Title: STATE v PERRY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14446 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- FRED PERRY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Byron Boggs argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris D. Tweeten, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana James J. Masar, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted: January 30, 1979 DecidedqEF 1 F, :q79 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a weapon by a prisoner and one count of aggravated a s s a u l t . H e w a s convicted of both counts following a t r i a l by jury i n Powell County i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable Robert J. Boyd, presiding. Xe appeals. This case arose o u t of a prison a l t e r c a t i o n i n which inmate Anthel Brown sustained severe i n j u r i e s . Brown and defendant had fought on a t l e a s t one occasion p r i o r t o t h e January 15, 1978, i n c i d e n t which r e s u l t e d i n t h e f i l i n g of t h e s e charges. According t o the testimony developed a t t r i a l , Brown confronted defendant when he entered t h e prison r e c r e a t i o n a r e a and showed him a sharpened f i l e . Defendant then walked t o t h e o t h e r end of t h e room and armed himself with a metal pipe. H e concealed t h e pipe i n h i s c l o t h i n g and disregarded an order from a prison o f f i c e r t h a t he s t o p t o be searched. Upon reaching Brown, he proceeded t o de- l i v e r numerous blows t o Brown's head and legs. Brown a l s o incurred s t a b wounds i n t h e c h e s t of undetermined o r i g i n . Defendant presents t h r e e i s s u e s on appeal, which can be summarized and s t a t e d a s follows: 1. Whether t h e j u r y ' s finding t h a t defendant was i n possession of a deadly weapon without lawful a u t h o r i t y i s supported by t h e evidence. 2. Whether defendant's conviction f o r t h e offense of possession of a weapon by a prisoner v i o l a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y prohibitions a g a i n s t double jeopardy. 3. Whether s e c t i o n 94-8-213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-8-318 MCA, i s unconstitutionally vague. Each of defendant's issues involves h i s conviction f o r t h e offense of possession of a weapon by a prisoner. Ad- dressing the f i r s t issue, defendant a s s e r t s t h a t the D i s - t r i c t Court erred by not granting h i s motion f o r a directed verdict made on the grounds t h a t the evidence was not s u f f i - c i e n t t o support the conviction. Defendant's argument is broken i n t o two parts. F i r s t , he a s s e r t s t h a t the metal pipe he possessed was not l i s t e d a s a deadly weapon i n section 94-8-213, R.C.M. 1947, now section 45-8-318 MCA, and was not " i n t r i n s i c a l l y a deadly weapon." Furthermore, defendant contends he needed no special authorization t o possess the pipe, and the S t a t e therefore f a i l e d t o prove t h a t he possessed the pipe "with- o u t law£ u l authority. " Section 94-8-213, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , now section 45-8-318 MCA, provides i n pertinent part: "Every prisoner committed t o the Montana s t a t e prison, who, while a t such s t a t e prison . . . possesses o r c a r r i e s upon h i s person o r has under h i s custody o r control without lawful authority, a d i r k , dagger, p i s t o l , revolver, slingshot, swordcane, b i l l y , knuckles made of any metal o r hard substance, knife, razor, not including a safety razor, o r other deadly wea- pon, is g u i l t y of a felony and s h a l l be punish- able by imprisonment i n the s t a t e prison f o r a t e r m not l e s s than f i v e ( 5 ) years nor more than f i f t e e n (15) years. Such term of imprisonment t o commence from the time he would have other- wise been released from said prison." (Empha- sis added.) For purposes of t h e "Criminal Code of 1973", "weapon" is defined i n section 94-2-101(65), R.C.M. 1947, now section 45-2-101 (65) MCA: "'Weapon' means any instrument, a r t i c l e , o r sub- stance which, regardless of -- its primary function, i s readily capable of being used t o produce death o r serious bodily injury." (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends t h a t a metal pipe does not f i t within t h e category of "other deadly weapon" a s it i s intended i n s e c t i o n 94-8-213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-8- 318 MCA. A review of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given t o t h e jury, however, reveals t h a t t h e jury w a s i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e meaning of t h e term " b i l l y " . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 read: " ' B i l l y ' means a club." W e f i n d t h a t t h e metal pipe wielded by defendant was c l e a r l y a club within t h e common under- standing of t h a t t e r m . A s a r e s u l t , w e need not reach t h e question of what may be included i n t h e phrase "other deadly weapon" a s it appears i n t h e s t a t u t e . Nor does t h e record support defendant's contention t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove h i s possession of t h e pipe was without lawful authorization. I n substance, Burt S o l l e , t h e prison r e c r e a t i o n d i r e c t o r , t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant could possess t h e t o o l s necessary t o complete a job without "spe- cial authorization" while working on t h e job. However, he d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t defendant had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o possess t h e m e t a l pipe under a l l circumstances. Furthermore, prison o f f i c e r Frank Knadler t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant's possession of t h e pipe f o r purposes o t h e r than i t s use as a weight bar o r t o o l was a v i o l a t i o n of prison regulations. F i n a l l y , defendant's conduct i n hiding t h e bar under h i s c l o t h i n g and ignoring an order t o submit t o a search i n d i c a t e s t h a t he knew he w a s exceeding h i s lawful a u t h o r i t y i n possessing t h e pipe. With r e s p e c t t o h i s double jeopary claim, defendant ar- gues t h a t t h e charge of possession of a weapon by a prisoner c o n s t i t u t e d , under t h e f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t case, an of- fense included i n t h e charge of aggravated a s s a u l t . Section 95-1711 (2) (a) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-11-502 MCA, addresses t h e double jeopardy p r i n c i p l e advanced by defendant: " ( 2 ) When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of more than one o f f e n s e , a person charged with such conduct may be prosecuted f o r each such offense. H e may not, however, be con- v i c t e d of more than one offense i f : " (a) one o f f e n s e i s included i n t h e o t h e r ; 'I Section 95-1711 (1) (b) (i) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46- 11-501(2)(a) MCA, d e f i n e s a n "included offense". It provides: " ( b ) A n o f f e n s e i s an included o f f e n s e when: " (i) it is e s t a b l i s h e d by proof of t h e same o r less than a l l t h e f a c t s required t o e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of t h e offense charged;" I t appears then t h a t two d i s t i n c t elements, n o t ele- ments of t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t , must be proved by t h e S t a t e t o s u s t a i n a conviction on a charge of posses- s i o n of a weapon by a p r i s o n e r . The S t a t e must prove (1) t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l involved was a p r i s o n e r a t t h e t i m e t h e o f f e n s e was committed, and (2) t h a t h i s possession of t h e weapon was unauthorized. Therefore, defendant's convictions do n o t v i o l a t e p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t double jeopardy. I n t h e f i n a l i s s u e presented by defendant, he a s s e r t s t h a t s e c t i o n 94-8-213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-8-318 MCA, is an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague s t a t u t e and t h e r e f o r e v i o l a t i v e of due process. The r u l e i n Montana is t h a t "unless [a s t a t u t e ] i s s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l i c i t s o t h a t a l l those s u b j e c t t o t h e p e n a l t i e s may know what t o avoid, it v i o l a t e s t h e e s s e n t i a l s of due process." S t a t e ex r e l . G r i f f i n v. Greene (1937), 104 Mont. 460, 467, 67 P.2d 995, 999. Section 94-8-213, now s e c t i o n 45-8-318 MCA, provides, among o t h e r things, t h a t unauthorized possession by a prisoner of a c l u b i s a punishable offense. A reasonable person would know possession of such an object is an offense only if it is possession without authorization. The conviction is affirmed. We Concur: Q. Justices i