Title: Juniper v. Warden (order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, March 4, 2011. 
 
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn and Millette, JJ., and 
Carrico, Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
 
Anthony Bernard Juniper, 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
   against 
 
Record No. 062556 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
 
 
Respondent. 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed December 11, 2006, and the May 1, 2007 petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed in compliance with the Court's March 2, 2007 
order, the respondent's motion to dismiss and petitioner's 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the Court is of the opinion 
that the motion to dismiss should be granted and the writ should 
not issue. 
 
Anthony Bernard Juniper was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk of four counts of capital murder, one count of 
statutory burglary, and four counts of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  The jury fixed Juniper's punishment at 
death for each of the four capital murder convictions and at life 
plus eighteen years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions.  
The trial court sentenced Juniper in accordance with the jury 
verdict.  This Court affirmed Juniper's convictions and upheld the 
 
2
sentences of death in Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 375-76, 
626 S.E.2d 383, 393, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006). 
 
In claim (I), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth failed 
to disclose exculpatory information to petitioner as required by 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), presented false 
testimony or allowed it to go uncorrected in violation of Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972), and made misleading representations to 
jurors.   
 
As the Court has stated previously: 
In Brady [], the United States Supreme Court held 
that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution." Id. at 87. Whether evidence is material 
and exculpatory and, therefore, subject to disclosure 
under Brady is a decision left to the prosecution. 
Inherent in making this decision is the possibility that 
the prosecution will mischaracterize evidence, albeit in 
good faith, and withhold material exculpatory evidence 
which the defendant is entitled to have under the dictates 
of Brady. If the defendant does not receive such evidence, 
or if the defendant learns of the evidence at a point in 
the proceedings when he cannot effectively use it, his due 
process rights as enunciated in Brady are violated. 
 
. . . . 
Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense. "A reasonable probability" is one which is 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
 
Muhammad v. Warden, 274 Va. 3, 3, 646 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 
 
3
Va. 451, 510, 619 S.E.2d 16, 49-50 (2005) (quoting Bowman v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111-12 (1994)).  
When considering the failure to disclose pretrial statements by 
witnesses, this Court has recognized that such information 
constitutes favorable evidence to the accused to the extent that it 
is useful for impeachment purposes.  Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 
Va. 454, 465, 352 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987). 
The nondisclosure of such evidence, however, requires 
reversal "only if the evidence is material in the sense that 
its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial." Evidence is material in this sense "only if there is 
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Furthermore, this Court has previously held that, "[i]n order 
to find that a violation of Napue occurred . . ., we must determine 
first that the testimony [at issue] was false, second that the 
prosecution knew of the falsity, and finally that the falsity 
affected the jury's judgment." Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 
492, 643 S.E.2d 708, 729 (2007).   
In the first portion of claim (I), petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose the promise to informant Ernest 
Smith that the prosecutor would "try and do something after [Smith] 
testified to help [him] with [his] sentence."  Additionally, 
petitioner contends that the Commonwealth told Smith to "say 
whatever [he] had worked out with the detectives."  In support of 
his claim, petitioner relies on the affidavit of Smith, the motion 
for a reconsideration of Smith's sentences filed after Smith's 
testimony, and the hearing on that motion, in which the Commonwealth 
 
4
joined, held shortly after petitioner was sentenced to death. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is without 
merit.  The record, including Smith's affidavit, the affidavit of 
the prosecutor and the transcript of the reconsideration hearing, 
demonstrates that Smith asked for a deal but that the prosecutor 
made no promises or deals with Smith in exchange for his testimony.  
Subsequently, the Commonwealth joined Smith's motion to reconsider 
sentence because Smith testified twice at petitioner's trial and 
because Smith was receiving threats as a result of his cooperation. 
In the second portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose to petitioner that Keon Murray 
testified falsely against him.  Petitioner alleges that police 
detectives created the story that Murray related at trial and 
threatened to charge him with being an accessory after the fact if 
Murray did not comply.  Petitioner further contends that after 
Murray invoked his Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify, 
Murray was removed from the courtroom and the prosecutor threatened 
Murray by telling him that if he did "not testify as instructed" he 
would be charged with capital murder and would face the death 
penalty. 
The record reveals that none of the alleged evidence was 
favorable to petitioner.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that Murray was removed from the courtroom 
while the prosecutor and defense counsel discussed whether the 
prosecutor would offer Murray immunity, and was returned only after 
the court accepted the prosecutor's plan to grant immunity to 
Murray.  In addition, the trial transcript and the affidavits of the 
 
5
prosecutor and the detectives demonstrate that the prosecutor did 
not threaten Murray with criminal charges related to the murder.  
Murray's taped statement to police implicated petitioner and thus 
was not exculpatory.      
In the third portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose to petitioner that Terence 
Fitzgerald was "directed ... to conceal certain information when 
testifying."  Relying on the affidavit of Fitzgerald, petitioner 
contends that Fitzgerald was told to conceal his sexual relationship 
with Keshia Stephens, one of the victims, and his knowledge of the 
"foot traffic" at Keshia's apartment.  Petitioner contends further 
that "[p]rosecutors failed to reveal that Fitzgerald reported to 
police that the only person he thought could have committed the 
crimes 'was someone who had been pistol whipped by some friends of 
Keshia's brother'" and that Fitzgerald had seen "a car parked on the 
corner of [Keshia's] street with three black men in it who were 
watching him and the kids closely as they left for school" on the 
day of the murders.  Petitioner contends the prosecution "also 
unconstitutionally failed to reveal that they told Fitzgerald that, 
in exchange for his testimony against Juniper, they would not 'make 
trouble for [him]' concerning other charges." 
The record reveals that none of the alleged evidence was 
favorable to petitioner or it was known to petitioner prior to 
trial. The record, including the trial transcript and Fitzgerald's 
affidavit, demonstrates that there is no evidence that Fitzgerald 
told police about "a very bad feeling" he had about the car or the 
 
6
men inside it, or that the information the prosecutor allegedly 
wanted him to conceal included his sexual relationship with Keshia 
or the "foot traffic" at her apartment.  Petitioner fails to 
articulate how the sexual nature of Fitzgerald's relationship with 
Keshia would have been relevant, and the record, including notes 
prepared by petitioner's investigator, Wayne Kennedy ("Investigator 
Kennedy"),  demonstrates that defense counsel was aware of the 
"foot traffic" and that Fitzgerald was considered to be Keshia's 
"sugar daddy." 
Furthermore, Fitzgerald's theory, expressed during the 
investigation, that Keshia was killed by "someone who had been 
pistol whipped by some friends of Keshia's brother," was disclosed 
to petitioner in the pre-sentence report.  This claim, therefore, is 
barred because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised 
in a motion for a new trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. 
Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In addition, petitioner alleges that Fitzgerald was at the 
apartment the day after the murders and that he noticed what 
appeared to be blood on the carpet in the hallway between the living 
room and the bathroom as well as in the bathtub in one of the 
bathrooms.  Petitioner contends that this information would have 
undermined the Commonwealth's theory that "the murders occurred 
solely in the bedroom and that the incident occurred in a very 
 
7
compressed time frame." 
The record reveals that none of this alleged evidence was 
favorable to petitioner. The record, including the trial transcript, 
Fitzgerald's affidavit, and the affidavits of co-counsel, 
demonstrates that the jury was presented with evidence concerning 
where blood was found on the day of the murders, including the 
testimony of several forensic investigators, photographs, and a 
video tape of the crime scene as it existed on the day of the 
murders.  How the crime scene appeared the following day after the 
apartment was no longer secure would not have been relevant. 
In the fourth portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose to petitioner that Tyrone Mings had 
provided inconsistent accounts about what he had seen at Keshia's 
apartment, including his initial failure to report that he had seen 
petitioner inside the apartment with a gun, and that Mings' account 
that both 911 telephone calls were made from Melinda Bowser's 
apartment was inconsistent with the timeline based on information 
reported in 911 telephone calls related to the shooting.  Petitioner 
asserts that the 911 telephone call log would have shown that the 
first call took place at a pay phone about a half-mile away from the 
apartment instead of in Bowser's apartment, as Mings had testified.  
Petitioner contends that Mings could not have made the phone call 
from the pay phone and have returned to the apartment in order to 
see the police leaving. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is without 
merit.  Pursuant to Brady, there is no obligation to produce 
information known to the defense.  See Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 
 
8
663, 686 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1120 (2003); Cherrix 
v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 303, 513 S.E.2d 642, 649, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999).  The record, including the trial 
transcripts and Investigator Kennedy's notes, demonstrates that 
Mings told Investigator Kennedy, petitioner's investigator, that he 
and Bowser walked to a nearby convenience store and used a pay phone 
to make the initial call.  Furthermore, Mings told Investigator 
Kennedy that he had seen petitioner with the gun in his hand in the 
apartment.  The trial transcript demonstrates that counsel was aware 
of Mings' failure to mention seeing Juniper in the apartment in his 
first statement to police, as demonstrated by counsel's cross-
examination of Mings on this issue.  Counsel knew of the 
information, and consequently there was no Brady violation. 
In the fifth portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose to petitioner that John Jones 
provided "crucially inconsistent statements" to the police, where he 
first denied any knowledge of the murders, then later implicated 
petitioner, and that he was "released on conditions requiring [his] 
extensive cooperation with the police."  Petitioner contends that 
this "exculpatory" evidence could have established Jones' 
involvement in the crime. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is without 
merit.  The record, including the trial transcripts and a newspaper 
article published prior to Juniper's arrest, demonstrates that 
information was publicly available prior to trial, that the police 
had questioned Jones, and that Jones had initially denied any 
involvement.  Furthermore, Jones did not testify, and consequently 
 
9
could not have been impeached.  Therefore, no Brady violation 
occurred.  
In the sixth portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose to petitioner Chaunte Hodge's 
identity and the statements Hodge and her mother-in-law, Mrs. 
Frazier, made to police that Mrs. Frazier did not hear any unusual 
noises from the apartment during the time that the murders occurred. 
The record, including Investigator Kennedy's notes, 
demonstrates that defense counsel were aware of Chaunte Hodge and 
had attempted to contact her.  Petitioner has not alleged that Mrs. 
Frazier's alleged failure to hear anything unusual on that date 
establishes that the murders did not occur or that petitioner was 
not the perpetrator.  Therefore, any failure to disclose the 
evidence does not constitute a Brady violation. 
Petitioner argues that all of the allegedly exculpatory 
evidence must be considered in its totality when determining the 
materiality of the evidence. Petitioner is correct that when 
considering materiality, we consider suppressed evidence as a whole, 
not item by item. See Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 645, 636 
S.E.2d 368, 375 (2006); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).  
The Court holds that all of the allegedly exculpatory evidence upon 
which petitioner relies was either available to petitioner or was 
not favorable.  See Workman, 272 Va. at 644-45, 636 S.E.2d at 374; 
Muhammad, 274 Va. at 13, 646 S.E.2d at 191.  
In the first portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate Renee Rashid's pretrial statements to police.  
 
10
Petitioner contends that Rashid's statements were inconsistent and 
contradictory and that counsel should have investigated them.  In 
addition, petitioner argues that counsel should have used 
impeachment evidence against Rashid, including Michael Lassiter's 
opinion that Rashid was a compulsive liar and drug addict.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  The record, including the affidavits of counsel and the 
trial transcripts, demonstrates that counsel cross-examined Rashid 
regarding inconsistencies in Rashid's statements to police.  
Although petitioner suggested Lassiter as an alibi witness, Lassiter 
could not provide counsel with an alibi for petitioner.  Moreover, 
if Lassiter had testified during the guilt phase of the trial, the 
prosecution could have impeached him with an audiotape of a 
telephone conversation between petitioner, who was in jail, and 
Lassiter, which revealed a plot to concoct an alibi for petitioner.  
Counsel made a tactical decision, based upon the unlikelihood that 
the court would permit testimony about Rashid's drug use for 
impeachment purposes, to preserve the viability of Lassiter as a 
witness during the sentencing phase, rather than put him on the 
stand at trial and risk the possibility that he might be perceived 
negatively.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In the second portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
 
11
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate Keon Murray more fully.  Petitioner first 
contends that counsel were ineffective for failing to discover the 
information that he contends the Commonwealth withheld, specifically 
evidence "that police told Murray that they knew he committed the 
murders and identified other co-suspects, that Murray failed a 
polygraph test about the crimes, that police provided Murray with 
details about the crimes, and that Murray agreed to testify as 
directed by police in order to avoid threatened criminal charges." 
The Court holds that the portion of claim (II)(A) concerning 
petitioner's allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
discover certain evidence regarding the interrogation tactics used 
by police when Murray was being interviewed satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits of 
counsel, the trial transcript and Investigator Kennedy's notes, 
demonstrates that Investigator Kennedy spoke with Murray on multiple 
occasions.  Murray told Investigator Kennedy that he had not been 
involved in the crime and did not know the individuals involved, and 
that "if a Keon is involved in this investigation it is most likely 
another Keon."  Murray also told Investigator Kennedy that he was 
providing to Investigator Kennedy the same answers he had given to 
the police.  Counsel cross-examined Murray about the inconsistencies 
between his testimony and his statements to Investigator Kennedy.  
Moreover, Murray testified that it was Investigator Kennedy, and not 
the police investigators, who threatened him that he could be 
charged with being an accessory to murder if he did not testify.  
 
12
Petitioner fails to articulate what additional actions counsel could 
have taken or how counsel could have used the information concerning 
the police investigators' tactics.  Consequently, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of petitioner's claim that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel concerning counsel's handling of the 
investigation of Murray and use of information for impeachment 
purposes, petitioner alleges that counsel were on notice concerning 
Murray's poor reputation for honesty and failed to investigate the 
inconsistencies in Murray's statements to defense investigators, 
including statements that he had participated in a two-hour taped 
interrogation session and that he had never given any type of 
written or recorded statement.  Petitioner contends that counsel 
also failed to object on Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
grounds to the court's decision to permit the prosecution to grant 
him immunity to compel his testimony. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel unsuccessfully objected on due 
process grounds to the grant of immunity to Murray.  Petitioner 
fails to assert a valid legal basis upon which he contends counsel 
could or should have objected to the prosecutor's request or the 
trial court's grant of immunity.  Furthermore, petitioner's right to 
 
13
confront this witness was not violated because Murray testified and 
was subject to cross-examination.  Moreover, Murray was fully cross-
examined by counsel regarding his inconsistent statements to 
Investigator Kennedy.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In the third portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate Tyrone Mings more fully, although "counsel 
maintained that Mings was lying," and to develop circumstantial 
evidence that Mings was involved in the murders.  Petitioner also 
contends that counsel failed to use available information to impeach 
Mings, such as using information that Keshia "did not work at the 
Tinee Giant at the time the crimes occurred" to impeach Mings' 
testimony that "he was trying to contact [Keshia] on the day of the 
shootings to retrieve [Melinda] Bowser's paycheck."  In addition, 
petitioner contends that counsel should have presented evidence that 
"it was well known in the neighborhood that Mings frequented the 
apartment" and should have pointed out in argument that Mings' 
ability to go "straight to the bedroom" was the result of "his 
familiarity with the apartment."  Petitioner contends that phone 
records prove that Mings called petitioner's house shortly after his 
call to "911." Petitioner argues that counsel should have used this 
evidence, along with "Mings' materially contradictory statements to 
police," and Bowser's account to police, to impeach Mings' testimony 
and "to expose Mings and his asserted fear of reprisal from 
 
14
[petitioner]."   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner speculates, but does not 
proffer any evidence, that Keshia could not have had Bowser's check 
simply because she no longer worked at Tinee Giant.  Furthermore, 
the record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that Mings 
went to Keshia's apartment because Murray called and told Mings that 
a shooting had occurred.  The diagram of the apartment demonstrates 
that the apartment was small and that the hallway led directly to 
the bedrooms.  In support of his claim that Mings had previously 
been inside petitioner's apartment, petitioner relies on the 
affidavit of Michael Lassiter, who claims that Mings would buy drugs 
from Keshia.  Lassiter does not articulate how he knew about Ming's 
alleged drug purchases and, in any event, counsel made a tactical 
decision not to call Lassiter because petitioner had asked Lassiter 
to help him develop an alibi, which conversation had been recorded.  
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In the fourth portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate Ernest Smith more fully after petitioner 
informed counsel and Investigator Kennedy that Smith had contacted 
homicide detectives and was trying to "get into" petitioner's case.  
Petitioner argues counsel should have spoken with other inmates "who 
 
15
knew that Smith spoke openly about fabricating evidence against 
Juniper."  Petitioner contends that, had counsel investigated Smith, 
they would have learned that Juniper never confessed to Smith. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel, Investigator Kennedy's notes, counsel's notes, and the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that counsel did not have reason to 
believe that Smith would testify against petitioner at the guilt 
phase of the trial, because when counsel confronted petitioner about 
Smith and other witnesses, whose names were on the Commonwealth's 
witness list, petitioner "claimed that these witnesses were 
unimportant third parties or jail house snitches who would not 
testify."  Additionally, the record, including the Commonwealth's 
Supplemental Notice of Intent to Present Evidence of Unadjudicated 
Criminal Conduct and the trial transcript, demonstrates that counsel 
was informed prior to trial that petitioner had attacked Smith and 
threatened to kill him while he and Smith were in the medical pod 
together and, therefore, counsel had no reason to believe Smith 
would have voluntarily spoken to them about the case.  Additionally, 
the record contains no evidence to support petitioner's claim that 
there were other inmates who would testify that Smith spoke about 
fabricating evidence against Juniper.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
In the fifth portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
 
16
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate Terence Fitzgerald more fully.  Petitioner 
contends that had counsel investigated more fully, counsel would 
have learned that Fitzgerald was "having sex with [Keshia] and using 
the apartment as a base of operations to sell drugs."  In addition, 
counsel would have learned of Fitzgerald's statements to police that 
"'the only people who might have wanted to do this was someone who 
had been pistol whipped by some friends of Keshia's brother,' and 
that he saw 'a gray automobile with a missing tag in the parking 
lot.'"  Petitioner contends that had counsel obtained these 
statements, counsel could have used them at trial and would have 
learned that the police had suspected and accused Fitzgerald of the 
crime.  In addition, petitioner contends that counsel should have 
asked Fitzgerald about his personal knowledge concerning the "foot 
traffic" at Keshia's apartment, which petitioner contends was the 
result of Keshia and her brother "selling drugs for Fitzgerald from 
the apartment."  Furthermore, petitioner contends counsel should 
have discovered that Fitzgerald had been at the apartment the day 
after the murders and that he had seen blood in the hallway and 
bathroom. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel and Investigator Kennedy's notes, the trial transcripts 
and the exhibits offered at trial, demonstrates that counsel had no 
reason to believe that additional investigation of Fitzgerald would 
have revealed the sexual nature of his relationship with Keshia, as 
 
17
Fitzgerald had explained to Investigator Kennedy that he felt sorry 
for Keshia when he discussed the rumors that he was her "sugar 
daddy."  The trial court ruled that evidence concerning the "foot 
traffic" at the apartment was inadmissible because it was 
irrelevant.  Counsel had no right to review Fitzgerald's statements 
to police unless they contained exculpatory evidence, which 
petitioner fails to allege was the case.  Fitzgerald's speculation 
that someone "who had been pistol whipped by some friends of 
Keshia's brother," may have been responsible for the murders is 
unsupported by any evidence.  Fitzgerald does not state that he told 
police about the men in a car, and Investigator Kennedy's notes 
reveal that Fitzgerald did not share this information with 
Investigator Kennedy.  Finally, Fitzgerald does not state that he 
told anyone about the blood he saw in the apartment the day after 
the murders, and his observations would have had little relevance as 
there was ample evidence presented at trial concerning the location 
of blood at the time the murders were discovered.  Petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In the sixth portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to investigate John Jones more fully.  In support of this 
claim, petitioner proffers that "Renee Archibald told counsel that 
Jones was a violent, controlling person who hated [Keshia]; Jones 
was possessive of Juniper and resented the fact that Juniper let 
 
18
[Keshia] come before him."  Petitioner contends that had counsel 
more fully investigated Jones, counsel could have used this 
information to support petitioner's "alibi defense and challenge the 
Commonwealth's evidence and theory that [petitioner] alone committed 
the murders and bore sole culpability."  Petitioner notes that 
evidence indicating he did not act alone, or that a sole perpetrator 
did not commit the crimes, would have undermined confidence in the 
jury's determination that death was the appropriate sentence.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel, the trial transcripts and the police reports, 
demonstrates that Jones did not testify at trial, but told the 
police shortly after his initial interrogation that he had, in fact, 
seen petitioner emerging from the apartment with a gun in his hand.  
Although Archibald was interviewed prior to trial, neither counsel's 
nor Investigator Kennedy's notes mention Archibald ever stating that 
Jones was violent or hated Keshia.  Petitioner does not explain how 
Jones' reputation for violence or his hatred of Keshia would have 
supported an alibi defense, or undermined evidence that petitioner, 
alone, committed the murders.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the seventh portion of claim (II)(A), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel were 
on notice, pursuant to the presentence report, that Bowser, 
 
19
Fitzgerald, and Jones had given statements to the police.  
Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth concealed these statements 
and that counsel "unreasonably failed to develop and present this 
evidence – after being put on notice by the presentence report – 
through motion for mistrial, continuance, or other appropriate 
vehicle."  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(A) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to articulate what 
information counsel would have developed, the basis upon which 
counsel should have moved for a mistrial, or that the statements 
contained exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (II)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
adequately investigate Michael Lassiter, who purportedly could have 
provided an alibi defense. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(B) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel, demonstrates that counsel spoke with Lassiter, but 
Lassiter never provided petitioner an alibi.  Counsel chose not to 
present Lassiter as a witness during the guilt phase of the trial 
because the Commonwealth possessed an audio recording of a 
conversation between Lassiter and petitioner, in which the two were 
 
20
attempting to fabricate an alibi.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the second portion of claim (II)(B), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to adequately investigate Keshia Stephens.  Petitioner 
contends counsel failed to discover that Keshia "had stolen at least 
two kilos from a drug dealer she was involved with," and asserts 
that "[w]hether true or not, this rumor alone would have made her a 
target."  Petitioner contends further that Keshia "was a regular 
drug user, [who] would rob people and have sex for money and drugs."  
Petitioner alleges that Keshia's "brother, Ruben Harrison III, also 
engaged in behavior that put him at risk," and that Mings 
"frequented the apartment because he was selling some of the drugs 
stashed there." 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(B) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel, demonstrates that counsel chose not to present evidence 
attacking the victims' lifestyles, because counsel did not believe 
this evidence would have exculpated petitioner, and because counsel 
did not want to risk offending the jury.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the third portion of claim (II)(B), petitioner alleges that 
 
21
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to adequately investigate Kevin Waterman, one of Keshia's 
neighbors, who told police that he heard four gunshots in Keshia's 
apartment around 1:30 p.m. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(B) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
of counsel and Waterman, demonstrates that counsel made a tactical 
decision not to call Waterman as a witness.  Even accepting 
Waterman's affidavit that he heard gunshots in the general vicinity 
of the apartment building between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. on the day of 
the murders, counsel could not reconcile this information with the 
other evidence that the murders occurred earlier in the day.  
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (II)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because "counsel unreasonably failed 
to investigate and present evidence from the letters and other 
documents of Keshia Stephens." Petitioner contends that if counsel 
had investigated these letters they would have determined that 
Keshia "was dishonest and willing to cheat people," and "was leading 
an increasingly dangerous lifestyle defined by multiple sex 
partners, drugs, and duplicity."  In support of this claim, 
petitioner submits a letter written by Keshia "explaining 
(untruthfully) why she was terminated from her job at the Tinee 
 
22
Giant."  Petitioner contends that counsel could have used this 
letter in cross-examination of Mings, who testified that he had gone 
to Keshia's apartment in part to get a check for Bowser, who worked 
at the Tinee Giant.  In addition, petitioner relies on a copy of "an 
opened letter to Fitzgerald from his probation officer, setting up a 
meeting time for January 5, 2004," which petitioner contends would 
have rebutted Fitzgerald's testimony that he had stopped going to 
the apartment. 
The Court holds that claim (II)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the letters upon 
which petitioner relies and the affidavits of counsel, demonstrates 
that the letters had little value to petitioner's case.  As for 
Keshia's letter, the letter does not negate Mings' reasons for going 
to the apartment and counsel made a tactical decision not to attack 
Keshia's lifestyle at trial.  The Fitzgerald letter upon which 
petitioner relies contains no recipient address and was dated weeks 
before the murders.  Petitioner proffers no other letters or 
documents in support of this claim.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (II)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
investigate the time of the shootings.  Petitioner contends that a 
time of death was not established by the medical examiner, and 
petitioner's alibi, together with Keith Waterman's testimony that he 
 
23
heard shots between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., would have refuted 
evidence that petitioner was in the apartment at the time of the 
murders.  Although police first arrived on the scene at 12:50 p.m. 
and left at 1:12 p.m., they did not go into the apartment or confirm 
that anyone had been killed.  Petitioner contends that evidence that 
the murders occurred at the time Waterman heard the shots would have 
created reasonable doubt as to petitioner's involvement in the 
crime. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(D) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the affidavits of counsel, demonstrates that 
counsel's failure to establish a timeline did not constitute 
ineffective assistance where neither the police, medical examiner, 
forensic laboratory, nor prosecutor could, based upon the evidence, 
eliminate all uncertainty as to the time of the shootings.  
Petitioner never provided counsel an alibi, and he cannot show that 
he was prejudiced by his counsel's inability to establish a timeline 
for the commission of the murders.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (II)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
investigate the forensic evidence.  He contends that counsel should 
have investigated whether the two different brands of nine 
millimeter bullets recovered from the scene "came from more than one 
 
24
gun," as well as certain unidentified fingerprint and DNA evidence 
found at the scene, by hiring their own forensic expert to conduct 
independent fingerprint, ballistics and DNA testing or to review the 
work of the state's lab.  Further, he contends that counsel should 
have fully investigated Fitzgerald to discover the blood evidence 
that refuted the Commonwealth's theory concerning how the murders 
occurred. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(E) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of petitioner's counsel, demonstrates that counsel determined that 
there was not a particularized need for a forensic expert in this 
case, and therefore did not request one.  Petitioner has not 
identified a particularized need for the expert, or set forth any 
reason to believe that a forensic expert would be able to obtain 
fingerprint or DNA results that the Commonwealth's forensic 
laboratory would not.  The fact that two different brands of bullets 
were recovered does not refute the Commonwealth's evidence that both 
brands of bullets were fired from the same gun.  Petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (II)(F), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel "failed to follow 
through on" certain theories of defense.  Petitioner contends that 
counsel did not present evidence from Michael Lassiter that 
 
25
petitioner had an alibi, and that "others were present at the crime 
scene that morning."  Petitioner contends further that counsel 
should have investigated "possible motives of others for the 
murders," and discovered that "several of the players involved were 
cold and calculating individuals, capable of committing a crime like 
this."  Petitioner alleges that, had counsel "investigated possible 
motives," they would have developed "critical evidence bolstering 
and substantiating" their theory "that there was drug dealing and 
prostitution going on inside the apartment."  Counsel also would 
have been able to present evidence of Ruben Harrison's recent rape 
conviction and that Harrison's "friends had recently pistol-whipped 
an individual." Petitioner contends further that counsel would have 
discovered that "the police did a bad job [of] collecting evidence." 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II)(F) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the affidavits of counsel, demonstrates that neither 
petitioner nor Lassiter provided an alibi for petitioner and that 
petitioner's numerous theories and alleged motives for the murders 
were not supported by any evidence.  Furthermore, counsel made a 
tactical decision not to "make an issue" of Harrison's rape 
conviction, because details of the offense did not provide a motive 
for the murders and counsel did not want to appear to "smear one of 
the victims."  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
26
In claim (II)(G), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to renew 
petitioner's motion for a change of venue.  Petitioner contends he 
was "entitled to a change of venue because media coverage was 
intense" and counsel had met the burden of presenting numerous 
prejudicial news accounts of petitioner and the crimes with which he 
was charged.  The record, including the pre-trial transcripts, 
demonstrates that counsel moved for a change of venue a few weeks 
prior to trial, and the trial court took the matter under 
advisement.  Petitioner cites the opinion from his direct appeal, 
where we held the issue to be barred on appeal because counsel did 
not timely renew the motion or bring it to the attention of the 
trial court.  Juniper, 271 Va. at 384, 626 S.E.2d at 398.  
Petitioner contends that had counsel renewed the motion, "there is a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome."  
The Court holds that claim (II)(G) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that the evidence did not support a 
finding that the media coverage had been extensive or warranted a 
change in venue.  Petitioner fails to allege that his motion would 
have been granted had he renewed it or even that he could have met 
his burden to establish that the media coverage at the time of trial 
was so pervasive "as to make it reasonably certain" that he could 
not receive a fair trial. Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 250, 
372 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1988).  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient.  Furthermore, petitioner 
 
27
has failed to demonstrate that a renewed motion for a change of 
venue would have been successful or that, in a different venue, the 
result of the criminal proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (II)(H), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object 
when the trial court changed the questions it used in voir dire.  
Petitioner contends that counsel did not object when the trial court 
"simplified 'substantially impair' to 'very difficult.'" Petitioner 
alleges that the two terms are defined differently and that "very 
difficult" is a higher burden than "substantially impair."  
Petitioner argues that jurors whose beliefs "substantially impaired" 
their decision making would not have admitted so if their beliefs 
did not also make their decision making "very difficult."  
Petitioner contends further that this Court did not reach the issue 
on direct appeal because counsel failed to preserve the claim.  
Juniper, 271 Va. at 385-86, 626 S.E.2d at 399.  
The Court holds that claim (II)(H) fails to satisfy the 
"prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Petitioner fails to allege that any juror held beliefs that 
"substantially impaired" his or her decision-making process, and 
fails to allege that the issue would have had merit on appeal had it 
been properly preserved at trial.  Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (II)(I), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel "failed to seek 
files from the Commonwealth."  Petitioner contends that counsel 
 
28
requested "police files" pertaining to petitioner's "unadjudicated 
criminal conduct and to Ruben Harrison III's recent rape 
conviction."  According to petitioner, counsel cited no valid legal 
principles that would have required the release of the files. 
Petitioner contends that, if counsel had raised the appropriate 
arguments, either the trial court would have ordered the police to 
share these exculpatory files or the issue would have been preserved 
for appeal.  
The Court holds that claim (II)(I) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  A defendant in a capital case is entitled 
to notice of the Commonwealth's intention to rely on unadjudicated 
criminal conduct at sentencing.  Code § 19.2-264.3:2 requires, 
concerning the Commonwealth's intention to rely on unadjudicated 
criminal conduct, that the Commonwealth give written notice, 
including a description of the conduct and, "to the extent such 
information is available, the time and place such conduct will be 
alleged to have occurred."  Petitioner has failed to identify the 
legal authority upon which he contends counsel could have argued for 
the underlying police files regarding his unadjudicated criminal 
conduct and has failed to establish that he was entitled to the 
underlying police files of the victim's rape conviction.  Petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (III), petitioner alleges his trial counsel suffered 
from an unconstitutional conflict of interest. Petitioner contends 
 
29
that the investigator hired to work with his defense team had 
previously "represented" Ernest Smith on an unrelated 
"rape/abduction case."  Petitioner argues that counsel should have 
investigated and discovered the conflict and should have revealed 
that conflict to petitioner. 
The Court holds that claim (III) is barred by Code § 8.01-
654(B)(2) and Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 
352 (2001), as well as by the applicable statute of limitations set 
forth in Code § 8.01-654.1.  Pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.1, 
petitioner had until December 11, 2006 to file his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus on that date that did not comply with the page 
limitations found in Rule 5:7A(g), along with a motion for leave to 
file an oversized petition.  Petitioner was ordered on January 24, 
2007 to file a petition in compliance with Rule 5:7A(g) no later 
than January 29, 2007. 
On January 26, 2007, petitioner filed a request for an 
emergency stay of the Court's January 24, 2007 order because his 
habeas counsel had determined that a potential conflict existed.  
Habeas counsel learned on January 24, 2007 that she formerly 
represented informant Ernest Smith in a criminal matter in 2001, and 
that Investigator Kennedy, who was hired as petitioner's habeas 
investigator, also investigated the case on behalf of Smith.   
On January 29, 2007, petitioner filed a 50-page petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus that did not include a claim related to the 
investigator's alleged conflict of interest.  On February 1, 2007, 
 
30
this Court denied the motion to stay the Court's January 24, 2007 
order as moot and directed the parties to brief the conflict issue.  
Thereafter, counsel moved to withdraw and requested the appointment 
of new counsel and the opportunity to file a new petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  On March 2, 2007, this Court granted 
counsel's request to withdraw, appointed new counsel, and granted 
petitioner 60 days in which to file an amended petition, if 
necessary.   
On May 1, 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Court's March 2, 2007 order, 
in which claim (III) was raised for the first time.  Claim (III), 
therefore, the facts of which were known prior to petitioner's 
January 29, 2007 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, was not 
previously raised, and was not raised until after the expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
In claim (IV)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his 
trial because counsel failed to "discover all reasonably available 
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence 
that may be introduced by the prosecutor."  See Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).  Petitioner contends that counsel failed 
to adequately investigate petitioner's family and social background 
and, as a result, failed to discover that petitioner has a family 
history of serious mental illness.  
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A) satisfies neither the 
 
31
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits of 
counsel and a memorandum counsel wrote to petitioner's client file 
on January 25, 2005, demonstrates that both petitioner and his 
family members were uncooperative.  Petitioner insisted, "he would 
rather be executed than spend his life behind bars," and 
"discouraged potential mitigation witnesses from providing counsel 
with useful information."  When approached by counsel, petitioner's 
relatives, including his mother, refused to cooperate or testify.  
Moreover, petitioner never mentioned to his trial counsel a possible 
mitigation witness who he contends could have provided information 
regarding his family's or his alleged mental health issues.  
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase because 
counsel failed to present rebuttal evidence to the aggravating 
evidence introduced by the prosecution.  He contends that counsel 
failed to investigate the alleged prior acts of violence against 
Keshia, including an incident where petitioner allegedly bound her 
with duct tape and tortured her with a stun gun, and did not present 
evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, to rebut the 
prosecution's allegations. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
 
32
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel presented evidence at trial 
consistent with what petitioner told police as to how Keshia's 
previous injuries occurred, including testimony of a police 
investigator that petitioner made a comment and then said "that she 
duct taped herself," which the officer understood to mean that 
Keshia "could charge [petitioner] with abduction and he could get 50 
years."  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase because 
counsel encouraged the jury to impose the harshest penalty possible 
when she argued, "If the goal here is to punish him, then make him 
suffer . . . . Don't put him to death like a sick animal and put him 
out of his misery.  The ultimate punishment here is time."  
Petitioner contends that this statement was equivalent to asking the 
jury not to have sympathy or mercy on petitioner but to impose the 
harshest penalty possible, which in counsel's opinion was life 
imprisonment. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that, taken in context, counsel's argument 
sought to humanize petitioner by invoking images of the abuse 
petitioner suffered as a child and by asking the jury to show mercy 
 
33
on him by considering any evidence that "in fairness or mercy may 
extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability and punishment."  
In addition, counsel asked the jury, if it were to seek the ultimate 
punishment, to do so by sentencing petitioner to life.  Petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient 
or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  
 
In claim (IV)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to 
Virginia's only available means of execution, which he contends 
violates his "Eighth Amendment guarantees as contrary to 
contemporary norms and standards and offending the dignity of the 
person and society because they create an unreasonable risk of 
unnecessary physical and psychological pain." The Court holds that 
claim (IV)(D) satisfies neither the "performance" nor the 
"prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
This Court has held that a Virginia prisoner has no constitutional 
claim regarding lethal injection because he can choose execution by 
electrocution, which this Court has repeatedly held does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment.  Orbe v. Johnson, 267 Va. 560, 562, 601 S.E.2d 
547, 549 (2004).  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to protect 
 
34
his confidentiality when counsel requested petitioner's school 
records via a subpoena duces tecum rather than by using a release 
signed by Juniper. Petitioner contends that because the documents 
were sent to both defense counsel and to the prosecution, the 
prosecution discovered that Juniper had several incidents of 
unadjudicated criminal conduct while he was incarcerated at the 
Hampton Roads Regional Jail.  
The Court holds that claim (IV)(E) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that counsel knew 
that the Commonwealth either had obtained or was in the process of 
obtaining petitioner's school records, thus there was no need for 
secrecy.  Petitioner, therefore, was not prejudiced by counsel's 
decision to pursue receipt of the records through the issuance of a 
subpoena.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(F), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase because 
counsel failed to ensure that the jurors were properly instructed.  
He contends that the verdict form was improper in that it required 
only that the jurors unanimously find that "either" aggravating 
circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, without requiring 
jurors to agree on which of the aggravating factors existed. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(F) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
 
35
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, written jury instructions, and verdict forms, 
demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed and that the 
verdict forms gave the jury the option to find either or both 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Prieto v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 366, 406, 682 S.E.2d 910, 931 (2009), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3419 (2010).  Jurors are presumed to 
follow the trial court's instructions.  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 
619 S.E.2d at 58.  Furthermore, the jury unanimously found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that petitioner "would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society" and unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
petitioner's "conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved depravity of 
mind and/or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the act of murder." Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(G), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase because 
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument that 
"the only just verdict is the ultimate punishment of death" and 
that Juniper had written "his own death warrant."  Petitioner 
contends that the prosecutor's statements were improper because 
they expressed his personal opinion that petitioner deserved the 
 
36
death penalty. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(G) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the prosecutor's statements did not 
express his personal opinion, misstate the evidence or mislead the 
jury.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
In claim (IV)(H), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase because 
counsel failed to object to the trial court's future dangerousness 
instruction.  He contends that the word "probability" in the 
instruction allows for more uncertainty than the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard, and that the instruction creates an 
unacceptable risk that the jury used a "probability" standard in 
judging future dangerousness. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(H) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including trial transcript 
and jury instructions, demonstrates that the instruction followed 
the "future dangerousness" language of Code § 19.2-264.4 which this 
Court has held is not unconstitutionally vague.  See, e.g., Stockton 
v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 134-35, 314 S.E.2d 371, 378 (1984).  
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
 
37
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (V), petitioner alleges the trial court 
unconstitutionally prohibited petitioner from putting on proper 
evidence of his lack of future dangerousness.  
The Court holds that claim (V) is procedurally defaulted 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 
205 S.E.2d at 682.   
In a portion of claim (VI), petitioner alleges he was denied 
his right to counsel of his choice. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI) is barred 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. 
In another portion of claim (VI), petitioner alleges that 
counsel's actions created an actual conflict of interest between 
counsel and petitioner, prejudiced him, and denied him the effective 
assistance of counsel.  Petitioner contends that counsel made "a 
self-serving proffer" regarding whether to put on evidence at the 
guilt phase of the trial, revealed attorney work product and 
attorney-client privileged communications, refused to pursue the 
course of action petitioner had chosen, and made incomplete 
representations to the court, thus concealing facts from the court's 
consideration.  Petitioner contends counsel failed to tell the court 
 
38
that Lassiter could confirm petitioner's alibi when counsel were 
expressing their decision not to call Lassiter during the guilt 
phase of the trial.   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VI) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his 
counsel.  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).  The record, 
including the affidavits of counsel and the trial transcript, 
demonstrates that counsel discussed with petitioner their decisions 
regarding presenting evidence during the guilt phase and strategic 
decisions not to call certain witnesses.  Furthermore, counsel 
informed petitioner of his right to testify and his right to decide 
whether to testify.  The trial court explored this issue with 
petitioner, who informed the court that he had decided not to 
testify.  As discussed previously, neither petitioner nor Lassiter 
ever provided counsel with an alibi and, therefore, counsel were not 
being "incomplete" by failing to inform the court of Lassiter's 
potential alibi testimony. Petitioner contends that counsel's 
proffers to the court created a conflict of interest, but petitioner 
does not identify how counsel's loyalties had been divided, or how 
he was prejudiced.  Petitioner has failed to establish either an 
actual conflict of interest or an adverse effect on counsel's 
performance.  See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2002).  
Therefore, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
 
39
would have been different. 
 
In claim (VII), petitioner alleges "[c]ounsel unreasonably 
failed to argue that an emerging national consensus opposing the 
authorization and practice of executing people with serious mental 
illness makes Juniper's death sentence unconstitutional." 
The Court holds that claim (VII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the petition, 
demonstrates that there is no evidence in the record that petitioner 
suffers "serious" mental illness and, therefore, such an argument 
would have been improper if made to a jury.  Petitioner fails to 
provide the argument or controlling authority he contends counsel 
should have raised in such an argument to a judge.  Therefore, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VIII), petitioner alleges he is actually innocent of 
capital murder. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII) is barred because assertions 
of actual innocence are governed by Code §§ 19.2-327.1 through -
327.6, and Code §§ 19.2–327.10 through -327.14, and are outside the 
scope of habeas corpus review. Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 
585 S.E.2d 801, 827 (2003). 
Upon consideration thereof, petitioner's "motion for leave to 
depose the department of forensic science," "motion for funds to 
hire a psychologist or psychiatrist," "motions for appointment of a 
 
40
DNA expert and discovery of electronic data," "motion for 
discovery," and motion for an evidentiary hearing are denied. 
Upon further consideration thereof, respondent's motions to 
strike petitioner's original appendix and supplemental appendix are 
denied.  The exhibits contained in the appendices are considered 
pursuant to the appropriate evidentiary rules.  Petitioner's motion 
to strike respondents' affidavits is denied.  The affidavits are 
considered pursuant to the appropriate evidentiary rules. 
Finally, respondent's motion to strike petitioner's third 
supplemental appendix, volume X, is granted.  This appendix is 
stricken as barred by Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) and Dorsey v. Angelone, 
261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352 (2001), as the exhibits 
contained therein relate to claims known to petitioner but not 
presented in either of the previous petitions for a writ of habeas 
corpus, including the claim relating to trial counsel's prior 
representation of Ernest Smith, and that petitioner suffered from 
sleep apnea.   
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the petition is 
dismissed. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk