Title: Hassan-El v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AKBAR HASSAN-EL, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 52, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN01-04-1576, -1581, 
§  and IN01-05-2004 
§  Cr. ID 0104010887 
§ 
 
Submitted: November 7, 2003 
  Decided: January 23, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 23rd day of January 2004, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Akbar Hassan-El, was convicted by a 
Superior Court jury of first degree reckless endangerment, possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, and resisting arrest.  The jury 
acquitted Hassan-El of carrying a concealed deadly weapon.  The Superior 
Court sentenced Hassan-El to a total period of ten years at Level V 
 
2 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving five years for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  This is Hassan-El’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Hassan-El's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Hassan-El's counsel asserts that, based 
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Hassan-El's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Hassan-El with a copy of the motion 
to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Hassan-El also was informed of 
his right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Hassan-El has raised 
several issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to the 
position taken by Hassan-El's counsel, as well as Hassan-El’s points, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that 
defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the 
law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of 
the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
 
 
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arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.1 
(4) 
In his response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Hassan-El has 
raised four discernable issues for the Court’s consideration.  First, Hassan-El 
asserts that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying defense 
counsel’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because the State’s evidence 
was insufficient to convict him on all or some of the charged offenses.  
Second, Hassan-El contends that the Superior Court erred i
n giving the jury 
an instruction on flight.  Third, Hassan-El contends that he was denied his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Finally, Hassan-El argues that the 
Superior Court erred by considering his then-pending capital murder charges 
in formulating its sentence on the present charges.  We review these claims 
seriatim. 
 
(5) 
On appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal, this Court makes a de novo determination of whether any rational 
trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2  Viewing the 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. 1998). 
 
 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the record fairly supports 
the following version of events.  On the evening of April 17, 2001, three 
undercover police officers were working together in the area of Fourth and 
Dupont Streets in the city of Wilmington.  Two of the officers testified at 
trial.  Both officers indicated hearing a verbal altercation across the street 
from where they were standing.  The officers saw two black males.  One of 
the men was dressed all in denim with a dark hooded shirt underneath.  The 
officers saw the man in denim fire several shots from a handgun.  The 
officers identified themselves, ordered the men to stop, and gave chase when 
the men began running.  Both officers testified that they saw the man in 
denim throw something as he ran.  Moments later, the officers apprehended 
the suspects.  
(6) 
 At trial, the officers identified Hassan-El as the man dressed in 
denim with the black hooded shirt.  Another officer testified regarding a gun 
that was recovered in the street adjacent to the sidewalk down which the 
suspects had fled.  Hassan-El testified at trial.  He admitted being at the 
scene with his friend.  He claimed that his friend asked him to hold some 
ammunition for him.  Hassan-El contended that it was his friend, not him, 
who fired the gun. 
 
 
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(7) 
The jury convicted Hassan-El of first degree reckless 
endangering, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and 
resisting arrest.  To prove the elements of the first two offenses, the State 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hassan-El recklessly engaged 
in conduct that created a substantial risk of death to another person by 
discharging a firearm in his possession.3  To prove the elements of resisting 
arrest, the State was required to prove that Hassan-El intentionally fled from 
police officers after he had been ordered to stop.4  Given the officers’ 
testimony that they saw Hassan-El fire a weapon in a residential 
neighborhood and that Hassan-El fled after the officers identified themselves 
and ordered him to stop, we conclude that a rational juror could have found 
Hassan-El guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the three charges.  It was 
entirely within the jury’s province as the trier of fact to credit the officers’ 
eyewitness identification of Hassan-El and to reject Hassan-El’s contention 
that he was not the individual who shot the gun. 5  Accordingly, we find no 
error in the Superior Court’s denial of Hassan-El’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal. 
                                                 
3 11 Del. C. §§ 604, 1447A. 
4 11 Del. C. § 1257. 
5 See Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
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(8) 
Hassan-El’s second argument is that the Superior Court erred 
by instructing the jury on flight.  No objection was made to this jury 
instruction at trial.  Accordingly, we review this claim on appeal for plain 
error.6  The challenged instruction informed the jury that “[e]vidence of 
evasion of arrest and flight is admissible in a criminal case as a circumstance 
tending to show identity and consciousness of guilt.” The Superior Court 
cautioned the jury that evidence of flight could not be considered for any 
other purpose than that stated.  The judge also told the jury that the evidence 
of flight must be considered in light of all the other facts proved and that the 
jury was solely responsible for determining the significance of the evidence.  
Under the circumstances, we find the Superior Court’s instructions on flight 
to be entirely appropriate.  Several witnesses testified that Hassan-El fled the 
scene after being ordered to stop.  Evidence of flight may be considered as 
tending to show consciousness of guilt.7  Accordingly, the Superior Court 
properly addressed the issue of flight within its instructions to the jury. 
 
(9) 
Hassan-El next complains that he was denied his right to a 
speedy trial.  In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his 
right to a speedy trial, the Court will consider all relevant circumstances, 
                                                 
6 See Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
7 Tice v. State, 382 A.2d 231, 233 (Del. 1977). 
 
 
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including the following four factors:  (a) the length of the delay; (b) the 
reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of t
he right to a speedy 
trial; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. 8  None of the four factors alone is 
“either a necessary or sufficient condition” to finding a deprivation of the 
right to a speedy trial.9 
(10) The length of the delay between Hassan-El’s arrest and trial in 
this case was over twenty months.  Although substantial, the reason for the 
delay is largely attributable to Hassan-El.  The record reflects that the week 
after his arrest on these charges in April 2001, he was released on bail but 
was subsequently re-arrested three months later on unrelated charges that 
included first degree murder.  The State argues that, for tactical reasons, 
defense counsel requested Hassan-El’s trial on the reckless endangering and 
related charges be postponed because of his pending capital murder charges.  
Hassan-El does not dispute this contention, nor does he dispute that he never 
raised a speedy trial concern below.  Furthermore, Hassan-El fails to assert 
that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay.  Under these 
circumstances, we find no merit to Hassan-El’s speedy trial claim. 
                                                 
8 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002). 
9 Id. (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972)). 
 
 
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(11) Finally, Hassan-El complains that the prosecutor improperly 
presented, and the Superior Court improperly considered, his capital murder 
charges at sentencing.  In reviewing a sentence that is within statutory limits, 
as Hassan-El’s sentence is, this Court will not find error unless it is clear 
from the record below that a sentence has been imposed on the basis of 
demonstrably false information or information lacking a minimal i
ndicia of 
reliability.10  Even if we assume that the trial court considered Hassan-El’s 
pending murder charges at sentencing in this case, which is an assumption 
unsupported by the record,11 it was within the Superior Court’s broad 
discretion to consider any relevant information relating to Hassan-El’s 
behavior, including pending criminal charges unrelated to the conduct for 
which he was convicted.12  Accordingly, we find no merit to this claim. 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Hassan-El’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
                                                 
10 Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836, 840 (Del. 1999) (quoting Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 
839, 843 (Del. 1992)). 
11 In pronouncing sentence, the Superior Court reflected upon the evidence 
presented at trial and the seriousness of the crime involved, which involved the 
indiscriminate, repeated firing of a gun in a residential area.  The judge noted that 
Hassan-El was “very, very fortunate standing here and not having killed somebody with 
what you did in this case.”  There is nothing to reflect that the judge considered any 
information beyond the specific facts of this case in sentencing Hassan-El within the 
statutory limits on the present charges. 
12 See Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 85 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
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appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Hassan-El's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Hassan-El could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice