 
Lassa's 
defamation 
claim. 
 
Concurrence, 
¶¶94, 
96. 
 
The 
concurrence conflates a defense to the defamation claim with a 
defense to the discovery and contempt sanctions.  In any event, 
both NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Burnett v. Alt, 
224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), demonstrate that this 
conclusion is incorrect. 
Similarly difficult to understand is the concurrence's 
belief that this court has jurisdiction over some but not all of 
the 
issues 
presented. 
 
See 
concurrence, 
¶¶94-96. 
 
The 
concurrence does not satisfactorily explain how this court has 
jurisdiction over some issues but not others, even though all of 
the issues initially stem from Lassa's now-dismissed defamation 
claim. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
17 
 
8, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (parties stipulated to 
liability but disputed damages); Weber v. White, 2004 WI 63, ¶5, 
272 Wis. 2d 121, 681 N.W.2d 137 (parties stipulated that one 
party was 100% negligent in causing an accident).  
¶35 Parties may not manufacture artificial issues for 
appeal.  Moreover, a judgment or order must be "final" as 
defined by rule in order to be appealable as a matter of right.  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 808.03(1); see also Cascade Mountain, Inc. 
v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 212 Wis. 2d 265, 269, 569 N.W.2d 45 
(Ct. App. 1997) (party "cannot, by stipulating to the entry of a 
conditional 
judgment, 
obtain 
a 
mandatory 
appeal 
of 
an 
interlocutory order").  Here, however, the parties' settlement 
and the judgment entered upon it do not implicate manufactured 
issues. 
 
They 
also 
do 
not 
run 
afoul 
of 
the 
finality 
requirement.12     
¶36 Having 
briefly 
addressed 
why 
this 
court 
has 
jurisdiction over Rongstad's appeal, we turn to the merits of 
Rongstad's arguments.  His arguments raise issues involving 
sanctions for a party's failure to comply with discovery orders 
and a related contempt of court.  Appellate courts ordinarily 
review circuit court decisions pertaining to such matters for an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  Schultz v. Sykes, 2001 WI App 
255, 
¶8, 
248 
Wis. 2d 746, 
638 
N.W.2d 604. 
 
However, 
we 
independently determine any underlying questions of law.  See 
                                                 
12 The settlement agreement and judgment are structured such 
that regardless of whether Rongstad or Lassa prevails on appeal, 
no further litigation between them will ensue in this case.  
No. 
2004AP377   
 
18 
 
Oliveto v. Circuit Court, 194 Wis. 2d 418, 429, 533 N.W.2d 819 
(1995); Evans v. Leubke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶16, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 
671 N.W.2d 304.  The lawfulness of the discovery and contempt 
sanctions in this case ultimately turns on a question of law 
subject to independent appellate review:  whether Rongstad made 
the required preliminary factual showing that meets the standard 
for asserting a constitutional privilege under NAACP.  See 
Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998); 
State v. Bentley,  201 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  
III 
A 
¶37 We begin by addressing Rongstad's assertion that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by compelling 
discovery 
and 
imposing 
sanctions 
over 
his 
claim 
of 
constitutional privilege before considering whether Lassa's 
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Rongstad argues that, in light of the constitutional questions 
raised by his assertion of privilege, the court should have 
first decided the motion to dismiss. 
¶38 Rongstad is joined in this argument by amici American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union 
of 
Wisconsin 
Foundation, 
Wisconsin 
Newspaper 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers 
& 
Commerce, 
Wisconsin 
Realtors 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Bankers 
Association, 
and 
Wisconsin 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
19 
 
Builders 
Association.13 
 
They 
assert 
that, 
given 
the 
constitutional rights at stake, a public figure such as Lassa 
should not be allowed discovery in a defamation action until any 
pending motion to dismiss has been resolved. 
¶39 Lassa does not seem to oppose such a procedure in 
general.  Rather, she maintains that based on the particular 
facts here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion by failing to decide Rongstad's motion to dismiss 
before imposing discovery sanctions. 
¶40 Cases like the one before us test the bounds of the 
rights to free speech and freedom of association in the face of 
other important rights and interests.  "Inviolability of privacy 
in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable 
to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a 
group espouses dissident beliefs."  NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.  
Likewise, the decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.  McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
¶41 At the same time, individual citizens, including 
candidates for public office, have an interest in being free 
                                                 
13 The American Civil Liberties Foundation of Wisconsin 
submitted the amicus brief it originally filed in the court of 
appeals, and it also joined in another amicus brief filed after 
this court accepted certification of the case.  Lassa moves to 
strike the ACLU's original brief, asserting that the ACLU has, 
in effect, filed two amicus briefs.  We agree with Lassa and 
discourage such practice by amici curiae in future cases.  
However, because our decision would be the same regardless of 
any consideration given to the ACLU's original brief, we choose 
to deny Lassa's motion. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
20 
 
from defamation.  Those who have been defamed have an important 
interest in clearing their names.  In addition, the state has a 
legitimate interest in preventing fraud and libel.  McIntyre, 
514 U.S. at 349.  This interest "carries special weight during 
election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have 
serious adverse consequences for the public at large."  Id.  
Stated another way, the voting public has a weighty interest in 
accurate information about candidates for public office.  The 
right of voters to get accurate information is essential to the 
election process.  While non-defamatory, protected speech may 
often further the voters' interest, defamatory speech assuredly 
undermines it.14 
¶42 Certainly, a defamation plaintiff should not be able 
to employ the rules of discovery to obtain the identity of an 
anonymous political speaker simply by filing a complaint that is 
facially unsustainable.  The speaker has most likely chosen 
anonymity for a reason.  If that reason is consistent with First 
Amendment principles, the use of discovery to uncover the 
speaker's identity may chill the exercise of the right to free 
speech.  Such a use of the discovery process also violates the 
basic principle that litigants are not entitled to discovery 
that 
causes 
unreasonable 
annoyance, 
embarrassment, 
or 
                                                 
14 There is no shortage of cases involving claims of 
defamation by candidates for public office against those who 
have criticized them.  See, e.g., Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 
Wis. 2d 735, 498 N.W.2d 232 (1993); D'Amato v. Freeman Printing 
Co., 38 Wis. 2d 589, 157 N.W.2d 686 (1968); Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 
Wis. 2d 271, 140 N.W.2d 259 (1966). 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
21 
 
oppression.  See Wis. Stat. § 804.04(3); Paige K.B. ex rel. 
Peterson v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 232, 594 N.W.2d 370 
(1999).15 
¶43 Yet, the constitution cannot work as an absolute bar 
to a plaintiff's interest in discovering the identity of a 
speaker who has actually defamed her.  If it did, anonymous 
speakers would be free to make false statements causing harm to 
others no matter how malicious or damaging.  Freedom of speech 
has its limits.  It does not embrace defamation.  Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).  
¶44 One way to reconcile all of these competing rights and 
interests, according to Rongstad and the amici, is to require 
that circuit courts decide whether a defamation complaint states 
a claim on which relief may be granted before imposing sanctions 
for the refusal to disclose information based on the type of 
constitutional 
privilege 
Rongstad 
has 
asserted. 
 
Such 
a 
procedure, 
they 
argue, 
helps 
ensure 
protection 
of 
the 
constitutional rights at stake. 
¶45 On a motion to dismiss, the court must determine 
whether a communication is "capable of a defamatory meaning."  
Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 287 
N.W.2d 747 (1980).  This means that if the communication cannot 
reasonably be understood as defamatory, then the plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim, and the motion to dismiss must be 
                                                 
15 We note that there is no real dispute in this case that 
Rongstad 
and 
the 
Alliance 
were the 
only 
source of the 
information that Lassa was seeking to discover.  
No. 
2004AP377   
 
22 
 
granted.  Id.; see also Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 Wis. 2d 735, 740, 
498 N.W.2d 232 (1993); Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 
140 N.W.2d 259 (1966). 
¶46 Few appellate courts have been asked to determine 
whether such a procedure should be followed, although the 
question has reached at least one other state supreme court.  In 
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), the Delaware Supreme 
Court was confronted with the question of what procedure to 
follow when a public figure defamation plaintiff seeks to 
discover the identity of an anonymous speaker criticizing the 
plaintiff via internet postings.   
¶47 The Delaware court was presented with a range of 
possible procedures to use in order to strike the proper balance 
between 
the 
competing 
rights 
and 
interests. 
 
The 
court 
explained: 
Before this Court is an entire spectrum of "standards" 
that could be required, ranging (in ascending order) 
from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to pleading 
sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a 
showing 
of 
prima 
facie 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, and beyond 
that, hurdles even more stringent. 
Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457. 
¶48 The court thoroughly described the particular concerns 
with which it was faced: 
We are concerned that setting the standard too 
low will chill potential posters from exercising their 
First 
Amendment right 
to 
speak 
anonymously. The 
possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit 
could intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring 
their comments or simply not commenting at all.  A 
defamation plaintiff, particularly a public figure, 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
23 
 
obtains a very important form of relief by unmasking 
the identity of his anonymous critics.  The revelation 
of identity of an anonymous speaker "may subject [that 
speaker] to ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, 
invite retaliation from those who oppose her ideas or 
from those whom she criticizes, or simply give 
unwanted 
exposure 
to 
her 
mental 
processes."  
Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts 
to 
meet 
the 
good 
faith 
test . . . even 
if 
the 
defamation claim is not very strong, or worse, if they 
do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a 
final decision. . . .   
Indeed, there is reason to believe that many 
defamation plaintiffs bring suit merely to unmask the 
identities of anonymous critics.  As one commentator 
has noted, "[t]he sudden surge in John Doe suits stems 
from the fact that many defamation actions are not 
really about money."  "The goals of this new breed of 
libel action are largely symbolic, the primary goal 
being to silence John Doe and others like him."  This 
"sue first, ask questions later" approach, coupled 
with a standard only minimally protective of the 
anonymity of defendants, will discourage debate on 
important issues of public concern as more and more 
anonymous posters censor their online statements in 
response to the likelihood of being unmasked. 
Id. at 457 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted). 
¶49 Given these concerns, the Cahill court concluded that 
"even the more stringent motion to dismiss standard, the middle 
option in the spectrum of standards from which we may choose, 
falls short of providing sufficient protection to a defendant's 
First Amendment right to speak anonymously."  Id. at 458.  Thus, 
the court held that "before a defamation plaintiff can obtain 
the identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory 
discovery process he must support his defamation claim with 
facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion."  Id. at 
460. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
24 
 
¶50 Although we share the Cahill court's concerns and 
think them fully applicable to the case at bar, we reach a 
somewhat different conclusion.  It appears that Delaware, unlike 
Wisconsin, does not require particularity in the pleading of 
defamation claims.  See id. at 458; cf. Wis. Stat. § 802.03(6).16  
The court in Cahill noted that "even silly or trivial libel 
claims can easily survive a motion to dismiss where the 
plaintiff pleads facts that put the defendant on notice of his 
claim, however vague or lacking in detail these allegations may 
be."  Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458.  
¶51 In addition, the Delaware court emphasized that one of 
the most important aspects of testing a defamation claim by 
summary judgment is that the claim must be "capable of a 
defamatory meaning" in order to survive summary judgment.  
Id. at 463.  This, of course, is the same inquiry that is the 
focus of a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation in 
Wisconsin.  See, e.g., Starobin, 94 Wis. 2d at 10. 
¶52 Accordingly, we determine that under Wisconsin law, 
requiring the circuit court to decide a motion to dismiss before 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.03 provides in relevant part: 
Pleading special matters . . . . 
. . . . 
(6) Libel or slander.  In an action for libel or 
slander, the particular words complained of shall be 
set forth in the complaint, but their publication and 
their application to the plaintiff may be stated 
generally. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
25 
 
compelling disclosure and imposing sanctions best addresses the 
concerns expressed in Cahill.  When faced with an assertion of 
constitutional 
privilege 
against 
disclosure 
of 
information 
identifying 
otherwise-anonymous 
organization 
members, 
the 
circuit court should decide a pending motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim before sanctioning the party for 
refusing to disclose that information. 
¶53 Having determined that, prospectively, this is the 
procedure that circuit courts should ordinarily follow, we 
nonetheless agree with Lassa that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion here even though it imposed 
some discovery sanctions before addressing Rongstad's motion to 
dismiss. 
¶54 Early in the litigation, Rongstad informed the circuit 
court that he intended to bring a motion to dismiss.  He did 
not, however, argue that the court was required to decide the 
motion before discovery proceeded.  When Rongstad filed his 17-
page motion and supporting brief, he also advanced no such 
argument.  Likewise, when the circuit court made its discovery 
rulings and when it initially imposed sanctions on March 11, 
2003, Rongstad did not present the argument. 
¶55 The court issued a briefing schedule on Rongstad's 
motion to dismiss within two days of the date that Rongstad 
filed the motion, February 11, 2003.  Under the briefing 
schedule, reply briefs were due approximately six weeks later, 
yet Rongstad did not file any objection to the schedule or 
request an accelerated schedule.  In addition, he did not file 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
26 
 
any objection when his insurer moved on February 19 to intervene 
and stay the merits of the case pending resolution of coverage 
issues.       
¶56 At the very earliest, it was not until April 30, 2003, 
that Rongstad first apprised the court of the argument he now 
advances, that the court was required to decide his motion to 
dismiss before compelling discovery.  On that date, Rongstad 
filed a letter with the court in which he requested that it 
address his motion to dismiss before resolving any other pending 
motions because this would "eliminate the need for any further 
action."  In our view, however, even this April 30 letter did 
not apprise the circuit court of the argument Rongstad now 
makes. 
¶57 In any event, by the time of Rongstad's April 30 
letter, the court had already compelled discovery and ordered 
sanctions.  It then decided his motion to dismiss before 
proceeding to impose further sanctions.  The court imposed no 
additional sanction until after it denied the motion.   
¶58 In short, Rongstad did not raise his argument that the 
circuit court was required to address his motion to dismiss 
before it compelled discovery until after the court imposed 
discovery 
sanctions. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
constitutional dimension of the parties' discovery dispute 
mandated this course of action was a relatively novel one 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
27 
 
considering existing law at the time.17  Given all of the 
circumstances, the court did not erroneously exercise its 
                                                 
