Title: State v. Hanson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2058-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Peter J. Hanson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 413,921 N.W.2d 517 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Judge 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Ana L. Babcock and Babcock Law, LLC, Green Bay. There 
was an oral argument by Ana L. Babcock. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Scott E. Rosenow. 
 
 
2019 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2058-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF41) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter J. Hanson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Peter Hanson ("Hanson") 
seeks review of the court of appeals'1 decision affirming the 
circuit court's2 denial of his postconviction motion.   
¶2 
Chad McLean ("McLean") disappeared on the night of 
February 22, 1998.  His body was found one month later in the 
Pensaukee River with four gunshot wounds to his head.   The case 
went cold until 2009 when Hanson's estranged wife Kathy Hanson 
                                                 
1 State v. Hanson, No. 2016AP2058-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018). 
2 The Honorable Michael T. Judge, of the Oconto County 
Circuit Court presided.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
2 
 
("Kathy") gave a statement to police implicating Hanson in 
McLean's murder.  In November 2012, a judge in Oconto County 
held a John Doe proceeding to further investigate McLean's 
murder.3  Hanson testified at that proceeding, made incriminating 
statements, and was subsequently charged with McLean's murder.  
Hanson was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.   
¶3 
Hanson challenges the admissibility at trial of 
portions of his testimony from the John Doe proceeding on two 
grounds.  First, Hanson contends that the admission of his John 
Doe testimony regarding Kathy's statement to police inculpating 
him in McLean's murder violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.  Second, Hanson claims his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his John 
Doe testimony because, at the time he testified, he was in 
                                                 
3 In 2011, a John Doe proceeding was convened, Oconto County 
Case No. 2011-JD-3, to investigate McLean's murder.  Wisconsin's 
John Doe proceeding, codified at Wis. Stat. § 968.26, "serves 
both as an inquest into the discovery of crime and as a screen 
to prevent 'reckless and ill-advised' prosecutions."  State ex 
rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 214 Wis. 2d 605, 
621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997).  "In order to commence a John Doe 
proceeding, the complainant, whether it be the district attorney 
or anyone else, must demonstrate to the John Doe judge 'that he 
has reason to believe that a crime has been committed within the 
jurisdiction.'"  State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. 
Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶85, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165 (quoted 
source omitted).  Section 968.26 gives a John Doe judge broad 
powers to determine the extent of the investigation and whether 
the investigation should be conducted in secret.  Id., ¶88.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
3 
 
custody on an unrelated matter and not read all of the Miranda 
warnings.4   
¶4 
We conclude that Hanson's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was not violated because his John Doe testimony 
regarding Kathy's statement to police was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.  We also conclude that 
Hanson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because 
the law was unsettled as to whether Miranda warnings were 
required at John Doe proceedings.  Finally, we determine as a 
matter of first impression that Miranda warnings are not 
required at John Doe proceedings.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On February 22, 1998, McLean and his friend Cory Byng 
("Byng") went to Byng's uncle's house for a cookout.  Hanson and 
his friend Chuck Mlados ("Mlados") also went to the cookout, 
arriving in a pickup truck driven by Hanson.  At around 9:30 or 
10:00 p.m., Hanson, McLean, and Mlados left Byng's uncle's 
house.  Hanson and Mlados alleged that they dropped McLean off 
at the Hi-Way Restaurant and Truck Stop on the way back to 
Hanson's house.  The restaurant surveillance footage from that 
night showed Hanson and Mlados buying beer at 9:53 p.m., but 
McLean was not seen in any of the footage.  At trial, six 
employees testified that they did not see anyone fitting 
McLean's description at the restaurant that night.   
                                                 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Approximately one month later, McLean's body was 
recovered in the Pensaukee River, 1.3 miles downstream from 
Hanson's house.  McLean had four gunshot wounds to his head.  
The case went cold for over a decade until 2009, when Kathy told 
police that Hanson had confessed to killing McLean.   
¶7 
In November 2012, Hanson, who was in custody at the 
Oconto County jail on charges unrelated to the homicide, was 
called as a witness to testify at a John Doe proceeding 
regarding McLean's murder.  Prior to questioning, the John Doe 
judge read Hanson most, but not all, of the Miranda warnings.5  
Hanson made incriminating statements at the proceedings.  In 
March 2013, the John Doe investigation was closed and the John 
Doe judge signed an order finding probable cause and authorizing 
the issuance of a criminal complaint.   
¶8 
At trial, the State introduced portions of Hanson's 
John Doe testimony.  Hanson objected on Confrontation Clause and 
                                                 
5 Miranda requires that "Prior to any questioning [of a 
person in custody], the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 
presence 
of 
an 
attorney, 
either 
retained 
or 
appointed."  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  It is undisputed that the John Doe 
judge informed Hanson that his testimony could be used against 
him in the John Doe proceeding or in another legal proceeding, 
that he had the right to have an attorney present during his 
testimony, and that he could stop the questioning in order to 
consult an attorney.  Hanson, No. 2016AP2058-CR, ¶6 n.2.  It is 
undisputed that the John Doe judge did not advise Hanson of his 
right to have counsel appointed if he could not afford to hire 
his own counsel.  Id.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
5 
 
hearsay grounds.6  The circuit court overruled Hanson's objection 
and held that the testimony qualified as an admission by a party 
opponent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b)1. (2017-18),7 and 
therefore was not hearsay and did not violate his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.   
¶9 
The jury also heard from three witnesses who testified 
that Hanson had confessed to killing McLean.  Kenneth Hudson 
testified that he had been Hanson's best friend and that about a 
month and a half after McLean's body was found, Hanson told him 
that he had shot McLean and dumped his body in the river.  Barry 
O'Connor, a friend of Hanson, testified that in 2008 Hanson told 
him that about ten years earlier he and Mlados had accidentally 
killed someone and dumped the body in a river.  O'Connor also 
testified that Hanson told him he had confessed the murder to 
Kathy, but that she could not testify against him because she 
was now dead.  Jeremy Dey testified that while he and Hanson 
were in the Oconto County jail together in 2013, Hanson told him 
that he had shot McLean and dumped his body in a river.  Dey 
further testified that Hanson told him Kathy had given the 
police a statement about McLean's murder that was against 
Hanson's interests. 
¶10 Hanson did not call any witnesses at trial and chose 
not to testify.  Hanson argued to the jury that the case against 
                                                 
6 Kathy died prior to the John Doe proceeding.   
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
6 
 
him was circumstantial and that the State had failed to meet its 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed 
McLean.   
¶11 During its deliberations, the jury asked the circuit 
court if it could review "anything that may pertain to Kathy 
Hanson's statement to the police."  The circuit court denied 
this request.  The jury ultimately found Hanson guilty of first-
degree intentional homicide as a party to the crime and he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. 
¶12 Hanson filed a postconviction motion seeking a new 
trial based upon, among other things, the alleged ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel.  At the Machner8 hearing 
regarding Hanson's claims, Hanson's trial counsel testified that 
he did not object to the admission of Hanson's John Doe 
testimony on Miranda grounds because he did not "believe that 
Miranda is applicable to a John Doe proceeding."  The circuit 
court denied Hanson's postconviction motion, concluding that 
"the colloquy between Peter Hanson and the Court satisfies any 
right that the defendant had to an attorney at a John Doe 
proceeding."   
¶13 Hanson appealed the denial of his postconviction 
motion and the circuit court's decision to overrule his 
objection regarding his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  
                                                 
8 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
7 
 
Hanson raised two issues on appeal:  (1) whether the circuit 
court improperly admitted his John Doe testimony regarding 
Kathy's statement to police in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation;9 and (2) whether his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to call any potentially exculpatory 
witnesses10 and for failing to object to the admission of his 
John Doe testimony on the grounds that he was not read all of 
the Miranda warnings at the John Doe proceeding.   
¶14 As to Hanson's Confrontation Clause claim, the court 
of appeals assumed without deciding that the circuit court's 
admission of Hanson's John Doe testimony was error.  State v. 
Hanson, No. 2016AP2058-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶13 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 18, 2018).  However, the court of appeals was 
"persuaded that any error in the admission of the challenged 
evidence was harmless because it duplicated other, unchallenged 
testimony."  Hanson, No. 2016AP2058-CR, ¶14.  Three witnesses 
testified that Hanson confessed to killing someone and dumping 
the body in a river.  Two witnesses testified that Hanson 
confessed the killing to Kathy and one witness testified that 
Kathy told the police Hanson killed McLean.  The court of 
appeals was not persuaded by the jury's request to see evidence 
regarding Kathy's statement to the police because the request 
                                                 
9 Hanson did not claim a violation of his right to 
confrontation in his postconviction motion, but this issue was 
preserved for review. 
10 Hanson did not request review of this claim on appeal to 
this court.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
8 
 
was denied and the jury heard about Kathy's statement through 
other unchallenged testimony.  Hanson, No. 2016AP2058-CR, ¶15.   
¶15 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
rejected 
Hanson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The court of appeals 
held that "[r]egardless of whether counsel was deficient for 
failing to object to the admission of [Hanson's John Doe] 
testimony on Miranda grounds, we are convinced that such error 
was 
not 
prejudicial 
to 
Hanson's 
defense." 
 
Hanson, 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR, ¶31.  Again, the court of appeals relied upon the 
fact that the John Doe testimony regarding Kathy's statement 
"merely duplicated other, unchallenged testimony."  Hanson, No. 
2016AP2058-CR, ¶32.  Hanson then petitioned this court for 
review.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We review Hanson's claims that his Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation was violated and that his trial counsel 
was ineffective.  Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was violated is a "'question of constitutional law 
subject to independent review.'"  State v. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 
¶15, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897 N.W.2d 363 (quoted source omitted).  
"We generally apply United States Supreme Court precedents when 
interpreting" the Sixth Amendment and the analogous Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Jensen, 2007 
WI 26, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.  
¶17 A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to 
effective assistance of counsel under both the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Wis. 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
9 
 
Const. art. I, § 7; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686 (1984) (holding that the right to counsel includes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel).11  "A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of 
law and fact."  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  We uphold the circuit court's 
findings of fact involving the circumstances of the case and 
trial counsel's conduct and strategy unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633-34, 369 
N.W.2d 711 (1985).  The final determination of whether counsel's 
performance 
satisfies 
the 
constitutional 
standard 
for 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  Id.  "To demonstrate that counsel's assistance 
was ineffective, the defendant must establish that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was 
prejudicial."  State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  
If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the analysis, 
we need not consider the other.  Id.   
                                                 
11 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence."  The Wisconsin Constitution provides:  "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.  This 
court has made clear that the test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel articulated by the United States Supreme Court applies 
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 235-36, 548 
N.W.2d 69 (1996).   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
10 
 
III. ANALYSIS  
¶18 We first consider Hanson's claim that his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation was violated.  We then 
determine whether Hanson's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the admission of his John Doe testimony on 
the grounds that he was not read all of the Miranda warnings at 
the John Doe proceeding.  Finally, we determine as a matter of 
first impression that Miranda warnings are not required at John 
Doe proceedings.   
A. Hanson's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was not violated. 
¶19 Hanson asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was violated when the circuit court admitted 
portions of his John Doe testimony into evidence at trial.  
"'The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions 
guarantee 
criminal 
defendants 
the 
right 
to 
confront witnesses against them.'"  State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, 
¶36, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811 (quoted source omitted).  
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court observed that the 
Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted."  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 
(2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).  
Therefore, a crucial aspect of the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, pursuant to Crawford, is that it "only covers 
hearsay, i.e., out-of-court statements 'offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.'"  United States v. 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
11 
 
Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2006).  It is well 
established that "out-of-court statements may be offered to 
prove innumerable relevant propositions apart from the truth of 
any matters (explicitly [or] implicitly[]) asserted."  7 Daniel 
D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 801.302 at 768 (4th ed. 2017); see State v. Medrano, 84 
Wis. 2d 11, 19-20, 267 N.W.2d 586 (1978) (reasoning that the 
testimony was properly admitted "because it was not offered for 
the 
truth 
of 
the 
statement"); 
Caccitolo 
v. 
State, 
69 
Wis. 2d 102, 107, 230 N.W.2d 139 (1975) ("the hearsay rule is 
inapplicable to out-of-court assertions . . . if the statement 
is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.")  
¶20 Our first inquiry, pursuant to Crawford, is to 
determine whether the testimony is hearsay.  The following 
relevant testimony was read to the jury: 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  Did you ever talk to your wife 
Kathy about Chad McLean's death?  
THE DEFENDANT:  Well, of course. We talked about it a 
lot. 
SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR: 
 
Okay. 
And 
at 
times 
Kathy 
confronted you and said you were responsible for Chad 
McLean's death?  
THE DEFENDANT:  No. She didn't do that until she was 
trying to put me away before she died. 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  Okay. But regardless of the 
timing, at some point Kathy Hanson confronted you and 
said you were responsible for Chad McLean's death? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Not to my face she didn't. She went to 
the police.  
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
12 
 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  At some point within the year 
before she passed away, isn't it a fact that Kathy 
confronted you about the Chad McLean death?  
THE DEFENDANT:  No. She never——we didn't talk about it 
anymore.  It wasn't until she kept trying to put me in 
jail for little stuff through my probation officer 
that then all the sudden she went to the police and 
accused me of——that she thought that I killed Chad 
McLean.  
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  But specifically she was telling 
people that you had shot Chad McLean?  
THE DEFENDANT:  Well, not that I know of.  
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  Well—— 
THE DEFENDANT:  She told the police.  
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  Who told you that she was saying 
that you killed Chad McLean?  
THE DEFENDANT:  [Detective Darren] Laskowski.   
.... 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  Question, have you ever told 
anybody that her dying was the best thing that ever 
happened to you? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yeah. 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:  How many people have you told 
that to? 
THE DEFENDANT:  A couple. 
¶21 Hanson's John Doe testimony presents three layers of 
out-of-court statements:  (1) Hanson's statement made at the 
John Doe proceeding about what Detective Laskowski told him; (2) 
Detective Laskowski's statement to Hanson about what Kathy told 
him; and (3) Kathy's statement to Detective Laskowski that 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
13 
 
Hanson killed McLean.12  The first layer is not at issue because 
the parties ultimately agree that Hanson's statement was an 
admission 
by 
a 
party 
opponent, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.01(4)(b)1., and not hearsay.    
¶22 The State asserts that Detective Laskowski's statement 
to Hanson forms the basis for the State's introduction of 
Hanson's John Doe testimony.  The State argues that Detective 
Laskowski's statement to Hanson, the second layer, was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show 
Hanson's consciousness of guilt.  If we accept the State's 
argument that Detective Laskowski's statement is not hearsay, 
the same argument applies to the third layer, Kathy's statement 
to Detective Laskowski.   
¶23 According 
to 
the 
State, 
Detective 
Laskowski's 
statement was not offered for the truth of whether Kathy 
actually told Detective Laskowski that Hanson killed McLean; 
but, rather, to show Hanson's belief that Kathy would testify 
against him.  Taken together with Hanson's statement that 
Kathy's death was the "best thing that ever happened" to him, 
the State claims there is an inference that Hanson was glad 
                                                 
12 The circuit court allowed this excerpt of the John Doe 
proceeding into testimony based on its conclusion that it 
qualified as an admission by a party opponent, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 908.01(4)(b)1.  The parties now agree that the second 
and third layer of out-of-court statements were not admissible 
under § 908.01(4)(b)1. 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
14 
 
Kathy was dead so she could not testify that he killed McLean.13  
Detective Laskowski's statement regarding what Kathy told him 
was thus offered to prove Hanson's consciousness of guilt and 
was not hearsay, as it is irrelevant whether Kathy actually made 
a statement to Detective Laskowski.   
¶24 Hanson asserts that because there is no overt link 
between his statement that Kathy's death was the best thing that 
ever happened to him and his knowledge that Kathy made a 
statement to Detective Laskowski, the State's assertion of 
consciousness of guilt is too attenuated.  Hanson gives a number 
of other reasons why he made the statement about Kathy's death, 
including that he believed that Kathy had an affair and that she 
was reporting "little stuff" to his probation officer in an 
attempt to put him in jail.  Hanson contends that the State's 
purported use of the testimony surrounding Kathy's statement to 
police was just a "ruse" to put Kathy's unconfronted testimonial 
statement before the jury.   
¶25 A mere claim that a statement is not offered for its 
truth is not enough to overcome a hearsay challenge to its 
admissibility.  "When the State proffers a statement for a 
nonhearsay purpose, close attention should be paid to the 
relevancy of, and need for, this use of the evidence."  Blinka, 
supra, § 802.302 at 828.  The question is not whether the 
                                                 
13  The State further points to the fact that the jury heard 
testimony about Hanson's confession to Kathy from multiple 
witnesses which Hanson did not object to on appeal.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence might be inadmissible hearsay if it is offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted; rather, the question is 
whether the evidence is offered for a legitimate reason other 
than for the truth of the matter asserted.  See  United States 
v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1971) (observing that 
"[r]elevant testimony relating an out-of-court conversation is 
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, even though it 
might be inadmissible hearsay if used to prove the truth of the 
facts asserted"); see also United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 
1248, 1260 (7th Cir. 1995);  Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 
799 F.2d 889, 895 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Hackett, 638 
F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (maintaining that the 
defendant's statements "were admitted not for their truth, but 
merely for the fact that the statements were made," which 
implied the defendant's consciousness of guilt.).   
¶26 A jury could infer that Hanson said that Kathy's death 
was the best thing that ever happened to him because he had 
heard from Detective Laskowski that she might be a witness 
against him in McLean's murder.  We accept the State's proffered 
purpose for Detective Laskowski's statement and conclude that it 
was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The 
same rationale applies to the third layer, Kathy's statement to 
Detective Laskowski, since whether Kathy actually told Detective 
Laskowski that Hanson confessed to her is discrete from Hanson's 
belief that she would testify against him.  There is therefore a 
legitimate nonhearsay purpose for the admission of Hanson's John 
Doe testimony that is relevant to the charge against Hanson for 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
16 
 
McLean's murder:  consciousness of guilt.  "[W]hen the State 
offers a statement for a proper nonhearsay purpose . . . it is 
neither 
hearsay 
(evidence 
law) 
nor 
testimonial 
hearsay 
(confrontation law)."  Blinka, supra, § 802.302 at 828.   
¶27 We conclude that Hanson's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was not violated because his John Doe testimony 
was offered to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and was not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Because the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to nonhearsay statements, 
Hanson's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
confrontation 
was 
not 
violated.14   
B. Hanson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails 
because the law was unsettled as to whether Miranda warnings 
were required at John Doe proceedings. 
¶28 Hanson asserts that his trial counsel was deficient 
for failing to object to the admission of his John Doe testimony 
on the grounds that he was not read all of the Miranda warnings.  
To establish that counsel's performance was deficient, the 
defendant must show that the performance fell below "an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness." 
 
See 
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶19.  In order to constitute deficient performance, 
the law must be settled in the area in which trial counsel was 
allegedly ineffective.  See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49 
(quoted source omitted) ("'[F]ailure to raise arguments that 
                                                 
14 Because we decide the statement was not hearsay, we need 
not decide whether the statement was testimonial, the next step 
in an analysis under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
17 
 
require the resolution of unsettled legal questions generally 
does not render a lawyer's services outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance sufficient to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment.'").  "'[I]neffective assistance of counsel 
cases should be limited to situations where the law or duty is 
clear such that reasonable counsel should know enough to raise 
the issue.'"  State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶29, 281 
Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583 (quoted source omitted).   
¶29 In his brief, Hanson "acknowledges that there is no 
binding authority requiring that all witnesses at a John Doe 
hearing be read Miranda warnings before being questioned."  
Hanson is correct that the law was unsettled.  Accordingly, 
trial counsel's failure to object to the introduction of 
Hanson's John Doe testimony on the grounds that he was not read 
all of the Miranda warnings at the John Doe proceeding cannot 
constitute deficient performance.  We conclude that because 
Hanson is unable to succeed under the first prong of the 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
analysis, 
deficient 
performance, we need not consider the second prong, prejudice.  
Breitzman, 
378 
Wis. 2d 431, 
¶37. 
 
Therefore, 
Hanson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.  
C. Miranda warnings are not required at John Doe proceedings. 
¶30 Whether Miranda warnings are required at John Doe 
proceedings is a matter of first impression.  We begin our 
analysis with the language and application of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Under Miranda, any statement made 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
18 
 
by a person in custody in response to interrogation by law 
enforcement officers must be suppressed if he or she has not 
been 
properly 
informed 
of 
their 
rights. 
 
"Custodial 
interrogation" set forth in Miranda, and reaffirmed in Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977), is defined as follows:  
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way."  Therefore, if 
questioning was not "initiated by law enforcement," or the 
person was not "in custody," Miranda warnings are not required.   
¶31 Because of the similarities between grand jury and 
John Doe proceedings,15 case law analyzing Miranda's application 
to grand jury proceedings is instructive.  In United States v. 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 566 (1976), a plurality of the United 
States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings are not required 
for grand jury witnesses.  The Mandujano Court explained that 
Miranda 
"simply 
did 
not 
perceive 
judicial 
inquiries 
and 
custodial interrogation as equivalents," as "the compulsion to 
                                                 
15 See Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 15-7:  
Grand Jury and John Doe Proceedings in Wisconsin (Mar. 2015)  
("Both grand jury and John Doe proceedings are independent 
inquiries into whether a criminal complaint should be issued in 
response to allegations of wrongdoing.").  Nevertheless, it is 
undisputed that John Doe proceedings "afford substantially more 
protection to a potential accused than does a grand jury."  
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 165, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977); see 
also State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 819, 266 N.W.2d 597 
(1978) (reasoning that a "John Doe is of a more restricted scope 
than a grand jury, limited basically to the subject matter of 
the complaint upon which the John Doe is commenced"). 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
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speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be 
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where 
there 
are 
often 
impartial 
observers 
to 
guard 
against 
intimidation or trickery."  Id. at 579 (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 461.)  The Court further emphasized that Miranda 
addressed "extrajudicial confessions or admissions procured in a 
hostile, 
unfamiliar 
environment 
which 
lacked 
procedural 
safeguards," which is distinguishable from the grand jury 
context.  Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 579.  Extending Miranda 
warnings to a grand jury witness "is an extravagant expansion 
never remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda," according 
to the Mandujano Court.  Id. at 579-80.   
¶32 In cases since Mandujano, the United States Supreme 
Court has suggested that Miranda warnings are not required to be 
read to grand jury witnesses prior to questioning.  In United 
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977), the Court noted 
that it had never held that Miranda applied to grand jury 
proceedings.16  In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, the 
Court held that a defendant did not need to be read Miranda 
warnings prior to speaking to his probation officer because he 
"was not 'in custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda 
protection." 
 
