Title: Brangan v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12284 
 
JAHMAL BRANGAN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2017. - November 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Indictment, Conduct of 
prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor.  Robbery.   
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 19, 2016.  
 
 
The case was considered by Lowy, J.  
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Amal Bala, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The petitioner, Jahmal Brangan, appeals from 
the denial, by a single justice of the county court, of his 
petition for relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss the 
indictment against him for armed robbery while masked by the 
trial judge, after the Commonwealth's closing argument led to a 
mistrial.  Brangan argues that principles of double jeopardy 
2 
 
 
forbid his retrial because the Commonwealth did not present 
sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty finding or, 
alternatively, the prosecutor's misconduct was so egregious that 
it warranted a dismissal of the indictment.  We affirm the 
decision of the single justice.   
Background.  The following facts are taken from 
Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143 (2016), and from the 
trial record.1   
In January, 2014, a bank in Springfield was robbed.  The 
robber entered the bank with his face obscured by a hat and 
sunglasses.  He was wearing gloves.  His nose and his cheeks 
were nonetheless visible.  He approached a teller's window, but 
that window was closed so the teller asked him to move to 
another teller window.  He then approached a second teller 
window and handed a note to that teller.  The note stated that 
the robber had a weapon and demanded all of the teller's cash.  
The teller complied and gave the robber an envelope with less 
than $1,000 in cash.  The robber fled, and the police arrived 
shortly thereafter.  The police processed the note for 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth appealed from the trial judge's order 
granting Jahmal Brangan's motion for a mistrial in Commonwealth 
v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143 (2016).  We held that the Commonwealth 
had no right to appeal because an order granting a mistrial is 
generally not appealable.  Id. at 144.  Brangan also obtained 
our review of the trial judge's order setting his bail in 
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 693 (2017), but that 
case is not relevant to this appeal.   
3 
 
 
fingerprints within hours of the crime.  On the note, the police 
found Brangan's thumbprint.  They also found a right palm print 
that was unusable for determining a match.  Brangan was 
arrested.   
At trial, both bank tellers testified about the robber's 
appearance.  The tellers each described her recollection of the 
robber's race, skin tone, and nose shape and size.  One teller 
described the robber as having acne scars on his cheeks.  The 
Commonwealth also played a surveillance video recording of the 
robbery. 
A police officer testified about the fingerprint testing on 
the note.  The officer explained that the powder used to 
discover the thumbprint can only uncover recent fingerprints, 
allowing the inference that Brangan touched the note recently, 
but the officer could not provide a more specific timeline.  The 
officer also opined that, because of the position of the right 
palm print, the author of the note was likely left-handed.  The 
prosecutor, during the Commonwealth's closing argument, stated:  
"[I]t would be impossible to write the note right-handed and put 
that mark on the note.  Left-handed, someone holding the paper 
[sic].  You've got to watch . . . Brangan the whole trial take 
his notes left-handed."  Brangan objected because no evidence 
about his alleged left-handedness was introduced during trial, 
and he moved for a mistrial.  The trial judge issued a curative 
4 
 
 
instruction and took Brangan's motion for a mistrial under 
advisement.  After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the judge 
granted Brangan's motion for a mistrial but did not dismiss the 
indictment, allowing the Commonwealth to move to retry him.   
Discussion.  Common-law double jeopardy prohibits the 
Commonwealth from prosecuting a defendant again for the same 
crime.  Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012).  
However, "[d]ouble jeopardy concepts do not bar second trials in 
all instances."  Thames v. Commonwealth, 365 Mass. 477, 479 
(1974).  After a mistrial, the Commonwealth may retry a 
defendant if it has presented evidence at the first trial that, 
if viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would 
be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant 
guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  If the 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt, the 
defendant still may not be retried if the prosecutor's 
misconduct in the first trial was so egregious that a dismissal 
with prejudice is warranted to discourage further misconduct of 
the same kind.  Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 672-673 
(2016), cert. denied,     S. Ct.    (2017), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 666 (2009).   
We conclude that the evidence the Commonwealth presented in 
the first trial was legally sufficient to support a guilty 
5 
 
 
finding and the alleged prosecutor's misconduct in closing 
argument was not sufficiently problematic to warrant a dismissal 
of the indictment.   
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence in Brangan's first trial.  
Where a first trial ends in a mistrial, "the defendant is 
entitled to a review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
before another trial takes place."  Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 
Mass. 793, 798 (1985).  Accordingly, "[w]e must review the 
evidence, together with permissible inferences therefrom, in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and then decide 
whether a rational trier of fact could have found each essential 
element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(citation and quotations omitted).  Corson v. Commonwealth, 428 
Mass. 193, 196–197 (1998).  "Questions of credibility are to be 
resolved in the Commonwealth's favor, and circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113 (2010), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011).  Brangan contends that the 
eyewitness testimony adds no evidentiary weight and, therefore, 
the testimony about his thumbprint on the robbery note is 
insufficient alone to support a finding of guilt.  He relies 
heavily on our decision in Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 
254, 257 (1996), in which we stated that where "the only 
identification evidence is the defendant's fingerprint at the 
6 
 
