Title: STATE v HOFFMAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14812 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, BONNIE LEE HOFFMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable Jack L . Green, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Garnaas, Hall, Riley & Pinsoneault, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: October 1, 1981 Decided: January 14, 1 9 8 2 Filed: J A N 14 1 9 8 2 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The d e f e n d a n t , Bonnie Lee Hoffman, was charged w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide under s e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA, based on her f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e medical a t t e n t i o n f o r her three-year-old son. She was c o n v i c t e d a f t e r a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, and r e c e i v e d a ten-year suspended s e n t e n c e . Bonnie Lee Hoffman m e t Kinley Dobson i n 1974 when t h e y were b o t h l i v i n g i n Cut Bank, Montana. T h e d e f e n d a n t was s i x t e e n a t t h e t i m e ; Dobson was twenty-four and m a r r i e d . The d e f e n d a n t became p r e g n a n t by Dobson, and on February 1 6 , 1975, t h e i r son, Chad, was born. Dobson and t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t g e t married a t t h i s time b u t continued t o s e e one a n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l l y over t h e n e x t few y e a r s . Dobson and t h e d e f e n d a n t had a v o l a t i l e and v i o l e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p , which ended w i t h t h e d e a t h of t h e i r young c h i l d . I n August 1977, Dobson and t h e d e f e n d a n t m a r r i e d . They l i v e d t o g e t h e r i n Missoula, Montana, where d e f e n d a n t had a j o b a s a key-punch o p e r a t o r a t a bank. She worked from about 2:00 p.m. u n t i l 10:OO p.m. Dobson was unemployed and s t a y e d a t home w i t h t h e i r two-year-old s o n , Chad. A f t e r about a month, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a g a i n t u r n e d v i o l e n t . Dobson f r e q u e n t l y t h r e a t e n e d t h e d e f e n d a n t and p h y s i c a l l y abused both her and t h e c h i l d . I n December 1977, a f t e r d e f e n d a n t had s t a y e d w i t h f r i e n d s and i n a s h e l t e r f o r b a t t e r e d women, s h e d i v o r c e d Dobson. Dobson, n e v e r t h e l e s s , c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e a t t h e defen- d a n t ' s apartment, s t a y i n g w i t h Chad w h i l e d e f e n d a n t worked. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e could n o t make Dobson l e a v e . She had t r i e d t o l o c k him o u t of t h e house, b u t he always f o r c e d h i s way back i n by coming through t h e windows o r p i c k i n g t h e lock on t h e d o o r . On February 22, 1978, Chad was t a k e n t o t h e h o s p i t a l by Dobson. Chad's body was covered w i t h numerous b r u i s e s . H e had a s e v e r e l y d i s t e n d e d stomach and was showing no s i g n of l i f e . The c h i l d was pronounced dead a t t h e h o s p i t a l . The c a u s e of h i s d e a t h was extreme shock r e s u l t i n g from a r u p t u r e d stomach. I n s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e p o l i c e and i n her own t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t o u t l i n e d t h e r o l e s h e played i n Chad's d e a t h . When s h e woke up a t about 1 1 : O O a.m. on February 22, Chad seemed f i n e . She s a i d t h a t s h e gave t h e c h i l d h i s l u n c h , i n c l u d i n g some cake. Defendant r e c a l l e d t h a t Dobson became angry because s h e had g i v e n Chad cake when he had n o t f i n i s h e d h i s sandwich. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t while s h e was watching t e l e v i s i o n , Dobson was whispering what s h e assumed were t h r e a t s t o t h e boy and t h e boy responded by y e l l i n g , "No! No!" and h i t t i n g Dobson. Then t h e boy y e l l e d , "Mommy, my tummy h u r t s . " Defendant l e f t f o r work a t about 2:00 p.m. t h a t a f t e r n o o n . Dobson c a l l e d her a t work a t about 3:00 p.m. s a y i n g t h a t Chad had been vomiting. Defendant t o l d Dobson t o g i v e Chad some Pepto-Bismol. A t about 4:15 t h a t a f t e r - noon, Dobson c a l l e d a g a i n saying t h a t Chad had f a l l e n down some s t a i r s while r i d i n g h i s t r i c y c l e and was h u r t badly. Defendant d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t Chad was h u r t b a d l y because Dobson c a l l e d her a t work many times each day, t r y i n g t o persuade her t o come home. Dobson would g e n e r a l l y s a y t h a t s h e should come home because Chad was h u r t . The d e f e n d a n t t o l d Dobson s h e would be home f o r her break a t 5:00 p.m. Defendant r e t u r n e d home about 4:50 t h a t a f t e r - noon. Chad was c o n s c i o u s b u t p a l e . H e had blood on h i s nose and mouth, and h i s stomach was swollen. Chad went limp when t h e d e f e n d a n t p l a c e d him i n h i s h i g h c h a i r and looked, according t o d e f e n d a n t , "exhausted" and "uncomfortable. " Also, a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t , he was a b l e t o d r i n k a s m a l l amount of Seven-Up. Not r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t Chad was s e r i o u s l y ill, defen- d a n t when back t o work a t approximately 5:30 p.m. A s soon a s s h e a r r i v e d a t work, s h e r e c e i v e d a message t h a t Dobson had c a l l e d and he was t a k i n g Chad t o S a i n t P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l . Defendant c a l l e d t h e h o s p i t a l t o make s u r e t h a t Dobson was t h e r e and t h e n l e f t . Chad showed no s i g n s of l i f e when Dobson brought him i n t o t h e h o s p i t a l a t 6:00 p.m. The d o c t o r s i n t h e emergency room t r i e d t o r e v i v e t h e boy, b u t a t 6:45 p.m. Chad was d e c l a r e d l e g a l l y dead. The d o c t o r on d u t y a t t h e emergency room when Chad was brought i n t e s t i f i e d t h a t Chad had b r u i s e s on n e a r l y e v e r y p a r t o f h i s body--his l e g s , b u t t o c k s , back, f a c e and arms--and t h a t he was i n extreme shock. The d o c t o r f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t f o r t y - f i v e minutes p r i o r t o Chad's a r r i v a l a