Title: Paula Jean Hearndon v. Kenneth L. Graham

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC92665
____________
PAULA JEAN HEARNDON,
Petitioner,
vs.
KENNETH L. GRAHAM,
Respondent.
[September 14, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision passing upon the following certified question
of great public importance:
WHERE A PLAINTIFF IN A TORT ACTION BASED
UPON CHILD ABUSE ALLEGES THAT SHE
SUFFERED FROM TRAUMATIC AMNESIA
CAUSED BY THE ABUSE, DOES FULTON
COUNTY ADMIN. v. SULLIVAN, 22 FLA. L.
WEEKLY S578 [—So.2d —] (FLA.1997), PRECLUDE
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF AN EXCEPTION TO
OR A TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF
DELAYED DISCOVERY RECOGNIZED IN
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CHAPTER 92-102, LAWS OF FLORIDA?
Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The certified question concerns the
effect of our decision in Fulton County Administrator v. Sullivan, No. 87,110 (Fla.
opinion filed Sept. 25, 1997).  However, subsequent to the district court’s decision
in Hearndon, this Court reconsidered its original decision in Sullivan and rendered 
a decision on rehearing determining that the limitations period of a foreign
jurisdiction (rather than Florida’s) applied.  Thus, the discussion of Florida’s
statute of limitations in the earlier Sullivan opinion was no longer applicable.  See
Fulton County Adm’r v. Sullivan, 753 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1999).  The certified
question is therefore rephrased as follows:
WHERE A PLAINTIFF IN A TORT ACTION BASED
ON CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGES THAT
SHE SUFFERED FROM TRAUMATIC AMNESIA
CAUSED BY THE ABUSE, DOES THE DELAYED
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE POSTPONE ACCRUAL
OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION?
We answer the rephrased question in the affirmative and reverse the district court's
decision.   
The facts established by the district court and its ruling below are as follows:
Paula Jean Hearndon [filed a complaint in 1991]
against Kenneth Graham, Hearndon's stepfather, for
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injuries that resulted from sexual abuses he allegedly
committed upon her beginning in 1968 when she was 8,
and continuing until 1975 when she turned 15 (at which
time, according to the complaint, Graham allegedly
murdered Hearndon's mother).  The complaint was
dismissed with prejudice on the sole ground that the
alleged cause of action was barred, as a matter of law, by
the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(o),
Florida Statutes (1987).  Hearndon argued to the trial
court that it should apply the doctrine of delayed
discovery of an injury to toll the statute of limitations in
her case on the basis that, as an adult survivor of
childhood sexual abuse, she suffered from so-called
"traumatic amnesia," or a related syndrome [until
approximately 1988], caused by the abuses allegedly
perpetrated by Graham, thereby explaining why earlier
commencement of the action had not been possible.  The
trial court dismissed Hearndon's complaint citing the
Third District Court of Appeal's decision in  Lindabury v.
Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
Hearndon, 710 So. 2d at 87-88.  The First District held that the statute of limitations
was not tolled based on the delayed discovery doctrine in light of the fact that the
Legislature provided explicit tolling provisions that did not include delayed
discovery due to lack of memory.  See id. at 90.  We conclude that the doctrine
should apply to causes of action alleging subsequent recollection of childhood
sexual abuse.
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POSTURE
This case is before the Court based on the district court’s affirmance of the
trial court order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint.  In
reviewing the rephrased certified question, we do so from the perspective of
viewing petitioner’s complaint in a light most favorable to her case, and will
consider all facts and reasonable inferences to her advantage.  See Gladstone v.
Smith, 729 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review dismissed, No. SC00-
944 (Fla. May 3, 2000).  For the sake of our review, petitioner suffered childhood
sexual abuse that caused her to suppress or lose memory of the events for several
years; she later recalled the abuse and filed suit.  We do not pass on the merits of
whether she actually lost and then retrieved her memory of these alleged events, and
we do not pass on the reliability of any psychological techniques that may have
been employed in arousing her memory.
The district court recognized that there is credible medical support for the
proposition that many victims of childhood sexual abuse develop amnesia because
of the horrible nature of the abuse so that they completely lose or suppress the
memory for years, only to later recall the events as adults.  See Jocelyn B. Lamm,
Easing Access  to the Courts for Incest Victims:  Toward an Equitable Application
of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 Yale L. J. 2189, 2194 (1991).  The district
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court cited to the dissenting opinion in Lindabury v. Lindabury, which stated that:    
In my view psychiatry "represents the penultimate
grey area," Nesbitt v. Community Health of South Dade,
467 So.  2d 711, 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Jorgenson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part), particularly with
regard to issues of foreseeability and predictability of
future dangerousness. However, it does not necessarily
follow that this area of medicine cannot serve the courts
and litigants by providing useful testimony with respect to
past events.  Expert testimony regarding past acts and
their consequences can readily be evaluated by a fact
finder and considered with other evidence in the case to
determine whether the alleged repression in fact occurred
and, accordingly, whether the plaintiff ever had an
opportunity to bring an earlier action.  Repression,
moreover, can hardly be deemed a novel concept;  it
appears in the literature as early as the late 19th century
and is integral to any number of psychoanalytic theories.
552 So. 2d at 1118 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, we recognize that the
acceptance of theories supporting memory loss of childhood sexual abuse is a
disputed area of psychological study.  It is debated whether such memory loss
actually occurs or whether plaintiffs are coached into believing that such abuse
occurred by suggestions posed by psychologists.  For example, one law journal
article  advocated the application of the delayed  discovery doctrine in the case of
childhood sexual abuse based on view that:
The classic psychological responses to incest
trauma are numbing, denial, and amnesia.  During the
assaults the incest victim typically learns to shut off pain
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by "dissociating," achieving "altered states of
consciousness . . . as if looking on from a distance at the
child suffering the abuse."  To the extent that this defense
mechanism is insufficient, the victim may partially or fully
repress her memory of the assaults and the suffering
associated with them: "Many, if not most, survivors of
child sexual abuse develop amnesia that is so complete
that they simply do not remember that they were abused
at all; or . . . they minimize or deny the effects of the
abuse so completely that they cannot associate it with any
later consequences."  Many victims of incest abuse
exhibit signs of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
("PTSD"), a condition characterized by avoidance and
denial that is associated with survivors of acute traumatic
events such as prisoners of war and concentration camp
victims.  Like others suffering from PTSD, incest victims
frequently experience flashbacks and nightmares well into
their adulthood.
Lamm, supra at 2194 (footnotes omitted).  On the other hand, another author has
stated that 
Without some objective corroboration courts probably
ought not to allow delayed recall incest litigation, [Note
158] and thus avoid the . . .  task of attempting to sort out
‘retrieved’ recollections of actual events from similarly
retrieved fantasies.
. . . . 
[Note 158]:  A number of courts have taken this position.
See, e.g., . . . Peterson v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 25 (Nev.
1990) ("We recognize that injustice may result from our
ruling in instances where (childhood sexual abuse) has
occurred but cannot be demonstrated by corroborative
evidence that is clear and convincing. We are persuaded,
however, that the potential for fraudulent claims is
sufficiently great to warrant such a ruling."); State v.
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Hungerford, No. 94-S-045, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H.
Super. Ct., May 23, 1995) (holding that the repressed
memory of assaults shall not be admitted at trial because
the process of therapy used in these cases to recover the
memories is not scientifically reliable); S.V. v. R.V., 933
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996) (holding that expert opinions
regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse
could not meet objective verifiability element for
extending discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse case)
. . .  .
Edward Greer, Tales of Sexual Panic In the Litigation Academy:  The Assault on
Reverse Incest Suite, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 513, 553-54 & n.158 (1998)
(footnote 157 omitted).  Organizations have been founded to counter what is
believed by some to be the inappropriate use of psychology to invent “repressed”
memories of abuse: 
Repressed memory became headline news in November
1993 when Steven Cook accused Cardinal Joseph
Bernardin of sexually abusing him on the basis of a 
hypnotically recovered memory that Cook subsequently
recanted (Woodward 1994). More than 300 "retractors"--
individuals who, like Cook, first came upon their
memories of abuse in therapy and later realized them to
be false--have disavowed their initial accusations and
denounced recovered memory therapy (Macnamara 1995,
41). As of October 1994 more than 
17,000 families had contacted the False Memory 
Syndrome Foundation (FMSF) reporting false
accusations of childhood sexual abuse (Lindsay and 
Read 1995, 850).  To  its supporters, the FMSF seeks to
promote education and public awareness of the damage
that recovered memory therapy causes its patients and
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their families; to its critics, however, the FMSF represents
a backlash against the efforts of feminists and others to
expose and overcome the reality of child sexual abuse in
America. Because the ideological stakes are so high and
the sides of this debate have so little common ground,
repressed memory has become an extremely divisive
issue.
Richard A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction of Repressed Memory, 22
Law & Soc. Inquiry 653, 654 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  Thus, this Court must
acknowledge that even though many jurisdictions (as cited below) support the
application of the delayed discovery doctrine based on memory loss of childhood
sexual abuse, there is considerable disagreement relative to the nature of these
discovered memories. 
THE DELAYED DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
The "delayed discovery" doctrine generally provides that a cause of action
does not accrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the
tortious act giving rise to the cause of action.  See Hillsborough Community Mental
Health Ctr. v. Harr, 618 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1993); 35 Fla. Jur. 2d Limitations and
Laches § 60 (1996).  The United States Supreme Court applied the "blameless
ignorance" doctrine in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949), thereby
delaying the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff reasonably discovered the
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right of action, reasoning that "the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations . . .
require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the
invasion of legal rights."  Id.  This Court adopted the doctrine into Florida law as
the "delayed discovery" doctrine.  City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306, 309
(Fla. 1954).  See Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1992); Creviston v.
General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1969) (explaining that the
"accrual of the [underlying cause of action] must coincide with the aggrieved
party's discovery or duty to discover the act constituting an invasion of his legal
rights").  Thus, application of the delayed discovery doctrine to the accrual of a
cause of action and, therefore, to the running of a statute of limitation is not new to
Florida law.
CONFUSION SURROUNDING ACCRUAL 
AND TOLLING AS THEY RELATE TO 
THE DELAYED DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
The district court correctly identified a certain amount of confusion regarding
this Court’s application of the delayed discovery doctrine–sometimes the Court
stated that the doctrine delayed the “accrual” of the cause of action and other times
we stated that the doctrine affected the “tolling” of the statute of limitations.  See
Hearndon, 710 So. 2d at 90-91.  Compare Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 39
1 The interchangeable use of accrual and tolling seems to be due to loose usage rather than a
determination that the two principles have the same meaning given that there is no case that makes such
a determination and given that their distinct usage by the Legislature contradicts an identical meaning. 
As stated by the California Supreme Court when it recognized that California courts were similarly
stating accrual and tolling interchangeably:  Clarity of thought will be promoted by the proper use of the
words since they represent different principles.  See Cuadra v. Millan, 952 P. 2d 704, 710 (Cal.
1998).     
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(Fla. 1976)(holding that “the statute of limitations will be tolled when it can be
shown that fraud has been perpetrated on the injured party sufficient to place him in
ignorance of his right to a cause of action or to prevent him from discovering his
injury”), modified on other grounds, Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993);
and Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160, 165 (Fla. 1955) (explaining
that delayed discovery tolls running of statute of limitation); with Miami Beach First
Nat'l Bank v. Edgerly, 121 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1960) (holding that cause of action
by depositor against bank for bank’s wrongful payment on forged check
endorsement accrued when the depositor learned of the forgery); and City of Miami
v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954) (holding that “the statute must be held to
attach when the plaintiff was first put upon notice or had reason to believe that her
right of action had accrued”).1  As we explain below, however, the delayed
discovery doctrine may only be applied to the accrual of a cause of action.   