17 The dissent imparts a spin to both the facts and the law.  
Contrary to what it first insinuates over the course of nine 
paragraphs, see dissent, ¶¶124-129, 139, 169-170, and then 
expressly concludes based on several more paragraphs of nuanced 
explanation, see id., ¶¶172-178, there is no real indication in 
the record of Rongstad's argument until April 30, 2003, at the 
earliest.  By suggesting otherwise, the dissent elevates the 
"silk purse from a sow's ear" aphorism to new levels.  The 
dissent apparently thinks that if it underlines the words 
"motion to dismiss" enough times, it can summon facts from the 
record that do not exist.  See id., ¶¶124-126, 128-129, 169. 
Likewise, none of the legal authorities that the dissent 
cites (or that Rongstad cited in the circuit court) would have 
apprised the circuit court that Rongstad was arguing the court 
must address his motion to dismiss before imposing discovery and 
contempt sanctions.  Those authorities do not address whether 
circuit courts should decide a pending dispositive motion in a 
defamation case before resolving discovery disputes.  As we have 
indicated in the body of this opinion, Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 
451 (Del. 2005), which was decided more than two years after the 
circuit court denied Rongstad's motion to dismiss, appears to be 
one of the few cases to address such an issue. 
The dissent relies, for example, on the Law Note for Judges 
on defamation that is found in the pattern jury instructions.  
See dissent, ¶173 (citing Wis. JI——Civil 2500).  Rongstad cited 
the Law Note in his brief in support of his motion to dismiss 
and provided the Law Note to the circuit court along with his 
April 30 letter.  The Law Note, however, simply acknowledges 
that the initial substantive inquiry in a defamation case is 
usually whether the words at issue are capable of defamatory 
meaning, a question for the trial judge that is normally 
presented by a motion to dismiss.  Wis. JI——Civil 2500, at 3.  
The Law Note provides no guidance as to how this procedure in 
the usual defamation case should interact with discovery 
disputes, let alone the type of discovery dispute here. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
28 
 
discretion in compelling discovery and imposing some sanctions 
without first deciding Rongstad's motion.18   
B 
¶59 We turn to Rongstad's argument that the circuit court 
incorrectly applied the constitutional balancing test under 
cases such as NAACP.  The United States Supreme Court's decision 
in NAACP has come to stand for a balancing test that applies to 
cases in which an organization or its members or contributors 
assert a First Amendment privilege in the face of compelled 
disclosure of member identities or related information.  See, 
e.g., Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1267-68 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); Crocker v. Revolutionary Communist Progressive Labor 
Party, 533 N.E.2d 444, 447-48 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988).19  As the 
following discussion of NAACP and other cases shows, the party 
seeking to assert the privilege must make a preliminary factual 
showing that at least demonstrates a reasonable probability of 
an actual chilling effect on First Amendment rights. 
                                                 
18 Here, as the circuit court recognized, the resolution of 
the discovery dispute was time-sensitive given the imminent 
special election for the state senate seat that Lassa had 
decided to seek.  In a similarly time-sensitive case, the court 
and parties would obviously need to be mindful of expediting any 
briefing or proceedings necessary to decide a motion to dismiss.    
19 The decision in Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 
1243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), was subsequently vacated by the United 
States Supreme Court on mootness grounds, see Moore v. Black 
Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982), but it continues to be 
cited as providing a sound analysis of the balancing test.  See, 
e.g., International Action Ctr. v. United States, 207 F.R.D. 1, 
3 n.6 (D.D.C. 2002). 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
29 
 
¶60 In NAACP, the attorney general of Alabama brought suit 
against the NAACP alleging that it was unlawfully conducting 
business in that state.  NAACP, 357 U.S. at 452.  The issue on 
appeal involved the constitutionality of a large monetary 
contempt sanction against the NAACP for its failure to comply 
with a discovery order requiring disclosure of its membership 
lists.  Id. at 453. 
¶61 The Court first recognized that the order "must be 
regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint 
upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to 
freedom of association."  Id. at 462.  In determining that the 
order was likely to chill NAACP members' associational rights, 
the Court referred to the NAACP's "uncontroverted showing that 
on past occasions revelation of the identity of rank-and-file 
members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of 
employment, 
threat 
of 
physical 
coercion, 
and 
other 
manifestations of public hostility."  Id.  The Court then 
weighed the likelihood of such a restraint on the exercise of 
members' rights against the state's asserted interests in 
obtaining disclosure of member identities.  See id. at 463-65.20   
¶62 Relying on NAACP, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976), elaborated on what is required under the first 
part of the balancing test, this time in the context of 
                                                 
20 Much as in NAACP, the Court in Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), spoke of "substantial uncontroverted 
evidence that public identification of persons in the community 
as members of the [NAACP] had been followed by harassment and 
threats of bodily harm."  Id. at 524. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
30 
 
contributions to political parties.  In Buckley the Court 
explained that there must be a factual showing sufficient to 
demonstrate a "reasonable probability" of threats, harassment, 
or reprisals, and the Court gave examples of the proof 
necessary:  
The evidence offered need show only a reasonable 
probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will 
subject [contributors] to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals from either Government officials or private 
parties.  The proof may include, for example, specific 
evidence of past or present harassment of members due 
to their associational ties, or of harassment directed 
against the organization itself.  A pattern of threats 
or specific manifestations of public hostility may be 
sufficient. 
Id. at 74; see also Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1267-68 
("[T]he litigant seeking protection need not prove to a 
certainty that its First Amendment rights will be chilled by 
disclosure.  It need only show that there is some probability 
that disclosure will lead to reprisal or harassment."). 
 
¶63 The Court was thus careful in Buckley to ensure that 
the burden on the party seeking to assert a privilege was not 
insurmountably high.  At the same time, the Court recognized, 
"[w]here 
it 
exists[,] 
the 
type 
of 
chill 
and 
harassment 
identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown."  Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 74. 
¶64 Thus, "[a] subjective fear of reprisal is insufficient 
to invoke first amendment protection against a disclosure 
requirement."  Dole v. Local Union 375, 921 F.2d 969, 973 (9th 
Cir. 1990).  "The proof offered must be 'objective'——an 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
31 
 
allegation 
of 
'apprehension' 
or 
subjective 
deterrence 
of 
membership or contribution is not sufficient."  O'Neal v. United 
States, 601 F. Supp. 874, 879 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (citations 
omitted); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) 
("[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill'" are not an adequate 
substitute 
for 
a 
claim 
of 
specific 
present 
objective 
harm . . . .). 
¶65 The court in Brock v. Local 375, 860 F.2d 346 (9th 
Cir. 1988), aptly summarizing much of the applicable case law, 
observed as follows: 
Many courts have grappled with the sufficiency of 
such a showing.  A factor emphasized in each of those 
decisions is the need for objective and articulable 
facts, which go beyond broad allegations or subjective 
fears. 
Brock, 860 F.2d at 350 n.1 (citations omitted). 
¶66 Here, Rongstad relies primarily on his own affidavit, 
consisting of a total of five short statements.  Specifically, 
he averred as follows: 
1.  That I am a board member and president of the 
Alliance for Working Wisconsin. 
2. 
That 
in that 
position, 
I had 
numerous 
conversations with members of the association over the 
last several years and recently specifically related 
to the lawsuit at issue. 
3. 
That as a board member and president of the 
association, I and 
the 
Alliance 
have 
previously 
guaranteed 
confidentiality 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
identity of members and have honored that throughout 
the course of my work with the Alliance. 
4. 
That members have told me that if I am 
compelled to disclose the identity of members of the 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
32 
 
organization, that they will no longer be interested 
in participating in the organization or any such 
organization, 
for 
fear 
of 
public 
reprisal 
and 
potential legal action. 
5. 
That 
disclosure 
of 
the 
names 
and 
the 
attendant loss of confidentiality will likely ruin my 
business and force me to find a new career. 
¶67 Rongstad's affidavit is insufficient to establish the 
required preliminary showing under NAACP and its progeny.  The 
affidavit provides no evidence of particular instances of past 
or present threats, harassment, or reprisals.  See Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 74; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.  It also does not indicate a 
pattern 
of 
threats 
or 
specific 
manifestations 
of 
public 
hostility against the Alliance or similar groups. 
¶68 Although a record of past harassment or reprisals is 
not always necessary, Rongstad has not otherwise established a 
reasonable probability of such chilling effects.  At most, he 
established precisely what is ordinarily deemed insufficient:  a 
general statement of subjective fear of reprisal without any 
basis in objective, particularized facts.  Only one of the five 
statements in his affidavit is directly related to the substance 
of the required showing, and that statement establishes only 
that some unspecified number of members have told him they will 
no longer be interested in participating in the Alliance or 
other organizations like it based on general fears of reprisal. 
¶69 We view the case of Friends Social Club v. Secretary 
of Labor, 763 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1991), as persuasive in 
light of the circumstances here.  In Friends Social Club, 
organization members submitted affidavits stating predictions 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
33 
 
and fears of harassment, including recrimination by political 
opponents.  Id. at 1394.  The affidavits suggested that 
disclosure of members' identities might discourage members from 
further participation.  Id.  The court in Friends Social Club, 
like the circuit court here, deemed such affidavits conclusory 
and insufficient.  Id. at 1395.  According to the Friends Social 
Club court, the affidavits fell "far short of sustaining a prima 
facie case" because they did not "set forth an objective factual 
basis for [the] subjective fears of reprisal from any particular 
person."  Id. 
¶70 Conversely, a comparison of the facts here to a number 
of other cases in which the factual showing was deemed 
sufficient underscores that Rongstad has failed to make the 
required showing.  See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign 
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1982) (evidence of threatening phone 
calls and hate mail, burning of group's literature, destruction 
of members' property, police harassment, firing of shots at the 
group's office, and termination of members' employment was 
sufficient); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 395-96, 
399 (5th Cir. 1980) (evidence of previous arrests, letters 
warning of liability for fines, and other public opprobrium and 
threats of reprisals, was sufficient); Wisconsin Socialist 
Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 433 F. Supp. 540, 547-48 
(E.D. Wis. 1977) (series of affidavits showing potential 
contributors' reluctance to contribute, specific instances of 
harassment, and widespread surveillance were sufficient); In re 
Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371, 376-77 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
34 
 
(Tex. 1998) (testimonial and other evidence was sufficient when 
it demonstrated specific instances when individuals opposed to 
group had boycotted affiliated members or encouraged others to 
do the same); Crocker, 533 N.E.2d at 447-48 (allegations of 
surveillance, intimidation, job firings, disciplinary actions, 
and other reprisals were sufficient where the party seeking 
discovery had position of authority over party asserting 
privilege).21 
¶71 Because we determine that Rongstad failed to make the 
required preliminary factual showing, we need not reach the 
question of whether there are compelling interests here that 
would outweigh a constitutional privilege.  The circuit court 
correctly rejected Rongstad's assertion of privilege under NAACP 
and its progeny.  Rongstad's assertion of privilege was 
                                                 