 
crime scene, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the fingerprint was placed there during the crime."  
The facts of Morris are distinguishable.  
In Morris, the defendant's fingerprint was found on a mask 
worn by one of five participants in a homicide and left at the 
scene of the crime.  Id. at 256.  The Commonwealth sought to 
prove that the defendant was connected to his alleged 
coconspirators and the homicide by introducing evidence that the 
suspects telephoned the defendant's home, including one suspect 
who did so while being booked for the homicide, and that one of 
the suspect's vehicles was stopped after the homicide a few 
blocks from the defendant's home.  Id. at 258-259.  However, 
this association also provided a clear alternative explanation 
for the defendant's fingerprint being on the mask found at the 
crime scene:  the defendant had touched the mask at some point 
in his dealings with the other suspects, other than during the 
homicide.  Id. at 259.  The Commonwealth thus had to prove that 
the defendant's fingerprint was left on the mask because he was 
wearing it during the crime.  Id. at 257-258.  The Commonwealth 
offered two witnesses to try to place the defendant at the scene 
of the crime.  Id. at 255-256.  However, each witness introduced 
more doubt and no affirmative evidence that linked the defendant 
7 
 
 
to the crime scene.2  We concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was at the scene.  Id. at 259-260.   
 Moreover, we do not agree with Brangan that Commonwealth 
v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176 (2014), demonstrates the weakness of 
the Commonwealth's evidence in this case.  In Joyner, a masked 
intruder robbed a gasoline station. Id. at 177-178.  Although 
the witness could not identify the robber, evidence that the 
defendant's fingerprint was found on the station's cash drawer 
was introduced at trial.  Id. at 179.  The Commonwealth proved 
that the defendant could not have touched the cash drawer at any 
time other than during the robbery.  Id.  Surveillance videotape 
of the crime showed the robber touching the cash drawer with his 
bare hand.  Id. at 178.  The defendant's fingerprints were found 
in the area depicted in the surveillance videotape.  Id.  
Further, the store owner testified that the defendant had never 
                     
 
2 The only witness to the homicide itself said that the 
masked killer may have been the defendant or may have been 
another man, whom the witness also knew.  Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 258 (1996).  A witness to the flight of 
the alleged killers from the crime scene described two vehicles 
fleeing the scene.  Id. at 255.  The description of one of the 
vehicles could have been found to be similar to a vehicle owned 
by the defendant's mother.  Id. at 256.  However, the witness 
testified that he had "no doubt" that the vehicle in question 
was a different make from the defendant's mother's vehicle.  Id.  
The Commonwealth presented no evidence linking that vehicle to 
the defendant.  Id. at 258.  The other vehicle was found soon 
after the homicide with two of the alleged conspirators and a 
gun used in the shooting.  Id. at 255.  The defendant was not in 
that vehicle.  Id. 
8 
 
 
worked at the gasoline station and that no customer had ever 
touched the cash drawer before.  Id. at 179.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wei H. Ye, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 392-393 (2001), S.C., 441 
Mass. 1010 (2004) (defendant's fingerprint found inside cabinet 
left open by the robbers in home was admissible where no other 
reasonable opportunity to place fingerprint and other 
circumstantial evidence connected defendant to crime). 
Similar to the Joyner case, here, as Brangan's thumbprint 
had been left on the note within a short time of the bank 
robbery, the jury could have found that he was responsible for 
writing it.  Also, other evidence placed Brangan at the scene of 
the crime, including a physical description of the robbers 
provided by the bank tellers, a videotape recording of the 
robbery, and a photograph of Brangan on the day of his arrest.  
The jury also had an opportunity to view Brangan throughout the 
trial.3  This evidence offered the jury an opportunity to compare 
him to the witnesses' descriptions and determine whether his 
physical characteristics were consistent with the witnesses' 
descriptions and what the jury could see of the robber from the 
videotape.   
                     
 
3 The extent to which the jury saw Brangan while he was 
seated at his table during the trial is disputed and related to 
Brangan's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, discussed infra.  
However, at the prosecutor's request, Brangan stood in front of 
counsel's table for the jury to view him.  He does not challenge 
this procedure. 
9 
 
 
On retrial, the jury are free to assess the credibility of 
all of the witnesses, including the police officer who testified 
that Brangan's thumbprint was on the note.  Moreover, Brangan's 
challenges to the descriptions of the robber provided by the 
bank tellers go to the weight of the evidence and credibility of 
the witnesses, but not to the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass. 799, 806-807 (2002), citing 
Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 172 (1984).  "[I]t is for 
the jury to determine -- after listening to cross-examination 
and the closing arguments of counsel —- what significance, if 
any, they will attach" to that evidence (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Voisine, 414 Mass. 772, 782 (1993).  We may, in 
some cases, evaluate eyewitness testimony when determining 
sufficiency of the evidence even where, as here, there was no 
identification attempted of the robber.  In this case, although 
we give this evidence the modest weight it deserves, when 
combined with the strength of the inference from Brangan's 
thumbprint on the note, we conclude that there is sufficient 
evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Commonwealth proved each element of 
the crime.   
10 
 
 
2.  Prosecutorial misconduct.4  In rare circumstances, 
prosecutorial misconduct will prohibit retrial where the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct in order to "goad the defendant 
into moving for a mistrial;" the misconduct caused such 
"irremediable harm" that a fair retrial is impossible; or the 
misconduct is "so egregious" that dismissal of the indictment is 
necessary to deter the Commonwealth from similar misconduct in 
the future.  Durand, 475 Mass. at 672-673, quoting Merry, 453 
Mass. at 666.  "Absent egregious misconduct or at least a 
serious threat of prejudice, the remedy of dismissal infringes 
too severely on the public interest in bringing guilty persons 
to justice."  Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 199 (1985), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Light, 394 Mass. 112, 116 (1985) 
(Liacos, J., dissenting).  Prosecutorial misconduct during a 
trial might be sufficiently "egregious" to warrant dismissal of 
an indictment when the prosecutor makes a statement to the jury 
that he or she knows to be false in an effort to gain a 
"tactical advantage" over the defendant.  See Merry, supra at 
664; Glawson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 1019, 1021 (2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1118 (2006).  "In such instances prophylactic 
                     
 
4 The Commonwealth moved to strike the portion of Brangan's 
brief addressing this issue, arguing that the issue was waived.  
However, both sides thoroughly briefed and addressed the issue 
at oral argument.  Therefore, in the interests of an efficient 
administration of justice and in light of the results we reach, 
we address the merits of Brangan's claim.  See Commonwealth v. 
Chatfield-Taylor, 399 Mass. 1, 3 (1987).   
11 
 
 
considerations may assume paramount importance and the drastic 
remedy of dismissal of charges may become an appropriate remedy" 
(quotations omitted).  Cronk, supra at 199, quoting Light, supra 
at 114.   
The standard for prosecutorial misconduct mandating the 
dismissal of an indictment is high.  See Merry, supra at 664-668 
(prosecutor's misconduct was not egregious when prosecutor's 
closing statement "exceeded the bounds of permissible argument," 
but "expert's material exculpatory opinion" not timely disclosed 
required new trial).  It is not enough for the prosecutor to 
make a false statement to the jury; rather, the prosecutor must 
knowingly make a false statement.  See id. at 664-665 (if 
prosecutor "intentionally misled the jury by making statements 
in his closing argument that he knew were false, his conduct 
might have been grounds for dismissal" [emphasis added]).   
Here, Brangan urges us to view the prosecutor's statements 
during her closing argument about his left-handed writing during 
the trial as such a false statement.  He does not dispute that 
the prosecution may refer to his generally observable 
characteristics during its closing argument.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 385-386 (1992) (no error where 
prosecutor linked defendant's right-handedness to crime during 
closing argument by stating, "I would suggest to you the gunshot 
is consistent with a right-handed man.  I think you've probably 
12 
 
 
seen [the defendant] writing during this case . . .").  See also 
Mass. G. Evid. § 1113 note, at 277 (2017) ("The appearance and 
demeanor of a person in a courtroom is evidence even if the 
person does not take the stand").  Rather, Brangan contends that 
the prosecutor knew the jury could not see him writing with his 
left hand and therefore intentionally made a false statement 
when she told the jury they indeed had seen him writing during 
the trial.  Neither the evidence in the record nor the trial 
judge's ruling is consistent with these allegations.   
During the trial, the prosecutor requested that Brangan 
stand and display himself to the jury.  When making this 
request, the prosecutor referred to "all the times" that she or 
the defense attorney had blocked the view of Brangan.  We are 
not able to discern from the record how often the prosecutor 
believed the jury could see Brangan.  The judge's memorandum of 
decision granting a mistrial also leaves open the possibility 
that some of the jurors could have seen Brangan writing during 
the trial.  Taken together, this evidence does not establish 
that the prosecutor thought that none of the jurors could see 
Brangan throughout the trial and sought to falsely inform them 
of what they had witnessed.  None of this rises to the level of 
proving that the prosecutor engaged in "intentional" misconduct 
by knowingly making a false statement to the jury.  Dismissal of 
13 
 
 
the indictment to discourage further prosecutorial misconduct is 
inappropriate.  
Conclusion.  The judgment of the single justice is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.