t t h e h o s p i t a l , it would have been obvious t h a t he was s e r i o u s l y ill. A p a t h o l o g i s t performed an autopsy on t h e c h i l d ' s body t h e day a f t e r h i s d e a t h . The p a t h o l o g i s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e b r u i s e s on t h e c h i l d ' s stomach were about t h e same age a s t h e o t h e r s and had occurred two t o f i v e hours b e f o r e d e a t h . The l a r g e b r u i s e on t h e c h i l d ' s stomach, a c c o r d i n g to the pathologist, was caused by a blunt force. The pathologist further testified that there was evidence of prior injuries both to the child's skull and stomach. Defendant raises two issues on review: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that she was guilty of negligent homicide because she failed to provide medical attention for her small child; and (2) whether the District Court erred by admitting into evidence color slides of the dead child taken by the pathologist prior to the autopsy. Because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict and because the probative value of the slides out- weighed any prejudicial effect, the defendant's conviction is affirmed. Under section 40-6-211, MCA, a parent entitled to custody of a child must provide the child with support and education suitable to his circumstances. In State v. Mally (1961), 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868, we concluded that the failure to obtain medical aid for one who is owed a duty is a sufficient degree of negligence as to constitute involun- tary manslaughter, provided death results from a failure to act. 366 P.2d at 872. Likewise, in State v. Bischert (1957 ) , 131 Mont. 152, 308 P. 2d 969, we noted that an omis- sion to perform an act required by law can be the basis for manslaughter. See also, State v. Parmenter (1968), 74 Wash.2d 343, 444 P.2d 680; Palmer v. State (1960), 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467; and for a discussion of homicide based on failure to provide medical attention see, 100 A.L.R.2d 483. The defendant here would be guilty of negligent homicide if, by failing to provide medical attention for her son, she d i s r e g a r d e d a r i s k of which s h e should have been aware, and t h e r i s k was s o g r e a t t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d it was a g r o s s devi- a t i o n from a r e a s o n a b l e s t a n d a r d of conduct. See s e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA, and s e c t i o n 45-2-101(37), MCA. The f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g Chad's d e a t h s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g t h a t defendant g r o s s l y d e v i a t e d from a r e a s o n a b l e s t a n d a r d of c a r e when s h e f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e medical a t t e n - t i o n f o r her three-year-old son. D e f e n d a n t ' s own t e s t i m o n y , t h e testimony of t h e d o c t o r s i n t h e emergency room, and t h e testimony of t h e p a t h o l o g i s t show t h a t on February 22, 1978, Chad was s e r i o u s l y ill a t 5:00 p.m. when d e f e n d a n t came home f o r her break. According t o t h e emergency room d o c t o r s , t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of Chad's i n j u r i e s would have been obvious t o anyone. F u r t h e r , t h e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t had Chad been brought t o t h e h o s p i t a l w h i l e c o n s c i o u s and a b l e t o d r i n k l i q u i d s , i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d h i s l i f e could have been saved. By d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of Chad's i n j u r i e s - - t h e b r u i s e s on h i s body, h i s vomiting, t h e blood on h i s nose and mouth, t h e d i s t e n t i o n o f h i s stomach, h i s p a l l o r and t h e d i l a t i o n of h i s eyes--defendant a c t e d n e g l i g e n t l y w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 45-2-101(37), MCA. Defendant r e f u s e d t o acknowledge t o h e r s e l f t h a t Chad was s e r i o u s l y ill. The r e c o r d shows ample proof of Chad's obvious need f o r medical c a r e and d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e it. Defendant n e x t contends t h a t t h e admission of c o l o r s l i d e s t a k e n by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t p r i o r t o t h e autopsy were t o o p r e j u d i c i a l and were submitted o n l y t o a r o u s e t h e sympathies of t h e j u r y . Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h e c o l o r s l i d e s were n o t n e c e s s a r y s i n c e t h e b l a c k and white photo- g r a p h s of t h e c h i l d t a k e n by a policeman a t t h e h o s p i t a l were sufficient to show Chad's death. Citing State v. Bischert, supra, defendant claims the color slides should have been excluded. It is well established in this state that the trial court has the discretion to allow into evidence duly veri- fied photographs to aid the jury in its fact-finding process. State v. Mackie (1981), - Mont. - , 622 P.2d 673, 38 St.Rep. 86. As we stated in the often-quoted case of Fulton v. Choteau County Farmers' Co. (1934), 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025, 1029: ". . . photographs stand on the same footing as diagrams, maps, plans, and the like, and as a general rule, whenever relevant to de- scribe a person, place, or thing, they are admissible for the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the court and jury in understanding the case." Here, because the color slides showed the extent of Chad's injuries more clearly than the black and white photographs, they helped the jury to determine the reason- ableness of the defendant's actions. While we found that admission of the color slides in Bischert was reversible error, we emphasized that failure to provide medical care was not in issue. Here, the defendant's failure to provide medical attention is the central and con- trolling issue. Further, the pathologist in Bischert said he did not need the colored slides to explain his findings. Here, the pathologist explicitly testified that he preferred to use his own color slides in order to be as accurate as possible. The color slides are therefore admissible since their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect they may have had. See State v. O'Donnell (1972), 159 Mont. 138, 496 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. We concur: