Title: Massey v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD F. MASSEY,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 82, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 85002855DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  July 10, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:  August 7, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of August 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Richard F. Massey, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 30, 2009 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in June 1978, Massey and his co-
defendant, Robert Martin, were convicted of Felony Murder in the First 
Degree and a number of related offenses.  Massey’s convictions and 
 
2 
sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.1  Massey’s 
subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the Superior Court.   This 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, Massey claims that the Superior Court erred and 
abused its discretion a) when it rejected his claim that his conviction for 
felony murder3 should be vacated pursuant to Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 
906 (Del. 2002); b) when it rejected his claim that the erroneous language of 
the jury instructions pertaining to second degree burglary4 improperly 
caused the jury to convict him of felony murder; and c) when it held him to a 
more stringent standard under Rule 61(i)(1) than has been applied to other 
litigants in postconviction proceedings, resulting in prejudice to him.     
 
(4) 
When deciding a motion for postconviction relief, the Superior 
Court is first required to determine whether the movant has satisfied the 
procedural requirements of Rule 61.5  In this case, Massey’s convictions 
became final in 1981 when this Court issued the mandate following its 
decision on Massey’s direct appeal.6  Because Massey’s convictions became 
                                                 
1 Martin v. State, 433 A.2d 1025 (Del. 1981). 
2 Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254 (Del. 1988). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2). 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 825. 
5 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
 
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final before Rule 61 was promulgated, he had until January 1, 1989 in which 
to file a postconviction motion.7  Massey’s most recent motion, which was 
filed in June 2008, was plainly untimely, as the Superior Court determined.8   
 
(5) 
Moreover, the record reflects that the indictment and the jury 
instructions given by the Superior Court at Massey’s trial were consistent 
with the rule announced in Williams.  Specifically, the indictment charged 
that Massey “in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of a 
felony, to wit:  Burglary Second Degree . . . recklessly cause[d] the death of 
[the victim] by shooting her in the head with a gun.”  Likewise, the jury was 
instructed that, in order to find the defendant guilty, they had to find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he “caused the death in the course of the commission 
of the felony, namely, Burglary in the Second Degree . . . .” and that he 
“caused the death in the furtherance of the commission of Burglary in the 
Second Degree . . . .”  Because the language of the indictment and the jury 
instructions was fully consistent with the ruling in Williams, the 
“miscarriage of justice” exception of Rule 61(i)(5) does not assist Massey in 
                                                 
7 Boyer v. State, 562 A.2d 1186, 1187-88 (Del. 1989). 
8 Massey argues that his claim is not untimely because, in 2007, this Court held, in Chao 
v. State, 931 A.2d 1000 (Del. 2007), that the Williams case, which reinterpreted the “in 
furtherance of” language of the felony murder statute, was to be retroactively applied.  
We disagree.  Under the plain language of Rule 61(i)(1), the Superior Court correctly 
determined that Massey’s motion also was untimely because it was filed more than 3 
years after the Williams decision was issued in 2002.   
 
4 
overcoming the time bar of Rule 61(i)(1).  We, therefore, conclude that 
Massey’s first claim is without merit.   
 
(6) 
Massey’s second claim is that the erroneous language of the 
jury instructions relating to the underlying felony of second degree burglary 
caused the jury to improperly convict him of felony murder.9  The second 
degree burglary statute states that, “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the 
second degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully . . . 
[i]n a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein . . . .”  According to 
Massey, if this language had been quoted correctly by the Superior Court in 
its jury instructions, the jury would have understood that he could not be 
found guilty of felony murder because, in accordance with the evidence 
presented at trial, the underlying burglary was “complete immediately upon 
entry” into the home where the murder occurred.  
 
(7) 
Massey’s interpretation of the law is incorrect.  The Superior 
Court properly determined that a defendant may still be convicted of felony 
murder, based upon the underlying felony of second degree burglary, even 
though the victim was killed after the defendant entered the victim’s home in 
                                                 
9  Massey argues that this claim, like his first, survives the time bar of Rule 61(i)(1) under 
the “miscarriage of justice” exception of Rule 61(i)(5). 
 
5 
order to burglarize it.10  In this case, the Superior Court’s determination that 
the murder was accomplished in order to facilitate the burglary was fully 
supported by the evidence presented at trial11 and fully in accordance with 
the language of the felony murder statute.12  We, therefore, conclude that 
Massey’s second claim is without merit.   
 
(8) 
Massey’s third, and final, claim is that the Superior Court held 
him to a higher standard under Rule 61(i)(1) than other litigants in 
postconviction proceedings, resulting in prejudice to him.  He cites to four 
Superior Court cases in support of his claim.13  Because the decision of the 
Superior Court in this case was fully consistent with Delaware law and free 
of any abuse of discretion, and because the cases cited are either factually 
distinguishable or the movant did not prevail on his postconviction claims, 
we conclude that Massey’s claim of prejudice as a result of the Superior 
Court’s application of an inappropriately stringent standard to him to be 
without merit.14  
                                                 
10 Zarychta v. State, 44 S.W. 3d 155, 169-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Dennison, 801 
P.2d 193, 197 (Wash. 1990). 
11 Id.  
12 Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293, 295 (Del. 1989); Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal 
Zone Indust. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Del. 1985). 
13 State v. Hill, 2008 WL 361227 (Del. Super.); State v. Blizzard, 2008 WL 5206769 
(Del. Super.); State v. Outten, 2008 WL 100117 (Del. Super.); State v. Fatir, Del. Super, 
Cr. ID. No. IN75-06-092, Slights, J. (Dec. 11, 2007). 
14 Massey’s claim that the Superior Court violated the Equal Protection Clause also is 
without merit.  Moyer v. State, 452 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1982). 
 
6 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice