Title: Buseck v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Buseck v. State1990 WY 5785 P.2d 855Case Number: 89-35Decided: 01/19/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
HANK 
BUSECK; JACK MUELLER; ELOISE HOWETH; DEBRA BRIDGES; VIRGINIA WADLIEGH; CATHY 
McLEES; AND KEIJI OKANO, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

STATE 
OF WYOMING; WYOMING STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; LYNN SIMONS, PERSONALLY AND 
AS STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION; AUDREY COTHERMAN, PERSONALLY AND 
AS DEPUTY STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

James 
H. Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Patrick 
E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

PER 
CURIAM.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to the appellees 
State of Wyoming; Wyoming State Department of Education; Lynn Simons, 
individually and as Superintendent of Public Instruction; and Audrey Cotherman, 
individually and as Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction. Appellants 
initially pled four theories for recovery of damages in the district court, two 
based upon state law - including the Governmental Claims Act - and two based 
upon federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this appeal, appellants 
challenge only that portion of the summary judgment which disposed of their § 
1983 claims.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants 
claimed that their constitutional rights were violated by actions of 
Superintendent Simons and her deputy in the course of their presenting to the 
Wyoming State Legislature a proposal to reduce staffing levels at the Wyoming 
State Department of Education. In the course of that presentation, as well as in 
answers to questions posed by members of the press corps following the session 
with the legislature, the state officials intimated that the employees whose 
positions were to be eliminated were not performing their jobs adequately or 
satisfactorily. They went on to indicate that the Department of Education would 
be hard pressed to continue to operate efficiently if the Department were 
required to continue to employ senior employees who were not performing 
satisfactorily, while having to eliminate less senior employees who were 
enthusiastic and performing their jobs well. At the conclusion of the 
negotiations with the legislature, the senior employees, who are appellants 
here, received notices that their jobs were being eliminated, and this became a 
matter of public knowledge. Very shortly after these notices were given, they 
were rescinded upon advice of the attorney general. These employees then sued 
asserting "damage" to their professional reputations and standing. Although the 
original complaint named both Simons and Cotherman individually, as well as in 
their official capacities, it was agreed by all parties that both Simons and 
Cotherman were, at all times relevant, acting within the scope of their official 
duties.

[¶4]      Subsequent to the 
time this case was decided in the district court and subsequent to the time the 
parties filed their briefs in this court, the United States Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989), stating clearly who are persons liable for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits suit only against 
persons, providing:

"Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress." (emphasis added)

Referring 
to the word "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court 
stated:

"Petitioner 
asserts, alternatively, that state officials should be considered `persons' 
under § 1983 even though acting in their official capacities. * * 
*

"Obviously, 
state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in 
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a 
suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit 
against the State itself. * * *

"We 
hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities 
are `persons' under § 1983." (citations omitted) Will v. Michigan Department of 
State Police, ___ U.S. at ___, 109 S. Ct.  at 2311-12.

[¶5]      The only claim 
which appellants sought to have reviewed here was the dismissal of their § 1983 
claims against Simons and Cotherman in their official capacities. The holding of 
the Will case is that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are "persons" under § 1983. Not being "persons" under § 1983, Simons 
and Cotherman, acting in their official capacities are not subject to suit for 
damages. The summary judgment in favor of Simons and Cotherman, therefore, 
is

[¶6]      Affirmed.