The 
Murphy 
Court 
repeatedly 
compared 
the 
                                                 
16 The Washington Court declined to resolve this issue 
because 
the 
defendant 
was 
read 
Miranda 
warnings 
before 
testifying at a grand jury proceeding.  United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977).   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
20 
 
defendant's situation to a subpoenaed witness at a trial or 
grand jury proceeding.  Id. at 427, 431-32.   
¶33 Relying on Mandujano, Washington, and Murphy, federal 
courts of appeals have also concluded that Miranda warnings are 
not required for grand jury witnesses.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1032 (10th Cir. 2017) (cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 436 (2017)); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 
350, 360–62 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gillespie, 974 
F.2d 796, 802-05 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that the United 
States Supreme Court "has explicitly distinguished the custodial 
nature of police interrogations from the grand jury context"); 
United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 307 (1st Cir. 
1989); Conley v. United States, 708 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 
1977).  As the Tenth Circuit aptly explained:  "a full-Miranda-
warning requirement would run counter to the Supreme Court's 
direction that grand-jury witnesses are not in custody while 
testifying, 
and 
that 
grand-jury 
questioning 
is 
not 
interrogation."  Williston, 862 F.3d at 1032.   
¶34 As in grand jury proceedings, a witness at a John Doe 
proceeding is not subject to custodial police interrogation.  A 
John Doe proceeding is convened by a judge for the purpose of 
determining if a crime has been committed.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26(2)(b); see also State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 
824, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) (emphasizing that a John Doe judge 
must "conduct himself as a neutral and detached magistrate in 
determining probable cause.").  While a district attorney often 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
21 
 
questions John Doe witnesses, this court has long recognized 
that the proceedings "are constantly under the scrutiny of a 
judge," who "does not act as 'chief investigator' or as a mere 
arm of the prosecutor."  State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners 
v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶86, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165 
(quoted source omitted) (emphasis in original).  Along with the 
statutory requirements of § 968.26, guidance for the John Doe 
judge is also given in the Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook and 
scripted material to address a witness is set forth in Special 
Materials 12 of the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions.  See 
Wis. Judicial Benchbook CR-48 (6th ed. 2019); Wis JI——Criminal 
SM-12 (2011). 17   
                                                 
17 For example, Special Materials 12 recommends that a John 
Doe judge address a witness using the following prompts:  
"If you believe that a truthful answer to any 
question asked of you would incriminate you, that is, 
subject you to criminal prosecution, you may refuse to 
answer the question on the grounds that it may 
incriminate you. Do you understand that?" 
"Do you understand that your answers to questions 
put to you may be used against you by this John Doe or 
in another legal proceeding?"  
. . . . 
"You are also advised that you have the right to 
have 
an 
attorney 
present 
with 
you 
during 
your 
testimony. . . ."   
Wis JI——Criminal SM-12 (2011).   
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
22 
 
¶35 Moreover, even if a witness at a John Doe proceeding 
is in custody relating to other charges at the time of the 
proceeding, they would not be compelled to confess for "fear of 
reprisal . . . or in the hope of more lenient treatment," as is 
the fear with custodial police interrogation and a "police-
dominated atmosphere."  See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 
296-97 (1990).  As the United States Supreme Court recently 
clarified, "service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is 
not 
enough 
to 
constitute 
Miranda 
custody," 
as 
"standard 
conditions of confinement and associated restrictions on freedom 
will not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Court 
sought to protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons 
subjected to custodial interrogation."  Howes v. Fields, 565 
U.S. 499, 512 (2012).  A witness at a John Doe proceeding is not 
subject 
to 
custodial 
interrogation 
and 
therefore 
Miranda 
warnings are not required.  Although we do not require Miranda 
warnings be given at John Doe proceedings,  we recommend a John 
Doe judge address a witness in accordance with Special Materials 
12.     
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook also encourages the John 
Doe judge to advise a witness on the record of their right 
against self-incrimination, that their testimony may be used to 
support issuance of a warrant, and that they have the right to 
consult an attorney before answering questions. See Wis. 
Judicial Benchbook CR-48 (6th ed. 2019). 
We note that the John Doe judge here read the script set 
forth in SM 12 almost verbatim.   
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
23 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We conclude that Hanson's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was not violated because his John Doe testimony 
regarding Kathy's statement to police was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.  We also conclude that 
Hanson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because 
the law was unsettled as to whether Miranda warnings were 
required at John Doe proceedings.  Finally, we determine as a 
matter of first impression that Miranda warnings are not 
required at John Doe proceedings.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. withdrew from participation. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP2058-CR   
 
 
 
1