The determination of whether a cause of action is time-barred may involve
the separate and distinct issues of when the action accrued and whether the
2 The distinction in Florida law between accrual of a cause of action and the tolling of a statute
of limitation is mirrored in federal law.  Under federal law, a claim generally accrues “when all of the
events have occurred which fix the alleged liability of the defendant and entitle the plaintiff to institute an
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limitation period was tolled.  A statute of limitations "runs from the time the cause
of action accrues" which, in turn, is generally determined by the date "when the last
element constituting the cause of action occurs."  § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987).  See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996)(“[A] cause
of action cannot be said to have accrued, within the meaning of the statute of
limitations, until an action may be brought.”).  The "tolling” of a limitation period
would interrupt the running thereof subsequent to accrual.  See § 95.051, Fla. Stat.
(1987).  To that end, the Legislature enumerated specific grounds for tolling
limitation periods, but did not include delayed discovery due to lack of memory. 
See § 95.051(1), Fla. Stat. (1987).  Furthermore, the tolling statute specifically
precludes application of any tolling provision not specifically provided therein.  See
§ 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1987).  We extrapolate, therefore, that while accrual pertains
to the existence of a cause of action which then triggers the running of a statute of
limitations, tolling focuses directly on limitation periods and interrupting the running
thereof.  That both accrual and tolling may be employed to postpone the running of
a statute of limitations so that an action would not become time-barred should not
cause confusion between these distinct concepts.2  Thus, a determination of
action,”  Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
whereas “[t]olling, strictly speaking, is concerned with the point at which the limitations period begins to
run and with the circumstances in which the running of the limitations period may be suspended.” 
Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978).  
3 A report produced by the Legislature recognizes the discovery rule as applied to accrual of
cause of actions:
VI.  When does a cause of action accrue?
A. General rule.
(1)  The statute of limitations does not begin to run, of course,
until the cause of action sued upon accrues.  For the vast majority of
the cases, the action accrues when [an] event giving rise to damage
occurs.  Examples are:  when the trespass occurs on land, when a
contract is breached or repudiated, or when the collision occurs in an
auto accident.
B.  Special Problems.
(1)  Special problems arise in certain tort and fraud cases
where the plaintiff cannot readily discover the injury done to him.  In
these cases the action is delayed through no fault of the plaintiff and
should be given special consideration. 
Thomas E. Bevis, Florida Law Revision Council, Project on Statutes of Limitation:  Some Policy
Considerations (Apr. 8, 1972)(unpublished report held by Florida State Archives).
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whether a cause of action is time-barred pursuant to the expiration of a statute of
limitations may require two different analyses:   First, whether the cause of action
accrued and, if so, when; and, second, whether a statutory tolling provision applies. 
In light of the above distinction, we recognize that the Legislature limited the
justification for tolling limitation periods to the exclusion of delayed discovery due
to loss of memory, but did not likewise limit the circumstances under which accrual
may have been delayed.3  We therefore recede from our past decisions that applied
4 But see Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).  In Lindabury, the
plaintiff filed a complaint in 1985 alleging childhood sexual batteries that purportedly occurred from
1955 through 1965.  The plaintiff claimed that her memories of the batteries were repressed and then
"rediscovered" just prior to filing her complaint.  The third district held that the action was time-barred
by the statute of limitations, explaining that "[i]t is beyond contradiction that the alleged incestuous acts,
if taken as true, damaged the appellant at the time they occurred" and that the last alleged battery in
1965 marked the accrual of her cause of action.  See id. at 1117.
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the delayed discovery doctrine to toll the running of a statute of limitation.  The
Florida Statutes do not impede, however, the delay of the accrual of the cause of
action.4
APPLICATION
Numerous courts around the country apply the delayed discovery doctrine to
cases alleging childhood sexual abuse followed by a temporary loss of memory. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill.1988); Doe v.
Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (Ariz. 1998);  Evans v. Ecklman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610
(Ct. App. 1990);  Phinney v. Morgan, 654 N.E.2d 77, 79-80 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Ault v.
Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994).  Application of the doctrine to such cases
constitutes both the majority rule and the modern trend in American jurisprudence. 
See Doe, 955 P.2d at 960; Ault, 637 N.E.2d at 872.
Reasons in favor of application of the doctrine in the case of childhood
5 Creviston, 225 So. 2d at 331 (injury due to broken refrigerator door).
6 City of Miami, 70 So. 2d at 307 (injury due to x-ray treatment).
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sexual abuse are as follows.  First, it is widely recognized that the shock and
confusion resultant from childhood molestation, often coupled with authoritative
adult demands and threats for secrecy, may lead a child to deny or suppress such
abuse from his or her consciousness.  See Ault, 637 N.E.2d at 872 (citing Evans,
265 Cal. Rptr. at 606, 608)).  Second, the doctrine is well established when applied,
for example, in cases involving breach of implied warranty5 or medical
malpractice;6 it would seem patently unfair to deny its use to victims of a uniquely
sinister form of abuse.  Accordingly, application of the delayed discovery doctrine
to childhood sexual abuse claims is fair given the nature of the alleged tortious
conduct and its effect on victims, and is consistent with our application of the
doctrine to tort cases generally; thus, we hold that the doctrine is applicable to
childhood sexual abuse cases.
SECTION 95.11(7), FLORIDA STATUTES
The 1992 enactment of the delayed discovery doctrine to be employed in
cases of childhood sexual abuse does not apply in the instant case.  Section 95.11,
Florida Statutes (1999), provides that:
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For intentional torts based on abuse.--An action
founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s.
415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04,
may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the
age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person
leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years
from the time of discovery by the injured party of both
the injury and the causal relationship between the injury
and the abuse, whichever occurs later. 
§ 95.11(7), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Subsection (7) became effective on April 8, 1992,
pursuant to the Legislature’s enactment of chapter 92-102, section 1 of the Laws of
Florida.  Petitioner’s action precedes the effectiveness of the above statute since
the abuse alleged in this case occurred from 1968 to 1975 and the abuse was not
recalled until approximately 1988, and since petitioner filed her complaint in 1991.
       
CONCLUSION
We therefore hold that the delayed discovery doctrine applies to the accrual
of the instant cause of action based on a claim of childhood sexual abuse
accompanied by traumatic amnesia–keeping in mind that by our decision petitioner
survives respondent’s motion to dismiss.  However, our decision does not pass on
the factual development of the issue that will be addressed at trial.  We hereby
answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, quash the district court's
7  Petitioner raises a second issue in which she asserts that this Court should recognize the
common law tort of corruption of a child.  We decline to address this issue because it was not
addressed by the district court below and because it is outside the scope of the certified question.
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decision below, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.7
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
The alleged sexual abuse in this case began in 1968 and continued until 1975. 
The complaint alleged that complainant did not become aware of the abuse until
1990.
Though the majority’s analysis is extensive, the analysis fails to deal with the
very similar case of Wiley v. Roof, 641 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1994).  The district court
opinion does acknowledge Wiley and attempts to distinguish it.  I cannot agree that
Wiley is distinguishable.
I conclude that the Legislature recognized that Florida law barred this type of
cause of action, as stated by the majority in the Third District’s case of Lindabury
v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and for that reason adopted
the amendment to the statute of limitations of section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes, in
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1992.  However, this Court held in Wiley that this 1992 amendment did not revive
barred causes of action.  Therefore, the trial court’s decision that the statute of
limitations barred this cause of action was correct and should be approved.
HARDING, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
First District - Case No. 1D92-3842
(Alachua County)
Horace N. Moore, Sr., Gainesville, Florida; and Norm La Coe, Brighton, Colorado, 
for Petitioner
Michael W. Jones, Gainesville, Florida,
for Respondent