Title: State v. Chinn

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 1999-Ohio-288.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CHINN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Chinn (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 548.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 97-2020 — Submitted February 23, 1999 — Decided June 2, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 16206. 
 
On the evening of January 30, 1989, Davel “Tony” Chinn, appellant, 
completed a midterm examination at Cambridge Technical Institute in Dayton.  
Later that night, fifteen-year-old Marvin Washington saw appellant near 
Courthouse Square in downtown Dayton.  Washington, who had known appellant 
for approximately one year, knew him only by the name of “Tony.”  Washington 
and appellant spent part of the night drinking beer and loitering around the 
downtown area.  At some point, appellant showed Washington a .22 caliber nickel-
plated revolver and suggested that they look for someone to rob.  At approximately 
11:00 p.m., Washington went into an adult bookstore on South Ludlow Street and 
was ejected from the store because of his age.  Thereafter, Washington and 
appellant loitered in the area of South Ludlow Street looking for someone to rob. 
 
Meanwhile, Gary Welborn and Brian Jones had pulled their cars into a 
parking lot at the corner of South Ludlow Street and Court Street and had parked 
side-by-side in opposite directions to converse with each other through their 
driver’s side windows.  Appellant and Washington spotted the two men and 
decided to rob them. 
 
Washington approached Jones’s vehicle from the rear, and appellant 
approached Welborn’s car from the rear.  Appellant pulled out a small silver 
revolver, pressed it against the side of Welborn’s head, and demanded money.  
Welborn saw Washington’s face, but he was unable to see the face of the gunman.  
Welborn handed his wallet to Washington, and Jones handed his wallet to the 
 
 
2
gunman.  According to Welborn, “the guy with the gun said we’d better have at 
least a hundred dollars between us or he’d kill us both.”  After emptying the 
victims’ wallets of money, the two assailants began discussing which car they 
wanted to steal.  Following a brief discussion, they decided to steal both cars.  
Washington got into the driver’s side of Jones’s car and forced Jones into the 
passenger’s seat.  Appellant instructed Welborn to remain still.  As appellant began 
walking toward the back of Welborn’s vehicle, Welborn seized the opportunity to 
escape.  At trial, Welborn testified, “The guy, he comes around.  He starts walking 
around my car, telling me not to touch my keys.  He still has the gun pointed at me.  
I watch him in my rearview mirror and sideview mirror.  As soon as he gets behind 
my car, I ducked down.  I thought he was going to kill me now or later anyway so I 
ducked down in my car seat, threw it in drive, and took up off [sic] Ludlow the 
wrong way, straight to the police station.”  Welborn arrived at the station at 
approximately 11:30 p.m. and reported the incident to police. 
 
After Welborn had escaped, appellant got into the back seat of Jones’s car 
and held the revolver to Jones’s neck while Washington drove the car away from 
Dayton and toward an area in Jefferson Township.  At some point, appellant 
instructed Washington to turn the vehicle around and to pull over to the side of the 
road.  Washington complied with appellant’s instructions.  After Washington had 
stopped the car, he leaned forward in the driver’s seat so that appellant could exit 
the two-door vehicle from the driver’s side.  According to Washington, appellant 
got out of the car and walked around to the passenger’s side.  Appellant then got 
Jones out of the car and shot him.  Appellant and Washington drove away from the 
scene in Jones’s automobile.  While fleeing from the scene, appellant told 
Washington that he shot Jones because Jones could have identified them and 
because Jones “didn’t have enough money.”  Appellant told Washington that he 
had shot Jones in the arm. 
 
 
3
 
Stacy Ann Dyer lived at 5500 Germantown Pike in Jefferson Township.  
Dyer witnessed the shooting but did not see the gunman’s face.  Dyer testified that 
on January 30, 1989, at approximately 11:30 p.m., she had just arrived home and 
was parked in her driveway facing the street.  At that time, Dyer saw a black two-
door Chevrolet Cavalier pull off to the side of the road on Germantown Pike.  Dyer 
observed a man get out of the driver’s side of the vehicle and walk over to the 
passenger’s side.  She also saw the silhouette of a person exiting the vehicle from 
the passenger’s side.  The two people then walked to the back of the car.  At that 
moment, Dyer heard a gunshot and a scream.  The victim ran through Dyer’s yard 
and fell to the ground in her neighbor’s yard.  Dyer then saw the black car speed 
away from the scene.  Dyer ran inside her house and informed her father and her 
sister what had happened.  Dyer’s sister called police, and Dyer and her father 
went outside to check on the victim.  They found the victim, Brian Jones, on his 
knees with his face to the ground.  Dyer asked the victim whether he was injured, 
but Jones did not respond.  When police and paramedics arrived at the scene, Jones 
was still breathing but was unconscious.  He never regained consciousness and was 
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. 
 
Dr. David M. Smith performed the autopsy.  Smith found that Jones had 
died as a result of a massive acute hemorrhage due to a gunshot wound to his arm 
and chest.  Smith found that the projectile had entered through Jones’s left arm, 
had proceeded directly into Jones’s chest, and had perforated the main pulmonary 
artery.  Smith recovered the .22 caliber lead projectile from an area near the base of 
Jones’s heart.  Carl H. Haemmerle, an expert in firearms, examined the .22 caliber 
projectile and determined that it had been fired from a revolver.  He also examined 
the sweatshirt that Jones had been wearing at the time of the shooting.  Evidence 
revealed that the muzzle of the weapon had been in direct contact with the garment 
at the time the shot was fired. 
 
 
4
 
Following the shooting, Washington and appellant drove in Jones’s car to 
5213 Lome Avenue in Dayton.  There, Washington introduced appellant to 
Christopher “Bay” Ward. 
 
Ward testified that, on January 31, 1989, at approximately 12:30 or 1:00 
a.m., Washington had pulled up to 5213 Lome Avenue in the black Chevrolet 
Cavalier and had introduced Ward to a man named “Tony,” who was seated in the 
front passenger’s seat.  Ward spoke to Washington for approximately thirty to 
forty-five minutes until Washington and the man he was with drove away.  Later 
that night, Washington returned to Lome Avenue and told Ward that “Tony” had 
shot someone in Jefferson Township. 
 
On February 5, 1989, police arrested Washington based on information they 
had received from Ward.  Washington confessed to police and named Tony as the 
killer.  However, Washington was unable to give police the suspect’s last name and 
address.  On February 7, Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch of 
Tony.  Later, after police had nearly exhausted all leads in their search for Tony, 
the composite sketch was released to the news media.  On Wednesday, February 
22, 1989, a Dayton area newspaper printed the composite sketch along with an 
article indicating that the suspect’s name was Tony. 
 
Shirley Ann Cox worked as a receptionist in her husband’s law office.  On 
Thursday, February 23, two men walked into the office.  One of the men identified 
himself as Tony Chinn and requested to see Cox’s husband.  Cox informed the 
man that her husband was not available.  That night, while Cox was reading the 
previous day’s newspaper, she saw the composite sketch of the suspected killer.  
She said to her husband, “My God, I don’t believe this.”  “This Tony Chinn that 
was in [the office] this morning is in the paper.”  On Friday, February 24, Cox 
called police to inform them that she had seen the suspect and that his name was 
Tony Chinn. 
 
 
5
 
After speaking to Cox, police obtained a photograph of appellant and placed 
it in a photo array with the pictures of five other men.  On February 24, police 
showed the photo array to Washington and to Ward.  Washington positively 
identified appellant as the killer.  Additionally, Ward identified appellant as the 
man he had seen in the passenger’s seat of the victim’s car — the man Washington 
had referred to as “Tony.”  That same day, on February 24, police arrested 
appellant in connection with the murder. 
 
On February 27, police conducted a lineup.  Washington, Ward, Cox, Dyer, 
and Welborn all viewed the lineup.  Dyer and Welborn could not identify 
appellant.  Welborn attempted to make a selection based on the voices of the 
subjects but chose someone other than appellant.  Ward and Cox were able to 
positively identify appellant.  Washington initially indicated that the killer was not 
in the lineup.  However, after leaving the room where the lineup was conducted, 
Washington summoned Detective David Lantz into an interview room and told 
him that number seven in the lineup (appellant) was the killer.  Washington 
explained to the detective that he had previously indicated that appellant was not in 
the lineup out of fear that appellant was able to see him through the screen in the 
room where the lineup was conducted. 
 
In March 1989, appellant was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand 
Jury for the aggravated murder of Jones.  Count One of the indictment charged 
appellant with purposely causing the death of Jones during the commission of an 
aggravated robbery.  Count One of the indictment also carried three death penalty 
specifications:  one alleging that the offense was committed for the purpose of 
escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense (R.C. 
2929.04[A][3]), a second alleging that the offense was committed during the 
course of aggravated robbery (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]), and a third alleging that the 
offense was committed during the course of kidnapping (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]).  
 
 
6
Appellant was also indicted on three counts of aggravated robbery (Counts Two, 
Four, and Five), one count of kidnapping (Count Three), and one count of 
abduction (Count Six).  Each count of the indictment also carried a firearm 
specification.  Additionally, Counts Two through Six each carried a specification 
alleging that appellant had previously been convicted of robbery. 
 
In August 1989, the matter proceeded to trial by jury on all counts and 
specifications alleged in the indictment, with the exception of the specifications 
premised on appellant’s prior robbery conviction, which were tried to the court.  
The defense presented several witnesses in the guilt phase of appellant’s trial.  
Through these witnesses the defense attempted to establish that appellant had gone 
directly home from school on the evening of January 30, 1989, and that he was at 
home, where he lived with his mother and his brother, at the time of the crimes in 
question.  Following deliberations, the jury returned verdicts of guilt on all of the 
matters that were tried to the jury.  Appellant presented several witnesses in 
mitigation and gave an unsworn statement in which he denied any involvement in 
the crimes.  Following the mitigation hearing, the jury returned its verdict 
recommending that appellant be sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of 
Jones.  The trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation and imposed the 
sentence of death.  The trial court also found appellant guilty of the prior 
conviction specifications that were tried to the court without a jury.  For the 
aggravated robberies of Jones and Welborn (Counts Two, Four, and Five), for the 
kidnapping of Jones (Count Three), and for the abduction of Welborn (Count Six), 
the trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with law.  The trial court also 
imposed one additional term of three years of actual incarceration for the firearm 
specifications in connection with the aggravated robbery counts.  Further, the court 
imposed one additional term of three years of actual incarceration for the firearm 
 
 
7
specification in connection with the kidnapping count, and one for the firearm 
specification in connection with the count of abduction. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals, in 1991, affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the cause to the trial court for the 
limited purpose of resentencing appellant on the jury’s recommendation of death 
for the aggravated murder of Jones.  State v. Chinn (Dec. 27, 1991), Montgomery 
App. No. 11835, unreported, 1991 WL 289178.  The court of appeals found that 
the trial judge had committed several errors in the performance of his functions 
under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) and 2929.03(F).  Specifically, the court of appeals held 
that “the trial judge in performing his independent review for purposes of 
sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) erred (1) by failing to state his findings 
specifically as required by R.C. 2929.03(F), (2) by failing to consider relevant 
mitigating factors, (3) by failing to merge aggravating circumstances, and (4) by 
weighing both culpability factors of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), ‘principal offender’ and 
‘prior calculation and design’ * * *.”  Id. at 2.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
vacated appellant’s death sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court “for its 
reconsideration and proper imposition of sentence, which may include a sentence 
of death or sentences of life imprisonment with parole eligibility as provided by 
statute.”  Id.  Additionally, the court of appeals found that the trial court had erred 
when it “imposed more than one sentence of actual incarceration for multiple gun 
specifications arising from the same transaction * * *.”  Id.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals vacated two of the three terms of actual incarceration that had been 
imposed by the trial court in connection with the firearm specifications.  However, 
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all other issues 
raised on appeal. 
 
On remand from the court of appeals’ 1991 decision, defense counsel, in 
January 1993, filed in the trial court a motion for imposition of a life sentence, a 
 
 
8
motion to present additional mitigation evidence, and a motion requesting that 
appellant be present at any resentencing hearing.  In August 1994, defense counsel 
filed a proffer of evidence and a request to submit certain documents under seal.  
On December 6, 1994, the trial court denied the motions for imposition of a life 
sentence, for an additional mitigation hearing, and for appellant to be present at 
resentencing.  That same day, the trial court filed an opinion and entry resentencing 
appellant to death. 
 
On appeal from the trial court’s resentencing decision, the court of appeals, 
in 1996, vacated appellant’s death sentence, finding that the trial court had denied 
appellant the right to be present at resentencing.  State v. Chinn (June 21, 1996), 
Montgomery App. No. 15009, unreported, 1996 WL 338678.  Therefore, the court 
of appeals again remanded the cause to the trial court for resentencing, i.e., “for 
imposition of sentence in Chinn’s presence.”  Id. at 16-17. 
 
On remand from the court of appeals’ 1996 decision, the trial court, in 
September 1996, once again imposed the sentence of death.  On appeal, the court 
of appeals, in August 1997, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and upheld 
appellant’s death sentence.  State v. Chinn (Aug. 15, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 
16206, unreported, 1997 WL 464736. 
 
The cause is now before us upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Stephen A. Ferrell and Joseph E. 
Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Appellant presents twenty-five propositions of law for our 
consideration.  (See Appendix, infra.)  We have considered each of appellant’s 
 
 
9
propositions of law and have reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and 
proportionality.  Upon review, and for the reasons that follow, we uphold 
appellant’s convictions and sentences, including the sentence of death. 
I 
 
We have held, time and again, that this court is not required to address and 
discuss, in opinion form, each and every proposition of law raised by the parties in 
a death penalty appeal.  We continue to adhere to that position today.  We have 
carefully considered all of the propositions of law and allegations of error and have 
thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety.  Many of the issues raised by 
appellant have been addressed and rejected by this court under analogous 
circumstances in a number of our prior cases.  Therefore, these issues require little, 
if any, discussion.  Additionally, many of appellant’s arguments have been waived.  
Upon a careful review of the record and the governing law, we fail to detect any 
errors requiring reversal of appellant’s convictions and death sentence.  We have 
found nothing in the record or in the arguments advanced by appellant that would, 
in any way, undermine our confidence in the outcome of appellant’s trial.  
Accordingly, we address and discuss, in detail, only those issues that merit detailed 
analysis. 
II 
Proposition of Law No. I 
 
Appellant contends that the trial court’s instructions to the jury in the penalty 
phase failed to adequately define aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors 
and gave the jury no guidance on what to weigh for purposes of reaching a 
sentencing recommendation.  However, appellant failed to object at trial to the 
instructions he now claims were erroneous and, thus, he has waived all but plain 
error with respect to these matters.  We find no plain error here. 
 
 
10
 
Appellant was charged with and found guilty of committing one R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) and two 2929.04(A)(7) specifications of aggravating circumstances 
in connection with the aggravated (felony) murder of Jones.  The R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) specification alleged that the aggravated murder was committed for 
the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for the 
commission of another offense committed by the offender.  One R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification alleged that the aggravated murder was committed 
during the course of an aggravated robbery and that appellant was either the 
principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the 
principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design.  The other R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification alleged that the aggravated 
murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping and that appellant was 
either the principal offender in the murder or, if not, committed the murder with 
prior calculation and design. 
 
In the penalty phase, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury: 
 
“Members of the Jury, you’ve heard the evidence and the arguments of 
counsel, and you will now decide whether you’ll recommend to the Court that the 
sentence of death shall be imposed upon the Defendant and, if not, whether you 
recommend [one of two life sentencing options].  You will consider all the 
evidence, the arguments, the statement of the Defendant, and all other information 
and reports which are relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating 
circumstances.  Among the circumstances that are listed in the statute and there are 
eight references have been made and you have found these aggravating 
circumstances.  One is that if the offense was committed for the purpose of 
escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense 
committed by the offender.  Another of those aggravating circumstances is if the 
offense was committed while the offender was committing, or attempting to 
 
 
11
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit 
kidnapping.  Then they list a number of others:  Kidnapping and rape; aggravated 
arson; aggravated robbery; or aggravated burglary; and either the offender was the 
principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the 
principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design.  You will consider all the evidence, the arguments, the statement of the 
Defendant, and all of the information and reports that are relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of the mitigating facts, and the mitigating facts include but are not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history, character, 
and background of the Defendant; and you may consider, I guess, should consider 
any facts that are relevant to the issue of whether the Defendant should be 
sentenced to death.  The prosecutor has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circumstances of which the Defendant was found guilty 
outweighs [sic] the facts in mitigation of imposing the death sentence. * * *  You 
shall recommend the sentence of death if you unanimously, that’s all twelve, find 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating facts.  If you do not so, fine, you shall unanimously, all twelve, 
recommend [one of two life sentencing options].” 
 
While the trial court’s instructions to the jury appear to be somewhat 
confusing, the instructions clearly do not rise to the level of plain error.  The trial 
court correctly instructed the jury on the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) aggravating 
circumstance the jury had previously found appellant guilty of committing.  
However, in referring to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstances 
premised on the kidnapping and aggravated robbery, the trial court referred to a 
number of felonies listed in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) for which appellant was neither 
charged nor convicted, i.e., rape, aggravated arson, and aggravated burglary.  
Nevertheless, it is a stretch to argue as appellant does now that the trial court 
 
 
12
“appear[ed] to be telling the jury that there [were] eight aggravating 
circumstances” in this case.  (Emphasis sic.)  A review of the record clearly reveals 
that the jury was made aware throughout the trial that there were three — not eight 
— specifications of aggravating circumstances at issue in this case.  Moreover, 
there was never any evidence offered of arson, rape, or aggravated burglary that 
may have led the jury to believe that appellant was guilty of committing an R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance premised upon those particular felonies.  
The trial court’s references to arson, rape, and aggravated burglary should not have 
been made, but the references do not amount to plain error. 
 
Additionally, during its deliberations in the penalty phase, the jury sent a 
note to the trial judge requesting a clarification of the aggravating circumstances 
and mitigating factors.  The note stated,  “We would like a summary of the 
elements that make up the mitigating and aggravating circumstances/factors.  For 
example, character of [defendant], testimony of [defendant], etc.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
The trial court responded, “The aggravating circumstances are those that you have 
found in previous specifications and the mitigating factors are those which are 
relevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, and 
they include, but are not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
the history, character and background of the defendant.”  We find that the trial 
court’s response to the jury’s question clarified that there were only three 
aggravating circumstances the jury was to consider and weigh in the penalty phase, 
i.e., the three specifications of aggravating circumstances the jury had previously 
found appellant guilty of committing. 
 
