Title: Commonwealth v. Silvelo

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12866 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DERON N. SILVELO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 2, 2020.  -  October 14, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Motor Vehicle, Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure, Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Motor 
vehicle, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, 
Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division 
of the District Court Department on March 17, 2014, and December 
4, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Michael 
A. Uhlarik, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered 
by him; and the case was tried before Holly V. Broadbent, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Michelle A. Dame for the defendant. 
 
Catherine P. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant was convicted by a jury of carrying 
a firearm without a license and possessing a loaded firearm.2  
His trial took place before our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 601 (2018), in which we concluded that in 
order to convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), the Commonwealth has to prove 
that the defendant knew that the firearm was loaded.  Thus, the 
judge did not instruct the jury on this element of the crime.  
The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and we granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review.  See 
Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 86-87 (2019). 
 
The defendant contends that (1) the motion judge erred in 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress the firearm; 
(2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of 
possession of a loaded firearm; (3) the failure to instruct that 
jury that the defendant had to know that the firearm was loaded 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice on that 
                                                 
 
2 On the first day of trial, the Commonwealth dismissed the 
indictment for possession of ammunition without an FID card.  
The defendant also faced a civil infraction for failing to wear 
a seat belt, pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 13A, for which the trial 
judge found the defendant responsible; the charge was filed. 
 
 
The judge sentenced the defendant to eighteen months 
imprisonment on the charge of carrying a firearm without a 
license, and to two years of probation on the charge of carrying 
a loaded firearm without a license, to run from and after the 
completion of his prison sentence. 
3 
 
 
charge; and (4) the prosecutor's closing arguments contained 
misconduct that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
We affirm the motion judge's denial of the motion to 
suppress.  We also determine that the evidence was so 
overwhelming that we have no serious doubt that a rational jury 
could have concluded that the defendant knew that the revolver 
he possessed was loaded had the judge properly instructed them, 
and therefore, we affirm the conviction under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n).  Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 581 (2018). 
 
1.  Background.  At around 11:15 P.M. on March 16, 2014, a 
State police trooper initiated a vehicle stop on a busy 
interstate highway due to an invalid inspection status.  Once 
the car stopped, the trooper approached from the passenger's 
side to avoid traffic.  While approaching, he observed at least 
four people in the back seat, including children or infants, and 
he noticed the defendant in the front passenger's seat 
attempting to fasten a seat belt.  Consequently, the trooper 
requested identification not only from the driver, but also from 
the defendant. 
 
As the defendant reached for his identification, the 
trooper observed a black object, which he believed to be a 
weapon because of its size and color, fall out of the 
defendant's pocket between his seat and the center console.  The 
4 
 
 
trooper returned to his cruiser and discovered that the 
defendant had outstanding warrants.  Rather than act by himself 
on that information, the trooper requested backup.  When backup 
arrived, the trooper arrested the defendant on the warrants, 
handcuffed him, and placed him in the cruiser.  The trooper 
immediately searched the front passenger's seat area of the 
stopped car and found a revolver.  He flipped open the revolver 
portion and saw four of the chamber's five openings filled with 
ammunition. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant 
appeals from the order denying his motion to suppress the 
firearm evidence as fruits of an unconstitutional automobile 
search.3  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 601 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
At the hearing on the motion, the trooper testified on 
direct examination that he saw a dark object he believed to be a 
firearm fall from the defendant's pocket.  On cross-examination, 
the trooper indicated that he was not one hundred percent sure 
                                                 
3 The defendant's motion for reconsideration also was 
denied. 
5 
 
 
that it was a firearm.  He testified that he saw "[a] dark 
object that could resemble a weapon."  The motion judge credited 
the trooper's testimony and found that the trooper observed the 
"defendant remove[] what appeared to be a gun from his pants 
pocket.".  The motion judge determined that the trooper's 
concern for his own safety reasonably justified the protective 
sweep of a vehicle pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968). 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, warrantless searches are presumptively "unreasonable 
. . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."   Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 
(2009), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  
See also Perkins, 465 Mass. at 603.  Because the trooper had no 
search warrant, the Commonwealth bears the burden of 
establishing that the stop and frisk "exception[] to the warrant 
requirement" applies.4  Perkins, supra at 603. 
                                                 
4 "In 'stop and frisk' cases, there is a two-step analysis:  
whether the initiation of the investigation by the police was 
permissible in the circumstances and whether the scope of the 
search was justified."  Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 
672 (2001).  In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued 
that the first prong was not justified because the stop of the 
vehicle, the request for the defendant's identification, and his 
arrest were unconstitutional.  He is no longer pursuing those 
contentions. 
6 
 
 
 
The "stop and frisk" exception to the warrant requirement 
permits a police officer without probable cause both to stop a 
vehicle, and to "conduct a limited [vehicle] search for weapons 
if . . . 'reasonably prudent'" people in the officer's position 
would justifiably fear for their safety or that of other 
persons.  Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 752 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 406 (1974).  See 
Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 49 (2018) (Terry-type 
protective sweep may extend to limited search of automobile).  
The officer's fear must be grounded in "specific, articulable 
facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Edwards, 476 Mass. 341, 345 (2017).  
To determine reasonableness, we "balanc[e] the need to search 
. . . against the invasion which the search . . . entails" 
(citation omitted).  Silva, 366 Mass. at 405. 
Warrantless searches of vehicles are justified where an 
officer would reasonably fear that the defendant may possess a 
weapon or that there is a weapon in the vehicle.  See Daniel, 
464 Mass. at 752.  Even where the officers ask the defendant to 
get out of the vehicle, they may reasonably fear for their 
safety because any other occupant may access a weapon left 
behind by the defendant, or the defendant may access a weapon 
left behind upon returning to the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 571 (2002) (officer "not 
7 
 
 
required to risk becoming a victim upon the suspect's reentry 
into the vehicle"). 
Although the trooper here had already arrested the 
defendant prior to the search, and the defendant could not 
return to the vehicle to access a weapon, the evidence 
nevertheless supports the motion judge's conclusion that a 
reasonable officer would continue to have safety concerns under 
the circumstances.  Contrast Edwards, 476 Mass. at 349.  The 
trooper observed a weapon fall from the defendant's pocket when 
he first approached the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 
407 Mass. 147, 152 (1990) (protective search of automobile 
justified because police saw wooden object consistent with 
weapon handle).  Given that other adults remained in the vehicle 
after the trooper arrested the defendant, the trooper's concern 
that the revolver "could [still] be used against" him was 
reasonable.  Id.  The search was therefore constitutionally 
permissible because a "reasonably prudent" trooper would not 
only have personal safety concerns, but also would appreciate 
that the other passengers might retrieve the weapon and harm the 
trooper, themselves, or others.  Daniel, 464 Mass. at 752, 
quoting Silva, 366 Mass. at 406.  See Commonwealth v. Graham, 78 
Mass. App. Ct. 127, 129 (2010).5 
                                                 
5 We note that other theories might justify the search of 
the defendant's vehicle, such as a search incident to arrest.  A 
8 
 
 
b.  Erroneous jury instruction.  Because our decision in 
Brown relied upon statutory interpretation, we apply its rule 
retroactively.6  See Commonwealth v. Paul, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 263, 
265-266 (2019).  Therefore, the trial judge's jury instruction 
omitted an essential element required to convict a defendant of 
violating G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n):  whether the defendant knew 
the gun he possessed was loaded.  Because the defendant did not 
object to the instruction, we determine whether the error 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, which 
requires us to order a new trial if "we have a serious doubt 
whether the result of the trial might have been different had 
the error not been made" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Sherman, 481 Mass. 464, 475-476 (2019).7 
                                                 
search of a vehicle is constitutional following a defendant's 
arrest, either to seize evidence of the offense for which the 
defendant was arrested or to remove weapons that the defendant 
might use to resist arrest or to escape.  See G. L. c. 276, § 1.  
See also Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 605 (2013), 
quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009).  The trooper 
here had secured the defendant in the police cruiser at the time 
of the search, so we do not reach the issue whether the 
officer's justification to search for weapons incident to arrest 
under G. L. c. 276, § 1, dissipated when he waited for backup 
before making the arrest. 
 
6 The jury returned the guilty verdicts in the defendant's 
case more than one year before we released Brown. 
 
7 We have noted multiple times that "this standard is 
particularly well suited to a situation, such as here, where the 
elements of a crime are erroneously stated in the jury charge."  
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 
72 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 647 
9 
 
 
 
To assess whether a jury instruction omitting an essential 
element of a crime created a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice, we evaluate the evidence as a whole to determine 
whether the evidence was "so overwhelming" that "there is no 
likelihood that the omitted instruction materially influenced 
the jury's verdict[]."8  Lutskov, 480 Mass. at 581.9  See 
Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 398 Mass. 1, 5 (1986) ("no harm 
accrues to a defendant if an error does not relate to an issue 
actively contested at trial").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 
Mass. 161, 173-174 (2006) (no substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice where evidence required jury to find element omitted 
from instruction). 
                                                 
n.21 (1997) ("This standard is well suited to these cases 
because, when the elements of a crime are incorrectly stated, 
there is a substantial risk that a person has been convicted for 
a course of conduct that is not criminal at all."). 
 
8 Because we conclude that the Commonwealth presented 
evidence "so overwhelming" that "there was no likelihood that 
the omitted instruction materially influenced the jury's 
verdict[]," Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 581 (2018), 
we conclude that the Commonwealth necessarily presented 
sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict the defendant 
of possessing a loaded firearm. 
 
9 We recognize that this formulation diverges from Azar, 435 
Mass. at 688, under which we analyzed whether the "evidence 
required the jury to [have found]" or to have "ineluctably 
inferred" that the Commonwealth carried its burden of proving 
the omitted element beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not intend 
this semantic difference in language to change the stringency of 
the standard announced in Azar with this formulation. 
10 
 
 
Without direct evidence that the defendant knew the gun was 
loaded, and with almost no discussion of the question at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress or at trial, we evaluate the 
circumstantial evidence, see Brown, 479 Mass. at 608, to 
determine whether the evidence was "so overwhelming" that we 
have no serious doubt that a rational jury could have concluded 
the defendant knew the revolver he possessed was loaded.  
Lutskov, 480 Mass. at 581.  Although the standard is a high one, 
we do not dispense with common sense when evaluating the 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 Mass. 340, 351 
(2003) ("As the terminology implies, a 'substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice' refers to a risk that has some genuine 
substance to it.  That standard does not encompass an abstract, 
theoretical possibility of a miscarriage of justice, utterly 
divorced from the case as it was tried"). 
The Commonwealth's case was strong.  The principal evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth was that the defendant had a 
loaded revolver in his pants pocket, which the trooper saw fall 
to the floor of the car.  Moreover, the Commonwealth entered the 
revolver in evidence, for the jury to view during deliberations.  
The jury therefore would have observed that the ammunition would 
have been clearly visible in the chamber given the revolver's 
configuration.  The revolver could hold five bullets in the 
cylinder, and it was loaded with four bullets when the trooper 
11 
 
 
seized it.  Even if one of the bullets was in the chamber, and 
therefore not visible in the cylinder, at least three bullets in 
the cylinder would have remained visible to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 828 n.7 (2012) 
(because "the firearm was a revolver located in a vehicle, a 
rational jury could infer that those who possessed the firearm 
knew that it was loaded with ammunition").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Resende, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 200 (2018) (jury 
reasonably could have concluded that defendant would have 
checked to see if firearm was loaded before he put it in his 
waistband to infer defendant knew firearm loaded).  But see 
Commonwealth v. Grayson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 752-753 (2019) 
(inference from waistband evidence alone insufficient). 
Given that we had not decided Brown at the time of trial, 
it is understandable that the defendant did not argue that the 
Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that he knew the 
revolver was loaded.  The defendant's position at trial was that 
he never possessed the firearm that the officer testified fell 
out of the defendant's pocket.  Considering the mandatory 
minimum sentence the defendant was facing for carrying a 
firearm,10 it is unlikely in the extreme that the defendant would 
have challenged the Commonwealth's proof. 
                                                 
 
10 The mandatory minimum for possessing a firearm without a 
license is eighteen months.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
12 
 
 
Rather, the defendant argued that he did not know that the 
revolver was in the vehicle because the previous owner of the 
car, from whom the defendant's mother had purchased the car a 
week before the arrest, must have left the revolver under the 
passenger seat.  However, the defendant's mother also testified 
that she inspected the car closely before purchasing it and that 
she kept it very clean.  The jury credited the trooper's 
testimony in finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.  
It is therefore difficult to imagine a rational jury, using 
their common sense, finding that the defendant carried the 
revolver, but that he did not know it was loaded.  The omitted 
essential element of knowledge that the firearm was loaded did 
not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Lutskov, 480 Mass. at 581. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's closing arguments.  Finally, the defendant 
contends that errors in the prosecutor's closing argument, to 
which the defendant did not object at trial, collectively 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 n.8 (1987).  We 
evaluate the closing arguments as a whole, in light of the 
strength of the evidence presented at trial, to determine 
whether we have a serious doubt that any discovered errors would 
have led to a different outcome at trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 333 (2015), overruled on another ground, 
13 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454 (2019).  Although we 
conclude that there was no error, following closely the reasons 
stated in the Appeals Court decision, see Silvelo, 96 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 91-93, we take this opportunity to remind prosecutors to 
avoid improper vouching. 
 
During closing, the prosecutor deployed the pronoun "we" 
when arguing that the trooper acted properly in deescalating the 
situation instead of immediately arresting the defendant upon 
observing what the trooper presumed to be a gun fall from the 
defendant's pocket.  The prosecutor stated:  "We don't know what 
would have happened if [the trooper] would have removed [the 
defendant] when [the trooper] first sees that firearm.  We don't 
know that.  What we do know is what he saw, what he did, and 
we're here as a result of it, on a deescalated situation."  The 
defendant alleges that by using the pronoun "we," the prosecutor 
improperly aligned himself with the jury. 
 
"A prosecutor's position is a delicate one.  The prosecutor 
must be free to argue that such a witness is credible, but may 
not explicitly or implicitly vouch to the jury that he or she 
knows that the witness's testimony is true."  Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 265 (1989).  Improper vouching includes 
suggestions that the prosecutor has personal knowledge of the 
veracity of a witness's testimony or knowledge about the case 
independent of the evidence before the jury.  See id.  See also 
14 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Carney, 472 Mass. 252, 258 (2015).  When it 
comes to the use of a first person pronoun, "it is preferable 
that counsel avoid arguing in a form that seeks to engage the 
jury with him or her personally," but the "[m]ere[] us[e of] a 
first person pronoun does not interject personal belief into a 
statement" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 797 (2011).  We remind prosecutors that 
arguments that suggest that the jury should be on the side of 
the government, instead of being judges of the facts and 
impartial arbiters of the application of the burden of proof, 
interferes with the equality of all parties before the bar of 
justice. 
 
Notwithstanding our caution against the use of "we," we 
conclude that the prosecutor here did not intend to align 
himself with the jury or to vouch improperly for the trooper's 
credibility.  The prosecutor merely summarized what the trooper, 
not the prosecutor, knew to be true, and responded to the 
defendant's closing, which repeatedly questioned the trooper's 
credibility because he did not react immediately to seeing what 
he presumed to be a gun fall from the defendant's pocket.  There 
was no error. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions of carrying a firearm without a license 
and of possessing a loaded firearm. 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.