Title: Bryson-Coles v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GREGORY BRYSON-COLES, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 192, 2018 
 
 
Respondent-Below, 
§ 
 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
Court Below—Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Case No.:  S1709016876 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 28, 2018 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
December 28, 2018 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 28th day of December, 2018, after careful consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The New Castle County Police arrested Gregory Bryson-Coles,1 who 
was then seventeen years old, and charged her with unlawfully entering Sarah 
Snow’s residence and stealing jewelry, clothing, footwear, and food. 
 
(2) 
The Family Court found Bryson-Coles delinquent of burglary in the 
second degree, theft exceeding $1,500, and criminal mischief less than $1,000 and 
                                         
1 The Court assigned this pseudonym to the Appellant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 
7(d).  Apparently, the Clerk’s office thought that the Appellant is a male.  From the record, it is 
apparent that she is not. 
2 
sentenced her to Level V confinement suspended for community supervision for 
twelve months with extended jurisdiction until she reaches her nineteenth birthday.  
The court also ordered that Bryson-Coles pay $2,150 in restitution to Snow. 
 
(3) 
On appeal, Bryson-Coles contends that the prosecution did not present 
sufficient evidence to support the Family Court’s determination that she committed 
the alleged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
(4) 
Where, as here, an appellant has unsuccessfully challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court, this Court reviews a similar appellate 
challenge de novo to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  In conducting this 
analysis, we recognize that it is the “sole province of the fact finder to determine 
witness credibility, resolve conflicts in testimony and draw any inferences from the 
proven facts.”3  Moreover, we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial 
                                         
2 Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774, 777 (Del. 2007) (citing Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 
1998)); see also Brown v. State, 1992 WL 135160, at *2 (Del. Mar. 11, 1992) (citing Williams v. 
State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1998)). 
3 Newman v. State, 942 A.2d 588, 595 (Del. 2008) (citing Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 
2005)). 
3 
evidence.4  Indeed, “[d]irect evidence is not necessary to establish guilt; 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient.”5 
 
(5) 
The trial record shows that Snow, upon returning to her residence on a 
late summer afternoon, noticed that the glass panes on her basement door were 
shattered around the doorknob.  Snow had been gone all day, but recalled that when 
she had left all the windows and doors were closed and locked. 
 
(6) 
Snow warily entered her residence to “look[] around to see . . . if it was 
a robbery . . . .”6 She noticed that the contents of her garage were in disarray and that 
her weed whacker was missing.  Her children’s shoes were also missing from a 
basket in the basement hallway.  On the second floor, Snow noticed that jackets and 
other clothes had been removed from the hall closet and that food was missing from 
the kitchen cabinets.  On the third floor, a pair of Allen Iverson sneakers was missing 
from the hallway closet.  In her bedroom, Snow noticed that clothes and sneakers 
were missing from her closet, a child’s chain was missing from the jewelry box on 
her dresser, and her teal hooded sweatshirt was no longer hanging on her door.  Snow 
also noticed that a jacket, a pair of jeans, and children’s shoes were missing from her 
son’s bedroom closet. 
                                         
4  Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1170 (Del. 1990)) (“[T]he fact that most of the State’s 
evidence was circumstantial is irrelevant; ‘the Court does not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence.’”). 
5 Wright v. State, 2001 WL 433456, at *3 (Del. Apr. 25, 2001); see Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 
1345, 1355 (Del. 1999) (quoting Shipley, 570 A. 2d at 1170). 
6 App. to Op. Br. A18. 
4 
 
(7) 
Thereafter, Snow contacted a friend for “moral support.”7  When the 
friend arrived, he touched the basement door handle to enter Snow’s townhouse.  
After she expressed to her friend that she believed her neighbor had committed the 
burglary, Snow confronted that neighbor—Bryson-Coles—at her residence.  Snow 
testified that Bryson-Coles appeared nervous and immediately became frustrated 
once she was accused.  When Snow asked her where she had been on the day of the 
burglary, Bryson-Coles said that she “just got home.”8  After this interaction, Snow 
contacted the police. A New Castle County police officer questioned Bryson-Coles, 
who told him that, contrary to what she had told Snow, she had remained home all 
day. 
(8) 
Snow testified that no one had permission to enter her townhouse on 
the day of the burglary.  She suspected that Bryson-Coles had committed the 
burglary because of their prior text messages and conversations. For instance, the 
day before the burglary, Bryson-Coles asked Snow when she would ordinarily leave 
and return from work.  And just a few weeks before the burglary, Bryson-Coles sent 
a text message to Snow asking whether she could have any of her shoes and 
specifically asked Snow if she owned “sneakers with black in them.”9  Additionally, 
Snow testified that Bryson-Coles had been in her bedroom prior to the burglary and 
                                         
7  Id. at A47–48. 
8 Id. at A68. 
9 Id. at A58. 
5 
had previously asked Snow if she could have her Allen Iverson sneakers, unused 
clothes, and New Balance sneakers for her daughter. 
 
(9) 
The New Castle County Police collected fingerprints from the exterior 
basement door and a glass nightstand in Snow’s bedroom.  The police matched the 
fingerprints on the basement door to Snow’s friend and matched the fingerprints on 
the nightstand to Bryson-Coles.  Snow testified that Bryson-Coles never touched her 
nightstand when she was in her bedroom prior to the burglary nor did she have a 
reason to touch it. 
 
(10) A few days after the burglary, police executed a search warrant at 
Bryson-Coles’ residence to seize her cell phone and to search for any items that 
Snow reported as missing.  Under a fire pit on Bryson-Coles’ back porch, officers 
found a plastic bag containing some of Snow’s missing items.  During a 
photographic identification, Snow confirmed that several items retrieved from 
Bryson-Coles’ residence, including several pairs of sneakers, a purse, and a hooded 
sweatshirt, belonged to her. 
 
(11) The data from Bryson-Coles’ cellphone revealed that Bryson-Coles had 
sent a text message to an acquaintance on the morning of the burglary stating that, 
once she put her daughter to sleep, she would “go to the girl[’s] house.”10  Bryson-
Coles then sent a follow-up text message stating, “I wanted you to come, but okay, 
                                         
10 Id. at A133. 
6 
what size sneakers you wear?”11  Later that day, Bryson-Coles received a text 
message asking whether “she have a lot upstairs?”  Shortly thereafter, Bryson-Coles 
replied that items were “in the hallway closet and in her room.”12 
 
(12) To support a conviction for burglary in the second degree, the State was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryson-Coles “knowingly 
enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime 
therein.”13  The felony theft conviction requires the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Bryson-Coles “t[ook], exercise[ed] control over or obtain[ed] 
property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or appropriate it” 
and that “the value of the property received, retained or disposed of [was] $1,500 or 
more.”14  Finally, the misdemeanor criminal mischief charge required proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Bryson-Coles “intentionally or recklessly damage[d] 
tangible property of another person” where the value of the property did not exceed 
$1,000.15 
 
(13) It is clear to us that the Family Court judge could have reasonably 
concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryson-Coles 
committed the crimes with which she was charged. 
                                         
11 Id. at A134. 
12 Id. at A133. 
13 11 Del. C. § 841(a)(1). 
14 11 Del. C. § 841(a), (c)(1). 
15 11 Del. C. § 811(a)(1), (b)(2)–(3). 
7 
 
(14) The evidence established through Snow’s testimony and an insurance 
loss report that the stolen property had a value in excess of the $1,500.  A fact-finder 
could reasonably infer that the person responsible for the unauthorized removal of 
property from Snow’s residence had unlawfully entered the residence through the 
basement door.  Moreover, the Family Court could reasonably conclude from the 
discovery of some of the stolen property at Bryson-Coles’ residence, her prior 
interest in some of the stolen items, the text messages consistent with Bryson-Coles’ 
involvement, the presence of her fingerprints on Snow’s bedroom nightstand, her 
nervous reaction when confronted by Snow, and her inconsistent description of her 
whereabouts on the day of the burglary, that Bryson-Coles was the culprit.  This 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State was sufficient for the Family 
Court to have found the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Family Court’s adjudication 
of delinquency is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice