Title: State v. Aiken

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Aiken (2003-126); 177 Vt. 566; 862 A.2d 285

2004 VT 96

[Filed  23-Sep-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 96

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-126

                               JUNE TERM, 2004

  State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	District Court of Vermont, 
                                       }	Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit
                                       }	
  Alvin Aiken	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 1489-9-02 FrCr

                                                Trial Judge: Michael S. 
                                                             Kupersmith

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant Alvin Aiken appeals his conviction for grossly
  negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  Defendant claims that the trial
  court erred by advising the jury, in response to a jury question during
  deliberations, that the gross negligence charge did not refer to the
  specific conduct described in the information, but rather to defendant's
  conduct generally while operating his vehicle on the day in question.  We
  reverse and remand.

       ¶  2.  Defendant's conviction arose from his encounter with state
  game wardens George Scribner and Robert Lutz.   During the evening of
  August 29, 2002, the game wardens responded to a complaint that someone was
  spotting deer in a field.  The complaint mentioned a reddish colored pickup
  truck with two people in it.  As the wardens proceeded to the reported
  site, a red pickup driven by defendant  passed their vehicle going in the
  opposite direction.  Warden Lutz turned his vehicle around and followed the
  pickup.  He turned on the vehicle's blue lights and briefly activated the
  siren.  The  pickup accelerated, and the wardens continued the pursuit on
  dirt roads, at speeds of up to sixty-five miles per hour.  Warden Scribner
  repeatedly instructed defendant to stop through the truck's public address
  system, but defendant continued on, his pickup fish-tailing, and the back
  end of the vehicle bouncing completely off the ground as it sped down the
  dirt road.  When the pickup spun around and headed towards the wardens'
  vehicle, warden Lutz tried to force defendant off the road by hitting the
  back end of the truck.  The pickup went into a ditch, but defendant was
  able to drive out of it.  After a further chase, warden Lutz backed off
  from active pursuit, but continued following the vehicle's tracks on the
  wet dirt.
   
       ¶  3.  Eventually, the wardens followed defendant to a narrow dead
  end road, the Jones Road.  Defendant's vehicle had turned around and was
  slowly approaching the wardens' vehicle.  Warden Lutz placed his vehicle in
  a manner that he hoped would block the pickup's way.  Nevertheless, as the
  wardens were getting out of their truck, defendant accelerated and passed
  the wardens' vehicle on the driver's side.  According to warden Lutz, the
  pickup passed within inches of him, forcing him to run to get out of the
  path of the vehicle.  Warden Lutz then fired a shot at the right rear tire
  of the truck. 

       ¶  4.  Using the pickup's plate number, the wardens located
  defendant at his home.  Defendant admitted that he was the driver of the
  truck and was arrested.  Defendant was charged with grossly negligent
  operation, reckless endangerment, and failure to stop for a game warden. 
  The information on count I, the grossly negligent operation charge, alleged
  that defendant "operate[d] a motor vehicle . . . in a grossly negligent
  manner, to wit, drove his truck within inches of Warden Lutz, in violation
  of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(b)."  Similarly, count II alleged that defendant
  "recklessly engaged in conduct which may place another in danger of serious
  bodily injury, to wit, accelerated his truck toward Warden Lutz and nearly
  hit him, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1025."  The information on count III,
  failure to stop for a warden, merely cited the pertinent statute, 10 V.S.A.
  § 4521(a), without setting forth any specific conduct.

       ¶  5.  At trial, defendant testified that he initially did not stop
  for the warden because he was free under conditions of release and had no
  driver's license.  Defendant further stated that when he saw the wardens'
  truck approaching his pickup on Jones Road, he sped up and passed it
  because he was afraid that warden Lutz would hit his pickup as he had done
  earlier in the chase.  Defendant asserted that when he drove past the
  warden's truck on Jones Road warden Lutz was still in the driver's seat and
  the truck was still moving.  Jennifer Cole, who was a passenger in the
  pickup during the chase, also testified that warden Lutz was still in his
  vehicle when defendant drove by the wardens' truck.  Warden Scribner
  testified that he did not see how close the pickup came to warden Lutz or
  where Lutz was when defendant passed the truck.

       ¶  6.  In their closing arguments, both parties focused on the
  moment when defendant drove past the wardens' truck on Jones Road.  The
  prosecutor asked the jury to consider the nature of the action that
  defendant was charged with -"driving at the driver's side of the warden's
  vehicle at the warden after warden Lutz had gotten out."  Defendant
  conceded his guilt on the charge of failure to stop for a game warden, but
  disputed that he had put the warden at risk.  Citing testimony that
  questioned whether warden Lutz was outside the truck when defendant passed
  him on Jones Road, defense counsel asked the jury: "Was [the warden]
  outside of the truck?  Was he inside the vehicle when it was coming?  How
  close was he to it [?]  Did [defendant] see him there?"  Defense counsel
  stated that the focus "has to be right there on the two vehicles." 
  Moreover, defense counsel emphasized to the jury that the alleged gross
  negligence was that defendant drove at warden Lutz, and therefore "[y]ou
  [the jury] have to find that he perceived a risk to warden Lutz and ignored
  that risk."
   
       ¶  7.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows on the charge
  of grossly negligent operation: "[T]he State's Attorney alleges that
  [defendant] . . . operate[d] a motor vehicle on a public highway, to wit,
  Jones Road, in a grossly negligent manner, to wit, drove his truck within
  inches of warden Lutz."  Nevertheless, during its deliberations, the jury
  sent out the following written question: "Count I. 'in a grossly negligent
  manner' Does this refer specifically to the activities on Jones Rd. (To
  wit: driving within inches of Officer Lutz)?"  In response to the trial
  court's request for comment, defense counsel stated, "the information was
  specific . . . and that was the thrust of the State's case."  The
  prosecutor agreed, commenting, "the to wit gives the notice to the
  defendant what actions we are alleging violate the statute, so I think I
  would have to say that the answer to the jurors' question is yes."  Despite
  the parties' agreement, the trial court stated that "the jury need not
  confine itself to the language specifically in the information." 
  Accordingly, the court answered the jury question in the negative, advising
  the jury that the grossly negligent count referred to defendant's conduct
  generally in operating his vehicle.

       ¶  8.  Shortly after the court answered the question, the jury
  returned a guilty verdict on the charge of grossly negligent operation and
  a not guilty verdict on the reckless endangerment charge.  The jury also
  found defendant guilty of failing to stop for a warden, a charge not
  contested by defendant.  Defendant moved for a new trial, citing as error
  the court's answer to the jurors' inquiry.  The trial court denied the
  motion, relying on an unpublished memorandum decision of a three-justice
  panel of this Court holding that descriptive language added to an
  information does not necessarily add an essential element to the offense
  charged.  See State v. Belisle, No. 99-080 (Nov. 24, 1999).  In its written
  decision and order, the trial court rejected defendant's argument that it
  effectively permitted an amendment of the information.  According to the
  trial court, "[t]he real question raised by the Defendant is whether the
  information gave him notice that evidence of the entirety of his operation
  of his vehicle during the pursuit . . . could be considered by the jury." 
  The trial court reasoned that the information, read in connection with the
  affidavit of probable cause, fully advised defendant of the charged
  conduct.  The trial court further stated that defendant did not complain
  that he was surprised by the State's evidence because "[i]f nothing else he
  was required to deal with evidence of the chase in connection with [the
  attempt to elude the warden charge]."  This appeal followed.

       ¶  9.  On motion of a defendant, the court may grant a new trial if
  required "in the interests of justice." V.R.Cr.P. 33; State v. Turner, 2003
  VT 73, ¶ 11, 175 Vt. 595, 803 A.2d 122.  "The standard is intentionally
  broad so that the courts can ensure that trials are fair without
  necessarily having to pigeonhole the grounds into narrow and specific
  findings of error."  State v. Heath, 162 Vt. 618, 619,