Nevertheless, appellant claims that the trial court’s response to the jury’s 
question merely “added to the confusion.”  Specifically, appellant argues that “[b]y 
telling the jury that the aggravating circumstances were the same as the 
specifications, the court instructed the jury to weigh a nonstatutory aggravating 
 
 
13
circumstance, the firearm specification, which was attached to each substantive 
count in the indictment.”  However, the record does not support appellant’s 
arguments in this regard.  The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court’s 
statement that “[t]he aggravating circumstances are those that you have found in 
previous specifications” referred only to the death penalty specifications for which 
the jury had previously found appellant guilty of committing.  The firearm 
specifications were submitted to the jury only in the guilt phase and were not even 
identified as “specifications” on the verdict forms that were returned by the jury at 
the conclusion of the guilt phase.  The only specifications that were identified as 
such on the verdict forms in the guilt phase of appellant’s trial were the three death 
penalty specifications that had been submitted to the jury in connection with Count 
One of the indictment, i.e., the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification and the two R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications.  For these reasons, it is clear that the trial court’s 
response to the jury’s question in the penalty phase did not invite the jury to 
consider the firearm specifications as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. 
 
Appellant also contends that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question 
concerning aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors led the jury to 
consider and to weigh the nature and circumstances of the offense as nonstatutory 
aggravating factors.  We disagree.  The trial court’s response to the jury’s question 
listed the nature and circumstances of the offense among the mitigating factors to 
be considered by the jury. 
 
Next, appellant contends that the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(7) 
specifications of aggravating circumstances should have been merged into a single 
aggravating circumstance prior to the penalty phase, since, according to appellant, 
the specifications were duplicative.  The court of appeals, in 1991, determined that 
the specifications should have been merged, stating, “In our view, all three 
specifications clearly arose from the same act or indivisible course of conduct.  
 
 
14
Jones was robbed in downtown Dayton and then driven to a remote area of 
Jefferson Township so that he could be killed to conceal the robbery.  The 
kidnapping (driving Jones to a rural area) occurred only so as to effectuate the 
concealment of the robbery, and, as explained above, the concealment of the 
robbery must merge with the robbery itself as a matter of law.  Furthermore, the 
kidnapping was merely incidental to the robbery, and thus must be merged for this 
reason as well.”  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 50-51.  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had erred by “failing 
to merge the three aggravating factors into one, viz., that Chinn was the principal 
offender in the aggravated murder committed while he was fleeing immediately 
after committing an aggravated robbery, per R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).”  Id. at 53-54.  
However, the court of appeals also determined that the trial court’s failure to merge 
the duplicative specifications in its instructions to the jury did not amount to plain 
error.  Id. at fn. 2.  We agree.  On remand from the court of appeals’ 1991 decision, 
the trial court merged the allegedly duplicative specifications into one R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification and imposed the death sentence upon a finding that the 
single aggravating circumstance outweighed the evidence in mitigation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The court of appeals, in 1997, also considered a single R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification for purposes of its independent sentencing review and 
concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 16206, unreported.  We 
believe that this conclusion was virtually inescapable.  Indeed, given the dearth of 
mitigating evidence in this case, it is clear to us that the outcome of appellant’s 
trial would not have been any different had the three specifications of aggravating 
circumstances been merged into one prior to the penalty phase. 
 
Additionally, this court can cure any error related to duplicative aggravating 
circumstances by merging the three specifications of aggravating circumstances as 
 
 
15
part of our independent sentencing review.  See, generally, State v. Palmer (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 543, 575, 687 N.E.2d 685, 711.  For purposes of our independent 
review, we too have considered only one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the single 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance predicated on aggravated robbery.  
Our independent review has produced no different outcome despite the merger of 
the allegedly duplicative specifications.  See discussion in Part XXIV, infra. 
 
Appellant also claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury in the 
penalty phase on both the principal offender and the prior calculation and design 
aspects of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Appellant asserts that the jury should have been 
instructed that it could not consider whether appellant committed the murder with 
prior calculation and design if appellant was found to be the principal offender in 
the aggravated murder.  However, we have held that “a trial court may instruct the 
jury on prior calculation and design and principal offender status disjunctively in 
the same specification.”  State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 405, 653 
N.E.2d 242, 248.  That is precisely what occurred in the case at bar. 
 
The court of appeals vacated the appellant’s death sentence in 1991 because 
the trial court, in its original sentencing opinion, had determined that appellant was 
the principal offender and that he had committed the offense with prior calculation 
and design.  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 52-57.  Appellant 
claims that “[b]ecause the trial court committed precisely this error, it is highly 
likely that the jury did also.”  However, appellant’s argument is purely speculative 
and is not supported by the record.  Moreover, contrary to appellant’s arguments, it 
is clear to us that the jury unanimously determined that appellant was the principal 
offender in the aggravated murder of Jones.  At trial, the state’s evidence portrayed 
appellant as the principal offender.  Conversely, appellant offered a defense of 
alibi.  Thus, the main issue for the jury was one of identity, i.e., either appellant 
shot and killed the victim or appellant was somewhere else at the time of the 
 
 
16
killing.  There was no evidence at trial that anyone other than appellant was the 
actual killer if, in fact, appellant was the man who was with Marvin Washington on 
the night in question.  Therefore, the evidence suggested that appellant was either 
the principal offender in the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, 
that he committed no offense at all.  The jury obviously accepted the state’s theory 
of the case and, in so doing, found appellant to be the principal offender in the 
aggravated murder.  Under these circumstances and because the jury was 
instructed on the principal offender and the prior calculation and design aspects of 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) in the disjunctive, there is no danger that the jury actually 
considered the prior calculation and design alternative of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
death penalty specifications during its sentencing deliberations. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, appellant’s first proposition of law is 
not well taken. 
III 
Proposition of Law No. II 
 
The matter concerning the appropriateness of appellant’s death sentence is 
addressed in our discussion in Part XXIV, infra. 
IV 
Proposition of Law No. III 
 
The matter concerning the proportionality of appellant’s death sentence is 
addressed in our discussion in Part XXIV, infra. 
V 
Proposition of Law No. IV 
 
Appellant raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct, but many of appellant’s 
arguments have been waived by his failure to object at trial.  We have carefully 
reviewed the record in its entirety and have considered all of appellant’s claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  We have found no instance of prosecutorial misconduct 
 
 
17
that would rise to the level of reversible error.  The instances of alleged 
misconduct, taken singly or together, did not substantially prejudice appellant or 
deny him a fair trial and a fair and reliable sentencing determination. 
VI 
Proposition of Law No. V 
 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to define the term 
“principal offender” as part of the instructions to the jury in the guilt phase.  
Appellant claims that the failure to define that term was tantamount to a failure to 
instruct on an essential element of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications.  
However, appellant not only failed to object to the lack of instruction, but he also 
failed to raise the issue on appeal to the court of appeals.  Therefore, appellant has 
waived all but plain error with respect to this matter. 
 
The term “principal offender,” as it is used in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), means 
“the actual killer.”  State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 371, 513 N.E.2d 744, 
746.  The jury should have been so instructed.  However, the absence of the 
instruction does not amount to plain error.  Here, the state presented strong 
evidence identifying appellant as the killer.  Conversely, the defense claimed that 
appellant was at home at the time of the killing.  There was no evidence to suggest 
that appellant, if he was present at the time of the aggravated murder, was anything 
but the actual killer.  Therefore, in order to find appellant guilty of the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications, the jury would have had to conclude that appellant 
was the actual killer.  Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to sua 
sponte instruct the jury that “principal offender” means the actual killer was not 
outcome-determinative.  See State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 461, 705 
N.E.2d 329, 339. 
VII 
Proposition of Law No. VI 
 
 
18
 
In his sixth proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court erred 
by allowing Shirley Ann Cox to testify at trial concerning appellant’s visit to her 
husband’s law office.  Appellant claims that Cox’s testimony was irrelevant and 
was unfairly prejudicial.  We agree with appellant’s assertions that the trial court 
should not have permitted Cox to testify that her encounter with appellant occurred 
in a law office.  However, we also agree with the court of appeals’ finding in 1991 
that although the evidence was “unfairly prejudicial, that unfairness does not 
clearly jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the proceeding or the reliability of 
the verdict.”  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 38.  Appellant 
protests that the court of appeals’ holding on this issue “fails to take into account 
the fundamental weakness of the State’s case against Chinn.”  However, 
appellant’s arguments plainly mischaracterize the strength of the evidence against 
him which, in our view, cannot seriously be labeled as “weak.”  Rather, the state’s 
case against appellant was substantial and compelling. 
 
Appellant also suggests that Cox’s testimony concerning her identification 
of appellant as the person depicted in the composite drawing should have been 
excluded because Cox did not witness the crimes and her testimony may have 
misled or confused the jury.  However, the jury was not misled or confused by 
Cox’s testimony.  The jury was well aware that Cox did not witness the killing.  
Her testimony was relevant to the fact that she had seen a man who identified 
himself as Tony Chinn and that she subsequently saw a composite sketch of the 
suspected killer and recognized the resemblance between the composite and Chinn.  
While this testimony was largely irrelevant to the question of appellant’s guilt, the 
testimony was relevant to inform the jury of the events that led to appellant’s 
apprehension and arrest.  Cox’s testimony also corroborated Washington’s 
testimony that appellant (whose real name is Davel Von Tress Chinn) went by the 
name of Tony Chinn.  The evidence was not confusing or misleading in any way. 
 
 
19
 
We conclude that while it might have been better for the trial court to have 
excluded Cox’s testimony altogether, or at least any reference to the fact that she 
had seen appellant in a law office, the trial court’s decision to allow Cox’s 
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cox’s testimony was not a 
major factor in this case.  Indeed, her testimony comprises less than eight full 
pages of the printed transcript.  The state’s case against appellant hinged on the 
testimony of Marvin Washington.  If the jury accepted Washington’s testimony, 
the jury was certain to convict appellant, but if the jury did not believe 
Washington, it was certain to acquit appellant of all charges.  Had the jury 
disregarded Washington’s account of the crimes, Cox’s testimony would have 
made no difference.  However, the jury believed Washington and, therefore, the 
verdicts of guilt were inevitable.  Cox’s testimony had little or no impact on the 
outcome. 
 
In this proposition, appellant also contends that the trial court erred by 
permitting Detective David Lantz to testify at trial concerning Cox’s identification 
of appellant at the February 27, 1989 lineup.  At trial, the following exchange took 
place during the state’s direct examination of Detective Lantz: 
 
“Q.  Was Mrs. Cox able to make an — 
 
“MR. MONTA [defense counsel]:  Objection, your Honor.  We need to 
approach on this. 
 
“MR. MONTA:  Your Honor, the prosecution had Mrs. Cox on the stand.  
They also had these documents which would indicate whether a person is seen in a 
line-up or not.  They did not choose to go into that with Mrs. Cox, and as a result 
of no questioning on this subject with her, this * * * testimony is going to be 
hearsay. 
 
“THE COURT:  Well, defense has also known that she had made the 
identification, which she could have been asked about.  The fact that she was not 
 
 
20
asked by either party does not in any way prevent this witness to testify as to what 
he saw.  I’ll overrule the objection. 
 
“Q.  Was Mrs. Cox able to [make an] identification at the line-up? 
 
“A.  Yes, she was. 
 
“Q.  Who[m] did she indicate? 
 
“A.  Again, number seven, the Defendant Davel Chinn.” 
 
Appellant contends that Lantz’s testimony constituted impermissible hearsay 
and resulted in substantial prejudice.  We disagree.  Lantz’s statements concerning 
Cox’s identification of appellant were not hearsay.  Evid.R. 801 provides: 
 
“(D)  A statement is not hearsay if: 
 
“(1)  The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is * * * (c) one of 
identification of a person soon after perceiving him, if the circumstances 
demonstrate the reliability of the prior identification.” 
 
As the court of appeals ably recognized, “[b]ecause Cox was ‘subject to 
cross-examination’ on the lineup, regardless of whether she was actually ever 
subjected to such examination, Det. Lantz’s testimony was not hearsay.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 39.  We agree 
that Lantz’s testimony did not constitute hearsay under Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(c).  
Moreover, and in any event, we fail to see how that testimony was prejudicial to 
appellant. 
 
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by permitting Detective Lantz 
to testify at trial, over defense objection, concerning Washington’s explanation for 
not immediately identifying appellant at the lineup.  Appellant contends that 
Lantz’s testimony was hearsay.  However, even if the testimony at issue was 
hearsay, and we do not believe that it was (see Evid.R. 801[D][1][b] and Chinn, 
 
 
21
Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 75-76), prejudice is lacking in that 
Washington had earlier testified as to the statement he made to Lantz. 
 
Additionally, appellant challenges Christopher Ward’s testimony concerning 
certain statements that Washington had made in the early morning hours of 
January 31, 1989.  Specifically, appellant claims that Ward’s testimony constituted 
inadmissible hearsay.  Appellant failed to object to the testimony at trial and, thus, 
has waived all but plain error with respect to these matters.  We agree with 
appellant that the testimony of Ward at issue was hearsay.  However, we conclude 
that appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error, i.e., that but for the alleged 
errors, the outcome of his trial clearly would have been otherwise.  Therefore, we 
reject appellant’s arguments concerning Ward’s testimony. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, appellant’s sixth proposition of law 
is not persuasive. 
VIII 
Proposition of Law No. VII 
 
The court of appeals, in 1991, vacated appellant’s original death sentence on 
grounds that the trial judge, after receiving the jury’s recommendation, had 
committed errors in his original independent evaluation under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) 
and in his original sentencing opinion.  However, the court of appeals also 
determined that the jury’s recommendation had not been tainted by error.  
Therefore, since the errors had been committed by the trial court and not by the 
jury, the court of appeals determined that the rule of Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 
N.E.2d 744, syllabus, did not prohibit the trial court from reimposing the death 
sentence on remand.  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 55-57.  
In this regard, the court of appeals found the situation analogous to one in which a 
three-judge panel commits error in sentencing — a situation that would not 
preclude reimposition of a death sentence.  Id., citing State v. Davis (1988), 38 
 
 
22
Ohio St.3d 361, 528 N.E.2d 925, syllabus (“When a reviewing court vacates the 
death sentence of a defendant imposed by a three-judge panel due to error 
occurring at the penalty phase, not otherwise covered by [former] R.C. 2929.06, 
and the reviewing court does not find the evidence to be legally insufficient to 
justify imposition of the death sentence, such reviewing court may remand the 
action to that trial court for a resentencing hearing at which the state may seek 
whatever punishment is lawful, including, but not limited to, the death sentence.”). 
 
On remand from the court of appeals’ 1991 decision vacating appellant’s 
original death sentence, appellant filed motions in the trial court requesting, among 
other things, a hearing to present additional mitigation evidence and requesting to 
be present at resentencing.  The trial court denied these motions and, in 1994, once 
again imposed the death sentence.  This time, the trial court complied with all 
statutory mandates, including those required under R.C. 2929.03(F), but did not 
impose the death sentence in appellant’s presence. 
 
Thereafter, on appeal from the trial court’s resentencing decision, the court 
of appeals, in 1996, held that it was error for the trial court to have denied 
appellant the right to be present at resentencing.  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 
15009, unreported.  However, the court of appeals found that the trial court had not 
erred by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on remand.  Id. at 2-6.  The 
court of appeals stated, “When we remanded Chinn’s case, we did not expect the 
trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing, and we find no compelling reason 
why Chinn should have been afforded a second opportunity to present mitigating 
evidence prior to sentencing.  Chinn was given a full opportunity to present such 
evidence at the initial sentencing hearing.  The error for which we remanded the 
matter occurred after the mitigating evidence had been presented and after the jury 
had made its recommendation based upon that evidence.  On remand, the trial 
court was required to proceed from the point at which the error occurred.  State ex 
 
 
23
rel. Stevenson v. Murray (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 112, 113 [23 O.O.3d 160, 160-161, 
431 N.E.2d 324, 325].  In Chinn’s case, the error occurred after the sentencing 
hearing.”  Id. at 5.  Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the trial 
court “for imposition of sentence in Chinn’s presence” and reiterated that the 
sentencing options included the possibility of a death sentence.  Id. at 16-17. 
 
On remand from the court of appeals’ 1996 decision, the trial court, in 
appellant’s presence, once again imposed the death sentence.  In its sentencing 
entry, the trial court stated, “With regard to Count 1, it is the conclusion of this 
Court that the verdict of the jury recommending death be accepted.”  On appeal, 
the court of appeals, in 1997, affirmed.  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 16206, 
unreported. 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant contends that he was ineligible 
for the death penalty on remand from the court of appeals’ 1991 decision vacating 
his original death sentence.  Appellant claims that “[w]hen the court of appeals 
vacated Chinn’s death sentence it also vacated the trial jury’s sentencing 
recommendation.”  We disagree.  In neither case where the court of appeals 
vacated appellant’s death sentence did the appellate court purport to vacate the 
jury’s verdict recommending imposition of the death penalty.  Nor was the court of 
appeals required to vacate the jury’s recommendation in this case.  The appellate 
court specifically determined, and we agree, that the recommendation of the jury 
was untainted by error.  Moreover, contrary to appellant’s contentions, Penix does 
not preclude the trial court from imposing the death sentence on remand.  The 
reason, of course, is that the errors identified and relied upon by the court of 
appeals in vacating appellant’s original death sentence in 1991 related to the trial 
judge’s independent evaluation of sentence.  These errors were committed after the 
jury had returned its verdict in the penalty phase.  Under these circumstances, the 
court of appeals correctly determined that Penix does not prohibit the trial judge, 
 
 
24
on remand, from accepting the jury’s 1989 sentencing recommendation.  Rather, as 
the court of appeals recognized, the trial court was required to proceed on remand 
from the point at which the errors had occurred, i.e., after the jury had returned its 
recommendation of death. 
 
In this proposition, appellant also argues that he had “an absolute right to 
present any new mitigating evidence at his resentencing hearing in 1994.”  In 
support of this proposition, appellant relies on several United States Supreme 
Court opinions requiring that the sentencer not be precluded from considering 
relevant mitigating evidence in a capital case.  See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 
438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986), 
476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1; and Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987), 481 
U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347.  However, each of those cases involved 
a situation where the capital sentencer was prohibited, in some form or another, 
from considering relevant mitigating evidence at trial.  In the case at bar, no 
relevant mitigating evidence was ever excluded from consideration during the 
penalty phase of appellant’s 1989 trial.  Therefore, the case at bar is clearly 
distinguishable from the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 
Lockett, Skipper, and Hitchcock.  Accordingly, as was the case in State v. Davis 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1194-1195, we find Lockett, 
Skipper, and Hitchcock to be inapplicable here.  It is of no consequence that the 
additional mitigating evidence in Davis involved post-trial accomplishments, 
whereas appellant’s additional mitigation evidence involves matters appellant 
claims he could have presented but did not present during the mitigation phase of 
his 1989 trial.  In this case, as in Davis, the errors requiring resentencing occurred 
after the close of the mitigation phase of the trial.  Under these circumstances, the 
trial court is to proceed on remand from the point at which the error occurred.  
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are not well taken.  In addressing this issue, 
 
 
25
the appellate court stated, “In sum, Chinn was not entitled to an opportunity to 
improve or expand his evidence in mitigation simply because we [the court of 
appeals] required the trial court to reweigh the aggravating circumstance and 
mitigating factors.”  Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 15009, unreported, at 6.  We 
agree with the court of appeals’ assessment of this issue. 
 
Additionally, appellant takes issue with the fact that in its 1996 sentencing 
entry the trial court simply stated, “it is the conclusion of this Court that the verdict 
of the jury recommending death be accepted.”  Appellant contends that the trial 
court failed to independently weigh the aggravating circumstance and the 
mitigating factors in reimposing the death sentence in 1996 and failed to comply 
with the requirements for the issuance of a sentencing opinion under R.C. 
2929.03(F).  However, the trial court’s 1994 sentencing opinion fully complied 
with the requirements of R.C. 2929.03(F).  The mere fact that the trial court did not 
specifically incorporate its 1994 sentencing opinion into its 1996 sentencing entry 
does not rise to the level of reversible error.  Furthermore, appellant failed to raise 
this issue during his final appeal to the court of appeals and, therefore, appellant’s 
arguments have been waived. 
 
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we reject appellant’s seventh 
proposition of law. 
IX 
Proposition of Law No. VIII 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, appellant contends that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the aggravated murder.  
He also claims that the evidence is insufficient to show that he specifically 
intended to cause the death of his victim.  Appellant’s contentions are not well 
taken. 
 
 
26
 
In this proposition, appellant essentially asks us to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses and to resolve all evidentiary conflicts in his favor.  However, in 
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 
99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573. 
 
Appellant argues that Marvin Washington’s testimony is inherently 
unreliable and wholly unbelievable.  We emphatically disagree.  Washington’s trial 
testimony was cogent and intelligible, and we are completely satisfied that his 
testimony identifying appellant as the killer, if accepted, sufficiently and 
overwhelmingly establishes appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Appellant points out that Washington was a participant in the crimes.  This is 
undoubtedly true.  Washington was an eyewitness to the killing and he participated 
in and witnessed all aspects of the crimes.  As a participant, he was in a much 
better position to identify the killer than anyone else who testified at trial.  
Washington had nothing to gain from testifying against appellant.  Prior to 
testifying, Washington was charged with and was sentenced in juvenile court for 
his participation in these crimes.  Washington’s testimony at appellant’s trial was 
not part of any plea agreement.  Additionally, as a juvenile offender, Washington 
was not eligible for the death penalty as an accomplice to the crimes.  Therefore, in 
addition to having been in the best position to identify the killer, Washington 
simply had no reason to lie. 
 
At trial, Washington testified that he and appellant robbed two men in 
Dayton and that they kidnapped Jones in Jones’s car.  Welborn corroborated 
Washington’s description of the robbery, the abduction, the kidnapping, and the 
car theft.  Welborn testified that Washington was one of the perpetrators of the 
 
 
27
robbery.  Welborn never saw the face of the second robber, but Washington’s 
testimony clearly identified appellant as the other participant in the crimes.  
Washington testified that he and appellant drove Jones to an area of Jefferson 
Township.  According to Washington, appellant then got out of the car and shot 
Jones.  Stacy Dyer witnessed the shooting.  Although Dyer did not get a look at the 
shooter and therefore could not identify him, Dyer’s testimony corroborated, in 
large part, Washington’s description of the events that occurred in Jefferson 
Township on the night of January 30, 1989.  Washington also testified that he and 
appellant then drove in the victim’s car to Lome Avenue in Dayton and that they 
spoke to Christopher Ward.  Ward testified that he saw Washington and appellant 
in Jones’s car in the early morning hours of January 31, 1989.  Therefore, Ward’s 
testimony not only corroborated Washington’s testimony but also served to 
severely undermine appellant’s alibi defense. 
 
Appellant points out that Washington failed to immediately identify him at a 
lineup conducted on February 27, 1989.  However, the reason that Washington had 
failed to do so was adequately explained at trial.  Additionally, there is no dispute 
that immediately after the lineup Washington summoned Detective Lantz into an 
interview room and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the 
aggravated murder. 
 
Appellant also points out that several witnesses at trial indicated that the 
man who was with Washington on the night of the murder was taller than 
appellant.  However, this discrepancy in the evidence does not severely undermine 
either Washington’s testimony identifying appellant as the killer or Ward’s 
testimony that he saw appellant and Washington in the victim’s car shortly after 
the murder. 
 
The fact remains that Washington was the state’s eyewitness to the crimes 
and that he positively identified appellant as the killer.  The jury accepted 
 
 
28
Washington’s testimony.  Upon a review of the entire record, it is clear to us that 
Washington’s testimony was neither inherently unreliable nor inherently 
unbelievable.  Indeed, upon a careful review of the record before us, we find 
Washington’s testimony to be entirely believable.  However, we note, in passing, 
that our view of the credibility of witnesses is not what is important on the question 
of sufficiency of the evidence.  What is important is our finding that the evidence 
in this case was sufficient to establish appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the 
aggravated murder. 
 
Appellant also claims that the evidence is insufficient to show that he 
specifically intended to cause Jones’s death, since the fatal shot had been fired into 
the upper portion of Jones’s left arm.  However, the evidence at trial established 
that the muzzle of the revolver was pressed against the victim’s sweatshirt at the 
time the weapon was discharged.  The projectile entered through the victim’s left 
arm, entered his chest, perforated the main pulmonary artery, and came to rest near 
the base of his heart.  We therefore have great difficulty accepting appellant’s 
characterization of the evidence as indicating nothing more than that the victim 
was “shot in the arm.”  The shot was fired in a manner that was likely to and did 
cause the victim’s death.  Additionally, “[i]t is well-established that ‘where an 
inherently dangerous instrumentality was employed, a homicide occurring during 
the commission of a felony is a natural and probable consequence presumed to 
have been intended.  Such evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to find a purposeful 
intent to kill.’ ”  State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 14, 529 N.E.2d 192, 
199, quoting State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 152, 512 N.E.2d 962, 968.  
The evidence was clearly sufficient to show that appellant specifically intended to 
cause the death of his victim. 
 
Upon a careful review of the entire record, we find that the evidence was 
more than sufficient to establish appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the 
 
 
29
aggravated murder and to show that he specifically intended to cause the death of 
his victim.  Accordingly, we reject appellant’s eighth proposition of law. 
X 
Proposition of Law No. IX 
 
The matter raised in appellant’s ninth proposition of law has been waived.  
Moreover, we find no merit to appellant’s arguments that R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) 
somehow renders R.C. 2929.04(A) and (B) unconstitutionally vague.  Accordingly, 
appellant’s ninth proposition of law is not well taken. 
XI 
Proposition of Law No. X 
 
Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that appellant and defense counsel were present on two 
occasions involving communications between the trial court and the jury.  
However, we are unwilling to presume that appellant and his attorneys were not 
present during the times in question.  Rather, “the record must affirmatively 
indicate the absence of a defendant or his counsel during a particular stage of the 
trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 527 
N.E.2d 844, 851.  The record does not affirmatively so indicate and, therefore, we 
reject appellant’s tenth proposition of law. 
XII 
Proposition of Law No. XI 
 
We find no errors in the manner in which the trial court conducted voir dire. 
XIII 
Proposition of Law No. XII 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
by denying his request for a bill of particulars.  In this proposition, appellant also 
contends that the prosecution failed to comply with certain discovery rules and 
 
 
30
thereby deprived him of a fair trial.  For the following reasons, we reject 
appellant’s Proposition of Law No. XII. 
 
During a hearing on various pretrial motions the trial court denied 
appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars.  The trial court noted that appellant’s 
motion had been untimely filed and determined that, even if the motion was timely, 
a bill of particulars was not necessary to aid appellant in preparing for trial.  
Appellant contends that the trial court’s denial of his request for a bill of 
particulars rendered him unable to present an adequate defense.  We disagree with 
appellant’s contentions. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that appellant’s request was timely, it was clear 
error for the prosecution to fail to provide a bill of particulars and for the trial court 
to have denied appellant’s motion.  The law is clear:  “In a criminal prosecution the 
state must, in response to a request for a bill of particulars * * *, supply specific 
dates and times with regard to an alleged offense where it possesses such 
information.”  State v. Sellards (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 17 OBR 410, 478 
N.E.2d 781, syllabus. 
 
However, appellant correctly notes that the issue raised herein ultimately 
turns on the question whether appellant’s lack of knowledge concerning the 
specific facts a bill of particulars would have provided him actually prejudiced him 
in his ability to fairly defend himself.  Here, the denial of appellant’s request in no 
way precluded or otherwise hindered him from effectively presenting his defense.  
A review of the indictment plainly indicates that appellant was being charged with 
the aggravated (felony) murder of Brian Jones, the kidnapping of Jones, the 
abduction of Welborn, and three separate aggravated robbery offenses, all of which 
occurred January 30, 1989.  Moreover, the record clearly reveals that defense 
counsel knew from the information they were able to obtain that the offenses had 
occurred between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and midnight on January 30, 1989.  
 
 
31
Therefore, the record simply does not support appellant’s claims that he lacked 
specific information as to the offenses charged.  Thus, while the denial of a timely 
request for a bill of particulars should never occur, it is clear that appellant suffered 
no prejudice as a consequence of the denial that occurred in this case. 
 
Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to grant 
discovery in accordance with the Local Rules of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Montgomery County, General Division.  Specifically, the trial court in this case 
ordered that discovery would proceed pursuant to Crim.R. 16 as opposed to Loc.R. 
3.01 and 3.03.  While much could be said concerning Crim.R. 16 and the theory of 
“open file” discovery of the type authorized by local rule (see, e.g., State v. 
Lambert [1994], 69 Ohio St.3d 356, 356-357, 632 N.E.2d 511, 511 [Pfeifer, J., 
concurring]; see, also, State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson [1994], 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 
428-429, 639 N.E.2d 83, 89-90), suffice it to say that our review of the record 
reveals that appellant suffered no prejudice in connection with the trial court’s 
decision to adhere to Crim.R. 16 exclusively.  The record is clear that appellant 
was in possession of much of the material that would have been available to him 
had the local rules been deemed applicable by the trial court.  With respect to the 
materials that appellant allegedly did not have and to which he claimed entitlement 
under the local rules, appellant has utterly failed to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced in any discernible way. 
 
We also find no reversible error in connection with any of the other matters 
appellant has raised in this proposition of law. Appellant’s argument concerning 
the alleged Brady violation (see Brady v. Maryland [1963], 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) and his argument with respect to the denial of a motion to 
seal the prosecutor’s file for appellate review are not well taken. 
XIV 
Proposition of Law No. XIII 
 
 
32
 
At trial, Christopher Ward testified that on January 31, 1989, at 
approximately 12:30 or 1:00 a.m., Washington had pulled up to 5213 Lome 
Avenue in the black Chevrolet Cavalier and introduced Ward to “Tony,” who was 
seated in the front passenger’s seat.  Ward testified that he shook Tony’s hand and 
then spoke to Washington for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes until 
Washington and Tony drove away.  Ward identified appellant as the man that 
Washington had introduced as Tony.  During cross-examination, defense counsel 
sought to cast doubt on Ward’s identification of appellant.  During questioning, the 
following exchange took place: 
 
“Q.  Do you remember telling McKeever — 
 
“MR. HECK:  I’m going to object now even though he didn’t get to finish 
what he’s going to quote. 
 
“THE COURT:  Let me see counsel at side Bench. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“THE COURT:  Let’s make a record.  First of all, let’s have your complete 
question. 
 
“MR. MONTA:  Okay.  The question which we would like to ask this witness 
was if he gave an oral statement to Major McKeever, Major Ronald McKeever, 
with the Jefferson Township Police on the 5th of February, 1989, and did he say to 
Major McKeever he did not pay any attention to the other man in the car whose 
name was Tony. 
 
“MR. HECK:  I object.  If he wants to cross-examine him on an alleged 
inconsistency in the statements, written statements, that’s fine.  But, my reading of 
the written statements there is not that inconsistency.  He is trying to cross-
examine this witness on either a made-up statement or on something that’s in the 
police report, which they have, and I object. 
 
 
33
 
“THE COURT:  First of all, under Rule 16, the police report is not available.  
Secondly, the copy of the statement given to the Court made by this witness on the 
5th of February, and McKeever as the officer signing it, has nothing to do with this 
question.  It does not contain any reference to the question before the Court; 
therefore, the question has to be solely caused by this police report, and so the 
Court will sustain the objection. 
 
“MR. MONTA:  May I just add, your Honor, the question which would be 
asked is one in which the defense is attempting to test the credibility of what the 
witness has said and answer will either be consistent with or impeach that 
testimony. 
 
“THE COURT:  Police reports are inherently inaccurate and that is the very 
reason why under criminal rule 16 they are not to be made available and not to be 
used on cross-examination of any witnesses.  On that basis, the Court sustains the 
objection.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The court of appeals in its 1991 decision in this matter found that the trial 
court had erred by denying defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine Ward 
on the alleged prior inconsistent statement, finding that “[w]hether evidence is 
discoverable under Crim.R. 16 has no bearing on its [admissibility],” since such 
evidence could be relevant, and all relevant evidence is generally admissible.  
Chinn, Montgomery App. No. 11835, unreported, at 73.  The court of appeals 
found that the question defense counsel propounded “did not concern a police 
report, but a prior statement of the witness to a police officer,” and that “Ward’s 
statements to Officer McKeever concerning ‘Tony’ were certainly relevant to his 
identification of Appellant.”  Id.  Therefore, the court of appeals determined, “To 
the extent that [Ward’s statements to McKeever] might contradict Ward’s trial 
testimony they were proper grounds for impeachment.”  Id.  Additionally, the court 
of appeals stated, “Appellant was prohibited by Evid.R. 613(B) from introducing 
 
 
34
evidence of the inconsistent statement in extrinsic form, that is, by way of 
McKeever’s testimony or his written report, unless Ward was first afforded an 
opportunity to explain and deny the same.  The trial court’s ruling foreclosed that 
opportunity.  The error was prejudicial if the prior statement could reasonably 
cause the jury to reject Ward’s testimony.”  Id. at 73-74.  However, on the issue of 
prejudice, the court of appeals determined that “the error was not so prejudicial as 
to require reversal.”  Id. at 74. 
 
Upon a review of the record, we find that the error, if any, in the trial court’s 
decision not to permit defense counsel to cross-examine Ward on the alleged prior 
inconsistent statement did not unfairly prejudice appellant.  After the trial court had 
sustained the objection to the question propounded by defense counsel, the defense 
questioned Ward whether he had ever “talked to McKeever about the description 
of the man on the passenger’s side” of Jones’s automobile.  Ward responded, “I 
don’t remember at all.”  Later, during the cross-examination of Major McKeever, 
defense counsel was permitted to question McKeever concerning the statements 
that Ward had allegedly made on February 5, 1989: 
 
“Q.  Now, you also did some investigation in this case; did you not? 
 
“A.  Yes, sir. 
 
“Q.  And before you interviewed Marvin Washington, did you not interview 
a person by the name of Christopher Ward? 
 
“A.  Yes, sir.  I did. 
 
“Q.  In fact, you interviewed him first; is that correct? 
 
“A.  That’s correct. 
 
“Q.  On the same day, the 5th of February? 
 
“A.  I can’t recall the day.  I probably would have to see my report. 
 
“ * * * 
 
 
35
 
“Q.  This starts at page 12, which was provided to us.  Is that your 
statement? 
 
“A.  Yes, that’s mine. 
 
“Q.  All right. 
 
“A.  That was on the same day. 
 
“Q.  And was Mr. Ward able to give you a description of the person that he 
said he saw, the other person, not Marvin Washington? 
 
“A.  Very — he indicated to me that he — well, he did see the driver. 
 
“Q.  Right. 
 
“A.  And shook hands with him, but he was more interested in the car they 
were driving, the dashboard. 
 
“Q.  Didn’t he indicate to you that he didn’t pay any attention to the other 
person? 
 
“A.  Yes, sir, meaning that he spoke to the gentleman but he was more 
interested in the dashboard of that particular automobile. 
 
“Q.  More interested in the dashboard and didn’t pay any attention to the 
other person? 
 
“A.  Correct.” 
 
During redirect examination, the prosecutor questioned McKeever 
concerning the police report.  The prosecution asked McKeever, “I’m going to ask 
you, they [the defense] asked you about the statement and what Christopher Ward 
told you.  They asked you this on cross-examination, about the second person, the 
passenger, this Tony in the car, and I believe Mr. Monta asked about paying 
attention to him.  Was that your conclusion or is it his words?”  McKeever 
responded, “That was my conclusion.”  The prosecution also asked, “Did Mr. 
Ward tell you at all times that he could identify the passenger in that car?”  
McKeever responded, “Several times.”  The prosecution then asked, “Did he also 
 
 
36
tell you that he saw the passenger and shook hands, in fact, with the passenger in 
the victim’s car along with Marvin Washington?”  McKeever replied, “That’s 
correct.” 
 