21 But cf. Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 782 (Cal. 
1978) (in which the majority of the court in a four-to-three 
decision seemingly ignored the need for a preliminary factual 
showing and the dissent stated that the majority had, without 
precedent, "expanded NAACP to a general abstract principle that 
the disclosure of any information about associational activities 
constitutes 
an 
impermissible 
violation 
of 
the 
right 
to 
associate" (Richardson, J., dissenting)); see also Pollard v. 
Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 258 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (seeming not to 
require factual evidence that individuals had been subjected to 
reprisals and instead determining that it would be naïve not to 
recognize that disclosure of identities would subject at least 
some of them to reprisals), aff'd per curiam, Roberts v. 
Pollard, 393 U.S. 14 (1968). 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
35 
 
therefore not an impediment to discovery sanctions in this 
case.22 
¶72 Before turning to Rongstad's next argument, we pause 
to address the dissent's treatment of NAACP and its progeny.  
Deeming those cases inapplicable, the dissent dispenses with 
decades of constitutional law.  Dissent, ¶158; see also dissent, 
¶146.  Worth noting is that this is the case law on which 
Rongstad has principally relied throughout this litigation.  
Tellingly, the dissent finds it necessary to evade these cases 
and their requirement of a preliminary factual showing in order 
to reach its result. 
¶73 As window dressing for its result, the dissent then 
raises the specter of "SLAPP" suits, deeming this case a "SLAPP 
suit masquerading as a defamation case."23  Dissent, ¶108; see 
also dissent, ¶¶159-160.  In characterizing this case as a 
"SLAPP" suit, the dissent seemingly takes on the role of 
advocate.  Rongstad has not characterized this case as a SLAPP 
                                                 
22The dissent inaccurately portrays our opinion as applying 
the deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard to the 
central constitutional issue in this case.  See dissent, ¶110.  
As we have already explained, the lawfulness of the discovery 
and contempt sanctions in this case ultimately turns on a 
question of law subject to independent appellate review:  
whether Rongstad made the required preliminary factual showing 
that meets the standard for asserting a constitutional privilege 
under NAACP.  See, e.g., Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 
330, 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998); State v. Bentley,  201 Wis. 2d 303, 
310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). 
23 "SLAPP" is an acronym for "Strategic Lawsuit Against 
Public Participation".  Vultaggio, 215 Wis. 2d at 359 (Bradley, 
J., dissenting).   
No. 
2004AP377   
 
36 
 
suit, has not advanced that we should address it as such, and 
has not asserted that addressing it as such makes a difference 
in the constitutional calculus.24  Unlike the dissent, we address 
the arguments that Rongstad makes, and we adhere to the 
applicable law.  
C 
¶74 We next turn briefly to Rongstad's argument that he 
made a "substantiated assertion of privilege" under Burnett v. 
Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999).  He argues that Alt 
should apply where a defendant in a defamation action asserts a 
privilege against disclosure based on the First Amendment. 
¶75 In Alt, this court concluded that a witness has a 
qualified privilege to refuse to provide expert testimony, 
absent compelling circumstances.  Id. at 89, 92.  We stated that 
"[a]lthough the circuit court should not rely on the judgment of 
the attorneys involved for their self-interested determination 
that a privilege exists, a substantiated assertion of privilege 
is substantial justification for failing to comply with an order 
to provide or permit discovery."  Id. at 94 (citation omitted).  
Thus, under Alt, a bald assertion of an evidentiary privilege to 
refuse to provide expert testimony will not suffice.  Rather, 
the assertion must be "substantiated." 
                                                 
24 We 
note 
that 
the 
dissent 
also 
wanders 
into 
the 
legislative role.  It calls upon the legislature to adopt anti-
SLAPP statutes even though it concedes that "[u]ntil this case, 
the term SLAPP suit had been relatively unheard of in Wisconsin 
jurisprudence."  Dissent, ¶¶161-162.   
No. 
2004AP377   
 
37 
 
¶76 The court in Alt did not define what is meant by a 
"substantiated" assertion of privilege against providing expert 
testimony.  It is apparent, however, that by requiring that the 
assertion be substantiated, the court was seeking to effectuate 
the necessary balance between the right of expert witnesses to 
be free from testifying against their will and the needs of the 
court and litigants for testimony.  See id. at 88.  The 
requirement of a "substantiated" assertion of the evidentiary 
privilege discourages illegitimate invocation of the privilege. 
¶77 In cases involving discovery orders in the face of an 
assertion of constitutional privilege as here, the balancing 
test under NAACP governs.  That balance, which involves 
considerations different from those in Alt, is effectuated by 
the standards set forth in NAACP and the cases interpreting it.  
Thus, we determine that Alt has no applicability here.  The 
showing that Rongstad had to make was the one required under 
NAACP and its progeny, not a "substantiated assertion" of an 
evidentiary privilege under Alt.  
D 
¶78 We now turn to Rongstad's assertion that the severity 
of the sanctions in this case bore no rational relationship to 
his 
conduct 
or 
to 
any 
harm 
suffered 
by 
Lassa. 
 
More 
specifically, Rongstad argues that the $65,000 in monetary 
sanctions ($43,000 in attorney's fees and a $22,000 forfeiture 
payable to the school fund) "bears no rational relationship to 
Rongstad's refusal to disclose political associations for a mere 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
38 
 
two months" in light of his claim of privilege and his attempt 
to seek interlocutory appeal.  We reject this argument.  
¶79 Rongstad's 
argument 
incorrectly 
assumes 
that 
the 
$65,000 in monetary sanctions is an amount of sanctions set by 
the circuit court, when in fact it is the amount to which the 
parties stipulated in their settlement agreement.  The circuit 
court never made a final ruling on the amount of monetary 
sanctions.  Rather, the parties stipulated to this amount of 
sanctions while the issue of the amount of monetary sanctions 
was still pending before the court.  We will not review the 
amount of monetary "sanctions" agreed to by the parties for an 
erroneous exercise of circuit court discretion.  The circuit 
court never had the opportunity to exercise its discretion as to 
the amount of monetary sanctions it ultimately deemed proper. 
¶80 Rongstad also asserts that a sanction of a default 
judgment on liability issues is too severe and bears no rational 
relationship to the harm suffered.  We question whether the 
parties' settlement agreement and the judgment entered pursuant 
to that agreement reflect an intent to permit Rongstad to appeal 
the propriety of the judgment on liability.25  Regardless, we 
                                                 
25 The parties' settlement agreement states that Rongstad 
"shall have the right to pursue an appeal with respect to the 
attorney's 
fees 
and 
forfeitures 
on 
First 
Amendment 
grounds . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  The judgment entered on the 
agreement, while purporting not to waive "any appellate rights," 
also provides as follows: 
The defendants intend to appeal the appropriateness of 
the fees and forfeitures under the First Amendment, 
Alt, and whether the Courts were justified in the 
award, and any other 
applicable 
legal 
theories.  
No. 
2004AP377   
 
39 
 
determine that the agreement and the judgment entered pursuant 
to the agreement, which dismissed Lassa's claim with prejudice, 
bar Rongstad from challenging the propriety of the default 
judgment on liability.  The effect of the default judgment on 
liability is moot under the parties' agreement and the judgment 
dismissing Lassa's claim with prejudice.   
¶81 We once again pause to address the dissent, which 
protests that "it is draconian to subject Rongstad to the heavy, 
heavy financial sanctions at issue in this case."  Dissent, 
¶183.  Lost on the dissent is that the parties stipulated to the 
amount of monetary sanctions. 
¶82 More 
importantly, 
in 
labeling 
the 
sanctions 
"draconian," the dissent turns a blind eye to facts of record 
that may have justified a circuit court award of monetary 
sanctions equal to or greater than the amount to which the 
parties agreed.  For example, the circuit court judge who 
initially presided in this case observed:  "Seldom have I seen 
such an abuse."  The court also found that Rongstad had lied 
under oath, was "highly evasive," and had "engaged in a well-
planned effort to cover up" his activities.  Similarly, the 
circuit court judge who later presided concluded that Rongstad's 
conduct was egregious and in bad faith.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Rongstad and The Valkyrie Group retain the right to 
appeal the contempt ruling on all issues for the 
stipulated amount of $65,000 with $43,000 in contempt 
related attorney's fees and $22,000 in forfeitures 
payable to the School Fund. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
40 
 
¶83 The dissent carefully avoids giving any truck to these 
facts, instead portraying Rongstad as the victim of a biased 
circuit court, of a "shrewd and savvy" legislator (Lassa), and 
now of this court.  Dissent, ¶¶129, 153, 162, 164 & n.11, 170, 
172, 179, 181-185.  Yet, nothing in the record calls into 
question the impartiality of the circuit court.  Likewise, we 
have taken pains in this opinion to avoid portraying either 
Lassa or Rongstad in an unfavorable light and to avoid 
suggesting an improper motive on the part of one party or the 
other.  Perhaps if the dissent had more facts or more law on its 
side, it could have done the same.  Instead, the dissent brings 
the following quotation to mind:  "When you have the facts on 
your side, argue the facts.  When you have the law on your side, 
argue the law.  When you have neither, holler." 
E 
¶84 Finally, we turn to address the question of whether we 
should exercise our superintending authority to establish an 
interlocutory appeal as a matter of right in defamation cases 
involving 
discovery 
sanctions 
that 
raise 
questions 
of 
a 
constitutional privilege.  Our exercise of the superintending 
power is limited to situations in which the "necessities of 
justice" require it.  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 
231, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  Moreover, requiring automatic 
grants of interlocutory appeal pursuant to this power is 
generally disfavored.  State ex rel. Hass v. Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, 2001 WI 128, ¶24, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
41 
 
¶85 Rongstad argues that this case should be controlled by 
Arneson, in which this court concluded that the court of appeals 
should as a matter of course grant a petition for an 
interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state 
official's claim of qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action.  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 219-20.  We determined that 
such a petition would always fall within the criteria for leave 
to appeal under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 808.03(2)(a) and (b).26  Id. 
at 229. 
¶86 In other contexts, however, the court has declined to 
exercise its superintending authority to require interlocutory 
appeals under circumstances that may be viewed as equally 
compelling to circumstances such as those here.  See Hass, 248 
Wis. 2d 634, ¶¶2, 20; State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 288 
N.W.2d 114, modified on reconsideration, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 97A-97B, 
292 N.W.2d 348 (1980).  In Jenich, for example, we declined to 
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 808.03(2) provides: 
Appeals by permission.  A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in 
the administration of justice. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
42 
 
direct the court of appeals to hear permissive appeals denying 
motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy claims despite the 
"serious 
constitutional questions" 
raised by 
such claims.  
Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d at 97A n.1, 97B.  Rather, we were content to 
urge the court of appeals to carefully exercise its discretion 
in considering whether to hear such appeals.  Id. at 97B. 
¶87 Here, we follow our approach in Jenich, mindful of the 
rule that automatic grants of interlocutory appeal are generally 
disfavored.  Mandatory interlocutory review of orders that 
compel or deny discovery when an assertion of constitutional 
privilege is raised in a defamation case is not foreordained by 
Arneson or otherwise dictated by the necessities of justice.  
Cf. Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) 
("[E]ven orders to produce information over strong objections 
based on privilege are not appealable, despite the claim that 
once the cat is out of the bag the privilege is gone."). 
¶88 Although defamation cases like the one before us may 
raise 
serious 
constitutional 
questions, 
the 
constitutional 
questions raised in double jeopardy cases are equally serious.  
The constitutional rights at stake are adequately protected by 
the court of appeals' careful consideration of petitions for 
leave to appeal and by any other review procedure available, 
such as a petition for a supervisory writ.  "[O]rdinary judicial 
review procedures suffice as long as the courts remain sensitive 
to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and administer 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
43 
 
those procedures accordingly."  City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts 
D-4, LLC, 541 U.S. 774, 781-82 (2004).27 
                                                 
27 We note that Rongstad did not exhaust all available 
procedures for appellate review.  As previously mentioned, for 
example, Rongstad initially sought interlocutory relief in the 
court of appeals from the circuit court's February 4, 2003, 
order, asserting that the circuit court erred by rejecting his 
assertion of privilege under NAACP.  Ultimately, however, the 
court of appeals dismissed Rongstad's petition for leave to 
appeal from the February 4 order after he failed to file any 
argument.  The court of appeals concluded "it appears that 
Rongstad no longer wishes to seek interlocutory review . . . ." 
Likewise, at the March 11, 2003 sanctions hearing, the 
circuit court observed as follows: 
Mr. Rongstad failed to pursue his further opportunity, 
which was to ask the Court of Appeals to address the 
merits 
of 
my 
order 
on 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal 
basis. . . .  It was, in effect, abandoned.  
And that having been said, Mr. Rongstad's most 
recent claims that he is going to seek vindication in 
the Court of Appeals and that that is what explains 
his conduct and his defiance of this Court's order 
likewise falls on rather hollow footing.  Instead, 
what it appears virtually certain to be is simply 
another in the variety of steps that Mr. Rongstad has 
taken in this litigation to seek delay and to avoid 
his responsibilities under the law. 
In addition, it appears that Rongstad chose not to utilize 
other mechanisms for interlocutory relief.  Lassa sets forth the 
following background facts in her brief: 
On April 1, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied a 
second petition for leave to appeal and motion for 
temporary relief filed by Mr. Rongstad seeking review 
of the court's February 28 and March 11, 2003 orders 
because the Court does not take permissive appeal[s] 
on oral orders.  Those sanctions orders were reduced 
to [a] written order on April 2, 2003. . . .   Mr. 
Rongstad did not seek leave for appeal of the April 2, 
2003 order. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
44 
 
¶89 Accordingly, we decline to exercise our superintending 
authority to establish a right to interlocutory appeal as 
Rongstad 
requests. 
 
Nevertheless, 
given 
the 
important 
constitutional issues raised and the consequent need for a 
timely resolution, we urge the court of appeals to carefully 
weigh whether there is a need for interlocutory appeal in a 
given case.  Such an appeal may be necessary to protect a party 
from "substantial or irreparable injury," one of the criteria 
for testing the appropriateness of an interlocutory appeal under 
§ (Rule) 808.03(2).  We trust that the court of appeals will 
carefully exercise its discretion to grant or deny leave to 
appeal or other relief as appropriate.  
IV 
¶90 In sum, we hold as follows: 
(A) In defamation cases, circuit courts should ordinarily 
decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
before sanctioning a party for refusing to disclose information 
that 
would 
identify 
otherwise-anonymous 
members 
of 
an 
organization.  Under the circumstances here, however, the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
compelling discovery and imposing sanctions before deciding 
Rongstad's motion to dismiss. 
(B) The 
circuit 
court 
properly 
rejected 
Rongstad's 
assertion of privilege under the balancing test of the NAACP 
line of cases because Rongstad failed to make the required 
preliminary factual showing to support his assertion. 
No. 
2004AP377   
 
45 
 
(C) Alt has no applicability in this case.  The showing 
that Rongstad had to make was the one required under NAACP, not 
a "substantiated assertion" of evidentiary privilege under Alt. 
(D) We reject Rongstad's challenge to the severity of the 
$65,000 in attorney's fees and forfeitures because the circuit 
court did not set that amount——the parties did by stipulation.  
Rongstad cannot claim that the amount of $65,000 has no rational 
relationship to the harm suffered or that the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion it setting the amount.  We also 
determine that Rongstad's challenge to the default judgment on 
liability is moot under the parties' settlement agreement. 
¶91 In addition, we decline to exercise our superintending 
authority to establish an interlocutory appeal as a matter of 
right in defamation cases involving discovery sanctions that 
raise questions of a constitutional privilege.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court judgment.  
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
¶92 JON P. WILCOX, N. PATRICK CROOKS, and PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶93 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  Todd 
Rongstad (Rongstad) seeks to assert First Amendment protections 
before 
this 
court 
in 
response 
to 
Julie 
Lassa's 
(Lassa) 
defamation claim.  The action before us is not about Lassa's 
defamation claim or Rongstad's First Amendment defense, however.  
This case is about the power of the circuit court to enforce the 
orders that it lawfully enters during litigation that is pending 
before it.  When viewed in the proper perspective, the 
resolution 
of 
this 
matter 
is 
relatively 
simple 
and 
straightforward. 
¶94 The majority and the dissent are determined to reach 
and decide matters that were dismissed as part of a settlement 
agreement that was accepted by the circuit court.  The majority 
chooses 
to 
reach 
Rongstad's 
assertions 
of 
privilege 
in 
determining whether discovery sanctions are appropriate for his 
refusal to comply with discovery orders.  The dissent chooses to 
reach Rongstad's assertions of privilege as part of deciding the 
defamation claim.  I am not so inclined.  The defamation claim 
has been dismissed, a result sought by Rongstad.  That dismissal 
includes the defenses to the claim, including any assertions of 
privilege by Rongstad.  The dismissal of the defamation claim 
was part of the settlement agreement between the parties, 
approved by the court.  It's over.  The merits of the underlying 
defamation action are simply not before us.  The assertions of 
privilege are not before us.  To reach out and decide the merits 
of that dismissed claim and any defense Rongstad had to it would 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
2 
 
allow Rongstad to have his cake, and eat it too.  We should not 
become so engaged.  
¶95 The majority concludes that in defamation cases, 
circuit courts should ordinarily decide a pending motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim before sanctioning a party 
for refusing to disclose information that would identify 
otherwise-anonymous members of an organization.  Majority op., 
¶¶5, 90.  Because I agree that this approach should be followed 
by the circuit courts in the future, I concur with and join that 
portion of the opinion.  Likewise, I concur with and join that 
portion of the decision in which we decline to exercise our 
superintending authority to establish a right to interlocutory 
appeal as Rongstad suggests.  Id., ¶¶6, 89, 91.  I also concur 
with and join that portion of the opinion which holds that under 
the circumstances here, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in compelling discovery and imposing 
sanctions before deciding Rongstad's motion to dismiss.  Id.,  
¶¶5, 90.  I finally concur with and join that portion of the 
opinion that rejects Rongstad's challenge to the severity of the 
$65,000 in attorney's fees and forfeitures because the parties 
stipulated to that amount.1  Id.   
¶96 Because the circuit court dismissed the underlying 
defamation claim with prejudice, however, I conclude that this 
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Lassa's 
defamation claim, and Rongstad's assertion of any privilege with 
                                                 
1 Three members of this court, Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Justice Bradley and I, all agree that sanctions in the amount of 
$65,000 are therefore proper in this matter. 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
3 
 
respect to that claim, including whether the circuit court 
properly imposed sanctions for a violation of pretrial discovery 
orders.   
¶97 It is axiomatic that in "all cases of appeal or error, 
there 
must 
have 
been 
a 
proceeding, 
in 
good 
faith, 
an 
adjudication in an inferior court.  This inferior court must 
have passed upon the case . . . ."  Webster v. Stadden, 8 Wis. 
83, *225, *228, 37 N.W. 316 (1859).  "[P]arties cannot, either 
by failure to raise the question or by consent, confer 
jurisdiction upon an appellate court to review an order which is 
not appealable."  Szuszka v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 241, 
243, 112 N.W.2d 699 (1961); see also Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Thoma, 45 Wis. 2d 580, 586-87, 173 N.W.2d 717 (1970).  This 
court simply has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a 
nonappealable order.  Gilbert v. Hoard, 201 Wis. 572, 573, 230 
N.W. 720 (1930); see also Hargrove v. Peterson, 65 Wis. 2d 118, 
122, 221 N.W.2d 875 (1974) ("When an order is not appealable, 
this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and any attempted 
appeal must be dismissed."). 
¶98 Prior to the reorganization of the court system in 
1977, Wis. Stat. § 817.10 provided that any judgment or order 
was reviewable by a "party aggrieved."  Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis. 2d 522, 526, 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983).  
That provision was omitted from the 1977 revision of the rules 
and statutes because it was considered to merely state a 
fundamental and well-understood concept upon which standing to 
appeal was predicated: 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
4 
 
"The elimination of the phrase in the revisions of the 
statutes and rules was not intended to change the 
concept that a person had to be aggrieved by a 
judgment or order before he could appeal."  Martineau 
and Malmgren, Wisconsin Appellate Practice, sec. 601 
(1978). 
Id.  A person is aggrieved if the judgment bears directly and 
injuriously upon his or her interests, and the person must be 
adversely affected in some appreciable manner.  Weina v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 345, 501 N.W.2d 465 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993); 
Ford 
Motor 
Credit 
Co. 
v. 
Mills, 
142 
Wis. 2d 215, 217-18, 418 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 
¶99 In this action, there is no question that Rongstad has 
been aggrieved by the sanctions imposed by the circuit court for 
contempt-related 
attorney's 
fees 
and 
contempt-related 
forfeitures.2  Those sanctions, along with the question of 
whether the circuit court should decide a pending motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim before sanctioning a party 
for refusing to comply with the circuit court's discovery 
orders, are therefore properly before this court. 
 
¶100 The underlying merits of Lassa's defamation claim and 
Rongstad's assertion of privilege with respect to both that 
claim, as well as to the validity of the discovery sanctions, 
are an altogether different matter.  The parties entered into a 
settlement, approved by the circuit court, which dismissed the 
                                                 
2 Once again, it must be noted that Rongstad agreed to be 
sanctioned, in part to secure a dismissal of the defamation 
claim against him.  This matter is complicated by his attempt to 
preserve certain issues on appeal as part of the stipulation, 
notwithstanding the dismissal of the underlying defamation 
claim. 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
5 
 
underlying defamation claim with prejudice.  Majority op., ¶¶26-
27.  While Rongstad has been aggrieved by the contempt sanctions 
for refusing to comply with lawful court orders, he simply 
cannot assert that he has been aggrieved from a judgment in 
which he prevailed.3  Wisconsin Stat. § 809.10 (4) does not 
provide Rongstad with a vehicle for appealing the judgment of 
dismissal entered in his favor.4 
 
¶101 It matters not that Rongstad sought to preserve 
certain of his appellate rights by way of stipulation.  See 
Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis. 2d 578, 587, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980) 
("It follows, therefore, that the [parties] lacked authority to 
                                                 
3 The 
majority 
curiously 
asserts 
that 
Rongstad 
is 
"aggrieved" by the final judgment because he entered into a 
"settlement agreement" that required him to pay $65,000 in 
sanctions.  Majority op., ¶28.  He agreed to the judgment, which 
included dismissal of the defamation claim against him, and he 
agreed to be sanctioned in that amount.   
4 The case of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), did not 
involve the dismissal of the underlying claim such as occurred 
here.  Instead, the NAACP chose to challenge the circuit court's 
final judgment of civil contempt against the organization in the 
context of opposing an action to enjoin the organization from 
conducting further activities in the state.  Id. at 452-53, 466-
67.  Similarly, in Burnett  v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 
N.W.2d 21 (1999), the underlying negligence action had not been 
dismissed when the issue of contempt arose and was appealed.     
That is precisely what should have occurred here.  Rongstad 
could have litigated the underlying defamation claim, any 
defenses to that claim, and the validity of the discovery orders 
had he 
chosen to 
do so. 
 Instead, 
Rongstad 
abandoned, 
unintentionally 
perhaps, 
any 
opportunity 
to 
pursue 
that 
defamation claim and any First Amendment defenses to it, as well 
as the validity of the discovery orders related to the 
defamation claim, when he agreed to the dismissal of the 
defamation claim, and the judgment of dismissal was entered by 
the circuit court. 
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
6 
 
create by contract a greater right of judicial review than what 
they enjoyed by statute.").  Parties simply cannot confer 
jurisdiction upon an appellate court by consent, and an order or 
judgment must be appealable for an appellate court to exercise 
its appellate jurisdiction.  As such, his stipulation preserving 
certain appellate rights was invalid.   
 
¶102 This matter should be decided on the same footing as 
this court's decisions in Lawrence v. MacIntyre, 48 Wis. 2d 550, 
553, 180 N.W.2d 538 (1970), and Gallagher v. Schernecker, 60 
Wis. 2d 143, 148-49, 208 N.W.2d 437 (1973).  In Lawrence, 48 
Wis. 2d at 553, the appellants appealed from an order dismissing 
the plaintiff's complaint, an order in their favor.  This court 
appropriately dismissed the appeal, ruling that the parties were 
not "aggrieved."  Id.  "We think it elementary that a party may 
not appeal from a judgment in his favor."  Id.  (citation 
omitted).   
 
¶103 Similarly, in Gallagher, 60 Wis. 2d at 148-49, this 
court held that where an appellant seeks an order vacating an 
arbitration award and secures such an order, "[a]s the moving 
party who prevailed, he is not an aggrieved party with the right 
to appeal the order vacating the award."5   See also Edlin v. 
Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 264 N.W.2d 275 (1978) (where the 
complainant had sought the relief granted by other portions of 
the judgment, and as to those parts of the judgment he was not 
                                                 
5 Because respondent cross-appealed from the order vacating 
the award, which was appealable as to the respondent, the issues 
were before the court and resolved on the merits.  Gallagher v. 
Schernecker, 60 Wis. 2d 143, 149, 208 N.W.2d 437 (1973).   
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
7 
 
an aggrieved party and could not appeal); Thoma, 45 Wis. 2d at 
588 (a "defendant cannot appeal from the judgment which grants 
the nonsuit he sought and secured."). 
 
¶104 Rongstad sought and secured a dismissal with prejudice 
of Lassa's defamation claim.  He is not an aggrieved party as to 
that judgment.  This court is therefore deprived of jurisdiction 
to decide the merits of that action and any orders entered as 
part 
of 
that 
action, 
including 
any 
defenses 
to 
it.  
Consequently, I would not reach the questions of whether the 
circuit court incorrectly applied the constitutional balancing 
test under NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), or whether 
Rongstad made a "substantiated assertion of privilege" under 
Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 94, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999).6  I 
respectfully decline to join those portions of the majority 
opinion.  If Rongstad wanted this court to reach these issues, 
he should have litigated them on the merits before the circuit 
court. 
 