The record is clear that defense counsel had an opportunity to impeach 
Ward’s trial testimony during cross-examination of McKeever by questioning 
McKeever concerning Ward’s alleged prior inconsistent statement that he “didn’t 
pay any attention” to the man who was with Washington in the victim’s car.  The 
record is equally clear that Ward never made any such statement to McKeever.  
Rather, the statement at issue was McKeever’s own statement and was the product 
of McKeever’s own conclusions.  In actuality, Ward specifically told McKeever 
that he had seen “Tony” and that he could positively identify him.  Ward did 
positively identify appellant, and he did so on three separate occasions, i.e., once 
from a photo array, once at the lineup, and again at trial.  Therefore, the alleged 
inconsistent statement, even if Ward had made it, was not inconsistent with any of 
Ward’s trial testimony.  We think it obvious that the trial court’s decision not to 
allow defense counsel to cross-examine Ward concerning the statement had no 
prejudicial impact whatsoever.  The error, if any, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
In this proposition, appellant also claims that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it refused to admit into evidence the composite sketch of the 
murder suspect during defense counsel’s cross-examination of Marvin Washington 
and Shirley Cox.  Defense counsel requested that the exhibit be admitted into 
evidence at that time so that the composite sketch could be shown to the jury 
during the cross-examination of these two witnesses.  However, R.C. 2945.03 
provides that “[t]he judge of the trial court shall control all proceedings during a 
criminal trial, and shall limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of 
counsel to relevant and material matters with a view to expeditious and effective 
 
 
37
ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters in issue.”  Here, the trial court 
admitted the composite sketch into evidence at the close of the state’s case-in-chief 
and the jury considered it in deliberations.  The trial court’s decision not to admit 
the exhibit at an earlier time does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
 
Accordingly, appellant’s thirteenth proposition of law is not persuasive. 
XV 
Proposition of Law No. XIV 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court 
gave unnecessary instructions to the jury in the guilt phase on the law of aiding and 
abetting and on the subject of prior calculation and design.  Appellant argues that 
the jury was instructed that “he could be found guilty as an accomplice to capital 
murder,” and that “he could be death eligible on the two felony murder 
specifications as either the principal offender, or if not the principal offender, by 
prior calculation and design.”  We reject appellant’s arguments for two reasons.  
First, appellant’s arguments have been waived.  Second, on the merits, appellant 
has failed to demonstrate plain error. 
 
With respect to the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the law of 
accomplice liability, we find that the record does not support appellant’s 
contentions.  The prosecution never wavered from its theory that appellant was the 
principal offender in the aggravated murder of Jones and, more importantly, 
neither the state nor appellant proffered any evidence suggesting that someone 
other than appellant was the principal offender.  The jury obviously did not find 
appellant guilty of the aggravated murder of Jones on the theory of accomplice 
liability, since the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that appellant was the 
principal offender in the aggravated murder.  Moreover, having reviewed the trial 
court’s instructions as a whole, we find that the trial court did not specifically 
instruct the jury on accomplice liability in connection with the aggravated murder 
 
 
38
charge.  Furthermore, contrary to appellant’s assertion, this instruction was not 
unwarranted, since the evidence tended to show that appellant, while the principal 
offender in the aggravated robbery of Welborn, was an aider and abetter in the 
aggravated robbery of Jones.  Accordingly, we find no plain error with respect to 
the trial court’s instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting. 
 
As to appellant’s arguments concerning the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
specifications, we also find no error, plain or otherwise.  It is not error for a trial 
court to “instruct the jury on prior calculation and design and principal offender 
status disjunctively in the same specification, as the court did here.”  Burke, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 405, 653 N.E.2d at 248.  Appellant does argue, however, that the trial 
court should have instructed the jury on the need to be unanimous concerning 
which of the two alternatives (principal offender or prior calculation and design) 
was applicable.  However, appellant never specifically requested such an 
instruction.  Additionally, given the evidence at trial, which showed either that 
appellant was the principal offender in the aggravated murder or that he had 
committed no offense at all, it is clear to us that the jury unanimously determined 
that appellant was the principal offender in the aggravated murder of Jones.  See, 
also, our discussion in Part II, supra.  Therefore, the lack of instruction on the need 
for unanimity does not rise to the level of plain error. 
XVI 
Proposition of Law No. XV 
 
In his fifteenth proposition of law, appellant questions other aspects of the 
trial court’s guilt phase jury instructions.  However, we have reviewed the jury 
instructions as a whole and find appellant’s objections not persuasive. 
XVII 
Proposition of Law No. XVI 
 
 
39
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give the requested 
“Telfaire instruction” concerning identification testimony.  See United States v. 
Telfaire (C.A.D.C.1972), 469 F.2d 552, 558-559.  The use of such an instruction is 
a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Guster 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 272, 20 O.O.3d 249, 252-253, 421 N.E.2d 157, 161.  
Here, the trial court gave a modified version of the Telfaire instruction that, in our 
judgment, was more than adequate on the facts of this case. 
XVIII 
Propositions of Law Nos. XVII, XIX, XX, and XXV 
 
Appellant acknowledges that these propositions of law (Nos. XVII, XIX, 
XX, and XXV) raise issues that we have previously addressed and rejected in a 
number of our prior cases.  Therefore, appellant concedes that these four 
propositions of law may be summarily rejected on authority of State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus, assuming that our position on 
the issues has not changed.  Our position on these issues has not changed.  
Therefore, we summarily reject these four propositions of law. 
XIX 
Proposition of Law No. XVIII 
 
The arguments raised in appellant’s eighteenth proposition of law are not 
supported by a fair and impartial review of the record.  Nothing in the trial court’s 
penalty phase instructions or in its response to the jury’s questions supports 
appellant’s assertion that “[t]hese instructions, when taken as whole, created a 
‘reasonable likelihood’ that Davel Chinn’s jury was precluded from considering all 
of his nonstatutory [i.e., R.C. 2929.04(B)(7)] mitigation in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.” 
XX 
Proposition of Law No. XXI 
 
 
40
 
Appellant’s twenty-first proposition of law concerns alleged victim-impact 
evidence that was heard by the trial judge after the jury was discharged but 
immediately before the trial court pronounced sentence on all of the crimes 
appellant was found guilty of committing.  Appellant claims that the evidence 
included an expression of opinion by Brian Jones’s mother that appellant should be 
sentenced to death.  However, Mrs. Jones never specifically stated her opinion as 
to the appropriate punishment.  Rather, she stated that “now we feel that the time 
has come for [appellant] to be punished according to the law of Ohio.”  Appellant 
also complains that Mrs. Jones stated or implied that appellant was incapable of 
rehabilitation.  However, the record does not fully support appellant’s claims in 
this regard.  Moreover, and in any event, there is absolutely nothing in the record 
to suggest that the trial court was influenced by irrelevant factors in sentencing 
appellant for the capital crime.  Therefore, we find no reversible error here. 
XXI 
Proposition of Law No. XXII 
 
In his twenty-second proposition of law, appellant argues that he was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel during the trial court proceedings.  
Several of appellant’s arguments under this proposition of law have been waived.  
Nevertheless, we have considered all instances of alleged ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel.  We find that appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington 
(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
XXII 
Proposition of Law No. XXIII 
 
Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of errors at the trial court level 
deprived him of a fair trial and a reliable sentencing determination.  We reject 
 
 
41
appellant’s contention in this regard.  Appellant received a fair trial and a fair and 
reliable sentencing determination. 
XXIII 
Proposition of Law No. XXIV 
 
Appellant also argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel in the court of appeals.  We find no merit to appellant’s contentions.  The 
fact that appellate counsel was able to persuade the court of appeals to reverse the 
death sentence on two separate occasions over the course of the years is a 
testament to the effectiveness of appellant’s counsel.  None of the instances of 
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel compels reversal here. 
XXIV 
 
Having considered appellant’s propositions of law, we must now 
independently review the death sentence for appropriateness (also raised in 
appellant’s Proposition of Law No. II) and proportionality (also raised in 
appellant’s Proposition of Law No. III).  We find that all specifications of 
aggravating circumstances of which appellant was found guilty (two under R.C. 
2929.04[A][7] and one under [A][3]) were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We specifically reject appellant’s Proposition of Law No. II, wherein 
appellant argues that our independent assessment of the evidence should lead us to 
conclude that the aggravating circumstances were not proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Washington’s testimony clearly chronicled the crimes and the conduct in 
which he and appellant engaged.  His testimony was compelling proof of the 
existence of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification of the aggravating circumstance 
that appellant killed Jones to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment 
for another offense.  Appellant told Washington after the murder that he shot Jones 
“because he didn’t have enough money and he could identify * * * us to the 
police.”  Washington’s trial testimony also fully supported the two R.C. 
 
 
42
2929.04(A)(7) 
specifications 
of 
aggravating 
circumstances. 
 
Moreover, 
Christopher Ward identified appellant as the person named “Tony” he had seen 
with Washington shortly after the murder.  Gary Welborn, the surviving victim of 
the robbery, identified Washington as one of the two perpetrators.  Welborn 
testified that the armed assailant who was with Washington “said we’d better have 
at least a hundred dollars between us or he’d kill us both.”  Shirley Cox identified 
“Tony Chinn” as the man police were looking for after she saw the composite 
sketch printed in the newspaper — the composite that was created as a result of 
Washington’s description of the gunman.  Both Washington and Ward were able to 
positively identify appellant in a photo array, at a lineup, and at trial.  Although 
Washington had waited until immediately after the lineup to actually inform police 
that appellant was in the lineup, his reasons for so doing were understandable and 
do not detract from his identification of appellant.  With respect to appellant’s 
defense, none of the defense witnesses directly contradicted the state’s evidence, 
except for appellant’s mother.  Overall, the alibi defense was weak and 
unpersuasive.  The evidence in this case compellingly supports a finding of guilt 
on each of the three specifications of aggravating circumstances.  We are 
convinced of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
For purposes of our independent review, however, we will consider only the 
single (merged) aggravating circumstance that was considered by the trial court on 
remand from the court of appeals and that was considered by the court of appeals 
in its own independent review of appellant’s death sentence.  Thus, we consider the 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification of the aggravating circumstance premised on 
aggravated robbery — i.e., that appellant shot and killed Brian Jones during the 
course of an aggravated robbery — which is clearly shown on the record before us. 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense reveal nothing of any mitigating 
value.  During the penalty phase, appellant presented no evidence regarding the 
 
 
43
mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(6), and our review 
of the record reveals that these factors are inapplicable here. 
 
In mitigation, appellant presented evidence concerning his history, character, 
and family background.  Appellant’s father was murdered in 1972.  Appellant’s 
grandmother testified that appellant, as a child, was “[v]ery emotionally upset” 
over his father’s death.  She also testified that appellant is deeply devoted to his 
nieces and nephews and to his entire family.  Appellant’s brother and sister 
testified that appellant helped them spiritually and that he is close to his family and 
helpful to family members.  Appellant’s mother, Anna Lee, testified that appellant 
was born in 1957.  Lee testified that appellant, during childhood, had no 
disciplinary problems and was a “[v]ery sensitive” and “active child.”  According 
to Lee, appellant became even more sensitive following his father’s death.  During 
childhood, appellant read from the Bible, believed in God, and was devoted to his 
family members.  Lee testified that appellant had enrolled in Cambridge Technical 
Institute to better his life through education.  Appellant gave an unsworn statement 
in which he proclaimed that he was innocent.  Appellant stated that he had been 
involved in sports and certain civic organizations and activities during his 
childhood.  He expressed his belief in God, his devotion to family, and his 
bitterness over his father’s death.  Appellant claimed to be “a compassionate and 
concerned human being.”  He also indicated that he had enrolled in Cambridge 
Technical Institute to better himself and that he was proud of his accomplishments 
in school. 
 
Upon a review of the evidence in mitigation, we find that the evidence 
concerning appellant’s history, character, and background is entitled to some, but 
very little, weight in mitigation.  Specifically, we find that appellant’s support and 
devotion for his family, his helpfulness to others, and his efforts toward education 
are entitled to some, but very minimal, weight in mitigation.  Appellant’s religious 
 
 
44
beliefs and his bitterness over his father’s death are also entitled to little or no 
weight in mitigation.  Appellant’s father died more than a decade before appellant 
committed this senseless and tragic murder of Brian Jones, an innocent victim who 
offered absolutely no resistance in the aggravated robbery.  Further, appellant’s 
belief in God obviously did not dissuade him from robbing and killing.  
Additionally, appellant’s assertions of innocence — a matter pertaining to the issue 
of “residual doubt” — are entitled to no weight in mitigation.  Residual doubt is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether appellant should be sentenced to death, State v. 
McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus, and we have 
absolutely no doubt of appellant’s guilt. 
 
Weighing the evidence presented in mitigation against the single R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance, we find that the aggravating 
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, 
the mitigating factors in this case absolutely pale in significance to the aggravating 
circumstance considered here. 
 
As our final task, we have undertaken a comparison of the sentence imposed 
in this case to those in which we have previously imposed the death sentence.  
Appellant’s death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate in comparison 
to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  See, e.g., State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482, which involved far more mitigating evidence than was 
presented in the case at bar.  We reject appellant’s Proposition of Law No. III, 
wherein appellant claims that his case is far different from cases in which we have 
previously imposed the death penalty for aggravated (felony) murder committed 
during the course of an aggravated robbery.  Appellant’s attempts to distinguish his 
crime from the crimes of others on the basis that he shot his victim only once and 
did not shoot the victim in the head, neck, chest, or other vital part of the body are 
completely unavailing.  Jones died as a result of the single shot appellant fired into 
 
 
45
his body during the course of an aggravated robbery.  The shot was fired at point-
blank range, and appellant specifically intended to cause the death of the victim.  
He pressed the muzzle of the revolver against the victim’s clothing and pulled the 
trigger, causing the projectile to rip into the upper portion of Jones’s arm and into 
his chest, where the projectile perforated the main pulmonary artery and came to 
rest near the base of Jones’s heart.  The single shot fired by appellant was just as 
effective in ending Jones’s life as the shot or shots that have been fired by other 
death-row inmates whose sentences we have affirmed for having killed their 
victims during the course of an aggravated robbery.  The fact that appellant shot 
Jones only once does not make appellant’s death sentence either excessive or 
disproportionate in comparison to those cases in which we have previously 
affirmed the death penalty. 
 
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals and uphold the sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. I:  When a jury is allowed to consider nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances because it receives inadequate guidance through a lack 
of instruction, or erroneous instruction during the penalty phase, and duplicative 
aggravating circumstances are not merged, the resulting death sentence is 
unreliable and cannot stand.  U.S. Const. Amend. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. II:  Where the aggravating circumstances are not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty in [sic] not appropriate. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. III:  The death sentence in appellant Chinn’s case is 
excessive and disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. 
 
 
46
 
“Proposition of Law No. IV:  The cumulative effect of prosecutorial 
misconduct throughout Chinn’s trial violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. V:  The accused’s rights to a jury trial, to due 
process, and to a reliable capital sentencing hearing are denied when the trial court 
fails to define an essential element of an aggravating circumstance, that makes the 
accused death eligible.  U.S. Const. Amend. VI, VIII, XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VI:  A trial court abuses its discretion when it 
allows the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and further allows 
inadmissible hearsay to be introduced in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VII:  A resentencing procedure in a capital case 
violates due process and infringes the defendant’s right against cruel and unusual 
punishment when, the defendant is resentenced to death without a recommendation 
by the trial jury that convicted him, and the resentencing court excludes relevant 
mitigation, and the resentencing court fails either to independently weigh the 
mitigation and aggravation or state the reasons why the aggravation outweighs the 
mitigation.  U.S. Const. Amend. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VIII:  Insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 
of aggravated murder is presented where the state relies entirely on the testimony 
of a co-defendant whose testimony is suspect, and reliable, independent evidence 
rebuts this testimony.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IX:  Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(1) 
(Anderson 1996) renders R.C. §§ 2929.04(A) and (B) unconstitutionally vague.  
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. X:  Where a jury, during its deliberations, 
communicates with the trial court, and the court, out of the presence of the parties, 
 
 
47
provides erroneous, substantive instructions to the jury, a new trial is warranted.  
(Bostic v. Connor [1988], 37 Ohio St.3d 144 [524 N.E.2d 881], approved and 
followed.) 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XI:  A capital defendant’s conviction and death 
sentence must be overturned where he was denied his right to a fair and impartial 
jury because the trial court unfairly limited his questioning, refused to conduct 
individual sequestered voir dire, and failed to excuse jurors who could not be fair 
and impartial.  U.S. Const. Amends. VI, VIII, and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XII:  In order for a capital defendant to be assured 
equal protection and due process of law, the trial court must see that the state 
complies with all discovery rules and turns over exculpatory material before trial.  
Where there are indications that the state is not complying with these rules, the 
prosecutor’s file must be sealed for appellate review.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIII:  The accused’s rights to due process, to a fair 
trial, and to confrontation are denied when the trial court denies the accused an 
opportunity to challenge the identification testimony of the state’s witnesses.  U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIV:  A jury should not be instructed that the 
defendant may be found guilty as an accomplice to aggravated murder when the 
evidence adduced at trial does not reasonably support that instruction.  Whenever 
the jury is charged that a capital defendant may be found guilty as the principal 
offender, or as an accomplice acting with prior calculation and design, the 
defendant is entitled to [a] unanimous verdict on one of those alternative theories.  
U.S. Const. Amend. VI, VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XV:  A jury instruction that shifts the burden of 
proof on the mens rea element of any offense to the accused, or reduces the state’s 
burden of proof, violates the Due Process Clause.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
 
 
48
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVI:  The accused is denied due process and a fair 
trial when the trial court fails to give a jury instruction that informs the jury of the 
problems with identification testimony.  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVII:  The accused’s right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated when the state 
is permitted to convict upon a standard of proof below proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVIII:  Constitutional error results when the trial 
court’s penalty phase instructions keep the jury from considering nonstatutory 
mitigating factors.  U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIX:  A capital defendant’s right to a reliable and 
nonarbitrary death sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is 
violated when the sentencing jury’s responsibility for its verdict is attenuated by 
the trial court’s instructions. 
 
“Proposition of Law [No.] XX:  A capital defendant’s right to reliable 
sentencing under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution is violated when the trial court refuses to instruct the jury that it may 
consider mercy in its penalty phase deliberations. 
 
“Proposition of Law [No.] XXI:  It is constitutional error for the trial court to 
consider victim impact evidence in capital sentencin[g] in the form of an opinion 
by a victim’s family member about the defendant’s inability to be rehabilitated and 
about the proper punishment for the defendant.  U.S. Const. Amend. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law [No.] XXII:  The accused’s right to the effective 
assistance of appointed counsel is denied when counsel’s errors and omissions 
undermine confidence in the result of the trial.  U.S. Const. Amend. VI and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XXIII:  The defendant is entitled to a new trial 
when the cumulative effect of trial error renders the conviction unreliable, and 
 
 
49
when the evidence against the defendant is not overwhelming.  U.S. Const. 
Amend. VIII, XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law [No.] XXIV:  The appellant’s right to due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated by the 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the court of appeals. 
 
“Proposition of Law [No.] XXV:  Ohio’s death penalty laws are 
unconstitutional.  The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution establish the requirements for a valid death penalty 
scheme.  Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sections 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 2929.022, 
2929.023, 2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05 (Anderson 1996).  Ohio’s death penalty 
statute does not meet the prescribed constitutional requirements and is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to appellant Chinn.”