¶105 Rongstad was found in contempt by the circuit court 
for intentionally failing to comply with the court's orders to 
provide discovery to Lassa.  "The court noted it appeared that 
Rongstad had lied under oath and that he had given evasive 
                                                 
6 Both the majority opinion and the dissent have chosen to 
address some of the First Amendment concerns raised by Rongstad 
in this appeal.  This would be entirely appropriate, had this 
matter been fully litigated at the circuit court level to 
conclusion.  As the circuit court has dismissed the underlying 
claim with prejudice, any relevance regarding First Amendment 
concerns would be now limited to the question of whether the 
circuit court should assess attorneys' fees against Rongstad, as 
opposed to whether the circuit court should have ordered 
sanctions in the first instance.  See Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(b).     
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
8 
 
answers designed to avoid providing the information ordered."  
Majority op., ¶21.  The circuit court found Rongstad's conduct 
to be "egregious and in bad faith."  Majority op., ¶24.  
Sanctions, including attorney's fees, were ultimately imposed 
against Rongstad for his contempt of court.7  While the amount of 
the sanctions imposed is properly before this court, there is no 
doubt that Rongstad intentionally failed to comply with the 
circuit court's discovery orders.  Majority op., ¶21.  Rongstad 
simply has no right to willfully disobey a lawful court order 
just because he disagrees with it. 
 
¶106 Rongstad had to abide by the terms of the discovery 
order, even if erroneously entered, until he either succeeded in 
reversing the order in the trial court or through the applicable 
review process.  See State v. Orethun, 84 Wis. 2d 487, 490, 267 
N.W.2d 318 (1978) ("Where a court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and the parties, the fact that an order or 
judgment is erroneously or improvidently rendered does not 
justify a person in failing to abide by its terms.") (citation 
omitted); Anderson v. Anderson, 82 Wis. 2d 115, 118-19, 261 
N.W.2d 817 (1978); cf. Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 222 
Wis. 2d 117, 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A voidable 
judgment . . . has the same effect and force as a valid judgment 
until it has been set aside.").  The only way he could refuse to 
follow the order was if that order was found to be void and 
therefore did not need to be obeyed.  See State v. Campbell, 
                                                 
7 It is not clear whether those sanctions were imposed 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 785.04(1) 
and 
804.12(2)(a)4., 
or 
whether they were imposed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(b).   
No.  2004AP377.lbb 
 
9 
 
2006 WI 99, ¶¶42, 49, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Because 
the underlying matter was dismissed as part of the settlement 
agreement entered into by Rongstad, the discovery order was 
never held to be void.  The circuit court was thus fully 
justified in enforcing its order.  
¶107 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
               
 
 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶108 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This is a SLAPP 
suit masquerading as a defamation case.1  A SLAPP suit represents 
an attempt to chill First Amendment rights by bringing a tort 
suit, such as defamation.  Like a defamation case, this suit 
implicates important issues of constitutional law. 
¶109 The United States Supreme Court has prescribed the 
standard 
for 
reviewing 
limitations 
on 
political 
speech, 
declaring that "[w]hen a law hinders core political speech, we 
apply 'exacting scrutiny' and we uphold the restriction only if 
it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest."  
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).  
Although this case involves review of judicial determinations 
affecting speech rather than the application of a speech-
restrictive statute, the standard we apply should be no less 
rigorous.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 
(1964). 
¶110 The majority sees it differently.  It does not apply 
exacting scrutiny to the circuit court's decision to compel 
discovery and impose sanctions.  Instead, it applies the 
deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard, as though 
this standard adequately safeguards First Amendment freedoms.  I 
cannot agree. 
 
                                                 
1 SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation.  Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 359, 572 
N.W.2d 450 (1998) (Bradley, J., dissenting); Briggs v. Eden 
Council, 969 P.2d 564, 565 n.1 (Cal. 1999).  
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
2 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶111 The facts and context are critical to the proper 
resolution of the constitutional issues in this case, and thus 
they are reported at some length. 
¶112 The plaintiff, Julie Lassa, is a Democratic state 
senator from Stevens Point.  She was elected to the Assembly in 
1998, 2000, and 2002, and elected to the Senate in a special 
election on April 29, 2003.2 
¶113 In 2002, shortly before the general election, the 
defendant, Todd Rongstad, caused a mailing to be sent to voters 
in Representative Lassa's 71st Assembly District, as well as 
some voters in other areas that make up the 24th Senate 
District.  The mailing consisted of an oversized two-sided 
postcard.  One side of this mailing shows a colored photograph 
of Lassa jumping, with her shoes off, in the rotunda of the 
State Capitol, in front of a group of students.  The smiling 
face of then-Senator Charles Chvala is superimposed, like 
multiple colored masks, on the students' heads. 
¶114 The bottom of this first side reproduces a Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel headline 
reporting, 
"Chvala 
charged 
with 
extortion, State Senator faces 20 felony counts, up to 85 years 
in prison."  At the top of the jumping picture in bold type is 
the name "Julie Lassa."  At the bottom of the picture is the 
phrase "When Chuck Said Jump . . ." 
¶115 On the other side of the card the following text is 
printed over the photograph of Senator Chvala's mug shot: 
                                                 
2 State of Wisconsin Blue Book at 66 (2005-06 ed.). 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
3 
 
Lassa Wanted To Be A State Senator, So She Hooked Up 
With Chuck Chvala. 
A Tale of Wisconsin Politics 
One day, Julie Lassa decided she wanted to be a state 
senator.  So she asked Senate Leader Chuck Chvala if 
she could, and he said okay. 
Nobody knows for sure what she had to promise to gain 
his approval.  But Chuck wanted a more compliant 
senator, so he got to work. 
What he did best was fundraise with unsubtle threats.  
Populist Chvala even sponsored a Lassa fundraiser at 
the state's ritziest country club. 
Chvala didn't care much for dissent.  And he was giddy 
with the idea of Senator Julie. 
Just like the old days when party bosses made 
decisions for us all. 
But then Lassa's mentor was charged with 20 felonies 
and things fell apart. 
The End? 
Extortion, misconduct in public office, pay to play, 
lying, cheating and stealing.  Wisconsin politics has 
gone 
completely 
astray. 
 
Please 
call 
Julie 
Lassa . . . and the rest and ask them the tough 
questions——did you compromise your integrity, did you 
play along with an illegal game, did you misuse tax 
dollars to win elections?   
And, most importantly, will you please clean up your 
act? 
¶116 This 
side 
of 
the 
card 
also 
carries 
two 
small 
photographs of Lassa as well as a space for a mailing address.  
In two places, the mailing indicates that it was produced by 
"The Alliance for a Working Wisconsin" (the Alliance) with a 
post office box in Waunakee, Wisconsin. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶117 The mailing was designed to embarrass Lassa by linking 
her to Senator Chvala, who had recently been charged with 
several campaign-related offenses.  The apparent motive for the 
mailing was to discourage Lassa from running for the state 
senate should the 24th District senate seat become vacant, or to 
weaken her candidacy if she made such a race. 
¶118 The 2002 mailing had no effect on Lassa's election to 
the Assembly, as she was re-elected with 73 percent of the vote, 
a higher percentage than she received in 2000. 
¶119 At that time, the 24th Senate District was represented 
by Senator Kevin Shibilski, also a Democrat.  Senator Shibilski 
had angered some members of his party, including Senator Chvala, 
when he voted for a Republican-sponsored budget "repair" bill in 
2002.  The residual effect of his vote surfaced later in the 
year when Senator Shibilski was defeated by Barbara Lawton in a 
statewide Democratic primary for lieutenant governor. 
¶120 After 
the 
2002 
election, 
Senator 
Shibilski 
was 
designated by Governor-elect James Doyle as the new Secretary of 
Tourism.  He resigned his senate seat in early January, which 
led eventually to a special election to fill the vacancy.   
¶121 On 
January 
16, 
2003, 
Lassa 
filed 
suit 
against 
Rongstad, alleging defamation.  Lassa's complaint stated in 
part: 
 
[1.] Lassa has not made a decision whether to run 
for [Shibilski's] vacated seat as of this [date]. 
 
[2.] Lassa was not a candidate for State Senate 
as alleged in the text of the mailer-postcard and 
Lassa did not ask for help from Chvala to run for the 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
5 
 
State Senate, a seat then occupied by Democratic 
Senator Kevin [Shibilski] . . .  
 
[3.] The message falsely asserts to citizens 
receiving 
the 
mailer-postcard 
a) 
that 
Lassa was 
running for the Senate; b) that she was doing so at 
the demand of Chvala who was, at the time of the 
mailing, under indictment on 20 felony counts; and c) 
that Lassa was involved in the conduct that led to the 
indictment of Senator Chvala. 
 
[4.] The bottom of the mailer-postcard shows a 
picture of Lassa directly to the right of the 
following text that is superimposed over what appears 
to be the booking information from the Dane County 
Sheriff's office for the arrest of Chvala: 
Extortion, misconduct in public office, pay 
to 
play, 
lying, 
cheating 
and 
stealing.  
Wisconsin 
politics 
has 
gone 
completely 
astray.  Please call Julie Lassa . . . and 
the rest and ask them the tough questions——
did you compromise your integrity, did you 
play along with an illegal game, did you 
misuse tax dollars to win elections?  And, 
most importantly, will you please clean up 
your act? 
 
[5.] The message falsely and maliciously asserts 
to her constituents that Lassa engaged in "extortion," 
"misconduct in public office," "pay to play," as well 
as "lying, cheating and stealing." 
 
[6.] Lassa 
has 
not 
engaged 
in such 
illegal 
activity . . . and is not involved in the Chvala 
matter in any way. 
 
[7.] The mailer-postcard was published out of ill 
will and an intent to destroy Lassa's political 
reputation in the community and any opportunity she 
might have to run for the State Senate and other 
political positions in the future. 
 
[8.] Defendants have caused to be communicated 
and 
published 
a 
false 
and 
malicious 
statement 
regarding Plaintiff's conduct. 
 
[9.] Plaintiff has been injured by the false and 
malicious 
communication 
by 
lowering 
her 
in 
the 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
6 
 
estimation of her constituents and other citizens of 
the state. 
 
[10.] 
As a direct and proximate result of the 
defamatory 
statements, 
Plaintiff 
has 
suffered 
compensatory damages, including but not limited to 
loss 
of 
future 
earnings 
and 
opportunities, 
humiliation, 
damage 
to 
her 
reputation, 
emotional 
distress, pain and suffering and costs incurred in 
bringing this action, all in amounts to be determined. 
 
¶122 The summons issued to Rongstad advised him that he had 
45 days after service to file a written answer to the complaint.  
However, on January 16, the same date as the filing, the 
plaintiff's attorney, Edward Garvey, issued a subpoena duces 
tecum commanding Rongstad to appear at Garvey's office on 
January 30 for a deposition.  The subpoena also commanded 
Rongstad to bring "any and all documents relating to the 
Complaint filed in this matter." 
 
¶123 On January 23, Rongstad's attorney, Michael P. Crooks, 
advised Attorney Garvey that the January 30 date was not 
convenient, either for him or for defendant Rongstad.  Having 
received no response by January 27, Attorney Crooks filed a 
motion with the court for a protective order postponing the 
deposition.  In this motion, Attorney Crooks asserted that the 
action and subpoena were not served upon the defendant until 
January 22, the day before he wrote to Attorney Garvey.  Thus, 
he claimed, the plaintiff had "subpoenaed Defendant Rongstad for 
a deposition scheduled 39 days before he is even required to 
file an answer." 
 
¶124 In the January 27 brief accompanying the motion, 
Attorney Crooks asked for time to answer the complaint.  
"Defendants also anticipate filing a motion to dismiss the 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
7 
 
summons and complaint.  Again, forcing Defendant Rongstad to 
undergo a deposition prior to a resolution of these preliminary 
matters subjects him to annoyance, oppression, undue burden and 
expense."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶125 In a second filing on January 28, Attorney Crooks 
swore in an affidavit: 
That as mentioned in the initial moving papers, your 
affiant plans on filing a motion to dismiss the 
complaint in its entirety, as the same fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.  [The] 
defendants request an adjournment of any depositions 
until after the Court has an opportunity to hear said 
motion.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶126 On January 28, Defendant Rongstad also filed an 
affidavit with the court, explaining why January 30 was 
inconvenient and stating, "[Y]our affiant has ordered his 
attorneys to file a motion to dismiss the case, based upon his 
belief that it is meritless and done for political purposes, 
rather than for pursuit of actual damages."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶127 On January 29, 2003, Dane County Circuit Judge Michael 
N. Nowakowski heard the motion to quash Attorney Garvey's 
subpoena for the January 30 deposition.  Attorney Crooks began 
his presentation with the observation that "within the lawsuit I 
think we're . . . entering real dangerous grounds.  If the Court 
allows this to go forward, the Court is essentially sanctioning 
a system where we put process ahead of what is purported to be a 
legitimate lawsuit." 
¶128 Rongstad's attorney argued that the purpose of the 
suit was political.  "[W]e intend to file a motion to dismiss 
the entire lawsuit within a week to 10 days. . . .  [To] subject 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
8 
 
[Rongstad] to the deposition process under the guise of a 
legitimate lawsuit is not right."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶129 The circuit court was not impressed.  The court 
chastised counsel for not knowing whether he and Rongstad, who 
was not present, were available for a January 31 deposition, yet 
it refused counsel's request to call his office.  The court 
said: 
I will make this point with respect to some of the 
contentions that you've raised.  There is no basis 
under the law to say that simply because someone has 
only recently been served and represents that they 
intend to file a motion to dismiss the case that they 
are therefore immune from or not subject to having 
their deposition taken.  That simply is not a 
principle of law that applies.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
. . . .  
 
The other thing that is apparent . . . is that 
there are other defendants who have not been served, 
have not been named and have only been identified as 
Does that Mr. Garvey and his client are entitled to 
try and find out who they are . . . . 
¶130 Ultimately, the parties agreed to a deposition on 
Monday, February 3, 2003.  At that deposition, Rongstad declined 
to answer certain questions on constitutional grounds, on the 
advice of counsel. 
¶131 At a hearing the following day, February 4, Rongstad's 
attorney stressed that Rongstad accepted full responsibility for 
the mailing, but he objected to comprehensive questioning about 
membership in Rongstad's organization and the speed with which 
the discovery was proceeding. 
¶132 In rebuttal, Attorney Garvey argued: "There is a 
special election that is coming up.  We now know that that seat 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
9 
 
is vacant, and therefore, I think it is extremely important that 
we get to the bottom of this as quickly as possible."3 
¶133 The court declared: 
This is a private lawsuit in which an individual 
citizen seeks injunctive relief and damages on the 
basis 
of 
her 
allegations 
that 
she 
has 
been 
defamed . . . . 
 
The 
suit 
asserts 
common 
law 
rights . . .  
 . . . [T]he 
interests 
to 
be 
weighed 
are 
different in this setting than in the pure government 
enforcement arena. 
¶134 The court distinguished NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958), cited by Rongstad, on grounds that Lassa represented a 
different kind of interest than the state government of Alabama: 
 
The purely private interest of any citizen in his 
or her good name has long been recognized as worthy of 
the careful protection of the law.  While the 
plaintiff by voluntarily injecting herself into the 
public spotlight by becoming a candidate for public 
office is expected to live with certain attacks on her 
good name that a purely private person might not have 
to suffer, she does not forfeit entirely the law's 
protection. 
 
. . . .  
 
Were I to sustain the objection to the questions 
at issue . . . the practical effect would be to grant 
these 
unknown 
participants 
in 
the 
alleged 
defamation . . . the 
absolute 
immunity 
that 
the 
Supreme Court was so careful to eschew. 
 
The objections are overruled, and the defendant 
Rongstad is ordered to answer all questions inquiring 
as to the names and behavior of any other persons 
involved in the preparation, funding or distribution 
of the mailing.  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
3 Governor Doyle did not issue an executive order for an 
April 1 primary and an April 29 special election until February 
19, 2003.  See Executive Order No. 4 (Feb. 19, 2003). 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
10 
 
 
¶135 Early on, the court rejected Rongstad's request to 
file briefs on the issues, and, after its ruling, the court 
rejected a stay so that Rongstad could seek a supervisory writ.4  
The 
court 
underlined 
its 
position: 
"The 
suggestion 
that 
[Rongstad] and his counsel have been denied the opportunity to 
make presentation on the two issues that were alluded to by Mr. 
Crooks is simply unfair, is an unfair characterization of what 
transpired . . . when I was unexpectedly confronted with this 
issue." 
 
¶136 On February 6, after "roughly 10 hours" and over 400 
pages of deposition, Rongstad asked the court to hear a motion 
for reconsideration.  Attorney Crooks argued that Lassa claimed 
that she was defamed "in the context of her position as a State 
Representative and potentially a State Senator.  She is an 
officer of the State of Wisconsin, and I believe as a result of 
that that the state action cases are applicable to the Court's 
analysis."  Moreover, he said, the court's order itself 
constituted "state action." 
                                                 
4 Rongstad promptly asked the court of appeals to stay the 
circuit court's order "to answer all questions inquiring as to 
the names and behavior of any other persons involved in the 
preparation, funding or distribution of the mailing."  On 
February 4, the court of appeals denied the petition.  On April 
1, the court of appeals denied Rongstad's request for leave to 
appeal and his motion for temporary relief.  On the same day, 
April 1, the court of appeals denied Rongstad's request for a 
supervisory writ.  The majority characterizes Rongstad's actions 
as failure "to pursue the appeal," majority op., ¶16, and 
failure to "exhaust all available procedures for appellate 
review."  Majority op., ¶88, n.27. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
11 
 
 
¶137 The court denied the motion for reconsideration and 
stated, "[I]t's a sad day in our political system when somehow 
this kind of activity is covered up and evaded.  Seldom have I 
seen such an abuse." 
 
¶138 On February 10, Rongstad filed an answer to the 
complaint.  For affirmative defenses, Rongstad asserted that the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted; the statements in the postcard were not defamatory; the 
statements 
in 
the 
postcard 
were 
substantially 
true; 
the 
defendant's conduct was privileged; and the statements, because 
they related to Lassa's "actions as a public official," were 
entitled to greater protection from liability than if they had 
been made against a private individual. 
 
¶139 The following day, February 11, Attorney Crooks filed 
a motion to dismiss, together with a 15-page brief discussing 
the constitutional principles and facts supporting the motion.5 
 
¶140 On February 18 the court heard argument on a motion by 
Attorney Garvey for a protective order to quash a subpoena to 
depose Lassa.  The court granted the motion, delaying any 
deposition of Lassa until after March 15. 
 
¶141 On February 21 Lassa moved for sanctions.  She 
requested that Rongstad be held in contempt and that the court 
                                                 
5 The majority plays up the circuit court's February 13 
briefing schedule, which gave Lassa only one month to answer 
Rongstad's brief on the motion to dismiss.  Majority op., ¶¶17, 
55.  Lassa filed her reply brief on March 14.  By that time, the 
court had held Rongstad in contempt, imposed attorney fees, and 
ordered that Rongstad pay a forfeiture of $1000 per day until he 
complied with the court's orders. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
12 
 
impose forfeitures for any continuing violation of the court's 
orders.  Hearings were held on February 28 and March 11.  The 
court imposed a sanction of more than $32,000 in attorney fees 
and ordered, beginning March 13, that Rongstad pay a forfeiture 
of $1000 per day until he complied with the court's orders. 
 
¶142 On April 1, Lassa handily won a Democratic primary 
election for the senate, defeating Attorney Alex Paul, who was 
ultimately exposed as having financed the 2002 mailing.  In 
expensive 
primary 
advertising, 
Paul 
promoted 
themes 
that 
paralleled the postcard, prompting Attorney Garvey to publicly 
threaten to depose Paul's campaign to determine whether Paul had 
anything to do with the mailing.  Paul, Lassa squabble over ads, 
Stevens Point J., Mar. 21, 2003.  In the April 29 special 
election, Lassa was elected to the senate, winning more than 61 
percent of the vote. 
¶143 On July 8, 2003, long after the election, a different 
Dane County judge denied the defendant's February 11 motion to 
dismiss.  On August 15 the court granted Senator Lassa's motion 
for default judgment.  By stipulation, the amount at stake in 
this review is $65,000. 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶144 This case was commenced as a defamation suit by a 
public official who was criticized during a contested election 
campaign.  Because of its facts, the case is at the epicenter of 
First Amendment principles, inasmuch as it involves not only the 
heavily protected freedom to criticize government officials, 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) and Sullivan, but also the 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
13 
 
right to facilitate political speech through the expenditure of 
money, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 22-23, 47-51, 54, 57-58 
(1976); the right to anonymous speech, McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); the right to 
associate with others for expression purposes and the right to 
privacy in those associations, NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
¶145 Because 
this 
case 
involves 
review 
of 
judicial 
determinations affecting political speech, this court must apply 
exacting scrutiny to these determinations.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
at 265.  From the outset, before it acceded to Lassa's request 
to compel Rongstad to disclose the membership of the Alliance, 
the circuit court should have ensured that its discovery order 
was "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest."  
McIntyre, 514 U.S. 347. 
¶146 The majority identifies two state interests, the 
interest of a candidate for public office in being free from 
defamation, and the state's interest in ensuring accurate 
information during election campaigns.  Majority op., ¶41.  The 
majority then reaches the surprising conclusion that the order 
requiring Rongstad to disclose the membership of the Alliance, 
who would then be named as defendants in a highly publicized 
defamation suit, did not chill First Amendment rights.  Majority 
op., ¶¶67-68.  As a result, the majority concludes that it need 
not balance the competing interests to determine whether the 
circuit court's decision to compel disclosure was narrowly 
tailored.  Majority op., ¶71.  I cannot agree. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶147 First, although I agree that affording candidates a 
means 
to 
relief 
from 
defamation 
and 
ensuring 
accurate 
information during election campaigns are legitimate state 
interests, I disagree that compelling Rongstad to disclose the 
membership of the Alliance advanced either interest.  Second, I 
believe that compelling Rongstad to disclose the membership 
information, 
effectively 
guaranteeing 
that 
the 
unmasked 
individuals 
would 
become 
defendants 
in 
this 
lawsuit, 
substantially chilled First Amendment rights.  Consequently, I 
conclude that the circuit court could not have concluded that 
the state interests outweighed Rongstad's assertion of privilege 
without first determining that Lassa's claim was capable of a 
defamatory meaning.  Thus, I conclude the order compelling 
disclosure was not narrowly tailored and cannot support the 
imposition of sanctions. 
A. 
No Compelling State Interest Justified Disclosure 
 
¶148 Lassa's suit implicates two state interests, the 
interest of a candidate for public office in being free from 
defamation, and the state's interest in ensuring accurate 
information during election campaigns.  Majority op., ¶41.  At 
the time the circuit court ordered Rongstad to disclose the 
membership of the Alliance, neither interest was compelling. 
1. 
The 
State 
Interest 
in 
Protecting 
Citizens 
Against 
Defamation 
¶149 Two features of Lassa's claim dilute the strength of 
the state's interest in protecting citizens from defamation.  
First, during an election campaign the state's interest in 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
15 
 
preventing defamation is counterbalanced by its interest in 
promoting political discourse.  See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).  A court's duty to protect speech 
involving a public figure is heightened during elections.  See 
Roy, 401 U.S. at 272 (stating that the First Amendment "has its 
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office").  Courts must be solicitous of 
the reality that "[t]he clash of reputations is the staple of 
election campaigns," and that campaigning necessarily entails 
bruised reputations. 
¶150 As the Supreme Court explained: 
It is of the utmost consequence that the people should 
discuss the character and qualifications of candidates 
for their suffrages.  The importance to the state and 
to society of such discussions is so vast and the 
advantages derived are so great that they more than 
counterbalance 
the 
inconvenience 
of 
the 
private 
persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional 
injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to 
the public welfare.  The public benefit from publicity 
is so great and the chance of injury to private 
character so small that such discussion must be 
privileged. 
Id. (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908)).6 
                                                 
6 The United States Supreme Court has expressed doubts as to 
"whether there [even] remains some exiguous area of defamation 
against which a candidate may have full recourse [during 
elections]."  Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 
(1971).  The Court in Roy noted that "'[i]f actionable 
defamation is possible in this field, one might suppose that the 
chief energies of the courts, for some time after every 
political campaign, would be absorbed by libel and slander 
suits.'"  Id. (quoting Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and 
Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875 (1949)). 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶151 Second, Lassa's suit presents a defamation claim by a 
public figure against a media or non-media defendant, "which 
will always involve a conditional constitutional privilege."  
See Wis JI——Civil 2500 at 9 (emphasis added).7  The central 
principles 
pertaining 
to 
public 
figure 
defamation 
were 
summarized by this court in Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 
210 Wis. 2d 524, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997): 
 
The First Amendment imposes a constitutional 
privilege on the publication of statements about 
public figures, even when those statements are false 
and 
defamatory. 
 
The 
privilege, 
however, 
is 
conditional, and the condition is the absence of 
actual malice.  The requirement that actual malice be 
proven is a minimal accommodation of the reputational 
interests 
of 
public 
figures 
and 
the 
community's 
interest in unfettered public debate. 
. . . .  
Proof of actual malice requires a showing that 
the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge 
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its 
truth. 
Id. at 535-36. 
¶152 To discourage the use of defamation claims as a tool 
to suppress political speech, candidates for public office must 
meet a high standard to prove defamation.  It is not that we 
love public officials less, but that we love freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although the majority cites several cases involving claims 
of defamation made by candidates for public office, majority op. 
¶41 n.14, the majority fails to cite a single case where a 
candidate succeeded in prosecuting a defamation claim. 
7 A "Law Note" with this identical categorization has been 
part of the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions since 1984. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
17 
 
expression more, that we must hold any public official to a high 
standard in a defamation suit. 
¶153 I doubt that if this court were to engage in a 
sentence-by-sentence analysis of the Rongstad mailing (or take 
it as a whole), it would conclude that the mailing was 
defamatory under the United States Constitution.  It is obvious 
that the majority shares this view, for it assiduously avoids 
any definitive pronouncement on defamation and attempts to 
recast the issues so that any such pronouncement is unnecessary. 
¶154 In my view, the Rongstad mailing was offensive and 
unfair but not defamatory in a constitutional sense.  Lassa had 
every right to be angry and to take steps to address the 
criticism she received.  On the other hand, she was a public 
official with access to the news media and ample time before the 
upcoming April elections to rally people to her defense.  There 
is no discernible reason why the court should have forced 
Rongstad to answer every question related to the 2002 mailing 
before determining that Lassa's suit could survive a motion to 
dismiss. 
2. 
The State Interest in Ensuring Accurate Information During 
Election Campaigns 
¶155 The majority's claim that the state had a compelling 
interest to ensure accurate information during an election 
campaign proves equally unpersuasive in this case. 
¶156 The nature of the Rongstad mailing undermines any 
claim that the state had an overriding interest in protecting 
the public from fraudulent and libelous speech.  The fact is, 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
18 
 
even without a court ruling, the mailing backfired.  The mailing 
was so transparently cartoonish and political in nature that it 
did not hurt Lassa; it helped her.8  As Bill Berry, a former 
editor of the Stevens Point Journal, put it, "An outsider 
doesn't trash a local farm girl up here and get away with it."  
See 
Bill 
Berry, 
Point 
counterpoint 
(Aug. 
28, 
2003), 
http://www.FightingBob.com.  Lassa's own complaint acknowledges 
that her voting percentage went up in the election immediately 
following distribution of the mailing, when its impact was 
fresh.  Accordingly, it is difficult to accept the proposition 
that Rongstad's mailing misled anyone.  
¶157 What's more, if the mailing did mislead anyone, Lassa 
had months to respond and set the record straight.  Cf. 
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 352 n.16.  In McIntyre the Supreme Court 
distinguished between the need to prevent fraudulent and 
libelous speech that occurs in the "eleventh-hour" before an 
                                                 
8 As the United States Supreme Court noted in McIntyre: 
Don't underestimate the common man.  People are 
intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an 
anonymous writing.  They can see it is anonymous.  
They know it is anonymous.  They can evaluate its 
anonymity along with its message, as long as they are 
permitted, as they must be, to read that message.  And 
then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide 
what is responsible, what is valuable, and what is 
truth. 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. at 348 n.11 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In their 
rulings, the circuit court and the majority underestimate 
voters.  In doing so, they do a disservice to us all by 
cheapening the concomitant rights to freedom of speech and 
freedom of association, and the right to privacy in those 
freedoms.  
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
19 
 
election and speech that occurs months in advance.  Id.  Whereas 
the former affords a candidate no time to respond, the latter 
gives a candidate adequate time to counter any falsehood.  
Immediate court action may be necessary to remedy an eleventh-
hour attack, but it is less likely to be necessary when the 
election is several months away. 
B. 
Disclosure Substantially Chills First Amendment Rights 
¶158 The majority relies upon the test expounded upon in 
NAACP, decided in 1958, and Buckley to determine whether 
Rongstad made a factual showing that disclosure would chill 
First Amendment rights.  Factually, however, the present case is 
very different from NAACP, Buckley, and any of the other cases 
the majority cites.  Unlike the cases cited by the majority, 
this case concerns a public official's attempt to obtain 
confidential 
membership 
information 
in 
the 
course 
of 
a 
defamation claim for the purpose of adding those anonymous 
members as defendants in the lawsuit.  This distinction matters 
because the amount of time and money required for private 
individuals to defend against a defamation claim should be 
recognized as sufficient to establish an objective, substantial 
chill 
upon 
First 
Amendment 
rights. 
 
See 
Torgerson, 
210 
Wis. 2d at 538-39 n.14 ("The threat of being put to the defense 
of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as 
chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of 
the outcome of the lawsuit itself") (quoting Washington Post Co. 
v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).  
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
20 
 
¶159 Since the Supreme Court decided NAACP and Buckley, 
legislatures, courts, and commentators have come to appreciate 
just how much lawsuits like this one chill First Amendment 
rights.  Lassa's defamation suit against Rongstad fits within 
the classic prototype of a SLAPP suit (a Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation).  Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause 
of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike 
or Dismiss, 22 Causes of Action 2d 317, 323 (2003) (noting that 
libel and slander are among the most common claims alleged in 
SLAPP complaints).  SLAPP suits "are fashioned as traditional 
lawsuits for tortious misconduct but are in actuality thinly 
disguised efforts to abuse the litigation process in order to 
silence citizen discussions on issues affecting the public well-
being."  Id. at 322.  "The purpose of the SLAPP . . . is 
distinctly not to succeed on the merits, but to so intimidate 
the private citizen (or even the government official) that 
citizen activity ceases because the expense, risk and anxiety 
engendered by the process of litigating a SLAPP is too great."  
Id.; accord In re Discipline of Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 
n.2 (Mass. 2004); Dickens v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
117 Cal. App. 4th 705, 713, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
¶160 Since the State of Washington enacted the first 
statute imposing procedural hurdles upon SLAPP suits in 1989,9 at 
least 19 states have enacted legislation to discourage SLAPP 
                                                 
9 See 
Wash. 
Rev. 
Code 
Ann. 
§ 4.24.510 
(West 
2005) 
(Historical and Statutory Notes). 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
21 
 
suits (anti-SLAPP statutes).  See Daerr-Bannon, supra, at 341-43 
(listing 
19 
states); 
California 
Anti-SLAPP 
Project, 
http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2006) 
(listing 24 states).  In addition, as of February 2006 anti-
SLAPP legislation was pending in 10 states.  California Anti-
SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last updated 
Feb. 6, 2006). 
¶161 Until this case, the term SLAPP suit had been 
relatively unheard of in Wisconsin jurisprudence.10  Mention of a 
SLAPP suit is made in only one Wisconsin case.  See Vultaggio v. 
Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 359, 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  In Vultaggio Justice Bradley recognized that 
                                                 
10 While the term SLAPP suit is relatively new in Wisconsin 
jurisprudence, the core concept is not new.  The third-party 
brief filed by Attorneys Friebert and O'Neill on behalf of Alex 
Paul opened with the observation: 
This case is a classic example of much ado about 
nothing.  Plaintiff has attempted to manufacture a 
defamation claim out of a run-of-the-mill negative 
political ad accurately pointing out that one of her 
supporters has been charged with criminal conduct. 
 
Her 
complaint 
hinges 
on 
an 
allegation, 
unsupportable by the actual text of the mailer, that 
the mailer accuses her of criminal conduct.  Based on 
this 
tenuous 
allegation, 
plaintiff 
aggressively 
pursued contentious discovery from defendant Todd 
Rongstad, for the express purpose of furthering her 
political goal of running for the State Senate. 
Because the concept of a SLAPP suit——though not the term——was 
before the circuit court, identifying this case as a SLAPP suit 
does not alter the "constitutional calculus[.]"  See Majority 
op., ¶73.  Rather, the necessary legal principles were presented 
to the court by the parties, but the court erred in how it 
balanced the competing interests. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
22 
 
"[r]egardless of whether such suits are legitimate grievances or 
SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) the 
possibility 
of 
a 
multi-million 
dollar 
lawsuit 
may 
chill 
democratic participation . . . ."  Vultaggio, 215 Wis. 2d at 359 
(Bradley, J., dissenting).  I believe that the present suit 
substantially chills First Amendment rights of speech and 
association and that the majority seriously errs by refusing to 
balance the competing interests to determine whether the circuit 
court should have compelled Rongstad to disclose the membership 
of the Alliance.  Cf. Major v. Silna, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1485, 
1490-91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 878 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting "the 
anti-SLAPP law has been applied to actions arising from 
political literature discussing the qualifications of candidates 
during elections.").  
¶162 Use of discovery to obtain confidential information 
pertaining to the membership of the Alliance, and the majority's 
response, demonstrate the need for legislation to prevent 
parties from manipulating the legal system to chill the exercise 
of First Amendment rights.  The legislature should consider the 
experience of other states that have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes 
and consider adopting legislation modeled upon the anti-SLAPP 
statutes in states like California, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 425.16 (West 2005), and Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 231, § 59H (West 2005).  The potential for the strategic 
abuse of legal process is real.  As one court put it: 
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the 
judicial arena where the SLAPP filer foists upon the 
target the expenses of a defense. . . .  The purpose 
of such gamesmanship ranges from simple retribution 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
23 
 
for past activism to discouraging future activism.  
Needless to say, an ultimate disposition in favor of 
the target often amounts merely to a pyrrhic victory.  
Those who lack the financial resources and emotional 
stamina to play out the "game" face the difficult 
choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or 
being brought to their knees to settle.  The ripple 
effect of such suits in our society is enormous.  
Persons who have been outspoken on issues of public 
importance 
targeted 
in 
such 
suits 
or 
who 
have 
witnessed such suits will often choose in the future 
to stay silent.  Short of a gun to the head, a greater 
threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be 
imagined. 
Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
C. 
The Order Compelling Disclosure Was Not Narrowly Tailored 
¶163 The circuit court's order to compel disclosure was not 
narrowly tailored.  The court failed to examine with exacting 
scrutiny the legitimacy of the asserted state interests and 
dismissed 
as 
unsubstantiated 
Rongstad's 
assertion 
that 
disclosure would chill First Amendment rights.  Based upon these 
errors, the circuit court ordered Rongstad to comply with its 
discovery order or pay $1000 per day in contempt.  Without a 
prior determination that Rongstad's mailing was capable of a 
defamatory meaning and that the identity of Alliance members was 
necessary for Lassa's suit to proceed, I cannot accept that the 
circuit court's order was narrowly tailored to protect First 
Amendment rights.  
¶164 It is difficult to understand how Lassa's interest in 
being 
free 
from 
defamation 
was 
furthered 
by 
compelling 
disclosure of the anonymous speakers at such an early date.  
Lassa had all the necessary ingredients to clear her name 
without requiring the disclosure of the Alliance membership.  In 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
24 
 
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), cited by the majority, 
the plaintiff did not know the identity of any of the defendants 
when discovery was sought; here Lassa knew the identity of the 
primary defendant.  Therefore, because "there is reason to 
believe that many defamation plaintiffs bring suit merely to 
unmask the identities of anonymous critics[,]" Cahill, 884 A.2d 
at 457, the circuit court should have protected Rongstad and the 
anonymous speakers from any potential ulterior motive by 
considering Rongstad's motion to dismiss before compelling 
discovery.11  In deciding otherwise, the circuit court and the 
majority appear to have lost sight of the purpose of defamation 
litigation and the proper balance of the constitutional rights 
at stake in this case. 
¶165 To succeed in a defamation claim against a public 
official, a plaintiff must prove actual malice, which might well 
require discovery.  In this case, however, there are preliminary 
                                                 
11 The fact that Lassa agreed to dismiss her defamation 
claim with prejudice as part of the settlement agreement 
supports an inference that Lassa was more interested in 
unmasking her anonymous critics than she was in being free from 
defamation. 
In its brief to the court of appeals as amicus curiae, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation referred 
to Lassa's lawsuit as a SLAPP action, i.e., a "Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation."  It notes, 
Because SLAPP actions are so dangerous to free speech, 
it is crucial to the continued protection of First 
Amendment freedoms of speech that courts recognize and 
dismiss these suits in a timely manner, upon proof of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, 
before 
compelling 
answers 
to 
discovery 
questions 
that 
require 
disclosure 
of 
potentially 
constitutionally protected political associations. 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
25 
 
issues to resolve, such as whether the statements in the mailing 
were substantially true or simply not defamatory as a matter of 
law.  The sine qua non of public figure defamation is the 
distribution of false words or statements that damage a person's 
reputation. 
¶166 A motion to dismiss raises a threshold challenge to a 
lawsuit, which a court should adjudicate early on so that 
meritless suits can be disposed of without the expense and delay 
of discovery and additional litigation.  Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1349, 
at 56-57 (3d ed. 2004).  Generally, the standard a complaint 
must meet to survive a motion to dismiss is toothless.  A 
complaint for defamation, however, must meet a higher standard.  
Not only must a court decide as a matter of law that the content 
complained of can support a defamatory meaning, but "the 
particular words complained of" must be set forth in the 
complaint.  Wis. Stat. § 802.03(6). 
¶167 Lassa's complaint made assertions of false statements 
that are simply not contained in the disputed mailing.  The 
"particular words complained of" were either not identified or 
consisted of the entire paragraph beginning with the sentence 
fragment: "Extortion, misconduct in public office, pay to play, 
lying, cheating and stealing."  Yet, this paragraph does not 
contain an assertion that Lassa herself committed any act in the 
list. 
¶168 The majority acknowledges that a "defamation plaintiff 
should not be able to employ the rules of discovery to obtain 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
26 
 
the identity of an anonymous political speaker simply by filing 
a complaint that is facially unsustainable."  Majority op., ¶42.  
The majority reasons that "the use of discovery to uncover the 
speaker's identity may chill the exercise of the right to free 
speech."  Id.  In support of this position, the blue chip amici 
in this case joined the defendants in urging us to require 
courts to "decide whether a defamation complaint states a claim 
on which relief may be granted before imposing sanctions for the 
refusal 
to 
disclose 
information 
based 
on 
the 
type 
of 
constitutional privilege Rongstad has asserted."  Id., ¶44 
(emphasis added).  The majority agrees, determining that: 
[U]nder Wisconsin law, requiring the circuit court to 
decide 
a 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
before 
compelling 
disclosure and imposing sanctions best addresses the 
concerns 
expressed . . . . 
 
When 
faced 
with 
an 
assertion 
of 
constitutional 
privilege 
against 
disclosure 
of 
information 
identifying 
otherwise-
anonymous organization members, the circuit court 
should decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim before sanctioning the party for 
refusing to disclose that information. 
Id., ¶52. 
¶169 Unfortunately, the majority fails to apply this rule 
in the present case even though the defendants requested 
repeatedly that the circuit court act first on the motion to 
dismiss.  In their January 27 Brief in Support of Motion for 
Protective Order, the defendants objected to the plaintiff's 
effort to "unreasonably expedite the discovery process. . . .  
Plaintiff's counsel has offered no explanation as to why 
discovery must begin immediately."  Defendants asked for a 
postponement of the deposition until they had the opportunity to 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
27 
 
answer the complaint and file a motion to dismiss.  "[F]orcing 
Defendant Rongstad to undergo a deposition prior to a resolution 
of 
these 
preliminary 
matters 
subjects 
him 
to 
annoyance, 
oppression, undue burden and expense."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
next day, Attorney Crooks requested an adjournment of any 
depositions until after the court heard the motion to dismiss. 
¶170 Defendants answered the complaint on February 10 and 
filed a motion to dismiss on February 11.  The court could have 
asked for earlier filings from the defendants in lieu of 
expedited discovery.  Instead, the defense was tied up for hours 
and hours of depositions and hearings before it had an 
opportunity to file and brief the motion to dismiss.  At almost 
the same time, the court relieved the plaintiff of the burden of 
submitting to a deposition that might have been useful to the 
defense in establishing the truth of certain controversial 
statements in the mailing.  Notably, the court issued a 
protective order for the defamation plaintiff but denied the 
same for the defamation defendants. 
¶171 As the majority concedes, the defense was still 
attempting to get a decision on its motion to dismiss in late 
April.  Majority op., ¶56.  Nonetheless, the court made no 
decision on the motion to dismiss until July 8, long after 
sanctions had been imposed, and 147 days after the motion to 
dismiss had been filed. 
¶172 The majority minimizes the defendants' efforts to 
obtain a ruling on the motion to dismiss before the court 
imposed sanctions.  We are told that few appellate courts have 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
28 
 
been asked to determine whether such a procedure should be 
followed.  Id., ¶46. 
In short, Rongstad did not raise his argument 
that the circuit court was required to address his 
motion to dismiss before it compelled discovery until 
after 
the 
court 
imposed 
discovery 
sanctions.  
Moreover, 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
constitutional 
dimension of the parties' discovery dispute mandated 
this course of action was a relatively novel one 
considering existing law at the time.  Id., ¶58. 
Poppycock. 
¶173 Contrary to the majority’s statements, the argument 
that courts should consider motions to dismiss or motions for 
summary judgment before compelling discovery in libel suits is 
not that novel.  The "Defamation Law Note for Trial Judges" has 
contained the following language since 1984: 
The initial inquiry in a defamation action is usually 
whether the words at issue in the lawsuit are capable 
of a defamatory meaning.  This inquiry is for the 
trial judge and is normally presented on a motion to 
dismiss.  On a motion to dismiss, it is the function 
of the Court to determine whether a communication is 
capable of a defamatory meaning. 
Wis JI——Civil 2500 at 3 (emphasis added).  This precise language 
was cited to the court in Attorney Crooks's February 11 brief, 
at the beginning of the section titled "ANALYSIS."  Counsel went 
on to state: "The Wisconsin Supreme Court has been clear in 
advocating the use of summary judgment and motions to dismiss in 
cases involving defamation."  The brief cited and quoted 
Torgerson, in which the court said: 
 
Since New York Times [Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964)] summary judgment has played a key role in 
protecting First Amendment values.  Indeed, it has 
been said that in public figure defamation cases, 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
29 
 
"because of the importance of free speech, summary 
judgment is the 'rule,' and not the exception."  
[citation omitted]  The Wisconsin court of appeals has 
said that "[s]ummary judgment may be particularly 
appropriate in defamation actions in order to mitigate 
the potential 'chilling effect' on free speech and the 
press that might result from lengthy and expensive 
litigation."   
Torgerson, 210 Wis. 2d at 538.  See also Mach v. Allison, 2003 
WI App 11, 259 Wis. 2d 686, 656 N.W.2d 766 (a Dane County case); 
Maguire 
v. 
Journal 
Sentinel, 
Inc., 
232 
Wis. 2d 236, 
605 
N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 
¶174 Furthermore, in 1977, the court in Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1329 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (reversed on 
other grounds), recognized that courts must consider dispositive 
motions, such as summary judgment, as soon as it becomes clear 
that a plaintiff cannot succeed with her defamation claim.  The 
court 
noted 
that 
"the 
court 
has 
a 
special 
responsibility . . . to determine if 
there 
is 
any genuine 
dispute because of the danger that speech may be chilled by the 
mere fact of litigation."  Id. (emphasis added).  It follows 
that courts have a special responsibility to consider motions to 
dismiss as soon as possible to determine whether the speech is 
even capable of a defamatory meaning.  While proof of actual 
malice may require additional discovery, proof that a mailing is 
capable of a defamatory meaning requires at most minimal 
discovery, 
and 
certainly 
not 
the 
unmasking 
of 
anonymous 
speakers. 
¶175 In Herbert v. Lando, a seminal case on public figure 
defamation, the United States Supreme Court upheld a defamation 
plaintiff's demands for civil discovery, but the case involved 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
30 
 
the search for "actual malice," assuming the existence of 
"damaging falsehoods."  Justice Powell, in concurrence, remarked 
that a district court, in supervising discovery in a libel suit 
by a public figure, "has a duty to consider First Amendment 
interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiff."  
Id. at 178.  "In some instances, it might be appropriate for 
[the court] to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope 
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other 
developments in discovery might reduce the need for the material 
demanded."  Id. at 180.  Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
made even stronger comments in dissent.   
¶176 These sentiments are echoed in Sack on Defamation.  "A 
plaintiff should be required to satisfy the court that the 
claims 
at 
issue 
are 
not 
frivolous 
before 
infringing 
on 
constitutionally based interests."  Robert D. Sack, Libel, 
Slander, and Related Problems § 12.3.2.2 (2d ed. 1994) (citing a 
host of cases). 
¶177 In light of the pervasive authority to the contrary, 
it is hard to accept the majority's conclusion that Rongstad's 
argument was so novel that the circuit court did not have to 
address Rongstad's motion to dismiss before compelling discovery 
or imposing discovery sanctions.  Majority op., ¶58. 
¶178 Even if the mailing were capable of a defamatory 
meaning, however, the court should still have afforded Rongstad 
a timely ruling on his motion to dismiss.  While Lassa had an 
interest under the McIntyre exacting-scrutiny analysis in being 
free from defamation, Rongstad had a legitimate First Amendment 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
31 
 
interest 
in 
protecting 
anonymous 
political 
speech. 
 
See 
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.  Because "anonymous pamphleteering is 
not 
a 
pernicious, 
fraudulent 
practice, 
but 
an 
honorable 
tradition of advocacy and . . . dissent[,]" the court order 
compelling disclosure before a ruling on defamatory meaning 
infringed upon First Amendment rights.  Id.  When the court 
refused to timely decide the motion to dismiss, it effectively 
deprived Rongstad of the opportunity to defend himself and the 
First 
Amendment 
rights 
of 
the 
Alliance 
membership. 
 
It 
effectively denied him due process of law.12 
¶179 By losing sight of the proper balance of interests and 
not applying exacting scrutiny, the majority inappropriately 
justifies the award of sanctions and compulsion of discovery.  
The 
majority 
justifies 
this 
decision 
by 
asserting 
that 
Rongstad’s counsel did not properly raise the issues before the 
                                                 
12 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) ("Due 
process requires that there be an opportunity to present every 
available defense") (quoting Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 
156, 168 (1932)); cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) 
("Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not 
from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due 
process of law is the opportunity to be heard. . . . In the 
present 
context 
these 
principles 
require . . . timely 
and 
adequate notice, and an effective opportunity to defend by 
confronting 
any 
adverse 
witnesses 
and 
by 
presenting . . . arguments 
and 
evidence 
orally.") 
(internal 
citations and punctuation omitted); William B. Tanner Co. v. 
Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 446, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981) 
("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in 
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections"). 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
32 
 
court and, therefore, did not assert his constitutional rights.  
Try as it may, the majority cannot change the context in which 
Rongstad's counsel presented the issues to the court.  The 
record is clear that counsel for the defense timely advised the 
circuit court of law and procedure to allow it to respect and 
conform to First Amendment principles.  The court demonstrated 
such disdain for the defendants, however, that it disregarded 
these principles. 
¶180 The right to anonymous speech would mean nothing if 
courts could require the exposure of an anonymous speaker who 
did not issue a defamatory statement.  At a minimum, the circuit 
court should have determined whether Rongstad's mailing was 
capable of a defamatory meaning before ordering discovery and 
imposing sanctions. 
¶181 Finally, even if I were wrong in how I balance the 
interests involved, I cannot understand how the majority can 
refuse to give Rongstad the benefit of the rule it adopts.  
Contra Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 625, 
563 N.W.2d 154 (1997).  In Jacque this court stated that a court 
should apply a new rule retroactively when refusing to do so 
would deprive the party who prompted the change of any benefit 
from its efforts and expense in successfully fighting to change 
an old rule.  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 625-26.  The majority does 
Rongstad a grave injustice by denying him the benefits of his 
efforts. 
 
 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
33 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶182 In this case, no court has ever ruled that the 2002 
mailing was defamatory.  A circuit court judge (Maryann Sumi, 
Judge) ruled that the mailing was capable of defamatory meaning 
but only after contempt sanctions had been imposed.  This 
procedure denied defendant Rongstad an authoritative judicial 
ruling on his motion to dismiss before the court required him to 
submit to total discovery.  If the court had made a prompt 
ruling that the mailing was capable of defamatory meaning, 
Rongstad might have yielded to the court's order.  In any event, 
the court's ruling would have gone a long way toward protecting 
Lassa's 
name 
before 
the 
senate 
election. 
 
The 
court's 
unwillingness to make a timely ruling on the motion to dismiss 
permitted the opposite inference. 
¶183 In the absence of such a ruling, it is draconian to 
subject Rongstad to the heavy, heavy financial sanctions at 
issue in this case.  We cannot remedy the procedural wrong that 
trivialized the defendants' constitutional right to anonymously 
exercise their right to speak and associate freely.  We can and 
we should, however, nullify the penalty imposed upon the 
defendants for attempting to assert First Amendment rights. 
¶184 From the beginning, the circuit court treated this 
case as though the plaintiff were helplessly chained to a 
railroad track with a speeding train just around the bend.  The 
facts never supported such urgency.  Senator Lassa is a shrewd 
and savvy legislator with a good reputation and durable 
popularity.  She waited more than two months after she won 73 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
34 
 
percent of the vote before she filed suit because she did not 
have to rescue her good name.  She did not file suit in her home 
county to protect her reputation among her voters.  She filed 
suit in Dane County, where her reputation was never at risk.   
¶185 The majority sees nothing amiss in socking the 
defendant $65,000 for advocating the very First Amendment 
principles that this court approves.  This case will prove 
without doubt to be a significant libel case, not necessarily 
for the law it has promulgated, but for the fact that a public 
figure defamation plaintiff got everything she wanted without 
ever proving defamation. 
¶186 Because I fear the majority decision chills freedom of 
expression not only for members of the Alliance, but for all 
Wisconsin citizens, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP377.dtp 
 
 
 
1